M 
 
 ;.*%<i<'
 
 iQAJljfri
 
 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Vol. I.
 
 HISTORY 
 
 or 
 
 PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 FROM THALES TO THE PRESENT TIME. 
 
 BY 
 
 DR. FRIEDRICH UEBERWEG, 
 
 LiTE PB0FES30B OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVEBSITY OF KONI08BS113. 
 
 tttansIatfU from tfje JTourtf) ffierman El}itto«, 
 
 BT 
 
 GEO. S. MORRIS, A.M., 
 
 PBOFBSSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVEB8ITY OF MICHIGAW. 
 
 Willi) aaoitians, 
 
 BT 
 
 NOAH PORTER, D.D., LL.D,, 
 
 PBESIDENT OP YAUE COLLEGE. 
 
 BY THE EDITORS OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY. 
 VOL. I.— HISTORY OF THE ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, 
 
 1889.
 
 AUTHORIZED TRANSLATION, 
 
 REVISED BY THE AUTHOR. 
 
 Entered according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1871, 
 
 By CHARLES SCRIBNER & CO., 
 In the OfBoe of the Librarian of CongreBS, at Washington. 
 
 Trow's 
 
 Printing and Booicbinding Co., 
 
 printers and bookbinders, 
 
 205-213 East 12th Si., 
 
 NEW VOKK.
 
 6 
 
 PUBLISHERS' NOTE. 
 
 The ^n-de adoption of Ueberweg's History of 
 Philosophy, as a text book iu the higher institutions 
 of learning, has induced the publishers to issue the 
 work in this smaller and less expensive form, in 
 order to bring it more generally within the reach of 
 students. 
 
 As now produced the work contains all the matter 
 of the original edition. 
 
 202£Ce3
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 Dr. Ueberweg's Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, in three parts, 
 was first published at Berlin, 1862 to '66. It met with such approval, not- 
 withstanding the competition with other able compends, that the first part 
 has already reached a fourth edition (1871). Since Tennemann's Afanual 
 (1812, 5th edition by Wend, 1829),* no work has appeared so well adapted 
 to meet the wants of students. Indeed, no work on the subject contains 
 such a careful collection of authorities and citations, or so full a bibliogra- 
 phical apparatus. The opinions of the various schools and their contrasted 
 principles, as well as the views of individual philosophers, are presented with 
 clearness and precision. This is the great value of the work. It is not writ- 
 ten, like some histories of philosophy, to propound or fortify the special 
 theories of the author. It shows a full mastery of the whole course of philo- 
 sophic thought, with independent investigations and criticisms. The various 
 systems are given, as far as possible, in the phraseology of their authors, and 
 this imparts variety to the style. It is eminently impartial. 
 
 The undersigned selected it as the best work with which to begin the philo- 
 sophical division of their proposed Library, after a full comparison of it with 
 other works of its class, and upon consultation with those best qualified to 
 judge about its merits. It is more concise than Ritter's General History ^ 
 and more full and authentic than Schwegler's Outline, which was first pre- 
 pared for an Encyclopaedia. The works of Fries, and Rixner, and Reinhold 
 have been supplanted by more recent investigations. Ritter's History of 
 Christian Philosophy (1858-'59), though very valuable, covers only a part 
 of the gi'ound, and presupposes some acquaintance with the sources which 
 Ueberweg so fully cites. The well-known history of Morell is restricted to 
 the later European systems. The able critical histories of modern philoso- 
 phy by Erdmann and Kuno Fischer are limited in their range, yet too ex- 
 tended for our object. The work with which we most carefully compared 
 Ueberweg's Treatise, was Professor Erdmann's Compend of the Whole History 
 
 * Translated by Rev. A. Johnson, revised and enlarged by T. R. Morell, London, 
 1852.
 
 VUl PREFACE. 
 
 of Philosophy ^ in two volumes (Berlin, 1866). This is the product of a master 
 of pliilosophic systems, and it is elaborate in method, and finished in style. 
 But it is perhaps better fitted to complete than to begin the study of the 
 History of Philosophy. Its refined criticisms and its subtle transitions from 
 one system to another, presuppose considerable acquaintance with recent Ger- 
 man spec\xlations. And Professor Erdmann himself generously expressed to 
 Dr. Schaff his appreciation of the special value of Ueberweg's Manual, say- 
 ing that he always kept it before him, and considered it indispensable ol. 
 account of its full literature of the subject. 
 
 This translation of TJeberweg appears under the sanction, and with the 
 aid of the author himself. He has carefully revised the proofs, and given to 
 our edition the benefit of his latest emendations. He did not survive to see 
 the completion of this work ; he died, after a painful illness of seven weeks, 
 June 7, 1871, at Konigsberg, while yet in the prime of his career. In re- 
 peated letters to Dr. Schaff, who conducted the correspondence with him, he 
 has expressed his great satisfaction with this translation, in comparison, too, 
 with that of his System of Logic (3d edition, Bonn, 1868), recently issued in 
 England.* His friend. Dr. Czolbe, wrote in behalf of his widow, that, " on 
 the day of his death, he carefully corrected some of the proof-sheets of this 
 translation, and was delighted with its excellency," 
 
 The work has been translated from the latest printed editions ; the First 
 Part, on Ancient Philosophy, is from the proof-sheets of the fovirth edition, 
 just now issued in German. For the Second and Third Parts, special notes, 
 modifications, and additions were forwarded by the author. 
 
 At our suggestion. Professor Morris has, in the majority of cases, trans- 
 lated the Greek and Latin citations ; retaining also the original text, when 
 this seemed necessary. A. long foot-note, § 74, on the recent German discus- 
 sions concerning the date and authorship of the Gospels, which was hardly in 
 place in a History of Philosophy, has been omitted with the consent of Dr. 
 TJeberweg. 
 
 Dr. Noah Porter, President of Yale College, has examined this translation 
 and enriched it by valuable additions, especially on the history of English 
 and American Philosophy. 
 
 The fu-st volume, now issued, embraces the first and second parts of the 
 original, viz.. Ancient and Mediaeval Philosophy ; the second and last volume 
 will contain the history of Modem Philosophy, with a full alphabetical index. 
 The sections have been numbered consecutively through both volumes. 
 
 * System of Logic and History of Logical Doctrines. By Dr. Friedrich TJeberweg, 
 Prof, of Phil, in the University of Konigsberg, Translated from the German, with 
 Notes and Appendices, by Thomas M, Lindsay, M.A., F.R.S.E., Examiner in Phi- 
 losophy to the University of Edinburgh. London : Longmans, Green & Co., 1871.
 
 PREFACE. IX 
 
 Besides this work, and his System of Logic, Professor Ueberweg was the 
 author of a treatise on IVie Development of Consciousness by Teachers, a 
 series of applications of Beneke's Theory of Consciousness, in didactic rela- 
 tions (Berlin, 1853) ; Investigations on tJte Genuineness ami Order of tJte 
 Platonic Writings, including a sketch of the Life of Plato, — a volume 
 crowned by the Imperial Academy of Vienna, 1861 ; De Frivre et Posteriore 
 Forma Kantiance Critices Pationis Puree, a pamphlet published at Berlin, 
 in 1862. The later labors of his life were chiefly given to his History of 
 Philosophy. In 1869 he published in J. H. von Kirchmann's PhUosophi- 
 sche Pibliothek, an excellent German translation of Bishop Berkeley's treatise 
 on the " Principles of Human Knowledge," with critical notes and illustra- 
 tions. This was, in part, the result of an animated metaphysical discussion ; 
 for there are even now German as well as English advocates of the intense 
 Subjectivism of Berkeley. The two chief philosophical journals of Germany 
 have entered into this controversy, which was begun by a work of CoUyns 
 Simon, LL.D., entitled The Nature and Elements of the External World, 
 or Universcd Immaterialism, London, 1862, in which Berkeley's theory was 
 acutely advocated. Dr. Ueberweg replied to it in Fichte and Ulrici's Zeit- 
 schrift fur Philosophie, Bd. 55, and Prof. Dr. von E-eichlin-Meldegg of 
 Heidelberg in the same journal, Bd. 56, 1870. Dr. Simon's rejoinder ap- 
 peared, with comments by Ulrici, in the same volume. In Bergmann's 
 Philosophische 3Ionatshefte, Bd. v., May, 1870, Simon, Hoppe, and 
 Schuppe in three articles controverted Ueberweg's positions ; his reply ap- 
 peared in August, ^vith a rejoinder by Schxippe, February, 1871. In this 
 controversy Dr. Ueberweg showed a full mastery of the subject. In Fichte's 
 Zeitschrift, Bd. 57, 1870, he continued his investigations upon the Order of 
 the Platonic Writings, by replying to Brandis and Steinhart, wlio had criti- 
 cised his views.* Such high-toned discussions contribute to tlie progress of 
 thought and knowledge. 
 
 Fi-iedrich Ueberweg was born January 22, 1826, the son of a Lutheran 
 clergyman near Solingen in Rhenish Prussia, His excellent mother was early 
 left a poor widow, and devoted herself to her only son till her death in 1868. 
 He was educated in the College at Elberfeld and the Universities of Gottin- 
 gen and Berlin, and attained to extraordinary proficiency in philosophy, phi- 
 lology, and mathematics. In 1852 he commenced his academic career as 
 Privatdocent in Bonn, and in 1862 he was called as Professor of Philosophy 
 to the University of Konigsberg. There he labored with untiring industry 
 till last summer, when (in the forty-sixth year of his age) he died in the midst 
 
 * This essay is entitled : Ueber den Oegensntz zwiscTicn Methodikern und Geneti- 
 ktrn und dessen Vermittelung bei dem Problem der Ordnung der Schriften Plato's.
 
 X PKEFACE. 
 
 of literary plans for the future, leaving a widow and four children and many 
 friends and admirers to mourn his loss. He was a genuine German scholar, 
 and ranked with the first in his profession. His History of Philosophy and 
 his Logic will perpetuate his name and usefulness.* 
 
 Ueberweg's History of Philosophy, while complete in itself, also forms a 
 part of a select Theological and Philosophical Library, which the under- 
 signed projected some years, since, and now intend to issue as rapidly as is 
 possible with so large an undertaking. A prospectus of the whole accom- 
 panies the present volume. 
 
 Henry B. Smith and Philip Schaff, 
 
 New York, Oct. 18, 187L Editors. 
 
 * Compare the fine tribute to his memory by his friend, Professor Fr. A. Lange, ol 
 Zurich: Friedriah Ueberweg, Berlin, 1871. Also Dilthey: Zum Andenken an Fried. 
 Ueberweg., in the " Preuss. Jahrbucher'''' for Sept. 1871, pp. 309-323 ; and Adolf Lassen : 
 Zum Andenken an F. JT., in Dr. Bergmann's '■'■ Philos. MonatshefU^'' vol, vii.. No. 7, 
 and separately published, Berlin, 1871.
 
 CONTENTS OF THE FIRST VOLUME. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 OF THE CONCEPTION, METHOD, AND GENERAL SOURCES OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 TOGETHER WITH THE LITERARY HELPS. 
 
 PAGB 
 
 § 1. The Conception of Philosophy 1-5 
 
 8 2. The Conception of History 5 
 
 § 3. The Methods of Historical Treatment 5-6 
 
 8 4. Sources and Aids 6-13 
 
 I. 
 
 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANTIQUITY. 
 
 § 5. Ge-aeral Character of Pre-Christian Antiquity and Philosophy 14: 
 
 § 6. Oriental PhOosophy 14-17 
 
 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 
 
 g 7. Sources and Aids for Greek Philosophy 18-24 
 
 § 8. Beginnings of Greek Philosophy in Greek Poetry and Proverbial "Wisdom . 24-26 
 § 9. Periods of Development of Greek Philosophy 26-29 
 
 FIRST PERIOD OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 PRE-SOPIIISTIC PHILOSOPHY, OR PREVALENCE OF COSMOLOGY. 
 
 §10. Fourfold Division of the First Period 29-32 
 
 FIRST DIVISION: THE EARLIER IONIC NATURAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 § IL The Earlier Ionic Natural Philosophers 32 
 
 §12. Thales of Miletus and Hippo 32-35 
 
 §13. Anaximander of Miletus 35-37
 
 Xll CONTENTS. 
 
 PAOB 
 
 §14. Anaximenes of Miletus and Diogenes of ApoUonia 37-38 
 
 § 15. Heraclitus of Epliesus and Cratylus of Athens 38-42 
 
 SECOND DIVISION: PYTHAGOREANISM. 
 
 § 16. Pythagoras of Samos and the Pythagoreans 42-49 
 
 THIRD DIVISION: THE ELEATIC PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 § 17. The Eleatic Philosophers 49-51 
 
 §18. Xenophones of Colophon 51-54 
 
 § 19. Parmenides of Elea 54-57 
 
 § 20. Zeno of Elea 57-59 
 
 §21. MeUssus of Samos 59-60 
 
 FOURTH DIVISION: LATER NATURAL PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 § 22. The Later Natural Philosophers 60 
 
 § 23. Empedocles of Agrigentum 60-63 
 
 § 24. Anaxagoras and Hermotimus of Clazoniense, Archelaus of Miletu.s, and 
 
 Metrodorus of Lampsacus 63-67 
 
 § 25. The Atomists : Leucippus and Democritus 67-7 1 
 
 SECOND PERIOD OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 FROM THE SOPHISTS TO THE STOICS, EPICUREANS, AND SKEPTICS, OR PERIOD OF THE FOUND- 
 ING AND PREDOMINANCE OF ANTHROPOLOGY, THE SCIENCE OF THE THINKING AND 
 WILLING SUBJECT (LOGIC AND ETHICS), ACCOMPANIED BY A RETURN TO PHYSICS. 
 
 §26. The Three Divisions of the Second Period 71-7 
 
 9 
 
 FIRST DIVISION: THE SOPHISTS. 
 
 § 27. The Sophistic Philosophy 72-73 
 
 §28. Protagoras of Abdera 73-76 
 
 §29. Gorgias of Leontitii 76-77 
 
 § 30. Hippias of Elis 77-78 
 
 §31. Prodicus of Ceos 73 
 
 § 32. The Later Sophists 79-80 
 
 SECOND DIVISION: GREEK PHILOSOPHY FROM SOCRATES TO ARISTOTLE INCLUSIVE. 
 
 § 33. Socrates of Athens 80-88 
 
 § 34. The Disciples of Socrates 88-89 
 
 §35. Euclid of Megara and his School 88-91 
 
 §36. Phffido of EHs, Menedemus of Eretria, and their Schools • 91 
 
 §37. Antisthenes of Athens and the Cynic School 92-94
 
 CONTENTS. xni 
 
 PACE 
 
 g 38. Aristippus of Cyrene and the Cyrenaic or Hedonic School 95-08 
 
 § 39. Plato's Life 98-104 
 
 g40. Plato's Writings 104-115 
 
 §41. Plato's Divisions of Philosophy and his Dialectic 115-123 
 
 §42. Plato's Natural Philosophy 123-128 
 
 §43. Plato's Ethics 128-132 
 
 § 44. The Old, Middle, and New Academies 133-137 
 
 §45. Aristotle's Life 137-139 
 
 §46. Aristotle's Writings 139-151 
 
 §47. Aristotle's Divisions of Philosophy and his Logic 151-157 
 
 § 48. Aristotle's Metaphysics or First Philosophy 157-163 
 
 § 49. Aristotle's Natural Philosophy 163-169 
 
 § 50. The Aristotelian Ethics and Esthetics 169-180 
 
 §51. The Peripatetics 180-185 
 
 THIRD DIVISION: STOICISM, EPICUREANISM, AND SKEPTICISM. 
 
 §52. The Leading Stoics 185-191 
 
 §53. The Stoic Division of Philosophy and the Stoic Logic 191-193 
 
 §54. The Physics of the Stoics 194-197 
 
 § 55. The Stoic Ethics 197-200 
 
 § 56. The Epicureans 201-203 
 
 § 57. The Epicurean Division of Philosophy and the Canonic of the Epicureans . 203-205 
 
 § 58. Epicurean Physics 205-208 
 
 §59. Epicurean Ethics 208-212 
 
 § 60. Skepticism 212-217 
 
 § 61. Eclecticism. — Cicero. — The Sextians 217-222 
 
 THIRD PERIOD OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 THE NEO-PLATONISTS AND THEIR PREDECESSORS, OR PREDOMINANCE OP THEOSOPHY. 
 
 § 62. Divisions of the Third Period 222-223 
 
 FIRST DIVISION: JEWISH-ALEXANDRIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 § 63. Aristobulus and Philo 223-232 
 
 SECOND DIVISION: NEO-PYTHAGOREANISM AND ECLECTIC PLATONISM. 
 
 § 64. The Neo- Pythagoreans 232-234 
 
 § 65. The Eclectic Platonists 234-238 
 
 THIRD DIVISION: NEO-PLATONISM. 
 
 g 66. The Neo-Platonists 338-2.o9 
 
 § 67. Ammonius Saccas and his immediate Disciples. Potamo the Eclectic . . 239-240
 
 Xiy CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGB 
 
 § 68. Plotinus, Amelias and PorpliyTy 240-252 
 
 § 69. Jamblichus and the Syrian School 252-254 
 
 § 70. The Athenian School and the later Neo-Platonic Commentators .... 255-259 
 
 II. 
 
 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA 
 
 § 71. General Character of the Philosophy of the Christian Era 261 
 
 § 72. Periods of Christian Philosophy 261-262 
 
 FIRST PERIOD.— PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 § 73. Principal Divisions of the Patristic Philosophy 263-271 
 
 § 74. The Christian Religion. Jesus and his Apostles. The New Testament . 264-271 
 
 §75. Jewish and Pauline Christianity 271-274 
 
 riRST division: the patristic philosophy until the council of nice. 
 
 § 76. The Apostolic Fathers 274-280 
 
 § 77. The Gnostics 280-290 
 
 § 78. Justin Martyr 290-294 
 
 § 79. Tatian, Atheiiagoras, Theophilus, and Hermias 294-299 
 
 § 80. Irenaeus and Hippolytus 299-303 
 
 §81. TertuUian 303-306 
 
 §82. Monarchianism, Arianism, and Athanasianism 306-311 
 
 §83. Clement of Alexandria and Origen 311-319 
 
 § 84. Minutius Felix, Arnobius, and Lactantius 319-325 
 
 SECOND division: the patbistic philosophy after the council of nice. 
 
 § 85. Gregory of Nyssa and other Disciples of Origen 325-333 
 
 § 86. Saint Augustine 333-34G 
 
 § 87. Greek Fathers after Augustine's Time 347-352 
 
 § 88. Latin Fathers after Augustine's Time 352-355 
 
 SECOND PERIOD.— THE SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 § 89. Definition and Divisions of the Scholastic Philosophy 355-377 
 
 first division : the beginnings of scholasticism. 
 
 § 90. Johannes Scotus (Erigena) 358-305 
 
 § 91. Realism and Nominalism from the ninth until near the end of the eleventh 
 
 century 365-371 
 
 § 92. Roscellinus, the Nominalist, and William of Champeaux, the Realist . . 371-;?77
 
 CONTENTS. XV 
 
 § 93. Anselm of Canterbury 377-336 
 
 § 94. Abelard and other Scholastics and Mystics of the twelfth century . . . 386^02 
 
 § 95. Greek and Syrian Philosophers of the Middle Ages 402-405 
 
 § 96. Arabian Philosophy in the Middle Ages 405-417 
 
 § 97. The Philosophy of the Jews in the Middle Ages 417-428 
 
 SECOND DIVISION : THB FULL DEVELOPMENT AND DOMINATION OF SCHOLASTICISM. 
 
 § 98. The Revolution in the Scholastic Philosophy about a. d. 1200 .... 429-432 
 
 § 99. Alexander ofHales and contemporary Scholastics: Bonaventura, the Mystic 433-463 
 
 § 100. Albertus Magnus 436-440 
 
 § 101. Thomas of Aquino and the Thomists 440-452 
 
 § 102. Johannes Duns Scotus and the Scotists 452-457 
 
 §103. Contemporaries of Thomas and of Duns Scotus 457-460 
 
 § 104. William of Occam, the Eenewer of Nominalism 460-464 
 
 §105. Later Scholastics previous to the Renewal of Platonism 464—467 
 
 g 106. German Mysticism in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Eckhart, 
 
 Tauler, and others 467-434 
 
 Supplement , 485-4S7
 
 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 INTEODUCTIOK'. 
 
 OF THE CONCBPTION, METHOD, AND GENERAL SOURCES OP THE HISTORY 
 OF PHILOSOPHY, TOGETHER WITH THE LITERARY HELPS. 
 
 § 1. Philosophy as a conception, historically, is an advance upon, 
 as it is an outgrowth from, the conception of mental development in 
 general and that of scientific culture in particular. The conception is 
 ordinarily modified in the various systems of philosophy, according to 
 the peculiar character of each LXet in alj of them philosophy is included 
 under the generic notion of science/ano, as a rule, is distinguished 
 from the remaining sciences by the specific difiference, that it is not 
 occupied, like each of them, with any special, limited province of 
 things, nor yet with the sum of these provinces taken in their full 
 extent, hut with the nature, laws, and connection of whatever ac- 
 tually is. With this common and fundamental characterit^tic of the 
 various historical conceptions of philosophy corresponds our definition : 
 Philosophy is the science of principles. 
 
 On the conception of philosophy cf. the author's article in the Zeitichri/t/iir Philosophie und pkiloso- 
 phixche Kritik. ed. by [mm. Ilerm. Fichto, Ulrici, an<l Wirlh, New Series, vol. xlii., Halle, 18C3, pp. 1S5-199; 
 also, among others. C. HebU-r, in No. 44 of Virchow and von Holtzendorf's Sammlung gemeinrerxtdnd- 
 licher iclimensch. Vortrdffe, a.M\ Ed. ZeWur, AkaUeni. Rede, Heidelberg:, ISfiS. The historic.il development 
 of the conception of philosojihy and the various meanings of the word are specially treated of by K. Haym, 
 in Ersch and Gruboi's Eiicycl. der Winn. ii. Kilnnte, III. 24, Leipsic, 1S48; and by Eisenmann in his 
 Ueber Begriff nnd Bedeuiung der co4>ia his <tnf Sokratet, Progr. of the Wilh.-Gymn., Munich, 1S59; 
 cf. Ed. .Mberti, on the Platonic Conception of Philosophy, in the ZeiUchr.f. Philos., New Series, vol. li., 
 Ualle, 1867, pp. 29-62, 169-204. 
 
 Ths word philosophy {ipilocno'ia, love of wisdom) and its cognates do not occur iti 
 Homer and Hesiod. Homer uses crocJ/^?, the second word in the compound {II. XV. 412) 
 with reference to the carpenter's art. In like manner, Hesiod speaks of one who is 
 vaimXh;/: aEtjo^La idvor {Op. 651). Later writers use ao(i>ia also for excellence in music and 
 poetry. With Herodotus any one is atxbor who is distinguished from the mass of men by 
 any kir/d of art or skill. The so-called seven wise men are termed by him ao^KTrai, 
 •' sophists " (I. 30 et al), and the same designation is given by him to Pythagoras (lY. 95). 

 
 ii THE CONCEPTION OF rillLOSOPHY. 
 
 Tho compounds 6i7.oao(()nv and <piXoGo<pia arc first found in Herodotus. In Herod. I. 30, 
 Croesus saj'S lo Solon : " I have heard that thou (piXoaotpfuv hast traveled over many lands 
 for the purpose of observing ;" ibid. I. 50, <pLloao(pia is applied to the knowledge of the stars. 
 Thucydides represents Pericles as saying in the Funeral Oration (II. 40) : ^i?ioKaXov/in' 
 fi£r' ni7E?iti(ic Kal (piTioaooovfin' avev /ia?MKtar^ where (pLloaoie'tv (philosophizing) signifies the 
 striving after intellectual and, more especially, after scientific culture. Thus is confirmed 
 'or this period the allegation of Cicero : " Omnis rerum optimarum cognitio atque in iis 
 exercitatio pJnIosophia nominata est." This more general signification, in which tho 
 "philosopher" is identified with him who fiETeiArjipe naiSeiag 6ia(j)6pov Kal TrepiT-i/t;^ or who 
 is educated above the mass of men, was long afterward retained by the word side by side 
 with that given to it as a term of art. 
 
 Pythagoras is cited as the first to designate by the word <pu.ofTo<pia philosophy as 
 science. The statement in regard to this point, which we find in Cicero (Tusc. V. 3), 
 Diogenes Laertius (I 12, VIII. 8), and others, and which (according to Diog. L. YIII. 8), 
 "was also contained m a work (i^iaSoxal), now no longer extant, written by Sosicrates of 
 Alexandria, is derived from Heraclides of Pontus, a scholar of Plato. Cicero represents 
 Pythagoras as saj'ing, in a conversation with Leon, the ruler of Phlius: ^' Baros esse quosdam, 
 qui ceteris omnibus pro nihilo habitis rerum naturam studiose intuerentur : has se appellate 
 sapientiae studiosos {id est enim philosophos)." Diog. Laert. (I. 12) adds, as the reason 
 given b}' Heraclides for this designation, " that no man, but only God, is wise." "Whether 
 the narrative is historically true, is uncertain ; Meiners ( Gesch. der Wiss. in Griech. u. 
 Horn. J. 119), and more recently Haym (in Ersch and Gruber's Allgevi. Encycl. der Wist. 
 u. Kitnste, Lcips. 1848, III. 24, p. 3), Zellcr {Philos. der Griechen, 3d ed., Yol. I., 1856, p. 1), 
 and others have doubted it; probably it is only a Socratic and Platonic thought (see 
 below) transferred by Heraclides to Pythagoras (perhaps as a poetic fiction, which sub- 
 sequent writers took to be historical). The modest disclaimer of Socrates in regard 
 to the possession of wisdom, and the preference given by Plato and Aristotle to pure 
 theorj' above all praxis and even above all ethico-political activity, are scarcely in accord 
 ■with the unbroken confidence of Pythagoreanism in the power of scientific investigation 
 and with tho undivided unity of the theoretical and practical tendencies of that philosophy. 
 Tho natural philosophers who call the universe kog^ioq (which, according to Diog. Laert. 
 YIII. 48, the Pythagoreans were the first to do), are in Xenophon (Memor. I. 1. 11) called 
 co(piGrai, in Plato (Gorg., p. 508a, ed. Steph.), "wise men" (cto^o/), without the least intima- 
 tion that the Pythagoreans would themselves have desired to be named, not wise, but 
 lovers of wisdom. It is also noticeable, though without demonstrative force, that in the 
 preserved fragments of the probably spurious work ascribed to Philolaus the Pythagorean 
 and devoted to the description of the astronomical and philosophical knowledge of the 
 order which reigns in the universe, (JO(i:a, not <pLAOGo<^ia, is iised (Stob. Ed. I. 23 ; cf Boeckh, 
 Fhilolaos, pp. 95 and 102 f) 
 
 Socrates calls himself in the Banquet of Xenophon (I. 5) a laborer in philosophy 
 [avTovpybc ri/g tfnAoaoipiag), in contrast to Callias, a disciple of the Sophists. In the Memora- 
 hilia (jO(j>ia is found often, ^(/locro^/a rarely. According to Xenoph. Mem. lY. 6. 1, co(p!a is 
 synonymous with tmcri/fj/^ (science). Human wisdom is patchwork ; the gods have re- 
 served what is greatest to themselves {ibid, and I. 1. 8). Y'e may ascribe this thought 
 with all the more confidence to the historical Socrates, since it reappears in the Ajwlogia 
 of Plato (pp. 20 and 23 of the edition of Stephanus, whose paging accompanies most later 
 editions), where Socrates says, he may perhaps be wise {cocpog) in human wisdom, but this 
 is very little, and in truth only God can be called wise. In the Platonic Apologia Socrates 
 interprets (p. 25) the declaration of the oracle m reply to Chaerephon, that " no one was
 
 THE CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY. 6 
 
 wiser than Socrates," as teaching tliat he among men was wisest who, like Socrates, dis- 
 claimed the possession of any wisdom of his own {bri ovroq . . . aoouraroc iariv, ocnq 
 ucireg 2w«^drr/f iyvuKtv, on ovdevoQ a^idg earc rfi a/iTj-dEia Trpof aot^iav) ; he calls (p. 28 sq.) 
 that examination of himself and others by which he broke up the shameful self-deception 
 of those who, without knowing, supposed themselves to know, his '•pliilosophizing," and 
 sees in it the mission of his life {fiL7Mao(bQvvTd fie delv l^rjv Kal i^erdi^ovra ifiavrov re koL 
 Tovq a7Ju)vq). Since the wisdom of Socrates was the consciousness of not knowing, and 
 not the consciousness of a positive, gradual approximation to tlie knowledge of truth, it 
 was impossible that (piTioacxpia, in distinction from cotpia, should become fixed in his termi- 
 nology as a technical term ; so far as wisdom seemed to him attainable, he could make use 
 as well of the words ao<p6g and co(pi.a (avOpunivT/) to express it. In the Apologia Socrates ap- 
 plies the terms ccxpovg and <f>i?u)(ro6ovvTag to earlier thinkers, the former rather in an ironical 
 sense (especially so, to the Sophists), but the latter more seriously {ApoL. p. 23). Yet it 
 remains uncertain whether Plato, in his Apologia (which appears to reproduce with fidelity 
 the essential parts of the actual defense of Socrates), confined himself in every particular 
 to the exact form of speech adopted by the historical Socrates. With the disciples of 
 Socrates <pL7Mao(pia appears already as a technical designation. Xenophon (Memor. I. 1, 19) 
 speaks of men, who asserted that they philosophized {^daKovreg <l)i?.oao(pelv) ; by whom a 
 Socratic school — the school of Antisthenes — is probably to be understood. 
 
 Plato expresses in various places (Phcedr. p. 278 d, Conviv. p. 20.'] e ; cf. Lysis, p. 218 a, 
 ed. Steph.) the sentiment ascribed by Heraclides of Pontus to Pythagoras, that wi.sdom 
 belongs only to God, while it belongs to man to be rather a lover of wisdom {(t>Mao<poc). 
 In the Convivium (and the Lysis) this thought is developed to the effect that neither he 
 who is already wise (ao^of), nor he who is imlearned {afindfjg), is a pliilosopher, but he who 
 stands between the two. The terminology becomes most distinct and definite in two 
 dialogues of late origin, probably composed by one of Plato's disciples, namely, in the 
 Sophistes (p. 217 a) and the Politicus (p. 257 a, b), where the Sophist, the statesman, and tlie 
 phOosopher (6 aorpiarr/c, 6 TroXirmdc^ and 6 <;>i?Mao6oc) are named in the preceding order, as the 
 advancing order of their rank. "Wisdom itself (aopia), according to Plato {Theaetet. p. 145 e), 
 is identical with kiriaTrmr] (true knowledge), while philosophj- is termed in tlio dialogue 
 Euthydemus (p. 288 d) the acquisition of such knowledge (nrf/aic e-HcarT/iiT/g). Knowledge 
 (inKJTTjfZT/) respects the ideal, as that which truly is, while opinion or representation (c't^fn) 
 is concerned with the sensuous, as with that which is subject to change and generation (i?ep. 
 V. p. 477 a). Accordingly Plato defines {Rep. 480 b) those as pliilosophers, " who set their 
 affections on that, which in each case really exists" (rovg avro d^a cKaarov rb bv da-^ai^o/^h'ovr 
 ptXoa6(j>ovg kX)jt£ov), or {Rep. VI. 484a) who "are able to apprehend the eternal and immu- 
 table " {(pMao(})Oi 01 Tov del Kara ravrd uaavTiog Ixovrog dwdfievoi kfdnTetr&ai). In a wider 
 sense Plato uses the term philosophy so as to include under it the positive sciences also 
 {Theaet. p. 143 d): Trtpi ye(.)fieTQiav y riva d/^Xr/v ^i/iocm<piav. 
 
 "We find also the same double sense in Aristotle. <pi%nao<pia in the wider signification 
 {Metaph. VI. 1, p. 1026 a, 18 ed. Bekker et al.) — for which ao(*,ia but rarely occurs {Met. 
 IV. 3, p. 1005 b, 1: iari di ao<pia rig Kal i) (pvaiidj, d7.'k' oh 7rp<j-;7, cf Met. XI. 4, 1061b, 
 32) — is science in general and includes mathematics and physics, and ethics and poetics. 
 But K/uu-T! (pihxjocpin, or ''first philosophy" {Met.Yl. 1, 1026 a, 24 and 30; XI. 4, 1061b, 
 19), whicli Aristotle also calls ao<pia, and which he indicates as pre-eminently the science 
 of the philosopher {tj tov (piXoadfov tmari/fxrf. Met. IV. 3, p. 1005 a, 21 ; cf. diAoaoiiia, Met. 
 XI. 4, 1061b, 25), is in his system that which we now term metaphysics, namely, the 
 science of being as such {to bv y dv. Met. A^. 1, 1026a, 31; cf XI. 3, 1060b, 31, and 
 XI. 4, 1061 b, 26), and not of any single department of being — the science, therefor*,
 
 4 THE CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHT. 
 
 wiiich coaaiders the ultimate grounds or principles of every thing that exists (in particular, 
 the matter, form, efficient cause, and end of every thing). Met. I. 2, 982 b, 9: del yap ravrjp 
 {rfjv ircuTriifiTfi) tuv TrpGJTurv apx'^^ ''ol alriuv elvai d^eo^riKTfv. In contrast with this " first 
 philosophy," the special sciences are termed (in Met. IV. 1, 1003 a, 22) partial sciences 
 {fTiarf/fiai kv /iipei leyvusvai). The plural <ptAoao(plaL is used by Aristotle sometimes in the 
 sense of "philosophical sciences" {Met. VI. 1, 1026a, 18, where mathematics, physics, 
 and theology are named as the three "theoretical philosophies;" cf. Ethic. Kicomach. I. 4, 
 1096 b, 31, where from ethics another branch of philosophy, d/,/// (pOxmooia, is distinguished, 
 which from the context must be metaphysics), and sometimes in the sense of "philosophi- 
 cal directions, systems, or ways of philosophizing" {Met. I. 6, 937a, 29: ficra 6e rdf 
 iifiTjfiiva^ <piXjoao(j>LaQ 7] TVka-uvoq ETzeyiveTo ■KpayfiaTeia). 
 
 The Stoics (according to Plutarch, De Plac. Philos. I., Prooem.) defined wisdom {no^ia) as 
 the science of divine and human things, but philosophy {<j)i'koao<j>ia) as the striving aftwr 
 virtue (proficiency, theoretical and practical), in the three departments of physics, ethics, 
 and logic. Cf. Senec. Episi. 89, 3 : Philosophia sapientiae amor et affectatio ; ibid. 1 : phUosoplua 
 studium virtutis est, sed per ipsam virtutem. The Stoic definition of philosophy removes the 
 boutiiiary wliich in Plato separates ideology, in Aristotle '' first philosophy," from the other 
 branches of philosophy, and covers the case of all scientific knowledge, together with its 
 relations to practical morality. Still, positive sciences (as, notably, grammar, mathematics, 
 and astronomy) begin with the Stoics already to assume an independent rank. 
 
 Epicurus declared philosophy to be the rational pursuit of happiness (Sext. Empir. Adv. 
 Math. XI. 169: 'E~//coiipof i'Aeye rfjv ^i?i.oao<piav ivipyeiav elvat Tuoyoiq Kal diaTMyiafwl^ tov 
 iv(^alfMva jiiov ireQnroLovaav). 
 
 Since all subsequent definitions of philosophy until the modern period were more or 
 less exact repetitions of those above cited and hence may here be omitted, we pass on to 
 the definition which was received in the school of Leibnitz and "Wolff. Christian Woltf 
 presents {Philas. Rationalis. Disc.Praelim., § 6), the following as a definition originating with 
 himself: (Cognitio philosophica e-st) cognitio rationis eorum, quae sunt veljiunt, unde intelligatur, 
 cur sint velfiant; {ibid. § 29) : philosophia est scientia possihilium, quatenus esse possunt. This 
 definition is obviously cognate with the Platonic and Aristotelian definitions, in so far as it 
 makes philosophy conversant with the rational grounds {ratio) and the causes, through 
 which existing objects and changes become possible. It does not contain the restriction to 
 first causes, and hence Wolff's conception of philosophy is the wider one ; but it fails, on 
 the other hand (as do Plato and Aristotle, when they use (pi/oaoipia in the broader signifi- 
 cation as synonj'-mous with imari/fXTi) to mark the boundaries between philo.sophy and the 
 positive (in particular, the mathematical) sciences. In this latter particular Kant seeks to 
 reach a more accurate determination. 
 
 Kant {Critique of Pure Reason, Doctrine of Method, chap. 3) divides knowledge in general, 
 as to its form, into historical {cognitio ex datis), and rational {cognitio ex pi-incipiis), and the 
 Litter again into mathematical (rational cognition through the construction of concepts), 
 and pliilosophical (rational cognition through concepts as such). Philosophy, in its scho- 
 lastic signification, is defined by him as the system of all the branches of philosophical 
 knowledge, but in its cosmical signification, as the science of the relation of all knowledge 
 to the essential ends of human reason {teleologia rationis humanae). 
 
 Herbart {Tntrod. to Philos., §4 f.) defines philosophy as the elaboration of conceptions. 
 This elaboration comprehends the three processes of the analysis, the correction and the 
 completion of tlie conceptions, the latter process depending on the determination of their 
 rank and value. This gives, as the leading branches of philosophy, logic, metaphysics, 
 and aesthetics. (Under cpsth*tics Herbart includes ethics, as well as asthetics in the nar-
 
 HISTuKICAL METHODS. 5 
 
 ro«irer and popular signification of the word. What Herbart understands by aesthetics 
 might be expressed by the word Timology, a term, however, which he never employs.) 
 
 According to Hegel, for whose doctrine Fichte, in respect of form, and Schelling, in 
 respect of matter, prepared the way, philosophy is the science of the absolute in the form 
 of dialectical development, or the science of the self-comprehending reason. 
 
 The definition of phOosophy given by us above meets the case even of those schools 
 which declare the principles of things to be unknowable, since the inquiry into the 
 fognoscibility of principles evidently belongs to the science of principles, and this science 
 accordingly survives, even when its object is reduced to the attempt to demonstrate the 
 incognoscibility of principles. 
 
 Such definitions as limit philosophy to a definite province (as, in particular, the 
 definition often put forward in recent times, that philosophy is "the science of spirit"), 
 fail at least to correspond with the universal character of the great systems of philosophy 
 up to the present time, and can hardly be assumed as the basis of an historical exposition. 
 
 § 2. History in the objective sense is the process by which nature 
 and spirit are developed. History in the subjective sense is the in- 
 vestigation and statement of this objective development. 
 
 The Greek words laropia and Icropelv, being derived from e'uUvai, signify, not history in 
 the objective sense, but the subjective activity involved in the investigation of facts. The 
 German word Geschichte involves a reference to that which has come to pass {das Gesche- 
 hene), and has therefore primarily the objective signification. Yet, not all that has actually 
 taken place faUs within the province of history, but only that which is of essential signifi- 
 cance for the common development. Development may be defined as the gradual realiza- 
 tion, in a succession of phenomena, of the essence of the subject of development. As to 
 its forin, development generallj^ begins through the evolution of contraries or oppositions, 
 and ends in the disappearance and reconciliation of these contraries in a higher unity (as 
 sufficiently illustrated, for example, in the progressive development which shows itself in 
 Socrates, his so-called " one-sided disciples," and Plato). 
 
 Through the study of history the whole life of the race is, in a manner, renewed on a 
 re(iuced scale in the individual. The intellectual possessions of the present, like its mate- 
 rial possessions, repose in all cases on tlie acquisitions of the past; every one participates, 
 to a degree, in this common property, even without having a comprehensive knowledge of 
 history, but each one's gain becomes all the more extensive and substantial the more this 
 knowledge is expanded and deepened. Only that productive activity which follows upon 
 a self-appropriating reproduction of the menttd labor of the past, lays the foundation for 
 true progress to higher stages. 
 
 § 3. The inethods of treating history (divided by Hegel into the 
 naive, the reflecting, and the speculative) may be classed as the 
 empirical, the critical, and the philosophical, according as the simple 
 collocation of materials, the examination of the eredibilirv of tradi- 
 tion, or the endeavor to reach an understanding of the causes and 
 significance of events, is made the predominant feature. The 
 philosophical method proceeds by explaining the connection and 
 endeavoring to estimate the relative worth of the phenomena of his-
 
 b 80UKCE8, AtJTHOKITIEft, JLND AIDS. 
 
 torj. The genetic method investigates the causal connection of 
 phenomena. The standard by which to estimate the relative worth 
 or importance of phenomena may be found either immediately in the 
 mental state and opinions of the individual student, or in the peculiar 
 nature and tendency of the phenomena themselves, or, finally, by 
 reference to the joint development in which both the historical object 
 and the judging subject, each at its peculiar stage, are involved ; 
 hence may be distinguished the material, the formal, and the specula- 
 tive estimate of systems. A perfect historical exposition depends on 
 the union of all the methodical elements now mentioned. 
 
 The later historians of philosophy in ancient times, as also the earliest modern liis- 
 torians, contented themselves, for the most part, with the method which consists in merely 
 empirical compilation. The critical sifting of materials has been introduced chiefly iu 
 modern times, by philologists and philosophers. From the first, and before any attempts 
 were made at a detailed and general historical delineation, philosophers sought to acquire 
 an insight into the causal connection and the value of the different systems, and for the 
 earliest philosophies the foundation for such insight was already laid by Plato and Aris- 
 totle; but the completion of the work thus begun, the widening and deepening of thia 
 insight, is a work, to the accomplishment of which every age has sought to furnish its 
 contribution and to which each age will always be obliged to contribute, even after the great 
 advances made by modern philosophers, who have sought to make the history of philosophy 
 intelligible as a history of development. The subjective estimate of systems, by the 
 application of the philosophical (and theological) doctrine of the historian as the norm 
 of judgment, has, in modern times, been especially common among the Leibnitzians (Brucker 
 and others) and Kantiaus (Tennemann, notably). The method of formal criticism, which tries 
 the special doctrines of a system by its own assumed principle, and this principle itself 
 by its capacity of development and application, has been employed by Schleierraacher (par- 
 ticularly in his "Critique of Previous Ethics") and his successors (especially by Brandis; 
 less by Eitter, who is more given to " material " criticism). Last of all, the speculative 
 method has been adopted by Hegel (in his " History of Philosophy and Philosophy of His- 
 tory ") and by his school. 
 
 To the oft-treated question, whether the history of philosophy is to be understood 
 from the stand-point of our own philosophical consciousness, or whether, on the contrary, 
 the latter is to be formed, enlarged, and corrected through historical study, the answer is, 
 that the case in question, of the relation of the mind to the historical object of its atten- 
 tion, is a case of natural action and reaction, and that consequently each form of that 
 relation indicated in the question has its natural time and place ; the one must follow the 
 other, each in its time. The stage of philosophical culture, which the individual, before his 
 acquaintance (or at least before his more exact familiarity) with the history of philosophy, 
 has already reached, should facilitate his understanding of that history, while it is at the 
 same time elevated and refined by his historical studies. On the other hand, the philo- 
 Bophic consciousness of the student, when perfected by historical and systematic discipline, 
 must afterward show itself fruitful in a deeper and truer understanding of history. 
 
 § 4. The most trustworthy and productive sources for our knowl- 
 edge of the history of philosophy are those philosophical works which
 
 SOUBCES, AUTHOEITIES, AND AIDS. 7 
 
 have come down to us in their original form and completeness, and, 
 next to these, the fragments of such works which have been pre- 
 served under conditions that render it impossible to doubt their genuine' 
 ness. In the case of pliilosophical doctrines which are no longer 
 before us in the original language of their authors, those " reports " 
 are to be held most authentic which are based immediately on the 
 writings of the philosophers, or in which the oral deliverances of the 
 latter are communicated by immediate disciples. If the tendency of 
 the author (or so-called " reporter"), whose statements serve us as 
 authorities, is less historical than philosophical, inclining him rather 
 to inquire into the truth of the doctrines mentioned by him than 
 simply to report them, it is indispensable, as a condition precedent 
 to the employment of his statements as historical material, that we 
 carefully ascertain the line of thought generally followed by the 
 author of whom he treats, and that in its light we test the sense of 
 each of the reporter's statements. Next to the sources whence the 
 " reporter " drew, and the tendency of his work, his own philosophical 
 culture and his capacity to appreciate the doctrines he reports, furnish 
 the most essential criteria of his credibilitv. The value of the 
 various histories of philosophy as aids to the attainment of a knowl- 
 edge and understanding of that history, is measured partly by the de- 
 gree of exactness shown by each historian in the communication of the 
 original material and his acuteness in their appreciation, and partly by 
 the degree of intelligence with which he sifts the essential from the 
 non-essential in each philosopher's teachings, and exhibits the inner 
 connection of single systems and the order of development of the 
 different philosophical stand-points. 
 
 On the literature of the history of philosophy, compare especially Joh. Jonsius, De Scriptoribus His- 
 toriae PhilosopfUcae libri quatuoi\ Frankf. 1659 ; recogniti aUjue adpraesentem aetatem usque perducti 
 cura. Joh. Chr. Dorn, Jen. 1716. J. Alb. F.ibricius, in the £ibl. Graeca, Ilaaib. 1705 sqq. Joh. Andreas 
 Ortloff, HandOucJi, der Litteratur der Philosophies 1. Abth. : Die Litteratiir der Litter argef-chicMe und 
 Geschichte der Philosop/Ue, Erlangen, 179S. Ersch and Geissler, Bibliograj'hifiches Handbuch, der 
 philoHophiachen Litteratur der Deutschen von der JUitte de« achizehnien Juhrhunderts bis avf di« 
 neueste Z'At, 3d ed., Leips. ISoO. V. Ph. Guniposch, L>ie j'Mlosophische Litteratur der Deutschen von 
 1400-1850, llegensbiirg, 1851, pp. 346-362. Ad. BQchting, Bibliotheca philosophica, oder Verzeichnis* 
 der von 1557-1807 ini dexitsclien BuMiand el erschienenen jMlos. Bilcher und Zeitschriften, Nordhausen, 
 1367. Of. the copious citations of literature in Buhle's Geschichte der Philoa., and also in F. A. Carus's 
 Jdeen eur Gesah. der Philos., Leipsic, 1809, pp. 21-90, in Tennemann's larger work and in his Manual of 
 the ITistory of Philosophy, 5th ed., revised by Amadeus Wcndt, Leips., 1S29, as also in other works on tho 
 history of philosophy ; see also the bibliographical citations in various monographs relating to literary 
 history, such as Ompteda's on the Literature of International Law, etc., and the comprehensive work of 
 Julius Petzholdt, Bibliotheca Bibliographica, Leips. 1866, of which pp. 458-463 are devoted to the history 
 of the literature of philosophy. 
 
 The writings of the early Greek pliilosophers of the pre-Socratic period exist now onl/ 
 in fragments. The complete works of Plato are stOl extant ; so also are the most impop-
 
 8 60UECES, AUTHORITIES, AND AIDS. 
 
 taut works of Aristotle, and certain otliers, which belong to the Stoic, Epicurean, Skeptic, 
 and Neo- Platonic schools. "We possess the principal works of most of the philosophers of 
 the Christian period in suflScient completeness. 
 
 At the commencement of modern times the disappearance of respect for many species 
 of authority, which had previously been accepted, gave special occasion for historical 
 inquiry. Lord Bacon, who was unsatisfied by the Aristotelianism of the Scholastics and 
 was disposed to favor the pre-Socratic philosophy, speaks of an expose of the placita 
 philosopJiorum as one of the desiderata of his times. Of the numerous general histories of 
 philosophy, the following may here be mentioned: — 
 
 The nistory of Philosophy, by Thorn. Stanley, London, 1655; 2d ed., 1687, 3d ed., 1701 ; 
 translated into Latin by Gottfr. Olearius, Leipsic, 1711; also Venice, 1733. Stanley treats 
 only of the history of philosophy before Christ, which is in his view the only philosophy ; 
 for philosophy seeks for truth, which Christian theology possesses, so that with the latter 
 the former becomes superfluous. Stanley follows in his exposition of Greek philosophy 
 pretty closely the historical work of Diogenes Laertius. 
 
 Jac. Thomasii (ob. 1684), Schediasma Historicum, quo varia discutiuntur ad hist, turn 
 phihs., turn ecclesiasticam 2)erti7ientia, Leipsic, 1665; with the title: Origines Hist. Philos. at 
 Ecclesiast., ed. by Christian Thomasius, Halle, 1699. Jac. Thomasius first recommended 
 disputed questions in the history of philosophy as themes for dissertations. 
 
 J. Dau. Huetii, Denionstratio Evangelica; p>hilosophi(ie veteris ac novae paraMelismus, Am- 
 sterdam, 1679. 
 
 Pierre Bayle, Dictlonnaire Historique et Critique, 1st ed., Rotterd. 1697. [English transla- 
 tion by Birch and Lockman, London, 1734-35, 2d ed., 1736-38. — 2V.] This very compre- 
 hensive work deserves to be mentioned here on account of the articles it contains on the 
 history of philosophy. Bayle contributed essentially to the awakening of the spirit of 
 investigation in this department of study. Yet, as a critic, he deals rather in a philosophical 
 criticism of transmitted doctrines from his skeptical stand-point, than in an historical criticism 
 of the fidelity of the accounts on which our knowledge of those doctrines is founded. The 
 philosophical articles have been published in an abridged German translation by L. H. 
 Jakob, 2 vols., Halle, 1797-98. 
 
 The Acta Philosophm-um, ed. Christ. Aug. Heumann, Halle, 1715 ff., contain several 
 valuable papers of investigation on questions in the history of philosophy. 
 
 Histoire Critique de la Philosophie, par Mr. D. (Deslandes), tom. I.-III., 1st ed., Paris, 
 1730-36. Includes also modern philosophy. 
 
 Joh. Jak. Brueker, Kurze Fragtn aus der jihilosopMschen Eistorie, 1 vols., Ulm, 1731-36, 
 with additions, ibid. 1737. Eistoria Critica Philosophiae a mundi incunahulis ad nostrain 
 usque aeiatem deducta. 5 vols., Leips. 1742-44; 2d ed., 1766-67; English abridged transla- 
 tion by Wm. Enfield, Loud. 1791. Institutiones hist, jihilosophicae, usui acad. juventuMs ador- 
 natae, 1st ed., Leips. 1747. Brucker's presentation, especially in his chief work, the Eistoria 
 Crit. Philos., is clear and easily followed, though somewhat difi'use, and often interspersed 
 with anecdotes, after the manner of Diogenes Laertius, and too rarety portraj'ing the connec- 
 tion of ideas. Brueker wrote in the infancy of historical criticism ; still he often gives proof 
 of a sound and sober insight in his treatment of the historical controversies current in his 
 times ; least, it is true, in what relates to the earlier periods, far more in his exposition of 
 the later. His philosophical judgment is imperfect, from the absence with him of the con. 
 ceptions of successive development and relative truth. Truth, he argues, is one, but erroi 
 is manifold, and the majority of systems are erroneous. The history of philosophy shows 
 " injinita falsae philosophiae exempla." Neo-Platonism, for example, Brueker does not 
 understand as a certain blending of Hellenism and Orientalism, with a predominance of the
 
 BOUBCE8, AUTHORITIES, AND AIDS. 9 
 
 form of Hellenism, and still less as a progress from skepticism to mysticism made relatively 
 necessary by the nature of things, but as the product of a conspiracy of bad men against 
 Christianity — ' ' in id conjuravere pessimi homines, ut quam verifate vincere non posseni reli- 
 gionera Christianam, frande impedirent ;" — and in like manner he sees in Christian Gnosti- 
 cism, not a similar blending, with a prevalence of the form of Orientalism, but the result 
 of pride and willfulness, etc. Truth is, for him, identical with Protestant orthodoxy, and 
 next to that with the Leibnitzian philosophy ; according to the measure of its material 
 accordance with this norm every doctrine is judged either true or false. 
 
 Agatopisto Cromaziano (Appiano Buonafede), Delia Iskyria e deUa Indole di ogni Filosofia, 
 Lucca, 1766-81, also Yen. 1782-84, on which is based the work: Leila Restauratione di 
 ogni Filosofia ne' Secoli XV., XVL, XVII., Ven. 1785-89 (translated into German by Carl 
 Heydenreich, Leipsic, 1791). 
 
 Dietr. Tiedemann, Geist der speculativen Fhilosophie, 1 vols., Marburg, 1791-97. By 
 "speculative" Tiedemann means theoretical philosophy. The speculative element in the 
 newer sense of this word is unknown to him. His work extends from Thales to Berkeley. 
 Tiedemann belongs to the ablest thinkers among the opponents of the Kantian phQosophy. 
 His stand-point is the stand-point of Leibnitz and Wolff, modified by elements from that of 
 Locke. In his interpretation and judgment of the various systems of philosophy, he seeks 
 to avoid unfairness and partisanship. But Ms understanding of them has, occasionally, its 
 limits. His principal merit consists in his application of the principle of judging systems 
 according to their relative perfection. Tiedemann declares his intention not to make any one 
 system the standard by which all others should be judged, since no one is universally 
 admitted, but " to consider chiefly, whether a philosopher has said any thing new and has 
 displayed acuteness in the support of his assertions, whether his line of thouglit is marked 
 by inner harmony and close connection, and, finally, whether considerable objections have 
 been or can be urged in opposition to his assertions." 
 
 Georg Gustav Fiillebom, Beitrdge zur Geschichte der Philosophic, sections 1-12, Ziilli- 
 chau, 1791-99. 
 
 Joh, Gottlieb Buhle, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie ttnd einer kritiscJien Littera- 
 tur derselben, 8 vols., Gtittingen, 179G-1804; Geschichte der nemren Philosophie seit der 
 Epoche der Wiederherstellung der Wissenschaften, 6 vols., Gottingen, 1800-1805. Buhle 
 writes as a disciple of Kant, but with a leaning toward the stand-point of Jacobi. He 
 allows his philosophical stand-point rarely to appear. Buhle evinces great reading, and 
 has, with critical insight, instituted valuable investigations, especially in the department 
 of the history of the hterature of philosophy. His " Gesch. der neuerea Philosophie" 
 contains many choice extracts from rare works. It forms the sixth part of the encyclo- 
 pedical work: '• Gesch. der KUnste u. Wins, seit der Wiederherstellung derselben his an das 
 Ervde des 18. Jahrhunderts." 
 
 Degerando, Uistoire Comparie des Systemes de la Philosophie, Tom. I.-III., Paris, 1804; 
 2d edit., Tom. I.-IV., Paris, 1822-23. Translated into German by Tennemann, 2 vols., 
 Marburg, 1806-1807. 
 
 Friedr. Aug. Cams, Ideen zur Geschichte der Philosophie, Leipsic, 1809. Fourth part of 
 his posthumous works. 
 
 "Wilh. Gottlieb Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, 11 vols., Leipsic, 1798-1819. 
 The work has never been wholly completed. It was to have filled thirteen volumes. The 
 twelfth volume was to have treated of German theoretical pliilosophy from Leibnitz and 
 Chr. Thomasius down to Kant, and the thirteenth of moral philosophy from Descartes 
 to Kant. Tennemann's work is meritorious on account of the extent and independence of 
 hig study of authorities, and the completeness and clearness of his exposition ; but it is
 
 10 80UECES, AUTHORITIES, AND AIDS. 
 
 marred by not a few misapprehensions, most of which are the result of a one-sided 
 method of interpretation from the Kantian stand-point. In his judgments, the measuring- 
 rod of the Kantian Critique of the Reason is often applied with too little allowance to the 
 earlier systems, although in principle, the idea, already expressed by Kant, of " the 
 gradual development of the reason in its striving after science," is not foreign to him. 
 
 Wilh. GottUcb Tennemann, G-rundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie far den akademischen 
 UnterridU, 1st ed., Leips. 1812; 5th ed., Leips. 1829; the last three editions revised by 
 Amadeus "Wendt. [Euglish translation (" Manual of the History of Philosophy," etc.), 
 by A. Johnson, Oxford, 1833. The same, revised, enlarged, and corrected by J. R. 
 Morel), London, 1852. — Tr.] From this much too brief exposition, it is impossible to 
 derive a complete understanding of the different systems ; nevertheless it is of value as a 
 repertory of notices concerning philosophers and their teachings ; especially valuable are 
 the perhaps only too numerous literary references, in respect to which Tennemann aimed 
 rather at completeness than at judicious selection. 
 
 Jak. Friedr. Fries, Geschichte der Philosophie, 2 vols., Halle, 1837-40. His stand-point, a 
 modified Kantianism. 
 
 Friedr. Ast, Grundriss einer Geschichte der Philosophie, Landshut, 1801, 2d ed., 1825. 
 He writes from Schelling's stand-point. 
 
 Thadda Anselra Rixner, Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie zum Gehauche seiner 
 Yorlesungen, 3 vols., Sulzbacli, 1822-23, 2d ed., 1829. Supplementary volume by Victor 
 Phil. Gumposch, 1850. The stand-point is that of Schelling. Its numerous citations from 
 original sources would render the book an excellent basis for a first study of the history 
 of philosophy, if Rixner's work was not disfigured by great negligence and lack of critical 
 skill in the execution of his plan. Gumposch, who brings the national element especially 
 into prominence, proceeds far more carefully. 
 
 Ernst Reinhold, Handbuch der allgemeUien Geschichte d.r Philosophie, 2 parts in 3 vols., 
 Gotha, 1828-30. Lehrbuchder Geschichte der Philosophie, Jena, 1836; 2d ed., 1839; 3d ed., 
 1849, Geschichte der Philosophie nach den Ilauptmomenten ihrer Entwickeiung, 5th ed., 3 
 vols., Jena, 1858. The presentation is compendious but not sufficiently exact. Reinhold 
 thinks and often expresses himself too much in the modern way and too little in the style 
 and spirit of the philosophers of whom he treats. 
 
 Heinr. Ritt«r, Geschichte der Philosophie, 12 vols., Hamburg, 1829—53; Vols. I.-IV., new 
 edition, 1836-38. [4 vols, translated. See below, ad § 7. — Tr.] The work reaches to 
 and excludes Kant ; the Uebersicht Uber die Geschichte der neitesten deutschen Philosophie seit 
 Kant (Brunswick, 1853), supplements and completes it. Ritter adopts substantially the 
 stand-point of Sclileiermacher. His professed object is, while adhering strictly to facts, 
 to present the history of philosophy as "a self-developing whole;" not, however, viewing 
 earlier systems as stepping-stones to any particular modern one, nor judging them from the 
 stand-point of any particular system, but rather " from the point of view of the general 
 intelligence of the periods to which they belong, respecting the object of the intellectual 
 faculties — respecting the right and the wrong in the modes of developing the reason." 
 
 Under Ritter's supervision, the following work of Schleiermacher was published, 
 after its author's death: Geschichte der Philosophie, Berlin, 1839 (Schleiermacher's Werke, 
 III., 4, a). The work is a summary, drawn up by Schleiermacher for his lectures. It 
 is not founded in all parts on original historical investigation, but it contains much that 
 is very suggestive. 
 
 G. W. Hegel, Yorlesungen uber die Geschichte der Philosophie, ed. by Karl Ludw. 
 Michelet. 3 vols. {Werke, Vols. XIII.-XV.), Berlin. 1833-36; 2d ed., 1840-42. The 
 stand-point here is the speculative, characterized above, § 3. Yet Hegel, as matter of fact,
 
 80UECKS, AUTHORITIES, AND AIDS. 11 
 
 has not in detail always maintained the idea of development in its purity, but has some- 
 times unhistorically represented the doctrines of philosophers, whom he esteemed, as 
 approximating to his own (interpreted, e. g., many philosophemes of Plato agreeably to his 
 own doctrine of immanence), and, ignoring their scientific motives, has misinterpreted those 
 of philosophers whom he did not esteem (e. g. Locke) ; still further, he unjustifiably 
 exaggerates in principle the legitimate and fundamental idea of a gradual development, 
 oljservable in the progress of events in general, and particularly in the succession of 
 philosophical systems, through the following assumptions: — 
 
 a. That every form of historical reality within its historic limits, and hence, in particu- 
 lar, every philosophical system, viewed as a determinate link in the complete evolution of 
 I)liilosophy, is to be considered in its place as wholly natural and legitimate ; while, never- 
 theless, side by side with the historically justified imperfection of individual forms, error 
 and perversity, as not relatively legitimate elements, are found, and occasion aberrations in 
 point of historic fact from the ideal norms of development (in particular, many temporary 
 reactions, and, on tlie other liand, many false anticipations) ; 
 
 b. That with the Hegelian system the development-process of pliilosophy has found an 
 absolute terminus, beyond which thought has no essential advance to make ; 
 
 c. That the nature of things is such that the historical sequence of the various philo- 
 sophical stand-points must, without essential variation, accord with the systematic sequence 
 of the different categories, whether it be with those of logic alone, as appears from VwL 
 uber die Gesch. der Philosophie, Vol. I. p. 128, or with those of logic — and the philosophy of 
 nature? — and mental philosophy, as is taught, ibid. p. 120, and Vol. III. p. 686 ff. 
 
 G. Osw. Marbach, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophic, 1 Abth. : Geschichte der 
 griechischen Philosophie, 2 Abth.: Gesch. der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Leipsic, 1338-^1. 
 Marbach's stand- point is the Hegelian ; but he often makes a somewhat forced application 
 of the categories of Hegel's system to material furni.shed him chiefly by Tennemann and 
 Rixner — though in part dra^\ni from the original sources — and but slightly elaborated by 
 himself. The book has remained uncompleted. 
 
 Jul. Braniss, Geschichte der Philosophie seit Kant, first vol., Breslau, 1842. The first 
 volume, the only one published, is a speculative survey of the history' of philosophy down 
 to the Middle Ages. Braniss owes his philosophical stand-point chiefly to Stoffens, Sclileier- 
 macher, and Hegel. 
 
 Christoph. "V^'illi. Sigwart, Gesch. der Philosophie, 3 vols., Stuttgart, 1854. 
 
 Albert Schwegler, Gesch. der Philos. irn Umriss, ein Leitfaden zur Uebersicht, Stuttgart, 
 1848, 7th edition, ibid., 1870. Contains a clear presentation of the philosophical stand- 
 points, but is seriously imperfect from tlie omission of the author to describe with sufficient 
 minuteness the principal doctrines which belong specially to eacli system and to the 
 subordinate branches of each system, by which means alone a distinct picture can be 
 jiresented. Schwegler's Compendium has been translated into English, with explanatory, 
 critical, and supplementary annotations, by J. H. Stirling, Edinburgh, 1867 ; 2d ed. 1868. 
 [American translation by J. TI. Seolye, N. Y. 1856; 3d ed., 1864.— ^r.] 
 
 Mart. V. Doutinger, Geschichte der Philosophie (1st vol.: Greek Philosophy. 1st div. : 
 Tiil the time of Socrates. 2d div. : From Socrates till the end of Greek philosophy). 
 Pvegensburg, 1852-53. 
 V Ludw. Noack, Geschichte der Philosophie in gedrdngter Uebersicht, Weimar, 1853. 
 
 Wilh. Bauer, Geschichte der Philosophie fur gebildete Leser, Halle, 1863. 
 
 F. Michelis, Geschichte der Philosophie von Thcdes bis au/unsere Zeit, Braunsberg, 1365. 
 
 Joh. Ed. Erdmanu, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, 2 vols., Berlin, 1866; 2d 
 ed. ibid. 1869-70.
 
 12 SOURCES, AUTHORITIES, AND AIDS. 
 
 F. Schmid (of Schwarzenberg), Grundriss der Geschichte der Fhilosophie von Thales fis 
 Schopenhauer, vom specukitiv-monotheistischen Standpunkte, Eriangen, 1867. 
 
 Conrad Hermann, Gesch. der Philos. in pragmatischer Behandlung, Leipsic, 1867. 
 
 J. H. Scholten, Gesch. der Rdigkm und Phihsophie, translated from the Dutch origin;.! 
 into French by A. Revillo, Paris and Strasbourg, 1861 ; German translation under the 
 above title by Ernst Rud. Redepenning, Elberfeld, 1868. 
 
 E. Diihring, Krit. Gesch. der Philos., Berlin, 1869. 
 
 Victor Cousin, Introduction d VHistoire de la Philosophie and Cours de VHistoire de la 
 PhUosophie Moderne in the (Euvres de V. C, Paris, 1846-48. Fragments Philosophiques, 
 Paris, 1840-43. Ilistoire Generale de la Philosophie depuis les temps Its pliis recules jusqu'd la 
 fin du XVIII. siecle, be ed., Paris, 1863. 
 
 J. A. Nourrisson, Tableau des Progres de la Pensee Humaine depuis Thales jusqii'd 
 Leibnitz, Paris, 1858; 2e edition, 1860. 
 
 N. J. Laforet, Ilist. de la Philosophie; premiere partle: Philos. Ancienne, Brussels and 
 Paris, 1867. 
 
 Robert Blakey, History of the Philosophy of Mind, from the earliest period to the present 
 time, 4 vols., London, 1848. 
 
 George Henry Lewes, A Biographical History of Philosophy, from its origin in Greece 
 doiun to the present day, London, 1846. The History of Philosophy from Thales to the present 
 day, by George Henry Lewes, 3d edition (Vol. I. Ancient Philosophy ; Vol. II. Modern 
 Philosophy), London, 1866. 
 
 Ed. Zeller, Vortrdge und AbJiandlungen geschichtlichen Inhalts, Leipsic, 1865, containing: 
 1. The development of monotheism among the Greeks; 2. Pythagoras and the legends 
 concerning him ; 3. A plea for Xanthippe ; 4. The Platonic state in its significance for the 
 succeeding time ; 5. Marcus Aurelius Antoninus ; 6. "Wolff's banishment from Halle, the 
 struggle of pietism with philosophy; 7. Joh. Gottlieb Fichte as a political philosopher; 
 8. Friedr. Schleiermacher ; 9. Primitive Christianity ; 10. The historical school of Tijbin- 
 gen; 11, Ferdinand Christian Baur; 12. Strauss and Renan. 
 
 Of works on the history of single philosophical disciplines and tendencies (from ancient 
 till modem times), the following are specially worthy of mention : — 
 
 Ad. Trendelenburg, Historische Beiirdge zwr Philosophie, Vol. I. (History of the Doctrine 
 of Categories), Berhn, 1846; Vol. II. (Miscellaneous Essays), ibid. 1855; Vol. III. (Misc. 
 Essays), ibid. 1867. 
 
 On Religious Philosophy : Karl Friedr. Staudlin, Gesch. und Geist des Skepticismus, 
 vorzilglich in Riicksicht auf Moral und Religion, Leipsic, 1794-95; Imman. Berger, Geschichte 
 der Religionsphilosophie, Berlin, 1800. 
 
 On the History of Psychology : Friedr. Aug. Cams, Geschichte der Psychologic, Leipsic, 
 1808. (Third part of the posthumous works.) The same subject, substantiality, is also 
 treated of in Albert Stockl's Die speculat. Lehre vom Menschen und ihre Geschichte, Vol. I. 
 ("Ancient Times"), Wiirzburg, 1858; Vol. II. ("Patristic Period," also under the title of 
 Geschichte der Philosophie der patristischen Zeit), ibid. 1859; and Geschichte der Philosophie 
 des Mittelalters (continuation of the preceding works), Mayence, 1864-65, and in Friedr. 
 Albert Lange's Geschichte des Mattrialismus, Iserlohn, 1866. 
 
 On the History of Ethical and Political Theories : Christoph, Meiners, Geschichte der 
 ulteren und neureren Ethik oder Lebensiveisheit, Gottingen, 1800-1801. Karl Friedr. Staud- 
 lin, Geschichte der Moralphilosophie, Hanover, 1823; and Geschichte der Lehre von der 
 Sittlichkeit der Scha^ispiele, vom Eide, vom Geioissen, etc., Gott. 1823 ff. Leop. v. Henning, 
 Die Principien der Ethik in historischer Entwickelung, Berlin, 1825. Friedr. v. Raumer, l>ie 
 geschichtliche Entwickelung der Begriffe von Staat, Recht und Politik, Leipsic, 1826; 2d cd.
 
 SOURCES, AUTHOillTIES, AND AIDS. 13 
 
 1332; 3d ed. 1361. Joh. Jos. Rossbach, Die Periaden der Rechtsphihsophie, Regensburg, 
 1342; Die Grundrichtungen in der Gesch. der Staatswifsenschaft, Erlangen, 1842; Gesch. der 
 Geaellscliaft, Wiirzburg, 1868 flf. Heinr. Liutz, Entumrf einer Geschichie der Eechtsphilos., 
 Dantzic, 1846. Emil Feuerlein, Die philosophise} le Sittenlehre in ihren geschichUichen IlaupU 
 formen^ 2 vols., Tiibingen, 1857-59. P. Janet, Ilistoire de la PhUosophie Morale et Politique 
 dans VAntiquite et les Temps Modernes, Paris, 1858. James Mackintosli, Dissertation on the 
 Progress of Ethical Philosophy, London, 1830; new edition, ed. by Will. Whewell, London, 
 1363. Tf. "Whewell, Lectures 07i the History of Moral Philosophy, new edition, London, 1862. 
 [Robert Blakey, History of Moral Science, second edition, Edinburgh, 1863. — Ed.] Jahnel, 
 De Consdentiae Notione, Berlin, 1862. Aug. Neander, Vorlesungen iiber die Gesch. der christ. 
 Ethik, ed. by Dr. Erdmann, Berlin, 1864. W. Gass, Die Lehre vom Gevmsen, Berlin, 18G9. 
 
 On the History of Logic : Carl Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, Vol. I. (Devel- 
 opment of Logic in Ancient Times), Leipsic, 1855; "Vols. IL-IV. (Logic in the Middle 
 Ages), ibid. 1 861-70. 
 
 On the History of Esthetics : Robert Zimmermann, Geschichie der Aesthetik als philoso- 
 phischer Wissenschaft, Vienna, 1858; cf. the liistorico-critical portions of Vischer's Aesthetik 
 and Lotze's Gesch. der Aesthetik in Deufschland, Munich, 1868.— (z./f^(3yti>f'U^ . 
 
 More or less copious contributions to the history of philosophical doctrines may be 
 found also in many of the works in which these doctrines are systematically expounded, 
 as, for example, in Stahl's Philosophic des Rechts nach geschichtlicher Ansicht (1st ed., Heidel- 
 berg, 1830 ff.), of which the first volume, on the " Genesis of the Current Philosophy of 
 Law " (3d ed., 1853), is critico-historical, and relates particularly to the time from 
 Kaut to Hegel ; cf in like manner Immanuel Herm. Fichte's System der Ethik, the first or 
 critical part of which (Leipsic, 1850) is a history of the philosophical doctrines of right, 
 state, and morals in Germany, France, and England from 1750 till about 1850; the first 
 volume of K. Hildenbrand's Geschichte und System der Rechts- und StaatsphHosophie (Leips. 
 1860), treats minutely of the history of theories in classical antiquity; much historical 
 material is also contained in the works of "Warnkonig, Roder, Rossler, Trendelenburg, and 
 others, on the philosophy of law. The works of Julius Schaller ( Gesch. der Naturphilosophie 
 seit Baco), Rob. v. Mohl {Gesch. u. Lit. der Stcuitswissenschaften, Erlangen, 1855-58), J. C. 
 Bluntschli {Gesch. des aUg. Staatsrechts und der Politik seit dem 16 Jahrh. bis zur Gegenwart, 
 Munich, 1864, etc.), and some others, relate to modern times. Cf. below, VoL IL § 1.
 
 THE PHILOSOPHY OF AJnJ^TIQUITT . 
 
 § 5. The general characteristic of the human mind in ante-Chris- 
 tian, and particularly in Hellenic antiquity, may be described as its 
 comparatively unreflecting belief in its own harmony and of its one- 
 ness with nature. The sense of an opposition, as existing either 
 among its own different functions and interests or between the 
 mind and nature and as needing reconciliation, is as yet relatively 
 undeveloped. The philosophy of antiquity, like that of every 
 period, partakes necessarily, in what concerns its chronological be- 
 ginnings and its permanent basis, of the character of the period to 
 which it belongs, while at the same time it tends, at least in its 
 general and most fundamental direction, upward and beyond the 
 level of the period, and so prepares the way for the transition to new 
 and higher stages. 
 
 For the solution of the diflScult but necessary problem of a general historical and 
 philosophical characterization of the great periods m the intellectual life of humanity, the 
 Hegelian philosophy has labored most successfully. The conceptions which it employs for 
 this eiKl are derived from the nature of intellectual development in general, and they prove 
 themselves empirically correct and just when compared with the particular phenomena of 
 the different periods. Nevertheless, the opinion is scarcely to be approved, that philosophy 
 always expresses itself most purely only in the universal consciousness of the time; the 
 truth is, rather, that it rises above the range of the general consciousness through the 
 power of independent thought, generating and developing new germs, and anticipating in 
 theory the essential character of developments yet to come (thus, e. jr., the Platonic state 
 anticipates some of the essential characteristics of the form of the Christian church, and 
 the doctrine of natural right, in its development since Grotius, foreshadows the constitu- 
 tionalism of the modern state). 
 
 § 6. Philosophy as science could originate neither among the 
 peoples of the North, who were eminent for strength and courage, 
 but devoid of culture, nor among the Orientals, who, though suscep- 
 tible of the elements of higher culture, were content simply to 
 retain them in a spirit of passive resignation, — but only among the 
 Hellenes, who harmoniously combined the characteristics of both. 
 The Romans, devoted to practical and particularly to political prob- 
 lems, scarcely occupied themselves with philosophy except in the
 
 ORIENTAL PHILOSOPnY, 15 
 
 appropriation of Hellenic ideas, and scarcely attained to any produc- 
 tive originality of their own. 
 
 The sacred writinprs and poetry of the various Orienta/ peoples, with their commentaries (Y-King, 
 ChoA-King; the moral treatises of Confucius and his disciples; the Vedas, the code of Many, the SakoDtala of 
 the poet Kalidasa, the Puranus or Tbeogonies, the ancient commentaries; — Zoroaster's Zend.ivesta, etc.) are 
 the original sources from which our knowledge of their philosophical speculations is derived. Of modern 
 works, treating of the religion and philosophy of these peoples, we name the following: — 
 
 Friedr. Crcuzer, Symbolik und Mythologie der alien Volker, 4 vols., Leipsic and Darmstadt, lSlO-12; 
 2d ed., 6 vols., ISl'J ff. ; Werke, 1. 1^ il/id. 1836 seq. K. J. II. Windischmann, Die Philosophie im Fortgan^ 
 der IFeW^t-JscAic/i/e, volume I., sections 1^ (on the "Foundations of Philosophy in the East"), Bonn, 
 1827-34. Stuhr, Die lieligion^synteme der heidninchen Volker den Orients, Berlin, 1S36-3S. Ed. 
 Loth, Geschichte ^mserer abenUindisclien Philosophie, vol. I., Mannheim, 1S46, 2d ed., 18C2. (Roth's 
 first volume is devoted to the speculations of the Persians .ind Egyptians, the second to the oldest Greek 
 philosophy. The book, though written in a lively style, is drawn in large measure from inauthentic 
 sources, and is not free from arbitrary interpretations and too hazardous comparisons. It contains more 
 poetry than historic truth.) Ad. Wuttke, GeschicJUe dea Ileidenthumsi, 2 vols., Breslau, 1S52-53. J. C. 
 Bluntschli, Aliasidtische Gottes- und Weltideen in ihren Wirkungen avf das Gemeiidehen der Men- 
 sche7i,/ii»f Vortrcige, Nordlingen, 1866. Owing to the stability of Oriental ideas, expositions relating to 
 modern times, such as Les Religions et les Philosophies dans VAsie centrale, piar le comte de Gohineaxi, 
 (Paris, 1S60), may be profit.ibly consulted by students of their earlier history. Of. the mytholodcil writings 
 of Schwenck and others, and Wolfgang Menzel's Die vorchristliche Unsterblichkeitslehre (Leipsic, 1S70), 
 Max Duncker's Gescli. der Arier (3ded., 186"), etc., and numerous articles in the Zeitschrift der deutschen 
 morgenlawiixchen Gesellscluifl (ed. by L. Krehl), and in other learned reviews. 
 
 G. Pauthier, Esquisse d'tme llistoire de la Philos. chinoise, Paris, 1844 ; Les Quatre Llvres de Philos. 
 Morale et Politique de la Chine, trad, da Chinois, Paris, 1S6S ; L. A. M.artin, Uistoire de la Morale, I. ; 
 La Morale chez les C/iinois, Paris, 1862 ; J. II. Plath, Die Religion und der Cultus der alien Chinesen, in 
 the Trans-ictions of the Philos. -Philol. Div. of the Bavarian R. Acad, of Sciences, Vol. IX., pt. 3, pp. 731-0G9, 
 Munich, 1863 ; Confucius xmd seiner Schiller Lehen und Lehren, Trans, of the Munich Acad, of Sciences, 
 XI. 2, Munich, 1867; T. Leggc, Tlie Life and Writings of Confucius, uith crit. and exeget. notes (in the 
 author's "Chinese Classics"), London, 1867 [New York, 1870]. 
 
 Colebrooke, Essays on the Vedas; and On the Philosophy of the ffindus,in his Miscellaneous Essays, 
 L pp. 9-113, 227-41D, Lonilon, 1837 ; partial translation in German by Poley, Leipsic, 1S47; new ed. of the 
 Essays on the Ret. and Phil, of the /?!, London, 1858; A. W. v. Schlegel, Bhagavad-Gita, i. e, Qeaneaiov 
 /icAo!, sive Krishnne ct Arjunae colloquium de rebus divinis, Bharatiae epixodium. Te^vt, rcc, adn. adj., 
 Bonn, lS2o; W. v. Humboldt, Ueber die nnter dem Kamen Bhagavad-Gita bekannte Episode des 
 Mahabharata, Berlin, 1826. {Ct IlegeVs article in the Berlin Jahrbti.cher,fiir wiss. Kritik, 1S27.) Chr. Las- 
 sen, Gymnosophista site Indicae philosophiae documenta, Bonn, 1S32; cf. his Ind. Alterthumsku.nde, 
 I.-IV.,Lei[i8. 1847-61; Othra. yra.nk. Die Philosophie der Hindu. Vddanta S<iravon Sadananda, Sanskrit 
 und deutsch, Munich, 1&35; Theod. Benfey, ladien, in Ersch and Grubcr's Encycl. sect II., vol. 17, Lcips. 
 1S40; E. Roer, Vedanta-Sara or Essence of the Vcdantu, Ca:cutta, 1845, and Die Lehrspriiche der 
 VaiQeshika- Philosophie von Kan/ida, translated into the German from the San.^crit, in the Zeitschr der 
 deutschen morgenldndischen Gesellschaft, vol. XXL, 1867, pp. 309-120; Roth, Zur Litteratvr und 
 Geschichte des Weda, 3 essays, Stuttgart, 1846; Alb. "Weber, Indische Literaiurgeschichte. Berlin, 1S52; 
 Indisehe Skisze^i, Berlin, 1857: cf. Indische Studien,cA. by A. Weber, Vol. I. .^eq., Berlin, 1850 ,seq. ; F. M. 
 Miillcr, Beitrdge zur Kenntniss der indischen Philosophie, in the fith and 7th vols, of the Ze't^chrift der 
 deutschen morgenldnd. Gesellschaft, Leipsic, 1852-53; cf. his History of Ancient Indian Literature, 2d 
 ed., London, 1S60; Max MuUer, Chipsfrovi a German Workshop, l.m\(\. 1SG6, X. Y. 1S67; II. II. Wilson, 
 Essays and Lectures on the Religions of the Hindus, collected and edited by R. Rost, Lond. 1S61-62. 
 
 Eug. Burnouf, Introduction d r Uistoire du Bouddhisme indien, Paris, 1844; C. F. Koppen, Die 
 Religion des Buddha, 2 vols., Berlin, 1857-59; W. Wassiljew, 2>fr Buddhi-sjnus, seine Dogmen, Ges- 
 chichte und Littcratur, tran5l. into German fr. the Russian by Th. Benfey, Leipsic, 1860; Barthelemj' St 
 Hilaire, Bouddha ct sa Religion, ie ed., Paris, 1SC2; Jam. de Alwis, Buddhism, its OrigiJi, History, and 
 Doctrines, its Scriptures and their Language, London, 1863; Emil Schlagintweit, Ueber den Gottes- 
 hegrifder Buddhismus, in the Reports of the Bavar. Acad, of Sciences, 18t>4, Vol. I. 83-102; R. S. Il.ardy, 
 7^ Legends and. Theories of the Buddhists compared tcith History and Science, with Introduct<vry 
 Notices of the Life and System of Gotama Buddha, London, 1867. 
 
 K. R. Lepsins. Das Todtenbuch der Aegypter, Leips. 1842 ; Die dgypt. Gotterkreise, Berlin, 1851 ; M. 
 tThlemann, 77«>iA orfer die Wissenschnft der alien Aegypter, Gottingen, 18.55; Aegyptische Alterthums- 
 tiWKf 6, Leipsic, 1867-58; Cbr. K. Josias von Bunsen, Aegyptens Stelle in der Weltgesdiichte., Hamburg
 
 16 ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and Gotha, 1S4&-5T. Cf. also, among other works, the article by L. Diestel, which is well adapted as ipi 
 introduction to the study of early Oriental religions: Set- Ti/phon, Asaftel imd Satati, ein Beitrag zur 
 Iteligiowgeschichte den Orients, in the Zeituchrift fur hUtorische Theologie, edited by Niedner, 1860, 
 pp. 159-217; further, Olllvier Bauregard, Les Divinitea EgyptUnnex, leur Origine, leur CuUe it son 
 Erpansion dans le Monde, Paris, 1S66. 
 
 J. G. Rhode, Die heilige Sage oder das gesammte Religion SRi/stem der alien Baktrer, Meder find 
 Ferser oder des Zend-colks, Frankf. on the M. 1S20; Martin Haug, Die filnf Gathd'a oder Sammlungen 
 von Liedem und Spruchen Zarathustra' s, seiner jUnger n7id Nac/i/olger, l,eips. 1858 and 1860 (in the 
 Transactions of the German Oriental Society); Essay on Sacred Language, Writings, and Religion of 
 the Parsees, Bombay, 1S62. 
 
 On the religious conceptions of the Jews, compare, among others, G. II. Ewald, in his Gesch. des Volkes 
 Israel his auf Christua, L. Ilerzfeld in his Gesch. des Volkes Jisrael von der Vollendung des sweiten 
 Tempels bis zur Einsetzung des Makkahdera Schimon, and Georg Weber in Das Volk Israel in der 
 altieatamentlichcn Zeit, Leipsic, 1867 (the first volume of the work by Weber and Iloltzman, entitled : 
 Gesch. des Volki's Israel und der Entsteliung dea Christenthnms. 2 vols., Leips. 1867). Alexander Kohut 
 (among recent writers) treats specially of Jewish angelology and demonology in their dependence on Par- 
 seeism, in the Abhandl.filr Kvnde dea Morgtnlandes, ed. by Herm. Brockhaus; his work also published 
 separately, Leipsic, 1866. 
 
 The so-called philosophy of the Orientals lacks in the tendency to strict demonstration, 
 and hence in scientific character. 'Whatever philosophical elements are discoverable 
 among them are so blended with religious notions, that a separate exposition is scarcely 
 possible. Besides, even after the meritorious investigations of modern times, our knowl- 
 edge of Oriental thought remains far too incomplete and uncertain for a connected and 
 authentic presentation. "We omit, therefore, here the special consideration of the various 
 theorems of Oriental philosophy, and confine ourselves to the following general state- 
 ments. 
 
 The doctrine of Confucius (551-4'?9 B. c), as also that of his followers (Meng-tseu, 
 born 371 B. c, and others), is mainly a practical philosophy of utilitarian tendency. 
 Its theoretical speculations (which are based on the generalized conception of the an- 
 tithesis of male and female, heaven and earth, etc.) are not scientifically wrought out. 
 The rich but immoderate fancy of the Hindus generated, on the basis of a pantheistic 
 conception of the world, a multiplicity of divinities, without investing them with har- 
 monious form and individual character. Their oldest gods — of whom the Vedas treat — 
 group themselves about three supreme divinities of nature, Indra, Yaruni, and Agni. 
 Later (perhaps about 1300 B. c.) supreme veneration was paid to the three divine beings, 
 which constituted the Hindu Trimurti, viz. : to Brahma, as the original source of the 
 world (which is a reflected picture in the mind of Brahma, produced by the deceiving 
 Maja), to Yischnu, as preserver and governor, and to Siva, as destroj-er and producer. 
 The oldest body of Brahman doctrine is the Mimansa, which includes a theoretical part, 
 the Brahmamimansa or Vedanta, and a practical part, the Karmamimansa. To the (uni- 
 versalistic) Mimansa (-'Investigation") Kapila opposed the Sankhya ("Consideration," 
 " Critique " — an individualistic doctrine, wliich denied the world-soul and taught the 
 existence of individual souls only). We find already in the Sankhya a theor}- of the kinds 
 and the objects of knowledge. To the authors of the Xiaya-doctrine, which subsequently 
 arose, the Syllogism was known. The age of tliese doctrines is uncertain. Jn opposition 
 to the religion of Brahma arose (not far from 550 B. c.) Buddhism, which was an attempt 
 at a moral reformation, hostile to castes, but the source of a new hierarchy. Its followers 
 •were required to make it their supreme aim to rise above the checkered world of changing 
 appearance, with its pain and vain pleasure. But this end was to be reached, not so much 
 through positive moral and intellectual discipline, as through another process, termed 
 "entrance into Nirvana," whereby the soul was saved from the torments of transmigra- 
 tion and the individual was brought into unconscious unity with the All. The Persian reli-
 
 ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 17 
 
 gion, founded or reformed by Zarathustra (Zoroaster), was opposed to the old Hindu religion, 
 whose gods it regarded as evil demons. Over against the kingdom of light or of good was 
 placed, in dualistic opposition, the kingdom of darkness or evil ; after a long contest the 
 former was to triumph. The Egyptians are credited with the doctrines of the judgment 
 of departed souls and of their transmigration, wliich doctrines Herodotus (II. 5.3, 81, 123) 
 supposes to have passed from them to the Orphists and the Pythagoreans. Their 
 mythology seems scarcely to have exercised any influence on the Grecian thinkers. Some- 
 what more considerable may have been the influence on the Greeks of the early astronomi- 
 cal observations of the Egyptians, and perhaps also of their geological observations and 
 speculations. Certain geometrical propositions seem rather to have been merely discovered 
 empirically by the Egyptians in the measurement of their fields, than to have been 
 scientifically demonstrated by them ; the discovery of the proofs and the creation of a 
 system of geometry was the work of the Greeks. The Jewish monotheism, which scarcely 
 exercised an (indirect ?) influence on Anaxagoras, became later an important factor in the 
 evolution of Greek philosophy {i. e. from the time of Neo-Pythagoreanism and in part even 
 earlier), when Jews, through the reception of elements of Greek culture, had acquired 
 a disposition for scientific thought.
 
 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. 
 
 § T. The sources of our knowledge of tlie philosophy of the 
 Greeks are contained partly in the philosophical Avorks and frag- 
 ments which have come down from them to us, and partly in reports 
 and occasional allusions. Modern historians have advanced grad- 
 ually in the employment of this material from the method of mere 
 compilation to a more exact historical criticism and a purer and 
 more profound philosophical comprehension. 
 
 The earlier philosophemes are never mentioned by Plato and Aristotle in the form of 
 mere repetition with historic intent, but always as incidental to the end of ascertaining 
 pliilosophical truth. Plato sketches, with historical fidelity in the essential outlines, 
 though with a poetic freedom of execution, vivid pictures of the various philosophies, 
 •which had preceded his own, as also of the persons who had been their representatives. 
 Aristotle proceeds rather with realistic exactness both in outline and in details, and only 
 departs occasionally from complete historic rigor in his reduction of earlier points of view 
 to the fundamental conceptions of his own system. The increasing restriction of later 
 classical authors to simple narrative is not calculated in general to impart to their state- 
 ments the advantage of greater fidelity, since they are generally lacking either in accurate 
 knowledge of the proper authorities, or in full capacity for the clear comprehension of 
 earlier philosophical opinions. 
 
 Plato characterizes in various dialogues the doctrines of Heraclitus and Parmenides, 
 of Empedocles, Auaxagoras, and the Pythagoreans, of Protagoras, Gorgias, and other 
 Sophists, and especially those of Socrates and of individual disciples of Socrates. Next to 
 him, Xenophon (especially in the Memorabilia) is the most important authority for Socrates 
 and his teaching. Aristotle, in all his writings, makes it his principle to consider, first 
 of all, in the discussion of any problem, what results obtained by his predecessors are 
 tenable, and presents, in particular, in the introduction to liis " first philosophy " (Meta- 
 physics), a critical review of the principles of all earlier philosophers from Thales to Plato 
 {Met. I. c. 3-10). In many places, also, Aristotle gives information concerning Plato's 
 "unwritten doctrines," as delivered in the oral lectures of the latter. A number of minor 
 ■works, in which Aristotle (according to Diog. L., T. 25) had treated of the doctrines of 
 various previous philosophers (nepl tC)v Uvdayopeiuv, nepl ttjc 'Apxvrov <pi?u)ao^iac, Tri-pl t?,c 
 l,TTevai7nrov Kal AevoKpdrovg, etc.) are lost; we find, however, in the Commentators many 
 statements drawn from them. The like is true of the works of Theophrastus on earlier 
 philosophers {n-egl ruv 'Ava^ayopov, ■Kepi tgiv 'Ava^ifievovg, Trepl tuv 'A();i;ePidov, Histories of 
 Arithmetic, of Geometry, of Astronomy, nsgl Tijq Ar/fioKQiTov aaTQO?a)yiag, tuv Aioyevov^ 
 crrvayuyf/, tteqI 'E/meSoiiTiEovc, Meyapwdf, etc., and his comprehensive work, (pvainal 66^ai, of 
 which fragments are extant; an abridgment of this work appears to have been used by 
 later writers as a principal source of information, see Diog. L., V. 42 aeq. ; cf. Usener,
 
 GREEK rniLOSOPHY— -SOURCES. 19 
 
 Analecta Thtophrastea, Leips. 1 858). Of Platoiiists, Speusippus (^rfpt ^/Xoff(5^<jx', Jl/MTun'or 
 iyKufiiov), Xenocrates (^tp' "wv nap/ieviduv and Hv&ayopeia), and Heraclides of Pontus 
 (irept T<ji> Ilv^ayopsiuv, npbg Ta TJjvuvoc;, 'WpaKTieirov i^Tfy^aeig^ irpbg tuv Ar^uoKpiTov e^r/yr/aeif), 
 and, later, notably Clitomachus (about 140 B. c, Trcpt ruv aipiaeuv), and of Aristotelians, 
 besides Theophrastiis and Eudem\is {yEuuergiKal larngiai^ aQf&fiTfriKf/ Icrogia, rrepl t<1)v aarpc- 
 ?.oyovuivu)v laTO()ia). Aristoxcnus (icrropiKa vnofxirfifiara^ Trt:gl Ylv^(iyuf)OV koI tuv y-T'iopi/^u-v 
 ahrnv, II/.dTwvof /3tof), Dicaearch (j3lng 'EAAaJof, also tteqI fHuv), Phanias of Lesbos {~toi 
 riiv ^uKpariKav and Trpof Toitg ao(piaTdg), Clearchus, Strato, Duris of Samos, the pupil of 
 Theophrastus (about 270 B. c), and others either treated originally of earlier philosophers, 
 or wrote works of more general content, or works pertaining to the history of special 
 sciences, which contained material for the history of philosophy. Also Epicurus {Ttpt 
 aipiaeuv) and his disciples, Hermarchus, Metrodorus, and Colotes (in polemical works), and 
 Idomeneus (tteqI tuv I,uKpariKuv), and the Stoics Clean thes (On Heraclitus), Sphaerus (On 
 Heraclitus, On Socrates, and On the Eretrian Philosophers), Chrysippus (On the Early 
 Physiologists), Panaetius (On the Philosophical Schools or Sects, Trept tuv aipiaeuv)^ and 
 others wrote of philosophical doctrines and works. Of all these works, which served as 
 authorities for later writers, we possess none. 
 
 The Alexandrians followed in their works the narratives of the authors above named. 
 Ptolemy Philadelphus {reg. 285-247 b. c.) founded the Alexandrian Library (for which 
 preparations had alread}'' been begun under his father by Demetrius Phalereus, who came 
 to Alexandria about 206 B. c, and) in which the writings of the philosophers were brought 
 together, thougli not a few spurious works were included among them. Callimachus of 
 Cyrene (about 294—224 B. c), while superintendent of this library (in which office he suc- 
 ceeded Zenodotus the Ephesian, who lived about 324—246 B. c), drew up "tables " of cele- 
 brated authors and their works {jvivaKcg tuv iv naoy Trai^ela 6ia/MUTpiivTuv Kal uv awtypa'diav). 
 Eratosthenes (276-194 B. c), who received from Ptolemy Euergetes {reg. 247-222) the con- 
 trol of the Alexandrian Library, wrote concerning the various philosophical schools (^rept tuv 
 KttTa (j)ih)ao(piav alpeaeuv), on which, as it seems, Apollodorus foimded liis (metrical) chron- 
 icle (composed in the second half of the second century B. c), from which, again, Diogenes 
 Laertius and others drew a large part of their chronological data. Aristophanes of Byzan- 
 tium (born about 264, died about 187 B. c, pupil of Zenodotus and Callimachus. successor, 
 as librarian, of Apollonius, the successor of Eratosthenes, and teacher of Aristarchus, 
 who lived about 212-140 b. v.) arranged most of the Platonic Dialogues in Trilogies, 
 placing the others after them as separate works (a part of his supplement to the Tr/vn/cff 
 of Callimachus; see 'S auck' s Sammlung der Frd'jmente cIps Aristophanes rvn Byzanz). Be- 
 sides Eratosthenes, the following persons wrote either expressly or incidentally of tlie 
 lives and succession of the philosophers and of their works and doctrines : Neanthes of 
 Cyzicus (about 240 b. c, resided at the court of King Attains I. in Pergamus, and wrote 
 fiovamd and Trepl tvSo^uv dv6puv), Antigonus Carystius (about 225, pint, etc.), Hermippus 
 (of Smyrna? about 200 b. c), the Callimachean (and Peripatetic), who, like Aristophanes 
 of Byzantium in other departments, furnished in his biographico-literary opuscules, which 
 were only too abundant in fables (TTfpt tuv aoipuv, -rrfpt payuv^ ■nfQi Tli'&ay6p(n<j rrf(2 
 'AptoTOTihwc, nepl QeoippdcTov, (iioc), a supplement to the 7r<'vo/cef of Callimachus (from which 
 Favorinus and, indirectly, Diogenes Laertius drew largely), Sotion the Peripatetic (about 
 190 B. c, nsQi StaSoxuv tuv ^I'kocd^uv), Satyrus (about 180 b. c, ^ioi), Apollodorus of Athens 
 (about 144 B. c, a pupil of Diogenes the Stoic, and author of the mythological f^i^hnB^KT] 
 and of the before-mentioned jpow/cfi, and perhaps also of the work iregl tuv (i)i2.orr6(t>uv 
 algi(7euv\ and Alexander Polyhistor (in the time of Sulla, ^la^nxal tuv (j)i?x)o6(pui'). From 
 the diadoxai of Sotion and the /iloi of Satyrus, Heraclides Lembus (about 150 a c), the
 
 20 GREEK PHILOSOPHY SOURCES. 
 
 aon of Serapion, compiled extracts, which are often mentioned by Diogenes Laertius (who 
 distinguishes — V. 93, 94: — fourteen persons named Heraclides). Antisthenes of Rhodus 
 (about 150 B.C.), the historian, and contemporary of Polybius, was probably the author of 
 the <ptKoa6(f,uv diadoxal^ to which Diogenes Laertius often alludes. Demetrius the Magne- 
 sian, a teacher of Cicero, wrote a critical work on Homonymous Authors {negi ofiuvvfiuv 
 TToiTjTuv Kul avyYpa^eii)v\ from wliich Diogenes Laertius, perhaps tlirough Diodes, drew 
 many of his statements (cf. Scheurleer, De Demetrio Magnete, diss, inaug., Leyden, 
 1858). Didymus Chalcenterus (in the second half of the first century b. c.) also 
 labored in the field of the history of philosophy, as a compiler of sentences. Sosicratea 
 wrote Siadoxai, which Diogenes Laertius often mentions. Diodes Magnes, a friend of 
 Epicureanism and opponent of Sotion, the partisan of the philosophy of Sextius, in the 
 time of Augustus and Tiberius, was the author of works entitled jiioi (pt^oao^v and 
 ivridpoiiij (j}t?Ma6(puv, from which Diog. Laertius, at least in his account of the Stoics, and 
 most likelj' also in that of the Epicureans, drew very largely. (According to Nietzsche, 
 Diogenes derived most of his data from Diodes Magnes and Pavorinus.) 
 
 Of the works of the ancients which have come down to us, those specially important 
 for the history of philosophy are the works of Cicero, Lucretius, Seneca, Plutarch, the 
 historian and Platonic philosopher, Galenus, the physician (bom 131, died after 200 A. d.), 
 Sextus the Skeptic (flourished about 200 a. d., a physician of the empirical school, and 
 hence usually named Sextus Erapiricus), the historical work (founded largely on the otto- 
 fivijuovEvfiaTa and TvavTo^aTri/ IcTopla of Favorinus) by Diogenes of Laerta (in Cilicia, about 
 220 A. D.), and the writings of numerous Neo-Platonists (but Porphyry's <j)Mao(pog la-opla 
 is no longer extant) and commentators of Aristotle ; of similar importance are the works 
 of certain of the Church Fathers, especially those of Justin Martyr (Apolog. and Dialo(j. 
 cum TrypJione), Clemens of Alexandria (Exhorimtion to the Hellenes, Paedagogus, Strmnata), 
 Origen {Contra Celsum, etc.), and Eusebius {Praqmratio EiangeMca), and in part those of 
 TertuUiau, Lactantius, and Augustine. Many materials for the history of philosophy 
 are found in Gellius (about 150 A. D., in his Nodes Atticae), Athenaeus (about 200, 
 Deijmosophistae), Flavins Philostratus (about 200), Eimapius of Sardis (about 400) 
 Johannes Stobaeus (about 500), Photius (about 880, Lexicon and Bibltotheca), and 
 Suidas (about 1000, Lexicon) ; the work ■nregt ruv kv iraiSeig diaXafiij^avruv coipijv, ascribed 
 to Hesychius of Miletus, appears to be a compilation from Diogenes Laertius and Suidas, 
 dating from the 15th century (see Lehrs, in the lihein. Mus. XVII., 1862, pp. 453-457). 
 Cicero gives evidence in his writings of a tolerably extensive and exact acquaintance with 
 the philosophical schools of his time, but his knowledge of Greek speculation was insuffi- 
 cient. A higher value belongs to most of the liistorical statements of the commentators 
 of Aristotle, since these were founded on original works of the philosophers, which were 
 then extant, or on various reports by Aristotle, Theophrastus, and other authors, which 
 have not come down to us. 
 
 Ciceronis Ilistoria Philosophtae Antiquae ex Omnibus JUius Scriptis collegit Fr. Gedike, 
 Berlin. 1782, 1801, 1814. 
 
 The works of Plutarch entitled iregl tuv irpurav <l>iXoao(p7jaavT(jv koi tuv aif avruv, Trepl 
 KvpTp>ai(jv, tK^yi/ ^Mtiao^wi', and crrpu/narelc iffropiKoc are not preserved. Plutarch's 
 "Moralia" contaui valuable contributions to the history of philosophy, especially in what 
 relates to the Stoic and Epicurean doctrines. The work entitled Plut. de Physicis Philo- 
 sojyhorum Decrtfis Libri Quinque (ed. Dan. Beck, Leipsic, 1787, and contained also in Wyt- 
 tenbach's and Diibner's editions of the " Moralia") is spurious. 
 
 Claud. Gakni Liber irepl tpi/oooipov 'laTOQiar (in the complete ed. of the Works of Galen, 
 ?'i. Kiihn, vol. XIX.) The work is spurious. Leaving out the commencement, it agrees
 
 GREEK PHILOSOPHY SOURCES. 21 
 
 almost throughout with the Pseudo-Phitarchic work above-mentioned, of which it is a recen- 
 sion somewhat abridged. In the genuine writings of Galen, however, there is found, in 
 addition to their medical contents, much that concerns the history of philosophy. 
 
 Se.xti Empirici Opera, Pyrrhoniurum Institutionum Libri Tres (nvppdiveioi inzo-nmijaEic, 
 Skeptical Sketches) ; Contra Mathemaiicos sive Disciplin. Proftsaores Libri sex, Contra Philoso- 
 phos lib)-i quinque; the two also together under the title: Adversus Math. Libri XI. 
 (Against the representatives of the positive sciences and against philosophical dogmatists.) 
 Ed. Jo. Alb. Fabricius, Leipsic, 1718; reprinted ibid. 1842. Ex. rec. Imm. Bekker, Berlin, 
 1842. 
 
 Flavii Philostrati Vitae Sophistarum. Ed. Car. Lud. Kayser, Heidelberg, 1838. Opera 
 ed. Kayser. Ziirich, 1844-46; ibid. 1853; ed. Ant. Westermann, Paris, 1849. 
 
 Athcnaei Deipnosophistae. Ed. Aug. Meineke, Leipsic, 1858-59. 
 
 Diogenis Laertii de Vitis, Dogmatibus et Apophthegmaiibus Clarorum Philosophorum libri 
 decern (■Jrept (iicjv, doyfiaruv /cat awo^^eyiiaTorv T(jv kv (piXoao^ia ehdoKiiiriadvTuv j3if3?i.ia deKo). 
 Ed. Hiibner, 2 vols., Leips. 1828-31; Commentaries on the same, vols. I. and II., Leips. 
 1830-33, containing the notes of Is. Casaubonus, Aeg. Menagius and others. The com- 
 mentary of Menagius on Diogenes Laertius appeared first in 1G52. Diog. L. Be Vitis, etc., 
 ex Jtalicis codicibus nunc primum excMssis recensuit C. Gabr. Cobet. Accedunt Olympiodori, 
 Ammonii, Jarnblichi, Porphyrii et aliorum Vitae Platonis. Aristotelis. Pythagorae, Plotini et 
 Jsidcri, Ant. Westermanno, et Marini vita Prodi, J. F. Boissonnadio edentibus. Graece et 
 Latine cum indicibus, Paris, 1850. Cf Frdr. Bahnsch, De Diog. L. Fontibus, {diss.-inaug. 
 Regimontanensis,) Gumbinnen, 1868; Frdr. Nietzsche, De LasrUi Diogenis Fontibus, in 
 the RJiein. Museum, new series, XXIII. 1868, and XXIY. 1869. Diogenes Laertius dedi- 
 cated his work, according to III. 47, to a female admirer of Plato. His general attitude 
 is that of an Eclectic, while in the different parts of his work he is influenced by 
 the character of the sources from which he draws. Diogenes brings the history 
 of Platonism down to Clitomachus, that of Aristot«lianism to Lyco. that of Stoicism, 
 in our te.xt, to Chrysippus, though originalh- (as shown by Valentine Rose in tlie 
 Hermes, vol. I., Berlin, 1866, p. 370 fF.) it was continued to Comutus ; he names tlie 
 principal Epicureans down to Zeno of Sidon, Demetrius Laco, Diogenes Tarsensis, and 
 Orion ; only the history of Skepticism is brought down by him to his own time, i. e., till 
 near 220 a. d. 
 
 Clementis Aiexandrini Opera. Ed. Reinhold. Klotz, Leipsic, 1830-34. Origenis (j,t/x)ao. 
 (povueva, in Jac. Gronovii Thesatir. Aniiqvitatum Graecarum, torn. X., Leyden, 1701, pp. 
 257-292. Compendium Historiae Philosaphicae Antiquae sive Philosophutnena, quae sub 
 Origenis nomine circum/eruntur, ed. Jo. Christoph. Wolf, Harab. 1706, 2d ed., ibid. 1716; 
 also in the complete editions of Origen. Qpiyevovg (j)i?iO(!o<povfi€va ?) /card naaijv alpeaeuv 
 kXeyxcc, Origenis Philosophumena, sive Omnium ITaeresium Rtfutatio, e codice Parisino nwic 
 primum ed. Emman. Miller, O.xford, 1851. S Hippobjti RefiUationis Omnium Haeresium 
 Librorum Decern qjiae supersxmt, ed. L. Puncker et F. G. Schneidewin, opris Schneidewino 
 defunct'} ab-solvii L. Duncker, Gott. 1859, ed. Patricius Cruice, Paris, 1860. Of this work, 
 the first book, which seems to be founded in large measure on the abridgment made in the 
 Alctaudrian period, of the Tzepl (pvacKiJv of Theophrastus, is identic^il with the <f>t?iooo- 
 <j)0v/j.eva, which is all of the work that was known until recenth'. Books IV.-X., with 
 the exception of tlie beginning of Book IV., were found in a cloister on Mount Athos 
 in 1842. That Origen was not the author of the work is certain ; that it was written by 
 the Church Father, Hippolytus, who lived about 220 a. d., and was a pupil of Irenjieus, is 
 extremely probable. 
 
 Eusebii Praeparatio Evangelica, ed. Viger, Paris, 1628; ed. Heinichen. Leips. 1842—43.
 
 22 GREEK PHILOSOPHY — SOURCES. 
 
 Euaebius draws very largely from Pseudo- Plutarch, da Placitis Philoso2)liorum, or more 
 likely from a fuller editiou of that work. 
 
 Eunapii Sardiaui Vitus Philosophoi-um et Sophistarum. Ed. J. F. Boissonade, Amst. 
 1322; Paris, 1849. 
 
 Jo. Stobaei Florikgium, ed. Thom. Gaisford, Oxford, 1822; Leipsic, 1823-23; ed. Aug. 
 Meiuecke, Leipsic, 1855-57. Eclogae Physicae et Ethicae, ed. Arnold Herm. Lud. Heereu, 
 Gott., 1792-1801 ; ed. Thom. Gaisford, Oxford, 1850; ed. Aug. Meineke, vol. I., Leips. 1860, 
 Vol. II., ib. 1864. The Eclogae agree with Pseudo-Plutarch, De Placitis Philos., and Pseudo- 
 Galen in those parts which relate to tlie same topics, but they contain, in passages, fuller 
 extracts from the common source from which each of these writers drew. Many of the 
 statements of the Bishop Theodoret, who died in 457, were drawn from this compilation. 
 
 Hesychii Milesii Opuscula, ed. Jo. Gonr. Orelli, Leipsic, 1820. 
 
 Siini)licii Gomm. ad Arist. Physicas Auscultationes. Ed. Asulanus, Venice, 1526. 
 
 Michael Hissman, in the Magazin fiir die Philosophie und ihre Geschichie, 6 vols. Gott. 
 and Lemgo, 1778-83, brought together a number of essays taken from the Annals of 
 various academies, many of which relate to ancient philosophy. Among these, attention 
 may be directed to the articles on Thales and Anaximander by the Abbe de Canaye, on Py- 
 thagoras by De la Nauze and by Freret, on Empedocles by Bonamy, on Anaxagoras by Abbe 
 le Batteux and by Heinius, on Socrates by Abbe Fraguier, on Aristippus by Le Batteux, on 
 Plato by Abbe Garnier, on Callisthenes by Sevin, on EuheTnerus by Sevin, Fourmont, and 
 Foucher, on Pa7iaetiiis and on Athenodorus by Sevin, on Musonius and on Sextius by De 
 Burigny, on Peregrinus the Cynic by Capperonier, and on Proclus by De Burigny. 
 
 Christoph. Meiners, Historia Doctrinae de Vtro Deo, Lemgo, 1780. Geschichte des 
 Ursprungs^ Fortgangs und Ver/alls der Wissenchaften in Griechenland und Bom, Lemgo, 
 1781-32. Grundriss der Gesch. der Weltweisheit, Lemgo, 1786; 2d ed. 1789. 
 
 D. Tiedemann, Griechenlands erste Philosophen oder Leben und Systeme des Chpheus, Phere- 
 cydes, Thales, und Pythagoras, Leipsic, 1781, 
 
 Fr. Vict. Lebereclit Plessing, Histor. und philos. Untersuchungen iiher die Denliart, 
 Theologie und Philosophie der iiltesten Volker, vorzHglich der Griechen, bis auf Aristot. Zeit, 
 Elbing, 1785; Mnemonium oder Versuche zur Enthiillung der Geheimnisse des Alterthunis, 
 Leipsic, 1787 ; Versuche zur Aufkliirung der Philosophie des Ultesten Alterthums, Leipsic, 
 1788. 
 
 Willi. Traug. Krug, Geschichte der Philosophie alter Zeit, vornehmlich unttr Grieclien und 
 Riimern, Leipsic, 1815; 2d ed., 1827. 
 
 Zeller writes of what has been done in the department of the history of ancient philoso- 
 phy since Buhle and Tennemann, in the Jahrbiicher der Gegenwart, July, 1843. 
 
 Historia plnlosojthiae Graeco-Romanae ex, fontium locis coniexta. Locos coUegerunt, dis- 
 posuerunt, notis auxtrimt H. Hitter, L. Preller. Edidit L. Preller, Hamburg, 1838. Edit. 
 IL recogn. et auxit L. Preller, Gotha, 1856. Ed. III. Gotha, 1864. Ed. IV., 1869. (A val- 
 uable compilation.) 
 
 Fragmenta PJiilosophorum Graecormn, ed. F. W. MuUach, Paris, 1860-67. 
 
 Christian Aug. Braudis, Ilandbuch der Geschichte der Griechisch- Romischen Philosophie 
 (Part I.: Pre-Socratic Philosophy; Part II., 1st Div. : Socrates, tlie Imperfect Disciples of 
 Socrates and Plato; Part IL, 2d Div.: Aristotle; Part III., 1st Div.: Review of the Aris- 
 totelian System and Exposition of the Doctrines of his Immediate Successors, as transition 
 to the third period of the development of Greek Philosophy). Berlin, 1835, '44, '53, '57, '60. 
 Geschichte der Entwickelungen der griechiscJien Philosophie und ihrer NnchwirknngeTi im 
 romischen Reiche, first half (till Aristotle). Berlin, 1862, second half (from the Stoics and 
 Epicureans to the Neo-Platonists, constituting, with the '■'■ Ausfiihrungen," which appeared
 
 GREEK PHILOSOPHY SOURCES. 23 
 
 in 186G, the 2d division of the 3d part of the '' HandbucK') ih. 1S64. An extremely care- 
 ful, comprehensive, and learned investigation. The " Geschichte der EntioicMungen " is a 
 shorter and compendious treatment of the subject. 
 
 Aug. Bernh. Krisclie, Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der alien Phihsophie. 1st Vol. : Dis 
 theologischen Lehren der griechuschen Dtnlcer, eine Priifung der Darstelluny Cicero's, G-ottingen, 
 1840. 
 
 Ed. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, eine Untersuchung iiher GhararAer, Gavg umi 
 JIauptmomente ihrer Entwickelung (Part I. : General Introduction, Pre-Socratic Philosophy. 
 Part II.: Socrates. Plato, Aristotle. Part III. : Post-Aristotehan Philosophy), Tiibingen, 
 1344, "46, '52. Second revised edition, with the title, Die Philosojihie den- Griechen in ihrer 
 ge-sch. Entwickelung dargestelU. Part I., Tiib. 1856. Part II. (Socrates and th<.' Socratic 
 Schools, Plato and the Old Academy), Tiib. 1856. Part II. 2d Div. (Aristotle and the Early 
 Peripatetics), Tiib. 1862. Part III. 1st Div. (Post-Aristotelian philosophy), 1st half, Leips. 
 1865; 2d half, with a Register, ib. 1869. Third P]dition, Part I., ib. 1869. ["Socrates 
 and the Socratic Schools'' (London, 1868) and "The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics" 
 (Lond. 1869), are translations by Dr. Oswald Reichel from this work of Zeller. — Tr.'\ This 
 work gives evidence of the most admirable combination of philosophical profoundness 
 and critical sagacity in the author. The philosophical stand-point of the author is a Hege- 
 lianism modified by empirical and critical elements. 
 
 Karl Prantl, Uebersicht der griechisch-roraischen Philosophie, Stvittgart, 1854; new 
 edition, 1863. 
 
 A. Schwegler, Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, ed. by 0. Kostlin, Tiibingen, 1859; 
 second enlarged edition, ib. 1870 (1869). 
 
 Ludwig Striimpell, Die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, zur Uebersicht, Repetition 
 tind Orientirung bei eigenen Studien entiuorfen (1st Div.: The Theoret. Philos. of the 
 Greeks; 2d Div.: Their Practical Philosophy), Leipsic, 1854-61. The stand-point is 
 Herbartian. 
 
 N. J. Schwarz, Manuel de VHistoire de la Philosophie Ancienne, Liege, 1842 ; 2. ed. 
 Liege, 1846. Ch. Renouvier, Manuel de Philosophie Ancienne, Paris, 1845. Charles 
 Leveque, Etudes de Philoaophie Grecque et Latine, Paris, 1864. L. Lenoel, Les Philoso- 
 phes de VAntiquite, Paris, 1865. M. Morel, Hist, de la Sagesse et du Gout chez les Grecs, 
 Paris, 1865. 
 
 Franco Fiorentino, Saggio Storico suUa Filosofia Greco-, Florence, 1865. 
 
 "W. A. Butler, Lectures on tlie History of Ancient Philosophy, edited by W. H. Thompson, 
 2 vols., Cambridge, 1856; London, 1866. Lectures on Greek Philosophy, and other Philo- 
 sophical Remains of James Frederick Ferrier, ed. by Al. Grant and E. L. Lushington, 2 
 vols., Edinb. and London, 1866. [Hitter's Jlisfory of Ancient Philosophy, translated from 
 the first volumes of Hitter's general history, mentioned above, § 4, by Alex. J. W. Morri- 
 son, 4 vols., Oxford, 1838-46. Walter Anderson, The Philosophy of Ancient Greece investi- 
 gated in its Origin and Progress, Edinb. 1791. — Tr.'\ 
 
 Of ancient physical theories, Th. Henri Martin treats in La Foudre, I'Electricite, et la 
 Magnetisme chez les Andens, Paris, 1866. Cf also Charles Thurot, Recherches Eistorique.s 
 sur le Principe d'Archimede (Extrait de la Revue Archeologique), Paris, 1869. 
 
 On Greek and Roman theories of law and of the state, cf. — beside the work of K 
 Hildenbrand, cited above, p. 13 — A. Veder, Historia Philosophiae Juris apud Veteres, Leyden, 
 1832; Herm. Henkel, Lineamenta Artis Graecorum Politicue, Bovl 1847; Studien zu einer 
 Geschichte der griechischen Lehre vom Staat, in the Philohgus, Vol. IX., 1854, p. 402 seq. ; Zur 
 Geschichte der griech. StaatswUs. (G. Pr.) Salzwedel, 1863 and 1866, Stendal, 1867 and 1869. 
 M. Voigt, Die Lehre vom Jui N'aturale, Aequum et Bonum und Jus Gentium dor Romer,
 
 24 THE EARLY POETS AXD SAGES. 
 
 Leips. 1866. (On Greek theories, pp. 81-176.) Cf. also the extensive work of Ihering: 
 Geist des romischen Rechts auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwickelung, Leips. 1852 seq. 
 
 Of the relation of Hellenic Ethics to Christianity, Neander treats in his Wiss. Abhand- 
 lungen, ed. by J. Jaoobi, Berlin, 1851; cf. his above-cited ^'Vorlesungen iiber die Gesch. der 
 christlichen Eihik." W. "Wehrenpfennig (Progr. des JoachimsthaVschen Gymnasiums, Berlin, 
 1856) writes of the diversity of ethical principles among the Hellenes and its causes. Ad 
 Gamier, De la Morale dans VAntiquite, Paris, 1865. 
 
 On ancient Esthetics, see Eduard Miiller, Gesch. der Theorie der Kvnst lei den Alien, 
 Breslau, 1834-37. Cf. Zimmermann's Gesch. der Aesthetik and A. Kuhn, Die Idee des 
 Schonen in Hirer Entwic.kelimg bei den Alien bis in unsere Tags, 2d edit., Berlin, 1865. 
 
 On the doctrine of Unity, see Wegener, Be Uno sive Unitate apud Graecorum Philosophos., 
 Realschul- Progr., Potsdam, 1863. 
 
 On ancient views of the Immortality of the Soul, see Karl Arnold, Gymn.-Progr., 
 Straubing, 1864. 
 
 Of the Philosophy of Language among the ancients, treat Lersch (Bonn, 1841), and H. 
 Steinthal (Geschichte der Sprachtviss. bei den Griechen und Romem, Berhn, 1863-64). Cf. 
 Schomann. Die Lehre von den Redetheilen bei den Alien, Berlin, 1862. 
 
 § 8, The efforts of the poetic fancy to represent to itself the nature 
 and development of things divine and human precede, excite to, and 
 prepare the way for philosophical inquiry. The influence of the 
 theogonic and cosmogonic notions of Homer and Hesiod on the 
 development of the earliest Greek philosophy was only remote and 
 inconsiderable; but perhaps certain Orphic poesies, as also the 
 Cosmology of Pherecydes of Syros (who iirst wrote in prose, about 
 600 B. c), and, on the other hand, the commencement of ethical reflec- 
 tion, which manifested itself in proverbs and poems, exercised a more 
 direct and essential influence. 
 
 The nnmerous works relating to those phases of intellectnal development, which preceded the advent 
 of philosophy, can not here be named with any degree of fullness ; it may suffice only to direct attention 
 to K. F. Nagelsbach's Homer. Theologie (Nurembersr, 1840) and his NachhmneriHcJie Theologie, also to the 
 works of Creuzer and Voss, the first volumes of Grotes History of Greece, the Popvldre Aufsdtze of 
 Lchrs, the works of Preller and others on Grecian Mythology, and various monographs, such as Eamdohr's 
 Zur IIomeriHclien Ethik {Programm des Gymnas. su Liineberg), etc Cf. Lobeck, De Carminibua 
 Orphicis, Konigsb. 1S24; De Orphei Aetate, ih. 1S26; Aylaophamun s. de Theol. Mtjst. Graecorum 
 Ciinnu, 2 vols., ib. 1829; K. Eichhoff, De Onomacrito Atheniensi, Gymn.-Progr., Elberfeld, 1840; C. 
 Haupt, Orpheu.% I/omerui, OnomaoriUis ; sive Tlieologiae et Philosophiae Initia apvd Graeeos, Gymn.- 
 Progr., Konigsberg in Neumark, 1S64; J. A. Hartung, Die Religion und Mytholoijie der GHecheii, 
 Leips. 1865 {ITartung detects in Epimenides, the Cretan, and Onomacritus a confusion in matters of be- 
 lief, due to the introduction of Egyptian, Phenician, and Phrygian superstitions); P. E. Schuster, De reteri^ 
 Orphicae theogoniae indfle atque origine, aocedit ffe/lnniei theogonia Orphica, Leipsic, 1869. On 
 Pherecydes, cf Friedr. Wilh. Sturz (Gera,lT89; 1798), Leips. 1824; L. Preller, Die Theogoniedex Ph. v. S. 
 in the Rhein. Jfits.f. Philol. new series. Vol. IV., 1S46, pp. 377-389, and in VrMefs, Auxgeip. Avfs.. c<\.\>y 
 R. Kohler, Berlin, 1864, pp. 350-361 ; R. Zlmmermann, L'eher die Lehre de--i Ph. v. S. und ihr Verhultnini 
 tn nnxxergriechlichen Glaubetiskrelseii, in Fichte's Zeitxcfir. f. Philot. Vol. 24. No. 2, 1854, and Joh. Con- 
 rad, De Pherect/dis Syrii Aetate atque Cosnwlogta {DUm. Bonnenmn), Ccblentz, 1856.— Karl Dilthey, 
 Cn'eck. Fraginente (Part I. : Fragments by the seven wise men, their contemi'oraries. and the Pj-tha- 
 P'lreans), Darmrtadt, 1S.'?5; H. AViskemann. De iMcedaenumiornm Philonnphtn et P!iilnmphisi deque 
 ffptem qnos dincnt SaptentibjM, Lac. dixripuKu et imitntorihiix. Hersfeld. 1840: Otto Bernhardt. THe niehen 
 VTeifieti Griechenlnndt, Gymn.-Progr., Sonm, 1804: Frc. Aemil. Bohren. De Septem Sa]ne7>tibiis, Bona, 
 ISCT.
 
 THE EARLT POETS AND SAGES. 25 
 
 The Homeric poems seem to imply an earlier form of religious ideas, the gods of which 
 were personified forces of nature, and they recall in occasional particulars (e. g. II. VIII., 
 19sq., myth of the aetpr/ xp^'<^^^fl) Oriental speculations; but all such elements in them are 
 v.'ithout exception clothed in an ethical form. Homer draws thoroughlj' ideal pictures of 
 human life, and the influence which his poetry in its pure naivete exercised on the Hellenes 
 (as also the less elevated influence of the more reflective poetry of Hesiod), was essentially 
 ethical and religious. But when this education had accomplished its work in sufficient 
 measure, the moral and religious consciousness of the race, increasing in depth and finding 
 the earlier stadium insufficient, advanced to a more rigorously polemic attitude, and even 
 proscribed the ideal of the past as a false, misleading, and pernicious agency (Xenophanes, 
 Heraclitus, and Plato). After this followed a species of reconciliation which lasted during 
 several centuries before the final rupture, but rested in part only on the delusive basis of 
 allegorical interpretation. Greek philosophy made incomparably greater advances in 
 that earlier polemic period than after its friendly return to the poetry of Homer and 
 Hesiod. 
 
 At a later time, when renewed speculation was again inclined to concede to the most 
 ancient poetry the higheet authority, the belief of earher times, that the Homeric poetry 
 was preceded by another of more speculative character, namely, the Orphic, found much 
 credit. According to the primitive legend, Orpheus was the originator of the worship of 
 Bacchus among the Thracians. Cosmogonic poems were early ascribed to him (by Ono- 
 macritus, the favorite of the Pisistratidae, and others). Herodotus says (II. 5.3) : " Homer 
 and Hesiod framed the theogony of the Hellenes ; but the poets, who are believed to have 
 lived before them, in my opinion, were their successors;'' in II. 81 (cf. 123), Herodotus 
 declares the so-called Orphic and Bacchic doctrines to be Egyptian and Pythagorean. 
 Those Orphic cosmogonies of which we have most precise knowledge date from an epoch 
 much later still, and arose tmder the influence of the later philosophy. It is, however, 
 susceptible of sufficiently convincing demonstration, that one of the Cosmogonies origi- 
 nated in a comparatively early period. Damascius, the Neo-Platonist, relates (Z)« Princ. 
 p. 382), tliat Euderaus, the Peripatetic, an immediate disciple of Aristotle, reported the 
 substance of an Orphic theogony, in which nothing was said of the intelligible, owing to 
 its being utterly inexpressible — so Damascius explains it from his stand-point — but the 
 beginning was made with Night. We may certainly assume that Aristotle also was 
 acquainted with this theogony (cf. also Plat. Tim., p. 40 c). Now Aristotle says, Metaph., 
 XIY. 4, that the ancient poets and the latest (philosophical) Oeo/.uyoi represented (panthe- 
 istically) what is highest and best as being not first, but second or subsequent in order 
 of time, and resulting from a gradual development ; while those, who (in point of time and 
 in their modes of thought and expression) stood between tlio poets and the pliilosophers 
 {ol /lefityfievoi avTuv), like Pherecydes, who no longer employed exclusively the language 
 of mythology, and the magi and some Greek philosophers, regarded (theistiailly) that 
 wliich is most perfect, as first in order of time. "What "ancient" poets (apxaloi TzoLTjTai, 
 whose time, for the rest, may reach down, in the case of some of them, into the sixth cen- 
 tury b. c.) are here meant, Aristotle indicates only by designating th.cir principles: oiov 
 NvKTa Kal Ovpavov t/ Xan^ fj 'nKeav6v. Of these Xdo^ is undoubtedly to be referred to 
 Hesiod (navruv fisv T^puricra Xdnq yiver', avrdp i-etra TaV Evpvarepvoc k. t. ?.. Theog. Y. 
 116 sq. ; £K Xaeog S" *Epe/3of te iiEXaLvd re Niif iyivovTO, ib. 123), 'fl/ceavof to Homer {'ilKcavov 
 re i?£uv ytveaiv ml fiTjrEpa l^'^vv, II. XIT. 201 ; II. XIV. 240 : 'i2«avdf, lic-tp yivtci^ 
 ■ndvreaai rervKrai), and Nvf Kal Ovpav6^, therefore, to some other well-known theogony, 
 in all probability to the same Orphic theogony which was described by Eudemus ; and 
 Sn this ease this theogony must have arisen, at the latest, in the sixth century before
 
 26 PERIODS OF DEVELOPMENT. 
 
 Christ, since Aristotle reckons its author among the "ancient poeta" {TrotrjTal ap;(alo(). 
 But this theogony, and indeed all the theogoiiies, to which the Aristotelian testimony 
 assigns a comparatively high antiquity, agree substantially, according to the same authority, 
 with the theogonies of Homer and Hesiod in their religious conceptions. Zeus appears 
 as the eternal ruler of all and as the soul of the world, in the following verse, which is, 
 most likely, the Tvalaibc Aoyoc to which Plato refers in Le'j., IV. 715 e: — 
 
 Zeyf ap^ri, Zeiir /xtniya, Atur 6' £k Trdvra rirvKTai. 
 
 Pherecydes, of the island of Syros (about 600-550 e. c), wrote a theogony in prose, 
 which is cited under the title of 'ETVTd/nvxog, probably from the folds (juvxolc) of his Koofior. 
 Diogenes Laertius cites, as follows, the opening words of this work (I. 119): Zevf fiev koI 
 Xp6vog elf dec Kat X6o)v fjv. Xdoviy de bvofia kyivsTo Tf/, cTetrf^ airry Zevg yipag SiSol. 
 
 The cosmologist, Epimenides, who was nearly contemporary with Pherecydes, describes 
 the world as coming forth from night and air, and belongs consequently to those whom 
 Aristotle designates as Ik vvktoc yevvuvrec dEoAoyoi. Acusilaus made Chaos first, Erebus 
 and Night being its children. Hermotimus of Clazomenae appears to have been one of the 
 theistical cosmologists (see below, § 24). 
 
 The so-called " Seven "Wise Men," Thales, Bias, Pittaciis, and Solon ; Cleomenes, Myaon 
 (or, according to others, Periander), and Chilon (Anacharsis, Epimenides, and others are 
 also named), with the sayings attributed to tlicm (Tliales: " Know Thyself," or, " What is 
 difficult? To know one's self; and what is easy? To advise another;" Solon: "Hold 
 the beautiful and good more sacred than an oath; " "Speak not falsely;" "Practice dili- 
 gently things excellent ; " " Be slow in acquiring friends, but those thou hast taken, do not 
 cast off; " "Learn to command by first learning to obey; " "Let thy advice be not what ia 
 most agreeable, but what is most honorable; " " Notliing in ex'cess;" Bias: "The posses- 
 sion of power will bring out the man," cited b}'' Arist., Elh. Nic, V. 3, and "The most aro 
 bad," etc.; Anacharsis: "Rule thy tongue, thy belly, tliy sexual desires," etc.), are repre- 
 sentatives of a practical wisdom, which is not yet sufficiently reflective to be called philos- 
 ophy, but which may pave the way for the philosophical inquiry after ethical principles. 
 In the Platonic dialogue Protagoras (p. 343), the " Seven "Wise Men " are spoken of as 
 exponents of Lacedajmonian culture expressing itself in moral maxims. The Aristotelian 
 Dicaearch {ap. Diog. Laert., I. 40) terms these men, with reason, "neither sages nor philos- 
 ophers, but rather men of broad common sense, and lawgivers {phre aotpovq ovte (f)i2.oa6(iiovc, 
 cwETovQ 6s Ttvag koI vo/xoSetikovc). Thales, who is occasionally mentioned as the wisest 
 of the seven sages, was at oiice an astronomer and tlie founder of the Ionic Natural 
 Philosophy. 
 
 § 9. The Periods of Developinent of Greek (and its derivative, 
 Roman) philosophy may he characterized, in respect of the object of 
 inquiry in each, as follows : 1st Period : Prevailing direction of pliil- 
 osopliical inquiry toward the universe of nature, or predominance of 
 Cosmology (from Thales to Anaxagoras and the Atomists); 2d Period : 
 Prevailing direction of philosophical inquiry toward man, as a willing 
 and thinking being, or predominance of Ethics and Logic — accom- 
 panied, however, by the gradual resumption and a growing encour- 
 agement of natural philosophy (from the Sophists to the Stoics, Epicu- 
 reans, and Skeptics) ; 3d Period : Prevailing direction of philosophical
 
 PERIODS OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 27 
 
 inquiry to the subject of the divine nature and the relation of the 
 world and man to it, or predominance of Theosophy, but not excluding 
 pliysics, ethics, and logic (from Neo-Pythagoreanism till the exit of 
 ancient philosophy in the Neo-Platonic school). As to the form of 
 philosophy in the successive periods, the first period was charac- 
 terized, in the main, by the immediate direction of thought to things, 
 though not without some attempts at mathematical and dialecti- 
 cal demonstration ; the second, by the introduction of the Definition as 
 an organ of inquiry, and the third by the prevalence of the idea of 
 mystical absorption in the Absolute. The germs of the peculiar con- 
 tent and also of the form of philosophy in each of the later periods are 
 discernible partly at the culmination and partly at the termination of 
 the period in each case next preceding ; the most eminent thinkers of 
 the second (in most of its representatives, prevailingly anthropological) 
 period rose nearest to a comprehensive philosophy. In the first period, 
 the persons representing the same or similar types of philosophy were, 
 as a rule (though by no means without exception), of the same race (the 
 earliest natural philosophy having arisen and flourished among the 
 lonians, while Pythagoreanism found its adherents chiefly among the 
 Dorians). But in the second period philosophical types became inde- 
 pendent of race-distinctions, especially after the formation at Athens 
 of a center of philosophical activity. The home of philosophy was 
 now coextensive with the Hellenic world, including in the latter 
 those nations subjected to the Macedonian or Roman supremacy, in 
 which the Hellenic type of culture remained predominant. In the 
 third period, the Hellenic mode of thought was blended with the 
 Oriental and the representatives of philosophy (now become theos- 
 ophy) were either Jews under Hellenic influence, Egyptians and 
 other Orientals, or men Hellenic in race who were deeply imj)regnated 
 with Orientalism. 
 
 Diogenes of Laerta (whose arrangement is based on an unintelligent and exaggerated 
 use of the distinction of Ionic and Italic philosopliy) repeats (III. 56) an observation, 
 which had been made by others before him, and which is worthy of note, to the effect 
 that the first "koyoq of the Greek philosophers was physical, while Ethics was added by 
 Socrates, and Dialectic by Plato. 
 
 Brucker follows substantially the arrangement of Diogenes Laertius, but begins a new 
 period with philosophy under the Romans. In this period he includes, beside the Roman 
 philosophers, the renewers of earlier schools, especially the Neo- Pythagoreans and the so- 
 called "Eclectic Sect" (so termed by him after Diog. Laert., I. 21, where Potamo is spoken 
 of as founder of an eclectic school), i. e. the Neo-Platonists, and also the later Peripatetics, 
 Cynica, etc., and the Jewish, Arabian, and Christian philosophers down to the end of th»
 
 28 PERIODS OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Middle Ages, the restoration of the sciences, and the commencement of modem phi- 
 losophy. 
 
 Tennemann divides Greek and Roman philosophy into three periods : 1. From Thalca 
 to Socrates — beginning in fragmentary speculations concerning the external world : 2. 
 From Socrates to the end of the contest between the Stoa and the Academy — in which 
 period speculation was called off from nature and directed to the human mind as the 
 source of all truth ; 3. From philosophy under the Romans and the New Skepticism of 
 ^nesidemus to John of Damascus — the period of the marriage of the "Western with the 
 Oriental mind, when men looked outside of the mind for the source of certitude and 
 declined into syncretism and fanaticism. 
 
 Similarly, H. Ritter distinguishes three periods of philosophical development : Pre- 
 Socratic Philosophy, the Socratic Schools (among which he includes the earlier Skeptics, 
 Epicureans, and Stoics) and the Later Philosophy down to Neo-Platonism. The first 
 period includes "the first awakening of the philosophic spirit," the second, "the most 
 perfect bloom of philosophical systems," the third, "the downfall of Greek philosophy." 
 More precisely, the first period is characterized, according to Ritter, by the one-sided scien- 
 tific interest, from which in it philosophical inquiry departs, its variety of direction being 
 determined by variety of race ; the second, by the complete systematic division of philoso- 
 phy (or at least " of that which the Greeks generally understood by philosophy ") into its 
 various branches, the different races no longer philosophizing each in its own way, but 
 "this philosophy being brought forth, as it were, from the intellectual totality of the Greek 
 nation;" the third, by the loss of the sense of the systematic order essential to Greek 
 philosophy, although the tradition of it was preserved, and by the decadence of the 
 peculiarity and vigor of the Greek mind, while scientific discipline was gradually covering 
 a greater range of experiences and being extended to a greater number of men. Ritter's 
 classification is based essentially on Schleiermacher's estimate of the philosophical signifi- 
 cance of Socrates, n.amely, that Socrates, by his principle of krwivledgs, rendered possible 
 the union of the previously isolated branches of philosophical inquiry in an all-em oracing 
 philosophical system, which union Plato was the first to realize. In accordance herewith, 
 Schleiermacher divides Greek philosophy, in his Lectures edited by Ritter, into two 
 periods, entitled " Pre-Socratic Philosophy," and " Philosophy from Socrates to the Neo- 
 Platonists ;" yet he sometimes himself subdivides the latter period into two periods, one 
 of bloom, the other of decay. 
 
 Brandis agrees, on the whole, with Ritter in his appreciation of the development of 
 Greek philosophy, yet with the not immaterial difference, that he transfers the Stoics and 
 Epicureans and the Pyrrhonic and Academic Skeptics from the second period of develop- 
 ment ("the time of manly maturity") to the third (" the period of decline"). 
 
 Hegel distinguishes three periods : 1. From Thales to Aristotle ; 2. Grecian philosophy 
 in the Roman world; 3. The Neo-Platonic philosophy. The first period extends from 
 the commencement of philosophizing thought till its development and perfection into a 
 scientific whole and into the whole of science. In the second period philosophical 
 science becomes split up into particular systems ; izch. system is a theory of the universe 
 founded entirely on a one-sided principle, a partial truth being carried to the extreme 
 in opposition to its complementary truth and so expanded into a totality in itself 
 (systems of Stoicism and Epicureanism, of whose dogmatism Skepticism constitutes the 
 negative face). The third period is, with reference to the preceding one, the affirmative 
 period, in which what was before opposed becomes now harmoniously united in a divine 
 ideal world. Hegel distributes the first period into three sections : a. From Thales to 
 Anaxagoras, or from abstract thought, as immediately determined by its (external) object,
 
 PKE-SOPHISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 29 
 
 to the idea of thought as determining itself; b. Sophists, Socrates, and disciples of 
 Socrates — thought which determines itself, is apprehended as present, as concrete in me — 
 principle of subjectivity; c. Plato and Aristotle — thought objective, the Idea, occupies the 
 whole sphere of being (with Plato, only in the form of universality, but with Aristotle, as 
 a fact confirmed in every sphere of real existence). 
 
 Zeller's first period extends from Thales to the Sophists, inclusive. The second 
 includes Socrates and his incomplete disciples, Plato and the Old Academy, Aristotle and 
 the earlier Peripatetics. All Post- Aristotelian philosophy is included in the third. In the 
 first period all philosophy takes an immediately objective direction. In the second period 
 the fundamental notion is that of the objectivity of ideas or of thought as per se existing, 
 in which Socrates recognized the supreme end of subjective endeavor, Plato the absolute, or 
 substantial reality, and Aristotle not simply the essence, but also the forming and moving 
 principle of the empiricallj' real. In the third period all independent speculation centers 
 in the question of the truth of subjective thought and the manner of life calculated to 
 bring subjective satisfaction ; thought withdraws from the object- world into itself. Even 
 Neo-Platonism, whbse essential character is to be sought in the tran.scendent theosophy 
 which it embodied and for which Skepticism prepared the way, furnishes, in Zeller's 
 opinion, no exception to the subjective character of the third period, since its constant and 
 all-controlling concern is the inward satisfaction of the subject. 
 
 No division can be regarded as truly satisfactory, in which reference is not had, so far 
 as practicable, at once to the prevailing object, the form and the geographical locahzation 
 of philosophy in the difierent periods. 
 
 FmsT (Pkevailingly Cosmological) Period of Greek Philgsopeit. 
 
 PRE-SOPHISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 § 10. The first period of Greek Philosophy includes, 1) the earlier 
 Ionic Natural Pliilosophers, 2) the Pythagoreans, 3) the Eleatics, 4) the 
 later Natural Philosophers. The Ionic "physiologists," predisposed 
 thereto by their racial character as lonians, directed their attention to 
 the sphere of sensible phenomena and inquired after the material prin- 
 ciple of things and the manner of their generation and decay ; for 
 them, matter was in itself living and psychically endowed. The Pytha- 
 goreans, whose doctrines flourished chiefly among the Greeks of Doric 
 race, especially in Lower Italy, sought for a principle of things which 
 should account at once for their form and substance, and found it in 
 number and figure. The philosophy of the Eleatics turned on the 
 unity and immutability of being. The later natural philosophers were 
 led by the antithesis in which the Eleatic speculation stood to the
 
 30 PRE-SOPHISTIU I'HILOSOPHT. 
 
 earlier natural philosophy, to attempt a mediation; to this end, they 
 admitted, on the one hand, the Eleatic doctrine of the immutability of 
 being, but affirmed, on the other, with the Pre-Eleatic philosophers, its 
 plurality, and explained its apparent changes as due to the combina- 
 tion or severance of immutable, primitive elements. With the last 
 representatives of natural philosophy and, especially, in the doctrine 
 of Anaxagoras concerning the independent existence and world- 
 disposing power of the divine mind (Noi)^-), the way was already beino- 
 prepared for the transition to the following period. 
 
 Fragmenta Philosophorxum Graecorum (of the time before Socrates), ed. Fr. Guil. Mullach, Paris 
 1800, Vol. II., ibid. 1867. 
 
 H. Ritter, Geschichte der lonischen Philosophie, Berlin, 1821. Chr. A. Branciis, Ueber die Reihen- 
 folge der lonischen Physiologen, in the Rhein. Mus., III. pp. 105 seq. Mallet, Ilw^mre de la Philomphie 
 JoHienne, Paris, 1S42. K. F. Herrnann, Be PhiloxopJiovmn Jonicoriim Aetatilus, Gott. 1849, 
 
 Ed. Both, Geschichte unserer abendUbulischen Philosophies 2d vol. (Greek Philosophy. The earliest 
 Ionic thinkers and Pythagoras), Mannheim, 185S, 2d ed., 1S62. 
 
 Aug. Gladisch, Die Pythagoreer und die Schinesen. Posen, 1841 ; Pie Eleaten und die Indier, ibid. 
 1S44; Pie Religion und die Philosophie in ihrer weltge^chichthche7i Entwickelung, Breslau, 1852; 
 Empedoklea und die Aegypter, Leipsic, 1868; IJerakleitos und Zoroaster, Leips. 1859; Anasctigoran und 
 die Jsra'dliten, Leipsic, 1854; Pie J/yperboreer und die alien Schinesen, eine historieche Untersuchung, 
 Leips. 1866. 
 
 Max Schneidewin, Ueber die Keime erkenntnisitheoretischer und ethischer Philosopfieme bei den 
 vorsokrat. Penkern (G.-Progr.), Arnstadt, 1868, and in Berguiann's Philos. Monatshefte, Vol. II., Ber- 
 lin, 1869. 
 
 A.S a. result of the peculiar cosmological principles adopted by the Pythagoreans and 
 Eleatics, Ethics appeared already in germ among the former and Dialectic among the 
 latter. Yet the Pythagorean and Eleatic philosophies are scarcely, for that reason, to be 
 termed (with Schleiermacher) respectively ethical and dialectical in their fundamental 
 character. These philosophies are, rather, like the speculation of the lonians, essentially 
 cosmological, and their ethical and dialectical tendencies result only from the manner in 
 which they seek to solve the cosmological problem. The Pythagoreans brought, not 
 ethics, but only the mathematico-philosophical theory of nature under a scieiitijk, form, and 
 the Eleatics produced no theory of dialectics. 
 
 In his work entitled PMo^oos des Pythagoreers Lehren (Berlin, 1819, p. 40 sq.), Boeckh 
 compares the different types of Greek philosophy in the first period with the characteristics 
 of the races, in which the several types were developed, with the following result. In the 
 materialistic view of the principles of things and of the manifold life and activity 
 of the material elements, as held by the Ionic philosophers, Boeckh finds an expres- 
 sion of the sensuousness of the lonians, of their attachment to the external, of their 
 sensibility to external impressions, and of their lively, mobile disposition. The Doric 
 character, on the contrary, was marked by that inward depth, from which springs vigorous 
 action, and by a quiet but persistent adherence to fixed and almost indestructible forms. 
 This character manifested itself in the tendency to ethical reflection and speculation — 
 although the latter never rose to the form of a developed theory — and more especially in 
 the circumstance, that the Doric thinkers sought to explain the nature of things by 
 adducing, not a material, but a formal principle, a principle which should account for their 
 unity and order. Thus Pythagoras was said to be the first to call the world Cosmos, and, in 
 conformity with the peculiarity of the Doric character, in conformity even with the spirit of
 
 THE IONIC NATURAL PHILOSOPHEES. 31 
 
 the government under which they lived, the philosophy of the Dorians assumed, externally, 
 the form of a confederation or order. Philosophy, says Boeckh, from its sensuous begin- 
 ning among the lonians, passed through the intermediate stage of Pj'thagoreauism (mathe- 
 matical intuition) to the non-sensuous doctrine of Plato, who had in tlio Eleatics able but 
 too one-sided predecessors, and who, by the Socratic method of criticism, limiting and 
 correcting not only the Eleatic philosophy, but also the other pliilosophies, the one by 
 the other, evolved from thera the most perfect system which the Hellenic mind was 
 capable of producing. Boeckh draws tlie following parallel between the successive theories 
 held in regard to the principles of things, and the degrees of the dialectical scale given by 
 Plato (see below, §41): the poetic-mythical symbols of the period previous to the exist- 
 ence of philosophy proper, correspond with ehaaia, the lonians investigate the realm of 
 things sensible, the aladnrd, the Pythagoreans investigate the mathematical order of 
 things, the Siavonrd, and the Eleatics the purely spiritual, intelligible, the voTfrd. The 
 influence of Eleaticism on the doctrines of the later natural philosophers has been espe- 
 cially pointed out by Zeller (who, however, still separates Heraclitus from the earlier 
 lonians). 
 
 To what extent the philosophy of this period (and hence the genesis of Greek philos- 
 ophy in general) war, affected by Oriental influences, is a problem whose definite solution 
 can only be anticipated as the result of the further progress of Oriental and, especially, of 
 Egyptological investigations. It is certain, however, that the Greeks did not meet with 
 fully developed and completed philosophical systems among the Orientals. The only 
 question can be whether and in what measure Oriental religious ideas occasioned in the 
 speculation of Grecian thinkers (especially on the subject of God and the human soul) a 
 deviation from the national type of Hellenic culture and gave it its direction toward the 
 invisible, the inexperimental, the transcendent (a movement which culminated in Pytha- 
 goreanism and Platonism). In later antiquity, Jews, Neo-Pythagoreans, Neo-Platonists, 
 and Christians unhistorically over-estimated the influence of the Orient in this regard. 
 Modern criticism began early to set aside such estimates as exaggerated, and critics have 
 manifested an increasing tendency to search for the explanation of the various philoso- 
 phemes of the Greeks in the progressive, inner development of the Greek mind ; but, in 
 their care not to exaggerate the results of external influences, they have verged perhaps too 
 near to the opposite extreme. The labors of Roth and Gladisch mark a reaction against 
 this extreme, both of them again laying stress on the influence of the Orient. But Roth's 
 combinations, which bj'- their audacity are capable of bribing the imagination, involve too 
 much that is quite arbitrary. Gladisch concerns hhnself, primarily, rather with the com- 
 parison of Greek philosophemes with Oriental religious doctrines, than with the demon- 
 stration of their genesis ; so far as he expresses himself in regard to the latter, he does 
 not affirm a direct transference of the Oriental element in the time of the first Greek 
 philosophers, but only maintains that this element entered into Greek philosophy through, 
 the medivun of the Greek religion ; Oriental tradition, he argues, must have been received 
 in a religious form by the Hellenes in very early antiquity, and so become blended with 
 their intellectual life ; the regeneration of the Hindu consciousness in the Eleatics, of the 
 Chinese in the Pythagoreans, etc., was, however, proximately an outgrowth from the 
 Hellenic character itself. But this theory has little value. It is much easier either for those 
 who deny altogether that any essential influence was exerted on the Greek mind from the 
 East, or for those who affirm, on the contrary, that such an influence was directly trans- 
 mitted through the contact of the earlier Greek philosophers with Oriental nations, to 
 explain the resemblance, so far as it exists, between the different Greek philosophies and 
 various Oriental types of thought, than for Gladisch, from his stand-point, to explain th»
 
 32 THALES OF MILETUS AND HIPPO. 
 
 separate reprodtiction of the latter in the former. For the ethical and anthropomorphitic 
 character impressed by the Greek poets upon the mythology of their nation was of such a 
 character as to eflace, not merely all traces of the influence of different Oriental nations 
 iu the religion of the Greeks, but all traces of Oriental origin whatsoever. The hypothesis 
 of a direct reception of Chinese doctrines by Pythagoras, or of Hindu doctrines by Xe- 
 nophanes, would indeed belong to the realm of the fanciful. But that Pythagoras, and 
 perhaps also Empedocles, appropriated to themselves Egyptian doctrines and usages 
 directly from Egypt, that possibly Anaxagoras, or perhaps even Hermotimus, his prede- 
 cessor, came in contact with Jews, that Thales, as also, at a later epoch, Democritus, 
 sought and found iu Egji'pt or in Babylonia material for scientific theories, that Heraclitus 
 was led to some of his speculations by a knowledge of Parseeism, and that therefore the 
 later philosophers, so far as they join on to these, were indirectly (Plato also directly) 
 affected in the shaping of their doctrines by Oriental influences, is quite conceivable, and 
 some of these hypotheses have no slight degree of probability. 
 
 § 11. The philosophy of the earlier Ionic physiologists is Hylozo- 
 ism, i. e., the doctrine of the immediate unity of matter and life, 
 according to which matter is by nature endowed with life, and life is 
 inseparably connected with matter. 
 
 This development-series includes, on the one hand, Thales, Anaxi- 
 mander, and Anaximenes, who sought mainly the material principle 
 of things, and, on the other, Heraclitus, who laid the principal stress 
 on the process of development or of origin and decay. 
 
 Ku<L Seydel, Per Fortechritt der Metaphysik unter den altesten Joniachen PhilosopTien, Leips. 1861. 
 In justification of the inclusion of Heraclitus in this series, cf. below, §§15 and 22. 
 
 § 12. Thales of Miletus, of Phenician descent and born in or 
 about Olympiad 35 (640 b. c), is distinguished by Aristotle as the 
 originator of the Ionic Natural Philosophy (and hence indirectly also 
 of Greek philosophy in general). The fundamental doctrine of his 
 philosophy of nature is thus expressed : Water is the original source 
 of all things. 
 
 The later philosopher, Hippo of Samos, or of Rhegium, a physicist 
 of the time of Pericles, also saw in water, or the moist, the jmnciple 
 of all things. 
 
 Some of the earlier historians of philosophy — as Brucker, notably — treat very fully of TTtales, but 
 without the requisite degree of criticism. The opuscule of the Abb6 de Canaye on Thales may be con- 
 sulted in the Memoires de Litterature, t. X., or iti German, in Michael Hissman's Magasin, Vol. I., pp. 
 809-444; cf. further J. II. MuUer (Altd. 1719), Doderlin (1750), rioucquet (Tub. 1763), Harless (Erlang., 
 1730-84), Flatt (De Thei/tmo Thaleti Milesio abjudieando. Tub. 17S5), Geo. Fr. Dan. Goess ( Ueber den 
 Begriff der Genchichte der Philosophie, und iiber das System des Tliales, Erlangen, 1794), and, recently, 
 F. Decker (Z)6 Tlialete Milesio, Inaugural Diss., Halle, 1865); cf. also, besides Bitter, Brandis, Zeller, and 
 other historians, Aug. Bernhard Krische, Forschungen avf dem. Oebiete der alten PMlos., I., pp. 84—42. It 
 remained for the most recent investigators to return to the testimony of Aristotle, and measure later testi- 
 mony by his. 
 
 On Sifpo, cf. Schleiermacher ( Vhtersuchung Uber den PhiloaopJien Hippon, read in the Berlin Acad.
 
 THALES OF MILETDS AND HIPPO. 33 
 
 of Sciences on the 14th of Febr., 1820; publisheil in Schleiermacher's Sdmmtliche TTer>fce, Alth. IIL, voL 3, 
 Berlin, lS3o, pp. 403-410), aud Wilh. Uhrig (Z>e Hippone Atheo, Gicsson, 1;>4S). 
 
 For determining the time of Thales' life, a datum is furnished in the report that ha 
 predicted an eclipse of the sun. which took place in the reign of the Lydian king Alyattes 
 (Herod., I. 74). The date of this eclipse, according to the supposition of Baily {Philosoph. 
 Transactions, 1311) and Oltmanns {Abh. der Bed. Akad. d. Wiss., 1812-13), is September 30, 
 610 B. c, but, according to Bosanquet, Hind, Airj- {Phihs. Trans., vol. 143, p. 179sq.), and< 
 Jul. Zech (J. Zech's Astron. Untersuchungen ilber die loicMigeren Finsternisse, welche von den 
 SchrifMellern des class. Alte7-thums erwdhnt U'erden, Leipsic, 1853), May 28, 585 E. c* The 
 latter date is defended l^y P. A. Hansen {Darlegung der theoret. Berechnung der in den Mond- 
 tafeln angeiuandten Siortmgen, ziceite uhhandlung, in the 7th vol. of tlie Abhandlungen der 
 math.-phys. CI. der K. Sachs. Ges. der Wiss., Leips. 1864, pp. 379 sq.). "With it agrees also the 
 supposition adopted, according to Diog. Laert. (T. 22), by Demetrius Phalereus in his List 
 of Archons {avaypa(pj] tuv apx6vTwi'), that Thales was named cro^df, while Damasias was 
 
 ♦ Zech and others write 5S4; but the year denoted in astronomical usage by this number is the same as 
 that designated in the ordinary and approvable practice of historians as 5S5 b. c, i. e.. the SSSth year before 
 the conventional point of departure of our chronology, which lies about IS^^ years before the day of tho 
 Emperor Augustus's death (Aug. 19, a. d. 14). Zech follows the custom introduced among astronomers 
 by Jacob Cassini (cf. Ideler's //(inc/bvch der Cfironologie, p. 75, and ZM/'/;?tcA, p. 89 sq.) of design.iting 
 every year before the birth of Christ by a number one less than the usual one. This mode of designation 
 (which is in so far defensible, as according to it the 25th Dec. of the year ± rt is removed by ± a years from 
 the beginning of the era) is, it is true, convenient for the purposes of astronomical calculation, but deviates 
 from historic usage, and is even itself in so far less appropriate, as it (not to mention how few days of the 
 year fall after the 25th of December, which, as the presumptive birthday of Jesus, itself formed the point of 
 departure in the new division of the years, according to the original and in principle unchanged intention) 
 makes the year + 1 iha Jirst year after the beginnins of the Christian era, but the year — 1, the seco7id 
 year before the beginning of this era : in the former every day is distant years and a fr.iction, but in tho 
 latter 1 year and a fraction from the commencement of our era. According to this astronomical usage, the 
 year, near the end of which the birth of Jesiis is placed, is numbered 0, the whole of it, with the exception 
 of the last days of December, falling before the birth of Christ. According to this reckoning, the year — a 
 is the year after which, without counting tliat year itself, n years are counted lill the birth of Christ; tho 
 year + a ought consistently to be the year, up to which, without counting that year, a years are reckoned 
 from the same date ; and there ought, therefore, to be a year after Christ, which the astronomer is never- 
 theless as far as the historian from positing. The historical usage is perfectly consequent in making tho 
 year 1 after the birth of Christ follow immediately on the year 1 b. c. as the first ye.ir of the era; this usage 
 we follow here without exception. 
 
 The above are the Julian date.'i. It is customary to extend backward the Julian Calendar and not the 
 Gregorian, in reckoning ancient time. Yet tho reduction of all historical dates to Gregorian dates affords 
 the by no means unessential advantage of making the equinoxes and solstices in the earliest historical 
 times fall in the same months and on the same days as now. The historian, at least (who, for the rest, 
 always deviates from the inaclice of the astronomer in the indic.ition of years and d.ays), ought to give 
 ancient dates according to the Gregorian Calendar. In order to m.akc the reduction, tho provisions whicli 
 were made at the introduction of the Gregorian Calendar (in 1582, when the 15th of October was made to 
 follow iinmcdiately upon the 4th) for the future, and with reference to a portion of the past (viz. : that in 
 every 400 years three interciilary days of the Julian Calendar should fall away, namely, in the yc.irs whose 
 numbers are divisible by 100 and not by 400 without remainder), must be applied also to the earlier past. 
 For the eclipse of Thales the Gregorian date, thus determined, is May 22, 585 r.. c. 
 
 In like manner the .Tulian dates in § .",9, § 01, etc., should be reduced to the Gregorian. From the Julian 
 date for the years 601 to ,501 n. c. 6 d.iys .ire to be subtracted, from 501 to 301 b. c. 5 d.ays,301 to 201. 4 days, 
 201 to 101, 3 days, 101 n. o. to a. d. 100, 2 days, a. n. 100 to 200, 1 day. For the years a. i). 300 to 500, one 
 day is to be added, 500 to 600, 2 days, etc. Yet it would bo, perhaps, still bettor to carry out Midler's 
 proposal and modify the Greirorian Calendar throughout, so that at the end of every 12S years an inter- 
 calary day of the Julian Calendar f-houlil fall away. The advantage of this reform would be greater 
 exactness in the demarcation of the srasons of the year, less uncertainty in the citation of early historical 
 dates, and perhaps also a diminution of the difficulty of harmonizing the llusso-Groek and occidental 
 calend.ars. 
 
 3
 
 34: THALES OF MILETUS AKD HIPPO. 
 
 Arclion at Athens (586-5 b. c). Apollodorus, in his Chronicle (according to Diog. Laert^ 
 T. 37), places his birth in Olympiad 35. 1 (640-639 B. c). 
 
 It is possible that Thales had learned of the Saros,, i. e. the period of the eclipses, dis- 
 corered after prolonged observation by the Chaldeans, and covering 233 synodic months, 
 or 6585 i days, or that he even knew of the greater period of 600 years. Yet on the basis 
 of this Saros, eclipses of the moon only, and not eclipses of the sun, could be foreknown 
 with a sufQcient degree of probability, for any determinate locality, and the prediction 
 ascribed to Thales is therefore probably only a legend, which arose perhaps from his 
 scientific explanation of the eclipse of the sun after it had taken place. Cf. Henri Martin, 
 Sur quelqiies predidioiis d'edipse^ mentionnees par des auteurs anciens, in the Revue Archeo- 
 logique, IX., 1864, pp. 170-199. 
 
 Thales belonged (according to Diog. L., I. 22) to the family of the Thelides (f/c ruv 
 67!?ii6(bv), whose ancestor was Cadmus the Phenician, and who emigrated (according to 
 Herod., I. 146) from Thebes to Ionia. Thales distinguished himself not only in the region 
 of scientific investigation, but also in political affairs ; he is reported, in particular, to have 
 dissuaded the Milesians from allying themselves with Croesus against Cyrus (Herod., I. 
 75; 170; Diog. L., I. 25). The writings which were in later times attributed to Thales 
 {vai'TiKy aarpn'Aoyia and others), had (according to Diog. L., I. 23) already been declared 
 spurious by some in antiquity. Aristotle speaks, probably, only from the reports of others, 
 of his fundamental philosophical doctrine, and only conjecturally of the argumentation by 
 which he supported it. 
 
 Aristotle says, Metaph., I. 3 : " Of those who first philosophized, the majority assumed 
 only material principles or elements, Thales, the originator of such philosophy (Qalijg 6 
 TTJc TotavTTjq apxT/oQ <pi7ioao(piac), taking water for his principle. He was led to this, prob- 
 abl}-, by the observation, that the nutriment of all things is moist, and that heat itself is 
 generated by moisture, and living beings live by it; — but that by which any thing is 
 generated is its principle ; — further, by the observation that the seed of all things is 
 naturally moist; but the principle, in virtue of which the moist is moist, is water." In the 
 same place and in De Coelo, II. 13, Aristotle reports that Thales represented the earth 
 as floating on the water. It is possible that the geognostic observations (as of sea-shells 
 in mountains) also lay at the bottom of Thales' doctrine. 
 
 Arist., De Anima, 1.2: " According to Thales, the magnet is animated, because it attracts 
 iron." Ihid. I. 5 : " Thales believed that all things were filled with gods " (miiTo ■K'Arjpr) 6tuv 
 that). Aristotle does not in this place affirm that the doctrine had been professed by 
 Thales, that "soul is mixed with all things," but only says conjecturally, that perhaps 
 such a conception was the ground of his belief in the universal presence of the gods. 
 Cicero's conception of the doctrine of Thales (De Nat. Deorum, I. 10) is unhistorical : 
 " Tliaks Milesius aquam dixit esse initium rerum, deum auiem earn mentern^ quae ex aqua 
 cuncia fingeretf^ for the Dualism here expressed, which stands in direct opposition to 
 Hylozoism, belongs, according to the express testimony of Aristotle {Metaph., I. 3), to 
 none of the earlier physiologists, Anaxagoras (and Hermotimus) being the first dualists. 
 
 Thales is said to have first taught geometry in Hellas. Proclus says {Ad Euclid., p. 19) 
 that arithmetic arose among the Phenicians and geometry among the Egyptians, and adds : 
 GaA^f de Trpurov e'lq Alyvirrov e/.^uv fiETt/yaycv ilg ttjv 'E/l/.dJ« ttjv -deupiav ravrrp^ koI 
 TTO/lAd fiev avToq evpe, voKkuv <!e tck; apxaq roZf //et' avrbv vcprfy^aaro^ rn'ig fiev Ka'&nXiKUTcpov 
 iTTi^aHcyv, Toit; tie a'la'&TjTLKurepov. Proclus attributes to liim, in particular, four propo- 
 sitions (following, for Nos. 3 and 4, according to his express statement, and probably also 
 for Nos. 1 and 2, the authority of Eudcmus, an immediate pupil of Aristotle) : 1. That 
 the circle is halved by its diameter (ih. p. 44) ; 2. That the angles at the base of an isosceles
 
 ANAXIMANDER OF MILETUS. 35 
 
 triangle are equal to each other (p. 67); 3. That the opposite angles formed by intersecting 
 lines are equal to each other (p. 79) ; 4. That two triangles are congruent, when one side 
 and two angles of the one are equal to the corresponding parts of the other (p. 92). The 
 report (Plutarch., Conviv. Septem Sap.^ c. 2), that he taught the Egj-ptian priests how to 
 measure at any time the height of tlie pyramids by their shadows presupposes that he 
 was acquainted with the theorem of the proportionality of the sides of similar triangles. 
 According to Diog. L., I. 24 sq., the proposition, that the angle inscribed in a semicircle is a 
 right angle, was by some attributed to Thalos, by others to Pythagoras. On the begin- 
 nings of geometry among the Egyptians, cf. Herod., II. 109; Plat., Phaedr.. p. 274; Arist., 
 Metaph., I. 1, p. 981b, 23; Strabo, XVII. 3 {ed. Mein.). 
 
 The reason, according to Aristotle, why philosophy begins with Thales, is that in his 
 attempt to explain the world, a scientific tendency is first manifested, in opposition to the 
 mythical form, whicli prevailed in the works of the ancient poets, and, to a great extent, 
 in those of Pherecydes also. Still, many problems remained too comprehensive for the 
 immediate attainment of a strictly scientific solution. 
 
 Of Hippo (who, according to a Scholion to Aristoph., Nub., 9G, — cited by Th. Bergk. 
 Comm. de Reliquiis Comoediae Ait., Leips. 1838 — was ridiculed by Cratinus in the iravo-rat) 
 Aristotle speaks seldom and not with praise. He calls him a very ordinary man 
 {(tiopTiKurEpov, Be Anima, I. 2), and says that on account of his shallowness {Sia ri^v evri/^iav 
 avToii r^f Siavolag) he can scarceh' be reckoned among the philosophers {Metaph., I. 3). 
 
 § 13. Anaximander of Miletus, born Olymp. 42.2 (= 611 b. c), 
 first, among the Greeks, composed a work " on Nature." He teaches : a 
 "All things must in equity again decline into that whence they havevj^iiJC. I 
 their origin ; for they must give satisfaction and atonement for injus- fXsf^Ly^ 
 
 tice, each in the order of time." Anaximander first expressly gave to^ -V— - 
 
 the assumed original material substance of things the name of jt>r?'n- <^ 
 ciple (apxv)' As such principle he posits a matter, undetermined hi^y- y^U*^ 
 quality (and infinite in quantity), the arreipov. From it the elementary 
 contraries, warm and cold, moist and dry, are first separated, in such 
 manner that homogeneous elements are brought together. Through 
 an eternal motion, there arise, as condensations of air, innumerable 
 worlds, heavenly divinities, in the center of which rests the earth, a 
 cylinder in form and unmoved on account of its equal remoteness 
 from all points in the celestial sphere. The earth, according to 
 Anaximander, has been evolved from an originally fluid state. Living 
 beings arose by gradual development out of the elementary moisture, 
 under the influence of heat. Land animals had, in the beginning, the 
 form of fishes, and only with the drying up of the surface of the earth 
 did they acquire their present form. Anaximander is said to have 
 described the soul as aeriform.— VW^^-^t-LrM^^^K^-^c - S^!-<^-«..*KJt t 
 
 Schleiermacher, Ueber AnaadmandroR (rend in the Berlin Acaj. of Sciences, Nov. 11, 1811), in the. 
 jLbh. o'er philos. CI., Berlin, 1815, and in Vol. II. of the 3d Div. of the Comphte Works of S., Berlin, 1S38, * * 
 
 pp. 171-296. Cr., besides the essay by the Abbe de Ciinaye (German in Hisstnann's Magaein), KiischeV 
 Forachungen, I., pp. 42-62, and Busgen, Ueber das aweipov Anaximnnders (G. Pr.), Wiesbaden, 1S67.
 
 36 ANAXIMANDKR OF MILETUS. 
 
 For determining the time of Anaximander's birtli we have only the statement of Apol- 
 lodorus to rest upon, who says (Diog. Laert., 11. 2), that in the second year of the 58th 
 Ol3rrap. (54T-546 B. c.) Anaximander was 64 years old; according to this, lie must have 
 be(?ii born in 01. 42.2 (611-610 B. c). He occupied himself with astronomy and geography, 
 ma(ie a geographical map (according to Eratosthenes, ap. Strabo, I. p. 7) and also an astro- 
 uomical globe (afalpa, Diog. L., II. 2), and invented the sun-dial (yvu/juv, Diog. L., IT. 1), 
 or rather, since this instrument was already in use among the Babylonians (Herod., II. 
 109), made it known to the Greeks and, in particular, introduced it into Lacedajmon. 
 From a work of his, the following sentence (probably changed into the oratio obliqua by 
 the narrator) is preserved {ap. Simplieius, In Arist. Phys., fol. 6 a): ef uv rfe ti -yevecrig kan 
 roli; ovff/., Kal t?/v (p-Qopav dq ravra yiveai^m Kara to xP^^v- 6id6vaL yap avra riaiv nal d'lKriv riji, 
 adtKiac Kara rf/v tov xP^'^ov ra^iv. (Definite individual existence, as such, is represented 
 afl au adiKia, injustice, which must be atoned for by extinction.) 
 
 "With the ansipov, or " Infinite," of Anaximander are connected several disputed questions. 
 The most important is, whether the aneipov is to be understood as a mixture of all distinct 
 elementary substances, from which the various individual things were mechanically sifted 
 out (Hitter's view), or, as a simple and qualitatively indeterminate matter, in which the 
 different material elements were contained only potentially (as Herbart and the majority 
 of recent historians suppose). The Aristotelian references, taken by themselves, might 
 seem to conduct to the former conclusion. Aristotle says, Phys., I. 4: ol J' U tov evot; 
 f'vovtrar rag ivavTLOTTjTaq tKKpivta'dat (Myovaiv), (Jairep ' Ava^i/xavdpog (j)i]ai koI baoi 6' ei> kuI 
 TToXXd (paaiv eivai, uarep "EuTrei'ioK'Atjc ««' 'Ava^ayopag. The doctrine with which this is set in 
 contrast, is (that of Anaximenes and other natural philosophers), that the manifold world of 
 things was formed from the one original substance by condensation and rarefaction (Arist.. 
 Metaph., XII. 2 : koI tovt' IgtI to ' Ava^ayopov iv . . .Kal 'E/iTrefJo/cAeoff to fuy/j.a kuI 'Ava^i^ 
 fjdvSpov). In Mdaph., I. 8 (§§ 19 and 20, ed. Schw.), Aristotle seems to attribute the theory 
 of an aopioTov^ or an indefinite, imqualified first substance, only to later, Post-Anaxagorean 
 pliilosophers (with special reference to the Platonists). But the statement of Theoplirastus, 
 reported by Simplieius {Art^t. Phys., fol. 33), that, provided the mixture asserted by Anax- 
 agoras be conceived as one substance, undetermined in kind and quantity, it forms an 
 (iTreipov like that of Anaximander {el 6e Tig tt/v fi't^iv tuv aTvavTuv viroXdfioi fiiav elvai <bvaiv 
 ddpioTov Kal Kar' eldog kuI KaTo. fiiyE'&og, — (paivsTai to. aufiaTiKd oToixda -rrapan'^Tjaiug ttoiuv 
 'Ava^ifiavSpu), is decidedly favorable to the second view. And this view alone accords with 
 the logical consequence of the system. For the first would require, in addition to the mix- 
 ture, a vovg, or controlling mind, which yet Anaximander does not assume ; unmistakable 
 witness is borne to his Hylozoism by Aristotle, in Phys., III. 4, according to which passage 
 lie taught of tlie cnreipov, that itself was the Divine, and that it embraced and governed 
 ail things. It is probable that Anaximander expressed himself with as little distinctness 
 respecting the nature of his anEipov as did Hesiod respecting liis Chaos, and that this 
 accounts for the uncertainty in the statements of the different authorities. 
 
 A second question in dispute is whether or not the aireipnv of Anaximander is a sub- 
 stance intermediate between air and water, as the ancient commentators of Aristotle sup- 
 posed it to be. Aristotle says {De Coelo, III. 5), that all those who assume such a substance, 
 represent things as having arisen from it by condensation and rarefaction ; but he denies of 
 Anaximander that he taught this process of evolution {Phys., I. 4) ; hence he can not have 
 regarded the dneipov of Anaximander as such an intermediate substance, and all the less 
 so, if, as shown by the above citation, he supposed it to be only a mixture (jilyfia). Who 
 they are, that assumed a substance intermediate between air and water, and also who are 
 meant by those who, according to Phys., I. 4, assumed one intermediate between fire and
 
 ANAXIMENES, DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA. 37 
 
 air, is unknown ; but probably Zeller is right in referring the latter assumption to 3ater 
 physiologists, whose doctrine had grown out of that of Anaximenes, or perhaps out of that 
 of Anaximander and of Empedocles. 
 
 § 14. Anaximenes of Miletus, younger tlian Anaximander, and 
 perhaps also one of his personal disciples, posits air as the first prin- 
 ciple, and represents fire, wind, clouds, wate r, and eartli as produced 
 from it by ^c ondensation (Tru/cvaxrtf) and-"*- rarefaction {y-dvioaic or 
 dpatwm?-). The earth, which is flat and round like a plate, is sup- 
 ported by the air. " As our soul, which is air, holds us together, so 
 breath and air encompass the universe." 
 
 Diogenes of Apollonia, who lived in the fifth century before 
 Christ, also sees in air the original essence and innnanent ground of 
 all things. So also Idseus of Ilimera. 
 
 Besides the histori.iDS of philosophy, Krische (Forschungen, I. i)p. 52-5") treats especially of Anax- 
 imenes. 
 
 Schlejerniachor, Ueher IHogeneJi von Apollonia (read in the Berlin Academy of Sciences, January 
 20, 1811), in the Ahh. der ph. CI., Berl. 1814; reprinted in Schleiermacher's Werke, Ahth. III. vol. 2, Berlin, 
 1838, pp. 149-170. F. Panzerbioter, De Diogeuls A. Vita et Scriptis, Meiningen, 1S2.3; Diogenes Apoi- 
 loniales, Leipsic, 1830. Cf. Krische, Forsohungen, I. pp. 163-1T7. 
 
 The birth of Anaximenes is placed by Apollodorus (Diog. Laert., II. 2) in the 63d 
 Olympiad (528-524 B. c). Yet perhaps here the time of his birth has been confounded 
 with the time when he flourished or with the year of his death. According to Suidas, he 
 was living in the 55th Olympiad, in the time of Cyrus and Croesus. Diog. L. terms him 
 (ibid.) a pupil of Anaximander. The dialect of his work was (according to the same locia) 
 the pure Ionic. 
 
 Aristotle testifies (Metaph., 1. 3): "Anaximenes and Diogenes hold the air to be prior to 
 water, and place it before all other simple bodies as their first principle." But this air, 
 without detriment to its materiality, Anaximenes conceived, conformably to his hylozoistio 
 stand-point, as animated. From tlie work composed by Anaximenes the following sentence 
 is preserved (by Stobseus, Eel. Phys., p. 296) : olov ?/ i'vxv V r'//ierepa af/p ovca av)KpaTel 
 T/uag, Koi oTiov rbv Koafiuv inevfin k<u ai/p Tzspux^i- It is not probable that Anaximenes 
 discriminated fire from this animated air as something diHerent and finer. On the contrary, 
 he appears to have identified fire with the finest air, as was universallj' customary before 
 Empedocles, as Heraclitus, in particular, explicitly conceives their relation, and as Diogenes 
 of Apollonia, who followed Anaximenes in his speculation, did ; then ■z'na'uair^ or conden- 
 sation, was the first, and apaiucir^ rarefaction, the second process which it underwent 
 Anaximenes, according to the imanimous testimony of post- Aristotelian authorities, con- 
 ceived this air as infinite in extent, so that we must include him among those referred to 
 in Arist., Phys., III. 4 (ijcnep tpaclv ol ^vmoT^oyoi, to ffw aufia -ov kogjuov, ov ?/ o'vcia y 
 af/p fj akTuo Ti ToiovTov, awEipov tlvai). Anaximenes taught that all things arose from r.ir 
 through condensation and rarefaction, which mode of origin he seems, according to Thco- 
 phrastus (in Simplic, Ad Arist. Phys., fol. 32), to have been the first to suggest ; when 
 Aristotle (Phys., I. 4 ; De Coelo, III. 5) ascribes it also to those physiologists who assume, 
 as a first principle, water or fire, or something between fire and air, or between water and 
 air, it is probable that, beside Heraclitus, he has especially in view later pliilosophers ; no
 
 38 HERACLITUS OF EPHESUS. 
 
 work by Thales was accessible to him, and it is hardly possible that any thing was known 
 to him from any other source of such a doctrine as having been held by Thales. Anax- 
 imenes is in advance of his predecessors, partly in his doctrine of condensation and rare- 
 faction, and partly because he chose for his principle, not a substance still imperfect and 
 undeveloped, but that one which, as being the finest, might most naturally pass for the 
 highest, — in which direction Heraclitus, in naming that substance fire, went still another 
 step further. 
 
 "We know nothing of Idaeus of Himera, except from a passage of Sext. Empir. (Adv. 
 Math., IX. 360), in which he is associated witli Anaximenes and Diogenes. 
 
 Of the work of Diogenes of Apollonia (in Crete, — a contemporary of Anaxagoras, 
 Diog. L., IX. 57) there exist a number of fragments, which Panzerbieter has collected 
 together. The doctrine of Diogenes is apparently to be understood as an attempt to 
 defend the stand-point of hylozoism in opposition to the dualism of Anaxagoras, and at the 
 same time to render the doctrine of hylozoism more perfect in itself When Diogenes 
 declares air to be the finest of substances, and yet represents other substances as arising 
 from it by condensation and rarefaction, it is obvious that this can not mean that the 
 original air is rarefied, but only that the formative process in general depends on conden- 
 sation and rarefaction, so that the former must have preceded the latter, just as, with 
 Heraclitus, the " downward way " (6<5of kutcS) goes before the " upward way " (odbg avu). 
 The proof of the imity of substance, Diogenes finds in the fact of the assimilation of the 
 substances of the earth by plants, and of the vegetable substances by animals (Simplic, 
 Ad Arist. Phys., fol. 32 b). 
 
 § 15. Heraclitus of Ephesus was probably younger than Pythagoras 
 and Xenophanes, whom he names and combats, but older than Par- 
 menides, who on liis part makes reference to Heraclitus, and seems to 
 have arrived at liis own metaphysical principle while arguing against 
 him. Through his doctrine of fire as the fundamental form of existence 
 and his doctrine of the constant flux of all things, Heraclitus gives the 
 most direct expression to the notion involved in the Ionic philosophy 
 generally, the notion of a constant process of the original, animated 
 substance. Heraclitus assumes, as the substantial principle of things, 
 ethereal fire, which he at once identifies with the divine Spirit, who 
 knows and directs all things. The process of things is twofold, 
 involving the transformation of all things into fire and then of 
 fire into all other things. The latter movement is styled the " way 
 downward," which leads from fire (identical with the finest air) to 
 water, earth, and so to death ; the former movement is the " way 
 upward" from earth and water to fire and life. Both movements 
 are everywhere intertwined with each other. All is identical and 
 not identical. We step down a second time into the same stream 
 and yet not into the same. All things fiow. Finite things arise 
 through strife and enmity out of the divine original fire, to which, on 
 the contrary, harmony and peace lead back. Thus the Deity builds
 
 HERACLITUS OF EPHESUS. 39 
 
 the world innumerable times in sport, and causes it at the determined 
 period to disappear again in fire, that he may build it anew. 
 
 Cratylus, the disciple of Heraclitus, and Plato's teacher at Athens, 
 carried the views of Heraclitus concerning the liux of all things to 
 the extreme. 
 
 Th« work of Heraclitus, on which nnmerons commentnries were written by the Stoics, nnd which was 
 also, in the second and third centuries after Christ, much read by Christians, until it became suspected by 
 the latter on account of its apparently favoring the Noetian heresy, is now extant only in fragments. Th« 
 " Letters of Heraclitus " are spurious. 
 
 JJeracliti Epintolae quae feruntur, ed. Ant. Westermann, Leipsic, 1857 (" University Programme"). 
 
 Schleicrraacher, I/erakleiio/i, der Utinkle von Epheso8,(iarg€.'iteUtmMden Triimmem seines Werkes, 
 und den Zeugnissen der Alien, in Wolf and Buttniann's Museum der Alterthmnswissenschafty Vol. I., 
 1S07, pp. 313-533, and in Schleierm., iSdimnt. Werke, Ahth. III., Vol. 2, Berlin, 1333, pp. 1-146. Ct Th. L. 
 Eichhoff, Diits. Her., Mayence, 1824, 
 
 Jak. Bernays, Heraclitea, Bonn, 1S4S. Heraklitishe Studien, in the Rhein. Jfus., new series, VII. 
 pp. 90-116, 1850; iVewe Bruchstilcke des Heraklit, ibid. IX. pp. 241-269, 1S54; J>U Heraklitischen Brie/e, 
 Berlin, 1869. 
 
 Ferd. Lassalle, Die PhilosojMe Herakleitos^ des Ihmkeln von Ephesoa, 2 vols., Berlin, 1858. (The 
 most thorough monograph on the subject, but the author is at times too much given to Hegelianizing. 
 Lassalle follows Hegel in styling the doctrine of Heraclitus " the jihilosophy of the logical law of the 
 identity of contradictories." Of., in reference to Lassalle's work, Itaffaele Mariano, Lassalle e il suo 
 Eraclito Saggio di filosofia egheliana, Florence, 1865.) 
 
 A. Gladisch, Herakleitos und Zoroaster, Leipsic, 1859; cf. his essays " ilber AuKspriiche des Herakl.," 
 in the Zeitschrift fiir ^/ter<^U7?!SM'i.»s6«.scA(//if, 1346, No. 121 sq. and 184T, 268q. Kettig, Ueber einen Aus- 
 spruoh Beraklits bei Flat. Coiiviv. 13T, Ind. lect., Berne, 1865. 
 
 Heraclitus was a descendant of a noble Ephesian family. The rights of a jlaaiTicvr 
 (king of sacrifices), which were hereditary in the family of Androclus, the founder of 
 Ephesus and descendant of Codrus, he is reported to have resigned in favor of his younger 
 brother. By the banishment of his friend Hermodorus, his aristocratic feeling was inten- 
 sified into the bitterest hatred of the Demos. (On Hermodorus, cf. Zeller, I>e Hermodoro 
 Ephesio et de Hermodoro Platonis discipulo, Marb. 1859.) Heraclitus also expressed himself 
 sharply respecting thinkers and poets whose opinions differed from his own, so far as he 
 found them distinguished rather for multifarious knowledge than for rational discernment 
 and ability to comprehend the all-directing reason. Thus he says (aj;. Diog. L., IX. 1): 
 TroTivfiadi?/ voov oh ih6daKei (or (pvei f as we read in Procl., In Flat. Tim., p. 31). 'llaio6ui' yap 
 av kSida^E Kal Hvdaydpr/v, avOig re Zevo^dved te Kal 'EKaraiov. Uis blame extended even to 
 Homer : " ' Homer,' he said, ' ought to have been driven from the lists and flogged, and 
 Archilochus likewise.' " It is, nevertheless, quite possible that those whom he censures 
 exercised an essential influence on his opinions ; at least, Heraclitus agreed with Xe- 
 nophanes in the hypothesis that the stars were aerial phenomena, constantly being repro- 
 duced, and we might (as Susemihl remarks) suppose the Heraclitean doctrine of the world 
 and of the fire-spirit related to the doctrine of Xenophanes, distinguishing the world, as 
 something manifold and changeable, from the one immutable God : still the theological 
 doctrines of these philosophers are very unlike, and their points of contact in natural 
 philosophy are few. The surname of Heraclitus, 6 aKorecvdg, "the Obscure," is found first 
 in the Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise De Mundo (c. 5). Yet we find already in the third book 
 of the Aristotelian Rhetoric (c. 5) an intimation that the syntactical relation of words in 
 Heraclitus was not always easy to determine, and Timon, the Sinograph (about 240 B. c), 
 terms him "ariddler" [alvLKTrjo). Socrates is reported to have said, that it needed a 
 Delian (excellent) diver to sound the meaning of his work. Heraclitus flourished, accord-
 
 40 HERACLITUS OF EPHESUS. 
 
 ibg to Diog. L., IX. 1 (Diog. probably follows Apollodorus), in the 69tli Olympiad (503-500 
 P. c), or, according to another account (given by Eusebius, Chron., ad 01. 80.2 and 81.2), 
 in Olymp. 80 or 81 ; with this latter account agrees, far better than with the former, the 
 apparently trustworthy report (ap. Strabo, XIY. 1, 25 ; cf. Plin., Hist. Natur., XXXIV. 
 5, 21), that Hermodorus of Ephesus, the friend of Heraclitus, assisted the Roman Decem- 
 virs in their legislation (about Olymp. 82.1). Epicharmus (whose life falls between 556 and 
 460 B. c, according to Leop. Schmidt, Quaest. Ejyicharm.. Bonn, 1846) notices his doctrine. 
 That Parmenides combats his ideas, and in doing so alludes clearly to specific propositions 
 and words of Heraclitus (in particular, to his doctrine of the coincidence of contraries and 
 of the ebbing and flowing harmony of the world, which Heraclitus compares to the form 
 and motion of the bow and the lyre) has been shown by Steinhart {Allg. Litt. Ztg., Halle, 
 1845, p. 892sq., PZai!. Werke, III., p. 394) and Jak. Bernays (Rhein. ifMsewm, VII., p. 114 sq.), 
 though Zeller {Ph. d. Gr., I., 2d ed., p. 495, 3d ed., p. 548 8q.)disputes this. 
 
 In view of these historical circumstances, the supposition is shown to be improbable, 
 which has been held by some modern investigators, that the doctrine of Heraclitus origi- 
 nated in the endeavor to unite the members of the antithesis : being and non-being, which 
 had been sharply distinguished and separated by the Eleatics (first by Parmenides). It 
 can not be said with truth that the primary conception and the startinp;-point in the 
 philosophy of Heraclitus was the abstract notion of becoming, as the unity of being and 
 non-being, and that this notion was then only embodied in the concreter form of a phj-sical 
 conception or dogma. Heraclitus is from first to last a hylozoist, fire and soul are for him 
 identical, the dry soul is the best, the moistened soul of the drunken is unwise. Having 
 been first incited by Anaximenes, he then developed his doctrine independently. It is 
 only correct to say that he attaches greater weight to the process of things than his pre- 
 decessors had done, as would be natural, considering the nature of the element which he 
 regarded as the principle of being. The advance of Parmenides to the conception of 
 being, first made it possible to extract the conception of becoming from the Heraclitean 
 notion of the flux of things or the transformations of fire. This abstraction is a mental 
 achievement which was first accomplished, not by Heraclitus himself, but by Parmenides 
 and Plato, in the critique of his opinions. (For this reason Heraclitus, although younger than 
 Pythagoras and Xenophanes, must be considered in connection with the earlier Ionic natural 
 philosophers, and that as the thinker who gave to the tendency of their school its most 
 perfect expression.) Aristotle, in his historical survey of the course of development in 
 the earlier Greek philosophy {Metaph., 1. 3 sq.), simply places Heraclitus among the earlier 
 lonians, without even noticing the actual diversity in stand-points ; for, after speaking of 
 the principles of Thales and of Anaximenes and Diogenes, he proceeds : "iTrnaaoQ 6e nvp 
 6 Mera-Tov-ivo^ Kal 'Hpax/lffrof 6 'E^fffwf. The triad : fire (including air), water, earth, 
 corresponds with the three "aggregate states" of matter (as they are now called); 
 Empedocles (see below), separating air more distinctly from fire, first arrived at the 
 distinction of the four so-called elements. 
 
 Plato (or rather some Platonist) says (Soph., p. 242), after speaking of some of the 
 earlier lonians and of the Eleatics : 'Iddeg Se koI liiKcXiKai tive^ voTepov fiovam. B_v this 
 he must mean either that the Sicilian doctrine, i. e., the doctrine of Empedocles, was later 
 than the Ionic, i. e., than that of Heraclitus, or (what is less probable) that both were 
 later than the Eleatic •, but in the latter case he could probably only mean : later than 
 Xenophanes' doctrine of unity. 
 
 The opposition of Heraclitus to the ideas of the masses and of their leaders the poets, 
 probably had principal reference (aside from their political diflTerences) to the popular my- 
 thology. The multitude know nothing of the one ail-controlhng divine fire-spirit. ("Ev to
 
 IIERACLITUS OF EPHE8US. 41 
 
 coa6v iiriaTaa^ai yvufijjv, ^te ol tyKV^epvTjaei [t/te oItj KVfSspva (lEi f ^te o'laKtl^et f KpadaivEi f] 
 ndvTa (hd ndvruv.) Of this yvu/i^, this eternal reason, the mass of men are ignorant 
 (roil Myov Tovd\ iovrog aei, a^vveroi dv-dpunoL yiyvmnaC). Out of the primitive substance, 
 which Heraclitus (in what is certainly a noticeable coincidence with Parsee conceptions, 
 to which Grladisch is right in directing attention) conceives as the purest fire or light, and 
 also as the Good, he represents individual objects as coming forth through the influence of 
 strife or combat (which Homer, therefore, was wrong in wishing to see brought to an end). 
 Thus with him is (Plut., Js. et Os., 48) "izoJ^fnx; irari/p rravTuv, "strife the father of all 
 things;" the world is the dispersed deity, the ev diac^Epofuvov avrb avTQ, but which, like 
 the elastic frame of the bow and the lyre, in going apart comes together again (Plat., 
 Sy77ipos., 187 a; cf Soph., 242 e). The universe is the elemental fire itself, which is now 
 extinguished and now kindled again (Clem., Str., Y. 599 : Kdajuov tov avrov dizavTuv ovte riq 
 6e<Jv OVTE dv6pi>Tzuv ETToiT/aEv^ dXTC f/v dsl Kal Eorac Tvvp aEi^uav, anTOiiEvov fitrpu koi 
 d-ToaliEvvvfisvov fierpu). The double process of the (relative) materialization of the fire- 
 spirit, and the re-spiritualization of earth and water, is constantly going on (nvpog 
 avTafiEijiETaL izavTa aal Tvvp diravTuv, uansp xP''-'^ov XPW^-'C- '^o'- jp'?|WaT<-rt' xP''^'^og), water and 
 earth are nvpog rpoirai, modes of fire ; fire passes over into them in the oJof Karu, or "down- 
 ward way," and thej' pass over into fire in the dSbg dvu, the "upward way," but both 
 ways are inseparable : 66ug dvu Kd-(j fi'iri. The priests of Ormuzd (as Gladisch remarks) 
 are actively on the side of the good principle, in the contest waged between good and evil ; 
 but Heraclitus, as a thinker, is controlled by a theoretical interest, that of discerning the 
 ground of their antagonism, and this he finds in the ■n-aAiv-po-nia, the ivavrla porj (Plat., 
 Crat, 413 e, 420 a), the kvavTiorpoTrr/ (Diog. L., IX. 7), or EvavTio()po/ua (Stob., Eclog., I. 60) of 
 things, the yiveoOai navra kut' EvavTioTT/ra, and says : ira/Jv-poiroi; dpfxoviif k6(j/j.ov, okucttep 
 Avprig Koi to^ov (Plut., Is. et Os., 5) ; cf. Arist., Eth. N. VIII. 2 : 'HpaKAeiToc ro avri^ow cvfKpt- 
 pov Kal f/c T(Jv 6ta(pep6vruv KaA/uart/v dpuoviav Kal Trdvra kut epiv yiyvEaftai. In other words, 
 it is a law of the universe that in every thing contraries are xmited, as life and death, 
 waking and sleeping, youth and old age, and each contrary passes into its opposite. 
 Unexpected things await man after death. Sext. Emp., Pyrrh. Rypotyp., III. 230 : ute fiiv 
 yap tjfiElq l^oifiEV, rag tpvxag r/fiuv TET&vdvai Kal kv 7jjilv re'&dodaf ore df ?/,"£'? aTzo^Svr/aKouev, 
 rdc Tpvxag dvaficovv Kal ^?7v, '' while we live, our souls are dead and buried in us ; but 
 when we die, our souls are restored to life." When the power of peace and unity prevails 
 in the All, all finite objects resolve themselves into pure fire, which is the Deity; but 
 they come forth from it anew through variance. Schleiermacher (whom Ritter, Brandis, 
 Bernays, and Zeller contradict in this point, while Lassalle agrees witli him) was probably 
 wrong in doubting that the doctrine of the periodical dissolution of the world in fire 
 (fKTzvpuaig) was held already by Heraclitus (and borrowed from him by the Stoics); Aristotle 
 ascribes it to him {MtteoroL, I. 14, De Coeh, I. 10, Phys., III. 5; cf. Metaph., XT. 10: 
 'HpaK^etrof (pr/aiv dnavra yiyvEodai ttote niip), and it is contained in the more recently dis- 
 covered fragment in Hippolytus, IX. 10 : ndvra rb irvp etteWov KpivEi Kal KaTaAr/rpErai. 
 
 In view of the dictum of Heraclitus, "all things flow," Plato (TJieaeL, 181a; cf CraL, 
 p. 402 a: bri ndv-a X''>P^^ '''*' ovdiv fiivEi) terras the Heracliteaiis playfully rovq peovraq, 
 " the flowing," at the same time having in view and censuring their inconstant character, 
 which rendered all serious philosophical discussion with them impossible. Cratylus, a 
 teacher of Plato, went beyond Heraclitus, wlio liad said that no one could step down 
 twice into the same stream, by asserting tliat this was not possible even once (Arist., Metaph., 
 IV. 5), — an extreme, as the last logical consequence of which, Aristotle reports that 
 Cratylus thought he ought to say nothing more, but simply moved his finger. 
 
 The changeable, which, tor Heraclitus, is synonymous with the sum of all real things,
 
 4:2 PYTHAGORAS AND THE PYTHAGOREANS. 
 
 is reduced by Parmenides to sensuous appearance, and by Plato to the complex of indi- 
 vidual objects subject to genesis and perceptible by the senses. But for the very reason 
 that Heraclitus assumes no second province of reality, his cosmos is not identical with 
 the mere world of the senses of later thinkers. Heraclitus does not distinguish from his 
 cosmos the divine and eternal, as something separable from it. The Pioyog or the eternal, 
 all-embracing order {yvutfiri^ diK?/, elfxapiiivrj, to nepdxov ?/fiag AoytKov te ov kol t^ipeviJiK^, o 
 Zeiif) is, according to him, immanent, as the ^w6v (kolv6v\ or universal principle, in change 
 itself, and he calls upon each individual to follow in his thought and action this universal 
 reason (Heracl., ap. Sext. Ertip., VII. 133 : 6ib del eTvea^ai tw ^w<I>- tov loyov 6e eovroq 
 ^wov ^ciovaiv ol iroXTiol wf Idiav i-;|;o:'ref (ppovr/aiv. Ap. Stob., Serm., III. 84 : ^wov ban 
 vaat. TO (ppovdv ^iiv vocj Ti^jovTaq laxvpit^ea-&aL XPV '^V ^vvu TzavTuv, OKucnep vo/xu ivolic 
 Kal TTO^v 'tGxvpoTEpug' TpecjiovTai yap navTsg oi av&puKtvoi vofiot vno evbg tov ■Qeiov, KpciTti 
 yap roaovTov okocov e^eXei Kal k^apKEi nacn Kal irspiyivETac). This is the same law with 
 that which keeps the heavenly bodies in their courses ; the sun, says Heraclitus, will not 
 overstep its bounds, for, if it did, the Erinnyes, handmaids of SiKrj, would find it again (ap. 
 Plut., De Exilio, 11). Without knowledge of the universal reason, the senses are untrust- 
 worthy witnesses. Mere abundance of knowledge profits nothing (Heracl., ap. Sext. Emp., 
 VII. 126 : KaKol fiapTvpeq av&punoiaiv b(j>-&a?.fxol Kal ura (iopfiopov ipvxdg ixovTog [according 
 to Bernays' conjecture, in place of the reading of the MSS. : fiapfidpovg i/wjdf txbi'Toyv'] ■ 
 ap. Diog. L., IX. 1 : TTo?.vpa-dij} voov ov t5«5da/c£<; ap. Procl., in Tim., p. 31: Tvo7a)fia-d'ni voov 
 oil (pvEi). The rule for practical conduct is also contained in the law common to all, 
 proximately in the law of the state, absolutely in the law of nature (Heracl., ap. Clem. 
 Alex., Strom., IV. 478 b: SUtj^ ovopa ovk. av ydeaav, eI ravra pij fiv. Ap. Diog. L., IX. 2: 
 /idxsty&ai. XPV "^ov dfjpov vnlp vofiov uku^ vTrsp TEixovq. Hid. : vjipiv xPV o(iEwvEiv fjLaTJkov 
 7/ TTvpKatTfv. Ap. Stobaeus, Serm., III. 84 : auippovslv apsri/ fieyioTj/, /cat ao<pi7] dXifdia ?JyEiv 
 Kat iroislv Kara (l)V(xiv ETraiovTag). 
 
 The doctrine of Heraclitus may be termed monistic, inasmuch as it represents the 
 eternal reason as immanent in the world of individuality and change; and hylozoistic, inas- 
 much as it conceives all matter to be animated. Plato ascribes to the ideal an independent 
 existence, separate from the sensible. Aristotle combats this Platonic ;f(jp«(T//of and affirms 
 the immanence of the universal in the individual, of tlie ideal iu the sensible ; yet he too 
 recognizes for mind (vovg) an existence apart from all matter. The Stoics, in their philoso- 
 phy of nature and in their theology, reproduced the doctrine of Heraclitus, — in which also 
 their ethics, notwithstanding its essentially Socratic and Cynic origin, found various points 
 of union. 
 
 § 16. Pythagoras of Samos, the son of Mnesarchus, was born 
 about 01. 49.3 = 582 b. c. According to some accounts he was a 
 pupil of Pherecydes and Anaximander and acquainted with the 
 doctrines of the Egyptian priests. At Crotona, in Lower Italy, 
 where he settled in 01. 62.4 = 529 b. c, he founded a society, whose 
 aims and character were at once political, philosophical, and religious. 
 All that can be traced back with certainty to Pythagoras himself is 
 the doctrine of metempsychosis and the institution of certain religious 
 and ethical regulations, and perhaps also the commencement of that 
 mathematico-theological form of speculation, which was subsequently 
 carried to a high degree of development.
 
 PYTHAGORAS AND THE PYTHAGOREANS. 43 
 
 Philolaus, a contemporary of Socrates, passes for the first Pytha- 
 gorean who made public (in a written work) the philosophical system 
 of the school. Of this work considerable fragments are still extant ; 
 yet it is very doubtful whether the work is genuine or a counterfeit, 
 dating at the latest from the last century before Christ, and only pos- 
 sessing a certain importance as an authority in regard to ancient 
 Pythagoreanism, from its having been partially founded on earlier 
 authorities. 
 
 Of the earlier Pythagoreans, the most celebrated, beside Philo- 
 laus, were his disciples Simmias and Cebes (who, according to Plato's 
 Phaedo, were friends of Socrates), Ocellus the Lucanian, Timaeus of 
 Locri, Echecrates and Acrio, Archytas of Tarentum, Lysis, and 
 Eurytus. Alcmseon of Crotona (a younger contemporary of Pythag- 
 oras), who held with the Pythagoreans the doctrine of contraries, 
 Hippasus of Metapontum, who saw in fire the material principle of 
 the world, Ecphantus, who combined the doctrine of atoms with the 
 doctrine of a world-ordering spirit, and taught the revolution of the 
 earth on its axis, Hippodamus of Miletus, an architect and politician, 
 and others, are named as philosophers, whose doctrines were related 
 to those of Pythagoreanism. The comic poet Epicharmus, who occa- 
 sionally alludes to disputed questions in philosophy, appears to have 
 come under the influence of various philosophies, and among them, 
 in particular, of Pythagoreanism. 
 
 The reputed -writings of Pythagoras are spurious {Carmen Aureum, ed. K. E. Gunthcr, Breslau, 1S16; 
 Th. Gaisford, in Poetae Minares Graeci, Oxford, 1S14-20, Leipsic, 1S23 ; Schneeberger, Die goldenen 
 Spr'dclie des Pyt/uif/oras — German translation, with introduction and annotations — Munnerstadt, 1S62). So 
 also are the worlis ascribed to Ocellus Lucanus (De Rerum Natitra, ed. A. F. Guil. liiuhdph, Leips. ISOl ; 
 ed. Mullach, in Ar-istot. de Melisno, etc., Berlin, ld45) and Timsens Locrus (who is credittd with a work nepi 
 i/zuxiis Kotrnco, which is only aa abstract of Plato's Timaetis, of late origin, ed. J. J. de Gelder, Leyden, 
 1*36; c£ G. Anton, De Origine Lib. imer. nep\ yjjvxa-i <cdcr»i(u ical (^ucreois, Berlin, 1S52), and, most probably, 
 also all the philosophical fragments of Archytas of Tarentum (Fragm., ed. Conr. Orelii, in the 2d vol. of the 
 Opmcula Graeeorum veterum Sententiosa el Moridia, Leipsic, 1S29 ; cf. Petersen, IJistor.-Phil. Studien 
 Hamburg, 1S32, p. 24; G. Hartenstein, De Archijtue Tarentini Fragmentis Philosop/iicis, Leipsic, 1SS3; 
 Petersen, in the Zeitschr./Ur AHert/iummoifm, 1S36, p. 878 ; O. F. Gruppe, Ueber die FragmenU des Archy- 
 tas und derdlteren Pyttiagoreer, Berlin, 1840; F. Beckmann, De Pythagoreorum Reliquii^, Berlin, 1S44 
 and "50; Quaestiones Pyihagor., L-IV., Braunsberg (Leciion.i-Katal.). 1S52,'.')5, '59, "68). The authenticity 
 of the work of Philolaus, formerly sometimes questioned, but after Bocckh's collection of the fragments 
 almost universally conceded, has been anew disputed, as to parts of the work, by Zeller and others, and 
 wholly rejected by Val. Eose. Still more recently Schaarschmidt has undertaken to demonstrate the 
 spuriousness of the work ; yet cr.,per contra, Zeller in the third ed. of Part I. of his PMlos. der Griecheti, 
 p. 243 seq. The most complete collection of Pythagorean fragments is furnished by Mullach, in Vol. IL 
 of his Fmgm. Philos. Gr., 1867, 1-129. 
 
 Jambllchus, De Vita PytKogorica liber; acced. Ma7chii.t Mve PorphyrivK. de vita Pythagorae, ed. 
 Kiessling. Leips. 1815-16; ed. Westermann, Paris, 1850. [English transl. of Jamblichus' Life of Pythagoras. 
 by Taylor, Lond. 1818. " The Life of Pythagoras icith his Golden Verses, together with the Life of 
 ILierodes and his Commentaries upon the Verses'" (Engl, transl. from the French of Dacier, with the 
 exception of the Golden Verses, which arc translated from the Greek) by N. Eowe, Lend. 1707.— TV.]
 
 44 PTTHAGOKAS AJJD THE PYTHAGOREANS. 
 
 Of the more modern writers on Pythagoreanism in general and on individual Pythagoreans, may be 
 mentioned : Chr. Meiners, in his Gesch. der Kilnste und Wiss. in Gr. u. Rom, Vol. I., p. 178 sq. ; Aug. 
 Boeclih, Dinp. de riatonico m/stemate coelestimn glohonim et de vera indole, astronomiae Pkilolaicae, 
 Heidelb. 1810, also with additions and supplement in his Kl. Sckr., III., Leips. 1SC6, pp. 266-342; PhilolaMS 
 des Pj/thagoreers Lefiren nebst den Bruclistucken seines Werkes, Berlin, 1819 ; J. A. Terpstra, De Sadalitii 
 Pythag. (h'i{/ine, Conditiaite, et Confiilio, Utrecht, 1824 ; Ileinrich Kitter, Ge^cli. der Pytluigo7-ei8chen 
 P/iilosophie, Hamburg, 1S2G; Ernst Reinhold, Beitrag zur Erlduterun-g der PyihagoreiscJien Metaphyxik. 
 Jena, 1827; Amadeus Wendt, Dercrum principiis secuiuhnn PythagoreoH, Leips. 1S27; Christ. Aug. Brandis 
 Ueber die Zahlenlehre der Pythagoreer und Platoniker, in the Rhein. Mus., 1828, p. 208 sq. and 568 sq.; Aug. 
 Bernh. Krische, De gocietaiis a Pythagora in urbe Crotoniutarum conditae scopo politico commeniatio, 
 Gottingen, 1830, cf. Krische's Forschungen, I. pp. 78-85 ; M. A. Unna, Z>e Alcmaeone Crotoniata, in Chr. 
 Petersen's Philol.-hist. Studien, Hamburg, 1832, pp. 41 -ST ; A. Gladisch, Die Pythagoreer und die iSchinesen, 
 Posen, 1841; F. H. Th. AUihn, De idea justi qualis fuerit apud Uomerum et Hesiodum et quomodo a 
 Doriensihus veteribiis et a Pythagora erciUta sit, Halle, 1847; G. Grote, History of Greece, Vol. IV. 
 (Loudon), pp. 525-551; Val. Rose, Comm de Arist. libr. ord. et avctor., Berlin, 1854, p. 2 (where the 
 genuineness of the Philolaus fragments is denied) ; C. L. Heyder, Ethices Pythagorean vindiciae, Frankfort- 
 0.1-the-M. 1854; F. D. Gerlach, Zaleukos, Charondas, Pythagoras, Basel, 1858; L. Noack, Pythag. und die 
 Anfdnge abendl. Wiss., in the '■'Psyche," Vol. III., 1S60, No. 1; Monrad, Ueber die Pyth. Philos., in ''Der 
 Gedatike" (ed. by Michelet), Vol. III., 1862, No. 3; \ermehren. Die Pythag. Zahlen {G.-Pr.), Gustrow, 
 1S63; A. Laugel, Pythagore, sa doctrine et son histoire d\tpres la critique allemunde, in Pemie des 
 Deux Mondes, XXXIV. annee. Par. 1864, pp. 9C9-9;9 ; C. Schaarschmidt, Die angebliche Schriftstellerei 
 des Philolaus und die DmchstUcke der ihm zugeschriebenen B'dcher, Bonn, 1864; Ed. Zeller, Pythagoras 
 und die Pythagorassage, in his Vortr. u. Abh., Leips. 1SG5, pp. 30-50 ; Georg Rathgeber, GroHsgriec! en- 
 land und Pythagoras, Gotha, 1866; Adolf Rothenbiicher, Das System der Pythagoreer nach den Angaben 
 des Arist, Berlin, 1867; Mullach, De Pythagora ejusque diseipulis et successoribus, in the Fragm. 
 Philos. Gr., II. 1867, pp. I.-LVII. ; Eduard Baltzer, Pyth. der W'eise von Snmos, 'SovdhanRen, 1868 (adopts 
 the theory of Riith); Albert Freiberr v(m Thimus, Die harmonikule Symbolik des Alterihums, part I., 
 Cologne, 1868; F. Latendorf, Seb. Franci de Pyth. ejusque symbolis disputatio comm. ill, Berlin, 18C8. 
 Cf. also L. Prowe, Ueber die Abhdngigkeit des Copernicus von den Gtdanken griechischer Philosophen 
 und Astronomen, Thorn, 1865, and the works by Ideler, Boeckh, and others, cited below (p. 47). 
 
 On Alcmaion the Crotoniate, see Krische, Forschungen, I. pp. 68-78. 
 
 On Ilippodamus of Miletus : C. F. Hermann, De Hijipod. Milesio, ad Arist, Pol, II. 5, Marburg, 1841 ; 
 L. Stein, in MohFs Zeitschr far Staatswissenschaft, 1853, 161 sq.; Rob. v. Mohl, Gesch, und Litt. der 
 Staatsioiss., Vol. I., Erl. 185:i, p. 171 ; Karl Hildenbrand, Gesch. u. System der Rechts- und Staatsphilos., 
 Vol. I., 1860, p. 59 sq. On Hippodamus and Phaleas: Herm. Henkel, Znir Gesch. der griech, Staatswiss, 
 (G. Progr.), Salzwedel, 1866. 
 
 Epicharmi fragmenta. coll. U. Polman Kruseman, Harlem, 1S34; rec. Theod. Bergk, Poetae lyrici 
 Graec, Leips. (1843, 53) 1866 ; ed. Mullach, Fragm. Ph. Gr., p. 135 seq.; cf Grysar, De Doriensium comoedia, 
 p. 84 sq.; Leop. ^<AixQ\<Xt, Quaestiones Epicharmeae, spec. J: de Epicharmi ratione philosopJiandi, 
 Bonn, 1846; Jac. Bernays, Epicharmog und der aOfavofxeyos Adyo?, in the Rhein Mus.f, Ph,, new series, 
 A'lII. 1853, p. 280 sq.; Aug. O. Fr. Lorenz, Lehen und Schriften des Koers Ep. nebst einer Fragmenten- 
 sammlung, Berlin, 1864 (cf. Leop. Schmidt in the Gbtt. gel. Anz., 1865, No. 24, pp. 931-958); G. Bernbardy, 
 Grundr. der griech. Litt, 2d revised ed., II. b, 1859, pp. 458-467. 
 
 " Of Pythagoreanism and its founder tradition has the more to tell us the farther it is 
 removed in time from its subject, whereas it becomes more reticent in proportion as we 
 approach chronologically nearer to that subject itself" (Zeller). Nevertheless, we possess 
 several very old and entirely reliable data concerning Pythagoras. Xenophanes, the 
 founder of the Eleatic school, ridicules the doctrine of Pythagoras in the following lines 
 (op. Diog. L., Vin. 36) :-- 
 
 Kal -rroTs /uiv Grv(pe7it^o/j.£vov CKv/MKog Trapiovra 
 ^adlv kirotKTelpai koI t66e (ftda^ai etto^- 
 Tiavaai, firjde pdm^\ etreiTj (pi^ov dvepoc [otI 
 '^vxv, ~^/v lyvcjv (p-^Ey^auivri^ aiwv. 
 
 Heraclitus says {ap. Diog. L., VIII. 6): "Of all men, Pythagoras, the son of Mnesarchus, 
 most practiced inquiry (laropiriv t/ckt/cev) • his own wisdom was eclectic and nothing better
 
 PYTHAGORAS AND THE PYTHAGOREANS. 45 
 
 than polymathy and perverted art." Herodotus (II. 81 and 123) traces the doctrine of 
 metempsychosis and certain religious regulations of the (Orphists and) Pythagoreans back 
 to the Egyptians, thus implying, apparently, that Pythagoras visited the Egyptians. 
 Isocrates (Laud. Busir., 28) is the first who expressly mentions such a visit. Cicero says 
 of Pythagoras {De Fin., Y. 29, 87): ^' Aegyptum lustruviV^ For the fact that the mathe- 
 matical sciences originated in Egypt and were there cultivated by the priests, we have 
 Aristotle's testimony {Met, I. 1). From that country Pythagoras, according to the evidence 
 of Callimachus (ap. Diodorus Siculus, in the Vaticanische Excerpte, VII.-X. 35), brought 
 much of his mathematical knowledge and transplanted it into Hellas, while other portions 
 of it were discovered by himself. Among other things, the discovery of the relation be- 
 tween the hypotenuse and the sides of the right-angled triangle is ascribed to him by 
 Diogenes Laertius (VIII. 12), on the authority of a mathematician named ApoUodorus. 
 Diogenes cites in this connection the epigram : 
 
 'Hv£/ca Tlv&ayoprjq to nepiKXesi; evparn ypajiua 
 Keiv', £<f brcf) kA^ivt/v ijyayE [iaxr&va'ajv. 
 
 Whether Pythagoras really traveled in Egypt is a matter not wholly free from doubt. 
 It may, nevertheless, be considered as very probable that he did. Many of the embellish- 
 ments added by later writers to their accounts of the life and journeys of Pythagoras, 
 are easily recognized as fables. Diogenes Laertius relates (VIII. 3), following, apparently, 
 the authority of Aristoxenus, that Pythagoras, hating the tyranny of Polycrates, emigrated 
 to Crotona, in Lower Italy. According to Cicero {Rep., II. 15; cf Tuscul.,1. 16), Pythagoras 
 came to Italy in 01. 62.4 (529 b. c). He united himself to tlie aristocratic party in Crotona. 
 where, as we are told, the depression caused by a defeat, suffered not long before in a 
 contest with the Locrians and Rhegians on the river Sagra, had made the population sus- 
 ceptible to moral influences, and he secured that party for liis project of an ethical and 
 religious reform. By this means the intimacy of the union of the members of the aris- 
 tocratic party and their power in the state were very considerably increased. 
 
 The members of the Pythagorean sooiety were subjected to a rigid ethico-religious regi- 
 men (the YlvdayopEioq rpoTro^ rov fiiov, which is mentioned already by Plato, Rep., X. p. 600 b). 
 An examination as to fitness preceded admission. Disciples wore bound for a long timo 
 to mute obedience, and unconditional submission to the authority of tlie doctrine pro- 
 pounded to them. Rigorous dally self-examination was required of all; the propagation 
 among tlie people of the doctrines (in particular, probably, the theosophic speculations) 
 of the school was prohibited. Further requirements imposed on members were moderation 
 in the use of articles of food and simplicity in personal attire. The use of animal food was 
 permitted, under certain limitations, — a fact attested by Aristotle and by Aristoxenes (ap. 
 Diog. L., VIII. 19 and 20); Heraclides of Pontus incorrectly assumes the contrary; but 
 certain Orphists and later Pythagoreans abstained wholly from the use of animal food. 
 Aristoxenus (ap. Gellius, IV. 11) disputes the assertion that Pythagoras forbade the use 
 of beans for food. According to Herod., II. 81, burial in woolen garments was forbidden 
 in the Orphic-Pythagorean mysteries. 
 
 The democratic party (perhaps also, at times, an imfricndly aristocratic fraction) reacted 
 against the growing power of the society. It is related of Pythagoras that, after having 
 lived in Crotona nearly twenty years, and soon after the victory gained in 510 B. c. by the 
 Crotoniates, on the river Traeis, over the Sybarites, who were living under the monarchical 
 rule of Telys, he was banished by an opposition party under Cylon, and that ho removed 
 to Metapontum and soon afterward died there. Pythagoreanism found acceptance among 
 the aristocracy of numerous Italian cities, and gave to their party an ideal point of support.
 
 4:6 PYTHAGORAS AND THE PYTHAGOREANS. 
 
 But the persecutions were also several times renewed. In Crotona, as it appears, the 
 partisans of Pythagoras and the "Cylonians" were, for a long time after the death of 
 Pythagoras, living in opposition as political parties, till at length, about a century later, the 
 Pythagoreans were surprised bj^ their opponents while engaged in a deliberation in the 
 "house of Milo" (who himself had died long before), and, the house being set on fire 
 and surrounded, all perished, with the exception of Archippus and Lysis of Tarentum. 
 (According to other accounts, the burning of the liouse, in which the P^'tha^oreans were 
 assembled, took place on the occasion of the first reaction against the society, in the 
 life-time of Pythagoras.) Lysis went to Thebes, and was there (soon after 400 b. c.) a 
 teacher of the youthful Epaminondas. Diog. L. (VIIL 7) ascribes to him the authorship 
 of a work commonly ascribed to Pythagoras. This work, according to Mullach's con- 
 jecture (Fragm. Ph. Gr., I. 413), was the "Carmen Aureum," a poem which, however, 
 at least in its present form, is probably of later origin. — Not long after this time all 
 the political consequence and power of the Pythagoreans in Italy came to an end. At 
 Tarentum the Pythagorean Arcliytas was still at the head of the state in the time of 
 Plato. 
 
 Among the authorities for the doctrine of the Pythagoreans, the indications furnished 
 by Aristotle are the most important. Of still greater value for our knowledge of the 
 Pythagorean system would be the fragments (collected bj' Boeckh) of the work of Philo- 
 laus, a contemporary of Socrates, in case their authenticity were assured. All other 
 pretended philosophical writings and fragments of writings by ancient Pythagoreans, are 
 decidedly spurious. The contents of the fragments attributed to Philolaus agree in many 
 respects quite well with the testimony of Aristotle, and afford besides a much more concrete 
 conception of the Pythagorean system ; yet with them is mingled much that is of extra- 
 neous and later origin, and which is yet scarcely to be placed to the account of the authors 
 in whom the fragments are found. Plato and Aristotle seem to have had no knowledge 
 of any other than oral utterances of Philolaus. Only their statements and, in part, those 
 of the earliest Aristotelians, b\it no later ones, are perfectly trustworthy. Timon the Sino- 
 graph (writer of satires, see below, i^ 60) s.ays (GelL, Noct. Att., III. 17) that Plato bought 
 for much money a small book, on which he foiinded his dialogue Timaeus (containing his 
 natural philosophy) ; but it is very doubtful what work is meant (perhaps a work of 
 Archytas). A spurious letter from Plato to Dio contains the commission to buj' Pytha- 
 gorean books. Neanthes of Cyzicus ascribes the first publication of Pythagorean doctrines 
 to Philolaus and Pimpedocles. Hermippus says that Philolaus wrote a book which Plato 
 bought in order to copy from it his Timaeus; Satyrus speaks of three books. The three 
 books, of which the fragments above mentioned ha^^e come down to us, are (as Schaar- 
 schmidt has shown) probably spurious, as also are the alleged writings of other ancient 
 Pythagoreans and of Pythagoras himself. 
 
 Charmed by the apodictical nature of that knowledge which we have of the mathe- 
 matical order immanent in things, the Pythagoreans exaggerated the power of the math- 
 ematical principle in their numerical speculation — a speculation which overstepped the 
 limits of exact mathematical science. 
 
 The principles of numbers, limit and the unlimited, were viewed by the Pythagoreans, 
 according to Aristotle, not as predicates of another substance, but as themselves the sub- 
 stance of things; at the same time things were looked upon as images of these principles 
 immanent in them. It does not appear that these two statements are to be referred to 
 different fractions of the Pythagoreans ; perhaps the mode of speech of some suggested 
 the one interpretation, that of others the other. Yet the same persons might in a certain 
 sense hold both of these doctrines. It is hardly supposable that any one of the ancient
 
 PYTHAGORAS AND THE PYTHAGOKEANS. 4< 
 
 Pythagoreans made use of the exact pliraseology employed by Aristotle. Aristotle seems, 
 ratlier, at times to be expressing in his own language conceptions which he only found 
 implied in their doctrines. The scale of created objects was symbolized by the series of 
 numbers, the numbers four {rerpaKTig) and ten (cJcKOf) playing an especially prominent 
 role. 
 
 Of the special doctrines of the Pythagoreans, their astronomical and musical doctrines 
 are the most worthy of remark. That the theory of a counter-earth {avTix()(^') under the 
 earth and the motion of both around a central fire, really belongs to the older Pytha- 
 goreans, we know (apart from the at least doubtful Philolaus-Fragments) from Aristotle 
 {De Coeio, II. 13, and Metaph., I. 5). Diog. Laert. says (VIII. 85) that the circular motion of 
 the earth was first taught by Piiilolaus, though others ascribed the doctrine to Ilicetas. The 
 doctrine of the earth and the counter-earth is ascribed to the Pythagorean Ilicetas by 
 Pseudo-Plutarch {Plac. Ph., III. 9); Cicero (Acad., II. 39) attributes to him, on the authority 
 of Theophrastus, the doctrine that the earth moves circum axevi. Tlie rotation of the 
 earth on its axis is also ascribed {Plac., III. 13 ; Hippol., Adv. Haer., I. 15) to Kcphantus 
 (according to Boeckh's supposition, a pupil of Hicetas), who assigned to the material atoms 
 magnitude, figure, and force, attributing their arrangement to God ; also to Plato's disciple, 
 Heraclides of Heraclea on the Euxine, who (according to Stob., Eel., I. 440) held the world 
 to be infinite. That the hypothesis of the sun's immobility and of the revolution of the 
 earth around it agrees with the phenomena was shown later, 281 B. c, by Aristarchus of 
 Samos, the astronomer; finally, Seleucus of Seleucia on the Tigris, in Baljylonia (about 150 
 B. c), taught the infinite extension of tlie world and propounded the heliocentric system 
 as his astronomical doctrine. (See Plut., Plac. Phil, II. 1, 13, 24; III. 17 ; Stob., Eclog. Phys., 
 I. 26 ; cf Lud. Ideler, Ueber das Verhdltnis-i des Copernicus zum Alterthum, in Wolf and Butt- 
 mann'.? Miis. f. d. Alter thuinswiss., II. 1810, pp. 393-454; Bocckh, De Plat, syst, etc., 1810, 
 p. 12 (Kl. Schr., III. p. 273), Philolaos, p. 122, Das Kosra. System des Plato, p. 122 sq. and p. 
 142 ; Sophus Ruge, Der Chaidder Seleukos, Dresden, 1865.) Yet accusations of heresy were 
 not wanting even in antiquity for those who held the doctrine of the earth's motion. "Wit- 
 ness Aristarchus of Samos, who was charged with impiety by Cleanthes the Stoic, on 
 account of his astronomical opinions. 
 
 The doctrine of the harmony of the spheres (Arist., De Coelo, II. 9) was grounded on 
 the assumption that the celestial spheres were separated from each other by intervals 
 corresponding with the relative lengths of strings, arranged to produce harmonious 
 tones. 
 
 The soul was, according to the Pythagoreans, a harmony; chained to the body as a 
 punishment, it dwelt in it as in a prison (Plat., Phaedo. p. 62 b). 
 
 According to the statement of Eudemus, the Aristotelian, in his lectures on Physics 
 (reported by Simplicius, Ad. Arift. Phys., 173 a), tlie Pythagoreans taught that in various 
 cosmical periods the same persons and events return or are repeated: tl 6e rig Tztarevctie 
 Tolg UtiOayopEioig ug 'Ka?.iv to. avra apiB/iQ Kayij /ivOoXnyycu ro {jaliiVtov ex(JV KaBjjiikvoig olru, 
 Kal TO. akla -navra ofioiug t^ei. (The same doctrine meets us again with the Stoics, but only 
 in combination with the Heraclitean doctrine oi in-hpuair; see below, § 54.) 
 
 Ethical notions bore among the Pythagoreans a mathematical form, symbols fillhig the 
 place of definitions. Justice was defined by them (according to Arist., Elh. Nic, \. 8 ; cf. 
 Magn. Moral. LI; I. 34) as apiftfic^g icaKtg laog (square-number), by which it was intended 
 to express the correspondence between action and suffering (rd avmvtTzovdog, i. e. a Ttg 
 knoiTjac, raiif avrinaOdv), or, in other words, retribution. 
 
 Some of the Pythagoreans (according to Arist., Met., I. 5) set forth a table of funda- 
 mental contraries, headed by that of limit and illimitation. The conceptions included in it
 
 48 PYTHAGORAS AND THE PYTHAGOREANS. 
 
 are not properly categories, because not absolutely universal, i. e., formal ground-concep- 
 tions, equally applicable to nature and mind. The table is as follows : — 
 
 Limit. Illimitation. 
 
 Odd. Even. 
 
 One. Many. 
 
 Right. Left. 
 
 Male. Female. 
 
 At rest. In motion. 
 
 Straight. Bent. 
 
 Light. Darkness. 
 
 Good. Bad. 
 
 Square. Oblong. 
 
 Alcmfeon, the Crotoniate, was a physician, who (according to Arist., Metaph., 1. 5) " wa* 
 in the flower of his age when Pythagoras was an old man," and taught that the majority 
 of human things were in twos [in contraries] {elvai 6vo to. TroAAd tuv avOpunivuv), yet did 
 not fix on a specific number of contraries, but only gave in each case those which hap- 
 pened to occur to him. He taught that the soul was located in the brain, whither all 
 sensations were conducted through canals from the organs of sensation (Theophr., De 
 Seiisu, 25 ; Plut., Flac. Ph., IT. 16, 17), and that the soul, like the stars, was the subject 
 of eternal motion (Arist., De An., I. 2). 
 
 Eurytus is mentioned, together with Philolaus, as among the Pytliagoreans whom 
 Plato met in Italy (D. L., III. 6). The system of numerical symbolism was further 
 developed by Eurytus, whose speculations appear to have been delivered only orally (Ar., 
 Met, XIV. 5, 1092 b, 10). Philolaus and Eurytus are spoken of as residents of Tarentum 
 i(Diog. L., VIII. 46): Xenophilus, of Chalcis in Thrace, and the Phliasians Phanto, Eche- 
 crates, Diodes, and Polymnastus, pupils of Philolaus and Eurytus, and all personally 
 known to Aristoxenus the Aristotelian, are said to have been the last of the Pythagoreans. 
 Xenophilus is reported to have taught in Athens and to have died at an advanced age. 
 The school disappeared (until tlie rise of Neo-Pythagoreanism), although the Orphic- 
 Pythagorean Orgies were continued. 
 
 Hippodamus of Miletus, a contemporary of Socrates, was (according to Arist., Polit, 
 II. 8), like Phaleas, the Chalcedonian {A.v.,Pol., II. 7), and (according toDiog. L., III. 37 and 
 57) Protagoras, the Sophist, a forerunner of Plato in tlie construction of political theories. 
 According to Aristotle, Hippodamus was tlie first private citizen who undertook to say 
 any thing respecting the best form of constitution for the state. The territory of the state, 
 he taught, should be divided into three portions: a sacred portion for the service 
 of the gods, a common domain for the support of the military order, and a third portion 
 to bo held as private property. The various courts of justice should be subject to one 
 court of appeal. 'Whether, or to what extent, Hippodamus was connected with the 
 Pythagorean school, are doubtfid questions. Among the later forgeries vuider the names 
 of early Pj-thagoreans, was one bearing the name of " Hippodamus tlie Pythagorean," and 
 another ascribed to " Hippodamus the Thurian," by which tlie same person seems to b& 
 intended. Fragments of these forgeries are preserved in Stobfeus {Florikg., XLIII. 92-94, 
 and XCVIII. 71). Phaleas desired that inequality of possessions among citizens should he 
 prevented, affirming that it easily led to revolutionary movements; indeed, he is the first 
 who expressly demanded that all citizens should have equal possessions (Arist., Pol., IL 7. 
 1266 b, 40).
 
 THE ELEATICS. 49 
 
 Epicharmua of Cos, son of Elothales (born about 550, died at Srracupe, about 460 n. c), 
 in tlie first of his poetical compositions cited by Diog. L. (III. 9-11), represents a mau 
 versed in Eleatic, Pythagorean, and especially in Heraclitean pliilosophy, engaged in conver- 
 sation with one who was a stranger to philosophy and a partisan of the religious ideas of 
 the fineient poets and the people. In another of the fragments preserved hy Diogenes ho 
 discusses ilie difference between art and the artist, and between goodness and the man who 
 is good, in terms which remind us of tlie Platonic doctrine of ideas. They are not to bo, 
 taken, however, altogether in the Platonic sense, which respects the difference between 
 the universal and the mdividual, but rather in the sense of the distinction between 
 abstract and concrete. A third fragment concludes from instances of artistic skill in ani- 
 mals, that they, too, are possessed of reason. A fourth contains, in its expressions con- 
 cerning the diversity of tastes, much to remind one of the verses of the Eleatic philosopher 
 Xenophanes, on the diversity of human conceptions of the gods. A philosophical system 
 can not be ascribed to Epicharmus. Plato says (T^eoei., p. 152 a), that the comic poet, 
 Epicharmus, embraced, like Homer, that conception of tlie world to which Ileraclitu.^ 
 gave the most general philosophical expression (the doctrine, which finds the real in 
 what is perceptible and changeable). Classical aphorisms of Epicharmus are: va(p£ kuI 
 MCfivaa' aTziarelv^ apOpa Tavra tuv (f>f)EV(ji; and vov^ opa kuI vohq aKobn, Ta?.'/.a Koxpa /cat 
 TtMpTia. The Roman poet Ennius composed a Pythagorizing didactic poem in imitation 
 of one attributed to Epicharmus. Various forgeries under the name of Epicharmus 
 were published at an early date. 
 
 The author of the work ascribed to Philolaus sees in tlie principles of numbers the 
 principles of tilings. These principles are the limiting and illimitation. They converge 
 to harmony, which is uxiity in multiplicity and agreement in heterogeneity. Thus they 
 generate in succession, fir.?t, unity, then the series of arithmetical or "monadic" numbers, 
 then the " geometrical numbers," or " magnitudes," i. e., the forms of space : point, line, 
 surface, and solid; next, material objects, then life, sensuous consciousness, and the higher 
 psychical forces, as love, friendship, mind, and intelligence. Like is known by like, but it is 
 by number that things are brought into harmonious relations to the soul. The understand- 
 ing, developed by mathematical study, is the organ of knowledge. Musical harmony 
 depends on a certain numerical proportion in the lengths of musical strings. The octave, in 
 particular, or harmony in the narrower sense, depends on the ratio — 1 : 2, which includes 
 tlie two ratios of the fourtli {?. : 4) and the fifth (2 : 3 or 4 : G). The five regular solids — the 
 cube, the tetrahedron, the octahedron, the icosahedron, and the dodecahedron — are respec- 
 tively the fundamental forms of earth, fire, air, water, and the fifth clement, which encom- 
 passes all the rest. The soul is united V^y number and harmony with the body, wliich is its 
 organ, and at the same time also its prison. From the Hestia, i. e., from the central fire, 
 around which e;irth and counter-earth daily revolve, the soul of the world spreads through 
 the spheres of the counter-earth, the earth, the moon, the sun, the planets Mercury, Venus, 
 Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, and the fixed stars to " Olympus," the last sphere which includes 
 all the others. The world is eternal, and ruled by the One, who is akin to it, and has 
 supreme might and excellence. The director and ruler of all things is God ; he is one 
 and eternal, enduring and immovable, ever like him.self, and different from all things 
 beside him. He encompasses and guards the universe. 
 
 § 17. The foundation of the Eleatic doctrine of unity was laid in 
 tiieological form by Xenophanes of Coloplion, metaphysically devel- 
 oped as a doctrine of being by Parmenides of Elea, dialectically de- 
 fended in opposition to the vulgar belief in a plurality of objects
 
 1 
 
 50 THE ELEATICS. 
 
 and in revolution and cliansfe by Zeno of Elea, and finally, with 
 pome declension in vigor of thought, assimilated more nearly to the 
 earlier natural philosophy by Melissus of Samos. 
 
 The following authors treat especially of tho Eleatic philosophers and their doctrines: Job. Gottfr. 
 Walther, Erbffnete Ele<itif:ch.e Oriiber, VA cd., Mnedcburg and Leipsic, 1724; Geo. Gust FuUeborn, Libtr de 
 Xenophane, Zenane, Gorgia Aristoteli Tulgo tributiis, passim illu^tr. commentario, Halle, 1789; Joh. 
 Gottl. Buhle, Commentatio de ortu et progr'eAmi pantheismi iride a A'enophane primo ejus auctore iisqus 
 ad Spinozam, Giittingen, 1790, Comm. soc. Goti.,\o\. X^ p. 157 seq. ; G. Lud\v.S[)aIding, Vindiciae philoso- 
 phorum Megarscomni suhjecto commentario in prim am partem, libelli de Xenophime, Zenone, Gorgia, 
 Berlin, 1793; FuUeborn, Frdgmente axis den Gedic/iten des Xenophunes iind des Farmenides,]n ihe £ei- 
 *raye zur Gesch. der Philos., '■'■ Stucke"' 6 and 7, Jena, 1795; Amad. Pcyron, Empedocl. et Farm, frag- 
 menta, Leips. 1810 ; Chr. Aug. Brandis, Comm. Eleat. pars I. Xenop/ianis, Parmenides et 3/elissi doctrina 
 6 propriis philosophorum reliquiis exposita, Alton. 1813 ; Vict. Cousin. Xenopihane, fundatevr de I'ecoU 
 d^E^ee, i.i his Nouveano!, frugmtns pMlos., Paris, 1828, pp. 9-95; Eoscnberg, Z)e El. ph. primordiis, Berlin, 
 1829; Sim. Karsten, rhilosophorum Graecorum veternm opertmi reliquiae, Amsterdam, 1835 sq., vol. I., 1: 
 Xenophanis Coloplionii carm. rel., I. 2: Parmenid.; Kianx, Essai sur Parm. d^Elee, Paris, 1S40; 
 Krische, Po-rschungen, I. pp. SC-llC; Theod. Bergk, Commentatio de Arist. libello de Xenopjhane, Zenons 
 et Gorgia, Marbnrg, 1843; Aug. Gladisch, i)J6 Eleaten und die Jiulier, Posen, 1S44; Frid. Guil. Aug. 
 Mullach, Aristotelis de Melisso, Xenophane et Go-rgia disimtationes, cum Eleaticoriim philoa.frag- 
 mentis, Berlin, 184.5, also in Fragm. ph. G>\, I. p. 101 seq.; E. Itcinhold, De genidna Xenop)hanis disci- 
 j/lina, Jena, 1847; Ueberwcg, Ueberden hisiorischen Wetth der &hvift de MeHsso,Zenone, Gorgia, in the 
 Philol., VIII., 1S53, pp. 104-112 (where I sought to show that the second part of the work, i. «., chaps. 3 and 
 4, does not contain a reliahle account respecting Xenophanes, but does so respecting Zeno; now, however, 
 only my first, or negative, not the second, positive, thesis, seems to me tenable), also ibid. XXVI. 1868, 
 pp. 709-711; E. F. Aj>elt, Parmenidis et Empedoclis doctrina de mundi structura, Jena, 1866; Conr, 
 Verraehreu, Die Autorschaft der dem Arisioteies eugeschriebenen Schrift nepl Eei'0(J>drou?, wepl Zriviovot, 
 TTcpi Popyiov, Jena, 1S62 ; Franz Kern, Quae^tionum XenopAanearum. cajntn duo {Progr. sc/tolae Por- 
 <«Ji«j.s), Naumburg, 1864: Symbolae cridcae ad libelhtm Aristotelicum de Xenophane, cic, Oldenburg, 
 1867; ©eo<;>pa(7Tou wepl Ueki<T<Tov, In the Philologns, XXVI. 1S6S, pp. 271-289; Theodor Vatke, Parm, 
 Veliensis doctrina qxtalis fuerit (diss, inaug.), Berl. 1864; lleinrich Stein, Fragm. des Parmenides, 
 ircpl <^v<rcu)s, in the Symb. philologoncm Bonnens-iiim in hoitorem Frid. Ritschelii coll.. Leipsic, 1864-67, 
 pp. 7C3-S0C; Paul V.uftor, De ph. Xen. Colnph. parte morali, diss, inaug., Leipsic, 1868; Th. Davidson, 
 Tlie Fragments of Parm., in tho Journal of ^pecul. Philos., IV. 1, St Louis, Jan., 1870. 
 
 That tlie first part {cap. 1, 2) of the treatise Be Xenophane, Zenone, Gorgia, transmitted to 
 US among the writings of Aristotle, treats of Melissus and not of Xenophanes, Buhle has 
 already demonstrated in the essay on pantheism above cited. In agreement with him and 
 with Spalding — with whom Fiilleborn, who had before been of a different opinion, expresses 
 his accord in his above-cited " Beitrdge " — the same is assumed by Brandis and all later 
 investigators, since this result is made perfectly manifest by a comparison of the part in 
 question with the doctrines of Melissus as known to us from other sources. It is uncer- 
 tain to whom the second part {cap. ,3, 4) relates, in the intention of the author, whether to 
 Xenophanes or to Zeno ; yet in no case arc the contents of these chapters to be considered 
 as historical.* The last part {cap. 5, 6) treats without doubt of Gorgias. Perhaps this 
 
 * The view supported by me in one of my earliest es.s.ays ('■ Veberden hisiorischen Werthder Schrift 
 de Itelliso, Zenone, Gorgia;' in Sohneidewin's Philologus, VIII. 1S53, pp. 104-112), that the second part 
 of the work {cap. 3, 4) relates to Zeno and contains a true report of his doctrines, I am now compelled to 
 abandon, after more thorough comparison and exactcr weighing of all tlie elements of the problem 
 (assenting, as I do, substantially to the argumentation of Zeller in the 2d ed. of the first part of his PA. d. Gr., 
 I>. 336sq.). I can only hold fast, therefore, to the negative opinion, that a trustworthy report respecting 
 Xenophanes is not to be found in the work. The teachings there developed (th.at God is eternal, one, 
 fpherical, neither bounded nor unbounded, neither moved nor unmoved, might, in view of their dialectical 
 form, and, in part also, in view of their nature, be more properly ascribed to Zeno than to Xenophanes. 
 Both of these suppositions are, however, opposed, partly by other considerations, partly by the silence 
 of Plato and Aristotle ; of Xenophanes, Aristotle says directly (Mei., I. 5), that he left the question
 
 X»5NOPHANKS OF COLOPHON. 51 
 
 eection was intended by the author to be the first in a reverted order (see ea-p. 6, Jin!). The 
 accounts respecting Melissus and Gorgias are substantially correct, though not so through- 
 out. The whole can not have been composed by Aristotle, nor by Theophrastus, but only 
 by some later Aristotelian. 
 
 The fragments preserved from the writings of the Eleatics are not very extensive, but 
 they furnish us a fully authentic and, with respect to the fundamental ideas, a sufficiently 
 complete view of the Eleatic philosophy. 
 
 § 18. Xenophanes, of Colophon, in Asia Minor (born 569 b. c), 
 who removed later to Elea, in Lower Italy, combats in his poems the 
 anthropomorphitic and anthropopathic representations of God pre- 
 sented by Homer and Hesiod, and enounces the doctrine of the one, 
 all-controlling God-head. God is all eye, all ear, all intellect ; 
 nntronbled, he moves and directs all things by the power of his 
 thought. 
 
 Xenophanes, according to his own statement {ap. Diog. L., IX. 19), began his wander- 
 ings through Hellas (as rhapsodist) at the age of twenty-five years, and lived to be more 
 than ninety-two years old. If (as may be assumed with some probability from one of his 
 fragments given by Athen., Ddpnosoph., II. p. 54) it is true that he left his native country 
 soon after the expedition of the Persians under Harpagus against Ionia (544 b. c), he must 
 have been born about 5G9 b. c. Apollodorus {ap. Clem. Al., Strom., I. 301 c) gives 01. 40 
 (G20 B. c.) as the time of his birth ; more probable is the report {op. Diog. L., IX. 20) that 
 he flourished 01. 60 (540 b. c). He outlived Pythagoras, whom he mentions after the 
 death of the latter; he is himself named by Heraclitus. In his latter years he lived in 
 Elea ('E?ia, 'Ti/.r/, Velia), a Phocean colony. Fragments of his poems, though onlj' a few 
 fragments of his philosophical poems, are extant. In a fragment of some extent, pre- 
 served by Athenaeus (XI. p. 462), in which Xenophanes describes a cheerful feast, he 
 demands first that the Deity (termed sometimes Gfdf, sometimes Qeol) be praised with pure 
 and holy words, and that the banqueters be moderate and discourse of the proofs of 
 virtue, and not of the contests of Titans and similar fables of the ancients [-Xacrfiara 
 ruv nporipuv); in another fragment (Ath., X. p. 413 seq.) he warns men not to think too 
 liighly of success in athletic contests, which he deems it wrong to prefer to intellectual 
 culture {nv(U- i^iKainv, Trpoapivetv pcj^T/v ryg nyaOfjg oocpujc;^. 
 
 That the God of Xenophanes is the unity of the world is a supposition that was early 
 current. "We do not find this doctrine expressed in the fragments which have come 
 
 of the ideal or material natnre of the unity of God untouched, and said nothing definite concerning his 
 limitation or non-limitation, whereas in chai)8. 3 and 4 of the treatise De Xen., eta, it i.s said, on the one 
 h.ind, that the Eleate there in question ascribed to God the spherical form, and on tlie other that he taught 
 (the antinomy) that God is neither bounded nor unbounded. It is se.ircely to be doubted that this latter 
 6t.itement arose from a misunderstanding either of the report of Aristotle or more probably of a similar 
 report by Theophrastus (which Simplic, In Phijs., fol. 6 b, h-as preserved for us). Whether the (probably 
 Lite) author of the work intends to treat of Xenoi)hanos or of Zt^no, remains still a matter of doubt; the 
 former supposition is. jierhaps, attended with fewer difliculties than the latter. The author may have made 
 use of a Pseudo-Xenophancan writing, or perhaps even of an inexact version of the doctrines and arguments 
 of Xenophanes, which had been prepared partly on the authority of the misunderstood pa.ssagc from Theo- 
 phrastus, partly from other sources. The misinterpretation was most easily possible at a time when such 
 antinomies had already taken the form (if philosophical doemas (cf., for example, Plotinus, JSnnead, V. 10, 
 11. who teaches that God is neither bounded nor unbounded). With this problem negative results are 
 reached more easily and with greater certainty than positive ones.
 
 ^2 XENOPHANF.S OF COLOPHON. 
 
 down to us, and it remains questionable whether Xenophanes pronounced liinvself posi- 
 tively iu this sense, in speaking of the relation of God to the world, or whether such a 
 conception was not rather thought to be implied in his teachings by other thinkers, who 
 then expressed it in the phraseology given above. In the (Platonic?) dialogue, Sophiates 
 (p. 242), the leading interlocutor, a visitor from Elea, says : " The Eleatic race among us, 
 from Xenophanes' and even from still earlier times, assume in their philosophical dis- 
 courses that what is usually called All, is One" {cjg evbc ovrog rwv ndvruv i(aAnvfisvuv). The 
 'still earlier" philosophers are probably certain Orphists, who glorified Zeus as the all- 
 nding power, as beginning, middle, and end of all things. Aristotle says, Metaph., I. 5 : 
 "Xenophanes, the first who professed the doctrine of unity — Parraenides is called his 
 disciple — has not expressed himself clearly concerning the nature of the One, so that it is not 
 plain whether he has in mind an ideal unity (like Parmenides, his successor) or a material 
 one (like Melissus) ; he seems not to have been at all conscious of this distinction, but, with his 
 regard fixed on the whole universe, he says only that God is the One." Theophrastus 
 Bays (according to Simplic, Ad Arist. Phys., fol. 5 b): tv rb bv Kal ndv Eevo(t>di>7/v vTrorideaOai. 
 Timon the Sinograph (Sext. Empir., ffypotyp. Pyrrhon., I. 224) represents Xenophanes as 
 saying, that whithersoever he turned his view, all things resolved themselves for him 
 into unity. 
 
 The following are all the philosophical fragments which have been preserved from the 
 writings of Xenophanes. Ap. Clem. Alex., Strom., V. 601 c, and Euseb., Praeparat. Evang., 
 XTII. 13: 
 
 Elf i?£of tv re ■&EnlaL Kal air&puirouji fisytaTog, 
 Ovre (Uuag ■&vr]Tdiaiv 6/xouog ovte v6rjfta. 
 
 Ap. Sextus Empir., Adv. Math., IX. 144, cf Diog. L., IX. 19: 
 
 Ov'Aor 6/)(7, ovTioQ 6e I'oel, ovXoq 6e r' OKOvei. 
 
 Ap. Simplic, Ad Arist. Phys., fol. 6a: 
 
 Alel 6' kv TCJVTU) TS flEVELV KLVOVflEVOV Ovfikv 
 
 Ovde iiETcpx^'^'^o,'- i""' ennrpi'irei d/l/lore (or dTilo^ev) d/lA?;. 
 Ibid. : 
 
 'A/IA' ciTTavsv^E TTovoio voov (j)pEvl TTavTa KpaiWivec. 
 
 Ap. Clem. Alex., Strom., Y. 601 c, and Euseb., Praepar. Evang., XIII. 13 : 
 'A?/ld (ipoTol i^oKEovoL ^Eovg yEvvda^at (e6eiv te ?) 
 Tyv (j(peTf:p7jv t' ala^jjaiv kx^iv <j)(JV7p> re dlfiag re. 
 'A/IA' eItoi ;\;eZpdf }-' elxov ftosg ijh Movtec, 
 Kal ypdipai ;^ti/3£(7ai Kal ipya teXeIv dtzEp av^psg, 
 "Ittvol piv -&' iTrnniai, (ioEg 6e te (ityvalv bpo'iag 
 Ka'c KE -^Euv Idiag h/pa^ov Kal aupar' knoiorw 
 Hoiai'^' o]6v TTEp Kal avTol depag eIxov CKacToi. 
 
 Cf. Clem. Alex., Strom., YII. p. '711b.: wf <pTiaiv 6 ^Evn^dv2/g- Al^ionig te pEXavag aipovc re, 
 OpaKcg TE TTvppovc Kal ylavKinig {soil. Tovg ■&Eovg diai^uypaipovaiv), which is also reported 
 by Theodoret., Graec. Affect, curat., Serm. III. p. 49, ed. Sylb. Ap. Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., 
 IX. 193 ; 
 
 UdvTa ■&Eo'Lg dvE-&j]Kav "Opijpdg t9' 'llaiodog te, 
 
 'Oaaa nap' dv&puTrotatv ovEidEa rral rjioyog eotIv, 
 
 KA^Trretv, (iolx^veiv te Kal d/l/l?;^vf diraTEveiv,
 
 XENOPHANE8 OF COLOPHON. 53 
 
 Jlid.1. 289: 
 
 'Ofiripo^ 6i Kal 'Rcio6o( Kara rbv Ko?u}<j)uviov Atvotpavi)' 
 Ot nXelar' i(l>^ey^avTo ^euv a^cftioTia tpya, 
 KAcTrretv, fioixcv^iv re koi aA./.tj'kovq anarevetv, 
 
 Arist., Rhet, II. 23, p. 1399 b, 6: Eevcxpdwg i'?\£yev on o/ioiuc aaejiovaiv ol yevtc^tu 
 
 ^OKOvreg Tovg -dcovq rolq anu^aveiv Myovaiv a/i(pOTepu>^ yap cv/xj3aiv£i fi?/ elvai rovg deohi 
 rroT£. Ibid. 1400 b, 5: Zfv. 'EAfdra/f ipuTuaiv el ^iuai ry AEVKO^ig Kal -QprfvCiciv, tj fit}, 
 cwefiovXevev, el fiev ^ebv vrroTia/ifidvovai, ^i] ^pr/velv^ el 6' atrdpunov, fi^ ■Sieiv. 
 
 [The verse, en yairi^ yap navra Kal elg yi/v iravra -e'kevTg^ cited by Sext. Empir. {Adv. 
 Maih., X. 313, but on the authority of others: " ^evo<pdvTic 6e Kar' eviov^") and by Stobseus 
 {Ed. Phys., I. p. 294, ed. Heeren) and others, seems to have been erroneously ascribed to 
 Xenophanes. Aristotle testifies (i/e<., I. 8, p. 989a, 5): "No philosopher has regarded 
 earth in the sense in which Thales regarded water, Anaximenes air, and Heraclitus fire, 
 as a unique material principle. Meiners {Hist. Doctr. de Vero Deo, p. 327), and after him 
 Heeren, Karsten, and others, have held this verse to be a forgery.] — Ap. Sext. Empir., Adv. 
 Math., IX. 361; X. 313, and others: 
 
 ndiref yap yairj^ re Kal idaroc kKyevdfiea&a. 
 
 Ap. Stobaeus, Florileg., XXIX. 41, ed. Gaisf., and Ecbg., I. p. 224: 
 
 Olroi an' apxvi Travra ■Qcol -dv^Tol^ nape^ei^av, 
 'AXXa XP^'^V ^V'ovvTeg £(pevpiaKovaiv afieivov. 
 
 Ap. Plutarch., Sympos., IX. p. 746 b: 
 
 Tarra Se^o^aarai fiev eoiKdra roZf eri/fiotncv. 
 
 Ap. Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., VII. 49 and 110, VIII. 326, and others: 
 
 Kal TO /lev ovv aa^eg ovrig avfjp I6ev ov6e rtf earai 
 EJ(5<if, afj.(pi d^euv re Kal aaaa Tiiyu nepl ndvTuv 
 Ei yap Kal to ftaXicra tvxoi TereT^cfievov ci;r«jv, 
 Kvrbq b/nuq ovk olde • Jo/iof 6' enl ndai rervKTai. 
 
 The most noteworthy of the physical theorems of Xenophanes, after his fundamental 
 doctrine, that earth and water are the elements of all created things, is the opinion, com- 
 bated by Empedocles (in the verses cited by Arist., De Coelo, II. 12, p. 204 a, 25: elnep 
 inzeipova y^f re lidOTj Kal daxlu'Aog aWr/p, tjf did 'ko7jmv dy yAoiaaT/q ^r/6fVTa ftaraiug EKKkx^rai 
 crofidruv bXiyov rov iravrbg Idovrwv), that the earth extends without limit downward, and 
 the air upward ; the verses in which this view is expressed are communicated by Achilles 
 Tatius in his Isagoge ad Aratum {ap. Petav., Doctr. Temp., III. 76) : 
 
 Tah/r ftev rode nelpaq avu Trapd ttoooIv opdrai 
 AWepi TzpouTrXdl^ov • rd Kdra 6' e f a~eipov iKavet. 
 
 With this doctrine the assertion, sometimes attributed to Xenophanes (but perhaps only 
 through the false transference to him of a Parmenidean theorem), that the Deity is spherical, 
 does not agree. Xenophanes held the stars (according to Stob., EcL, I. 522) to be fiery clouds : 
 the rainbow also was termed by him a ircSof. Xenophanes (according to Origen, Philoso- 
 phumena, or rather Hippolytus, Adv. IfaeretKos, I. 14) explained the fact that sea-animals 
 were found petrified in the mines of Syracuse, in the marble quarries on the island of 
 Pares, and in many other places both inland and on mountains, by the hypothesis, that
 
 54 FAKMENIDE8 OF KLEA. 
 
 tlie sea had oace covered the land ; and this hypothesis was imraediatelj enlarged by him 
 into the theory of a periodical, alternate mixing and separation of earth and water. 
 Xeniades of Corinth is incorrectly named (by Sext. Emp., Adv. Math., YIII. 53, et al.) as a 
 disciple of Xenophanes. 
 
 § 19. Parmenides of Elea, born about 515-510 b. c. (so that hia 
 youtli falls in the time of the old age of Xenophanes), is the most 
 important of the Eleatic philosophers. He founds the doctrine of unity 
 on the conception of being. He teaches y Only bein g is, non-l)eing is 
 not ; there is no becoming. That which truly is exists in the form of 
 a single and eternal sphere, whose space it fills continuously. Plu- 
 rality and change are an empty semblance. The existent alone ig 
 thinkable, and only the thinkable is real. Of _the one true existence, 
 convincing knowledge is attainable by thought ; but the deceptions 
 of the senses seduce men into mere opinion and into the deceitful, 
 rhetorical display of discourse respecting the things, which are sup- 
 posed to 1)0 manifold and changing. — In his (hypothetical) explanation 
 of the world of appearance, Parmenides sets out from two opposed 
 principles, which bear to each other, within the sphere of appearance, 
 a relation similar to that which exists between being and non-being. 
 These principles are light and night, with which the antithesis of fire 
 and earth corresponds. 
 
 That Parmenides received through Xenophanes the philosophical impulses which gave 
 direction to his own thinking, we must suppose, even setting aside later evidence, from 
 the following language of the (Platonic?) dialogue Sophistes (p. 242): "the Eleatic race 
 of philosophers dating from the time of Xenophanes (and even earher)." Aristotle says 
 {Afetaph., I. 5): " Parmenides is said (XiyeTac) to have been his (Xenophanes') pupiL'' Here 
 Tieyerai is, perhaps, not to be taken as signifying an uncertainty on the part of Aristotle 
 with respect to the personal relation of the two philosophers, but as pointing to the half- 
 truth of the term "pupil" (uaflr/r^/f), since Parmenides may have been incited to his 
 inquiries more by the writings of Xenophanes than by his oral instruction, and since he 
 does not stand merely in the relation of a scholar to his predecessor, having himself first 
 created the metaphysical principles of Eleaticism. Theophrastus expresses the relation 
 in which Parmenides stood to Xenophanes by the use of the term eTnyevdfievoc (in a 
 passage in the first book of his Physics, as cited by Alexander Aphrodis., Schol. in Arist., 
 ei. Brandis, p. 536 a, 10: -oitg) 6e ETriytvufiE^'oc TlapfiEvidyiq TlvpjjTo^ 6 'EleaTT/q). Plato, 
 Theaet, p. 180 e (cf Soph., p. 217 c) represents Socrates as saying that, while still very 
 young, he met Parmenides, who was already advanced in years {irdw veo^ ttcw npeofivTy), 
 as the latter was expounding his philosophical doctrines. From this story the scenery in 
 the (probably spurious) dialogue Parmenides is derived, while more specific statements are 
 added as to the ages of Parmenides (65 years) and his companion Zeno (40 years) at the time 
 alluded to by Socrates. Whether a meeting between Socrates and Parmenides really took 
 place, or was only imagined by Plato, is doubtful; but the former supposition is by far the 
 more probable, since Plato would scarcely have allowed himself the fiction here merely for 
 scenic effect ; still less would he have done so in the narrative introduced in the Theaeteius.
 
 PAEMEN1DE8 OF ELEA. 5^ 
 
 But even if it were only a fiction, Plato would be careful not to offer too great violence 
 m it to chronological possibility. The report of Diog. Laert. (IX. 23), that Parmenidea 
 •• flourished " in OL 69 (504-500 B. c), must, therefore, be erroneous ; at that time he can 
 scarcely have been more than a few years old. The probable reference of Parmenides, 
 in his argumentation, to Herachtus (see above, § 15), of itself impUes that the former 
 was younger than Heraclitus. Parmenides appears not lo have written his " work " before 
 
 about 475-470. 
 
 Parmenides is said to have exerted a salutary influence on the legislation and morals 
 of his native city, where he supported the ethico-pohtical doctrine and action of the 
 Pythagoreans. (Diog. L. says [IX. 23] : Ikyerai de mi vdfwvg Oelvai rolg noliraLr, ioq (?tjci. 
 I,KEV(Tnnrog ev tu Trepl <pc?ioa6(puv.) For the moral character and the philosophy of Par- 
 menides Plato expresses the highest respect. Aristotle places a lower estimate on his 
 doctrine and argumentation, but admits that he was the ablest thinker among the 
 
 Eleatics. 
 
 In his Didactic Poem (the fragments of which are found in Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., 
 YIl. HI • Diog. Laert., IX. 22; Proclus, Comm. to Plato's Timaeus; Simpllcius, odArist. Phys., 
 etc.), Parmenides represents the goddess of wisdom, to whose seat he is drawn by horse.^ 
 under the guidance of the virgin daughters of Helios, as opening up to him the double 
 insight, not only mto convincing truth, but also mto the deceptive opinions of mortals (jpew 
 de ae ndvra TrvOiaOat, rjfitv oATidelriq direidsoQ ciTpsKsq f]Top, t]6£ (iporuv 66^aq, ralg ovk tvi 
 marcg dXr/dr/g). Truth consists in th e kn owk-dirL- that being is^ and non-being can not be ; 
 deception lies in the belief that non-being also is and must be. Parmenides describes the 
 "goddess as saying (in a fragment preserved by Proclus in his Comm. on Plato's Timaeus, 
 II. p. 105 b, ed Bas.) : 
 
 'H fiEv, oKug ecTiv re Kal ug ovk kart jj.?/ elvai 
 Jleidovg kcTi KEAEvdoq, akjideii] yap bm^del. 
 'H <r, cjf OVK iariv re aal tjf ;j;pewv kcm fi^ elvai, 
 T^ 6t/ <70i <ppa!^(j TzavaTTEiBka ififiev arapTTov 
 Ovre yap av yvoit^q to yc fi^ kov (ov yap efiKTov) 
 Oiire (jipdaaig* 
 
 After this appear to have followed immediately the words (cited by Clem. Alex., Strom., VI. 
 p. 627 b, and by Plotinua, Ennead., V. 1, 8) : 
 
 TO yap avTo voe'iv eotlv te koI Eivac. 
 
 I. e.: The predicate being belongs to thought itself; that I think something and that 
 this, which I think, is (in my thought), are identical assertions ; non-being — that which is 
 not — can not be thought, can, so to speak, not be reached, since every thing, when it is 
 thought, exists as thought ; no thought can be non-existent or without being, for there is 
 nothing to which the predicate being does not belong, or which exists outside of the sphere 
 of being. — In tliis argumentation Parmenides mistakes the distinction between the subjective 
 being of thought ami an objective realm of beingto which thought is directed, by direct- 
 ing his" attention only to the fact that both are subjects of the predicate boing. Says 
 Parmenides {ap. Simplic, Ad Phijs., fol. 31. in the third line, we write u'v6' i/v in.stead of 
 ovdev, according to Bergk's conjecture, see Ind. Led. Hal., 1867-68) : 
 
 [* A metrical translation of all the Parmenidean fraginents cited in this section may be read in tha 
 Journal of Speculative Philosophy, St. Louis, Jan., 1870, Vol. IV., No. 1. The doctrine contained in them 
 « fully explwned in the text.— TV.] 

 
 06 PAEMENIDES OF ELBA. 
 
 TuvTov 6" tare voetv re koL ovvEKev eart vot/fia ' 
 Ov yap avev rov fotror, iv <1) nE<pa~iCfitvov ioTiv^ 
 'EvpTjOtiQ TO voelv ov6' yv yap ij iariv ij eoTai 
 'A/l/lo napEK Tov tdirof. 
 
 Not the senses, which picture to us pUirality and change, conduct to truth, but only 
 thought, which recognizes the being of that which is, as necessary, and the existence of 
 that wliicli ia not, as impossible, farm., ap.Sext. Empir., VII. Ill : 
 
 'AA/ld cv rfjoS a^' b6ov dii^ijaioq slpys vor/fia, 
 MtjSe (f £i?of TToXvneipov or^bv Kara rrpide Piaa-&a>, 
 Ncj/zav aGKOTTov o/ifia Kal i/xv^ci'^av aitov^ 
 Kal y'Xuaaav Kplvat de Xdycj Tro?iv6f/piv E?iEy;:(ov 
 'Ef EflE-dEV 'p7j-&EVTa. 
 
 Much severer still than his condemnation of the naive confidence of the mass of men 
 in the illusory reports of the senses, is that with which Parmenides visits a philosophical 
 doctrine which, as he assumes, makes of this very illusion (not, indeed, as illusion, in 
 which sense Parmenides himself proposes a theory of the sensible, but as supposed truth) 
 the basis of a theory that falsifies thought, in that it declares non-being identical with 
 being. It is very probable that the IleracUtean doctrine is the one on which Parmenides 
 thus animadverts, however indignantly Heraclitus might have resented this association of 
 his doctrine with the prejudice of the masses, who do not rise above the false appearances 
 of the senses; the judgment of Plato {Theaet, p. 179) and Aristotle {De Anima, I. 2, p. 
 405 a, 28 : kv KivfjcEi 6' Eivac to. ovra KUKElvog oxro Kal oi noXXoi) agrees with that of Parmen- 
 ides with respect to the matter in question. Parmenides says (ap. Simplicius, Ad Phys., foL 
 19 a and 25 a): 
 
 Xp^ OE Xiysiv TE voEcv t' • Eov EpfiEvai ' EOTi yap elvai, 
 Mt/Sev 6' ovK Eivat • to. a' kyU) (ppd^Ea^ai avuya. — 
 Ilp<l)f af' 66ov TavT7ic ic^f/aio^ slpyE voijpa, 
 Avrap eiteit' awo Tijq^ i} 6tj (ipoTol fJJdref ov6ev 
 YiXa^ovrai dmpavoi ■ hfitixavir] yap iv aiiruv 
 '^TTj'BEaiv 'i-QvvEi TTAayKTov voov, 01 (?£ ^opEvvrai 
 K(j<fioi ofiitq TV(p/ioi te TEiSj^^dref, aKpiTa <pv}.a, 
 0!f TO tteXeiv te Kal ovk elvai tuvtov VEvojiicTai 
 
 Koi) TUVTOV^ TiClVTOlV TE TTaMvTpOTrog E<TTl KE?.EV&Og' 
 
 Parmenides (in a passage of some length, given by Simpl., Ad Phys., fol. Slab) ascribes 
 to the truly existent all the predicates which are implied in the abstract conception of being, 
 and then proceeds further to characterize it as a continuous sphere, extending uni- 
 formly from the center in all directions — a description which we are scarcely authorized 
 in interpreting as merely symbolical, in the conscious intention of Parmenides. That which 
 truly is, is without origin and indestructible, a unique whole, only-begotten, immovable, 
 and eternal-, it was not and will not be, but is, and forms a continuum. 
 
 M6vog ff £Ti /iii^of oSoio 
 AEiTTETat tlif EOTiv • TavTti (T Int aijfiar' iaai 
 T\.o7jm fiaX ug ayivrjTov ibv Kal avuA£-&p6v irsTcv, 
 OvXov, fiowayevEq te Kal aTpEpiq yd' aTs'kEBTov • * 
 Ov ttot" Erjv ov6' ioTat, inel vvv eotiv 6/xov Trdv, 
 
 "EV ^WEXEC 
 
 * Or aSeriTov, according to Bergk's conjecture. 
 
 i
 
 ZENO OF ELEA. 57 
 
 For what origin should it have ? How could it grow ? It can neither have arisen from 
 the nou-existent, since this has no existence, nor from the existent, since it is itself the 
 existent. There is, therefore, no becoming, and no decay (rug yeveatg /xev aTrea^earai Kal 
 amaroc o/^poi;). The truly existent is indivisible, everywhere like itself, and ever iden- 
 tical with itself. It exists independently, in and for kseK {rcjvTov r" iv tuvtCi -e /nivov Kaff 
 iavTo Te ksItol), thinking, and comprehending in itself all thought ; it exists in the form of a 
 well-rounded sphere {-avroOev evkvk7mv c6a(pT/g iva?iiyKiov oyKu fuaaodev 'Laona7\iQ rrdirry). 
 
 The Parmenidean doctrine of the apjiarent world is a cosmogony, suggesting, on the one 
 hand, Anaximander's doctrine of the warm and the cold as the first-developed contraries and 
 the Heraclitean doctrine of the transformations of fire, and, on the other, the Pythagorean 
 opposition of "limit" and "the unlimited" {an-eipov)^ and the Pythagorean doctrine of con- 
 traries generally. It is founded on the hypothesis of a universal mixture of warm and 
 cold, light and dark. The warm and light is ethereal fire, which, as the positive and efficient 
 principle, represents within the sphere of appearance the place of being; the cold and 
 dark is air and its product, by condensation (see Euseb., Praepar. Evang., I. 8, 7 : '/Jyti 
 fie rijv yijv too ttvkvov Karappvevroq aipog yeyovevai), earth. The combining or " mixing" 
 of the contraries is effected by the all-controlling Deity (Aat/zfcjv »} ttovto Kv,3spvq), at whose 
 will Eros came into existence as first, in time, of the gods {npu-Lorov fiev 'Epura 6euv 
 firp-ianro Trdvruv, Plat., Symp., 178 b, where, as Schanz has shown, the words from 'Jiai66u 
 to 6fio?uoyei, together with of must be placed before <pr/OL; Arist., Metaph., 1. 4, 984 b, 
 26). That which fills space and that which thinks, are the same ; how a man shall think, 
 depends on the " mixture " of his bodily organs ; a dead body perceives cold and silence 
 (Parm., ap. Theophrast., De Sensu, 3, where, however, in the sentence: rd yap tz'/Jov icrrl 
 vojjfia, the words to tt'asov mean, not the preponderating, but the full, or space which ie 
 filled). 
 
 If the verse in the long fragment, ap. iSimplicius, in Phys., f. 31 a, et al. (also ap. Plat., 
 TTieaeL, p. 180): olou aaiifr/Tov r' ifievai, ru Tvdvr' ovo /i' karh; baaa (Sporol Kari^EVTo Trenoi-doreg 
 elvai akri&i]., y'lyveo-dat re /cat dXXva-&ai, etc., could be emended (as is done by Gladisch, who 
 seeks in it an analogue to the Maja of the Hindus) so as to read : ru ■ndvr' bvap koriv, 
 Parmenides would appear as having explained the plurality and change attested by the 
 senses, as a dream of the one true existence. But this conjecture is arbitrary ; and the 
 words cited in the Soph., p. 242: wf evdg ovrog ruv ttovtuv KaAjovfiivuv, as also the doctrine 
 of the Megarians concerning the many names of the One, which alone really exists, confirm 
 the reading bvop.' of the MSS. The sense of the passage is therefore: "All the manifold 
 and changing world, which mortals suppose to be real, and which they call the sum of 
 things, is in reality only the One, which alone truly is." 
 
 In the philosophy of Parmenides no distinction is reached between appearance, or sem- 
 blance, and phenomenon. The terms being and appearance remain witii him philosoph- 
 ically unreconciled ; the existence of a realm of mere appearance is incompatible with the 
 fundamental principle of Parmenides. 
 
 § 20. Zeno of Elea (born about 490-485 b, c.) defended the doctrine 
 of Parmenides by an indirect demonstration, in which he sought to 
 show that the 6U]>position of the real existence of things manifold 
 and changing, leads to contradictions. In particular, he opposed to 
 the reality of motion four arguments : 1. Motion can not begin, 
 because a body in motion can not arrive at another place until it has
 
 
 •u 
 
 53 ZENO OF KLEA. 
 
 V passed through an unlimited number of intermediate places. 2. 
 
 S^ Achilles can not overtake the tortoise, because as often as he reaches 
 
 the place occupied by the tortoise at a previous moment, the latter 
 
 has already left it. 3. The flying arrow is at rest ; for it is at every 
 
 moment only in one place. 4. The half of a division of time is equal 
 
 to the whole ; for the same point, moving with the same velocitj^ 
 
 traverses an equal distance {i. e., when compared, in the one case, 
 
 ^ with a point at rest, in the other, with a point in motion) in the one 
 
 ^ case, in half of a given time, in tlie other, in the whole of that time. 
 
 ^ C. H. E. Lohse, De Argumentia, quibus Zeno Eleates nullwm esse motitm demonstravit, Halle, 1794. 
 
 "■v Ch. L. Gerling, De Zenonia EleaUci paralogismis niotum apectantibus, Marburg, 1625. 
 
 ' [Si Zeno, disciple and friend of Parmenides, is reported (by Strabo, VI. 1) to liave joined his 
 
 > "^ master in liis ethico-political efforts, and at last (by Diog. Laert., IX. 26, and many others), 
 L Cv after an unsuccessful enterprise against the tyrant Nearchus (or, according to others, 
 ' N; -Diomedon), to have been seized and put to death amid tortures, which he endured with 
 steadfastness. 
 
 In the (Platonic?) dialogue Parmenides, a prose writing {avyypafi/na) of Zeno is men- 
 tioned, which was distributed into several series of argumentations {Myoi), in each of 
 which a number of hypotheses (vKodeaeig) were laid down with a view to their reductio in 
 ahmrdum, and so to the indirect demonstration of the truth of the doctrine that Being is 
 One. It is probably on account of this (indirect) metliod of demonstration from hypotheses, 
 c,,' that Aristotle (according to Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., VII. 7, and Diog. Laert., VIII. 57 ; IX. 
 ' ■ 25) called Zeno the inventor of dialectic {€vperfjv diaAeK-iK?)^). 
 
 If the manifold exists, argues Zeno {ap. Siraplic, Ad Arist. Phys., fol. 30), it must be at 
 
 "^ the same time infinitely small and infinitely great ; the former, because its last divisions 
 
 ^sS^re without magnitude, the latter, on account of the infinite number of these divisions. 
 
 5si (In this argument Zeno leaves out of consideration the inverse ratio constantly maintained 
 
 T between magnitude and number of parts, as the division advances, whereby the same 
 
 product is constantly maintained, and he isolates the notions of smaUness and number, 
 
 opposing the one to the other.) In a similar manner Zeno shows that the manifold, if it 
 
 exists, must be at the same time numerically limited and unlimited. 
 
 Zeno argues, further (according to Arist., Phys., IV. 3 ; cf Simplic, In Phys., fol. 130 b), 
 against the reality of space. If all that exists were in a given space, this space must be 
 in another space, and so on in infinitum. 
 
 Against the veracity of sensuous perception, Zeno directed (according to Arist., Phys., 
 
 VII. 5, and Simplic. on this passage) the following argument : If a measure of millet-grains 
 
 in falling produce a sound, each single grain and each smallest fraction of a grain must 
 
 also produce a sound ; but if the latter is not the case, then the whole measure of grains, 
 
 whose effect is but the sum of the effects of its parts, can also produce no sound. (The 
 
 ethod of argumentation here employed is similar to that in the first argument against 
 
 plurality.) 
 
 ? The arguments of Zeno against the reality of motion (cited by Arist., Phys., VI. 2, p. 233 a, 
 
 .1 21 and 9, p. 239 b, 5 seq., and the Commentators) have had no insignificant influence on 
 
 the development of metaphysics in earlier and later times. Aristotle answers tlie two 
 
 first {ibid. c. 2) with the observation (p. 233 a, 11) that the divisions of time and space are 
 
 ^ the same and equal (rdf avThq yap koI -aq laar diaipiaetq 6 xpovoq Staipelrai Koi to fxeyeSo^) 
 
 I
 
 MELISSUS OF SAM08. 59 
 
 for both time and space are continuous {awex^^) ; that a distance divisible in infinitum caa 
 therefore certainly be traversed in a finite time, since the latter is also in like manner 
 divisible in infinitum, and the divisions of time correspond with the divisions of space ; the 
 infinite in division (aTrsipoD koto, duupeaii') is to be distinguished from the infinite in extent 
 [ajTtipov Tolg iaxaroLO; his reply to the third argument (c. 9) is, that time does not consist 
 of single indivisible pomts (conceived as discontinuous) or of "nows" (p. 239 b, 8: ov ydft 
 ahynELTai 6 xpovo^ £k tciu vvv tuv adiaipiruv). In the fourth argument he points out what 
 Zeno, as it seems, had but poorly concealed, viz., the change of the standard of comparison 
 (p. 240 a, 2 : to /liv irapd kivoviisvov, to 6e' Trap' ^pe/xow). It can be questioned whether the 
 Aristotelian answers are fully satisfactory for the first three arguments (for in the fourth 
 the paralogism is obvious). Bayle has attacked them in his Dictionnaire Hist, et Crit. 
 (A.rticle, Zinon). Hegel [Genchichte der Phil, I. p. 316 seq.) defends Aristotle against 
 Bayle. Yet Hegel himself also sees in motion a contradiction; nevertheless, he regards 
 motion as a real fact. Herbart denies the reality of motion on account of the contradiction 
 which, in his opinion, it involves.* 
 
 § 21, Melissus of Samos attempts by a direct demonstration 
 to establish the truth of the fundamental thought of the Eleatic 
 philosophy, that only the One is. By unity, however, he understands 
 rather the continuity of substance than the notional identity of being. 
 That which w, the truly existent, is eternal, infinite, one, in all points 
 the same or " like itself," unmoved and passionless. 
 
 It is extremely probable that Melissus the philosopher is identical with Melissus the 
 statesman and admiral, who commanded the fleet of the Samians on the occasion of their 
 victory over the Athenians, 440 B. c. (Plut., Pericl., c. 26; Tfiemist., c. 2; Thueyd., I. 117). 
 
 Several fragments of the work of Melissus, " On the E.xistent " (or " On Nature ") are 
 found in Simplic, Ad Arist. Phys. (fol. 7, 22, 24, and 34), and /d, in Arist. De Coelo (fol. 
 137); with them agrees almost exactly the section on this philosopher in the Pseudo- 
 Aristotelian work, De Melissa, etc. Cf. the works of Brandis, Mullach, and others cited 
 above (§ 17). 
 
 If nothing were, argues Melissus, how were it then even possible to speak of it, as 
 of something being? But if any thing is, then it has either become or is eternal. In the 
 former case, it must have arisen either from being or from non-boing. But nothing can 
 come from non-being ; and being can not have arisen from being, for then there must 
 have been being, before being came to be (became). Hence being did not become ; hence 
 it is eternal. It will also not perish ; for being can not become non-being, and if being 
 cliange to being, it has not perished. Therefore it always was and alwaj'S will be. 
 
 As without genesis, and indestructible, being has no beginning and no end; it is, there- 
 fore, infinite. (It is easy to perceive here the leap in argumentation from temporal 
 infinity to the infinity of space, which very likely contributed essentially to draw on Me- 
 lissus Aristotle's reproach of feebleness of thought.) 
 
 As infinite, being is One ; for if it were dual or plural, its members would mutually 
 limit each other, and so it would not be infinite. 
 
 As one, being is unchangeable; for change would pluralixe it. More particularly, it is 
 
 * In my " System der Logik-'^ 2il ed., Bonn, 1865, pp. 176, 867 seq., I have discussed these problemi 
 more thoroughly than was possible or appropriate in this place.
 
 60 THK LATER NATURAL PHILOSOPHEKS. 
 
 unmoved; for there exists no empty space in which it can move, since siich a space, if it 
 existed, would be an existing nothing ; and being can not move within itself, for then the 
 One would become a divisuTn, hence manifold. 
 
 Notwithstanding the infinite extension which Melissus attributes to being, he will not 
 have it called material, since whatever is material has parts, and so can not be a unity. 
 
 § 22. While the later Natural Philosophers asserted with the 
 Eleatics the immutability of substance, they assumed, in opposition 
 to the Eleatics, a plurality of unchangeable substances, and reduced 
 all development and change, all apparent genesis and destruction, to 
 a cliange in the relations of these substances to one another. In 
 order to explain the orderly change of relations, Empedocles and 
 lALuaxagoras taught the existence of a spiritual force in addition to 
 tlie material substances, while the Atomistic philosophers (Leucippus 
 and Democritus) sought to comprehend all phenomena as products 
 of matter and motion alone. The hylozoism of the earlier natural 
 philosophers was thus superseded in principle by the severance of the 
 moving cause from matter; yet its after-influence remained quite 
 considerable, as seen chiefly in the doctrines of Empedocles, and also, 
 but less prominently, in those of Anaxagoras and the Atomists. 
 Anaxagoras (and Empedocles also, so far as love and hate are repre- 
 sented by him as independent forces, separate from the material 
 elements) advanced in principle to a Dualism of mind and matter ; 
 while the Atomists proceeded to Materialism. 
 
 The earliest Greek philosophers advanced gradually but constantly from the sphere of 
 sensuous intuition toward the sphere of abstractions. This movement culminated, with the 
 Eleatic philosophers, in the most abstract of all conceptions, the conception of Being. But » 
 from the stand-point thus reached it was found impossible to furnish an explanation of 
 phenomena; hence the tendency among the philosophers immediately subsequent to the 
 Eleatics, so to conceive the principle of things that, without denying the imity and con- 
 stancy of being, a way might yet be opened up leading to the plurality and change of the 
 phenomenal world. In particular, they sought to account for the change and development^ 
 or the becoming of things, which (like their being) remained unexplained in the conceptions 
 of the earlier natural philosophers, by reducing the same to the motion (combination and 
 separation) of elements, whose quality is invariable. The boundary-line, which separates^ 
 the earlier from the later natural philosophy, lies in the Eleatic philosophy, or more pre- 
 cisely in the ontology of Parmenides — not in Xenophanes' theological doctrine of unity. 
 Heraclitus, who taught later than Xenophanes, but earlier than Parmenides, belongs, by 
 the character of his doctrine, to the earlier philosophers, and is not to be associated with 
 the group formed by Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Atomists. 
 
 § 23. Empedocles of Agrigentum, born not long after 500 b. c, 
 posits in his didactic poem " On Nature," as the material principles 
 or " roots " of things, the four elements, earth, water, air, and fire, to
 
 EMPEDOCLES OF AGKIGENTUM. 61 
 
 which he joins as moving forces two ideal principles : love as a nniting, 
 and hate as a separating force. The periods of the formation of the 
 world depend on the alternate prevalence of love and hate. During 
 certain periods all heterogeneous elements are separated from each 
 other by hate ; during others, they are everywhere united by love. 
 We know things in their material and ideal elements by virtue of 
 the like material and ideal elements in ourselves. 
 
 Special works on Empedocles are the following: Frid. Guil. Stnrz, De EmpedocliK Agrigmtini vita et 
 philosophia expos^ carminum reliq. coW., Leips. 1805; Ainadeua Peyron, Empedoclin et Parmeindis 
 fragmenta, Leips. 1810; II. Pwitter, Ueber die philonophische Lehre deit Empedokles, in Wolfs Litera- 
 rimhe Analekten, Vol. II., 1820, p. 411 seq. ; Lommatzsch, J>ie Weixkeit den Empedokles, Berl. 1S30; Simon 
 Karsten, Emp. Agrig. carminum reliquiae (vol. 2 of the Reliquiae phil. vet. Graec). Amet. 1888; Th. 
 Bergk, Emp. fragmenta, in the Poet. lyr. Gr.. Leips. (1S43. '53) 1866 ; De jrrooemio Empedoclis, Berl. 
 1839; Krische, Forsrhungen. I. pp. 116-129; Panzerbieter, Beitrdge zxtr Kritik und ErUuterung des 
 Empedokles, Meiningen, 1844, and Zeitxchr. f. A. W., 1S45, pp. 8S3 scq. ; Raynaud, De Emp., Strasburg, 
 1348; MuUach, /)eiS'n!p. prooewjo, Berlin, 1850; Quaestionum Emp. specimen secundnm,ib. IS52; P/tilos. 
 Or./ragm., XIV. seq., 15 seq. ; Ilelnrich Stein, Emp. Agrig. fragments erf., praemissa disj). de Empedoclia 
 gcriptis, Bonn, 18.52; W. Hollenberg, Empedoclea, Berlin, 1853 (" Gymnasial- Programm'^); E. F. Apelt, 
 Parmenidis et ETnpedoclis doctrina de mundi stritctura, Jena, 1856; A. GladiscU, Empedokles und 
 die Aegypter, eine histor. Untersuchung, mit ErUinteningen at/.? den aegypt. Denkmdlern vo7i H. 
 Brugsch und Jos. Passalacqua, Leipsic, 1858; cf. Gladisch, Emp. und die alten Aegypter, in Noack's 
 Jahrb. fur speculat. Philos., 1847, Heft 4, No. 82, IJeft 5, No. 41 ; Da-ti mystische vierspeichige Bad bei 
 den alten Aegyptern und neUe7ien, in the Zeitschr. der deutsche7i morgenhtnd. Genelhchaft. Vol. XV., 
 Heft 2, p. 406 seq.; H, Winnefeld, Die Philosoplne des Empedokles ('■' Donaueschinger Gymn.-Pro- 
 gramm "), Eastatt, 1862. 
 
 The testimony of Aristotle {Met., I. 3) requires us to consider Empedocles as a contem- 
 porary of Anaxagoras, but younger than the latter philosopher, -who was born, probably, 
 about 500 B. c. According to Aristotle (op. Diog. L., YIII. 52, 74), he lived sixty years, so 
 that we may (with Zeller) adopt 492 and 432 as the approximate dates of his birth and 
 death, respectively. His family belonged to the democratic party, for which Empedocles, 
 like his father Meton, labored successfully. He visited numerous cities in Sicily and Italy 
 in the character of physician, sacrificial priest, and thaumaturgist, claiming for himself 
 magical powers. Aristotle is said (Diog. L., VIII. 57, IX. 25 ; Sext. Emp., VII. 6) to have 
 termed him the inventor of rhetoric, as he called Zeno the inventor of dialectic. 
 
 We know with certainty of only two works written by Plmpedocles : rcEpX (pvaeuq and 
 Ka6ap/ini (Diog. L., VIII. 77) ; the larpiKoq ?.6yoq (mentioned by Diog., ibid.) may have been a 
 part of the (jivaim, and of the tragedy, which was ascribed to him by some, others deny 
 that ho was the author (Diog. L., VIII. 57). 
 
 Empedocles combats the hypothesis of absolute generation and decay : nothing, which 
 previously was not, can come into being, and nothing existing can be annihilated. The 
 phenomena usually referred to those heads result respectively from the commingling and 
 separation of elements (,«'s'C i^ta^.^a^ig te fiiyevruv) ; actual origination {(pvaic) is a name void 
 of objective meaning. The mingling of elements is the work of Love {pi?.6Tr/g, aropyi/, 'Aopo- 
 iiTTi), their separation is effectuated by Hate (N£?Kof) ; to the former Empedocles applies 
 the predicate T/Trtorpporv (kindly disposed), the latter he terms destructive, baneful, furioua 
 {pvXSfievov, Xvyp6v, fiaivoutvnv), so that obviously the opposition of these two forces was in 
 his mind in a certain sense identical with that of good and evil. The primitive material 
 elements, which remain unchanged in all mixture and separation, are fire {^vp, v^xTup,. 
 'RTuog, 'H^atdrof, Zevq apf^i), air {aWr/p, ovpavoc, "Upri (pepiafiiog), water {vSup, 6///3/30f,
 
 62 EMPBDOCLES OF AGRIGENTUM. 
 
 ndvTo^, ddlaaca, Nr/trrtf), and earth {yfj, .t^oii', 'ALduvEvc;). Empedocles calfe these elements 
 roots {rkcaapa twv ttclvtuv 'piC,ufiara). 
 
 In their original condition the elements are described by Empedocles as being all 
 mingled together and forming one all-including sphere (p(palpoQ] Aristotle, following the 
 sense of Empedocles, terms the a(paipo^ the evdaijioviaTaToq Oeoi, Met, III. 4, p. 1000 b, 3). 
 In this sphere love is supreme and hate is powerless. By the gradual development, how- 
 ever, of the influence of hate the elements become separated and individual things and 
 beings come into existence. When the extreme of separation is reached, when hate alone 
 rules and love is inactive, individual existence disappears again. Then follows a period when 
 love regains its power and unites what was separated, while individual existences appear 
 anew, till at last, love becoming, as at first, sole ruler, individual things again disappear and 
 the original condition is restored. The changes thus described are then repeated in the 
 same order, and continue without end to follow each other in periodical succession. Cf. 
 Arist, Phys., VIII. 1 ; Plat. (?), Soph., p. 242. 
 
 Of the members of the organic creation, the plants sprang first from the earth, while 
 the latter was still in process of development. After them came the animals, their dif- 
 ferent parts having first formed themselves independently and then been joined by love ; 
 subsequently, the ordinary method of reproduction took the place of this original genera- 
 tion (Plutarch, De Plac. Fhilos., V. 19, 26). At first eyes, arms, etc., existed separately; 
 as the result of their combination arose many monstrosities, which perished ; those com- 
 binations which were capable of subsisting, persisted, and propagated themselves. Em- 
 pedocles, in Arist., De Coeh, III. 2, and Simplic, Comm. in De Coelo, f. 144 b: 
 
 'Hi ■n-o2.2,di fiev Kopaai avavx^^^ £Ji2.ac~Tjcav, 
 Tvfivol 6' enTia^ovro fipaxioveq evviSt^ ufiuv, 
 'Ofifiara cT oV enXavaro nevTiTevovra fieTcnruv. 
 — Avrap iwEi Kara fiel^ov e/j.icr}'eTO daifiovi 6ai/zuv, 
 TavTo. re cv/j-nlKTecKov, onr] cwEKvpaev iKaarOj 
 'AAAd TE Tvpbg to'k; jroAAd dir^vEKEg i^EyivovTo. 
 
 By the ^aifinvec the elements are apparently to be understood, 'A'iSuvEvc, Nr/anc, etc. This 
 doctrine of Empedocles is thus expressed by Aristotle, Phys., II. 8 : onov jiev ovv dnavra awe [it] 
 hcTVEp mv tl EVEKCL Tov iyivETo, ravra fih) Ecudr] airo tov avTOfidrov avcTavra ETnrTfdEiug ' baa (5f 
 (IT/ oiJTug, (VKiSkETo KQi andTCkvTM, KaddnEp 'Efj.iTE6oK?i^g ?Jy£i rd fiovysvij avdpdirpupa, to which 
 Aristotle replies, that the organisms constructed in apparent conformity to a plan, do not 
 appear singly, as would be expected if their origin were fortuitous, but fj del ?) wf ettI to no?.!'. 
 
 Since the higher forms of life can only arise out of the lower, these latter must be 
 regarded as the lower stages, through which the former must pass. Empedocles says {ap. 
 Diog. L., VIII. 77): 
 
 'H(5?; yap ttot' iyu yevS/i?^ mvpoq te Koptj te 
 Odfivog t' oiufog te Kal Eiv dXl f/lAoTrof Ixf^i'i.* 
 
 * This doctrine may he compared with the natural philosophy of Scbellinf; and Oken and the theory 
 of derivation as propounded hy Lamarck and Darwin ; still, accordinfr to the latter, the progress from lower 
 to higher in the development of species is rather are.sult of successive differentiations of simjile forms, while 
 the Empodoclcan doctrine views it as resulting from the combination of heterogeneous forms ; but even 
 this difference is only relative. Ernst Hackel. an investigator who hns adopted the theorj' of Darwin and 
 contributed to its further development, traces (in his Kdtnrl. SchopfiitigsgegcMchie, 2d ed., Berlin, 1870) the 
 "genealogical tree of man" from the "monactjc" forms of life down through primitive animals of one and 
 of many cells, radiate infusoria, worms, fishes, reptiles, marsupialia. apes end orang-outangs, ending, 
 finally, with "speech-endowed man.'"
 
 ANAXAGORAS, HERM0TIMU8, AND AKCHELAUS. 63 
 
 Empedocles explains the workings of distant bodies on each other, and the possibility 
 of the mixture of elements, by the hypothesis of effluxes (cnroppoai) proceeding from all 
 objects, and of pores (Tropo/), into which these effluxes enter ; some effluxes are adapted 
 to specific pores, for which others would be too large or too small. By this theory 
 Empedocles also accounts for sensuous perception. In the case of seeing, a twofold 
 efflux takes place : on the one hand, effluxes pass from the objects seen to the eye (Plat, 
 Meno, p. 76; Arist., De Sensu et Serisibili, c. 2, p. 438 a, 4: ralg anoppoiaig ralg ano tuv 
 6p(j/J.evuv), while, on the other hand, effluxes from its own internal fire and water pass out 
 through the pores of the eye (Emped. in Arist., p. 437 b, 26 seq. : " Delicate nets in the eye 
 retain the mass of circumambient water, but the fire, wherever it extends, pierces through, 
 as rays of light pass through a lantern," — in reply to which Aristotle [p. 437 b, 13] objects, 
 that we ought then to be able to see in the dark). The perceived image arises on the meeting 
 of the two streams. Light needs a certain time in which to come from the sun to lis 
 (Arist, Be An., II. 6 ; De Sensu, c. 6 ; Aristotle controverts this theory). Sounds arise in the 
 trumpot-shaped auditory passage on the entrance of air in motion. Tlie sensations of smeU 
 and taste depend also on the penetration of fine particles of matter into the appropriate organs 
 (Arist, De Sensiu, a 2, 4; Theophr., De Sensu, 9). Empedocles ascribed sensation and 
 desire (as did also Anaxagoras and Democritus) to plants (Pseudo-Arist., rrepl <pvTuv, I. 1). 
 
 We know each element of things through the corresponding element in ourselves, or 
 like by like (^ yvuaig rov ofioiov -<Zi ofioiu, Emped., ap. Arist., De Anima, I. 2 ; Metaph., III. 4, 
 1000b, 6; Sext Empir., Adv. Math., VII. 121, etc.): 
 
 jail} /lev yap jalav oTTomafiev, vSart 6' viSup^ 
 al&epi d" aidipa 6'lov, arap ■Kvpl irvp aidtj'kov, 
 CTopyf) de cropyijv. ve'iKog 6e re veiKel ?.vypC>' 
 tK TovTuv yap Tzavra nenif/aaLv apuoc'&fvrn, 
 Ka\ TovToiq (jipoveovat Kal ^iSovt' r/fT aviuvrai. 
 
 "With the philosophemes peculiar to him. Empedocles united the Pythagorean doctrine of 
 the transmigration of souls (but modified and adapted to his system in the sense above 
 indicated) and a doctrine similar to that of Xenophanes concerning the spirituality of the 
 Doity (unless the loci in which this is affirmed are taken, say, from a work falsely attribTited 
 to Empedocles). 
 
 § 24. Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (in Asia-Minor), born about 500 
 B. c, reduced all origin and decay to a process of niirgling and un- 
 mingling, but assumed as ultimate elements an unlimited number of 
 primitive, qualitatively determinate substances, which were called by 
 him seeds of thinjrs. bv Aristotle, elements consistins: of homoireneous 
 parts, and by later writers (employing a term formed from tlie Aris- 
 totelian phraseology) HomoeomerifE. Originally there existed, accord- 
 ing to Anaxagoras, an orderless mixture of these diminutive parts : 
 " all things were together." But the divine mind, which, as the finest 
 among all things, is simple, unmixed and passionless reason, brought 
 order to them, and out of chaos formed the world. In the explana- 
 tion of individual existence, Anaxagoras confined himself, according 
 to the testimony of Plato and Aristotle, to the search for mechanical
 
 64 ANAXAGOKAS, HEKMOTIMUS, AND AKCHELAUS. 
 
 causes, and only fell back on the agency of the divine reason, when 
 he was nnable to recognize the presence of such causes. 
 
 Essentially the same doctrine of the world-ordering mind is 
 ascribed, among earlier philosophers, to Hermotimus of Clazomenae, 
 and among the later, to Archelaus of Miletus (or, according to 
 others, of Athens). 
 
 Of the legends of Hermotimns of Clazomenae treat Friedr. Aug. Cams, in Fulleborn's Seitrdge zur 
 Geschichte der Pkilos., Vol. 111.. Art. 9, 1798, repr. in Cams' Nachgel. Werke (Vol. IV.: Ideen zur Gesch. 
 der Philos.), Leipsic, 1809, pp. 330-392; Ignat. Denzinger, De Hermot. Vla^omenio comment, Liege, 1825. 
 
 On Anaxagoras, of. Friedr. Aug. Cams, De Anax. cnsmotheologiae foniibuK, Leipsic, 1797, and in 
 Cams" Ideen zur Gesch. der Philon., Leips. 1809, pp. 689-762, Anaxagoras aus Klazomerm und sein Zeit- 
 geist, in FQlleborn's Beitr. zur Gesch. der Philos., Art. 10, 1799, and in Cams' Ideen zur Gegch. der 
 Philos., pp. 395-478; J. T. Hemsen, Anax. Claz., Gott. 1821 ; £d. Schaubach, Anasti. Claz. fragm., Leips. 
 1827; Gail. Schorn, Anax,. Claz. et Diogenis Appolloniatae fragmenta, Bonn, 1S29; F. J. Clemens, Z)« 
 philoHophia Anaxagorae Clazomenii, Berlin, 1839; Fr. Breier, Die Philosophie des Anaxagoras von 
 Klazomenae nach Arisioteles, Berlin, 1840; Krische, Forschungen, I. pp. 60-68; C. M. Z6vort, Dissert, mir 
 la vie et la doctrine dWnaxagore, Paris, 1848; Franz Hoffman, Veber die Gottesidee des Anaxagoras, 
 Sokrates, und Platan, Wiirzbiirg, 1860 ("Gluckwiinseh-Programm" to the University of Berlin), cf Mi- 
 chelet, in '■'■Der Gedanke,''"' Vol. II., No. 1, pp. 33^44, .ind Iloflfmann's reply in Fichte's Zeitschrift Jiir 
 Ph. V. ph. Kritik, new series, Vol. 40, 1862, pp. 1-48; Aug. Gladisch, Anax. und die Israeliten, 
 Leipsic, 1864. cf. Gladisch on Anax. imd die ulten Israeliten, in Niedner's Zeitschr. fur histor. Tlieol., 
 1849, Heft 4, No. 14; C. Alexi, Anax. u. s. Philosophie, nach deri Fragmenten bei Simplicius ad Arist. 
 (G.-Pr.), Neu-Kuppin, 1867; Heinr. Beckel, Anax. doctrina de rebus animatis (diss.), Miinster, 1808. 
 
 Anaxagoras was descended from a reputable family in Clazomenfe. From this city he 
 removed to Athens. Here he lived a long time as the friend of Pericles, until, liaving 
 been accused of impiety on account of his philosophical opinions by the political opponents 
 of the great statesman, he found himself compelled to seek safety in Lampsacus, where he 
 is said to have died soon afterward. The chronological data respecting him are in part 
 discrepant. The accusation took place, according to Diodorus (IX. 38 sq.) and Plutarch 
 {Pericl., c. 38), in the last years before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war. Allowing 
 this date to be correct, it is inadmissible, with K. F. Hermann {De Philos. Ionic, aetatibus, 
 Gott. 1849, p. 13 seq.), to place the birth of the philosopher in Olymp. 61.3 (534 B. c); it 
 is more probable that the version of Apollodorus (ap. Diog. L., II. 7) is the correct one, 
 and that Anaxagoras was born in Olymp. "JO (500-496). If he lived m all seventy-two 
 years (as Diog., ibid.., reports), the date of his death must be Olymp. 88 (for which we 
 read in Diog., 78 — probably an error). In Athens he is said to have lived thirty years; the 
 statement referred (by Diog. L., II. 7) to Demetrius Phalereus, that he began to philosophize 
 in the twentieth year of his life at Athens, while Callias (Calliades?) wasarchon, probably 
 arose from a misinterpretation of the report that he began to philosophize while Callias 
 was archon at Athens. The statement of Aristotle {Metaph., I. 3), that Anaxagoras was 
 prior to Empedocles in point of age, but subsequent in respect of his (philosoiihical) per- 
 formances {rii uiv TjALKig izpoTipnc, 7oi(," '5' spyoic varepoc;), is probably to be taken purely 
 chronologically, and not as pointing to a relative inferiority or advance in philosophical 
 insight. The difference of age can not liave been great. Anaxagoras seems already to 
 have known and to have accepted in a modified form the doctrines of Empedocles. 
 
 The written work of Anaxagoras {nepl fvaeur) is mentioned by Plato (Fhaedo, p. 97) 
 and others. 
 
 In the place of the four elements of Empedocles, Anaxagoras assumes the existence 
 of an infinite number of elementary and original substances. Every thing that has parts
 
 AI^AXAGOEAS, HEEMOTIMUS, AND AKCHELAUS. 65 
 
 qualitatively homogeneous with the whole, owes its origin, according to Anaxagoras (as 
 reported by Aristotle, Met, I. 3), to the coming together {avyKpiciq) of these parts from the 
 state of dispersion among other elements, in wliich they had existed from the beginning. 
 This combination of the homogeneous is, in his view, that which really takes place in what 
 is called becoming or generation. Each primitive particle remains unchanged by this 
 process. In like manner, that which is called destruction, is in fact only separation 
 {fiiciKpiGL^). Every thing whose parts are homogeneous with the whole (e. g., flesh, blood, 
 bones, gold, silver), Aristotle calls in his terminology ofioiofiepic, in opposition to the 
 avouoioiiEpk^ (e. g., the animal, and, in general, the organism as a whole), the parts of which 
 are of diverse quality. The expression to o^oiouEpig, rd bfioiofiep^ does not denote 
 originally the homogeneous parts themselves, but the whole, whose parts are homo- 
 geneous with each other ; but it can also be applied to the parts themselves as smaller 
 wholes, since in that which has throughout the same quality the parts of every part muse 
 be homogeneous with one another. In Metaph., I. 3, Aristotle calls the wholes, which, 
 according to Anaxagoras, arise by the mingling together of homogeneous parts, ofioiouep^; 
 in other places he gives the same name to the parts, e. g., Be Coelo, III. 3 : flesh and bones, 
 etc., consist JC n-opciTuv 6/xocofiepuv Travruv j/Opoiofievuv • cf. De Gen. et Corr., I. ] : Anax- 
 agoras represents those substances which have like parts, e. g., bones, etc., as the ele- 
 mentary substances (rd ofioiofiep^ aroixela r'Srjciv, olov oaroirv Koi aiaoKa nal fivt?Mv). 
 Lucretius says (I. 834 seq.) that, according to Anaxagoras, every rerum homoeomeria, e. g., 
 bones, intestines, etc., consists of smallest substances of the same kind. The plural 6/xoi- 
 ouipeiai is used by later writers (e. g., Plut., PericL, c. 4 ; voiv aTroKpivovra rdf ofioiouepeiaq) 
 to designate the primitive, ultimate particles themselves (cf Sext. Emp., Adv. Math., X. 25 : 
 ol yap aropovg eiTruvTeg 7/ ouoiouEpelag f/ oyKovc, and Diog. L., II. S : apx^-Q '^f ouo/ouepeiar). 
 Anaxagoras himself calls these original constituents of things " seeds " {aTripfzara), and also 
 less precisely (like the objects which they constitute), " things " {xPVf^t^Ta). But not every 
 thing which appears to have like parts is held by Anaxagoras to possess them indeed. It is 
 true that Aristotle in one place, immediately after referring to Empedocles, cites (Met., I. 3) 
 water and fire as examples of substances of homogeneous parts. But where he expresses 
 himself more exactly concerning the opinion of Anaxagoras (De Gen. et Corr.. I. \: De Coelo, 
 III. 3), he says expressly that the latter regarded precisely those substances which with 
 Empedocles passed for elementary, — fire, air, water, and earth, — as not internally homo- 
 geneous, but as compounds of numerous heterogeneous particles. 
 
 Anaxagoras finds the moving and shaping force of the world neither (with the old 
 lonians) in the nature of the matter assumed as principle itself, nor (with Empedocles) in 
 impersonal psychical potencies, like love and hate, but in a world-ordering mind (voif). 
 (Anaxagoras, ap. Simplicius, in Ar. Phys., fol. 35 a: uaola inE7J.ev laeadai kuI oaola fjv koI 
 aaaa vvv tan nnl oKola iarai, Tvavra diEKoofiTjae v<5of.) This mind is distinguished from mate- 
 rial nat\ires by its simplicity, independence, knowledge, and supreme power over matter. 
 Every tiling else is mixed with parts of all other things besides itself, but mind (I'oor) is 
 pure, unmixed, and subject only to itself. All minds, whatever their relative power or 
 station, are (qualitatively) alike. The mind is the finest of things {/.eiTTorarov rrdv-uv 
 Xpv/^oTuv). Matter, which is inert and without order, it brings into motion, and there- 
 by creates out of chaos the orderly world. There is no fate [eluapuivT]) and no chance 
 
 {Tvxn)- 
 
 In the primitive condition of things the most heterogeneous substances were, according 
 
 to Anaxagoras, everywhere intermingled (Anaxagoras, ap. Simplicius, in Arist Phys.. fol. 
 
 33 b : ojidv ■Kavra ;fp^//ara ifv, uTreipa koL Tr/.ridoq kuI aficKporriTra, the first words of the work 
 
 of Anaxagoras). "When matter had thus remained inert during an indeterminate period, 
 
 5
 
 66 ANAXAGORAS, HEKMOTIMIJS, AND ARCHELAUS. 
 
 the Mind worked upon it, communicating to it motion and order (Arist., Phys., YIII. 1, p. 
 250 b, 24 : (prjal yap eKslvoq ['Ai^a^a^dpafJ, oiinv Tidvruv ovtuv koI r/pejuovvTuv rbv aneipov 
 ^povov, KLVTjaLV ifinoLfjaai rbv vovv Kal Sianplvai). 
 
 The Mind first effected a revolving motion at a single point ; but ever-increasing masses 
 ■were gradually brought within the sphere of this motion, which is still incessantly extending 
 farther and farther in the infinite realm of matter. As the first consequence of this 
 revolving motion, the elementary contraries, fire and air, water and eartli, were separated 
 from each other. But a complete separation of dissimilar and union of similar elements 
 was far from being hereby attained, and it was necessary that within each of the masses 
 resulting from this first act, the same process should be repeated. By this means alone 
 could things originate, having parts really homogeneous, e. g., gold, blood, etc. But even 
 these consist not entirely, but only prevailingly, of like parts. In gold, for example, 
 however pure it may seem, there are, says Anaxagoras, not merely particles of gold, but 
 also particles of other metals and of all other things ; but the denomination follows the 
 predominant constituent. 
 
 In the middle of the world rests the earth, which is shaped like a short section 
 of a cylinder, and is supported by the air. The stars are material ; the moon is inhabited 
 like the earth; the sun is a glowing mass of stone (fivSpoq didnvpoq, Diog. L., II. 12), and 
 the stars are of like nature. The moon receives its light from the sun. The sky is 
 full of stones, which occasionally fall to the earth, when the force of xheir revolving 
 motion is relaxed; witness the meteor of Aegospotomos (Diog. L., II. 8-12). Plants have 
 souls ; they sorrow and rejoice. Plants and animals owe their origin to the fecundation 
 of the earth, whence they sprung, by germs previously contained in the air (Theophrast., 
 Hist. Plant., III. 1, 4 ; Be Catcsis plantarum, I. 5, 2). In our perception of things by the 
 senses, like is not known by like, but by unlike, e. g., heat by cold, cold by heat; that 
 which is equally warm (etc.) with ourselves, makes no impression on us. The senses 
 are too weak to know the truth ; they do not sufficiently distinguish the constituents 
 of things (Anaxagoras, ap. Sextus Empir., Adv. Math. VII. 90 : vtto adavporr/Toc avTuv uv 
 SwaToi icfiEv uplveiv zaXTjdiq). By the mind we know the world of external objects ; 
 every thing is known to the divine reason (Anax., ap. Simplic, in Phys., f. 33 : Tvavra iyvu 
 j'dor). The highest satisfaction is found in the thinking knowledge of the universe. 
 
 The explanation of phenomena sought by Anaxagoras was essentially the genetic and 
 physical; ho did not investigate the nature of their order, which he referred to the vovg. 
 For this reason Plato and Aristotle (whom, in this particular, Plotinus follows, Ennead., 
 I. 4, 7) charge that his vovc plays a rather idle role. Plato, in the Phaedo (p. 97 c), 
 represents Socrates as saying that he had rejoiced to see the vovg designated as cause 
 of the order of the world, and had supposed that as the reason why every thing is 
 as it is, the fitness of its being so (the final cause) would be pointed out; but that 
 in this expectation he had been fully deceived, since Anaxagoras specified only me- 
 chanical causes. Cf. Leg., XII. 967 b. Aristotle praises Anaxagoras in view of his 
 principle; in rising to the conception of a world-ordering mind, ho was like a sober man 
 coming among the drunken ; but he knew not how to make the most of this principle, and 
 employed the vovr only as a mechanical god for a make-shift, wherever the knowledge of 
 natural causes failed him {Mdaph., I. 4). If, now, another thinker directed his attention 
 only to that which the vovq really was for Anaxagoras, not to the luord and the possible 
 content of the concept, he must consider a vovg as cause of motion and distinct from mate- 
 rial objects, to be unnecessary (following a line of thought simUar to that of Laplace and 
 others, in modern times, who ridicule the "God" of the earlier astronomers, as only 
 " standing upon one side and giving things a push"). Such a philosopher would neces-
 
 THE ATOMISTS : LEUCIPPU6 AND DEMOCKmjS. X) i 
 
 sarily deem it a more scientific procedure to reject the dualism of Anaxagoras, and find ic 
 things themselves the sufficient causes of their motions. It is thus that tlie doctrine of 
 Democritus stands contrasted with the doctrine of Anaxagoras. On the other hand, the 
 conception of the vnvg might occasion a real investigation of the nature of mind, and conse- 
 quently conduct beyond mere cosmology. In this way, though not till a later period, the 
 Anaxagorean principle continued to exert an influence, not so much in the teachings of 
 the Sophists, as, rather, in those of Socrates and his continuators. 
 
 Of Hermotimus, Aristotle says {Metaph., I. 3) that the hypothesis of a world- 
 ordering mind was ascribed to him ; but that nothing certain or precise was known 
 in regard to his doctrine. Later writers repeat many miraculous legends concerning 
 the man. Probably he belongs to the ancient "theologians" or cosmogonists. (See 
 above, p. 26.) 
 
 Archelaus, the most important among the disciples of Anaxagoras, appears to have 
 interpreted the original medley of all substances as equivalent to air, and to have toned 
 down the antithesis between mind and matter, thus receding again nearer to the older 
 Ionic natural philosophy, and in this respect occupying a position relative to Anaxagoras 
 similar to that of his contemporary, Diogenes of Apollonia (mentioned above, § 14, pp. 
 37 and 38). The doctrine that right and wrong are not natural distinctions {(pvaei\ but 
 depend on human institution, is ascribed to Arciielaus. 
 
 Another disciple of Anaxagoras, Metrodorus of Lampsacus, interpreted the Homeric 
 poems allegorically ; by Zeus the vovq was to be understood, by Athene art {rix"^)- 
 
 The fine verses, in which Euripides (op. Clem. Alex., Strom., IV. 25, § 157), with un- 
 mistakable reference to Anaxagoras, sings the praises of the investigator, may here be 
 cited : 
 
 'OX0ioi oari^ rfiq laropiaq 
 
 enl irr/fioavva^, fir/r' el^ aSiKOVf 
 
 irpd^etc dpfxCrv, 
 
 aXTi adavaTov KaBopuv (pvaeac 
 
 Kdgfiov ayf/pu, r/f te awiarrj 
 
 KoL hnri Kal oTrcig ■ 
 
 To'tg ToioiiToig ovdeizor' aiaxpi^v 
 
 ipyuv iMt^ETTifia Trpoai^ei. 
 
 § 25. Leucippus of Abdera (or Miletus, or Elea) and Democritus 
 of Abdera, the latter, according to his own statement, forty years 
 younger than Anaxagoras, were the founders of the Atomistic phi- 
 losophy. These philosopliers posit, as principles of things, the " full " 
 and the "void," which they identify respectively with being and non- 
 being or something and nothing, the latter, as well as the former, 
 having existence. They characterize the " full " more particularly, 
 as consisting of indivisible, primitive particles of matter, or atoms, 
 which are distinguished from one another, not by their intrinsic 
 qualities, but only geometrically, by their form, position, and arrange- 
 ment. Fire and the soul are composed of round atoms. Sensation 
 is due to material images, which come from objects and reach the sonl
 
 68 THE ATOMISTS : LEDCIPPUS AND DEMOCRITU8. 
 
 through the senses. The ethical end of man is happiness, which is 
 attained through justice and culture. 
 
 Of Democritus treat Schleiermacher, Ueber das Verzeiohniss der Schriften deg Demokrit hei Diog. L. 
 (IX. 45 seq.), read Jan. 9, 1S15, and jirinted in his Sdmmtl. Werke, 8d div., Vol. 3, pp. 293-305; Getfera, 
 Qnaesst. Dem., QOtt. 1829; J. F. W. Burcbard, Democriti p?iilo8aphiae de sevnibuH /ragmenta, Minden, 
 T?oO; Fraijmente der Moral des Abderiten Demokritus, Minden, 1S34; Papeucordt. Ve atmnicorum doc- 
 trino. Berlin, 1832; Frid. Heimsoetli. Democriti de anima doctrina, Bonn, 1835; Kriscbe, Fornclningen. 
 I. pp. 142-163; Frid. Guil. Aug. Mullach, Quaestionem Democritearum spec. I-II., Berlin, 1835-42; Demo- 
 criti 02>eru7n fragme,nta coll., rec, veriit, esrpHc. ac de philosophi vita, scriptix et jylaeitis commtn- 
 iitus est, Berlin, 1843; Fragm. ph. Gr., I. p. 330 seq. ; B. ten Eviu)^, Anecdotn EpicJiarmi, Democriti, etc., 
 in the Philolog^M, VI. 1851, p. 577 seq. ; Democriti de se ipso testimonia, ib. p. 589 seq., VII.. 1852, p. 354 
 seq. ; Democriti liber Trepl di-Spuin-ou (^licrtos, ibid. VIII., 1853, p. 414 seq. ; Ed. Johnson, Der Sensualismv* 
 des Demokrit (G.-Pr.), Plauen, 1868. 
 
 Of the age of Leucippus and the circumstances of his life little is definitely known; it is 
 also uncertain whether he wrote any thing himself, or whether Aristotle and others drew 
 their information concerning his opinions from the writings of his pupil Democritu:?. 
 Aristotle commonly names him in connection with Democritus. The statement (Diog. L., 
 IX. 30), that he heard Zeno, the Eleatic, receives confirmation from the character of his 
 doctrine. Hiat the principles of his philosophy were largely derived from the Eleatics is 
 aLso testified by Aristotle, Be Gen. et Corr., 1. 8, 325 a, 26. 
 
 Democritus of Abdera, in liis work ^uKphq Aiuko(t/li.o^, said (according to Diog. L., IX. 41) 
 that he wrote this work 730 years after the capture of Troy, and that he was forty years 
 younger than Anaxagoras. He must, according to the latter statement, have been born 
 about 4G0 b. c, with which date agrees the statement of Apollodorus {op. Diog. L., ibid.), 
 tliat he was born 01. 80; according to Thrasyllus (ibid.), 01. Tt.G = 470 b. c. ; but for the 
 date of the capture of Troy Democritus appears to have assinned, instead of 1184, the 
 year 1150, whence we derive, as the date of the composition of the work named, the year 
 420 B. c. He is said to have died at a great age (ninety years old; according to others, 
 one lumdred, or even more). Desire for knowledge led him to undertake extended jour- 
 neys, Egypt and the Orient being among the places visited by him. Plato never mention.^ 
 him, and speaks only with contempt of the materialistic doctrine. Plato desired, according 
 to the narrative of Aristoxenus, the Aristotelian (in his laropiKci vTrouvyfiarn, see Diog. L., 
 IX. 40), that the writings of Democritus should be burned, but was convinced by the 
 Pythagoreans AmycLas and Clinias, of the uselessness of such a proceeding, since the 
 books were already widely circulated. Aristotle speaks of Democritus with respect. 
 
 Democritus wrote numerous works, among which the /Lteyac AiaKoa/iog was the most 
 celebrated. His style is greatly praised by Cicero, Plutarch, and Dionysius, for its clear- 
 ness and elevation. 
 
 The Atomistic system was urged by Democritus, who perfected it and raised it to an 
 acknowledged position, in opposition to the Anaxagorean (in the sense indicated above, at 
 the end of § 24). The relation between Leucippus and Anaxagoras is uncertain. Since 
 Democritus is called by Aristotle {3Ietaph.. I. 4) an halpnq (an intimate companion and 
 disciple) of Leucippus, the difference between their ages can liardly have amounted to forty 
 years, so that Leucippus must have been younger than Anaxagoras. If Anaxagoras did 
 not make himself known by his philosopliical productions in early life, it may be that 
 Leucippus (who appears to be immediately associated with the doctrine of Parmenides by 
 )iis polemic against it) preceded him in this respect; yet this is not very probable, and can 
 by no means be concluded from certain passages of Anaxagoras, in which he combats 
 opinions (in particular the hypothesis of empty inter-atomic spaces) that are, it is true,
 
 THE ATOMISTS : LEUCIPPU8 AND DEM0CEITU8. 09 
 
 found in the writings of the Atomists, but had already been propounded by earlier philos- 
 ophers (especially by Pythagoreans), and had also been, in part, combated by Parmenides 
 and Empedocles. In view of tins uncertainty respecting Leucippus and of the undoubted 
 reference which Demochtus constantly makes to Anaxagoras, we place the exposition of 
 the Atomistic system immediately after that of the Anaxagorean. Besides, the nature of 
 the doctrine of Hoinoeomeria-, which is a sort of qualitative Atomism, places it in the 
 middle between the four qualitatively different elements of Empedocles and the reduction 
 by Leucippus and Democritus of all apparent qualitative diversity to the merely formal 
 diversity of an infinite number of atoms. 
 
 In his account of the principles of the earlier philosophers, in the first book of the 
 Metaphysics, Aristotle says (c. 4) : " Leucippus and his associate, Democritus, ^ssume as 
 elements the full {TrXypec, arepeov, vacTov) and the void {kpvov, fiavov). The former they 
 term being (6v), the latter, non-being (//^ oi') ; hence the^' assert, further, that non-being 
 exists as well as being." According to another account (Plutarch., Adv. Col., 4), Democ- 
 ritus expressed himself thus : fir) fiaTJ/jov rb 6h' f] -6 fujdev clvai (''Thing is not more real 
 than no-thing"), expressing by the singularly constructed word, 6h\ something ("thing"). 
 The number of things in being (atoms) is infinitely great. Each of them is indivisible 
 (aTOfiov). Between them is empty space. In support of the doctrine of empty space, 
 Democritus alleged, according to Aristotle (Phys., lY. 6), the following grounds: 1. Motion 
 requires a vacuum ; for that which is full can receive nothing else into itself; 2. E,arefac- 
 tion and condensation are impossible without the existence of empty intervals of space ; 
 3. Organic growth depends on the penetration of nutriment into the vacant spaces of 
 bodies ; 4. The amount of water which can be poured into a vessel filled with ashes, 
 although less than the vessel would contain if empty, is not just so much less as the space 
 amounts to, which is taken up by the ashes ; hence the one must in part enter into the 
 vacant interstices of the other. 
 
 The atoms differ (according to Arist., Metaph., I. 4) in the three particulars of shape 
 {axf/fJ-a, called pvafzor by the Atomists themselves, according to Aristotle), order (ra^tc, or, 
 in the language of the Atomists, diadi/y^), and position (Oiaig, Atomistic -poni]). As an 
 example of difference in shape, Aristotle cites the Greek characters A and N, of order or 
 sequence AN and NA, and of the difference of position Z and X. As being essentially 
 characterized by their shape, Democritus seems to have called the atoms also i6iaq and 
 cxvp-ara (Arist., Phys., III. 4 ; Phit., Adv. Col, 8 ; Hesych., s. v. IdEo). These differences are 
 sufficient, according to the Atomists, to explain the whole circle of phenomena; are not the 
 same letters employed in the composition of a tragedy and a comedy (Arist., De Gen. e( Corr., 
 1. 2) ? The magnitude of the atoms is diverse. The weight of each atom corresponds 
 with its magnitude. 
 
 The cause of th'i atoms is not to be asked after, for they are eternal, and hence uncaused 
 (Afist., P/iys., Vin. 1, p. 252 a, 35: Ar//x6Kpiror tov aei ovk a^ial a.pxf,v i^r/reiv). (It was 
 probably not the Atomists themselves, but later philosophers, who first hypostasized this 
 very absence of a cause into a species of cause or efficient nature, to avrdjuarov.) 
 
 'Democritus is said also to have declared tlie motion of the atoms to be primordial and 
 eternal. But w'th this statement we tind united the other, that the weight of the larger 
 atoms urged them downward more rapidly than the others, by which means the smaller 
 and lighter ones were forced upward, while through their collision with the descending 
 atoms lateral movements were also produced, in this way arose a rotatory motion (f''w), 
 which, extending farther and farther, occasioned the formation of worlds. In this process 
 homogeneous elements came together (not in consequence of the agency of "love" and 
 "hate," or an all-ruling " Mind," but) in obedience to natural necessity, in virtue of which
 
 70 THE ATOMISTS I LEUCIPPUS AND DEM0CRITU8. 
 
 things of like weight and shape must come to the same places, just as we observe in the 
 winnowing of grain. Many atoms having become permanently united in the course of their 
 revolutions, larger composite bodies and whole worlds came into existence. 
 
 The earth was originally in motion, and continued thus, while it was yet small and 
 light ; but gradually it came to rest. Organized beings arose from the moist earth. The 
 soul consists of fine, smooth, and round atoms, which are also atoms of fire. Such atoms 
 [are distributed throughout the whole body, but in particular organs they exercise par- 
 ticular functions. The brain is the seat of thought, the heart, of anger, the liver, of desire. 
 When we draw in the breath we inhale soul-atoms from the air ; in the expiration of 
 breath we exhale such atoms into the air, and life lasts as long as this double process is 
 continued. 
 
 Sensuous perception is explained by eilluxes of atoms from the things perceived, 
 whereby images (ftdcjAa) are produced, which strike our senses. Through such eiduXa, 
 says Democritus, even the gods manifest themselves to us. Perception is not wholly 
 veracious ; it transforms the impressions received. The atoms are invisible on account 
 of their smallness (only excepting, perhaps, those which come from the sun). Atoms and 
 vacuity are all that exists in reality; qualitative differences exist only fw us, in the 
 sensuous phenomenon (No/uu) yXvKi! kuI vofiu ircKpov, vofiu Osp/uov, vo^oj •i/w;fp6v, vofiu XP°'-V ' 
 erey de arofia aal kevov, Democritus, op. Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., VII. 135). The asser- 
 tion of Democritus {ap. Diog. L., IX. 72), that in reahty we know nothing, etc. {hreij 6e 
 ovSkv l6/xev, kv j3v&(^ yap ?'/ ah'/-&£ia), must, as employed by him, probably be restricted to 
 the case of sensuous phenomena ; for in view of the assurance with which Democritus 
 professes the doctrine of atoms, this skeptical utterance can not bo supposed to bear upon 
 that doctrine itself. Democritus (according to Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., VII. 138) also 
 expressly distinguished from sensuous perception, which he called obscure knowledge 
 (anoriT/), the genuine knowledge {yvr/aiTi) acquired by the understanding through investiga- 
 tion. That kind of philosophical thinking by which Democritus went beyond the results of 
 sensuous perception and recognized in tlie atoms the reality of things, was not made by 
 him itself a subject of philosophical reflection, and the manner in which such thinking is 
 effected was left by him without special explanation; it is among the philosophers of the 
 following period (with the earliest among whom Democritus was indeed contemporaneous) 
 that reflection concerning the nature of thought itself begins. Yet it follows from the 
 fundamental principles of Democritus that thought can not be independent of sensation or 
 the vovg of the ^rvx^, and this inference was expressly drawn by Democritus (Cia, De Fin., 
 I. 6 ; Plut., De PL Philos., IV. 8 ; cf Arist., De An., III. 3). The only expression which 
 Democritus appears to have given to his views concerning tlie origin of true knowledge, is 
 that implied in the principle wliich he enounced in agreement with Anaxagoras, that we 
 sliould proceed in our inferences from phenomena {(patvo/ueva) to the unknown {a6j}Xa, see 
 Sext. Empir., Adv. Muth., VII. 140). and in hLs doctrine that thought arises when the 
 motions of the soul are •' symmetrical " (Theophr.. De Semu, 58). 
 
 The soul is the noblest part of man ; he who loves its goods, loves what is most divine. 
 He who loves the goods of the body, which is the tent of the soul, loves the merely human. 
 The highest good is happiness (evearu, EvSvfiia, uTapa^ia, ada/ifila). This is attained by 
 avoiding extremes and observing the limits fixed by nature (jieTpioTTfri ripipiog Kat (iiov 
 ^vnfierpii)). Not external goods secure happiness ; its seat is the soul (evdaifiovir; rpvxf/c 
 Kal KaKo6aLfiovirj ovk iv (ioaKijfiaaL o'lKsec oiid' ev jprcroj, ■ipvxv 6e oIkt/tt/pcov 6atfiovo^). Not 
 the act as such, but the will, determines moral character (ayadbv ov to fifj ddiKteiv, aXhi 
 TO fi7/6i- kd'e/xLV — ;^ap<0TfK6f ovk. 6 /3Ae7r(jv Trpof ttjv a/ioifi^, aXX 6 ev Sp&v TrpoiypT/fjevoc). 
 The highest satisfaction comes from knowledge (Euseb., Pr. Ev., XIV. 27, 3 ; ArjfipoKtToi,
 
 DIVISIONS OF THE SECOND PEBIOD. < i 
 
 ITuye PovXeoBai na7JMV fiiav eiijelv aiTio?Mylav, ij rifv liepadv ol fiaai^^iav yeviadai). The 
 country of the wise and good is the whole world {avdfjl aofC> naaa yij jiaTr/ • iwxni yap 
 ayadijg TznTplq 6 ^v/nrag Koafiog). 
 
 In the ethical theorems of Democritus, as also in those which relate to the difference 
 between objective reality and our subjective apprehension of it, and which belong to the 
 theory of cognition, the tendency to overstep the limits of cosmology becomes manifest — a 
 tendency not wanting to any of the older philosophers and peculiarly natural in those 
 standing on the borders of the first period. Democritus, the contemporary of Socrates, but 
 younger than he, went considerably farther in this direction than Anaxagoras or any 
 other of the earlier thinkers. 
 
 The first disciples and successors of Democritus (among whom Metrodorus of Chios is 
 the most important) seem to have emphasized more strongly and developed to a greater 
 extent the skeptical elements, which were contained more particularly in his doctrine 
 of sensuous perception. 
 
 Second (Pbevailingly Anthropological) Period of Greek 
 
 Philosophy. 
 
 FROM THE SOPHISTS TO THE STOICS, EPICUREANS, AXD 
 
 SKEPTICS. 
 
 § 26. To th© Second Period of Greek Philosophy belong, 1) the 
 Sophists, 2) Socrates, the imperfect disciples of Socrates, Plato, and 
 Aristotle, 3) the Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics. The Sophists, as 
 speculators, regard mainly the phenomena of gerce^tionj represen- 
 tation, and desire. Socrates considers principally the phenomena 
 and laws of logical thinking and moral willing, and thus recognizes 
 the essential relation of man, the thinking subject, to the objective 
 world ; the more precise investigation of this relation is undertaken 
 by Plato and Aristotle, who also redirect attention to physical phi- 
 losophy, and w'ho (as regards their political and ethical doctrines) 
 regard man as essentially a social being, or the individual as an essen- 
 tial and a natural part of the body politic. Tiie Stoics and Epicu- 
 reans, w'hile indeed laying more stress upon the independence of the 
 individual, leave him nevertheless subject to norms of thought and 
 will having universal validity. Finally, Skepticism, which likewise 
 seeks its end in the satisfaction of the needs of the individual subject, 
 prepares the way for a new period, through the dissolution of all 
 existing systems.
 
 72 GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE SOPHISTIC DOCTRINES. 
 
 The ethical and religious utterances of the poets, historians, etc., of this period contain philosophical 
 matter, but not in philosophical form, and the exposition of them must be left to the historians of literature 
 and of human culture in its more general development. 
 
 In this period Athens became the center of Hellenic culture and, especially, of Hellenic 
 philosophy. Pericles (in Thucyd., II. 41) describes Athens as a school of civilization for 
 Greece. In the Platonic dialogue Protagoras (p. 331 d), the Sophist, Hippias of Elis, terms 
 Athens "the Prytaneum of the wisdom of Hellas." Isocrates says {Panegyr., 50): "the 
 Athenian state has caused the name Hellenes to become suggestive rather of intellectual 
 culture than of historical descent." The susceptibility of the Athenians for art and 
 science, their disposition for philosophical reflection, and the consequent establishment of 
 the philosophical schools at Athens, are the most important circumstances in the historic 
 connections of the second period of Greek philosophy. 
 
 § 2T. In the doctrine of the Sophists the transition was effected 
 from philosophy as cosmology, to philosophy as concerning itself with 
 the thinking and willing subject. Yet the reflection of the Sopliists 
 extended only to the recognition of the subject in his immediate 
 individual character, and was incompetent, therefore, to establish on 
 a scientific basis the theory of cognition and science of morals, for 
 which it prepared tlie way. The chief representatives of this ten- 
 dency were Protagoras the Individualist, Gorgias the Nihilist, Hippias 
 the Polymathist, and Prodicus the Moralist. These men were followed 
 by a younger generation of Sophists, who perverted the philosophi- 
 cal principle of subjectivism more and more, till it ended in mere 
 frivolity. 
 
 On the Sophists, compare — in addition to the several chapters -which treat of them in the above- 
 cited works of Hegel, Brandis, Zeller, and others, and in Grote's Ehtory of Greece (V III. pp. 474-544), and 
 K. F. Hermann's Gench. v. Syst. der Platon. PhiloRophie (pp. 179 seq. and 296 seq.)— in particular, the 
 following works : Jac. Geel, IHstoria critica sopMataiitm, qni SocratiH aetate Athenis Jioruerunt, in the 
 Nova acta titt. societ. Ii!ic7io-Trajectinae, p. II., Utr. 1823; llerm. Roller, Die griechischen Sophigtensu 
 Sokrateis^ und PlaMfs Zeit unci ihr Einfltiss avf Beredtsamkeit und Philo&ophie, Stuttg. 1S32; W. G. 
 F. Eoscher, Be historicne doctrinae apud sophistas majores vestigiig, Gott. 1838 ; W. Baumhauer, 
 Quam vim sopMstae hahuerint Athenis ad aetatis suae dinciplinam, mores ac studia irnmutanda, 
 Utrecht, 1844; H. Schildencr, Die Sophisten, in Jahn's Archiv far PJiilol., Vol. XVII., j). 365 seq. 
 1851; Job. Frei, Beitrdge zur Geschichte der griechisclien Sophistik. in the Rhein. J)fnK. /. Ph.. new 
 series, VII. 1S50, pp. 527-554, and VIII. 1S5.3, pp. 26S-279; A. J. Vitringa. De sophistarum schoHs, quae 
 Socraiis aetate Athenis floruerunt, in: Mnemosyne, II. 1853, pp. 223-237; Valat, Essai historiqne snr 
 les eophisies grecs, in PInvestigateur, Paris, 1859, Sept., pp. 257-267, Nov., pp. 321-336, Dec, pp. 353-361 ; 
 Theod. Gomperz, Die griech. Sophisten, in the Deutsche Jahrh., Vol. VII., Bcrl. 1863; N. Wecklein, Di« 
 Sopfiisten und die Sophi.<itik nach den Angaben Plato^s, Vfurzhnrg, 1865; Martin Schanz, Beit} age zur 
 rorsokrati^chen Philosophie aus Plato, I. Heft.' Die Sophiiten. Gottingen, 1867; MuUach, Fragmenta 
 Ph. Graec. II., 1S67, p. LVIII. seq., and " Sophistarum Fragm.," ibid. p. 130 seq. ; H. Siebeck, Das Problem 
 des Widens bei Sokrates und der Sophistik, Halle, 1870. 
 
 The Sophists are historically of importance not only as rhetoricians, grammarians, and 
 diffusers of various forms of positive knowledge, but also (as, in particular, Hegel has 
 shown) as representatives of a relatively legitimate philosophical stand-point. Their philo- 
 eophical reflection centered in man, was subjective rather than objective in direction, and 
 thus prepared the way for ethics and logic. That the Sophists should turn their attention
 
 PROTAGORAS OF ABDERA. 73 
 
 primarily to the natural basis and condition of thought and will alone, i. e., to perception 
 and opinion, to sensuous pleasure and individual desire and will, was natural and neces- 
 sary; their error consisted in treating this natural basis, beyond which their reflective obser- 
 vation did not extend, as comprehending all the subjective powers and data, and in ignoring 
 or misapprehending the higher. It is none the less true^ hat the doctrine of the Sophists 
 marks a progress in philosophical thought. The sensualistic subjectivism of Protagoras is 
 in one respect superior to the philosophical thinking of Parmenides ; for the latter is only 
 concerned with being in general, not (or at least only incidentally) with perception and 
 thought themselves. The sensualism of the Sophists is not itself sensuous perception, 
 but, essentiall}', reflective thinking concerning perception and opinion, and consequently 
 the next step to that speculation concerning thought as such, which was instituted by 
 Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Without those "Sophists," these "philosophers'" could 
 not have become what they did become. In considering the judgments expressed by 
 Plato and Aristotle concerning the doctrine of the Sophists, not orly should the great 
 difference be borne in mind between the earlier and later generations of Sophists, but also 
 the nature of the standard by which these phOosophers judged them. Measured by the 
 ideal principles of Plato, the thinking and the character of the Sophists appear reprehen- 
 sible ; but they were not opposed in prmciple to the opinions and practices of the times 
 (the Sophists, as Plat., Re2?., 493, says, taught to. tuv ttoAawi; 66yiia-a\ although many 
 of the Sophists disputed in certain respects the authority of tradition. The Sophists, 
 who cultivated chiefly rhetoric and much more rarely the pseudo-dialectical science of dis- 
 pute ("Eristic"), only prepared the way for the dialectical destruction of naive, traditional 
 convictions. It was (as Grote correctly remarks) Socrates and his pupils, who first com- 
 pleted this work of destruction and at the same time undertook to furnish a positive 
 substitute for what was destroyed. 
 
 If the teaching of the Sophists were only criticism, and had only accomplished the sub- 
 version of cosmological philosophy, we should be obliged to include it (as Zeller and others 
 do) in the first period. But since it is essentially characterized by reflection on certain 
 phases of subjective life, it belongs unquestionably to the second period. Even Zeller, j 
 who places it in the first, admits {Ph. d. Gr., If. 1, 2d ed. p. 129; cf. also I. p. 725) that 
 " the Sophists first conducted philosophy from objective investigation to ethics and dia- 
 lectic, and transferred thought to subjective grovmd." 
 
 The essential point in which the Sophists were innovators was this : that they intro- 
 duced a new kind of instruction, not in anj^ special department, as music or gymnastics, 
 but with a view to the development of a certain universality of culture, a culture which 
 should embrace all the interests of life and which, in particular, should provide the 
 recipients of it with political intelligence ; that, further, this instruction was founded on 
 speculations concerning the nature of human volition and thought, and that by it, rather 
 than by tradition or common opinion, thcj- caused the views and practices of the citizens 
 to lie determined. This new branch of instruction was by no means given up by Socrates 
 and his disciples : it was only expanded and developed by them in another and more pro- 
 found manner, so that, with all their opposition to the Sophists, thej' nevertheless stand 
 witn them on the common ground of subjective philosophical speculation (cf. Plutarch's 
 Life of Themistocles, chap. 2). 
 
 § 28, Protagoras of Abdera (born about 490), who figured as 
 teacher of rhetoric in numerous Greek cities, especially at Athens, 
 arvd was a contemporary of Socrates, although considerably older than
 
 7i PKOTAGORAS OF ABDEEA. 
 
 he, transferred and applied the doctrine of Heraclitus respecting the 
 eternal flux of all things to the knowing subject, and asserted : Man 
 is the measure of all things, of things that are, that they are, of things 
 that are not, tliat they are not. Just as each thing appears to each 
 man, so is it for him. All truth is relative. The existence of the 
 gods is uncertain. 
 
 On Protagoras alone, cf. Geist, D6 Protagora Sophista, Giessen, 1827 ; Leonh. Spengel, De Protagora 
 rhetore ejusque seriptis, in his Xwayiayr) rexvitv, Stuttg. 1828, p. 52 seq.; Ludw. Ferd. Herbst, Protagoras^ 
 Leben und Sophistik aus den Quellen zusammengestellt, in PhiloL-hint. Sttidien, e<l. by Petersen, Ist 
 part, Hainb. 1832, p. 88 seq. ; Krische, Forschungen, I. pp. 130-142 ; Job. Frei, Quaestioiiea Protagoreae, 
 Bonn, 1845; O.Weber, Qnaesiiones Proto^wene, Marburg, 1S50; Jak. Bernays, /We KarafiaWovrts dei 
 Protagoras, in the Bhein.Mus. f. Phil., N. S., VII. 1850, pp. 4&4-46S: A. J. Vitringa, 2>e Protagorae vita 
 et philosophia, Groningen, 1853; Friedr. Blass, I>ie aU. £eredsamkeif, Leipsic, 1868, pp. 2S-29. Cf. the 
 works cited, ad § 27. 
 
 Plato States {Protag., 31T c, seq.) that Protagoras was considerably older than Socrates. 
 According to a statement in the Platonic dialogue Meno (p. 91 e), from which the similar 
 statement of Apollodorus (ap. Diog. L., IX. 56) seems to have been copied, he lived about 
 seventy years ; according to another version (ap. Diog. L., IX. 55), he lived more than 
 ninety years. Probably he was born ca. 491, and died ca. 421-415 b. c. He called himself 
 a oocpccF-yg, i. e., a teacher of wisdom (Plat., Protag., p. 316 d: oixoT^yu re co<^taTTj^ elvai Kal 
 -rratSeveiv avdpuTzovQ). The word Sophist acquired its signification as a term of reproach 
 especially through Aristophanes and afterward through the followers of Socrates, par- 
 ticularly Plato and Aristotle, who contrasted themselves, as "philosophers," with the 
 " Sophists." Sophists like Protagoras stood in high consideration with the majority of 
 cultivated people, as Plato's dialogue Protag. especially attests, although a respectable and 
 well-to-do Athenian burgher could not himself have been a Sophist (man of letters), and 
 earned money by public lessons. It is well known that at a later time rhetoricians were 
 also called Sophists. Protagoras is said to have prepared the laws for the Athenian 
 colony of Thurii (Heraclides, ap. Diog. L., IX. 50). He was first at Athens between 451 
 and 445 B. c. (see Frei), next perhaps about 432, and again 01. 88.3 = 422-421 B. c, and 
 shortly before his death. It is probable that Plato in his dialogue Protagoras has with 
 poetic license transferred single circumstances from 422 to 432. On the occasion of his 
 last sojourn at Athens (about 415 ? or 411 ?) lie was accused and condemned as an atheist. 
 The copies of his work were demanded of their private owners, and burned in the market- 
 place ; he himself perished at sea on his passage to Sicily. The supposition of Epicurus, 
 that he had been a pupil of Democritus (Diog. L., IX. 53 ; X. 8), is hardly consistent with 
 the relation between their ages, and is improbable on other grounds. On the other hand, 
 it is even affirmed that Democritus mentioned and opposed Protagoras in his writings 
 (Diog. L., IX 42 ; Plutarch., Adv. Coloten, l\. 2). 
 
 In the doctrine of Protagoras Plato finds the inevitable consequence of the doctrine of 
 Heraclitus {Theaet, p. 152 seq.). He admits its validity with reference to sensuous percep- 
 tion (aladr/aic), but objects to any extension of it beyond this province as an illegitimate 
 generalization of the theory of relativity. (For the rest, there is contained in the proposi- 
 tion, that all that is true, beautiful, and good, is such only for the knowing, feeling, and 
 willing subject, a permanent truth. This truth Protagoras only one-sidedly exaggerated 
 by ignoring the objective factor.) 
 
 According to Diog. L., IX. 51, the original words of the fundamental theorem of Pro- 
 tagoras ("Man the measure of all things'') were as follows: ttuvtuv xpVf^oTcw /urpop
 
 PROTAGORAS OF ABDERA. 75 
 
 avdpuTTOi;, Tuv fikv bvruv <jf kari, tuv 6e ovk ovtuv cjf ovk iarcv. It remains uncertain how 
 far the manner in which Protagoras estabhshed this proposition agreed with that wiiich 
 we find reported in Plato's Theaetetus (p. 152 seq.). Diog. L. says of Protagoras that " he 
 first showed how theses miglit be defended and attacked," and " he first said that on every 
 subject contradictory affirmations could be maintained." It is to the equivocal pseudo- 
 dialectical mode of discussion which is implied in these quotations, and which Protagoras 
 seems to have followed in his work 'A-vriloyi-Ka, tliat Plato alludes in terms of censure in 
 Phaedo, p. 101 d, e. Aristotle says {Metaph., III. 2, 32, p. 998 a, 4) : Lanep Ylpuraydpac 
 i'/.F.yev iAey;(uiv Tuiig yeu/uiTpai;, ovff ai Kivr/acig Kal k'/UKEQ tov ovpavov bfioiatj ntpl cjv ij aarpo- 
 Xoyia TTOieiTai rovg Adyovc, ohre rd CT/fiela rolq aarpoLq rr/v avr^ exsi (fwjiv, from which it 
 appears that Protagoras sought to meet the objection urged against his sensualistic sub- 
 jectivism on the ground of tlie universal validity of geometrical propositions independently 
 of individual opinion, by retorting that, in the sphere of objective reality, simple points, 
 straight lines, and geometrical curves nowhere exist. In this he confounded with mere 
 subjective experience, abstraction when employed as a means of confining the attention to 
 special phases of objective reality. 
 
 In illustration of the fundamental idea of Protagoras, a kindred utterance of Goethe 
 may be compared, which will illustrate as well the relative truth of that idea, as the one- 
 sidedness of disallowing an objective norm. " I have observed that I hold that thought to 
 be Irtie which is fruitful for me, which adjusts itself to the general direction of my thought, 
 and at the same time furthers me in it. Now, it is not only possible, but natural, that 
 such a thouglit should not chime in with the sense of another person, nor further him, 
 perhaps even be a hinderance to him, and so he will hold it to be false ; when one is right 
 thoroughly convinced of this he will never indulge in controversy" (Goethe- ZeUerscher 
 Briefioechsel. V. 354). Compare further the following in Goethe's Maximen und Refiexionen : 
 " Wlien I know my relation to myself and to the outer world, I say that I possess the 
 truth. And thus each may have his own truth, and yet truth is ever the same." 
 
 Protagoras won for himself considerable scientific distinction by his philological investi- 
 gations. He treated of the right use of words {opdoiTreia, Plat., Phaedr., 267 c), and he first 
 distinguished the different forms of the sentence which correspond with the moods of the 
 verb (Diog. L., IX. 53 : 6iel?.e 6i tov "kdyov TrpciroQ elg riTrapa' evx^J^^/v, kpuTi/au', cnroKpiaiv, 
 evToX^v). (But the use of the imperative in such passages as Iliad, I. 1 : M.7/viv aecSe, ded, 
 where not a command, but a request, was to be expressed, threw him into a perplexity, 
 from which he could only rescue himself by censuring the Homeric form of expression ; v. 
 Arist., Poet., c. 19, p. 1456 b, 15). Protagoras also distinguished the genders of nouns. 
 Those who would perfect themselves in the art of discourse were required by him to 
 combine practice with theory (Stob., Floril., XXIX. 80: Upurayopag kXeye nrjdkv elvai fiJire 
 -kxvrrv avev /it/jTT/g firjTE fieXirrfv avtv rf^V7/f). 
 
 A case, which would otherwise be lost, may be made victorious by the rhetorical art 
 (tov fiTTu 7.6yQv KpetTTcj TToieiv, Arist., RheL, II. 24; Gell., K A., V. 3). This utterance of 
 Protagoras does not imply that the " weaker " side must necessarily be known to be unjust 
 (as Aristophanes presupposes, who falsely attributes the doctrine to Socrates, Xub., 113). 
 Still, to the prejudice of the moral character of the art of rhetoric, the difierence is left 
 unnoticed which subsists between cases where just arguments, which would otherwise 
 remain unremarked, are brought to light, and cases in which the unjust is clothed with 
 the appearance of justice; the Protagorean principle of the identity of appearance and 
 reality rendered such a distinction impossible. 
 
 The sentence: Kavrojv xPVf^'^i''^ fiirpov karh' avBpum-og formed, according to Sextus 
 Kiiipiricus, Adv. Math., VII. 560, the beginning of the work entitled KaTa/?d/Uovref {sc
 
 76 GOEGIAS OF LEONTINI. 
 
 Adyoi). With the same sentence began also, according to Plat., Theaet., p. 161 c, the 
 AXr/6E/n. No work bearing either of these titles is mentioned by Diogenes Laertius in his 
 list of the works of Protagoras (D. L.. IX. 55). We must, therefore, either assume with 
 Bernays (Bhein.Mus., new series, VII. p. 467), that the 'AvTi?M-yuu mentioned by Diogenes 
 were identical with the KarafjaTilovTeg or the 'A'AydEia, or perhaps regard 'Avrikoyiai or 
 KarafidlTiovTeg as having constituted the general title, while "A'At/tieta was the special name 
 given to the first book. According to the exaggerated and undoubtedly calumniatory 
 expression of the Aristotelian, Aristoxeuus — whom Phavorinus followed (cited by Diog. L., 
 III. 37 and 57) — Plato drew nearly all the positions of his theory of the ideal state from 
 the ' AvTiloyiKo. (AvTi7.oyiai) of Protagoras. This, while perhaps true of single positions, 
 can not be true of the theory as a whole, owing to the difference of the fundamental 
 principles assumed by Protagoras and Plato. Whether the myth, which Plato puts into 
 the mouth of Protagoras, in the dialogue of the same name (p. 320 c, seq.), really belongs 
 to him, is uncertain, though not improbable. 
 
 Of the gods, Protagoras (according to Diog. L., IX. 51) affirmed that he did not know 
 whether they existed or not; for many things hindered this knowledge, such as the 
 obscurity of the subject and the shortness of liuman life. 
 
 § 29. Gorgias of Leontini (in Sicilj), who came to Athens as embas- 
 sador from his native city in the year 427 b. c, was an elder contem- 
 porary of Socrates, whom he outlived. He taught chiefly the art of \ 
 rhetoric. In philosophy he held a doctrine of nihilism, expressed \\ 
 in these three propositions : 1) Nothing exists ; 2) If any thing ex- ' 
 isted, it would be unknowable; 3) If any thing existed and were , 
 knowable, the knowledge of it could nevertheless not be communi-ji/ 
 cated to others, ' 
 
 The following works treat Bpecially of Gorgi.as : H. Ed. Fosb, De Gorgia Leontiiio commentatio, inter- 
 positus est Ariniotelis de Gorgia liber emendatiM editun, Halle, 1828 ; Leonh. Spengel, De Gorgia rhetore, 
 IS'28, in " Svi/aywyi) rtx^dv" Stuttg. 1828; Orutures Attici, ed. J. G. Haiterus et Herm. Sauppius,f<i8c. VII., 
 Zurich, 1845, p. 129 seq.; Yrei, Beitr. zur Gesch. der griecfi. Soj)hiiiiU\ in the lihein. Mu»., VII. 1S50, p. 
 527 seq. and VIIL, 2C8 seq. ; Franz Susemihl, Ueher da.s VerhdlUiitin de^- Got (/itm surn EmpedokleK, in the 
 N. Jahrb. fur Ph., 1856, pp. 40^2. A. Bauinstark, Gorgias von Leontium, in the Rhein. Mus. J. Philol , 
 XV. 1860, pp. 624-626; Franz Kern, Kritische Benierkungen sum S. TJieil der pBeudo-Aristotelischen 
 Schrift TT. Hei'., w. Zr)v., n. Topyiov, Oldenburg, 1869; Fried. Blass, Ifie att. Beredn. von Gorg. bis eu Li/dias, 
 Leipsic, 1868, pp. 44-72. 
 
 That Gorgias, in 01. 88.2 (in the summer of the year 427 B. c), at the head of a Leon- 
 tine embassy, sought to persuade the Athenians to send help against the Syracusans, is 
 related by Diodorus (XII. 53; cf Thucyd., III. 86). Plato compares him {Fhaedr., p. 261) 
 to Nestor, on accoimt of his oratorical talent, and having reference also, as is probable, to 
 his great age. The approximate dates of his birth and death may (according to Frei) be 
 assumed as respectively 483 and 375 b. c. According to the account given in Athenseus, 
 XI. 505 d, he was still living when the Platonic dialogue Gorgias was written, and termed 
 the author of it an Archilocus redivivus. He appears to have passed the last part of his life 
 at Larissa, in Thessaly. 
 
 According to the Platonic dialogue Meno (p. 76 c) Gorgias agreed with Empedocles in 
 the doctrine of effluxes from perceived objects and of pores ; and appears to have been m 
 general, a disciple of Empedocles in natural p])ilosophy. Corax and perhaps also Tisias 
 were bis predecessors and patterns in rhetoric; the rhetorical manner of Empedocles
 
 HIPPIAS OF ELI8. 77 
 
 appears also to have exercised a powerful influence on him. Gorgias described rhetoric 
 as the worker of conviction {neiQovq driniovpyoq). He is said to have termed tragedy a salu- 
 tary deception (Plut., De Gloria Atheniensium, cap. 5 ; ef. De Aud. Poet, c. 1 : Topyiac 6e r^ 
 Tpayudiav dnev a-arrfv, r/v b re aTcari/aaq StKatorepo^ rov /u/ cnraTT/aavroc kuI 6 ai^aTTjde'ic^ 
 (To<j>uTEpoq To'v fiy airaTjjdivro^). In his philosophical argumentations Gorgias made use of 
 the contradictory propositions of the earlier philosophers, yet in such a manner as to de- 
 grade their earnest tendency into a rhetorical word-play. 
 
 In his Gnrgl'^s (p. 462 seq.) Plato defines sophistry {(so(i>iariK}/, m the narrower sense of 
 the term, and apparently with special reference to the political and ethical doctrine of Pro- 
 tagoras) as a corruption of the art of legislation, and rheioric (as taught especially by 
 Gorgias and his successors) as_a_corrupliQuj)f justly (considered here in a narrower sense 
 than in the Rep., namely, as denoting retribution and reward, awi-e7rw^6r) ; the charac- 
 teristic feature in eacli being flattery {KoXaKsia) ; these corruptions, he affirms, are not arts, 
 but simply forms of quackery. Plato parallelizes the two arts named, which are included 
 by him under the one name of politics, and their corruptions, as having reference all of them 
 to the soul, with an equal number of " businesses " [eTTir^devaeic), which have reference 
 to the body, namely, the art of legislation with gymnastics, justice with the healing art, 
 sophistry with the art of adornment, and rhetoric with the art of cookery. But in these 
 depreciatory definitions and comparisons he refers less to the doctrines of Gorgias than to 
 the practice of some of his successors, who were less scrupulous than Gorgias himself, 
 about ignoring the dependence of true rhetoric on tlie knowledge of what is truly good 
 and just, aud who abandoned themselves exclusively to the chase after "joy aud 
 pleasure." 
 
 The main contents of the work of Gorgias, rrepl rov fiy dvrog r] izepl (pvaeu^, are found in 
 Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., VII. 65 seq., and in the last chapters of the treatise. Be Melissa, 
 Xenophaiie (or Zenont) et Gorgia. 1) Nothing is; for if any thing were, its being must be 
 eitlier derived or eternal ; but it can not have been derived, whether from the existent or 
 from the non-existent (according to the Eleatics) ; nor can it be eternal, for then it must be 
 infinite ; but the infinite is nowhere, since it can neither be in itself nor in any thing else, and 
 what is nowhere, is not. 2) If any tiling were, it could not be known; for if knowledge 
 of the existent were possible, then all that is thought must be, and the non-existing could not 
 even be thought of; but then error would be impossible, even though one should affirm 
 that a contest with chariots took place on the sea, which is absurd. 3) If knowledge were 
 possible, yet it could not be communicated ; for every sign differs from the thing it signifies ; 
 how can any one communicate by words the notion of color, seeing that the ear hears 
 not colors, but sounds? And how can the same idea be in two persons, who are yet dif- 
 ferent from one another? 
 
 In a certain sense every opinion is, according to Protagoras, true ; according to Gorgias, 
 false. But each of these positions leads equally to the negation of objective truth, and 
 implies the complete substitution of mere persuasion for conviction. 
 
 § 30. Hippias of Elis, one of the younger contemporaries of Pro- 
 tagoras, and distinguished more for rhetorical talent and for his 
 mathematical, astronomical, and archreological acquisitions, than for 
 his philosophical doctrines, exhibits the ethical stand-point of the 
 Sophistic philosophy in the position ascribed to him by Plato, that 
 the law is the tyrant of men, since it forces them to do many things 
 contrary to nature.
 
 78 PRODICUS OF CEOS. 
 
 On Hippias, cf. Leonh. Bpengel, Be Uippia Eleo ejusgue scripiie, in " Swavio-yij tcx»'w>'," Stuttg. 1828; 
 Osann, Der Sophist Hippian als Archdoiog, lihein. Mus,, N. 8., II. 1843, p. 495 seq. ; C. Muller, J/ipp. 
 Elei fragmenta coll.^ in Fragmenta historui. Graec, Vol. II., Paris, 1848; Jac. Mahly, Der Sophist ff. 
 «. K, Mh. Mu8., N. S., XV. 1860, pp. 514-535, and XVI. 1861, pp. 38-49; F. Blass, Dieatt. Bereds., Leips., 
 1868, pp. 31-83. 
 
 In the congress of Sophists which Plato represents in his dialogue Protagoras as being 
 held in the house of Callias, shortly before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, Hippias 
 appears as a man in middle life, considerably younger than Protagoras. According to 
 Prot, p. 318, he gave instruction in arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music. Cf. also 
 Pseudo-Plat., Hippias Major, p. 285 c. 
 
 In Prot, p. 387 c, Plato puts into the mouth of Hippias the doctrine above enunciated: 
 6 6e vd/iog, rvpawo^ tjv ruv avdpuTTov, 7ro/i/,a napa ttjv (pvaiv f^ia^erai. He finds it contrary 
 to nature that differences of country and laws should estrange from each other men of 
 education, who are united by a natural kinship ((pvaei ffvyyei'ttf). In Xenophon {Memor,, 
 lY. 4) he contends against the duty of respecting the laws by urging their diversity and 
 instability. Yet in his ethical deliverances Hippias seems as little as other Sophists 
 to have placed himself in conscious and radical antagonism to the spirit of the Grecian 
 people; monitions and rules of life like those which in the dialogue, Hippias Major (p. 
 286 a), he represents Nestor as giving to Neoptolemus, may have been uttered by him 
 with a fair degree of good faith. 
 
 § 31. Prodicus of Ceos, by his parenetical discourses on moral 
 subjects (among which " Hercules at the Cross-roads" is the one best 
 known) and by his distinctions of words of similar signification, pre- 
 pared the way for the ethical and logical efforts of Socrates. Yet he 
 did not go materially beyond the stand-point of the older Sophists. 
 
 Cf. on Prodlcns, L. Spengel, De Frodico Ceo, in " 'Xwayiayr) rtxviav^ p. 46 seq. ; F. 6. Welcker, Prodikot, 
 der Vorgdnger dee Sokrates, in the R?i,ein. Mus. f. Ph., 1. 18-33, pp. 1-39 and 583-643 (cf. IV. 18.36, p. 355 
 seq.), and in Welcker's Kl. Schr., II. pp. 398-541 : Hummel, Z>e Prodico sopkisia, Leyden, 1847 ; E. Cougny. 
 Z>e Prodico Ceio, Socnitis magistro, Paris, 1858 ; Diemer, De Prod. Ceio(G.-Pr.\ Corbach, 1859 ; Kraemer, 
 Die AUegorie des Prodikos nnd der Traum des Lvkianos, in the N. Jahrb. f. Ph. und Pad., vol. 94, 
 1866, pp. 439-443; F. Blass, IHe att. Bereds., Leipsic, 1868, pp. 29-31. 
 
 Prodicus appears from Plato's Protagoras to have been younger than Protagoras, and 
 of about the same age with Hippias. Socrates recommended his instruction in many 
 instances to young men, though, indeed, only to such as he found ill-adapted for dia- 
 lectical training (Plat, T'heaet., 151 b), and he sometimes terms himself (Plat., Protag., 
 341a; cf. Charm., 163 d, Crat., 384 b, Meno, 96 d), a pupil of Prodicu.s, though more 
 sportively than seriously. Plato pictures him in the Protag. as effeminate, and as, in his 
 distinctions of words, somewhat pedantic. Yet his most considerable philosophical merit 
 is founded on liis investigations of synonyms. 
 
 The men of the earliest times, said Prodicus, deified whatever was useful to them, and 
 so bread was venerated as Demeter, wine as Dionysus, fire as Hephaestus, etc. (Cia, De 
 Nat. Deorum, I. 42, 118; Sextus Empir., Adv. Math., IX. 18, 51 seq.). 
 
 Xenophon {Memor. II. 1. 21 seq.) has imitated the myth of Prodicus concerning the 
 choice of Hercules between virtue and pleasure. Prodicus declared death to be desirable 
 as an escape from the evUs of life. His moral consciousness lacked philosophical basis 
 and depth.
 
 OTHER SOPHISTS. 
 
 79 
 
 § 32. Of the Later Sophists, in whom the evil consequences of 
 granting exclusive recognition to the accidental opinion and ego- 
 tistic will of the individual became more and more conspicuous, 
 the best-known are Polus the rhetorician, a pupil of Gorgias ; 
 Thrasymachus, who identified right with the personal interest of 
 those who have might, and the pseudo-dialectical jugglers Euthy- 
 demus and Dionysodoras. Many of the most cultivated men at 
 Athens and in other Greek cities (as, notably, Critias, who stood at 
 the head of the thirty oligarchical despots), favored Sophistic prin- 
 ciples, though not tliemselves assuming the functions of Sophists., 
 i. e., of instructors in eloquence and polite learning. 
 
 On the later Sophists, see Leonh. Spengel, Z>« Polo rhetore, in his " 'S.wayutyri t^x''"''-" St»ttg. 1S28. pp. 
 84-88; Id. de Tlirasymacho rhetore, ibid., pp. 93-98; C. F. Hermann, Zie Thrunymacho Chalcedonio 
 sophiHta (Ind. led.), Giittingen, 1848-49; Nic. Bacli, Critiae Atheniensis tyranni carminum aliorumqut 
 ingenii movumeiitorum quae mperisunt, Lcips. 182T; Leonh. Spenijel, De Criiia. in '• ^wayuiyri rtx^oiv,"' 
 Stuttg. 1828, p. 120 seq. Cf. also Vnhlen, Der Sophist Lykophron, Gorgiaa ; der Rhetor I'olykratei, in the 
 Rhein Mwi., N. S., XXI., pp. 143-148. 
 
 Our information concerning the later Sophists is derived mainly from the descriptions 
 of them given by Plato in his dialogues. Polus figures in the Gorgias, Thrasymachus in 
 the Republic, and Euthydemus and Dionysodorus in the Euthydemns. To these sources 
 must be added a few notices in Aristotle and others, e. g., PoLit., III. 10, p. 1280 b, 10, 
 where it is mentioned that the Sophist Lycophron called the law kyyv7]T7}q -uv (hKaiuv. Yet 
 in respect to some of the more important Sophists, still other accounts and even fragments 
 of their writings have been preserved to us. 
 
 Critias declared (according to Sext. Kmpir., Adv. Math., IX. 54 : cf Plat., Leges, X., 889 e) 
 that the belief in the existence of gods was the invention of a wise statesman, who, by 
 thus disguising truth in falsehood, aimed at securing a more willing obedience on the part 
 of the citizens {(h^ayfidruv aptarov e'laj/yr/aaro, ipevikl Kalitpag r^ a/.z/Oeiav /o; ")• Critias 
 regarded the blood as the seat and substratum of the soul (Arist., Be Anima, I. 2). 
 
 According to the account given by Plato in the Protag. (p. 314 e, seq.), some of those 
 who composed the circle of educated Athenians who met in the house of Callias, adhered 
 particularly to Protagoras (such as Callias himself, Charmides, and others), others to Ilip- 
 pias (viz.: Eryximachus, Phaedrus. and others), and still others to Prodicus (Pausanias, 
 Agathon, etc.), although they could not be regarded as, properly speaking, the disciples of 
 those Sophists, or as standing exclusively under their influence. 
 
 The Sophist Antiphon (apparently to be distinguished from Antiphon the orator) occupied 
 himself with problems connected with the theory of cognition {nepl alTideiaq), with math- 
 ematics, astronomy, and meteorology, and with politics (see Arist.. De Soph. EL, c. 11, p. 
 172 a, 2; Phijs., I. 1, p. 186a, 17; Sauppe, in the Oratores Attici, on the orator Antiphon: 
 J. Bernays, in the Rhein. Mus., new series, IX. 255 seq.). Hippodamus of Miletus, the 
 architect, and Phaleas, the Chalcedonian, also propounded political theories ; see above, § 16. 
 
 Kvenus of Paros, a contemporary of Socrates, is mentioned by Plato {Apol, 20 a; Phaedr.. 
 267 a; Phaedo, 60 d) as a poet, rhetorician, and teacher of "human and political virtue.'" 
 Of Spengel, Y.way. texvo)v, 92 seq. ; Bergk, Lyr. Gr., 474 seq. 
 
 To the time and school of the Sophists belongs Xeniades of Corinth, whom Sextus 
 Empiricus {Bypotyp. Pyrrhon., II. 18; Adv. Math., YII. 48 and 53; VIII. 5) classes as a
 
 80 SOCRATES OF ATHENS. 
 
 Skeptic, representing that (in his skepticism) he agreed with Xenophanes the Eleatic. 
 Xeniades affirmed (according to Sext., Adv. Math., VII. 53) that all was deception, every 
 idea and opinion was false {irdvr' tlvai tpev^y, kcu iraaav tpavraciav koI 66^av ijjev^eaOai), and 
 that whatever came into being, came forth from nothing, and whatever perislied, passed 
 into nothing. Sextus affirms {Adv. M., VII. 53) that Democritiis referred to Xeniades in his 
 
 works. 
 
 The dithyrambic poet, Diagoras of Melos, must not be included among the Sophists. 
 Of Diagoras it was said that he became an atheist because he saw that a crying injustice 
 remained unpunished by the gods. Since Aristophanes alludes to the sentencing of 
 Diagoras, — in the "Birds" (v. 1073), which piece was represented on the stage in Olymp. 
 91.2, — we are led easily to the inference that the "injustice" referred to was the slaughter 
 of the Melians by the Athenians (in 416 b. c. ; see Thucyd., V. 116); the allusion of Aris- 
 tophanes in the "Clouds" (v. 380) to the atheism of the Melian must, therefore, have been 
 inserted in a second, revised edition of this comedy. Perhaps the prosecutions of religious 
 offenders, which took place after the desecration of the images of Hermes, in the year 415, 
 had some influence in bringing about the punishment of Diagoras. Diagoras is said to 
 have perished by shipwreck, while attempting to escape. 
 
 § 33. Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete, was born 
 in Olymp, 77.1-3, — according to later tradition, on the 6th day of 
 the month Thargelion (hence in 471-469 b. c, in May or June). He 
 agreed with the Sophists in the general tendency to make man the 
 special object of reflection and study. Pie differed from them by 
 directing his attention not merely to the elementary functions of man 
 as a logical and moral subject, viz., to perception, opinion, and sen- 
 suous and egotistical desire, but also to the highest intellectual 
 functions which stand in essential relation to the sphere of objective 
 reality, namely, to knowledge and virtue. Socrates made all virtue 
 dependent on knowledge, i e., on moral insight; regarding the former 
 as flowing necessarily from the latter. Virtue, according to Socrates, 
 could be taught, and all virtue was one. Aristotle (whose testimony 
 is confirmed by Plato and Xenophon) testifies that Socrates first 
 introduced induction and definition, together with the dialectical 
 art of refuting false knowledge, as instruments of philosophical in- 
 quiry. The foundation of the Socratic Maieutic and Irony was 
 dexterity in the employment of the methods of inductive definition 
 in conversations relative to philusophical and, in particular, to moral 
 problems, in the absence of systematically developed, substantive 
 knowledge. The *• demonic sign," which was accepted by Socrates as 
 the voice of God, was a conviction, resulting from practical tact, with 
 reference to the suitableness or unsuitableness of given courses of 
 action (including also their ethical relations). The world is governed 
 by a supreme, divine intelligence.
 
 SOCRATES OF ATHENS. 81 
 
 The accusation of Socrates, which took place in the year 399 b. c. 
 (01. 95.1), not long after the expulsion of the Thirty Tyrants, and 
 which was brought forward by Meletus, and supported by Anytus, the 
 democratic politician, and Lycon, the orator, contained substantially 
 the same charges which Aristophanes had made in the '' Clouds." 
 It ran thus : '* Socrates is a public offender in that he does not rec- 
 ognize the gods which the state recognizes, but introduces new demo- 
 niacal beings; he has also offended by corrupting the youth." This 
 accusation was literally false ; but, considered with reference to its 
 more profound basis, it rested on the correct assumption of an essen- 
 tial relationsliip between Socrates and the Sophists, as evidenced in 
 their common tendency to emancipate the individual, and in their 
 coiumon opposition to an immediate, unreflecting submission to the 
 customs, law, and faith of the people and the state. But it mistook, 
 on the one hand, what was legitimate in this tendency in general ; 
 and, on the other, — and this is the principal point, — it ignored the 
 specific difference between the Socratic and Sophistic stand-points, or 
 the earnest desire and endeav^or of Socrates, in distinction from the 
 Sophists, to place truth and morality on a new and deeper foun- 
 dation. 
 
 After his condemnation, Socrates submitted his conduct, but not 
 his convictions, to the decision of his judges. Ilis death, justly 
 immortalized by his disciples, assured to his ideal tendency the most 
 general and lasting influence. 
 
 Dan. Heinsius, De. doctrina ei mnribwi Sncrntia, Leydcn, 1627. 
 
 Freret, Observatiowt sttr Im caitse^ ei sur quelques circonsUinces de la condemnation de Socrate, an 
 essay read in the. year 1736, and published in tlie Menioire» de VAcademie des Iiiscripiiont, T. 47 b, 209 aeq. 
 (Combats the old uncritical view of the Sophists as instigators of the accuB-itlon and sentence of Socrates, 
 and points out the politic:il causes of these transactions.) 
 
 Sig. Fr. Dresig, EpistoUt de Socrate juste datnnato, Leips. 178S. (As an opponent of the legally 
 e.xisting denaocracy, Sociiites was justly condemned.) 
 
 M. C. E. Keltner, Socrat. criminin majentutis accns. vind., Leipsic, 170S. 
 
 Joh. Luzac, Oraiio de Socrate cive, Leyden. 1796 ; of. J.ect. Atticae : De iiyay-ia SocraiU, Leyden, 
 1909 (wherein the mutual antipathy of the Peripatetics and Platonists is pointed out as one among other 
 impure sources of many unfavorable narrations respecting Socrates and his disciples). 
 
 Georg Wiggers, Sokrdtes ah Menxch, Biirffer uiid PhUn-toph, Rostock, 1S07. 2d od.. Ncnstrelltz, ISU. 
 
 Ludolph Dissen, De philoHophiii morali in Xenophoiiti:^ de Socrate comment\iriis tradila, 1S12, and 
 in D.'s Kleine Schriften, Gott. 1S89, i)p. 57-SS. (Dissen brings together in systematic order the Socratic 
 thoughts contained in Xenophon, but considers the narrative of Xenophon inexact, on account of his havinij 
 unjustly attributed to Socrates his own utilitarian stand-point.) 
 
 Friedr. Schleiermacher, Veher den Werth des Socrates als Philosophen. re.ad in the Berlin Akad. der 
 Wins, July 27, 1815, published m the A//h. der philos. Clause, Berlin, ISIS, p. 50 seq., and in Schloiermacher'a 
 S'dmmil. Werke. III. 2, 1S3S, pp. 2S7-30S. (The idea of knowledge, says Schleiermacher, is the central point 
 of the Socratic philosophy ; the proof of this is to be fonnd — in view of the discre;i.incy between the reporti 
 of the nearest witnesses, the too prosaic Xenophon and the idealizing Plato — in the different character of 
 Greek philosophy before ond after Socrates. Before him, single departments of philosophy, so far as they 
 6
 
 82 SOCRATES OF ATHENS. 
 
 ■were at all distinguished from each other, -were developed by isolated groups of philosophers ; while after 
 him, all departments were logically discriminated and cultivated by every school. Socrates himself must, 
 therefore, while having no system of his own, yet represent the logical principle which makes the construc- 
 tion of complete systems possible, i. «., the idea of knowledge.) 
 Ferd. DelbrCick, Sok-ratef!, Cologne, 1S19. 
 
 "W. Suvern, Ueber Aristophanes' Wolken, Berl. 1826. (According to Siivem, Aristophanes confounded 
 Socrates with the Sophists.) 
 
 Ch. A. Brandis, Gruiidlinien der Lehre den Sokrates, in the Rhein. Mils., Vol. I., 1827, pp. 118-150. 
 Herra. Theod. Kotscher, Aristophanes und sein Zeitalter, Berlin, 1827. (In this work Eotscher pub- 
 lished for the first time in a detailed and popular form— particularly in the section on the " Clouds"— the 
 Hegelian view of Socrates, as the representative of the principle of subjectivity, in opposition to the prin- 
 ciple of " substantial morality," on which the ancient state, according to Hegel, was founded— and of the 
 attack of Aristophanes and the subsequent accusation and condemnation of Socrates, .is representing the 
 conflict of these two principles. Eotscher treats the narrative of Xenophonas the most impartial evidence 
 In regard to the original teaching of Socrates, Cf. Hegel, Phdnomenoloyie das Geistes, p. 560 seq. ; Aeiike- 
 tik. III. p. 537 seq. ; Vorl iiher die Gesch. der Phil., IT. p. 81 seq.) 
 
 Ch. A. Brandis, Ueher die vorgebliche Suhjectivitdt der Sokratisehen Lehre. Rhein. 31v8., II. 1828, 
 pp. 85-112. (In opposition to the view supported by Eotscher, concerning the stand-point of Socrates and 
 the fidelity of tho accounts of Xenophon.) 
 
 P. W. Forchhammer, Die Athener und Sokrates, die GesetzUehen und der Revoliitiondr, Berlin, 
 1837. (Forchhammer goes to an altogether untenable extreme in his recognition of the justification of the 
 Athenians in condemning Socr.ates. yet his special elucidation of the political circumstances is a work 
 of merit. Cf. in reference to the same subject, Bendi.ven, Ueber den tieferen Schriftsinn den revolution- 
 iiren Sokrates und der gesetzlichen Athener, Huysum, 1S8S.) 
 
 C. F. Hermann, De Soaratis magistri-s et discipUna jweenili, Marburg, 1837. 
 
 Ph. Gull, van Heusde, Characteri»mi prineipum philosophorum veterum, Socratis, PIntonix, Arit- 
 totelis, Amsterdatn, 18^9. " 0« the Cosmopolitanism of Socrates^'' ^' On Xanthippe" '^ On the Cloud « of 
 Aristophanes;''' in the Verslagen en Med. of the K. Akad. van W., IV. 3, 1859; see the articles in the 
 Philologu.% XVI., pp. 383 seq. and 566 seq. 
 
 J. "W. Hanne, Sokrates als Genius der Bumanitat. Brunswick, 1841. 
 C. F. Hermann, De Socratis nccusatoribus, Gott. 1854. 
 
 Ernst von Lasaulx, Des Sokrates Leben, Lehre und Tod, nach den Zeitgnissen der Alien dargestellt, 
 Munich, 1857. 
 
 [J. P. Potter, Characteristics of the Greek Philosophers, Socrates and Plato, London, 1845. E. D. 
 Hampden, 77ie Fathers of Greek PlMosophy (Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle — articles reprinted from the 
 Encyclop(P,dia Britannica), Edinburgh, 1862. E. Zeller, Socrates and the Socratic Schools, translated 
 from the German by O. Reichel, London, 1868.— TV.] 
 
 E. A. Alborti, Sokrates, ein Versuch Uber ihn nach den Quellen. Gottingen, 1869. 
 Tlio political bearings of the trial of Socrates are very comprehensively and exactly developed in G. 
 Grote's nistory of Greece, chap. 63 (Vol. VIII. pp. 551-684). 
 
 Of the numerous lectures and essays on Socrates we name here the following : C. W. Brumbey, 8. nach. 
 Diog. L., Lemgo, 1800; Friedr. Aug. Cams, Sokrates, in his Ideen zur Gesch. der Philos., Leipsic, 1809, 
 pp. 514-555; F. Lclut, Du Demon de Socrate, Paris, 1836; Aug. Boeckh, De Socr. rervm physiearum 
 studio. 1838; H. E. Ilummel, De Theologia Socr.. Gott. 1839; J. D. van Hoevell, De Socr. philoxophia, 
 Groningen, 1S40 ; Zeller, Zur Ehrenretttrng der Xanthippe, in the Morgenhlatt fur gebildete Leser. 1S50, 
 Ko. 265 seq., and in Zellcr's Vortrdge und Abhandlungen, Leipsic, 1865, pp. 51-61; liurndaW, De philos. 
 mor. Socr., Heidelberg, 1S53; C. M. Fleischer, De Socr. quatn dicunt Utopia. "Progr." of the Gymn. at 
 Cleve, 1855 ; Hermiinn KitchXy, Sokrates und sein Volk, akadem. Vortrag. gehalten 1855, in Kochly's Akad. 
 Vortr. und Reden, I.. Ziirich, 1859, pp. 219-386; cf. the review by K. Lehrs in the .V Jahrb. f. Phil. u. 
 Pad.. Vol. LXXIX., 1859, pp. 555 seq. ; Seibert, Sokr. und Christus, in the Piid. Archiv.. ed. by Langbein. 
 I., Stettin, 18.59, pp. 291-307; L. Noack, Sokrates und die Sophisten, in Psyche. Vol. II., 1859; G. Mchring. 
 Veber Sokr., in Fichte's Zeitschr. f. Philos., Yo\. XXXVI., Halle, 1860, pp. 81-119; F. Ucberweg, Deber 
 Sokr.,\n Gelzer's Protect. Monatsbl, Yo\. XVL, No. 1, .July, 1860; Pteflfenfen, ibid.. Vol. XVII.. No. 2; 
 A Bohringer, Der philns. Standpunkt des Sokrates, Cnrlsruhe. 1860, Ueber die M'olken des Aristophanes, 
 ibid., 1863; H. Schmidt, Sokrates. Vortrag gehalten in Wittenberg, Halle. 1860; W. F. Volkmann, 
 Die Lehre des Sokrates in ihrer histor. Stellung, in the Abh. der Bbhm. Ges. der Wiss., Fifth Series, 
 Vol. XI., Prague, 1861, pp. 199-222; Bartelmann, De Socrate (G.-Pr.), Oldenburg, 1862; Phil. Jat. 
 Ditges, Die epagogische oder inductorische Methode des Sokrates und der Beyriff (G.-Pr.). Cologne, 
 1864; M. Carriftre, S. ti. s. Stelltmg in der Gesch. des menschl. Geiste~% in Wcstermann's Monatsh.. 18(>4, 
 No. 92; Bourneville, Socrate etait-il fou f reponse d M. Bally, membre de racad.,extr. du journal dt 
 med. mentale, June, 1864; Ch. H. Bertram, Der Sokrates des Xenophon und der des Aristophanes,
 
 SOCRATES OF ATHENS. 83 
 
 {G.-ProQr.\ Magdeb. 1865; Franz Dittrich. De Socratis gententia, virtuUm eaue seientiam, Index Ltct. 
 Lycei Hosiani, Braunsberg, 1868; Job. Peters, De Soerate, qui est in, Atticorum antiqua eomoe/I ia 
 disput. ("Progr." of the Gymn. at Beuthen), Leipsic, 1869; E. Chaignet, Vie de 5, Parie, 1869; P. Montee, 
 La philos. de »?.. Arras, 1869 ; H. Siebeck (see above, § 27). 
 
 On the intellectual development of Socrates and the relation thereto of Plat., /'^aed ., 95 e, seq., see 
 Boeckh in the Summer Catalogue, Berlin, 18-38; Kriscje, ForitcJiungen, I. p. 210; Susemihl in the PhiMo- 
 gus, XX., 186;>, p. 226 seq. ; Ueberweg, ibid. XXL 1864, p. 20 seq., and Volquardsen, li/i. Mus., New Series, 
 XIX. 1864, pp. 605-520. 
 
 On the " Demon " of Socrates, cf. Kiihner, In his edition of the Memorabilia, (Bfbl. Graec., cur. F. 
 Jacobs e< V. Chr. F. Pvost, Scr. Orat. Ped.,)Yo\. VIII., Gotha, 1811, pp. 18-25, where other earlier works 
 »re cited; of later writers, of., besides Brandis, Zeller, and others, C. F. Volquardsen. Dan Ddmovium deg 
 Sokrates und geine Interpreten, Kiel, 1862; L. Breitenbach, Zeitgchrift f. d. Gymiutsialioegen, XVII. 1863, 
 pp. 499-611 ; Chr. Cron, in the Eos, gOdd. Zeitschr. fiir Philol. u. Gymnasialwesen, ed. by L. Urlichs, B. 
 Stark, and L. v. Jan, I., Wurzburg, 1864, pp. 169-179; P. W. Frey mailer, Progr., Metten, ISM; Ferd. 
 Fridr. Hfigli, Das Ddmonium des Sokrates, Berne, 1864. 
 
 For determining the year of tlie birth of Socrates we find our surest data in tlie recorded 
 fear of his death and the number of years that he is known to have Hved. Socrates drank 
 the cup of poison in the month of ThargeHon, in 01. 95.1 (= 400-.H99), hence in May or 
 June, 399 B. c. (on the 20th of Thargelion, ace. to K. F. Hermann, De Theoria Ddiaca, in 
 tlie Irulc.x. Lect., Gott. 1846-47). At the time of his condemnation he was, according to 
 fiis own account in Plat., Apol, 17 d, more than seventy years old {ettj yeyovug ttXeiu e/?(5o- 
 HT/Kovra). He must, therefore, have been born at the latest in 4C9, or ratlier certainly 
 before 469. In the Platonic dialogue Onto (-p. 52 e), Socrates represents the laws of Athens 
 as saying to him : " For the space of seventy years you have been at liberty, Socrates, to 
 quit Athens, if you were dissatisfied with us." This also points to an age of more than 
 seventy years. Hence 01. 70.1 or 2 is to be assumed as the year of his Inrth. (Cf. Boeckh, 
 CarpTis Inscript, II. p. 321, and K. F. Hermann, Pint. Philos., p. 666, Note 522). Tlie 
 statement of Apollodorus (Diog. L., II. 44), that Socrates was born in 01. 77.4, is accord- 
 ingly inexact. The 6th of the month Thargelion is given (by Apollodorus, op. Diog. L., 
 ihid., and others) as his birthday, and this day, like the 7th of the same month, as the birth- 
 day of Plato, was annually celebrated by the Platonists. But the immediate succession of 
 these days one after the other, and still more their coincidence with the days on which th.e 
 Delians celebrated the birth of (the maieutic) Artemis (6th of Thargelion) and Apollo (Thar- 
 gelion 7th), are enough to make it probable that the birthdays assigned to both of these 
 philosophers, or at least that of Socrates, are not historical, but were arbitrarily chosen for 
 celebration. 
 
 The father of Socrates was a sculptor, and Socrates himself followed his father's occu- 
 pation for a time ; in the time of the Pericgotes Pausanias (about a. d. 150), a work executed 
 by Socrates (or at least ascribed to him), and representing the Graces attired, was standing 
 at the entrance to the Acropolis. Plato makes him allude to his mother in Theaet., p. 
 149 a, where he calls himself vloq fialar fia7M yinniaiaq re .Kal pAoavpnc;. ^ntvapcTi]^, and 
 says of himself that he also practices her art pf midwifery, when he entices the ideas of 
 his collocutors into the light of day, and examines whether they are genuine and tenable. 
 Socrates received at Athens in his youth the education prescribed by the laws (Plat, Crito, 
 60 d), and made himself also acquainted with geometry and astronomy (Xen., Memor., IV. 7). 
 That he " heard " Anaxagoras or Archelaus is reported only by untr\istworthy authorities. 
 Plato accounts (Phaedo, 97 f ) for his acquaintance with the opinions of Anaxagoras by 
 supposing that he had read the work written by that philosopher. Socrates was also 
 familiar with the doctrines of other natural philosophers {Mem., I. 1. 14; IV. 7. 6), although 
 he did not accept them; he read critically (according to Xen., Mem., I. 6. 14; cf IV. 2. 1 
 and 8) the writings of the early sages (twc dijaavpoi'c tuv tralai acxpijv avApuv, oi'f CKelvoi
 
 84 SOCRATES OF ATHENS. 
 
 KareXcTTOv ev jii^XioLQ ypaipavTEr, civeXittuv Koivy avv roi^ (t>/?,ot^ SLepxo/iac, Kai av re opiourv 
 ayaBov, EKXeY^jUEda). The meeting with Parmenides, mentioned by Plato, is probably to oe 
 regarded as historic (see above, § 19). A material intiucnce oa his philosophical develop- 
 ment was exercised by the Sophists, to whose discourses he sometimes listened, and with 
 wliom he often conversed, and to whom, also, he not unfrequently directed others (Piat., 
 Tlieaei., 151b). He sometimes speaks of himself in Plato's works {Protag., 341a; cf. 
 Jleno, 96 d; Charmides, 163 d; Cratyl, 384 d; Hipp. Maj., 282 c) as a pupil of Prodicus, yet 
 not without a shade of irony, aimed especially at the subtle word-distinctions of thai. 
 Sophist. A Platonic testimony respecting the course of the intellectual development ot 
 Socrates may be regarded as contained substantially in Phaedo, p. 95 seq., although tho 
 Platonic conception and representation of Socrates is here, as everywhere, influenced l)y 
 tho, not Socratic, but Platonic doctrine of ideas (see Boeckh, in the Sommer-Eatalog. 
 der Univ., Berlin, 1838, and my Plat. Untersuchungen, Vienna, 1861, pp. 92-94, and latet 
 works relative to the mental development of Socrates, cited above, p. 83). Plato transfers 
 to Socrates from his own thought only that which (like the theory of ideas and the ideal 
 of the state) would naturally follow from the views actually held by the historical Socrates; 
 Plato can not have ascribed to Socrates the history of his own mental development, inaa- 
 much as it was demonstrably other than that portrayed in the passage "m question. 
 
 Socrates (according to PL, Apol., 28 e) took part in three mihtary campaigns, viz. : in 
 the campaigns of Potidaea (between 432 and 429, cf. PL, Sympos., 219 e, and Gharm., init), 
 Delium (424, cf. Symp., 221 a, Lack., 181 a), and Amphipolis (422). He demonstrated his 
 fidelity to the laws during his life under democratic and oligarchical rulers (Apol, p. 32), 
 and at last by scorning to save his life by flight (PL, Criio, p. 44 seq.). Beyond this, 
 Socrates kept himself remote from political affairs. His only vocation, as he believed, waa 
 to strive, by means of his dialectic, to quicken the moral insight and influence the moral 
 conduct of individuals, as he was convinced that this form of activity was most advan- 
 tageous for himself and his fellow-citizens (PL, Apol, p. 29 seq.). 
 
 In the writings of the disciples of Socrates, the latter appears almost always as a raon 
 already advanced in years, such as they themselves had known him. In their delineations 
 of his character, the leading feature is the utter discrepancy between the interior and the 
 exterior — which, to the Hellenic mind, accustomed to harmony, was an aronov — his simi- 
 larity with Sileni and Satyrs in personal appearance and the homeliness of his conversa- 
 tional discourses, combined with the most sterhng moral worth, the most complete self- 
 control in pleasure and privation, and a masterly talent in philosophical dialogue (Xen., 
 Mem., IV. 4. 5 ; IV. 8. 11 et al.; Sympos., IV. 19; V. 5 ; Plat., Symp., pp. 215, 221). 
 
 In their accoimt of the life of Socrates, the two principal authorities, Xenophon and 
 Plato, sulistantially agree, although the Platonic picture is sketched with the more delicate 
 hand. As to their reports of his doctrine, it is, first of all, unquestionably true that Plato 
 in his dialogues generally presents his own thoughts through the mouth of Socrates. But in 
 a certain sense his dialogues can, nevertheless, serve as authorities for the Socratic teaching, 
 because the groundwork of the philosophy of Plato is contained in that of Socrates, and 
 because it is possible, in general, though not in all cases in detail, to discriminate between 
 tlie Platonic and Socratic elements. Plato took care not to be led by his love of idealization 
 too far from historic truth ; in some of his compositions (in the Apology, in Orito, and in 
 part also in the Protagoras, Laches, etc.) he remains almost entirely faithful to it, and in 
 others puts those doctrines which Socrates could not have professed into the mouth of 
 otlier philosophers. Xenophon wrote the Memnr. and the Symj^osium (for the so-called 
 " Apology of Xenophon " is spurious) not so much in the spirit of a pure historian as in 
 that of an apologist ; but his honorable defense of Socrates demands from us full confidence
 
 SOCRATES OF AlflENS. ?5 
 
 in his historic fidelity, so far as his intention is concerned. But it must be acknowledged 
 that as much can not be said of his intellectual qualification for an exact and comprehensive 
 understanding of the Socratic philosophy. Xenophon appears to attribute too uncon- 
 ditionally to Socrates the tendency, natural to himself, to connect all scientific activity with 
 a practical purpose, and he thus gives too small a place to the dialectic of Socrates, as 
 compared with his ethical teachings. The brief statements of Aristotle respecting the 
 philosophical doctrines of Socrates are very valuable, since they are purely historical, and 
 relate to the most important points of his teaching. 
 
 We read in the Metaphysics of Aristotle (XIII. 4), that Socrates introduced the method 
 of induction and definition (which sets out from the individual and ends in the definition 
 of the general notion — rovg t' inaK-iKovg "koyovq koI to 6piC,Ea6ai K.ad67x)v). The field of 
 investigation in which Socrates employed this method is designated by Aristotle as the 
 ethical {Metapfi., I. 6). The fundamental conception of Socrates was, according to the same 
 authority, the inseparable union of theoretical in-biyhl with practical moral excellence (Arist, 
 Eth. Nicom.y YI. 13: l,uKpdTijg cppovyaeig <jeto elvai rracag raq aperdg-.. . Auyuvq rag apsrag 
 ijyro dvac ■ eTviG-^/tag -yap elvai ■ndaag, cf. Xen., Mem., II. 9. 4 seq.). We find these state- 
 ments fully confirmed by Plato and Xenophon ; only Aristotle may have described Socrates' 
 ideas in more definite, technical language than was used bj- their author (Xen., Memor., 
 I. 1. 16: avrbg Je Ttepl tuv av&pu-^eluv av del ^i£?J:yETo, ckottuv, t'l evaeSeg, ri aaeSeg- ri 
 Kfl/ldv, ri a'lGxpdv • ri Sikoiov, ri ddiKov ■ ri atxipoaivrj^ ri fiavia • ri av6peia, ri deU-ia • ri 7rd/Uf, 
 ri TToTiiTtKdg • ri dpx>j dv&puTrojv, rig apxiKog dv^pcjiruv, Kat Trepl ruv aX?MVj d rovg fisv cldorag 
 ip/clro Kohybg myad^ovg elvai^ rovg <5' dyvoovvrag dv6pano6u6eig av diKaiog KEK^.f/c&ai. lb. 
 lY. 6. 1 : OKOKuiv avv rolg cwovai, ri iKaarov eh/ ruv bvruv, ovSeTrdnror^ D.T/yev. Tb. III. 
 4. 9 seq. : co(piav de Kal (sw(ppoa'vv7jv oh iiupt^ev • . . . f ot? 6k Kal rijv dLKaioavvTjv Kai rfp^ d/.'krjv 
 ndaav dperyv ao<j>iav elvat). Holding these opinions, Socrates was convinced that virtue 
 was capable of being taught, that all virtue was in truth only one, and that no one was 
 voluntarily wicked, all wickedness resulting merely from ignorance (Xen., Memorab., III. 9 ; 
 lY. 6; cf. Sympcs., II. 12; Plat., ApuL, 25 e, Protag., p. 329 b, seq., 352). The good 
 (dyadov) is identical with the beautiful [KaXov) and the useful (iopeXi/iov • xpV'^tuov — Mem., 
 lY. 6. 8 and 9 ; Protag., 333 d, 353 c, seq.). Better than good fortune (evrvxia), which is 
 accidental, is a correct praxis, arising from insight and self-discipline [evTrpa^ia, Mem.. III. 
 9. 14). Self-knowledge, fulfillment of the requirement of the Delphian Apollo, "Know 
 thyself," is the condition of practical excellence (Mem., lY. 2. 24). External goods do not 
 advance tlieir possessor. To want nothing is divine ; to want the least possible, brings 
 one nearest to divine perfection (Xen., Memor., I. 6. 10). Cicero's well-known declaration 
 (Acad, post, I. 4. 15; Tusc, Y. 4. 10; cf. Diog. L., II. 21), that "Socrates called philosophy 
 down from the heavens to earth, and introduced it into the cities and houses of men, 
 compelling men to inquire concerning life and morals and things good and evil," indicates, 
 in terms substantially correct, the progress of philosophy in Socrates from the cosmology 
 and physics of his predecessors to anthropological ethics. Socrates, liowever, possessed 
 no complete system of ethical doctrines, but only the living instinct of inquiry, and could, 
 therefore, naturally arrive at definite ethical theorems only in conversation with others. 
 Hence his art was intellectual midwifery (as Plato terms it, Theaet, p. 149); he enticed 
 forth thoughts from the mind of the respondent and subjected them to examination. With 
 his confessed ignorance. — which yet, as reposing on a lively and exact consciousness <>f 
 the nature of true knowledge, stood higher than the pretended knowledge of his collocu- 
 tors, — was connected the Socratic irony (npuveia), or the apparent deference of Socrates 
 to the superior intelligence and wisdom oi others, until these vanished into nothingness 
 before that dialectical testing, in the course o- which he compared the asserted general
 
 'BG SOCEATE8 OF ATHENS. 
 
 iruth with admitted particular facts. lu this manner Socrates exercised the vocation 
 which he beUeved had been indicated for him by tlie Delpliic god, when, in reply to 
 Chaerephon, the oracle declared that Socrates was the wisest of men — the vocation, namely, 
 of examining men (e^iraaic, Plat., Apol., p. 20 seq.). He devoted his life especially to the 
 education of youth. For the accomplishment of this end he relied on the aid of fpojf, 
 love, which, without excluding its sensuous element, he refined and utilized as an instru- 
 ment in the conduct of souls and the common development of his thoughts and those of 
 his listeners. 
 
 The fundamental thought in the political doctrine of Socrates is that authority prop- 
 erly belongs to the intelligent (eTricrTdfxevoc), to him who possesses knowledge (Xenoph., 
 Metnorab., III. 9. 10 ; cf III. 6. 14). The good ruler must be, as it were, a shepherd to 
 those whom he rules (the Tvoifi^ Xauv, of Homer). His business, his '-virtue," is to make 
 them happy (to evSaifiovaq ttouIv uv av r'/y^rac, Mem., III. 2. 4 ; cf. I. 2. 32). Socrates found 
 fault with the appointment of officers by popular suflrage and by lot {Mem., I. 2. 9; 
 in. 9. 10). 
 
 The peculiar philosophical significance of Socrates lies in his logically rigorous reflec- 
 tion upon moral questions, his combination of the spirit of research with that of doubt, 
 and his dialectical method of demolishing seeming and conducting to true knowledge. 
 But since reflection, from its very nature, is occupied with the universal, while action in 
 *>very specific case relates only to the particular, it is necessary for the existence of prac- 
 tical ability that the habit of reflection should be accompanied by a certain practical insight 
 or fact, which also involves moral tact, although not exclusively, nor even mainly, confined 
 to the latter. This tact respects chiefly the favorable or unfavorable result to be expected 
 from a given action or course of action. Socrates recognized reflection as man's peculiar 
 work; but that immediate conviction of the suitableness or unsuitableness of certain 
 actions, of whose origin he was not conscious, but which he recognized as a sign pointing 
 him to the right way, he piously ascribed, without subjecting it to psychological analysis, 
 to divine agency. This divine leading is that which he designates as his daiuoviov. In the 
 Apology of Plato (p. 31 d), Socrates says: " The reason of my remaining apart from public 
 life is oTi fioL OeIov tl Kai 6aifi6viov yiyverai, " and he goes on to explain that from his youth 
 up he had been ever cognizant of a voice, which only warned, but never encouraged him. 
 This voice he terms, in the Phaedrus, "his demonic and familiar sign " (to Saijioviov te kuI 
 TO ELudoq atjjXEiov). Accordiug to Xen., Memor., IV. 8. 5, this daifioviov interposed its 
 warning when he was about to reflect on the defense he should make before his judges, 
 i. e., his practical tact showed him that it was worthier of him and better for his cause, 
 that he should give himself exclusively over to the solemn inspiration of the moment, than 
 by rhetorical preparation to prejudice his hopes of such inspiration. Less exact is the 
 occasional statement of Xenophon, that Socrates was shown by the Saifioviov " what things 
 he ought to do and what not" (a te xpv '^oie'iv ;ial a. fir/, Mem., I. 4. 15; IT. 3. 12). The 
 power from which this voice emanated is designated as "the God" (6 deog, Mem., IV. 8. 6), 
 or "the Gods" (ol dsoi, Mem., I. 4. 15 ; IV. 3. 12), the same Gods who also speak to men 
 by the oracles. 
 
 Socrates defends the belief in the existence of gods on teleological grounds, arguing 
 from the structure of organized beings, whose parts are subservient to the wants of the 
 whole, and founding his reasoning on the general principle, that whatever exists for a use 
 must be the work of intelligence (ttpe-ei fiev to. ett' oxpElEia yq'vofiEva yv(Ju7/c kpya E\vai. 
 'S Memor., I. 4. 4 seq. ; IV. 3. 3 seq ). The Wisdom {(ppovr/aig), says Socrates, which is present 
 
 \ and rules in all that exists, determines all things according to its good pleasure. It is 
 
 distinguished from the other gods as the ruler and disjwser of the universe (o rdi> b\o'
 
 SOCKATES OF ATHENS. 87 
 
 ii6a/iov cwraTTuv re kuI awixuv). The gods, like the human soul, are invisible, but make 
 known their existence unmistakably by their operations {Memor., lY. 3. 13). 
 
 Aristophanes, in the " Clouds " (which were first represented in 423 B. c), attributes to 
 Socrates not only traits of character and doctrines which really belonged to him, but also 
 Anaxagorean doctrines and Sophistic tendencies. The ground of the possibility of this 
 misapprehension (or, if the expression is preferred, of this poetical license) is to be found, 
 on the part of Socrates, not only in the fact that he stood, as a philosopher, in a certain 
 antagonism to the general popular consciousness, and that the Anaxagorean theology had 
 not remained without a considerable influence upon him, but more especially in the fact 
 that, as a philosopher whose reflection was directed to the subjective processes and 
 phenomena, and who made action dependent on such reflection, ho moved in the same 
 general sphere with the Sophists, being specifically differentiated from them only by the 
 peculiar direction or kind of his philosophizing. On the part of Aristophanes, it is to be 
 found in the fact that he, as a poet and not a philosopher, and (so far as he is in earnest in 
 his representations) as an anti-Sophistical moralist and patriotic citizen of the old school, 
 with his conviction of the immorality and dangerousness of all philosophy, scarcely con- 
 sidered the significance of specific differences among philosophers as worthy of his atten- 
 tion, not to say, was unable to appreciate their essential importance. 
 
 The same opinion respecting Socrates which we find in Aristophanes, seems also to have 
 been entertained by his accusers. Meletus is described in Plato's Euihyjjhron (p. 2 b) as a 
 young man, little known; and personally almost a stranger to Socrates. In the Platonic 
 Apologia it is said of him that he joined in the accusation because he felt himself injured by 
 Socrates' demonstration of the ignorance of poets respecting the nature of their art (iTrep 
 ruv ■KOLTiTuv axBojievoq, Apol, p. 23 e). Perhaps he was a son of the poet Meletus, whom 
 Aristophanes mentions in the "Frogs" (v. 1302). Anytus, a rich leather-dealer, was an 
 influential demagogue, who had fled from Athens during the rule of the Thirty, and had 
 returned fighting on the side of Thrasybulus ; Socrates says in tlie Apoloijia (p. 23 e) that 
 he joined in the accusation as a representative of the tradesmen and politicians (vTrep tuv 
 drjfiiovpyuv Koi tuv tvoIitikcjv axdo/ievo^), and in the Mejio (p. 94 e) it is intimated that he was 
 displeased with the depreciatory judgment of Socrates respecting the Athenian statesmen. 
 According to the Apology of Pseudo-Xenoplion (29 seq.), he was angry with Socrates 
 because the latter thought liis son fitted for something better than the leather business, 
 and had counseled liim to educate this son for something higher. Lycon felt injured 
 by what Socrates had said of the orators [vTep tuv pr/ropuv, Apol, 23 e). The accusation 
 ran as follows (Apol, p. 24 ; Xen., Mem., 1. 1 ; Favorinus, ap. Diog. L., II. 40) : rdSe 
 E-ypaxparo Kal civrupoaaTo Me/lTTTOf MeA^/rov n£ri?£T)f "ZuKparei ^uxppov'KJKOv 'AXuvEKf/^ev ' adixei 
 "LuKpcLTrjq ovg fiiv 7) ToT^iq vofjii^EL iJewf ov vofiO^uv, srspa 6e Katva 6aip6via E'lariyovuevo^, ci^ikeI 6e 
 Koi Tovg vEoi% 6iaod£ipuv. ripr/pa- iJavarof. The ordinary objections against all philosophers 
 were directed against Socrates, without any special investigation of the peculiar tendency 
 or aim of his teachings {Apol., 23 d). The particular charges which Xenophon (I. ch. 2.) 
 cites and labors to refute, appear (as Cobet, Xovae LecUones, Ijeydcn, 185S, p. 662 seq., 
 seeks to demonstrate — yet cf. Bvichsenschiitz, in the Philologus, XXII., p. 691 seq.) to have 
 been taken, not from tlie speeches of the accusers, but from a work by Polycrates, the 
 rhetorician, written after the death of Socrates, in justification of the sentence. The 
 conduct of Socrates is described by Plato witli historic fidelity in the essential outlines, 
 in the Apol, in Grito, and in the first and last parts of the Phaedo. The Parrhesia of 
 Socrates appeared to his judges as presumptuousness. His philosophical reflection seemed 
 to them a violation of those ethical and religious foundations of the Athenian state, which 
 the restored democracy were endeavoring to re-establish. The former intimacy of Socrate*
 
 88 THE DISCIPLES OF SOCKATES. 
 
 with Alcibiades, and especially with the hated aristocrat, Critias (cf. ^schines, Adv. 
 Timarch., § 71), led to a mistrust of his doctrines and purposes. Nevertheless, the con- 
 demnation was voted by only a small majority of voices ; according to Apol., p. 36 a, he 
 would have been acquitted if only three, or, according to another reading, thirty of the 
 judges had been of a different mind; so that of the probably 500 or 501 judges, either 253 
 or 280 must have voted for his condemnation, and 247-248 or 220-221 for his acquittal. 
 But since, after the condemnation, he would not acknowledge himself guilty by expressing 
 an opinion as to the punishment he should receive, but declared himself worthy, on the 
 contrary, of being fed at the Prytaneum as a benefactor of the state, and at last only on 
 the persuasion of his friends agreed to a fine of thirty minae, he was (according to Diog. L., 
 II. 42) condemned to death by a majority increased by eighty votes. The execution of the 
 sentence had to be delayed thirty days, until the return of the sacred ship, which had been 
 sent only the day before the condemnation with an embassy to Delos. Socrates scorned 
 as unlawful the means of escape which Crito had prepared for him. He drank the cup of 
 poison in his prison, surrounded by his disciples and friends, with perfect steadfastness 
 and tranquillity of soul, full of assurance that the death which was to attest his fidelity to 
 his convictions would be most advantageous for him and for his work. 
 
 The Athenians are reported soon afterward to have regretted their sentence. Yet a 
 more general revulsion of opinion in favor of Socrates seems first to have taken place in 
 consequence of the labors of his scholars. That the accusers were, some exiled, some put 
 to death, as later writers relate (Diodorus, XIY. 37 ; Plut., De Invid., c. 6 ; Diog. L., II. 43, 
 VI. 9 seq., and others) is probably only a fable, which was apparently founded on the fact 
 that Anytus (banished, perhaps, for political reasons) died, not in Athens, but in Heraclea 
 on the Pontus, where in later centuries his tomb was still pointed out. 
 
 § 34. Ill the Socratic principle of knowledge and virtue, the prob- 
 lem for the successors of Socrates was indicated beforehand. That 
 problem was the development of the philosophical disciplines termed 
 dialectic and ethics. Of his immediate disciples (so far as they were 
 of philosophical significance) the larger number, as " partial disciples 
 of Socrates," turned their attention predominantly to the one or the 
 other part of this double problem ; the Megaric or Eristic school of 
 Euclid and the Elian school of Phsedo occupying themselves almost 
 exclusively with dialectical investigations, and the Cynic school of 
 Antisthenes and the Hedonic or Cyrenaic school of Aristippus treat- 
 ing, in different senses, principally of ethical questions. In each of 
 these schools, at the same time, some one of the various types of pre- 
 Socratic philosophy was continued and expanded. It was Plato, 
 however, who first combined and developed into the unity of a com- 
 prehensive system the different sides of the Socratic spirit, as well as 
 all the legitimate elements of earlier systems. 
 
 K. F. Hermann, Die philosopkische Stellung der dlteren ,^kratiker und ihrer Schulen, in his 
 Ges. Abhandlunffen, Gottingen, 1S49, pp. 227-255. 
 
 On ^schines, cf. K. F. Hermann, I>6 Aesohinis Socratici reliquiis disp. acad., Gott. 1850. 
 
 On Xenopbon, cf. .\. Boeckh, De simultate, quam Plato cu»i Xenojihonte ea-ercinase fertur, Berlin, 
 1811 ; Niebuhr, Kl. Schriften, I., p. 467 seq. ; F. Delbriick, JCenophon, Bonn, 1829 ; Hirscbig.De disciplina*
 
 EUCLID OT MEGARA AND HIS SCHOOL. 89 
 
 Socraticae in vitam et morM antiquorum vi et efficacitate, in Xenophontis decern mille Gratcot tm 
 Axia sal/vos in patriam reducentis eremplo rnani/esta, in : SymboUie litt.. 111., Auistcniam, 1S39 ; J. D. 
 van HoevelL, De Xenophontin philoxophia, Groniiif;. 1640; J. H. Lindemanti, i>«« LebensaimicAt de« Xeti., 
 CoDitz,1843; Die rel.-silU. WeltarmscJiauunff dee llerodot, Thuoydideg und Xenophon, Buriin, 1652; P. 
 Werner, Xenoph. de rebus publ. aentent., Broslaii, ISol ; Engel, X polit. Stellung und Wirktujnkeit, 
 Stargard, 1863 : A. Gamier, Uistoire de la Morale: Xenophon, Paris, 1S57. 
 
 Cf. also the articles by X. Uufr, Philol.. VI[., 1852. pp. 63S-695; and K. F. Hermann, Philol. VIII., 
 337 Beq. ; and the opuscule of Georg Ferd. ItetUg, Univ.-Pr.. Berne, 1S64, on the mutual relation of the 
 XenoplioDtic and Platonic St/mpoiia, and Am. Hug's Die Unechtheit der dem Xenophon zugeschriebenen 
 Apologie des Socniies, in llerm. Kochly's A/cad. Vorlr. u. Bede' , Zurich, 1&59, pp. 480^439. See also H. 
 Henkel, Xenophon und Uocrates {Progr.\ Salzwedel, 1S66 (cf. P. Sanneg, De Scholn Isocratea, disg.. 
 Halle, 1867); and A. Nicolai, Xenophon's Vyropddie tmd seine An^icht vom Staat (Progi:), Bemburg, 
 1867. 
 
 Xenophon, who was born about 444 b. c. (according to Cobet, 430), died about 354 B. c, 
 and belongs to the older disciples of Socrates. His Cyropaedia is a philosophical and political 
 novel, illustrating the fundamental Socratic principle that authority is the prerogative of the 
 intelligent, who alone are quahfied to wield it; but it is to be confessed that the "intelli- 
 gent " man, as depicted by Xenophon, is, as Erasmus justly says (cf. Hildebrand, Gesch. u. 
 Syst. d. Rechts- und Staatsphibsophw, I. p. 249), "rather a prudent and skillfully calcu- 
 lating politician than a truly wise and just ruler." Xenophon and iEschines are scarcely 
 to be reckoned among the representatives of any special philosophical type or school. 
 They belong rather to the class of men who, following Socrates with sincere veneration, 
 strove, through intercourse with him, to attain to whatever was beautiful and good (/ca/.o- 
 KayaOio). Others, as, notably, Critias and Alcibiades, sought by association with Socrates 
 to enlarge the range of their intelligence, yet without bringing themselves permanently 
 under his moral influence. Few out of the great number of the companions of Socrates 
 proposed to themselves as a life-work the development of his philosophical ideas. 
 
 The expression "partial disciples of Socrates," is not to be understood as implying that 
 the men so named had only reproduced certain sides of the Socratic philosophy. On the 
 contrary, they expanded the doctrines of their master, each in a definite province of 
 philosophy and in a specific direction, and even their renewal of earlier philosophemes may 
 be described rather as a self-appropriating elaboration of the same than as a mere combina- 
 tion of them with Socratic doctrines. In like relation stands Plato to the entire body of 
 Socratic and pre-Socratic philosophy. While Cicero's affirmation is true of the other 
 companions of Socrates {De Orat., III. 16, 61): "ea; illius (Socratis) variis et diversis et in 
 omnem partem diffusis disputationibus alius aliud apprehendit" Plato combined the various 
 elements, the, so to speak, prismatically broken rays of the Socratic spirit in a new, higher, 
 and richer unity. 
 
 § 35. Euclid of Megara united the ethical principle of Socrates 
 with the Eleatic theory of the One, to which alone true being could 
 be ascribed. He teaches : The good is one, although called by many 
 names, as intelligence, God, reason. The opposite of the good is 
 without being. The good remains ever immutable and like itself 
 The supposition that Euclid, wiihout detracting from the unity of the 
 good or the truly existent, nor from the unity of virtue, also assumed 
 a multiplicity of unchangeable essences, is very improbable. The 
 method of demonstration employed by Euclid was, like that of Zeno, 
 the indirect. The most noted of the followers of Euclid were Eubu-
 
 90 EUCLID OF MEGARA AND HIS SCHOOL. 
 
 lides the Milesian, and Alexinus — celebrated for the invention of the 
 sophistical arguments known as the Liar, the Concealed, the Measure 
 of Grain, the Horned Man, the Bald-head ; Diodorus Cronus — known 
 as the author of new arguments against motion, and of the assertion 
 that only the necessary is real and only the real is possible; and the 
 disciple of Diodorus, Philo, the dialectician (a friend of Zeno of 
 Cittium). Stilpo of Megara combined the Megaric philosophy with 
 the Cynic, He argued against the doctrine of ideas. The dialectical 
 doctrine, that nothing can be predicated except of itself, and the 
 ethical doctrine, that the wise man is superior to pain, are ascribed 
 to him. 
 
 Oa ihe Jtegarians, cf. Georg Ludw. Spalding, Vindiciae philos. Megaricoram, Berlin, 1T93 ; Ferd. 
 Deycks, De ilegaricorum doctrina, Bonn, 1S27; Heinr. Eitter, Bemerkungen iiOer die Philos. der Mega- 
 rischen Schule, in the Khein. Mus. /. PMlol., II. 1828, p. 295 seq. ; Henne, Ecole de Migare, Paris. 1S43; 
 Mallet, Uistoire de Vecole de Megareet dea ecoles d'Elia et d'Eretrie, Paris, 1S45; Hartenstein, Veber di« 
 Bedeutung der Megarischen Schulefur die Geschichte der inetaphysischen Probleme, m the VerhandL 
 der sdchs. Oeselhch. der TTij.*., 1848, p. 190 seq. ; Prantl, Oesch. der Logik, I. p. 33 seq. 
 
 Of Euclid the Megarian (who must not be confounded with the Alexandrian mathema- 
 tician, who lived a century later) it is related (GelL, Nod. Att., VI. 10) that, at the time 
 when the Athenians had forbidden the Megarians, under penalty of death, to enter their 
 city, he often ventured, for the sake of intercourse with Socrates, under cover of evening 
 to come to Athens. Since this interdict was issued in Olymp. 87.1, Euclid must have been 
 one of the earliest disciples of Socrates, if this story is historical. He was present at the 
 death of Socrates (Phaedo, p. 59 c), and the greater part of the companions of Socrates are 
 reported to have gone to him at Megara soon afterward, perhaps in order that they loo 
 might not fall victims to the hatred of the democratic rulers in Athens against philosophy 
 (Diog. L., II. 106; III. 6). Euclid appears to have lived and to have remained at the head 
 of the school founded by him, during several decades after the death of Socrates. Early 
 made familiar with the Eleatic philosophy, he modified the same, under the influence of 
 the Socratic ethics, malting the One identical with the good. The school of Euclid is 
 treated of by Diog. Laert., in his Vitae Philos.. II. 108 seq. 
 
 The author of the dialogue Sophistes mentions (p. 246 b, seq.) a doctrine, according to 
 which the sphere of true being was made up of a multiplicity of immaterial, absolutely 
 unchangeable forms {di?}), accessible only to thought. Many modern inve-stigators (in par- 
 ticular Schleiermacher, Ast, Deycks, Brandis, K. F. Hermann, Zeller, Prantl, and others) refer 
 this doctrine to the Megarians ; others (especially Ritter? as above cited, Petersen, in the 
 Zeitschrift fur Alterthumswiss, 1856, p. 892, and Mallet, ibid. XXXIV.) dispute this. In 
 defense of the latter position may be urged the inconsequence which the doctrine would 
 imply on the part of Euclid, if ascribed to him, and also the testimony of Aristotle [Metaph., 
 I. 6 seq. ; XIII. 4), according to which Plato must be regarded as the proper author of the 
 theory of ideas, whence it results that this theory can not have been professed by Euclid 
 under any form. The passage in the Sophistes must, in case Plato was the author of that 
 dialogue, be interpreted as representing the opinion of partial Platonists (cf my Unter- 
 suchungen iiber die Echtheit und Zeitfolge Platonischer Schriftfn, Vienna, 1861, p. 277 seq.). 
 But since the dialogue (as Schaarschmidt has .shown, cf TTeberweg in Bergmann's PhUm. 
 Mon., III. p. 479) was probably composed by some Platonist, who modified the doctrine ol
 
 PH-iEDO OF KLI8 AND HIS SCHOOL. 91 
 
 Plato, the passage in question is rather to be considered as referring to Plato's theory of 
 ideas, or perhaps to an interpretation of it, which the author of the dialogue thought inexact. 
 Cf. Schaarschmidt, Die Sanimliing der Flatonischen Schriften, Bonn, 1866, p. 210 seq. 
 
 The doctrine of Euclid (as given at the beginning of this section) is expressed by Diog. 
 L. II. 106, in these words: oirof ev to ayaBbv aKecpaivero -KoXXolg bvufiaai Ka'/Mvfisvov ore 
 /lev yap <pp6vtimv, ore Si 6ebv Koi ojOmte vovv kcI to. Tuoma. to. 6e avriKeifiSva T<j ayaB(^ avypei, 
 nil elvai (pdcKuv. Such a principle was not capable of being positively developed into 
 a philosophical system ; it could only lead to a continued war with current opinions, 
 which the Megarians sought to refute by a deduciio ad absurdum. This is the philo- 
 sophical meaning of the Megaric "Eristic." 
 
 Stilpo, who taught at Athens about 320 B. c, is said by Diog. L. (II. 119) to have 
 assumed a polemical attitude with reference to the theory of ideas (avypei ml ra eldr/). 
 Such an attitude would be in logical accordance with the exclusive doctrine of unity, 
 which Stilpo held with the earlier Megarians (according to Aristocles, see Euseb., Pr. Ev., 
 XIV. 17. 1). Stilpo proclaimed iusensibility {a^rrddeia) as the proper end of all moral 
 endeavor (cf Senec, Ep. 9: hoc inter nos (Stoicos) et illos interest: nosier sapiens vincit 
 quidem incommodum omne, sed sentit; Hlorum ne sentit quidem). The sage is so sufficient 
 to himself, that not even friends are necessary for his happiness. One of Stilpo's disciples 
 was Zeno of Cittium, the founder of the Stoic school (see below, § 52). On the other hand, 
 the Skeptics, Pyrrho and Timon, seem also to have taken the doctrine of the Megarians 
 for their point of departure (see § 60). 
 
 § 36. Plisedo of Elis, a favorite disciple of Socrates, founded, after 
 the death of the latter, in his native city, a philosophical school, 
 which appears to have resembled in tendency and character the 
 Megaric school. Menedemus, who enjoyed the instructions of 
 Platonists and Phsedonists and of Stilpo, transplanted tlie Elian 
 school to his native city, Eretria, whence his followers received the 
 name of Eretrians. 
 
 L. Preller, Phaedons Lebensschicksale und Sohriften, in the Rhein. Mus.f. Philol., New Series, IV., 
 1S46, pp. 891-899, revised in Ersch and Gruber's EThcykl, Sect. III., Vol. XXL, p. 857 seq., and now pub. 
 lisbed in Preller's Kleine Schriften, ed. by R. Kohler. 
 
 Phasdo, the founder of the Elian school, is the same person whom Plato represents in 
 the dialogue named after him, as recounting to Echecrates the last conversations of Socrates. 
 According to Diog. L., II. 105, he was ransomed from the condition of a prisoner of war 
 by Crito, at the instance of Socrates. He is said to have written dialogues; yet the 
 genuineness of most of the dialogues which bore his name was disputed. Of his doctrines 
 we know little. 
 
 Of Phredo's (indirect) disciple, Menedemus (who lived 352-276 B. c), Horaclides 
 (Lembus) says {ap. Diog. L., II. 135), that ho espoused the opinions of Plato, but only 
 sported with dialectic. Both statements are not to bo taken in too rigorous a sense. 
 Compare, however, Heinrich von Stein, Gesch. des Platonismus^ II. Gott. 1864, p. 202 seq. 
 Respecting his ethical tendency, Cicero says {Acad.^ IV. 42, 129): a Menedemo Eretriaci 
 appellati, quorum omne bonum in mente positvm et mentis acie, qua rcj-um cemeretur. Like 
 the Megarians, he regarded all virtues as one, though called by different names. He 
 defined virtue as rational insight, with which he seems, like Socrates, to have considered 
 right endeavor as inseparably connected.
 
 92 ANTISTHKNES AND THE CYNIC SCHOOL. 
 
 § 37. Antistlienes of Athens, at first a pupil of Gorgias, but after- 
 ward of Socrates, taught, after the death of the latter, in the gym- 
 nasium called Cynosarges, whence his school was called the Cynic 
 school. Yirtue, he taught, is the only good. Enjoyment, sought as 
 an end, is an evil. The essence of virtue lies in self-control. Virtue 
 is one. It is capable of being taught, and, when once acquired, can 
 not be lost. The safest wall for a town is knowledge based on secure 
 inferences. Virtue requires not many words, but only Socratic force. 
 Antisthenes combats the Platonic theory of ideas. He grants the 
 validity only of identical judgments. His assertion that contradiction 
 is impossible, gives evidence of his lack of earnestness in the treatment 
 of dialectical problems. The opposition to the political forms and 
 the polytheism of the Hellenic race, which remained still undeveloped 
 in Socrates, pronounced itself distinctly in the cosmopolitism of An- 
 tisthenes and in his doctrine of the unity of God. 
 
 To the school of Antisthenes belong Diogenes of Sinope, Crates 
 of Thebes, Hipparchia, the wife of Crates, Metrocles, her brother, 
 and others. 
 
 The Cynics are treated of and the fragments of their writings are brought together in Mullach'g 
 Fragm. Philos. Gr., II. pp. 261-895. 
 
 The fragments extant of the works of Antisthenes have been edited by Aug. Wilh. Winckelmann. 
 Zurich, 1842. Cf. Krischi;, Forschun gen, I. pp. 234-246; Chappuis. Antisthene, Paris, 1854; Ad. Miiller, 
 1)6 Antisthenis Cynicl vita et ncHptis (^^ Progr.'"' of the Vitzth.-G.), Dresden, 1860. 
 
 On Diogenes, of. Karl Wilh. Gottling, D. der Cyniker oder die Philosophie des griechischen Pro- 
 letariats, in his Ges. Ahhandl., Vol. I., Halle, 1851 ; Hermann, Znir Gesch. nnd Kritik des Diogenes von 
 /Sinope (G.-Pr.), Heilbronn, 1S60 ; Wehrmann, Ueber den Cyniker P., in the Pddag. Archiv.,'l86'i, pp. 
 97-117. 
 
 On Crates, cf Postumus, 7>e Orat., Gron. 1823. The 38 (spurious) letters ascribed to him are edited by 
 Boissonade in Notices et Extraits de Manuscrits de la Bibliotlieque du Roi, t. IX., Paris, 1827. 
 
 F. V. Fritschc treats of the fragments by Demonax, in De Frugrn. Demonactis Philos., Rostock and 
 Leipsic, 1866. Cf. Lucian, in his Vita Demonactis, and A. Keclinagel, Comtn. de Dejnonactis phitof., 
 Nuremberg, 1857. 
 
 Antisthenes, born at Athens in Olymp. 84.1 (444 B. c), was the son of an Athenian 
 father and a Thracian mother (Diog. L., YI. 1). For this reason he was restricted to 
 the gymnasium called Cynosarges. In the rhetorical form of his dialogical writings 
 Antisthenes betrayed the influence of Gorgias' instruction. He went to Socrates first in 
 later life, for which reason he is designated in the Sophistes (p. 251 b, where without doubt 
 he is referred to) as the "late learner" {btpi/M6r/c). Plato {Theaet, 155 e; cf. Soph., 251 b, 
 seq.) and Aristotle {Metaph., XIII. 3) criticise him as lacking in culture. Before becoming 
 a disciple of Socrates, he had already given instruction in rhetoric (Diog. L., VI. 2), an 
 occupation which he also afterward resumed. He appears to have lived thirty years after 
 the death of Socrates (Diodorus, XV. 76). In external appearance Antisthenes, most of all 
 the disciples of Socrates, resembled his master, with whom he stood on terms of intimate 
 personal friendship. The titles of numerous works by Antisthenes are given in Piog. 
 L., VI, 15-18.
 
 ANTISTHENE8 AND THE CYNIC SCHOOL. 93 
 
 Antisthenes holds fast to the Socratic principle of the unity of virtue and knowledge. 
 He emphasizes chiefly its practical side, though not wholly neglecting its dialectical 
 bearings. 
 
 Antisthenes (according to Diog. L.. VI. 3) first defined definition Q.dyoq) as the expres- 
 sion of the essence of the thing defined : 7M"'oq kaTiv 6 rb ri i/v fj eari dr/Z.uv (where the 
 Imperfect ^v seems to point to the priority of objective existence before the subjective acts 
 of knowing and naming). The simple, said Antisthenes, is indefinable : it can only be 
 named and compared; but the composite admits of an exposition, in which the component 
 parts are enumerated conformably to the actual order and manner of their combination. 
 Knowledge is correct opinion based on definition (;'. e., logically accounted for), 66^a aTitfiiic 
 fierd Xoyov (Plat., Theaet, p. 201 seq., where indeed Antisthenes is not named, but is prob- 
 ably meant ; Arist., Metaph., VIII. 3). According to Simphc, Ad Arist. Categ., f. 66 b, 45, 
 the following argument against the Platonic doctrine of ideas was attributed to Antis- 
 thenes: 0) Yllarunt, l-nov /lev opoi, Imror^a (T ovx opu, "0 Plato, I see horses, but no 
 horseness " (because, Plato is said to have replied, you have no eye for it). According to 
 Ammon. Ad Porphyr. Isag., 22 b, Antisthenes said that the ideas were iv Tpi^Mtc ETrivolaic, 
 from which it is hardly to be inferred that Antisthenes attempted to transform the doctrine 
 of ideas in a subjective sense (as the Stoics did later) ; he meant probably only to describe 
 Plato's theory of ideas as an empty fancy. Somewhat sophistical is the doctrine attributed 
 to Antisthenes in Arist., Top., I. II, and Met., V. 29 (cf. Plat., Euthyd., 285 e), that it is 
 impossible to contradict one's self (ovk eariv avri/JjEiv), together with the argument: 
 either the same thing is subject of the two supposed contradictory affirmations — and 
 then, since each thing has only one o'ikeIo^ ^oyoc, these affirmations are equivalent, and 
 not contradictory — or the affirmations relate to different subjects, and consequently 
 there is no contradiction. The last result of this dialectical tendency was reached in 
 the doctrine that only identical judgments are valid (Plat.? Soph., 251 b; Arist., Metaph., 
 
 V. 29). 
 
 According to Diog. L., VI. 104 seq., Antisthenes recognized virtue as the supreme end 
 of human life ; whatever is intermediate between virtue and vice was indifferent {a6id(l>opov). 
 Virtue is sufficient to secure happiness (Diog. L., VII. 11: avrapK)] 6e tt/v apeTrjv Trpbg 
 e'oSai/xoviav, fiTjSevoQ TzpoaihofiEVTjv on fiy "ZuKparLKfj^ 'laxvo^, Tr/v t' apETyv rcyv ipyuv Eh'ai, 
 fifiTE Xdyurv rrXEidTuv Seo/xevt/v fii/TE /ia-^T/judruv). Pleasure is pernicious. A frequent saying 
 of Antisthenes (according to Diog. L., VI. 3) was : iiavEirjv fia?.?jov rj r/aOsi^, " I would 
 rather be mad than glad." The good is beautiful, evil is hateful (ibid. 12). He who has 
 once become wise and virtuous, can not afterward cease to be such (Diog. L., VI. 105: rr/v 
 apET^ diSoKT^ slvai Kat avaTr63?.TfTov vrcapxEtv; also in Xen., Mem., I. 2. 19: otl ovk dv 
 TOTE 6 SiKaior MiKoc ykvocTo K. T. 1., the principal reference is probably to Antisthenes). 
 The good is proper to us (oIkeiov), the bad is something foreign (^evikov, a7.7x>rpiov, Diog. L., 
 
 VI. 12; Plat., Conviv., p. 205 e; cf Charmides, p. 163 c). 
 
 No actual or possible form of government was pleasing to the Cynic. The Cynic 
 restricts his sago to the subjective consciousness of his own virtue, isolating him from 
 existing society, in order to make him a citizen of the world (Antisthenes, ap. Diog. L., 
 VI. 1 1 : Tov ffo(pbv ov Kord ^ov^ KEifiEVOvq vouovg TTo7..tTEva€(T0ai, a/.Ad Kara, rbv ri}^ dpErf/r. 
 Ibid. 12 ; rQ cto^u ^evov ovSkv oikT airopov). He demands that men return to the simplicity 
 of a natural state. Whether it is to this position of Antisthenes that Plato refers in his 
 picture of a natural political state (Rej-).. II. 372 a) — which he yet terms a society of swine— 
 and in his examination of the identification of the art of conducting men with the art of 
 the shepherd (Polit, p. 267d-275c), is doubtful; perhaps in the latter passage the only 
 veference is (aa suggested by Henkel, Zur Gesch. der gr. Staaiswiss, II., p. 22, Salzwedel,
 
 94 ANTISTHENES AND THE CYNIC SCHOOL. 
 
 1866) to the Homeric idea of the noi/xijv Aawv, "shepherd of the people," which appears in 
 various passages of Xenophon's Memor. and Cyrop. (cf. Politicus, p. 301 d. and Rep., YII. 
 p. 520 b, with Xen., Cyrop., V. 1, 24, with reference to the comparison of the human ruler 
 with the queen-bee). That Antisthenes can not have anticipated Plato in the doctrine of 
 the community of women and children, follows from Arist., Pol., II. 4. 1, where it is affirmed 
 that Plato first proposed this innovation. 
 
 The religious faith of the people, according to the Cynics, is as little binding on the sage 
 as are their laws. Says Cicero (Z>e Nat. Deorum, I. 13, 32): Antisthenes in eo lHyro qui 
 physicus inscrihitur, populares deos mulios, naturahm unum esse (dicit). The one God is not 
 known through images. Virtue is the only true worship. Antisthenes interpreted the 
 Homeric poems allegorically and in accordance with his philosophy. 
 
 Diogenes of Sinope, through his extreme exaggeration of the principles of his teacher, 
 developed a personality that is even comical. He is said liimself not to have repelled the 
 epithet "Dog," which was applied to him, but only to have replied that he did not, like 
 other dogs, bite his enemies, but only his friends, in order that he might save them. He 
 was also called " Socrates raving " (Lunpdrr/g fiaivo/ievog). With the immorality of the times 
 he rejected also its morality and culture. As tutor of the sons of Xeniades, at Corinth, he 
 proceeded not without skill, on the principle of conformity to nature, in a manner similar 
 to that demanded in modern times by Rousseau. He acquired the enduring love and 
 respect of his pupils and of their father (Diog. L., YI. 30 seq., 74 seq.). Diog. L. (VI. 80) 
 cites the titles of many works ascribed to Diogenes, but says that Sosicrates and Satyrus 
 pronounced them all spurious. Diogenes designates, as the end to which all effort should 
 tend, ewpvxfa kcI T6voq tpvxvg (in opposition to mere physical force, Stob., Florileg., 
 VII. 18). Of the disciples of Diogenes, Crates of Thebes, a contemporary of Theophrastus 
 the Aristotelian, is the most important (Diog. L., YI. 86 seq.) ; through his influence Hip- 
 parchia and her brother Metrocles were won over to Cynicism. Monimus the Syracusan 
 was also a pupil of Diogenes. Menippus of Sinope, who seems to have lived in the third 
 century before Christ, and is mentioned by Lucian [Bh Accu-t., 33) as "one of the an- 
 cient dogs who barked a great deal " (cf. Diog. L. , 99 seq.). was probably one of the 
 earlier Cynics. There were probably several Cynics who bore the name Menippus. 
 
 Cynicism, in its later days, degenerated more and more into insolence and indecency. 
 It became ennobled, on the other hand, in the Stoic philosophy, through the recognition 
 and attention given to mental culture. The Cynic's conception of virtue is imperfect from 
 its failure to determine the positive end of moral activity, so that at last nothing remained 
 but ostentatious asceticism. "The Cynics excluded themselves from the sphere in which 
 is true freedom " (Hegel). 
 
 After Cynicism had for a long time been lost in Stoicism — which (as Zeller happily 
 expresses it) " gave to the doctrine of the independence of the virtuous will the basis of a 
 comprehensive, scientific theory of the universe, and so adapted the doctrine itself more 
 fully to the requirements of nature and human life " — it was renewed in the first century 
 after Christ under the form of a mere preaching of morals. But it was accompanied in 
 this phase of its existence by much empty, ostentatious display of staves and wallets, of 
 uncut beards and hair, and ragged cloaks. Of the better class of Cynics in this later 
 period were Demetrius, the friend of Seneca and of Thrasea P.-etus, (Enomaus of Gadara 
 (in the time of Hadrian), who (according to Euseb., Praeparat. Evang., Y. 18 seq.) attacked 
 the system of oracles with special violence, and Demonax of Cyprus (praised by Lucian. 
 born about A. D. 50, died about 150), who, though holding fast to the moral and religious 
 principles of Cynicism, advocated them rather with a Socratic mildness than with the 
 vulgar Cynic rudeness.
 
 ARISTIPPUS AND THE CYBKNAIC SCHOOL. 95 
 
 § 38. Aristippns of Cyrene, the founder of the Crrenaic or He- 
 donic school, and termed bj Aristotle a Sophist, sees in pleasure, 
 which he defines as the sensation of gentle motion, the end of life. 
 The sage aims to enjoy pleasure, without being controlled by it. 
 Intellectual cidtnre alone fits one for true enjoyment. No one kind 
 of pleasure is superior to anotlier ; only the degree and duration of 
 pleasure determines its worth. "We can know only our sensations, 
 not that which causes them. 
 
 The most eminent members of the Cyrenaic school were Arete, 
 the daughter of Aristippus, and her son, Aristippus the younger, 
 surnamed the "mother-taught" (jiTjrpodtdaKrog)^ who first put the 
 doctrine of Hedonism into systematic form, and was probably the 
 author of the comparison of the three sensational conditions of 
 trouble, pleasure, and indiflference, to tempest, gentle wind, and sea- 
 calm, respectively ; also Theodorus, surnamed the Atheist, who 
 taught that the particular pleasure of the moment was indifferent, 
 and that constant cheerfulness was the end sought by the true sage, 
 and his scholars Bio and Euliemerus, who explained the belief in the 
 existence of gods as having begun with the veneration of distin- 
 guisncd men ; further, Hegesias, surnamed the " death-counseling " 
 {TTeioiddvaroq)^ — who accepted the avoidance of trouble as the highest 
 attainable good, despaired of positive happiness, and considered life 
 to be intrinsically valueless, — and Anniceris (the younger), who again 
 made the feeling of pleasure the end of life, but included in his 
 system, in addition to idiopathic pleasure, the pleasure of sympathy, 
 and demanded a partial sacrifice of the former to the latter. 
 
 The Cyrenaics are treated of, and the fragments of their writings are brought together in Mullach's 
 Fragm. Pk. Or., II. pp. 39T-43S. 
 
 Ainadeus Wendt, De pkilosophia Ci/renaica. Gott. 1S41 ; Henr. de Stein, De jMloxophia Cyrenaica^ 
 Part I.: De vita Aristippi. Gott. 185.^ (of. bis Oesch. dex PldtonismHu. II. Gott. 1SC4, pp. 60-64). 
 
 On Aristippus, cf. C. M. Wieland, Arintipp und einiye Miner Zeitgenossen. 4 vols., Leipsic, ISOO-lSflS; 
 J. F. Thrige, De Arintippo philotiopho Cijrennico aliisque Ci/renaicii,, in his J!es Cyrenensium, Copenh. 
 182a 
 
 There exist early monographs on individual members of the Cyrenaic sohool, one, in particular, on 
 Arete, by J. G. Eck (Leipsia 1776), and another on Hegesias ireKridacaTot, by J. J. Kambach (Quedlin- 
 burs, 1771). The fragments of the ctpa avaypa4>ri of Euhenierus have been collected by Wesseling (in 
 Diod. Sic Bihl. I/ivt., torn. II., p. 623 seq.) Of Euhemenis, with special reference to Ennius, who shared 
 in his views, Krahner treats in bis Grvndlinien siir OencJi. des VerfaJls der torn. Stnatftreliffion (<?.- 
 Progr.), Halle, 1S3T; cf. also C,a.nf,s.Quae»tio>iex Euhemerea* (G.- Pr.\ Kempen, ISfiO, and Otto Sieroka. />* 
 Suhetnerv (A>j.t«. Jnaug.), Konigsberg, 1869. 
 
 Aristippus of Cyrcne was led bj- the fame of Socrates to seek his acquaintance, and 
 joined liimHelf permanently to the circle of Socrates' disciples. In criticism of an (oral) 
 utterance of Plato, which he thought to ha%'e been too confidently delivered, he is reported 
 to have appealed to the more modest manner of Socrates (Arist., Hhet., II. 23, p. 1398 b, 29:
 
 96 ARISTIPPUS AND THE CYKENAIC SCHOOL. 
 
 'ApifTinirog -Kpoq TVkaTuva kTvayye?i.TiK(jTep6v rt elnovra I'jg Jiero ■ a/iAa fit/v o y' irnipor ti/liuv^ 
 e(p7/, oi'div toiuvtot, /.iyuv tov I,coKpdTT/v). Perhaps, before the period of his intercourse with 
 Socrates he had become famihar with the philosophy of Protagoras, of whose influence hia 
 doctrine shows considerable traces. The customs of his rich and luxurious native city 
 were most likely of the greatest influence in determining him to the love of pleasure. That 
 he, together with Cleombrotus, was absent in yEgina at the time of Socrates' death, is 
 remarked by Plato (Phaedo, 59 c), obviously with reproachful intent. Aristippus is said to 
 have sojourned often at the courts of the elder and younger Dionysii in Sicily ; several 
 anecdotes are connected with his residence there and his meeting with Plato, which, though 
 historically uncertain, are at least not unhappily invented, and illustrate the accommo- 
 dating servility of the witty Hedonist, occasionally in contrast with the uncompromising 
 Parrhesia of the rigid moralist and idealist (Diog. L., II. 78 et al.). Aristippus seems to 
 have taught in various places, and particidarly in his native city. He first, among the 
 companions of Socrates, imitated the Sophists in demanding payment for his instructions 
 (Diog. L., II. 65). It is perhaps for this reason, but probably also on account of his doc- 
 trine of pleasure and his contempt for pure science, that Aristotle calls him a Sophist 
 {Metaph., III. 2). 
 
 According to the suppositions of H. von Stein (in the work cited above), Aristippus 
 was born about 435 b. c, resided in Athens during a series of years commencing with 416, 
 in 399 was in ^gina, in 389-388 was with Plato at the court of the elder Dionysius, and 
 in 361 with the same at the court of the younger Dionysius, and, finally, after 356 was, 
 apparently, again in Athens. Von Stein remarks, however (Gesch. des Platonisrmts, II., 
 p. 61), on the uncertainty of the accounts on which these dates are founded. According 
 to Diog. L., II. 83, Aristippus was older than -(fischines. 
 
 The fundamental features of the Cyrenaic doctrine are certainly due to Aristippus. 
 Xenophon [Memor.. II. 1) represents him as discussing them with Socrates; Plato refers 
 probably to them in Rep., VI. 505 b (perhaps also in Gorg., 491 e, seq.), and most fully in 
 the Philebus, although Aristippus is not there named. But the systematic elaboration of 
 his doctrines seems to have been the work of his grandson, Aristippus fn/rpoSidaKTog. 
 Aristotle names, as representing the doctrine of pleasure (Eth. A'i'c, X. 2), not Aristippus, 
 but Eudoxus. 
 
 The principle of Hedonism is described in the dialogue Phikhus, p. 66 c, in these words : 
 Tayadbv krideTo rifilv rjdovfjv elvai iraoav kol TravTeTif/. Pleasure is the sensation of gentle 
 motion (Diog. L., II. 85 : Ti/ioc aTveibaivE {^ Apia-nzirog) tt/v leiav KivT/aiv e'lr alaBrjaiv avaSuh- 
 ^ievTjv). Violent motion produces pain, rest or very slight motion, indifference. That all 
 pleasure belongs to the category of things becoming {yivecL^) and not to that of things 
 being [ovaia), is mentioned by Plato in the dialogue Philebus (p. 53 c, cf 42 d) as the correct 
 observation of certain "elegants" (KOfnpol), among whom Aristippus is probably to be 
 understood as included. Yet the opposing of ytvr.aiq to ovcia is certainlj' not to be ascribed 
 to Aristippus, but only probably the reduction of pleasure to motion (kIvtjbi^), from which 
 Plato drew the above conclusion. No pleasure, saj^s Aristippus, is as such bad. though it 
 may often arise from bad causes, and no j)leasure is different from another in quality or 
 worth (Diog. L., II. 87: ///} ihaoipsiv I'/dopf/v 7/6ov7jr, cf. Phikh., p. 12d). Virtue is a good 
 as a means to pleasure (Cic, Be Offic, III. 33, 116). 
 
 The Socratic element in the doctrine of Aristippus appears in the principle of self- 
 determination directed by knowkdge (the manner of life of the wise, says Aristippus, op. 
 Diog. L., 68, would experience no change, though all existing laws were abrogated), and 
 in the control of pleasure as a thing to be acquired through knoioledge and culture. The 
 Cynics sought for independence throngh abstinence from enjoyment, Aristippus through
 
 AKISTIPPUS AND THE CTKENAIC SCHOOL. 97 
 
 the control of enjoyment in the midst of enjoyment. Thus Aristippus is cited by Stob. 
 {Flor., 17, 18) as saying that "not he who abstains, but he who enjoys without being car- 
 ried away, is master of his pleasures." Similarly, in Diog. L., II. 75, Aristippus is said to 
 have required his disciples •' to govern, and not be governed by their pleasures." And, 
 accordingly, he is further said to have expressed his relation to Lais, by saying: excj, ovk 
 rxofiai. In a similar sense Horace says {Epist, I. 1, 18): nunc in Aristippi furtim prae- 
 cepta relabor, et mihi res, non me rehis subjungere conor. The Cynic sage knows how to deal 
 with himself, but Aristippus knows how to deal -with men (Diog. L., VI. 6, 58 ; II. 68, 102). 
 To enjoy the present, says the Cyrenaic, is the true business of man ; only the present is 
 in our power. 
 
 With the Hedonic character of the ethics of Aristippus corresponds, in his theory of 
 cognition, the restriction of our knowledge to sensations. The Cyrenaics distinguished 
 (according to Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., VII. 91) ro -KaSog and to eKTog inroKsifievov koI tov 
 Trddovg irotijTiKov (the affection, and the "thing in itself" which is external to us and affects 
 us); the former exists in our consciousness {rb Tzadog r/fjlv ten (iaivo/zevov); of the "thing 
 in itself," on the contrary, we know nothing, except that it exists. Whether the sensa- 
 tions of other men agree with our own, we do not know; the afiBrmative is not proved by 
 the identity of names employed. The subjectivism of the Protagorean doctrine of knowl- 
 edge finds in these propositions its consistent completion. It is improbable that the 
 motive of ethical Hedonism was contained in this logical doctrine ; that motive must rather 
 be sought, in part, in the personal love of pleasure of Aristippus, and in part in the eudas- 
 monistic element in the moral speculations of Socrates, which contained certain germs, not 
 only for the doctrine of Antisthenes, but also for that of Aristippus (see, in particular, 
 Xenophon, Memorah., I. 6. 7, respecting Kaprepeiv in immediate connection with the ques- 
 tion, ibid. I. 6. 8 : tov 6e /if/ 6ov?ieiEii> yaoTpl fiijde virvu Koi Tutyveig olei ti d^Ao aiTiuTspov 
 dvai T) TO ETepa ix^iv tovtuv i)6Uo), The essence of virtue lies, according to Socrates, in 
 knowledge, in practical insight. But it is asked, what is the object of this insight? If 
 the reply is, the Good, then the second question arises, in what the Good consists. If it 
 consists in virtue itself, the definition moves in a circle. If in the useful, the useful is 
 relative and its value is determined by that for which it is useful. But what is this last 
 something, in whose service the useful stands 7 If Eiulaemonia, then it must be stated in 
 what the essence of Eudaemonia consists. The most obvious answer is: Pleasure, and 
 this answer was given by Aristippus, while the Cynics found no answer not involving 
 them in the circle, and so did not advance beyond their objectless insight and aimless 
 asceticism. Plato's answer was : the Idea of the Good {Rep., VI. p. 505). 
 
 Later Cyrenaics (according tb Sext. E., Adv. Math., VII. 11) divided their system of 
 doctrines into five parts: ]) Concerning that which is to be desired and shunned (goods 
 and evils, atpcrd kuI (pevnTn); 2) Concerning the passions {jradTJ); 3) Concerning action.? 
 (Tzpa^eig) ; 4) Concerning natural causes {alTia) ; 5) Concerning tlie guaranties of truth 
 (nidTEiq). Hence it appears that these later Cyrenaics also treated the theory of knowledge, 
 not as the foundation, but rather as the complement of ethics. 
 
 As the control of pleasure aimed at by Aristippus was in reality incompatible with the 
 principle that the pleasure of the moment is the highest good, some modifications in his 
 doctrine could not but arise. Accordingly we find Theodorus adeoq (Diog. L, II. 97 seq.), 
 not, indeed, advancing to a principle specifically different from pleasure, but yet sub- 
 stituting for the isolated sensation a state of constant cheerfulness {xapa\ as the " end " 
 (T^^of). But mere reflection on our general condition is not sufficient to elevate us above 
 the changes of fortune, since our general condition is not under our control, and so 
 Hegesias TreiaiOavaTog (Diog. L., II. 93 seq.) despaired altogether of attaining that result.
 
 98 PLATO'S LITE. 
 
 Anniceris the Younger {ibid. 96 seq. ; Clem., Strom., 11. 417 b.) sought to ennoble the Hedonic 
 principle, by reckoning among the tilings which afford pleasure, friendship, thankfulness, 
 and piety toward parents and fatherland, social intercourse, and the strife after honors ; 
 yet he declared all labor for the benefit of others to be conditioned on the pleasure which 
 our good will brings to ourselves. Later, Epicureanism reigned in the place of the 
 Cyrenaic doctrine. 
 
 Euhemerus, who lived (300 B. c.) at the court of Cassander, and favored the principles 
 of the Cyrenaic school, exerted great influence by his work lepa avaypa^ij^ in which 
 (according to Cic, Be Nat. Deorum, I. 42 ; Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., IX. 17, and others) he 
 developed the opinion that the Gods (as also the Heroes) were distinguished men, to 
 whom divine honors had been rendered after their death. In proof of this opinion he 
 referred to the tomb of Zeus, which was then pointed out in Crete. It is indisputable 
 that Euhemerism contains a partial truth, but unjustly generalized ; not only historical 
 events, but natural phenomena and ethical considerations, served as a basis for the myths 
 of the Gods, and the form of the mythological conceptions of the ancients was conditioned 
 on various psychological motives. The one-sided explanation of Euhemerus strips the 
 myths of the most essential part of their religious character. But for this very reason it 
 found a more ready hearing at a time when the power of the ancient religious faith over 
 the minds of men was gone, and in the last centuries of antiquity it was favored by many 
 representatives of the new Christian faith. 
 
 § 39. Plato, born in Athens (or JEgina) on the 7th of Thargelion, 
 in the first year of the 88th Olympiad (May 26 or 27, 427 b. c.) or 
 perhaps on the 7th of Thargelion, Olymp. 87.4 (June 5 or 6, 428), and 
 originally named Aristocles, was the son of Aristo and Perictione (or 
 Potone). The former was a descendant of Codnis ; the ancestor of 
 Perictione was Dropides, a near relative of Solon, and she was cousin 
 to Critias, who, after the unfortunate termination of the Pelopon- 
 nesian war, became one of the Thirty oligarchical Tyrants. From 
 Olymp. 93.1 till 95.1 (408 or 407 to 399 b. c.) Plato was a pupil of 
 Socrates. After the condemnation of the latter, he went with others 
 of Socrates' disciples to Megara, to the house of Euclid. From there 
 it is said that he undertook a long journey, in the course of which he 
 visited Gyrene and Egypt, and perhaps Asia Minor, whence he seems 
 to have returned to Athens ; it is possible, however, that previous to 
 this journey he had already returned to Athens and lived there a 
 certain length of time. When he was about forty years old he visited 
 the Pythagoreans in Italy, and went to Sicily, where he formed 
 relations of friendship with Dio, the brother-in-law of the tyrant 
 Dionysius I. Here, by his openness of speech, he so oifended the 
 tyrant, that the latter caused him to be sold as a prisoner of war in 
 ^gina, by Pollis, the Spartan embassador. Ransomed by Anniceris, 
 he founded (387 or 386 b. c.) his philosophical school in the Academy. 
 Plato undertook a second journey to Syracuse about 367 b. c, after
 
 Plato's life. 99 
 
 the death of the elder Dionysius, and a third in the year 361. The 
 object of the second journey was to endeavor, in company with Dio, 
 to bring the younger Dionysius, on whom the tyranny of his father 
 had devolved, under the influence of his ethical and, so far as circum- 
 stances permitted it, of his political theories. The object of the third 
 was to eifect a reconciliation between Dionysius and Dio. In each 
 case he failed to accomplish the desired results. Henceforth he lived 
 exclusively devoted to his occupation as a philosophical teacher until 
 his death, which took place Olymp. 108.1 (348-347, probably in the 
 second half of the Olympiadic year, near his birthday, hence in May 
 or June, 347 b. c). 
 
 Data relative to Plato's life were recorded in antiquity by some of the immediate disciples of the 
 philosopher, in particular by Speusippus (CAaTuivos tyKuJ/utot-, Diog. L., IV. 5; cf. IIAaTwi'ot TrfpiSdnvov, 
 Diog. L., III. 2, cited also by Apuleius, De llabitudine Doctrinarum Flat.), Hermodorus (Simi)lic., Ad 
 Arist. Phys., 54b, 66b; cf. Diog. L., IL 106; 111. 6), Phillippus the Opuntian (Suidas, «. h. •».), and 
 Xenocrates (cited by Simplicius in the Scholia to Aristotle, ed. by Brandis, pp. 4"0a, 27, and 474 a, 12). 
 Aristoxenus, the Peripatetic, also wrote a life of Plato (Diog. L., V. 35). Of later writers, Favorinus (in 
 the time of Trajan and Hadrian) wrote Trepi XIAaTioi'os, from which work Diogenes L. drew largely. All 
 these works have been lost. The following are extant : — 
 
 Apuleius Madaurensis, De doctrina et nativitate Platonic (in the Opera Apul. ed. Oudendorp, Ley- 
 den, 1786; ed. G. F. Hildebrand, Leipsic, 1842, 1843). 
 
 Diogenes Lacrtius, De Vita et Doctr. Philos. (see above). Book III. is entirely given to Plato; 
 §§ 1-45 treat of his life. 
 
 Olympiodori Vita Platonig (in several of the complete editions of Plato's works, also in Didot's 
 edition of Diog. L., and in the Btovpai^oi, ed. Westermann, Brunswick, 1845). This Vita forms the begin- 
 ning of the IIpoAeyo/iiei'a 7^5 nAdraii/os <^tAo<ro(^cas, ed. K. F. Hermann, in the sixth volume of Hermann's 
 edition of Plato's works. Cf Theophil Roeper, ZccWofi«.s Ahulpharagianae alterae: de Jlonainv, ut 
 fertur,vita Platonis (Pr.), Dantzic, 1S67. 
 
 More trustworthy than these and other late and unimportant compilations, is, in general (though not 
 in all parts), the seventh of the Letters, which have come down to us under the name of Plato. This 
 letter is indeed inauthcntic, like all the others, and perhaps was not even composed by an immediate dis- 
 ciple of Plato; but it dates from a comparatively early epoch, and was known to Aristophanes of Byzan- 
 tium, by whom it must have been considered Platonic. Cf , besidesother earlier investigations, in particular, 
 Herni. Thorn K.trsten, De Platonis qiiaeferuniur, epintolis, praecipue tertia, septima. octava, Traj. ad 
 Rhen., 1664, with whom, in his rejection of the authenticity of these letters, II. Sauppe agrees, in his review 
 in the Gott. Gel. Anseigen, 1866, No. 23, pp. 881-892. Farther, many passages in Plato's own writings, and 
 In the works of Aristotle, Plutarch, and others, arc important as furnishing data for the biography of Plato. 
 Of modern works on the life of Plato, those most worthy of mention are: Marsilius Ficinus, Vita 
 Platonis, prefixed to his translation of Plato's writings. Pemarirx on the Life and "Writings of Plato, 
 Edinb. 1760; German translation with annotations and additions by K. Morgenstern, Leipsic, 1797. W. G. 
 Tennemann, System der Platon. Philosophie, 4 vols., Leipiiic, 1792-95. (The first volume begins with an 
 account of Plato's life.) Friedr. Ast, Plato's Leben und Schriften, Leipsic, 1816. K. F. Hermann, 
 Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosophie, first part (the only one published), Heidelb. 1889. 
 (Pages 1-126, "On Plato's life and external relations;"' pp. 127-340, "Plato's predecessors and contempo- 
 raries considered with reference to their influence on his doctrine;" pp. 841-718, " Plato's literary 
 works as authorities for the interpretation of his system, sifted and arranged.") George Grote, Plat* 
 and the other Companions of Socrates, London, 1865, 2d ed. 1867. A critique of the traditional accounts 
 of the life of Plato, in which the same are represented as almost altogether unhistorical, or at least aa 
 almost wh(dly untrustworthy, is given by Heinrich von Stein, in i<ieben Biicher ztir Gesch. des Platonismui, 
 Part II. ((Jott. 1864), in Section 17, on "The biographical myth and the literary tradition " (pp. 158-197): 
 Schaarschmidt adopts these results, and goes still farther in his work: Die Sammlung der Platonischen 
 Schriften, Bonn, 1866, p. 61 seq. On the basis of the transmitted records accepted without critical sifting, 
 E. Welper has written a novel (Plato und seine Zeit, hist.-hiograph. Lehensbild, Cassel, 1866), the com- 
 parison of which with the traditions! accounts may assist one to a clearer intelligence of the way in which
 
 100 
 
 PLATO S LIFE. 
 
 given facts arc accustomed to be enlarged upon under the influence of a too luxtirlant inyentivo facultf, 
 and so to a more correct estimation of the value of tradition itself. 
 (Cf. the literature in §§40 and 41.) 
 
 That Plato was born in Olymp. 88.1 (427 B. c, when Diotimus was Archon) is directly- 
 affirmed by Apollodorus, iv xpovcKoig, ap. Diog. L., III. 2 (i. e., if by Olymp. 88 the first 
 year of that Olympiad is to be understood); cf. also Hippol., Refut. Haer., I. 8. We are 
 also conducted indirectly to this result by the statement of Hermodorus, an immediate 
 disciple of Plato, given in Diog. L., II. 106, and III. 6, — a statement which gives rise to 
 doubts in its transmitted form (cf., among others, Schaarschmidt, in the work above cited, 
 p. 66), but which is yet the most trustworthy of aU the chronological statements relating to 
 this subject, and probably forms the basis of the statement of Apollodorus. The purport 
 of it is that Plato, at the age of twenty-eight years, soon after the execution of Socrates, 
 went to Megara, to the house of Euclid. But Socrates drank the hemlock in the second 
 half of the month of Thargelion, Olymp. 95.1 (in May or June, 399 b. c). For the year 
 429 (87.3, the year when ApoUodorus was Archon) as the year of Plato's birth, we 
 have the evidence of Athenseus (Beipnosoph., V. 17, p. 217); for 428, we have the state- 
 ment in Diog. L., III. 3, that Plato was born in the same Archontic year in which Pericles 
 died (i. e., in the second half of the archonship of Epameinon, 01. 87.4 = 429-428, in the 
 first half of which Pericles died), and also the statement (Pseudo- Plutarch., Fi/. Isocr.. 2, 
 p. 836), that Isocrates was born seven years before Plato — assuming it to be estabhshed 
 that Isocrates was born in Olymp. 86.1 (436-435 B. c). That Plato was born on the 7th of 
 Thargehon (Diog. L., III. 2) seems likewise to rest on the authority of Apollodorus, so 
 that if the celebration of Plato's birth was transferred to this day on account of its being 
 the birthday of the Delian Apollo, the change must have been made by the Academics 
 soon after Plato's death. This day, in the Olympiadic year 88.1, included — if Boeckh is 
 correct in assuming that the octennial cycle was then in vogue at Athens — the time from 
 the evening of May 2Gth to the evening of May 27th, 427 B. c. (or, if the Metonic cycle had 
 already been adopted. May 29-30). Plato's birthplace was Athens, or, according to some, 
 ^gina, whither his father had gone as a Kleruch (Diog. L., III. 3). 
 
 The following table represents the genealogy of Plato, so far as it is known to us (see 
 Charm., 154 seq., Tim., 20 d, Apol, 24 a, De Rep., init, Farm., init., et al.): — 
 
 Apw7r/(J^f, a relative of 2(5/lwv. 
 
 KpiTtac. 
 
 I I 
 
 KdX?iaiaxpoi. TTmvkuv. 
 
 'ApiffTOK^C- 
 
 'AvTUpUV. 
 
 r 
 
 Kptrtaf. Xapfildriq. TVepiKTidvT] married 1) with 'Apiaruv, 2) with UvpiXd/iirjj):. 
 
 I I I I 
 
 I 
 
 I 1 
 
 A6EifiavT0C. UXdruv. T^vkuv. Ilorwt^. 'Avrttpuv. 
 
 I
 
 Plato's life. 101 
 
 It should be remarked that the second marriage of Perictione and the existence of 
 Antiphon are facts known only on the evidence of the dialogue Parmenides — whose genu- 
 ineness is, to say the least, very doubtful, and whose historical statements are therefore 
 not to be taken as positively trustworthy — and on that of later \\Titers (especially Plu- 
 tarch), whose only authority was this dialogue. Pyrilampes appears, from Charm., 158 a, 
 to have been an uncle of the mother of Perictione, 
 
 Plato received his early education from teachers of repute. Dionysius (who is men- 
 tioned in the spurious dialogue Anterastae) is reported to have instructed him in reading 
 and writing ; Aristo of Argos, in gymnastics (Diog. L., III. 4), and Draco, a pupil of Damon, 
 and Metellus (or Megillus) of Agrigentum, in music (Plutarch, De Mus., 11). The report- 
 concerning Aristo (who is said to have given to his pupil the name of Plato) seems to be 
 historical ; the others are more doubtful. Plato is said to have taken part in several 
 military campaigns. By Athenian law he would be required to perform military service 
 from his eighteenth year (409 B. c). Accordiug to Aristoxenus {ap. Diog. L., III. 8) he 
 was engaged at Tanagra, Corinth, and Delium — an account which is unhistorical if refer- 
 ence is intended to the well-known battles at Tanagra and Delium ; but perhaps it alludes 
 to minor engagements in the years 409-405. In the battle at Corinth (394) Plato may 
 have taken part. Perhaps, like his brothers, he was present and participated in an 
 encounter which took place near Megara in the year 409 [Rep., II. p. 368 ; Diod. Sic, 
 XIII. 65). The poetical essays of his youth were discontinued after he became more 
 intimately acquainted with Socrates. Before that time he had been already instructed in 
 tl:e Heraclitean philosophy by Cratylus (Arist., Metaph., I. 6). The intimacy of Socrates 
 with Critias and Charmides may have led early to Plato's acquaintance with him ; the 
 philosophical intercourse of Plato with Socrates began, according to Diog. L. (III. 6), who, 
 perhaps, follows the authority of Hermodorus, in Plato's twentieth year. A young man, 
 endowed with a luxuriant fancy, he received the logical discipline to which Socrates sub- 
 jected him as a kindness worthy of all gratitude; the moral force of Socrates' character 
 filled him with awe, and the steadfastness with which he suffered death for the cause of 
 truth and justice, finally transfigured, in his mind, into a pure ideal, the image of his 
 master. We may assume that, while Plato was associated with Socrates, he also familiar- 
 ized himself with other philosophical systems. But whether he had at that time already 
 conceived the leading traits of his own system, founded on the theory of ideas, is uncer- 
 tain ; certain historical indications are wanting in regard to this subject. Nevertheless, 
 the Aristotehan account of the genesis of the theory of ideas from Heraclitean and Socratic 
 doctrines (see below, § 41) makes it very probable that Plato had this theory already in 
 his mind during the period of his personal intercourse with Socrates; the doctrine of 
 Euclid, the Megarian, may also have had its influence on him at the same period. Ee- 
 specting the precise character of the intercourse between Socrates and Plato, we have no 
 specific accounts. Xenophon (who recounts conversations of Socrates with Aristippus and 
 Antisthenes) mentions Plato only once {Mem., III. 6. 1), where he says that for his sake, 
 as also for that of Charmides, Socrates was well-disposed toward Glaucon. According to 
 Plat., ApoL, p. 34 a, 38 b, Plato was present at the trial of Socrates, and announced him- 
 self as ready to guarantee the payment of any fine; according to Phaedo, 59b, he was ill 
 on the day of Socrates' death, and was thereby hindered from being present at the last 
 conversations of his master. 
 
 Plato found his hfe's vocation, not in participating in the political contests of the parties 
 then existing at Athens, but in founding a philosophical school. This task demanded the 
 unconditional application of his undivided powers, and in the execution of it Plato accom- 
 plished a work infinitely more advantageous for humanity than any which he could have
 
 102 Plato's life. 
 
 accomplished if he had chosen rather to exercise the civic virtues of a patriotic popular 
 orator. Plato could consecrate himself to no political activity which failed to correspond 
 with the sense and spirit of his philosophical principles. He could not, like Demosthenes, 
 exhort the Athenians to maintain their democracy and to guard themselves against a 
 foreign monarch, because democracy did not appear to him a good form of government; 
 he could only consent to co-operate for the establishment of an aristocracy or a monarchy 
 founded upon the pliilosophical education of the ruling class, for only a political activity 
 directed to this end could seem to him useful or obligatory. A work of this latter kind he 
 did once undertake, when the state of things in Sicily appeared to him (erroneously, it is 
 true) favorable to the solution of the political problem as he conceived it. Cf Ferd. Del- 
 briick, Vertlieidigung Plato's gegen einen Angriff (Niebuhr's, in the Rh. Mvs. fur Fhilol, 
 Gesch. u. griech. Philos., I. p. 196) auf seine Bilrgertugend, Bonn, 1828. 
 
 It is possible that the intercourse of Plato with Euclid of Megara also exercised a 
 considerable influence on the formation of his own system. Whether Plato, after hia 
 sojourn with Euclid, next lived in Athens, and in the year 394 participated in the 
 Corinthian campaign, is uncertain. He is said, when at Gyrene, to have visited Theodorus, 
 the mathematician (Diog. L., III. 6), whose acquaintance he seems to have made at Athens 
 shortly before the death of Socrates (Theaet, p. 143 b, seq.) ; he remained, as we are credibly 
 informed, a certaifl time at Cyrene, perfecting himself in mathematics under the direction 
 of Theodorus. According to Cic, De Fin., V. 29, Plato went to Egj^^t for the purpose of 
 obtaining instruction from the priests in mathematics and astronomy, in which particular his 
 example was followed by his pupil, Eudoxus, the astronomer, who for a considerable period 
 took up his residence in Egypt, the land of ancient experiences. It is uncertain whether the 
 accounts of Plato's visits to Cyrene and Egypt are historical or legendary. Their only basis 
 may have been Plato's mention of Theodorus (in the Theaetetus) and the references to Egypt 
 in Plato's works {Phaedr., p. 247 c ; Rep., IV. 435 ; Tim., 21 e ; Leges, II. 656 d, 657 a, Y. 747 c, 
 VII. 799 a, 819 a; cf Pol, 264 c, 290 d). But even admittmg this, the inference in favor, 
 at least, of a journey to Egypt, has strong support. From the picture given by Plato of 
 the Heracliteans in Ionia [Theaet, 179 seq.), Schleiermacher {PL W., II. 1, p. 185) infers that 
 he had probably been in Asia Minor ; but other evidence for this conclusion is wanting. 
 Plutarch, in the dialogue De genio Socratis (Tvepc tov 'Lcjuparovg daifiovlov), c. 7, p. 579, 
 represents Simmias as saying: "At Memphis, the home of the prophet 'K.ovov^iq, we 
 remained for a time philosophizing, Plato and 'E/IAott/cjv and I. "When we had started 
 on our return from Egypt, we were met near Caria by certain Delians, who requested 
 from Plato, as a man acquainted with geometry, the solution of the problem proposed to 
 them by Apollo, viz. : how to double a cubiform altar. Plato indicated as a condition of 
 the solution of the problem, that they must find two mean proportionals, and directed the 
 petitioners, for the rest, to Eudoxus of Cnidos and Helicon of Cyzicum. He also instructed 
 them that the god demanded not so much the altar, as that they should occupy themselves 
 with the study of mathematics." But this narrative can not be regarded as historical; the 
 whole dialogue is interspersed with free inventions from Plutarch's hand. Plato seems to 
 have gone to Italy and Sicily (about 390 ?) from Athens {Epist, VII. p. 326 b, seq.). It is 
 uncertain whether he was at Athens about 394 B. c. and took part in the Corinthian cam- 
 paign. On the occasion of his first arrival at Syracuse, he was, according to the 7th Letter 
 (p. 324 b), about forty years old. Among the Pythagoreans Plato probably sought to 
 acquire, not only a more exact knowledge of their doctrine, but also a view of their scientific, 
 ethical, and political life in common, and their manner of educating their youth. At Syracuse 
 he won over to his doctrines and to his theory of life, the youthful Dio, then about twenty 
 years old, whose sister was married to Dionysius (the elder) ; but the tyrant himself
 
 Plato's life. 103 
 
 thought Plato's admonitions " senile " (Diog. L., III. 18), and revenged himself on him by 
 treating him as a prisoner of war. The sale of Plato at .^gina (in case it is historical) 
 must have taken place shortly before the end of the Corinthian war, 387 B. c. Anniceria 
 is reported to have ransomed him and afterward to have refused to allow the friends of 
 Plato to make up to him the price of the ransom, and so, as the story goes, the sum wa3 
 applied to the purchase of the garden of the Academy, where Plato united around him a circle 
 of friends devoted to philosophy. His instructions, as we must infer from the form of his 
 writings and from an express declaration in the Phaedrus (p. 275 seq.), were generally con- 
 veyed in the form of dialogues ; yet he seems, besides, to have delivered connected lectures. 
 Nothing but the hope of attaining an important political and philosophical result {Epist, 
 VII., p. 329) could determine Plato twice to interrupt his scholastic activity by journeys 
 to Sicily. Tlie object of Plato in undertaking his second journey to Sicily, not long 
 after the accession of the younger Dionysius to power (367 b. c), was to unite with Dio in 
 an attempt to win over the young ruler to philosophy, and to move him to transform his 
 tyranny into a legally-ordered monarchy. This plan was frustrated through the fickle- 
 ness of the youth, his suspicion that Dio wished to get him out of the way in order to 
 possess himself of supreme power, and the counter-efforts of a poUtical p^rty, who 
 sought to maintain the existing form of government unchanged. Dio was banished, and 
 Plato was left without influence. He undertook his third journey to S?cily in the hope of 
 effecting a reconciliation between Dionysius and Dio. Not only did he fail to accomplish 
 this result, but his own life came at last into danger through the mistrust of the tyrant, 
 the intercession of the Pythagorean Archytas of Tarentum being all that saved it. Dio, 
 supported by friends and pupils of Plato, undertook in Olymp. 105.3 (358-5T) a successful 
 expedition to SicUy against Dionysius, but was murdered in 353 by a traitor among his 
 companions in arms, Callippus (who was himself put to death in 350). Dionysius, who had 
 asserted Ids power successfully in Locri in Italy, was restored, in 346, to power in Syra- 
 cuse, until, in 343, he was driven out by Timoleon. Returning to Athens (in 361 or 360), 
 Plato resumed his doctrinal labors both orally and in writing. According to Dionys., De 
 Compos. Verb., p. 208, Plato labored till into his eightieth year in perfecting his writings. 
 An account, perhaps based on numerical speculations, and reported by Seneca {Epist., 58. 
 31), represents him as having died on his birthday, at the exact age of eighty-one years. 
 Cicero says [De Senect, V. 13) : uno et octogesimo anno scribens est mortuus, by which he may 
 mean that Plato had just entered upon his eighty-first year. He died in the year when 
 Theophilus was Archon (Olymp. 108.1). 
 
 In his "School of Athens," Raphael (as he is commonly interpreted — another interpreta- 
 tion is given by H. Grimm, Neue Essays, cf Preuss. Jahrb., 1864, Nos. 1 and 2) represents 
 Plato as pointing toward heaven, while Aristotle turns his regards upon the earth. In the 
 spirit of tbis representation, Goethe characterizes Plato as follows : " Plato's relation to the 
 world is that of a superior spirit, whose good pleasure it is to dwell in it for a time. It is 
 not so much his concern to become acquainted with it — for the world and its nature are 
 things which he presupposes — as kindly to communicate to it that which he brings with 
 him, and of which it stands in so great need. He penetrates into its depths, more that he 
 may replenish them from the fullness of his own nature, than that he may fathom their 
 mysteries. He scales its heights as one yearning after renewed participation in the source 
 of his being. All that he utters has reference to something eternally complete, good, 
 true, beautiful, whose furtherance he strives to promote in every bosom. Wliatever of 
 earthly knowledge he appropriates here and there, evaporates in his method and in his 
 discourse." Cf below, § 45, Goethe's characterization of Aristotle. " In Plato's phi- 
 losophy," says Boeckh, "the expanding roots and branches of earlier philosophy ar©
 
 104 Plato's writings. 
 
 developed into the full blossom, out of which the subsequent fruit was s\owly brought 
 to maturity." 
 
 § 40. As works of Plato, thirty-six compositions (in fifty-six books) 
 have been transmitted to ns (the " Epistles " being counted as one) ; 
 beside these, several works, which in ancient times were already 
 designated as spurious, bear his name. The Alexandrian gram- 
 marian, Aristophanes of Byzantium, arranged several of the Platonic 
 writings in Trilogies, and the Neo- Pythagorean Thrasyllus (in the 
 time of the Emperor Tiberius) arranged all those which he considered 
 genuine in nine Tetralogies. Schleiermacher assumes that Plato 
 composed all his works (with the exception of a few occasional com- 
 positions) in a didactic order. This would necessarily presuppose a 
 plan, of which the outlines were conceived and fixed at the begin- 
 ning, Schleiermacher divides the works into three groups : ele- 
 mentary, mediatory or preparatory, and constructive dialogues. As 
 Plato's first composition he names the Phaedrus, as his latest writ- 
 ings, the Republic^ Timaeus, and the Laws. K. F. Hermann, on the 
 other hand, denies this unity of literary plan, and considers the 
 writings of Plato separately as documents exponential of his own 
 philosophical development. He assumes three " literary periods " in 
 the life of Plato, the first reaching to the time immediately following 
 the death of Socrates, the second covering the time of Plato's resi- 
 dence at Megara and of the journeys which he made directly after- 
 ward, and the third beginning with the return of Plato to Athens 
 after his first iournev to Sicilv and extendingr to the time of his death. 
 The earliest compositions of Plato were, according to him, the shorter 
 ethical dialogues which most bear a Socratic type, such as Hijpjpias 
 Minor ^ Lysis^ and the P7'otagoras i in designating the latest he agrees 
 with Schleiermacher. He styles the Phaedrus (with Socher and 
 Stallbaum) the "inaugural programme of Plato's doctrinal activity at 
 the Academy." Ed. Munk judges that Plato intended in his writings 
 to draw an idealized picture of the life of Socrates as the genuine 
 philosopher, and that he indicated their order through the increasing 
 age of Socrates in the successive dialogues. This view is incom- 
 patible with Hermann's principle, but, on the hypothesis of a single 
 plan held in view from the beginning, is very plausible, though not 
 the only possible view ; it is, however, incapable of being maintained 
 throughout without the aid of excessively violent suppositions. 
 
 In any case, the point of departure in inquiring into the genuine-
 
 Plato's wRrriNGS. 105 
 
 ness of the Platonic writings must be the passages in Aristotle in 
 which these are alluded to. Judged by this standard, the works best 
 attested as belonging to Plato are the Rejmhlic^ Timaeus^ and the 
 Laws^ all of which are mentioned in Aristotle by their titles, with 
 Plato's name. Next to these come, judged by the same standard, 
 the Phaedo, the Banquet (cited under the title of " Erotic Dis- 
 courses "), Phaedrus^ and GorgiaSy which are mentioned by Aris- 
 totle by their titles, and with evident reference to Plato as their 
 author, although he is not expressly named. The Meno^ Hijppias 
 (meaning Hippias Minor'), and Menexenus (cited as the "Epitaphic" 
 Discourse), are mentioned by Aristotle by their titles as extant, but 
 not, apparently, with unquestionable reference to Plato as their 
 author. Aristotle refers to passages in the Theaetetus and the Pliile- 
 huSs which he cites as Plato's works, but without naming these titles ; 
 he also refers to doctrines contained in the Sophistes, but which 
 seem rather to be cited as oral deliverances of Plato or (in some in- 
 stances) as the doctrines of Plato's disciples. Without naming Plato 
 or the titles, Aristotle appears also to refer to passages in the Polit- 
 icus, the Apologia, Lysis, Laches, and perhaps the Protagoras, 
 possibly also to passages in the Euthydemus and the Cratylus. Pe- 
 specting the time of the composition of the dialogues, only a few data 
 can be found which are fully certain. From an anachronism in the 
 Banquet, it appears beyond question that that dialogue was written 
 after (and probably very soon after) 385 b. c, and it is expressly 
 stated by Aristotle that the Laws were composed later than the 
 Republic. In view of the idealizing character of the Platonic dia- 
 logues, the only natural supposition is that Plato wrote none of them 
 until after the death of Socrates. According to an ancient and not 
 improbable, but also not sufficiently well-authenticated account, the 
 dialogue Phaedrus was the earliest of Plato's compositions. It is 
 a matter of question whether the Protagoras and Gorgias preceded 
 or followed the Phaedrus, but we may assume that the Phaedrus 
 was composed before the Banquet. It is most probable that Plato 
 began to write his dialogues in about his fortieth year, on the occasion 
 of the founding of his school in the garden of the Academy, and in the 
 following order: Phaedrus, Banquet, Protagoras, together with a num- 
 ber of shorter ethical dialogues, Gorgias, and then perhaps Meno; 
 these dialogues were ])erhaps immediately followed by the Repvhlic, 
 together with the Timaeus and the Critias fragment, then by the
 
 106 Plato's writings. 
 
 Phaedo^ Cratylus, Theaetetusy Philehus^ and Laws, which latter Plato 
 is said to have left unfinished. The Apology appears to have been 
 written soon after the trial of Socrates and in substantial agreement 
 with his actual defense. 
 
 The works of Plato were published first In Latin in the translation of Marsilina Ficinus, Florence, 
 1483-14S4, reprinted at Venice, 1491, etc. In Greek, they were first published at Venice, in 1513, by Aldui 
 Manutius (with the co-operation of Marcus Masurus). This edition was followed by the edition of 
 Johannes Oporinus and Simon Grynaeus, Basileae apud Joh. Valderum, 1534. Then came the edition 
 BaMeae apud ITenricum Petri, 1556, and afterward that of Henricus Stephanus, with the translation of 
 Joh. Serranus, 3 vols., Par. 1578. The paging and side-numbers of this edition are printed in all modern 
 editions, and are those usually followed in citation. The edition of Stephanus was reproduced at Lyons, 
 1590, with the translation of Ficinus, and also, in Greek alone, at Frankfort, 1602. Subsequent complete 
 editions are the edition published at Zweibriicken, in 1781-87 (instituted by the so-called Bipontines, G. Oh. 
 Croll, Fr. Chr. Exter, and J. Val. Embser, and to which belong the Argumenta dial. Plat, expos, et ill. a. 
 £>. Tiedemanno, Zweibr., 1786), the Tauchnitz edition, edited by Chr. Dan. Beck (Leipsic, 1813-19, 1829 
 and 1850), and the editions of Bekker (Berlin, 1816-17, with Commentary and Scholia, iOid. 1823, and Lon- 
 don, 1S26), Ast (Leipsic, 1819-32), Gottfr. Stallbaum (Leipsic, 1821-25; 1833 seq., and in one vol., Leipsic, 
 1850 and 1867), and Baiter, Orelli, and Winckelmann (Zurich, 1889-^2; 1861 seq.); Greek and German 
 edition, Leipsic, 1841 seq., Greek and Latin edition, ed. by Ch. Schneider and P.. B. Hirschig, Par. 1846-56, 
 Greek alone, ed. K. F. Hermann, Leipsic, 1851-53. 
 
 Platan's Werl-e, by F. Schleiermacher (Translations and Introductions), I. 1 and 2, II. 1-3, Berlin, 
 1804-10; new and improved edition, ibid. 1817-24; IIL 1 (^Republic), ibid. 1828; 3d ed. of I. and II. and 
 2d ed. of III. 1, ibid. 1855-62. [Schleiennacher's Introductims.to the IHalogues of Plato, translated by 
 W. Dobson, Cambridge and London, 1836.— TV.] (Exwres de Platon, French translation by Victor Cousin, 
 8 vols., Paris, 1825-40. Translated into Italian by Eug. Bonghi, Opere di Platone nuovamente tradotte, 
 Milan, 1857. Pinion's SSmmtliehe Werke, translated by Hieron. Miiller, with introductions by Karl Stein- 
 hart, 8 vols., Leipsic, 1850-66. (Cf. Steinhart's Aphorismen iller den gegenw'drtigen Stand der PI. For- 
 sahmmen, in the Verh. der 2b. Philol- Vers, in Halle, Leipsic, 1868, pp. 54-70.) [There are two complete 
 translations of the works of Plato in English : The Works of Plato (with notes, abstract of Greek Com- 
 menuries, etc.— nine of the dialogues translated by F. Sydenham), by Thomas Taylor, 5 vols., London, 1804 ; 
 and Plato (in Bohn's Classical Library), translated by Cary, Davis, and Burges, 6 vols., London, 1852 seq. ; 
 cf Summary and Analysis of the Dialogues of Plato, by Alfred Day (Bohn"s L.), London, 1870.— Jr.] 
 
 For ancient Commentaries on Plato, see below §§ 65, 70. Timaei Lexicon voc. Platonic, ed. D. 
 Euhnken, Leyden, 1789, it. ed., cur. G. A. Koch, Leipsic, 1S2S. For the works of Ast and K. F. Hermann 
 on Plato, see above, § 39 ; cf. also Ast's Lexicon Platonicum, Leipsic, 1834-39. Jos. Socher, Ueber Platon's 
 Schriften, Munich, 1820. Ed. Zeller, Platonische Stitdien (on the Leges, Menexenus, Hippias Minor, Par- 
 menides, and on Aristotle's representation of the Platonic philosophy), Tiibingen, 1889. Franz Susemihl, 
 Prodromus Plat. Forschungen {Greifsic. Uab.-Schr.), Gott. 1852. By the same. Die genet. Bnticickelung 
 der Platon. Philosophie, einleitend dargestellt, 2 parts, Leipsic, 1855-60. Cf his numerous reviews of 
 modern works on Plato, in several volumes of Jahn's Jahrbucher f. Phil. u. Pad., and his original articles 
 in the same review and in the Philologus, especially his Platonische Forschungen in the second supple- 
 mentary volume to the Philologus, 1863, and in the Philologus, Vol. XX., Gott., 1863, and also the intro- 
 ductions to his translations of several of Plato's dialogues. G. F. "W. Suckow, Die iviss. und kiinstlerische 
 Form der Plaionisohen Schriften in ihrer bisher -verboi-genen Eigenthumlichkeit dargestellt, Berlin, 
 1855. Ed. Munk, Die naturliche Ordnvmg der Platonischen Schriften, Berlin, 1856. Sigurd Ribbing, 
 Genetiskframstdllning af Plato's ideeWra jtmte bifognde under sbkningar om de Platonska skrifternaa 
 iikthei och inbordes sammanhang, Upsala, 1858, in German, Leipsic, 1863-64. H. Bonitz, Platon. Studien, 
 Vols. I. and II. (on the Gorg., Theaet.. Euthyd., and Soph:), Vienna, 1858-60 ; Friedrich Ueberweg, TJnter- 
 suchungen ilber die Echiheit und Zeitfolge Platonischer Schriften und ilber die Ilauptmomente aua 
 Plato's Leben, Vienna, 1861; and Ueber den Gegensatz zwischen Geneiikern und Methcdikem und 
 dessen Vermittlzmg (in the Zeitschr. fur Phil. u. philos. Krit., vol. 57, Halle, 1870). G. Qrote, Plato, 
 etc. (see above, § 39, p. 96) ; 2d edition, Lond., 1867. Cf., on this work by Grote, J. St. Mill, in the Edinh. 
 Pevino, April, 1866; Paul Janet, in the Journal des Savans, June, 1866, pp. 881-395, and Feb., 1867, pp. 
 114-132; Charles de E6musat, in the Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. 73, 1868, pp. 43-77, and D. Peipers, in 
 the Gott. gelehrt. Anz., 1869, pp. 81-120, and ibid., 1870, pp. 561-610. Carl Schaarschmidt, Die Sammlimf 
 der Platonischen Schriften, zur Seheidung der echten von den unechten untersucht, Bonn, 1866. 
 
 Of the numerous editions and translations of and commentaries on single dialogues or collections of
 
 Plato's writings. 107 
 
 dialogues— all of which can not here be cited (see Engelmann's BiUiotheca Script. Claw., 5th ed., Leipsic, 
 1858, and also various lists of works in different volumes of the Philologue, and in works on the history 
 of literature) — we may mention here : 
 
 Dialogi selecti cura Lva1</v. Frid. Heiiuiorfii, wl apparatum Inman. Bekkeri led. d^nuo emend. 
 Phil. Buttmano, Berlin 1S02-2S. Dlalogorum delectus ex rec. et cum lat. intttrpret. F. Aug. Wolfi\ 
 {Euthypliron, Apologia Crito), Berlin, 1812. Sympoe^ioii, ed. F. A. Wolt Leipsic, 1782. Phaedo, ed. 
 D. Wyttenbach, Leyden. 1810; Leipsic. 1324 [T. D. Woolsey], etc. Tht Repv^lu^ has been edited by 
 Ast, K. Schneider, and others, the Leges by Ast, Schnlthess, etc., Euthydemus and Laches by Badham, 
 
 Jena, 18o5. 
 
 GriechUche Prosaiker in neuer I'ebers. hrsg. van C. K. v. Osiander und G. Schwab (containing 
 Plato's works, translated by L. Geor^i, Franz Susemihl, J. Denschle, and others), Stuttgart (J. B. Metz- 
 ler), 185:3 seq. Pl.s Werke, transl. by K. Prantl and others, Stuttgart (Karl Hoffmann), 1854 seq. PVa 
 ausgewdhlte SchHften, fur den Schulgeljrauch erkldrt, by Christian Cron and Jul. Deuschle, Leips. 1857 
 seq. PL's PhaedruK und Gastma/d, iibs mit einl. Voncort von K. Lehrs, Leips. 1870. The Banquet has 
 also been translated and explained by (amonsr others) Ed. Zeller (Marburg, 1857), the Gorgias by G. Schult^ 
 hess (new, revi.sed edition by S. Vogelin, Ziirich, 1857), the Republic by F. C. Wolf (Altona, 1799), Kleuker 
 (Vienna, 1S05), K. Schneider (Breslau, 18S9), and others, [including Davies and Vaughan. The Republic of 
 Plato, 4th ed., Cambridge, 1868 ; cf. also, W. Whewell, Platonic Dialogues for English Readers, 3 vela., 
 1859-60.— rr.]. 
 
 On the Phaedrus compare the introductions of the various editors and translators of that dialogue, as 
 also the appropriate parts in the comprehensive works of Ast, Socher, F. Hermann, Brandis. Zeller, Suse- 
 mihl, Mnnk, Grote, etc., and, in particular, A. B. Krische, Ueber PL's Phaedr., Gott. 1848; Jul. Deuschle, 
 Ueber den innern Gedankemus. im PI. Phaedrus, in the Zeitschr. f. die Alterthumawiss, 1854, pp. 
 25-44; Die PI. itythen, imbe.'i. der itythus im Phaedr., Hanau, 1854; Lipke, De Phaedri connilio (G.- 
 Pr.), Wesel, 1866; C. E. Volquardsen, PL's Phaedrus, PVserste Schrift, Kiel, 1862; F. Bresler, Ueber den 
 PI. Phaedr. (G.-Pr.), Dantzic, 1867; Eud. Kiihner, PI. de eioquentia in Phaedra dialogo judicium {G.- 
 Pr.), Spandau, 1868 ; Carl Schmelzer, Zu PI. Phaedrus (.Progr.), Guben, 1S68 ; L. B. Forster, Quaestio de 
 PI. Phaedro, Berlin, 18C9. Cf. also Lehrs' Introduction to his translation of the Phaedrus and the Sym- 
 posion, Leipsic, 1860. 
 
 Of the Platonic Symposian treat (besides Schleiermacher, Steinhart, etc.) : F. A. Wolf, in his Ver- 
 mischte Schr., pp. 288-339 ; Carl Fortlage. Philonophische MediiaUonen ilber Plato's Sympos., Heidelberg, 
 1*35 ; Ferd. Delbrtick, De Plat. Symposia, Bonn, 1839 : Albert Schwegler, Veber die Compos, des PL 
 Symp., Tubingen, 1843; Ed. Wunder, Blicke in PL's Symp., in the PhiloL, V. pp. 682 seq.; Franz Suse- 
 mihl, Ueber die Compos, des PL Gastmahls. in the PhiloL, TI. 1851, pp. 177 seq., and VIII. 1853, pp. 
 15:3-159 : Ed. Zeller, in his Translation of the Symp., Marburg, 1859. On the relation of the Platonic to the 
 Xeoophontic Symposion, see Boeckh, De simultate, quam Plato cum Xenophonte exercuisse fertur, 
 Berlin, 1811 (cf. Boeckh, in v. Eaumer's Antiqnar. Briefe, Leips. 1851, p. 40 seq.); K. F. Hermann, Num 
 PI. an Xenoph. Convivium suum prius scripserit, atqiie de consilio horum libellorum, Marb. 1834; 
 Vermuthung, dass PL Symposion alter set als das Xenophontische.gerechtfertigt. ib. 1841; Zur Frag* 
 uber das Zeitrerhaltniis der heiden Symposien, in the PhiloL, VIII. pp. 329-3-33. Arn. Hug arcues on 
 decisive grounds in favor of the priority In time of the Banquet of Xenophon, in the Philol., VII. pp. 
 6:38-695; Georg Ferd. Eettig (argues in the same sense), Progr., Berne, 1864. 
 
 Of the dialogue Protagoras write (besides Schleiermacher, Steinhart, Susemihl, Grote, etc.) Conr. G. 
 Fehmer, PL Protag. nach seinem innern Zusammenhang enttc-ickelt {Progr.), Zeitz, 1839; W. Natt- 
 mann, De PL Protag., Emmerich. 1855; Kroschel, Zu den chranoL Terh. des PL Protag., in the Zeitzchr. 
 f. d. Gymnasialwesen, XI. 1857, pp. 561-567; Eichard Schone. Ueber PL Protag.. ein BHtragsur Losung 
 der PL Frage, Leips. 1862; Meinardus, M'ie ist PL Protag. aufzufassent (G.-Pr.), Oldenburg, 1864; Wal- 
 deck. Analyse des PL Protag. (G.-Pr.), Corbach, 1868. 
 
 On the order of ideas in the Gorgias anA the tendency of the dialogue compare, in particular. Joh. Bake, 
 De Gorg. PL consilio et ingenio. in B.'s Scholica ITypomnemata, III. pp. 1-26, Leyden, 1844; Hcrm. 
 Bonitz. in his above-mentioned Studien ; Ludw. Paul, Ist die Scene fiir den Gorg. im ITause des Kal- 
 Uklest (Festgruss a« dt« 27 PWto/.- Fers.), Kiel, 1869. [The Gorgias of Plato, T. D. Woolsey, Boston, 
 1842, 2d edition, 1848.— TV.] 
 
 In regard to the Meno, Euthyphron, Crito, and other minor dialogues, as the Philebus, Parmenides, 
 SopMstes. etc„ it may suflfice here to refer to the works of Schaarschmidt and Grote, of whom the former 
 disputes, while the latter defends, the authenticity of all these dialogues. [Recent translations of three of 
 these dialogues are : Philebtis, a Dialogue of Plato, etc.. translated by Edward Poste, London, (since) 
 1860; The Sophittes of Plato, translated and preceded by an Intr. on Ancient and Modern Philosophy, by 
 E. W. Mackay, Lond. 1S63 : Plato's Mmo, transl. by Mackay, with an Essay on the Moral Education of th« 
 Greeks, London, 1869.— TV.]
 
 108 Plato's writings. 
 
 The principal works relating to the Republic are cited ad § 43, and those relating to the Timaeus and 
 Phaedo, ad § 42. 
 
 The gpuriousness of all the Letters attributed to Plato has been demonstrated most decisively by Herm. 
 Thorn. Karsten (see above, § 39, p. 99). 
 
 The Aristotelian citations from Plato form the only sufficient external criterion and 
 certificate of the genuineness of the works of Plato. Every dialogue which is unques- 
 tionably attested as Platonic by Aristotle, must be regarded as genuine, or has at least the 
 most decided presumption in its favor. Of course, the converse is not true, that tlie 
 silence of Aristotle proves the spuriousness of a dialogue, although under specific circum- 
 stances this silence is certainly to be considered as an important element in the evidence. 
 The question of genuineness in connection with those dialogues which are not proved 
 authentic by Aristotle's testimony, must be decided mainly on internal grounds. The 
 libraries of Plato's pupils, while sufficient to assure the preservation of all that was 
 genuine among the works attributed to Plato, were insufficient to assure the exclusion 
 of all that was spurious. On the one hand, works published by immediate disciples of 
 Plato (for example. Leges, Epinomis, Sophistes, and Politicus), which were found in the 
 libraries with no exact indication of the name of the author, or the name of the author 
 having been lost, were early received as works of Plato ; among these were some that 
 were written in the spirit of Plato's doctrine and under his name, being founded on 
 his posthumous literary remains or on his oral utterances; on the other hand, some 
 works, which may have been composed from sixty to one hundred years after Plato's 
 death (for example, a part of the Letters), were received into the Alexandrian Library as 
 works presumably Platonic. Still others of Plato's "Works" are forgeries of even later 
 date. 
 
 The trilogies, as arranged by Aristophanes of Byzantium are (according to Diog. L., 
 III. 61.) the following: 1) Rep., Timaeus, Critias; 2) Sophista, Politicus, Cratjdus; 3) Leges, 
 Minos, Epinomis; 4) Theaet., Euthyphro, Apologia; 5) Crito, Phaedo, Epistolae; besides 
 these, there were other dialogues which Aristophanes received as genuine, and enumerated 
 separately. It is not known which these were. The tetralogies proposed by Thrasyllus 
 were (according to Diog L., 56 seq.): 1) Euthyphron, Apologia, Crito, Phaedo; 2) Cratylus, 
 Theaetetus. Sophista, Politicus; 3) Parmenides, Philebus, Convivium, Phaedrus; 4) Alci- 
 biades I. and II., Hipparchus, Anterastae ; 5) Theages, Charmides, Laches, Lysis ; 6) 
 Euthydemus, Protagoras, Gorgias, Meno ; 7) Hippias Major, Hippias Minor, lo, Menexenus ; 
 8) Clitophon, Rep., Timaeus, Critias; 9) Minos, Leges, Epinomis, Epistolae. 
 
 As dialogues confessedly spurious, Diog. L. names the following: Mido, Eryxias, 
 Halcyo, eight dialogues without an introduction {aae^alot rf) Sisyphus, Axiochus, Phaeaces, 
 Demodocus, Chelidon, Hebdome, Eplmenides. Of these are preserved: 1) Axiochus; 2) 
 Concerning what is just (one of the dialogues without exordium); 3) Concerning virtue 
 (ditto) ; 4) Demodocus ; 5) Sisyphus ; 6) Eryxias ; 7) Halcyo (which usually accompanies 
 Lucian's works) ; to these are to be added the Definitiones, w^hich are likewise spurious. 
 
 Bchleiermacher places in the first, or elementary division of the Platonic works, as chief 
 works : Phaedrus, Protagoras, Parmenides ; as adjuncts : Lysis, Laches, Charmides, Euthy- 
 phron ; as occasional writings : Apologia and Crito ; and as semi-genuine or spurious : lo, 
 Hippias Minor, Hipparchus, Minos, Alcibiades II. In the second division, which contains the 
 dialogues indirectly dialectical in form, dialogues devoted principally to the explanation of 
 knowledge and of intelligent action, Schleiermacher classes as chief works : Theaetetus, 
 Sophistes, Politicus, Phaedo, Philebus ; as adjuncts : Gorgias, Meno, Euthydemus, Craty- 
 lus, Convivium; as semi-genuine or spurious: Theages, Erastae, Alcibiades I., Menexenus, 
 Hippias Major, Clitopho. The third, constructive division, finaDy, contains, according to
 
 Plato's writings, 109 
 
 Schleierraacher, as chief works the dialogues : Republic, Timaeus, and Critias ; and as an 
 adjunct, the Leges. — Brandis agrees substantially with Schleiermacher, but holds that 
 the Protagoras may have been composed before the Phaedrus, and places (with Zeller) 
 Parmenides immediately after Sophistes and Politicus. 
 
 K. F. Hermann includes in the first of the three development-periods which he ascribes 
 to Plato, the following dialogues: Hipp. Min., lo, Alcib. I., Charm., Lysis, Laches, Protag., 
 Euthyd. The Apol., Crito, Gorgias, Euthyphro, Meno, Hipp. Major belong to a "transition 
 period." In the second, or Megaric period, he places Cratylus, Theaet., Soph., Politicus. 
 Parmenides, and in the third period, the period of maturity, Phaedrus, Menexenus, Con- 
 vivium, Phaedo, Phileb., Rep., Tim., Critias, Leges. 
 
 Steinhart (in his introductions to the Platonic dialogues accompanying Miiller's trans- 
 lation) adopts substantially the arrangement of Hermann, modifying it only in a few minor 
 points. Susemihl, who at first (in his Prodromtis Platon. Forschungen) was more inclined 
 to the view of Schleiermacher, approached subsequently nearer to that of Hermann, 
 adopting an intermediate and conciliatory position between them. He holds that a definite 
 plan underlies the Platonic writings, but that this was not wholly developed in Plato's 
 mind at the very beginning of his literary activity. He believes that it was developed 
 gradually, like his philosophy, during the first stadia ©f his literary activity, becoming 
 constantly clearer and more complete. Susemihl differs from Hermann, in ascribing the 
 development of philosophical doctrine in Plato's mind less to external influences and more 
 to Plato's originality. Susemihl regards the Phaedrus as earlier than the dialogues of 
 Hermann's "Megaric period," or, at least, than a part of them. 
 
 Munk holds fast to the fundamental idea of Schleiermacher, that all the dialogues of 
 Plato were composed with reference to a determinate plan, but believes that they were 
 nearly all written after the death of Socrates. He emphasizes more the artistic side of this 
 plan than the didactic, and supposes that Plato designed in the succession of his writings 
 to present an idealized portrait of Socrates as the genuine philosopher ; he believes, accord- 
 ingly, that by the chronological succession of the scenes or "situations," and especially 
 by the increasing age at which Socrates figures in the successive dialogues, Plato indicated 
 the order in which he himself intended them to be studied, and that this order agrees in 
 general with the time of their composition. Munk's theory is an hypothesis worthy of 
 consideration. Many of the results of special investigation accord very well with it, 
 while others seem to oppose it, though without being sufBcient to set aside entirely 
 the principle involved. But it is beyond question that the manner in which Munk has 
 carried through and applied his principle in detail, is imperfect, and leaves room for 
 numerous corrections. Munk has neglected the question of the genuineness of the 
 dialogues, and has often either made too light work of the investigation of their chrono. 
 logical succession or conducted it from too exclusive a stand-point. He has, nevertlieless, 
 furnished many very valuable contributions to this department of special investigation. 
 He distinguishes three series of writings : I. Socrates' consecration to philosophy and his 
 contests against false wisdom ; time of composition 389-384 B. c. : Parm. (time of the 
 action, 446), Protag. (434), Charm. (432), Laches (421), Gorgias (420), lo (420), Hippias L 
 (420), Cratylus (420), Euthyd. (420), Sympos. (417). H. Socrates teaches true wisdom; 
 time of composition, 383-370 : Phaedrus (410), Philebus (410), Rep., Tim., and Critias (409, 
 see Munk in Jahn's Jahrb., 79, p. 791). IIL S. demonstrates the truth of his teachings by 
 the criticism of opposite opinions and by his death as a martyr ; time of composition, after 
 370: Meno (405), Theaet. (on the day when the accusation was brought forward by 
 Meletus), Soph, and Politicus (one day later), Euthyphron (the same day with Theaet.) 
 Apok)g. (one day after the embassy to Delos), Crito (two days before the death of Socrates),
 
 110 Plato's WRrrmcs. 
 
 Phaedo (on the day of Socrates' death). These writings form, according to Munk, a Cyclua 
 complete in itself; they were preceded by a few youthful compositions, viz.: Alcib. I., 
 Lysis, and Hippias II., and followed by Menexenus (composed after 387) and Leges (begun 
 in 367). 
 
 Grote holds that all those dialogues which were considered genuine by Thrasyllus are 
 really such, because it is to be presupposed that they were preserved in the Alexandrian 
 Library as Platonic writings (which is, indeed, very probable), and because it is further to 
 be assumed that this Library received them in the beginning from Platonists of the 
 Academy (which is probably true of many of these writings, but scarcely of all), and that 
 these Platonists possessed a complete and correct collection of the genuine Platonic 
 writings. (This latter supposition, however, is very doubtful, and is not proved; for in 
 those early times the productive philosophical interest generally took precedence of the 
 literary and antiquarian ; it is quite conceivable that among Plato's remains, as also in 
 book-collections belonging to Platonists, were included copies of the dialogical writings 
 of Plato's disciples — which, from all the indications, we must suppose to have been very 
 numerous — some of them without precise indications as to their authorship, and that this 
 gave occasion, earlier or later, to errors, and even to imposture. The supposition that a 
 complete collection of the genuine writings of Plato was in the possession of the School, and 
 that this served as the norma for the Platonic canon, would prove too much, since from it 
 would follow the genuineness of the entire collection transmitted ; but surely the genuine- 
 ness of all the contents of that collection can not be satisfactorily defended, as, e. ^., that 
 of Minos and the Epistles, which are certainly spurious, yet belong to the writings con- 
 sidered genuine by Aristophanes of Byzantium.) Grote assumes, further, that all the 
 dialogues of Plato and those of the other companions of Socrates were composed after the 
 death of Socrates ; he supports this altogether reasonable opinion with the most cogent 
 arguments. Grote rejects the hypothesis of Schleiermacher and Munk, of a didactic or 
 artistic plan comprehending, with few exceptions, all the dialogues; he denies all 
 " peremptory and intentional sequence or interdependence;" each dialogue, he argues, is 
 the product of the "state of Plato's mind at the time when it was composed;" in the com- 
 position of the dialogues of research or inquiry, it is not necessary to suppose that Plato 
 was already in possession of the solutions contained in the constructive dialogues ; the 
 disturbing of prejudices and pointing out of difficulties has in itself a very great worth ; 
 "the dialogues of research present an end in themselves." Here Grote seems to go too 
 far. That, for example, in the Protagoras, the Platonic Socrates hypothetically develops 
 opinions which were not held by Plato himself, and that this is intimated by Plato by the 
 early age at which he brings forward Socrates in the dialogue named — thereby suggesting 
 a more advanced and mature stadium in Socrates' life, to be set forth in other dialogues — 
 all this would have to be admitted, even though Schleiermacher's and Munk's view of an 
 artistic and didactic plan underlying all the dialogues, were justly rejected. Grote does 
 not believe that the chronological sequence of most of the dialogues can be determined; 
 he considers them in his work in the following order : Apologia (early, and essentially 
 faithful), Crito, Euthyphron, Ale. I. and II., Hippias Major and Minor, Hipparchus, Minos, 
 Theages, Erastae, Ion, Laches, Charmides, Lysis, Euthydemus, Meno, Protagoras, Gorgias, 
 Phaedo, Phaedrus, Symposion, Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophistes, Politicus, Cratylus, 
 Philebus, Menexenus, Clitopho (which Grote defends as genuine, but fragmentary, and 
 first made public after Plato's death), Rep., Tim., and Critias, Leges, and Epinomis. 
 Grote's work is rich in suggestion and instruction ; the author of the " History of Greece " 
 maintains here his masterly superiority in historical presentation, but his acceptance as 
 genuine of all the dialogues accredited by ThrasyUus has caused him to lose sight of th«
 
 Plato's wkitings. Ill 
 
 essential unity present in Plato's thought and works, and to admit in its stead a multi- 
 fariousness abounding in change and contradiction. 
 
 Schaarschmidt's investigations relate chiefly to the question of the genuineness or spu- 
 riousness of Plato's works, and incidentally only to that of their chronological order. The 
 result he arrives at is, that the authenticity of the following dialogues only is fully assured : 
 Phaedrus, Protagoras, Banquet, Gorgias, Republic, and Timaeus, Theaetetus, Phaedo, Laws. 
 In Plato's genuine works he sees dramatic dialogues, which are not intended to instruct 
 the reader in the solution of the fundamental questions of philosophy themselves, but 
 rather from the stand-point of the writer's own experience, to impress in a living, impres- 
 sive manner on the heart of the reader that the dialectical labor necessary to the solution 
 of those questions is the moral concern and duty of every man, and to offer, in the exam- 
 ple of the most remarkable investigator of ideas, samples of the art by which one elevates 
 himself into the ideal region and in its light contemplates the essence of the soul, the best 
 form of the state, or even of the cosmos, as the expression of the most perfect harmony. 
 The Socratic dialogue, which with Xenophon and other followers of Socrates served to 
 recall their late master's discussions concerning ideas, was elevated by Plato, who used the 
 greatest liberty in modifying its content as well as its shape, to a philosophical drama, in 
 which Socrates and his collocutors acquire a typical character as representatives of various 
 intellectual tendencies and ethical states. 
 
 In all the dialogues of Plato, Socrates appears to such a degree and in such a manner 
 idealized, that it is impossible to suppose any of them to have been composed before that 
 event of Socrates' death, which transfigured the image of Socrates in the mind of Plato. 
 The Apology appears to have been written at an early period by Plato, and to present not 
 merely the sense and spirit, but nearly the very words of Socrates's defense (as Schleier- 
 macher assumes). Setting aside this dialogue (and the Crito?), the ideal picture of 
 Socrates, as presented in those dialogues, in which Plato represents him as a man not 
 yet advanced in years, approaches nearest to his historical figure. This is true without 
 exception, if we set aside as spurious the dialogue Parmenides, which treats of the ideas, 
 and the One (ev), which can neither be nor not be. The time of the action of this 
 dialogue is about 450, and in it the early training of Socrates is depicted unhistorically, 
 with a certain idealization, as in Phaedo, p. 95 e, seq., not conformable to the tendency, 
 early characteristic of Socrates, to "examine" subjects dialectically and in their ethical 
 bearings, nor in a manner which accords with the Protagoras and the other dialogues, 
 but with a mixture of later ideas, and such as wore foreign to Socrates. The unjustified 
 reproach is here directed against Socrates, that he had in earlier life assumed the ex- 
 istence of ideas, for the purposes of preparatory dialectical exercises (conducted in the 
 method of two-sided discussions respecting particular conceptions). Socrates appears as a 
 man of middle age, probably not yet forty years old, and forcing the recognition of his 
 mastership in pliilosophy, in discussions with Protagoras, who was by many years his 
 senior (and incidentally also with Hippias and Prodicus), in the artistically very finished 
 dialogue Protagoras. The date of this dialogue must be regarded as about 432 b. c, 
 although it contains portions pointing anachronistically to a later period. It was certainly 
 composed after the death of Socrates, and perhaps later than the Phaedrus. In the dia- 
 logue Protagoras the relation of virtue to knowledge, the unity or plurality of the virtues, 
 and the cultivation of virtue are made subjects of investigation, and the conceit of the 
 Sophists, in presuming to be wise and to make others wise, is annihilated by the e^iraaic 
 of Socrates, whose dialectic is based on an earnest striving after truth and morality. A 
 dialogue more peculiarly Platonic in content and form is the (Jorgias (on the questions: 
 What is rhetoric ? conversation between Socrates and Gorgias, cc. 2-1 5 ; What worth
 
 112 Plato's writings. 
 
 and what real power does rhetoric possess ? conversation between Socrates and Tolas, cc 
 16-36; Is the proper business of hfe pohtical rhetoric or philosophy? conversation 
 between Socrates and Callicles, cc. 57-83 ; the whole is at the same time a justification by 
 Plato of himself in adopting the philosopher's vocation). The time at which Plato would 
 represent the conversations as being held, is probably 427 B. c, though anachronistic 
 reference is made in them to events of a later date. In these dialogues, as also in the 
 following, whose authenticity in part is not fully certified, Laches (on Courage), Lysia 
 (on Friendship), Charmides (on Temperance), Euthyphro (on Piety), Hippias Minor (on 
 Willful Wrong-doing), and in others, which are of very doubtful authenticity or are 
 decidedly spurious, the specifically Platonic theory of ideas is contained only by implication, 
 but not formally developed and established. This may be explained by supposing that 
 Plato in these dialogues intentionally confined himself to mere suggestions or intimations, 
 being guided in this by the didactic principle of a gradual exposition of his doctrines. Or, 
 it may be explained by the hypothesis, that Plato had himself not yet arrived at the theory 
 of ideas in its developed form (according to the principle of gradual development assumed 
 by K. P. Hermann) ; but the circumstance that Plato in the Protagoras and also in Gor- 
 gias (and Laches, etc.) introduces Socrates as a man still in middle age, is decidedly favor- 
 able to the first supposition. The theory of ideas, with all the theoretical positions 
 which it involves, is first expressly set forth in the Phaedrus and the Convivium, though 
 in mythical form — not in the form of dialectical development. The dialogue Phaedrus 
 criticises ostentatious eloquence (that of Lysias in particular) from the stand-point of 
 philosophy, and the false art of instruction and education from the stand-point of that 
 art which is true. It does this first by the collocation of discourses concerning love, 
 the first Lysianic, the second in form only, and the third in both form and tendency, 
 Platonic and Socratic, and then by a general consideration, founded on these examples, 
 of the rhetorical and the philosophical or dialectical methods. But the examples, in 
 respect of their suVijects, are not arbitrarily chosen. They treat directly of the true end 
 of life and of the way which conducts to it, love, taken in the philosophical sense, being 
 here represented as the united striving of souls to reach the goal of philosophy, i. e., the 
 knowledge of ideas, and to attain to that practical conduct of life which corresponds with 
 such knowledge; while an unphilosophical rhetoric is portrayed as pursuing ends alto- 
 gether inferior. The Phaedrus is also a justification of Plato's doctrinal activity as a 
 teacher. In it, philosophical authorship is represented as secondary to, and dependent 
 upon oral schooling in dialectic. It is held that the former should follow the latter 
 only as vTrdfivriccg, and is nothing but a -KayKokn TraiSid, a kind of philosophical poesy 
 (cf. Bep., p. 602), not to be compared with the serious earnestness of a life devoted, 
 in common with others, to inquiry and to the work of education (a declaration, which, 
 although its immediate occasion was Plato's poetical imitation of the Socratic dialectic, 
 none the less implies beyond a doubt the existence already of a circle of companions of 
 like mind with Plato, and also a circle of scholars and co-investigators, who recognized 
 Plato as their leader). The Convivium contains a series of discourses respecting love, 
 which set forth the various conceptions of the same, ending with the highest philosophical 
 conception of love, as maintained by Socrates, and all in the form of encomia addressed to 
 Eros. At last Alcibiades steps in, extolling Socrates as one who, in liis relations with 
 himself, had exemplified the genuine, pedagogical love in a manner fully commensurate 
 with the requirement of philosophy. The Convivium was composed 385-384, or at least 
 not earlier (as appears from an historical allusion contained in it) ; the action falls in the 
 year 417. The relation of this dialogue to the Symposion of Xenophon is discussed on 
 the one side by K. P. Hermann {Frogr., Marb. 1841 ; Gott. 1844-45), who considers the
 
 PLATo'rf WRITINGS. 113 
 
 Platonic composition tlio earlier; on the other, by A. Hug (in the Philol, YII. 1852, p. 638 
 seq., to which Hermann responds, ibid., Vol. VHL), G. Ferd. Rettig {Progr., Berne, 1864), 
 and Boeckh (De simultate, quarn Plato cum Xenvphonte exercuisse fertur, Berlin, 1811, and in 
 V. Raumer's Antiqitar. Briefe, Leipsic, 1851, p. 40 seq.). The Phaedrus appears to have 
 been written not long before the Banquet ; the time of the action in Plato's intention may- 
 be perhaps most surely determined from the circumstance that Isocratcs (born 435) is 
 named in it as a young beginner, of whom great expectations might justly be entertained; 
 with this is to be joined the fact that Lysias, who is represented as living at Athens, is 
 known from otlier sources to liave returned thither from Lower Italy in the year 411; 
 yet it is uncertain whether Plato knew and took into consideration this time of the return 
 of Lysias, of which he nowhere makes mention himself. According to Diog. L., HI. 33, 
 the Phaedrus was Plato's earliest composition ; yet this statement, though possibly correct, 
 is not sufficiently well authenticated. The date of the composition of the Phaedrus falls 
 undoubtedly within the years 396-384 B. c, according to the present state of investiga- 
 tions ; but nearly all the data on which are founded the various attempts at a more exact 
 determination of it are very uncertain. In case Plato made this dialogue first public on his 
 return after long journeys, and wrote the Protagoras, as also the Gorgias, at a later period, 
 it would seem beyond doubt that in these latter dialogues, which are tilled with elementary 
 inquiries in the field of dialectic and ethics, Plato consciously and with artistic intention 
 represented the age of Socrates as such, that notwithstanding their possibly later compo- 
 sition, they could be used as preparatory for the development of ideas contained in the 
 Phaedrus — each of the dialogues, of course, being considered in its relation to the ideal 
 picture of the Platonic Socrates, as presented by all the dialogues taken together. 
 
 In a letter addressed to me, and which its author has kindly permitted me to publish, 
 Susemild expresses his belief that the date of the composition of the Phaedrus may be 
 fixed at 389 or 388. He reasons as follows: "Isocrates must have been at that time a 
 well-known author and perhaps also already a teacher of eloquence; but up to 392 he 
 neither engaged in giving instruction as such a teacher, nor in any other occupation except 
 the composition of judicial discourses, a work which he afterward entirely discontinued; 
 and since the criticism of Lysias in the Phaedrus turns on one of the ostentatious discourses 
 of that orator, it is hardly possible not to suppose that the Isocrates who is contrasted 
 with him, had already begun to compose such discourses, when the dialogue was written. 
 Now the oldest of these, the Encomium of Busiris, seems to date from 390-389. On the 
 other hand, it is difficult to suppose tliat long after 390 or 389 Plato should not have be- 
 come so undeceived respecting the character and merits of Isocratcs, as to render it impos- 
 sil)le for him still to express himself respecting him in such terms as those here employed 
 by him. Spengel, indeed (Isokr. und PL, p. 15 seq.; 347 seq.), thinks tliat when Isocrates 
 composed his work against the Sophists, which is beyond question to be considered as a 
 sort of inaugural programme of his course as an instructor, he can have been at the most 
 not more than forty years old, since he says in Aniid., § 193, that he wrote this work 
 vnuTepog and aa/idCuv, but it is to be noticed, 1) that he there judges himself (§ 9) 
 TT/jeffTTiTf/wf only at the age of eighty-two years; 2) tliat if Isocrates opened his school 
 at Athens as earlj^ as 496, he must at tlie same time have been writing judicial discourses 
 during a period of at least two years, which contradicts the express testimony of Aristotle, 
 in Cic, Brutus, 12, 48 {Fragm., 119, Rose)." 
 
 Of very uncertain authenticity are the Hippias Major (On the Beautiful), lo (Concerning 
 
 Inspiration and Retlection), Mono (Can Virtue be Taught?), and Menexcnus (a ?.o}o? t~<- 
 
 ' rd^wf on fallen Athenians with Socrates as the speaker). It is possible that Plato early 
 
 commenced writing on the dialogue on justice, which he afterward enlarged into the work 
 
 8
 
 114 Plato's wbitiicgs. 
 
 respecting justice in the life of the individual and in the state (The State, Politeia, Res- 
 publica). This work was followed by the Timaeus (containing Plato's natural philosophy, 
 with Tima3us the Pythagorean as spokesman) and Critias (a fragment of an unfinished 
 work, containing an imaginary political story of the primitive times) ; the time of these 
 dialogues falls in the year 409 b. c. The Phaedo, which presents the dying Socrates 
 demonstrating the immortality of the soul, seems to have been commenced later than 
 the Timaeus and to close up the Cyclus, by showing how the noblest and the abiding 
 good for the immortal soul consists in philosophical knowledge and in action founded 
 on such knowledge (somewhat as in the Banquet, where Plato advances from the 
 praise of Eros to that of the person of the true Erotic). To the dialogues of late com- 
 position, the Theaetetus (which stands in the closest relation to Rep.^ Y. 474 seq., and 
 Tim., p. 51) seems to belong. In this dialogue Plato shows how knowledge {hTriaryfnj) 
 differs from sense-perception (aladfjaig, ch. 8-30), and from correct judgment or opinion 
 (66^a aTiTjOr/q, chs. 31-38). The definition of inLaTTjixT] as 66^a a7^T]df]g fisra /.dyov (ch. 39 
 seq.), he finds unsatisfactory on account of the ambiguity of the term ^Myog. He thus 
 indirectly props up the theory of ideas by maintaining that the dilTerence between knowl- 
 edge on the one hand, and sensuous perception and opinion on the other, is founded 
 on a difference between the objects of knowledge and those of sensation and opinion 
 (hence on the difference between the ideas and the individual objects existing in time and 
 space). Of uncertain, yet extremely probable authenticity is the dialogue analogous in 
 character to the Theaetetus, entitled Cratylus (~£pi opdorr/rog uvn^mTuv. Wliether the 
 names of things belong to them (piaei, by natural adaptation, or are given to them 
 arbitrarily and by common consent) ; see, on the one hand, Schaarschmidt, Ueber die 
 Unechtlieit des Dialogs Kratylos, in the Rhein. Mus., N. S., XX. 1865, pp. 321-356; and his 
 work : Die Sammlung, etc., p. 245 seq. ; on the other hand, Alberti, in the Rhein. Mus., XXI., 
 186G, pp. 180-209; and in the Gbtt. Gel. Anz., 1867, pp. 721-758; and especially Benfey 
 in the Nachrichten von der Kgl. Ges. d. Wiss. zu Gottingen, No. 8, March 7, 18G6: "■ Auszug 
 einer Ahhandlung iiher die Aufgahe des Flaton. Dialogs Kratylios" or the work itself, which 
 has since been published at Gottingen, 1866; also Lehrs, in the Rhin. Mus., N. S., XXII. 
 1367, pp. 436-440. It is also questionable whether Plato himself, or, what would appear 
 more probable, an early Platonist composed the Euthydemus, a dialogue richly spiced with 
 pleasantry, and the subject of which Bonitz (Platon. Studien, Heft 2, Vienna, 1860, p. 32 seq.) 
 happily describes as follows: "The vocation of philosophy, as the true educatrix of youth, 
 is defended and justified in opposition to the seeming wisdom which seeks to take its place, 
 in a contest in which each is brought forward in its own defense." Schaarschmidt at- 
 tempts to demonstrate its spuriousness (in his work above cited, pp. 326-342). The Philebus, 
 treating of the Good, is one of the latest compositions of Plato ; in it we perceive already 
 sometliing of the Pytliagorizing manner, toward which Plato inclined in his later years, 
 and which prevailed still more among the first Academics. The Sophistes (on the Sophist 
 and the field of his knowledge, the Non-Existent) and the Politicus (the Statesman and 
 the field of his knowledge and action) were composed, in all probability, not by Plato, but 
 by one of his scholars (see Schaarschmidt, Rhein. Mus., N". S., XVIII. pp. 1-28, and XIX. 
 pp. 63-96, 1862 and '63 : yet cf. Hayduck, Ueber die Echtheit des Soph, und Pol, I. {Greifsw. 
 Gymn.-Frogr), 1864, and Ed. Alberti, Rhein. Mus., 1866, No. 2, p. 130 seq. ; and on the other 
 side again, Schaarschmidt, Die Sammlung, etc., pp. 181-245). The dialogues Sophistes 
 and Politicus are formally connected with the Theaetetus of Plato, as constituting with it 
 one whole. They purport to furnish that continuation of the inquiry begun in the 
 Theaetetus, which was declared necessary at the end of this dialogue, and in which the 
 subject of Ideas was to be more especially treated of. But their relation to the Theaetetus
 
 Plato's dialectic. 115 
 
 Is only superficial, and the continuation alluded to was furnished rather in the investiga- 
 tions conducted by Plato in the midst of his disciples and in the teachings he then and 
 there communicated to them, the so-called aypacpa ddyfiara. The last work of Plato, made 
 public, according to ancient accounts, by one of his disciples, Philip the Opuntian, from 
 Plato's rough draught, is the Leges (Concerning the second-best state). By the guest from 
 Athens, who leads in the conversation, Plato seems to have intended himself. 
 
 Adhuc sub judice lis est. The immediate problem is now the exact investigation of the 
 composition of the dialogues taken singly, as introductory to which work, besides Schleier- 
 macher's Introductions and the works of Brandis, Steinhart, Susemihl, and others, such 
 essays as Trendelenburg's De Plat. Philehi consilio (Berlin, 1837), and Bonitz's Platonische 
 Studien (Vienna, 1858-60), may be profitably consulted. 
 
 § 41. The division of philosophy into Ethics, Physics, and Dia- 
 lectic, though not expressly enunciated by Plato, was practically 
 involved in his treatment of the different classes of philosophical 
 problems in different dialogues, and may be made the basis of an 
 exposition of his doctrine. We begin with the Dialectic of Plato. 
 
 The Platonic philosophy centers in the Theory of Ideas. The 
 Platonic Idea (ISta or eldog) is the pure, archetypal essence, in which 
 those things which are together subsumed under the same concept, 
 participate, ^sthetically and ethically, it is the perfect in its kind, 
 to which the given reality remains perpetually inferior. Logically 
 and ontologically considered, it is the object of the concept. As the 
 objects of the outer world are severally known through coiTesponding 
 mental representations, so the idea is known through the concept. 
 The Idea is not the essence immanent in the various similar individual 
 objects, as such, but rather this essence conceived as perfect in its 
 kind, immutable, unique, and independent, or existing jye?' se. The 
 idea respects the universal ; but it is also represented by Plato as a 
 spaceless and timeless archetype of individuals. The more Plato in 
 his speculation and in his language gives place to his fancy, so much 
 the more does he individualize his Ideas; the more he confines 
 himself to pure cogitation, so much the more does he approach the 
 apprehension of the idea under the form of imiversality. Let the 
 individuals M'hich share in the same essence or belong to the same 
 class, be conceived as freed from the limits of space and time, from 
 materiality and individual deficiency, and so reduced to a unity, 
 which is the ground of their existence, and this unity (objective and 
 real, not merely thought by us through abstraction) will be the Pla- 
 tonic idea. 
 
 To express the relation of individuals to their corresponding ideas,
 
 116 Plato's dialectic. 
 
 Plato employs the term " participation " {pitdeHg), and also " imita- 
 tion" {fiifiTjotg, dfioLU)ocg). The idea is the archetype {-rrapadecyixa)^ indi- 
 vidual objects are images (eMwAa, bfioLMfiaTo) ; the idea, though existing 
 independently {avrd Ka-d" avro)^ has also a certain community {Koiviovia) 
 with things ; it is in some sense present {napovata) in them ; but the 
 specific nature of this community Plato has neglected more precisely 
 to define. 
 
 The attribution to the ideas of independent, singular existence, 
 or the hypostatizing of the ideas, implied a certain separation of them 
 from individual things. Thus understood, the doctrine was described 
 and combated by Aristotle as a ;t;wpi^£tv (separation of the ideal 
 from the real). This view of the ideas seems to have grown upon 
 Plato, so that at last we find him considering the ideas (and espe- 
 cially the highest among them, the idea of the Good) as eflScient 
 causes, which impart to individuals their existence and essence. 
 Plato calls them figuratively (in the Timaeus) Gods, and appears, in 
 speaking of the World-Builder (the Demiurges), who shapes all 
 things for good, to intend the idea of the Good. The (unconsciously 
 mythical) personification of the ideas became complete in the asser- 
 tion, that movement, life, animation, and reason belonged to them ; 
 yet this doctrine (enounced in the dialogue Sophistes) can scarcely 
 have been that of Plato himself, who held fast to the immutability 
 of the ideas, but only of a portion of his disciples. 
 
 A plurality of ideas is assumed by Plato, corresponding with the 
 plurality of concepts. All the relations which subsist between con- 
 cepts find, according to Plato, their analoga in the relations of the 
 ideas to each other. The higher or more general concept is related 
 to the lower or less general ones ranged under it, as each of the latter 
 is to the individual notions which it includes ; accordingly, in Plato's 
 view, that idea which is the object of the higher concept, is so related 
 to tliose ideas, which are the objects of the lower concepts, as is each 
 of these ideas to the group of individual objects corresponding to it. 
 
 The highest idea is the Idea of the Good. As the cause of being 
 and cognition, it is as the sun in the kingdom of ideas. Plato 
 appears to identify it with the supreme Deity, That the idea of the 
 good, and not that of Being, should be conceived as the highest, is in 
 consonance with the ethical character of the doctrine of ideas, accord- 
 ing to which the idea is the perfect in its kind; and it is not in 
 conflict with the logical and ontological purport of that doctrine,
 
 Plato's dialectic. 117 
 
 becanee the good may be considered as an idea quite as universal as 
 being, since every thing, in so far as it is truly existent, is also neces- 
 sarily good. 
 
 As mathematical cognition holds a middle place between philo- 
 sophical and sensible cognition, so mathematical objects form a mean 
 between sensuous things and ideas. 
 
 The method of cognition by which the ideas are apprehended, is 
 Dialectic, which proceeds in a twofold direction, rising first to the 
 universal and then returning from the universal to the particular. 
 A forerunner of dialectical cognition, and, in the event of the latter 
 being unattainable, its substitute, is the mythical method in treating 
 of the ideas. 
 
 The work of drawing up a complete system of the ideas was not 
 accomplished by Plato. As a step in this direction, however, we 
 may regard the reduction of the ideas to numbers, which Plato 
 undertook in his old age, after having originally developed the theory 
 of ideas apart from all consideration of the relations of numbers. 
 Such also was the stoicheiology connected with this reduction, or the 
 doctrine of the singular or limiting element, of the undetermined 
 element determinable bv the former, and of the third element result- 
 ing from the mixture of the first two, — the three constituting the 
 elements of all that exists. 
 
 On the System of Plato in general, cf., in addition to the above-cited works of Tennemann and K. F. 
 Hermann and the histories of Ritter, Brandis, and Zoller, the following:: Phil. Guil. van Heiisde, 7«ii«<« 
 Philosaphioe Platonicae, Utrecht, 1827-36; ed. IL, Leyden, 1S42; C. Beck, Plato's PhilonophU im 
 Aln-igs ihrer geneiutch^n Eyitwichehmg, Stuttgart. 1S53; A. Arnold, SysUm der PlaionUscJun Philo- 
 itophie als EinMtung in das Studium dee Plato tmd d*r Philosophic ilberhanpt, Erfurt. 1S58. (Forms 
 the third part of Plat. fVerke, einseln erkldrt und in ihrem Zusammenhange dargestellt, Erfurt, 
 1886 seq.) 
 
 On the whole Platonic philosophy in its relations to Judaism and Christianity, see Car. Frid. Staudlin, 
 De philoHophiae Platonicae cum doctrina religionis Judaica et Christiana cognatione, Gott. 1S19; C. 
 Ackermann, £>as Christliclie in Plato wid in, der Platonischen Philosophic, Hamburg, 1835 [translated by 
 8. K. .\8bury : 77te Christian Element in Plato, Edinbnrirh, 1861.— Tr.] ; Ferd. Christ. Baur, Das CliristUche 
 des Platonismus o<ler Sokrates und Ckristus, in the Ztschr. fwr Theol, 1S37, No. 8, pp. 1-154, and seja- 
 rately, Tiib. 1837. (Baur shows how the practicable elements in the Platonic ideal state wore realized by 
 the Christian church, which result he attributes to the inner relationship of the two, as each recognizing the 
 Bubstantiality of the ideal ; but Platonism, he adds, was wanting in the sense of the unity of the divine and 
 the human, in positive or substantial import, and in a recognition of the phenomena of subjective con- 
 sciousness. Baur'8 conception of "substantiality," however, wavers between that of unconsciousness [the 
 ancient conception] and transcendence [a more modern one]. It may well be asked, whether more of 
 " unity" is not visible in Plato's dialectic than in the dogmas of the church ?) A. Neander. Wiss. Abhanu- 
 Iwigen, ed. by J. L. Jacobi. Berlin, 1851, p. 169 seq. ; J. DoUinger, Ileid^nthmn nnd Judenthum. Eegensbnrg, 
 1857, p. 295 seq. ; R. Ehlers. De vi ao potestate, quam philosojikia aniigua, imprimis Platonica et Stoica, 
 in doctr. apologetarum saec II. hahuerit, Gott, 1859: F. Michelis, Die Philosophic Plato's in ihrtr 
 innem Beziehwig zur geqffenbarten Wahrheit, Munster, 1859-60 ; Deitrich Becker. Das philos. System 
 PlaMs in se/iner Beziehimg cum cAristlidien Dogma, Freiburg, 1862; Heinr. von Stein, Sieben SHchei 
 eur GescAichie des Platonismus, Parts I. and IL, Gott., 1862-&1 ; Alfred Fonill6e, La philosophic d^e
 
 118 Plato's dialectic. 
 
 Platan : £ippomtion, histoire et critique de la thiorie des ideeg (Ouvrage oouronni par FAcad. de« 
 Sciences Morales et Politiqices), Paris, 1S69. (Cf. the literature to § 48.) 
 
 Among the earlier monographs on Plato's theory of ideas may be mentioned those of Jak. Brucker 
 (1748), Qottlob Ernst Schulze (1TS6), Friedrich Victor Leberecht Plessing, Joh. Friedr. Dammann, Th. 
 Fahse (1795) ; among the more recent, those of Joh. Friedr. Herbart (De Platonici SystemuUs Fwndamento 
 Gott., 1805, reproduced in Vol. I. of Herbart's Kl. Schr., 1S42, p. 67 seq , and in Vol. XII. of his Compl. Works 
 1S52, p. 61 seq. ; cf Boeck h, t/ejiacr LU.-Zeitung, 1808, No. 224.), Christ. Aug. Brandis {Diatribe Acudemica 
 de perditis Aristotelis libris de Ideis et de Bcmo, Bonn, 1823), Ad. Trendelenburg {Platonis de Idein et Nu- 
 meris doctrina ex ArUtotele illtMtrata, Leips. 1826), 11. Richter (De Id. PI., Leips. 1827), Ludolf Wien- 
 borg (De priviitivo id. PI. senm, Altona, 1829), K. F. Hermann (Marb. Leet.-Kat, 1832-1833 and 1839), 
 Herm. Bonitz (Di»p. PlaUmicae duae: De Idea Boni ; De Animae Mwndanae apud Plat. Elementis, 
 Dresden, 1837), Zeller (Ueber die Aristot. Darstellung der Platan. Philmophie, in Z.'s Plat. Studien, Tab. 
 1839, pp. 197-800), Franz Ebbeu (De PI. id. doctrina, Bonn, 1849), J. F. Nourrisson (Quid PI. de ideis sen- 
 serit, Paris, 1852, Expos, de la theorie platonicienne des idees, Paris, 1858), Graser (Torgau, 1861), S. Rib- 
 bing (see above, § 40), Th. Maguire (An. Essay an the Platonic Idea, London, 1866), Herm. Cohen (Die 
 2>lat. Ideenlehre, psychologisch entuickelt, in the '■'■ Zeit^chr: fur Vblkerp.sychologie wnd Spruchu-iss,^'' ei\. 
 by M. Lazarus and H. Steinthal, Vol. IV., Berlin, 1866, pp. 403-464); cf Max Schneidewin's Disqwrn'^iorMtwi 
 ph Has. de Platonis Theateti parte priori specimen (Inaug.-Diss.), Gottingen, 1865, and other opuscules 
 by the same author on the Theaetetus, Soph., Parm., etc., and Ad. Trendelenburg's Das Ebenmaass, ein 
 Band der Vei-wa-rulUchaft Zirischen der griechischen Archaeologie vnd Philosophie, Berlin, 1865. (The 
 rising of the idea above the phenomenal — which is in conformity with the tendency of nature herself — is 
 illustrated by Trendelenburg by an example from the plastic art of the Greeks, where the facial angle of 
 Camper exceeds, in its approach to a right angle, the limits actually observed in nature; in this sense, 
 says T., the idea is "the fundamental form or type, elevated above the mutation of phenomena, the arche- 
 type, toward which all things tend.") 
 
 On the mathematical passages in Plato's writings, Theodorus of Soli (Plutarch, De Def. Orac, ch. 82) 
 and Thco. of Smyrna (tCiv Kara fi.a.6rii/LaTiKr)v ^pJic^'V"" *'S 'rij" Tou nKaroivo^ avayvuiaiv) in ancient times, 
 and in modern times Mollweide (Gott. 1805, and Leipsic, 1813), C. E. Chr. Schneider (De J^umero Plat., 
 Breslau, 1822), J. J. Fries (PVs Zahl [Pep., 540], Heidelberg, 1823), C. F. Wex (De loco mathem. in 
 Platanis 3Ienone, Halle, 1825), Joh. Wolfg. Miiller (Commentar Uber zioei Stellen in PL's Meno u. 
 TVieaet., Nuremberg, 1797; Priifung der con Wexi versucliten Erkl., ibid. 1826), C. F. Hermann (Da 
 Nuinero Platonis, Marburg, 1838), E. F. August (Berlin, 1829 and 1844), and others, have written ; Adolph 
 Benecke appears to have given the correct explanation of the geometrical hypothesis advanced in the 3Ienn^ 
 in the Progr. des Elhinger Gymn., 1867. His merits in respect of the advancement of mathematics have 
 been discussed (though, for the most part, without sufficiently critical investigation) by the historians of 
 mathematics, especially by Montucla, Bossut, Chasles, Arneth, and in the monograph by C. Blass, De Plat, 
 matheinatico (Diss.-Inaug.), Bonn, 1861 ; cf also Finger, De priinardim geoinetriae apud Graecos, Heidel- 
 berg, 1S31, and Bretschneider, in his work on the Geometry of Euclid. Leipsic, 1870. 
 
 Of the Platonic Dialectic treat : Joh. Jac. Engel, Versuch einer Methode, die Vernunftlehre atis PI. Dia- 
 logen sn entwickeln, Berlin, 1780 ; Joh. Jac. Heinr. Nast, De meth. PL philos. docendi dialogicae, Stuttgard, 
 1787 ; Analysis logica dial. PI. qui inscr. Meno, ibid., 1792-93 ; Jac. Borellus, De methodo Socr. docendi 
 exempio e dial. Plat, qui inscr. Euthyphro illustrata, Upsala, 1798; Fr. Hoffmann, Die Dialektik PL's. 
 Munich, 1832; Karl Kiesel, in Gymn. Programmes, Cologne, 1840, Diisseldorf 1851 and 1863; Th. Wilh. 
 Danzel (Hamburg, 1841, and Leipsic, 1845), K. Kuhn (Berlin, 1843), K. Gunther (in the Philologus. V. 1850, 
 p. 36 seq.), Kuno Fischer, De Parm. Plat., Stuttg., 1851 ; Karl Eichlioff, Logica triwn dial. PI. eaplic. 
 (Meno, Crito, Phaedo), G.-Pr., Duisburg, 1854; Ed. Alberti, Zur Dial, des PL, vom Theaet. bis sum Parm., 
 Leips. 1856 (from Suppl., Vol. I., to the N. Jahrb. /. Phil. u. Pad.); H. Druon, An fuerit interna s. eso- 
 terica PL doctr., Paris, 1860; Hiilzer, GnondzUge der Erkenntnisslehre in Plato's Staat. (G.-Pr.), Cottbus, 
 1861 ; C. Martinius. Ueber die Fragefttellung in den Dialogen Plato's, in the Zeitschr. /. d. Gymn.- Wesen, 
 Berlin, 1S66, pp. 97-119 and 497-516; Rud. Alex. Reinhold Kleinpaul, Der Begr. der Erk. in PL's Theaet. 
 (Diss.- Lips.), Gotha, 1SC7; Josef Steger, Plat. Studien, I., Innsbruck, 1869 ; W. Weicker, Amor Platottieus et 
 disserendi ratio Socratica qua necessitudine inter sese conti7ieant7ir (G.-Pr.), Zwickau, 1869; Karl Uphues. 
 ZHe phihs. Untersxichungen des PL Soph. u. Parm. (Dissert), Miinster, 1869; Elem. der Platan Ph. auf 
 Grund des Soph. u. mit Riicksicht axifdie Scholastik, Soest, 1870. 
 
 On the use of myths by Plato, cf C. Crome (Gymn.- Progr., Dtlsseldorf, 1S35), Alb. Jahn (Berne, 1839), 
 Schwanitz (Leips., 1S52, Jena, 1863, Frankf-on-theM., 1!<64), Jul. Denschle (Hanau. 1854), Hahn (Die pdda- 
 gogischen Mythen Plato's, G.-Pr., Parchim, 1860), A. Fischer (Diss. Inaug., Konigsberg, 1865). 
 
 On Plato's philosophy of language, cf Friedr. Michelis (De enundatianis natura diss., Bonn, 1849), 
 Jul. Deuschle (Marburg, 1352), Charles Lenormant (Sur le Cratyle de PL, Athens, 1861) ; cf. Ed. Alberti 
 Die Sprachpkilosophie vor Plato, in Philol., XI. GotL 1856, pp. 681-705.
 
 PLATO'S DIALECTIC. 119 
 
 The division of philosophy into Ethics, Physics, and Dialectic (ascribed to Plato by Cic, 
 Acad. Post, I. 5, 19) was first formally propounded (according to Sext. Emp., Adv. Math., 
 VII. 16) by Xenocrates, the pupil of Plato; but Plato, as Sextus correctly says, was poten- 
 tially its originator {6wd/iei apxnyog). Several of Plato's dialogues were devoted to ethics 
 (from the Protag. to the Rtp.), one {Timaeus) was devoted especially to physics, and one 
 {Theaeteius, with which Cratylus, on Language, and some other dialogues belong, if genu- 
 ine) to the theory of cognition ; these dialogues were supplemented by oral lectures on 
 the ideas and their elements (aroixsia), in which were communicated the " unwritten 
 doctrines," which were taken down by Aristotle, Hermodorus, and others, and were prob- 
 ably used by the author of the Soph, and the Pol. 
 
 Of the genesis of the theory of ideas we find an account in Arist., Met., I. 6 and 9 (cf. 
 XIII. 4 seq.). Aristotle describes this theory as the joint product of the Heraclitean doctrine 
 of the constant flux of things and of the Socratic fondness for definition. The doctrine, 
 says Aristotle, that the sensuous is subject to perpetual change, was derived by Plato 
 from Cratylus the Heraclitean, and was ever afterward maintained liy him. Accordingly, 
 when Plato liad learned through Socrates of conceptions which, when once rightly defined, 
 remain ever invariable, he believed that their counterparts must not be sought in the sen- 
 suous world, but that there must be other existences which were the objects of conceptual 
 cognition, and these objects he named ideas. The reduction of these ideas to (ideal) num- 
 bers is spoken of in Met., XIII. 4, as a later modification of the original doctrine. — Aristotle 
 here gives to the logical and metaphysical side of the theory of ideas a prominence which 
 belongs equally to the no less essential ethical and aestlietic side ; in this he was imdoubt- 
 edly influenced by the prevalent shape assumed by the theorj^ in the later phases of its 
 development, in which the idea of that perfection, which transcends all experience, became 
 gradually superseded by the idea of universality — so, already, in connection with the idea 
 of table, in Bej)., X. 596. 
 
 In the Phaedrus of Plato the doctrine of ideas is presented symbolically, and yet in 
 such form tliat the author of the dialogue must unquestionabl}^ have been already in pos- 
 session of the theory in its logical form, although reserving its scientific presentation and 
 demonstration for later dialogues. According to the myth in the Pliaedrus (p. 247 seq.), 
 the pure essences, or the ideas, sit enthroned in a place beyond the vault of heaven — in 
 particular the ideas of justice, temperance, science, etc. They are colorless, without figure, 
 imperceptible by any sense, and accessible only to the contemplative view of the reason 
 (vot'f). Plato portrays the process by which one rises to the knowledge of the ideas as an 
 upward journey of the soul to the super-celestial region. In the Conviv. (p. 211 seq.) Plato 
 defines the idea of the beautiful in opposition to individual beautiful objects, in a manner 
 which may be taken as descriptive of the relation of each idea to the individual objects 
 corresponding to it. In contradistinction to beautiful bodies, arts, sciences (/ca/.d atjiiara, 
 tTctTTidevfiara, f/aOr/fiaTa), he terms the idea of the beautiful, the beautiful per se (avrb ro 
 KOAdv), and applies to it the predicates uncorrupted, pure, unmixed (si?UKpivig, Kodapdv, 
 auLKTov). This Beautiful per se is eternal, without origin or decay, neither increasing nor 
 decreasing, remaining absolutely like itself (Kara, ravra c;t'ov, fiovoeuMr ael bv), not in one 
 respect beautiful, but in another ugly ; not now beautiful, but at another time not so ; not 
 beautiful in comparison with one object, but, in comparison with another, ugly ; not appear- 
 ing beautiful in one place or to certain persons, but in another place or to other persons 
 ugly. Neither can it be represented by the fancy, as if it were a material thing; nor is it a 
 (subjective) conception or a form of knowledge (oi'Jf riq A6yo^, ov6e rig EKiar^fi?/) ; it is not in 
 any other object, nor in any living being, not on earth nor in the heavens, but it exists as a 
 substance of and by itself {avrb naff avrb fieff avrov). Every thing else that is beautiful
 
 120 Plato's dialkctic. 
 
 participates in it (ckeIvov fisrex^')- According to Hep., p. 523 seq., those sensible objects, 
 which nppear in one respect small, in another large, etc., and, in short, all those objects to 
 which contrary predicates appear applicable, are the occasion of our calling in the aid of 
 reason for iheir consideration; reason solves the contradiction, hy separating those con- 
 traries which appear united (forming a avyKexvfievov, concretum, a concrete object), conceiving 
 Greatness as an idea by itself, and Smallness, in like manner, as another, and, in general, 
 viewing the opposed predicates apart (rd 6vo KExtopiof^eva). Analogous to this are the 
 explanations given in the Phaedo (p. 102): Simmias is large in comparison with Socrates, 
 small in comparison with Phaedo ; but the idea of largeness and also the jiroperty of large- 
 ness are never at the same time identical with smallness; on the contrary, the idea 
 remains permanently what it is, and so does the quality, unless it ceases to exist. The 
 idea has with the individual objects corresponding to it a certain community (Koivuvia), it is 
 present with them {Trapovaia) ; but the character of this community (which, according to 
 the comparison in the Rejmhlic between the idea of the Good and the sun, may be con- 
 ceived as analogous to the community between the sun and the earth, through the rays 
 of the former extending to the latter) Plato declines more precisely to define {Phaedo, 
 p. 100 d: 074 ovK. LTi'ao ti ttouI avrb ku/mv fj ekeivov tov KaTicii eIte Trapovala ecte noivuvia 
 [ttre] oTVTj dtj Koi oTTug TTpoGyEvofXEVT], for which ■^pocyEvojiivov is probably to be read). 
 Tim., p. 51 seq. (cf. Rep., Y. 414 seq.): If scientific cognition and correct opinion {vovq and 
 So^a al7jdi]g) are two different species of knowledge, then there exist ideas which possess 
 absolute being and are cognizable, not through sense-perception, but only by thought [eISt] 
 voovjiEva) ; but if, as it appears to some, both are identical, then the talk of ideas is mere 
 talk Q.oyoQ, or perhaps : ideas are nothing objective, they are simply subjective conceptions), 
 and only the sensible exists. But in fact both are different, both in their origin (through 
 conviction ; — through persuasion) and in their nature (certainty and immutability ; — uncer- 
 tainty and change). There are, therefore, also two different classes of objects: the one 
 includes that which remains perpetually like itself, has not become and can not pass away, 
 never from any source receives any thing into itself, nor itself passes into any thing else {ovte 
 elf savTo EiaSExn/iiEvov alio aHoflsv, ovte aiirb Eig d/lAo Trot I6v) ■ the other class covers the 
 realm of individual objects, which are homonymous (ofiuwfia) with the ideas and similar 
 (bfioca) to them, which become and perish at definite places, and are always in motion {nE<j>opTi- 
 fjLEvov asi). The difference between knowledge, on the one hand, and sensible perception 
 and correct opinion, on the other, is considered at length and demonstrated in the dialogue 
 Theaetelm. The (fantastical) tendency, which in the Platonic theory of ideas accompanies 
 the logically legitimate recognition of a relation in the subjective conception to objective 
 reality, culminates in the Sophistes (p. 248), with the attribution to ideas of motion, life, 
 animation, and reason. This tendency to hypostatize or give substance to that phase of 
 objective reality, w^hich is known through the concept, appears, however, not to have been 
 pushed to this extreme by Plato, but by a fraction of his Pythagorizing disciples, who (ac- 
 cording to So2ih., 248 b) were often disputing with an opposite fraction, and among whom 
 the inclination to hypostatize and personify abstractions was strongest. From the stand- 
 point reached in the Platonic exposition — which was marked by the free and natural inter- 
 play of fancy, even in the severest operations of thought, so that in it doctrines scientifically 
 valid appear interwoven with poetic fiction — an advance in one of two directions was pos- 
 sible. Either the poetic element could be critically sifted out and the doctrine of ideas 
 could be transformed into the doctrine of the essence or essential nature known through and 
 corresponding with the concept (v Kara IMyov ovaia) — which was done by Aristotle — or the 
 poetic element might, and did, become dogmatically fixed and, in scholastic fashion, seem- 
 ingly rationalized, as bj' some of the Platonists, in the Sophistes and Politicus, until ita
 
 PLATO's DIALECTIC. 121 
 
 inevitable replacement by Skepticism took place, as in the Middle Academy and in the 
 dialogue Parmtnides. This dialogue may have been composed in the time immediately 
 following Plato's death, but perhaps not till the time of the Middle Academy, and it 
 finds a tenable position neither in the admission nor in the rejection of the ideas and 
 the One. 
 
 Myths, in which the truly existent was represented in the form of the perpetually 
 becoming and the psychical in the form of the perceptible, were employed by Plato as a 
 means of facilitating in his readers the subjective apprehension of his doctrines ; they were 
 also a necessary element in the poetico-philosophical style of Plato ; but the dialectical 
 method was considered as alone adequate to the object-matter of pure philosophical cog- 
 nition. The allegorical or mythical style was possible in treating of the ideal itself, and 
 for the representation of its relation to the sensible it was in so far necessary for Plato, 
 as he was unable, on account of the (as Deuschle terms it) "not genetical, but ontical" 
 (ontological) character of his doctrine of ideas, to conceive this relation in a purely 
 scientific form ; but the cognition and representation of the sensible was, according to 
 Plato, necessarily not figurative, but only probable. Such were the emoreq fivdoi (Km., 
 p. 59 et al.), with which Plato believed we must content ourselves in the department 
 of natural philosophy, while dialectic in all its rigor could be applied only in the 
 field of ethics and in the investigation of cognition and the ideas. Owing to the char- 
 acter which Plato thus ascribed to natural philosophy, the style appropriate to it 
 was that of continuous discourse; hence in the Timaeus Plato could and was obliged 
 to content himself with this style, which may have been already employed by the 
 Pythagoreans. 
 
 It is impossible, according to the dialogue Cratylus. that the consideration of xvo'rds 
 should be of assistance in the investigation of the essence of things, because the con- 
 structors of language were not sufficiently acquainted ■nath the true and permanent essence 
 of things, but remained satisfied with the popular opinion, which Heraclitus afterward ex- 
 pressed in its most general form, but which, in fact, is true only of objects of sense, viz. : 
 that all things are in constant movement. 
 
 The two cognitive processes, which together constitute the dialectical procedure, are 
 described by Plato {Phaedr., 265 seq.) as the collective consideration of separate individuals 
 and their reduction to unity of essence, on the one hand, and, on the other, the resolution 
 of unity into plurality, following the order that exists in nature. The first process finds 
 its term in definition, or the knowledge of the essence of the thing defined (and accord- 
 ingly in Plato, Pep., VII. 534, he is termed a dialectician, who attains to this conception of 
 the essence, rov Myov XaujiavovTa r^g ovaiag) ; the second is the division of the generic 
 concept into its subordinate specific concepts. In Rep., VI. p. 510, VII. p. 533, Plato con- 
 trasts deduction, which, from certain general presuppositions, that are, however, not neces- 
 sarily ultimate or expressive of first principles, derives conclusions that depend on them, 
 with the process of rising to the unconditioned {eir' apxvv am'Trddernv, wliich principle, since 
 it is absolutely the highest, can not serve as a basis for a further progress), a process 
 which is accomplished by the suppression of all that is merely hyjjothetical. The 
 former procedure rules, according to Plato, in the mathematics, the latter in philosophy. 
 In the PkcLedo (p. 101 d) it is recognized as legitimate in a philosophical investigation 
 to base provisional inferences on inoOiaeig; but it is requisite that these hypotheses 
 be themselves sub.sequently justified, by being deduced from others more general and 
 more nearly approaching the nature of principles, till at last the investigation finds its 
 legitimate terminus in the iKavov, \'iz., the absolutely highest and self-demonstrating 
 conception.
 
 122 Plato's dialectic. 
 
 Plato, recapitulating, schematizes as follows, De Rep., VII. pp. 509 seq. and 533 seq. 
 
 A. OBJECTS. 
 
 NcwTT^v ytvoq [ovaia). 
 'ISiai. I MadT/uaTiKa. 
 
 'Oparov yevo^ {yeveai^). 
 
 B. WAYS OF KNOWING 
 Notic (or voTjaiq or kircar'^fJ.Ti). | Aidvoia. 
 
 A(5fa. 
 UiaTi^. I E'lKaaia. 
 
 The highest object of knowledge (jueyiarov /ud67/fia) is the idea of the good (Rep., VI. 
 505 a). This idea is supreme in the realm of vowfieva and diflBcult of cognition ; it is the 
 cause of all truth and beauty. To it objects owe their being and cognoscibility and the 
 mind its power of cognition {Rep., VI. 508 seq.). It is superior to the Idea of Being, 
 Rep., VI. p. 509 b : koI To'ig yiyvucKofievocq roivvv [if] fiovov to ytyvucKEodai (the power of 
 being known) cfxivat virb tov ayadov rrapelvai, aXAa koI to elvai ts koI t^ ovaiav (being, 
 taken predicatively) vtt' iKeivov avrocg Tzpoanvai, ovk ovaiac bvTog tov ayadov, dX/,' eti 
 eireKEiva T^f ovaiag TTpsajSsig Kai dwafxei vTzepkxovToq (the Idea of Good bestows not only 
 cognoscibility, but also being; it is not identical with being, but, on the contrary, ia 
 exalted above it). Every thing which exists and is knowable, has received from God, 
 who is the Idea of the Good, its existence and its ability to be known, because he knew 
 that it was better that it should exist, than that it should not exist (cf Phaedo, p. 97 c). 
 (So far as we are to understand by "being," objective being or objective reahty, a.l?]6eia, 
 this being is not the most general idea, but is inferior in generality to the Good.) In the 
 Philebus (p. 22) the Idea of the Good is identified with the divine reason. The general 
 character of the Platonic teaching requires us to identify it also with the world-builder 
 (ST/fuovpyog), who (according to Ti7n., 28 seq.), the absolutely good, contemplating the ideas 
 {i. e., himself and the other ideas), makes all generated things, as far as practicable, 
 also good. 
 
 Of the reduction of the ideas to (ideal) numbers, of which Aristotle speaks, some traces 
 are found in certain of the later dialogues, mostly in the Phikhos, m which the ideas are 
 termed haSeg or [lovadec, and (in Pythagorizing fashion) nepac and aneipov are considered 
 as elements of things. Akin to this doctrine is the doctrine of the different elements of the 
 world-soul, in the Timaeios, and of " the same " {ravTov^ and " the other " {6dTEpov) in the 
 Sophistes. According to the Aristotehan accounts [Metaph., I. 6 ; XIV. 1, 1087 b, 12 e< al., 
 also in the fragments of the works De Bono and De Ideis), as also according to Hermodorus 
 (Simplic, Ad Arist PTiys., fol. 54 b and 56 b), Plato posited two elements {aToixda) ae 
 present in the ideas and in all existing things, namely, a form-giving {irEpao) and a form- 
 receiving, and, in itself, formless element {dTTeipov), but the aireipov, or infinite, which the 
 Pythagoreans had already opposed to the TreirepaGfihov, or the finite, was divided by Plato 
 into a duad, namely, into the great and small (or more and less). In every class of objects 
 (ideas, mathematical and sensible objects) Plato seems to have assumed such elements, and 
 to have regarded the objects themselves as a mixture of both elements {}iikt6v). In the 
 things which are perceived by the senses the aneipov appears to represent the matter which 
 constitutes them (described in the Timaeus), and the irkpaq their shape and quality. In 
 the soul of the world the iripaq is the singular, self-identical {ravTov) and indivisible 
 (d/xepec) element, and the awEipov the heterogeneous (ddTepov) and divisible (jispiOTov) one. 
 In numbers and geometrical figures and in the ideas Trepaq represents unity («'), while of 
 the otTreipov several kinds are distinguished: as being the "indefinite duad" (do/xarof Judf),
 
 Plato's physics. 123 
 
 the great and small constitute the form-receiving element or substratum (the v}.?}), from 
 which through the iv numbers are formed; long and short, broad aud narrow, high and 
 low, are the species of the great and small, from which the form-giving principle, whose 
 nature is unity, produces lines, surfaces, and solids (Arist., Meiaph., XIII. 9). From the 
 One and from the a-reipov, when divided into the duad of great and small, numbers arise, 
 sars Aristotle {Melaph., I. 6), in a natural manner (ncpvug) • but the derivation of the ideas 
 from these depends on the reduction of the ideas to numbers. From these (ideal) numbers 
 Plato distinguishes the numbers of mathematics, which stand between the ideas and 
 sensible things. The ideal numbers seem to have had with Plato essentially the sense 
 of expressions to denote higher and lower degrees of generality and — what was for him 
 the same thing — higher and lower degrees of worth : a relation of succession (a Trporcpov 
 Kal varepov) subsisted among them, but they could not be added (a^vfxB/^r/Toc). The kv 
 (the One) was identified by Plato with the idea of the good (according to Aristotle, ap. 
 Aristox., Barm. Element, II. p. 30, Meib., cf. Arist., Met., I. 6, XIV. 4). 
 
 § 42. The world ((5 Koofiog) is not eternal, bat generated ; for it is 
 perceptible by the senses and is corporeal. Time began with the 
 world. The world is the most beautiful of all generated things; it 
 was created by the best of artificers and modeled after an eternal 
 and the most excellent of patterns. Matter, which existed from 
 eternity, together with God, being absolutely devoid of quality and 
 possessing no proper reality, was at first in disorder and assumed a 
 variety of changing and irrational shapes, until God, who is abso- 
 lutely good and without envy, came forth as world-builder, and 
 transformed all for ends of good. He formed first the soul of the 
 world, by creating from two elements of opposite nature, the one 
 indivisible and immutable, the other divisible and mutable, a third 
 intermediate substance, and then combining the three in one whole, 
 and distributing this whole through space in harmonious proportions. 
 To the soul of the world he then joined its body. In tlms bringing 
 order and proportion to the chaotic and heaving mass of matter, he 
 caused it to assume determinate mathematical forms. The earth 
 arose from cubiform elements, and fir^ from elements having the 
 shape of pyramids ; between these two came, as intermediate terms 
 of a geometrical proportion, water, whose elements are icosahedral in 
 form, and air, with octahedral elements. The dodecahedron is re- 
 lated to 'L'j i^rm of the universe. Plato knew of the inclination 
 of the ecliptic. Of the elements of the world-soul, the better, i. e., 
 the unchangeable element, was distributed by the Demiurgus in the 
 direction of the celestial equator. The other, the changeable element, 
 he placed in the direction of the ecliptic. The divine part of the hu- 
 man soul, having its seat in the head, was made like the world-soul.
 
 124 Plato's physics. 
 
 The first or indivisible element of this soul in man is, as in the soul 
 of the world, the instrument of rational cognition, the other element 
 is the organ of sensuous perception and representation. With the 
 soul, whose seat is in the head, are combined in man two other 
 souls, which Plato in tlie Phaedrus seems to conceive as pre-existing 
 before the terrestrial life of man, but in the Timaeus describes as tied 
 to the body, and mortal. These are the courageous soul {to dvi^weidtc, 
 irascibility), and the appetitive soul {to i-mOvfiriTiKdv, disposition to 
 seek for sensual pleasure and for the means of its gratification). 
 Thus the whole or collective soul resembles the composite force of a 
 driver and two steeds. The appetitive soul is possessed also by 
 plants, and courage is an attribute of the (nobler) animals. The soul 
 in general (according to the Phaedrus)^ or the cognitive soul alone 
 (according to the Timaetis) is immortal. With this doctrine Plato • 
 connects (in the Phaedo^ which contains his arguments for immor- 
 tality) the ethical admonition to seek, through a life of purity and 
 conformity to reason, the only possible deliverance from evil, and also 
 a number of "probable arguments" in support of the doctrines of 
 the transmigration of the soul through the bodies of men and animals 
 for a cosmical period of ten thousand years, of the purification of 
 those who were good citizens, but not philosophers, of the temporary 
 punishments of sinners who are not past all healing, of the eternal 
 damnation of incurable offenders, and of the blessedness of those whose 
 lives were pre-eminently pure and pleasing to God. 
 
 The following authors (in addition to the editors and commentators of the Timaetts and the historians 
 of Greek philosophy) treat especially of the Platonic theology: Marsilius Ficinus (Theoloffia Platonica, 
 Florence, 14S2), Puflendorf (i)e theol. PL, Leipsic, 1653), Oelrichs (Ductr. PI. de deo, Marburg, ITSS), Horstel 
 (PI. docir. de deo, Leipsic, 1S04), Theoph. Ilartmann (De diis Tim. PL, Breslau, 1840), Krische (Forschttn- 
 gen, 1.. pp. 181-204), J. Bilharz (1st PVa Speculation TheinmiisT Carlsruhe and Freiburg, 1842), Heinr. 
 Schiirniann (Be deo Plat., Munster, 1S45), Ant. Erdtiiian (De deo et idels, Miinster, 1S56), II. L. Ahrens 
 (De dvodecim dels PL, Hanover, 1SG4), G. F. Pettig (auia im Philebm die personL Gottheit des Plato, 
 Oder: Pluto Icein Pantheist, Berne, 1866), and Karl Stumpf (Verhdltniss des Platani,schen, Goites eur 
 Idee des Guten, in the Ztsehr. f. Philos., Vol. 54, Nos. 1 and 2, Halle, 1869, published also separately). 
 Cf., also, the works on Plato's doctrine of ideas, cited above, § 41. 
 
 Plato's Natural Philosophy is discussed by the various editors and translators of the Timaev-s, among 
 ■whom Chalcidius (of the fourth century A. D. ; his translation, together with Cicero's tran.slation of a part 
 of the TiiiiaeiM. is edited by Mullach, in Vol. 2 of his Fratjju. Philos. Graec, Paris, 18G7, pp. 147-258), of 
 ancient translators, and Martin (Etudes sur le Timee de Platon, 2 torn., Paris, 1841), among modern trans- 
 lators are the most important ; also, in jiarticular, by Aug. Boeckh (De Plat, eorpofis ■niundani fabrica, 
 lleidelb., 1809, and De Plat, system, coelestiuni glohorutn et de tera iiidole astronomiae Philolaicae, ibid. 
 1810, both which works are printed in the third volume of the complete works of Boeckh, edited by F. 
 Ascherson, Leipsic, 1SC6, accompanied with many additions; see also B.'s Cnteisuchwngen ilber das kott- 
 misdie. System des Phitmi mit Bezug auf Gruppe's " EosmUsche Systeme der Griechen,'" Berlin, 1852), 
 Reinganum (Pl.^s Ansicht von der Gestalt der Erde, in the Ztsehr. f. die A. Wiss., 1S41, No. 90), J. S. 
 Konitzer ( Cefter Ferhdltniss, Formuiid Wesen der Elementarkorpernaeh Plato's 7?7?2tf««s, Neu-Euppin, 
 1S46), Wolfgang Hocheder (Z)(w kosmische System des Plato mit Besug auf die neuesten Auffassungen de»
 
 Plato's physics. 125 
 
 Mlh&n, Progr., Aschaffenbnrg, 1855; cf., per contra, Susemihl, in Jahrh. /. d. PhiloL, Vol. 75, 1857, pp. 
 59si-602), A. Hundert (De Platonis altera rerttm pHneipio, Progr., Cleve, 1857), Felix Bobertag (£»« 
 materia PL q^cam fere vacant meletemata, Breslaii, 18&4), Franz Susemihl {Zur Platoninchen Encha, 
 tologie vmd Astronomie. in the Philologtc«, Vol. XV., 1860, pp. 417-434), G. Grote {Plato's Doctrine re- 
 specting the Rotation, of the Earth and Aristotle's Caniment vpori that Doctrine, London, 18C0; German 
 transl. by Joa. Holzamer, Prague, ISGl ; cf., on this work by Grote, Ileinr. v. Stein, in the Gott. Am., 18G2, 
 p. 1438, Friedr. Uebem-eg, in the Zeitschr.f. Philos., Vol. XLIL, 186.3, pp. 177-182, and particularly Bopckh, 
 in the third volume of his collected works, 1866, pp. 294-820), C. Goebel {De coelestihus ap. Plat, motibus, 
 G.-Pr., Wernigerode, 1869). 
 
 On the Psychology of Plato: Aug. Boeckh ( Veher die Bildung der Weltseele im Timaexu.in. Daub and 
 Creuzer'8 Studien, Vol. III., 1807, pp. 1-95, repr. with suppl. in the 3d vol, of his Ges. kl. Schriften, Leips. 
 1866, pp. 109-lSO), Henn. Bonitz {Disput. Plat. Dtiae : dean. mund. elem., see above, §41), F. Ueberwcg 
 (Ueber die Platonische Weltseele, in the Ehein. Mus. f. Ph., new series, Vol. IX., 1853. pp. 37-84), Franz 
 Susemihl (Platan. Forschiingen, III., in Philologus, Supplementband II., Ihft 2, 1861, pp. 219-250), 
 Chaignet {De la psychalogie de Platan, Paris, 1862), J. P. Wohlstein {Maierie "und Weltseele in dem 
 Plat. System, Inaug.-Diss., Marburg, 1863), Hartung {Auslegung dea Mdrchens von der Seele, I., Erfurt, 
 1866). 
 
 On the Platonic doctrine of immortality and the related doctrines of jrre-existence and reminiscence : 
 .loach. Oporinus (ffistar. crit. doctr. de immortalitate, Hamb. 1735, p. 185 seq.), Chr. Ernst von Windheim 
 {teamen argumentorum PI. pro immort. animae hum., Gott. 1749), J. C. Gottleber {Argum. aliquot in 
 PI. Phaedone de anim. immort. diacnssio, spec, I.-IV., Altdorf, 1765-67), Moses Mendelssohn {Phadon, 
 Ist edition, Berlin, 1764), Gust. Fried. Wiggers {Ea-amen arg^nn. PI. pro. imm. anim. hit/m., Rostock, 1803), 
 F. Pettovel {Disp. Acad., Berlin, 1815), Knnhardt {Teber PI. Phaedon, Lubeck, 1817), Adalb. Schmidt 
 {Argwn. pro imm. anim., Halle, 1827; PL's rn.^terhUchl-eitslehre, Progr., Ilalle, 1835), J. W. Braut 
 ( Ueber die at'a^ivTjat?, Brandenb. 1832), C. F. Hermann (De immortalitatis notione in Plat. Phaed., Marb. 
 1835; De partibus animae immortalibus sec. Platonem, Gott. 1850), Ludw. Hase (Pn, Magdeb. 1843), 
 Voigtlander (De animorum praeexristentia. Diss., Berlin, 1844), K. Ph. Fischer (PI. de immort. an. doctr., 
 Eriangen, 1845), Ilerm. Schmidt (G.-Progr., Wittenb. 1845; Halle, 1850-52; Zur Kritik und ErkL v. PL's 
 Phaedon, in the Philol., V. 18.50, p. 710 seq.; Zeitxchr.f. Gymn.-Wesen, II. 1848, Nos. 10 and 11, and VI. 
 1852, Nos. 5, 6, 7; PL's Phaedon erkl., G.-Pr., Wittenberg, 1S.54), Franz Susemihl (Philologus, V. 1850, p. 
 385 seq.; Jahn's Jahrb., Vol. 73, 1856, pp. 236-240; Philologus, XV., and Suppl., Vol. II., 219 seq.) M. 
 Speck (fi^.-Pr., Breslau, 1858), L. H. O. Muller (Die Eschatologie Plato''a und Cicero's im Verhaltniss 
 eum Christenthum, Jever. 1854), K. Eichhoff (^.-Pr., Duisburg, ISM, pp. 11-18), A. J. Kahlert (G.-Pr. von 
 Czernowitz. Vienna, 1S55). Ch. Prince (/V., Tfeufohatel, 1859), Bucher(P/. spec. Bewf.d. UnMerbl. der 
 menschl. Seele, Inaug. Diss., Gott. 1861), Drosilm (Die Mythen iiher Prd- und Post- Existens, G.-Pr., 
 Coslin, 1861), K. Silberschlag (Die Grundlehren PL iiber das Verhaliniss des MenscJien zu Gott und das 
 Leben nach dem, Tode in ihrer Beziehung eu den Mythen des Alterthmns, in the Deutsch. Mus., 1862, 
 No. 41), F. Gloel (De argumentorum in Plat. Phaedone cohaerentia, G.-Pr., Magdeb. 1868). Alb. Bischoff 
 (Pl.''s Phaedon eine Reihe von Betrachtaingen zur Erkldrung und Beurtheilung des Gesprdchs, Er- 
 iangen, 1866; cf. F. Mezger, in the ZeitschriftfUr luth. Theologie, 1868, No. 1, pp. 80-86), A. Boelke (Ueber 
 PL's Beweisef'ur die Unsterbl. der Seele Rostock and Berlin, 1869), Paul Zimmermann (Die Vnsterbl. 
 der Seele in Plata's Phaedo, Leipsic, 1869). 
 
 Plato opens tho exposition of his physics in the Tim. (p. 28 seq.) with the affirmation 
 that since tho world bears the form of yeveciq (development, becoming) and not that of 
 true being (ovala), notliing absolutely certain can be laid down in this field of investigation, 
 but only what is probable {e'ikotec ni/doi). Our knowledge of nature bears not the charac- 
 ters of science (eTziaTT]fjLTJ) or of the knowledge of truth (a?i;ftrici), but those of belief (T/trrir). 
 Plato says {Tim., p. 29c): "What being is to becoming, that is truth to faith" (6, re Trsp 
 irpbc ytveatv ovala, tovto Trpbg tiotiv aXi/Osia). What Plato says in the Phaedo, p. 114 d, 
 explains his idea of the probable: "Firmly to assert that this is exactly as I have expressed 
 it, befits not a man of intelligence; yet that it is either so or something like it {on f/ rai-r' 
 ecrnv fj roiavr' arra) must certainly bo assumed. 
 
 Plato raises in Ti^n., p. 28 a, the question whether tho world is without origin, eternal 
 ab initio, or whether it had a beginning, and answers it by saying, that on account of the 
 visibility of the world, the second, and not the first, alternative must be adopted as the 
 truth. But the world is the best of generated, as its author is of eternal existences.
 
 126 Plato's physics. 
 
 God's goodness is the reason of the construction of the world. Phaedrus, p. 247 a : " Envy 
 stands outside of the divine choir." Timaeus, p. 29 e : He (God) was good ; but the good 
 are never envious with regard to any thing. Being, therefore, without env_v, he phtnned 
 all things so that they should be as nearly as possible like himself: " ayadog t/v (6 dTjfiLorp- 
 yo^, the supreme God, the constructor of the world), ayadcj Se ovdelg ncpl ovSevb^ ovSiivoTe 
 iyylyverai ^ovo^. tovtov 6' £/crdf tjv navra bri ^akiara ipovA.ijdr] yeviadai irapan^.Tjoia aiirC). 
 (Cf also Arist., Metaph., I. 2, p. 983 b, 2. Tet the notion of the envy of the gods, which 
 Plato and Aristotle combat, involves also an ethical and religious element in so far as by 
 " envy " it is intended to indicate the reaction of the universal order against all individual 
 disproportion or excess.) 
 
 The adaptation and order of the world have their ground in the world-constructing 
 reason; whatever of blind necessity is manifest in it arises from the nature of matter. 
 Mechanical causes are only ^walria (concomitants) of the final causes. 
 
 When matter (as Se^afiivrj, or form-receiving principle) assumed orderly shapes, there 
 arose first the four elements: fire, air, water, and earth. Between the two extremes, fire 
 and earth, of which the former was necessary for the visibility, the latter for the palpa- 
 bility of things, a bond of connection was needed ; but the most beautiful of bonds is pro- 
 portion, which in the present case, where solid bodies are concerned, must be twofold. 
 (In the case of plane figures one intermediate term is sufficient ; the side of a square, 
 whose contents are the double of a given square, is determined by the proportion 
 1: x: : x: 2, where x = V2, the side of the given square being = 1 ; and this given square, 
 whose contents = 1 x 1, is to the rectangle, one of whose sides — 1, the other = V2, 
 and whose contents therefore = 1 x \,'2, as the latter is to the square whose con- 
 tents = i^2 X V2 r= 2. But in the case of solids, two intermediate terms are necessary; 
 the length of the side of a cube whose contents rr 2, is determined by the two propor- 
 tions : \ : x: : x: y, and x : y: : y: 2, where a; =r ' V 2 and 2/ = ^ V 2", and the cube, whose 
 contents = 1 x 1 x 1, is to the parallelepiped, whose contents = 1 x 1 x V2, as the 
 latter is to the parallclopiped = 1 x ' v^2 x * |/2; and the latter again stands in a like relation 
 to the cube whose contents = ' V2 x ^ V2 x " V2 = 2. "Whatever is true, in this respect, 
 of squares and cubes, is applicable to all mutually similar forms, though only to such. 
 A comprehensive and exact examination and explanation of all these relations is given by 
 Boeckh in the Comm. acad. de Platonica corporis immdani fabrica confiati ex elennentis 
 geometrica ratione concinnatis, Heidelberg, 1809, reprinted in Boeckh's Gts. kl. Schr., Vol. 
 III., pp. 229-252, together with an annexed Excursus, pp. 253-265.) Fire must accord- 
 ingly be related to air, as air to water, and air to water, as water to earth. 
 
 The distances of the celestial spheres from each other are proportioned to the different 
 lengths of the strings which produce harmonious tones. The earth is at rest in the center 
 of the universe. It is wound around the (adamantine) bar or distaff (r/Aa/cdr;?), which 
 Plato (according to Grote, doctrinally, according to Boeckh, mytliically) represents as 
 extending from one end of the axis of the world to the other ; the sky and also the 
 planets revolve around this distaff once in every twenty-four hours ; but the planets have 
 besides a motion peculiar to themselves, which is occasioned by the c^6vdv7joi, which lie 
 about the spindle and together constitute the whorl, since these, while participating in the 
 revolving motion of the heavens, rotate at the same time, but more slowly, in the opposite 
 direction ; the earth remains unmoved. If the distaff (^Aa/cdr?/) of the spindle {aTpaKTo^) is 
 conceived as motionless (as it is by Boeckh), the earth is to be regarded as simply rolled 
 into a ball around it and firmly attached to it ; but if it is included in the daily rotation of 
 the heavens, the earth must not be conceived (as it is by Grote) as partaking in this motion, 
 but the (absolute) rest of the earth must be explained by a (relative) motion of the same
 
 Plato's physics. 127 
 
 around the distaff in the opposite direction. If the distance of the moon from the earth 
 is represented by 1, then that of the sun — 2, that of Venus = 3, that of Mercury = 4, 
 tliat of Mars = 8, that of Jupiter =r 9, that of Saturn = 27. The incHnation of the ecHptic 
 is explained by Plato as a result of the inferior perfection of the spheres underneath the 
 sphere of the fixed stars. According to a statement of Theophrastus (see Plutarch., Plat. 
 Qu., 8, cf Numa, ch. 11), Plato in his old age no longer attributed to the earth (but to the 
 central fire probably) the occupancy of the center of the world; this accoimt, in itself alto- 
 gether credible as an oral utterance of Plato, is nevertheless not easily reconciled with the 
 fact that in the Zjeges — which was written after the Rep., and beyond question also after 
 the Timaeus, and that, too, according to late but apparently trustworthy tradition, not by 
 Plato, but by Philip the Opuntian, from a sketch made by Plato — the doctrine contained 
 in the Timaeas is reaffirmed. Cf. Boeckh, Bas kosmische System des Plato, Berlin, 1852, 
 pp. 144-150. 
 
 The soul of the world is older than its body : for its office is to rule, and it is not 
 fitting that the younger should rule the older. It must unite in itself the elements of all 
 orders of ideal and material existences, in order that it may be able to know and under- 
 stand them (Tim., p. 34 seq.). Plato says {Tim., p. 35 seq.), that the Indivisible in the soul 
 enables it to have knowledge of the ideas, while the Divisible mediates its knowledge of 
 sensible objects. The third or mixed element may be considered as the organ of mathe- 
 matical knowledge (or perhaps of all particular, distinct acts of cognition?) Tliese cogni- 
 tive faculties pertain exclusively to that part (loyiariKov) of the human soul which resides 
 in the head. 
 
 The hypothesis that the human soul has three parts {kTridvfiriTtKov, dv/ioei6eg, 2ayca-iK6v) 
 seems to have been framed in intentional correspondence with the natural gradation : plant, 
 animal, man (Tim., 77 b; Hep., IV. 441 b); this distinction, however, of the orders of the 
 natural kingdom was not so distinctly marked or attended to by Plato as by Aristotle. 
 The supremacy of each of these different parts, taken in their order, is illustrated in the 
 gain-loving Phenicians and Egyptians, the courageous Barbarians of the North, and the 
 culture-loving Hellenes {Rep., IV. 435 e to 436 a). 
 
 The doctrine of the immortality of the soul is founded by Plato, in tlie Ph'aedrus (p. 245), 
 on the nature of the soul, as the self-moving principle of all motion : in the Rep. (X. 609), 
 on the fact, that the life of the soul is not destroyed by moral badness, which yet, as the 
 natural evil and enemy of the soul, ought, if any thing could effect this, to effect its 
 destruction ; in the Tim. (p. 41), on the goodness of God, who, notwithstanding that the 
 nature of the soul, as a generated essence, subjects it to the possibilitj' of destruction, can 
 not will that what has been put together in so beautiful a manner should again be dis- 
 solved; in the Phaedo, finally (pp. 62-107), this doctrine is supported, partly by an 
 argument drawn from the nature of the subjective activity of the philosopher, whose 
 striving after knowledge involves the desire for incorporeal existence, i. e., the desire to 
 die, and partly on a series of objective arguments. The first of these arguments is founded 
 on the cosmologic.'d law of the transition of contraries into each otlier, according to wliich 
 law, just as the living die, so the dead must return to life: the second, on the nature of 
 knowledge, as a species of reminiscence (cf Meno, p. 80 seq., where the pre-existence of the 
 soul is inferred from the nature of the act of mathematical and philosophical learning, 
 whose only satisfactory explanation, it is argued, is found in the hypothesis of the soul's 
 recollection of ideas which had been perceived by the intellect in a pre-terrestrial life) ; the 
 third, on the relationship between the soul, as an invisible essence, and the ideas, as 
 invisil)le, simple, and indestructible objects; the fourth argument, in reply to the objection 
 (of Simmias), that the soul is perliaps only the resultante and, as it were, the harmony of the
 
 128 Plato's ethics. 
 
 functions of the body, is based partly on the previously demonstrated pre-existence of the 
 soul, and partly on the qualification of the soul to rule the body, and on its nature as a sub- 
 stance, so that, says Plato, while one harmony can be more a harmony than another, one 
 soul can not be more or less soul than any other, and the soul, if virtuous, may have har- 
 mony for its attribute ; the fifth argument, finally, and the one which Plato himself deemed 
 decisive, was in reply to the objection (of Cebes), that although the soul perhaps survived 
 the body, it might yet be not absolutely indestructible, and was founded on the necessarv 
 participation of the soul in the idea of life, whence the inference that the soul can never bo 
 lifeless, a dead soul would be a contradiction, and consequently immortality and imper- 
 ishableuess must be predicated of it. In this argument, it is assumed that that, whoso 
 nature is such that, so long as it exists, it neither is nor can be dead, can never cease to 
 exist; this assumption is connected with the double sense in which aOdvarog is employed, 
 a. in the sense, which results from the general tenor of the argument, viz. : not dead ; I. in 
 the sense corresponding to ordinary usage: immortal, 
 
 § 43. The highest good is, according to Plato, not pleasure, nor 
 knowledge alone, but the greatest possible likeness to God, as the 
 absolutely good. The virtue of the human soul is its fitness for its 
 proper work. It includes various particular virtues, which form a 
 system based on the classification of the faculties or parts of the 
 human soul. The virtue of the cognitive part of the soul is the 
 knowledge of the good, or wisdom [oofla)- that of the courageous 
 part is valor (av(5pta), which consists in preserving correct and legiti- 
 mate ideas of what is to be feared and what is not to be feared ; the 
 virtue of the appetitive part is temperance (moderation or self-control, 
 self-direction, aafgoovvr])^ which consists in the agreement of the 
 better and worse parts of the soul, as to which should rule ; justice, 
 finally (diKaioovvrj),^ is the universal virtue, and consists in the fulfill- 
 ment by each part of its peculiar function. Piety {daiorrjg) is justice 
 with reference to the gods. One of the ramifications of wisdom is 
 philosophical love, or the joint striving of two souls for the attain- 
 ment of philosophical knowledge. Yirtue should be desired, not 
 from motives of reward and punishment, but because it is in itself 
 the health and beauty of the soul. To do injustice is worse than to 
 suflTer injustice. 
 
 The state is the individual on a large scale. The highest mis- 
 sion of the state is the training of the citizens to virtue. In the ideal 
 state each of the three principal functions and coiTesponding virtues 
 of the soul is represented by a particular class of citizens. These are, 
 1) the rulers, whose virtue is wisdom ; 2) the guardians or warriors, 
 whose virtue is valor; and 3) the manual laborers and tradesmen, 
 whose virtue is self-restraint and willing obedience. The rulers and
 
 Plato's ethics. ^ 129 
 
 warriors are to labor only for the realization of the true and the 
 good ; all individual interests whatsoever are forbidden them, and they 
 are all required to form in the strictest sense one family, without mar- 
 riage and without private property. The condition of the realization 
 of the ideal state is that philosophers should at some time become 
 rulers, or that rulers should philosophize rightly. The Laws contains 
 a later draught by Plato of the second-best form of the state, which, 
 he says, it would be more easy to realize. In this scheme, the tlieory 
 of ideas disappears from the programme for the education of the 
 rulers, and the chief stress is laid on their mathematical schooling ; 
 the kind of religious worship here prescribed was also less alien to 
 the general beliefs of the Hellenic people, and marriage and private 
 property were allowed as a concession to individual interests. 
 
 In the Platonic state, that Art alone finds a place which consists 
 in the imitation of the good. In tbis category are included philo- 
 sophical dramas, such as Plato's own dialogues, the narration of 
 myths (expurgated and ethically applied), and, in particular, reli- 
 gious lyrics (containing the praises of gods and also of noble men). 
 All art which is devoted to the imitation of the phenomenal world, 
 in which good and bad are commingled, is excluded. Art and the 
 Beautiful hold their place in Plato's system only in subordination to 
 the good. The Beautiful, whose essence lies, according to Plato, in 
 the fitness and symmetry resulting from the relation of the concept 
 to the plurality of phenomena, is nevertheless for him, though not the 
 highest of ideas, yet that one which imparts to its sensible copies the 
 highest brilliancy, since it, most of all ideas, shines through its copies. 
 
 The education of youth was regulated by Plato in accordance with 
 the principle of a gradual advance to the cognition of the ideas and 
 to the corresponding practical activity in the state, so that only the 
 best-qualified persons could rise to the highest stations, while the rest 
 were destined to exercise inferior practical functions. The cognition 
 of the idea of the good was reserved as a final topic of instruction 
 for the most mature. 
 
 The following .iiitliors, in addition to the authors cited above, nd % 41, treat of Plato's Ethics and 
 Politics in their relation to the national character of the Greeks and to Christianity : Grotefend (Vommentatio 
 in qua doctrina Platonis ethioa cum chrixUana comparatur ita, lit utriugque turn consenmix, turn din- 
 crimen eirponatur, Gott. 1S21), I. Ogienskl {Pericles et Plato, Breslaii, 1S8S), Jul. Guil. Ludw. Mehlia 
 {Comparatio Pint, doctrinae de rep. cum, Christiana de regno divino doc'rirui, Gott 1S45), K. F. ner- 
 mann {Die hist. Elementedes Platon. St<uttsideal\ Gott. 1S49, pp. 132-159), P. F. Stuhr ( Vom Staatsleben 
 nach Platon., Arist. und christlichen Grundsatzen, Part I., lierlin, 1S50), Ed. Kretzschmar {Der Kampf 
 des Plato um die relig. nnd sittUchen Prineipien, des Staatslebens, Leipsic, 1S52), W. Wchrcnpfennij 
 (Die Verschiedenheit der ethisehen Principien bet den HelUnen, Berlin, 1S56, p. 40 seq.), W. Wiegand 
 9
 
 130 Plato's ethics. 
 
 {EinUitung in Plato's Gottesstaat filr Freunde der Akademie, G.-Pr., "Worms, 1858), Ed. Zellrr (Der 
 Platan. Staat in seiner Bedentung far die Folgezeit, in Von Sybel's Hist. Zeitschr., VoL I., 1859, No. I, 
 pp. 108-126, and in Zeller's Vortr. u. Abh. gench. Inhalts, Leipsic, 1865, pp. 62-81), Hildenbrand (Gesch. u. 
 System der Rechts und Staatsphilosophie, Leipsic, 1860, I. 151 seq., 156 seq., 166 6eq.), S. Lommatzseh 
 (Qtiomodo PI. et Arist. relig. ae reip. principia conjunxerini, Diss. Inaug., Berlin, 1S63), Eman. 
 Grundcy (Be Plat, princijnis ethicis, Di^s. Inaug., Berlin, 1865); an essay on the leading characteristics 
 of Plato's theory of the st,Tte is contained in Glaser's Jahrh.fur Gesellschafts- und Staatsrnssenschaften, 
 Vol. VI., No. 4, 1866, pp. 309-318; cf. also Bertrand Eobidou, La Pip. de Platon, comparee aux idees et 
 aux etats modernes, Paris, 1869. 
 
 On Plato's doctrine of the highest good, cf. Ad. Trendelenburg (Pe PI. Philebi conmlio, Berlin. 1887), 
 Theod. Wehrmann (Plat, de summo bono docirina, Berlin, 1843), Wenkel {PI. Lehre nom h. G. vnd der 
 Gliickseligkeit, G.Pr., Sondorshauscn, 1857), 6. Loewe (Be bonoruin apud Platonem gradibus. Diss. 
 Ealensis, Berlin, 1861), Franz Susemihl {Ueber die Gutertafel im Pliilebus, in the PMlologus, SuppU 
 Vol. II., Gottingen, 1863, pp. 97-132), Rud. Hirzel {De bonis in fine Philebi enumeratis, Diss. Berolinen- 
 sis, Leipsic, 1868). 
 
 On his doctrine of pleasure, cf O. Kalmns (Halberstadt, 1867), H. Anton (in Fichte's Zeitschr. f. 
 Pkilos., new series, Vol. 33, Ilalle, 1858, pp. 65-81 and 213-238), W. E. Kranlchfeld {Pltiiouiti et Arist. de 
 JiSovji sententiae quomodo turn consentiant, turn dissentiant, Berlin, 1859), W. Kiister (in the Progr. of 
 the Bophien-gymnasium at Berlin, 1868). 
 
 On his doctrine of justice : W. Ogienski ( Welches ist der Sinn des Platonischen ra iavToii ■npamiv t 
 Progr., Trzemeszno, 1845), W. Jahns (Inaug. Diss., Brcslau, 1850), and J. F. Amen (PL dejtistitiae doctrina, 
 G.-Pr., Berlin, 1654). 
 
 On his doctrine of (T<a^po(rvvy\ : K. Hoflftneister (Essen, 1827) ; and on his doctrine in regard to falsehood; 
 Th. Kelch (Disqu. in PI. de mendaeio doctr. [De Rep., II. III.], Elbing, 1820). 
 
 On Plato's theory of the state, cf. Crl. Morgenstern (De Plat. rep. commentatimies tres, Halle [Bruns- 
 wick], 1794), C. L. Piirschke (De Plat, poetas e rep. bene const, esse expelL, Konigsb. 1803), G. de Geer 
 (Pol. Plat, princip.. Diss., Utrecht, 1810), Friedr. Koppen (Politik nacii PL Grimdsutzen, Leipsic, 1818, 
 RecMslehre nach PL Grds.. ibid. 1819), Harestadt (De eth. et pol. di«ciplinae in PL dial, cohaerentia, 
 Inaug.-Dissert., MOnster, 1845), Voigfland (Die eth. Tendemen des PL Staats, G.-Pr., Schleusingen, 
 1853). On Plato's politics as compared with Aristotle's, see Gust. Pinzger (De its, quae Ar. in PL Politta 
 re/pr., Leipsic, 1822), and others (see below, ad § 50) ; the mutual relation of Plato's Politics and Ethics 
 is also discussed in various compositions relating to the Platonic dialogue De RepuhL, particularly in the 
 Introductions to that dialogue by Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, and Steinhart, in Susemibl's work. Vol. II., 
 p. 58 seq., and in monographs by A. G. Gernhard (in the Act. soc. Graecae, I., Leipsic, 1836; Pr., 
 Weimar, 1837; ibid. 1829, 1840), E. Manicns (G.-Pr., Schlesw. 1854), G. F. Rettig (Prolegmn. ad Plat, 
 remp., Berne, 1845, and Ueber Steinharfs, SusemihVs und Stallbaii/m's Einl. e. PI. Staat, in the Rhein. 
 Mus., new series, XVI. 1861, pp. 161-197), A. 0. Wigand (Das sweiie Bitch des Platon. Goitesstaates, 
 Oder Plaio^s eigene Ansichi vmi dem }fVesen der Gereehtigkeit, ^orvas., 1868); also in writings relative 
 to the Politicris, especially the Introductions of the various editors, and in Deuschle's Beitrage zvr 
 Erkl.desPol. (G.-Pr.), Magdeb. 1857; cf. A. 11. Baabe, De poetica PL philos. natura, praesertim in 
 amoris expositione conspieua, Rotterdam, 1866. Of the community of goods in Plato's theory, E. v. 
 Voorthuysen has treated (Utrecht, 1850) ; cf. Thonissen (Le Socialisme. t. I., Paris, 1852, p. 41 seq.). On the 
 principles of criminal law, according to Plato, see Plainer, in the Zeitschr. /Ur Alterthumswiss., 1844, 
 Nos. 85 and 86. 
 
 On Plato's aesthetics, cf. Ed. Miiller ( Ueber das Nachahmende in der Kunst nach Plato, Eatibor, 
 1831 ; Geschichte der Theorie der Kunst bei den Alten, Breslau, 1834, pp. 27-129), Arnold Ruge (Die Plat. 
 Aesthetik, Halle, 1832), Wilh. Abeken (De /i'M'io'E'us apud Platonem et Arist. notione, Gott. 1836), Eassow 
 ( Ueber die Benrtheilung des Homerischen Epos bei Plato und bei Aristoteles,i^\e\.i\'n, 1850), Ch. Leveque 
 (Platon, fondaieur de VeHthetique, Paris, 1857), K. Justi (Die usthet. Elemente in der Platonischen 
 Philos., Marburg. ISGO), Th. Striiter (Studien zur Geschichte der Aesthetik, Heft 1: Die Idee des Schonen 
 bei Plato, Bonn, 1861 ; cf Boumann's review of this work in Michelet's Journal Der Geda7>ke. Vol. VI., 
 Berlin, 1865, pp. 14-25), Jos. Reber (PL und die Poesie, Inaug.-Diss., Munich, 18G4), Max Eemy (PL 
 doct. de artibus liberal., Halle, 1864), A. H. Raabe (De poetica Plat, philos. natvra, in amoris expositione 
 conspieua, Rotterdam, 1866), C. von Jan (Die Ton<irten bei PL, in the J^. Jahrb.f. Ph. und Pud.. 95, 1867, 
 pp. 815-826). 
 
 On Plato's doctrine of education, cf. Anne den Tex (De vi mxisices ad excol. hcrm. e sent. Plot., Utr. 
 1816), G. A. Blunie (De Platonis liberorum educ. disciplina, Ilalle, 1818), Ch. Schneider (De gymnastica 
 in civ. Plat., Breslau, 1817), Ad. Bartholom. Kayssler (Fragmente aus Plato's und Goethe's Pddagogik, 
 Breslau, 1821), C. Stoy (De auctoritate in rebus paedag. a Plat. civ. principibus tributa, Jen. 1932), 
 Alexander Kapp (Platonis Ereiehungslehre, Minden, 1888), Wiese (In optima Plat, civiiaie qualis »it
 
 Plato's ethics. 131 
 
 pueroriim institutu), Prenzlav. 1834), E. Snethlage (i9a« et/ti«che Prineip. der Plat. Erziehung, 'Berhn. 
 18-34), W. Baumgarten-Crusius (Dindplina juvenilin Plat, cum nostra comp., Meissen, 1836), K. H. Lach- 
 maun (Plat. Vor,^t. von Rechttmd Erziehung, Ilirschberg, 1849), Arens (Z)ie relig. Erziehuny dee Plat. 
 StaataburgerH, Oldenburg. 1853), Bomback (Entwickelung der Plat. Erziehmtgslehre, Rottweil, 1854), Vol- 
 qaardsen (Plat. Idee dee per/ionl. Oeinteti und seine Lehren ilber Erziehung, etc., Berlin, 1860), Baunard 
 (Quid apud Graecos de iiwtitutione puerorum senserit Plato, Orleans, 1860), Hahn {LHe pddagog. 
 Mythen Plato's, Parchim, 1860), L. Wittmann (Erziehung xmd Unterricht bei Plato, Giessen, 1S68), Cuers 
 (PI. u. Arist. Ansichten vber den padagog. Bildun^sgehalt der Kilnste, in the Jf. Jahrb. /. Philol. und 
 Padag., Vol. 98, 1868, pp. 521-658). 
 
 The possession of the Good, according to Plato, is happiness (Sympos., 240 e : Krr/aei 
 yap ayaOuv oi evdatfiove^ cvdaifioveq. Sympos., p. 202 e : evdai/iovag -ovq Tayafia koI koJA 
 KEKTT//xevovg. Cf. Gcrg., p. 508 b. : 6iKaioavvTiq koI auxppoavvrjg KTrjcei evSai/iove^ oi evSai/wvec, 
 Kaidag 6e ol adXtoi adXiot). Happiness depends on culture and justice or on the possession of 
 moral beauty and goodness ((?or^., p. 470 d). Rep., IV. p. 420 b: "Our object in found- 
 ing the state is, that not a class, but that all may be made as happy as possible." The 
 ethical end of man is described by Plato as resemblance to God, the absolutely good, in 
 Rep., X. 613 a; Theaet, 176. Through his psychological doctrine of the different faculties 
 or parts of the soul, Plato was enabled to do what for other disciples of Socrates, such 
 as Euclid and Anlisthenes, was, as it seems, impossible, viz. : to demonstrate a plurality 
 of virtues as comprehended within the one general conception of virtue. The parallel 
 between virtue in the state and in the individual is introduced by Plato with the remark, 
 that in the former we read, as it were, in larger characters the same writing, which in 
 the latter is written in smaller ones {Rep., II. p. 368). 
 
 The Platonic theory of the state borrows many of its special provisions from tlie Hel- 
 lenic, and especially from the Doric legislation. But its essential tendency is not (as K. F. 
 Hermann and others affirm) toward the restoration and intensification of the Old- Hellenic 
 principle of the unreflecting subordination of the individual to the whole. It is rather an 
 advance upon all Hellenic forms whatever and an anticipation of institutions which were 
 afterward approximately realized, notably in the Hierarchy of the Middle Ages.* 
 
 * As Plato's theory of ideas points beyond the sensible phenomenon and sees the truly real only in 
 absolutely existent essences, exalted above time and space and figured as dwelling beyond the heavens, so 
 Plato'8 ethico-political ideal points beyond the terrestrial ends of political society (on which, however, the 
 genesis of the state originally depends. Rep., II. p. 369 seq.) to the cognition and realization of a transcend- 
 ent ideal good. The sensible may, indeed, participate in the ideal : the latter may shine through the former 
 and lend it proportion and beauty (Pfuiedr., Sympos.) ; but the ultimate and supreme duty of man is, 
 nevertheless, to eseipe from the sensible world to the ideal (Tlieaet., p. 176a: rreipao-flot xp'v ii'SiyStv 
 fKt'urt <^evyeiv on TcixKTTa, by which is attained oftoiucri; flew Kara, to fiuvoToi'). Thus, while the class of 
 philosophers in the state are not, indeed, to p.iss their lives in pure contemplation alone, and while they are 
 not to have their own ideal good only in view, but are to have a care for their fellow-citizens who exercise 
 the inferior functions, their supreme destination and at the same time their fullest satisfaction are to be 
 found in contc niplation itself, culminating in cognition of the idea of the good (Rep., VII. p. 519). Plato 
 seeks to assure the supremacy of the idea in the state, not by requiring the consciousness of all to be filled 
 and permeated by it, and so developing a universal community of mind and spirit, but by providing a par- 
 ticular class, who are to live for it, and to whom the other classes owe unconditional obedience, the members 
 of that class being alienated from sensible and individual interestsby the extermination of these interests, so 
 far as possible. Precisely the same motives gave rise, at a later epoch, to the Mediaval Hierarchy. If it be 
 assumed that Platonism was among the causes which led to the development of that hierarchy, its influence 
 must be conceived as mainly indirect and exerted through the doctrines of Philo, the Nco-Platonists, and 
 the Church Fathers, all of whom had been especially attracted and influenced by the Platonic doctrine of 
 the ultra-phenomenal world. But an equally influential cause was the example of the Jewish hierarchy. 
 Whatever judgment may be passed on the question of historic dependence, and setting aside many specific 
 difi"erences, the general chanacter of the Platonic state and that of the Christian Hierarchy of the Middle 
 Ages are essentially the same. In the former the philosophers occupy nearly the same position with refer- 
 ence to the other classe* which in the latter the priests occupied with reference to the laity. In ordering
 
 132 Plato's ethics. 
 
 In Plato's ideal state it was impossible that ancient Greek art, especially the Homeric 
 poetry, whieu ran ^wviuter to Plato's rigid conception of moral dignity in the control of the 
 passions, should find a place. If the phenomenal is an imitation of the ideal, that art, 
 which in turn imitates the phenomenal, can only be of inferior worth. Only that art 
 which imitates the good can be recognized as fully legitimate. Beauty is the shining of 
 the ideal through the sensible. The Idea, which is the One as opposed to the plurality of 
 phenomena, manifests itself in the phenomenal in the relations of proportion. The deri- 
 vation of beauty from the ideal is emphasized by Plato in the Phaedrus, Symposian, and 
 Republic, while its formal side is especially considered in dialogues of later composition 
 ( Timaeus and Philebus ; Eippias Major is probaljly spurious). 
 
 The various forms of government are ranked in the Republic as follows : The Ideal 
 State (government of the philosophically cultivated), Timocracy (ascendency of the dv- 
 fioeuUg over the TioytaTiKov, of military prowess over culture). Oligarchy (participation ir 
 the government conditioned on the amount of one's possessions, which minister to eTn6vfiid^ 
 Democracy (freedom, abolition of distinctions of worth). Tyranny (complete perversion of 
 justice through the supremacy of the bad). In the Politicus, six forms are enumerated, in 
 the following order : Monarchy (legal government of one individual), Aristocracy (legal 
 government of the rich), Legal Democracy, Illegal Democracy, Oligarchy (lawless goveru- 
 meut of the rich), Tyranny (lawless government of one person). The character of the 
 citizens coresponds naturally with the character of the government. To take part in the 
 government of bad states is impossible for the philosopher, because it would degrade him. 
 So lo!ig as such states continue to exist, he can only withdraw himself from public life, 
 and lead, in the company of a few friends, a life of contemplation {Theaet, p. 173 seq. ; 
 compare what is said, perhaps in opposition to Isocrates, in Rep., VI. p. 487 seq., respect- 
 ing the reason why the ablest philosophers could be of no service to the states as then 
 actually constituted). 
 
 For the education of the children of the rulers and warriors of the ideal state, Plato 
 provides in the Rep. as follows: From the 1st to the 2d year, care of the body; from 3 to 
 6, narration of myths; from 7 to 10, gymnastics; from 10 to 13, reading and writing; from 
 14 to IG, poetry and music; from 16 to 18, mathematical sciences; from 18 to 20, military 
 exercises. Then follows a first sifting. Persons possessing an inferior capacity for 
 science, but capable of bravery, remain simply warriors ; the rest go on, until the age of 
 30, learning the sciences in a more exact and universal form than was possible in their 
 earlier, youthful years. In this period, topics previously learned separately are appre- 
 hended in their mutual relations as parts of one whole ; this at the same time furnishes 
 the test of the talent for dialectic, for the dialectician must be able to comprehend many 
 things in one view (6 yap ^vvotttikoc dialsKTiKuq iarn). Then comes a second sifting. 
 The less promising are assigned to practical public offices. The rest pursue, from the age 
 of 30 to 35, the study of dialectic, and then assume and hold positions of authority until 
 the 50th year. After this they attain finally to the highest degree in philosophy, the con- 
 templation of the idea of the good ; at the same time they are received into the number of 
 rulers and fill in turn the highest offices of the state, being charged with the superin- 
 tendence of the entire government. Most of the time in this last period of their lives 
 they are permitted to devote to philosophical contemplation. 
 
 the strict subordination of the individual to the whole, the Platonic state agreed no less with the Grecian 
 stite in its early historic form than with the Church of the Middle Ages. But in the kind and the sense of 
 the subordination thus required it was more akin to the latter. For the subordination required by the 
 Platonic state is by no moans unreflecting, bounded by mere custom and subserving simply the power and 
 greatness of the state. It rests on the authority of a finished system of doctrines, and its tendency is, in 
 the highest degree, toward the promotion of purely spiritual ends.
 
 THE OLD, MIDDLE, AND NEW ACADEMIES. 1 
 
 oo 
 
 § 44. It is the custom of historians to distinguish, among the pro- 
 fessed disciples of Plato, three, or, by a more circumstantial division, 
 five consecutive tendencies or schools. These are the Old, Middle, 
 and New Academies : the Old Academy including the first school, the 
 Middle Academy including the second and third schools, and the 
 New Academy, the fourth and fifth. To the first Academy belong : 
 Speusippus, Plato's sister's son and the successor of Plato as Scho- 
 larch (which office he held from 347 to 339), who pantheistically 
 represents the Best or Divine as first indeed in rank, but as chrono- 
 logically the last product of development, and who finds the principle 
 of ethics in the happiness of a life conformed to nature ; Xenocrates 
 of Chalcedon, who succeeded Speusippus in the directorship of the 
 Academy (339-314), and who identifies ideas with numbers, and 
 founds on the doctrine of numbers a mystical theology; Heraclides 
 of Pontus, who distinguished himself especially in astronomy, teach- 
 ing the daily rotation of the earth on its axis from West to East and 
 the immobility of the firmament of the fixed stars ; Philip the Opun- 
 tian, author of the Epinomis (which is a continuation of the Lav:s of 
 Plato) ; Ilermodorus, who was likewise one of Plato's immediate dis- 
 ciples, and who contributed to the spread of Plato's doctrines, espe- 
 cially his unwritten ones; and Polemo, Grantor, and Crates, who 
 redirect attention chiefly to ethical inquiries. In the Middle Academy 
 a skeptical tendency becomes more and more prominent. The heads 
 of this Academy M-ere Arcesilas (315-241 b. c), the founder of what 
 is called the second Academy, and Carneades (214-129), the founder 
 of the third Academic school. The New Academy returned to Dog- 
 matism. It commenced with Philo of Larissa, founder of the fourth 
 school, who lived at the time of the first Mithridatic war. His pupil, 
 Antiochus of Ascalon, founded a fifth school by combining the doc- 
 trines of Plato with certain Aristotelian and more particularly with 
 certain Stoic theses, thus preparing the way for the transition to Neo- 
 Platonism. 
 
 On the Old Academy, cf. Zeller, Ph. d. Gr., 2d ed., II. a, pp. 641-698. On Speusippus, Rav-iigsoii, 
 Spe>i*ipp. Pldc, P.iris, 1S38; M. A. Fischer, De iip. vita, Kast. 1S45; Krische, Forschun(/en, I. pp. 247-2.'S. 
 On Xenocrates: Wynpersse, Diatribe de Xenocrate C/ialcedonio, Leyden, 1S22; Krische, Forschungen. I. 
 pp. 311-324. On Heraclides : Roulez, De Vit. et Scnptis fferaclidis Pontici, Louvain,lS2S; E. Deswert, De 
 HerofUde Pont. ibid. ISJ^O; Fianz Schmidt, De Ileraclidae Pont, et Dicaearchi Jfes-seuii dialogis diper- 
 ditis (Diss. Jnaug.),BTes]nv.lb6-i ; cf. Muller, Fragm. Hist. Gr., II. p. 197 seq. ; Krische, Forsc/iuiigen, 1. j.p. 
 S24-336. On Eudoxus; L. Ideler, Veber Eiidoo'w, in the Ah?i. der £erl. Akad d. TI7«s., 1S2&, 1S30; Aup. 
 Boecfeh, Ueber die vierydhrigen Sonnenkreise der Alten. vorzUglich den Eudna-ischen, Berlin, 1S63; cf., 
 George Cornewall Lewis, Historical Survey of the Ancient Astronomy, ch. III., sect. 8. p. 146 seq. On 
 Eudoxus of Cnidus, the geographer (about 255 b. c), who must be distinguiBhed from Eudoxus the pbilobo-
 
 134 THE OLD, MroOLE, AND NEW ACADEMIES. 
 
 pher, and who was the author of a y^s >repio8os, as also on Geminus the astronomer (about 137 b. c), cf. H. 
 
 BrandfS, in the Jahrb. f. Ph., LXIV. 1852, p. 268 seq., and in the Jahrb. des Vereins/ilr Erdkunde zu 
 Leipsig, Leips. 1866. On Hermodorus, cf. Ed. Zeller, 2>e Hemwdoro Ephesdo et Hermodoro Platmiis di»- 
 oipvlo, Marb. 1859. On Grantor: F. Schneider, De Oranloris SolennUi philonophi Acadetnicomim philo- 
 tophiae addicti libro, gzii n-epl 7rei/0ovs inscribitor commentatio, in the Zeitmhr.filr die Alterthumfiwins, 
 1836, Nos. 104, 105; M. Herm. Ed, Meier, Ueber die Schrift des Krantor -inpi TtivOovi;, Halle, 1840; Frid. 
 KsLyaer, De Crantore AcMlemico <^i««., Heidelb., 1841. On the later Academics: Fr. Dor. Gerlach, <?om- 
 tnentatio exhibens Acade^nixiorum jwniomm, imprimis Arcesilae atque Carneadix de pi-obabilitate 
 disjytttaiione^, Gott. 1815; I. Rud. Thorbecke, Jn dogmaiiois oppugnaiidis nuTnquid inter academicos et 
 scepticos inter-fuerit, ZwoUae Batav., 1820; Rich. Brodersen, De Arcesilao philosopko academico, Altona, 
 1821; Aug. G&Sera,DeArce8ila (O.-Pr.). Gott. 1841 ; Td., DeArcesilae sncceasoribuSy ibid. 1845; cf. Zeller, 
 Ph. d. Gr., 2d ed.. III. a, p. 448 seq.; Roulez, De Carneade, annul. Gondav., 1824-25; C. J. Grysar, Die 
 Academiker Philo imd Antiockug, Cologne, 1849 ; C. F. Hermann, Disputatio de Philone Larriseaeo, 
 Gott. 1851; Disput. altera, ibid. 1B55; Krische, in the GoU. Stud., II. 1845, pp. 126-200; Zeller, PA. d. 
 Gr., 2d ed., HI. a, p. 522 ; David d'Allemand, De Antiocho Ascalonita, Paris, 1856; cf. Krische, Gott. Stud.^ 
 II. 160-170; Zeller, Fh. d. Gr., 2d ed., III. a, pp. 530-540. 
 
 That Speusippus was the immediate successor of Plato in the leadership of the Acad- 
 emy is testified by Diog. L., IV. 1. Aristotle not unfrequently makes mention of his 
 opinions, especially in the Metaph., but often without naming him; he expressly ascribes to 
 him, with the Pythagoreans, a doctrine of pantheistic character (Metaph., XII. 7 : vnolafi- 
 j3dvov(nv . . . oi Ilvd^aydpeioi Kal "LnevauKizot;, to KaTCktarov Kai apiarov fif] iv apxv f'^'Oi, 6ia to 
 Kal Tuv (j)ijTuv Kal Tuv ^uuv Tag apxoc alTia fiev elvai^ to 6e /caAov /cat riTieiov iv Toig in tovtutv). 
 According to Stob., Eel, I. p. 58, he rejected the (Platonic) identification of the one (ev), the 
 good (ayadov), and the reason {vovg). He assumed (like Pseudo-Philolaus, who perhaps 
 followed his example, but who, however, illogically joined the doctrine of this assumption 
 with other heterogeneous doctrines) a rising gradation of existences, positing the abstract 
 as the earliest and most elementary, and the more concrete as later and higher. Aristotle 
 says (3Iet., YII. 2) that Speusippus, commencing with the " One " (ev), assumed a greater 
 number of classes of essences than Plato, and that for each class, namely, for numbers, 
 the geometrical figures, and the soul, he posited different principles. Speusippus seems to 
 have denied the existence of Ideas (whereas Xenocrates identified them with mathematical 
 objects). The soul was defined by him (Stob., Ed. Phys., I. 1 ; Plut., De Anim. Procr., 22) a.s 
 extension shaped harmoniously by number, hence, as in some sense, a higher unity of the 
 arithmetical and the geometrical. According to Cic. {Nat. D., I. 1 3) he assumed a vis ani- 
 malis, qua omnia regantur. His ethical principle is thus expressed by Clem. Alex. {Strom., 
 II. 418 d) : STrei'CTfTTTrof tt/v evdaifiov'iav (brjalv e^iv dvai TEleiav ev roif /card (pvaiv ixovatv, 
 f] E^tv aya-&uv. 
 
 Xenocrates of Chalcedon (396-314 B. c.) distinguished (according to Sext. Empir., Adv. 
 Math., VII. 147) three classes of essences: the sensible, the inteUigible, and the inter- 
 mediate, the latter being the objects of opinion {So^a)- the intelligible lay beyond the 
 heavens {cKTog ovpavov), the sensible within the heavens {evTog ovpavov), while the do^aaTov, 
 or matter of opinion, was identical with the heavens themselves, since these could be both 
 perceived and scientifically contemplated. (To him are to be referred the words in Arist., 
 Met., VII. 2 : ivioi ds to. fxiv Eldrj Kal toi-c apc&ijovg tt/v avT^v exsiv (paal ipvaiv, ra 6e ak7.a 
 kxOfJ-Eva, ypafifiaq Kal inineda, p-ixP'^ npbq tt/v tov ovpavov ova'tav Kal to. aifrdr/Ta). Out of 
 the "One" and the "Indefinite Duad" he constructed all existences (Theophrast., Met., 3, 
 p. 312). He defined the soul as self-moving number, api6fxdv avTov v<p' iavrov Kivovfievov 
 (Plut., De An. Procr., 1, cf. Arist., De An., I. 2, 4; Analyt. Post., II. 4). In the symbolical 
 u.se of the names of the gods, Xenocrates indulged in an almost childish play. Happines.s 
 was described by him (according to Clem., Strom., II. p. 419 a) as resulting from our pos- 
 session of the virtue proper to us (okttaf apeTf/g) and of power devoted to its service.
 
 THE OLD, MIDDLE, AND NEW ACADEMIES. 135 
 
 Among tlie earliest disciples of Plato belongs Eudoxus of Cnidus, who was subse- 
 quently distiuguished as a mathematician and astronomer (and lived about 406-353 B. c). 
 He heard Plato perhaps about 383, and went to Egypt probably about 378 (not first in 362) 
 with a letter of recommendation from Agesilaus to King Nektanebus. At Heliopolis he 
 studied astronomy ; at Tarentum, under Archytas, geometry ; and iu Sicily, under Philistion, 
 medicine (as Diog. L., YIII. 86, reports, following the HivaKeg of Callimachus). He after- 
 ward taught in Cyzicus and Athens, and finally returned to Cnidus, his native city, where 
 he erected au astronomical observatory. At Athens Menaechmus and Helicon wore 
 among his pupils in geometry ; Helicon accompanied Plato in his third voyage to Sicily 
 (361 B. c. ; see Pseudo-Plat., Ep., XIII. p. 360 d; Plutarch, Dion., ch. 19). In ethics 
 Eudoxus maintained the Hedonic doctrine (Arist., Eth. N., X. 2, 3). 
 
 Heraclides of Heraclea on the Pontus, to whom (according to Suidas) Plato intrusted 
 the direction of the Academy during his last journe}' to Sicily, occupied himself, among 
 other things, with the question thus propounded (according to Simplic, In Arist. De Coelo, 
 f. 119) by Plato (in a form distinguished for its logical merits): rivuv vTroredeiaov ofiaAuv 
 Kai TETay/ievuv Kivi/aeuv SiaacjOy ra rrept rag klvtjgek; ruv TrTiavufievuv (f>aiv6fin'a, or " what 
 uniform and regulated motions can be assumed (to explain the phenomena of the universe), 
 whose consequences will not be in contradiction with the phenomena." The form of this 
 question gives evidence of a consciousness already very highly developed, of the correct 
 method of investigation, and • involves only the error of supposing that mathematical 
 regularity as such necessarily belongs to the actual movements of nature, so that the 
 research for real forces, from whose activity these motions arise, seemed unnecessary. 
 Eudoxus is said to have proposed several hypotheses in reply to the above Platonic ques- 
 tion, but decided in favor of the immobility of the earth. Heraclides, on the contrary (with 
 Ecphantus the Pythagorean, whom he also followed in his doctrine of atoms), decided for 
 the theory of the revolution of the earth on its axis (Plut., Flac. Philos., III. 13). Hera- 
 clides regarded the world as infinite in extent (Stob., Ed., I. 440). 
 
 Hermodorus was an immediate pupil of Plato, and we are indebted to him for a number 
 of notices respecting the life and doctrines of his master (see above, § 39, p. 100, and 
 § 41). From his work on Plato, Dercyllides (see below, § 65) borrowed data relative to 
 the Platonic Stoicheiology. Perhaps it was these "unwritten doctrines" which constituted 
 the Myoi, with which Hermodorus traded in Sicily, whence the saying to which Cicero 
 alludes {Ad Att., XTII. 21 : 7.6yoiaiv 'Ep/u66upog efiTropsveTat). 
 
 Philip the Op>mtian, the mathematician and astronomer (cf. Boeckh, Sonnenkreise. p. 
 34 seq.), is the reputed author of the Epinomis. The revision and publication of the manu- 
 script of the Leges, which was left by Plato unfinished, are also ascribed to him (Diog. L., 
 III. 37, and Suidas sub voce (piMao(pog). 
 
 Polemo, who followed Xenocrates as head of the school (314-270). gave his atten- 
 tion mainly to ethics. He demanded (according to Diog. L., IV. 18) that men should 
 exercise themselves more in right acting than in dialectic. Cicero gives (Acad. Pr., 11. 43) 
 the following as his ethical principle: honeste vivere, fruentem rebus iis, quas primers homini 
 natura conciliet. To liis intiuence on Zeno, Cicero bears witness, De Fin., TV. 16, 45. 
 
 Crantor is termed by Proclus {Ad Tim., p. 24) the earliest expounder of Platonic 
 writings. As the living tradition of Plato's doctrines died out, his disciples began 
 more and more to consult his written works. Crantor's work on Sorrow {rrepl irevdoix) 
 is praised by Cicero {Tusc, I. 48, 115; cf. III. 6, 12). He assigns (in a fragment, ap. 
 Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., XI. 51-58) the first place among good things to virtue, the 
 second to health, the third to pleasure, and the fourth to riches. He combats the Stoic 
 requirement that the natural feehngs should be suppressed (in accord with Plat., R^.^
 
 136 THE OLD, MIDDLE, AND Ni:W ACADEMIES. 
 
 X. 603 e). Grantor died before Polemo (Diog. Laer., IV. 27). Crates directed the school 
 after Polemo. 
 
 The successor of Crates was Arcesilas or Arcesilaus, who was born, about 315 b. c, at 
 Pitane iu yEoha, and had at first attended upon the instructions of Theophrastus, but after- 
 ward became a pupil of Crantor, Polemo, and Crates. Of his habit of abstaining (eTroxy) 
 from judgment and of disputing on both sides, Cicero tells us {De Orat, III. 18 : quern ferunt 
 primum instituisse, non quid ipse sentiret ostendere, sed contra id quod quisque se sentire dixisstt, 
 disputane; of. Diog. L., IV. 28: npuroq 6e e'lq kKcirepov enex^ipv'^^''')- He is said (Cic, 
 Acad. Post., I. 12) to have taught that we can know nothing, not even the fact of our 
 inability to know. But this (according to Sext. Emp., Hyp. Fyrrh., I. 234 seq., and others) 
 was only for the discipline and testing of his pupils, to the best-endowed of whom he was 
 accustomed afterward to communicate the Platonic doctrines. Of this explanation (ac- 
 cepted by Geffers, disputed by Zeller) we may admit that, in view of the nature of the 
 case, it is credible, in so far as a head of the Academy could hardly break at once and 
 completely with the theory of ideas and the doctrines founded on it ; only this explanation 
 does not necessarily imply an unconditional assent to that theory and to those doctrines. 
 According to Cic, Acad. Post, I. 12, Arcesilas combated unceasingly the Stoic Zeno. He 
 contested especially (according to Sext. Emp., Hyp. Pyrrh., I. 233 seq.. Adv. Math., VII. 
 153 seq.) the naralrj-ilnq and avyKaradeaig of the Stoics (see below, § 53), j^et recognized the 
 attainability of the probable {to evXoyov), and found in the latter the norm for practical 
 conduct. Aristo, the Stoic, parodying Hiad, VI. 181, said (according to Diog. L., IV. 33, 
 and Sext. Emp., Pyrrhon. Hypotypos., I. 232) that Arcesilas was: 
 
 ■trpoade H/mtuv, brndev Jlvppuv, jiiaaoq AioSupot;, 
 
 or, " Plato in front, Pyrrho behind, and Diodorus in the middle." 
 
 Arcesilas was followed in the leadership of the school (241 B. c.) by Lacydes, Lacydes 
 (in 215) by Telecles and Evander, the latter by Hegesinus, and he by Carneades. 
 
 Carneades of Cyrene (214-129; he came as an embassador to Rome in the year 155 
 E. c, together with Diogenes the Stoic and Critolaus the Peripatetic) went still farther in 
 the direction of Skepticism. He disputed, in particular, the theses of Chrysippus the Stoic. 
 Expanding the skeptical arguments of Arcesilas, he declared knowledge to be impossible, 
 and the results of dogmatic philosophy to be uncertain. His pupil, Clitomachus (who fol- 
 lowed him in the presidency of the School, 129 B. c), is related (Cic, Acad. Pr., II. ch. 45) 
 to have said: "it had never become clear to him what the personal opinion of Carneades 
 (in ethics) was." Cicero {De Orat, I. 11) calls Carneades, as an orator, hominem omnium 
 in dicendo, id ferehaiit, acerrimum et copiosissimum. While at Rome he is said to have 
 delivered on one day a discourse in praise of justice, and on the next to have demonstrated, 
 on the contrary, that justice was incompatible with the actual circumstances in which men 
 live, and in particular to have hazarded the observation, that if the Romans wished to 
 practice justice in their political relations, they would be obliged to restore to the rightful 
 owners all that they had taken away by force of arms, and then return to their huts 
 (Laetant., Inst., V. 14 seq.). To the doctrine of cognition his most important contribution 
 was the theory of probability {e/j.(paGic, •mdav6Trj(;). He distinguished three principal 
 degrees of probability: a representation may be, namely, either 1) probable, when con- 
 sidered by itself alone ; or 2) probable and unimpeached, when compared with others ; 
 or 3) probable, unimpeached, and in all respects confirmed (Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math., 
 VII. 166), 
 
 Philo of Larissa, a pupil of Clitomachus, came in the time of the first Mithridatio 
 war to Rome, where Cicero heard him (Cic, Brut, 89). He appears to have given hii
 
 aeistotle's 
 
 LIFE. 137 
 
 attention chiefly to Ethics, and, in treating the subject, to have inclined toward the 
 method of the Stoics, although remaining in general their opponent. 
 
 Antiochus of Ascalon, Philo's disciple, sought to show that the chief doctrines of the 
 Stoics were to be found already in Plato (Sext. Emp., Pyrrh. Hyp., I. 235). He differed 
 from the Stoics in rejecting the doctrine of the equality of all vices, and in holding that 
 virtue alone, though producing a happy life, is not productive of the happiest of lives ; in 
 other respects he agreed with them almost entirely (Cic, Acad. Pr., II. 43). 
 
 § 45. Aristotle, born 384 b. c. (Olymp. 99.1) at Stagira (or Sta- 
 geiros) in Thrace, and son of the physician Nicomachus, became in 
 his eighteenth year (367) a pupil of Plato, and remained such for 
 twenty years. After Plato's death (347) he repaired with Xenocrates 
 to the court of Hermias, the ruler of Atarneus and Assos in Mysia. 
 He remained there nearly three years, at the expiration of which 
 time he went to Mitylene and afterward (343) to the court of Philip, 
 king of Macedonia, where he lived more than seven 3'ears, until the 
 death of that monarch. He was the most influential tutor of Alexan- 
 der from the thirteenth to the sixteenth years of the life of the latter 
 (343-340). Soon after Alexander's accession to the throne, Aristotle 
 founded his school in the Lyceum, over which he presided twelve 
 years. After the death of Alexander, the anti-Macedonian party at 
 Athens preferred an accusation against Aristotle, for which religion 
 was called upon to furnish the pretext. To avoid persecution, Aris- 
 totle retired to Chalcis, where he soon afterward died, Olymp. 114.3 
 (322 B. c.) in the sixty-third year of his age 
 
 On the life of Aristotle, compare Dionys. Hal., Epint. ad Anitnaeum, I. 5; Diog. Laert., V. 1-S5; 
 Buidas (the work edited by Menagiua agrees in its biographical part word for -word with the first and 
 larger part of the article by Suidas; but there is appended to it a list of the writings of Aristotle, which 
 reproduces, with some omissions and some additions, the catalogue of Diogenes Laertius ; cf. Curt 
 Wachstnuth, De Fotitibtis Suidae, ia Symbola philol. BonneJisium, I. p. 13S) ; (Pseudo-) Ilesychius; 
 (Pseudo-) Ammonius, Vita Arint., with which the Vita e cod. Murciano, publishi-d by L. lloblje, Leyden, 
 1861, agrees almost throughout; an old Latin work on the life of Aristotle, e<l. Nunnez, Barcelona, 1594, 
 Leyden, 1621, 1681, llelrasL 1666, is a third redaction of the same Vita. The Biographies of Aristotle 
 by Aristoxenus, Aristocles, Timotheus, Hermippus, ApoUodorus, and others are lost The chronology 
 of Aristotle's life, as given by Diogenes L, is taken from the xP°'"-'"^ "^ ApoUodorus; Dionys. Halic. 
 appears to have drawn from the same source. J. G. Buhle, Vita AHstoteUs per annos digesta, in the 
 first volume of the Bipontine edition of the works of Aristotle. Ad. Stahr, Aristotelia (Part L, on the 
 life of Aristotle of Stagira), Halle, 1S30. George Henry Lewes, Aristotle, a Chapter from the History of 
 Science., London, 1S64 (translated into German by Victor Carus, Leipsic, 1865); the first chapter is on the 
 life of Aristotle. Cf. Aug. Boeckh, Hermias ron Atarneus, in the Af/h. der Akad. der Wisa. ki^st.-phil. 
 CI, Berlin, 1853, pp. 133-157. 
 
 On Aristotle's relations with Alexander, cf. K. Zoll {Arist. ah Lfhrer des Alexander, in: Ferien- 
 echriften, Freiburg, 1826), Friil. Guil. Car. Hogel {Ve AiHstotele et Alearandro magno, Berlin, 1887), 
 P. 0. Kngelbrecht {Ceber die wichtigsten Lehensumfitande des Aristoteles und sein Verhliltniss su 
 Alexander dem Grossen, hexonders in Beziehting auf seine Naturstudien, Eisleben, 1845). Kob. Geier 
 (Alexander und Aristoteles in ihren gegenseitigen Beziehungen. Halle, 1856), Egger {Aristote conaidiri 
 comme preoeptenr d' Alexandre, Caen, 1862, Extrait des Jfim. de VAcad. de Caen), Mor. Carriire (^Alexan- 
 der und Aristoteles, in Westermanu's Monatsh., Febr., 1S65).
 
 /38 akistotlk's life. 
 
 Not only Aristotle's father, but also his ancestors, were physicians ; they traced their 
 pedigree to Machaon, the son of Asclepius. The father, Nicomachus, resided as physician- 
 in-ordinary at the court of the Macedonian king Amyntas at Pella. From a comparison 
 of the statements respecting the time of Aristotle's death, and his age at that time, as also 
 respecting the age of Aristotle at the time of his coming to Athens and the date of his con- 
 nection with Plato, it appears probable that his birth occurred in the first half of the Olym- 
 piadic year, hence in 384 B. c. Soon after the first arrival of Aristotle in Athens, Plato 
 undertook his visit to Dio and the younger Dionysius, from which he returned three years 
 later. Respecting the details of the early education of Aristotle we are not informed. It is 
 easily supposable that he early, and while Plato was yet living, came to entertain opinions 
 deviating from those of his master, and that he also gave open expression to them. It is 
 possible that the anecdote is genuine which represents Plato as having said that Xenocratea 
 needed the spur, but Aristotle the bridle. But it is improbable that Plato was himsel/ 
 the author of the comparison of Aristotle to a foal kickmg at its mother ; for Plato was 
 not a partisan of the principle of authority, and was certainly not ofi'ended by opposition 
 in argumentation. Plato is said to have called the house of Aristotle the reader's house, 
 and Aristotle himself, on account of his ready wit, the soul of the school. It is probable 
 that Aristotle did not set up a school of his own during the life-time of Plato. If he had 
 done so, it is unlikely that he would have immediately afterward given it up. At that 
 time he gave instruction, however, in rhetoric in opposition to Isocrates, and is reported 
 to have said, in parody of a verse of Philoctetus : " It is disgraceful to be silent, and 
 allow Isocrates to speak " (alaxpov aiungv, 'IcoKparrj & kav leyeiv, Cic, Be Ch-at, III. 35 
 et al. ; Quinct., III. 1. 14). The stories of an offensive bearing of Aristotle toward Plato 
 are refuted by the friendly relation which continued, after Plato's death, to subsist be- 
 tween Aristotle and Xenocrates, Plato's devoted disciple, when they went in company to 
 Atarneus, at the invitation of Hermias. Some verses of an elegy by Aristotle on the 
 early death of his friend Eudemus are also preserved (ap. Olympiodor. in Plat. Gorg., 
 166), in which he calls Plato a man whom the bad might not even praise [avdpoc, bv ov6' 
 alvdv toIgl KaKolai defiig), and who first showed by word and deed, how a man may be at 
 once good and liappy (uf ayadoq re koc eixWiixuv a/ua ytverai avijp). After the unhappy 
 end of Hermias, as a Persian captive, Aristotle married Pythias, the niece (or adopted 
 daughter) of Hermias. He was subsequently married to Herpyllis. 
 
 As the tutor of a prince, Aristotle was more fortunate than Plato ; it must be confessed, 
 however, that in this capacity he also labored under more favorable circumstances than 
 Plato. "Without losing himself in the pursuit of impracticable ideals, Aristotle seems to 
 have fostered the high spirit of his ward. Alexander always retained sentiments of re- 
 spect and love for his teacher, although in his last years a certain coldness existed between 
 the two (Pint, AUx., ch. 8). 
 
 Aristotle returned to Athens not long before the entrance of Alexander upon his 
 Asiatic campaign (in the second half of Olymp. 111.2, or the spring of 334), perhaps in the 
 year 335 b. c. He taught in a gymnasium called the Lyceum (consecrated to Apollo 
 AiiKeiog), in whose avenues of shade-trees {ncpi-rraToi, whence the name Peripatetics) he 
 walked, while communing with his more intimate disciples upon philosophical problems ; 
 for more promiscuous audiences he lectured sitting (Diog. L., T. 3). It is possible that 
 he also again gave rhetorical instruction, as in the period of his first residence at Athens. 
 Gellius says (jV. A., XX. 5) : E^urepiKO. dicehantur, quae ad rhetoricas meditationes facv.lta- 
 temque argutiarum civiKumque rerum notitiam conducehant ; aKpoariKa autem vocabantur, in 
 quibus philosophia remotior subtiliorque agitahatur. For his investigations in natural science 
 facilities are said to have been tendered him by Philip and, more especially, by Alexander
 
 THE W0KK3 OF ARISTOTLE. 139 
 
 (Aelian., Var. Hist., IV. 19; Athen., IX. 398 e; Plin., Hist. Nat, VIIL 16, 44). The accu- 
 sation brought against Aristotle was founded on the impiety {aaifteia) which his enemies 
 pretended to discover in his hymn in eulogy of Hermias ; it was designated by them as a 
 Pa3an, and its author was charged with having deified a man. But in fact this hymn 
 (which is preserved in Diog. L., V. 7) is a hymn to virtue, and Hermias, who had suf- 
 fered a death full of torments at the hands of the Persians, was only lauded in it as a 
 martyr to virtue. Quitting Athens (late in the summer of 323), Aristotle is related to 
 have said, alluding to the fate of Socrates, that he would not give the Athenians the 
 opportunity of sinning a second time against philosophy. His death was not caused (as 
 some report) by a self-administered poison nor by his throwing himself into the Euripus 
 (for which no cause existed), but by disease (Diog. L., V. 10, following Apollodorus ; the 
 disease appears to have been located principally in the stomach, according to Censorinus, 
 De Die Nat., 14, 16). His death (according to Gell., JV. A., XVII. 21, 35) occurred shortly 
 before that of Demosthenes, hence late in the summer of 322 B. c. 
 
 Goethe ( Werke, Vol. 53, p. 85) characterizes Aristotle, in contrast with Plato (cf. above, 
 § 39), in these words: " Aristotle stands to the world in the relation pre-eminently of a great 
 architect. Here he is, and here he must work and create. He informs himself about the 
 surface of the earth, but only so far as is necessary to find a foundation for his structure, 
 aad from the surface to the center all besides is to liim indifferent. He draws an immense 
 circle for the base of his building, collects materials from all sides, arranges them, piles 
 them up in layers, and so rises in regular form, like a pyramid, toward the sky, while 
 Plato seeks the heavens like an obelisk or, better, like a pointed flame." This charac- 
 terization of Aristotle is, indeed, not so happy as that of Plato, cited above. The empirical 
 basis, the orderly rise, the sober, clear insight of the reason, and the healthy, practical 
 instinct, are traits rightly expressed ; but when Goethe seems to assume that knowledge 
 was of interest to Aristotle only so far as it was of practical significance, he runs counter 
 to the doctrine and practice of this philosopher. Further, the methods both of Plato and 
 of Aristotle include, together with the process of ascending to the universal, the reverse 
 process of descending by division and deduction to the particular. 
 
 § 46. The writings of Aristotle were composed partly in popular, 
 partly in acroamatic form ; the latter in great part, and a very few 
 fragments of the former, are all that have come down to us, Aris- 
 totle wrote most of the works of the latter class during his last resi- 
 dence in Athens. In point of subject-matter they are divided into 
 logical, ethical, physical, and metaphysical works. His logical works 
 have received the general title of Organon. The doctrine embodied 
 in his metaphysical writings was called by Aristotle Fird Pldlosophy 
 {i. ^., the pl)ilos(^phy of lirst or ultimate principles). Of those works 
 which relate to physics or natural science, the Physics {Auscvlta- 
 tiones Physicae), and also the Natural History of Anhnals (a com- 
 parative Physiology), are of especial philosophical importance. Still 
 more important are his psychological works (three books on the Soul 
 and several minor treatises). Among his ethical works the funda- 
 mental one is his Ethics^ which treats of the duties of the individual,
 
 I4r0 THE WOKKS OF ARISTOTLE. 
 
 and which exists in a threefold form : Nicomachean Ethics (Aris 
 totle's work), Eudemean Ethics (written by Eudenius), and Magna 
 Moralia (consisting of extracts from the two first). The Politica is 
 a theory of the state on the basis of the Ethics. The Rhetoric and 
 Poetic join on partly to the logical, and still more closely to the 
 ethical works. 
 
 The works of Aristotle were first printed in a Latin translation, together with the CommeutarieB of the 
 Arabian philosopher, Averroes (about 1180), at Venice, 14S9, and afterward, ibid. 1496, 1507, 1538, 1550-62, 
 Basel. 1538, and often afterward; in Greek, first, Venetiis apud Aldmn Manutium, 1495-98; again, under 
 the supervision of Erasmus and Simon Grynaeus, Basel, 1531, 1539, and 1650 (this third Basel edition is 
 termed the Inengriniana, from Isengrin, one of its editors) ; other editions were edited by Job. Bapt. 
 Camotius, Venetiis apiid Aldi Jilios, 1551-53; Friedrich Sylburg, Francf 1584-87; Isaac Casauboiius, 
 Greek and Latin, Lyons, 1590, etc. (1696, 1597, 1605, 1646) ; Du Val, Greek and Latin, Paris, 1619, etc. (1629, 
 16;39, 1654); the last complete edition in the 17th century appeared (in Latin) at Rome, 1C68. Single 
 works, in particular the Nicom. Ethics, were very frequently edited till toward the middle of the seven- 
 teenth centurj-; after this epoch editions of single works apipeared but rarely, and no more complete edi- 
 tions were published till near the end of the eighteenth century, when an edition of the works of Aristotle 
 in Greek and Latin was commenced by Buhle, Biponti et Argentorati, 1791-lSOO. This edition was never 
 completed. The first volume contains several essays, which are still of value, particularly as relating to 
 the various editions of Aristotle and to his Greek and Latin commentators. Until the rise of Cartesianism 
 and other modern philosophies, the doctrine of Aristotle, more or less freely interpreted, it is true, in indi- 
 vidual points, was received as the true philosophy. Logic, ethics, etc., were learned from his writings at 
 Catholic universities throughout the second half of the Middle Ages, and at Protestant universities, almost 
 in the same sense in which geometry was learned from the elements of Euclid. Afterward, Aristotelianism 
 came to be widely considered as a false doctrine, and (after sustaining attacks of constantly increasing 
 frequency and virulence, beginning from the close of the Middle Ages) became even more and more univer- 
 sally neglected, except where, as at the schools of the Jesuits, tradition retained unconditional authority. 
 Thus tiie existing editions were quite sufficient to meet the diminished interest felt in their contents. 
 Leibnitz endeavored especially to appreciate justly the measure of philosophical truth contained in the 
 doctrines of Aristotle, disajiproving equally the two extremes of unconditional submission to their 
 authority, and of absolute rejection. But he made of his own monadic doctrine and of his religious convic- 
 tions too immediate a standard of judgment. (See, among others, the monograph of Dan. Jacoby, Z>e 
 Leihnitii studii^ Aristotelicis, inest inediium Leibnitii, Diss. Jnaiig., Berlin, 1867.) In the last decades 
 of the eighteenth century the historic instinct became more and more awakened, and to this fact the works 
 of Aristotle owed the new appreciation of their great value as documents exponential of the historical de- 
 velopment of philosophy. Thus the interest in the works of Aristotle was renewed, and this interest has 
 gone on constantly increasing during the nineteenth century up to the present day. The most important 
 complete edition of the present century is that prepared under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences at 
 Berlin, Vols. L and 11.. Arist-oteles Graece ex ree. Imrn. Bekkeri, Berlin, 1S31; Vol. III., Arintotelet 
 Latine interpretibus variis, ibid. 1831 ; Vol. IV., Scholia in Aristotelem collegit Chri^it. Aug. Brandig, 
 ibid. 1836; Bekker's text was reprinted at Oxford in 1837, and Bekker has himself published the principal 
 works of Aristotle separately, followed, with few exceptions, the text of the complete edition, but, unfor. 
 tunately, without annexing the Varietas led. contained in the latter. Didot has published at Paris 
 an edition, edited by Dubner, Bussemaker, and Heitz (1848-69), which is valuable. Stereotyped editions 
 were published by Tauchnitz, at Leipsic. in 1831-S2 and 1843. German translations of most of Aristotle's 
 works are contained in Metzler's collection (translated by K. L. Roth, K. Zell, L. Spengel, Chr. Walz, F. A. 
 Krenz, Ph. H. Kiilb, J. Rieckher, and C. F. Schnitzer), in Hoffmann's Library of Translations (translated 
 by A. Karsch, Ad. Stahr, and Karl Stahr), and in Engelmann's collection (Greek and German together). Of 
 the editions of separate works the following may be mentioned: — 
 
 Arist. Organon, ed. Th. Waitz, 2 vols., Leipsic, 1844-46. Arist. Categor. gr. ciimi venione Arahica 
 IsaacA Ifoneini Jil., ed. Jul. Theod. Zenker, Leipsic, 1846. Sopli. Eleuchi, ed. Edw. Poste, London, 1866. 
 
 AHst. Eth. Nicwn., ed. C. Zell, 2 vols., Heidelberg, 1820 ; ed. A. Coray, Paris, 1822 ; ed. Cardwell, Oxford, 
 1828-30; ed. C. L. Michelet, Berlin, 1829-35, 2d edition, 1848; further, separate editions of the text of 
 Bekker, 1881, 1845, 1861 ; the edition of W. E. Jelf, Oxford and London, 1856, reproducing for the most part 
 Bekker's text; the edition of Rogers, edit, altera, London, 1865, and The Ethics of Aristotle illuittrated 
 with Essays and Notes, by Sir Alex. Grant, London, 1856-68, 2d edition, 1S66. Books VIH. and IX. (On
 
 THE WORKS OF AEISTOTLE. 141 
 
 Friendship), published separately, Giessen, 1847, edited by Ad. Theod. Herm. Fritsche, who also published 
 an edition of the Eit^L Eth., Regensburg, 1S59. 
 
 Polit., ed. Ilenii. Conring, Helrast. 1656. Brunswick, 1730, ed. .1. G. Schneider, Frankfort-on-the-Oder, 
 1309; C. Gottling, Jena, 1324; Ad. Stahr, Leipsic, 18.39; B. St. Uilaire, Paris, 1837, 2d ed. 1S4S; I. Bekker, 
 Berlin (1831), 1855; Eaton, Oxford, 1855; E. Congreve, London, 1855 and 1862; Bhet, ed. Spengel, 
 Leipsic, 1867. 
 
 Poet, ed. O. nermann, Leipsic, 1802; Franz Eitter, Cologne, 1S39; E. Egger (in his Essai siir 
 rhistoire de la ct-itique chez Us G7-ecs, Paris, 1S49); B. St. Hilaire, Paris, 185S: l.'Re\.\:.er (Ar. Rhet.et 
 Poet, ab I. B. tertium ed., Berlin, 1859); Franz Susemihl (/'oe'<., in Greek and German, Leipsic, 1865); 
 Joh. Vahlen, Berlin, 1S67; F. CTeberweg (with translation and commentary), Berlin, 1869. 
 
 The Phynics of Aristotle has been published, Greek and German together, with explanatory notes, by C. 
 Prantl, Leipsic, 1854; also the works De Coelo and De Generatione et Cort~iiptione have been edited by the 
 same, Leipsic, 1S57. Arist. iiber die Farheii, erl. durch eine Uebersieht uber die Farbeniehre der Alten, 
 von Carl Prantl, Munich, 1849. Meteorolog., ed. Jul. Ltid. Idoler, Leipsic, 1834-36. B. St. Hilaire has edited 
 and published, in Greek and French, and with explanatory notes, the Physica of Arist., Paris, 1862; the 
 Meteorolog., Paris, 1867 ; the De Coelo. Paris, 1866 ; De Gen. et Car/:, together with the work De 3telimo, 
 Xenophane, Gorgia (with an Introd. »ur lei originea de la philos. grecque). Paris, 1866. De Animal. 
 Iliator., ed. J. G. Schneider, Leipsic, 1811. Vier B'ucher iiber die Theile der Tliiere, Greek and German, 
 with explanatory notes, by A v. Frantzius, Leipsic, 13.53 ; ed. Bern. Langkavel, Leipsic, 1868. Ceber die 
 Zeugu7ig und Entxcickelimg der mere, Greek and German, by Aubert and Wimmer, Leipsic, 1860; 
 Thierkunde, Greek and German, by the same, ibid. 1863. 
 
 Arist. De Amma libri tres, ed. F. Ad. Trendelenburg, Jena, 1833 ; ed. Barth. St. Hilaire, Paris, 1S46; 
 ed. A Torstrik, Berlin, 1862 (cf. P.. NoeteVs review in the Z. /. G. W., XVIII., Berlin. 1^64, pp. 131-144). 
 
 Arist. Jfetaph., ed. Brandis, Berlin, 1823; ed. Schwegler, Tub. 1847-43; ed. H. Bonitz. Bonn, 1848-49. 
 
 Many valuable contributions to the exegesis of Aristotle's works are contained in those ancient com- 
 mentaries and paraphrases which have come down to us, especially in those of Alexander of Aphrodisias, 
 the exegete (see below, § 51) of Dexippus and Themistius (see below, §69), and of Syrianus, Ammonins 
 Ilermiaefilius, Simplieius, and Philoponus (see below, § 70); also in the writings of Boethius {ibid.) and 
 others. Scholia to Aristotle have been published by Brandis, Berlin, 1836 (in Bekker's edition of the text), 
 to the Metaphysics, by Brandis, ibid. 1887, to the De Aniina (extracts from an anonymous commentary 
 on Aristotle's De Ani7na), by Spengel, Munich, 1847, and a paraphrase of the Soph. Elench., by Spengel, 
 ihid. 1842. An old Hebrew translation of the Commentary of Averroes on the Rhetoric was published 
 by J. Goldenthal, at Leipsic, in 1842. 
 
 Of modern writers on the works of Aristotle, we name the following : J. G. Bnhle, Commentatio de 
 librorum Arisiotelis distributio7ie «« exotericos et acroamaticos, Gott. 1783 (contained also in the first 
 vol. of Buhle's edition of Aristotle, Biponti, 1791, pp. 105-152), and Ueber die Editheit der Metaph. dss 
 Aristoteles, in the Bibl.f. alie Litt. u. Eu7ist, No. 4, Gott. 1788, pp. 1^2; Ueber die Ordnung und Folge 
 der Aristot. Sehr-i/ien iibe7hau2>t, ibid. No. 10, 1794, 33-47. 
 
 Am. Jourdain, Recherches critiqztes siir Vage et Forigine des tradtictions latines d^Arintote et aur les 
 oommentaires grecs ou arabes e77iployes par les doeteurs scholastiques, Paris, 1819, 2d ed. 1843. 
 
 Franc. Nicol. Titze, De Aristotelis operum serie et disti7ietio>ie, Leipsic, 1326. 
 
 Ch. A. Brandis, Veber die Schicksale der Aristotelisch-en Bilcher imd einige Kriteri07i Hirer EcMheit, 
 in the Rhei7i. Mus., I. 1827, pp. 236-254, 259-286 (cf. Kopp, Xachtrag aw Br. Vnters. iiber die Schicksale 
 d-er Arist. Biicher, ibid. III. 1, 1829) ; Ueber die Reihe7tfolge der Biicher dea Arist. Organons und ihre 
 gri^ch. Ausleger, in the Abh. der Berl. Akad. der Wiss., 1383; Ueber die Arist. Metaphysik, ibid. 1884; 
 Ueber Aristoteles' RhetG7nk wid die griech. Ausleger derselben, in the Philolpgiis, IV., 1849, p. 1 seq. 
 
 Ad. Stahr, Aristotelia, Vol. II.: Die Schicksale der A/-ist. Schriften, etc., Leipsic, 1832; Aristoteles 
 hei de7i Rmteni, ibid. 1834. 
 
 Leonl). Spengel (On Aristotle's Poetic; On the 7th Book of the Physics; On the mutual relation of 
 the three works on Ethics attributed to Aristotle; On the Politics of Aristotle; On the order of Aristotle's 
 works in natural science; On the Ehetoric of Aristotle), in the Abh. der bair. Akad. der Wiss.. 1837, 
 1841, '43, '47, '48, '51; Ueber KMnpcm rCiv na9rinaTiov bei Arist., ibid. Vol. IX. Munich, 1859; Ari.<itot. 
 Studien: Nik. Ethik; Eude77*. Ethik ; grosse Ethik ; Politik ; Poetik. in Vols. X. and XI. of the Trans, 
 of the Bavar. Acad, of Sciences, Munich. 1863-66 (cf. Bonitz, in tho Zeitschr. f. ostr.-Gy/nn. 1866, pp. 
 777-804). 
 
 Jacob Bernays, Ergdnzung au Af^toteles'' Poetik, in the Rhein. 3fus./Ur Ph., now series, VIII., 1353, 
 pp. 561-596; Gru7idziige der verloreneTi Abhandliing des Aristoteles Uber Wirkrmg der Tragodie^ in the 
 Abh. der hist, philos. Ges zu Breslau, Breslau, 18.58; Die Dialoge des Arist. i7i ihre77i VerfiaJl7iiss zu 
 seinen iibrigen Werken, Beriin, 1868. Cf. P. W. Forchhammer, AristoMea und die eacoteriachen Rederi, 
 Kiel, 1S64.
 
 142 THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE. 
 
 Herm. Bonitz, Arist. Studien, I.-V., Vienna, 1862-1867. 
 
 Valentin Rose, De Arist. librorum ordine et auctoritate, Berlin, 1854; Aristotelefs pseudepigraphus 
 (a collection of tbe fragments of the lost works, almost all of which are regarded by Rose as spurious), 
 Leipsic, 1863. 
 
 Emil Heitz, Die verlorenen Schri/ien des Aristoteles, Leipsic, 1865. 
 
 Rud. Eucken, i»<5 Arisi. dicendi ratione, pars I.: Observationes de pai-ticularum, usu, Gbtt. '{id^ 
 ("observations," which may be useful as assisting to determine the authorship of particular works i.iid 
 books, as e. g., the "observation" that the combination kclv ci, where av remains without influence upon 
 the construction, is employed by Aristotle and Eudemus in cases where Theophrastus wivuld use koI ei iij 
 Tis, and that Eudemus approaches, in general, much more nearly than Theophrastus to Aristotle in mode 
 of expression, etc. ; hut cf. the review of Eucken's dissertation by Bonitz in the Zeitschrift fiir osterr. 
 Gymn., 1866, pp. 804-812); Ueher den Sprachgebrauch des Aristoteles, Berlin. 1869; Beitrage z. Verst. 
 des Arist. in the Meue Jahrh.f. Philol. u. Pad. Vol. 99, 1869, pp. 243-252 and 617-820. 
 
 Of the Logic and logical writings of Aristotle write: Philipp Gumposch, Leipsic. 1839, F. Th. Waitz, 
 De Ar. libri n. ep/iirji-eias cap. decimo, Marb. 1S44, Ad. Textor, De Her m. At: (Inaugural Diss.), Berlin, 
 1870 (cf. §47, below). 
 
 Of the Metaphysics : C. L. Michelet, Examen critique de Touvrage d^Aristote intitule Jletaphysi^-ue, 
 ouvr. cour. par Vacad. des sc. mor. et pol., Paris, 1836; Felix Ravaisson, Essai sur In Metaphysigue 
 d'Aristote, Paris, 1837-46; Brummerstadt, Veber I^ihalt und Zusammenhang der metaph. Biicher des 
 Arist., Rostock, 1841 ; J. C. Glaser, Die Metaph. des Arist. nacli Composition, Jnhalt iind Methode, 
 Berlin, 1841; Heim. Bonitz, Observ. Criticae in Arist. libros metaphysicos, Berlin. 1842; Wilb. Christ, 
 Studia ill Arist. libros metaph. collata, Berlin, 1853. Cf. Krische, Eorschungen av/ dem Gebiete der 
 alien Philosophie I, 1840, pp. 263-276; and Bonitz and Schwegler, in their commentaries on the Met. of 
 Aristotle (cf. below, §48). 
 
 Of Aristotle's physical works: C. Prantl, De Ar. librorum ad hist, animal. pert, ordine atqite dispo- 
 sitione, Munich, 1843; Symbolae criticae in Arist. phy«. ausculiationes, Berlin, 1843; H. Thiel, De Zool. 
 Ar. I. ordine aa distrib. {6.-Pr.), Breslau, 1855; Sonnenbiirg, Zu Ar. Thiergeschiclde {G.-Pr.), Bonn, 
 1857; Ch. Thurot, Obs. crit. on Ar. De Part. Aiiimalium, in the Revue arch., 1867, pp. 233-242; on the 
 Meteorol., ibid. 1869, pp. 415-420. Cf. various works by Barth6Iemy St. Ililaire, Jessen, and others (sea 
 §49, below). 
 
 Of the Ethics and Politics: Wilh. Gottlieb Tennemann, Bern, iiber die sogen. grosse Ethik dea 
 Arist., Erfurt, 1798; F. Schleiermacher, Veber die griech. SchoUen zur Nikomuchischen Ethik des Arist. 
 (read on May 16, 1816), in S.'s Sammtliche HVrA-e, III. 2, 1833, pp. 309-826; Ueber die ethischen Werke 
 des Ari.'itoteles (read December 4, 1S17), ibid. III. 3, 1835, 306-3-33; W. Van Swinderen, De Ar. Pol. libris, 
 Groningen, 1824; Ilerm. Bonitz, Obs. Crit. in Arist. quae ferimtiir Magixa Moralia et Eth. Eudemia, 
 Berlin, 1844; A. M. Fischer, De Ethieis Xicom. et Eudem., Bonn, 1847; Ad. Trendelenburg, Ueher Stellen 
 in der Nik.-Ethik, in the Monatsher. der Berliner Acad. d. Wiss., 1850, and in Trendelenburg's l/ist. Beitr. 
 sur Philos., II., Berlin, 1855; Zur Arist. Ethik, in Uist. Beitr., III., Berlin, 1867; Job. Pttr. Nickes, De 
 Arist. PoliUcorum libris {diss, inaug), Bonn, 1851 ; J. Bendixen, Comni. de Ethicoruin Kicomachewum, 
 integritate, Ploena, 1854; Bemerkungen sum 7. Buck der Nikom. Ethik, in the Philol., X. 1855, pp. 
 199-210, 26.3-292; UebersiolU uber die neueste die Aristotelische Ethik und Politik betreffende Litt. ibid. 
 XI. 1856, pp. 351-378, 544-582, XIV. 1859, 832-372, XVI. 1860, 465-522; cf. XIII. 1858, pp. 264-301; 
 H. Hampke, Ueber dasfunfte Buck der Nik. Eth., ibid. XVI. pp. 60-84; G. TeichiiiiilUr, Zur Frage uber 
 die lieihenfolge der Biicher in der Arist. Politik, ibid. pp. 164-166; Christian Pansch, De Ethieis Nicom. 
 ffenuino Arist. libra diss., Bonn, 18.33 (cf. Trendelenburg's review of this %vork, and, in particular, his de- 
 fense against Pansch of the genuineness of the 10th Book of the Kicom. Ethics, in the Jahrb. fur loiss. 
 Kritik, 1834, p. 858 seq., and Spengel, in the Abh. der bair. Akad., III. p. 518 seq ); Clir. Pansch, De Ar. 
 Eth. Nic, VII. 12-15 and X 1-5 (G.-Pr.), Eutin, 1858 ; H. S. Anton, Quae intercedat ratio inter Eth. Nic 
 VII. 12-15 et X. 1-5, Dantzic, 1858; F. Munscher, Qnaest. crit. et exeget. in Arist. Eth. Nicom., Marburg, 
 1861 ; R. Noetel, Quaest. Ar. (de libra V. Eth. Nic.\ ( G.-Pr.), Berlin, 1862 ; F. Hacker, Das V. Buch der Nik, 
 Ethik., in the Zeitschr.f. d. G.-W., XVI. jtp. 513-560; Beitr. z. Kritik u. Erkl. des VII. Buchesder Nik. 
 Ethik, in the Zeitschr.f. d. G.-W., Berlin, 1869 (cf. 1868); H. Rassow, Observationes criticae in Aristote- 
 fewi, Berlin, 1S5S; Emendationes Aristoteleae, 'W nmar, 1861; Beitrage zur Erkldrung und Textkritik 
 der Nik. Ethik des Arist., Weimar, 1862 and 1SG8; Bemerkungen Uber einige Stellen der PoHtik des 
 Aristoteles, Weimar, 1864; Joh. Imelmann, Obs. cr. in Ar. E. N. (Diss.), Ilalle, 1S64: Moritz Vermehren, 
 Aristotelische Schriftstellen, Heft I.: zur Nikom. Ethik, Leipsic, 1864; W. Oncken, Die Wiederbelebung 
 der Arist. Politik in der dbendldndi«chen Les&welt, in the Festschrift zur Begriissung der2i. Vers, 
 deutscher Philol. u. Schulm. zu Heidelberg, Leipsic, 1865, pp. 1-lS; Die Staatslehre des Arist., Leipsic, 
 1870 ; Snsemihl, Zum ersten. zweiten und vierten Buche der PoHtik, in the Jahrb. f Ph. u. Pad., Vol. 
 XCIIL pp. 327-333, Bhein. Mus., N. 8., XX. 1865, pp. 504-517 ; XXI. 1866, pp. 551-573 ; and Zum 3, 7. «. a
 
 THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE. 143 
 
 Suche, In the PMlologus, XXV. p[i. 3S5-115; XXIX. pp. 97-119; De Aruit. Polittcarum Jihrii I. 
 et II., GrcifswaUI, 1867; Appendix, ibid. 1SG9; d. n. Lit. z. Ar. Pol. Jahrh.f. Ph., XCIX. pp. 598-610, ;il<1 
 CI. (1870), pp. »43-35lJ; Ewald BGcker, De quibusdam Pol. Ar. loeiH (Inaug. Diss.), Grelfsw. 1867 (tf. 
 below, § 50). 
 
 To the Poetic and Rhetoric of Aristotle relate (beside the works already cited of Spengel, Bornays, 
 and others) the following: Max Schmidt, De tempore quo ab Ari»t. I. de arte rhet. conficr. et ed. aint, 
 Halle, 1837; Franz Suseiiiihl, Studien zur Arintotel. Poetik, in the Rh. Miut., XVIII. p. 366 seq., 471 seq., 
 XIX. p. 197 seq., XXII. p. 217 seq.; cf. Jahn's Jahrb., 89, p. 504 seq., and 95, pp. 159-184 and 221-286; 
 Job. Vahlen, Zur Kritik ArUt. Sc/iriften (Poetic and Rhetoric), Vienna, ISGl, in the Sitzungsberichte of 
 the Vienna Acad, of Sciences, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 59-148; also, Ari«t. Lehre von der Rongfolge der Ttieile 
 der Tragbdie, in the " Gratulatiorwdirift^'' entitled SymhoUi phlUtlogorum Bonnenmum in honorem 
 Frid. RitHclielii collecta, Leipsic, 1864, pp. 155-184; Beitrdge zur Aritt. Poetik, Vienna, 1865-1867 
 (from the "Sitzungsberichte" of the Academy); Gnst Teichmiiller. Arist. Forschungen, I.: Beitrdge 
 zur Erkldrung der Poetik des Arist. (Uulle, 1867), II.: Arist. Philox. der Kunat (ibid. 1869), (cf. 
 below, § 50). 
 
 Aristotle probably composed a number of works in dialogue during his first residence at 
 Athens and in the life-time of Plato. Of this class was the dialogue Eudemvs, some frag- 
 ments of which are preserved (op. Plutarch, Dio, 22 ; Consul, ad Apol., ch. 27 ; Cic, Be 
 Div., I. 25, 53, etc.; cf. J. Bernays, in the Rhein. Mus. f. Phil., new series, XVI. 1861, pp. 
 236-246). Eudemus was a member of the Platonic circle, a friend of Aristotle, and a 
 participant in the campaign of Dio against Dionysius in Sicily, where he fell, 353 b. c. To 
 his memory Aristotle dedicated the dialogue named after him, a work in imitation of 
 Plato's Phaedo ; in it Aristotle presented arguments in favor of the immortality of the soul. 
 The first twenty-seven volumes in the catalogue of the works of Aristotle, as given by 
 Diog. Laert., V. 22-27 (cf. Anonym. Menag., 61 seq.) are writings in dialogue. They are : 
 On Justice, On Poets, On Philosophy, Politicus, Gryllus, Nerinthus, Sophist, Menexenus, 
 Eroticus, Symposion, On Riches, Protrepticus, etc. By subsequent writers these works 
 were termed exoteric, and in distinction from them the more strictlj'' scientific ones were 
 termed esoteric. In Aristotle's works the word esoteric does not occur (yet cf. Analyt. Post, 
 I. 10, p. 76 b, 27, iau ?i6}vc as 6 ei> tTj ^j>vx{l, vi opposition to efu ?M-}or)- but exoteric is 
 employed in the sense of " outwardly directed, addressed to the respondent (Trpof erepov)" 
 arguing from what appears to him to be true, in contrast to that which interests the 
 thmker who looks only at the essential (rij <piXna6(p(j kuc ^tj-tovvti KafT envrbv /ilXei • see 
 Top., VIII. 1, 151b, 9; Anal. Post, I. 10, 76 b, 24; Pol, VII. 3, 1325 b, 29, and compare 
 Thurot, in Jahn's Jahrh., 81, 18G0, p. 749 seq., and in his Etudes sur Aristote, Paris, 1860, 
 p. 214 seq. ; cf. also G. Thomas, De Ar. e^ a. deque Ciceronis Aristoielio more, Gott. 1860, and 
 Stahr, in liis Arifit., II. pp. 235-279) ; sometimes Aristotle (as Jak. Bernays has shown, Dia- 
 loge des Ai-ist, Berlin, 1863, pp. 29-93) applies the epithet in question to his dialogical writ- 
 ings; yet he also employs it {Phys., IV. 10, 217 b, 19) in reference to those explanatory 
 parts of his strictly scientific works, with which, in conformity to his dialectical method, he 
 usually prefaces the parts devoted to rigid demonstration (a~o(5«^<f), or to those parts which 
 are rather "dialectical," i. e., controversial, than "apodictical," or purely scientific (Pol, I. 5, 
 p. 1254 a, 33). The general signification of the word is in both cases the same, the applica- 
 tion only being different. Dialogues are also termed by Aristotle ev koivu> yiyvS/ievoi Myot 
 ("arguments carried on in common," i. e., by means of disputation with a respondent, 
 whether in real SiaXsKTiKalc avTo^oti;, Top., VIII. 6, or in diaiogical writings), or IkSc 
 dofikvoi Myoi, i. e., \6yoL given to the public, in distinction from unpublished speculations, 
 instituted primarily by the philosopher for his own benefit, and then communicated, 
 whether orally or in writing, to the (private) circle of pupils associated with him in 
 strictly scientific speculation. Rigidly philosophical speculations are termed by Aristotle, 
 in Pol, III. 12, p. 1282 b, 19 et al (cf Eud. Eth., I. 8, 1217 b, 23), ol Kara <^iM>oo<piav UyoL,
 
 14:4 THB WOEK8 OF ARISTOTLE. 
 
 and closely related to this is the expression SiSaaKaMKoi Tioyoc, defined in De Soph. EIenchi&, 
 C. 2, p. 165 b, as oj r/c rwv o'ike'luv ap^uv imGTov fja^T/fiaro^ /cat ovk t/c rov tov arroiipivo- 
 fiivov do^cjv avXkoyiL.ofiEvoi (which latter 'Aoyoi, although as TvetpaariKoi they must be classed 
 as exoteric, do nevertheless not wander from the precise matter in hand, like the k^udtv 
 Uyoi, Pol, II. 6, 1264 b, 39; cf. Eth. Eud., Yll. 1, 1235 a, 4 and 5, 1239 b, or the '/Jyeiv e^cj 
 TOV Trpdy/iarog, liheL, I. 1. 1354 b, 27, 1353 a, 2). The i^uiTEptKO. are defined by Simplicius 
 {In Fhys., 386 b, 25) as to. koivo. kol 6i' hSd^uv Trspairdfieva, by Philopouus, as ?.6yoi /(^ 
 a~o6eiKTCKol firjde Ttpoc Tovg yvTialovg ruv aKpoaruv e'lprjuivoi, aTCka npbg Tovg TcoXAovg ck wtOa- 
 vuv upfiTjuhoi. In view of the fact that Aristotle here and there in his strictl}- scientific 
 writings addresses himself to the " hearers," and that at least many of these writings stand 
 in the closest relation to his oral lectures (aKpoaaeig, which were intended to be read publicly 
 or were taken down from his extemporaneous lectures), they were called by later genera- 
 tions acroamatic or (metaphorically) anpoaaeig. Philosophical occupation with a specific 
 group of objects was called a npayfiareia, and hence the rigidly philosophical writings, 
 directed strictly and alone to the object of inquiry, leaving out all dialogical ornamentation, 
 were termed by the successors of Aristotle "pragmatic." His works of this sort appear, 
 either wholly or for the most part, not to have been made public by Aristotle himself, so 
 long as he was engaged in lecturing on the subjects of which they treat, but to have 
 been first published by his scholars — a part of them by Andronicus of Rhodes. 
 
 As secondary works and forerunners of his strictly scientific writings we must regarA 
 the vnOjiivf/fiaTa, or the resumes drawn up by Aristotle for his personal use, and some of 
 which attained to publicity. Among the lost works of this kind belong abstracts of the 
 writings of Archytas, of the Platonic Republic, of the Leges, the Tim., etc., mentioned by 
 Diog. L. in his list of Aristotle's works. The work De Melissa, de Xenophane (or de Zenone), 
 de Gwgia, which has come down to us, bears also tlie character of a vTrofivTjfia, but its 
 authenticity is at least doubtful (see above, § 17). In the same class belong also the works 
 De Bono and De Ideis, of which fragments are extant, collected and edited by Brandis (Bonn, 
 1823) ; they are memoirs of Plato's oral teachings, written down from memory with the aid, 
 perhaps, of transcripts of Plato's lectures made at or near the time of their delivery. Cf. 
 the works of Brandis, Bournot, and others, cited above, § 41. 
 
 Aristotle's logical works are the Karr/yopiai (whose authenticity is not wholly certain, 
 see Spengel, Milnchener Gel. Anz., 1845, No. 5, and Prantl, in the first volume of his Gesch. 
 der Logik), on the fundamental forms of the mentally representable, and the corresponding 
 fundamental forms of mental representations and words, or on the fundamental forms of 
 "affirmations concerning the existent;" Tvepl ep/iT^siag (De Inierpretatione, whose genuine- 
 ness is disputed hy Andronicus of Rhodus, though, apparently, on insufficient grounds), on 
 the Proposition and the Judgment ; avakvTLna irpdrepa, on the Syllogism ; ava^ArrcKO. varepa, 
 respecting Proof, Definition, Division, and the Cognition of Principles; the rmviKa, on 
 Dialectical or Examining Inferences, such as usually arise in disputations from provisional 
 or probable premises (evdo^a) ; and nepl ao(picriKO)v e/iyjwv, on the Fallacies of tlie Sophists 
 in their refutations and on the exposure of the deceptive appearance in these fallacies. 
 These works were termed by the Aristotelians opyavim, i. e., works treating of method, 
 the "organon" of investigation. In the Topica, YIII. 14, 1G3 b, 11, Aristotle remarks 
 that it is an important aid {ppyavov) to the attainment of scientific knowledge, to be able to 
 draw the consequences which follow from- each one of two contradictory propositions, and 
 in Met, IV. 3, 1005 b, 4, he adds that the study of the doctrine of the bv i} cv (or of being 
 as such, i. e. the study of ontology or metaphysics, npijTj] (piAoaodia) must not be com- 
 menced until one is already familiar with Analytics; these remarks of Aristotle indicate 
 the origm and significance of the term "Organon," as above applied.
 
 THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE. 145 
 
 To the works on ■n-purri ij)t}Mm<l>ia gome arranger of tlie works of Aristotle (Andronicus 
 of Rhode?, as there is scarcely any reason to doubt), on the ground of certain didactic 
 utterances of Aristotle respecting the nporepov Tzpoc rjixaq and the Trpdrepov <^vaei, or the 
 '•prior for us" and tlie "prior by nature," assigned a place after those on physics, and 
 hence gave to them, as arranged in fourteen books, the general title, to. /lera ra (pvacKd 
 (works commg after those relating to Physics), the books being numbered A, a, B, T, etc., 
 up to N = I., II., III., IT., etc., to XIV.; in determining the order of the books, he seems 
 to have been guided chiefly by the citations contained in them. The "Metaphysics" is 
 made up of an extended, connected, but not completely finished exposition of doctrine 
 (Book I.: Pliilosophical and historico-critical Introduction, and Books III.; IV.; VI., VII., 
 VIII. ; IX.), and of several smaller and in part spurious treatises. Some ancient authorities 
 attribute the authorship of Book II. (a) to Pasicles of Rhodes, a son of a brother of Eude- 
 mus and an auditor of Aristotle. According to others. Book I. (A) was his composition (see 
 Asclcp., Schol in Arist. ed Br., p. 520 a, 6). Book V. (A) contains an inquiry Trepl rov Troaaxuc, 
 respecting the various significations of philosophical terms, and is cited by this title in VI. 
 4, VII. 1, and X. 1. Book X. treats of the one and the many, the identical and the 
 opposed, etc. Book XI. contains, in chaps. 1-8, p. 1065 a, 26, a shorter presentation of 
 the substance of III., IV., and VI. ; if genuine, it must be regarded as a preliminary 
 sketch ; if not, it is an abstract made by an early Aristotelian ; chaps. 1 and 2 correspond 
 with Book III. {rnropiai, doubts, difficulties), 3-6 with IV. (the problem of metaphysics and 
 the principle of contradiction), and 7 and 8, up to the place indicated, with VI. (introduc- 
 tory remarks on the doctrine of substance) ; the rest of Book XI. is a compilation from the 
 Physics, and hence decidedly spurious. The first five chapters of Book XII. contain a 
 sketch of the doctrine of substance (more fully detailed in Books VII. and VIII.) and of 
 the doctrine of potentiality and actuality (discussed more fully in Book IX.); chaps. 6-10 
 are a somewhat more detailed, but still very compressed exposition of Aristotle's theology. 
 The last two books (XIII. and XIV.) contain a critique of the theory of ideas and of the 
 number-doctrine, which in parts (XITI. 4 and 5) agrees verbally with portions of the first 
 book (I. 6 and 9). An liypothesis has been suggested by Titze, and modified and expanded 
 by Glaser and others, to the effect that Books I., IX. chs. 1-8, and XII., constituted origi- 
 nally a shorter draught of the whole Trpurj] <pi7.oGo^'ta, of whicli the first book was retained 
 by Aristotle in his larger work, while the rest were altered and enlarged; b\it this theory 
 is very uncertain, and it is quite as possible that the whole of Book K (XI.) and at least the 
 first part of Book A (XII.) are spurious. In the relation of Books I., XIII. and XIV., to 
 each other and to the whole there is much that is puzzling; in particular, it would seem 
 that Aristotle can not have intended the repetition of the critique of the theory of ideas. 
 The parts of Book XIII. which agree with parts in the first book appear to have been 
 written later than the latter, and not by Aristotle, but by some revising Aristotelian; the 
 genuineness of Book XIII., as far as ch. 9, p. 1086 a, 21, is at least doubtful. The begin- 
 ning of the Mttaph. is said (by Albertus Magnus, see Jourdain, Recherches Critiques) to have 
 been regarded by the Arabians as the work of Theophrastus. The natural termination of 
 the Jleiajihysics is with the doctrine of God, or the theology of Aristotle (XIT. C-10). 
 
 The series of works on natural science opens with the (;>vcik?) aKpouat^ in eight books 
 (called also <pvaiKa or to. nepl (pvaeog, of which V., VI., and VIII. treat special!}- of motion, 
 while VII. seems not to belong in this connection, and was probably not written by Aris- 
 totle at all); to this should bo joined ncpl ovpavnv in four and Trcpt yn'iaeur nal (pOnpfig in 
 two books ; also the peTcupo/.oyiKa (or trepl /lEreupuv) in four books, of which the fourth 
 appears to be an independent treatise. The book nepl Koaftov is spurious. The opuscule 
 TFfpi xP<^f^aTuv was composed in the Peripatetic school. The original work on plants i3 
 
 10
 
 146 THE WORKS OF ARISffOTLE. 
 
 lost ; the one which exists under that title in our editions is spurious — perhaps the work 
 of Nicolaus of Damascus. The History of Animals (nepi -a i^ua iaropiat, of which the tenth 
 book is spurious), together with certain related works on the parts, generation, and 
 locomotion of animals (the Tr-ept fwwv nivr/aeug is not genuine), is preserved, but the 
 Anatomy of Animals {avaro/iai) is lost. To the three books -rrepl ipvx^c join on the 
 opuscules : rr£pl ala^rjaeuq ical alo'&T/Tuv, -jrepl ^vrjfiriQ kol ava/Ltvr/aeug, nepl vttvov kqI eypT)- 
 jdpcEoc, ^fpi iwKvUyv, nepl /lavriicyc T^i iv role VT^voig, wcpl /laKpoficoT-^To^ Kai l3paxv/3i6T9p-oc, 
 ■nepl (ur/^ Kal -davarov (with which the Trepl vsorr^rog Kai yr/pug of our editions must ap- 
 parently be classed). The ^vcioyvuiuKo. is spurious. The collection of npo/3?i7JfMTn is a 
 conglomerate gradually brought together on the basis of Aristotle's notes (cf Carl Prantl, 
 Ueber die Probleme des ArisL, in the Abh. der Akad. d, W.^ Munich, 1850). The Trep). 
 6av/mauov aKova/uaTuv is spurious (cf. H. Schrader, Ueber die Quellen der pseudo-arist Schrift 
 n. 6. a., in the Jahrh. f. Philol. u. Pad., Vol. 97, 1867, pp. 217-232); so, perhaps, is also 
 the TTspl ardfjuv ypafjfiuv. 
 
 Three works in our Corpus Aristoteleum treat of ethics in general : »/ft/cd "NiKOfidxsia in 
 ten books, i/dtKa 'Kv6?'/fie/a in seven books, and T/fhua fieyaXa (perhaps corrupted from tjBikuv 
 Ke<t>d?iaia or from t/Oikuv fieydXuv Ke(pd?iaia, according to Trendelenburg's conjecture, Beit- 
 rage zur Philos., Vol. II., Berlin, 1855, p. 352 seq.). The three works on ethics correspond 
 with each other in content as follows: Eth. Nic, I., II., III. 1-7, Eih. Eud., I., IL, Magn. 
 Mor., I. 1-19, contain general preparatory considerations; Eth. Nic., III. 8-15 and IV., Eih. 
 Eud., III., Magn. Mor., I. 20-23, treat of the different ethical virtues, with the exception of 
 justice; Eih. Nic, V., with whicli Eih. Eud., IV., is identical, and Magn. Mor., I. 34, and IL, 
 init., relate to justice and equity; Eth. Nic, VI., with which Eth. Eud., V., is identical, and 
 Magn. Mor., I. 35 (cf II. 2, 3), relate to the dianoetic virtues ; Eth. Nic, VII., identical 
 with Eth. Eud., VI., and Magn. Mor., II. 4-7, to continence, incontinence, and pleasure ; 
 Eih. Nic, VIII., IX., Eih. End., VII. 1-12 (or 13 init., where there is evidently a gap), and 
 Magn. Mor., II. 11-17, treat of friendship ; Eth. Eud., VII. 13 (where the text is full of gaps 
 and alterations) treats of the power of wisdom {cppovrjatg, practical wisdom) ; Magn. Mor., II. 
 10, of the signification of op^of ^dyo^, and of the power of ethical knowledge; Eih. Eud., 
 VII. 14, 15, and Magn. Mor., TI. 8, 9, of prosperity and KaloKayadia (honor, the union 
 of the beautiful and the good) ; Eth. Nic, X., of pleasure and happiness. That the 
 so-called Magna Moralia, the shortest of these works, is not the oldest of them (as 
 Schleiermacher believed), but that the Nicomachean Ethics (from which the citations 
 in Pol, II. 2, III. 9 and 12, IV. 41, VII. 1 and 13, are made) is the original work of 
 Aristotle, while the Eudemian Ethics is a work of his pupil, Eudemus, based on the 
 work of Aristotle, and that the Magna Moralia is an abstract from both, but principally 
 from the Eudemian Ethics, has been almost universally allowed since Spengel's investi- 
 gation of the subject (see above, p. 141) ; Barthelemy St. Hilaire, however {Morale 
 d'Aristoie, Paris, 1856), sees in the Eiidemian Ethics not so much an original work of 
 Eudemus, as rather a mere redaction of a series of lectures on Ethics by Aristotle, exe- 
 cuted by one of his auditors (probably by Eudemus, who, it is supposed, wrote them down 
 for his own use, as they were delivered) ; he is inclined to assign to the Magn. Moral, also 
 the same date and kind of origin. But there can hardly be a doubt that this latter work 
 belongs to a later period, such are the marks of Stoic influences in thought and termi- 
 nology which it contains (see Ramsauer, Zur Charakteristik der Magna Moralia. [G.-Pr^, 
 Oldenburg, 1858, and Spengel, Arist. Studien, I., Munich, 1863, p. 17, and Trendelenburg, 
 Einige Belege far die nacharisi. Abfassungszeit der Magna Mor., in his Histor. Beitr., III. p. 
 433 seq.); the following citation contained in it (II. 6, 1201 b, 25): uoTrep i(pafxEv iv rolg 
 avaXvTiKolg, is ground for the conjecture, that the author published it under the name of
 
 THE "W0KK8 OF AEISTOTLE. 147 
 
 Aristotle; still, other Analytica (paraphrases of the Aristotelian worli) may be meant. Of 
 the Eudemian Ethics, Spengel and Zeller, in particular, liave sliown that the author, though 
 generally following Aristotle, has introduced original matter, which appears occasionally 
 in the hght of an intentional correction of Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics appears 
 to have been pubhshed after the death of Aristotle by his son Nicomachus. To which 
 work the books common to the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics [Nic., V.-VII., Eud., 
 IV.-VL) originally belonged, is a matter of dispute. It may be shown, as well on 
 internal grounds as from references in the Politica, that the first of these books {Eth. 
 Nic, Y. — Eth. Eudem., IV.)* was originally a part of the Nicomachean Ethics.f The pres- 
 ent Book VI. of the Nic. Eth. {— B. V. of the Eud.) agrees in many respects better with 
 the books belonging to the Eud. than with those which belong to the Nic. Eth. (cf. Alb. 
 Max. Fischer, De Eth. Nic. et Eud., diss, inaug., Bonn, 1847, and Fritzsche in his edition of 
 the Eud. Ethics): yet at least a book of essentially similar content must have belonged 
 originally to the Nic. Eth., to which book Aristotle refers in Metaph., I. 1, 981b, 25. But 
 the last of these identical books {Eth. Nic. VII. = Eth. Eud., VI.) belongs very probably 
 either wholly or at least in its last chapters {Eth. Nic., VII. 12-15, which, like B. X. of 
 the Nic, though not altogether in the same sense, treats of pleasure) not to the Nico- 
 machean Ethics, and is also not to be viewed as an earlier draught of Aristotle's, but as a 
 later revision, probably executed by Eudemus. The opuscule Trept aperwv ml Kaiauv is 
 probably spurious. The eight books of the 7ro?uTiicd join on to the Ethics. According to 
 Barth. St. Hilaire and others the original order of the Books was L, II., III., VII., VIII., 
 IV., VI., V. : yet the theory that Book V. and VI., have been made to exchange places, is 
 improbable ; Ilildenbrand, Zeller, and others, oppose, while Spengel, and, in a recent work, 
 Oncken {Siaatsl. des ArisL, I. 98 seq.) defend it. That Books VII. and VIII. should follow 
 immediately after III. is extremely probable, was long ago affirmed, among others, by 
 Nicolas d'Oresme (died in 1382) and by Conring (who edited the Politics in 1656) to be 
 the order intended by Aristotle. In B. I. Aristotle treats of the household, omitting, 
 however, to give rules for the moral education and training of children, since these 
 depend on the ends pursued by the state. In B. II. he criticises various philosophical 
 ideals and existing forms of the state. In B. III. he discusses the conception of the 
 state, and distinguishes, as the different possible forms of government, monarchy and 
 
 ♦ With the possible exception of chs. 11, 12, 15. 
 
 t In the second half the order has been considerably disturbed. The section, c. 10, p. 1134a, 2S-1184a, 
 16, must be misplaced ; Ilildenbrand conjectures that it belongs at the end of c. 8. This c<)njecture is 
 opposed by the expression fiprjTat Trporepof, p. 1134 a, 24, which implies a greater separation from c. 8, and 
 by the general plan evidently adopted by Aristotle in the whole work, in accordance with which the special 
 and particularly the political bearings of each to[iic are not considered until each topic has been treated of 
 in general terms; according to this method the jiassage in question should not come before c. 9, and perhaps 
 not before c. 10. C. 15 must follow immediately after c. 12, and hence Zeller would place this chapter, with 
 the exception of the last sentence, between cc. 12 and 13; but since c. 13 in respect of subject-matter (not 
 formally, indeed; perhaps some words have fallen awny from the beginning) joins on to c. 10 (Spengel 
 asserts this conjecturally ; Hermann Adolph Fechner, IIam|pko, and others are more positive), the correct 
 order is rather to be rctlored by placing ca 11 and 12 after 1.3 and 14. As the correct order, therefore, we 
 would propose the following: cc. 8, 9, 10, excepting the section above Indicated, 13, 14, then that section 
 from c 10, and finally 11, 12, 15. The defective arrangement may have arisen from the misplacement of a 
 few leaves in an original codex. Originally, a leaf numbered, «. g.. a, contained say c. 8 post med. to c. 10, 
 p. 1184 a, 2.% le.if a +/., c. 10, 1135 a, 15 to c. \O.Jin... p. 11.36 a, 9. leaf a + II., c. 13 .ind 14, p. 1137 a. 4 to 
 1138a, 8. leaf o + ///., the passage now standing in c. 10, p. 1184 a, 23 to 1185 a, 15, leaf a + IV., cc. 11 and 
 12, p. 1136 a, 10 to 1137 a, 4, and, finally, leaf a + F., the conclusion of the whole book, c. 15, p. 1138 a, 4 to 
 1188b, 14. The leaves then fell into the false order: a, a + 111., a +I.,a + IV., a + //., a + V. The 
 author of the Magna Moralia seems to have fonnd this arrangement already existing. Perhaps .it the 
 plaee where this confusion arose, two books of the Eud. Ethics were inserted into the Ni*. Eth. A differ 
 ent order is proposed by Trendelenburg, Jlist. Beitr. zur ridlot.. 111. pp. 418-426.
 
 148 THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE. 
 
 tyranny, aristocracy and oligarchy, politeia (a commonwealth of free citizens) and de- 
 mocracy. He then treats (III. 14—17) of the first of the above forms, which under 
 certain conditions is reckoned by him as the best possible, and (III. 18, and its con- 
 tinuation : YII. and VIII.) of the good state, which is favored in respeet of its external 
 couditions, and is based on the supremacy of the best men, i. e., citizens who are virtuously 
 educated. In Books lY. and Y. follows the inquiry concerning the other forms of the 
 state besides monarchy and aristocracy, B. Y. being especially occupied with the investi- 
 gation of the causes of the preservation and destruction of governments; B. Y. thus 
 contains what, according to lY. 2, was to follow after the characterization and the descrip- 
 tion of the genesis of the different forms of the state, viz.: the science of Political Nosology 
 and Therapeutics, In B. YI. Aristotle treats supplementarily of the particular kinds of 
 democracy and oligarchy and of the different offices in the state, the discussion having 
 been very likely originally extended to other topics, including, in particular, the subject 
 of laws. At least the second Book of the Economics is spurious. The noAiTEiai, a descrip- 
 tion of the constitution of some 158 states, is lost. The Poetic (Trepl iTonrTiKfjq) is incom- 
 plete in its present form. The Rhetoric, in three books, has been preserved. The Rhetor 
 ad Alex, is spurious (according to Spengel — who edited it in 1844 — Yictorius, Buhle, and 
 others, who found their rejection of it on Quintil., III. 4, 9). 
 
 The chronological order in which the works of rigidly philosophical form were written 
 can be for the most part, though not in all instances, determined with certainty ; the 
 interest belonging to the investigation of this subject is rather one of method than of 
 development, since Aristotle seems to have composed these works (except, perhaps, those 
 on logic) during his second residence at Athens, hence at a time when his philosophical 
 development was already substantially complete. Frequently one work is cited in another. 
 But these citations are in so many cases reciprocal, that it is scarcely possible to infer any 
 thing from them as to the historical sequence of the works ; such inferences can be drawn 
 with perfect certainty only when a work is announced as yet to be written. The logical 
 writings were probably composed the earliest (in Anal. Post, II. 12, anticipatory reference 
 is made to the Physics: /zdAAov de ({)avep(l)g ev rolq KaOoXov rrepl Kivijaeoq 6d ?^e;^dyvai Trepl 
 avTuv), and in the following order: Categories, Topica, Analytica, and still later the De 
 Interpret., in which work the previous existence not only of the Analytica, but also of the 
 Psychology, is affirmed by implication. Whether the ethical works {Eth. Kic. and Polit.) 
 were written before (Rose) or after (Zeller) the physical and psychological, is question- 
 able, though the former alternative is by far the more probable ; Eth. Nic, 1.13. ] 102 a, 2G, 
 presupposes only popular expositions of psychological problems (in the early dialogieal 
 works) and not the three books nepl ipi^xvi, and YI. 4, init, points only to works of tlio 
 same character on the difference between ■Ko'irjaig and npa^ig- YI. 13, 1144a, 9, on the 
 contrary, appears to imply the previous existence of the De Anima; but this book was 
 also apparently not written hy Aristotle, but by Eudemus. Aristotle could compose his 
 ethical works before his psychological works, because (according to Eth. K, I. 13), though 
 Oeupririov rut ttoXitikC) Trepl ipvxv?, yet this is necessary only £^' bcov iKavug ixei npbg ra 
 Cr/roi'/iEva, and ethics (Eth. N., II. 2) is not a purely scientific but a practical doctrine. The 
 Ethics and Politics were followed by the Poetic (to which anticipatory reference is made, 
 Pol., YIII. 7), and the Rhetoric (which appears to be referred to, by anticipation, in Etk., II. 
 7, p. IIOS b, 6); according to Rhet., I. 11, p. 1372 a, 1 ; III. 2, p. 1404 b, 7, the Poetic pre- 
 ceded the Rhetoric. That the Rhet. was composed immediately after the logical work.'? 
 (Rose) is scarcely to be credited ; it must have been preceded not only by the logical but 
 also by the ethico-political works, in accordance with the Aristotelian dicta, Rhet, I. 2, 
 . 1366 a, 25, and 4, 1359 b, 9 : ttjv pijTopiKfiv olov izapatpveq ti v^g diaXcKUK^g e'lvai ml rijg repi
 
 THE WORKS OF AKISTOTLE. 149 
 
 tH rprj npayuaTria^ fjv 6iKai6v iari npoaayopcveiv ttoAitiktp^, and r/ pijTopLKTj cvyKEirai Ik ti t/j 
 avaTiVTLKf/g iTTiaTT/urj^ aal ry^ nepl ra tjHtj "o'/atlmjc. The works relating to physics were com- 
 posed in the following order : Auscult. physicae, De Coelo, Be Ge/ier. et Corr., Meteorologica ; 
 then followed the works relating to organic nature and psychical life. That the Metaphysics 
 is of later date than the Physics (which Rose incorrectly places after the former) follows 
 with certainty from Phys., I. 9, p. 192 a, 36: rfjg Trpwrrj^ (pi'/.oacxp'iai: ipyov eari ^lopicai^ Lore tic 
 ineivov tov Kaipov aTTOKeioOu; in it the Analytics, Ethics, and Physics are cited. According to 
 the statement of Asclepius {Schol. in Arist, p. 519 b, 33), the Mttaph. was not first edited 
 immediately after the death of Aristotle by Eudemus, to whom Aristotle is said to have 
 sent it, but very much later, from an imperfect copy, which was completed by additions from 
 other Aristotelian works. From this review it results inductively that Aristotle advanced 
 in a strictly methodical manner in the composition of his works from the TipoTcpov Tzpoq T/naq 
 to the nporepov fvaei, in accordance with the didactic requirement, to which, with special 
 reference to logic (analytics) and metaphysics (first philosophy), he gives expression in 
 Met., IV. 3, p. 1005 b, 4, nanvely, that one must be familiar with the former before "hear- 
 ing " the latter. 
 
 According to Strabo (XIII. 1, 54) and Plutarch {Vit. Sull., ch. 26) a strange fortune 
 befell the works of Aristotle in the two centuries following the death of Theophrastus. 
 The whole of the extensive library of Aristotle, including his own works, came first into 
 the possession of Theophrastus, who left them to his pupil, Xeleus of Skepsis in Troas ; 
 after his deatli tliey passed into the hands of his relatives in Troas, who, fearing lest the 
 princes of Pergamus might seek to take them away for their own library, concealed them 
 in a cellar or pit (dicypv^), where they suffered considerable injury from dampness. Accord- 
 ing to Athenaeus, Deipnos., I. 3, tins same library had been acquired by purchase for tlie 
 Alexandrian Library in the time of Ptolemaeus Philadelphus ; but this, at least, can not be 
 true of the original MSS. of Arist. and Theophrastus. These manuscripts were finally 
 discovered (about 100 B. c.) by Apellicon of Teos, a wealthy bibliophile, who bought them 
 and carried them to Athens; he sought as well as possible to fill up the gaps, and gave 
 the works to the public. Soon afterward, at the taking of Athens by the Romans (86 B. c), 
 the manuscripts fell into the hands of Sulla. A grammarian named Tyrannion, from 
 Amisos in Pontus (on him see Planer, I)e Tyrannione grammatico, Berlin, 1852), made use 
 of them, and from him Andronicus of Rhodes, the Peripatetic, received copies, on the basis 
 of which he (about 70 b. c.) set on foot a new edition of the works of Aristotle, and drew 
 up a catalogue of them. Strabo brings the narrative, at least in the text of the Geographica 
 as we now possess it, only down to Tyrannion ; what relates to Andronicus is found in 
 Plutarch. Strabo and Plutarch assume that in the period preceding their discovery by 
 Apellicon, the principal works of Aristotle were inaccessible to students, or, in other 
 words, that they existed only in the original manuscripts, and thus they explain the 
 deviation of the later Peripatetics from Aristotle in doctrine ; and by the numerous 
 hiatuses in the badly disfigured manuscripts, which no one knew how to fill out correctly, 
 they explain the unfortunate condition of the text of Aristotle in later times. But the 
 supposition that all the philosophical works of Aristotle remained concealed from the 
 public after the death of Aristotle is in itself scarcely credible, and is refuted by the traces 
 (which Brandis, Spengel, Stahr, Zeller, and others have, with more or less of success, 
 pointed out) of an acquaintance with some of the most important of the strictly philo- 
 sophical works of Aristotle in the third and second centuries before Christ. The depo- 
 sitions of Strabo and Plutarch respecting the fortune of the manuscripts are, however, 
 of unquestionable authority, and it is quite possible that not only some rough draughts 
 made by Aristotle, which were not intended for publication, but also some of the larger
 
 150 THE W0KK8 OF ARISTOTLE. 
 
 works, in particular the Metaphysics, and perhaps aiso the Politica were first made public 
 after their discovery by Apellicou. (This is asserted in reference to the Psychology by E. 
 Essen, in his Der Keller zu Skepsis, Stargard, 1 866 ; the supposition is possible, that in the 
 twofold recension in which parts of the second Book of the Psychology have come down 
 ■ to us. and in which perhaps the entire work at one time existed, we possess, on the one 
 hand, the form which the work received from Alexandrian tradition, and, on the other, the 
 form in which it appeared after its revision by Andronicus ; still, it appears more probable 
 that the one form is the Aristotelian, and that the other is the paraphrase of some Aris- 
 totehan.) The theory that several of the chief philosophical works of Aristotle were 
 unknown in the time from Theophrastus and Neleus to Apellicon and Andronicus, receives 
 a certain confirmation from the list of Aristotle's works in Diog. L., V. 22-27, in case this 
 list was (as Nietzsche argues) not derived from the work of Andronicus on the works of 
 Aristotle, but, through the works of Demetrius Magnes, and Diodes, from the work of 
 Hermippus the Callimachean (at least, for the most part, and aside from certain additions 
 taken from authorities belonging to the time after Andronicus). 
 
 The edition set on foot by Andronicus gave new life to the study of the works of 
 Aristotle. The Peripatetics of the following period distinguished themselves particularly 
 as paraphrasts and commentators, as did also several of the Neo-Platonists, such as 
 Themistius, Simplicius, and Philoponus. From the Greeks the writings of Aristotle passed 
 (with the exception of the dialogical works, which were suffered to perish) into the hands 
 of the Syrians and Arabians (see below, §§ 95 and 96). In the Christian schools some of 
 the logical works of Aristotle and various expositions of the Aristotelian Logic by Boethius 
 and others, were employed as text-books; St. Augustine's recomniendatien of dialectic 
 served as an authority for their use. The principal works of Aristotle on logic were, 
 however, not known even to the Scholastics until about the middle of the twelfth century, 
 and then only in Latin translations. In the second half of the twelfth and in the course 
 of the thirteenth century the physical, metaphysical, and ethical writings of Aristotle 
 became also known in the Western world, at first (until near the year 1225) only through 
 the agency of the Arabs, but afterward by means of direct translations from the Greek 
 (see below, § 98) ; some works, in particular, the Politics, in place of which the Arabians 
 knew only of spurious works on the same subject, became known only through the latter 
 channel. The translations from the Arabian are distorted to the extent of being com- 
 pletely unintelligible ; the direct translations from the Greek, and especially the translation 
 of all or, at least, of very many of the works of Aristotle, which was made in about 1260- 
 1270 by "Wilhelm von Moerbecke, by request of Thomas Aquinas, are executed with such 
 literal fidelity, as in many instances to enable us to infer from their form wliat was the 
 reading of Codices on which they are based, but they are done without taste and not 
 unfrequently express no meaning. The reading of the physical writings of Aristotle was 
 forbidden in 1209 by a Provincial Council at Paris, on account of the doctrine of the 
 eternity of the world and some other doctrines which they contained, but which, in fact, 
 were misconceived and misrepresented ; the reading of the physical and metaphysical 
 writings was prohibited in 1215, by Robert of Courcon, the papal legate, on the occasion 
 of his sanctioning the statutes of the University of Paris. This prohibition, which was 
 renewed in a limited form in April, 1231, by Pope Gregory IX., remained formally in force 
 until the year 1237 (according to the testimony of Roger Bacon, as cited by Emile Charles, 
 Boger Bacon, Paris, 1861, pp. 314 and 412). But soon afterward, the judgment of the 
 church concerning the works of Aristotle became more favorable. The Scholastics from 
 this time on, depended, in philosophical respects, chiefly on the authority of Aristotle, 
 although not abstaining from modifying m a measure some of his doctrmes. In par-
 
 Aristotle's logic. 151 
 
 ticular, the philosophy of Tliomas Aquinas, which became the prevalent philosophy among 
 the teachers of the church, was Aristotelianism, and even other Scholastic systems, aa 
 those of Scotus and Occam, which were opposed to the system of St. Thomas, remained 
 substantially true to the teaching of Aristotle. In 1254 the Physics and Metaphysics of 
 Aristotle were included among the topics to be taught by the Faculty of Arts at Paris- 
 The EOiics and Politics of Aristotle were likewise held in high estimation, although the 
 Politics at least was studied with less zeal. At the revival of classical studies in the 
 fifteenth century the renewal of Platonism detracted somewhat from the prestige and 
 authority of Aristotle. Still the study of Aristotle received an essential impulse from the 
 extending knowledge of the Greek language. New translations of his works, more cor- 
 rect, more intelligible, and expressed in purer Latin, supplanted the old ones, and soon 
 numerous Latin and Greek editions of his works were published. At the Protestant 
 universities the works of Aristotle were zealously studied, owing especially to the influ- 
 ence of Melanchthon. In the sixteenth century nearly all of the works of Aristotle were 
 frequently edited, translated, and commentated ; in the seventeenth century considerably 
 fewer, and during the greater part of the eighteenth century, with few exceptions, almost 
 none. But toward the end of the eighteenth century a new interest in these works was 
 awakened, an interest which still continues and seems even to be constantly increasing, 
 and which manifests itself in numerous (above-cited) literary works. 
 
 § 47. The divisions of philosophy, according to Aristotle, are theo- 
 retical, p ractica l, and poetic. Theoretical philosophy is the scientific 
 cognition of the existent, the end of the cognition being found in it- 
 self. Practical philosophy is that form of knowledge which relates to 
 action or conduct, and which prescribes rules for the latter. Poetic 
 philosophy is a form of knowledge having reference to the shaping 
 of material, or to the technically correct and artistic creation of 
 works of art. Theoretical philosophy, again, is subdivided into 
 mathematics, physics, and " first philosophy " (ontology or meta- 
 physics). 
 
 The analytical and dialectical investigations (in the " Organon ") 
 were apparently intended as a methodological propaedeutic to phi- 
 losophy, and not as a body of properly philosophical doctrine. Aris- 
 totle's conduct of them is, however, none the less for this reason 
 strictly scientific. 
 
 The various species of mental representations and of " dicta " (or 
 parts of speech) correspond, according to Aristotle, with definite 
 forms of that which exists. The most universal forms of existence 
 are substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, pos- 
 session, action, passion. The forms of representations, and so of 
 possible aflirmations or " dicta respecting the existent ." which are 
 conditioned by these forms of the representable, are termed by Aris- 
 totle categories. The concept should represent the real essence of
 
 152 Aristotle's logic. 
 
 the objects included under it. Truth in a logical judgment is the 
 correspondence of the combination of mental representations with a 
 combination of things, or (in the case of the negative judgment) the 
 correspondence of a separation of representations in the mind with a 
 separation of things; falsity in judgments is the variation of the ideal 
 combination or separation from the real relation of the things to 
 which the judgments relate. Inference, or the derivation of one judg- 
 ment from others, has two forms, the syllogism, which descends from 
 the universal to the particular, and induction, which rises to the 
 miiversal from a comparison of the single and particular. A scien- 
 tific inference or a proof is an inference from true and certain 
 principles ; a dialectical inference is a tentative inference from what 
 appears true or even from mere (uncertain) indications ; a sopliistical 
 inference is a paralogism or fallacy, depending on false premises or 
 deceptive combination. The principle of contradiction and excluded 
 middle is with Aristotle an ultimate metaphysical and logical prin- 
 ciple, on which the possibility of demonstration and of all certain 
 knowledge depends. Principles are known immediately by the rea- 
 son. The prior and more knowable for us is the sensible, or that 
 which in the order of conceptions is less general and hence less 
 removed from the sphere of sensuous perception ; but the really prior 
 and more knowable are the principles, or at least those conceptions 
 which are least removed in point of generality from principles. 
 
 Of the more modern works on the whole System of Aristotle may be named : Franz Biese, Die Philoso- 
 phie des Aristoieles (Vol. I., Logic and Metaphysics ; Vol. II., The Special Sciences), Berlin. 1885-42 ; Chr. 
 Aug. Brandis, Ai'intoteles. seine uk<(demUchen Zeitgenossen vnd 7iachiften yachfolger, Berlin, 185.3-57, or 
 2d div. of the 2il part of his Ilandbitch der Gexch. der Grech.-Emn. Philos., and I'eber-nicJit iiber dan 
 Arist. Lehrgibilnde, 1st div. of the 3d part, Berlin, 1860; Ed. ZcUer. Arinioteles mid die ulten Peri- 
 patetiker, TUbingen, 1861, 2d div. of the 2d part of the 2d cd. of his " Philoa. der Griechen.'''' Ch. Thurot 
 (Etudes sur Aristote, Paris, ISCO) treats of the Politics, Dialectic, and Rhetoric of Aristotle. Of. F. Meunier. 
 Ar. a-t-il eu deux doctrines, Fwis oitenMble, fautre secrete? Paris, 1864. Otto Caspari's Die Irrthilmer 
 der altda^sii. Philosophie in ihrer Bedeutung far das p/iilax. Princip (Heidelberg, 1868) treats prin- 
 cipally of Platonism and Aristotelianism, and in particular of the theory of ideas and the theory of knowl- 
 edge. [Thomas Taylor, Diss, on the Philos. of Aristotle, London, 1813.— 7>.] 
 
 Of special works relating to the Aristotelian Logic may be named : F. .J. C. Fraucke, De AriM. iia argii- 
 mentandi nxodis, qui recedtint a perfecta sylogismi forma, Hostock, 1624; Car. Weinlioltz, De Finibu-s 
 atque Pretio Logicae Aristotelicae. ib., 1825 ; Ad. Trendelenburg, De Arist. categoriis prolusio aeadetnica. 
 Berlin. lSo3, Geschichte der Kategorienlehre, ib., 1S46, pp. 1-195, 209-217, Elementa logicett Arisioteleae. 
 ib., 1836, 6th ed, 1868, Erlanterungen sur Arint. Logik. Berlin, 1842, 2d ed., 1861 (cf. on these works Max 
 Schmidt and G. H. Heidtmann, in the Zeitschr.f. d. Gymnasiahcesen, V. VI. VII. lS5I-'53); Phil. Gum- 
 posch, Veber die Logik iind die logisehen Schriften des Aristoteles, Leipsic, 1839 ; Herin. Rassow, Aris- 
 totelis de notionis dejinitione doctrina, Berlin, 1843; H. Hettner, /)e logices Aristotelicae specnlativo 
 principio, ilMe, ISiS ; Car. Kuhn, De notionis dejinitione qualem Arist. constituerit, Halle. 1844; A. 
 Vera, Platonis, Aristotetis et /Je^/elii de medio termino doctrina, Paris, 1845; A. L. Gastmann, De methodo 
 philos. Arist, Groningcn, 1845; C. L. W. Heyder, Kritische Darstelhing und Vergleichung der Ariit- 
 iotelischen und UegeFschen Dialektik (1 Bd., 1 Abth. : die Methodologie der Arist. Philos. und der 
 friiheren Systeme), Erlangen, 1S45; G. Ph. Chr. Kaiser, De logica Pauli Apostoli logices Aristottlea*
 
 ARISTOTLE S LOGIC. 153 
 
 tmendatrice {Progr.), Erlangen, 1847 ; Carl Prantl, Ueber die Enttcickelung der AristoUliscli-en Logik axu 
 der PlatonUcJun Pliilosophit, in the Ahh. der Bair. Akad. der M'j««., hist.-phU. Classe, Vol. Vll., part 
 1st, pp. 129-211, Munich, 1S63 (cf. the sections on the same topic in Prantl's Gendi. der Logik)\ II. Boniiz, 
 Veber die Kategwieii des Aristoteles, in the SitcungnbericJii^ der Wieiier Akad. der Wiss., hisi.-philol. 
 CI., Vol. X., 1S63, [ip. 59:-645; A. F. C. Kerslen, (^/^uo jure J^antitts Arist. cuUgonan rejeceiit (Progr. of 
 the Realgymn. at Colosne), Berlin, 1S53; K. Essen, Z>w Definition nacJt AristoUle^ {G.-Pr.), Stargard, 
 ISM; J. Ilcrmann, Quae Arist. de uliimis cognosceiidi j>rincijiii« docuerit, Berlin, IbW; Aristotle on 
 Fallacies), or the Sophistic Elenchi, with a translation and notes, by Edward Poste, London, 1S66; [7X« 
 Logic of Science, a transl. of th« Later Analytics of Aristotle, with an Inirod. and Sotes, by the same, 
 London. — TV.]; Wilh. Schuppe, Die Arist. Kategorien (in the '• /"ro^r." of the Gleiwitz Gynin. on the 
 occasion of the cck-bration of the founding of the institution, April 29, 1S66). Gleiwitz, 1S6G; A. Wentzke, 
 Die KalegoHen des L'rtheiia im Anchluss an Arist., erlduiert und begriindet (G.-Pr.), Culm, 1&68; 
 Friedr. Zelle, Der Unterschied in der Aaffassuny der Logik Oei Arist. und bei Kant, Berlin, 1670; Fried. 
 Ferd. Kampo, Die ErkenntniaxUieorie de« Arist, Lelpsic, 1S70. 
 
 Of the Aristotelian conception of philosophy we have treated above (p. 3 seq.). We 
 find a division of the system of jihilosophy, not very different from that adopted by Plato, 
 in the Topiai (1. 14, p. 105 b, 19) : "Philosophical problems and theorems are either ethical, 
 physical, or logical {i/OiKal, (pvctKai, or AoytKai),'^ where by " logical " theorems are to be 
 understood such as have a universal reference, or in which the specifically physical or 
 ethical character is left out of consideration ; theorems, in other words, which belong to 
 metaphysics (or ontology). But this division is given here by Aristotle only as a pro- 
 visional sketch ((jf TVTzui nepiAafielv). Where Aristotle expresses his opinion more 
 exactly, he divides philosophj'' (in the sense of scientific knowledge in general) in the 
 manner indicated at the beginning of this paragraph, Metaph., VI. 1 : Traaa Sidvoia j] 
 T7paK7iKT/ i] TvoajTiKy 7] -dEuptiTiKy. Metaph., XI. 7 : Si'f/Mv 'oivw, otl Tpia yivrj ruv i9£cj- 
 prp-LKuv iari • <pvaiK^, iiadtJixaTiKT/, ^eo7.oyiK.7] (the latter identical with TipCiTt] (Iii?voao0ia, which 
 with Aristotle culminates in theology). To each of the different branches of philosophy 
 Aristotle assigns a definite rank, the first place being given to the theoretical sciences. 
 Of these latter, again, he pronounces " theology " {OEa?MyiKy) to be the highest, because it 
 has the highest of objects — following the principle, that the value of each science is in 
 accordance with the value of its peculiar object : jSe/.riuv ^e kuI x^'P^'^ EKaarij ?Jy£Tac 
 Kara to oIkhIov i^riGTr/rov [Metaph., XI. 7). Aristotelians divided practical philosophy into 
 Ktliics (in the narrower sense), CEccnomics, and Politics (Eth. Eudem., I. 8: TToTuriKt]^ 
 oiKovofiLKTj Kai (ppovT/ai^), and in like manner Aristotle {Eth. Xic., VI. 9) co-ordinates o'lKovofiia 
 and noAiTEia with (ppovr/aic; (moral insight, on which morality in the individual is held 
 to depend). But where he defines himself more exactly, Aristotle describes (Economics, 
 logetlier with Rhetoric and Generalship, as sciences auxiliary to Politics. By Politics, in 
 the broader sense of the term, Aristotle understands tlie whole of the ethical sciences, 
 among which Kthics and the Doctrine of the State (Politics in the narrower sense) are 
 included (Eth. N.. I. 1 ; X. 10 ; lihet., I. 2). Poetic philosophy in its general conception is 
 equivalent with Aristotle to technology in general, i. e., the doctrine of shapes or images 
 ill any material; but the .special doctrine of the "imitative" arts, regarded in its philo- 
 sophical bearings, is the same with our modern "^Esthetics," of which only the theory of 
 Poetrj-^ (Poetics) was actually worked out by Aristotle. As Logic in the modern sense, or the 
 Aristotelian Analytics, has no place in tlxis division, A.ristotle may be supposed to have re- 
 garded it only as a proprpdeutic doctrine . With this agrees his above-cited declaration (Met., 
 IV. 3) of the necessity of being acquainted with it before studying mctapiiysics, a declara- 
 tion which indeed places logic in a propaedeutic relation only to metaphysics (and in so far 
 favors the supposition tliat Aristotle included it in npurr) <pi?iO<To<pia, as a formal introduc- 
 tion to the same), but which implies, nevertheless, a like propaedeutic relation to ethics and 
 phviiica, in so far as the logical method, with which the student of philosophy must be
 
 15i Aristotle's logic. 
 
 previously familiar, is not only the method of metaphysics, but also of every philosophica'^ 
 discipline, including, therefore, ethics and physics. (This method is, of course, also the 
 method of logic itself; on the circle thus resulting and its solution, cf. my System of 
 Logic, % 4.) 
 
 The Analytica of Aristotle (together with the other works accompanying it) contain an 
 exposition of the forms of inference and of cognitive thought in general, thought being 
 resolved, as it were, into content and form, and the latter being made the special subject 
 of consideration. Truth in knowledge is the agreement of knowledg-e with reality ( Categ.^ 
 c. 12: rcj yap elvai tu Trpdy/xa fj fii) ah/'&i/^ 6 Tioyo^ y \pEv6?/c MyErai). This dictum is 
 thus particularized, in Met, IV. 7, with reference to the various possible cases : " Affirming 
 non-existence of the existent, or existence of the non-existent, is falsehood. ; but affirming 
 ex istence of the existent, and n on-existence of the non-ex istent, is truth. " As the con- 
 tent, so also the forms of thought are viewed by Aristotle in their relation to reality. The 
 various kinds of words or of expressions, considered apart from all grammatical connection 
 (rd /card /lydifiiav cvfinTMKfjv XEy6/j.eva, I)e Cat, c. 4), represent so many ways of making 
 "affirmations concerning the existent," or so many categories {yevri riJv Karyyoptuv, kutti- 
 yopiai Tov bvTOQ or tuv ovtcjv), and denote, accordingly, either 11 substance {ovaia or -l eon), 
 as examples of which Aristotle mentions man, horse, or 2) ciuantitj (ttogoi'), e. g., two or 
 three yards long, or 3) quality (ttoiov). e. g., white, grammatical, or 4) relation, (node ti), e. g., 
 double, half, greater, or 5) glace_(7roi), e. g., in the Lyceum, in the market-place, or fi) t'me 
 {■tore), e. g., yesterday, last year, or 1) position (Ksladcu), e. g., lies, sits, or 8) possession 
 (exeiv), e. g., is shod, armed, or 9) action {ttoceiv), e. g., cuts, burns, or 10) passion (rrdgjcn). 
 e. g., is cut, burnt. The correspondence of the forms of speech with the forms of being is 
 expressly affirmed by Aristotle (MetapJi., V. 7: oaaxcjg yap Ih/erai, Toanvraxu^ to elvai 
 ar/fialv£i). The forms of representations (or categories) and the parts of speech being 
 alike conditioned on the forms of existence, the former correspond with the latter. Thus, 
 in particular (according to Trendelenburg), the category of Substance corresponds with the 
 Substantive (ow//a), while the other categories, collectively, correspond with the pf/pa, in 
 the wider sense (of Predicate) in which Aristotle employs this term ; and, more particularly, 
 the categories of Quantity, Quality, and Relation with the Adjective and Numeral and 
 certain Adverbs, the categories of place and time with the Adverbs (or Adverbial Expres- 
 sions) of place and time, the category of Position with the Intransitive Verb, that of Pos- 
 session with the Perf. Pass., that of Action with the Active Verb, and that of Passion with 
 the Pass. Verb. While, however, this correspondence exists in a measure de facto, it is 
 less evident that it was expressly indicated by Aristotle ; least of all is it certain that the 
 Aristotelian categories arose from the observation of the different parts of speech. The 
 theory of the parts of speech is in its first beginnings with Aristotle, and was first developed 
 by later writers; besides, the correspondence in question is not in all respects exact (Zeller, 
 Ph. d. Gr., II. 2, 2d ed., p. 190 seq.). Aristotle seems to have had in view more the parts 
 of the sentence than the different kinds of words, or rather he seems not yet to have distin- 
 guished between the two. (Cf., on the relation of the forms of reahty to the forms of 
 representations and the parts of speech, in the Aristotehan theory of categories. Ueber- 
 weg. System der Logik, § 47, 2d ed., Bonn, 1865, p. 92.) In all the works of Aristotle com- 
 posed after the De Cat. (supposing this to^e geB|Uine) and the Topica, the number of 
 categories is reduced from ten to eiglit,-'*^ff&ai and e^^ivbeing omitted, probably because 
 Aristotle found that both might be subsumed under other categories. So Anal. Post, L 22, 
 p. 83 a, 21 and b, 15 (in which latter passage there can be no doubt that a full enumera- 
 tion was intended), Phys. V. 1 (where likewise completeness is necessarily implied), and 
 Met., V. 7. Prantl, in his Gesch. der Logik (I. p. 207), gives a schematized harmony of all 
 
 ?oj\Kx.fy\ tpb i t ^^ u^y:^ '^.^x^'^^ 6U> ery^^^^-^J^ 
 
 (H^ (5ju<X^"^. 
 
 '>J
 
 Aristotle's logic. 155 
 
 the passages in Aristotle where categories are mentioned. According to Prantl (p. 209), 
 the essential import of the doctrine of categories is perceived, when we regard it, not as a 
 complete enumeration of the forms of existence and thought, but as an expression of the 
 truth that substance {maia) appears, determined in respect of space and time {-ov, Tvori) 
 and quality (rroiov), in the world of things numerable and measurable (ttooov), and that 
 within the sphere of manifold existence it shows itself active according to its determinate 
 cliaracter (ttoieIv, 'n-da;^Eiv^ izpoq tl). In Analyt. Post, I. 22, all the other categories are 
 contrasted with Substance, as accidents {cvfijie^TiKO-a). In Met, XIV. 2, p. 1089 b, 23, 
 three classes are distinguished : to. fitv yap ovaiai, rd 6k Tzddri, ra 6e npoq ti, substances, 
 attributes, an d relations . Ovata, as a category, denotes the independent, the substantial. 
 But in another sense it signifies the essential ; this latter is the object of the concept 
 (Aoyof). Tlie concept is an expression of the essence of the objects whi(;h it Hpnntpg (Ao^of 
 r^f ovalagj Cat, 1 ; 6 Aoyog ttjv ovalav opi'^ei, De Part Anim., IV. 5), and the essence 
 corresponds to the concept {tj koto. ?i6yov ovaia). That, in any thing, which is extraneous 
 to t he essence [ovaia) of the thing — which exists, so to speak, as an appendage to the 
 essence — is accidental (avfif3efi^K6g). Accidents are of two kinds, some being necessarily 
 connected with the essential, so that we can deduce them apodictically from the latter, 
 and others being not thus deducible ; the former belong to the object, in which they 
 inhere, as such, or to the conception of the object {avfi[iEliijK6q Kaff avTo •, thus it is a 
 necessary accident of the triangle that the sum of all iis angles should be equal to two 
 right angles); the latter are truly accidental ((Tn/z/Je/Jj^/cof in the ordinary sense). In Defi- 
 nition (opia/io^) we cognize the essence of the thing defined (Anal. Post, II. 3). Through 
 the combination (cv/itt-Ziok//) of representations determined according to the specified cate- 
 gories arise the Judgment and its expression, the Provosition (niroipavaic), which latter 
 may be either an jifHrmation (Kard/paaig) or a neaaiion [aTvooacic). Every proposition is 
 necessarily either true or false ; not so are the uncombined elements of the proposition 
 (De Cat, c. 4). Hence the Principle of Contradiction and of Excluded Third or Middle, in 
 its logical form (De Cat, c. 10): " Of the affirmation and the negation of the same thing, 
 the one is always false, the other true ; " Met, YV. 1 : '' Between the two terms of a con- 
 tradiction there is no mean ; it is necessary either to affirm or to deny every predicate of 
 every subject." The metaphysical or ontological form of the principle of contradiction 
 (i. e., as appUed to Being itself), on which the validity of the logical form depends, is thus 
 expressed (Metaph., IV. 3) : to avrb dfia inrapxEiv re koI fjy vndpxeiv ddiivaTov tCi avrcj 
 Kal Kara to aiiTo, " The same thing can not at the same time and in the same respect 
 belong and not belong to the same thing." Of the principle in this form, no proof, accord- 
 ing to Aristotle, is possible, but only a subjective conviction, that no one can deny it in 
 thought. To di^av (pdvai r] aTrocpdvai [the principle of excluded middle] is expressly declared 
 by Aristotle (Anal. Post., I. 11) to be tlie principle of indirect proof lie defines the Syl- 
 logism (Top., I. 1 ; cf Anal. Pri., I. 1) as a form of ratiocination, in which, from certain 
 premises and through the force of those premises, there follows necessarilj: a conclusion 
 different from the premises (earl 6jj av'/Juoyiaixbg ?i,o}of iv w TS'divTuv tivcjv irepov tl tuv 
 KeiuEvuv ff dvdyKTiQ avfifiaivei did tuv Ketfiivuv). Ho assumes (Anal. Pri., I. 4— 6^ cf. 32 ; 
 cf. the citations ad § 103 in my System of Logic) three syllogistic figures, according as the 
 middle term (bpog fieaog) is either subject in one of the premises (-pordaeiq) and predicate 
 in the other (first figure), or predicate in both premises (second figure), or subject in both 
 (third figure). A syllogism which is correct in form has either apodictic or dialectic 
 validity, according to the relation of the premises to objective truth. Top., I. 1 : " 'At6- 
 d'A^iq [real demonstration] takes place when we conclude from true and ultimate premises, 
 or at least from premises which have been proved true on the ground of other true and
 
 156 ARISTOTLE S LOGIC. 
 
 ultimate premises; the Dialectic Syllogism, on the contrary, concludes e| ivdd^uv .... and 
 evdo^a are principles which appear true to the mass of men, or to the educated, or to indi- 
 viduals whose opinion is specially worthy of respect." An additional form of inference is 
 the Eristic Syllogism, which concludes from premises having only an apparent or alleged, 
 but no real probability. With the dialectical syllogism agrees, in the want of a strictly 
 scientific or apodiciical character, the Rhetorical Syllogism, but it differs from the former 
 in its use, the former being an instrument of examination, while the latter (which concludes 
 " from probabilities or signs," and produces only a subjective conviction — ef e'lKoruv f/ 
 tSTjfieluv) is an instrument of persuasion. In the province of demonstration rhetoric occu- 
 pies the same place as dialectic in the province of examination, inasmuch as each is con- 
 ^ersant with material which in some sense is the property of all men, and which belongs 
 to no particular science {kolvo. Tponov riva airavruv icTi yvupiCeiv Kai ovJf^/df imaTT/fiT/g 
 acpupia^iivr/c;), and as each deals only with the probable, whence Rhetoric forms the natural 
 counterpart of Dialectic {RheLI. 1 : ^ pr^ropiKy avricTpo^og ri) SiaXeKTiny, cf. Cic, Orat, c. 32: 
 quasi ex altera parte respondens diakdicae; Dialectic teaches e^erdl^Eiv Kal vnexeiv 2.6yov, and 
 Rhetoric anoXoyeiGdai koI KaTtjyopdv). A form of investigation akin to the dialectical is 
 the logical, i. e., the investigation of a topic in the light of universal conceptions alone 
 (especially in the light of metaphysical conceptions, or such as belong to "first phi- 
 losophy "), in distinction from that method which looks rather to the particular or to that 
 which is peculiar {piKdov) to the subject of investigation, and which, therefore, in the depart- 
 ment of physics, "investigates physically " {(pvaiKug t^T/relv. De Gen. et Corr., 316 a, 10, et al), 
 ill the department of analytics, "analytically" (ava?.vTiK(l)c ^r/rdv), etc. (See Thurot, Etudes 
 sur Aristoie, Paris, 1860, p. 118 seq.) The Middle Term in that syllogism which is most 
 important as an instrument of cognition, corresponds with and expresses an objective cause 
 (Analyt. Post.^ 11. 2: to jxiv yap a'lTiov to fiecov^ cf. my Sijst. of Logic, § 101). In Induction 
 [eTtayuy?}, 6 ff tnayuyyg cvAloyicfidg) we conclude from the observation that a more gen- 
 eral concept includes (several or) all of the individuals included under another concept of 
 inferior extension, that the former concept is a predicate of the latter {Anal. Fri., II. 23). 
 Induction leads from the particular to the universal (airb tuv KadeKaoTa ettI to. Ka66?iov 
 e(po6og, Top., I. 10). Tlie term ETrayuyi], for Induction, suggests the ranging of particular 
 cases together in files, like troops. The Complete Induction, according to Aristotle, is the 
 only strictly scientific induction ; the Incomplete Induction, which with a syllogism sub- 
 joined constitutes the Analogical Inference {TvapadEiy/xa), is principally of use to the orator. 
 Considered absolutely, the Syllogism proper, which arrives through the middle term at 
 the major term as the predicate of the minor (6 6ia tov fiiaov avXhjyia/xog), is more 
 rigorous, prior in nature, and more demonstrative ((pvaec npdTEpog Kal yvupifiu-Epog, Anal. 
 Fri., II. 23; fiiaariKtJTEpov Kal npbg tvvc avTiAoyiKovg ivEpyEOTEpov, Top., I. 12); but the 
 Inductive Syllogism easier for us to understand (ijn'iv hapyiGTEpog, Anal. Fri., II. 23 ; m^^a- 
 vuTEpov Kal aa^EdTEpov Kal koto, tt/v ala-&T]aiv yvupi/uurEpav Kal toIq noAkolg Koivdv, Top., 
 I. 12). Universally, "the prior and more cognizable for us" is what lies nearest to the 
 sphere of sensation, but " the absolutely prior and more cognizable " is what is most 
 remote from that sphere (Analyt. Fast., I. 2 : Trpbr yuag fihv npoTEpa koc yvupipojTtpa rd 
 kyyvTEpov tijq ala-drjOEug, anTiuq 6e npdTEpa Kal yvupijuoiTEpa to. TToppuTEpov). The limits 
 of knowledge are, on the one hand, the individual, on the other, the most general. In 
 itself it is better — because more scientific — to pass from the "prior in nature" to the 
 "prior for us," from the condition to the conditioned; but for those who can not follow 
 this order, the inverse one must be employed (Top., VI. 4). The most general principles 
 are insusceptible of demonstration, because all (direct) demonstration presupposes, as its 
 basis or premise, something more general than that which is to be proved ; and some-
 
 akistotle's metaphysics. 157 
 
 thiag, also, which must be at least as obvious and certain, or even more so, than the thing 
 to be proved ; the most general truths, therefore, must be immediately certain {Anal. Post., 
 I. 2 ; cf. my System of Logic, § 135). The absolutely flrst truths in science must consist 
 of indemonstrable definitions (rd Trpura opaifiol ecovrai avaTroSeiKToc, Anal. Post, II. 3). 
 These principles (as they are called, or apxai) are the objects of reason (vovc) ; whatever is 
 universally and necessarily derived from them is the object of science (kmar^fiTj), while 
 opinion (fWfa), whose characteristic is instability {a^i^aiov), is concerned with whatever is 
 subject to variation [Anal. Post., I. 33 ; II. 19). 
 
 § 48. In the " First Philosophy," or, as it was subsequently 
 termed, the Metaphysics of Aristotle, the principles common to all 
 spheres of reality are considered. The number of these principles, 
 as given by Aristotle, is four, viz. : Form or Essence, Matter or Sub- 
 stratum, Moving or Efficient Cause, and End. The principle of 
 Form or Essence is the Aristotelian substitute for the Platonic Idea. 
 Aristotle argues against the Platonic (or, at least, what he held as 
 the Platonic) view, that the Ideas exist for themselves apart from the 
 concrete objects which are copied from them, affirming, however, on 
 his own part, that the logical, subjective concept has a real, objective 
 correlate, in the essence immanent in the objects of the concept. As 
 the one apart from and heside the many the Idea does not exist ; none 
 the less must a unity be assumed as (objectively) present in the many. 
 The word substance (pvoia) in its primary and proper signification 
 belongs to the concrete and individual ; only in a secondary sense can 
 it be applied to the Genus. But although the universal has no inde- 
 pendent existence apart from the individual, it is yet first in worth 
 and rank, most significant, most knowable by nature and the ])roper 
 subject of knowledge. This, however, is true, not of every common 
 notion, but only of such notions as represent the Essential in the 
 individual objects. These universal notions combine in one whole all 
 the essential attributes of their objects, both the generic and the 
 specific attributes ; they represent the essential Form, to denote which 
 Aristotle employs the expressions el6o(;, nop<f7J, ?) Kara rdv Xoyov ovoia 
 and rd ri Tjv elvai [form, intelligible or notional essence. — Tr.]. The 
 matter in which form inheres is not absolutely non-existent ; it exists as 
 possibility or capacity {dvvafii^, potentia). Form, on the contrary, is 
 the accomplishment, the realization {EvreX^ix^La, ivsp^'eia, actus) of this 
 possibility. Relatively, however, matter may be styled non-existent, 
 in so far as it denotes the as yet unefiectuated existence of the finished 
 shape or thing (in which form and matter are united). The opposite 
 of eutelechy or actuality is deprivation, want, non-possession (ar^p^/a^).
 
 158 akistotle's metaphysics. 
 
 No matter exists altogether deprived of form ; the idea of mere mat- 
 ter is a pure abstraction. But there does exist an immaterial form- 
 principle, and this principle is the form which has " separable " or 
 independent existence (^wptfrrdv), in distinction from the inseparable 
 forms which inhere in matter. Form, in the organic creation, is at 
 once form, end, and moving cause. Matter is the passive, deter- 
 minable factor, and is the ultimate source of imperfection in things. 
 But it is also the principle of individuation in things, form being 
 not (as Plato asserts) the ground of unity, but only of homo- 
 geneous plurality. Motion or change (Kivrjoig) is the passage of 
 potentiality into reality. All motion implies an actual moving cause. 
 Now, in the sphere of existence we find included that which is per- 
 petually moved and that which both moves and is moved ; there 
 exists, therefore, a terti/ntn quid^ which is always imparting motion 
 but is itself unmoved. This teriium is God, the immaterial and 
 eternal Form, the pure Actuality in which is no potentiality, the self- 
 thinking Reason or absolute Spirit, who, as absolutely ])erfect, is 
 loved by all, and into the image of whose perfection all things seek 
 to come. 
 
 Scholia graeca in Arist. Metaphymca ed., Ch. A. Brandis, Berlin, 1S37. Aleaandri Aphrodisiensis 
 commentarius in lihros Metaphys. Arist.^ rec. Herm. Bonitz, Berlin, 1S47. 
 
 On the metaphysical principles of Aristotle, as compared with those of Plato, the following authors 
 may be consulted : Chr. Herm. Weisse, De I'latonin et Aristotelis in cvnsiituendis siimmis jyhi/os. prin- 
 cipiis differentia, Leipsic, 1828; M. C'arridre, De Ai'isiotele Platonis amico ejtisque, doclrinae jiitto 
 censore, Gott. 1S37; Th. Waltz, Plato und Aristoteles, in the Transactions of the 6th Reunion of German 
 philologists at Cassel, 1843; F. Michelis, De Aristotele Platonis in idear-wm doctrina adversaria, 
 Braunsber?, 1S64; cf. Ed. Zeller. Plat. Stiidien (Tub. 1837, pp. 197-800: On Aristotle's account of Plato's 
 Philosophy), Uebcrweg, Platan. Untermtchungen (Vienna, 1861, pp. 177-lSO), and W. Iloseiikranz, Die 
 Plat. Ideenlehreund ihre Bekdmpfung durch Aristoteles, Mayence, 1869 (reprinted from Kosenkranz's 
 Wissenschafi des Wissens, Mayence, 1868-1869). F. Brentano treats of the various significations of exist- 
 ence according to Aristotle (Von der manniqfaclien Bedeututiff des Scienden nach Aristoiele,% Freiburg 
 in Breisgau, 1862). G. v. Hertling treats of the Aristotelian conception of the One (in a Diss. Brl.), 
 Freiburg, 1864. Osc. Weissenfels, De casu et subatantia Arist. {diss, inaug.), Berlin, 1866. K. G. Michaelis, 
 Zur Erkldruny von Arist. Metaph. Z., 9 (G.-Pr.), Keu-Strelitz, 1S66. G. Ueyne, De Arist. cuisv et con- 
 tingente {diss, inawg.), Ilalle, 1866. On the form -principle, see F. A. Trendelenburg (to ivl tZvai, to 
 iyaOM elvat, TO Ti riv elvai bet Aristoteles, in the Rhein. Mus.f. Ph., II. 1828, p. 457 seq. ; cf. T 's edition of 
 the De Anima, pp. 192 seq., 471 seq. ; Gesch. der Kategoriejilehre, p. 84 seq.) ; see also the works by Biese, 
 Heyder, Kuhn, Rassow, Waitz, and Schwegler, already cited (the passages bearing on this subject are indi- 
 cated by Schwegler in his edition of Aristotle's Met., Vol. IV. p. 369 seq.), and C. Th. Anton, De discrimine 
 inter Aristotelicum ti icnt. et ri riv tlvai (Progr.), Gorlitz, 1847. A. de Roaldes, Les Pensevrs dujonr et 
 AHsiotele, traite des etres substantiels, Meaux, 1868. On the Aristotelian expression 6 ttotc bv (which 
 points to the substratum, or uTroKeificvof, e. g. : 6 nore ov ifxpoiitvov ia-n, "whatever it may be [i. e., any 
 object, such as a stone, a piece of wood, a point] that is involved in progressive motion "), see Ad. Torstrik, 
 in the lihein. 3fus., new series, XII. 1857, pp. 161-173. G. Engel writes of the i/At; of Arist. in the Phein. 
 Mris.f. Ph., new scries, VII. 1850, pp. 891-418. On the Entelechy of Aristotle, see J. P. F. Ancillon, Re- 
 cherche criii/ptes et philosophiques s-ur Ventelechie d'Aristote, in the Transactions of the Berlin Acad, 
 of Sciences, Philos. Class, 1804-11. On the Aristotelian doctrine of necessity, works hove been published 
 by Ferd. Kuttner {Diss., Berlin, 1853), and Eug. Pappenheim {Diss. JTalen-sit, Berlin, 1856). Of his doc- 
 trine ot finality treat M. Carrifire {Teleologiae Arist. lineamenta, Berlin, 1S88), and Gustav Schneider
 
 Aristotle's METAPnTsics. 159 
 
 (Qua^ ait causae flnalin apud ArUt. vis atque natura, dim. inaug., Berlin, 1864, and more fully in liii 
 2>e Cauea finali Aristotelea, Berlin, 166oj; cf. Trendelenburg, Log. Cntersucfi. 2d ed., Leipsic, 1S62, II. 
 p. 65 seq. 
 
 The Theoloffy of Aristotle is discussed by Vater ( Vindiciae theoiogiae Arist., Halles 1795), Simon 
 (/>« deo Arist., Paris, 183'J), Krische { Forxc/iungen, I. pp. 25S-811), C. Zell (/>e Ari^it. patritirum 
 rtligionum aextinuttorey lluidelb. 1S4T; Aritt. in seinem Verhaltniss zxtr griech. Staatsreligion, in 
 FeriensdiriftKH, new series, Vol. I., Hcidelb. 1S57, pp. 291-892; Dan Verhaltniss der Arist. Philos. tur 
 Jieiigion, Mayence, 1863X E. Keinhold (Arist. theologia contra falsam JJe/jelinnam interpretationem 
 de/enditur, Jena, 1848), O. H. Weichelt (T7ieologumena Aristotelea, Berlin, 1552), F. v. Ecinohl 
 (Darstelluiig des Arist. Gotleibegriffa und Vergleic/iung dennelhen 7>iit dern I'latonischen, Jena, 1S54), 
 A. L. Kym (Die GottesleJire den ArixtoteJes und das C/iristenthum, Zurich, 1SC2), J. P. Romang (Die 
 Oottesl. des Ar. u. d. Chr., in the Protest. Kirchenzeitung, 1SG2, No. 42). F. G. Starke (Aristotelis de 
 imitate Dei sententia [0.-Pr.'\, Neu-Ruppin, 1S64), L. F. Goetz (Der Arist. Gotteahegriff. contained in 
 Festgabe., den alten Crucianem zur Einueihung des neiien Scfiulgeh. getcidmet. etc., Dresden, 18C6, pp. 
 S7-G7). Other works, both new and old, are cited by Schwe<;ler in his edition of the itetaphijKics, Vol. IV. 
 p. 257. The /'»e?«fo-Aristiitelian work, Theologia, of Neo-Platonic origin, translated in the ninth century 
 into Arabic, known to the Scholastics in a Latin re-translation, first printed at Rome in 1519, and Included 
 in Du Val's and other editions of Aristotle (1629, II pp. 1035 seq., and 1639, p[). 603 seq.) is the subject of an 
 essay by Haneberg in the Reports of the Munich Acad, of Sci., 1862, 1. pp. 1-12; Uaneberg treats (ibid. 
 1862. I. pp. 861-888) of the book De Caiwis, included in the early Latin editions of Aristotle ( Venei. 1496 
 and 1550-1552) as a work of Aristotle, but which in reality was extracted from Neo-Platonic works, and in 
 particular from the Instit. Theol. of Proclus or one of his disciples. Cf. below, § 97. 
 
 Reviewing the various orders of human knowledge (Metaph., I., cc. 1 and 2), Aristotle 
 remarks that the experienced man (efiirapoc) is justly considered wiser than he whose 
 knowledge is restricted to single perceptions and recollections; the man of theoretic 
 knowledge (o rexi'l-rrjc), than the merely experienced ; the director of an undertaking 
 involving the application of art or skill, than he who is engaged in it merely as a manual 
 laborer ; and, finally, he whose life is devoted to science (which relates to being — ov — 
 as art, rixKV, does to becoming, ysveaig, Anal. Pos., II. 19), than he who seeks knowl- 
 edge only in view of its application to practical uses : but in the sphere of scientific 
 knowledge, he adds, that is the highest which respects the highest or ultimate reasons 
 and causes of things; this highest in knowledge is "first philosophy," or wisdom, in the 
 strict and absolute sense of the word (aodia, see above, § 1, pp. 3 anrl 4). 
 
 The four formal principles of Ari.stotle, form, matter, efficient cause, and end, are enu- 
 merated in Met, I. 3 (cf. Y. 2; Till. 4; Phys., II. 3), in the following terms: to. alrta 
 7J.ycTat TETpax(oc, wv fxiav /j.ev alriav (pafiev elvac ttjv ovaiav /cat to ti rp> elvac, . . . hepav 
 6e TTjv vh/v Kal to viroK£(.fj.evov, Tpi-ifv de b-dev i/ ap^f/ t^C Kivt/aeuq, rerdpTTfv 6e rffv avri- 
 Keifitvtiv aiTtav Tfivrri, to ov ivcKa nal Taya-d6v, rt/of yap yevtceur koI Kivtjceu^ Tzdarj^ 
 tovt' eoTiv. The oldest Greek philosophers, as Aristotle attempts in a comprehensive 
 review of their doctrines {Metaph., I. 3 seq.) to demonstrate, inquired only after the mate- 
 rial principle. I'^mpcdocle.i and Anaxagoras, he adds, iu([uirctl, further, after the cause of 
 motion. The principle of essence or form was not clearly stated by any among the earlier 
 philosophers, though the authors of the theory of ideas came nearest to it. The prin- 
 ciple of finality was enounced by earlier philosophers only in a jvirtial or comparative 
 seBse, and not as a complete and independent principle. 
 
 Aristotle opposes numerous objections (^Mttnj)h., I. 9, XIII. and XIV.) to the Platonic 
 theory of ideas, some of which relate to the demonstrative force of the argimients for that 
 theory, while others are urged against the tenablcncss of the theory itself. The argument 
 founded on tho real existence of scientific knowledge, says Aristotle, is not stringent ; the 
 reality of the tmiversal does indeed follow from the fact in question, but not its detached 
 existence ; did this follow, however, then from the same premises much else would fol- 
 low, which tho Platonists neither do nor can admit, such as the existence of ideas of
 
 160 Aristotle's metaphysics. 
 
 ■R-orks of art, of the non-substantial, of the attributive and the relative ; for these things, 
 too, possess ideal unity (ro vorjixa iv). But if the existence of ideas is assumed, the 
 assumption is useless and leads to the impossible. The theory of ideas is useless ; for 
 the ideas are only an aimless duplication of sensible things (a sort of aladrfTa atdia, 
 eternal sensibles), to which they are of no service, since tliey are not the causes of any 
 motion in them, nor of any change whatever ; neither do they help things to exist, 
 nor us to know things, since they are not immanent in the common objects of our 
 knowledge. But the hypothesis of the existence of ideas leads also to the impossible. 
 It is affirmed of these ideas that they express the essence of their respective objects; 
 but it is impossible that an essence and that of which it is the essence should exist 
 apart {do^eiev hv adivaTov, dvai x'^P'^i ''"^ ovciav Koi ov rj ovaia) ; furthermore, the 
 imitation of the ideas in individual objects, which Plato teaches, is inconceivable, and 
 the expression contains only a poetic metaphor ; to which must be added, finally, that 
 since the idea is represented as substantial, both it and the individuals which participate 
 in it must be modeled after a common prototype, e. g., individual men and the idea of man 
 (the avrodvdpuTTog) after a third man {rpirog avOpunoc, Met., I. 9 ; VII. 13 ; cf. Be Soph. EL, 
 c. 22). The result of Aristotle's critique of the Platonic theory of ideas is, however, not 
 merely negative. Aristotle is not, for example (as used often to be assumed), the author 
 of the doctrine called Nominalism in the Middle Ages, the doctrine which explains the 
 concept as a mere subjective product, and the universal as merely a subjective community 
 in representation and grammatical designation. Aristotle admits that the subjective con- 
 cept is related to an objective reality, and in this sense he is a Realist; but in place of the 
 transcendent existence, which Plato ascribed to the ideas in contradistinction to individual 
 objects, he teaches the immanence of the essence or the noumenon in the phenomenon. 
 Accordingly he says {Met, XIII. 9, 1086 b, 2-7): Socrates, through his efforts to determine 
 the concepts of things (to define them), led to the creation of the theory of ideas ; but he 
 did not separate the universal from the individuals included under it, and in this he was 
 right ; for without the universal, knowledge is impossible ; it is only its isolation apart 
 from the world of real things, that is the cause of the incongruities which attach to the 
 theory of ideas. (Cf. Anal. Post., I. 11 : d^rj fiiv ovv elvat r/ kv ri izapa to. tzoTJm ovk avayKTj, 
 el airdSei^i^ earai ■ e'lvai fitvToi ev koto. iroXkuv a7.Tj-&iq einelv avayKt]. De Anima, III. 4 : 
 £v Tolg Ixovatv vhffv Swdfisi eKacrov kari tuv votjtuv. Ibid., III. 8 : tv ro'tg el6eai rolq ale- 
 ■^TjTolq TO. voTird kariv.) More negative is the critique which Aristotle directs against the 
 reduction of the ideas to (ideal) numbers, and against the derivation of them from certain 
 elements (aroixda. Met, XIY. 1) ; in the efforts to effect this he finds very much that is 
 arbitrary and preposterous : qualitative differences are construed as resulting from quanti- 
 tative differences, and that which can only be a function or state (Trddog) of another thing, 
 is made the principle or an element of the latter ; thus the quantitative is confounded 
 with the qualitative, and the accidental with the substantial, in a manner which leads to 
 numerous contradictions. 
 
 The opinion of Aristotle, that the individual alone has substantial existence (as ova'ia), 
 the universal being immanent {ivv^:dpxo^') in it, seems, when taken in conjunction with the 
 doctrine that (conceptual or scientific) knowledge is of the ovaia and, more particularly, that 
 definition is a form of cognition of the ovaia (ovalag jvupiafidg), to involve the consequence 
 that the individual is the proper object of knowledge, while in fact Aristotle teaches that 
 not the individual as such, but rather the universal and ultimate, is in logical strictness the 
 object of science. This apparent contradiction is removed, if we bear in mind the distinc- 
 tion between the different meanings of ovala, viz.: "the individual substance," and "the 
 essential." Substance, oiaia, in the sense of the essential, is termed by Aristotle (Metaph.,
 
 AKISTOTLe's ME'^APHYSICa. 161 
 
 I. 3 et al), Tj Kara rov "koyov ovaca, i. e., the essence which corresponds with and is cog- 
 nized through the concept ; but ovaia in the sense of the individual substance is defined 
 {Metaph., V. 8 ; XIV. 5 ei al.) as that which can not be predicated of any thing else, but of 
 which any thing else may be predicated (namely, as its accident), or as that which exists 
 independently and separately (xupicruv). In Cafeg., 5, individual things are called "first 
 substances'' {TVfx'^rai waim), and species, "second substances" ((kvrepac ovaiat). In Met., 
 VIII. 2, Aristotle distinguishes in the sphere of ovcia aiad?jTT/ (sensible being): 1) matter 
 (I'/l^), 2) form {nopipi/), 3) the product of both {tj Ik Tovron; the individual thing itself as a 
 whole). The individual substance (the t66e n) is the whole {ahvo/Mv) resulting from the 
 union of the material substratum {vTroKei/iievov, vXt/) with the ideal essence or form ; it is 
 tlie subject of mere states (Trad?/) and relations (rrpof r/), that are distinguished according 
 to the nine categories which, together with ovcia (individual substance), make up the 
 system of ten categories. The more immediate subject of scientific inquiry is, indeed, the 
 ■individual, but its ultimate and more appropriate subject is the universal in the sense of 
 the essential. It is true that, according to Aristotelian principles, if the universal is the 
 proper object of knowledge, it can only be such because it possesses reality in a higher 
 sense than the individual; but such reality does belong to it, since it constitutes the 
 essential in all individual substances. If the universal exists only in the individual, it 
 follows, indeed, that the former can not be known without the latter, and that this was 
 Aristotle's belief is coafirmed by the importance which he concedes to experience and 
 induction in his theory of cognition and in his actual investigations in all departments 
 of inquiry; but it does not follow that the individual, considered on the side of its 
 individuality, must be the object of knowledge, for it can very well be this in view 
 simply of the universal, which is immanent in it. Knowledge is concerned pre-eminently 
 with the ideal essence (K«rd rov X6yov ovaia or ri yv dvai) of individual substances (riyv 
 oiimuv, Metaph., VII. 4, 1030 b, o). In the case of the highest, i. e., the divine and imma- 
 terial sphere of being, however, this difference between the universal and the individual, 
 according to Aristotle, does not exist. 
 
 The expression rii tl fjv dvai, is with Aristotle the general formula for expressions of 
 the following kind : t<j ayaOC) dvai, to hi elvac, to avdpuTru dvat, so that the tI r/v is to 
 be considered as used substantively in the Dative. The use of nvai in the^e expressions, 
 gives to them the force of abstract nouns, e. g., to ayadhv, the Good, to ayad<J elvat, the 
 being good, goodness. (Similarly in the formula: eoTi fiiv TavTd, to 61 elvai ov tuvto 
 [e. g., Eth. Mc, V. 3 fin.], I e., "the object is the same, but the ideal essence is not the 
 same." So I>e Anima, III. 7 : Kal oi'x eTspov to bpsKTiKov kui fEVKTiKov ovt' a?.A7/Aov o'vte 
 Tov alffdrfTiKov, a/M to nvai alio). The Dative here is apparently the Dative of posses- 
 sion. The question tl eoTi, "what is it?" can be answered by aya06v, ev, avOpu,77or, 
 "good," "one," "man," or by any other concrete term (although Aristotle uses that 
 interrogative formula in so comprehensive a signification, that it can also receive an 
 abstract answer) ; then r/ iari is made to stand for tlie answer itself, and is hence em- 
 ployed as a general expression for ayaBov, h; av6pu~oc, and the like concrete terms. Now, 
 as a general formula to represent combinations of single Datives with elvai, we might, 
 perhaps, expect to find the expression to ti ectl dvai ; but since the putting of the ques- 
 tion is to be conceived as already past, Aristotle chose the Imperfect r/v. (Another 
 explanation of this Imperfect attributes to it an objective signification, as denoting the 
 originally, eternally existent, the prim of individual existence ; but this Tlatonizing ex- 
 planation can not be admitted, because the abstract, which finds its expression in dvai, 
 ought then, according to this view, to precede the concrete, while here priority is in 
 the expression ri t/v, ascribed, if to either, to the concrete.) To ri i/v dvai denotes, accord- 
 11
 
 162 Aristotle's metaphysics. 
 
 ingly, the essence conceived as separate from its substrate, or, as Aristotle defines it 
 {Met., VII. 7, p. 1032 b, 14), ovaiav avev iAwf. The form of thought which corresponds with 
 and may be said to express the ri t]v elvai, is the Concept, /.oyoc (Eth. K, II. 6 : ruv Myo¥ 
 Ti f/v dvai MyovTa), whose content is given in the Definition (6 opicjuoc, Top., VII. 5 ; 
 Melaph., Y. 8). 
 
 Of the four principles : matter (7 iA;?), form (to d6og), moving cause (to bOev i) Kivr/ai^), 
 and end or final cause (ro ov kveKo), the three latter, according to Phys., II. 7, are often one 
 and the same in fact ; for essence (form) and end are in themselves identical, since the 
 proximate end of every object consists in the full development of its proper form (i. e., the 
 immanent end of every object, by the recognition of which the Aristotelian doctrine of 
 finality is radically distinguished from the superficial utilitarian Teleology of later philoso- 
 phers), and the cause of motion is at least identical in kind with the essence and the end ; 
 for, says Aristotle, man is begotten by man, and in general one fully developed organism 
 begets another of the same species, so that though the catisa efficiens is not the form itself^ 
 which is yet to be produced, yet it is a form of similar nature. In the organic creation, 
 the soul is the unity of those three principles {De An., II. p. 415 b, 9: ouoiu^ 6' tj ^rvxfi 
 /card TovQ diupiCfiEvovq rponovq Tpelq aiTia- Kal yap 'd-&£i' t'/ KivrjCK: avrrj koi oil eveko /cot 
 (jf ovaia Tuv e/xilwx"'^ au/idruv ij tI^x^ alrla). In the case of products, whose causes are 
 external to the products themselves (Mechanism), as, for example, in the construction of a 
 house, the three causes which stand opposed to matter are distinguished from each other 
 not only in conception, but in reality. Examined in their relation to the phenomena of 
 generation and growth, matter and form are opposed to each other as potentiality {6i>va,uig\ 
 and actuality (or, as Aristotle terms it, "entelechy," EVTeXexeta). Of entelechy in general, 
 Aristotle distinguishes two species: "first entelechy," by which the state of being com- 
 plete or finished is to be understood, and "energy," which denotes the real activity of 
 that which is thus complete ; yet in practice he does not bind liimself strictly to the 
 observance of this distinction (cf. Trendelenburg, ad Be Anima, p. 296 seq., and Schwegler, 
 Met., Vol. IV., p. 221 seq.). Motion or development is the actualization of the possible, qud 
 possible (// Tov dm'arnv, ?'? (hn'arov evteTiexei-o. . . . kIvt/gi^ iariv, Phys., III. 1). Especially 
 worthy of notice is the relativity, which Aristotle attributes to these notions, when he em- 
 ploys them in concrete cases : the same thing, he says, can be in one respect matter and 
 potentialit}', in another, form and actuality, e. g., the hewn stone can be the former in rela- 
 tion to the house, the latter in comparison with the unhewn stone, the sensuous side of 
 the soul (or 'i'vxfj) can be the former in comparison with the intelligent mind (I'oi'f), the 
 latter when compared with the body. Thus the apparent dualism of matter and form 
 tends at least to disappear in the reduction of the world to a gradation of existences. 
 
 The very highest place in the scale of being is occupied by the immaterial spirit, called 
 God. The proof of the necessity of assuming such a principle is derived by Aristotle 
 from the development in nature of objects whose form and structure indicate design, and is 
 founded on Aristotle's general principle, that all transition (aivrjaic) from the potential to 
 the actual depends on an actual cause. {Met., IX. 8 : Potentialitj^ is always preceded in time 
 by some form of actuality, ael yap ek tov dwafiei bvToq yiyverat rb EVEpysia ov vTrb EVEp} Eia 
 ovroQ. De Gen. Animal., II. 1 : baa (pvoEt yiyvETai ^ rixvri, iV tvEpye'ta bvroq jQ'veTai. ek tov 
 SwafiEi bvToc.) Every particular object which is the result of development, implies an actual 
 moving cause ; so the world as a whole demands an absolutely first mover to give form to 
 the naturally passive matter which constitutes it. This principle, the first mover (Trptirov 
 Kivovv) must (according to Met., XII. 6 seq.) be one, whose essence is pure, energy, since, if it 
 were in any respect merely potential, it could not unceasingly communicate motion to all 
 things; it must be eternal, pure, immaterial form, since otherwise it would be burdened
 
 ARISTOTLE S NATURAL PHILOSOPHY. 163 
 
 with potentiality (to t'l f]v dvac ovk exei v^tfv to irpiJTov • evreXexeia yap). Being free from 
 matter, il is without plurality and without parts. It is absolute spirit (vovg), which thinks 
 itself, aud whose thought is therefore the thought of thought {yoT/aiq vor/aeu^). Tts agency as 
 the cause of motion is not active and formative, but passive, for it remains itself unmoved ; 
 it acts by virtue of the attraction which the loved exerts upon the loving, for it is the Good 
 per se and the end toward which all things tend (Kivel ov mvovfievov • . . . Kivel uq ipu/ievov). 
 Not at any given time did God shape the orderly world ; he conditions and determines the 
 order of the world eternally, in that he exists as the most perfect being, and all things else 
 seek to become like him ; the world as an articulate whole has always existed and will 
 never perish. As being an "actual" principle, God is not a final product of development ; 
 he is the eternal prius of all development. Thought, which is the mode of his activitj^, con- 
 stitutes the highest, best, and most blessed life (Metaph., XII. 7 : r) ^eupia to t/Siotov kqI 
 apiarov • . . . /cot ^u^ rfe -ye kvimapxu • tj yap vov ivepyeta C,ufi • . . . ucte l^ufj koX aluv awexVQ 
 Koi aidioq iinapxet. tu iSftJ). The world has its principle in God, and this principle exists not 
 merely as a form immanent in the world, like the order in an arm}', but also as an absolute 
 self-existent substance, like the general in an army. Aristotle concludes his theology (J/e^., 
 XII. lOyiw.) and marks his opposition to the (Speusippic) doctrine of a plurahty of inde- 
 pendent and co-existent principles, by citing the following line from Homer {/Has, II. 204): 
 
 Ovk ayadbv noTiVKOtpavir]' tlf Koipavoq ioTu. 
 
 In essential agreement with this scientific justification of the belief in God's existence, 
 though differing from it in form, was the substance of the popular reflections contained in 
 the third book of the dialogue "Concerning Philosophy." Cicero [De Nat. Deorum, II. 
 37, 95) has preserved from it a paragraph of some length, translated into Latin, and it may 
 here be cited entire, as furnishing also a specimen of the style of Aristotle in his popular 
 (exoteric) writings (to which is to be referred Cicero's praise in Acad. Pr., II, 119: /lumen 
 orationis aureum fundens Aristoteles ; cf. Cic, De Orat, I. 49, Top., 1, De Livent, H- 2, Brut, 
 31, Ad Att., II. 1, 1, De Fin., I. 5, 14; Dionys. Halic, De Verhorum Copia, 241, p. 187 of 
 Reiske's edition, and De Censura Vet. Script., 4, p. 430) : " Imagine men who have always 
 dwelt beneath the earth in good and well-illuminated habitations, habitations adorned with 
 statues and paintings and well furnished with every thing wliich is usually at the com- 
 mand of those who are deemed fortunate. Suppose these men never to have come up to 
 the .surface of the earth, but to have gathered from an obscure legend that a Deity and 
 divine powers exist. If the earth were once to be opened for these men, so that they 
 could ascend out of their concealed abodes to the regions inhabited by us, and if they 
 were to step forth and suddenly see before them the earth and the sea and skies, and 
 perceive the masses of the clouds and tlio violence of the winds; and if tlien they were 
 to look up at the sun and become cognizant of its magnitude and also of its workings, that 
 he is the author of day, in that ho sheds his light over the entire heavens ; and if after- 
 ward, when night had overshadowed the earth, they were to see the whole sky beset and 
 adorned with stars, and should contemplate the changing light of the moon in its increase 
 and decrease, the rising and setting of all these heavenly bodies, aud their course to all 
 eternity inviolable and unalterable : truly, they would then believe that Gods really exist, 
 and that these mighty works originate vdth them." 
 
 § 49. Nature is the complex of objects having a material constitu- 
 tion and involved in necessary motion or change. Change {fierafioXTj) 
 or motion (Kivrjoig), in the broader sense, includes, on the one hand,
 
 164 Aristotle's natural philosophy. 
 
 origin and decay (or motion from the relatively non-existent to the 
 existent, and conversely); and, on the other, motion in the narrower 
 sense, which again is divisible into three species : quantitative mo- 
 tion, qualitative motion, and motion in space ; or increase and de- 
 crease, qualitative transformation, and change of place ; the latter 
 accompanies all other species of motion. The universal conditions 
 of all change of place and of all motion, of whatever kind, are place 
 and time. Place {roTrog) is defined as the inner limit of the inclosing 
 body. Time is the measure (or number) of motion with reference to 
 the earlier and later. No place is empty. Space is limited ; the 
 world possesses only a finite extension ; outside of it is no place. 
 Time is unlimited ; the world was alw^ays, and always will be. The 
 primum, motuin is heaven. The sphere, to which the fixed stai« 
 are attached, has, since it is in immediate contact with the Deity, the 
 best of all possible motions, namely, the motion of uniform circular 
 rotation. Aristotle seeks to explain the movements of the planets by 
 the theory of numerous spheres moved, in various senses, by unmoved^ 
 p immaterial beings, who are, as it were, a sort of inferior gods. The 
 / earth, w^hich is spherical, reposes unmoved at the center of the world. 
 The five material elements — ether, fire, air, water, and earth — occupy 
 in the universe determinate places, suited to their natures. The ether 
 fills the celestial spaces, and of it the spheres and the stars are formed. 
 The other elements belong to the terrestrial world; they are distin- 
 guished from each other by their relative heaviness or lightness, and 
 also by their relative warmth or coldness and dryness or moisture ; 
 they are commingled in all terrestrial bodies. Nature, guided by the 
 principle of finality and proceeding by the way of an ever-increasing 
 subjection of matter to form, produces on the earth a scale of living 
 beings. Each superior degree in this scale unites in itself the charac- 
 ters of the inferior degrees, adding to them its own peculiar and more 
 excellent virtue. The vital force, or the soul, in the widest sense of 
 this word, is the entelechy of the body. The vital force of the plant 
 is nothing more than a constructing force ; the animal possesses this, 
 and the faculties of sensation, desire, and locomotion besides ; man 
 combines with all these the faculty of reason. Reason is partly 
 passive, subject to determining influences and of temporary duration, 
 partly active, determining, and immortal. 
 
 Alemandri AphrodigienHs Qiiaentionnm Naturattwm et MoraUvmi ad ArUtctelis philosophiam illits- 
 trandam lihri quatuor^ ex recens. Leonh. Spengel, Munich, 1842. 
 
 The content of the ■writings of Aristotle on natural science is treated of by George Henry Lewes in bis
 
 Aristotle's natural philosophy. 165 
 
 Ariistotle, a Chapter from the Hietory of Science, London, 1864, German translation by J. V. Cams, Leipe. 
 1865; cf. J. B. Meyer's account of the book in the Gott. gel. Am., 1865, pp. 1445-1474. 
 
 On the character of the Aristotelian Physics in general, cf. C. M. Zevort (Paris, 1846), Bartbeleniy 6t. 
 Hilaire (in the Introd. to his edit of the Phya., Paris, 1862), Ch. L6veque (La Physique dAristote et la 
 Science CoTiiempoi-airie, Paris, 1S63). On Aristotle's doctrine of the eternity of the world, see the article 
 by H. Siebeck. ZeiUchrift fur exacte PhiloKophU, IX. 1869, pp. 1-38 and 181-154. 
 
 On the Arist, doctrine of space and time : G. R. Wolter (Bonn. 1845), and Otto Ule, on Aristotle's 
 and Kant's doctrines of space (Halle, 1S50) ; on the doctrine of time alone (Phijs., A. 10 seq.) : Ad. Toretrik, 
 Philoloffus, voL 26, 1868, pp. 446-523; on the doctrine oi continuity : G. Schilling (Giesscn, 1840). 
 
 On the mathematical \i-ao-9:\ed^e of Arist.: A. Burja (in Mem. de VAcad. de Berlin, 1790-'91); on his 
 mechanical problems : F. Th. Poselger (in Ahh. der Berl. Akad., 1829), Ruelle (Etude gvr un passage 
 d'Aristote relatif d la mechanique, in the Re-vue Arclieol.. 1S57, XIV., pp. 7-21); on his meteorology : J. 
 L. Idcler (Berlin, 1532), and Suhle (G.-Pr., Bernb. 1864); on his theory of light: E. F. Eberhard (Coburg, 
 1836), and Praiitl (Arist. ilber die Farben erlaxde.rt durch eine Uebersiclit iiber die Farbenlehre der 
 Alten, Munich, 1849); on his geography : B. L. Konigsmann (Schleswig, 1803-1806). 
 
 On the botany of Aristotle : Hen;chel (Breslau, 1824), F. Wimmcr (PJiytologiae Arist. Fragm., Breslau, 
 1838), Jessen (Ueber des Arist. Pfiansr.nuerke, in the Ph. Jfus., new serit^s, XIV., 1859, pp. 88-101). On 
 the Zoology of A., cf., besides the annotations of J. G. Schneider in his edition of the Jlistoria Anirnalium. 
 (Leips. 1811). the works of A. F. A. "W iepmar\n (Observ. zoologicae eriiicae in Arist. hi-storiam, animaliuTn, 
 Berlin, 1826), Karl Zell (Ueber den Sinn des Geschmacks, in: Ferienscliriften, 3. Sammliing, Freiburg, 
 1833), Job. Muller ( Ueber den glatten Ilai des Arist., Akad., Berlin, 1842), Jiirgen Bona Meyer (De pHn- 
 cipiis Arist. in distrilnit anirnalium adhibiii.t, UerMn, 1854; Arist. Thierkunde, Berlin, 1855), Sonnen- 
 bnrg (Zu Aristot. Tliiergeschicht^, G.-Pr., Bonn, 1857), C. J. Sundeval (Die 77iierarten des Aristot., 
 Stockholm, 1863), Langkavel (Zu De Part. An., G.-Pr., Berlin, 1863), Aubert (Die Cephalopjoden dea 
 Ariat, in soologischer, anatomischer und gesohichtlicher Beziehung, in the Zeitschr. /. wiss. Zoologie, 
 XII., Leips. 1802, p. 372 seq. ; cf. the edition with translation and notes of Aristotle's work on the Genera- 
 tion and Development of Animals, by II. Aubert and Fr. "Wimmer, Leipsic, 1560), Henri Philibert (Le 
 Principe de la Vie siticant ^lr;.sfe?<>, Chaumont, 1865; Arist. philosophia zoologica, thesis Parixi^nsis, 
 Chaumont and Paris, 1565), Charles Thurot (Obserxations critiques sur le traite d'' Arist. De Partibua 
 Anirnalium, in the Revue Grit, new series, 1807, pp. 223-242). The two following authors treat specially 
 of Aristotle's doctrines of human anatomy and physiology : Andr. Westphal (De anatomia Aristotelis, 
 imprimis num. cadavera secuerit htimana, Greifswald, 1745), and L. M. Philippson (uAij a.v8puiirivrj, 
 pars I. : de internarum hrimani corporis partium cognitione Aristotelis cu7n Platonis sententiis com- 
 parata ; pars 11. : philosophorwm veterum ■u«qu6 ad Theophrastum doctiina de sensu, Berlin, 1831). 
 Of Arif,U>t\c''s physiognomies treat E. Taube (G.-Pr., Gleiwitz, 1866), and J. Henrychowski (Diss. Inaug., 
 Breslau, 1868). 
 
 The following authors treat of the Psrjchology of Aristotle : Job. Heinr. Deinhardt (Der Be^riff der 
 Seele mil Riicksicht auf Aristoteles, Hambuig, 1840), Gust. Ilartenstein (De p-fychol. vulg. orig. ab 
 Arittotele repetenda, Leipsic, 1840), Car. Phil. Fischer (De principiis Aristotelicae de anima doctri- 
 nue diss., Erlangen, 1845), B. St. Hilaire (in his edition of the De Anima, Paris, 1S46), Wilh. Schraiier 
 (Arist. de noluntate doctrina, Progr. des Brandenb. Gimn., Brandenburg, 1S47, and Die Unstir- 
 blichkeitslehre deA Aristoteles, in K Jahrb. f. Philol. u. Pad., Vol. 81, 1860, pp. 89-104), W. Wolff 
 ( Von dem Begriff des Arist. iiber die Seele und dessen Anirendung auf die heutige Psychologie, Progr.., 
 Bayreuth, 1845), Gsell-Fels (Psychol. Plat, et Arist, Progr., Wiirzbiirg, 1854), Hugo Anton (Doctrina 
 de nat. horn, ab Arist. in scriptis ethicis proposita, Berlin, 1S52. and De hominis habitu naturali 
 quam Arist. in Eth. Nic. proposuerit doctrinam., Erfurt, 1860), W. F. Volkmann (Die Gritndzilge 
 der Aristotelisch^n Psychologie, Prague, 1858), Herm. Beck (Arist. de sensuum actione, Berlin, 156 ), 
 Pansoh (De Aristotelis animae definitione diss., Greifswald, 1861), Wilh. Biehl (Die Arist. Definit. 
 der Seele, in Verh. der Augsburger Philologen-Vers. for the year 1862, Leipsic 1863, pp. 94-102). J. 
 Freudenthnl (Ueher den Begriff des Wortes 4>avTacria bei Aritt., Gottiugen, 1863), A. Gratacap (Arist. 
 de sensibns doctrina, diss, ph., Montpellier, 1866). Leonh. Schneider (Die UnterblicJikeifslehre df.i 
 Aristoteles., Passau, 1867), Eugen Eberhard (Die Arist. Definition der Seele und ihr M'erth fiir die 
 Gegenwart, Berlin, 1868), [George Grote, in the Supplement to the third edition of Bain's Senses and Vl6 
 Intellect, London, 18C9.— Tr.] 
 
 Aristotle's doctrine of the voCs is discussed in works by F. G. Starke (Neu-Euppin, 1838), F. H. Chr. 
 Ribbentrop (Breslau, 1840). Jul. Wolf (Arif>f. de intellectu agente et patiente doctrina, Berlin, 1844), and 
 others, and, recently, by Wilh. Biel (Gymn.-Pr., Linz, 1864), and Franz Brentano (Die Psychologie des 
 Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom vov^ b-oitjtiicot, nebst einer Beilage iiber das Wirken des 
 Arist Gottes. Mayence, 1867). Cf., also, Prantl, Gesch. d. Log., I. p. 108 seq., and F. F. Kampe. Di4 
 Erkimttnisslehre des A., Leipsic, 1870, pp. 3-60.
 
 166 akistotle's natueal philosophy. 
 
 Aristotle designates {Fhys., II. 1) as the universal character of all which is by naiure, 
 that it has in itself the principle of motion and rest, while in the products of human art 
 there is no tendency to change. All natural existences (De Coelo, I. 1) are either them- 
 selves bodies, or have bodies or are principles of things having bodies (e. g., body ; man ; 
 «oul). The word motion (jiivrjaiq) is sometimes used by Aristotle (e. g., Phys., III. 1) as 
 synonymous with change (jiETafiolr]); but, on the other hand, he says {Phys., V. 1), that 
 though all motion is change, yet the converse is not true, all change is not motion, such 
 changes, namely, as affect the existence of objects, i. e., generation and decease (}fi'f(T(f and 
 fdopa) are not motions. Motion proper exists in the three categories of quantity [na-a rb 
 Toadv or Kara /leyedo^), quality [Kara to ■kol6v or Kara irdfef), and place (/card to ttov or Knrd 
 Tonov) : in the first case it is increase and decrease {av^ijaiQ koI (pdlacc) ; in the second, 
 alteration (a/l/lo/wffif) ; in the third, change of place {ipopd). Aristotle defines Tdno^* {Phys., 
 lY. 4, p. 212 a, 20), as the first and unmoved boundary of the inclosing body on the side 
 of the inclosed {to tov ■KspiexovTo^ irepag aniviiTov wpioTov). TdTrog may be compared to an 
 unmoved vessel, containing the object whose Td-rrog it is. Aristotle understands, therefore, 
 by roTof, not so much the space through which a body is extended, as, rather, the limit by 
 which it is bounded, and this conceived as fixed and immovable ; liis chief argument for 
 the non-existence of an unfilled rSTrog and for the non-existence of a roTrof outside of the 
 world, is founded on the above definition, in accordance with which no void within or 
 region without the world is possible. All motion must, according to Aristotle, take place 
 in a plenum by means of an exchange of places {avTiTvepicTaaiq). The motion of the world, 
 as a whole, is not an advancing, but simply a rotary motion. The definition of time [re- 
 cited above] is worded as follows {Phys., IV. 11, pp. 219 b, 1, 220 a, 2-1): 6 ;jfpovof apid/udg 
 iaTi KiVTjaeuq KaTo. to tvpoTEpov koL voTepov. For the measure of time the uniform circular 
 motion is especially appropriate, since it is most easily numbered. Hence time is repre- 
 sented (ch. 14) as connected with the motion of the celestial spheres, since by these all 
 other motions are measured. But time is (ch. II, p. 219 b, 8) the number which is reck- 
 oned, not that by means of which we reckon. Without a reckoning soul there would be 
 no number, hence no time, but only motion, and in it an earlier and later. 
 
 All motion in nature is directed to an end. " God and nature do nothing in vain " (6 6ehg 
 Kat 7/ (pvaig ovSev judTTjv ttolovgiv, De Coelo, I. 4). Nevertheless, a certain room is left by 
 Aristotle {Phys., II. 4-6) for the play of the accidental {avTOfiuTov) or the advent of results, 
 which were not intended, in consequence of some secondary effect following from the 
 means used to bring about another end; under the avTOfiaTov falls, as a concept of nar- 
 rower extension, chance (y rrj^), the emergence of a result which was not (consciously) 
 intended, but which might have been intended {e. g., the finding of a treasure while 
 plowing the ground). Nature does not always attain her ends, on account of the obstacles 
 offered by matter. The degree of perfection in things varies according as they are more or 
 less removed from the direct influence of God (cf. § 48). God acts directly on the firmament 
 of the fixed stars, which he touches, without being touched by it. (The notion of contact 
 (d0^), which Aristotle {Phys., V. 3) defines as the juxtaposition of dupa or {De Gen. et Corn, 
 
 * [ToTTo? is the Greek word for space. It signifies, properly, however, rather place than space, and this 
 is the signification which it has with Aristotle. Aristotle's conception of space is not that of indefinite 
 extension. He disallows the idea of unfilled space, and as nothing can occupy space but the world, and as 
 the world is, in Aristotle's view, a bounded sphere.it follows that space in general must be the "place" 
 occupied by the world, and that its limits are the limits of the world. Aristotle remarks, however, that not 
 the world, but only its parts, are in space— which follows from his definition. The place of any thing. h« 
 defines, is the inner surface of the body surrounding it. that surface being conceived as fixed and immova- 
 ble. As nothing exists outside of the world, except God. who is pure thought and not in space, the worU 
 naturally cao not le in space, i. e., its "place" can not be defined.— TV.]
 
 Aristotle's natural philosophy. 167 
 
 I. 6) eaxc-To, is here intermediate in signification between contiguity in space and ideal 
 afiection.) God moves the world from its circumference. The motion of the heaven of 
 the fixed stars is better than that of the planetary spheres ; the obliquity of the ecliptic 
 marks an imperfection of the lower regions ; less perfect still are the motions which ara 
 accomplished ou the earth. Each motion of a surrounding sphere is communicated to the 
 spheres included in it, so, in particular, that of the sphere of the fixed stars to all the rest; 
 when this effect ought not to be produced, as in fact it is not by the planetary spheres on 
 those still inferior, retroacting spheres, or spheres with a counter-motion, are requisite. 
 The whole number of spheres assumed by Aristotle is 47, or according to another con- 
 struction, 55 (J/ef., XII. 8). 
 
 The nature of the Ether (which extends from the heaven of the fixed stars down 
 to the moon, Meteor., I. 3) adapts it especially for circular motion ; to the other elements, 
 the upward motion {i. e., from the center of the world toward its circumference) or 
 the downward {i. e., from the circumference to the center) is natural Of these other 
 elements, earth is the one to which the attribute of heaviness belongs, and its natural 
 place in the world is, consequently, the lowest, viz.: the center of the world; fire is the 
 light element, and its place is the sphere next adjoining the sphere of the ether. Fire 
 is warm and dry, air is warm and moist (fluid), water is cold and moist (fluid), and 
 earth is cold and dry. Ether is the first element in rank {Meteor., I. 3 ; Be Coda, I. 3 ; 
 cf. De Gen. An., II. 3); but if we enumerate, beginning with the elements directly 
 known by the senses, it is the fifth, the subsequently so-called Tcifi-nTov ctolxeIov, quinta 
 essentia. 
 
 In all organic creations, even in the lowest animals, Aristotle {De Part. An., I. 5) finds 
 something admirable, full of purpose, beautiful and divine. The plants are less perfect 
 than the animals {Phys., II. 8) ; among the latter, those which have blood are more perfect 
 than the bloodless, the tame than the wild, etc. [De Gen. An., II. 1 ; Pol, I. 5). The 
 lowest organisms may arise by original generation (generatio sjyontanea sive aequivoca, i. e., 
 by "generation" only homonymously so called [6/iiiJvv/u.u(;], and consisting in evolution from 
 the heterogeneous). But in the case of all higher organisms, like is generated by like ; in 
 those which have attained their full development, the germs of new organisms of the same 
 name and species are developed {Metaph., XII. 3 : eKdart/ ek awuvvuuv yijverai y oicia 
 . . . avdpuT^oq yap avdpcmov yewa). In the act of generation Aristotle teaches that the 
 form-giving or animating principle proceeds from the male, and the form-receiving or 
 material principle from the female. 
 
 The two general classes in which Aristotle includes all animals, namely, animals having 
 blood and bloodless animals, correspond with what Cuvier termed the Tertebrates and the 
 Invertebrates. The latter are classified by Aristotle as either Testacea, Crustacea, Mollusks. 
 or Insects; and the former as Fishes, Amphibious Animals. Birds, and Mammalia: the apo 
 ia viewed by him as an intermediate form between man and other viviparous animals. 
 Aristotle founds the division of his anatomical investigations on the distinction of 
 avofioinfxeprj, i. e., organs, whose parts are not like the organs themselves (e. g., the hand ; 
 the hand does not consist of hands), and ouoiouep/j, i. e., substances, whose parts are like 
 the substances themselves {e. g., flesh, blood ; the parts of a piece of flesh or of a mass of 
 blood are like the wholes to which they belong). Aristotle had a far more exact knowl- 
 edge of the internal organs of animals than of those of the human body. The (physio- 
 logical) work on the Senses and the work on the Generation and Development of 
 Animals are followed in the " History of Animals " by a collection of observations on 
 the habits of life, and, in particular, on the psychical functions of the different classes 
 of animals.
 
 168 Aristotle's natural philosophy. 
 
 Aristotle defines the soul as the first entelechy of a physical, potentially living and 
 organic body (De Anima, II. 1 : egtIv ovv ipvxrj ivreAexcia ij Trp('jrr/ auyfiaroq fvaiKov Coi7;v 
 eXovTog 6vvdfj.er tolovtov 6e b av y bpyaviKov). "First entelechy" is related to "second," 
 as knowledge {eKiaTrj/j.Ti) to speculation (deupeiv). Neither is mere potentiality ; both are 
 realized potentialities ; but while knowledge may be ours as a passive possession, specula- 
 tion is, as it were, knowledge in activity, or knowledge put to its most characteristic use ; 
 so the soul is not (like the divine mind) always engaged in the active manifestation of its 
 own essence, but is always present, as the developed force capable of such manifestation. 
 As the entelechy of the body the soul is at once its form {principium fornians), its prin- 
 ciple of motion and its end. Each organ exists (De Part. An., I. 5) in view of an end, and 
 this end is an activity; the whole body exists for the soul. The vegetable soul, i. e., the 
 vital principle of the plant, is (according to De An., II. 1 et al.) a nourishing soul, to 
 DpeTTTtKov, the faculty of material assimilation and reproduction. The animal possesses in 
 addition to this the sensitive, appetitive and locomotive faculties {to a\a-&TjTiK6v, to opsKTiKov, 
 -b KLVTjTLKov KUTo. Tomjv). The corporeo-psychical functions of animals (at least of the 
 more highly developed animals) have a common center (/^roor^/f), which is wanting in 
 plants ; the central organ is the heart, which is viewed by Aristotle as the seat of sensa- 
 tion, the brain being an organ of subordinate importance. Sensuous perception (alc67;ciq\ 
 is the result of qualities which exist potentially in the objects perceived and actually in the 
 perceiving being. The seeing of colors depends on a certain motion of the medium of 
 vision (air or water). With sensuous perception are connected imaginative representation 
 {tpai'Taaia), which is a psychical after-effect of sensation {De An., III. 3), or a sort of weak- 
 ened sensation {Rhet., I. 11, 1370 a, 28), and also (involuntary) memory {/uvr/ju?;), which is 
 to be explained by the persistence (/lovr/) of the sensible impression {De Memor., ch. 1 ; Anal. 
 Post, II. 19), and (voluntary) recollection {avd/:iv?/aLc), which depends on the co-operation 
 of the will aud implies the power of combining mental representations {De Memor., ch. 2). 
 Out of these theoretical functions, combined with the feeling of the agreeable and the 
 disagreeable, springs desire {bpe^ig) ; whatever, says Aristotle, is capable of sensation, is 
 also capable of pleasure and pain and of the feeling of the agreeable and disagreeable, and 
 whatever is capable of these, is capable also of desire {De An., II. 3, p. 414 b, 4). The 
 human soul, uniting in itself all the faculties of the other orders of animate existence, is a 
 Microcosm (De An., III. 8). The faculty by which it is distinguished from those orders is 
 reason {vovq). The other parts of the soul are inseparable from the body, and are hence 
 perishable {De An., 11. 2); but the vovg exists before the body, into which it enters from 
 without as something divine and immortal {De Gen. Animal., II. 3 : Xeinerai tov vovv fiovov 
 dvpaOev, ETTEiaitvac /cat 6elov dvai fiovov). But the concept or notion is impossible without 
 the representative image {(pdvTaa/iia). This stands to the concept in a relation similar to 
 that in which the mathematical figure stands to that which is demonstrated by means of 
 it, and only by the aid of such an image, joined with the feeling of the agreeable or dis- 
 agreeable, can the reason act upon the appetitive faculty, i. e., become practical reason 
 {DeAn., III. 10). The vovg, therefore, in man, has need of a Svvafug, or what may be called 
 an unfilled region of thought, a tabula rasa, before it can manifest its form-giving activity 
 {De An., III. 4 : \yovg k(jTi\ ypafi/idTEiov^ ij fiTj^kv inrdpxei EvepyEtq yEypanfiEvov). Accord- 
 ingly, a distinction must be made between the passive reason {vovg TraOr/TiKdg), as the form- 
 receiving, and the active reason {vovg noiTjTiKog), as the form-giving principle ; substantial, 
 eternal existence belongs only to the latter {De Anima, III. 5 : 6 %'ovg ;f6)p«Tr6f ko: dTva^ijg 
 nal afiLyrjg r^ ovalg tJv eve py Eta, ... 6 Se ■KO&TjTLKog vovg (p&apTog). How the active reason 
 is related, on the one hand, to individual existence, on the other, to God, is not made per- 
 fectly clear ; a certain latitude is left for a naturalistic and pantheistic or for a mor(j
 
 Aristotle's ethics and aesthetics. 169 
 
 spiritualistic and theistic interpretation, and each of these interpretations has found 
 numerous representatives both in ancient and later times; yet it is scarcely possible to 
 develop either of them in all its consequences, without running counter to other portions 
 of Aristotle's teaching. 
 
 § 50. The end of human activity, or the highest good for man, is 
 happiness. This depends on the rational or virtuous activity of the 
 soul throughout the whole of its life. With activity pleasure is 
 joined, as its blossom and natural culmination. Virtue is a pro- 
 liciency in willing what is conformed to reason, developed from the 
 state of a natural potentiality by practical action. The development 
 of virtue requires the existence of a faculty of virtue, and requires 
 also exercise and intellisence. All virtues are either ethical or 
 dlanoetic. Ethical virtue is that permanent direction of the will (or 
 state of mind), which guards the mean proper for us, as determined 
 for us by the reason of the intelligent ; hence it is the subordination 
 of appetite to reason. Bravery is the mean between cowardice and 
 temerity ; temperance, the mean between inordinate desire and stupid 
 indiiference ; generosity, the mean between prodigality and parsimony, 
 etc. The highest among the ethical virtues is justice or righteous- 
 ness. This, in the most extended sense of the word, is the union 
 of all ethical virtues, so far as they regard our fellow-men; in the 
 narrower sense, it respects the equitable (toov) in matters of gain or 
 loss. Justice in this latter sense is either distributive or commuta- 
 tive ; the former respects the partition of possessions and honors, the 
 latter relates to contracts and the reparation of inflicted wrongs. 
 Equity is a complementary rectification of legal justice by reference 
 to the individuality of the accused. Dianoetic virtue is the correct 
 functioning of the theoretical reason, either in itself or in reference 
 to the inferior psychical functions. The dianoetic virtues are reason, 
 science, art, and practical intelligence. The highest stage of reason 
 and science is wisdom in the absolute sense of the terra, tlie highest 
 stage of art is wisdom in the relative sense. A life devoted only to 
 sensual enjoyment is brutish, an ethico-political life is human, but a 
 scientific life is divine. 
 
 Man has need of man for the attainment of the practical ends of 
 life. Only in the state is the ethical problem capable of solution. 
 Man is by nature a political being. The state originated for the 
 protection of life, but ought to exist for the promotion of morally 
 upright living ; its principal business is the development of moral
 
 170 akistotle's ethics and esthetics. 
 
 capacity in the young and in all its citizens. The state is prior to 
 the individual in that sense in which in general the whole is prior to 
 the part and the end prior to the means. Its basis is the family. 
 He who is capable only of obedience and not of intelligence must be 
 a servant (slave). The concord of the citizens must be founded on 
 unanimity of sentiment, not on an artificial annihilation of individual 
 interests. The most practicable form of the state is, in general, a 
 government in which monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic ele- 
 ments are combined ; but in all individual cases this form must be 
 accommodated to the given circumstances. Monarchy, Aristocracy, 
 and Timocracy (or a Republic) are, under the appropriate circum- 
 stances, good forms of government ; Democracy, Oligarchy, and 
 Tyranny are degenerate forms, of which the latter, as being the cor- 
 ruption of the most excellent form, is the worst. The distinguishing 
 mark of good and bad forms of government is found in the object 
 pursued by the rulers, according as this object is either the public 
 good or the j^rivate interest of the rulers. It is right that the 
 Hellenes should rule over the barbarians, the cultured over the 
 uncultured. 
 
 Art is of two kinds, useful and imitative. The latter serves 
 three ends : recreation and (refined) entertainment, temporary eman- 
 cipation from the control of certain passions by means of their excita- 
 tion and subsequent subsidence, and, last and chiefly, moral culture. 
 
 Of the ethics of Aristotle in general write Chr. Garve ( Uebers. nnd Erldut., Berlin, 1T98-1802), Sehleier- 
 macher (in various passages of his Grundlinien einer KriUk der bishe7-ige7i Sittenlehre, Berlin, 1S03 ; cf. 
 Ueber die iciss. Behandlung des Tit gendh eg riffs, in the Abh. der Acad., Berlin, 18'JO), K. L. Michelet 
 {Die Ethik des Arisi. in ihrem Verhciltnifis sum System, der Moral, Berlin, 1827; cf. his Syy»t. der philoa. 
 Moral, 1828, pp. 195-2:37), Ilartenstein ( Ueber den wiss. Werth der Arist. Ethik, in the Berichte iiber die 
 Verhandlungen der K. Siichs. Gesellsch. der Wiss. zu Leipzig, p/iilol.-liisi. cl., 1859, pp. 49-107, and in 
 H.'s JTist.-philos. Abh., Leipsic, 1870), Trendelenburg {Ueber Ilerbart's p>raktisdie J'hilos. und die Ethik 
 der Alien, in the Abh. der Berl. Akad., 1856; cf. the 10th essay in T.'s Hist. Beitr. zur Philos., Vol. II., 
 Berlin, 1855, Ueber einige Stellen im. 5 n. 6, Buche der Kikomach. Ethik, and the 9th Article in Vol. III. 
 of the same, Berlin, 1S67; Zur Arist. Ethik., pp. 399-444), Dielitz {Qtiaestiones Aristoieleae, Progr. of the 
 Sophien-gymn, Berlin, 1S67). 
 
 Of the relation of Aristotle''s ethics and politics to the corresponding doctrines of Plato, and of Aris- 
 totle's critique of the latter, treat Pinzger (Leipsic, 1822), H. VV. Broecker (Leipsic, 1824), W. Orges (Berlin, 
 1843), St. Matthies (Greifswald, 1848), A. J. Kahlert (Czernowitz, 1854), W. Pierson (in the Bhein. Mvs.f. 
 Ph., new series, XIII., 1858, pp. 1-48 and 209-247) ; also, Fr. Guil. Engelhardt, Loci. Pliitmiici, qvonim Aris- 
 toteles in conscribendis Politicis oidetur memor /uis.se, 'Da.ntz\c. 1S.5S; Siegfr. Lommatzsch, Quomodo 
 Plato et Arist. religionis et reip. prineijna conjunverint, Berlin, 1863; C. W. Schmidt, Ueber die Ein- 
 wurfe des Ariit. in der Kik. Ethik gegen Plat. Lehre vrni der Lust (G.-Pr.), Bunzlau, 1864; Kalmns, Ar. 
 de volupt. doctr. {G.-Pr.), Pyritz, 1862; Rassow, IHe Pep. des Plato und der beste Sfaat des Arist, 
 "Weimar, 1866. Cf. the dissertations by Gnst. Goldmann (Berlin, 1868), and Adolf Ehrlich (Halle, 1868). and 
 the opuscule of Herm. Henkel on Plato's Zajm and the Politics of Aristotle {Gym. -Progr.). Seehauser, 
 1869. On Kant's Ethics as compared with Aristotle's, see Traug. Bruckner, De trihvs ethice.i locis, guibii^ 
 differt Eantius ab Aristotele, diss, inaug.. Berlin, 1866, and Trendelenburg, Der Widerstreit zwischen 
 Kant und Arist. in der Ethik, in his Histor. Beitruge zur Philosophie, Vol. III., 186T, pp. 171-214.
 
 Aristotle's ethics and esthetics. 171 
 
 Ch. E. Luthart, Die Ethik des Ariat. in ihrem Untersdded von der Moral dM ChristenthwM, Leipsic, 
 1869. Wilh. Oncken, Die StaaUUhre den Arint. in hvtt.-pol. Umriseen, Leipsic, 1870; Ar. u. «. L.v. Staai, 
 in Viichow aud Hollzeudorfif's Savunlung yemeinverHtdndliche toins. Vortrdye. No. 103, Berlin, 1870. 
 
 Of the ethical aud political principles of Aristotle treat Starke (Neu-Kuppin, 1S3S and I860), Holm 
 (Berlin, 1853X Ueberweg (Das Arist., Kaiitisc/ie und Uerbartsche Moral-princip., in Fichte's Z., Vol. 24, 
 Halle, 1854, p. 71 seq.); on the method and the bases of Aristotle's Ethics, of. Rud. Eucken {O.Pr^ Frank- 
 fort-on-the-Mitin. 1870); on points of contact between the Ethics and Politics, J. Municr (G.-Pr., Mayence, 
 1358), Schutz (Potsd. 1860); on the Highest Good, Kruhl (Breslan, 1832 and 1833), Afzelius (Holmiae, 1888X 
 Axel Nybliius (Lund, 1863), "Wenkel (Die Lehre den Ariat. uher das hdchste Gut oder die GlOck- 
 seligkeit. G.-Pr., Sonderscausen. 1864); on the Eudaemonia of Ari.st., Herm. Hauipke (De Etulaemonui, 
 Arist. moralis disciplina^ priiicipio, diss, inuug. BeroL, Brandenb. 1S6S). G. Teichiniilier (Die Einhett 
 der Ar. Eiuiilmonie, from the Melanges grneco-rommns, I., II , St. Petersburg, 1859. in the Bulletin 
 hist.-phil., t. XVI.. of the Imperial Acad, of Sciences, ibid. 1859), E. Laas (Diss. Brl., 1859), Chr. A. 
 Thilo (in the Zeitschrift fur exacte PhiloH., Vol. 11., Leipsic, 1861, pp. 271-30J), Karl Kiiappe (Grundzixge 
 der Arist. Lehre von dsr Ewdam., G.-Pr., Wittenberg, 1364-66): on A.'s conception of virtue, Nielander 
 (G.-Pr., Herl'ord, 1861); on the theory of Duties, Carl. Aug. Mann (/>««. iiiavg., Berlin, 1867): on the 
 conceptions (lecroTrjs and opflbs Aoyo?, G. Glogau (Halle, 1869); on the place of Sensation in Aristotle's 
 doctrine, lloth (in Theolog. Studten -and Krit., 1850, Vol. I., p. 625 seq.)-. on Justice, A. G. Kastner 
 (Leipsic. 1737), C. A. v. Droste-Hulehoff (Bonn. 1826), Herm. Ad. Fechner (Dreslauer Diss., Leipsic, 1865), 
 Freyschmidt (Die Arist. Lehre von der Gerechtiglceit und das moderne Stuatsrecht, G.-Pr., Berlin, 
 1367), and Trendelenburg (in the above-cited works) ; cf. also the articles of H. Hainpke (in PhiloL, 
 XVL 1860, pp. 60-84) and F. Hacker (in Miitzeirs Zeitschr. fiir das GymnUdtcesen, Berlin, 1862, pp. 513- 
 660) on the fifth book of the Nicom. Ethics, which treats of justice; on the place given to practical prudence 
 in A.'s doctrine, Liidke (Stralsund, 1862) ; on the principle of division and arrangement followed in the 
 classificatioii of moral virtues in the Nic. Eth., F. Hacker (Progr. des Coin. Real.-Gyrtm., Berlin, 1863, and 
 in Mutzell's Zeitschr fur G.- W.. XVII., Berlin, 186-3, pp. 821-843) ; on the Dianoetic Virtues, Prantl (Munich, 
 1352), and A. Kuhn (Berlin, 1860); on Imputition, according to Aristotle, Afzelius (Upsalae, 1841); on 
 Friendship, Breier (De amicprincipum, ad Ar. Eth. Me., 115Sa, G.-Pr., Lubeck, 1858} ; on Slavery, W. T. 
 Krug (Leips. 1813), C. Gottling (Jena, 1821), Ludw. Schiller (Erlangen, 1847), S. L. Steinheim (Hamburg, 
 1853), and Wilh. Uhde (LHss. inaiig., Berlin, 1856); on the Arist. conception of Politics, Jul. Findeisen 
 (LHss. inaug., Berlin, 1868); on Aristotle's Classification of Forms of Government, G. Teichmuiler (Progr. 
 of the School of St. Ami at St. Petersburg, St. Petersburg and Berlin, 1859); on Aristotle's Theory of the 
 State, J. Bendixen (Progr. der Plbner Gelehrtenschule. Hamburg, 1868); on the economic doctrines in the 
 '• Politics" of Aristotle. Ludwig Schneider (Gyvin.-Progr.. Deutsch Crone, 1S68). 
 
 Of the Arist. doctrine of poetry and art in general, treat Lessing (in his Ilamh. Dramatvrgie, Stiick 87 
 seq.. 46 seq., 74 seq.), Ed. MuUer (6^. d. Th. d. A'unst. b. d. A., II. pp. 1-18-3, 346-395. and 417), Wilh. Schrader 
 (De artis apnd Arist. notione ae vi, Berlin, 1843), Franz Suseinihl ( Vortirig. Griefsw. lsi;2), Th. Striiter (in 
 Fichtes Z. f. Ph., new series. Vol. XL. pp. 219-247; Vol. XLI., pp. 204-223,1862); of the conception of 
 imitation, E. MuUer (in the volume above cited, pp. 1-23 and 346-361; also, in Die Idee der Aesthetikin 
 ihrem historisch&n Ursprxmg, Eatibor, 1840), and W. Abeken (Gott. 1886) ; of A.'s I^oetics and modem, 
 dramatists, F. v. Kaumer (read in the Berlin Acad. d. Wisa., 1828) ; of his doctrine of the tragedy, Lobel 
 (Leips. 1786), A. Boeckh (Ges. Kl. Schriften, I. p. ISO seq., a discourse delivered in 1830). Starke (Neu- 
 Kuppin, 1830), G. W. Nitzsch (Kiel, 1S46), Ileinrich Weil (in Verhandl. der 10 Versammlung deutscher 
 Philologen, Basel, 1848, pp. 131-141), Wassmuth (Saarbrucken. 1852), Klein (Bonn, 1856), Jakob Bernays 
 (Breslau, 1858, see above, ad § 46, and in the Ph. Mus., new series, XIV. pp. 867-877, and XV. p. 606 seq.), 
 Ad. Stiihr (Arist u. d. Wirkwng der Trag., Berlin, 1S69, and notes to his translation of the Poetics, Stutt- 
 gart, 1860), Leonh. Spengel (Ueber die icdflapo-tt riav naertixaTuiv, Munich, 1859, in Vol. IX. of the Abh. der 
 Munchener Akad. d. Wiss., pp. 1-80, cf Rh. Mus., new series, XV. pp. 458-462); of these works and of 
 other works by Liepert (Ari>it. und der Zweck der Knnst, G.-Pr., Passau, 1862), Geyer, and others, a 
 critical account is given by F. Ueberweg (in Ficlite's Zeitschr. fur Phil-os., Vol. 86, 1860, pp. 260-291 ; a 
 2J0sitive complement to that article is furnished in my article on Dis Lehre des A. von dem Wesen und der 
 Wirkiing der Kunst, ibid.. Vol. 50, 1867, pp. 16-89, and in Notes 23 and 25 to ray transl. of A.'s Poetics, 
 Berlin, 18G9). Franz Susemihl (in N. Jahrb. fur Philol. u. Pa(/«{?., Vol. 85, 1862, pp. 395-425, .ind iu his 
 edition and transl. of the Poetics), and A. Doring (in P.'iilol,, XXL, 1864, pp. 496-534, and XXVII., 1868, 
 pp. 689-728). Gerh. Zillgenz, Arist. und das deutsche Drama. Wurzburg, 1865. Paul Graf York von 
 Wartenburg, Die Katharsis dejt Arist. und der Oedipus Colonus des Sophokles, Berlin, 1866. Cf also R. 
 Wachsmutli, De Arist. Studiis Homericis, Berlin, 1868, and the contributions to the critique and elucida- 
 tion of Arist.'s Poetics, by Vahlen. Susemihl, Teichmuiler, and others (see above, p. 148). On Lessing's 
 conception of the Aristotelian doctrine of Tragedy, cf. K. A. F. Sundelin, Upsala, 1668. 
 
 On the Rhetoric of Aristotle in its relation to Plato's Gorgias, cf. H. Anton (in Rh. Mus. f. Ph., new
 
 172 AKISTOTLe's ethics and iESXHETICS. 
 
 Beries, Vol. XIV., 1859), and in its relation to Plato's Pfuiedriis and Gorgias, Georg Richard WiecLmaiii 
 (Platonic et Arint. de arte rketwica doctrinae inter sc. comparatae, duss. inauy.^ Berlin, 1S64), and Sjjen- 
 gel (Ueber diu> Studium der Bhetorik hei den Alien, in the Ahhundl. der Munch. Akad. d. W., 1M2, and 
 Ueber die JthetorUc dea Arint, ibid., 1851 ; cf. also Spengel, Philol . XVIII. 1862, pp. 604-646 and the litera- 
 ture there cited by him, p. 605 seq., on the Pseudo-ArisL, so-called Rhetofica ad Ale«am,drum, as the 
 author of which, the rhetorician Anaxiuienos, a contemporary of Arist., is named by Victorius and, in 
 modern times, by Spengel), Usener (Quaentiones Anaximeneae, Gott. 1856), and others. Sal. Kalischer, De 
 Arist. Rhetor, et Eth. Nicom. (Diss, inatiy.), Halle, 1868. 
 
 On the Aristotelian Theory of Education, cf. J . C. Orelli (in his Philol. Beitr. aiis d. Schveiz. ZmSch, 
 1819, I. pp. 61-130), Alex. Kapp (Arist. Staatspddagogik. Hamm, 1837), Fr. Chr. Schnize (Naumbiirg. 1844), 
 Sal. Lefmann (De Arist. in hominum educatio^ie principiis, Bei'lin, 1864 j, Frid. Alb. Janke (Arisiotelet 
 doctrinae paedagogicae pater, diss, inaug., Halle, 1866). 
 
 In accordance with his general metaphysical doctrines respecting the relation of 
 essence to end, Aristotle can determine the essence of morality only by considering what 
 is the object or aim of moral activity ; the fundamental conception of his Ethics is accord- 
 ingly that of the highest good, or rather, since ethics relates to human conduct, of the 
 highest practical good attainable by man as an active being {to iravruv oKporarov rijv 
 TTfiaKTcJv ayadcjv. Eth. Nic., I. 2); it is unnecessary, he observes, for the purposes of ethics, 
 to speculate, after the manner of Plato, about the idea of the Good {ibid. I. 4). The aim of 
 all moral action, says Aristotle, is admitted on all hands to be happiness or eudaemonia 
 (evSacfiovia, to ev C,riv or eii TvpdrTttv). Eudaemonia results from the performance of the pecu- 
 liar work which belongs to man as man {Eth. Nic, I. 6; X. 7). The peculiar work of man 
 can not consist in merely living, for plants also live, nor in having sensations, for these are 
 shared by man with the brute creation ; it can only consist in a life of action, under the 
 control of reason (^w^ npaKTiKij rig -ov Aoyov txovToq). Since now it is in the sphere of the 
 characteristic activity of each living being that we are to search for its peculiar excellence, 
 it follows that man's rational activity (''I^XVC evepyeia Kara Aoyov), and none other, is at the 
 same time honorable and virtuous activity {ipvxvi evepyeia kut' aperijv ; Eth. Nic., II. 5 : 
 fj Toi' avdpuTTov apery ely av efif a<p' 7/g aya'dbg av&puno^ yiverai Kal acj)' ijq ev to eavTov 
 ipyov aKo^cjaei). The greatest happiness is connected with the highest of the virtues 
 {Eth. Mc, I. 6 ; X. 7). Nevertheless, for complete happiness a suflScient provision of ex- 
 ternal goods is essential, since these are necessary for the active manifestation of virtue, 
 just as the equipping of the chorus is necessary for the representation of a dramatic work 
 of art {Eth. Nic, I. 11). 
 
 Pleasure is the complement of activity, it is the end in wliicli activity naturally dis- 
 charges itself and comes to rest ; pleasure is to activity what beauty is to the perfect 
 physical development of youth {Eth. Nic, X. 4: reAeiol Se ttjv evspyeiav t/ r)6ovfi ovx wf y 
 i-^ig ivinrdpxovaa, aA/l' wf kTriyr/vofievov ri riAo^, olov role dufiaioiQ ij copa). Pleasure is 
 united with Eudaemonia, and exists in the highest degree in connection with that highest 
 p]udaeraonia, which results from knowledge (Eth. N, X. 7). 
 
 Morality presupposes freedom. This exists whenever the will of the agent meets no 
 obstacles and he is able to deliberate intelligently. It is destroyed by ignorance or con- 
 straint {Eth. Nic, TIL, init.). 
 
 The reasou must, on the one hand, be obeyed by the lower functions (especially by the 
 TTadij, the passions), and, on the other, must rightly develop its own activities ; on this 
 double requirement is founded the distinction of the two kinds of virtues, the practical or 
 ethical and the dianoetic virtues {r/diKoi and diavojfrLKal or Aoy^/cat aperai, or al fiev tov 
 Tjdovi, al 6e ryg diavniaq aperai). The inclusion of the dianoetic or intellectual in the 
 sphere of virtue is explained by the broader signification of the latter term in Greek (as 
 equivalent to ability). 'H^of [whence the English ethics\, which denotes originally the
 
 Aristotle's ethics and esthetics. 173 
 
 natural bent of maa iu mind and disposition (temperament), signifies here the moral 
 character. 
 
 Aristotle's [above-cited] definition of ethical virtue (or the virtue of character) is worded 
 in the original as follows {Eth. Nic., II. 6) : e^c^ TifjoaipertKi/ ev fxeaor^ri oiaa ry -Kpbq r/fiaq 
 cjpiaiiEvrj (the MSS., to judge from the earlier editions, appear to have had upiafdvri^ and 
 that is probably the correct reading, although Bekker retains the Nominative) Xoyu kgI wf 
 av 6 (ppdviung opiaecev. Virtue is a E^«f [usually translated habitxis iu Latin and habitude in 
 English], and the latter is to Svva/Jig [power, potentiality] as proficiency is to endowment; 
 the ethical Svva/itt; is originally undetermined and may be determined in either of the two 
 opposite moral directions; its actual development must take place in a definite direction, 
 and tlie i^t^ then has the corresponding character. (According to the Aristotelian defini- 
 tion — from which the subsequent definition of the Stoics deviated — all e^etg were also 
 diadeaeic, but not all diadsaeig were e^etg, Categ., 8, p. 9 a, 10 ; diadtmg is defined, J/ei., V. 
 19, as Tov IxovTog fiepT] ra^ig, fj Kara tottov fj Kara dvvafiiv ij nar' eWof ; the ff<f is changed 
 with difficulty, while those chaOeaecg, which are pre-eminently so-called and are not iietc, 
 such as warmth, coldness, disease, health, are easily changeable, according to Categ., ch. 8, 
 p. 8 b, 35. Cf. Trendelenburg, Gesch. ckr Kitegorienlehre, p. 95 seq., and Comm. ad De 
 Anima, II. 5, 5.) The "ef<c TTponipeTiKr'/," direction of the will or the disposition. The 
 function of the reason in connection with the desires, which are prone to err through 
 excess or omission {vTrepf3oXy and ellei-^pK;), on the side of the too much or the too little, is to 
 determine the right proportion or the mean (/neao-rig) ; in this connection Aristotle himself 
 (Eth. Nic, II. 5) recalls the Pythagorean doctrine (which was also adopted by Plato in 
 another reference) of limit and the unlimited (jrepa^ and aTTeipm). 
 
 In enumerating the particular virtues, Aristotle follows the order of the rank or dignity 
 of the functions to which they have reference, advancing from the necessary and useful to 
 the beautiful (cf. Pol, VII. 14, p. 1333 a, 30). These functions are 1) physical hfe, 2) 
 sensuous, animal enjoyment, 3) the social life of man in its various relations (possession 
 and honor, social community in word and action, and, above all, political community), 4) the 
 speculative functions. 
 
 The ethical virtues are courage, temperance, liberality and magnificence, high-minded- 
 ness and love of honor, mildness, truthfulness, urbanity and friendship, and justice [Eth. 
 Nic., II. 1 ; cf. the less rigorous exposition in Rhet, I. 9). 
 
 Courage {avSpeia) is a mean between fearing and daring (/leaorj/c nepl (p6[iovq nal 
 Bappj)); but not every such mean is courage, at least not courage in the proper sense 
 of the term. In the strict sense, he only is courageous who is not afraid of an honorable 
 death {6 nept rbv KaXov Oavarov ader/c, IU. 9), and, in general, he only who is ready to 
 face danger for the sake of the morally beautiful (KaT^ov, Eth. Nic, III. 10, p. 1115 b, 12: 
 wf (hi Se Kal ug 6 Ti^oyog, inro/xevel (6 avrSpeZof ra (poj3epa) tov Ka?u)v ivsKa, tovto yap 
 Te'koq TTjq apETTjg). Genuine courage does not flow from passionateness (dv/ioc), although 
 the latter may co-operate with the former, but from giving to the befitting (which de- 
 pends on the moral end) the preference over life. The extremes, between which courage 
 is the mean, are represented by the foolhardy man and the coward (Eth. Nic, II. 7, 
 and III. 10). 
 
 Temperance {auippoahvif) guards the proper mean in respect of pleasures and pains 
 (/M£(y6T)/g Tvepl A/fioi'Qf Kal 7.vTrac:), but rather in respect of pleasures than of pains ; and also 
 not in respect of pleasures of every sort, but in respect of the lowest pleasures, which are 
 common to man with the animal, those of touch and taste ; and yet more particularly, in 
 respect of the "enjoyment which ari.ses wholly through the sense of touch, whether in 
 meats, in drinks, or in what are termed venereal pleasures " (d-oAav<jif, f/ yivETat Kaaa 6i 
 
 )
 
 174 Aristotle's ethics and esthetics. 
 
 atp^C Kul h> airioi^ Kai tv trorol^ Kal roi^ a<ppo^iainig Tisyo/jh'oic, III. 13). The extremes 
 are intemperance and insensibility (II. 7, and III. 14). 
 
 Liberality {iXevOepidTjjg) observes the proper mean in giving and receiving {jxeaoTrjq nepl 
 Maw xpVftnTuv Kal Xijipiv), especially in giving, and in cases where it is a question of 
 comparatively small values (IV. 1) ; when greater values are involved, the right mean is 
 magnificence (jnEyaTiOTrpiTreia, IV. 4) or " princeliness." The extremes are prodigality and 
 stinginess (II. 7 and IV. 1), and meanness and vulgarity (bad taste, IV. 4). 
 
 The proper mean in matters of honor and dishonor {uccStt/c nepl tljxtjv Kal artiuiav), in 
 cases of importance, is highmindedness {iiEyaTinipvx'M, IV. 7); in cases of less consequence, 
 ambition [(pi?ioTifiia), or, more exactly, the correct mean between ambition and indifference 
 {(KpiT'.oTi ftia, IV. 10). The high-minded or high-spirited man {fir/a?i6-ijJVXoc) is he, who, being 
 indeed worthy of great things, holds himself to be worthy of them (6 fieydluv avrbv 
 a^cuv a^ioq uv). He who erroneously holds himself to be worthy of great tilings, especially 
 he who incorrectly thinks himself deserving of high honor, is vain {xavvoq), while he who 
 underrates his own worth is mean-spirited (lUKpd^lwxo^). The ambitious {(ptTioTijioq) and the 
 unambitious err in regard to the measure and manner in which, the reason for which, and 
 the time when honor should be sought. Praiseworthy is only the correct mean, wliich, in 
 opposition to the one or the other extreme, is termed sometimes ambition, sometimes 
 indifference. 
 
 Mildness {npaoTrj^) is the proper mean in seeking for revenge {jiecoTTjq rrepl opyf/v, II. 7, 
 and IV. 1 1 ). 'Opy^ is the desire of revenge (rt/icjpia^ bpe^i^), it is the passion of the 6v/x6g ; 
 the di'fidg is the potentiality, which may be developed either into bpy^ or into npdvvaig 
 (placability; metaphorically, 6v/j.6g denotes bpyr/ itself). Excess in regard to anger is 
 irascibility, when the anger quickly rises and goes quickly away (whereas those who are 
 nucpoi, bitter, in their wrath, cherish it a long time) ; deficiency in this respect is aopyrjaia. 
 
 Truthfulness (or sincerity), facility in social intercourse, and friendliness {dlyOcia, evrpa- 
 trtXeia and (fiiAla) are means in the management of one's words and actions in society 
 (jieabrrjTeq nspl ?.6yuv Kal npd^euv Koivuviav). The first of these three virtues regards 
 veracity (the dTiT/Oeg) in discourse and action; the other two end in the agreeable (j'/i^v), the 
 one (evrpawi/^ia), being in place in social pastimes (fv ralg vai.Sialg) and the other (friend- 
 ship), in all other social relations (II. 7 and IV. 12-14). The obsequious man praises and 
 yields, in order not to render himself disagreeable to his companions, and the flatterer 
 {k67m^) does the same from motives of self-interest. The fretful and the cross man care 
 not, whether their conduct is offensive to others. The right mean of conduct in this 
 respect has no particular name. It most resembles friendship, from which, however, it is 
 distinguished, in that it is to be followed not merely among acquaintances and friends 
 (whom we love), but also, so far as is becoming, in our intercourse with all whom we may 
 meet. The candid man holds the mean between the braggart (nAnCwi') and the dissembler 
 (elpuv), in that he gives himself out for just what he is, and neither boasts nor belittles 
 himself. Those who indulge in well-timed mirth, are witty and elegant; those who carry 
 mirthfulness to excess, are buffoons and rude ; while those who hate all mirth, appear un- 
 cultivated, clownish, and stiff. 
 
 Supplementarl-y Aristotle treats of certain other "means," which are not regarded by 
 him as properly virtues, and, in particular, of shame (the r/dog of the a'uh'/^uuv)^ which he 
 considers as only relatively praiseworthy (?} al6ug k^ v-o'&iaeug eTriEiKsg), and more becom- 
 ing to youth than to riper age (IV. ch. 15). Shame is the fear of ill-repute {<p6f3og ddo^iag) 
 and is rather a passive emotion {ivddog) than a developed virtue (i^tg). The extremes are 
 represented by the timid and the shameless. Nemesis, or just indignation, is a mean 
 (a fieabTTjg nepl to. nad^), whose extremes are envy {(pObvoc) and spitefulness (imxaipEKaaia).
 
 Aristotle's ethics and esthetics. 175 
 
 To instico {^iKaionvv?)) he devotes a minute consideration (£^7i. A'!, Y.). Justice in the 
 most general sense is the practice of all virtue toward others (riyf bX/ig ape-y^ XPW^i ^Pk 
 dA2w, V. 5); it is "perfect virtue, yet not absolutely, but with reference to others" 
 (apET^ fi£v reXeia, all' ovx a-'Auq, a/M irpoQ erepov, V. 3). It is the most perfect virtue, 
 because it is the perfect exBrcise of all (perfect) virtue {pri TJjq Tel.eiag aperf;q xpwk f*""* 
 re?iela- reMn cT iariv, etc. — for TE?.eia is to be repeated in this passage, 1129 b, 31; cf. 
 the similar turn of expression in Cic, Tuscul, I. 45 : nemo parum diu vixit, qui viriutis 
 perfectae perffcto fuvjctris est munere), and because he, who possesses it, is able to practice 
 virtue as well in regard to others as in regard to himself. But justice, viewed as a single 
 virtue among others, respects the equal and the unequal {laov and aviaov), and is further 
 divisible into two species (fW//), of which the one is applied in the distribution (ev ralg 
 diavouatc) of honors or possessions among the members of a society, while the other takes 
 the form of commutation in intercourse or trade (tv rotg awalXaynaaiv). Commutation 
 may be either voluntary or involuntary ; the former is settled by contract, the latter by the 
 principles of penal justice. Distributive justice (70 kv rnl^ Siavofzalg diKaiov or ro SiavefxTj-tKov 
 diKaiov) rests on a geometrical proportion : just as the persons in question, with their indi- 
 vidual worth (a^ia), are to each other, so also must that be, which is dealt out to each 
 (A : B = a : /?, where B = e . A, and /? = e . a). Commutative justice (ro iv rolg cin>aA7Ay/inci 
 SiKaiov or to 6iopdu-iK6v, b yiverai. h rolg avvaTiMy/naai Kat roig iKovaioig Kal rolg aKovcloig) 
 is, indeed, likewise an equalizing principle (iffov), but proceeds by arithmetical and not 
 by geometrical proportion, since it regards not the moral worth of the persons involved, 
 but only the advantage gained or injury suffered by them; commutative justice removes 
 the difference between the original possession and the diminished (or increased) possession, 
 as occasioned by loss (or gain), by causing an equal gain (or loss), the latter increasing (or 
 diminishing) the amount of the possession by so much as the first loss (or gain) diminished (or 
 increased) it. The amount as thus restored (undiminished and unaugmented) is a mean be- 
 tween the less and the greater according to arithmetical proportion (a — 7 : a = a : a + 7). 
 In connection with this doctrine of Aristotle, cf. Plato. Leges, VI. p. 757, wlicre the geo- 
 metrically proportional is recognized as the principle of political justice, but the arithmeti- 
 cally proportional, as a political principle, is rejected : it is this arithmetical equality whose 
 place in the economy of trade is justly vindicated by Aristotle. (Trendelenburg directs 
 attention to this difference, Das Ebenmaass, etc., p. 17.) 
 
 Equity {to iwietKEg) is a species of justice, not mere legality, but an emendation of legal 
 justice, or a supplementing of the law, where the latter fails through the generality of its 
 provisions (kirardpSufia v6fiov tJ iXXriirei. 610. to KadoAov). The provisions of the law are 
 necessarily general, and framed with reference to ordinary circumstances. But not every 
 particular case can be brought within the scope of these general provisions, and in such 
 instances it is the part of equity to supply the deficiencies of the law by special action, 
 and that, too, in the spirit of the lawgiver, who, if he were present, woidd demand the 
 same action. 
 
 The dianoetic virtues are divided by Aristotle into two classes. These correspond 
 with the two intellectual functions, of which the one exercised by the scientific faculty 
 {to kTTidTjjfioviKov), is tlic considcration of the necessary, and the other, exercised by 
 the faculty of deliberation {to /MyioTiKdv), is the consideration of that which can be 
 changed (by our action). The one includes the best or the praiseworthy s^eig of the 
 scientific faculty, the other includes those of the deliberating faculty. The work of the 
 scientific faculty is to search for the truth as such; the work of the practical reason 
 (iidvota), which subserves the interests of practical action or artistic creation, is to 
 discover that truth, which corresponds with correct execution. The best tieig or virtues
 
 176 akistotle's ethics and aesthetics. 
 
 of each faculty are therefore those, through which we approach nearest to the truth. 
 These are — 
 
 A. "With reference to that which is capable of variation: art and practical wisdom 
 (rexv^ and (jtpdvr/ai^), which are related to each other as noieiv and rrpdrTEiv. npdrreiv 
 (action, conduct) has its end in itself, while Trotslv (formation, creation) ends in a positive 
 product (ipyov) distinct from the productive act {ivep-yeia, Eth. Nic., I. I ; VI. 5). Hence 
 the value of the products of art is to be found in these products themselves, while the 
 worth of the works of virtue lies in the intention. Art, as a virtue, is creative abihty 
 imder true intellectual direction {i^iq fiera ?.6yov ah/^ov^ noiTp-iK?/, YI. 4) ; practical wisdom 
 (or <i)p6vT/air;) is practical ability, under rational direction, in the choice of things good and 
 in the avoidance of things which are evil for man (ff'? aT^jj-Qf/^ fiera Myov TrpaicTiKy irepl 
 ra dv&puTTu dya'&a koX kuko, VI. 5). 
 
 B. "With reference to that which can not be changed by our agency : science and reason 
 (ETviary/iTj and vovg), the latter directed to principles, the former to that which is demon- 
 strable from principles. Science is a demonstrative e^ic {a-KoSeiKTCKTi, VI. 3) ; reason appre- 
 hends the principles of science (apxVi or dpxat^ tov evcctt/tov, VI. 6). 
 
 In connection with the dianoetic virtues, another conception, expressed by the word 
 ao<j)ia (wisdom), is considered by Aristotle. This word, however, does not denote with him 
 a fifth virtue distinct from those already named, but the highest potencies of three of 
 them, namely, of art, science, and reason. In the sphere of art, it has a relative significa- 
 tion (crowds T7jv avSpiavTotrouav, wise, skilled in the art of sculpture, etc.) ; in the sphere of 
 science and reason, it is taken absolutely (o/lwf, ov Kara fj-spoc, ov6' a/lAo ti ao<p6g), and is 
 defined as the science and the reason of those things which have by their nature the 
 highest worth or rank {iwiarijurj koI vovq tuv TifiiuraTuv ttj ^vast, VI. 7). In one passage 
 {Eth. Nic, VI. 7) aocpia, in the relative sense of the word, is termed the "virtue of art" 
 {apETTi TExviO) ; but it does not follow from this, that art itself is not a virtue, nor 
 that science and reason are not virtues until they rise to absolute wisdom, for all these 
 e^eiq participate necessarily in truth, and all, which do this, are virtues {Eth. Nic, VI. 
 2 seq.). 
 
 To practical wisdom {(ppovr/cic) belong prudence {ev(iov'Xia), which finds out the right 
 means for the end fixed upon (VI. 10), and understanding {avveaiq), which is exercised in 
 passing correct judgments on that respecting which <pp6v^aig gives practical precepts. 
 Jivveaig is critical {KpaiKri), ^povrjciq is imperative {encTaKTiKT/) • correct discrimination {Kpiaig) 
 is the function of the £vyv6fion>, or the man of good sense (VI. 11). 
 
 EyKpareia (of which Book VII. of the Nic Ethics treats) is moral strength or self-control. 
 Where this is wanting, that discrepancy arises between insight and action, which would 
 be impossible if (as Socrates taught) knowledge possessed an absolute power over the will. 
 The occasion for self-control arises in connection with whatever is pleasurable or painful ; 
 in the latter case it is endurance {Kaprepia). 
 
 Friendship {iptXia.) is of three kinds, according as it is based on the agreeable, the useful, 
 or the good. The last is the noblest and most enduring {Eth. Nic, VIII. and IX.). The 
 love of truth should have precedence before love to the persons of our friends {Eth. N., I. 
 4, 1096 a, 16; cf. Plat, Rep., X. 595 b, c). 
 
 The natural community, to which the individual primarily belongs, is the family. The 
 domestic economy includes, when complete, husband, wife, children, and servants. To the 
 servants the master of the house should be an absolute ruler, not forgetting, however, to 
 temper his mle with mildness, so that the man in the servant may also be respected. To 
 the wife and children he must be as one who rules over freemen; to the former as an 
 archon in a free commonwealth, to the latter as a king by right of aflfection and seniority
 
 Aristotle's etuics akd esthetics. 177 
 
 (Pol'l., I. ch. 4). It becomes him to care more for his family, as human beings, and for their 
 virtue, than for gain {Pol., I. 5). 
 
 The character of the family hfe is essentially dependent on the character of the civil 
 government. Man is by nature a political animal {Pol, I. 2). The state is the most com- 
 prehensive human society. This society should not be an undifferentiated unity, but an 
 articulated whole (Pol, II. 1 seq.). The end of the state is good living (ev i^fjv), i. e., the 
 morality of the citizens and their happiness as founded on virtue {Pol., VII. 8). The end 
 of the state is of a higher order than are the actual causes which may have led to its 
 existence {Pol., I. 2 : ?} noXi^ . . . yivofievy fisv ovv tov i^ip) evekq, ovaa 6e rov ev l^f/v). 
 
 Since the highest virtue is intellectual, it follows that the pre-eminent duty of the state 
 is, not to train the citizens to military excellence, but to train them for the right use of 
 peace {Pol, VII. 2). 
 
 The various Forms of Government are ranked by Aristotle (as he himself intimate?^ 
 Pol., IV. 2) in the same order as by the author of the Politicus (p. 302 seq.), whom he de- 
 nominates as rif T(Jv npoTepov (one who, before Aristotle, had treated of the same subject, 
 by whom he can scarcely mean Plato, but rather some Platonist). But the point of view 
 from which he enumerates them is not (as in the Politicus) that of legality or illegality, but 
 that of the measure in which, in each, the rulers seek the common advantage of all, or 
 only their own profit. "When the rulers seek rather the good of all, than their own profit, 
 their government is good ; otherwise it is bad. In either case three forms of government 
 are possible, according as the number of rulers is one, a few, or many. Hence these six 
 forms of government, whose names are monarchy, aristocracy, and polity (7ro/liTfm, "the 
 common name for all polities "), on the one hand ; and tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy, 
 ou the other {Pol, III. 7). The placing of the government in the hands of all the citizens 
 is justified by the principle, that power belongs to the free as such. The rule of the few, 
 or of only one, may result either from wealth or from education, or both. For every par 
 ticular state, that form must be sought which corresponds with the given conditions {ij es. 
 Tuv vrroKei/xevom apiarrj). The ver}' best form of government, is the aristocracy of intel- 
 lectual eminence and moral worth, whether these qualities, in their highest development, y, . 
 be found in a few persons, or only in one. 
 
 None but a brave people is capable of freedom, and only among cultured nations is a 
 comprehensive and enduring political union possible. It is only where courage and cul- 
 ture are combined (as in the Hellenes, who are thus distinguished from the Northern and 
 Oriental nations), that a state can exist at once large and free, and it is only in this cast? 
 that a nation is justified in extending its rule over peoples less advanced {Pol , VII. 7). 
 
 The laws must accord with tlie form of the government {Pol, III. 11). 
 
 The lawgiver must care most of all fur the education of the young {Pol, VIII. 1 seq.). 
 The supreme end of all discipline should be virtue. Things which are serviceable for 
 external ends may, however, and should also be made a subject of instruction, except 
 where they tend to render the learner vulgar (i. e., disposed to seek external gain on its 
 own account). Grammar, gymnastics, music, and drawing are the general elementary 
 topics of instruction. 
 
 Art {tsx'^v), in the wider sense of the term, as signifying that skill in giving form to 
 any material, which results from or at least depends on the knowledge of rules, has a 
 twofold object: it has either to complete what nature has been unable to complete, or it 
 may imitate (Phys., II. 8: b?Mr rs y -Ixvil to fisv eTnTc7.el, a y (pvaiq c'uh'varel anspyd- 
 aaadai, to. c^e fu/ielTai). Nature has left man naked and unarmed, but has imparted to him 
 t he ability to acquire n early all varii'ti(-s of nrlistic skill,_and_has_ given liiin the hand, as 
 t he instrument of instr uuuuis ^^J>, Part. An., \\ . 10). The useful arts subsorvi' ih«_> > h^ls ^if^ 
 12 ^^^ -^ "* 
 
 '\l
 
 178 Aristotle's ethics and esthetics. 
 
 practical life. Imitative art supplies a refined amusement (Siayuy^) and recreation {aveaic, 
 TT/c awToviag avcLTravaig); it emancipates (icddapai^) the soul from the pressure of pent-up 
 feelings, through a harmless (and in other respects positively beneficial) excitation of 
 them {Pol, VIII. 7). By Kadapaig (purification) is not to be understood a purification of 
 the feelings from the bad that is in them, but rather the temporary removal, discharge, 
 nullification of the feelings or passions themselves (cf. Pol., II. 1267 a, 5-7, where the satis- 
 faction of a passionate desire is represented as producing a "healing effect "). While the 
 representation draws to its artistic conclusion, the feelings excited in the susceptible spec- 
 tator and auditor become, by a corresponding and natural movement, stilled. Works of 
 art, in which subjects of more than ordinary beauty or elevation are imitated, may serve 
 as a means of ethical culture (iraiSela, fxdd^ai^); so, in particular, certain kinds of music and 
 painting, and, unquestionably, certain descriptions of poetry also. Art attains its ends by 
 imitation (fiifiTjmg). That which it imitates, however, is not so much the particular, with 
 which the accidental is largely connected, as, rather, the essence of its particular object, 
 and, as it were, the tendency of nature in its formation ; in other words, art must idealize 
 its subjects, each in its peculiar character. When this requirement is rightly met, the 
 resulting work of art is beautiful, although the object imitated may be not (as in the case 
 of the Tragedy) more beautiful and noble than ordinary objects, but (as in the case of the 
 Comedy) only equal or even inferior to the latter in these respects. The good, when as 
 such it is also agreeable, is beautiful (Rhet., 1. 9). Beauty implies a certain magnitude and 
 order (Poet, ch. 7). 
 
 The Tragedy is defined by Aristotle as the imitative representation of a weighty, 
 finished, and more or less extended action, in language beautified by various species of 
 ornamentation [meter and song], which are distributed separately to the difi'ereut parts of 
 the work [the dialogical and choral], acted and not merely recited, and, by exciting pity and 
 fear, purging the mind of such passions* (eariv ovv rpayudia /^Ifirjaig Trpa^eug oTTovSaiag 
 Kal TfAe/af, fiiye^og kxoi'OJjr, ySvafcivu Adyco X'^P^i eKaaru tuv e16uv kv Tolg fiopioig ipuvruv 
 Koi oh 6t aTzayyeTdar, &C tkiov koI (jtS^ov wtpaivovaa rfp Ttjv toiovtuv Tra'&Tj/j.druv m-dapatv, 
 Poet, ch. 6). The definition requires that the subject-matter of the tragedy should be 
 serious and morally elevated (Trpd^scjc arrovdaiag), and that its form should be esthetically 
 pleasing {//6va/iievcj Tioyui). The last words indicate the cathartic operation of tragedy : the 
 fear excited in the spectator by the tragical events represented and the consequent flow of 
 sympathy in him are followed by the satisfaction and subsidence of the tendency to foster 
 such feelings {i. e., feelings of fear and pity).f The irapaaKevd^eiv nddr] and the uddapaiq, 
 
 * That, among other things, pity and also fear and menace should be inchided among the moral ele- 
 ments of the tragedy had already been said by Plato, Phaedr., p. 268, where the addition of the third 
 element (menace, aTreiArjTiKal pjjo-ets) indicates plainly that at least Plato did not contemplate the excitation 
 in the spectator of fear on his own account — an interpretation erroneously given by Lessiug to the "fear" 
 of Aristotle. Cf. Ar., Poet, 11, p. 1452a, 88 ; IS, p. 1453 a, 4. 
 
 t The (caflapats Tiof iTa.6y]ti.a.Ttav is — as has been shown, in particular by J. Bernays — not a purification of 
 the emotions, but a (temporary) emancipation of the Individual from their influence ; yet I would not define 
 it, more specifically (with Bernays), as a relief from permanent emotional tendencies (fearfulncss, sym- 
 pathetic disposition, etc.), obtained by giving way to them for the time, nor (with Heinrich Weil, who 
 regards tujv toloutwi' TTaSr)fi.6.ruiv as the subjective Genitive, with man understood as the object) as merely 
 a deliverance from the uneasiness which attends the want of, or the exhaustion which follows, emotional ex- 
 citement, but rather (as shown by me in Fichte's Zeitschrift, Vol. 36, 1860, and in an article on Aristotle's 
 doctrine of the nature and effect of art, ibid.. Vol. 50, 1867, and also by A. Doring, who a.gnes from the 
 nedical use of the term, in the Philol., XXI. 1864), as a temporary removal, elimination, nullification of the 
 emotions themselves. In Plato, P/uiedo, p. 69 c, icaSaptris riov riSoviiv — a deliverance (of the 80ul)/rom 
 lusts; the (caflopTi); k\).TTo?iiuiv y-aBrjuaai iofui' (Soph., p. 230 e) is one who delivers y>'o?« such opinions as 
 obstruct one's advance to true insight; the same eonstruction occurs in Arist., Hist. Anim., VI. 18 («<£#•
 
 Aristotle's ethics and esthetics. 179 
 
 the excitation and the natural subsidence of the feelings and their final counterpoise, 
 tranquilization, and emancipation, will be the more surely and completely accomplished in 
 
 Karaiiiiviav), which passage is rightly cited by Doring (Philol, XXI. p. 526) in illastration of the medical 
 
 use of the term. Against Bernays' interpretation it may be urged that neither his argument for the ren- 
 dering of KaBapcrii as ''relief obtained by giving way to," nor that for the rendering of iraBrmara as "emo- 
 tional dispoaitions" can be regarded as demonstrative, and that, according to Pol., VIII. 7, p. 1342a, 1 seq, 
 it Is not tlie Trdflij^io, but the iraflot, a form of •'motion'" (<ciia)<ris), which is spoken of as the object of 
 Kd9ap(Tti. 'Where Plato aims at the permanent deliverance of man from the emotions by their extirpation, 
 Aristotle proposes instead, a temporary relief^ to be obtained throueh tbeir very excitation (by artificial 
 means) and subsequent subsidence. After hearing music, witnessing the representation of a tragedy, 
 etc., the emotions excited in us are again quieted by their very exhaustion, are in a sense purged out of 
 us (icaflaipeTat) ; but although it is only the emotions immediately excited by the given work of art which 
 are thus affected directly, yet indirectly all other similar emotions, which fall into the same concept with 
 them and into which the emotional tendency might have been developed had it not been thus diverted, 
 are similarly purged away; we are temporarily freed (or "cleansed'') from all of them, until the neces- 
 sity arises anew for their e.'scitation and exhaustion. The object is here not to extirpate the feelings 
 (irdOr)) once for all, nor to generate apathy or even moderated emotion, nor is it to effect a (qualitative) 
 improvement (purification) of the emotions, but rather to bring about a provisional satisfaction of a 
 regularly recurring emotional instinct, an instinct which is in itself altogether normal, but which by 
 long continuance would become an impediment in the way of other functions, especially the ^uifli/cri? (or 
 function of cognitive learning), for which reason it must be appeased (according to Aristotle, by allowing 
 it just and proper satisfaction) and the soul freed or as if cleansed from it. This instinct is not entirely 
 wanting in any man, not even in those in whom it is abnormally feeble, but its nature is most easily recog- 
 nized in cases where it appears with abnormal strength (as in enthusiasts), whence Aristotle, in explaining 
 the concept of Catharsis (Pol., 'VIII. 7), begins with such cases. (Cf. Plat., Lege^, VII. p. 790 seq.) With 
 the Catharsis of the feelings is necessarily connected a degree of pleasure ((covc^i^eaSai /xeS' rjSoi^?), whether 
 the feeling itself was originally inspiriting or depressing. (Cf. numerous utterances by poets respecting the 
 relief which arises from the expression of the feelings — as, e. g., Goethe's words concerning the "divine 
 worth of tones and tears,''' concerning the emotional relief arising from the production of works of art, 
 ^sch., Clioeph. Parod., Str. <i 5 : 5i' aHavo^ 5' Ivytiolai iSdo-Kerai Ktap. etc. [" the heart/«d with cries of p!»in "], 
 and others.) The object of art is not to transform actually existing emotions (those of common life), bat to 
 excite and exhaust emotions existing only in potentiality in an audience which is not yet moved, but is 
 already waiting to be moved. In itself the Catharsis may operate indifferently on emotions of a noble or 
 ignoble character ; but as the man of coarser type craves a coarser species of excitation, so the more refined 
 craves an excitation of a nobler kind (Arist., Pol., VIII. 7: Trotec 6e ■n)v if]liovriv eitao-Toi! to <taTo <i)vai.v oi/celov). 
 Aristotle requires that the need of both classes of the public be satisfied. The proposed exciuition of the 
 emotions, regarded as a mere means of recreation, is termed ai'eo-i? or TraiSio, but as u means of refined enter- 
 tainment through the enjoyment of a work of art it is Siaytoy?;. Aiaycoyrj presupposes a degree of mental cul- 
 ture. Still, works of high art, which leave the uncultivated man unmoved at the moment when they afford 
 the purest enjoyment to the cultivated, may serve as a means of culture for the former, accustoming him t* 
 be glad and to mourn as and when he ought (xaipeti/ ica't AuTTflo-eai op^u? or oU &(l) and so refining his disposi- 
 tion. This effect can not be produced by every kind of art, but only by that which idealizes, i.e., which repro- 
 duces its objects in forms more excellent and more beautiful than those which they commonly or actually 
 possess; nor can it be produced in every person, but only in one who is capable of cultivation, hence chiefly 
 in the young. Aristotle terms this the ethical effect of art (irpb? apenji' ■na.i&eia, fiderja-i^). In this connection 
 he lays particular stress on certain kinds of music. The Tragedy (like the Epos) bears, according to its defini- 
 tion (as /m'fiijtri? Trpaffoj? <rnov5ai as), that elevated, noble character, which makes the " purification" effected 
 by it subservient to "refined entertainment."' This character renders \t capable of serving the ends of 
 ethical culture. Still, Aristotle has at least not expressly considered the Tragedy as a means of education for 
 the young, but seems rather, in treating of it, to pres\ipposc the existence of a public possessing in general a 
 sufiScient degree of culture (even though not wholly free from deficiencies in this respect) to appreciate it as 
 a means of "refined entertainment" (iio-ywy^); but in view of the variability in the mean degree of culture 
 of this public, Aristotle can not have meant completely to exclude from among the effects of the Tragedy, 
 its effect as an instrument of ethical discipline. With the "Catharsis" effected by any art are in reality 
 always joined by a casual nexus the other effects of the same,— the latter effects flow from the "Catharsis," 
 but are generically different from it. The cathartic, hedonic, and ethico-disciplinary effects are co-ordinate 
 in conception, and any interpretation of " Catharsis," which inclndes in Its conception the notion of " puri- 
 fication," " refinement," " emancipation from the goadiugs of low and selfish impulses," etc., is to be con-
 
 180 THE PEKIPATETICS. 
 
 the spectator, the more complete the work of art is in itself, or the more true it is to the 
 objective norms, which are founded in the nature of the object represented, and, especially, 
 the less it is wanting (in what Goethe demands in the interests of its cathartic operation, 
 namely) in the element of a reconciling rounding off or finale. The feeling awakened by 
 the tragedy, though painful, yet contains in itself an elevating and pleasurable element, 
 inasmuch as it is a feeling of sympathy with what is noble. This mixed character of the 
 feeling is not expressly afiSrmed by Aristotle in the parts of the Poeiica which are now 
 extant, but it is affirmed in the Rhetorical. 11, 1370b, 24-28), where, in the threnody, 
 Aristotle finds involved not only the sentiment of sadness, but also the pleasure of 
 memory and, so to speak, the pleasure of bringing before the mind in the present those 
 thmgs which the hero did in his life, and what sort of a man he was. 
 
 Auxiliary and subordinate to Politics is Rhetoric, the art of persuasion {dvvafiiq irepi 
 EKaarov tov deupfjaai to ivdexofxevov nidavdv, Rhet., I. 2). The business of Rhetoric is not 
 80 much to persuade, as to furnish a knowledge of those considerations which, in connec- 
 tion with any subject in hand, are persuasive. It is of no use to attempt to convince the 
 masses of men by scientific arguments. The basis of one's argumentation must be that 
 which is known to all (icoivd). The rhetorical art must indeed be able to give an appear- 
 ance of equal credibility to contradictory assertions. But the intention (npoaipeaig) of the 
 orator must be to arrive at the true and the just. The rhetorical faculty, which may be 
 developed and applied either in a good or in a bad sense, should be employed by us only 
 in the good sense. The possibility of being perverted to wrong uses, belongs to rhetoric 
 in company with every thing that is good, except virtue ; but this fact does not destroy ila 
 utility {Rhet, I. 1). 
 
 § 51. The disciples of Aristotle in the next two to three centuries 
 after his death, particularly Theophrastus of Lesbus, Eudemus of 
 Rhodes, Aristoxenus the Musician, Dicaearch, Clearchus of Soli, 
 and also Strato the Physicist, Lyco, Aristo, Hieronymus, Critolaus, 
 Diodorus, Staseas, and Cratippus (which latter was heard at Athens 
 by Cicero's son Marcus), abandoned, for the most part, metaphysical 
 speculation, and applied themselves either to the study of nature or 
 to a more popular treatment of Ethics, at the same time modifying in 
 many ways the teaching of Aristotle — mostly in a naturalistic direc- 
 tion. The later Peripatetics returned again to the peculiar concep- 
 tions of Aristotle ; their merits are founded chiefly in their exegesis 
 of his works. The most noteworthy exegetes were Andronicus of 
 
 •Idered as un-Aristotelian, because it effaces the strongly-marked opposition in which Aristotle places xadop- 
 <rt« to /u.a9j)a-is. (Cf., in confirmation, Arist, Pol., VII. 6, 1341 a, 21; ovk eanv 6 avAbs ri0iKOV, akKifiaWor 
 bpytafmKoVt uKTre npo^ tou9 toioutou? avTcu Kaipov^ \pTj(TTeovy ei* ol? 17 Netopia Kadaptrty fxaXXov 5vuaTa.L rj 
 p.a9rj<Tiv. Ih. 7, 1341 b, 36 : ^ap.iv 6e ov jiiia^ eveKcv a>(/>cAfia9 717 p.ov<tlkti ;^pj)o"0at Selc, aAAa Kai nKaoviov \6.piv' 
 Km yap iraiSeias ei'C<c€i' Kai Ka0dp(Teta<; , — rpirov Si n-pb? StayoiyTiv, Trpb? dfecrti" Tc Kai irpb? ttjv tv9 (TViTOfia? 
 avdrravtrci' . lb. 1342 a, S : ex 5c xwi' iepuiv ne\iav bpui/Liec toutou?, orav \pr)<riot'Tai TOis t'f opyia^outji Trjv ipvyi]!' 
 ^eAfcTt, Ka6iaTap.€vovi ia<nrep iarpeia^ ruxovTai; xal KaOdptmn';, ravTo Si) tovto avayKaiov Troio^f"' '"»'• Ton 
 eAe^fxOfa; icai Toiis <^oj9>jtkcou? xaX tou? oAu; (oAms tou??) n-aSrjTiicoin, ToOs 5e oAAovs Ka9' 6(tov e7ri/3aAAei twi' 
 TO'.ot,'To>»' eKa<TT(a Kai nd<Ti yive(TBai nva KaOapaii' Kai Kou<^e^*eo"dat re^' i}&oyri<:. ofxoiu}^ 5e Kai rd ^x^\i} ra 
 K!i9<ipTiKa Trape'x*' X^P*'' <i^Aa/3^ tois dvOpuinoi'i).
 
 THE PERIPATETICS. 181 
 
 Rhodes, the arranger of the works of Aristotle (about 70 b. c), 
 Boethus of Sidon (who lived in the time of Caesar), Nicolaus of 
 Damascus (who taught at Rome under Augustus and Tiberius), 
 Alexander of yEgae (a teacher of Nero), Aspasius and Adrastus of 
 Aphrodisias (about 120 a. d.), Alexander of Aphrodisias (about 200 
 A. D.), who was called the Exegete war e^o;^7?v; and among the still 
 later interpreters (of the school of the Neo-Platonists), Porphyrius 
 (in the third century), Themistius (in the fourth), and Philoponus 
 and Simplicius (in the sixth century after Christ). 
 
 A. Trendelenburg, Veber die Dargtellung der Peripatetischen Ethik bei Stobaeus, pp. 155-158, in the 
 Monthly lieports of the Berl. A!cad. d. WUs., February, 1858; H. Meurer, Peripateticorum philosophia 
 inaralU Hecundura Stcbueum^ 'Weimar, 1859. Cf. Meineke, in Miitzeirs Zeiisclir. f. d. G.-W., 1859, p. 
 563 seq. 
 
 The extant works of Theophrastus were lirst printed with those of Aristotle at Venice, 1495-96. 
 TheophragH Ere«ii quae super8U7U, ed. Jo. Gottlob Schneider, Leipsic, 1818-21 ; ed. Fr. Wimmer, Bres- 
 lau, ld42; Leipsic, 1S54; Paris, 1866. On the works of Theophrastus compare Herm. Usener (Analecta 
 Theopkrastea [diss. Bonnensis], Leipsic, 1S53, and Rh. Jfm., XVL pp. 259 seq. and 470 seq.); on his 
 Pliytology works have been published by Kurt Sprcngel (Altona, 1S22) and E. Meyer (Gesch. der Botanik, 
 I. 8 seq.i; on his Psychologj/, cf. Philipjjson (uArj avepui-niirq, 2 vols., Berlin, 1831), on his Theology, Krische 
 (Forschungen, L, pp. 339-349) ; on his delineation of human " characters," cf., among later writers, Carl 
 Zell (Freiburg, 1823-25), Pinzger (P.atibor, 1833-39), U. E. Foss (Progr., Halle and Altenburg, 1S34, '36, '61), 
 Fr. Hanow (Diss. Bonn., Leips. 1858); cf. also Th. Charuct, ed. Foss, Leips. 1858; ed. E\ig. Petersen. Leips. 
 1859; Jac. Bernays, Theophrastos' ScJirift ilber Frommigkeit, ein Beitrag znr lieligiontigesch, mit krit. 
 und erkl. Bemerkungen zu Porphyrias' Schi-ift iiber EnVuiltsamkeit, Berlin, 1866 ; Tlieophr. Charuct. et 
 Philodemi de Vitiis lib. X., ed. T. L. Ussing, Uanau, 1868. 
 
 On Eudemus, see A. Th. H. Frilzsche (De Eud. Rhodii philosophi Peripatetici vita et scriptis, in his 
 edition of the Eud. Ethics, Kegensburg, 1851). The Fragments of End. have been edited by Spengel 
 (Eudemi Rhodii Peripatetici fragmenta quae supersunt, Berlin, 1866, 2d edition, 1S70). 
 
 Fragments from the writings of later Peripatetics (Aristosenus, Dica:'arcb, Phanias, Clearchus, De- 
 metrius, Strabo, and others) have been collected together by Carl Miiller in his Fragtn. Ifistoricorwm 
 Graec., Vol. IL, Paris, 1848. 
 
 Aristoxerms^ GrundzUge der Rhythmik, Greek and German, ed. by Heinr. Feussner, Hanau, 1840; 
 Elem. rhythm, frugmentum, ed. J. B. Bartels (diss.), Bonn, 1S.')4; Aristosceni Harmmi. quae supersuni, in 
 Greek and German, by Paul Marquard, Berlin, 1868. Of Aristosenus treat W. L. Mahne (Amst. 1793), 
 Hirsch (Ar. u. s. Grundeiige d. Rhythm., G.-Pr., Thorn, 1859), Paul Marquard (De Ar. Tarentini Ele- 
 memMs harmonids, diss, inaug., Bonn, 1863). Carl von Jan (in the Philol., Vol. 29, 1869, pp. 300-318), and 
 Bernh. Brill (Ar.''s rhythm, undmetr. Jfessiingen, m. ein. Vorw. v. k. Lehrs, Leipsic, 1870). 
 
 Dica^irchi quae superswnt, ed. Max. Fuhr, Darmst. 1841. Of Diciearch treat .\ug. Buttnaann (Berlin, 
 1832), F. Osann (In Beitr. zur griech. u. roni. Litteraturgesch., Vol. II., Cassel. 1839), A. F. Nake (in Op^i!<c. 
 philol, I. Bonn, 1842), Mich. Kutorga (in Melanges gr.-rom. de CAcad. de St. Peterab., I. 1850), and 
 Franz Schmidt (De fferaclidis Pontici et Dicaearchi Messenii dialogis deperditis, diss, inaug., Bres- 
 lau, 1867). 
 
 On Clearchus, cf. J. Bapt. Verraert (De Clenrcho Soltnsi, Gandavi, 1828). 
 
 On Phanias of Eresus, cf. Aug. Voisin (Gandavi, 1824), I. F. Ebert (Kunigsberg, 1825), A. Boeckh (in 
 Corp. inner. Graec, Vol. IT., Berlin, 1843, p. 304 seq.). 
 
 On Demetrius of Phakrus: H. Dohrn (Kiel, 1825), Th. Herwig (Rinteln, 1850), Ch. Ostermann (Hers- 
 fcld, 1847, and Fulda, 1857); cf. Grauert ( //««. u. philol. Analekten., I. p. 310 seq.). 
 
 On Strato of Lampsacus : C. Nauwerck (Berlin. 1836) ; cf. Krische, Forschungen, I. pp. 349-S5S. 
 
 On Lyco: Creuzer (in the Wiener Jahrb., 1883. Vol. 61, p. 209 seq.). 
 
 On Aristo of Ceos: J. G. Hubmann (in Jahn's Jahrb., 8. Suppleynentbd., 18-34. p. 102 seq,), F. Ritschl (in 
 the Rhein. Mus., new series, I. 1842, p. 193 seq.), Krische (Foi-schungen, I. p. 405 seq.). 
 
 Later Peripatetics are treated of by Brandis (Ueber die griech. Ausleger des Arist. Org., in the Ahh. 
 der Berl. Akad. d. Wiss., 18;33, p. 273 seq.), and Zumpt (Ueber den Bestand der philoa. Sehulen in Atfun., 
 ibid. 1842, p. 96 seq.). On Adrastns, cf. Martin, Thto. Smyrnaeus Astronom., Paris, 1849, p. 74 seq.
 
 182 THE PEE1PATETIC8. 
 
 On Nicolaus of Damascus, cf. Conrad Trieber {Quaest. Laconic^ p. l; D« Jficol. Dam. Laconicii, 
 Diss. GotUng., Berlin, 1867). 
 
 Some of the works of Alexander of Aphrodisias were printed in the 3d volume of the Aldine edition 
 of Aristotle, Venice, 1495-98. Alexaiidri Aphrodisiensis de anima, de/ato, in Themist. opera, Venet. 
 1534: Defato. ed. Orelli, Zurich, 1824; Quaent. nut. ei mor., ed. L. Spengel, Munich, 1842; Cmmn. in AtiM. 
 nietaph., ed. H. Bonitz, Berlin, 184T. On Alexander of Aphrodisias, cf. Usener {Alex. Aphr. quaeferuntwr 
 problemat. lib. HI. ei IV., Programm of the Joachimsth. Oym. of Berlin, 1859), and Nourisson (De la 
 liberie et du hasard, ess. swr Al. d^Aphr., suivi du traiti du desUn et du libre pawvoir, trad, en /r., 
 Paris, 1870). 
 
 Aristotle is reported (by GelL, K A., XIII. 5), shortly before his death, to have 
 returned to the question, whom he considered worthy to succeed him in the office of 
 instructor, the allegorical answer, that the Lesbian and Rhodian wines were both excel- 
 lent, but that the former was the more agreeable {ydiiov 6 h.ec[iioq) ; thus he is said to 
 have decided as between Eudemus of Rhodes and Theophrastus of Lesbos, in favor of the 
 latter. During thirty-five years after the death of Aristotle, Theophrastus was the leader 
 of the Peripatetic School, and as he died while retaining that ofiice, at the age of eighty- 
 five (Diog. L., V. 36, 40, 58), he must have been born in 373 or 372 B. c, and died m 288 or 
 287. His original name was Tyrtamus, and it is said that the name of Theophrastus 
 was given him by Aristotle, on account of the charm of his discourse. Theophrastus 
 and Eudemus, in their works, mainly supplement the works of Aristotle, although, in 
 some cases, they attempt to correct him. Of the two, Eudemus seems to have followed 
 Aristotle the more faithfully, and Theophrastus to have proceeded the more independently. 
 In the details, in which they deviate from Aristotle, Eudemus shows rather a theological, 
 Theophrastus a naturalistic bias ; the affinities of the former are thus relatively Platonic, 
 those of Theophrastus Stratonic. Subsequent writers (e. g., Proclus, in his work On 
 Euclid) drew considerably from the lost work of Eudemus on the History of Mathe- 
 matical and Astronomical Doctrines. In Logic, the doctrines of the problematical judg- 
 ment and the syllogism were specially developed by Theophrastus and Eudemus. In 
 Metaphysics and Psychology, Theophrastus manifests a certain leaning toward the hypoth- 
 esis of immanence in connection with problems which Aristotle would have solved by the 
 doctrine of transcendence ; yet, on the whole, Theophrastus remained true to the ideas of 
 Aristotle. Thus he, like Aristotle (according to Simpl., in Phys., f. 225), treats the reason 
 (vovg) as the better and diviner part of man, affirming that it is implanted in man from 
 without in a perfect state, and is not developed from within : so also he admits the substan- 
 tial existence (xupiajiog) nature of the reason. Yet he teaches that that faculty is in 
 some sense congenital {m'/ii(pvTog) with man, but how, our reports do not clearly inform us. 
 He, too, terms the activity of thought a species of motion {Kivrjciq), but not motion in space. 
 In Ethics, Theophrastus laid great emphasis on the "Choregia" of virtue, or on external 
 goods as essential to tlie cultivation of virtue ; without such goods perfect happiness, he 
 taught, was unattainable. The reproach was very often brought against him in later times 
 (particularly by the Stoics), that he had approved the poetic maxim: vitam regit fortuna non 
 sapientia; but this he applied, without doubt, only to the external Ufe of man. Theophrastus 
 held fast to the doctrine that virtue is worthy to be sought on its own account, and that 
 without it all external goods are valueless (Cic, Tusc, Y. 9 ; De Leg., 1. 13). He held that a 
 slight deviation from the rules of morals was permissible and required, when such devia- 
 tion would result in warding off a great evU from a friend or in securing for him a great 
 good. He opposed the sacrifice of animals. All ethical relations resulted, acc:)rding to 
 him (cf. Ar., Eth. N., VIII. 1), from the community [o'ikeiott]^) which exists among all living 
 beings. The principal merit of Theophrastus consists in the enlargement which he gave 
 to natural science, especially to Botany (Phytology), in the fidelity to nature with which
 
 THE PERIPATETICS. 183 
 
 he executed his delineation of Human Characters, and next to these things, in his contri- 
 butions to the constitution and criticism of the history of the sciences. 
 
 Aristoxenus of Tarentum, the •' Musician," is said to have renewed the theory con- 
 demned by Plato, but which received an essentially new signification through Aristotle's 
 conception of entelechy, namely, that the soul is the harmony of the body (animam ipsiv^ 
 corporis interdvmem qtiandam esse; velut in cantu et Jidibus quae harmonia dicitur, sic ex 
 corporis totius natura etjigura varios motus cieri tamquam in cantu sonos, Cic, Tusc, 1. 10. 20). 
 He is chiefly of significance on account of his theory of music, which, however, was not 
 founded on philosophico-mathematical speculations, but on the acute perceptions of the ear. 
 Besides his Elements of Harmonics, he wrote, among other things, biographies of philoso- 
 phers, particularly of Pythagoras and Plato. 
 
 Diciearch of Messene (in Sicily) gave the preference to the practical as compared with 
 the theoretic life (Cic, AdAtt., II. 76). He devoted himself more to empirical investigation 
 than to speculation. His Biog 'K/.?.adog, of which some fragments have been preserved, 
 was a geographico-historical description of Greece. According to Dicaearch, there exist 
 no individual substantial souls, but only, in its stead, one universal, vital, and sensitive force, 
 wliich is diffused through all existing organisms, and is transiently individualized in differ- 
 ent bodies (Cic, Tusc, I. 10, 21; 31; 37). 
 
 Strato of Lampsacus, the Physicist (who succeeded Theophrastus as the head of 
 the School in 288 or 287 B. c, and continued to occupy that position for eighteen years), 
 transformed the doctrines of Aristotle into a consistent Naturalism. Perception and 
 thought are immanent in each other (Plut., Be Sol. Animal., ch. 3); there exists no vov<; 
 absolutely separate or separable from the body. The seat of thought is in the head, 
 between the eyebrows ; the (material) traces {virouovf]) of the images of perception remain 
 there permanently; in the case of memory these traces become again active (Plut., De 
 Plac., IV. 23). The formation of the world is the result of natural forces (Cic, De Nat. 
 Dear., I. 13. 35; Acad. Pr., II. 38. 121). 
 
 Cicero names as other and later Peripatetics : Lyco, the pupil of Strato, Aristo of Ceos, 
 the pupil of Lyco, Hieronymus, Critolaus, and Diodorus {De Fin., Y. 5), but does not 
 attribute to them any great significance. A disciple and heir of Aristo of Ceos was 
 Aristo of Cos (Strabo, XIV. 2. 19). Callipho, also, whom Cicero {De Pin., V. 25), men- 
 tions as older than Diodorus, appears to have been a Peripatetic, who taught in the second 
 century u. c. Besides these may be mentioned the more erudite than philosophical 
 Alexandrians : Hermippus (perhaps identical with the Hermippus of Smyrna, mentioned 
 by Athenfeus, VII. 327 ; cf. A. Lozynski, Ilermippi Smyrnaei Peripatetici Proijrnenta, Bonn, 
 1832; Preller, in Jahn's Jahrh., XVII. 1836. p. 159 seq.; Miiller, Fragm. Hist. Gr., IIL 
 35 seq.), whose Bioi appear to have been composed about 200 b. c. ; Satyrus, who likewise 
 wrote a collection of biographies ; Sotion (of whom Panzerbieter treats in Jahn's Jahrh., 
 Supplemented. V., 1837, p. 211 seq.), the author of the AmJo^at rCtv (pi>x>c!6<p<jv, of which 
 Diog. Laertius made much use (date, about 190 b. c), and Heraclidos Lembus (see Miiller, 
 III. 167 seq.), who, about 150 B. c, compiled a book of extracts from the B/ot of Satyrus 
 and the ^ladoxai of Sotion. To the first century b. c. belong Staseas of Naples (Cic, 
 De Fin., V. 25 ; De Orat., I. 22), and Cratippus, who taught at Athens (Cic, De Off., I. 
 1 et aJ,.). 
 
 Andronicus of Rhodes, the (above-mentioned, p. 149) editor and expositor of the Aris- 
 totelian writings (about 70 B. c), Boethus of Sidon (together with Sosigenes, the mathema- 
 tician, of the time of Julius Cajsar), and Nicolaus of Damascus (under v^ugustus and 
 Tiberius) were particularly influential in promoting the study and intelligent under- 
 standing of the works of Aristotle. Andronicus arranged the works of Aristotle and
 
 184: THE PEKIPATETICS. 
 
 Theophrastus according to their subject-matter (Porphyr., Viia Phtini, 24: 'Av6p6viKo^ 6 
 riepnraTT/riKdc ra ' ApiaroTeTiovg Koi Qeo<f>pdaTov ng KpayfMTeiac didTie rdf o'lKeiaq inoOiatig 
 fif Tavrbv avvayayuv). In his exposition of the doctrine of Aristotle (according to the testi- 
 mony of the Neo-Platonist, Ammonius) he set out with logic, as the doctrine of demon- 
 stration {aiTodei^iQ, or that form of philosophizing which is employed in all systems of 
 philosophy, and must therefore be first known, cf Arist., Met., IV. 3, 1005 b, 11); the 
 customary arrangement of the works of Aristotle (which in all probability originated with 
 him), following this principle, begins with the Logic (Analytics) or " Organon." His 
 pupil, Boethus (among whose friends belonged Strabo the geographer, an adherent of 
 Stoicism), judged, on the other hand, that Physics was the doctrine most closely related to 
 us and most easily understood, and maintained, therefore, that philosophical instruction 
 should commence with it. Each of them lield fast to the axiom, that the Trpayfiarelai 
 (complexes of related bodies of investigation, hence separate bodies of philosophical doc- 
 trine, branch-sciences of philosophy) were to be arranged according to the principle of an 
 advance from the TvpoTepov npbg rjfiaq (the prior for us) to the irporepov <pmei (the prior by 
 nature). Diodotus, the brother of Boethus, was also a Peripatetic philosopher (Strabo, XVI. 
 2. 24). Boethus seems, at least in some respects, to have been followed by Xenarchus, 
 who taught at Alexandria, Athens, and Rome. Nicolaus of Damascus set forth the Peri- 
 patetic philosophy in compendia, following in the Metaph3'sics a different order from that 
 followed by Andronicus in his edition of Aristotle's Metaphysics. The Alexandrian Peri- 
 patetic, Aristo, who lived at about this same time, seems to have occupied himself chiefly 
 with logic and physics. Apuleius {De Dogm. PL, III.) ascribes to liim a computation of 
 the syllogistic figures, and he may also have been the author of an exegesis of the 
 Categories, which is mentioned by Simplicius, as also of a work on the Nile, mentioned by 
 Strabo (XVII. 1, 5), and with which was connected a dispute between this Peripatetic and 
 the eclectic Platonist, Eudorus, on a question of priority (see below, § 65). 
 
 In many of the Peripatetics of this later period we find an approximation toward 
 Stoicism, — so in particular in the author of the work De Mundo {nepl Koafiov), which con- 
 tains many doctrines taken from the Stoic Posidonius, and was probably composed in the 
 first century b. c, or near the time of the birth of Christ ; and so, also, in other regards, 
 in the work of Aristocles of Messene (in Sicily), the teacher of Alexander of Aphrodisias. 
 Through this sort of Eclecticism the way was prepared for the later blending together of 
 the leading systems in Neo-Platonism. 
 
 The principal merit of the Peripatetics of the times of the emperors rests on their 
 exegesis of the works of Aristotle. Explanatory notes to the Categories, as also to the De 
 Coelo, were written both by Alexander of -^Ega?, who was one of Nero's teachers, and by 
 Aspasius, and by the latter, also, to the De Inter pretatione, the Physics, the Metaphysics, and 
 the Nicomachean Ethics. Adrastus wrote concerning the order of the works of Aristotle 
 {irepl rfiQ roffwf tHiv ' ApiaTorDMrg av}ypa^/udTo)v), and an exposition of Aristotle's Catego7-ies 
 and Physics, as also of the Tiniaeus of Plato, and perhaps of the Ethics of Aristotle and 
 Theophrastus; also a work on Harmonics, in three books, and a treatise on the sun, 
 which may have constituted a part of the astronomical work from which Theo's Astrono- 
 my (see below, § 65) was, for the most part, borrowed. Herminus wrote commentaries 
 on the Categories and other logical writings of Aristotle. Aristocles wrote an historico- 
 critical work on philosophy. Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Exegete, expounded the 
 Peripatetic philosophy at Athens, from the year 198 to 211, in the reign o.' Septimus 
 Severus. lie was a pupil of Herminus, of Aristocles of Messene, and of Sosigenes, the 
 Peripatetic (not to be confounded with the astronomer of the same name, of the time of 
 Juhus Caesar). He distinguished in man a material or physical reason {yovg iXiKog or
 
 THE MOST EMENENT STOICS. 185 
 
 4,vaiK6g), and an acquired or developed reason (voiig tTriKTr/Tog or vovc Kaff t^iv), but identi- 
 fied the vot'f TToiT/riKog (tlie "active intellect"), through whose agency the potential intel- 
 lect in man becomes actual, with God. Of Alexander's Commentaries there are still 
 extant the Commentaries on Book I. of the Analyt. Friora, the Tojncs, the Meteorology, 
 the Be Sensu, and Books I.-V. of the Metaphysics, together -with an abridgment of his 
 commentary on the remaining books of the Metaphysics ; his commentaries on several of 
 the logical and physical works, and on the Psychology of Aristotle, are lost. Of his other 
 writings the following are preserved: nept (pvxvc, irepl ei/^apfiiv^g, cpvaiKuv Kat ^Oikuv 
 cnropiuv km ?.vaeuv, Trepl /xl^E(jg. The "Problems" and the work " On Fevers," are spuri- 
 ous. Some other works by him have been lost. i 
 
 § 52. Zeno of Citium (on the island of Cyprus), a pupil of Crates, 
 the Cynic, and afterward of Stilpo, the Megarian, and of Xenocrates 
 and Polemo, the Academics, by giving to the Cynic Ethics a more 
 elevated character, and combining it with an Ileraclitean physics and 
 a modified Aristotelian logic, founded, about 308 b. c, a philosophical 
 school, which was called, from the place where it assembled, the 
 Stoic. To this school belonged Zeno's disciples : Persaeus, Aristo of 
 Chios, Herillus of Carthage, Cleanthes, Zeno's successor in the office 
 of teacher and one of his most important disciples, and also Sphserus, 
 from the Bosphorus, a pupil of Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, who suc- 
 ceeded Cleanthes as teacher of the school, and who first brought the 
 Stoic doctrine to a state of complete systematic development, Zeno of 
 Tarsus, the successor of Chrysippus, Diogenes the Babylonian, An- 
 tipater of Tarsus, Panaetius of Khodes, who was the principal agent in 
 the propagation of Stoicism at Home, and Posidonius of Khodes, a 
 teacher of Cicero. Of the Roman Stoics may be mentioned : L. An- 
 naeus Cornutus (first century after Christ) and A. Persius Flaccus, the 
 satirist, L. Annseus Seneca, C. Musonius Kufus, the slave Epictetus 
 of Phrygia, the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, in the second 
 century after Christ, and others. 
 
 Writers on the Simc Philosophy in general, are Justus Lipsius (Manuductio ad Stmeam philoso- 
 phiam, Antw. 1604, and later), Dan. Ucinsius (in his Orat., Leyden, 1627), Gataker (/>e disciplina Stoica 
 cumsectia aliii collata, prefixed to his edition of the works of Antoninus, Cambridge, 165S), and others, of 
 whom the most important is Dietr. Tiedemacn (Hyttem der stoixchen Philonophie, 8 vols., Leips. 1776). A 
 snrvey of the whole historical development of Stoicism is given by L. Noack (Aiis der Sioa sum Eaiser- 
 thum, ein Blick auf den WeUlauf der atoisclun Philosophies in the Psyche, Vol. V., Heft 1, 1S62. pp. 1-24). 
 Of. D. Zimmermann, Quae, ratio philosophiae Stoicae sit cum religiotie Romana, Erlangen, 1S58; L. v. 
 Arren, Qukl ad in/ormando/t moreJi valere 2)otuerit priorum St. doctHna, Colmar, 1S69; F. Ravaisson, 
 E»8ai mir le Sioici^me, Paris. 1S56; F. Lcferriere, Memoire concernant Vinfluence du Sioicisme mir la 
 doctrine des jurisoonsultes romains, Paris, 1860; J. Dourif, Ihi Stolcisme et du Christianimne consi- 
 deres dans lewrs rapports, leurs differences et Vii\fl'uence respective quits ont eaercee snr les maurs, 
 Paris. 1863. The most thorongh investisration of the subjoct of Stoicism and its representatives, is that of 
 Zeller, Ph. d. Or.. 2d ed.. III. 1, 1865, pp. 26-340. 498-522. 606-684. [See The Stoicx. Epicureans, and 
 Skeptics, translated from Zeller's Philos. der Griechen, by O. Reichel, London, 1869.— TV.]
 
 186 THE MOST EMINENT STOICS. 
 
 Zeno's works (on the State, the Life according to Nature, etc.), a list of which is found in Diog. L»ert., 
 VII. 4, have all been lost. Of Zeno treat Ilemingius Forellus (Upsala, 1700), and G. F. Jenichen (Leips. 
 1T24) ; on his theology, cf. Krische, For»chun^en, I. pp. 365-404. 
 
 There exist dissertations on Aristo of Chios, by G. Buchner (Leips. 1725), J. B. Carpzow (Leips. 1742), 
 and J. F. Hiller (Viteb. 1761), and a more recent one by N. Saal (Cologne, 1852); on his theology, se« 
 Krische, Forsdiungen, I. pp. 404-415. 
 
 On nerillus, cf. W. Tr. Krug {Ilerilli de summo bono sententia explosa, non explodenda,in Symb. 
 ad hist, philos., p. III., Leips. 1822), and Saal (Be Aristmie Ohio et Uerillo CarthaginieruA, Cologne, 1852). 
 
 On Persjeus, see Krische, Forschungen, I. pp. 436-443. 
 
 The hymn of Cleanthes to the supreme God has been edited by H. H. Cludius (Gott. 1766), J. F. H. 
 Schwabe (Jena, 1819), Petersen (Kiel, 1825), Sturz and Merzdorf {Cleanthis hymnus in Jovem, ed. 
 Sturz, Leips. 17S5, ed. 7ioi\ cur., Merzdorf. Leips. 1835), and others. The other works of Cleanthes (the 
 titles of which are given by Diog. L., VII., 174 seq.) have been lost. Cf. Gottl. Cbr. Friedr. Mohnike 
 {Kleanthes der Stalker, Vol. I., Greifswald, 1814), Wilh. Traugott Krug (Ve Cleanthe divinitatis ame/rtor» 
 ac predicatore, Leipsic, 1819); Krische, Fonchunyen, I. pp. 415-436. 
 
 On Chrysippus have written F. N. G. Baguet (Louvain, 1822), Chr. Petersen (Phil. Chrys.fundamenta, 
 Altona and Hamb. 1827; cf. Trendelenburg's review in the Berl. Jahrb. f. iciss. Kritik, 1827, 217 seq.), 
 Krische (Forsehungen, I. 443-481), Th. Bergk (De Chrynippi libris n-epi ano^avTiKuiv, Cassel, 1841), and 
 Nicolai (De logicis Chrytnppi libris, Quedlinburg, 1859). The titles of the works of Chrysippus are 
 recorded in Diog. Laert., VII. 189 seq. 
 
 On Diogenes the Babylonian, cf. Krische, ^orscA-impw, I. pp. 482-491 ; on Antipater of Tarsus: A. 
 Waillot (Leodii, 1S24), and F.Jacobs (Jena, 1827); on Pansetius: C. G. Ludovoci (Leips. 1734), and .also 
 F. G. van Lynden (Leyden, 1802), whose work is the more complete of the two. The fragments of Posi- 
 donlus have been edited by J. Bake (Leyden, 1810), and C. Miiller (in Fragm. Eist. Gr., III. Paris, 1819, 
 p. 245 seq.). Paul Topelmann (in his Diss. Bonn., 1867), and E. Scheppig (De Posidomio Apamensi, rerum, 
 gentium, terrarum scriptare, Berlin, 1870) treat of Posidonius. 
 
 Of Stoicism among the Romans, HoUenberg (Leips. 1793), C. Aubertin (De sap. doctoribus. qui a (He. 
 morte ad Nermiis princ. liomae vig., Paris, 1857), and Ferraz (De Stoica disciplina apud poetas Ro- 
 manos, Paris, 1S63) have written. Cf. also, C. Martha, Les Moralistes sous Fempire Romain, philosoph^s 
 et poetes, Ta.ns, 1864, 2. ed., 1866; P. tAontke., Le Stoicisme a Rome, Paris, 1865; Franz Knickenberg, /)« 
 ratione Stoicti in Persii satiris apparente, diss, phil., Miinster, 1867 ; Herm. Schiller, Die stoische Oppo- 
 sition unter Nero ("Programm" of the Wertheim Lyceum), "Wertheim, 1S67; Lud. Borchert, Num Aniis- 
 tius Labeo, auctor scholae ProcuUanorwm, Stoicae philos. fuerit addictus (Diss, inaug. jur.), Berlin, 
 
 Of the philosophical writings of L. Annajus Seneca, the following are extant: Quaestionum Ndtu- 
 ralium Librd VII, and a series of moral and religious treatises. De procidentia, De bre-vitate vitae, and 
 consolatory writings addressed ad Belviam matrem, ad Mareiam and ad Polybium ; also De vita beata, 
 De otio out secessu sapientis, De animi tranquillitate, De constantia, De ira, De dementia, De benejiciis, 
 and the Epistolae ad Lucilium. Editions of them by Gronovius (Amsterdam, 1662), Euhkopf (Leips. 
 1797-1811), Schweighauser (Zweibrucken, 1809), Vogel (Leipsic, 1829), Fickert (Leipsic, 1842-45), Haase 
 (ibid. 1852-53), and others. Cf. E. Caro (Quid de beata vita senserit Seneca, Paris, 1852), Werner (De 
 Semecae philosophia, Breslau, 1825), Wolfflin (in the PMlologii,s, Vol. VIII., 1853, p. 184 seq.), H. L. 
 Lehmann (L. Annaeus Seneca und seine philos. Schriften, Philologus, Vol. VIII., 1853, pp. 309-328), F. L. 
 Bohm (Annaeus Seneca und sein Werth auch filr itnsere Zeit, Progr. of the Fr.-Wilh.-Gymn. of Berlin, 
 1856), C. Aubertin (Sur les rapports supposes e7itre Seneque et St. Paul, Paris, 1S57 and 1869), Fickert (<?.-Pr., 
 Breslau, 1857), H. Doergens (Antonin. cum Sen. ph. compar., Leips. 1857), Baur (Seneca mid Paulus, das 
 Verhdltniss des Stoicismus zum Oiristenthum nach den Schriften Seneca's, in the Zeitschr. f. wiss. TTieoL, 
 Vol. I., 1S5S, Nos. 2 and 3), Holzherr (Der Philosoph Annaeus Seneca, '• RastaUer Schulprogr.," Tiib. 1858 
 and '59), Rich. Volkmann (Zur Gesch. der Beurtheilung Seneca's, in Pad. Archiv., I., Stettin, 1859, pp. 
 5.89-610). W. Bernhardt (Die Anschaming des Seneca wm Vninersum, Wittenberg, 1861), Siedler (Die 
 religios-sittliche Weltanschauung des Philosophen Lucius Annaeus Seneca, ^' Schulpr.," Fraustadt, 1863). 
 Cf. Bernhardy, Grmulr. der rom. LiU., 4th ed., p. 811 seq. ; Octav. Greard, De litteris et liUerarum 
 Studio quid censuerit Seneca (Diss.), Paris, 1867; Ed. Qo^\xe\, SenAque, Strasbourg, 1868. 
 
 L. Annaei Phumuti (Comuti), De natura deorum I. (irfpi n)<: tHiv Bimv ^vtreom), ed. Frid. Osann ; adj. 
 est. J. de Villoison, De theologia physica Stcyicorum commentatio, Gott. 1844. Cf. Martini, De L. Amnaeo 
 Oomuto, Leyden, 1825. 
 
 C. Musonii Ruji reliquiae et apophthegmata, ed. J. Venhuizen Peerlkamp, Harlem, 1822, pra«;««f. 
 PetH Nieuwlandii diss, de Mus. Rufo (which appeared first in 17^3). Cf. Moser, in Daub and Creuzer's 
 Stmdisn. VI. 74 seq., Babler in the N. SchweizeHsches ifusewn, IV. 1, 1864, pp. 23-87 ; Otto Bernhardt, 
 2u Mus. Rufus (G.-Pr.), Sorau, 1866.
 
 THE MOST EMINENT STOICS. 187 
 
 The teachings of Epictetus (recorded by Arriaii) iu the Aiarpi^ol and the Encheiridion have been 
 edited by Joh. Schweighauser (Leips. 1799); the same, together with the commentary of Simplicius on the 
 Encheiridian, ibid. 1800. German translations of the Conversations of Epictetus have been made by J. M. 
 Schullz (Altona, lSOl-3), and K. Enk (Vienna, 1866); Enk has also translated Siiiiplicius' commenUry on 
 the ManiuU, Vienna, 186i (1S66). {TheWorks of Fpicteim, Engl, transl. by T. W. Iligginson, founded on 
 Mr.s. Carter's version, Boston, 1S65.— Tn] Works on Epictetus have been written by Beyer (Marburg. 
 1795), Perlett (Erfurt, 179S), Spangeuberg (Hanau, 1S49), Winnefeld (in the Zeitschr. f. Philos., new series, 
 Vi)l. 49, 1866, pp. 1-S2 and 193-226), and Gust. Grosch [^Die SittenUhre des Epiktei, G.-Pr., Wernigerode, 
 1867). With the Encheiridion, a work entitled Tabula (iriVaf), falsely attributed to the Cebes, who 
 appears in Plati/s J'haedo, but in reality a product of the later Eclectic Stoicism, has often been published 
 (by Schweighauser, Leipsic, 1798, and others). 
 
 The work entitled to. ek iavTov, by the Emperor Marc. Aurelius Antoninus, has been edited by J. M. 
 8chultz (Schleswig, 1802), and others. Cf. N. Bach, De M. Awrel. Ant. imperatore jMlosop/uinte, H. Doer- 
 gens (see above, ad Seneca), F. C. Schneider's translation of the Meditatimis (Breslau, 1557, 2(1 ed., 1865), 
 M. E. de Suckau, Etude sur Marc Aurele. sa vie et sa doctrine (Paris, 1853). M. Noel des Vergers, Essai 
 sur Marc-A^i/reU (Paris, 1S60), Mas Konigsbeck, Be Stoici»mo Marci Antonini (Konigsberg, Pr., 1861), 
 Ed. Zeller, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (in Zeller's Vortr. u. Abh., Leips. 1865, pp. S2-107), Am. Bodek, 
 M. Aur. Ant. als Freund und Zeiitgenosse des liahbi Jehxida ha- Nasi (Leips. 1S6S), and J. Schuster, 
 Ethices Stoicae apud M. Aur. Ant. fimdamenta (in the Schriften der Univ. zu Kiel aux dem Jahre 1868, 
 Vol. XV., Kiel, 1669). [Engl, translation of the Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius, Boston, 1864.— TV.] 
 
 Besides the works and fragments of works by the Stoics themselves, the statements of Cicero, Plu- 
 tarch, Diog. L. (Book VIL), Stobseus, and Simplicius, are especially useful as aids to the knowledge of 
 Stoicism. 
 
 The Stoics classed themselves among the followers of Socrates ; and they were, in 
 reality, so nearly related to Socrates in their doctrines and their theory of life, and were 
 to such a degree mere continuators of previous types of thought, that, although they may 
 be distinguished from the previous schools, they can not be regarded as introducing a new 
 period in Greek philosophy. "Socrates sat for the portrait of the Stoic sage; the Stoics 
 strove earnestly to build up their inner man after the pattern of the virtuous wise man, 
 whose lineaments they borrowed from the transfigured and lofty form of Socrates " (Noack, 
 Psyche^ v., 1., 1862, p. 1,3). The productive element in the Stoic philosophy i.s indeed not to 
 be deemed insignificant, especially in the field of ethics, where their rigorous discrimination 
 and severance of the morally good from the agreeable, and the rank of indifference to 
 which they reduced the latter, mark at once the merit and the onesidedness of the Stoics. 
 But this element is less characteristic of their philosophy as a whole, than is tlio fact that 
 in the latter those elements of humane culture were conserved, which were bequeathed to 
 the Stoics by their predecessors, and by their agency these elements gained a wider range 
 of influence. The modifications introduced by the Stoics into the form and content of phi- 
 losophy were, for the most part, only such as grew out of their tendency to philosophize 
 for the many. But the extensive diffusion of a philosophy, together with the modifica- 
 tions of doctrine involved in such diffusion, is insufficient, when taken in connection with 
 an inferior activity in the development of philosophic thought, to authorize us in regarding 
 that philosophy as inaugurating a new period. 
 
 The life of Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, falls nearly between 350 and 258 
 B. c. ; for the exact determination of the dates our authorities are too contradictory. A 
 son of Mnaseas, who was a merchant of Cittium (au Hellenic city, but inhabited partly by 
 Phenicians), he too was occupied in his early life (according to Diog. L., VII. 1 seq., until 
 his 30th, or, more likely, according to Porsajus as cited by Diog. L., VII. 28, until his 
 22d year) in commerce. A shipwreck is said to have been the occasion of his residing for 
 a while at Athens. The reading of works written by the disciples of Socrates (especially 
 the reading of Xenophon's Memorahilia and the Platonic Apology, see Diog. L., VII. 3, and 
 Themist., Orat 23, p. 295 e) filled him with admiration for the strength of character dia-
 
 188 THE MOST EMLNENT STOICS. 
 
 played in Socrates, and in Crates the Cynic he thought he had found the man who, of all 
 men then living, most resembled Socrates. Accordingly he joined himself to Crates as his 
 pupil. It is said that the writings of Zeno, especially the earliest of them, contained ideas 
 which savored of the harshness and coarseness of Cynicism and for which later Stoics 
 (probably Chrysippus, in particular) sought to substitute others more mild and refined. 
 Of Zeno's work on the State, it was said (Diog. L., VII. 4) that he wrote it em rijc rov 
 Kvvbq oiipdc. Not deriving permanent satisfaction from the Cynic philosopher, he is said to 
 have addressed himself to Stilpo, from whom Crates in vain sought again to tear him 
 away (Diog. L., VII. 24) ; then he heard Xenocrates, and after the death of the latter 
 (Olymp. 116.3 = 314 B. c), Polemo. Not long after 310 B. C. he founded his own philo- 
 sophical school in the 2roa ttoikiXt) (a portico adorned with paintings of Polygnotus), 
 wheuce the school received the name of Stoic. According to Apollonius (ap. Diog. L., 
 VII. 28), he taught 58 3'ears, which agrees with the statement that he lived 98 years; 
 but according to the testimony of Persfeus (ibid.) he died at the age of 72 years (for which 
 Zurapt reads 92, in view of Diog. L., VII. 9, where Zeno in a letter to Antigonus calls 
 himself 80 years old). The Athenians held Zeno in high respect, and honored him (accord- 
 ing to Diog. L,, VII. 10) with a golden chaplet, a tomb built at the public expense, and 
 (Diog. L., VII. 6) also with a monument of brass, on account of the virtue and temperance 
 of which he gave proofs iu his doctrine and life, and to the practice of which he directed 
 the young. The titles of Zeno's works are cited in Diog. L., VII. 4. 
 
 Cleanthes of Assus in Troas was (according to Diog. L., VII. 168) originally a pugilist, 
 and, while in attendance on the instructions of Zeno, earned his living by carrying water 
 and kneading dough in the night. He grasped philosophical doctrines slowly and with 
 difficulty, but held faithfully to that which he had once taken in, whence Zeno is said to 
 have compared him to a hard tablet, on which it was difficult to write, but which retained 
 permanently the characters once inscribed on it. According to Diog. L. (VII. 176), he 
 remained nineteen years the pupil of Zeno, whom he then succeeded as director of the 
 school. For the titles of his written works, see Diog. L., VII. 174, 175. 
 \ Noteworthy pupils of Zeno, besides Cleanthes, were Persteus of Cittium, to whom we 
 
 owe several valuable literary notices (he repaired in 278 B. c, with his pupil Aratus of 
 Soli, from Athens to the court of the Macedonian king Antigonus Gonatas) ; Aristo of 
 Chios, who undervalued the theoretical, rejected logic as useless, and physics as a science 
 beyond the reach of man, and declared all things except virtue and vice to be indifferent ; 
 and Herillus of Carthage, who, on the contrary, defined the chief business of man as 
 knowledge {iTricrrjfiT])^ but recognized besides it another secondary end (vnoTE'Kiq, Diog. L., 
 VII. 165): according to him, the gifts of fortune are treasures of the unwise, but the 
 highest good of the wise man is knowledge. 
 
 Chrysippus of Soli or Tarsus in Oicilia (282-209 B. c), the successor of Cleanthes, 
 became, through his elaboration of the system on all its sides, a sort of second founder of 
 the Stoic school, so that it was said (Diog. L., VII. 183) that "without Chrysippus, the 
 Stoa had not existed " (Ei //;) yap tjv Xpi'cnrnog, ovk av f/v 2rod). Yet in his works he was 
 very diffuse. He is said to have written daily five hundred lines, and to have composed 
 seven hundred and five books, which were largely filled with citations from other authors, 
 especially from poets, and with numerous repetitions and corrections of what had gone 
 before (Diog. L., VII. 180 seq.) 
 
 After Chrysippus, Sphserus from the Bosphorus was one of the most celebrated of 
 the disciples of Cleanthes. The Stoic Boethus appears to have been a contemporary and 
 condisciple of Chrysippus (as may be inferred from Diog. L., VII. 64). 
 
 The successors of Chrysippus were Zeno of Tarsus and Diogenes the Babylonian (from
 
 THE MOST EMINENT STOICS. 189 
 
 Seleucia on the Tigris), of whom Crates of Mallos, perhaps also Aristarchus and certainly 
 ApoUodorus, the author of the Xpovmd (written after 144 B. c.) and other works, were pupils. 
 The next leader of the school after them was Antipater of Tarsus. Diogenes went (accord- 
 ing to GelL, N. A., XY. 11) in the year 155 B. c, together with Carneades, the Academic, 
 and Critolaus, the Peripatetic, to Rome, as an embassador of the Athenians, commissioned 
 to procure the remission of a pecuniary fine which had been laid upon them. Through 
 the public discourses of these philosophers Greek philosophy was first made known at 
 Rome; but it was unfavorably received by the Senate. "The Peripatetic, Critolaus, 
 fascinated the Roman youth by the cleverness and aptness of his style ; the Academic, 
 Carneades, by his forcible delivery and brilliant acuteness ; the Stoic, Diogenes, by the 
 mild and tranquil flow of his discourses." (On the sending of these men to Rome in the 
 year 155 B. c, cf. "Wiskeman, G.-Pr., Hersfeld, 1867.) The elder Cato was unwilling that 
 the public policy of Rome, which for the Roman youth was the supreme norm of judgment 
 and action, and was possessed of unconditional authority, sliould, through the influence of 
 foreign philosophers, become subordinated in the consciousness of these youtli to a more 
 universal ethical norm. He insisted on the earliest possible dismissal of these embas- 
 sadors. In his view, the condemnation of Socrates, as the author of such corrupting 
 speculation, was just and was well done. A decree of the Senate, in the year 150 B. c, 
 ordered the banishment from Rome of all foreign philosopliers and teachers of rhetoric. 
 
 Panffitius of Rhodes (about 180-111 B. c), a disciple of Diogenes, won over to Greek 
 philosophy such members of the Roman aristocracy as Lselius and Scipio (the latter of 
 whom, according to Cic, Acad., II. 2. 5, et al., he accompanied on his diplomatic journey to 
 Alexandria, 143 b. c). He toned down the harsher elements of the Stoic doctrine (Cic, 
 De Fin., IV. 28), aimed at a less rugged and more brilliant rhetorical style, and, in addition 
 to the authority of the earlier Stoics, appealed also to that of Plato, Aristotle, Xenocrates, 
 Theophrastus, and Dicsearch. Inclined more to doubt than to inflexible dogmatism, he 
 denied the possibility of astrological prognostications, combated all forms of divination, 
 abandoned the doctrine of the destruction of the world by fire, on which Boethus and 
 other Stoics had already had doubts, and with Socratic modesty confessed that he was 
 still far from having attained to perfect wisdom. His work Trept tov Kadijuovroq forms the 
 basis of Cicero's De Officiis (Cic, De Off., III. 2; Ad Att, XVI. 11). With him begins 
 the leaning of Stoicism toward Eclecticism (a change largely due to Roman influences). 
 Among the disciples of Panajtius were the celebrated jurist and Pontife.^ Maximus, Q. 
 Mucins Scajvola (died 82 B.C.), who distinguished three theologies: the theology of the 
 poets, the theology of the philosophers, and the theology of statesmen. The first was 
 anthropomorphic and anthropopathic, and therefore false and ignoble. The second was 
 rational and true, but impracticable. The third, on which the maintenance of the estab- 
 lished cultus depended, was indispensable. (Of a similar nature were the opinions of \l. 
 Terentius Varro [115-25 B. c], who, educated by Antiochus of Ascalon, the Academic, 
 was, like the latter, an eclectic in philosophy, but interpreted the religious myths alle- 
 gorically, as did the Stoics, and conceived God as the soul of the universe.) 
 
 Posidonius of Apamea (in Syria), whose school was located at Rhodes, — whore,among 
 others, Cicero and Pompey heard him, — was a disciple of Panaitius, and was regarded as the 
 man of the most comprehensive and thorough learning {Tro?^vuaOeffrarog and iT:LarT]^iov[K('>- 
 raro^) among all the Stoics. He returned again toward dogmatism, blended Aristotelian 
 and Platonic with Stoic doctrines, and took such pleasure in high-sounding discourse, that 
 Strabo (III. p. 147) avers he was "inspired with hyperboles." About the same time 
 lived the Stoic ApoUodorus Ephillus, or, rather, Eplielus (o i<i>riAo^^ lentigiiwsiis). 
 
 The Stoic Athenodorus of Tarsus was superintendent of the Pergamean Library, tmd
 
 190 THE MOST EMINENT STOICS. 
 
 afterward a companion and friend of the younger Cato {Uticensis), who approved the 
 Stoic principles by his life. Besides him, Antipater of Tyre, who died at Athens about 
 45 B. c, was also a teacher of the younger Cato. The Stoic ApoUonides, a friend of Cato, 
 was with the latter during his last days. 
 
 Diodotus was (about 85 b. c.) a teacher of Cicero, and afterward (until his death, about 
 60 B. c.) a member of his family and his friend. Athenodonis, the son of Sandon, and 
 perhaps a pupil of Posidonius, was (together with Arius of Alexandria, who is probably 
 identical with the eclectic Platonist, Arius Didymus) a teacher of Octavianus Augustus. 
 The Stoic Ileraclitus (or Heraclides), the author of the "Homeric Allegories" {ed. Mehler, 
 Leyden, 1851), seems to have lived near or in the time of Augustus. Under Tiberius, 
 Attains, one of Seneca's tutors, taught at Rome. An instructor of Nero was Chaeremon, 
 who appears afterward to have presided over a school at Alexandria. 
 
 L. Annasus Seneca, born at Cordova (in Spain), was the son of M. Annasus Seneca, the 
 rhetorician, and lived a. d. 3-65. In philosophy, his attention was mainly directed to 
 Ethics, which science, however, assumed in his hands rather the form of exhortation to 
 virtue than that of investigation into the nature of virtue. Seneca resembled the Cynics 
 of his time in the slight worth which he attributed to speculative investigations and 
 systematic connection. The conception of earnest, laborious inquiry, as an ethical end 
 possessing an independent worth in itself, is absent from his philosophy ; he knows only 
 the antithesis: facere docet phihs&phia, non dicere; philosophiam ohlectamentum facere, quum 
 remedium sit, etc., and thus illustrates the Stoic distaste for the Aristotelian conception of 
 philosophizing, carried to its extreme. By his hopeless complaints over the corruptness 
 and misery of human life, and by his indulgent concessions to human frailty, he is far 
 removed from the spirit of the earlier Stoa. 
 
 L. Ann^us Comutus (or Phurnutus) lived about a. d. 20-66 or 68 at Rome. He wrote 
 in the Greek language. A. Persius Flaccus, the satirist (a. d. 34-62), was his pupil and 
 friend. M. Annajus Lucanus (39-65), the son of Seneca's brother, was also among his 
 scholars. To the Stoic circle belonged, further, the well-known Republicans Thrasea 
 PfEtus (Tac, Ann., XVI. 21 seq.; Hist, lY. 10, 40) and Helvidius Prisons {Ann., XVI. 
 28-35 ; Hist, IV. 5 seq. ; 9, 53). 
 
 C. Musonius Rufus of Volsinii, a Stoic of nearly the same type as Seneca, was, 
 with other philosophers, banished from Rome by Nero (Tacitus, Annal., XV. 71). He was 
 afterward recalled, probably by Galba. When Vespasian ordered the banishment of all 
 philosophers from Rome, Musonius was allowed to remain. He stood also in relations of 
 personal intimacy to Titus. His pupil Pollio (perhaps, according to Zeller, III. 1, 1865, 
 p. 653, identical with Valerius Pollio, the grammarian, who lived under Hadrian) wrote 
 arrofivT/fiovEvfzaTa Movaonuov, from which, probably, Stobaeus drew what he communicates 
 respecting his teachings. Musonius reduced philosophy to the simplest moral teachings. 
 One of his finest sayings is : "If thou doest good painfully, tliy pain is transient, but the 
 good will endure ; if thou doest evil with pleasure, thy pleasure will be transient, but the 
 evil will endure." 
 
 Epictetus of Hieropolis (in Phrygia) was a slave of Epaphroditus, who belonged to the 
 body-guard of the Emperor Nero. He was afterward set free, became a disciple of 
 Musonius Rufus, and was s\ibsequently a teacher of philosophy at Rome, until the proscrip- 
 tion of philosophers throughout Italy by Domitian in the year 94 (Gell., X. A., XIV. 11 ; 
 cf. Suet., Domil., 10), after which he lived at Nicopolis in Epirus. There he was heard by 
 Arrian, who recorded liis discourses. Epictetus emphasizes chiefly the necessity of holding 
 the mind independent of all external goods, since these are not under our control. To this 
 end we should bear and forbear {avexov km inrixov). Man should invariably strive to find
 
 THE LOGIC OF THE STOICS. 191 
 
 ■11 his goods in himself. He should fear most of all the god (feoc or 6atfiav) within hie 
 own breast. 
 
 The Sentences of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius are founded largely on those of Epic- 
 tetus. His predilection for solitary contemplation. " in which man is alone in the presence 
 of his Genius," gives to his views a certain relationship with the Neo-Platonic philosophy, 
 which was soon afterward to arise. 
 
 § 53. The Stoics make Logic and Physics in reality ancillary to 
 Ethics, although they generally ascribe to Physics (including The- 
 ology) a higher rank than to Ethics. Under Logic many of the Stoics 
 include Dialectic and Rhetoric. The Stoic Dialectic is a theory of 
 cognition. It is founded on the Analytics of Aristotle, which it sup- 
 plements by certain investigations respecting the criterion of truth, 
 the nature of sensuous perception, and certain forms of the syllogism 
 (the hypothetical syllogism, in particular). Its changes in terminology, 
 however, mark no scientific progress, their only use being perhaps to 
 facilitate the work of elementary instruction ; greater intelligibility 
 was not unfrequently purchased at the cost of profundity. The fun- 
 damental criterion of truth, with the Stoics, is sensuous distinctness 
 in the mental representation. All knowledge arises from sensuous 
 perception ; the soul resembles originally a piece of blank paper, on 
 which representations are afterward inscribed by the senses. In place 
 of the Platonic theory of ideas and the Aristotelian doctrine of the 
 conceptual essences of things, the Stoics teach the doctrine of subjec- 
 tive concepts, formed through abstraction ; in the sphere of objective 
 realitv onlv concrete individuals exist. For the ten categories of 
 Aristotle the Stoics substitute four class-conceptions, to which they 
 attribute the highest generality, viz. : Substratum, Essential Attri- 
 bute or Quality, Condition, and Relation. 
 
 The stoic conception of irp6K-i]<^i.<; is treated of by Roorda (Levden, 1S23, from the AnnnUs Acad. Lug- 
 dun., 1822-23), the Stoic doctrine of categories by Trendelenburj; (Ge.ich. der KttUgorienlehre, Berlin, 1S46, 
 pp. 217-232); cf PranO, in liis Get^cJi. d. Logik, Zcller, in his Ph. d. Gr., etc., also, J. II. Hitter, De St. 
 doctr. pracs. de eorum logica, Breslau, 1S49, and Nicolai, De Log. C/irya. librix, G.-Pr., Quedl. 1859. 
 
 The three parts into which philosophy was divided by the Stoics corresponded with 
 the three species of virtue {nperr/), which, according to them, the philosopher must seek to 
 acquire, namely : thoroughness in the knowledge of nature, in moral culture, and in logical 
 discipline (Plutarch, De Plac. Philos., I. Proem: aperac rag yevcKcjrdrag rpeli' (pvaiK^', ^-^ikt/v, 
 "koyiKyv). The Stoics employed the term Logic to denote the doctrine of 7,6yoig.i i. e., of 
 thought and discourse, and divided it into Dialectic and Rhetoric (Diog. L., YII. 41 : rb ^i 
 hyymbv fispog ^aclv evioi clg (Vvo diaipelo'&ai iiriaTTifiaq, e'lq ptfTopiK)/v koI elg lUnXeKTiid/v), 
 Cleanthes enumerated six divisions of philosophy: Dialectic, Rhetoric, Ethics, Politics, 
 Physics, and Theology ; he does not appear to liave reduced these, in any case, to the 
 three above-named. To illustrate the nature and mutual relation of logic, ethics, and
 
 192 THE LOGIC OF THE STOICS. 
 
 physics, the Stoics (according to Diog. L., "VII. 40, and Sext. Emp., Adv. Math., VII. IT 
 seq.) compared the tirst to the bones and sinews of the body, the shell of an q^^, or the 
 fence inclosing a garden ; ethics, to the flesh of the body, the white of the egg (and the 
 trees in the garden ?) ; and physics (especially when viewed as theology), to the soul, the 
 yolk of the G^g (and the fruits of the garden ?) ; sonoe, however (e. g.., Posidonius), preferred 
 the comparison of physics to flesh, the white of the egg, and the trees in the garden, and 
 ethics to the soul, the yolk of the egg, and the fruits of the garden. 
 
 In Dialectic the Stoics included the doctrine of language (grammar), and the doctrine of 
 that which language expresses, representations and thoughts (theory of cognition, includ- 
 ing the Aristotelian Logic as modified by them). In Grammar the Stoics accomplished 
 very meritorious results, but these are in part of more significance for the history of 
 positive philological inquiry than for the history of philosophy. Cf. the above-cited works 
 of Lersch and Steinthal (p. 24). 
 
 The fundamental question in the Stoic theory of cognition relates to the means by 
 which truth is to be known as such [Kpirr/piov). A similar question was not unknown to 
 Aristotle {Metaph., IV. 6 : -if 6 npivuv tov vyiaivovra Kal o/lwf tov nepl CKacTa Kpivovra 
 opi?d)f;), but he classed it with such idle questions as whether we are now awake or 
 asleep. "With the Stoics, on the contrary, and in Post-Aristotelian philosophy generally, 
 the question as to the criterion of truth acquired a constantly increasing importance. 
 The theories of the earliest Stoics respecting the conditions of the veracity of our cog- 
 nitions, are rather indefinite. Zeno (according to Cic, Acad., II. 47) likened perception 
 to the outstretched fingers, assent {pvyKaradeGiq) to the hand half closed, the mental 
 apprehension of the object itself {KaTd/jpfur) to the hand fully closed (the fist), and knowl- 
 edge to the grasping of the fist by the other hand, whereby it was more completely and 
 surely closed. "V\''ith this accords the Stoic definition of knowledge as the certain and 
 incontestable apprehension, through the concept, of the thing known (KaTaXr/ipic ac<pa2ric 
 Kal afiETaTTTtJToi; vnb Aoyov, Stob., Ed. Eth., 11. 128), together with the consequent defini- 
 tion of science as the system of such " apprehensions." The Stoic Boethus (Diog. L., VII. 
 54) named, as criteria : reason, sensation, desire, and science. But Chrysippus, in opposi- 
 tion to Boethus, and with him Antipater of Tarsus, ApoUodorus, and others, proposed as 
 a criterion the KaTaAr/nTmij (pavraaia, i. e., that representation which, being produced in us 
 by a real object, is able, as it were, to take hold of or grasp [naTala^pdvea) that object. The 
 word KaraXa/updveiv is also used in the work ascribed to Philolaus, to denote the grasping 
 of an object (t'Tro tov ofioiov to biioiov Kara.'kanfidveadai -n-edvKev, see Boeckh, Philol., p. 192), 
 and in the same sense it is employed by Posidonius, the Stoic, as cited in Sext., Adv. M., 
 VII. 93: "light," he says, "is apprehended by the luminous eye, soimd by the aeriform 
 ear, and the nature of the All by the related /loyof in us ; " the expression <pavTaaia naTa- 
 V.rjirTiKT] is therefore to be explained, not as signifying a representation by which the soul is 
 taken possession of or affected, but one by which the soul grasps the object of representation 
 [to vTrdpxov). In Sext. Emp., Adv. M., VII. 244, the (pavraaia KaTa?.r;:rTiKy is defined as a 
 representation coming from the object and agreeing with it, impressed and sealed on the 
 mind and incapable of existing without the existence of its object (>? arrb tov vTvdpxovTog 
 Kal KaT' avTO to vrrdpxov evaTrofieuay/ievT) Kal EvaTrEacppayianevT!, oTvoia ovk av yevoiTO otto fj^ 
 iiirdpxovTor). There remains, it is true, in every case the second question, whether a 
 given representation is of the kind described or not ; it depends on our freo determination 
 either to allow or to deny to a representation that assent (avyKaTddemC), by which we 
 declare it true, and in this none but the sage will be sure never to commit an error. The 
 next distinguishing element of correct representations is sensuous distinctness (ivdpyeia), 
 which is usually wanting in representations which do not arise from an object, i. e., in the
 
 THE LOGIC OF THE STOICS. 193 
 
 mere images of the fancy {(pavrdajuaTa). But since it sometimes happens that false repre- 
 Heutatious appear with all the force of true ones, the later Stoics (according to Sext. Emp., 
 Adv. Math., VII. 253) found themselves constrained to add that the above description 
 applied only to those representations against which no contrary instance could be alleged 
 (uT/dEV f,:|;ow7rt EvaTTifia). 
 
 Representation {(pavraaia) was defined by Zeno as an impression on the soul {rvnuaiq h 
 ^>vxi)), and Cleanthes compared it to the impression made by a seal on wax ; but Chry- 
 sipjjus opposed the definition of Zeno, lalcen in its literal sense, and himself defined (pavraaia 
 as an alteration m tlie soul (erepoiuaig tpvxK, Sext. Emp., Adv. M., VII. 228 seq.). The 
 6nv-aaia is a state (rrnflo^) produced in tlie soul, to which it announces both its own 
 existence and that of its object (Plutarch, De Plac. Philos., IV. 12). Through our percep- 
 tions of external objects and also of internal states (such as virtuousness and viciousness, 
 see Chrysippus, reported in Plut., De St. Repugn., 19, 2), the originally vacant soul is filled 
 witli images and as if with written cliaracters (Plut., De Plac. Ph., IV. 11 : ua-ep xapriov 
 ivepyov fif dnoypadr/v). 
 
 After perceivmg an object, the memory {jivrjfirj) of it remains behind, though the object 
 be removed. From the combination of similar memories arises experience [kfiireipla, defined 
 as TO Tuv 6fio£i6(l)v n7J]&or). The concept (kvvoia) is formed from single perceptions by 
 generalization, which act may be either spontaneous and unconscious f^'ivsTTLTExi'jTuq) or 
 conscious and methodical {^C ^fisrepac 6a^aaKa?uag kuI kTrifiEleiaq); in the former case 
 "common ideas" or "anticipations" (Koival kwoiai or Trpo?J;^Eir) are formed, in the latter, 
 artificial concepts. " Common ideas " are general notions developed in the course of 
 nature in all men (iari & r/ TTpo/.rppig ivvoia (pvaiKT/ tov Ka-&6'/MV, Diog. L., VII. 54). 
 These ideas (although termed iu<pvrot. irpoXr/TpEig) were not viewed by at least the earlier 
 Stoics as innate, but only as the natural outgrowth from perceptions. Rationality is a 
 product of the progressing development of the individual; it is graduall}- "agglomer- 
 ated " [owadpoiCETui) out of his perceptions and representations until about the fourteenth 
 year of life. The technically-correct formation of concepts, judgments, and inferences 
 depends on the observance of certain rules, which it is the business of Dialectic to teach. 
 
 In their theory of the concept the Stoics maintain tlie doctrine which was afterward 
 denominated Nominalism (or Conceptualism). They hold that the individual alone pos- 
 sesses real existence, and that the universal exists only in us, in the form of subjective 
 thought (Plut., De Plac. Ph., I. 10: ol cnrb Z//vuvog IiVuIkoI Evvm/jiara yukrEpa rag tdiac 
 E^aaav). That Zeno put forth this doctrine in express opposition to tlic Platonic theory of 
 ideas, is affirmed by Stob., Eel, I. 332. 
 
 The four most general concepts (rd ycrt/cwrarrt), which with the Stoics take the place of 
 the ten categories of Aristotle, are: 1. rb vt^okeiueiov (the substratum); 2. rb rroiuv, or, 
 more exactly, to Troibv vnonEifiEvov (essential quality) ; 3. to Trwf ix°^y or, more exactly, 
 TO TTug t ;^ov rroibv vTroKsifievov (accidental state or condition) ; 4. to Tzpog ti Tuq exov, or 
 more exactly, to irpoc ti mjg ex'^'^ rroibv vnoKEiiiEvov (relation). 
 
 In their doctrine of the Syllogism the Stoics began with the hypothetical syllogism 
 which (according to Boeth., De Syllog. Hypoth., p. 606) was first considered by the two Aris- 
 totelians, Theoi)hrastus and Eudemns (most fully by the latter). Clirysippus (according 
 to Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., VIII. 223) placed at the head of liis doctrine of the syllogism, 
 five " non-apodictic syllogisms " {av7.'koytaiiol avaTvo^ciKToi), in which the Major Premise 
 (Kf/fifia) posited two terms as either standing or falling together, while the Minor Premise 
 {npbdrppLc) categorically affirmed or denied one of these terms, and tlio Conclusion (fTrtcpopa) 
 stated what then resulted for the other term. Cf. Prantl, Gesch. der Log., I. pp. 407—496; 
 Zeller, Philos. der Gr., 2d ed., III. p. 98 seq. 
 13
 
 194: THE PHYSICS OF THE STOICS. 
 
 § 54, Physics, with the Stoics, includes not only Cosmology, but also 
 Theology. The Stoics teach that whatever is real is material. Matter 
 and force are the two ultimate principles. Matter hper se motionless 
 and unformed, though capable of receiving all motions and all forms. 
 Force is the active, moving, and molding principle. It is inseparably' 
 joined with matter. The working force in the universe is God. The 
 world is bounded and spherical. It possesses a general unity, while 
 containing the greatest variety in its several parts. The beauty and 
 adaptation of the world can only have come from a thiuKing mind, 
 and prove, therefore, the existence of Deity. Since the woild con- 
 tains parts endowed with self-consciousness, the world as a whole, 
 which must be more perfect than any of its parts, can not be uncon- 
 scious ; the consciousness which belongs to the universe is Deity. The 
 latter permeates the world as an all-pervading breath, as artistically 
 creative fire, as the soul and reason of the All, and contains the rational 
 germs of all things {Xoyoi onepiJ-artKoi.). The formation of the world 
 takes place by the transformation of the divine original lire into air 
 and water ; of this water, one part becomes earth, another part remains 
 water, and a third part is changed by evaporation to air, which, again, 
 is subsequently rekindled into fire. The two denser elements, earth 
 and water, are mainly passive ; the two finer ones, air and fire, are 
 mainly active. At the end of a certain cosmical period all things are 
 reabsorbed into the Deity, the whole universe being resolved into fire 
 in a general conflagration. The evolution of the world then begins 
 anew, and so on without end. The rise and decay of the world are 
 controlled by an absolute necessity, which is only another expression 
 for the subjection of nature to law or for the divine reason ; this 
 necessity is at once fate {diiaQfiEvr}) and the providence (Trpdvota), 
 which governs all things. The human soul is a part of the Deity, or 
 an emanation from the same ; the soul and its source act and react 
 upon each other. The soul is the warm breath in us. Although it 
 outlives the body, it is yet perishable, and can only endure, at the 
 longest, till the termination of the world-period in which it exists. 
 Its parts are the five senses, the faculty of speech, the generative 
 faculty, and the governing force {rb 7]y eiiovlkov)^ which is situated in 
 the heart, and to which belong representations, desires, and under- 
 standing. 
 
 Of the natur.il philosophy, psychology, and theology of the Stoics, treat Jnstns Lipsiiis {Physiologia 
 f<taicomm, Antw. 1610), .Tac. Thomasius (De Stoic, mwndi ea~iiMione, Leipsic, 1672), Mich. Sonntag (De 
 pnlingenesui Stoic, Jena, 1700), Joh. Mich. Kern {Stoicomm Dogmata de Deo, Gott. 1761), Ch. Meiners
 
 THE THTSICS OF THE STOICS. 195 
 
 ^yontm. dt Stoicorum sententia de animorum po«t mortem statu et /atv), in his F«rm. philo». ScJirifl4^ 
 A^ips. 1775-76. Vol. II., pp. 265 seq.), Th. A. Suabedissen (Cur pavci semper /uerint physiologiae Stoi- 
 u/rmn sect<itores, Cassel, 1813). D. Ziniuiermaun (<^uue ratio philvsophide Stoicae sit cum religione lio- 
 mana, Eriangen, 1858), R. Ehlers {Vis acpotestus, quam philosophia antiqua, imj/rintia Platonica et 
 Stoica, in doctr. apologetarum sec. II. habu-erit, GOtt. 1S59), O. Heine (Stoicorum de fata doctrina, 
 eomm. Portensia, Nuremberg, 1859) — cf. O. Heine (Stohaei Eclog. locinonntUU ad St.philos. pertin. emend., 
 G. Pr., Ilirsciiberg, 1869) — C. Wachsmuth (Die AnsicJiten der Stoiker iiher Mantik und Ddmonen, Berlin, 
 1860), F. Winter (.Stoico-rum panUieismus et principia doctr. et/iicae quomodo s-int inter se apta ac con- 
 neaeu, G.-Pr., Wittenberg, 1863). 
 
 Theology and all other doctrines which Aristotle included under metaphysics, were 
 assigned by the Stoics, for whom every thing real was material, to physics. But although 
 they accorded to physics, as comprehending speculative theology, the highest rank among 
 the philosophical disciplines, yet it was cultivated by them in fact with less zeal than was 
 ethics. This is specially evidenced by the fact that they proceeded more independently in 
 logic and ethics than in physics, for which they went back substantially to the Heraclitean 
 natural philosophy. 
 
 Instead of the four Aristotelian apxal or principles (matter, form, working cause, and 
 final cause, which, indeed, Aristotle had himself already reduced, in a certain aspect, to 
 two), the Stoics name two principles: to noioiiv and to ■n-daxov, or the active and the passive 
 principles. These principles are regarded by them as inseparably united in all forms of 
 existence, including the highest. Hence they conceive the human and even the divine 
 spirit, not as immaterial intelligence (vovc), but rather as force, embodied in the finest and 
 lughest material substances. The Stoics, therefore, differ from Aristotle, as Aristotle 
 differed from Plato, and as Theophrastus (in a measure) and more especially Strato of 
 Lampsacus and his followers differed from Aristotle, namely, in the increased tendency 
 which they manifest to substitute the idea of immanence for that of transcendence. 
 
 According to Diog. L., VII. 134, the Stoics defined the passive principle as unqualified 
 substance {cnroLog ovcia) or matter (I'J^)?), and the active principle as the reason immanent 
 in matter (6 iv avTr/ Myoc) or Deity (6 deog). The former is the constituent, the latter 
 the formative principle of things (Senec, Epist.. 65. 2 : dicunt, ut scis, Sloici nostri, du* esse 
 in rerum natura, ex quihus omnia fiant, cansam et materiam. Materia jacet iners, res ad 
 omnia paraia, cessatura, si nemo moveat. Causa auiem, id est ratio, materiam format et 
 quocumque vult, versat; ex ilia varia opera producit. Esse debet ergo, unde aliquid fiat, deinde, 
 a quo fiat: hoc causa, est, illud materia). The highest rational force dwells in the finest 
 matter. The principle of life is heat (Cic, De Nat. Deorum, II. 9 : [according to the doc- 
 trine of the Stoics] omne quod vivit, sive animal, sive terra editum, id vivit propter inclusum 
 in eo cahrem. Ex quo intelligi debet, earn caloris naiuram vim habere in se vitalemper omnem 
 ruundum pertinentem). This vital heat the Stoics derived from to irvevfia Sh'jkov 6i' oaov 
 Kocfiov (the spirit that pervades the whole world) or to irvp texvik6v (the artistically crea- 
 tive or forming fire, in distinction from fire that consumes). Says Plutarch {De Stoic. Bepugn., 
 41) : " Chrysippus teaches, in tlie first book of his Tzepl Trpovoiac, that at certain periods the 
 whole world is resolved into fire, which fire is identical with the soul of the world, the gov- 
 erning principle or Zeus ; but at other times a part of this fire, a germ, as it were, detached 
 from the whole mass, becomes changed into denser substances, and so leads to the existence 
 of concrete objects distinct from Zeus." Again {ibid. 38) : '' There was a beginning to the 
 existence of the sun and moon and the other gods, but Zeus is eternal." That part of the 
 Deity which goes forth from him for the formation of the world, is called the ^yog anepfw.' 
 TiKoq, or " seminal reason " of the world, and is resolved into a plurality of 16yot airep/iariKoi 
 (Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., IX. 101 ; Plutarch., Flac. Ph., I. 7). That the Stoic Boethus, and 
 also Panaetius and Posidonius, abandoned the dogma of the burning up of the world, and
 
 196 THE PHYSICS OF THK STOICS. 
 
 affirmed its imperishability, and that Diogenes, the Babylonian, in his old age, advanced at 
 least so far as to entertain doubts of that dogma, is asserted by the author of the work 
 which goes under the name of Philo, and is entitled Tiepl a(p6apaiaq Koafiov, pp. 497 (ed, 
 Maugey) and 502 (pp. 492-497 stand, in the manuscripts and published editions of the 
 work, by several leaves too near the beginning, as is shown by J. Bernays in the 
 Monatsher. der Berliner Akad. d. W., 1863, pp. 34-40; this section should be advanced to 
 p. 502). 
 
 Diog. L. (VII. 140) mentions, as doctrines of the Stoics, the unity, finiteness, and 
 sphericity of the world. Beyond the world exists an unlimited void. Time (ibid. 141) is 
 the e.ictension of the motion of the world [SuiarT/^ia rf/g tov Kdafiov Kivr/aeug). It is infinite 
 both in the direction of the past and of the future. 
 
 All individual things are different from each other (Senec, Epist., 113, 13: eooegit 
 a se \divini artificis ingeniurn], ut, quae acia erant, et dissimilia essent et imparia). No 
 two leaves, no two living beings are exactly alike. This view was expressed subse- 
 quently by Leibnitz in his principium identitatis indiscernibilium, in connection with his 
 Monadology. 
 
 The new world, which comes forth after each general conflagration, becomes, in conse- 
 quence of the necessity which governs all things, in all respects similar to that which 
 preceded it (Nemes., De Kat. Horn., ch. 38). Yet not all of the Stoics seem to have under- 
 stood this necessity in so rigorous a sense. Cleanthes, in his " Hymn to Zeus," excepts 
 from the influence of the divinely determined Necessity, all evil actions, saying: "Nothing 
 takes place without thee, Deity, except that which bad men do through their own want 
 of reason ; but even that which is evil is overruled by thee for good, and is made to har- 
 monize with the plan of the world." Cf. also Cleanthes, as cited by Epictetus, Manual, 52: 
 
 'Ayov 6t fi' <j Zfi) koL av Y ti Jlenpufievri 
 'Ottoi Tzod" vfiiv e't/xl SiaTeray/xivog 
 'flf Eipofj.ai y aoKvoc fjv de fjiij ODm, 
 Ka/cof ysvdjuevog, ovSev tjttov hpofjai. 
 
 Chrysippus sought (according to Cic, De Fato., 18), by distinguishing between "prin- 
 cipal" and "auxiliary" causes, to maintain the doctrine of fate, and yet to escape from 
 that of necessity, asserting that fate related only to auxiliary causes, while the appetitus 
 remained in our own power. 
 
 The human soul, as defined by the Stoics, is an inborn breath (Diog. L., VII. 156: ™ 
 (jvfKpveg Tifuv TvvEVfia), or, more explicitly, an inborn breath extending continuously through 
 the whole body (Chrysippus ap. Galen., H. et Plat. Plac., ed. Kiihn, Vol. V., p. 287 : nvEVfia 
 avfiipyrov I'l/ilv crwexi^C Tr'avrl rcj cufiaTc 6i?)kov). It is a part severed from the Deity (anoa- 
 ■n-acffia tov deov, Epict., Diss., I. 14. 6). Its eight parts (the ^y^fioviKov, or governing part, 
 the five senses, the faculty of speech, and the generative force) are enumerated by Plu- 
 tarch, Be Plac. Ph., IV. 4-(cf Diog. L., VII. 157 seq.). That the hegemonicon, or governing 
 part, was situated in the breast, and not in the head, was inferred by Chrysippus and 
 others, chiefly from the circumstance that the voice, by which thoughts are expressed, 
 arises from the breast. Yet on this point the Stoics were not all agreed (Galen., Hipp. 
 et Plat. PL, III. 1, p. 290 seq.). 
 
 Cleanthes asserted (Diog. L., VII. 157) that all souls would continue to exist until the 
 general conflagration of the world, but Chrysippus admitted this only for the souls of the 
 wise. Panaetius appears (according to Cic, Tusc, I. 32) to have denied the doctrine of 
 immortality altogether. But the later Stoics returned, for the most part, to the earlier 
 doctrine.
 
 THE ETHICS OF THE STOICS. 197 
 
 As the most important document of the Stoic Theology, the '^ Hymn of CleantJces to 
 Zeus " {ap. Stob., Eel, I. p. 30) may here And a place: 
 
 Kiitiiff"' a^avaruv^ rro/.vuvvfie, nayKpartg alel, 
 Zeii, (phaeug apxT/'f, vofxov jxtra navra KVjiepviov, 
 Xalpe • cs yap TravreaaL ^ipig ^vr/rolai npoaavdav. 
 'Ek. aov yap yivog eofiev, h'/g nipT/fw. Tjixovte^ 
 Movvoi, baa C,(jel -e nal epTrec i?V7/r' inl yalav. 
 TcJ ce na^vfivijao), kuI abv KpaToq alev aeiau. 
 2oi (5i7 Trdf ode Koa/iug EAiaaofitvoq Tvepl yalav 
 Jlei'&erat y Kev ayyg Kal ekuv vnb aelo KpaTelrat. 
 lolov ex^ii vnoepyov aKiv//~oig evl x^P'^'^y 
 ' Afi<pi]K.Tj, trvpdevTa, ad ^tjovra Kspawdv, 
 Toil yap vtto Tv'Arp/yq (p'vaeuq ttovt' kpplyaaiv, 
 ^iii Gv KOTEV&vveig kolvov Auyov, bg 6ia navruv 
 ^oiTcr fiiyvvfievog /leyaAoig fiiKpoig te (paEoaiv, 
 'Of Toaaog yEyacjg vTiarog (iaoLMvg 6ia 'Travrdg. 
 Oi)6£ Ti yiyvETai ipyov ettI x'^ovl cov i^ix^t 6ai/wv 
 OvTE Kar' al^kpiov ■dElov TzdAov, ovt' in-l ttovtu, 
 TIa^v oTTooa 'pEL,oi>ai kokoI aiperEpticiv avoiaig. 
 'A/lAd cry K.al to. ■KEpiaaa ETrlaraaaL apria ■^Eivai^ 
 Kal KOdfiElg -a ukog/m, koI oh (ptAa col (pi?M, egt'lv. 
 'fl^e yap E'lg ev cnvavra cinnjpp.0K.ag kc&TM Kanolciv^ 
 *i2(Ti?' iva yiyvEC&ai wavToiv Zoyov aiEV iovra, 
 'Ov (jtEvyovTEg euciv bcoi ■dvTjTcjv KaKoi eIclv, 
 Avapopoi, ol -f aya-&€)V fuv asl KTijaiv Tvod^kovTeg 
 Oiir' eaopiJai •&eov koivov vopov, ovte Kkvovciv, 
 
 ^ill KEV TTEL'dopEVOi CVV VC) (iioV EC'^?X>V EXOtEV. 
 
 AiiToi (T av^' bppuaiv avev Ka/xiii aA/jog ett' dAAa, 
 
 01 fiEV vnip 66^7jg CTTovdi/v dvctpicTov ixovTEg^ 
 
 Ot (T ettI KEpSoavvag TETpap/iEvoi ovSevl KdcfKJ, 
 
 ' AXaol J' eif avEctv Kal c^jiarog ydia ipya. 
 
 'AZ/id Zev TrdvfJwpe, KtTiatvEiptg apxiKspawE, 
 
 'KvdpuTTovg pEv pvov cnzEipoa'wTig cltvo 7.vyp^g, 
 
 "Hv CTi', nuTEp, cKEt^aaov ipi'Xf/g drro, 6bg Se KVpijaai 
 
 Tvupr/g, i) -Kicwog cv 6lKrjg pira Tvavra KV^Epvgg, 
 
 '0<Pp' av rip7]-&EVTEg hpEt(i^pEC-&d ae Tipy, 
 
 'TpvoiiVTEg ra ca Ipya 6ij;vEKEg, ug kirtoiKE 
 
 Ovr/Tov e6vt\ etteI ovte [iporolg yipag cTaJx) tc fiel^ov, 
 
 Ovte i?eoZf, f/ koivov asl vbpov iv d'lKy vpvEiv, 
 
 § 55. The supreme end of life, or the highest good, is virtue, i. «9., 
 a life coufornied to nature {dfioXoyovfu:vo)g rfj (fvaeL Cr/v), the agreement 
 of human conduct with the all-controlling law of nature, or of the 
 human with the divine will. Not contemplation, but action, is the 
 supreme problem for man. But action implies, as its sphere, human 
 society. All other things exist for man and the gods, but man exists 
 for society. Virtue is sufficient for happiness. It alone is a good in
 
 ] 98 THE ETHICS OF THE STOICS. 
 
 the full sense of that word ; all that is not virtue or vice is neither a 
 good nor an evil, but a something intermediate ; but among things 
 intermediate, some are to be preferred and others to be rejected, while 
 others still are absolutely indifferent. Pleasure follows upon activity, 
 jbut should never be made the end of human endeavor. The cardinal 
 virtues are practical wisdom (<fpovT]aig)^ courage, discretion, and jus- 
 tice. Only he who unites in himself all virtues can be said truly to 
 possess virtue as such. To the perfect performance of duty (or 
 /caTo'p^wjita), it is essential that one should do right with the right dis- 
 \ position, the disposition possessed by the sage ; right action as such, 
 without reference to disposition, is the befitting (KadfjKov). The sage 
 alone attains to the complete performance of his duty. The sage is 
 ^, without passion, although not without feeling ; he is not indulgent, 
 i but just toward himself and others ; he alone is free ; he is king and 
 lord, and is inferior in inner worth to no other rational being, not 
 even to Zeus himself; he is lord also over his own life, and can law- 
 fully bring it to an end according to his own free self-determination. 
 The later Stoics confessed that no individual corresponded fully with 
 their ideal, and that in fact it was possible only to discriminate 
 between fools and those who were advancing (toward M'isdom). 
 
 On the moral philosophy of the Stoics, cf. C. Scioppius (Elementa Stoicae Philosophiae Mwalin, May- 
 ence, 1606), Joh. Barth. Niemeyer (2>« Stoicornim airafleia, Hclmst. 1679), Jos. Frunz Budde {De Erroribvs 
 SfM-coruni in Philoa. Morali, Halle, 1695-96), C. A. Heumann (De avroxeipia I'hilosophorvm. maxims 
 Stoicorum, Jena, 1703), Joh. Jac. Dornfeld {De fine hcmiitiis Sioico, Leipsic, 1720), Christoph Weiners 
 {Ueber die Apathie der Staiker, in his Verm, pkilon. Schriften, Leips. 1775-76, 2d part, p. 130 seq.), Joh. 
 Neeb ( Verhaltniss der Stoischen JUoral zur Religion, Mayence, 1791), C. Ph. Couz (Ahhandluiigen uber 
 die Genchichte und das Eigenthiitnliche der spateren stoischen Philosophic, nehst eitiem Versnche iiber 
 ehristliche, Kantische und Staische JUoral, Tub. 1794), J. A. L. Wegschneider {Ethices Stoicorwn recen- 
 iiorum fundamenta cum principiis ethices Xantianae compar., Hamb. 1797), Ant. Kress (De Stoicomm 
 supremo ethico jjrineipio, Witt., 1797), Christian Gaive (in the Introductory Essay prefixed to his transl. 
 of Aristotle's Ethics, Vol. I., Breslau, 1798, pp. 54-89), E. G. Lilie {De Stoico7~um philosophia morali, 
 Altona, ISOO), Wilh. Traug. Knig {Zenonis et Epieuri de summo bono doctrina cum Kantiana comp., 
 Wittenb., ISOfl), Klippel (Doctrinae Stoicor-um ethicae atque Christ, expositio, Gott. 1823), J. C. F. Meyer 
 (Stoicorum doctrina ethica cum Christ, comp., Gott. 1828), Deichmann {De paradoxo Stoicontm, otnnia 
 peccata paria esse, Marb. 1833), Wilh. Traug. Krug (De formulis, quibus philosaphi Stoici mmmwu 
 bonum deflnierunt, Leips. 1834), M. M. a Baumhauer (n-cpl t^s tvkoyov e'fayuy^s, veterum philos., prae- 
 cipue Stoic, doctrina de murte vohintarin, Utrecht, 1842), Munding {Die Grundsutze der stoi«chen 
 Moral, Eottweil, 1846, " Programm''), F. Kavaisson (De la morale des St., Paris, 1850), Guil. Gidionsen (De 
 eo quod Stoici naturae convenienter xivendvm esse principinm ponunt, Leips. 1852), M. Heinze (5?o/- 
 corwm de affectibus doctrina. Berlin, 1861, St<ncor\im ethica ad origines suas relata, Nanmburg, 1862), 
 Winter (Stoicorum pantheismus et principia doctrinae ethicae qnomodo sint inter se apta et connexa, 
 O.-Pr., Wittenb. 1863), Kiister {Die Grundzilge der stoischen Tvgendlehre, Progr. of the Werder-Gymn., 
 BerUn, 1S64). 
 
 According to Stob., Ed., II. p. 122, the ethical end. as defined by Zeno, was harmony 
 with one's self (to o/xo^nyovfiivu^ C^-, roiiro 6' karl Ka^' eva Uyov ml av/tipuvox; C^v), Cleanthes 
 being the first to define it as conformity to nature (by adding r^ <t>meL »o oaoAoyov^uEvwf).
 
 THE ETHICS OF THE STOICS. 199 
 
 Still, Diog. L. (VII. 87) says that Zeno, in his work Trept av^p<lnrov (pvaeuc;, expressed 
 the principle of morals as 6/io?M-,ovfiivo)^ ry (pvasi ^r/r, and this statement is all the morn 
 credible, because Speusippus (agreeably to his naturahstic modified Platonism) had already 
 defined happiness as a perfect i^ig ("habitude") in things according to nature (according 
 to Clem. Alex., Strom., II. p. 418 d), and Polemo (according to Cic, Acad. Pr., II. 42) had 
 demanded that men live virtuously, enjoying the things provided by nature (honeste vivere, 
 /ruent&m rebus lis, quas primas homird natura conciliet), and Heraclitus also {ap. Stob., Serm., 
 III. 84, see above ad § 15, p. 42) had enounced the ethical postulate, that men should be 
 guided by nature in their actions {aXTj-^ka ?J-ysiv nal ■Koidv Kara (pvmv k-aiovTa(;). The 
 •'nature," which we are to follow, is with Cleanthes principally the nature of the universe; 
 Chrysippus, on the contrary, defines it as the nature of man and of the universe combined, 
 our natures being parts of universal nature. The formula of Chrysippus was: " Live 
 a ccording to your experience of the course of nature tor' iuTreipiav tu)v (pvaei avf^SaivovTuv 
 or ano^v^ug ry (pvaei C,fjv, Diog. L., VII. 87 seq.). A general leaning toward tlie anthro- 
 pological conception of the principle of morals is manifest in the formulas employed by the 
 later Stoics, especially in the following dictum of certain of the latest of them : " The end 
 of man is to live agreeably to the natural constitution of man " {rkAoq emai. to I^tjv anoXov- 
 ■&cjg TTf Tov av&puTTov KciTaoKEvy, Clem. Alex., Strom., II. p. 476). The formula of Diogenes 
 Babylonius demanded the use of prudence and reason in selecting things according to 
 nature (™ ev7.oyLa-tiv iv ry ruv Kara <f>i'aiv fK/'.o;.?)); that of Antipater of Tarsus required 
 the unvarying choice of things conformable, and rejection of things uon-conforraable to 
 nature, to the end of attaining those things which are to be preferred {!^yv EKlcyofievavg 
 fiiv TO. Kara fvaiv, (nreKXeyojuevovg Se to. Tzapa ipixjcv Sir^vsKug Kal a-wapai3aTug Tvpbg to rvy- 
 XavELV Tuv npoTiyiievov Kara (piaiv) ; Pana?tius recommended following the impulses of 
 nature (rb ^f/v Kara rag dtdofievag I'/fuv rf/g (pvaeug a(pop/j.dg), and Posidonius required men 
 to live, having in view the true nature and order of all things (rb ^ijv -deopovvra rrjv ruv 
 b'Auv aTiTj-QeLav Kal rd^iv). Seneca was of opinion that the simple 6/iio?.oyovfi€vug was sufiQ- 
 cient, since wisdom consisted "in always willing and rejecting tlie same things," and that 
 the limitation "rightly" was also unnecessary, since "it was impossible for one to be 
 always pleased with any thing which was not right." 
 
 The true object of the original vital instinct in man is not pleasure, but self-conservation 
 (Diog. L., VII. 85, expressing the doctrine of the first boolc of the Tvtpl re/.civ of Chry- 
 sippus : Trpurov oIkeIov Eivai iravrl ^6(fi rfiv avrov cvcraaiv Kal rijv ravrrig awEiiTjciv). Plea- 
 sure is the natural result {imykwrjfia) of successful endeavor to secure what is in harmony 
 with our nature. Of the various elements of human nature, the highest is reason, through 
 which we know the aU-controlliug law and order of the universe. Yet the highest duty 
 of man is not simply to know, but to follow obediently the divine order of nature. Chry- 
 sippus (op. Plutarch., De St. Repugn., ch. 2) censures those philosophers who regard the 
 speculative life as having its end in itself, and affirms that in reality they practice only a 
 finer species of Hedonism. (This only proves that to Chrysippus, as to the most of his 
 contemporaries, the earnest labor of purely scientific investigation had become unfamiliar 
 and incomprehensible.) Nevertheless, the Stoics affirm that the right praxis of him, whose 
 life is conformed to reason {jii-og A.oyiKog), is founded on speculation (decjpia) and intimately 
 blended with it (Diog. L., VII. 130). 
 
 Virtue {recta ratio, Cic, Tusc, IV. 34) is a diadeaig, i. e., a property in which (as in 
 straightncss) no distinction of more or less is possible (Diog. L., VII. 98 ; Simplic, in Ar. ^ 
 Cat, fol. 61 b). It is possible to approximate toward virtue ; but he who only thus C 
 
 approximates is as really unvirtuous as the thoroughly vicious ; between virtue and vice V 
 
 (oper^ Kal KaKia) there is no mean (Diog. L., VII. 127). Cleanthes (in agreement with the "^
 
 V 
 
 f> 
 
 k^- 
 
 200 THE ETHICS OF THE STOICS. 
 
 (lynics) declared that virtue could not be lost {avan6(3X7rrov), while Chrysippua afiQrmed 
 the contrary ((nro(i2.rjTr^, Biog. L., VII. 127). Virtue is sufficient for happiness (Cic, 
 Parad., 2 ; Diog. L., VII. 127), not because it renders us insensible to pain, but because it 
 makes us superior to it (Sen., Ep., 9). In his practical relation to external things, man is 
 to be guided by the distinction between things to be preferred (TrpoT/y/xiva) and things not 
 to be preferred {a-rr-po-KpoTjyueva, Diog. L., VII. 105 ; Cic, De Fin., III. 50). The former are 
 not goods, but things possessing a certain value and which we naturally strive to possess ; 
 among these are included the primary objects of our natural instincts {prima naturae). In 
 our efforts to obtain them we are to be guided by their relative worth. An action 
 (ev£p}'7j/ua), which is conformed to the nature of the agent and which is therefore rationally 
 justifiable, is befitting {naOfjKov) ; when it results from a virtuous disposition or from obe- 
 dience to reason, it is Ka6f/Kov in the absolute sense, or morally right action (KaTopdujua, 
 Diog. L., VII. 107 seq. ; Stob., Ed., II. 158). No act as such is either praiseworthy or 
 disgraceful ; even those actions which are regarded as the most criminal are good when 
 done with a right intention ; in the opposite case they are wrong (Orig., c. Cels, IV. 45 ; 
 correct, by this passage in Origen, the statements of Se.\t. Empir., Adv. Math., IX. 190; 
 Pyrrh. Hyp., III. 245). Since life belongs in the class of things indifferent, suicide is per- 
 missible, as a rational means of terminating life {cv7ioyo<; e^ayuyr/; cf. Cic, Be Fin., III. 60; 
 Sen., Ep., 12; De Prov., ch. 6; Diog. L., VII. 130). 
 
 All virtues were reduced by Zeno to (ppovrjaic, practical wisdom, which, however, took in 
 various circumstances the form of (distributive) justice, prudence, and courage (Plut., De 
 Stoic. Iiepugn.,1; Pint., Virt. Mor., ch. 2: opi^o/xevo^ T9/v (ppovrjatv iv fiev anovefirp-foig diKai' 
 oavvjp), ev 6e alpeTioic cu^poovvrjv, tv 6e vTrofievereoic avdpiav). Later Stoics, adopting the Pla- 
 tonic enumeration of four cardinal virtues, defined moral insight as the knowledge of things 
 good, bad, and indifferent; courage as the knowledge of things to be feared, of things not to 
 be feared, and of things neither to be feared nor not to be feared; prudence (self-restraint) 
 as the knowledge of things to be sought or avoided, and of things neither to be sought nor 
 avoided; and justice as llie distribution to every person of that which belongs to him {suxim 
 cuique tribuens). In every action of the sage all virtues are united (Stob., Eel, II. 102 seq.). 
 
 The emotions, of which the principal forms are fear, trouble, desire, and pleasure (with 
 reference to a future or present supposed evil or good), result from the failure to pass 
 the right practical judgment as to what is good and wliat evil ; no emotion is either natural 
 or useful (Cic, Tusc, III. 9, and IV. 19; Sen., Ep., 116). 
 
 The sage combines in himself all perfections, and is inferior to Zeus himself only in 
 things non-essential. Seneca, De Prov., 1 : Bonus ipse tempore taiitum a Deo differt. Chry- 
 sippus (according to Plut., Adv. St., 33) : " Zeus is not superior to Dio in virtue, and both 
 Zeus and Dio, in so far as they are wise, are equally profited the one by the other." The 
 fool should be classed with the demented (Cic, Paradox., 4; Tusc, III. 5). Without 
 prej)idice to his moral independence, the sage is a practical member of that community, in 
 which all rational beings are included. He interests himself actively in the affairs of the 
 state, doing this with all the more willingness the more the latter approximates to the 
 ideal state which includes all men (Stob., Ed., 11. 186). 
 
 The distinction between the wise and the unwise was conceived most absolutely by 
 Zeno, who is said to liave divided men peremptorily into two classes, the good {aTzovia'ioi) 
 and the bad {i^nvloi, Stob., Ed., II. 198). With the confession, that in reality no sage, but 
 only men progressing (ttpokottuv) toward wisdom could be found, goes hand in hand 
 among the later Stoics (particularly from and after the time of Pana^tius) a leaning toward 
 Eclecticism ; while, on the other hand, elements of Stoic doctrine were incorporated into 
 the speculations of Platonists and Aristotelians.
 
 THE EPICUREANS. 201 
 
 § 56. Epicurus (341-270 b. c.) belonged to the Athenian Demos, 
 Gargettos, and was a pupil of Kausiphanes, the Deniocritean. 
 Adopting, but modifying, the Hedonic doctrine of Aristippus, and 
 combining it with an atomistic physics, he founded the philosophy 
 which bears liis name. To the Epicurean school belong Metro- 
 dorus of Lampsacus, who died before Epicurus, Hermarchus of 
 Mitylene, who succeeded Epicurus in the leadership of the school, 
 Polysenus, Timocrates, Leonteus and his wife Themistia, Colotes of 
 Lampsacus and Idomeneus, Polystratus, the successor of Hermarchus, 
 and his successor, Dionysius ; also Basilides, Apollodorus, " the pro- 
 fuse," author of more than four hundred books, and his pupil, Zeno 
 of Sidon (bom about 150 b. c), whom Cicero distinguishes among the 
 Epicureans, on account of the logical rigor, the dignity, and the 
 adornment of his style, and whose lectures formed the principal basis 
 of the works of Philodemus. his pupil ; two Ptolemies of Alexandria, 
 Demetrius the Laconian, Diogenes of Tarsus, Orion, Phasdrus, con- 
 temporary with Cicero, but older than he, Philodemus of Gadara 
 in Coelesyria (about 60 b. c), T. Lucretius Cams (95-52 b. c), 
 author of the didactic poem De Rerum Natura^ and many others. 
 Epicureanism had very many adherents in the later Roman period, 
 but these were, for the most part, men of no originality or indepen- 
 dence as thinkers. 
 
 EpUyuri wept <|)u<re<u9 j3', la, in fferculanernium Toluminum quae supersuni, torn. II., Naples, 1809; 
 torn. X., 1850. Epicuri fragmenta Hhromim II. et XI. de nutura, voluminiius papyraceUex Ilerculano 
 erutU reperta. ex torn. II. volum. Ilercul. eviendatius, ed. J. Conr. Orellius, Leips. 1S18. New fragments 
 from Ibe same work (which si-rve in part to correct and complete passages of Book XI., previously pub- 
 lished) are contained in the sixth volume of the Ilercul. voU. colleHio altera, of which the first part ap- 
 peared at Naples in 1866. MetrodoiH Epicurei de »ensionibius comm., in the Ilercul. rail., XeapnL, torn. 
 VI., 1839. Idomenei Lampsaeeni fntgmenta, in FraQin. hi»t. Graec, vol. II., Paris, 1S4S. noAuo-Tpdrou 
 Ti-epl aAoyou Ka7a.<i)povrj<ie<,ii; (in part well preserved) in the Ilercul., Vol. IV., Naples, 1832. Phaedri 
 Epieureiy vulgo Anonymi IIerculanen»is, De datura Deorum /raffmentum, ed. Drumrnond {Ilercu- 
 lanensi/i, London, ISIO) ; ed. Petersen, Hamburg, 1833. (The title should be, rather: <JiiAoirj/ioi; ir«pl 
 euae^fia?) ; cf. Volum. I/ercul. collect, alt., torn. II., 1862 ; Si>cngel, Au€ den HereulaJt. Hollen : Philod. itefii. 
 «vo-e3«ias, from the Trans, of the Munich Acad. (1364), Philol.-philos. Class, X. 1, pp. 127-167; Sauppe, De 
 Philod. lihro De Pietate, Gottincen, 1804. 
 
 Philodemi de Musica, de Vitiis, and other works, in the Ilerculanens. volum., torn. I., III., IV., V., VI., 
 VIII., IX., X., XL, 1793-1865. iiAoSTJ/aou wept Koxiitv, '\viovvnov n€pl opy^s, etc., in the Iferculanenmum 
 voluminum, p. I., IL, Oxford, 1824-25. Leonh. Spcngel, Das rierte Buch der Rhetorik des Philodemus in 
 den Ilercukinensischen Rollen, in the Trans, of the Bavarian Academy (philos. CI.), Vol. III., 1st div., p. 
 207 seq., Munich, 1840. Philodemi n-epi ko-kiCiv liher decimva. ad vol. Ilercul. ejrempla Keapolitanum, et 
 Oxoniente distinxit, supplecit, explicarit Ilerm. Sauppe, Leips. 185.3. Philod. Abh. ilber den Hodimuth 
 and Theophr. Ilaush. u. CJuirakterbilder ; Greek te.xt and German translation by J. A. Hartung, Leips. 
 1857. Herculanensium voluminum quae supersunt collectio altera. Tom. I. seq.: Philodemi irepi kokimm 
 <cai 7u>v avTLKd.fi.ei'ujv apuTuiv, et: Trepi op-yij?, etc.. Nap. 1S61 seq. Philodemi Epicurei de ira liber, e piapiyro 
 Ilercul. ad Jidem. exemplorum Oxon ieu.'iis et Xeapiolitani, ed. Theod. Gomperz, Leips. 1864. Ilereu- 
 lanische Studien, by Theod. Gomperz, First Part: I'hilodem ilber Induction^sdtliisse ('tiAoiijjioj' irtpi 
 cTDLfiiav Kttl <rnij.fi,iaceu>v), nach der Ox/order mid Xeapolitaner Abschrift hrsg., Leips. 1865; Second Part;
 
 202 THE EPICITREANS. 
 
 PhiloJem uber Frommigkeit , ibid. 1866 (cf. Phaedr., above). Theophrasti Characteres et Philodemi d» 
 viUis liber decimus, ed. J. L. Ussing, Leipsic, 186S. 
 
 Recent eUitions of the De Rerum Natura of T. Lucretius Carus are those of C. LacbmaDn (Berlin, 
 Ist ed., 1S50, witb Commentary), Jali. Bernays (Leips. 1852, 2(1 ed., 1857), and H. A. J. Miinro (Cumbr. 
 1866); translations (in German) by Knebel (Loips. 1821, 2d ed., 1831), Gust. Bossart-Oerden (Berl. 1865), 
 Brieger (Book I., 1-369, Posen, 1806), and W. Binder (Stuttgart, 1868), and (in French) by M. de Ponger- 
 ville (Paris, 1866), [Engl, transl. by J. S. Watson .ind J. M. Good, in Bohn's Classical Library. — TV.] 
 
 Besides the works of the Epicureans, the principal source of our knowledge of Epicureanism is Book X. 
 of the historical work of Diogenes of Laerta, together with Cicero's .accounts (Z)e Fin., L, De Nat. Deorwm, 
 L, etc.). Modern writers on Epicureanism are: P. Gassendi {Exercitationum paradoxicanmi adv. AHs- 
 toteleos, liber I., Grenoble, 1624; //. The Hague, 1659; Pe vita morihus et docirina Epicuri, Lyons, 
 1647; Animadv. in Diog. Z., X., Leyd., 1649; Syntagma philoaophiae Epicuri. The Hague, 1655), Sam. da 
 Sorbiere (Paris, 1660), Jacques Eondel (Paris, 1679), G. Ploucquet (Tub. 1765), Batteux (Paris, 1758), War- 
 nekrus (Greifsw. 1795), H. Wygmans (Leyden, 1834), L. Preller (in the Philol., XIV., 1859, pp. 69-90), and 
 on the doctrine of Lucretius, in particular, A. J. Eeisacker (Bonn, 1847, and Cologne, 1855), Herni. Lotze (in 
 the Philologus, VIL, 1852, pp. 696-732), F. A. Marcker (Berlin, 1S53), "W. Christ (Munich, 1855), E. Hallicr 
 (Jena, 1857), J. Guil. Braun (Z. de aiomis doctr., diss, inaug., Miinster, 1857), E. de Suckau (Pe Lucr. 
 metaph. et mor. doctr., Paiis, 1S57), T. Mont6e {Etude sur L. cons. c. moraliste, Paris, 1860), Susemihl and 
 Brieger (in the Philologus, XIV., XXIII., and XXIV.), Hildebrandt( T. Liicr. deprimordiis doctrina. G.- 
 Pr., Magdeb. 1864), H. Sauppe {Oamm. de Lucretii cod. Victoriano, Gottingen, 1864). Rud. Bouterwek (Lu- 
 cret. quaest. gramm. et crit., Halle, 1861 ; De Liter, codice Victoriano, Halle, 1865), E. Heine {De Lucr. 
 carmine de rerum natura, diss, inaug., Halle, 1865), Th. Bindseil {Ad Lucr: de rerum not. carm. libr. I. 
 et II., qui sunt de atomis, diss, inaug., Halle, 1865 ; Quaest. Lucr., G.-Pr., Anclam, 1867). Cf., also, H. Pur- 
 mann {G.-Pr., Cottbus, 1867), Jul. Jessen (Diss., Gott. 186S), and C. Martha {Le Poemede Luerece, Paris, 
 1868), and Bockemuller {Lucretiana, G.-Pr., Stade, 1863). 
 
 According to Apollodorus (ap. Diog. L., X. 14), Epicurus was born Olymp. 109. .3, 
 during the arclionship of Sosigenes, in the month of Gamelion (hence in December, ,342, or 
 in January, 341 B. c). He passed his youth in Samos (according to Diog. L., X. 1), 
 ■whither a colony had been sent from Athens, and it appears, also, that the place of 
 his birth was not Athens, but Samos, since the colony was sent out in Olympiad 
 107.1 (352-51). His father, a school-teacher (jpafi/naToSiSdaKaXog), was drawn thither as a 
 Kleruchos.* Epicurus is said to have turned his attention toward philosophy at the age 
 of fourteen years, because his early instructors in language and literature could give him no 
 intelligence respecting the nature of Hesiod's Chaos (Diog. L., X. 2). According to another 
 and quite credible account {ibid. 2-4), he was at first an elementary teacher or an assistant 
 to his father. At Samos Epicurus heard the Platonist Pamphilus, who, however, failed to 
 convince him. Better success attended the efforts of Nausiphanes, the Democritean, who 
 had also passed through the school of the Skeptics and who recommended a Skeptical bias, 
 which should, however, do no prejudice to the acceptation of his own doctrine. According 
 to Diog. L., X. 1 and 14, the Canonic (Logic) of Epicurus is founded on principles which 
 he learned from Nausiphanes. Epicurus made himself acquainted with the writings of 
 Democritus at an early age (Diog. L., X. 2). For some time he called himself a Democ- 
 ritean (Plut., Adv. Colot, 3, after the accounts of Leonteus and other Epicureans) ; but he 
 afterward attached so great importance to the points of difference between himself and 
 Democritus, that he conceived himself justified in regarding himself as the author of the 
 true doctrine in physics as well as in ethics, and in opprobriously designating Democritus 
 by the name of Ar/poKpiTog (Diog. L., X. 2). In the autumn of 323, when he was eighteen 
 years old, Epicurus went for the first time to Athens, but remained there only a short 
 time. Xenocrates was then teaching in the Academy, while Aristotle was in Chalcis. It 
 was asserted by some that Epicurus attended the lessons of Xenocrates ; others denied it 
 
 [* A Kleruchos was a settler, to whom colonial possessions had been allotted, and who retained abroad 
 the rights of Athenian citizenship. — 7>\]
 
 THE LOGIC OF EPICURUS. 203 
 
 (Cic, Be Nat. Bear., I. 26). According to Apoilodorua (ap. Diog. L., X. 14), Epicurus com. 
 menced as a teacher of philosopliy at the age of thirty- two (310 or 309 B. c), in Mityleue, 
 taught soon afterward at Lampsacus, and founded some years later (306 B. c, according to 
 Diog. L., X. 2) his school at Athens, over which he presided until his death in Olymp. 
 127.2 (270 B. c). 
 
 A cheerful, social tone prevailed in the school of Epicurus. Coarseness was pro- 
 scribed. But in the choice of means of amusement no excess of scrupulousness was 
 observed. Aspersive gossip respecting other philosophers, especially respecting the 
 chiefs of other schools, seems to have formed a favorite source of entertainment ; Epi- 
 curus himself, as is known, did not hesitate uncritically to incorporate into his writings a 
 mass of evil reports, which were, for the most part, unfounded. He embodied the prin- 
 ciples of his philosophy in brief formulae (Kvfjiai 66^ai), which he gave to his scholars, to 
 be learned by heart. 
 
 In the composition of his extremely numerous works, Epicurus was very careless, and 
 so proved his saying, that "it was no labor to write." The ordy merit allowed to them was 
 that they were easy to be understood (Cic, Be Fin., I. 5) ; in every other respect their form 
 was universally condemned (Cic, Be Nat. Beorum, I. 26 ; Sext. Emp., Adv. Math., I. 1 et al.). 
 They are said to have filled in all nearly three hundred volumes (Diog. L., X. 26). A list of 
 the most important works of Epicurus is given in Diog. L., X 27 and 28. Diogenes names, 
 in particular, besides the Kvpcat 66^ai, 1) works directed against other philosoj)hical schools, 
 e. g., " Against the Megarians," " On Sects " {nepl aipiaeuv); 2) logical works, e. g., " On the 
 Criterium or Canon;" 3) physical and theological works, e.g., " On Nature," in thirty-seven 
 books (of which considerable remains have been found at Herculaneum ; a part of them 
 are yet to be published), "On the Atoms and Empty Space," "On Plants," "Abridgment 
 of the works on Physics," " Chaeredemus, or On the Gods," etc.; 4) works on moral sub- 
 jects, e.g., "On the End of Action" {TVEpl teXov^), "On Upright Action," "On Piety," 
 " On Presents and Gratitude," etc., besides several whose nature is not evident from their 
 titles (such as " Neocles to Themista," " Symposion," etc), and Letters. Some of the 
 latter have been preserved by Diogenes Laertius. 
 
 The most important of the immediate disciples of Epicurus was Metrodorus of Lamp- 
 sacus. His works, which were largely polemical, are named in Diog. L., X. 24. The 
 other more considerable Epicureans (Hermarchus, etc.) are also named, ibid. X. 22 seq. In 
 tte very front rank of the Epicureans belongs the Roman poet Lucretius. Horace also 
 subscribed to the practical philosophy of the Epicureans. In the time of the emperors 
 the Epicurean philosophy was very widely accepted. (Whether in the passage, Diog. L., 
 X. 9, in which the Epicurean philosophy is spoken of as almost the only one stiU surviving, 
 reference is intended to the time of Diogenes himself or to that of Diodes, his voucher, is 
 doubtful.) 
 
 § 57. Epicurus treats logic, in so far as lie admits it at all into 
 his system, as ancillary to physics, and the latter, again, as ancillary 
 to ethics. He considers the dialectical method incorrect and mis- 
 leading. His logic, termed by him Canonic, proposes to teach tlie 
 norms (Kanones) of cognition, and the means of testing and knowing 
 the truth (criteria). As criteria Epicurus designates perceptions, 
 representations, and feelings. All perceptions are true and irre- 
 futable, Kepresentations are remembered images of past perceptions.
 
 204 THE LOGIC OF EPICURUS. 
 
 Beliefs are true or false, according as they are confirmed or refuted 
 by perception. The feelings of pleasure and pain are criteria indi- 
 cating what is to be sought or avoided. A theory of the concept 
 and of tlie syllogism was omitted by Epicurus as superfluous, since 
 no technical definitions, divisions, or syllogisms, could supply the 
 place of perception. 
 
 On the prolepsis of Epicurus, cf. Job. Mich. Kern (Gott. 1756) and Eoorda {Epicureorum et Stoicorvm 
 de Anticipationibus Doctrina, Leyden, 1823, reprinted from the Annul Acad. Lvgd., 1822-23). Gom- 
 pertz, in his Jle/rculan. SttuiieM (see above, § 56), treats of the Epicurean doctriue of the analogical and the 
 inductive inference. 
 
 According to Diog. Laert., X. 29, Epicurus divided philosophy into three parts: t6 tc 
 KavoviKov Kal (pvaiKov Kal ijQcuov. Logic, or "Canonics," was placed before physics, as an 
 introduction to the same (according to Diog. L., X. 30; Cic, Acad., IJ. 30; De Fin., I. 7; 
 Sen., EpisL, 89). 
 
 Rejecting dialectic, Epicurus (according to Diog. L., X. 31) declared it sufBcient: rotf 
 <iivaiKoix jj^wpcZv Kara rovg tuv Trpayfidruv cpdoyyovQ (that the investigators of nature should 
 observe the natural names of things ; cf. Cic, Dt Fin., II. 2, 6 : Epicurum, qui crelro dicat, 
 diligenter oportere exprimi, quae vis suhjeda sit vocihus). To the three criteria of Epicurus 
 above mentioned (which were designated by him in a work entitled "Canon," in the fol- 
 lowing terms: Kpirr/pia Tfjq aX^eiag elvai rag aladrjaci-g nal rag wpolriTpEiQ koI to. nd6r!, 
 see Diog. L., X. 31), the Epicureans added: Kal rag (pavraaTimg knijSoMg r^g diavoiag (the 
 intuitive apprehensions of the intellect). [Rather the imaginative, i. e., representative 
 operations of the intellect. — Fd.] This latter criterion appears, however, from Diog. L., 
 X. 38, not to have been unfamiliar to Epicurus himself. Xo perception can be proved 
 false, whether by other perceptions (whose authority can not be greater than that of the 
 perception in question), or by reason, which is simply an outgrowth from perceptions. 
 The hallucinations of the insane, even, and dreams are true {ah/di}) ; for they produce an 
 impression {kiveI yap), which the non-existing could not do (Diog. L., X. 32). It is ob- 
 vious, in connection with this latter argument, that in Epicurus' conception of truth 
 {aTiT/deia), the latter, in the sense of agreement of the psychical image with a real object, is 
 confounded with psychical reality. 
 
 Mental representations (npoTiTjTpeig) are general and permanent images preserved in the 
 memory, or the remembrance of numerous similar perceptions of the same object (Kado'AiKTj 
 voijaLc^ fivjj^i] Tov Tio'klaiug i^udev ^avEvrog, Diog. L., X. 33). They emerge in consciousness 
 when the words are employed which designate their respective objects. Opinion {66^a) or 
 beUef (vTT-6?i.7jTpig) arises from the persistence of the impressions made on us by objects. It 
 relates either to the future (npocfievov) or to the imperceptible (aSriT^ov). It may be true 
 or false. It is true, when perception testifies in its favor {av iTn^apTvpijrai, as, e. g., when 
 ^ correct assumption respecting the shape of a tower is verified by observing it near at 
 band), or, if direct evidence of this kind is impoasible (as, e. g., in regard to the theory 
 of atoms), when perception does not witness against it (^ fii; avTifiapTvpf/rai) ■ in all other 
 cases it is false (Diog. L., X. 33 seq. ; 50 seq. ; Sext. Emp., Adv. Math., VII. 211 seq.). 
 Epicurus demanded that investigators should advance from the phenomenal to the search 
 for the unknown (i. e., to the search for causes which do not fall under the observation of 
 the senses, such as, in particular, the existence and nature of atoms, Diog. L., X. 33 : Ti-fpl 
 T(Jv adijTMV airb ruv <j)aivofdvuv xPV orjfiuovodai). But he did not develop more minutejy
 
 THE EPICUREAN PHYSICS. 205 
 
 the logical theory of this path of investigatioa (which Zeno, the Epicurean, and Philo- 
 demus afterward attempted to do). 
 
 The feelings (irddrj) are the criteria for practical conduct (Diog. L., X. 34). 
 
 Epicurus treated only of the most elementary processes of knowledge with any con- 
 siderable degree of attention ; he neglected those logical operations which conduct beyond 
 the deliverances of mere perception. Of the mathematical sciences he affirmed (according 
 to Cic, De Fin., I. 21. 71): a falsis initiis pro/ecla vera non possunt, et si essent vera, nihil 
 afferrenl, quo jifundiv-s, i. e., qtu) melius viveremus. Cicero say.s further {De Fin., I. 7, 22): 
 "In another part of philosophy, which is called logic, our philosopher (Epicurus) seems to 
 rae weak and deticient ; he rejects definition ; he gives no instruction respecting division 
 and distribution ; he does not tell how reasoning is to be effected and brought to a right 
 conclusion ; nor does he show in what manner fallacies are to be resolved and ambiguities 
 brought to light." Still, the work of Philodemus, recently published, Trspl arnueiuv Kal 
 <j7jfiei6aeoiv, which is founded on the lectures of Zeno the Epioirean, his teacher, contains 
 a respectable attempt at a theory of analogical and inductive inference. (See Th. Gomperz, 
 in the above-cited Herculan. Studien, No. 1, Preface, where an essay on the content and 
 worth of this work is promised in the numbers yet to come.) The inference from 
 analogy (6 Kara ryv ofioidTTira rpdiro^) is described as the way from the known to the 
 unknown. Zeno requires that different individuals of the same genus be examined, with a 
 view to discovering the constant attributes; these may then be ascribed to the other 
 individuals of the same genus. According to Proclus. in Fuel., 55, 59, GO, Zeno (who had 
 also heard Carneades) disputed the validity of mathematical demonstration, while Posi- 
 donius the Stoic defended it. 
 
 § 58. The Natural Philosophy of Epicurus agrees substantially with 
 that of Democritus. According to Epicurus, every thing which takes 
 place has its natural causes ; the intervention of the Gods is unneces- 
 sary for the explanation of phenomena. Yet it is not possible in every 
 particular instance to designate with complete certainty the real natu- 
 ral cause. Nothing can come from the non-existing, and nothing 
 which exists can pass into non-existence. Atoms and space exist from 
 eternity. The former have a specific form, magnitude, and weight. 
 In virtue of their gravity, the atoms were originally affected with a 
 downward motion, all falling with equal rapidity. The first collisions 
 of atoms with each other were due to an accidental deviation of single 
 atoms from the vertical line of descent ; thus some of them became 
 permanently entangled and combined with each other, while others 
 rebounded with an upward or side motion, whence, ultimately, the 
 vortical motion, by which the worlds were formed. The earth, 
 together with all the stars visible to us, form but one of an infinite 
 number of existing worlds. The stars have not souls. Their real 
 and apparent magnitudes are about the same. In the intermundane 
 spaces dwell the gods. Animals and men are products of the earth ; 
 the rise of man to the higher stages of culture has been gradual.
 
 206 THE EPICUREAN PHYSICS. 
 
 "Words were formed originally, not by an arbitrary, but by a natural 
 process, in correspondence with our sensations and ideas. The soul 
 is material and composed of exceedingly fine atoms. It is nearly 
 allied in nature to air and fire, and is dispersed through the whole 
 body. The rational soul is situated in the breast. Its corporeal 
 envelope is a condition of the subsistence of the soul. The possibility 
 of sensuous perception depends on the existence of material images, 
 coming from the surfaces of things. Opinion or belief is due to the 
 continued working of impressioris on us. The will is excited, but not 
 necessarily determined by ideas. Freedom of the will is contingency 
 (independence of causes) in self-determination. 
 
 The Epicurean physics is specially discussed by G. Charleton {PhysioJogia Epicureo-Gaasendo-Charle- 
 Umiana, London, 1654), and Plitucquet (De co»mogonia Epieuri, Tub. 1765); the theology of E[)icurus, 
 by Joh. Fausti (Strasburie, 1C85). J. H. Kroninayer (Jena, 1718), J. C. Schwarz (Cob. 1718), J. A. F. Bieike 
 (.Jena, 1741), Christoph Meiners (in his Verm, philog Schi-iften, Leips. 1775-76, II. p. 45 seq.), O. F. Schoe- 
 mann (Schediasma de Epieuri theologia. ind. nchoL, Greifswald, 1S64); his doctrine of the mortality of 
 the soul, by Jos. Eeisacker (Der Todesgedanke hei den Griechen, eine historische Enpiiickelurtg, mil 
 ieaonderer Ruel'sicht avf Epicur imd den rbmiHchen Diehter Lxicrez^ G.-Pr.^ Trier, 1S62). Cf., also, F. 
 A. Lange's Geschif.hte des Materialismus and his Jf. Beitrage zur Gesch. des Mat.., Winterthnr, 186T. 
 
 At the head of his physics Epicxinis places the principle: "Nothing can come from 
 nothing," together with its correlate: "The existent can not become non-existent" [ovdev 
 ■yiverai kn rov jlit/ ovtoc, and ov6ev (p'&eipeTai fif to jifj ov, Ep., ap Diog. L., X. 38). Of 
 things corporeal, some are composite and some (all others) are the constituent parts of 
 which the former are compounded (i&., 40 seq.). Continued division of the composite must 
 at last bring us to ultimate indivisible and unchangeable elements (ciTa/ja Kal aiierap7.7]ro.), 
 unless every thing is to be resolved into the non-existent. All these indivisible and primi- 
 tive elements are indeed of various magnitudes, but they are too small to be separately 
 visible. They have no qualities beyond magnitude, shape, and gravity. Their number is 
 infinite. Farther, if that which we call vacuum and space or place did not exist, there 
 would be nothing in which bodies could exist and move. "Whatever is material has three 
 dimensions and the power of resistance {to Tpi^V ^taaTOTdv jueTci avTiTv-Kiaq, Sext. Emp., 
 Adv. Math., I. 21 et al.); empty space is intangible nature {(pvaig ava<j>Tiq, ib. X. 2; Diog. L., 
 X. 40) ; it is Tdnoq (" place "), viewed as that in which a body is contained, and X^P"' 
 ("room"), viewed as that which admits the passage of bodies through it. 
 
 The most considerable of the points of difference between the Epicurean and the 
 Democritean physics is, that Epicurus, in order to explain how the atoms first came in 
 contact with each other, ascribes to them a certain power of individual or arbitrary self- 
 determination, in virtue of which they deviated slightly from the direct line of fall (Lucrct., 
 II. 216 seq. ; Cic, De Fin., I. 6, De Nat Deor., I. 25, etc.). He thus attributes in some sort 
 to atoms that species of freedom (or rather that independence of law) which he attributes 
 to the human will. 
 
 The motion of the atoms is not directed by the idea of finality. The Empedoclean 
 opinion (Arist., Phys., II. 8, De Part. Anim., I. 1), that among the numerous fortuitous 
 creations of nature which first arose, only a few were capable of prolonged life and con- 
 serve<l their existence, while the rest perished, was renewed by the Epicureans. Lucretius 
 Bays {De Rerum Nat, I., 1020 seq.);
 
 THE EPICUREAN PHYSICS. 207 
 
 Nam certe neque consilio primordia rerum 
 Ordine se quaeque atqv£ sagaci menie locarunt, 
 Nee quos quaeque dnrent rnotus pepigere profecto : 
 Sed quia multa modis muUis mutata per omii« 
 Ex infinito vexantur percita plagis, 
 Omne genus motus et coeius experiundo, 
 Tandem deveniunt in tales disposituras, 
 Qualil^us haec rebus consistit sumina creata. 
 
 The theory of a iivine guidance of the affairs of nature was also expressly denied by 
 Epicurus himself. Says Epicurus {ap. Diog. L., X. 76 seq.) : "It must not be supposed 
 that the motions of the stars, their rising and setting, their eclipses and the like, are 
 effected and regulated, or that they have been once for all regulated by a being possessing 
 at the same time complete blessedness and immortaUty ; for labor and care and anger and 
 favor are not compatible with happiness and self-sufficiency." 
 
 A world (Kdafwg) is a section of the infinite universe, containing stars, an earth, and 
 every variety of phenomena [Tzepiox^ riq ovpavov, aarpa te kuI yfp) koI Tzavra ra tpaivoueva 
 irepii ;{ovaa, anorofi^v ixoixja and rov an-dpov, Epic, ap. Diog. L., X. 88). The number 
 of such worlds is infinite ; they are not eternal ab initio, nor will they endure forever 
 (ibid. 88, 89). 
 
 The real and apparent magnitudes of the sun and the other heavenly bodies are the 
 same ; for if the effect of distance were to reduce (apparently) their (real) magnitude, the 
 same must be true of their brilliancy, which nevertheless remains e-vidently undiminished. 
 The gods of the popular faith exist, and are imperishable and blessed beings. "We possess 
 a distinct knowledge of them, for they often appear to men and leave behind representa- 
 tive images (Trpo/ljyi/'f'f) in the mind. But the opinions of the mass of men respecting the 
 gods are false assumptions {v7To?J^tl>eic xpEvdEig), containing much that is incongruous with 
 the idea of their immortaUty and blessedness (Epic, ap. Diog. L., X. 123 seq. ; Cic, Be 
 Nat. Dear.. I. 18 seq.). The gods are formed of the finest of atoms, and dwell in the void 
 spaces between the different worlds (Cic, De Nat. Bear., II. 23 ; Be Biv., II. 17 ; Lucret., 
 I. 59; III. 18 seq.; V. 147 seq.). The sage finds his motive for revering them, not in 
 fear, but in admiration of their excellence. 
 
 The Soul is defined by Epicurus {ap. Diog. L., X. 63) as a cfjua ?.ETrTouEpec nap' o?mv to 
 adpoiafia nafiEanapfikvov (see above, p. 206). It is most similar in nature to air; its atoms 
 are very different from those of fire ; yet in its composition a certain portion of warm 
 substance is united with the aeriform. In death the atoms of the soul are scattered (Epic, 
 ap. Diog. L., X. 64 seq.; Lucr., III. 418 seq.). After this resolution of the soul into its 
 constituent atoms, sensation ceases ; the cessation of which is death {(rrEprjaiq a'taOr/aEug). 
 When death comes, we no longer exist, and so long as we exist, death does not come, 
 so that for us death is of no concern (6 Odvanc ov6ev npbr fjfiac, Epic, ap. Diog. L., X. 
 124 seq.; Lucret., III. 842 seq.). JSJothing is immaterial except empty space, which can 
 effect nothing ; the soul, therefore, which ia the agent of distinct operations, is material 
 (Epic, ibid. X. 67). 
 
 The doctrine of material effluxes from things and of images (eliW/.n), which were sup- 
 posed necessary to perception, was sliared by Epicurus with Democritus. These images, 
 types (rvnni), were represented as coming from tlie surface of things and making their way 
 through the intervening air to the visual faculty or the understanding (e'lg rffi' oftv ^ rf/v 
 didvoiav; Diog. L., X. 46-49; Epicuri frngni. libr. If. et XL, de natura. Lucret., IV. 33 seq.). 
 
 There is no fate (eifiapiu.e:vTi) in the world. That which depends on us is not subject to
 
 20S THE EPICUREAN ETHICS. 
 
 the influence of any external power (to rrap' tjiuv a6iaTzorav), and it is our power of frea 
 self-determination which makes us proper subjects of praise and blame (Epic, ap. Diog. L., 
 X. 133; cf. Cic, Acad., II. 30 ; De Fato, 10. 21 ; De Nat. Deortim, I. 25). 
 
 The interest of Epicurus in his natural philosophy turns essentially on the disproof of 
 theological explanations and the establishment of the naturahstic principle, and not on the 
 determination of completed scientific truth. 
 
 § 59. The Epicurean Ethics is founded on the Ethics of the Cyre- 
 naics. In it the higliest good is defined as happiness. Happiness, 
 according to Epicurus, is synonymous with pleasure, for this is what 
 every being naturally seeks to acquire. Pleasure may result either 
 from motion or from rest. The former alone was recognized by the 
 Cyrenaics ; but this pleasure, according to Epicurus, is only necessary 
 when lack of it gives us pain. The pleasure of rest is freedom from 
 pain. Pleasure and pain, further, are either mental or bodily. The 
 more powerful sensations are not, as the Cyrenaics affirmed, bodily, 
 but mental ; for while the former are confined to the moment, the 
 latter are connected with the past and future, through memory and 
 hope, which thus increase the pleasure of the moment. Of the 
 desires, some are natural and necessary, others natural but not ne- 
 cessary, and still others neither natural nor necessary. Not every 
 species of pleasure is to be sought after, nor is every pain to be 
 shunned ; for the means employed to secure a certain pleasure are 
 often followed by pains greater than the pleasure produced, or involve 
 the loss of other pleasures, and that, W'hose immediate effect is pain- 
 ful, often serves to ward off greater pain, or is followed by a pleas- 
 ure more than commensurate with the pain immediately produced. 
 Whenever a question arises as to the expediency of doing or omit- 
 ting any action, the degrees of pleasure and pain which can be foreseen 
 as sure to result, whether directly or indirectly, from the commission 
 of the act, must be weighed and compared, and the question must be 
 decided according to the preponderance of pleasure or pain in the 
 foreseen result. The correct insight necessary for this comparison is 
 the cardinal virtue. From it flow all other virtues. The virtuous 
 man is not necessarily he who is in the possession of pleasure, but he 
 who is able to proceed rightly in the quest of pleasure. But since the 
 attainment of the highest possible amount of pleasure in connection 
 with the smallest possible amount of pain, depends on a correct 
 praxis, and since the latter, in turn, is dependent on correct insight, 
 it follows that the virtuous man alone is able to attain the end de- 
 scribed ; on the other hand, the virtuous man will attain it without 
 
 I
 
 THE EPICUREAN ETHICS. 209 
 
 failure. Virtue, then, is the only possible and the perfectly sure way 
 to happiness. The sage, who as such possesses virtue, is consequently 
 always happy. Duration of existence does not affect the measure of 
 his happiness. 
 
 The Mor.ll Philosophy of the Eplciir'^ans is specially treated of by Des CoDtures (Paris, 1685, another 
 edition, enlartreil by I'Loiidel. Hui;ue, 1CS6), Batteux (Paris, ITOS), and Oarve (in connection with his transl. 
 of A[istolk''8 Ethics. Vol. I., Breshiu, 1798. pp. 90-110); cf., also, E. Platner, i'eher die stoiache und Epi- 
 tureisohe Erkldrung vom Ursprung des Vergnilgen, in the Neue Bibl. der tchoiien Wise., Vol. 19. 
 
 Epicurus' own declarations respecting the principles of ethics may be read in Book X. 
 of Diogenes L., especially in the letter from Epicurus to Menoeceus (X. 122-135). Exact- 
 ness in definition and rigid deduction do not there appear as arts in which Epicurus was 
 pre-eminent. Re utters his ideas loosely, in the order in which they occur to him, and with 
 all the indeterminateness of imelaborated tliought. He takes no pains to be exact and 
 systematic, his only aim being to provide rules of easy practical application. The principle 
 of pleasure comes to view in the course of the progress of his discussion in the following 
 terms (X. 128): riiovijv hpxvv kciI re'Aof; leyofiev elvai tov fuiKapiuq C,?)v, and in defense of it 
 Epicurus adds (X. 129), that in pleasure we are cognizant of the good which is first among 
 all goods and congenial to our nature (dyn^bv TrpuTov ml avy-yeviKov), the beginning of all our 
 choosing and avoiding, and the end of all our action, sensation being the criterion by which 
 we judge of every good. But previously to the formulation of this doctrine, many rules of 
 conduct are given, the various species of desires are discussed, pleasure and freedom from 
 pain are discoursed upon, and, in particular, the principle, by which we are to be guided 
 iu our acts of choice or avoidance, is defined (X. 128) as health and mental tranquillity 
 {jl TOV aufiarag vyleia kuI r) rf/c i/'''^W ctrapa^ia), in which happiness becomes complete (k~£l 
 roi'To TOV fiaKapiu^ i^f/v ioTi relog). Epicurus nowhere states in the form of a definition 
 what we are to understand by pleasure (r/6ov?'/), and what he saj'S of the relation of posi- 
 tive to negative pleasure (as the absence of pain) is very indefinite. In the letter referred 
 to, after an exhortation to all men to philosophize in every period of life, to the end that 
 fear may be banished and happiness (rr/v evSai/wviav) attained (X. 122), follows, first (123- 
 127), instruction respecting the gods and respecting death, and then (127) a classification 
 of desires (eindvfiiat). Of the latter, we are told that some are natural {(ivaiKai), other.s 
 emptj'' (KEvai). Of the natural desires, some are necessary (civnyKalat), while the others 
 are not necessary ((pvmKai fiavov). Those which are natural and necessary, are necessary 
 either for our happiness (rrpof evfiaifinviav, which is obviously taken in a narrower sense 
 than before), or for the preservation of the body in an untroubled condition {~poi; t/]v tov 
 aoiuaTog ao,x^7}atai'), or for life itself (^rpof ni'To to Cyv). (In another place, Diog. L., X. 
 149, the desires are classified simply as either natural and necessary, or natural and not 
 necessary, or neither natural nor necessary: desires of the first class aim at the removal 
 of pain: those of the second at the diversification of pleasure; and those of the third at tlio 
 gratification of vanity, ambition, and empty conceits generally. This classification is criti- 
 cised with unjust severity by Cicero, Z)e.F., 11. ch. 9.) Proper attention to these distinc- 
 tions, according to Epicurus (ap. IMog. L., X. 128), will lead to the right conduct of life, 
 to health and serenity, and consequently to happiness {finnapio)^ l^f^'). For, he continues, 
 the object of all our actions is to prevent pain either of the body or of the mind (ott^ 
 fir/Te aTiyufiev, /ir/Te Tapftufia'). We have need of pleasure (f/AovT/) then, when its absenc 
 brings us pain, and only then. Pleasure is, therefore, the starting-point and the end of 
 happiness. (How the two statements: "Pleasure is the ethical principle" and '-We 
 14
 
 210 THE EPICUREAN ETHICS. 
 
 have need of it only when its absence brings \is pain," can be reconciled, or how one is 
 the consequence of the other, it is difficult to say ; for if really the end of all our action 
 is only to secure our freedom from pain, and if we have no need of pleasure oxcept 
 when its absence Avould be painful, pleasure is obviously not an end but a means.) After 
 the (above-given) brief justification of the hedonic principle (X. 129), Epicurus labors 
 to disprove the mistaken idea that all kinds of pleasure are worthy to be sought after. 
 He admits that every pleasure, without distinction, is a natural and therefore a good thing, 
 and that every pain is an evil, but demands that, before deciding in favor of a given 
 pleasure or against a certain pain, we weigh its consequences {avfi/uirpjjcic), and that we 
 then adopt or reject it according to the preponderance of pleasure or pain in the result. 
 In the light of this principle, Epicurus then recommends, with special emphasis, modera- 
 tion, the accustoming of one's self to a simple manner of life, abstinence from costly and 
 intemperate enjoyments, or, at most, only a rare indulgence in them, so that health may be 
 preserved and the charm of pleasure may remain undiminished. To give greater force to 
 his recommendations, he returns to the proposition, that the proper end of life is freedom 
 from bodily and mental suffering {/nr/re alyelv Kara cuiin, /i^re rapdrTecdai Kara ijwxv^). 
 Right calculation is the essence of practical wisdom, which is the highest result of phi- 
 losophy and the source of all other virtues (Diog. L., X. 132). It is mipossible to live 
 agreeably {r/<^(uc) without living prudently, decently, and uprightly (<ppovi/i(jg kuI KaXi^c 
 Koi diKaiuq). Conversely, it is impossible that a life thus directed should not be at 
 the same time an agreeable one: the virtues and pleasure grow together inseparably 
 (cvfnr£(pvKaaiv at aperal tu Cf/v r'/deug, X. 132). Epicurus concludes his letter by portray- 
 ing the happy life of the sage, who, concerning the gods, holds that opinion which is 
 demanded by reason and piety, does not fear death, rightly values all natural goods, knows 
 that there is no such thing as fate, but by his insight is raised above the contingencies of 
 life, deeming it better to fail of his end in single instances after intelligent deliberation, 
 than to be fortunate without intelligence {Kpeirrov elvai vo/u(uv evTMyi^ruq arvxelv, rj 
 a?.o}'iaTu)r evTv^fv), the man who, in one word, lives like a god among men in the enjoy- 
 ment of immortal goods (X. 133-135). 
 
 The Epicureans deny that the laws of ethics are innate in man, or that they were 
 invented and violently imposed on him by his first rulers ; on the contrary, they are the 
 result of the judgment of eminent and leading men respecting what is useful (mi/j<t>ipov) to 
 society (Hermarchus, ap. Porphyr., Be Absiin., I. chs. 7-13; cf. Bernays, Theophr. Schri/t 
 uber Frommigkeit, Berlin, 1866, p. 8 seq.). 
 
 Epicurus distinguishes {ap. Diog. L., X. 136) between two species of pleasure, viz.: the 
 pleasure of rest, KaraaTTjiiaTiKr ij^ovrj [stabiliias voluptatis, Cic, De Fin., II. 3), and the 
 pleasure of motion, ?) /card k'lvticlv tj6ovti (voluptas in motu. Cic, ibid.) ; the former is defined 
 as freedom from trouble and labor (arapa^la koc anovici), the latter as joy and cheerfulness 
 {xapa Kal eixppoavv?/). In his conception of the "pleasure of rest," Epicurus varies, some- 
 times identifying the latter with the momentary satisfaction which arises from tlie removal 
 of a pain, and sometimes with the mere absence of pain. This uncertainty is the more 
 unfortunate, since the term r/fW^/ (like voluptas and "pleasure") never receives in the 
 ordinary usage the signification of absence of pain; Cicero's severe censure {De Fin., IT. 
 2 seq.) of the carelessness and obscurity of Epicurus in the employment of this term is, 
 therefore, not imgrounded. Yet Cicero's accomit appears to be not wholly free from mis- 
 apprehensions. Thus it can only be ascribed to an inexact apprehension of the doctrine of 
 Epicurus, that Cicero should suppose that Epicurus identified the highest pleasure with 
 the absence of pain as such {De Fin., I. 11; II. 3 seq.)-, Epicurus {ap. Diog. L., X. 141) 
 only says that the complete removal of pain is inseparably connected with the highest
 
 THE EPICUREAN ETHICS. 211 
 
 intensification of pleasure (for which, indeed, it would be more exact to say that the latter 
 always involves the former, but not conversely). 
 
 It would appear from the accounts of Cicero (Be Fin., I. 7 and 17 ; II. 30) that Epicu- 
 rus derived all psychical pleasure from the memory of past or the hope of future corporeal 
 pleasures. This doctrine is not to be found in any of the writings of Epicurus now at 
 hand, and it is quite possible that in this point he has been misunderstood. Memory 
 and liope are, indeed, according to Epicurus, the ground of the higher worth of psychical 
 pleasure, but he can scarcely have taught that they were the onh* source of such pleasure. 
 It is right to say only (according to Epicurus), that all psychical pleasure originates in one 
 way or another in sensuous pleasure. In a letter quoted by Diog. L. (X. 22), Epicurus 
 declares with reference to himself, that his bodily pains are outweighed in his old age by 
 the pleasure which the recollection of his philosophical discoveries affords him. 
 
 The alleged averment of Epicurus in his work nepl re/un'c (see Diog. L., X. 6), that he 
 did not know what he should imderstand by the good, if sensiious pleasures were taken 
 away (hoaipuv ftev rdf did ;(v?.(Jv r/t^om^, CKfiaipuv 6^ Kal rag di' a(Pfjo<haiuv Kal rag 6i' aKpoa- 
 /idrcjv Kal rag 6ia fiop<p^g), is compatible not only with the doctrine that sensuous plea- 
 sures are the only real ones, but also with the doctrine that they are the necessary basis 
 of all other pleasures, so that with them all others would disappear. If we adopt the 
 latter as the doctrine of Epicurus, the word aqaipelv in the passage above quoted must 
 not be understood in the Aristotelian sense, as denoting merely mental abstraction, but 
 as signifying an attempt (of course only in thought) at real removal. In what manner 
 mtellectual pleasures are dependent on sensuous pleasures is left undetermined. 
 
 Epicurus says expressly that no kind of pleasure deserves in itself to be rejected, 
 though many a pleasure must be sacrificed on account of its consequences (Diog. L., X. 
 141, cf. 142). The conception of a distinction in the worth of different pleasures, as 
 determined by their quality, according to which the one pleasure could be termed refined, 
 the other less refined, or unrefined, finds no place in the Epicurean system. Hence the 
 conception of honor remains inexplicable in the Epicurean theory, and in the praxis of the 
 Epicureans it was, so far as possible, placed in the background. It was these deficiencies 
 that occasioned the most weighty and annihilating objections of Gicero (De Fin., II.) 
 against Epicureanism. Yet these causes also secured for the system its most extensive 
 acceptation at the time, when the thirst for pleasure and despotism had broken down the 
 antique sentiment of honor. 
 
 In principle the Epicurean etliics is a system of egoism ; for the advantage of the indi- 
 vidual, which is treated as identical with the happiness of the individual, is required in 
 all cases to furnish the law of action. Even Friendship is explained by this principle. 
 Friendship, according to Epicurus, is the best means of assuring to man all the enjoyments 
 of life. Some of the Epicureans (according to Cic, De Fin., I. 20) added to this two 
 other theories of friendship, some asserting that it began in the idea of profit, which in 
 the natural progress of friendly intercourse became changed into a sentiment of unselfish 
 good-will, and others affirming that a covenant among the wise men bound them to love 
 each his friend as himself. P'picurus liimself is the author of the aphorism (ascribed to 
 to him in Plutarch, Nan Fosse Siuiviter Vivi sec. Epicurum, 15. 4): "It is more pleasant to 
 do than to receive good " (to ei.< noielv rjdwv tov Tzaax^iv). Yet through the great weight 
 which, both in theory and in their actual life with each other, was laid by the Epicureans 
 on friendship (a social development which only became possible after the dissolution of the 
 bond which in earlier times had so closely united each individual citizen to the civil com- 
 munity), Epicureanism aided in softening down the asperity and exclusiveness of ancient 
 manners and in cultivating the social virtues of companionableness, compatibility, friendli-
 
 212 SKEPTICISM. 
 
 ness, gentleness, beneficence, and gratitude, and so performed a work whose merit should 
 not be underestimated. 
 
 If we compare the Epicurean teaching with the Cyrenaic, we discover, along with their 
 agreement in their general principle, the principle of Hedonism, two main differences (of 
 which Diog. L. treats, X. 136, 137). The Cyrenaics posit only the positive pleasure which 
 is connected with gentle motion (Aela kivt/cic), where Epicurus posits not only this, but 
 also the negative pleasure connected with repose (KaraaTT^finTtKy 7/fWr;). Farther, tho 
 Cyrenaics aflSrm that the worst pains are bodily, while Epicurus affirms them to be psy- 
 chical, since the soul suffers from that which is past and from that which is to come ; in 
 like manner, to the former, bodily pleasure seems the greater; to the latter, psychical. 
 The ethical teachings of the principal representatives of the Cyrenaic school after Aris- 
 tippus were all incorporated into the Epicurean system. Thus Epicurus agreed with 
 Theodorus that the ethical " end " was a general state rather than particular pleasures, 
 with Hegesias, that the principal thing was to avert suffering, and with Anniceris, that 
 the sage should zealously cultivate friendship. 
 
 That by which Epicureanism is scientifically justified, is its endeavor to reach objective 
 knowledge by rigidly excluding (or attempting to exclude) mythical forms and conceptions. 
 Its deficiency lies in its restriction to those most elementary and lowest spheres of inves- 
 tigation, in which alone, as things then were, knowledge having even the show of exact- 
 ness and free from poetic and semi-poetic forms was possible, and in its explaining away 
 whatever was not susceptible of scientific explanation in accordance with the insufficient 
 hypotheses of the system. The indecisiveness of the struggle between Epicureanism and 
 the more ideal philosophical schools, and the rise of Skepticism and Eclecticism, can be 
 otherwise explained than by the hypothesis of an abatement of the desire for knowledge. 
 They were rather (and to-day something of the same kind is being repeated) the natural 
 result of the distribution of different advantages and deficiencies among these various 
 schools : the idealistic philosophers sacrificed (as they stiU do to a great extent to-day), 
 in many respects, scientific purity and rigor of form to an unconsciously poetical, or at 
 least half-poetic, manner of apprehending the highest objects of knowledge ; while Epi- 
 cureanism (like all exclusively realistic systems), in its endeavor to present a perfectly clear 
 and intelligible account of things on the principle of immanent natural causality, ignored 
 largely the existence and importance of oV)jects ■which were then incapable of explanation 
 under a form so strictly scientific. Cf., further, respecting the significance of Epicu- 
 reanism, the sections on this subject in A. Lange's Gesch. des Mate)-ialismus, Iserlohn, 1 866, 
 and in his Neue Beitrage zur Gesch. des Materialismus, "Winterthur, 1867. 
 
 § 60. The results of the great philosophical systems were not only 
 reproduced or appropriated and developed in the schools which fol- 
 lowed, but were subjected to a critical revision and re-examination, 
 which led either to their being remodeled and blended together in 
 new systems, or to doubt in regard to all of them and in regard to 
 the cognoscibility of any thing, i. e., to Eclecticism and Skepticism. 
 
 There appeared in succession three Skeptical schools or groups of 
 philosophers : 1) Pyrrho of Elis (in the time of Alexander the Great) 
 and his earliest followers ; 2) the so-called Middle Academy, or the 
 second and third Academic Schools ; 3) the Later Skeptics, beginning 
 with ^nesidemus, who again made the teaching of Pyrrho the basis
 
 SKEPTICISM. - 213 
 
 of their own teaching. The skepticism of the Middle Academy, 
 issuing from the Platonic Dialectic, was less radical than that of the 
 Pjrrhonists, since it was directed principally against a determinate 
 form of doctrine, namely, against the dogmatism of the Stoics, and 
 was at least so far from absolutely denying the possibility of knowl- 
 edge, that it admitted the existence of probabilities, of which various 
 degrees were distinguished. 
 
 The earlier school of Skeptics, among whom, next to Pyrrho, 
 Timon of Phlius, the Sillograph, was the most important, asserted that 
 of every two mutually contradictory propositions, one was not more 
 true than the other. They sought, by withholding their judgment in 
 all cases, to secure peace of mind, and esteemed every thing except 
 virtue indifferent. Among the later Skeptics, the most noteworthy 
 was ^nesidemus, who went back to Pyrrho in ])hilo8ophy, was the 
 author often ske])tical " tropes," and attempted, on the basis of Skep- 
 ticism, to revive the philosophy of Heraclitus. Beside him we may 
 mention, in particular, Agrippa, who reduced the ten tropes to five, 
 Favorinus, who seems to have wavered between the Academic and 
 the Pyrrhonic form of doubt, and Sextus, who belonged to the em- 
 pirical school of physicians, and composed the works, still extant, 
 entitled "Pyrrhonic Sketches" and '' Against the Dogmatists." 
 
 Of the Skepticism of Pyrrho treat Joh. Arrhenins (Ups. 170S), G. Ploucquet (Tub. 175S), Kindervater 
 {An P. doctr. onmis tollatur virtus, Leipsic, 17S9), J. G. Miiuch (De Notione atque Indole Sceptu-iitini, 
 nominaiim PyrrhonUmi, Altd. 1796), K. Brodersen (De philos. Pyrrhtmis, Kiel, IS19), J. K. Thorbecke 
 (Quid inter acadeni. ei itcept. intejf., Leyden, 1821); on Timon, see Jos. F. Langheinrich (Diss, ires de 
 Titnone Mlographo. ace. ejunde>n/ra{/meuta, Leips. 1720-24), and, of more recent writers, Wachsniuth (De 
 THinone Phliasio ceteritique sillogrup/iis Graecis, Leips. 1659); cf.. respecting the general subject ot SUloi 
 among the Greeks, Franz Anton Wolke (Warschaii, 1S20), and Friedr. Paul (Berlin, 1S21). Fragments of 
 the writings of Timon are found in the Anthology published by F. Jacobs, from the Palatine Codex (Leips, 
 1818-17). Cf. D. Zimmermann, Darntelliuig der Pyrrh. Ph., Erl. 1841 ; Ceher Vrtepir. v. Bedettturiig dtr 
 Pyrrh. Ph., ib. 1843; CommenUUio, qua Timonis PIdkuii m/lorum reliquiae a Sexto Empirico traditae 
 explaitantiM- (G.-Pr.), ib. I860. Saisaet treats of .finesidemus, in Le SceptieUime : Aenesideme, Pancal, 
 Kant, 2d ed., Paris, 1S67. 
 
 For the literature relating to the Middle Academy, see above, § 44, p. 134. For the editions of the two 
 works of Sextus Empiricns (Pyrrhon. Infttitut. Lihr. III., and Contra ^(athematico/l lAbH XI.\ see above. 
 § 7, p. 21. Cf. L. Kayser, Ueber Seictu-n Empir. Ik-hrift irpb? AoycKou?. in the Rhein. Miut. f. Ph.. titvr 
 series. VII. 1850, pp. 161-190 ; C. Jourdain, Sea-t. Empir. et la Philosophic Scolastique, Paris. 1S5S. 
 
 Cf. Tafel, Gesch. de« Sk-epticismun, Tiibingen, 1834; Uorman MaccoU, T7ie Greek Skeptics from Pyrrho 
 to Sextus, London and Cambridge, 1869. 
 
 Pyrrho of Elis (about 360-270 b. c.) is said (Diog. L., IX. 61, cf. Se.xt. Emp. Adv. Math., 
 VIT. 13) to have been a pupil of Bryso (or Dryso), who was a son and disciple of Stilpo; 
 yet this statement is very doubtful, since Bryso, if he was really a son of Stilpo, must have 
 been younger tlian Pyrrho ; according to other accounts, Bryso was a disciple of Socrates 
 or of Euclid of Megara, Socrat«s' disciple. Perhaps this Bryso, disciple of Socrates, was the 
 Bryso of Heraclea, from whose dialogues, according to Theopompus, op. Athenseus, XI. 
 p. 508, Plato was said to have borrowed considerabb' (perhaps, in particular, in the Theae-
 
 214 SKEPTICISM. 
 
 teius ?). He seems to have thought highly of the doctrines of Democritus, but to have hated 
 most other philosophers, regarding them as Sophists (Diog. L., IX. 67 and 69). He accom- 
 panied Anaxarchus, the Democritean, of the suite of Alexander the Great, on his military 
 campaigns, as far as India. He became of the opinion, that nothing was beautiful or hate- 
 ful, just or unjust, in reaUty (r^ alridsia, Diog. L., IX. 61, for which we find <l>vaei, ib. 101, 
 and in Sext. Emp., Adv. Math., XI. 140) ; in itself every thing was just as much and just 
 as Uttle {ohdev fia/JMv) the one as the other ; every thing depended on human institution 
 and custom. Hence Pyrrho taught that real things were inaccessible to human knowledge 
 or incomprehensible (d/caraA?;i/'/a), and that it was our duty to abstain from judging (ettoj;)). 
 The external circumstances of human life are all indifferent {a6ia(j)opov);*{t becomes the 
 wise man, whatever may befall him, always to preserve complete tranquillity of mind, and 
 to allow nothing to disturb his equanimity (arapaf/'a, Diog. L., IX. 61, 62, 66-68; cf. 
 Cic, De Fin., 11. 13; III. 3 and 4; IV. 16: Pyrrho, qui virtute constituta, nihil omnino 
 quod appetendum sit, relinquat). The Pyrrhonists were termed (according to Diog. L., IX. 
 69) doubters (aKopT/TiKoi), skeptics (cr/ce7rr</co/), suspenders of judgment (kcjiEKTiKot), and 
 inquirers {l^rjTTjTiKoi). Pyrrho himself developed his views only orally (Diog. L., Proem, 16 ; 
 IX. 102). It was thus easy for his name to become a typical one, and for many views to 
 be ascribed to him by later disciples and writers, which were only the views of the school. 
 The most correct reports of his doctrines are those which are derived from the writings of 
 Timon, his disciple (termed by Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., I. 53 : 6 npo<pT]Tr]^ ruv livpfxjvo^ 
 
 As immediate disciples of Pyrrho, Diog. L. (IX. 67, 69) names, among others, Philo of 
 Athens, Nausiphanes of Teos, the Democritean, who afterward became a teacher of Epi- 
 curus, and, as the most eminent of all, Timon of Phlius. Timon (born about 325, diea 
 about 235 B. c), whom (according to Diog. L., IX. 109) Stilpo, the Megarian, had instructed 
 before Pyrrho, was the author of satirical poems, "LUTmi, in three books, in which he 
 treated and reviled as babblers all the Greek philosophers, except Xenophanes, who, lie 
 said, had sought for the real truth, disengaged from useless subtleties, and Pj'^rrho, who 
 found it. In opposition to tlie assertion, that the truth was known through the co-opera- 
 tion of the senses and the intellect, Timon, who held both to be deceptive, repeated the 
 verse: "Attagas and Numenius" (two notorious cheaters) "came together" [owi/Wev 
 'ATTaydc tc koI ^ovpyviog). According to Aristocles (ap. Euseb., Praejiar. Evang., XIV. 18), 
 Timon appears to have developed the main thesis of skepticism in the following manner : 
 He who would attain to happiness must consider three things : 1) the nature of things, 
 2) how we are to conduct ourselves with reference to them, 3) the (theoretical and prac- 
 tical) result flowing from this conduct. There exist no fixed differences among things ; all 
 things are unstable and can not be judged of by us. Owing to the instability of things our 
 perceptions and representations are neither true nor false, and can therefore not be relied 
 upon. Adopting this view, we become non-committal (we decide, say nothing) or free 
 from all theoretical bias (acbaoia), and thus secure imperturbableness of mind {arapa^ia). 
 This state of mind follows our suspension of judgment {ETroxv) as its shadow (f7«mf rpdirov, 
 Diog. L., IX. 107). The subject of doubt is not what appears (the phenomenon), but what 
 is. Says Timon {apt. Diog., IX. 105): "That a thing is sweet I do not affirm, but only 
 admit that it appears so." In his work entitled Tlvduv, Timon (according to Diog. L., IX. 
 76) explained his expression, ov6ev fiaXkov, as equivalent to fir/dsv 6pi(ecv or aTrpnaderelv (we 
 determine nothing and assent to nothing). The grounds for every proposition and its 
 contradictory opposite show themselves equally strong (laoaOheia riiv M] uv). Another 
 expression for the skeptical withliolding of one's judgment Is apf)e-pia, or equilibrium 
 {ibid. 74). The ovSh naXkov is intended by the Skeptics to be taken, not in the positive
 
 SKEPTICISM. 215 
 
 sense of asserting real equality, but only in a privative sense [ov deriKug, a7J' avaiperiKu^), 
 as when it is said, "Scylla exists no more than the Chimijera," i. e., neither exists {ibid. 75). 
 All these principles, after being first applied against the assertions of the dogmatists, 
 were finally to be applied to themselves, in order that in the end not even these prin- 
 ciples should retain the character of fixed assertions ; just as every other ^oyor, or asser- 
 tion, could be met by a contradictory assertion, so also could these (ib., 76, given, apparently, 
 as an affirmation of Timon). In this position, obviously, Skepticism, carrying its own prin- 
 ciple to the extreme, at last destroys itself; besides, the Skeptics, while arguing against the 
 force of logical forms, could not but employ them themselves, thus conceding to them in 
 fact the force \\«hich their theory denied them (except, of course, in so far as the employ- 
 ment of them from the Skeptical stand-point was declared to be merely hypothetical, and 
 intended merely to show that if they were valid they might be turned against themselves, 
 and were thus self-destructive). 
 
 The later Skeptics, who styled themselves Pyrrhonists, were accustomed to define the 
 difference between the members of the Middle Academy (see above, § 4^1) and the Pyrrho- 
 nistic doubters, by saying that the Academics of the schools of Arcesilas and Carneades 
 asserted that they knew only one thing, viz. : that nothing was knowable, while the Pyr- 
 rhonists denied even this one supposed certainty (Sext. Emp., Hypotyx). Pyrrhon., I. 3, 226, 
 233 ; cf Gell., N. A., XI. 5, 8). But this appreciation is incorrect in what concerns the 
 Academics ; for neither Arcesilas (Cic, Acad. Post., I. 12, 45) nor Carneades (Cic, Acad. 
 Pr., II. 9, 28) ascribed to the theses of Skepticism complete certainty. It is correct only 
 to say, in general, that the Skepticism of the Academics was less radical than that of the 
 Pyrrhonists, but not for tlie reason above cited, but because it admitted a theory of proba- 
 bihty (against which Sext. Emp. contends. Adv. Math., YII. 435 seq.), and, in what con- 
 cerns Arcesilas, because this philosopher (according to Sext. Emp., Hyp. Pyrrh., 1. 234, 
 and others) employed his method of negative criticism only as a preliminary to the com- 
 munication of Plato's teachings (provided, for the rest, that this statement is exact or 
 referred to the right person). There existed besides a very important difference between 
 the Academic and the Pyrrhonic Skeptics, in that the latter only, and not the Academics, 
 saw in ataraxy tlie supreme end of philosophy. 
 
 After that the Academy (in the persons of Philo of Larissa and Antiochus of Ascalon, 
 and their successors) had gone over to an eclectic dogmatism, tlie Skeptical doctrine of 
 Pyrrho was renewed, especially by j^nesidemus. ^Enesidemus of Cnossus appears to 
 have taught at Alexandria in the first century after Christ. Ho wrote Tlvppui'eion' 7.6yuv 
 oKTu PifiXia (Diog. L., IX. 116), of which Photius {BiU. cod., 212) prepared an abridgment, 
 which is still extant, but is very brief Ills stand-point is not that of pure Skepticism, 
 since he proposed, by the employment of the skeptical principle, to lay the foundation for 
 a renewed Ileraclitism. lie proposed (according to Sext. Emp., Uyp. Pyi-rh., I. 210) to 
 show first that contradictory predicates appeared to be applicable to the same thing, in 
 order to break tlie ground for the doctrine that such predicates were in reality thus appli- 
 cable. With him doubt was not doctrinal, but directive [ayuyij). The ten ways (rpdiroi) 
 of justifying doubt, which, according to Sext. Empir., Hyp. Pyrrh., I. 36, were traditional 
 among the earlier Skeptics [napa rolg apxnioripoi^ aKCTZTiKol^), appear to have been first 
 enumerated in his work, and not in that of Timon ; Sextus treats Agrippa as the first of 
 the "Later Skeptics." The ten tropes (otherwise termed 7.6yoi or to-oi) were, according 
 to Sext. Empir. {Hyp. Pyrrh., I. 36 seq.) and Diog. L. (IX. 79 seq.) severally as follows : 
 The first was derived from the different constitution of the various classes of animated 
 beings, resulting in differences in their modes of apprehending the same objects, of which 
 modes it was impossible to decide which, if either, was correct; the second was dr»w«
 
 216 SKEPTICISM. 
 
 from the diflferent constitution o. different men, whence ftie same result as before ; the 
 third, from the different structure of tlie several organs of sense ; the fourth, from the 
 Tariability of our physical and mental conditions ; the fifth, from the diversities of appear- 
 ance due to position, distance, and place ; the sixth, from the fact that no object can be 
 perceived by itself alone, apart from all otliers ; the seventh, from the various appearance 
 of objects as determined by quantity, size of parts, and the like ; the eighth, from the gen- 
 eral relativity of all our knowledge (and this, as is correctly remarked by Sext. Empir. 
 [Hyp. Fyrrh., I. 39 ; cf GelL, XI. 5, 7], is the substance of all skeptical tropes) ; the ninth, 
 from the variations in our notions of objects, according as we perceive them more or les3 
 frequently ; and the tenth, from diversities of culture, customs, laws, mythical notions, and 
 philosophical theories. 
 
 The later Skeptics, beginning with Agrippa (the fifth successor of ^nesidemus), and in- 
 cluding Sextus, the empirical, or, as he preferred to be called (see Hyp. Fyrrh., I. 236 seq. ; 
 Adv. Math., YIII. 327), the methodical physician (about 200 A. D.), and his pupil Saturninus 
 (Diog. L., IX. lie), and others (with whom, among others, Favorinus of Arelate, the gram- 
 marian and antiquarian, who lived at Kome and Athens under Hadrian, and was the teacher 
 of A. Gellius, seems to have agreed), enumerated, as reasons for "etto;);^," or the suspen- 
 sion of judgment, five tropes (see Sext. Emp., Hyp. Pyrr., I. 164 seq. ; Diog. L., IX. 88 seq.). 
 The first of these was founded on the discrepancy of human opinions respecting the same 
 objects ; the second pointed to the regress in infinitum involved in proof, since whatever is 
 proved, is proved by that which itself needs proof, and so on without end ; the third was 
 taken from the relativity of things, all of which vary in appearance according to the con- 
 stitution of the percipient and according to their relations to other things with which they 
 are combined ; the fourth called attention to the arbitrariness of the fundamental prin- 
 ciples of the dogmatists, who, in order to avoid the regressus in infinitum, set out in their 
 proofs from some pre-supposition, whose truth they illegitimately assumed ; the fifth 
 pointed out the usual circle in demonstration, where that on which the proof rests must 
 itself be established by that which is to be proved. According to Sext. Empir., Hyp. 
 Pyrrh., I. 178 seq., still later Skeptics maintained the two following tropes: 1) Nothing 
 is certain of itself, as is proved by the discrepancy of opinions concerning all that is per- 
 ceptible or thinkable ; and, therefore, 2) nothing can be made certain by proof, since the 
 latter derives no certainty from itself, and, if based on other proof, leads us either to a 
 regressus in infinitum, or to a circle in demonstration. 
 
 To disprove the possibility of demonstration, Sextus advanced a series of arguments, of 
 which the most noticeable was this {Hyp. Pyrrh., II. 134 seq.), that every syllogism moves 
 in a circle, since the major premise, on which the proof of the conclusion depends, depends 
 for its own certainty on a complete induction, in which the conclusion must have been 
 already contained. (Cf. Hegel, Log., II. p. 151 seq. ; EncycL, § 190 seq., and the remarks 
 in my System of Logic, under § 101.) 
 
 Of special interest and importance are the skeptical arguments against the validity of 
 the notion of causality, reported, apparently after ^nesidemus, in Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., 
 IX. 207 seq. A cause is a relativum, for it is not to be conceived without that which it 
 causes ; but the relative has no existence {ovx vTrapxec) except in thought {iTzivoElrai ftovov). 
 Further, in each case cause and effect must be either synchronous, or the former must pre- 
 cede or follow the latter. They can not be synchronous, for then cause and effect would 
 as such be indistinguishable, and each could with equal reason be claimed as the cause 
 of the other. Nor can the cause precede its effect, since a cause is no cause until that 
 exists of which it is the cause. Lastly, the supposition that the cause follows its effect 
 is without sense, and may be abandoned to those fools who habitually invert the natural
 
 ECLECTICISM, CICERO. THE SEXTIAN8. 217 
 
 order of things. Other arguments ajrainst causality are also adduced by Sextus; the 
 characteristic fact in connection with them is tliat that argument is not included among 
 them, which in modern times (since Hume) has had most weight, namely, that the origin 
 of the notion of causality can not be so accounted for, as to justify our relying upon it as 
 a form of cognition. (Cf Zeller, Ph. d. Gr., 1st ed.. III. p. 474; 2d ed., III. b, p. 38 seq.) 
 
 Theology, also, and especially the Stoic doctrine of providence, were among the objects 
 of Skeptical attack in the later period of Skepticism. The arguments employed in this 
 connection were derived especially from Carneades (Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., IX. 137 seq.: 
 Hyp. Pyrrh.. III. 2 seq.), and were drawn principallj' from the evil in the world, which God 
 either could not or would not prevent, both of which suppositions were incompatible with 
 the idea of God. Yet the Skeptics explained that their intention was not to destroy the 
 behef in the existence of gods, but simply to combat the arguments and the pretended 
 knowledge of the dogmatic philosophers. 
 
 § 61. A tendency, more or less decided, toward Eclecticism, is 
 manifest in all the dogmatic philosophy of the later portion of an- 
 tiquity, and especially in the period of the propagation of Greek 
 philosophy in the Roman world. The most important and influen- 
 tial representative of this tendency is Cicero, who, in what pertains 
 to the theory of cognition, confessed his adhesion to the skepticism of 
 the Middle Academy, took no interest in physics, and in ethics 
 wavered between the Stoic and the Peripatetic doctrines. 
 
 The school of the Sextians, who flourished for a short time at 
 Kome, about the beginning of the Christian era, seems to have occu- 
 pied a position intermediate between Pythagoreanism, Cynicism, and 
 Stoicism. 
 
 Edward Zeller (in No. 24 of the Hrst series of the Sammlung gemeinvemtdndlicher tcisx. Vorlrci-ge, ed. 
 by Rud. Virchow and Fr. v. Iloltzendorf, Berlin. 1S66) treats of religion and philosophy among the Romant. 
 
 Among the earlier treatises on the philosophy of Cicero may be mentioned those of Jason de Nores 
 {Cic. rhilns. de Vita et Marihm, Padua, 1597), Ant. Bucher (Ethica Ciceroniana, Hamb. 1610), J. C. Wal- 
 din (De philosophia Ciceronis Ptatonica, Jena, 1758), Chr. Meiners (Orat. de phitos. Ciceronis, ejuAqu4 
 in universnm philos. mentis, in his Vei-m. philos. Schr., Vol. I., 177.5, p. 274 seq.), 11. C. K. HOlsemnnn 
 (De indole philosophical Ciceronis, Liincb. 1799), Gedike's Collation of those passages in Cicero which 
 relate to the history of philosophy (Berlin, 1782, 1801,1814)— which is more valuable as an expose of Cicero's 
 philosophical conceptions, than as a contribution to the history of philosophy — and the annotations and dis- 
 cussions appended by Christian Garve to his translation of the De Officiis (Breslau, 1783. 6th ed., ib. 1819), 
 as also Krische's Forschungen (Gott. 1S40, see above, p. 23) and Ritter's minute exposition of the phi- 
 losophy of Cicero in his Gesch. der Philos., IV. pp. 106-176 [Morrison's English translation of R.'s Hist, of 
 Philos., London, 1846, Vol. IV.. pp. 99-160. — T;-.] More recent works worthy of mention are those of J. F. 
 Herbart ( f/efier die Philos. des Oic., Werke, Vol. XII., pp. 167-182), Karl Saloin. Zachariae (Staatsirissen- 
 aeh'iftliche Betrachtungen uber Cicero's wiedergefimdenes Werk rom Staate, Heiilelb. 1823), Lotheisen 
 (Cicero's Gruiulsdtze und Beurtheilung des Sohonen, Brieg, 1825), Rapli. Kuhner (M. Tiilii Ciceronis in 
 philosophiam ejvsque partes merita, Hamburg, 1825), J. A. C. van lleusdo (J/. TuUius Cicero ()>L\on\a.Tu}v, 
 Traj. ad Rhen. 18.36). Riumhauer (De Aristotelia vi in Cic scriptis, Utrecht, 1841), C. F. Hermann (De 
 interpretntione Timaei dialogi a Cic. relicta, Progr., Gott. 1342). J. Klein (De foniihus Topicorwn Cice- 
 ronis, Bonn, 1844), Legeay (31. TulUus Cicero philosophiae historicus, Leyden, 1846), C. Crome (QuiA 
 Graecis Cicero in philosophia, quid sibi debuerit. G.-Pr., Dusseldorf, 1855), Havestadt (De Cic. primis 
 principiis philosophiae moralis, G.-Pr., Emmerich. 1S.'>7), A. Desjanlins (De scientia civili apud Cic^ 
 Beauvais, 18.57). Burmeister (Cic. als Neu-Akademiker, G.-Pr., 01d«nbure. 1860). Hoflg (Cicero's Anticht 
 von der St-cuitsreUgion, G.-Pr., Krotoschin, 1868), C. M. Bernhardt (/)« Cicerone Qraecae philosophia
 
 218 ECLECTICISM. — CICEEO. — THE SEXTIAN8, 
 
 interprete, '■'■ Progr." of the Fr.-Wilh.-Gymn., Berlin, 1865), F. Hasler (Ueber das VerfuiUniss der heid- 
 nischen unci christlichen Ethik auf Gi'wiid einer Vergleichimtj des Oiceronianischen Bu-c/ies />e Officii* 
 mil dem gleichnwinigen des heiligen Ambrosiii^, Munich, 1866), G. Barzelotti {DeUe doUrine JilosoJicAe 
 ne> Libri di Oicerone, Florence, 1867), J. "Walter {De An. Immoi't. quae praec. Cic. trad., Prague, 1867), 
 G. Zietschmann (De Tusc. qu. fontibus. Diss., Ilalle, 1868). The inaugural dissertation of Hugo Jentsch 
 (Aristotelis ex arte rhetorica quaeritur quid haheat Oicero, Berlin, 1866) contains noteworthy contribu' 
 tions to the solution of the question, to what extent Cicero had read and understood Aristotle. 
 
 On the philosopher Sextius, see De Burigny (Memoires de tAcad. des Inscript., XXXI.), Lasteyri' 
 (Sentences de Sextius, Paris, 1842), and Meinrad Ott (Character und Ursprung der Spriicfie des Philoso- 
 phen Sextius, G.-Pr., llottweil, 1861, and Die syrischen '^ auserlesenen Spriiche des IJerm Xistusi, 
 BiscJiofs von Rom." nlcht eine Xistusschrift, sondem eine Uberarbeitete Sextiusschrift, O.-Pr., Bottweil 
 and Tiibingen, 1862 and 1863). 
 
 "When criticism had demonstrated the presence of untenable elements in all the great 
 systems, the ineradicable need of philosophical convictions could not but lead either to 
 the construction of new systems or to Eclecticism. In the latter it would necessarily 
 end, if the philosophizing subject retained a naive confidence in his own " Unbefangenheit," 
 i. e., in the directness of his natural perceptions of truth or in his sagacious tact in the ap- 
 preciation of philosophical doctrines, while yet lacking the creative power requisite to the 
 founding of a system. In particular, Eclecticism would naturally find acceptance with 
 those who sought in philosophy not knowledge as such, but rather a general theoretical 
 preparation for practical life and the basis of rational convictions in religion and morals, 
 and for whom, therefore, rigid unity and systematic connection in philosophical thought 
 were not unconditionally necessary. Hence the philosophy of the Romans was almost 
 universally eclectic, even in the case of those who professed their adhesion to some one of 
 the Hellenic systems. The special representative of Eclecticism is Cicero. 
 
 M. TuUius Cicero (Jan. .Sd, 106 — Dec. 7th, 43 B. c.) pursued his philosophical studies 
 especially at Athens and Rhodes. In his youth, he heard, first, Phaadrus the Epicurean 
 and Philo the Academic, and was also instructed by Diodotus the Stoic (who was after- 
 ward, with Tyrannio, an inmate of his house, Tiisc, V. 39, EjiisL, passim). He after- 
 ward heard Antiochus of Askalon, the Academic, Zeno the Epicurean, and lastly (at 
 Rhode.s), Posidonius the Stoic. In his latter years Cicero turned his attention again to 
 philosophy, especially during the last three years of his life. Tusc, V. 2 : Philosophiae 
 in sinum quum a primis iemporibtis aetatis nostra voluntas studiumque nos compuiisset, his 
 gravissimis casihus in eundem portum, ex quo eramus egrtssi magna jactati tempestate con- 
 fugimus. 
 
 Cicero gives a list of his philosophical writings in De Div., II. 1. In his work entitled 
 Ebrtensius, he had, as he here says, urged the study of philosophy ; in the Academics lie 
 had indicated what he considered the most modest, consequent, and elegant mode of phi- 
 losophizing (namely, that pursued by the Middle Academy) ; in the five books De Finihus 
 Bonorum et Malorum he had treated of the foundation of ethics, the doctrine of the highest 
 good, and of evil, after which he had written the five books of Tusculan Disputations, in 
 which he had shown what things were necessary to the greatest happiness in life ; then 
 had followed the three books De Natura Deorum, to which were to he joined the then 
 unfinished work De Divinatione and the projected work De Faio. Among his philosophical 
 works were also to be reckoned the six books De Republica (previously composed) and the 
 works entitled Consolatio and De Senectute; to these might be added his rhetorical writings: 
 the three books De Oratore, and Brutus (De Claris Oratoribus), constituting a fourth, and 
 the Orator, constituting a fifth book on the same general topic. 
 
 Cicero composed the work De Rep. (in six books) in the j-ears 54-52 B. c. About the 
 third part of it has come down to us, most of which was first published by A. Mai, from
 
 ECLECTICISM. CICEKO. — THE 8EXTIANS. 219 
 
 the Palimpsest in the Vatican (Rome, Ist ed., 1822); a part of Book VI., the dream of 
 Scipio, is preserved in Macrobius. Complementary to this work was the De Legihus, 
 begun in 52 b. c, but never finished, and now extant only in a fragmentary form. Pos- 
 sibly a.s early as the beginning of the year 46 B. c, but perhaps later, Cicero wrote th« 
 small work called Paradoxa, which is not mentioned by him in De Div., II. 1. The Con- 
 solatio and Hortensius were composed in 45 b. c, of both of which only a few fragments 
 remain to us ; in the same year the Academics (now incomplete) and the Be Finibiis (which 
 we possess entire) were written, and the Tuscnlan. Disp. and the De Nat. Deor. were begun ; 
 the two last-named works were not completed till the following year. The date of the 
 Coio Major sive De Senedute falls in the beginning of 44 a. c. ; that of the De Divinatmie 
 (above-cited, intended as a complement to the work on the Nature of the Gods) falls in the 
 same year, as also do the De Fafo (which has not come down to us entire), the lost work 
 De Gloria, and the extant works : Laelius s. De Amicitia and De Offidis ; the treatise De 
 Virtutibus (not extant) was probably composed immediately after the De Offidis. Among 
 the youthful works of Cicero were the translations (now lost) of Xenophou's CEconomicus 
 and Plato's Protagoras (which latter was still existing in the times of Priscianus and Dona- 
 tus) ; but his translation of Plato's Timaezis, of which a considerable fragment is preserved, 
 was written, after the Academica, in 45 (or 44) b. c. Of the rhetorical works, which are 
 classed by Cicero himself with liis philosophical works, the De Oratore was written in the 
 year 55, and Brutus and the Orator in 46 B. c. 
 
 That Cicero in his philosophical writings depended on Grecian sources appears from 
 his own confession, since he says of the former (Ad Atticum, XII. 52) : aTz6ypa(j>a sunt, 
 minore labore fiunt, verba tantuTn affero, quibus abundo (yet cf. De Fin., I. 2. 6; 3. 7 ; De Off., 
 I. 2. 6, where Cicero alleges his relative independence). It is still possible to point out the 
 foreign sources of most of his writings (generally by the aid of passages in these writings 
 themselves or in Cicero's ICpistles). The works De Pep. and De Legibus are in form imita- 
 tions of the works of Plato bearing the same names ; their contents are founded partly on 
 Cicero's own political experiences and partly on Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic doctrines, 
 and, to a not inconsiderable extent, on the writings of Polybius. The Paradoxa discuss cer- 
 tain well-known Stoic principles. The Consolatio is founded on Crantor's work irefil -rrh-dov^, 
 the (lost) Hortensius, probably on the UporpeivTiKur, which Aristotle had addressed to Themi- 
 son, king in one of the cities of Cyprus (see Bernays, Die Dialoge des Arist, p. 116 seq.), or, it 
 may he, on the P)ohepticus of Pliilo of Larissa, the Academic (see Krischo, Ueber Cicero's Aca- 
 demica, Gott. Studien, II., 1845, p. 191); the De FifiiTms (the best of the extant philosophical 
 writings of Cicero), on the works of Phaidrus, Chrysippus, Carneades, Antiochus, as also 
 on the results of the studies pursued by Cicero in his youth, when he listened to lectures 
 and engaged in philosophical discussions; tlie Academica, on the writings and in part also 
 on the discourses of the more distinguished of the Academics ; the Tvsc. Disp., on the works 
 of Plato and Grantor, and on Stoic and Peripatetic writings ; the first book of the De Nahira 
 Deorum, on an Epicurean work, which has been discovered in the Ilerculanoan Rolls, and 
 was at first considered to be a treatise of Phasdrus irspl deuv. but has now been recognized 
 as the work of Philodemus TTenlevaejieiaq; Cicero's critique of the Epicurean stand-point is 
 founded on a work by Posidonius the Stoic; the second book of the De Nat. Deor. is founded 
 particularly on tlie works of Cloantlies and Clirysippus ; the third, on those of Carneades 
 and Clitomachus, the Academics ; the first of the two books De Divinatione is based on 
 Chrysippus' work Trepl xPVCf^'^v, on the Trepl fiavrtKf/g of Posidonius, and on works com- 
 posed by Diogenes and Antipater ; the second book, on the works of Carneades and of 
 Panjetius the Stoic ; the treatise De Fato, on writings of Chrysippus, Posidonius, Cleanthes, 
 and Carneades; and the Cato Major, on writings of Plato. Xenophon, Hippocrates, and
 
 220 ECLECTICISM. — CICEKO, — THE SEXTIANS. 
 
 Aristo of Chius. The Laelius of Cicero reposes especially upon the work of Theophrflstiis 
 on Friendship, and also on the Ethics of Aristotle and the writings of Chrysippus; the two 
 first books of the Le Ojfficiis were drawn principally from Panaitius ; the third, from Posi- 
 donius ; but besides the writings of these men, those of Plato and Aristotle, and also those 
 of the Stoics, Diogenes of Babylon, Antipater of Tyre, and Hecato, were employed in the 
 composition of the De Officiis. 
 
 From Skepticism, which Cicero was unable scientifically to refute, and to which he was 
 ever being invited by the conflict of philosophical authorities, he was disposed to take 
 refuge in the immediate certainty of the moral consciousness, the consensus gentium and the 
 doctrine of innate ideas {notiones innaiue, natura nobis insitue). Characteristic are such decla- 
 rations as tiie following from the De Legibus, I. 13 : Perturbatricera autem harum omnium 
 rerum Academiam hanc ab Arcesila et Carnende receniem ezoremus ut sileat, nam si invaserit 
 in haec, quae satis scite nobis instruda et composita videntur, nimias edet ruinas; quam quidc/n 
 ego placare cupio, submovere non audeo. In physics Cicero does not advance beyond the 
 stadium of doubt; still he regards the field of physical investigation as furnishing agreeable 
 "pastime " for the mind, and one not to be despised {Acad..^ II. 41). That which most inter- 
 ests him in natural science is its relation to tlie question of God's existence. The following 
 noticeable passage is directed against atheistic atomism {De Nat. Deor., II. 37) : Hoc (viz., 
 the formation of the world by an accidental combination of atoms) qui existimat fieri potuisse, 
 non intelUgo cur non idem putet, si innumerabiles unius et viginti forvnae Htterarum vel aureae 
 vel quales libet aliquo cotijiciantur, posse ex his in ierrani excussis annates Ennii, ut deinceps 
 legi possint, effici. Cicero would have mythology purged of every thing unworthy of the 
 gods (the story of the abduction of Ganymede, for example, Tusc, I. 26; IV. 33), but 
 would, as far as possible, hold fast to that in which the beliefs of different peoples agree 
 (7'msc., I. 13); he is particularly attached to the belief in providence and immortality {Tusc, 
 I. 1. 2 seq. ; 49 et ul.\ but is not altogether free from uncertainty on these subjects, and 
 with dispassionate impartiality allows the Academic philosopher, in his De Natura Deorum, 
 to develop the grounds of doubt with the same minuteness and thoroughness with which 
 the Stoic develops his arguments for dogmatism. Cicero defines the morally good (honestum) 
 as that which is intrinsically praiseworthy {De Fin., II. 14 ; De Off., I. 4), in accordance 
 with the etymology of the word, which to him, the Roman, represents the Greek naTiov. 
 The most important problem in ethics with him is the question whether virtue is alone 
 sufficient to secure happiness. He is inclined to answer this question, with the Stoics, 
 in the affirmative, though the recollection of his own weakness and of the general frailty 
 of mankind often fills him with doubts ; but then he reproaches himself for judging of 
 the power of virtue, not by its nature, but by our effeminacy {Tusc, T. 1). Cicero is not 
 altogether disinclined {De Fin., V. 26 seq.) to the distinction made by Antiochus of Aska- 
 lon between the vita beata, which is made sure under all circumstances by virtue, and the 
 vita beatissima, to which external goods are necessary, although he entertains ethical and 
 logical scruples respecting it, and elsewhere (Tusc, V. 13) rejects it; but he contents him- 
 self with the thought that all which is not virtue, whether it deserves the name of a good 
 or not, is at all events vastly inferior to virtue in worth, and is of vanishing consequence in 
 comparison with it {De Fin., V. 32 ; De Off'., III. 3). From this point of view the difference 
 between the Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines sinks, in his view, to a mere difference of words, 
 which Carneades (according to Cic, De Fin., III. 12) had already declared it to be. Cicero 
 is more decided in opposing the Peripatetic doctrine, that virtue requires the reduction of 
 the Tradr/ (translated by Cicero perturbationes) to their right proportions ; he demands, with 
 the Stoics, that the sage should be without -rtadri. But he makes his demonstration easier, 
 by including in the concept -Kddor {peHurbatio) the mark of faultiness {Tusc, Y. 6 : aversa a
 
 ECLECTICISM. — CICERO. — THE SEXTIAN8. 221 
 
 mcta ratione animi commotio), so that, in fact, he only proves what is self-evident, viz. : that 
 that which is faulty is not to be suffered; but he misses the real point in dispute {Tusc, 
 IV. 17 seq.). In another particular, also, he stands on the side of the Stoics, namely, in 
 regarding practical virtue as the highest virtue. Cf. De Off., I. 44 : omne offieium, quod 
 ad conjunctionem hominum et ad societatem tuendam valet, anieponendum e.st illi officio, 
 quod cognitione et saentia continetur. lb., 45 : agere considerate pluris est, quam cogitara 
 prudentur. 
 
 Cicero's political ideal is a government made up of monarchical, aristocratic, and demo- 
 cratic elements. He finds it realized approximately in the Roman state {De Rep., I. 29 ; 
 II. 23 seq.). Cicero approves of auguries and the like, as an accommodation to popular 
 beUef, as also of deceiving the people by allowing them only the ajjpearance of political 
 liberty, since he regards the mass of men as radically unreasonable and unfit for freedom 
 {De Nat. Dear., III. 2 ; De Divinat, II. 12, 33, 72 ; De Leg., II. 7 ; III. 12 et al). 
 
 Cicero is most attractive in those parts of his works, in which in an elevated rhetorical 
 style, and without touching upon subtle matters of dispute, he sets forth the truths and sen- 
 timents which are universally affirmed by the moral consciousness of man. His praise of 
 disinterested virtue, for example {De Fin., II. 4 ; Y. 22), is very successful ; so, in particular, 
 is the manner in which the idea of the moral community of mankind (on which idea, taken 
 by Cicero from the spurious letter of Archytas, Plato founds in the Rep. his demand that 
 philosophers should enter practically into the affairs of the state) : non nobis solum nati 
 sumus ortusque nostri partem patria vindicat, partevi amid, etc. {De Off., I. 7 ; cf. De 
 Fin., II. 14), and the Aristotelian doctrine of man as a " political animal " {De Fin., V. 
 23) are presented. And, again, in his Tusculan Disp^s, the weakness of Cicero's argumen- 
 tation and the dullness of his dialectic, especially as compared with the Platonic dialectic 
 which he makes his model, are not more marked than the rhetorical perfection of the pas- 
 sages in which he discourses of the dignity of the human mind {Tusc, I. 24 seq.; cf De 
 Leg., I. 7 seq.). So, too, his enthusiastic panegyric of philosophy {Tusc, V. 2 : vitae phi- 
 losophia dux! virtutis indagat)-ix expulfnxque vitiorum, etc. ; cf. De Leg., I. 22 seq. ; Acad., 
 I. 2 ; Tusc, I. 26 ; II. 1 and 4 ; De Off., II. 2) contains much that is felicitous in thought and 
 expression (e. g., est autem unus dies bene et ex praeceptis tuis actus peccanti immortalitati ante- 
 ponendus, etc.) ; and although it is somewhat defaced by rhetorical exaggeration, it was 
 inspired by a conviction which was deeply rooted in Cicero's mind at the time when he 
 wrote the works just cited. 
 
 Seneca {Nat. Quaest., VII. 32) says of the school of the Sextians, that after having com- 
 menced its existence with great eclat, it soon disappeared. Q. Sextius (born about 70 B. c.) 
 was the founder of tlie school, and Sextius, his son, Sotion of Alexandria (whose instruc- 
 tions Seneca enjoyed about 18-20 .\. D.). Cornelius Celsus, L. Crassitius of Tarentum, and 
 Papirius Fabianus, are named as his disciples. Q. Sextius and Sotion wrote in Greek. 
 Sotion inspired his pupil, Seneca, with admiration for Pythagoras (Sen., Ej}., 108); absti- 
 nence from animal food, daily self-examination, and a leaning toward the doctrine of the 
 transmigration of souls, are among the Pythagorean elements in the philosophy of the 
 Sextians. Their teaching seems to have consisted principally of exhortations to moral 
 excellence, to energy of soul, and to independence with reference to external things. The 
 sage, says Sextiu.s, goes through life armed by his virtues against all the contingencies of 
 fortune, wary and ready for battle, like a well-ordered army when the foe is near (Sen.. 
 Ep., 59). Virtue and the happiness which flows from it are not ideals without reality (as 
 they had come to be regarded by the later Stoics), but goods attainable by men (f^on., Ep., 
 64). (The collection of aphorisms, which lias come down to us in the Latin translation of 
 Rufinus, is the work of a Christian, who wrote not long before a. d. 200. It is first cited
 
 222 PRINCIPAL DIVISIONS OF THE THIRD PERIOD. , 
 
 by Orig., c. Celsum, VIII. 30, under the title : Scfrov yviJ/uai. A Syriac version of it exists 
 aod is published in the Analeda Syriaca of P. de Lagarde, Leipsic, 1858. It appears to be 
 founded on a few of the authentic sayings of Q. Sextius.) 
 
 Third (Prevailingly Theological) Period of Greek 
 
 Philosophy. 
 
 THE NEO-PLATONISTS AND THEIR PREDECESSORS IN 
 THEOSOPHICAL SPECULATION. 
 
 § 62. To the Third Period of Greek philosophy, or the period of 
 the predominance of theosophj, belong : 1) the Jewish-Greek phi- 
 losophers, 2) the Neo-Pythagoreans and the Pythagorizing Platon- 
 ists, 3) the Neo-Platonists. The Jewish-Greek philosophers sought 
 to blend Judaism with Hellenism. The philosophy of the Neo- 
 Pythagoreans, Pythagorizing Platonists, and Neo-Platonists was 
 theosophic. To this the previous development of Greek ])hilosophy 
 itself was alone sufficient to conduct them, when physical and mental 
 investigation had ended in Skepticism and Eclecticism. This state 
 of Greek philosophy (especially, in view of the close contact in this 
 period of the West with the East) could not but induce a greater 
 susceptibility to Oriental influences than had hitherto existed, and 
 such influences did operate, in no insignificant measure, to determine 
 the form and substance of the speculation of the period. 
 
 On the Greek philosophers of this period, cf. the first section of E. W. Moller's Geschichte der Kosmo- 
 logie in der griechischen Eirche bis auf Origene^, Halle, 1S60 (pp. 5-111). 
 
 The influence of the Orient was an important co-operating factor in determining the 
 character of the philosophy of this period (see Ritter, Ilibtory of Philosoj^hy, IV. p. 330 
 seq.) ; but there were also internal causes — to which Zeller rightly directs attention (Ph. d. 
 Gr., 2d ed., Vol. III. b, pp. 56 seq., 368 seq.) — which produced a leaning toward a mythical 
 theology. "The feeling of alienation from God and the yearning after a higher revelation 
 are universal characteristics of the last centuries of the ancient world ; this yearning was, 
 in the first place, but an expression of the consciousness of the decline of the classical 
 nations and of their culture, the presentiment of the approach of a new era, and it called 
 into life not only Christianity, but also, before it, pagan and Jewish Alexandrianism, and 
 other related developments." But this same feeling of exhaustion and this yearning after 
 extraneous aid, accompanied, as they were, by a diminished power of original thought, led, 
 in religion, to the adoption of Oriental forms of worship and Oriental dogmas, and, above 
 all, in speculation, to sympathy with the Oriental tendency to conceive God as the tran- 
 scendent rather than as the immanent cause ef the world, and to regard self-abnegation as
 
 THE JEWISH- ALEXANDRIAN PHILOSOPHY. 2'23 
 
 the essential form of morality, while, under the same influence, special emphasis was 
 placed on tlie kindred elements in Greek, and especially in the Platonic philosophy. Neo- 
 Platonism is a philosophy of syncretism. Its elements are partly Oriental (Alexandrian- 
 Jewish, in particular) and partly Hellenic ; its form is Hellenic. The religious philosophy 
 of the Alexandrian Jews and the Gnosis of early Christianity are products of the same ele- 
 ments, but under an Oriental form. Robert Zimmermann rightly remarks {Gesch. der 
 Aesthetik, Vienna, 1858, p. 123), that Plato's attempt to translate Oriental mysticism into 
 scientific speculation, ends in Neo-Platonism with a re-translation of thought into images. 
 
 The traits common to the speculations of the Jewish-Greek philosophers and the Neo- 
 Pythagoreans, the later Platonists and Neo-Platonists, are aptly enumerated by Zeller 
 (Philos. der Griechen, 1st ed., III. p. 566 seq., 2d ed., III. b., p. 214) as follows: "The dualistic 
 opposition of the divine and the earthly ; an abstract conception of God, excluding all knowl- 
 edge of the divine nature ; contempt for the world of the senses, on the ground of the Pla- 
 tonic doctrines of matter and of the descent of the soul from a superior world into the body; 
 the theory of intermediate potencies or beings, through whom God acts upon the world of 
 phenomena; the requirement of an ascetic self-emancipation from the bondage of sense, and 
 faith m a higher revelation to man, when in a state called Enthtisiasm." From Plato's own 
 doctrine these later forms of Greek philosophy, notwithstanding all their intended agreement 
 with and actual dependence on it, are yet very essentially distinguished by the principle of 
 revelation contained in them. To the Nec-Platonists the writings of Plato, the " God- 
 enlightened " (Proel., Tlieol. Plat, I. 1), became a kind of revealed record. The most 
 obscure and abstruse of them (e. g., the Pseudo-Platonic Parmenides, with its dry schema- 
 tism and its sophistical play with the conceptions of One and Being) were to many of these 
 philosophers the most welcome, and were regarded b}'' them as the most sublime docu- 
 ments of Platonic theology, because they offered the freest room for the play of their 
 unbridled imaginings concerning God and divine things. 
 
 Granting that theosophical speculation, in comparison with the investigation of nature 
 and man, may appear as the higher and more important work, still Neo-Platonism remains 
 decidedly inferior to its precursors in the earlier Greek philosophy, since it did not solve 
 its problem with the same measure of scientific perfection with which they solved theirs. 
 
 § 63. There is as yet no distinct evidence of a combination of 
 Jewish theology with Greek philosophemes in the Septnagint, or in the 
 doctrines of the Essenes. Such a combination existed, possibly, in the 
 doctrine of the Tfurapeutes, who held certain doctrines and usages in 
 common with the Pythagoreans, and certainly in the teachings of Aris- 
 tobulus (about IflO b. c), who appealed to (spurious) Orphic poems, 
 into which Jewish doctrines had been incorporated, in support of the 
 assertion (in which he agrees with Pseudo-Aristeas), that the Greek 
 poets and philosopliei'S borrowed their wisdom from a very ancient 
 translation of the Pentateuch. The biblical writings, says Aristo- 
 bulus (who interprets them allegorically), were inspired by the Spirit 
 of God. God is invisible; he sits enthroned in the heavens, and is 
 not in contact with the earth, but only acts upon it by his power. 
 He formed the world out of material previously existing. In de-
 
 224 THE JEWISH-ALEXANDEIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 fending tlie observance of the Sabbath, Aristobulus employs a Pytha- 
 gorizing numerical symbolism. The personification of the wisdom 
 of God as an intermediate essence between God and the world, and 
 pre-existing before the heavens and the earth, seems to have begun 
 already with him. In the Book of Wisdom (of Pseudo-Solomon) 
 wisdom is distinguished from the divine essence itself, as the power 
 of God which works in the world. But Philo (born about 25 b. c.) 
 was the first who set up a complete system of theosopl)y. With him 
 the expounding of the books of the Old Testament is synonymous 
 with the philosophy of his nation ; but in his own exposition he alle- 
 gorically introduces into those documents philosophical ideas, partly 
 derived from the natural, internal development of Jewish notions, 
 and partly appropriated from Hellenic philosophy. He teaches that 
 God is incorporeal, invisible, and cognizable only through the reason ; 
 that he is the most universal of beings, the being to whom alone being, 
 as such, truly pertains ; that he is more excellent than virtue, than 
 science, or even than the good j9<?r se and the beautiful jper se. He is 
 one and simple, imperishable and eternal ; his existence is absolute 
 and separate from the world ; the world is his work. God alone is 
 free ; every thing finite is involved in necessity. God is not in con- 
 tact with matter ; if he were he would be defiled. He who holds the 
 world itself to be God the Lord has fallen into error and sacrilege. 
 In his essence, God is incomprehensible; we can only know that he 
 is, not what he is. All names which are intended to express the 
 separate attributes of God are appropriate only in a figurative sense, 
 since God is in truth unqualified and pure being. God is present 
 in the world only by his operations, not by his essence. The Logos, 
 a being intermediate between God and the world, dwells with God 
 as his wisdom (aocpia) and as the place of the Ideas. The Logos is dif- 
 fused through the world of the senses as divine reason revealing itself 
 in the world. This one divine rational potency is divided into numer- 
 ous subsidiary or partial potencies [Swd^ei^, XoyoC)^ which are minister- 
 / ing spirits and instruments of the divine will, immortal souls, demons, 
 \^ or angels ; they are identical with the general and specific essences, 
 
 \ the ideas ; but the Logos, whose parts they are, is the idea of ideas, 
 \ the most universal of all things except God. The Logos does not exist 
 
 ^> from eternity, like God, and yet its genesis is not like our own and 
 V that of all other created beings; it is the first-begotten son of God, 
 
 V and is for us, who are imperfect, a God ; the wisdom of God is its 
 
 v"
 
 THE JEWISn-ALEXANDRIAN PHILOSOPHY. 225 
 
 mother ; it is the older and the world is the younger son of God. 
 Through the agency of the Logos, God created the Tvorld and has 
 revealed himself to it. The Logos is also the representative of the 
 world before God, acting as its high-priest, intercessor, and Para- y^"*. 
 clete. The Jews are the nation to whom God revealed himself; from 
 them the Greeks borrowed their wisdom. Knowledge and virtue are 
 gifts of God, to be obtained only by self-abnegation on the part of ^ 
 man. A life of contemplation is superior to one of practical, political -^ 
 occupation. Ihe various minor sciences serve as a preparatory train- r 
 ing for the knowledge of God. Of the philosophical disciplines, ' 
 logic and physics are of little worth. The highest step in phi- 
 losophy is the intuition of God, to which the sage attains through 
 divine illumination, when, completely renouncing himself and leaving 
 behind his finite self-consciousness, he resigns himself unresistmgly to 
 the divine influence. 
 
 On Judaism under the influence of Greek civilization, cf. the sections relating to this subject in Isaak 
 Marcus Jost's Ge^ch. dex JvdentAums (Vol. I., Leips. 1S57, pp. 99-lOS; 844-361, etc.), and in the comprehen- 
 sive work of II. Gratz, Genchichie der Juden (Vol. III., Lcips. 1S56, pp. 29S-342), as also in the works of 
 Ewald (see above, p. IC) and others, and 11. Schultz, Die jildUche Religionxphilonophie his zur Zersiorung 
 Jerusalems (in Gelzer's Prot. Monatsbl., Vol. 24, No. 4, Oct., 1864), and Wilhcl. Clemens, Die Tlterapeuten 
 (Progr. of the Gyran. ^riderioanicm), Konigaborg, 1S69. 
 
 Of Aristobulus and Aristeas tre.it Gerh. Jo. Voss (De hist. Graec, Frankfort-on-the-Main, 167T, I. ch. 10, 
 p. 55 seq.), Is. Voss (De LAW. Interpret., The Hague, 1661 ; Obnerv. ad Pomp. Mel, London, 1686), Fabric 
 (Bibl. Gr., III., p. 469), Rich. Simon {Hi-fi. erit. d. V. T., Paris, 1678, II. 2. p. 189 ; III. 23, p. 479), Humfred 
 Hody (Contra Itistoriam Aristeae de, LXX. inteipretibus, etc., O.^ford, 1685. and De bibliorum text, oriy., 
 rersionibua, etc.. ibid. 1705), Nic. de Nourry (Paris, 1703), Ant. van Dale (Amsterdam, 1705), Lndov. Casp. 
 V.'ilckenaer, De Aristobuio Judaeo philosopho Peripateiico Alexandrino,ed.Jo. Luzac, Leyden, 1S06; cf. 
 Lobeck, Aglaophamus, I. p. 447; Matter, ^.«.«fri hititor. »ur Tecole d'' Alexandrie,VsxT\%,\?>1(i, \o\. II. p. 121 seq. ; 
 cf , also, the works of Gfrorer (II. 71 seq.) and Diihne (II. 73 seq.) cited below ; Georgii, in Illgcn's Zeitsclirift 
 f. hist. Theol., 1839, No. 8, p. 86, and Eob. Binde, Ari-atobulische Studien (Gymn. Progr.), Glogau, 1869. 
 
 On Pseud o-Phocylide9 (a poem of Jewish origin, devoted to moral philosophy), cf. Jak. Dernays, Leber 
 dan Phokylideiscfie Gedicht, ein Beitrag znr hellenisiischen Litt, Berlin, 1856; Otto Gornm, De Psettdo- 
 Phocylide, in the Philol, XIV., 1859, pp. 91-112; Leopold Schmidt, in Jahn's Jahrb., Vol. 75, 1857, p. 510 
 seq. where Schmid seeks to point out separately the Hellenistic or Jewish-Alcx-indrian and the purely 
 Jewish elements in the principal passage of the poem, and excludes all but the last-named as interpolated. 
 
 Philo's works have been edited by Thom. Mangey (London, 1742), A. P. Pfeiffer (ErI.angen, 1785-92, 
 2d ed , 1820), and C. E. Kichter (Leips. 1828-30), among others; a stereotyped edition w.is published at 
 Leipsic In 1811-53; Philo's book on the creation of the world lias been published, pf'ecededby a careful intro- 
 duction by J. G. Muller (Herlin, 1841); Philonea,ed. C Tischcndorf, Leipsic, 1S6S. On Philo's doctrine, cf., 
 especially. August GfrOrer, PhUo iind die alexnndritn^he Theonophie, Stuttgart, 1831 (also under the 
 title: Kritische Gesc/iicJde deH C}iristenthums,'Vo\. I.); Aug. Ferd. Pahne, Geschichtlich^ Darfielluvg 
 der jiid inch- alexandrinisdien ReUgionsphiloHophie. Halle, 1884. See also Christian Ludw. Georgii, Ueber 
 die iieuesten Ge^ensatze in Anffitmuiig der Alexundi'iniiidten lieligiorixphilosophie, inabeitondef-e da^ 
 j'dd. AJexandrini.wius, in Illgcn's Zeitnchrift f. hi.st. Tlieol., 1889. No. 3. pp. 3-98, anil No. 4, pp. 3-98. Gross- 
 man has written a number of works on Philo (Leips. 1829, 1830 seq.); other writers on the same subject 
 are 11. Planck (De interpr. Phil, cdleg., GOtt. 1807), W. Scheffer (Qttaest. PhUon., Marburg, 1829, 1831), Fr. 
 Creuzer (in Ullman and Umbreit's Theol. Sttid. v. Krit, Jahrgang V.. Vol. I., 1832, pp. 8-43, and in Creu- 
 zer's work, Zur Gesch. der griech, u. rom. Litt., Darmst. and Leips. 1847, pp. 407-44C), F. Kefcrstein (Ph.''a 
 Lehre von dem gottl. Slittelwesen, Leips. 1846), J. Bncher (PhiloniDch^ Studien, Tub. 1S4S), M. Wolff (Di4 
 Philonische Philosophie, etc., Leips. 1849; 2d ed., Gothenburg, 1868), L. Noack (Psydie, Vol.11., No. 5, 
 1859), Z. Frankel (Zur Ethik des Philo, in the Monntxehr. fur Gesch. u. Wi«a. des Judenthvms, July, 1S67), 
 and Ferd. Delaunay (Philon d'Alexaiidrie, Paris, 1867). 
 15
 
 226 THE JEWISH-ALEXANDRIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 For us, the earliest document of Jewish-Alexandrian culture is the Septuagint. The 
 oldest parts of it, among which the translation of the Pentateuch belongs, reach back into 
 the earliest period of the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus (who was king from 284 to 247 
 B. c). Aristobulus says (op. Eusebius, Fraepar. Evang., XIII. 12, in a fragment of his 
 dedicatory epistle to the king, who — according to Euseb., Fraepar. Ev., IX. 6, with which 
 Clem. Alex., Strom., I. p. 342, is to be compared — was Ptolemy Philometor), that before 
 the time of Alexander, and also before the supremacy of the Persians in Egypt, the four 
 last books of the Pentateuch had been already translated, Demetrius Phalereus taking the 
 lead in the matter. According to a statement of Hermippus the Callimachean (Diog. L., 
 V. 78), Demetrius lived at the court of PtolemsEUS Lagi only, but under Philadelphus was 
 obliged to avoid the country. This account is not in contradiction with that of Aris- 
 tobulus (and R. Simon, Hody, and others, are consequently at fault in arguing from the 
 Bupposed contradiction, that the fragments of Aristobulus are spurious) ; we may, rather 
 conclude from the two reports that preparations were made for the translation by Demetrius 
 during the life of Ptolemajus Lagi (but probably not till the last part of his reign), and that it 
 may have then been begun, but that it was principally accomplished imder Philadelphus; 
 Josephus (Ant., XII. 2) places the commencement of the translation in the year 285 u. c. 
 Whether certain parts of the Pentateuch were really translated into Greek still earlier is 
 doubtful, but the}' were certainly not translated at so early an epoch as that named by Aris- 
 tobulus. The translation of the principal canonical writings may have been completed under 
 Ptolemy Euergetes, the successor of Philadelphus, soon after his accession to the throne 
 (247). Parts were added to the Hagiographa at least as late as 130 B. c. (according to the 
 Prologue of Siracides), and without doubt also very much later. Dahne (II. pp. 1-72) pro- 
 fesses to have discovered in the Septuagint numerous traces of the Jewish-Alexandrian 
 philosophy, which was subsequently more fully developed by Philo ; according to him, the 
 authors of this translation of the Bible knew and approved the principal doctrines of this 
 philosophy, contrived to suggest them by apparently insignificant deviations from the 
 original text, and, foreseeing the method of allegorical interpretation, which was subse- 
 quently to be adopted, endeavored by the construction of their translation to facilitate it. 
 But the passages on which Dahne founds his argumentation by no means force us to this 
 very doubtful hypothesis (see Zeller, Fh. d. Gr., 1st ed.. III., pp. 5G9-573, 2d ed., III. b., p. 
 215 seq.); we find only that, as a rule, the notion of the sensible manifestation of God is 
 suppressed, anthropopathic ideas, such as the idea of God's repenting, are toned down in 
 their expression, the distance between God, in his essence, and the world, is increased, and 
 the ideas of mediating links between the two (in the form of diviuc potencies, angels, the 
 divine Jofa, the Messias as a heavenly mediator) appear more fully developed than in the 
 original text. In these peculiarities germs of the later religious philosophy may undoubt- 
 edly be seen, but not as yet this philosophy itself. It is scarcely necessary, either, to see 
 in them a union of Greek philosophemes with Jewish ideas. 
 
 Such a union is first discoverable with certainty in the fragments of Aristobulus, the 
 Alexandrian, who (according to Clem. Al. and Eusebius) was usually styled a Peripatetic. 
 The passages in Eusebius, cited above, establish beyond a doubt that he lived under Ptole- 
 mseus Philometor (181-145 B. c), notwithstanding several evidently erroneous authorities, 
 which place him under Ptol. Philadelphus. He wrote a commentary on the Pentateuch, and 
 dedicated it to Ptolemy (Philometor). Fragments of the same and of the dedicatory epistle 
 are preserved in Clem. Alex., Strom., I. (12 and) 25; (Y. 20:) VI. 37, and in Euseb., Fraepar. 
 Ev., VII. 13 and 14; VIII. 6 and 10; IX. 6, and XIII. 12. In the fragments furnished us bj 
 Eusebius, Aristobulus cites a number of passages purporting to have been taken from the 
 poems of Orpheus, Homer, Hesiod, and Linus, but which were evidently brought aito the
 
 THE JEWISH-ALEXANDEIAN PHILOSOPHY. 227 
 
 fann in which they are cited by some Jew, and perhaps by Aristobiihis himself. (Yet of. 
 Jost, Gesch. lies Judenthums, I., p. ;569 seq., wIjo disputes the latter supposition.) The 
 most extensive and important fragment is one which purports to be taken from the Upbg 
 Tioyoc; of Orpheus (Eus., Praep. Ev., XIII. 12); the same fragment, in another form, has been 
 preserved by Justin Martyr, De Monarchia (p. 37, Paris edition, 1742), so that it is still pos- 
 sible to point out precisely the changes made in it by some Jew. The main doctrines of 
 the poem are thus recapitulated by Aristobulus: All created things exist and are upheld 
 by divine power, and God is over all things {dianpaTdadai deia Swafiei to. iravra koX yevTjTa 
 vTTdfJx^iv Kal inl navTon' elvac rbv deov). But in the God who accomplishes and rules over 
 all things (Koa/ioto rvTrurr/g . . . avrov 6' vno ndvra Te/ielrai, ev 6' avro'tc avrog TreptviaaeTai)^ 
 Aristobulus recognizes not, with the Grecian poets and philosophers (especially the Stoics), 
 the Deity himself, but only the Divine potency (dbvafiti), by whom the world is governed ; 
 God himself is an extra-mundane being; he is enthroned in the heavens, and the earth is 
 under his feet; he is invisible, not only to the senses, but to the eye of the human soul — 
 the vovg alone perceives him (oiJe ng avrov elaopaa tln.ix<^v dvrjTuv, vtJ d' e'laopdaraC). In 
 these theological and psychological propositions it is possible to discover a reversion to the 
 Aristotelian doctrine and a modification of the Stoic, and, in so far, a justification of the 
 denomination Peripatetic as applied to Aristobulus ; but they bear, at least to an equal 
 extent, the impress of the religious faith of the Jewish nation. In interpreting the seven 
 days' work of creation, Aristobulus interprets, metaphorically, the light, which was created 
 on the first day, as symbolizing the wisdom by which all things are illumined, which some 
 of the (Peripatetic) philosophers had compared to a torch ; but, he adds, one of liis own 
 nation (Solomon, Prov. viii. 22 seq. 7) had testified of it more distinctly and finely, that it 
 existed before the heavens and the earth. Aristobulus then endeavors to show how the 
 whole order of the world rests on the number seven : 6C i^Sofiddov 6e koI ivdg 6 Koofwg 
 KVKlslTai (Aristob., ap. Euseb., Pr. Ev., XIII. 12). 
 
 Aristeas is the nominal author of a letter to Philocrates, in which are narrated the 
 circumstances attending the translation of the sacred writings of the Hebrews by the 
 seventy (or seventy-two) interpreters {ed. Sim. Schard, Basel, 1561; ed. Bernard, Ox- 
 ford, 1692, and in the editions of Josephus ; also in Hody, De Bibl. Text. Orig., Oxford, 
 1705, pp. i.-xxxvi.). The letter states that Aristeas had been sent by the king of Egypt 
 to Eleazar, the high-priest, at Jerusalem, to ask for a copy of the law and for men who 
 would translate it. The letter is spurious, and the narrative full of fables. It was probably 
 written in the time of the Asmoneans. In this letter, a distinction is made between the 
 power {(ivvcifiig) or government ((Juvaarcm) of God, which is in all places {(hd Travruv eariv, 
 ■ndvTa rdnav ■n-2.7}pol), and God himself, the greatest of beings (jiejiaTog), the lord over all 
 things (o Kvpieiioiv dndvruv dedg), who stands in need of nothing {dirpoaSeyg), and is enthroned 
 in the heavens. All virtue is said to descend from God. God is truly honored, not by gifts 
 and offerings, but by purity of soul (V^';tW KadnpiorT/ri). — The allegorical form of interpreta- 
 tion appears already brought to a considerable degree of perfection in Pseudo- Aristeas. 
 
 In the Second Book of the Maccabees (ii. 39) — which is an extract from the history of the 
 Syrian wars, written by Jason of Cyrene — the distinction made between God himself, who 
 dwells in the heavens, and the divin» power, ruling in the temple at Jerusalem, recalls 
 the similar Alexandrian dogma. Non- Alexandrian, on the contrary, are the belief in the 
 resurrection, by divine favor, of the bodies of the just (vii. 9-14 ; xiv. 46), and in creation 
 out of nothing (vii. 28), if, indeed, the latter doctrine is to be understood here in its strict 
 dogmatic sense. Some have attempted, further, to point out analogies with Alexandrian 
 doctrines in the third and fourth Books of Maccabees, in the third Book of Ezra, in the 
 Jewish portions of the Sibyllincs, and (n the Wisdom of Siracides. The Pseudo-Solomonic
 
 228 THE JEWISH-ALEXANDRIAN PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 Book of Wisdom, which appears to have been composed before the time of Philo, describe* 
 "wisdom as the reflected splendor of the divine light, as a mirror of the divine efiBciency, an 
 etflux of the divine glory, and as a spirit diffused through the whole world, fashioning at: 
 things with art and uniting itself to those souls who are pleasing to God. The pre- 
 existence of individual souls is taught (i. 20, in the words: ayaddc oiv i]Wm eJf ciJua 
 afiiavTov); the resurrection of all men, of the good to blessedness and of the bad to judg- 
 ment, is taught, and men are referred for happiness to the future life. God created the 
 world from a pre-existing matter (xi. 18). 
 
 At what time the society of Essenes arose in Palestine and of Therapeutes in Egypt, is 
 uncertain. Josephus first mentions the Essenes in his account of the times of Jonathan 
 the Maccabean (about 160 b. c.) ; there existed, he says, at that time, three sects (alpeaei^) 
 among the Jews, the Pharisees, the Sadducees, and the Essenes {Ant., XIII. 5). It seema 
 necessary to regard the name of the Essenes as derived from chaschah, to be silent, mys . 
 terious (conservers of secret doctrines, mystics). They sought to attain to the highest de- 
 gree of holiness by the most rigid abstemiousness (after the example of the Nazarites), 
 and transmitted to their successors a secret doctrine respecting angels and the creation 
 (from which, as it appears, the Cabbala subsequently arose; cf. below, § 97). The Thera.- 
 peutes (who were more given to mere contemplation in monastic retirement) sprung from 
 the Essenes (rather than the latter from the former). The doctrine of the Therapeutes was 
 related to the Pythagorean, and more especially to the Neo-Pythagorean doctrine. That 
 the body is a prison for the (pre-existent and post-existent) soul — also the doctrine of cod. 
 traries which are everywhere present in the world, are tenets belonging to ancient Pytha.- 
 goreanism ; not so the Therapeutic inhibition of the oath, of bloody offerings, and of the use 
 of meat and wine (at least, according to the testimony of Aristoxenus the Aristotelian, not 
 the earliest Pythagoreans, but only the Orphists and a part of the Pythagoreans of the fifth 
 and fourth centuries B. c, abstained from the use of meat), and the recommendation of 
 celibacy, the doctrine of angels (demons), magic, and prophecy — traits which reappear in 
 Neo-Pythagoreanism, and are unmistakably of Oriental origin. It is conceivable that (as 
 Zeller assumes) these doctrines and customs were derived from the East by the Orphists 
 and Pythagoreans, that before the time of the Maccabees they passed from the latter to 
 the Jews m Palestine (the Essenes), and that the latter again delivered them to the Jews 
 in Egypt (the Therapeutes). Still, it is improbable that Pythagoreanism, at a time when it 
 had become nearly or quite extinguished (cf. Zeller, I., 2d edition, p. 215, 3d edition, p. 
 251), could have exerted so powerful influence on a portion of the Jewish nation, and it is 
 more natural to suppose (with Hilgenfeld) that the Therapeutic doctrine of abstinence was 
 transmitted without Grecian intervention from the Parsees — after they, for their part, had 
 submitted in their doctrine to a Buddhistic influence — to the Jews of Palestme and from 
 the latter to the Egyptian Jews. The existence of the Therapeutic sect may, however, on 
 its part, have been among the causes which induced the rise of Neo-Pythagoreanism at 
 Alexandria. 
 
 Philo the Jew lived at Alexandria, which he calls " our Alexandria " (^fieripa 'A?ie§av- 
 Apeia) in his work De Legatione ad Cajwn (ed. Mangey, vol. II. 567). According to Josephus 
 {Ant, XVIII. 8 ; XX. 5), he was descended from one of the most illustrious families of the 
 country; Eusebius {Hist. Eccl., II. 4) and Hieronymus (Catal. Scriptorum Eccles.) report that 
 he belonged to a sacerdotal family. His brother held the office of Alabarches (superinten- 
 dent of the Jews at Alexandria). In the first half of the year 40 Philo was at Rome as an 
 ambassador from the Alexandrian Jews to the Emperor Caius ; he was then already ad- 
 yanced in years [De Legat. ad Cajum, ed. Mang., II. 592), and at the period when he wrote 
 his accouat of this embassy — probably soon after the death of Caius (a. d. 41) and during the
 
 THE JEWISH-ALEXANDKIAN PHILOSOPHY. 229 
 
 reign of Claudius — he classed himself among the old men [yipovrec). His birth falls. coii« 
 sequently, in the third decade before Christ. 
 
 The allegorical method of interpreting the sacred Scriptures, which had long prevailed 
 among the more cultivated of the Alexandrian Jews, was adopted by Philo without restric- 
 tion. His principle, that the prophets were only involuntary instruments of the spirit 
 which spoke through them, was favorable to the freest use of this mode of exegesis. 
 Philo criticises the attitude of tliose who merely hold fast to the literal sense of Scriptures 
 as low, unworth}', and superstitious ; he denies, in opposition, obviously, to a claim of the 
 orthodox, that this is "unvarnished piety without ostentation" (aKa/.?iUTTiarov evaipeiav 
 ftera arv^taf), affirming this honoraVjle description as applicable, rather, to his mystical 
 method of interpretation, and describing his opponents as being affected with the incurable 
 disease of word-picking, and Winded by the deceptive influence of custom (De CJierubim, 
 ed. Mang., I. 146). God can certainly not be said properly to go to and fro, or to have feet 
 •with which to walk forwards, he, the uncreated author of all things, who fills all, etc. ; the 
 anthropomorphitic representations of Scripture are only permitted as an accommodation to 
 the wants of the sensuous man, Avhile for the discerning and spiritual it declares that God is 
 not like a man, nor like the heavens, nor like the world ( Quod Deus sit immutabilis, ed. Mang., 
 I. 280 seq.). Philo does not reject the literal sense in every case ; he often, especially in 
 the case of historical statements, assumes both this and the higher or allegorical sense as 
 equally true ; but the latter, in his view, is never absent. Yet, with the same positiveness 
 with which Philo combats the literalists, does he also oppose those SymVjolists, who ad- 
 vanced to a consequence which threatened to overthrow the positive content of Judaism, 
 by ascribing not only to tlie doctrines, but also to the commands, of the ceremonial law, a 
 merely figurative character, and by teaching that the literal observance of the latter was 
 superfluous, and that it was only necessary to observe the moral precepts, which alone they 
 were intended to inculcate. PhOo recognizes, it is true, that even in the commands of 
 Scripture the literal sense is always accompanied by another, more profound and higher ; 
 but, he says, they are to be observed according to the former as well as the latter sense, 
 since both belong together, like soul and body. " Although circumcision properly sym- 
 bolizes the removal of all passion and sensuality and impious thoughts, yet we may not 
 therefore set aside the practice enjoined ; for in that case we should be obliged to give up 
 the public worship of God in the temple, and a thousand other necessary solemnities " (De 
 Migratiane Abrahami, ed. Mang., I. 450). Yet the inference rejected by Philo appeared 
 later in the doctrine, that (Christian) faith, even without the works of the law, was suffi- 
 cient to salvation. That the idea of God, which was alone worthy of Him, would one 
 day create for itself another and more adequate "body" than that of the Mosaic cere- 
 monial law, was a conviction to which Philo was unable to attain. 
 
 The theology of Philo is a blending of Platonism and Judaism. While Philo contends 
 that God is to be worshipped as a personal being, he yet conceives Him at the same 
 time as the most general of existences: -u yEviKurardv iariv 6 Oeoq {Legis AUeg., II.). God 
 is the only truly existent being, to bv {De Somn., I. 655, Mang.). But Philo, similarly to 
 the Neo-Platonists of a later epoch, advances upon the Platonic doctrine by representing 
 God as exalted not onlj" above all human knowledge and virtue — as Plato had done — but 
 also above the idea of the Good — (/cpf/rTow re 17 aper^ Kal Kpeirruv rj iTTiarrjfiTi, koI Kpelrruv 1/ 
 ni'To rayadov Kal avro to koMv, De Mundi Opijicio, I. 2, ed. Mang.) — with which Plato identifies 
 Him — and by teaching that we do not arrive at the Absolute by scientific demonstration 
 (^.dyuv (iTTodd^fi)^ but by an immediate subjective certainty (hapyeia, De post. Caini, 48. p. 
 258 Mang.). Still, a certain kind of knowledge of God, which, however, is only second in 
 rank, results from the aesthetic and teleological view of the world, as founded on the Socrati*
 
 230 THE JEWISH-ALEXANDRIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 principle that " no work of skill makes itself" {ovdev tuv texvikuv ipyuv aTratfro/iaTil^erai)t 
 Grod is one and simple : 6 6ebg /j.6vog earl koI ev, oil aiiyKpifia, <pvai^ cnz'kTJ . . . reraKmi ovi 
 6 deoq Kara tu ev koI tt/v fiovdda^ iiakhrv 6e koI ij fiovdq Kara rbv iva Oeov {Ltgis Alleg., 
 II. ; ed. Mang., I. 66 seq.). God is the only free nature (7 fidvij D^vdkpa <pvaiQ, De Somn., 
 II.). full of himself and sufficient to himself (avro iavrov Tzliipeq kol iavrC) iKavov, De Nom. 
 Mutat., I. 582). Notwithstanding the pantheistically-sounding neuters which Philo applies 
 to God, he ascribes to him the purest blessedness; ''He is without grief or fear, not 
 subject to evils, unyielding, pamless, never wearied, filled with unmixed happiness " (De 
 Cherubim, I. 154). God is everywhere by his power {raq dwdfieiq ahrov Sid yfjq koI vdaroq, 
 dipog re Kal ovoavov Tcivag), but in no place with his essence, since space and place 
 were first given to the material world by him {De Linguarum Cotif.. I. 425). Speaking 
 figuratively, Philo describes God as enthroned on the outermost border of the heavens 
 in an extra-mundane place {tottoq fiEraKocr/icoc), as in a sacred citadel {Genes., 28. 15 ; De Vit. 
 Mos., II. 164, etc.). God is the place of the world, for it is He that contains and encom- 
 passes all things {De Somniis, I.). 
 
 In creating the world, God employed as instruments incorporeal potencies or ideas, 
 since he could not come in contact with polluting matter (ef kKEivrjg {tjjq ovaiaq) navr' 
 iyivvT/CEv 6 deoq, ovk EcpaTTTo/j-evoq avroq • ov yap ^ dtfiiq diTEipov Kal TrEcpvpfXEVTig v^tk 
 ipavEiv Tov ISuova Kal fiaKdpiov • dXkd toIq dacofidrocq Swd/isaiv, uv ETVfiov ovofxa ai Idsai, 
 KaTExpv'ya.To Trpbq to ysvoq EKaarov rfjv dp/ioTTovaav Xafisiv /xop<p7/v, De SacriftcantiJms, II. 
 261). These potencies surround God as ministering spirits, just as a monarch is sur- 
 rounded by the members of his court. The highest of the divine potencies, the creative 
 {noiTjTiKjj), bears also, according to Philo, in Scripture the name of God {Oeoq) ; the second 
 or ruling {fiaai?uK7/) potency, is called Lord {Kvpioq, De Vita Mosis, II., 150 et ai). These 
 are followed by the foreseeing potency, the law-giving, and many others. They are all 
 conceived by Philo, not only as of the nature of divine qualities, but also as relatively 
 independent, personal beings, who can appear to men and who have favored some of them 
 {e. g., Abraham) with their more intimate intercourse {De Vita Abrah., II. 17 seq.). 
 
 The highest of all the divine forces is the Logos (Word). The world of ideas (6 ek ruv 
 iSeuv Koafioq) has its place (roTrof) in the divine Logos, just as the plan of a city is in the 
 soul of the master-builder {De MuncK Opificio, I. 4). Philo also uses sometimes the name 
 Sophia (Wisdom), which with Aristobulus and other earlier speculators was the name for 
 the highest of the potencies intermediate between God and the world (e. g., Legis Alleg., II. : 
 jj roil deoii (yo<j)ia, fjv aKpav kol npuTiarrfv irefiEv and rotv kavrov dvvd^Euv), but Logos is the 
 term more commonly employed by him. Sometimes he seems to conceive Sophia as the 
 highest of the potencies into which the Logos is divided, and as the source of all the rest. 
 For the Logos is two-fold in its nature, and that, too, in man as well as in the All. In man 
 there is a 'Aoyor EvSiddeToq and a loyoq TirpofupiKog ; the former is the reason which dwells in 
 man, the latter is the spoken word ; the former is, as it were, the source, the latter the out- 
 flowing stream. (Cf Plat. ? Soph., 263 e : didvoia is the interior discourse of the mind , 
 and Arist. : 6 iau ^.dyoq, see above, p. 143.) But of the Logoi which belong to the All, 
 the one which corresponds with the EvStdderoq in man, dwells in the incorporeal and 
 archetypal ideas of which the intelligible world consists ; the other, corresponding with 
 the ■n:po<popcK6q in man, is diffused in the form of germs (the Idyog cirEpfmriKSq) in the things 
 which are seen, and which are imitations and copies of the ideas, and constitute the 
 world of sensuous perception {De Vita Mosis, III., ed. Mang., II. 154). In other words: 
 in God dwells reason, thought {ivvnta as kvairoKEifiEvi] votiaiq), and its expression {(havor/air 
 as vorjcEuq 6le^o6oq or pf/fia 6eov, Quod Deus sit immut, T. 278, ed. Mang., in commenting 
 on Genesis, vi. 6). This reason is God's wisdom (Sophia). Yet, in other passages, Philo
 
 THE JEWISH-ALEXANDRIAN PHILOSOPHY. 231 
 
 calls Sophia the mother of the Logos [De Profugis, 562, Mang.). He sees the symbol of 
 the two-fold Logos in the double breast-plate [dnzXovv ?My€i(n>) of the high-priest. Ordi- 
 narily, however, he speaks only of the divine Logos without qualification or distinction, 
 styling him Son and Paraclete, the Mediator between God and man, etc. (De Vita Mosis, 
 IL 155, ed. Mang.; Quis Rerum Divin. Haeres sit, I. 501 seq., et pass.). 
 
 The creation of the world was due to God's attribute of love. He created it, through 
 the instrumentality of the Logos, out of unqualified matter, which is therefore of the 
 nature of the unreal (o Oeoc alnov, ovk opyavov, to 6e yiyvofitvov 6C bpydvov fiev, viro 6e 
 roi) aiTiov Trdvruc; ylyvtrat. • evpr/aeif alriov rov kog/jlov rbv 6e6v, bpyavov 6e Xoyov deov, 
 iiXrjv de to. ri-rrapa <Tro<;jfeZa). 
 
 The business of man is to follow and imitate God (De Caritate, II. 404, et pass.). The 
 soul must strive to become the dwelling-place of God, his holy temple, and so to become 
 strong, whereas it was before weak, and wise, whereas before it was foolish (De Somn., 
 I. 23). The highest blessedness is to abide in God (~ipa^ evdaifiovia^ to aK/.ivcjg koI 
 appcTTug iv fiovG) deO aTfjvai). 
 
 Philo traces the doctrine of ideas back to Moses : Mwiicewf tcyrl to 66yfia tovto, ovk ifiov ; 
 for, he says, Moses teaches {Gen., i. 27) that God created man in the image of God, and 
 if this is true of man, it must certainly be true also of the entire sensible cosmos {Dt 
 Mundi Opifido, Mang., I. 4). Obvious as are the signs of Platonic influences in Philo's 
 doctrine of ideas (Philo himself names Plato, and testifies his esteem for him), and of Stoic 
 influence in his Logos-doctrine, j'ct in fact the transformation of the ideas uito divine 
 thoughts, having their seat in the Logos of God, is an outcome of Philo's religious concep- 
 tions, and the doctrine, thus transformed, may therefore be said to come from "Moses." 
 (This transformation of the Platonic theory of ideas not only exercised a controlling influ- 
 ence on the philosophy of later thinkers, but it has also interfered with the correct his- 
 torical comprehension of Platonism even down to our own times.) 
 
 As in what he says of the ideas and forces generally, so also in his utterances respect- 
 ing the Logos, Philo wavers between the attributive and substantive conception of it ; the ' 
 latter, according to which the Logos is hypostatized to a person, is already developed in "^ 
 his doctrine to too firm a consistency for us to suppose that the personification was for \^^ 
 Philo's own consciousness a mere poetic fiction (all the more, since in Plato the ideas are n. 
 not mere attributes, but possess an independent and almost a personal existence), and yet ^ 
 not to a consistency of so absolute a character that Philo could be interpreted as teaching, , 
 as a positive doctrine, the existence beside God of a second person, in no way reducible -^ 
 to a mere attribute or function of the first person. Yet so far as Philo personifies, 
 whether it be poetically or doctrinally, he owns to a certain subordinationism. The Logos is 
 for him, as it were, a chariot-driver, whom the other divine forces (Jwd/ze/f) must obey ; 
 but God, as the master of the chariot, prescribes to the Logos the course which is to be ''"^ 
 maintained. Philo vacillates consequentl_y between the two conceptions, the aualoga of 
 which reappear later in the Christian church in Monarchianism and Arianism; but a doc- 
 trine analogous to Athanasianism is entirely foreign to him, and would contradict his 
 religious as well as his philosophical consciousness. It was impossible that he should 
 conceive of the Logos as incarnated, on account of the impurity of matter in his view — a \ 
 consideration revived at a later epoch by the Docetans — and for this reason, if for no 
 other, it was impossible for Philo to go farther and identify the Logos with the expected 
 Messias, to which course, nevertheless, he was powerfully moved by the practical and 
 spiritual interest connected with redemption through the Messias. The incarnation of 
 the Logos in Christ forms the fundamental speculative, as the invalidity of the positive 
 Mosaic law and the new commandment of love form the fundamental practical, doctrine by 
 
 ^ 
 
 ^ 

 
 232 THE NEO-PYTHAGOREAN8. 
 
 which Christianity separated from Alexandrian theosophy. The representatives of this 
 theosophy beiug, for the most part, men of more theoretical culture tlian force of will, could 
 not accept the doctrine of the incarnation without a sense of their infidelity to their prin- 
 ciples, and dill not possess the martyr's courage — which is rarely developed in the lap of 
 material and intellectual wealth — necessary for the practical renunciation of the ceremonial 
 law, although this course was demanded as a logical consequence of their own views. 
 
 § 64. Cicero names as the firsf renewer of Pytliagoreanisra, P. 
 Nigidius Figulus, who appears to iiave lived in the first half of the 
 last century before Christ, at Alexandria. In the time of Augustus 
 there originated several v^^orks falsely attributed to the earlier Pytha- 
 goreans, but containing Neo-Pythagorean ideas. About the same 
 time Sotion, the disciple of Sextius, the Pythagorizing Eclectic, lived 
 at Alexandria. The chief representatives of Neo-Pythtigoreanisra 
 are Apollonius of Tyana, in the time of Nero, Moderatus of Gades, 
 also in the time of Nero, and Nicomachus of Gerasa, in the time of 
 the Antonines. Also, Secundus of Athens (under Hadrian) appears 
 to be by his ovv^n doctrine not far removed from this group of philoso- 
 phers. 
 
 To Neo-Pythagoreanism relates in fact the greater part of the literature cited above, arf § 16, pp. 43 and 
 44. Of. also Hicron. Schellbergcr, Die goldenen Spriiche des Fyth. ill's Deutsche ilbertragen mit Einl. 
 u. Anm. (G.-Pr.), Muniierstadt, 1862, and, respecting the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers, in general, 
 Vermehren, Die pyth. Zrihlen, Giistrow, 1863. Zeller, in Ph. d. Gr., III., 2d edition, p. 85 seq., gives a 
 Bummary of the pseudonymous literature (after Beckmann, Mullach, and Orelli). 
 
 On the subject of the general revolution of philosophy among the Greeks in this period from Skep- 
 ticism to Mysticism, cf. Heinr. W. J. Thiersch, Politik wild PhiloHaphie in ihrem VerhiiltnisB stir Religion 
 ■anter Ty-ajanus, Hadrianvs und den beiden Antoninen. Marburg, 1858, and Zeller, as cited above, ad § 62. 
 
 Lutterbeck (Die neiitest. Lehrhegrijfe, Vol. I., 1862, p. 370 seq.) treats of Nigidius Figxilus and the Neo- 
 Pythagorean school. Cf. also Bucheler, in the i^/i. J/««., new series, XIII., p. 177 seq., and Klein, i)i«#., 
 Bonn, 1861. 
 
 Philostrntorum quae mii>ermint omnia: vita Apolhnii Tyanensis, etc. Accedunt Apollonii Ty(tn. 
 epistolae, Eu,seOti liber adv. IJieroclem, etc., ed. Godofr. Olearius, Leipsic, 1709; ed. C. L. Kayser, Zui-ich 
 (1844, 1846), 1858 : ed. Ant. Westermann, Paris, 1848. Iwan Miilier, Comm., qua de Philontr. in componenda 
 memioria ApoUonii T. Jide qxiaeritur, Zwtibriicken, 1858-60. Of Apollonius treat: J. C. Herzog (Leips. 
 1719), S. G. Klose (Viteb. 1723-24), J. L. Mosheim (in his Ctnrimtnt., Hamb. 1751, p. 347 seq.), J. B. Luder- 
 ■vvald (Halle, 1793). Ferd. Chr. Baur (Apollonius und Chrixtun^ Tiibinger ZeitKchrift fiir Theol.. 1832), A. 
 Wellaur (in Jahn's ^rc/a». Vol. X., 1844, pp. 418-467); Neander (Ge^tch. der Christl. Religion, TJieil I., 
 p. 172), L. Noack (in his Pm/che, Vol. I., No. 2, Giessen, 1858), P. M. Mervoyer (Etude sur A. de T., Paris, 
 1862), A. Chassang (Ze merTeilleux dans Pantiquite. A. de T.. sa vie, ses voyages, ses prodiges, jicir Phi- 
 lostrate. et ses lettres, ovrrages tradtiits du grec, avec introduction, notes et eclaircissements, Paiis, 1862, 
 2d ed. 1S64) ; cf. Iv an Muller {Zur A])ollonins-Litteratur, in the Zeitsehr. fiir luth. Theol. u. Kirhe, ed. by 
 Delitzsch and Guericke, Vol. 24. 1S65, pp. 412-428 and p. 592). 
 
 Nicomachi Geraseni arithm eticae, libr. II., ed. Frid. Ast, in his edition of Jamblichi Chnlcidennig 
 tlieologumena ar-ithmelicae, Leips. 1817. (An earlier edition of this work, NtKo^dxou Tepaar]voi apiOii-q- 
 TiK^? /Si^Xta &V0, was published at Paris in 1538.) Ji iKOfiaxov Tepaayivov Ilv9ayopi.Kov apiflnTjTix^ ii<Tayu>yii, 
 Jficornacfii Geraseni Pythagorei introduciionis arithmeticae lilir. II. rec. Rieardns Hoche, accednnt 
 codieis Cizensis problemata arithm. Leips. 1866. 'lotavvov ypa/u./itaTiKoG 'AAefai'Spea)? (toC <I>iAo7rdi'Ob) 
 €19 TO TtpioTov T^? NiKo/xaxou opiflnTjTiK^t eiffaytoy^s. Prirmim ed. Rich. Hoche, Leipsic, 1864; in libr. 11. 
 Nic. inirod. arithm. ed. idem {G.-Pr.), Wesel, 1867. The EyxeipiSiov dp^onK^s of Nicomachus has been 
 edited by Meibom in his Musici Graeei. In the Bibl. of Photius (cod. 187) there is an extract from a work 
 purporting to have been written by him, and entitled " TTieologumena Arith."
 
 THE NEO-PYTHAGOREANS. 233 
 
 Secundi (Atheniensis SophUtae) SenUntiae^ ed. Lucas Holstenins, together with the Sentences ol 
 Demophilus and Democrates, Leyden, ICSy. p. 810 seq. ; ed. J. A. Schier (together with the Bio? 2«<c. <^iAo- 
 <To</>oii), in Demophili, Democr. et Sec. Sent., Leijis^ 1754, p. 71 seq.; Gr. et. Lot., ed. J. C. OreUi, in Opu»- 
 cula Graecorum vet. sententiona et moralia. Leips. 1S19-21, Vol. I., p. 208 seq. Tischendorf has recognized 
 a part of the Bios 'S.tKovvBov 4>i\o(T6<t>ov on a sheet of papyrus discovered in Egypt, and belonging, as T. sup- 
 jKises, to the second, or, at the latest, to the third century of the present era; cf. Hermann Sauppe, in the 
 JViilol., XVII., 1861, pp. 149-154; Eud. Reicke has pullished an old Latin translation of this Life, from a 
 Codex in the Kouigsberg Library, in the PhUologus, Vol. XVIIL, 1862, pp. 528-584. 
 
 The return to older systems was, at Alexandria, a result in part of the learned investiga- 
 tions carried on in connection with the Library, and in this respect Neo-Pythagoreanisra 
 stands side by side with the renewal at Alexandria of the Homeric form of poetry. A 
 consideration of more essential significance is, that a philosophy which conceived the 
 divine under the form of the transcendent (or which at least admitted this conception side 
 by side with the conception previously prevalent and gave to the former a constantly 
 increasing weight) corresponded far better with the autocratic form of government and 
 the Oriental conception of life than did the systems of the period next preceding, systems 
 which presuppose a certain freedom in social and political life, and which at the time now 
 under consideration had already been shaken to the foundation, even in their merely 
 theoretical bearings, by the spirit of doubt. The satisfaction which was not found either 
 in nature or in the individual subject, was now sought in an absolute object, represented as 
 beyond tlie spheres of both. But for the purposes of this search, Pythagoreanism and 
 also Platonism offered the appropriate points of support. Added to this, finally, was the 
 influence of Oriental religious ideas, Egyptian, Chaldaic, and Jewish (the influence of the 
 latter being the most important) arising through the meeting of various nationalities at 
 the same place and in the same political union. 
 
 Of P. Nigidius Figulus, who was also a grammarian (G«ll., K A.. XIX. 4), Cicero 
 tells us (Tiin., 1) that he renewed the Pythagorean philosophy; but he cannot have 
 exerted a very considerable influence, since Seneca ( Quaest. Nat, VII. 32) knew nothing 
 of the existence of a Xeo-Pythagorean School. The school of the Sextians has been 
 already mentioned (§ 61). That the predilection of the Libyan king lobates (probably 
 Juba II. of the time of Augustus) for Pythagorean writings gave occasion to forgeries, is 
 reported by David the Armenian {Schol. in Arist., p. 28 a, 13). Philo cites, already, the 
 work attributed to Ocellus Lucanus. The work entitled ivpbq rovq aTvexofiivovg tuv crapKuv 
 mentioned by Porphyry and written by Sextius Clodius, the teacher of Marcus Antonius 
 the Triumvir, seems to have been directed against those Neo-Pythagoreans who abstained 
 from the use of meat (see Jac. Bernays, Theophr. Schrift iiber Frommigkeit, Berlin, 1866, 
 p. 12). 
 
 A fragment from the work of ApoUonius of Tyana on Sacrifices is preserved in Euse- 
 bius (Fraep. Ev., IV. 13). In it ApoUonius distinguishes between the one God, who exists 
 separate from all things, and the other gods; to the former no offerings whatever should 
 be brought, nay, more, he is not even to be named with words, but only to be apprehended 
 by the reason. All earthly things are, on account of their material constitution, impure, 
 and unworthy to come in contact with the supreme God. To the inferior gods ApoUonius 
 seems to have required the bringing of bloodless offerings. The work on ApoUonius 
 of Tyana, written by Flavins Philostratus (at the instance of the Empress Julia Domna, 
 the wife of Septimius Severus), is a philosophico-religious romance, in which the Neo- 
 Pythagorean ideal is portrayed in the person of ApoUonius, and is claimed to be superior 
 to that of other schools and sects (referring especially to Stoicism, and, as it would appear, 
 to Christianity). 
 
 Moderatus of Gades, who was nearly contemporaneous with ApoUonius, sought to
 
 234 THE ECLECTIC PLATONISTS. 
 
 justify the incorporation into Pythagoreauism of Platonic and neo-theological doctrines, 
 through the hypothesis that the ancient Pythagoreans themselves intentionally expressed 
 the highest truths in signs, and for that purpose made use of numbers. The number one 
 was the symbol of unity and equality, and of the cause of the harmony and duration of all 
 things, while two was the symbol of difference and inequality, of division and change, etc. 
 (Moderatus, ap. Porphyr. Vit. Pythag., 48 seq.). 
 
 Nicomachus of Gerasa, in Arabia, who seems to have lived about 140 or 150 A. D., 
 teaches (in Ariihm. Jntroduct, I. 6) the pre-existence of numbers before the formation of the 
 world, in the mind of the Creator, where they constituted an archetype, in conformity with 
 which He ordered all things. Nicomachus thus reduces the Pythagorean numbers, as 
 Philo reduces the Ideas, to thoughts of God. Nicomachus defines number as definite 
 quantity (nXfjOog upiafiivov, I. 7). In the QkohiyovfiEva apc6n?iTiKd, Nicomachus, accord- 
 ing to Photius, Cod., 187, expounded the mystical signification of the first ten numbers, 
 
 t according to which the number one was God, reason, the principle of form and goodness, 
 
 and two, the principle of inequality and change, of matter and evil, etc. The ethical 
 problem for man, he teaches, is solved by retirement from the contact of impurity and 
 
 ^ reunion with God. 
 
 To Secundus of Athens, the silent philosopher, who hved under Hadrian, are ascribed 
 (in the Vita Secundi, a work of the second century after Christ, much read in the Middle 
 Ages) certain answers (which he is reported to have made in writing) to philosophical 
 questions raised by the Emperor, answers conceived in an ascetic and fantastic spirit, 
 which is akin to the spirit of Neo-Pythagoreanism. 
 
 § 65. Among the Pythagorizing and Eclectic Platonists, who, 
 through their renewal and further development of the Platonic prin- 
 ciple of transcendence, in especial opposition to Stoic Pantheism 
 and Epicurean Naturalism, became the precursors of Neo-Platonism, 
 the best-known are Eudorus and Arius Didymus (in the time of Au- 
 gustus), Dercyllides and Thrasyllus (in the time of Tiberius), Theon 
 of Smyrna and Plutarch of Chaeronea (in Trajan's time), Maximus 
 of Tyre (under the Antonines), Apuleius of Madaura (in Kumidia), 
 Alcinous, Albinus, and Severus (of nearly the same epoch), Calvisius 
 Taurus and Atticus, Galenus, the physician (131-200 a. d.), Celsus, 
 the opponent of Christianity (about 200 a. d.), and Numenius of Apa- 
 mea (toward the end of the second century of the present era). 
 
 On Eudorus, cf. Roper, in the Philologus, VII., 1852, p. 584 seq. ; on Alius Didymus, Meineke, in Mut- 
 lelVa Zeituchr. fur das Gymn.-W., Berlin, 1S59, p. 563 seq. ; on Tlirasyllus, S6vin i31em. de Vacad. dM 
 iiiser-ipt, torn. X), K. F. Hermann (/7J</. Scfiol., Gott. 1852), and MfiUer (Fragm. hist. Gr., III. 501); on 
 Plutarch, among others, K. 'E,\d\ihoS (Gymn.-Progr., Elberfeld, 1S33), Theod. Hilmar Schreiter (Doctr. Plu- 
 tarchi et theologica et niorali.% in Illgen's Zeitsohr. fur hist. TTieol., Vol. VI., Leips. 1836, pp. 1-162\ Ed. 
 MuUer (in his Gesch. der T/iearie der Kunst hei den Alien, Vol. II., Berlin, 1887, pp. 207-224), G. W. Nitzsch 
 (Jnd. Led., Kiel, 1S49), Pohl {Die Damono/ogie des Plutarch, G.Pr., Breslau, 1861), Bazin (De Plutarcho 
 Stoicorum Adversaria, Tliesis Parimenxia, Nice, 1S66), O. Greard (De la Jfarale de Plutarque, Paris, 
 1867). Rich. Volkmann (Lehen, Scliri/ten nnd Philos. de.t Plntarch, 2 parts, Berlin, 1869); on Apnleius, 
 Prantl (Gesch. der Logik, I., pp. .578-591). Editions of Albinus' work on Plato have been j.ublished by 
 Schneider (Ind. Lect., Breslau, 1852), and K. F. Hermann (in Vol. VI. of his edition of the works of Plato) 
 and editions of Alcinous' work on the same by Orelli (in Alex. Aphrod. de Fato, etc., 1824), and K. F. Her- 
 mann (in Vol. VI. of Plato's works). The philosophical treatises of Plutarch, Apuleius, and Galen are found
 
 THE ECLECTIC PLATONI8TS. 235 
 
 fn the complete editions of their works, Plutarch's Maralia in Didot's collection, edited by Diibner, Paris, 
 1S41 (as Vols. III. and IV. of his works), and separately, ed. Wyttenbach (Oxford, 1795-1830, Leips. 1796- 
 1884). On Calvisius Taurus, cf. Bezier. La Philoxo/Me de Taurus, Havre, 1S69. On the philosophical 
 opinions of Galen, cf. Kurt Spengel, Beitr. zur Oesch. der Medecin, I. 117-195. On Celsus, the opponent 
 of Christianity, cf. F. A. Philippi, X»« Celai, advermrii ChriHtianoruin, philoMphandi (je.nere, Berlin, 
 1836, C. W. Bindemann, Ueher Celsus und seine Schrift gegen die C?iristen, in the ZeiUchr. fur hist. 
 Theol., 1842, O. Baumgarten-Crusius, De Scriptoribus saeculi, 11. p. chr., qui novam religionem impug- 
 narurU, Meissen, 1815, Bedepenning, Orig., Vol. II., Bonn, 1S46, pp. 130-156, F. Chr. Baur, Das Cliristen- 
 tlbiim ill den drei ersten Jahrh., pp. 3GS-395, and Von Engelhardt, Celsus oder die alteste kritik lib,. 
 Gesch. u. christl. Lehre vom Standpii/nkte des UeideiUhums, in the Dorpater Zeitschr. f. Th. u. Kirehe, 
 Vol. XI. 1869, pp. 2S7-344. 
 
 Eiidorus of Alexandria (about 25 B. c.) wrote commentaries on the Timaetis of Plato 
 and also on works of Aristotle, and a work on the Parts of Philosophy (iLaifjeatq tov Kara 
 ipiXoao(piav Aoyov), in which (as in the Pseudo-Plutarchic Placita Philos., a work founded, aa 
 is likely, in part on the works of Eudorus and Arius) the views of different philosophers 
 on the various problems {npo^'kruiara) of pliilosophy are brought togetlier (Plutarch, 
 De Anim. Frocreat, 3 ; Simplic, Ad Arist. Catcg., Sckol, ed. Br., p. 61 a, 25 et al. ; Stob., 
 Ed., II. 4G seq.). This Platonist wrote also concerning the Pythagorean doctrine (Simplic, 
 in Phys., 39 a, where, notwithstanding the duality of the elements assumed by the Pytha- 
 goreans, namely, the number One and the "indefinite diiad," the doctrine is ascribed to 
 them that the One is the principle of all things). 
 
 Arius Didymus, a learned Academic of the time of Augustus and a pupil of Antiochus 
 of Ascalon, wrote irepi rwv apeaKovruv YlTMTurvi and other works (Euseb., Pr. Ev., XI. 23 ; 
 XV. 15 seq.). Stobseus cites {Florileg., 103. 28) " from the Epitome of Didymus," a pas- 
 sage concerning the Peripatetic doctrine of Eudaemonia, and his account of the Peripatetic 
 Ethics {Eel., II. pp. 242-334), in which this passage is again cited, and also his account of 
 the Stoic doctrine, and other things, which were probably taken from the Epiiome of Arius 
 (see Meineke, as above cited, and Zeller, Ph. d. Gr., III. a, 2d ed., 1865, p. 546). In this 
 account the Peripatetic Ethics is assimilated to that of the Stoics, in the same manner 
 in which, according to Cicero, this was done by Antiochus of Ascalon. Didymus wrote 
 also TVEfu HvdayopiK^c (pt2,o(7()(pia(;. 
 
 Thrasyllus, known as the arranger of the Platonic dialogues, was a grammarian, who 
 lived in the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius, and died a. v>. 36, while holding the ofiBce 
 of astrologer to the latter. He combined with Platonism a Neo-Pythagorean numerical 
 speculation and the practice of magic, after the manner of the Chaldeans. Schol. in Juven., 
 VI. 576 : Thrasyllus multarum artium sdentiam pro/essit-s postremo se dedit PlaUmicae sectae, 
 et ddnde mathesi, qtm praecipue viguii apud Tiberium. The mathesis here spoken of was a 
 superstitious, mystical doctrine, founded on speculations with numbers, and combined with 
 a.strology. Albinus {Introd. in Platon. Dialogos, ch. 6), names, besides Thrasyllus, Dercyllides, 
 as one of the authors of the division of the Platonic dialogues into Tetralogies ; the first 
 tetralogy, at least (Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo), was arranged by Dercyllides. Ac- 
 cording to Porphyry, ap. Simplic. ad Arist. Phys., f. 54 (SrhoL, ed. Brandis, p. 344 a), Dercyl- 
 lides composed a work on Plato's philosophy, in the eleventh book of which he cited, from 
 Hermodorus on Plato, a passage representing that Plato reduced matter, and the infinite 
 or indefinite, to the More and Less (Magnitude and Smallness, etc.). The problem here 
 discussed relates to one of the most important points of contact between Platonism and 
 Pythagoreanism. 
 
 Theon of Smyrna (in the second century a. d.) wrote a work, which is still extant, 
 explaining the mathematical doctrine of Plato {ed. Bullialdus, Paris, 1644: ed. J. J. de 
 Gelder, Leyden, 1827; ejusdem Lib. de Astronomia, ed. Th. IL Martin, Paris, 1849). H«
 
 236 THE ECLECTIC PLAT0N18TS. 
 
 was more a mathematician than a philosopher. His astronomical doctrines were for the 
 most part borrowed from a work by Adrastus the Peripatetic. 
 
 Plutarch of Chteronea, (born about 50, died about 125 a. d.), a pupil of Ammonius of 
 Alexandria, who taught at Athens under Nero and Vespasian, developed his philosophical 
 opinions in the form of an exposition of passages from Plato. In this exposition he be- 
 lieved that he had reproduced Plato's meaning, and only that, just as subsequently the 
 Neo-Platonists believed in regard to their work ; but his doctrines are far less removed 
 from pure Platonism than theirs. He opposed the monism of the Stoics, and had recourse 
 to the Platonic hypothesis of two cosmical principles, namely, God, as the author of all 
 good, and matter, as the condition of the existence of evil. For the formation of the 
 world it was necessary, he taught, that the " monad " (uovdg) should be combined with the 
 ''indefinite duad " {6va^ aopioTog)^ or the form-giving with the form-receiving principle. 
 The Ideas, according to him, were intermediate between God and the world ; matter was 
 the chaotic substrate of creation, the ideas were the patterns and God the efficient cause 
 (// fiev ovv v2.7] Tuv vnoKEifiivuv araKTOTaTov iariv • i/ & I6ea ruv TrapaSeiyfidroiv kciTJugtov ' 
 6 6e ^edg tuv a'lTMv apiarov, Quaest. Conv., VIII. 2. 4). God's essence is unknown to us 
 {Be Pyth. Orac, 20) ; he sees, but is not seen [De Is. et Osir., 75), he is one and free from 
 all differentiation {irEpoTTjg), he is the existent (6v), and has no genesis {De EI apud Delph. 
 20; De Is. et Osir.., 78). Only God's workings can be known by us. In itself matter is not 
 bad, but indifferent ; it is the common place for good and evil ; there is in it a j'earning 
 after the divine ; but it also contains another principle, the evil world-soul, which coexists 
 with the good one, and is the cause of all disorderly motions in the world (De Is., 45 seq. ; 
 De An. Frocreat., ch. 6 seq.). The gods are good. Of the demons (who are necessary as 
 mediators between the divine and human), some are good and others are evil ; in the 
 human soul both qualities are combined. Besides the one supreme God, Plutarch recog- 
 nizes as real the popular divinities of the Hellenic and Non-Hellenic faiths. The moral 
 element in Plutarch is elevated and without asperity. 
 
 Maximus of Tjrre, who lived about one half-century after Plutarch, v/as more favorable 
 to Syncretism in religion and to a superstitious demonology. 
 
 Apuleius of Madaura, born probably between 126 and 132 A. D., taught that, besides 
 God, the Ideas and Matter were the original principles of things. He discriminates as 
 belonging to the sphere of the supra-sensible, or truly existent, God and his reason, which 
 contains the ideal forms, and the soul; from these are contradistinguished all that is sen- 
 sible or material. The belief in demons receives the same favor from him as from Maxi- 
 mus. The third book of his work De Dogmate Platonis contains logical theorems, in which 
 Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines are blended together. Marcianus Capella, who between 
 A. D. 3,30 and 439 (and probably between 410 and 439) wrote a manual of the "seven 
 liberal arts" (edited by Franz Eyssenhardt, Leipsic, 186G), also Isidorus, (see below, § 88), 
 borrowed much from this work of Apuleius. 
 
 Alcinous, who lived probably at about the same time with Apuleius, likewise names 
 in his outline of the Platonic teaching {eiq ra rov 'n.?MTcjvuc Sdyfiara daayuyy), God, the 
 ideas, and matter as the first principles. He uncritically mixes Aristotelian and Stoic with 
 Platonic opinions. 
 
 Albinus (whose instruction Galenus sought at Smyrna, in 151-152 A. D.) wrote an in- 
 troduction to the Platonic Dialogues, which is of little value, and also commentaries on 
 some of the works of Plato. Cf. Alberti, Ueher des Alb. Isagoge, in the Rh. Mus., new series, 
 XIII. pp. 76-110. 
 
 Severus, from whoso writings Eusebius (Pr. Ev., XIII. 17) has preserved us a frag- 
 ment, combated single doctrines of Plato. In particular, he denied the genesis of the world
 
 THE ECLECTIC PLATONISTS. 237 
 
 (Prod, in Tim., II. 88), and aflBrmed the soul to be simple, like a mathematical figure, anc 
 not compounded of two substances, tlie one capable the other incapable of being acted 
 upon. "With his Platonism were blended Stoic doctrines. 
 
 Calvisius Taurus (who taught at Athens about 150 a. d.) wrote against the Stoics and 
 on the difference between the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle (A. Gellius, K A., XII. 5 ; 
 Suidas, s. v. Tavpof). Gellius (born about 130), who was his pupil (in about the year 160), 
 often mentions him. 
 
 Atticus (said to have flourished about 176 A. n.) opposed the combination of Platonic 
 with Aristotelian doctrines, and disputed violently against Aristotle (Euseb., Praep. Ev., 
 XI. 1 et al). He held to the literal sense of the Tiviaeus (especially as to the doctrine 
 of the temporal origin of the world). In his interpretation of the ethics of Plato, he 
 seems to have assimilated it to that of the Stoics. A pupil of Atticus was Harpocration 
 (Procl., in Tim., II. 93 b). 
 
 Claudius Galenus (in the second half of the second century), the well-known teacher of 
 medicine, cultivated also philosophy, and occupied himself with the minute exposition of 
 works of Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Chrysippus. Galenus extols philosophy (which 
 with him is identical with religion) as the greatest of divine goods [ProtrepL, ch. 1). In 
 logic he follows Aristotle. The fourth syllogistic figure, named after him, was not first 
 brought to light or " discovered " by him, but was obtained by a repartition into two 
 figures of the modes included by Theophrastus and Eudemus in the first figure. In meta- 
 physics, Galenus added to the four Aristotelian principles, matter, form, moving cause, and 
 final cause, a fifth principle, namely, the instrument or means {6i' ov), which by (Plato and) 
 Aristotle, as it appears, had been subsumed under the concept of the moving cause. With 
 all his inclination to assent to the Platonic views respecting the immateriality of the soul, 
 he was unable, in regard to this question, and, in general, in regard to all questions which 
 conduct beyond the limits of experience, to overcome his tendency to doubt. The thing of 
 principal importance, in his estimation, was to have a religious conviction of the existence 
 of the gods and of an over-ruling providence. 
 
 Celsus (perhaps about 200), the opponent of Christianity, whose arguments were con- 
 troverted by Origen, was a Platonist ; he cannot have been an Epicurean. He does not 
 deny the influence of the gods on the world, but only that God works directly on the 
 world of sense. In antagonism to the divine causality stands that of matter, which latter 
 is the source of an irresistible physical necessity. From this Celsus is to be distinguished 
 the Epicurean of the same name, who lived about 170 a. d., and is mentioned by Lucian in 
 the Pseudomantis. 
 
 Numenius of Apamea in Syria, who lived in the second half of the second century 
 after Christ, combined Pythagorean and Platonic opinions in such manner that, while him- 
 self conceding to Pythagoras the highest authority and asserting that Plato borrowed the 
 essential parts of his teachings from him, he made in fact the Platonic element predominant 
 in his doctrine. Numenius traces the philosophy of the Greeks back to the wisdom 
 of the Orientals, and calls Plato an Attic-speaking Moses [Muva^g arTiKti^uv, Clem. Alex., 
 Strom., I. 3-42 ; Euseb., Praep. Ev., XI. 10). He was without doubt well acquainted with 
 the doctrines of Philo and with the Jewish- Alexandrian philosophy in general. He wrote, 
 among other things, :rept tuv H/ldTwvof anoppr/ruv, nspl rayoBov, and Tzepl rf/g ruv 'AKadij- 
 fiaiKuv npbg JlXdruva Siarrraaeug (Euseb., Pr. Ev., XIII. 5 ; XIV. 5). The most note- 
 worthy deviation of Numenius from Plato (but which was not recognized by him as such) 
 consists in this : that he (following, perhaps, the precedent of the Christian Gnostics, espe- 
 cially the Yalentinians, and indirectly influenced by the distinction made by the Jewish- 
 Alexandrian philosophers between God himself and his power working in the world, tha
 
 238 NEO-PLATONIC SCHOOLS. 
 
 Logos) distinguished the world-builder {drifiiovpyoq) as a second God, from the highest deity. 
 The first God is good in and through himself; he is pure thought-activity [vovc) and the 
 principle of being {ovaiag apxv-. Euseh., Pr. Ev., XI. 22). The second God (6 6tvTEpo<; 6i6(: 
 6 6?j/uovpybg deog) is good by participation in the essence of the first {uerovaia roi- npurov) ; 
 he looks toward the supersensuous archetypes and thereby acquires knowledge (iTriaTrjfirj) ; 
 he works upon matter and thus forms the world, he being the principle of genesis or 
 becoming (yrviceuQ apxv)- The world, the production of the Demiurges, is the third 
 God. Numenius terms the three Gods, respectively, father, son, and grandson (ndn-T:oc, 
 EK-yovoc, and anoyovog, Procl., in Plat. Tim., II. 93). Nuraenius ascribes this doctrine not 
 only to Plato, but also even to Socrates (Euseb., Pr. Ev., XIV. 5). The descent of the soul 
 from its incorporeal pre-existent condition into the body implies, according to him, pre- 
 vious moral dehnquency. Cronius, who is often named in connection with Numenius, 
 and is described by Porphyry (i>e Antro Kymph., 21) as his friend (sTalpog), seems to have 
 shared with him in his opinions. He gave to the Homeric poems an allegorical and mythi- 
 cal interpretation. Harpocration also followed Numenius in his doctrine of the three 
 highest gods. 
 
 The writings of the pretended Hermes Trismegistus {ed. Gust. Partliey, Berlin, 1854: 
 of., respecting him, Bauragarten-Crusius, Progr., Jena, 1827; B. J. Hilgers, Bonn, 1855, 
 and Louis Menard, Hermes Trismegiste, traduction complete, precedee d^une etude sur Forigine 
 des livres hermetiques, Paris, 1866, 2d ed., 1868), which in religious and philosophical 
 regards bear an entirely syncretistic character, belong to the time of Neo-Platonism. 
 
 %QQ. Among the adherents of Neo-Platonism, a system founded on 
 the principle of the transcendence of the Deity, and in which, not- 
 ■withstanding its filiation upon Plato, the whole of philosophical science 
 was brought under a new systematic form, belong, 1) the Alexandrian- 
 E-oman school of Ammonius Saccas, the originator of the whole ^eo- 
 Platonic movement, and of Plotinus, who was the first to develop the 
 system on all its sides, 2) the Syrian School of Jamblichus, who fa- 
 vored a fantastical theurgy, 3) the Athenian school of the younger 
 Plutarch, and of Syrianus, and of Proclus and his successors, — in 
 whose doctrines the theoretical element became again predominant, — 
 together with the later Neo-Platonic commentators. 
 
 On Neo-Platonjsm in general may be compared the essays or works of G. Olearius (annexed to his 
 translation of Stanlei's History of Philosophy. Leips. 1711, p. 1205 seq.), J. A. Dietelmaier (lyogramma, quo 
 geriem veterum in scliola Aleteandrina doctorum eocponit, WU\. XJiOi). Xhe. Iliatoive critique, del eclecti- 
 ci»me ow des noiive<ix Platoniciens (Avign. 1766), Meiners (Leijis. 17S2), Keil (Leips. 1785). Oelrichs (Marb. 
 178S), Fulleborn (in Beitr. zur Gesch. d. Ph., III. 3. p. 70 seq.). 1. 11. Fichte (Z>e Philos. Novae Platon. Origine. 
 Berlin. ISlb), F. Bouteiwek (Philosophorum Alexandrinorum ao Neoplatonicorum recenxio accnratior, 
 in Comm. Soc. Peg. Gotting. rec., vol. V., pp. 227-258, Gottingen, 1821). Tzschirner (Per Fall des IJeiden- 
 thums, Leips. 1829), K. Vogt {Keoplatonismus und Christenthum, Berlin, 18.36), Matter (Sur Tecole d'Alese- 
 andrie. Paris, 1820, 2d ed., 1840-48), Jules Simon (Histoire de I'ecole d'Al., Paris, 1543-45, cf. Eniile Saisset 
 in Pevue des DetuB Mondes, Sept. 1, 1844), J. Barth61emy St. Hilaire {Sur le concours ourert pnr I'Acad. 
 des scienceJi morales et poUtiques sur Vecole d'Alexandrie. Paris. 1845), E. Vacherot (UiKtoire critiqu* 
 de Vecole cTAl., Paris, 1846-51), Steinbart {Neuplat. Philosophie. in Panly's RealencycL dex dasB. Alter- 
 thums). Cf.. also. Heinr. Kellner, HeUenismus^ind Christevthnm oder die geisfliche Reactiov de» antU'ett. 
 Ueiaenthumti gegen da« Christenthu/m. Cologne, 1865, and Franz Hipler, Nenplaton. Stvdien, in the 
 Vierte^ahrachr. fur kath. Theol., Vienna, 186S (and separately).
 
 AMMONIUS SACCAS AND HIS PUPILS. 239 
 
 It will scarcely be necessary to remark that the Neo-Platonic philosophy, although H 
 sprung up after Christianity, belongs in its characteristics to the pre-Christian era. 
 
 § 67. The founder of Neo-Platonism was Ammonius Saccas, the 
 teacher of Plotiiius. Ammonius expounded his doctrine only orally, 
 and its exact relation to that of Plotinus cannot be determined with 
 certainty. The affirmation that no essential difference existed be- 
 tween the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle is referred to him ; yet 
 the correctness of this reference is also uncertain. 
 
 Of the disciples of Ammonius, the most important, after Plotinus, 
 are Origen the Neo-Platonist, Origen Adamantius the Christian, 
 Erennius, and Longinus the philologist. 
 
 Dehant, Ksmii hiiitoriqu,6 snr la vie et la doctrine (TAmmonius SaccaK Brussels, 1S36. G. A. Helgl, 
 Der Bericltt des Porpkyrius iiber Origenes, Kegensburg. 1835. IHonys. Longinus: De Suhlimitate, e<i. S. 
 F. N. MoruB. Leips. 1769, ed. B. Weiske, Lelps. 1809. Longini vel Dionynii rrepl iii^ous ed. L. Spengt-1, in 
 Rh-etores Graeci, I,, Leips. 1853; ed. Otto Jahn, Bonn, 1867. Longini <piae /lupersiint, ed. Woiske, Oxford, 
 1820; ed. A. E. Esiier, Paris, 1837; Day. Ruhnken, Di.ts. de Vita et scriptis Longi7ii, 'Lfyi\en,l''iG. ii\so 
 in his Opusc, Leyden, 1S07, pp. 306-347. E. Egger, Longin est-il veritahlement Cauteur du iraite du 
 sublime t — in Egger's Essai sur Vhistoire de la critique chez les Grec«, Paris, 1S49, pp. 524-533. Louis 
 Vaucher, Etiides critiques sur le TraiU du SubUme, Geneva, 1854. Emil Winkler, De Longini qui 
 /ertur libello n. v., Halle, 1S70. 
 
 Ammonius, who lived about 1T5-250 A. D., was brought up by his parents in the 
 belief of Christianity, but returned afterward to the Hellenic faith (Porphyr., ap. Euseb. 
 Hist. Eccl., YI. 19: 'Afifiuviog fiiv yap Xpiartavog iv 'Kpiariavolg uvarpaoelg roZf yovevciv, 
 OTE rnv (ppovelv /cat r^f <pi/io(jo(piag ^iparo, €v6vg rrpbg tt/v Kara vouovg TTo/.crEiav /leTEfSd/^eTo). 
 The surname 2«/«df (the sack-bearer) was derived from the occupation by which Ammo- 
 nius originally gained his living. Later writers (notably Hierocles) gave him the surname 
 deo6i6aKTog (divinely taught). The report that he declared the Platonic and Aristotelian 
 doctrines essentially identical, originated with Hierocles (ap. Phot., Bibl. Cod., 214, p. 172 a, 
 173 b; Cod. 251, p. 461 a, Bekk.) ; Hierocles belonged to the Athenian school of Xeo-Plato- 
 nists, who, perhaps, only imputed to Ammonius their own desire to reconcile the teacliings 
 of the two philosophers. Nemesius (De Nat. Horn., ch. 2) makes some statements con- 
 cerning the doctrine of Ammonius respecting the immateriality of the soul; still, it may be 
 questioned whether he has not ascribed to Ammonius opinions held by others. "Whether 
 the doctrine that the One, the absolutely Good, is exterior to the world of Ideas and the 
 divine understanding — a doctrine of fundamental importance in the system of Plotinus — 
 was already enunciated by Ammonius, is uncertain. It was (according to Procl., Theol. 
 Plat., II. 4. init.) not held by Origen, the condisciplo of Plotinus ; what was the position of 
 Longinus on this point cannot be determined, since the point disputed between him and 
 Longinus, whether the Ideas subsist outside the Nous, is not necessarily connected with 
 the one now in question. 
 
 That Origen the Christian is to be distinguished from Origen the Xeo-Platonist 
 (although G. A. Heigl asserts their identity), is beyond doubt ; for the works of the Chris- 
 tian Church-Father were known by Porphyry (Euseb., Hist. Eccl., YI. 19), who complains 
 of his adherence to Christianity in spite of his Hellenic education {'Qpiyh'Tjc <5i 'E/IP.tv iv 
 'E?.X7;m nacfievOelg Xoyoig npog to fidpfiapov i^uKei?.e ro^.prjpa), and yet says of Origen the 
 Platonist, that (apart from his commentary on the Prooemium of the Platonic Timaeus, 
 
 I
 
 240 PLOTINDS, AMELIU8, AND PORPHYRY. 
 
 ■which Proclus mentions, ad Plat. Theol, II. 4) he wrote only on the two following subjects : 
 TTt-pl dai^uvuv and u-i /xdvoq Troirjriiq 6 j3aaiAevg (Porphyr., Vita Plotini, ch. 3). The latter 
 ■work treated, it is most probable, of the identity of the -world-builder -with the supreme 
 God. (Cf. G. Helferich, Unters. aus dem Gebiet der class. Alterthumswiss. G.-Pr , Heidel- 
 berg, 1860.) Origen the Christian (185-254 A. D.) appears to have attended the school 
 of Ammonius in about the year 212. 
 
 Porphyry relates {Vita Plotini, ch. 2) that "Erennius, Origen, and Plotinus made a 
 mutual promise not to divulge the doctrine of Ammonius ; but, Erennius having broken 
 this agreement, Origen and Plotinus felt themselves also no longer bound by it ; still, 
 Plotinus -wrote nothing till quite late in life." Of Erennius, tradition says that he explained 
 the terra "metaphysics" as denoting -what lies beyond the sphere of nature (see Brandis in 
 the Abh. d. Berl. Akad., 1831, p. 34 seq.), 
 
 Longinus (213-273 A. D.), known as a grammarian and writer on aesthetics, upheld, in 
 opposition to Plotinus and his follov^fers, the doctrine that the ideas exist separate from 
 the Nous. Porphyry also, -who was for a time a pupil of Longinus, sought, in a -work 
 directed against Plotinus, to demonstrate the same doctrine {oti i^o) rov vov {(pearr^Ke rd 
 voT/rd), but w-as afterward led by Amelius to abandon it, whereupon he was attacked by 
 Longinus (Porphyr., Vit. Plot, ch. 18 seq.). At a still later period Plotinus admitted that 
 Longinus was still the ablest critic of his times ( Vita Plot., ch. 20 : tov koi?' r/fiag kpitikutcltov 
 yevofih'ov) ; but he contended (perhaps because Longinus, in opposition to him, insisted on 
 the — real or supposed — literal sense of the Platonic writings) that he was only a philol- 
 ogist and no philosopher [ap. Porphyr., Vita Plotin., ch. 14 : ipMloyor^ fiev 6 Aoyylvog, 
 <fiil6ciO(poq 6e ov6afi(Jq). This judgment was, at all events, too severe. It is true that Lon- 
 ginus did not, like Plotinus, contribute to the positive development of theosophy. But he 
 participated, nevertheless, in the philosophical investigations connected with this subject, 
 and really enriched the science of aesthetics by his work on the Sublime (nepl vrpovg), which 
 is full of fine and just observations. 
 
 § 68. Plotinus (204-269 a. d.), who first developed the Neo- 
 PlatoDic doctrine in systematic form, or, at least, was the first to put 
 it in writing, was educated at Alexandria under Ammonius Saccas, 
 and afterward (from a. d. 244 on) taught at Rome. His works were 
 revised in point of style by Porphyry, and published in six Enneads. 
 
 Plotinus agrees with Plato in the doctrine of " sensibles '' {alo- 
 OrjTo) and " intelligibles " {vorjrd) and intermediate or psychical na- 
 tures. But he differs from him radically (though unconsciously — for 
 Plotinus believed that his own doctrine was contained in Plato's 
 writings), inasmuch as he teaches that the One or the Good, which 
 with Plato was the highest of the Ideas, is elevated above the sphere 
 of the Ideas and above all the objects of rational apprehension, and 
 that the Ideas, to which Plato ascribed independent existence, are 
 emanations from this " One," the soul an emanation from the Ideas, 
 and so on, the Sensible being the last in the series of emanations ; 
 he differs from him, further, in teaching that the Ideas are in the 
 Nous, while Plato in the Tirhaeus, with a phraseology which indi-
 
 PLOTINUS, AMELIU8, AND POBPHYRY. 241 
 
 cates a wavering between the tendency to poetic personification and 
 the dogmatic, doctrinal tendency, styles the Ideas gods and the 
 highest Idea the Idea of the Good, the highest god ; and the author 
 of the SopJiistes ascribes to them, in unqualified, dogmatic form, mo- 
 tion, life, and reason. 
 
 The primordial essence, the original unity, the One {tv) or the 
 Good {ayuOov)^ is neither reason nor an object of rational cognition 
 (neither vov<; nor vo-q-ov)^ because excluded, by virtue of its absolute 
 unity, from and exalted above both the terms thus contrasted. From 
 the excess of its energy it sends forth an image of itself, in like manner 
 as the sun emits rays from itself. This image, turning with an invol- 
 untary movement toward its original, in order to behold it, becomes 
 thus Nous, mind [vov^). In this Nous the Ideas are immanent, not 
 however as mere thoughts, but as substantially existent and essential 
 parts of itself They constitute in their unity the Nous, just as the 
 theorems of a science constitute in their nnity that science. It is to 
 them that true being and life really belong. Tlie same ideal reality is 
 thus at once the truly existent or the true object of knowledge, and 
 knowing subject or Reason ; in the former aspect it is considered as 
 at rest, in the latter, as in motion or active. The Nous in turn pro- 
 duces as its image the soul, which exists in it, as itself exists in the 
 One. The soul has affinities both for the ideal and the sensible. The 
 body is in the soul, and depends on it ; but the soul, on the contrary, 
 is absolutely separable from the body, not only in respect of its 
 thinking power, but also in its lower faculties, memory and sensuous 
 perception, and even in the formative force through which it molds 
 and builds up its material environment. It precedes and survives the 
 body. The matter, which is in the objects of sensuous perception, is 
 only generically similar to the matter, which is in the Ideas (^. c, both 
 fall under the same general concept of matter); but the former is 
 specifically differentiated from the latter by the attributes of extension 
 in space and solidity. The former is fif} dv, non-existent, essenceless, 
 and can only be reduced to form and order by higher forces, non- 
 derivable from itself. The forms and the fornuitive forces, the 
 powers of nature (Adyot), which enter into it, come from the Ideas, 
 or the Nous. The same categories are not applicable to the ideal 
 and the sensible. The business of man is to return to God, whom 
 he, as a sensuous being, has estranged from himself. The means 
 by which this return is to be accomplished are virtue, philosophic 
 
 16
 
 242 PLOTINUS, AMELIUS, AND PORPHYRY. 
 
 thought, and, above all, the immediate, ecstatic intuition of God and 
 the becoming one with Him. 
 
 Of the disciples of Plotinus, the most noteworthy are Amelius, 
 one of his earliest disciples, and Porphyry, the reviser, arranger, and 
 editor of his works. 
 
 The works of Plotinus were first published in the Latin translation of Marsilius Ficinus (Florence, 
 1492; Saligniaci, 1540 : Basel. 1559), and then in Greek and Latin (Basel, 1580, 1615); editions with the trans- 
 lation of Ficinus annexed have been published by Dan. Wyttenbach, G. H. Moser, and Fr Creuzer (Ox- 
 ford, 1835), by Creuzer and Moser (Paris, 1855), and by A. Kirchhoflf (Leips. 1856). Plotinus' treatises on 
 the virtues and against the Gnostics were edited and published by KirchhofTin 1847, and the latter of those 
 ■works, by Heigl (Regensb. 1832). Enn. I. 6, has been published separately by Creuzer- Plotini Lib. de 
 PulchriUid ine, Heidelb. 1814. The eighth book of the third Ennead (concerning nature, contemplation, 
 and the One) has been translated and explained by Creuzer (in Daub und Crenzef s, Stud ten. Vol. L, Heidelb. 
 1805, pp. 23-103), the first Ennead, by J. G. V. Engelhardt (Erlangen, 1820). Parts of Plotinus' works have 
 been translated into English by Tli. Taylor (London, ITST, 1794, 1817), and all have been translated into 
 French and provided with a commentary by Bouillet (Paris, 1857-60). 
 
 Of modern works on Plotinus we name those of Gottl. Wilh. Gerlach (Disp. de differentia, quae inter 
 Plotini et Schellinrjii doctrinam de mtmine ftummo intercedit, Witt., 1811), Lindeblad {['lot. de Pu/chro, 
 Lund, 1830), Steinhart (7>6 di(d. Plotini raticme, Halle, 1829; Meleiemata Plotinianu, diss. Pc/rt., Naum- 
 burg, 1840; and Art. Plotin, in P.auly's Real-enc. d. cl. Alt.\ Ed. Miiller (in his Geseh. der Thearie der 
 KwMt hei den Alten, II., pp. 286-315, Berlin, 1837), J. A. Neander (Ueber Ennead. II. 9: Gegen die 
 Gnostiker. in the Abh. der Perl. Akad., Berlin, 1843, p. 299 seq.), F. Creuzer (in the Prolerjmn. to the Paris 
 edition of the works of Plotinus), Ferd. Gregorovius (in Fichte's Zeitschr. f. Ph., XXVI., i)p. 112-147), 
 Rob. Zimmermann {Gesch. der Aenth., Vienna, 1S58, pp. 122-147), C. Herm. Kirchner {Die J'/tiloxop/ne 
 des Plotin, Halle, 1854), Starke (Plotini de amore senteiitia, Neu-Ruppin, 1854), R. Volkmann (Pie Hbhe 
 der antiken Aesthetik, oder Plotin' s Abh. vom iSytonera, Stettin, 1800), Emil Brenning {Die Lehrevom, 
 Schonen bei Plotin, im Zusammenhange seines Systems darge.'tellt, ein Beitrag zvr Geschichte der 
 Aesthetik, Gottingen, 1864), A. J. Vitringa {De egregio quod in rebus corporeis constituit PloUnvs 
 piilchri jirincipio, Amst. ISM), Ydlcntmer {Plotin v»d seine Ennead en nebst Vebersctzimg von Enn. 
 II. 9., in Stncdien und Kritiken, 1864, p. 118 seq.), Arthur Richter {Neuplat. Studien ; I/e/t 1 ; iiber Leben 
 vnd Geistesenticickelung des Plotin ; Ileftl: Plotin's Lehre vom Sein und die metaj^hys. Grundlage 
 seiner Philosophie; IleftZ: die Theo^agiexind Physik des Plotin; Ilefti: die Psychologie des Plotin ; 
 Heft 5: die Ethik de.'s Plotin, Halle. 1864-67), Kirm. Ferd. Mullcr {Ethices Plotinianae lineamenta 
 Diss., Berlin, 1867), E. Grucker {De Plotinianis libris, qui inscribuntur -nepi toO KaAoO et Trepi toO •'otjtoO 
 (taAAous, DUs., Strasbourg .and Paris, 1866). 
 
 Porphyrii Vita Plotini, composed in 303. appeared first in connection with the Basel editions of the 
 Enneads in 1580 and 1615, then in Fabric. Bibl. Gr., IV. 2, 1711, pp. 91-147, and in the 0.xford edition of 
 the EnneadsUi 1835, but not in the Paris edition, again in Kirchoflf's edition, Leips. 1850, and in Cobet's 
 Diog. Laert., Paris, 1850, append, pp. 102-118, ed. Ant. Westermann. Porphyrii Vit. Pyth. ed. Kiessling, 
 in the ed. of Jambl. de Vit. Pythagorica, Leips. 1815-16; ed. Westermann, in Cobet's Diog. L., Paris, 
 1850, app. pp. 87-101. Porphyrii atpopfial npo^ to. wTiTa, ed. L. Holstenius, with the Vita Pythag., Rome, 
 1630, and in the Paris edition of Plotinus (1855). Porphyr. Epist. de Diis Daenionibus ad Anebotiem, in 
 connection with Jambl. de Myst., Venice, 1497, and in Gale's ed. of the same work, O.vford, 1678. Por- 
 phyr. de quinque ^locibtis sive in categor. Aristotelis introductio,Va.T\&,'i.^Z; the same is prefi.xed to most 
 editions of the Org.anon, and is published in Vol. III. of the Berl. Akad.'s edition of Aristotle. Porphyr. 
 de abstinentia ah esu animaliuin I. quatuor, ed. Jac. de Rhoer, Utrecht, 1767. Porphyr. epist. ad JIarcel. 
 lam, ed. Angelus Maius, Milan, 1816 and 1831, ed. J. C. OrelIiu.s, in Opusc. Graec. Sententiosa, tarn. I., I^ips. 
 1819. Porphyrii de philosophia ex oraculis haurienda librorum reliquiae, ed. Gu.st. Wolflf, Berlin, 
 1866; cf. G. Wolff, De norissima oraculorum aetate, Berlin, 1854; Porphyr. de abstinentia et de antra 
 nympharum, ed. Rud. Hercher (together with Aclian's De Nat. Animal., etc.), Paris, 1S5S; Porph. philos. 
 Platonici opuscula tria rec, Aug. Nauck, Leips. 1860; Ullmann, ParalleUn aus den Schriften des Por- 
 phyr's zicneutest. Stellen, in the Tlieol. Stud.u. Erit.,\. 1, 1832, pp. 376-394. On Porphyry, cf. Lucas 
 Holsten {De vit. et scr. P., in the preface to his editions of Porphyry's works, Rome, 1630, Cambridge, 1655, 
 and in Fabric. Bibl. Or., IV. p. 2, ch. 27), Brandis(^tA. d. Berl. Ak. d. Wiss., ph.-hist. CL, 1833, p. 219 .seq.), 
 and Gust. Wolff ( Veber das Leben des Porphyr und die Abfassungseeit seiner Schriften, prefixed to Wolff's 
 ed. of Porph. de philos. ex oraculis, etc., pp. 7-18, 14-37); on his rank among the rei>re8entativea of Neo- 
 
 II
 
 PLOTINUS, AMELIUS, AND PORPHYRY. 243 
 
 PUtonism, cf. N. Bouillet (Porphyre, son role dans Vecole neoplatonicienne, sa lettre d MarceUa, traduitt 
 en fr., Ext/r. de la Revue Crit. et Bibliogr., Paris, March. 1864) : on his relation to Christianity, see Kellner 
 (in Kubn's Theol. QuartaUchr.^ 1860, No. 1), Jak. Bernays (TTieop/iraatos Sciirijt iU/er Frcnnmigkeit, ein 
 Beitrag zur IieUgix)nsge«chichte^ rnit kritischen und erkliirenden Bemerkungen zu Porphyrios' Schriji 
 u/ier Enthdltnamkeit. Berlin, 1866), and Adolf Schafer (De Porphyr in Plot. Tim. contmentario, Dixe., 
 Bonn, 1868). Porphyr von der Ehithaltsamkeit, a. d. Oriech. m. Anm,., by E. Baltzer, Nordhausen, 1869. 
 
 The native city of Plotinus was Lycopolis in Egypt (Eunap., Vit. Soph., p. 6, Boiss. 
 et al.). He himself was unwilHng even to name his birthplace or his parents, or the time 
 of his birth, for, says Porphyry, his disciple ( Vit. Plot, ch. 1), he despised these as terres- 
 trial matters, and he seemed to be ashamed of being in the body. Porphyry states {ibid., 
 ch. 2) that Plotinus died near the end of the second year of the reign of Claudius (269, 
 assuming, as we may, that the year of his reign began with the civil year ; otherwise, 270), 
 and that (according to information given to Eustochius, his own fellow-disciple) he was 
 then sixty-six years old ; from these data Porphyry derives 204 (205 ?) as the birth-year of 
 Plotinus. In his twenty-eighth year Plotinus applied himself to plnlosophy, and listened 
 to the instructions of the men then famous at Alexandria, but none of them was able to 
 satisfy him, till at last he came to Ammonius, in whom he found the teacher he had 
 Bought. He remained with Ammonius till the year 242 or 243, when he joined himself 
 to the expedition of the Emperor Gordian against the Persians, that he might learn the 
 Persian philosophy. He was prevented from accomplishing this purpose by the unfortu- 
 nate issue of the expedition, and was obliged to flee for his life to Antioch. 
 
 The inference of some historians (Brucker, for example, see above, p. 27) that Plotinus 
 was a disciple and adherent of the Potamo who is mentioned in Diog. L., I. 21, as the 
 founder of an eclectic sect, is incorrect. Suidas says (s. v. Hord/iwi') : Hot. ' AAe^avSpeig 
 yeyoviiq wpo Avynvarov Kal fzer' avrov, " Potamo, the Alexandrian, living before and after 
 the time of Augustus," and he adds that he was the author of a commentary on Plato's 
 Republic. If the statement of Suidas is correct, Diogenes Laertius must simply have 
 copied the words of his authority (Diodes) without thought, and the reference in the 
 words npb oAiyov Kal ekTiektlktj rig alpemg e'la^x^^ '^''^° UoTauuvog must be to the time of 
 Augustus. This Potamo appears to be identical with the person mentioned by Plutarch 
 (Akx., 61) as "Potamo the Lesbian," one of the teachers of Sotion the Sextian. 
 
 At the age of forty years (243 or 244 a. d.) Plotinus went to Rome (Porphyr., Vit. Plot., 
 ch. 3). He succeeded there in finding disciples, and, later still, he won over to his doctrine 
 the Emperor Gallienus, as also his wife Salonina, so that he ventured to entertain the 
 idea of founding, with the approval and support of tlio Emperor, a philosophers' city in 
 Campania, wliich was to be called Platonopolis, and whose inhabitants were to live ac- 
 cording to the Laws of Plato. He proposed to live in it himself, with his disciples. Gal- 
 lienus was not indisposed to grant the philosopher the desired permission, but he was 
 dissuaded from so doing by his counselors, and the plan remained unexecuted. Plotinus 
 remained in Rome till the first year of the reign of M. Aurelius Claudius (268 A. D.), and 
 then retired to Campania, where he died in the year 269, near Minturna;, at the country- 
 seat of Castricius Firmus, liis admirer. 
 
 It is evident from his writings that Plotinus had obtained an exact knowledge of the 
 doctrines of all the philosophical schools of the Greeks, by reading their principal works; 
 tliat, in particular, he had studied Aristotle with scarcely less zeal than he had studied 
 Plato, is expressly certified by Porphyry ( Vila Plot, ch. 14). The works of Numenius 
 exerted a powerful influence on him. Porphyry recognizes in Numenius a forerunner of 
 Ammonius and Plotinus, but agrees witli Amelius and Longinus in repelling the charge 
 raised by some against Plotinus, that he merely reproduced the teachings of Numenius;
 
 2i4 PLOTINUS, AMELICS. AND PORPHTEr. 
 
 oa the contrary, he says, Plotinus developed the Pythagorean and Platomc principles with 
 far greater exactness, thoroughness, and distinctness, than any one of his predecessors 
 ( Vita Plot, chs. 17 seq. ; 20 seq.). At the Synousiai Plotinus caused not only the writings 
 of the Platonists Severus, Cronius, Numenius, Gains, and Atticus, but also those of the 
 Peripatetics Aspasius, Alexander (of Aphrodisias ?), and Adrastus, to be read, and with 
 these he connected his own speculations (Porphyr., Vit. Plot., ch. 14). 
 
 Plotinus began the written exposition of his doctrines in his fiftieth year (253 a. d.) 
 His manuscript was revised after his death and given to the public by his disciple Por- 
 phyry ; yet a few copies made from the original had previously come into the hands of his 
 more familiar disciples. There existed also in ancient times an edition by Eustochuis, 
 respecting which the notice has come down to us that in it the psychological investigations 
 contained in Ennead. IV. 3-5, and which belong together, were divided otherwise than in 
 the Porphyrian revision, the third chapter coming nearer the commencement of the Er 
 nead in the former than in the latter edition. All the manuscripts now extant are based 
 on the edition of Porphyry. 
 
 The works of Plotinus lack the artistic form of the Platonic Dialogues, and still mor*( 
 their dialectical force; yet they possess a certain attractiveness from the earnest self-aban- 
 donment of the writer to his thought and the unction of his style. Porphyry ascribes to 
 the Plotinic diction terseness and wealth of ideas (avvTovog Kal noXvvov^) and sees in many 
 parts rather the language of religions inspiration (rd noTila ivdovciuv koI eK-rradug (ppdCuv) 
 than the tone of instruction. Longinus, who combated many of the doctrines of Plotinus, 
 confesses, nevertheless (in a letter to Porphyry, given in the latter's Vita Plotin., ch. 19) his 
 high appreciation of the Plotinic style of thought and expression {rbv 6e rvnov rf/g ypa<pri<: 
 Kal Tuv kwaiuv Tav6pbq rijv -nvici'OTijTa nal to ^iX.6ao(f)OV rfj^ tuv !l,rjT7jfiaT(jv diadkaeox; virep- 
 ^aXkovTiog ayafiai Kal <f>i?i,o>, Kal fiera tuv e/Jujyi/iujTdTov ayeiv rd tovtov ^t^Xla (pairiv kv 
 6elv Tovg CiT]TT;TiKovq). 
 
 The subjects of the fifty-four opuscules of Plotinus, which Porphyry arranged together 
 in six Enncads — following, as he himself says ( Vit. Plot, ch. 24), the method of Andronicus 
 the Aristotelian, in bringing together those which related to similar subjects, and begin- 
 ning with what was easiest to be understood — are the following : 
 
 First Ennead. 1. What is meant by l^uov, or living being, in general, and the nature of 
 man (in chronological order the 53d treatise). 2. Concerning the virtues (chronologically 
 the 19th). 3. Concerning dialectic, or on the three steps in the process of rising to the 
 intelligible (20). 4. On happiness (46). 5. Whether happiness increases with its duration 
 (36). 6. On the beautiful (1). 7. Concerning the first good (primum bonum) and the 
 other goods (54). 8. What objects evils are and what is the origin of evil (51). 9. On the 
 unlawfulness of suicide (16). Porphyry designates [Vit Plot, ch. 24) the topics of the first 
 Ennead in general as ethical (rd rjdiKUTEpa or rdf ydiKUTepag vTroOeaeig). The place assigned 
 to them, however, is in scientific regards inappropriate, and is also scarcely justifiable on 
 didactic grounds ; for Plotinus everywhere makes the ethical doctrine of the subjective ele- 
 vation of the individual to goodness dependent on the previously developed doctrines of 
 that which is good in itself, of being and of the soul (cf , in particular, Ennead. I. 3, 1 init). 
 
 Second Ennead (tuv (j>vaiK<ov awnyoyr/). 1. On the heavens (40). 2. On the revolution 
 of the heavens (14). 3. Whether the stars exert influences (52). 4. On the two kinds 
 of matter (12). 5. On potentiality and actuality (25). 6. On quality and essence (17). 
 7. On the possibility of complete mixture (37). 8. Why a distant object appears to the 
 eye smaller than it really is, while a near one appears with its actual magnitude (35). 
 9. Against the (Christian) Gnostics, who give out that the world and its author, or the 
 Demiurge, are evil (33). 
 
 fl
 
 PLOTTNUS, AMELIUS, AND PORPHYRY. 245 
 
 Third Ennead {hi to. nepl Kda^ov). 1. On fate (3). 2 and 3. On providence (47 and 
 4S). 4. Concerning the Demon charged to watch over us (15). 5. Concerning love (50). 
 6. On the irapassibUity of the immaterial (26). 7. Concerning eternity and time (45). 
 
 8. On nature, contemplation, and the One (30). 9. Various considerations respecting the 
 relation of the divine Nous to the ideas, and respecting tlie soul and the One (13). — Por- 
 phyry says ( Vt. PI, ch. 25), that ho placed the seventh chapter here 6ia ra rrepl tov 
 ;^p6vov and the eightli i^ca to nepl <j>vcnjq Ki:<pdAaiov, but he omits to say anything of the 
 other not less important contents of these chapters. 
 
 Fourth Ennead {to. nepl ipvxvc). 1. On the essence of the soul (4). 2. How the soul 
 holds the middle place between indivisible and divisible substance (21). 3-5. On various 
 psychological problems (27-29). 6. On sense-perception and memory (41). 7. On the 
 soul's immortality (2). 8. On the descent of the soul into the body (6). 9. On the ques- 
 tion, whether all souls are one (8). 
 
 Fifth Ennead {ra repl vov). 1. On the three original hypostases: the First Being, the 
 Nous, and the Soul (10). 2. On the genesis and order of that which comes after the First 
 Being (11). 3. Respecting the cognitive substances and that which is above and beyond 
 them (49). 4. Respecting the One and the manner in which all things descend from it (7). 
 5. That the voT^-d (Intolligibles) do not exist outside of the Nous; also, on the Nous and 
 on God as the absolutely good (32). 6. That that which transcends being is not a thinking 
 essence, and what it is that possesses thought originally and what possesses it derivatively 
 (24). 7. Whether there exist ideas of individual objects (18). 8. Respecting intelligible 
 beauty (31). 9. On the Nous, tlie ideas, and the existent (5). — Porphyry confesses that no 
 one of these chapters treats exclusively of the Nous. 
 
 Sixth Ennead (concerning the existent and the Good or the One). 1-3. Of the genera 
 of the existent (the Categories) (42-44). 4 and 5. That the existent, since it is one and 
 the same, is also everywhere entire (22, 23). 6. On numbers (34). 7. On the plurality of 
 the truly existent and concerning the Good (38). 8. On human and divine freedom (39). 
 
 9. On the Good or the One (9). 
 
 The chronological order of these fifty-four treatises is (according to Porpliyr., Vit. Plot, 
 chs. 4-6) the following: From a. d. 253 to 262: Enn., 1. 6. (On the beautiful; yet, in 
 respect to this one Porph. (ch. 26) expresses himself in doubt), IV. 7, III. 1, IV. 1, V. 9, 
 IV. 8, V. 4, IV. 9, VI. 9, V. 1, V. 2, II. 4, III. 9, II. 2, III. 4, I. 9, II. 6, V. 7, I. 2, I. 3, 
 IV. 2. From 262 to 267 : VI. 4 and 5, V. 6, II. 5, III. 6, IV. 3-5, III. 8, Y. S, V. 5, II. 9, 
 VI. 6, II. 8, I. 5, II. 7, VI. 7, VI. 8, II. 1, IV. 6, VI. 1-3, III. 7. 267-268: I. 4, III. 2 
 and 3, V. 3, III. 5. 268-269: I. 8, II. 3, 1. 1, I. 7. Another composition, written at about 
 the same time as V. 6, is mentioned by Porphyry {Vit. Plot, ch. 5), but the title is not 
 given, and it is not included by Porphyry in any of the Enneads. 
 
 Philo of Alexandria, the Jew, had introduced the distinction between God and his 
 world-building forces, which latter constituted together the divine Logos; Plutarch of 
 Chseronea had treated of God as unknowable in his essence and cognizable only in his 
 world-constructing activity ; Numeuius of Apamea had hypostatized God himself and the 
 Demiurge into two different beings, with whom the world was to be classed as a third ; 
 and Plotinus went further in the like direction. With Plato, he styled the Supreme 
 Essence the One, the Good per se, but denied to it — what it still retained in the doctrines 
 of Philo and Plutarch — the epithet of Being {to ov), for he taught that it transcended 
 Being {erceKEtva r^q ovaiag, cf. Plat., Rep., VI. 509, see above, p. 122); he also denied to 
 it the faculty of thought — in opposition to Numemus — affirming that it was also exalted 
 above the rational nature {ineKeiva vo^aeuq). 
 
 Plotinus pays particular attention to the demonstration of his fundamental doctrine,
 
 246 PL0TINU8, AMELIUS, AND PORPHYRY. 
 
 that the One is exalted abore the Nous. The treatise classed by Porphyry as the eighth 
 ia the third Eniiead, but which on didactic grounds might properly be placed at the begin- 
 ning of the whole work, opens with the proposition with which the Metaphysics of Aristotle 
 begins ("All men naturally seek after knowledge "), but in a modified and expanded form, 
 viz.: "All things tend toward thought" [deotpia, of which s2)eculation is the etymological 
 English equivalent. — Tr.]. He first introduces this assertion as a sort of playful prooe- 
 mium, and then proceeds to justify it by serious and extended argumentation. Nature, he 
 says, is the unconscious, or, as it were, the sleeping Logos, and she gives form to matter, 
 that she may rejoice in that which she has formed, as in a magnificent drama ; the soul of 
 the All and the souls of men find their highest end in thought ; action is only debUity of 
 thought {aadkveia deupiaq) or a result of it {napaKoTiovOrifia), the former when it takes place 
 without previous reflection, the latter when it is preceded by independent thought ; for which 
 reason, says Plotinus, those boys who are the least gifted, and are too stupid for purely 
 intellectual activities, resort to manual labor. Thought can be directed in a rising succes- 
 sion to nature, the soul, and the Nous, becoming ever more and more united with the object 
 of thought; but there remains ever involved in it the dual distinction of the act of knowing 
 and the object of knowledge, and this must be true not only of the human Nous but of every 
 Nous, even the divine (navrl vu awe^evKTac to votttov). But duality implies unity, and this 
 unity we must seek to discover {el 6e 6vo, del to irpo tuv 6vo Xa/ieiv). The Nous cannot 
 itself be the unity sought, since it is necessarily subject to the duality above pointed out. 
 Separate the Nous (intellect) from the votjtov (intelligible) and it will no longer be Nous. 
 Hence that which is prior to duality is above and beyond the Nous {rb Trporepov tuv 6vo 
 TovTuv ETriKetva dei vov elvac). The One can no more be votjtov than Nous ; for the vorfvov 
 is also inseparably united with the Nous. If, therefore, it can neither be Nous nor vo7jt6v, 
 it must be that from which each alike is derived. It is not, however, for this reason 
 irrational, but supra-rational or transcending reason (v7rep/3e(3?/Koc tt/v vov <p6aiv). It is to 
 the Nous what light is to the eye {Ennead. VI. *?). It is more snnple than the Nou-s, since 
 the producing is always simpler than the produced. Just as the unity of the plant, of the 
 animal, of the soul is the highest element in these existences, so unity in itself is that 
 which is absolutely first in ontological regards. It is the principle, the source, and the 
 power from which true being descends. — Plotinus here hypostatizes the last result of ab- 
 straction, and makes of it a being, existing apart from other beings. He then regards it 
 as the principle of that from which it was abstracted, and accordingly identifies it with the 
 Deity. — Just as he who has looked at the heavens and seen the lustre of the stars, thinks 
 of and seeks to discover the artist who fashioned the heavens, so must he who lias beheld 
 and known and admired the intelligible world {tov votjtov Kocrfxov), seek for its artist, and 
 asks who then it is that has called into existence this more glorious world of the Intelli- 
 gible (voT/Tov) and the Intellect (voif). 
 
 The difference between the fundamental doctrine of Plotinus and the corresponding 
 doctrine of Plato is very clearly expressed in the comparisons instituted by each. Plato 
 compares the idea of the good, as the highest in the world of ideas, to the sun, as that 
 which is highest in the sensible world ; Plotinus compares the same idea as the creatrix of 
 the ideal world to the creator of tiie sensible world. With another application of the Pla- 
 tonic figure, Plotinus compares the One to light, the Nous to the sun, and the soul to the 
 moon (Ennead. V. 6. 4). Plotinus, nevertheless, believed himself in agreement not only 
 with Plato, but also with the oldest philosophers. He says {Ennead. V. 1. 8) that with 
 Plato the Nous was the Demiurgos, hence the Cause (alnov), but that Plato maintained 
 the existence of a father to this Cause, and that this father was the Good (Taya6dv), which 
 is superior to both reason and being {to eneKeiva vov kuI eneKeiva ovoiar). Plato, he con 
 
 I
 
 PLOTINUS. AMELIUS, AND POKPHYRT. 247 
 
 tinues, applies the term Idea to Being and Nous, and must, therefore, have considered the 
 idea as having the Good for its source. Plotinus overlooks, in this connection, the fact 
 that Plato terms the Good, in some places, " the Idea of the Good," an expression which is 
 avoided by Plotinus, who, on the contrary, distinctly affirms that tlie principle of the Ideas 
 is itself not ideal, but exalted above ideality {Ennead. V. 5, 6 ; YI. 7. 32 : apxi] 6i rb 
 aveideov, ov tu fiop(pfiq 6e6/ievov, a7Jk' acj) ov -rraaa fJ-opipii voepa) ; ]jy the ovala^ Being, to 
 which Plato conceives the Good as superior, Plotinus understands not the Idea of Being, 
 but the sum of all Ideas. These dogmas, continues Plotinus, were touched upon already 
 before the time of Plato by Parmenides, who rightly identified the existent and the Nous, 
 and separated them from the Sensible ; but when he proceeded to see in this unity of being 
 and thought the highest of all unities, he proceeded inexactly and laid himself open to 
 criticism, which must still recognize in this pretended unity a real plurality. But the 
 Parmenides of the Platonic Dialogue, says Plotinus, discriminates more exactly {En- 
 nead. V. 1. 8). Nor did Anaxagoras, who posited the Nous as first and simplest, with his 
 antique manner hit upon the precise truth. The same may be said of Aristotle, for whom, 
 1il- .wise, the Nous was first in rank. Plotinus seeks, nevertheless, to show that his own 
 doctrine is the inevitable consequence of certain Aristotelian teachings. In Heraclitus and 
 Empedocles he discovers at least a separation of the intelligible from the sensible ; but of 
 all the philosophers before Plato, he finds the Pythagoreans and Pherecydes most friendly 
 to his conceptions {Ennead. Y. 1. 9). The Pythagoreans saw that the One, as exalted above 
 all contrariety, admitted only of negative determinations, and that even unity could be 
 ascribed to it only in the sense of the negation of plurality, for which reason they give it the 
 symbolical name of Apollo {Ennead. Y. 6. 4). Plotinus considers himself, therefore, justified 
 in drawing the general conclu.sion that his doctrine, so far from being new, was known even 
 to the earliest philosophers, though insufficiently developed by them, and in the develop- 
 ment supplied by himself he pretends to furnish merely an exegesis of what these, his pre- 
 decessors, had already taught (roif vvv Aoyovq t^rfyriTa^ ekeivuv yeyovivai, Ennead. Y. 1. 8). 
 
 In what manner the Many, or plurality, was evolved from the One is a problem on 
 whose solution Plotinus does not venture without a preliminary prayer to the Deity for 
 the gift of correct discernment {Ennead. Y. 1. 6). He rejects the attempted pantheistic 
 solution, according to which the One is at the same time All ; the One, he says, is not all 
 things, but before all {Ennead. III. 8. 8). The One is at once nothing and all things; the 
 former, since all things are posterior to the One, the latter, inasmuch as all are derived 
 from it {Eimead. YII. 1. 32). It is not by division that all things are derived from it, since 
 then it would cease to be One {Ennead. III. 8. 9). Remaining itself in repose, its products 
 arise from it as if by radiation {Ttepilafiilnr)^ just as the sun emits from itself the bright- 
 ness which surrounds it {Ennead. Y. 1. 9). But many difficulties remain in the way of 
 this hypothesis, which Plotinus will not conceal. "Was the plurality, which the One has 
 discharged from itself, originally contained in the One or not? If the affirmative bo true, 
 then the One was not strictly one ; if the negative, how could the Ouo give that which it 
 did not possess? The solution of this difficulty is found in the transcending power of the 
 One, which latter, as the superior, can send forth from the superabundance of its perfec- 
 tion the inferior, without having contained the latter, as such, in itself {Ennead. Y. 2. 1 : 
 bv yap TeAEiov olov vnepeppvri, Kal to vnepTrA-^pec ovrov TrenoiriKV a?./.o). More especially, 
 the possibility of the genesis of all things from the One is grounded in the circumstance 
 that the One is both everywhere and yet in no place. If it were simply everywhere, it 
 would be all things and so not one ; but since it is also nowhere, it follows that while 
 all things exist through the One, in virtue of its being everywhere, they exist as differen- 
 tiated from the One, in virtue of its being nowhere {Ennead. III. 9. 3).
 
 248 PLOTINU8, AMELIUS, AND POKPHYRT. 
 
 The immediate product of the One is tlie Nous (Ennead. V. 1. 6 and 7.) The latter is 
 »n image (e'lKuv) of the former. As the product of the One, the image turns toward the 
 One in order to grasp and comprelieud it, and througli this very turning (e-moTpoipfj) it be- 
 comes Nous (reason), for all theoretical comprehension is either aladrjaiq or vov^ (sense-per- 
 ception or rational apprehension) ; it is the former only when the olDJect of comprehension 
 is sensible, hence when this object is supra-sensible it is vov^. The Nous is in distinction 
 from the One subject to differentiation {erspoTT/g), in that the duality of knowing and known 
 is inherent in it; for even when both these terms are, in fact, identical (in self-knowledge), 
 the ideal difference remains. The Nous includes in itself the world of Ideas (Ennead. III. 9 ; 
 V. 5). The Ideas have their material constitution, but it is a supra-sensible nature {En- 
 nead. IV. 4. 4 : ei de iiop<pi], iari koI to nopcpov/ievov, ■nepl b t] 6ta(popa., iariv apa Kal vXrj ?/ 
 77]v nop<l)fjv dexofj-evtj Kai ati to intOKELfiEvov " etl ci Koafioq voTjroq ianv EKtl, /j.i/i7!fj.a (ii ovto^ 
 CKEivov, oiirof 6e avvdEToc icai t^ vh/^, kclkeI SeI v'atjv slvai). That the Ideas are immanent 
 in the Nous and do not exist externally to it (oti ovk e^u tov vov to. voT/rd) is the second 
 cardinal point of the Plotinic doctrine. Plotinus cites Plato's utterance in the Timaeus, 
 that the Nous looks at the Ideas, which are in "the Living" (iv rcj 6 ian ^iJov), and says 
 that from this it might appear that the Ideas were prior to the Nous; but if that were 
 so, the Nous would only possess in itself representations of the truly existent, and 
 not the latter itself, hence not the truth, which would then lie beyond its sphere. Plato 
 can only have intended, therefore, to assert the identity of the Nous with that intellectual 
 world in which exist the Ideas (the noapoq vot/toc or the 6 eoti l^uov). The intelligible 
 (i'o/;-oi) is not substantially, but only ideally, distinguishable from the Nous; the same 
 existence is intelligible, in so far as it possesses the attributes of repose and unity {ardcLq.^ 
 (voTm, r/cvxta), aud Nous, in so far as it exercises the act of knowing (Ennead. III. 9. ]). 
 The Nous, i. c. the divine and true Nous, cannot err; if it had not the truth in itself, but 
 only images of the truth, it would err (rd ■\pEv6rj e^el Kai oidiv aX?/6£^), it would not par- 
 ticipate In the truth (duoipot; ah/HEiac;), and would yet be subject to the false belief that it 
 possessed the truth; it would then not be Nous at all, and no place whatsoever would 
 remain for the truth. It is, therefore, incorrect to seek for the Ideas (-a voijtq) outside of 
 the Nous (as did Longinus), or to suppose tliat the Nous contains only images or impres- 
 sions (ri'not) of thai which exists; on the contrary, one must confess that in the true Nous 
 the Ideas are immanent (Ennead. Y. 1. 1 and 2).* 
 
 The Soul is the image (Eidulov) and product of the Nous, just as the Nous is of the 
 One (Ennead. V 1. 7 rjwxvf yEwa vovg). As being only the image of the Nous, the soul 
 IS necessarily of inferior rank and character, though none the less really divine and en- 
 dowed wllii generative force. The soul turns in a double direction toward the Nous, its 
 producer, and toward the material, which is its own product. Coming forth from the 
 Nous, the soul extends itself, as it were, into the corporeal, just as the point, extended, 
 becomes a line ; there is, therefore, in the soul (and this is in accordance with Plato's 
 leaching in Ihe-Tiinaeiis) an ideal, indivisible element, and a divisible element which goes 
 to produce the material world. The soul is an immaterial substance, not a body, nor tlie 
 
 * Neither the doctrine of Loneinus nor that of Plotinus Is identicnl with Plato's doctrine • Pluto repre 
 sents the Nous of the world-artist as immanent in the idea of the Good, and in the dialocue Sop/i. (p. 248) — 
 where what was [irobahly in the beginninp a poetic personirtcation has already become a matter of doctrine — 
 motion, life, animation, and reason are ascribed to the Ideas, so that their relation to the Nous is neither 
 that of Immanence nor that of transcendence, but the Nous is immanent in them. That the Ideas transcend 
 the human Nous is justly recosnized as Plato's doctrine both by Plotinus and Lonsiinus It followed ob- 
 viously from the argument of Plotinus, that he must either refuse to man a knowledge of the Ideas at 
 e)ge make them also immanent in the human Nous,
 
 PLOTINUS, AMELIUS, AND POKPHTBT. 249 
 
 harmony, nor the entelechy of the body and inseparable from the latter, since not only th« 
 Nous, but also memory, and even the faculty of perception and the psychical force, which 
 molds the body, are separable from the body (Plotm., ap. Euseb., Praepar. Ev., XV. 10). 
 There exists a real plurality of souls ; the highest of all is the soul of the world ; but the 
 rest are not mere parts of the world-soul {Ennead. lY. 3. 7 ; IV. 9). The soul permeates 
 the body as fire permeates air. It is more correct to say that the body is in the soul than 
 that the soul is in the bodj^ ; there is, therefore, a portion of the soul in which there is no 
 body, a portion to whose functions the co-operation of the body is unnecessary. But nei- 
 ther are the sensuous faculties lodged in the body, whether in its individual parts or in 
 the body as a whole; they are only present with the body (Trapelvai, irapovcia), the soul 
 lending to each bodily organ the force necessary for the execution of its functions {Ennead. 
 IV. 3. 22 and 23). Thus the soul is present not only in the individual parts of the body, 
 but in the whole body, and present everywhere in its entirety, not divided among the dif- 
 ferent parts of the body ; it is entirely in the whole body, and entirely in every part. The 
 soul is divided, because it is in all the parts of its body, and it is undivided, because it is 
 entirely in all parts and in every part (/lepiary, on kv naat fiipeai tov ev cj kartv, a/iepiaTog 
 6k, oTi oTiTi tv Tract, kol ev otcjovv aiiTov b?.7/, Ermead. IV. 2. 1). The soul is per se indivi- 
 sible, being divided only as related to the bodies into which it enters, since these could not 
 receive it if it remained undivided (ibid.). (It is obvious that Plotinus sought by this 
 qualification to escape the objection of Soverus to the Platonic doctrine of the mixed 
 nature of the substance of the soul.) The soul is essentially in the Nous, as the Nous 
 is in the One ; but the soul contains the body {Ennead. V. 5. 9). The Divine extends from 
 the One to the soul {Ennead. V. 1. 7). 
 
 The soul, in virtue of its mobility, begets the corporeal {Ennead. III. 7. 10; cf. IV. 3. 9 > 
 I. 8. 5). That material bodies possess a substratum {vTroKei/ievov), which, itself unchanged, is 
 the subject of manifold changing forms, is inferable (as Plato teaches) from the transition 
 of various kinds of matter into each other, whereby it is made obvious that there are no \ 
 
 determinate forms of matter which are original and unchangeable, such as, for example, \ 
 
 the four elements of Empedocles, but that all determination arises from the union of form i 
 
 {liopfn) and unqualified matter {iih/}. Matter, in the most general sense of the word, i | 
 
 is the basis or "depth" of each thing {rb (idOog EKaarov tj vmj). Matter is darkness, as \ 
 
 the Logos is light. It has no real being (it is jiy bv). It is the qualitatively indeterminate 
 {aKEipox), which is rendered determinate by the accession of form ; as deprived of form 
 it is evil («aK(5v), as capable of receiving forms, it is of an intermediate nature between 
 good and bad {/itaov ayaOov koI kukov). But the matter in the ideas is only in so far simi- 
 lar to that which is in sensible objects, as both fall under the general designation of " the ^ 
 dark depth ; " in other respects, the difference between these two kinds of matter is as 
 great as that which exists between ideal and sensible form {6id(j>op6v ye fjijv to oKoreivov 
 r6 re ev Tolg votjtoI^ t6 re kv voir aladiiTo'iq vwdpxov, 6td<^p6q te tj vXt/, baov Kai to eldog 
 TO imKELfievov d/i(polv 6id(t>opov) ; as that form {fiopdfj) which is perceived by the senses is 
 only an image {el6ulov) of ideal form, so also the substratum of the sensible world is only 
 an image or shadow of the ideal substratum ; this latter has, like the ideal form, a true 
 existence, and is rightly called ovaia, substance, while the designation of the substratum 
 of sensible things as substance is incorrect {Ennead. II. 4). 
 
 Plotinus subjects the Aristotelian and also the Stoic doctrine of categories to a minute 
 criticism, of which the fundamental idea is that the ideal and the sensible do not fall 
 under the same categories. He then offers, himself, a new doctrine of categories. In 
 agreement with the (Platonic?) Dialogue Sophistejs (p. 257 seq.), he designates as funda- 
 mental forms of the ideal : being, rest, motion, identity, and diflference {bv, ardaii, Kivrjcig,
 
 250 PLOTINUS, AMELroS, AND PORPHYET. 
 
 ravTOTTj^, and hepoTTjg). The categories which apply to the sensible world, taken in the 
 sense here given to them, are not the same with those of the ideal world, yet they are 
 not entirely different; they are homonymous with the latter, but are to be understood 
 only in an analogous sense {Sei . . . Tavra avaXoyia Kal o/iuvvfiia TiafifidvEiv). Plotinus 
 seeks to reduce the Aristotelian categories to these analoga of the ideal categories 
 {Ennead. VI. 1-3). 
 
 The essence of beauty consists not in mere symmetry, but in the supremacy of the 
 higher over the lower, of the form over matter, of the soul over the body, of reason and 
 goodness over the soul. Artistic representation imitates not merely sensible objects, but, 
 in its highest development, the ideas themselves, of which sensible objects are images. 
 
 In consequence of their descent into corporeality, the souls of men have forgotten their 
 divine origin and become unmindful of the Heavenly Father. They wished to be inde- 
 pendent, rejoiced in their self-lordship (rw avTE^ovc'nJ), and fell constantly farther and 
 farther from God, forgetting their own dignity, and paying honor to that which was 
 most contemptible. Hence the need of man's conversion to that which is the more 
 excellent {Ennead. V. 1. 1). Man has not lost his freedom; the essence of freedom — says 
 Plotinus, in agreement with Aristotle — is the absence of constraint, combined with knowl- 
 edge {}i7] (Ha iiETo. Tov eldivac, Ennead. VI. 8. 1). Some men remain buried in the sen- 
 suous, holding pleasure to be the only good and pain the only evil ; they seek to attain 
 the former and to avoid the latter, and this they regard as their wisdom. Others, who 
 are capable of rising to a certain point, but are yet unable to discern that which is 
 above them, become only virtuous, and devote themselves to practical life, aiming merely 
 to make a right choice from among those things, which are after all only of an inferior 
 nature. But there is a third class of men of divine nature, who, gifted with higher 
 power and keener vision, turn toward the radiance which shines from above and rise 
 into its presence ; they rise above the region of obscuring mists and, despising all that 
 is of the earth, sojourn there, where is their true fatherland and where they become 
 partakers of true joy (Ennead. V. 9. 1). Virtue is defined by Plotinus, with Plato, as 
 resemblance to God (few 6fzoio6f/vai, Ennead. I. 2. 1), and sometimes, also, as activity 
 conformed to the nature of the agent {evepyslv Kara tijv ovaiav), or obedience to reason 
 (knaiELv loyov), definitions wliich recall the doctrines of Aristotle and the Stoics. Plotinus 
 distinguishes between civil and x'urifying virtues and virtues which render their possessor 
 like God. The civil virtues [KO/iiTiKal aperaP) are practical wisdom, courage, temperance, 
 and justice, the latter in the sense of " attention to one's own business, whether as a ruler 
 or a subject " {oLKEionpayia apxv^ TTEpl Kal tov apxEadai) ; the purifying virtues {mdapaEiQ) 
 deliver man from all sin {dfiapria), by making him to flee from whatever pertains merely to 
 sense, while the third class of virtues end, not in deliverance from sin, but in identification 
 with God (oi'/c e^cj dfiapTiac eh'ai, a/l/ld ^eov slvat). In the virtues of the last class those 
 of the first are repeated in a higher sense (^ dmaioavvrj tj fiEi^uv to npog vovv ivEpyEiv, to 
 6e cuffjovEiv Tj Eiau) trpoq vovv arpocpT/, ^ ds avSpEia anddEia naff ofioiuaiv tov npb(' b 
 (iTi^KEi^ dnadeq ov t7/v (pvatv, . . rrpb^ vovv /} bpaaig ao(j)ia nai ^povr/aic, Ennead. I. 2). 
 
 The last and highest end for man is ecstatic elevation to the one truly Good. This 
 elevation is not effectuated by thought, but by a higher faculty ; the intellectual cognition 
 of the Ideas forms to it only a stepping-stone, which must be passed and left behind. The 
 highest point which can be reached or aspired to is the knowledge of, or rather contact 
 with, the Good itself (7 tov ayadov eIte yvuaig eIte £na(j>Tj)\ for the sake of this the soul 
 despises even thought itself, which she yet prefers to all things except this; thought is a 
 form of motion (Kivr/oic), but the soul desires to be unmoved, like the One itself {Ennead. 
 VI. 7. 25 and 26). The soul resembles God by its unity {Ennead. III. 8. 9) and by its pos-
 
 PLOTINUS, AMELIU8, AND PORPHYRY. 251 
 
 aession of a centre (to ijvxm ohv Kevrpov, Ennead. VI. 9. 8), and hence arises the possi- 
 bility of its communion with the One {Ennead. VI. 9. 10). When we look upon God we 
 have reached our end and found rest, all disharmony is removed, we circle around God in 
 the movements of a divinely-inspired dance {x^P^'^^ ivOeog), and behold in him the source 
 of life, the source of the Xous, the principle of being, the cause of all good, the source and 
 principle of the soul, and we enjoj' the most perfect blessedness {Ennead. VI. 9. 8 and 9). 
 Yet this is not a beholding (dia/ua), but another manner of knowing; it is ecstasy, simpli 
 fioation, contact with Good (eKCTaaig, airTMatg, d(b7/, Ennead. VI. 9. II). Not always are we 
 able to abide in this blessed state; not yet completely loosed from the bonds of the earthly, 
 it is only too easy for the earthly to win back our regards, and only rarely does the direct 
 vision of the supreme God fall to tlie lot of the best of men, the virtuous and wise, the 
 god-hke and blessed (Ennead. VI. 9. 10 and 11). 
 
 According to the testimony of Porphyry, his disciple, Plotinus attained to this unifica- 
 tion with God only four times in the six years which Porphyry spent with him (Porphyr., 
 Vit. Plot., c. 23). 
 
 One of the earliest disciples of Plotinus at Rome (2-46 seq.) was Amelius (G«ntilianu8, 
 the Tuscan, from Ameria), who at the same time allowed also great authority to Nume- 
 nius. He distinguished in the Nous three hypostases, which he styled three Demiurges 
 or three kings : rbv bvra, tov Ixovra, tov o^uvra. Of these the second participated in the 
 real being of the first, and tlie third in the being of the second, enjoying at the same 
 time the vision of the first (Procl., in Plat. Tmi., 93 d). Amelius maintained the theory 
 (opposed by Plotinus) of the unity of all souls in the world-soul (Jamblich., ap Stob., 
 EcL, I. 886 ; 88S ; 898). 
 
 The most important of the disciples of Plotinus was Porphyry. Born at Batanea, in 
 Syria, or perhaps at Tyre, in the year 232 or 233 a. u., he received his education at Tyre. 
 His original name was Malchus, which Longinus, whose pupil he was for a time (252-262), 
 is said to have translated into Porphyrius (Eunap., Vit. Sojih.., p. 7, Boiss.). At Rome, in 
 the year 262, he became a pupil and follower of Plotinus, and here, after liaving passed 
 the years 267-270 in Sicily, he is said to have lived and died (about 304 a. d.). Porphyry 
 lays claim less to the rank of an originator in philosophy than to that of an expositor and 
 defender of the doctrine of Plotinus, which he regards as identical with that of Plato and 
 substantially also with that of Aristotle. Porphyry wrote a work in seven books, entitled 
 vepl TOV (liav elvai rijv IIAdrwvof /cat ' AptaroTtTuovq at/^eciv (according to Suidas, 5. v. Hopcpvptoc), 
 and also expositions of Plato's Timaeus and Sophistes and of Aristotle's Cntegoriae and X>e 
 Interpretatione, and the still extant Elcayuyr/ elf rd^ ('Aptaro-£?.ovf) Kan^yopiaq {Tvepl -yivov^ Kal 
 eidotig Kai (ha(popdr /cat idiov Kal avjxfiejijiKoTOQ), which is usually printed in the beginning of 
 the Orgaivon. An epitome, by Porphyry, of the Plotinic system, expressed in a series of 
 aphorisms, is likewise now extant. Besides tliese. Porphyry wrote a number of original 
 works. Eunapius {^Vita Porphyr., p. 8, Boiss.) ascribes to Porphyry, as his principal 
 merit, that by his perspicuous and pleasing diction he brought within the range of the 
 understanding of all men tlie doctrine of Plotinus, which in the language of its author 
 had seemed difficult and obscure. The doctrine of Porphyry is, however, distinguished 
 from that of Plotinus by its more practical and religious character ; the end of philoso- 
 phizing, according to Porphyry, is the salvation of the soul (7 rfj^ ''I'^XVi aur^pia, 
 Porphyr., ap. Euseb., Pr. Ev., IV. 7, et at). The cause of evil is to be found in the soul, 
 in its desires after the low and base, and not in the body as such {Ad MarceUam, c. 29). 
 The means of deliverance from evil are self-purification {KaOapcic) through asceticism and 
 the philosophical cognition of God. To divination and theurgical initiations Porphyry con- 
 cedes only a subordinate significance ; in his later years, especially, he was instant in
 
 252 JAMBLICHUS AND THE STEIAN SCHOOL. 
 
 warning his followers against their misuse (see, in particular, his epistla to Anebo, the 
 Egyptian Priest). Porphj^ry recommends abstinence from animal food on religious 
 grounds (see Bernays, Theophr. Schr. ilber Frommigkeit, mit kr. u. erkl. Bern, zu Porph. Sdir. 
 uber EntJialt, pp. 4-35). Porphyry appears to have taught (in his six books nepl vT^nc) 
 more distinctly than Plotinus the doctrine of the emanation of matter from the super- 
 sensuous (and proximately from the Soul; Procl., in Tim., 109, 133, 139; Simplic, in Phys., 
 f. 50 b). The doctrine that the world is without beginning in time was defended by Por- 
 phyry against the objections of Atticus and Plutarch (Procl., in Tim., 119). During his 
 residence in Sicily, Porphyry wrote a work kuto. xplotuivuv, distributed into fifteen Books, 
 in which he attacked the doctrines of the Cliristians, and especially the doctrine of the 
 divinity of Jesus. This work is often mentioned by the Church Fathers (Euseb., Hist. 
 Eccles. VI. 19; Bemonstr. Evang., III. 6; Augustin., Civ. Dei, XIX. 23 et ah). In the 
 twelfth book Porphyry declared the prophecies in the Book of Daniel (which appears to 
 have been composed about 164 or 163 B. c.) to be prophecies after the event {vaticinia ex 
 eventu). Methodius, Eusebius of Cffisarea, Apollinarius, and Philostorgius wrote works in 
 reply to Porpliyry's. But neither these works, nor the work of Porphyry (which was 
 burned by order of the Emperor Theodosius II., in the year 435) have come down to us. 
 Cf. J Bernays, Theophr., etc., p. 133 seq. 
 
 § 69. Jamblichus (died about 330 a, d.), a native of Chalcis in 
 Coele-Syria and pupil of Porphyry, employed the Keo-Platonic phi- 
 losophy simply as a means for confirming the polytheistic cultus. He 
 attempted the speculative justification of superstition. He imitated 
 Pythagoras more than Plato, his philosophy resting rather on mystical 
 speculations with numbers, than on Platonic ideas. In his system 
 not only did all the gods of the Greeks and Orientals (excepting the 
 Christian God) and the gods of Plotinus find a place, but he also took 
 a quite peculiar pleasure in adding to the number of superior divini- 
 ties from the resources of his own fancv. 
 
 For the disciples of Jamblichus, chief among whom were^desius, 
 Chrysantbius, Maximus, Prisons, Eusebius, Sopater, Sallustius, and 
 Julian the Apostate (who was Emperor from December, 361, to June, 
 363), and others, the practice of theurgy had in general more interest 
 than philosophical speculation. Theodorus of Asine, one of the ear- 
 liest of the disciples of Jamblichus, is the only one who labored for 
 further development of the system. The immoderate and even deify- 
 ing veneration of the heads of schools, and especially of Jamblichus, 
 increased in proportion as the philosophic achievements of their dis- 
 ciples became more insignificant. Those in this period who did most 
 for philosophy were the commentators of the works of the ancient 
 philosophers, Themistius being the most noteworthy among them. 
 
 Jamhlichi Chalcidensiti de Vita Pythagorica Liber, ed. Theoph. Kiessling; aecedmit Porphyr. <?« 
 Titu Pythag., etc., Leijis. 1815-16. Jamhl. de Pytha^orica Vitn, ed. Ant. ■Westermann, Paris, 1850. in 
 Cobet's edition of Diogenes Laertius. Jamhl. Adhortatio ad Philonophiatn, ed. Kiessling, Leips. 1818.
 
 JA.MBLICHUS AND THE SYRIAN SCHOOL. 253 
 
 Jamhl. wepi Tij? Koirij? fio9j|»iaTK(^9 eTTtoTTj/aij? A070? TpiTo? (in Villoison's Anecd. Graec., II., pp. 185 seq., 
 Venice. 1781). Jamhl. Theo/ogumena Arithmeticae ; accedunt Kiconuichi Geraseiii Arithmetical Libri 
 J J., ea. F. Ast, Leips. 1817. (Jamblichi f) de MynUriix liber, erf. Gust. Parthey, Berlin, 1857. G. E. Heben- 
 Btreit (m De JamO/icfti, philonophi Syri, doctrina Christianue religioni, quam imituri studet, noria, 
 Leips. 1764) treats of the doctrine of Jamblichus. Of the author of the De Mysteriis ^gyjitiorum treat 
 Meiners (in the Comment. Soc. Gotting., IV. p. 50 seq., 1782), Harless (Dae Buck von den agypti/KJien 
 MyHterien, Munich, 1858). and Eeinr. Kellner (Analt/ae der Schrift den Jnmhlichits De Mysteriis. alx einea 
 Versuches, eine wisa. Theologie des Ileidenthuma herzustelleu, in the 77ieol. Quartalschr., 18C7, No. 3, 
 pp. 359-396). 
 
 Dremppi in AriM. categorias duhitationes et solvtiones primum, ed. Spengel, Munich, 1869. 
 
 J/lafifiov 4>tAo<ro<^ov irepi KaTapxiov, ed. Gerhardius, Leips. 1820. 
 
 Juiiani Imp. Opera, ed. Petrus Petavius and Car. Cantoclarus, Paris, 1553 (ed Dion. Petavius), Paris, 
 1630; ed. Spanheim, Leips. 1696. LibaniuH. tTrtroi^ios ejr 'lovAiavcp, in Lib. Op.,ed. Eeiske, Altenburg, 
 1791-97. Epistolae, ed. L. H. Heyler, Mayence, 1828. Of modern writers on Julian maybe mentioned 
 Gibbon (chaps. XXII.-XXIV. of his History), Aug. Neander (Ueber den Kaiser Julian -und sein Zeitalter, 
 Leipsic, 1812). G. F. Wiggers (De Jul. Apost, Diss., Rostock, ISIO, and in Illpen's Zeitachr. /. hist. Theol., 
 Leips. 1837), H. Schulze (Progr., Strals. 1889), TeufTel {Dins., Tub. 1S44). D. F. Strauss (Jul. der Abtriliv- 
 nige. der Romantiker auf dem Thron der Cdsnren, Mannheim, 1847), Auer (Kaiser Julian der Abtr., 
 Vienna, 1855), Willi. Mangold (Jul. der Abtr.,Vorfrag, gehalten in Marlmrg, Stnttg. 1862), Carl Semisch 
 {Jul. der Abtr., ein Charakterbild, Breslau, 1862), Fr. Lubker (K. Julians Kampf und Ende, Hamburg, 
 1864), Eogdne Talbot (Jidien, aevAires completes, traduction nouvelle accompagnee de sommaires, notes, 
 eolairciaaementa, etc., Paris, 1863), Banr (Die christl. Kirche vom 4.-6. Jahrh., pp. 17-43), and Philip 
 Schaff (Ilistory of the Ancient Church, New York, 1859-67, German edition, Leipsic, 1867, §§ 136 and 141, 
 and in the Zeitachr.f. hist. Th., h. v. Kahnis. 1S67, pp. 408-444. 
 
 SaUustii philosophi de diis et mundo lib. ed. Leo Alatius, Rome, 1C38: ed. J. C. Orelli, Zurich, 1821. 
 
 Themiatii opera omnia ; paraphrases in Aristot. et orationes, cum Aleacandri Aphrodi«iensis libria 
 d« anima et de fato ed. Vict. Trincavellua, Venice, 1534. Them, paraphrases Arist. librorum, quae 
 su2)ersimt ed. Leon. Spongel, Leipsic, 1866. Cf. Valentin Rose, on a supposed paraphrase by Themistius 
 (of the P7-ior Anahjtics) in the Hermes (Review), Vol. II. 1867, No. 3, pp. 359-396 (Rose ascribes this 
 paraphrase conjecturally to Sophonias, a monk of the fourteenth century). 
 
 On Hypatia, cf. Jo. Chph. Wolff (in Fragmenta et elogia mulierum Graecarum, quae orat. prosa 
 usae sunt, GOtt. 1739), Jo. Ch. Wernsdorf (Wittemberg, 1747-8), Rich. Hoche (Hypatia, die Tochter Theona, 
 in the Philol. XV., 1860, pp. 435-474). 
 
 Jamblichus heard first the Neo-Platonist Anatoh'us, a disciple of Porphyry, and after- 
 ward Porphyry himself (Eunap., Vit. Jambl, p. 11, Boiss.). He died in the reign of Con- 
 stantine, and was not living when the latter caused Sopater, one of his disciples, to 
 be executed (Eunap., Vit. JSdesii, p. 20). Some even of the immediate disciples of Jam- 
 blichus believed in the miraculous acts attributed to this philosopher, who was called by 
 his reverers " the divine " (very often in Proclus), or, sometimes, '" most divine " (Julian, 
 Epist., 27). Besides his commentaries en Plato and Aristotle, and his Xa?.6alK^ TeXeiordTTi 
 Oeo^Myia (the 28th book of which is cited by Damasc, De Princ., ch. 43 init.), he composed, 
 among other things, the following works, still extant : xjpt rov UvOa-yopinnv pior', "^.oynt; 
 TzpoTfyeivTiKoq fJf (ptXoacxpiav, nepl KOivrjq /xadrifiartK^g ETiarTjuTiq, rrepl ttjq 'SiKo^dxov dpid- 
 (iriTiKTjq e'laayuyrjq and the OeoXoyovfiEva rrj^ aptdinjriKrjq. Whether the work Da Mysteriis 
 jEgyptiorum is from the pen of Jamblichus is doubtful ; Proclus is reported to have 
 ascribed it to him ; at all events, it was composed either by Jamblichus or by one of his 
 disciples. The pretended Epistles of Julian to Jamblichus, still extant, are supposititious ; 
 the hypothesis (of Brucker and others), that the Emperor addressed them to the nephew 
 of the head of the school, who bore the same name, is not in harmony with the character 
 of these letters. 
 
 Above the One of Plotinus, Jamblichus assumes still another absolutely first One, 
 superior to all contraries and, as being wholly without attributes, elevated even above the 
 Good. Under and next to this utterly ineffable fir.st essence (// TvavTij dppTjroc cipxv, accord- 
 ing to Damaac., De Princ., ch. 43 init.) stands that One, which (as Plotinus had taught) is
 
 254 JAMBLICHCS AND THE SYRIAN SCHOOL. 
 
 identical with the Good. Its product is the intelhgible world {ndcfioc votjtoc), from wliich 
 the intellectual world {koo^oq voepoc) is an emanation. The intelligible world includes the 
 objects of thought (the ideas), while the intellectual world includes all thinking beings. 
 The elements of the intelligible world are "limit" or "subsistence" (wipag or v-rrapSic^ 
 termed also "father," nar^p), " illimitation " or "possibility of subsistence" {aneipcv or 
 Svvafiiq TTjq i'Trdpffwf), and the union of these two or the realization of the given "possi- 
 bility " {fiiKTov or evfpyeia or v6j]aii; rfjq 6vva/xcu^). The members of the intellectual world 
 are likewise three in number; they are Nous, Power {Svva/iic), and the Demiurge, which, 
 however, Jamblichus seems to have subdivided into seven. Then follows the psychical 
 sphere, containing again three parts : the supra-mundane Soul and two other souls, which, 
 according to Jamblichus (ap. Procl., in Tim., 214 seq.), emanated from the first. Within 
 the world exist the souls of the gods of the popular polytheistic religion, and of angels, 
 demons, and heroes in multitudes, whose numbers Jamblichus (Pythagorizing) determines 
 according to a numerical schema and whom he ranks in a fantastical order. The last place 
 in the order of existence is filled by the sensible world. 
 
 The work De ilysteriis uSgyptiorum ['Afidfi/jiava^ SiSacKaXov Trpof ttjv 'n.op(pvpiov Trpof 
 'Avefti) inLOToTii/v andKpici^ Kol tuv iv avrri aTropTj/idruv Aiceig) claims supra-rationality 
 not only (as was done by Plotinus) for the supreme, supra-existential essence, but for all 
 the gods, on the ground that the principle of contradiction does not apply to them (I. 3 
 et al.) ; this speculative doctrine is then employed in justification of the crudest absurdities, 
 with no lack in any instance of apparently rational grounds. 
 
 One of the immediate disciples of Jamblichus was Theodoras of A sine, who is said also 
 to have hstened to the instructions of Porphyry. He drew up a triadic system still more 
 complicated than the system of Jamblichus, thus assisting the transition to the doctrine 
 of Proclus. He posits (with Plotinus and Porphyry) only a single first being, not (with 
 Jamblichus) a first and a second, as being above the sphere of the intelligible, but desig- 
 nates it (with Jamblichus) as the Ineffable and as the cause of good. Between the first 
 being and the psychical realm he places a trinity of essences, the intelligible, the intellec- 
 tual, and the demiurgic. 
 
 Other disciples of Jamblichus were Sopater of Apamea, who was suspected by Con- 
 stantine the Great of having deprived a fieet laden with grain of favorable winds by 
 magical agencies, and was consequently put to death, Dexippus, ^desius of Cappadocia, 
 the anonymous author of a compendium of the Neo-Platouic philosophy, and I']ustachius 
 of Cappadocia. -(Edesius was the successor of Jamblichus and teacher of Chrysanthius of 
 Sardis (who instructed Eunapius), and of Maximus of Ephesus, Priscus of Molossi, and 
 Eusebius of Myndus, by whom Julian was instructed. With Julian agreed in philosophy 
 Sallustius, one of his youthful friends. Scientific demonstration was a matter of small 
 consequence with the most of these men ; the practice of theurgical arts was better suited 
 for their lofty intellects. The attempt to foment a reaction against Christianity absorbed 
 the best forces of the school. 
 
 In the course of the fourth and beginning of the fifth century lived and taught Themis- 
 tius (born about 317, died after 387 ; he was the son of Eugenius of Paphlagouia, was 
 educated at Constantinople, became a Peripatetic and Eclectic Platonist, gained repute as a 
 commentator of Aristotle and Plato, and was honored by his contemporaries, on account 
 of his excellent style, with the surname 6 TSiV(ppa67;c ; his paraphrase of the Posterior Ana- 
 lytics, Physics, and Psychology of Aristotle is still extant), Aurelius Macrobius, the author 
 of the Saturnalia, and, at Alexandria, the elder Olympiodorus, and the female philosopher 
 Hypatia, who was murdered by the Christians in the month of March, 415, a martyr to 
 polytheism. Marcianus Capella (see above, § 65) lived probably about 430 a. d.
 
 THE ATHENIAN SCHOOL, AND NEC-PLATONIC COMMENTATORS. 255 
 
 § 70. After the failure of the practical contest waged against 
 Christianity and in behalf of the renovation of the ancient cultus 
 and the ancient faith, the representatives of Neo-Platonism applied 
 themselves with new zeal to scientific labors, and especially to the 
 study and exegesis of the works of Plato and Aristotle. To the 
 Athenian School belong Plutarcli, the son of Nestorius (died about 
 433 A. D.), Syrianus, his pupil, who wrote commentaries on works of 
 Plato and Aristotle, Hierocles the Alexandrian, and Proclus (411- 
 485), the pupil of (the elder) Olympiodorus and of Plutarch and 
 Syrianus. Proclus is the most important of the later Neo-Platonists, 
 "the Scholastic among the Greek philosophers." He collated, ar- 
 ranged, and dialectically elaborated the whole body of transmitted 
 philosophy, augmented it by additions of his own, and combined the 
 whole in a sort of system, to which he succeeded in giving the appear- 
 ance of a rigidly scientific form. Other adherents of the same school 
 were Marinus, Proclus' pupil and successor, Asclepiodotns, a fellow- 
 pupil of the latter, Ammonius, the son of Hermias, Zenodotus, Isi- 
 dorus, the successor of Marinus, and his successor, Hegias, all imme- 
 diate pupils of Proclus ; also Damascius, who was the president of the 
 school at Atliens from about 520 a. d., until the closing of the same 
 in 529 by an edict of the Emperor Justinian, interdicting the giving 
 of instruction in philosophy at Athens. Hellenic philosophy suc- 
 cumbed, partly to the intrinsic weakness into which its own vagaries 
 had led it, and partly to the pressure of Christianity. Still, both at 
 and after the time of this event service was rendered to philosophy 
 through the composition of commentaries on the works of Aristotle 
 and Plato, in which the latter were transmitted to later generations. 
 Among those who distinguished themselves in this connection may 
 be mentioned, especially, Simplicius and (the younger) Olympiodorus, 
 as also Boethius and Philoponus the Christian. 
 
 Syriani Comment, in libroa III.. XIII., XIV., mttaphys. Ar-UsM. ktt. interpret. H. B.isolino, Voiiice. 
 1558. On Syrianus cf. Bacli, De Si/> iano philoitopho neo-phiionieo. Part I., O.-Pr.. Lauban. ISG'2. 
 
 HierocHu Akxandrini Commentar. in Aur. Carm. Pyth. ed. Jo. (^iirteriu.s, Paris, l.")S;3 ; De Providenfia 
 ei Fato, ed. V. Morelliiis, Paris, IMT ; Quae superifinit, ed. Pearson, London, lCr» and 1CT3 ; Comm. in Arir. 
 Carm. Pyth. ed. Thorn. Guisford, in his edition of Stohanis, O.^iford, 1S60; ed. Mullach, Berlin, 1S53. 
 
 Prodi in Plat. Tim. Comm. et in libros De Hep., Basel, 1534. (Published ns a supplement to tlio 
 Basel edition of the Works of Plato. The Commentary on the Pep. is incomplete. ]ve?pectiiii: certain later, 
 partially complementary, publication.s, see Bernars. In the appen<Ii.K to his work, entitled '^Ariitt. ilher 
 Wirkuny der Ti'agodre.'^ No. 13, ad p. 163.) Prodi in Tlicologhtm Pliitonis Hbri se,r una cnm Marini 
 vita Prodi et Prodi Inatlt. Tlieolog.. ed. Aemil. Portus et Fr. Lindenbrog, Hamburg:, IGIS; Ercerj.ta ea> 
 Prodi fidmUia in Plat. Cratylum, ed. J. F Boissonade, Leipsic 1S20: In Plat. Alcih. iomm. ed. Fr. 
 Crenzer. Frankfort. 1820 -'25; Prodi Opera, ed. Victor Cousin. Paris, lft20-2.'i; Prodi Comw. in Plat. 
 Farm., ed. G. Stallbaum, in bis edition of the Parm., Leipsic, 1839, and separately, Leipsic, 1S40; In Plat.
 
 256 THE ATHENIAN SCHOOL, AND NEO-PLATONIC COMMENTATORS. 
 
 Timaeutn, ed. C. E. Chr. Schneider, Breslau, 1847; Procli philos. Platonici opera inedita, quae primus 
 oUm e codicihufi mscr. Parisinis Italicisque vulgaverat, nunc secundin enris emend, et auxit Victor 
 Cousin, Paris, 1S64. The Medicean Codex of the works of Proclus on the Rep. of Plato Is incomplete, but 
 contains an index of the complete Commentary; cf. Val. Rose, in the Hermes II. 1867, pp. 96-101. A 
 Codex, formerly in the possession of the Salviati at Florence, but now at Rome, contains the sections 
 which are wanting in the Medicean Cod., yet with many gaps; of. Mai, Spicil. Horn. VIII., Praef. p. XX. 
 and p. 664, in the copy of one of the "works" which is given by Mai. 
 
 Marini Vita Procli, ed. J. F. Fabricius, Hamburg, 1700 ; ed. J. F. Boissonade, Lelpsic, 1814, and in 
 the Cobet edition of Diog. L., Paris, ISoO. Cf A. Berger, Prociim, Hvpomtion de na Doctrine, Paris, 1S40; 
 Hermann Kirchener, Pe Procli ncaplatonid metaphysica, Berlin, 1846 ; Steinhart, Art. Proclus, in Pauly's 
 Real-Ene. d. cl. Alt., Vol. VI., pp. 62-76. 
 
 Ammonii, I/ermiae JiUi, comment, in praedicamenta Aristotelis et Porphyrii Isagogen, Venice, 1545 
 seq., De Fato, ed. J. C. Orelli in his edition of the works of Alexander of Aphrodisias and others concerning 
 Fate, ZQrich, 1824. 
 
 Damascii, phihsophi Platonici, guaestionen de primis principiis, ed. Jos. Kopp, Frankfort-on-the- 
 Main, 1S26. Cf Ruelle, Le philomphe Damaseitis, etude »ur sa vie et sea ouvrages, Paris, 1S61. 
 
 Simplicii comment, in Arist. c<itegorias,YeBice,1499; Basel, 1551; in Arist. physic, ed. Asulanus, 
 Venice, 1526 ; in Ar. libros de coelo, ed. id. ibid. 1526, 1548 etc., in Ar. libros De Anima cum comment. 
 Ales-. Aphrod. in Arist. lib. De Senmi et Sensibili, ed. Asulanus, Venice, 1527 ; Simpl. comm. in Epicteti 
 Enchiridion, ed. Jo. Schweighauser, Leipsic, 1800; German by K. Enk, Vienna, 1867 (1S66). Simpl. 
 Comm. in Quatuor libros Aristotelis De Coelo ex rec. Sim. Karsteniimandatoregiaeacad. disciplinariim. 
 Nederlandicae editus, Utrecht, 1865. On Simplicius, cf Jo. Gottl. Buhle, De Simplicii mta, ingenio et 
 meritis, in the Gott. gel. Am. 1786, p. 1977 seq. 
 
 Olympiodori comm. in Arist. Meteorolog. Or. et Lat. Camotio interprete. Tenet. Aid. 1550-''51 ; Vita 
 Platonic, see above, p. 99 ; <Tx6\i.a eis toi/ TWanova, <nrovS-^ 'AvSp. Movcrrof u5ov <cat Atj/x. S^iVo, in : 2uAAoyi) 
 'EWrjviKiav avcKSoTuiv noi-qriov KaX \oyoypd<f>u}u, Venice, 1816, Part IV.; (r^oAta eis ^aiSiava, ibid. Part V.; 
 Comm. in Plat. Alciliadem. ed. F. Creuzer, in his edition of the Comm. of Proclus on the Alcib. II. 
 Frankfort, 1821; Scholia in PI. Phiiedonem, ed. Chsto. Eberh. Finckh, Heilbronn, 1847; Schol. in PI. 
 Gorgiam ed. Alb. Jahn, in Jahn's Archiv. Vol. XIV., 1848. 
 
 Joannis Philoponi Comm. in Arist. libros De Generatione et Interitu, etc., Venice (Aid.), 1527 ; in Ar. 
 Analyt. Post., Yenice (Aid.), 1534; contra Procl. de Mimdi Aetemitate, erf. Trincavellus, Venice, 1535; 
 Comm. in prim OS quatuor libros Arist. de Nat. Ai^scuUatione, ed. Trincavellns, Venet. 1535; Comm.. in 
 Arist. libros De Anima, ed. Trincavellns, Venice, 1535; Comm. in Arist. Anril. Priora, ed. Trincavellua, 
 Venice, 1536; Comm. in prim. Meteorolog. Arist. libr., etc., Venice (Aid.), 1551 ; Comm. in Arist. metaph. 
 lat. ex interpret. F. Patricii, Ferrara, 1583; Comm. in Nichomachi Arithm. ed. E. Hoche, Leipsic, 1864 
 (See above, § 64.) 
 
 For the literature relative to Boethius, see below, ad § 88. Cf., further, C. Jonrdain, De Torigine det 
 traditions sur le Christianisme de Boice. Paris, 1861; G. Friedlein, Gerbert,die Geometrie des Bo'ithiitu 
 mid die indischen Ziffern, Erlangen, 1861 (cf. Jahn's Jahrb., Vol. LXXXVIL 1863, pp. 425-427); M. Can. 
 tor, Math. Beitr. zum Culturleben der Volker, Halle, 1863, Sect. XIII. 
 
 Plutarch of Athens, the son of Nestorius, born about 350, died 433, and snrnnmed by 
 later Neo-Platonists " the Great,'' in distinction from the historian and Platonic philoso- 
 pher, who lived in the reign of Trajan, and from others of the same name, was, perhaps, a 
 pupil of Priscus, who (according to Eunap., Vit. Soph., p. 102) was still teaching at Athens 
 after the death of Julian. Plutarch (according to Procl., In Farm., VI. 21) distinguished 
 between the One, the Nous, the Soul, the forms immanent in material things, and matter, 
 and in so far seems not to have departed from the Plotinic form of doctrine. His son 
 Hierius and his daughter Asclepigeneia taught with him at Athens. 
 
 Syrianus of Alexandria, pupil of Plutarch and teacher of Proclus, regarded the Aristo- 
 telian philosophy as a stepping-stone to the Platonic. He recommended, therefore, the 
 study of the works of Aristotle as a preparation {Tzporeleia and lUKpa. ^vcT-qpia) for the 
 Pythagorean-Platonic philosophy or theology (a prelude to the scholastic employment of 
 the Aristotelian philosophy as a handmaid to Christian theology). This view and use of 
 Aristotle continued among the pupils of Syrianus, and in the same spirit Proclus calls 
 Aristotle 6atyL6vLoq, or, of demoniac rank, but Plato (and Jamblichus) duoq, divine. In his 
 
 1
 
 THE ATHENIAN SCHOOL, AND NEO-PLATONIC COMMENTATOE8. 257 
 
 commentary on the Aristotelian Metaphysics, Syrianus seeks to defend Plato and tho 
 Pythagoreans against the attacks of Aristotle. His commentaries to Plato are no longer 
 in existence. 
 
 Hierocles of Alexandria (about 430, to be distinguished rom the Hierocles who was 
 governor of Bithynia under Diocletian and figured as an opponent of Christianity) was 
 another pupil of Plutarch (Phot., Bibl. Cod., 214). Since he ascribes to Ammonius Saccas, 
 the founder of Neo-Platonism, the demonstration that Plato and Aristotle agreed substan- 
 tially with each other, we may presume that he too was occupied with the endeavor to 
 prove the same agreement. In the fragmentary remains of his writings he appears more 
 particularly in the character of a moralist. A disciple of Syrianus was Hermias of Alex- 
 andria, who afterward taught at the Museum in Alexandria, and was married to ^desia, 
 likewise an adherent of Neo-Platonism, and a relative of Syrianus. Another pupil of 
 Syrianus was Domninus, the mathematician. 
 
 Proclus, born at Constantinople about 411, of Lycian descent, and brought up at Xan- 
 thus, in Lycia (whence his surname "Lycius"), was in philosophy a pupil of Olympiodorus 
 (the elder) at Alexandria, of the aged Plutarch at Athens, and afterward of Syrianus. He 
 taught at Athens, where he died, A. d. 485. Oppressed by the great mass of transmitted 
 doctrines, all of which he nevertheless attempted to work into his system, he is said often 
 to have expressed the wish that nothing had been preserved from antiquity, except the 
 Oracles {7<.6yia xc-^^c-'-'^^i on which Proclus wrote very full allegorical commentaries) and 
 the Timaevs of Plato. 
 
 The principal momenta in the dialectical process by which, according to Proclus, the 
 formation of the world was accomplished, are the issuing of a thing from its cause and 
 its return to the same. That which is brought forth is at the same time like and imlike 
 its cause : in virtue of its likeness it is contained and remains in the cause (wov^) ; in virtue 
 of its unlikeness it is separated from it (TrpooJof) ; it must return to its cause (eTriaTpoifiT/) by 
 becoming like it, and in this return the same stadia are involved as in the previous forward 
 or out-coming movement {Prodi croixdiMiq BeoloyiK^, chs. 31-38). All reality is subject to 
 this law of triadic development. But the oftener the process is repeated the less perfect is 
 the result. What is first is highest, the last is the lowest in rank and worth. The devel- 
 opment is a descending one, and may be symbolized by the descending course of a spiral 
 line (while the Pythagorean and Speusippic development, and in modern times the Hege- 
 lian, is an ascending one). 
 
 The primordial essence is the unity, which lies at the foundation of all plurality, the 
 primal good, on which all good depends, the first cause of all existence {Tnstit., ch. 4 seq.). 
 It is the secret, incomprehensible, and ineffable cause of all tilings, which brings forth all 
 things and to which all tend to return. It can only be defined by analogy ; it is exalted 
 above all possible affirmation or negation ; the conception of unity is inadequate fully to 
 express it, since it is exalted even above unity, and so also are the conceptions of good and 
 of cause (it is avacriog alriov; Plat. Theoi, III. p. 101 seq.; In Paryn., VI. 81; In Tim., 
 110 e ; it is naartq aiyrj^ a'p'pjjToTepov kol ■nda/i^ iTapiecj^ ay-voaroTepov, Plot. TJieoL, II. 
 p. 110). 
 
 Out of this first essence Proclus represents, not (with Plotinus) the intelligible world, 
 nor (with Jamblichus) a single One, inferior to the first, but a pluralit}' of luiities (evader) 
 as issuing, all of them exalted above being, life, reason, and our power of knowledge. The 
 precise number of these unities (evdrfef) is not given by Proclus, but they are less numer- 
 ous than the Ideas, and they so exist in each other as, notwithstanding their plurality, to 
 constitute together but one unity. While the absolute, first essence is out of all relation 
 to the world, these unities operate in the world ; they are the agents of providence (/fi*t 
 17
 
 258 THE ATHENIAN SCHOOL, AND NKO-PLATONIC COMMENTATORS. 
 
 TJieol, 113 seq.). They are the gods (deoi) in the higliest sense of this word (ibid., 129). 
 The rank of the dififerent unities is determined according to the greater or less nearness in 
 which they stand to the first essence (Inst, 126). 
 
 The unities are followed by the triad of the intelligible, intelligible-intellectual, and intel- 
 lectual essences (to votjtuv, to vot/tov a/j.a Kal varpov, to voepov, Plat. TheoL, III. 14). The 
 first of these falls under the concept of being (ovaia), the second under that of life (sw?)), the 
 third under that of thought (Imi., 103 and 138; Plat. Theol, III. p. 127 seq.). Between 
 these three essences or classes of essences there exists also, notwithstanding their unity, 
 an order of rank ; the second participates in the first, the third in the second (Plat. Theol., 
 IV. 1). The Intelligible in the narrower sense of the term, or Being (ovcia) includes three 
 triads, in each of which the two first terms are "limit" (Trcpac:) and " illimitation " (aTveipuv), 
 the third terms being, in the first triad, the "union" of the two first, or "being" (fnnTdv 
 or ovaia), in the second, "hfe" (C^?/), and in the third, "ideas," or "that which has hfe in 
 itself" (iSeai or avT6(^(Mv). In each of these triads, the first or limiting term is also 
 denominated by Proclus (who follows in this particular the precedent of Jamblichus) 
 "Father" (Trar^yp), the second or unlimited term is called "Power" (Mvaiuir), and the 
 tliird or mixed term, " Reason " (vovc). The intelligible-intellectual sphere, falling under the 
 concept of life (C^^), contains, according to Proclus, feminine divinities, and is subdivided 
 into the following triads : One, Other, Being («', iTepov, ov), the triad of original numbers ; 
 One and Many, "Whole and Parts, Limit and Illimitation, the triad of '• gods who hold 
 together " (awtKTiKol 6eoi) ; and ?; rd ia^aTa ep^ovaa liioT-qq, t) Kara to teXelov and r/ KaTo. to 
 axviia, the triad of "perfecting Gods" (TETieaiovpyol -dEoi, ProcL, In Tim., 94; Theolog. 
 Platan., IV. 37). The intellectual essences, lastly, falling under the concept of reason (vovg), 
 are arranged according to the number seven, the two first terms in the triadic division, or 
 the terras which correspond respectively with Being and Life, being each subject to a 
 threefold subdivision, while the third term remains undivided. By a further, sevenfold 
 division of each of the seven terms (or "Hebdomas ") thus obtained, Proclus obtains seven 
 intellectual Hebdomades, with the members of which he connects by allegorical interpreta- 
 tion some of the deities of the popular faith and certain Platonic and Neo-Platonic fictions, 
 e. g., with the eighteenth of the fortj'-nine members, which he calls the " source of life " 
 (TTT/yy ipvx'ov), the mixing-vessel in the Timaeus of Plato, in which the Deraiurgos com- 
 bines the elements of the substance of the soul with each other. 
 
 The Psychical emanates from the intellectual. Every soul is by nature eternal and only 
 in its activity related to time. The soul of the world is composed of divisible, indivisible, 
 and intermediate substance, its parts being arranged in harmonious proportions. There 
 exist divine, demoniacal, and human souls. Occupying a middle place between the sen- 
 suous and the divine, the soul possesses freedom of will. Its evils are all chargeable upon 
 itself. It is in the power of the soul to turn back toward the divine. Whatever it knows 
 it knows by means of the related and corresponding elements in itself; it knows the One 
 through the supra-rational unity present in itself. 
 
 Matter is in itself neither good nor evil. It is the source of natural necessity. When 
 the Demiurgos molds it according to the transcendent, ideal prototypes, there enter into 
 it forms which remain immanent in it (Aoyoe, the Xoyoi cTrspfinTiKui of the Stoics, Prod, in 
 Tim., 4 c, seq. ; In Parmen., IV. 152). Proclus only repeats here the Plotinic doctrines. 
 
 Under Marinus (of Flavia Neapolis or Sichem in Palestine), the successor of Proclus, it 
 is related that the Neo-Platonic school at Athens sunk very low (Damasc, Vita Isidori, 
 228). Marinus seems to ha^e occupied himself with theosophical speculations less than 
 Proclus, but more with the theory of ideas and with mathematics (ibid., 275). Con- 
 disciples with Marinus were Asclepiodotus, the physician, of Alexandria, who afterward
 
 THE ATHENIAN SCHOOL, AND NEO-PLATONIC COMMENTATORS, 259 
 
 lived at Aphrodisias, and the sons of Hermias and ^desia, Heliodonis and Ammoniiis, 
 who afterward taught at Alexandria; such also were Severianus, Isidonis of Alexandria, 
 Hegias, a grandson of Plutarch, and Zenodotus, who taught with Marinus at Athens. 
 Isidorus, who had also heard Proclus and who became the successor of Marinus in the 
 office of Scholarch, paid greater attention to theosophy, but soon gave up his ofiSce and 
 returned to Alexandria, his native city. The next Scholarch at Athens was ITegias. and 
 the next after Ilcgias and the last of all was Damascius of Damascus (from about 520 on). 
 The special object of the speculation of Damascius respecting the first essence was to show 
 (in agreement with Jarablichus and Proclus) that the same was e.\alted above all those con- 
 traries which inhere in the finite. 
 
 Damascius did not long enjoy the liberty to teach. The Emperor Justinian, soon after 
 his accession to the throne (a. d. 527), instituted a persecution directed against heretics 
 and non-Christians, and in 529 forbade instruction to be given in philosophy at Athens, 
 and confiscated the property of the Platonic school. Soon afterward (531 or 532) Damas- 
 cius, Simplicius of Cilicia, the industrious and exact commentator of Aristotle, and five 
 other Neo-Platonists (Diogenes and Hermias of Phoenicia, Eulamius or Eulalius of Phrygia, 
 Priscianus, and Isidorus of Gaza) emigrated to Persia, where, from the traditions of the 
 country, they hoped to find the seat of ancient wisdom, a people moderate and just, and 
 (in King Khosroes) a ruler friendly to philosophy (Agathias, Be Rebus Jmiiniani, II. ch. 
 30). Undeceived hj sorrowful experiences, they longed to return to Athens, and in the 
 peace concluded between Persia and the Roman Empire in the year 533, it was stipulated 
 tliat they should return without hindrance and retain complete liberty of belief; but the 
 prohibition of philosophical instruction remained in force. The works of the ancient 
 thinkers never became entirely unknown in Greece ; it is demonstrable that, even in the 
 period immediatel}'^ following, Christian scholars of the aries liberales at Athens studied 
 also philosophy; but from this time till the renaissance o? classical studies, Hellenic phi- 
 losophy (except where, as in the case of Sj-nesius and Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita, it 
 assumed a Christian exterior) remained scarceh^ more than a subject of mere erudition 
 (as in the cases of the Christian commentator of Aristotle, Johannes Philoponus, who was 
 nearly contemporaneous with Simplicius, and David the Armenian, who flourished about 
 500 A. n. ; see below, § 96); gradually it, and especially the Aristotelian philosophy, won 
 a growing influence on the scliolastic and formal treatment of Christian theology, and in 
 part also on the substance of theological doctrines. 
 
 One of the last Nco-Platonists of antiq^iity Avas Boethius (470-525, educated at Athens, 
 480-498), who, through his Consolatio, as also through his translation and exegesis of some 
 of the logical writings of Aristotle anil through his annotations to his own translation of 
 the Isagogc of Porphyry and to that of Marius Victorinus (a rhetorician and grammarian, 
 who lived about 350), became the most influential medium for the transmission of Greek 
 philosophy to the Occident during the first centuries of the Middle Ages. His Corwiolatw 
 is founded on the Platonic and Stoic idea, that the reason should conquer the emotions. 
 " Tu, quoque si vis lumine claro cernere verum tramite recto carpere callem : gaudia pelk, peUe 
 timorem spemque fugato ne dolor ad'it: Nubila mens est vinctaque freiiis, liaec uhi regnant ! '' 
 (Of. below, § 88).
 
 v/- 
 
 >/ 
 
 >
 
 PART II. 
 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN EPA. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 § 71. The religious facts, ideas, and doctrines of Christianity gave 
 a new impulse to philosophical investigation. The philosophic 
 thought of Christian times has been mainly occupied with the theo- 
 logical, cosmological, and anthropological postulates of the biblical 
 doctrine of salvation, the foundation of which is the consciousness of 
 the law, of sin, and of redemption. 
 
 On the whole philosophy of Christian times, see Heinrich Eitter, Die cJirisUiche Philosophie, 2 vols., 
 Gottiniren, 1S5S-59; cf. the more minute exposition in Eitter's Geschidite der Philosophie^ Vol. V. seq^ 
 Hamburg, 1S41 seq., as also the volumes relating to this subject in the works of Brucker, Buhle, Tenne- 
 mann, Hegel, and others mentioned above, p. 8 seq. J. G. Mussman's Grundriss'Ier allg. GescJi. der christL 
 Philosophie (Halle, 1S30) may also be mentioned here. Ferd. Baur, in Vol. V. of the Vieolog. Jahrb. (Tu- 
 bingen, 1846, pp. 29-115 and 183-233) treats in a very comprehensive manner of the nature of Christian 
 philosophy, and of the principal stages in the history of its development, ivith special reference to the 
 oi>inions of Eitter; c{., per contra, Heinr. Eitter, in Theol. Studien u. Kritiken, Jahrg. XX., Vol. 2, 
 1S47, pp. 557-648. Cf, also, the works on ecclesiastical history and the history of dogmas, cited below, 
 § 73, p. 268. 
 
 § 72. The primitive creative epoch in the history of Christianity 
 was followed in the Middle Ages by a period especially characterized 
 by the evolution of the consciousness of opposition between God and 
 the world, priests and laity, church and state, and, in general, between 
 the human spirit, on the one hand, and God, the human spirit itself 
 and nature, on the other, and hence by the evolution of the sense of 
 the limitation and bondage of man. The period of Modern Times, 
 on the contrary, is marked, in the main, by the development of the 
 consciousness of restored unity, and lience of the reconciliation and 
 freedom of the human spirit. In the patristic period, philosophic 
 thought stands in tlie closest union with theological speculation, and 
 co-operates in the development of Christian dogma. In the Scho- 
 lastic period it passes into the service of theology, being employed 
 merely to reduce to scientiiic form a body of dogmatic teaching for
 
 262 PERIODS OF CHRISTIAJf PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the most part already at hand, by introducing a logical arrangement 
 and bringing to its support philosophical doctrines from ante-Chris- 
 tian antiquity. In Modern Philosophy it gradually acquires, with 
 reference to Christian theology and ancient philosophy, the character 
 of an independent science, as regards both form and content. 
 
 Rightly to discriminate between that which belongs to the history of philosophy and 
 that which belongs to the history of theology, in the Patristic and Scholastic periods, is a 
 work of uo little difiiculty. The same difficulty also arises in attempting to distinguish 
 between what pertains to the history of philosophy and what to the history of the natural 
 sciences in modern times, when these sciences are so closely interwoven with philosophy. 
 Yet the definition of philosophy as the science of principles furnishes a sufficiently accurate 
 criterion. It is necessary that the exposition of the philosophy of early Christian times 
 should be preceded and introduced by a consideration of the religious and theological bases 
 on which society then newly reposed, and the presentation of the beginnings of Christian 
 philosophy itself must necessarily include fundamental portions of the history of dogmas, 
 unless the living organism of the new development of rehgious thought introduced by 
 Christianity is to be arbitrarily dealt with, by separating, as was afterward done, a "-theo- 
 logia naturalis " fi-om " theologia revelata.'' It is only thus that an insight into the genesis 
 and connection of Christian ideas becomes possible. 
 
 The dogmas of the Church were developed in the course of the contest waged by its 
 defenders against Jews and Greeks, against Judaizers, Gnostics, and heretics of all sorts. 
 To this development philosophical thought lent its aid, being employed before the Council 
 of Nice in elaborating and perfecting the fundamental doctrines, and subsequently in ex- 
 panding them into a comprehensive complex of dogmas. Whatever was new and peculiar 
 in the doctrine of Augustine was the result of the contest in which he was engaged, 
 either inwardly or outwardly against the doctrines of the Manicheans, Neo-Platonists, 
 Donatists, and Pelagians. But when the belief of the Church had been unfolded into a 
 complex of dogmas, and when these dogmas had become firmly established, it remained 
 for the School to systematize and verify them by the aid of a corresponding reconstruction 
 of ancient philosophy ; in this lay the mission of Scholasticism. The distinction between the 
 Patristic and the Scholastic philosophy is indeed not an absolute one, since in the Patristic 
 period, in proportion as the dogmas of the Church became distinctly developed, thought 
 was made subservient to the work of arranging and demonstrating them, while, on the 
 other hand, in the Scholastic period, these dogmas, not having previously become com- 
 pletely determined in every particular, received a certain additional development, as the 
 result of the then current theologico-philosophioal speculation. 
 
 Still, the close relation of the two periods does not set aside the dift'erence between 
 them, but only serves to demonstrate what is found to be verified in detail, namely, that 
 the beginnings of the scholastic manner of philosophizing recede into the time of the Church 
 Fathers (witness Augustine, who in several passages of his writings enunciated the Scho- 
 lastic principle that that which faith already holds to be certain should also be compre- 
 hended, if possible, by the light of the reason, while, in the work De Vera Religione, he 
 asserts the unity of philosophy and true religion, and in none of his writings excludes 
 reason as a way to faith), and that, on the other hand, the most important Scholastics may, 
 in a certain, though inferior, measure, be regarded as fathers of the Church and of its 
 doctrines (some of which men have indeed received from the Church this title of honor ; cf. 
 below, § 76).
 
 PEINCIPAL DIVISIONS OF THE PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 263 
 
 FiEST Period of the Philosophy of the Chbistian Eka. 
 PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 § 73. The Patristic Period is the period of the genesis of Christian 
 doctrine. It may be regarded as extending from the time of the 
 Apostles to that of Charlemagne, and may be divided into two Sec- 
 tions, separated by the Council of Nice (a. d. 325). The first section 
 includes the time of the genesis of the fundamental dogmas, when 
 philosophical and theological speculation were inseparably interwoven. 
 The second covers the period of the further development of the doc- 
 trines of the Church on the basis of the fundamental dogmas already 
 established, in which period philosophy, being used to justify these 
 dogmas and co-operating in the further development of new ones, j 
 begins to assume a character of independence with reference to the 
 dogmatic teaching of the Church. 
 
 The works of certain of the Church Fathers were among the earliest books printed. Dc-siderius Eras- 
 mus (lived 14G7-1536), especially, did a service to Patrology by his editions (published at Basel) of Hiero- 
 nymus, Hilarius, Anibrosins, and Augustine. Afterward, mostly upon the initiative of Ecclesiastical Orders, 
 complete editions were set on foot, the earlier of which contained, for the most part, only the works of 
 comparatively little magnitude, while in the later editions greater completeness was constantly aimed at. 
 We may mention here the editions of Margarinus de la Bigne (Paris, 1575-79; 6th ed. 16.54, 17 vols, fol.), 
 Andr. Gallandius (Venice, 1765-71, 14 vols, fol.), and J. P. Migne (Pairnlogiae OursuD Completus, Paris, 
 1S40 seq.). The edition of Grabe {Spicilegium Patrnm et Haereticorum saec., I.-IJI., Oxford, 1698), and 
 T>'anwi\''% Analecta Ante-Nicaena (London, 1854) are confined to the works of the first three centuries. 
 Compare, further, the Corpus ncriptorum eccl. Latinorum ed. cotisiUo et ivipemHs academiae lilt., 
 Caesareae VitidobonensU (Vol. I.: Sulpiciua Severua exrec. C. Halmil, Vienna, 1866 ; Vol. II.: Minucius 
 Felix et Firmicua Maternus, ex rec. C. Ualmii, ibid. 1867). Extracts and clire.stomathies have been 
 published by Eosler (Bihliothek der Kirchenvdter, 10 vols., Leips. 1776-86), August! (Chrextomathia Pa- 
 tri.<ttica, Leips. 1S12), Gersdorf (Bihl. pair. eccl. Lat. nel., Leips. 1885^7), and others. A German transla- 
 tion of numerous works of the Church Fathers has been published at Kempten, 1830 seq. Ante-Nicene 
 Christian Library: translations [into English] of the writings of the Fathers down to a. d. 325, Edinburgh, 
 T. & T. Clark, 1867 on; New York, Scribner. 
 
 Busse, Griindrina der christ. Litteraiur. MUnster, 1828. J. G. Dowling, Notitia scriptorum S. Pa- 
 truiu alicmmique veteri^ ecclesiae moniimentor^im, quae in collectionibus anecdoiorum post annttfn clir. 
 MDCC. in lucem editi» eontinentur. Oxford, 1839. 
 
 Mohler's Patrologie, Vol. I. (first three centuries), ed. by F. X. Relthmayr, Regensburg, 1840. Inxti- 
 tutioneti Patrologiae concinnavit Jos. Fessler, Insbruck, 1860-51 (to Gregory the Great). Deutinger, 
 Geist der chritstl. Ueberlie/ei-ung. Regensburg, 1850-51 (to Athanasius). C. Werner, Gesch. der apolo- 
 getiHchenund polemisclien Litteratur der christl. T/jso/., Schaffhausen, 1861 seq. Job. Alzog, Grundriait 
 der Patrologie oder der dltem chrivtl. Litterdrgesck. , Freiburg In Br., 1866. Cf. the works on the his- 
 tory of doctrines and ecclesiastical history by Munscher, Anuusti, Ncander, Gicseler, Baumgarten-Crusius, 
 Hase, Klee, Hagenbach, Baur, Niedner, Bohringer, etc., Dorner's EntirickelungsgescA. der Lehre von der 
 Person Christi, Stuttgart, 2d ed., 1845-53 ; Bslut's Christ I iche Gnonin, TQbingen, 1835, Ckriiitlicht Lehre 
 tionder Tersbhnung, ibid., 1S3S, and Christl. Lehre von der I>reieinigkeit und Mvnschwerdung GoUm 
 ibid., 1341-43, and many other theological writings. 
 
 Alb. Stockl, Gesch. der Philoxnphie der patristischen Zeit., Wurzburg, 1858. 
 
 Joh. Huber, JHe Philoa. der Kirclunvdter, Munich, 1S5S.
 
 264 JESUS AND HIS APOSTLES. 
 
 § 74. Of all the nations of antiquity, the religious sense of the 
 distinction and antagonism between holiness and sin was most promi- 
 nent among the Hebrews. The ethical ideal of the Hebrews was, 
 however, inseparably connected with their ritual law, and the revela- 
 tion of God was supposed by them to be confined to the chosen people 
 of the children of Israel. The Alexandrian philosophy, which arose 
 through the contact of Judaism with Hellenic culture, prepared the 
 way for the breaking down of the barriers which restricted the 
 moral and religious life of the people, and Christianity completed the 
 work. At the time when Greek culture had destroyed the intel- 
 lectual exclusiveness, and the Roman Empire had annihilated the 
 political independence of the nations, there arose in Christianity, in 
 opposition to the reality of the kingdom of the world, the idea of a 
 kingdom of God, founded on purity of heart. The expectation of 
 the Messiah among the Jewish people was spiritualized, repentance 
 and moral improvement were recognized as the condition of the sal- 
 vation of the soul, and the principle of all commandments was found 
 in the law of love^ whence the ceremonial law, and with it all 
 national, political, and social distinctions lost their earlier positive 
 significance; to the poor the gospel was preached, participation in the 
 kingdom of heaven was promised to the oppressed, and the conscious- 
 ness of God as the Almighty Creator, the holy law-giver, and just 
 judge was completed by the consciousness of redemption and divine 
 sonship, through the working and indwelling of God in Christ and in 
 the community of believers. 
 
 For the literature of this topic we mnst here refer particularly to the theological manuals. Of. — hesidei 
 the Introductions to the Biblical writings, by De Wette, Hug, Reuss, etc.— especially, Carl August Credner's 
 Gexchichte de« neutestamentlicfien Jawon, ed. by G. Volkmar, Berlin, 1S60, and Adolf Hilgenfeld's I>er 
 Kanon und die Kritik des Ne^im TextammU in ihrer geechichtlkihen Au^hildung und GestaUung, Halle, 
 186.3 ; and, on the other hand, the numerous works on the didactic forms and the logical doctrines of the 
 New Testament, as also monographs like those of Carl Niose on the Johannean Psychology (Progr. of the 
 '' Landesschule'' at Pforta, Naumburg, 1865), and R. Rohricht, Zur johanneischen Log oslehre, in Theol. 
 Studien u. EHUken, 1868, pp 299-814. 
 
 Neander (Christl. Bogmengesch., ed. by J. Jacobi, Berlin, 1867, and often in others of 
 his writings; cf., also, Neander, Ueber das Verhdltniss der hellenischen Ethik zum Christen- 
 thum, in his Wissensch. Abhandlungen, ed. by J. Jacobi, Berlin, 1851), consciously adopting 
 the views of Schleiermacher and not uninfluenced, whether consciously or not, by Hegelian 
 conceptions, sees the peculiarity of Christianity in the idea of "redemption, the conscious- 
 ness of the unification of the divine and human," and remarks with reference to the relation 
 of Christianity to Judaism and Hellenism {ibid., p. 36) : " The religious stand-point of Juda- 
 ism represents in general the positive consciousness of alienation from God and of the 
 schism in man's nature, while Hellenism, on the contrary, is the embodiment of youthful 
 natural life, as yet unconscious of its opposition to God. For those occupying the former
 
 JESD8 AND HIS APOSTLES. 265 
 
 Stand-point Christianity aims at removing the sense and the fact of opposition and discord, 
 through redemption : for tliose occupying the stand-point of Hellenism, it first brings to 
 consciousness tlie sense of discord, and provides for the communication of divine life lo 
 humanity, through the removal of this discord." (In the same place Xeander designates as 
 the fundamental trait of Orientalism, in the Hindoo and other natural religions, the 
 "schism and unrest of the human mind, as manifested in the language of sorrow and 
 melancholy, in view of the limits of human nature, and in imcontroUed longings after the 
 infinite and for absorpliou into God.") Cf. above, § 5. 
 
 In his own teaching, which was expressed especially in aphorisms and parables, 
 Jesus laid chief emphasis on the necessity of rising above the legal righteousness of the 
 Pharisees (Matt. v. 20) to the ideal completion of the law through the principle of love, and 
 to the real fulfillment of the law as thus completed. The commandments and prohibitions 
 of Moses (including those of the ceremonial law), and even many of the injunctions of his 
 successors, were thus left substantially untouched (altliough in the matter of things purely 
 external and of no immediate ethical or rehgious significance, such, in particular, as the 
 observance of the Sabbath and various forms of purification and sacrifice, actual observance 
 was made by the Messiah no longer obligatory for the subjects of his "kingdom of God," 
 Mark ii. 23-28 ; vii. 14-23, etc.) ; but that which Moses had allowed on account of the 
 liardness of heart of his people remained no longer lawful, but was to be regulated in 
 accordance with the ideal ethical law, which took cognizance of the intentions of men. 
 Thus the peremptoriness of the requirements of ethics was made to appear not in the least 
 relaxed, but rather increased. (Hence the declaration in Matt. v. IS — true, of course, only 
 in a figurative sense — that till the end of the world no jot or tittle of the law should be 
 abrogated, if indeed this verse, in the form here given, is authentic and has not been em- 
 phasized by the reporter, in opposition to a party of Pauline or ultra-Pauline Antinomians, 
 so as to make the declaration more positive than it was as delivered by Jesus, and more in 
 accordance with the sentiment of the Jewish Christians, who required that even the Mes- 
 sias should keep the whole law.) It is not that Moses had given only a ceremonial law and 
 that Christ had recognized on/y the moral law ; the law of love was taught, although in more 
 limited form, already by the former (Lev. xix. 18; cf Deut. vi. 5, xxx. IG, on love to God, 
 and such passages as Is. Iviii. 7, in tlie writings of the prophets who foreshadowed and 
 prepared the way for the ideality of the Christian law), and the ritual retains a certain 
 authoritj' with the latter (at least, according to the Gospel of Matthew ; Mark and Luke do 
 not affirm the continuing authority of the Law). But the relative importance of the two 
 elements becomes reversed in consequence of the radical significance attached by Christ 
 to the law of love (Matt. xxii. 34 secj. ; Mark xii. 28 seq. ; Luke x. 25 seq.) and also in conse- 
 quence of the name of Father, by which he (in a manner at most only suggested in the Old 
 Testament) indicated that the relation of man to God should be one of friendly intimacy. 
 Sometimes Jesus appeals directly to passages of the Old Testament (such as 1 Sam. xv. 
 22 and xxi. G, IIos. vi. 6, in Matt. ix. 13, xii. 3); the prophetic picture of the Messianic 
 kingdom, in which peace and joj' were to reign, and strife should no longer dwell (Is. ix. 
 et al.), involved the idea of actualized, all-embracing love ; the Nazarite's vow of the Old 
 Testament implied the insufficiency of common righteousness and the necessity of ex- 
 ceeding it by tlie practice of abstinence ; and perhaps also the principles and regimen of 
 the Essenes exerted (through John the Baptist) some influence on Jesus (cf. A. Hilgenfeld, 
 Der Essdismus und Jesns, in the Zeitschr. f. wiss. TheoL, X. 1, 1867, pp. 97-111). Jesus, 
 the disciple of John, feeling liimsclf, from the time of his baptism by John, the herald of 
 the Messiah, to be himself the Messiah, not inferior even to Moses in dignity (according 
 to Deut. iviii. 15), and intrusted by God with imperishable authority and an eternal king-
 
 266 JE8U8 AND HIS APOSTLES. 
 
 dom (Dan. vii. 13, 14), believed himself called and had the courage to found a kingdom of 
 God, to gather about him the weary and heavy-laden, to advance beyond all established 
 forms, and to teach and live rather in accordance with the suggestions of his own moral 
 consciousness and the wants of the people, with whom he was in sympathy, than accord- 
 ing to traditional institution. The principle of pure love to man prevailed over conceptions 
 of Oriental derivation and in spite of the lack of developed notions of labor, and of inde- 
 pendence, property, right, and state, as reposing on labor. In the love with which he 
 worked for his friends, in his unconditional opposition to the previous leaders of the 
 people and to all other hostile powers, and in his death thus brought about, yet willingly 
 accepted in the confident expectation that he should return, and while fearlessly avow- 
 ing, in the face of death, his Messianic authority, the life of Jesus appears as a picture 
 of perfect righteousness. His prayer that God might forgive his judges and enemies 
 involved the unshaken conviction of his absolute right, and the same conviction continued 
 after his death among his disciples. In the kingdom of God founded by the Messiah, 
 blessedness was to dwell together with holiness. Jesus prayed that God's name might 
 be sanctified, his kingdom come, his will be done, and that earthly need might be re- 
 moved, together with sin. To the weary and heavy-laden relief was promised through 
 the removal of the weight of external tyranny and of personal poverty, sickness, and 
 sinfulness, and tlirough the confirmation in the relation of sonship to God and in the 
 hope of eternal blessedness of all such as belonged to the kingdom of God. Jesus pre- 
 supposed for those, to whom his preaching was addressed, the same immediate possibility 
 of elevation to purity of heart and to moral perfection, i. e., to the image of the perfect God, 
 the Heavenly Father, of which he was conscious in his own case. 
 
 The moral doctrine and life of Jesus involved, as logical consequences, the obsolescence 
 of the Mosaic law of rites, and with this the overtiirow of the national barriers of Judaism. 
 These consequences were first expressly enunciated by Paul, who in proclaiming them was 
 always conscious of his dependence on Christ (" not I, but Christ in me," Gal. ii. 20). On 
 the ground of his own personal experience, from which he dogmatically drew general 
 conclusions for all men, Paul declared that the power necessary for tlie fulfillment of the 
 purely moral law and the way to true spiritual freedom were to be found only in faith in 
 Christ. Paul denies the dependence of salvation on law and nationality or on an3'thing 
 whatever that is external (here "there is neither Jew nor Greek, neither bond nor free, 
 neither male nor female," Gal. iii. 28; cf vi. 15: ohre nEpiTOfifj ovf aKpofivarla, aXXa Kacvij 
 KTiaic, and also Rom. x. 12 ; 2 Cor. v. 17). Positively, he makes it dependent on the free grace 
 of God, the appropriation of which on the part of the individual is effected through faith in 
 Christ as the Redeemer. The law was the schoolmaster to bring us to Christ {Traidayuyoc 
 f£f Xpiarov, Gal. iii. 24). Through faith the inner man is built up (6 eau avdpuTrog, Rom. vii. 
 22; Ephes. iii. 16; cf Rom. ii. 29 ; 1 Pet. iii. 4; cf also 6 evrbc avdpunor in Plat., Rep. IX., 
 p. 589 a — wliere, however, this expression is based on a developed comparison — and o iau 
 Aoyog in opposition to i^o) Xoyog in Arist., Analyt. Post, I. 10). The law furnishes no 
 deliverance from the schism between the spirit, which wills the good, and the flesh, which 
 does what is evil ; but through Christ this schism is removed, the impotence of the flesh is 
 overcome by his Spirit dwelling in us (Rom. vii. and viii.). Faith is reckoned to man by 
 God as righteousness, and by making man a recipient of the Spirit of Christ, it restores to 
 him the power, lost since the time of Adam's fall, truly to fulfill the moral law. "With con- 
 secration to Christ, the Redeemer, there arises, in place of the servile condition of fear in 
 view of the penalty threatened against the transgressor of the law, the free condition of 
 sonship, of communion with God in love, the state of justification by faith. The believer, 
 Bays Paul, has put on Christ in baptism; Christ is to be formed in him; as Christ desce nded
 
 JESUS AND HIS APOSTLES. 267 
 
 into death and rose again, so the believer, by virtue of hia union with him, dies unto 
 sin, crucifies the flesh, with its lusts and desires, and rises to a new moral life in the 
 spirit, the fruits of which are love, joy, peace, long-sufi'ering, geutleuess, goodness, faith, 
 meekness, temperance (Gal. ii. 17; iii. 27; iv. 19; v. 22-24; Rom. vi. 1; viii. 12 seq. ; 
 xiii. 14). But the believer has in this life only the first-fruits of the Spirit [cnzapxri rov 
 nvevftarog, Rom. viii. 23) ; we are indeed saved, but only in hope, and we walk in patience 
 (Rom. viii. 24 seq.) ; we walk still by faitli, not by sight {6ia. Tziartuc; TTEpnraTovfiev, ov 
 did el6ovc, 2 Cor. v. 7). The new life is (according to 1 Cor. xv. 23) to be introduced by 
 the second coming of Christ (when, according to 1 Thess. iv. 17, the living and those 
 raised from the grave are to ascend on clouds to the presence of the Lord, cf John's Rev. 
 xi. 12). Paul, like Christ, sees in love the substance of the moral law (Gal. v. 14: 6 yap 
 Trdf vouoq iv tvl Xoyi^ ■n'kripovTai^ iv rCi ayaTcljaeii; tov rrXT/aiov cov ug iavrov^ Gal. vi. 2 : tov 
 vdfiov Toil XpiOTov, Rom. xiii. 8—10: 6 aya~uv rov erepov, v6/nov tz en ATjpuKE- . . . nXijpufia 
 ovv vdfiov T] aydirri, cf. 1 Cor. ix. 21 ; Rom. iii. 27 ; viii. 2). Love is the last and supreme 
 word of Christianity; it is superior even to faith and hope (1 Cor. xiii. 13). Love is the 
 active expression of faith (Gal. v. C : niaric cW dyd~7/g ivepyov/iivr/). The Pauhne doctrine 
 of the relation between faith and love was of a nature calculated powerfully to stimulate 
 thought with reference to the question as to the bond connecting these two elements of the 
 religious life. If love or a morally perfect will is logically involved in the very conception 
 of faith (as may be inferred from Gal. iii. 26 ; v. 6 ; Rom. vi. 3 seq. ; viii. 1 seq. ; 1 Cor. xii. 
 3), and if, therefore, the justification which is by faith means the divine recognition of an 
 essential righteousness contained in it (i. e., in other words, if the divine justifying sen- 
 tence — to follow, as may be and has been done, the Kantian terminology — is an " analytical 
 judgment respecting the subjective moral quality of the believer "), then, on the one hand, 
 the necessary connection of essential moral goodness with the historic and dogmatic ele- 
 ments involved in faith in Jesus as the Messiah and the son of God, is not demonstrated, 
 and, on the other, we seem rather to be led to the non-Pauline sequence of faith, begin- 
 ning of regeneration and sanctification, and relative justification in proportion to the degree 
 of sanctification already attained, than to the Pauhne one of faith, justification, and sancti- 
 fication. But if, on the contrary, faith does not necessarily involve love (as may appear 
 from Rom. iv. 19; x. 9, etc.), and enters only as a new statutory element, a Christian 
 substitute for Jewish offerings and ceremonies [i. e., if God's justification of believers is 
 only a ^^ synthetic judgment" an imputation of another's righteousness), then the miprove- 
 ment of the will and life remains indeed a thing required, but no longer appears as a 
 necessary consequence of faith, and the moral advantage possessed by him who believes 
 in the real death and resurrection of Christ, and considers himself redeemed from guilt 
 and punishment by the merit of Christ, over those who are not of the same faith, can 
 only be arbitrarily asserted, since it is by no means verified in all instances by the facts 
 of experience. It follows also, in case the believing sinner, to whom righteousness has 
 been imputed, fails to advance to real righteousness, that the divine justification of the 
 morally unimproved believer, together with the condemnation of others, must appear 
 arbitrarj-, partisan, and unjust, and unrestricted liberty is left to men for the frivolous mis- 
 use of forgiving grace as a license to sin. At a later period, when attempts were made to 
 transform the half-mystic and half-religious ideas of Paul respecting dying and rising again 
 with Christ into dogmatic conceptions, this difficulty of interpretation (which in recent 
 times Schleiermacher sought to solve by defining justifying faith as the appropriation to 
 one's self of the perfection and beatitude of Christ, i. e., as the giving up of one's self to 
 the Christian ideal) appeared with increasing distinctness, and gave occasion to manifold 
 theological and philosophical attempts at explanation, as the Epistle of James may witness.
 
 268 JESDS AND HIS APOSTLES. 
 
 The Early Catholic Church went forward to the point of making the moral law and tiieo- 
 retical dogmatic faith co-ordinate, while in Aiigiistinism, in the Reformation, and again in 
 the theological and philosophical ethics of modern times, the dialectic resulting from the 
 Pauline conceptions has repeatedly reappeared in ever-varying form. 
 
 Although Paul recognized love (which, first implied in the requirement to give to the 
 poor and in tlie principle of community in the possession of goods, rose subsequently, 
 through idealization and generalization, to the rank of a pure conception) as the highest 
 element in Christianity, he nevertheless treats in his Epistles chiefly of faith, as of that by 
 which the law is abolished. In the Epistles of John, on the contrary, and in the (fourth) 
 Gospel, which bears his name, love occupies the central position. God, says John, is love 
 (1 John iv. 8, 16). His love has been made known in the sending of his Son, in order 
 that all who believe on Him may have eternal life (1 John iv. 9 ; Jolin's Gosp. iii. 16). 
 He who abides in love abides in God and God in him. The new commandment of Christ 
 is love. He who loves God must love his brother also. Our love to God is manifested 
 when we keep his commandments and walk in the light (John xiii. 34 ; xv. 12 ; 1 John 
 i. •? ; iv. 16, 21 ; v. 2). Believers are born of God. They are hated of the world; but the 
 world lies in wickedness (John xv. 18 et al. ; 1 John v. 19). In place of the contest waged 
 by Paul against single concrete powers, especially against the continued validity of the 
 Mosaic law, we have here a contest against the "world" in general, against all tendencies 
 opposed to Christianity, against unbelieving and hostile Jews and Gentiles. The distinc- 
 tion between the chosen Jewish people and the heathen is that between believers in 
 Christ, who walk in the light, and unbelievers and children of darkness, and the temporal 
 distinction between the present period and the future is changed into the ever-present dis- 
 tinction between the world and the kingdom of God, which is the kingdom of the Spirit 
 and of truth. The belief that Jesus is the Christ is made the power that overcomes the 
 world. That the law came by Moses, but grace and truth by Jesus (John i. 17) appears 
 already as an assured conviction. The law is abrogated, religious life is no longer to be 
 nourished and filled up with offerings and ceremonies; and into the place thus left vacant 
 enters, together with the practical activity required by love, a form of theoretical specula- 
 tion arrived at through the development of the doctrine of faith. 
 
 In the Gospel named after Matthew, Jesus is styled the Messiah, the Son of David, 
 who as such is also the Son of God ; this phraseology is here employed with immediate 
 reference to the expectations of the Jewish nation. In the Gospel according to Mark, he 
 is generally spoken of as the Son of God, the expression " Son of David " being employed 
 only once (x. 47 seq., in the mouth of the blind man of Jericho). In this Gospel the con- 
 tinuing validity of the Jewish law is no longer affirmed. The recognition of Christ as the 
 Son of God in the Epistles of Paul and in the Gospel of Luke, which bears the impress of 
 Pauline ideas, is an expression of the sense of the universal or absolute character of the 
 Christian religion. In the Epistle to the Hebrews (which is likewise Pauline in character 
 and was possibly written by Barnabas or ApoUos) the superiority of Christianity in dignity 
 to Judaism and of the New Covenant to the Old Covenant, with its laws, which are no longer 
 binding on Christians, is expressed by the affirmation of the personal exaltation of Jesus 
 above Moses and above the angels, through whose agency the law was given. In this Epis- 
 tle it is said of Christ as the Son of God, that by him the world-periods (aliJvec) were created, 
 that he is the brightness of the divine glory, the image of the divine nature {a-rravyaafia Kal 
 XnpaKTj/p Tjjg iTToaraaEuq)^ the eternal high-priest after the order of Melchisedek, king of 
 priests, to whom even Abraham made himself subject, and to whom therefore the Levites, 
 as children of Abraham, are also inferior. Repentance and turning away from dead works, 
 and faith in God, are reckoned by the author of this Epistle as the elementary requirements
 
 JESUS AND HIS APOSTLES. 2fi9 
 
 of Christianity, as the milk or foundation from which it is necessary to advance to '• strong 
 meat '' or " perfection." This Epistle contains already the seeds of the later Gnostic doc- 
 trines. The fourth Gospel, named after the Apostle John, teaches the pure spirituality of 
 God's nature, and demands that God should be worshiped in spirit and in truth. It recog- 
 nizes in Christ the Logos become flesh, who was from eternity with God and through whom 
 God created the world and reveals himself to man; the Logos became flesh and "of his full- 
 ness (f/c Toi) TrXr/pufiaTog avTov) have all we received, and grace for grace." 
 
 Yet, however weighty and pregnant may have been the conceptions which Christ's 
 immediate and indirect disciples may have formed of his person, it is, nevertheless, not 
 true that "the proper basis and the vital germ of Christian doctrine" are to be sought m 
 them (see Huber, in his excellent work entitled Fhilosophie der Kirchenviiter, Mumch, 1859, 
 p. 8 ; on p. 10 Huber affirms, adopting the sentiment expressed by Schelling in his Philos. 
 der Offmibarung, Werke, II. 4, p. 35, that " Christ was not the teacher and founder, but the 
 content of Christianity ") ; this basis and this germ are contained rather in Jesus' ethical 
 requirement of inward righteousness, purity of heart, and love, and in liis own practice of 
 the things he required (and Huber, on p. 8 of the work cited above, justly acknowledges 
 that the source of those conceptions [of Christ's person] was the life and doctrine of 
 Jesus — which acknowledgment, however, involves an essential limitation of Huber's assent 
 to Schelling's doctrine). 
 
 Without prejudice to the essential originality and independence of the principles of 
 Christianity, it must be admitted that previous to their formal enunciation they liad been 
 foreshadowed and the ground had been prepared for them partly in the general principles 
 of Judaism, and partly and more particularly in connection with the attempt among the 
 Jews to revive the ancient gift of prophecy (a movement to which Parsee influences con- 
 tributed, and which lay at the foundation of Essenism) and (after the time of Paul and of 
 the Epistle to the Hebrews, and especially after the first development of Gnosticism and 
 the production of the fourth Gospel) in the religions philosophy of the Alexandrian Jews, 
 which arose througli the contact of Judaism with Hellenism. The essential object of the 
 allegorical interpretation of Scripture and of theosophy was to spiritualize the ideas con- 
 tained in the Old Testament. The sensible manifestations of God were interpreted as 
 manifestations of a divine power distinct from God and operating in the world. As in 
 Aristobulus and in the Book of Maccabees (iii. 39) the power (diva/ui^) of God, which dwells 
 in the world, is distinguished from God in his extra-mundane, absolute existence, and as 
 in the Proverbs (viii. 22 seq.) and the Book of Wisdom (vii. seq.) the Wisdom of God is 
 distinguished from God himself, so Paul proclaims Christ as tlie power and wisdom of 
 God (I Cor. i. 24 : Kr/pvaaoinev Xpiarov Gfof; Avvafiiv /cat Qeoi) Hoipiav). Philo terms God the 
 cause (alTiov) of the world, by (inrb) w-hom it had its origin, distinguishing from him the 
 Logos, through {(ha) whom he formed it, and the four elements which constitute it mate- 
 rially ; in like manner, in the Epistle to the Hebrews the Son of God is represented as he 
 through whom {(h' ov) God creates, and according to the Gospel of John all things that 
 were created were created through (J«i) the Logos (John i. 3 and 10: 6i' avrov). But the 
 Alexandrian theosophy did not admit the possibility of the incarnation of the divine Logos, 
 nor could it admit this, since, according to it, matter was impure, and the descent of the 
 soul into a mortal body was the penalty of moral delinquency on the part of the former. 
 For the adherents of this theosophy, therefore, the identification of the Messiah with the 
 divine Logos was impossible. They were waiting for the coming of the Messiah at the 
 time when Jesus recognized himself as the Messiah already come. They did not perceive 
 in the commandment of love to man the radical and positive expression for the spirituali- 
 eation of the law. They did not draw from their spiritualization of the law, the (Pauline)
 
 270 JE6US AND HIS APOSTLES. 
 
 consequence, that now, since the Messiah had appeared, the ancient law in its literal sense 
 was no longer binding on those who believed in him. They did not suffer the ceremonial 
 worship of the God revealed to the Jews to be replaced by the worship of God in spirit 
 and in truth. These radical differences indicate that the Alexandrian philosophy belongs 
 to the ante-Christian period, and it can only be regarded as one of the stepping-stones, 
 although it must at the same time be received as the last and nearest stepping-stone, to 
 Christianity. Cf. above, § 63. 
 
 Monotheism as a world-religion could only go forth from Judaism. The triumph of 
 Christianity was the triumph over polytheism of the religious idea of the Jewish people, 
 stripped of its national limitations and softened and spiritualized. This triumph was com- 
 pletely analogous to that won by the Hellenic language, and by Hellenic art and science, 
 in the kingdoms founded by Alexander the Great and afterward reduced under Roman 
 supremacy, only that the struggle in the field of religion was all the more severe and 
 wearisome, as the elements of permanent worth which were contained in the polytheistic 
 religioHS were more numerous. "When national exclusiveness had once given way to the 
 active commerce of nations and to the unity of the world-empire, it was necessary that, 
 in place of a plurality of forms of culture existing side by side, one of them should 
 gradually become dominant, which was strongest, most elevated, and most developed, or, 
 in other words, that Greek language, art, and science, Roman law (and also, for the West, 
 the Roman language), and either Greco-Roman or the (universalized, denationalized) Jewish 
 religion should become predominant. The Jews — especially those outside of Palestine — 
 although still holding on to monotheism, had begun to feel the unfitness of the further 
 maintenance of the positive law, and the circumstances of tlie time even necessitated its 
 abrogation. So soon, therefore, as an authority for such abrogation — an authority at once 
 satisfactory to the religious consciousness of the Jews and not repugnant to non-Jews 
 (who would have nothing to do with Judaism as traditionally constituted) — was found in 
 the divine-human Messiah, the superior of Moses and Abraham (albeit that the Messiah, 
 while on earth, had not pronounced this abrogation, perhaps had not willed it, and had 
 only furnished for it a possible 2'>oint dfappui through his new commandments, which went 
 beyond the requirements of mere positive legality), so soon as this condition was met, 
 as it was by the Apostle Paul, it was inevitable that the contest of religions should begin. 
 It was necessarily more difficult for the new tendency to make headway within the sphere 
 of Judaism and among those behevers who held fast to the letter of the commandments 
 of the Messiah who had personally lived among them, than within the sphere of Hellenism, 
 althovigh the latter did not jield to it without violent opposition, and, when it finally yielded, 
 .so filled the new movement with essential elements of its own, that in a certain sense Chris- 
 tianity, although sprung from Judaism, can justly be called the synthesis and product of 
 both Judaism and Hellenism — a synthesis superior to either of its elements. These two 
 factors, under the influence of new motives that afterward arose, were at a later period 
 again arrayed in opposition within the fold of Christianity, and primitive Catholicism was 
 the first victorious reconciliation of them. 
 
 As contrasted with Judaism, Christianity was marked by its greater spirituality, and 
 hence struck the positivists of the ancient faith, who could not bring themselves to 
 approve the Pauline abrogation of the law, as a free-thinking scandal {aitm'6aA.ov, 1 Cor. 
 i. 23). To the cultivated Hellenes the doctrine of a crucified God of Jewish race was a 
 superstitious folly (jiopia, ibid.), for which reason not many of high station accepted it 
 (1 Cor. i. 26 seq.). But the weak, the heavj'-laden, and oppressed heard gladly the tidings 
 cf the God who had descended to their low condition and the preaching of a future resur- 
 rection to beatific life. Not the religion of cheerful contentment, but consolation in mis'
 
 JEWISH AND PAULINE CHRI8TIANITT. 271 
 
 fortune, was what their wants demanded. Their opposition to their oppressors found in 
 faith in Christ a spiritual support, and llio commandment of love furnished to the principk 
 of mutual lielp a powerful motive. And now after the destruction of the poUtical inde 
 pendence of the cities and nations which had before been either constantly engaged in 
 feuds and wars with each other, or else had existed entirely apart from each other, far 
 greater importance was attached than before to the material and spiritual interests of the 
 individvxjl^ to personal morality and happiness. The union of men of like mind from 
 among the most different peoples and civil communities in one religious society now first 
 became possible, and acquired a higher spiritxial charm. The existence of a world- 
 monarchy was favorable to the idea of religious imity and to the preaching of concord and 
 love. A religion which in its tlieoretical as well as its positive groundwork should rest, 
 not on ancient national conceptions, but on the more comprehensive, less poetic, and more 
 reflective consciousness of the present, became a necessity. It could not be otherwise than 
 that the more simple and popular doctrine of the Gospel should triumph over such artificial 
 attempts in the interest of an intellectual aristocracy and foreign to the popular belief, 
 among the later Stoics and the Neo-Platonists, as were made to furnish new interpretations 
 and combinations of pagan doctrines. The authors of these attempts did not dare, and 
 were unable to guard unchanged the Old-Hellenic principle in the presence of Christianity ; 
 for the allegorical interpretation of the myths of Paganism was only a proof that those 
 who professed to believe tliem were ashamed of them, and thus prepared the way for 
 the triumph of Christianity, which openly rejected them. But after the dissolution of the 
 ethical harmony which characterized the bloom of Hellenic antiquity, and as a consequence 
 of the increasing moral degeneracy of the times, moral health, salvation, was held to 
 depend primarily on self-purification through renunciation of the W'orld, on the "cruci- 
 fixion of the lusts and desires," and on self-consecration to an etliical ideal, whose charac- 
 teristic was not that it artistically transfigured the present natural life, but that it ele- 
 vated the spirit above it. With many the fear of the tlireatened pains of hell and the 
 hope of the promised salvation and blessedness of the members of the kingdom were 
 very powerful motives. It should also be added that the blood of the martyrs became, 
 through the attention and respect transferred from their persons to their cause, a seed of 
 the church. ^_ 
 
 § 75. The opposition between Judaism and Hellenism reappeared, 
 though in a sense and in a measure which were modilied by the com- 
 munity of the opposing parties in Christian principle, within the circle 
 of Christianity itself, in the division of the Jewish from the Gentile 
 Christians. Jewish Christianity united with faith in Jesus as the Mes- 
 siah the observance of the Mosaic law. Gentile Christianity, on the 
 contrary, arose from the Pauline conception of Christianity as con- 
 sisting in justification and sanctification through Christ, without the 
 works of the law. But both parties agreeing in the recognition of 
 Jesus as the Messiah and in the adoption of the moral law of love as 
 promulgated by him, this opposition yielded to the desire for Chris- 
 tian unity (which sentiment was most powerful in mi.xed churches, 
 like that at Rome). A canon of the writings of all the Apostles, differ- 
 ing but little from our own, was constituted, in which the Johannean
 
 272 JEWISH AND PAULINE CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 Gospel was added to the three first of our Gospels, all others heing 
 rejected, and with these a collection of Apostolical writings was com- 
 bined. Finally, the early Catholic Church was founded, which con- 
 ceived Christianity as essentially contained in the new law of love; 
 the Mosaic law of ceremonies was abolished, as no longer binding 
 on those who should believe in Christ, and in connection with the 
 development and completion of a new hierarchical constitution, a 
 rule of faith was established, having the form of a law. The rule of 
 faith related chiefly to the objective conditions of salvation. The 
 conceptions of God, and of his only-begotten Son and of the Holy 
 Ghost — conceptions which, chiefly through the formula of baptism, 
 were becoming universally fixed in the Christian consciousness — lay 
 at its basis, and it was directed against Judaism, on the one hand, 
 and, on the other, against those speculations of the Gnostics, which 
 were not in correspondence with the common sentiment of the Chris- 
 tian churches. 
 
 Aug. Neander, Allgemeine Oeschichte der chriitlichen Religion imd Kircke, 3d ed., Gotha, 1856 ; 
 Oesch. der PJians'iing nnd Leitung der ckristMchen Kirche diirch die Apostel, Hamburg, 1882, 5th 
 ed., Gotha, 1862; OhriKt. Dogmengesch., hrsg. van J. L. Jacobi, Berlin, 185T. Rich. liothe, I>i« Anfange der 
 chr-istl. Kirche tmd ihrer Verfassung, Vol. I., Wittenberg, 1S37. Ferd. Christian Baur, Paulus der 
 ApostelJemi Christi, Tiibingen, 1845; Lehrbiich der christl. Dogmengesch., 2d ed., Stuttgart, 1868; Vor- 
 lenungen iiber die neutestamenil. TTieologie, hrsg. von Ferd. Friedr. Baiir, Leips. 1864 ; Vorl. ilber die 
 christl. Dogmengesch. (posthumous publication), Tiibingen, 1865; Das Ch7-istenthum -und die christl. 
 Kirche der drei ersteii Jahrhtinderte, 3d ed., ibid. 1863 ; Die christl. Kirche vom Anfang des vierten bis 
 sum Ernie des sechsteti Jahrhunderts, 2d ed., il/id. 1868. Albert Schwegler, Das nachapostolische Zeitalter 
 in den Hatiptmomenten seiner Ent/wickelu7ig, Tubingen, 1846. Albrecht Eitschl, Die Entstehung der alt- 
 katholischen Kirche, 2d cd., Bonn, 1857. Ad. Hilgenfeld, Das Urchristenthum in den IJauptwende- 
 punkten seines Entwickltingsganges, Jena, 1855. Cf. the numerous articles of Hilgenfeld in his Zeitschr. 
 f. wiss. Theol., and Heinrich Holtzmann's Judenthum 7ind Chrinienthiim, Leipsic. 1867. Ph. Sohaff, Oe- 
 schichte der Apost. Kirche, 'id ed., Leipsic, 1854 ; Geschichte der alten Kirche, 3 vols., 2d ed., Leipsic, 1869. 
 [The same in English, New York.] 
 
 The early Catholic Church, although numbering both Jewish Christianity and Paulinism 
 among its antecedents, and containing certain elements derived from both, was neverthe- 
 less more immediately an outgrowth from the latter, or from Gentile Christianity. In the 
 abrogation of the Mosaic law and of national barriers on the ground of the new principle 
 of faith in Christ, it was in material agreement with Paulinism. But in form it was less 
 removed from Judaism and from Jewish Christianity, on account of the legal character 
 with which it invested the Christian principle in matters of faith, charity, and church 
 order. For it Christianity was essentially a new law (John xiii. 34: kvTolri naivfj; cf. Gal. 
 vi. 2, where Paul speaks of that love which manifests itself in acts of mutual assistance, 
 as the "law of Christ," in distinction from the Mosaic law, and 1 Cor. xi. 25, 2 Cor. iii. 6, 
 and Heb. viii. 1 3 : Kaivfj diadijKT), Epist. Barnabae, II. 4 ; nova lex Jesu Christi). The pre- 
 dilection for the legal form in matters of faith, practice, and constitution, may be explained 
 partly by the influence which the legal religion and hierarchy of the Old Testament, how- 
 ever modified and idealized by Christianity, could not but exert on the Gentile Christians 
 (and this, too, without conscious " concessions " to the opposing party, which were only
 
 jf:wish and pauline Christianity. 273 
 
 made incidentally and far more by a fraction of the Jewish Christians than by the Gentile 
 Christians), as also by the influence of early Christian tradition, especially that of the 
 '/.oyLd KvpinKn, or "Words of the Lord," and partly b}- the ecclesiastical necessity which 
 existed of advancing from the subjective conceptions of Paul to objective norms and by 
 the moral reaction which took place against ultra-Pauline Antinomianism.* In like manner, 
 precisely, the transition from Luther's faith to Luther's articles of faith, and, later, to the 
 symbols of the Lutheran Church, was due partly to the surviving influence of the old 
 Cluu-ch, in spite of all the opposition which was directed against it, and partly to the 
 inherent necessity of objective norms and to the reaction excited by extreme reformatory 
 attempts. 
 
 The Jewish Christians, who united with the observance of tlie Mosaic law a belief in 
 the Messianic dignity of Jesus, were divided, after the commencement of Paul's ministry, 
 into two factions. The more rigid of them denied the apostolic character of Paul, 
 and refused to recognize as members of the Messiah's kingdom those Christians who 
 were born in heathenism, except upon the condition of their being circumcised ; the less 
 rigid of them, on the contrary, conceded the authority of Paul to labor among the Gentiles, 
 and only demanded of believers converted from heathenism the observance of those things 
 which had been prescribed by the Jews for the proselytes of the gate (in accordance with 
 the so-called decree of the Apostles, Acts xv. 29 : aTzix^c^Oai n^uAoOiruv koI al/iuTog nai 
 wviKTov Kul Topveiaq, whereas in Gal. ii. 10 only the contribution for the poor at Jerusalem 
 
 * NeaTider designates, in addition to the fact of the diminished power and purity of tlie religious spirit 
 in the post-ApostoUc times, the example of the Old Testament, whose influence was first and most directly 
 manifest in the constitution of the Church, as the cause of the development of a new discipline of law in the 
 early Catholic Church. Baur and Schwegler emphasize most the idea of the successive development and 
 reconciliation of the opposition between Jewish Christianity and Panlinism, but both of them (and espe- 
 cially Schwegler) ascribe to JewLsli Chiisti.inity (which is chiefly of historical import;ince only as having 
 directly preceded Panlinism) in the post-Pauline period (in which, under the name of Ebionitism, it con- 
 tinued to be powerful until near the year 185, after which it was scdrcely more than a rapidly-declining 
 remnant of the jiast) perhaps a more widespread acceptation and influence than are actually demonstrable or 
 internally probable. Albert Ritschl, on the other hand, is a prominent representative of those who argue 
 that Catholic Christianity was not the result of a reconciliation effected between Jewish and Gentile Cbrii- 
 tian;^, but a stage in the history of Gentile Christianity alone. The transformation of Panlinism into 
 Catholic Christianity was occasioned, says Pitschl, by the need in the Church of norms of thought and life 
 which should possess universal validity, 'With Paul the theoretical and the practical were blended, with u 
 touch of mysticism, in the conception of faith, and this blending was in harmony with the peculiaritie,'; of 
 his character and experience. What with Paul, therefore, was living and mobile, the church sousht to 
 express in fixed fornmlas, a result which could only be attained at the expense of the peculiar warmth and 
 elevation of the Christianity of Panl (Ritschl, Entntehntig der ultkuth. Kirche, 1st ed,, p, 273), In the 
 second edition of his work Pitschl maintains thr.t the qnestiim is not whether the early Catholic Church 
 was developed on the basis of Jewish Christianity or on that of P.aulinism, but whether it was developed 
 out of Jewish or out of Gentile Christianity, The jieculiar marks of Gentile Christianity, as he further 
 remarks, were the rejection of Jewish customs and the entertainment of the belief that tliev, the Gentile 
 Christians, had entered into the place of the Je«s in the covenant relation with God (both of which were 
 rendered possible only tlirongh the initiative taken by Paul), and he continues: "The Gentile Oiristians 
 needed first to be instructed concerning the unity of God and the history of his covenant-revelation, con- 
 cerning moral righteousness and judgment, sin and redemption, the kingdom of God and the Son of God, 
 before they could besrin to attend to the dialectical relations between sin and law, grace and _'ustiflcntion, 
 faith and righteousness'' (2d ed., p, 27'2) ; they accepted tlie equal authority of all the Apo.<tles, including 
 Paul, but they involuntarily interpreted the teachings of the Apostles so as to find in them Christ repre- 
 sented as a lawgiver and the believer's religious relation to him as inridving simply the acceptance of the 
 "rule of faith" and the fulfillment of Christ's law (ibid., p. 580 seq.). Pitschl's merUorious work a|ipear» 
 only to need, for its completeness, a more minute inquiry into the historical development of dogmas, ami 
 more particularly into the development of the Johannean doctrine, of OnostiRtsm, and of the re»ctio« 
 a^inst the latter. 
 18
 
 274 THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS, 
 
 is mentioned, the only condition to which Paul could assent without favoring a relapao 
 into the legality against which he made war). Tlie milder fraction, which granted tolera- 
 tion to the Gentile Christians, had in the time of Justin already sunk to the condition of a 
 tolerated party {Dial. c. Tryph., ch. 47). The more exactmg fraction lost its hold in propor- 
 tion as the antagonism between Christians and Jews became more pronounced. The 
 decree issued after the suppression of the rising under Barkochba (135 A. D.), which 
 forbade the Jews to remain in Jerusalem, excluded also all Jewish Christians living accord- 
 ing to Jewish law from this center of Christendoro, and permitted only a Christian com- 
 munity which had renounced the Mosaic law to exist there, under a bishop chosen from 
 among the Gentile Christians ; and finally the primitive Catholic Church, whose consti- 
 tution was effected with the recognition of a complete apostolic canon (about ITS a. d.), 
 excluded from its fold all Jewish Christians as heretics (so that henceforth they continued 
 to exist only as a sect), while it rejected, on the other hand, as false, a one-sided, ultra- 
 Pauline Antinomianism and Gnosticism, which threatened to lead to the destruction of 
 morality itself and to the dissolution of the connection of Christianity with its Old Testa- 
 ment basis. 
 
 These differences among the early Christians were among the causes which led to the 
 beginnings of Christian philosophical speculation (for which reason they could not remain 
 TBnmentioned here). 
 
 FIRST SECTION. 
 
 Patristic Philosophy till the Time of the Council of Nice. 
 
 § 76. Among the teachers of tlie Church who were received as 
 immediate disciples of the Apostles, and were called Apostolic Fa- 
 thers, Clement of Rome, who was probably the author of the first of 
 the two Ejpistles to the Corinthian Churchy which have come down 
 to us under his name, and the authors of the Epistles ascribed to 
 Barnabas, to Ignatius of Antioch, and to Polvcarp of Smyrna, as also 
 the author of the Epistle to Diognct^is^ represent Gentile Christianity 
 at the time of its development into the early Catholic Church. Th(i 
 Shepherd of Ilermas bears a very un-Pauline character, and is by no 
 means free from Judaizing elements. The work entitled Testaments 
 of the Twelve Patriarchs represents the doctrines of the milder frac- 
 tions of Jewish Christians. A Jewish-Christian stand-point is appa- 
 rent in the pseudo-Clementine Recognitions and Ilom.ilies. In the 
 writings of the Apostolic Fathers we see, principally, the fundamental 
 doctrines, theoretical and practical, of Christianity being developed 
 in the struggle with Judaism and paganism, the distinction between 
 Jewish and Gentile Christianity gradually disappearing, and each 
 
 J
 
 THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS. 275 
 
 extreme becoming constantly more and more separated from the 
 Church, as the latter becomes united on the basis of the equal author- 
 ity of all the Apostles (including Paul). 
 
 Patrum Apostolicorum Opera, ed. Cotelier, Paris, 1672, ed. II., ed. Clericns, Amsterdam, 1724, since 
 reproduced by Gallandius and by Migne ; ed. Car. Jos. Helele, Tubingen, 1839, etc.; ed. Albert Dressel, 
 Leipa. 1857, 2d ed., 1863. Novum 7'e«tamentum ertra Canonem receptmn (V Cl^m. Horn,. Epi»t., 2. Bar- 
 ■ndhax, 3 Herman, 4. Lihrorum Deperd. FragmenUi: Ev. sec. Hehr., nee. Petr-um, gee. Aegyptios, Mat- 
 t?iiae tradit., Petri et Pauli praedioationis et aciuum, Petri apocalypseofi, etc.. quae supersunt), ed. Ad. 
 Hiljrenfeld, Leips. 1866. dementis Pomani quae Jeruntur Homiliae. Textum recognotit, versionem 
 lat. Cotelerii repet. pass, emend., selectas Cotelerii, Da/cisii, Clerici atque suas annotationes addidit 
 Mbertus Schwtgler, Stuttgart, 1847. Clem. Pom., quae feruntur Homiliae viginti nunc primvm inte- 
 ffrae. e<1. Bressel, Gott 1853. Clementina, ed. I'aiil do Lagarde, Leipsic, 1865. iS'. Ignatii quae feruntwr 
 Epixt. una cum ejuAdem Martyrio, ed. Jul. Petermann, Leipsic, 1S49. Cf. Rich. Kothe, Ueber die 
 EcJMeit der ignatianischen Briefe, in the Supplement to his work on the Beginnings of the Christian 
 Church, Vol. I., Wittenberg, 1837; Ad. Schliemann, Die Clementinen, Hamburg, 1844; Ad. Hilgenfeld, Dis 
 Clement in ischen PeeogniHonen und Hontiliem., Jena, 1848, and IHe npogt. Vdter, Ilalle. 1853; G. Uhlhom, 
 Pie /Tom. u. Pecogn. des Clemens Pomanus, Oottingen, 1854; also Bunsen's, Baur's, Alb. Kitschl's, Volk- 
 inar''s and others' investigations. 
 
 The "Apostolic Fathers" begin the list of "Church Fathers" in the wider signification 
 of this expression, i. e., of those ecclesiastical writers who, next to Christ and the Apostles, 
 were most influential in establishing the doctrine and constitution of the Church. (The 
 expression is founded on 1 Cor. iv. 15.) As " Church Fathers" in the narrower sense, the 
 Catholic Church recognizes only those whom she has approved as such on account of the 
 pre-eminent purity in which they preserved the faith of the Church, the erudition with 
 which they defended and established the faith, the holiness of their lives, and their (rela- 
 tive) antiquity. In respect of time, three periods are generally assumed in the list of 
 Church Fathers, the first extending to the end of the third century, the second to the end 
 of the sixth century (or, more exactly, to the year 604, m which Gregory the Great died, 
 and in the Grecian Church perhaps to the time of John of Damascus), and the third either 
 extending to tJie thirteenth century or limited only by the duration of the Church itself. 
 Among its "Fathers" the Catholic Church has especially distinguished with the name of 
 Doctores Eccksine, in the Eastern Church the following: Athanasius, Basil the Great, 
 Gregory of Nazianzen, and Chrysostom, and also John of Damascus; and in the Western 
 Churcli (by a decree of Pope Boniface VIII. in the year 1298): Ambrosius, Hieronymus, 
 Augustine, Gregory the Great; at subsequent epochs, Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventura; 
 and finally Saint Bernard and ITilarius of Poitiers were raised by Papal bulls to the rank 
 of Fathers and Doctors of the Church. Those men who do not fully meet the require- 
 ments of the above criteria (and especially that of orthodoxy) are called, not Patres, but 
 simi)ly Scriptores Ecclesiasiici. Among these are Papias, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, 
 Tertullian, Eusebius of Ctesarea, and others. 
 
 In regard to the person of Clement of Rome (who must be distinguished not only from 
 Clement of Alexandria, but perhaps also from the Clement of Philippi, mentioned in Phil, 
 iv. 3, with whom Origen, Eu.sebius, Hieronymus, and others identify him) accounts are con- 
 tradictory. According to the Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions, Clement was the son of a well- 
 born Roman named Faustinianus; that he might become acquainted with the Christian doc- 
 trine, he made a journey to Ca^sarea in Palestine, where he found Peter, and was instructed 
 by him in the principles of Christianity. According to the spurious Epi.«tle of Clemens to 
 the Apostle James, Peter chose him as his successor in the chair of the Roman Bishop. Ac- 
 cording to Tertullian, he was the immediate successor of Peter in that oflBce ; according to
 
 276 THE APOSTOLIC FATHEES. 
 
 Irenfeus, Eusebius, Hieronymus, and others, he was the fourth Roman Bishop, Linus and 
 Anicetus having occupied that office between Peter and himself. Eusebius and Hierony- 
 mus represent him as at the head of the Roman Church from a. u. 92 to 100. Witli the 
 Flavius Clemens, of consular rank, who was executed under Domitian in the year 95 as a 
 Judaizing atheist (probably, therefore, as a Christian), tradition has not identified him. A 
 division, which had arisen in the Church at Corinth (in the time of Domitian, according 
 to that Hegesippus who lived in the middle of the second century, see Euseb., E. 11.^ 
 IIL 16), IS represented as the occasion of the letter, written in the name of the Roman 
 Church, which has come down to us as the first (probably genuine, though revised, yet iu 
 Volkmar's opinion spurious) Epistle of Clemens (composed about A. d. 125). The ideas 
 expressed by Clemens are those contained in the Pauline Epistles and in the P]pistle to 
 the Hebrews. We are made righteous, he says, not bj'- ourselves, nor by our wisdom, 
 knowledge, piety, or works, but by faith. But we are not for that reason to be slow to 
 good works, nor to abate our love, but we must accomplish every good work with joyful 
 zeal, just as God himself, the Creator, rejoices in his works. Where love reigns, no divi- 
 sions can continue to exist. Have we not one G-od and one Christ and one Spirit of grace, 
 which IS poured out upon us, and is there not one calling in Christ ? Christ was sent by 
 God, and the Apostles were sent by Christ ; filled with the Holy Ghost by the resurrection 
 of Christ, they proclaimed the coming of the kingdom of God, and ordained the first be- 
 lievers as overseers and ministers (tmff/coTrowf «at SiaKovovg, cf. Phil. i. 1) of the rest. To 
 the overseers we owe obedience ; to those who are most aged, reverence. Clemens 
 defends the incipient Christian hierarchy by pointing to the orders of the Old Testament, 
 the symbolical understanding of which he calls yvuatc (cf. 1 Cor. xii. 8; Heb. v. and vi.). 
 He seeks to silence the doubt of many as to the second coming of Christ and the resurrec- 
 tion, by adducing natural analogies, such as the succession of day and night, the growth 
 of the seed sown in the earth, and the (supposed) revivification of the bird Phoenix. The 
 second Epistle, in which teachers are admonished to walk worthily of their vocation, as 
 also the Epistles to Virgins (ascetics of both sexes), which Wettstein first discovered in a 
 Byriac version, and published in 1752, are probably spurious. The Apostolic Constitutions 
 and Canons, which were ascribed to Clemens Romanus, date in their present form from 
 the third and fourth centuries after Christ, though some parts are older. 
 
 The so-called Recognitions and Homilies of Clemens were composed under his name by 
 Jewish Christians. The Recognitions, founded on an older Judaizing work, the " Ke^-ygma 
 of Peter,'" and written about 140 or 150 a. d., though in their present form probably of 
 later date, combat Gnosticism, as represented by Simon the Magian, and defend the iden- 
 tity of the Creator of the world with the only true God; but they distinguish from Him 
 (after the manner of Philo) the Spirit, as the organ through which he created, the Only- 
 begotten, of whom he himself is the head. The true worshiper of God is he who does 
 His will and observes the precepts of the law. To seek after righteousness and the king- 
 dom of God is the way in which to arrive in the future world at the direct vision of the 
 secrets of God. Tlie written law cannot be rightly understood without the aid of tradi- 
 tion, which, starting from Christ, the true prophet, is carried forward by the Apostles 
 and teachers. The essential part of the law is contained in the ten commandments. The 
 Mosaic institution of offerings had only a provisional significance ; in its place Christ has 
 instituted the ordinance of baptism. For the non-Jews who believe in Christ those com- 
 mands are binding which were laid on the proselytes of the gate. The Jews must believe 
 in Christ, and the Gentile who believes in Christ must fulfill the law in its essential and 
 permanent requirements {Recogn., IV. 5 : debet is, qui ex gentibus est et ex Deo habet ut dili- 
 gat Jesum, proprii habere propositi, ut credat et Moysi; et rursus Eebraeus, qui ex Deo habet.
 
 THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS. 277 
 
 lit credai Moysi, habere debet et ex proposito suo, ut credat in Jesum). The Homilies, which are 
 probably a revision of the RecognitioTits, made about 170 A. D., represent in general the same 
 stand-point with tlie Rtcog nit ions, teaching that the fuudauienlal doctrines of Christ, the 
 true prophet, who was God's Son, but not God, are, that iliere is one God, who made the 
 world, and who, because he is just, will give to every one according to his works ; yet ihey 
 contain a greater number of speculative elements than the Recognitimis. Their fuudamenUil 
 theoretical principle is, that God, the One, has arranged all things according to contraries. 
 God stands to his wisdom, the creatress of the All, in the double relation expressed by 
 cvoToTJj, in virtue of which Jie forms witli it a unity (,uovdc), and eKraau:, in virtue of which 
 this unity is separated into a dualitj-. The contraries, warm and cold, moist and dry, form 
 the basis of the four different elements, into which God divided the originally simple mat- 
 ter of which he made the world. Man alone is endowed with freedom of will. The souls 
 of the godless are punished with annihilation. The true prophet has appeared at various 
 times, under different names and forms, first in Adam, last in Christ. Through Christ the 
 Gentiles have become participants in the benefits of the revelation of God. That part of 
 the law which he abrogated (in particular, the requirement of offerings) never really be- 
 longed to it, but arose from the corruption which the genuine tradition of the revelation 
 made to Moses underwent on the occasion of its being written down in the books of the 
 Old Testament. He who believes in but one of the revelations of God is well-pleasing to 
 God. Christianity is the universal form of Judaism. When he who was born a Gentile 
 fulfills the law in the fear of God, he is a Jew, otherwise he is a Gentile (E7i?.Tfv). — The 
 chronological relation between the Recognitions and the Homilies is a matter of dispute. 
 Uhlhorn, among others, holds the Homilies to be the earlier work, Hilgeufeld, the Recogni- 
 tions ; the former is supported by F. Nitzsch, among others, in his History of Dogmas, I. 
 49; but Nitzsch admits that, in the Recognitions (composed at Rome), certain parts of the 
 traditional material common to both works appear in a simpler and more primitive form 
 than in the Homilies. Tliere exists also an Epitome of tJie Homilies, which has been several 
 times edited (most recently by A. Dressel, Leips. 1859). 
 
 The work entitled '• Testaments of the Tivelve Patriarchs,'^ which may here be mentioned 
 with this pseudonymous literature, was probably written near the middle of the second 
 century. Its author belonged to that Jewish-Christian party which did not demand that 
 the Gentile Christians should be circumcised. In it the Epistles of Paul and also the Acts 
 of the Apostles are reckoned among the Holy Scriptures. It teaches that the high- 
 priesthood of Christ completed and replaced the Levitical service of the temple ; that the 
 Spirit of God descended on Jesus at his baptism, and wrought in him holiness, righteous- 
 ness, knowledge, and sinlcssness; that the Israelites who were scattered abroad are to be 
 gathered together and converted to Christ, and that the fear of God, with prayer and 
 fasting, is a shield against temptation, and gives strength for the fulfillment of the divine 
 commands. 
 
 Tlie work entitled •' The Shepherd,'' purports to have been written in the time of 
 Bishop Clement. It was probably composed about the year 130, and is ascribed to one 
 Hermas, who is described in the Muratori- Fragment as the brother of Pius, the Bishop of 
 Rome from 140 to 152. In any case, it cannot have been the work of the Hermas in 
 Romans xvi. 14. The work contains a narrative of visions vouchsafed to Hermas. A 
 guardian spirit in shepherd's clothing, sent by an adorable angel, communicates to liim 
 certain commandments for himself and his Church, and interprets parables for liim. The 
 purport of the commandments is that thej' to whom they are addressed should believe m 
 God and walk in the fear of Him. The Old Testament law is not mentioned, but the pre- 
 cepts whicli are given respecting abstinence, fastmg, etc., betray simpl}' the legal stand-
 
 278 THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS. 
 
 point, and even the doctrine of supererogatory works is put forward. After baptism a 
 second opportunity is allowed for repentance. Christ is styled the first-created angel, who 
 was from the beginning only the organ of the Holy Ghost. God is compared to the master 
 of a house, the Holy Ghost to his son, and Christ to the most faithful of his servants. 
 Hermas, having acquired perfection through repentance and good works, is surrounded by 
 twelve ministering virgins, who represent the various powers of the Holy Ghost. He is 
 made a building-stone in the edifice of the Church. 
 
 The date of the so-called Epistle of Barnabas^ is, according to Hilgenfeld {Das Urchris- 
 tenthum, p. 77, and Nov. Test, extra Can. rec, 11., p. xiii.), a. d. 96 or 97. Volkmar, reason- 
 mg from the passage in cli. 16, on the restoration of the temple by the aid of the Romans, 
 concludes with greater probability that it was written in 118-119, hy some one who was 
 not a Jew but who was familiar with the Alexandrian philosophy (ch. IG: r/v ////wv to 
 KarotKTjTTipiov Tfj<; Kapd'iaq izlf/peq eldulolaTpeiaq), and whose intention was perhaps to write 
 in the name and according to the doctrine of Barnabas, as of one whose doctrine was the 
 same with Paul's. But where Paul and the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews recognize 
 two covenants, objectively distinct (the Tza/jua and the naLvfj 6ia6?/K7/), the author of the 
 Epistle of Barnabas sees rather only a subjective difference between successive modes of 
 apprehending the divine revelation. The Jews, he says, through their devotion to the 
 letter, failed to perceive the true sense of God's covenant-agreement with them and by 
 their sins forfeited salvation ; for this they were reproved by the prophets, who taught 
 that obedience was better than sacrifice ; the Christians have entered into the inheritance 
 originally intended for the Jews and have become the true covenant people ; their work is 
 to fear God and keep his commandments, not the ceremonial law, but the new law of 
 Jes.us Christ (nova lex Jesu Cfiristi), which requires the self-cousecration of man to God 
 (cf. Rom. xii. 1), and does not impose a yoke of bondage (cf. Gal. v. 1). Insight into the 
 true sense of Scripture, attained by the aid of the allegorical method of interpretation, is 
 termed, in the Epistle of Barnabas, yvuaic, knowledge (cf. 1 Cor. xii. 1 seq. ; Hebr. v. vL), 
 which is related to faith (-ianq) as higher to lower. Yet no aristocratic separation from 
 the cliurch is to be allowed on the part of those who have risen to this higher attain- 
 ment (cf. Hebr. x. 25). Tlie (Judaistic) opinion, that the Testament of the Jews, as under- 
 stood by them, is also of authority for Christians, is denounced by the author of the Epistle 
 of Barnabas, as a very great error ; he warns : Iva fir/ 7vpoaepx<JfJ-£6a Jif k-KifAvraL r<j 
 EKHvav vonu (ut non incurramus tanqtunn pronelyti ad illorum legem, ch. 3 ; ne similetis iis, 
 qui peccata sua congerunt et dicunt: quia testanientum illorum et nx)strwn est, ch. 4). (The 
 Codex SiAaiticus, discovered by Tischendorf, gives the original Greek of the first four 
 chapters, which were before known only in a Latin translation; reprinted in Dressel's 
 Patr. Ajyosi., 2d edition, 1863 ; cf. Weizsiicker, Zur Kritik des Barnabasbriefs, aus dem Codex 
 Sinaiticus, Tubingen Univ. Programm, 1863). 
 
 The Epistle of Polycorp to the Phiiippiuns, which was written between 147 and 167, and 
 perhaps in the year 150, is probably for the most part genuine; but there are so many 
 grounds for suspecting the authenticity of the Epistles ascribed to Ignatius of Antiocli 
 (who was torn in pieces b}^ leopards as a despiser of the gods, on the 20th of December. 
 A. D. 115, not at Rome, as we have almost conclusive reason for believing, but at Autioch, 
 soon after the earthquake at Antioch, which took place during Trajan's sojourn in that city ; 
 cf G. Volkmar, in the Phein. Museum, new series, XII., 1857, pp. 481-511), or for supposing 
 that extensive interpolations were made in them at various times, that they cannot be confi- 
 dently relied on as documents exponential of the development of religious thought in the 
 post-apostolic age. An Epistle of Polj'carp to the Phihppians is mentioned by Irenaeus! 
 (Adv. Haer., III. 3) ; but with that one the Epistle now extant is only partially identical.
 
 THE APOSTOLIC FATHEK8. 279 
 
 Whether the brief Syriac recension (found in an Egyptian cloister, and first published by 
 W. Cureton at London, in 1845) of the three Epistles of Ignatius to the Ephesians, to the 
 Romans, and to Polycarp, contains the earlier text, or is an abridgment of the Greek text, 
 is uncertain ; though the former supposition is the more probable. The character of these 
 Epistles is Pauline, and in the case of those of Ignatius, partly Johannean. But the 
 hierarchical tendency is visible iu all of them, especially in the Epistles of Ignatius. Poly- 
 carp (died 167) admonishes those to whom his Epistle is addressed (ch. 5), to be obedient 
 to their presbyters and deacons, as to God and Christ, and the Epistles of Ignatius contain 
 the basis of a hierarchical system. The Ignatian Epistles, especially that addressed to 
 the Romans, breathe forth love for martyrdom, which the author represents as shortly 
 awaiting himself. In the later ones, the hierarchical tendency becomes constantly more 
 prominent. Nothing but steadfast loj'alty to God, Christ, the bishop, and the command- 
 ments of the apostles can protect one from the temptations of the heretics, who mix Jesus 
 Christ with poison (Ad Trallianos, ch. 1 seq.). In the Epistles to the Ephesians, to the 
 Trallians, and to the Smyrneans, it is chiefly the Docetes, and iu the Epistles to the 
 Magnesians and Philadelphians it is the Judaizing Christians, who are combated. Cf. 
 Bunsen's Die drei echten und die vier unechttn Brieft des I<juati%ts von Antiochien, Hamburg, 
 1847; Ignatius von Antiochien u. s. Zeit, ibid. 1847; Baur's Untersuchungen iiher die ign. 
 Briefe, Tubingen, 1848; cf. also the uavestigations of Uhlhorn, Hilgenfeld and others 
 (according to whom, the Syriac text is an abridgment of the Greek), Friedr. Bohringer 
 [Kirchtnyesch. dtr drei ersten Jahrhwulerte, 2d edition, Ziirich, 1861, pp. 1-46), who gives an 
 exact analysis of the Epistles, Richard Adalbert Lipsius (Ueber das Verhdltniss des Textes 
 der drei syriichen Briefe des Ignatius zu den iibrigen Recensionen der Ignatianischen Literatm; 
 Leipsic, 1859; also in Abh. fiir die Kunde des Morgenlandes, j)ublished by the Deutsche mor- 
 genldnd. Gesellschaft, and edited by llerm. Brockhaus, Leipsic, 1859 and 61, where Lipsius 
 argues iu favor of the priority of the Syriac recension), and further (for the opposite 
 view), A. Merx's Meleteniata Ignatiana (Halle, 1861). According to Yolkmar, the three first 
 Martyr-Epistles were composed in about 170, the next four about 175-180, at which time 
 he judges that the spurious passages were added to the genuine Epistle of Polycarp. 
 
 The (anonymous) Epistle to Diognetus (who was probably the favorite of Marcus Aure- 
 lius, mentioned by Capitolinus, Vit. Ant., ch. 4) is included, sometimes among the writings 
 of Justin, sometimes among those of the Apostolic Fathers, although in stylo and dogmatic 
 stand- point it differs materially from the works of Justin (see Semisch, Justin, I. p. 178 
 seq.). Its composition by an immediate disciple of the Apostles is by no means certain, 
 since the author seems rather to appeal to the Catholic principle of the " iraditio aposto- 
 lo7-um." The Epistle contains a spirited Christian apology. (It has been published by 
 Otto with the works of Justin, see below, § 78, and separately by W. A. HoUeuberg, Ber- 
 lin, 1853.) Its stand-point is akin to that of the Johannean Epistles and the fourth Gospel. 
 Judaism is rejected. To pretend to find in circumcision an evidence of one's election and 
 of God's especial favor, is treated by the author as a boastful assumption, deserving to be 
 met with scorn. He considers the sacrificial cultus to be an error, and anxious strictness 
 in the choice of meats and in the solemnization of the Sabl)ath to be without reason. Yet 
 he is no less decided in his opposition to paganism. The Greek gods are for him inanimate 
 images of wood, clay, stone, and metal, and the worship oftered to them is senseless. In 
 the ages before Christ God had left man subject to the disorderly play of his sensuous 
 desires, in order to show that it is not by human strength and merit, but simply through 
 the mercy of God, that eternal life can be attained. The moral superiority of the Chris- 
 tians is portrayed by the author in glowing colors. Their manner of life, he says, is most 
 admiraWe and excellent. They dwell as strangers in their native lands. They perform all
 
 280 GNOSTICISM. 
 
 duties like citizens, and endure all that is inflicted upon them, as if they were foreigners. 
 Every land, however foreign, is fatherland for them, and every fatherland is foreign. 
 They marry, like all men, and beget children, but they do not expose those whom 
 they have begotten. They have their meals, but not their wives, in common. They 
 are on the earth, but their life is in heaven. They love all men, and are persecuted by 
 all. They are not known, and yet are condemned. They are killed, and yet live. They 
 are poor, yet make many rich. "What the soul is in the body, that are the Christians in 
 the world. That which produces in them this manner of life is the love of God, which has 
 been manifested in the sending of the Logos, who formed the world, and is ever being 
 born anew in the hearts of the saints (jravTOTe VEoq iv ayiuv Kapdiatg yevvu/j.Evog). 
 
 § 77. The so-called Gnostics, in their endeavor to advance from 
 Christian faith to Christian knowledge, made the first attempt to 
 construct a religious philosophy on the Christian basis. The Gnostic 
 speculation was less logical than imaginative, the various abstract 
 elements of religious belief being realized in the form of personal 
 beings, forming a Christian or rather a semi-Christian mythology, 
 underneath which lay hidden the germs of a correct historical and 
 scientific appreciation of Christianity. In this latter regard the first 
 problem in importance was the relation of Christianity to Judaism, 
 and this problem was solved by the Gnostics by translating into its 
 equivalent theoretical expression the practical attitude assumed by 
 the ultra-Paulinists with reference to Judaism. The next problem 
 was the relation of Christianity to the various heathen and, in par- 
 ticular, to the Hellenic religions. Tlie ideas of the Gnostics were 
 partly those of the Old Testament and of Christianity, and in part 
 Hellenic and pagan. It is with reference to these problems and this 
 range of ideas that we must distinguish the separate stadia and forms 
 of Gnosticism, which from simple beginnings resulted in very com- 
 plicated systems. Christianity was removed from Judaism by a con- 
 stantly-increasing interval in the doctrines of Cerinthus, Cerdo, Satur- 
 ninus, and Marcion, of whom the three former distinguished the God 
 of Moses and of the prophets from God, the Father of Jesus Christ, 
 while Marcion, an enemy to all external legality, assigned to Chris- 
 tianity, as the one absolutely independent, unconditional, and abso- 
 lute religion, a position of complete isolation from the Old Testament 
 revelation, the author of which was, in his opinion, merely a just but 
 not a good being. The speculations of Carpocrates, a Christian Pla- 
 tonist and TJniversalist, of the Ophites or Naasenes and Perates, who 
 saw in the Serpent a wise and good being, and of Basilides the Syrian 
 and Valentinus and his followers, concerned in part the relation of
 
 GNOSTICISM. 2S1 
 
 paganism to Christianity, and were more or less pervaded by pagan 
 ideas. Basilides the Syrian taught that the highest of the divine 
 potencies were located in a supra-mundane space, that the God wor- 
 shiped by the Je'^s was a being of limited power, but that those who 
 believed in Chrht were illuminated and converted by a gospel, of 
 which the true and supreme God was the author. The Gnosticism ' 
 of Valentinus hud his numerous followers, on the other hand, was in 
 essential prMioulars affected by Parsee influences. According to 
 this system, tjaere emanated first from the original Being, or Father, 
 a number of divine, supra-mundane ^ons, constituting the " full- 
 ness" (Pieroma) of the divine life. Wisdom (Sophia), the last of 
 these -^o'lis, through its unregulated yearning after the original 
 Father^ became subject to the law of effort and suffering, and gave 
 birth to an inferior "Wisdom, represented as tarrying in a region 
 outsi'ie of the " Pleroma" and named Achamoth; she also brought 
 forth the psychical and material realms, together with the Demiurge. 
 The Yalentinians taught, further, that three redemptive works were 
 wrought, the first in the world of ^ons, by Christ, the second in 
 the case of Achamoth, by a Jesus who was produced by the ^ons, 
 and the third on earth, by Mary's Son Jesus, in whom dwelt the 
 Holy Ghost or the divine wisdom. Bardesanes, the Syrian, simplified 
 the doctrines of Gnosticism. He taught that man's superiority con- 
 sisted in the freedom of his will. The Dualism of Mani was a 
 combination of Magianisin and Christianity, for which Gnostic spec- 
 ulations furnished the connecting link. 
 
 The sonrces from which our knowledge of Gnosticism is derived are — if we except the Gnostic work : 
 IHetis Sophia (e cod. Coptico descr. lat. vertit M. G. Schwartze, ed. J. H. Peterman, Berlin. 1S51) and 
 several fragments— exclusively the works of its opponents, especially Irenaus' cAey^o* t^^ ^iitv&aivvfiov 
 yvio<Tfioi {ed. Stieren, Leips. 1S5.3; Vol. I, pp. 901-971 : G^iosticorum., quorum memiuit IrenaeuK, frag- 
 mtnta) and Psfiido-Origines" (Hippolytns') ikfyxo<: Kara naaCiv aipiaeuiv (pr. ed. Emm. Miller, O.vforc^ 
 1851), the works of Pseudo-Ignatius, Justin, Tertullian, Clement of Alex., Origen, Eusebius, Philastrina, 
 Epiphanius, Theodoret, Augustine, and others, and the treatise of Plotinus, the Xeo-Platonist, against the 
 Gnostics, Ennead., II. 9. Of modern writers on this subject, the following may be mentioned : Neander, 
 Genet. Entw. der vomehmeten gno8ti«chen Systeme, Berlin, ISIS (cf. Kirchengench., I. 2, 2d ed.. p. 681 
 seq.); J. Matter, Uigt. crU. du Ononticlfune^ 1S2S, 2d ed., 1S43; Mohler, Urxprung des Gnosiicismus, Ttib. 
 1831 ; Ferd. Chr. Baur, De gnosticonim chrintianismo ideali. Tub. 1S27; Die chriittJ. Giio.fi^ oder Reli- 
 giorupliilosophie, Tub. 1885; Dae ClirisUntlnim der drei ersten Jahrhunderte, 2d ed.. Tub. 1860, pp. 
 1T5-234; J. Hildebrandt, PAifogopAtae gnosticae origines, Berlin, 1839; J. L. Jacobi, in Ilerzog's lieal- 
 enctjc. filr Theol. tind Kirche, Vol. V., Stuttg. and Ilanib. 1S>56; R. A. Lipsius, in Ersch und Gruber's 
 Encycl^ L 71, publ. Sep., Leips. 1860, and in many portions of his work entitled: Zur QueUenkrii. des 
 Epiph.. Vienna, 1S65; Wilh. Moller. Gench. der Kosmolngie in der griech. Kirche hix nnf Origene-i. Halle, 
 1860, pp. 189-478; Hilgenfeld, Der Onoaticismrttt und die P/iilosophnmena. in the Ztschr. filr iriss. Theo- 
 logie, v., Halle, 1862, pp. 400-464. In Bunsen^s Analecta Ante-Nicaena, 8 vols., London, 1864, may be 
 found the extracts made by Clement of Alexandria from the works of Theodotus the Valentinian, edited by 
 Jac. Bernays (Vol. I., pp. 20.V273'). [A dear and full view of Gnosticism and its several schools is present) 
 ed in Schaff, HUtory of the Christian Church, Vol. I., pp. 221-261.— Tr.]
 
 282 GNOSTICISM. 
 
 " Gnosticism was the first comprehensive attempt to construct a philosophy of Chris, 
 tianity; owing, however, to the immense reach of the speculative ideas which pressed 
 themselves on the attention of the Gnostics, but with which they were wholly lackmg in 
 scientific ability to cope, this attempt ended only in mysticism, tlieosophy, mythology, in 
 short, m a thorouglily imphilosophical system " (Lipsius, in the Encycl. der Wissensch. und 
 KUnste, ed. Erscli. and Gruber, I. 71, Leipsic, 1860, p. 269). The classification of the forms 
 of Gnosticism must (in agreement with Baur, Das Christenthum der drei ersten Jahrh., 
 p. 225, though not allogetlier in the manner adopted by him) be founded on the religions 
 whose various elements afiected the content of Gnosticism. 
 
 The conception of yvcjcng, in the wider sense of religious knowledge, is older than the 
 development of the systems of Gnosticism. The allegorical interpretation of the Holy 
 Scriptures by tho Jews who were educated at Alexandria was in substance Gnosis. In 
 Matt. xiii. 11, Christ after having spoken to the multitude in parables, interprets what he 
 had been sa3dng to his disciples, since to them was given the ability, denied to the multi- 
 tude, of knowing (yvcjvac) the mysteries of the kingdom of God. Paul (1 Cor. i. 4, 5) 
 thanks God that the Corinthians are rich "in all utterance and all knowledge^' (yvcjaei); 
 tlio rational view of the use of meats offered to idols he terms Gnosis (1 Cor. viii. 1 seq.), 
 and among the gifts of the Spirit he mentions (1 Cor. xii. 8) the " word of wisdom " and 
 tlie "word of knowledge''^ (Xoyoc yix'joeoc:) as distinct from faith (Triari.r') — rwhere the word 
 yvojcrig seems, like the expression " strong meat " (aTepea rpoipT/) in the Epistle to the He- 
 brews (v. 14), to refer especially to the allegorical interpretation of the Scriptures (cf 
 1 Cor. X. 1-12; Gal. iv. 21-31).* In Rev. ii. 24, a "knowledge of the depths of Satan" 
 is spoken of, probably in opposition to some who laid claim to a knowledge of tlie 
 depths of the Godhead. Both Jewish Christians (as, for example, the author of tho 
 Clementines) and Gentile Christians, ortliodox as well as heterodox, appropriated and 
 started from the primitive Christian conception of yvuaig, in their attempts to increase 
 the depths of their Christian knowledge ; the Alexandrian Church Fathers, in particular, 
 laid great stress on the distinction between faith and knowledge {yvo>air). The author 
 of the Eiyistle of Barnabas seeks to instruct his readers, to the end "that with their 
 faith they may also have perfect knowledge " (iva fxera ri/g niarEug reXeiav exiire koI tj/v 
 yvcxjiv), and by this "knowledge" is meant an acquaintance with the typical or allegorical 
 sense of the Mosaic ceremonial law. But those who first extended the allegorical method 
 of interpretation to tlie books of the New Testament were men who sought (either con- 
 sciously or unconsciously) to pass beyond the sphere of ideas contained in them ; this 
 extension of tlie principle of allegorical interpretation appeared first among the heretical 
 Gnostics and especially among the Valentinians, but was afterward also accepted by tho 
 Alexandrian members of the Church and others. Of the various sects which are usually 
 comprehended under the name of Gnostics, it is reported (Hippol., Fhibs., V. 6, and 
 Epiphan., Haeres., 26) that the Ophites or Naasenes, in particular, gave themselves this 
 name ((paoKovreg /lovoi ra [iadr/ yiyvuaKEiv). 
 
 The idea that Judaism was but a preparation for Christianity was expressed in the 
 doctrine of Cerinthus {K?/piv6og) — who lived in Asia Minor ca. 115 a. d., and was perhaps 
 educated at Alexarudria {PJdlos., VII. 33 : Alyvwriuv irac6eia aaKr^sig) — in the form of a 
 distinction between the God worshiped by the Jews and who created tlie world, and 
 
 * [But allegorical interpretation, provided it rests on a rational principle, is not gnostic. Much less 
 does it follow that the words yvCitm, yviovai., when used in the New Testament in contrast with faith, as 
 meaning explanation or rational Interpretation, lent any eanction to the gnostic tendencies against which, 
 in their germinant beginnings, the apostolic teachings and warnings are distinct and earnest (Col. ii. IS; 
 1 Tim. i. 4; Tit. iii. 9 ; 1 John iv. 3 ; Jude 4 seq.)— Ed.]
 
 GNOSTICISM, 283 
 
 the supreme and true God. The latter, according to Cerinthus, caused the -(Eon Christ to 
 descend on Jesus of Nazareth, the son of Joseph and Mary, at his baptism ; this .^on 
 Christ proclaimed through Jesus the true God, but left Jesus before his death and had no 
 part iu his passion {Iren., I. 26 ; Hippol., Philos., VII. 33). In Epiphan., Eaeres., 28, a par- 
 tial leaning toward Judaism (-poatx^iv ru 'lov<^diafiC> and fiipovq) is ascribed to Cerinthus 
 and his followers. By this it is scarcely probable that we are to understand tliat, the doc- 
 trines of the Church having already been brought to a relatively advanced stage of de- 
 velopment, a regressive Judaiziug movement was begun in the doctrine of Cerinthus (a mis- 
 apprehension into which early historians fell, for reasons easily understood), but simply 
 tliat in his doctrine vestiges were visible of the original intimate union of Christianity with 
 Judaism ; the theosophy of Cerinthus shows throughout a very decided tendency to pass 
 over all the barriers of Judaism. Ceriuthus must have been influenced iu liis doctrine by 
 the Pauline doctrine of the law as a preparation for Christianity, a TraaJaycjyoc f(f Xpiarov, 
 and by such ideas as prevail in the Epistle to the Hebrews. Employing the Philonic dis- 
 tinction between God and His world-creating power, he went on to define the difference 
 between Judaism and Christianity as arising from the non-identity of the divine beings 
 worshiped by each. 
 
 The Nicolaitans, mentioned in the Revelation of John, are described by Iremeus (III. 
 11) as forerunners of Cerinthus. Such they may have been, in so far as they, carrying out 
 to its logical conclusion the Pauline principle that the law was made void through faith, 
 objected to the imposition on themselves of the laws which were ordained for the Prose- 
 lytes of the Gate, and which, according to the conciliatory proposition reported in the Acts 
 of the Apostles, were to be observed by the Gentile Christians. As the Book of Revela- 
 tion is opposed to the Nicolaitans, so, according to Irenajus (III. II), the Gospel of John 
 was directed against the doctrine of Cerinthus ; this statement contains in so far an ele- 
 ment of truth, as it is true that the Gospel in question (which may have been written 
 about 100 A. D., before the time of Cerinthus), iu teaching that the world was created by 
 God's Logos, opposes the doctrine that the world-creating God of the Jews was other 
 than the true and supreme God, — a doctrine maintained by Cerinthus, but afterward far 
 more completely developed by other Gnostics. 
 
 It is quite uncertain with how much reason the beginnings of heretical Gnosis have 
 been ascribed to Simon Magus (mentioned in Acts viii. 9-24). Simon is said to have pre- 
 tended that he was a manifestation of God, and that Helena, whom he took about with 
 him, was an incarnation of the divine reason (Justin, Apol., T. 2G, 56; Iron., I. 23). But 
 much has been unhistorically ascribed to him which belongs either to Paul or to later indi- 
 viduals. There existed a sect of Simonians (Iren., I. 23). The most important disciple of 
 Simon is said to have been Menander of Samaria (Iren., I. 23), under whose influence 
 Saturninus of Antioch and Basilides are reporteil to have stood (Iron., I. 24). The doc- 
 trine of Cerdo is said to have been connected with that of Simon and the Nicolaitans 
 (Iren., I. 27 ; Philos., VII. 37). 
 
 Saturninus of Antioch, who lived in the reign of Hadrian, taught (according to Iren., 
 I. 24; Philos., VII. 2S) that there existed an luiknowable God. the Father, who had created 
 the angels, archangels, and various other forces and powers ; that the world, including 
 man, was created by seven angels, and that the superior power, in whose likeness man 
 was formed, communicated to the latter a spark of life, which after death returned to its 
 source, while the body was resolved into its original elements. The Father, he taught, 
 was without origin, bodiless, and formless, and had never in reality appeared to men ; the 
 God of the Jews was only an angel. Christ came to abolish the power of the God of the 
 Jews, to save the believing and the good, and to condemn the wicked and the demons
 
 284 GNOSTICISM. 
 
 Marriage and procreation were the works of Satan. All prophecies were inspired cither 
 by the angels who made the world or by Satan, who worked in opposition to those angels 
 and especially in opposition to the God of the Jews. 
 
 Cerdo, a Syrian, came (according to the testimony of Irenasus, I. 27.1 and III. 4. 3) to 
 Rome while Hyginus (the successor of Telesphorus and predecessor of Pius) was Bishop, 
 hence shortly before 140. He, like Cerinthus, distinguished between the God of Moses 
 and the prophets and God the Father of Jesus Christ ; the former could be known, the 
 latter could not be known ; the former was just, but the latter was good (Iren., I. 27 ; 
 Hippol., Fhilos.,Yll. 37). 
 
 Marcion of Pontus taught (according to Iren., III. 4. 3) at Rome after Cerdo, in the 
 time of Bishop Anicetus (the successor of Pius and predecessor of Soter), hence about 160 
 A. D. He had previously taught at Sinope about the year 138, and in 140 was excommu- 
 nicated at the same place. In ethical respects he maintained, as an Antinomian, an ex- 
 treme Pauhnism. Of the Gospels, he accepted only the Gospel of Luke, in a revised form 
 adapted to his own stand-point. After giving himself up to Gnostic speculations, he car- 
 ried to an extreme before unknown those theoretical fictions, in which the practical attitude 
 assumed by his party with reference to the Jewish law, had found a fantastic theological 
 expression. Not content simply to distinguish the Creator of the world, whom the Jews 
 worshiped, from the supreme God, and to declare the former inferior in rank to the latter, 
 he affirmed (judging certain statements of the Old Testament from the stand-point of his 
 own Christian consciousness, and thus rejecting the method of allegorical interpretation) 
 that the God of the Jews, though just (in the sense of one who, in executing the law, 
 spares no one), was not good, since he was the author of evil works, and was bloodthirsty, 
 changeable, and full of contradictions. In the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius, 
 Jesus, he taught, was sent by the Father, the supreme God, in human form to Judea, to 
 abrogate the law and the prophets and all the works of the God who created and ruled 
 the world (the Koa/iWKparufi). It is a part of our struggle against the Creator of the world 
 that we abstain from marriage (Clem. Alex., Strom., III. 3, 4). Only the soul can attain 
 to eternal blessedness; the earthly body cannot survive death (Iren., I. 27; Hippol., 
 Philos., VII. 29) That the Marcionites regarded light and darkness as eternal principles, 
 and Jesus as a tliird being reconciling their antagonism, and that they also distinguished 
 the "Creator of the world" from the "God of Light," and preached asceticism as an aid 
 in the contest with evil, are affirmations contained in the Fihrist (see Fliigel, Mani, Leipsic, 
 1862, p. 159 seq.). Cf Lipsius, Die Zeit des Marcion unci dcs Herakleon, in the Ztschr. fiir 
 wiss. Theol, X., 1867, pp. 75-83. 
 
 In direct contrast to this anti-Judaistic tendency was the ethical :nid philosophical Ju- 
 daism of the Clementina (see above, § 76), which opposed strenuously tlie distinction of 
 the highest God from the Creator of the world. 
 
 In distiuguishing the highest God, from whom Christ descended, from the Demiurge 
 and Lawgiver, Carpocrates, Basilides, Valentinus, and others, agreed with the Gnostics 
 thus far named ; but their doctrines betrayed to a more considerable extent the influence 
 of Ilehenic speculation. These Gnostics treated, in part, expressly of the relation of 
 Paganism to Christianity. Valentinus and, to a much greater extent, Mani transplanted 
 Parsee conceptions into the field of Christianity. 
 
 Carpocrates of Alexandria — among whose followers was one named Marcelliua, who 
 came to Rome during the bishopric of Anicetus (about 160 A. d.)— taught perhaps as early 
 as the year 130, and maintained a species of universalistic rationalism. His followers kept 
 before thenj images of the persons to whom they paid the greatest reverence, among 
 whom were included not only Jesus and Paul, but also Homer, Pythagoras, Aristotle, and
 
 GNOSTICISM. 285 
 
 others. lu regard to the relation of Christianity to Judaism, Carpocrates agreed substan- 
 tially with Cerinthus and Cerdo, and more particularly with Saturninus, with whom he 
 taught that the world and all that it contains were created by angels far inferior to the 
 uncreated Father. With the Ebionites, Carpocrates taught that Jesus was the son of 
 Joseph and Mary, but, in opposition to the Ebionites, viewed him not as the perfect Jew, 
 on whom, in consideration of his perfect fulfillment of the law, the Messianic dignity had 
 been conferred, but, rather, simply as the perfect Man. Carpocrates taught that it was 
 because Jesus, in spite of his Jewish education, had the sense to despise Judaism, that he 
 became the Redeemer and the Deliverer of man from the sufferings laid upon him for his 
 discipline ; every soul which, like Jesus, was able to despise the powers which govern the 
 world, would receive the same power which he received. In support of this position, Car- 
 pocrates made use of dogmas which he undoubtedly borrowed from Platonism. The souls 
 of men existed before they descended into their earthly bodies ; they, together with the 
 unbegotten God, had gazed, while the world revolved, on that which exists eternally be- 
 yond the arch of heaven (meaning, evidently, the Ideas, which are represented in the myth 
 of the rhaedrus as situated above the heavens) ; the more energetic and the purer a soul 
 is, the better able is it in its eartlily existence to recall what it saw in that previous state, 
 and he who is able to do this receives from above a power {6vvafii(;\ which renders him 
 superior to the powers that rule the world. This " power " passes from the locality be- 
 yond the heavens, where God is, through the planetary spheres and the world-ruling 
 potencies that inhabit them, and strives, freed from their influence, to reach those souls 
 which are like itself, as the soul of Jesus was. He who has lived in perfect purity, 
 unspotted by transgression, goes after death to God, but all other souls must expiate their 
 crimes by passing successively into various bodies. At last, after suflBcient atonement has 
 been made, all are saved and live in communion with God, the Lord of the angels, who 
 made the world. Jesus had a special, secret doctrine for those who were worthy of it and 
 obedient. Man is saved through faith and love ; every work is, as such, indifferent, and 
 is only good or bad in human opinion. The Carpocratians not merely occupied themselves 
 with speculation, but practiced a highly-developed cultus peculiar to themselves, which 
 their ecclesiastical opponents called magic (Iren., I. 25 ; Hippol., PMhs , YII. 32 ; by this 
 latter reference the inaccuracies of the Latin text of Irenaeus and the misapprehensions of 
 Epiphanius, Haeres., 27, which many in modern times have shared in, are to be corrected ; 
 cf. Theodoret, Ilaer. Fab., I. 5). Epiphanes, the son of Carpocrates, carrying his father's 
 principle to the extreme, and influenced probably by the doctrines of Tlato's Republic, 
 maintained an anarchical communism (Clem., Strom., III. 2). 
 
 The Naassenes or Ophites, who called themselves Gnostics, taught that the beginning 
 of perfection was the knowledge of man, and its end the knowledge of God {apxf/ re'^eici- 
 asug yvuffig avdpuTTov, 6eov 6e ■)i<uaic aTrrjpricr/ih'Tj T£?.ei(j(jtr, Hippol., PhUos., Y. 6). The 
 first man, Adam, was, according to them, androgynous (apati-odrjlvg), uniting in himself the 
 spiritual, the psychical, and the material {rh voepuv, ru tjn-xiiidv, to ;i:o''Kor), and tho same 
 character descended on Jesus, the son of Mary (Hippol., Philos., Y. 6). Embracing the prin- 
 ciple of tradition, these Gnostics traced their doctrine back to James, the brother of the Lord 
 {ihid., ch. 7). Irenffius and Epiphanius ascribe to them a relatively complete system, similar 
 to that of the Talentinians ; probably this system belonged to the later Ophites. Akin to 
 the Ophites in doctrine wore the Peratcs, who asserted that through their knowledge they 
 were able to overcome the liability to decay {6ie7y.de'iv aal nepaoni rf/v <p6opdv, Philos., Y. 
 16). They distinguished three principles: the unbegotten, the self-begotten, and the be- 
 gotten Good. All the forces of the terrestrial world, the world of change and development, 
 descended from the upper worlds, and so Ciirist descended from the unbegotten principle,
 
 2SG GNOSTICISM. 
 
 Christ the Saviour, the Son, the Logos, the serpent, who mediates between the motionless 
 Father and matter, which is subject to motion. The serpent present at the fall of mart 
 (6 aori>bi TT]r ¥.hn^ '^<>yo<,), the serpent lifted up by Moses, and Christ, are identical {Philos., 
 V. 12 soq.). The Ophitic Systems have been recently reviewed by Lipsius in Hilgenfeld's 
 Zeiischr. fiir wiss. Theologie, 1863 and 18G4. Cf. Job. Nep. Gruber, Ueber die Ophiten, Inau- 
 guraldiss., "VVurzburg, 1864. On tlie Perates, cf. Baxmann, Die rhilosophumena und die 
 Feraten, m Niedner's Zdtschr. far histor. TheoL, 18C0, pp. 218-257. 
 
 Basilides (BnOT^£itJr/f), who, according to Epiphanius, was of Syrian origin, taught about 
 the year 130 at Alexandria. Iren:eus (I. 24) and Hippolytus {Philos. VI. 20 seq.) treat 
 specially of his doctrine; cf. Jacobi, Basilidis phihsophi gnostici sentent., Berlin, 1852; Bun- 
 sen, Hippolytus und seine Zeit, Lcips. 1852, I. p. 65 seq. ; Uhlhorn, Das hasilidianische Sys- 
 tem, Gott. 1855; Ililgenfeld, Das System des Gnosiikers Basilides, in the Theol. Jakrb., 
 1856, p. 86 seq., and Die jildische Apokalyptik, nebst einem Anhange iiber das gnostische Sys- 
 tem des Basilides, Jena, 1857, pp. 287-299; Baur, Das System des Gnostikers Basilides und 
 die neuesten Aiiffassungen desselben, in the Theol. Jahrb., 1856, p. 122 seq., and Das Chris- 
 ienthum der drei ersten Jahrh., 2d ed., 1860, pp. 204—213; Lipsius, Zur Quellenkritik des 
 Epiphanius, Yicnna, 1865, p. 100 seq.; cf., also, articles in Hilgenfeld's Zeitschr. filT 
 wiss. Theologie. Irenaeus represents the system of Basilides as more nearly allied to the 
 Valentinian, while Hippolytus, on the contrary, ascribes to it a more original character. 
 According to Irenasus, Basilides taught that the Nous [reason personified] was an emana- 
 tion from the uubegotten Father, that the Logos [Word] was an emanation from the Nous, 
 Phronesis [practical wisdom] from the Logos, Sophia [wisdom] and Dynamis [power] were 
 from Phronesis, and that the Virtues (or Forces, virtutes) and the "chiefs" and Angels — 
 termed by him also primi — emanated from Sophia and Dynamis. These angels made the 
 first heaven. From them emanated other angels, who made the second heaven, in the like- 
 ness of the first. From the second series of angels emanated still another series, who made 
 a third heaven, and so on, the whole number of heavens (or heavenly spheres) being 365, 
 and all being under the rule of Abraxas or Abrasax, whose name was the Greek expres- 
 sion for 365 (1 + 2 + 100 + 1 + 60 + 2 + 200, according to the numerical significance 
 of the Greek letters). The lowest heaven is seen by us, and the angels to whom it be- 
 longs are also those who formed and govern the terrestrial world ; their chief is the God 
 whom the Jews worshiped. This God desired to make all other nations subject to his 
 chosen nation; but all the other heavenly powers arrayed themselves against him, and all 
 the other nations against his nation. Seized with compassion, the unbegotten Father now 
 sent his first-born Nous, who is Christ, to deliver the believing from subjection to the 
 powers that rule the world. This Nous appeared in human form, yet did not suffer him- 
 self to be crucified, but substituted in his place Simon the Cyrenian. He who believes on 
 the crucified One is still under the dominion of the rulers of the world. It is necessary to 
 believe in the eternal Nous, who was only in appearance subjected to the death of the 
 cross. Only the souls of men are immortal ; the body perishes. The Christian who sacri- 
 fices to the gods is not thereby defiled. lie who has knowledge knows all others, but is 
 himself not known of others. Knowledge is the possession of but few among thousands. — 
 According to Hippolytus, the Basilidians pretended to derive their system from the secret 
 teachings of Christ, transmitted to them by Matthew. Basilides, he says, taught that, 
 originally, there existed absolutely nothing. Out of this condition of non-being, the seed 
 of the world was first made to come forth by the non-existing God, who by his will, which 
 was no will (not by emanation) called forth from the non-existing the unity, which con- 
 tained in itself this seed or iravanEpfiia (or, according to Clem. Alex., the <Tvyx''-'<^^C ('■PX'-'^V) oi 
 the entire world. In the seed was a tripartite sonship ; the first rose instantly to the non-
 
 GNOSTICISM. ' 287 
 
 existing God, the second, less fine and pure, was, as it were, provided ■with wings by the 
 first, receiving from it the Holy Ghost, while the third sonship, needing purification, re- 
 mained behind with the great mass of the rrava-:Tep/jia. The non-existing God and the two 
 first sonships {vlurr/rer) are in the supra-mundane space, which is separated from the world 
 tliat it surrounds by a fixed sphere {aTspeu/ua). The Holy Ghost, after having risen with 
 the second sonship to the supra-mundane region, returned to the middle point between the 
 siyira-mundane space and the world, and thus became ■^zvev/ua /lEdopiov (or "boundary- 
 spirit"). In our world dwells the ruler of the world, who cannot ascend above the anpt- 
 u/ia, and fancies that he is the highest God and that there is nothing over him; under 
 him is the lawgiving God, and each of these two has begotten a son. The first of these 
 two rulers {apxovrer) dwells in the ethereal kingdom, the Ogdoas; he ruled on earth from 
 from Adam to Moses. The second dwells in the world under the moon, the Hebdomas, 
 and ruled from Moses to Christ. When now the Gospel came, or the knowledge of supra- 
 mundane things (?/ Tuv v-epKoa/u'iov yvoiatg), through the son of the world-ruler receiving, 
 by the agency of the Spirit, enlightenment from the supra-mundane sonship, the world- 
 ruler learned of the supreme God, and was seized with fear ; but fear became for him the 
 beginning of wisdom. He repented of his boasting, and so did the God who was subor- 
 dinated to him, and the Gospel was announced to all dominions and powers in the 365 
 lieavens. By the light emanating from the supra-niuudane sonship, Jesus also was 
 enlightened. The third sonship now attained to that purification, of which it had need, 
 and raised itself to the place where the blessed sonship already was, namely, to the non- 
 existing God. When all things have been brought into their proper places, the lower 
 orders become ignorant (ayvoLa) of the higher, in order that they may be free from longing. 
 The accounts of Irenseus and Hippolytus agree in the fundamental idea that the God wor- 
 shiped by the Jews had only a limited sphere of influence (like the gods of the heathen), 
 and that the redemption accomplished by Christ originated with the supreme God. They 
 vary most essentially in their account of the intermediate beings, who, according to Irenseus, 
 were Nous, Phronesis, Sophia, and Dynamis, etc., but, according to Hippolytus, were the 
 three sonships. Which of the two reports is based on the teachings of Basilides himself, 
 and which on those of his followers, may be disputed. Baur cousiders the report of Hip- 
 polytus to be the more authentic, requiring tis to assume that Hippolytus, elsewhere less 
 well-informed than Irenasus, his teacher and model, sometimes, and particularly in reference 
 to Basilides, possessed better sources of informatioia than he did. Hilgenfeld, on the con- 
 trary, holds, apparently with reason, that his own investigations, in particular, and also the 
 investigations of Lipsius, have demonstrated that the Philosophumena of Ilippolj'tus repre- 
 sent only a late and degenerate form of Basilidianism. The son and disciple of Basilides, 
 Isidorus, defined the ethical work of man to be the extirpation of those traces of the lower 
 grades of life which still cling to us (as -n-poaapTr/fiara or appendages). Tlie influence of 
 Aristotle, from whose doctrine Hippolytus seeks to derive that of Basilides, scarcely ex- 
 tended farther than to the external form in which his doctrines wore presented, and to his 
 astronomical opinions; the observation, on the other hand (Ilippol., Fhilos., I. 22). that the 
 doctrine of the sonship furnished with wings was borrowed from Plato, is undoubtedly 
 correct. The substance of the system was derived principally from the comparison of 
 Christianity with the religions before Christ (which took tlie form of a comparison of 1h» 
 deities of various religions). 
 
 The most comprehensive of all the Gnostic systems is that of Talentinus, the master 
 of Heracleon, Ptolem.Tus, Secundus, Marcus, and many others. Yalentinus lived and 
 taught till near 140 in Alexandria, and afterwards at Rome. He died in Cyprus about the 
 year 160. Irenseus testifies (III. 4. 3, Greek ap. Euseb., K U. TV. 11) that "Yalentinu»
 
 288 GNOSTICISM. 
 
 came to Rome in the time of Hyginus, flourished in the tiae of Pius, and remained 
 till the time of Anicetus." The chief sources from wliich our knowledge of the Valen- 
 tinian System must be derived are, the work of Irensi s against false Gnosis, which is 
 principally directed against the doctrine of Valentinus and Ptolemasus, and Hippoi., Philos. 
 YI. 29 seq., as also TertuUian's work, Adversus Valentinianos, and numerous passages and 
 extracts in Clemens Alexandrinus. Cf. also, among others, Rossel, in his Hinterlassene 
 Schriften, Berlin, 1847, Vol.11, pp. 250-300. At the summit of all existence, the Valentin- 
 ians placed a single timeless and spaceless being, an uncreated, imperishable, and incom- 
 prehensible Monad {jiovaq aykwrjToi;, acjSapTo^^ aKaraTcriTZToq, aTrsptvojjTo^, yovi/uo^, Hippoi., 
 YI. 29). The epithets which they applied to it were Father (ttot^p, Hippoi., ibid.), Fore- 
 father (npoTrciTijp, Iren., I. 1. 1), Depth {3vd6q, Iren., ibid.), Ineffable [appr/ro^), and the 
 "perfect JRon" (reXeioc aldiv). Yalentinus himself (Iren., I. 11. 1), and many of the 
 Yalentinians, associated with this being. Silence (oi-yy) or Thought (ewoia), as a female 
 principle; but others (according to Hippoi.) opposed the notion that a feminine prin- 
 ciple was associated with the Father of all things, and were inclined to represent the 
 latter as superior to the distinction of sex (Iren., I. 2. 4). The original father of all 
 things was moved by love to beget them (Hippolyt., Philos., VI. 29: (piMpT/juoc yap ovk tjv 
 ayaTTT) yap, (hrjaiv, rjv 'o\o(;, i) de aya.'Kr} ovk icriv aydnT/, iav firj y to ayanufievov). The 
 two first products of the supreme principle were reason (vovg) and truth {aAf/6eia), which, 
 together with the generative and parturient principles, "depth" {(ivdog) and "silence" 
 {(yt.yrj), constitute the TSTpaKTvg or quaternary of "roots" of all things (pil^a to>v iravTuv). 
 To Nous they gave the predicate of only -begotten ; the Nous was for them (Iren., ibid.) 
 the "father and principle of all things." Nous (and truth) gave birth to Logos and life, 
 and the latter to man and church (avOpuKog koX iKKltjoia). All these form together an 
 Ogdoas. Ten more yEons descended from Logos and life, and twelve from man and 
 church; the youngest of these twelve ^ons, and hence the youngest of the whole thirty 
 ^ons, was Wisdom (Sophia), a feminine ^on. The sum of these ^ons constitute the Ple- 
 roma, the kingdom of the fullness of divine life {TrTiripuiia), which is divided into the above- 
 named ogdoad, and into a decad and a dodecad. The Saviour (aurr/p, to whom they did not 
 apply the predicate Lord), lived thirty years in obscurity, to indicate the mystery of the 
 thirty ^ons. "Wisdom desired, ostensibly from love, but in reality from presumption, to 
 come into immediate nearness to the first Father and to comprehend his greatness, as the 
 Nous, and it alone, comprehenied it; in this attempt she would have wasted all her 
 energies, had not bpog (limit) with great pains convinced her that the supreme God was 
 incomprehensible (a«ard/l;77rrof). Desiring (according to the doctrine of certain Yalen- 
 tinians), like the supreme principle, to bring forth progeny alone, without the co-operation 
 of her masculine mate, and not being truly able to do this, she gave birth to an imperfect 
 being, which consisted of matter without form, since the masculine shape-giving principle 
 had not co-operated with her, an ovaia aaopipoc, an abortion (eKrpuua). Pained with this 
 result, Wisdom turned imploringly to the Father, who caused her to be purified and com- 
 forted by bpog, and restored to her place in the Pleroma, after putting an end to her striving 
 {j.vdhfiriaic) and her suffering. At the command of the Father, Nous and truth now occa- 
 sioned the emanation of Christ and the Holy Ghost ; Christ gave form and being to that 
 which Wisdom had brought forth, and then hastened back into the Pleroma and instructed 
 the ^ons respecting their relation to the Father, while the Holy Ghost taught them grati- 
 tude and brought them to rest and blessedness. As a thank-offering, the -lEons, contribu- 
 ting for the purpose each his best, brought to the Father, with the approval of Christ 
 and the Holy Ghost, a glorious form, Jesus, the Saviour, who is also called patronymically 
 the Christ and Logos. He is the common fruit of the Pleroma {Koivb<: rov TrXr/p^fxaTor
 
 GNOSTICISM. 289 
 
 Ka/)7r<5f), and the great high-priest. He was seut by the Pleroma to deliver the ivdifi^air 
 of tlie superior Wisdom, who was wandering without the Pleroma, and was an mferior 
 Wisdom, failed Achamoth (niODnn from Djri, n?DDn), from the sufferings which she 
 
 ; r - - T T : T 
 
 endured in her search for Christ. Her emotions (ndf)?/) were fear, sadness, need, and 
 entreaty (<z>o/3oc Kai Avtttj Kal anopia koI 6iT]a(^ or iKersia). Jesus removed these Trad?; from 
 her and made of them separate existences ; fear he turned into a psychical desire, sadness 
 into a material desire, need into a demoniacal one, and prayer or entreaty into conversion, 
 repentance, and restitution of the psychical nature. The region inhabited by Achamoth is 
 an inferior one, the Ogdoas. This region is separated from that of the .^ons by " limit " 
 (opoc Tuv TTATjiJCJuaToi;) and by the "cross" (p-avpu^). Underneath the Ogdoas is the Heb- 
 domas, the region of the Psychical and of the World-builder {drintovpyoq), who formed bodies 
 for souls out of material substance. The material man (o vliKoq avOpu-xoq) is inhabited 
 sometimes by the soul alone, sometimes by the soul and by demons, and sometimes by 
 the soul and the rational powers (Aoyot) ; the latter are disseminated in this world by 
 Jesus, the joint product of the factors of the Pleroma, and Vjy Wisdom (troo/a), and they 
 enter into the soul when it is not occupied by demons. The law and the prophets were 
 given by the Demiurgos ; but when the time for the revelation of the mysteries of the 
 Pleroma had come, Jesus, the son of the Virgin Mary, was born. He was made not 
 merely like the children of Adam, by the Demiurgos, alone, but by him and (the inferior) 
 Wisdom (Achamoth), or Vjy him and the Holy Ghost, who imparted to him a spiritual 
 nature, so that he became a heavenly Logos, begotten by the Ogdoas through Mary. The 
 Italian school of Valentin ians, and among them Heracleon (who wrote a commentary on 
 the Gospel according to Luke, about 175 a. d., and on the Gospel according to John, about 
 195) and Ptolemaus (who made much use in his writings of the Gospels, including the 
 fourth Gospel, which he, too, ascribed to the Apostle John, as appears from his letter to 
 Flora, cited by Euseb., Haeres., XXXIIL, and who interpreted them for the most part 
 allegoricall}'), in particular, taught that the body of Jesus was of a psychical nature, but 
 that the spirit, which animated him, descended upon him at the time of his baptism. But 
 the Eastern school, Axionicus and Ardesianes (Bardesanes ?), in particular, taught that the 
 body of Jesus was pneumatic, having been endowed with the Spirit from the time of his 
 conception and birth. Just as the Christ, who emanated from his source at the will of 
 Nous and truth, and Jesus, the product of the Pleroma, were world-restorers and saviors, 
 the one in the world of ^ons, the other in the Ogdoas for Achamoth, so Jesus, the son 
 of Mary, is the Redeemer for this terrestrial world. The redeemed become, through him. 
 partakers of the Spirit ; they know the mysteries of the Pleroma and the law given by the 
 Demiurgos is no longer binding on them. The most perfect blessedness is reached through 
 Gnosis ; those psychical men, who do not advance beyond mere faith {Tziartq), become par- 
 takers only of partial blessedness. For these, works are essential, in addition to faith, for 
 their salvation; but the Gnostic is saved without works, like a spiritual man. This doc- 
 trine was used as an excuse for immorality, and especially for sexual excesses, by Marcus 
 and his followers, with whom speculation was graduallv lost in eccentricities and absurd- 
 ities (Iren., L 13 seq.). 
 
 The Valentinian doctrine of the error, suffering, and redemption of Wisdom lies at the 
 basis of the work entitled Pistis Sophia, in which the story of the sufferings of this 
 "Sophia" is spun out at still greater length, and her songs of penitence and complaint aro 
 given. (Of. K5stlin, Das gnostisrhe System des Buches TMariq looia, in the Theol. Jahrb., 
 Tiibingen, 1854.) 
 
 Bardesanes (" the son of Deisan," t. e., born on tlie river Deisan in Mesopotamia), was 
 born about 153 a. d., and died soon after 224. He simplified the doctrines of Gnosticism, 
 19
 
 290 
 
 JUSTIN MARTYR. 
 
 \ 
 
 rendering them less repugnant to the doctrine of the Church. Yet he, too, associated 
 
 with the Father of hfe, a female deity, in order to explain the work ot creation. That evil 
 IS not made necessary, either by natural propensity or by fate, as the astrologers pretended, 
 but is a consequence of the freedom of the will, which God imparted to man conjointly 
 with the angels, as a high prerogative, is clearly and impressively argued by a disciple 
 of Bardesanes in the dialogue concerning fate ("Book of the Laws of the Lands"), pub- 
 lished by Cureton in his Spicilegium Syriacum, London, 1855. As the soul dwells in the 
 body, so the spirit dwells in the soul. (Cf. Aug. Hahn, Bardesanes gnosticus Sijrorum. pri- 
 mue hymnologus, Leipsic, 1819, and the passages from the Fihrist, in Fluegel's Mani, 
 Leipsic, 1862, pp. 161 seq. and 356 seq. ; also, A. Merx, Bardesanes von Edessa, Halle. 
 1863, and Hilgenfeld, Bardesanes, der letzte Gnostiker, Leipsic, 1864.) 
 
 The religion introduced by Mam, the Persian (who, according to the most probable 
 supposition, was born in 214. first publicly proclaimed his doctrine in 238, and, after nearly 
 forty years of public activity, fell a victim to the hatred of the Persian priests), was a dis- 
 orderly medley of Cinostic-Christian and Zoroastrian conceptions. Its philosophical interest 
 is derived almost exclusively from its dualistic principle, its co-ordination of a primaeval 
 evil being with the good principle, and from the ascetic character of the ethics developed 
 on the basis of that dualism. Augustine, who was for a time an adherent of Manichfeism, 
 afterward opposed it in several of his writings. (Cf. J. de Beausobre, Histoire crit. de 
 Manichee et du Manicheisme, Amsterdam, 1734—39; K. A. v. Reichlin-Meldegg, Die Theo- 
 logie des Magiers Manes und ihr Ursprung, Frankfort, 1825; A. F. Y. de Wegnern, Mani- 
 chaeorum indulgentias cum brevi toiius Manichaeismi adumbratione, efontibus descripstl, Leip. 
 1827 ; P. Chr. Baur. Das Manich. Beligionssystem, Tubingen, 1831 ; F. E. Coldit, Die Entste- 
 hung des Manich. Beligionssystems, Leipsic, 1831 ; P. de Lagarde, Tifi Bostreni contra Manich. 
 libri quatuor Syriace, Berlin, 1859; Fliigel, Mani und seine Lehre, Leipsic, 1862.) 
 
 In opposition to the aristocratic Separatism of the Gnostics, on the one hand, and to 
 the one-sided narrowness of the Judaizing Christians on the other, the Catholic Church 
 continued to develop itself, always engaged in controversy, but, at the same time, being 
 thereby incited to new positive advances. Its fixed intermediate position in matters of 
 doctrine was marked by the rule of faith (regida fidei), which grew up gradually out of the 
 simpler outlines given in the baptismal confession. 
 
 § Y8. Flavius Justinus, of Flavia NeapoHs (Sichem) in Palestine, 
 flourished about 150 a. d. He learned first Greek philosophy, par- 
 ticularly the Stoic and Platonic, but was aftervv^ard led to embrace 
 Christianity, partly by the respect and admiration which the stead- 
 fastness of the Christians extorted from him, and partly by his distrust 
 of the power of human reason. Thenceforth he defended Christianity, 
 now against heretics, now against Jews and pagans. The chief works 
 by him, which have come down to us, are the Dialogue with Tryphon 
 the Jew, and the greater and lesser Apologies. Whatever of truth 
 is to be found in the works of the Greek philosophers and poets, and 
 elsewhere, must be ascribed, says Justin, to the workings of the divine 
 Logos, which is present among all men in the germ, while in Christ it 
 appeared in its complete fullness. Yet the revelations made by this 
 divine Word are not all equally direct; to Pythagoras and Plato it
 
 JL'STm MARTYE. 291 
 
 jpoke through Moses and the Prophets. Justin conceives Christianity 
 as essentially contained in the new law of Christ, the incarnate Logos, 
 who abrogated the ceremonial law, and substituted in its place the 
 moral law. Future rewards and punishments are to be eternal. The 
 body will be raised again. The millennial reign of Christ is to pre- 
 cede the final judgment. 
 
 Justin's works have been published by Rob, Stephanas, 1551 (this edition was completed by Hein. 
 rich Stephanus through the addition of the Oratio ad Oraeeox, Paris, 1592, and the Epistle to Diogne- 
 tus, 1595), Friedrich Sylburg, with a Latin tmnslation (which first appeared at Basel, 1565) by Lang, 
 Heidelberg, 1593, Morellus, Cologne, 1686, I'rudentius Maranus, Paris, 1742 (included also in Gallandi's 
 JSiOl. Vet. Pdtr., Vol. I. 1765, and in the Opera Pair. Gr., Vols. L-IIL 1777-79). The best modern edition 
 is that of Joh. Car. Theod. Otto {CorpuH apologetarwn ChrwtianoT~iim saecnli isecundi. Vol. I. . Jmtini 
 apolog., I. et II. ; Vol. IL : Justini cum Tryphone Judaea dialogus ; Vol. IIL : Jnstini opera ad<tubitata 
 cxmifragmentU deperditorum actiikiuemartyrii ; Vols. IV. and V.: Opera Junt. subditicia. 1st edition, 
 Jena, 1S42 seq. ; 2d edition, Jena, 1847-5)). In J. P. Migne's Patrologiae Curms Completus, Justin's 
 works constitute Vol. VI. of the Greek Fathers. On Justin cf Karl Semisch, Justin der Martyrer, 2 vols., 
 Breslau, 1940-42 (the earlier literature is cited by Semisch, Vol. I. pp. 2-i), and L. Aube, St. Jmtin. Philoso- 
 phe et Martyr., Paris, 1861. Cf. also Bohringer in the second edition of his Kirchengewh. in Biographien. 
 On the time of Justin, see Volkmar, Theolog. Jalirb., 1S55, pp. 227 seq. and 412 seq.; on his Cosmology, 
 Wilh. Muller, Die Kosmologie in der griechinchen Kirche bis avf Origenes, Ilalle, 1860, pp. 112-188; on 
 his Christology, H. Waubert de Puiseau, Leyden, 1864; and on his Theology, C. Weizsacker in tbc Ja?trb. 
 /. deutsche Theolog., XII. 1. 1867, pp. 60-119. 
 
 Jii.stin opens for us the line of those Fathers and Teachers of the Church who are not 
 inchided among the " Apostohc Fathers." His teaching corresponds essentially with the 
 doctrine of the early Catholic Church. He is not the first author of an Apology for Chris- 
 tianity, but he is the first whose apologetical writings have come down to us. Quadratus 
 of Athens and Aristidcs of Athens were older than Justin, and presented their Apologies 
 (in whicli they laid stress upon the difference between Christianity and Judaism) to Hadrian. 
 The Apology of Quadratus is reported to have produced to some degree an effect which 
 was favorable for the Christians. But Quadratus probably did not make use of philo- 
 sophical arguments in his defense of Christianity, though Aristides, perhaps, did. The 
 arguments of Justin were chiefly philosophical. 
 
 There can hardly be any doubt that the Decree of Hadrian, as given by Justin at the 
 close of his Greater Apology, is genuine, but it is not to be understood as condemning the 
 Christians ou account of common crimes rather than on account of their Christian faith. 
 The class of actions contrary to law, mentioned in the decree of Hadrian, included un- 
 doubtedly tlie refusal to bring to the gods and to the Genius of the Emperor the customary 
 offerings. The well-known decree of Trajan, which indeed forbade the official searching for 
 Christians, but yet recognized a capital offense in the permanent confession of a belief in 
 Christianity and in the refusal to make the sacrifices required by law, remained unrepealed, 
 but a milder practice was introduced through the express interdiction of all tumultuous 
 proceedings, and still more by the heavy punishments with which accusers were menaced 
 who should be unable to make good their charges. Under Antoninus Pius, the practice of 
 the government, based on the unrepealed decree of Trajan, became again more severe, and 
 this was the occasion of Justin's Apologies. The decree was most vigorously e.x:ecuted 
 under Marcus Aurelius, owing to his intense personal dislike of Christianity. 
 
 In his first Apology Justin describes liis circumstances in life, and in the Dialogue with 
 Tryphon speaks more particularly of his intellectual history. He was born of Grecian 
 parents, whOj as it seems, had joined the colony which Vespasian, after the Jewish war,
 
 292 JUSTIN MAKTYR. 
 
 sent to the desolated Samaritan city of Siciiem (from that time called Flavla Neapolis, no^ 
 Nablus). It appears that for his intellectual discipline he repaired to Greece and Asia 
 Minor. The place where his " Dialogue with Tryphon " took place was, according to Euse- 
 bius {E. H., IV. 18), Ephesus; one passage in it (Dial. c. Tr., ch. 1, p. 217, d) may suggest 
 Oorintli as the locality. The instructions of his Stoic teacher left him unsatisfied, because 
 they did not afford him the desired explanation of the nature of God. The Peripatetic 
 (iisgusted him by his haste in demanding payment, which he thought unworthy of a phi- 
 losopher, and he was frightened away from the Pythagorean by the requirement of the 
 latter that he should first go tlirough the mathematical sciences before commencing the 
 study of philosophy. The Platomst alone was able, in all respects, for a time to satisfy him. 
 Afterward, the objections raised by an aged Christian against the Platonic doctrines led 
 him to doubt the truth of all philosophy and to accept Christianity. In particular, the argu- 
 ments of the Christian against the natural immortality of the soul and in favor of the belief 
 that immortality was a gift due alone to divine grace, appeared to him irrefutable. But 
 how, he asked himself, could this view of the case have escaped the attention of Plato and 
 Pythagoras? "Whence can we hope for succor if such men as they are not in possession 
 of the truth ? While he thought and felt thus, the only alternatives open to Justin were 
 either to remain a skeptic or to accept the idea that knowledge is the product of a gradual 
 development, depending on continued investigation, or, finally, if he felt it necessary to 
 find absolute truth somewhere, to recognize the same as immediately given by divine reve- 
 lation in sacred writings. Justin adopted (just as, in their way, the Neo-Platonists and 
 Neo-Pythagoreans did in the sphere of Hellenism) the last-named alternative. The Pro- 
 ptiets — so said the aged man to Justin — are authenticated as organs of the Holy Ghost by 
 their antiquity, their holiness, their miracles, and their fulfilled prophecies. They must 
 simply be believed, for they demonstrated notliing, but spoke simply as witnesses of the 
 truth, possessing so complete a title to our confidence that they needed not to demonstrate 
 any thing. They proclaimed the Creator of the world, God the Father, and the Christ who 
 was sent by him. The ability to understand their words is a gift of God's grace, for which 
 supplication must be made in prayer. These words of the old man kindled in Justin a 
 love for the prophets and for the men who were called friends of Christ, and in their 
 words he found what he believed to be the only certain and salutary philosophy. Of the 
 works which have come down to us under his name, only the two Ajwhgies and the Dia- 
 logue with Tryphon are of indubitable authenticity. The first and larger Apology was 
 written (as Volkmar has shown) in the year 147 ; the second and smaller one was simply 
 supplementary to and continuative of the larger one. The Dialogue with Tryj)hon took 
 place and was written down at a later date, not far from a. d. 1 50. Justin had previously 
 composed — in about the year 144 — a polemical work directed against the Heretics and 
 especially against Marcion. He suffered death by martyrdom somewhere between 150 
 and 166, perhaps in the year 166 [Chron. Alex., ed. Rader, p. 606). 
 
 Even after his conversion to Christianity Justin held the philosophy of the Greeks in 
 high estimation, as an evidence of the universal presence among men of the divine Logos 
 (or " germinant Logos," Koyoq aiiEp/iaTtKdr) ; but the whole truth, he taught, existed in 
 Christ alone, who was the incarnate Logos itself The philosophers and poets were able, 
 according to the measure of their participation in the Logos, to see and recognize the 
 truth (oi jap avyypadelg Trdvrff 6ia r^f kvovaTjc £p(j>vTov tov Aoyov oTopac afivdpuQ eovvavro 
 6f)av TO. bvra). But the "germ," communicated to each man according to the measure of 
 )iis susceptibility, and the image, must not be confounded with the original Logos itself, in 
 which men are allowed to participate (Apol, II. 13). "Whatever is true and rational is 
 Christian (baa ovv ivapa iraai ko^-u^ ElpT^rai, ■fjficjv tuv XpianaviJv ecriv, Apol., II. 13).
 
 JUSTIN MARTYR. 293 
 
 Christ is the Logos, in whom tlie entire human race has part, the first-born of God, and 
 those who have hved in communion with the Logos are Christians, although they may 
 have been regarded as atheists; such were Socrates and Heraclitus and their like among 
 the Hellenes, and Abraham, Ananias, Azarias, Misael, Elias, and many others, among the 
 non-Greeks (ApoL, I. 46). Socrates proscribed Homer and spurred men on to seek for 
 rational knowledge of the true God. He did not, however, consider it advisable to pro- 
 claim the Father and Architect of the world to all men. But this Christ has done, through 
 the power of God. not through the arts of human speech (Apoi, IL 10). But beside the 
 inner revelation made to the Greek philosophers through the omnipresent Logos, Justin 
 believed that they possessed a knowledge of the teachnig of Moses. The doctrine of our 
 freedom as moral agents was taken, according to Justin, by Plato from Moses, and all that 
 philosophers and poets liave said of the immortality of the soul, of punishments after 
 death, of the contemplation of heavenly things, was borrowed originally from the Jewish 
 prophets. Germs of truth {cr-lpuara ttj^ a'/ifldac) have found their way from the latter 
 to all parts of the world; but through the failure of men perfectly to apprehend this truth, 
 there arose various conflicts of opinion {Apol.^ I. 44). Plato not only knew of the Jewish 
 religion, but he was acijuainted with the whole of the Old Testament, though in many in- 
 stances he misunderstood it; thus, e. g., his doctrine of the world-soul spread out in the 
 form of a Greek letter Chi (by which Plato represents the angle which the Ecliptic makes 
 with the Equator, Tim., p. 36) arose from his misinterpretation of the narrative of the 
 brazen serpent (Numbers xxi. 9). Orpheus, Homer, Solon, Pythagoras, and others, be- 
 came acquainted with the doctrines of Moses in Egypt, and were thus enabled at least 
 partially to correct erroneous opinions respecting the nature of God (Cohortatio ad Graecos, 
 ch. 14. We make this reference to the Cohortatio on the supposition that it is genuine, a 
 supposition which is rendered at least doubtful by the fact that in chap. 23, vs. 70 of 
 this work the doctrine of the creation of matter is taught, on the ground tliat God would 
 have no power over uncreated matter, whereas in his ApoL, I. p. 92, c, and elsewhere, 
 Justin simply teaches, in agreement with Plato, that the world was made from " formless 
 matter "). 
 
 The idea of God, says Justin, is innate in man {e/KpvTo^ rfj oiaei riJv avdpijnuv do^a, 
 Apol, II. 6); so, too, the most general moral ideas are possessed in common by all men, 
 although often obscured (Dial. c. Tryph., ch. 93). God is one, and by reason of his one- 
 ness, nameless {avuvofxaaToq, Apol., I. 63) and ineffable [appr/ro^, ApoL, I. 61, p. 94. d, et aL). 
 He is eternal, unbegotten (ayivv?/To^, ApoL, II., 6, et aL), and unmoved {DiaL c. Dyph., ch. 
 27). He is enthroned above the heavens {DiaL c. Tryph., ch. 56 : iv rol^ vTrepovpavioi^ ad 
 fievovToc). He brought forth from himself before the formation of the world a rational 
 potency {^vvapiv nva /ioyiKr/v), the IiOgos, through whose agency he created the world 
 (ApoL, II. 6 ; DiaL c. Tryph., ch. 60 seq.). The Logos became man in Jesus Christ, the son 
 of the Virgin (DiaL c. Tryph., ch. 48 : on Kal ■KpovnrjpxEv vloq tov ttoi^tov tuv o7mv, 6s^<; 
 Civ, Kal yeytvvrjTai avflpuTvog rfw rr/f -Kapdevov). Christ, the Word, abolished the Mosaic 
 law in which not only the sacrifices, but also the rite of circumcision and all other ritual 
 ordinances were commanded only on accoinit of the hardness of heart of the people; for 
 all this Christ substituted the moral law [Dud. c. Tryph., ch. 1 1 seq.). He is the new law- 
 giver (o KOLviq vopoSeTT/r, DiaL c. Tryph., ch. 18). — Justin thus agreed with the Jewish 
 Christians in regarding the norm of moral and religious life as existing under the form of a 
 law, while at the same time he joined hands with Paul (who, however, is not named by 
 Justin) in going forward to the abrogation of the entire ceremonial law. — Beside God the 
 Father and the Logos, his only-begotten Son, together with the angels or potencies of God, 
 the Holy Ghost, or the Wisdom of God, is an object of worship {ApoL, I. 6 : ofioXoyovMci
 
 294 TATIAN, ATHENAGOKAS, THEOPHILUS, AND HERMIA8. 
 
 rcjv Toiovruv vofii^ofievuv dcuv (the Hellenic gods, whom Justin calls Kanov^ /cat avoaiov^ 
 daifwva^) adeot elvaij aXX' ovxi tov d)i.TidsoTdTov kol Trarpbg diKacoavvrjq kol auxppoavi^g /cat tuv 
 aXXuv aperCiv aveirt/i'tKTov re Kaniaq deov • okTC EKslvdv re Kal tov ■Trap' aiirov viov iTiffovra Kal 
 6i6d^avTa yfiag tuvto, kol tov tcJv dTJujv etvo/ievuv Kal e^ofioiovfiivDV dyaduv ayyDvUV OTparSv, 
 i:veviJ.d ri to 7rpo<piTiKbv oefiofieda Kai irpooKwovueVj X6y(,) Kal aATjOeLg. TifxcjvTEg. Cf. ApoL, 
 I. 13 : TOV drjfiiovpydv Tov6e tov navTog ae^ofievot . . . tov 6i6dcrKaX6v te tovtuv yevojuevov 
 rifilv Kal elg tovto ytvvjjdivTa 'Irjaovv XpiaTov . . . vlbv avTov tov ovrug 6tov /laOovTcg Kal 
 £v devTEpa X"P? ^X°^'''^^i 'Tvevfia te t:po6tjtlkov kv TpiTy Ta^Ei). Baptism is administered, 
 according to Apol, I. 61, "in the name of God, the Father and Lord of all things, and of 
 Jesus Christ the Saviour, and of the Holy Ghost " {ett' bvo/uaTog tov iraTpbg tuv b?Mv koI 
 SEairoTov 6eov Kal tov auT^pog -qfiuv 'Itjcov XpiaTov Kal nvEVfiaTog dylov). The divine fore- 
 knowledge does not imply fate nor destroy human freedom. The only necessity (and that 
 a contingent one) that exists is, that men should receive eternal blessedness or punish- 
 ment, according as they have chosen the good or the evil. The first resurrection will take 
 place at the second coming (or napovaia) of Christ, which Justin describes as near at hand 
 {Apol, I. 52; Dial. c. Tryph., ch. 31 seq., ch. 80 seq., etal.); Jerusalem will be restored, 
 and Christ will reign there a thousand years, granting rest and joy to his followers, ac- 
 cording to the predictions of John in the Apocalypse ; afterward the general resurrection 
 will take place, followed by the judgment, which God will commit to Christ's hands 
 {Dial. c. Tryjth., ch. 58., ch. 81). Each person will receive eternal punishment or salva- 
 tion as his portion, according to the merit or demerit of his actions {ekootov etv' alurviav 
 Ko'/Mffiv 7/ cuTTjpiav kut' d^iav TG)v Trpd^euv ■nropEVEodai, ApoL, I. 12). Hell (yEevva) is the 
 place where those are to be punished by fire who have lived in unrighteousness and 
 have doubted as to the coming realization of that which God foretold to them through 
 Christ {Apol, I. 12, 19, 44, et al). This punishment will endure as long as it shall please 
 God that souls should exist and be punished {Dial. c. Tryph., ch. 5), i. e., eternally {Apol., 
 I. 23 ; Dial. c. Trypjh., ch. 130), and not, as Plato supposed, merely a thousand years 
 {Apol, I. 8). 
 
 Justin's influence on the later Church Fathers, by whom he was very highly esteemed 
 as (to use the expression of Eusebius, E. H., lY. 8) a "genuine defender of true phi- 
 losophy," was so important, that it has been said not without reason (by Lange, in his 
 Dissertatio, in qua Justini Mart. Apologia prima sub examen vacatur, Jena, 1795, I. p. 7): 
 " Justinus ipse fundamenta jecii, quilnis sequeiis aetas toium illud corpus philosophematum de 
 religionis capitihus, quod a nobis hodie theologia thetica vacatur, super struxit." 
 
 § 79. Among the Apologists of Christianity in the second century, 
 the most worthy of mention, besides Justin, are Tatianus, Athe- 
 nagoras, Theophikis of Antioch, and Hermias. In Tatian, the As- 
 syrian, Christianity appears tempered with a haughty over-estimation 
 of the value of Oriental ideas, with barbaric hatred of Hellenic cul- 
 ture, and with a tendency toward a narrow asceticism. The writings 
 of Athenagoras of Athens present an agreeable combination of 
 Christian thought with Hellenic order and beauty of presentation ; 
 Athenagoras is in this respect the most pleasing of the Christian 
 authors of the period to which he belongs. Theophilus of Antioch 
 discusses, more than the other Apologists, the subjective conditions
 
 TATIAN, ATHENAGOEAS, THEOPHILUS, AND HKEMIA8. 295 
 
 of faith, especially the dependence of religious knowledge on purity 
 of heart. Ilermias' Ahuse of the Greek Philosophers is an unim- 
 portant work. 
 
 Tatian's DUcoume to the Greeks was first published, together with other patristic writings, at Zurich 
 in 1546 {ed. Johannes Frisius). A Latin translation by Conrad Gesner was published at the i>ame place in 
 the same year. Text and translation were afterward repeatedly reproduced. Newer editions have been 
 published by W. Worth (Oxford. 1700), Maranus (Paris, 1742), and, lastly, by J. C. Th. Otto (in his Corp. 
 Apol., VoL VI., Jena, 1S51). On Tatian, cf. Daniel. Tatiati c/er Apologet, Halle, 1S37. 
 
 The work of .Vthena^oras, entitled ircpl avocrTao-ewt tuiv v€KpCiv, was first printed at Louvaln, 1541, and 
 the npecr^eia rrepi XpicTiavotv^ together with the work just named, which is intimately connected in sub- 
 stance with this Apology, at Zurich, in 1557, and frequently since then, last in the Corpus Apologetamm 
 SaecuH If. ed., J. C. Th. Otto, Vol. VII., Jena, 1S57. On Athenagoras, cf. Th. A. Clarisse, De Ath. Vita, 
 Scriptis et Doctrina, Ley den, 1819. 
 
 The work of Theophilus, addressed to Autolycus, was first published at Zurich in 1546, along with 
 the Discourse of Tatian. It has recently been reproduced, together with the Commentary of Theoph. on 
 the Gospels, by Otto, in the above-named Corpus Apol., Vol. VIII., Jena, 1861. 
 
 Hermias' JrrUio Gentilium Philosophorum was first printed in Greek and Latin at Basel in 1555. 
 Numerous editions have since been published, and it is contained in Maranus' edition of Justin (1742). 
 
 Ten author.s, in all, are known to us as Apologists of Christianity, as opposed to Pa- 
 ganism, in the second century. These are, besides those already mentioned in § 78, 
 namely, Quadratus, Aristides, and Justin, the following: Melito of Sardis, ApoUinaris of 
 Hierapolis, and Miltiades the Rhetorician, whose works have not come dowTi to us, and 
 the four mentioned above, of whose works some are still m our possession : Tatian, Athe- 
 nagoras, Theophilus, and Hermias. Besides Justin, Aristo of Pella and Miltiades wrote', 
 especially against Judaism. \ 
 
 Melito, Bishop of Sardis, wrote, among other things, an Apology for Christianity, which 
 he presented to the Emperor Marcus Aurclius, about the year 170. In this defense, ad- 
 dressed to the philosophical Emperor, Christianity is described as a " Philosophj-, " which 
 had indeed first arisen among the barbarians, but which had attained to a flourishmg con- 
 dition in the Roman world in the time of the Empire, to the benefit of which it had 
 greatly redounded (Melito, ap. Euseb., Hist. EccL, IX. 26). A SjTiac translation of the 
 Apology of Melito of Sardis has been discovered by Cureton and Renan, and has been pub- 
 lished by Pitra in his Spicilegium Solesmense, II., pp. XXXA^III.-LY. (yet cf , per contra, 
 Uhlhorn, m Kiedner's Z. f. h. Th., 1866, p. 104). 
 
 ApoUinaris, Bishop of Hierapolis, wrote, among other things (about 180), a /.oyog, to 
 Marcus Aurelius, in favor of Christianity, and npbg "E/.^r/rnf avyypdfi/xaTa iriiTe (Euseb., 
 Hist. Eccl, IV. 26, 27). 
 
 Miltiades, a Christian rhetorician, who wrote against Montanism, composed also loyovc 
 npoQ 'WCArivaq and npoq 'lovSaiovg, and addressed an Apology for Christianity to the " rulers 
 of the world" (Euseb., nist Eccl, Y. 17). 
 
 Aristo, of Pella in Palestine, by birth a Hebrew, wrote (about 140 ?) a work, in which 
 the converted Hebrew, Jason, convinces the Alexandrian Jew, Papisous, after a long dis- 
 pute, of the truth of Christianity. This end is effected mainly by showing how the Mes- 
 sianic prophecies are fulfilled in Jesus of Nazareth fHieron., Quaest. in Genes, svh. init. ; 
 Maximus in Scholia ad lihrum Diomysii Areopag. de mystica theologia, ch. 1). The work 
 was therefore probably of but slight importance as a conxribution to the philosophy of 
 Christianity. Celsus, the pagan opponent of Christianity, mentions the work of Aristo 
 with derision (Origcn, Contra Cels., ed. Paris., I., 1. IV., p. 544), and Origen only cefeada 
 it partially and feebly.
 
 296 TATIAN, ATHENAGORAS, THEOPHILUS, AND HEKMIAS. 
 
 Tatian, an Assyrian by birth, received, according to his own statement (Orai. ad Gr., 
 ch. 42), the education of a Greek, but became subsequently a convert to Christianity, the 
 despised '' philosophy of the barbarians." Ireu;eus {Adv. Haeret, I. ch. 28) represents that 
 he was a pupil of Justin. In his work addressed "to the Greeks" {npbg 'EA/l^yvaf, written 
 about 100-170 a. d.), which is still extant, and in which (as Ritter expresses it, Gesch. der 
 Philos., Y. p. 32), "we see often less of the Christian than of the barbarian," Tatian labors 
 to depreciate Greek culture, morals, art, and science, the better to recommend in their 
 stead Christianity. To this end he does not disdain to revive the most vulgar calumnies 
 which had been raised against the most illustrious Greek philosophers, at the same time 
 misrepresenting their teachings {Orat. ad Gr., ch. 2). With barbaric despotism of abstrac- 
 tion, he mcludes in the category of immoralities the sensuous wants of man, when esthetic- 
 ally refined and transfigured, as well as his brutish lusts, so far as both are not controlled 
 by the moral rules, in order thereby to present Christian purity and continence in a clearer 
 light (e. g., ch. 33 : Kal ?/ fiev "Lmrtitu yivaiov nopviKov ipuTOfjaveg Kal ttjv kavTtJQ aceTc/eiav 
 gSei • Ttaaai de ai nap' ijn'iv aucppovovai, Kal ivepl rag iiTMKciTaQ al -Kapdivoi to /card deov 
 laXovatv SKfuv^/jiaTa Tf/q Trap' vfilv naidog aTrovfiaidrepov). As to his dogmatic attitude, 
 Tatian pays especial attention to the development of the doctrines of God, as the rational 
 principle and the hypostasis of the universe {viroaTaciQ -ov Travroq) ; of the Logos, as the 
 being whose nature is actual reason, and who issued from God by the will of God, not by 
 the way of division, but hy communication, like light from light; of the creation of the 
 world and of the resurrection, of the sin of Adam, which resulted in the deep degradation 
 of the human race, but did not destroy our freedom of will; and of redemption and regene- 
 ration through Christ (ch. 5 seq.). At a later epoch Tatian espoused the doctrines of tlie 
 Yalentinian Gnostics, and subsequently founded or contributed to build up the sect of the 
 Encratites who rejected marriage as sinful, as also the use of animal food and wine, and 
 even substituted water for wine in the celebration of the Eucharist. 
 
 Athenagoras of Athens, according to the very doubtful authority of Philippus Sidetes 
 (a teacher in the school of catechists, in the fifth century), was for a time at the head of 
 the school of catecliists at Alexandria (see Giiericke, De schola, quae Alexandriae ftoruii 
 caiechetica, Halle, in Saxony. 1824). He was familiar with Greek, and especially with the 
 Platonic philosoph}-. In his Apology, the Upeaptta (Supplicatio) nspl Xpiariavuv, which he 
 addressed in the year 176 or 177 to the Emperor Marcus Aurelius and to his son and col- 
 league Commodus, Athenagoras defends the Christians against the threefold accusation of 
 atheism, unchaste associations, and Thyestian repasts. In replying to the first charge, he 
 appeals to the declarations of Greek poets and philosophers against polytheism and in 
 favor of the unity of God, and develops the doctrine of the divine Trinity. Athenagoras 
 seeks to establish the unity of God by an a jniort proof, which meets us here for the first 
 time in Christian literature. If there were more Gods than one, he argues (Suppl., ch. 8), 
 these Gods must be at once unlike and in different places; for only those things are similar 
 to each other and co-ordinate which are formed after a common model, and are therefore 
 temporal and finite, and not eternal and divine; and there cannot be difierent localities for 
 the abode of different Gods, for the God who formed the round world occupies the space 
 outside the world, as being himself a supra-mundane being (6 /xev Koofioq a(paipiKdg aT:o-i?.ec- 
 de'tg ovpavov kvkXok; anoKiK^eiarai, 6 6i rov aoofjov noiTjT7j(; hvuripu tuv yeyovoruv, ine;^(jv 
 avTov Tfj Tov-ruv TTpovnio), and it is impossible that another God should exist either within 
 the lim'its of the world-sphere, or there where the world-builder is; and if such a God 
 existed beyond the latter locality in or around another world, his existence would not 
 concern us, and, besides, on account of the limited sphere of his existence, he would be 
 no true God.
 
 TATIAN, ATHENAGOEAS, THEOPHILUS, AND HEEMIAS. 297 
 
 Hellenic poets and philosophers, incited to inquiry by the divine Spirit, have them- 
 selves taught the unity of God, says Athenagoras; but perfect clearness and certainty of 
 knowledge are obtained only from the divine instructions imparted to us in the Holy Scrip- 
 tures, in the writings of Moses, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and other prophets, who abandoned! all 
 ideas peculiar to themselves and were employed by the Holy Ghost as organs, just as the 
 flute is used by the flutist {Suppl., chs. 5-9). All things were made by God, through his 
 intelligence or Logos, which, since God is necessarily a rational being, has always existed 
 with him. The Logos came forth from God to be the prototype of the world and the 
 active force (i6ea koX ivipyeia) in all material things, and is thus the first product of tht 
 Father, or the Son of God. Father and Son are one ; the Son is in the Father and the 
 Father in the Son through the unity and power of the Spirit. The Spirit also, which 
 wrought in the Prophets, is an emanation from God {anoppoia rov Qeov), going forth from 
 him and returning to him like a ray of the sun. We acknowledge, as the object of our 
 worship, God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and we recognize their solidarity in power 
 and their orderly division (r^ iv ry evugel 6vva/iiv Kal tjjv ev rf/ ra^et dtaipeaiv) ; nor do 
 we confine our theology to this, but believe that angels and servants of God have been 
 assigned by the Logos to assist in the conduct of the world (ch. 10). We pro%'e our faith 
 in God by our purity of heart and our love to our enemies (ch. 11); for we are convinced 
 that after death we shall be obliged to render an account for our lives (ch. 12). Christians 
 cannot participate in the worship of tlie many pretended Gods of the various nations (ch. 
 13 seq.). Athenagoras denies the charges of immorality directed against the Christians, 
 appealing to the well-known purity of the morals of the latter (ch. 32 seq.). 
 
 The work by Athenagoras on the Resurrection of the Dead contains an introduction (ch. 
 1) and two principal parts. The first part (chs. 2-10) is taken up with the refutation of 
 objections; the second (chs. 11-25) contains the positive arguments. If the resurrection 
 were impossible, argues Athenagoras, it must be from a lack either of ability or of will on 
 the part of God. He would lack the requisite ability, provided — and only provided — he 
 were deficient in knowledge or in power. But the work of creation shows that he is 
 deficient in neither. If it is held that the resurrection of the body is impossible on ac- 
 count of the fact that our bodies are perpetually undergoing material change, so that the 
 same particles may belong at different times to different human bodies, to all of which 
 they can obviously not be restored at the resurrection, Athenagoras replies by denying the 
 supposed fact, on the ground that every being assimilates from that which it takes as 
 nutriment only such elements as agree with itself, and that no elements of the human 
 body can be transformed into animal flesh and then be assimilated a second lime by a 
 second human body. If God has not the will to raise again the bodies of men, it must be 
 because — and only because — such a resurrection would involve an injustice to those who 
 were raised or to other creatures, or because it would be unworthy of God. But netther 
 of these suppositions is correct, the first for obvious reasons, and the latter, because if It 
 were unworthy of God to raise the dead, tlien it must have been unworthy of him to 
 create man in the first instance. The positive arguments by v/hich Athenagoras defends 
 the doctrine of the resurrection are founded. 1) on the reason of man's creation, which 
 was that he might always contemplate the divine wisdom, 2) on the nature of man, which 
 demands that he sliould live eternally, in order that he may realize the life according to 
 reason, 3) on the necessity of a divine judgment on men, 4) on the fact that in this life the 
 end for which man was created is not attained, this end consisting neither in the absence 
 of pain nor in sensuous pleasure, nor in the felicity of the soul alone, but in the contem- 
 plation of the truly-existent Being and in rejoicing In his decrees. 
 
 Theophilus of Antioch informs us (Jd Autolyc, 1. 14) that he was led to embrace
 
 :298 TATIAN, ATHENAGOEAS, THEOPHILUS, AND HEEMIA8. 
 
 Christianity by reading the prophetic parts of the Holy Scriptures. In his work addressed 
 to Autolycus (written soon after 180) he admonishes the latter likewise to believe, lest, 
 remaining in unbelief, he be afterward, to his detriment, compelled to believe by those 
 eternal punishments of hell, which the Prophets and, stealing from them, Greek poets and 
 philosophers have foretold (I. 14). To the demand of Autolycus, "Show me thy God," 
 Theophilus replies (ch. 1): "Show me thy man," i. e., show me whether thou art free from 
 sin, for ouly the pure can see God. To the demand, '-Describe God to me," he answers 
 (1. 3): "God's nature is ineffable; his honor, greatness, loftiness, power, wisdom, goodness, 
 and grace transcend all human conceptions. If I call God light, I name but his image ; if I 
 call him Logos, I name his dominion ; if reason (vov^), his insight {(ppovr/au:) ; if spirit, his 
 breath ; if wisdom, his creation ; if strength, his power ; if energy, his efiBcient agency ; if 
 providence, his goodness; if dominion, his glory; if Lord, then I term him a judge; if a 
 judge, then I pronounce him just; if Father, then I say that he is loving (aya-rruvra, 
 according to Heumann's conjecture, for to. ndvra, or, more correctly. Creator, on the sup- 
 position of Grabe, that rd wavTa being correct, the word noif/cavTa has fallen out ; cf. ch. 
 •i : TTaryp 6ia to elvai aurov irpb tuv oAwv, and Philo, Be Kom. Mut, ed. Mangey, I. p. 
 582 seq., where dsor, TxoiTjTtK^ diivafiig, 6i' r/g edyjKe ra -rvavra and na-j/p are given as equiva- 
 lent expressions) ; and if I call him fire, I name thereby the anger which he cherishes 
 against evil-doers." He is unconditioned, because without beginning, and immutable, as 
 he is immortal. He is called God (fcof) because he established all things (Jm rb TedsiKevai 
 ra TTcivra) and because he moves and works {6ia to dieiv). (Qebg — Zend: Daeva; Persian: 
 I>eiv and Diw {daemon) — is derived, as is now known, from the TOot Div, to be bright or 
 glitter, Sanscr. Deva, the shining one.) God created all things for his glory (I. 4: to. navra 
 6 debg ETtoiTjcev £j ovk ovtuv e'lg rb elvai, Iva 6ia tg)V ipyuv yiyv6aK7/rac Kal vorfiy to fih/edog 
 avrov). The invisible God is known from his works, just as from the regulated course of a 
 ship the presence of a helmsman can be inferred. God made all things through his Logos 
 and his "Wisdom (I. 7). The Logos was from eternity with God (as Aoyog EvSidderog h rolg 
 Idioig [tov Oeov'] anldyxvoig [II. 10] or kvdiddeTog iv napSla dtov [II. 22]); before the world 
 was he who was " reason and wisdom " (vovg kuI ^govijaig) was God's counsellor [ov/xPovAog). 
 But when God willed the creation of the world, he begot this Logos, placing him out of 
 himself [rovrov tov Aoyov iyivvrjce vpotpopiKov) as the first-born before the creation, not as 
 though he became thereby himself deprived of a ^oyog, but so that the Aoyor^ after the act 
 of generation, remained still a part of God (II. 24). The three days before the creation of 
 the heavenly luminaries were types of the triad : God, Logos, and Wisdom (II. 15 : rvrroi 
 T?/g rptddog rov 6eov nal tov Aoyov avrov Kal rr/g co(j)iag). God, who created us, can and 
 will create us once again at the resurrection (I. 8). The names of the Greek gods are 
 names of deified men (I. 9 seq.). The worship of the gods through images is irrational, 
 and the doctrines of pagan poets and philosophers are foohsh. The writings of Moses and 
 the prophets are the oldest Scriptures, and contain that truth which the Greeks have for- 
 gotten and rejected (II., III.). — To what extent the Commentary on the Four Gospels, which 
 has come down to us bearing the name of Theophilus, is genuine, cannot be determined 
 with certainty. The polemical work of Theophilus against Marcion, mentioned in the 
 Jlist. Eccl. of Eusebius, as also the similar work against Hermogenes, the Aristotelianizing 
 and Plaionizing speculator (who supposed an original, uncreated, chaotic matter, on which 
 God's power was exerted, in a manner like that in which the magnet attracts iron, a doc- 
 trine which was opposed also by Tertullian), and other writings of Theophilus, are lost. 
 
 Hermias is an author who appears to have lived in the first half of the third century 
 after Christ, since he represents it as the fundamental doctrine of Plato, that God, matter, 
 and form are the original causes of all things, and in this representation agrees with the
 
 IJBEN^US AND HIPP0LYTU8. 299 
 
 eclectic Platonists of the second century (cf. above, § 65), but not with the Neo-Platonista 
 who lived after Plotiuus. In his " Abuse of the Pagan Philosophers " (thaavpudg tuv i^u 
 <ptAoa6<pcjv), he endeavors to show how the views of those philosophers involve contradic- 
 tions. "Now I am immortal and rejoice, now I am mortal and lament ; now I am ground 
 iuto atoms, or become water, air, fire; I am made an animal of the forest, or a fish — at last 
 comes Empedocles and makes me a bush." Since Ilermias does not enter into the grounds 
 and the systematic connection of the views which he combats, and still less understands 
 the order and law of development of the Grecian philosophy, his work has no scienti6c 
 value. Heathen philosophy he considers as a gift of demons, who sprung from a union 
 of fallen angels with earthly women (and not, like Clemens of Alexandria, as a gift of 
 God, delivered to man by the inferior angels). 
 
 § 80. Ireuaeus, who was born about 140 a.d., iii Asia Minor, and 
 died iu about the year 202 while Bishop of Lyons and Vienne in Gaul, 
 was a pupil of Poly carp. He is of importance in the history of the 
 development of Christian thought chiefly as an opponent of the 
 Gnostics. Irenseus ascribes the growth of Gnosticism to the corrupt- 
 ing influence of ante-Christian philosophy on the Apostolic tradition. 
 Denouncing that freedom of speculation which had degenerated into 
 mere lawlessness of the imagination, and that Antinomianism which 
 had degenerated into a libertinism hostile to morality, he lays special 
 emphasis on Christian tradition and the Christian law, and is hence 
 to be regarded as one of the founders and principal representatives of 
 the early Catholic Church. Maintaining the identity of the supreme 
 God with the Creator of the world and with the author of the Mosaic 
 law, Irenaeus (with Paul) explains the difference between the revela- 
 tions of the Old and New Testaments as arising from the nature of 
 God's plan for the education of the human race, in which plan the 
 Mosaic law was included as a means of preparation for Christianity'. 
 The Son or Logos and the Holy Ghost are one with the Father and 
 instruments in the works of creation and revelation. Christ has con- 
 firmed the essential part of the law, the moral law, and has made it 
 more broad by including among its objects the intentions of men, 
 while at the same time he has declared us free from its external 
 ordinances. Man freely decides for or against the divine command, 
 and receives accordingly reward or punishment in eternity. — In the 
 same circle of ideas moves also the disciple of Irenseus, the Roman 
 presbyter Hippolytus, who, with more completeness than Irenaeus in 
 details, but at the same time less impartiality, seeks to demonstrate 
 the heathen origin of the Gnostic doctrines. 
 
 The earliest editions of the works of Irenn-us are those of Erasmus: Opu« entditisidmum divi Irenaei 
 epMcopi LugdunensU in quitvjue libron dige«Uim. in (juibuA mire reterjit et cari/uiat veterum hoeresenn 
 impias ac porientosaa opiniones, ex vetuatias. codicum coUatione emend, opera Dea. Eraami Roterodami
 
 300 IKENJEUS AND HIFPOLYTUS. 
 
 ac nunc primum in lucem ed. opera Jo. Frobenii. Basel, 1526; 2d ed., 1528, 3d. 1584, etc.; on these are 
 based the editions of Gallasius (Geneva, 1570), Grynfeus (B.isel, 1571), Fcuardcntius (1675-76; 1596, etc.), 
 Grabe (Oxford. 1702), Massuet (Paris, 1712, and Venice, 1734), and Ad. Stieren (Leipsic, 1853), which latter 
 edition is accompanied with Massuet's essays on the Gnostics and on the life, writings, and doctrines of 
 Irenaeiis. The writings of Irenaeus fill Vol. VII. in that division of Migne's Cursus Patrologiae which is 
 devoted to the Greek Fathers. BOhringer treats with special fullness of Ircn^us in Die Kirche ChrisU, 
 I. 1, 2d ed, Zurich, 1861, pp. 271-612. There exist, besides, monographs on the Christolngy of Irenieus (by 
 L. Duncker, Gott. 1843), on his Cosmology (W. Moller, Die Kosmologie in der griechtKficn Kirche, etc., 
 \>p. 474-506), on his Eschatology (Moritz Kirchner, in TheoL Stud, und Eritiken, 1863, pp. 315-358), and on 
 his doctrine concerning grace (Joh. Korber, Ir. de gratia sanctijicante, diss, inaug., Wurtzburg, 1865). 
 
 The work of Hippolytus, xara vojjuiv axpitTftiv tXtyxpi;, of which formerly only the first book, under 
 the title, Origenis Philosopkumena, was known, was discovered by Mynoides Mynas in 1842, and pub- 
 lished in 1851 (cf. above, p. 21). Other writings of II. have been collected together by P. A. Lagarde under 
 the title llippolyti Jiomani quae feruniur omnia Graeee, Leipsic and London, 1858. Cf. C. W. Ilaenell, De 
 IHppolyto episcopo, tertii saecxM scriptore, Gott. 1838; Bunsen, Ilippoli/ttis und neine Zeit, Leips. IS&i- 
 "53 ; Dollinger, Hippolytus und Kallitstus, Munich, 1853 ; J. E. L. Gieseler, Ueber Hippolytus, die ersien 
 Monarchianer und die rom. Kirche in der ersten Ilalfte des dritten Jahrh., in Theol. Stud. u. Kr., 1853 ; 
 Volkmar, Hippolytus wnd die romischen Zeiigenossen, Zurich, 1655. 
 
 In a letter to Florinus {ap. Stieren, I. pp. 822-824) Irenseus mentions that he remem- 
 bers very exactly the discourses of the aged Polycarp, of whom, in his boyhood, he, 
 together with Florinus, was a pupil. Polycarp suffered martyrdom in 167 a. d. ; Irenaeus 
 may have received his instruction not long before that date. According to Hieronymus 
 (Br., 75), he was also a pupil of Papias. Soon after this Irenajus came to Lyons in Gaul, 
 at which place he was made presbyter, and, after the martyrdom of Pothinus in the year 
 177, bishop. Hieronymus names Irena^us as a Christian martyr, and Gregory of Tours 
 {Hist of Gaul, I. 27) affirms that he suffered death in the persecution under Severus (about 
 A. D. 202). His chief work: Showing up and Refutation of the Knowledge falsely so-called 
 (£AE}';t;of nal avarpoTTij rfjq Tpevdwvvfiov -/vuaei.)^) has come down to us in an ancient Latin 
 translation ; yet many fragments, and in particular the largest part of the first book, have 
 been preserved in the original text. This work is especially directed against the Valen- 
 tinians. It was composed (according to III. 3. 3) at the time when Eleutherus held the 
 office of Bishop of Rome {i. e., about 180 A. D. ; but different portions of it were written 
 at diflTerent times). Eusebius {E. iT., V. 26) mentions a treatise by Irenseus against Hellenic 
 science, and also an exposition of the doctrines announced by the Apostles, and other 
 writings. Irenseus designates as the fundamental characteristic of Gnosticism, the blas- 
 phemy that the supreme God and the Creator of the world are two different beings ; and 
 of the same nature with this division of the Father into two beings is, according to him, 
 the division of the Son into a plurality of arbitrarily-assumed beings (as seen particularly 
 in the teachings of the Valentinians). The Gnostic pretence that Jesus taught an esoteric 
 doctrine is pronounced false by Irenteus. The true Gnosis is the apostolic doctrine, as 
 deUvered to us by the Church. Irenaeus reminds his readers of the limits of human 
 knowledge. The Creator is incomprehensible, transcending all human imagination. He is 
 intelligent, but not after the manner of human intelligence ; he is light, but not like what 
 we know as light. All our notions of him are inadequate. It is better to know nothing, 
 to believe in God and abide in his love, than through subtle investigations to fall into 
 atheism. Whatever we know of God we know through his revelation of himself With- 
 out God's aid, God cannot be known. Just as those who see the light are in the light, so 
 those who perceive God are in him and participate in his splendor. God himself is the 
 creator of the world. In it he reveals himself to man and by it the better class of hea- 
 thens have already known him. What he did before the creation of the world he himself 
 only knows. Matter owes its existence to God's will. In creating the world God wai 
 guided only by that plan which he had formed in his own mind. He had no need of (the
 
 IRENiEUS AND HIPP0LYTD3. 301 
 
 Platonic) "archetypes; " besides, if such archetypes existed, then there must have existed 
 archetypes of those archetypes, and so on in infinitum. In God nothing is without mea- 
 sure ; the measure of the Father is the Son, who in Jesus became man, who knows the 
 depths of the divine nature, and who is the steward and distributor of the Father's grace, 
 to the blessing of humanity ; the Son or the Word, and the Spirit or the Wisdom of God 
 are the hands of the Father. But we cannot measure the greatness of God. Jesus, the 
 Son of the Virgin, was man in reality, and not in appearance only, and he lived through 
 every period of life (till he was nearly fifty years old). When man was created, God 
 impressed on his heart the natural moral law, and this impression was not effaced by 
 the fall of man and the consequent introduction of sin into the world. This law was ex- 
 pressed in the decalogue ; but the Jews, owing to their proneness to fall away from God. 
 received in addition the ceremonial law, which was intended to restrain them from the 
 worship of idols, and contained types of Christ, but which was not intended to remain 
 always in force. Christ has taken away the bonds of servitude which it contained, and 
 extended the decrees of freedom, but has not abrogated the decalogue. The revelations 
 in nature, and in the Old and Xew Covenants, mark the three stages in the plan of salva- 
 tion. It is the same God whose aid is given to men at these different stages, according 
 to their different needs. Just as truly as Christ had a material body, so truly will our 
 bodies also be raised again; it is not our souls alone that will continue to exist. The 
 soul of man does not exist before his body, nor is there such a thing as the transmigra- 
 tion of souls. That the soul can immediately rise to God after the death of the body, 
 Irenajus pronounces to be an heretical notion, held indeed by some who are called ortho- 
 dox, but which is inconsistent with the true doctrine of the gradual advancement of 
 the righteous in the next world, and which ignores the fact that we can only by degrees 
 become accustomed to incorruption. At first all souls must go into Hades, whence they 
 will rise at the time of the resurrection and will again be clothed with their bodies. But, 
 before this. Antichrist must appear, and then the separation of the good from the bad, 
 which will have been proceeding in the measure of the progress of the divine revelations, 
 will be completed. By Antichrist is to be understood Satan incarnate in human form. 
 When he shall have reigned for a time (three and one-half years) and sat enthroned in 
 the temple at Jerusalem, Christ will come from heaven in the same flesh in which he suf- 
 fered, and in the glory of the Father, and will cast Antichrist and his followers into the 
 lake of fire. This will happen when the world shall have stood exactly six thousand 
 years, or one thousand years for each day of its creation. Christ will then reign one 
 thousand years among the righteous who have been raised from the dead, or during the 
 period which is to correspond with the seventh day of creation, the day of rest. The 
 citizens of this kingdom will live in blessed, painless fruition, and will be rewarded for 
 their former perseverance amid vexations and sufferings. The earth itself will then be 
 restored by Christ to its original condition. This kingdom of rejoicing is to be the king- 
 dom of the Son. It will be followed by the kingdom of the Father, i. e., by eternal 
 blessedness ; for as the Spirit leads men through faith to the Son, so the Son leads those 
 who obtain salvation to the Father. But since the same God who is good is also just, a 
 second resurrection will take place after the expiration of the reign of the Son, when the 
 unrighteous will also be raised, and that to judgment. All who deserve punishment will 
 receive it in the souls and bodies in which they turned aside from the offers of divine 
 grace. This punishment will consist in the loss of all the blessings of grace ; it will be 
 eternal and infinite, as are also the blessings of God. 
 
 Hippolytus, a pupil of Irenaeus (according to Photius, Cod. 121), was a Roman pres- 
 byter, and is reported to have been exiled to Sardinia in the year 235. On a pillar in th»
 
 302 lEEN^US AND HIPPOLTTUS. 
 
 vicinity of Rome, Hippolytus is represented as sitting on a Cathedra, on which a list of his 
 works, and also the Easter-cycle, as reckoned by him, are engraved. Among the works 
 thus mentioned is one bearing the title : Trepi rfj^ tov Travrhq ovalac, and as the author of 
 the e^eyxo^, cited above, designates himself (in the 10th book) as the author of a work 
 under this title, it follows that the eXeyxoc is with probability to be ascribed to Hippolytus. 
 To Hippolytus also is attributed a avvrayfia Kara alpeaeuv, and the author of the iAeyjof 
 mentions (iu his Introduction) a smaller work, in which he had previously treated of the 
 doctrines of the heretics, and which appears to have been identical with the olvrayfia men- 
 tioned. It is true that Photius assigns the Trfpi r^f tov navToq avaia^ to the Roman pres- 
 byter Cajus, whom Baur [Theol. Jahrh., 1853, 1. 3) considered as the author of the eTi-eyxo^; 
 but the relation of the statements issuing from Cajus respecting Cerinthus to those con- 
 tained in the IT^eyxog, and facts reported by Dionysius of Alexandria and Eusebius 
 respecting Cajus, militate against attributing to him the work in question. (J. L. Jacobi, 
 Duncker, Bunsen, Gieseler, Bollinger, and A. Ritschl regard Hippolytus as the author of 
 the eXeyxoq) Others have ascribed the work to other authors, but without sufficient rea- 
 son. The eleyxo^ Kara nacijv alpiaeuv was written after the death of Callistus, Bishop 
 of Rome, which took place in the year 223 ; if Hippolytus was its author, it must therefore 
 have been written between A. i). 223 and 235. Hippolytus seeks in his works to demon- 
 strate that the errors of the Gnostics were not derived from the Sacred Scriptures and 
 Christian tradition, but from the wisdom of the Hellenes, from the doctrines of various 
 heathen philosophers, and from pagan mysteries and astrology (Book I., Prooem.). In his 
 exposition of Valentinianism he follows Irenaeus substantially, but the Basilidean doctrine 
 he had studied for himself, although it is still doubtful whether his knowledge of that doc- 
 trine was derived from original writings of Basilides, or (what is perhaps more probable), 
 from later works, written by persons belonging to a branch of the school. The Hellenes, 
 says Hippolytus, glorified the parts of creation, since they knew not the Creator, and the 
 heresiarchs have followed after them (X. 32). The one God, who is over all, begot first 
 the Logos; and by Logos is meant, not speech, but that idea of the universe which is 
 immanent in God {EvdidOtTov tov rravTog Tioyiafiov). This Logos was not, like all the rest of 
 creation, created out of nothing; God created it out of his own substance. Thus the 
 Logos, as being consubstantial with God, is itself God {6lo Kal fcof, ovoia vndpxuv Beov), 
 The world was created by the Logos, at the command of the Father, out of nothing; it is 
 therefore not God, and it can be annihilated whenever God wills it. Man was created a 
 dependent being, but endowed with free will; the misuse of this freedom is the source of 
 all evil. Since man is free, God has placed him under law ; for the beast is governed by 
 whip and bit, but man by command and reward and punishment. The law was first laid 
 down by just men, and, more especially, afterward by Moses; the Logos, which warns and 
 leads men to obey the law, has exerted its influence in all times ; it has in these last days 
 appeared personally to men, as the Son of the Virgin. Man is not God; but if thou wilt 
 even become God (ft 6e OeTieig Kat Oebr yeveodai), obey thy creator and transgress not his 
 commandment, that, found faithful in that which is less, thou mayest be entrusted with 
 that which is greater (X. 33). There are not two Gods, but only one, in whom there are 
 two persons, and a third economy, the grace of the Holy Ghost. The Logos is the intelli- 
 gence, which came forth from God and was revealed in the world as the Son of God. All 
 things are through him ; he comes from the Father, as light from light, or water from its 
 source, or the ray of light from the sun. God is only one, whether considered as the com- 
 manding Father, the obeying Son, or the enlightening Holy Ghost. It is impossible other- 
 wise to believe in the one God than by truly believing in the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost 
 (Hippol., Contra Haeres. Noeti, 11 seq.). 
 
 j_//-;y
 
 TEKTULLIAN. 303 
 
 § 81. Tertullian (160-220), Presbyter of Carthage, went, in his 
 opposition to Gnostic and especially to Marcionitic Antinomianism, 
 to an extreme of ascetic ethics and lecjalitv, which transcended the 
 limit maintained by the Church, and brought him finally to adopt 
 the Puritanism of the Montanists (which was founded on an energetic 
 belief in the speedy return of Christ). According to him, Chris- 
 tianity was a law, the new law of Jesus Christ. Tertullian was i 
 unfriendly to speculation. Philosophy, in his opinion, was the mother i 
 of heresies ; Jerusalem should be completely separated from Athens, 
 the Church from the Academy. His anti-philosophical tendency 
 culminated in the proposition : Credo quia absurdum est. ' 
 
 TertuUiani Opera ed. Rhenanus, Basel, 1539; ed. Eigaltius, Paris, 1635, 1666; ed. Semler and Schutz, 
 Halle, 1770; E.F.Leopold in Qarulnrf't, Bihl. Pair. Lat, Vols. IV.-VII., Lcipsic, 1S39-41 ; F. Oehler, 3 
 vols., Lcipsic, 1S5.3-54. Works on him by J. A. Nosselt {De rera aetate ac doclrina scriptorum. Tertnl- 
 Kant, Halle, 1768), W. Miinscher {Darstellwig der moraliachen Ideen den Clemens van AUxandrien und 
 des Teritdlian, in Henke's ifagasiiifur ReUgioTUtphilosophie, Exegexe und Kirchengeschichte, Vol. VI., 
 Heltnst. 1796, pp. 106 seq.), tSewnAer (AntignosticuK, oder Geist des Tertullian und Einleitung in dessen 
 Schri/ten, Berlin, 1825, 2d edition. I&i9), Schwegler (in his work on 3fo7itaniam, Tubinpren, 1S41, p. 302), 
 Hesselberg ( T"*/-*. Lefire, entwicJ^elt axis geinen Schri/ten, Part I.: Leben und Schriften, Dorpat. 1548), 
 Engelhardt {Tertullian' s nchriftstelleriscJier Character, in the Zeituchr.f. hist. Tlieol., 1852, 2), G. Uhlliorn 
 (Fundamenta Chronologiae TertxiUianae, diss, inaug., Gottingen, 1852); cf. also Bohringer's account 
 of Tertulli-in's doctrine in the second edition of his Kirchengesch. in Biographien. 
 
 Quintus Septiraius Florens Tertullianus was born at Carthage, about a. d. 160, of hea- 
 then parents, and was first educated for the law. In about 197 a.d. he was converted to 
 Christianity. He joined the Montanists in about the year 200, according to Nosselt and 
 TIesselherg, or, according to the more probable supposition of Uhlhorn, in 202 ; others fix 
 the date at 204-206. In developing his Christian theology, he was influenced by the 
 judicial habit of mind resulting from his previous legal studios, while, in defending it, he 
 employed that peculiar eloquence which had characterized him as an advocate ; he made 
 the spirit secondary to the law, and Christ, so to speak, the servant of Moses. His 
 writings (as classified by Neander) are partly apologetic, addressed to pagans, and relat- 
 ing to the conduct of the Christians under the persecutions of the former — partly ethical 
 and disciplinary, and partly dogmatic and polemical. Antc-Montanistic works of the first 
 class are the Ad Martyres, De Spectacidis, De Idolatria, Ad Kationes, Ajwlogeiiais (about 
 A.D. 200), De T&stimonio Animae; of the second class: De Fatieniia, Oratione (Prayer), 
 Baptismo, Pocnitentia. Ad Uxorem, De Cultu Feminarum ; of the third class : De Praescrip- 
 tione Haereticxyrum, Montanistic works of the first class: De Corona MUitis, De Fuga in 
 Persecuiione, Contra Gnosticos Scorpiace, Ad Scapulam (Proconsulcvt) ; of the second class : 
 De ExJwrtaUone Castitafis, Monogamza, Pudicitia, Jejuniis, Virginibus Velandii, Pallio ; of 
 the third class: Advers'u.'! Mardonem, Adv. Ifernwgenan, Adv. Valcntinianos (if written by 
 Tertullian), De Came Christi, Resurrectione Carnis, Anima, Adversus Praxeam. 
 
 Of all the ancient Church Fathers (except Tatian) Tertulhan emphasizes most the 
 opposition between morality and the sensuous nature of man, as also between the divine 
 revelation and human reason. The divine mysteries cannot, indeed, in the last analysis, 
 be opposed to reason, says Tertullian ; God is the creator of matter, and the dualism of the 
 Manicheans is false. But the monism thus avowed by Tertullian is constantly left by him 
 in the background, and the antagonism of principles is portrayed in fiery declamations.
 
 304 TERTULLIAN. 
 
 What have the philosopher and Christian in common? The disciple of Greece and the 
 disciple of heaven? The aspirant for earthly honor and he who aspires to (eternal) life? 
 The maker of words and the performer of deeds ? The destroyer and the builder-up of 
 things ? The friend and the enemy of error ? The corrupter and the restorer of truth, its 
 thief and its guardian ? What have Athens and Jerusalem, the Church and the Academy, 
 heretics and Christians, in common with each other? Our doctrine has come down from 
 the porch of Solomon, who himself left us as his legacy the injunction, to seek the Lord 
 ia simplicity ot heart. Let those who offer us a Stoic, or Platonic, or dialectical Christian- 
 ity, reflect what they are doing. There is no more curiosity for us, now that Christ has 
 come, nor any occasion for further investigation, since we have the Gospel. We are to 
 seek for nothing which is not contained in the doctrine of Christ. The Christian may not 
 search for more than it is permitted him to find ; the Apostle forbids endless questions. 
 What could Thales, the first of the Physiologists, tell Croesus with certainty respecting 
 the Godliead? Socrates was condemned, because, by destroying the gods, he advanced 
 nearer to the truth ; but even the wisdom of Socrates is not to be highly estimated, for who 
 would have known the truth without God, and to whom is God known without Christ? 
 Who can understand Christ without the Holy Ghost, and to whom has it been given thus 
 to understand him, without the sacrament of faith? Socrates, as he himself confesses, was 
 led by a demon. Every Christian laborer has found God ; he shows him forth, and can 
 answer every question that is asked concerning God, while Plato assures us that it is 
 difficult to find the architect of the world, and that it is not practicable, if possible, to 
 make him known to all, when found. thou poor Aristotle, who hast discovered for the 
 heretics the art of dialectic, the art of building up and destroying, the art of discussing 
 all things and accomplishing nothing! What doest thou, daring Academy? Thou 
 uprootest the whole organism of human life, thou destroyest the order of nature, thou 
 deniest the providence of God, when thou supposest that the senses, which God has 
 given to his creatures, are deceptive as means of knowledge and unreliable as instruments 
 for the practical uses of life (an anticipation of Descartes' argument from the veracite de 
 Dieu). Poets and philosophers have drawn special, isolated truths from the Old Testa- 
 ment, bnt they have corrupted them and ambitiously claimed them as discovered by them- 
 selves. The philosophers are the patriarchs of the heretics. Platonism furnished the 
 material for the Yalentinian heresy, and Stoicism for the Marcionitic. The Epicureans are 
 the fathers of those who deny the immortality of the soul, while all the philosophical 
 schools lend support to the deuiers of the resurrection. Those heretics who teach that 
 matter is equally original with God draw upon Zeno's doctrine ; those who speak of the 
 "fiery God" have learned of Heraclitus. The philosophers contradict each other. While 
 they hypocritically pretend to possess truth, the Christian possesses it indeed. Only the 
 Christian is wise and true, and no one is greater than he. Even the offices of Ludimagistri 
 and Professores Lilerarum are incompatible with the Christian character. Christianity is in 
 contradiction with human wisdom and culture. " Crucifixus est dei Jilius ; non piidet, quia 
 pudendum est. El mortuus est dei JiUus ; proisus credibile est, quia ineptvm est. Et sepultus 
 resurrexit; certum est, quia impossibtle est." 
 
 Like human thought, so also the human will is viewed by Tertullian as entirely cor- 
 rupt. Instead of considering tlie sensuous nature of man as that which may be permeated, 
 and, so to speak, filled out with the ideal, he leaves the former in all its crudeness, in 
 order that he may the more successfully combat and condemn it, and in order that he may 
 find in it, in so far as it is the necessary and inexpugnable basis of spiritual life, the source 
 of universal depravity. Matrimonium and stuprum are both alike forms of commixtio 
 camis, and are distinguished only by the legal form. (In some passages, however, Tertul-
 
 TERTDLLIAN. 305 
 
 lian rises superior to his principle, and describes Christian marriage as a real life-commu- 
 nion.) Celibacy ("pure virginity") is best; but God permits us to marry once, out of 
 regard for our frailty (De Exhort. Castit, chs. 1, 9; De Monog., ch. 15). Tertullian's Chris- 
 tian (like Tatian's) is •' an angel riding on a tamed beast." With regard to marriage and 
 the family, ^'fuga saeculi is synonymous for him with fleeing from the world of moral 
 action." 
 
 As in the doctrine of the Stoics (of whom Seneca, at least, was held in high estimation 
 by Tertullian), so also in the doctrine of TertuUian, a dualistic ethics, in which the sensuous 
 nature is condemned, is united with a sensualistic theory of cognition and a materiahstic 
 psychology. Tertullian's ontology is a gross form of Realism. He teaches : The senses 
 do not deceive us. All that is real is material. The materiality of God and the soul is 
 without prejudice to the exalted nature of the former and the immortality of the latter 
 (Nihil enim, si non corpus. Omne quod est, corpus est sui generis ; nihil est incorporate, nisi 
 quod non est, De Anirna, 7; De Carne Chr., 11. Quis enim negaverit, deum corpus esse, etsi 
 deus spiritus est? spiriius enim corpus sui generis in sua effigie. Adv. Prax., 1). The soul 
 has the same form as the body, and is delicate, luminous and aeriform in substance. If it 
 were not material, it could not be acted upon by the body, nor would it be capable of 
 sufiering, and its existence in the bod}- would not depend on the nourishing of the latter 
 {De Anima, 6 seq.). The soul of the child comes from the semen of the father, hke a shoot 
 (tradux) from the parent-stock of a plant, and it afterwards increases gradually in sense 
 and understanding (De Anima, 9). Every human soul is a branch (surculu^'i) of Adam's 
 soul. With the soul the spiritual qualities of the parents are transmitted to the children ; 
 hence the universal sinfulness of the children of Adam {tradux animae tradux peccati). But 
 together with this inherited sin, a remnant of goodness or of the divine image remains in 
 us {quod a deo est, non tarn extinguitur, quam obumbratur), so that sin becomes in us our 
 own free work. The soul is naturally drawn toward Christianity {a7iima naturaliter Chris- 
 tiana, De Testim. An. 1 seq. ; Apohg., 1 7), as is seen in the fact that the simplest and most 
 natural manifestations of the religious consciousness among polytheists manifest an invol- 
 untary tendency to return to the original monotheistic belief of humanity. 
 
 Just as the sim is not known by us in its real substance as it exists in the heavens, but 
 only in its rays which are shed upon the earth, so God is never revealed to man in the full- 
 ness of his majesty, but only according to our human faculties of comprehension, as a 
 human God, who has revealed himself in his Son {Adv. Prax., 14). Since God is the 
 greatest of beings, he can be only one {Adv. Marc, I. 3, 5). He is eternal and unchange- 
 able, free, subject to no necessity; his nature is reason, which is one with his goodness. 
 Even anger and hate may be predicated of God ; with his goodness is joined the attribute 
 of justice {Ado. Marc, I. 23 seq. ; II. 6 seq.). So soon as God found Wisdom to be neces- 
 sary for the work of the creation of the world, ho conceived it in himself and begot it, a 
 spiritual substance, bearing the characters of the revealing Word, the all-disposing reason 
 and the all-executing power. On account of tho oneness of this substance with the substance 
 of God, it also is called God. It came forth from God, just as the ray breaks forth out of 
 the sun ; God is in it, as the sun is in the ray, the substance in each case being only 
 extended, but not separated. Spirit came from spirit, God from God, light from light, with- 
 out the source of existence being in either case thereby diminished. The Father is the 
 whole substance of tho Godhead, while the Son is a derivative from and a part of that 
 substance, as he himself confesses, saying : " The Father is greater than I " {Adv. Ilermog., 
 18; Apol., 21, Adv. Praxeam, 9). Reason always existed in God, but there was a time 
 when the Son did not exist. The Son first came into existence when and because the 
 Father had need of him as an instrument for the creation of the world, and so carised th« 
 20
 
 306 M0NAKCHIANI8M, ARIANISM, AND ATHANASIANISM. 
 
 Son to come forth from himself as the second person in the Godhead (Adv. Prax., 14 ; Adv. 
 Hermog., 3). But time, in the proper sense of tlie term, first began with the existence of 
 the world; the Goodness, which made time, was, before the existence of time, without 
 time {Adv. Marc, II. 3). Like the Son, so also the Holy Ghost came forth from the divine 
 substance {Adv. Prax., 26). The third to Father and Son is the Spirit, just as the third to 
 root and branch is the fruit of the branch, the third to source and stream is the mouth of 
 the stream, the third to sun and ray is the extremity of the ray. Thus the Trinity is not in 
 contradiction with the divine monarchy, and is in accordance with the economy of the uni- 
 verse {Adv. Prax., 8). The world was created out of nothing, and not out of a material 
 substance, which had eternally pre-existed, nor was it created from eternity. God was God 
 before the creation of the world; but it is only since the creation that lie has become 
 Lord. The former title is the name of the substance of God, the latter designates his 
 power {Adv. Hermog., 3 seq.). Man was created after the image of God; God, in the 
 formation of the first man, being guided by the model of the man Christ who was to come 
 {De Resurr., 6). The gods of the heathen are fallen angels, who allowed their love for 
 mortal women to lead them away from God {De Cultu Femin., I. 2). 
 
 Justice was originally an undeveloped " Nature," which feared God. Through the Law 
 and the Prophets it attained next to childhood (j'et only among the Jews, since God was 
 not among the heathen ; the heathen stood without, like the drop on the bucket ; they are 
 the dust on the threshing-floor). Through the Gospel it grew into the strength of youth. 
 Through the new (Montanistic) prophecy, which demands perfect sanctification, it is 
 developed into the maturity of manhood [De Virginibus Velandis, 1). The souls of the dead 
 await in Hades the resurrection and the judgment. A blessed lot is in store for the right- 
 eous ; all deformity, natural or acquired, will be removed, and the female sex will be con- 
 verted into the male {De Resurr., 57 ; De Cultu Fern., I. 2). 
 
 Tertullian deserves especial remembrance on account of his energetic defense of relig- 
 ious freedom. The choice of one's religion is, he says, the right of every individual. It 
 is not religious to seek to force men into religion {Humani juris et naturalis potestatis est 
 unicuique quod putaveril colere. Nee alii obesi autjirodesi alter ius religio. Sed nee religionis 
 est cogere religionem, quae sponte suscipi debeat, non vi, qutim et hostiae ah animo libenti expos- 
 tulentur. Ita etsi nos compuleritis ad sacrificandum, nihil praestabitis diis vest/ris, Ad Scap., 2. 
 Colat alius Deum, alius Jovem, alius ad Coelum supplices manus tendat, alius ad aram Fidei, 
 alius, si hoc putatis, Nubes numeret orans, alius Lacunaria, alius suam animam Deo suo voveat, 
 alius hirci. Videie enim, ne et hoc ad irreligiositatis elogium concurrat, adimere libertaiem 
 religionis et inter dicer e optionem divinitatis, ut non liceat mihi colere quern velim, sed cogar 
 colere quern nolim. Nemo se ah invito coli volet, ne homo quidem, Ajwl., ch. 24). Yet it may 
 be doubted, whether Tertullian would have conceded the same religious liberty to heathens 
 and heretics, if the Christians had been in the majority and in possession of the civil 
 power ; the unmistakable satisfaction with which he speaks of the future torments of the 
 enemies of Christ {De Spectac., 30, 61-62 ; Conf. Apol, 49, 295), hardly permits us to 
 suppose it. 
 
 § 82. The moral reaction excited by the Antinomianism of the 
 Gnostics led to a legal conception of Christian ethics, investing the 
 latter with a character akin to, but not identical with, Jewish legal- 
 ism. The leaders in this reaction defined Christianity as the new law 
 of Jesus Christ, and in the persons of Tertullian and the Montanists 
 overstepped the limit of doctrine prescribed by the Churcli. In like 
 
 Jl
 
 MONABCHIANISM, ARIANISM, AND ATHANA8IANISM. 307 
 
 manner the speculative reaction against Gnostic polytheism (and Do- 
 cetism), and especially against the doctrine that the supreme God was 
 not identical with the Creator of the world, led to the placing of 
 renewed emphasis on the doctrine of monotheism. The result of 
 this was not a simple return to the monotheism of the Jewish reli- 
 gion, but a return to a form of monotheism nearly allied to Judaism, 
 and in Monarchianism the leaders in this reaction went beyond the 
 trinitarian middle-ground chosen by the Church. Monarchianism is 
 the doctrine of the unity of God, excluding the doctrine of the 
 Trinity, or the doctrine that the Father, as One divine person, is 
 alone Lord of all, and that the Logos and Holy Ghost have no sepa- 
 rate, personal existence. Monarchianism is Modalisra, in so far as 
 the Logos and the Holy Spirit are viewed by it as modes of the exist- 
 ence or essence of God, or even merely as modes in which he reveals 
 himself. Monarchianism was taught variously in the form of a modi- 
 fied Ebionitism, of Patripassianism, and of a doctrine mediating be- 
 tween these two. The earlier Church Fathers, in whose teachings 
 the dogma of the Trinity had not attained to that distinct form to 
 which it was afterward developed in the Church, leaned, so far as 
 they avoided Monarchianism, almost without exception to a form of 
 that doctrine which asserted the subordination of the Son and the Holv 
 Ghost to the Father, and which afterward received its most distinct 
 expression in Arianism. The doctrine finally adopted by the Church, 
 and which is commonly named after Athanasius, agreed with Monar- 
 chianism in its opposition to the theory of subordination, and in its 
 doctrine of the identity in essence of the Father and the Logos and 
 the Spirit, while, in agreement with the theory of subordination,- it 
 affirmed the complete personal distinction of the three, and opposed 
 their reduction to mere attributes or even to mere forms of the revela- 
 tion of One divine person. 
 
 In regard to the nbandant literature of the subjects of this paragraph, it may sufiBce. in view of their 
 specifically theological character, to refer to Buch leading works as those of l?aur and Dorner, cited above 
 (p. 263), and to Sclileierinacher's treatise on Sabellianism, Werire, 1. 2, pp. 4S5-574, Miihler's Athanasius, 
 Mayeuce, 1827, and Heinr. Voigt, Die Lekre dea Athanasitis vo7i AlexandrUn, Bremen, 1S61. 
 
 In so far as the development of the doctrines of the unity and trinity of God was 
 founded on the biblical passages which relate to the Father, to Christ, and to the Holy 
 Ghost, it belongs only to positive theology to treat of it; but in so far as it was founded 
 on speculative grounds, it belongs at once to the history of theological dogmas and to the 
 history of Christian philosophy. In this place a summary exposition will sufiBce, all the 
 more, owing to the minute and exhaustive treatment which this controverted subject 
 usually and of necessity receives in works on dogmatic history.
 
 308 MONAKCHIANISM, ARIANI3M, AND ATHANASIANI3M. 
 
 One fraction of the Moaarchians, the followers of Artemon, asserted that until the time 
 of Victor, Bishop of Rome, their doctrine was the reigning one in the Roman Church, and 
 that it was first proscribed by Victor's successor, Zephyrinus (after A. D. 200). This may 
 be an exaggerated statement, rendered possible only by the indetiniteness of the earliest 
 formulas of Christian doctrine ; yet that Monarchianism, connected with a legalistic 
 theory of morals, was in the earlier times of Christianity in fact widely extended, is evi- 
 dent from numerous writings that have been traced back to the Apostolic Fathers, and 
 especially from the, for a long time, highly esteemed work, the "Shepherd of Hermas," 
 aud also from the testimony of an opponent of Monarchianism, namely, Tertullian (Adv. 
 Fraxeam, ch. 3 : simplices quique, ne dixerim imprudentea et idiotae, quae major semper cre- 
 dentium pars est, quoniam et ipsa regulafidei apluribus diis saeculi ad unicwn et verum Beum 
 transfert, non intelligentes unicwn quidem, sed cum sua otKovo/j.ia esse a-edendum, expavescunt 
 ad OLKOvofiiav. Numerum, et dispositianeni trinitatis divisionem praesumunt unitatis, quando 
 unitas ex semet ipsa derivans trinitatem non destruatur ab ilia, sed admiiiiitretur. Itaque duxyis 
 et ires jam jactitavt a nobis praedicari ; se vera unius Dei cultores praesumunt, quasi non et 
 unitas irrationaliter collecta haeresim faciat, et trinitas rationaliter expensa veritatem constituat). 
 
 Theodotus of Byzantium and Artemon are representatives of that form of Monarch- 
 ianism which was nearly allied to deism, or rather to the doctrine of the Ebionites, which 
 was founded on the revelation of the Old Testament, and also to the synoptic form of doc- 
 trine. Theodotus taught that Jesus was born of the Virgin according to the will of the 
 Father, and that at his baptism the higher Christ descended upon him. But this higher 
 Christ Theodotus conceived as the Son of Him who was at once the supreme God and the 
 Creator of the world, and not (with Cerinthus and other Gnostics) as the son of a deity 
 superior to the God of the Jews. Artemon supposed a special influence to have been 
 exerted by the supreme God on Jesus, whereby he was distinguished from all other men 
 and made the Son of God. In the teachings of these Monarchianists the Logos-conception 
 is not found. 
 
 Noetus of Smyrna taught (according to HippoL, Fhilos., IX. 7 seq.) that the one God, 
 who created the world, though in himself invisible, had yet from most ancient times ap- 
 peared from time to time, according to his good pleasure, to righteous men, and that this 
 same God had himself become also the Son, when it pleased him to submit to being born ; he 
 was consequently his own son, and in this identity of the Father and the Son consisted the 
 " monarcJiia " of God. (Hippolytus compares this doctrine with the Heraclitean doctrine 
 of the identity of contraries, expressing his belief that the former arose from the latter.) 
 An associate and disciple of Noetus was Epigonus, who brought the doctrine he professed 
 to Rome ; and his pupd, again, was Cleomenes, who defended the doctrine of Noetus in the 
 time of Bishop Zephyrinus, the successor of Victor. With this Cleomenes, according to 
 Hippolytus, Callistus, the successor of Zephyrinus, was on terms of friendship, and was 
 of like opinion (teaching: rbv Aoyov ambv elvai vlov, avrov koI -ira-epa, bvofiaai fih (6vac) 
 KuXov/iEvov, ev 6e bv, to xvevfia adiaiperov). The one person is indeed nominally, but not 
 in essence, divided {ev tovto npoauirov bvofiari fiiv fiepi^ofievov, ovaia 6' oh). Father and 
 Son are not two Gods, but one ; the Father as such did not suffer, but he " suffered with " 
 the Son {Philos., IX. 12: rbv Trarepa avfiTrewovdivai tQ vIoj, oh . . . Kenovdevai). 
 
 The Monarchian, Praxeas, who taught at Rome in the time of Victor, and against 
 whom Tertullian wrote a polemical work, appears to have adopted the opinions of Noetus 
 and to have taught that the Father descended into the Virgin. He distinguishes the 
 divine and human in Christ as spirit and flesh ; but by the flesh he understands human 
 nature entire. Christ, he says, suffered, as man ; to the Father, or God in him, Praxeas 
 ascribed a co-passion {compati).
 
 MONAKCHIAIflSM. ARIANI8M, AJSTD ATHANASIAI^ISM. 309 
 
 The doctriue of Sabelliiis may be looked upon as a return from the Patripassian form of 
 Monarchianism to the earUer form, coupled with the adoption of the Logos-conception and 
 such modification of the latter as the case required. Sabellius of Libya was Presbj'ter of 
 Ptolemais, in the African Pentapolis, and lived at Rome under Zephyrinus. He is one of 
 the most important representatives of Monarchianism, which is often called after his name 
 (Sabellianism). He discriminated (according to Athanas., Contra Arianos, IV. ; Epiphan., 
 Haer., 62 ; Basilius, Epist; Hippol., Phihs., IX. ]1 seq.) between the Monas and the Trias, 
 and taught: f) /lovaq KAnrvvQelaa yeyove Tpidq {ap. Athanas., Oral., IV., Contra Avian., § 13). 
 From this it might appear as if the Monas were related to Father, Son, and Spirit, as 
 the common foundation of all three, and as if the latter were the three forms in which it 
 was revealed, namely, as the Father, before the time of Christ, in the creation of the 
 world and the giving of the law (or in the general relation of the Monas to the world); 
 secondly, as Christ; and lastly, as the Spirit in the Church. This is the interpretation 
 given by Schleiermacher iu his essay on Sabellius (1822; Werke, Vol.1. 2, pp. 485-574), and 
 with him many of the more recent investigators, and also Baur, substantially, have agreed. 
 But with the expression cited is joined the following {ibid., § 25) : 6 -aryp 6 avrdg ntv ten, 
 nTiarvvETnc 6t: elg vlbv Kal Tvvevfia, which places it beyond doubt, that by the Monas, which 
 is expanded into Son and Spirit, the Father himself was meant, and that therefore the doc- 
 trine of Sabellius is distinguished from the (Philonic and) Johannean. according to which 
 the Father is the absolute God and the Logos is the revealing principle, only by its non- 
 recognition of the proper personality of the Logos (and by the greater prominence given in 
 it to the doctrine of the Holy Ghost — which indeed was somewhat inconsequent, since it 
 would have been more natural that the Holy Ghost should have been regarded by Sabel- 
 lius rather as an attribute of the Logos), and not by its causing God to recede (like the 
 other persons of the Godhead) into a secondary position with reference to the Monas. 
 How little is proved by the expression, /; fiova^ nAaTtn'Oelaa ysyove rpiac, against the iden- 
 tity of the Monas with the Father, is obvious from the perfectly analogous expression 
 employed by Tertullian in his own name : unitas ex semet ipsa derivans iriniiaiem, while yet 
 there can be no doubt that Tertullian himself regarded the Father as absolutely first and 
 original, and conceived the Son and Spirit as derived from him. The Logos came forth 
 from God for the creation of the world, and especially for the creation of man (iva yfielq 
 KTiadiifiev, TzpofiWev 6 Tioyoq). The Logos is the divine reason, not a second person, but a 
 faculty of God ; as a person (or an hypostasis) the Logos appeared first in Christ. The 
 Logos is not subordinate to God the Father, but is identical with God's essence; but its 
 hypostatic existence in Christ was transitory. As the sun receives back into itself the ray 
 which went forth from it, so the divine Logos, after its hypostatization in Christ, returned 
 again to the Father or Monas. Cf. Voigt, Athan., pp. 249, 265 seq. 
 
 The (Sabellian) idea that the Logos, although existing before its manifestation in Christ, 
 was not previous to that event a distinct person, having a distinct essence, but was only 
 immanent in the essence of God the Fatlier, was expressed by Beryllus, Bishop of Bostra 
 in Arabia (according to Euseb., Hi^st. Eccl, VI. 33) in the fornuila: Christ, previously to his 
 life upon earth, did not possess a distinct personal existence (kut' i6iav ovaiag -KeptypaQir/v), 
 and his divinity was not originally his own, but only the divinity of the Father dwelling in 
 him {firi^E deoTijTa \6iav ex^iv, dAA' e/nroXirevo/iivr^ aiiru [j.6vi}v t?/v TvaTpiKr/v). (Yet it has 
 been attempted, though incorrectly, to find in the histori&il data concerning Beryllus' doc- 
 trine a proof that the latter agreed with the doctrine of Noctus.) Beryllus was brought 
 over by Origencs (who, however, ascribed personal pre-existence to all men, and hence, 
 in logical consistency, naturally ascribed the same to the spirit of Christ) to the doctrine 
 of the Church, that the Logos, as a person distinct from God the Father, existed before
 
 310 MONAECHIANISM, ARIANISM, AND ATHANASIANI8M. 
 
 the incarnation. Cf. Ullmann, De Beryllo Bostreno, Hamb. 1835, and Heinr. Otto Friedr. 
 Fock, Die Christologie des Beryll von Bostra, in Niedner'a Zdtschrift fur histor, TheoL, Leipa. 
 1846, pp. 376-394. 
 
 The consequences of Sabellianism for the doctrine of the person of Christ were drawn 
 especially by Paul of Samosata. If the Logos is not a second person, but only the rational 
 energy of God, then Jesus (as also each of the prophets who were filled with the Holy 
 Ghost) must have been a distinct person from God and a man. "While, therefore, the 
 Logos, as the rational energy of God, is not subordinated to God, but is, rather, identical 
 with him, Christ, as a person, must stand in the relation of subordination to God the 
 Father. Jesus, according to Paul of Samosata, was, although begotten in a supernatural 
 manner, yet in himself only a man, but he became the Son of God and became God by his 
 moral perfection (redeoTroiTjTai). The reason or rational energy of God dwelt indeed in him, 
 yet not by means of a substantial union of the God and the man in him, but through the 
 exertion of a divine influence, by which his human powers of understanding and will were 
 increased. Paul of Samosata disputed (according to Athanas., De Sy7i., ch. 51) the theory 
 of the Jiomousia, or consubstantiality of two divine persons, the Father and the Son ; if this 
 theory were true, he argued, the ovaia, or substance common to both, would necessarily rank 
 as the first and absolute existence, while the two persons would be related to each other, 
 not as father and son, but as two brothers or as common sons of the original ovoia. That 
 the doctrine here controverted by Paulus is identical in substance with that defended by 
 Sabellius (as Baur argues), the Monas of Sabellius bearing the same relation to the persons 
 of the Godhead as does the ohcia in the above representation, is an incorrect assumption, 
 as shown by the account already given of the doctrine of Sabellius. The arguments of the 
 Samosatan are directed rather against the doctrine adopted by the Church, from which he 
 draws the above consequence, by whose acknowledged absurdity he seeks to overthrow 
 the postulate from which it is derived. (And in fact the Synod at Antioch, in the year 
 269, which maintained the distinction of persons and the identity of Christ with the second 
 person of the Godhead, rejected the term dfioovacoc, in order to escape the consequence 
 indicated by Paulus and finally adopted by Synesius). 
 
 The subject of Arianism, which teaches that the second person of the Godhead is subor- 
 dinate to the Father and that there was a time when this person was not existing, as also of 
 the conclusion of the controversy concerning these points by the triumph of the Athanasian 
 doctrine of the equality in essence (homousia) of the three persons of the Godhead, and of 
 the further development of doctrine which took place within the bosom of the Church, may 
 here be omitted, as topics belonging to ecclesiastical and dogmatic history, it being sufiicient 
 for our purpose thus to have called attention to the dogmatic basis of the next succeeding 
 stadium of philosophical speculation. The motives which led to the triumph of Atha- 
 nasianism were not so much of a scientific as of a specifically religious and ecclesiastical 
 nature. A laudatory accoimt of the life and doctrine of Athanasius has been written, from 
 the Catholic stand-point, by J. A. Mohler (Mayence, 1827); H. Voigt (Bremen, 1861) treats 
 of the same subject from the stand-point of Orthodox Protestantism. Whatever judgment, 
 for the rest, may be passed on Athanasius (296-373), whether the dogma which he suc- 
 cessfully advocated be thought to mark a real advance toward a purer expression of the 
 idea of God and man as united in one, or whether there be found in it a concealed tri- 
 theism, which afterward Augustine and others again modified so as to make it more con- 
 sonant with the monotheistic idea, the historic fact must in any case be acknowledged, 
 that the Athanasian form of the doctrine in question, not only in respect of terminology, 
 but also in respect of conception and application, was not known in the Christian Churcli 
 from the beginning, but marks, on the contrary, a lafter stadium in the development of
 
 CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA, AND OEIGEN. 311 
 
 Christian thought. In the view of the earlier Christians, who taught that the world was 
 created or formed in time, the Logos was a being who came forth from God for the pur- 
 pose of that formation or creation. Origen's doctrine of the eternal creation of the world 
 attributed also to the Logos an eternal personal existence, which was likewise in harmonj 
 with Origen's doctrine of the pre-existence of human souls. Later orthodoxy let fall the 
 preexistence of souls and the eternity of the creation of the world, but held fast to the 
 doctrine of the eternal existence of the Logos as a second person, begotten of God the 
 Father, whereby its rank was so much elevated that it was but a short advance to the 
 formula of homousia. The Holy Ghost, finally, which originally was only the spirit of 
 God itself, was now, with a species of logical consistency, placed as a third person in the 
 same rank with the first and second persons. That the nature of the religious conscious- 
 ness of man renders these hypostatizations necessary, and that the denial of them must 
 lead to an unreligious pantheistic speculation, or else to abstract deism, can hardly be 
 asserted with justice. The biblical conception of man's religious consciousness includes 
 the possibility of the inspiration of man by the Spirit of God, unassociated with adherence 
 to any fixed dogmas, and with this conception the Sabellian doctrine (to which, rather 
 than to the Athanasian, Schleiermacher, on good religious grounds, gave the preference) 
 would seem more nearly accordant than that which finally prevailed in the Church. Faith 
 in development and in historical progress degenerates into unphilosophical superstition 
 when might and success are made the criteria of right and truth. 
 
 § 83. The reaction against Gnosticism was accompanied by an 
 attempt on the part of some of the teachers of the Church to assimi- 
 late the legitimate elements of Gnosticism to the doctrine of the 
 Church. In particular. Clement of Alexandria and Origenes, who 
 were teachers in the school for catechists at Alexandria, mav be re- 
 garded as representatives of a class of Gnostics, who strove to remain 
 free from all heretical tendencies and to maintain an entire agreement 
 with the universal (catholic) faith of the Church, and who, in the gen- 
 eral character of their teachings, though not in every separate point of 
 doctrine, were successful in this attempt. This party were well dis- 
 posed toward Hellenic science, and in particular toward Hellenic 
 philosophy, which they sought to bring into the service of Christian 
 theology. Philosophy, teaches Clement — applying to Paganism the 
 same method of historical and philosophical judgment which Irenaeus 
 and TcrtuUian employed with reference to primitive times and with 
 reference to Judaism and Christianity — philosophy served among the 
 Hellenes the same end which the law served among the Jews. — it 
 educated them for Christianity ; and for those wliose faith depends on 
 scientific demonstration it must still serve as a discipline preparatory 
 for the Christian doctrine. Clement and Origen seek, by means of an 
 allegorical interpretation of the Old Testament Scriptures, to prove 
 the oneness of Judaism and Christianity. Christianity, they say, is
 
 312 CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA, AND OKIGEN, 
 
 Judaism unveiled ; in the former the revelation of God has become 
 more perfect. The Gnosis of the heretics is at fault in not recog- 
 nizing the identity of the Creator and Lawgiver of the world witli 
 the Father of Jesus Christ, and in despising the world and denying 
 the freedom of the will. — In their Christology, Clement and Origen 
 lean toward a form of the doctrine of subordination, which recognizes 
 only in God the Father the absolute and eternal being, conceives the 
 Son and the Spirit as persons in the full sense of the word, and repre- 
 sents them as having come forth from the Father from eternity 
 according to the will of the Father, and as not equal with the Father. 
 The creation of the world is viewed by Clement and Origen as an act 
 of God, accomplished not in time, but from eternity. To the human 
 soul Origen (with Plato) ascribes pre-existence before the body, into 
 which latter it descended in consequence of some moral delinquency. 
 The soul is endowed with free will. It is on the freedom of the will 
 that the distinction between good and bad, virtue and vice, reposes; 
 in its full recognition of human freedom lies the peculiar ethical 
 character of Christianity, as opposed to Paganism. Active obedience 
 to the divine commands is the condition of salvation. It was in 
 virtue of his freedom that the divine and human were united in 
 Christ. In the person of Christ the divine and human interpenetrate 
 each other, as when iron is heated through by fire. Christ's redemp- 
 tive act was a contest against demoniac powers ; every Christian 
 who denies the world and obeys God's commandments takes part 
 in this contest. The end of all things will come when the punish- 
 ment of transgressions shall have been accomplished, and will consist 
 in the restoration {Apokatastasis) of all men to their original good- 
 ness and blessedness, in order that God may be all in all. 
 
 Ou the question whether and to what extent the theology of the Church Fathers in general, and that 
 •f the Alexandrians in particular, was affected by the philosophy of Plato and the Neo-Platonists, treat 
 Souverain ( ie Platonisme devoile ou essai tcruchant le verbe Platonicien, Cologne [Amsterdam], 1700 ; 
 German translation by Luffler, Ziillichau, 1T92), Franciscus Baltus (Deftvse d&t SS. Peres accuses de 
 Platoiii^me, Paris, 1711), Moslieim {De turhaUi j^er recentiores Platonicos ecciesia, first published In 1725. 
 and reprinted in connection with his translation of Cudworth's Systema Iniellectuale, Leyden, 1773). Keil 
 {De catisis ulieiii Platonicorum, recentiorum, a relig. Christiana anirni, 1785, and in his '• Programms" 
 De doetorihus veUris ecclesiae culpa corruptae per Platoiiicas sententias theologiae Wierandis, 1793, 
 reprinted in Keil's Optisc. Acad., ed. Goldhorn, sectio posterior, Leipsic, 1S21, pp. 8S9-85S), Oolrichs {De 
 docitina Platotiis de Deo a Chriatianis et rec. Platonicis varie erpl. et corrupta, Marburg, 17SS), Dahne 
 (De yvuMTti, Clemeniis Alexnndrini et de veMigiis neoplatonicne philosophiae in €a ofri^Ji*. Leipsic, 1831), 
 Alb. Jahn {Dimerf. Platonica. Bern, 1839), Baum-arten-Crusius {Lehrbiich der Dogmengesch., 1. 67 seq.), 
 Heinrich v. Stein {Der Streit iiber den angebl. Platonismus der Kirchenvdter, in Niedner's Zeitschr./.hist. 
 Th., 1861, No. 3, pp. 319-419, and in the second part of his Gesch. des PJatonismus, Gottingen, 1864). In 
 relation to this question may also be compared various essays and articles, such as Clausen's {Ajwlogeta*
 
 CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA, AND ORIGEN. 313 
 
 «ceU»iae Ohr. ante- Tlieodoaiani Platonis ejuoque philosophiae arbitri, 1818), Ehler's and others" (see 
 above, §41, p. 117). 
 
 Of the Alexandrian School for Catechists, treat Guericke (Halle, 1824-25), and C. F. W. ilasselbach {De 
 »chola,qua4 Aleocandriae Jlornit, catec/ietica, Stettin, 1S26, and De Ctitec/iumenorum (n-dinihus, ibid., 
 1839) ; cf. Dauaigarten-Crusius {bognifnyesch., \. p. 126), Schnilzer ( Origenes p. V.), Eedepenuing {(Jrigents, 
 I. p. 5T aeq), and also Matter, in his IlUt. de Vecote d'' Alexandrie, Pans, 1840, and J. Simon, Hist, de tioole 
 d^ Alexandrie, Paris, 1845. 
 
 The works of Clement of Alexandria have been edited by P. Victorias (Florence, 1560), Fried. Sylburg 
 (Heidelberg, 1592), Potter (Oxford, 1715), Frid. Oberthir (Herblpoli, 1780), Reinhold Klotz (in BiblioVieca. 
 tacra pdtrum ecclesiae Graecorum, Part III., Leipsic, 1831-34); in Migne's Curxus they form Vols. VIII. 
 and IX. of the Greek Fathers. Of Clement treat Munscher (see above, under Tertullian), P. Hofstede de 
 Groot, DUp. de CUmente Alex, philosopho christiano, Groningen, 1826, Dahne, De yvuiirei dementis AUoe., 
 (see above), Lepsius, " On the npuira ixTotx^la in Clemens Alex.", in the lihein. Mm., 1836, p|). 142-148, 
 Eeinkens, Z>« Clemente presbytero alexcnidrino, Jumiine, scriptore, philosopho, theoloffo libero, Breslau, 
 1851, Herm. Keuter, Clem. Alex, theol. moralis capita selecta, comm. acad., Berlin, 1353, II. Lammer, 
 C2em. Alex. deXoyif doctrina, Leipsic, 1855, Hebert-Duperron, Essai sur la polemiqve et la philos. de 
 Clement d^ AlexandHe, 1855, J. Cognat, Clement d' Alexandrie, sa doctrine et .\a px/Umiqve, Paris, 1858, 
 H. Schurmann, Die helleniitche Bildnng UTid ihr Verhliltniss sur christlichen nach der Darstellvng des 
 Clem. V. Alex. (G.-Pr.), Miinster, 1859, Freppel, Clement d'Alexandrie, Paris, 1866; cf. also, particularly, 
 Baur, In his Christliche Gnosis, pp. 502-540, and W. Mciller, iu the work above cited (Eoamologie der 
 griechischen Kirche), pp. 506-535. 
 
 Of the works of Origen, the Latin texts were edited by J. Merlin (1st edition, Paris, 1512-19); the 
 work Adversus Cel^um appeared in print first at Rome, a. d. 1481, in the Latin translation of ChristophoruB 
 Persona, and was first edited in Greek by David Hoschel (Augsburg, 1605), and afterward by W. 
 Spencer (Cambridge, 1058; 2d edition, 1677); his Commentaries, iu Greek, on a part of the Bible were 
 edited and published, together with introductory essays by Huetius (Rouen, 1668, Paris, 1679, etc.); his 
 complete works have been published by C. and C. V. Delarue (Paris, 17-33-59), Oberthiir (15 vols., TViirz- 
 burg, 1780-94), and by C. H. E. Lommatzsch (Berlin, 1831-47). The work wept apxi^v has been separately 
 published by Redepenning (Leipsic, 1886). In Migne's Cvrsus the works of Origen fill Vols. XI.-XVII. 
 Of Origen treat, among others, Schnitzer {Origem.es ilber die Gmndlehren der Glaubenswissenschoft, 
 Stuttgart, 1S36), G. Thomasius (Origenes, Nuremberg, 1837), Redepenning {Origenes, eine Darsiellung 
 seines Lebens mul seiner Lehre, Bonn, 1841-46), Kriiger (on Origen's relation to Ammonius Saccas, in 
 Illgen's Zeitschr., 1843, I. pp. 46 seq.), Fischer [Commentatio de Origenis theologia et cosmologia. Halle, 
 1846), Ramers {Des Ori^. Lehre von der Auferstehung des Fleisches, Trier, 1851), Fermand {Exposition 
 crit. des opinions d^Origene sur la natare et Vorigine du peche, Strasburg, 1861); cf Baur and Corner, 
 Ritter, Neander, Mohlcr, and Bohringer, in their works before cited, Kahnis, Die Lehre vom, heil. Geisi., 
 Vol. I., 1847, pp. 331 seq.. and W. MOllcr, Kosmol., etc. (see above), pp. 536-5G0. 
 
 On Celsns cotnpare F. A. Philippi, De Celsi adversarii Christianorum pihilosophandi genere, Berlin, 
 1836, 0. W. J. Bindemann, Ueber C. u. s. Schrift gegen die Christen, in the Zeitschr i/t fUr histor. Theol., 
 1842, G. Baumgarten-Crusius, De scriptoribus saeculi, p. Chr. II., qui novam, relig. impugnarunt, 
 Misenae, 1845. 
 
 The old controversy respecting the "Platonism of the Church Fathers" is to-day not 
 yet in every respect ended. That these Fathers submitted in a measure to the influence 
 of the philosophy of Plato is unquestioned; but it is susceptible of dispute how far this 
 influence extended, and whether it v/as direct or indirect. That certain of the Church 
 Fathers occupied themselves as scholars with the works of Plato could scarcely account for 
 the exertion of more than a secondary influence on the development of Christian dogmas 
 and Christian pliilosophy — an influence which has often been over-rated. Of much greater 
 consequence was the indirect influence which Platonism (and Stoicism), in their Jewish- 
 Alexandrian form and in their combination and blending with Jewish religious ideas, exerted 
 in shaping the doctrine contained in the New Testament writings of Paul and in the fo\irth 
 Gospel, and so, in consequence of the canonical importance of these writings, in determin- 
 ing Uie creed of all Christendom. Subsequently, the ideas thus introduced into Chris- 
 tianity, having become common Christian property, served as points of union and departure 
 for further studies.
 
 314 CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA, AND OEIGEN. 
 
 "Alexandria, the original home of Gnosis, is also the birth-place of Christian theology, 
 which, in its first form, itself aimed to be nothing else than a Christian Gnosis " (Baur, Ch?: 
 de)- drei ersten Jahrh., 2d ed., p. 248). The Catechists' School at Alexandria may have been 
 founded at a comparatively early date, upon the model of the schools for Hellenic culture, 
 after that, as an ancient tradition has it, the Evangelist Mark had there proclaimed the 
 message of Christ. Athenagoras is said to have taught in this school (see above). In 180 
 A. D. it was under the direction of Pantajnus, who, before his conversion to Christianity, 
 had been a Stoic. "With him (from 189 on) and after him his pupil Titus Flavius Clemens, 
 the Alexandrian, taught there ; several of his works have come down to us, in par- 
 ticular the Aoyog -irpo-pEnTiKoq irpoq ""ElATjvaq, in which he argues against Paganism, from 
 the absurdities and scandals of the heathen mythology and mysteries, and admonishes 
 his readers to come to Christ, and become obedient to the one God and the one Logos of 
 God I further, the Faedagogus, containing rules of Christian ethics, and the arpufxara or 
 aTpofj-aTEig in eiglit books, in which Clement expounds the substance of Christian faith in 
 its relation to the doctrines of Greek philosophers and of Christian heretics, and seeks to 
 guide his readers from faith to knowledge, to the true Gnosis ; but proceeds (as he himself 
 acknowledges and as he indicates by his title, which characterizes the work to which it ia 
 prefixed by comparing it to a carpet of various color.s), not with systematic order and con- 
 nection, but aphoristioally ; there is, besides, a shorter work by him under the title: Tig 6 
 au^ofiEvog nlovaiog ; Several other writings are mentioned by Eusebius, Hist. Ecci, VI. 13. 
 
 Clement adopts the view of Justin, that to Christianity, as the whole truth, the con- 
 ceptions of ante-Christian times are opposed, not as mere errors, but as partial truths. Tlie 
 divine Logos, which is everywhere poured out, like the light of the sun {Stro7yi., V. 3), 
 enlightened the souls of men from the beginning. It instructed the Jews through Moses 
 and the prophets {Faed., I. 7). Among the Greeks, on the contrary, it called forth wise 
 men and gave them, through the mediation of the lower angels, whom the Logos had 
 appointed to be shepherds of the nations [Strain., VII. 2), philosophy as a guide to 
 righteousness (Strom., I. 5 ; VI. 5). Like Justin, Clement maintains that the philoso- 
 phers took much of their doctrine secretly from the Orientals, and, in particular, from 
 the religious books of the Jews, which doctrine they then, from desire of renown, falsely 
 proclaimed as the result of their own independent investigations, besides falsifying and 
 corrupting it [Strom., I. 1, 17; Faed., II. 1, etc.). Yet some things pertaining to true 
 doctrine were really discovered by the Greek philosophers, by the aid of the seed of the 
 divine Logos implanted in them [Cohort., VI. 59). Plato was the best of the Greek phi- 
 losophers (o Tvdvra upiarog II?Atg)v, . . . olov 6£0(}>opovfiEvog, Faed., III. 11; Strom., V. 8). 
 The Christian must choose out that which is true in the writings of the different phi- 
 losophers, i. e., whatever agrees with Christianity [Strom., I. 7 ; VI. 17). We need the aid 
 of philosophy in order to advance from faith [Triarig) to knowledge [yviJaic). The Gnostic is 
 to him who merely believes without knowing as the grown-up man to the child; having out- 
 grown the fear of the Old Testament, he has arrived at a higher stage in the divine plan for 
 man's education. Whoever will attain to Gnosis without philosophy, dialectic, and the study 
 of nature, is like him who expects to gather grapes without cultivating the grape-vine 
 [Strom., I. 9). But the criterium of true science must always be the harmony of the latter 
 with faith [Strom., II. 4: Kvptoj-epov ovv rf/g eTriarr/fing ri niarig Kai tariv avTtjg Kpirripiov). 
 The Gnostic must raise himself through the world of birth and sin to communion with God 
 [Strom., VI. 16). With Gnosis is inseparably joined love, which renders man perfect 
 [Strom., VII. 10). Clement regards a positive knowledge of God as impossible; we know 
 only what God is not. God is formless and nameless, although we rightly make use of tlie 
 best names in designating him ; he is infinite ; he is neither genus, nor diflerence, neither 
 
 I
 
 CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA, AND ORIGEN. 315 
 
 species, nor individual, neither number, nor accident, nor any tiling that can be predicated 
 of another thing {Strom., V. 11, 12). Only the Son, who is the power and wisdom of the 
 Father, is positively knowable {Strom., V. 1 seq.). In Clement's utterances concerning 
 the Son, the Philonic wavering between the theory of subordination and Modalism (see 
 above, p. 231) is not fully overcome. — The Holy Ghost occupies the third place in the divine 
 triad ; he is the energy of the Word, just as the blood is the energy of the flesh {Strom., 
 V. 14 ; Paed., II. 2). 
 
 Of the ethical precepts which Clement lays down in the Paedagogtis, those are pecu- 
 liarly worthy of notice which relate to marriage. In distinction from TertuUian and 
 others, who saw in marriage only a legalized satisfaction of an animal instinct and who 
 barely tolerated it, while affirming celibacy to be morally superior to it, Clement appeals in 
 favor of the opposite view to the example of several of the Apostles, such as Peter and 
 Philip, who were married ; he meets the argument drawn from the example of Christ by 
 saying that Christ's bride was the Church, and that he, as the Son of God, occupied an 
 altogether exceptional position, and argues that it is necessary to the perfection of man 
 that he should live in wedlock, beget children, and not allow himself by the cares which 
 they bring him to be drawn away from love to God, but endure and overcome the tempta- 
 tions arising from children, wife, domestics, and possessions {Strom., III. 1, 6; VII. 12). 
 As in marriage, so in the case of riches, every thing depends on a mind capable of preserv- 
 ing itself pure and faithful in every situation in life, independent of external goods, and 
 master of its own interior freedom (n'f 6 aui^ofzcvog ■rr?Mvaio^ ; see, especially, ch. 19). In 
 the case of martyrdom, again, the essential thing is not the act of confession and the suf- 
 fering, as such, but the constant and successful striving to purify one's self from sin and 
 to enddre readily all that the confession of Christianity may render necessary {Strom., IV. 
 chs. 9 and 10). 
 
 Origen (born A. D. 185, probably at Alexandria, died in 254, in the reign of Valerian) 
 was educated in his early youth by his father Leonidas, and afterward especially by 
 Clement of Alexandria. Familiar with the Scriptures from his youth, he also devoted 
 himself, as lie came to maturity, to the study of the works of the Greek philosophers, 
 especially to the works of Plato, Numenius, Moderatus, Nicomachus, and the Stoics 
 Chseremon, Cornutus, Apollophanes, and others ; he then attended, though, as it seems, 
 not till after his twenty-fifth year, the school of Ammonius Saccas, the founder of Neo- 
 Platonism (Porphyr., ap. Euseb., E. K, VI. 19). Origen taught in the School for Cate- 
 chists while yet very young, beginning when he was eighteen years old. Compelled in 
 the year 232 to quit Alexandria, he lived in his later years at Caesarea and Tyre. Of 
 his writings, which for the most part are explanatory of various parts of the Bible, the 
 TTEpl apx^v (concerning the fundamental doctrines) — in which he, first among all Christian 
 theologians, undertook to set forth the doctrines of the Christian faith in a systematic 
 connection, but which, with the exception of a few fragments preserved by Hieronymus, 
 has come down to us only in the Latin translation of Rufinus (or, rather, in the revision 
 of Rufinus, for Rufinus altered the original text, so as to soften down what was most 
 heterodox in it) — and the work Contra Celsum — a defence of Christian faith against tho 
 objections of a Platonist — are those which have special philosophical significance. 
 
 Before Origen there existed no system of Christian doctrine. The beginnings of a sys- 
 tematic presentation were contained in the Epistle of Paul to the Romans and in the Epistle 
 to the Hebrews. The necessity of reducing the teachings of the Bible and tho doctrines 
 developed in tho course of the controversies against heretics and non-Christians to a 
 systematic form, was first felt by the teachers at the School for Catechists, and they, in 
 going to work to meet this necessity, were guided by the baptismal confession and the 
 
 J
 
 316 CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA, AND OEIGEN. 
 
 Hegula Fidei. In the writings of Clement the subjects of his Gnosis are loosely combined, 
 the treatises disclose no plan followed in detail, they are only labors preparatory to a sys- 
 tem. Setting out with these materials, Origen laid the foundation of a well-ordered 
 system of Christian dogmas. Yet his order was not very exact. The gain of a systematic 
 doctrinal form was, however, not secured without substantial loss. The doctrines relating 
 to the pre-mundane existence of God being placed first, in the regular scholastic order, 
 concealed those living germs seated in man's religious feeling or contained in the history 
 of religion, which might otherwise have influenced beneficially the historical development 
 of Christian doctrine, and the doctrine of Soteriology was left comparatively undeveloped. 
 
 Origen says : " The Apostles taught only what was necessary ; many doctrines were not 
 announced by them with perfect distinctness ; they left the more precise determination and 
 demonstration of many dogmas to the disciples of science, who were to build up a scientific 
 system on the basis of the given articles of faith " {De Princ, Frae/., 3 seq.). The principle 
 that a systematic exposition should begin with the consideration of that which is naturally 
 first, is expressly enounced by Origen {Tom. in Joan., X. 178), where, in an allegorical inter- 
 pretation of the eating of the fishes, he says : in eating, one should begin with the head, i. e., 
 one should set out from the highest and most fundamental dogmas concerning the heavenly, 
 and should stop with the feet, i. e., should end with those doctrines which relate to that 
 realm of existence which is farthest removed from its heavenly source, whether it be to 
 that which is most material or to the subterranean, or to evil spirits and impure demons. 
 
 The order of presentation in the four books respecting fundamental doctrines is (ac- 
 cording to the outline given by Redepenning, Orig., II. 276) as follows: "At the com- 
 mencement is placed the doctrine of God, the eternal source of all existence, as point of 
 departure for an exposition in which the knowledge of the essence of God and of the 
 unfoldings of that essence leads on to the genesis of the eternal in the world, viz. : the 
 created spirits, whose fall first occasioned the creation of the coarser material world. This 
 material is without difficulty arranged around the ecclesiastical doctrines of the Father, 
 Son, and Spirit, of the creation, the angels, and the fall of man. All this is contained in 
 the first book of Origen's work on fundamental doctrines. In the second book we set foot 
 upon the earth as it now is ; we see it arising out of an ante-mundane though not abso- 
 lutely eternal matter, in time, in which it is to lead its changing existence until the restora- 
 tion and emancipation of the fallen spirits. Into this world comes the Son of God, sent by 
 the God of the Old Testament, who is no other than the Father of Jesus Christ ; we hear 
 of the incarnation of the Son, of the Holy Ghost as he goes forth from the Son to enter 
 into the hearts of men, of the psychical in man in distinction from the purely spiritual in 
 him, of the purification and restoration of the psychical man by judgment and punishment, 
 and of eternal salvation. In virtue of the inalienable freedom belonging to the spirit, it 
 fights its way upward in the face of the evil powers of the spiritual world and against 
 temptations from within, supported by Christ himself and by the means of grace, i. e., by all 
 the gifts and operations of the Holy Ghost. This freedom, and the process by which man 
 becomes free, are described in the third book. The fourth book is distinct from the rest 
 and independent, as containing the doctrine of the basis on which the doctrine of the pre- 
 ceding books rests, viz., the revelation made in Holy Scripture " (whereas later dogmatists 
 have been accustomed to place this doctrine before the other contents of their systems). 
 
 Of the special doctrines of Ojigen, the following are those most worthy of notice. In 
 opposition to the Gnostics, he, like Ircnajus and others, holds it to be apostolic doctrine 
 that God, who created the world out of nothing, is at once just and good, the author of the 
 Old and New Testaments, the giver of the law and the Father of Jesus Christ, who was 
 born of the Virgin through the influence of the Holy Ghost, and became man by his own
 
 CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA, AND OEIGEN. 317 
 
 voluntary self-humiliatioa {De Princ, I. 4). He conceives G-od as a purely spiritual es- 
 sence, not fire, nor light, nor breath, but an absolutely immaterial unit (jiovaq or hdq, De 
 Princ, I. 96 seq.)- Only on the supposition that he is immaterial can God be conceived as 
 absolutely unchangeable, for all that is material is mutable, divisible, and perishable {De 
 Princ, II. 184). The depths of the divine wisdom and knowledge are unsearchable ; the 
 entire fullness of the divine light is accessible to no creature {Tom. in Jo., II. 80 seq.). Tet 
 God is not without measure and limit, ho is self-limiting; the absolutely unlimited would be 
 unable to conceive itself (Tbw. in Matth.. XIII. 569). God's omnipotence is limited by his 
 goodness and wisdom ( G. Gels., III. 493). The Son is always begotten of God the Father, 
 in the same manner in which light always begets its own lustre, or as the will proceeds 
 outward from the mind, without causing a division of the latter into parts, i. e., without 
 being separated from the mind {De Princ, I. 110 seq.). In all which the Father is and 
 has the Son participates, and in this sense a community of essence may be predicated of 
 him and the Father; yet he is {De Orat., 222) not only as an individual {Kara vTvoKettievov) 
 another being than the Father, a second God (C. Gels., Y. 608 : Sd'-epog deoq), but he is also 
 inferior to him in essence {nar' ovaiav), in so far as his existence is conditioned and depends 
 on that of the Father ; he is deoq, but not, like the Father, 6 feof, he knows the Father, 
 but his knowledge of the Father is less perfect than is the Father's knowledge of himself 
 {Tom. in Joh., XXXII. 449). As being a copy, he is inferior to the original, and is so 
 related to the Father as we are to him {Fragm. de princ, I. 4) ; at least in that measure in 
 which the Son and the Spirit tower above all creatures, does the Father tower above 
 themselves {Tom. in Jo., XIII. 235). In relation to the world, the Son is a prototype, 
 'i6ea I6euv {G. Gels., VI. 64). In the unfolding of the divine unity into plurality, the Son 
 is the first term, the Spirit the second, standing next to the created world, yet himself 
 belonging to the Godhead as the last element or term in the adorable Trinity {Term, in Jo., 
 YI. 133: rz/f -rvpoaKWTj-fjq rpiafioc). The Spirit receives all which he is and has through 
 the Son, as the latter also receives all from the Father ; he is the mediator of our com- 
 munion with God and the Son {De Princ, IV. 374). Later in order than the Holy Ghost, 
 but not later in time, is the entire world of spirits, created by the will of the Father, and 
 numbering more than we can calculate, though not absolutely innumerable {De Princ, II. 
 219 ; Pragm. de princ, II. 6). The time will come when all spiritual beings will possess 
 the knowledge of God in the same perfect measure in which the Son possesses it, and all 
 shall be sons of God in the same manner in which now the Only-begotten alone is (7*0771. 
 in Jo., I. 17), being themselves deified through participation in the deity of the Father 
 {Tom. in Jo., II. 50 : fisToxy rijg EKeivov dedr^og deoTToiov/ievoi), so that then God will be all 
 in all {De Princ, III. 318, 321). 
 
 The goodness of God could never remain inactive nor his omnipotence bo without 
 objects for his government, hence the creation of the world cannot have been begun in any 
 given moment of time, but must be conceived as without beginning {De Princ, III. 308). 
 There have been no ajons in which no worlds existed. This present world has, nevertheless, 
 had a commencement, and is subject to decay, and the duration of each world-icon, and 
 therefore (since, according to Origen, the number of the aeons is obviously finite) time itself, 
 is limited; God could not foreknow all things if the duration of the world was unlimited 
 {Tom. in Matth., XIII. 5G9). God did not find matter already in existence and then merely 
 communicate shape and form to it, but he himself created matter; otherwise a providence, 
 older than God, must have provided for the possibility of his expressing his thoughts in 
 material forms, or a happy accident must have played the role of providence {De Princ, II. 
 164). God, who in himself is spaceless, is by his working power everywhere present in 
 the world, just as the architect is present in his work, or as the soul, as organ of seusa-
 
 318 CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA, AND ORIGEN. 
 
 tion, is extended throughout the body ; only that which is evil is not filled by his presence 
 (De Orat., p. 233 ; Be Princ, II. 172). God comes down to men, not in space, but by his 
 providence (C. Cels., V. 586). The created human spirit, having turned away from the 
 fullness of the divine life, was placed in a material environment, but is free to choose 
 between the good and the bad ; the faculty of willing and the power which men may use 
 for good, are the gift of God, but man's decisions are his own work. Yet even in this God 
 affords us his aid through his Holy Spirit ; each of our actions results from a mixture of 
 our own volition and of divine assistance {De Princ, III.; In Ps., p. 672 ; In Matth., XII. 
 561). Evil is the turning away of the creature from the fullness of true being to empti- 
 ness and nothingness, hence a privation ; hfe in sin is a life of death [De Princ, I. 109). 
 The cause of evil is neither God nor matter, but that free act of turning away from 
 God, which God did not command, but only did not prevent (C Gels., VII. 742). In the 
 future world there will be rewards and punishments, but at last evil itself must become 
 ancillary to good ; the consequences of evil cannot endure until after the end of the world ; 
 at the end of all things will take place the Apokatastasis, the restoration of all things to 
 unity with God (De Princ, III. 312 seq.). The evil spirits, at their head the devil, tempt 
 us as much as is necessary that we may prove ourselves (C. Cels., VI. 666); but even they 
 are corrigible and shall be redeemed [De Princ, I. 156 ; III. 233). Good angels stand at 
 our side ; at last love brought the Logos himself Aovra to us, and led him to assume not 
 only a human body, but also a complete, rational, human soul {De Princ, II. 6 ; IV. 32), 
 To numerous ages of the world the Logos did not appear himself; in the present aeon, 
 which is already drawing near to its end, he has come down as a Redeemer, to lead all 
 things back to God {De Princ, II. 17). The divine Logos, mightier than sin, is the world- 
 redeeming power ; through him the Almighty God, for whom nothing is irretrievably lost, 
 will lead all men back to full and blessed life {De Princ, I. 109, 324). The object of 
 future punishments is purification; as by fire, the evil in us will be extirpated more quickly 
 in those who are purest, less quickly in the impure ; the worst sinners will continue in 
 these punishments, as in their hell, till the end of time ; after which God will be all in all, 
 being the measure and the form of all the motions of the souls, who only feel and behold 
 him {De Princ, III. 311). 
 
 The Holy Scriptures were inspired by God, and contain his word, or his revelations. 
 The doctrine contained in them has already made its way as revealed truth among all 
 peoples, whereas the philosophical systems of men, with all their proofs, have not been 
 able to gain the acceptance of a single people, much less of all nations. That the Scrip- 
 tures are inspired is testified not only by the fact of their wide propagation, but also by 
 the impression which we receive in reading them; for we then feel ourselves touched by 
 the breath of the Holy Ghost. These Scriptures contain pre-eminently {vpoTp/ovfiivu^) 
 matter of instruction, and inform us respecting the formation of the world and other mys- 
 teries; in the next place, they furnisli precepts for our conduct. The Gospel and the 
 Apostolic Ej)i.stles stand in no respect behind the Law and the Prophets. The Old Testa- 
 ment is unveiled in the New. Yet the New Testament is itself not the end and consum- 
 mation of the revelations of God, but it is related to the complete truth as the Old 
 Testament is to it ; it awaits its unveiling at the second coming of Christ, and is only a 
 shadow and image of those things which shall be after the end of the present period of the 
 world ; it is temporary and not immutable, and wiU one day be changed into an eternal 
 Gospel {De Princ, III. 327 ; IV. 1 seq. ; 61 seq. ; 364). Even a Paul and a Peter descried 
 only a small portion of the truth (Horn, in Jerem., VIII. 174 seq. ; Tom. in Epist. ad Rom., 
 V. 545). The understanding of the secret meaning of the Holy Scriptures or their alle- 
 gorical interpretation is a gracious gift of the Holy Ghost, the greatest of all his gifts;
 
 MINUnUS FELIX, ARNOBroS, AND LACTANTIUS. 319 
 
 Origen calls it, not — after the manner of his predecessors, including Clement — Gnosis 
 (which designates for him only an inferior stage of knowledge), but "Wisdom (7 Oeia ao<t)ia, 
 C. Cds., VT. 639 ; Sel. in Ps., p. 568 ; ;fdp<cr/ya r^c m6iar or ?.6ym' koI aoipiag, Sel. in Maith., 
 p. 835). Origen designates the allegorical method of interpretation in opposition to the 
 ordinary method of interpretation or interpretation proper, as the spiritual in opposition to 
 the somatic; from it he occasionally distinguishes also moral interpretation, which he terms 
 psychical (De Frinc, IV. 59). (In reality, allegorical interpretation amounted in practice, 
 in the case of all those passages in which the biblical writer did not himself intend to 
 speak allegorically — which intention, it is true, the Alexandrians always imputed to him, 
 when the literal sense failed to edify themselves — only to a species of aphoristical philoso- 
 phizing on the occasion of Bible passages.) 
 
 The eclectic Platonist, Celsus, incorrectly supposed by Origen to be an Epicurean (and 
 therefore to be distinguished from the Epicurean of the same name who lived about 
 170 A. D., and is mentioned by Lucian in the Pseudomanfis) wrote about the year 200 a 
 ?Myog aAT/dr/c against the Christians, in which he combats Christianity, partly from the 
 Jewish and partly from his own philosophical stand-point, reducing its historical basis to 
 an abortive attempt at insurrection, and opposing to the Christian idea of forbearing love 
 the idea of justice ; to faith in the redemption of humanity, faith in an eternal, rational 
 order of the universe; to the doctrine of God incarnate, the idea of the remoteness of God, 
 whose influence on earthly things is exerted only indirectly, and to faith in the resurrec- 
 tion of the body, the doctrine of the nothingness of matter and of the future existence of 
 the soul alone. Celsus finds the cause of the wide acceptance of Christianity in the fear 
 and hope excited among the uncultured masses, who were incapable of rising above sen- 
 suous conceptions, by threats and promises with reference to their future condition. In 
 return, Origen, in his reply, written at the request of his friend Ambrosius, asserts the 
 reasonableness and demonstrableness of the Christian faith. He finds his proofs of Chris- 
 tianity in the fulfilled prophecies of the Old Testament (Contra Celsum, I. 366), in the 
 miracles which were daily performed on the sick and on persons possessed by evil spirits 
 through the reading of the Gospel (t6., I. 321 et al), in the victorious extension of Chris- 
 tianity and its sanctifying power, and in the conspicuous puritj' of the Christian com- 
 munities in the midst of general corruption [ib., I. 323 ; III. 466). Origen then seeks to 
 establish the single dogmas of Christianity in substantially the same manner as in the nepi 
 apxuv. The right of the Christian communities to exist, against the will of the state, is 
 founded by Origen on tlie law of nature, which is given by God and is higher than the 
 written law {G. Gels., Y. 604). 
 
 The later adlierents of Orthodoxy, the form and character of which were fundamentally 
 influenced by the doctrine of Origen (see above, I5 82, end) recognized the importance of 
 the services rendered by him to Christianity, and yet at the same time opposed him, 
 receiving with favor his apologetical, but rejecting his systematic, work, while, on the other 
 side, Arians, and afterward Pelagians, appealed to him as an authority. In his writings 
 lay combined (as in more recent times in the writings and views of Sclileiermacher) the 
 germs of opposed theological systems, which at a later period were to attain to an inde- 
 pendent development. The same Justinian who (in A. D. 529) broke up the school of the 
 Neo-Platonists, condemned (about 540) Origenism in nine anathemas. 
 
 § 84, While Christological Bpeculation was developed chiefly by 
 Hellenistic theologians, the Latin teachers of the Church gave promi- 
 nence more especially to tlie general basis of the Christian doctrine,
 
 320 MINUTIUS FELIX, ARNOBIUS, AND LACTANTroS. 
 
 as contained in the belief in God and immortality, as also to anthro- 
 pological and ethical questions. Minutius Felix, a Roman attorney, 
 defended, without touching on Christology, the belief of the Chris- 
 tians in the unity of God. He sought to show that this belief was 
 held by the most distinguished philosophers ; he combated sharply the 
 polytheism of the popular faith, as opposed to reason and the moral 
 sense, and maintained, against various objections, the Christian doc 
 trines of the perishableness of the world, the imperishability of the 
 soul, and the resurrection of the body. With less elegance of form, but 
 greater completeness of detail, and yet often more superficially than 
 thoroughly, the same theme is handled by Arnobius, who also pays 
 some attention to the Christological question, attempting to prove the 
 deity of Christ by his miracles. He holds the belief in God's exist- 
 ence to be innate. With Justin and Irenseus, he denies the natural 
 immortality of the soul, whose nature he regards as intermediate be- 
 tween the divine and material, and he opposes the Platonic argu- 
 ments for the pre-existence and post-existence of the soul, reserving 
 his favor only for the theological and moral argument. The rheto- 
 rician Lactantius unites in his theologico-philosophical writings agree- 
 ableness of form and Ciceronian purity of style with a tolerably 
 comprehensive and exact knowledge of his subject-matter; yet his 
 always clear and facile presentation sometimes lacks in thoroughness 
 and profundity. He sets the Christian doctrine as the revealed truth 
 over-against the polytheistic religion and the ante-Christian phi- 
 losophy, both of which he makes war upon as being false and per- 
 nicious, although confessing that no opinion is without some elements 
 of truth ; but affirming that he only can rightly point out these ele- 
 ments who has been taught of God. The union of true wisdom with 
 true religion is the end which he seeks to further by his waitings. 
 The rejection of polytheism, the recognition of the unity of God, and 
 Christology, are for him the successive stages of religious knowledge. 
 True virtue rests on true religion ; its end is not itself, but eternal 
 blessedness. 
 
 The apologetical work of Minuthis Felix wns first published with the work of Arnobius Adv. Genien 
 (Rome, 1543), it being supposed to he the hist (eighth) book of the latter work ; under its proper title 
 of Octanus, and as a work of Minutius Felix, it was first edited by Franz Baldnin (Heidelberg, 1560), then 
 in the edition ol Arnobius (Rome, 15S3, etc.), and in more recent tiuies by Lindner (Langensalza, 1773 1, 
 Russwurm (Hamburg, 1S24), Muralt (Ziirlch, 1S36), Liibkert (with translation and commentary, Leipsic. 
 1S36), by Franc. Oehler, in Gersdorf's Bibl. Patrwn Eccles. Lat. sel. (Leipsic, 1847), and by J. Kayser 
 (Paderborn, 1863), and finally by Halm, Vienna, 1867 (see above, p. 263). 
 
 The work of Arnobius, Acfrersns Ge?ite.% was first printed at Rome in 1543; more recently it has been 
 published at Leipsic, 1816, edited by Joh. Con. Orelli, at Halle, 1844, edited by HiUlebrandt, and in
 
 MINUTIUS FELIX, ARNOBIUS, AND LACTANTIUS. 321 
 
 GersdorVs Bild. pair. eccl. Lat.,\o\. XII., edited by Franz Oehler, Lcipsic, 1846. On Arnobius. see £. 
 Klussniann, Arnob. u. Lucretius, in the rMlolo(fus, Vol. XXVI. 1S67, pp. 362-3GG. 
 
 The works of Lactantius, of which the Jmtitut. Div. were the first to appear in print (Subiaco. 1405 seq.. 
 Eome. 1470 seq., etc.), have been printed very often; more recent editions are those by J. L. Bijnemana 
 (Leipsic. 1739), J. B. Le Bnin and >iic. Lenglet-Dufresnoy (Paris, 1748). O. V. Fritzsche, in Gersdorfs Bill, 
 Vols. X. and XI. (Leipsic, 1S42-44), and in J. P. Migne's Blbl. (Paris, 1&44). 
 
 The short work of Minutius Felix (who lived probably before the end of the second 
 century, and in some of his ideas follows in the path of TertuUian), marked by graceful- 
 ness of style and mildness of spirit, contains an account of the conversion of the heathen 
 Csecilius by the Christian Octavius. Csecilius urges, that in ^^ew of our uncertainty re- 
 specting all supra-terrestrial things, men should not with vain self-conceit allow them- 
 selves to judge respecting them, but that men should retain and respect, in regard to them, 
 the traditions of their ancestors, and that, if they will philosophize, they should confine 
 themselves, like Socrates, to the things which relate to man, while in relation to other 
 things they find, with Socrates ana the Academics, their true wisdom in the knowledge of 
 their ignorance. Quod snpra est, nihil ad nos. Confessae imperitiae summa prudentia est. In 
 reply to this argumentation (which, of course, was equally good for men of all religions, 
 including Christians, when their religion should once have become dominant and traditional), 
 Octavius answers, first, by pointing out the contradiction involved in the combination of 
 theoretical skepticism with actual adherence to a traditional religion. Octavius approves 
 the requirement of self-knowledge, but asserts, in opposition to the afQrmations of CaecUius 
 respecting the incognoscibility of the transcendent, that in the universe all things are so 
 intimately united to each other, that the human cannot be known without the divine {ut 
 nisi divinitatis raiiunem diligenter excusseris, nescias humanitatis). Besides, continues Octa- 
 vius, our knowledge of God is not so uncertain ; such knowledge is our prerogative, as 
 beings endowed with speech and reason, and it results for us from our observation of the 
 order of nature, and especially from our observation of the adaptation of means to ends m the 
 structure of all organized beings, and, above all, in man {Quid enim potest esse tarn apertum. 
 tarn confessum, iamque perspicuum, quum oculos in caelum sustuleris et quae stmt infra circaqve 
 lustraveris, quam esse aliquod numen praestantissimae mentis, quo omnia natura inspiretur, 
 moveatur, alaiur, guiernetur? — Ipsa praecipue forniae nostrae pvlchritudo Deum fatetur arti- 
 ficem; nihil in homine membrorum est, quod nan et necessitatis caiisa sit et decoris. Kec 
 universitati solummodo Deus, sed et partihus consulit). The unity of the order of nature proves 
 the unity of the Deity. God is infinite, almighty, and eternal; before the world he was to 
 himself in the place of the world {Ante mundum sibi ipsefuit pro mundo). He is fully known 
 only to himself, being exalted beyond the reach of the senses and the understanding of man. 
 On account of his unity he needs no peculiar or specifying name; the word God is sufficient. 
 Even to the popular consciousness the intuition of the unity of the divine is not foreign {si 
 Deus dederit, etc.); it is expressly acknowledged by nearly all philosophers. Even Epicurus, 
 who denied to the gods activity, though not existence, saw a unity in nature ; Aristotle 
 recognizes a unique divine power, the Stoics teach the doctrine of providence, Plato speaks 
 in the Timaeus almost like a Christian, when ho calls God the father and architect of the 
 world, adding that he is difficult to be known and is not to be publicly proclaimed ; for the 
 Christians, too, regard God as the father of all things, and they proclaim him publicly only 
 then, when they are called on to bear witness to his truth. In this view it may be held 
 either that the Christians are philosophers, or that the philosophers were already Chris- 
 tian. The gods of the heathen are deified kings or inventors. The faith of our ancestors 
 should not determine our own ; the ancients were credulous and took }>lcasure in mirncu- 
 Jious narratives, which we recognize as fables ; for if such things as are narrated had taken 
 21
 
 322 MINUTIUS FELIX. AENOBIUft, AND LACTANTIUS 
 
 I 
 
 place, they would also be taking place to-day ; but they did not take place, because it was 
 impossible that they should. It is the poets who most prejudice the interests of truth, 
 when they ensnare us in their sweet illusions ; Plato was right in banishing them ; the 
 myths of the heathen religions are lenient toward vice. Impure demons, assuming the title 
 of Gods, have thus secured the worship of men. The true God is omnipresent : ubique non 
 tantum nobis proximus, sed infusus est ; non solum in oculis ejus, sed et in sinu vivimus. The 
 world is perishable, man is immortal. God will renew our bodies, just as in the actual 
 economy of nature all things are periodically renewed ; the belief that the soul alone is 
 immortal is a half-truth; the doctrine of the transmigration of souls is a fable, though 
 even in this doctrine there is contained a foreshadowing of truth. It is right that a better 
 lot should fall to the Cliristians than to the heathen, for not to know God is alone suffi- 
 cient to justify punishment, while the knowledge of God is a ground of pardon; besides, 
 the moral life of the Christians is better than that of the heathen. The doctrine of divine 
 predestination is not in contradiction with the justice of God nor with human freedom; for 
 God sees beforehand what will be the characters of men, and determines their fate accord- 
 ingly ; fate is only the seuteuce of God {Quid enim aliud estfatum, quam quod de unoquoque 
 nostrum Deus fatus est?). Sufferings serve to test the quality of Christians and to confirm 
 them in their contests with adverse powers. They are right in refraining from worldly 
 pleasures, which are of doubtful character in moral and religious regards. 
 
 In the work written soon after 300 by Arnobius, the African, "against the Heathen" 
 (Adversus Gentes), the polytheism of the popular faith is opposed in a manner similar to 
 that adopted in the Avork of Minutius. though with greater fullness. Arnobius denounces 
 polytheism as absurd and immoral, and defends the doctrine of the one, eternal God, in 
 whom, he says, the Hellenic gods themselves, in case they existed, must have had their 
 origin, and who therefore is not to be identified with Zeus, the son of Saturn. Arnobius 
 energetically rejects the allegorical interpretation of the myths concerning the gods. The 
 doubt whether the highest God exists at all he considers (I. 31) unworthy of refutation, 
 since the belief m God is inborn in all men : even the brute animals and the plants, if they 
 could speak, would proclaim God as the Lord of the universe (I. 33). God is infinite and 
 eternal, the place and space of all things (I. 31). In distinction from Minutius Felix, how- 
 ever, Arnobius seeks also to answer the reproach of those who affirmed that the gods were 
 angry with the Christians, not because they worshiped the eternal God, but because they 
 held a man who was crucified as a criminal to be a God (I. 36 seq.). To this Arnobius 
 replies that Christ might justly be called God on account of the benefits conferred by him 
 on the human race ; he was, however, also God in reality, as appears from his miraculous 
 works and his power to transform the opinions and characters of men. Arnobius lays 
 very great weight on the argument from miracles. Philosophers, he says (II. 11), like 
 Plato, Cronius, and Numenius (cf above, pp. 237-238), whom the pagans believe, were 
 perhaps morally pure, and learned in the sciences, but they could not, like Christ, work 
 miracles ; they could not calm the sea, heal the blind, etc., and consequently we must regard 
 Christ as higher than they and give more credence to his affirmations concerning hidden 
 things than to theirs. In respect of terrestrial and supra-terrestrial things, all are compelled 
 to believe; the Christian believes Christ (II. 8 seq.). It was necessary that Christ should 
 appear on earth as a man, because, if he had come down to it in his original nature, he 
 could not have been seen by men nor have accomplished the objects of his mi.ssion. 
 Arnobius combats, with Justin, the Platonic doctrine that the human soul is by nature 
 immortal, and particularly the opinion that knowledge is reminiscence; in answer to the 
 argument brought forward in the Meno, he says that the slave who answered correctly the 
 geometrical questions of Socrates, did so, not owing to a knowledge of the subject already
 
 MmiTTIUS FELIX, AKNOBroS, AND LACTANTIUS. 323 
 
 existing in him, but in consequence of intelligent reflection (non rerum scieniia sed inttUi- 
 gentia) and of the methodical manner in which the questions were put to him (II. 24). A 
 man who from his birth should have lived in complete solitude would show no signs of 
 intellect and by no means be filled with notions of supra- terrestrial things perceived in a 
 previous life. Equally false is the opinion of Epicurus that the souls of men perish; if 
 that were so, it would be not only the greatest error, but foolish blindness, to restrain the 
 passions, since there would be no future reward awaiting us for so violent a labor (II. 30). 
 The immortality, which heathen philosophers infer from the supposed divine nature of the 
 soul, is regarded by the Christians as a gift of God's grace (II. 32). The true worship of 
 God consists, not in bringing offerings, but in having right views concerning the Deity 
 {opinio religionem facit et recta de divis mens, VII., 51 Or.). 
 
 At about the same time when Arnobius wTote, Firmianus Lactantius, the rhetorician 
 and Christian convert, composed his Institutiones Divinae ; of this work he prepared an 
 abridgment : Epitome Divinarum Institutionum ad Pentadium fratrem (in which he says that 
 Christ was born, in round numbers. 300 years before then, ch. 43). Other extant works of 
 his are: Liber de opijkio Dei ad Demetrianum ; De ira Dei liber; De mortibus persecutorum 
 liber; Fragmenta and Carmina. Jerome (Cat, ch. 80) calls Lactantius a pupil of Arno- 
 bius; yet there is no evidence in his writings of his having stood in such a relation 
 .to Arnobius. In the Inst. Div. (V. 1-4) he mentions particularly as his predecessors Ter- 
 tullian, Minutius Felix, and Cyprian (who lived 200-258 A. D., and labored especially for 
 the unity of the Church, and to whom belongs the dictum : habere jam non potest Deum 
 patrem, qui ecclesiam non liahtt matrem), but not Arnobius, and the content of his work 
 shows also, apparently, no signs of Arnobianic influence. Tertullian did not satisfy him 
 in the matter of form; of Minutius Felix he makes laudatory mention, saying that his work 
 shows that, if he had devoted himself solely to the subject of which he treated, he would 
 have been able fully to meet all its requirements ; but Cyprian, he says, uses language 
 that is too mystical for the apologetic purpose ; he fails in his method of demonstration, 
 since his ap])eal to the authority of the bibhcal writings could carry no conviction to un- 
 believers. Lactantius evidently composed his Institutiones and also his Epitome of them at 
 a time when Christianity had not yet received public recognition ; the addresses to Con- 
 stantino as the protector of the Christians were inserted in his principal work either by 
 himself or by others at a later epoch. The work De opificio Dei grounds the belief m 
 God's existence on the adaptations seen in the forms of the organic world, in pointing out 
 which Lactantius goes into very minute details. In the Institutiones Lactantius proposes 
 not only to demonstrate the right of Christianity to exist, but also to communicate instruc- 
 tion in the Christian doctrine itself (lY. 1 seq. ; T. 4), and to combine the wisdom whereby 
 polytlieism is destroyed, and the true God known and, in his quality of Father, loved, 
 with the religion which worships him as Lord of all ; but knowledge, he says, must pre- 
 cede worship. The highest good for man is neither pleasure, which the animals also 
 enjoy, nor even virtue, which is only the way to it, but religion. For humanity is synony- 
 mous with justice, but justice is piety, and piety is the recognition of the fatherhood of 
 God {Inst, III. 11 seq. ; TV. 4 ; Y. 1). Lactantius presupposes in the Inst. Div. (what in 
 the De opific. Dei he demonstrates in full), as something scarcely ever doubted, that the 
 rational order of the world proves the existence of a divine providence {Inst, I. 2 : nemo 
 est enim tarn rudis, tarn feris moriTnts, qui non, oculos suos in coelum toUens, iametti nesciat, 
 cujus del providentia regatur hoc omne quod cernitur. aliquam tamen esse intelligat ex ipsa 
 rerum magnitudine, motu, dvspositione, constantia, ■utilitate, pulchritudine, temperatione, nee 
 posse fieri quin id, quod mirabili ratione constat, consilio majori aliquo sit instructum). He 
 then turns to the demonstration of the unity of God, which he infers from the perfection
 
 324 MINUTroS FELIX, AKNOBIUS, AND LACTANTIUS, 
 
 of God as the eternal Spirit (Inst., I. 3 : Dens autem, qui est aeterna inens, ex omni utiqite 
 parte per/ectae consummataeque virtutis est; . . . virhitis autem perfecta natura in eo poiius est, 
 in quo totam est, quam in eo, in quo pars exigua de toto est ; Deus vero, si perfec.tus est, ut esse 
 debet, non potest esse nisi units, ut in eo sint omnia). A plurality of Gods would involve the 
 divisibility of the divine power, from which its perishableness would follow. Several Gods, 
 if they existed, might will opposite things, whence contentions would arise between them, 
 which would destroy the order of the world ; only on the condition of a single providence 
 existing and controlling all the parts of the world, can the whole subsist ; hence the world 
 must necessarily be directed by the will of one being (I. 3). As the human body is gov- 
 erned by one spirit, so the world by God {ibid.). Beings that must obey the one God are 
 not Gods {ibid.). To the unity of God bear witness not only prophets (I. 4), but also poets 
 and philosophers — not as though the latter had rightly known the truth, but because tlie 
 power of truth is so great that it enlightens men even against their will (I. 5) ; no philo- 
 sophical school is altogether without elements of truth (VII. 7). In his appeal to the 
 phdosophical witnesses to the unity of God, Lactantius evidently follows in substance 
 Minutius Felix ; both of them draw their information chiefly from Cicero's work De 
 Natura Deorum ; but Lactantius is far from agreeing with Minutius Felix in his favorable 
 judgment of philosophers, for he affirms, with TertuUian, that heathen religion and phi- 
 losophy are each false and misleading, and places them in contrast with the truth revealed 
 by God (I. 1 ; III. 1 et pass.), employing against the philosophers the biblical proposition 
 that the wisdom of men is foolishness with God. The third book of the Inst, is expressly 
 devoted to showing the nullity of philosophy {philosophiam quoque ostendere quam inanis et 
 falsa sit, ut omni errore sublato Veritas pate/acta clarescat. III. 2. Fhilosophia quaerit sajnen- 
 tiam, non ipsa sapientia est, ibid.). Philosophy must be either knowledge or opinion. Knowl- 
 edge (and here the philosophical knowledge of nature, natural philosophy, is chiefly meant) 
 is unattainable by man ; he cannot draw it out of his own mind, since tlio power to do this 
 belongs only to God and not to man {mortalis natura non capit scientiam nisi quae venial 
 extrinsecus) ; we know not the causes of things, as Socrates and the Academics rightly teach. 
 Hence not philosophy, but revelation, conducts to the knowledge of truth. Dialectic is 
 useless (III. 13). In Ethics the opinions of philosophers differ in the same manner as in 
 Physics. In order to choose from among them, we must be already wise, which yet we 
 were to learn to be from the philosophers ; moreover, the skeptical Academic admonishes 
 us never to believe in any school, whereby he evidently destroys even the possibility of our 
 believing in his ovvn doctrines. What remains, therefore, but to fly to the giver of true 
 wisdom ? After his refutation of false religion and philosophy, Lactantius turns to the 
 exposition of the Christian doctrine, and attempts to show that God so ordered all things 
 from the beginning, that as the end of the world {i. e., the expiration of the 6,000 years to 
 which its duration was limited) drew near, it was necessary that the Son of God should 
 come down to the earth and suffer, in order to build up a temple for God and lead men to 
 righteousness. He founds the belief in Christ as the Logos and Son of God mainly on tlie 
 testimony of the prophets {Inst, IV.). Father and Son are one God, because their spirit 
 and will are one ; the Father cannot be truly worshiped without the Son (IV. 29). (The 
 Holy Ghost is not recognized by Lactantius as a third person in the Godhead, but only as 
 the spirit of the Father and the Son.) The temple of God erected by Christ is the Catliolic 
 Church {InsL, IV. 30). Justice consists in piety and equity ; piety is its source, equity, 
 which rests on the recognition of the essential equality of men, is its power and energy 
 (V. 14). Both the source and the power of justice remained hid for the philosophers, since 
 they had not the true religion, but to the Christians they have become known by revela- 
 tion (V. 15). Virtue is the fulfilling of the divine law, or the true worship, which consists, 
 
 i
 
 GREGORY OF NYSSA, AND OTHER OKIGENISTS. 325 
 
 rot in sacrifices, but in pure intentions and in the fulfillment of all obligations toward God 
 and man {Inst., VI.). Not the suppression of the passions, nor their restraint, but the 
 right employment of them, is the part of virtue (VI. 16); even God is sometimes angry 
 (De Ira Dei). Justice has been clothed by God in the semblance of folly, in order thus to 
 point to the mysterious nature of true religion; justice would indeed be follj' if no future- 
 reward was reserved for virtue. Plato and Aristotle had the laudable intention of defend- 
 ing virtue ; but they were unable to accomplish their aim, and their exertions remained 
 vain and useless, because they were unacquainted with the doctrine of salvation, which is 
 contained in the Holy Scriptures ; they erroneously imagined that virtue was to be sought 
 on its own account, and that it had its reward in itself alone {Inst, V. 18 : qui sacra- 
 mtntum hominis ignorant ideoque ad hanc vitam temporalem re/erunt omnia, quanta sit vis 
 jtistitiae scire non possunt; nam et quum de virtute disputant quamvis intelligant aerumnis ac 
 miser iis esse plenissimam, tainen exjietendam ajurd sua causa; ejus eniin praemia quae sunt 
 aeierna et immortalia, nullo modo vident ; sic rehus omnibus ad lianc praeseniem vitam relatis 
 virtutem plane ad stultitiam redigunt. Inst, V. 18: virtus et mercedem suam Deojudice acci- 
 piet et vivet ac semper vigebit; quae si tolkis, nihil potest in vita hominum tam inutile, tarn 
 ttultum videri esse quam villus. Inst, VI. 9 : nee aliter virtus quum per se dura sit, haheri 
 pro hono potest, quam si acerhitatem suam maximo bono penset). In this manner Lactantius 
 arrives at the conclusion that the soul (whose existence is the result, not of the act of 
 generation, but of divine creation, De Opif. Dei, 19) is immortal, and divinely-ordered 
 rewards await the virtuous in the future world {Inst, V. 18), without which virtue would 
 be useless. The world exists for man, man for immortality, and immortality for the eternal 
 worship of God. The conviction of man's immortality Lactantius seeks to justify, first, on 
 the ground of the testimony of the Scriptures, and then by arguments deemed sufficient to 
 compel belief {last, VI. 1 seq.). The arguments which Plato borrows from the automatism 
 and the intellectuality of the soul seem to him insufficient, since other authorities can be 
 cited against them {Inst, VII. 8). The soul can exist without the body, for is not God incor- 
 poreal ? It will continue to live after the death of the body, since it is capable of knowmg 
 and worshiping God, the Eternal ; without immortality virtue would not have that worth 
 which it in fact possesses, nor would vice receive the punishment which befits it {Inst., VII. 
 1 seq.). Our souls, when raised, will be clothed by God with bodies (VII. 23). First, 
 the righteous will arise to beatific life ; at the second resurrection the unrighteous or un- 
 believing will be reawakened, and that to eternal torments (VII. 26). 
 
 j^ /^-^ y/ 
 
 SECOND SECTION. 
 
 The Patristic Philosophy after the Council of Nice, 
 
 § 85. After the Christian religion had attained to recognized inde- 
 pendence and supremacy in the Roman state, and the fundamental 
 dogmas had been ecclesiastically sanctioned (at the Council of Nice, 
 A. D. 325), Christian thought directed itself, on the one hand, to the 
 more special, internal elaboration of the doctrines which had now
 
 326 GEEGOET OF NTSSA AND OTHER OKIGENISTS. 
 
 been defined and agreed upon in general terms, and, on the other, to 
 the work of demonstrating them on grounds either of Christian or of 
 philosophical theology. The contests between heresy and orthodoxy 
 awakened the productive energy of thought. Philosophico-theologi- 
 cal speculation was most cultivated in the period next following by 
 the school of Origen. The most prominent representative of this school 
 is Gregory of Nyssa (331-394), the first, who (after the defence, chiefiy 
 by Athanasius himself, of the Christological dogma against the Arians 
 and Sabellians) sought to establish by rational considerations the whole 
 complex of orthodox doctrines, though, at the same time, he did not 
 neglect the argument drawn from biblical passages. In his scientific 
 method Gregory follows Origen ; but he adopted the doctrine of the 
 latter, only in so far as it agreed with the orthodox dogmas ; he com- 
 bats expressly such theorems as that of the pre-existence of the soul 
 before the body, and deviates from the approved faith of the Church 
 only in his leaning toward the theory of a final restoration of all things 
 to communion with God. He pays particular attention to the problems 
 of the divine Trinity and of the resurrection of man to renewed life. 
 Gregory regards the doctrine of the Trinity as the just mean between 
 Jewish monotheism, or Monarchianism, and pagan polytheism. To 
 the question, why three divine persons are not three Gods rather than 
 one, he replies, that the word God (Osu^) designates the divine essence, 
 which is one, and not the person ; his investigations, occasioned by 
 this problem, concerning the relation of the divine essence to the 
 individuals in the Godhead, are in a certain respect an anticipation 
 of the Scholasticism of the Middle Ages. The origin of the human 
 soul is simultaneous with that of the body ; it is everywhere present 
 in its body; it survives the body, and has, after the death of the 
 latter, a spaceless existence; but it has the power to find again, from 
 amidst the whole mass of existing matter, the particles which be- 
 longed to its body, and to reappropriate them, so that at the resurrec- 
 tion it will again clothe itself in its body. Gregory lays great weight 
 on human freedom in the matter of appropriating the means of salva- 
 tion ; only on condition of this freedom, he argues, can we be con- 
 vinced of God's justice in the acceptance of some and the rejection 
 of others ; God foresaw how each man would decide, and determined 
 his fate accordingly. Moral evil is the only real evil ; it was neces- 
 sary in view of human freedom, without which man would not be 
 essentially superior to the animal. In view of this justification of 
 
 I
 
 GEEGOKT OF NTSSA AND OTHER ORIGENISTS. 327 
 
 the moral order of the world, Gregory repels the Manichaean dualism 
 between a good and a bad principle. From God's superabundant 
 goodness and from the negative nature of evil follows the final salva- 
 tion of all beings ; punishment serves for purification ; there will be 
 no place left for evil, when the will of God is triumphant. 
 
 The works of Gregory of Nyssa have been published in part by L. Sifanus (Basel, 1562 and 15T1) and 
 others; a completer edition, by Morellus (Paris, 1615). Single works of his have been edited by various 
 men^ notalily. in recent times, the Dialogue on the Soul and the liesurredion, by Krabinger (Leipsic, 
 1S3T); a selection of his most important writinsrs, together with a German translation, has been published 
 hy Oehler (JHUiothek der Kirchenvdter, I. Thtil : Gregnr von Xyma, Vols. I.-IV., Leipsic, 1S58-59); his 
 dialogue on the soul and the resurrection, with German translation and critical notes, by llerm. Schmidt, 
 was published at Halle In 1S64. Concerning him treat Rupp {Gregors des Sischofs von l^yaaa Leben vnd 
 Meinun^en, Leipsic, 1S34), Heyns (Disp. de Greg. Xyss., Lcyden, 1S35), E. W. MoUer (Gregorii Xysseni 
 doctrinam de hominis natura et illustravit et cum Origeniana comparavit, Halle, 1S54) and Stigler (Z>J6 
 PgycltologU dea heiligen Gregoriut von Xyssa, Hegensburg, 1S57). 
 
 The most important scientific productions of the Greek Fathers issued from the School 
 of Origen. From him his disciples inherited especially the love for Platonic studies, of 
 which the result is manifest in the numerous imitations contained in tlieir writings. That 
 portion of the doctrine of Origen which disagreed with the then crystallizing doctrine of 
 the Church, or whatever was heterodox in his teachings, they either openly opposed or 
 tacitly removed. Methodius of Tjtc (about 290 — his extant writings have recently been 
 published, together with copious demonstrations of the Platonic correspondences in them, 
 by Albert Jahn, Bern, 1865; in Migne's Patrol. Cursus Compl, his works fill Vol. XVIII. 
 of the Greek Fathers), although in other respects himself a Platonizer, argued against the 
 doctrines of the pre-existence of the soul, its fall and descent into the body as into a prison, 
 and the eternity of the divine creative work. He recommends an ascetic life. His exposi- 
 tion is rich in fanciful analogies. In the later period of the existence of this school appear 
 "the three lights of the Church of Cappadocia": Basil the Great, of Csesarea (cf Alb. 
 Jahn, Basilius Flato7iizans, Bern, 1838, and his Anunadversiones, ibid., 1842 ; E. Fialon's 
 Biographic de St. Basile, Paris, 1861), his friend, Gregory of Nazianzen, celebrated as a 
 pulpit orator and theologian, and a pupil of Athanasius, and Basil's brother Gregory, Bishop 
 of Nyssa. These all held Origen in great reverence ; Basil and Gregory of Nazianzen 
 commenced preparing an anthology of his writings under the title <pi?iOKa?ua. In hie- 
 rarchical talent Basil was the most distinguished of the three, while in the department of 
 ecclesiastical theology and eloquence, Gregory of Nazianzen was most eminent; but in 
 respect of the philosophical demonstration of Christian dogmas, Gregory of Nyssa did the 
 most important service, for which reason to him alone a more detailed exposition must 
 here be devoted. Hilarius of Poitiers (respecting whom a comprehensive monograph has 
 recently been published by Reinkens, Breslau, 1865), the champion of Athanasianism in 
 the West, about the middle of the fourth century, is also rather of significance for tho 
 history of the Church than for that of philosophy, and the same may be said of Julius 
 Firmicus Maternus — who wrote, near the middle of the fourth century, De Errore Profa- 
 narum Relvjioimm {ed. Carl Halm, Vienna, 1865, see above, p. 263), in order to excite the 
 secular autliorities to an energetic persecution of the adherents of the ancient faith — as 
 also of Cyprian, the predecessor by a century of the latter (lived 200-258), and many other 
 Church teachers. 
 
 At the period in the history of Christianity at which we have now arrived, the period 
 when Christianity had attained to political supremacy and had become dogmatically fixed
 
 S28 GEEGORT OF NYSSA AND OTHER OKIGENISTS. 
 
 by decrees of Councils, there appears, together with the greater orthodoxy of its doctrines 
 in point of objective expression, a less degree of firmness or at least of directness in the 
 convictions of its supporters with reference to these doctrines. This is characteristically 
 illustrated in the language used by Gregory of Nyssa in his " Dialogue with his sister 
 Macrina concerning the Resurrection" — language which he indeed admits to be somewliat 
 imprudent and bold, but which no one of the earlier Church Fathers could have em- 
 ployed, namely: "The words of Scripture are like commandments, by which we are 
 forcibly constrained to believe in the eternal duration of the soul ; we have not been con- 
 vinced of this doctrine by rational demonstration, but in this, as in other respects, our 
 minds seem servilely to accept through fear what we are commanded to believe, and not 
 spontaneously impelled to assent to it " (III. p. 183 c, ed. Morell). Gregory, it is true, con- 
 demns this language on his part ; but in that whicli follows it we do not find that the 
 mental attitude of Gregory is, for example, that of one who seeks merely to excite anew 
 and to confirm a faith founded on the witness of the divine to the human spirit, a faith 
 directly awakened by Scripture and preaching, and only diminished in energy ; we find 
 rather that the author proceeds to furnish the required rational proofs, and this, too, 
 not with a view to raising to knowledge a faith already fixed and sure of itself, but in 
 order to prop up the faith, which at least for a moment was wavering, and to restore the 
 lacking conviction. The deductions of the writer are at times interrupted by an appeal to 
 passages of Scripture (which, however, are allegorically interpreted, after the manner of 
 the Alexandrians, with an arbitrariness limited only by the rule of faith and the dogmatic 
 canon, notwithstanding the unconditional subjection which Gregory expressly professes to 
 the authority of the Scriptures, see III. 20) ; but the complete unity of the theological and 
 philosophical points of view disappears ; Gregory of Nyssa is the representative of the sepa- 
 ration, beginning in his time, of these two intellectual forces, theology and philosophy, in the 
 sense above indicated. Later authors (as Augustine, notably) returned indeed to the order 
 proclaimed by Clement, and made their thinking dependent on their faith, yet not in the 
 sense of a mere restoration of the earlier form of religious thought ; from the time when a 
 certain body of doctrine had been finally defined, the immediate unity of tlie processes of 
 demonstration and definition ceased with reference to it, and remained confined to dogmas 
 not yet defined, and then began the new direction of thought to the work of the rational 
 justification of given dogmas. From this time on, (Christian) philosophy becomes, with 
 reference to the fundamental dogmas, what it was in the Middle Ages with reference to all 
 doctrines (with few exceptions), the hand-maid of (not identical with) theology. Yet the 
 boundary-line is by no means altogether distinct; in many respects the character of tlie 
 earlier period is apparent in the followmg one, and vice versa. The contrast between them 
 appears in the fullest degree when the two first Christian centuries, especially the Apos- 
 tolic and Gnostic periods, are compared with that medieval period, when hierarchism and 
 scholasticism reached their culminating point; in the intervening centuries the contrast is 
 reduced to a relative difference of more or less. 
 
 In his Tiuyor Kari/xriTiKog Gregory of Nyssa develops the Christian doctrine in systematic 
 connection. The belief in God he grounds on the art and wisdom displayed in the order of 
 the world, and the belief in the unity of God, on the perfection which must belong to God in 
 respect of power, goodness, wisdom, eternity, and all other attributes, but which could not 
 exist if there were several Gods. Stih, continues Gregory, the Christian who combats the 
 error of polytheism has need to exercise great care, lest, in contending against the Hel- 
 lenes, he may unwittingly fall back into Judaism ; for the Christian doctrine itself admits a 
 distinction of hypostases in the unity of the divine nature. God has a Logos, for he can- 
 not be without reason. But this Logos oannot be merely an attribute of God, it must be
 
 GREGORY OF NTSSA AND OTHER ORIGENISTS. 829 
 
 conceived as a second person. To this more exalted conception of tlie divine Logos we are 
 led by the consideration, that in the measure in which God is greater than we, all his pre- 
 dicates must also be higher than the homonymous ones which belong to us. Our Logos is 
 a limited one ; our discourse has only a transient existence. But the subsistence (vnocTactc) 
 of the divine Logos must be indestructible and eternal, and hence necessarily living, since 
 that which is rational cannot be conceived as lifeless and soulless, like a stone. Moreover, 
 the life of the word of God must be an independent life (ai>ro^w//), and not a mere life by par- 
 ticipation (C^J^f /lETovaia), since in the latter case it would lose its simplicity. But, further, 
 there is nothing which has life and is deprived of will ; therefore the divine Logos has also 
 the faculty of will {npoaipeTiid/v 6vva/Mv). Again, the will of the Logos must be equalled 
 by his power, since a mixture of power with impotence would destroy his simplicity. His 
 will, as being divine, must be also good and efficient ; but from the ability and will to work 
 the good follows the realization of the latter, hence the bringing into existence of the wisely 
 and artfully adjusted world. But since, still further, the logical conception of the Word is 
 in a certain sense a relative one (n-pof ri), the word being necessarily related in thought to 
 him who speaks it, it follows that, together with the Word, the Father of the Word must 
 be recognized as existing {ov yap av e'itj Xoyoc, firj ruvoq uv ?.6yog). Thus the mystery of 
 our faith avoids equally the absurdity {aroiria.) of Jewish monotheism, which denies to the 
 Word life, activity, and creative power, and that of heathen polytheism, since we acknowl- 
 edge the equality in nature of the Word and of the Father of the Word ; for whoever affirms 
 goodness or power or wisdom or eternity or freedom from evil, death and decay, or abso- 
 lute perfection as a mark of the Father, will find the Logos, whose existence is derived from 
 the Father, marked by the same attributes {/.6y. kuttix. Prologue and chap. 1). In like 
 manner Gregory seeks by the analogy of human breath — which indeed (he adds) is nothing 
 but inhaled and exhaled Are, t. e., an object foreign to us — to demonstrate the community 
 of the divine Spirit with the essence of God and the independence of its existence {ibid., 
 chap. 2). In this doctrine he believes the proper mean between Judaism and Paganism to 
 be found : from the Jewish doctrine the unity of the divine nature (j? Trjg ^vceuq ivdrrjg) 
 has been retained, from Hellenism, the distinction into hypostases (7 Kara rof vnoaraaetg 
 (huKpcaic, ibid., chap. 3). (That the same argumentation, which in the last analysis reposes 
 only on the double sense of vTvoaracic, viz. : a) real subsistence, b) individually independent, 
 not attributive subsistence, could be used with reference to each of the divine attributes, 
 and so, for the complete restoration of polytheism, Gregory leaves unnoticed.) A number 
 of difficulties, arising from this view of the topics thus far treated, are discussed by Greg- 
 ory in treatises "Concerning Father, Son, and Holy Ghost," "On the Holy Trinitj-," "On 
 Tritheism," and " To the Hellenes, from the Stand-point of the Universal Dicta of Rea- 
 son." In the last-named work he says : If the name God signified the person of God, then, 
 w-henever we speak of the three persons we should necessarily speak of three Gods ; but 
 if the name God indicates the essence of God, then we affirm the existence of only one 
 God, acknowledging, as we do, that the essence of the Holy Triad is only one. Now, in 
 fact, the name God is the name only of the divine essence. If it were a personal name, 
 only. one of the three persons would be called God, just as only one is called Father. But 
 if it should be said : we call Peter and Paul and Barnabas three men, and not one man, as 
 we should be compelled to do if the word man signified the universal essence of humanity, 
 and not rather individual human existence (rr)v ficpiK^; or what Gregory calls a more 
 exact expression, iJ^/c^v ovalav); and if it be said that, according to this analogy, the word 
 God, like the word man, ought to be considered as denoting separate, individual personality, 
 and that it must be confessed that there are three Gods in the Christian Trinity, — Gregory 
 admits, in reply, the analogy, but interprets and applies it in a contrary sense, affirming
 
 330 GKEGOEY OF NTSSA AND OTHER OKIGENISTS. 
 
 that the word man, like all similar words, is applied to individuals only by an abuse of 
 language, which arose from the accidental circumstance that it is not always possible to 
 perceive the same essence in individuals of the lower orders (evidently a doubtful way of 
 meeting the difficulty, since the plural can express nothing but the plurality of individuals 
 of the same essence or nature, similarity of essence and identity of concept not excluding 
 the possibility of numerical difference ; when Gregory says, p. 85, c, d : eari 6s TliTpog Kal 
 IlavXog Kal Bapvajjag Kara to avdpunoq tlf avdpuTTog Kal Kara ro avro tovto, Kara to avOpuTzog^ 
 ■KoXkol ov dhvaTai elvai, TityovTai 6e noTJ^ol avflpuTroi KaTaxp'tjOTiKug kol ov Kvpiug, it is impos- 
 sible not to perceive that he confounds the abstract conception, which indeed excludes the 
 plural, with the concrete conception, which demands it ; and so sometimes expressly em- 
 ploys the abstract for the concrete expression, as in p. 86 a, where he says of Scripture : 
 (pvXdTTOvaa TavTOTJiTa de6-r]Toq iv ISwrriTi vTroaTdaeojv). It is doubtless not without a 
 feeling of the deficiencies of his argumentation, that Gregory confesses that man can by 
 severe study of the depths of the mystery win only a moderate knowledge of it, such is its 
 unspeakable nature (/card to dn6pp?jTov /xErpiav Tivd KaTavoTjoiv — Aoy. kutt/x-j c<^P- 3 init.). 
 
 God created the world by his reason and wisdom, for he cannot have proceeded 
 irrationally in that work ; but his reason and wisdom are, as above shown, not to be 
 conceived as a spoken word or as the mere possession of knowledge, but as a substantially- 
 existent, personal and willing potency. If the entire world was created by this second 
 divine hypostasis, then certainly was man also thus created, yet not in view of any neces- 
 sity, but from superabounding love {aycnrjig nepcovaia), that there might exist a being, who 
 should participate in the divine goods. If man was to be receptive of these goods, it was 
 necessary that his nature should contain an element akin to God, and, in particular, that 
 he should share in the eternity of the divine nature, i. e., be immortal. Thus, then, man 
 was created in the image of God and in possession of all divine goods. He could not, 
 therefore, be without the gifts of freedom, independence, and self-determination, and his 
 participation in the divine goods was consequently made dependent on his virtue. In 
 virtue of his freedom he could decide in favor of evil, which cannot have its origin in the 
 divine will, since then it would not be subject to censure — but only in our inner selves, 
 where it arises in the form of deviation from good, just as darkness is the privation 
 (a-epTjaic) of light, or as blindness is the privation of the power of vision. The antithesis 
 between virtue and vice is not to be so conceived, as if they were two independent exist- 
 ences ; but just as to being non-being is opposed, not as a second existence, but as non- 
 existence set over-against existence, so vice is opposed to virtue, not as something existing 
 in and for itself, but as absence of the better. Since now all that is created is subject to 
 change, it was possible that first one of the created spirits, namely, he who was entrusted 
 with the oversight of the earth, should turn his eye away from the good and become 
 envious, and that from this envy should arise a leaning toward badness which should, in 
 natural sequence, prepare the way for all other evil. He seduced the first men into tlie 
 folly of turning away from goodness, by disturbing the divinely-ordered harmony between 
 their sensuous and intellectual natures and guilefuUy tainting their wills with evil 
 (Aoy. KrtT., chs. 5 and 6). God knew what would happen and hindered it not, that he 
 might not destroy our freedom; he did not, on account of his foreknowledge of the evil 
 which would result from man's creation, leave man uncreated, for it was better to bring 
 back sinners to original grace by the way of repentance and physical suffering than not to 
 create man at all. The raising up of the fallen was a work befitting the giver of life, the 
 God who is the wisdom and power of God, and for this purpose he became man {ibid., chs. 
 7, 8 ; 14 seq.). The incarnation was not unworthy of him ; for only evil brings disgrace 
 (ch. 9). The objection, that the finite cannot contain the infinite, and that therefore the
 
 GEEGOKT OF NYS8A AND OTHEK OKIGENISTS. 331 
 
 human nature could not receive into itself the divine, is founded on the false supposition 
 that the incarnation of the Word naeans, that the infinity of God was contained in the 
 limits of the flesh as in a vessel ; on the contrary, the divine nature is to be conceived as 
 having been so united with the human, as flame is with a combustible, which former ex- 
 tends beyond the latter, as also our souls overstep the limits of our bodies and through 
 the motions of thought extend themselves without hindrance through the whole creation 
 (eh. 10). For the rest, the manner in which the divine nature was united to the human sur- 
 passes our power of comprehension, although we are not permitted to doubt the fact of that 
 union in Jesus, on account of the miracles which he wrought ; the supernatural character of 
 those miracles bears witness to their divine origin (ch. 11 seq.). After we had freely sold 
 ourselves to evil, he, who of his goodness sought to restore us to liberty, could not for this 
 end have recourse to measures of arbitrary violence, but must follow the way of justice. 
 It was necessary, therefore, that a ransom should be paid, which should exceed in value 
 that which was to be ransomed, and hence it was necessary that the Son of God should 
 surrender himself to the power of death. His goodness moved him to save us and his 
 justice impelled him to undertake the redemption by the way of exchange of those who 
 were reduced to bondage. His power was more signally displayed by his incarnation than 
 it would have been had he remained in his glory, and the act of incarnation was not in 
 conflict with his wisdom, eternity, or omnipresence (ch. 22 seq.). By concealing the divine 
 nature within the human, a certain deception was indeed practiced on the Evil One ; but 
 for the latter, as himself a deceiver, it was only a just recompense that he should be 
 deceived liimself ; the great adversary must himself at last find that what has been done 
 was just and salutary, when he also shall have been purified, and as a saved being shall 
 experience the benefit of the incarnation (ch. 26). It was necessary that human degeneracy 
 should have reached its lowest point before the work of salvation could enter in (ch. 29). 
 That, however, grace through faith has not come to all men must not be laid to God's 
 account, who has sent forth his caU to all men, but to the account of human freedom ; 
 if God were to break down our opposition by violent means, the virtue and praiseworthi- 
 ness of human conduct would be destroyed in the destruction of human freedom, and man 
 would be degraded to the level of the irrational brute (ch. 30 seq.). Gregory seeks farther 
 to show how it was worthy of God that he should die on the cross (ch. 32). He then 
 shows the saving nature of prayer and of the Christian sacraments (chs. 33-37). It is 
 essential for regeneration to believe that the Son and the Spirit are not created spirits, but 
 of like nature with God the Father ; for he who would make his salvation dependent on 
 anything created would trust to an imperfect nature and one itself needing a savior (ch. 38 
 seq.; cf the treatise on the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, p. 38, d: those who hold the Son 
 to have been created must either worship a creature, which is idolatrous, or not worship 
 him, which is unchristian and Jewish). He alone has truly become a child of God who 
 gives evidence of his regeneration by voluntarily putting away from himself all vice 
 (ch. 40). 
 
 A series of aniAropological speculations are contained in the work "On the Creation of 
 Man." Biblical propositions are combined with Aristotelian and Platonic ideas and with a 
 teleological physiology. The possibility of the creation of matter by the divine spirit rests 
 on the fact that matter is only the unity of qualities which in themselves are immaterial 
 (ch. 23 seq.). Man is more noble than the rest of creation (ch. 3). His spirit pervades 
 his whole body, and not merely a single part of it (ch. 12 seq.). It begins to exist at 
 the same time with the body, neither before nor after (ch. 28). The soul will at a future 
 time bo reunited with its body, and, once purified by punishment, will return to the Good 
 (ch. 21). The subject of eschatology is discussed by Gregory in the "Dialogue con-
 
 332 GEEGORY OF NYSSA AND OTHEK ORIGENISTS. 
 
 cerning the Soul and the Resurrection." Faith in the continued existence of the soul 
 after death is declared to be necessary to virtue, since it is only on the condition of man's 
 future existence that virtue has any advantage over pleasure (p. 184, a). But Gregory 
 does not (like Lactantius) proceed at once to construct on the basis of this necessity a 
 "moral" argument for immortality, holding, rather, that the case is one that calls for 
 speculative or scientific arguments. To the objection of those who assert that the nature 
 of the soul, as of all real things, is material, he replies that the truth of this doctrine 
 would involve the truth of Atheism, but that Atheism is refuted by the fact of the wise 
 order which reigns in the world, and that the spiritual nature of God, which cannot be 
 denied, proves the possibility of immaterial existence (p. 184, b seq.). We may with the 
 same right conclude from the j^henomena of the human Microcosm to the actual existence 
 of an immaterial soul, as from the phenomena of the world as a whole to the reality of 
 God's existence (p. 188, b seq.). The soul is defined by Gregory as a created being, having 
 life, the power of thought, and, so long as it is provided with the proper organs, the power 
 of sensuous perception (p. 189, c). The power of thought is not an attribute of matter, 
 since, were it otherwise, matter would show itself endowed with it, would, for example, 
 combine its elements so as to form works of art (p. 192, b seq.). In its substantial exist- 
 ence, as separable from matter, the soul is like God; but this likeness does not extend 
 to the point of identity ; the soul only resembles God, as a copy resembles its original 
 (p. 196, a). As being "simple and uncompounded " {an/.ri koI acvvde-og (f>vaig) the soul 
 survives the dissolution of the composite body {pvyKpifia — p. 197, c), whose scattered 
 elements it continues and will continue to accompany, as if watching over its property, 
 until the resurrection, when it will clothe itself in them anew (p. 198, b seq.; cf. 213, a 
 seq.). Anger and desire do not belong to the essence of the soul, but are only among its 
 varying states {TzaOij rijq (pvoecj^ Kal ovk ovoid) ; they are not originally a part of ourselves, 
 and we can and must rid ourselves of them (p. 199, c seq.), and bring them, so long as 
 they continue to mark our community with the brute creation, into the service of good (p. 
 204, c seq.). Hades, which the soul enters after its separation from the world of sense, 
 is not a particular place; it means the Invisible {to aqiavtq ts /cat aeiSeg, p. 210, a; cf. 
 Plat., Phaedo, p. 80, d) ; those passages in the Bible in which the regions under the earth 
 are alluded to are explained by Gregory as not literal or descriptive of real localities, but 
 allegorical — although in this point Gregory would not strenuously resist the partisans of 
 the opposite interpretation, since in the principal point, the recognition of the soul's future 
 existence, he and they agree (p. 211, a seq.). God decrees to sinners severe and long-con- 
 tinued pains in eternity, not because he hates them, nor for the sake alone of punishing 
 them, but for their improvement, which latter cannot take place until the soul has under- 
 gone a painful purging from all its impurities (p. 226, b seq.). The degree of pain which 
 must thus be endured by each one is necessarily proportioned to the measure of his 
 wickedness (227, b). "When the process of purification has been completed, the better 
 attributes of the soul appear, imperishabilitj', life, honor, grace, glory, power, and, in short, 
 all that belongs to human nature as the image of divinity (p. 260, b). In this sense the 
 resurrection is the restoration of man to his original state — as Gregory often defines it 
 (avaoTaoK; ioTiv tj ilq to apx^iov tt)^ (pvaeur y/jciv aTTOKardaTaciq, p. 252, b et al.). 
 
 The doctrine of the final reunion of all things with God is too firmly rooted in Gregory's 
 conception of the negative nature and limited power of evil, and of the supreme goodness 
 of the God whose punishments aim only at the improvement of the sinner, to admit of the 
 passages in his writings, which contain this doctrine, being regarded as interpolations. 
 Such, according to the report of Photius {BiU. Cod., 233), the Patriarch Germanus of Con- 
 stantinople (about 700) pretended that they were; the Patriarch was evidently moved
 
 SAES^T AUGUSTINE. 333 
 
 hj the apologetic desire to save Gregory's orthodoxy. Yet it cannofc be denied that 
 Gregory's doctrine of freedom, as excluding all compulsion of the will in the direction of 
 goodness, does not accord well with the theory of the necessary return of every soul to 
 goodness ; one can but regret the absence of any attempt to remove this at least seeming 
 contradiction. 
 
 "Without doubt Augustine was a more highly gifted man than Gregory ; yet the Ori- 
 genistic and Gregorian form of teaching, as compared with the Augustinian, possesses never- 
 theless, in point of logic and moral spirit, advantages peculiar to itself which were never 
 reached by the Latin Church Father. 
 
 § 86. In Augustine the development of ecclesiastical doctrine in 
 the Patristic Period reaches its culminating point. Aurelius Augus- 
 tinus was born on the 13th of November, in the year 354, and died 
 August 28, 430, while Bishop of Hippo Pegius. His father was a 
 heathen, but his mother was a Christian, who brought up her son 
 in the Christian faith. He subsequently espoused the belief of the 
 Manichaeans and prepared himself by classical studies for the office of 
 a teacher of rhetoric. After a skeptical transition-period, when also 
 Platonic and Neo-Platonic speculations had prepared him for the 
 change, he was won over by Arabrosius to Catholic Christianity, in the 
 service of which he thenceforth labored as a defender and constructor 
 of doctrines, and also practically as a priest and bishop. Against the 
 Skepticism of the Academics Augustine urges that man needs the 
 knowledge of truth for his happiness, that it is not enough merely to 
 inquire and to doubt, and he finds a foundation for all our knowledge, 
 a foundation invulnerable against every doubt, in the consciousness wei 
 have of our sensations, feelings, our willing, and thinking, in short, of 
 all our psychical processes. From the undeniable existence and pos- 
 session by man of some truth, he concludes to the existence of God as 
 the truth per se ; but our conviction of the existence of the material 
 world he regards as only an irresistible belief. Combating heathen 
 religion and philosophy, Augustine defends the doctrines and institu- 
 tions peculiar to Christianity, and maintains, in particular, against 
 the Neo-Platonists, whom he rates most highly among all the ancient 
 philosophers, the Christian theses that salvation is to be found in 
 Christ alone, that divine worship is due to no other being beside the 
 triune God, since he created all things himself, and did not commission 
 inferior beings, gods, demons, or angels to create the material world ; 
 that the soul with its bodv will rise ac'ain to eternal salvation or 
 damnation, but will not return periodically to renewed life upon the 
 earth ; that the soul does not exist before the body, and tliat the latter
 
 334 SAINT AUGUSTINE. 
 
 is not the prison of the former, but that the soul begins to exist at the 
 same time with the body ; that the workl both had a beginning and 
 is perishable, and that only God and the souls of angels and men are 
 eternal. — Against the dualism of the Manichseans, who regarded good 
 and evil as equally primitive, and represented a portion of the divine 
 substance as having entered into the region of evil, in order to war 
 against and conquer it, Augustine defends the monism of the good 
 principle, or of the purely spiritual God, explaining evil as a mere 
 negation or privation, and seeking to show from the finiteness of the 
 things in the world, and from their differing degrees of perfection, 
 that the evils in the world are necessary, and not in contradiction 
 with the idea of creation ; he also defends, in opposition to Mani- 
 chseism (and Gnosticism in general), the Catholic doctrine of the 
 essential harmony between the Old and New Testaments. Against 
 the Donatists, Augustine maintains the unity of the Church. In 
 opposition to Pelagius and the Pelagians, he asserts that divine grace 
 is not conditioned on human worthiness, and maintains the doctrine 
 of absolute predestination, or, that from the mass of men who, through 
 the disobedience of Adam (in whom all mankind were present poten- 
 tially), have sunk into corruption and sin, some are chosen by the free 
 election of God to be monuments of his grace, and are brought to 
 believe and be saved, while the greater number, as monuments of his 
 justice, are left to eternal damnation. 
 
 The works of St. Angustine ■were published at Basel in 1506, and subsequently — edited by Erasmus — in 
 152S-29 and 1569. An edition by the Lovanienses theologi appeared at Antwerp in 1577, another, by the 
 Benedictines of the Maurine Congregation, at Paris, lC89-1700(£'rf. A'o'P., Antwerp, 1700-1708), and still 
 another, in more recent times, at Paris, 1835-40. Of the numerous writings of Augustine the Ccmfeafiiones 
 {ed. stereotyp., Leipsic, 1S07) and De Civitate Dei (Leipsic, 1S25, Cologne, 1850, Leipsic, 1S63), have very 
 frequently been edited separately; Krabinger's edition of the Enchiridion ad Laiirentium de Fide,, Spe 
 et Caritate (Tiibingen, 1861) is distinguished by its critical exactness. Of. Busch, Librorum Augustini 
 Recensv^, Dorpat, 1S26. In Migne's Pair.,, the works of Augustine form Vols. XXXII.-XLVII. of the 
 Latin Fathers. The fourth volume of a French translation, made under the direction of Ponjoulat and 
 Kaulx, and to be completed in fifteen volumes, appeared at Montauban, in 1866. 
 
 The Biography of Augiistine, by his younger friend Possidius, is to be found in most of the editions 
 of Augustine's works (especially in Vol. X. of the Maurine edition) ; it serves as a complement to Augus- 
 tine's own Confessions. Of the numerous modern works on Augustine, the most comprehensive are those 
 of G. F. Wiggers (VersJich einer pragmat. Dcirstellung den Augaxtinismtis u. Pelagianisnius, Hamburg, 
 1821-33), Kloth (Der heilige KirchenUhrer An^ustinux, Aix-la-Chapclle. 1840); C. Bindemann (T)er heilige 
 Any., Vol. I., Berlin, 1844; Vol. II., Leipsic, 1S56 : Vol. III., Greifswald, 1869). Friedrich Biihringer, in his 
 Oetch. d. Kirclie Chr. (I. 3, Ziirich, 1845, pp. 99-774), Neander {Ch. HUt.) and Schaff (CA. ffist.), treat 
 with great fullness of Augustine. On Augustine's doctrine of time, cf. Fortlage (Heidelberg, 1836); on his 
 psychology : Gangauf (Augsburg, 1852) and Ferraz (Paris, 1SG3, 2d edition, ISOO) ; on his logic: Prantl (Gesch. 
 der Logik im Abendlande, I., Leipsic, 1S55, pp. 665-672) ; on his doctrine of cignition : Jac. Merten ( Ueber 
 die Bedeutun/j der ErkenntnissUhre des heiligen. Angustimts und. des heiligen Thomas von Aquino fiir 
 den gesch. Eniwickhm.gsgang der Philosophie als reiner rernun/ticissenschn/t, Treves, 1865), and Nic. Jos. 
 Lndw. Schutz (Divi An^gmtini de origine et via cognitinnis intellectualis doctrina ab ontologismi nota 
 vindicata, comm. philos., Munster, 1867); on his doctrine of self-knowledge: E. Melzer (Aug. atque
 
 SAINT AUGUSTINE. 335 
 
 CurieHi placita de mentis humanae mii cognitione quomodo inter ge ccmffntant a xe/ieque differant^ dixft. 
 inaug., Bonn, 1S60): on liis doctrine of sin and grace in relation to the doctrines of Paul and the Reformers: 
 Zeller (in the Theol. Jahrb., Tubingen, 1854. pp. 295 seq.); on his doctrine of miracles: Friedr. Nitzsch 
 (Berlin, 18(15); on his doctrine of God as triune: Theodor Gangauf (.\ugsbnrg, 1866); on his philosophy <.f 
 history: Jos. Eeinkens (Schaffhausen, 1S6C). Of the more recent French works on Augustine the mojt 
 comprehensive is F. Nourrisson's La Philosophie de St. Augvstin, Paris. 1S65. 2d ed., 1SC6. Cf. also A. F. 
 Hewitt, The Problems of t/te Age, with Studies in St. Augustine, New Tork, 1863. 
 
 Augustine's father, Patricius, remained a heathen until shortly before his death; his 
 mother, Monica, was a Christian, and exerted a profound influence over her son. Educated 
 at Thagaste, Madaura, and Carthage, Augustine followed first in his native city, then at 
 Carthage and Rome, and from 384—386 in Milan, the vocation of a teacher of eloquence; 
 yet his interest always centered chiefly in theological problems. The Hortensius of Cicero 
 awakened in the young man, who had been addicted to sensuous pleasures, the love of 
 philosophical inquiry. The biblical Scriptures failed at that time, in respect of form and 
 content, to satisfy him. To the question of the origin of evil, the Manicha;an dualism 
 seemed to him to furnish the most satisfactory answer ; the supporters of this doctrine 
 seemed to him, also, to judge more correctly, when they rejected the Old Testament as 
 contradicting the New, than did the Catholic Church, which presupposed the entire har- 
 mony of all biblical writings. But the contradictions of the Manich?ean doctrine in itself 
 and with astronomical facts gradually destroyed his faith in it, and he approached more 
 and more toward the skepticism of the New Academy, till finally (in the year 386) the 
 reading of certain writings of (Plato and) Neo-Platonists (in the translation of Victorinus) 
 turned him in the direction of a positive faith, and the preaching of Bishop Ambrosius at 
 Milan — which he had attended originally only on account of the rhetorical excellence of 
 the style of that orator — led him back to the Church. The allegorical interpretation of the 
 Old Testament removed its apparent contradictions with the New, and removed from the 
 notion of God that anthropomorphism which had given offense to Augustine ; and the 
 thought of the harmony of the divinely-created universe in all its parts converted him 
 from dualism. Augustine was baptized by Ambrosius at Easter in 387. Soon afterward 
 he returned to Africa, became in 391 priest at Hippo Regius and in 395 was raised to 
 the dignity of a bishop at the same place (first as assistant bishop of Valerius, who soon 
 afterward died). He waged an untiring combat against the Manichscans, Donatists, and 
 Pelagians, and labored for the confirmatioM and extension of the Catholic faith, advancing 
 constantly more and more from religious philosophy to positive dogmatics. He died on 
 the 28th of August, in the year 430. 
 
 The earliest of Augustine's works, written in his Manichaean period, while he was a 
 professional rhetorician, and entitled De Pulchro et Apto, is lost. Of his extant works, the 
 earliest is that directed against the skepticism of the Academics (Contra Academicos), which 
 he composed before his baptism, while residing at Cassiciacum, near Milan, in the autumn 
 of 386 ; at tlie same place he wrote the treatises De Beata Vita and De Ordine and the 
 Soliloquia, and after his return to Milan, but also before his baptism, the De TmmoriaJiiaie 
 Animae, wliich is the sketch of a continuation of the Soliloquies, and a book on Grammar. 
 Here also he began to write works on Dialectic, Rhetoric, Geometry, Arithmetic, Music, and 
 Philosophy (August., Retract, I. 6). Still, the genuineness of the works on grammar and on 
 the principles of dialectic and rhetoric, published among his writings, has been questioned ; 
 according to Prantl's showing, the Frincipia Dialectices may perhaps be considered as 
 genuine, while the supplementary treatise on the ten categories is spurious ; the latter is 
 perhaps (as Prantl conjectures) a modification of Themistius' paraphrase of the Categories 
 of Aristotle (cf. W. Crecelius, S. Aurelii Augustini de Diakctica Liber, G.-Pr., Elberfeld,
 
 33G SAINT AUGUSTINE. 
 
 1857, for the arguments in favor of the genuineness of the Dialectic and Rhetoric at- 
 tributed to Augustine, and for the spuriousness of the G^-ammar, together with emenda- 
 tions of the text of the Dialectic). The work on immortality was followed by another on 
 the G-reatness of the Soul, composed while Augustine was stopping at Rome, on his return 
 from Milan to Africa ; this was succeeded by the three books on the Freedom of the Will, 
 directed against the Manichaian solution of the question of tlie origin of evil — of which 
 books ho wrote the two last in Africa — and by the works on the Morals of the Catholic 
 Church and on the Morals of the Manichceans, which were likewise begun at Rome ; at 
 Thagaste, whither he returned in 388, he composed, among other works, the books on Music, 
 the work De Genesi contra Manichceos — an allegorical interpretation of the biblical history 
 of creation — and the book De Vera Eeligione, which he had already projected while at 
 Cassiciacum ; this latter work was an attempt to develop faith into knowledge. His works 
 against Manicha^ism are the De Utilitate Credendi, which was written while Augustine was 
 presbyter at Hippo, the De duabus Aniviahtis, in which he combats the doctrine of the 
 union of a good and a bad soul in man, the work against Adimantus, the disciple of Mani, 
 which discusses the relation of the Old Testament to the New, and the Disputation ivilh 
 Fortunatus; in the period of Augustine's presbyterial functions, fall also — besides numer- 
 ous expositions of the books of Scripture, including a literal interpretation of the first 
 part of Genesis — a discourse concerning faith and the symbol or confession of faith, and 
 his casuistical work on lying. Of the works subsequently composed by Augustine, after 
 he was made a bishop, the greater number were polemical writings aimed against the 
 Donatists and the Pelagians, being written in the former case in defense of the unity of 
 the Church, and in the latter in defense of the dogma of original sin and of the predestina- 
 tion of man by the free grace of God ; of especial importance are the works on the Trinity 
 (400-410) and on the City of God {De Civitate Dei), the latter Augustine's principal work, 
 begun in 413, completed in 426. The Confessiones \fevQ written about 400. The Eefrac- 
 tationes Avere written by Augustine a few years before his death, and are a review of his 
 own works, together with corrective remarks, which, for the most part, were intended to 
 restrict those of his earlier opinions which were deemed too favorable to the sciences and 
 to human freedom, so as to make them strictly accordant with the teaching of the Church. -'^ 
 
 The knowledge which Augustine seeks is the knowledge of God and of himself {So- 
 liloqu., I. 7 : Deum et animam scire cupio. Nihilne plus ? Nihil omnino. Ih., II. 4 : Deus 
 semper idem, noverim me, noverim te!) Of tlie principal branches of philosophy, etliics or 
 the doctrine of the highest good rightly fulfills its task only when it finds this good in the 
 enjoyment of God ; dialectic is valuable as an instrumental science, as the doctrine of cog- 
 nition, teaching how to teach and how to learn {De Ord., II., 38; cf. De Civ. Dei, YIII. 10: 
 rationalem piartem sive logicam, in qua quaeritur, quonam modo Veritas percipi possit) ; physics 
 is of value only in so far as it teaches of God, the supreme cause; otherwise it is super- 
 fluous, or so far as it contributes nothing to our salvation {Confess., V. 7 : beatus autem qui te 
 scit etiamsi ilia nesciat; qui vero et te et ilia novit, non propter ilia beatior, sed propter te solum 
 beatus est; ib., X. 55: hinc ad perscrutanda naturae, quae praeter nos est, operta j^roceditur, 
 quae scire nihil prodest). In opposition to the thought expressed in his early work, De 
 Ordine (II. 14, 15), that the sciences constitute the way which leads us to the knowledge 
 of the order which reigns in all things, and consequently to the knowledge of the divine 
 wisdom, Augustine observes in the Retractationes (I. 3. 2), that there are many holy men 
 who are not acquainted with the liberal sciences, and that many who are acquainted with 
 them are without holiness. Science profits only where love is, otherwise she puffs iip. 
 Humility must cure us of the impulse to seek for unprofitable knowledge. To the good 
 angels the knowledge of material things, with which demons are puffed up, appears mean 
 
 >l. 
 
 I
 
 SAINT ATJGTJSTINE. 337 
 
 in comparison with the sanctifying love of the immaterial and immutable God ; they have a 
 more certain knowledge of things temporal and changeable, for the very reason that they 
 behold the first causes of those things in the Word of God, by whom the world was made 
 {De Civ. Dei, IX. 22). This view of Augustine respecting the relative value or worthless- 
 ness of the various sciences exercised a decisive influence on the entire intellectual charac- 
 ter of the Christian world of the Middle Ages. 
 
 "With his opinion of philosophy corresponds Augustine's judgment respecting the phi- 
 losophers before Christ (which it is worth while to reproduce here, more particularly on 
 account of its influence in subsequent times). In the eighth book of the Civitas Dei (ch. 
 2) he gives a sketch of the "Italic" and "Ionic" philosophy before Socrates; by the 
 former he understands the Pythagorean philosophy, in the latter he includes the doctrine 
 of Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, and his two pupils Anaxagoras and Diogenes, of 
 whom, he says, the former conceived God as the fashioner of matter, while the latter 
 regarded air as the substance in which the divine reason inhered. One of Anaxagoras' 
 disciples, says Augustine, was Archelaus, and he is said to have had for a disciple Soc- 
 rates, who (ch. 3) first limited all philosophy to ethics, either on account of the obscurity 
 of physics, or, as some, who were more disposed to favor Socrates, have judged, because 
 none but a mind ethically purified should venture on the investigation of the eternal light, 
 in which the causes of all created beings live unchangeable. Of the disciples of Socrates, 
 Augustine only mentions briefly Aristippus and Antisthenes, and then discourses more fully- 
 (ch. 4 seq.) of Plato and the Neo-Platonists as the most eminent of all ancient thinkers. 
 After the death of Socrates, Plato familiarized himself with the wisdom of the Egyptians 
 and the Pythagoreans. He divided philosophy into moralis, naturalis, and rationalis philo- 
 Sophia; the latter belongs principally (together with natural philosophy) to theoretical 
 {contemplativa) philosophy, while moral philosophy is equivalent to practical {activa) phi- 
 losophy. Plato, continues Augustine, retained in his writings the Socratic method of con- 
 cealing his own opinions to that extent, that it is difficult to know what was his real belief 
 respecting the most important subjects. Augustine prefers, therefore, to confine himself to 
 the later Platonists, " qui Plaionem ceteris philosophis gentium longe recteque praelatum acutius 
 aique veracius intellexisse atque secuti esse fama celebriore laudaniur." Augustine numbers 
 Aristotle among the Old Platonists, but adds that he founded a '^secta" or "haeresis'' of his 
 own, distinct from the Academics ; he was a " vir excellentis ingenii ei eloquio Platoni quidem 
 impar, sedmxdtos facile super ans " {De Civ. Dei, YIII. 12). The later followers of Plato desired 
 to be called, not academics nor Peripatetics, but Platonists, pre-eminent among whom were 
 Plotinus, Porphyry, and Jamblichus. For them God is the caxisa subsistendi. the ratio intelli- 
 gendi, and the ordo vivendi (ch. 4). " No philosophers have approached nearer to us than did 
 they " (ch. 5). Their doctrine is superior to the "fabulons religion " of the poets, the '• civil 
 religion " of the pagan state, and the " natural religion "' of all other ancient philosophers, 
 including that of the Stoics, who thought to find the first cause of all things in fire, and that 
 of the Epicureans, who found the same in the atoms, and both of which philosophical sects 
 were too sensualistic in tlieir theories of knowledge and too little theological in their ethics. 
 In searching for the eternal and immutable God, the Platonists, with reason, went beyond 
 the material world and the soul and the realm of mutable spirits {De Civ. Dei, YIII. 6 : 
 cuncia corpora transscenderunt quaerentcs Deum ; omnem animam mxitabilesque omnes sjyiritus 
 transscenderunt quaerentes summum Deum). But they separated themselves from the truth 
 as held by Christians, in paying religious veneration, not only to this supreme God, 
 but also to inferior deities and demons, who are not creators {De Civ. Dei, XII. 24). The 
 Christian, even without the aid of philosophy, knows from the Holy Scriptures, that God 
 is our Creator, our teacher, and the giver of grace {De Civ. Dei, YIII. 10). Some Chris- 
 Si}
 
 338 SAINT AUGUSTINE. 
 
 tians have been led, in their astonishment at the agreement of Plato's theology with 
 that of the Scriptures, to the belief that, while he was in Egypt, he heard the prophet Jere- 
 miah, or even read the prophetic Scriptures ; Augustine confesses that for a time he him- 
 self entertained that opinion (expressed by him, De Dodr. Christ, II. ch. 29) ; but he finds 
 (De Civ. Dei, VIII. 11), that Plato lived considerably later than Jeremiah; he holds it not 
 impossible that Plato made himself acquainted with the contents of the biblical writings 
 by means of an interpreter, and thinks that he may have drawn his doctrine of the immu- 
 tability of God from the biblical expressions : Ego sum qui sum, and qui est, misit me ad vos 
 (Exod. iii. 14); yet he (ch. 12) holds it quite as possible that Plato inferred the eternal 
 being of God from the contemplation of the world, according to the words of the Apostle 
 (Rom. i. 19 seq.). The Platonists were not altogether without a knowledge even of the 
 Trinity, although they speak of three Gods with undisciplined words {De Civ. Dei, X. 29). 
 But they reject the doctrine of the incarnation of the immutable Son of God, and do not 
 believe that the divine reason, which they call TzarpLKoq voir, took on itself a human 
 body and suffered the death of the cross ; for they do not truly and loyally love wisdom 
 and virtue, they despise humility, and illustrate in themselves the words of the prophet 
 (Isaiah xxix. 14) : perdam sapientiam sapientium et prudentiam prudentium, reprobaho {De 
 Civ. Dei, X. 29). These philosophers saw, though obscurely, the goal, the eternal father- 
 land ; but they missed their way, and their disciples are now ashamed to leave the school 
 of Plato for the school of Christ, who by the Holy Ghost gave to the fisherman, John, the 
 knowledge of the Incarnate "Word {ih., ch. 29). Not he who, following reason, lives 
 according to human customs, but only he who subjects his spirit to the will of God and 
 follows God's commands, can be saved {Retract, I. 1. 2). 
 
 In the earliest of his extant works Augustine seeks to demonstrate, in opposition to the 
 Academics, the existence of a necessary element in knowledge. It is a characteristic 
 feature of his discussion of this subject that he does not begin with the question of the 
 origin of knowledge, but with the question, whether the possession of truth is one of our 
 wants, or whether, without it, happiness is possible ; or, in other words, that he proceeds, 
 in the first instance, not genetically, but teleologically. One of the interlocutors, the 
 youthful Licentius, defends the proposition, that the mere searching for truth makes us 
 happy, since wisdom or the life according to reason, and the intellectual perfection of man, 
 on which his happiness depends, consist, at least during his earthly life, not in the posses- 
 sion, but in the loyal and unceasing pursuit, of truth. Trygetius, a young man of the 
 same age with Licentius, afBrms, on the contrary, that it is necessary to possess the truth, 
 since constant searching without finding is synonymous with erring. Licentius replies, 
 that error consists rather in assenting to the false instead of the true ; that seeking is not 
 error, but rather wisdom, and is, as it were, the straight way of life, by following which 
 man frees his spirit from the entanglements of the body, so far as this is possible, unites 
 all its powers within itself, and becomes at the end of his life worthy to attain his true 
 end, the enjoyment of divine, as now he enjoys human, happiness. But Augustine himself 
 does not at all approve the doctrine of Licentius. He afBrms, first, that without the true 
 the probable is unattainable, which yet the Academics held to be attainable, and then, that 
 the true, to which the probable is similar — this similarity constituting the essence of the 
 probable — is the standard by which the probable is known. He then remarks that no one, 
 certainly can be wise without wisdom ; and that every definition of wisdom, which ex- 
 cludes knowledge from the idea of wisdom and makes the latter equivalent to the mere 
 confession of ignorance, and to abstinence from all assent, identifies wisdom with nullity or 
 with the false, and is therefore untenable. (It is obvious that Augustine here leaves 
 wisdom in the sense of a "way of living," out of consideration.) But if knowledge
 
 SAINT AUGUSTINE. 339 
 
 belongs to wisdom, then it belongs also to happiness, for only the wise man is happy. Ee 
 who lightly pretends to the name of the wise man without possessing the knowledge of 
 truth, draws around himself only pitiable, deceived followers, who, always seeking, but 
 never finding, with mind desolate and inspired by no living breath of truth, must end by 
 cursing their misleading guides. Besides, the pretended inability of man to attain to 
 knowledge does not exist, on which the Academics found their demand that men should 
 always withhold their assent. It is neither true that the impressions of the senses are 
 altogether deceptive, nor that thought is fully dependent on them; a certain kind of 
 knowledge is arrived at even in physics and ethics through our dialectical knowledge of 
 the necessity, that of the two alternatives of a contradictory disjunction, the one must be 
 true (certum enim habeo, aut unum esse mundum aut non unum, et si non unum, aut finiti 
 numeri aut injiniti, etc.). In the work De Beata Vita, Augustine adds the argument, that 
 no one can be happy who is not in possession of that which he wishes to possess ; but no 
 one seeks who does not wish to find; he, therefore, who seeks the truth, without finding 
 it, has not that which he wishes to find, and is not happy. Nor is he wise, for the wise 
 man, as such, must be happy. So, too, he who seeks after God, has indeed already God's 
 grace, which leads him, but has not yet come to complete wisdom and happiness. In the 
 Betraclationes, however, Augustine emphasizes rather the thought, that perfect blessedness 
 is not to be expected till the future life. 
 
 Seeking, in opposition to Skepticism, an indubitable certitude as a point of departure i 
 for all philosophical investigation, Augustine finds it, in his work Contra Academicos, in all 
 disjunctive propositions, on the one hand, and remarks, on the other, that our sensible ^ 
 perceptions are at least subjectively true : noli plus assentiri quam ut ita iibi apparere per' 
 suadeas, et nulla deceptio est {Contra Acad., III. 26), and in the nearly synchronous work De 
 Beata Vita (ch. 7), he lays down the principle, which has been so fruitful in philosophy, ! 
 that it is impossible to doubt one's own living existence — a principle, which, in the Solilo- 
 quia, written immediately afterward, is expressed in this form: thought, and therefore the 
 existence of the thinker, are the most certain of all things {Sol., II. 1 : Tu, qui its te nosse, 
 tcis esse te ? Scio. Unde sets f Nescio. Simplicem te sentis an midtiplice^n f Kesdo. Mover i 
 te scis ? Nescio. Cogitare te scis ? Scio). In like manner, Augustine concludes (in De Lib. -, 
 Arbitr., II. 7) from the possibility of our being deceived {/alii posse) to the fact of our i 
 existence, and makes being, life, and thought co-ordinate. (Cf. De Vera Eeligione, 72: ' 
 noli foras ire, in te redi, in interiore hx/mine habitat Veritas, et si animam mutabilem in- 
 veneris, transscende te ipsum. Ibid. 73: omnis, qui se dvbitaniem inielligit, verum intelligit, 
 et de hue re, quam intelligit, certus est. Omnis igiiur qui utrum sit Veritas dubitat, in se ipso 
 hahet verum unde non dubitet, nee ullum verum nisi veritaie verum est. Non itaque oportet eum 
 de veriiate dubitare, qui potuit undecunque dubitare. De Trinitate, X. 14: utrum aeris sit vis 
 Vivendi — an ignis — dubitaverunt homines ; vivere se tam.en et meminisse et intclligere et velle et 
 cogitare et scire etjudicare quis dubitett quandoquidem etiam si dubitat, vivit, si dubitat, unde 
 dubitet meminit, si dubitat, dvhitare se intelligit, si dubitat, certus esse vtdt, si dubitat, cogiiat, 
 si dubitat, scit se nescire, si dubitat, judical non se temere consentire oportere. Ibid. XIT. 7 : 
 nihil enim tarn novit mens, quam id, quod sibi praesto est, nee menti magis quidquam praesio 
 est, quam ipsa sibi.) In De Civ. Dei, XI. 26, Augustine finds an image of the divine 
 Trinity in the triad of our being, our knowledge of our being and our self-love, in 
 regard to which error is impossible {nam et sumus et nos esse novimus et id esse ac nosse 
 diligimus; in his autem tribus quae dixi, nulla nos falsitas verisimilis turbat; non enim ea, 
 sicut ilia quae /oris sunt, vllo sensu corporis tangimus, . . . quorum sensibilium etiam imagines 
 iis simillimas nee jam corporeas cogitaiione versamus, memoria tenemus et per ipsas in 
 istorum desideria concitamur, sed sine uUa phantasiarum vel phantasmatum imaginatione
 
 340 
 
 SAINT AUGUSTINE. 
 
 ludificatoria mihi esse me idque nosse et amare certissimum est). That material bodies 
 exist, we can indeed only believe; but this belief is necessary in practice {Confess., VI- 
 7), and because not to believe thus would lead to worse errors {De Civ. Dei., XIX. 
 I 18). Faith is also necessary to the knowledge of the wills of other men {De Fide 
 , Eerum, quae non Vid., 2). Faith, in the most general sense, is assenting to an idea {cum 
 asseiisione cogitare, De Praedest. Sanct, 5). That which we know, we also believe; but 
 not all, that we believe, are we able immediately to know ; faith is the way to knowl- 
 edge {De Div., qu 83, qu. 48 and 68; De Trin., XV. 2; EpisL, 120). When we reflect 
 upon ourselves, we find in ourselves not only sensations, but also an internal sense which 
 makes of the former its objects (for we have knowledge of our sensations, but the 
 external senses are imable to perceive their own sensations), and, finallj", reason, which 
 knows both the internal sense and itself {De Lib. Arb., II. 3 seq.). That which judges is 
 always superior to that which is judged ; but that, according to which judgment is ren- 
 dered, is also superior to that wliich judges. The human reason perceives that there is 
 something higher than itself; for it is changeable, now knowing, now not knowing, now 
 seeking after knowledge, now not, now correctly, now incorrectly judging; but truth itself, 
 which is the norm according to which it judges, must be unchangeable {De Lib. Arb., 
 II. 6; De Vera Eel, 54, 57; De Civ. Dei, VIII. 6). If thou findest thy nature to be 
 changeable, rise above thyself to the eternal source of the light of reason. Even if thou 
 only knowest that thou doubtest, thou knowest what is true ; but nothing is true unless 
 1 truth exists. Hence it is impossible to doubt the existence of the truth itself {De Vera Bel., 
 j 72 seq.). Now the imchangeable truth is God. Nothing higher than it can be con- 
 I ceived, for it includes all true being {De Vera Eel., 57 ; De Trin., VIII. 3). It is identical 
 I with the highest good, in virtue of which all inferior goods are good {De Trin., VIII. 4; 
 quid plura et plura? bonum hoc et bonum illud? tolle hoc et illud et vide ipsum bonum, si 
 I pates, ita Deum videbis non alio bono bonum, sed bonwrn omnis boni). All ideas are in God. 
 I He is the eternal ground of all form, who imparted to created objects their temporal 
 ^ forms {De Div., qu. 46; De Ideis, 2: Sunt namque ideae principales formae quaedam vel 
 ra.iiones rerum stabiles et incommutabiles, quae ipsae formatae non sunt atque per hoc aeternae 
 ac semper eodem modo se habentes, quae in divina intelligentia continentur, et quum ipsae neqve 
 oriantur neque intereant, secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne, quod interire potest et 
 i omne, quod oritur et interit) ; he is the absolute unity to which all that is finite aspires, 
 without ever fully reaching it, the highest beautj-, which is superior to and the condition 
 of all other beauty {^^ omnis pulchrltudinis forma unitas esC"); he is absolute wisdom, 
 blessedness, justice, the moral law, etc. {De Vera Eel., 21 et al. ; De Lib. Arb., II. 9 seq. ; 
 De Trin., XIV. 21). The mutability of created things is to us a reminder of the immuta- 
 bility of the truth {Conf, XI. 10). Plato did not err in positing the existence of an intelli- 
 gible world ; this was the name which he applied to the eternal and unchangeable reason, 
 by which God made the world ; he who refuses to accept this doctrine must say that God 
 proceeded irrationally in the creation of the world {Eetract., I. 3. 2). In the One divine 
 wisdom are contained immeasurable and infinite treasures of intelligible things, in which 
 are included all the invisible and immutable rational grounds of things {rationes rerum), not 
 excepting the visible and mutable things, which were created by the divine wisdom {De Civ. 
 Dei, XL 10. 3 ; cf. DeDiv., quaest. 83, qu. 26. 2 : singula igitur propriis sunt creata rationibiis). 
 In the case of bodies, substance and attribute are different ; even the soul, if it shall ever 
 become wise, will become such only by participation in the unchangeable wisdom itself, 
 ( with which it is not identical. But in beings whose nature is simple, and which are ulti- 
 mate and original and truly divine, the quality does not differ from the substance, since 
 auch beings are divine, wise, and happy in themselves, and not by participation in something
 
 SAINT AUGUSTIHE. 341 
 
 foreign to them (De Civ. Dei, XL 10. 3). In the same manner it is tnie of God himself that 
 the distinction of quality and substance, and, in short, of all the (Aristotelian) categories, is ' 
 inapplicable to him. God falls under no one of the categories {De Trin., Y. 2 : ut sic intelli- 
 garnus Deurn, si possumus, qvantum jyossumus, sine qualitate bonum, sine quantitate magmiTn, 
 sine iudigentia creatorem, sine situ jiraesidcntem, sine habitu omnia continentem, sine loco 
 ubuiue totum, sine tempore sempiternum, sine ulla sui mutatione mutahilia facientem nihilqve 
 patientem). Even the category of substance is not properly appUcable to God, although he ^ 
 in the liighest sense is or has reality (De Trin.. VH. 10: res ergo mutabiles neque simplices 
 proprie diamtur substantiae: Dtus auttm si subsistit ut substantia proprie did possit, inest in to 
 aliquid tamquam in subjecto et nan est simplex, — unde mani/estum est De^xm abusive substan- 
 iiam vocari, ut nomine usitatiore intelligatur essentia quod vere ac proprie dicitur). Yet' 
 Augustine prefers to follow the terminology of the Church (ib., II. 35), all the more 
 because an adequate knowledge of God and the power adequately to name him are unat- / 
 tainable by man in tliis earthly life {De Trin., YII. 1 : verius enim cogitatur Deus, quam 
 dicitur, et verius est, quam cogitatur). It may be questioned whether any positive affirma- 
 tion respecting him is literally true {De Trin., Y. 11 ; cf. Con/., XI. 26) ; we know with 
 certainty onh' what he is not {De Ord., II. 44, 47); yet it is no inconsiderable advan- 
 tage to be able to deny of God what does not belong to him {Dc Trin., YIII. 3). If 
 we had no knowledge whatever of God we could not invoke and love him {De Trin., 
 VIII. 12; Confess., 1. 1, YII. 16). God is, as was rightly perceived and acknowledged by the 
 Platonists, the principle of being and knowledge, and the guiding-star of life {Confess., 
 YII. 16; De Civ. Dei, YIII. 4). He is the light in which we see the intelligible, the 
 light of eternal reason; what we know, we know only in him {Conf, X. 65 ; XII. 35 ; De 
 Trin., XII. 24). 
 
 God is the Triune. Augustine confesses his belief in the Trinity in the sense estab- \ 
 lished by Athanasius and adopted by the Church, and seeks by various analogies to render 
 the conception more accessible to the common apprehension {De Civ. Dei, XI. 24: credi- 
 mus et tenemus et fideliter praedicamus quod Pater genuerit Verbum, hoc est Sapientiam, ptr 
 qtiam facta sunt omnia, unigenitum Filium, u?ius unum, aeternus coaeternum, summe bonus 
 aequaliter bonum, et quod Spiritus sanctus sijyiul et Pairis et Filii sit Spiritus et ipse consub- 
 stantialis et cocietcrnus ambobus, atque hoc totum et Trinitas sit propter proprietatem personarum 
 et unitrS Deus propter inseparabiJem divinitatem, sicut unus omnipotens propter inseparabilem 
 omnipotentiam, ita tamen, ut etiam quum de singulis quaeritur, unusquisque eorum et Deus et 
 omnipotens esse respondeatur, quum vero de omnibus simul, non ires dii vet tres omnipotentes, 
 sed unus Deus omnipotens ; tanta ibi est in ti-ibus inseparabilis unitas, quae sic se voluit praedi- 
 cart). Augustine does not (with Gregory of Nyssa, Basilius, and others) conceive the 
 relation of the three divine persons or hypostases to the unity of the divine essence 
 as similar to the relation of finite individuals to their universal {i. e., the relation of Peter. 
 Paul, and Barnabas to the essence of man); the substance of the Godhead is realized fullv 
 and completely in each of the three persons {De Trin., YII. 11). Augustine repudiates, T 
 indeed, decidedly the heresy of the Sabellians, who with the unity of the essence of God 
 affirmed also the imity of his person ; but the analogies which he employs to illustrate the , 
 nature of the Trinity are taken from the sphere of individual existence ; so, in particular, j 
 the analogy drawn from the combination of being, life, and knowledge in man {DeLib. Arh.,S 
 II. 7), or, as Augustine afterward preferred to put it, the analogy from the union cf 
 being, knowledge, and love in man {Confess., XIII. 11; De Trin., IX. 4; De Civ. Dei, XI. 
 26), or from memory, thought, and will, or, within the sphere of reason, from the con- 
 sciousness of eternity, wisdom, and love of blessedness {De Trin., XI. 16; XY. 5 seq.), as 
 also the analogy to the Trinity which he finds in all created things, in that they all unite
 
 342 SAINT AUGUSTINE. 
 
 ia themselves being in general, their own particular being, and the orderly combination of 
 the former (the universal) with the latter (the particular, De Vera Rel, 13: esse, species, 
 ordo; of. De Trin., XI. 18: mensura, numerus, pondus). The trace of the Trinity appears, so 
 far as this is consistent with the dignity of the latter, in all creatures (De Trin., VI. 10). 
 
 The being of God is the highest and most complete form of being (summa essentia, 
 summe est), and is therefore unchangeable {immutabilis). To the things which he created 
 out of nothing he gave various degrees of being, but to none of them such being as his 
 own. He assigned to them, also, a natural order (naturas essentiarum gj-adibus ordinavit, 
 De Civ. Dei, XII. 2 seq.). The opposite of God is not being, in any of its forms, but 
 non-being, and evil which is related to the latter as its product [De Civ. Dei, XII. 2 seq.). 
 The good God was free and subject to no necessity in creating the world, and his object 
 was to create something good {De Civ. Dei, XI. 21 seq.). The world bears witness through 
 its order and beauty to its divine authorship {ib., XI. 4). God created it, not out of his 
 own essence, for then it would have been equal with God, but out of nothing [De Civ. Dei, 
 XI. 10 ; Confess., XII. 7). As being creative substance, God is in all places {uhique diffusus). 
 The preservation of the world is a continual creation. If God should withdraw from the 
 world his creative power, it would straightway lapse into nothingness {De Civ. Dei, XII. 
 25). His creative work is not an eternal one ; for since the world is finite, it must be 
 limited in time as in space. Yet we are not to conceive unlimited periods of time as having 
 preceded the creation of the world, nor infinite spaces as existing outside of it ; for time 
 and space exist, not out of the world, but in and with it. Time is the measure of motion ; 
 but in the eternal there is no motion or change. The world, therefore, was created with 
 time, rather than in time. But God's design and resolve to create the world existed from 
 eternity {De Civ. Dei, XI. 4 seq.). The world is not simple, as is all that is eternal, but 
 manifold, though not without unity ; the idea that many worlds exist is the product of an 
 empty play of the imagination {De Ord., I. 3 ; De Civ. Dei, XV. 5). 
 
 It was necessary that, in the order of the universe, that which is deemed mean and 
 inferior should not be wanting {De Civ. Dei, XII. 4). "We should not judge of things by 
 the standard of their utility to us, nor hold that to be bad which is injurious to us, but 
 should judge of each object according to its own nature ; every thing has its measure, its 
 form, and a certain harmony in itself. God is to be praised in view of all that exists {ib., 4 
 seq.). All being, as such, is good {De Vera Rel., 21 : in quantum est, quidquid est, bonum 
 est). Even matter has its place in the general order of things ; it was created by God ; its 
 excellence consists in its plasticity. The body is not the prison of the soul (De Vera 
 Eel, 36). 
 
 The soul is immaterial. There are found in it only functions, such as thought, know- 
 ing, willing, and remembrance, but nothing which is material {De Trin., X. 13). It is a 
 substance or subject, and not a mere attribute of the body (ibid., 15). It feels each affection 
 of the body at that point where the affection takes place, without being obliged first to 
 move itself to that place ; it is therefore wholly present both in the entire body and in each 
 part of it, whereas the corporeal is with each of its parts only in one place {Ep. 166 ad 
 Hier.,A; Contra Ep. Man., ch. 16). Augustine distinguishes as faculties in the soul, memory, 
 intellect, and will ; all passions are manifestations of the will {De Civ. Dei, XIV. 6 : voluntas 
 est quippe in omnibus, immo omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt). The relation of mem- 
 ory, intellect, and will to the soul must not be conceived as analogous to the relation of 
 color and figure to the body, or of accidents to the substratum in which they are found ; 
 for accidents can extend no farther than their substrata {subjecta, vnoKEifieva) — the figure 
 or color of one body cannot be those of another body. But the mind {mens) can, in 
 loving, love both itself and that which is other than itself; in knowing, know itself
 
 SAINT AUGUSTINE. 343 
 
 and that which is other than itself; hence memory, intellect, and will, share in the sub- 
 stantiality of the mind (De Trin., IX. 4), although the latter, not is, but Jias, the faculties 
 of memory, intellect, and love (ib., XV. 22). All these functions can be directed upon 
 themselves, the understanding can know itself, memory can remember that we possess 
 memory, the free will can make use of its freedom or not (De Lib. Arbitr., II. 19). 
 The immortality of the soul follows philosophically from its participation in immutable 
 Truth, and from its essential union with the eternal reason and with life (Solil., II. 2 seq. ; 
 De Imm. An., 1 seq.); sin robs it not of hfe, but only of blessedness {De Civ. Dei, YI. 12). 
 Yet it is faith alone which authorizes the hope of true immortality, or of eternal life in God 
 (De Trin., XIII. 12). (Cf Plato's argument in the Rep., X. p. 609, and the last argument iu 
 the Phaedo, above, p. 128). 
 
 The cause of evil is to be found in the will, which turns aside from the higher to the 
 inferior, or in the pride of those angels and men who turned away from God, who has abso- 
 lute being, to themselves, whose being was limited. Not that the inferior as such is evil, 
 but to decline to it from the higher is eviL The evil will works that which is evil, but ia 
 not itself moved by any positive cause ; it has no causa efficiens, but only a causa deficiens 
 (De Civ. Dei, XII. 6 seq.). Evil is not a substance or nature (essence), but a marring of 
 nature (the essence) and of the good, a "defect," a "privation," or "'loss of good," an 
 infraction of integrity, of beauty, of happiness, of virtue ; where there is no violation of 
 good there is no evil (Esse viiium et non nocere non potest). Evil, therefore, can only exist 
 as an adjunct of good, and that, not of the immutably, but only of the mutably good. An 
 absolute good is possible, but absolute evil is impossible (De Civ. Dei, XI. 22 ; XII. 3). 
 Such was Augustine's chief argument against Manichseism, which taught that evil was 
 equally original with good, and that it constituted a second essence side by side with the 
 good. Evil, continues Augustine, does not disturb the order and beauty of the universe ; it / 
 cannot wholly withdraw itself from subjection to the laws of God ; it does not remain 
 unpunished, and the punishment of it is good, inasmuch as thereby justice is executed; as 
 a painting with dark colors rightly distributed is beautiful, so also is the sum of things 
 beautiful for him who has power to view them all at one glance, notwithstanding the 
 presence of sin, although, when considered separately, their beauty is marred by the 
 deformity of sin (De Civ. Dei, XI. 23; XII. 3; cf De Vera Bel., 44: et est pulchritudo uni- 
 versae creaiurae per haec tria inculpabilis, damnationem peccatorum, exercitationem justorum, 
 per/ectionem beatorum). God would not have created those angels and men of whom he 
 knew beforehand that they would be wicked, if ho had not also known how they would 
 subserve the ends of goodness; the whole world thus consists, like a beautiful song, of 
 oppositions (contrariorum oppositione saeculi pulchritudo componitur, De Civ. Dei, XI. 18). 
 To these considerations Augustine attached so great an importance, that, unlike Origeu 
 and Gregory of Nyssa and others, he believed the doctrine of a general aTzoKardaracig 
 (or "restoration") unnecessary in a theodicy. 
 
 God created first the angels — a part of whom remained good, while the rest became 
 evil — and then the visible world and man; the angels are the "light," which God first 
 created (De Civ. Dei, XL 9). The human race began with one man, created in the begmning 
 by God (ib., XII. 9). Not only they err, who (like Apuleius) hold that the world and man 
 have always existed, but also those, who, on the authority of incredible writings, hold it to 
 be historically demonstrated that they have existed many thousands of years, since it 
 appears from the Holy Scriptures that it is not yet six thousand years since man was 
 created (ib., XII. 10). The shortness of this period is not sufficient to render the biblical 
 statement incredible ; for if, instead of six thousand, a countless number of thousands of 
 years had passed since man's creation, the number would still vanish, in comparison with
 
 34:1: 
 
 SAINT AUGD8TINE. 
 
 the previous eternity, in which God had not created man, into nothingness — like a drop 
 compared with the ocean, or rather m a manner incomparably more absolute {ib., XII. 12). 
 The (Stoic) belief, that after its destruction the world is renewed, and that all events repeat 
 themselves in successive world-periods, is altogether false ; Christ has died only once, and 
 will not agam enter into the bonds of death, and we shall in the future be eternally in the 
 presence of God {ib., XII. 13 seq.). 
 
 The first man contained, not indeed visibly, but in the foreknowledge of God, the 
 germ of two human communities, the secular state and the city of God ; for from him were 
 to spring the men, of whom some were to be united with the evil angels in punishment, 
 and the rest with the good angels in receiving rewards, according to the hidden, yet 
 just, decree of God, whose grace cannot bo unjust, and whose justice cannot be cruel {De 
 Civ. Dei, XII. 27). Through the fall of man, which was the result of disobedience to the 
 divine command, man became subject to death as his just punishment (ib., XIII. 1). Of 
 death, however, there are two kinds, namely, the death of the body, when the soul quits 
 it, and the death of the soul, when it is abandoned of God; the latter is not an absolute 
 cessation of existence and life, but the cessation of life from God. Death in the first sense 
 is indeed in itself an evil, but for the good it works only good ; the second death, which is 
 the summura malum, comes only to the bad. The body, as well as the soul, of man is des- 
 tined to rise again. The bodies of the righteous will be transfigured and become more 
 noble than was the body of the first man before the fall. The bodies of the wicked, on 
 the contrary, will be given over to everlasting suffering {ib., XIII. 2 seq.). Since Adam 
 had forsaken God, he was forsaken of God, and death in every sense was the punishment 
 with which he was threatened {ib., XIII. 12, 15); voluntarily depraved and justly con- 
 demned, he begot depraved and condemned children; for we were all in him, when "all of 
 us " consisted of him alone; the form in which we were to live as" individuals had not yet 
 been created and communicated to us, but there was already existent in Adam the natura 
 seminalis from which we were to arise, and smce this nature was stained with sin, given 
 over to death, and justly condemned, the same character was transmitted to the posterity 
 of Adam. Through the misuse of man's free will arose this prolonged mischief which is 
 leading the human race, radically corrupted, through a series of suSerings to eternal death, ■ 
 with the exception only of those who are redeemed by God's grace {ib., XIII. 14; cf. XXI. 
 1 2 : hinc est universa generis humani massa damnata, quoniam qui hoc primiitis admisit, cum ea 
 quae in illo fuerat radicata sua sti7-pe punitus est, ui nidlus ab Iwcjusto debitoque supplicio, nisi 
 misericordia et indehUa gratia liberetur). These theses seem to involve, with reference to 
 the origin of luimau souls, the doctrine of Generationism or Traducianism, to which Augus- 
 tine was m fact inclined on account of his doctrine of original sin ; yet he never took ground 
 decidedly in its favor, but only rejected the doctrine of pre-existence as erroneous, and 
 with it renounced the Platonic doctrine of learning as a species of reminiscence {De Quant. 
 An., 20) ; nor did he express his disapproval of Creationism, according to which each soul 
 is the result of a special creative act on God's part, but remained undecided to the end 
 {Retract., I. 1. 3 seq. ; cf. De Trin., XII. 15). Adam did not sin from a motive of mere 
 sensual pleasure, but, like the angels, from pride {ib., XIV. 3; 13). Human nature, ruined 
 by the original sin, can be restored only by its author (XIV. 11). For the purpose of this 
 restoration Christ appeared. Looking forward to redemption, God permitted the temptation 
 and fall of the first man, although it was in his power to cause that neither an angel nor a 
 man should sin; but he would not remove the question of their remaining holy or becoming 
 sinful from their own voluntary decision, in order that it might be shown how much evil 
 their pride and how much good his grace could accomplish (XIV. 21). Voluntary service 
 is better than involuntary ; our mission is to serve God freely {servire liberaliter Deo).
 
 sAmr AUGUSTINE. 345 
 
 The freedom of the will is only by grace and in it. The first freedom of the will, the free- 
 dom of Adam, was the ability not to sin {posse non peccare), but the highest freedom, that of 
 the saved, will be the inability to sin {non posse peccare, De Corr. et Grat, 33). By grace the 
 will is made holy ; the will follows grace as its servant. It is certain that we act, when we 
 act, but the fact that we act, that we believe, will, and execute, is due to God, who communi- 
 cates to us the necessary active powers. Man does nothing good, except as God by his work- 
 ing causes him to do it. God himself is our might {potestas nostra ipse est, Solil, II. 1 ; cf. De 
 Gratia Christi, 26 et al.). The doctrine of Pelagius (who, according to Aug. de Praedesi. 
 Sand., ch. 18, says: "praesciebat Deus, quifuturi essent sancti et immaculati per liherae volun- 
 tatis arbitrium et idea eos ante mundi consiitutionem in ipsa sua praescientia, qua tales futures 
 esse praescivit, ekgif^) involves a misapprehension of the fact that this self-determination is 
 conditioned upon the irresistible grace of God, and it is not in harmony with Holy Scripture. 
 Cf., besides the above-mentioned (p. 334) work of "Wiggers, especially J. L. Jacobi's Die Lehre 
 des Pelagius, Leips. 1842; and Friedr. "Worter, Der Pelagianismus nach seinem Ursprung und 
 seiner Lehre, Freib. in Br., 1866. Augustine's last works : De Praedestinatione Sanctorum and 
 De Dono Perseverantiae, are directed against the semi-Pelagian doctrine, as held especially 
 by Cassianus, who admitted that man can accomplish nothing good without grace, but 
 ascribed the beginning of every good work, which God's grace alone could bring to com- 
 pletion, to the free will of man himself, and could not admit that God would save only a 
 portion of the human race and that Christ died only for the elect. Augustine, on the 
 contrary, maintained the doctrine of all-determining, antecedent grace, and that even the 
 commencement of good in man is dependent on such grace. St. Jerome (on whom com- 
 pare, among others, Otto ZiJckler, Gotha, 1865, and A. Thierry, St. Jerome et St. Augustin, 
 Paris, 1867) says in the Dialogus contra Pelagianos (composed A. D. 415): Man can determine 
 himself in favor of good or evil, but it is only with the assistance of grace that he can 
 accomplish the good. 
 
 God's grace having from the beginning withdrawn a part of the human race from the gen- 
 eral ruin, there thus arose by the side of the earthly state, the state or city of God {De Civ. 
 Dei, XIV. 28). Of these two societies, the one is predestinated to reign eternally with God, 
 the other to suffer eternal punishment with the devil {Ibid., XT. 1). The whole period of the 
 life of men is the period of the development {excursus) of these two states {Ibid., XY. 1). 
 Augustine distinguishes, sometimes three, sometimes six periods within the history of man. 
 Men lived at first without law, and then no attempt was made by them to oppose the lust 
 of this world; next under the law, when opposition was attempted, but without success; and 
 finally, under grace, the period of opposition and victory. But of the six periods, the first ex- 
 tends from Adam to Noah, Cain and Abel being the representatives of the two "states: " it 
 ends by being buried up in the flood, just as, in the history of individual man, the period of 
 childhood is buried in oblivion. The second period extends from Koah to Abraham, and 
 may be compared to the period of boyhood in man ; as a punishment for man's arrogance, 
 the confusion of tongues at Babel took place, only the people of God preserving the primi- 
 tive language. The third period reaches from Abraham to David, and is the period of the 
 youth of humanity; the law is now given, but still more distinctly sound the divine 
 promises. The fourth period, that of the manhood of humanity, extends from David to 
 the Babylonish captivity ; it is the time of the kings and prophets. The fifth period covers 
 the time from the Babylonish captivity to Christ ; prophecy now ceases, and the deepest 
 humiliation of Israel begins precisely at the time when, the temple having been rebuilt 
 and the nation released from the Babj'lonish captivity, it had hoped for a better condition. 
 The sixth period begins with Christ and will end with all earthly history; it is the period of 
 grace, of the struggle and victory of believers, and terminates with the introduction of the
 
 346 GREEK FATHEKS AFTER AUGUSTESTe's TIME. 
 
 eternal Sabbath, when all struggling will end in repose and time will be swalloweij up in 
 eternity, when the citizens of the divine city will rejoice in everlasting salvation, and the 
 commonwealth of this world will be given over to eternal damnation, so that history closes 
 with a separation which is irreversible and eternal. Augustine made the history of the 
 Israelites the basis of this philosophy of history, and according to its periods he determined 
 those of the world's history in general. Of the other nations he notices, besides the 
 Oriental nations, especially the Greek — among whom, he says, their kings introduced the 
 worship of false gods before the time of Joshua, and poets deified distinguished men and 
 rulers or natural objects — and the Romans, whose history he describes as beginning contem- 
 poraneously with the destruction of the Assyrian nation, while the prophets were living in 
 Israel. Rome, says Augustine, was the Western Babylon, stained at its very origin by 
 fratricide, and gradually increased through lust of dominion and avarice, and through 
 ostensible virtues, which were, rather, vices (XIX. 25), to an unnatural, gigantic magni- 
 tude. In the time of its supremacy over the nations, Christ was to be born, in whom the 
 prophecies made to the people of Israel find their accomplishment, and all races of men are 
 blessed {De Civ. Dei, XV. seq.). 
 
 Augustine distinguishes seven stadia in the progress of the individual soul to God ; 
 but it is only in his early years that he treated of this subject. In defining these stadia, 
 he assumes the Aristotelian doctrine as his guide, but (following the analogy of the Neo- 
 Platonic doctrine of the higher virtues) goes further than that doctrine would lead him. 
 The stadia are marked by : 1) the vegetative forces, 2) the animal forces (including memory 
 and imagination), 3) the rational force, on which the development of the arts and sciences 
 depends, 4) virtue, as the purification of the soul attained by struggling against sensual 
 pleasure and by faith in God, 5) security in goodness, 6) attaining unto God, 7) the eternal 
 vision of God (De Quant. An., 72 seq.). In the vision of God we arrive at complete like- 
 ness to God, whereby we do not indeed become Gods, nor like God himself, but his image 
 is restored in us {De Trin., XIII. 12; XIV. 24). 
 
 Augustine combats decidedly and in numerous passages the doctrine, that all pun- 
 ishments are intended to serve merely for the purification of those who are punished ; 
 they are needed as a proof of the divine justice; it would not be unjust if all men were 
 eternally punished ; but since the divine mercy must also be manifested, some are saved, 
 though only a minority; the far larger number of men remain under punishment, in order 
 that it may be shown what was due to all [De Civ. Dei, XXI. 12). No man of sound faith 
 can say, that even the evil angels must be saved through God's compassion, for which 
 reason also the Church does not pray for them ; but he who should be led by a misplaced 
 sympathy to believe in the salvation of all men, ought, from the same motive, to believe in 
 the salvation of the wicked angels also ; the Church makes request, indeed, for all men, 
 but only JDCcause she does not know with certainty of any individual, whether God has 
 appointed him to salvation or to damnation, and because the time for saving repentance is 
 still present ; if she knew with certainty who they are, that " praedesfinati sunt in aeternum 
 ignem ire cum diabolo," she would no more pray for them than for the devil {De Civ. Dei, 
 XXI. 24). Thus Augustine maintains the dualism of good and evil in respect of the 
 end of the world's development as decidedly, as, in opposing Manichseism, he combats the 
 dualistic doctrine, when applied to the principle of all being (which doctrine he meets with 
 the theory of a gradation in the orders of existences). ^ ^ ' ^ _. r/ / 
 
 § 87. The philosophy of the Christian Church in the Orient was 
 founded, in the later Patristic period, on a combination of Platonic 
 and Neo-Platonic and, to some extent, also of Aristotelian ideas
 
 GREEK FATHEE8 AFTEE AUGUSTINe's TIME. 347 
 
 with Christian Dogmatics. Sjmesius of Cyrene, born a. d. 375, ad- ■ 
 hered, even after his consecration as a Christian priest and bishop, to 
 the essential, fundamental idea of Neo-Platonisra, and regarded that 
 portion of the Cliristian dogmas which was not in accordance there- 
 with as constituting a sacred allegory. Nemesius, Bishop of Emesa 
 in Phoenicia, and probably a younger contemporary of Synesius, like- 
 wise stands, in his work on the nature of the soul, on the ground of 
 the Platonic and in part also on that of the Aristotelian philosophy, 
 teaching the pre-existence of the human soul and the unending dura- 
 tion of the world, though rejecting other Platonic doctrines. He 
 defends the theory of the freedom of the will against the doctrine of 
 fatalism, ^neas of Gaza, on the contrary, disputes in his dialogue 
 " TheopJirastus " (composed about 487) the doctrine of the pre-exist- 
 ence of the human soul, as also that of the eternity of the world. 
 Among the opponents of the latter doctrine in the sixth century may 
 be named also the Bishop of Mitylene, Zacharias Scholasticus, and 
 the commentator of Aristotle, Johannes Philoponus of Alexandria, 
 which latter person, by extending the Aristotelian doctrine that sub- 
 stantial existence is to be predicated in the fullest sense only of indi- 
 viduals, to the dogma of the Trinity, incurred the accusation of 
 Tritheism. To the period when Neo-Platonic opinions could expect to 
 be received only under the garb of Christianity — probably the end of 
 the fifth century — belong the writings which their author designates 
 as the work of Dionysius the Areopagite, of Athens, one of the imme- 
 diate disciples of the Apostles. It is in a great measure the kind of 
 speculation contained in these works which is continued in the writ- 
 fngs of Maximus the Confessor (580-662), a profound, mystical theolo- 
 gian, John of Damascus, who lived in the eighth century, gives, in his 
 work on the ^'■Source of Knowledge,'^ a brief account of (the Aristo- 
 telian) Ontology, then a refutation of heresies, and finally a minute 
 and systematic exposition of Orthodox Dogmatics. The purpose of 
 John in the entire work is, according to his express declaration, not to 
 advance anything original, but only to sum up and present what has 
 been said by holy and learned men. Accordingly, he does not labor 
 for the further development of Christian doctrine, which he regards as 
 already substantially complete, but only collocates and arranges the 
 thoughts of his predecessors, employing philosophy, and more espe- 
 cially logic and ontology, as an instrument in the service of theology, 
 and thus illustrating already the principle of Scholasticism.
 
 348 GREEK FATHERS AFTER AUGUSTINE's TIME. 
 
 The works of Synesius were published by Turnebus, at Paris, in 1553, and by Dionysius Petavius, 
 Paris, 1612, 1631, 1683. Single works of his have been often published, in particular, the Calvitii Enco- 
 viioii, Stuttgart, 1S34, and " Die dgypt. Erz. iiber die Vorsehung." Sulzbach, 1835, by Krabingur, and the 
 JJymnx, by Qregoire and CoUombat, Lyons, 1836; also in the 15th volume of the Sylloge Poetarum Or., by 
 J. F. Boissonade, Paris, 1823-1832. Works upon him have been written by Aem. Th. Clausen {De Syne»io 
 Philosopho, Libyae PetUapoleos MetropoUta, Copenhagen, 1331), Thilo {Comm. in, Synes. nymnum Sec, 
 zicei Oniversiiatsprogramme, Halle, 1842 and 1843), and Bernh. Kolbe (Der Bischo/ Synesius van Cyrene, 
 Berlin, 1850); of. also Franz Xaver Ktmis. {Studien iiber Syn. -von Eyrene, in the Theol. Quartalsclir. 
 1865, No. 3, pp. 3S1-44S, and No. 4, pp. 537-600). 
 
 Nemesii Trepi <()ua-eu>s a.vBpumov pr. ed. graec. et lat. a Nicosia EUebodio, Antwerp, 1565 ; ed. J. Fell, 
 Oxford, 1671 ed. Ch. Fr. Matthaei, Leipsic, 1802, N&mes liber die Freiheit, translated from the Greek by 
 Fiilleborn in his Beitr. sur Oesch. der Philos. /., Ziillichau, 1791. Nemesius iiber die Natur des Jfenschen, 
 German transl. by Osterhammer, Salzburg, 1810. 
 
 Aeneae Gaeaei Theophrastiis, ed. J. Wolf, Zurich, 1560; Aeti. Gas. et Zach. Mityl. de imnwrtalitate 
 animae et mortalitate universi, ejusdeni dial, de opif. mundi., ed. C. Barth, Leipsic, 1655. Aiveias koX 
 Zaxap'as. Aeneas Gaeaeus et Zacharias ^litylenueus de immortalitate animae et consummation e 
 mundi, ed. J. F. Boissonade, Paris, 1836. On Jineas of Gaza compare the work of Wernsdorf (Naumburg, 
 1810), and his Disp. de Aen. G. ed. adorn., prefixed to the edition of Boissonade. 
 
 Concerning the editions of the writings of John Philop., see above, § 70, p. 256. Cf. the article by 
 Trechsel, in the Theol. Stud. u. Kritiken, 1835, Article I. 
 
 Tlie woiks attributed to Dionysius Areopagita, De Divinis Nominibus, De Theologia Mystica, De 
 Coelesti IlierarclUa, De Ecclesiastioa Ilierarchia, {decern) Epistolae, were first printed in Greek as Dion. 
 Areopag. Opera, at Basel, 1539, and afterward at Venice, 1558, Paris, 1562; ed. Lanselius, Paris, 1615; ed. 
 Balthas. Corderius, Antwerp, 1634, the latter edition reproduced at Paris in 1644, Brixen, 1854, last in 
 Migne's collection ; German by J. G. V. Engelhardt {Die angeblichen Schri/ten des Areopagiten Dionysius 
 Ubersetzt und mii Abhandlungen begleifet, Sulzbach, 1823), who also reproduces the essay of Dallaeus 
 (Geneva, 1664) concerning the age of the author of the Areopagitic writings ; cf. L. F. O. Baumgarten-Crusius, 
 De Dionys. Areopag., Jena, 1823, also in his Opusc. theol., Jena, 1836; Karl Vogt, Neuplatonismn« vnd 
 Christenthum, Berlin, 1836; F. Hipler, Dionysius der Areop., Eegensburg, 1861 ; Ed. Bohmer, D. A., in the 
 Eeview entitled Damasis, 1864, No. 2. 
 
 JIaximi Confessoris opera, ed. Combefisius, Paris, 1675. Maximi Confessor is de variis difficili- 
 busque locis s. patriim Dionysii et Gregorii librum, ed. Fr. Oehler, Halle, 1857. 
 
 Johannis Damaseem opera in lat. serm. conversa per Billium, Paris, 1577; Opera quae extant, ed. 
 Le Quien, Paris, 1712. 
 
 Synesius was a Neo-Platonist before he became a Christian. The female philosopher, 
 Hypatia (see above, § 69, p. 254), was his instructress, and his relations with her continued 
 friendly after his conversion. After he had accepted Christianity and been designated by 
 Theophilus the Patriarch of Alexandria, as Bishop of Ptolemais, he franlily declared to 
 Theophilus that he did not in all points assent to the teaching of the Church. He did not 
 believe in the final destruction of the world, was inclined to favor the doctrine of tlie pre- 
 existence of the soul, believed, indeed, in the immortality of the soul, but considered the 
 doctrine of the resurrection as merely a sacred allegory ; he promised, nevertlieless, in his 
 doctrinal teachings to accommodate himself to the dogmas generally accepted, holding that 
 the people had need of myths, that pure, unfigured truth was capable of being known only 
 by a few, and would only serve to dazzle and blind the spiritual eyes of tlie multitude 
 (Epist, 95, p. 236 A, ed. Petav.). This same aristocracy of intelligence, which was in conflict 
 with the common spirit of the Christian Church, appears in his poetical works, composed 
 when, notwithstanding the confession above mentioned, the episcopal dignity had been con- 
 ferred upon him. More in the Neo-Platonic than in the Cliristian manner he conceives 
 God as the unity of unities, the monad of monads, the indifference of contraries, which, 
 after "super-existent" throes, was poured forth through its first-born form in an unspeak- 
 able manner, received a triple-headed energy, and as super-existent source was crowned by 
 the beauty of the children which, issued from the middle, collect in numbers around that 
 middle. After this exposition, however, Synesius enjoins silence on the too audacious
 
 GREEK FATHEES AFTER AUGUSTINE's TIME. 349 
 
 lyre ; it must not proclaim to tlie people the most mysterious of sacred things (the 
 priority of the Monad before the three persons of the Godhead?). The Holy Ghost, 
 divided without division, having entered into matter, the world thus received its form and 
 motion. The Holy Ghost is present also in those who fell to earth, as the power which 
 shall raise them up again to heaven. 
 
 Nemesius, who lived about a. d. 450 — according to others, 400 — occupies also substan- 
 tially the Xeo- Platonic staud-point; the Aristotelian element in his writings is only of 
 subordinate importance, and determines more the form than the content of his philoso- 
 phizing. His investigations are chiefly of a psychological nature. For him, as for Plato, 
 the soul is an immaterial substance, involved in incessant and self-produced motion. Prom 
 it the body receives its motion. The soul existed before it entered the body. It is eternal, 
 like all supra-sensible things. It is not true that new souls are constantly coming into 
 existence, whether by generation or by direct creation. The opinion is also false, that the 
 world is destined to be destroyed, when the number of souls shall have become complete ; 
 God will not destroy what has been well put together. Nemesius rejects, nevertheless, 
 the doctrine of a world-soul and of the migration of the human soul through the bodies 
 of animals. In considering the separate faculties of the soul, and also in his doctrine of 
 the freedom of the will, Nemesius follows largely Aristotle. Every species of animals, he 
 says, possesses definite instincts, by which alone its actions are determined ; but the actions 
 of man are infinitely varied. Placed midway between the sensible and the supra-sensible 
 worlds, man's business is to decide by means of his reason in which direction he will 
 turn ; that is his freedom. 
 
 ^neas of Gaza, a pupil at Alexandria of Hierocles the Neo-Platonist, and Zacharias of 
 Mitylene approved only those Neo-Platonic doctrines which were in accordance with 
 Christian Dogma. 
 
 In the same limited way, Johannes Philoponus (whose works were written between 
 500 and 570), a pupil of Ammonius Hermiaj (see above, § TO, pp. 255, 256, 259), attempted, 
 though with imperfect success, to follow Aristotle. He laid stress (in distinction from 
 Simplicius and other Neo-Platonists) upon the difference between the Platonic and Aristo- 
 telian doctrines. The Ideas, he taught, are the creative thoughts of God, which, as arche- 
 types, can and must have existed before their temporal copies. 
 
 In the works ascribed to Dionysius the Areopagite (Acts xvii. 34), who was reputed to 
 have been first Bishop of Athens, the attempt is made to blend the dominant ideas in Neo- 
 Platonism with the Christian doctrine. " After that the doctrine of the Church had been 
 developed and had become the common property of all believers, there were men, to whom 
 this, which all, including the most superficial, could believe, seemed for this reason insuffi- 
 cient, and who sought therefore for a faith resting on a profounder basis. Besides, heathen 
 philosophy, as it made its way anew and more extensively than ever before among the 
 Christians, furnished necessarily new food for doubt and consequently for mysticism " 
 (Rittor). 
 
 The first mention of the Areopagitic writings is found in a letter of Innocentius, the 
 Bishop of Maronia, in which he refers to a conference that had been hold at (Constan- 
 tinople in the year 532, at the command of the Emperor Justinian — Hypatius, the Metro- 
 politan of Ephesus, presiding — with the Sevorians (known as a sect of moderate 
 Monophysites, who admitted that Christ was Kara. adpKa oftoovmoc; ^fiiv, but were opposed 
 by the more rigid Monophysites as (pdapTolaTpat). The Severians appealed to passages m 
 the writings of Cyrillus, Athanasius, FeHx, Julius, Gregorius Thaumaturgus, and also of 
 Dionysius Areopagita (whose work scarcely touches upon the questions there in dispute, 
 although it contains some of the expressions used at the Council of Chalcodon in 451, th«
 
 350 GREEK FATHERS AFTER ArOUSTINE's TIME. 
 
 expressed purpose of the author being rather to further the positive development of doCf 
 triae than to condemn opponents, in which particular he conformed to the spirit of the 
 imperial Ilenotikon issued in 482). Hypatius, the spokesman of the Catholics, disputed 
 the genumeness of the works imputed to Dionysius, which neither Cyril nor Athanasius 
 and others had known. Afterward, however, these works gained credit in the Catholic 
 Church, especially after the Roman Popes Gregory, Martin, and Agatho had cited them in 
 their writings and appealed to their authority. The commentary on them composed by 
 the orthodox abbot, Maximus Confessor, strengthened their authority. They exerted a 
 not inconsiderable influence over the Scholastic Philosophy of "Western Europe after their 
 translation by Scotus Erigena ; from them the Mystics of the Middle Ages drew chiefly the 
 substance of their opinions. Their inauthenticity was first asserted by Laurentius Valla, 
 and afterward demonstrated by Morinus, Dallfeus, and others. The only question remain- 
 ing for us, therefore, concerns the time of their composition, and not their spuriousness ; 
 they date probably from the last decades of the fifth century. To set back the date of 
 Pseudo-Dionysius from the second half of the fifth century into the first half of the fourth, 
 is in contradiction with the general liistorical development of Christian thought, and can 
 only win a semblance of historic legitimacy, when, neglecting the general view, the regard 
 is fixed only on single passages in the earlier Church Fathers, which, because they remind 
 modern savants of similar passages in Dionysius, are declared to be in fact derived from the 
 latter, and to prove an acquaintance on the part of their authors with the works in question; 
 while, in fact, these correspondences are explained partly by the common Platonic and Neo- 
 Platonic basis on which all these writers stand, and partly by a common influence tending 
 in the opposite direction. The Neo- Platonic influence is quite unmistakable ; but the form 
 of Neo-Platonism manifested in it, though chiefly Plotinic, yet betrays also (as Erdmann, 
 among others, rightly affirms) the influence of the later members of the school, especially 
 Jamblichus and Proclus, with both of whom Pseudo-Dionysius agrees in the doctrine that 
 the One is exalted, not simply above the vovg and the ideas {ovaia), but also above goodness 
 itself The description of God, as restoring the divided multitude of created things to 
 unity, as substituting for universal war undifferentiated union through participation in the 
 divine peace (Z>e Biv. Nbm., ch. 11), suggests Proclus' doctrine of the /^oi7/, irpooSoc and 
 emarpocpT/ (see above, § 70, p. 257). Not while the effort was being made to determine the 
 fundamental outlines of a system, but only after a corpus docirinae^ fixed in all or nearly 
 all of its most important points, had once been developed, become traditional, and arrived 
 at assured supremacy, could this whole, as such, within the limits of the Church, be at once 
 acknowledged and denied, or reduced to a merely symbolical significance in the manner 
 illustrated by Pseudo-Dionysius. 
 
 Dionysius distinguishes between affirmative theology^ which, descending from God to the 
 finite, contemplates God as the being to whom all names belong, and abstracting theology, 
 which, following the way of negation, ascends again from the finite to God and considers 
 him as the nameless being, superior to all positive and negative predicates. Following the 
 latter method, the soul, after completing its ascent into that region of being which, from its 
 very sublimity, is to the impotent human intellect a region of obscurity, becomes com- 
 pletely passive, the voice is stilled, and man becomes united with the Unspeakable {De 
 Theol. Myster., ch. 3). "AflBrmative theology" formed the subject of the theological 
 treatises — mentioned by Dionysius, De Div. Nom., chs. 1 and 2, and De TJteol Myst, ch. 3, 
 but not now extant — in which the unity and trinity of God were treated of. the Father 
 being considered as the original source of deity, Jesus and the Holy Ghost as his branches, 
 and in which the entrance of the "super-essential" Jesus into true human nature is 
 described, by which act, it is said, he became an essence. The same is true of the work
 
 GKEEK FATHEKS AFTER AUGUSTTNe's TEME. .'351 
 
 entitled: De Divirds Nominibus — in which the spiritual or "intelligible" names of God 
 were discussed, all of these names being vindicated as applicable to the whole Trinity — 
 and of the work on Symbolicul Theology (also lost), which treated of those names of God 
 which are derived by analogy from the sensuous world. "Abstracting theology" is con- 
 tained in the short work entitled, De Theologia Mystica, which forms a negative termina- 
 tion to the system. The Celestial Hierarchy of Angels and the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy as its 
 image, are considered in the two works bearing these titles. 
 
 In the work on the Names of God Dionysius mentions with approval the doctrine of 
 " certain of our divine and holy teachers," by whom a distinction was made between two 
 forms of goodness and deity, the one being supra-good and supra-divine — or transcendent 
 in its attributes — and the other being ideally good and divine. The former was a gift from 
 God, and was endowed with the power to create good, which power it exercised by the 
 creation of the second form of goodness and deity above specified. God, the Invisible, was, 
 according to the same doctrine, the author also of those providences and dispensations of 
 goodness which fall in superabundant fullness to the lot of all existing things, and so, in 
 reality, the Cause of all things wa.s exalted above all, and the super-existent and super- 
 natural was superior to every form of nature or essence [DeNom. Div., ch. 11). The supra- 
 essential One limits the existing One and all number, and is it.^elf the cause and principle of 
 the One and of number and, at the same time, the number and the order of all that exists. 
 Hence the Deity, who is exalted above all things, is praised as a Monad and as a Triad, but 
 is unknown to us or to any one, whether as Monad or as Triad ; in order truly to praise the 
 supra-unified in him and his divine creative power, wo apply to him not only the triadic 
 and monadic names, but call him the nameless One, the supra-essential, to indicate that he 
 transcends the category of being. No Monad or Triad, no number, no unity, no genera- 
 tion, nothing which exists or is known by those who exist can enable us to comprehend the 
 mysterious nature of the supra-essentially supra-exalted supra-Deity. He has no name, no 
 concept. The region which he inhabits is inaccessible to us. He transcends all things. We 
 do not even ascribe to him the attribute of goodness, as though that were adequate to 
 express his nature, but filled with longing to understand and to say something of his 
 ineffable nature, we consecrate to him first the most holy and reverend name ; and in this, 
 no doubt, we are in accord with the Holy Scriptures, but we remain far removed from the 
 truth of the case. For this reason the Scriptures have also preferred the way of negation 
 which withdraws the soul from that which is akin to it and carries it through all divine 
 intelligences, above which is placed that Nameless One who is exalted above all concep- 
 tion, all name, and all knowledge (De Div. Kom,., ch. 13). 
 
 Whatever proceeds from him who is the cause of all things is comprehended by Diony- 
 sius under the denomination of the Good {De Div. Kom., ch. 5). In God exist the arche- 
 types (ideas) of all existing things. The Holy Scriptures call these archetypes Trponpiafjoi^. 
 The Good is a term of wider extension than Existence, for it includes both the existent and 
 the non-existent, and is superior to both. The nature of evil is negative. If evil, as evil, 
 positively subsisted, it would be evil to itself and would, therefore, destroy itself. The 
 name of the existent extends to all that is, and it is exalted above all being ; existence 
 extends farther than life. The name life applies to all that lives and is exalted above all 
 that lives ; life extends farther than wisdom. The name of wisdom applies to all that is 
 spiritual and endowed with reason or sensation, and is exalted above all these. To the 
 question why it is that the realm of life is higher and nearer to God than the realm of 
 (mere) existence, the realm of sensation than the realm of (mere) life, the realm of under^ 
 standing than the realm of (mere) feeling, and why, finally, the realm of spirits (vorr) is 
 higher than the realm of (mere) understanding, Dionysius answers that this is beca\ise that
 
 352 LATIN FATHERS AFTER AUGUSTINe's TIME. 
 
 which is most richly endowed by God must be better than all else and exalted above all else; 
 but it is the spirit which has received the richest endowments, since both being and life and 
 feeling and thought belong to it, etc. {De Div. Nom., chs. 4 and 5). (In this answer Diony- 
 sius ranks as highest that which possesses the greatest wealth of attributes, after the 
 manner of Aristotle ; and yet within the spheres of tlie ideal and supra-ideal Dionysiua 
 gives the first place to that which is most abstract or to that which possesses the greatest 
 extension and the least content. In this he follows Plato, but does not succeed better 
 than Proclus or any other of liis Neo-Platonic predecessors, in the a-'.tempt to carry 
 through to its logical end either the one or the other of these opposite tendencies of 
 thought.) 
 
 Maximus Confessor (580-662), who, as an opponent of the Monotheletes and on account 
 of his steadfast endurance of persecution, enjoyed great consideration in the Church, fol- 
 lows in the main Gregory of Nyssa and Dionysius. He taught that God had revealed 
 himself through nature and by his word. The incarnation of God in Christ was the cul- 
 mination of revelation, and would therefore have taken place even if man had not fallen. 
 When God became man, man was made God {diuaic:). The universe will end in the union 
 of all things with God. 
 
 The monk, Johannes Damascenus, who lived about 700 a. d., brought together, with 
 the aid of the Aristotelian Logic and Ontology, all the teachings of the Church in a sys- 
 tematic and orderly form. The authority of his work is still great in the East ; the later 
 Scholastics of Western Europe also stood under his influence in their expositions of theo- 
 logical doctrine. 
 
 § 88. The history of philosophical speculation in the Western por- 
 tion of the Church during the period immediately following the death 
 of Saint Augustine, is for the most part connected with the names of 
 Claudianus Maraertus, Marcianus Capella, Bocthius, and Cassiodorus. 
 Claudianus Mamertus, a Presbyter at Vienne in Gaul, defended, 
 about the middle of the fifth century, from the Augustinian stand-point 
 and against Faustus the Semi-Pelagian, the doctrine of the imma- 
 teriality of the human soul, which latter, he taught, was subject only 
 to motion in time, but not to motion in space. Marcianus Capella 
 wrote about 430 a compendium of the septem artes Uherales, which 
 became very influential in the Middle Ages. . Anicins Manlius Tor- 
 quatus Severinus Boethius was educated by ^eo-Platonists, and 
 labored zealously and successfully for the preservation of ancient 
 science and culture in the Christian Church, through his transla- 
 tions of and commentaries on various works of Aristotle, Porphyry, 
 Euclid, Nicomachus, Cicero, and others, and through his additions 
 to them, as also through his work, founded on Neo-Platonic prin- 
 ciples and entitled De Consolatione Philosophiae. A contemporary of 
 Boethius, Magnus Aurelius Cassiodorus, the Senator, opposed, like 
 Claudianus Mamertus, in his work De Anima the hypothesis of the 
 materiality of the rational human soul and defended the doctrine of
 
 LATIN FATHERS AFTEK AUGUSTINE's TIME. 35 
 
 9 
 
 the likeness of the soul to God ; he wrote also concerning Instruction 
 in Theology and on the liberal arts and sciences, followiug in this 
 more particularly the lead of Boiithius, of whose more extended works 
 he prepared an epitome for didactic purposes. On the works of 
 these men were founded those of Isidorus Hispalensis (about 600), 
 Beda Yenerabilis (about 700), and Alcuin (about 800). 
 
 The work of Claiidianns Mamertus, De Statu Animae, was edited by Petrus Mosellanus (Basel, 1520) 
 and Casp. Earth (Cygn. 1655). 
 
 The Satyricon of Marcianus Capella has been often published, more recently, in particular, by Frani 
 EyssenharUt, Leips. 1806. Cf. E. G. Graff, Old High German translation and e.\i>lanation of M. C.'s two 
 books De Nnptiis Mercurii et Philologiae, made about the beginning of the eleventh century, Berlin, 1638, 
 and Hattemer, Notkers W'., II., pp. 257-372. On M. C. and his S!itire see C. BOttgtr in Jahn's Archiv, vol. 
 13, 1S47, pp. 591-622. Prantl treats of his Logical Conii>endium in his Geitch. d. Leg., I. C72-679. 
 
 The work of Bocthius, De Consolations Philosophiae, was first published at Kureuiberg in 1473; a 
 more recent edition is that of Obbarius, Jen., 1S43 ; his Works were printed at A^enice in 1492 and at Basel 
 in 1546 and 1570; for the old High German translation of the Con«oZ., published by Graff and Von Hattemer, 
 see below, § 91. Of him write, especially, Fr. Xitzsch (Das Syiitem des loethins, Berlin, 1S60); cf. Schenkl 
 in Verh. der 18 Vera, deutscher rhilologen vnd SchtdmCinner, Vienna, 1859, pp. 76-92, on the relation of 
 Boethlus and his works to Christianity, and concerning his logic, see Prantl, Gcsch. d. Log., I. C79-722. 
 
 The works of Cassiodorns were published by Jo. Garetius, Rouen, 1679, and at Venice, 1729; the 
 last part of the De Artibus <ic LMiciplinis Liberalium Litterarum was first edited and puMished by A. 
 Mai, Rome, 1831. On Cassiodorus, cf. F. D. de St. Marthc (Paris, 1695), Buat (in Ahh. der Bair., Akad. 
 d. W., I. p. 79 seq.), Staudlin (in KircJienliist. AreMv fiir 1825, p. 259 seq.), Prantl {Gesch. der Log., I. pp. 
 722-724). 
 
 The Encyclopaedia of Isidorus Hispalensis, under the title: Originvm g. Etymologiarum Lihri XX., 
 was edited and published at Augsburg in 1472, c. noti& Jac. Gothofredi, in A%ict. Lat., p. 811 seq., and 
 recently at Leipsic, 1S33, ed. by E. V. Otto. The work De 2iat. Rernm, ed. by Gust. Becker, Berlin, 1857, 
 the Opera, ed. by Do la Bigne, Paris, 1580, by Jac. du Brcul, Paris, ICOl, Cologne, 1617, and in more modern 
 times by Faustinus Arevalus, in seven volumes, Rome, 1797-1808, and lastly in Migne's /"u^ro^ Curisui 
 Computus. On his logic compare Prantl, Gesch. der Log., II. pp. 10-14. 
 
 The works of Beda Vencrabilis were printed at Paris in 1521 and 1544, and at Cologne in 1612 and 
 1688. A Giles, Tlie Complete Works of the Venerable Bede in the Original L-atin, 12 vols., London, 
 1843-44; Carmina, edited by U. Meyer, Leips. 1835. 
 
 Alcuin's works have been published by Quercetanus (Duchesne), Paris, 1617, and Frobenius, Ratisb. 
 1777. On him cf. F. Lorenz (Alcvin's Leben, Ha.\]e, 1829), 'M.o-nmeT {Alcuin et son ivfluence Utteraire, 
 relig. et polit., Paris, 1853), and Prantl {Gesch. der Log., 11., pp. 14-17); concerning his pupil, Rhabanus 
 Maurus, cf. F. H. Chr. Schwarz {De Rhabano Mauro primo Germaniae %/raeceptwe, Heidolb., 1811), an4 
 Prantl {Gesch. d. Log., II. p. 19 seq.) ; cf. below, § 91. 
 
 The philosophical importance of Claudianus Mamertus (Presbyter at Tienne in the 
 Daiiphinee; died ca. 477) is founded on his argumentation in favor of the immortality of the 
 soul. Tertullian had once asserted the materiality of God, but this opinion had long been 
 given up, yet even as late asca. 350 a. d., Ililarius, the Athanasiau and Bishop of Poitiers 
 (mentioned above, § 85, p. 327), afBrmod that in distinction from God all created tilings, 
 including, therefore, the human soul, were material. This doctrine was afterward main- 
 tained by Cassianus, the chief founder of Scmi-Pelagianism — a doctrine which sought to 
 mediate between the Augustinian and Pelagian stand-points — by Faustus, Bishop of 
 Regium in Gaul, and one of the most prominent Semi-Pelagians after the middle of the 
 fifth century, and by Gennadius, near the end of the fifth century. In every created 
 object, according to Faustus, matter and form arc united. All created things are limited, 
 and have an existence in space, and are therefore material. Every created object has 
 quality and quantity — for God is the only being exalted above and independent of the 
 logical categories — and with quantity is necessarily combined a relation to space, or exten' 
 23
 
 354 LATIN FATHEKS AFTER AUGUSTINe's TIME. 
 
 sion ; and, finally, the soul, since it dwells in the body, is necessarily a substance, having 
 limits in space, and is, therefore, material. Claudianus Mamertus rejoins: It is true 
 that all creatures, and, therefore, the soul among them, fall within the sphere of the 
 categories ; the soul is a substance, and has quahty ; but the soul is not, like material 
 Bubstances, subject to all tho categories; in particular, quantity, in the usual spatial 
 eense of that term, cannot be predicated of it ; it has magnitude, but only in respect of 
 virtue and intelligence. The motion of the soul takes place only in time, and not, like that 
 of material objects, in time and space together. The world, in order to be complete, must 
 contain all species of existences, the immaterial, therefore, as well as the material, of 
 ■which the former resembles God by its non-quantitative and spaceless character, and is 
 superior to material objects, while, by its creatureship and its being subject to the category 
 of quality and to motion in time, it differs from the unqualitative and eternal God and 
 resembles the naaterial world. The sour is not environed by, but itself environs, the body, 
 which it holds together. Yet Claudianus also adopts the Neo-Platonic and Augustinian 
 theory that the soul is present entirely in all parts of its body, just as God is present in all 
 parts of the world. 
 
 The work on the Artes Liberales, composed about 430 (between 400 and 439) by Mar- 
 cianus Capella (who never confessed the Christian faith), and to which the marriage of 
 Mercury with Philology forms the introduction, contains the oldest compendium of the 
 doctrines then and afterward taught in the schools which has come down to us complete. 
 
 Concerning Boethius (470-526), cf. above, pp. 256 and 259. "We still possess his transla- 
 tions of the Analytica Friora and Posteriora, the Topica and the Soph. Elench. of Aristotle, 
 as also his translation of the De Interpretatione, and his commentary on the same, also hia 
 translation of the Categories, with commentary, his commentary on Victorinus' translation 
 of the Isagogue of Porphyry, his own translation of the Isagoge, which he likewise accom- 
 panied with a commentary, and the works : Introductio ad Categoricos Syllogismos ; De Syl- 
 logismo Categorico, De Syllogismo Hypoflietico, De Divisione, De Definitione; De Differentiis 
 Topicis. His commentary to the Topics of Cicero is not preserved entire. The aim of Boe- 
 thius in these works was purely didactic, his plan being simply to hand down in a form as 
 readily intelligible as possible the investigations of earlier philosophers. His Consolatio, as 
 also the De Unitate et Una, etc., is founded on Xeo-Platonic ideas. The work De Trinitate 
 has been falsely ascribed to him. 
 
 Cassiodorus (l^orn about 468, died not before 562) proposes in all his works, not to 
 effectuate an essential progress in philosophic thought, but simply to present a review and 
 summary of the most important contents of the works which he has read {De Anima, 12). 
 In his work De Anima he asserts that man alone has a substantial and immortal soul, but 
 that the life of the irrational animals has its seat in their blood {De An., 1). The human 
 soul is, in virtue of its rationality, not indeed a part of God — for it is not unchangeable, but 
 can determine itself to evil — but capable, through virtue, of making itself like God ; it 
 is created to be an image of God {De An., 2 seq.). It is spiritual, for it is able to know 
 spiritual things. Wliatever is material is extended in three dimensions, in length, breadth, 
 and thickness; it has fixed limits and is present in any determinate place with only one of 
 its parts. The soul, on the contrary, is present in its entirety in each of its parts; it is 
 everywhere present in its body and not limited by a spatial form {De An., 2 : ubicumque 
 substantialiter inserta est; iota est in partibus suis, nee alibi major, alibi minor est, sed alicubi 
 iatensius, alicubi remissive, ubique tamen vitali intensione porrigitur; ib. 4: ubicumque est nee 
 formam recipit). Cassiodorus differs from Claudianus Mamertus by denying that even the 
 category of quality, in its proper sense, applies to the soul {De An., 4). Cassiodorus recom- 
 mends the liberal arts and sciences (the three .4 r^es or Snentiae Sermocinales : grammar,
 
 CONCEPTION AND PERIODS OF SCHOLASTICISM:, 355 
 
 dialectic, rhetoric, and the four Disciplinae or Scientiae Reales : arithmetic, geometry, music, 
 and astronomy) as being useful, inasmucli as they serve to facilitate the understanding of 
 the Holy Scriptures and the knowledge of God, although it is possible without them to 
 arrive at the knowledge of Christian truth (De Instit. Div. Litt, 28). His work 2)e Artihu3 
 ac DiscipUnis Liberalium LiUerarum was much used as a text-book in the centuries next 
 following the time of their composition. Cassiodorus often refers in them to the more 
 comprehensive compilations of Boethius; his dialectic is mainly taken from Boethius and 
 Apulcius. 
 
 Isidorus Hispalensis (died 636) furthered the encyclopedic studies by his Encyclopedia, 
 and, in particular, following in the lead of Cassiodorus and Boethius, he carried forward 
 the logical tradition of the schools by devoting the second book of his Encyclopedia to 
 rhetoric and dialectic, both which subjects he included under the name of logic. His three 
 books of Sentences, containing dicta of the Church Fathers, and his works De Ordine Crea- 
 turarum and De Rerum Natura were also used by later writers as sources of information. 
 
 The Anglo-Saxon Beda (e'ZS-iSS) made up his Compendia chiefly by drawing upon the 
 writings of Isidorus; these Compendia, again, as also Isidorus and the Pseudo-Augustinian 
 treatise concerning the ten categories, were drawn upon by Albinus Alcuinus (736-804) 
 in the composition of his works on grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic. An excerpt from 
 Cassiodorus on the seven liberal arts, much read in the Middle Ages, was formerly incor- 
 rectly supposed to be the work of Alcuin. In this work these " arts " are called the seven 
 pillars of wisdom, or the seven steps by which one may rise to perfect science {Oper., ed. 
 Proben., II. p. 268). In the Cloister-Schools which were founded by Alcuin the septem 
 artes ac disciplinae liberales, or at least some of them, were taught by the Doctores, dialectic 
 being pursued with special enthusiasm. From the application of dialectic to theology arose 
 "Scholasticism;" but before this application was made there was a period in which dia- 
 lectic was pursued merely as a part of the Trivium, and which consequently does not 
 belong to the Scholastic Period. 
 
 Second Period of the Philosophy of Christian Times. 
 
 THE SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 § 89. Scholasticism was philosophy in the service of established 
 and accepted tlieoloj^ical doctrines, or, at least, in such subordination 
 to them, that, where philosophy and theology trod on common ground, 
 the latter was received as the absolute norm and criterion of truth. 
 More particularly. Scholasticism was the reproduction of ancient phi- 
 losophy under the control of ecclesiastical doctrine, with an accom- 
 modation, in cases of discrepancy between them, of the former to the 
 latter. Its divisions are: 1) the commencement of Scholasticism or 
 the accommodation of the Aristotelian logic and of Neo-Platonic phi-
 
 356 CONCEPTION AND PERIODS OF SCHOLASTICISM. 
 
 losopliemes to the doctrine of the Church, from John Seotus Erigena 
 to the Amalricans, or from the ninth till the beginning of the thir- 
 teenth century ; 2) the complete development and widest extension 
 of Scholasticism or the combination of the Aristotelian philosophy, 
 which had now become fully known, to the dogmas of the Church — 
 from Alexander of Hales to the close of the Middle Ages, the revival 
 of classical studies, the commencement of the investigation of nature 
 and the division of the Church. During this time, philosophy among 
 the Arabs and the Jews stood in a like relation to the respective 
 religious doctrines of those nations. 
 
 Of those who have written upon the Scholastic Philosophy, we name Lud. Vives (De Causis Corntp- 
 tarum Artium, in his Works, Basel, 1555), Lambertus Danseus (in his Prolegom. in primum libru7n 
 Senlentiarum cum cmnm., Geneva, 15S0), Ch. Binder {De Scholastica theologia, Tubingen, 1624), J. Lau- 
 noy {De varia Aristotelis fortuna in aead. Parisiensi, Paris, 1653, and De scholis celehr. a Carolo M. ei 
 post ipsmn instauratis, Paris, 16T2), Ad. Tribechovius {De doctoribus scholasticis et corritpia per eo« 
 divinartim Jiumanarumque rerum scientia, Giessen, 1665; second edition, edited by Heuniann, Jena, 
 1719), 0. D. Bulffius {Hist, universit. Parisiengis, Paris, 1665-T3), Jac. Thomasius {De doctoribus schoL, 
 Leips. 1676), Jac. Brucker {Hist. crit. philos., t. III., Leips. 1748, pp. 709-912), "W. L. G. v. Eberstein {Die 
 natiirl. Theologie der Scholaatiker, nebst Zuslitzen ilber dia Freiheitslehre und den Begriff d^rWahrheit 
 hei dengelben, Leipsio, 1S03), and Tiedemann, Buhle, Tennemann, Eitter, and others, in their general his- 
 tories of pliilosophy ; of modern writers, compare especially: A. Jourdain {Recherches critiques sitr Vdge 
 et Vorigine des traductions latines d'Aristoie, Paris, 1S19, 2d ed., Paris, 1843, German translation by Stahr, 
 Halle, 1831), Rousselot {Etudes sur la pJiilosopMe dans le moyen-Age, Paris, 1840-42), Barth. Haureau (Z)e 
 la philosophie scolastique, 2 vols., Paris, 1850; Singularites kistoriqves et litteraires, Paris, 1861), Prantl 
 {Gesch. der Logik im Abendlande, Vol. II., Leipsic, 1861, Vol. III., ibid. 1867), W. Kaulich {Gesch. der 
 sc'iolast. Philosophie, 1. Iheil : von Joh. Seotus Erigena bis Abdlard, Prague, 1853), and Alb. Stockl 
 {^Gesch. der Philos. des 31 ittelalters. Vols. I.-III., Mayence, 1864-66); also Erdmann in his Grundr. der 
 GescJi. d. Philos., Vol. I., Berlin, 1865, pp. 245-166, and in his article on Der Entiricklungsgang der Scho- 
 lastik, in the Zeilsahr. fur wiss. Th., Vol. VIII., No. 2, Halle, 1865, pp. 113-171. Cf. also V. A. Huber, 
 I>i6 Englischen Universitaten, Vol. I. (The Middle Ages), Cassel, 18-39; Charles Thurot, De VorganUa- 
 Hon de Fens eignement dans Vuniversiti de Paris au OToyen-(J(7e, Paris and Bosanfon, 1850; L. Figuier, 
 Vies des Sa/vants Uliistres du Moyen-Age avec lappreciation sommaire de leurs travaux, Pai'is, 1867 ; 
 Herm. Doergus, Zur Lehre von den Universalien. Heidelberg, 1867, and de Cii\<&\y, Esprit de la philos. 
 scoL, Paris, 1868; K. D. Hampden, D.D., afterward Bishop of Hereford, The Scholastic Philosophy consid- 
 ered in its relation to ChHstian Theology, Oxford, 1832; 8d edition, London, 1838; also. Life of Thomas 
 Aquinas; a Dissertation of the Scholastic Philosophy of the Middle Ages, London, 1848. 
 
 The name of Scholastics (doctores scTiolastici) which was given to the teachers of tho 
 septem liherales artes (grammar, dialectic, rhetoric, in the Trivium; arithmetic, geometry, 
 music, and astronomy, in the Quadrivium), or at least of some of them, in the Cloister- 
 Scliools founded by Charlemagne, as also to teachers of theology, was afterward given to 
 all who occupied themselves with the sciences, and especially with philosophy, following 
 the tradition and example of the Schools. (The earliest known use of the term (rxo^aoriKoi 
 as a word of technical import occurs in a letter from Theophrastus to his pupil Phanias, 
 from which extracts are given in Diog. L., V. 50. The term was transmitted to the Middle 
 Ages through the medium of Roman Antiquity.) 
 
 At the beginning of the Scholastic Period philosophic thought had not yet been 
 brought into a relation of complete vassalage to Church doctrine ; Seotus Erigena, in par- 
 ticular, affirmed rather the identity of true religion with true philosophy than the subordi- 
 nation of the latter to the former. In fact, he deviated not unessentially from the teaching 
 
 i
 
 CONCEPTION AND PERIODS OF SCHOLASTICISM. 357 
 
 of the Church, in seeking by a forced interpretation of the latter, in accordance with the 
 principles of the (Dionvsian and Neo-PIatonic) philosophy, which he adopted, to bridge 
 over the cleft between philosophy and dogma ; and even in the period next succeeding, a 
 certain conformity of thought with the doctrine of the Church was only gradually effected, 
 and that after violent struggles. In the second division of the Scholastic period (from th» 
 middle of the thirteenth century on), the conformity of the reconstructed Aristotelian phi- 
 losophy with the faith of the Church appears as firmly settled, yet limited, from the 
 beginning, by the fact that the specifically Christian dogmas (the Trinity, incarnation, 
 resurrection of the body, etc.) were excepted in this connection as undemonstrable by 
 reason. The relation of vassalage, which the most eminent Scholastics ascribed to phi- 
 losophy with reference to theology, is not to be understood as implying that all dogmas 
 were to be philosophically demonstrated or justified, or that all philosophizing stood in 
 direct relation to theology, and that there existed no interest in philosophical problems as 
 such and on their own account. Such an interest, although in reference to a limited range 
 of problems, did exist in great intensity. The vassalage of philosophy consisted in the 
 fact that an impassable limit was fixed for the freedom of philosophizing in the dogmas of 
 the Church, that the test of truth and falsehood in matters common to philosophy and 
 theology was not sought in observation and in thought itself, but in the doctrines of the 
 Church, and that accordinglj- the Aristotelian doctrine, partly in its theological portions 
 (witli reference to the doctrine of the eternity of the world), and partly in its psychology 
 (relatively to the doctrine of the voi'c as related to the inferior parts of the soul), was modi- 
 fied by the most eminent Scholastics, while those dogmas which were incapable of phi- 
 losophical demonstration or confirmation were not allowed to be made at all the subjects 
 of philosophical discussion. With its territory thus limited, philosophy was indeed allowed 
 by theology a freedom which was rarely and only by exception infringed upon. The 
 number of theological theses demonstrable by reason became gradually more and more 
 limited, most so at the time of the renewed supremacy given to Nominalism by William 
 of Occam. Thus, at last, in place of the Scholastic presupposition of the conformity to 
 reason of the teachings of the Church, there arose an antagonism between the (Aristotehan) 
 philosophy of the Schools and the Christian faith. This led (chiefly during the period of 
 the transition to modern philosophy, see below, Vol. II., § 3 seq.) to various results. A por- 
 tion of the philosophers (as, notably, Pomponatius and his followers) came secretly to favor 
 a direction of thought hostile to the dogmatic Supra-naturalism of the Church. On the 
 other hand, a portion of the believers (Mystics and Reformers) were led to take sides 
 openly again.st the reason of the Schools and in favor of unconditional surrender to a reve- 
 lation believed to be superior to all human thought, while still others, finally, were led to 
 new essays in philosophy, founded partly on the renewal of older systems (in particular, 
 the Neo-Platonic), and partly on independent investigation (Telesius, Bacon, and others).
 
 358 JOHN SCOTUS ERIGENA. 
 
 FIRST DIVISION. 
 
 The BEGiN2!rtNGS of Scholasticism. 
 
 § 90. Johannes Scotus, or Erigena, is the earliest noteworthy phi- 
 losopher of the Scholastic period. He was of Scottish nationality, 
 but was probably born and brought up in Ireland, At the call of 
 Charles the Bald he emigrated to France. In his philosophical specu- 
 lations, which are set forth mainly in his work entitled De Divisione 
 Naturae^ he followed more particularly the lead of Dionysius the 
 Areopagite, whose works he translated into Latin, as also of his com- 
 mentator Maximus Confessor, and of Gregory of Nazianzen, Gregory 
 of Nyssa, and other Greek teachers of the Church, and, after them, of 
 the Latin Doctors, especially of Augustine, True philosophy was, in 
 his view, identical with true religion. Attempting to interpret the 
 dogmas of the Church in the light of the supposed early-Christian, 
 but in fact Neo-Platonizing conceptions of pseudo-Dionysius, he pro- 
 duced a system containing at once the germs of mediaeval mysticism 
 as well as of dialectical Scholasticism, but which was rejected by the 
 authorities of the Church as in contradiction with the true faith, 
 Erigena sought to render the Christian conception of creation intelli- 
 gible by interpreting it in the sense of the Neo-Platonic doctrine of 
 emanation. God, he taught, is the supreme unity, one and yet mani- 
 fold ; the process of evolution from him is the pluralization of the 
 divine goodness [or original being] by means of the descent from the 
 general to the particular, so that, first after the most general essence 
 of all things, the genera having the highest generality are produced, 
 then the less general, and so on, by the addition of specific differ- 
 ences and properties down to the species, and finally, to individuals. 
 This doctrine was founded upon the realization of an abstraction : the 
 general, namely, was conceived as an essence existing realiter, in 
 respect of order, before the particular ; or, in other words, the Pla- 
 tonic doctrine of ideas, in that conception of it which it was subse- 
 quently customary to express by the formula: '''"universalia ante 
 7'gm," lay at the basis of the doctrine of John Scotus. Yet Scotus 
 did not deny that the universal exists also in the particular. The 
 going forth of finite beings from the Deity was called by Scotus the 
 process of unfolding {analysis, resolutio), and, in addition to this, he
 
 JOHN 8C0TUS EEIGENA. 359 
 
 taught the doctrine of the return of all things unto God or their deifi- 
 cation {reversto, deificatid)^ or the congregation of the infinite plurality 
 of individuals in the genera and finally in the simplest unity of all, 
 which is God, so that then God should be all in all, John Scotus 
 followed Dionysius the Areopagite also in distinguishing affirmative 
 theology, which ascribes to God positive predicates with a symbolical 
 meaning, from negative theology, in which the same predicates in 
 their ordinary signification are denied of him. 
 
 The work of John Scotas Erigena entitled De Divina Praedesiinaiicne first appeared In print (after 
 the printing of his translation of Dionysius, at Cologne, in 1556), in Guilberti Maugnini vett. auctt. qui 
 nono seculo Ue praedesiinatione ei gratia scripserunt opera et/ragnienta, Paris, 1050, torn. I., p. 103 seq. 
 The De Divisions Xaturae, condemned to be burned by Pope Honorins III., February 23, 1225, was first 
 published by Thomas Gale, Oxford, 1681, next by C. B. Schliiter, Munster, 1S3S, and finally, together with 
 the translation of Dionysius, by H. J. Floss, Paris, 1S53, as Vol. 122 of Migne's Patrologiae Ourtus 
 Computus. Erigcna's Commentary to Marcianus Capella, edited by Haur6au, Paris, ISCl. Of John 
 Scotus write, in particular, P. Hjort {Johann Scotvs Erigena oder von dem Urf-prvng einer chrietlichen 
 Philosophie und ihrem heiligen Bervf, Copenhagen, 1S23), Heinrich Schmid (in Der Mysticitmui 
 des Mittelalters in teiner Evtstehnngitperiode, Jena, 1SC4, pp. 114-178), Fr. Ant. Stnudenmaier (Jo- 
 hannes Scotus Erigena, Vol. I., Frankfort-on-the-Maln, 1834), Ad. Helfferich (Die christl. Mystik., Bd. 
 II., Gotha, 1842, pp. 05-126), St. Ec'n6 Taillandier (Scot Erigene et la philosoii/tie scolantique, Strasburg, 
 1S43), Nic. JiioUer (Joh. Scotu4 Erigena und seine Irrthiimer, May eDce, 1S44), Theod. Cbristlieb (Lthen 
 tmd Lehre des Joh. Scotus Erigena, Gotha, I860), Joh. Huber (Joh. Sc. Erig., ein Beitrag zur Geschichte 
 der Philosophie und Theologie im Mittelalter, Munich, 1S61), A. Stockl (De Joh. Sc. Er.. Miinstcr, 1S67), 
 Oscar Hermens (Das Leben des Scotus Erigena, Inaug. Diss., Jena, 186S). Cf. Haureau, Philos. scolastique, 
 I., pp. ni-130, Wilh. Kaulich, in Alh. d. lohm. Ges. d. W., XI., 1861, pp. 147-lOS, and Ge-sch. d. tcholast. 
 Philos., I. i)p. 65-226; also the prefaces of the editors of the works of John Scotus, and, on Lis logic, 
 Prantl, Gesch. d. Log., II., pp. 20-S7. 
 
 Johannes, who in the MSS. is called sometimes Scotus and sometimes Jeriigena or 
 Erigena, came probably from Ireland, which was then called Scotia Major, as the native 
 land of the Scotch, who migrated thence into Scotland. Gale's derivation of Erigena from 
 Ergene, in the County of Hereford, as the place of his birth, is incorrect, and Mackenzie's 
 derivation of it from Aire, in Scotland, is improbable ; the name points (as Thomas Moore, 
 History of Ireland, I. ch. 13, has shown) to Hibernia i^lepvrj). The year of tlic birth of 
 John Scotus must fall between 800 and 810. He received his education probably in the 
 schools which were then flourishing in Ireland. He understood Greek, though perhaps 
 not so well as Latin. Of the writings of ancient philosophers, he was acquainted with the 
 Timcexis of Plato in the translation of Chalcidius, also with the Be Inter 'pretatione of Aris- 
 totle, the Categ. (?), together with the Isago'je of Porphyry and the Compendia of Boethius, 
 Cassiodorus, Marcianus CapcUa, Isidorus, and others who wrote after them, and with the 
 Principia Diakctices and Decern Categ. ascribed to Augustine. Charles the Bald called him, 
 about 843, soon after his accession to the throne, to the court-school (schola palatind) at 
 Paris, at the head of which he remained for some time. Charles also commissioned him 
 to translate the pretended writings of Dionysius Areopagita, which had been presented in 
 824 to Louis the I. by the Emperor Michael Balbus. But the Pope, Nicolaus I., complained 
 to the king that Scotus did not send his translation to him before its publication, that it 
 might undergo his censorship, and he proposed to call him to defend himself against a 
 charge of holding heretical opinions. It is uncertain whether John Scotus, upon this, was 
 removed from his position as teacher in the Court-School ; in any case, he retained the 
 favor of the king and remained near him. According to some accounts he was called by
 
 I 
 
 360 JOHN 8C0TUS EEIGENA. 
 
 Alfred the Great ca. 882 to the University founded at Oxford and was afterward murdered 
 by the monks while holding the ofBce of Abbot at Malmesbury ; but in these accounts he 
 seems to have been confounded with another Johannes. According to Haureau (Nouvelle 
 Biographie Generale, torn. XVI.), John Scotus died in France about 877. 
 
 The Church ITathers acknowledged the full authority of the Old, and, at an early date, 
 also of the New Testament. But the allegorical method of interpretation which they em- 
 ployed, and which in many cases led to very liberal constructions of Scripture, prevented 
 their relation to that authority from being one of mere dependence, while, in relation to 
 their predecessors, they all assumed, substantially, to possess equal authority with them, 
 and did not hesitate to modify and rectify the teachings of the latter, in accordance with 
 their own views. The Scholastics, on the contrary, and with them John Scotus — at least 
 so far as his intention is concerned — treat the authority of the "Fathers" with almost as 
 much consideration as the words of Scripture itself. According to Scotus, all our inquiries 
 must begin with faith in revealed truth {De Praedest, I. : salus nostra ex fide inchoat. 
 De Divis. Nat., 11. 20 (ed. Schliiter): Nbn enim aliafidelium animarum salzis est, quam de uno 
 omnium principio quae vere praedicantur credere et quae vere creduntur, intelligere). We may 
 not — as we read, ibid., I. 6G — advance concerning God our own inventions, but only that 
 which is revealed in the Holy Scriptures or what may be inferred from its statements 
 {ibid., II. 15: ratiocinationis exordium ex divinis eloquiis assumendum esse existimo). But it is 
 our business to discover by the aid of reason the sense of the divine utterances, which is 
 manifold and, like a peacock's feather, glows with many colors (ib., IV. 5), and in particular 
 to reduce figurative expressions to their literal sense {ib., I. 66). In penetrating into the 
 mysteries of revelation, we are to be guided by the writings of the Fathers of the Church. 
 It is not befitting in us to pass judgment on the wisdom of the Fathers, but we must 
 piously and with reverence accept their teachings ; yet it is permitted us to choose out 
 what appears in the judgment of the reason to be more in accordance with the divine 
 oracles {ib., II. 16), especially in cases where the ancient teachers of the Church are in 
 contradiction with eacli other {ib., IV. 16). 
 
 Appealing to the authority of Augustine, John Scotus affirms the identity of true phi- 
 losophy with true religion ; he bases this assertion especially on the fact that community 
 of cultus depends on community of doctrine {De Praedest., Prooeni : non alia est philosophia, 
 i. e., sapientiae studiuin, et alia religio, quum hi, quorum doctrinam non approhamus, nee sac- 
 ramenta nobiscum comumnicant. Quid est aliud de philosophia tractare nisi verae religionis 
 regulas exponere ? Conficitur inde verani esse piJdlosophiam veram religionem conversimque 
 veram religionem esse veram plalosophiam). But he does not conceive -true religion alto- 
 gether as simply identical with the doctrine sanctioned by ecclesiastical authority ; on the 
 contrary, in case of a collision between authority and reason, he would give the preference 
 to reason {De Divis. Nat., I. p. 39; ib., I. 71: auctoritas ex vera ratione processit, ratio vera 
 nequaquam ex auctoritate. Omnis auctoritas, quae vera ratione non approbatur, infirma esse 
 videtur ; vera autem ratio, quum viriutibus suis rata atque immuiabilis munitur, nullius auc- 
 toritatis adstipulatione roborari indiget. Yet he confesses \ib., II. 36] : nihil veris rationibvs 
 convenientlus subjungitur, quam sanctorum patrum inconcussa probabilisque auctoritas). His 
 opponents charged him with a want of respect for the authorities of the Church ; they said 
 he had argued (m his work against Gottschalk) too independently on the subject of pre- 
 destination. 
 
 j The fundamental idea, and at the same time the fundamental error, in Erigena's doc-] 
 trine is (as Haureau, also, justly remarks, Philos. Schol, I. p. 130) the idea that the degrees 
 
 \ of abstraction correspond with the degrees in the scale of real existence. He hypostasizes 
 the Tabula Logica.
 
 JOHN SC0TU8 ERIGENA. 361 
 
 In tlie work entitled De Divisione Naturae, John Scotus sets out ■with the division of 
 (piai^, or nature — in which conception he includes all that is either existent or non-exist- 
 ent — into four species : 1) that which creates and is not created, 2) that which is created 
 and creates, 3) that which is created and does not create, 4) that which neither creates nor 
 is created {De Divis. Nut , I. 1 : videtur mihi divisio naturae per quatuor diffei-entias quatuor 
 species recipere, quarum prima est quae creat tt non creaiur, secunda quae creatur et creat, 
 terrtia quae creatur et non creat, quarta quae nee creat nee creatur). The first is the cause of 
 all that is existent or non-existent; the second includes the ideas which subsist in God as 
 priviordiales causae ; the third comprises all things that appear in space and time ; and the 
 fourth coincides with the first in so far as both refer to God, the first, namely, to God as 
 Creator, the fourth to God as the end of all things. 
 
 By the non-existent Scotus means, not that which has absolutely no being {quod penitus 
 non est), or mere privation, but (1), in the highest sense, that which is above the reach of 
 our senses or our reason ; (2) that which, in the scale of created being — which descends 
 from the rational force {virtue inteUectualis) through ratio and sensus down to the anima 
 nutriiiva et auciiva — is in each given case the higher, in so far as it as such is not known by 
 the inferior, whereas it is to be denominated existent, in so far as it is known by those 
 who are higher in the scale than itself, and by itself; (3) that which is as yet onlj-- poten- 
 tially existent (like the human race in Adam, the plant in the seed) ; (4) in the language 
 of philosophy, the material, since it comes and goes, and is not truly existent, like the 
 intelligible ; (5) sin, as being the loss of the divine image {De Div. Nat, I. 2 seq.). 
 
 The creating and uncreated being alone has essential subsistence. He alone truly is. 
 He is the essence of all things {De Div. Nat, I. 3 : ipse namque omnium essentia est, qui 
 sobis vere est, ut ait Dionysius Areopagita. lb., I. 14: solummodo ipsam \_naturam creatricem 
 omniumqus causakm^ esstntiaUter subsistere). God is the beginning and end of things {lb., 
 I. 12 : est icjitur principium, medium et finis : principium, qziia ex se sunt omnia quae essen- 
 tiara participant, medium aulem quia in se ipso et per se ipsum subsistunt omnia, finis vera quia 
 ad ipsum moventur, quietem motus sui suaeque ptr/tctionis stabilitatem quatrcntia). God's 
 essence is incognizable for men and even for the angels. Nevertheless, his being can be 
 seen in the being of things, his wisdom in their orderly classified arrangement, and his life 
 in their constant motion ; by his being is to be understood, here, the Father, by his wis- 
 dom, the Son, and by his life, the Holy Ghost {ib., I. 14). God is therefore an essence 
 {essentia) in three substances. True, all these terms are not hterally appropriate ; Diony- 
 sius says justly that the highest cause can be expressed by no name; these expressions are 
 only symbolically pertinent. They belong to that affirmative theology which is called, 
 among the Greeks, KaraijiaTiKTj ; negative theology {anoipaTiKT/) denies their applicability 
 to God. Symbolically or metaphorically speaking, God can be called truth, goodness, 
 essence, light, justice, sun, star, breath, water, lion, and numberless other things. But in 
 reality he is exalted above all these predicates, since each of them has an opposite, while in 
 him there is no opposition {De Div. Nat, I. 16 : essentia ergo diciiur Dens, sed proprie essen- 
 tia non est, cui oppionitur nihil, virepoi'aio^ igitur est, id est superessentialis ; item bonitas 
 diciiur, sed proprie bonitas non est, bonilati enim malitia opponitur, vTztpayaOo^ igitur, plus 
 quam bonus, et vnepayaOoTT/g, id est plus quam bonitas). In like manner John Scotus applies to 
 this "creative and uncreated nature" the predicates vntpdeo^, inepcXr^djc and VTr£pa?.y6etc, 
 vTTEpatiJvio^ and vnepaiuwia vnipao<poc, and vKepao<pia (transcendently divine, true, eternal, 
 wise), all of which sound indeed affirmative, but involve a negative sense. So, too, he 
 represents this natura (in this following expressly the example of St. Augustine) as supe- 
 rior to the ten categories, those most universal genera into which Aristotle had divided all 
 created things {ib., I. 16 seq.).
 
 362 JOHN BC0TU8 EBIGENA. 
 
 The uncreated but creating nature is the source of all created things. First of all, the 
 created natures or beings, which are endowed at the same time with creative power, were 
 produced. These include the totality of prim.ordiales causae, prototypa, primordialia exem- 
 pla, or ideas, i. e., the eternal archetypes of things {De Divis. Nat, II. 2 : species vel formae, 
 in quibus rerum omnium faciendarum priusquam essent immutahiles rationes condiiae sunt). 
 
 These Ideas, which are the first causes of individual existences, are contained in the 
 divine Wisdom or the divine Word, the only-begotten Son of the Father. Under the 
 influence of the Holy Ghost (or the fostering divine love) they unfold their effects, which 
 are the created and not creating objects, or the external world (lb., II. 19: spiritus enim 
 sanctus causas primordiales, quas pater in principio, in filio videlicet suo, fecerat, ut in ea 
 quorum causa sunt procederent, fovebat, hoc est divini amoris fotu nutriebai ; ad hoc namque ova 
 ab alifibv^, ex quibus haec metaphor a assumta est, foventur, ut intima invisibilisque vis, quae in 
 eis latet, per numeros locorum temporumque in formas visibiles corporalesque pulchritudines, 
 igne amque in humorihus seminum terrenaque materia op)erantibus, erumpat). The mate- 
 riality of the world is {ib., I. 36, where John Scotus appeals to the authority of Gregory 
 of Nyssa, cf. § 85, p. 331) only apparent ; it is due to the combination of accidents {acciden- 
 tium quorundam concur.sus). By that "nothing," out of which, according to the doctrine of 
 the Church, the world was created, is to be understood God's own incomprehensible 
 essence {De Divis., Nat., III. 19: ineffdbilem et incomprehensibilem divinae naturae inaccessi- 
 bilemque claritatem omnibus intellectibus sive humanis sive angelicis incognitam (svperessentialis 
 est enim et supernaturalis) eo nomine {nihil) significatam crediderim). Creation is an act of 
 God, by which he passes through {processio) the primordiales causas or pi-incipia into the 
 world of invisible and visible creatures {ib.. III. 25). But this procession is an eternal act 
 {ib.. III. 17 seq. : omnia quae semper vidit, semper fecit; non enim in eo praecedit visio opera- 
 tionem, quoniam coaeterna est visioni operatio ; — videt enim operando et videndo operatur). The 
 substance of all finite things is God {Non enim extra earn {divi7iam naturam) suhswtunt; con- 
 clusum est, ipsam solam esse vere ac proprie in omnibus et nihil vere ac proprie esse quod ipsa 
 non sit. Proinde non duo a se ipsis distantia delemus intelligere Dominum et creaturam, sed 
 unum, et id ipsum. Nam et creatwra in Deo est subsisttns, et Dens in creafura mirabili et 
 ineffabili modo creatur, se ipsum manifestans, invisibilis visibilem se faciens et incomprehensibilis 
 comprehensibilem et occultus opertum et incognitus cognitum et forma et specie carens formosum 
 et speciosum et superessentialis esseniialem et supernaturalis naturalem, — et omnia creans in 
 omnibus creatum et mnnium factor factum in omnibus). Scotus says expressly that he 
 affirms the doctrine of the descent of the Triune God into finite things, not only with refer- 
 ence to the single instance of the incarnation, but with reference to all created things or 
 existences. Our life is God's life in us {ib., I. 78: se ipsam sancta trinitas in nobis et in se 
 ipsa amat, videt, movet). The knowledge which angels and men have of God is God's reve- 
 lation of himself in them {apparitio Dei), or theophany {deotpdveia, ib. I. 7 seq.). 
 
 The nature which neither creates nor is created is not a fourth nature, distinct from 
 the three first, but is in reality identical with the creating, uncreated nature ; it is God, 
 viewed as the term in which all things end, to which all finally return. After this return 
 they repose eternally in God ; the process of development or " creation " is not repeated {De 
 Divis. Nat, II 2 : prima namqus et quarta unum sunt, quoniam de Deo solummodo intelli- 
 guntur ; est enim principium omnium quae a se condiia sunt, et finis omnium quae eum appetunt, 
 ut in eo aeternaliter immutabiliierque quiescant. Causa siquidem omnium propterea dicitur 
 creare, quoniam ab ea universitas eorum, quae post earn, ab ea creata sunt, in genera et species et 
 numeros, differential quoque ceteraque quae in natura condita considerantur, mirabili quadam 
 divinaque multiplicatione procedit; quoniam vera ad eandem cajisam ovinia quae ab ea proce- 
 dunt dum ad finem pervenient reversura sunt, propterea finis omnium dicitur et neque create
 
 JOHN SC0TI7S EEIGENA. 363 
 
 neque creari perkibetur ; nam postqiuim m earn reversa sunt omnia, nihil ulterius ah ea per 
 generaiionem loco et ttmjjore generibus et formis procedet, quoniam in ta omnia quieta erunt et 
 unum individuum atque immutabile manebunt. Nam, quae in processionibus naturarum muUi- 
 pliciter divisa atqtie partita esse videniur, in piimordialibus causis unita atque unum sunt, ad 
 quam unitatem reversura in ea aetemaliter atque imm.utalAliter manebunt. lb.. III. 23 : jam 
 desinit creare, omnibus in suas aeternas rationes, in quilms aeterniter manebunt et manent con- 
 versis, appellatione quoque creaturae significari desistentibus ; Deus enim omnia in omnibus erit 
 et omnis creatura obumbrabitur in Deum, videlicet conversa sicut astra sole orie?ite). 
 
 Since the Deity is viewed by John Scotus as the substance of all things, it is impossible 
 for him, with the Aristotelians (whom he terms Dialecticians), to regard individual, con- 
 crete things as substances, of which the general may be predicated, and in wliich the acci- 
 dental is contained ; lie views all things, rather, as contained in the divine substance, the 
 special and individual as immanent in the general, and the latter, again, as existing in 
 things individual as in its natural parts {De Divis. Nat., I. 27 seq.). Yet neither is this 
 view identical with the original Platonic doctrine ; it is a result of a transference of the 
 Aristotelian conception of substance to the Platonic idea, and of an identification of the 
 relation of accidents {uvfijieliTjKOTa) to the substances in which they inhere, with that of the 
 individuals to the ideas, of which, in the Platonic doctrine, they are copies. 
 
 That this doctrine is taken wholly from Dionysius the Areopagite and his commentator 
 Maximus, is expressly affirmed by John Scotus, especially in the dedication of his transla- 
 tion of the Scholia of Maximus to Gregory of Nazianzen ; the Platonic and Neo-Platonic 
 basis is also manifest throughout it. The attempt to combine it with the doctrine of the 
 Church in one harmonious whole could not be carried through without logical inconsis- 
 tency. If God is the 6v, the real essence, that is cognized through the most universal 
 conception of being, then it follows, on the one hand, that the conception which represents 
 him as a personal being, is and can only be the result of the imagination, not of thought, 
 and, on the other, that plurality, or, in particular, trinity, cannot be predicated of God him- 
 self, but only of his development or outcome ; so Plotinus represents the vovg with the 
 ideas as occupying the second place in the ontological order and as coming after the abso- 
 lutely simple original essence (the world-soul forming the third form of Deitj'). But the 
 Logos-doctrine, in the form given it by Athanasius, required Scotus to treat the Logos (as 
 also the Holy Ghost) as a part of the original essence {i. e., of God), placing only the ideas, 
 which are in the Logos, in the second class (as in the third was placed the world, made 
 with the co-operation of the Holy Ghost). — The return of all things into God, which, in 
 agreement with his fundamental conception, was taught by Scotus, was not m harmony 
 with the doctrinal system of the Church. 
 
 In addition to Platonic and Neo-Platonic, there are traces also of Aristotelian influences 
 in the works of John Scotus, although he was only indirectly acquainted with any of the 
 metaphysical teachings of Aristotle. The three lirst of his four "divisions of nature" are a 
 partly Neo-Platonic, partly Christian, modification of the three-fold ontological division of 
 Aristotle {Metaph., XII. 7): the unmoved and moving, the moved and moving, and the 
 moved and not moving, with which Scotus may have become acquainted from a passage in 
 Augustine (De Civ. Dei, V. 9 : causa igitur rerum quMefacit nee fit, Deus est; aliae vero causae 
 eifaciunt etfiunt, sicut sunt omnes creati spiritus, maxime rationales; corporales autem causae, 
 quae magis fiunt quam faciunt, non sunt inter causas efficientes annumerandae). The Dionysian 
 doctrine of the return of all things into God furnished then the fourth form. 
 
 In the doctrine of John Scotus universals are before and also in the individual objects 
 which exist, or rather the latter are in the former; the distinction between these (Realistic) 
 formulae appears not yet developed in his writings. But his system could scarcely lead
 
 3G4 JOHN SCOTUS ERIGENA. 
 
 later tliinkers to Nominalisni, unless by the unremoved contradictions which it contained, 
 and which might lead to the denial of the postulate of the substantial existence of univer- 
 sals and to tho conception of the latter as merely subjective forms ; viewed in its positive 
 aspects, the system contains no germs of Xominalism. The following notice, taken from 
 an old Hisioria a Roberto rege ad iiwrtem Fhilippi primi, was first published by Bulajus, in his 
 Historia Vnivers. Paris., I. p. 443 : in dialectica hi potentes exsiiterunt sophisiae : Johannes, qui 
 eandem artem sophisticam vocalem esse disseruif, Hobei'tiis Paris iacensis, Rocelinus Compendien- 
 s^is, Arnvlphus Laudunensis, hi Joannis fuerunt sectatores, qui etiam quamplures habuenmt audi- 
 iores (cf. Haureau, Philos. Seal, I. pp. 174 seq., and Prantl, Gesch. der Log., II. pp. 16 seq.). 
 The Johannes to whom reference is here made is surely not John Scotus (as Haureau and 
 Prautl assume), but a later dialectician, otherwise unknown to us. Erigena is throughout a 
 realist. He teaches, it is true, that grannuar and rhetoric, as branches of dialectic, or aids 
 to it, relate only to words (voces), not to things, and that they are therefore not properly 
 sciences (De Divis. Xat., Y. 4: matri artiu7n, quae est dialectica^ se^vper adhaerent; sunt enim 
 veluti quaedam ipsius brachia rivulive ex ca manantes vel certe inst^-umenta, quibus suas intelli- 
 gibiles inventioiies humanis itsibus manifestat) ; but he co-ordinates dialectic itself or XoyiK^, 
 ratio7ialis sophia {De Div. Xat., III. 30) with ethics, physics, and theology, defining it as the 
 doctrine of the methodical form of knowledge (qiiae ostendit quibus regulis de unaquaque 
 trium aliarum partium disputandum), and assigning to it, in particular, as its work, the dis- 
 cussion of the most general conceptions or logical categories (predicaments), which cate- 
 gories he by no means regards as merely subjective forms or images, but as the names of 
 the highest genera of all created tilings [De Divis. Xai., I. 16: Aristoteles, acutissimus apud 
 Graecos, ut ajunt, naturalium rerum discretionis repen-Un; omnium re)-um, quae post Deuin sunt 
 el ab eo creatae, inmunerabiles varietates in decent universalibus generibus conclusit ; — ilia pars 
 philosophia^., quae dicitur dialectica, circa horum ge7ieru77i divisiones a generalissimis ad spe- 
 ciaiissima itei'umqu^ collectiwie a specicdissi77iis ad ge7ieralissi7na ve7-satur. lb., I. 29 : dialec- 
 tica est communium animi conceptionum rationabilium diligens investigatrixque disciplina. lb., 
 I. 46 : dialectical ^)roj:))'/eto^ est rerum 07nniu7n, quae intelligi possunt, naturas divide7-e, con- 
 junge7-e, disce7-nere, propriosque locos U7ucuuiu£ dist7-ibuere, atque ideo a sapientibus vera rerum 
 contemplatio solet appellari. lb., TV. 4 : intelligitur, quod ars ilia, quae dividit genera in 
 species et species in genera resolvit, quae dialeKTiKT] did.tv,r, non ab humanis machinationibus sit 
 facta, sed in natin-a re7-um ah auctore omnium a7tium. quae vei-e artes su77t, condita et a sapien- 
 tibus inve7ita et ad utilitate/7i solerti reru7n indagine usitata. lb., Y. 4 : ars ilia, quae a Gi'oecis 
 dicitur dialectica et definitur bene disputandi scientia, prima 077iniu77i ci7-ca ovciav veluti circa 
 proprium sttU77i principiiim versatur, ex qua omnis divisio et multiplicatio eorum, de quibus ars 
 ipsa disptitat, i72choat, pe7- genera generalissimxi mediaque ge/iera usqice adfor^nas et species spe- 
 cialissimas descendens, et iteru77i complicationis regulis pe7- eosdem gradvs, per quos degreditur, 
 donee ad ipsam ovalav, ex qua egressa est, perveniat, non desinit redire in earn, qua semper 
 appetit quiscere et circa earn vel solum vel maxi77ie i7itelligihili viotu convolvi). 
 
 Tho most notewortliy features in John's theory of the categories (in the first book) are 
 his doctrine of the combination of the categories with each other, and his attempt to sub- 
 sume them under the conceptions of motion and rest, as also his identification of the cate- 
 gory of place with definition in logic, which, he says, is the work of the under.<5tanding. 
 Tho dialectical precepts which relate to the form or method of philosophizing are not 
 discussed by him in detail ; the most essential thing, in his regard, is the use of the four 
 forms, called by the Greeks division, definition, demonstration, and analysis (SiatpertK^, 
 bpiaTiKt], ciTToSeiKTiK!/, nvaXvTiKff). Under the latter he understands the reduction of the 
 derivative and composite to the simple, universal, and fundamental (De p7-aed., Prooem.), 
 but uses the term also in the opposite sense, to denote the unfolding of God in creation
 
 BEGINNINGS OF REALISM AND NOMINALISM. 365 
 
 {Pr<ief. ad amb. S. Max. : divina in omnia processio avakvriKfi dicitur, reversio veto diuaic, 
 i. e., deificatio). 
 
 In the controversy respecting predestination. John Scotus took sides against Gotts- 
 chalk's doctrine of two kinds of fore-ordination, of fore-ordination to salvation and of 
 fore-ordination to damnation, announcing his belief in the former only. In the disputes 
 concerning the Eucharist, he gave prominence to the idea that the presence of Christ in 
 that sacrament is of a spiritual nature. But of these specifically theological points it i3 
 unnecessary here to treat. 
 
 § 91. The doctrine combated by John Scotus and held bj those 
 whom he called the dialecticians, who derived it in part from -wTit- 
 ings of Aristotle and Boethius, as also the doctrine of Augustine 
 and Pseudo-Augustine, — according to which individual objects were 
 substances in the fullest sense, while species and genera were such 
 only in a secondary sense, and generic and specific characteristics 
 were predicable of individual substances, in which latter the unes- 
 sential marks or accidents also inhered — found among the Scholastics 
 during and after the time of John Scotus, numerous supporters, some 
 of whom advanced it expressly in opposition to his Neo-Platonic theory, 
 while others admitted rather the true substantiality of the universal. 
 Among a portion of these "dialecticians" a doubt arose whether, 
 since the general can be predicated of the individual, the genus was 
 to be regarded as anything positive (real) — for it seemed impossible 
 that one thing should be affirmed as a predicate of another thing ; 
 this doubt led to the assertion that genera were to be viewed as mere 
 words [voces). The development of these doctrines was connected, in 
 particular, with the study of Porph}Ty's Introduction to the logical writ- 
 ings of Aristotle, in which Introduction the conceptions : genus, differ- 
 entia, species, projyrium, and accidens, are treated of ; the question was 
 raised, whether by these were to be undei*stood five realities or only 
 five words [quinque voces). A passage in this same Introduction 
 touched upon the questions: (1) whether genera and species (or the 
 so-called universals) have a substantial existence or whether they exist 
 solely in our thoughts ; (2) whether, supposing them to exist substan- 
 tially, they are material or immaterial essences; and (3) whether they 
 exist apart from the objects perceptible by the senses or only in 
 and with them. Porphyry declined to enter upon a special dis- 
 cussion of these questions (which he found suggested in the meta- 
 physical writings of Aristotle — that were unknown in the earlier part 
 of the Middle Ages — in the Platonic or Pseudo-Platonic dialogue 
 Parmenides, and in the teachings of his own master, Plotinus), on the
 
 366 BEGINNINGS OF REALISM AND NOMINALISM. 
 
 ground that they were too diflBciilt to be considered in an introductory 
 work ; but even those few words were sufficient so to express the main 
 problem itself, and to indicate the possible ways of attempting its 
 solution, as to furnish a point of departure for mediaeval Realism and 
 Nominalism, and that all the more, since the dialectical treatment of 
 the fundamental dogmas of the Cliurch could not but lead to the dis- 
 cussion of the same problem. The doctrine (of Plato, or at least the 
 doctrine ascribed to him by Aristotle), that universals have an inde- 
 pendent existence apart from individual objects, and that they exist 
 before the latter (whether merely in point of rank and in respect of the 
 causal relation, or in point of time also), is extreme Realism, which was 
 afterward reduced to the formula : universalia ante rem. The (Aris- 
 totelian) opinion, that universals, while possessing indeed a real exist- 
 ence, exist only in individual objects, is the doctrine of Moderate 
 Realism, expressed by the formula : universalia in re. Nominalism 
 is the doctrine that only individuals have real existence, and that 
 genera and species are merely subjective combinations of similar ele- 
 ments, united by the aid of one and the same concept {conceptus), 
 through which concept >ve think the manifold homogeneous ob- 
 jects which it includes, and under one and the same word {noTtien 
 vox), which word, for want of a sufficient number of simple proper 
 names, we employ to express at once the totality of homogeneous 
 objects included under the concept. Of Nominalism there are two 
 varieties, according as stress is laid on the subjective nature of the 
 concept (conceptualism), or on the identity of the word employed to 
 denote the objects comprehended under the concept (Extreme Nom- 
 inalism, or Nominalism in the narrower sense of the tenn). The 
 formula of Nominalism is : universalia post rem. All these leading 
 types of doctrine appear, either in embryo or with a certain degree 
 of development, in the ninth and tenth centuries; but the more 
 complete expansion and the dialectical demonstration of them, as 
 well as the sharpest contests of their several supporters, and also 
 the development of the various possible modifications and combina- 
 tions of them, belong to the period next succeeding. 
 
 Of Realism and NomiDalism in the Middle Ages treat, among others, Jac Thomasius (Oratio de $ecta 
 nominaliinn, in his Orationes, Leipsic, 1683-S6), Ch. Meiners {De nominalium ac realium initiis, in : 
 Comm soc Oott. XII., class, hist), L. F. O. Baumgarten-Crusius {Progr. de vero schotasHcorum realium 
 et nominalium discrimine et aententia theologica, Jen., 1821), F. ^xner {Ueber J^otninnlinmw und Eeal- 
 ismw, Prague, 1842), H. O Kohler {Realismus und KwninaU^mm in ihrem Einfitiss auf die dogmat. 
 Systeme den Mittelalters, Gotha, 185S) ; C. S. Barach, Zur Oesch. des Nominalismm nor Roscellin, nach 
 handschr. Quellen der Wiener kais. ffo/Mbliothek., Vienna, 1866 (on the marginal comments in a MS. of 
 the Pseudo-Augnstinian Categories). Of. the works above cited on the philosophy of the Scholastics.
 
 BEGINNINGS OF REALISM AND NOMINALISM. 367 
 
 Following after Jourdain {liecherches critiques, etc., and otlier writings) Cousin, Haureau, 
 and Prantl, in particular, have demonstrated that, until nearly the middle of the twelftli 
 century, the only logical writings of the ancients known in the Middle Ages were the fol- 
 lowing: Aristotle's Categ. and De Jnterpr., in the translation of Boethius, Porphyry's 
 Isagoge, in the translations of Boethius and Victorinus, the works of Marcianus Capella, 
 Augustine, Pseudo- Augustine, and Cassiodorus, and the following works of Boetliius: 
 Ad Porphyr. a Victorino translatum, ad Aridt. de interpret., ad Vic. To])., Introd. ad categoric. 
 sylL, De syllog. categorico, De syll. hypothetico, De divisione, De definitione, De differ, top. Both 
 the Analytica, the Topica, and the Soph. Elcnch. of Aristotle were unknown. Of all the 
 works of Plato it is probable that only a portion of the Timaeus, and that in the transla- 
 tion of Chaleidius, was possessed by mediaeval scholars ; witli this exception his doctrines 
 were known to them only indirectly, particularly through passages in Augustine. They 
 possessed also the work of Apuleius, entitled De Dogmate Platonis. The Analyt. and Top. 
 of Aristotle became gradually known after the year 1128, and his metaphysical and physical 
 writings from about the year 1200. 
 
 The passage in the Isagoge of Porphyry, which was the historical occasion of the 
 development of the various dialectical tendencies above named, reads as follows, in the 
 translation of Boethius, in which it was known in the Middle Ages : Quum sit necessarium, 
 Chrysaori, et ad earn quae est apud Aristotelem pra^dicameritorum dodrinam, nosse quid sit 
 genus, quid differentia, quid species, quid proprium et qidd accidens, et ad dejinitionum assigna- 
 tionem, et omnino ad ea quae in divisione et in demonstratione sunt, utili isinrum rerum 
 speculatione, compendiosam tihi traditionem faciens, tentabo breviter velut introductionis modo, 
 ea quae ab antiquis dicta sunt aggredi, ah altioribus quidem quaestionibus abstinens, simpliciores 
 vera mediocriter conjcctans. Mox de generibus et speciebus illud quidem sive subsistant sive in 
 solis nudis intellectibus posita sint, sive suhsisientia corporalia sint an incorporalia, et utrum 
 separata a sensilibus an in sensilibus posita et circa haec consisientia, dicere recusaho ; altissi- 
 mum enim negotium est hujusmodi et majoris egens inquisitionis. Victor Cousin (in Ouvrages 
 inedits d'Abelard, Paris, 1836, p. LYI.), following the lead of Tennemann and others, has 
 called especial attention to this passage as being the point of departure for the contest 
 between Realism and Nominalism in the Middle Ages. 
 
 In distinction from the Neo-Platonism of Joh. Scotus, the school of Hrabanus Maurus, 
 who died in 856, while Archbishop of Mayence (works edited by Colvener, Cologne, 1627), 
 held fast to the stand-point of Aristotle and Boethius. Cf., respecting Hrabanus, Schwarz, 
 and Prantl (above, § 88), and F. Kunstmann (Mayence, 1841). 
 
 Eric (Heiricus) of Auxerre, who studied at Fulda, at the school founded by Alcuin'a 
 pupil, Hrabanus, under the direction of Ilaimon (likewise a pupil of Alouin), and, after 
 further training at Ferrieres, opened a school at Auxerre, wrote, among otlier things, on the 
 margin of his copy of the Pseudo- Augustinian Categoriae, glosses, which were discovered 
 and have been published by Cousin and Haureau. The style is clear and facile; the differ- 
 ence of logical stand-points is as yet but slightly marked. Heiricus says (as cited by 
 Haureau, Phil. Scot., p. 142) with Aristotle and Boethius: rem condpit intellectus. intdkc- 
 turn voces designant, voces autem litierae significant, and affirms (after Aristotle, De Interpr., 
 1) that res and intellectus are natural, and that voces and litterae are conventional (secundum 
 positionem hominum). He does not, however, view the universal, as it exists in our con- 
 ceptions, as corresponding with a real or objective universality in things, but expresses 
 himself rather after the manner of Nominalism {ap. Haureau, PhU. Scol., p. 141): sciendum 
 autem, quia propria nomina primum sunt innumerabilia, ad quae cognoscenda intellectus nuUus 
 sen memoria sufficit, haec ergo omnia coartcUa species comprehendit et facit primum gradum. 
 qui latissimus est, scilicet hominem. equum, leonem et species hujusmodi omnes continet; sed
 
 36S BEGINNINGS OF REALISM AND NOMINALISM. 
 
 quia haec rursus erant innumerahilia ei incomprehensihilia, alter /actus est gradus angustior 
 jam, qui constat in genere, quod est animal, surculus et lapis ; iterum haec genera, in unum 
 coacta nomen, tertium fecerunt gradum arctissimum jam et angustissim,um, ulpote qui uno 
 nomine solummodo consiet, quod est usia. Concepts of qualities do not denote things (Heiri- 
 cus ap. Haurcau. Ph. Sc, p. 139: si quis dixerit album et nigrum absolute sine jwopria et 
 certa suhstantia, in qua continetur, per hoc nan poterii certam rem osiendere, nisi dicat alhus 
 Iwmo vel equus aut niger). In the same Codex are also contained, together with marginal 
 notes upon them, Boethius' translation of Aristotle's De Jnterpr., Augustine's Dialectica, 
 and the translation of the Isagoge of Porphyry by Boethius. In the glosses to the latter 
 work, the questions of Porphyry are answered in accordance with the doctrine of moderate 
 (Aristotelian) Realism, which appears as the doctrine generally prevalent in the period in 
 which Eric lived. The true being or subsistence {vere esse or vere subsistcre) of genera and 
 species is defended {ap. Cousin, Ouvr. Ined. d'Abelard, p. LXXXII.) ; these are in themselves 
 immaterial, but subsist in things material ; the latter, as being individual, are the objects 
 of sense-perception, while the universal, conceived as existing by itself, is the subject of 
 thought. The genus is (conceptualistically) defined as cogitatio collecta ex singularum simili- 
 tudine specierum. These glosses are, including the statement with reference to Plato {sed 
 Plato genera et species non inodo intelligit universalia, verum eiiam- esse atque praeter corpora 
 subsistere putat), almost wnthout exception extracts from Boeth. in Porphyr. a se translatum, 
 in particular from the passage cited by Haureau, Ph. Sc, I. p. 95 seq. 
 
 Heiricus' pupil, Remigius of Auxerre, taught, beginning in 882, grammar, music, and dia- 
 lectic at Rheims and, later, at Paris, where he had among his pupils Otto of Clugny. His 
 Commentary on Marcianus Capella (taken in large measure from the Commentary of John 
 Scotus on the same author — see extracts in Haureau's Ph. Scot, I. p. 144 seq., and Notices 
 et Extraits de Manv^crits, t. XX. p. II.) betokens a more realistic tendency, containing, as 
 it does, the Platonic doctrine that the specific and individual exist by participation in the 
 universal, yet without quitting the Boethian and Aristotelian stand-point of immanence. 
 Remigius defines the genus as the collection of many species {genus est complexio, id est 
 collectio et comprehensio multarum formarum i. e. specierum). That this is to be understood 
 as describing, not a mere subjective act, but an objective unity, is seen from the definition 
 o? forma or species as a substantial part of the genus {partitio substantialis) or as the sub- 
 stantial unity of the individuals included in the species Qwmo est m.uUorum hominum substan- 
 tialis unitas). Remigius discusses the question (oft treated by his predecessors), how the 
 accidents exist before their union with the individuals to which they belong, in what man- 
 ner, for example, rhetorical culture exists before its union with Cicero. His decision is, 
 that accidents, previous to their manifestation, are already contained potentially in the 
 individuals of the species, that, e. g., rhetorical culture is contained in human nature in 
 general, but that in consequence of Adam's sin it disappeared in the depths of ignorance, 
 continued in memoria, and is now called into consciousness {in praesentiam intelligentiae) by 
 the process of learning (Remig., ap. Haureau, Notices et Extraits da Manuscr., XX., II. 
 p. 20). 
 
 Of the dialectical writings belonging to the ninth century, a manuscript should here be 
 mentioned, which was discovered and published by Cousin (in Ouvrages Jnedits d'Abelard, 
 Paris, 1836) and is entitled Super Porphyrium. Cousin and Haureau, on the ground of 
 manuscript tradition, assign its authorship to Rhabanus Maurus, but it is more probably 
 to be ascribed (in agreement with Prantl's opinion, which Kaulich also adopts) to one of 
 his (direct or indirect) disciples. In this work logic is divided (not as by Rhabanus him- 
 self — De Universo, XV. 1, ed. Colvener, Cologne, 1627 — into dialectic and rhetoric, but) 
 into grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic. The intention of Porphyry in his Isagoge is de-
 
 BEGmNINGS OF REALISM AND NOMINALISM. 3G9 
 
 scribed here as follows {ap. Cousin, ib., p. 613) : intentio Porphyrii est in hoc opere facilem 
 intellectum ad praedicamenta praeparare tractando de quinque rebus vel locibus, genere scilicet, 
 specie, differentia, propria et accidente, quorum cognitio valet ad j^raedicavientorum cognitionem. 
 The autlior discusses the view of some who argued that Porphyry intended to treat in his 
 Jsagoge, not de quinque rebus, but de quinque vocibus, on the ground, as our author relates, that 
 otherwise his definition of the genus would be inapt {genus est quod praedicatur): for a thing 
 cannot be a predicate {Res enim mm j)raedic.atur. Quod hoc modo probant: si res praedicatur, 
 ■tes dicitur; si res dicitur, res enunciatur ; si res enunciatur, res profertur ; sed res jyrofenri non 
 potest, nihil enim profertur nisi vox, neque enim aliud est prolatio, quam aeris pleciro linguae 
 percussio). Another proof, we are told, was founded by the same party on the fact that 
 Aristotle, in the work on the Categories, to which Porphyry was preparing an introduction, 
 intended mainly to treat de vocibus (in the language of Boethius: de primis reruni nominibus 
 et de vocibus res significantibus), and the introduction must, of course, correspond in character 
 with the work to which it belongs. It is not, however, for this reason denied, that the 
 word genus may be taken realistically, for Boethius says that the division of the genus 
 must be conformable to nature. The genus is defined as substantialis similitudo ex diversis 
 speciebus in cogiiatione colkcta. In the statement of Boethius : alio namque modo {sub- 
 stantia) universalis est quum cogitatur, alio singularis quum sentitur, the following meaning is 
 found by the author : quod eadem res individuum et species et genus est. et non es.se universalia 
 individuis quasi quiddam dirersum, ut quidam dicunt; scilicet sp)eciem nihil aliud esse quam 
 genus informatum et individuum nihil aliud esse quam speciem informatam. This work shows 
 how, at the time now under consideration, the germs of the different doctrines were all 
 existing side by side in relative harmony, being as yet undeveloped. 
 
 The pursuit of dialectic, as of all the aries liberates, in the schools, continued during the 
 tenth and eleventh centuries, but was almost entirely unproductive of new scientific re- 
 sults, till near the end of the latter century. At Fulda, about the middle of the tenth 
 century, Poppo taught dialectic, mainly on the basis of the works of Boethius, following in 
 this not only the tradition of his convent but also the universal custom of liis times. He 
 is said also to have written a commentary on the Be Consolaiione of Boethius. Reinhard 
 •wrote, in the cloister of St. Burchard at Wiirzburg, a commentary on the Categories of 
 Aristotle. A considerable scholastic activity, first excited, as it would appear, by the 
 school founded by Hrabanus at Fulda, was developed in the cloister of St. Gallen. Notker 
 Laheo (died 1022) contributed much to its maintenance and development. He translated 
 into German the Categ. and iJe Jnterpr. of Aristotle, the Consol. Fhilos. of Boethius, and 
 the De Kuptiis Fhilologiae et Me^-curii of Marcianus Capella (as also the Psalms), and com- 
 posed works on the divisions of the art of thinking, on syllogisms, on rhetoric and music 
 (published by Graff, Berlin, 1837, and again, more completely and exactly, by Heinr. Hat- 
 temer, in Benkmale des MittdaUers, 3d vol., St. Gallen, 1844-49). 
 
 Gerbert, who was subsequently made Pope, under the title of Sylvester II. (died 1003), 
 was educated in the cloister at Aurillac in Auvergne, which had been brought under more 
 rigid discipline by Otto of Clugny, the scholar of Rcmigius. and afterward in other schools 
 of France and also in Spain among the Arabs (from whom also he took the Indian nume- 
 rals). Cf., concerning him, C. F. Hock, Vienna, 1837; Max Biidinger, Cassel, 1851; G. 
 Friedlein, Erlangen, 1861, and M. Cantor, Mafhematische Beitrdge zum Culturkben der 
 Volker, Halle, 1863, of which section XIII. treats of Boethius, XIX. of Isidorus, Eeda, and 
 Alcuin, XX. of Otto of Clugny, and XXI. and XXII. of the life and mathematical labors 
 of Gerbert. Of the works of Gerbert, one treats of the Lord's Supper, and the other of 
 the rational and of the use of the reason (De Fationali et Ratione Uti, printed in Pcz's Thes. 
 Anecd., I. 2, pp. 146 seq., and in the Oeuvres de Gerbert, edited by A. OUeris, Clermont- 
 24
 
 370 BEGINNINGS OF RKALISM AJ^D NOMINALISM. 
 
 Ferrand and Paris, 1867, pp. 297-310). Besides these, Cousin (Ouvrages Ined. cTAbelard, 
 pp. 644 seq.) has pubhshed some mathematical matter from the pen of Gerbert. The 
 Rational may be either eternal and divine (in which division Gerbert includes the Platonic 
 ideas), or it may be something living in time. In the former the rational power is always 
 active, in the latter only at times ; in the former potentiality is inseparable from actuality, 
 it is sub necessaria specie actus, while to the essence of the latter only the rational capa- 
 city necessarily belongs, while the real manifestation of reason is here only an accidens, 
 not a substantialis differentia. Hence the proposition: rationale ratione utitur, is true of 
 rational beings of the first class, as a universal proposition, but of those of the second, 
 only as a particular one ; Gerbert holds that a logical judgment, expressed without speci- 
 fication of quantity, can be taken as a particular judgment. Thus Gerbert solves the 
 diflSculty which at the beginning he had pointed out in the proposition : rationale ratione 
 utitur, that, namely, it appeared to contradict the logical rule according to which the pre- 
 dicate must be more general than the subject. He not imsuitably introduces in his discus- 
 sion of this problem the distinction between the liigher concept in the logical sense, i. e., 
 the concept of wider extension, and the concept the object of which stands higher in rank 
 in the order of existence. 
 
 Among the pupils of Gerbert was Fulbert, who in the year 990 opened a school at 
 Chartres, and was Bishop there 1007-1029. Devoted pupils called him their Socrates. 
 Distinguished for his knowledge of sacred and secular topics, he accompanied his in- 
 structions with a pressing exhortation to his scholars not to give heed to deceitful 
 innovations and not to deviate from the paths of the holy fathers. The danger that dia- 
 lectic would be raised to a position in which it would surpass in authority the Bible and 
 the Church, was already beginning to be felt, for which reason the demand was expressly 
 formulated on the part of the Church that it should be made to retain its ancillary position. 
 Petrus Damiani (cf., respecting him, Vogel, Jena, 1856), the apologist of the monastic life and 
 of monastic asceticism, says, about 1050 {Opera, ed. Cajetan., Paris, 1743, III. p. 312): quae 
 tamen artis Immanae pieritia si quando iractandis sacris eloquiis adhibetur, non debet jus magis- 
 terii sibimet arroganter arripere, sed velut ancilla dominae quodam famulatus obsequio subser- 
 vire, ne si pratcedit, oberret. In a similar strain the monk Othlo (who died at Regensburg 
 about 1083) complains, about the same time, in his work De Tribus Quaest. (cited by Pez, 
 Thes. Anecd., III. 2, p. 144), of the existence of dialecticians, who were so exclusively 
 dialecticians that they imagined themselves bound to limit even the statements of Holy 
 Scripture in obedience to the authority of dialectic, and gave more credence to Boethius 
 than to the sacred penman. The definition of person as substantia rationalis offered already 
 an opportunity for collision with the Church in regard to the doctrine of the Trinity, and 
 the strife was soon afterward to break out on this point (with Roscellinus). 
 
 A scholar of Fulbert was Berengarius of Tours (999-1088), whose dialectical zeal was 
 greater than his respect for ecclesiastical authority. The rationalizing position assumed by 
 him with respect to the question of the Lord's Supper was the occasion of a conflict be- 
 tween him and the orthodox dialectician Lanfranc (born at Pavia about 1005, first educated 
 in the law at Bologna, afterward a monk and Scholastic in the convent at Bee in Nor- 
 mandy, and from 1070 on, Archbishop of Canterbury; died 1089 ; Oi)p. ed. d'Achery, Paris, 
 1648 ; ed. Giles, Oxford, 1854), who, in the opinion of their contemporaries and according to 
 the judgment of the Church, defeated Berengarius in argument. The doctrine defended by 
 Berengarius in his work De Sacra Coena adv. Lanfrancum {ed. A. F. and F. Th. Vischer, 
 Berlin, 1844), is thus summed up by Hugo, Bishop of Langres : " You say that in the sacra- 
 ment [of the Eucharist] the presence of the body of Christ involves no change in the 
 nature and essence of the bread and wine, and you regard that body, which you had said
 
 KOSCELLINUS A AD WILLIAM OF CHAMPEACX. 371 
 
 was crucified, as an intellectual body " {dicis in hujusmodi sacramento corptis ChrisH sic esse, 
 ut panis et vird naiura et essentia non mutetur, corpusqtte quod dixeras crucijixum, intellectuale 
 constituis). Berengarius disputes the theory of a change of substance without a corre- 
 sponding change in the accidents. His opponents took exceptions in part to the appeal 
 to the senses — in part to the dialectical arguments by which he supported his opposition 
 to the doctrine of the change of substance. But we will not enter more minutely upon 
 the details of this dispute, on account of its specifically theological character. Cf. Les- 
 sing, Ber. Twonensis, Brunswick, 1770; Staudlin, Leips. 1814, and others. This con- 
 troversy exerted an unfavorable influence on the authority of the writings of John Scotus ; 
 for, because Berengarius in his doctrine of the Lord's Supper had in great measure simply 
 followed the work of John Scotus, De Eucharistia, the latter book was condemned (at 
 the Synod at Vercelli, 1050) and the reading of his writings was altogether prohibited. 
 A farther result was that the inviolability of the contents of the creed against the attacks 
 of reason began now to be urged. 
 
 Probably Lanfranc, and not Anselm, his pupil, was the author of the work: Elucidarium 
 sive dialogu-s summam totius theohgiae cornplectens (formerly published among Anselm's 
 works, though its authorship was questioned ; Giles, on the authority of numerous MSS., 
 ascribes it to Lanfranc and has included it in the edition of his writings). In this work 
 the whole substance of the dogmatics of the time is set forth in genuine scholastic 
 manner, in syllogistic form and with a dialectical examination of proofs and counter-proofs. 
 This form of investigation is applied also in the task of delineating and determining dog- 
 matically the forms under which the conditions of men in another state are to be repre- 
 sented to the imagination (e. g., in the consideration of the questions whether clothes 
 will be worn in the future life, in what position the bodies of the damned are placed in 
 hell, etc.). 
 
 Ilildebert of Lavardin, Bishop of Tours (bom 1057, died about 1133), was a pupil of Be- 
 rengarius, whom he greatly revered. He warned against the pursuit of dialectic as danger- 
 ous and vain, taking refuge, for his own part, in that simple and unquestioning faith which, 
 he said, was not contrary to reason. He defined faith as voluntaria certiiudo abseniium, 
 supra opinionem et infra scientiam constituta (Tract. Theol, ch. 1 seq., in Opera, ed. Ant. Beau- 
 gendre, Paris, 1708, p. 1010). God chooses neither to be completely comprehended — in 
 order that faith may not be deprived of its proper merit — nor yet to remain wholly un- 
 known — that there may be no excuse for unbelief. HUdebert seeks to prove the existence 
 of God, by arguing from the creatureship of man and of all finite things, which, he reasons, 
 implies the existence of an eternal cause. With his skeptical depreciation of dialectic there 
 was combined a shade of mysticism. God, he taught, was above, beneath, without, and 
 within the world (super totus praesidendo, suhttr lotus susiinendo, extra totus complectendo, intra 
 totus est implendo). In his Philos. Moralis Hildebert follows Cicero and Seneca. Bernard 
 of Clairvaux termed Hildebert a great pillar of the Church ("tantam eccksiae columnam)." 
 
 § 92, Nominalism, as the conscious and distinct stand-point of the 
 opponents of Realism, first appeared in the second half of the eleventh 
 century, when a portion of the Scholastics ascribed to Aristotle the 
 doctrine that logic has to do only with the right use of words, and 
 that genera and species are only (subjective) collections of the various 
 individuals designated by the same name, and disputed the interpreta- 
 tion which gave to universals a real existence. These Nominalists
 
 372 ROSCELLINUS AND WILLIAM OF CHAMPEAUX. 
 
 were sometimes called modern dialecticians, because they opposed the 
 traditional realistic interpretation of Aristotle. Among the Nomi- 
 nalists of this time, the most famous is Roscellinus, Canon of Com- 
 piegne, who, by his application of the nominalistic doctrine to the 
 dogma of the Trinity, gave great offense and thereby occasioned the 
 speedy discomfiture of ^Nominalism. If, as the ISTominalistic theory 
 affirms, only individuals exist in reality, then the three persons of the 
 Godhead are three individual substances, that is, in fact, three Gods, 
 and nothing but the prevalent ecclesiastical phraseology, in which 
 the Godhead is only designated as threefold in person and not in 
 substance, stands in the way of our speaking of these persons as three 
 Gods. This consequence was openly avowed by Roscellinus, and he 
 was accordingly required by the Ecclesiastical Council of Soissons 
 (1092) to recant the offensive inference; but the Nominalistic doctrine 
 itself, from which it had been deduced, he appears still to have main- 
 tained and taught subsequently to this time. In the period imme- 
 diately following, Nominalism did not entirely disappear, yet there 
 were but few who ventured openly to confess it. It was first renewed 
 in the fourteenth century, particularly by William of Occam. The 
 most influential opponent of Roscellinus, among his contemporaries, 
 was Anselm of Canterbury, The special champion of Realism in 
 France was William of Champeaux, who taught that the species 
 inheres in each of the individuals included in it. essentially, or, as he 
 was afterward led by Abelard to say, indifferently. Abelard, too, 
 who sought to maintain an intermediate and conciliatory position, 
 opposed the extreme Nominalism of Roscellinus, his earlier teacher. 
 
 A letter from Roscellinus to Abelard Is published by J. A. Schmeller, from a Munich MS. (pod. lot. 
 4643), in the Abh. der philos.-iyhilol. Classe der k. hayr. Akad. der Wiss., V. 3, pp. 189 seq.. 1851, and is 
 iucluded by Cousin in his new edition of the Complete Works of Abelard. The dissertation of Joh. Mart. 
 Chladenius (/>e vita ei haeresi Jiosceltini, Erl., 1756, also included in G. E. Waldau's Thesaurus bio- ft 
 biblio-graphicuii, Chemnitz, 1792) is now antiquated. The theological consequences of the tendencies 
 arrayed against each other in the time of Roscellinus and Anselm, are developed by Bouchitt6 in Le 
 r(itio7i<ilinme direiiiri d la fin dn omieme siecJe, Paris, 1842. 
 
 On William of Champeaux, cf. Michaud, Gicillaume de Champeaux et les ecoles dt Paris au Xlle 
 Heole, d'apres des documents inedits, Paris, 1867, 2d edition, 1868. 
 
 ■Roscelliims is often named as the founder of Nominalism. Thus, for example, Otto 
 von Freising {De gestis Frederici I., lib. I.) says of Roscellinus: primus nostiis temporibus 
 sententiam vocum instituit in logica. So, too, Anselm, Abelard, John of Salisbury, and Vincen- 
 tius of Beauvais, know of no predecessor to Roscellinus. On the other hand, in the work 
 entitled Bernardiis triumphans, Roscellinus is termed by Caramuel Lobkowitz, "not the 
 author, but the builder-up " (non autor, sed auctor) of the sect of Nominalists, and in the 
 notice cited above (in the section upon John Scotus, p. 363) a Johannes (who lived prob- 
 ably about 1050 — not Erigena, nor John of Saxony, who was called by King Alfred, in
 
 EOSCELLINUS AND WILLIAM OF CHAMPEAUX. 373 
 
 about the year 847, from France to England, whore he died while Abbot of Althenay) is 
 mentioned as his predecessor, and Robert of Paris and Amulph of Laon are mentioned as his 
 fellows in opinion. Herman, Abbot of Tournay in the first half of the twelfth century, 
 reports that about a. D. 1100 Master Rainibert of Lille taught dialectic nominalistically (dia- 
 ledicam clericis suis in voce kgebat), and with liim many others ; these men, he continues 
 had excited the enmity of Odo or Odardus, who expounded dialectic not in the modem way 
 {juxta quosdam modernos) or nominalistically [in voce), but realistically {in re), according to 
 Boethius and the ancient teachers. These moderns, so the writer complains, prefer to 
 interpret the writings of Porphyry and Aristotle in accordance with their new wisdom, 
 than according to the exposition of Boethius and the other ancients. It is scarcely possible 
 that in so short a time the school of Roscellinus had become so widely extended ; the dis- 
 tinction of parties must have been already developed at an earlier period. The report 
 {Aventin. Annal. JBoior., YJ.), therefore, that Roscellinus of Brittany was the originator of 
 the new school {novi lycei conditor) and that through him there arose a "new sort of Aris- 
 totelians or Peripatetics," is only in so far true, as that he was the most influential repre- 
 sentative of the sententia vocum, or Nominalistic doctrine. 
 
 Roscellinus (or Rucelinus) was born in Armorica (in Lower Brittany, therefore). He 
 studied at Soissons and Rheims, resided for a time (about 1089) at Compiegne as Canon, and 
 afterward at Besancjon, and also taught at Tours and Locmenach (near Vannes in Brittany), 
 where the youthful Abelard was among his pupils. In the year 1092 the Council of Sois- 
 sons forced him to recant his tritheistic exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity. He 
 appears to have written nothing, but to have delivered his opinions orally alone. There is 
 extant, however, a letter, mainly about the doctrine of the Trinity, which was probably ad- 
 dressed by him to Abelard. With this exception, it is only from the statements of his 
 opponents, which, if not distorted, were at least colored bj' the influence of passion, that 
 we can learn what his doctrines were. Yet it is possible in a degree to correct these 
 reports by comparing them with the nominalistic utterances of others who lived earlier. 
 Such a comparison furnishes us in many cases the most satisfactory commentary on the re- 
 ported doctrines of Roscellinus. 
 
 Anselm (De Fide Trin., ch. 2) speaks of " those dialecticians of our times, those heretics 
 in dialectic, who think that the so-called universal substances are only emissions of sound 
 by the voice (words, flatum vocis) ; who are unable to understand that color is anything 
 apart from the body in whicli it inheres, or that the wisdom of man is other than the soul 
 of man; " he charges these "heretics in dialectic" with having their reason so enslaved by 
 their imagination, that they are unable to set the latter aside and view apart that which 
 must be considered by itself. Though the expression ^^ flatus vocis" cannot have been 
 employed by the Nominalists themselves, yet it must undoubtedly have been suggested by 
 something in their own phraseology, and recalls the passage above cited (p. 369) from the 
 commentary of Pseudo-Hrabanus, Super Forphyrium : res proferri non potest, nihil enim. pro- 
 fertur nisi vox, neque enim aliud est prolatio, nisi aeris plectro linguae percussio, which was 
 intended to prove that since the genus, in conformity with the Boethian definition, may be 
 affirmed as a predicate, it cannot be a thing (res), but only a word (vox). The other stric- 
 ture of Anselm, that Roscellinus was unable to distinguish between the attribute and the 
 subject to which it belongs, proves that the behef of RosceUinus was in agreement with 
 the above-mentioned (p. 363) doctrine of Heiricus : " If any one pronounces the word 
 black or white by itself, he will not indicate thereby any particular thing, unless he says 
 ' white or black man, or horse ' " (si quis dixerit nigrum et album absolute, . . . per hoc non 
 poterit certam rem ostendere, nisi dicat aVms homo vd equus aut niger). This indeed shows 
 the stricture to have been without foundation ; for what the Nominalists opposed was the
 
 374 KOSCELLIKUS AND WILLIAM OF CHAMPEAUX. 
 
 passage from abstraction, or (Kpaipeaic, to x^p'-'^f^^C, or to the doctrine that that which ia 
 abstracted is actually and independently existent, apart from that from which it is ab- 
 stracted. Auselm, who committed the error which the Nominalists thus denounced 
 afiBrmed from his stand-point, not only that they did not hold to the separate existence of 
 the universal (the product of abstraction), but also that they did not possess the faculty 
 of abstraction ; but he did not demonstrate the illegitimacy of the distinction (which, 
 indeed, they themselves had, perhaps, not marked with sufficient distinctness) on which 
 the stand-point of his opponents was founded. 
 
 Anselm says further {Be Fid. Trin., ch. 2) : qui enim nondum intelligit, quomodo plures 
 homilies in specie sint homo unus, qualiter in ilia secretissima natura comprehendet, quomodo 
 plures personae, quarum singula quaeque est perfecius Deus, sint Deus unus .? et cujus mens 
 obscura est ad discernendum inter equum suum et colorem ^us, qualiter discernet inter unum 
 Deum et plures rationes {relationes) ? deniqvs qui non potest intelUgere aliud esse hominem nisi 
 individuum, nullatenus intelliget hominem nisi humanam personam. The contrast of the 
 stand-points is here clearly presented ; Realism regards the totality of similar individuals 
 as constituting a real unity, the totality of men as a generic unity, unus homo in specie ; 
 NominaHsm, on the contrary, holds that this unity exists only in the common name, and 
 that the only real unity is the individual. 
 
 It was but logically consistent if Nominalism, which held the union of several individ- 
 uals in the same genus or species to be merely the result of a subjective act, in like manner 
 affirmed the distinction of parts in the individual to be only the result of a subjective act 
 of analysis. That Roscellinus affirmed this consequence, appears from the statements of 
 Abelard. Abelard says, in his letter concerning Roscellinus to the Bishop of Paris, that 
 Roscellinus, holding that the distinction of parts in any object was merely subjective and 
 verbal, and not real, held, by implication, that, for example, when we are told in the 
 New Testament that Jesus ate part of a fish, we are to understand that what he really 
 ate was a part of the word " fish," and not a part of the thing which it denotes {hie 
 sicut pseudo-dialecticus, ita et pseudo-christianu^ quuni in dialectica sua nullam rem, sed solam 
 vocem partes habere aestimat, ita divinam paginam impudenter pervertit, ut eo loco quo dicitur 
 dominus partem piscis assi comedisse, partein hujus vocis quae est piscis assi, non partem rei 
 intelUgere cogatur. Id., De Dlvis. et Defin., p. 472 ed. Cousin: fuit autem, 'niemini, magistri 
 nostri Roscellini tam insana senteniia, ut nullam rem partibus constare vellet, sed sicut soils 
 vocibus species, ita et partes adscribebat). The objection, that the wall must surely be 
 regarded as a part of the house, was met by Roscellinus, according to Abelard, with the 
 argument that then the wall, as being a part of the whole, must also be a part of the parts, 
 of which the whole consists, viz. : of the foundation, and the wall, and the roof, i. e., it 
 must be a part of itself Plainly sophistical as is this argumentation of Roscellinus in the 
 awkward form in which it is here given (it is perhaps not reported with exact fidelity, or 
 at least not in its complete connection with the whole teaching of Roscellinus), it never- 
 theless contains the idea necessarily associated with the Nominalistic stand-point, that the 
 relation of the part to the whole, like every relation, is only subjective, but that realiter 
 every object exists in itself alone, related only to itself, and consequently that realiter 
 nothing exists as a part, apart from the act by which we think of it as related to the 
 whole, since otherwise it must be in and by itself, and when viewed by itself, a part, and 
 consequently a part of itself Understood in this sense, the argumentation appears, in- 
 deed, one-sided and just as disputable as is the Nominalistic or Individualistic partisan 
 stand-point itself (for the objective reality of relations can be affirmed with at least as 
 much reason as it can be disputed), but it is by no means sophistical. The consequence 
 drawn by Abelard, however, as to the eating of a part of the word fish, is not a necessary
 
 ROSCELLLN^US AXD WILLIAM OF CHAMPEAUX. 375 
 
 one, for the reason that in the act of eating, an actual separation into parts takes place, 
 while RosceUinus disputed only the objective validity of that division into parts which wo 
 make in thought and discourse. Whatever is a substance, is, according to the teaching of 
 RosceUinus, as such not a part ; and the part is as such not a substance, but the result of 
 that subjective separation of the substance into parts, which we make in (thought and in) 
 discourse. In respect to numerous divisions (e. g., of time according to centuries, of that, 
 which is extended in space, according to the ordinary units of measurement, of the circle 
 into degrees, etc.), which to us are indispensably necessary, and to which we are often 
 naively inclined to assign an objective significance, the remark of RosceUinus is undoubt- 
 edly pertinent. 
 
 Probably the Nominalism of RosceUinus, though developed with greater logical con- 
 sistency than had been shown by his predecessors, would yet not have attracted any very 
 special consideration, nor have immortalized his name as that of the head of a party, had 
 it not been for his tritheistic interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity, which excited 
 universal attention. Like the earlier dialecticians, of whom the monk Othlo complained 
 (see above, p. 370), RosceUinus accepts unconditionally the Boethian definition of person as 
 substantia rationalis ; he refuses to admit that these words, when applied to the Trinity, 
 are to be taken in any other than the ordinary sense, affirming that if we are in the habit 
 of speaking of the Godhead as including three persons, and not three substances, this is 
 but the result of custom {non igitur per personam aliud aliquid signijicaitius quam substaji- 
 Ham, licet ex quadam loquendi cor,sueiudine tripUcare soleamus personam, non subsiantiam, 
 Epist. ad Abaelardum, cited by Cousin, Ab. 0pp., 11. p. 798). Generating substance and 
 generated substance {substantia generans, and substantia generata), he afBrms, are not identi- 
 cal {semper erdm generans et generatmn plura sunt, non res una, secundum illam beati Avgus- 
 tini praefatam sententiam, quo ait, quod nulla omnino res est quae se ipsum gignat, Ibid. p. 
 199). He asks why three eternal beings {tres aeterni) are not to be assumed to exist, 
 seeing that the three persons of the Godhead are eternal {si tres illae personae sunt aeternae). 
 With this agrees the statement of Anselm, Epist, II. 41 : RosceUinus clericus dicit, in Deo 
 tres personas esse tres res ab invicem separatas, sicut sunt tres angeli, ita iamen, ut una sit 
 voluntas et potestas. De Fide Trin., ch. 3 : tres personae sunt tres res sicut tres angeli aut tres 
 animae, ita tamen, ut voluntate et potentia omnino sint idem. RosceUinus, says Anselm, 
 advanced the argument, that, if the three persons were " one thing " {una res), it would 
 follow that, together with the Son, the Father also, and the Holy Ghost, must have entered 
 into the flesh. The affirmation of RosceUinus (which is reported also by Anselm, Ep., II. 
 41), that only custom opposes our speaking of the three persons of the Godhead as three 
 Gods, appears, when compared with certain passages of Gregory of Nyssa and other Greek 
 Church Fathers, and even with the mild judgment of St. Augustine respecting the One, 
 the vovc (or Reason) and the World-soul as the three chief Gods of the Nco-Platonists, 
 less heretical and less at variance with the common belief, than when judged m the light 
 of the more rigid monotheism of St. Augustine and others, who in many regards approxi- 
 mated in their teachings to the modalism of the Sabellians, and only rejected it on account 
 of its incompatibility with the doctrine of the incarnation as held by the Church. What 
 Anselm counter-affirmed was the reality of the generic unity of the three divine persons : 
 unus Beus. For the rest, RosceUinus, who was not inclined to heresy, as such, but desired 
 to hold fast to the Christian faith and to defend it, could well believe that in using the 
 expression: tres substaniiae (which was applied by John Scotus, among others, to the three 
 divine persons), he was not in disaccord with the teaching of the Church, since he every- 
 where used the word substantia in the sense of that which has an independent existence, 
 in which sense it may be employed to translate the Greek word virocraaic (hypostasis),
 
 376 BoscELLmus and william of champeaux. 
 
 which, confessedly, is used in the plural (rpeif inoGTaaeic) with reference to the three per- 
 sons ; his language was indeed at variance with what had become the estabhshed termi- 
 nology of the Church ; for in the latter the term substantia was always employed as the 
 equivalent of the Greek word ovaia (being, substance), and was, therefore, only used in the 
 singular, in order to express the unity of the essence (essentia) of the divine persons ; this 
 usage necessarily became all the more invariable, since ovcla has the same double significa- 
 tion as substantia. 
 
 To Sabellianism, with which Haureau {Ph. Sc, I. p. 189 seq.) erroneously identifies the 
 doctrine of Roscellinus, this doctrine offers a direct contrast, although both are founded on 
 a commou principle. Sabellianism reasons thus : Three persons in the Godhead are three 
 Gods ; now there are not three Gods, but only one ; therefore there are not three persons 
 in the Godhead (but only three forms of existence). Roscellinus argues, on the contrary : 
 Three divine persons are three divine beings; there are three di\ane persons, hence 
 there are ihree divine beings. The Sabellians aflSrmed that tritheism followed inevitably 
 from the doctrine of Athanasius. Roscellinus accepted this consequence. The defenders 
 of the doctrine of the Church, on the contrary, while agreeing with the Sabellians that tri- 
 theism was an erroneous doctrine, denied that it could be deduced from the doctrine of 
 Athanasius. The doctrine of Roscellinus is essentially distinguished, on the other hand, 
 from the doctrine of the Arians, by its recognition of the equality in power (and will) of 
 the three divine persons. Roscellinus appears originally to have believed that, with regard 
 to the doctrine of the Trinity, his own doctrine was in agreement with that of Lanfranc, 
 who was at that time greatly honored as the vanquisher of the heresy of Berengarius, and 
 with that of Lanfranc's pupil and successor, Anselm, until one of his hearers, named 
 Johannes, addressed himself by letter to Anselm, communicating the doctrine of Ros- 
 cellinus and requesting the judgment of Anselm respecting it ; this was the occasion of 
 Anselm's controversy with Roscellinus. 
 
 William of Champeaux was born about 1070, and died, while Bishop of Chalons-sur- 
 Marne, in 1121. He studied first under Manegold of Lutenbach at Paris, next under the 
 at that time very famous Anselm of Laon (to be distinguished from Anselviv^ Cantuarensis), 
 and finally under Roscellinus at Compiegne, to whose doctrine, however, the doctrine of 
 William, who asserts the reality of the universal (notwithstanding its immanence in re, 
 i. e., in the individual), was decidedly opposed. He then taught in the Cathedral School at 
 Paris, where Abelard heard and disputed with him, until the year 1108, when he retired 
 to the convent of St. Victor, where he assumed the functions of chorister. Yet in this 
 place he soon resumed his lectures on rhetoric, philosophy, and theology, and appears to 
 have laid tlie foundation for the mystical tendency which afterward reigned in the school 
 of St. Victor. From 1113 to 1121 William was bishop of Chalons. He remained a friend 
 of St. Bernard of Clairvaux until his death. Of his works, there are extant a number on 
 theological subjects [De Eucharistia and JDe Origine Animae ; in the latter he pronounced 
 himself in favor of Creationism, i. e., in support of the doctrine that the soul is created at 
 the beginning of its earthly existence) and other works, which have been edited by Ma- 
 billon, Martene, and Patru. There are also extant a few MSS. of his on philosophical 
 problems. In the main, we are obliged to rely for our knowledge of his opinions on the 
 accounts of Abelard. The latter says (in his Historia Calamitatum) of William of Cham- 
 peaux, that he taught that universals w^ere essentially and wholly present in each one of 
 their individuals, and that in the latter there was no diversity of essence, but only a 
 variety of accidents (erat auiem in ea sententia de cormnunitate universalium, ut eandem essen- 
 tialiter rem totam simul singulis suis inesse adstrueret individuis, quorum quidem nulla esset in 
 essentia diversitas, sed sola multitudine accidentium varietas). In reply, Abelard objects that
 
 ANSELM OF CAIJTERBUEY. 377 
 
 if this were true, then the same substance must receive different and mutually incompatible 
 accidents, and, in particular, the same thing must be in difiTerent places at the same time. 
 (The latter objection is clearly developed in the De Geiier. et Spec, apparently in the spirit 
 of Abelard's doctrine.) For if the essence of humanity is wholly present in Socrates, then 
 it is not where Socrates is not. If, therefore, it is yet really also in Plato, then Plato 
 must be Socrates and Socrates must be not only where he himself is, but also where Plato 
 is. As a consequence of these objections, William of Champeaui is said to have modified 
 liis opinion and to have substituted individualiter for essentialiie)' in his expression of it ; 
 that is to say, he now taught, according to tliis account, that the universal substance 
 exists in each individual, not in the entirety of its essence, but by virtue of individual 
 modifications. But according to another lection, which, it can scarcely be doubted, is the 
 correct one, the word substituted was indifferenter, so that "William of Champeaux sought to 
 avoid the objection of Abelard by teaching, instead of the numerical unity of each universal 
 essence, its plurality unaccompanied with difference. In a passage (cited by Michaud) 
 from one of the theological works of William (edited by Patru, Paris, 1847), the latter 
 remarks that the word ickm, the same, may be taken in two senses, the one implying the 
 indifference and the other the identity in essence of the objects termed the same; thus 
 Peter and Paul are the same in so far as they are both men, having the universal attribute 
 of humanity, namely, rationality, although the humanity of each is more strictly speaking 
 not identical, but similar ; but this kind of sameness, adds William, the sameness of indif- 
 ference, does not exist among the persons of the Trinity ( Vides " idem " duobus accipi modis, 
 secundum in differ entiam et secundum identitatem ejusdein prorsus essentiae; secundum indiffe- 
 rentiam, ut Fetrum et Paulum idem dicimus esse in hoc quod sunt homines ; quantum enim ad 
 humanitatem. pertinet, sicut iste est rationalis, et ille ; sed si veritatem confiteri ivlumus, non est 
 eadem utriusqu^ humanitas, sed similis, quum sunt homines. Sed hie modus unius ad naturam 
 divinitatis non referendus). How it was that the problem of the Trinity led to the doctrine 
 of Realism, and how tlie latter was thought to solve the former, appears most clearly from 
 a passage (cited by Haureau, Ph. Sc, I. p. 227) from Robert PuUeyn, who represents a 
 " dialectician " of the realistic school as saying: "the species is the whole substance of 
 tlie individuals contained in it, and the whole and same species is in each of the indi- 
 viduals; therefore the species is one substance, but its individuals are many persons, and 
 these many persons are that one substance " (species est tota substantia individuorum, totaquf 
 species eademgue in singulis reperitur individuis ; itaque species una est substantia, etjus vera 
 individua multae personam, et hae multae personae sunt ilia una substantia). 
 
 Toward the end of the eleventh century there was developed (as Thurot well remarks, 
 Kevue critique d'histoire et de litterature, 1868, No. 42, p. 249) a very active, intellectual 
 movement, which was more productive of original results than was either the period pre- 
 ceding it — when the interest in scientific subjects was, for the most part, very restricted in 
 extent — or the succeeding period, when thought was, so to speak, buried under a mass of 
 authorities. But this fact is scarcely sufficient to justify the beginning of a new period at 
 this point, for the general character of mediaeval philosophy, as determined by the number 
 and nature of the authorities on which it depended, underwent no general change until 
 about the year 1200. 
 
 § 93. Anselmus, born in 1033 at Aosta {Augusta Praetoria, in 
 Piedmont), was in 1060 induced bv the fame of Lanfranc to enter the 
 convent at Bee in Normandy. In 1063 he became Prior, and in 
 1078 Abbot of the same. From 1093 till his death in 1109 he was
 
 378 ANSELM OF CANTEEBURY. 
 
 Archbishop of Canterbury, which office he administered according to 
 the principles of Pope Gregory YII. The sense of his motto, " Credo ^ 
 ut intelligam^^'' is that Christians should advance from direct faith to 
 whatever degree of scientific insight may be attainable by them, but 
 always only on condition that the Christian creed, already fixed in 
 dogmatic form (and not, as in the time of the Fathers, in process of 
 development, side by side with and by the aid of philosophic and 
 theological thought), remain untouched and be regarded as the abso- 
 lute norm for thought. The result of examination may only be affirm- 
 ative ; if in any respect it is negative, thought is by that very fact 
 exposed as false and sinful, the dogma sanctioned by the Church being 
 the adequate doctrinal expression of the truth revealed by God. The 
 fame of Anselm is connected chiefly with the ontological argument 
 for God's existence given in his ''^ Proslogiwrn^'' and with the Christo- 
 logical theory of satisfaction developed in his work : " Cur Deus 
 homo ? " The ontological argument is an attempt to prove the exist- 
 ence of God, as following from the very idea which we have of him. 
 By the word God we understand, by definition, the greatest object or 
 being that can be conceived. This conception exists in the intellect 
 of all such as have the idea of God, and in the intellect of the atheist 
 as well, for the atheist understands what is expressed by the words : 
 the absolutely greatest. But the greatest cannot be in the intellect 
 alone, for then it would be possible to conceive something still 
 greater, which should exist not only in the intellect but also in 
 external reality. Hence the greatest must exist at the same time in 
 the intellect and in the sphere of objective reality. God, therefore, is 
 not simply conceived by us ; he also really exists. That this argu- 
 ment is a paralogism was asserted by Gaunilo, a monk and one of 
 Anselm's contemporaries, residing at Mar-Moutier. From Gaunilo's 
 objections Anselm sought to rescue his argument in his '* Liber Apolo- 
 geticusy — According to Anselm's theory of satisfaction, which was 
 adopted by the Church, and which is substantially an application of 
 juridical analogies to relations that are simply ethical and religious, 
 the guilt of men, as sinners against the infinite God, is infinitely 
 great, and must, therefore, according to the principles of divine jus- 
 tice, be atoned for by a punishment of infinite severity. If this pun- 
 ishment were to fall upon the human race, all men must sufier eternal 
 damnation. But this would conflict with the divine goodness. On 
 the other hand, forgiveness without atonement would conflict with
 
 ANSELM or CANTEEBUKY. 379 
 
 the divine justice. The only remaining alternative, therefore, by 
 which at once the goodness and justice of God could be satisfied, was 
 to resort to the expedient of representative satisfaction, which, in view 
 of the infinite nature of our guilt, could be rendered only by God, 
 since he is the only infinite being. But he could not represent the 
 human race without assuming the character of a man descended from 
 Adam (yet conceived without sin by the Yirgin) ; hence the necessity 
 that the second person of the Godhead should become man, in order 
 that he, standing in the place of humanity, might render to God the 
 satisfaction due to him, and thereby conduct the believing portion of 
 humanity to salvation. 
 
 The -works of Ansclm were published at Kuremberg by Gasp. Hochfeder in 1491 and 1494, at Paris in 
 1544 and 1549, at Cologne in 1573, ib., by Picardus, in 1612, at Paris, by Gabr. Gerberon, in 1C75, iJ., 1721, 
 at Venice in 1744, and, more recently, at Paris, in J. P. Migne's collection, Vol. 155, 1S52. The Cur Deus 
 homo f has been edited moi-e recently by Hugo Laeinmer, Berlin, 1S57, and by F. Fritzsche, ZUrich, 1666. The 
 MonoloffiuTn anil Prosloffwm, togethsT v:ith the accompanying works: GaunilonU liber pro insipiente 
 and Am. liber apologeticus, have been edited by Carl Haas and published as Part I. of Sancti Annelmi 
 opuscula phiJosophico-theologica selecta, TQb. 1863. Aiiselm's life was written by his pupil Eadmer, a 
 Canterbury monk (Z>« vitii S. Ansdini^ed. G. Henschen, in Acta Sanctorum, t. X., p. S6G soq., and ed. Ger- 
 beron in his edition of the works of Ansclm); from this biography John of Salisbury and others have drawn. 
 Among the modern authors who have written of Anselra, wo may name Mohler, in the Tiib. Quartal- 
 schri/t, 1827 and 1S28 (reproduced in M.'s Complete Works, edited by Dollinger, Eegensburg, 1S39, Vol. I., 
 p. 32 seq.), G. F. Franck, Anselm v. C, Tiib. 1842, Eud. Hasse, Anselm von Canterbury, Leips. 1842-52 (cf. 
 Hasse, De ontologioo An«elnii pro existentia Dei arguynento, Bonn, 1S49), and Charles de Remusat, An- 
 ielme de Cantorhery, tableau de la vie monastique et de la lutte du powcoir apirituel avec le pour, tem- 
 porel au XI. siecJe. Paris, 1S54, 2d ed. 186S; cf. the article entitled Anitelm. von Canterbury als Vorkdmjifeir 
 fur die kirchliche Freiheit des 11. Jahrh., in G. Philipp's and G. Gorres ITist.-Polit. Bl. filr da« kath. 
 Peutschland, Vol. 42, 1858. On Anselm's theory of satisfaction, cf. C. Schwarz, Diss, de satis/ . Clir. ab Ana. 
 Cant, eaposita, Gryph., 1841 ; Ferd. Chr. Baur, in his history of the doctrine of atonement and in the 
 second volume of his v,-ork on the doctrine of the Trinity; Dorner, in his history of the development of the 
 person of Christ, and others. On Anaelm's doctrine of faith and knowledge, compare Ludw. Abroell, A. 
 C. de mutuo Jidei ac rationia consortia (diss, i^iawj/.), W'iirzburg, 1864, and Aemilius Hohne, Anselmi 
 Cantuarensis philosophia cum alioriim il'ius aetaiis decretis comparatur ejundemque de satis/actione 
 doctrina dijudicatur (diss, inaug.), Leips. 1867. [Cf. further, on Anselm's anthropology and soteriology, 
 W. G. T. Shedd, Uistory of Christian Doctrine, Vol. IL, New York, 1864, pp. 111-140 and 273-286.— Tr] 
 
 Anselm requires unconditional submission to the authority of the Church. So in- 
 flexible is he on this point, that if we were to regard his doctrine as properly charac- 
 terizing the period to which he belongs, wo should be obliged to terra it the period of 
 the strictest subordination of philosophy to theology. (It is thus characterized, among 
 others, by Cousin, who, in his Cours de Vhistoire de la philo.iophie, iieuvieme lefon, Oeuvres I., 
 Bruxelles, 1840, p. 190, describes the first period as that of tlie subordination absolue 
 de la philosqphie a la theologie, the second as that of their alliance, and the tlurd as the 
 commencement d^une separation). But, on the one hand, the character of the Anselmic 
 philosophy was not that of the whole period, since there were other prominent thinkers 
 in that period who differed from Anselm in opinion and against whom the more rigid 
 churchmen were obliged to contend before carrying off the victory; and, on the other 
 hand, the intention to reduce philosophy to a position of the most complete subordination, 
 •was very different from that actual, elaborate adaptation of it in all its parts to be an 
 instrument in the service of the Church, which was effected in the period next succeeding,
 
 380 ANSELM OF CANTKKBHEY. 
 
 notably by Thomas Aquinas and his pupils. — It is a characteristic circumstance that An- 
 selm sought to establish on rational grounds, not only the existence of God, but also (what 
 Thomas, Duns Scotus, and Occam subsequently declined, and only Raymundus Lullus ven- 
 tured again to attempt) the Trinity and incarnation ; he attempted to accomplish this by 
 the aid of Platonic and Neo- Platonic doctrines. 
 
 Anselm affirms repeatedly, as his fundamental principle, that knowledge must rest on 
 faith, and not faith on a preceding knowledge developed out of doubt and speculation. 
 Anselm derived this principle from Augustine {De Vera Bel, chs. 24, 45 ; De Utilitate Cred., 
 9 ; De Ord., II. 9), but carried it to a greater extreme than Augustine, who, however reso- 
 lutely he may have combated the Maniehasans, in their one-sided founding of faith upon 
 knowledge, nevertheless admitted that faith might rest on knowledge as well as knowledge 
 on faith, and required that both should reciprocally further each other (De Vera Bel, ib. ; 
 Epist. 120 ad Consent, § 3). Anselm defends his position with the following argument: 
 "Without faith there is no experience, and without experience understanding is impossible {De 
 Fide Trin., 3). Knowledge is tlie higher ; to advance to it is the duty of every one, accord- 
 ing to the measure of his capacity. Cur Deus homo ? ch. 2 : " As the right order demands 
 that we first receive into ourselves, beheving, the mysteries of Christianity, before sub- 
 jecting them to speculative examination, so it seems to me the part of negligence if, after 
 having become confirmed in the faith, we do not endeavor to understand what we have 
 believed." By this, however, Anselm does not mean that, after the objects of faith have 
 first been appropriated by a willing and trustful acceptation of them and the understanding 
 of them has thus been made possible, the believer, now arrived at the stage of intelligence, 
 is free to judge for himself concerning their truth and value (in which sense the principle 
 would be identical with that which governs our relation to ancient poetry, mythology, and 
 philosophy); on the contrary, he constantly affirms the absolute inviolability of the Catholic 
 doctrine. The substance of faith cannot be made more certain by means of the knowledge 
 which grows out of it, for it is in itself eternally sure and fixed ; much less may it be con- 
 tested. For, says Anselm, whether that is true which the universal Church believes with 
 the heart and confesses with the mouth, no Christian can be permitted to place in question, 
 but, while holding fast to ir without doubting, and loving and living for this faith, he may 
 and should search in humility for the grounds of its truth. If he is able to add to his 
 faith, intelligence, let him thank God; if not, then let him not turn against his faith, but bow 
 his head and worship. For human wisdom will sooner destroy itself on this rock than move 
 the rock (De Fide Trinit, chs. 1, 2). In the letter which Anselm gave to Bishop Fulco, 
 of Beauvais, to be delivered by him to the council which was to be held against Roscel- 
 linus, he explains in a similar sense the doctrine here enunciated {Christianus 2'>e^' fidem debet 
 ad irdellectum proficere, non per intellectum ad fidem accedere aut si intelligere non valet, a fide 
 recedere), and advises — with more consistency than humanity — that no discussion should be 
 entered into with Roscellinus at the Synod, but that he should be at once called on to 
 recant. The result could only be that the opponent remained unconvinced, with no choice 
 but to become a martyr to his doctrine or to play the hj'pocrite and submit. RosceUinus 
 at Soissons was moved, as he afterward declared, by the fear of death, to choose the latter 
 alternative, openly returning, when the danger was over, to the conviction which he had in 
 reality never renounced. Anselm supplemented the above advice by attempting to refute 
 Roscellinus in his De Fide Trinitatis. | 
 
 The Dialogus de Grammatico, probably Anselm's earliest work, is a dialogue between j 
 
 a. teacher and his pupil on a question frequently discussed by the dialecticians of Anseln^ i 
 
 time (as Anselm attests, ch. 21), viz.: whether grammaticus is to be subsumed under the j 
 
 category of substance or under that of quality. Grammatical cultivation does not belong
 
 AJS'SELM OF CANTEIiBLEY. 381 
 
 to the essence of man, but only to the essence of the grammarian as such. Hence the 
 propositions may bo affirmed : omnis homo potest intdligi sine grammatica ; nullus gravi- 
 ■maticus potest intelligi sirte grammatica; or, "Every man can be conceived as destitute of 
 grammatical knowledge." but "No grammarian can be conceived as destitute of suoh 
 knowledge." By the rules of logic, it would seem to follow from these premises that no 
 grammarian is man. Why is this inference not correct ? Because, replies Anselm. of the 
 different senses in which the premises are true : the first premise, namely, is not univer- 
 sally true, except when predicated of men, considered simply as men and without reference 
 to the possibility that some men may be grammarians; the second premise, on the contrary, 
 is true without qualification. It only follows, therefore, that the concepts grammarian 
 and man are different, but not that no grammarian is a man. If the grammarian is a man, 
 he is a substance ; but how then can Aristotle cite grammaticus as an example of a concept 
 of quality? The word grammaticus contains two elements, grammatica and homo (the ad- 
 jective and the substantive significations), the former in the word grammaticus directly {per 
 se), the latter indirectly (per aliud); if we consider only the former signification, the word 
 denotes a How {Quale), not aWhat {Quid), but if the latter, it denotes a substance, the 
 Tiomo grammaticus — a substantia prima, if an individual grammarian is meant ; a substantia 
 secunda, if the species is intended. Since dialectic is concerned chiefly with the means of 
 expression {voces) and their signification, and only indirectly with the things named {res), 
 (as Anselm teaches with Boethius, who says in his commentary to the Categories : nan de 
 rerum generibus neque de rebus, sed de sermonibus rerum genera significantibus in hoc opere 
 tractatus habetur), the dialectician must confine himself to the meaning which is immediately 
 contained in the words per se, and must, therefore, to the question, quid est grammaticus f 
 answer : vox significans qualitatem; for the thing directly denoted by the word gravimaticus 
 is the qudk, the habens gra/ni7naticam, and it is only secundum appellationem that man is 
 also denoted. — This work shows that Anselm also, notwithstanding his "Realism," viewed 
 dialectic as relating especially to words {voces), and that with Aristotle he regarded the 
 individual as substance in the first and fullest sense {substantia prima), and the species and 
 genus as substances only in the secondary sense {substantia secunda). 
 
 In the Diahgus de Veritate Anselm follows Aristotle in teaching that the truth of an 
 affirmative or negative judgment depends on the existence or non-existence of the subject 
 of the judgment ; the res enunciata is the causa veritatis of the judgment, although not its 
 Veritas or rectitudo as such. From the truth of the logical judgment or of thought, Anselm 
 distinguishes a truth of action and of being in general, and then, with Augustine and in 
 Platonic fashion, concludes from the actuality of some truth to the existence of the truth 
 per se, in which all that is true must, in order to be true, participate. The truth per se is 
 only a cause ; the truth of being is its effect and at the same time the cause of the truth of 
 knowledge ; the latter is only an effect. The truth per se, the summa Veritas per se stibsis- 
 tens, is God. 
 
 In the Monologium (composed about 1070, before the Dial, de Verit.) Anselm constructs, ' 
 on the basis of the realistic theory that goodness, truth, and all other universals possess 
 an existence independent of individual things, and are not merely immanent in and only 
 existing through the latter (as in the case of color in material objects), a proof of the being 
 of God, in which proof he follows substantially St. Augustine {De Lib. Arb., II. 3-15 ; De 
 Vera Eel, 55 seq. ; De Trin., YIII. 3, see above, p. 340; cf. Boeth., De Consol. rhil, Y., Pr. 
 10). There are many goods which we desire, partly- as a means or for their utility {propter . 
 utilitatem), and partly for their intrinsic beauty {propter honestatem). But all these goods ' 
 are only more ot less good, and therefore imply, like all things of a merely relative nature, 
 something which is perfectly good and by which their worth is estimated. All relative
 
 382 ANSELM OF CANTERBURY. 
 
 \ goods, then, necessarily presuppose an absolute good ; this summum lonum is God (Monol^ 
 ch. 1). In like manner, all that is great or high is only relatively great or high; there 
 must, therefore, be something absolutely great and high, and this is God (ch. 2). The 
 I scale of beings cannot ascend in infinitum {nullo fine daudatur) ; hence there must exist at 
 least one being, than whom no other is higher. There can, further, exist only one such 
 being. For if several supreme beings, similar to each other, existed, they would all either 
 participate together in one supreme essence {essentia), or be identical with it. In the 
 former case, not they, but this supreme essence, would stand at the head of the scale of 
 existences ; in the latter case they would not be many, but one. But the one highest exist- 
 ence is God (ch. 4). The Absolute exists from and by itself (ch. G). The dependent is not, in 
 respect of matter and form, derived from the Absolute, but it is created by it (ch. 7 aeq.). 
 Whatever is created does not possess in itself the power to continue in being, but requires 
 the preserving presence of God (Sicut nihil factum est, nisi per creatricem praesentem essentiam, 
 ita nihil viget, nisi per ejusdem servatricem praesentiam, ch. 13 ; cf. Augustin., De Civ. Dei, 
 XII. 25; see above, p. 342, where the conservation of the world is described as a continual 
 creation and the view is developed that, if God should withdraw his power and presence 
 from the world, the latter would instantly sink back into nothingness). Justice among 
 finite beings is derived, existing only by participation in absolute justice. But God is not 
 just by participation; God is justice itself (ch. 16). In the Absolute justice is identical 
 with goodness, wisdom, and every other attribute {proprietas, ch. 17); they all involve the 
 attributes of eternity and omnipresence (ch. 18 seq.). God created all things by his word, 
 the eternal archetype, of which creation is the copy (ch. 29 seq.). The speaker and the 
 spoken word constituted a duality, though it is impossible to say w^hat they separately are. 
 They are not two spirits, nor two creators, etc. They are numerically, but not intrinsic- 
 ally, distinguishable {alii, but not aliud). In their mutual relation, of which the relation 
 of begetter and begotten furnishes the most pertinent image, they are two, while in their 
 essence they are one (ch. 37 seq.). For the sake of preserving the divine unity, there 
 must bo joined with the self-duplication of the Deity a reactive tendency, a unifying pro- 
 cess; just as the first consciousness of man, or memoria, becomes by reduplication 
 consciousness of consciousness, or intelligentia, so the unifying tendency above mentioned 
 appears in the Godhead as the reciprocal love of the Father and the Son, which proceeds 
 from memoria and intelligentia, i. e., as the Holy Ghost (ch. 49 seq.). Tlie constant and 
 logicaUy illegitimate hypostatization of abstractions, which occurs in this " exemplum medi- 
 tandi de ratione fidei,'' is evident; Anselm himself really acknowledges that he has not 
 arrived by his speculation at the conception of personality, when he affirms (ch. 78) that 
 only the poverty of language compels us to express the frina uniias by the term persona 
 (or by substantia in the sense of vTrdaraai^), and that in the literal sense of the word there 
 is in the supreme being no more a plurality of persons than of substances ( Omnes plures 
 personae sic suhsistunt separatim ah invicem, ut tot necesse sit esse substantias quot sunt per- 
 sonae ; quod in plurihus hominibus, qui quot personae, tot individuae sunt substantiae, cognos- 
 citur. Quare in summa essentia sicut non sunt plures substantiae, ita nee plures personae. 
 Anselm here only advances further in the same direction in which Augustine had gone, in 
 departmg from the generic conception of the Trinity, which prevailed among the Greek 
 theologians, such as Basihus, Gregory of Nazianzen, and Gregory of Nyssa, and approach- 
 ing toward Monarchianism. On the other hand, passages like the above might easily lead 
 Roscellinus, who held fast to the full signification of the concept of personality, to believe 
 that Anselm must confess himself at one with him in his assertion that the three persons 
 were three res per se, and that they could, if usage only permitted it, be designated as three 
 Gods.)— In the Monologium Anselm seeks (chs. 67-77) to explain the nature of the human
 
 ANSELM OF CANTEEBUKT. 383 
 
 spirit and to demonstrate its eternity. The human spirit is a created image of the divine 
 spirit, and, like the latter, has the faculties of memory, intelligence, and love. It can and 
 ought to love God as the highest good, and all else for his sake ; in this love is contained 
 the guarantee of its own eternity and eternal blessedness, for no end will be made to this 
 blessedness either by its own will or against its will by God, since God is himself love. 
 If, however, the finite spirit refuses the love of God, it must suffer eternal punishment. 
 "With the immutahilis sufficientia of the saved must correspond the inconsolahiiis indigtntia 
 of the lost. Love has its root in faith, which is the consciousness of the object of love, 
 and more particularly in living faith, which involves a striving after its object (i. e., the 
 root of faith is credere in Deum, in distinction from merely credere Deum). Love, on the 
 other hand, is itself the condition of that hope which anticipates the attainment of the end 
 of present strife. (The Augustinian antithesis between salvation and damnation — the 
 former as depending on "faith," and the latter as consisting in a satisfaction rendered to 
 God by the eternal pain of the sinner, and termed justice — reappears in the works of 
 Anselm in all its naked severity.) 
 
 The conception of God, to which, on cosmological grounds, by a logical ascent from the 
 particular to the universal. Anselm had arrived in the Monologium, he seeks in the Pros- 
 logium [Alhquium Dei, originally entitled Fides quaerens intellectum) to justify ontologically 
 by a simple development of the conception of God, i. e., he seeks to prove God's existence 
 as following from the very idea which we have of Him ; for Anselm had been disquieted 
 by the circumstance that in the proof attempted in the Monologium, the demonstration of 
 the existence of the Absolute had appeared dependent on tlie existence of the relative. 
 "We reproduce here the ontological argument, of which the substance is given above, p. 378, 
 in Anselm's own words, since the phraseology itself is important in deciding upon the con- 
 clusiveness of the argument. Domine Devs, qui das fidei intellectum, da mihi ut, quantum 
 sets expedire, inielligani quia es, sicut credimus, et hoc es quod credimus. Et quidem credimus, 
 te esse honum qvx) maju^s bonum cogitari nequit. An ergo nan est aliqzia talis natura, quia dixit 
 insipieiis in corde sua (according to Psalm xiv. 1) : non est Deus ? Sed eerie idem ipse insipiens 
 quum audit hoc ipsum quod dico : bonum, quo majus nihil cogitari p)otest, intelligit utique quod 
 audit, et quod intelligit utique in ejus intellectu est, etiam si non' intelligat illud esse. (Aliud est 
 rem esse in intellectu, et aliud intelligere rem esse. Kam quum pictor jwaecogiiat imuginem quam 
 facturus est, habet earn quidem jam in intellectu, sed nondum esse intelligit quod nondum, fecit ; 
 quum vero jam pinxit, et habet in intellectu et intelligit jam esse quod fecit.) Convincitur ergo 
 insi2^iens esse vel in intellectu aliquid honum quo majus cogitari nequit, quia hoc quum audit 
 intelligit, et quidquid intelligitur in intellectu est. Ad eerie id quo majus cogitari nequit, non 
 potest esse in intellectu solo. Si enim quo majus cogitari non potest, in solo intellectu foret, 
 utique eo quo majus cogitari non potest, majus cogitari potest (sc. id. quod tale sit etiam in re). 
 jExistit ergo pnocul dubio aliquid, quo majus cogitari non valet, et in intellectu et in re (ch. 2). 
 Hoc ipsum autem sic vere est, ut nee cogitari possit non esse. Kam potest cogitari aliquid esse, 
 quod non possit cogitari non esse, quod majus est utique eo, qux)d non esse cogitari potest. Quare 
 si id, quo majus nequit cogitari, potest cogitari non esse, id ipsum quo majus cogitari nequit, non 
 est id quo majtis cogitari nequit, quod convenire non potest. Vere ergo est aliquid. quo majus 
 cogitari non potest, ut nee cogitari possit non esse, et hoc es tu, Domine Deus noster (ch. 3). To 
 the question, How then is it possible for the fool to say in his heart or to think that there ia 
 no God ? Anselm replies by urging the difference between the mere thinking of a word or 
 the being conscious of an idea, and the cognition of the reality which th« word denotes 
 and to which the idea corresponds (ch. 4). The paralogistic nature of the argument was 
 observed by some among the contemporaries of Anselm, although the precise nature of its 
 defect was not at first made perfectly clear. Every deduction from a definition is valid
 
 384 ANSELM OF CANTEKBURY. 
 
 only upon the hypothesis of the existence of the subject of the definition. Thus, Xen- 
 ophanes, the Eleatic, had correctly inferred from the nature of God (his existence being 
 assumed) his unity and spirituality (cf. Arist., Metaph., III. 2. 24: deovg /uev elvai (pdaKovrci; 
 avdpuKoecdEic 6e), and Augustine (who defined God as the highest good, than which nothing 
 better can be conceived) had deduced from the definition of God his eternity: whoever 
 admits that there is a God, and yet denies his eternity, contradicts himself, for eternity 
 belongs to the essence of God ; just so certainly as God is, is he also eternal (Augustin., 
 Confess., VII. 4 : non est corruptiMlis substantia Dei, quando si hoc esset, non esset Deus. The 
 passages, Be Trin., VIII., ch. 3, and elsewhere, which are often referred to in this connec- 
 tion, correspond rather with the argumentation in the Monologium.) Tliat which distin- 
 guishes the argumentation of Anselm from Augustine's, is that in the former an attempt is 
 made to conclude to the existence of God, and this peculiarity of the ontological argument 
 constitutes its defect. The only conclusion which is logically valid is this: so surely as 
 God exists, so surely is he a real being — which is a meaningless ta\itology — or, at the niostt 
 say, this : so surely as God exists, so surely does he exist not only in the mind, but also in 
 nature. This latter distinction, between the (real and not merely ideal) existence of God 
 in the mind of man and his existence in nature, is employed by Anselm instead of the dis- 
 tinction between merely ideal and real existence. By this means the conditional clause on 
 which the argument depends, viz. : if God exists, is put out of view. Anselm confounds the 
 literal sense of the expression: in intelledu esse, with its metaphorical sense. He rightly 
 distinguishes between the two senses: "existing in tlie imagination," and "known as 
 existing in reality," and correctly proposes to lay the former at the basis of his argumenta- 
 tion. He avoids in reality the possible confusion of meanings pointed out by himself. But 
 he does not avoid confounding existence in the imagination, or existence in the form of a 
 mental representation — which can be metaphorically termed the existence of the (real or 
 imaginary) object of the idea in the mind, but wliich in reality is only the existence of an 
 image of that object in the mind — with real (objective, substantive) existence in the mind. 
 Hence the deceitful appearance as if it were already ascertained that the object of the idea 
 "God" somehow exists (namely, in the mind) and as if the condition on which all arguing 
 from definitions depends, viz. : that the existence of the subject of the definition be pre- 
 viously ascertained, were fulfilled, and as if all that remained were to determine more 
 precisely the kind and manner of God's existence. That which is demonstrated to be absurd 
 is in reality not the belief entertained by the atheist, that God does not exist and that the 
 idea of God is an objectless idea, but the belief which he neither entertains nor can be 
 forced to adopt, but which Anselm supposes that he must either entertain or be forced 
 to assume, viz. : that God himself (assumed as existing objectively in the mind) is an ob- 
 jectless idea, existing as a merely subjective representation. This appearance is main- 
 tained so long as it serves to give to the argumentation a plausible basis. But in the 
 conclusion, which pretends to contain, as a result of the argumentation, not merely the 
 manner of God's existence, but the fact of his existence, the original sense of the antitliesis 
 between in intelkctu esse and in re esse, namely: "exist, ideally alone, in the human con- 
 sciousness" and "exist in reality," is resumed. Anselm's argument was combated in an 
 anonymous Liber pro Insipiente by a monk named Gaunilo of the Convent of Marmoutier 
 (Majus Monasferium, not far from Tours ; according to Martene, in his manuscript history 
 of the convent, ap. Ravaisson, Rapports sur les bibliotheques de V Quest, Paris, 1841, Append. 
 XVII., Gaunilo was a Count of Montigni, who, after meeting in 1044 with some misfor- 
 tunes resulting from personal feuds, entered the convent, where he lived till as late as 1083). 
 Gaunilo, who speaks of the other contents of the Proshgium in terms of great respect, 
 points out correctly the weak place in Anselm's argument. He remarks that it does not
 
 ANSELM OF CANTERBURY. 385 
 
 follow from the fact that we have and that we understand the conception of God, that God" f; 
 so exists in the intellect that we may conclude from this to his existence in reality ; that , 
 "thai? which nothing greater can be conceived" does not exist in the human intellect ia ; 
 any other sense than that in which all objects that we know exist there : an imaginary 
 island, of which we may have a conception, exists in the intellect just as much as God 
 does when we have a conception of him. If the being of God " in the intellect " were 
 taken in the fuller sense of "knowing that he exists" (intelligere rem esse) — which, how- 
 ever, Anselm himself disavows — tliis would amount to presupposing that which was to be 
 proved. The real existence of the object must be ascertained beforehand, if from its 
 essence we would deduce its predicates {Prius enim cerium mihi necesse est fiat, re vera esse 
 alicuM majiLS ipsum, et turn demum ex eo quod majus est omnihtis, in se ipso quoque subsistere 
 non erit amhiguum). Gaunilo then seeks to demonstrate that Anselm's argument proves 
 too much, since, in a similar manner, the existence of a perfect island might be proved. 
 But Anselm, in his rejoinder, the Liber apologeticus adversus respondentem pro insipiente, 
 denied the pertinence of the latter objection, expressing his confidence that his argu- 
 ment applied to that being, and only to that one, than whom a greater could not be con- 
 ceived (praeter quod mojus cogitari non possit), though without showing with what reason 
 he restricted the application of his argument to that particular instance ; and in his explana- 
 tions relative to that expression in which the defect of the argument is to be sought 
 for — for Gaunilo had not exposed with complete logical definiteness what was deceptive in 
 the metaphor " in intellectu esse "' — he fell back into the old mistake of making cogitari and 
 inteUigi (the thought or conception of an object) synonymous with its esse in cogitatione vel 
 intellectu (or its real existence in thought or in the intellect), so that constantly and without 
 consciousness of the absurdity of the act, he compares with each other two beings, one of 
 which is conceived but does not exist, while the other is both conceived and exists, and 
 then concludes that the latter is greater, by the fact of existence, than the former ; the 
 greatest conceivable being, being in the intellect, must, says Ansolm, not only be in the 
 intellect, but must also exist out of the intellect and in reality. The idea of a being, than 
 whom none greater can be conceived, as existing solely in the intellect, is, indeed, contra- 
 dictory. But the contradiction in the idea does not prove the existence of such a being in 
 reality ; it proves rather that the affirmation, that when such a being is conceived by the 
 intellect, it is in the intellect, is literally false and inadmissible ; at all events, it is not 
 admissible until existence has been proven; for only under the presupposition that God 
 exists, and not for the purpose of establishing this postulate itself, can (with Augu.stine, In 
 Joh. Ev., ch. 3, Tract. XVI.: '^crescat ergo Deus, qui semper perfectus est, a'escat in te ; 
 quanta enim magis intelligis Deum et qiuxnto mcLgis capis, videtur in te crescere Dens ") our 
 knowledge of God be described as God's existence in us, and the growth of that knowledge 
 as the growth of God in us. The other deficiency of the argument, that, namely, the 
 indeterminate conception of that than which nothing greater can be thought, is still far 
 removed from the conception of a personal God, Anselm sought to supply (ch. 5 seq.) b}' the 
 logical development of the concept of "the Greatest," showing that the Greatest must be 
 conceived as creator, spirit, almighty, merciful, etc. The opinion often expressed in 
 modern times, and especially by Hasse {Ansehn, II. pp. 262-272), that the ontological 
 argument stands or falls with Realism, is incorrect. The reverse is, indeed, true of the 
 arguments employed in the Monologium, for these are founded on the Platonic-Aug\istinian 
 theory of ideas. But there is no necessary connection between Realism, which teaches 
 that our subjective conceptions correspond with real universals known through the former, 
 and what is the characterizing feature of the ontological argument, viz. : the confusion 
 of inteUigi with esse in intellectu, or, in other words, the deduction of real existence in 
 25
 
 386 ABELARD AND OTHER SCHOLASTICS OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY. 
 
 the intellect from the presence of an idea in the intellect. Realism does, indeed, involve 
 the presupposition (which, for the rest, not even Nominalism, as such, altogether rejects, 
 the presupposition, which Skepticism only leaves undecided, and which Criticism combats 
 by its distinction between empirical and transcendental objectivity), that necessity in 
 thought is a proof of objectively real existence ; but this presupposition is very different 
 from the confusion that lies at the foundation of the ontological argument, of the idea 
 with the object of the idea, conceived as existing in the mind. Realism afQrms only that 
 that, in regard to which the proposition or the logical judgment, that it exists, has been 
 categorically (not merely hypothetically) and without logical error demonstrated, exists in 
 reality, but not that that, which we, whether arbitrarily or with subjective necessity, think, 
 or the idea of which we understand, itself exists in any literal sense in this our thought or 
 imderstanding of it, or that on account of this thought or understanding it is to be 
 recognized as having objective reality. (It is nevertheless not to be denied, that the con- 
 fusion above described was peculiarly natural in connection with the form of Realism held 
 by Anselm.) 
 
 Of the work entitled: Cur Deus homof the first book was written in 1094 and the 
 second in 1098. In it Anselm treats of the doctrine of redemption and atonement. It is 
 Anselra's merit in this work that he gets beyond the theory of a ransom paid to the devil — 
 a theory which until liis time had been very widely accepted, and which, as held by several 
 of the Fathers of the Church (Origen and other Greeks, Ambrosius, Leo the Great, and 
 others) had extended to the avowal that God had outwitted the devil. For the notion of a 
 conflict between God's grace and the rights of the devil (as asserted even by Augustine, De 
 Lib. Arbitr., III. 10), Anselm substitutes the notion of a conflict between the goodness and 
 justice of God, which conflict, he asserts, came to an end with the incarnation. The 
 defect of his theory (a defect only in conformity with the medifeval tendency to emphasize 
 the aspect of opposition between God and the world) is the transcendence of the act of 
 atonement, in his view of it, in that, although accomplished through the humanity of Jesus, 
 it is represented as exterior to the consciousness and intention of the men to be redeemed, 
 so that stress is laid rather on the judicial requirement that guilt should be removed, than 
 on the ethical requirement of a purified will. The Pauline "dying and rising with Christ" 
 is left out of consideration; the subjective conditions of the appropriation of salvation are 
 not discussed ; tlie equal salvation of all men seems logically to follow from the doctrine 
 of Anselm, and the confinement of Christ's merit to those who accept grace by faith could 
 not, therefore, but appear arbitrary. Thus it was possible that the Church, holding this 
 doctrine, should think of making this appropriation of grace dependent on other, more con- 
 venient conditions, and finally on the purchase of indulgences. The objective and divine 
 aspect was realistically emphasized and the subjective and individual element, the element 
 of human personality (which, per contra, Nominalism could emphasize to the point of 
 destroying the commimity of nature belonging to different persons) was placed in the 
 background. This deficiency necessarily called forth in the succeeding period a reforma- 
 tory movement, which, directed at first only against the extreme consequences of the 
 defective doctrine, terminated in an ethical and religious transformation of its fundament^il 
 conception. Yet this mere suggestion of these specifically theological points may suffice 
 here. 
 / ■" ' 
 
 I § 94. Petrus Abaelardus (Abeillard, or Abelard), was born in 1079, 
 
 at Pallet (or Palais), in the county of Nantes. He was educated under 
 
 Roscellinus, William of Champeaux, and other Scholastics. He then
 
 ABELAED AND OTHEB SCHOLASTICS OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY. 387 
 
 taught in various places — in particular, from 1102 till about 1136, at 
 Paris, tliough with several interruptions — and died in 11-12, at the 
 priory of St. Marcel, near Chalons-sur-Saone. In dialectic he adopted 
 a position by vt^hich he avoided at once the Noniinalistic extreme of 
 Roscellinus and the Realistic extreme of William of Champeaux. 
 His doctrine was, however, not far removed from strict Nominalism. 
 He taught that the universal exists not in words as such, but in 
 affirmations, or in words considered in reference to their signification 
 {sermones). The forms of things existed in the divine mind before 
 the creation, as conceptions {conceptus mentis). In his Introduction 
 to Theology, Abelard lays down the principle that rational insight 
 must prepare the way for faith, since without that faith is not sure of 
 its truth. In opposition to the tritheism of Roscellinus, and by 
 employing the Augustinian terminology, he gives to the doctrijae of 
 the Trinity a Monarchian interpretation, explaining the three persons 
 as being God's power, wisdom, and goodness, and yet not denying the ! 
 personality of those attributes. He interprets the Platonic world-soul ' 
 as meaning the Holy Ghost or the divine love in its relation to the 
 world, in so far as this love bestows goods on all men, Jews and hea- 
 then included. In Ethics Abelard lays stress on the state of the 
 heart ; it is not the act as such, but the intention, on which sin and 
 virtue depend. Whatever is not in conflict with the conscience, is 
 not sinful, although it may be faulty, since conscience may err ; the 
 harmony of the will with the conscience is then only a sufficient evi- 
 dence of one's virtue, when the conscience holds that to be good or 
 pleasing to God which in reality is such. Bernard of Chartres, Wil- 
 liam of Conches, and Adelard of Bath, held a Platonism modified by 
 Christian elements, but they carefully maintained the authority of the 
 Aristotelian doctrine with reference to our knowledge of the world 
 of sensation. Among the logicians of those times may be mentioned, 
 as representatives of various forms of Realism, Walter of Mortagne. 
 and especially Gilbertus Porrctanus, the author of a Commentary to 
 (Pseudo-) Boethius' De Trinitate and De Duahus Naturis in Christo^ 
 and of a work on the last six categories. Abelard's pupil, Petrus 
 Lombardus, the '' MagiMer Sententiarum,^'' prepared a manual of 
 theologv, which for a long time was universally employed as the basis 
 of theological instruction and a guide for the dialectical treatment of 
 theological problems. The mystical theologians, like Bernard of J 
 Clairvaux, Hugo and Richard of St. Yictor, took ground in opposition
 
 388 ABELARD AND OTHER SCHOLASTICS OF THE TWELFTH CEKTDRY. 
 
 to the liigli estimate placed on dialectic, and especially h\ opposition 
 to its application to theology. John of Salisbury, the erudite and 
 elegant author, labored as an opponent of the narrow scholastic logic 
 of dispute, and in favor of the union of classical studies with the 
 Scholastic theology. Alanus " ab instills " (of Lille) composed a sys- 
 tem of ecclesiastical theology founded on rational principles. Amal- 
 rich of Bene and David of Dinant renewed doctrines found in the 
 works of Dionysius Areopagitica and John Scotus Erigena, panthe- 
 istically identifying God with the essence of the world, Alanus, 
 David, and probably Amalrich, were acquainted with a number o^ 
 works translated from the Arabic. 
 
 A part of the works of Abelard, including, in particular, his correspondence with Heloise, his Com- 
 mentary on the Romans, and his Introduction to Theology, were first published from the M9S. of Franfo'u 
 d'Amboise, state counsellor, by Qiiercetanus (Duchesne), Paris, 1616; the Theologia Christiana wbs« 
 printed first iu the Thesaurv^ Novvi Aiiecdotorum of Mart^ne and Dnmnd, Vol. V., 1717, the Ethias cv 
 the Suito te ipimm, in the Thesaiirus Ayiecdotorwm Novissknus, by B. Fez, Vol. III., 1721 ; the Dialogv^ 
 inter philosophum, Judaeum et Ohristianum, by F. H. Rheinwald (Berlin, 1831), who has also published a^^ 
 Eiritome Tlieologiae Christianae, by Abelard, Berlin, 1S25; the Dialogue ■v/a.aaXio included by Victor Cousis; 
 in the Ouvrages inedits d'Ahelard, Paris, 1836, as were also, among other things, the theological wor%: 
 entitled Sic et Non, which is made up of contradictory sayings of the Church Fathers, and is not conipletev, 
 the Dialectic of Abelard, the fragment De Generibus et Specaebvs, ascribed by Cousin to Abelard, an't 
 Glosses to the Jsagoge of Porphyry, to Aristotle's Categ. and De Iiiterpretatione and to the Topioa of 
 Bocthius; a complete edition of the works of Abelard was afterwards set on foot by Cousin {Petri Ahae- 
 lard/i opera hactenus seorsim edita nunc primum in unum collegit, teaitit/m rec., notas, argum., indicek 
 adj. Victor Cousin^ adjiwante C. Jov,rdain, Vol. I., Paris, 1849, Vol. II., ibid. 1859); the first complet"* 
 edition of the Sic et Non was edited by E. L. Th. Ilenke and G. Steph. Lindenkohl, Marburg, 1851. Abe- 
 lard's theological writings fill the 178th volume of Migne's Patrol. Oursvs Completus. 
 
 The life of Abelard was recounted by himself in the Ilistoria Calamitatum Meariim ; of his life, and 
 especially of his relations with Heloise, treat Gervaise, Paris, 1720, John Berington, Birmingham and Lon- 
 don, 1787, German translation by Samuel Hahnemann, Leipsic, 1789, Fessler, 1806, Fr. Chr. Schlosser, 
 Abalard und Dulcin, Leben und Meinungen eines Schwarmers nnd eines Philosophen, Gotha, 1807, 
 Guizot, Paris, 1839. Ludw. Feuerbach, Abalard und, Heloise, 2d edition, Leipsic, 1844; the work entitled 
 Les amours, les jnalheurs et les ouvrages d^ibilard et Heloise, published in 1616, was republished by 
 Villemain, Paris, 1S85. Cf. also B. Dnparay, Pierre le Venerable, abbe de Cltimy, sa vie, ses muvres et la 
 societe monastique au douzieme siecle, Chalons-sur-Saonc, 1862. On his dogmatics and ethics, Frericli.s 
 (Jena, 1827), on the principles of his theology, Goldhorn (Leipsic, 1836, cf. Zeii«c7i. f. hist. Tlieol., 186C, 
 No. 2, pp. 162-229), and on his scientific importance as a philosopher and theologian, Cousin (in his Intro- 
 duction to the Ouvrages Ined., Paris, 1836), and J. Borneinann (in Anselmvs et Abaelardvs sive initia 
 scholastioismi, Havniae, 1840) have written. The most complete work on Abelard is Charles de Ilemusafs 
 Abelard, Paris, 1S45 [cf. North American Peview, Vol. 88, 1859, pp. 132-166. — TV.], which contains parts 
 of the still inedited Glasulae sxtper Porphyrirtm by Abelard (difi'erent from the Glossae published in the 
 Ouvr. Ined.), though some of those which arc of decisive import arc given only in a French paraphrase. 
 J. L. Jacobi, Abalard und Ifeloise, Berlin. 1850; A. Wilkens, Peter Abalard. Bremen. 1855; G. Schuster, 
 Ab. u. Ileloiiis. ]I;imburg, 1800; Ed. Bonnii^r, Ab. et St. Bernard, Paris, 1862; H. liayd, Ab. und seine 
 Lehre, Regensburg, 1868 ; O. Johanny de Rochely, St. Bernard, Abelard et le Rationalimne Modeme, 
 Paris and Lyons, 1867. 
 
 Several copies of the work of Bernard of Chartres on the Megacosmus and Microcosmus are contained 
 in the Imperial Library at Paris; parts of it are published by Cousin in the Supplement to the Ouvrages 
 In4d. d' Abelard, pp. 627-639; ibid. 640-644 are extracts from Bern.ard's allegorical explanation of the 
 Aeneid of Virgil. 
 
 The work of William of Conches on Nature, under the title: Magna de Naturis Philosophia, was 
 published in 1474; the beginning of the Philosophia Minor was printed under the title irtpi JtSafeuc in the 
 worki of Beda Venerabilis, Basel, 1563, Cologne, 1612 and 1688, II., p. 206 seq. ; Cousin {Ouvrages inid-
 
 ABELAED AND OTHER SCHOLASTICS OF THE TWELFTH CENTUET. 3S0 
 
 dAbilard, pp. 669-977) hw published parts of the Secunda and Tertia Phiiosophia (A-uthropology and 
 Cosmology) by the same a\ithor; extracts from the Glossas to the De Conwlat. Philos. are given by Ch. 
 Jonrdain in Notices et Exiraits, etc, XX. 2, 1861 ; perhaps (according to Haureau's conjecture) William of 
 Conches is to be regarded as the author of the Commentary on the Timueut of Plato, from which Cousin 
 (who ascribes it to Ilonorius of Autun, who lived at the beginning of the twelfth century) has pulilished 
 extracts in the Supplement to the Ouw. IrUd, d^Ab., pp. 64S-657. The Dratjmaticon, (thus spelled instead 
 of Dramaticon) Philcsophiae, his last worlc, has been edited under the title of DiaZogus de subntantiU 
 physicig confectus a WiUielmo Aneponymo philosopho industria Guil. Grataroli, Strasburg, 15S3. C i. 
 Haureau, Singularites hUtorUjues et litteraires, Paris, 1S61 (cited above, p. 856). 
 
 Fragments of the De Eodern et Diverso, by Adelard of Bath, are given in A. Jourdain's Reck. Crit., 
 2d edition, 1843, pp. 25S-277. On physical philosophy in the twelfth century, a work was published by Cb. 
 Jonrdain, at Paris, in 1S33. 
 
 Letters on theological topics, by Walter of Montagne, are printed in D'Achery's Spicile^unu, ed. de la 
 BaiTe, Paris, 1723, IH., p. 520 seq. Mathoud, also, in his edition of the Works of Eobert PuUeyn (Paris, 
 1655) gives some extracts from the writings of the same author. 
 
 The commentary on (Pseudo-) Boethiug de Trinitate. by Gilbertus Porretanus, is inchided in the 
 edition of the writings of Boethius, published at Basel, 1570, pp. 1128-1273 ; his work De iSer. PrincipiU 
 w.is published in the oldest Latin editions of Aristotle, in connection with the Organan, — separate edition 
 by Arnold Woesterfeld, Leipsic, 150". Cf , concerning him, Lipsius, in Ersch and Gruber's Encycl^ Sect. I., 
 Part 67. 
 
 Petri Lombardi libri quatuor aententiarum was published at Venice, in 1477, Basel, 1516, Cologne, 
 1576, etc., and is also included in the 192d Vol. of Migne's Patrologie,; the ^Sentences of Kobertus Pulius, 
 and of Peter of Poitiers, were edited by Mathoud. Paris, 1655; Du Boulay, in his ffiet. Uni'cers. Par., and 
 Haureau, Ph. Sc.. L, p. 332 seq., publish fragments of the QuaeMones de Ditina Pagina or Summa 
 Theologiae, by Robert of Melun. 
 
 BeTiiardi Clarevallenxin Opera, ed. Martene, Venice, 1567; ed. Mabillon, Paris, 1696 and 1719 ; on him, 
 Neander (Berlin, 1813, 8d edition, 1865), Ellendorf (Essen, 1837), and G. L. Plitt (in Niedner's ZeiUcnr.fUr 
 hUtor. Theologie, 1862, pp. 163-238), have written. Hugonis a & Victore Opera, Paris, 1524; Venice, 1588; 
 Stud, etindusir. Canonicorum abbat. S. Vict, Eouen, 164S, and In Migne's Patrol., Vols. 175-177; of him 
 write A. Liebner (Leipsic, 1836), Haureau (Paris, 1860), and Ed. Bohmer (in the "■ Damaris;' 1864, No. 3). 
 Richardi a S. Vict. Opera, Yenice, 1506; Paris, 1518; in Mij,'ne"s Patrol., Vol. 194; on him cf. Engil- 
 hardt, Rich. v. S. Vici. und Johannes Ruyisbroeck, Erlangen, 18:58. Wilhelm Kaulich, Die Lehren den 
 Hugo u. Richard von St. Victor, in Abh. d^r Bohm. Gesellschaft der Wiss., 5th Series, Vol. XIIL, for the 
 years 1863 and 1S64, Prague, 1865 (also published separately). Cf. concerning the orthodox, as also concern- 
 ing the heretical Mystics of that period, Heinrich Schmid, Der ilystici^rmis in seiner Entst-eltun^speHod e, 
 Jena, 1824; Gorres, Die cln^tl. Mystik, Eegensb. 1836-42; Heltferich, Die cJirisil. Mystik, Hamburg, 1842 ; 
 Noack, Die christl. Mystik des Mittelalters. KOnigsberg, 1S53. 
 
 The J'olicraticxts site de nugis curiaiium et testigiis philosophorum of John of Salisbury appeared 
 first in an edition without date at Brussels, about 1476, then at Lyons, 1513, etc.; the Letters were piib- 
 lished at Paris (ed. Masson), in 1611, and with the Policratus in the Ribl. Max. Patrum, Ly<in.s 1677, Vol. 
 XXIII.; the J/«<atoj7i<nis, Paris, 1610, etc. ; the Entheticus (^Xuthetieus), together with literary and his- 
 torical investigations by Christian Petersen, Hamburg, 1S43; complete edition of works, by J. A. Giles, 5 
 vols., Oxford, 1&18, reproduced in Migne's Patrolog., Vol. 199. On him, cf. Herm. Keuti-r, Joh. v. S.. eur 
 Oe.ix}i. der chrnstl. Wis-iennchaft im zwblften Jahrhundert, Berlin, 1842; Carl Schaarschmidt, J'. ^S. m- 
 seincin Verhdltniss zur clasa. LiMeratur, in the Rhein. Mtis. f. Ph., new series, XIV., 1858. pp. 20J-234, 
 and Johannes Sare^beriensis nach Leben, und Stiulien, Schriften und PhiloKophie, Leipsic 1862. 
 
 Alani ab insults Op. ed. de Visch, Antwerp, 1653. De arte cutholictie Jidei ed. Pez. in Tlies. anted.. 
 Vol. I. The most complete collection of his works is contained in Vo!. 120 of Migne's Patrologia. 
 
 Hahn treats of Amalrich and the Ainalricans in Theol. Stud. u. Krit, 1846, No. 1; of Amalrich of 
 Bena and David of Dinant, Kronlein treats. Ibid., 1847, pp. 271-830. 
 
 In addition to the great talent of Abelard as a teacher and his conflicts with the Church 
 (he was condemned by two Synods, at Soissons in 1121, and at Sens in 1140), liis unfor- 
 tunate love-relations with Heloise, the niece of the revengeful Canon Fulbert, have made 
 his name popular. Abelard taught dialectic at Melun, then at Corbeil, afterward at Paris 
 in the school connected with the Cathedral, and again at Mount Sainte-G^nevieve and in 
 the Monastery of St. Dionysius ; in the Cathedral School at Paris he also gave theological 
 instruction. (From the union of the schools of logic at Mount St. Genevieve with the
 
 390 ABELAKD AND OTHER SCHOLASTICS OF THE TWELFTH CENTUET. 
 
 theological school in the Convent of Notre-Dame arose the University of Paris ; the instruct* 
 org and scholars formed a corporation, Universitas Magisirorum, or, in the language gen- 
 erally employed in the papal bulls of the 'thirteenth century, " Universitas magistrorum et 
 scholarium Farisiis studentium." Till about the year 1200 the University had been under 
 the more or less arbitrary control of the Chancellor of the Chapter of Notre-Dame ; its cor- 
 porate independence was secured to it by Innocent III. See Thurot, p. 11 of the work 
 cited above). Remusat very justly describes the instruction given by Abelard as indicating 
 •' rather an originality of talent than of ideas " {AMI., I. p. 31). Victor Cousin says (Ouvrages 
 imd. d\4.b., JntroducL, p. VI.): "It is the regular and systematic application bj' Abelard 
 of dialectic to theology, which constitutes perhaps his most signal title to a place in his- 
 tory." From the time of Charlemagne, says Cousin (p. III. seq.), grammar and elementary 
 logic and dogmatics were indeed more or less taught, but dialectic was scarcely at all 
 introduced into theology; this it remained for Abelard mainly to do. "Abelard is, there- 
 fore, the principal founder of the philosophy of the Middle Ages, so that it is at once 
 France that gave to Europe in the twelfth century Scholasticism by Abelard, and, at the 
 commencemeat of the seventeenth century, in Descartes, the destroyer of this same phi- 
 losophy and the father of modern philosophy " (p. IV.). These statements contain some 
 truth, but great exaggeration. Before Abelard, Anselm had applied dialectic to theology 
 with all the skill of a virtuoso, and had in his way rationalized dogmatics; with still greater 
 genius had John Scotus Erigena, following in the lead of Dionysius Areopagitica, and 
 hence of the Neo-Platonists, made the same application, which, for the rest, the Greek 
 Church Fathers and Augustine, in particular, also did in a greater or less measure ; the 
 interval between John Scotus and Anselm was also filled with many noticeable attempts to 
 apply dialectic to theological questions, especially to the doctrines of the Eucharist and the 
 Trinity. Abelard, therefore, simply went further in a way which had already been opened 
 up. That which is peculiar to him is rather his facile and elegant style, than the strictly 
 dialectical form of his reasoning ; although it is to be confessed that he contributed very 
 materially toward assuring the permanent adoption of the dialectical form in theological 
 discussions. In comparison with the rigid orthodoxy of Anselm, he shows what for his 
 times was a rather strong rationaUstic tendency. 
 
 Abelard, like all the Scholastics of his time, was acquainted with no Greek works, 
 except in Latin translations ; Plato he knew only from the quotations of Aristotle, Cicero, 
 Macrobius, Augustine, and Boethius, but not, so far as appears, from the translation by 
 Chalcidius of a part of the dialogue Timaeus, which he might have seen; and of Aristotle's 
 works, he was unacquainted not only with the Physics and Metaphysics, but also with both 
 the Analytics, the Topics, and the De Soph. Elenc. ; he knew only the Categ. and De Inier- 
 pretatione. He says himself, in his Dialectic (composed in the latter part of his life, prob- 
 ably 1140-42, see Cousin, p. 228 seq.): Sunt autem tres, quorum septem codicibus omnis in 
 hoc arte eloqueniia latina armatur : Aristotelis enim duos tantum, Pra^dicameniorum scilicet et 
 Periermenias lihros, usus adhuc Latinorum cognovit, Porphyrii vera unum, qui videlicet de quin- 
 que vocihus conscripius, genere scilicet, specie, differentia, propria et accidente, introduction em ad 
 ipsa praeparat Praedicamenta ; Boethii autem quatuor in consuetudinem duximus libros, videlicet 
 Divisionum et Topicorum cum Syllogismis tarn categoricis quam hypoiheticis. He confesses 
 in the same work (p. 200) his ignorance of the Physics and Metaphysics, and adds that ho 
 could not learn Plato's dialectic from Plato's o-mi writings, because the latter were not 
 translated (p. 205 seq.). In the time next succeeding the time of Abelard, and in part 
 dtiring his life, the other logical writings of Aristotle became generally known r and 
 Abelard must himself (as Prantl shows, Gesch. der Log., pp. 100 seq.) have had some 
 indirect knowledge of the contents of these writings before he composed hia Diaiectica-
 
 ABELARD AND OTHER SCHOLASTICS OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY. 391 
 
 To a passage in the Chronica of Robert de Monte, relating to the year 1128, an ''alia 
 manus" — which, according to Pertz (Monum., VIII. p. 293), likewise belonged to a person 
 of the twelfth century — has added the notice: Jacobus Clericus de Venetia transtulit de 
 graeco in latinurn qtiosdam lihros Aristotelis et comvientatus est, scilicet Topica, Analyt. Pr. A 
 Post, et Elenchos, quamvis antiquior translatio haheretur. The "earlier translation " of these 
 parts of the Organon was that of Boethius, which, however, was not widely circulated, 
 and the new translation did not at once become universally known and had not been seen 
 by Abelard when he wrote his Dialectic. Gilbertus Porretanus, who died in 1154, cites 
 the Aristotelian Analytics as a work already generally known. His disciple. Otto of Frei- 
 sing, was the first, or one of the first, to bring into Germany the Topica, the Analytics, and 
 the Blench. Soph. — perhaps in the translation of Boethius. John of Salisbury knew not 
 only these, but also other new translations, in which greater literalness had been aimed at. 
 That part of the Organon, which first became known about the middle of the twelfth cen- 
 tury, was for centuries termed "Nova Logica," and the part previously known, "Vetus 
 Logica." With this distinction must not be confounded that of a '• Logica Antiqua" (or 
 Antiquorum), which included the Nova as well as the Vetus Logica, and a '' Logica Moderna" 
 {Modernorum), which wiU be treated of in §§ 95 and 103. 
 
 In dialectic Abelard recognizes Aristotle as the highest authority. In speaking of a 
 difference between Aristotle and Plato as to the definition of the Relative, Abelard {Dial., 
 p. 204) employs language which illustrates characteristically the dependence of men in his 
 time on authority. He says: "It were possible to choose a middle course; but that may 
 not be, for if we suppose Aristotle, tlie leader of the Peripatetics, to have been in fault, what 
 other authority shall we receive in matters of this kind (si Aristotelem Peripateticorum p'rincipein 
 culpare praeswmamus, quern amplius in hoc arte recipiemus)? There is only one thing m 
 Aristotle which Abelard cannot suffer, and this is his polemic against Plato, his teacher. 
 Abelard prefers by a favorable interpretation of the words of Plato to pronounce both 
 master and scholar in the right {Dial., p. 206). — These views belonged indeed to the old 
 age of Abelard. In contending against the dialecticians of his times, he sometimes de- 
 preciated their leader, Aristotle, when he seemed to come in conflict with theological 
 authority {Theol. Christ., II., p. 1275; ib., 1282: "Aristoteles vesier"). 
 
 Abelard ascribes to dialectic the work of distinguishing the true and the false {Dial., 
 p. 435 : veritatis seu falsitatis discretio. Glossulae super Porphyrium, ap. Remusat, i>. 95: est 
 logica av^toritate Tullii (cf. Boeth., ad Top. Cic, p. 762) diligens ratio disserendi, i.e.. discretio 
 argumentorum per quae disseritur i. e. disputatur). Logical distinction is accomplished by 
 distinguishing between the difi'erent applications of words {discretio impositionis vocum, 
 Dial., p. 350; cf. p. 351 : Si quis vocum impositionem recte pensaverit, enuntiationum quarum- 
 libet veritatem facilius deliberaverit, et rerum consecutionis necessitatem velocius animadverterit. 
 JIoc autem logicae disciplinae proprium relinquitur, ut scilicet vocum imposiiiones ptnsando, 
 quantum unaquaque proponatur oratione sive dictione discutiat; physicae v.ro proprium est 
 inquirere utrum rei natura consentiat enuntiaiioni, utrum ita sese, ut dicitur, rerum pro- 
 prietas habeat vet non). Physics is presupposed by logic, for the peculiarities of objects 
 must be known in order to the right application of words {ibid.). 'Words, as Abelard, 
 according to the then universal opinion and in Peripatetic language teaches, were invented 
 by men to express their thoughts; but thoughts must conform to things (r/ieo/. Christ., 
 p. 1275 : vocabula homines instituerunt ad creaturas designandas, quas intelligere potuerunt, 
 quum videlicet per ilia vocabula suos intellectus manifestare vellent. Cf. ib., p. 1162 seq. on 
 the cognatio between the sermones and intellectus. Dial., p. 487 : neque enim vox aliqna natu- 
 raliier rei significafae inest, sed secundum hoiiiinum impositionem ; vocis enim inipositionem 
 summus artifex nobis commisit, rertim autem naturam propriae suae dispositioni reservavit,
 
 392 ABELAKD AND OTHER SCHOLASTICS OF THE TWELFTH CENTUKY. 
 
 unde et vocem secundum impositionis suae originem re significata posterim-em liquet esse). But 
 because human speech is of human origin, it is not therefore arbitrary, but it has in the 
 objects it expresses its norm {Inlrod. ad theol., II. 90 : constat juxta Boethium ac Platonnn, 
 cognatos de qtiib-us loquuntur rebus oportere esse sermones). 
 
 The position of Abelard with reference to the problem of Nominalism and Realism, or 
 the doctrine of universals, is still a subject of dispute. In his Dialectic he does not ex- 
 pressly take up the subject. In the Glossae in Porphyrium he contents himself with an 
 explanation of the literal sense of the passage in Porphyry, which only defines the problem 
 itself. It is only in the Glossulae super Porphxjrium that he expresses his own views. But 
 these Glossulae exist only in MS. ; Remusat has published many passages from this work, 
 but has failed to give the Latin text of precisely those passages which were of de- 
 cisive importance. Furthermore, the treatises De Intellectibus and De Generibus, from which 
 results less equivocal coiild have been derived, have been incorrectly ascribed to Abelard. 
 Still it is possible to discern the main points of his doctrine. John of Salisbury describes 
 it as a modification of the Nominalism of Roscellinus, that Abelard found the universal, 
 not in the words (voces) as such, but in words as employed in sentences (sermoiies) ; the 
 main argument employed against Realism by the representatives of this doctrine, he 
 adds, was that a thing cannot be predicated of a thing, but that the universal is that 
 which is predicable of many things, and is, therefore, not a thing (Joh. Sal., Metahg., 
 II. 17 : alius sermones intuetur et ad illos detorquet quidquid alicubi de universalibus meminit 
 scriptum ; in hoc autem 02nnione deprehensus est j)eripa.teticus Palatirais Abaelardus noster; — 
 rem de re praedicari monstrum dicunt). With this agree Abelard's own expressions. He 
 says {Dial., p. 496): "According to us, it is not a thing, but only a name, which can be 
 predicated of several objects " {nee rem ullam de pluribus did, sed nomen tantum concedimus). 
 But he defines the imiversal (Remusat, II. 104) as that whose nature it is to be predicated 
 of several objects {qux)d de pluribus natum est praedicari, following Arist., De Interpret, 
 ch. 7 : TO. fiev KaOoXov tuv irpay/idTuv, to, 6e Kaff iKaarov, AeytJ 6e koOoTiov /lev b ettI Tr/letdvwv 
 ni(pvK.£ KaT7]}op£~ta6ai, Ka& eKaarov 6e b (lij, o'lov avOpuTvog [liv rwv Ka66Xov, 'K.aTJ'.iaq 6e tuv 
 Kaff EKacTov). The universality, therefore, is contained in the word ; yet not in the word as 
 such, as though this were itself anything universal (for every word is but a particular single 
 word), but in the word applied to a class of objects, or in the word so far as it is predicated 
 of these objects, hence in the sentence, sermo; only metaphorically are the objects them- 
 selves called universals. Says Remusat (II. p. 105) : Ce n'est pas le mot, la voiz, mats le 
 discours, sermo, c'est a dire Vexpression du mot, qui est attribuable a divers, et qiwique les 
 discours soient des mots, ce ne sent pas les mots, mats les discours qui sent universels. Quant 
 aux choses, s^il etait vrai qu'une chose pHt s^affirmer de plu^ieurs choses, une seule et meme 
 chose se retrouverait egalement dans plusieurs, ce qui repugne. Ibid., p. 109 : il decide que 
 Men que ces concepts ne donnent pas les chases comme discretes ainsi que les donne la sensa- 
 tion, its n^en sont pas moins justes et valables et embrassent les choses reelles, de sm-te qu'il est 
 vrai que les genres et les especes subsistent, en ce sens quHls se rapportent d des choses subsis- 
 tantes, car c^e.st par metaphore seulement que les philosophes ont pu dire que ces universaux sub- 
 .distent; au sens propre ce serait dire quHls sont substances et Con veut dire seulement que les 
 objects qui donnent lieu, aux universaux subsistent. In explanation of the very indefinite 
 expression " donner lieu," we can, since Remusat does not give here the words of Abelard, 
 only fall back upon the above words concerning genres and especes, that these "se rappor- 
 tent a des choses subsisiantes." The French historians are wont to designate this doctrine 
 of Abelard's as Conceptualism ; yet Abelard by no means lays chief stress on the subject- 
 ive concept as such, b\it on the word in its relation to the object denoted by it. The pith 
 of his doctrine is contained in the sentence (Remusat, II. p. 107): ^a« sermo praedicabilis. 
 
 I
 
 ABELAKD AND OTHER SCHOLASTICS OF THE TWELFTH CENTUEY. 393 
 
 Only in an undeveloped form is Conceptualism contained in these words, in so far, namely, 
 as the signilicatiou of each word is in the first instance the concept connected with it, which 
 concept, however, itself has respect to the object denoted by the word (just as the logical 
 judgment respects objective relations), whence Abelard distinguishes {Dial, p. 238 seq.) a 
 si(jniJicatio inttllectualis and realis of all words and propositions ; cf. Abelard's affirmation 
 {Diid., p. 496) that the Definitum is the word explained in respect of its meaning (not in 
 respect of its essence — nihil est definitum, nisi declaratum secundum signtficationem voca- 
 buluni). 
 
 In regard to the question of objective existence Abelard expressly combats the (extreme 
 realistical) theory that the universal has an independent existence before the individual. 
 True, the species arise out of the genus by the addition of a form to the latter (Dial, p. 486: 
 in constitutione speciei genus quod quasi materia poniiur, accqyta differentia, quae quasi forma 
 superudditur, in speciem transit) ; but this issuing of the species from the genus does not 
 imply a priority of the latter in point of time or existence {Introd. ad Theobg., II. 13, 
 p. 1083 : quum autem species ex genere creari seu gigni dicaiitur, von tamen ideo necesse est 
 genus species suas tempore vel per existentiam praecedere, ut videlicet ipsum prius esse contigerit 
 quam illus; numquam etenim genus nisi per aliquam speciem suam esse contingit, vel ullatenus 
 animal fuit, antequam rationale vel irrationale fuen-it, et ita species cum suis generibus simul 
 naturaliter existunt, ut nullatenus genus sine illis, sicut nee ipsae sine genere esse potuerint). It 
 were not impossible to detect in these deliverances the Aristotelian doctrine of the univer- 
 sal in the individual (so, in particular, H. Ritter, Gesch. der Ph., TII. p. 418, judging 
 especially from this passage, ascribes to Abelard the doctrine : universalia in re, non ante 
 rem) ; but Abelard is far from expressing in principle this moderate form of Realism and 
 developmg it in systematic and logical form. For, holding that doctrine, he would have 
 been obliged to declare the subjective sense of the word '■'universale" to be the meta- 
 phorical one and to explain the expression, "that which can be predicated," as meaning: 
 "that which is in such sense objective, that its concept (and the corresponding word) can 
 be predicated." On the contrary, Abelard {Dial, p. 458) expressly repels the realistic 
 hypothesis {earn philosophicam sententiam, quae res ipsas, non tantum voces, genera et species 
 esse confitetur). Still, it would be in vain to seek in Abelard's works a rigid solution of the 
 problem in question, with which he occupied himself only incidentally and rather polemic- 
 ally, than in the way of positive development. His merit consists here only in the for- 
 tunate avoidance of certain untenable extremes. 
 
 Notwithstanding his opposition to the theory of the independent existence of the uni- 
 versal, Abelard finds means to support the doctrine of Plato, such as, from the statements 
 of Augustine, Macrobius, and Priscianus, he understands it to be. The Ideas, he says, 
 exist as the patterns of things, even before the creation of the latter, in the divine under- 
 standing. Still, the remnant of substantiality which remained to the Ideas after the 
 Plotinic transformation of the Platonic doctrine, became less and less in the specula- 
 tions of the Christian thinkers, who were seeking, not to determine what was the real 
 object of the Socratic concept, but to discover between God, the personal spirit, and 
 the world, a connecting link, by which the creation of the latter might be explained; 
 Abelard had already arrived at the conception of the Ideas as subjective conceptions 
 of the divine mind {conceptus mentis, Theol. christ, I. p. 1191 : non sine causa maximus 
 Plato philosophorum prae ceteris commendatur ah omnibus. Ibid.. IV. p. 1336: ad hunc 
 modum Plato formas exemplares in mente divina considerat, quus ideas appellat et ad quas 
 postmodum quasi ad exemplar quoddam summi artificis providentia operata est. Introd. ad 
 Theol, I. p. 987 : sic et Macrobius {Somn. Scip., I. 2, 14) Platonem insecutus mentem Dei. quam 
 Graeci Noyn appellant, originales rerum species quae ideae dictae sunt, continere meminit, ante-
 
 394 ABELARD AND OTHER SCHOLASTICS OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY. 
 
 quavi etiam, inquit Priscianus, in corpora prodirent, h. e. in effecta operum provenirent. lb., 
 II. p. 1095 seq. : ha7ic autem processionem, qua scilictt conceptus mentis in fffectum operanda 
 prodit, Priscianus in prima ccnstructionum {Inst. Giamm., XVII. 44) diligtnter aperit diceint 
 generales et speciales formas rerum intelligibiliter in mente divina constitisse, antequam in cor- 
 pora prodirent, h. e. in effecta per operationem, quod est dicere: antea providit Deus quid ei 
 qualiter agerct, quam illud impleret, ac si diceret: nihil impraemeditate sive indiscrete cgit). In 
 reference to the divine mind, therefore, Abelard inclines in reality to a form of Concept 
 tualism, for the adlierents of which there would, however, no longer remain any logical 
 motive for limiting the Ideas to universals, since God thinks also the particular. This con- 
 sequence was soon deduced by Bernard of Chartres (below, p. 397). 
 
 Abelard holds, with Augustine, that of all the ancient philosophers the Plalonista 
 taught the doctrine most consonant with Cliristian faith, their One or Good, the Nous with 
 the ideas, and the world-soul, being interpreted as referring to the three persons of the 
 Trinity : God the Father, the Logos, and the Holy Ghost. Abelard's explanation of the 
 world-soul as representing the Holy Ghost gave offence, and was one of the points in the 
 accusation of Bernard of Clairvaux against him. In his Dialectic Abelard industriously 
 gives prominence to the points of difference between the Platonic doctrine and the Catho- 
 lic, and in particular to the fact that the soul of the world is represented as coming forth 
 from the Nous in time, whereas the Holy Ghost proceeds eternally from the Father and 
 the Son, and only liis working in the world has had a temporal beginning, namely, with 
 the world itself. The passage in the Dialectic appears like a recantation, for which reason 
 Cousin {Ouv. ined. d'Abel, Introd., p. XXXV.) not without reason concludes that this 
 work was composed after the Council of Sens (1140). 
 
 If, as Nominalism or Individualism logically implies, three divine persons are three 
 Gods, then one God is one divine person. Abelard, who did not quit the nominahstic 
 stand-point as such (notwithstanding the modifications by which he brought it nearer to 
 Conceptualism), but decidedly rejected the Tritheism of Roscellinus, verged by his doctrine 
 toward Mouarchianism (which reduces the three persons to three attributes of God), al- 
 though he did not confess this consequence. Otto of Freising, a pupil of Gilbertus Porre- 
 tanus, while showing how the theological position of Abelard resulted from the Nominalism 
 which he had imbibed from Roscellinus, his first teacher, says {De Gestis Frid., I. 47) that 
 Abelard compared the unity in essence of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to the unity in the 
 Syllogism of the three parts of the Syllogism {sententiam ergo vocum seu nominum in naturali 
 tenens facultate nan caute iheologiae admiscuit, quare de sancta Trinitate docens et scribens tres 
 personas nimiuin attenuans non bonis usus exemplis inter cetera dixit: sicut eadem oratio est 
 propositio, assuuiptio et conclusio, ita eadem essentia est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus). This 
 comparison is employed by Abelard in the Mrod. ad Theol, II. p. 1078; it was probably 
 suggested by August, de Vera Eel, 13, see above, p. 342; but the introduction of the Syllo- 
 gism into the comparison is the work of Abelard. He often employs, besides, the almost 
 Monarchianistic comparisons of Augustine, the opponent of the generic interpretation of the 
 Trinity. 
 
 The question whether God can do more than he really does is decided by Abelard to 
 the effect that it can only be answered in the affirmative, when abstract reference is had 
 to the divine power alone ; but that when the unity of the divine power and wisdom is 
 considered, it must be answered in the negative (Th. Chr., p. 1353 seq.; Epist. Th., ed. 
 Rheinw., p. 53 seq.). 
 
 In his presentation of the doctrines of the Church, the chief merit of Abelard consists in 
 his endeavor to maintain a certain independence with regard to patristic authority. In tlie 
 bold work " Sic et Non," he makes the authorities nentraUze each other by placing side by
 
 ABELAKD A2fD OTHEK SCHOLASTICS OF THE TWELFTH CENTUET. 395 
 
 side their mutually contradictory assertions. Abelard gives indeed rules whereby the con- 
 tradictions may for the most part be recognized as only apparent, or due to the evil designs 
 of forgers or to the inaccuracy of copyists; yet enough of them are left standing to force 
 assent to the proposition that only what is contained in the canonical Scriptures is without 
 exception and unconditionally true, and that no one of the Church Fathers may be regarded 
 as of equal authority with the Apostles. Our duty is to investigate, and for investigation, 
 according to Aristotle, doubt prepares the way {Dubitando enim ad inquisitionem venimus, 
 inquireiido veritatem percipimus, Frol., ap. Cousin, p. 16). Where a strict demonstration 
 cannot be given, the moral consciousness must be our guide {Introd. ad Th., III. p. 119: 
 magis autem honestis quam necessariis rationibus utimur, quoniam apud bonos id semper priu' 
 cipium staiuitur, quod ex honestate amplius commendaiur). 
 
 Not inconsiderable is Abelard's merit in Ethics, especially on account of his development 
 of the doctrine of conscience, by emphasizing the subjective aspect. He regards Christian 
 ethics as a reformation of the natural law of morals (Theol. Christ, II. p. 1211 : si enim 
 diligenkr moralia evangelii praecepta consideremus, nihil ea aliud quam refoi'mationem legis 
 naturalis inveniemus, quam secutos esse philosophos constat). The philosophers, like the Evan- 
 gelists, represent the intention (animi intentio) as the criterion of morality. They rightly 
 teach that the good hate sin from love of virtue, and not from a slavish fear of punishment 
 (i6., p. 1205). The business of Ethics is, according to Abelard, to point out the highest 
 good, as the aim of human endeavor, and to show the way to the same {Dialog, inter philos., 
 Jud. et Chr., p. 669). The absolutely highest good is God- the highest good for man is 
 love to God, which makes him well-pleasing to God, and the greatest evil is to hate God, 
 whereby man becomes displeasing to God {ib., p. 694 seq.). The way which leads to the 
 highest good is virtue, i. e., a will of which goodness has become a confirmed quahty {ib., 
 p. 669 seq.; ib., G75 : bo7ia in habitum solidata voluntas). The '^habiizis" of virtue makes 
 one inclined to good actions, just as the opposite habitus inclines one to evil actions {Eth., 
 Frol., p. 594). Yet it is not in the action, but in the intention, that moral good and evil 
 reside. In the broader sense, it is true, the word fault {peccatum) denotes any deviation 
 from the fitting {quaecunque non convenienter /acimus, Eth., ch. 15), even when uninten- 
 tional, but in its narrower signification it denotes only a voluntary error. Actions as such 
 are indifferent. Nor is the propensity to evil, which belongs to us in consequence of 
 original sin, e. g., the merely natural inclination to anger or sensuality arising from the 
 disposition of the body, in itself sin. It is only the consenting to evil which is sin, and 
 that because it implies a culpable contempt of God {Eth., ch. 3: non enim quaefiant, sed quo 
 animo fiant, pensat Deus, nee in opere, sed in intentione meriium operantis vel laus c(msistit. 
 Ib., ch. 7 : opera omnia in se indifferentia nee nisi pro infentione ageittis vel bona vel mala 
 dicenda sunt, non videlicet quia bonum vel malum, sit ea fieri, sed quia bene vel male fiunt, hoc 
 est ex intentione qua convenit fieri aut minime. Ib., ch. 3 : hunc vera consensum proprie pecca- 
 tum nominamus, hoc est culpam animate, qua damnationem merelur vel apud Deum rea sta- 
 tuitur. Quid est enim iste consensus nisi contenitus Dei et offensio ipsius ? A^on enim Deus ex 
 damno, sed ex contemtu offendi potest). Abelard gives special prominence to the conception 
 of conscience {conscieniia). or the individual moral consciousness of the acting subject, as 
 opposed to the objective norms of morality. The idea of sin, he affirms, implies not only a 
 departure from what is morally good in itself, but at the same time a violence done to the 
 sinner's own moral consciousness; whatever, therefore, is not in conflict with this con- 
 sciousness is not sin, although that which harmonizes with one's own moral consciousness 
 is not for that reason virtue, unless this consciousness is what it ought to be. The coin- 
 cidence of the objective norms with the subjective consciousness is the condition of virtue 
 in the most complete sense, which consists in a direction of the will in accordance with
 
 396 ABELAKD AND OTHER SCHOLASTICS OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY. 
 
 these guides ; and the same coincidence is the condition of sin in the most complete sense, 
 as being a direction of the will in opposition to the same guides. If, however, the subject- 
 ive moral conviction of a person is erroneous, then the corresponding acts of will and 
 performance are, not indeed good, but faulty, thougli less faulty than would be a course of 
 action in accordance with the objective norms, but opposed to the conscience of the agent 
 (Eth., ch. 13 : nan est peccatum nisi contra conscientiam. lb., ch. 13 : non est itaque intentio 
 bona dicenda quia bona videtur, sed insuper quia talis est sicut existimaiur quum videlicet illud 
 ad quod tendit, si Deo placere credit, in hoc insuper existimatione sua nequaquam faUatur. lb., 
 ch. 14 : sic et illos qui persequantur Christum vel suos, quos ptrsequendos credebant. per opera- 
 tionem peccasse dicimus, qui tamen gravius cidpam peccassent, si contra conscientiam eis 
 jjarcereni). Sin, in the proper and strict sense of the word, as the consenting to known evil 
 :md contempt of God, is avoidable, although on account of the sinful propensities, against 
 which we are obhged to combat, it cannot be avoided without great difficulty {lb., ch. 15: si 
 autem proprie peccatum intelligentes solum Dei contemtum dicamus peccatum, potest revera sine 
 Iwc vita transigi, quamvis cum maxima difficultate). 
 
 The rationalistic tendency of Abelard was complained of by St. Bernard of Clairvaux, 
 who affirmed that he " savored of Arius when he spoke of the Trinity " (referring to the com- 
 parison of the Father and the Son to the genus and the species ; others of his comparisons 
 are more Sabellian in spirit), " of Pelagius when he spoke of grace, and of Nestorius 
 when he spoke of the person of Christ" {Epist. ad Guidonem de Castelh). St. Bernard said 
 further, that "while he labored to prove Plato a Christian, he showed himself a heathen" 
 {Epist. ad papam Innocentium). But although Abelard was compelled to recall those parts 
 of his teachings which were in conflict with the doctrine of the Church, his influence on 
 his contemporaries and on following generations was great and lasting. By Anselm and 
 Abelard the dialectical form was ineflaceably impressed on the theology of the Middle 
 
 Ages. 
 
 An anonymous Commentary to the Be Interpretatione, from which Cousin {Fragmens 
 Philos., Phil. Scol.) has published some extracts, belongs to the school of Abelard ; in it 
 logic is defined as doctrina sermonum, and, in accordance with the plan followed by Abelard 
 himself in his Dialectica, is divided into doctrina incomplexorum, propositionum et syllogis- 
 morum. Farther removed from Abelard's doctrine are the contents of the treatise De Jn- 
 tellectibus, which Cousin {Fragm. Philos., 2d ed., Paris, 1840, pp. 461-496) has published as 
 a work of Abelard, and in which the concepts {intellectus), which the author calls also specu- 
 lationes or visus animi, are explained and distinguished from sensus, imaginatio, existimatio, 
 scientia, and ratio. Aristotle's Anal. Poster, must at least in parts have been known to the 
 author, and that in another translation than the Boethian, since in the latter 66^a is trans- 
 lated by opinatio, and not by existimatio (see Prantl, Gesch. der Log., II. pp. 104, 2C6). The 
 concept is derived by abstraction from the perceptions of the senses, and in it we think a 
 form without regard to its substratum {subjecta materia), or an undifferentiated essence, 
 with no distinction of individuals {naiuram quamlibet indifferenter aUque suorum scilicet 
 individuorum discretione). The manner in which we here regard the object of the concept 
 is diff'erent from that in which the object itself subsists, since in reality the indiffei-ens only 
 exists in the midst of individual plurality, and not unmixed and by itself, as in thought 
 {nusquam enim ita pure subsistit, sicut pure concipitur, et nulla est natura, quae indifferenter 
 subsistat). This, however, does not render the concept false ; for it could only be such in 
 case I conceived the object as being different from what it really is, but not when only the 
 modus attendendi intellectus and the modus subsistendi of the res are distinguished from one 
 another. 
 
 The treatise to which Cousin has given the title: De Generibus et Speciebus (pubhshing
 
 ABELAKD AND OTHER SCHOLASTICS OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY. 397 
 
 it from a MS. of St. Germain as a work of Abclard's in Omit. Ined. d'Ab., pp. 507-550), is, 
 as was rightly perceived by H. Ritter {Gesch. der Fhilos., VII. p. 363, cf. Prantl, II. p. 143 
 seq.), of a style and of contents such as preclude our attributing it to Abelard ; but Hitter's 
 conjecture that Joscellin (or Gauslenus) — who was Bishop of Soissons from 1122 to 1151, 
 and of whom we know, through John of Salisbury {Metalog., II. IT, p. 92), that he ''universali- 
 tatem refms in vnum collectis attribuit et singulis eandem demit " — or one of liis pupils was the 
 author, is also uncertain. In this work several doctrines relating to the subject of the con- 
 troversy between Nominalism and Realism are cited and discussed in an erudite and acute 
 manner, all of wliich doctrines belong indeed to the first half of the twelfth century, but 
 scarcely all of them to the time of Abelard's youth (when Cousin believes the work to have 
 been written). In distinction from Abelard. the author of this work, who indeed employs in 
 part the arguments of Abelard (p. 514), confesses his adhesion to a moderate form of Reahsm, 
 by which the universal is represented as not immanent in the single individual as such, but 
 in the totality of similar individuals. Abelard (see above, p. 392) had founded his Nominal- 
 istic conception of universals on the Aristotelian definition of the universal as that whose 
 nature it is to be predicated of several objects, by combining with this definition his doc- 
 trine that not things, but only words can be predicated (or, res de re non praedicatnr). But 
 the author of the treatise now in question escapes this nominalistic consequence of the 
 above definition by taking "predicated" in the sense of "principally signified by the 
 predicated word" {principaliter significari per voceni praedicatam, Cousin, p. 531); but that 
 which is signified is always something objective, and in the case of the names of species, 
 that which is signified principaliter is the totality of similar individuals. (The author illus- 
 trates the difference between principaliter significare and secondary meanings by a reference 
 to the Aristotelian employment of white as an example of quality — reminding us thus of 
 Anselm's dialogue De GrammaUco.) Accordingly the author defines (p. 524 seq.) the species 
 as not that human essence, which is in Socrates or any other individual alone, but as the 
 collected essence of all individuals of the same nature ; the species is thus essentially plural, 
 though one in name, just as a nation is called one, though consisting of many persons 
 {spedem dico esse non illam essentiam hominis solum, quae est in Socrate vel quae est in aliquo 
 alio individuorum, sed totam illam collectionem ex singidis aliis hujus naturae conjunctam, quae 
 tota collectio, quamvis essentialitrr multa sit, ah audoritatibus tamen una species, unum universale, 
 una natura appellatur, sicut populus quamvis ex multis personis collectus sit, units dicitur). The 
 individual is not identical with the universal, but when the universal is aflBrmed of the 
 individual (e. g., Socrates est homo), the meaning is that the former inheres in the latter 
 (p. 533 : omnis natura, quae pluribus inhaeret individuis materialiter, species est). The usual 
 denomination of the genus as the Tnateria, and of the substantialis differentia as the fcyrma, 
 by the addition of which it becomes a species, is also found here (p. 516 et al.). The matter 
 of the individual is its species and its individuality is its form (p. 524 : unumquodque indi- 
 viduum ex materia et forma compositum est, ut Socrates ex Ttomine materia et Socratitate forma, 
 sic Plato ex simili materia, sc. homine, et forma diversa, sc. Platonitate, componitur, sic et sin- 
 guli homines ; et sicut Socratitas, quae formaliter constituit Socratem, nusquain est extra Socratevi, 
 sic ilia hominis essentia, quae Socratitatem sustinet in Socrate, nusquam est iiisi in Socrate). 
 
 Bernard of Chartres (born about 1070-1080), "William of Conches, and Adelard of 
 Bath, who all taught in the first half of the twelfth century, grounded their teachings on 
 Plato, but endeavored, in order not to come in conflict with the authority of Aristotle, to 
 combine the opinions of both those thinkers. "We stand, says Bernard of himself and his 
 contemporaries, in comparison with the ancients, hke dwarfs on the shoulders of giants. 
 On the authority of the Platonic Timaeus (in the translation of Chalcidius) and of the 
 Augustinian reports concerning Platonism, or rather concerning Neo-Platonism, Bernard
 
 398 ABELARD AND OTHEE SCHOLASTICS OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY 
 
 supposes matter (hyk) to liave been reduced to orderly shape by the world-soul, and that 
 the world-soul issued from the divine reason in which the Ideas were contained, and which 
 was itself the Logos of God the Father, the stiprerna divimtas, called also by Bernhard 
 Tagaton. The Ideas or formae ezemplares, which remain unchanged amid all the change 
 of individual objects and are the original grounds of all things, exist as eternal concepts 
 of genera, species, and also of individuals in the divine reason (Bern., Megacosm., ap. 
 Cousin, Oeiovr. Ined. d^Abelard, p. 628 : JVot/s summi et exsuperantissimi Dd est intellectus et 
 ex ejus divinitale nala natura, in qua vitae viventis imagines^ notiones aeternae, mundus iniel- 
 ligihilis, rerum cognitio praefinita. Erat igitur videre velut in speculo tersiore qv.idquid operi 
 l)ei secrdior destinaret affedus. Jllic in genere, in specie, in individuali singularitate con- 
 scripta quidquid yle, quidquid mundus, quidquid parturiunt elementa. lUic exarata supremi 
 digito dispunctoris textus temporis, fatalis series, dispositio saeculorum ; illic lacrymae pauperum 
 fortunaqiui regum, etc.). The soul [of the world] is an Endelychia {hreAex^io. of Aristotle) 
 which issued, as if by emanation {yelut emanatione defluxit), from the divine mind. This 
 soul (p. 631) then gave shape to nature (naturam informavii). William of Conches, who 
 discusses particular physiological and psychological problems, avows, in those cases in 
 which Platonism diverges from the Christian doctrine, his adhesion to the latter {Chris- 
 tianus sum, non academics, ap. Cousin, Oeavr. Ined. d'Ab., p. 673), especially in reference to 
 the question of the origin of souls {cum Augustino credo et sentio quotidie novas animas non ex 
 traduce [which opinion Augustine had, however, not unconditionally rejected], non ex aliqua 
 substantia, sed ex nihilo, sob jussu creatoris creari). Little as William of Conches is disposed 
 to accept the authority of the Church Fathers in matters of physics ('' etsi enim majores nobis, 
 homines tamen," etc.), he yet submits to it unconditionally in spiritual matters ("m eis, quae 
 ad fidem cath. vel ad institutionem morum pertinet, non est fas Bedae vel alictii alii sanctorum 
 patrum contradicere''^). In what manner the theory of ideas was reconciled with the Aris- 
 totelian doctrine is shown by the work (composed about 1115) of Adelard of Bath, who 
 distinguished himself through his extensive knowledge of natural history, acquired on long 
 journeys, especially among the Arabians, and who translated Euclid from the Arabic (cf. 
 Sprenger, Mohammad, Vol. I., Berlin, 1861, p. III.). He says {ap. Haureau, Ph. Sc, I. 
 p. 225 seq.) that Aristotle was right in teaching that genera and species were immanent in 
 individuals, in so far as it is true that the objects of sensation are, according to the 
 manner in which they are considered — i. e., according as we pay attention to their indi- 
 vidual existence or to that in which they resemble each other — individuals or species or 
 genera, but that Plato was also right in teaching that they only exist in complete purity 
 apart from things, i. e., in the divine mind. 
 
 Walter of Mortaigne (died in 1174 while Bishop of Laon), is mentioned by John of 
 Salisbury as the chief representative of the doctrine that the same objects, according to the 
 diflferent condition {staitis) in which they are considered — i. e, according as our attention is 
 directed to their differences or to their likeness, to the indifferent or the consimile in them — 
 are either individuals or species or genera {Metalog., II. 17: partiuntur igitur status duce Gau- 
 tero de Mauretania, et Platonem in eo quod Plato est, dicunt individuum, in eo quod homo, speciem, 
 in eo quod animal, genus, sed subaliernum, in eo quod substantia, generalissimum). This doctrine 
 is spoken of by the same author as no longer maintained by any one in his time. Abelard 
 (in the Glossulae super Porphyrium, ap. Remusat, Ab., II. p. 99 seq. ; probably arguing 
 against Adelard of Bath), and, from a different point of view, the author of the work Be 
 GeneribtMS et Specieb^u; (Cousin, Oeuvr. Ined. d^Ab., p. 518) had opposed it. 
 
 Gilbert de la Porree (Gilbertus Porretanus, called also Pictaviensis, from Poitier, his 
 native place), a pupil of Bernard of Chartres and others, advanced, in connection with the 
 Boethian rendering of Aristotle's definition of the universal {qu^dnatum est de fluribus prae-
 
 ABELAED AND 0THP:R SCHOLASTICS OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY. 399 
 
 dicari), the doctrine of "native forms" (wliich John of Sahsbury thus sums up: univer- 
 salitaiem formis nativis attribuit et in earum conformitate laborat; est autem forma naiiva 
 originalis eocemplum et quae non in mente Dei consistit, sed rebus creatis inhaeret. haec graeco 
 eloquio dicHur eldor, habens se ad ideam ut exemplum ad exemplar, sensibilis qmdem in re sensi- 
 bili, sed mente conrApitur insensibilis, singularis quoque in singulis, sed in omnibus universalis). 
 In his commentary to (Pseudo-) Boethius de Trinitate {Op. Boeth., ed. Basil, 1570, p. 1152), 
 Gilbert distinguishes two significations of the word substance: 1) quod est, sive subsisterts, 
 2) quo est, sive suhsistentia.* Genera and species are generic and specific subsistences, but 
 not objects existing substantially (now swfetowi t;erc, p. 1139); subsisting things constitute 
 the being of their subsistences {res subsistentes sunt esse subsistentiarum), while the subsist- 
 ences are substantial forms {formae substantiales, p. 1255 seq.). There are generic and 
 specific, and also singular subsistences, which latter exist always in only one individual; 
 individuals are distinguished from each other not only by accidental, but, also, by substan- 
 tial properties (p. 1128). The intellect {intelledus) collects (colligif) the universal, which 
 exists, but not as a substance {est, sed non substat), from the particular things which not 
 merely are {sunt) but also (as subjects of accidents) have substantial existence {substant, 
 p. 1138 seq.), by considering only their substantial similarity or conformity (p. 1135 seq.; 
 1252). In sensible or natural things form and matter are united; the forms do not exist 
 as "native forms" apart from things {inabsh-acte), but with them {concretae) : tlie mind can 
 by abstraction {ahstradim) attend to them {aftendere) ; for tilings are often conceived {con- 
 cipiuntur) not in the way in which they are, but in another way (p. 1138). In God, who is 
 pure form without matter, the archetypes of material things {corporum exemplaria, p. 1138) 
 exist as eternal, immaterial forms. No one of the categories (as Gilbert teaches, with 
 Augustine and others) can be applied in its literal sense to God (p. 1154); theological 
 speculation, which relates to the immaterial, to that which exists abstractly, cannot con- 
 form altogether to the laws of natural, concrete things (p. 1140 ; 1173). In his theological 
 speculations Gilbert caused scandal by teaching that the one God in three persons was the 
 one deltas or divinitas, the one form in God by which God is God, and from which the three 
 persons derive their form {forma in Deo, qua DeMS sit, the forma, qua tres 2)ersonae infor- 
 mentur). The subject was especially discussed at the Council at Rheims in 1148. Saint 
 Bernard condemned the distinction between Deus and Diiinita.s. — The work of Gilbert, De 
 Sex Frincipiis, treats of the last six categories of Aristotle : actio, piassio, ubi, quando, situs, 
 habere. Numerous commentaries on it were written by later Scholastics. According to 
 Gilbert, quantity, quality, and relation {in propria statu) are inherent {formae inhaerentes) in 
 the category of substance, while the last six categories are only {respectu altcrius) assistant 
 forms {formae assistentes) in connection with the same category. The vahdity of this 
 distinction is quite questionable, especially when relatio is reckoned among the inherent 
 forms, for relation is impossible without a reference to a second object, and it is in just this 
 reference that it consists ; Gilbert regarded it as sufficient that the possibility in general of 
 being related to something else should exist in the object itself In this Albertus Magnus 
 agreed with him; but the later Scholastics recognized only substance, quantitv. and quality 
 as absolute categories, and ascribed to the seven others a relative character, just as Leib- 
 nitz also recognized as ''determinations internes'' only ''Vessence, la qualiie, la quantite'' 
 (reducing, however, the ten categories of Aristotle to five, viz.: substance, quantity 
 quality, action and passion, and relation). 
 
 Petrus Lombardus (of Lumelogno, near Novara, in Lombardy, and who died in 1164, / 
 
 * ["Since forms have no accidents, it cannot be said that they »ubstant. or are substances, but since 
 they, nevertheless, guhnistunt, they are termed aubsUtentiae [or subsistences]." Erdmann, Grundris« 
 der Gesch. d.er rhilos., § 163. 3.— TV.]
 
 400 ABELAED AND OTHER SCHOLASTICS OF THE TWELFTH CENTUKY. 
 
 while Bishop of Paris) collected in his four books of Sentences various sayings of the 
 Church Fatliers concerning ecclesiastical dogmas and problems, but was not uninfluenced 
 in his exposition of them by Abelard's Sic et A^on and the Summa Sententiarwm of Hugo 
 of St. Victor. Petrus Lombardus treats, in the first book, of God as the absolute good 
 {quo fridmur), in the second of creatures (quihus utimur), in the third of the incarnation 
 (which Hugo had considered in connection with the doctrine of God and the Trinity in his 
 first book) and of redemption and of the virtues, and in the fourth of the seven sacra- 
 ments, as the signs {sirjna) by which salvation is communicated, and of the end of the 
 world. His work became and for centuries continued in the schools to be the principal 
 basis of theological instruction. It was imitated by some, and commented on by very 
 many. In the dialectical treatment of theological questions his Sentences were, as a rule, 
 made the point of departure. Similar works were prepared by Robert Pulleyn (died at 
 Rome in 1150; from his work: Sententiarum libri octo, Petrus Lombardus borrowed much), 
 Robert of Melun, Hugo of Amiens, and Peter of Poitiers, a pupil of Peter the Lombard. 
 
 The orthodox Mystics of the twelfth century, such as Abelard's opponent, Bernard of 
 Clairvaux (1091-1153) — who valued knowledge only in so for as it ministered to edification, 
 and held that to seek for knowledge on its own account was heathenish — Hugo of St. 
 Victor (1097-1141) — a man of encyclopedical erudition, who laid down the principle, 
 that the " uncorrupted truth of things cannot be discovered by reasoning " — and his dis- 
 ciple, Richard of St. Victor (died in 1173) — who treated the faculty of mystical contem- 
 plation as superior to imaginatio and ratio — contributed to the elaboration of ecclesiastical 
 doctrine; but, inasmuch as they really made the images of the fancy of more account than 
 the conceptions of the reason, they occupied a position so foreign and hostile to philosophy, 
 that it was impossible that they should contribute materially to the advancement of the 
 latter. "Walter of St. Victor, a monastic Prior, gave (according to Bukeus, Hist. Univ. 
 Far., I. p. 404, and Launoy, De var. Arist. fort, ch. 3), in about the year 1180, to Abelard, 
 Petrus Lombardus, Gilbert and Peter of Poitiers, the name of the " four labyrinths of 
 France," affirming that all of them, "inspired with the Aristotelian spirit, had treated witl* 
 scholastic levity of the inefifable Trinity and the Incarnation." 
 
 John, of Salisbury in the south of England {Johannes Saresberiensis), was born about 
 1110-20, and educated in France in the years 1136-1148. In the latter year he returned 
 to England. He was a friend of Theobald, Archbishop of Canterbury, and of Thomas 
 Becket, and from 1176 till his death in 1180 was Bishop of Chartres. He was a pupil 
 of Abelard, of Alberich, the anti-nominalistic logician, of Robert of Melun, of William of 
 Conches, and Gilbert de la Porree, and also of Robert Pulleyn the theologian, and others. 
 Like Abelard and Bernard of Chartres, but to a still greater extent than they, he combined 
 with the study of logic and theology the study of classical authors. He composed in 
 1159-1160, about twenty years after the time when he had pursued his studies in logic, his 
 two principal works, the PoUcraticus, i. e., the overcoming of the inanities (migae) of the court 
 by the spirit of ecclesiastical philosophy, and the Metalogicus, on the value of logic, in which 
 he undertook the defense of that discipline {logicae suscepit pairocinium, Prol., p. 8. ed. Giles). 
 The MeUxlogicus is full of information concerning the manner in which logic was cultivated 
 by the Scholastics of John's time. John mentions in the Metalogicus (II. 17) eight different 
 opinions (the eighth, according to which the species are " maneries," or onarderes, is akin to 
 the seventh, according to which they are formed by the act of colligcre), and among them, 
 as the third in order (after the doctrines of Roscellinus and Abelard), the conceptualistic 
 (which he thus expresses : alius versatur in intellectihus et eos duntaxat genera dicet esse et 
 species; s^imunt enim occasionem a Cicerone et Boethio, qui Aristotelem laudant auctorem quad 
 haec credi et did debeant notiones [Cicero appeals only to the authority of " Graeci,'^ by whom
 
 ABELAKD AND OTHER SCHOLASTICS OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY. 401 
 
 the Stoics are to be understood] ; est autem, ut ajunt, notio ex ante peoxejnta forma cvjusque 
 rei cognitio enodatione indigens, et alibi: notio est quidam intelkctus et simplex animi conceptio; 
 eo ergo deflectitur quidquid scriptum est, ut intellectus aut notio universalium universalitatem 
 claudat). John does not avow an unconditional acceptance of either of these doctrines, but 
 shows himself everywhere most favorably inclined to the doctrine of Gilbert ; he conceives 
 the universalia to be essential qualities or forms, immanent in things and separated from 
 tliem only by abstraction, and he contests the hypothesis of independent Ideas existing 
 apart from God. For the rest, in reference to this question he for tlie most part expresses 
 himself as in doubt {Metal.. II. 20: qui me in his quae sunt duhitahilia sapienti, academicum esse 
 pridem professus sum). He holds it to be unfitting to spend too much time on problems of 
 this kind or to devote all one's Hfe to them alone, and charges even Aristotle with subtihzing 
 [argutias, Poller.., III. 3 ; YII. 12 et al); Aristotle, he says, was more convincing in his argu- 
 ments against the opinions of others than in the demonstration of his own, and was by no 
 means infallible and, as it were, ^^ sacrosanctua'^ {Metal, III. 8; lY. 27). John had too 
 often seen how, in the defense of an opinion, all other passages from the authorities were 
 violently accommodated to the one passage from which the opinion in question had been 
 derived, not to feel scandalized by a mode of interpretation which permitted such proce- 
 dures. He therefore demands that heed be paid to the changes in the use of words, and 
 that perfect uniformity in expression be not always expected. He also admits the real 
 difference in opinion and even the errors of the ancient masters, without, however, com- 
 prehending their differences as phases of the development of philosophic thought. In 
 opposition to the fruitless contentions of the schools, John lays great weight on the ^^ utile" 
 and especially on whatever furthers moral progress. All virtue, even that of the heathen, 
 is derived from divine illumination and grace (Poltcrat., III. 9). The perfect -will is in 
 God's sight equal to the act ; yet works furnish that evidence which God requires of our 
 perfect will {Poller. , V. ?> : prohatio dilectionis exhihitio operis est). John's practical stand- 
 point is that of rigid ecclesiasticism. 
 
 Alanus ("fl& Iiistdis") (died a monk at Clairvaux, about 120.3) wrote in five books, De 
 Arte sive de Articulis Fidei Catholicae, in which he sought to confirm the principal doc- 
 trines of the Christian Church by rational grounds. Setting out from general propositions 
 in regard to causation (such as quidquid est causa causae, est etiam causa causati; omnis causa 
 subjecti est etiam caicsa accidentis [nam accidens habet esse per subjectum^ ; nihil seiyiet ipsuin 
 composuit vel ad esse produxit [nequit enim aliquid esse prius semet ipso], etc.), he presents, 
 following essentially the order of the Sentences of Peter the Lombard, in the first book the 
 doctrine of God, the One and Triune, the sole cause of all things; in the second, the 
 doctrine of the world, the creation of angels and men, and free-will; in the third, the doc- 
 trine of the restoration {reparatio) of fallen man; in the fourth, the doctrine of the sacra- 
 ments of the Church ; and in the fifth, the doctrine of the resurrection and the future life. 
 Alanus had known the book on Causes {Liber dc Gausis), which is founded on Xeo-Platonic 
 theses and came to the Scholastics through the Jews. 
 
 Amalrich, of Bena in the district of Chartres (died while teaching theology at Paris, 
 in 1206 or 1207), and his followers, among whom David of Dinant was the most distin- 
 guished, philosophized in a sense somewhat opposed to the teaching of the Church and ap- 
 proaching to Pantheism. Their doctrines were condemned in the beginning of the thirteenth 
 century, at the Synod of Paris in 1209, and at the Latoran Council called by Pope Innocent 
 III., in 1215, and their writings, as also the work of Erigena and the Physics of Aristotle, 
 and afterward also the Aristotelian Metaphysics, which seemed to favor their doctrines, were 
 forbidden to be read (cf. below, § 98). Amalrich taught (according to Gerson, De Con- 
 cordia Metaph. cum Log.. IV.) the identity in some sense of the Creator with the creation. 
 26
 
 402 GREEK AND SYRIAN PHILOSOPHERS OF THE MEDDLE AGES. 
 
 God was the one essence of all creatures. The Ideas possessed creative power, although 
 they were themselves created. All that was divisible and changeable would return finally 
 into God. David of Dinant composed a book entitled De Toinis {i. e., de divisionibus), in 
 which he sought to demonstrate that God and the original matter of the universe and the 
 Nous were identical, since they all corresponded with the highest (most abstract) concept 
 which can be formed ; if they were diverse, there must exist above them some higher and 
 common element or being, in which they agreed, and tlien this would be God and Nous 
 and the original matter (Albert. M., Summa Th., I. 4. 20). The principal sources from 
 which this extreme Realism was derived, were (in addition to the Albigensian heresy, 
 which was founded on Manicheism and Paulicianism) the works of John Scotus and 
 Dionysius Areopagita ; but at least David of Dinant, and probably Araalrich also, had 
 made use of the Metaphysics and Physics of Aristotle — on which, together with his Ethics, 
 from this time forward the development of Scholasticism depended — and David of Dinant 
 had very probably made use of the " Fons Vitae " of Avicebron {Ibn Gebirol, see below, 
 
 § 95. The causes which led to the transformation of the Scholastic 
 philosophy after the end of the twelfth century and its development 
 into the highest perfection attainable for it, were that acquaintance 
 with all the works of Aristotle, for which the Scholastic philosophers 
 were indebted to the Arabians, the Jews, and, at a later time, to the 
 Greeks, as also their acquaintance with the philosophy of those men 
 by whom Aristotle was thus made known to them. Among the 
 Greek Christians, after the suppression of Neo-Platonism by the 
 decree of Justinian (529), and when the heterodox influence of this 
 philosophy on Christian theologians (as illustrated by Origen and his 
 pupils) had been brought to an end, the Aristotelian philosophy gained 
 constantly in authority, the Aristotelian dialectic, which was first 
 employed only by heretics, being finally employed also by the ortho- 
 dox in their theological controversies. The school of the Syrian Nes- 
 toi'ians at Edessa (afterward at Nisibis) and the medico-philosophical 
 school at Gandisapora were principal seats of Aristotelian studies ; 
 through them the Aristotelian philosophy was communicated to the 
 Arabians. The Syrian Monophysites also participated in the study 
 of Aristotle, especially in the schools at Resaina and Kinnesrin. 
 Johannes Philoponus, a Monophysite and Tritheist, and Johannes 
 Damascenus, an orthodox monk, were Christian Aristotelians, the 
 latter of whom, in scholastic fashion, employed the logic and meta- 
 physics of Aristotle as aids to the systematic presentation of the 
 strictly orthodox faith. In the eighth and ninth centuries all studies 
 were on the decline in the Orient; yet the tradition of them was pre- 
 served. In the eleventh century Michael Psellus and Johannes
 
 GEEEK AND SYRIAN PHILOSOPHERS OF THE MIDDLE AGES. 403 
 
 Italus distinguished themselves especially as logicians. From the 
 centuries next following several commentaries on works of Aristotle 
 and some minor works on other philosophers have been preserved. 
 In the fifteenth century the Greeks, particularly after the taking of 
 Constantinople by the Turks in the year 1453, brought to the nations 
 of the West that increased knowledge of ancient literature which, in 
 the department of philosophy, gave rise to the struggle between Aris- 
 totelian Scholasticism and the newly-arising Platonism. 
 
 The philosophy of the Greeks in the Middle Ages is discussed by Jac Brucker (Ilist. crit. philoa.. Vol. 
 III., Leipsic, 1748, pp. 532-554), and, in later times, with special reference to logic, by Carl I'rantl (Ge^ch. 
 der Logik, I., p. &iA scq., and II., pp. 261-296). E. E6nan (Paris, 1852) has written of the Pi-ripatetic philoso- 
 phy among the Syrians. Cf. G. Hoffmann, De hermeneuticis apud Syros Aristotelcis (Diss. Inaug.). 
 Berlin, 1868. 
 
 The Aristotelian logic was already regarded to a certain extent as an authority in the 
 school of Origen. Gregory of Nazianzen wrote an abridgment of the Organon (see Prantl, 
 Gesch. d. Z., I. p. 657). But at first the Aristotelian philosophy was studied more by here- 
 tics than b}' Orthodox Christians. The Platonic doctrines were more allied to those of 
 Christianity and were more highly esteemed, yet in proportion as theology became a scho- 
 lastic science the Aristotelian logic was more highly prized as an organon. 
 
 Together with Nestorianism, Aristotelianism found acceptance in the fifth century among 
 that part of the Syrians who dwelt in the East, and especially in the school at Edessa. 
 The oldest document of this philosophy among the Syrians is a commentary on Arist. de 
 I?iterpr., by Probus, a contemporary of Ibas, who was Bishop of Edessa, and translated the 
 commentaries of Theodorus of Mopsueste on certain books of the Bible. The same Probus 
 wrote also commentaries on the Atuil. Pri. and Soph. El. In 489 the school at PMessa was 
 broken up by command of the Emperor Zeno, on account of the Xestorianisra which pre- 
 vailed in it, and the persons implicated fled to Persia and spread there, under the favor of 
 the Sassanidse, their religious and philosophical doctrines. Out of the remams of the 
 school at Edessa arose the schools at Nisibis and Gandisapora. the latter being more par- 
 ticularly devoted to medicine {Acadeviia Hippocratica). King Chosroes of Persia took a 
 lively interest in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. Men educated in the school at 
 Gandisapora became afterward teachers of the Arabs in medicine and philosophy. liater, 
 but not with less zeal than the Xestorians, the Syrian Monophysites or Jacobites applied 
 themselves to the study of Aristotle. At Resaina and Kinnesrin in Syria existed schools 
 in which the Aristotelian philosophy was dominant. This study of Aristotle began in the 
 sixtli century with Sergius of Resaina, who translated Aristotle's works into the Syriac 
 language. In codices of the British Museum there exist by him (according to Renan, De 
 Pldlos. Perip. apud Syros, p. 25) : Log. iractatus, Liber de causis universi juxta mentem Aris- 
 totelis, quo demonstratur universvrn circulum efficere, and otlier works. Among the men 
 educated at Kinnesrin, Jacob of Edessa, who translated theological and philosophical works 
 from Greek into Syriac, deserves to be mentioned ; his translation of the Cakg. of Aristotle 
 is still extant in MS. 
 
 Concerning Johannes Grammaticus or Philoponus, see above, § 87, pp. 347, 349, and con- 
 cerning Johannes Damascenus, ib., pp. ,"?47, 352. In the second half of the ninth century the 
 Patriarch Photius distinguished himself by his comprehensive erudition ; his Bihliotheca (ed. 
 Bekker, Berlin, 1824) contains extracts from numerous philosophical works. His work 
 on the Aristotelian Categories exists in MS.
 
 404: GKEEK AND SYRIAN PHILOSOPHERS OF THE MIDDLE AGES. 
 
 Micliael Psellus (born A. D. 1020) wrote an Introduction to Pliilosoj)hy (printed Venice, 
 1532, and Paris, 1541), a book on the opinions of the philosopliers concerning the soul 
 (Paris, 1618, etc.), and also commentaries on the Quinque Voces of Porphyry and Aristotle's 
 Gat'igories (Venice, 1532; Paris, 1541) and Aristotle's De Interpretatione (Venice, 1503).* 
 
 A younger contemporary and rival of Psellus and his successor in the dignity of a 
 v-aror <pi2.oa6(j)uv was Johannes Italus, author of commentaries on the De Interpr. of Aris- 
 totle and on the first four books of the Topica, and the author also of other logical works, 
 which are preserved in MS. (see Prantl, Gesch. der Log., II. p. 294 seq.). A contemporary 
 of Johannes Italus was Michael Ephesius, who, like Eustratius, Metropolitan of Nicaja 
 ia the twelfth century, and others, wrote a commentary on parts of the Orgaiwii of 
 Aristotle. 
 
 In the first half and about the middle of the thirteenth century lived Nicephorus Blem- 
 mydes, author of an ''E.TriTofi?/ "koyiKfjQ (published by Thomas "Wegelin, Augsburg, 1605\, 
 (The Greek voces memoriales for the syllogistic modes, with the exception of the Theo. 
 phrastic modes, are found also in this 'ETrtro//^, although only written on the margin iu 
 the MSS., no mention being made of them in the text; they were, therefore, probably 
 added by later hands, in imitation of the Latin words Barbara, etc.). An individuixl 
 termed Georgius Aneponymus wrote likewise about the same time a compendium of tlvft 
 Aristotelian logic (printed at Augsburg in 1600). 
 
 From the beginning of the fourteenth century a compendium of logic by Georgius 
 
 * To him also is ascribed a compendium of Logic, bearing the title: Sui-ov^t? ei? ■nji' 'Apio-ToreAom 
 Aoyiici)!' €ni.(XTTiixr)v (edited by Elias Ehinger, Wittenberg, 159"), which reproduces in five sections the 
 substance of the Trept epfXTjrei'as of Aristotle, the Isagoge of Porphyry, and the Categ., Anal. Priora an-l 
 Topica o{ Ar-Ut. ; the Topica are given in the same form in which Boethins gives them; they are followe(t, 
 iu chapters 25 and 26 of the fifth book, by a section on cn)ij.a<jia (signijicatio) and on ii7ro0e<Tis {s^ippositio). 
 A complete summary of the contents of this Si/7ioj>.ii.s is given by Prantl, Gesch. der Log., II., pp. 265-293. 
 In this compendium are found the syllogistic mnemonic words, in which a denotes the universal affirni:^- 
 tive judgment, e the universal negative, i the particular affirmative, and o the particular negative judgment. 
 The voces memoriales given for the four chief modes of the first figure, are ypa/jLuara, iypaxj/e, ypa(j>iSi., 
 Tcxi'iKo?: for the five Theophrastic modes of the same figure (out of which modes Galenus formed the fourth 
 figure): Ypafi^atni/, era^e, xap'C', TrapSefo?, iepor; for the four modes of the second figure: e-ypai//e, Karex^, 
 ix^rpiov, axokov; for the six modes of the third figure: airaai. cfiffapos, icraKis, atrn-iSt, ofiaAo?, <j>ipi.<7T0i 
 (of. Prantl, Gesch. der Log., II., p. 2T5 seq.); the Latin logicians useil instead the familiar words: Barbara, 
 Celarent, Daril, Ferio, etc. The discussion of crij^ao-ia and inroeeo-i?, added to the last chapter of the 
 To2)ioo. forms a part of the doctrine which later Latin logicians were accustomed to present under the 
 title "Z><! Terminorum Propriefatibus," and to which they gave the name of Modern Logic {Tractattts 
 Modernorum), in distinction from the logic transmitted from ancient times ( Logica Antiqtia). Whether 
 Psellus was really the author of this Suroi^i?, is, however, very doubtful. In a manuscript of the wiirk 
 now at Munich (formerly at Augsburg), apparently of the fourteenth century, the following notice is added 
 by a later hand: toO crcxfuaTaTov i/^eAAoO eis Tiji' 'Apio-TOTeAovs Ao-ycKT)v cVio-T^jLtTji' (rvroi/ds, and hence Ehinger 
 edited the work as one of Michael Psellus. But in other manuscripts fhe work is called a translation of 
 the logical compendium of Petrns Ilisjianus (see below. § lOS), Georgins Scholarius (see below, Vol. II. §3) 
 being named as the translator. The name of the translator is probably incorrectly given, for the Munich 
 M3. is so old th.at it can scarcely have been translated from the Latin work, unless it were by an earlier trans- 
 lator (say, Maximus Planudcs, who lived about 13.^0). Prantl regards the Compendium of Petrus His- 
 panus as a translation of the Synopsis of Psellus, while Val. Rose and Ch.arles Thurot believe the Greek 
 work to be a translation of the Latin one. If we adopt the latter theorj-, which the comparison of texts 
 compels us to do. there still remains the question as to the origin of the new logical doctrines "-de terv\i- 
 norum proprietatilnis'" (which arose in general from the blending of logic and grammar), which question 
 needs, in regard to single points, to be answered more satisfactorily than it as yet has been. Cf. Prantl, 
 Geach. der Log., II. p. 288, and III. p. 18; also '-Michael Psellus nnd Petrus Mspanus, eine liechtferti- 
 g'mg, Leips. 1867," and, on the other hand, Val. Rose, in the " Hermes,"" II., 1S67, p. 146 seq., and Charles 
 Thurot. in the Rvrme orcheologique, n. a. X, Juillet a Decembre, 1364, pp. 267-231, and No». 13 and 27 of 
 the liewe Critique for 1867.
 
 ARABIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE MIDDLE AGES. 405 
 
 Pachymeres has been preserved ; it is entitled 'Eirirofir/ rf/g ' ApiaroreXovg 7.oytK^^ (printed 
 at Paris, 1548), and follows closely the Aristotelian Organon. In the fourteenth century 
 Theodorus Metochita wrote paraj»hrases of the physiological and psychological works of 
 Aristotle, and works on Plato and other philosophers (Fabric, Bihl Gr., Vol. IX.). In the 
 period next succeeding, the study of Plato and Aristotle was pursued with zeal by the 
 Graeks. 
 
 § 96. The whole philosophy of the Arabians was only a form of 
 Aristotelianism, tempered more or less with Neo-Platonic conceptious. 
 The medical and phj^sical science of the Greeks and Greek philosophy 
 became known to the Arabs especially under the rule of the Abassidae 
 (from A. I). 750 on), when medical, and afterward (from the time of 
 the reign of Almamum, in the first half of the ninth century) philo- 
 sophical works were translated from Greek into Syriac and Arabic by 
 Syriac Christians. The tradition of Greek philosophy was associated 
 witli that combination of Platonism and Aristotelianism which pre- 
 vailed among the last philosophers of antiquity, and with the study 
 by Christian theologians of the Aristotelian logic as a formal organon 
 of dogmatics ; but in view of the rigid monotheism of the Moham 
 medan religion it was necessary that the Aristotelian metaphysics, 
 and especially the Aristotelian theology, should be more fully adopted 
 among the Arabs than among the Neo-Platonists and Christians, and 
 that in consequence of the union among the former of philosophical 
 with medical studies the works of Aristotle on natural science should, 
 be studied by them with especial zeal. Of the Arabian philosophers' 
 in the East , the most important were Alkendi, who was still more 
 renowned as a mathematician and astrologer, Alfarabi, who adopted 
 the Neo- Platonic doctrine of emanation, Avicenna, the representative 
 of a purer Aristotelianism and a man whoror centuries, even among 
 the Christian scholars of the later median-al centuries, stood in the 
 highest consideration as a philosopher and, still more, as a teacher of 
 medicine, and finally Algazel, who maintained a philosophical skep- 
 ticism in the interest of theological orthodoxy. The most important 
 Arabian philosophers in the Wj^t were Avempace (Ibn Badja), Abu- 
 bacer (Ibn Tophail), and Av erroe s (Ibn Roschd). Avempace and 
 Abubacer dwell in their works on the idea of the independent and 
 gradual development of man. Abubacer (in his " Natural Man '') 
 develops this idea in a spirit of opposition to positive religion, 
 although he affirms that positive religion and philosophical doctrine 
 pursue the same end. namely, the union of the human intellect with 
 the divine. Averroes, the celebrated commentator of Aristotle, inter- 
 
 \
 
 406 AKABIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE MIDDLE AGES. 
 
 prets the doctrine of the latter respecting the active and the passive 
 intellect in a sense which is nearly pantheistic and which excludes the 
 idea of individual immortality. He admits the existence of only one 
 active intellect, and affirms that this belongs in common to the 
 whole human race, that it becomes temporarily particularized in in- 
 dividuals, but that each of its emanations becomes finally reab- 
 sorbed in the original whole, in which alone, therefore, they possess 
 immortality. 
 
 The philosophy of the Arabs, and especially the Arabian translations of Aristotle, are treated of by 
 Mohammed al Schahrastani (died a. d. 1153) in his History of religious and philosophical sects among the 
 Arabs, written in Arabic and edited by W. Cureton, London, 1S42-46 — German translation by Haarbriicker, 
 Halle, 1S50-51. On the same subject Abulfaragius (of the thirteenth century), Hist. Ih/nast. (Oxford, 1663), 
 and other Arabian scholars have written, and also the following authors : Huetius, De Claris interpreiibus, 
 Paris, 16S1, p. 123 seq. ; Eenaudot, De barbaincis Aristotelis tersioiiibus, apud Fabr., Bill. Or., t. III., p. 
 291 seq., ed. Harless, of. I., p. 861 seq. ; Brucker, Ifist. Crit. Philos., III., Leips. 1743, pp. 1-240 (Brucker follows 
 particularly Moses Maimonides and the historian Pococke, but also copies many fables from the untrust- 
 worthy Leo Africanus); F^eif^ke, De principibus 7nuhaninied(inis, qui out ab eruditimie aut ah amord 
 litterarmn et litteratoruin. claruerunt, Leips. 174T ; Casiri, Bibliotheca Arabico-hispana, Madrid, 1760 ; 
 Buhle, Commentatio de studii graecarum litterarum inter Arahes initiis et rationibus, in the Comin. 
 reg. soc. Gotting, t. XI., 1791, p. 216; Proleg. edit. Arist. quum curavit Buhle, t. I., Zweibriicken, 1791, 
 p. 315 seq. ; Camus, Notices et extraiis des manu/Kr. de la bibl. nat., t. VI. p. 392 ; de Sacy, Mem. sur 
 Vorigiiie de la littirature chesles Arahes, Paris, 1S05; Jos. von Hammer in the Leipz. Litteraturseitung, 
 1313, 1S14, 1S20, 1S26, and especially in Nos. 161-1 C3, which contain a short history of Arabian metaphysics; 
 A. Tholuck, De vi, quam Graeca j>hilosophia in theolofjiavi turn Moham^nedanorum, turn Judaeorttm 
 exercuerit, part. /., Hamb. 1S35; F. Wiistenfeld, Die Akademien der Araber wnd ihre Lehrer, Gottingen, 
 133T, Gesch. der arab. Aerzte, Gottingen, 1840; Aug. SchmOIders, Docum. philos. Arab., Bonn, 1S3G, and 
 Essai sxtr les ecoles philosophiques chez les Arabes, Paris, 1S42 (where particularly the Motekallemin or 
 philosophizing theologians and the philosopher Algazeli are treated of); Flugel, i)« arabicis scrijitor'U7n 
 graeo. interpretibus, Meissen, 1841 ; J. G. Wenrich, De auctomm graecorum verrsionibns et commeniariis 
 syriacis, ai'abicis, armeniaoia, persicisque, Leips. 1842 ; Bavaisson, Mhn. sur la philos. d'Ariitot^ chez les 
 Arabes, Paris, 1844 (in Compt. rend, de Vacad., t. V.) ; Bitter, Geach. der Philos., VII. pp. 6G3-7G0 and VIII. 
 pp. 1-178; Haureau, Ph. Sc, I. pp. 362-390; v. Hammer-Purgstall, Gesch. der arab. Litter atur,Yo\s. 
 I.-VIL, Vienna, 1850-56 ; E. Eenan, De Philos. j^erip. apud Syros, Paris, 1852, p. 51 seq. ; 8. Munk, Melanges 
 de philosophiejuive et arabe, rtnfermant des extraita metliodiquea de la source de vie de Salomon Jim 
 Gebirol, dit Avicehron, etc., des notices s^ir les principaux philosophes arabes et leurs doctrines, et une 
 esquisse historique de la philosophie chez les yuifs, Paris, 1S59; cf. his article on the Arabes, Kendi, 
 Farabi, Gazali, Jbn-Badja, Ibn Boschd, Ibn-Sina, in the Dictionnaire des sciences philos., Paris, 1844-52 ; 
 Fr. Dieterici. Der Streit Ztmschen Mensch und Thier (an Arabian poem of the tenth century). Die Natu- 
 ranschauung und Naturphil. der Araber im zehnten Jahrhundert aua den Schr-iften der lauteren 
 Brilder iiber.setzt, Berlin. 1S61, Die (mat/iematisclie) Propadeuiik der Araber, Berlin, 1865, and IHe Logik 
 und Psychohigie der Araber im 10. Jahrh. nach Chr., Leipsic, ISGS, and Ileinr. Stelner, Die Mutaziliten 
 Oder Freidenker im Islam als Vorldufer der islamischen Dogmatiker und Philosoplten, nebst kritischen 
 Anm. z^i GazzaWs Munkid, Leipsic, 1SG5. Cf. also E. H. Palmer, Oriental Mysticism, a treatise on the 
 Sufflstie and Unitarian Jlieosophy of the Persians, compiled fronx native sources, London, 1867 ; Leo- 
 pold Dukes, Philosophisches aus d£m 10. Jahrh. bei den Mohammedanern und Juden, Nakel, 1868; A. v. 
 Kramer, Geschichte der herrschenden Ideen des Islam, Leipsic, 1S6S. 
 
 Of Alkendi write Abulfaragius, in his Hist. Dynasty IX.; and, among the moderns, Lackemacher, 
 Ilelmst.. 1719; Brucker, Hist. crit. philos.. III., Leipsic, 1743, pp. 63-09; Casiri, Bibl. Arab., I. 353 seq. ; 
 Wastenfeld, Geach. der arab. Aerzte und Naturforscher, Gottingen, 1840, p. 21 seq. ; Schmolders, Essai 
 sur les ecoles i)hilos. chez les Arabes, p. 131 seq. ; Haureau, Ph. Sc., I., p. 363 seq. (who also makes some 
 citations in the passage referred to from the Tractatus de erroribus philosopharum (of the thirteenth 
 century, still e.xisting in MS.); G. Flugel. Al-Kindi, genannt ''der Philosaph der Araber," ein VorUld 
 seiner Zeit und seines Volkes, Leipsic, 1857 (in the Abh. filr die Kunde des Morgenlandes, published by 
 the German Oriental Society, Vol. I. No. 2), in which (pp. 20-35) the titles of the two hundred and sixty-
 
 ARABIAN PniLOSOPHY IN THE MIDDLE AGES. 407 
 
 five ■works of Alkendi are enumerated as given in the Fihrist; and Munk, in the I>ict. des Sc. Ph., «. v. 
 Kendi, and Melanges, pp. 339-341. 
 
 On Alfarabi, cf. among others Caslri, Bill. Arah.-IIisp., I. p. 190; Wustenfeld, Gesch. der arab, 
 Aerzte vnd Naturf., p. 53 seq. ; Schmiilders, Docum. philos. Arab., p. 15 seq. ; Munk, Diet, s. t. Farabi, 
 and 3/<"7an6r€^, pp. 341-352 ; two of his works were printed ia Latin, at Paris, in 1G38, viz. : De Scientii* 
 and De Intellectu et Intellecto (the latter published also with the works of Avicenna, Venice, 1495) ; in 
 addition to these Schmolders gives two others, Abu Nasr Alfarahii de rebvs siiidio Aristotelicae 
 philosophiae praemittendis commetttatio (pp. 17-25), and Abu Kaitr Alfarabii fcmtes quaestionum (pp. 
 43-56). A considerable, number of citations from Alfarabi us arc to be found in the works of Albertus 
 Magnus and others. Moritz Steinsehneider, Alfarabi, Petersburg and Leipsie, 1S69. 
 
 Several of the works of Avicenna were translated into Latin before the end of the twelfth century, the 
 Canones of tho Art of Medicine being translated by Gerhard of Cremona, while Dominicus Gundisalvi and 
 Avendeath the Jew translated his Commentaries on Aristotle's De Anima, De Coelo, De J/nndo, Aiiscvltat. 
 Phys. and Meiapfiys., and his Analysis of the Organmi (Jourdain, Pecherches Critiqne.i, p. 116 seq.) His 
 Metaph. was edited at Venice in 1493. His Logic (in part) and several other works, under the title, 
 Avicennae peripatetici philosophiae ■medicorum facile primi opera in lucem redacta, Venice, 1495; a 
 short treatise on logic by Avicenna was published In a French translation by P. Vattier, at Paris, in 1658 ; a 
 didactic poem, intended to convey elementary instruction and containing the main principles of logic, is 
 included by Schmolders in his Docum. Philos. Arab., pp. 26-42. A German translatii)n of Avicenna's poem, 
 entitled " To the iSo!<7," is given by v. Ilammer-Purgstall in the Vienna Zeit.schrift fur Kunat, etc., 1835. 
 His philosophy is discussed by Scharestani in his History of the relig. and phil. Sects, pp. 84S-429 of the 
 Arabian text, and 213-332 (Vol. II.) of Haarbriickcr's German translation; on his logic see Prantl, Gesch. 
 der Log. II. pp. 318-361, and I>. Hanebcrg, Ztir Erkenninizslehre von P>n Sina nnd Alberius Magnus, in 
 the Abh. der philos.-philol. cl. der k. layer. Akad. der M'iss.. XI. 1, Munich, 1866, pp. 189-267. 
 
 A translation of Algazel's ^' JJakacid alfilasifa"' was brought about near the middle of the twelfth 
 century, by Dominicus Gundisalvi; it was edited with the title, Logica et PJiilosophia Algazelis 
 Arabis,hy Peter Lichtcnstein of Cologne, Venice, 1506. The Covfes.no fid ei orthodotrorum Algaeeliana 
 is given in Pococke's Spec. Hist. Arab., p. 274 seq., cf. Brucker, Hint, cr-it. philos., V., pp. 348 seq., 856 seq. 
 The ethical treatise, entitled '• O Child,^'' has been published in Arabic and German by Jos. von Ilammer- 
 Purgstall, Vienna, 1838; in his Introduction, von Haiimer gives the particulars of the life of Algazel. 
 Another ethical work, called "• Tlie Scales of Actions,'''' translated into Hebrew by Rabbi Abraham ben 
 Hasdai of Barcelona, has been published by Goldenthal under the title, ConipendiuTn doctHnae ethicae, 
 Leipsie, 1839. Tholuck, in the above-cited work, De Vi, etc., cites several theological dicta from a Berlin 
 MS. of Algazel's Liber quadraginta pladtorum circa principia religionis. The work entitled " 77/6 
 Reanimation of the Peligiotis iSciewce*," is discussed by Hitzig in the Zeitschr. d. d. mcrgenl. Ges., VII.. 
 1852, pp. 172-186, and by Gosche (see below). Cf. Aug. Schmolders, Essai svr les ecoles philos. chez let 
 Arabes et notamment svr la doctririe (PAlgazali, Paris, 1842; Munk, Dictionn. des sc. phil., s. v. Gazali, 
 and Melanges, pp. 366-383, and II. Gosche, I'eber GhaeeulVs Leben itnd M'erke. in Abh. der Perliner 
 Akad. d. '^'iss., ISbS, phil.-fiist. Cl., pp. 239-811 ; with reference to his logic see Prantl, II. pp. 861-373. 
 
 On Avempace, see Munk, Melanges de pliilos. jvive et arabe, pp. 383-410. 
 
 Abulacer's work: ^' J/aji Lbn Jakdhan,^'' was early tran.«late(l into Hebrew, and was published in 
 Arabic with a Latin translation by Ed. Pococke, under the title, Philosophus auiodidactvs tire epistola, 
 in qua ostenditur quomodo est ivferiorvm contemplation e ad fnipei-iMitni iiotitiam mens ascendert 
 possit, Oxford, 1671 and 1700; it was translated from this Latin version into English by Ashwell and 
 George Keith, a Quaker, from the Arabic original by Simon Ockley, into Dutch by other translators, and 
 into German by Joh. Georg Pritius (Frankfort, 1726), and by J. G. Eichhorn (Der ITaturmensch, Berlin, 
 1783). Cf. on Abnbaccr, Ititter, Gesch. der Ph., VIII. pp. 104-115, and Miiiik, Melanges, pp. 410-418. 
 
 The works of AverroOs were first jirinted in Latin in 1472, and afterwards very frequently, generally 
 with the works of Aristotle. Of those who have written upon Averroes we name Lebrecht, in the 
 MagaHnfilr die Litteratur des Auslandet, 1 842, No. 79 seq. ; E. Eenan, Averroes et VAverroism e, Paris, 1852, 
 2d ed., 18C5, and Munk, Diet., III. p. 157 seq., and Melanges, pp. 418-458. On his logic, see Prantl, Gesch. der 
 Logik, II. pp. 374-885, and M. Jos. ^IfiUcr, Philos. und 77ieol. des Averro'es,\n tho Moimmenta Saecularia, 
 published by the Koyal Academy of Sciences of Bavaria, on the occasion of its 100th anniversary, March 28, 
 1859, Munich, 1859. A medical work by Averroes, on therapeutics, was published in Latin under the title 
 " CoUiget'^ (Collijjat, Generalities), in the tenth volume of the works of Aristotle, together with the Com- 
 mentary of Averroes, Venice, 1552, etc. An astronomical work, containing a summary of the Ptolemaic Al- 
 magest, in which AverroGs follows strictly tho Ptolemaic system, is still existing in MS., and also in a Hebrew 
 translation, in the Imperial Library at Paris ; in other works he said, with lbn Badja and lbn Tophaii, that 
 the Ptolemaic computations were correct, but that the actual state of things did not correspond with the 
 system of Ptolemy ; the theory of epicycles and excentricities was improbable, and he wished, since he was
 
 408 ARABIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE MIDDLE AGES. 
 
 then too old for such inquiries, that his words might incite others to further investigations (Averr. in Arist., 
 Metaph., XII. 8). And in fact, his somewhat younger contemporary, Abu Ishak al Bitrodji (Alpelragius, 
 about 1200), the astronomer, and pupil of Ibn To[>hail, in order to avoid the hypothesis of epicycles, excen- 
 tricities, and the two contrary motions of the spheres, originated another theory, of which the fundamental 
 idea was, that the slower motion from east to west was to be explained not by a supposed motion in the con- 
 trary direction, but from the diminished influence of the outermost moving sphere — an influence decreasing 
 as the distance from it increased. The work of Alpetragius was translated by Michael Scotus into Latin in 
 1217 ; another Latin translation, made from another in Hebrew, appeared at Venice, in 1531. Cf. Munk, JJel., 
 pp. 513-52'J. But AverroiJs has become far more renowned in philosophy than in medicine and astronomy, 
 especially through his commentaries on the works of Aristotle. For several of these works he did a three- 
 fokl service, by preparing, 1) short paraphrases, in which he reproduced the doctrines of Aristotle in strictly 
 systematic order, omitting Aristotle's examinations of the opinions of other philosophers, but occasionally 
 adding his own views and the theories of other Arabian philosophers, 2) commentaries of moderate extent, 
 which he himself designates as i-esumes, and which are commonly termed the intermediate commentaries, 
 3) complete commentaries (of later date). The works of each kind relating to the Analytiea Posteriora, 
 the PhyaicSy the De Ooelo^ De Aninia, and 3fetaphysics, are still extant. (The Arabic original of the inter- 
 mediate commentary on the De Anima exists, written in Hebrew characters, in the Library at Paris.) Of 
 the works on the Jsagoge of Porphyry, the Caieff., De Inter pr.^ Anal. Prior a. Top., De Soph. EL, Rhetor., 
 Poet., De Gen. et Corr., and Meteorolog., only the shorter commentaries and the paraphrases are in exist- 
 ence. For the Nicom. Ethics Averroes wrote only a shorter commentary. Only paraphrases of the Parva 
 Naturalia and of the four books De Partibiis Aninialium, and of tbe five books De Generatione Aiiima- 
 lium, are extant. There exists no commentary by Ibn Roschd on the ten Libri Hist. Aninialium, nor on 
 the Politics, of which, at least in Spain, no copies were at hand. The Greek originals of the Aristotelian 
 writings were unknown to Ibn Koschd; he understood neither Greek nor Syriac; where the Arabic trans- 
 lations were unclear or incorrect, he could only attempt to infer the correct meaning from the connection 
 of the Aristotelian doctrine. Besides bis Commentaries, Ibn Koschd composed several philosophical 
 treatises, of which the more important were, 1) Tehafot al Tehafot, i. e., deUructio destruction is, a refuta- 
 tion of Algazel's refutation of the philosophers; a Hebrew translation of this work is extant in MS., from 
 which again a (very bungling) Latin translation was made, published at Venice in 149T and 1527, and in 
 the Supplement to several old Latin editions of the works of Aristotle, together with the Commentaries 
 of Averroes. 2) Investigaticins concerning diverse passages of the Organon, in Latin, with the title : 
 Quaesita in lihros logicae Aristotelis, printed in the same Latin editions of Aristotle ; Prantl {Gesch. der 
 Log., IL, p. 374) regards these Quaesita, .is also an '■^ Eititmne" of the Organon, as spurious. 3) Physical 
 treatises (on problems in the Pkysicf of Aristotle), published in Latin in the editions mentioned. 4) Two 
 treatises on the union of the pure (immaterial) intellect with man, or of the active intellect with the 
 passive, in Latin, ibid., with the titles: Epistola de eonnexione intellectus abstraeti cum homine and De 
 animae heatitudine. 5) On the potentia or material intellect, extant only in a Hebrew translation. 
 6) Refutation of Ibn Sina's division of beings into beings absolutely accidental (sublunary), beings accidental 
 as such but rendered necessary through an agency external to themselves (God), and the absolutely necessary 
 being — in reply to wliich Averroes remarks, that the necessary product of a necessary cause can never be 
 called accidental ; the work exists in Hebrew among the MSS. of the Imperial Library at Paris. 7) On 
 the agreement of religion with philosophy, in Hebrew, ibid. S) On the true sense of religious dogmas or 
 ways of demonstrating religious dogmas, iu Hebrew, ibid., in Arabic, in the Escurial. Some other treatises 
 ore lost. 
 
 Sprenger, in his work on the hfe and doctrine of ''Mohammad" (I., Berlin, 1867, p. 17), 
 designates as the cause of the rise of Mohammedauism among the Arabs, the felt need of a 
 religion at once monotheistic and antitrinitarian ; but a need, adds Sprenger, is always and 
 necessarily followed by an attempt to satisfy it, which attempt is repeated until the end is 
 attained. In contradistinction from ecclesiastical Christianity, Mohammedanism can be re- 
 garded as the result of the late but all the more energetic reaction of Subordinationism, 
 which, since the Council of Nicaja, had been suppressed by violence rather than spiritually 
 overcome, and from the stand-point of which the Trinitarian faith necessarily appeared as 
 a concealed tritheism. An edict such as that of the Emperor Theodosius of the year 380, 
 which threatened all who were not Catholics, and who were denominated as "inordinate 
 madmen," with temporal and eternal punishments, might indeed fortify Catholicism exter- 
 nally, but could not strengthen it internally; on the contrary, it could only foster a 
 languid and prescriptive faith, which continued only in controversies concerning dogmatic
 
 ARABIAN PHILOSOPUY IN THE MIDDLE AGES. 409 
 
 subtilties to manifest a certain vitality, but was unable to resist a violent shock from 
 without. 
 
 Ebionitic Christians had still continued, even after the triumph of Catholicism, to main- 
 tain their existence, particularly in the Nabathsean wilderness. They were divided into 
 several sects, of which some retained rather the features of Judaism, while others pos- 
 sessed those of Orthodox Christianity. In the time of Mohammed there existed two of 
 these sects in Arabia, the Ilakusii and the Hanifs (Sprenger, I. 43 seq.). To the first 
 belonged (according to Sprenger's conjecture) Koss, who preached at Mecca the unity of 
 God and tlie resurrection of tlie dead, and for this purpose also visited the fair at Okatz, 
 where Mohammed heard him. The Hanifs were (according to Sprenger, ib.) Essenes, who 
 had lost nearly all knowledge of the Bible and had submitted to various foreign influences. 
 but professed a rigid monotheism. Their religious book was called '^ Roll of Abraham^ 
 In the time of Mohammed several members of this sect were living in Mecca and Medina, 
 and Mohammed himself, who originally had worshiped the gods of his people, became a 
 Hanif The doctrine of the Hanifs was Islam, i. e., submission to the one God ; they were 
 themselves Moslim, t. e., men characterized by such submission. Very considerable was 
 the direct influence e.terted by Judaism on Mohammed (cf. Abraham Geiger, T-Fcw hat Mo- 
 hammed aus dem Judenthum au/gawmmen? Bonn, 1833). The name Mohammed seems to 
 have been an official designation assumed by the founder of the new religion ; according to 
 an old tradition he was originally called Kotham, and afterward also Abul Kasim (father of 
 Kasim) after his eldest son ; he, however, said of himself that he was the Mohammad, i. e., 
 the extolled, the Messiah announced by the Thorah, but that in the Gospel his name was 
 Alimad, i. e., the Paraclete (see Sprenger, I. p. 155 seq.); Abraham had called him and the 
 Son of Mary had foretold his coming {ib., p. 166). 
 
 In Mohammed himself and in his followers, the abstract idea of the one infinitely 
 exalted being, to whom alone worship was due, led to the enthusiasm of a quickly-blazing 
 fanaticism. This fanaticism pitilessly annihilated all resistance, but its subjects were 
 unable to appreciate in their full significance and to cultivate the rnau}' influences and 
 forces of actual human life ; they failed to recognize the immanence of the divine in the 
 finite ; tliev lacked the power to bring the sensual nature of man under that discipline 
 which would make it ancillary to morality, and were obliged therefore either to govern it 
 despotically or to leave it under the unchecked influence of passion, while no alternative 
 was left to the rational spirit but the mechanical subjection of an unreflecting and fatalistic 
 faith, to the will of Allah and to tlie revelation of himself as made through the Prophet. 
 By a doctrine which was the direct opposite of the Christian doctrine of peace, and which 
 called on men to fight for the glory of God, and by a course of action which received from 
 this doctrine its religious sanction, extremely important results were attained in the begin- 
 ning; but soon the period of stability commenced and the period of relaxation and degen- 
 eracy quickly followed. 
 
 It is reported that, in the year 640, what remained (said to be 50,120 volumes) of the 
 Alexandrian Library, after its destruction in 392 by Christians under Bishop Theophilus, 
 was burned by Amru, the General of the Caliph Omar, as a means of raising the Koran to a 
 position of exclusive authority (Abulfarag., Ilist. Dyn., p. 116). Be this a mere legend or an 
 historical fact, it cannot be denied that the Mohammedan doctrine of Islam was completely 
 antagonistic to the Old-HcUenic conception of life, as represented in the principal works 
 of that collection. It was of necessity more hostile than Christianity to Greek paganism. 
 Among the Grecian philosophies, the doctrine of Aristotle, although (especially in his 
 ethics, which rested on the Hellenic principle of freedom and order) differing essentially 
 in spirit from the doctrines of Mohammedanism, contained many points of agreement with
 
 M 
 
 410 ARABIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE MIDDLE AGES. 
 
 these doctrines. His doctrine of the personal unity of God made his metaphysics more 
 acceptable to the Mohammedans than to the Fathers of the Christian Church. His physics 
 was a source of information in a Held of inquiry scarcely touched on in the Koran, and 
 could not but be welcome as furnishing a scientific basis for the healing art. His logic 
 could be of service as an instrument (organon) of method in every science, and especially 
 in every theology which aspired to a scientific form. Thus Aristotehanism gradually 
 found entrance among the Mohammedans, notwithstanding that the Koran forbade all free 
 investigation concerning religious doctrines, and consoled those who doubted only with the 
 hope of a solution of their doubts at the judgment-day. Still, foreign philosophy remained 
 always confined to a narrow circle of inquirers. The rationalistic Mufazilin, the orthodox 
 Ascharites, etc., were theological dogmatists {Motekallemin, Hebrew Medabherim, i. e., Teachers 
 of the Word, in distinction from the teachers of the Mkh, i. e., the traditional law. 
 
 The acquaintance of the Mohammedan Arabs with the writmgs of Aristotle was brought 
 about through the agency of Syrian Christians. Before the time of Mohammed many 
 Nestorian Syrians lived among the Arabs as physicians. Mohammed also had intercourse 
 with Nestorian monks. Hareth Ibn Calda, the friend and physician of the prophet, was a 
 Nestorian. It was not, however, until after the extension of the Mohammedan rule over 
 Syria and Persia, and cliiefly after the Abassidas had commenced to reign (a. d. 750), that 
 foreign learning, especially in medicine and philosophy, became generally known among 
 the Arabs. Philosophy had already been cultivated in those countries during the last days 
 of Neo-Platonism, by David the Armenian (about 500 A. d., see above, p. 259; his Prolog. 
 to Philos. and to the Isagoge and his commentary on the Categ., in Brandis' collection of 
 Scholia to Arist. : his "Works, Venice, 1823; on him, cf. C. P. Neumann, Paris, 1829) and 
 afterward by the Syrians especially. Christian Syrians translated Greek authors, particu- 
 larly medical, but afterward philosophical authors also, first into Syriac and then from 
 Syriac into Arabic (or they perhaps made use also of earlier Syriac translations, some of 
 which are to-day extant). During the reign and at the instance of Almamun (a. d. 
 813-833) the first translations of works of Aristotle into Arabic were made, under the 
 direction of Johannes Ibn-al-Batrik {i. e., the Son of the Patriarch, who, according to Renan 
 [I I., p. 57], is to be distinguished from Johannes Mesne, the physician); these transla- 
 tions, in part still extant, were regarded (according to Abulfaragius, Histor. Dynast, p. 153 
 et al.) as faithful but inelegant. A man more worthy of mention is Honein Ibn Ishak (Jo- 
 hannitius), a Nestorian, who flourished under Motewakkel and died in 876. Acquainted 
 with the Syriac, Arabic, and Greek languages, he was at the head of a school of inter- 
 preters at Bagdad, to which his son Ishak ben Honein and his nephew Hobeisch-el-Asam 
 also belonged. The works not only of Aristotle himself, but also of several ancient Aris- 
 totelians (Alexander Aphrodisiensis, Themistius, and also Neo-Platonic exegetes, such as 
 Porphyry and Ammonius), and of Galenus and others, were translated into (Syriac and) 
 Arabic. Of these translations, also, some of those in Arabic are still existing, but the 
 Syriac translations are all lost. (Honein's Arabic translation of the Categories has been 
 edited by Jul. Theod. Zenker, Leips. 1846.) In the tenth century new translations, not 
 only of the works of Aristotle, but also of those of Theophrastus, Alexander of Aphro- 
 disias, Themistius, Syrianus, Ammonius, etc., were produced by Syrian Christians, of whom 
 the most important were the Nestorians Abu Baschar Mata and lahja ben Adi, the Tag- 
 ritan, as also Isa ben Zaraa. The Syriac translations (or revisions of earlier translations) 
 by these men have been lost, but the Arabic translations were widely circulated and have 
 in large measure been preserved; they were used by Alfarabi, Avicenna, Averroes, and the 
 other Arabian philosophers. The Republic, Timaeus, and Laws of Plato were also trans- 
 lated into Arabic. Averroes (in Spain, about 1150) possessed and paraphrased the Rep.,
 
 AEABIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE MIDDLE AGES. 411 
 
 but he did not possess the Politics of Aristotle ; the book existing in MS. at Paris, entitled 
 Siaset, i. e., Folitica, is the spurious work De Regimine Friacipum s. Secretum Secretorum ; 
 the Politics of Aristotle is not known to exist in Arabic. Further, extracts from the 
 Neo-Platonists, especially from Proclus, were translated into Arabic. The Syrians were 
 led, especially in consequence of their contact with the Arabs, to extend their studies 
 beyond the Organon ; tliey began to cultivate in the Arabic language all the branches of 
 philosophy on the basis of Aristotle's works, and in this they were afterward followed by 
 the Arabs themselves, who soon surpassed their Syrian teachers. Alfarabi and Avicenna 
 were the scholars of Syrian and Christian physicians. The later Syrian philosophy bears 
 the type of the Arabian philosophy. The most important representative of the former was 
 Gregorius Barhebrajus or Abulfaragius, the Jacobite, who lived in the thirteenth century 
 and was descended from Jewish parents, and whose compendium of the Peripatetic phi- 
 losophy [Butyrum Sapientiae) is still of great authority among the Syrians. 
 
 Alkendi (Abu Jusuf Jacub Ibn Eshak Al Kendi, i. e., the father of Joseph, Jacob, son 
 of Isaac, the Kendaaan, of the district of Kendah) was born at Basra on the Persian Gulf, 
 where later, in the tenth century, the '"Brothers of Purity," or the "Sincere Brethren," 
 who collected in an Encyclopedia the learning then accessible to the Arabians, were 
 located. lie lived during and after the first half of the ninth century, dying about 870. 
 He was renowned as a mathematician, astrologer, physician, and philosopher. He com- 
 posed commentaries on the logical writings of Aristotle and wrote also on metaphysical 
 problems. In theology he was a rationalist. His astrology was founded on the hypothesis 
 that all things are so bound together by harmonious causal relations that each, when com- 
 pletely conceived, must represent as in a mirror the whole universe. 
 
 Alfarabi (Abn Xasr Mohammed ben Mohammed ben Tarkhan of Farab), born near the 
 end of the ninth century, received his philosophical training mainly at Bagdad, where he 
 also began to teach. Attached to the mystical sect of the Silfi, which Said Abul Chair 
 had founded about a. d. 820 (under the unmistakable influence of Buddhism, although 
 Tholuck [" Ssvjismus," Berlin, 1821, and ^- Bliitheiisammlung aus der rnorgenldnd. Mysiik, 
 Berlin, 1825] assigns to it a purely Mohammedan origin), Alfarabi went at a later epoch 
 to Aleppo and Damascus, where he died A. D. 950. In logic Alfarabi follows Aristotle 
 almost without exception. Whether logic is to be regarded as a part of philosophy or not, 
 depends, according to Alfarabi, on the greater or less extension given to the conception of 
 philosophy, and is therefore a useless question. Argumentation is the instrument by 
 which to develop the unknown from the known ; it is employed by the uteris logicu.s ; hgica 
 docens is the theory which relates to this instrument, argumentation, or which treats of it 
 as its subject {suhjectum). Yet logic also treats of single concepts (incomplexa) as elements 
 of judgments and argumentations (according to Alfarabi, as reported by Albertus M., De 
 Praedicabil., I. 2 seq.. cf Prantl, Gesch. der Log., II., p. 302 seq.). Alfarabi defines the 
 universal (see Alb. M., De Praed., II. 5) as the unuin de multis et in multis, which definition 
 is followed immediately by the inference that the universal has no existence apart from the 
 individual (wot? habet esse separatum a multis). It is worthy of notice that Alfarabi does not 
 admit in its absolute sense the aphorism : singulare sentitur, universale intelligitur, but 
 teaches that the singular, although in its material aspect an object of sensible perception, 
 exists in its formal aspect in the intellect, arjd, on the other hand, that the universal, 
 although as such belooging to the intellect, exists also in sensri, in so far as it exists 
 blended with the individual (Alb., An. post, I. 1. 3). Among the contents of the Meta- 
 physics of Alfarabi, mention should be made of his proof of the existence of God, which 
 was employed by Albertus Magnus and later philosophers. This proof is founded on 
 Plat., Tim., p. 28 : "v ytvo^evu (pafiev vtt' ahiov Tivog avajKr/v elvai yevecdac, and Arist.,
 
 412 ARABIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE MIDDLE AGES. 
 
 Metaph., XII. 1 : ean roivvv tl kol b mve't, etc., or on the principle that all change and all 
 development must have a cause. Alfarabi distinguishes {Fontts Quaestionum, ch. 3 seq., in 
 Schmolders Doc. Phil. Ar., p. 44) between that which has a possible and that which has a 
 necessary existence (just as Plato and Aristotle distinguish between the changeable and 
 the eternal). If the possible is to exist in reality, a cause is necessary thereto. The world 
 is composite, hence it had a beginning or was caused (ch. 2). But the series of causes and 
 effects can neither recede m infinitum, nor return like a circle into itself; it must, there- 
 fore, depend upon some necessary link, and this link is the first being (ens primum). This 
 first being exists necessarily ; the supposition of its non-existence involves a contradiction. 
 It is uncaused, and needs in order to its existence no cause external to itself. It is the 
 cause of all that exists. Its eternity implies its perfection. It is free from all accidents. 
 It is simple and unchangeable. As the absolutely Good it is at once absolute thought, 
 absolute object of thought and absolute thinlving being {iatelligeatia, intelligibile, intelligens). 
 It has wisdom, life, insight, might and will, beauty, excellence, brightness ; it enjoys the 
 liighest happiness, is the first willing being and the first object of will (desire). In the 
 knowledge of this being Alfarabi {De rebus studio Arist. phil. praemiit. comm., ch. 4, ap. 
 Schmolders, Doc. ph. Arab., p. 22) sees the end of i3hilosophy, and he defines the practical 
 duty of man as consisting in rising, so far as human force permits it, into likeness with 
 God. In his teachings respecting that which is caused by or derived from God {Pontes 
 Quaest, ch. 6 seq.) Alfarabi follows the Neo-Platonists. His fundamental conception is 
 expressed by the word emanation. The first created thing was the Intellect, which came 
 forth from the first being (the 'Nave of Plotinus ; this doctrine was logically consistent 
 only for Plotinus, not for Alfarabi, since the former represented his One as superior to all 
 predicates, while Alfarabi, in agreement with Aristotle and with religious dogmatics, 
 recognized in his first being intelligence). From this intellect flowed forth, as a new 
 emanation, the Cosmical Soul, in the complication and combination of whose ideas the basis 
 of corporeality is to be found. Emanation proceeds from the higher or outer spheres to 
 the lower or inner ones. In bodies matter and form are necessarily combined with each 
 other. Terrestrial bodies are composed of the four elements. The lower psychical powers, 
 up to the potential intellect, are dependent on matter. The potential intellect, through the 
 operation (in-beaming) of the active divine intellect, is made actual (intellectus in actu or in 
 effectu), and this actual intellect, as resulting from development, may be called acquired 
 intellect (intellectus acquisitus, after the doctrine of Alexander of Aphrodisias, concerning 
 the vovg iTriKTr/TOQ, see above, p. 185). The actual human intellect is free from matter, 
 and is a simple substance, which alone survives the death of the body and remains inde- 
 structible. Evil is a necessary condition of good in a finite world. All things are under 
 divine guidance and are good, since all was created by God. Between the human under- 
 standing and the things which it seeks to know there exists (as Alfarabi teaches, De 
 Jntellecto et Lddlectu, p. 48 seq.) a similarity of form, which arises from their having both 
 been formed by the same first being, and which makes knowledge possible. 
 
 Avicenna (Abu Ali Al Hosain Ibn Abdallah Ibn Sina) was born at Afsenna, in the 
 Province of Bokhara, in the year 980. Ilis mind was early developed by the study of 
 theology, philosophy, and medicine, and in his youth he had already written a scientific 
 encyclopedia. He taught medicine and philosophy in Ispahan. He died at Hamadan in 
 the fifty-eighth year of his life. His medical Canon was employed for centuries as the 
 basis of instruction. In philosophy he set out from the doctrines of Alfarabi. but modi- 
 fied them by omitting many Neo-Platonic theorems and approximating more nearly 
 < to the real doctrine of Aristotle. The principle on which his logic was founded, and 
 which Averroes adopted and Albertus Magnus often cites, was destined to exert a great
 
 ARABIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE MIDDLE AGES. 413 
 
 Influence. It was worded thus : intdkctus in formis agit univtrsalitatem (Alb., De Praedicab^ ' 
 II. 3 and 6). The genus, as also the species, the differentia, the accidens, and the pro- 
 prium, are in themselves neither universal nor singular. But the thinking mind, by com- 
 paring the similar forms, forms the genus logicum, which answers to the definition of the 
 genus, viz. : that it is predicated of many objects specifically different, and answers the 
 question, " Wliat is it ? " (tells the quiditas). It is the genus naturale which furnishes 
 the basis of comparison. When the mind adds to the generic and specific the individual 
 accidents, the singular is formed (Avic, Log., Venice edition, 1508, f. 12, ap. Prantl, Ge- 
 schichte der Logilc, 11. 347 seq.). Only figuratively, according to Avicenna, can the 
 genus be called matter and the specific difference, form ; such phraseology (frequent in 
 Aristotle) is not strictly correct. Avicenna distinguishes several modes of generic exist- 
 ence, viz. : a7it€ res, in rebus, and post res. Genera are ante res in the mind of God ; for 
 all that exists is related to God as a work of art is related to the artist; it existed in 
 his wisdom and will before its entrance into the natural world of manifold existence ; in 
 this sense and only in this sense is the universal before the individual. Realized with its ' 
 accidents in matter the. genus constitutes the natural thing, res naturalis, in which the uni- 
 versal essence is immanent. The third mode of the existence of the genus is that which 
 it has in being conceived by the human intellect ; when the latter abstracts the form and 
 then compares it again with the individual objects to which by one and the same definition 
 it belongs, in this comparison (respedus) is contained the universal (Avec, Log.,{. 12, 
 Metaph., V. 1, 2, f 8T, in Prantl, II. p. 349). Our thought, which is directed to things, 
 contains nevertheless dispositions which are peculiar to itself; when things are thought, 
 there is added in thought something which does not exist outside of thought. Thus uni- 
 versality as such, the generic concept and the specific difference, the subject and predicate 
 and other similar elements, belong only to thought. Now it is possible to direct the atten- 
 tion, not merely to things, but also to the dispositions which are peculiar to thought, and 
 this takes places in logic {Metapih., I. 2 ; III. 10, in Prantl, II. p. 320 seq.). On this is based 
 the distinction of "first" and "second intentions.'' The direction of attention to things is 
 the first intention {intentio 2>rima) ; the second intention {intentio secunda) is directed to the 
 dispositions which are peculiar to our thinking concerning things. Since the universal as 
 such belongs not to things, but to thought, it belongs to the second intention. The prin- 
 ciple of individual plurality, according to Avicenna, is matter, which he regards, not with 
 Alfarabi as an emanation from the Cosmical Soul, but with Aristotle as eternal and un- 
 created ; all potentiality is groimded in it, as actuality is in God. Nothing changeable can 
 come forth directly from the unchangeable first cause. His first and only direct product 
 is the intelligentia prima (the vov^ of Plotinus, as with Alfarabi); from it the chain of ema- 
 nations extends through the various celestial spheres down to our earth. But the issuing 
 of the lower from the higher is to be conceived, not as a single, temporal act, but as an . 
 eternal act, in which cause and effect are synchronous. The cause which gave to things ; 
 their existence must continually maintain them in existence; it is an error to imagine that 
 things once brought into existence continue therein of themselves. Notwithstanding its 
 dependence on God. the world has existed from eternity. Time and motion always were 
 (Avic, Metaph., YI. 2 et al. ; cf. the account in the Tractatus de Erroribus, ap. Haureau, Ph. 
 Sc, I. p. 3G8). Avicenna di.stinguishes a twofold development of our potential under- 
 standing into actuality, the one common, depending on instruction, the other rare, and 
 dependent on immediate divine illumination. According to a report transmitted to us by 
 Averroes, Avicenna, in his Pliilosophia OrientaUs, which hts not come down to us, contra- 
 dicted his Aristotelian principles, and conceived God as a heavenly body. 
 
 Algazel (Abu Hamed Mohammed Ibn Achmed Al-Ghazzali), born a. d. 1059 at Ghaz-
 
 414 ARABIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE MIDDLE AGES. 
 
 zalah in Khorasan, taught first at Bagdad, and afterward, having become a Sfifi. resided 
 in Syria. Ho died A. ix 1111 at Tiis. He was a skeptic in philosophy, but only that 
 Ids faitli might be all the stronger in the doctrines of theology. His course in this 
 respect marked a reaction of the exclusively religious principle of Mohammedanism against 
 philosophical speculation — which in spite of all accommodation had not made it.self fully 
 orthodox — and particularly against Aristotelianism ; between the Mysticism of the Neo- 
 Platonists, on the contrary, and the Silfisra of Algazel there existed an essential affinity. 
 In his " Makacid al filasifa" (The Aims of the Philosophers) Algazel sets forth the doc- 
 trines of philosophy, following essentially Alfarabi and particularly Avicenna. These 
 doctrines are then subjected by him to a hostile criticism in his " Tchafot al filasifa " 
 (Against the Philosophers), while in his " Fundamental Principles of Faith " he presents 
 positively his own views. Averroes wrote by way of rejoinder his Destrudio Dcstructionis 
 Fhilosojiliorum. Algazel exerted himself especially to excite a fear of the chastisements of 
 God, since in his opinion the men of his times were living in too great assurance. Against 
 the philosophers he defended particularly the religious dogmas of the creation of the world 
 in time and out of nothing, the reahty of the divine attributes and the resurrection of the 
 body, as also the power of God to work miracles, in opposition to the supposed law of 
 cause and effect. In the Middle Ages his exposition of logic, metaphysics, and physics, as 
 given in the JIakacid, was much read. 
 
 The result of the skepticism of Algazel was in the East the triumph of an unphilo- 
 sophical orthodoxy ; after him there arose in that quarter no philosophers worthy of men- 
 tion. On the other hand, the Arabian philosophy began to flourish in Spain, where a 
 succession of thinkers cultivated its various branches. 
 
 Avempace (Abu Bckr Mohammed ben Jahja Ibn Badja), born at Saragossa near the end 
 of the eleventh century, was celebrated as a physician, mathematician, astronomer, and 
 philosopher. About 1118 he wrote, at Seville, a number of logical treatises. At a later 
 period he lived in Granada, and afterward also in Africa. He died at a not very advanced 
 age in 1138, without having completed any extensive works; yet he wrote several smaller 
 (mostly lost) treatises, among which, according to Munk {Melanges, p. 386), were Logical 
 Tractates (still existing, according to Casiri, Bihliuth. Arahico-Hisp. Escurialensis, I. p. 179, in 
 the library of the Escurial), a work on the soul, another on the conduct of the solitary 
 (regime du solitaire), also on the union of the universal intellect with man, and a fiirewell 
 letter ; to these may be added commentaries on the Physics, Meteorology, and other works 
 of Aristotle relating to physical science. Munk gives the substance of the ^'■Conduct of 
 the Solitary,"' as reported by a Jewish philosopher of the fourteenth century, Moses of 
 Narbonne (Mel., pp. 389-409). This work treats of the degrees by which the soul rises 
 from that instinctive life which it shares with the lower animals, through gradual emanci- 
 pation from materiality and potentiality to the acquired intellect {intellecius acquisiius), 
 which is an emanation from the active intellect or Deity. Avempace seems (according to 
 Averroes, De Anima, fol. 1 68 A) to have identified the intellectus materialis with the imagi- 
 native faculty. In the highest grade of knowledge (in self-consciousness) thought is 
 identical with its oVjject. 
 
 AbiiLwPcr (Abu Bekr Mohammed ben Abd al Malic Ibn Tophail al Keisi) was born in 
 about the year 1100, at "Wadi-Asch (Guadix), in Andalusia, and died in 1185, in Morocco. 
 He was celebrated as a physician, mathematician, philosopher, and poet, and pursued still 
 further the path of speculation opened up by Ibn Badja. His chief work, that has come 
 down to us, is entitled Haji Ibn Jakdhan, i. e., the Living One, the Son of the "Waking One. 
 The fundamental idea is the same as in Ibn Badja's ^'Conduct of the Solitary ;" it is an 
 exposition of the gradual development of the capacities of man to the point where his
 
 ARABIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE MIDDLE AGES. 41 
 
 intellect becomes one with the divine. But Ibn Tophail goes considerably farther than his 
 predecessor in maintaining the independence of man in opposition to the institutions and 
 opinions of liuraan society. In his theory he represents the individual as developing him- 
 self without external aid. That independence of thought and will, which man now owes 
 to the whole course of the previous history of the human race, is regarded by him as 
 existing in the natural man, out of whom he makes an extra-historical ideal (like Rousseau 
 in the eighteenth century). Ibn Tophail regards T^ositive religion, with its law founded on 
 reward and punishment, as only a necessary means of discipline for the multitude ; 
 religious conceptions are in his view only types or envelopes of that truth to the logical 
 comprehension of which the philosopher gradually approaches. 
 
 Averroes (Abul Walid Mohammed Ibn Achmed Ibn Roschd), born A. D. 1126, at Cor- 
 dova, where his grandfather aud father filled high judicial offices, studied first positive 
 theology and jurisprudence, and then medicine, mathematics, and philosophy. He ob- 
 tained subsequently the office of judge at Seville, and afterward at Cordova. He was a 
 junior contemporary and friend of Ibn Tophail, who presented him to Calif Abu Jacub 
 Jusuf soon after the latter's ascent of the throne (1163), and recommended liim in place of 
 himself, for the work of preparing an analysis of the works of Aristotle. Ibn Roschd won 
 the favor of this prince, who was quite familiar with the problems of philosophy, and, at a 
 later epoch, he became his physician in ordinary (1182). For a time he was in favor also 
 with the son of this prince, Jacub Almansur, who succeeded to his father's rule in 11 S4, 
 and he was still honored by him in 1195. But soon after this date he was accused of 
 cultivating the philosophy and science of antiquity to the prejudice of tlie Mohammedan 
 religion, and was robbed by Almansur of his dignities and banished to Elisana (Lucena) 
 near Cordova; he was afterward tolerated in Morocco. A strict prohibition was issued 
 against the study of Greek philosophj', and whatever works on logic and metaphysics were 
 discovered, were delivered to the flames. Averroes died in 1198, in his seventy-third 
 year. Soon afterward the rule of the Moors in Spain came to an end. The Arabian 
 philosophy was extinguished, and liberal culture sunk under the exclusive rule of the 
 Koran and of dogmatics. 
 
 Averroes shows for Aristotle the most unconditional reverence, going in this respect i 
 much farther tlian Avicenna; he considers him, as the founders of religions are wont 
 to be considered, as the man whom alone, among all men, God permitted to reach the 
 highest summit of perfection. Aristotle was, in his opinion, the foinider and perfecter of 
 scientific knowledge. In logic, Averroes everywlicre limits himself to merely annotating 
 Aristotle. The principle of Avicenna: intellecftis in formis agit universalitate?)i, is also hia 
 (Averr., De An., I. 8; cf. Alb. M., Be Praedicub., II. ch. 6). Science treats not of universal' 
 things, but of individuals under tlieir universal aspect, wliich the understanding recognizes 
 after making abstraction of tlieir common nature (Dtst?: desir., fol. 17 : scieritia autem non est 
 scientia rei universalis, sed est scientia particularium modo universali, quern facit intelledus in 
 particular thus, quum abstrahit ah its naturam unam communem, quae divisa est in materiis). 
 The forms, xohich are developed through the influence of higher forms, and, in the last resort, 
 through the influence of the Deity, are contained embryonically in matte)-. The most noticeable 
 thing in his psychology is the explanation which he gives of the Aristotelian distinction 
 between the active and the passive intellect {vovr TzadrjTiKSq and Troit/rtKo^). Thomas 
 Aquinas, who opposes the explanation, gives it in those words: intellectum siihstantiam ess6 
 omnino ab anima separatam, esseque unum in omnibus hominihus ; — nee JDeum face^-e posse quod 
 tint plures intellectum ; but, ho says, Averroes added : per ra.tionem condudo de necessitate quod 
 inteUectus est units num^ro, firmiter tamen teneo oppositum per fidem. In his commentary to 
 the twelfth book of the Metaphysics, Averroes compares the relation of the active reason
 
 416 ARABIAN PUILOSOPHT IN THE MIDDLE AGES. 
 
 to mau with that of the sun to vision; as the sun, by its hght, brings about the act 
 of seeing, so the active reason enables us to Ivuow; hereby the rational capacity in man 
 is developed into actual reason, which is one with the active reason. Averroes attempts 
 to reconcile two opinions, the one of which he ascribes to Alexander of Aphrodisias, and 
 the other to Themistius and the other Commentators. Alexander, he says, had held the 
 passive intellect {vohg Tvadr/riKog) to be a mere "disposition" connected with the animal 
 faculties, and, in order that it might be able perfectly to receive all forms, absolutely form- 
 less ; this disposition was in us, but the active intellect (vovg noirrnKoq), which was the 
 cause of its development or of its becoming receptive intellect {vovq kiriKrt/roc), was without 
 us; after our death our individual intellects no longer existed. Themistius, on the contrary, 
 and the other Commentators, had regarded the passive intellect not as a mere disposition 
 connected with the lower psychical powers, but as inhering in the same substratum to 
 which the active intellect belonged; this substratum, according to them, was distinct 
 from those animal powers of the soul which depend on material organs, and as it was 
 immaterial, immortality was to be predicated of the individual intellect inhering in it. 
 Averroes, on the other hand, held that the passive intellect (vnvg ■iraOrjriKo^) was, indeed, 
 more than a mere disposition, and assumed (with Themistius and most of the other Com- 
 mentators, except Alexander) that the same substance was passive and active intellect 
 (namely, the former, in so far as it received forms, the latter, in so far as it constructed 
 forms) ; but he denied that the same substance in itself and in its individual existence 
 was both passive and active, assuming (with Alexander) that there existed only one active 
 intellect in the world, and that man had only the " disposition " in virtue of which he 
 could be affected by the active intellect ; when the active intellect came in contact with 
 this disposition there arose in us the passive or material intellect, the one active intellect 
 becoming on its entrance into the plurality of souls particularized in them, just as light is 
 decomposed into the different colors in bodies; the passive intellect was (according to 
 Munk's translation): '^une chose composee de la disposition qui eziste en nous et d'un intellect 
 qui se joint a cette disposition, et qui, en fant quHl y est joint, est un intellect predispose (en 
 puissance) et non pas un intellect en acte, mais qui est intellect en acte en tant qu'il n^est plus 
 joint a la disposition " (from the Commentaire nioyen sur le traite de VAme, in Munk's Mel., 
 p. 447) ; the active intellect worked first upon the passive, so as to develop it into actual 
 and acquired intellect, and then on this latter, which it absorbed into itself, so that after 
 our death it conld be said that our vov^, mind, continued to exist — though not as an indi- 
 vidual substance, but only as an element of the. universal mind. But Averroes did not 
 identify this universal mind (as Alexander of Aphrodisias identified the vovg TrotTjriKoc) 
 with the Deity himself, but conceived it (following in this the earlier Arabian commenta- 
 tors and indirectly the Neo-Platonists) as an emanation from the Deity, and as the mover 
 of the lowest of the celestial circles, i. e., the sphere of the moon. This doctrine was 
 developed by Averroes particularly in his commentaries on the De An., whereas, in the 
 Paraphrase (written earlier) he had expressed himself in a more individualistic sense 
 (Averr., ap. Munk, Melanges, p. 442 seq.). The psychological teaching of Averroes resem- 
 bled, therefore, in the character of its definitions, that of Themistius, but in its real 
 content that of Alexander Aphrodisiensis, since both Averroes and Alexander limited the 
 individual existence of the human intellect (vote) to the period preceding death, and recog- 
 nized the eternity only of the one universal active intellect (vovc TroiT^riKog). For this reason 
 the doctrines of the Alexandrists and of the Averroists were both condemned by the 
 Catholic Church (cf. Yol. II. § 3). 
 
 Averroes professed himself in no sense hostile to religion, least of all to Mohammedan- 
 ism, which he regarded as the most perfect of all religions. He demanded of the philoso-
 
 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE JEWS IN THE MIDDLE AGES. 417 
 
 pher a grateful adherence to the religion of his people, the religion in which he was 
 educated. But by this '-adlierence " ho meant only a skillful accommodation of his views 
 and life to the requirements of positive religion— a course which could not but fail to 
 satisfy the real defenders of the religious principle. Averroes considered religion as 
 containing philosophical truth under the veil of figurative representation ; by allegorical 
 interpretrtion one might advance to purer knowledge, whUe the masses held to the literal 
 sense. The highest grade of intelligence was philosophical knowledge; the peculiar 
 religion of the philosopher consisted in the deepening of his knowledge; for man could 
 offer to God no worthier cultus than that of the knowledge of his works, through which , 
 we attain to the knowledge of God himself in the fullness of his essence (Averroes in the j 
 larger Commentary to the Metaph., ap. Munk, Melanges, p. 455 seq.). 
 
 § 97. The philosophy of the Jews in the Middle Ages was partly 
 the Cabala and partly the transformed doctrine of Plato and Aris- 
 totle. The Cabala, a secret philosophy of emanations, is contained in 
 two works entitled Jezirah (Creation) and Sohar (Briglitness). The 
 former was in the tenth century already regarded as a very ancient 
 book, but it was probably composed after the middle of the ninth 
 century. The doctrine of the Sohar was built up, after the com- 
 mencement of the thirteenth century, on the basis of earlier ideas, 
 by Isaac the Blind and his pupils Ezra and Azriel, and other Anti- 
 Maimunists. It was committed to writing in about the year 1300 
 by a Spanish Jew, most probably by Moseh ben Schem Tob de Leon, 
 It was subsequently increased by additions and made the subject of 
 commentaries. Tradition ascribes the Jezirah now to Abraham, the 
 father of the Jewish race, and now to Rabbi Akiba (who was exe- 
 cuted in consequence of his participation in the insurrection of Bar- 
 cochba — about 135 a. d. — whom he had announced as the Messiah, 
 and of his violation of the edict issued after the suppression of the 
 revolt, forbidding him to teach), and the Soliar to Simeon Ben Jochai, 
 the pupil of the latter. Some of the fundamental Cabalistic doc- 
 trines are indeed old, but in the course of their development they 
 were considerably modified under the influence of Greek and par- 
 ticularly of Platonic conceptions — an influence exerted, perhaps, first 
 through the medium of the Jewish-Alexandrian religious pliilosophy, 
 and afterward through Neo-Platonic writings. Contact Avith foreign 
 types of culture — first and especially with Parseeism, then with Hel- 
 lenism and the Boman world, and afterward also with Christianity 
 and Mohammedanism — widened the view of the Jewish people and 
 led by degrees to a more and more complete removal of the national 
 limits in its theological belief But in proportion as its conception 
 of the world became more broad and complete, its concej^tion of 
 
 27
 
 4:18 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE JEWS IN THE MIDDLE AGES. 
 
 God became more transcendent : Jehovah was conceived as more 
 spiritual, higher, farther removed from the individual, and, finally, as 
 exalted above space and time, and his active relation to the world was 
 regarded as depending on the agency of beings intermediate between 
 God and the world. Thus the Persian doctrine of angels first found 
 entrance among the Jews, being especially cultivated by the Essenes. 
 Then arose, particularly at Alexandria under the co-operating in- 
 fluence of Greek philosophy, the doctrine of the divine attributes 
 and energies, which appears in its most developed form, blended 
 with the Platonic theory of ideas and the Stoic Logos-doctrine, in 
 Philo's writings, and which, as a doctrine of the Logos and of the 
 JEons, found its way into the system of the Christian faith and into 
 the Christian Gnosis. The secret doctrine of the Rabbis in the first 
 Christian centuries was founded chiefly on the allegorical interpreta- 
 tion of two passages in the Bible, viz. : the history of creation, in 
 the book of Genesis, and the vision of the chariot of God (the Mer- 
 haba), in the prophecy of Ezekiel. In the later, more developed 
 Gnosis of the Cabala, the origin of the world in God was represented 
 in the form of a gradually descending series of emanations of the 
 lower from the higher. — Of the theologians who philosophized on the 
 basis of human reason, the earliest belonged to the sect of the Karseans 
 or Karaites (who rejected the Talmud ; the sect was founded about 
 A. D. 761, by Anan ben David). The most notable among these was 
 David ben Merwan al Mokammez (about 900). More worthy of 
 mention is the Eabbinist Saadja ben Joseph al Fajjumi (S92-942), 
 the rationalistic defender of the Talmud and opponent of the Karaites, 
 who undertook to demonstrate the reasonableness of the Mosaic and 
 post- Mosaic articles of Jewish faith. Solomon Ibn Gebirol, who lived 
 about 1050 in Spain, is the representative of a class of Jewish thinkers 
 who wrote under the influence of the Neo-Platonic philosophy. Solo- 
 mon Ibn Gebirol was regarded by the Christian Scholastics as an 
 Arabian philosopher, and he was cited by them under the name of 
 Avicebron. His doctrines exerted a material influence on the later 
 development of the Cabala as contained in the Soltar. IS'^ear the end 
 of the eleventh century Bahja ben Joseph composed an ethical work 
 on the duties of the heart, in which more stress was laid on internal 
 morality than on mere legality. A direct reaction against philosophy 
 was encoui'aged by the poet Juda ha-Levi (about 1140) in his book 
 entitled Kkosar'i. In this book the author represents, first, Greek
 
 THK PHILOSOPHY OF THE JEWS IN THE MIDDLE AGES. 419 
 
 philosophy, and then Christian and Mohammedan theologr, as van- 
 quished by the doctrines of Judaism, and develops the grounds on 
 which the Rabbinic Judaism was founded ; he lauds the secret doc- 
 trine of the Jezirah, which book he ascribes to the patriarch Abraham. 
 A reconciliation of Jewish theology with Aristotelian philosophy was 
 attempted about the middle of the twelfth century by Abraham ben 
 David of Toledo ; soon after him the solution of the same problem 
 wa6 undertaken with far greater success by the most celebrated of 
 the Jewish philosophers of the Middle Ages, Moses ben Maimun 
 (Moses Maimonides, 1135-1204). In his " Guide of the DouUing^'^ ; 
 Maimonides ascribed to Aristotle unconditional authority in the \ 
 science of sublunary things, but limited it in the science of heav- ,■ 
 enly and divine things by asserting the greater authority of revela- j 
 tion. By giving prominence to the spiritual and moral ideas of 
 Judaism, he exerted on all Jewish theology (even that of the Kara- 
 ites, as seen, notably, in the doctrine of Ahron ben Elia in the 
 fourteenth century) a salutary and, in spite of violent reactions, a 
 permanent influence. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the ; 
 philosophy of the Arabian Aristotelians, being proscribed by the 
 Mohammedan rulers, found an asylum among the Jews in Spain and 
 France, especially in Provence, their writings being translated from 
 Arabic into Hebrew, and, in some cases, made the subject of new 
 commentaries. As a commentator of the Paraphrases and Commen- 
 taries of Averroes, and also as the author of independent works, Levi 
 ben Gerson is especially distinguished ; his writings fall in the first 
 half of the fourteenth century. Through the agency of Jews, Arabic , 
 translations of (genuine and spurious) works of Aristotle and Aris- I 
 totelians were made into Latin. In this way the entire Aristotelian 
 philosophy was first brought to the knowledge of the Scholastics, 
 who were thus inspired soon afterward to procure for themselves 
 other translations of the works of Aristotle, -which were founded 
 immediatelv on the Greek text. 
 
 A survey of the entire philosophy of the Jews is given by Sal. Mnnk, in his Mekingen de philosophit 
 JiUoe et arabe, pp. 461-511 {Esquisse hi-ttorique de la philo/iophie dies les jui/s) ; a German translation of 
 this sketch, by B. Beer, was published at Lcipsic in 1852. A. Schiniedl has an article on the conceptions 
 of substance and accident in the philosophy of the Jews of the Middle Ages, in the Monat^itehr. fur Gesch. 
 u. Wish. dc,<! Jiuierithutris, ed. by Frankel, Broslau, 1SG4. Of. J. M. Jost, 11. Gratz. .ind Abr. Gei^er in their 
 histories of Judaism, and Julius Fiirst, Bibliotheca judcica, biblioffraphisches ilandhuch der gesammten 
 judiadien Litteratv/r^ Leipsic, 1849-G.3, and Steinschneider, Jiidische I/itteratur, in Ersch vnd Oruber^$ 
 Encyklopadie, Sect. II., Vol. 27. 
 
 A. Nager, Die Religionsphilonophie d«s Talmud.^ Leipsic, 1864. 
 
 A collection of cabalistic writings, set on foot by Joh. Pistorins, and containing a Latin translation d
 
 4'JO THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE JEWS IN THE MIDDLE AGES. 
 
 the Jezirah, as also Joh. Reuchlin's Lihri tres de arte cahbalistica (first published in 151T), was printed at 
 Basi'l in 1587, under the title; Artis Cabbalisticae Sorij^to^es. The Jeziroh was published in Hebrew at 
 Mantua in 1562, and then translated into Latin and annotated by Rittangclus, Amsterdam, 1&42, etc. The 
 Sohar was published first at Mantua, 155S-60, then in more complete form at Cremona, 1560, and Lublin, 
 1623, also Amsterdam, 1670; again in an extensive collection of cabalistic writinirs, published by Chris- 
 tian Knorr von Rosenroth, under the title: Kubhala denudata seu doctrina Ebraeorum transcendentaliH 
 et metaphys'ica atque theologic-a, Vol. I., Sulzbach, 1G77-7S, Vol. II., Frankfort, 16S4, and separately, Sulz- 
 bach, 1684; also Amsterdam, 1714, 1728, 1772, 1805, Krotoschin, 1844, 1S58, etc. In the seventeenth century 
 tlie genuineness of the Sohar was disputed by Joh. Morin {Exercit. bibl.. p. 363 seq. ; cf. Tholuck. Cormn. 
 de vi, qwnn r/raeca phUos. in tlieolog. turn Jfoha»iine<htnorum, tuin Judaeorwn exercuerit, II. p. 16seq.), 
 and by Leon of Modena (in the work: Are Nohem, published by Julius Fiirst, Leipsic, 1840). Of modern 
 works on the Cab.ila the most important is Ad. Franck's Syst. de la Kahbale^ Paris. 1842, translated into 
 German by Ad. Jellinek, Leipsic, 1844, under the title: Die Kahbala oder die Religionsphilosophie der 
 ITebraer ; a minute critique of this work, but one that goes too far in its opposition to Franck's conception 
 of the cabalistic doctrine, is the work of H. Joel, 3fidrasch ha-Sohar, die Jieligianxphi/osaphie des Soha/r 
 -und ihr VerJidltniss zur allgemeinen jiidiscken Tkeohgie, Leipsic, 1849. Cf. also, L. Zuuz, Die gottee- 
 dienstlichen Vortr'dge der Juden., Berlin, 1832 (chap. IX., die Geheimlehre) ; Franck, Deux memoires mi^ 
 la Cabhale, Paris (^cad.), 1839; Franck, Diet, ph.. Art. Kabbala; Adler, in Noack's Jist/ir&ifcAer for 1846 
 and 1847; M. S. Freystadt, Philos. cabbalistica et pantheismus, ex /oniibus primariis adumbr., Kiiniga- 
 berg, 1832, Philosophus et Cabbalista^ Choker n- Mekubbal, ibid. 1840; Tholuck, De ortu cabbalae (part H. 
 of the abo\e-citvd Commeniatio), Hamburg, 1S37; H. Gratz, Gnosticisnius und Judenthmn, Kvotos,c\i\n, 
 1846 ; Ad. Jellinek, Moses ben Sehem Tob de Leon •>ind sein Verhaltniss zum Sohar, Leipsic, 1851. Beitrdge 
 zur Geschichte der Kabbula, Leipsic, 1852, Auawahl habhalistiseher 3/ys<iyt, Leipsic, 1855; S. Munk, 
 Melanges, p. 275 seq. et ah; Isaac Misses, Die jildische Geheimlehre, Cracow, 1862-63; GrStz, Gesch. der 
 Juden, Vol. VII. 1863, Note 3, p. 442 seq., and Note 12, p. 487 seq. ; Ginsburg, The Eahbalah, its doctrines, 
 development, and literature, an essay, London, ISe."). For the later history of the Cabala we may cite, ia 
 addition to the histories of Judaism, the work by Abr. Geiger, Leon da Modena (1571-1648), seine 
 Stelhmg zur Kabbalah, zutn Talmud und zum ChriMenthumi, Breslau, 1856. 
 
 Saadja's Book concerning Religions and Dogmas, translated in the twelfth century from Arabic into 
 Hebrew, by Jehuda Ibn Tibbon, has been repeatedly edited ; a German translation by Jul. Fiirst appeare<l 
 at Leipsic, in 1845. Of him treat Sal. Munk, Notice sur Saadia, Paris, 1838; Leop. Dukes, in Litt. MH- 
 theilungen ilber die dlteMen hebrdischen Exegeten, Grammatiker und Lexikographen, Stuttgard, 1844. 
 
 From the Fons Vitae, the principal work of Ibn Gebirol, extensive extracts which were made from the 
 Arabic original by the Jewish philosopher, Schem Tob ibn Falaquera, of the thirteenth century, and tran.<»- 
 lated by him into Hebrew (with the Hebrew title, Mekor Ohajjim), have been published, together with a 
 French translation, by S. Munk, in his Melangex de philos. juit^e et arabe. Paris, 1857; there is a notice of 
 a Latin MS. of the whole work, by Seyerlen, in Zeller's T7ieol. Jahrb., XV. and XVI. The discovery that 
 Ibn Gebirol was identical with the Avicebron (or Avencebrol) often cited by the Scholastics, was announced 
 by 9. Munk in the Liter aturblatt des Orients for 1845, No. 46, col. 721. Specimens of the religious poetry 
 of Ibn Gebirol are given by S. Munk, Melanges, p. 159 seq., and Michael Sachs, in Die religiose Poesie der 
 Juden in Spanieji, Berlin, 1845, pp. 8-40. A treatise, written by Ibn Gebirol in 1045, on the Improvement 
 of Morals, has been repeatedly published in the Hebrew translation, made in 1167 by Jehuda ibn Tibbon, 
 last at Luneville, 1804. A treatise on the Soul, translated into Latin by Dominicus Gundisalvi, is men- 
 tioned by Munk, p. 170, as a work probably composed by Ibn Gebirol, but containing pa.ssages interpolated 
 by the translator. 
 
 The work of Bahja ben Joseph, on the Duties of the Heart, was published in the Hebrew translation 
 of Jehuda Ibn Tibbon, at Napleg, in 1490, etc., and last by Is. Benjakob, Leipsic, 1846; also with a German 
 translation, by R. J. Furstenthal, Breslau, 1836. Of Bahja ben Joseph, Ad. jL-llinek treats, in the editioh 
 by Is. Benjiikob, Leipsic, 1846, and M. F. Stern, Die Ilerzenspjlichten Ton B. b. J., Vienna, 1856. 
 
 Thj Khusari of Jehuda ha-Levi, in the translation made at Lunel in 1167, by Jehuda Ibn Tibbon of 
 Granada, has been published many times. Last at Hanover, in 1888, Prague, 1838-40, and, in part, Leipsic, 
 1841-42: with a Latin translation by Job. Buxtorf, Basel, 1660, and in German (not complete), ed. H. 
 Jolowiez and Dav. Cassel, Leipsic, 1841-42. 
 
 The work composed in Ar.abic by Abraham ben David ha-Levi of Toledo, and entitled " The Sublime 
 Faith,'" has been preserved in a Hebrew translation, which w.as published, together with a German trans- 
 lation by Simpson Weil, at Frankfort-on-the-Main, in 1852. 
 
 The principal philosophical work of Moses Maimonides, Dalalat al ITalrin (Guide of the Doubting), 
 was published several times before 1480 in the Hebrew translation of Samuel ibn Tibbon (lived about 1200), 
 under the title, "■ Moreh Nebuchim.'" no place of publication being given, — then Venice, 1551, etc., with 
 Latin translation, Paris, 1520, and, likewise with Latin translation, ed. Joh. Buxtorf, Basel, 1629, translated
 
 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE JEWS IN THE MIDDLE AGES, 421 
 
 <in part) into German, by R. J. Furstenthal, Krotoschin, 183S, and translated by Simon Scheyer, Frankfort 
 on-thc-Maiu, ISiJS, and recently in Arabic and French, with critical, literary, and explanatory notes, by S. 
 Munii, under the title. Le guide den erjar&i, tntite de theologU et de philosophie. Vol. I. -III. Pans. 186€i 
 "61, 'C6. In rejiard to the latter extremely meritorious work, it is only to be regretted that the haliit of 
 incorrectly translating the title has, through the practice of the author, apparently obtained a new sanction, 
 although Munk himself, in his note on the title. II. p. 8"9 seq., gives .is its true sense: Indication ou guide 
 pour eeux qui .lont diitm la perplexit-e, d<ins le trouble ou dans T indecision, so that not those who have 
 gone astray, but those who are wandering in uncertainty, the seekers or doubters, are to be understood, 
 those who. In view of the different ways opened before them, the ways of philosophy and positivism, 
 of allegorical and literal biblical interpretation, are undecided and in need of counsel; the Latin translation, 
 Paris, 1520, has the correct title: Dux sen director dubitantium aut perplexorum ; Albertus Magnus cites 
 it as Dux 2^eutrorum ; others, Directio Perplexorum. The Ethics of Maimonides has been published m 
 a German translation by Simon Falkenheiin, Konigsberg, 1S32. }i\&Voc<ibularium Logicae was published 
 at Venice in 15.>0. etc., and last at Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1540. Of Maimonides treat — besides Munk — 
 Franck, in the Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques, Vol. IV. p. 31, Simon Scheyer, Frankfort-on-the- 
 Main, 1845, Abr. Geiger, Rosenberg, 1S50, M. Joel, Die Reti^jiontphilosopkie des M. h. J/., in the "Pro- 
 gramme" of the Jewish Theological Seminary at Breslau, 1S59, .and, with special reference to his influence 
 on Albertus Magnus, the Scholastic, in another work published at Breslau in ISfiS. The Ethics of Mai- 
 monides, and its Influence on the Scholastic philosophy of the thirteenth centurj-, are discussed by Ad. 
 Jaraczewsky, in tha Zeitsclir. f. Philos. u. plUlos. Kritik, New Series, Vol. XLVI. Ilalle, 1S65, pp. 5-24. 
 Moses ben Maimiin's acht Capitel, arab. und deutscJi mit Anm. von il. Wolff, Leipsic, 1S63. 
 
 Commentaries on the Moreh NebucJiim, or on parts of it. have been written, in particular, by Schem 
 Tob ben Joseph ibn Falaqueni (12S0, printed at Pressburg in lS-37), Joseph ibn Caspi (about 1300, published 
 at Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1S4S), Moses ben Josua of Narbonne (composed, 135.5-62, edited by Goldenthal, 
 Vienna, 1852), and Is. Abrabanel (in the fifteenth century, published by M. J. Landau, Pnuruc. 1831-32). 
 
 Commentaries by Levi ben Gerson, relating to the Isagoge of Porphyry, the Categ. and the De Jnterpr., 
 are printed in the Latin translatioii of Jacob Mantino, in the first volume of the old Latin editions of the 
 works of Aristotle, as also are the Commentaries of Averroes. His philosophical .ind theological work, 
 entitled '' Milhamoth Adonai" was publi-shed at Riva di Trento, in loCO. M. Joel (Breslau. 1862) and J. 
 Weil (Paris, ISCS) treat of his religious philosophy, and Prantl (Gesch. der Log., II. pp. 394-396) of his 
 logic. There has lately appeared : Levi ben Gerson, ifildiamot ha-ScJiem. Die Kampfe Gottes. R«- 
 Ugionsphilosophische und kosm. Fragen, in sechs Biichern abgehandelt. (In Hebrew.) New edition, 
 Leipsic, 1866. 
 
 The system of religious philosophy of Ahron ben Elia of Nicomedia, the Karaite, completed at Con- 
 stantinople in 1346. was published by Delitzsch and Steinschneider, Leipsic, 1S41. Cf. Franck, Archives 
 Israelites, 1S42. p. 173, and Jul. Fiirst, Geschichte des Kar'derthums, Leipsic, 1862-65. 
 
 Ad. Franck estimates the date of the rise of the Cabala as earlier than the dates assigned 
 by all others who have investigated the subject. He sees traces of it in the Septiiagint, 
 in the proverbs of Ben Sira and in the Book of Wisdom, and accounts for them as arising 
 from the influence of the Zoroastrian religion on the Jews. Tet Franck admits that in the 
 Cabala dualism is replaced by the theory of emanations, that ideas, forms, and attributes 
 take the place of angels, and that "mythology is forced back by metaphysics," and it is 
 quite a matter of question whether this transformation arose from the inllucnce of Jewish 
 monotheism alone, or whether Hellenic modes of thought were not also in their measure the 
 cause of it ; that at least the more developed cabahstic system gives evidence of the influence 
 of Platonism, is beyond question. The conjecture (defended, among others, by S. Munk, 
 Paldstina, p. 515, and Mel, p. 468) is a very probable one, that the Esstei or Es.senes were 
 the first who held the half-mystical, half-philosophical doctrine, which was developed among 
 the Jews not later than the time of the rise of Christianity, and whose inlhience was mani- 
 fested in the development of Christian Gnosticism and in the doctrines of the Cabala. 
 
 At a later epoch, theorems of the Neo-Platonic philosophy, known at first, perhaps, 
 through original Greek texts, but shortly afterward through Arabic translations, and cer- 
 tainly also the philosophy of Hm Gebirol, exerted an influence on the development of the 
 cabalistic doctrine. The doctrine of angels, applied to the biblical history of creation and 
 the vision of Ezekiel, was apparently the earliest form of a doctrine which subsequently
 
 422 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE Jp:WS IN THE MIDDLE AOE8. 
 
 entered into the Cabala (in which form it had perhaps been already held by the Essenes) ; 
 at a considerably later period, and having but a tolerably superficial connection with thia 
 earlier speculation, appears to have followed the development of the doctrine of the 
 Sephiroth aud the worlds, imder Jewish- Alexandrian, Gnostic, and Neo-Platonic influences. 
 Respecting the beginnings only conjectures are possible, such is our lack of positive 
 information; respecting the more developed Cabala there exist data for a more definite 
 judgment. 
 
 The need of finding a middle term to mediate between the Deity, conceived as tran- 
 scendent, and the visible world, led to the cabalistic speculations, in which the Oriental 
 doctrine of angels and the Platonic theory of Ideas, as modified at Alexandria, were blended 
 together. The question raised by some of the later Cabahsts and by historians as to 
 whether the cabalistic Sephiroth were beings distinct from God (as affirmed by Rabbi 
 Menachem Reccanati, and, in modern times, by H. Joel, who represents them as creatures), 
 or momenta of God's existence, which are only subjectively distinguished by us (as, ac- 
 cording to Corduero, Rabbi David Abbi Simra maintained), or whether God (according 
 to the conciliatory theory of Corduero, adopted by Franck) was regarded as indeed above, 
 but also as in and not without them, seems incapable of solution, since it implies in the 
 Cabala the existence and maintenance of distinctions which a doctrine so much the work 
 of fancy, and so little of the reflective reason, was not capable of containing. Of a similar 
 nature, as we have seen, is the uncertainty in which we are placed with regard to Philo's 
 doctrine of the Logos and of the other Potencies or Ideas, since we find him sometimes 
 ascribing to them an attributive, and sometimes a substantial form of existence (see above, 
 § 63, p. 230 seq.). The doctrme of emanations, advanced in the Cabala, has not the char- 
 acter of a theory resting on philosophical grounds and put forward in conscious opposition 
 to the doctrine of creation ; it is intended rather as an interpretation of the latter. But 
 that the idea of emanation is present in the fundamental doctrines of the Cabala is none the 
 less true, and it is incorrect (with II. Joel) to consider those doctrines as containing only 
 the dogmatic theory of creation, and to seek for the doctrine of emanation exclusively in 
 the later additions and commentaries, although it is indeed in these latter that the doctrine 
 is most definitely developed and is based on metaphysical axioms. 
 
 In the Jezirah the outlines of the doctrines of God, of the intermediate beings, and of 
 the worlds, are presented. The author of the book considers (in Pjrthagorean and Platonic 
 fashion) the series of numbers (Sephiroth) and the letters of the alphabet, " which are the 
 elements of the divine word, and are inscribed on the air at the boundary of the intellectual 
 and physical worlds," as the basis of the world-soul aud of the whole creation. 
 
 The Suhar teaches the incognoscibility of God as he really is, and liis gradual manifesta- 
 tion through the series of emanations. God, the Ancient of Days, the Hidden of the 
 Hidden Ones, is, apart from his revelation in the world, a nothing, so that the world, 
 created by Iiim, came forth out of nothing. (This doctrine recalls the Basilidian doctrine 
 of the non-existent God, and also the doctrine of Dionysius.) This nothing is infinite, and 
 is therefore called the Limitless, En- Soph. Its light originally filled all space: beside it 
 nothing existed. But in order that something else might come into existence, it concen- 
 trated itself into a portion of space, so that outside of itself there was a void, which it pro- 
 ceeded to fill with a light, whose brightness diminished in proportion to the removal of 
 the light from its source. En-Soph first revealed himself in his word or his working, his 
 son, the fir?* man, Adam Kadmon, the man in the vision of Ezekiel (Ezek., ch. i.). The 
 potencies or intelligences which constitute this Adam Kadmon (as parts of his being, just 
 as the ^vva/uEic or Aojoi are parts of the Logos of Philo) are the ten Sephiroth, numbers, 
 forms, circles of light, which surround the throne of the Highest. The three first Sephi-
 
 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE JEWS IK THE MIDDLE AGES. 423 
 
 roth are, 1) Kether, crown, 2) Chokhma, wisdom (ffo'i/a), 3) Binah, understanding (/.070c). 
 (This separation of ao(pia and '/.uyoc belongs to the Post-Philonic ix;riod, but in the present 
 form is of much later date still.) The seven other Sephiroth are, 4) Chesed, grace (or 
 Gedulah, greatness), 5) Din, judgment, rigor (or Gehurah, strength), 6) Tiphercih, beauty, 
 7) Nezach, firmness, 8) Hod, splendor, 9) Jisod, foundation, 10) Malkuth, kingdom. Occa- 
 sionally, the second, fourth, and seventh of the Sqjhiroth are grouped together, and entitled 
 pillars of grace, the third, fifth, and eighth being termed pillars of strength, and the first, 
 sixth, and ninth, middle pillars. (This recalls the Gnostic distinction between the just God 
 and the good God, which, however, here becomes a mere distinction of powers or attributes, 
 in order to preserve the monotheistic principle.) The Sephiroth constitute the first ema- 
 nation, or the world Azilah, which is followed by three other worlds (named after Isaiah 
 xliii. 7), viz.: the world Beriah (from larah, to create, to shape), containing the pure forms 
 or simple substances (ideas), which are conceived as spiritual, intelligent beings ; then the 
 world Jezirah (from jazar, to form), the world of the celestial spheres, of the Souls or 
 Angels ; and, lastly, the world Asijjah (from at<ah, to make), the world of the material 
 works of God, of objects which are perceptible through the senses, and which arise and 
 decay. (With Ihe four-fold division of Plotinus : the One, the Xous, with ideas immanent 
 in the same, the soul, and the material realm, this division agrees in so far as it represents 
 the ideas still as distinct from the Sephiroth.) The three first Stphiroth exert their influence 
 in the spiritual world, the next three in the psychical, and the three next in the material 
 world. In man, the spiritual, immortal soul (neschama) belongs to the first of the three 
 worlds, the animating breath (ruach) to the second, and the breath of life (nephesch) to the 
 third. The soul wanders through different bodies, until it rises purified into the world of 
 spirits. The last soul to enter into the earthly life, will be that of the Messias. 
 
 To the fanciful Cabala, a philosojjhy which followed the guidance of the understanding, 
 formed a contrast that sometimes led to mutual enmities. The rise of this philosophy was 
 essentially conditioned on the contact of Judaism with Hellenism and Mohammedanism. 
 Of little importance were the logioo-plilosophical studies of Jewish physicians, such as, in 
 particular, Isaac Israeh (flourished about 900 ; died at an advanced age, about 940-950 ; 
 according to Steinschneider's conjecture, in his work on Alfarabi, p. 248, Isaac Israeli was 
 the author of an old commentary on the Jezirah). The Karaites, who broke with the 
 Talmudic tradition, were the first Jewish theologians, who, following the example of the 
 Mohammedan theologians, treated of dogmatics in systematic form. In this they were 
 afterward followed by the Rabbinic theologians (Rabbinists). 
 
 Saadja was bom at Fajjum, in Egypt, in about the year 892. He was appointed at the 
 head of the Jewish school at Sora, or Sura, in Babylon in 928, and died in 942. He was 
 celebrated not only as a philosopher, but also as a religious poet, and was (as Jost 
 expresses it, Gesch. des Jwlenthums, II., Leipsic. 1858, p. 279) "a fruit of the Jewish soil, 
 modified by grafts from the Arabian garden." In the year 933 he wrote his principal work 
 on religious philosophy, in which, following, as it seems, the example of his older Karaite 
 contemporar)', David ben Merwan al Mokammez of Racca in Arabian Irak, he attempts 
 to demonstrate the reasonableness of the articles of the Jewish faith and the untenable- 
 ness of the dogmas and philosophemes opposed to them. The work contains (according 
 to Julius Fiirst), besides the Introduction, ten sections, with subjects severally as follows : 
 1) The world and its beings are created; 2) The Creator of all things is One ; 3) Law and 
 Revelation ; 4) Obedience to God and disobedience, perfect righteousness and bondage ; 
 5) Merit and guilt ; 6) The nature of the soul and its future existence ; 7) Revivification of 
 the dead ; 8) Emancipation and redemption ; 9) Reward and punishment ; 10) Ethics. The 
 cardinal points of his philosophy are the unity of God, plurality of attributes without plu-
 
 424 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE JEWS IN THE MIDDLE AGES. 
 
 rality of persons, the creation of the world out of nothing, and not from material elements 
 previously existing, the inviolability of the revealed law, the freedom of the will, future 
 retribution and (rejecting the doctrine of its transmigration) the reunion of the soul with 
 the body at the resurrection, which is to take place when the number of souls which were 
 to be created has been exhausted The substance of the teaching of Saadja is therefore 
 in unison throughout with Jewish orthodoxy ; but the form which it took as a system of 
 religious philosophy was in large measure determined by the precedent of the Arabian 
 Motekallemin^ the Mutazilm being those between whose doctrine and that of Saadja the 
 greatest resemblance exists. (The Mutazilin were a rationalizing fraction of the Mote- 
 kallemiu. who took from the dogma of predestination something of its severity, by reducing 
 it to the doctrine of mere foreknowledge, in order to save human freedom and moral 
 responsibiUty ; the Ascharites, on the contrary, insisted especially upon the truth of this 
 dogma in all its severity.) The positive influence of Aristotelianism is slight. Yet Saadja 
 shows an acquaintance with some of the logical doctrines of Aristotle, and especially with 
 his doctrine of categories, and he (II. 8) expressly undertakes to prove the non-applicability 
 of these latter to the Deity. On the other hand, he opposes some doctrines which are 
 founded on Aristotehanism, such as the eternity o*" the world and also the naturalistic 
 bibUcal criticism of Chivi Albachi (of Bactria), the Rabbinist. 
 
 In Spain the earliest representative of philosophy among the Jews was Salomo ben 
 Jehuda ben Gebirol (or Gabirol, i. e., Gabriel, in Arabic, Abu Ajjub Soleiman ibn Jahja ibn 
 Djebirul), whom Sal. Munk has discovered to be identical with the philosopher whom the 
 Scholastics knew under the name of A vicebron (or Avencebrol), as author of the work "Fans 
 17tae" (Mekor hajim), and whom they regarded as an Arabian philosopher. Born in 1020 
 or 1021 at Malaga, and educated at Saragossa, he labored in the years 1035-10G9 or 1070 as 
 a religious poet, moralist, and philosopher. His principal work was the Fons Yitae. Schem 
 Tob, who translated the most important parts of it into Hebrew, defines the general idea 
 which underlies the whole work as being contained in the doctrine that even spiritual sub- 
 stances are in some sense material, the matter of which they are formed being spiritual 
 matter, the substratum of their forms a sort of basis into which the form descends from 
 above. Albertus Magnus says (Summa totiiis Theol., I. 4, 22), that the work ascribed to 
 Avicebron rested on tlie hypothesis that things corporeal and incorporeal were of one mat- 
 ter {corporalium et incorporalium esse materiam uniDii), and Thomas Aquinas {Quaest. de 
 Anima. Art. VI.) names him as the author of the doctrine that the soul and all substances, 
 except God, are compounded of matter and form. From the extracts published by Munk it 
 appears how this hypothesis squares with the whole of his philosophy, which arose from 
 the blending of Jewish religious doctrines with Aristotelian, and, in particular, with Neo- 
 Platonic philosophemes. The first book treats of matter and form in general and of their 
 ditferent kinds ; the second, of matter as that which gives body to the universe (to which the 
 categories apply) ; the third, of the existence of the (relatively) simple substances, the middle 
 essences which are said to be contained in the created Intellect, and are intermediate be- 
 tween God, the first Cause, and the material world; the fourth, of these intermediate 
 essences as consisting of matter and form; the fifth, of matter and form in the most 
 general sense of the terms or of universal matter and universal form, followed by consid- 
 erations relative to the divine will, as the outcome of the divine wisdom, through which 
 being is educed from nothing, or as the middle term between God, the first substance, and 
 all that consists of matter and form, or, again, as that source of life whence all forms 
 emanate. All the arguments of the author postulate the Platonic theory of the real exist- 
 ence of all which is thought by means of universal concepts. Everything, argues Avice- 
 bron, that subsists falls under the concept of subsistence, therefore all things which subsist
 
 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE JEWS IN THE MIDDLE AGES. 425 
 
 possess real subsistence in common with each other; but this common element cannot 
 be a form, since it is in the form of an object that its pecuharity and difference from other 
 objects consists ; it must therefore be matter — matter in the most general sense {materia 
 universalis), of which corporeal and spiritual matter are the two species. Since form can 
 only have its existence in matter, the forms of intelUgible things must possess some sort 
 of material substrate peculiar to themselves. God, who is immaterial, is called form 
 only in an unnatural sense. (It would have been more consistent either to apply the 
 general thesis to God, or to deny the separate existence of God, and to identify him with 
 the materia universalis or the material substance. The latter alternative was chosen by 
 David of Dinant, who was probably not uninfluenced by the doctrine of Avicebron — and in 
 modern times again by Spinoza.) In the doctrine of the matter peculiar to intelligible 
 essences, Avicebron follows Plato, in so far as the latter, as is reported by Aristotle, 
 ascribed to the ideas a material substratum (which ascription was the necessary conse- 
 quence of their hypostatization), and also Plotinus, who enounced explicitly the distinction, 
 contained at least by implication in the doctrine of Plato, of the different kinds of matter. 
 (Plotinus, Ennead., II. 4, 4 : " with the p-oppij, form, there is everywhere necessarily joined 
 the vATj, matter, or the v-oneifievov, substrate, of which it is the fiopo?/; if the sensible 
 world, the image of the unseen or intelligible world, consists of matter and form, there 
 must also be a kind of matter as well as form in the archetype.") The Jewi.sh philosopher 
 was not acquainted with the works of Plotinus, but he probably had met some of the Neo- 
 Platonic writings in Arabic translations. These writings, nearly all of which are pseudony- 
 mous, and which after the end of the twelfth century were known to the Scholastics in 
 Latin translations, and were so employed by them, were (according to Munk, Melanges, 
 p. 240 seq. ; Munk follows in part the authority of Mohammed al Schahrestani, an Arabian 
 historian, who wrote of religious and philosophical sects, and died in the year 1153) the 
 following : 
 
 1 ) The Elementa Theologian of Proclus. 
 
 2) Pseudo-Empedocles, on the Five Elements, and perhaps still other works ascribed to 
 Empedocles, translations of which had been brought from the East to Spain, soon after the 
 commencement of the tenth century, by Mohammed ibn Abdallah ibn Mesarrah of Cordova ; 
 in them the ancient natural philosopher is credited with teaching that the Creator made the 
 iriateria prima as primitive element ; from this emanated the Intellect, and from the Intel- 
 lect the Soul ; the vegetative soul was the rind of the animal soul, this the rind of the anima 
 rationalis. and the latter again that of the anima intelkctualis ; the different individual souls 
 were parts of the universal soul, while the product of this soul was nature, in which hate 
 reigned, as love reigned in the universal soul ; seduced by nature, the individual souls had 
 turned aside to the sensuous world, while for their rescue, purification, and recovery to the 
 communion of things intelligible, the prophetic spirits went forth from the universal soul. 
 
 3) Pseuclo- Pythagoras, who represents symbolically the Creator, the Intellect, the Soul, 
 and Nature, by the numerical terms: Monad, Duad, Triad, and Tetrad, or distinguishes 
 them as, 1) unity before eternity, 2) unity with eternity, 3) unity after eternity and before 
 time, and 4) unity in time. 
 
 4) Psextdo-Aristoty s Theologia, a work which in the ninth century had already been 
 translated into Arabic and was known in a Latin translation to the Scholastics. This trans- 
 lation was printed at Rome, in 1519, with the title: Sapientissimi phihsophi Aristotelis 
 Stagxjritae theologia sive mystica philosophia secundum Aegyj)tios, and is reprinted in Du 
 Val's complete edition of the works of Arist. ; following this translation and also the Arabic 
 text, Munk gives a number of extracts from the work in his Melanges, p. 249 seq. In this 
 work the Neo-Platonic doctrine of the first Cause, of the Intellect, and of the pure Forms
 
 i2f? THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE JEWS IN THE MIDDLE AGES. 
 
 (Ideas), which are in it, of the world-soul with the individual souls, and of nature as com- 
 prisiug the thing-s which arise and perish, is developed, the immateriality of the pure forms 
 contained in the Intellect is asserted, on the authority of the Metaphysics, which is men- 
 tioned as an earlier work by the same author, and the theery is combated that all sub- 
 stances, with the exception of the Deity, consist of matter and form. Between the One 
 and the Intellect Pseudo- Aristotle inserts the divine Word, the Logos. Cf. Hanneberg, Die 
 Theologie des Aristoteles, in the Reports of the Munich Academy of Sciences, 1862, I. 1-12. 
 
 5) Perhaps the work De Causis, which likewise contains Neo-Platonic doctrines, for the 
 most part in literal extracts from the Institutio Theologica of Proclus. It is a late compila- 
 tion of thirty-two metaphysical theses, and was perhaps not made until after the time 
 of Ibn Gebirol ; possibly the compiler was David, the Jewish commentator (as Albertus 
 Magnus supposes, who, Iiowever, was unacquainted with the source of the compilation; 
 Thomas recognized as such source the " Eleoatio Theologica " of Proclus, by which his 
 "LroixduatQ (feo/MyiKij, Institutio Thtologica — perhaps the work of a pupil of Proclus — is to be 
 understood). As a supposed work of Aristotle it was translated into Latin, about A. D. 
 1150, by the Archdeacon Dominicus Gundisalvi, with the aid of Johannes Avendeath (Ibn 
 David?), a converted Jew, and was known to the later Scholastics and used by Alanus ab 
 Insulis (Alanus of I-ille), who cites it as " liber de essentia purae bonitaiis.'^ The belief 
 that it was used by Aristotle was, notwithstanding the better knowledge of Albertus and 
 Thomas, long entertained by many, and it was printed in the first Latin editions of the 
 works of Aristotle (Venice, 14.96, and in Vol. VII. of the Lat. ed. of the works of Aristotle 
 and Averroes, Venice, 1552). Analyses of its contents are to be found in Haureau's Phil. 
 Scol, I. 284 seq., and in Vacherot's Hist. Critique de Vecole d' Alexandrie, III. 96 seq. In it 
 abstract concepts are treated as possessing real existence ; that which corresponds to the 
 more abstract concept is treated as being the higher, earlier, and more powerful cause; 
 being is placed before life, and life before individual existence. The Pseudo-Pythagorean 
 distinction between the highest form of existence, which is before eternity, the Intellect, 
 which is with eternity, the Soul, which is after eternity and before time, and temporal 
 things, is found also in this work. Cf. Hanneberg, Reports, etc., 1863, pp. 361-388. 
 
 Considerable as was the influence of the philosophy of Ibn Gebirol with a portion of 
 the Scholastics (and, in particular, with Duns Scotus), it was correspondingly small with 
 the Jews of the period next succeeding, among whom only his poems and ethical writings 
 procured for his name any popularity. But the Arabian philosophers of the twelfth cen- 
 tury seem not to have known of him at all. Aristotelianism, which, in consequence of the 
 gradually increasing influence of the writings of Ibn Sina, was making its way among the 
 Mohammedans and Jews in Spain, drove out the Neo-Platonic ideas, which, however, soon 
 found a place of refuge in the Cabala. To this must be added, that the intermediate posi- 
 tion assigned by Ibn Gebirol to the Will, which he represented as emanating from the 
 divine Wisdom, notwithstanding the stress laid by him in single passages on the unity of 
 this will with God, and his attempts to conceive it as an attribute, was of a nature to give 
 offence to the more rigid monotheists. 
 
 Bahja (or Bahijja?) ben Joseph composed, near the end of the eleventh century, a work 
 on the " Duties of the Heart," in which, commencing with a consideration of the unity of 
 God, he sketches out a complete system of Jewish Morals. The author seeks to demon- 
 strate, by reason. Scripture, and tradition, that the performance of spiritual duties is not a 
 mere supererogatory addition to that pietj"^ which is manifested in obedience to law, but 
 is the foundation of all laws. 
 
 Jehuda ben Samuel ha-Levi (born about 1080, died 1150), a celebrated author of reli- 
 gious songs, in his work entitled Kfiosari — in which the scenes of the dialogues are based 
 
 1
 
 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE JEWS IN THE MIDDLE AGES. 427 
 
 ou the (historical) conversion of a Chazar king to Judaism — expresses himself moderately 
 respecting the Mohammedan and Christian religions, but with severity respecting Greek 
 (Aristotelian) philosophy, which denied that the world had a beginning in time. He warns 
 his readers not to approach this philosophy. He seeks, in a popular style, to justify the 
 Jewish law on rational grounds. 
 
 As the author of a " Microcosmus '' (about 11 40), Josef Ibn Zaddek should be mentioned. 
 
 Abraham ben David, of Toledo, wrote, in the year 1160, in the Arabic language, a work 
 called '"The Sublime Faith," in which he defends the Aristotelian philosophy, but combats 
 strongly the Neo-Platonism of Ibn Gebirol. He develops in particular the doctrine of the 
 freedom of the human will. 
 
 Moses Maimonides, or Maimuni (Moseh, son of Maimun the judge), was born at Cor- 
 dova, March 30, lI3o, and retired with his father, on account of the religious compulsion 
 attempted by the Almohades, first to Fez, and then (1165) by way of Palestine to Egypt, 
 and lived in Fostat (ancient Cairo), where he died December 13, 1 204. Educated in the Aris- 
 totelian philosophy, and acquainted with Arabic commentators (in particular with Abu- 
 IJacer ; he did not, on the contrary, read the works of Averroes until a few years 
 before his death), he introduced in his Explanation of the Mischnah (composed 1158-1168) 
 and in the fourteen Books of the Law (1170-1180) systematic order into the Talmud-Con- 
 glomerate (whereas the historical sense in him, as in his contemporaries generally, remained 
 undeveloped). His chief philosophical work (completed about A. D. 1190), the " Guide of 
 the Doubting," contains (according to Munk's judgment. Melanges, p. 486) nothing which in 
 philosophical respects was of decisive importance or originality, but it contriljuted mightily 
 toward bringing the Jews to the study of the Aristotelian philosophy, through which they 
 fiecame able to transmit to Christian Europe the science of the Arabs, and thereby to exercise 
 a considerable influence on the Scholastic philosophy. Maimonides' influence was greatest 
 on the theology of the Jews. The fundamental idea in his works is that the law was 
 given to the Jews, not merely to train them to obedience, but also as a revelation of the 
 highest truths, and that, therefore, fidelity to the law in action is by no means sufficient, 
 but that the knowledge of the truth is also a religious duty. By this teaching he offered 1 
 a powerful incitement to speculation in religious philosophy, yet he also contributed b_v his 
 enunciation of definite articles of faith to a narrow determination of Jewish dogmas, 
 although his own investigations bear throughout a rationalizing character. Maimonides is 
 no friend to astrological mysticism : we are only to believe that which is either attested by 
 the senses or strictly demonstrated by the understanding or transmitted to us by prophets 
 and godly men. In the province of science, he regards Aristotle as the most trustworthy 
 leader, and only differs from him when the dogma requires it, as, especially, m the doctrine 
 of the creation and providential guidance of the world. Maimonides holds firmly to the be- 
 lief (without which, in his opinion, the doctrines of inspiration and of miracles as suspensions 
 of natural laws could not bo maintained), that God called iHto existence out of nothing, not 
 only the form, but also the matter of the world, the philosophical proofs to the contrary not 
 appearing to him conclusive. If these proofs possessed mathematical certainty, it would be 
 necessary to interpret those passages in the Bible which appear to oppose them allegori- 
 cally — which is now not admissible. Accordingly, Maimonides condemns the hypothesis 
 of the eternity of the world in the Aristotelian sense, or the doctrine that matter is eternal 
 ab initio, and has always been the substratum of an order or form arising from the tendency 
 of all things to become like the eternal and divine Spirit ; the Bible, ho says, teaches the 
 temporal origin of the world. Less discordant with the teachings of the Bible, according 
 to M., is the Platonic theory, which he interprets with the strictest exactness according to 
 the literal sense of the dialogue Timaeus (which he might have read in an Arabic translation).
 
 428 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE JEWS IN THE MIDDLE AGES. 
 
 He underetands the theory as assuming that matter is eternal, but that the divinely-caused 
 order, by the addition of which to matter the world was formed, had a beginning in time. 
 Yet he does not himself accept this theory, but adheres to the belief that matter was 
 created by God. In Ethics, Maimonides lays special stress on the freedom of the will. 
 Every man has complete freedom, either to enter upon the way of goodness and piety, or 
 to go in the ways of evil and wickedness. Do not, says Maimonides, allow thyself to be 
 persuaded by fools that God predetermines who shall be righteous and who wicked. He 
 who sins has only himself to blame for it, and he can do nothing better than speedily 
 to change his course. God's omnipotence has bestowed freedom on man, and liis om- 
 niscience foreknows man's choice without guiding it. We should not choose the good, 
 like children and ignorant people, from motives of reward or punishment, but we should 
 do good for its own sake and from love to God; still, retribution does await the im- 
 mortal soul in the future world. — The resurrection of the body is treated by Maimonides 
 as being simply an article of faith, which is not to be opposed, but which also cannot ba 
 explained. 
 
 The presupposition of Maimonides that there exists a kind of knowledge independent 
 of faith, to which, in so far as it possesses complete certainty, the literal sense of Scrip- 
 ture must be sacrificed by means of allegorical interpretation, appeared to some of the 
 Rabbis to be an inadmissible limiting of the authority of the bibhcal revelation ; it was a 
 "selling of Holy Scripture to the Greeks," or a "destroying of firm ground." His inter- 
 pretation of the sensuous representations of the Godhead and of the future life, which the 
 Bible contains, and of some of tlie miracles, and his attempt to find rational grounds for 
 the Jewish laws, were regarded by them as jeopardizing religion. In France there were 
 fanatics who did not content themselves with anathemas, but who claimed and obtained 
 the aid of Christian inquisitors against the detested heresy. But this very step, this trea- 
 son committed against the national spirit of the Jews, contribtited materially to the 
 triumph of the rationalizing tendency of Maimonides, whose works soon obtained an 
 almost unresisted authority among the Jews, not only of the East, but also of the West. 
 They were also highly esteemed by Arabian and Christian thinkers. 
 
 Among the numerous Jewish philosophers, who figured for the most part as translators 
 and commentators of Aristotle and of Arabian disciples of Aristotle, the most noteworthy 
 are, in the thirteenth century, Schem Tob ben Joseph ibn Falaquera, the commentator of 
 the Moreh Nebuchim and translator of the extracts from Ibn Gebirol's Fountain of Life, 
 and, in the fourteenth century, Levi ben Gerson (born in 1288, died 1344), and Moses, the 
 son of Joshua, of Narbonne, called Master Vidal. The former of these men was a partisan 
 of the doctrine of Ibn Roschd. He adopted the Aristotelian theory of the formation of the 
 world by God out of a material substance previously existing, which substance, however, 
 as being absolutely formless, was nothing, and explained the immortality of the soul as 
 consisting in its union with the active intellect, in which each soul, according to the degree 
 of its perfection, participated. Moses, the son of Joshua, wrote the commentary (men- 
 tioned above, p. 421) on the Moreh of Maimonides and other commentaries on the works 
 of Arabian philosophers, still extant in MSS. 
 
 The work in imitation of the March by Ahron ben Elia, of Nicomedia (a Karaite who 
 lived in the fourteenth century) and entitled the "Tree of Life" (which contains also 
 detailed accounts respecting the religious and philosophical schools among the Arabs), is a 
 presentation, on a philosophical basis, of the dogmas of Mosaism. 
 
 From the fifteenth century onward the renewed Platonism (which is to be treated of 
 hereafter) exerted a certain influence on the philosophy of the Jews, as may be seen in the 
 dialogues concerning Love, by Leo the Hebrew, the son of Isaac Abrabanel. 
 
 3-/f-^^ 
 
 :Z- 2-2-- ^^
 
 THE KEVOLUTION Hi SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY — ABOUT 1200. 429 
 
 SECOND DIVISION. 
 
 The Period of the Full Development and Univeesal Swat op 
 
 THE Scholastic Philosophy. 
 
 § 98. The introduction into Europe of Aristotle's Metaphysics, 
 Physics, Psychology and Ethics, and of the partly Neo-Platonic, 
 partly Aristotelian writings of Arabian and Jewish philosophers, led 
 to a material extension and transformation of philosophical studies 
 among the Christian Scholastics. The theosophical doctrine of ema- 
 nation contained in some of those works, and especially in certain 
 books which were at first falsely attributed to Aristotle, but which 
 were in fact the work of Neo-Platonists, favored, in connection with 
 the doctrines of John Scotus Erigena, a leaning toward pantheistic 
 doctrines. But a powerful ecclesiastical reaction soon took place, 
 which at first threatened to operate not only against these doctrines, 
 but also against the physics and metaphysics of Aristotle, but which 
 afterward, when the theistic character of the genuine works of Aris- 
 totle became known, assisted his doctrine to obtain a decided triumph 
 and to force the Platonism of the earlier Scholastics, which they de- 
 rived from Augustine and other Church Fathers, into the background. 
 The prevalence of the Aristotelian, Arabian, and Jewish doctrines of 
 monotheism in the philosophy of the later Scholastics had for a conse- 
 quence the complete accomplishment of the till then imperfect sepa- 
 ration of natural from revealed theology, "the doctrine of the Trinity, 
 in the philosophical justification of which Church Fathers and earlier 
 Scholastics had found the principal aim of their philosophical think- 
 ing, being now maintained on the ground of revelation alone, and 
 withdrawn, as a theological mystery, from the sphere of philosophical 
 speculation, while the belief in the existence of God was philosophi- 
 cally justified by Aristotelian arguments. Through an extensive 
 appropriation, and in part also through a modification of the doctrines 
 of Aristotle to suit the demands of the Church, the Scholastic phi- 
 losophy became, both materially and formally, for the fundamental 
 theses contained in the " theologia naturalist'' and formally, for the 
 mysteries reserved to mere faith, the adequate instrument of eccle- 
 siastical theology. This it continued to be until after the renewal of
 
 430 THE REVOLUTION IN SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHT ABOUT 1200. 
 
 Nominalism, when the Scholastic postulate of the harmony of the 
 substance of faith with reason — which postulate, however, from the 
 time when Aristotelianism became dominant, in the thirteenth cen- 
 tury, had never been affirmed in its full sense, except as applying to 
 the fundamental theses above mentioned — became more and more 
 restricted, and was at last altogether rejected. 
 
 Of the introduction of the Scholastics to the knowledge of the physical, metaphysical, and ethical works 
 of Aristotle (and also to the writin'^s of the Arabian and Jewish commentators) A. Jourdain treats, in his 
 Recherchen criti/jues sur Fdge et rorigine des traductions latines d'Aristote, Paris, 1S19, 2. 6d., 1843, 
 German translation by Stahr, Halle, 1S31 : cf. Renan. Avcrr., Paris, 1852, pp. 148 and 158 seq., 228 seq. On 
 the first reception given to these writings, see Haurcau, In his Phil. Scol, I. p. 391 seq.; cf.. also, Ilaurean, 
 Ze concile de Paris de Vanned 1210, in the Povue areheoL, new series, vol. 10, Paris, 18G4, pp. 417-434. 
 
 The question as to when and in what way the Scholastics became acquainted with the 
 works of Aristotle, except the Organon, has been answered by the investigations of Am. 
 Jourdain, who has shown that their first acquaintance with these works was brought 
 about through the Arabians, but that not long afterward the Greek text was brought to 
 the West (particularly from Constantinople) and translated directly into Latin. In former 
 times the prevalent (and, substantially, the correct) belief was, that the Latin translations 
 had been made from the Arabian ; but in numerous cases critics forgot to distinguish sufQ- 
 ciently between the case of the logical writings, which had been known earlier, and the 
 other writings of Aristotle, and they paid too little attention to the fact of the gradual 
 addition of direct translations from the Greek. Heeren (in his Gesch. des Studiums der 
 class. Litt, I. p. 183) fell into the opposite mistake of under-estimating the agency of the 
 Arabs. Buhle {Lehrb. der Gesch. der Philos., V. p. 247) guards the proper mean by direct- 
 ing attention especially to the difference between the case of the Organon and that of the 
 other works, but without investigating and communicating the documentary proofs subse- 
 quently given by Jourdain. That the Organon, however, was not fully known until the 
 middle of the twelfth century, and that before that time the Scholastics were acquainted 
 with the Categ. and Interpr., together with the Isagoge and the works of Boethius, was 
 first discovered after Jourdain's investigations by Cousin, Prantl, and others. 
 
 The influence of Arabian science was felt sporadically in the early days of Christian 
 Scholasticism. Gerbert in Spain had drawn upon it to a certain extent, although (as Bii- 
 dinger has shown in his work Ueber GerbeHs wins, und polit. Stellung, Marburg, 1851) he did 
 not understand the Arabic language (and probably not the Greek). Constantinus Afri- 
 canus, a monk, who lived about A. D. 1050 and journeyed in the East, and afterward estab- 
 lished himself in the monastery of Montecassino, translated from tlio Arabic various, and 
 especially medical, works, among which were the works of Galemis and Hippocrates, by 
 . -which the teachings of William of Conches appear to have been influenced. Soon after 1100 
 Adelard of Bath made himself acquainted with some of the performances of the Arabs, 
 from which lie borrowed several theses in natural philosophy. About 1150, by command 
 of Eainmnd, Archbishop of Toledo, Johannes Avendeath (Johannes ben David, Johannes 
 Hispalensis) and Dominicus Gundisalvi translated, from the Arabic through the Castilian 
 into Latin, the principal works of Aristotle and certain physical and metaphysical writings 
 of Avicenna, Algazeli, and Alfarabi, as also the "Fountain of Life" of Avicebron (Ibn 
 Gebirol). The work entitled "De Causis'' (also called De causis caicsarum, De intelUgentiis, 
 De esse, De essentia purae bonitatis) on which David the Jew wrote a commentary, and which 
 was a compilation of Neo-Platonic theses, became widely circulated soon after 1150, in a
 
 THE REVOLUTION IN SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY ABOUT 1200. 431 
 
 Latin translation, as a work of Aristotle, and had an important influence in determining 
 the method of Alanus. The Theologia (also called De secretiore Aegyptiorum philosophia), 
 falsely ascribed to Aristotle, was known in a Latin translation at least as early as 1 200, 
 and perhaps still earlier. It was partly owing to the existence and influence of this work- 
 that at first Neo-Platonic doctrines were admitted among ihe Scholastics under the authority 
 of Aristotle. Probably this work, as also the De Causis and Avicebron's Fons Vitae, were 
 influential in determining the doctrine of Amalrich of Bena (who seems only to have taught 
 orally) and his pupils, although the essence of his doctrine was undoubtedly derived from 
 Scotus Erigona (as is clearly demonstrated by the reports of Henry of Ostia — in his Lecture 
 sive apparatus super quinque libris decretalium, printed in 1512, ad\. 1, 2, and copied by 
 Tennemann, by Kronlein, and by Iluber, in his Scotus Erigena, Munich, 18C1, p. 435 seq. — 
 and of Martinus Polonus, Chron., IV., copied by Iluber, p. 437, and by Haureau, Ph. Sc, 
 I. 412). Soon after the death of Amalrich (which took place in the year 1206 or 1207) it 
 became knoMm that his heresy was not confined to the proposition which he had openly 
 taught and which he had finally been forced to recant, viz. : that every believer must 
 regard himself as a member of tiie body of Christ, but that it rested on a pantheistic basis 
 and was connected with the many-branched heresy, which was then threatening the exist- 
 ence of the Church and with which the '^Eternal Gospel" (composed about A. D. 1200 by 
 Joachim of Flores, Abbot of Calabria, and a good Catholic, of whom Ernest Renan treats 
 in the liev. des deux Mondes, Vol. 64, July, 1866, pp. 94-142), and also still later, mystical 
 works (in particular, the Evangelium Sancti Spiritus of the Fratricelli. composed by John 
 of Parma, who lived 1210-1289) were in many respects tainted. God the Father — so 
 some of the Amalricans tauglit — became man in Abraham, and the Son became man in 
 Christ, who had abrogated the Jewish law. But now the time of the Holy Ghost had been 
 introduced, who had become incarnate in themselves and had abrogated also the institu- 
 tions and sacraments of the Church, and substituted knowledge and love in the place of 
 faith and hope. Not works, but the will and spirit, are decisive ; he who abides in love 
 does not sin. This heresy was exterminated by fire and imprisonment, and the study of 
 the physical works of Aristotle, in so far as they seemed to favor the heresj-, as also of 
 the works of Erigena, was prohibited by ecclesiastical decrees. In the year 1209 the Pro- 
 vincial Council, assembled at Paris under the presidency of Peter of Corbeil, Archbishop 
 of Sens, ordered, among other things, that neither the books of Aristotle on natural phi- 
 losophv, nor commentaries on the same, should be read, wliether piiblicly or secretly, at 
 Paris {nee lihri Aristotelis de naturali philosophia nee commenta legantur Parisiis puhlice vel 
 secreto). The historian Rigordus, or rather his continuator, Guillaume le Breton, reports 
 (inexactly) that the metaphysical writings of Aristotle (and it was to these that David of 
 Dinant really appealed), which had shortly before been brought from Constantinople and 
 translated from Greek into Latin, had been burned and the study of them prohibited, be- 
 cause they had given occasion to the Amalrican heresy. The continuator of the chronicle 
 of Robert of Auxerre says, not of the Metaphysics, but of the Physics of Aristotle {libri 
 Aristotelis. qui de naturali philosophia inscripti sunt), that the reading of it was forbidden by 
 the Council (in 1 209) for three years ; the same is related by Caisarius of Ileisterbach, who only 
 names libros naiurales. From this it might seem that in 1212 the' prohibition was removed. 
 Yet in the statutes of the University of Paris, which were sanctioned in the year 1215 by 
 Robert of Cour^on, the papal legate, the study of the Aristotelian books on dialectic, both the 
 " old " and the " new " books {i. e., the parts of the Logic of Aristotle which were previously 
 known and those which first became known about a. d. 1140) is ordered, while the study 
 of the works of Aristotle on metaphysics and on natural philosophy, as also of the com- 
 pendia of their contents, and of the doctrines of David of Dinant, Amalrich, and Mauritius,
 
 432 THE KEVOLUTION IN SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY — ABOUT 1200. 
 
 the Spaniard (by whom some conjecture that Averroes is intended, Mauritius being regarded 
 as a corrupted form of Mauvitius, a name sometimes given to Averroes) is forbidden. The 
 Ethica remained unprohibited, but exerted in the following decade only an inconsiderable 
 influence. By a bull of February 23, 1225, Pope Honorius III. commanded the burning 
 of all copies of the work of Erigena entitled Tvepl <i>vaEcjr /lepiafiov. In April, 1231, Pope 
 Gregory IX. directed that the libri naturales, forbidden by the Provincial Council for a 
 specific reason (which reason, according to Roger Bacon, was that these books contained 
 the doctrine of the eternity of the world), should not be used until they had been examined 
 and purified from all suspicion of error. From this limiting clause, and from the fact that 
 at about this same time all the works of Aristotle, including the Physics, began to be 
 expounded by the most esteemed doctors of the Church, and that in 1254, at Paris, the 
 Jfeiaph. and Phys. were ofScially included in the list of subjects to be taught by the 
 Faculias Artium, we may infer that the Scholastic theologians had learned gradually to dis- 
 tinguish the genuine Aristotle from the Platonizing expositions of him, and had perceived 
 that it was precisely the metaphysical basis of the dreaded heresy, namely, the hyposta- 
 tizing of the universal, which was most vigorously combated by Aristotle. Eoger Bacon 
 expressly testifies that the ecclesiastical prohibition remained only in force until 1237. 
 The doctrine of Aristotle acquired the greatest authority in the following time, when it 
 was customary to draw a parallel between him, as the '^ praecursor Christi in naturalibus," 
 with John the Baptist, as the " praecursor Christi in graiuitis." (How great his authority 
 was in the latter portion of the Middle Ages, is shown, among other things, by the litera- 
 ture of the " auctoritates " or " dicta notahilia" of which Prantl treats in the Sitzungsher. der 
 Miinchener Akad. der Wiss., 1867, II. 2, pp. 173-198.) Even before the judgment of the 
 Church had become more favorable, the Emperor Frederick II. caused the works of Aris- 
 totle, together with Arabian commentaries (especially those of Averroes), to be translated 
 into Latin, in Italy, imder the superintendence of Michael Scotus and Hermannus Aleman- 
 nus, with Jewish assistance. Tlie whole body of the works of Aristotle was at hand from 
 about A. D. 1210 to 1225 in Latin translations from the Arabic (Am. Jourdain, Jiech. crit, 
 2d ed., Paris, 1843, p. 212). Subsequently Robert Greathead and Albertus Magnus, among 
 others, and, in particular, Thomas Aquinas, labored to secure purer texts founded on direct 
 translations from the Greek, while Thomas of Cantimpre, "William of Moerbeka, Henrj' of 
 Brabant (the latter in about the year 1271, and in consequence of a request from Thomas 
 Aquinas) and others, did good service as translators. 
 
 While the application of dialectic to theology had been already in the first period a 
 characteristic of Scholastic philosophy, it was not until the second period that tlie dialectic 
 method of exposition, as adopted by the Scholastic philosophers, reached its highest de- 
 velopment. The means by which this development was attained, were the study of the 
 Aristotelian logic and metaphysics and the practice of Scholastic disputation. The method 
 consisted, first, in connecting the doctrines to be expounded, with a commentary on some 
 work chosen for the purpose. The contents of this work were divided and subdivided 
 until the separate propositions, of which it was composed, were reached. Then these 
 were interpreted, questions were raised with reference to them, and (for the most part in 
 strictly syllogistic form) the grounds for afBrming and for denying them were presented. 
 Finally the decision was announced, and in case this was affirmative, the grounds for the 
 negative were confuted, or, in the opposite case, the grounds for the affirmative. The 
 names of the persons holding the various opinions which were discussed, were, as a rule, 
 not given. No opinions were defended during this period, which were altogether original 
 and were not supported by some authority. (The truth of this latter statement, in what 
 belongs to the province of logic, has been demonstrated in detail by Prantl.)
 
 ALEXANDER OF HALES, BONAVENTURA, AND OTHERS. 433 
 
 § 99. Alexander of Hales (died 1245) was tlie lirst Scholastic who 
 was acquainted with the whole philosophy of Aristotle, and also with 
 a part of the Commentaries of the Arabian philosophers, and who 
 employed the same in the service of Christian theology. He did not/ 
 however (like Albertus Magnus), treat systematically of the separate 
 branches of philosophy as such, but merely made use in his Summa 
 Theologiae of philosophical doctrines for the demonstration of theo- 
 logical dogmas. William of Auvergne, Bishop of Paris (died 1249), 
 defended the Platonic theory of ideas and the doctrine of the substan- 
 tiality of the human soul ag-ainst Aristotle and Arabian Aristotelians. 
 As a Christian, he identified the whole complex of Ideas with the 
 second person of the Godhead. Robert Greathead, Bishop of Lincoln 
 (died 1252), combined Platonic with Aristotelian doctrines. Michael 
 Scotus is of importance in the history of philosophy, more as a 
 translator of the works of Aristotle than as an original author. 
 The learned Yincentius of Beauvais (died 1264), was rather an ency- 
 clopedist than a philosopher. Bonaventura (died 1274), the mystical 
 philosopher and scholar of Alexander of Hales, gave to the teachings 
 of Plato (as transformed by the Neo-Platouists and Church Fathers) 
 the preference over those of Aristotle, but subordinated all human 
 wisdom to divine illumination. There is greater merit, according to 
 Bonaventura, in the fulfillment of the monastic vows than in com- 
 mon morality, and the highest point which the human soul can 
 reach is mystical contemplation, which affords a foretaste of future 
 blessedness. 
 
 The Summa Universae Theologiae of Alexander of Hales was first printed at Venice in 1475, then at 
 Nuremberg in 14S2, Venice, 1576, etc. 
 
 The Works of William of Auvergne were i)ublished at Venice in 1591, and more accurately and com- 
 pletely by Blaise Leferon, at Orleans, in 1674. 
 
 The Summary of the eight books of Aristotle's Phyniat, by Robert Greathead of Lincoln, was printed 
 at Venice in 1498 and 1500, and at Paris in 1533; his Commentary on the Anal. Pout., at Venice several 
 times, and .at P.idiia in 1407. Cf, concerning him, Ileinhold Pauli, Bischof Grossete^te vnd Adam von 
 Marith, Tubingen (Vnir.-Sehrift). 1SG4. 
 
 Michael Scotus's Super Aiitorem Sphcrae w.is printed at Bologna in 1495. .and at Venice in 1631. his De 
 Sole et Luna at Strasbnrg in 16-22, and his Pe Chiromantia repeatedly in the fifteenth century. 
 
 Vincentius of Beauvais' Speculum Quadruphx: Naturale, Doctrinale. IlistoriaU, Morale, was 
 published at Venice in 1494, and Duaci 1624, the Speculum 2fat. et Doctrinale, Strasburg, 1473. and, with 
 the nistor., JSurembcrg, 148B. Of., on him, a work by Christoph Schlosser, published at Fraukfort-on- 
 the-Main, in 1819, Aloys Vogel, Univ.-Pr.y Freiburg, 1843, and Prantl, Gevch. der Lo'jik, III. pp. 77-85. Th« 
 "Mirror of Doctrine" was composed, according to Al. Voge), about a. d. 1250, the "Mirror of History" 
 about 1254; the "Mirror of Morals" was not written by Vincentius. but by a later author, between 1310 
 and 1320; this work, at least, contains later interpolations; but even the other parts are, according to 
 Prantl's belief {GeJioh. der Log., III. 87), not free from interpolations (which are found nevertheless in 
 MSS. of the fourteenth century). 
 
 The writings of Bonaventura were printed at Strasburg in 14S2, Rome, 158S-96, etc. Sonaventura» 
 opera, ed. A. C. Peltier, Besanfon et Paris, 1861, etc. Bonavent. opuso. duo praestantissima : Brevilo<f 
 28
 
 434- ALEXANDER OF HALES, BONAVENTURA, AND OTHERS. 
 
 et Jtinerarium mentis ad Deiim, ed. Car. Jos. Hefele, Sd edition, Tubinpen, 1862. Of him treat especially 
 W. A. HoUenberg {Studien zii Bmuiv., Berlin, 1S62; Bon. als Ttogmutiker, in Theol. Stud. u. Krit.^ 1868, 
 Hel't. 1, pp. 95-1311), and ]5ertiiaumier (Gesch. des keiUgen Bonwv. ins Deutsche ubersetet, Eegensbnrg, 
 1863); cf. the proper sections in the works above (p. 389) cited on MediPBval Mysticism. 
 
 The Summa Theologies of Alexan der of Hales — who was born in the county of Glou- 
 cester, joiued the Franciscan Oriier, and studiecl and taught at Paris, where he died in 
 1245 — is a syllogistical demonstration of ecclesiastical dogmas, following, though not 
 servilely, in part the Sentences of Hugo of St. Victor, and in part — more especially in its 
 arrangement — the similar work by Peter the Lombard. His work, however, is not the 
 first which bore the title of a Summa of theological doctrines, since before him Summ,<M 
 had been written by Robert of Melun and Stephen Langton, and, still earlier, "William of 
 Auxerre had composed an " Explanatio in quatuor sententiarum libros" which was printed 
 at an early date at Paris. But while earlier Scholastics had known only the Logic of Aris- 
 totle, and William of Auxerre, yielding to the commands of the Church, had ignored the 
 Physics and Metaphysics (he only mentions, in addition to the Logic, the Ethics of Aristotle), 
 Alexander of Hales first used the entire philosophy of Aristotle as an auxiliary of theology 
 in his, for the rest, strictly orthodox and papally recommended Commentary. Of the Ara- 
 bians, he notices, in particular, Avicenna, and rarely Averroes. Alexander of Hales is a 
 Realist. Yet he regards the Uhiversalia ante rem as being in the mind of G-od : " mundum 
 intelligibilem nuncupavit Plato ipsam rationem sempiternam, qua fecit Deus mundum.'''' They 
 do not exist as independent essences apart from God. They constitute the cavrSa exemplaris 
 of things ; yet they are not distinct from the causa efficiens, but are identical with it in 
 God. The Universale in re is the form of things (as Alexander assumes in agreement with 
 Gilbert de la Porree). Alexander's pupils honored him with the title o£ Doctor Irrefraga- 
 hilis. The Summa was finished after his death by his scholars, about a. d. 1252. Alex- 
 ander of Alexandria, who likewise belonged to the Franciscan Order, wrote the Glossae to 
 the Aristotelian Metaphysics, which were printed at Venice in 1572, and were sometimes 
 ascribed to Alexander of Hales. A pupil of Alexander of Hales, and his successor in the 
 Franciscan chair of instruction at Paris, was John of Rochelle, who gave special attention 
 to psychology. 
 
 - W-itti«Ba— o£-_AjiE£rgne, born at Aurillac, teacher of theology at Paris and Bishop of 
 Paris from 1228 onward (died in 1249), wrote works entitled De Universo and De Anima, 
 which were based in large measure on Aristotle, to whom, however, he only conceded 
 such authorit}'' as was consistent with the truth of ecclesiastical dogma. He also refers 
 frequently, though for the most part only for the purpose of combating them, to the doc- 
 trines of Alfarabi, Avicenna, Algazel, Avicebron, Averroes, and others. In his ideology 
 and cosmology "William of Auvergne follows Plato, whom, however, he knew only through 
 the Timaeus and Phaedo. Just as we are forced, on the ground of certain sense-perceptions. 
 to believe in the existence of material objects, as perceived by us through the senses, so 
 must we, in view of tlie facts of intellectual cognition, recognize the existence of intelligible 
 objects, which are reflected in our intellects {De Univ., 11. 14). The "archetypal world" 
 (immdus archetypus) is God's Son and true God {De Univ., 11. 17). In order to know the 
 intelligible, there is no need of an active Intellect external to us and separated from our 
 souls. Our intellects belong to our souls; and the latter exist independently of the body, 
 as separate substances, having need of the body as an instrument for the exercise of sen- 
 sual functions, but by no means as a condition of their existence; the soul is related to its 
 \iody, as the cithern-player to his cithern {De Anima, V. 23). 
 
 Robert Greathead (Robertus Capito. Grosseteste) , born at Strodbrook, in the county of 
 Suflfolk, educated at Oxford and Paris, for a time Chancellor of the IJniversity of Oxford,
 
 ALEXANDER OF HALES, BONAVENTURA, AND OTHERS. 435 
 
 intimately connected with the Franciscans, and a violent opponent of the Pope, died in 
 1253 while Bishop of Lincoln. He wrote commentaries on various works of Aristotle and 
 also on the mystical Theology of Pseiido-Dionysius. He distinguishes three kinds of 
 form : 1) form immanent in matter, which the Physicist considers ; 2) that form which is 
 abstracted by the understanding and is considered by the mathematician ; and 3) immaterial 
 form, which the metaphysician considers. Among the forms which are in themselves 
 immaterial and not simply separated in reflection from matter, he reckons, beside God and 
 the Soul, the Platonic Ideas. 
 
 Michael Scotus (born in 1190), who translated the Z>e Codo and De Anima of Aristotle, 
 together with the Commentaries of Averroes, and other works, was regarded as a learned 
 but heterodox philosopher. He wrote on astrology and alchemy, but his principal merit lay 
 in his translations. 
 
 Vincentius of Beauvais, a Dominican and teacher of the sons of Saint Louis, contributed 
 materially, by his comprehensive, compiled work, in which he touched, among other sub- 
 jects, upon philosophy, to the furtherance of encyclopedical studies in the Middle Ages. 
 He often cites Albertus Magnus, and sometimes even Thomas. 
 
 John Fidanza, born at Balneoregium (Bagnarea in Tuscany) in the year 1221, was sur- 
 named Bonaventura by Saint Francis of Assisi, the founder of the Franciscan Order, who 
 performed on him a miraculous cure in his youth, and became in his twenty-second year 
 a Franciscan and afterward (125G) the General of the Order. He was a pupil of Alexander 
 of Hales from 1243 to 1245, then of John of Rochelle, and, from 1253 on, the successor of 
 the latter in the professorial chair. He died in 1274, and was canonized in 1482. His 
 revering admirers named him " Doctor Seraphicus." Bonaventura developed further the 
 mystical doctrine begun by Bernard of Clairvaux on the basis furnished by Dionysius 
 Areopagita, and continued by Hugo and Richard of St. Victor and others. He was some- 
 what affected by the influence of Aristotelianism, but, after the manner of the earlier 
 Scholastics, in all questions which rose above mere dialectic, followed by preference 
 Plato in the sense in which the latter was then understood, i. e., as interpreted by Augus- 
 tine. Bonaventura affirms that, according to Plato, God was not only the beginning and 
 end of all things, but also their arclietypal ground (ratio exemplaris) ; but this latter doc- 
 trine, he adds, was disputed by Aristotle with arguments possessing no force. (This 
 judgment indicates that Bonaventura falsely identified the tlieory of the hypostatical 
 nature of tlie Ideas — which Aristotle disputed — with the doctrine of their existence in 
 God, which latter doctrine, however, was first advanced several centuries later by Philo, 
 whose point of departure w-as the Jewish conception of God, and by the Neo-Platonists 
 and Christian philosophers, who arrived at it by a theological transformation of the theory 
 of ideas.) Bonaventura adds, further, that from this error of Aristotle arose another, that, 
 namely, of ascribing to God no providential care of earthly thiugs, since he had not in him- 
 self the "ideas," by which he could be cognizant of them (whence it appears that Bona- 
 ventura conceived the Platonic ideas, which Aristotle opposed, as thoughts of the divine 
 mind). Further. Bonaventura censures the blindness of Aristotle in holding the world to 
 be eternal and in opposing Plato, who, conformably to truth, assigned a beginning to the 
 world and to time. But all human wisdom, even that of Plato, appears to him as folly in 
 comparison with mystical illumination. As regards his ethical doctrine, especial importance 
 belongs to Bonaventura's defence of the genuine Christian character of tlie monastic prin- 
 ciple of poverty, and of mendicancy as a means of obtaining the necessaries of life — a 
 principle on which the Franciscans, more than any other order of monks, laid stress. The 
 (.\ri3t0telian) ethical principle of the riglit mean between the too much and the too little 
 is valid, he says, only in common life ; but that type of life which is ordered according t«
 
 436 ALBERTUS MAGNUS. 
 
 the counsels of the Gospel, the vita supererogationis, to which poverty and chastity belong, 
 is of a higher order. Bonaventura does not hold every Christian to be bound to the imita- 
 tion of Christ in all things, but distinguishes three stages of Christian perfection: the 
 observance of the requirements of the law, the fulfillment of the spiritual counsels of the 
 Gospel and the enjoyment of eternal happiness in contemplation, and he regards the 
 attainment of the higher stages as reserved to ascetics. The mystical work of Bonaven- 
 tura, entitled SoUloquium, a dialogue between man and his soul, is in imitation of Hugo, 
 and the Itinerarium mentis in Beum, in imitation of Richard of St. Victor ; in his Medita- 
 tions on the Life of Jesus, written in a style at once popular and mystical, Bonaventura 
 follows more especially Bernard. 
 
 § 100. Albert of Bollstadt, born at Lauingen iii Swabia, in the year 
 1193, educated at Paris and Padua, a Dominican teacher at Paris 
 and Cologne, and from 1260 to 1262 Bishop of Regensburg, died at 
 Cologne 1280, and was called, on account of his extensive learning 
 and great talent as an instructor, " the Great" (Albertus Magnus) 
 and " Doctoi' Universalis.'''' He was the first Scholastic who repro- 
 duced the whole philosophy of Aristotle in systematic order, with 
 constant reference to the Arabic commentators, and who remodeled 
 it to meet the requirements of ecclesiastical dogma. The Platonisra 
 and Neo-Platonism, which in the earlier periods of Scholasticism had 
 been predominant in all those parts of philosophy which went beyond 
 logic (so far as these were at all cultivated at that time), were not 
 indeed wholly removed from them by Albert. On the contrary, they 
 exercised a not inconsiderable influence on his own philosophical 
 speculations, but through the greater influence of the Aristotelian 
 order of ideas were forced into the background. Albert was ac- 
 quainted with a number of Platonic and Neo-Platonic writings ; all 
 of the works of Aristotle were accessible to him in Latin translations 
 from the Arabic, and a few of them in translations from the Greek. 
 In a series of works, consistino- of commentaries on the works of 
 Aristotle and paraphrases of the same, Albert set forth the doctrines 
 of Aristotle, as modified to meet the views of the Church. The uni- 
 versal exists, according to him, in a threefold sense : 1) as universal 
 \ante rem, in the mind of God, according to the Neo-Platonic and 
 Augustinian teaching, 2) as universale in re, according to the doc- 
 trine of Aristotle ; and 3) as universale post rem, by which Albert 
 (understands the subjective concept, in which alone Nominalism and 
 Conceptualism had admitted the existence of the universal. In 
 speculative theology Albert separates strictly, in all cases, the doc- 
 trine of the Trinitv and the dosrmas connected with it from rational 
 or philosophical theology, in which particular he was followed by
 
 ALBERTUS MAGNUS. 437 
 
 Thomas. He taught, in agreement with the doctrine of the Church, 
 that the creation of the world was an act in time, rejecting the Aris- 
 totelian theory of the eternal subsistence of the world. In psychology, 
 his most important modification of the Aristotelian teaching was hia 
 uniting of the lower psychical faculties with that substance separate 
 from the body which Aristotle termed the Xous, bodily organs being 
 necessary, according to Albert, not to the existence of these faculties, 
 but only to their activity in the earthly life. The Ethics of Albert 
 rests on the principle of the freedom of the will. With the cardinal 
 virtues of the ancients he combines the Christian virtues, as virtues 
 of equal rank. 
 
 The Works of Albertns Magnus were published in twenty-one folio volumes by Petr. Jammy, Lyons, 
 ICol, his Phyx. and Metaph.^ Venice. 1518, per M. Ant. Zimaritim, De Coelo, ih., 1519. Of him treat Ru- 
 dolphus Noviomagensis (De Vita Alb. Magn., Cologne, 1499) and others, and, in more recent timea, 
 Joachim Sighart (Albertus Magnus, sein Leben nnd seine Wissenschaft, Eegensburg, 1S5T) and others; cf. 
 F. J. von Bianco, l>ie alte Universitdt Kbln, Part I., 1865 — in which work, among other things, a biography 
 of Alb. is coiit-iined — and M. Joel, Das Verhaltnis.i Alherfs d. G. su Jfoses 3/aimonkles, Breslau, 1S63 
 (cf above, cul § 97); Hanebcrs, Zur ErkenntnisftleJire (les Aricenna und Alb. Jf. (cf above, p. 407); 
 Prantl, Gesch. der Log.. III., S9-107. Albert's botanical work h:is been published by Jessen : Alberti 
 Jdagni de vegetabilibus Ubri septem, historiae naiuralis pars XVIII. : editionem criticam ab Ernesto 
 Mey o coeptavi absolvit Carolus Jessen, Berlin, 1S67. [O. i\^A.ma,\\\y, Albert le Grand, Paris, 1870. — Tr] 
 
 The year of Albert's birth was, according to the more probable authority, 1193; 
 btliers regard it as 1205. At Padua Albert studied philosophy, mathematics, and medi- 
 cine, and there, in the year 1221, he was induced by Jordanus the Saxon to join the 
 Dominican Order, after which lie pursued his studies in theology at Bologna. Begin- 
 ning in the year 1229, he taught philosophy during a series of years at Cologne and 
 other places. In 1 245 he began to teach at Paris, whence he subsequently returned to 
 CologDe as a teacher of philosophy and theology. To the latter place, though repeatedly 
 called away to till various ecclesiastical ofiBces, he always returned anew to his studies and 
 his professorial occupations. He died at Cologne November 25, 1280. Albert is said to 
 have developed slowly in his youth, and in his old age to have suffered from impaired 
 faculties (" Alhtrtus ex asino foetus est philosophy et ex philosopho asinzis "). Familiar as he 
 was with the Aristotelian doctrine, the historical course of development of Greek philoso- 
 phy in general remained unknown to him. He identifies Zeno the Eleatic with the 
 founder of Stoicism, calls Plato and Speusippus Stoics, and the like. In knowledge of 
 natural science he was distinguished above the most of his contemporaries. His works 
 fjive evidence of his very extensive erudition; yet he often fails in power to control the 
 results of his wide-spread investigations. In the spirit of system, in critical insight and 
 clearness of thought, his pupil, Thomas Aquinas, was far superior to him. In Com- 
 mentaries on Pseudo-Diouysius and in Minor works {De adhaerendo Deo, etc.) Albert trod 
 also the ground of Mj'sticism. 
 
 In the interpretation and presentation of the doctrines of Aristotle, Albert follows 
 principally Avicenna. He mentions Averroes more rarely, and generally only for the 
 purpose of opposing him ; still, he follows him occasionally, especially in his commentary 
 on the De Coelo. In many particulars he follows Maimouides, as one less removed than 
 the Arabian philosophers from ecclesiastical orthodoxy, especially in disputing against the 
 arguments for the eternity of the world.
 
 438 ALBEKTU8 MAGNUS. 
 
 While Anselm of Canterbury applies his principle " Credo, ut inteUigam,'^ especially to 
 the mystery of the Trinity and the mystery of the incarnation (in the Cur JDeus homo ?), 
 Albert, while searching constantly for rational arguments in support of the articles of 
 faith, and for the fortification of believers, the direction of the ignorant, and the refutation 
 of the unbelieving, yet excludes the specifically biblical and Christian doctrines of revelation 
 from the sphere of things knowable by the light of reason {Suraina Theol, 0pp., Vol. XVII. 
 p. 6 : et ex lumine quidem connaturali non elevatur ad scientiam trinitatis et incarnationis et 
 resurrecUonis). He asserts (p. 32) as a reason for this, that the human soul has power only 
 to know that, the principles of which it has in itself {anima enim humana nullius rei accipit 
 scientiam nisi illiits, cujus principia habet apud se ipsam), and since it finds itself to be a 
 simple essence, containing no trinity of persons, it cannot conceive of the Godhead as 
 tri-personal, except as illumined by the light of grace {nisi aliqua gratia vel illuminatione 
 altioris luminis suhlevata sit anima). Still Albert does not repudiate the Augustinian idea 
 that natural things contain an image of the Trinity. 
 
 Logic is defined by Albert ( 0pp., I. p. 5) as a speculative science, teaching us how to pass 
 from the known to the knowledge of the unknown {sapientia contemplativa docens qualiter 
 et per quae devenitur per notum ad ignoti notitiam). He divides it into the doctrine of In- 
 complexa, or uncombined elements, in regard to which it is possible only to inquire after 
 the essence, which is denoted by their definition, and of complexa, or combinations of these 
 elements, in connection with which the different modes of inferring are treated of. Phi- 
 losophia prima or Metaphysics treats of that which is, as such, according to its most 
 universal predicates, as which Albert designates, in particular, unity, reality, and goodness 
 [quodlibet ens est unum, verum, banum, 0pp., XVII. p. 158). Albert affirms the reality of 
 the universal, because, if the universal were not real, it could not with truth be predicated 
 of real objects. It could not be known if it did not exist in reality; it does exist as 
 form, for in its form lies the entire being of an object. There are three classes of forms, 
 and hence three modes of existence of the universal: 1) before the individuals, in the 
 divine mind, 2) in the individuals, as the one in the many, and 3) after the individuals, 
 as a result of abstraction, performed by us in thought {De Natura et Origine Animm Tr., 
 1,2: et tunc resultant tria formarum genera : unum quidem ante rem existens, qitod est causa 
 formativa ; aliud autem est ipsum genus formarum, quae fluctuant in materia ; tertium autem 
 est genus formarum, quod abstrahente intellectu separaiur a rebus). 
 
 The universal per se is an eternal emanation from the divine intelligence. It does not 
 exist independently out of the divine mind. The form present in material things, con- 
 sidered as the end of development (finis generationis vel compositionis suhstantiae desideraiae 
 a materia), is termed by Albert their reality {actus), but considered as including the full 
 being of the object {totum esse rei), it is termed their quiddity {quidditas). The principle of 
 individuation is to be sought in matter, in so far as this is the bearer or substratum {sub- 
 jectum, vTroKEi/iEvnv) of forms. The particular form of each object depends on the nature 
 and capacity of tlie matter of which it is composed {ibid., I. 2). Matter contains in itself 
 form potentially {potentia, it contains the potentia inchoationis formae, Summa Theol., II. 
 1, 4). Material generation or development is a process whose products are educed from 
 matter {educi e materia) through the agency of an actually existing cause. Variety in 
 material constitution is not the cause but the result of diversity of form {Phys., VIII. 1, 13) ; 
 \)ut all individual plurality depends on the division of matter (in Metaph., XI. 1 : indi- 
 viduorum multitudo fit omnis per divisionem, materiae). The matter of wliich any individual 
 object (hoc aliquid) consists, is hmited and distinguished by individuating accidents {termi- 
 nata et signata accidentibus individiiantibus). The particular is substantia prima, the universal 
 is substantia stcunda. The occasional denomination in Aristotle of the universal as a kind
 
 ALBERTU8 MAGNUS. 439 
 
 of matter — which language it is difficult to reconcile with the doctrine that it is the form 
 of a thing which constitutes its essence — is explained by Albert (in a manner similar to 
 that in which Avicenna explains it) by the distinction of this matter, which is so called 
 only in virtue of a logical usage, from real matter ; he holds fast to the proposition, that 
 the existence of the universal is formal and not material {De Intelkdu et Intelligihili, I. 2. 3: 
 esse universale est formae et non materiae). The universal is an essence fitted to give being 
 to a plurality of objects {essentia apta dare multis eSse. Per hanc aptitudinem universale est 
 in re extra). But its only actual existence is in the intellect. 
 
 Albert teaches, with Aristotle, that those effects which are last in the order of reality 
 are first iu the order of our knowledge, and constitute its point of departure (the posteriora 
 are priora qvaad nos, Summa Theol., I. 1, 5). From the experimental knowledge of nature 
 we must rise to the knowledge of God as the author of nature, and from the experience 
 of grace we ascend to the comprehension of the grounds of faith {Jides ex posterioribus 
 crediti quaerit intellectum). It is not the ontological, but the cosmological argument, which 
 makes us certain of God's existence. God is not fully comprehensible to us, because the 
 finite is not able to grasp the infinite, yet he is not altogether beyond our knowledge ; our 
 intellects are, as it were, touched by a ray of his light, and through this contact we are 
 brought into communion with him {lb., I. 3, 13). God is the universally active intellect, 
 which is constantly emitting intelligences from itself {De Caus. et Procr. Univ., 4. 1 : pri- 
 mum prindpium est indeficientur fluens, quo intellectus universalittr agtns indesinenter est 
 intelligentias emitteiui). God is simple, but he is not for tliis reason (as held by David of 
 Dinant) to be regarded as that which is most universal, and identified with the materia 
 universalis; for simple substances are distinguished from each other by themselves and not 
 by constitutive differences. Nothing can belong iu common to God and his creatures, and 
 hence past and future eternity cannot belong to both. The world was not created out of a 
 pre-existing matter — for God would be a being having need of something, if his working 
 presupposed an already existing matter — but out of nothing. Time must have had a 
 beginning, otherwise it would never have reached the present instant {Summa Theol., 11. 
 1, 3). Creation is a miracle, and cannot be comprehended by the natural reason, whence 
 the philosophers never advance beyond the principle, ex niliilo nihil fit, which is applicable 
 only to secondary causes and not to the first cause, and is of authority only in physics, and 
 not in theology {Summa de Creaturis, T. 1, 1 ; Summa Theol., II. 1, 4). 
 
 Only that whose existence is self-derived has by its very nature eternal being ; every 
 creature is derived from nothing, and would therefore perish, if not upheld by the 
 eternal essence of God {Summa Theol., II. 1, 3). By virtue of its community with God, 
 every human soul is an heir of immortality. The active Intellect is a part of the soul, for 
 in every man it is the form-giving principle, in which other individuals cannot share 
 {TntellecMs agens est pars animae et forma animae, Mttaph., XI. 1, 9). This same thinking 
 and form-giving principle bears in itself the forces, which Aristotle calls the vegetative, 
 sensitive, appetitive, and motive faculties, and hence these latter are, like the former, capa- 
 ble of being separated from the body, and are immortal. To tlie refutation of the mono- 
 psychism of Averroes, which, as Albert himself testifies, was then widely accepted, and 
 which asserted the unity of the immortal spirit in the plurality of human souls that are 
 constantly arising into existence and perishing, Albert, by command of Pope Alexander 
 IV., consecrated, in about the year 1255, an especial treatise {De unitate intellectus contra 
 Averroistas, 0pp., Vol. V. p. 218 seq.), which he afterward incorporated into Ids Summa 
 Theol. { 0pp., Vol. XVIII.) ; in it he opposes to thirty arguments, which might be advanced 
 iu favor of the Averroistic doctrine, thirty-six arguments of a contrary lieariug. In his 
 De Natura et Origins Animae (0;)p., Vol. V. f 182) and in his Commentary on the third
 
 440 THOMAS AQUINAS. 
 
 book of Aristotle's Dt Anima (Tr., II. ch. 7) he returns to this same controversy. H« 
 designates the opinion combated by him as an " error completely absurd, most wicked, 
 thoroughly reprehensible." 
 
 Between that which the reason recognizes as desirable, and that which natural pro- 
 pensity desires, free will (liberum arUtrium) decides ; through this decision desire is trans- 
 formed into perfect will {perfecta voluntas). The law of reason {lex mentis, lex rationis et 
 intellectus), which engages us to act or not to act, is conscience {conscieniia) ; this is inborn 
 and imperishable, m so far as it is the consciousness of the principles of action ; it is 
 acquired and variable in relation to single cases {unde lex mentis habitus naturalis est 
 quantum ad principia, acquisitus quantum ad scita). Albert distinguishes from conscience 
 the moral capacity, which he, like Alexander of Hales (after Jerome in his commen- 
 tary on the vision of Ezekiel, I. 4-10 : scintillae conscientiae, with reference to 1 Thess. 
 i. 5), calls synteresis or synderesis; the former is a habitus (ff<f), the latter only a potentia 
 (dvvancc). Virtue he defines with Augustine as a quality of goodness in the mind, pro- 
 ductive of right living and of no evil, and which God alone produces in man {bona qualitas 
 mentis, qua rede vivitur, qua mdlus male utitur, quam solus Deus in homine operatur). To the 
 four cardinal virtues of the ancients and the Aristotelian virtues which were joined with 
 them as "adjunct virtues," he gives the name of "acquired virtues," and adds to them, 
 in imitation of Petrus Lombardus, the three theological or "infused" virtues: faith, hope, 
 and love {Alb. 0pp., XVIII. pp. 469-480). 
 
 § 101. Thomas of Aquino was the son of Landolf, Count of 
 Aquino, and was born in 1225 or 1227 at the Castle of Roccasicca, 
 near Aquino in the territory of Naples (ancient Arpinum). He 
 received his first instruction from the monks of the Convent of Monte 
 Cassino, and in early life was induced to enter the Dominican Order 
 at Naples. He then continued his studies at Cologne and Paris, par- 
 ticularly under the guidance of Albert the Great, and became after- 
 ward a teacher of philosophy and theology at Cologne, Paris, Bologna, 
 Naples, and other places. He died March 7, 1274, in the Cistercian 
 Convent of Fossa Nuova, near Terracina, while on his journey from 
 Naples to the Council of Lyons, and was canonized during the pon- 
 tificate of John XXn., in the year 1323. He brought the Scholastic 
 philosophy to its highest stage of development, by efi^ecting the 
 most perfect accommodation that was possible of the Aristotelian phi- 
 losophy to ecclesiastical orthodoxy. He distinguished, however, the 
 specifically Christian and ecclesiastical doctrines of revelation — which, 
 in reply to the objections of their opponents, could only be shown by 
 the reason to 1)6 free from contradiction and probable — from those 
 doctrines which could be positively justified on rational grounds. 
 Besides commentaries on works of Aristotle and numerous philo- 
 sophical and theological monographs, he composed, in particular, the 
 three following comprehensive works : the Commentary on the
 
 THOMAS AQUINAS. 441 
 
 Sentences of Peter the Lombard, in wLich he discussed subjects of 
 theological controversy ; the four books of the De Veritate J^idei 
 Catholicae contra Gentiles (composed later, in 1261 and 1264), con- 
 taining a rational demonstration of theology ; and, lastly, the (unfin- 
 ished) Summa Theologiae^ in which all revealed doctrines were to be 
 systematically presented. Thomas agrees with Aristotle in regarding i 
 knowledge, and pre-eminently the knowledge of God, as the supreme 
 end of human life. On the question of universals he is a realist, in 
 the moderate Aristotelian sense. The universal, he teaches, is, in the 
 world of reality, immanent in the individual, being separated from it 
 only by the abstracting mind ; but our conception of the universal is 
 not hereby rendered false, so long as we do not judge that the univer- 
 sal exists independently, but simply make it alone the subject of our 
 attention and judgment. But Thomas recognizes, besides the uni- 
 versal in things or the Essence {XhQ forma substantiaiis or quidditas) 
 and the universal after things, or the concept which w^e form by 
 abstracting in thought the essential (the quidditas) from the acci- 
 dental (or the unessential attributes, forinae acoidentales)^ a form in 
 which the universal exists hefore things, viz. : as ideas in the divine 
 mind, i. e., as the thoughts which God, before the creation of the 
 w^orld, had of the things to be created ; it is only against the Platonic 
 theory of ideas, as represented by Aristotle, that, in agreement with 
 the latter, he assumes an attitude of decided opposition, rejecting as an 
 idle fiction the hypothesis of ideas existing independently (separately), 
 whether in things or in the divine mind. The existence of God is 
 demonstrable only a posteriori^ namely, from the contemplation of 
 the world as the work of God. There must be a first mover, or a 
 first cause, because the chain of causes and efiiects cannot contain an 
 infinite number of links. The order of the world presupposes an 
 orderer. God exists as pure, immaterial form, as pure actuality, wholly 
 free from potentiality ; he is the efiicient and final cause of the world. 
 The world has not existed from eternity ; it was called into existence 
 out of nothing by God's almighty power at a determinate instant in 
 time, with which instant time itself began. Yet the non-eternity of 
 the world in the past is not strictly demonstrable on philosophical 
 grounds, but only probable, and it is only made certain by revelation. 
 The immortality of the soul follows from its immateriality, since a 
 pure form can neither destroy itself nor, through the dissolution of a 
 material substratum, be destroyed. Immateriality must be ascribed
 
 4ri2 ■ THOMAS AQUINAS. 
 
 to the human intellect from the very nature of the latter. For the 
 intellect thinks the universal ; but if it were a form inseparable from 
 matter, like the soul of a brute, it could think only the individual, 
 and not the universal. Immateriality, further, is an attribute of the 
 whole soul, since the sensitive, appetitive, motive, and even vegeta- 
 tive faculties, belong to that substance, which possesses the power of 
 thought. The soul exercises the latter power without the aid of a 
 bodily organ, whereas the lower functions can only be exercised by it 
 through material organs. The human soul does not exist before the 
 body. It does not acquire its knowledge through the recollection of 
 ideas beheld in a pre-existent state, as Plato assumed. Nor does it 
 possess innate conceptions. Its thinking rests on the basis of sensuous 
 perceptions and of representative images, from which the active intel- 
 lect abstracts forms. The will depends on the understanding ; that 
 which appears good, is necessarily sought after ; but necessity arising 
 from internal causes and reposing on knowledge, is freedom. In 
 Ethics, Thomas adds to the natural virtues — in treating of which he 
 combines Plato's doctrine of the four cardinal virtues with the doc- 
 trine of Aristotle — the supernatural or Christian virtues, namely, 
 faith, love, and hope. 
 
 The complete works of Thomas Aquinas were published at Rome in 1570, in seventeen folio volumes; 
 at Venice in 1594, Antwerp, 1612, Paris, 1660, Venice, 1787, Parma, 1S52, etc. The editions of single works, 
 especially of the Summa Theologian, are extremely numerous. The source of information for his life is the 
 Biography incorporated in the Acta Sanctorum VJI. Mart., written by Gulielmus de Thoco, a contem- 
 porary of Thomas, together with the Acta of the process of canonization. Of recent works on Thomas and 
 his doctrine (many of which in the last few decades of years were occasioned by the Gtlntherian philosophy 
 and the ThomistSchoListic reaction against it), it may suffice to mention the following: Hortel, Th. v. A. 
 und seine Zeit, Augsburg, 1846 ; Carle, Ilistoire de la vie et des owvrages de iSt. Thomas, 1846 ; Montet, 3Ie- 
 moire sxt/r Thomas d'Aquin, in the transactions of the Acad, des so. morales. Vol. II., 1847, pp. 511-611; 
 Oh. Jourdain, La phllosophie de St. Thomas d^Aquin, Paris, 185S; Cacheux, De la philosophie de St. 
 Thojnas, Paris, 1S58; Liberatore. IHe Erkenntnisslehre des heiligen Thmnas von Aquino, ubersest von 
 E. Fram, Mayence, 1861 ; Karl Werner, Der h. Thomas von Aquino, Regensburg, 1S58, etc. (Vol. I. : Life 
 and Writings; Vol. II.: Doctrine; Vol. III.: History of Thomism), cf. Gaudin, Philosophia juxta D. 
 Thomae dogmata, new ed. by Roux Lavergne, Paris, 1861 ; (E. Plassman, Die Schule des h. Thomas von 
 Aquino, Soest, 1857-62); Anton Rietter, Die Moral des h. Thomas von Aquino, Munich, 1858; Oischinger, 
 Die speculatii^e Theol. des Th. v. Aqu., Landshut, 1858, and Quaestiones controversae de philosophia 
 seliolastica, ibid., 1859 ; Aloys Schmid, Die thomistische und scotistische Gewissheitslehre, Dillingen, 
 1859; Kuhn, Glauben und Wissen nach Thomas von Aquino, in the Tilb. theol. Quartalschri/t, 1S60, 
 No. 2; Heinr. Contzen, Th. von A. als volkswirthsch. Schriftsteller, ein Beitrag zur vation<tl-bkonom. 
 Dogmengesch. des Mittelalters, Leips. 1861 ; see the controversial works asainst the renewal of Thomism, 
 such as those by Giinther and Giintherians, and by Frohschammer, Michelis, and others: Knhn, Phi/osophie 
 und Theologie, Tiibingen, 1860 ; cf. those sections in the works on the history of philosophy in *he Middle 
 Ages, by Tenneman, Ritter, Haureau, and in the works on the history of dogmas and on Church history by 
 Mohler, Ncander, Baur, and others, which relate to this topic ; Jellinek, Th. von A., in the Md. Litt.. 
 Leipsic, IS.'iS. In the Review entitled Der Katholik, a number of articles have been published in different 
 years (IR.'ig seq.) containing a critique from Its (Tbomistic) stand-point of the recent literature bearing on 
 Thomas of Aquino. J ic. Merten, Ueber die Bedeutung der Erkenntnisslehre des heiligen Augustiniut 
 und des heiligen JTwmas von Aquino fur den gesch. Entudcklungagang der PhUoa. alt reiner Ver-
 
 THOMAS AQUINAS. 443 
 
 nun/twist., Treves, 1865. Albert Eitschl, Geach. Studien zur chriMichen Lehre von GoU, in the Jahrb. 
 fur deuisch« TheoL, X. pp. 277-318 (relating especially to the theology of Thoooas and Scotus). PrantI, 
 Getch. der Logik, 111. pp. 107-113. 
 
 Of the works of Thomas Aquinas which relate to philosophy, should be named (in addition to the three 
 larger ones above luentioiiucj, viz. : the (Joumientary on the Sentences, the iiumma <xmt?a GenHlts and 
 (Suii.ma TUeol.), in particular, ihe following: Commentaries on Arist. de interpret^ Anal poster., Jfeiaph. 
 J'hys^ Pa7-va Naturalia, De Aimna, Eth. Nic., I'olit, Meteor., De CoeU> et Mundo, De Gen. et Corr. and 
 on the Liber de cauHis ; an early work entitled De Elite et Essentia, and numerous other minor treatises 
 such as De I'riiuiipio Jndividuationis, De I'ropoidt. McdaliUus, De Eallaciis, De ^temitute Mundi De 
 Ji/'atura Jiateriae, etc. Several other treatises are either insullicieutly authenticated (De Kdtura SuUo- 
 gismorwM, De Jnventione Medii, De Demonstratione, etc.) or are probably sjiurious (De Natura Acci- 
 dentia, De iVatwra Generia, De FturaHtate Formarwm, De Intellectu et Intelligibili, De Oniversalibut 
 etc.). 
 
 The relation of philosophy to theology in the doctrine of Thomas is most distinctly 
 expressed by him in the following words : "It is impossible for the natural reason to 
 arrive at the knowledge of the divine persons. By natural reason we may know those 
 things which pertain to the unity of the divine essence, but not those which pertain to the 
 distinction of the divine persons, and he who attempts to prove by the natural reason the 
 trinity of person.s, detracts from the rights of faith" (Sum. Theol, I., Qu. 32, Art. 1). In 
 like manner the Church's doctrines of the creation of the world in time, of original sin, of 
 the incarnation of the Logos, of the sacraments, purgatory, the resurrection of the flesh, 
 the judgment of the world, and eternal salvation and damnation, are not to be demonstrated 
 by natural reason. These revealed doctrines are regarded by Thomas as above, but not 
 contrary to, reason. As regards these doctrines, reason can confute arguments, which are 
 adduced in opposition to faith, either by showing them to be false, or by showing that 
 they are not binding {solvere rationes, quas inducit (adversaritis) contra Jidevi sive osten- 
 dendo esse falsas, sive ostendendo non esse necessarias). Reason can also find out for them 
 analogies or probable reasons (thus Thomas himself, in the steps of Augustine, dlus- 
 trates the mutual relation of the persons of the Trinity by the analogy of the soul, the 
 Son, in particular, corresponding with the understanding, and the Spirit with the will); but 
 it cannot from its own principles advance to the demonstration of those dogmas. The 
 cause of this inability is, that reason can only conclude from the creation to God, in so far 
 as God is the principle of all existence; but the creative power of God is common to the 
 entire Trinity, and belongs, therefore, to the unity of essence, not to the distinction of per- 
 sons {S. Th., I., Qu. 32, Art. 1). The demonstration of the doctrines peculiar to Christianity 
 is only possible when the principle of revelation is admitted and faith is given to the 
 documents of revelation. But that which necessitates this admission and this faith is to be 
 found partly in an inward moving of God, who invites us to faith [interior instinctus Dei 
 invitantis), and partly in the miracles, in which are included the fulfilled prophecies and 
 the triumph of the Christian religion. The indemonstrableness of the doctrines of faith is 
 a source of the merit attaching to faith as an act of confidence in the divine authority. In 
 the realm of faith the will has the pre-eminence {jwincipalitatem). The intellect assents to 
 the articles of faith in obedience to the command of the will, and not because forced to do 
 so by proof. The truths cognizable by natural reason are the preambles of faith {jprae- 
 amhula fidei), just as, in general, nature precedes grace and is not nullified by it, but per- 
 fected {gratia naturam non tollit, sed pei-ficit). It is the praeambula fidei, and only these, 
 that are the subject of demonstrative arguments {rationes demonstrattvae, Summa Theol., 
 II. 2). But only a few are able in this way really to perceive the truths cognizable by 
 natural reason : hence God has included them in his revelation. In so far, therefore, aa 
 the praeamhda fidei are themselves propositions to be believed, they are the prima credi- 
 bilia, the basis and root of all others. By its demonstrations of the praeambtda fidei, and
 
 i 
 
 4-44 THOMAS AQUmAS. 
 
 by showing that the dogmas reserved for faith alone are not refutable by reason and are 
 probable, natural reason subserves the interests of faith {naturalis ratio sxdjservit fidei). 
 
 This so precise determination of tlie boundaries of philosophical or natural theology, as 
 opposed to the revealed doctrines of Christianity, was due to the influence of the mono- 
 theism of Aristotle and his Arabian and Jewish commentators. None of the earlier Scho- 
 lastics and none of the Church Fathers expressed the distinction in this manner. That it 
 was thus made by Thomas cannot be ascribed to the influence of the Platonic or Areopa- 
 gitic doctrine, in which, the rather, the trinitarian idea was ever accustomed, now in a 
 more rational, and now in a more mystical form, to find its support; Thomas was influenced 
 rather by the fact that with Aristotle the unity of the divine essence was identical with the 
 unity of the divine person. This distinction between the teachings of reason concerning 
 God and the teachings of revelation continued prevalent (although opposed by Raymundus '|i 
 
 LuUius and others), and was even more strongly emphasized in the later periods of Scho- 
 lasticism by the Nomiualists. It appeared also in the post-Scholastic period, not indeed 
 among the renewers of Platonism, who appealed to Plato and Plotinus and their disciples "i 
 
 in confirmation of the dogma of the Trinity, but in the schools of Descartes, Locke, and 
 Leibnitz, until the Critical Philosophy of Kant withdrew not only the trinity, but as well 
 the unity of the divine person, from the sphere of doctrines susceptible of theoretical or 
 rational demonstration, and relegated all conviction respecting God and divine things to 
 the province of mere faith — faith not indeed in the teachings of revelation, but in the pos- 
 tulates of the moral consciousness — while the schools of Schelhng and Hegel again vindi- 
 cated the right of the doctrine of the Trinity, speculatively modified or interpreted, to a 
 place in rational theology. In this — but on the basis of Catholic Christianity — the latter 
 were imitated by Giinther and his disciples, who excluded from the sphere of reason only the 
 fiistorical mysteries of Christianity, but failed to secure the approbation of the ecclesiastical 
 authorities. Thomism is now the ruling doctrine in the Catholic Church ; and in Protestant 
 theology, also, the (Thomist) distinction prevails. The decree, approved at Paris in the 
 year 1271, asserting the supremacy of theology over philosophy (ap. Du Boulay, III. 
 p. 398 ; cf. Thurot, De Vwig. de Venseign. dans Vuniv. de Paris, Paris, 1850, p. 105 seq.), 
 and directing that no instructor in the Philosophical Faculty should treat of any speci- 
 fically theological question (such as the Trinity and the Incarnation), favored the same 
 distinction. 
 
 The logical and metaphysical basis of philosophy is with Thomas, even more decidedly 
 than with Albert, the Aristotelian, although not without certain modifications derived 
 partly from Platonism and partly from Christian theology. The Thomist doctrine of con- 
 cepts, judgments, syllogisms, and proofs, is the doctrine of Aristotle. Metaphysics is 
 made by hija conversant with " being, as such, and its modifications " {ens in quantum ens 
 et passiones entis). In itself each ens is res and ununi, ; in distinction from others, it is 
 aliquid; as in harmony with the action of the knowing faculties, it is verum; and as harmon- 
 izing with the will, it is honum. Thomas holds with Albert the conciliatory and almost 
 iiominalistic form of Reahsm, which was taught by Aristotle, and according to which the 
 universal is in reality immanent in the individual, from which it is by us mentally abstracted 
 and regarded independently in consciousness. Yet Thomas does not altogether reject the 
 Platonic doctrine of ideas, but only in certain regards. If, namely, by ideas are understood 
 independently existing generalities, then Aristotle was right in arguing against these ideas, 
 as against meaningless fictions {Universalia non habent esse in rerurn natura ut sint universa- 
 lia, sed solum secundum quod sunt individuata, De Anima, art. 1. Universalia iwn sunt res 
 subsistentes, sed habent esse solum in singularilms, Contra Gent., I. 65). But taken in another 
 sense — in which sense the doctrine of ideas is supported by the authority of Saint Augus-
 
 THOMAS AQUINAS. 4i5 
 
 tine — Thomas recognizes the theory of ideas as unobjectionable, viz. : when the ideas are 
 understood as tlioughts immanent in the divine mind, and when their action upon the sen- 
 sible world is conceived as merely indirect {Ctmtra Gentiles, III. 24: formae qiuie sunt in 
 materia, venerunt a formii, quae sunt sine materia, et quantum ad hoc, verificatur dictum 
 Platonis, quod/onnae separatae sunt principia formarum, quae sunt in materia, licet posuerit eas 
 per se suhsistentes et causantes immediate formas sensibiliuin, nos vera ponimus eas in intellectu 
 existentes et causantes formas inferiores 2>er motum, coeli). Thomas admits, therefore, the 
 existence of the universal in a threefold sense : ante rem, in re, post rem (In Sent., II., dist., 
 III., qu., 3). The cause, according to Thomas, which led Plato falsely to conceive the 
 universal as possessing hypostatic existence, lay in his erroneous supposition that we could 
 have no certain knowledge of abstract truth, unless the universal not merely possessed a 
 reality of some sort, but also existed in the same manner in our thought and in external 
 reality {Su7nma TheoL, I. 84 : credidit (Plato), quod forma cogniti ex necessitate sit in cog- 
 noscente eo mx>do, quo est in cognito, et ideo existimavit quod oporteret res intellectas Iwc modo 
 in se ipsis subsistere, sc. immaterialiter et immobiliter). Thomas demonstrates tlie incorrect- 
 ness of this view by showing, in the steps of Aristotle, what is the nature of the process 
 of abstraction. Just as the senses in their sphere are able to separate what realiter is not 
 separate, — as the eye, e. g., perceives only the color and shape of an apple, and not its smell 
 and taste, — so, and much more even, the mind can effect the like purely subjective separa- 
 tion by considering in the individuals only the universal (De Poientiis Animae, ch. 6 : quia 
 Ucet principia speciei vel generis numquam sint nisi in individuis, tamen potest apprehendi 
 animal sine Tiomine, asino ei aliis speciebus, et potest apprehendi homo non apprehenso Socrate 
 vel Platone, et caro et ossa non apprehensis his carnibus et ossibv^, et sic semper intellectas 
 f&rmas dbstractas, id est superiora sine inferioribus, intelUgit). Thomas goes on to prove that 
 this subjective abstraction (a(j>aipemg) in thought is not vitiated by the fact of its not being 
 founded on an objective distinction and separation (xupiof^og) of things, employing the same 
 argument which was employed in the twelfth century by the author of the De Tatellectibvs 
 (see above, p. 396), the argument, namely, that the separation effected in thought apper- 
 tains not to our judgment of the true state of the case, but is only an incident of the 
 action of our minds, of the act of attention or apprehension (ibid. : nee tamen falso inteUigit 
 intellectus, quia non judical hoc esse sine hoc, sed apprehendit et judical de uno non judkando 
 de altera). If, as thus appears, the universal has no substantial existence in the sphere 
 of reality, it must yet possess reality in some other form, because all science respects the 
 universal, and would be illusory if the universal were without all reality ; the truth of 
 knowledge depends on the reality of the objects of knowledge. The universal exists in 
 reality in the individual, as the one in the many, as the essence of things or their quid- 
 ditas ; the intellect performs only that act of abstraction whereby the universal becomes, 
 in the intellect, the one beside the many. 
 
 The individualizing principle (principiurn individuationis) is matter, in so far as it is the 
 substratum of forms or is bounded by determinate limits (Materia non quomodolibet accepta 
 est principium individuationis, sed solum materia signata, et dico materiam signatam, quae sub 
 certis dimensionibus consideratur : De Ente et Essentia, 2). Into the detinilion of man, matter 
 in general (materia non signata) alone enters (in so far, namely, as man, as such, does not 
 exist without matter) ; into the definition of Socrates, the matter, which is peculiar to him, 
 would enter, if Socrates (the individual as such) could be defined (Prima dispositio materiae 
 est quantitas dim^nsiva, Summa Th., III. qu. 77, art. 2. This doctrine rests on tlie propo- 
 sition which Aristotle (Met.. I. 6) opposes to the theory of the Platonists. who asserted 
 that the idea was the principle of unity, and matter that of indeterminate plurality: 
 (^iverai & £k fudg vAvf fiia rpdnet^a, 6 de to eldog ETTicpEpuv clf uv noXXag nocel). Thorn ists
 
 446 THOMAS AQUINAS. 
 
 (notably, for example, ^gidio Colonna, and, later, Paolo Soncini and others) employed the 
 expression : " matter quantitatively determined " {materia qrianta) to denote the principle 
 of individuation, and referred, in justilication, to the teaching of Thomas (in the Summa c. 
 Gent., IT. 49 et al. : principium diversitatis individuorum ejusdem speciei est divisio materiae 
 secundum quantitatem ; De Princ. Indiv., fol. 207: quantitas deterniinata dicitur principium 
 individuationis). But this quantitas determinata, according to Thomas, is not the cause, but 
 only the condition of the existence of individuals. It does not create the individual sub- 
 stance, but accompanies it inseparably and determines it in its actual and present form 
 (hie et nunc, Be Pr. Jnd., ibid.). It can, indeed, be objected to this doctrine, and was 
 objected by Realists, who saw in the foryn the principle of individuation, that quantum 
 denotes a quantity already possessing individual determination, and that this determination 
 is left unexplained. Moreover, since Thomas admits the existence of " separate " or 
 immaterial forms (formae separatae), he teaches that these are individualized by them- 
 selves, since they have no need for their existence of a form-receiving substratum 
 (Formae separatae eo ipso, quod in (dio recipi nan possunt, hahent rationem primi subjecti, et 
 idea se ipsis individicantur ; — multiplicatur in eis form.a secundum rationem formae, secundum 
 se et non per aliud, quia non recipiuntur in alio : omnis enim talis multipUcatio muUiplicat 
 speciem, et ideo in eis tot sunt species, quot sunt individua, De Nat. Mat, ch. 3 ; cf Be Ente, 
 eh. 3). The correctness of this conclusion of Thomas may, indeed, be questioned. If the 
 cause of individual existence is contained in a form-receiving principle (in a v-jronElfirn'ov, 
 subjecftim, or in some form of matter), then, if we admit that there are forms having an 
 independent existence, we must of course admit with Thomas, that in them the form is ita 
 own substratum {suhjectu,m, vwoKsi/iEfov). But the question is, whether we should not 
 rather infer from the principle first laid down, that there are no " separate forms " which 
 exist as individual essences, that all mere forms are merely universal (and hence, e. g., that 
 the intellects of men are one in the Averroistic sense), and that all individuality depends 
 on some kind of material existence. Duns Scotus (in imitation of earlier opponents of, 
 Thomas, who, about 1276, had already advanced similar objections) raised the question, 
 how, if the doctrine of Thomas was true, the soul, which was immaterial, could be multi- 
 plied [apud B. Thomam individuatio est propter materiam; anima autem in se ipsa est sine 
 materia ; qttomodo ergo potest multiplicari) ? 
 
 Aristotle had regarded the Deity and the active intellect {vovq voiTjriKdc), which was the 
 only immortal part of the soul, as immaterial and yet individual forms ; yet it is not per- 
 fectly clear how he conceived the relation between this immortal intellect and the individual 
 soul into which it was reputed to enter from without. Among his earliest successors, the 
 naturalistic leaning toward the conception of all form as immanent in matter, gained 
 ground more and more ; on this conception rest the doctrines of Dicajarch and Strato. Alex- 
 ander of Aphrodisias conceded to the Deity, but to the Deity alone, a transcendent, immate- 
 rial, yet individual existence ; but he represented the soul as completely dependent on matter 
 in all that relates to its individual existence. The later Exegetes, disciples of Neo-Pla- 
 tonism, defended the doctrine of the individual, independent existence of the human intel- 
 lect (vovc:), as well as that of the Deity, and in this they were followed by Thomas, in 
 especial opposition to the Averroistic conception ; and Thomas also, like Albert, ascribed 
 to the soul, regarded as substantial and separate from the body, not only the highest func- 
 tions, which are implied in thought, but also the lower ones. 
 
 Thomas discrimmates between several classes of forms. Immaterial forms (formae 
 separatae) are God, the angels, and human souls ; the forms of sensible objects are insepara- 
 bly united to matter. 
 
 God is the absolutely simple form ; he is pure actuality. God's being is indeed per S4
 
 THOMAS AQUINAS. 447 
 
 oertain, because his essence is identical with his being, so that the predicate of the pro- | 
 position, " God is," is identical %vith the subject. But God's being is not immediately '• 
 certain for us, because we do not know what God is. God's existence, so far as our 
 knowledge is concerned, is sometliing to be proved, and the grounds for this proof are to be 
 sought in that which is more knowable for us, although not most knowable in itself, i. e., 
 in the works of God (Summa Th., I. 2, 1). This methodical principle is the Aristotelian 
 principle that the prior {irporepov) or more knowable {yvupiiiurepov) by nature {(pvaet) must 
 be learned by us from that which is prior or more knowable for us {7j/uv yvupifiuTcpov or 
 TTpdrepov ■:Tpog rjuac,), i. e., the conditioning from the conditioned. Accordingly, Thomas 
 represents God as only a posteriori knowable for us, and regards those proofs, which, like 
 Anselm's, are founded on the mere conception of God, as not binding. The system of 
 faith, which presupposes the existence of God, proceeds from the consideration of God to 
 the consideration of the created world; but in philo.sophy we must advance from the 
 knowledge of creatures to the knowledge of God. When Thomas Aquinas says: God 
 cannot be known a priori, he means by a priori knowledge that which Aristotle means by 
 the same expression, viz. : a knowledge of things derived from the knowledge of their 
 causes (which is obviously impossible in the case of the uncaused supreme cause), and not, 
 according to the modern Kantian modification of that expression, knowledge which is 
 wholly independent of experience. In a certain sense, says Thomas, man has naturally 
 (naturaliter) the knowledge of God. He has it in so far as God is for him the happiness 
 (beatitudo) for which he naturally seeks ; for seeking implies a kind of knowledge. But for 
 certain and clear knowledge proof is necessary ; the existence of God is neither a mere 
 article of belief, nor, like those propositions whose predicates are already contained in the 
 concept of the subject {S. Th., T. 2, 1), an axiomatic or self-evident truth (it is not an 
 " analytical judgment " in the Kantian sense; and of " synthetic judgments a priori" there 
 are, according to Thomas, none). After mentioning two arguments against the existence 
 of God, of which the one is taken from the presence of evil in the world — which, it is 
 affirmed, is incompatible with the existence of an infinite goodness — and the other from 
 the possibility of tracing all natural results to nature and ail intended ones to human 
 thought and will, Thomas proposes (Summa Th., I., qu. 2, art 3) the following proofs of | 
 God's existence: 1. There must be a first unmoved principle of motion (after Arist., 3fet., 
 XII. 7). 2. The series of active causes cannot recede in infinitum, because in all regular 
 causal series the first terms in the series are the causes of the middle terms, and these are 
 the causes of the last. (The finiteness of the number of terms, which was to be proved, is 
 here presupposed by Thomas). 3. The accidental depends on the necessary, and the 
 necessary either on something else that is necessary or on itself; hence, since this series 
 also cannot extend backwards in infinitum, there must exist a necessary being, the cause 
 of whose necessity is not to be found anywhere but in himsElf, and which being is the 
 cause of necessity for other things. 4. There are foimd in things different degrees of per- 
 fection ; hence there is something which lias the highest degree of perfection and is, there- 
 fore, the cause of the perfection, goodness, and reality of all other things; that is, there 
 exists a most perfect or most real being. 5. Natural objects, which have not the power 
 of knowledge, nevertheless act as if with intelligence; but that which has no knowledge 
 can only then work with an appearance of intelligence, when it is directed by a knowing 
 being, as the arrow is directed by the archer. Natural causes are therefore insufficient for 
 the explanation of the processes of nature, and tliere must be assumed to exist an intelli- 
 gent being as their guide and ruler. Thus the ultimate explanation of natural effects and 
 also of human actions, in so far as they imply an unconscious adaptation of means to ends, 
 cannot be found in nature and the human mind, but must be referred to God as their first
 
 448 THOMAS AQUINAS. 
 
 cause ; the existence of evil does not conflict with this, since God overrules for good the 
 evil which he permits. 
 
 I Thomas follows Albert in refuting the pantheistic doctrine of Amalrich of Bena and 
 \ David of Dinant, that God is the essence of all things, and hence either their forma univer- 
 \ salts, which Amalricli may have taught, or the Tnateria ^miversalis, as professed by David. 
 
 This doctrine was maintained on the ground that, if God were not himself the most uni- 
 versal of things, he would be distinguished therefrom by a specific difference, and so 
 consist of genus and differentia, and consequently not be simple ; but only inasmuch as he is 
 the absolutely simple being can God be the absolutely necessary being. Thomas denies 
 that all diversity implies specific differences and a generic agreement. Two objects, he 
 says, may suffer absolutely no comparison with each other (may be completely disparate), 
 and such is the relation between the infinite and the finite {quod differant non aliquo extra 
 se, sed quod differant potius se ipsis. In Lihr. II. Sent., Distinct. XVII., qu. 1, art. 2). 
 
 All beings, says Thomas, except God were created by God. At the creation God chose 
 from the various possible worlds the best one, and gave to it reality. The world has not 
 existed from eternity, but only since a definite moment, with which moment time itself 
 
 II began. Thomas regards the creatureship of the world not as a matter of mere faith, but 
 I as scientifically demonstrable (by the above cited proofs of the existence of God as the 
 \ author of the world), but the beginning of the world in time he regards as only an article 
 \ of faith and not pliilosophically demonstrable ; the arguments of Aristotle for the past 
 
 eternity of the world are in his view not conclusive, and yet he is at the same time just as 
 far from ascribing to the philosophical arguments for the beginning of the world in time 
 full demonstrative force. The dictum : The efficient cause must precede in time that which 
 It causes {oportet, ut causa agens praecedat duratione suuni causatum), is, he says, not true in 
 relation to a perfect cause ; God could by his almighty power create an eternal world. 
 That the world was created from nothing does not (as Albert and his predecessors had 
 assumed) prove its temporal origin; for "from nothing"' (ex nihilo) implies only the non- 
 existence of anything from which tlie world was made {non esse aliquid, unde sit factum, or 
 non ex aliquo); but this non-existence does not need to be referred to a temporal past, and 
 "from nothing " {ex nihilo) implies something which followed after this nothing (post nihilum), 
 not necessarily in the sense of temporal succession, but only in that of order {posterius 
 secundum ordinem naturae). Nor woidd the world, if eternal, be like God in essence ; for 
 the world is subject to constant change in time, while God is unchangeable. The principle 
 of the impossibility of a regressus in infinitum in causis efficientibv^ offers no difficulty, for in 
 tlie world there are only intermediate causes, and the absolute cause is not involved in the 
 question of the world's eternity. If the incompatibility of the past eternity of tlie world 
 with the immortality of the individual human soul be affirmed (an objection afterward 
 renewed by Luther), on the ground that in the past infinity of time there must have come 
 into being an infinite number of souls, which could yet not actually co-exist, Thomas 
 rejoins, that at least the angels, if not men, could have been created from eternity. 
 Accordingly, Thomas affirms : mundum incipisse {initium durationis liohuisse) sola fide 
 tenetur, " that tlie world had a beginning in time, is an article of mere belief." The pre- 
 servation of the world, Thomas, with Augustine, conceives as an ever-renewed creation 
 {Contra Gent., II. 38; S. Th., I. qu. 46 and 104). Cf. Frohschammer, Ueher die Ewigkeit der 
 Welt, in the Athendum, I., Munich, 1862, p. 609 seq.). 
 
 The angels were the first and the noblest creatures of God. They have their being not 
 through themselves, but from God ; their being is not identical with their nature. They 
 are not absolutely simple. The plurality of angels is a plurality of individuals; but since 
 they are immaterial, the difference between them in the sense explained above (p. 446) caa
 
 THOMAS AQUINAS. 449 
 
 only be conceived of as of the same nature with the difference between species ; as many 
 as are the individuals, so many are the species {tot sunt species, quot sunt individua). 
 Among the angels must be classed the intelligences which move the stars. That the stars 
 are moved, not by a physical, but by an intellectual cause (hence either by God or by 
 angels), Thomas holds to be apodictically certain, and that they are moved by angels he 
 regards as rationally probable {C. Gent, III. 23 et al). (Cf. A. Schmid, Lie peripatetisch- 
 scholastische Lehre von den Gestirngeistern, in the Atlienaum, I., Munich, 1862, pp. 549-589). 
 Like the angels, so also the souls of men are immaterial forms, formae separata^. 
 Tliomas accepts the Aristotelian definition of the soul as the entelechy of the body, as also 
 the Aristotelian division of the psychical functions; but ascribes to the same soul, which 
 as votif, or rational soul, has individual and yet immaterial existence and is separable from 
 the body, the animal and vegetable functions, so that for him the form-producing principle 
 of the body, the anima sensitiva, appeiitiva, and motiva, and, finally, the anima raiionalis, 
 are all one and the same substance. (This doctrine attained at the Council of Tienne, 
 1311, to the authority of a dogma.) The vegetative and animal faculties, which Aristotle 
 conceived as necessarily connected with the body, are represented by Thomas (as by 
 Albert) as depending only in their temporal activity on bodily organs. The intellect alone 
 works without an organ, because the form of the organ would hinder the correct knowledge 
 of other forms than itself (Comm. de An., III. 4; S. Tli., I., qu. 75, art. 2). God and the 
 active and passive human intellects are related to each other as are the sun, its light, and 
 the eye ( QtiodUoeta, VII., VIII.). The forms, which the passive intellect takes from the 
 external world through the senses, are rendered really intelligible by the active intellect, 
 as the colors of bodies are made really visible by the light, and through abstraction they 
 are raised by the same agency to an independent existence in our consciousness. All 
 human knowledge depends on an influence of some sort exerted by the objects known 
 on the knowing soul. There is no knowledge that is innate and independent of all expe- 
 rience. He who is deprived of a sense wants the corresponding conceptions ; one born 
 blind has no conception of colors. The human intellect needs, in order to its earthly 
 activity, a sensuous image (phaniasma), without which no actual thought is possible for it, 
 although the senses as such grasp, not the essence of things, but only their accidents. 
 {S. Th., I., qu. 78, art. 3: sensus non apprehendit essentias rerum, sed exieriora accidentia 
 solum. S. Th., I., qu. 84 (cf. qu. 79) : Intellectus agens facit phantasmaia a semilms accepta 
 intelligibilia per modum ahstractionis cujusdam. lb., qu. 84 : Impossibik est inteliectum nos- 
 trum secundum praesentis vitae statum, quo passihili corpori conjungitur, aliquid inteUigere in 
 aciu, nisi convertendo se ad 2}Jiantasmata. Et hoc driobus indiciis apparet. Prima quidem, 
 quia quum intelkctus sit vis quaedam non utens corporali organo, nuUo modo impediretur in suo 
 actu per laesionem alicujus corporalis organr, si non requireretur ad ejus actum actus aliaijv^ 
 piotentia^ utentis orgctno corporali. Utuntur autem organo corporali sens^is et imaginatio et 
 aliae vires periinentes ad partem sensitivam, unde manifestum est, quod ad hoc quod intellectus 
 actu intelUgat, nan solum accipiendo scientiam de novo, sed etiam utenda scientia jam acquisita, 
 requiritur actus imaginaiionis et caeterarum virtutum. Videmus enim, quod impedito actu 
 viriutis imaginatively per laesionem organi, ut in phrenetici^, et similiter impedito actu metnoro- 
 tivae virtutis, ut in lethargicis, impeditur homo ah intelligendo in actu etiam ea quorum scientiam 
 praeaccepit. Secundo, quia hoc quilibet in se ipso e^cperiri potest, quod quando aliquii- conatur 
 aUquid inteUigere, format sibi aliqua phantasmata, per modum exemplorum, in quihus quasi, 
 inspiciat quod inteUigere stud/'t. Et inde est etiam quod quando aliquem volmnus facere aliquid 
 inteUigere, proponimus ei exempla, ex quihus sibi phantasmata formare possit ad intelligendum. 
 Hujus autem ratio est, qicia potentia cognoscitiva proportionatur cognosdbili. Unde intellectus 
 angelici, qui est iotaliter a corpore separatus, objectum proprium est substantia intelligibilis a
 
 f 
 
 450 THOMAS AQUINAS. 
 
 corpore separata^ et per hujusmodi intelligibile materialia cognosdt; intelledns autem Tiumani, 
 qui est conjuncius corpori, proprium ohjectum est quidditas sive natnra in materia corporali 
 existens, et per hujusmodi naturas visibilium rerum etiam in invisibilium rerum aliqualem cog- 
 nitionem ascendit, de ratione autem hujiis naturae est, quod non est absque materia corporali. — 
 aS";; autem proprium ohjectum intellecitis nostri esset forma separata, vel si formae rerum sensi- 
 bilium subsisterent non in jiarticularibus secundum Platonicos, non oporteret quod intellectus 
 noster semper intelligendo converteret se ad phantasmata). 
 
 Tlie Averroistic theory of the unity of the immaterial and immortal intellect in all men 
 {intelledum sxdistantiam esse omnino ab anima separatum esseque unum in omnibus hominibus), 
 wherebj' individual immortality was rendered theoretically impossible, is termed by Thomas 
 an " error indecentior" which had for some time been acquiring influence with many per- 
 sons, lie argues partly against the correctness of the Averroistic interpretation of Aris- 
 totle, and partly against the Averroistic teaching itself. In opposition to the interpretation, 
 he asserts that it results clearly from the words of Aristotle, that the active intellect, in 
 the opinion of Aristotle, belonged to the soul itself (qu^d hie intellectus sit aliquid animae), 
 that it was not a material faculty and that it worked without a material organ, and that it 
 therefore existed separate from matter and entered from without into the body, after the 
 dissolution of which it could still remain active. Against the truth of the Averroistic 
 doctrine Thomas advances the arguments that the possession by man of an intellect sepa- 
 rate from the soul would not justify us in calling man himself a rational being, while yet 
 rationality is the specific difference which separates man from the brutes, that with reason 
 you take away at the same time the will, and therefore the moral character, and finally, 
 that the necessary relation of thought to sensuous images (phantasmata) could not subsist 
 in an intellect separated from the soul. But the theory of the unity of tlie active intellect 
 in all men seems to him absurd, because there would follow from it the individual unity of 
 different persons and the complete similarity of their thoughts, consequences that contra- 
 dict experience. But it must be remarked that these objections are only pertinent in case 
 the one intellect separable from all individuals is interpreted, not as the one common mind 
 existing in the plurality of rational individuals, but as an intellect existing individually for 
 and by itself externally to them. 
 
 Thomas pronounces himself equally opposed to the doctrine of the pre-esistence of the 
 human soul, and in favor of the doctrine of its continued existence after the termination of 
 its terrestrial life. To the Platonic doctrine of pre-existence he opposes the argument that 
 for the soul, as the " form " of the body, union with the body is natural, and separation, if 
 not contra, is at least praeter naturam, hence accidental, and therefore also subsequent to 
 tmion {quod convenit alicui praeter naturam, inest ei per accidens; quod autem per accidens est, 
 semper posteriris est eo quod est per se. Animae igitur privs convenit esse unilam corpori quam 
 
 I esse a corp)07-e separatam). God creates the soul outright, as soon as the body is prepared 
 for it (C. Gent, II. 83 seq.). But the immortality of the soul follows from its immateriality. 
 ' Forms which inhere in matter are destroyed by the dissolution of this matter, as are the 
 souls of animals on the dissohztion of their bodies. But the human soul, which, since it 
 has the power of cognizing the universal, must subsist apart from matter, can neither be 
 destroyed by the dissolution of the body with which it is united, nor by itself, since neces- 
 sary being is implied in the very conception of form, which is actuality, and such being is 
 therefore inseparable from such form [S. Th., I. 75, 6: impossibile est, quod forma subsistens 
 desinat esse). (Tliis argument is similar to that of Plato in the Phaedo, viz. : tliat life is 
 inseparable from the soul according to the very idea of the latter.) Thomas joins with 
 this the argument drawn from the longing of the soul after immortality, and founded ou 
 the principle that a natural longing cannot remain unsatisfied. The desire of unending
 
 THOMAS AQUINAS. 451 
 
 being is natural to the tliinking soul, because the latter is not confined in its thoughts by 
 the limit of the Now and the Here, but is able to abstract from every limitation, and desire 
 follows knowledge (S. Th., I. 15). Immortality belongs not merely to the tliinking power, 
 but also to the lower powers, for all of these belong to the same substance with the 
 thinking power, and depend only for their active manifestation, not for their existence, on 
 bodily organs (lb., qu. 7G : dicendvm, est, quod nulla alia forma svbstantialis est in homine nisi 
 sola anima inidlectiva, et quod ipsa sicut virtute continet animam sensitivam et nuiritivam, ita 
 virtute continet omnes inferiores formas et facit ipsa sola quidquid imperfectiores formae in aliis 
 faciunt — Anitna intelkdiva habet non solutn virtutem irdelligendi, sed etiam virtutem sentiendi, 
 lb., qu. '?G, art. 5). Since this thinking and feeling soul is at the same time the form-giving 
 principle of the body, it forms for itself after death, by means of this very power, a new 
 body, similar to its former one (Summa c. Gent., IV. 79 seq.). 
 
 In Ethics Thomas follows Aristotle in the definition of virtue and in the division of the 
 virtues into ethical and dianoetic, the latter being also ranked by him, as by Aristotle, as 
 the higher. iTe ranks, further, the contemplative life, in so far as the contemplation is 
 theological, above the practical. But to the philosophical virtues, chief among which 
 Thomas, with Albert, reckons the four cardinal virtues, he adds the theological virtues of 
 faith, love, and hope; the former, as acquired virtues, lead to natural happiness, but the 
 latter, the theological virtues, as being infused by God {virtutes in/usae), lead to super- 
 natural happiness. Thomas's doctrine of virtue is made still more complicated by his 
 adoption (after Macrobius) of the Plotinic distinction between civil, purifying, and perfect- 
 ing virtues {virtutes poliiicae, purgatoriae, exemplares). The will is not subject to the neces- 
 sity of compulsion — where compulsion is opposed to desire — but to that necessity which does 
 not destroy freedom, the necessity of striving after ends. Voluntary action is self-action, 
 t. c, action resulting from an internal principle {Moveri volunta/rie est moveri ex se, id est a prin- 
 cipio intrinseco, Summa Th., I., qu. 105). The animal, confined as he is to the particular, 
 judges of ends by instinct, but man does so freely and after comparison by the reason (ex 
 collatione quadam rationis). By caUing up one or another class of ideas we can control our 
 decisions. The choice lies in our power ; still, we have need of divine help in order to be 1 
 truly good, even in the sphere of the natural virtues, which, if man had not fallen, he could I 
 have practiced by his own strength. The moral faculty (synderesis or sy7iteresis), which 
 was not destroyed by the fiill of man, cannot be a mere potentiality. It is a habitus quidam, 
 nafuralis principiorum operabilium, sicut intellectus habitus est principionim speculabilium ; — 
 conscientia est actius, qico scientiam nostram, ad ea quae agimus, applicamus. Highest and per- ' 
 feet happiness is the vision of the divine essence; and this, since it is a good which sur- 
 passes the power of created beings to produce, can only be given to finite spirits by the 
 agency of God {Summa Th., I., qu. 82 seq.; II. 1 seq.). 
 
 In 1286 Thomas was made a doctw ordinis by the Dominicans; afterward the Jesuits 
 also adopted substantially his teaching. His authority early became so generally recog- 
 nized in the Church beyond the circle of his order as to justify the title of honor, " Doctor 
 universalis." Still more frequently was Thomas called " Doctor angelicus." Of his immediata 
 disciples, the most noteworthy arc ^gidius of Colonna, of Rome, an Augustinian monk 
 extolled as Doctor fuvdatissimus (1 247-1316) ; the Dominican monk, Hervasus Natalis (Her- 
 vaeus of Nedellec in Brittany), renowned as an opponent of the Scotists (died at Narbonne 
 In 1323); Thomas Bradwardine (died 1349), who upheld strongly the doctrine of deter- 
 minism, in opposition to the semipelagianism of the Scotists, and William Durand of St. 
 Pour9ain (Durandus de S. Porciano, died 1332, called ^^ Doctor resolutissimus"), who, how- 
 ever, from being a supporter of Thomism, V)ecame ite opponent, and prepared the way for 
 nominalism. We may mention also ./Egidius of Lessines — who defended the Thomist doo
 
 452 JOHANNES DUNS SCOTUS. 
 
 trine in a work entitled De Unitate Formae, written in 1278 — and Bernardus de Trilia 
 (died 1292), who wrote Quaestiones de Cognitione Animae, and Johannes Parisiensis (about 
 1290), who was perhaps the author of the ''■ Defevsorium" of the Thomist doctrine against 
 the ^^ Correciorium fratris T/iomae," written (in 1284) by William Lamarre, a Franciscan; 
 the Defensorium (printed at Venice in 1516) has usually been ascribed to JEgidius Romanua. 
 Farther, Gottfried of Fontaines {de Fontibus), the teacher at the Sorbonne, from whose 
 Quodlibeta, composed about A. D. 1283, Haureau {Ph. Scol, II. p. 291 seq.) gives some 
 extracts, favored Thomism. Dante's poetry is also based on the doctrine of Thomas (cf. 
 V'ol. II., § 3, of this work, and especially the work there cited of Ozanam on Dante and 
 the Cath. Philos. in the thirteenth century, Paris, 1845; cf. also Wegele, Dante Alighierfs 
 Leber, und Werke, 2d ed., Jena, 1865 ; Charles Jourdain, La philosnphie de St. Tlumias 
 di'AqvAn, II. p. 128 seq., and Hugo Delff, Dante Alighieri, Leipsic, 1869. Delff points out, 
 in particular, the influence of Platonism and Mysticism in the works of Dante). Of the 
 later Thomists, the most prominent was Franz Suarez, who died in 1617. Of him, as the 
 last chief of Scholasticism, K. "Werner has written at length (in a work published at 
 Regensburg in 1861). 
 
 § 102. Johannes Duns Scotus, born at Dunston, in Northumber- 
 land (or, according to others, at Dun, in the North of Ireland), distin- 
 guished himself in the Franciscan Order as a teacher and disputer, 
 first at Oxford, then, in 1304 and the following years, at Paris, and 
 in 130S at Cologne, and died while still young (according to the 
 ordinary account at the age of thirty-four) at Cologne, in November, 
 1308. As an opponent of Thomism he founded the philosophical and 
 theological school named after him. His strength lay rather in acute, 
 negative criticism of the teachings of others, than in the positive 
 elaboration of his own. Strict faith in reference to the theological 
 teachings of the Church and the philosophical doctrines corresponding 
 with their spirit, and far-reaching skepticism with reference to the 
 arguments by which they are sustained, are the general characteristics 
 of the Scotist doctrine. After having destroyed by his criticism their 
 rational grounds, there remains to Scotus as the objective cause of the 
 verities of faith only the unconditional will of God, and as the subjec- 
 tive ground of faith only the voluntary submission of the believer to the 
 authority of the Church. Theology is for him a knowledge of an essen- 
 tially practical character. Duns Scotus limits the province of natural 
 theology by reckoning not only, with Thomas, the Trinity, the incar- 
 nation, and the other specifically Christian dogmas, but also the 
 creation of the world out of nothino; and the immortalitv of the 
 human soul, as among the propositions which reason cannot demon- 
 strate, but can only defend as being beyond the reach of refutation 
 and as more or less probable, and which revelation alone rendered 
 certain. Still he by no means aflarms in principle the antagonism of 
 
 1
 
 JOHANNES DUNS SCOITJS. 453 
 
 reason and faith. In philosophy, the authority of Aristotle is not so ' 
 great with him as with Thomas; he adopts many Platonic and Neo- 
 Platonic conceptions, with which he became familiar especially through 
 Avicebron's (Ibn Gebirol's) " Fountain of Life." All created things, 
 says Scotus, have besides their form some species of matter. Not 
 matter, but form, is the individualizing principle; the generic and 
 specific characters are modified by the individual peculiarity, which 
 is what renders an object capable of being designated as "this" 
 (gives it its haccccitas). The universal essence is distinct, not only 
 in the intellect, but also in reality, from the individual peculiarity, 
 although it does not exist apart from the latter; the distinction is not 
 merely virtually present in things and afterward realized by the mind, 
 but it exists formally in the things themselves. The soul unites in ] 
 itself several faculties, which differ from one another, not realitei\ as 
 parts or accidents or relations, but formaliter^ as do unity, truth, and 
 goodness in God (the £ns). The human will is not determined by 
 the understanding, but has power to choose with no determining 
 ground. The undetermined freedom of the will is the ground of the 
 merit of that self-determination which is in conformity with the 
 divine will. 
 
 There exists only the following complete edition of the works of Dnns Scotus: Joh. DwmH Scoti, 
 doctoris nubtUis ordinU minorum, opera omnia coUecta, recognita, notis et seholiis et commeutariis lU., 
 Lyons, 1639. This ediiuin was prepared by the Irish fathers of the Koraan College of St. I^idorus; Lucns 
 Wadding, the annalist of the Franciscan Order and principal editor of the edition, is ordinarily named as its 
 editor. It does not contain the Positioa, i. e., the Comuieataries on the Bible, but only the philosophical 
 and dogmatic writings (qiuie ad rem epeculaiivam spectant or t issertatioius sctioUisticas). Vol. 1. 
 J^Qicalia. II. Comment, in librog Pfri/sic. (»i>nrUms); Qruwttiones supra liOros Arist. de anima. III. 
 Traatutus de rerum pri/icipio, Theoremata, CoUationen, etc. IV. Exprnnitio in Metaph., Coiichudo-nes 
 metapfiy«icae, QiuteMtionea itupra libroa Metaphtjisicorum. V.-X. LHxtindiones in quatuor libroa sen- 
 teniiarum, the so-c;vlled Opus Oxonieiue. XI. Jieportatorum Parimieyisium Ubri qiuituor, the so-called 
 Opwi PariHense, the Commentary on the Sentences of Petriis Loiiibardus, which was written down by 
 persons who heard his lectures at the University of Paris (in Erdmaiin's judgment less perfect in exjwsitory 
 form, though, in some of its theorems, indioiting greater maturity than the Opus Oxonienee). XII. <^uaes- 
 ttones quodlibetales. The Quaentiones quod HbetiileH was published separately, Venice, 1506, the Reporiata 
 i-uper IV.l. sententiaruni, Paris, 1517-18, and by Hugo Cavellus, Cologne, 163.% the Quaestiones in Ar. kg., 
 1520 and 1622, Super libros de aniin<i, 152S, and by Hugo Cavellus, Lyons, 1625, the Distinctiones in 
 quatuor libros senientiarurn,hy "ilnfio Cavellus, Antwerj), 1620. Among the earlier works on Scotism, 
 that of Joannes de Reda is particularly instructive. It is entitled: Controrernae theologicae inter S. 
 Tfimnam et ScMum sniper quatuor libros senteniiamm, in qnibus pugnantes nententiae re/eruniur, 
 potiores difficiMates ehicidantur et responsiones ad argumenta Scoti rejiciuntur, Venice, 1599, oud 
 Cologne, 1620. A Summa Theol. was compiled from the works of Duns Scotus by the Franciscan monk 
 Uieronymus de Fortino; a general exposition of the Scotist doctrine is given hy Fr. Eleuth. Alberponi in 
 )x\% Resolutio docirinae Scoticue, in qua qii id Doctor subtil is cifca ftingu7<is quas exagitat quaeMonfS 
 demtiat, bretifer ostenditur. Lyons, 164.3. Of more recent authors, Baumgarten-Crusius has written a />« 
 thtol. Scoti. Jena, 1S26. The philosophical system of Scotus is described in the larger histories of philoso- 
 phy; cf. also Erdinann, Andeutungen iiber die wissenschaftlic/ie Stelluny des Duns Scotus. in the TTifol. 
 Studien und Kr., 18a3, No. 3, pp. 429-451, and Ordr. der Gesddchte der Philos., 1. § 213-215; Pr»ntl, 
 Geseli. der Log., III. 202-232.
 
 454 JOHANNES DUN8 8COTU8. 
 
 In the doctrine of Duns Scotus, as in that of Thomas, philosophy was made ahnost 
 throughout ancillary to theology in all that concerns the general and specifically Christian 
 dogmas. Theologia Naturalis was indeed confined by Scotus within narrower limits, but it 
 was not abolished. Natural reason, said Scotus, conducts to the beatifying vision of 
 God, but needs to be completed by revelation. It does not conflict with the teachings of 
 revelation, and, so far from being indifi'erent in its relation to these teachings, it furnishes 
 them with an essential support. As a theologian, Scotus defended the doctrine, first made 
 a dogma in our times, but which is in complete correspondence with the spirit of Catholi- 
 cism, the doctrine of the immaculata conceptio B. Virginis, whereas Thomas had not yet 
 recognized it. The criticism of the opinions of others, which is the predominant charac- 
 teristic in the writings of Scotus, is not a speculation with reference to the nature or prin- 
 ciples of Scholasticism, and tending to the destruction of Scholasticism ; for his object 
 remains always the establishment of a harmony between philosophy and the teaching of 
 the Church. His doubting is not to the prejudice of faith ; he says {In Sent, III. 22) : 
 Faith does not exclude aU doubt, but only victorious doubt {nee fides excludit omnem dubita- 
 tionern, sed dulitationem vincentem). Although, therefore, Scotus' critique of the validity of 
 the arguments for Christian doctrine might and necessarily did prepare the way for the 
 rupture between philosophy and theology, and although some of his utterances went 
 beyond the limit which he prescribed for himself in principle, Scotism is none the less, like 
 Thomism, one of the doctrines In which Scholasticism culminates. 
 
 The relation of Duns Scotus to Thomas of Aquino was similar to that of Kant to Leib- 
 nitz. Thomas and Leibnitz were dogmatists ; Duns Scotus and Kant were critics, who 
 disputed more or less the arguments for the theorems of natural theology (especially those 
 for the existence of God and the immortahty of the soul), but did not deny the truth of 
 the theorems themselves ; both founded the convictions, for which the theoretical reason 
 no longer furnished them with proofs, on the moral will, to which they assigned the 
 priority over the theoretical reason. A fundamental difference is indeed to be found in tlie 
 circumstance that for Duns Scotus the authority of the Catholic Church, for Kant that of 
 the personal moral consciousness, is the court of final appeal, and in the further circum- 
 stance that Kant's critique is radical and universal, while that of Scotus was only partial. 
 But as Scotus to the doctrines of the Church, so Kant to the convictions of the universal 
 reUgious consciousness ever maintains the positive relation of one who assents to them in 
 that particular sense in which that consciousness understands them. 
 
 Having enjoyed in his youth the advantage of discipline in mathematical and other 
 studies. Duns Scotus knew what was meant by proving, and could therefore recognize in 
 most of the pretended proofs ofiTered in philosophy and theology no real proofs. At the 
 same time the authority of the Church was in his view sacred and inviolable. The har- 
 monious combination of the desire for scientific exactness with the disposition to accept 
 with faith the Church's dicta, characterizes the ''Doctor subtilis." With him logic is a 
 science, like physics, mathematics, and metaphysics. But in theology, notwithstanding 
 that its object is the highest of all objects, he finds it difficult to recognize the characteristics 
 of a science, because it maintains itself only on grounds of probability and is of much greater 
 practical than theoretical importance. 
 
 With Albert and Thomas, Duns Scotus agrees in assuming a threefold existence of the 
 imiversal: it is be/ore things, as form in the divine mind; in things, as their essence {quid- 
 ditas), and after things, as the concept formed by mental abstraction. He, too, condemns 
 nominalism and vindicates for the universal a real existence, on the ground that otherwise 
 our knowledge through concepts would be without a real object; all science, he says, 
 would resolve itself into mere logic, if the universal, to which all scientific knowledge
 
 JOHANNES DUNS SC0TU8. 455 
 
 relates, consisted merely of rational concepts. Reality seems to him in itself indifferent in 
 relation to universality and individuality, so that both can equally belong to its sphere. 
 Biit Duns Scotus is not at one with his predecessors on the subject of the relation of the 
 universal to the individual. The universal should not, according to him, be identified with 
 the form nor the individualizing principle with the matter; for the individual, as the ultima 
 realitas, can, since individual existence is not a deficiency, only through the addition of 
 positive determinations arise from the universal, i. e., only when the universal essence or 
 the quidditas is completed by the individual nature (haecceitas). Just as animal becomes 
 homo, when to life the specific difference of humanitas is added, so Jiomo becomes Socrates, 
 when to the generic and specific essence the individual character, the Socratitas, is added. 
 Hence also the immaterial can be individual in the full meaning of this term ; the Thomist 
 view, that in angels species and individual coincide, and that, therefore, every angel is 
 alone in its kind, is to be rejected. In the single object the universal is not only virtualiter 
 but formuUter distinct from the individual, but not separated from it, as one thing is sepa- 
 rated from another thing. Duns Scotus seeks to prevent the confounding of his doctrine 
 with the Platonic doctrine (in the sense in which, from the accounts of Aristotle, he under- 
 stands and combats that doctrine. Opus Oxon., II., dist. 3 : Report. Paris., I., dist. V. 36 ; 
 Theorem., 3 et al). 
 
 The most universal of all concepts is, according to Duns Scotus, the concept of Being 
 {Ens, see De An., qu. 21). This concept is of wider signification than are the logical cate- 
 gories, or it is a '-transcendent" concept, for not only the substantial is, but also the acci- 
 dental is ; in like manner it is more general than the concepts God and the world, for being 
 is a predicate of both, and that, too, not merely aequivoce (not by mere homonymy, simi- 
 larity of words without similarity of meaning). Yet this concept is not properly to be 
 called the highest generic concept, for the genus presupposes likeness of category; no 
 genus can at once include what is substantial and what is accidental. Hence the expres- 
 sion " generic concept " is inapplicable to the concept Ens, and, in general, to all trans- 
 cendental concepts. The other transcendentaUa besides Ens are called by Duns Scotus 
 passiones Entis, or modifications of being. He distinguishes {Metaph., IV., n. 9) two kinds 
 of them, the simple {unicae) and the disjunctive (disjunctae). Among the former he reckons 
 One, Good, True (unum, bonum, verum); among the latter identity or difference (idein vel 
 diversvm), contingence or necessity {contingens vel necessarium), and actuality or potentiality 
 (actus vel potentia). The distinction of equal and unequal, like and unlike, can also be 
 regarded as transcendent, when not referred merely to the categories of quantity and 
 quality (Opus Oxon., I., dist. 19, qu. 1). 
 
 God, as being actus purus, is absolutely simple. His existence, according to Scotua, 
 does not follow for us from the mere idea which we have of him [ex teiininis), nor is it 
 demonstrable a priori, i. e., by reasoning from his cause, since he has no cause, but only 
 a posteriori, i. e., from his works. There must be an ultimate cause superior to all else, 
 which cause is at the same time the ultimate end of all things, and this is God. Scotus 
 admits, however, the impossibility of arriving in this way — i. e., by arguing from tAe finite 
 — at the strict demonstration of anything more than the existence of one ultimare cause, 
 on which all things finite depend. It is impossible in this way to prove the existence of 
 an absolutely almighty cause, or the creation of the world out of nothing {Opus Oxon., I., 
 dist. 42 ; Rep. Paris., I., dist. 42 ; Quodlib., qu. 7). In so far as man is the image of God, 
 self-contemplation may furnish him a point of departure from which he can rise via emi- 
 nentiae to the knowledge of the divine nature {Opus Oxon., L, dist. 3). 
 
 Everything which is not God, including the created spirit, has matter and form. But 
 the matter which underlies the human soul and the angels, is very different from that of
 
 456 JOHANNES DUNS SCOTUS. 
 
 which bodies are composed. Duns Scotus calls matter, when not yet determined by form 
 ■materia prima, but makes a further, threefold distinction between materia primo-prima, the 
 most universal basis of all finite existence, created and formed immediately by God, materia 
 secundo-prima, the substratum in which generatio and corruptio take place, and which is 
 changed and transformed by the second or created class of agents {agentia creata or secun- 
 daria), and materia tertio-prima, the matter which is shaped by the artist, or, in general, 
 by any external agent, after it has received, through the internal operation of nature, a 
 natural form, and before it has as yet been shaped in agreement with the form intended by 
 the artist. The materia secundo-prima is a materia primo-prima distinguished by the mark 
 of perishability, and the materia tertio-prima is a materia secundo-prima determined by 
 natural generatio. There exists no matter besides the first-named, but only this under 
 various forms {materia prima est idem cum mnni viateria particulari). In connection with 
 the theorem that every created substance, whether spiritual or corporeal, has some form 
 of matter, Duns Scotus expressly affirms his adhesion to the doctrine of Avicebron (whom 
 Albert and Thomas had opposed), saying: '^ ego autein ad positionem Avicembronis redeo." 
 (Cf. Avicebron's doctrine, above, § 96, and in Munk, Mel., p. 9 seq.) Like Avicebron, so 
 also Scotus regards as that which is most universal, matter, absolutely undetermined, 
 which, since it is undifferentiated, is the same in all created beings {quod unica sit materia), 
 so that the world appears to him as a gigantic tree, whose root is matter, whose branches 
 are all perishable substances, whose leaves are the changeable accidents, whose fruit the 
 angels are, and which God planted and cares for {Be Rerum Princ., qu. VIII.). Duns 
 Scotus, the hierarchist and enemy of the Jews, who even held it justifiable to resort to 
 the compulsory agency of the secular power to force Jews into the Church, had no sus- 
 picion that Avicebron, on whose teachings his own were founded, was the Jew Ibn 
 Gebirol, whose songs were highly esteemed in the synagogue. 
 
 The fundamental proposition of Scotus in psychology and ethics was this : voluntas est 
 superior inteUeciu, the will is superior to the intellect. The will is the moving agent in the 
 moving element in the whole realm of the soul, and everything obeys it. In his doctrine 
 of the speculative functions Scotus agrees mostly with Thomas. He too opposes, even 
 more decidedly than his predecessor, the theory of in-born knowledge ; he does not admit 
 such knowledge even in the angels, in whom Thomas represents God as having implanted, 
 by radiation from himself, intelligible forms. The intellect forms universal concepts by 
 abstraction from perceptions. It is unnecessary that between knowledge and its object 
 there should subsist an equality {aequalitas), but only a proportion between the knowing 
 agent and the object known {proportio motivi ad mobile). Thomas, says Scotus, taught 
 incorrectly, that the lower is unable to know the higher. In the act of perception Scotus 
 teaches that the soul is not a mere recipient, but an active participant. He emphasizes 
 still more the activity of the soul in the higher speculative functions, and especially in its 
 free assent to propositions which are not absolutely certain. Besides external perception, 
 which takes place per speciem impressam, Scotus recognizes an intuitive act of self-appre- 
 hension on the part of the soul per speciem expressam, quam reflexione sui ipsius supra se 
 exprimit; for, he says, through its essence alone the soul is not conscious of itself, but 
 attains to self-consciousness only when in itself it produces out of its essence the image 
 {species) of itself {Be Rerum Princ, qu. XV.). But Scotus' doctrine of the will is entirely 
 different from that of Thomas. Thomas teaches the determination of the will, Scotus its 
 mdetermination. Thomas affirms the doctrine of predestination in the strict, Augustinian 
 sense of the term. Scotus teaches a doctrine of Synergism not far removed from Pela- 
 gianism. According to Thomas, God commands what is good, because it is good; according 
 to Scotus, the good is good, because God commands it. The relation between the under-
 
 CONTEMPOEAKIES OF THOMAS AND SCOTUB. 457 
 
 Standing and the will in us is an image of the same relation as it exists eminenter in God. 
 The fundamental psychical powers in us are an imago of the persons in God, and thus 
 render possible for us a certain natural knowledge of the Trinity. Creation, incarnation, 
 the necessity of accepting the merit of Christ as atonement for our guilt, are facis dependmg 
 solely on the free-will of God, unconditioned by any rational necessity. He might have 
 left the world uncreated. He might, if he had willed it, have united himself with any 
 other creature instead of man. The suffering which Christ endured as a man is not neces- 
 sarily, but only (according to the Scotist theory of acceptation) because he accepts it, an 
 equivalent reckoned to the credit of the believer for the punishment made necessary by 
 his guilt. Thus the pre-eminence ascribed by Scotus to the will over the reason in God 
 and in man resolves itself in fact into the omnipotence of the arbitrary will of the Deity. 
 
 The most noted of the disciples of Duns Scotus were Joh. de Bassolis, who seems to 
 have taught before Occam a pliilosopher, whose doctrines he never mentions; Antonius 
 Andreae, the '• Doctor dukificus" (died about 1320); Franciscus de Mayronis, the '• Mayister 
 absiradionum" or ^^ Doctor iUumwatus" (died A. d. 1325 — his works were printed at Venice 
 in 1520), who is said (this widely-accepted supposition has been disproved by Charles 
 Thurot, in De V organisation de Penseignement dans V Universiie de Paris au moyen-dge, p. 150) 
 in 1315 to have caused the rule for disputations at the Sorbonne (aciiis Sorbonici) to be 
 promulgated, which provided that the defender of a thesis must reply from six o'clock 
 in the morning till six in the evening to all objections which were made to it ; Walter 
 Burleigh (Burlaeus, born 1275, died about 1337), the " Doctw planus et perspicuus" and the 
 realistical opponent of Occam ; and Nicolaus de Lyra, Petrus of Aquila, and others. 
 
 § 103. Of the contemporaries of Thomas of Aquino and Duns 
 Scotus, the following are those who are of most importance as phi- 
 losophers: Henrj Goethals (of Muda, near Ghent, hence called Hen- 
 ricus Gandavensis, born about 1217, died 1293), who defended, in 
 opposition to the Aristotelianism of Albert and Thomas, a doctrine 
 more allied to the Platonism of Augustine ; Richard of Middletown 
 (Ricardus de Mediavilla, born about 1300), a Franciscan, who fol- 
 lowed more nearly the Scotist than the Thomist doctrine ; Siger of 
 Brabant (de Curtraco — died before 1300), who passed over from a 
 type of doctrine akin to Scotism to Thomism ; Petrus Ilispanus of 
 Lisbon (died 1277, as Pope John XXI.), whose Sumrnulae Logical-es 
 were of considerable influence among the Scholastics, as a guide to 
 the practice of logic; Roger Bacon (born at Ilchester 1214, died 1294), 
 who became by his devotion to natural investigation a forerunner of 
 Bacon of Verulam ; and Raymundus Lullus (born 1234 on the island 
 of Majorca, died 1315), who found for his fancil'ul theory of the com- 
 bination of concepts, with a view to the conversion of the unbelieving 
 and the reformation of the sciences, a great number of partisans (Lul- 
 lists), even in later times, when the unsatisfying character of Scholas- 
 ticism and an indefinable impulse toward the novel favored all sorts 
 of quixotic attempts. In addition to the schools which acknowledged
 
 458 CONTEMPORARIES OF THOMAS AND SC0TU8. 
 
 the authority of the Church, there arose anti-ecclesiastical thinkers, 
 who regarded philosophical and theological truth as two different 
 things, or even rejected the theology of the Church as untrue. 
 
 JZenrici Gandavoiuifi Quodlibeta theologica, Paris, 1518, etc. ; Summa guaestionum ordinarium, 
 Paris, 1520; Summa i/ieolngiae, ibid. 1520, Ferrara, 1646. Franfois Iluet treats of Henry of Ghent, in 
 liecherchefi historiques et critiques sur la Die, les outrages et la doctrine de Henri de Gand, surjwmmi 
 le docieur solentiel, Ghent, 1S3S. 
 
 liicardi de Mediavilla comm. in quaiuor libr. Sentent., Venice, 14S9 and 1509, Brescia, 1591; Quod- 
 libeta, Venice, 1507 and 1509, Paris, 1510 and 1529. 
 
 The Summulae Logicales of Petrus Hispanus have been very often printed, beginning in 14S0, at 
 Cologne, Venice, Leipsic, etc. ; see Prantl, Gesch. der Log., III., Leipsic, 1867, pp. 35-40. 
 
 R. Bacon is opus majus ad Clementem IV., ed. Sam. Jebb, London, 1733; Venice, 1750. Ejusdem 
 epist. de secretis artis et naturae operibus atque miUitate magiae, Paris, 1542. Cousin discovered frag- 
 ments of the Opus Minus, an epitome, made by Eoger Bacon himself, of the Opus Majus, and the whole 
 of an introductory work, the Opus Tertiiim (published by J. S. Brewer in Rerum Brit. med. aevi script., 
 London, 1860). On Roger Bacon, cf. Emile Charles, R. B., Paris, 1861, and U. Siebert, Jnaug.-JHss., Mar- 
 burg, 1861; cf. also an article on R. B. in Gelzer's Protest. Monatsbl., XXVII. No. 2, February, 1866, 
 pp. 63-83. 
 
 Raimundi LuUi opera ea, quae ad inventam ab ipso artem universalem pertinent, Strasburg, 1598, 
 etc. Opera omnia, ed. Salzinger, Mayence, 1721-42. Ct Jo. ITenr. Altstddtii clavis artis LulUanae et 
 verae logicae, Strasburg, 1009; Perroquet, Vie de R. ZuU6,Yendome, 1667. On Eaymundus Lullus and 
 the beginnings of the Catalonian Literature, A. Helfferich (Berlin, 1858) has written. The logic of Lullus is 
 described minutely in Prantl's Gesch. der Log., III. pp. 145-177. 
 
 Henry of Ghent, surnamed ^^ Doctor solemnis," adopting the Platonico-Aiigustinian form 
 of doctrine, according to which the Idea represents the universal, afiBrmed that in the 
 divine mind there existed only ideas of genera and species, and none of individuals. He 
 denied the doctrine of Thomas of Aquinas, who taught that in God there was an idea of 
 each particular object {"idea hvjus creaturae"); the divine knowledge of individuals is 
 already contained in the knowledge of their genera. Henry of Ghent objected to the de- 
 nomination of the matter of sensible objects as non-real and merely potential ; he regarded 
 this matter, rather, as a real substratum, capable of receiving forms. With Henry of 
 Ghent were united Stephen Tempier, Robert Kilwardby, and, especially, William Lamarre, 
 as early opponents of Thomism. 
 
 Richard of Middletown opposed both the theory that the universal exists actually in 
 individual objects and the doctrine that matter is the principle of individuation; he laid 
 stress on the practical character of theology and the non-demonstrableness by philosophical 
 arguments of the mysteries of faith. 
 
 Siger of Brabant, who taught at the Sorbonne, wrote a Commentary on the Prior Ana- 
 lytics, and Quaestiones Logicales, and other logical works, extracts from which are given in 
 the Hist, litteraire de la France, XXI. pp. 96-127. Cf Prantl, Gescfi. der Log., III. p. 234 
 seq. Dante [Paradiso, X. v. 136) mentions Siger as an excellent teacher. 
 
 Petrus Hispanus, after the example of William Shyreswood (who, born at Durham, 
 studied' at Oxford, afterward lived in Paris, and died in 1249 while Chancellor of Lincoln), 
 and perhaps also of Lambert of Auxerre (about 1250, if indeed Lambert was the real 
 author of the " Summa Lamberti," which was very similar to the Compendium of Petrus 
 Hispanus, and exists in MS. at Paris), expanded the logic of the schools by incorporating 
 into it new grammatical and logical material. The much-used manual of Petrus Hispanus, 
 '■^ Summulae Logicales," presents logic in seven sections or "tractates." Their titles are : 
 1. De Enunciatione, 2. De Universalibiis, 3. De Praedicamenti'^, 4. De Syllogismo, 5. De Locis 
 Dialecticis, 6. De Fallaciis, 7. De Terminorum Proprietatihus {parva logicalia). The first six 
 
 i
 
 CONTEMPOEAKIES OF THOMAS AND SCOTU8. 459 
 
 sections contain in substance the logic of Aristotle and Boethius (the so-called " logica 
 antiqua," wliich must be distinguished from the ^^vetus logica," i. e., the formerly known 
 logic, the logic already known before 1140); the seventh section, on the contrary, contained 
 the additions of the moderns {inoderiwrum). This seventh section, on the "properties 
 of terms," treated de suppositionibus (by the suppositio was understood the representa- 
 tion by the concept of that which was contained in the extension of the concept, so that, 
 e. g., omnis homo viortcdis est, stood for Cajus mortalis est, Titius mortalis est, etc.), de rela- 
 tivis, de appellationfbus, de ampliatione, and de restriciume (expanding or restricting the 
 meaning of an expression), de distrihutione and de exponibilibus, which latter belonged also 
 to the chapter entitled De dictionihus syncategorematids (by which are to be understood the 
 other parts of speech besides the noun and verb). The origin of these grammatico-logical 
 speculations is questionable. That they were borrowed by the Western logicians from the 
 "Synopsis of Psellus" (which, in the form in which it has come down to us, contains only 
 the principal part of the doctrine of the suppositio, but may originally have contamed the 
 other parts of the seventh section of the Summulae) is (notwithstanding Prantl's support 
 of it) an untenable hypothesis (see above, the Note to § 95, p. 404). Some of the new 
 terms and doctrines were formed with reference to passages in the then newly-known 
 works of Aristotle and his Greek commentators, and, probably, also of Arabian logicians 
 belonging to the first half of the thirteenth century ; others, and apparently the greater 
 number of them, are older, and it is probable that they arose in the course of the twelfth 
 century through a combination of the grammatical tradition with the logical (e. g , suppo- 
 sitio, according to Thurot's hypothesis, from the grammatical use of the word suppositum in 
 Priscian; in Priscian, II. 15, is found the statement that the dialecticians recognized as 
 parts of speech only the noun and the verb, and called other kinds of words '■'■ syncate- 
 goreumata, hoc est consignificantia ") ; yet, as to the origin of many terms, no sufficient 
 evidence is at hand. 
 
 Roger Bacon was educated at Oxford and Paris, being a pupil of Robertus Capito, 
 Petrus de Mahariscuria (Meharicourt, in Picardy), the physicist, and others, and became 
 subsequently a Franciscan monk. He preferred to study nature rather than bury himself 
 in scholastic subtleties. Ho studied mathematics, mechanics, astronomy, and optics, partly 
 from Greek, Arabian, and Hebrew works, and partly by the personal observation of nature. 
 Pope Clement TV. was his patron ; but after the death of the latter he was obliged to atone 
 for his opposition to the spirit of his times by many years of confinement. He did not 
 succeed in diverting the interest of his contemporaries from metaphysics and directing it to 
 physics and philology. 
 
 Eaimundus Lullus (or LuUius) found a not insignificant number of partisans credulous 
 enough to believe in the fanciful system whose merits he so vaingloriously vaunted. He 
 was the author of an art of invention, which depended on the placing in different circles of 
 various concepts, some formal, others material, so that, when the circles were turned, 
 every possible combination was easily produced by mechanical means, presenting a motley 
 conglomerate of sense and nonsense. Raimundus Lullus was also acquainted with the 
 secret doctrine of the Cabala, which he attempted to employ in the interests of his intended 
 improvement of science. Ho blamed Thomas for holding the doctrines of the Trinity and 
 the incarnation to be indemonstrable ; with his way of conducting " proofs " and " con- 
 quering " unbelievers, he found the demonstration of these dogmas not difficult. That the 
 enthusiast met with applause needs no explanation. 
 
 Even during the most flourishing periods of Scholasticism, there were never wanting 
 anti-ecclesiastical philosophemes, which were derived from the Aristotelian philosophy, 
 especially in the Averroistic interpretation of the latter. That the first acquaintance with
 
 460 WILLIAM OF OCCAM, THE KENEWER OF NOMINALISM. 
 
 foreign philosophy led to heterodox ideas has already been remarked (§ 98). It was, per- 
 haps, the same influence which enabled the dialectician, Simon of Tournay, at Paris (about 
 1 200), with equal facility (openly) to demonstrate the truth of the doctrines of the Church 
 and (secretly) to show their untruth. It soon became a favorite practice with many to 
 distinguish between philosophical truth (or whatever was directly inferable from the 
 Aristotelian principles) and theological truth (harmony with the doctrines of the Church), 
 which distinction, in the presence of the many unsustainable attempts to combine the two, 
 had its perfect relative justification, but was a negation of the principle of Scholasticism, 
 was condemned by the ecclesiastical authority, and failed in this period to become a ruling 
 idea. This distinction flowed more particularly from Averroism (cf Ern. Renan, Averroes 
 et rAverroisme, p. 213 seq.). Already, in the year 1240, Guillaume d'Auvergne, then Bishop 
 of Paris, made several theorems which were borrowed from the Arabs (and probably from 
 the work Be Causis) the subject of official censure. In the year 1269 Etienne Tempier, then 
 Archbishop of Paris, summoned an assembly of teachers of theology, by whom thirteen 
 Averroistic propositions were examined and (in 1270) condemned. But the anti-ecclesias- 
 tical doctrines continued to assert themselves. In the year 1276 Pope John XXI. censured 
 the assertion that truth was twofold, and in 1277 Etienne Tempier found occasion to cen- 
 sure propositions like the following, which were professed by philosophers at Paris : God 
 is not triune and one, for trinity is incompatible with perfect simplicity; The world and 
 liumanity are eternal ; The resurrection of the body must not be admitted by philosophers; 
 The soul, when separated from the body, cannot suffer by fire ; Ecstatic states and visions 
 take place naturally, and only so ; Theological discourses are based on fables ; A man, who 
 is furnished with the moral and intellectual yirtues, has in himself all that is necessary to 
 happiness (see the supplement to the fourth book of the editions of Petrus Lombardus; 
 Du Boulay, Hist. univ. Paris., torn. III. pp. 397, 442 ; Charles du Plessis d'Argentre, Col- 
 hclio judiciorum de novis erroribus, Paris, 1728, I. p. 175 seq.; Charles Thurot, De V organ. 
 de Venseigneme7it dans Vuniv. de Paris au m.-dge, p. 105 seq.). One of the chief seats of 
 Averroism was Padua. In about the year 1500 the doctrine of the twofold character of 
 truth prevailed among Averroists and Alexandrists (cf below, Vol. II., § 3). 
 
 § 104. Preceded by Petrus Aureolus, the Franciscan (died 1321), 
 and William Durand of St. Pourgain, the Dominican (died 1332), 
 \ William of Occam, the " Venerabilis Inceptor''' (died April 7, 1347), 
 following in his terminology the " modern " logic, renewed the doc- 
 trine of Nominalism. The philosophical school which he thus 
 founded, while in itself nearly indifferent with reference to the doc- 
 trine of the Church, acknowledged nevertheless the authority of the 
 latter, but rendered it, at least in material respects, no positive ser- 
 vices. Occam not merely, like Scotus, reduced the number of 
 theological doctrines which, as Thomas had taught, were demon- 
 strable by pure reason, but denied that there were any such. Even 
 the existence and unity of God were, in his judgment, merely articles 
 of faith. With him the critical method rose to an independent rank. 
 The Nominalism of Occam was rather a continuance of the contest 
 against Kealism, than a positive and elaborate system. The particu-
 
 WILLIAM OF OCCAM, THE RENEW KR OF NOMINALISM. 461 
 
 lar alone being recognized as real, and the universal being repre- 
 sented as a mere conception of the thinking mind, great weight was 
 laid on the external and internal perceptions, by which the particular 
 is apprehended. With this doctrine prevailing, and with the co- 
 operation of other influences tending in the same direction, it became 
 easier than, when Realism prevailed, it had been to impose limits on 
 Scholastic abstraction, and the way was prepared for an inductive 
 investigation of external nature and of psychical phenomena. 
 
 PeiH Atireoli Verberii archiepMC. Aquensis eommentar. in quatuor lihros sententiarvm, Rome 
 1596-1605. Of. PrantI, Gesch. d. Log., III. pp. 319-32T. 
 
 Durandi de <S<. Porciano conim. in magistr. sentent, Paris, 1508, Lyons, 1568, Antwerp, 1576. Of. 
 PrantI, III. pp. 292-29". 
 
 Guil. Occam, Quodlibeta aeptem, Paris, 1487, Strasburg, 1491 ; Summa toUtts logices, or TYactaiut, 
 logices in tres partes diviims, Paris, 1488, Venice, 1591. O.xford, 1675; QuaeMionea in libros Phi/»icor~um, 
 Strasburg, 1491, 1506; Quaeationes et deoisionea in quatuor libros aententiarum, Lyons, 1495, etc. Centi- 
 logium theologicum, ibul. 1496; Kxpositio aurea »iiper totam artem reterem, ■videiicit in Porjihyrii 
 praedicabilia et Arist. praedicamenta, Bologna, 1496. Occam's Piaputatio super potentate eccleaiaatica 
 praelatia atque prineipibua terrarum commiaaa waa published by Melchior Goklast (it had been pre. 
 viously published in Paris in 159S) in the Monorchia, Vol. I. p. 135 seq., and his Defenaoriinn, addressed to 
 John XX., by Ed. Brown, in the Appendix to the Faacic. rerum ecejyetendarum et fugiendar^im, p. 486 
 seq. Cf., on him, Rettberg's article on Occam and Luther, in the Stud. u. JCrit., 1839, W. A. Schreiber, 
 Pie polit. V. re/ig. Poctrinen unter Lvdwig dem Saier, Landshut, 1858, PrantI, Per Univeraalienatreit 
 im 13 und 14 Jahrhundert, in the Reports of the Ph. CI. of the Munich Academy, 1864, I. 1, pp. 58-67, 
 and Geach. der Log., III. pp. 327-420, and, on his and in general on the nominalistic doctrine of God, 
 A. Ritschl, in the JahrbUcher/ilr deutache Theologie, No. 1, 1868. 
 
 Pierre Aureol (Petrus Aureolus), born at Yerberie-sur-Oise, and surnamed ^^ Doctor 
 aJmndans" or ^'Doctor facundt.i-%" professed a coneeptualism which excluded from the 
 sphere of real existence all f^enera and species (In I. pr. Sent, dist. 23, art. 2 : manifesium 
 e-^t quod ratio honiinis et animalis prout distinguitur a Socrate, est fabricaia per iniellectum nee 
 est aliud nisi co7iceptu.s ; — non eniTn fecit has distinctas rationes natura in eu'istentia actuali). He 
 enounced the principle suVjsequentlv known as the Law of Parcimony (In Sent, II., dist. 
 12, qu. 1 : non est philosophicum, pluralitatem rerum ponere sine causa; frustra enim fit per 
 plura, qvx)d fieri potest iier pav dor a). He held that we perceive things themselves without 
 the intervention of "fomiae speculares" {Ibid.: unde patet, quomodo res ipsae conspiciuntur 
 in mente, et illud, quod intuemur, non est forma alia, specular is, sed ipsamet res, habens esse appa- 
 rens, et hoc est mentis conceptus, sive noiitia objectiva). 
 
 Durand de St. Pourf;ain (Durandus de St. Porciano), who has been mentioned above 
 (p. 453) among the Thomists, began to teach in Paris in 1313. He was simimoned to 
 Rome some time after, became Bishop of Pnv-en-Yelay in 1318, and died in 1332. It i.s 
 probable that his teaching at Paris preceded that of Occam, who about 1320 had acquired 
 a reputation in that city, and hence that the opposition which he finally waged against 
 Thoniist opinions, which at first he had accepted, is not (with Rousselot, wliose view is 
 refuted by Haureau, Ph. Sc, II. p. 410 seq.) to be ascribed to the influence of Occam. lie 
 taught as follows : The universal and individual natures form together one and the same 
 object, and are distinguished only by the manner in which we apprehend them ; the genus 
 and species, in other words, express in an indefinite manner that which the individual 
 presents definitely. (This is an anticipation of the doctrine of Wolff, the Leibnitzian, that 
 the individual, in distinction from the generic or specific concept resulting from abstrac- 
 tion, is that which is in all respects determined. The words of Durand are as follows:
 
 402 WILLIAM OF OCCAM, THE RENEWER OF NOMINALISM. 
 
 Universale est unum solum secundum conceptum, singvlare vero est unum secundum esse realc. 
 Nam sicut actio inteUedus facit universale, sic actio agentis singularis terminatur ad singulare. — 
 Non oportet praeter naturam et jwincipia naturae quaerere alia prindpia individui. — Nihil est 
 principium individualionis, nisi quod est principium naturae et quidditatis). There exist only 
 individuals ; Socrates is an individual by the very fact of his existence {In I. II. Sent., dist. 
 3). The abstraction of the universal from the particular is not the operation of a distinct 
 active intellect, as Averroes erroneously supposed, but of the same faculty which is affected 
 by external impressions. Nor is it more true that the universal exists before the action 
 of the intellect {intelkctio or operatio intelligendi). On the contrary, the universal is the 
 result of this action, the object from the contemplation of which it is derived being sepa- 
 rated in our thoughts from the individualizing conditions (In I. I. Serd., dist. 3, qu. 5: 
 universale non est primum ohjectum intellectus nee prae existit intelkctioni, sed est aliquid formo/- 
 turn per operationem intelligendi, per quam res secundum considerationem abstrahitur a condi- 
 tionibus individuantihus). 
 
 "William, born at Occam in the county of Surrey, in England, a Franciscan and pupil of 
 Duns Scotus, and afterward teacher at Paris, took sides, in the contest of the hierarchy 
 against the political power, with the latter. Pursued by the Pope, he fled to Lewis of 
 Bavaria, who protected him, and to whom he said : " Do thou defend me by the sword, 
 and I will defend thee with my pen " {tu me defcndas gladio, ego te defendam calami). As 
 the renewer of Nominalism, he received from the later Nominalists the title of ^'■Venerahilis 
 Inceptor ; " he was also called by his followers '^Doctor invincibilis." 
 
 William of Occam founds his rejection of Realism on the principle : Entities must not 
 he unnecessarily multiplied (entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem). He combats 
 the realizing and hypostatizing of abstractions (Sufficiunt singularia, et ita tales res univer- 
 sales omnino frustra ponuntur). From the fact that our knowledge depends on our posses- 
 sion of universal conceptions, it does not follow that the universal as such has reality. It 
 is enough that the individuals, which in the formation of judgments are designated or 
 represented together by the same concept, exist realiter {scientia est de rebus singularibus, 
 quod pro ipsis singularibus termini supponunt. The termini, bpoi, are. according to Petrus 
 Hispanus, composiii ex voce et significatione. The Nominalists were hence called also Ter- 
 minists. Occam employs supponere pro aliquo, taken intransitively, as synonymous with 
 sia/re pro aliquo. This usage, as Thurot has shown, had become customary at least as 
 early as the year 1200. When supponere is used transitively, the termini are the sup- 
 ponentia and the individuals the stipposita.) The hypothesis of the real existence of 
 the universal, argues Occam, leads, in whatever form it may be expressed, to absurdities. 
 If (with Plato) independent existence be ascribed to the universal, the effect is to make 
 of the latter an individual object. If it be represented as existent in individual things, 
 BO that in reality, and without reference to our thinking, it is distinguished from the 
 individual, then the universal is pluralized or multiplied in proportion to the number of 
 individuals, and is consequently individualized ; but a "formal" distinction, supposed to 
 exist in the individual object as such, were of necessity a real one, and can therefore not 
 be assumed to exist. But if, on the contrary, the universal be asserted so to exist in tlie 
 particular, that only the process of abstraction performed by us can give it separate realitj-, 
 then it does not exist as universal in the particular, for thinking does not determine the 
 nature of the external object, but only generates the concept in us. The universal, there- 
 fore, does not exist in things, but only in the thinking mind. It is a "mental conception, 
 signifying univocally several singulars" {conceptus mentis, signijicans univoce plura singularia). 
 It exists in the mind, not substantially (subjective), but as a representation (objective), while 
 ontside of the mind it is only a word, or, in general, a sign of whatever kind, representing 
 
 II
 
 WILLIAM OF OCCAM, THE KENEWEB OF NOMINALISM, 463 
 
 conventioually several objects. Each thing is as such individual {quaelibet res eo ipso quod 
 est, est haec res). The cause of each thing is, by that very fact, at the same time the cause 
 of its individual existence. The act of abstraction, by which the universal is formed in the 
 mind, does not presuppose an activity of the understanding or will, but is a spontaneous, 
 second act, by which the first act, i. e., perception, or the image left by perception in the 
 memory (habitus derelidus ex primo actu), is naturally followed, as soon as two or more 
 similar representations are present (In Sent, I., Dist. 2 ; Summa tot. log., ch. 16). The 
 Aristotelian doctrine of categories is treated by Occam as resting on a division, not of 
 things, but of words. The categories have, according to him, primarily a grammatical 
 reference, and it is to this character of the categories that (like Trendelenburg, in more 
 recent times) he directs particular attention. 
 
 Just as mental representations do not exist substantially in us, so the so-called Ideas 
 do not exist substantially, or as parts of the divine essence, in God. They are simply the 
 knowledge which God has of things ; and they are his knowledge of particular, concrete 
 things, since it is only these that exist realiter (ideae sunt primo singularium et nan sunt 
 apecierum, quia ipsa singularia sola sunt extra producihilia et nulla alia). All this, however, 
 is only true provided it is at all permitted us to represent to ourselves the divine knowl- 
 edge after the analogy of our own. 
 
 Since all that exists is individual, it follows that intuition is the natural form of our 
 cognition (In Sentent., I., dist. 3, qu. 2 : nihil potest naturaliter cognosci in se nisi cognoscatur 
 intuitive). By intuitive knowledge, Occam understands a knowledge by which we are 
 made to know whether a thing is or is not ; the judgment itself is then made by the intel- 
 lect. The act of judgment (actus judicativus) presupposes the act of apprehension (actus \ 
 apprehensivus). Abstracted knowledge, on the contrary, justifies no judgment in a question '■ 
 of existence or non-existence. Yet the most certain knowledge is not obtained through 
 the senses ; through them we receive only signs of things, which are indeed connected 
 with tlie latter, but are not necessarily similar to them, just as, for example, smoke is a 
 natural sign of fire, or groaning of pain, without its being true that smoke is similar to fire 
 or groaning to pain. (Words are arbitrary signs of the conceptions of the mind, depending 
 on human agreement, cwOt/kt], and are therefore only signs of signs and, indirectly, of 
 things.) In judging of the existence of external objects deception is possible. The in- 
 tuitive knowledge of the intellect concerning our own internal states is more certain than 
 all sense-perception (Intellectus noster pro statu isto non tantum cognoscit sensibilia, std etiam 
 in particulari et intuitive cognoscit aliqua intellectibilia, quae nulla rnodo cadunt sub sensu, non 
 plus quam substantia separata cadit sub sensu, cujusmodi sunt intelkctiones, actus voluntatis, 
 delectaiio, tristitia et hujtismodi, quae potest homo experiri inesse sibi, quae tamen non sunt sensi- 
 bilia nobis, nee sub aliquo sensu cadunt. In I. Sent, Prol., qu. 1). But only the states, not the 1 
 essence of the soul are known in this way. "Whether sensations and feelings, and intellec- j 
 tive and volitional acts are the work of an immaterial Form, wo do not know bj- experience, ' 
 and the proofs offered on behalf of such an hypothesis are uncertain (Qtiodi, I., qu. 10). 
 
 But Occam by no means restricts knowledge to that which is intuitive. On the con- 
 trary, ho affirms that science is the evident knowledge of the necessaril}' true, which 
 knowledge can be generated by the agency of syllogistical thinking (ib., qu. 2). The fun- 
 damental principles are obtained from experience by iuduction. Occam does not, however, 
 show how it is possible for apodictical knowledge to rest on the basis of experience (a 
 possibility that is founded in the regularity, or conformity to law, of the real world itself, 
 the knowledge of which is taken into our consciousness through processes of perception 
 and thought regulated by the norms of logic), and from his stand-point it was impossible 
 to show this. Consequently ho was not protected against the (not less plausible than false)
 
 1 
 
 I 
 
 464 LATER SCHOLASTICS UNTIL THE RENEWAL OF PLATONISM. 
 
 objection of the subjective a priori philosophers (an objection which, in more recent times, 
 has been advanced against his doctrine by Tennemann, the disciple of Kant, among others), 
 namely, that the principles on which the generalization of experiences depends cannot 
 themselves be derived from experience. 
 
 To the identification of the thinking mind (anima intelkcUva) with the feeling soul 
 (anima seiisiiiva) and with the soul as form-giving prmciple of the body {forma corporis) 
 Occam is unfriendly. The sensitive soul is extended, he teaches, and is joined circum- 
 scriptive with the body, as the form of the latter, so that its parts dwell in separate parts 
 of the body. But the intellective soul is another substance, separable from the body and 
 jomed with it diffinitive, so that it is entirely present in every part. Occam's argument for 
 the (ancient Aristotelian) doctrine of the separate substantial existence of the intellect 
 (voiif) is founded on the antagonism of sense and reason, which, in Occam's opinion, in 
 inconceivable as existing in one and the same substance. 
 
 Occam's principles could not lead to a rational theology, since all knowledge which 
 transcends the sphere of experience was relegated by him to the sphere of mere faith. 
 God, teaches Occam, is not cognizable by intuition ; nor (as the ontological argument sup- 
 poses) does his existence follow from the conception which we have of him (ez terminis) ; 
 only an a posteriori proof, and that not a rigorous one, is possible. That the series of finite 
 causes cannot contain an infinite number of terms, but that it implies God as a first cause, 
 is not strictly demonstrable ; a plurality of worlds, with different authors, is conceivable ; 
 " the most perfect being is not necessarily infinite, etc. Nevertheless, Occam considers that 
 the existence of God is indeed rendered probable on rational grounds (Ceniil. tkeoL, 1 seq.); 
 1 but, for the rest, he declares that the " articles of faith " have not even the advantage of 
 ' probability for the wise of this world and especially for those who trust to the natural 
 f reason {"pro sapientibus mundi et praecipue innitentihus rationi naturaW''). The precepts of 
 morals are not, in the view of Occam (who in this agrees with Scotus), in themselves 
 necessary , it is conceivable, that God, if his will had been different, would have sanctioned, 
 as being just and good, other principles than those which we are now taught to consider 
 as the foundation of justice and good. Nor is the human will subordinate to the under- 
 I standing. That the doctrine of the Trinity, according to which the one divine essence is 
 entirely present in each of the three divine persons, implies the truth of Realism, is ex- 
 pressly admitted by Occam {In Sent., I., dist. 2, qu. 4) ; but he is contented that in relation 
 to subjects like this only the authority of the Bible and of Christian tradition, and not the 
 principles of experimental science, should be accepted. The will to believe the indemon- 
 strable is meritorious. 
 
 "With Occam and his successors, the Scholastic axiom of the conformity of faith to 
 reason gave place before what till their time was but a sporadically (see above, § 103, 
 p. 460) appearing consciousness of their discrepancy. This consciousness led, among a por- 
 tion of those who philosophized, to the postulation of two mutually contradicting kinds of 
 truth, and those who adopted this postulate concealed, under a semblance of submission to 
 the Church, their real espousal of the cause of philosophical truth. Mystics and reformers, 
 on the contrary, were led by the same cause to take sides against the reason of the schools 
 and to assert the claims of unreflecting faith. 
 
 § 105. Among the Scholastics of the latest period, when Nominal- 
 ism, renewed, was acquiring more and more the supremacy, the most 
 iiotoworthy are John Buridan, Rector of the University of Paris in 
 1327 (died after 1350), and of importance for his investigations con-
 
 LATER SCHOLASTICS UNTIL THE RENEWAL OF PLATONISM. 465 
 
 cerning the freedom of the will and his logical text-book ; Albertus de 
 Saxonia, who taught at Paris about 1350-1360; Marsilius (or Mar- 
 celius) of Inghen (died 1392), who taught at Paris about 1364-1377, 
 and afterward at Heidelberg; Peter of Aillj (1350-1-125), the Nomi- 
 nalist, who defended the doctrine of the Church, but gave precedence 
 to the Bible rather than to Christian tradition, and to the Council 
 rather than to the Pope, and who sought in philosophy to steer be- 
 tween skepticism and dogmatism ; Raymundus of Sabnnde, a Spanish 
 physician and theologian, and teacher of theology at Toulouse, who 
 (about A. D. 1334-36, or perhaps still earlier) sought in a rational, yet, 
 in some respects, rather mystical manner, to demonstrate the harmony 
 between the book of nature and the Bible ; and, lastly, Gabriel Biel 
 (died in 1495), the Oceamist, whose merit lay not in any original 
 advancement of philosophical thought eftected by him, but only in his 
 clear and faithful presentation of the nominalistic doctrine. Of the 
 Mystics of this later period, who for the most part are of more impor- 
 tance in the history of religion than in that of philosophy, d'Ailly's 
 pupil and friend, Johannes Gerson (1363-1429), may here be men- 
 tioned, on account of his attempted combination of Mysticism with 
 Scholasticism. 
 
 Job. Buridan, Summa d« Dialectica, Paris, 1487, Compendium Logicae, Venice, 1489, Quaentionts in 
 octo libros pht/x., De Anima, Parva Xaturalia, Paris, 1516, In Arist. 3fetaph., Paris, 151S, QuaeMione* in 
 decern libros ethic, Paris, 14S9, and Oxford, 1637, In Polit. Arist. Paris, 1500, and Oxford, 1640. 
 
 Alberti de Saxonia Quaestiones in libros de Coelo ei de Mundo, Venice. 1497. 
 
 Marailii Quaestiones mipra quatuor libros sententiarum, Strasburfr, 1501. 
 
 Petri de Alliaco Quaestiones super qiuituor libros sentent., Strasbiirg, 1490. Tractatus et sermonts, 
 ibid. 1490. 
 
 6. Bielii CoUectorium ex Occamo, Tubingen, 1512. Gabriel Byel in quatuor Sententiarum, I. 
 Tiibingon, 1501. Of. Linsenmann, GabHel Pdel und die Anfdnge der Universiidt zu Tubingen in tlio 
 Tlieol. Quartalschrift, 1SG5, pp. 195-226 ; G. Biel, Der letzie Scholastiker,und der Kominalismiis, ibid. 
 pp. 449-481 and 601-676. 
 
 Gersonis Opera, Cologne, 14S3. Strasburg, 1488-1502. Paris, 1521, Paris, 1606, .ind ed. by du Pin, An- 
 twerp, 1706. Of Gerson treat, among others, Engelhardt, De Gersonio mystico, ErI., 1S2.S. Lcciiy, ]7e de 
 G., Paris, 1S35, Ch. Jourdain, Paris, 1883, C. Schmidt, Strasburg, 1839, Mettenleiter, Augsburg, 1857, and 
 Job. Baptist Schwab, Wurzburg, 1S59. 
 
 Paymundi Tlieologia naturalis sive liber creaturarum was printed two or three times before 14S8, 
 then at Strasburg in 149G. Lyons, 1.'507, Paris. 1509, etc., and recently, Sul/bach, 1S52 (but without the pro- 
 logue named in the index), bis Dialogi de natura hominis (a .summary of the preceding work) at Lyons, 
 1st edition, 1568. Cf. Montaigne, Essais, II. 12. Among those who have written of liaymundus are Fr. 
 Ilolberg, De tlieol. nat. P. de S, Ilalle, 1S43, David Matzke, Die natilrlicke Theologie des P. v. S., Breslau, 
 1846, M. Huttler, Die Religionsphilosophie des P. v. S., Augsburcr, 1851, C. C. L. Kleiber. De P. rita et 
 tcriptis (Progr. of the Dorotheenst Pealschule). Berlin, 1S56. Fr. Nitzsrh, Qitaentiones Pnimnndanae, in 
 Niedner'8 Zeittchr.f. hist. Theol., 1659, No. 3, pp. 893-436, and C. Schaarschmidt In Uerzog's ITieol. Pealenc 
 Vol. XII. 1860, pp. 571-577. 
 
 John Buridan, a pupil of Occam, discussed only the problems of logic, metaphysics, and 
 ethics, and not those belonging specifically to theology. In his Logic he sought particu- 
 larly to teach how to find the middle term, which could be conceived as a sort of bridge
 
 460 LATER SCHOLASTICS UNTIL THE KENEWAL OF PLATONISM. 
 
 between the termini exlremi, and since, according to Arist., Anal. Post., I. 34, it is in the 
 quick discovery of middle terms that quickness of intellect is manifested, this introduction 
 to the practice of logic, which might be of service to the more obtuse, was called pons 
 asinorum (according to Sanctacrucius, Dial, ad mentem Scoti, I. 3, 11, ap. Tennemann, 
 Gesch. tier Philos., VIII. p. 916). Buridan declared it impossible {In Eth. Mc, III. qu. 1 
 seq.) to decide the question as to whether the will, when under the influence of evenlj- 
 balanced motives, can with equal facility decide in favor of or against a given action ; to 
 answer it affirmatively (doctrine of Indeterminism) were to contradict the principle, that 
 when all the conditions requisite to a thing {e. g., to a decision in favor of a proposed 
 action) are present, the thing itself (e. g., the decision supposed) must follow, and that the 
 same conditions admit only one and the same result ; but to deny it (Determinism) is to 
 contradict the moral consciousness of responsibihty. (In this reasoning the fact was over- 
 looked, that the very quality of will which gives character to the decision is itself the 
 subject of moral judgment, and that only an external causality, a necessity obstructing the 
 will, whether this be an external or a psychical compulsion, and not the causality grounded 
 in the will itself, the inner necessity which is contained in its own nature destroys the 
 I freedom of the will.) The oft-cited illustration of the "ass of Buridan," which stands mo- 
 1 tionless between two equally attractive bundles of hay, or between fodder and water, being 
 \ drawn with equal force in both directions, has not been found in his works. The argument 
 (as Thurot remarks) is derived from Arist., Z>e Coelo, II. 13, p. 295 b, 13; the ^^asimis" was 
 added by the Scholastics (and, as it appears, by some of Buridan's opponents). 
 
 Albert of Saxony belongs to the more distinguished teachers at the University of Paris 
 after the middle of the fourteenth century. His labors were confined chiefly to logic (and 
 especially to the "modern" doctrine entitled De Siq-ypositionibus) and physics. A note- 
 worthy passage occurs in his exposition of the De Coelo (II., qu. 21), where he mentions 
 that one of his teachers appeared to have held that the theory of the motion of the earth 
 and the immobility of the heavens could not be proved incorrect. His own opinion was, 
 that even were all other arguments against that theory fully met by the counter-reasoning 
 of his teacher, yet the relative positions of the planets and the ecUpses of the sun and moon 
 were inexplicable by the theory. 
 
 Marsilius of Inghen taught, first at Paris, then at the University of Heidelberg, of which 
 he was one of the founders, the nominalistic doctrine of Durand and Occam. 
 
 Pierre d'Ailly (Petrus de Alliaco) labored in his Commentary on the Sentences (I. 1, 1), 
 while discussing the jircliminary questions respecting the possibility of knowledge, to 
 demonstrate the proposition (of Occam), that self-knowledge is more certain than the per- 
 ception of external objects. He argues : I cannot be deceived with regard to the fact of 
 my own existence ; but it is conceivable that my behef in the existence of external objects 
 is an erroneous belief, for the sensations, on which it is grounded, might be produced in 
 me by God's almighty power, even if there were no external objects ; or God might permit 
 me to retain these sensations after he had destroyed their external causes. Our conviction 
 of the reality of the objects of perception rests, according to Peter, on the postulate that 
 the ordinary course of nature and the divine agency will remain in the future what they 
 have been in the past, and this conviction is practically or subjectively sufficient. Peier 
 admits also that logic, or the science of inference, which presupposes the principle of con- 
 tradiction, is in practice a source of scientific certainty ; he adds that the existence of a 
 science of mathematics is a sufficient refutation of him who denies the possibility of such 
 certainty. In regard to the ordinary proofs of God's existence, he expresses the opinion, 
 in agreement with Occam, that they are not logically binding, although sufficient to estab- 
 lish a probability.
 
 GERMAN MYSTICISM IX THE 14tII AND loTH CENTUEIES. 467 
 
 Other Nominalists, who moro or less distinguished themselves, were Robert Holcot, 
 the Dominican (died A. D. 1349), who so far separated philosophical from theological truth," 
 as to teach that from the premises of philosophy their pure consequence, unmodified by 
 any side reference to the interests of theology, might and must be drawn ; Gregory of 
 Rimini (died 1358), who was influential as a General of the Augustinian Order; the mathe- 
 maticians, Richard Suinshead or Suisset (about 1350) and Henry of Hessen (died 1397); 
 John of Mcrc'^ria, who deduced from Detertniaism the (supposed) consequence that he 
 who succumbs under an irresistible temptation does not sin, and that sin itself, as being 
 willed by God, is rather good than bad (these propositions were condemned in the year 
 1347 by the University of Paris, which had already (1339) proscribed Occam's books and 
 (1340) condemned Nominalism); Nicolaus of Autricuria, who in 1348 was forced to recall 
 his attacks on Aristotle, together with his skeptical theses, which were founded on 
 Nominalism, and his doctrine of the eternity of the world ; and, finally, Gabriel Biel, who 
 produced a summary of the doctrines of Occam, and was the so-called ''last Scholastic," 
 and whose nominalistic doctrine exerted a not inconsiderable influence on Luther and 
 Melancthon. At Paris, in 1473, all teachers were bound by oath to teach Realism ; but 
 in 1481 the nominalistic doctrine was already again tolerated. 
 
 The attempt of Raymuudus of Sabunde to prove the doctrines of Christianity from the 
 revelation of God in nature had no imitators. Setting out with the consideration of the 
 four stages designated as mere being, life, sensation, and reason, Raymimdus (who agrees 
 with the Nominalists in regarding self-knowledge as the most certain kind of knowledge) 
 proves by ontological, physico-teleological, and moral arguments (the latter based on the 
 principle of retribution), the existence and trinity of God, and the duty of grateful love to 
 God, who first loved us. His work culminates in the mystical conception of a kind of love 
 to God, by which the lover is enabled to grow into the essence of the loved. 
 
 Since the nominalistic philosophy, in the majority of its representatives, though not 
 indeed hostile to theology, scarcely rendered it any positive services — being, rather, almost 
 indifferent in regard to it — it was natural that the theologians should assume a corre- 
 sponding attitude in reference to philosophy. Gerson (John Charlier of Gerson), the Mystic, 
 himself an adherent of Nominalism and seeking to reconcile theology with Scholastic phi- 
 losophy (" concordare theologiam cum nostra scholastica "), exhorts his followers to give but 
 a moderate attention to secular science and philosophy ; the truth could be learned only 
 tlirough revelation. Repentance and faith, says Gerson, lead moro surely than all human 
 inquiry to true knowledge. Neither Plato nor Aristotle is the right guide for him who is 
 seeking his salvation. Better than all rational knowledge is obedience to the diviue ex- 
 hortation : Poenitemini et credite Evangelio ! Such also was the attitude first assumed by 
 Protestantism toward philosophy. 
 
 § 106.* "When Scholasticism liad already passed its period of 
 bloom, there grew up on German soil a peculiar branch of Mysticism, 
 which exerted an indirect or a direct influence on the further develop- 
 ment of science down to the most recent times. German Mysticism 
 was developed chiefly in sermons from the German pulpit. Ser- 
 monizing was cultivated with especial ardor by the members of the 
 
 *) This parasrraph is from the pen of my friend Dr. AJo// Latson, of ■whose thorough studies in the 
 department of Mediaeval Mysticism I am glad and grateful that this Compendium should reap th» 
 benefit. — Ueberweg.
 
 468 GERMAN MYSTICISM IN THE 14tII AND 15tH CENTURIES. 
 
 Dominican Order. The object of the preaeliers was to present tlio 
 system of the schools, as exhibited in the writings of Albert the Great 
 1 and Thomas, in a manner which should take hold of the heart of 
 ' every individual among the people. With the transference of science 
 into the German language, and with the attempt of preachers to 
 assume a popular style, the prevalent tendency toward the logical, 
 and toward the ingenious combination of fundamental ideas in the 
 form of syllogistic proofs, fell away ; in its place came speculation, 
 which, giving to the theorems of faith spiritual vitality, stripped them 
 of the unyielding form of dogmas, and, viewing them from the stand- 
 point of one vitalizing, central idea, spread them as a synthetic whole 
 before the hearts and wills of the hearers. This central idea was the 
 conception, still latent in the systems of Albert and Thomas, of the 
 essential unity of the soul in reason and will with God, a conceptioa 
 which here, where a system of ideas took rather the form of an unity 
 felt internally than of a whole consisting of logically-reasoned proofs^ 
 could be expressed freely and without regard to ulterior consequences, 
 and around which were gathered all the kindred elements contained 
 in the entire previous development of Christian science. In partic- 
 ular, the Platonic and Neo-Platonic elements, which were not wanting 
 even with Albert and Thomas, were now placed in the foreground ; 
 an extreme Realism was everywhere tacitly presupposed. It was not 
 the Church and its teaching, but Christianity, as they understood it, 
 that the Mystics aimed to advance by editying speculation and to 
 render comprehensible by the transcendent use of the reason. The 
 author and perfecter of this entire development was Master Eckhart. 
 Appealing on almost all points to the doctrines of earlier speculators, 
 in particular to those of the Pseudo-Areopagite, to Augustine, and to 
 Thomas, he nevertheless, with bold originality, remolded the old in a 
 new spirit, in many cases anticipating the labor of subsequent times. 
 At all events, notwithstanding the censure of the Church, which fell 
 on him, he produced the deepest impression on his contemporaries. 
 Familiarly acquainted with Aristotle, and with the Scholastic phi- 
 losophy founded on Aristotle, he by no means assumed a position 
 liostile to the science of his times. He only rejected in many cases 
 its form for purposes of his own, while he aimed to reveal its true 
 sense. Theoretical knowledge was, in his view, the means by which 
 man must become a partaker of divine knowledge ; but, in Neo- 
 Platonic fashion, he regarded, as the highest form in which reason
 
 GERMAN MYSTICISM IN THE 14tH AND loTH CENTURIES. 469 
 
 manifests .itself, an immediate intuition transcending all finiteness 
 and all determination. Earnestly as he pursued in sermon and 
 treatise the end of edification and awakening, he was animated not 
 less powerfully by a purely theoretical interest. 
 
 In the doctrine of Eckhart knowledge is represented as a real 
 union of Subject with Object ; only in knowledge is the absolute 
 seized upon and with joy possessed. In opposition to the teaching of 
 Duns Scotus, the will is treated as subordinate to the knowing faculty, 
 and extreme emphasis is laid on the presence in the divine nature of 
 the element of rational necessity. Reason finds its satisfaction only 
 in a last, all-including unity, in which all disthictions vanish. The 
 Absolute, or Deity, remains as such without personality and without 
 work, concealed in itself. Enveloped in it is God, who is from eter- 
 nity, and who has the power of revealing himself. He exists as the 
 one divine nature, which is developed into a trinity of persons in the 
 act of self-knowledge. In this eternal act the divine nature beholds 
 itself as a real object of its own cognition, and in the love and joy 
 which this act excites in itself it eternally takes back itself (as object 
 of cognition) into itself (as subject of cognition). The Subject in this 
 knowledge is the Father, the Object is the Son, the love of both for 
 each other is the Spirit. The Son, as he is eternally begotten by the 
 Father, involves at once the ideal totality of things. The world is 
 eternally in God as a world of ideas or antetypes, and is withal 
 simple in its nature. The manifold and different natures of finite 
 things arose first through their creation in time out of nothing. Out 
 of God, the creature is a pure nothing; time and space and the plu- 
 rality, which depends on them, are nothing in themselves. The duty 
 of man as a moral being is to rise beyond this nothingness of the 
 creature, and by direct intuition to place himself in immediate union 
 with the Absolute ; by means of the human reason all things are to 
 be brought back into God. Thus the circle of the absolute process, 
 which is at the same time absolute rest, is gone through and the last 
 end is reached, the anniliilation of all manifoldness in the mystery 
 and repose of the Absolute. — The fundamental conceptions of Eck- 
 hart's doctrine were not, in his time, further developed in a scientific 
 manner by any one. The most influential representatives of Mys- 
 ticism in his extremely numerous school were, Johann Tanler, Ilein- 
 ricli Suso, the unknown author of a small work entitled " A German 
 Theology^'' and Johann Rusbroek.
 
 470 GEKMAN MYSTICISM IN THE 14tH AND 15tH CENTURIES. 
 
 Deutsche Mystiker d. 14 Jahrhunderts, edited by F. Pfeiffer, Vol. I. Leipsic, 1845; Vol. II. ibid. 185T, 
 Vol. II. contains Meister Eckhart. Until the publication of this work only the sermons and treatises 
 contained in the appendi.x to the edition of Tauler's Sermons (Basel, 1521) were known as works of Eck- 
 hart. Pfeiflfer's extremely thankworthy edition, although containing only a part of the works named by 
 Trithemius (De Script. Eccles.) and examined by Nicolaus Cusanus {Opp., ed. Basil., p. 71) furnishes suffi- 
 cient material for a survey of the ideas of the " Master." Much, that must now be ascribed to Eckhart, 
 passed formerly under Tauler's and Kusbroek's names. In many cases the text is sorely mutilated, and 
 many passages are rendered unintelligible. 
 
 Concernini; the German Mystics, cf. in addition to the works above cited (p. 389) and the works on the 
 History of Dogmas (p. 263), the following: Gottfr. Arnold, Ifistoria et descrijMo theologiae mysticae, 
 Frankfort, 1702. De Wette, Ohristliche Sittenlehre, II. 2, Berlin, 1821. Eosenkranz, Die deutsche Mystik, 
 zur Gesohichte der deutschen Litteratur, Konigsberg, 1836. UUmann, Beformatoren vor der Reforma- 
 tion, Vol. II. Hamburg, 1842, pp. 18-284. Ch. Schmidt, Etudes sur le mysticisme alleniand {Memoires de 
 facad. des sci^jicea mor. et polit., t. II., p. 240, Paris, 1847). Wilh. Wackernagel, Gesch. der deutschen 
 Litteratur, Abth. 2, Basel, 1853, pp. 381-341. Boehringer, Kirchengeschichte in Biographien (II. 8: Die 
 deutschen Mystiker), Zurich, 1S55. Bamberger, Stimmen aus deni Ileiligthmn der christl. Mystik und 
 Theosophie, 2 parts, Stuttgard, 1857. Greith, Die Mystik im Predigerorden, Freiburg in Br., 1861. G. A. 
 Eeinrich, Les mystiques aUemands au moyen-dge, in the Revue d'Economie Chretienne. November, 1866, 
 p. 926 seq. C. Schmidt, Nicolaus von Basel, Vienna, 1866. T. Tietz, Die Mystik und ihr Verhiiltniss zw 
 Reformation, in the Zeitschr. fur die luther. Theologie. 1868, pp. 617-638. W. Treger, Zur GeschichU der 
 deutschen 2Iystik, in the Zeitschr. fur lUstor. T7i£ol., 1869, pp. 1-145. 
 
 On Eckhart, cf. C. Schmidt, in TVieol. Stud. u. Krit, 18:39, p. 663 seq. ; Martensen, Meister E., Ham- 
 burg, 1S42; Steffensen, TJeher Meister E. u. d. Mystik, in Gelzcr's Protest. Monatsbldtter, 1858, p. 267 seq. ; 
 Petr. Gross, De E. philosopho {diss, inaug.), Bonn, 1858; R. Heidrich, Das theol. System des Meisters E. 
 i^Progr.), Posen, 1864; Joseph Bach, Meister E., der Vater der deutschen Speculation, Vienna, 1864; W. 
 Preger. Ein neuer Tractat Meister E.'s (Ztsclir. f. Mstor. Theol., 1864, p. 163 seq.), and KritiscJce Studien 
 su Meister E. (ibid. 1S6C, p. 453 seq.); E. Biihmer, Meister E. (Giosebrechfs i)a??!a?'i«, 1865, p. 52 seq.); 
 Wahl, Die Seelenlehre Meister E:s {Theol. Stud. u. Krit, 186S. pp. 273-296) ; Ad. Lasson, Meister Eckhart, 
 der Mystiker, Berlin, 1868; W. Treger, Meister E. und die Inquisition, Munich, 1S69. 
 
 The most important editions of Tauler's Sermons are those of Leipsic, 1498, Basel, 1521 and 1522, 
 Cologne. 1543; translated into Latin by Surius, Cologne, 1548; translated into modern German, Frankfort- 
 on-the-Main, 1S26 and 1S64, 3 parts. The book : Von der Naohfolge des armen Lebens Christi was jjub- 
 lisbed by Schlosser, Frankfort-on-the-Main, 18:53 and 1864. Cf. C. Schmidt, Joh. Tauter, Hamburg, 1841 ; 
 Eudelbach, Oh>-istl. Biogr., Leipsic, 1849, p. 187 seq. ; F. Bahring, Joh. Tauter und die Gotte.<freunde, 
 Hamburg, 1853 ; E. Bohmer, Nicolaus v. Basel u. Tauter (Giesebrecht's Damaris, 1865, p. 148 seq.). 
 
 Suso's works appeared at Augsburg in 1482, 1512. etc.; translated into Latin by Surius. Cologne, 1555, 
 ed. Diepenbrock. Eegensb., 1829, 1837, 1854. Die Briefe Ileinrich Suso's, from a MS. of the fifteenth cen- 
 tury, ed. Wilh. Preger, Leipsic, 1867. Cf. C. Schmidt, Theol. Stud. ?«. Krit., 1843, p. 835 seq. ; Bohmer, 
 Giesebrecht's Damaris, 1865, p. 821 seq.; Wilh. Volkmar, Der Mystiker Ileinr. Suso {Gymn.-Progr.), 
 Duisburg, 1869. 
 
 A list cf editions of the opuscule, entitled Eine deutsche Theologie (first published in part by Lu- 
 ther. 1516) is given in the edition of F. Pfeifi'er, Stuttgard, 1851, 2d edition, with modern German trans- 
 lation, Stuttgard, 1855 (Preface, pp. 10-18). Cf. UUmann, Theol. Stud. u. Ki-it., 1852, p. 859 seq. ; Lisco, 
 Die Ueihlehre der Theologia deutsch, Stuttgard, 1857 ; Eeifenrath, Die deutsche Theologie des Franck- 
 furter Gottesfreundes, Halle, 1863. 
 
 Rmbroek 0pp. latine, ed. Surius, Cologne, 1552, etc., in German, by Gottfr. Arnold, Oflfenbach, 1701. 
 Vier Sohriften R.'s, published in low German by A. v. Arnswaldt, Hanover, 1848. Werken van Jan van 
 Ruiisbroee, Ghent, 1858 seq., 5 parts. Cf. Engelhardt, Rich. v. St. Victor u. B., Erlang., 1838 (see above, 
 p. 339); Ch. Schmidt, Etude sur Jean R., Strasburg, 1859. 
 
 Of the remaining exceedingly copious literature of the School of German Mystics founded by Eck- 
 hart, only fragments are extant, in part still unprinted. Of. Wackernagel (see above) and Bach. Meister 
 Eckhart, pp. 175-207. Yet important as these works were in their influence on the development of German 
 prose and on the religious life of the German people, they wore without any special importance for the 
 progress of science. One of the most important of them, for the most part compiled from Eckhart, is found 
 translated in Greith's Die deutsche Mystik im Predigerorden, pp. 96-202. 
 
 The characteristic spirit of German Mysticism appears, at least in germ, in the works 
 of David of Augsburg, the Franciscan monk (died 1271 — on him cf Pfeifler's Deutsche. 
 Mystiker, Vol. I. p. xxvi. seq. and pp. 309-386), and particularly in those of Albertus
 
 GERMAN MYSTICISM IN THE 14tH AND lOTH CENTUEIES. 471 
 
 Magnus. Eckhart, born after 1250, perhaps at Strasburg, eatered the Dominican Order, 
 and was possibly an immediate pupil of Albert. He studied and taught afterward at 
 Paris, but was summoned in 1302 — hence before the arrival in Paris of Duns Scotus — by 
 Bonifacius VIII. to Rome, and made a doctor (" dodoreTn ipse inauguravit" Quetif et Echard, 
 Script. Ord. Fraed., Vol I. f. 507). E. held positions of high dignity in his order. In 1304 
 he became its Provincial for Saxony, and in 1307 its General Vicar, commissioned to 
 reform the convents of the Order in Bohemia. He taught and preached in many parts of 
 Germany with the greatest eclat. Having been perhaps even before then removed from his 
 offices, he was brought in 1327 before a tribunal of the Inquisition at Cologne. He 
 recanted conditional!}' {siquid errorum repertum fuerit, . . . hie revoco publice), but appealed, 
 in reply to further requisitions, to the Pope. He died before the bull condemning twenty- 
 eight of his doctrines was published (March 27, 1329). 
 
 The youth of Eckhart fell in a time of active scientific conflicts. In 1270 and 1277 the 
 Archbishop of Paris, Etienne Tempier, was compelled to take steps against a wide-spread 
 rationalism, which, setting out from the traditional distinction between revealed truths and 
 truths of the reason, affirmed that only that which was scientifically demonstrable could be 
 accepted as true, and consequently that all dogmas peculiar to Christianity were untrue (cf. 
 above, p. 460). To this were added the manifold pantheistic and antinomian heresies of that 
 age. It was with reference, not only to all these, but also, at a later epoch, with refer- 
 ence to the doctrines of Duns Scotus and the Nominalists, that Eckhart found it necessary 
 to define his position. On the basis of the principles of Albert and Thoraa.s, he went on to 
 add to the superstructure which they had erected, and carried their philosophy of the 
 intellect to the point of affirming that all religious truth lay within the sphere of human 
 reason. But while he sought to penetrate religious truth with the eye of knowledge, he 
 unconsciously foisted on it an interpretation of his own, treating the doctrines of the 
 Church as a symbolical, representative expression of the truth, while he believed himself to 
 possess, in the form of adequate conceptions, the full truth. Eckhart placed in the fore- 
 ground of his theology the Neo-Platonic elements, derived particularly from the Pseudo- 
 Areopagite, but also present in Albert and Thomas, while at the same time, by studying 
 the writings of the Apostle Paul and of Augustine, he succeeded in giving to Ethics a more 
 profound basis. The nature of his speculations was essentially iutiuenced by the fact that 
 he regarded himself as a servant rather of Christian truth than of the Church. Isolated 
 expressions in his writings respecting the abuses of the Church are not so important a 
 confirmation of this fact, as is the ingenuousness which everywhere characterizes him when 
 maintaining conceptions of Christian doctrine which were in diametrical opposition to the 
 teaching of the Romish Church. Thus he addressed himself above all to the Christian 
 people, not to the schools, and viewed scientific knowledge chiefly with an eye for ita 
 morally edifying power. Eckhart did not intend to oppose either the Church or Scholas- 
 ticism, but in reality he tore himself loose from their ground. At first, only the relative 
 importance assigned to particular elements of doctrine was changed by him, the latter 
 being liberated from the narrow spaces of the School and arranged to meet the needs of 
 the Christian people ; afterward, the character of the doctrines was transformed, and much 
 that had been concealed under Scholastic formulas appeared as the proper consequence of 
 the Scholastic doctrine. Scholasticism had for its object the advancement of the Church 
 and its doctrine; Eckhart aimed to promote the spiritual welfare of Christians and to pomt 
 out the nearest way to union with God. Hence his indiflerence and even hostility to the 
 purely ecclesiastical and dialectical elements of the philosophy of the Schools wherever, 
 instead of proposing tWe shorter and true way to God, they seemed to interpose an endlesi 
 •eries of artificial and false conditions.
 
 472 GERMAN MYSTICISM IN THE 14tH AND 15tH CENTURIES. 
 
 We find no questions of a purely logical nature discussed by Eckhart. But the univer- 
 sal is for liim that which truly exists ; in order to become active, it needs the individual, 
 which on its part receives being and permanence from the universal, and can only through 
 its immanence in the universal assert itself as real and permanent (cf , e. g., Pfeiffer, Vol. 
 II., p. 632, line 30; 250, 16; 419, 24). 
 
 The chief points in his doctrine are indicated by Eckhart himself, on p. 91 : he was 
 accustomed, he says, to speak of "decease," of the building up anew of the soul in God, 
 of the high nobility of the soul, and of the purity of the divine nature. The exposition of 
 his doctrine must begin with his psychology, which includes the source of all his con- 
 ceptions. 
 
 I. Eckhart's psychology agrees most nearly with that of Augustine and Thomas. The 
 soul is immaterial, the simple form of the body, entire and undivided in every part of the 
 body. The faculties of the soul are the external senses, and the lower and higher 
 faculties. The lower faculties are the empirical understanding {Bescheidenheit), the heart 
 (organ of passion), and the appetitive faculty ; the higher faculties are memory, reason, and 
 will, corresponding with Father, Son, and Spirit. The senses are subordinate to the per- 
 ceptive faculty or the common sense ; by the latter that which is perceived is handed over 
 to the understanding and memory, having been first stripped of its sensuous and material 
 element and the manifold in it having been transformed into unity. Sensuous perception 
 takes place by the aid of images of the objects which are taken up into the soul. Regu- 
 lated by the appetitive faculty, and purified and freed by the reflective intellect fi'om all 
 that is merely symbolical or figurative, the representative object of perception reaches the 
 region of the highest faculties (p. 319 seq. ; 538 ; 383 seq.). The soul is not subject to the 
 conditions of space and time; all its ideas are immaterial (p. 325); it acts in time, but not 
 temporally (p. 25). Regarding only its highest faculties in their supra-sensuous activity, 
 we call the soul spirit ; but as the vitalizing principle of material bodies, it is called soul. 
 Yet both are one essence. All activity of the soul (in the narrower sense) depends on the 
 presence of organs. But the organs are not themselves the essence of the soul ; they are 
 an outcome of its essence, although a degenerate outcome. In the profouudest recesses 
 of the soul these organs cease, and consequently all activity ceases. Nothing but God the 
 Creator penetrates these recesses. The creature can know only the faculties in which it 
 beholds its own image. The soul has thus a double face, the one turned toward this 
 world and toward the body, which the soul fits for all its activity, the other directed 
 immediately to God. The soul is something intermediate between God and created things 
 (pp. 110, 250, KO). (Cf Greith, pp. 96-120). 
 
 The higliest activity of the soul is that of cognition. This is represented by E. as an 
 act in which all plurality and materiality are eliminated more or less forcibly, according to 
 the kind of cognition. There are three species of cognition : sensible, rational, and supra- 
 rational cognition ; only the last reaches the whole truth. "Whatever can be expressed in 
 words is comprehended by the lower faculties ; but the higher ones are not satisfied with 
 so little. They constantly press further on, till they reach the source whence the soul 
 originally flowed forth. The highest faculty is not, like each of the inferior faculties, one 
 faculty among others; it is the soul itself in its totality; as such it is called the "spark," 
 also (p. 113) Synleresis (corresponding to the soul-centre of Plotinus, cf above, pp. 250, 251). 
 This highest faculty is served by all the faculties of the soul, which assist it to reach the 
 source of the soul, by raising the latter out of the sphere of inferior things (p. 131 ; 469). 
 The spark is content with nothing created or divided; it aspires to the absolute, to that 
 unity outside of which there remains nothing. |g| 
 
 Reason is the head of the soul, and knowledge is the ground of blessedness. Essenc»
 
 GERMAN MYSTICISM IN THE 14tH AND IStH CENTURIES. 473 
 
 and knowledge are one. Of that which has most essence there is the most cognition. To 
 know an object is to become really one with it. God's knowing and my knowing are one ; 
 true union with God takes place in cognition. Hence knowledge is the foundation of all 
 essence, the ground of love, the determining power of the will. Only reason is accessible 
 to the divine light (pp. 9D, 84, 221). But the knowledge here referred to is something 
 supra-sensible, inexpressible in words, unaided by the understanding ; it is a supernatural 
 vision above space and time, and is not man's own deed, but God's action in him. (By 
 Suso, in his " Book Third," chap. 6, true knowledge is defined as the comprehension of 
 two contraries united in one subject.) Hence it is also a non-cognition, a state of blind- 
 ness, of not knowing. But in respect of form it remains a cognition, and all finite cog- 
 nition is an active progress toward infinite cognition. Hence the first requirement is: 
 grow in knowledge. But if this knowledge is too high for you, believe ; believe in Christ, 
 follow his holy image and be redeemed (p. 498). With right knowledge, all fancying, 
 imagining and faith, all seeing through images and comparisons, all instruction by Scrip- 
 ture, dogmas, and authorities cease ; then no external witness, no arguments addressed 
 to the understanding, are loxiger necessary (pp. 242, 245, 381, 302, 458). But since the 
 truth is incomprehensible to the empirical understanding — so much so, that if it were 
 capable of being comprehended and believed, it would not be truth (p. 206) — the knowl- 
 edge of the truth, in contradistinction from perception and mere logically correct think- 
 ing, is called faith (p. 567), with special reference to the fact that this relation of the 
 soul to the supra-sensible (in the cognition of truth), springs up in the reason, but becomes 
 operative in the will. "When, in other words, the reason arrives at the limit of her power, 
 there remains a transcendent sphere, which she cannot fathom. This she then reveals in 
 the innermost recesses of the soul, where reason and will stand in living interchange, or in 
 the will, and the will, illuminated by the divine light, plunges into a state of non-knowing 
 and turns from all perishable light to the highest good, to God. Thus faith arises (pp. 102, 
 171, 176, 384 seq., 439, 454-460, 521, 537, 559, 567, 591), an exaltation which, commencing 
 with the understanding, takes possession of the whole soul and guides it into its highest 
 perfection (cf. Greith's work, p. 172 seq.). 
 
 The highest object of cognition is not the three persons of the Godhead, for these are 
 distinguished from each other; nor the unity of the three, for this unity has the world 
 outside itself. Reason penetrates beyond all determinateness into the silent desert, into 
 which no distinction has ever penetrated, and which is exalted motionless above all con- 
 trast and all division (pp. 193, 281, 144). 
 
 II. In his Theology Eckhart starts from the Areopagite's negative theology (cf. above, 
 p. 350). He resumes the distinction made by Gilbertus Porretanus between the Godhead 
 and God (see above, p. 399), giving it a deeper signification, but presents the doctrine of 
 the Trinity in the same form in which Thomas does. The Absolute is called, in Eckhart'a 
 terminology, the Godhead, being distinguished from God. God is subject to generation 
 and corruption ; not so the Godhead. God works, the Godhead does not work. — Yet these 
 terms are not always precisely discriminated. God {i. e., the Godhead), we are told, has 
 no predicates and is above all understanding, incomprehensible, and inexpressible ; every 
 predicate ascribed to him destroys the conception of God, and raises to the place of God 
 an idol. The most abstract predicate is essence (being) ; but inasmuch as this too contains 
 a certain determination, it also is denied of God. God is in so far a nothing, a not-God, 
 not-spirit, not-person, not-image, and yet, as the negation of negation (p. 322), he is at the 
 same time the unlimited "/« se" the possibility to which no species of essence is wanting, 
 in which every thing is (not one, but) unity (pp. 180, 268, 282, 320, 532, 540, 590, 5, 26, 46, 
 59). — The Godhead as such cannot be revealed- It becomes manifest first in its persons
 
 474: GERMAN MYSTICISM IN THE 14tH AND 15tH CENTUBIE8. 
 
 (p. 320). The Absolute is at once absolute process. The Godhead is the beginning a.id 
 final goal of the whole series of essences which exist. It is in the latter capacity, or, it 
 is there where every essence is not annihilated, but completed {i. e., in the concrete uni- 
 versal), that the Godlaead comes to repose. The eternal Godhead, as the beginning and 
 end of all things, is concealed in absolute obscurity, being not only unknown and unknow- 
 able to man, but also unknown to itself (p. 288). God, says Eckhart, improving upon 
 Pseudo-Dionysius, dwells in the nothing of nothing which was before nothing (p. 539). 
 But God does not stop there. God as Godhead is a spiritual substance, of which it can 
 only be said that it is nothing. In the Trinity he is a living light that reveals itself (p. 499). 
 In the Godhead the relation between essence and nature oscillates constantly between iden- 
 tity and difference. In every object matter and form are to be distinguished (p. 530), with 
 which correspond, in the Godhead, essence and the divine persons. The form of an object 
 is that which the object is for others ; it is the revealing element, and hence the persons of 
 the Trinity are the form of the essence (p. 681). (In the school of Eckhart, as in that of 
 Duns Scotus, form is the individualizing principle. Form gives separate essence, accord- 
 ing to Suso in the " Third Book," ch. 4.) The persons of the Trinity are held together by 
 the one divine nature common to them all, and this nature in the Godhead is the revealing 
 principle in the same. The divine essence is the natura non naturata, the persons belong 
 to the natura naturata; but the latter are no less eternal than is the former. The naiura 
 naturata is nothing but one God in three persons, and these endow the creature with its 
 nature. The divine nature is the Father, if we disregard his distinction from the two 
 other persons of the Godhead. The Father is as near to the natura non naturata as to 
 the naiura naturata. In the former he is alone, in the latter he is first (p. 537). The 
 Father is contained in the unrevealed Godhead, but only as essence without personality, 
 hence not yet as Father ; it is only in self-knowledge that he becomes Father. He is a 
 light which as person and essence is reflected in itself The Father is the j-eason in the 
 divine nature. There that which knows and that which is known are one and the same 
 (pp. 499, 670). This being reflected in himself is the Father's eternal activity. It is called 
 begetting and speaking, and the object of the activity is called the Son or the Word, the 
 second person in the divine nature. Sensuous nature works in space and time, in which, 
 therefore, Father and Son are separated ; in God there is no time or space, therefore Father 
 and Son are at the same time one God, distinguished only as different aspects of one sub- 
 stratum. The Father "pours out" himself; himself, as thus "poured out," effused, is the 
 Son (p. 94). The Son returns eternally back into the Father in love, which unites both. 
 This love, the common will of the Father and the Son, is the Spirit, the third person. The 
 Trinity flows from the one divine nature in an eternal process, and into the same divine 
 nature it is eternally flowing back. "While the Godhead thus really includes three persons, 
 it is in the unity of the Godhead that absolute power resides. By virtue of this power, 
 and not in his personal capacity, the Father begets the Son; it is only through this act of 
 begetting that the Father becomes a person. This begetting is eternal and necessary, and 
 is implied in the conception of the divine essence (p. 335). The divine nature is in itself 
 neither essence nor person, but it makes the essence to be essence, and the Father, 
 Father. The divine nature and the divine persons mutually imply each other ; they are 
 alike eternal and alike original, but in the former no distinction is possible, while the 
 latter admit of distinction. The self-conservation of the Godhead in its peculiarity is the 
 eternal process; the immovable repose of the Godhead finds in the eternal process its 
 substratum. In the divine nature eternal rest is involved in eternal procession (pp. 682, 
 677). In the absolute divine unity all difference is annulled, the eternal flux subsides into 
 itself. The divine essence and the dirine nature form only a relative opposition. If they
 
 GERMA2; MYSTICISM IN THE 14tH AND 15tII CENTURIES. 475 
 
 were two determiuations of the Absolute, the one must have sprung from the other ; in 
 the absoUite unity they are one. The Absohite, as essence, is the essence of the divine 
 persons and of all things ; as nature it is the unity of the persons. It is the essence of 
 the divine essence, the nature of the divine nature (p. 669). The eternal process in God 
 is the principle of eternal goodness and justice (p. 528). 
 
 To the revealed God belong the divine predicates, and especially the predicate of reason. 
 God's life is his self-cognition. God must work and know himself He is goodness and 
 must communicate himself. His essence depends on his willing what is best. He works 
 without a shade of temporality, unchangeable and immovable. He is love, but he loves 
 only himself, and others in so far as he recognizes himself in them (pp. 11, 133, 134, 145, 
 270, 272). — Eckliart repeats very often that God cannot be comprehended by the finite 
 understanding; what we say of him we must stammer. But he attempts to communicate 
 in the form of definite conceptions his own intuition, and to describe God as the absolute 
 process. In this description the doctrine of the Church is not recognizable. The divine 
 persons, as Eckhart conceives them, are in reality the stadia of a process. He has not 
 succeeded in his attempted logical derivation of plurality in the Deity. Plurality and 
 whatever else revelation asserts of the divine nature are, the rather, incorporated by him 
 directly into his conception of the Absolute, and asserted as facts, but they are by no 
 means metaphysically deduced. 
 
 III. The Absolute is, further, the ground or cause of the world (p. 540 seq.). All 
 things are from eternity in God, not indeed in gross material form, but as the work of art 
 exists in the master. "O'hen God regarded himself, he saw the eternal images of all things 
 prefigured in himself, not, however, in multiplicity, but as one image (p. 502). Eckhart 
 follows Thomas in proclaiming the doctrine that there exists an eternal world of ideas 
 (pp. 324-328). Distinct from this is the world of creatures, which was created in time 
 and out of nothing. This distinction of two worlds must be kept in mind, in order not to 
 impute to Eckhart a pantheism, which he was in fact far removed from holding (p. 325). 
 The world was in the Father originally in uncreated simplicity. But at the moment of its first 
 emergence out of God it took on manifoldness ; and yet all manifoldness is simple in essence, 
 and the independent existence of single objects is only apparent (p. 589). It is not that a 
 new will arose in God. "When the creature had as yet no existence for itself, it was yet 
 eternally in God and in his reason. Creation is not a temporal act. God did not literally 
 create heaven and earth, as we inadequately express it; for all creatures are spoken in the 
 eternal Word (p. 488). In God there is no work ; there all is one now, a becoming without 
 becoming, change without change (p. 309). The 7iow in which God made the world is the 
 now in which I speak, and the day of judgment is as near to this now as is yesterday 
 (p. 268). The Father uttered himself and all creatures in the Word, his Son, and the return 
 of the Father into himself includes the like return of all creatures into the same eternal 
 source. The logical genesis of the Son furnishes a type of all evolution or creation ; the Sou 
 is the unity of all the works of God. God's goodness compelled him to create all that is 
 created, with which he was eternally pregnant in his providence. The world is an inte- 
 grant element in the conception of God ; before the creatures were, God was not God 
 (p. 281). This, however, is true only in relation to the ideal world, and so it can be said: 
 God is in all things, and God is all things. Out of God there is nothing but nonentity. 
 The world of things, in so far as these appear to assert their independence over against 
 God, is therefore a nonentity. Whatever is deficient, whatever is sensuous in its nature, 
 is the result of a falling off from essential being, a privation: all creatures are pure 
 nothing. They have no essence, except so far as God is present in them. Manifoldness 
 exists only for the finite intellect; in God is only one word, but to the human underetanding
 
 476 GERMAlif MYSTICISM IN THE 14:TH AND lOTH CENTDKIES. 
 
 there are two : God and creature (p. 207). Pure thought above time and space sees all things 
 as one, and in this sense, but not when viewed with reference to tlieir finite determinate- 
 ness and diversity, all things are in God (pp. 311, 322 seq., 540) and have true being. — 
 Eckhart does not attempt to explain the apparently independent existence of things. This 
 appearance, he says, is connected with the genesis and existence of things in time (pp. 117, 
 466, 390, 589); but whence the possibility of being, out of God? In one passage (p. 497) 
 Eckhart accounts for the plurality of concrete existence by the fall of man ; but evil itself 
 and sin are left unexplained. Eckhart is aware of the subjectivity of thought (p. 484, line 
 36) ; but that the false appearance in question has its source in human thought and is only 
 subjective, is not his opinion. Not till a much later epoch was Eckhart's speculation 
 fartlier developed by attempts to comprehend the nature of evil and to demonstrate the 
 subjectivity of thought. 
 
 The relation of God to the world may be more precisely described as follows : God is 
 the first cause of the world ; in things God has externalized his innermost essence. Con- 
 sequently he could never know himself if he did not know all creatures. If God were to 
 withdraw what belongs to him, all things would fall back into their original nothingness. 
 Ail things were made of nothing, but the Deity is infused into them. Nothingness is 
 attached, in the form of finiteness and difference, to all that is created. God constrains all 
 creatures to strive after likeness to him. God is in all things, not as a nature, nor in a 
 personal form, but as their essence. Thus God is in all places, and he is present in every 
 place with his entire essence. Since God is undivided, all things and all localities are 
 places where God is. God communicates himself to all things, to each according to the 
 measure of its ability to receive him. God is in all things as their intelligible principle; 
 but by as much as he is in aU things, by so much is he also above them. No creature can 
 come in contact with God. In so far as God is in things, they work divinely and reveal God, 
 but none of them can reveal liim completely. Created things are a way leading either from 
 God or to him. God so works all his works that they are immanent in him. The three 
 persons of the Godhead have wrought their own images in all creatures, and ail things 
 desire to return into their source. This return is the end of all motion in created things. 
 The creature strives always for something better; the aim of all variation of form is 
 improvement (pp. 333, 143). Repose in God is the ultimate end of all motion. 
 
 The means for bringing all things back to God is the soul, the best of created things. 
 God has made the soul like himself, and has communicated to it his entire essence. But 
 that which exists in God by his essence does not thus exist in the soul, but is a gift of 
 grace. The soul is not its own cause ; while it is an efflux from the divine essence, it has 
 not retained that essence, but has assumed another and a strange one. Hence it cannot 
 resemble God in the form of its activities, but as God moves heaven and earth, so the soul 
 vitalizes the body and imparts to it all its activities. At the same time, as being inde- 
 pendent of the body, it can with its thoughts be elsewhere than in the body, as an infinite 
 nature in the realm of finiteness (p. 394 seq.). All things were created for the soul. The 
 reason, beginning with the activity of the senses, has power to take within its survey all 
 creatures. All things are created in man. In the human reason they lose their finite 
 limitations. But not only in thought does man ennoble all created things, but also by 
 bodily assimilation in eating and drinking. Transformed into human nature, every crea- 
 ture attains to eternity. Every creature is one man, whom God must love from eternity ; 
 in Christ all creatures are one man, and this man is God. The soul never rests till it comes 
 into God, who is its first Form, and all creatures never rest till they pass into human nature 
 and through this into God, their first Form (pp. 152 seq., 530). Generation and growth 
 «nd universally in degeneration (decay); our present temporal being ends in eternaj
 
 OEKMAif MYSTICISM IN THE 14tH AND 15tH CENTURIES. 477 
 
 decay (p. 497). Thus the circle of tlie eternal process is run through, and things return to 
 their center, the undeveloped, undisclosed Deity. It is the fiovlj, irpoodor and t-:TLarpo(^ of 
 Proclus, which have entered by the way of Pseudo-Dionysius into Eckhart's, as previously 
 into Erigena's speculation (cf. above, pp. 257, 350, and 358 seq.). 
 
 lY. "With the conception of the return of all things through the soul to God, the prin- 
 ciple of Ethics is given to Eekhart. Morality is for him this restoration of the soul and 
 with it of all things into the Absolute. The condition of this restoration is death to self 
 i.e., the abolition of creatureship; its end is the union of man with God. It is particularly 
 in the province of Ethics that Eekhart rendered important service. His speculation pene- 
 trates, still more deeply than the rationalism of Abelard, into the very substance of 
 morality. 
 
 In order to bring back the soul to God, man is required to strip off all that pertains to 
 the creature, and first of all in cognition. The soul is divided into faculties: each has its 
 particular office, but the soul itself is only made so much the weaker for this division. 
 Hence the necessity that the soul should gather itself together and pass from a divided life 
 to a life of unity. God is not obliged to direct his attention from one thing to another, as 
 we are. "We must become as he is, and in an instant know all things in one image (pp. 13 
 seq., 264). If thou wilt know God divinely, thy knowledge must be changed to igno- 
 rance, to oblivion of thyself and of all creatures. This ignorance is synonymous with 
 unlimited capacity for receiving. Thus all things become God for thee, for in them all 
 thou thinkest and wiliest nothing but God alone. This is a state of passivity. God 
 needs only that man should give him a quiet heart. God will accomplish this work him- 
 self; let man only follow and not resist. Not the reason alone, but the will also, must 
 transcend itself Man must be silent, that God may speak. "We must be passive, that 
 God may work. The powers of the soul, which before were bound and imprisoned, must 
 become unemployed and free. Man must thus let go, must give up his proper selfhood. Give 
 up thine individuality and comprehend thyself in thine unmixed human nature, as thou art 
 in God: thus God enters into thee. Couldst thou annihilate thyself for an instant, thou 
 wouldst possess all that God is in himself Individuality is mere accident, a nothing ; put 
 off this nothing, and all creatures are one. The One, that remains, is the Son, whom the 
 Father begets (p. 620). All the love of this world is built on self-love; hadst thou given up 
 this, then thou hadst given up all the world. The man who will see God must become 
 dead to himself and be buried in God, in the unrevealed and solitary Deity, in order again 
 to become that which he was when he as yet was not. This state is called decease, a 
 freedom from all passions, from one's self, and even from God. The liighest point is 
 reached when man, for God's sake, relinquishes God himself. This implies complete sub- 
 mission to God's will, joy in all sufferings, though they were the sufferings of hell, joy in 
 the vision of God, as also in his absence. The "deceased" man loves no particular good, 
 Init goodness for goodness' sake ; he does not comprehend God, in so far as God is good 
 and just, but only in so far as he is pure substance. He has absolutely no will ; he lias 
 entered completely into the will of God. Everything which comes between God and the 
 soul must be removed; the end is not likeness, but unity. The soul, in being thus 
 absorbed in God, enters at the same time into and dwells in the soul's most proper essence, 
 in the wilderness of the soul, where the soul must be robbed of itself and be God with God 
 — mto that negation of all determination in wliich the soul has eternally hovered without 
 truly possessing itself (p. 510). The highest degree of "decease" is called poverty. A 
 poor man is he who knows nothing, wills nothing, and has nothing. So long as man still 
 has the will to fulfill God's will, or desires God or eternity or any definite object, he is not 
 yet truly poor, i. e., not yet truly perfect (p. 280 seq.).
 
 478 GERMAN MYSTICISM IN THE 14tH AND IStH CENTCBIES, 
 
 If I am in the state of "decease," God brings forth his Son in me. The sanctification 
 of man is the birth of God in the soul. All moral action is nothing other than this bring- 
 ing forth of the Son by the Father. (This language is lound also in the Epistle to Diog- 
 netus, see above, p. 280.) The birth of God in the soul takes place in the same way as 
 the eternal birth of the "Word, above time and space. In this Avork all men are one Son, 
 different in respect of bodily birth, but in the eternal birth one, a sole emanation from 
 tlio eternal TTord (p. 157). At the same time it is I who bring forth the Son in my moral 
 action. God has begotten me from eternity, that I may be Father and beget him who 
 begat me. God's Son is the soul's son. God and the soul have one Son, namely, God. 
 This birth of God in the soul is irreversible. He in whom the Son is once begotten can 
 never fall again. It were a mortal sin and heresy to believe otherwise (pp. 652 and 10). 
 
 From this principle are deduced the various doctrines of Etliics. Virtuous action is 
 purposeless action. Not even the kingdom of heaven, salvation, and eternal life are legiti- 
 mate objects of the moral wiU. As God is free from all finite ends, so also is the righteous 
 man. Desire nothing, thus wilt thou obtain God and in him all things. Work for the sake 
 of worlcmg, love for love's sake ; if heaven and heU did not exist, thou shouldst yet love 
 God for the sake of his goodness. Still more: thou shalt not love even God because he is 
 righteousness or because of any quahty in him, but only in view of his likeness to himself. 
 All that is contingent must be laid aside, including therefore virtue, in so far as it is a 
 particular mode of action. Virtue must be a condition, my essential condition ; I must be 
 built up and built over into righteousness. No one loves virtue except him who is virtue 
 itself. All virtues should become in me necessities, being performed unconsciously. 
 Morality consists not in doing, but in being. Works do not sanctify us, we are to 
 sanctify works. The moral man is not like a pupil, who learns to write by practice, 
 giving attention to every letter, but like the ready writer, who, without attention, uncon- 
 sciously exercises, perfectly and without labor, the art which has become to him a 
 second nature (pp. 524, 546, 549, 571). All virtues are one virtue. He who practices one 
 virtue more than another is not moral. Love is the principle of all virtues. Love strives 
 after the good. It is nothing other than God himself. Next to love comes humiUty, which 
 consists in ascribing all good, not to one's self, bat to God. — The beauty of the soul is, that 
 it be well-ordered (cf. Plotinus' doctrine, above, § 68, p. 250). The lowest faculties of the 
 soul must be subordinated to the highest, and the liighest to God : the external senses must 
 be subordinated to the internal senses, tlie latter to the understanding, the understanding 
 to the reason, the reason to the will, and the will to unity, so that the soul may be "de- 
 ceased " and nothing but God may enter into it. 
 
 It will be easily understood that Eckhart places a very low estimate on external works, 
 such as fastings, vigils, and mortitications. The idea that salvation depends on them is 
 declared to be a suggestion of the devil (p. 633). They are rather a hindrance than a 
 help to salvation, if one depends on them. They are appointed to prepare the spirit to turn 
 back into itself and into God, and to draw it away from earthly things ; but lay on the spirit 
 the curb of love, and thou wilt reach the goal far better (p. 29). No work is done for its 
 own sake ; in itself a work is neither good nor bad ; only the spirit, from which the work 
 proceeds, deserves these predicates. Nothing has hfe, except that which originates its 
 motion from within. All works, therefore, which arise from an external motive are dead 
 m themselves. The will alone gives value to works, and it sufiSces in place of them. The 
 will IS almighty ; that which 1 earnestly will I have. No one but thyself can hinder thee. 
 The true working is a purely interior working of the spirit on itself, i. e.. of the spirit in 
 God or upon God's motion. Even works of compassion, done for God's sake, have the 
 same disadvantage which belongs to all external aims and cares. Such works make of the 
 
 i
 
 GEEMAN MYSTICISM IN THE 14tH AND 15tH CENTUEIES. 479 
 
 soul, not a free daughter, but a serving-maid (pp. 71, 353, 402, 453 seq.). The inner work 
 is infinite, and takes place above space and time; none can hinder it. God does not 
 demand external works, that depend for their execution on space and time, thai are bmited, 
 that can be hindered or forced, and that grow wearisome and old with time and repetitioa 
 Just as the liberty of falling can bo taken away from the stone, but not the inclination to 
 fall, so with the inner work of raoraUty, which is to will and to incline toward all good and 
 to strive against evil (p. 434). The action of the righteous is not legaUty, but a life of faith 
 (p. 439). The true inner work is an independent rising of the reason to God, not through 
 the aid of definite rational conceptions, but in simple immediate unity with God (p. 43). 
 So also true prayer is the knowledge of the absolute essence. The prayer of the lips is 
 only an outward practice, ordained for the assembly. True prayer is voiceless, a working 
 in God and a giving up of ourselves to God's working in us, and so men should pray with- 
 out ceasing in all times and places. Thou needest not to tell God what thou hast need of; 
 he knows it all beforehand. Let him who would pray aright ask for nothing but God 
 alone. If I pray for anything, I pray for that which is nothing. He who praj-s for any- 
 thing besides God prays for an idol. Hence complete resignation to God's wnll belongs to 
 prayer. The "deceased" man does not pray; for every prayer is for some definite object, 
 but the heart of the " deceased " craves nothing. God is not moved by our prayers. But 
 God has foreseen all things from eternity, including, therefore, our prayers, and he has from 
 eternity granted or refused them (pp. 240, 352 seq., 487, 610). 
 
 There are no degrees in virtue. Those who are increasing in it are as yet not moral at 
 all (pp. 80, 140). Complete sanctification is attainable. Man can surpass all the samts in 
 heaven ar^ even the angels. Even in his present body he can arrive at the state in which 
 it is impossible for him to sin (p. 460). Then light streams through the body itself, all the 
 powers of the soul are harmoniously ordered, and the entire outward man becomes an 
 obedient servant of the sanctified will. Then man does not need God, for he has (Jod. His 
 blessedness and God's blessedness are one. 
 
 Eckliart avoids with great discreetness the quietistic and antinomiau consequences that 
 seem to follow from such conceptions as liis, and which in the contemporaneous fanaticism 
 of the Brothers and Sisters of the Free Spirit, based on the doctrine of Amalrich of Bena, 
 appeared in such glaring colors. A state of transcendent union with God by no means 
 hinders a temporal and rational occupation with empirical tilings. Tlio freedom from law 
 and from all activity, which is above described, belongs, according to Eckhart, only to the 
 "little spark," but not to the faculties of the soul. Only the " little spark" of the soul is 
 to be at all times with God and united with God, but thereby are desire, action, and feeling, 
 all to bo determined (pp. 22, 3S5, 161, 514). Man cannot continue without interruption in 
 that highest state termed above " poverty ; " otherwise aU communion of the soul with the 
 body would cease. God is not a destroyer of nature ; he completes it, and enters with his 
 grace where nature achieves her highest works (pp. 18, 78). In this life no man can or 
 ought to become free from passions, provided only that the excitement of the lower instincts 
 be not allowed to disturb the reason, and that nothing strange or unfitting shall penetrate 
 into the highest part of the soul (pp. 52 seq., 489, 666-668). No contemplation without 
 working; mere contemplation were selfishness. The .still work of reason is not prejudiced 
 by external activity with the numerous faculties and conditions therein involved. That 
 which the reason comprehends as One and out of time, the faculties translate into temporal 
 and spatial definiteness. If a man were in an ecstasy, like St. Paul, and k-new of n poor 
 man who had need of a little pottage, it were better that lie should leave his ecstasy and 
 minister to the needy (pp. 18-21, 330, 554, 607). So far is it from being tnie that works 
 cease when sanctification is attained, that it is not until after one's sanctification that right
 
 480 GERMAN MYSTICISM IN THE 14tH AND 15tH CENTURIES. 
 
 activity, love to all creatures, and most of all to one's enemies, and peace with all, begia 
 Ecstasies are soon over, but union with God becomes an abiding possession of the soul, 
 even when, in the midst of the soul's outward activity, that union seems to be withdrawn. 
 The outward works of mercy are indeed not done on their own account ; they have an end 
 where there is no sorrow nor poverty, in eternity, while the discipline of the inner man, 
 from which they arise, begins here and endures eternally (p. 329 seq.). A man can relin- 
 quish himself and still — and then only with full right — retain temporal goods. He can 
 enjoy all things ; no natural sensation is unworthy of him. "We should destroy no smaller 
 good in us, in order to secure a greater one, nor should we give up any mode of acti^-ity 
 that is of limited goodness for the sake of a greater good ; but we should comprehend every 
 good m its highest sense, for no good conflicts with another (pp. 421, 473, 492, 545, 5*73). 
 Only the principle is important ; from the right principle flow right actions as a matter of 
 course (p. 179). Many people say : If I have God and his love, I can do what I will. They 
 must be careful rightly to understand the case. So long as thou hast power to do anything 
 which is against God's' will, thou hast not God's love (p. 232). Do that to which thou 
 feelest thyself most impelled by God. That which is one man's hfe is often another's death. 
 All men are by no means required by God to follow the same way. God has not made man's 
 salvation dependent on a particular form of activity. If thou findest that the nearest way 
 for thee to God consists not in many works and outward labors and deprivations — which 
 are not of great importance unless one feels himself peculiarly moved toward them and has 
 power to do and undergo them without confusion in his inward life — if, then, thou findest 
 this not in thee, be entirely at peace and care but little for it. Also follow Christ spirit- 
 ually. Wouldst thou fast forty days because Christ did so ? Nay, follow him only in this, 
 that thou perceivest to what he draws thee most, and then practice renunciation. That 
 were a weak inward life which should depend on its outward garb ; the inner must deter- 
 mine the outer. Therefore those may with perfect right eat who would be quite as ready 
 to fast. Torment not thyself ; if God lays sufferings on thee, bear them. If he gives thee 
 honor and fortune, bear them with no less readiness. One man cannot do all things ; he 
 must do some one thing ; but in this one he can comprehend all things. If the obstacle is 
 not in thee, thou canst as well have God present with thee by the fire or in the stall as in 
 devout prayer. Be not satisfied with a God whom thou only conceivest in thought. If 
 thought perishes, so perishes thy God. Thou mayst by faith arrive at the state in which 
 thou shalt have God essentially dweUing in thee, and thou shalt be in God and God in 
 thee (pp. 543-578). 
 
 V. Since God accomphshes the process of his own redintegration from a state of self- 
 alienation by means of the soul, it follows that God needs the soul. He lies constantly in 
 wait for us, that he may draw us into himself For this eud he works all his works. God 
 can as little do without us as we without him. This eternal process in God is his grace. 
 God's grace works supernaturally and in a manner that transcends reason; it is unmerited, 
 eternally predestinated, but does not destroy our freedom of will. Nature makes no leaps ; 
 she commences with the least, and works steadily forward till she reaches the highest. 
 God's action does not conflict with man's free-will. The work of grace is nothing else than 
 a revelation of God, a revelation of himself for himself in the soul (p. 678). Grace begins 
 with the conversion of the wih, which conversion is at once a new creation out of nothing. 
 It effects in man, not a course of action, but a condition, an indwelling of the soul in God. — 
 Concerning the relation of grace to free wll, Eckhart expresses himself in an uncertain 
 manner. 
 
 By grace man regains the complete union with God, which he had originally. The soul, 
 like all things, pre-existed in God. Then I was in God, not as this individual man, but as
 
 GEEMAN MYSTICISM IN THE 1-ItII AND loTU CENTCKIES. 4S1 
 
 God, free and unconditioned like him. Then there were no real differences in God. Im- 
 manent in the divine essence, I created the world and myself. By my emanation from him 
 into individual existence I gave God his divine nature (his Godship), and do give it him 
 constantly ; for I give him that possibility of communicating himself which constitutes his 
 essence. God can only understand himself through the human soul ; in so far as I am 
 immanent in the essence of the Deity, he works all his works through me, and whatever is 
 an object of the divine understanding, that am I (pp. 581-583, 614, 281-284). If I return 
 out of my finite form of existence into God, I receive an impulse that bears me above the 
 angels and makes me one with God. Then I am again what I was ; I neither increase nor 
 decrease, but remain an immovable cause, that moves all things. This breaking through 
 and out from the limitations of creatureship is the end of all existence and of all change. 
 God became man that I might become God. I become one body with Christ and one spirit 
 with God. I comprehend myself no otherwise than as a son of God, and draw all things 
 after me into the uncreated good (pp. 511, 584). But the soul is uevertheless not anni- 
 hilated in God. There remains a little point in which the soul continues to show itself a 
 creature, in distinction from the Deity, namely, in this: that it is unable to fathom the depths 
 of the Godhead. Complete annihilation of the soul in God is not its highest end. "We 
 become God by grace, as God is God by nature. This state is also called a deification of 
 man (the Oeuaig of Dionysius and Maximus — see above, p. 352 — and of Erigena, see above, 
 pp. 358, 362 seq.), and not only is the soul affected by this change, biit the body also 
 becomes transfigured, freed from the senses (pp. 128, 185, 303, 377, 465, 523, 533, 662). 
 
 The relation of evil to the absolute process is not clearly explained by Eckhart. It was 
 impossible that this should be otherwise, since Eckhart, like his predecessors, conceded to 
 evil only the character of privation. As denoting a necessary stadium in the return of the 
 soul into God, evil is sometimes represented by Eckhart as a part of the divine plan of the 
 universe, as a calamity decreed by God. All things, sin included, work together for good 
 for those that are good (p. 556). God ordains sin for man and for those, most of all, wliom 
 he has chosen for great things. For this, also, man should be thankful. He should not 
 wish that he had not sinned. By sin man is humiliated, and by forgiveness he is all the 
 more intimately united to God. Nor should he wish that there might be no temptation to 
 sin, for then the merit of combat and virtue itself would no longer be possible (pp. 426, 
 552, 557). Eegarded from a higher stand-point, evil is not evil, but only a means for the 
 realization of the eternal end of the world (pp. Ill, 327, 559). God could do no greater 
 harm to the sinner than to permit or predestine him to be sinful and then not send upon him 
 suffering sufficiently great to break his wicked wUl (p. 277). God is not angry at sin, as 
 though in it he had received an affront, but at the loss of our happiness, i. e., he is angry 
 only at the thwarting of his jilau in regard to us (p. 54). To the permanent essence of tlie 
 spirit sin is external only. Even after the commission of mortal sins the .spirit retains in 
 its essence its likeness to God ; even then good works may arise from the eternal basis of 
 the soul, the fruit of which remains in the spirit and, if the latter is received to grace, 
 redound to its furtherance (pp. 71-74, 218). — Yet Eckhart also teaches the Church doctrine 
 of original sin. Adam's fall really disturbed the divine plan of the world, and not only 
 brought disorder into the nature of man, which was before free from all weakness and 
 morally perfect, and rendered man mortal, but also introduced confusion into all external 
 nature (pp. 368, 497, 658\ and sin has since become the nature of aU (pp. 370, 433, 5'29, 
 hne 26). 
 
 Eckhart distinguishes between and teaches both an eternal and a temporal incarnation, 
 and makes abundant exertions to render the latter conceivable. He first discriminates care- 
 fully in Christ between the man and the God, and then teaches that these elements were
 
 482 GERMAN MYSTICISM IN THK 14tH AND 15tH CENTURIES. 
 
 united in one person. Christ's person was eternally present in God as the second person 
 of the Trinity. He assumed not the nature of a particular man, but humanity itself, which 
 subsisted as an idea eternally in God. Hence, as Eckhart asserts with Maximus, in oppo- 
 sition to Thomas, God would have become man, even if Adam had not fallen. Not Adam, 
 therefore, but Christ, is the first man whom God created ; for when God created man, it was 
 I the future Christ that God had in mind (pp. 158, 250, 591). Christ was bom as a man by 
 a miracle at a definite moment of time, while at the same time he abides eternally in God. 
 I His body was derived from Mary, his spirit was created by God out of nothing ; to the 
 body as well as the spirit God communicated himself. The human and divine natures are 
 united in Christ, but mediately and in such manner that each continues to subsist in its 
 peculiarity ; his person is the common substratum and bond of union of the two natures 
 (pp. 674, 677). Between Christ as creature and the eternal "Word the distinction must be 
 carefully maintained. Christ's soul was in itself a creature : divinity was communicated to 
 him in a supernatural manner after his creation. After Adam's fall it was necessary that 
 all creatures should labor to bring forth a man who should restore them to their original 
 glory (p. 497). By nature Christ's soul was like that of any other man; by moral exertion 
 Christ raised himself into the immediate vicinage of God, as I also can do through him 
 (p. 397). His soul is the wisest that ever existed. It turned in the creature to the 
 Creator, and therefore God endowed it with divine attributes. Christ's created soul never 
 completely fathomed the Deity. In his youth he was simple and unknowing, like any other 
 child ; during all his hfe on earth his unity with God was withdrawn, so that he had not the 
 full intuition of the divine nature. In heaven the soul of Christ still remains a creature and 
 is hmited by the conditions of creatureship (pp. 535, 674). But the unequaUed degree of 
 moral elevation in him was due to an unparalleled working of divine grace. "When Christ 
 was created his body and soul were united in one moment with the eternal "Word. In his 
 deepest sufferings he remained united with the highest good in the highest faculty of his 
 soul. But his body was mortal, and in bis senses, his body, and his understanding, he was 
 subject to suffering. His union with God was so powerful that he could never for an 
 instant turn away from God, and the origin and end of all his actions was to be found iu 
 his own essence — they were free, unconditioned, and emptied of all finite ends (pp. 292, 
 293, 583). Christ's sitting at the right hand of the Father signifies his exaltation above 
 time into the rest of Deity, to which also those who are risen with Christ shall attain (p. 116 
 seq.). Thus Christ is our pattern. If we can, like him, become not owe man, but humanity, 
 we shall receive by grace all that Christ had by nature. — Of the theory of satisfaction 
 slight traces only are found in Eckhart, and these only such as were suggested by linguistic 
 usage. Christ is the Redeemer by his moral merit. Through God's assumption of the 
 human nature, the latter has been ennobled, and I attain this nobihty in so far as I am in 
 Christ and reahze in myself the idea of humanity (pp. 64, 65). Christ has proved to us the 
 blessedness of suffering ; redemption through his blood is with Eckhart only another ex- 
 pression for the sanctifying, typical power of his sufferings (pp. 452, 184). By his perfect per- 
 formance of duty ho earned a reward, in which we all participate, so far as we are one with 
 him (p. 644). Hence his mortal body deserves no worship ; every moral soul is nobler than 
 it (p. 397). The consideration of Christ's appearance as a man is but a preliminary step ; 
 even to the disciples Christ's bodily presence was a hindrance. We must follow and seek 
 after the humanity of Christ till we apprehend his deity. Thinking much of the man Jesus, 
 of his bodily appearance and his suffering, is vicM^ed by Eckhart as the source of a false 
 emotion and a sentimental devotion without moral power and clear knowledge (pp. 241, 
 247. 636, 658). Mary is blessed, not because she bore Christ bodily, but because she bore 
 lijru spiritually, and in this every one can become like her (pp. 285, 345-347). In a similar 
 
 4
 
 GERMAN MYSTICISM IN THE 14tH AND lOTH CENTURIES. 4S3 
 
 maimer Eckhart judges concerning the sacraments, even when he is insisting most strongly 
 on the orthodox doctrine. The Eucharist may indeed be the greatest gift of God to 
 Aumanitj- ; still, it is greater blessedness to have God spiritually bom in us than to be 
 united corporeally with Christ. For him who should be spiritually well prepared for it 
 every meal would become a sacrament. Sacrament means sign. He who adheres con- 
 stantly to the sign alone comes not to the inward truth to which the sign merely points 
 (pp. 568, 239, 396, 593). — Until death it is possible to advance in sanctification, but not 
 afterward. The state in which one is at his death remains his state forever (p. 639). 
 Hell is a condition ; it is existing in nothingness, in alienation from God. For those 
 who are converted shortly before dying a purgatory of temporary duration is given. 
 At the judgment-day it is not God that pronounces judgment, but man who passes 
 sentence upon himself; as he then appears in his essence, so shall he remain eternally. 
 At the resurrection the body receives and shares the essence of the soul : that which 
 is raised is not the material body itself, but the ideal principle of the body (pp. 470- 
 472, 522). 
 
 Eckhart's doctrine is an interpretation and in part a modification of the fundamental 
 Christian dogmas, resting en a bold metaphysical fundamental conception, the idea of the 
 equality in essence of the soul with God. In his independent attitude with reference to 
 ecclesiastical doctrine Eckhart was a forerunner of modern science. If later thinkers, on 
 grounds of pure rational science alone, have striven against an agreement of philosophy 
 with Christianity, Eckhart, setting out with what he believed to be a conception held by the 
 Church, arrived at the doctrine of the absolute supremacy of the reason. The type of his 
 character and teaching was derived from the innermost essence of the German national 
 character, and in Germany the impulses which his doctrinee gave to thought have never 
 ceased to be operative, even when his name has been almost forgotten. Eckhart wished 
 to edify, but by means of clear knowledge. With him the dogmatic lost its specific form, 
 the historical its essential meaning; the motives of his doctrine, although dominated by a 
 high ethical consciousness and a corresponding endeavor, were of a purely scientific 
 nature, notwithstanding that the scientific form was relatively wanting. Eckhart does not 
 linger at the stages in the elevation of the soul to God, like the representatives of Romanic 
 Mysticism, but expends his force in the exposition of that which truly is, and of true 
 knowledge. Thus he seeks to separate the pure idea contained in the doctrine of the 
 Church and of his predecessors from all its integuments, as also to comprehend the doc- 
 trines of the heretics in that aspect in which they are relatively justified. The mystical 
 elements in Eckhart are his conception of the highest activity of the reason as immediate 
 intellectual intuition, his denial of the being of all finite things, his demand that the indi- 
 vidual self should be given up, and his doctrine of complete union with God as the supreme 
 end of man. But his mysticism is not so much a matter of feeling as of thought, and this 
 gives him that coolness and clearness which he seldom disowns. He does not shun the 
 most extreme consequences; the paradoxical is rather sought than avoided, and the ever- 
 enchaining, often fascinating, form of expression is carried to the extreme in its kind, In 
 order to render it impressive and to make more manifest the contrast between the view 
 presented and the more superficial view ordinarih' taken. For this reason the expression 
 IS often more paradoxical than the thought, and Eckhart is careful to add the necessary 
 restrictions. In many points the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas approaches exceedmgly near 
 to that taught by Eckhart; but his attitude with reference to the Church and its doctrines 
 docs not permit him to strike out so far beyond all statutory limits into the pure ground 
 of the religious consciousness. In so far the doctrine of Eckhart is a spiritualized Thomism. 
 The Romanic Thomas became the highest scientific authority of the Romish Church, whila
 
 484 GERMAN MYSTICISM IN THE 14tH AND 15tH CENTURIES. 
 
 the doctrine of Eckhart, the German, prepared the way through its ethics for the Refor, 
 mation, and through its metaphysics for later German speculation. 
 
 The mystical school, which arose from Eckhart's teaching, was divided into a heretical 
 and a Church party. The former, called the " false free spirits," favored a wild and in its 
 consequences immoral pantheism, while the latter sought to combine Eckhart's doctrine in 
 a modified form with personal piety. There followed a popular commotion, which affected 
 large portions of the German people. Ancient heresies found a support in the doctrines 
 of Eckhart. On the other hand, the widespread, retired community of the Friends of God 
 (the name indicates the opposite of slaves of the law), whose peculiarity consisted in an 
 extravagant feeling of the nearness of God, also found their chiefs mostly among the dis- 
 ciples of Eckhart. The most important of Eckhart's immediate disciples were the cele- 
 brated preacher Johannes Tauler of Strasburg (1300-1361) — who combined, in his sermons 
 and in his opuscule on the Imitation of the Poverty of Christ, impressive and morally 
 edifying exhortation with the repetition of the speculative doctrines of Eckhart, and Hein- 
 rich Suso, of Constance (1300-1365), the Minnesinger of the love of God, with whom the 
 pious effusions of an extravagant fancy entered into singular union with Eckhart's abstract 
 speculations. Also the treatise from the fourteenth century by an unknown author, which 
 was discovered by Luther, and which, published under the title of "^ German Theology," 
 produced so great effects, is a substantially faithful reproduction of the fundamental ideas 
 of Eckhart, although in parts the point of the original expression is blunted off. Though 
 incited by the doctrines of Eckhart, John Rusbroek (1293-1381), Prior of the Convent of 
 Grunthal, near Brussels, approached more nearly to the Romanic Mysticism, and taught, 
 without going very deeply into ontological speculations, that the way to God was through 
 contemplation. Yet he also became suspected, by Chancellor Gerson, of pantheism and 
 of deifying the soul. None of the men named developed farther the doctrine of Eckhart 
 in scientific form. "With them the purely theoretical interest was inferior to the religious 
 and ethical and practical ; all of them fought against the wild outgrowths from Eckhart's 
 conceptions. They sought in particular to indicate more exactly the distinction between 
 God and his creatures ; they considered the union of the soul with God, not as a union of 
 essence, but as one of wQl and of vision, and conceived faith more as a subjection of the 
 understanding to authority, although unable to break loose themselves from Eckhart's 
 conception. Tauler and the " German Theology " were most instrumental in perpetuating 
 Eckhart's speculation, while the ban of the Church rested with all its weight on Eck- 
 hart's memory and works. 
 
 Later Mysticism, as it was developed among the Brothers of the Common Life (founded 
 by the friend of Rusbroek, Gerhard Groot, died 1384), and especially by Thomas Hamer- 
 ken of Kempen (died 1471, " Of the Imitation of Christ "), and as, inspired from this source, 
 it became in Johann Wessel's writings (died 1489) a system of reformed theology, bears no 
 longer the speculative character of the school of Eckhart. 
 
 END OF VOL. I.
 
 SUPPLEMEI:s"T. 
 
 Table, showing the Succession of Scholakchs at Athens. 
 
 (Taken mostly from Zumpt, Ueber den Bestand der philosophischen Schulen in Athen und die 
 Secession der Scholarchen, in the Transactions of the Berlin Academy of Sciences for 
 the year 1842, Berlin, 1844— Phil, and Hist. Papers, pp. 27-119.) 
 
 BEFORE CHRIST. 
 
 Platonists. 
 
 Aristotelians. 
 
 Stoics. 
 
 EpiCtTKEAXS. 
 
 Plato of Athens, 387 
 
 
 
 
 to 347. 
 
 
 
 
 Speusippus of Athens, 
 
 
 
 
 347-339. 
 
 
 
 
 Xenocrates of Chalce- 
 
 Aristotle of Stagirus, 
 
 
 
 don, 339-314. 
 
 335-322. 
 
 
 
 Pole mo of Athens, 
 
 Theophrastus of Ere- 
 
 ZenoofCittium.SOS?- 
 
 Epicurus of Samos (of 
 
 314-270. (With and 
 
 sus, 332-287. 
 
 258? 
 
 Athenian descent). 
 
 under him, Grantor.) 
 
 Strato of Lampsacus, 
 287-269. 
 
 
 306-270. 
 
 Crates of Athens, 
 
 Lyco of Troas, 269- 
 
 Cleanthes of Assos, 
 
 Hermarchus of Mity- 
 
 270—? 
 
 226. 
 
 258?-? 
 
 lene, 2 70-? 
 
 Arcesilaus of Pitana in 
 
 Hieronymus the 
 
 (Herillus of Carthage 
 
 
 ^olis, from— 241 ? 
 
 Rhodiao. 
 
 and Aristo of Chios.) 
 
 Polystratus. 
 
 Hippoclides. 
 
 Lacydes of Cyrene, 
 
 ? Praxiphanes. 
 
 Chrysippus ofSoli, 
 
 Dionysius. 
 
 241-215. 
 
 ? Prytanis. 
 
 from-209? 
 
 
 Telecles and Evander, 
 
 Aristo of lulls in the 
 
 
 
 215—? 
 
 island of Kewf, 226-? 
 
 
 
 Hegesinus of Perga- 
 
 ? Aristo of Cos. 
 
 
 
 mum, ? — ? 
 
 ? Lyciscus. 
 
 Zeno of Tarsus, 209- ? 
 
 Basilides. 
 
 
 ? Phormio. 
 
 Diogenes the Babylo- 
 
 ? Protarchus of Bar- 
 
 Carneades of Cyrene, 
 
 Critolaus of Phaselis 
 
 nian, from Seleucia 
 
 gylia in Caria. 
 
 from — 129 ? (in 
 
 in Lycia (in Rome, 
 
 on the Tigris (in 
 
 
 Rome, 155.) 
 
 155). 
 
 Rome, 155). 
 
 
 Clitomachus (Asdru- 
 
 
 Antipater of Tarsus. 
 
 ? Demetrius Lacon. 
 
 bal) of Carthage, 
 
 Diodorus of Tyre (till 
 
 Panajtius of Rhodes 
 
 ? Diogenes of Tarsus. 
 
 129-109. 
 
 after 110). 
 
 (till about 111). 

 
 486 
 
 THE SUCCESSION OF SCH0LARCH8 AT ATHEJ^S. 
 
 BEFORE CHRIST. 
 
 Pr.ATONISTS. 
 
 ARISTOTELI.iXS. 
 
 Stoics. 
 
 EPICUREAJfS. 
 
 ? Charmadas. 
 
 Erymneus. 
 
 M n e s a r c h u s (about 
 
 ApoUodorus 6 Kr)TiO- 
 
 ? ^schines of Naples. 
 
 
 110 to 90). 
 Dardanus. 
 
 Tvpavvoq. 
 
 Philoof Larissa(in87 
 
 ? Athenio (Aristio). 
 
 
 Zeno of Sidon (about 
 
 at Rome, where Ci- 
 
 
 
 90-78). 
 
 cero heard him). 
 
 
 
 (Cicero and Atticus 
 his "hearers" in 79.) 
 
 Antiochus of Askalon, 
 
 Andronicus of Rhodes 
 
 Dionysius. 
 
 Phfedrus (from 78 to 
 
 83 ? — 68 ? (Cicero 
 
 (about 70, teacher of 
 
 
 7 teacher in Athens ; 
 
 heard him in the win- 
 
 Boethus of Sidon) 
 
 Antipater of Tyre. 
 
 previously, about 96, 
 
 ter of 79-78.) 
 
 ivSe KaTog airo tov 
 
 
 a teacher of Cicero at 
 
 
 'ApiaroreTiovg. 
 
 
 Rome). 
 
 Aristus of Askalon, 
 
 
 
 Patron (70 till after 
 
 68?-49? (teacher of 
 
 
 
 51). (Contemporane- 
 
 M. Brutus, about 65.) 
 
 
 
 ously with him, Phi- 
 
 Theomnestus of 
 
 Cratippus of Mitylene 
 
 
 lodemus of Gad ar a 
 
 Naucratis in Egypt 
 
 (about 44). 
 
 
 lived at Rome, and 
 
 (about 44). 
 
 ? Xenarchus of Se- 
 
 
 Syro taught in Romo 
 
 
 leucia in C i 1 i c i a 
 
 
 and perhaps in Na- 
 
 
 (taught at Alexan- 
 
 
 ples.) 
 
 
 dria, Athens, and 
 
 
 
 
 Rome). 
 
 
 
 AFTER CHRIST. 
 
 Platonists.- 
 
 Aristotelians. 
 
 Stoics. 
 
 Epicureans. 
 
 Ammonius of Alexan- 
 
 
 
 
 dria (under Nero and 
 
 
 
 
 Yespasian, teacher 
 
 
 
 
 of Plutarch). 
 
 ? Menephylus (toward 
 
 
 
 ?Aristodemus of 
 
 the end of the first 
 
 
 
 JEgium (under Do- 
 
 century). 
 
 
 
 mitian and Trajan). 
 
 ? Aspasius of Aphro- 
 disias (about 120; 
 Galenus heard one of 
 his pupils in 145). 
 
 ? Adrastus of Aphro- 
 
 
 
 Calvisius Taurus of 
 
 disias. 
 
 
 
 Berytus or Tyre (in 
 
 
 
 
 the times of Hadrian 
 
 Herminus. 
 

 
 THE SUCCESSION OF SCHOLAPwCHS AT ATHENS. 
 
 4S7 
 
 AFTER CHRIST. 
 
 Platonists. 
 
 and Antoninus Pius ; 
 teacher of A. Gel- 
 lius). 
 
 (Favorinus.) 
 ? Atticus (in the time 
 of Marcus Aurelius 
 Antoninus). 
 
 Diodotus or Theodo- 
 tus (about 230). 
 
 Eubuhis (about 265). 
 (Longinus, teacher of 
 literature, hved till 
 273). 
 
 ? Theodorus of Asine 
 in Argolis (under 
 Constantine the 
 Great). 
 
 ? Euphrasius. 
 
 ? Chr^'santhius of Sar- 
 dis. 
 
 Priscus of Molossi 
 (about 350-380). 
 
 Plutarch of Athens, 
 son of Nestorius (till 
 433). Hierius and 
 Asclepigonia. 
 
 Syrianus of Alexan- 
 dria, 433-450? 
 
 Proclus, the Lycian, 
 450?-485. 
 
 M a r i n u s of Sichem, 
 485-? 
 
 Together with him 
 Zenodotiis. 
 
 Isidorus of Alexan- 
 dria?-? 
 
 Hegias?-510? 
 
 Damascius of Damas- 
 cus, 520? -529. 
 
 Aristotelians. 
 
 Aristocles of Messene 
 in Sicily. 
 
 Alexander of Damas- 
 cus (aVjout 176). 
 
 Alexander of Aphro- 
 disias (time of Septi- 
 mus Severus, about 
 200). 
 
 Ammonius. 
 
 Ptolemaeus. 
 
 Stoics. 
 
 Athenaius. 
 
 Musonius. 
 
 CaUietes (about 260). 
 
 Epicureans.
 
 ^a^^. 
 
 
 f
 
 i
 
 L- 
 
 > 
 
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 Qh>^
 
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