M ;.*%ia his ia also for excellence in music and poetry. With Herodotus any one is atxbor who is distinguished from the mass of men by any kir/d of art or skill. The so-called seven wise men are termed by him ao^KTrai, •' sophists " (I. 30 et al), and the same designation is given by him to Pythagoras (lY. 95). ii THE CONCEPTION OF rillLOSOPHY. Tho compounds 6i7.oao(()nv and ia is found often, ^(/locro^/a rarely. According to Xenoph. Mem. lY. 6. 1, co(p!a is synonymous with tmcri/fj/^ (science). Human wisdom is patchwork ; the gods have re- served what is greatest to themselves {ibid, and I. 1. 8). Y'e may ascribe this thought with all the more confidence to the historical Socrates, since it reappears in the Ajwlogia of Plato (pp. 20 and 23 of the edition of Stephanus, whose paging accompanies most later editions), where Socrates says, he may perhaps be wise {cocpog) in human wisdom, but this is very little, and in truth only God can be called wise. In the Platonic Apologia Socrates interprets (p. 25) the declaration of the oracle m reply to Chaerephon, that " no one was THE CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY. 6 wiser than Socrates," as teaching tliat he among men was wisest who, like Socrates, dis- claimed the possession of any wisdom of his own {bri ovroq . . . aoouraroc iariv, ocnq ucireg 2w«^drr/f iyvuKtv, on ovdevoQ a^idg earc rfi a/iTj-dEia Trpof aot^iav) ; he calls (p. 28 sq.) that examination of himself and others by which he broke up the shameful self-deception of those who, without knowing, supposed themselves to know, his '•pliilosophizing," and sees in it the mission of his life {fiL7Mao(bQvvTd fie delv l^rjv Kal i^erdi^ovra ifiavrov re koL Tovq a7Ju)vq). Since the wisdom of Socrates was the consciousness of not knowing, and not the consciousness of a positive, gradual approximation to tlie knowledge of truth, it was impossible that (piTioacxpia, in distinction from cotpia, should become fixed in his termi- nology as a technical term ; so far as wisdom seemed to him attainable, he could make use as well of the words aoi?u)(ro6ovvTag to earlier thinkers, the former rather in an ironical sense (especially so, to the Sophists), but the latter more seriously {ApoL. p. 23). Yet it remains uncertain whether Plato, in his Apologia (which appears to reproduce with fidelity the essential parts of the actual defense of Socrates), confined himself in every particular to the exact form of speech adopted by the historical Socrates. With the disciples of Socrates Maoi?Mao6oc) are named in the preceding order, as the advancing order of their rank. "Wisdom itself (aopia), according to Plato {Theaetet. p. 145 e), is identical with kiriaTrmr] (true knowledge), while philosophj- is termed in tlio dialogue Euthydemus (p. 288 d) the acquisition of such knowledge (nrf/aic e-HcarT/iiT/g). Knowledge (inKJTTjfZT/) respects the ideal, as that which truly is, while opinion or representation (c't^fn) is concerned with the sensuous, as with that which is subject to change and generation (i?ep. V. p. 477 a). Accordingly Plato defines {Rep. 480 b) those as pliilosophers, " who set their affections on that, which in each case really exists" (rovg avro d^a cKaarov rb bv da-^ai^o/^h'ovr ptXoa6(j>ovg kX)jt£ov), or {Rep. VI. 484a) who "are able to apprehend the eternal and immu- table " {(pMao(})Oi 01 Tov del Kara ravrd uaavTiog Ixovrog dwdfievoi kfdnTetr&ai). In a wider sense Plato uses the term philosophy so as to include under it the positive sciences also {Theaet. p. 143 d): Trtpi ye(.)fieTQiav y riva d/^Xr/v ^i/iocmLaQ 7] TVka-uvoq ETzeyiveTo ■KpayfiaTeia). The Stoics (according to Plutarch, De Plac. Philos. I., Prooem.) defined wisdom {no^ia) as the science of divine and human things, but philosophy {ia) as the striving aftwr virtue (proficiency, theoretical and practical), in the three departments of physics, ethics, and logic. Cf. Senec. Episi. 89, 3 : Philosophia sapientiae amor et affectatio ; ibid. 1 : phUosoplua studium virtutis est, sed per ipsam virtutem. The Stoic definition of philosophy removes the boutiiiary wliich in Plato separates ideology, in Aristotle '' first philosophy," from the other branches of philosophy, and covers the case of all scientific knowledge, together with its relations to practical morality. Still, positive sciences (as, notably, grammar, mathematics, and astronomy) begin with the Stoics already to assume an independent rank. Epicurus declared philosophy to be the rational pursuit of happiness (Sext. Empir. Adv. Math. XI. 169: 'E~//coiipof i'Aeye rfjv ^i?i.oaoie j'Mlosophische Litteratur der Deutschen von 1400-1850, llegensbiirg, 1851, pp. 346-362. Ad. BQchting, Bibliotheca philosophica, oder Verzeichnis* der von 1557-1807 ini dexitsclien BuMiand el erschienenen jMlos. Bilcher und Zeitschriften, Nordhausen, 1367. Of. the copious citations of literature in Buhle's Geschichte der Philoa., and also in F. A. Carus's Jdeen eur Gesah. der Philos., Leipsic, 1809, pp. 21-90, in Tennemann's larger work and in his Manual of the ITistory of Philosophy, 5th ed., revised by Amadeus Wcndt, Leips., 1S29, as also in other works on tho history of philosophy ; see also the bibliographical citations in various monographs relating to literary history, such as Ompteda's on the Literature of International Law, etc., and the comprehensive work of Julius Petzholdt, Bibliotheca Bibliographica, Leips. 1866, of which pp. 458-463 are devoted to the history of the literature of philosophy. The writings of the early Greek pliilosophers of the pre-Socratic period exist now onl/ in fragments. The complete works of Plato are stOl extant ; so also are the most impop- 8 60UECES, AUTHORITIES, AND AIDS. taut works of Aristotle, and certain otliers, which belong to the Stoic, Epicurean, Skeptic, and Neo- Platonic schools. "We possess the principal works of most of the philosophers of the Christian period in suflScient completeness. At the commencement of modern times the disappearance of respect for many species of authority, which had previously been accepted, gave special occasion for historical inquiry. Lord Bacon, who was unsatisfied by the Aristotelianism of the Scholastics and was disposed to favor the pre-Socratic philosophy, speaks of an expose of the placita philosopJiorum as one of the desiderata of his times. Of the numerous general histories of philosophy, the following may here be mentioned: — The nistory of Philosophy, by Thorn. Stanley, London, 1655; 2d ed., 1687, 3d ed., 1701 ; translated into Latin by Gottfr. Olearius, Leipsic, 1711; also Venice, 1733. Stanley treats only of the history of philosophy before Christ, which is in his view the only philosophy ; for philosophy seeks for truth, which Christian theology possesses, so that with the latter the former becomes superfluous. Stanley follows in his exposition of Greek philosophy pretty closely the historical work of Diogenes Laertius. Jac. Thomasii (ob. 1684), Schediasma Historicum, quo varia discutiuntur ad hist, turn phihs., turn ecclesiasticam 2)erti7ientia, Leipsic, 1665; with the title: Origines Hist. Philos. at Ecclesiast., ed. by Christian Thomasius, Halle, 1699. Jac. Thomasius first recommended disputed questions in the history of philosophy as themes for dissertations. J. Dau. Huetii, Denionstratio Evangelica; p>hilosophi(ie veteris ac novae paraMelismus, Am- sterdam, 1679. Pierre Bayle, Dictlonnaire Historique et Critique, 1st ed., Rotterd. 1697. [English transla- tion by Birch and Lockman, London, 1734-35, 2d ed., 1736-38. — 2V.] This very compre- hensive work deserves to be mentioned here on account of the articles it contains on the history of philosophy. Bayle contributed essentially to the awakening of the spirit of investigation in this department of study. Yet, as a critic, he deals rather in a philosophical criticism of transmitted doctrines from his skeptical stand-point, than in an historical criticism of the fidelity of the accounts on which our knowledge of those doctrines is founded. The philosophical articles have been published in an abridged German translation by L. H. Jakob, 2 vols., Halle, 1797-98. The Acta Philosophm-um, ed. Christ. Aug. Heumann, Halle, 1715 ff., contain several valuable papers of investigation on questions in the history of philosophy. Histoire Critique de la Philosophie, par Mr. D. (Deslandes), tom. I.-III., 1st ed., Paris, 1730-36. Includes also modern philosophy. Joh. Jak. Brueker, Kurze Fragtn aus der jihilosopMschen Eistorie, 1 vols., Ulm, 1731-36, with additions, ibid. 1737. Eistoria Critica Philosophiae a mundi incunahulis ad nostrain usque aeiatem deducta. 5 vols., Leips. 1742-44; 2d ed., 1766-67; English abridged transla- tion by Wm. Enfield, Loud. 1791. Institutiones hist, jihilosophicae, usui acad. juventuMs ador- natae, 1st ed., Leips. 1747. Brucker's presentation, especially in his chief work, the Eistoria Crit. Philos., is clear and easily followed, though somewhat difi'use, and often interspersed with anecdotes, after the manner of Diogenes Laertius, and too rarety portraj'ing the connec- tion of ideas. Brueker wrote in the infancy of historical criticism ; still he often gives proof of a sound and sober insight in his treatment of the historical controversies current in his times ; least, it is true, in what relates to the earlier periods, far more in his exposition of the later. His philosophical judgment is imperfect, from the absence with him of the con. ceptions of successive development and relative truth. Truth, he argues, is one, but erroi is manifold, and the majority of systems are erroneous. The history of philosophy shows " injinita falsae philosophiae exempla." Neo-Platonism, for example, Brueker does not understand as a certain blending of Hellenism and Orientalism, with a predominance of the BOUBCE8, AUTHORITIES, AND AIDS. 9 form of Hellenism, and still less as a progress from skepticism to mysticism made relatively necessary by the nature of things, but as the product of a conspiracy of bad men against Christianity — ' ' in id conjuravere pessimi homines, ut quam verifate vincere non posseni reli- gionera Christianam, frande impedirent ;" — and in like manner he sees in Christian Gnosti- cism, not a similar blending, with a prevalence of the form of Orientalism, but the result of pride and willfulness, etc. Truth is, for him, identical with Protestant orthodoxy, and next to that with the Leibnitzian philosophy ; according to the measure of its material accordance with this norm every doctrine is judged either true or false. Agatopisto Cromaziano (Appiano Buonafede), Delia Iskyria e deUa Indole di ogni Filosofia, Lucca, 1766-81, also Yen. 1782-84, on which is based the work: Leila Restauratione di ogni Filosofia ne' Secoli XV., XVL, XVII., Ven. 1785-89 (translated into German by Carl Heydenreich, Leipsic, 1791). Dietr. Tiedemann, Geist der speculativen Fhilosophie, 1 vols., Marburg, 1791-97. By "speculative" Tiedemann means theoretical philosophy. The speculative element in the newer sense of this word is unknown to him. His work extends from Thales to Berkeley. Tiedemann belongs to the ablest thinkers among the opponents of the Kantian phQosophy. His stand-point is the stand-point of Leibnitz and Wolff, modified by elements from that of Locke. In his interpretation and judgment of the various systems of philosophy, he seeks to avoid unfairness and partisanship. But Ms understanding of them has, occasionally, its limits. His principal merit consists in his application of the principle of judging systems according to their relative perfection. Tiedemann declares his intention not to make any one system the standard by which all others should be judged, since no one is universally admitted, but " to consider chiefly, whether a philosopher has said any thing new and has displayed acuteness in the support of his assertions, whether his line of thouglit is marked by inner harmony and close connection, and, finally, whether considerable objections have been or can be urged in opposition to his assertions." Georg Gustav Fiillebom, Beitrdge zur Geschichte der Philosophic, sections 1-12, Ziilli- chau, 1791-99. Joh, Gottlieb Buhle, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie ttnd einer kritiscJien Littera- tur derselben, 8 vols., Gtittingen, 179G-1804; Geschichte der nemren Philosophie seit der Epoche der Wiederherstellung der Wissenschaften, 6 vols., Gottingen, 1800-1805. Buhle writes as a disciple of Kant, but with a leaning toward the stand-point of Jacobi. He allows his philosophical stand-point rarely to appear. Buhle evinces great reading, and has, with critical insight, instituted valuable investigations, especially in the department of the history of the hterature of philosophy. His " Gesch. der neuerea Philosophie" contains many choice extracts from rare works. It forms the sixth part of the encyclo- pedical work: '• Gesch. der KUnste u. Wins, seit der Wiederherstellung derselben his an das Ervde des 18. Jahrhunderts." Degerando, Uistoire Comparie des Systemes de la Philosophie, Tom. I.-III., Paris, 1804; 2d edit., Tom. I.-IV., Paris, 1822-23. Translated into German by Tennemann, 2 vols., Marburg, 1806-1807. Friedr. Aug. Cams, Ideen zur Geschichte der Philosophie, Leipsic, 1809. Fourth part of his posthumous works. "Wilh. Gottlieb Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, 11 vols., Leipsic, 1798-1819. The work has never been wholly completed. It was to have filled thirteen volumes. The twelfth volume was to have treated of German theoretical pliilosophy from Leibnitz and Chr. Thomasius down to Kant, and the thirteenth of moral philosophy from Descartes to Kant. Tennemann's work is meritorious on account of the extent and independence of hig study of authorities, and the completeness and clearness of his exposition ; but it is 10 80UECES, AUTHORITIES, AND AIDS. marred by not a few misapprehensions, most of which are the result of a one-sided method of interpretation from the Kantian stand-point. In his judgments, the measuring- rod of the Kantian Critique of the Reason is often applied with too little allowance to the earlier systems, although in principle, the idea, already expressed by Kant, of " the gradual development of the reason in its striving after science," is not foreign to him. Wilh. GottUcb Tennemann, G-rundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie far den akademischen UnterridU, 1st ed., Leips. 1812; 5th ed., Leips. 1829; the last three editions revised by Amadeus "Wendt. [Euglish translation (" Manual of the History of Philosophy," etc.), by A. Johnson, Oxford, 1833. The same, revised, enlarged, and corrected by J. R. Morel), London, 1852. — Tr.] From this much too brief exposition, it is impossible to derive a complete understanding of the different systems ; nevertheless it is of value as a repertory of notices concerning philosophers and their teachings ; especially valuable are the perhaps only too numerous literary references, in respect to which Tennemann aimed rather at completeness than at judicious selection. Jak. Friedr. Fries, Geschichte der Philosophie, 2 vols., Halle, 1837-40. His stand-point, a modified Kantianism. Friedr. Ast, Grundriss einer Geschichte der Philosophie, Landshut, 1801, 2d ed., 1825. He writes from Schelling's stand-point. Thadda Anselra Rixner, Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie zum Gehauche seiner Yorlesungen, 3 vols., Sulzbacli, 1822-23, 2d ed., 1829. Supplementary volume by Victor Phil. Gumposch, 1850. The stand-point is that of Schelling. Its numerous citations from original sources would render the book an excellent basis for a first study of the history of philosophy, if Rixner's work was not disfigured by great negligence and lack of critical skill in the execution of his plan. Gumposch, who brings the national element especially into prominence, proceeds far more carefully. Ernst Reinhold, Handbuch der allgemeUien Geschichte d.r Philosophie, 2 parts in 3 vols., Gotha, 1828-30. Lehrbuchder Geschichte der Philosophie, Jena, 1836; 2d ed., 1839; 3d ed., 1849, Geschichte der Philosophie nach den Ilauptmomenten ihrer Entwickeiung, 5th ed., 3 vols., Jena, 1858. The presentation is compendious but not sufficiently exact. Reinhold thinks and often expresses himself too much in the modern way and too little in the style and spirit of the philosophers of whom he treats. Heinr. Ritt«r, Geschichte der Philosophie, 12 vols., Hamburg, 1829—53; Vols. I.-IV., new edition, 1836-38. [4 vols, translated. See below, ad § 7. — Tr.] The work reaches to and excludes Kant ; the Uebersicht Uber die Geschichte der neitesten deutschen Philosophie seit Kant (Brunswick, 1853), supplements and completes it. Ritter adopts substantially the stand-point of Sclileiermacher. His professed object is, while adhering strictly to facts, to present the history of philosophy as "a self-developing whole;" not, however, viewing earlier systems as stepping-stones to any particular modern one, nor judging them from the stand-point of any particular system, but rather " from the point of view of the general intelligence of the periods to which they belong, respecting the object of the intellectual faculties — respecting the right and the wrong in the modes of developing the reason." Under Ritter's supervision, the following work of Schleiermacher was published, after its author's death: Geschichte der Philosophie, Berlin, 1839 (Schleiermacher's Werke, III., 4, a). The work is a summary, drawn up by Schleiermacher for his lectures. It is not founded in all parts on original historical investigation, but it contains much that is very suggestive. G. W. Hegel, Yorlesungen uber die Geschichte der Philosophie, ed. by Karl Ludw. Michelet. 3 vols. {Werke, Vols. XIII.-XV.), Berlin. 1833-36; 2d ed., 1840-42. The stand-point here is the speculative, characterized above, § 3. Yet Hegel, as matter of fact, 80UECKS, AUTHORITIES, AND AIDS. 11 has not in detail always maintained the idea of development in its purity, but has some- times unhistorically represented the doctrines of philosophers, whom he esteemed, as approximating to his own (interpreted, e. g., many philosophemes of Plato agreeably to his own doctrine of immanence), and, ignoring their scientific motives, has misinterpreted those of philosophers whom he did not esteem (e. g. Locke) ; still further, he unjustifiably exaggerates in principle the legitimate and fundamental idea of a gradual development, oljservable in the progress of events in general, and particularly in the succession of philosophical systems, through the following assumptions: — a. That every form of historical reality within its historic limits, and hence, in particu- lar, every philosophical system, viewed as a determinate link in the complete evolution of I)liilosophy, is to be considered in its place as wholly natural and legitimate ; while, never- theless, side by side with the historically justified imperfection of individual forms, error and perversity, as not relatively legitimate elements, are found, and occasion aberrations in point of historic fact from the ideal norms of development (in particular, many temporary reactions, and, on tlie other liand, many false anticipations) ; b. That with the Hegelian system the development-process of pliilosophy has found an absolute terminus, beyond which thought has no essential advance to make ; c. That the nature of things is such that the historical sequence of the various philo- sophical stand-points must, without essential variation, accord with the systematic sequence of the different categories, whether it be with those of logic alone, as appears from VwL uber die Gesch. der Philosophie, Vol. I. p. 128, or with those of logic — and the philosophy of nature? — and mental philosophy, as is taught, ibid. p. 120, and Vol. III. p. 686 ff. G. Osw. Marbach, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophic, 1 Abth. : Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, 2 Abth.: Gesch. der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Leipsic, 1338-^1. Marbach's stand- point is the Hegelian ; but he often makes a somewhat forced application of the categories of Hegel's system to material furni.shed him chiefly by Tennemann and Rixner — though in part dra^\ni from the original sources — and but slightly elaborated by himself. The book has remained uncompleted. Jul. Braniss, Geschichte der Philosophie seit Kant, first vol., Breslau, 1842. The first volume, the only one published, is a speculative survey of the history' of philosophy down to the Middle Ages. Braniss owes his philosophical stand-point chiefly to Stoffens, Sclileier- macher, and Hegel. Christoph. "V^'illi. Sigwart, Gesch. der Philosophie, 3 vols., Stuttgart, 1854. Albert Schwegler, Gesch. der Philos. irn Umriss, ein Leitfaden zur Uebersicht, Stuttgart, 1848, 7th edition, ibid., 1870. Contains a clear presentation of the philosophical stand- points, but is seriously imperfect from tlie omission of the author to describe with sufficient minuteness the principal doctrines which belong specially to eacli system and to the subordinate branches of each system, by which means alone a distinct picture can be jiresented. Schwegler's Compendium has been translated into English, with explanatory, critical, and supplementary annotations, by J. H. Stirling, Edinburgh, 1867 ; 2d ed. 1868. [American translation by J. TI. Seolye, N. Y. 1856; 3d ed., 1864.— ^r.] Mart. V. Doutinger, Geschichte der Philosophie (1st vol.: Greek Philosophy. 1st div. : Tiil the time of Socrates. 2d div. : From Socrates till the end of Greek philosophy). Pvegensburg, 1852-53. V Ludw. Noack, Geschichte der Philosophie in gedrdngter Uebersicht, Weimar, 1853. Wilh. Bauer, Geschichte der Philosophie fur gebildete Leser, Halle, 1863. F. Michelis, Geschichte der Philosophie von Thcdes bis au/unsere Zeit, Braunsberg, 1365. Joh. Ed. Erdmanu, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, 2 vols., Berlin, 1866; 2d ed. ibid. 1869-70. 12 SOURCES, AUTHORITIES, AND AIDS. F. Schmid (of Schwarzenberg), Grundriss der Geschichte der Fhilosophie von Thales fis Schopenhauer, vom specukitiv-monotheistischen Standpunkte, Eriangen, 1867. Conrad Hermann, Gesch. der Philos. in pragmatischer Behandlung, Leipsic, 1867. J. H. Scholten, Gesch. der Rdigkm und Phihsophie, translated from the Dutch origin;.! into French by A. Revillo, Paris and Strasbourg, 1861 ; German translation under the above title by Ernst Rud. Redepenning, Elberfeld, 1868. E. Diihring, Krit. Gesch. der Philos., Berlin, 1869. Victor Cousin, Introduction d VHistoire de la Philosophie and Cours de VHistoire de la PhUosophie Moderne in the (Euvres de V. C, Paris, 1846-48. Fragments Philosophiques, Paris, 1840-43. Ilistoire Generale de la Philosophie depuis les temps Its pliis recules jusqu'd la fin du XVIII. siecle, be ed., Paris, 1863. J. A. Nourrisson, Tableau des Progres de la Pensee Humaine depuis Thales jusqii'd Leibnitz, Paris, 1858; 2e edition, 1860. N. J. Laforet, Ilist. de la Philosophie; premiere partle: Philos. Ancienne, Brussels and Paris, 1867. Robert Blakey, History of the Philosophy of Mind, from the earliest period to the present time, 4 vols., London, 1848. George Henry Lewes, A Biographical History of Philosophy, from its origin in Greece doiun to the present day, London, 1846. The History of Philosophy from Thales to the present day, by George Henry Lewes, 3d edition (Vol. I. Ancient Philosophy ; Vol. II. Modern Philosophy), London, 1866. Ed. Zeller, Vortrdge und AbJiandlungen geschichtlichen Inhalts, Leipsic, 1865, containing: 1. The development of monotheism among the Greeks; 2. Pythagoras and the legends concerning him ; 3. A plea for Xanthippe ; 4. The Platonic state in its significance for the succeeding time ; 5. Marcus Aurelius Antoninus ; 6. "Wolff's banishment from Halle, the struggle of pietism with philosophy; 7. Joh. Gottlieb Fichte as a political philosopher; 8. Friedr. Schleiermacher ; 9. Primitive Christianity ; 10. The historical school of Tijbin- gen; 11, Ferdinand Christian Baur; 12. Strauss and Renan. Of works on the history of single philosophical disciplines and tendencies (from ancient till modem times), the following are specially worthy of mention : — Ad. Trendelenburg, Historische Beiirdge zwr Philosophie, Vol. I. (History of the Doctrine of Categories), Berhn, 1846; Vol. II. (Miscellaneous Essays), ibid. 1855; Vol. III. (Misc. Essays), ibid. 1867. On Religious Philosophy : Karl Friedr. Staudlin, Gesch. und Geist des Skepticismus, vorzilglich in Riicksicht auf Moral und Religion, Leipsic, 1794-95; Imman. Berger, Geschichte der Religionsphilosophie, Berlin, 1800. On the History of Psychology : Friedr. Aug. Cams, Geschichte der Psychologic, Leipsic, 1808. (Third part of the posthumous works.) The same subject, substantiality, is also treated of in Albert Stockl's Die speculat. Lehre vom Menschen und ihre Geschichte, Vol. I. ("Ancient Times"), Wiirzburg, 1858; Vol. II. ("Patristic Period," also under the title of Geschichte der Philosophie der patristischen Zeit), ibid. 1859; and Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters (continuation of the preceding works), Mayence, 1864-65, and in Friedr. Albert Lange's Geschichte des Mattrialismus, Iserlohn, 1866. On the History of Ethical and Political Theories : Christoph, Meiners, Geschichte der ulteren und neureren Ethik oder Lebensiveisheit, Gottingen, 1800-1801. Karl Friedr. Staud- lin, Geschichte der Moralphilosophie, Hanover, 1823; and Geschichte der Lehre von der Sittlichkeit der Scha^ispiele, vom Eide, vom Geioissen, etc., Gott. 1823 ff. Leop. v. Henning, Die Principien der Ethik in historischer Entwickelung, Berlin, 1825. Friedr. v. Raumer, l>ie geschichtliche Entwickelung der Begriffe von Staat, Recht und Politik, Leipsic, 1826; 2d cd. SOURCES, AUTHOillTIES, AND AIDS. 13 1332; 3d ed. 1361. Joh. Jos. Rossbach, Die Periaden der Rechtsphihsophie, Regensburg, 1342; Die Grundrichtungen in der Gesch. der Staatswifsenschaft, Erlangen, 1842; Gesch. der Geaellscliaft, Wiirzburg, 1868 flf. Heinr. Liutz, Entumrf einer Geschichie der Eechtsphilos., Dantzic, 1846. Emil Feuerlein, Die philosophise} le Sittenlehre in ihren geschichUichen IlaupU formen^ 2 vols., Tiibingen, 1857-59. P. Janet, Ilistoire de la PhUosophie Morale et Politique dans VAntiquite et les Temps Modernes, Paris, 1858. James Mackintosli, Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, London, 1830; new edition, ed. by Will. Whewell, London, 1363. Tf. "Whewell, Lectures 07i the History of Moral Philosophy, new edition, London, 1862. [Robert Blakey, History of Moral Science, second edition, Edinburgh, 1863. — Ed.] Jahnel, De Consdentiae Notione, Berlin, 1862. Aug. Neander, Vorlesungen iiber die Gesch. der christ. Ethik, ed. by Dr. Erdmann, Berlin, 1864. W. Gass, Die Lehre vom Gevmsen, Berlin, 18G9. On the History of Logic : Carl Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, Vol. I. (Devel- opment of Logic in Ancient Times), Leipsic, 1855; "Vols. IL-IV. (Logic in the Middle Ages), ibid. 1 861-70. On the History of Esthetics : Robert Zimmermann, Geschichie der Aesthetik als philoso- phischer Wissenschaft, Vienna, 1858; cf. the liistorico-critical portions of Vischer's Aesthetik and Lotze's Gesch. der Aesthetik in Deufschland, Munich, 1868.— (z./f^(3yti>f'U^ . More or less copious contributions to the history of philosophical doctrines may be found also in many of the works in which these doctrines are systematically expounded, as, for example, in Stahl's Philosophic des Rechts nach geschichtlicher Ansicht (1st ed., Heidel- berg, 1830 ff.), of which the first volume, on the " Genesis of the Current Philosophy of Law " (3d ed., 1853), is critico-historical, and relates particularly to the time from Kaut to Hegel ; cf in like manner Immanuel Herm. Fichte's System der Ethik, the first or critical part of which (Leipsic, 1850) is a history of the philosophical doctrines of right, state, and morals in Germany, France, and England from 1750 till about 1850; the first volume of K. Hildenbrand's Geschichte und System der Rechts- und StaatsphHosophie (Leips. 1860), treats minutely of the history of theories in classical antiquity; much historical material is also contained in the works of "Warnkonig, Roder, Rossler, Trendelenburg, and others, on the philosophy of law. The works of Julius Schaller ( Gesch. der Naturphilosophie seit Baco), Rob. v. Mohl {Gesch. u. Lit. der Stcuitswissenschaften, Erlangen, 1855-58), J. C. Bluntschli {Gesch. des aUg. Staatsrechts und der Politik seit dem 16 Jahrh. bis zur Gegenwart, Munich, 1864, etc.), and some others, relate to modern times. Cf. below, VoL IL § 1. THE PHILOSOPHY OF AJnJ^TIQUITT . § 5. The general characteristic of the human mind in ante-Chris- tian, and particularly in Hellenic antiquity, may be described as its comparatively unreflecting belief in its own harmony and of its one- ness with nature. The sense of an opposition, as existing either among its own different functions and interests or between the mind and nature and as needing reconciliation, is as yet relatively undeveloped. The philosophy of antiquity, like that of every period, partakes necessarily, in what concerns its chronological be- ginnings and its permanent basis, of the character of the period to which it belongs, while at the same time it tends, at least in its general and most fundamental direction, upward and beyond the level of the period, and so prepares the way for the transition to new and higher stages. For the solution of the diflScult but necessary problem of a general historical and philosophical characterization of the great periods m the intellectual life of humanity, the Hegelian philosophy has labored most successfully. The conceptions which it employs for this eiKl are derived from the nature of intellectual development in general, and they prove themselves empirically correct and just when compared with the particular phenomena of the different periods. Nevertheless, the opinion is scarcely to be approved, that philosophy always expresses itself most purely only in the universal consciousness of the time; the truth is, rather, that it rises above the range of the general consciousness through the power of independent thought, generating and developing new germs, and anticipating in theory the essential character of developments yet to come (thus, e. jr., the Platonic state anticipates some of the essential characteristics of the form of the Christian church, and the doctrine of natural right, in its development since Grotius, foreshadows the constitu- tionalism of the modern state). § 6. Philosophy as science could originate neither among the peoples of the North, who were eminent for strength and courage, but devoid of culture, nor among the Orientals, who, though suscep- tible of the elements of higher culture, were content simply to retain them in a spirit of passive resignation, — but only among the Hellenes, who harmoniously combined the characteristics of both. The Romans, devoted to practical and particularly to political prob- lems, scarcely occupied themselves with philosophy except in the ORIENTAL PHILOSOPnY, 15 appropriation of Hellenic ideas, and scarcely attained to any produc- tive originality of their own. The sacred writinprs and poetry of the various Orienta/ peoples, with their commentaries (Y-King, ChoA-King; the moral treatises of Confucius and his disciples; the Vedas, the code of Many, the SakoDtala of the poet Kalidasa, the Puranus or Tbeogonies, the ancient commentaries; — Zoroaster's Zend.ivesta, etc.) are the original sources from which our knowledge of their philosophical speculations is derived. Of modern works, treating of the religion and philosophy of these peoples, we name the following: — Friedr. Crcuzer, Symbolik und Mythologie der alien Volker, 4 vols., Leipsic and Darmstadt, lSlO-12; 2d ed., 6 vols., ISl'J ff. ; Werke, 1. 1^ il/id. 1836 seq. K. J. II. Windischmann, Die Philosophie im Fortgan^ der IFeW^t-JscAic/i/e, volume I., sections 1^ (on the "Foundations of Philosophy in the East"), Bonn, 1827-34. Stuhr, Die lieligion^synteme der heidninchen Volker den Orients, Berlin, 1S36-3S. Ed. Loth, Geschichte ^mserer abenUindisclien Philosophie, vol. I., Mannheim, 1S46, 2d ed., 18C2. (Roth's first volume is devoted to the speculations of the Persians .ind Egyptians, the second to the oldest Greek philosophy. The book, though written in a lively style, is drawn in large measure from inauthentic sources, and is not free from arbitrary interpretations and too hazardous comparisons. It contains more poetry than historic truth.) Ad. Wuttke, GeschicJUe dea Ileidenthumsi, 2 vols., Breslau, 1S52-53. J. C. Bluntschli, Aliasidtische Gottes- und Weltideen in ihren Wirkungen avf das Gemeiidehen der Men- sche7i,/ii»f Vortrcige, Nordlingen, 1866. Owing to the stability of Oriental ideas, expositions relating to modern times, such as Les Religions et les Philosophies dans VAsie centrale, piar le comte de Gohineaxi, (Paris, 1S60), may be profit.ibly consulted by students of their earlier history. Of. the mytholodcil writings of Schwenck and others, and Wolfgang Menzel's Die vorchristliche Unsterblichkeitslehre (Leipsic, 1S70), Max Duncker's Gescli. der Arier (3ded., 186"), etc., and numerous articles in the Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenlawiixchen Gesellscluifl (ed. by L. Krehl), and in other learned reviews. G. Pauthier, Esquisse d'tme llistoire de la Philos. chinoise, Paris, 1844 ; Les Quatre Llvres de Philos. Morale et Politique de la Chine, trad, da Chinois, Paris, 1S6S ; L. A. M.artin, Uistoire de la Morale, I. ; La Morale chez les C/iinois, Paris, 1862 ; J. II. Plath, Die Religion und der Cultus der alien Chinesen, in the Trans-ictions of the Philos. -Philol. Div. of the Bavarian R. Acad, of Sciences, Vol. IX., pt. 3, pp. 731-0G9, Munich, 1863 ; Confucius xmd seiner Schiller Lehen und Lehren, Trans, of the Munich Acad, of Sciences, XI. 2, Munich, 1867; T. Leggc, Tlie Life and Writings of Confucius, uith crit. and exeget. notes (in the author's "Chinese Classics"), London, 1867 [New York, 1870]. Colebrooke, Essays on the Vedas; and On the Philosophy of the ffindus,in his Miscellaneous Essays, L pp. 9-113, 227-41D, Lonilon, 1837 ; partial translation in German by Poley, Leipsic, 1S47; new ed. of the Essays on the Ret. and Phil, of the /?!, London, 1858; A. W. v. Schlegel, Bhagavad-Gita, i. e, Qeaneaiov /icAo!, sive Krishnne ct Arjunae colloquium de rebus divinis, Bharatiae epixodium. Te^vt, rcc, adn. adj., Bonn, lS2o; W. v. Humboldt, Ueber die nnter dem Kamen Bhagavad-Gita bekannte Episode des Mahabharata, Berlin, 1826. {Ct IlegeVs article in the Berlin Jahrbti.cher,fiir wiss. Kritik, 1S27.) Chr. Las- sen, Gymnosophista site Indicae philosophiae documenta, Bonn, 1S32; cf. his Ind. Alterthumsku.nde, I.-IV.,Lei[i8. 1847-61; Othra. yra.nk. Die Philosophie der Hindu. Vddanta Sfr Buddhi-sjnus, seine Dogmen, Ges- chichte und Littcratur, tran5l. into German fr. the Russian by Th. Benfey, Leipsic, 1860; Barthelemj' St Hilaire, Bouddha ct sa Religion, ie ed., Paris, 1SC2; Jam. de Alwis, Buddhism, its OrigiJi, History, and Doctrines, its Scriptures and their Language, London, 1863; Emil Schlagintweit, Ueber den Gottes- hegrifder Buddhismus, in the Reports of the Bavar. Acad, of Sciences, 18t>4, Vol. I. 83-102; R. S. Il.ardy, 7^ Legends and. Theories of the Buddhists compared tcith History and Science, with IntroductiA orfer die Wissenschnft der alien Aegypter, Gottingen, 18.55; Aegyptische Alterthums- tiWKf 6, Leipsic, 1867-58; Cbr. K. Josias von Bunsen, Aegyptens Stelle in der Weltgesdiichte., Hamburg 16 ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY. and Gotha, 1S4&-5T. Cf. also, among other works, the article by L. Diestel, which is well adapted as ipi introduction to the study of early Oriental religions: Set- Ti/phon, Asaftel imd Satati, ein Beitrag zur Iteligiowgeschichte den Orients, in the Zeituchrift fur hUtorische Theologie, edited by Niedner, 1860, pp. 159-217; further, Olllvier Bauregard, Les Divinitea EgyptUnnex, leur Origine, leur CuUe it son Erpansion dans le Monde, Paris, 1S66. J. G. Rhode, Die heilige Sage oder das gesammte Religion SRi/stem der alien Baktrer, Meder find Ferser oder des Zend-colks, Frankf. on the M. 1S20; Martin Haug, Die filnf Gathd'a oder Sammlungen von Liedem und Spruchen Zarathustra' s, seiner jUnger n7id Nac/i/olger, l,eips. 1858 and 1860 (in the Transactions of the German Oriental Society); Essay on Sacred Language, Writings, and Religion of the Parsees, Bombay, 1S62. On the religious conceptions of the Jews, compare, among others, G. II. Ewald, in his Gesch. des Volkes Israel his auf Christua, L. Ilerzfeld in his Gesch. des Volkes Jisrael von der Vollendung des sweiten Tempels bis zur Einsetzung des Makkahdera Schimon, and Georg Weber in Das Volk Israel in der altieatamentlichcn Zeit, Leipsic, 1867 (the first volume of the work by Weber and Iloltzman, entitled : Gesch. des Volki's Israel und der Entsteliung dea Christenthnms. 2 vols., Leips. 1867). Alexander Kohut (among recent writers) treats specially of Jewish angelology and demonology in their dependence on Par- seeism, in the Abhandl.filr Kvnde dea Morgtnlandes, ed. by Herm. Brockhaus; his work also published separately, Leipsic, 1866. The so-called philosophy of the Orientals lacks in the tendency to strict demonstration, and hence in scientific character. 'Whatever philosophical elements are discoverable among them are so blended with religious notions, that a separate exposition is scarcely possible. Besides, even after the meritorious investigations of modern times, our knowl- edge of Oriental thought remains far too incomplete and uncertain for a connected and authentic presentation. "We omit, therefore, here the special consideration of the various theorems of Oriental philosophy, and confine ourselves to the following general state- ments. The doctrine of Confucius (551-4'?9 B. c), as also that of his followers (Meng-tseu, born 371 B. c, and others), is mainly a practical philosophy of utilitarian tendency. Its theoretical speculations (which are based on the generalized conception of the an- tithesis of male and female, heaven and earth, etc.) are not scientifically wrought out. The rich but immoderate fancy of the Hindus generated, on the basis of a pantheistic conception of the world, a multiplicity of divinities, without investing them with har- monious form and individual character. Their oldest gods — of whom the Vedas treat — group themselves about three supreme divinities of nature, Indra, Yaruni, and Agni. Later (perhaps about 1300 B. c.) supreme veneration was paid to the three divine beings, which constituted the Hindu Trimurti, viz. : to Brahma, as the original source of the world (which is a reflected picture in the mind of Brahma, produced by the deceiving Maja), to Yischnu, as preserver and governor, and to Siva, as destroj-er and producer. The oldest body of Brahman doctrine is the Mimansa, which includes a theoretical part, the Brahmamimansa or Vedanta, and a practical part, the Karmamimansa. To the (uni- versalistic) Mimansa (-'Investigation") Kapila opposed the Sankhya ("Consideration," " Critique " — an individualistic doctrine, wliich denied the world-soul and taught the existence of individual souls only). We find already in the Sankhya a theor}- of the kinds and the objects of knowledge. To the authors of the Xiaya-doctrine, which subsequently arose, the Syllogism was known. The age of tliese doctrines is uncertain. Jn opposition to the religion of Brahma arose (not far from 550 B. c.) Buddhism, which was an attempt at a moral reformation, hostile to castes, but the source of a new hierarchy. Its followers •were required to make it their supreme aim to rise above the checkered world of changing appearance, with its pain and vain pleasure. But this end was to be reached, not so much through positive moral and intellectual discipline, as through another process, termed "entrance into Nirvana," whereby the soul was saved from the torments of transmigra- tion and the individual was brought into unconscious unity with the All. The Persian reli- ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 17 gion, founded or reformed by Zarathustra (Zoroaster), was opposed to the old Hindu religion, whose gods it regarded as evil demons. Over against the kingdom of light or of good was placed, in dualistic opposition, the kingdom of darkness or evil ; after a long contest the former was to triumph. The Egyptians are credited with the doctrines of the judgment of departed souls and of their transmigration, wliich doctrines Herodotus (II. 5.3, 81, 123) supposes to have passed from them to the Orphists and the Pythagoreans. Their mythology seems scarcely to have exercised any influence on the Grecian thinkers. Some- what more considerable may have been the influence on the Greeks of the early astronomi- cal observations of the Egyptians, and perhaps also of their geological observations and speculations. Certain geometrical propositions seem rather to have been merely discovered empirically by the Egyptians in the measurement of their fields, than to have been scientifically demonstrated by them ; the discovery of the proofs and the creation of a system of geometry was the work of the Greeks. The Jewish monotheism, which scarcely exercised an (indirect ?) influence on Anaxagoras, became later an important factor in the evolution of Greek philosophy {i. e. from the time of Neo-Pythagoreanism and in part even earlier), when Jews, through the reception of elements of Greek culture, had acquired a disposition for scientific thought. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. § T. The sources of our knowledge of tlie philosophy of the Greeks are contained partly in the philosophical Avorks and frag- ments which have come down from them to us, and partly in reports and occasional allusions. Modern historians have advanced grad- ually in the employment of this material from the method of mere compilation to a more exact historical criticism and a purer and more profound philosophical comprehension. The earlier philosophemes are never mentioned by Plato and Aristotle in the form of mere repetition with historic intent, but always as incidental to the end of ascertaining pliilosophical truth. Plato sketches, with historical fidelity in the essential outlines, though with a poetic freedom of execution, vivid pictures of the various philosophies, •which had preceded his own, as also of the persons who had been their representatives. Aristotle proceeds rather with realistic exactness both in outline and in details, and only departs occasionally from complete historic rigor in his reduction of earlier points of view to the fundamental conceptions of his own system. The increasing restriction of later classical authors to simple narrative is not calculated in general to impart to their state- ments the advantage of greater fidelity, since they are generally lacking either in accurate knowledge of the proper authorities, or in full capacity for the clear comprehension of earlier philosophical opinions. Plato characterizes in various dialogues the doctrines of Heraclitus and Parmenides, of Empedocles, Auaxagoras, and the Pythagoreans, of Protagoras, Gorgias, and other Sophists, and especially those of Socrates and of individual disciples of Socrates. Next to him, Xenophon (especially in the Memorabilia) is the most important authority for Socrates and his teaching. Aristotle, in all his writings, makes it his principle to consider, first of all, in the discussion of any problem, what results obtained by his predecessors are tenable, and presents, in particular, in the introduction to liis " first philosophy " (Meta- physics), a critical review of the principles of all earlier philosophers from Thales to Plato {Met. I. c. 3-10). In many places, also, Aristotle gives information concerning Plato's "unwritten doctrines," as delivered in the oral lectures of the latter. A number of minor ■works, in which Aristotle (according to Diog. L., T. 25) had treated of the doctrines of various previous philosophers (nepl tC)v Uvdayopeiuv, nepl ttjc 'Apxvrov Ilv^ayopsiuv, npbg Ta TJjvuvoc;, 'WpaKTieirov i^Tfy^aeig^ irpbg tuv Ar^uoKpiTov e^r/yr/aeif), and, later, notably Clitomachus (about 140 B. c, Trcpt ruv aipiaeuv), and of Aristotelians, besides Theophrastiis and Eudem\is {yEuuergiKal larngiai^ aQf&fiTfriKf/ Icrogia, rrepl t<1)v aarpc- ?.oyovuivu)v laTO()ia). Aristoxcnus (icrropiKa vnofxirfifiara^ Trt:gl Ylv^(iyuf)OV koI tuv y-T'iopi/^u-v ahrnv, II/.dTwvof /3tof), Dicaearch (j3lng 'EAAaJof, also tteqI fHuv), Phanias of Lesbos {~toi riiv ^uKpariKav and Trpof Toitg ao(piaTdg), Clearchus, Strato, Duris of Samos, the pupil of Theophrastus (about 270 B. c), and others either treated originally of earlier philosophers, or wrote works of more general content, or works pertaining to the history of special sciences, which contained material for the history of philosophy. Also Epicurus {Ttpt aipiaeuv) and his disciples, Hermarchus, Metrodorus, and Colotes (in polemical works), and Idomeneus (tteqI tuv I,uKpariKuv), and the Stoics Clean thes (On Heraclitus), Sphaerus (On Heraclitus, On Socrates, and On the Eretrian Philosophers), Chrysippus (On the Early Physiologists), Panaetius (On the Philosophical Schools or Sects, Trept tuv aipiaeuv)^ and others wrote of philosophical doctrines and works. Of all these works, which served as authorities for later writers, we possess none. The Alexandrians followed in their works the narratives of the authors above named. Ptolemy Philadelphus {reg. 285-247 b. c.) founded the Alexandrian Library (for which preparations had alread}'' been begun under his father by Demetrius Phalereus, who came to Alexandria about 206 B. c, and) in which the writings of the philosophers were brought together, thougli not a few spurious works were included among them. Callimachus of Cyrene (about 294—224 B. c), while superintendent of this library (in which office he suc- ceeded Zenodotus the Ephesian, who lived about 324—246 B. c), drew up "tables " of cele- brated authors and their works {jvivaKcg tuv iv naoy Trai^ela 6ia/MUTpiivTuv Kal uv awtypa'diav). Eratosthenes (276-194 B. c), who received from Ptolemy Euergetes {reg. 247-222) the con- trol of the Alexandrian Library, wrote concerning the various philosophical schools (^rept tuv KttTa (j)ih)ao(piav alpeaeuv), on which, as it seems, Apollodorus foimded liis (metrical) chron- icle (composed in the second half of the second century B. c), from which, again, Diogenes Laertius and others drew a large part of their chronological data. Aristophanes of Byzan- tium (born about 264, died about 187 B. c, pupil of Zenodotus and Callimachus. successor, as librarian, of Apollonius, the successor of Eratosthenes, and teacher of Aristarchus, who lived about 212-140 b. v.) arranged most of the Platonic Dialogues in Trilogies, placing the others after them as separate works (a part of his supplement to the Tr/vn/cff of Callimachus; see 'S auck' s Sammlung der Frd'jmente cIps Aristophanes rvn Byzanz). Be- sides Eratosthenes, the following persons wrote either expressly or incidentally of tlie lives and succession of the philosophers and of their works and doctrines : Neanthes of Cyzicus (about 240 b. c, resided at the court of King Attains I. in Pergamus, and wrote fiovamd and Trepl tvSo^uv dv6puv), Antigonus Carystius (about 225, pint, etc.), Hermippus (of Smyrna? about 200 b. c), the Callimachean (and Peripatetic), who, like Aristophanes of Byzantium in other departments, furnished in his biographico-literary opuscules, which were only too abundant in fables (TTfpt tuv aoipuv, -rrfpt payuv^ ■nfQi Tli'&ay6p(nuv algi(7euv\ and Alexander Polyhistor (in the time of Sulla, ^la^nxal tuv (j)i?x)o6(pui'). From the diadoxai of Sotion and the /iloi of Satyrus, Heraclides Lembus (about 150 a c), the 20 GREEK PHILOSOPHY SOURCES. aon of Serapion, compiled extracts, which are often mentioned by Diogenes Laertius (who distinguishes — V. 93, 94: — fourteen persons named Heraclides). Antisthenes of Rhodus (about 150 B.C.), the historian, and contemporary of Polybius, was probably the author of the iXoao(p7jaavT(jv koi tuv aif avruv, Trepl KvpTp>ai(jv, tK^yi/ ^Mtiao^wi', and crrpu/narelc iffropiKoc are not preserved. Plutarch's "Moralia" contaui valuable contributions to the history of philosophy, especially in what relates to the Stoic and Epicurean doctrines. The work entitled Plut. de Physicis Philo- sojyhorum Decrtfis Libri Quinque (ed. Dan. Beck, Leipsic, 1787, and contained also in Wyt- tenbach's and Diibner's editions of the " Moralia") is spurious. Claud. Gakni Liber irepl tpi/oooipov 'laTOQiar (in the complete ed. of the Works of Galen, ?'i. Kiihn, vol. XIX.) The work is spurious. Leaving out the commencement, it agrees GREEK PHILOSOPHY SOURCES. 21 almost throughout with the Pseudo-Phitarchic work above-mentioned, of which it is a recen- sion somewhat abridged. In the genuine writings of Galen, however, there is found, in addition to their medical contents, much that concerns the history of philosophy. Se.xti Empirici Opera, Pyrrhoniurum Institutionum Libri Tres (nvppdiveioi inzo-nmijaEic, Skeptical Sketches) ; Contra Mathemaiicos sive Disciplin. Proftsaores Libri sex, Contra Philoso- phos lib)-i quinque; the two also together under the title: Adversus Math. Libri XI. (Against the representatives of the positive sciences and against philosophical dogmatists.) Ed. Jo. Alb. Fabricius, Leipsic, 1718; reprinted ibid. 1842. Ex. rec. Imm. Bekker, Berlin, 1842. Flavii Philostrati Vitae Sophistarum. Ed. Car. Lud. Kayser, Heidelberg, 1838. Opera ed. Kayser. Ziirich, 1844-46; ibid. 1853; ed. Ant. Westermann, Paris, 1849. Athcnaei Deipnosophistae. Ed. Aug. Meineke, Leipsic, 1858-59. Diogenis Laertii de Vitis, Dogmatibus et Apophthegmaiibus Clarorum Philosophorum libri decern (■Jrept (iicjv, doyfiaruv /cat awo^^eyiiaTorv T(jv kv (piXoao^ia ehdoKiiiriadvTuv j3if3?i.ia deKo). Ed. Hiibner, 2 vols., Leips. 1828-31; Commentaries on the same, vols. I. and II., Leips. 1830-33, containing the notes of Is. Casaubonus, Aeg. Menagius and others. The com- mentary of Menagius on Diogenes Laertius appeared first in 1G52. Diog. L. Be Vitis, etc., ex Jtalicis codicibus nunc primum excMssis recensuit C. Gabr. Cobet. Accedunt Olympiodori, Ammonii, Jarnblichi, Porphyrii et aliorum Vitae Platonis. Aristotelis. Pythagorae, Plotini et Jsidcri, Ant. Westermanno, et Marini vita Prodi, J. F. Boissonnadio edentibus. Graece et Latine cum indicibus, Paris, 1850. Cf Frdr. Bahnsch, De Diog. L. Fontibus, {diss.-inaug. Regimontanensis,) Gumbinnen, 1868; Frdr. Nietzsche, De LasrUi Diogenis Fontibus, in the RJiein. Museum, new series, XXIII. 1868, and XXIY. 1869. Diogenes Laertius dedi- cated his work, according to III. 47, to a female admirer of Plato. His general attitude is that of an Eclectic, while in the different parts of his work he is influenced by the character of the sources from which he draws. Diogenes brings the history of Platonism down to Clitomachus, that of Aristot«lianism to Lyco. that of Stoicism, in our te.xt, to Chrysippus, though originalh- (as shown by Valentine Rose in tlie Hermes, vol. I., Berlin, 1866, p. 370 fF.) it was continued to Comutus ; he names tlie principal Epicureans down to Zeno of Sidon, Demetrius Laco, Diogenes Tarsensis, and Orion ; only the history of Skepticism is brought down by him to his own time, i. e., till near 220 a. d. Clementis Aiexandrini Opera. Ed. Reinhold. Klotz, Leipsic, 1830-34. Origenis (j,t/x)ao. (povueva, in Jac. Gronovii Thesatir. Aniiqvitatum Graecarum, torn. X., Leyden, 1701, pp. 257-292. Compendium Historiae Philosaphicae Antiquae sive Philosophutnena, quae sub Origenis nomine circum/eruntur, ed. Jo. Christoph. Wolf, Harab. 1706, 2d ed., ibid. 1716; also in the complete editions of Origen. Qpiyevovg (j)i?iO(!ot?iooo- y R. Kohler, Berlin, 1864, pp. 350-361 ; R. Zlmmermann, L'eher die Lehre de--i Ph. v. S. und ihr Verhultnini tn nnxxergriechlichen Glaubetiskrelseii, in Fichte's Zeitxcfir. f. Philot. Vol. 24. No. 2, 1854, and Joh. Con- rad, De Pherect/dis Syrii Aetate atque Cosnwlogta {DUm. Bonnenmn), Ccblentz, 1856.— Karl Dilthey, Cn'eck. Fraginente (Part I. : Fragments by the seven wise men, their contemi'oraries. and the Pj-tha- P'lreans), Darmrtadt, 1S.'?5; H. AViskemann. De iMcedaenumiornm Philonnphtn et P!iilnmphisi deque ffptem qnos dincnt SaptentibjM, Lac. dixripuKu et imitntorihiix. Hersfeld. 1840: Otto Bernhardt. THe niehen VTeifieti Griechenlnndt, Gymn.-Progr., Sonm, 1804: Frc. Aemil. Bohren. De Septem Sa]ne7>tibiis, Bona, ISCT. THE EARLT POETS AND SAGES. 25 The Homeric poems seem to imply an earlier form of religious ideas, the gods of which were personified forces of nature, and they recall in occasional particulars (e. g. II. VIII., 19sq., myth of the aetpr/ xp^'<^^^fl) Oriental speculations; but all such elements in them are v.'ithout exception clothed in an ethical form. Homer draws thoroughlj' ideal pictures of human life, and the influence which his poetry in its pure naivete exercised on the Hellenes (as also the less elevated influence of the more reflective poetry of Hesiod), was essentially ethical and religious. But when this education had accomplished its work in sufficient measure, the moral and religious consciousness of the race, increasing in depth and finding the earlier stadium insufficient, advanced to a more rigorously polemic attitude, and even proscribed the ideal of the past as a false, misleading, and pernicious agency (Xenophanes, Heraclitus, and Plato). After this followed a species of reconciliation which lasted during several centuries before the final rupture, but rested in part only on the delusive basis of allegorical interpretation. Greek philosophy made incomparably greater advances in that earlier polemic period than after its friendly return to the poetry of Homer and Hesiod. At a later time, when renewed speculation was again inclined to concede to the most ancient poetry the higheet authority, the belief of earher times, that the Homeric poetry was preceded by another of more speculative character, namely, the Orphic, found much credit. According to the primitive legend, Orpheus was the originator of the worship of Bacchus among the Thracians. Cosmogonic poems were early ascribed to him (by Ono- macritus, the favorite of the Pisistratidae, and others). Herodotus says (II. 5.3) : " Homer and Hesiod framed the theogony of the Hellenes ; but the poets, who are believed to have lived before them, in my opinion, were their successors;'' in II. 81 (cf. 123), Herodotus declares the so-called Orphic and Bacchic doctrines to be Egyptian and Pythagorean. Those Orphic cosmogonies of which we have most precise knowledge date from an epoch much later still, and arose tmder the influence of the later philosophy. It is, however, susceptible of sufficiently convincing demonstration, that one of the Cosmogonies origi- nated in a comparatively early period. Damascius, the Neo-Platonist, relates (Z)« Princ. p. 382), tliat Euderaus, the Peripatetic, an immediate disciple of Aristotle, reported the substance of an Orphic theogony, in which nothing was said of the intelligible, owing to its being utterly inexpressible — so Damascius explains it from his stand-point — but the beginning was made with Night. We may certainly assume that Aristotle also was acquainted with this theogony (cf. also Plat. Tim., p. 40 c). Now Aristotle says, Metaph., XIY. 4, that the ancient poets and the latest (philosophical) Oeo/.uyoi represented (panthe- istically) what is highest and best as being not first, but second or subsequent in order of time, and resulting from a gradual development ; while those, who (in point of time and in their modes of thought and expression) stood between tlio poets and the pliilosophers {ol /lefityfievoi avTuv), like Pherecydes, who no longer employed exclusively the language of mythology, and the magi and some Greek philosophers, regarded (theistiailly) that wliich is most perfect, as first in order of time. "What "ancient" poets (apxaloi TzoLTjTai, whose time, for the rest, may reach down, in the case of some of them, into the sixth cen- tury b. c.) are here meant, Aristotle indicates only by designating th.cir principles: oiov NvKTa Kal Ovpavov t/ Xan^ fj 'nKeav6v. Of these Xdo^ is undoubtedly to be referred to Hesiod (navruv fisv T^puricra Xdnq yiver', avrdp i-etra TaV Evpvarepvoc k. t. ?.. Theog. Y. 116 sq. ; £K Xaeog S" *Epe/3of te iiEXaLvd re Niif iyivovTO, ib. 123), 'fl/ceavof to Homer {'ilKcavov re i?£uv ytveaiv ml fiTjrEpa l^'^vv, II. XIT. 201 ; II. XIV. 240 : 'i2«avdf, lic-tp yivtci^ ■ndvreaai rervKrai), and Nvf Kal Ovpav6^, therefore, to some other well-known theogony, in all probability to the same Orphic theogony which was described by Eudemus ; and Sn this ease this theogony must have arisen, at the latest, in the sixth century before 26 PERIODS OF DEVELOPMENT. Christ, since Aristotle reckons its author among the "ancient poeta" {TrotrjTal ap;(alo(). But this theogony, and indeed all the theogoiiies, to which the Aristotelian testimony assigns a comparatively high antiquity, agree substantially, according to the same authority, with the theogonies of Homer and Hesiod in their religious conceptions. Zeus appears as the eternal ruler of all and as the soul of the world, in the following verse, which is, most likely, the Tvalaibc Aoyoc to which Plato refers in Le'j., IV. 715 e: — Zeyf ap^ri, Zeiir /xtniya, Atur 6' £k Trdvra rirvKTai. Pherecydes, of the island of Syros (about 600-550 e. c), wrote a theogony in prose, which is cited under the title of 'ETVTd/nvxog, probably from the folds (juvxolc) of his Koofior. Diogenes Laertius cites, as follows, the opening words of this work (I. 119): Zevf fiev koI Xp6vog elf dec Kat X6o)v fjv. Xdoviy de bvofia kyivsTo Tf/, cTetrf^ airry Zevg yipag SiSol. The cosmologist, Epimenides, who was nearly contemporary with Pherecydes, describes the world as coming forth from night and air, and belongs consequently to those whom Aristotle designates as Ik vvktoc yevvuvrec dEoAoyoi. Acusilaus made Chaos first, Erebus and Night being its children. Hermotimus of Clazomenae appears to have been one of the theistical cosmologists (see below, § 24). The so-called " Seven "Wise Men," Thales, Bias, Pittaciis, and Solon ; Cleomenes, Myaon (or, according to others, Periander), and Chilon (Anacharsis, Epimenides, and others are also named), with the sayings attributed to tlicm (Tliales: " Know Thyself," or, " What is difficult? To know one's self; and what is easy? To advise another;" Solon: "Hold the beautiful and good more sacred than an oath; " "Speak not falsely;" "Practice dili- gently things excellent ; " " Be slow in acquiring friends, but those thou hast taken, do not cast off; " "Learn to command by first learning to obey; " "Let thy advice be not what ia most agreeable, but what is most honorable; " " Notliing in ex'cess;" Bias: "The posses- sion of power will bring out the man," cited b}'' Arist., Elh. Nic, V. 3, and "The most aro bad," etc.; Anacharsis: "Rule thy tongue, thy belly, tliy sexual desires," etc.), are repre- sentatives of a practical wisdom, which is not yet sufficiently reflective to be called philos- ophy, but which may pave the way for the philosophical inquiry after ethical principles. In the Platonic dialogue Protagoras (p. 343), the " Seven "Wise Men " are spoken of as exponents of Lacedajmonian culture expressing itself in moral maxims. The Aristotelian Dicaearch {ap. Diog. Laert., I. 40) terms these men, with reason, "neither sages nor philos- ophers, but rather men of broad common sense, and lawgivers {phre aotpovq ovte (f)i2.oa6(iiovc, cwETovQ 6s Ttvag koI vo/xoSetikovc). Thales, who is occasionally mentioned as the wisest of the seven sages, was at oiice an astronomer and tlie founder of the Ionic Natural Philosophy. § 9. The Periods of Developinent of Greek (and its derivative, Roman) philosophy may he characterized, in respect of the object of inquiry in each, as follows : 1st Period : Prevailing direction of pliil- osopliical inquiry toward the universe of nature, or predominance of Cosmology (from Thales to Anaxagoras and the Atomists); 2d Period : Prevailing direction of philosophical inquiry toward man, as a willing and thinking being, or predominance of Ethics and Logic — accom- panied, however, by the gradual resumption and a growing encour- agement of natural philosophy (from the Sophists to the Stoics, Epicu- reans, and Skeptics) ; 3d Period : Prevailing direction of philosophical PERIODS OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 27 inquiry to the subject of the divine nature and the relation of the world and man to it, or predominance of Theosophy, but not excluding pliysics, ethics, and logic (from Neo-Pythagoreanism till the exit of ancient philosophy in the Neo-Platonic school). As to the form of philosophy in the successive periods, the first period was charac- terized, in the main, by the immediate direction of thought to things, though not without some attempts at mathematical and dialecti- cal demonstration ; the second, by the introduction of the Definition as an organ of inquiry, and the third by the prevalence of the idea of mystical absorption in the Absolute. The germs of the peculiar con- tent and also of the form of philosophy in each of the later periods are discernible partly at the culmination and partly at the termination of the period in each case next preceding ; the most eminent thinkers of the second (in most of its representatives, prevailingly anthropological) period rose nearest to a comprehensive philosophy. In the first period, the persons representing the same or similar types of philosophy were, as a rule (though by no means without exception), of the same race (the earliest natural philosophy having arisen and flourished among the lonians, while Pythagoreanism found its adherents chiefly among the Dorians). But in the second period philosophical types became inde- pendent of race-distinctions, especially after the formation at Athens of a center of philosophical activity. The home of philosophy was now coextensive with the Hellenic world, including in the latter those nations subjected to the Macedonian or Roman supremacy, in which the Hellenic type of culture remained predominant. In the third period, the Hellenic mode of thought was blended with the Oriental and the representatives of philosophy (now become theos- ophy) were either Jews under Hellenic influence, Egyptians and other Orientals, or men Hellenic in race who were deeply imj)regnated with Orientalism. Diogenes of Laerta (whose arrangement is based on an unintelligent and exaggerated use of the distinction of Ionic and Italic philosopliy) repeats (III. 56) an observation, which had been made by others before him, and which is worthy of note, to the effect that the first "koyoq of the Greek philosophers was physical, while Ethics was added by Socrates, and Dialectic by Plato. Brucker follows substantially the arrangement of Diogenes Laertius, but begins a new period with philosophy under the Romans. In this period he includes, beside the Roman philosophers, the renewers of earlier schools, especially the Neo- Pythagoreans and the so- called "Eclectic Sect" (so termed by him after Diog. Laert., I. 21, where Potamo is spoken of as founder of an eclectic school), i. e. the Neo-Platonists, and also the later Peripatetics, Cynica, etc., and the Jewish, Arabian, and Christian philosophers down to the end of th» 28 PERIODS OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. Middle Ages, the restoration of the sciences, and the commencement of modem phi- losophy. Tennemann divides Greek and Roman philosophy into three periods : 1. From Thalca to Socrates — beginning in fragmentary speculations concerning the external world : 2. From Socrates to the end of the contest between the Stoa and the Academy — in which period speculation was called off from nature and directed to the human mind as the source of all truth ; 3. From philosophy under the Romans and the New Skepticism of ^nesidemus to John of Damascus — the period of the marriage of the "Western with the Oriental mind, when men looked outside of the mind for the source of certitude and declined into syncretism and fanaticism. Similarly, H. Ritter distinguishes three periods of philosophical development : Pre- Socratic Philosophy, the Socratic Schools (among which he includes the earlier Skeptics, Epicureans, and Stoics) and the Later Philosophy down to Neo-Platonism. The first period includes "the first awakening of the philosophic spirit," the second, "the most perfect bloom of philosophical systems," the third, "the downfall of Greek philosophy." More precisely, the first period is characterized, according to Ritter, by the one-sided scien- tific interest, from which in it philosophical inquiry departs, its variety of direction being determined by variety of race ; the second, by the complete systematic division of philoso- phy (or at least " of that which the Greeks generally understood by philosophy ") into its various branches, the different races no longer philosophizing each in its own way, but "this philosophy being brought forth, as it were, from the intellectual totality of the Greek nation;" the third, by the loss of the sense of the systematic order essential to Greek philosophy, although the tradition of it was preserved, and by the decadence of the peculiarity and vigor of the Greek mind, while scientific discipline was gradually covering a greater range of experiences and being extended to a greater number of men. Ritter's classification is based essentially on Schleiermacher's estimate of the philosophical signifi- cance of Socrates, n.amely, that Socrates, by his principle of krwivledgs, rendered possible the union of the previously isolated branches of philosophical inquiry in an all-em oracing philosophical system, which union Plato was the first to realize. In accordance herewith, Schleiermacher divides Greek philosophy, in his Lectures edited by Ritter, into two periods, entitled " Pre-Socratic Philosophy," and " Philosophy from Socrates to the Neo- Platonists ;" yet he sometimes himself subdivides the latter period into two periods, one of bloom, the other of decay. Brandis agrees, on the whole, with Ritter in his appreciation of the development of Greek philosophy, yet with the not immaterial difference, that he transfers the Stoics and Epicureans and the Pyrrhonic and Academic Skeptics from the second period of develop- ment ("the time of manly maturity") to the third (" the period of decline"). Hegel distinguishes three periods : 1. From Thales to Aristotle ; 2. Grecian philosophy in the Roman world; 3. The Neo-Platonic philosophy. The first period extends from the commencement of philosophizing thought till its development and perfection into a scientific whole and into the whole of science. In the second period philosophical science becomes split up into particular systems ; izch. system is a theory of the universe founded entirely on a one-sided principle, a partial truth being carried to the extreme in opposition to its complementary truth and so expanded into a totality in itself (systems of Stoicism and Epicureanism, of whose dogmatism Skepticism constitutes the negative face). The third period is, with reference to the preceding one, the affirmative period, in which what was before opposed becomes now harmoniously united in a divine ideal world. Hegel distributes the first period into three sections : a. From Thales to Anaxagoras, or from abstract thought, as immediately determined by its (external) object, PKE-SOPHISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 29 to the idea of thought as determining itself; b. Sophists, Socrates, and disciples of Socrates — thought which determines itself, is apprehended as present, as concrete in me — principle of subjectivity; c. Plato and Aristotle — thought objective, the Idea, occupies the whole sphere of being (with Plato, only in the form of universality, but with Aristotle, as a fact confirmed in every sphere of real existence). Zeller's first period extends from Thales to the Sophists, inclusive. The second includes Socrates and his incomplete disciples, Plato and the Old Academy, Aristotle and the earlier Peripatetics. All Post- Aristotelian philosophy is included in the third. In the first period all philosophy takes an immediately objective direction. In the second period the fundamental notion is that of the objectivity of ideas or of thought as per se existing, in which Socrates recognized the supreme end of subjective endeavor, Plato the absolute, or substantial reality, and Aristotle not simply the essence, but also the forming and moving principle of the empiricallj' real. In the third period all independent speculation centers in the question of the truth of subjective thought and the manner of life calculated to bring subjective satisfaction ; thought withdraws from the object- world into itself. Even Neo-Platonism, whbse essential character is to be sought in the tran.scendent theosophy which it embodied and for which Skepticism prepared the way, furnishes, in Zeller's opinion, no exception to the subjective character of the third period, since its constant and all-controlling concern is the inward satisfaction of the subject. No division can be regarded as truly satisfactory, in which reference is not had, so far as practicable, at once to the prevailing object, the form and the geographical locahzation of philosophy in the difierent periods. FmsT (Pkevailingly Cosmological) Period of Greek Philgsopeit. PRE-SOPHISTIC PHILOSOPHY. § 10. The first period of Greek Philosophy includes, 1) the earlier Ionic Natural Pliilosophers, 2) the Pythagoreans, 3) the Eleatics, 4) the later Natural Philosophers. The Ionic "physiologists," predisposed thereto by their racial character as lonians, directed their attention to the sphere of sensible phenomena and inquired after the material prin- ciple of things and the manner of their generation and decay ; for them, matter was in itself living and psychically endowed. The Pytha- goreans, whose doctrines flourished chiefly among the Greeks of Doric race, especially in Lower Italy, sought for a principle of things which should account at once for their form and substance, and found it in number and figure. The philosophy of the Eleatics turned on the unity and immutability of being. The later natural philosophers were led by the antithesis in which the Eleatic speculation stood to the 30 PRE-SOPHISTIU I'HILOSOPHT. earlier natural philosophy, to attempt a mediation; to this end, they admitted, on the one hand, the Eleatic doctrine of the immutability of being, but affirmed, on the other, with the Pre-Eleatic philosophers, its plurality, and explained its apparent changes as due to the combina- tion or severance of immutable, primitive elements. With the last representatives of natural philosophy and, especially, in the doctrine of Anaxagoras concerning the independent existence and world- disposing power of the divine mind (Noi)^-), the way was already beino- prepared for the transition to the following period. Fragmenta Philosophorxum Graecorum (of the time before Socrates), ed. Fr. Guil. Mullach, Paris 1800, Vol. II., ibid. 1867. H. Ritter, Geschichte der lonischen Philosophie, Berlin, 1821. Chr. A. Branciis, Ueber die Reihen- folge der lonischen Physiologen, in the Rhein. Mus., III. pp. 105 seq. Mallet, Ilw^mre de la Philomphie JoHienne, Paris, 1S42. K. F. Herrnann, Be PhiloxopJiovmn Jonicoriim Aetatilus, Gott. 1849, Ed. Both, Geschichte unserer abendUbulischen Philosophies 2d vol. (Greek Philosophy. The earliest Ionic thinkers and Pythagoras), Mannheim, 185S, 2d ed., 1S62. Aug. Gladisch, Die Pythagoreer und die Schinesen. Posen, 1841 ; Pie Eleaten und die Indier, ibid. 1S44; Pie Religion und die Philosophie in ihrer weltge^chichthche7i Entwickelung, Breslau, 1852; Empedoklea und die Aegypter, Leipsic, 1868; IJerakleitos und Zoroaster, Leips. 1859; Anasctigoran und die Jsra'dliten, Leipsic, 1854; Pie J/yperboreer und die alien Schinesen, eine historieche Untersuchung, Leips. 1866. Max Schneidewin, Ueber die Keime erkenntnisitheoretischer und ethischer Philosopfieme bei den vorsokrat. Penkern (G.-Progr.), Arnstadt, 1868, and in Berguiann's Philos. Monatshefte, Vol. II., Ber- lin, 1869. A.S a. result of the peculiar cosmological principles adopted by the Pythagoreans and Eleatics, Ethics appeared already in germ among the former and Dialectic among the latter. Yet the Pythagorean and Eleatic philosophies are scarcely, for that reason, to be termed (with Schleiermacher) respectively ethical and dialectical in their fundamental character. These philosophies are, rather, like the speculation of the lonians, essentially cosmological, and their ethical and dialectical tendencies result only from the manner in which they seek to solve the cosmological problem. The Pythagoreans brought, not ethics, but only the mathematico-philosophical theory of nature under a scieiitijk, form, and the Eleatics produced no theory of dialectics. In his work entitled PMo^oos des Pythagoreers Lehren (Berlin, 1819, p. 40 sq.), Boeckh compares the different types of Greek philosophy in the first period with the characteristics of the races, in which the several types were developed, with the following result. In the materialistic view of the principles of things and of the manifold life and activity of the material elements, as held by the Ionic philosophers, Boeckh finds an expres- sion of the sensuousness of the lonians, of their attachment to the external, of their sensibility to external impressions, and of their lively, mobile disposition. The Doric character, on the contrary, was marked by that inward depth, from which springs vigorous action, and by a quiet but persistent adherence to fixed and almost indestructible forms. This character manifested itself in the tendency to ethical reflection and speculation — although the latter never rose to the form of a developed theory — and more especially in the circumstance, that the Doric thinkers sought to explain the nature of things by adducing, not a material, but a formal principle, a principle which should account for their unity and order. Thus Pythagoras was said to be the first to call the world Cosmos, and, in conformity with the peculiarity of the Doric character, in conformity even with the spirit of THE IONIC NATURAL PHILOSOPHEES. 31 the government under which they lived, the philosophy of the Dorians assumed, externally, the form of a confederation or order. Philosophy, says Boeckh, from its sensuous begin- ning among the lonians, passed through the intermediate stage of Pj'thagoreauism (mathe- matical intuition) to the non-sensuous doctrine of Plato, who had in tlio Eleatics able but too one-sided predecessors, and who, by the Socratic method of criticism, limiting and correcting not only the Eleatic philosophy, but also the other pliilosophies, the one by the other, evolved from thera the most perfect system which the Hellenic mind was capable of producing. Boeckh draws tlie following parallel between the successive theories held in regard to the principles of things, and the degrees of the dialectical scale given by Plato (see below, §41): the poetic-mythical symbols of the period previous to the exist- ence of philosophy proper, correspond with ehaaia, the lonians investigate the realm of things sensible, the aladnrd, the Pythagoreans investigate the mathematical order of things, the Siavonrd, and the Eleatics the purely spiritual, intelligible, the voTfrd. The influence of Eleaticism on the doctrines of the later natural philosophers has been espe- cially pointed out by Zeller (who, however, still separates Heraclitus from the earlier lonians). To what extent the philosophy of this period (and hence the genesis of Greek philos- ophy in general) war, affected by Oriental influences, is a problem whose definite solution can only be anticipated as the result of the further progress of Oriental and, especially, of Egyptological investigations. It is certain, however, that the Greeks did not meet with fully developed and completed philosophical systems among the Orientals. The only question can be whether and in what measure Oriental religious ideas occasioned in the speculation of Grecian thinkers (especially on the subject of God and the human soul) a deviation from the national type of Hellenic culture and gave it its direction toward the invisible, the inexperimental, the transcendent (a movement which culminated in Pytha- goreanism and Platonism). In later antiquity, Jews, Neo-Pythagoreans, Neo-Platonists, and Christians unhistorically over-estimated the influence of the Orient in this regard. Modern criticism began early to set aside such estimates as exaggerated, and critics have manifested an increasing tendency to search for the explanation of the various philoso- phemes of the Greeks in the progressive, inner development of the Greek mind ; but, in their care not to exaggerate the results of external influences, they have verged perhaps too near to the opposite extreme. The labors of Roth and Gladisch mark a reaction against this extreme, both of them again laying stress on the influence of the Orient. But Roth's combinations, which bj'- their audacity are capable of bribing the imagination, involve too much that is quite arbitrary. Gladisch concerns hhnself, primarily, rather with the com- parison of Greek philosophemes with Oriental religious doctrines, than with the demon- stration of their genesis ; so far as he expresses himself in regard to the latter, he does not affirm a direct transference of the Oriental element in the time of the first Greek philosophers, but only maintains that this element entered into Greek philosophy through, the medivun of the Greek religion ; Oriental tradition, he argues, must have been received in a religious form by the Hellenes in very early antiquity, and so become blended with their intellectual life ; the regeneration of the Hindu consciousness in the Eleatics, of the Chinese in the Pythagoreans, etc., was, however, proximately an outgrowth from the Hellenic character itself. But this theory has little value. It is much easier either for those who deny altogether that any essential influence was exerted on the Greek mind from the East, or for those who affirm, on the contrary, that such an influence was directly trans- mitted through the contact of the earlier Greek philosophers with Oriental nations, to explain the resemblance, so far as it exists, between the different Greek philosophies and various Oriental types of thought, than for Gladisch, from his stand-point, to explain th» 32 THALES OF MILETUS AND HIPPO. separate reprodtiction of the latter in the former. For the ethical and anthropomorphitic character impressed by the Greek poets upon the mythology of their nation was of such a character as to eflace, not merely all traces of the influence of different Oriental nations iu the religion of the Greeks, but all traces of Oriental origin whatsoever. The hypothesis of a direct reception of Chinese doctrines by Pythagoras, or of Hindu doctrines by Xe- nophanes, would indeed belong to the realm of the fanciful. But that Pythagoras, and perhaps also Empedocles, appropriated to themselves Egyptian doctrines and usages directly from Egypt, that possibly Anaxagoras, or perhaps even Hermotimus, his prede- cessor, came in contact with Jews, that Thales, as also, at a later epoch, Democritus, sought and found iu Egji'pt or in Babylonia material for scientific theories, that Heraclitus was led to some of his speculations by a knowledge of Parseeism, and that therefore the later philosophers, so far as they join on to these, were indirectly (Plato also directly) affected in the shaping of their doctrines by Oriental influences, is quite conceivable, and some of these hypotheses have no slight degree of probability. § 11. The philosophy of the earlier Ionic physiologists is Hylozo- ism, i. e., the doctrine of the immediate unity of matter and life, according to which matter is by nature endowed with life, and life is inseparably connected with matter. This development-series includes, on the one hand, Thales, Anaxi- mander, and Anaximenes, who sought mainly the material principle of things, and, on the other, Heraclitus, who laid the principal stress on the process of development or of origin and decay. Kufce, Alth. IIL, voL 3, Berlin, lS3o, pp. 403-410), aud Wilh. Uhrig (Z>e Hippone Atheo, Gicsson, 1;>4S). For determining the time of Thales' life, a datum is furnished in the report that ha predicted an eclipse of the sun. which took place in the reign of the Lydian king Alyattes (Herod., I. 74). The date of this eclipse, according to the supposition of Baily {Philosoph. Transactions, 1311) and Oltmanns {Abh. der Bed. Akad. d. Wiss., 1812-13), is September 30, 610 B. c, but, according to Bosanquet, Hind, Airj- {Phihs. Trans., vol. 143, p. 179sq.), and< Jul. Zech (J. Zech's Astron. Untersuchungen ilber die loicMigeren Finsternisse, welche von den SchrifMellern des class. Alte7-thums erwdhnt U'erden, Leipsic, 1853), May 28, 585 E. c* The latter date is defended l^y P. A. Hansen {Darlegung der theoret. Berechnung der in den Mond- tafeln angeiuandten Siortmgen, ziceite uhhandlung, in the 7th vol. of tlie Abhandlungen der math.-phys. CI. der K. Sachs. Ges. der Wiss., Leips. 1864, pp. 379 sq.). "With it agrees also the supposition adopted, according to Diog. Laert. (T. 22), by Demetrius Phalereus in his List of Archons {avaypa(pj] tuv apx6vTwi'), that Thales was named cro^df, while Damasias was ♦ Zech and others write 5S4; but the year denoted in astronomical usage by this number is the same as that designated in the ordinary and approvable practice of historians as 5S5 b. c, i. e.. the SSSth year before the conventional point of departure of our chronology, which lies about IS^^ years before the day of tho Emperor Augustus's death (Aug. 19, a. d. 14). Zech follows the custom introduced among astronomers by Jacob Cassini (cf. Ideler's //(inc/bvch der Cfironologie, p. 75, and ZM/'/;?tcA, p. 89 sq.) of design.iting every year before the birth of Christ by a number one less than the usual one. This mode of designation (which is in so far defensible, as according to it the 25th Dec. of the year ± rt is removed by ± a years from the beginning of the era) is, it is true, convenient for the purposes of astronomical calculation, but deviates from historic usage, and is even itself in so far less appropriate, as it (not to mention how few days of the year fall after the 25th of December, which, as the presumptive birthday of Jesus, itself formed the point of departure in the new division of the years, according to the original and in principle unchanged intention) makes the year + 1 iha Jirst year after the beginnins of the Christian era, but the year — 1, the seco7id year before the beginning of this era : in the former every day is distant years and a fr.iction, but in tho latter 1 year and a fraction from the commencement of our era. According to this astronomical usage, the year, near the end of which the birth of Jesiis is placed, is numbered 0, the whole of it, with the exception of the last days of December, falling before the birth of Christ. According to this reckoning, the year — a is the year after which, without counting tliat year itself, n years are counted lill the birth of Christ; tho year + a ought consistently to be the year, up to which, without counting that year, a years are reckoned from the same date ; and there ought, therefore, to be a year after Christ, which the astronomer is never- theless as far as the historian from positing. The historical usage is perfectly consequent in making tho year 1 after the birth of Christ follow immediately on the year 1 b. c. as the first ye.ir of the era; this usage we follow here without exception. The above are the Julian date.'i. It is customary to extend backward the Julian Calendar and not the Gregorian, in reckoning ancient time. Yet tho reduction of all historical dates to Gregorian dates affords the by no means unessential advantage of making the equinoxes and solstices in the earliest historical times fall in the same months and on the same days as now. The historian, at least (who, for the rest, always deviates from the inaclice of the astronomer in the indic.ition of years and d.ays), ought to give ancient dates according to the Gregorian Calendar. In order to m.akc the reduction, tho provisions whicli were made at the introduction of the Gregorian Calendar (in 1582, when the 15th of October was made to follow iinmcdiately upon the 4th) for the future, and with reference to a portion of the past (viz. : that in every 400 years three interciilary days of the Julian Calendar should fall away, namely, in the yc.irs whose numbers are divisible by 100 and not by 400 without remainder), must be applied also to the earlier past. For the eclipse of Thales the Gregorian date, thus determined, is May 22, 585 r.. c. In like manner the .Tulian dates in § .",9, § 01, etc., should be reduced to the Gregorian. From the Julian date for the years 601 to ,501 n. c. 6 d.iys .ire to be subtracted, from 501 to 301 b. c. 5 d.ays,301 to 201. 4 days, 201 to 101, 3 days, 101 n. o. to a. d. 100, 2 days, a. n. 100 to 200, 1 day. For the years a. i). 300 to 500, one day is to be added, 500 to 600, 2 days, etc. Yet it would bo, perhaps, still bettor to carry out Midler's proposal and modify the Greirorian Calendar throughout, so that at the end of every 12S years an inter- calary day of the Julian Calendar f-houlil fall away. The advantage of this reform would be greater exactness in the demarcation of the srasons of the year, less uncertainty in the citation of early historical dates, and perhaps also a diminution of the difficulty of harmonizing the llusso-Groek and occidental calend.ars. 3 34: THALES OF MILETUS AKD HIPPO. Arclion at Athens (586-5 b. c). Apollodorus, in his Chronicle (according to Diog. Laert^ T. 37), places his birth in Olympiad 35. 1 (640-639 B. c). It is possible that Thales had learned of the Saros,, i. e. the period of the eclipses, dis- corered after prolonged observation by the Chaldeans, and covering 233 synodic months, or 6585 i days, or that he even knew of the greater period of 600 years. Yet on the basis of this Saros, eclipses of the moon only, and not eclipses of the sun, could be foreknown with a sufQcient degree of probability, for any determinate locality, and the prediction ascribed to Thales is therefore probably only a legend, which arose perhaps from his scientific explanation of the eclipse of the sun after it had taken place. Cf. Henri Martin, Sur quelqiies predidioiis d'edipse^ mentionnees par des auteurs anciens, in the Revue Archeo- logique, IX., 1864, pp. 170-199. Thales belonged (according to Diog. L., I. 22) to the family of the Thelides (f/c ruv 67!?ii6(bv), whose ancestor was Cadmus the Phenician, and who emigrated (according to Herod., I. 146) from Thebes to Ionia. Thales distinguished himself not only in the region of scientific investigation, but also in political affairs ; he is reported, in particular, to have dissuaded the Milesians from allying themselves with Croesus against Cyrus (Herod., I. 75; 170; Diog. L., I. 25). The writings which were in later times attributed to Thales {vai'TiKy aarpn'Aoyia and others), had (according to Diog. L., I. 23) already been declared spurious by some in antiquity. Aristotle speaks, probably, only from the reports of others, of his fundamental philosophical doctrine, and only conjecturally of the argumentation by which he supported it. Aristotle says, Metaph., I. 3 : " Of those who first philosophized, the majority assumed only material principles or elements, Thales, the originator of such philosophy (Qalijg 6 TTJc TotavTTjq apxT/oQ r?'n- <^ ciple (apxv)' As such principle he posits a matter, undetermined hi^y- y^U*^ quality (and infinite in quantity), the arreipov. From it the elementary contraries, warm and cold, moist and dry, are first separated, in such manner that homogeneous elements are brought together. Through an eternal motion, there arise, as condensations of air, innumerable worlds, heavenly divinities, in the center of which rests the earth, a cylinder in form and unmoved on account of its equal remoteness from all points in the celestial sphere. The earth, according to Anaximander, has been evolved from an originally fluid state. Living beings arose by gradual development out of the elementary moisture, under the influence of heat. Land animals had, in the beginning, the form of fishes, and only with the drying up of the surface of the earth did they acquire their present form. Anaximander is said to have described the soul as aeriform.— VW^^-^t-LrM^^^K^-^c - S^!-<^-«..*KJt t Schleiermacher, Ueber AnaadmandroR (rend in the Berlin Acaj. of Sciences, Nov. 11, 1811), in the. jLbh. o'er philos. CI., Berlin, 1815, and in Vol. II. of the 3d Div. of the Comphte Works of S., Berlin, 1S38, * * pp. 171-296. Cr., besides the essay by the Abbe de Ciinaye (German in Hisstnann's Magaein), KiischeV Forachungen, I., pp. 42-62, and Busgen, Ueber das aweipov Anaximnnders (G. Pr.), Wiesbaden, 1S67. 36 ANAXIMANDKR OF MILETUS. For determining the time of Anaximander's birtli we have only the statement of Apol- lodorus to rest upon, who says (Diog. Laert., 11. 2), that in the second year of the 58th Ol3rrap. (54T-546 B. c.) Anaximander was 64 years old; according to this, lie must have be(?ii born in 01. 42.2 (611-610 B. c). He occupied himself with astronomy and geography, ma(ie a geographical map (according to Eratosthenes, ap. Strabo, I. p. 7) and also an astro- uomical globe (afalpa, Diog. L., II. 2), and invented the sun-dial (yvu/juv, Diog. L., IT. 1), or rather, since this instrument was already in use among the Babylonians (Herod., II. 109), made it known to the Greeks and, in particular, introduced it into Lacedajmon. From a work of his, the following sentence (probably changed into the oratio obliqua by the narrator) is preserved {ap. Simplieius, In Arist. Phys., fol. 6 a): ef uv rfe ti -yevecrig kan roli; ovff/., Kal t?/v (p-Qopav dq ravra yiveai^m Kara to xP^^v- 6id6vaL yap avra riaiv nal d'lKriv riji, adtKiac Kara rf/v tov xP^'^ov ra^iv. (Definite individual existence, as such, is represented afl au adiKia, injustice, which must be atoned for by extinction.) "With the ansipov, or " Infinite," of Anaximander are connected several disputed questions. The most important is, whether the aneipov is to be understood as a mixture of all distinct elementary substances, from which the various individual things were mechanically sifted out (Hitter's view), or, as a simple and qualitatively indeterminate matter, in which the different material elements were contained only potentially (as Herbart and the majority of recent historians suppose). The Aristotelian references, taken by themselves, might seem to conduct to the former conclusion. Aristotle says, Phys., I. 4: ol J' U tov evot; f'vovtrar rag ivavTLOTTjTaq tKKpivta'dat (Myovaiv), (Jairep ' Ava^i/xavdpog (j)i]ai koI baoi 6' ei> kuI TToXXd (paaiv eivai, uarep "EuTrei'ioK'Atjc ««' 'Ava^ayopag. The doctrine with which this is set in contrast, is (that of Anaximenes and other natural philosophers), that the manifold world of things was formed from the one original substance by condensation and rarefaction (Arist.. Metaph., XII. 2 : koI tovt' IgtI to ' Ava^ayopov iv . . .Kal 'E/iTrefJo/cAeoff to fuy/j.a kuI 'Ava^i^ fjdvSpov). In Mdaph., I. 8 (§§ 19 and 20, ed. Schw.), Aristotle seems to attribute the theory of an aopioTov^ or an indefinite, imqualified first substance, only to later, Post-Anaxagorean pliilosophers (with special reference to the Platonists). But the statement of Theoplirastus, reported by Simplieius {Art^t. Phys., fol. 33), that, provided the mixture asserted by Anax- agoras be conceived as one substance, undetermined in kind and quantity, it forms an (iTreipov like that of Anaximander {el 6e Tig tt/v fi't^iv tuv aTvavTuv viroXdfioi fiiav elvai U Heraklitischen Brie/e, Berlin, 1869. Ferd. Lassalle, Die PhilosojMe Herakleitos^ des Ihmkeln von Ephesoa, 2 vols., Berlin, 1858. (The most thorough monograph on the subject, but the author is at times too much given to Hegelianizing. Lassalle follows Hegel in styling the doctrine of Heraclitus " the jihilosophy of the logical law of the identity of contradictories." Of., in reference to Lassalle's work, Itaffaele Mariano, Lassalle e il suo Eraclito Saggio di filosofia egheliana, Florence, 1865.) A. Gladisch, Herakleitos und Zoroaster, Leipsic, 1859; cf. his essays " ilber AuKspriiche des Herakl.," in the Zeitschrift fiir ^/ter<^U7?!SM'i.»s6«.scA(//if, 1346, No. 121 sq. and 184T, 268q. Kettig, Ueber einen Aus- spruoh Beraklits bei Flat. Coiiviv. 13T, Ind. lect., Berne, 1865. Heraclitus was a descendant of a noble Ephesian family. The rights of a jlaaiTicvr (king of sacrifices), which were hereditary in the family of Androclus, the founder of Ephesus and descendant of Codrus, he is reported to have resigned in favor of his younger brother. By the banishment of his friend Hermodorus, his aristocratic feeling was inten- sified into the bitterest hatred of the Demos. (On Hermodorus, cf. Zeller, I>e Hermodoro Ephesio et de Hermodoro Platonis discipulo, Marb. 1859.) Heraclitus also expressed himself sharply respecting thinkers and poets whose opinions differed from his own, so far as he found them distinguished rather for multifarious knowledge than for rational discernment and ability to comprehend the all-directing reason. Thus he says (aj;. Diog. L., IX. 1): TroTivfiadi?/ voov oh ih6daKei (or (pvei f as we read in Procl., In Flat. Tim., p. 31). 'llaio6ui' yap av kSida^E Kal Hvdaydpr/v, avOig re Zevo^dved te Kal 'EKaraiov. Uis blame extended even to Homer : " ' Homer,' he said, ' ought to have been driven from the lists and flogged, and Archilochus likewise.' " It is, nevertheless, quite possible that those whom he censures exercised an essential influence on his opinions ; at least, Heraclitus agreed with Xe- nophanes in the hypothesis that the stars were aerial phenomena, constantly being repro- duced, and we might (as Susemihl remarks) suppose the Heraclitean doctrine of the world and of the fire-spirit related to the doctrine of Xenophanes, distinguishing the world, as something manifold and changeable, from the one immutable God : still the theological doctrines of these philosophers are very unlike, and their points of contact in natural philosophy are few. The surname of Heraclitus, 6 aKorecvdg, "the Obscure," is found first in the Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise De Mundo (c. 5). Yet we find already in the third book of the Aristotelian Rhetoric (c. 5) an intimation that the syntactical relation of words in Heraclitus was not always easy to determine, and Timon, the Sinograph (about 240 B. c), terms him "ariddler" [alvLKTrjo). Socrates is reported to have said, that it needed a Delian (excellent) diver to sound the meaning of his work. Heraclitus flourished, accord- 40 HERACLITUS OF EPHESUS. ibg to Diog. L., IX. 1 (Diog. probably follows Apollodorus), in the 69tli Olympiad (503-500 P. c), or, according to another account (given by Eusebius, Chron., ad 01. 80.2 and 81.2), in Olymp. 80 or 81 ; with this latter account agrees, far better than with the former, the apparently trustworthy report (ap. Strabo, XIY. 1, 25 ; cf. Plin., Hist. Natur., XXXIV. 5, 21), that Hermodorus of Ephesus, the friend of Heraclitus, assisted the Roman Decem- virs in their legislation (about Olymp. 82.1). Epicharmus (whose life falls between 556 and 460 B. c, according to Leop. Schmidt, Quaest. Ejyicharm.. Bonn, 1846) notices his doctrine. That Parmenides combats his ideas, and in doing so alludes clearly to specific propositions and words of Heraclitus (in particular, to his doctrine of the coincidence of contraries and of the ebbing and flowing harmony of the world, which Heraclitus compares to the form and motion of the bow and the lyre) has been shown by Steinhart {Allg. Litt. Ztg., Halle, 1845, p. 892sq., PZai!. Werke, III., p. 394) and Jak. Bernays (Rhein. ifMsewm, VII., p. 114 sq.), though Zeller {Ph. d. Gr., I., 2d ed., p. 495, 3d ed., p. 548 8q.)disputes this. In view of these historical circumstances, the supposition is shown to be improbable, which has been held by some modern investigators, that the doctrine of Heraclitus origi- nated in the endeavor to unite the members of the antithesis : being and non-being, which had been sharply distinguished and separated by the Eleatics (first by Parmenides). It can not be said with truth that the primary conception and the startinp;-point in the philosophy of Heraclitus was the abstract notion of becoming, as the unity of being and non-being, and that this notion was then only embodied in the concreter form of a phj-sical conception or dogma. Heraclitus is from first to last a hylozoist, fire and soul are for him identical, the dry soul is the best, the moistened soul of the drunken is unwise. Having been first incited by Anaximenes, he then developed his doctrine independently. It is only correct to say that he attaches greater weight to the process of things than his pre- decessors had done, as would be natural, considering the nature of the element which he regarded as the principle of being. The advance of Parmenides to the conception of being, first made it possible to extract the conception of becoming from the Heraclitean notion of the flux of things or the transformations of fire. This abstraction is a mental achievement which was first accomplished, not by Heraclitus himself, but by Parmenides and Plato, in the critique of his opinions. (For this reason Heraclitus, although younger than Pythagoras and Xenophanes, must be considered in connection with the earlier Ionic natural philosophers, and that as the thinker who gave to the tendency of their school its most perfect expression.) Aristotle, in his historical survey of the course of development in the earlier Greek philosophy {Metaph., 1. 3 sq.), simply places Heraclitus among the earlier lonians, without even noticing the actual diversity in stand-points ; for, after speaking of the principles of Thales and of Anaximenes and Diogenes, he proceeds : "iTrnaaoQ 6e nvp 6 Mera-Tov-ivo^ Kal 'Hpax/lffrof 6 'E^fffwf. The triad : fire (including air), water, earth, corresponds with the three "aggregate states" of matter (as they are now called); Empedocles (see below), separating air more distinctly from fire, first arrived at the distinction of the four so-called elements. Plato (or rather some Platonist) says (Soph., p. 242), after speaking of some of the earlier lonians and of the Eleatics : 'Iddeg Se koI liiKcXiKai tive^ voTepov fiovam. B_v this he must mean either that the Sicilian doctrine, i. e., the doctrine of Empedocles, was later than the Ionic, i. e., than that of Heraclitus, or (what is less probable) that both were later than the Eleatic •, but in the latter case he could probably only mean : later than Xenophanes' doctrine of unity. The opposition of Heraclitus to the ideas of the masses and of their leaders the poets, probably had principal reference (aside from their political diflTerences) to the popular my- thology. The multitude know nothing of the one ail-controlhng divine fire-spirit. ("Ev to IIERACLITUS OF EPHE8US. 41 coa6v iiriaTaa^ai yvufijjv, ^te ol tyKV^epvTjaei [t/te oItj KVfSspva (lEi f ^te o'laKtl^et f KpadaivEi f] ndvTa (hd ndvruv.) Of this yvu/i^, this eternal reason, the mass of men are ignorant (roil Myov Tovd\ iovrog aei, a^vveroi dv-dpunoL yiyvmnaC). Out of the primitive substance, which Heraclitus (in what is certainly a noticeable coincidence with Parsee conceptions, to which Grladisch is right in directing attention) conceives as the purest fire or light, and also as the Good, he represents individual objects as coming forth through the influence of strife or combat (which Homer, therefore, was wrong in wishing to see brought to an end). Thus with him is (Plut., Js. et Os., 48) "izoJ^fnx; irari/p rravTuv, "strife the father of all things;" the world is the dispersed deity, the ev diac^Epofuvov avrb avTQ, but which, like the elastic frame of the bow and the lyre, in going apart comes together again (Plat., Sy77ipos., 187 a; cf Soph., 242 e). The universe is the elemental fire itself, which is now extinguished and now kindled again (Clem., Str., Y. 599 : Kdajuov tov avrov dizavTuv ovte riq 6eTzuv ETToiT/aEv^ dXTC f/v dsl Kal Eorac Tvvp aEi^uav, anTOiiEvov fitrpu koi d-ToaliEvvvfisvov fierpu). The double process of the (relative) materialization of the fire- spirit, and the re-spiritualization of earth and water, is constantly going on (nvpog avTafiEijiETaL izavTa aal Tvvp diravTuv, uansp xP''-'^ov XPW^-'C- '^o'- jp'?|WaT<-rt' xP''^'^og), water and earth are nvpog rpoirai, modes of fire ; fire passes over into them in the oJof Karu, or "down- ward way," and thej' pass over into fire in the dSbg dvu, the "upward way," but both ways are inseparable : 66ug dvu Kd-(j fi'iri. The priests of Ormuzd (as Gladisch remarks) are actively on the side of the good principle, in the contest waged between good and evil ; but Heraclitus, as a thinker, is controlled by a theoretical interest, that of discerning the ground of their antagonism, and this he finds in the ■n-aAiv-po-nia, the ivavrla porj (Plat., Crat, 413 e, 420 a), the kvavTiorpoTrr/ (Diog. L., IX. 7), or EvavTio()po/ua (Stob., Eclog., I. 60) of things, the yiveoOai navra kut' EvavTioTT/ra, and says : ira/Jv-poiroi; dpfxoviif k6(j/j.ov, okucttep Avprig Koi to^ov (Plut., Is. et Os., 5) ; cf. Arist., Eth. N. VIII. 2 : 'HpaKAeiToc ro avri^ow cvfKpt- pov Kal f/c T(Jv 6ta(pep6vruv KaA/uart/v dpuoviav Kal Trdvra kut epiv yiyvEaftai. In other words, it is a law of the universe that in every thing contraries are xmited, as life and death, waking and sleeping, youth and old age, and each contrary passes into its opposite. Unexpected things await man after death. Sext. Emp., Pyrrh. Rypotyp., III. 230 : ute fiiv yap tjfiElq l^oifiEV, rag tpvxag r/fiuv TET&vdvai Kal kv 7jjilv re'&dodaf ore df ?/,"£'? aTzo^Svr/aKouev, rdc Tpvxag dvaficovv Kal ^?7v, '' while we live, our souls are dead and buried in us ; but when we die, our souls are restored to life." When the power of peace and unity prevails in the All, all finite objects resolve themselves into pure fire, which is the Deity; but they come forth from it anew through variance. Schleiermacher (whom Ritter, Brandis, Bernays, and Zeller contradict in this point, while Lassalle agrees witli him) was probably wrong in doubting that the doctrine of the periodical dissolution of the world in fire (fKTzvpuaig) was held already by Heraclitus (and borrowed from him by the Stoics); Aristotle ascribes it to him {MtteoroL, I. 14, De Coeh, I. 10, Phys., III. 5; cf. Metaph., XT. 10: 'HpaK^etrof (pr/aiv dnavra yiyvEodai ttote niip), and it is contained in the more recently dis- covered fragment in Hippolytus, IX. 10 : ndvra rb irvp etteWov KpivEi Kal KaTaAr/rpErai. In view of the dictum of Heraclitus, "all things flow," Plato (TJieaeL, 181a; cf CraL, p. 402 a: bri ndv-a X''>P^^ '''*' ovdiv fiivEi) terras the Heracliteaiis playfully rovq peovraq, " the flowing," at the same time having in view and censuring their inconstant character, which rendered all serious philosophical discussion with them impossible. Cratylus, a teacher of Plato, went beyond Heraclitus, wlio liad said that no one could step down twice into the same stream, by asserting tliat this was not possible even once (Arist., Metaph., IV. 5), — an extreme, as the last logical consequence of which, Aristotle reports that Cratylus thought he ought to say nothing more, but simply moved his finger. The changeable, which, tor Heraclitus, is synonymous with the sum of all real things, 4:2 PYTHAGORAS AND THE PYTHAGOREANS. is reduced by Parmenides to sensuous appearance, and by Plato to the complex of indi- vidual objects subject to genesis and perceptible by the senses. But for the very reason that Heraclitus assumes no second province of reality, his cosmos is not identical with the mere world of the senses of later thinkers. Heraclitus does not distinguish from his cosmos the divine and eternal, as something separable from it. The Pioyog or the eternal, all-embracing order {yvutfiri^ diK?/, elfxapiiivrj, to nepdxov ?/fiag AoytKov te ov kol t^ipeviJiK^, o Zeiif) is, according to him, immanent, as the ^w6v (kolv6v\ or universal principle, in change itself, and he calls upon each individual to follow in his thought and action this universal reason (Heracl., ap. Sext. Ertip., VII. 133 : 6ib del eTvea^ai tw ^w- tov loyov 6e eovroq ^wov ^ciovaiv ol iroXTiol wf Idiav i-;|;o:'ref (ppovr/aiv. Ap. Stob., Serm., III. 84 : ^wov ban vaat. TO (ppovdv ^iiv vocj Ti^jovTaq laxvpit^ea-&aL XPV '^V ^vvu TzavTuv, OKucnep vo/xu ivolic Kal TTO^v 'tGxvpoTEpug' TpecjiovTai yap navTsg oi av&puKtvoi vofiot vno evbg tov ■Qeiov, KpciTti yap roaovTov okocov e^eXei Kal k^apKEi nacn Kal irspiyivETac). This is the same law with that which keeps the heavenly bodies in their courses ; the sun, says Heraclitus, will not overstep its bounds, for, if it did, the Erinnyes, handmaids of SiKrj, would find it again (ap. Plut., De Exilio, 11). Without knowledge of the universal reason, the senses are untrust- worthy witnesses. Mere abundance of knowledge profits nothing (Heracl., ap. Sext. Emp., VII. 126 : KaKol fiapTvpeq av&punoiaiv b(j>-&a?.fxol Kal ura (iopfiopov ipvxdg ixovTog [according to Bernays' conjecture, in place of the reading of the MSS. : fiapfidpovg i/wjdf txbi'Toyv'] ■ ap. Diog. L., IX. 1 : TTo?.vpa-dij} voov ov t5«5da/c£<; ap. Procl., in Tim., p. 31: Tvo7a)fia-d'ni voov oil (pvEi). The rule for practical conduct is also contained in the law common to all, proximately in the law of the state, absolutely in the law of nature (Heracl., ap. Clem. Alex., Strom., IV. 478 b: SUtj^ ovopa ovk. av ydeaav, eI ravra pij fiv. Ap. Diog. L., IX. 2: /idxsty&ai. XPV "^ov dfjpov vnlp vofiov uku^ vTrsp TEixovq. Hid. : vjipiv xPV o(iEwvEiv fjLaTJkov 7/ TTvpKatTfv. Ap. Stobaeus, Serm., III. 84 : auippovslv apsri/ fieyioTj/, /cat aoe Alcmaeone Crotoniata, in Chr. Petersen's Philol.-hist. Studien, Hamburg, 1832, pp. 41 -ST ; A. Gladisch, Die Pythagoreer und die iSchinesen, Posen, 1841; F. H. Th. AUihn, De idea justi qualis fuerit apud Uomerum et Hesiodum et quomodo a Doriensihus veteribiis et a Pythagora erciUta sit, Halle, 1847; G. Grote, History of Greece, Vol. IV. (Loudon), pp. 525-551; Val. Rose, Comm de Arist. libr. ord. et avctor., Berlin, 1854, p. 2 (where the genuineness of the Philolaus fragments is denied) ; C. L. Heyder, Ethices Pythagorean vindiciae, Frankfort- 0.1-the-M. 1854; F. D. Gerlach, Zaleukos, Charondas, Pythagoras, Basel, 1858; L. Noack, Pythag. und die Anfdnge abendl. Wiss., in the '■'Psyche," Vol. III., 1S60, No. 1; Monrad, Ueber die Pyth. Philos., in ''Der Gedatike" (ed. by Michelet), Vol. III., 1862, No. 3; \ermehren. Die Pythag. Zahlen {G.-Pr.), Gustrow, 1S63; A. Laugel, Pythagore, sa doctrine et son histoire d\tpres la critique allemunde, in Pemie des Deux Mondes, XXXIV. annee. Par. 1864, pp. 9C9-9;9 ; C. Schaarschmidt, Die angebliche Schriftstellerei des Philolaus und die DmchstUcke der ihm zugeschriebenen B'dcher, Bonn, 1864; Ed. Zeller, Pythagoras und die Pythagorassage, in his Vortr. u. Abh., Leips. 1SG5, pp. 30-50 ; Georg Rathgeber, GroHsgriec! en- land und Pythagoras, Gotha, 1866; Adolf Rothenbiicher, Das System der Pythagoreer nach den Angaben des Arist, Berlin, 1867; Mullach, De Pythagora ejusque diseipulis et successoribus, in the Fragm. Philos. Gr., II. 1867, pp. I.-LVII. ; Eduard Baltzer, Pyth. der W'eise von Snmos, 'SovdhanRen, 1868 (adopts the theory of Riith); Albert Freiberr v(m Thimus, Die harmonikule Symbolik des Alterihums, part I., Cologne, 1868; F. Latendorf, Seb. Franci de Pyth. ejusque symbolis disputatio comm. ill, Berlin, 18C8. Cf. also L. Prowe, Ueber die Abhdngigkeit des Copernicus von den Gtdanken griechischer Philosophen und Astronomen, Thorn, 1865, and the works by Ideler, Boeckh, and others, cited below (p. 47). On Alcmaion the Crotoniate, see Krische, Forschungen, I. pp. 68-78. On Ilippodamus of Miletus : C. F. Hermann, De Hijipod. Milesio, ad Arist, Pol, II. 5, Marburg, 1841 ; L. Stein, in MohFs Zeitschr far Staatswissenschaft, 1853, 161 sq.; Rob. v. Mohl, Gesch, und Litt. der Staatsioiss., Vol. I., Erl. 185:i, p. 171 ; Karl Hildenbrand, Gesch. u. System der Rechts- und Staatsphilos., Vol. I., 1860, p. 59 sq. On Hippodamus and Phaleas: Herm. Henkel, Znir Gesch. der griech, Staatswiss, (G. Progr.), Salzwedel, 1866. Epicharmi fragmenta. coll. U. Polman Kruseman, Harlem, 1S34; rec. Theod. Bergk, Poetae lyrici Graec, Leips. (1843, 53) 1866 ; ed. Mullach, Fragm. Ph. Gr., p. 135 seq.; cf Grysar, De Doriensium comoedia, p. 84 sq.; Leop. ^f)EV(ji; and vov^ opa kuI vohq aKobn, Ta?.'/.a Koxpa /cat TtMpTia. The Roman poet Ennius composed a Pythagorizing didactic poem in imitation of one attributed to Epicharmus. Various forgeries under the name of Epicharmus were published at an early date. The author of the work ascribed to Philolaus sees in tlie principles of numbers the principles of tilings. These principles are the limiting and illimitation. They converge to harmony, which is uxiity in multiplicity and agreement in heterogeneity. Thus they generate in succession, fir.?t, unity, then the series of arithmetical or "monadic" numbers, then the " geometrical numbers," or " magnitudes," i. e., the forms of space : point, line, surface, and solid; next, material objects, then life, sensuous consciousness, and the higher psychical forces, as love, friendship, mind, and intelligence. Like is known by like, but it is by number that things are brought into harmonious relations to the soul. The understand- ing, developed by mathematical study, is the organ of knowledge. Musical harmony depends on a certain numerical proportion in the lengths of musical strings. The octave, in particular, or harmony in the narrower sense, depends on the ratio — 1 : 2, which includes tlie two ratios of the fourtli {?. : 4) and the fifth (2 : 3 or 4 : G). The five regular solids — the cube, the tetrahedron, the octahedron, the icosahedron, and the dodecahedron — are respec- tively the fundamental forms of earth, fire, air, water, and the fifth clement, which encom- passes all the rest. The soul is united V^y number and harmony with the body, wliich is its organ, and at the same time also its prison. From the Hestia, i. e., from the central fire, around which e;irth and counter-earth daily revolve, the soul of the world spreads through the spheres of the counter-earth, the earth, the moon, the sun, the planets Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, and the fixed stars to " Olympus," the last sphere which includes all the others. The world is eternal, and ruled by the One, who is akin to it, and has supreme might and excellence. The director and ruler of all things is God ; he is one and eternal, enduring and immovable, ever like him.self, and different from all things beside him. He encompasses and guards the universe. § 17. The foundation of the Eleatic doctrine of unity was laid in tiieological form by Xenophanes of Coloplion, metaphysically devel- oped as a doctrine of being by Parmenides of Elea, dialectically de- fended in opposition to the vulgar belief in a plurality of objects 1 50 THE ELEATICS. and in revolution and cliansfe by Zeno of Elea, and finally, with pome declension in vigor of thought, assimilated more nearly to the earlier natural philosophy by Melissus of Samos. The following authors treat especially of tho Eleatic philosophers and their doctrines: Job. Gottfr. Walther, Erbffnete Ele\, I. p. 101 seq.; E. Itcinhold, De genidna Xenop)hanis disci- j/lina, Jena, 1847; Ueberwcg, Ueberden hisiorischen Wetth der &hvift de MeHsso,Zenone, Gorgia, in the Philol., VIII., 1S53, pp. 104-112 (where I sought to show that the second part of the work, i. «., chaps. 3 and 4, does not contain a reliahle account respecting Xenophanes, but does so respecting Zeno; now, however, only my first, or negative, not the second, positive, thesis, seems to me tenable), also ibid. XXVI. 1868, pp. 709-711; E. F. Aj>elt, Parmenidis et Empedoclis doctrina de mundi structura, Jena, 1866; Conr, Verraehreu, Die Autorschaft der dem Arisioteies eugeschriebenen Schrift nepl Eei'0(J>drou?, wepl Zriviovot, TTcpi Popyiov, Jena, 1S62 ; Franz Kern, Quae^tionum XenopAanearum. cajntn duo {Progr. sc/tolae Por- <«Ji«j.s), Naumburg, 1864: Symbolae cridcae ad libelhtm Aristotelicum de Xenophane, cic, Oldenburg, 1867; ©eo<;>pa(7Tou wepl Ueki. 336sq.). I can only hold fast, therefore, to the negative opinion, that a trustworthy report respecting Xenophanes is not to be found in the work. The teachings there developed (th.at God is eternal, one, fpherical, neither bounded nor unbounded, neither moved nor unmoved, might, in view of their dialectical form, and, in part also, in view of their nature, be more properly ascribed to Zeno than to Xenophanes. Both of these suppositions are, however, opposed, partly by other considerations, partly by the silence of Plato and Aristotle ; of Xenophanes, Aristotle says directly (Mei., I. 5), that he left the question X»5NOPHANKS OF COLOPHON. 51 eection was intended by the author to be the first in a reverted order (see ea-p. 6, Jin!). The accounts respecting Melissus and Gorgias are substantially correct, though not so through- out. The whole can not have been composed by Aristotle, nor by Theophrastus, but only by some later Aristotelian. The fragments preserved from the writings of the Eleatics are not very extensive, but they furnish us a fully authentic and, with respect to the fundamental ideas, a sufficiently complete view of the Eleatic philosophy. § 18. Xenophanes, of Colophon, in Asia Minor (born 569 b. c), who removed later to Elea, in Lower Italy, combats in his poems the anthropomorphitic and anthropopathic representations of God pre- sented by Homer and Hesiod, and enounces the doctrine of the one, all-controlling God-head. God is all eye, all ear, all intellect ; nntronbled, he moves and directs all things by the power of his thought. Xenophanes, according to his own statement {ap. Diog. L., IX. 19), began his wander- ings through Hellas (as rhapsodist) at the age of twenty-five years, and lived to be more than ninety-two years old. If (as may be assumed with some probability from one of his fragments given by Athen., Ddpnosoph., II. p. 54) it is true that he left his native country soon after the expedition of the Persians under Harpagus against Ionia (544 b. c), he must have been born about 5G9 b. c. Apollodorus {ap. Clem. Al., Strom., I. 301 c) gives 01. 40 (G20 B. c.) as the time of his birth ; more probable is the report {op. Diog. L., IX. 20) that he flourished 01. 60 (540 b. c). He outlived Pythagoras, whom he mentions after the death of the latter; he is himself named by Heraclitus. In his latter years he lived in Elea ('E?ia, 'Ti/.r/, Velia), a Phocean colony. Fragments of his poems, though onlj' a few fragments of his philosophical poems, are extant. In a fragment of some extent, pre- served by Athenaeus (XI. p. 462), in which Xenophanes describes a cheerful feast, he demands first that the Deity (termed sometimes Gfdf, sometimes Qeol) be praised with pure and holy words, and that the banqueters be moderate and discourse of the proofs of virtue, and not of the contests of Titans and similar fables of the ancients [-Xacrfiara ruv nporipuv); in another fragment (Ath., X. p. 413 seq.) he warns men not to think too liighly of success in athletic contests, which he deems it wrong to prefer to intellectual culture {nv(U- i^iKainv, Trpoapivetv pcj^T/v ryg nyaOfjg oocpujc;^. That the God of Xenophanes is the unity of the world is a supposition that was early current. "We do not find this doctrine expressed in the fragments which have come of the ideal or material natnre of the unity of God untouched, and said nothing definite concerning his limitation or non-limitation, whereas in chai)8. 3 and 4 of the treatise De Xen., eta, it i.s said, on the one h.ind, that the Eleate there in question ascribed to God the spherical form, and on tlie other that he taught (the antinomy) that God is neither bounded nor unbounded. It is se.ircely to be doubted that this latter 6t.itement arose from a misunderstanding either of the report of Aristotle or more probably of a similar report by Theophrastus (which Simplic, In Phijs., fol. 6 b, h-as preserved for us). Whether the (probably Lite) author of the work intends to treat of Xenoi)hanos or of Zt^no, remains still a matter of doubt; the former supposition is. jierhaps, attended with fewer difliculties than the latter. The author may have made use of a Pseudo-Xenophancan writing, or perhaps even of an inexact version of the doctrines and arguments of Xenophanes, which had been prepared partly on the authority of the misunderstood pa.ssagc from Theo- phrastus, partly from other sources. The misinterpretation was most easily possible at a time when such antinomies had already taken the form (if philosophical doemas (cf., for example, Plotinus, JSnnead, V. 10, 11. who teaches that God is neither bounded nor unbounded). With this problem negative results are reached more easily and with greater certainty than positive ones. ^2 XENOPHANF.S OF COLOPHON. down to us, and it remains questionable whether Xenophanes pronounced liinvself posi- tively iu this sense, in speaking of the relation of God to the world, or whether such a conception was not rather thought to be implied in his teachings by other thinkers, who then expressed it in the phraseology given above. In the (Platonic?) dialogue, Sophiates (p. 242), the leading interlocutor, a visitor from Elea, says : " The Eleatic race among us, from Xenophanes' and even from still earlier times, assume in their philosophical dis- courses that what is usually called All, is One" {cjg evbc ovrog rwv ndvruv i(aAnvfisvuv). The 'still earlier" philosophers are probably certain Orphists, who glorified Zeus as the all- nding power, as beginning, middle, and end of all things. Aristotle says, Metaph., I. 5 : "Xenophanes, the first who professed the doctrine of unity — Parraenides is called his disciple — has not expressed himself clearly concerning the nature of the One, so that it is not plain whether he has in mind an ideal unity (like Parmenides, his successor) or a material one (like Melissus) ; he seems not to have been at all conscious of this distinction, but, with his regard fixed on the whole universe, he says only that God is the One." Theophrastus Bays (according to Simplic, Ad Arist. Phys., fol. 5 b): tv rb bv Kal ndv Eevo(t>di>7/v vTrorideaOai. Timon the Sinograph (Sext. Empir., ffypotyp. Pyrrhon., I. 224) represents Xenophanes as saying, that whithersoever he turned his view, all things resolved themselves for him into unity. The following are all the philosophical fragments which have been preserved from the writings of Xenophanes. Ap. Clem. Alex., Strom., V. 601 c, and Euseb., Praeparat. Evang., XTII. 13: Elf i?£of tv re ■&EnlaL Kal air&puirouji fisytaTog, Ovre (Uuag ■&vr]Tdiaiv 6/xouog ovte v6rjfta. Ap. Sextus Empir., Adv. Math., IX. 144, cf Diog. L., IX. 19: Ov'Aor 6/)(7, ovTioQ 6e I'oel, ovXoq 6e r' OKOvei. Ap. Simplic, Ad Arist. Phys., fol. 6a: Alel 6' kv TCJVTU) TS flEVELV KLVOVflEVOV Ovfikv Ovde iiETcpx^'^'^o,'- i""' ennrpi'irei d/l/lore (or dTilo^ev) d/lA?;. Ibid. : 'A/IA' ciTTavsv^E TTovoio voov (j)pEvl TTavTa KpaiWivec. Ap. Clem. Alex., Strom., Y. 601 c, and Euseb., Praepar. Evang., XIII. 13 : 'A?/ld (ipoTol i^oKEovoL ^Eovg yEvvda^at (e6eiv te ?) Tyv (j(peTf:p7jv t' ala^jjaiv kx^iv re dlfiag re. 'A/IA' eItoi ;\;eZpdf }-' elxov ftosg ijh Movtec, Kal ypdipai ;^ti/3£(7ai Kal ipya teXeIv dtzEp av^psg, "Ittvol piv -&' iTrnniai, (ioEg 6e te (ityvalv bpo'iag Ka'c KE -^Euv Idiag h/pa^ov Kal aupar' knoiorw Hoiai'^' o]6v TTEp Kal avTol depag eIxov CKacToi. Cf. Clem. Alex., Strom., YII. p. '711b.: wf ^ey^avTo ^euv a^cftioTia tpya, KAcTrretv, fioixcv^iv re koi aA./.tj'kovq anarevetv, Arist., Rhet, II. 23, p. 1399 b, 6: Eevcxpdwg i'?\£yev on o/ioiuc aaejiovaiv ol yevtc^tu ^OKOvreg Tovg -dcovq rolq anu^aveiv Myovaiv a/i(pOTepu>^ yap cv/xj3aiv£i fi?/ elvai rovg deohi rroT£. Ibid. 1400 b, 5: Zfv. 'EAfdra/f ipuTuaiv el ^iuai ry AEVKO^ig Kal -QprfvCiciv, tj fit}, cwefiovXevev, el fiev ^ebv vrroTia/ifidvovai, ^i] ^pr/velv^ el 6' atrdpunov, fi^ ■Sieiv. [The verse, en yairi^ yap navra Kal elg yi/v iravra -e'kevTg^ cited by Sext. Empir. {Adv. Maih., X. 313, but on the authority of others: " ^evo, Ncj/zav aGKOTTov o/ifia Kal i/xv^ci'^av aitov^ Kal y'Xuaaav Kplvat de Xdycj Tro?iv6f/piv E?iEy;:(ov 'Ef EflE-dEV 'p7j-&EVTa. Much severer still than his condemnation of the naive confidence of the mass of men in the illusory reports of the senses, is that with which Parmenides visits a philosophical doctrine which, as he assumes, makes of this very illusion (not, indeed, as illusion, in which sense Parmenides himself proposes a theory of the sensible, but as supposed truth) the basis of a theory that falsifies thought, in that it declares non-being identical with being. It is very probable that the IleracUtean doctrine is the one on which Parmenides thus animadverts, however indignantly Heraclitus might have resented this association of his doctrine with the prejudice of the masses, who do not rise above the false appearances of the senses; the judgment of Plato {Theaet, p. 179) and Aristotle {De Anima, I. 2, p. 405 a, 28 : kv KivfjcEi 6' Eivac to. ovra KUKElvog oxro Kal oi noXXoi) agrees with that of Parmen- ides with respect to the matter in question. Parmenides says (ap. Simplicius, Ad Phys., foL 19 a and 25 a): Xp^ OE Xiysiv TE voEcv t' • Eov EpfiEvai ' EOTi yap elvai, Mt/Sev 6' ovK Eivat • to. a' kyU) (ppd^Ea^ai avuya. — Ilpposition of the real existence of things manifold and changing, leads to contradictions. In particular, he opposed to the reality of motion four arguments : 1. Motion can not begin, because a body in motion can not arrive at another place until it has •u 53 ZENO OF KLEA. V passed through an unlimited number of intermediate places. 2. S^ Achilles can not overtake the tortoise, because as often as he reaches the place occupied by the tortoise at a previous moment, the latter has already left it. 3. The flying arrow is at rest ; for it is at every moment only in one place. 4. The half of a division of time is equal to the whole ; for the same point, moving with the same velocitj^ traverses an equal distance {i. e., when compared, in the one case, ^ with a point at rest, in the other, with a point in motion) in the one ^ case, in half of a given time, in tlie other, in the whole of that time. ^ C. H. E. Lohse, De Argumentia, quibus Zeno Eleates nullwm esse motitm demonstravit, Halle, 1794. "■v Ch. L. Gerling, De Zenonia EleaUci paralogismis niotum apectantibus, Marburg, 1625. ' [Si Zeno, disciple and friend of Parmenides, is reported (by Strabo, VI. 1) to liave joined his > "^ master in liis ethico-political efforts, and at last (by Diog. Laert., IX. 26, and many others), L Cv after an unsuccessful enterprise against the tyrant Nearchus (or, according to others, ' N; -Diomedon), to have been seized and put to death amid tortures, which he endured with steadfastness. In the (Platonic?) dialogue Parmenides, a prose writing {avyypafi/na) of Zeno is men- tioned, which was distributed into several series of argumentations {Myoi), in each of which a number of hypotheses (vKodeaeig) were laid down with a view to their reductio in ahmrdum, and so to the indirect demonstration of the truth of the doctrine that Being is One. It is probably on account of this (indirect) metliod of demonstration from hypotheses, c,,' that Aristotle (according to Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., VII. 7, and Diog. Laert., VIII. 57 ; IX. ' ■ 25) called Zeno the inventor of dialectic {€vperfjv diaAeK-iK?)^). If the manifold exists, argues Zeno {ap. Siraplic, Ad Arist. Phys., fol. 30), it must be at "^ the same time infinitely small and infinitely great ; the former, because its last divisions ^sS^re without magnitude, the latter, on account of the infinite number of these divisions. 5si (In this argument Zeno leaves out of consideration the inverse ratio constantly maintained T between magnitude and number of parts, as the division advances, whereby the same product is constantly maintained, and he isolates the notions of smaUness and number, opposing the one to the other.) In a similar manner Zeno shows that the manifold, if it exists, must be at the same time numerically limited and unlimited. Zeno argues, further (according to Arist., Phys., IV. 3 ; cf Simplic, In Phys., fol. 130 b), against the reality of space. If all that exists were in a given space, this space must be in another space, and so on in infinitum. Against the veracity of sensuous perception, Zeno directed (according to Arist., Phys., VII. 5, and Simplic. on this passage) the following argument : If a measure of millet-grains in falling produce a sound, each single grain and each smallest fraction of a grain must also produce a sound ; but if the latter is not the case, then the whole measure of grains, whose effect is but the sum of the effects of its parts, can also produce no sound. (The ethod of argumentation here employed is similar to that in the first argument against plurality.) ? The arguments of Zeno against the reality of motion (cited by Arist., Phys., VI. 2, p. 233 a, .1 21 and 9, p. 239 b, 5 seq., and the Commentators) have had no insignificant influence on the development of metaphysics in earlier and later times. Aristotle answers tlie two first {ibid. c. 2) with the observation (p. 233 a, 11) that the divisions of time and space are ^ the same and equal (rdf avThq yap koI -aq laar diaipiaetq 6 xpovoq Staipelrai Koi to fxeyeSo^) I MELISSUS OF SAM08. 59 for both time and space are continuous {awex^^) ; that a distance divisible in infinitum caa therefore certainly be traversed in a finite time, since the latter is also in like manner divisible in infinitum, and the divisions of time correspond with the divisions of space ; the infinite in division (aTrsipoD koto, duupeaii') is to be distinguished from the infinite in extent [ajTtipov Tolg iaxaroLO; his reply to the third argument (c. 9) is, that time does not consist of single indivisible pomts (conceived as discontinuous) or of "nows" (p. 239 b, 8: ov ydft ahynELTai 6 xpovo^ £k tciu vvv tuv adiaipiruv). In the fourth argument he points out what Zeno, as it seems, had but poorly concealed, viz., the change of the standard of comparison (p. 240 a, 2 : to /liv irapd kivoviisvov, to 6e' Trap' ^pe/xow). It can be questioned whether the Aristotelian answers are fully satisfactory for the first three arguments (for in the fourth the paralogism is obvious). Bayle has attacked them in his Dictionnaire Hist, et Crit. (A.rticle, Zinon). Hegel [Genchichte der Phil, I. p. 316 seq.) defends Aristotle against Bayle. Yet Hegel himself also sees in motion a contradiction; nevertheless, he regards motion as a real fact. Herbart denies the reality of motion on account of the contradiction which, in his opinion, it involves.* § 21, Melissus of Samos attempts by a direct demonstration to establish the truth of the fundamental thought of the Eleatic philosophy, that only the One is. By unity, however, he understands rather the continuity of substance than the notional identity of being. That which w, the truly existent, is eternal, infinite, one, in all points the same or " like itself," unmoved and passionless. It is extremely probable that Melissus the philosopher is identical with Melissus the statesman and admiral, who commanded the fleet of the Samians on the occasion of their victory over the Athenians, 440 B. c. (Plut., Pericl., c. 26; Tfiemist., c. 2; Thueyd., I. 117). Several fragments of the work of Melissus, " On the E.xistent " (or " On Nature ") are found in Simplic, Ad Arist. Phys. (fol. 7, 22, 24, and 34), and /d, in Arist. De Coelo (fol. 137); with them agrees almost exactly the section on this philosopher in the Pseudo- Aristotelian work, De Melissa, etc. Cf. the works of Brandis, Mullach, and others cited above (§ 17). If nothing were, argues Melissus, how were it then even possible to speak of it, as of something being? But if any thing is, then it has either become or is eternal. In the former case, it must have arisen either from being or from non-boing. But nothing can come from non-being ; and being can not have arisen from being, for then there must have been being, before being came to be (became). Hence being did not become ; hence it is eternal. It will also not perish ; for being can not become non-being, and if being cliange to being, it has not perished. Therefore it always was and alwaj'S will be. As without genesis, and indestructible, being has no beginning and no end; it is, there- fore, infinite. (It is easy to perceive here the leap in argumentation from temporal infinity to the infinity of space, which very likely contributed essentially to draw on Me- lissus Aristotle's reproach of feebleness of thought.) As infinite, being is One ; for if it were dual or plural, its members would mutually limit each other, and so it would not be infinite. As one, being is unchangeable; for change would pluralixe it. More particularly, it is * In my " System der Logik-'^ 2il ed., Bonn, 1865, pp. 176, 867 seq., I have discussed these problemi more thoroughly than was possible or appropriate in this place. 60 THK LATER NATURAL PHILOSOPHEKS. unmoved; for there exists no empty space in which it can move, since siich a space, if it existed, would be an existing nothing ; and being can not move within itself, for then the One would become a divisuTn, hence manifold. Notwithstanding the infinite extension which Melissus attributes to being, he will not have it called material, since whatever is material has parts, and so can not be a unity. § 22. While the later Natural Philosophers asserted with the Eleatics the immutability of substance, they assumed, in opposition to the Eleatics, a plurality of unchangeable substances, and reduced all development and change, all apparent genesis and destruction, to a cliange in the relations of these substances to one another. In order to explain the orderly change of relations, Empedocles and lALuaxagoras taught the existence of a spiritual force in addition to tlie material substances, while the Atomistic philosophers (Leucippus and Democritus) sought to comprehend all phenomena as products of matter and motion alone. The hylozoism of the earlier natural philosophers was thus superseded in principle by the severance of the moving cause from matter; yet its after-influence remained quite considerable, as seen chiefly in the doctrines of Empedocles, and also, but less prominently, in those of Anaxagoras and the Atomists. Anaxagoras (and Empedocles also, so far as love and hate are repre- sented by him as independent forces, separate from the material elements) advanced in principle to a Dualism of mind and matter ; while the Atomists proceeded to Materialism. The earliest Greek philosophers advanced gradually but constantly from the sphere of sensuous intuition toward the sphere of abstractions. This movement culminated, with the Eleatic philosophers, in the most abstract of all conceptions, the conception of Being. But » from the stand-point thus reached it was found impossible to furnish an explanation of phenomena; hence the tendency among the philosophers immediately subsequent to the Eleatics, so to conceive the principle of things that, without denying the imity and con- stancy of being, a way might yet be opened up leading to the plurality and change of the phenomenal world. In particular, they sought to account for the change and development^ or the becoming of things, which (like their being) remained unexplained in the conceptions of the earlier natural philosophers, by reducing the same to the motion (combination and separation) of elements, whose quality is invariable. The boundary-line, which separates^ the earlier from the later natural philosophy, lies in the Eleatic philosophy, or more pre- cisely in the ontology of Parmenides — not in Xenophanes' theological doctrine of unity. Heraclitus, who taught later than Xenophanes, but earlier than Parmenides, belongs, by the character of his doctrine, to the earlier philosophers, and is not to be associated with the group formed by Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Atomists. § 23. Empedocles of Agrigentum, born not long after 500 b. c, posits in his didactic poem " On Nature," as the material principles or " roots " of things, the four elements, earth, water, air, and fire, to EMPEDOCLES OF AGKIGENTUM. 61 which he joins as moving forces two ideal principles : love as a nniting, and hate as a separating force. The periods of the formation of the world depend on the alternate prevalence of love and hate. During certain periods all heterogeneous elements are separated from each other by hate ; during others, they are everywhere united by love. We know things in their material and ideal elements by virtue of the like material and ideal elements in ourselves. Special works on Empedocles are the following: Frid. Guil. Stnrz, De EmpedocliK Agrigmtini vita et philosophia expos^ carminum reliq. coW., Leips. 1805; Ainadeua Peyron, Empedoclin et Parmeindis fragmenta, Leips. 1810; II. Pwitter, Ueber die philonophische Lehre deit Empedokles, in Wolfs Litera- rimhe Analekten, Vol. II., 1820, p. 411 seq. ; Lommatzsch, J>ie Weixkeit den Empedokles, Berl. 1S30; Simon Karsten, Emp. Agrig. carminum reliquiae (vol. 2 of the Reliquiae phil. vet. Graec). Amet. 1888; Th. Bergk, Emp. fragmenta, in the Poet. lyr. Gr.. Leips. (1S43. '53) 1866 ; De jrrooemio Empedoclis, Berl. 1839; Krische, Forsrhungen. I. pp. 116-129; Panzerbieter, Beitrdge zxtr Kritik und ErUuterung des Empedokles, Meiningen, 1844, and Zeitxchr. f. A. W., 1S45, pp. 8S3 scq. ; Raynaud, De Emp., Strasburg, 1348; MuUach, /)eiS'n!p. prooewjo, Berlin, 1850; Quaestionum Emp. specimen secundnm,ib. IS52; P/tilos. Or./ragm., XIV. seq., 15 seq. ; Ilelnrich Stein, Emp. Agrig. fragments erf., praemissa disj). de Empedoclia gcriptis, Bonn, 18.52; W. Hollenberg, Empedoclea, Berlin, 1853 (" Gymnasial- Programm'^); E. F. Apelt, Parmenidis et ETnpedoclis doctrina de mundi stritctura, Jena, 1856; A. GladiscU, Empedokles und die Aegypter, eine histor. Untersuchung, mit ErUinteningen at/.? den aegypt. Denkmdlern vo7i H. Brugsch und Jos. Passalacqua, Leipsic, 1858; cf. Gladisch, Emp. und die alten Aegypter, in Noack's Jahrb. fur speculat. Philos., 1847, Heft 4, No. 82, IJeft 5, No. 41 ; Da-ti mystische vierspeichige Bad bei den alten Aegyptern und neUe7ien, in the Zeitschr. der deutsche7i morgenhtnd. Genelhchaft. Vol. XV., Heft 2, p. 406 seq.; H, Winnefeld, Die Philosoplne des Empedokles ('■' Donaueschinger Gymn.-Pro- gramm "), Eastatt, 1862. The testimony of Aristotle {Met., I. 3) requires us to consider Empedocles as a contem- porary of Anaxagoras, but younger than the latter philosopher, -who was born, probably, about 500 B. c. According to Aristotle (op. Diog. L., YIII. 52, 74), he lived sixty years, so that we may (with Zeller) adopt 492 and 432 as the approximate dates of his birth and death, respectively. His family belonged to the democratic party, for which Empedocles, like his father Meton, labored successfully. He visited numerous cities in Sicily and Italy in the character of physician, sacrificial priest, and thaumaturgist, claiming for himself magical powers. Aristotle is said (Diog. L., VIII. 57, IX. 25 ; Sext. Emp., VII. 6) to have termed him the inventor of rhetoric, as he called Zeno the inventor of dialectic. We know with certainty of only two works written by Plmpedocles : rcEpX (pvaeuq and Ka6ap/ini (Diog. L., VIII. 77) ; the larpiKoq ?.6yoq (mentioned by Diog., ibid.) may have been a part of the (jivaim, and of the tragedy, which was ascribed to him by some, others deny that ho was the author (Diog. L., VIII. 57). Empedocles combats the hypothesis of absolute generation and decay : nothing, which previously was not, can come into being, and nothing existing can be annihilated. The phenomena usually referred to those heads result respectively from the commingling and separation of elements (,«'s'C i^ta^.^a^ig te fiiyevruv) ; actual origination {(pvaic) is a name void of objective meaning. The mingling of elements is the work of Love {pi?.6Tr/g, aropyi/, 'Aopo- iiTTi), their separation is effectuated by Hate (N£?Kof) ; to the former Empedocles applies the predicate T/Trtorpporv (kindly disposed), the latter he terms destructive, baneful, furioua {pvXSfievov, Xvyp6v, fiaivoutvnv), so that obviously the opposition of these two forces was in his mind in a certain sense identical with that of good and evil. The primitive material elements, which remain unchanged in all mixture and separation, are fire {^vp, v^xTup,. 'RTuog, 'H^atdrof, Zevq apf^i), air {aWr/p, ovpavoc, "Upri (pepiafiiog), water {vSup, 6///3/30f, 62 EMPBDOCLES OF AGRIGENTUM. ndvTo^, ddlaaca, Nr/trrtf), and earth {yfj, .t^oii', 'ALduvEvc;). Empedocles calfe these elements roots {rkcaapa twv ttclvtuv 'piC,ufiara). In their original condition the elements are described by Empedocles as being all mingled together and forming one all-including sphere (p(palpoQ] Aristotle, following the sense of Empedocles, terms the a(paipo^ the evdaijioviaTaToq Oeoi, Met, III. 4, p. 1000 b, 3). In this sphere love is supreme and hate is powerless. By the gradual development, how- ever, of the influence of hate the elements become separated and individual things and beings come into existence. When the extreme of separation is reached, when hate alone rules and love is inactive, individual existence disappears again. Then follows a period when love regains its power and unites what was separated, while individual existences appear anew, till at last, love becoming, as at first, sole ruler, individual things again disappear and the original condition is restored. The changes thus described are then repeated in the same order, and continue without end to follow each other in periodical succession. Cf. Arist, Phys., VIII. 1 ; Plat. (?), Soph., p. 242. Of the members of the organic creation, the plants sprang first from the earth, while the latter was still in process of development. After them came the animals, their dif- ferent parts having first formed themselves independently and then been joined by love ; subsequently, the ordinary method of reproduction took the place of this original genera- tion (Plutarch, De Plac. Fhilos., V. 19, 26). At first eyes, arms, etc., existed separately; as the result of their combination arose many monstrosities, which perished ; those com- binations which were capable of subsisting, persisted, and propagated themselves. Em- pedocles, in Arist., De Coeh, III. 2, and Simplic, Comm. in De Coelo, f. 144 b: 'Hi ■n-o2.2,di fiev Kopaai avavx^^^ £Ji2.ac~Tjcav, Tvfivol 6' enTia^ovro fipaxioveq evviSt^ ufiuv, 'Ofifiara cT oV enXavaro nevTiTevovra fieTcnruv. — Avrap iwEi Kara fiel^ov e/j.icr}'eTO daifiovi 6ai/zuv, TavTo. re cv/j-nlKTecKov, onr] cwEKvpaev iKaarOj 'AAAd TE Tvpbg to'k; jroAAd dir^vEKEg i^EyivovTo. By the ^aifinvec the elements are apparently to be understood, 'A'iSuvEvc, Nr/anc, etc. This doctrine of Empedocles is thus expressed by Aristotle, Phys., II. 8 : onov jiev ovv dnavra awe [it] hcTVEp mv tl EVEKCL Tov iyivETo, ravra fih) Ecudr] airo tov avTOfidrov avcTavra ETnrTfdEiug ' baa (5f (IT/ oiJTug, (VKiSkETo KQi andTCkvTM, KaddnEp 'Efj.iTE6oK?i^g ?Jy£i rd fiovysvij avdpdirpupa, to which Aristotle replies, that the organisms constructed in apparent conformity to a plan, do not appear singly, as would be expected if their origin were fortuitous, but fj del ?) wf ettI to no?.!'. Since the higher forms of life can only arise out of the lower, these latter must be regarded as the lower stages, through which the former must pass. Empedocles says {ap. Diog. L., VIII. 77): 'H(5?; yap ttot' iyu yevS/i?^ mvpoq te Koptj te Odfivog t' oiufog te Kal Eiv dXl f/lAoTrof Ixf^i'i.* * This doctrine may he compared with the natural philosophy of Scbellinf; and Oken and the theory of derivation as propounded hy Lamarck and Darwin ; still, accordinfr to the latter, the progress from lower to higher in the development of species is rather are.sult of successive differentiations of simjile forms, while the Empodoclcan doctrine views it as resulting from the combination of heterogeneous forms ; but even this difference is only relative. Ernst Hackel. an investigator who hns adopted the theorj' of Darwin and contributed to its further development, traces (in his Kdtnrl. SchopfiitigsgegcMchie, 2d ed., Berlin, 1870) the "genealogical tree of man" from the "monactjc" forms of life down through primitive animals of one and of many cells, radiate infusoria, worms, fishes, reptiles, marsupialia. apes end orang-outangs, ending, finally, with "speech-endowed man.'" ANAXAGORAS, HERM0TIMU8, AND AKCHELAUS. 63 Empedocles explains the workings of distant bodies on each other, and the possibility of the mixture of elements, by the hypothesis of effluxes (cnroppoai) proceeding from all objects, and of pores (Tropo/), into which these effluxes enter ; some effluxes are adapted to specific pores, for which others would be too large or too small. By this theory Empedocles also accounts for sensuous perception. In the case of seeing, a twofold efflux takes place : on the one hand, effluxes pass from the objects seen to the eye (Plat, Meno, p. 76; Arist., De Sensu et Serisibili, c. 2, p. 438 a, 4: ralg anoppoiaig ralg ano tuv 6p(j/J.evuv), while, on the other hand, effluxes from its own internal fire and water pass out through the pores of the eye (Emped. in Arist., p. 437 b, 26 seq. : " Delicate nets in the eye retain the mass of circumambient water, but the fire, wherever it extends, pierces through, as rays of light pass through a lantern," — in reply to which Aristotle [p. 437 b, 13] objects, that we ought then to be able to see in the dark). The perceived image arises on the meeting of the two streams. Light needs a certain time in which to come from the sun to lis (Arist, Be An., II. 6 ; De Sensu, c. 6 ; Aristotle controverts this theory). Sounds arise in the trumpot-shaped auditory passage on the entrance of air in motion. Tlie sensations of smeU and taste depend also on the penetration of fine particles of matter into the appropriate organs (Arist, De Sensiu, a 2, 4; Theophr., De Sensu, 9). Empedocles ascribed sensation and desire (as did also Anaxagoras and Democritus) to plants (Pseudo-Arist., rrepl ' tK TovTuv yap Tzavra nenif/aaLv apuoc'&fvrn, Ka\ TovToiq (jipoveovat Kal ^iSovt' r/fT aviuvrai. "With the philosophemes peculiar to him. Empedocles united the Pythagorean doctrine of the transmigration of souls (but modified and adapted to his system in the sense above indicated) and a doctrine similar to that of Xenophanes concerning the spirituality of the Doity (unless the loci in which this is affirmed are taken, say, from a work falsely attribTited to Empedocles). § 24. Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (in Asia-Minor), born about 500 B. c, reduced all origin and decay to a process of niirgling and un- mingling, but assumed as ultimate elements an unlimited number of primitive, qualitatively determinate substances, which were called by him seeds of thinjrs. bv Aristotle, elements consistins: of homoireneous parts, and by later writers (employing a term formed from tlie Aris- totelian phraseology) HomoeomerifE. Originally there existed, accord- ing to Anaxagoras, an orderless mixture of these diminutive parts : " all things were together." But the divine mind, which, as the finest among all things, is simple, unmixed and passionless reason, brought order to them, and out of chaos formed the world. In the explana- tion of individual existence, Anaxagoras confined himself, according to the testimony of Plato and Aristotle, to the search for mechanical 64 ANAXAGOKAS, HEKMOTIMUS, AND AKCHELAUS. causes, and only fell back on the agency of the divine reason, when he was nnable to recognize the presence of such causes. Essentially the same doctrine of the world-ordering mind is ascribed, among earlier philosophers, to Hermotimus of Clazomenae, and among the later, to Archelaus of Miletus (or, according to others, of Athens). Of the legends of Hermotimns of Clazomenae treat Friedr. Aug. Cams, in Fulleborn's Seitrdge zur Geschichte der Pkilos., Vol. 111.. Art. 9, 1798, repr. in Cams' Nachgel. Werke (Vol. IV.: Ideen zur Gesch. der Philos.), Leipsic, 1809, pp. 330-392; Ignat. Denzinger, De Hermot. Vla^omenio comment, Liege, 1825. On Anaxagoras, of. Friedr. Aug. Cams, De Anax. cnsmotheologiae foniibuK, Leipsic, 1797, and in Cams" Ideen zur Gesch. der Philon., Leips. 1809, pp. 689-762, Anaxagoras aus Klazomerm und sein Zeit- geist, in FQlleborn's Beitr. zur Gesch. der Philos., Art. 10, 1799, and in Cams' Ideen zur Gegch. der Philos., pp. 395-478; J. T. Hemsen, Anax. Claz., Gott. 1821 ; £d. Schaubach, Anasti. Claz. fragm., Leips. 1827; Gail. Schorn, Anax,. Claz. et Diogenis Appolloniatae fragmenta, Bonn, 1S29; F. J. Clemens, Z)« philoHophia Anaxagorae Clazomenii, Berlin, 1839; Fr. Breier, Die Philosophie des Anaxagoras von Klazomenae nach Arisioteles, Berlin, 1840; Krische, Forschungen, I. pp. 60-68; C. M. Z6vort, Dissert, mir la vie et la doctrine dWnaxagore, Paris, 1848; Franz Hoffman, Veber die Gottesidee des Anaxagoras, Sokrates, und Platan, Wiirzbiirg, 1860 ("Gluckwiinseh-Programm" to the University of Berlin), cf Mi- chelet, in '■'■Der Gedanke,''"' Vol. II., No. 1, pp. 33^44, .ind Iloflfmann's reply in Fichte's Zeitschrift Jiir Ph. V. ph. Kritik, new series, Vol. 40, 1862, pp. 1-48; Aug. Gladisch, Anax. und die Israeliten, Leipsic, 1864. cf. Gladisch on Anax. imd die ulten Israeliten, in Niedner's Zeitschr. fur histor. Tlieol., 1849, Heft 4, No. 14; C. Alexi, Anax. u. s. Philosophie, nach deri Fragmenten bei Simplicius ad Arist. (G.-Pr.), Neu-Kuppin, 1867; Heinr. Beckel, Anax. doctrina de rebus animatis (diss.), Miinster, 1808. Anaxagoras was descended from a reputable family in Clazomenfe. From this city he removed to Athens. Here he lived a long time as the friend of Pericles, until, liaving been accused of impiety on account of his philosophical opinions by the political opponents of the great statesman, he found himself compelled to seek safety in Lampsacus, where he is said to have died soon afterward. The chronological data respecting him are in part discrepant. The accusation took place, according to Diodorus (IX. 38 sq.) and Plutarch {Pericl., c. 38), in the last years before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war. Allowing this date to be correct, it is inadmissible, with K. F. Hermann {De Philos. Ionic, aetatibus, Gott. 1849, p. 13 seq.), to place the birth of the philosopher in Olymp. 61.3 (534 B. c); it is more probable that the version of Apollodorus (ap. Diog. L., II. 7) is the correct one, and that Anaxagoras was born in Olymp. "JO (500-496). If he lived m all seventy-two years (as Diog., ibid.., reports), the date of his death must be Olymp. 88 (for which we read in Diog., 78 — probably an error). In Athens he is said to have lived thirty years; the statement referred (by Diog. L., II. 7) to Demetrius Phalereus, that he began to philosophize in the twentieth year of his life at Athens, while Callias (Calliades?) wasarchon, probably arose from a misinterpretation of the report that he began to philosophize while Callias was archon at Athens. The statement of Aristotle {Metaph., I. 3), that Anaxagoras was prior to Empedocles in point of age, but subsequent in respect of his (philosoiihical) per- formances {rii uiv TjALKig izpoTipnc, 7oi(," '5' spyoic varepoc;), is probably to be taken purely chronologically, and not as pointing to a relative inferiority or advance in philosophical insight. The difference of age can not liave been great. Anaxagoras seems already to have known and to have accepted in a modified form the doctrines of Empedocles. The written work of Anaxagoras {nepl fvaeur) is mentioned by Plato (Fhaedo, p. 97) and others. In the place of the four elements of Empedocles, Anaxagoras assumes the existence of an infinite number of elementary and original substances. Every thing that has parts AI^AXAGOEAS, HEEMOTIMUS, AND AKCHELAUS. 65 qualitatively homogeneous with the whole, owes its origin, according to Anaxagoras (as reported by Aristotle, Met, I. 3), to the coming together {avyKpiciq) of these parts from the state of dispersion among other elements, in wliich they had existed from the beginning. This combination of the homogeneous is, in his view, that which really takes place in what is called becoming or generation. Each primitive particle remains unchanged by this process. In like manner, that which is called destruction, is in fact only separation {fiiciKpiGL^). Every thing whose parts are homogeneous with the whole (e. g., flesh, blood, bones, gold, silver), Aristotle calls in his terminology ofioiofiepic, in opposition to the avouoioiiEpk^ (e. g., the animal, and, in general, the organism as a whole), the parts of which are of diverse quality. The expression to o^oiouEpig, rd bfioiofiep^ does not denote originally the homogeneous parts themselves, but the whole, whose parts are homo- geneous with each other ; but it can also be applied to the parts themselves as smaller wholes, since in that which has throughout the same quality the parts of every part muse be homogeneous with one another. In Metaph., I. 3, Aristotle calls the wholes, which, according to Anaxagoras, arise by the mingling together of homogeneous parts, ofioiouep^; in other places he gives the same name to the parts, e. g., Be Coelo, III. 3 : flesh and bones, etc., consist JC n-opciTuv 6/xocofiepuv Travruv j/Opoiofievuv • cf. De Gen. et Corr., I. ] : Anax- agoras represents those substances which have like parts, e. g., bones, etc., as the ele- mentary substances (rd ofioiofiep^ aroixela r'Srjciv, olov oaroirv Koi aiaoKa nal fivt?Mv). Lucretius says (I. 834 seq.) that, according to Anaxagoras, every rerum homoeomeria, e. g., bones, intestines, etc., consists of smallest substances of the same kind. The plural 6/xoi- ouipeiai is used by later writers (e. g., Plut., PericL, c. 4 ; voiv aTroKpivovra rdf ofioiouepeiaq) to designate the primitive, ultimate particles themselves (cf Sext. Emp., Adv. Math., X. 25 : ol yap aropovg eiTruvTeg 7/ ouoiouEpelag f/ oyKovc, and Diog. L., II. S : apx^-Q '^f ouo/ouepeiar). Anaxagoras himself calls these original constituents of things " seeds " {aTripfzara), and also less precisely (like the objects which they constitute), " things " {xPVf^t^Ta). But not every thing which appears to have like parts is held by Anaxagoras to possess them indeed. It is true that Aristotle in one place, immediately after referring to Empedocles, cites (Met., I. 3) water and fire as examples of substances of homogeneous parts. But where he expresses himself more exactly concerning the opinion of Anaxagoras (De Gen. et Corr.. I. \: De Coelo, III. 3), he says expressly that the latter regarded precisely those substances which with Empedocles passed for elementary, — fire, air, water, and earth, — as not internally homo- geneous, but as compounds of numerous heterogeneous particles. Anaxagoras finds the moving and shaping force of the world neither (with the old lonians) in the nature of the matter assumed as principle itself, nor (with Empedocles) in impersonal psychical potencies, like love and hate, but in a world-ordering mind (voif). (Anaxagoras, ap. Simplicius, in Ar. Phys., fol. 35 a: uaola inE7J.ev laeadai kuI oaola fjv koI aaaa vvv tan nnl oKola iarai, Tvavra diEKoofiTjae v<5of.) This mind is distinguished from mate- rial nat\ires by its simplicity, independence, knowledge, and supreme power over matter. Every tiling else is mixed with parts of all other things besides itself, but mind (I'oor) is pure, unmixed, and subject only to itself. All minds, whatever their relative power or station, are (qualitatively) alike. The mind is the finest of things {/.eiTTorarov rrdv-uv Xpv/^oTuv). Matter, which is inert and without order, it brings into motion, and there- by creates out of chaos the orderly world. There is no fate [eluapuivT]) and no chance {Tvxn)- In the primitive condition of things the most heterogeneous substances were, according to Anaxagoras, everywhere intermingled (Anaxagoras, ap. Simplicius, in Arist Phys.. fol. 33 b : ojidv ■Kavra ;fp^//ara ifv, uTreipa koL Tr/.ridoq kuI aficKporriTra, the first words of the work of Anaxagoras). "When matter had thus remained inert during an indeterminate period, 5 66 ANAXAGORAS, HEKMOTIMIJS, AND ARCHELAUS. the Mind worked upon it, communicating to it motion and order (Arist., Phys., YIII. 1, p. 250 b, 24 : (prjal yap eKslvoq ['Ai^a^a^dpafJ, oiinv Tidvruv ovtuv koI r/pejuovvTuv rbv aneipov ^povov, KLVTjaLV ifinoLfjaai rbv vovv Kal Sianplvai). The Mind first effected a revolving motion at a single point ; but ever-increasing masses ■were gradually brought within the sphere of this motion, which is still incessantly extending farther and farther in the infinite realm of matter. As the first consequence of this revolving motion, the elementary contraries, fire and air, water and eartli, were separated from each other. But a complete separation of dissimilar and union of similar elements was far from being hereby attained, and it was necessary that within each of the masses resulting from this first act, the same process should be repeated. By this means alone could things originate, having parts really homogeneous, e. g., gold, blood, etc. But even these consist not entirely, but only prevailingly, of like parts. In gold, for example, however pure it may seem, there are, says Anaxagoras, not merely particles of gold, but also particles of other metals and of all other things ; but the denomination follows the predominant constituent. In the middle of the world rests the earth, which is shaped like a short section of a cylinder, and is supported by the air. The stars are material ; the moon is inhabited like the earth; the sun is a glowing mass of stone (fivSpoq didnvpoq, Diog. L., II. 12), and the stars are of like nature. The moon receives its light from the sun. The sky is full of stones, which occasionally fall to the earth, when the force of xheir revolving motion is relaxed; witness the meteor of Aegospotomos (Diog. L., II. 8-12). Plants have souls ; they sorrow and rejoice. Plants and animals owe their origin to the fecundation of the earth, whence they sprung, by germs previously contained in the air (Theophrast., Hist. Plant., III. 1, 4 ; Be Catcsis plantarum, I. 5, 2). In our perception of things by the senses, like is not known by like, but by unlike, e. g., heat by cold, cold by heat; that which is equally warm (etc.) with ourselves, makes no impression on us. The senses are too weak to know the truth ; they do not sufficiently distinguish the constituents of things (Anaxagoras, ap. Sextus Empir., Adv. Math. VII. 90 : vtto adavporr/Toc avTuv uv SwaToi icfiEv uplveiv zaXTjdiq). By the mind we know the world of external objects ; every thing is known to the divine reason (Anax., ap. Simplic, in Phys., f. 33 : Tvavra iyvu j'dor). The highest satisfaction is found in the thinking knowledge of the universe. The explanation of phenomena sought by Anaxagoras was essentially the genetic and physical; ho did not investigate the nature of their order, which he referred to the vovg. For this reason Plato and Aristotle (whom, in this particular, Plotinus follows, Ennead., I. 4, 7) charge that his vovc plays a rather idle role. Plato, in the Phaedo (p. 97 c), represents Socrates as saying that he had rejoiced to see the vovg designated as cause of the order of the world, and had supposed that as the reason why every thing is as it is, the fitness of its being so (the final cause) would be pointed out; but that in this expectation he had been fully deceived, since Anaxagoras specified only me- chanical causes. Cf. Leg., XII. 967 b. Aristotle praises Anaxagoras in view of his principle; in rising to the conception of a world-ordering mind, ho was like a sober man coming among the drunken ; but he knew not how to make the most of this principle, and employed the vovr only as a mechanical god for a make-shift, wherever the knowledge of natural causes failed him {Mdaph., I. 4). If, now, another thinker directed his attention only to that which the vovq really was for Anaxagoras, not to the luord and the possible content of the concept, he must consider a vovg as cause of motion and distinct from mate- rial objects, to be unnecessary (following a line of thought simUar to that of Laplace and others, in modern times, who ridicule the "God" of the earlier astronomers, as only " standing upon one side and giving things a push"). Such a philosopher would neces- THE ATOMISTS : LEUCIPPU6 AND DEMOCKmjS. X) i sarily deem it a more scientific procedure to reject the dualism of Anaxagoras, and find ic things themselves the sufficient causes of their motions. It is thus that tlie doctrine of Democritus stands contrasted with the doctrine of Anaxagoras. On the other hand, the conception of the vnvg might occasion a real investigation of the nature of mind, and conse- quently conduct beyond mere cosmology. In this way, though not till a later period, the Anaxagorean principle continued to exert an influence, not so much in the teachings of the Sophists, as, rather, in those of Socrates and his continuators. Of Hermotimus, Aristotle says {Metaph., I. 3) that the hypothesis of a world- ordering mind was ascribed to him ; but that nothing certain or precise was known in regard to his doctrine. Later writers repeat many miraculous legends concerning the man. Probably he belongs to the ancient "theologians" or cosmogonists. (See above, p. 26.) Archelaus, the most important among the disciples of Anaxagoras, appears to have interpreted the original medley of all substances as equivalent to air, and to have toned down the antithesis between mind and matter, thus receding again nearer to the older Ionic natural philosophy, and in this respect occupying a position relative to Anaxagoras similar to that of his contemporary, Diogenes of Apollonia (mentioned above, § 14, pp. 37 and 38). The doctrine that right and wrong are not natural distinctions {(pvaei\ but depend on human institution, is ascribed to Arciielaus. Another disciple of Anaxagoras, Metrodorus of Lampsacus, interpreted the Homeric poems allegorically ; by Zeus the vovq was to be understood, by Athene art {rix"^)- The fine verses, in which Euripides (op. Clem. Alex., Strom., IV. 25, § 157), with un- mistakable reference to Anaxagoras, sings the praises of the investigator, may here be cited : 'OX0ioi oari^ rfiq laropiaq enl irr/fioavva^, fir/r' el^ aSiKOVf irpd^etc dpfxCrv, aXTi adavaTov KaBopuv (pvaeac Kdgfiov ayf/pu, r/f te awiarrj KoL hnri Kal oTrcig ■ To'tg ToioiiToig ovdeizor' aiaxpi^v ipyuv iMt^ETTifia Trpoai^ei. § 25. Leucippus of Abdera (or Miletus, or Elea) and Democritus of Abdera, the latter, according to his own statement, forty years younger than Anaxagoras, were the founders of the Atomistic phi- losophy. These philosopliers posit, as principles of things, the " full " and the "void," which they identify respectively with being and non- being or something and nothing, the latter, as well as the former, having existence. They characterize the " full " more particularly, as consisting of indivisible, primitive particles of matter, or atoms, which are distinguished from one another, not by their intrinsic qualities, but only geometrically, by their form, position, and arrange- ment. Fire and the soul are composed of round atoms. Sensation is due to material images, which come from objects and reach the sonl 68 THE ATOMISTS : LEDCIPPUS AND DEMOCRITU8. through the senses. The ethical end of man is happiness, which is attained through justice and culture. Of Democritus treat Schleiermacher, Ueber das Verzeiohniss der Schriften deg Demokrit hei Diog. L. (IX. 45 seq.), read Jan. 9, 1S15, and jirinted in his Sdmmtl. Werke, 8d div., Vol. 3, pp. 293-305; Getfera, Qnaesst. Dem., QOtt. 1829; J. F. W. Burcbard, Democriti p?iilo8aphiae de sevnibuH /ragmenta, Minden, T?oO; Fraijmente der Moral des Abderiten Demokritus, Minden, 1S34; Papeucordt. Ve atmnicorum doc- trino. Berlin, 1832; Frid. Heimsoetli. Democriti de anima doctrina, Bonn, 1835; Kriscbe, Fornclningen. I. pp. 142-163; Frid. Guil. Aug. Mullach, Quaestionem Democritearum spec. I-II., Berlin, 1835-42; Demo- criti 02>eru7n fragme,nta coll., rec, veriit, esrpHc. ac de philosophi vita, scriptix et jylaeitis commtn- iitus est, Berlin, 1843; Fragm. ph. Gr., I. p. 330 seq. ; B. ten Eviu)^, Anecdotn EpicJiarmi, Democriti, etc., in the Philolog^M, VI. 1851, p. 577 seq. ; Democriti de se ipso testimonia, ib. p. 589 seq., VII.. 1852, p. 354 seq. ; Democriti liber Trepl di-Spuin-ou (^licrtos, ibid. VIII., 1853, p. 414 seq. ; Ed. Johnson, Der Sensualismv* des Demokrit (G.-Pr.), Plauen, 1868. Of the age of Leucippus and the circumstances of his life little is definitely known; it is also uncertain whether he wrote any thing himself, or whether Aristotle and others drew their information concerning his opinions from the writings of his pupil Democritu:?. Aristotle commonly names him in connection with Democritus. The statement (Diog. L., IX. 30), that he heard Zeno, the Eleatic, receives confirmation from the character of his doctrine. Hiat the principles of his philosophy were largely derived from the Eleatics is aLso testified by Aristotle, Be Gen. et Corr., 1. 8, 325 a, 26. Democritus of Abdera, in liis work ^uKphq Aiuko(t/li.o^, said (according to Diog. L., IX. 41) that he wrote this work 730 years after the capture of Troy, and that he was forty years younger than Anaxagoras. He must, according to the latter statement, have been born about 4G0 b. c, with which date agrees the statement of Apollodorus {op. Diog. L., ibid.), tliat he was born 01. 80; according to Thrasyllus (ibid.), 01. Tt.G = 470 b. c. ; but for the date of the capture of Troy Democritus appears to have assinned, instead of 1184, the year 1150, whence we derive, as the date of the composition of the work named, the year 420 B. c. He is said to have died at a great age (ninety years old; according to others, one lumdred, or even more). Desire for knowledge led him to undertake extended jour- neys, Egypt and the Orient being among the places visited by him. Plato never mention.^ him, and speaks only with contempt of the materialistic doctrine. Plato desired, according to the narrative of Aristoxenus, the Aristotelian (in his laropiKci vTrouvyfiarn, see Diog. L., IX. 40), that the writings of Democritus should be burned, but was convinced by the Pythagoreans AmycLas and Clinias, of the uselessness of such a proceeding, since the books were already widely circulated. Aristotle speaks of Democritus with respect. Democritus wrote numerous works, among which the /Lteyac AiaKoa/iog was the most celebrated. His style is greatly praised by Cicero, Plutarch, and Dionysius, for its clear- ness and elevation. The Atomistic system was urged by Democritus, who perfected it and raised it to an acknowledged position, in opposition to the Anaxagorean (in the sense indicated above, at the end of § 24). The relation between Leucippus and Anaxagoras is uncertain. Since Democritus is called by Aristotle {3Ietaph.. I. 4) an halpnq (an intimate companion and disciple) of Leucippus, the difference between their ages can liardly have amounted to forty years, so that Leucippus must have been younger than Anaxagoras. If Anaxagoras did not make himself known by his philosopliical productions in early life, it may be that Leucippus (who appears to be immediately associated with the doctrine of Parmenides by )iis polemic against it) preceded him in this respect; yet this is not very probable, and can by no means be concluded from certain passages of Anaxagoras, in which he combats opinions (in particular the hypothesis of empty inter-atomic spaces) that are, it is true, THE ATOMISTS : LEUCIPPU8 AND DEM0CEITU8. 09 found in the writings of the Atomists, but had already been propounded by earlier philos- ophers (especially by Pythagoreans), and had also been, in part, combated by Parmenides and Empedocles. In view of tins uncertainty respecting Leucippus and of the undoubted reference which Demochtus constantly makes to Anaxagoras, we place the exposition of the Atomistic system immediately after that of the Anaxagorean. Besides, the nature of the doctrine of Hoinoeomeria-, which is a sort of qualitative Atomism, places it in the middle between the four qualitatively different elements of Empedocles and the reduction by Leucippus and Democritus of all apparent qualitative diversity to the merely formal diversity of an infinite number of atoms. In his account of the principles of the earlier philosophers, in the first book of the Metaphysics, Aristotle says (c. 4) : " Leucippus and his associate, Democritus, ^ssume as elements the full {TrXypec, arepeov, vacTov) and the void {kpvov, fiavov). The former they term being (6v), the latter, non-being (//^ oi') ; hence the^' assert, further, that non-being exists as well as being." According to another account (Plutarch., Adv. Col., 4), Democ- ritus expressed himself thus : fir) fiaTJ/jov rb 6h' f] -6 fujdev clvai (''Thing is not more real than no-thing"), expressing by the singularly constructed word, 6h\ something ("thing"). The number of things in being (atoms) is infinitely great. Each of them is indivisible (aTOfiov). Between them is empty space. In support of the doctrine of empty space, Democritus alleged, according to Aristotle (Phys., lY. 6), the following grounds: 1. Motion requires a vacuum ; for that which is full can receive nothing else into itself; 2. E,arefac- tion and condensation are impossible without the existence of empty intervals of space ; 3. Organic growth depends on the penetration of nutriment into the vacant spaces of bodies ; 4. The amount of water which can be poured into a vessel filled with ashes, although less than the vessel would contain if empty, is not just so much less as the space amounts to, which is taken up by the ashes ; hence the one must in part enter into the vacant interstices of the other. The atoms differ (according to Arist., Metaph., I. 4) in the three particulars of shape {axf/fJ-a, called pvafzor by the Atomists themselves, according to Aristotle), order (ra^tc, or, in the language of the Atomists, diadi/y^), and position (Oiaig, Atomistic -poni]). As an example of difference in shape, Aristotle cites the Greek characters A and N, of order or sequence AN and NA, and of the difference of position Z and X. As being essentially characterized by their shape, Democritus seems to have called the atoms also i6iaq and cxvp-ara (Arist., Phys., III. 4 ; Phit., Adv. Col, 8 ; Hesych., s. v. IdEo). These differences are sufficient, according to the Atomists, to explain the whole circle of phenomena; are not the same letters employed in the composition of a tragedy and a comedy (Arist., De Gen. e( Corr., 1. 2) ? The magnitude of the atoms is diverse. The weight of each atom corresponds with its magnitude. The cause of th'i atoms is not to be asked after, for they are eternal, and hence uncaused (Afist., P/iys., Vin. 1, p. 252 a, 35: Ar//x6Kpiror tov aei ovk a^ial a.pxf,v i^r/reiv). (It was probably not the Atomists themselves, but later philosophers, who first hypostasized this very absence of a cause into a species of cause or efficient nature, to avrdjuarov.) 'Democritus is said also to have declared tlie motion of the atoms to be primordial and eternal. But w'th this statement we tind united the other, that the weight of the larger atoms urged them downward more rapidly than the others, by which means the smaller and lighter ones were forced upward, while through their collision with the descending atoms lateral movements were also produced, in this way arose a rotatory motion (f''w), which, extending farther and farther, occasioned the formation of worlds. In this process homogeneous elements came together (not in consequence of the agency of "love" and "hate," or an all-ruling " Mind," but) in obedience to natural necessity, in virtue of which 70 THE ATOMISTS I LEUCIPPUS AND DEM0CRITU8. things of like weight and shape must come to the same places, just as we observe in the winnowing of grain. Many atoms having become permanently united in the course of their revolutions, larger composite bodies and whole worlds came into existence. The earth was originally in motion, and continued thus, while it was yet small and light ; but gradually it came to rest. Organized beings arose from the moist earth. The soul consists of fine, smooth, and round atoms, which are also atoms of fire. Such atoms [are distributed throughout the whole body, but in particular organs they exercise par- ticular functions. The brain is the seat of thought, the heart, of anger, the liver, of desire. When we draw in the breath we inhale soul-atoms from the air ; in the expiration of breath we exhale such atoms into the air, and life lasts as long as this double process is continued. Sensuous perception is explained by eilluxes of atoms from the things perceived, whereby images (ftdcjAa) are produced, which strike our senses. Through such eiduXa, says Democritus, even the gods manifest themselves to us. Perception is not wholly veracious ; it transforms the impressions received. The atoms are invisible on account of their smallness (only excepting, perhaps, those which come from the sun). Atoms and vacuity are all that exists in reality; qualitative differences exist only fw us, in the sensuous phenomenon (No/uu) yXvKi! kuI vofiu ircKpov, vofiu Osp/uov, vo^oj •i/w;fp6v, vofiu XP°'-V ' erey de arofia aal kevov, Democritus, op. Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., VII. 135). The asser- tion of Democritus {ap. Diog. L., IX. 72), that in reahty we know nothing, etc. {hreij 6e ovSkv l6/xev, kv j3v&(^ yap ?'/ ah'/-&£ia), must, as employed by him, probably be restricted to the case of sensuous phenomena ; for in view of the assurance with which Democritus professes the doctrine of atoms, this skeptical utterance can not bo supposed to bear upon that doctrine itself. Democritus (according to Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., VII. 138) also expressly distinguished from sensuous perception, which he called obscure knowledge (anoriT/), the genuine knowledge {yvr/aiTi) acquired by the understanding through investiga- tion. That kind of philosophical thinking by which Democritus went beyond the results of sensuous perception and recognized in tlie atoms the reality of things, was not made by him itself a subject of philosophical reflection, and the manner in which such thinking is effected was left by him without special explanation; it is among the philosophers of the following period (with the earliest among whom Democritus was indeed contemporaneous) that reflection concerning the nature of thought itself begins. Yet it follows from the fundamental principles of Democritus that thought can not be independent of sensation or the vovg of the ^rvx^, and this inference was expressly drawn by Democritus (Cia, De Fin., I. 6 ; Plut., De PL Philos., IV. 8 ; cf Arist., De An., III. 3). The only expression which Democritus appears to have given to his views concerning tlie origin of true knowledge, is that implied in the principle wliich he enounced in agreement with Anaxagoras, that we sliould proceed in our inferences from phenomena {(patvo/ueva) to the unknown {a6j}Xa, see Sext. Empir., Adv. Muth., VII. 140). and in hLs doctrine that thought arises when the motions of the soul are •' symmetrical " (Theophr.. De Semu, 58). The soul is the noblest part of man ; he who loves its goods, loves what is most divine. He who loves the goods of the body, which is the tent of the soul, loves the merely human. The highest good is happiness (evearu, EvSvfiia, uTapa^ia, ada/ifila). This is attained by avoiding extremes and observing the limits fixed by nature (jieTpioTTfri ripipiog Kat (iiov ^vnfierpii)). Not external goods secure happiness ; its seat is the soul (evdaifiovir; rpvxf/c Kal KaKo6aLfiovirj ovk iv (ioaKijfiaaL o'lKsec oiid' ev jprcroj, ■ipvxv 6e oIkt/tt/pcov 6atfiovo^). Not the act as such, but the will, determines moral character (ayadbv ov to fifj ddiKteiv, aXhi TO fi7/6i- kd'e/xLV — ;^ap<0TfK6f ovk. 6 /3Ae7r(jv Trpof ttjv a/ioifi^, aXX 6 ev Sp&v TrpoiypT/fjevoc). The highest satisfaction comes from knowledge (Euseb., Pr. Ev., XIV. 27, 3 ; ArjfipoKtToi, DIVISIONS OF THE SECOND PEBIOD. < i ITuye PovXeoBai na7JMV fiiav eiijelv aiTio?Mylav, ij rifv liepadv ol fiaai^^iav yeviadai). The country of the wise and good is the whole world {avdfjl aofC> naaa yij jiaTr/ • iwxni yap ayadijg TznTplq 6 ^v/nrag Koafiog). In the ethical theorems of Democritus, as also in those which relate to the difference between objective reality and our subjective apprehension of it, and which belong to the theory of cognition, the tendency to overstep the limits of cosmology becomes manifest — a tendency not wanting to any of the older philosophers and peculiarly natural in those standing on the borders of the first period. Democritus, the contemporary of Socrates, but younger than he, went considerably farther in this direction than Anaxagoras or any other of the earlier thinkers. The first disciples and successors of Democritus (among whom Metrodorus of Chios is the most important) seem to have emphasized more strongly and developed to a greater extent the skeptical elements, which were contained more particularly in his doctrine of sensuous perception. Second (Pbevailingly Anthropological) Period of Greek Philosophy. FROM THE SOPHISTS TO THE STOICS, EPICUREANS, AXD SKEPTICS. § 26. To th© Second Period of Greek Philosophy belong, 1) the Sophists, 2) Socrates, the imperfect disciples of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, 3) the Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics. The Sophists, as speculators, regard mainly the phenomena of gerce^tionj represen- tation, and desire. Socrates considers principally the phenomena and laws of logical thinking and moral willing, and thus recognizes the essential relation of man, the thinking subject, to the objective world ; the more precise investigation of this relation is undertaken by Plato and Aristotle, who also redirect attention to physical phi- losophy, and w'ho (as regards their political and ethical doctrines) regard man as essentially a social being, or the individual as an essen- tial and a natural part of the body politic. Tiie Stoics and Epicu- reans, w'hile indeed laying more stress upon the independence of the individual, leave him nevertheless subject to norms of thought and will having universal validity. Finally, Skepticism, which likewise seeks its end in the satisfaction of the needs of the individual subject, prepares the way for a new period, through the dissolution of all existing systems. 72 GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE SOPHISTIC DOCTRINES. The ethical and religious utterances of the poets, historians, etc., of this period contain philosophical matter, but not in philosophical form, and the exposition of them must be left to the historians of literature and of human culture in its more general development. In this period Athens became the center of Hellenic culture and, especially, of Hellenic philosophy. Pericles (in Thucyd., II. 41) describes Athens as a school of civilization for Greece. In the Platonic dialogue Protagoras (p. 331 d), the Sophist, Hippias of Elis, terms Athens "the Prytaneum of the wisdom of Hellas." Isocrates says {Panegyr., 50): "the Athenian state has caused the name Hellenes to become suggestive rather of intellectual culture than of historical descent." The susceptibility of the Athenians for art and science, their disposition for philosophical reflection, and the consequent establishment of the philosophical schools at Athens, are the most important circumstances in the historic connections of the second period of Greek philosophy. § 2T. In the doctrine of the Sophists the transition was effected from philosophy as cosmology, to philosophy as concerning itself with the thinking and willing subject. Yet the reflection of the Sopliists extended only to the recognition of the subject in his immediate individual character, and was incompetent, therefore, to establish on a scientific basis the theory of cognition and science of morals, for which it prepared tlie way. The chief representatives of this ten- dency were Protagoras the Individualist, Gorgias the Nihilist, Hippias the Polymathist, and Prodicus the Moralist. These men were followed by a younger generation of Sophists, who perverted the philosophi- cal principle of subjectivism more and more, till it ended in mere frivolity. On the Sophists, compare — in addition to the several chapters -which treat of them in the above- cited works of Hegel, Brandis, Zeller, and others, and in Grote's Ehtory of Greece (V III. pp. 474-544), and K. F. Hermann's Gench. v. Syst. der Platon. PhiloRophie (pp. 179 seq. and 296 seq.)— in particular, the following works : Jac. Geel, IHstoria critica sopMataiitm, qni SocratiH aetate Athenis Jioruerunt, in the Nova acta titt. societ. Ii!ic7io-Trajectinae, p. II., Utr. 1823; llerm. Roller, Die griechischen Sophigtensu Sokrateis^ und PlaMfs Zeit unci ihr Einfltiss avf Beredtsamkeit und Philo&ophie, Stuttg. 1S32; W. G. F. Eoscher, Be historicne doctrinae apud sophistas majores vestigiig, Gott. 1838 ; W. Baumhauer, Quam vim sopMstae hahuerint Athenis ad aetatis suae dinciplinam, mores ac studia irnmutanda, Utrecht, 1844; H. Schildencr, Die Sophisten, in Jahn's Archiv far PJiilol., Vol. XVII., j). 365 seq. 1851; Job. Frei, Beitrdge zur Geschichte der griechisclien Sophistik. in the Rhein. J)fnK. /. Ph.. new series, VII. 1S50, pp. 527-554, and VIII. 1S5.3, pp. 26S-279; A. J. Vitringa. De sophistarum schoHs, quae Socraiis aetate Athenis floruerunt, in: Mnemosyne, II. 1853, pp. 223-237; Valat, Essai historiqne snr les eophisies grecs, in PInvestigateur, Paris, 1859, Sept., pp. 257-267, Nov., pp. 321-336, Dec, pp. 353-361 ; Theod. Gomperz, Die griech. Sophisten, in the Deutsche Jahrh., Vol. VII., Bcrl. 1863; N. Wecklein, Di« Sopfiisten und die Sophi.e Protagorae vita et philosophia, Groningen, 1853; Friedr. Blass, I>ie aU. £eredsamkeif, Leipsic, 1868, pp. 2S-29. Cf. the works cited, ad § 27. Plato States {Protag., 31T c, seq.) that Protagoras was considerably older than Socrates. According to a statement in the Platonic dialogue Meno (p. 91 e), from which the similar statement of Apollodorus (ap. Diog. L., IX. 56) seems to have been copied, he lived about seventy years ; according to another version (ap. Diog. L., IX. 55), he lived more than ninety years. Probably he was born ca. 491, and died ca. 421-415 b. c. He called himself a oocpccF-yg, i. e., a teacher of wisdom (Plat., Protag., p. 316 d: oixoT^yu re co<^taTTj^ elvai Kal -rratSeveiv avdpuTzovQ). The word Sophist acquired its signification as a term of reproach especially through Aristophanes and afterward through the followers of Socrates, par- ticularly Plato and Aristotle, who contrasted themselves, as "philosophers," with the " Sophists." Sophists like Protagoras stood in high consideration with the majority of cultivated people, as Plato's dialogue Protag. especially attests, although a respectable and well-to-do Athenian burgher could not himself have been a Sophist (man of letters), and earned money by public lessons. It is well known that at a later time rhetoricians were also called Sophists. Protagoras is said to have prepared the laws for the Athenian colony of Thurii (Heraclides, ap. Diog. L., IX. 50). He was first at Athens between 451 and 445 B. c. (see Frei), next perhaps about 432, and again 01. 88.3 = 422-421 B. c, and shortly before his death. It is probable that Plato in his dialogue Protagoras has with poetic license transferred single circumstances from 422 to 432. On the occasion of his last sojourn at Athens (about 415 ? or 411 ?) lie was accused and condemned as an atheist. The copies of his work were demanded of their private owners, and burned in the market- place ; he himself perished at sea on his passage to Sicily. The supposition of Epicurus, that he had been a pupil of Democritus (Diog. L., IX. 53 ; X. 8), is hardly consistent with the relation between their ages, and is improbable on other grounds. On the other hand, it is even affirmed that Democritus mentioned and opposed Protagoras in his writings (Diog. L., IX 42 ; Plutarch., Adv. Coloten, l\. 2). In the doctrine of Protagoras Plato finds the inevitable consequence of the doctrine of Heraclitus {Theaet, p. 152 seq.). He admits its validity with reference to sensuous percep- tion (aladr/aic), but objects to any extension of it beyond this province as an illegitimate generalization of the theory of relativity. (For the rest, there is contained in the proposi- tion, that all that is true, beautiful, and good, is such only for the knowing, feeling, and willing subject, a permanent truth. This truth Protagoras only one-sidedly exaggerated by ignoring the objective factor.) According to Diog. L., IX. 51, the original words of the fundamental theorem of Pro- tagoras ("Man the measure of all things'') were as follows: ttuvtuv xpVf^oTcw /urpop PROTAGORAS OF ABDERA. 75 avdpuTTOi;, Tuv fikv bvruv uTEpoq To'v fiy airaTjjdivro^). In his philosophical argumentations Gorgias made use of the contradictory propositions of the earlier philosophers, yet in such a manner as to de- grade their earnest tendency into a rhetorical word-play. In his Gnrgl'^s (p. 462 seq.) Plato defines sophistry {(so(i>iariK}/, m the narrower sense of the term, and apparently with special reference to the political and ethical doctrine of Pro- tagoras) as a corruption of the art of legislation, and rheioric (as taught especially by Gorgias and his successors) as_a_corrupliQuj)f justly (considered here in a narrower sense than in the Rep., namely, as denoting retribution and reward, awi-e7rw^6r) ; the charac- teristic feature in eacli being flattery {KoXaKsia) ; these corruptions, he affirms, are not arts, but simply forms of quackery. Plato parallelizes the two arts named, which are included by him under the one name of politics, and their corruptions, as having reference all of them to the soul, with an equal number of " businesses " [eTTir^devaeic), which have reference to the body, namely, the art of legislation with gymnastics, justice with the healing art, sophistry with the art of adornment, and rhetoric with the art of cookery. But in these depreciatory definitions and comparisons he refers less to the doctrines of Gorgias than to the practice of some of his successors, who were less scrupulous than Gorgias himself, about ignoring the dependence of true rhetoric on tlie knowledge of what is truly good and just, aud who abandoned themselves exclusively to the chase after "joy aud pleasure." The main contents of the work of Gorgias, rrepl rov fiy dvrog r] izepl (pvaeu^, are found in Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., VII. 65 seq., and in the last chapters of the treatise. Be Melissa, Xenophaiie (or Zenont) et Gorgia. 1) Nothing is; for if any thing were, its being must be eitlier derived or eternal ; but it can not have been derived, whether from the existent or from the non-existent (according to the Eleatics) ; nor can it be eternal, for then it must be infinite ; but the infinite is nowhere, since it can neither be in itself nor in any thing else, and what is nowhere, is not. 2) If any tiling were, it could not be known; for if knowledge of the existent were possible, then all that is thought must be, and the non-existing could not even be thought of; but then error would be impossible, even though one should affirm that a contest with chariots took place on the sea, which is absurd. 3) If knowledge were possible, yet it could not be communicated ; for every sign differs from the thing it signifies ; how can any one communicate by words the notion of color, seeing that the ear hears not colors, but sounds? And how can the same idea be in two persons, who are yet dif- ferent from one another? In a certain sense every opinion is, according to Protagoras, true ; according to Gorgias, false. But each of these positions leads equally to the negation of objective truth, and implies the complete substitution of mere persuasion for conviction. § 30. Hippias of Elis, one of the younger contemporaries of Pro- tagoras, and distinguished more for rhetorical talent and for his mathematical, astronomical, and archreological acquisitions, than for his philosophical doctrines, exhibits the ethical stand-point of the Sophistic philosophy in the position ascribed to him by Plato, that the law is the tyrant of men, since it forces them to do many things contrary to nature. 78 PRODICUS OF CEOS. On Hippias, cf. Leonh. Bpengel, Be Uippia Eleo ejusgue scripiie, in " Swavio-yij tcx»'w>'," Stuttg. 1828; Osann, Der Sophist Hippian als Archdoiog, lihein. Mus,, N. 8., II. 1843, p. 495 seq. ; C. Muller, J/ipp. Elei fragmenta coll.^ in Fragmenta historui. Graec, Vol. II., Paris, 1848; Jac. Mahly, Der Sophist ff. «. K, Mh. Mu8., N. S., XV. 1860, pp. 514-535, and XVI. 1861, pp. 38-49; F. Blass, Dieatt. Bereds., Leips., 1868, pp. 31-83. In the congress of Sophists which Plato represents in his dialogue Protagoras as being held in the house of Callias, shortly before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, Hippias appears as a man in middle life, considerably younger than Protagoras. According to Prot, p. 318, he gave instruction in arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music. Cf. also Pseudo-Plat., Hippias Major, p. 285 c. In Prot, p. 387 c, Plato puts into the mouth of Hippias the doctrine above enunciated: 6 6e vd/iog, rvpawo^ tjv ruv avdpuTTov, 7ro/i/,a napa ttjv (pvaiv f^ia^erai. He finds it contrary to nature that differences of country and laws should estrange from each other men of education, who are united by a natural kinship ((pvaei ffvyyei'ttf). In Xenophon {Memor,, lY. 4) he contends against the duty of respecting the laws by urging their diversity and instability. Yet in his ethical deliverances Hippias seems as little as other Sophists to have placed himself in conscious and radical antagonism to the spirit of the Grecian people; monitions and rules of life like those which in the dialogue, Hippias Major (p. 286 a), he represents Nestor as giving to Neoptolemus, may have been uttered by him with a fair degree of good faith. § 31. Prodicus of Ceos, by his parenetical discourses on moral subjects (among which " Hercules at the Cross-roads" is the one best known) and by his distinctions of words of similar signification, pre- pared the way for the ethical and logical efforts of Socrates. Yet he did not go materially beyond the stand-point of the older Sophists. Cf. on Prodlcns, L. Spengel, De Frodico Ceo, in " 'Xwayiayr) rtxviav^ p. 46 seq. ; F. 6. Welcker, Prodikot, der Vorgdnger dee Sokrates, in the R?i,ein. Mus. f. Ph., 1. 18-33, pp. 1-39 and 583-643 (cf. IV. 18.36, p. 355 seq.), and in Welcker's Kl. Schr., II. pp. 398-541 : Hummel, Z>e Prodico sopkisia, Leyden, 1847 ; E. Cougny. Z>e Prodico Ceio, Socnitis magistro, Paris, 1858 ; Diemer, De Prod. Ceio(G.-Pr.\ Corbach, 1859 ; Kraemer, Die AUegorie des Prodikos nnd der Traum des Lvkianos, in the N. Jahrb. f. Ph. und Pad., vol. 94, 1866, pp. 439-443; F. Blass, IHe att. Bereds., Leipsic, 1868, pp. 29-31. Prodicus appears from Plato's Protagoras to have been younger than Protagoras, and of about the same age with Hippias. Socrates recommended his instruction in many instances to young men, though, indeed, only to such as he found ill-adapted for dia- lectical training (Plat, T'heaet., 151 b), and he sometimes terms himself (Plat., Protag., 341a; cf. Charm., 163 d, Crat., 384 b, Meno, 96 d), a pupil of Prodicu.s, though more sportively than seriously. Plato pictures him in the Protag. as effeminate, and as, in his distinctions of words, somewhat pedantic. Yet his most considerable philosophical merit is founded on liis investigations of synonyms. The men of the earliest times, said Prodicus, deified whatever was useful to them, and so bread was venerated as Demeter, wine as Dionysus, fire as Hephaestus, etc. (Cia, De Nat. Deorum, I. 42, 118; Sextus Empir., Adv. Math., IX. 18, 51 seq.). Xenophon {Memor. II. 1. 21 seq.) has imitated the myth of Prodicus concerning the choice of Hercules between virtue and pleasure. Prodicus declared death to be desirable as an escape from the evUs of life. His moral consciousness lacked philosophical basis and depth. OTHER SOPHISTS. 79 § 32. Of the Later Sophists, in whom the evil consequences of granting exclusive recognition to the accidental opinion and ego- tistic will of the individual became more and more conspicuous, the best-known are Polus the rhetorician, a pupil of Gorgias ; Thrasymachus, who identified right with the personal interest of those who have might, and the pseudo-dialectical jugglers Euthy- demus and Dionysodoras. Many of the most cultivated men at Athens and in other Greek cities (as, notably, Critias, who stood at the head of the thirty oligarchical despots), favored Sophistic prin- ciples, though not tliemselves assuming the functions of Sophists., i. e., of instructors in eloquence and polite learning. On the later Sophists, see Leonh. Spengel, Z>« Polo rhetore, in his " 'S.wayutyri t^x''"''-" St»ttg. 1S28. pp. 84-88; Id. de Tlirasymacho rhetore, ibid., pp. 93-98; C. F. Hermann, Zie Thrunymacho Chalcedonio sophiHta (Ind. led.), Giittingen, 1848-49; Nic. Bacli, Critiae Atheniensis tyranni carminum aliorumqut ingenii movumeiitorum quae mperisunt, Lcips. 182T; Leonh. Spenijel, De Criiia. in '• ^wayuiyri rtx^oiv,"' Stuttg. 1828, p. 120 seq. Cf. also Vnhlen, Der Sophist Lykophron, Gorgiaa ; der Rhetor I'olykratei, in the Rhein Mwi., N. S., XXI., pp. 143-148. Our information concerning the later Sophists is derived mainly from the descriptions of them given by Plato in his dialogues. Polus figures in the Gorgias, Thrasymachus in the Republic, and Euthydemus and Dionysodorus in the Euthydemns. To these sources must be added a few notices in Aristotle and others, e. g., PoLit., III. 10, p. 1280 b, 10, where it is mentioned that the Sophist Lycophron called the law kyyv7]T7}q -uv (hKaiuv. Yet in respect to some of the more important Sophists, still other accounts and even fragments of their writings have been preserved to us. Critias declared (according to Sext. Kmpir., Adv. Math., IX. 54 : cf Plat., Leges, X., 889 e) that the belief in the existence of gods was the invention of a wise statesman, who, by thus disguising truth in falsehood, aimed at securing a more willing obedience on the part of the citizens {(h^ayfidruv aptarov e'laj/yr/aaro, ipevikl Kalitpag r^ a/.z/Oeiav /o; ")• Critias regarded the blood as the seat and substratum of the soul (Arist., Be Anima, I. 2). According to the account given by Plato in the Protag. (p. 314 e, seq.), some of those who composed the circle of educated Athenians who met in the house of Callias, adhered particularly to Protagoras (such as Callias himself, Charmides, and others), others to Ilip- pias (viz.: Eryximachus, Phaedrus. and others), and still others to Prodicus (Pausanias, Agathon, etc.), although they could not be regarded as, properly speaking, the disciples of those Sophists, or as standing exclusively under their influence. The Sophist Antiphon (apparently to be distinguished from Antiphon the orator) occupied himself with problems connected with the theory of cognition {nepl alTideiaq), with math- ematics, astronomy, and meteorology, and with politics (see Arist.. De Soph. EL, c. 11, p. 172 a, 2; Phijs., I. 1, p. 186a, 17; Sauppe, in the Oratores Attici, on the orator Antiphon: J. Bernays, in the Rhein. Mus., new series, IX. 255 seq.). Hippodamus of Miletus, the architect, and Phaleas, the Chalcedonian, also propounded political theories ; see above, § 16. Kvenus of Paros, a contemporary of Socrates, is mentioned by Plato {Apol, 20 a; Phaedr.. 267 a; Phaedo, 60 d) as a poet, rhetorician, and teacher of "human and political virtue.'" Of Spengel, Y.way. texvo)v, 92 seq. ; Bergk, Lyr. Gr., 474 seq. To the time and school of the Sophists belongs Xeniades of Corinth, whom Sextus Empiricus {Bypotyp. Pyrrhon., II. 18; Adv. Math., YII. 48 and 53; VIII. 5) classes as a 80 SOCRATES OF ATHENS. Skeptic, representing that (in his skepticism) he agreed with Xenophanes the Eleatic. Xeniades affirmed (according to Sext., Adv. Math., VII. 53) that all was deception, every idea and opinion was false {irdvr' tlvai tpev^y, kcu iraaav tpavraciav koI 66^av ijjev^eaOai), and that whatever came into being, came forth from nothing, and whatever perislied, passed into nothing. Sextus affirms {Adv. M., VII. 53) that Democritiis referred to Xeniades in his works. The dithyrambic poet, Diagoras of Melos, must not be included among the Sophists. Of Diagoras it was said that he became an atheist because he saw that a crying injustice remained unpunished by the gods. Since Aristophanes alludes to the sentencing of Diagoras, — in the "Birds" (v. 1073), which piece was represented on the stage in Olymp. 91.2, — we are led easily to the inference that the "injustice" referred to was the slaughter of the Melians by the Athenians (in 416 b. c. ; see Thucyd., V. 116); the allusion of Aris- tophanes in the "Clouds" (v. 380) to the atheism of the Melian must, therefore, have been inserted in a second, revised edition of this comedy. Perhaps the prosecutions of religious offenders, which took place after the desecration of the images of Hermes, in the year 415, had some influence in bringing about the punishment of Diagoras. Diagoras is said to have perished by shipwreck, while attempting to escape. § 33. Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete, was born in Olymp, 77.1-3, — according to later tradition, on the 6th day of the month Thargelion (hence in 471-469 b. c, in May or June). He agreed with the Sophists in the general tendency to make man the special object of reflection and study. Pie differed from them by directing his attention not merely to the elementary functions of man as a logical and moral subject, viz., to perception, opinion, and sen- suous and egotistical desire, but also to the highest intellectual functions which stand in essential relation to the sphere of objective reality, namely, to knowledge and virtue. Socrates made all virtue dependent on knowledge, i e., on moral insight; regarding the former as flowing necessarily from the latter. Virtue, according to Socrates, could be taught, and all virtue was one. Aristotle (whose testimony is confirmed by Plato and Xenophon) testifies that Socrates first introduced induction and definition, together with the dialectical art of refuting false knowledge, as instruments of philosophical in- quiry. The foundation of the Socratic Maieutic and Irony was dexterity in the employment of the methods of inductive definition in conversations relative to philusophical and, in particular, to moral problems, in the absence of systematically developed, substantive knowledge. The *• demonic sign," which was accepted by Socrates as the voice of God, was a conviction, resulting from practical tact, with reference to the suitableness or unsuitableness of given courses of action (including also their ethical relations). The world is governed by a supreme, divine intelligence. SOCRATES OF ATHENS. 81 The accusation of Socrates, which took place in the year 399 b. c. (01. 95.1), not long after the expulsion of the Thirty Tyrants, and which was brought forward by Meletus, and supported by Anytus, the democratic politician, and Lycon, the orator, contained substantially the same charges which Aristophanes had made in the '' Clouds." It ran thus : '* Socrates is a public offender in that he does not rec- ognize the gods which the state recognizes, but introduces new demo- niacal beings; he has also offended by corrupting the youth." This accusation was literally false ; but, considered with reference to its more profound basis, it rested on the correct assumption of an essen- tial relationsliip between Socrates and the Sophists, as evidenced in their common tendency to emancipate the individual, and in their coiumon opposition to an immediate, unreflecting submission to the customs, law, and faith of the people and the state. But it mistook, on the one hand, what was legitimate in this tendency in general ; and, on the other, — and this is the principal point, — it ignored the specific difference between the Socratic and Sophistic stand-points, or the earnest desire and endeav^or of Socrates, in distinction from the Sophists, to place truth and morality on a new and deeper foun- dation. After his condemnation, Socrates submitted his conduct, but not his convictions, to the decision of his judges. Ilis death, justly immortalized by his disciples, assured to his ideal tendency the most general and lasting influence. Dan. Heinsius, De. doctrina ei mnribwi Sncrntia, Leydcn, 1627. Freret, Observatiowt sttr Im caitse^ ei sur quelques circonsUinces de la condemnation de Socrate, an essay read in the. year 1736, and published in tlie Menioire» de VAcademie des Iiiscripiiont, T. 47 b, 209 aeq. (Combats the old uncritical view of the Sophists as instigators of the accuB-itlon and sentence of Socrates, and points out the politic:il causes of these transactions.) Sig. Fr. Dresig, EpistoUt de Socrate juste datnnato, Leips. 178S. (As an opponent of the legally e.xisting denaocracy, Sociiites was justly condemned.) M. C. E. Keltner, Socrat. criminin majentutis accns. vind., Leipsic, 170S. Joh. Luzac, Oraiio de Socrate cive, Leyden. 1796 ; of. J.ect. Atticae : De iiyay-ia SocraiU, Leyden, 1909 (wherein the mutual antipathy of the Peripatetics and Platonists is pointed out as one among other impure sources of many unfavorable narrations respecting Socrates and his disciples). Georg Wiggers, Sokrdtes ah Menxch, Biirffer uiid PhUn-toph, Rostock, 1S07. 2d od.. Ncnstrelltz, ISU. Ludolph Dissen, De philoHophiii morali in Xenophoiiti:^ de Socrate comment\iriis tradila, 1S12, and in D.'s Kleine Schriften, Gott. 1S89, i)p. 57-SS. (Dissen brings together in systematic order the Socratic thoughts contained in Xenophon, but considers the narrative of Xenophon inexact, on account of his havinij unjustly attributed to Socrates his own utilitarian stand-point.) Friedr. Schleiermacher, Veher den Werth des Socrates als Philosophen. re.ad in the Berlin Akad. der Wins, July 27, 1815, published m the A//h. der philos. Clause, Berlin, ISIS, p. 50 seq., and in Schloiermacher'a S'dmmil. Werke. III. 2, 1S3S, pp. 2S7-30S. (The idea of knowledge, says Schleiermacher, is the central point of the Socratic philosophy ; the proof of this is to be fonnd — in view of the discre;i.incy between the reporti of the nearest witnesses, the too prosaic Xenophon and the idealizing Plato — in the different character of Greek philosophy before ond after Socrates. Before him, single departments of philosophy, so far as they 6 82 SOCRATES OF ATHENS. ■were at all distinguished from each other, -were developed by isolated groups of philosophers ; while after him, all departments were logically discriminated and cultivated by every school. Socrates himself must, therefore, while having no system of his own, yet represent the logical principle which makes the construc- tion of complete systems possible, i. «., the idea of knowledge.) Ferd. DelbrCick, Sok-ratef!, Cologne, 1S19. "W. Suvern, Ueber Aristophanes' Wolken, Berl. 1826. (According to Siivem, Aristophanes confounded Socrates with the Sophists.) Ch. A. Brandis, Gruiidlinien der Lehre den Sokrates, in the Rhein. Mils., Vol. I., 1827, pp. 118-150. Herra. Theod. Kotscher, Aristophanes und sein Zeitalter, Berlin, 1827. (In this work Eotscher pub- lished for the first time in a detailed and popular form— particularly in the section on the " Clouds"— the Hegelian view of Socrates, as the representative of the principle of subjectivity, in opposition to the prin- ciple of " substantial morality," on which the ancient state, according to Hegel, was founded— and of the attack of Aristophanes and the subsequent accusation and condemnation of Socrates, .is representing the conflict of these two principles. Eotscher treats the narrative of Xenophonas the most impartial evidence In regard to the original teaching of Socrates, Cf. Hegel, Phdnomenoloyie das Geistes, p. 560 seq. ; Aeiike- tik. III. p. 537 seq. ; Vorl iiher die Gesch. der Phil., IT. p. 81 seq.) Ch. A. Brandis, Ueher die vorgebliche Suhjectivitdt der Sokratisehen Lehre. Rhein. 31v8., II. 1828, pp. 85-112. (In opposition to the view supported by Eotscher, concerning the stand-point of Socrates and the fidelity of tho accounts of Xenophon.) P. W. Forchhammer, Die Athener und Sokrates, die GesetzUehen und der Revoliitiondr, Berlin, 1837. (Forchhammer goes to an altogether untenable extreme in his recognition of the justification of the Athenians in condemning Socr.ates. yet his special elucidation of the political circumstances is a work of merit. Cf. in reference to the same subject, Bendi.ven, Ueber den tieferen Schriftsinn den revolution- iiren Sokrates und der gesetzlichen Athener, Huysum, 1S8S.) C. F. Hermann, De Soaratis magistri-s et discipUna jweenili, Marburg, 1837. Ph. Gull, van Heusde, Characteri»mi prineipum philosophorum veterum, Socratis, PIntonix, Arit- totelis, Amsterdatn, 18^9. " 0« the Cosmopolitanism of Socrates^'' ^' On Xanthippe" '^ On the Cloud « of Aristophanes;''' in the Verslagen en Med. of the K. Akad. van W., IV. 3, 1859; see the articles in the Philologu.% XVI., pp. 383 seq. and 566 seq. J. "W. Hanne, Sokrates als Genius der Bumanitat. Brunswick, 1841. C. F. Hermann, De Socratis nccusatoribus, Gott. 1854. Ernst von Lasaulx, Des Sokrates Leben, Lehre und Tod, nach den Zeitgnissen der Alien dargestellt, Munich, 1857. [J. P. Potter, Characteristics of the Greek Philosophers, Socrates and Plato, London, 1845. E. D. Hampden, 77ie Fathers of Greek PlMosophy (Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle — articles reprinted from the Encyclop(P,dia Britannica), Edinburgh, 1862. E. Zeller, Socrates and the Socratic Schools, translated from the German by O. Reichel, London, 1868.— TV.] E. A. Alborti, Sokrates, ein Versuch Uber ihn nach den Quellen. Gottingen, 1869. Tlio political bearings of the trial of Socrates are very comprehensively and exactly developed in G. Grote's nistory of Greece, chap. 63 (Vol. VIII. pp. 551-684). Of the numerous lectures and essays on Socrates we name here the following : C. W. Brumbey, 8. nach. Diog. L., Lemgo, 1800; Friedr. Aug. Cams, Sokrates, in his Ideen zur Gesch. der Philos., Leipsic, 1809, pp. 514-555; F. Lclut, Du Demon de Socrate, Paris, 1836; Aug. Boeckh, De Socr. rervm physiearum studio. 1838; H. E. Ilummel, De Theologia Socr.. Gott. 1839; J. D. van Hoevell, De Socr. philoxophia, Groningen, 1S40 ; Zeller, Zur Ehrenretttrng der Xanthippe, in the Morgenhlatt fur gebildete Leser. 1S50, Ko. 265 seq., and in Zellcr's Vortrdge und Abhandlungen, Leipsic, 1865, pp. 51-61; liurndaW, De philos. mor. Socr., Heidelberg, 1S53; C. M. Fleischer, De Socr. quatn dicunt Utopia. "Progr." of the Gymn. at Cleve, 1855 ; Hermiinn KitchXy, Sokrates und sein Volk, akadem. Vortrag. gehalten 1855, in Kochly's Akad. Vortr. und Reden, I.. Ziirich, 1859, pp. 219-386; cf. the review by K. Lehrs in the .V Jahrb. f. Phil. u. Pad.. Vol. LXXIX., 1859, pp. 555 seq. ; Seibert, Sokr. und Christus, in the Piid. Archiv.. ed. by Langbein. I., Stettin, 18.59, pp. 291-307; L. Noack, Sokrates und die Sophisten, in Psyche. Vol. II., 1859; G. Mchring. Veber Sokr., in Fichte's Zeitschr. f. Philos., Yo\. XXXVI., Halle, 1860, pp. 81-119; F. Ucberweg, Deber Sokr.,\n Gelzer's Protect. Monatsbl, Yo\. XVL, No. 1, .July, 1860; Pteflfenfen, ibid.. Vol. XVII.. No. 2; A Bohringer, Der philns. Standpunkt des Sokrates, Cnrlsruhe. 1860, Ueber die M'olken des Aristophanes, ibid., 1863; H. Schmidt, Sokrates. Vortrag gehalten in Wittenberg, Halle. 1860; W. F. Volkmann, Die Lehre des Sokrates in ihrer histor. Stellung, in the Abh. der Bbhm. Ges. der Wiss., Fifth Series, Vol. XI., Prague, 1861, pp. 199-222; Bartelmann, De Socrate (G.-Pr.), Oldenburg, 1862; Phil. Jat. Ditges, Die epagogische oder inductorische Methode des Sokrates und der Beyriff (G.-Pr.). Cologne, 1864; M. Carriftre, S. ti. s. Stelltmg in der Gesch. des menschl. Geiste~% in Wcstermann's Monatsh.. 18(>4, No. 92; Bourneville, Socrate etait-il fou f reponse d M. Bally, membre de racad.,extr. du journal dt med. mentale, June, 1864; Ch. H. Bertram, Der Sokrates des Xenophon und der des Aristophanes, SOCRATES OF ATHENS. 83 {G.-ProQr.\ Magdeb. 1865; Franz Dittrich. De Socratis gententia, virtuUm eaue seientiam, Index Ltct. Lycei Hosiani, Braunsberg, 1868; Job. Peters, De Soerate, qui est in, Atticorum antiqua eomoe/I ia disput. ("Progr." of the Gymn. at Beuthen), Leipsic, 1869; E. Chaignet, Vie de 5, Parie, 1869; P. Montee, La philos. de »?.. Arras, 1869 ; H. Siebeck (see above, § 27). On the intellectual development of Socrates and the relation thereto of Plat., /'^aed ., 95 e, seq., see Boeckh in the Summer Catalogue, Berlin, 18-38; Kriscje, ForitcJiungen, I. p. 210; Susemihl in the PhiMo- gus, XX., 186;>, p. 226 seq. ; Ueberweg, ibid. XXL 1864, p. 20 seq., and Volquardsen, li/i. Mus., New Series, XIX. 1864, pp. 605-520. On the " Demon " of Socrates, cf. Kiihner, In his edition of the Memorabilia, (Bfbl. Graec., cur. F. Jacobs e< V. Chr. F. Pvost, Scr. Orat. Ped.,)Yo\. VIII., Gotha, 1811, pp. 18-25, where other earlier works »re cited; of later writers, of., besides Brandis, Zeller, and others, C. F. Volquardsen. Dan Ddmovium deg Sokrates und geine Interpreten, Kiel, 1862; L. Breitenbach, Zeitgchrift f. d. Gymiutsialioegen, XVII. 1863, pp. 499-611 ; Chr. Cron, in the Eos, gOdd. Zeitschr. fiir Philol. u. Gymnasialwesen, ed. by L. Urlichs, B. Stark, and L. v. Jan, I., Wurzburg, 1864, pp. 169-179; P. W. Frey mailer, Progr., Metten, ISM; Ferd. Fridr. Hfigli, Das Ddmonium des Sokrates, Berne, 1864. For determining the year of tlie birth of Socrates we find our surest data in tlie recorded fear of his death and the number of years that he is known to have Hved. Socrates drank the cup of poison in the month of ThargeHon, in 01. 95.1 (= 400-.H99), hence in May or June, 399 B. c. (on the 20th of Thargelion, ace. to K. F. Hermann, De Theoria Ddiaca, in tlie Irulc.x. Lect., Gott. 1846-47). At the time of his condemnation he was, according to fiis own account in Plat., Apol, 17 d, more than seventy years old {ettj yeyovug ttXeiu e/?(5o- HT/Kovra). He must, therefore, have been born at the latest in 4C9, or ratlier certainly before 469. In the Platonic dialogue Onto (-p. 52 e), Socrates represents the laws of Athens as saying to him : " For the space of seventy years you have been at liberty, Socrates, to quit Athens, if you were dissatisfied with us." This also points to an age of more than seventy years. Hence 01. 70.1 or 2 is to be assumed as the year of his Inrth. (Cf. Boeckh, CarpTis Inscript, II. p. 321, and K. F. Hermann, Pint. Philos., p. 666, Note 522). Tlie statement of Apollodorus (Diog. L., II. 44), that Socrates was born in 01. 77.4, is accord- ingly inexact. The 6th of the month Thargelion is given (by Apollodorus, op. Diog. L., ihid., and others) as his birthday, and this day, like the 7th of the same month, as the birth- day of Plato, was annually celebrated by the Platonists. But the immediate succession of these days one after the other, and still more their coincidence with the days on which th.e Delians celebrated the birth of (the maieutic) Artemis (6th of Thargelion) and Apollo (Thar- gelion 7th), are enough to make it probable that the birthdays assigned to both of these philosophers, or at least that of Socrates, are not historical, but were arbitrarily chosen for celebration. The father of Socrates was a sculptor, and Socrates himself followed his father's occu- pation for a time ; in the time of the Pericgotes Pausanias (about a. d. 150), a work executed by Socrates (or at least ascribed to him), and representing the Graces attired, was standing at the entrance to the Acropolis. Plato makes him allude to his mother in Theaet., p. 149 a, where he calls himself vloq fialar fia7M yinniaiaq re .Kal pAoavpnc;. ^ntvapcTi]^, and says of himself that he also practices her art pf midwifery, when he entices the ideas of his collocutors into the light of day, and examines whether they are genuine and tenable. Socrates received at Athens in his youth the education prescribed by the laws (Plat, Crito, 60 d), and made himself also acquainted with geometry and astronomy (Xen., Memor., IV. 7). That he " heard " Anaxagoras or Archelaus is reported only by untr\istworthy authorities. Plato accounts (Phaedo, 97 f ) for his acquaintance with the opinions of Anaxagoras by supposing that he had read the work written by that philosopher. Socrates was also familiar with the doctrines of other natural philosophers {Mem., I. 1. 14; IV. 7. 6), although he did not accept them; he read critically (according to Xen., Mem., I. 6. 14; cf IV. 2. 1 and 8) the writings of the early sages (twc dijaavpoi'c tuv tralai acxpijv avApuv, oi'f CKelvoi 84 SOCRATES OF ATHENS. KareXcTTOv ev jii^XioLQ ypaipavTEr, civeXittuv Koivy avv roi^ (t>/?,ot^ SLepxo/iac, Kai av re opiourv ayaBov, EKXeY^jUEda). The meeting with Parmenides, mentioned by Plato, is probably to oe regarded as historic (see above, § 19). A material intiucnce oa his philosophical develop- ment was exercised by the Sophists, to whose discourses he sometimes listened, and with wliom he often conversed, and to whom, also, he not unfrequently directed others (Piat., Tlieaei., 151b). He sometimes speaks of himself in Plato's works {Protag., 341a; cf. Jleno, 96 d; Charmides, 163 d; Cratyl, 384 d; Hipp. Maj., 282 c) as a pupil of Prodicus, yet not without a shade of irony, aimed especially at the subtle word-distinctions of thai. Sophist. A Platonic testimony respecting the course of the intellectual development ot Socrates may be regarded as contained substantially in Phaedo, p. 95 seq., although tho Platonic conception and representation of Socrates is here, as everywhere, influenced l)y tho, not Socratic, but Platonic doctrine of ideas (see Boeckh, in the Sommer-Eatalog. der Univ., Berlin, 1838, and my Plat. Untersuchungen, Vienna, 1861, pp. 92-94, and latet works relative to the mental development of Socrates, cited above, p. 83). Plato transfers to Socrates from his own thought only that which (like the theory of ideas and the ideal of the state) would naturally follow from the views actually held by the historical Socrates; Plato can not have ascribed to Socrates the history of his own mental development, inaa- much as it was demonstrably other than that portrayed in the passage "m question. Socrates (according to PL, Apol., 28 e) took part in three mihtary campaigns, viz. : in the campaigns of Potidaea (between 432 and 429, cf. PL, Sympos., 219 e, and Gharm., init), Delium (424, cf. Symp., 221 a, Lack., 181 a), and Amphipolis (422). He demonstrated his fidelity to the laws during his life under democratic and oligarchical rulers (Apol, p. 32), and at last by scorning to save his life by flight (PL, Criio, p. 44 seq.). Beyond this, Socrates kept himself remote from political affairs. His only vocation, as he believed, waa to strive, by means of his dialectic, to quicken the moral insight and influence the moral conduct of individuals, as he was convinced that this form of activity was most advan- tageous for himself and his fellow-citizens (PL, Apol, p. 29 seq.). In the writings of the disciples of Socrates, the latter appears almost always as a raon already advanced in years, such as they themselves had known him. In their delineations of his character, the leading feature is the utter discrepancy between the interior and the exterior — which, to the Hellenic mind, accustomed to harmony, was an aronov — his simi- larity with Sileni and Satyrs in personal appearance and the homeliness of his conversa- tional discourses, combined with the most sterhng moral worth, the most complete self- control in pleasure and privation, and a masterly talent in philosophical dialogue (Xen., Mem., IV. 4. 5 ; IV. 8. 11 et al.; Sympos., IV. 19; V. 5 ; Plat., Symp., pp. 215, 221). In their accoimt of the life of Socrates, the two principal authorities, Xenophon and Plato, sulistantially agree, although the Platonic picture is sketched with the more delicate hand. As to their reports of his doctrine, it is, first of all, unquestionably true that Plato in his dialogues generally presents his own thoughts through the mouth of Socrates. But in a certain sense his dialogues can, nevertheless, serve as authorities for the Socratic teaching, because the groundwork of the philosophy of Plato is contained in that of Socrates, and because it is possible, in general, though not in all cases in detail, to discriminate between tlie Platonic and Socratic elements. Plato took care not to be led by his love of idealization too far from historic truth ; in some of his compositions (in the Apology, in Orito, and in part also in the Protagoras, Laches, etc.) he remains almost entirely faithful to it, and in others puts those doctrines which Socrates could not have professed into the mouth of otlier philosophers. Xenophon wrote the Memnr. and the Symj^osium (for the so-called " Apology of Xenophon " is spurious) not so much in the spirit of a pure historian as in that of an apologist ; but his honorable defense of Socrates demands from us full confidence SOCRATES OF AlflENS. ?5 in his historic fidelity, so far as his intention is concerned. But it must be acknowledged that as much can not be said of his intellectual qualification for an exact and comprehensive understanding of the Socratic philosophy. Xenophon appears to attribute too uncon- ditionally to Socrates the tendency, natural to himself, to connect all scientific activity with a practical purpose, and he thus gives too small a place to the dialectic of Socrates, as compared with his ethical teachings. The brief statements of Aristotle respecting the philosophical doctrines of Socrates are very valuable, since they are purely historical, and relate to the most important points of his teaching. We read in the Metaphysics of Aristotle (XIII. 4), that Socrates introduced the method of induction and definition (which sets out from the individual and ends in the definition of the general notion — rovg t' inaK-iKovg "koyovq koI to 6piC,Ea6ai K.ad67x)v). The field of investigation in which Socrates employed this method is designated by Aristotle as the ethical {Metapfi., I. 6). The fundamental conception of Socrates was, according to the same authority, the inseparable union of theoretical in-biyhl with practical moral excellence (Arist, Eth. Nicom.y YI. 13: l,uKpdTijg cppovyaeig j dv&puTrojv, rig apxiKog dv^pcjiruv, Kat Trepl ruv aX?MVj d rovg fisv cldorag ip/clro Kohybg myad^ovg elvai^ rovg <5' dyvoovvrag dv6pano6u6eig av diKaiog KEK^.f/c&ai. lb. lY. 6. 1 : OKOKuiv avv rolg cwovai, ri iKaarov eh/ ruv bvruv, ovSeTrdnror^ D.T/yev. Tb. III. 4. 9 seq. : co(piav de Kal (sw(ppoa'vv7jv oh iiupt^ev • . . . f ot? 6k Kal rijv dLKaioavvTjv Kai rfp^ d/.'krjv ndaav dperyv aoiav elvat). Holding these opinions, Socrates was convinced that virtue was capable of being taught, that all virtue was in truth only one, and that no one was voluntarily wicked, all wickedness resulting merely from ignorance (Xen., Memorab., III. 9 ; lY. 6; cf. Sympcs., II. 12; Plat., ApuL, 25 e, Protag., p. 329 b, seq., 352). The good (dyadov) is identical with the beautiful [KaXov) and the useful (iopeXi/iov • xpV'^tuov — Mem., lY. 6. 8 and 9 ; Protag., 333 d, 353 c, seq.). Better than good fortune (evrvxia), which is accidental, is a correct praxis, arising from insight and self-discipline [evTrpa^ia, Mem.. III. 9. 14). Self-knowledge, fulfillment of the requirement of the Delphian Apollo, "Know thyself," is the condition of practical excellence (Mem., lY. 2. 24). External goods do not advance tlieir possessor. To want nothing is divine ; to want the least possible, brings one nearest to divine perfection (Xen., Memor., I. 6. 10). Cicero's well-known declaration (Acad, post, I. 4. 15; Tusc, Y. 4. 10; cf. Diog. L., II. 21), that "Socrates called philosophy down from the heavens to earth, and introduced it into the cities and houses of men, compelling men to inquire concerning life and morals and things good and evil," indicates, in terms substantially correct, the progress of philosophy in Socrates from the cosmology and physics of his predecessors to anthropological ethics. Socrates, liowever, possessed no complete system of ethical doctrines, but only the living instinct of inquiry, and could, therefore, naturally arrive at definite ethical theorems only in conversation with others. Hence his art was intellectual midwifery (as Plato terms it, Theaet, p. 149); he enticed forth thoughts from the mind of the respondent and subjected them to examination. With his confessed ignorance. — which yet, as reposing on a lively and exact consciousness <>f the nature of true knowledge, stood higher than the pretended knowledge of his collocu- tors, — was connected the Socratic irony (npuveia), or the apparent deference of Socrates to the superior intelligence and wisdom oi others, until these vanished into nothingness before that dialectical testing, in the course o- which he compared the asserted general 'BG SOCEATE8 OF ATHENS. iruth with admitted particular facts. lu this manner Socrates exercised the vocation which he beUeved had been indicated for him by tlie Delpliic god, when, in reply to Chaerephon, the oracle declared that Socrates was the wisest of men — the vocation, namely, of examining men (e^iraaic, Plat., Apol., p. 20 seq.). He devoted his life especially to the education of youth. For the accomplishment of this end he relied on the aid of fpojf, love, which, without excluding its sensuous element, he refined and utilized as an instru- ment in the conduct of souls and the common development of his thoughts and those of his listeners. The fundamental thought in the political doctrine of Socrates is that authority prop- erly belongs to the intelligent (eTricrTdfxevoc), to him who possesses knowledge (Xenoph., Metnorab., III. 9. 10 ; cf III. 6. 14). The good ruler must be, as it were, a shepherd to those whom he rules (the Tvoifi^ Xauv, of Homer). His business, his '-virtue," is to make them happy (to evSaifiovaq ttouIv uv av r'/y^rac, Mem., III. 2. 4 ; cf. I. 2. 32). Socrates found fault with the appointment of officers by popular suflrage and by lot {Mem., I. 2. 9; in. 9. 10). The peculiar philosophical significance of Socrates lies in his logically rigorous reflec- tion upon moral questions, his combination of the spirit of research with that of doubt, and his dialectical method of demolishing seeming and conducting to true knowledge. But since reflection, from its very nature, is occupied with the universal, while action in *>very specific case relates only to the particular, it is necessary for the existence of prac- tical ability that the habit of reflection should be accompanied by a certain practical insight or fact, which also involves moral tact, although not exclusively, nor even mainly, confined to the latter. This tact respects chiefly the favorable or unfavorable result to be expected from a given action or course of action. Socrates recognized reflection as man's peculiar work; but that immediate conviction of the suitableness or unsuitableness of certain actions, of whose origin he was not conscious, but which he recognized as a sign pointing him to the right way, he piously ascribed, without subjecting it to psychological analysis, to divine agency. This divine leading is that which he designates as his daiuoviov. In the Apology of Plato (p. 31 d), Socrates says: " The reason of my remaining apart from public life is oTi fioL OeIov tl Kai 6aifi6viov yiyverai, " and he goes on to explain that from his youth up he had been ever cognizant of a voice, which only warned, but never encouraged him. This voice he terms, in the Phaedrus, "his demonic and familiar sign " (to Saijioviov te kuI TO ELudoq atjjXEiov). Accordiug to Xen., Memor., IV. 8. 5, this daifioviov interposed its warning when he was about to reflect on the defense he should make before his judges, i. e., his practical tact showed him that it was worthier of him and better for his cause, that he should give himself exclusively over to the solemn inspiration of the moment, than by rhetorical preparation to prejudice his hopes of such inspiration. Less exact is the occasional statement of Xenophon, that Socrates was shown by the Saifioviov " what things he ought to do and what not" (a te xpv '^oie'iv ;ial a. fir/, Mem., I. 4. 15; IT. 3. 12). The power from which this voice emanated is designated as "the God" (6 deog, Mem., IV. 8. 6), or "the Gods" (ol dsoi, Mem., I. 4. 15 ; IV. 3. 12), the same Gods who also speak to men by the oracles. Socrates defends the belief in the existence of gods on teleological grounds, arguing from the structure of organized beings, whose parts are subservient to the wants of the whole, and founding his reasoning on the general principle, that whatever exists for a use must be the work of intelligence (ttpe-ei fiev to. ett' oxpElEia yq'vofiEva yv(Ju7/c kpya E\vai. 'S Memor., I. 4. 4 seq. ; IV. 3. 3 seq ). The Wisdom {(ppovr/aig), says Socrates, which is present \ and rules in all that exists, determines all things according to its good pleasure. It is distinguished from the other gods as the ruler and disjwser of the universe (o rdi> b\o' SOCKATES OF ATHENS. 87 ii6a/iov cwraTTuv re kuI awixuv). The gods, like the human soul, are invisible, but make known their existence unmistakably by their operations {Memor., lY. 3. 13). Aristophanes, in the " Clouds " (which were first represented in 423 B. c), attributes to Socrates not only traits of character and doctrines which really belonged to him, but also Anaxagorean doctrines and Sophistic tendencies. The ground of the possibility of this misapprehension (or, if the expression is preferred, of this poetical license) is to be found, on the part of Socrates, not only in the fact that he stood, as a philosopher, in a certain antagonism to the general popular consciousness, and that the Anaxagorean theology had not remained without a considerable influence upon him, but more especially in the fact that, as a philosopher whose reflection was directed to the subjective processes and phenomena, and who made action dependent on such reflection, ho moved in the same general sphere with the Sophists, being specifically differentiated from them only by the peculiar direction or kind of his philosophizing. On the part of Aristophanes, it is to be found in the fact that he, as a poet and not a philosopher, and (so far as he is in earnest in his representations) as an anti-Sophistical moralist and patriotic citizen of the old school, with his conviction of the immorality and dangerousness of all philosophy, scarcely con- sidered the significance of specific differences among philosophers as worthy of his atten- tion, not to say, was unable to appreciate their essential importance. The same opinion respecting Socrates which we find in Aristophanes, seems also to have been entertained by his accusers. Meletus is described in Plato's Euihyjjhron (p. 2 b) as a young man, little known; and personally almost a stranger to Socrates. In the Platonic Apologia it is said of him that he joined in the accusation because he felt himself injured by Socrates' demonstration of the ignorance of poets respecting the nature of their art (iTrep ruv ■KOLTiTuv axBojievoq, Apol, p. 23 e). Perhaps he was a son of the poet Meletus, whom Aristophanes mentions in the "Frogs" (v. 1302). Anytus, a rich leather-dealer, was an influential demagogue, who had fled from Athens during the rule of the Thirty, and had returned fighting on the side of Thrasybulus ; Socrates says in tlie Apoloijia (p. 23 e) that he joined in the accusation as a representative of the tradesmen and politicians (vTrep tuv drjfiiovpyuv Koi tuv tvoIitikcjv axdo/ievo^), and in the Mejio (p. 94 e) it is intimated that he was displeased with the depreciatory judgment of Socrates respecting the Athenian statesmen. According to the Apology of Pseudo-Xenoplion (29 seq.), he was angry with Socrates because the latter thought liis son fitted for something better than the leather business, and had counseled liim to educate this son for something higher. Lycon felt injured by what Socrates had said of the orators [vTep tuv pr/ropuv, Apol, 23 e). The accusation ran as follows (Apol, p. 24 ; Xen., Mem., 1. 1 ; Favorinus, ap. Diog. L., II. 40) : rdSe E-ypaxparo Kal civrupoaaTo Me/lTTTOf MeA^/rov n£ri?£T)f "ZuKparei ^uxppov'KJKOv 'AXuvEKf/^ev ' adixei "LuKpcLTrjq ovg fiiv 7) ToT^iq vofjii^EL iJewf ov vofiO^uv, srspa 6e Katva 6aip6via E'lariyovuevo^, ci^ikeI 6e Koi Tovg vEoi% 6iaod£ipuv. ripr/pa- iJavarof. The ordinary objections against all philosophers were directed against Socrates, without any special investigation of the peculiar tendency or aim of his teachings {Apol., 23 d). The particular charges which Xenophon (I. ch. 2.) cites and labors to refute, appear (as Cobet, Xovae LecUones, Ijeydcn, 185S, p. 662 seq., seeks to demonstrate — yet cf. Bvichsenschiitz, in the Philologus, XXII., p. 691 seq.) to have been taken, not from tlie speeches of the accusers, but from a work by Polycrates, the rhetorician, written after the death of Socrates, in justification of the sentence. The conduct of Socrates is described by Plato witli historic fidelity in the essential outlines, in the Apol, in Grito, and in the first and last parts of the Phaedo. The Parrhesia of Socrates appeared to his judges as presumptuousness. His philosophical reflection seemed to them a violation of those ethical and religious foundations of the Athenian state, which the restored democracy were endeavoring to re-establish. The former intimacy of Socrate* 88 THE DISCIPLES OF SOCKATES. with Alcibiades, and especially with the hated aristocrat, Critias (cf. ^schines, Adv. Timarch., § 71), led to a mistrust of his doctrines and purposes. Nevertheless, the con- demnation was voted by only a small majority of voices ; according to Apol., p. 36 a, he would have been acquitted if only three, or, according to another reading, thirty of the judges had been of a different mind; so that of the probably 500 or 501 judges, either 253 or 280 must have voted for his condemnation, and 247-248 or 220-221 for his acquittal. But since, after the condemnation, he would not acknowledge himself guilty by expressing an opinion as to the punishment he should receive, but declared himself worthy, on the contrary, of being fed at the Prytaneum as a benefactor of the state, and at last only on the persuasion of his friends agreed to a fine of thirty minae, he was (according to Diog. L., II. 42) condemned to death by a majority increased by eighty votes. The execution of the sentence had to be delayed thirty days, until the return of the sacred ship, which had been sent only the day before the condemnation with an embassy to Delos. Socrates scorned as unlawful the means of escape which Crito had prepared for him. He drank the cup of poison in his prison, surrounded by his disciples and friends, with perfect steadfastness and tranquillity of soul, full of assurance that the death which was to attest his fidelity to his convictions would be most advantageous for him and for his work. The Athenians are reported soon afterward to have regretted their sentence. Yet a more general revulsion of opinion in favor of Socrates seems first to have taken place in consequence of the labors of his scholars. That the accusers were, some exiled, some put to death, as later writers relate (Diodorus, XIY. 37 ; Plut., De Invid., c. 6 ; Diog. L., II. 43, VI. 9 seq., and others) is probably only a fable, which was apparently founded on the fact that Anytus (banished, perhaps, for political reasons) died, not in Athens, but in Heraclea on the Pontus, where in later centuries his tomb was still pointed out. § 34. Ill the Socratic principle of knowledge and virtue, the prob- lem for the successors of Socrates was indicated beforehand. That problem was the development of the philosophical disciplines termed dialectic and ethics. Of his immediate disciples (so far as they were of philosophical significance) the larger number, as " partial disciples of Socrates," turned their attention predominantly to the one or the other part of this double problem ; the Megaric or Eristic school of Euclid and the Elian school of Phsedo occupying themselves almost exclusively with dialectical investigations, and the Cynic school of Antisthenes and the Hedonic or Cyrenaic school of Aristippus treat- ing, in different senses, principally of ethical questions. In each of these schools, at the same time, some one of the various types of pre- Socratic philosophy was continued and expanded. It was Plato, however, who first combined and developed into the unity of a com- prehensive system the different sides of the Socratic spirit, as well as all the legitimate elements of earlier systems. K. F. Hermann, Die philosopkische Stellung der dlteren ,^kratiker und ihrer Schulen, in his Ges. Abhandlunffen, Gottingen, 1S49, pp. 227-255. On ^schines, cf. K. F. Hermann, I>6 Aesohinis Socratici reliquiis disp. acad., Gott. 1850. On Xenopbon, cf. .\. Boeckh, De simultate, quam Plato cu»i Xenojihonte ea-ercinase fertur, Berlin, 1811 ; Niebuhr, Kl. Schriften, I., p. 467 seq. ; F. Delbriick, JCenophon, Bonn, 1829 ; Hirscbig.De disciplina* EUCLID OT MEGARA AND HIS SCHOOL. 89 Socraticae in vitam et morM antiquorum vi et efficacitate, in Xenophontis decern mille Gratcot tm Axia sal/vos in patriam reducentis eremplo rnani/esta, in : SymboUie litt.. 111., Auistcniam, 1S39 ; J. D. van HoevelL, De Xenophontin philoxophia, Groniiif;. 1640; J. H. Lindemanti, i>«« LebensaimicAt de« Xeti., CoDitz,1843; Die rel.-silU. WeltarmscJiauunff dee llerodot, Thuoydideg und Xenophon, Buriin, 1652; P. Werner, Xenoph. de rebus publ. aentent., Broslaii, ISol ; Engel, X polit. Stellung und Wirktujnkeit, Stargard, 1863 : A. Gamier, Uistoire de la Morale: Xenophon, Paris, 1S57. Cf. also the articles by X. Uufr, Philol.. VI[., 1852. pp. 63S-695; and K. F. Hermann, Philol. VIII., 337 Beq. ; and the opuscule of Georg Ferd. ItetUg, Univ.-Pr.. Berne, 1S64, on the mutual relation of the XenoplioDtic and Platonic St/mpoiia, and Am. Hug's Die Unechtheit der dem Xenophon zugeschriebenen Apologie des Socniies, in llerm. Kochly's A/cad. Vorlr. u. Bede' , Zurich, 1&59, pp. 480^439. See also H. Henkel, Xenophon und Uocrates {Progr.\ Salzwedel, 1S66 (cf. P. Sanneg, De Scholn Isocratea, disg.. Halle, 1867); and A. Nicolai, Xenophon's Vyropddie tmd seine An^icht vom Staat (Progi:), Bemburg, 1867. Xenophon, who was born about 444 b. c. (according to Cobet, 430), died about 354 B. c, and belongs to the older disciples of Socrates. His Cyropaedia is a philosophical and political novel, illustrating the fundamental Socratic principle that authority is the prerogative of the intelligent, who alone are quahfied to wield it; but it is to be confessed that the "intelli- gent " man, as depicted by Xenophon, is, as Erasmus justly says (cf. Hildebrand, Gesch. u. Syst. d. Rechts- und Staatsphibsophw, I. p. 249), "rather a prudent and skillfully calcu- lating politician than a truly wise and just ruler." Xenophon and iEschines are scarcely to be reckoned among the representatives of any special philosophical type or school. They belong rather to the class of men who, following Socrates with sincere veneration, strove, through intercourse with him, to attain to whatever was beautiful and good (/ca/.o- KayaOio). Others, as, notably, Critias and Alcibiades, sought by association with Socrates to enlarge the range of their intelligence, yet without bringing themselves permanently under his moral influence. Few out of the great number of the companions of Socrates proposed to themselves as a life-work the development of his philosophical ideas. The expression "partial disciples of Socrates," is not to be understood as implying that the men so named had only reproduced certain sides of the Socratic philosophy. On the contrary, they expanded the doctrines of their master, each in a definite province of philosophy and in a specific direction, and even their renewal of earlier philosophemes may be described rather as a self-appropriating elaboration of the same than as a mere combina- tion of them with Socratic doctrines. In like relation stands Plato to the entire body of Socratic and pre-Socratic philosophy. While Cicero's affirmation is true of the other companions of Socrates {De Orat., III. 16, 61): "ea; illius (Socratis) variis et diversis et in omnem partem diffusis disputationibus alius aliud apprehendit" Plato combined the various elements, the, so to speak, prismatically broken rays of the Socratic spirit in a new, higher, and richer unity. § 35. Euclid of Megara united the ethical principle of Socrates with the Eleatic theory of the One, to which alone true being could be ascribed. He teaches : The good is one, although called by many names, as intelligence, God, reason. The opposite of the good is without being. The good remains ever immutable and like itself The supposition that Euclid, wiihout detracting from the unity of the good or the truly existent, nor from the unity of virtue, also assumed a multiplicity of unchangeable essences, is very improbable. The method of demonstration employed by Euclid was, like that of Zeno, the indirect. The most noted of the followers of Euclid were Eubu- 90 EUCLID OF MEGARA AND HIS SCHOOL. lides the Milesian, and Alexinus — celebrated for the invention of the sophistical arguments known as the Liar, the Concealed, the Measure of Grain, the Horned Man, the Bald-head ; Diodorus Cronus — known as the author of new arguments against motion, and of the assertion that only the necessary is real and only the real is possible; and the disciple of Diodorus, Philo, the dialectician (a friend of Zeno of Cittium). Stilpo of Megara combined the Megaric philosophy with the Cynic, He argued against the doctrine of ideas. The dialectical doctrine, that nothing can be predicated except of itself, and the ethical doctrine, that the wise man is superior to pain, are ascribed to him. Oa ihe Jtegarians, cf. Georg Ludw. Spalding, Vindiciae philos. Megaricoram, Berlin, 1T93 ; Ferd. Deycks, De ilegaricorum doctrina, Bonn, 1S27; Heinr. Eitter, Bemerkungen iiOer die Philos. der Mega- rischen Schule, in the Khein. Mus. /. PMlol., II. 1828, p. 295 seq. ; Henne, Ecole de Migare, Paris. 1S43; Mallet, Uistoire de Vecole de Megareet dea ecoles d'Elia et d'Eretrie, Paris, 1S45; Hartenstein, Veber di« Bedeutung der Megarischen Schulefur die Geschichte der inetaphysischen Probleme, m the VerhandL der sdchs. Oeselhch. der TTij.*., 1848, p. 190 seq. ; Prantl, Oesch. der Logik, I. p. 33 seq. Of Euclid the Megarian (who must not be confounded with the Alexandrian mathema- tician, who lived a century later) it is related (GelL, Nod. Att., VI. 10) that, at the time when the Athenians had forbidden the Megarians, under penalty of death, to enter their city, he often ventured, for the sake of intercourse with Socrates, under cover of evening to come to Athens. Since this interdict was issued in Olymp. 87.1, Euclid must have been one of the earliest disciples of Socrates, if this story is historical. He was present at the death of Socrates (Phaedo, p. 59 c), and the greater part of the companions of Socrates are reported to have gone to him at Megara soon afterward, perhaps in order that they loo might not fall victims to the hatred of the democratic rulers in Athens against philosophy (Diog. L., II. 106; III. 6). Euclid appears to have lived and to have remained at the head of the school founded by him, during several decades after the death of Socrates. Early made familiar with the Eleatic philosophy, he modified the same, under the influence of the Socratic ethics, malting the One identical with the good. The school of Euclid is treated of by Diog. Laert., in his Vitae Philos.. II. 108 seq. The author of the dialogue Sophistes mentions (p. 246 b, seq.) a doctrine, according to which the sphere of true being was made up of a multiplicity of immaterial, absolutely unchangeable forms {di?}), accessible only to thought. Many modern inve-stigators (in par- ticular Schleiermacher, Ast, Deycks, Brandis, K. F. Hermann, Zeller, Prantl, and others) refer this doctrine to the Megarians ; others (especially Ritter? as above cited, Petersen, in the Zeitschrift fur Alterthumswiss, 1856, p. 892, and Mallet, ibid. XXXIV.) dispute this. In defense of the latter position may be urged the inconsequence which the doctrine would imply on the part of Euclid, if ascribed to him, and also the testimony of Aristotle [Metaph., I. 6 seq. ; XIII. 4), according to which Plato must be regarded as the proper author of the theory of ideas, whence it results that this theory can not have been professed by Euclid under any form. The passage in the Sophistes must, in case Plato was the author of that dialogue, be interpreted as representing the opinion of partial Platonists (cf my Unter- suchungen iiber die Echtheit und Zeitfolge Platonischer Schriftfn, Vienna, 1861, p. 277 seq.). But since the dialogue (as Schaarschmidt has .shown, cf TTeberweg in Bergmann's PhUm. Mon., III. p. 479) was probably composed by some Platonist, who modified the doctrine ol PH-iEDO OF KLI8 AND HIS SCHOOL. 91 Plato, the passage in question is rather to be considered as referring to Plato's theory of ideas, or perhaps to an interpretation of it, which the author of the dialogue thought inexact. Cf. Schaarschmidt, Die Sanimliing der Flatonischen Schriften, Bonn, 1866, p. 210 seq. The doctrine of Euclid (as given at the beginning of this section) is expressed by Diog. L. II. 106, in these words: oirof ev to ayaBbv aKecpaivero -KoXXolg bvufiaai Ka'/Mvfisvov ore /lev yap e Orat., Gron. 1823. The 38 (spurious) letters ascribed to him are edited by Boissonade in Notices et Extraits de Manuscrits de la Bibliotlieque du Roi, t. IX., Paris, 1827. F. V. Fritschc treats of the fragments by Demonax, in De Frugrn. Demonactis Philos., Rostock and Leipsic, 1866. Cf. Lucian, in his Vita Demonactis, and A. Keclinagel, Comtn. de Dejnonactis phitof., Nuremberg, 1857. Antisthenes, born at Athens in Olymp. 84.1 (444 B. c), was the son of an Athenian father and a Thracian mother (Diog. L., YI. 1). For this reason he was restricted to the gymnasium called Cynosarges. In the rhetorical form of his dialogical writings Antisthenes betrayed the influence of Gorgias' instruction. He went to Socrates first in later life, for which reason he is designated in the Sophistes (p. 251 b, where without doubt he is referred to) as the "late learner" {btpi/M6r/c). Plato {Theaet, 155 e; cf. Soph., 251 b, seq.) and Aristotle {Metaph., XIII. 3) criticise him as lacking in culture. Before becoming a disciple of Socrates, he had already given instruction in rhetoric (Diog. L., VI. 2), an occupation which he also afterward resumed. He appears to have lived thirty years after the death of Socrates (Diodorus, XV. 76). In external appearance Antisthenes, most of all the disciples of Socrates, resembled his master, with whom he stood on terms of intimate personal friendship. The titles of numerous works by Antisthenes are given in Piog. L., VI, 15-18. ANTISTHENE8 AND THE CYNIC SCHOOL. 93 Antisthenes holds fast to the Socratic principle of the unity of virtue and knowledge. He emphasizes chiefly its practical side, though not wholly neglecting its dialectical bearings. Antisthenes (according to Diog. L.. VI. 3) first defined definition Q.dyoq) as the expres- sion of the essence of the thing defined : 7M"'oq kaTiv 6 rb ri i/v fj eari dr/Z.uv (where the Imperfect ^v seems to point to the priority of objective existence before the subjective acts of knowing and naming). The simple, said Antisthenes, is indefinable : it can only be named and compared; but the composite admits of an exposition, in which the component parts are enumerated conformably to the actual order and manner of their combination. Knowledge is correct opinion based on definition (;'. e., logically accounted for), 66^a aTitfiiic fierd Xoyov (Plat., Theaet, p. 201 seq., where indeed Antisthenes is not named, but is prob- ably meant ; Arist., Metaph., VIII. 3). According to Simphc, Ad Arist. Categ., f. 66 b, 45, the following argument against the Platonic doctrine of ideas was attributed to Antis- thenes: 0) Yllarunt, l-nov /lev opoi, Imror^a (T ovx opu, "0 Plato, I see horses, but no horseness " (because, Plato is said to have replied, you have no eye for it). According to Ammon. Ad Porphyr. Isag., 22 b, Antisthenes said that the ideas were iv Tpi^Mtc ETrivolaic, from which it is hardly to be inferred that Antisthenes attempted to transform the doctrine of ideas in a subjective sense (as the Stoics did later) ; he meant probably only to describe Plato's theory of ideas as an empty fancy. Somewhat sophistical is the doctrine attributed to Antisthenes in Arist., Top., I. II, and Met., V. 29 (cf. Plat., Euthyd., 285 e), that it is impossible to contradict one's self (ovk eariv avri/JjEiv), together with the argument: either the same thing is subject of the two supposed contradictory affirmations — and then, since each thing has only one o'ikeIo^ ^oyoc, these affirmations are equivalent, and not contradictory — or the affirmations relate to different subjects, and consequently there is no contradiction. The last result of this dialectical tendency was reached in the doctrine that only identical judgments are valid (Plat.? Soph., 251 b; Arist., Metaph., V. 29). According to Diog. L., VI. 104 seq., Antisthenes recognized virtue as the supreme end of human life ; whatever is intermediate between virtue and vice was indifferent {a6id(l>opov). Virtue is sufficient to secure happiness (Diog. L., VII. 11: avrapK)] 6e tt/v apeTrjv Trpbg e'oSai/xoviav, fiTjSevoQ TzpoaihofiEVTjv on fiy "ZuKparLKfj^ 'laxvo^, Tr/v t' apETyv rcyv ipyuv Eh'ai, fifiTE Xdyurv rrXEidTuv Seo/xevt/v fii/TE /ia-^T/judruv). Pleasure is pernicious. A frequent saying of Antisthenes (according to Diog. L., VI. 3) was : iiavEirjv fia?.?jov rj r/aOsi^, " I would rather be mad than glad." The good is beautiful, evil is hateful (ibid. 12). He who has once become wise and virtuous, can not afterward cease to be such (Diog. L., VI. 105: rr/v apET^ diSoKT^ slvai Kat avaTr63?.TfTov vrcapxEtv; also in Xen., Mem., I. 2. 19: otl ovk dv TOTE 6 SiKaior MiKoc ykvocTo K. T. 1., the principal reference is probably to Antisthenes). The good is proper to us (oIkeiov), the bad is something foreign (^evikov, a7.7x>rpiov, Diog. L., VI. 12; Plat., Conviv., p. 205 e; cf Charmides, p. 163 c). No actual or possible form of government was pleasing to the Cynic. The Cynic restricts his sago to the subjective consciousness of his own virtue, isolating him from existing society, in order to make him a citizen of the world (Antisthenes, ap. Diog. L., VI. 1 1 : Tov ffo(pbv ov Kord ^ov^ KEifiEVOvq vouovg TTo7..tTEva€(T0ai, a/.Ad Kara, rbv ri}^ dpErf/r. Ibid. 12 ; rQ cto^u ^evov ovSkv oikT airopov). He demands that men return to the simplicity of a natural state. Whether it is to this position of Antisthenes that Plato refers in his picture of a natural political state (Rej-).. II. 372 a) — which he yet terms a society of swine— and in his examination of the identification of the art of conducting men with the art of the shepherd (Polit, p. 267d-275c), is doubtful; perhaps in the latter passage the only veference is (aa suggested by Henkel, Zur Gesch. der gr. Staaiswiss, II., p. 22, Salzwedel, 94 ANTISTHENES AND THE CYNIC SCHOOL. 1866) to the Homeric idea of the noi/xijv Aawv, "shepherd of the people," which appears in various passages of Xenophon's Memor. and Cyrop. (cf. Politicus, p. 301 d. and Rep., YII. p. 520 b, with Xen., Cyrop., V. 1, 24, with reference to the comparison of the human ruler with the queen-bee). That Antisthenes can not have anticipated Plato in the doctrine of the community of women and children, follows from Arist., Pol., II. 4. 1, where it is affirmed that Plato first proposed this innovation. The religious faith of the people, according to the Cynics, is as little binding on the sage as are their laws. Says Cicero (Z>e Nat. Deorum, I. 13, 32): Antisthenes in eo lHyro qui physicus inscrihitur, populares deos mulios, naturahm unum esse (dicit). The one God is not known through images. Virtue is the only true worship. Antisthenes interpreted the Homeric poems allegorically and in accordance with his philosophy. Diogenes of Sinope, through his extreme exaggeration of the principles of his teacher, developed a personality that is even comical. He is said liimself not to have repelled the epithet "Dog," which was applied to him, but only to have replied that he did not, like other dogs, bite his enemies, but only his friends, in order that he might save them. He was also called " Socrates raving " (Lunpdrr/g fiaivo/ievog). With the immorality of the times he rejected also its morality and culture. As tutor of the sons of Xeniades, at Corinth, he proceeded not without skill, on the principle of conformity to nature, in a manner similar to that demanded in modern times by Rousseau. He acquired the enduring love and respect of his pupils and of their father (Diog. L., YI. 30 seq., 74 seq.). Diog. L. (VI. 80) cites the titles of many works ascribed to Diogenes, but says that Sosicrates and Satyrus pronounced them all spurious. Diogenes designates, as the end to which all effort should tend, ewpvxfa kcI T6voq tpvxvg (in opposition to mere physical force, Stob., Florileg., VII. 18). Of the disciples of Diogenes, Crates of Thebes, a contemporary of Theophrastus the Aristotelian, is the most important (Diog. L., YI. 86 seq.) ; through his influence Hip- parchia and her brother Metrocles were won over to Cynicism. Monimus the Syracusan was also a pupil of Diogenes. Menippus of Sinope, who seems to have lived in the third century before Christ, and is mentioned by Lucian [Bh Accu-t., 33) as "one of the an- cient dogs who barked a great deal " (cf. Diog. L. , 99 seq.). was probably one of the earlier Cynics. There were probably several Cynics who bore the name Menippus. Cynicism, in its later days, degenerated more and more into insolence and indecency. It became ennobled, on the other hand, in the Stoic philosophy, through the recognition and attention given to mental culture. The Cynic's conception of virtue is imperfect from its failure to determine the positive end of moral activity, so that at last nothing remained but ostentatious asceticism. "The Cynics excluded themselves from the sphere in which is true freedom " (Hegel). After Cynicism had for a long time been lost in Stoicism — which (as Zeller happily expresses it) " gave to the doctrine of the independence of the virtuous will the basis of a comprehensive, scientific theory of the universe, and so adapted the doctrine itself more fully to the requirements of nature and human life " — it was renewed in the first century after Christ under the form of a mere preaching of morals. But it was accompanied in this phase of its existence by much empty, ostentatious display of staves and wallets, of uncut beards and hair, and ragged cloaks. Of the better class of Cynics in this later period were Demetrius, the friend of Seneca and of Thrasea P.-etus, (Enomaus of Gadara (in the time of Hadrian), who (according to Euseb., Praeparat. Evang., Y. 18 seq.) attacked the system of oracles with special violence, and Demonax of Cyprus (praised by Lucian. born about A. D. 50, died about 150), who, though holding fast to the moral and religious principles of Cynicism, advocated them rather with a Socratic mildness than with the vulgar Cynic rudeness. ARISTIPPUS AND THE CYBKNAIC SCHOOL. 95 § 38. Aristippns of Cyrene, the founder of the Crrenaic or He- donic school, and termed bj Aristotle a Sophist, sees in pleasure, which he defines as the sensation of gentle motion, the end of life. The sage aims to enjoy pleasure, without being controlled by it. Intellectual cidtnre alone fits one for true enjoyment. No one kind of pleasure is superior to anotlier ; only the degree and duration of pleasure determines its worth. "We can know only our sensations, not that which causes them. The most eminent members of the Cyrenaic school were Arete, the daughter of Aristippus, and her son, Aristippus the younger, surnamed the "mother-taught" (jiTjrpodtdaKrog)^ who first put the doctrine of Hedonism into systematic form, and was probably the author of the comparison of the three sensational conditions of trouble, pleasure, and indiflference, to tempest, gentle wind, and sea- calm, respectively ; also Theodorus, surnamed the Atheist, who taught that the particular pleasure of the moment was indifferent, and that constant cheerfulness was the end sought by the true sage, and his scholars Bio and Euliemerus, who explained the belief in the existence of gods as having begun with the veneration of distin- guisncd men ; further, Hegesias, surnamed the " death-counseling " {TTeioiddvaroq)^ — who accepted the avoidance of trouble as the highest attainable good, despaired of positive happiness, and considered life to be intrinsically valueless, — and Anniceris (the younger), who again made the feeling of pleasure the end of life, but included in his system, in addition to idiopathic pleasure, the pleasure of sympathy, and demanded a partial sacrifice of the former to the latter. The Cyrenaics are treated of, and the fragments of their writings are brought together in Mullach's Fragm. Pk. Or., II. pp. 39T-43S. Ainadeus Wendt, De pkilosophia Ci/renaica. Gott. 1S41 ; Henr. de Stein, De jMloxophia Cyrenaica^ Part I.: De vita Aristippi. Gott. 185.^ (of. bis Oesch. dex PldtonismHu. II. Gott. 1SC4, pp. 60-64). On Aristippus, cf. C. M. Wieland, Arintipp und einiye Miner Zeitgenossen. 4 vols., Leipsic, ISOO-lSflS; J. F. Thrige, De Arintippo philotiopho Cijrennico aliisque Ci/renaicii,, in his J!es Cyrenensium, Copenh. 182a There exist early monographs on individual members of the Cyrenaic sohool, one, in particular, on Arete, by J. G. Eck (Leipsia 1776), and another on Hegesias ireKridacaTot, by J. J. Kambach (Quedlin- burs, 1771). The fragments of the ctpa avaypa4>ri of Euhenierus have been collected by Wesseling (in Diod. Sic Bihl. I/ivt., torn. II., p. 623 seq.) Of Euhemenis, with special reference to Ennius, who shared in his views, Krahner treats in bis Grvndlinien siir OencJi. des VerfaJls der torn. Stnatftreliffion (iex Euhemerea* (G.- Pr.\ Kempen, ISfiO, and Otto Sieroka. />* Suhetnerv (A>j.t«. Jnaug.), Konigsberg, 1869. Aristippus of Cyrcne was led bj- the fame of Socrates to seek his acquaintance, and joined liimHelf permanently to the circle of Socrates' disciples. In criticism of an (oral) utterance of Plato, which he thought to ha%'e been too confidently delivered, he is reported to have appealed to the more modest manner of Socrates (Arist., Hhet., II. 23, p. 1398 b, 29: 96 ARISTIPPUS AND THE CYKENAIC SCHOOL. 'ApifTinirog -Kpoq TVkaTuva kTvayye?i.TiK(jTep6v rt elnovra I'jg Jiero ■ a/iAa fit/v o y' irnipor ti/liuv^ e(p7/, oi'div toiuvtot, /.iyuv tov I,coKpdTT/v). Perhaps, before the period of his intercourse with Socrates he had become famihar with the philosophy of Protagoras, of whose influence hia doctrine shows considerable traces. The customs of his rich and luxurious native city were most likely of the greatest influence in determining him to the love of pleasure. That he, together with Cleombrotus, was absent in yEgina at the time of Socrates' death, is remarked by Plato (Phaedo, 59 c), obviously with reproachful intent. Aristippus is said to have sojourned often at the courts of the elder and younger Dionysii in Sicily ; several anecdotes are connected with his residence there and his meeting with Plato, which, though historically uncertain, are at least not unhappily invented, and illustrate the accommo- dating servility of the witty Hedonist, occasionally in contrast with the uncompromising Parrhesia of the rigid moralist and idealist (Diog. L., II. 78 et al.). Aristippus seems to have taught in various places, and particidarly in his native city. He first, among the companions of Socrates, imitated the Sophists in demanding payment for his instructions (Diog. L., II. 65). It is perhaps for this reason, but probably also on account of his doc- trine of pleasure and his contempt for pure science, that Aristotle calls him a Sophist {Metaph., III. 2). According to the suppositions of H. von Stein (in the work cited above), Aristippus was born about 435 b. c, resided in Athens during a series of years commencing with 416, in 399 was in ^gina, in 389-388 was with Plato at the court of the elder Dionysius, and in 361 with the same at the court of the younger Dionysius, and, finally, after 356 was, apparently, again in Athens. Von Stein remarks, however (Gesch. des Platonisrmts, II., p. 61), on the uncertainty of the accounts on which these dates are founded. According to Diog. L., II. 83, Aristippus was older than -(fischines. The fundamental features of the Cyrenaic doctrine are certainly due to Aristippus. Xenophon [Memor.. II. 1) represents him as discussing them with Socrates; Plato refers probably to them in Rep., VI. 505 b (perhaps also in Gorg., 491 e, seq.), and most fully in the Philebus, although Aristippus is not there named. But the systematic elaboration of his doctrines seems to have been the work of his grandson, Aristippus fn/rpoSidaKTog. Aristotle names, as representing the doctrine of pleasure (Eth. A'i'c, X. 2), not Aristippus, but Eudoxus. The principle of Hedonism is described in the dialogue Phikhus, p. 66 c, in these words : Tayadbv krideTo rifilv rjdovfjv elvai iraoav kol TravTeTif/. Pleasure is the sensation of gentle motion (Diog. L., II. 85 : Ti/ioc aTveibaivE {^ Apia-nzirog) tt/v leiav KivT/aiv e'lr alaBrjaiv avaSuh- ^ievTjv). Violent motion produces pain, rest or very slight motion, indifference. That all pleasure belongs to the category of things becoming {yivecL^) and not to that of things being [ovaia), is mentioned by Plato in the dialogue Philebus (p. 53 c, cf 42 d) as the correct observation of certain "elegants" (KOfnpol), among whom Aristippus is probably to be understood as included. Yet the opposing of ytvr.aiq to ovcia is certainlj' not to be ascribed to Aristippus, but only probably the reduction of pleasure to motion (kIvtjbi^), from which Plato drew the above conclusion. No pleasure, saj^s Aristippus, is as such bad. though it may often arise from bad causes, and no j)leasure is different from another in quality or worth (Diog. L., II. 87: ///} ihaoipsiv I'/dopf/v 7/6ov7jr, cf. Phikh., p. 12d). Virtue is a good as a means to pleasure (Cic, Be Offic, III. 33, 116). The Socratic element in the doctrine of Aristippus appears in the principle of self- determination directed by knowkdge (the manner of life of the wise, says Aristippus, op. Diog. L., 68, would experience no change, though all existing laws were abrogated), and in the control of pleasure as a thing to be acquired through knoioledge and culture. The Cynics sought for independence throngh abstinence from enjoyment, Aristippus through AKISTIPPUS AND THE CTKENAIC SCHOOL. 97 the control of enjoyment in the midst of enjoyment. Thus Aristippus is cited by Stob. {Flor., 17, 18) as saying that "not he who abstains, but he who enjoys without being car- ried away, is master of his pleasures." Similarly, in Diog. L., II. 75, Aristippus is said to have required his disciples •' to govern, and not be governed by their pleasures." And, accordingly, he is further said to have expressed his relation to Lais, by saying: excj, ovk rxofiai. In a similar sense Horace says {Epist, I. 1, 18): nunc in Aristippi furtim prae- cepta relabor, et mihi res, non me rehis subjungere conor. The Cynic sage knows how to deal with himself, but Aristippus knows how to deal -with men (Diog. L., VI. 6, 58 ; II. 68, 102). To enjoy the present, says the Cyrenaic, is the true business of man ; only the present is in our power. With the Hedonic character of the ethics of Aristippus corresponds, in his theory of cognition, the restriction of our knowledge to sensations. The Cyrenaics distinguished (according to Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., VII. 91) ro -KaSog and to eKTog inroKsifievov koI tov Trddovg irotijTiKov (the affection, and the "thing in itself" which is external to us and affects us); the former exists in our consciousness {rb Tzadog r/fjlv ten (iaivo/zevov); of the "thing in itself," on the contrary, we know nothing, except that it exists. Whether the sensa- tions of other men agree with our own, we do not know; the afiBrmative is not proved by the identity of names employed. The subjectivism of the Protagorean doctrine of knowl- edge finds in these propositions its consistent completion. It is improbable that the motive of ethical Hedonism was contained in this logical doctrine ; that motive must rather be sought, in part, in the personal love of pleasure of Aristippus, and in part in the eudas- monistic element in the moral speculations of Socrates, which contained certain germs, not only for the doctrine of Antisthenes, but also for that of Aristippus (see, in particular, Xenophon, Memorah., I. 6. 7, respecting Kaprepeiv in immediate connection with the ques- tion, ibid. I. 6. 8 : tov 6e /if/ 6ov?ieiEii> yaoTpl fiijde virvu Koi Tutyveig olei ti d^Ao aiTiuTspov dvai T) TO ETepa ix^iv tovtuv i)6Uo), The essence of virtue lies, according to Socrates, in knowledge, in practical insight. But it is asked, what is the object of this insight? If the reply is, the Good, then the second question arises, in what the Good consists. If it consists in virtue itself, the definition moves in a circle. If in the useful, the useful is relative and its value is determined by that for which it is useful. But what is this last something, in whose service the useful stands 7 If Eiulaemonia, then it must be stated in what the essence of Eudaemonia consists. The most obvious answer is: Pleasure, and this answer was given by Aristippus, while the Cynics found no answer not involving them in the circle, and so did not advance beyond their objectless insight and aimless asceticism. Plato's answer was : the Idea of the Good {Rep., VI. p. 505). Later Cyrenaics (according tb Sext. E., Adv. Math., VII. 11) divided their system of doctrines into five parts: ]) Concerning that which is to be desired and shunned (goods and evils, atpcrd kuI (pevnTn); 2) Concerning the passions {jradTJ); 3) Concerning action.? (Tzpa^eig) ; 4) Concerning natural causes {alTia) ; 5) Concerning tlie guaranties of truth (nidTEiq). Hence it appears that these later Cyrenaics also treated the theory of knowledge, not as the foundation, but rather as the complement of ethics. As the control of pleasure aimed at by Aristippus was in reality incompatible with the principle that the pleasure of the moment is the highest good, some modifications in his doctrine could not but arise. Accordingly we find Theodorus adeoq (Diog. L, II. 97 seq.), not, indeed, advancing to a principle specifically different from pleasure, but yet sub- stituting for the isolated sensation a state of constant cheerfulness {xapa\ as the " end " (T^^of). But mere reflection on our general condition is not sufficient to elevate us above the changes of fortune, since our general condition is not under our control, and so Hegesias TreiaiOavaTog (Diog. L., II. 93 seq.) despaired altogether of attaining that result. 98 PLATO'S LITE. Anniceris the Younger {ibid. 96 seq. ; Clem., Strom., 11. 417 b.) sought to ennoble the Hedonic principle, by reckoning among the tilings which afford pleasure, friendship, thankfulness, and piety toward parents and fatherland, social intercourse, and the strife after honors ; yet he declared all labor for the benefit of others to be conditioned on the pleasure which our good will brings to ourselves. Later, Epicureanism reigned in the place of the Cyrenaic doctrine. Euhemerus, who lived (300 B. c.) at the court of Cassander, and favored the principles of the Cyrenaic school, exerted great influence by his work lepa avaypa^ij^ in which (according to Cic, Be Nat. Deorum, I. 42 ; Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., IX. 17, and others) he developed the opinion that the Gods (as also the Heroes) were distinguished men, to whom divine honors had been rendered after their death. In proof of this opinion he referred to the tomb of Zeus, which was then pointed out in Crete. It is indisputable that Euhemerism contains a partial truth, but unjustly generalized ; not only historical events, but natural phenomena and ethical considerations, served as a basis for the myths of the Gods, and the form of the mythological conceptions of the ancients was conditioned on various psychological motives. The one-sided explanation of Euhemerus strips the myths of the most essential part of their religious character. But for this very reason it found a more ready hearing at a time when the power of the ancient religious faith over the minds of men was gone, and in the last centuries of antiquity it was favored by many representatives of the new Christian faith. § 39. Plato, born in Athens (or JEgina) on the 7th of Thargelion, in the first year of the 88th Olympiad (May 26 or 27, 427 b. c.) or perhaps on the 7th of Thargelion, Olymp. 87.4 (June 5 or 6, 428), and originally named Aristocles, was the son of Aristo and Perictione (or Potone). The former was a descendant of Codnis ; the ancestor of Perictione was Dropides, a near relative of Solon, and she was cousin to Critias, who, after the unfortunate termination of the Pelopon- nesian war, became one of the Thirty oligarchical Tyrants. From Olymp. 93.1 till 95.1 (408 or 407 to 399 b. c.) Plato was a pupil of Socrates. After the condemnation of the latter, he went with others of Socrates' disciples to Megara, to the house of Euclid. From there it is said that he undertook a long journey, in the course of which he visited Gyrene and Egypt, and perhaps Asia Minor, whence he seems to have returned to Athens ; it is possible, however, that previous to this journey he had already returned to Athens and lived there a certain length of time. When he was about forty years old he visited the Pythagoreans in Italy, and went to Sicily, where he formed relations of friendship with Dio, the brother-in-law of the tyrant Dionysius I. Here, by his openness of speech, he so oifended the tyrant, that the latter caused him to be sold as a prisoner of war in ^gina, by Pollis, the Spartan embassador. Ransomed by Anniceris, he founded (387 or 386 b. c.) his philosophical school in the Academy. Plato undertook a second journey to Syracuse about 367 b. c, after Plato's life. 99 the death of the elder Dionysius, and a third in the year 361. The object of the second journey was to endeavor, in company with Dio, to bring the younger Dionysius, on whom the tyranny of his father had devolved, under the influence of his ethical and, so far as circum- stances permitted it, of his political theories. The object of the third was to eifect a reconciliation between Dionysius and Dio. In each case he failed to accomplish the desired results. Henceforth he lived exclusively devoted to his occupation as a philosophical teacher until his death, which took place Olymp. 108.1 (348-347, probably in the second half of the Olympiadic year, near his birthday, hence in May or June, 347 b. c). Data relative to Plato's life were recorded in antiquity by some of the immediate disciples of the philosopher, in particular by Speusippus (CAaTuivos tyKuJ/utot-, Diog. L., IV. 5; cf. IIAaTwi'ot TrfpiSdnvov, Diog. L., III. 2, cited also by Apuleius, De llabitudine Doctrinarum Flat.), Hermodorus (Simi)lic., Ad Arist. Phys., 54b, 66b; cf. Diog. L., IL 106; 111. 6), Phillippus the Opuntian (Suidas, «. h. •».), and Xenocrates (cited by Simplicius in the Scholia to Aristotle, ed. by Brandis, pp. 4"0a, 27, and 474 a, 12). Aristoxenus, the Peripatetic, also wrote a life of Plato (Diog. L., V. 35). Of later writers, Favorinus (in the time of Trajan and Hadrian) wrote Trepi XIAaTioi'os, from which work Diogenes L. drew largely. All these works have been lost. The following are extant : — Apuleius Madaurensis, De doctrina et nativitate Platonic (in the Opera Apul. ed. Oudendorp, Ley- den, 1786; ed. G. F. Hildebrand, Leipsic, 1842, 1843). Diogenes Lacrtius, De Vita et Doctr. Philos. (see above). Book III. is entirely given to Plato; §§ 1-45 treat of his life. Olympiodori Vita Platonig (in several of the complete editions of Plato's works, also in Didot's edition of Diog. L., and in the Btovpai^oi, ed. Westermann, Brunswick, 1845). This Vita forms the begin- ning of the IIpoAeyo/iiei'a 7^5 nAdraii/os <^tAo. Tiedemanno, Zweibr., 1786), the Tauchnitz edition, edited by Chr. Dan. Beck (Leipsic, 1813-19, 1829 and 1850), and the editions of Bekker (Berlin, 1816-17, with Commentary and Scholia, iOid. 1823, and Lon- don, 1S26), Ast (Leipsic, 1819-32), Gottfr. Stallbaum (Leipsic, 1821-25; 1833 seq., and in one vol., Leipsic, 1850 and 1867), and Baiter, Orelli, and Winckelmann (Zurich, 1889-^2; 1861 seq.); Greek and German edition, Leipsic, 1841 seq., Greek and Latin edition, ed. by Ch. Schneider and P.. B. Hirschig, Par. 1846-56, Greek alone, ed. K. F. Hermann, Leipsic, 1851-53. Platan's Werl-e, by F. Schleiermacher (Translations and Introductions), I. 1 and 2, II. 1-3, Berlin, 1804-10; new and improved edition, ibid. 1817-24; IIL 1 (^Republic), ibid. 1828; 3d ed. of I. and II. and 2d ed. of III. 1, ibid. 1855-62. [Schleiennacher's Introductims.to the IHalogues of Plato, translated by W. Dobson, Cambridge and London, 1836.— TV.] (Exwres de Platon, French translation by Victor Cousin, 8 vols., Paris, 1825-40. Translated into Italian by Eug. Bonghi, Opere di Platone nuovamente tradotte, Milan, 1857. Pinion's SSmmtliehe Werke, translated by Hieron. Miiller, with introductions by Karl Stein- hart, 8 vols., Leipsic, 1850-66. (Cf. Steinhart's Aphorismen iller den gegenw'drtigen Stand der PI. For- sahmmen, in the Verh. der 2b. Philol- Vers, in Halle, Leipsic, 1868, pp. 54-70.) [There are two complete translations of the works of Plato in English : The Works of Plato (with notes, abstract of Greek Com- menuries, etc.— nine of the dialogues translated by F. Sydenham), by Thomas Taylor, 5 vols., London, 1804 ; and Plato (in Bohn's Classical Library), translated by Cary, Davis, and Burges, 6 vols., London, 1852 seq. ; cf Summary and Analysis of the Dialogues of Plato, by Alfred Day (Bohn"s L.), London, 1870.— Jr.] For ancient Commentaries on Plato, see below §§ 65, 70. Timaei Lexicon voc. Platonic, ed. D. Euhnken, Leyden, 1789, it. ed., cur. G. A. Koch, Leipsic, 1S2S. For the works of Ast and K. F. Hermann on Plato, see above, § 39 ; cf. also Ast's Lexicon Platonicum, Leipsic, 1834-39. Jos. Socher, Ueber Platon's Schriften, Munich, 1820. Ed. Zeller, Platonische Stitdien (on the Leges, Menexenus, Hippias Minor, Par- menides, and on Aristotle's representation of the Platonic philosophy), Tiibingen, 1889. Franz Susemihl, Prodromus Plat. Forschungen {Greifsic. Uab.-Schr.), Gott. 1852. By the same. Die genet. Bnticickelung der Platon. Philosophie, einleitend dargestellt, 2 parts, Leipsic, 1855-60. Cf his numerous reviews of modern works on Plato, in several volumes of Jahn's Jahrbucher f. Phil. u. Pad., and his original articles in the same review and in the Philologus, especially his Platonische Forschungen in the second supple- mentary volume to the Philologus, 1863, and in the Philologus, Vol. XX., Gott., 1863, and also the intro- ductions to his translations of several of Plato's dialogues. G. F. "W. Suckow, Die iviss. und kiinstlerische Form der Plaionisohen Schriften in ihrer bisher -verboi-genen Eigenthumlichkeit dargestellt, Berlin, 1855. Ed. Munk, Die naturliche Ordnvmg der Platonischen Schriften, Berlin, 1856. Sigurd Ribbing, Genetiskframstdllning af Plato's ideeWra jtmte bifognde under sbkningar om de Platonska skrifternaa iikthei och inbordes sammanhang, Upsala, 1858, in German, Leipsic, 1863-64. H. Bonitz, Platon. Studien, Vols. I. and II. (on the Gorg., Theaet.. Euthyd., and Soph:), Vienna, 1858-60 ; Friedrich Ueberweg, TJnter- suchungen ilber die Echiheit und Zeitfolge Platonischer Schriften und ilber die Ilauptmomente aua Plato's Leben, Vienna, 1861; and Ueber den Gegensatz zwischen Geneiikern und Methcdikem und dessen Vermittlzmg (in the Zeitschr. fur Phil. u. philos. Krit., vol. 57, Halle, 1870). G. Qrote, Plato, etc. (see above, § 39, p. 96) ; 2d edition, Lond., 1867. Cf., on this work by Grote, J. St. Mill, in the Edinh. Pevino, April, 1866; Paul Janet, in the Journal des Savans, June, 1866, pp. 881-395, and Feb., 1867, pp. 114-132; Charles de E6musat, in the Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. 73, 1868, pp. 43-77, and D. Peipers, in the Gott. gelehrt. Anz., 1869, pp. 81-120, and ibid., 1870, pp. 561-610. Carl Schaarschmidt, Die Sammlimf der Platonischen Schriften, zur Seheidung der echten von den unechten untersucht, Bonn, 1866. Of the numerous editions and translations of and commentaries on single dialogues or collections of Plato's writings. 107 dialogues— all of which can not here be cited (see Engelmann's BiUiotheca Script. Claw., 5th ed., Leipsic, 1858, and also various lists of works in different volumes of the Philologue, and in works on the history of literature) — we may mention here : Dialogi selecti cura Lva1as Christliclie in Plato wid in, der Platonischen Philosophic, Hamburg, 1835 [translated by 8. K. .\8bury : 77te Christian Element in Plato, Edinbnrirh, 1861.— Tr.] ; Ferd. Christ. Baur, Das CliristUche des Platonismus olat. Ideenlehre, psychologisch entuickelt, in the '■'■ Zeit^chr: fur Vblkerp.sychologie wnd Spruchu-iss,^'' ei\. by M. Lazarus and H. Steinthal, Vol. IV., Berlin, 1866, pp. 403-464); cf Max Schneidewin's Disqwrn'^iorMtwi ph Has. de Platonis Theateti parte priori specimen (Inaug.-Diss.), Gottingen, 1865, and other opuscules by the same author on the Theaetetus, Soph., Parm., etc., and Ad. Trendelenburg's Das Ebenmaass, ein Band der Vei-wa-rulUchaft Zirischen der griechischen Archaeologie vnd Philosophie, Berlin, 1865. (The rising of the idea above the phenomenal — which is in conformity with the tendency of nature herself — is illustrated by Trendelenburg by an example from the plastic art of the Greeks, where the facial angle of Camper exceeds, in its approach to a right angle, the limits actually observed in nature; in this sense, says T., the idea is "the fundamental form or type, elevated above the mutation of phenomena, the arche- type, toward which all things tend.") On the mathematical passages in Plato's writings, Theodorus of Soli (Plutarch, De Def. Orac, ch. 82) and Thco. of Smyrna (tCiv Kara fi.a.6rii/LaTiKr)v ^pJic^'V"" *'S 'rij" Tou nKaroivo^ avayvuiaiv) in ancient times, and in modern times Mollweide (Gott. 1805, and Leipsic, 1813), C. E. Chr. Schneider (De J^umero Plat., Breslau, 1822), J. J. Fries (PVs Zahl [Pep., 540], Heidelberg, 1823), C. F. Wex (De loco mathem. in Platanis 3Ienone, Halle, 1825), Joh. Wolfg. Miiller (Commentar Uber zioei Stellen in PL's Meno u. TVieaet., Nuremberg, 1797; Priifung der con Wexi versucliten Erkl., ibid. 1826), C. F. Hermann (Da Nuinero Platonis, Marburg, 1838), E. F. August (Berlin, 1829 and 1844), and others, have written ; Adolph Benecke appears to have given the correct explanation of the geometrical hypothesis advanced in the 3Ienn^ in the Progr. des Elhinger Gymn., 1867. His merits in respect of the advancement of mathematics have been discussed (though, for the most part, without sufficiently critical investigation) by the historians of mathematics, especially by Montucla, Bossut, Chasles, Arneth, and in the monograph by C. Blass, De Plat, matheinatico (Diss.-Inaug.), Bonn, 1861 ; cf also Finger, De priinardim geoinetriae apud Graecos, Heidel- berg, 1S31, and Bretschneider, in his work on the Geometry of Euclid. Leipsic, 1870. Of the Platonic Dialectic treat : Joh. Jac. Engel, Versuch einer Methode, die Vernunftlehre atis PI. Dia- logen sn entwickeln, Berlin, 1780 ; Joh. Jac. Heinr. Nast, De meth. PL philos. docendi dialogicae, Stuttgard, 1787 ; Analysis logica dial. PI. qui inscr. Meno, ibid., 1792-93 ; Jac. Borellus, De methodo Socr. docendi exempio e dial. Plat, qui inscr. Euthyphro illustrata, Upsala, 1798; Fr. Hoffmann, Die Dialektik PL's. Munich, 1832; Karl Kiesel, in Gymn. Programmes, Cologne, 1840, Diisseldorf 1851 and 1863; Th. Wilh. Danzel (Hamburg, 1841, and Leipsic, 1845), K. Kuhn (Berlin, 1843), K. Gunther (in the Philologus. V. 1850, p. 36 seq.), Kuno Fischer, De Parm. Plat., Stuttg., 1851 ; Karl Eichlioff, Logica triwn dial. PI. eaplic. (Meno, Crito, Phaedo), G.-Pr., Duisburg, 1854; Ed. Alberti, Zur Dial, des PL, vom Theaet. bis sum Parm., Leips. 1856 (from Suppl., Vol. I., to the N. Jahrb. /. Phil. u. Pad.); H. Druon, An fuerit interna s. eso- terica PL doctr., Paris, 1860; Hiilzer, GnondzUge der Erkenntnisslehre in Plato's Staat. (G.-Pr.), Cottbus, 1861 ; C. Martinius. Ueber die Fragefttellung in den Dialogen Plato's, in the Zeitschr. /. d. Gymn.- Wesen, Berlin, 1S66, pp. 97-119 and 497-516; Rud. Alex. Reinhold Kleinpaul, Der Begr. der Erk. in PL's Theaet. (Diss.- Lips.), Gotha, 1SC7; Josef Steger, Plat. Studien, I., Innsbruck, 1869 ; W. Weicker, Amor Platottieus et disserendi ratio Socratica qua necessitudine inter sese conti7ieant7ir (G.-Pr.), Zwickau, 1869; Karl Uphues. ZHe phihs. Untersxichungen des PL Soph. u. Parm. (Dissert), Miinster, 1869; Elem. der Platan Ph. auf Grund des Soph. u. mit Riicksicht axifdie Scholastik, Soest, 1870. On the use of myths by Plato, cf C. Crome (Gymn.- Progr., Dtlsseldorf, 1S35), Alb. Jahn (Berne, 1839), Schwanitz (Leips., 1S52, Jena, 1863, Frankf-on-theM., 1!<64), Jul. Denschle (Hanau. 1854), Hahn (Die pdda- gogischen Mythen Plato's, G.-Pr., Parchim, 1860), A. Fischer (Diss. Inaug., Konigsberg, 1865). On Plato's philosophy of language, cf Friedr. Michelis (De enundatianis natura diss., Bonn, 1849), Jul. Deuschle (Marburg, 1352), Charles Lenormant (Sur le Cratyle de PL, Athens, 1861) ; cf. Ed. Alberti Die Sprachpkilosophie vor Plato, in Philol., XI. GotL 1856, pp. 681-705. PLATO'S DIALECTIC. 119 The division of philosophy into Ethics, Physics, and Dialectic (ascribed to Plato by Cic, Acad. Post, I. 5, 19) was first formally propounded (according to Sext. Emp., Adv. Math., VII. 16) by Xenocrates, the pupil of Plato; but Plato, as Sextus correctly says, was poten- tially its originator {6wd/iei apxnyog). Several of Plato's dialogues were devoted to ethics (from the Protag. to the Rtp.), one {Timaeus) was devoted especially to physics, and one {Theaeteius, with which Cratylus, on Language, and some other dialogues belong, if genu- ine) to the theory of cognition ; these dialogues were supplemented by oral lectures on the ideas and their elements (aroixsia), in which were communicated the " unwritten doctrines," which were taken down by Aristotle, Hermodorus, and others, and were prob- ably used by the author of the Soph, and the Pol. Of the genesis of the theory of ideas we find an account in Arist., Met., I. 6 and 9 (cf. XIII. 4 seq.). Aristotle describes this theory as the joint product of the Heraclitean doctrine of the constant flux of things and of the Socratic fondness for definition. The doctrine, says Aristotle, that the sensuous is subject to perpetual change, was derived by Plato from Cratylus the Heraclitean, and was ever afterward maintained liy him. Accordingly, when Plato liad learned through Socrates of conceptions which, when once rightly defined, remain ever invariable, he believed that their counterparts must not be sought in the sen- suous world, but that there must be other existences which were the objects of conceptual cognition, and these objects he named ideas. The reduction of these ideas to (ideal) num- bers is spoken of in Met., XIII. 4, as a later modification of the original doctrine. — Aristotle here gives to the logical and metaphysical side of the theory of ideas a prominence which belongs equally to the no less essential ethical and aestlietic side ; in this he was imdoubt- edly influenced by the prevalent shape assumed by the theorj^ in the later phases of its development, in which the idea of that perfection, which transcends all experience, became gradually superseded by the idea of universality — so, already, in connection with the idea of table, in Bej)., X. 596. In the Phaedrus of Plato the doctrine of ideas is presented symbolically, and yet in such form tliat the author of the dialogue must unquestionabl}^ have been already in pos- session of the theory in its logical form, although reserving its scientific presentation and demonstration for later dialogues. According to the myth in the Pliaedrus (p. 247 seq.), the pure essences, or the ideas, sit enthroned in a place beyond the vault of heaven — in particular the ideas of justice, temperance, science, etc. They are colorless, without figure, imperceptible by any sense, and accessible only to the contemplative view of the reason (vot'f). Plato portrays the process by which one rises to the knowledge of the ideas as an upward journey of the soul to the super-celestial region. In the Conviv. (p. 211 seq.) Plato defines the idea of the beautiful in opposition to individual beautiful objects, in a manner which may be taken as descriptive of the relation of each idea to the individual objects corresponding to it. In contradistinction to beautiful bodies, arts, sciences (/ca/.d atjiiara, tTctTTidevfiara, f/aOr/fiaTa), he terms the idea of the beautiful, the beautiful per se (avrb ro KOAdv), and applies to it the predicates uncorrupted, pure, unmixed (si?UKpivig, Kodapdv, auLKTov). This Beautiful per se is eternal, without origin or decay, neither increasing nor decreasing, remaining absolutely like itself (Kara, ravra c;t'ov, fiovoeuMr ael bv), not in one respect beautiful, but in another ugly ; not now beautiful, but at another time not so ; not beautiful in comparison with one object, but, in comparison with another, ugly ; not appear- ing beautiful in one place or to certain persons, but in another place or to other persons ugly. Neither can it be represented by the fancy, as if it were a material thing; nor is it a (subjective) conception or a form of knowledge (oi'Jf riq A6yo^, ov6e rig EKiar^fi?/) ; it is not in any other object, nor in any living being, not on earth nor in the heavens, but it exists as a substance of and by itself {avrb naff avrb fieff avrov). Every thing else that is beautiful 120 Plato's dialkctic. participates in it (ckeIvov fisrex^')- According to Hep., p. 523 seq., those sensible objects, which nppear in one respect small, in another large, etc., and, in short, all those objects to which contrary predicates appear applicable, are the occasion of our calling in the aid of reason for iheir consideration; reason solves the contradiction, hy separating those con- traries which appear united (forming a avyKexvfievov, concretum, a concrete object), conceiving Greatness as an idea by itself, and Smallness, in like manner, as another, and, in general, viewing the opposed predicates apart (rd 6vo KExtopiof^eva). Analogous to this are the explanations given in the Phaedo (p. 102): Simmias is large in comparison with Socrates, small in comparison with Phaedo ; but the idea of largeness and also the jiroperty of large- ness are never at the same time identical with smallness; on the contrary, the idea remains permanently what it is, and so does the quality, unless it ceases to exist. The idea has with the individual objects corresponding to it a certain community (Koivuvia), it is present with them {Trapovaia) ; but the character of this community (which, according to the comparison in the Rejmhlic between the idea of the Good and the sun, may be con- ceived as analogous to the community between the sun and the earth, through the rays of the former extending to the latter) Plato declines more precisely to define {Phaedo, p. 100 d: 074 ovK. LTi'ao ti ttouI avrb ku/mv fj ekeivov tov KaTicii eIte Trapovala ecte noivuvia [ttre] oTVTj dtj Koi oTTug TTpoGyEvofXEVT], for which ■^pocyEvojiivov is probably to be read). Tim., p. 51 seq. (cf. Rep., Y. 414 seq.): If scientific cognition and correct opinion {vovq and So^a al7jdi]g) are two different species of knowledge, then there exist ideas which possess absolute being and are cognizable, not through sense-perception, but only by thought [eISt] voovjiEva) ; but if, as it appears to some, both are identical, then the talk of ideas is mere talk Q.oyoQ, or perhaps : ideas are nothing objective, they are simply subjective conceptions), and only the sensible exists. But in fact both are different, both in their origin (through conviction ; — through persuasion) and in their nature (certainty and immutability ; — uncer- tainty and change). There are, therefore, also two different classes of objects: the one includes that which remains perpetually like itself, has not become and can not pass away, never from any source receives any thing into itself, nor itself passes into any thing else {ovte elf savTo EiaSExn/iiEvov alio aHoflsv, ovte aiirb Eig d/lAo Trot I6v) ■ the other class covers the realm of individual objects, which are homonymous (ofiuwfia) with the ideas and similar (bfioca) to them, which become and perish at definite places, and are always in motion {nEopTi- fjLEvov asi). The difference between knowledge, on the one hand, and sensible perception and correct opinion, on the other, is considered at length and demonstrated in the dialogue Theaetelm. The (fantastical) tendency, which in the Platonic theory of ideas accompanies the logically legitimate recognition of a relation in the subjective conception to objective reality, culminates in the Sophistes (p. 248), with the attribution to ideas of motion, life, animation, and reason. This tendency to hypostatize or give substance to that phase of objective reality, w^hich is known through the concept, appears, however, not to have been pushed to this extreme by Plato, but by a fraction of his Pythagorizing disciples, who (ac- cording to So2ih., 248 b) were often disputing with an opposite fraction, and among whom the inclination to hypostatize and personify abstractions was strongest. From the stand- point reached in the Platonic exposition — which was marked by the free and natural inter- play of fancy, even in the severest operations of thought, so that in it doctrines scientifically valid appear interwoven with poetic fiction — an advance in one of two directions was pos- sible. Either the poetic element could be critically sifted out and the doctrine of ideas could be transformed into the doctrine of the essence or essential nature known through and corresponding with the concept (v Kara IMyov ovaia) — which was done by Aristotle — or the poetic element might, and did, become dogmatically fixed and, in scholastic fashion, seem- ingly rationalized, as bj' some of the Platonists, in the Sophistes and Politicus, until ita PLATO's DIALECTIC. 121 inevitable replacement by Skepticism took place, as in the Middle Academy and in the dialogue Parmtnides. This dialogue may have been composed in the time immediately following Plato's death, but perhaps not till the time of the Middle Academy, and it finds a tenable position neither in the admission nor in the rejection of the ideas and the One. Myths, in which the truly existent was represented in the form of the perpetually becoming and the psychical in the form of the perceptible, were employed by Plato as a means of facilitating in his readers the subjective apprehension of his doctrines ; they were also a necessary element in the poetico-philosophical style of Plato ; but the dialectical method was considered as alone adequate to the object-matter of pure philosophical cog- nition. The allegorical or mythical style was possible in treating of the ideal itself, and for the representation of its relation to the sensible it was in so far necessary for Plato, as he was unable, on account of the (as Deuschle terms it) "not genetical, but ontical" (ontological) character of his doctrine of ideas, to conceive this relation in a purely scientific form ; but the cognition and representation of the sensible was, according to Plato, necessarily not figurative, but only probable. Such were the emoreq fivdoi (Km., p. 59 et al.), with which Plato believed we must content ourselves in the department of natural philosophy, while dialectic in all its rigor could be applied only in the field of ethics and in the investigation of cognition and the ideas. Owing to the char- acter which Plato thus ascribed to natural philosophy, the style appropriate to it was that of continuous discourse; hence in the Timaeus Plato could and was obliged to content himself with this style, which may have been already employed by the Pythagoreans. It is impossible, according to the dialogue Cratylus. that the consideration of xvo'rds should be of assistance in the investigation of the essence of things, because the con- structors of language were not sufficiently acquainted ■nath the true and permanent essence of things, but remained satisfied with the popular opinion, which Heraclitus afterward ex- pressed in its most general form, but which, in fact, is true only of objects of sense, viz. : that all things are in constant movement. The two cognitive processes, which together constitute the dialectical procedure, are described by Plato {Phaedr., 265 seq.) as the collective consideration of separate individuals and their reduction to unity of essence, on the one hand, and, on the other, the resolution of unity into plurality, following the order that exists in nature. The first process finds its term in definition, or the knowledge of the essence of the thing defined (and accord- ingly in Plato, Pep., VII. 534, he is termed a dialectician, who attains to this conception of the essence, rov Myov XaujiavovTa r^g ovaiag) ; the second is the division of the generic concept into its subordinate specific concepts. In Rep., VI. p. 510, VII. p. 533, Plato con- trasts deduction, which, from certain general presuppositions, that are, however, not neces- sarily ultimate or expressive of first principles, derives conclusions that depend on them, with the process of rising to the unconditioned {eir' apxvv am'Trddernv, wliich principle, since it is absolutely the highest, can not serve as a basis for a further progress), a process which is accomplished by the suppression of all that is merely hyjjothetical. The former procedure rules, according to Plato, in the mathematics, the latter in philosophy. In the PkcLedo (p. 101 d) it is recognized as legitimate in a philosophical investigation to base provisional inferences on inoOiaeig; but it is requisite that these hypotheses be themselves sub.sequently justified, by being deduced from others more general and more nearly approaching the nature of principles, till at last the investigation finds its legitimate terminus in the iKavov, \'iz., the absolutely highest and self-demonstrating conception. 122 Plato's dialectic. Plato, recapitulating, schematizes as follows, De Rep., VII. pp. 509 seq. and 533 seq. A. OBJECTS. NcwTT^v ytvoq [ovaia). 'ISiai. I MadT/uaTiKa. 'Oparov yevo^ {yeveai^). B. WAYS OF KNOWING Notic (or voTjaiq or kircar'^fJ.Ti). | Aidvoia. A(5fa. UiaTi^. I E'lKaaia. The highest object of knowledge (jueyiarov /ud67/fia) is the idea of the good (Rep., VI. 505 a). This idea is supreme in the realm of vowfieva and diflBcult of cognition ; it is the cause of all truth and beauty. To it objects owe their being and cognoscibility and the mind its power of cognition {Rep., VI. 508 seq.). It is superior to the Idea of Being, Rep., VI. p. 509 b : koI To'ig yiyvucKofievocq roivvv [if] fiovov to ytyvucKEodai (the power of being known) cfxivat virb tov ayadov rrapelvai, aXAa koI to elvai ts koI t^ ovaiav (being, taken predicatively) vtt' iKeivov avrocg Tzpoanvai, ovk ovaiac bvTog tov ayadov, dX/,' eti eireKEiva T^f ovaiag TTpsajSsig Kai dwafxei vTzepkxovToq (the Idea of Good bestows not only cognoscibility, but also being; it is not identical with being, but, on the contrary, ia exalted above it). Every thing which exists and is knowable, has received from God, who is the Idea of the Good, its existence and its ability to be known, because he knew that it was better that it should exist, than that it should not exist (cf Phaedo, p. 97 c). (So far as we are to understand by "being," objective being or objective reahty, a.l?]6eia, this being is not the most general idea, but is inferior in generality to the Good.) In the Philebus (p. 22) the Idea of the Good is identified with the divine reason. The general character of the Platonic teaching requires us to identify it also with the world-builder (ST/fuovpyog), who (according to Ti7n., 28 seq.), the absolutely good, contemplating the ideas {i. e., himself and the other ideas), makes all generated things, as far as practicable, also good. Of the reduction of the ideas to (ideal) numbers, of which Aristotle speaks, some traces are found in certain of the later dialogues, mostly in the Phikhos, m which the ideas are termed haSeg or [lovadec, and (in Pythagorizing fashion) nepac and aneipov are considered as elements of things. Akin to this doctrine is the doctrine of the different elements of the world-soul, in the Timaeios, and of " the same " {ravTov^ and " the other " {6dTEpov) in the Sophistes. According to the Aristotehan accounts [Metaph., I. 6 ; XIV. 1, 1087 b, 12 e< al., also in the fragments of the works De Bono and De Ideis), as also according to Hermodorus (Simplic, Ad Arist PTiys., fol. 54 b and 56 b), Plato posited two elements {aToixda) ae present in the ideas and in all existing things, namely, a form-giving {irEpao) and a form- receiving, and, in itself, formless element {dTTeipov), but the aireipov, or infinite, which the Pythagoreans had already opposed to the TreirepaGfihov, or the finite, was divided by Plato into a duad, namely, into the great and small (or more and less). In every class of objects (ideas, mathematical and sensible objects) Plato seems to have assumed such elements, and to have regarded the objects themselves as a mixture of both elements {}iikt6v). In the things which are perceived by the senses the aneipov appears to represent the matter which constitutes them (described in the Timaeus), and the irkpaq their shape and quality. In the soul of the world the iripaq is the singular, self-identical {ravTov) and indivisible (d/xepec) element, and the awEipov the heterogeneous (ddTepov) and divisible (jispiOTov) one. In numbers and geometrical figures and in the ideas Trepaq represents unity («'), while of the otTreipov several kinds are distinguished: as being the "indefinite duad" (do/xarof Judf), Plato's physics. 123 the great and small constitute the form-receiving element or substratum (the v}.?}), from which through the iv numbers are formed; long and short, broad aud narrow, high and low, are the species of the great and small, from which the form-giving principle, whose nature is unity, produces lines, surfaces, and solids (Arist., Meiaph., XIII. 9). From the One and from the a-reipov, when divided into the duad of great and small, numbers arise, sars Aristotle {Melaph., I. 6), in a natural manner (ncpvug) • but the derivation of the ideas from these depends on the reduction of the ideas to numbers. From these (ideal) numbers Plato distinguishes the numbers of mathematics, which stand between the ideas and sensible things. The ideal numbers seem to have had with Plato essentially the sense of expressions to denote higher and lower degrees of generality and — what was for him the same thing — higher and lower degrees of worth : a relation of succession (a Trporcpov Kal varepov) subsisted among them, but they could not be added (a^vfxB/^r/Toc). The kv (the One) was identified by Plato with the idea of the good (according to Aristotle, ap. Aristox., Barm. Element, II. p. 30, Meib., cf. Arist., Met., I. 6, XIV. 4). § 42. The world ((5 Koofiog) is not eternal, bat generated ; for it is perceptible by the senses and is corporeal. Time began with the world. The world is the most beautiful of all generated things; it was created by the best of artificers and modeled after an eternal and the most excellent of patterns. Matter, which existed from eternity, together with God, being absolutely devoid of quality and possessing no proper reality, was at first in disorder and assumed a variety of changing and irrational shapes, until God, who is abso- lutely good and without envy, came forth as world-builder, and transformed all for ends of good. He formed first the soul of the world, by creating from two elements of opposite nature, the one indivisible and immutable, the other divisible and mutable, a third intermediate substance, and then combining the three in one whole, and distributing this whole through space in harmonious proportions. To the soul of the world he then joined its body. In tlms bringing order and proportion to the chaotic and heaving mass of matter, he caused it to assume determinate mathematical forms. The earth arose from cubiform elements, and fir^ from elements having the shape of pyramids ; between these two came, as intermediate terms of a geometrical proportion, water, whose elements are icosahedral in form, and air, with octahedral elements. The dodecahedron is re- lated to 'L'j i^rm of the universe. Plato knew of the inclination of the ecliptic. Of the elements of the world-soul, the better, i. e., the unchangeable element, was distributed by the Demiurgus in the direction of the celestial equator. The other, the changeable element, he placed in the direction of the ecliptic. The divine part of the hu- man soul, having its seat in the head, was made like the world-soul. 124 Plato's physics. The first or indivisible element of this soul in man is, as in the soul of the world, the instrument of rational cognition, the other element is the organ of sensuous perception and representation. With the soul, whose seat is in the head, are combined in man two other souls, which Plato in tlie Phaedrus seems to conceive as pre-existing before the terrestrial life of man, but in the Timaeus describes as tied to the body, and mortal. These are the courageous soul {to dvi^weidtc, irascibility), and the appetitive soul {to i-mOvfiriTiKdv, disposition to seek for sensual pleasure and for the means of its gratification). Thus the whole or collective soul resembles the composite force of a driver and two steeds. The appetitive soul is possessed also by plants, and courage is an attribute of the (nobler) animals. The soul in general (according to the Phaedrus)^ or the cognitive soul alone (according to the Timaetis) is immortal. With this doctrine Plato • connects (in the Phaedo^ which contains his arguments for immor- tality) the ethical admonition to seek, through a life of purity and conformity to reason, the only possible deliverance from evil, and also a number of "probable arguments" in support of the doctrines of the transmigration of the soul through the bodies of men and animals for a cosmical period of ten thousand years, of the purification of those who were good citizens, but not philosophers, of the temporary punishments of sinners who are not past all healing, of the eternal damnation of incurable offenders, and of the blessedness of those whose lives were pre-eminently pure and pleasing to God. The following authors (in addition to the editors and commentators of the Timaetts and the historians of Greek philosophy) treat especially of the Platonic theology: Marsilius Ficinus (Theoloffia Platonica, Florence, 14S2), Puflendorf (i)e theol. PL, Leipsic, 1653), Oelrichs (Ductr. PI. de deo, Marburg, ITSS), Horstel (PI. docir. de deo, Leipsic, 1S04), Theoph. Ilartmann (De diis Tim. PL, Breslau, 1840), Krische (Forschttn- gen, 1.. pp. 181-204), J. Bilharz (1st PVa Speculation TheinmiisT Carlsruhe and Freiburg, 1842), Heinr. Schiirniann (Be deo Plat., Munster, 1S45), Ant. Erdtiiian (De deo et idels, Miinster, 1S56), II. L. Ahrens (De dvodecim dels PL, Hanover, 1SG4), G. F. Pettig (auia im Philebm die personL Gottheit des Plato, Oder: Pluto Icein Pantheist, Berne, 1866), and Karl Stumpf (Verhdltniss des Platani,schen, Goites eur Idee des Guten, in the Ztsehr. f. Philos., Vol. 54, Nos. 1 and 2, Halle, 1869, published also separately). Cf., also, the works on Plato's doctrine of ideas, cited above, § 41. Plato's Natural Philosophy is discussed by the various editors and translators of the Timaev-s, among ■whom Chalcidius (of the fourth century A. D. ; his translation, together with Cicero's tran.slation of a part of the TiiiiaeiM. is edited by Mullach, in Vol. 2 of his Fratjju. Philos. Graec, Paris, 18G7, pp. 147-258), of ancient translators, and Martin (Etudes sur le Timee de Platon, 2 torn., Paris, 1841), among modern trans- lators are the most important ; also, in jiarticular, by Aug. Boeckh (De Plat, eorpofis ■niundani fabrica, lleidelb., 1809, and De Plat, system, coelestiuni glohorutn et de tera iiidole astronomiae Philolaicae, ibid. 1810, both which works are printed in the third volume of the complete works of Boeckh, edited by F. Ascherson, Leipsic, 1SC6, accompanied with many additions; see also B.'s Cnteisuchwngen ilber das kott- misdie. System des Phitmi mit Bezug auf Gruppe's " EosmUsche Systeme der Griechen,'" Berlin, 1852), Reinganum (Pl.^s Ansicht von der Gestalt der Erde, in the Ztsehr. f. die A. Wiss., 1S41, No. 90), J. S. Konitzer ( Cefter Ferhdltniss, Formuiid Wesen der Elementarkorpernaeh Plato's 7?7?2tf««s, Neu-Euppin, 1S46), Wolfgang Hocheder (Z)(w kosmische System des Plato mit Besug auf die neuesten Auffassungen de» Plato's physics. 125 Mlh&n, Progr., Aschaffenbnrg, 1855; cf., per contra, Susemihl, in Jahrh. /. d. PhiloL, Vol. 75, 1857, pp. 59si-602), A. Hundert (De Platonis altera rerttm pHneipio, Progr., Cleve, 1857), Felix Bobertag (£»« materia PL q^cam fere vacant meletemata, Breslaii, 18&4), Franz Susemihl {Zur Platoninchen Encha, tologie vmd Astronomie. in the Philologtc«, Vol. XV., 1860, pp. 417-434), G. Grote {Plato's Doctrine re- specting the Rotation, of the Earth and Aristotle's Caniment vpori that Doctrine, London, 18C0; German transl. by Joa. Holzamer, Prague, ISGl ; cf., on this work by Grote, Ileinr. v. Stein, in the Gott. Am., 18G2, p. 1438, Friedr. Uebem-eg, in the Zeitschr.f. Philos., Vol. XLIL, 186.3, pp. 177-182, and particularly Bopckh, in the third volume of his collected works, 1866, pp. 294-820), C. Goebel {De coelestihus ap. Plat, motibus, G.-Pr., Wernigerode, 1869). On the Psychology of Plato: Aug. Boeckh ( Veher die Bildung der Weltseele im Timaexu.in. Daub and Creuzer'8 Studien, Vol. III., 1807, pp. 1-95, repr. with suppl. in the 3d vol, of his Ges. kl. Schriften, Leips. 1866, pp. 109-lSO), Henn. Bonitz {Disput. Plat. Dtiae : dean. mund. elem., see above, §41), F. Ueberwcg (Ueber die Platonische Weltseele, in the Ehein. Mus. f. Ph., new series, Vol. IX., 1853. pp. 37-84), Franz Susemihl (Platan. Forschiingen, III., in Philologus, Supplementband II., Ihft 2, 1861, pp. 219-250), Chaignet {De la psychalogie de Platan, Paris, 1862), J. P. Wohlstein {Maierie "und Weltseele in dem Plat. System, Inaug.-Diss., Marburg, 1863), Hartung {Auslegung dea Mdrchens von der Seele, I., Erfurt, 1866). On the Platonic doctrine of immortality and the related doctrines of jrre-existence and reminiscence : .loach. Oporinus (ffistar. crit. doctr. de immortalitate, Hamb. 1735, p. 185 seq.), Chr. Ernst von Windheim {teamen argumentorum PI. pro immort. animae hum., Gott. 1749), J. C. Gottleber {Argum. aliquot in PI. Phaedone de anim. immort. diacnssio, spec, I.-IV., Altdorf, 1765-67), Moses Mendelssohn {Phadon, Ist edition, Berlin, 1764), Gust. Fried. Wiggers {Ea-amen arg^nn. PI. pro. imm. anim. hit/m., Rostock, 1803), F. Pettovel {Disp. Acad., Berlin, 1815), Knnhardt {Teber PI. Phaedon, Lubeck, 1817), Adalb. Schmidt {Argwn. pro imm. anim., Halle, 1827; PL's rn.^terhUchl-eitslehre, Progr., Ilalle, 1835), J. W. Braut ( Ueber die at'a^ivTjat?, Brandenb. 1832), C. F. Hermann (De immortalitatis notione in Plat. Phaed., Marb. 1835; De partibus animae immortalibus sec. Platonem, Gott. 1850), Ludw. Hase (Pn, Magdeb. 1843), Voigtlander (De animorum praeexristentia. Diss., Berlin, 1844), K. Ph. Fischer (PI. de immort. an. doctr., Eriangen, 1845), Ilerm. Schmidt (G.-Progr., Wittenb. 1845; Halle, 1850-52; Zur Kritik und ErkL v. PL's Phaedon, in the Philol., V. 18.50, p. 710 seq.; Zeitxchr.f. Gymn.-Wesen, II. 1848, Nos. 10 and 11, and VI. 1852, Nos. 5, 6, 7; PL's Phaedon erkl., G.-Pr., Wittenberg, 1S.54), Franz Susemihl (Philologus, V. 1850, p. 385 seq.; Jahn's Jahrb., Vol. 73, 1856, pp. 236-240; Philologus, XV., and Suppl., Vol. II., 219 seq.) M. Speck (fi^.-Pr., Breslau, 1858), L. H. O. Muller (Die Eschatologie Plato''a und Cicero's im Verhaltniss eum Christenthum, Jever. 1854), K. Eichhoff (^.-Pr., Duisburg, ISM, pp. 11-18), A. J. Kahlert (G.-Pr. von Czernowitz. Vienna, 1S55). Ch. Prince (/V., Tfeufohatel, 1859), Bucher(P/. spec. Bewf.d. UnMerbl. der menschl. Seele, Inaug. Diss., Gott. 1861), Drosilm (Die Mythen iiher Prd- und Post- Existens, G.-Pr., Coslin, 1861), K. Silberschlag (Die Grundlehren PL iiber das Verhaliniss des MenscJien zu Gott und das Leben nach dem, Tode in ihrer Beziehung eu den Mythen des Alterthmns, in the Deutsch. Mus., 1862, No. 41), F. Gloel (De argumentorum in Plat. Phaedone cohaerentia, G.-Pr., Magdeb. 1868). Alb. Bischoff (Pl.''s Phaedon eine Reihe von Betrachtaingen zur Erkldrung und Beurtheilung des Gesprdchs, Er- iangen, 1866; cf. F. Mezger, in the ZeitschriftfUr luth. Theologie, 1868, No. 1, pp. 80-86), A. Boelke (Ueber PL's Beweisef'ur die Unsterbl. der Seele Rostock and Berlin, 1869), Paul Zimmermann (Die Vnsterbl. der Seele in Plata's Phaedo, Leipsic, 1869). Plato opens tho exposition of his physics in the Tim. (p. 28 seq.) with the affirmation that since tho world bears the form of yeveciq (development, becoming) and not that of true being (ovala), notliing absolutely certain can be laid down in this field of investigation, but only what is probable {e'ikotec ni/doi). Our knowledge of nature bears not the charac- ters of science (eTziaTT]fjLTJ) or of the knowledge of truth (a?i;ftrici), but those of belief (T/trrir). Plato says {Tim., p. 29c): "What being is to becoming, that is truth to faith" (6, re Trsp irpbc ytveatv ovala, tovto Trpbg tiotiv aXi/Osia). What Plato says in the Phaedo, p. 114 d, explains his idea of the probable: "Firmly to assert that this is exactly as I have expressed it, befits not a man of intelligence; yet that it is either so or something like it {on f/ rai-r' ecrnv fj roiavr' arra) must certainly bo assumed. Plato raises in Ti^n., p. 28 a, the question whether tho world is without origin, eternal ab initio, or whether it had a beginning, and answers it by saying, that on account of the visibility of the world, the second, and not the first, alternative must be adopted as the truth. But the world is the best of generated, as its author is of eternal existences. 126 Plato's physics. God's goodness is the reason of the construction of the world. Phaedrus, p. 247 a : " Envy stands outside of the divine choir." Timaeus, p. 29 e : He (God) was good ; but the good are never envious with regard to any thing. Being, therefore, without env_v, he phtnned all things so that they should be as nearly as possible like himself: " ayadog t/v (6 dTjfiLorp- yo^, the supreme God, the constructor of the world), ayadcj Se ovdelg ncpl ovSevb^ ovSiivoTe iyylyverai ^ovo^. tovtov 6' £/crdf tjv navra bri ^akiara ipovA.ijdr] yeviadai irapan^.Tjoia aiirC). (Cf also Arist., Metaph., I. 2, p. 983 b, 2. Tet the notion of the envy of the gods, which Plato and Aristotle combat, involves also an ethical and religious element in so far as by " envy " it is intended to indicate the reaction of the universal order against all individual disproportion or excess.) The adaptation and order of the world have their ground in the world-constructing reason; whatever of blind necessity is manifest in it arises from the nature of matter. Mechanical causes are only ^walria (concomitants) of the final causes. When matter (as Se^afiivrj, or form-receiving principle) assumed orderly shapes, there arose first the four elements: fire, air, water, and earth. Between the two extremes, fire and earth, of which the former was necessary for the visibility, the latter for the palpa- bility of things, a bond of connection was needed ; but the most beautiful of bonds is pro- portion, which in the present case, where solid bodies are concerned, must be twofold. (In the case of plane figures one intermediate term is sufficient ; the side of a square, whose contents are the double of a given square, is determined by the proportion 1: x: : x: 2, where x = V2, the side of the given square being = 1 ; and this given square, whose contents = 1 x 1, is to the rectangle, one of whose sides — 1, the other = V2, and whose contents therefore = 1 x \,'2, as the latter is to the square whose con- tents = i^2 X V2 r= 2. But in the case of solids, two intermediate terms are necessary; the length of the side of a cube whose contents rr 2, is determined by the two propor- tions : \ : x: : x: y, and x : y: : y: 2, where a; =r ' V 2 and 2/ = ^ V 2", and the cube, whose contents = 1 x 1 x 1, is to the parallelepiped, whose contents = 1 x 1 x V2, as the latter is to the parallclopiped = 1 x ' v^2 x * |/2; and the latter again stands in a like relation to the cube whose contents = ' V2 x ^ V2 x " V2 = 2. "Whatever is true, in this respect, of squares and cubes, is applicable to all mutually similar forms, though only to such. A comprehensive and exact examination and explanation of all these relations is given by Boeckh in the Comm. acad. de Platonica corporis immdani fabrica confiati ex elennentis geometrica ratione concinnatis, Heidelberg, 1809, reprinted in Boeckh's Gts. kl. Schr., Vol. III., pp. 229-252, together with an annexed Excursus, pp. 253-265.) Fire must accord- ingly be related to air, as air to water, and air to water, as water to earth. The distances of the celestial spheres from each other are proportioned to the different lengths of the strings which produce harmonious tones. The earth is at rest in the center of the universe. It is wound around the (adamantine) bar or distaff (r/Aa/cdr;?), which Plato (according to Grote, doctrinally, according to Boeckh, mytliically) represents as extending from one end of the axis of the world to the other ; the sky and also the planets revolve around this distaff once in every twenty-four hours ; but the planets have besides a motion peculiar to themselves, which is occasioned by the c^6vdv7joi, which lie about the spindle and together constitute the whorl, since these, while participating in the revolving motion of the heavens, rotate at the same time, but more slowly, in the opposite direction ; the earth remains unmoved. If the distaff (^Aa/cdr?/) of the spindle {aTpaKTo^) is conceived as motionless (as it is by Boeckh), the earth is to be regarded as simply rolled into a ball around it and firmly attached to it ; but if it is included in the daily rotation of the heavens, the earth must not be conceived (as it is by Grote) as partaking in this motion, but the (absolute) rest of the earth must be explained by a (relative) motion of the same Plato's physics. 127 around the distaff in the opposite direction. If the distance of the moon from the earth is represented by 1, then that of the sun — 2, that of Venus = 3, that of Mercury = 4, tliat of Mars = 8, that of Jupiter =r 9, that of Saturn = 27. The incHnation of the ecHptic is explained by Plato as a result of the inferior perfection of the spheres underneath the sphere of the fixed stars. According to a statement of Theophrastus (see Plutarch., Plat. Qu., 8, cf Numa, ch. 11), Plato in his old age no longer attributed to the earth (but to the central fire probably) the occupancy of the center of the world; this accoimt, in itself alto- gether credible as an oral utterance of Plato, is nevertheless not easily reconciled with the fact that in the Zjeges — which was written after the Rep., and beyond question also after the Timaeus, and that, too, according to late but apparently trustworthy tradition, not by Plato, but by Philip the Opuntian, from a sketch made by Plato — the doctrine contained in the Timaeas is reaffirmed. Cf. Boeckh, Bas kosmische System des Plato, Berlin, 1852, pp. 144-150. The soul of the world is older than its body : for its office is to rule, and it is not fitting that the younger should rule the older. It must unite in itself the elements of all orders of ideal and material existences, in order that it may be able to know and under- stand them (Tim., p. 34 seq.). Plato says {Tim., p. 35 seq.), that the Indivisible in the soul enables it to have knowledge of the ideas, while the Divisible mediates its knowledge of sensible objects. The third or mixed element may be considered as the organ of mathe- matical knowledge (or perhaps of all particular, distinct acts of cognition?) Tliese cogni- tive faculties pertain exclusively to that part (loyiariKov) of the human soul which resides in the head. The hypothesis that the human soul has three parts {kTridvfiriTtKov, dv/ioei6eg, 2ayca-iK6v) seems to have been framed in intentional correspondence with the natural gradation : plant, animal, man (Tim., 77 b; Hep., IV. 441 b); this distinction, however, of the orders of the natural kingdom was not so distinctly marked or attended to by Plato as by Aristotle. The supremacy of each of these different parts, taken in their order, is illustrated in the gain-loving Phenicians and Egyptians, the courageous Barbarians of the North, and the culture-loving Hellenes {Rep., IV. 435 e to 436 a). The doctrine of the immortality of the soul is founded by Plato, in tlie Ph'aedrus (p. 245), on the nature of the soul, as the self-moving principle of all motion : in the Rep. (X. 609), on the fact, that the life of the soul is not destroyed by moral badness, which yet, as the natural evil and enemy of the soul, ought, if any thing could effect this, to effect its destruction ; in the Tim. (p. 41), on the goodness of God, who, notwithstanding that the nature of the soul, as a generated essence, subjects it to the possibilitj' of destruction, can not will that what has been put together in so beautiful a manner should again be dis- solved; in the Phaedo, finally (pp. 62-107), this doctrine is supported, partly by an argument drawn from the nature of the subjective activity of the philosopher, whose striving after knowledge involves the desire for incorporeal existence, i. e., the desire to die, and partly on a series of objective arguments. The first of these arguments is founded on the cosmologic.'d law of the transition of contraries into each otlier, according to wliich law, just as the living die, so the dead must return to life: the second, on the nature of knowledge, as a species of reminiscence (cf Meno, p. 80 seq., where the pre-existence of the soul is inferred from the nature of the act of mathematical and philosophical learning, whose only satisfactory explanation, it is argued, is found in the hypothesis of the soul's recollection of ideas which had been perceived by the intellect in a pre-terrestrial life) ; the third, on the relationship between the soul, as an invisible essence, and the ideas, as invisil)le, simple, and indestructible objects; the fourth argument, in reply to the objection (of Simmias), that the soul is perliaps only the resultante and, as it were, the harmony of the 128 Plato's ethics. functions of the body, is based partly on the previously demonstrated pre-existence of the soul, and partly on the qualification of the soul to rule the body, and on its nature as a sub- stance, so that, says Plato, while one harmony can be more a harmony than another, one soul can not be more or less soul than any other, and the soul, if virtuous, may have har- mony for its attribute ; the fifth argument, finally, and the one which Plato himself deemed decisive, was in reply to the objection (of Cebes), that although the soul perhaps survived the body, it might yet be not absolutely indestructible, and was founded on the necessarv participation of the soul in the idea of life, whence the inference that the soul can never bo lifeless, a dead soul would be a contradiction, and consequently immortality and imper- ishableuess must be predicated of it. In this argument, it is assumed that that, whoso nature is such that, so long as it exists, it neither is nor can be dead, can never cease to exist; this assumption is connected with the double sense in which aOdvarog is employed, a. in the sense, which results from the general tenor of the argument, viz. : not dead ; I. in the sense corresponding to ordinary usage: immortal, § 43. The highest good is, according to Plato, not pleasure, nor knowledge alone, but the greatest possible likeness to God, as the absolutely good. The virtue of the human soul is its fitness for its proper work. It includes various particular virtues, which form a system based on the classification of the faculties or parts of the human soul. The virtue of the cognitive part of the soul is the knowledge of the good, or wisdom [oofla)- that of the courageous part is valor (av(5pta), which consists in preserving correct and legiti- mate ideas of what is to be feared and what is not to be feared ; the virtue of the appetitive part is temperance (moderation or self-control, self-direction, aafgoovvr])^ which consists in the agreement of the better and worse parts of the soul, as to which should rule ; justice, finally (diKaioovvrj),^ is the universal virtue, and consists in the fulfill- ment by each part of its peculiar function. Piety {daiorrjg) is justice with reference to the gods. One of the ramifications of wisdom is philosophical love, or the joint striving of two souls for the attain- ment of philosophical knowledge. Yirtue should be desired, not from motives of reward and punishment, but because it is in itself the health and beauty of the soul. To do injustice is worse than to suflTer injustice. The state is the individual on a large scale. The highest mis- sion of the state is the training of the citizens to virtue. In the ideal state each of the three principal functions and coiTesponding virtues of the soul is represented by a particular class of citizens. These are, 1) the rulers, whose virtue is wisdom ; 2) the guardians or warriors, whose virtue is valor; and 3) the manual laborers and tradesmen, whose virtue is self-restraint and willing obedience. The rulers and Plato's ethics. ^ 129 warriors are to labor only for the realization of the true and the good ; all individual interests whatsoever are forbidden them, and they are all required to form in the strictest sense one family, without mar- riage and without private property. The condition of the realization of the ideal state is that philosophers should at some time become rulers, or that rulers should philosophize rightly. The Laws contains a later draught by Plato of the second-best form of the state, which, he says, it would be more easy to realize. In this scheme, the tlieory of ideas disappears from the programme for the education of the rulers, and the chief stress is laid on their mathematical schooling ; the kind of religious worship here prescribed was also less alien to the general beliefs of the Hellenic people, and marriage and private property were allowed as a concession to individual interests. In the Platonic state, that Art alone finds a place which consists in the imitation of the good. In tbis category are included philo- sophical dramas, such as Plato's own dialogues, the narration of myths (expurgated and ethically applied), and, in particular, reli- gious lyrics (containing the praises of gods and also of noble men). All art which is devoted to the imitation of the phenomenal world, in which good and bad are commingled, is excluded. Art and the Beautiful hold their place in Plato's system only in subordination to the good. The Beautiful, whose essence lies, according to Plato, in the fitness and symmetry resulting from the relation of the concept to the plurality of phenomena, is nevertheless for him, though not the highest of ideas, yet that one which imparts to its sensible copies the highest brilliancy, since it, most of all ideas, shines through its copies. The education of youth was regulated by Plato in accordance with the principle of a gradual advance to the cognition of the ideas and to the corresponding practical activity in the state, so that only the best-qualified persons could rise to the highest stations, while the rest were destined to exercise inferior practical functions. The cognition of the idea of the good was reserved as a final topic of instruction for the most mature. The following .iiitliors, in addition to the authors cited above, nd % 41, treat of Plato's Ethics and Politics in their relation to the national character of the Greeks and to Christianity : Grotefend (Vommentatio in qua doctrina Platonis ethioa cum chrixUana comparatur ita, lit utriugque turn consenmix, turn din- crimen eirponatur, Gott. 1S21), I. Ogienskl {Pericles et Plato, Breslaii, 1S8S), Jul. Guil. Ludw. Mehlia {Comparatio Pint, doctrinae de rep. cum, Christiana de regno divino doc'rirui, Gott 1S45), K. F. ner- mann {Die hist. Elementedes Platon. Stke. Vol. VI., Berlin, 1865, pp. 14-25), Jos. Reber (PL und die Poesie, Inaug.-Diss., Munich, 18G4), Max Eemy (PL doct. de artibus liberal., Halle, 1864), A. H. Raabe (De poetica Plat, philos. natvra, in amoris expositione conspieua, Rotterdam, 1866), C. von Jan (Die Toni*ipp. Pldc, P.iris, 1S38; M. A. Fischer, De iip. vita, Kast. 1S45; Krische, Forschun(/en, I. pp. 247-2.'S. On Xenocrates: Wynpersse, Diatribe de Xenocrate C/ialcedonio, Leyden, 1S22; Krische, Forschungen. I. pp. 311-324. On Heraclides : Roulez, De Vit. et Scnptis fferaclidis Pontici, Louvain,lS2S; E. Deswert, De HerofUde Pont. ibid. ISJ^O; Fianz Schmidt, De Ileraclidae Pont, et Dicaearchi Jfes-seuii dialogis diper- ditis (Diss. Jnaug.),BTes]nv.lb6-i ; cf. Muller, Fragm. Hist. Gr., II. p. 197 seq. ; Krische, Forsc/iuiigen, 1. j.p. S24-336. On Eudoxus; L. Ideler, Veber Eiidoo'w, in the Ah?i. der £erl. Akad d. TI7«s., 1S2&, 1S30; Aup. Boecfeh, Ueber die vierydhrigen Sonnenkreise der Alten. vorzUglich den Eudna-ischen, Berlin, 1S63; cf., George Cornewall Lewis, Historical Survey of the Ancient Astronomy, ch. III., sect. 8. p. 146 seq. On Eudoxus of Cnidus, the geographer (about 255 b. c), who must be distinguiBhed from Eudoxus the pbilobo- 134 THE OLD, MroOLE, AND NEW ACADEMIES. pher, and who was the author of a y^s >repio8os, as also on Geminus the astronomer (about 137 b. c), cf. H. BrandfS, in the Jahrb. f. Ph., LXIV. 1852, p. 268 seq., and in the Jahrb. des Vereins/ilr Erdkunde zu Leipsig, Leips. 1866. On Hermodorus, cf. Ed. Zeller, 2>e Hemwdoro Ephesdo et Hermodoro Platmiis di»- oipvlo, Marb. 1859. On Grantor: F. Schneider, De Oranloris SolennUi philonophi Acadetnicomim philo- tophiae addicti libro, gzii n-epl 7rei/0ovs inscribitor commentatio, in the Zeitmhr.filr die Alterthumfiwins, 1836, Nos. 104, 105; M. Herm. Ed, Meier, Ueber die Schrift des Krantor -inpi TtivOovi;, Halle, 1840; Frid. KsLyaer, De Crantore AcMlemico <^i««., Heidelb., 1841. On the later Academics: Fr. Dor. Gerlach, aiv6fin'a, or " what uniform and regulated motions can be assumed (to explain the phenomena of the universe), whose consequences will not be in contradiction with the phenomena." The form of this question gives evidence of a consciousness already very highly developed, of the correct method of investigation, and • involves only the error of supposing that mathematical regularity as such necessarily belongs to the actual movements of nature, so that the research for real forces, from whose activity these motions arise, seemed unnecessary. Eudoxus is said to have proposed several hypotheses in reply to the above Platonic ques- tion, but decided in favor of the immobility of the earth. Heraclides, on the contrary (with Ecphantus the Pythagorean, whom he also followed in his doctrine of atoms), decided for the theory of the revolution of the earth on its axis (Plut., Flac. Philos., III. 13). Hera- clides regarded the world as infinite in extent (Stob., Ed., I. 440). Hermodorus was an immediate pupil of Plato, and we are indebted to him for a number of notices respecting the life and doctrines of his master (see above, § 39, p. 100, and § 41). From his work on Plato, Dercyllides (see below, § 65) borrowed data relative to the Platonic Stoicheiology. Perhaps it was these "unwritten doctrines" which constituted the Myoi, with which Hermodorus traded in Sicily, whence the saying to which Cicero alludes {Ad Att., XTII. 21 : 7.6yoiaiv 'Ep/u66upog efiTropsveTat). Philip the Op>mtian, the mathematician and astronomer (cf. Boeckh, Sonnenkreise. p. 34 seq.), is the reputed author of the Epinomis. The revision and publication of the manu- script of the Leges, which was left by Plato unfinished, are also ascribed to him (Diog. L., III. 37, and Suidas sub voce (piMao(pog). Polemo, who followed Xenocrates as head of the school (314-270). gave his atten- tion mainly to ethics. He demanded (according to Diog. L., IV. 18) that men should exercise themselves more in right acting than in dialectic. Cicero gives (Acad. Pr., 11. 43) the following as his ethical principle: honeste vivere, fruentem rebus iis, quas primers homini natura conciliet. To liis intiuence on Zeno, Cicero bears witness, De Fin., TV. 16, 45. Crantor is termed by Proclus {Ad Tim., p. 24) the earliest expounder of Platonic writings. As the living tradition of Plato's doctrines died out, his disciples began more and more to consult his written works. Crantor's work on Sorrow {rrepl irevdoix) is praised by Cicero {Tusc, I. 48, 115; cf. III. 6, 12). He assigns (in a fragment, ap. Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., XI. 51-58) the first place among good things to virtue, the second to health, the third to pleasure, and the fourth to riches. He combats the Stoic requirement that the natural feehngs should be suppressed (in accord with Plat., R^.^ 136 THE OLD, MIDDLE, AND Ni:W ACADEMIES. X. 603 e). Grantor died before Polemo (Diog. Laer., IV. 27). Crates directed the school after Polemo. The successor of Crates was Arcesilas or Arcesilaus, who was born, about 315 b. c, at Pitane iu yEoha, and had at first attended upon the instructions of Theophrastus, but after- ward became a pupil of Crantor, Polemo, and Crates. Of his habit of abstaining (eTroxy) from judgment and of disputing on both sides, Cicero tells us {De Orat, III. 18 : quern ferunt primum instituisse, non quid ipse sentiret ostendere, sed contra id quod quisque se sentire dixisstt, disputane; of. Diog. L., IV. 28: npuroq 6e e'lq kKcirepov enex^ipv'^^''')- He is said (Cic, Acad. Post., I. 12) to have taught that we can know nothing, not even the fact of our inability to know. But this (according to Sext. Emp., Hyp. Fyrrh., I. 234 seq., and others) was only for the discipline and testing of his pupils, to the best-endowed of whom he was accustomed afterward to communicate the Platonic doctrines. Of this explanation (ac- cepted by Geffers, disputed by Zeller) we may admit that, in view of the nature of the case, it is credible, in so far as a head of the Academy could hardly break at once and completely with the theory of ideas and the doctrines founded on it ; only this explanation does not necessarily imply an unconditional assent to that theory and to those doctrines. According to Cic, Acad. Post, I. 12, Arcesilas combated unceasingly the Stoic Zeno. He contested especially (according to Sext. Emp., Hyp. Pyrrh., I. 233 seq.. Adv. Math., VII. 153 seq.) the naralrj-ilnq and avyKaradeaig of the Stoics (see below, § 53), j^et recognized the attainability of the probable {to evXoyov), and found in the latter the norm for practical conduct. Aristo, the Stoic, parodying Hiad, VI. 181, said (according to Diog. L., IV. 33, and Sext. Emp., Pyrrhon. Hypotypos., I. 232) that Arcesilas was: ■trpoade H/mtuv, brndev Jlvppuv, jiiaaoq AioSupot;, or, " Plato in front, Pyrrho behind, and Diodorus in the middle." Arcesilas was followed in the leadership of the school (241 B. c.) by Lacydes, Lacydes (in 215) by Telecles and Evander, the latter by Hegesinus, and he by Carneades. Carneades of Cyrene (214-129; he came as an embassador to Rome in the year 155 E. c, together with Diogenes the Stoic and Critolaus the Peripatetic) went still farther in the direction of Skepticism. He disputed, in particular, the theses of Chrysippus the Stoic. Expanding the skeptical arguments of Arcesilas, he declared knowledge to be impossible, and the results of dogmatic philosophy to be uncertain. His pupil, Clitomachus (who fol- lowed him in the presidency of the School, 129 B. c), is related (Cic, Acad. Pr., II. ch. 45) to have said: "it had never become clear to him what the personal opinion of Carneades (in ethics) was." Cicero {De Orat, I. 11) calls Carneades, as an orator, hominem omnium in dicendo, id ferehaiit, acerrimum et copiosissimum. While at Rome he is said to have delivered on one day a discourse in praise of justice, and on the next to have demonstrated, on the contrary, that justice was incompatible with the actual circumstances in which men live, and in particular to have hazarded the observation, that if the Romans wished to practice justice in their political relations, they would be obliged to restore to the rightful owners all that they had taken away by force of arms, and then return to their huts (Laetant., Inst., V. 14 seq.). To the doctrine of cognition his most important contribution was the theory of probability {e/j.(paGic, •mdav6Trj(;). He distinguished three principal degrees of probability: a representation may be, namely, either 1) probable, when con- sidered by itself alone ; or 2) probable and unimpeached, when compared with others ; or 3) probable, unimpeached, and in all respects confirmed (Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math., VII. 166), Philo of Larissa, a pupil of Clitomachus, came in the time of the first Mithridatio war to Rome, where Cicero heard him (Cic, Brut, 89). He appears to have given hii aeistotle's LIFE. 137 attention chiefly to Ethics, and, in treating the subject, to have inclined toward the method of the Stoics, although remaining in general their opponent. Antiochus of Ascalon, Philo's disciple, sought to show that the chief doctrines of the Stoics were to be found already in Plato (Sext. Emp., Pyrrh. Hyp., I. 235). He differed from the Stoics in rejecting the doctrine of the equality of all vices, and in holding that virtue alone, though producing a happy life, is not productive of the happiest of lives ; in other respects he agreed with them almost entirely (Cic, Acad. Pr., II. 43). § 45. Aristotle, born 384 b. c. (Olymp. 99.1) at Stagira (or Sta- geiros) in Thrace, and son of the physician Nicomachus, became in his eighteenth year (367) a pupil of Plato, and remained such for twenty years. After Plato's death (347) he repaired with Xenocrates to the court of Hermias, the ruler of Atarneus and Assos in Mysia. He remained there nearly three years, at the expiration of which time he went to Mitylene and afterward (343) to the court of Philip, king of Macedonia, where he lived more than seven 3'ears, until the death of that monarch. He was the most influential tutor of Alexan- der from the thirteenth to the sixteenth years of the life of the latter (343-340). Soon after Alexander's accession to the throne, Aristotle founded his school in the Lyceum, over which he presided twelve years. After the death of Alexander, the anti-Macedonian party at Athens preferred an accusation against Aristotle, for which religion was called upon to furnish the pretext. To avoid persecution, Aris- totle retired to Chalcis, where he soon afterward died, Olymp. 114.3 (322 B. c.) in the sixty-third year of his age On the life of Aristotle, compare Dionys. Hal., Epint. ad Anitnaeum, I. 5; Diog. Laert., V. 1-S5; Buidas (the work edited by Menagiua agrees in its biographical part word for -word with the first and larger part of the article by Suidas; but there is appended to it a list of the writings of Aristotle, which reproduces, with some omissions and some additions, the catalogue of Diogenes Laertius ; cf. Curt Wachstnuth, De Fotitibtis Suidae, ia Symbola philol. BonneJisium, I. p. 13S) ; (Pseudo-) Ilesychius; (Pseudo-) Ammonius, Vita Arint., with which the Vita e cod. Murciano, publishi-d by L. lloblje, Leyden, 1861, agrees almost throughout; an old Latin work on the life of Aristotle, ee Leihnitii studii^ Aristotelicis, inest inediium Leibnitii, Diss. Jnaiig., Berlin, 1867.) In the last decades of the eighteenth century the historic instinct became more and more awakened, and to this fact the works of Aristotle owed the new appreciation of their great value as documents exponential of the historical de- velopment of philosophy. Thus the interest in the works of Aristotle was renewed, and this interest has gone on constantly increasing during the nineteenth century up to the present day. The most important complete edition of the present century is that prepared under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences at Berlin, Vols. L and 11.. Arist-oteles Graece ex ree. Imrn. Bekkeri, Berlin, 1S31; Vol. III., Arintotelet Latine interpretibus variis, ibid. 1831 ; Vol. IV., Scholia in Aristotelem collegit Chri^it. Aug. Brandig, ibid. 1836; Bekker's text was reprinted at Oxford in 1837, and Bekker has himself published the principal works of Aristotle separately, followed, with few exceptions, the text of the complete edition, but, unfor. tunately, without annexing the Varietas led. contained in the latter. Didot has published at Paris an edition, edited by Dubner, Bussemaker, and Heitz (1848-69), which is valuable. Stereotyped editions were published by Tauchnitz, at Leipsic. in 1831-S2 and 1843. German translations of most of Aristotle's works are contained in Metzler's collection (translated by K. L. Roth, K. Zell, L. Spengel, Chr. Walz, F. A. Krenz, Ph. H. Kiilb, J. Rieckher, and C. F. Schnitzer), in Hoffmann's Library of Translations (translated by A. Karsch, Ad. Stahr, and Karl Stahr), and in Engelmann's collection (Greek and German together). Of the editions of separate works the following may be mentioned: — Arist. Organon, ed. Th. Waitz, 2 vols., Leipsic, 1844-46. Arist. Categor. gr. ciimi venione Arahica IsaacA Ifoneini Jil., ed. Jul. Theod. Zenker, Leipsic, 1846. Sopli. Eleuchi, ed. Edw. Poste, London, 1866. AHst. Eth. Nicwn., ed. C. Zell, 2 vols., Heidelberg, 1820 ; ed. A. Coray, Paris, 1822 ; ed. Cardwell, Oxford, 1828-30; ed. C. L. Michelet, Berlin, 1829-35, 2d edition, 1848; further, separate editions of the text of Bekker, 1881, 1845, 1861 ; the edition of W. E. Jelf, Oxford and London, 1856, reproducing for the most part Bekker's text; the edition of Rogers, edit, altera, London, 1865, and The Ethics of Aristotle illuittrated with Essays and Notes, by Sir Alex. Grant, London, 1856-68, 2d edition, 1S66. Books VIH. and IX. (On THE WORKS OF AEISTOTLE. 141 Friendship), published separately, Giessen, 1847, edited by Ad. Theod. Herm. Fritsche, who also published an edition of the Eit^L Eth., Regensburg, 1S59. Polit., ed. Ilenii. Conring, Helrast. 1656. Brunswick, 1730, ed. .1. G. Schneider, Frankfort-on-the-Oder, 1309; C. Gottling, Jena, 1324; Ad. Stahr, Leipsic, 18.39; B. St. Uilaire, Paris, 1837, 2d ed. 1S4S; I. Bekker, Berlin (1831), 1855; Eaton, Oxford, 1855; E. Congreve, London, 1855 and 1862; Bhet, ed. Spengel, Leipsic, 1867. Poet, ed. O. nermann, Leipsic, 1802; Franz Eitter, Cologne, 1S39; E. Egger (in his Essai siir rhistoire de la ct-itique chez Us G7-ecs, Paris, 1S49); B. St. Hilaire, Paris, 185S: l.'Re\.\:.er (Ar. Rhet.et Poet, ab I. B. tertium ed., Berlin, 1859); Franz Susemihl (/'oe'<., in Greek and German, Leipsic, 1865); Joh. Vahlen, Berlin, 1S67; F. CTeberweg (with translation and commentary), Berlin, 1869. The Phynics of Aristotle has been published, Greek and German together, with explanatory notes, by C. Prantl, Leipsic, 1854; also the works De Coelo and De Generatione et Cort~iiptione have been edited by the same, Leipsic, 1S57. Arist. iiber die Farheii, erl. durch eine Uebersieht uber die Farbeniehre der Alten, von Carl Prantl, Munich, 1849. Meteorolog., ed. Jul. Ltid. Idoler, Leipsic, 1834-36. B. St. Hilaire has edited and published, in Greek and French, and with explanatory notes, the Physica of Arist., Paris, 1862; the Meteorolog., Paris, 1867 ; the De Coelo. Paris, 1866 ; De Gen. et Car/:, together with the work De 3telimo, Xenophane, Gorgia (with an Introd. »ur lei originea de la philos. grecque). Paris, 1866. De Animal. Iliator., ed. J. G. Schneider, Leipsic, 1811. Vier B'ucher iiber die Theile der Tliiere, Greek and German, with explanatory notes, by A v. Frantzius, Leipsic, 13.53 ; ed. Bern. Langkavel, Leipsic, 1868. Ceber die Zeugu7ig und Entxcickelimg der mere, Greek and German, by Aubert and Wimmer, Leipsic, 1860; Thierkunde, Greek and German, by the same, ibid. 1863. Arist. De Amma libri tres, ed. F. Ad. Trendelenburg, Jena, 1833 ; ed. Barth. St. Hilaire, Paris, 1S46; ed. A Torstrik, Berlin, 1862 (cf. P.. NoeteVs review in the Z. /. G. W., XVIII., Berlin. 1^64, pp. 131-144). Arist. Jfetaph., ed. Brandis, Berlin, 1823; ed. Schwegler, Tub. 1847-43; ed. H. Bonitz. Bonn, 1848-49. Many valuable contributions to the exegesis of Aristotle's works are contained in those ancient com- mentaries and paraphrases which have come down to us, especially in those of Alexander of Aphrodisias, the exegete (see below, § 51) of Dexippus and Themistius (see below, §69), and of Syrianus, Ammonins Ilermiaefilius, Simplieius, and Philoponus (see below, § 70); also in the writings of Boethius {ibid.) and others. Scholia to Aristotle have been published by Brandis, Berlin, 1836 (in Bekker's edition of the text), to the Metaphysics, by Brandis, ibid. 1887, to the De Aniina (extracts from an anonymous commentary on Aristotle's De Ani7na), by Spengel, Munich, 1847, and a paraphrase of the Soph. Elench., by Spengel, ihid. 1842. An old Hebrew translation of the Commentary of Averroes on the Rhetoric was published by J. Goldenthal, at Leipsic, in 1842. Of modern writers on the works of Aristotle, we name the following : J. G. Bnhle, Commentatio de librorum Arisiotelis distributio7ie «« exotericos et acroamaticos, Gott. 1783 (contained also in the first vol. of Buhle's edition of Aristotle, Biponti, 1791, pp. 105-152), and Ueber die Editheit der Metaph. dss Aristoteles, in the Bibl.f. alie Litt. u. Eu7ist, No. 4, Gott. 1788, pp. 1^2; Ueber die Ordnung und Folge der Aristot. Sehr-i/ien iibe7hau2>t, ibid. No. 10, 1794, 33-47. Am. Jourdain, Recherches critiqztes siir Vage et Forigine des tradtictions latines d^Arintote et aur les oommentaires grecs ou arabes e77iployes par les doeteurs scholastiques, Paris, 1819, 2d ed. 1843. Franc. Nicol. Titze, De Aristotelis operum serie et disti7ietio>ie, Leipsic, 1326. Ch. A. Brandis, Veber die Schicksale der Aristotelisch-en Bilcher imd einige Kriteri07i Hirer EcMheit, in the Rhei7i. Mus., I. 1827, pp. 236-254, 259-286 (cf. Kopp, Xachtrag aw Br. Vnters. iiber die Schicksale d-er Arist. Biicher, ibid. III. 1, 1829) ; Ueber die Reihe7tfolge der Biicher dea Arist. Organons und ihre gri^ch. Ausleger, in the Abh. der Berl. Akad. der Wiss., 1383; Ueber die Arist. Metaphysik, ibid. 1884; Ueber Aristoteles' RhetG7nk wid die griech. Ausleger derselben, in the Philolpgiis, IV., 1849, p. 1 seq. Ad. Stahr, Aristotelia, Vol. II.: Die Schicksale der A/-ist. Schriften, etc., Leipsic, 1832; Aristoteles hei de7i Rmteni, ibid. 1834. Leonl). Spengel (On Aristotle's Poetic; On the 7th Book of the Physics; On the mutual relation of the three works on Ethics attributed to Aristotle; On the Politics of Aristotle; On the order of Aristotle's works in natural science; On the Ehetoric of Aristotle), in the Abh. der bair. Akad. der Wiss.. 1837, 1841, '43, '47, '48, '51; Ueber KMnpcm rCiv na9rinaTiov bei Arist., ibid. Vol. IX. Munich, 1859; Ari. tTj ^j>vx{l, vi opposition to efu ?M-}or)- but exoteric is employed in the sense of " outwardly directed, addressed to the respondent (Trpof erepov)" arguing from what appears to him to be true, in contrast to that which interests the thmker who looks only at the essential (rij yiyvS/ievoi Myot ("arguments carried on in common," i. e., by means of disputation with a respondent, whether in real SiaXsKTiKalc avTo^oti;, Top., VIII. 6, or in diaiogical writings), or IkSc dofikvoi Myoi, i. e., \6yoL given to the public, in distinction from unpublished speculations, instituted primarily by the philosopher for his own benefit, and then communicated, whether orally or in writing, to the (private) circle of pupils associated with him in strictly scientific speculation. Rigidly philosophical speculations are termed by Aristotle, in Pol, III. 12, p. 1282 b, 19 et al (cf Eud. Eth., I. 8, 1217 b, 23), ol Kara <^iM>ooia gome arranger of tlie works of Aristotle (Andronicus of Rhode?, as there is scarcely any reason to doubt), on the ground of certain didactic utterances of Aristotle respecting the nporepov Tzpoc rjixaq and the Trpdrepov <^vaei, or the '•prior for us" and tlie "prior by nature," assigned a place after those on physics, and hence gave to them, as arranged in fourteen books, the general title, to. /lera ra (pvacKd (works commg after those relating to Physics), the books being numbered A, a, B, T, etc., up to N = I., II., III., IT., etc., to XIV.; in determining the order of the books, he seems to have been guided chiefly by the citations contained in them. The "Metaphysics" is made up of an extended, connected, but not completely finished exposition of doctrine (Book I.: Pliilosophical and historico-critical Introduction, and Books III.; IV.; VI., VII., VIII. ; IX.), and of several smaller and in part spurious treatises. Some ancient authorities attribute the authorship of Book II. (a) to Pasicles of Rhodes, a son of a brother of Eude- mus and an auditor of Aristotle. According to others. Book I. (A) was his composition (see Asclcp., Schol in Arist. ed Br., p. 520 a, 6). Book V. (A) contains an inquiry Trepl rov Troaaxuc, respecting the various significations of philosophical terms, and is cited by this title in VI. 4, VII. 1, and X. 1. Book X. treats of the one and the many, the identical and the opposed, etc. Book XI. contains, in chaps. 1-8, p. 1065 a, 26, a shorter presentation of the substance of III., IV., and VI. ; if genuine, it must be regarded as a preliminary sketch ; if not, it is an abstract made by an early Aristotelian ; chaps. 1 and 2 correspond with Book III. {rnropiai, doubts, difficulties), 3-6 with IV. (the problem of metaphysics and the principle of contradiction), and 7 and 8, up to the place indicated, with VI. (introduc- tory remarks on the doctrine of substance) ; the rest of Book XI. is a compilation from the Physics, and hence decidedly spurious. The first five chapters of Book XII. contain a sketch of the doctrine of substance (more fully detailed in Books VII. and VIII.) and of the doctrine of potentiality and actuality (discussed more fully in Book IX.); chaps. 6-10 are a somewhat more detailed, but still very compressed exposition of Aristotle's theology. The last two books (XIII. and XIV.) contain a critique of the theory of ideas and of the number-doctrine, which in parts (XITI. 4 and 5) agrees verbally with portions of the first book (I. 6 and 9). An liypothesis has been suggested by Titze, and modified and expanded by Glaser and others, to the effect that Books I., IX. chs. 1-8, and XII., constituted origi- nally a shorter draught of the whole Trpurj] vcik?) aKpouat^ in eight books (called also d?iaia or from t/Oikuv fieydXuv Ke(pd?iaia, according to Trendelenburg's conjecture, Beit- rage zur Philos., Vol. II., Berlin, 1855, p. 352 seq.). The three works on ethics correspond with each other in content as follows: Eth. Nic, I., II., III. 1-7, Eih. Eud., I., IL, Magn. Mor., I. 1-19, contain general preparatory considerations; Eth. Nic., III. 8-15 and IV., Eih. Eud., III., Magn. Mor., I. 20-23, treat of the different ethical virtues, with the exception of justice; Eih. Nic, V., with whicli Eih. Eud., IV., is identical, and Magn. Mor., I. 34, and IL, init., relate to justice and equity; Eth. Nic, VI., with which Eth. Eud., V., is identical, and Magn. Mor., I. 35 (cf II. 2, 3), relate to the dianoetic virtues ; Eth. Nic, VII., identical with Eth. Eud., VI., and Magn. Mor., II. 4-7, to continence, incontinence, and pleasure ; Eih. Nic, VIII., IX., Eih. End., VII. 1-12 (or 13 init., where there is evidently a gap), and Magn. Mor., II. 11-17, treat of friendship ; Eth. Eud., VII. 13 (where the text is full of gaps and alterations) treats of the power of wisdom {cppovrjatg, practical wisdom) ; Magn. Mor., II. 10, of the signification of op^of ^dyo^, and of the power of ethical knowledge; Eih. Eud., VII. 14, 15, and Magn. Mor., TI. 8, 9, of prosperity and KaloKayadia (honor, the union of the beautiful and the good) ; Eth. Nic, X., of pleasure and happiness. That the so-called Magna Moralia, the shortest of these works, is not the oldest of them (as Schleiermacher believed), but that the Nicomachean Ethics (from which the citations in Pol, II. 2, III. 9 and 12, IV. 41, VII. 1 and 13, are made) is the original work of Aristotle, while the Eudemian Ethics is a work of his pupil, Eudemus, based on the work of Aristotle, and that the Magna Moralia is an abstract from both, but principally from the Eudemian Ethics, has been almost universally allowed since Spengel's investi- gation of the subject (see above, p. 141) ; Barthelemy St. Hilaire, however {Morale d'Aristoie, Paris, 1856), sees in the Eiidemian Ethics not so much an original work of Eudemus, as rather a mere redaction of a series of lectures on Ethics by Aristotle, exe- cuted by one of his auditors (probably by Eudemus, who, it is supposed, wrote them down for his own use, as they were delivered) ; he is inclined to assign to the Magn. Moral, also the same date and kind of origin. But there can hardly be a doubt that this latter work belongs to a later period, such are the marks of Stoic influences in thought and termi- nology which it contains (see Ramsauer, Zur Charakteristik der Magna Moralia. [G.-Pr^, Oldenburg, 1858, and Spengel, Arist. Studien, I., Munich, 1863, p. 17, and Trendelenburg, Einige Belege far die nacharisi. Abfassungszeit der Magna Mor., in his Histor. Beitr., III. p. 433 seq.); the following citation contained in it (II. 6, 1201 b, 25): uoTrep i(pafxEv iv rolg avaXvTiKolg, is ground for the conjecture, that the author published it under the name of THE "W0KK8 OF AEISTOTLE. 147 Aristotle; still, other Analytica (paraphrases of the Aristotelian worli) may be meant. Of the Eudemian Ethics, Spengel and Zeller, in particular, liave sliown that the author, though generally following Aristotle, has introduced original matter, which appears occasionally in the hght of an intentional correction of Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics appears to have been pubhshed after the death of Aristotle by his son Nicomachus. To which work the books common to the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics [Nic., V.-VII., Eud., IV.-VL) originally belonged, is a matter of dispute. It may be shown, as well on internal grounds as from references in the Politica, that the first of these books {Eth. Nic, Y. — Eth. Eudem., IV.)* was originally a part of the Nicomachean Ethics.f The pres- ent Book VI. of the Nic. Eth. {— B. V. of the Eud.) agrees in many respects better with the books belonging to the Eud. than with those which belong to the Nic. Eth. (cf. Alb. Max. Fischer, De Eth. Nic. et Eud., diss, inaug., Bonn, 1847, and Fritzsche in his edition of the Eud. Ethics): yet at least a book of essentially similar content must have belonged originally to the Nic. Eth., to which book Aristotle refers in Metaph., I. 1, 981b, 25. But the last of these identical books {Eth. Nic. VII. = Eth. Eud., VI.) belongs very probably either wholly or at least in its last chapters {Eth. Nic., VII. 12-15, which, like B. X. of the Nic, though not altogether in the same sense, treats of pleasure) not to the Nico- machean Ethics, and is also not to be viewed as an earlier draught of Aristotle's, but as a later revision, probably executed by Eudemus. The opuscule Trept aperwv ml Kaiauv is probably spurious. The eight books of the 7ro?uTiicd join on to the Ethics. According to Barth. St. Hilaire and others the original order of the Books was L, II., III., VII., VIII., IV., VI., V. : yet the theory that Book V. and VI., have been made to exchange places, is improbable ; Ilildenbrand, Zeller, and others, oppose, while Spengel, and, in a recent work, Oncken {Siaatsl. des ArisL, I. 98 seq.) defend it. That Books VII. and VIII. should follow immediately after III. is extremely probable, was long ago affirmed, among others, by Nicolas d'Oresme (died in 1382) and by Conring (who edited the Politics in 1656) to be the order intended by Aristotle. In B. I. Aristotle treats of the household, omitting, however, to give rules for the moral education and training of children, since these depend on the ends pursued by the state. In B. II. he criticises various philosophical ideals and existing forms of the state. In B. III. he discusses the conception of the state, and distinguishes, as the different possible forms of government, monarchy and ♦ With the possible exception of chs. 11, 12, 15. t In the second half the order has been considerably disturbed. The section, c. 10, p. 1134a, 2S-1184a, 16, must be misplaced ; Ilildenbrand conjectures that it belongs at the end of c. 8. This c<)njecture is opposed by the expression fiprjTat Trporepof, p. 1134 a, 24, which implies a greater separation from c. 8, and by the general plan evidently adopted by Aristotle in the whole work, in accordance with which the special and particularly the political bearings of each to[iic are not considered until each topic has been treated of in general terms; according to this method the jiassage in question should not come before c. 9, and perhaps not before c. 10. C. 15 must follow immediately after c. 12, and hence Zeller would place this chapter, with the exception of the last sentence, between cc. 12 and 13; but since c. 13 in respect of subject-matter (not formally, indeed; perhaps some words have fallen awny from the beginning) joins on to c. 10 (Spengel asserts this conjecturally ; Hermann Adolph Fechner, IIam|pko, and others are more positive), the correct order is rather to be rctlored by placing ca 11 and 12 after 1.3 and 14. As the correct order, therefore, we would propose the following: cc. 8, 9, 10, excepting the section above Indicated, 13, 14, then that section from c 10, and finally 11, 12, 15. The defective arrangement may have arisen from the misplacement of a few leaves in an original codex. Originally, a leaf numbered, «. g.. a, contained say c. 8 post med. to c. 10, p. 1184 a, 2.% le.if a +/., c. 10, 1135 a, 15 to c. \O.Jin... p. 11.36 a, 9. leaf a + II., c. 13 .ind 14, p. 1137 a. 4 to 1138a, 8. leaf o + ///., the passage now standing in c. 10, p. 1184 a, 23 to 1185 a, 15, leaf a + IV., cc. 11 and 12, p. 1136 a, 10 to 1137 a, 4, and, finally, leaf a + F., the conclusion of the whole book, c. 15, p. 1138 a, 4 to 1188b, 14. The leaves then fell into the false order: a, a + 111., a +I.,a + IV., a + //., a + V. The author of the Magna Moralia seems to have fonnd this arrangement already existing. Perhaps .it the plaee where this confusion arose, two books of the Eud. Ethics were inserted into the Ni*. Eth. A differ ent order is proposed by Trendelenburg, Jlist. Beitr. zur ridlot.. 111. pp. 418-426. 148 THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE. tyranny, aristocracy and oligarchy, politeia (a commonwealth of free citizens) and de- mocracy. He then treats (III. 14—17) of the first of the above forms, which under certain conditions is reckoned by him as the best possible, and (III. 18, and its con- tinuation : YII. and VIII.) of the good state, which is favored in respeet of its external couditions, and is based on the supremacy of the best men, i. e., citizens who are virtuously educated. In Books lY. and Y. follows the inquiry concerning the other forms of the state besides monarchy and aristocracy, B. Y. being especially occupied with the investi- gation of the causes of the preservation and destruction of governments; B. Y. thus contains what, according to lY. 2, was to follow after the characterization and the descrip- tion of the genesis of the different forms of the state, viz.: the science of Political Nosology and Therapeutics, In B. YI. Aristotle treats supplementarily of the particular kinds of democracy and oligarchy and of the different offices in the state, the discussion having been very likely originally extended to other topics, including, in particular, the subject of laws. At least the second Book of the Economics is spurious. The noAiTEiai, a descrip- tion of the constitution of some 158 states, is lost. The Poetic (Trepl iTonrTiKfjq) is incom- plete in its present form. The Rhetoric, in three books, has been preserved. The Rhetor ad Alex, is spurious (according to Spengel — who edited it in 1844 — Yictorius, Buhle, and others, who found their rejection of it on Quintil., III. 4, 9). The chronological order in which the works of rigidly philosophical form were written can be for the most part, though not in all instances, determined with certainty ; the interest belonging to the investigation of this subject is rather one of method than of development, since Aristotle seems to have composed these works (except, perhaps, those on logic) during his second residence at Athens, hence at a time when his philosophical development was already substantially complete. Frequently one work is cited in another. But these citations are in so many cases reciprocal, that it is scarcely possible to infer any thing from them as to the historical sequence of the works ; such inferences can be drawn with perfect certainty only when a work is announced as yet to be written. The logical writings were probably composed the earliest (in Anal. Post, II. 12, anticipatory reference is made to the Physics: /zdAAov de ({)avep(l)g ev rolq KaOoXov rrepl Kivijaeoq 6d ?^e;^dyvai Trepl avTuv), and in the following order: Categories, Topica, Analytica, and still later the De Interpret., in which work the previous existence not only of the Analytica, but also of the Psychology, is affirmed by implication. Whether the ethical works {Eth. Kic. and Polit.) were written before (Rose) or after (Zeller) the physical and psychological, is question- able, though the former alternative is by far the more probable ; Eth. Nic, 1.13. ] 102 a, 2G, presupposes only popular expositions of psychological problems (in the early dialogieal works) and not the three books nepl ipi^xvi, and YI. 4, init, points only to works of tlio same character on the difference between ■Ko'irjaig and npa^ig- YI. 13, 1144a, 9, on the contrary, appears to imply the previous existence of the De Anima; but this book was also apparently not written hy Aristotle, but by Eudemus. Aristotle could compose his ethical works before his psychological works, because (according to Eth. K, I. 13), though Oeupririov rut ttoXitikC) Trepl ipvxv?, yet this is necessary only £^' bcov iKavug ixei npbg ra Cr/roi'/iEva, and ethics (Eth. N., II. 2) is not a purely scientific but a practical doctrine. The Ethics and Politics were followed by the Poetic (to which anticipatory reference is made, Pol., YIII. 7), and the Rhetoric (which appears to be referred to, by anticipation, in Etk., II. 7, p. IIOS b, 6); according to Rhet., I. 11, p. 1372 a, 1 ; III. 2, p. 1404 b, 7, the Poetic pre- ceded the Rhetoric. That the Rhet. was composed immediately after the logical work.'? (Rose) is scarcely to be credited ; it must have been preceded not only by the logical but also by the ethico-political works, in accordance with the Aristotelian dicta, Rhet, I. 2, . 1366 a, 25, and 4, 1359 b, 9 : ttjv pijTopiKfiv olov izapatpveq ti v^g diaXcKUK^g e'lvai ml rijg repi THE WORKS OF AKISTOTLE. 149 tH rprj npayuaTria^ fjv 6iKai6v iari npoaayopcveiv ttoAitiktp^, and r/ pijTopLKTj cvyKEirai Ik ti t/j avaTiVTLKf/g iTTiaTT/urj^ aal ry^ nepl ra tjHtj "o'/atlmjc. The works relating to physics were com- posed in the following order : Auscult. physicae, De Coelo, Be Ge/ier. et Corr., Meteorologica ; then followed the works relating to organic nature and psychical life. That the Metaphysics is of later date than the Physics (which Rose incorrectly places after the former) follows with certainty from Phys., I. 9, p. 192 a, 36: rfjg Trpwrrj^ (pi'/.oacxp'iai: ipyov eari ^lopicai^ Lore tic ineivov tov Kaipov aTTOKeioOu; in it the Analytics, Ethics, and Physics are cited. According to the statement of Asclepius {Schol. in Arist, p. 519 b, 33), the Mttaph. was not first edited immediately after the death of Aristotle by Eudemus, to whom Aristotle is said to have sent it, but very much later, from an imperfect copy, which was completed by additions from other Aristotelian works. From this review it results inductively that Aristotle advanced in a strictly methodical manner in the composition of his works from the TipoTcpov Tzpoq T/naq to the nporepov fvaei, in accordance with the didactic requirement, to which, with special reference to logic (analytics) and metaphysics (first philosophy), he gives expression in Met., IV. 3, p. 1005 b, 4, nanvely, that one must be familiar with the former before "hear- ing " the latter. According to Strabo (XIII. 1, 54) and Plutarch {Vit. Sull., ch. 26) a strange fortune befell the works of Aristotle in the two centuries following the death of Theophrastus. The whole of the extensive library of Aristotle, including his own works, came first into the possession of Theophrastus, who left them to his pupil, Xeleus of Skepsis in Troas ; after his deatli tliey passed into the hands of his relatives in Troas, who, fearing lest the princes of Pergamus might seek to take them away for their own library, concealed them in a cellar or pit (dicypv^), where they suffered considerable injury from dampness. Accord- ing to Athenaeus, Deipnos., I. 3, tins same library had been acquired by purchase for tlie Alexandrian Library in the time of Ptolemaeus Philadelphus ; but this, at least, can not be true of the original MSS. of Arist. and Theophrastus. These manuscripts were finally discovered (about 100 B. c.) by Apellicon of Teos, a wealthy bibliophile, who bought them and carried them to Athens; he sought as well as possible to fill up the gaps, and gave the works to the public. Soon afterward, at the taking of Athens by the Romans (86 B. c), the manuscripts fell into the hands of Sulla. A grammarian named Tyrannion, from Amisos in Pontus (on him see Planer, I)e Tyrannione grammatico, Berlin, 1852), made use of them, and from him Andronicus of Rhodes, the Peripatetic, received copies, on the basis of which he (about 70 b. c.) set on foot a new edition of the works of Aristotle, and drew up a catalogue of them. Strabo brings the narrative, at least in the text of the Geographica as we now possess it, only down to Tyrannion ; what relates to Andronicus is found in Plutarch. Strabo and Plutarch assume that in the period preceding their discovery by Apellicon, the principal works of Aristotle were inaccessible to students, or, in other words, that they existed only in the original manuscripts, and thus they explain the deviation of the later Peripatetics from Aristotle in doctrine ; and by the numerous hiatuses in the badly disfigured manuscripts, which no one knew how to fill out correctly, they explain the unfortunate condition of the text of Aristotle in later times. But the supposition that all the philosophical works of Aristotle remained concealed from the public after the death of Aristotle is in itself scarcely credible, and is refuted by the traces (which Brandis, Spengel, Stahr, Zeller, and others have, with more or less of success, pointed out) of an acquaintance with some of the most important of the strictly philo- sophical works of Aristotle in the third and second centuries before Christ. The depo- sitions of Strabo and Plutarch respecting the fortune of the manuscripts are, however, of unquestionable authority, and it is quite possible that not only some rough draughts made by Aristotle, which were not intended for publication, but also some of the larger 150 THE W0KK8 OF ARISTOTLE. works, in particular the Metaphysics, and perhaps aiso the Politica were first made public after their discovery by Apellicou. (This is asserted in reference to the Psychology by E. Essen, in his Der Keller zu Skepsis, Stargard, 1 866 ; the supposition is possible, that in the twofold recension in which parts of the second Book of the Psychology have come down ■ to us. and in which perhaps the entire work at one time existed, we possess, on the one hand, the form which the work received from Alexandrian tradition, and, on the other, the form in which it appeared after its revision by Andronicus ; still, it appears more probable that the one form is the Aristotelian, and that the other is the paraphrase of some Aris- totehan.) The theory that several of the chief philosophical works of Aristotle were unknown in the time from Theophrastus and Neleus to Apellicon and Andronicus, receives a certain confirmation from the list of Aristotle's works in Diog. L., V. 22-27, in case this list was (as Nietzsche argues) not derived from the work of Andronicus on the works of Aristotle, but, through the works of Demetrius Magnes, and Diodes, from the work of Hermippus the Callimachean (at least, for the most part, and aside from certain additions taken from authorities belonging to the time after Andronicus). The edition set on foot by Andronicus gave new life to the study of the works of Aristotle. The Peripatetics of the following period distinguished themselves particularly as paraphrasts and commentators, as did also several of the Neo-Platonists, such as Themistius, Simplicius, and Philoponus. From the Greeks the writings of Aristotle passed (with the exception of the dialogical works, which were suffered to perish) into the hands of the Syrians and Arabians (see below, §§ 95 and 96). In the Christian schools some of the logical works of Aristotle and various expositions of the Aristotelian Logic by Boethius and others, were employed as text-books; St. Augustine's recomniendatien of dialectic served as an authority for their use. The principal works of Aristotle on logic were, however, not known even to the Scholastics until about the middle of the twelfth century, and then only in Latin translations. In the second half of the twelfth and in the course of the thirteenth century the physical, metaphysical, and ethical writings of Aristotle became also known in the Western world, at first (until near the year 1225) only through the agency of the Arabs, but afterward by means of direct translations from the Greek (see below, § 98) ; some works, in particular, the Politics, in place of which the Arabians knew only of spurious works on the same subject, became known only through the latter channel. The translations from the Arabian are distorted to the extent of being com- pletely unintelligible ; the direct translations from the Greek, and especially the translation of all or, at least, of very many of the works of Aristotle, which was made in about 1260- 1270 by "Wilhelm von Moerbecke, by request of Thomas Aquinas, are executed with such literal fidelity, as in many instances to enable us to infer from their form wliat was the reading of Codices on which they are based, but they are done without taste and not unfrequently express no meaning. The reading of the physical writings of Aristotle was forbidden in 1209 by a Provincial Council at Paris, on account of the doctrine of the eternity of the world and some other doctrines which they contained, but which, in fact, were misconceived and misrepresented ; the reading of the physical and metaphysical writings was prohibited in 1215, by Robert of Courcon, the papal legate, on the occasion of his sanctioning the statutes of the University of Paris. This prohibition, which was renewed in a limited form in April, 1231, by Pope Gregory IX., remained formally in force until the year 1237 (according to the testimony of Roger Bacon, as cited by Emile Charles, Boger Bacon, Paris, 1861, pp. 314 and 412). But soon afterward, the judgment of the church concerning the works of Aristotle became more favorable. The Scholastics from this time on, depended, in philosophical respects, chiefly on the authority of Aristotle, although not abstaining from modifying m a measure some of his doctrmes. In par- Aristotle's logic. 151 ticular, the philosophy of Tliomas Aquinas, which became the prevalent philosophy among the teachers of the church, was Aristotelianism, and even other Scholastic systems, aa those of Scotus and Occam, which were opposed to the system of St. Thomas, remained substantially true to the teaching of Aristotle. In 1254 the Physics and Metaphysics of Aristotle were included among the topics to be taught by the Faculty of Arts at Paris- The EOiics and Politics of Aristotle were likewise held in high estimation, although the Politics at least was studied with less zeal. At the revival of classical studies in the fifteenth century the renewal of Platonism detracted somewhat from the prestige and authority of Aristotle. Still the study of Aristotle received an essential impulse from the extending knowledge of the Greek language. New translations of his works, more cor- rect, more intelligible, and expressed in purer Latin, supplanted the old ones, and soon numerous Latin and Greek editions of his works were published. At the Protestant universities the works of Aristotle were zealously studied, owing especially to the influ- ence of Melanchthon. In the sixteenth century nearly all of the works of Aristotle were frequently edited, translated, and commentated ; in the seventeenth century considerably fewer, and during the greater part of the eighteenth century, with few exceptions, almost none. But toward the end of the eighteenth century a new interest in these works was awakened, an interest which still continues and seems even to be constantly increasing, and which manifests itself in numerous (above-cited) literary works. § 47. The divisions of philosophy, according to Aristotle, are theo- retical, p ractica l, and poetic. Theoretical philosophy is the scientific cognition of the existent, the end of the cognition being found in it- self. Practical philosophy is that form of knowledge which relates to action or conduct, and which prescribes rules for the latter. Poetic philosophy is a form of knowledge having reference to the shaping of material, or to the technically correct and artistic creation of works of art. Theoretical philosophy, again, is subdivided into mathematics, physics, and " first philosophy " (ontology or meta- physics). The analytical and dialectical investigations (in the " Organon ") were apparently intended as a methodological propaedeutic to phi- losophy, and not as a body of properly philosophical doctrine. Aris- totle's conduct of them is, however, none the less for this reason strictly scientific. The various species of mental representations and of " dicta " (or parts of speech) correspond, according to Aristotle, with definite forms of that which exists. The most universal forms of existence are substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, pos- session, action, passion. The forms of representations, and so of possible aflirmations or " dicta respecting the existent ." which are conditioned by these forms of the representable, are termed by Aris- totle categories. The concept should represent the real essence of 152 Aristotle's logic. the objects included under it. Truth in a logical judgment is the correspondence of the combination of mental representations with a combination of things, or (in the case of the negative judgment) the correspondence of a separation of representations in the mind with a separation of things; falsity in judgments is the variation of the ideal combination or separation from the real relation of the things to which the judgments relate. Inference, or the derivation of one judg- ment from others, has two forms, the syllogism, which descends from the universal to the particular, and induction, which rises to the miiversal from a comparison of the single and particular. A scien- tific inference or a proof is an inference from true and certain principles ; a dialectical inference is a tentative inference from what appears true or even from mere (uncertain) indications ; a sopliistical inference is a paralogism or fallacy, depending on false premises or deceptive combination. The principle of contradiction and excluded middle is with Aristotle an ultimate metaphysical and logical prin- ciple, on which the possibility of demonstration and of all certain knowledge depends. Principles are known immediately by the rea- son. The prior and more knowable for us is the sensible, or that which in the order of conceptions is less general and hence less removed from the sphere of sensuous perception ; but the really prior and more knowable are the principles, or at least those conceptions which are least removed in point of generality from principles. Of the more modern works on the whole System of Aristotle may be named : Franz Biese, Die Philoso- phie des Aristoieles (Vol. I., Logic and Metaphysics ; Vol. II., The Special Sciences), Berlin. 1885-42 ; Chr. Aug. Brandis, Ai'intoteles. seine uk<(demUchen Zeitgenossen vnd 7iachiften yachfolger, Berlin, 185.3-57, or 2d div. of the 2il part of his Ilandbitch der Gexch. der Grech.-Emn. Philos., and I'eber-nicJit iiber dan Arist. Lehrgibilnde, 1st div. of the 3d part, Berlin, 1860; Ed. ZcUer. Arinioteles mid die ulten Peri- patetiker, TUbingen, 1861, 2d div. of the 2d part of the 2d cd. of his " Philoa. der Griechen.'''' Ch. Thurot (Etudes sur Aristote, Paris, ISCO) treats of the Politics, Dialectic, and Rhetoric of Aristotle. Of. F. Meunier. Ar. a-t-il eu deux doctrines, Fwis oitenMble, fautre secrete? Paris, 1864. Otto Caspari's Die Irrthilmer der altda^sii. Philosophie in ihrer Bedeutung far das p/iilax. Princip (Heidelberg, 1868) treats prin- cipally of Platonism and Aristotelianism, and in particular of the theory of ideas and the theory of knowl- edge. [Thomas Taylor, Diss, on the Philos. of Aristotle, London, 1813.— 7>.] Of special works relating to the Aristotelian Logic may be named : F. .J. C. Fraucke, De AriM. iia argii- mentandi nxodis, qui recedtint a perfecta sylogismi forma, Hostock, 1624; Car. Weinlioltz, De Finibu-s atque Pretio Logicae Aristotelicae. ib., 1825 ; Ad. Trendelenburg, De Arist. categoriis prolusio aeadetnica. Berlin. lSo3, Geschichte der Kategorienlehre, ib., 1S46, pp. 1-195, 209-217, Elementa logicett Arisioteleae. ib., 1836, 6th ed, 1868, Erlanterungen sur Arint. Logik. Berlin, 1842, 2d ed., 1861 (cf. on these works Max Schmidt and G. H. Heidtmann, in the Zeitschr.f. d. Gymnasiahcesen, V. VI. VII. lS5I-'53); Phil. Gum- posch, Veber die Logik iind die logisehen Schriften des Aristoteles, Leipsic, 1839 ; Herin. Rassow, Aris- totelis de notionis dejinitione doctrina, Berlin, 1843; H. Hettner, /)e logices Aristotelicae specnlativo principio, ilMe, ISiS ; Car. Kuhn, De notionis dejinitione qualem Arist. constituerit, Halle. 1844; A. Vera, Platonis, Aristotetis et /Je^/elii de medio termino doctrina, Paris, 1845; A. L. Gastmann, De methodo philos. Arist, Groningcn, 1845; C. L. W. Heyder, Kritische Darstelhing und Vergleichung der Ariit- iotelischen und UegeFschen Dialektik (1 Bd., 1 Abth. : die Methodologie der Arist. Philos. und der friiheren Systeme), Erlangen, 1S45; G. Ph. Chr. Kaiser, De logica Pauli Apostoli logices Aristottlea* ARISTOTLE S LOGIC. 153 tmendatrice {Progr.), Erlangen, 1847 ; Carl Prantl, Ueber die Enttcickelung der AristoUliscli-en Logik axu der PlatonUcJun Pliilosophit, in the Ahh. der Bair. Akad. der M'j««., hist.-phU. Classe, Vol. Vll., part 1st, pp. 129-211, Munich, 1S63 (cf. the sections on the same topic in Prantl's Gendi. der Logik)\ II. Boniiz, Veber die Kategwieii des Aristoteles, in the SitcungnbericJii^ der Wieiier Akad. der Wiss., hisi.-philol. CI., Vol. X., 1S63, [ip. 59:-645; A. F. C. Kerslen, (^/^uo jure J^antitts Arist. cuUgonan rejeceiit (Progr. of the Realgymn. at Colosne), Berlin, 1S53; K. Essen, Z>w Definition nacJt AristoUle^ {G.-Pr.), Stargard, ISM; J. Ilcrmann, Quae Arist. de uliimis cognosceiidi j>rincijiii« docuerit, Berlin, IbW; Aristotle on Fallacies), or the Sophistic Elenchi, with a translation and notes, by Edward Poste, London, 1S66; [7X« Logic of Science, a transl. of th« Later Analytics of Aristotle, with an Inirod. and Sotes, by the same, London. — TV.]; Wilh. Schuppe, Die Arist. Kategorien (in the '• /"ro^r." of the Gleiwitz Gynin. on the occasion of the cck-bration of the founding of the institution, April 29, 1S66). Gleiwitz, 1S6G; A. Wentzke, Die KalegoHen des L'rtheiia im Anchluss an Arist., erlduiert und begriindet (G.-Pr.), Culm, 1&68; Friedr. Zelle, Der Unterschied in der Aaffassuny der Logik Oei Arist. und bei Kant, Berlin, 1670; Fried. Ferd. Kampo, Die ErkenntniaxUieorie de« Arist, Lelpsic, 1S70. Of the Aristotelian conception of philosophy we have treated above (p. 3 seq.). We find a division of the system of jihilosophy, not very different from that adopted by Plato, in the Topiai (1. 14, p. 105 b, 19) : "Philosophical problems and theorems are either ethical, physical, or logical {i/OiKal, (pvctKai, or AoytKai),'^ where by " logical " theorems are to be understood such as have a universal reference, or in which the specifically physical or ethical character is left out of consideration ; theorems, in other words, which belong to metaphysics (or ontology). But this division is given here by Aristotle only as a pro- visional sketch ((jf TVTzui nepiAafielv). Where Aristotle expresses his opinion more exactly, he divides philosophj'' (in the sense of scientific knowledge in general) in the manner indicated at the beginning of this paragraph, Metaph., VI. 1 : Traaa Sidvoia j] T7paK7iKT/ i] TvoajTiKy 7] -dEuptiTiKy. Metaph., XI. 7 : Si'f/Mv 'oivw, otl Tpia yivrj ruv i9£cj- prp-LKuv iari • ery^^^^-^J^ (H^ (5juJ Aristotle's logic. 155 the passages in Aristotle where categories are mentioned. According to Prantl (p. 209), the essential import of the doctrine of categories is perceived, when we regard it, not as a complete enumeration of the forms of existence and thought, but as an expression of the truth that substance {maia) appears, determined in respect of space and time {-ov, Tvori) and quality (rroiov), in the world of things numerable and measurable (ttooov), and that within the sphere of manifold existence it shows itself active according to its determinate cliaracter (ttoieIv, 'n-da;^Eiv^ izpoq tl). In Analyt. Post, I. 22, all the other categories are contrasted with Substance, as accidents {cvfijie^TiKO-a). In Met, XIV. 2, p. 1089 b, 23, three classes are distinguished : to. fitv yap ovaiai, rd 6k Tzddri, ra 6e npoq ti, substances, attributes, an d relations . Ovata, as a category, denotes the independent, the substantial. But in another sense it signifies the essential ; this latter is the object of the concept (Aoyof). Tlie concept is an expression of the essence of the objects whi(;h it Hpnntpg (Ao^of r^f ovalagj Cat, 1 ; 6 Aoyog ttjv ovalav opi'^ei, De Part Anim., IV. 5), and the essence corresponds to the concept {tj koto. ?i6yov ovaia). That, in any thing, which is extraneous to t he essence [ovaia) of the thing — which exists, so to speak, as an appendage to the essence — is accidental (avfif3efi^K6g). Accidents are of two kinds, some being necessarily connected with the essential, so that we can deduce them apodictically from the latter, and others being not thus deducible ; the former belong to the object, in which they inhere, as such, or to the conception of the object {avfi[iEliijK6q Kaff avTo •, thus it is a necessary accident of the triangle that the sum of all iis angles should be equal to two right angles); the latter are truly accidental ((Tn/z/Je/Jj^/cof in the ordinary sense). In Defi- nition (opia/io^) we cognize the essence of the thing defined (Anal. Post, II. 3). Through the combination (cv/itt-Ziok//) of representations determined according to the specified cate- gories arise the Judgment and its expression, the Provosition (niroipavaic), which latter may be either an jifHrmation (Kard/paaig) or a neaaiion [aTvooacic). Every proposition is necessarily either true or false ; not so are the uncombined elements of the proposition (De Cat, c. 4). Hence the Principle of Contradiction and of Excluded Third or Middle, in its logical form (De Cat, c. 10): " Of the affirmation and the negation of the same thing, the one is always false, the other true ; " Met, YV. 1 : '' Between the two terms of a con- tradiction there is no mean ; it is necessary either to affirm or to deny every predicate of every subject." The metaphysical or ontological form of the principle of contradiction (i. e., as appUed to Being itself), on which the validity of the logical form depends, is thus expressed (Metaph., IV. 3) : to avrb dfia inrapxEiv re koI fjy vndpxeiv ddiivaTov tCi avrcj Kal Kara to aiiTo, " The same thing can not at the same time and in the same respect belong and not belong to the same thing." Of the principle in this form, no proof, accord- ing to Aristotle, is possible, but only a subjective conviction, that no one can deny it in thought. To di^av (pdvai r] aTrocpdvai [the principle of excluded middle] is expressly declared by Aristotle (Anal. Post., I. 11) to be tlie principle of indirect proof lie defines the Syl- logism (Top., I. 1 ; cf Anal. Pri., I. 1) as a form of ratiocination, in which, from certain premises and through the force of those premises, there follows necessarilj: a conclusion different from the premises (earl 6jj av'/Juoyiaixbg ?i,o}of iv w TS'divTuv tivcjv irepov tl tuv KeiuEvuv ff dvdyKTiQ avfifiaivei did tuv Ketfiivuv). Ho assumes (Anal. Pri., I. 4— 6^ cf. 32 ; cf. the citations ad § 103 in my System of Logic) three syllogistic figures, according as the middle term (bpog fieaog) is either subject in one of the premises (-pordaeiq) and predicate in the other (first figure), or predicate in both premises (second figure), or subject in both (third figure). A syllogism which is correct in form has either apodictic or dialectic validity, according to the relation of the premises to objective truth. Top., I. 1 : " 'At6- d'A^iq [real demonstration] takes place when we conclude from true and ultimate premises, or at least from premises which have been proved true on the ground of other true and 156 ARISTOTLE S LOGIC. ultimate premises; the Dialectic Syllogism, on the contrary, concludes e| ivdd^uv .... and evdo^a are principles which appear true to the mass of men, or to the educated, or to indi- viduals whose opinion is specially worthy of respect." An additional form of inference is the Eristic Syllogism, which concludes from premises having only an apparent or alleged, but no real probability. With the dialectical syllogism agrees, in the want of a strictly scientific or apodiciical character, the Rhetorical Syllogism, but it differs from the former in its use, the former being an instrument of examination, while the latter (which concludes " from probabilities or signs," and produces only a subjective conviction — ef e'lKoruv f/ tSTjfieluv) is an instrument of persuasion. In the province of demonstration rhetoric occu- pies the same place as dialectic in the province of examination, inasmuch as each is con- ^ersant with material which in some sense is the property of all men, and which belongs to no particular science {kolvo. Tponov riva airavruv icTi yvupiCeiv Kai ovJf^/df imaTT/fiT/g acpupia^iivr/c;), and as each deals only with the probable, whence Rhetoric forms the natural counterpart of Dialectic {RheLI. 1 : ^ pr^ropiKy avricTpo^og ri) SiaXeKTiny, cf. Cic, Orat, c. 32: quasi ex altera parte respondens diakdicae; Dialectic teaches e^erdl^Eiv Kal vnexeiv 2.6yov, and Rhetoric anoXoyeiGdai koI KaTtjyopdv). A form of investigation akin to the dialectical is the logical, i. e., the investigation of a topic in the light of universal conceptions alone (especially in the light of metaphysical conceptions, or such as belong to "first phi- losophy "), in distinction from that method which looks rather to the particular or to that which is peculiar {piKdov) to the subject of investigation, and which, therefore, in the depart- ment of physics, "investigates physically " {(pvaiKug t^T/relv. De Gen. et Corr., 316 a, 10, et al), ill the department of analytics, "analytically" (ava?.vTiK(l)c ^r/rdv), etc. (See Thurot, Etudes sur Aristoie, Paris, 1860, p. 118 seq.) The Middle Term in that syllogism which is most important as an instrument of cognition, corresponds with and expresses an objective cause (Analyt. Post.^ 11. 2: to jxiv yap a'lTiov to fiecov^ cf. my Sijst. of Logic, § 101). In Induction [eTtayuy?}, 6 ff tnayuyyg cvAloyicfidg) we conclude from the observation that a more gen- eral concept includes (several or) all of the individuals included under another concept of inferior extension, that the former concept is a predicate of the latter {Anal. Fri., II. 23). Induction leads from the particular to the universal (airb tuv KadeKaoTa ettI to. Ka66?iov e(po6og, Top., I. 10). Tlie term ETrayuyi], for Induction, suggests the ranging of particular cases together in files, like troops. The Complete Induction, according to Aristotle, is the only strictly scientific induction ; the Incomplete Induction, which with a syllogism sub- joined constitutes the Analogical Inference {TvapadEiy/xa), is principally of use to the orator. Considered absolutely, the Syllogism proper, which arrives through the middle term at the major term as the predicate of the minor (6 6ia tov fiiaov avXhjyia/xog), is more rigorous, prior in nature, and more demonstrative ((pvaec npdTEpog Kal yvupifiu-Epog, Anal. Fri., II. 23; fiiaariKtJTEpov Kal npbg tvvc avTiAoyiKovg ivEpyEOTEpov, Top., I. 12); but the Inductive Syllogism easier for us to understand (ijn'iv hapyiGTEpog, Anal. Fri., II. 23 ; m^^a- vuTEpov Kal aa^EdTEpov Kal koto, tt/v ala-&T]aiv yvupi/uurEpav Kal toIq noAkolg Koivdv, Top., I. 12). Universally, "the prior and more cognizable for us" is what lies nearest to the sphere of sensation, but " the absolutely prior and more cognizable " is what is most remote from that sphere (Analyt. Fast., I. 2 : Trpbr yuag fihv npoTEpa koc yvupipojTtpa rd kyyvTEpov tijq ala-drjOEug, anTiuq 6e npdTEpa Kal yvupijuoiTEpa to. TToppuTEpov). The limits of knowledge are, on the one hand, the individual, on the other, the most general. In itself it is better — because more scientific — to pass from the "prior in nature" to the "prior for us," from the condition to the conditioned; but for those who can not follow this order, the inverse one must be employed (Top., VI. 4). The most general principles are insusceptible of demonstration, because all (direct) demonstration presupposes, as its basis or premise, something more general than that which is to be proved ; and some- akistotle's metaphysics. 157 thiag, also, which must be at least as obvious and certain, or even more so, than the thing to be proved ; the most general truths, therefore, must be immediately certain {Anal. Post., I. 2 ; cf. my System of Logic, § 135). The absolutely flrst truths in science must consist of indemonstrable definitions (rd Trpura opaifiol ecovrai avaTroSeiKToc, Anal. Post, II. 3). These principles (as they are called, or apxai) are the objects of reason (vovc) ; whatever is universally and necessarily derived from them is the object of science (kmar^fiTj), while opinion (fWfa), whose characteristic is instability {a^i^aiov), is concerned with whatever is subject to variation [Anal. Post., I. 33 ; II. 19). § 48. In the " First Philosophy," or, as it was subsequently termed, the Metaphysics of Aristotle, the principles common to all spheres of reality are considered. The number of these principles, as given by Aristotle, is four, viz. : Form or Essence, Matter or Sub- stratum, Moving or Efficient Cause, and End. The principle of Form or Essence is the Aristotelian substitute for the Platonic Idea. Aristotle argues against the Platonic (or, at least, what he held as the Platonic) view, that the Ideas exist for themselves apart from the concrete objects which are copied from them, affirming, however, on his own part, that the logical, subjective concept has a real, objective correlate, in the essence immanent in the objects of the concept. As the one apart from and heside the many the Idea does not exist ; none the less must a unity be assumed as (objectively) present in the many. The word substance (pvoia) in its primary and proper signification belongs to the concrete and individual ; only in a secondary sense can it be applied to the Genus. But although the universal has no inde- pendent existence apart from the individual, it is yet first in worth and rank, most significant, most knowable by nature and the ])roper subject of knowledge. This, however, is true, not of every common notion, but only of such notions as represent the Essential in the individual objects. These universal notions combine in one whole all the essential attributes of their objects, both the generic and the specific attributes ; they represent the essential Form, to denote which Aristotle employs the expressions el6o(;, nope Cauea finali Aristotelea, Berlin, 166oj; cf. Trendelenburg, Log. Cntersucfi. 2d ed., Leipsic, 1S62, II. p. 65 seq. The Theoloffy of Aristotle is discussed by Vater ( Vindiciae theoiogiae Arist., Halles 1795), Simon (/>« deo Arist., Paris, 183'J), Krische { Forxc/iungen, I. pp. 25S-811), C. Zell (/>e Ari^it. patritirum rtligionum aextinuttorey lluidelb. 1S4T; Aritt. in seinem Verhaltniss zxtr griech. Staatsreligion, in FeriensdiriftKH, new series, Vol. I., Hcidelb. 1S57, pp. 291-892; Dan Verhaltniss der Arist. Philos. tur Jieiigion, Mayence, 1863X E. Keinhold (Arist. theologia contra falsam JJe/jelinnam interpretationem de/enditur, Jena, 1848), O. H. Weichelt (T7ieologumena Aristotelea, Berlin, 1552), F. v. Ecinohl (Darstelluiig des Arist. Gotleibegriffa und Vergleic/iung dennelhen 7>iit dern I'latonischen, Jena, 1S54), A. L. Kym (Die GottesleJire den ArixtoteJes und das C/iristenthum, Zurich, 1SC2), J. P. Romang (Die Oottesl. des Ar. u. d. Chr., in the Protest. Kirchenzeitung, 1SG2, No. 42). F. G. Starke (Aristotelis de imitate Dei sententia [0.-Pr.'\, Neu-Ruppin, 1S64), L. F. Goetz (Der Arist. Gotteahegriff. contained in Festgabe., den alten Crucianem zur Einueihung des neiien Scfiulgeh. getcidmet. etc., Dresden, 18C6, pp. S7-G7). Other works, both new and old, are cited by Schwe<;ler in his edition of the itetaphijKics, Vol. IV. p. 257. The /'»e?«fo-Aristiitelian work, Theologia, of Neo-Platonic origin, translated in the ninth century into Arabic, known to the Scholastics in a Latin re-translation, first printed at Rome in 1519, and Included in Du Val's and other editions of Aristotle (1629, II pp. 1035 seq., and 1639, p[). 603 seq.) is the subject of an essay by Haneberg in the Reports of the Munich Acad, of Sci., 1862, 1. pp. 1-12; Uaneberg treats (ibid. 1862. I. pp. 861-888) of the book De Caiwis, included in the early Latin editions of Aristotle ( Venei. 1496 and 1550-1552) as a work of Aristotle, but which in reality was extracted from Neo-Platonic works, and in particular from the Instit. Theol. of Proclus or one of his disciples. Cf. below, § 97. Reviewing the various orders of human knowledge (Metaph., I., cc. 1 and 2), Aristotle remarks that the experienced man (efiirapoc) is justly considered wiser than he whose knowledge is restricted to single perceptions and recollections; the man of theoretic knowledge (o rexi'l-rrjc), than the merely experienced ; the director of an undertaking involving the application of art or skill, than he who is engaged in it merely as a manual laborer ; and, finally, he whose life is devoted to science (which relates to being — ov — as art, rixKV, does to becoming, ysveaig, Anal. Pos., II. 19), than he who seeks knowl- edge only in view of its application to practical uses : but in the sphere of scientific knowledge, he adds, that is the highest which respects the highest or ultimate reasons and causes of things; this highest in knowledge is "first philosophy," or wisdom, in the strict and absolute sense of the word (aodia, see above, § 1, pp. 3 anrl 4). The four formal principles of Ari.stotle, form, matter, efficient cause, and end, are enu- merated in Met, I. 3 (cf. Y. 2; Till. 4; Phys., II. 3), in the following terms: to. alrta 7J.ycTat TETpax(oc, wv fxiav /j.ev alriav (pafiev elvac ttjv ovaiav /cat to ti rp> elvac, . . . hepav 6e TTjv vh/v Kal to viroK£(.fj.evov, Tpi-ifv de b-dev i/ ap^f/ t^C Kivt/aeuq, rerdpTTfv 6e rffv avri- Keifitvtiv aiTtav Tfivrri, to ov ivcKa nal Taya-d6v, rt/of yap yevtceur koI Kivtjceu^ Tzdarj^ tovt' eoTiv. The oldest Greek philosophers, as Aristotle attempts in a comprehensive review of their doctrines {Metaph., I. 3 seq.) to demonstrate, inquired only after the mate- rial principle. I'^mpcdocle.i and Anaxagoras, he adds, iu([uirctl, further, after the cause of motion. The principle of essence or form was not clearly stated by any among the earlier philosophers, though the authors of the theory of ideas came nearest to it. The prin- ciple of finality was enounced by earlier philosophers only in a jvirtial or comparative seBse, and not as a complete and independent principle. Aristotle opposes numerous objections (^Mttnj)h., I. 9, XIII. and XIV.) to the Platonic theory of ideas, some of which relate to the demonstrative force of the argimients for that theory, while others are urged against the tenablcncss of the theory itself. The argument founded on tho real existence of scientific knowledge, says Aristotle, is not stringent ; the reality of the tmiversal does indeed follow from the fact in question, but not its detached existence ; did this follow, however, then from the same premises much else would fol- low, which tho Platonists neither do nor can admit, such as the existence of ideas of 160 Aristotle's metaphysics. ■R-orks of art, of the non-substantial, of the attributive and the relative ; for these things, too, possess ideal unity (ro vorjixa iv). But if the existence of ideas is assumed, the assumption is useless and leads to the impossible. The theory of ideas is useless ; for the ideas are only an aimless duplication of sensible things (a sort of aladrfTa atdia, eternal sensibles), to which they are of no service, since tliey are not the causes of any motion in them, nor of any change whatever ; neither do they help things to exist, nor us to know things, since they are not immanent in the common objects of our knowledge. But the hypothesis of the existence of ideas leads also to the impossible. It is affirmed of these ideas that they express the essence of their respective objects; but it is impossible that an essence and that of which it is the essence should exist apart {do^eiev hv adivaTov, dvai x'^P'^i ''"^ ovciav Koi ov rj ovaia) ; furthermore, the imitation of the ideas in individual objects, which Plato teaches, is inconceivable, and the expression contains only a poetic metaphor ; to which must be added, finally, that since the idea is represented as substantial, both it and the individuals which participate in it must be modeled after a common prototype, e. g., individual men and the idea of man (the avrodvdpuTTog) after a third man {rpirog avOpunoc, Met., I. 9 ; VII. 13 ; cf. Be Soph. EL, c. 22). The result of Aristotle's critique of the Platonic theory of ideas is, however, not merely negative. Aristotle is not, for example (as used often to be assumed), the author of the doctrine called Nominalism in the Middle Ages, the doctrine which explains the concept as a mere subjective product, and the universal as merely a subjective community in representation and grammatical designation. Aristotle admits that the subjective con- cept is related to an objective reality, and in this sense he is a Realist; but in place of the transcendent existence, which Plato ascribed to the ideas in contradistinction to individual objects, he teaches the immanence of the essence or the noumenon in the phenomenon. Accordingly he says {Met, XIII. 9, 1086 b, 2-7): Socrates, through his efforts to determine the concepts of things (to define them), led to the creation of the theory of ideas ; but he did not separate the universal from the individuals included under it, and in this he was right ; for without the universal, knowledge is impossible ; it is only its isolation apart from the world of real things, that is the cause of the incongruities which attach to the theory of ideas. (Cf. Anal. Post., I. 11 : d^rj fiiv ovv elvat r/ kv ri izapa to. tzoTJm ovk avayKTj, el airdSei^i^ earai ■ e'lvai fitvToi ev koto. iroXkuv a7.Tj-&iq einelv avayKt]. De Anima, III. 4 : £v Tolg Ixovatv vhffv Swdfisi eKacrov kari tuv votjtuv. Ibid., III. 8 : tv ro'tg el6eai rolq ale- ■^TjTolq TO. voTird kariv.) More negative is the critique which Aristotle directs against the reduction of the ideas to (ideal) numbers, and against the derivation of them from certain elements (aroixda. Met, XIY. 1) ; in the efforts to effect this he finds very much that is arbitrary and preposterous : qualitative differences are construed as resulting from quanti- tative differences, and that which can only be a function or state (Trddog) of another thing, is made the principle or an element of the latter ; thus the quantitative is confounded with the qualitative, and the accidental with the substantial, in a manner which leads to numerous contradictions. The opinion of Aristotle, that the individual alone has substantial existence (as ova'ia), the universal being immanent {ivv^:dpxo^') in it, seems, when taken in conjunction with the doctrine that (conceptual or scientific) knowledge is of the ovaia and, more particularly, that definition is a form of cognition of the ovaia (ovalag jvupiafidg), to involve the consequence that the individual is the proper object of knowledge, while in fact Aristotle teaches that not the individual as such, but rather the universal and ultimate, is in logical strictness the object of science. This apparent contradiction is removed, if we bear in mind the distinc- tion between the different meanings of ovala, viz.: "the individual substance," and "the essential." Substance, oiaia, in the sense of the essential, is termed by Aristotle (Metaph., AKISTOTLe's ME'^APHYSICa. 161 I. 3 et al), Tj Kara rov "koyov ovaca, i. e., the essence which corresponds with and is cog- nized through the concept ; but ovaia in the sense of the individual substance is defined {Metaph., V. 8 ; XIV. 5 ei al.) as that which can not be predicated of any thing else, but of which any thing else may be predicated (namely, as its accident), or as that which exists independently and separately (xupicruv). In Cafeg., 5, individual things are called "first substances'' {TVfx'^rai waim), and species, "second substances" ((kvrepac ovaiat). In Met., VIII. 2, Aristotle distinguishes in the sphere of ovcia aiad?jTT/ (sensible being): 1) matter (I'/l^), 2) form {nopipi/), 3) the product of both {tj Ik Tovron; the individual thing itself as a whole). The individual substance (the t66e n) is the whole {ahvo/Mv) resulting from the union of the material substratum {vTroKei/iievov, vXt/) with the ideal essence or form ; it is tlie subject of mere states (Trad?/) and relations (rrpof r/), that are distinguished according to the nine categories which, together with ovcia (individual substance), make up the system of ten categories. The more immediate subject of scientific inquiry is, indeed, the ■individual, but its ultimate and more appropriate subject is the universal in the sense of the essential. It is true that, according to Aristotelian principles, if the universal is the proper object of knowledge, it can only be such because it possesses reality in a higher sense than the individual; but such reality does belong to it, since it constitutes the essential in all individual substances. If the universal exists only in the individual, it follows, indeed, that the former can not be known without the latter, and that this was Aristotle's belief is coafirmed by the importance which he concedes to experience and induction in his theory of cognition and in his actual investigations in all departments of inquiry; but it does not follow that the individual, considered on the side of its individuality, must be the object of knowledge, for it can very well be this in view simply of the universal, which is immanent in it. Knowledge is concerned pre-eminently with the ideal essence (K«rd rov X6yov ovaia or ri yv dvai) of individual substances (riyv oiimuv, Metaph., VII. 4, 1030 b, o). In the case of the highest, i. e., the divine and imma- terial sphere of being, however, this difference between the universal and the individual, according to Aristotle, does not exist. The expression rii tl fjv dvai, is with Aristotle the general formula for expressions of the following kind : te Anima, III. 7 : Kal oi'x eTspov to bpsKTiKov kui fEVKTiKov ovt' a?.A7/Aov o'vte Tov alffdrfTiKov, a/M to nvai alio). The Dative here is apparently the Dative of posses- sion. The question tl eoTi, "what is it?" can be answered by aya06v, ev, avOpu,77or, "good," "one," "man," or by any other concrete term (although Aristotle uses that interrogative formula in so comprehensive a signification, that it can also receive an abstract answer) ; then r/ iari is made to stand for tlie answer itself, and is hence em- ployed as a general expression for ayaBov, h; av6pu~oc, and the like concrete terms. Now, as a general formula to represent combinations of single Datives with elvai, we might, perhaps, expect to find the expression to ti ectl dvai ; but since the putting of the ques- tion is to be conceived as already past, Aristotle chose the Imperfect r/v. (Another explanation of this Imperfect attributes to it an objective signification, as denoting the originally, eternally existent, the prim of individual existence ; but this Tlatonizing ex- planation can not be admitted, because the abstract, which finds its expression in dvai, ought then, according to this view, to precede the concrete, while here priority is in the expression ri t/v, ascribed, if to either, to the concrete.) To ri i/v dvai denotes, accord- 11 162 Aristotle's metaphysics. ingly, the essence conceived as separate from its substrate, or, as Aristotle defines it {Met., VII. 7, p. 1032 b, 14), ovaiav avev iAwf. The form of thought which corresponds with and may be said to express the ri t]v elvai, is the Concept, /.oyoc (Eth. K, II. 6 : ruv Myo¥ Ti f/v dvai MyovTa), whose content is given in the Definition (6 opicjuoc, Top., VII. 5 ; Melaph., Y. 8). Of the four principles : matter (7 iA;?), form (to d6og), moving cause (to bOev i) Kivr/ai^), and end or final cause (ro ov kveKo), the three latter, according to Phys., II. 7, are often one and the same in fact ; for essence (form) and end are in themselves identical, since the proximate end of every object consists in the full development of its proper form (i. e., the immanent end of every object, by the recognition of which the Aristotelian doctrine of finality is radically distinguished from the superficial utilitarian Teleology of later philoso- phers), and the cause of motion is at least identical in kind with the essence and the end ; for, says Aristotle, man is begotten by man, and in general one fully developed organism begets another of the same species, so that though the catisa efficiens is not the form itself^ which is yet to be produced, yet it is a form of similar nature. In the organic creation, the soul is the unity of those three principles {De An., II. p. 415 b, 9: ouoiu^ 6' tj ^rvxfi /card TovQ diupiCfiEvovq rponovq Tpelq aiTia- Kal yap 'd-&£i' t'/ KivrjCK: avrrj koi oil eveko /cot (jf ovaia Tuv e/xilwx"'^ au/idruv ij tI^x^ alrla). In the case of products, whose causes are external to the products themselves (Mechanism), as, for example, in the construction of a house, the three causes which stand opposed to matter are distinguished from each other not only in conception, but in reality. Examined in their relation to the phenomena of generation and growth, matter and form are opposed to each other as potentiality {6i>va,uig\ and actuality (or, as Aristotle terms it, "entelechy," EVTeXexeta). Of entelechy in general, Aristotle distinguishes two species: "first entelechy," by which the state of being com- plete or finished is to be understood, and "energy," which denotes the real activity of that which is thus complete ; yet in practice he does not bind liimself strictly to the observance of this distinction (cf. Trendelenburg, ad Be Anima, p. 296 seq., and Schwegler, Met., Vol. IV., p. 221 seq.). Motion or development is the actualization of the possible, qud possible (// Tov dm'arnv, ?'? (hn'arov evteTiexei-o. . . . kIvt/gi^ iariv, Phys., III. 1). Especially worthy of notice is the relativity, which Aristotle attributes to these notions, when he em- ploys them in concrete cases : the same thing, he says, can be in one respect matter and potentialit}', in another, form and actuality, e. g., the hewn stone can be the former in rela- tion to the house, the latter in comparison with the unhewn stone, the sensuous side of the soul (or 'i'vxfj) can be the former in comparison with the intelligent mind (I'oi'f), the latter when compared with the body. Thus the apparent dualism of matter and form tends at least to disappear in the reduction of the world to a gradation of existences. The very highest place in the scale of being is occupied by the immaterial spirit, called God. The proof of the necessity of assuming such a principle is derived by Aristotle from the development in nature of objects whose form and structure indicate design, and is founded on Aristotle's general principle, that all transition (aivrjaic) from the potential to the actual depends on an actual cause. {Met., IX. 8 : Potentialitj^ is always preceded in time by some form of actuality, ael yap ek tov dwafiei bvToq yiyverat rb EVEpysia ov vTrb EVEp} Eia ovroQ. De Gen. Animal., II. 1 : baa (pvoEt yiyvETai ^ rixvri, iV tvEpye'ta bvroq jQ'veTai. ek tov SwafiEi bvToc.) Every particular object which is the result of development, implies an actual moving cause ; so the world as a whole demands an absolutely first mover to give form to the naturally passive matter which constitutes it. This principle, the first mover (Trptirov Kivovv) must (according to Met., XII. 6 seq.) be one, whose essence is pure, energy, since, if it were in any respect merely potential, it could not unceasingly communicate motion to all things; it must be eternal, pure, immaterial form, since otherwise it would be burdened ARISTOTLE S NATURAL PHILOSOPHY. 163 with potentiality (to t'l f]v dvac ovk exei v^tfv to irpiJTov • evreXexeia yap). Being free from matter, il is without plurality and without parts. It is absolute spirit (vovg), which thinks itself, aud whose thought is therefore the thought of thought {yoT/aiq vor/aeu^). Tts agency as the cause of motion is not active and formative, but passive, for it remains itself unmoved ; it acts by virtue of the attraction which the loved exerts upon the loving, for it is the Good per se and the end toward which all things tend (Kivel ov mvovfievov • . . . Kivel uq ipu/ievov). Not at any given time did God shape the orderly world ; he conditions and determines the order of the world eternally, in that he exists as the most perfect being, and all things else seek to become like him ; the world as an articulate whole has always existed and will never perish. As being an "actual" principle, God is not a final product of development ; he is the eternal prius of all development. Thought, which is the mode of his activitj^, con- stitutes the highest, best, and most blessed life (Metaph., XII. 7 : r) ^eupia to t/Siotov kqI apiarov • . . . /cot ^u^ rfe -ye kvimapxu • tj yap vov ivepyeta C,ufi • . . . ucte l^ufj koX aluv awexVQ Koi aidioq iinapxet. tu iSftJ). The world has its principle in God, and this principle exists not merely as a form immanent in the world, like the order in an arm}', but also as an absolute self-existent substance, like the general in an army. Aristotle concludes his theology (J/e^., XII. lOyiw.) and marks his opposition to the (Speusippic) doctrine of a plurahty of inde- pendent and co-existent principles, by citing the following line from Homer {/Has, II. 204): Ovk ayadbv noTiVKOtpavir]' tlf Koipavoq ioTu. In essential agreement with this scientific justification of the belief in God's existence, though differing from it in form, was the substance of the popular reflections contained in the third book of the dialogue "Concerning Philosophy." Cicero [De Nat. Deorum, II. 37, 95) has preserved from it a paragraph of some length, translated into Latin, and it may here be cited entire, as furnishing also a specimen of the style of Aristotle in his popular (exoteric) writings (to which is to be referred Cicero's praise in Acad. Pr., II, 119: /lumen orationis aureum fundens Aristoteles ; cf. Cic, De Orat, I. 49, Top., 1, De Livent, H- 2, Brut, 31, Ad Att., II. 1, 1, De Fin., I. 5, 14; Dionys. Halic, De Verhorum Copia, 241, p. 187 of Reiske's edition, and De Censura Vet. Script., 4, p. 430) : " Imagine men who have always dwelt beneath the earth in good and well-illuminated habitations, habitations adorned with statues and paintings and well furnished with every thing wliich is usually at the com- mand of those who are deemed fortunate. Suppose these men never to have come up to the .surface of the earth, but to have gathered from an obscure legend that a Deity and divine powers exist. If the earth were once to be opened for these men, so that they could ascend out of their concealed abodes to the regions inhabited by us, and if they were to step forth and suddenly see before them the earth and the sea and skies, and perceive the masses of the clouds and tlio violence of the winds; and if tlien they were to look up at the sun and become cognizant of its magnitude and also of its workings, that he is the author of day, in that ho sheds his light over the entire heavens ; and if after- ward, when night had overshadowed the earth, they were to see the whole sky beset and adorned with stars, and should contemplate the changing light of the moon in its increase and decrease, the rising and setting of all these heavenly bodies, aud their course to all eternity inviolable and unalterable : truly, they would then believe that Gods really exist, and that these mighty works originate vdth them." § 49. Nature is the complex of objects having a material constitu- tion and involved in necessary motion or change. Change {fierafioXTj) or motion (Kivrjoig), in the broader sense, includes, on the one hand, 164 Aristotle's natural philosophy. origin and decay (or motion from the relatively non-existent to the existent, and conversely); and, on the other, motion in the narrower sense, which again is divisible into three species : quantitative mo- tion, qualitative motion, and motion in space ; or increase and de- crease, qualitative transformation, and change of place ; the latter accompanies all other species of motion. The universal conditions of all change of place and of all motion, of whatever kind, are place and time. Place {roTrog) is defined as the inner limit of the inclosing body. Time is the measure (or number) of motion with reference to the earlier and later. No place is empty. Space is limited ; the world possesses only a finite extension ; outside of it is no place. Time is unlimited ; the world was alw^ays, and always will be. The primum, motuin is heaven. The sphere, to which the fixed stai« are attached, has, since it is in immediate contact with the Deity, the best of all possible motions, namely, the motion of uniform circular rotation. Aristotle seeks to explain the movements of the planets by the theory of numerous spheres moved, in various senses, by unmoved^ p immaterial beings, who are, as it were, a sort of inferior gods. The / earth, w^hich is spherical, reposes unmoved at the center of the world. The five material elements — ether, fire, air, water, and earth — occupy in the universe determinate places, suited to their natures. The ether fills the celestial spaces, and of it the spheres and the stars are formed. The other elements belong to the terrestrial world; they are distin- guished from each other by their relative heaviness or lightness, and also by their relative warmth or coldness and dryness or moisture ; they are commingled in all terrestrial bodies. Nature, guided by the principle of finality and proceeding by the way of an ever-increasing subjection of matter to form, produces on the earth a scale of living beings. Each superior degree in this scale unites in itself the charac- ters of the inferior degrees, adding to them its own peculiar and more excellent virtue. The vital force, or the soul, in the widest sense of this word, is the entelechy of the body. The vital force of the plant is nothing more than a constructing force ; the animal possesses this, and the faculties of sensation, desire, and locomotion besides ; man combines with all these the faculty of reason. Reason is partly passive, subject to determining influences and of temporary duration, partly active, determining, and immortal. Alemandri AphrodigienHs Qiiaentionnm Naturattwm et MoraUvmi ad ArUtctelis philosophiam illits- trandam lihri quatuor^ ex recens. Leonh. Spengel, Munich, 1842. The content of the ■writings of Aristotle on natural science is treated of by George Henry Lewes in bis Aristotle's natural philosophy. 165 Ariistotle, a Chapter from the Hietory of Science, London, 1864, German translation by J. V. Cams, Leipe. 1865; cf. J. B. Meyer's account of the book in the Gott. gel. Am., 1865, pp. 1445-1474. On the character of the Aristotelian Physics in general, cf. C. M. Zevort (Paris, 1846), Bartbeleniy 6t. Hilaire (in the Introd. to his edit of the Phya., Paris, 1862), Ch. L6veque (La Physique dAristote et la Science CoTiiempoi-airie, Paris, 1S63). On Aristotle's doctrine of the eternity of the world, see the article by H. Siebeck. ZeiUchrift fur exacte PhiloKophU, IX. 1869, pp. 1-38 and 181-154. On the Arist, doctrine of space and time : G. R. Wolter (Bonn. 1845), and Otto Ule, on Aristotle's and Kant's doctrines of space (Halle, 1S50) ; on the doctrine of time alone (Phijs., A. 10 seq.) : Ad. Toretrik, Philoloffus, voL 26, 1868, pp. 446-523; on the doctrine oi continuity : G. Schilling (Giesscn, 1840). On the mathematical \i-ao-9:\ed^e of Arist.: A. Burja (in Mem. de VAcad. de Berlin, 1790-'91); on his mechanical problems : F. Th. Poselger (in Ahh. der Berl. Akad., 1829), Ruelle (Etude gvr un passage d'Aristote relatif d la mechanique, in the Re-vue Arclieol.. 1S57, XIV., pp. 7-21); on his meteorology : J. L. Idcler (Berlin, 1532), and Suhle (G.-Pr., Bernb. 1864); on his theory of light: E. F. Eberhard (Coburg, 1836), and Praiitl (Arist. ilber die Farben erlaxde.rt durch eine Uebersiclit iiber die Farbenlehre der Alten, Munich, 1849); on his geography : B. L. Konigsmann (Schleswig, 1803-1806). On the botany of Aristotle : Hen;chel (Breslau, 1824), F. Wimmcr (PJiytologiae Arist. Fragm., Breslau, 1838), Jessen (Ueber des Arist. Pfiansr.nuerke, in the Ph. Jfus., new serit^s, XIV., 1859, pp. 88-101). On the Zoology of A., cf., besides the annotations of J. G. Schneider in his edition of the Jlistoria Anirnalium. (Leips. 1811). the works of A. F. A. "W iepmar\n (Observ. zoologicae eriiicae in Arist. hi-storiam, animaliuTn, Berlin, 1826), Karl Zell (Ueber den Sinn des Geschmacks, in: Ferienscliriften, 3. Sammliing, Freiburg, 1833), Job. Muller ( Ueber den glatten Ilai des Arist., Akad., Berlin, 1842), Jiirgen Bona Meyer (De pHn- cipiis Arist. in distrilnit anirnalium adhibiii.t, UerMn, 1854; Arist. Thierkunde, Berlin, 1855), Sonnen- bnrg (Zu Aristot. Tliiergeschicht^, G.-Pr., Bonn, 1857), C. J. Sundeval (Die 77iierarten des Aristot., Stockholm, 1863), Langkavel (Zu De Part. An., G.-Pr., Berlin, 1863), Aubert (Die Cephalopjoden dea Ariat, in soologischer, anatomischer und gesohichtlicher Beziehung, in the Zeitschr. /. wiss. Zoologie, XII., Leips. 1802, p. 372 seq. ; cf. the edition with translation and notes of Aristotle's work on the Genera- tion and Development of Animals, by II. Aubert and Fr. "Wimmer, Leipsic, 1560), Henri Philibert (Le Principe de la Vie siticant ^lr;.sfe?<>, Chaumont, 1865; Arist. philosophia zoologica, thesis Parixi^nsis, Chaumont and Paris, 1565), Charles Thurot (Obserxations critiques sur le traite d'' Arist. De Partibua Anirnalium, in the Revue Grit, new series, 1807, pp. 223-242). The two following authors treat specially of Aristotle's doctrines of human anatomy and physiology : Andr. Westphal (De anatomia Aristotelis, imprimis num. cadavera secuerit htimana, Greifswald, 1745), and L. M. Philippson (uAij a.v8puiirivrj, pars I. : de internarum hrimani corporis partium cognitione Aristotelis cu7n Platonis sententiis com- parata ; pars 11. : philosophorwm veterum ■u«qu6 ad Theophrastum doctiina de sensu, Berlin, 1831). Of Arif,U>t\c''s physiognomies treat E. Taube (G.-Pr., Gleiwitz, 1866), and J. Henrychowski (Diss. Inaug., Breslau, 1868). The following authors treat of the Psrjchology of Aristotle : Job. Heinr. Deinhardt (Der Be^riff der Seele mil Riicksicht auf Aristoteles, Hambuig, 1840), Gust. Ilartenstein (De p-fychol. vulg. orig. ab Arittotele repetenda, Leipsic, 1840), Car. Phil. Fischer (De principiis Aristotelicae de anima doctri- nue diss., Erlangen, 1845), B. St. Hilaire (in his edition of the De Anima, Paris, 1S46), Wilh. Schraiier (Arist. de noluntate doctrina, Progr. des Brandenb. Gimn., Brandenburg, 1S47, and Die Unstir- blichkeitslehre deA Aristoteles, in K Jahrb. f. Philol. u. Pad., Vol. 81, 1860, pp. 89-104), W. Wolff ( Von dem Begriff des Arist. iiber die Seele und dessen Anirendung auf die heutige Psychologie, Progr.., Bayreuth, 1845), Gsell-Fels (Psychol. Plat, et Arist, Progr., Wiirzbiirg, 1854), Hugo Anton (Doctrina de nat. horn, ab Arist. in scriptis ethicis proposita, Berlin, 1S52. and De hominis habitu naturali quam Arist. in Eth. Nic. proposuerit doctrinam., Erfurt, 1860), W. F. Volkmann (Die Gritndzilge der Aristotelisch^n Psychologie, Prague, 1858), Herm. Beck (Arist. de sensuum actione, Berlin, 156 ), Pansoh (De Aristotelis animae definitione diss., Greifswald, 1861), Wilh. Biehl (Die Arist. Definit. der Seele, in Verh. der Augsburger Philologen-Vers. for the year 1862, Leipsic 1863, pp. 94-102). J. Freudenthnl (Ueher den Begriff des Wortes 4>avTacria bei Aritt., Gottiugen, 1863), A. Gratacap (Arist. de sensibns doctrina, diss, ph., Montpellier, 1866). Leonh. Schneider (Die UnterblicJikeifslehre df.i Aristoteles., Passau, 1867), Eugen Eberhard (Die Arist. Definition der Seele und ihr M'erth fiir die Gegenwart, Berlin, 1868), [George Grote, in the Supplement to the third edition of Bain's Senses and Vl6 Intellect, London, 18C9.— Tr.] Aristotle's doctrine of the voCs is discussed in works by F. G. Starke (Neu-Euppin, 1838), F. H. Chr. Ribbentrop (Breslau, 1840). Jul. Wolf (Arif>f. de intellectu agente et patiente doctrina, Berlin, 1844), and others, and, recently, by Wilh. Biel (Gymn.-Pr., Linz, 1864), and Franz Brentano (Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom vov^ b-oitjtiicot, nebst einer Beilage iiber das Wirken des Arist Gottes. Mayence, 1867). Cf., also, Prantl, Gesch. d. Log., I. p. 108 seq., and F. F. Kampe. Di4 Erkimttnisslehre des A., Leipsic, 1870, pp. 3-60. 166 akistotle's natueal philosophy. Aristotle designates {Fhys., II. 1) as the universal character of all which is by naiure, that it has in itself the principle of motion and rest, while in the products of human art there is no tendency to change. All natural existences (De Coelo, I. 1) are either them- selves bodies, or have bodies or are principles of things having bodies (e. g., body ; man ; «oul). The word motion (jiivrjaiq) is sometimes used by Aristotle (e. g., Phys., III. 1) as synonymous with change (jiETafiolr]); but, on the other hand, he says {Phys., V. 1), that though all motion is change, yet the converse is not true, all change is not motion, such changes, namely, as affect the existence of objects, i. e., generation and decease (}fi'f(T(f and fdopa) are not motions. Motion proper exists in the three categories of quantity [na-a rb Toadv or Kara /leyedo^), quality [Kara to ■kol6v or Kara irdfef), and place (/card to ttov or Knrd Tonov) : in the first case it is increase and decrease {av^ijaiQ koI (pdlacc) ; in the second, alteration (a/l/lo/wffif) ; in the third, change of place {ipopd). Aristotle defines Tdno^* {Phys., lY. 4, p. 212 a, 20), as the first and unmoved boundary of the inclosing body on the side of the inclosed {to tov ■KspiexovTo^ irepag aniviiTov wpioTov). TdTrog may be compared to an unmoved vessel, containing the object whose Td-rrog it is. Aristotle understands, therefore, by roTof, not so much the space through which a body is extended, as, rather, the limit by which it is bounded, and this conceived as fixed and immovable ; liis chief argument for the non-existence of an unfilled rSTrog and for the non-existence of a roTrof outside of the world, is founded on the above definition, in accordance with which no void within or region without the world is possible. All motion must, according to Aristotle, take place in a plenum by means of an exchange of places {avTiTvepicTaaiq). The motion of the world, as a whole, is not an advancing, but simply a rotary motion. The definition of time [re- cited above] is worded as follows {Phys., IV. 11, pp. 219 b, 1, 220 a, 2-1): 6 ;jfpovof apid/udg iaTi KiVTjaeuq KaTo. to tvpoTEpov koL voTepov. For the measure of time the uniform circular motion is especially appropriate, since it is most easily numbered. Hence time is repre- sented (ch. 14) as connected with the motion of the celestial spheres, since by these all other motions are measured. But time is (ch. II, p. 219 b, 8) the number which is reck- oned, not that by means of which we reckon. Without a reckoning soul there would be no number, hence no time, but only motion, and in it an earlier and later. All motion in nature is directed to an end. " God and nature do nothing in vain " (6 6ehg Kat 7/ (pvaig ovSev judTTjv ttolovgiv, De Coelo, I. 4). Nevertheless, a certain room is left by Aristotle {Phys., II. 4-6) for the play of the accidental {avTOfiuTov) or the advent of results, which were not intended, in consequence of some secondary effect following from the means used to bring about another end; under the avTOfiaTov falls, as a concept of nar- rower extension, chance (y rrj^), the emergence of a result which was not (consciously) intended, but which might have been intended {e. g., the finding of a treasure while plowing the ground). Nature does not always attain her ends, on account of the obstacles offered by matter. The degree of perfection in things varies according as they are more or less removed from the direct influence of God (cf. § 48). God acts directly on the firmament of the fixed stars, which he touches, without being touched by it. (The notion of contact (d0^), which Aristotle {Phys., V. 3) defines as the juxtaposition of dupa or {De Gen. et Corn, * [ToTTo? is the Greek word for space. It signifies, properly, however, rather place than space, and this is the signification which it has with Aristotle. Aristotle's conception of space is not that of indefinite extension. He disallows the idea of unfilled space, and as nothing can occupy space but the world, and as the world is, in Aristotle's view, a bounded sphere.it follows that space in general must be the "place" occupied by the world, and that its limits are the limits of the world. Aristotle remarks, however, that not the world, but only its parts, are in space— which follows from his definition. The place of any thing. h« defines, is the inner surface of the body surrounding it. that surface being conceived as fixed and immova- ble. As nothing exists outside of the world, except God. who is pure thought and not in space, the worU naturally cao not le in space, i. e., its "place" can not be defined.— TV.] Aristotle's natural philosophy. 167 I. 6) eaxc-To, is here intermediate in signification between contiguity in space and ideal afiection.) God moves the world from its circumference. The motion of the heaven of the fixed stars is better than that of the planetary spheres ; the obliquity of the ecliptic marks an imperfection of the lower regions ; less perfect still are the motions which ara accomplished ou the earth. Each motion of a surrounding sphere is communicated to the spheres included in it, so, in particular, that of the sphere of the fixed stars to all the rest; when this effect ought not to be produced, as in fact it is not by the planetary spheres on those still inferior, retroacting spheres, or spheres with a counter-motion, are requisite. The whole number of spheres assumed by Aristotle is 47, or according to another con- struction, 55 (J/ef., XII. 8). The nature of the Ether (which extends from the heaven of the fixed stars down to the moon, Meteor., I. 3) adapts it especially for circular motion ; to the other elements, the upward motion {i. e., from the center of the world toward its circumference) or the downward {i. e., from the circumference to the center) is natural Of these other elements, earth is the one to which the attribute of heaviness belongs, and its natural place in the world is, consequently, the lowest, viz.: the center of the world; fire is the light element, and its place is the sphere next adjoining the sphere of the ether. Fire is warm and dry, air is warm and moist (fluid), water is cold and moist (fluid), and earth is cold and dry. Ether is the first element in rank {Meteor., I. 3 ; Be Coda, I. 3 ; cf. De Gen. An., II. 3); but if we enumerate, beginning with the elements directly known by the senses, it is the fifth, the subsequently so-called Tcifi-nTov ctolxeIov, quinta essentia. In all organic creations, even in the lowest animals, Aristotle {De Part. An., I. 5) finds something admirable, full of purpose, beautiful and divine. The plants are less perfect than the animals {Phys., II. 8) ; among the latter, those which have blood are more perfect than the bloodless, the tame than the wild, etc. [De Gen. An., II. 1 ; Pol, I. 5). The lowest organisms may arise by original generation (generatio sjyontanea sive aequivoca, i. e., by "generation" only homonymously so called [6/iiiJvv/u.u(;], and consisting in evolution from the heterogeneous). But in the case of all higher organisms, like is generated by like ; in those which have attained their full development, the germs of new organisms of the same name and species are developed {Metaph., XII. 3 : eKdart/ ek awuvvuuv yijverai y oicia . . . avdpuT^oq yap avdpcmov yewa). In the act of generation Aristotle teaches that the form-giving or animating principle proceeds from the male, and the form-receiving or material principle from the female. The two general classes in which Aristotle includes all animals, namely, animals having blood and bloodless animals, correspond with what Cuvier termed the Tertebrates and the Invertebrates. The latter are classified by Aristotle as either Testacea, Crustacea, Mollusks. or Insects; and the former as Fishes, Amphibious Animals. Birds, and Mammalia: the apo ia viewed by him as an intermediate form between man and other viviparous animals. Aristotle founds the division of his anatomical investigations on the distinction of avofioinfxeprj, i. e., organs, whose parts are not like the organs themselves (e. g., the hand ; the hand does not consist of hands), and ouoiouep/j, i. e., substances, whose parts are like the substances themselves {e. g., flesh, blood ; the parts of a piece of flesh or of a mass of blood are like the wholes to which they belong). Aristotle had a far more exact knowl- edge of the internal organs of animals than of those of the human body. The (physio- logical) work on the Senses and the work on the Generation and Development of Animals are followed in the " History of Animals " by a collection of observations on the habits of life, and, in particular, on the psychical functions of the different classes of animals. 168 Aristotle's natural philosophy. Aristotle defines the soul as the first entelechy of a physical, potentially living and organic body (De Anima, II. 1 : egtIv ovv ipvxrj ivreAexcia ij Trp('jrr/ auyfiaroq fvaiKov Coi7;v eXovTog 6vvdfj.er tolovtov 6e b av y bpyaviKov). "First entelechy" is related to "second," as knowledge {eKiaTrj/j.Ti) to speculation (deupeiv). Neither is mere potentiality ; both are realized potentialities ; but while knowledge may be ours as a passive possession, specula- tion is, as it were, knowledge in activity, or knowledge put to its most characteristic use ; so the soul is not (like the divine mind) always engaged in the active manifestation of its own essence, but is always present, as the developed force capable of such manifestation. As the entelechy of the body the soul is at once its form {principium fornians), its prin- ciple of motion and its end. Each organ exists (De Part. An., I. 5) in view of an end, and this end is an activity; the whole body exists for the soul. The vegetable soul, i. e., the vital principle of the plant, is (according to De An., II. 1 et al.) a nourishing soul, to DpeTTTtKov, the faculty of material assimilation and reproduction. The animal possesses in addition to this the sensitive, appetitive and locomotive faculties {to a\a-&TjTiK6v, to opsKTiKov, -b KLVTjTLKov KUTo. Tomjv). The corporeo-psychical functions of animals (at least of the more highly developed animals) have a common center (/^roor^/f), which is wanting in plants ; the central organ is the heart, which is viewed by Aristotle as the seat of sensa- tion, the brain being an organ of subordinate importance. Sensuous perception (alc67;ciq\ is the result of qualities which exist potentially in the objects perceived and actually in the perceiving being. The seeing of colors depends on a certain motion of the medium of vision (air or water). With sensuous perception are connected imaginative representation {tpai'Taaia), which is a psychical after-effect of sensation {De An., III. 3), or a sort of weak- ened sensation {Rhet., I. 11, 1370 a, 28), and also (involuntary) memory {/uvr/ju?;), which is to be explained by the persistence (/lovr/) of the sensible impression {De Memor., ch. 1 ; Anal. Post, II. 19), and (voluntary) recollection {avd/:iv?/aLc), which depends on the co-operation of the will aud implies the power of combining mental representations {De Memor., ch. 2). Out of these theoretical functions, combined with the feeling of the agreeable and the disagreeable, springs desire {bpe^ig) ; whatever, says Aristotle, is capable of sensation, is also capable of pleasure and pain and of the feeling of the agreeable and disagreeable, and whatever is capable of these, is capable also of desire {De An., II. 3, p. 414 b, 4). The human soul, uniting in itself all the faculties of the other orders of animate existence, is a Microcosm (De An., III. 8). The faculty by which it is distinguished from those orders is reason {vovq). The other parts of the soul are inseparable from the body, and are hence perishable {De An., 11. 2); but the vovg exists before the body, into which it enters from without as something divine and immortal {De Gen. Animal., II. 3 : Xeinerai tov vovv fiovov dvpaOev, ETTEiaitvac /cat 6elov dvai fiovov). But the concept or notion is impossible without the representative image {(pdvTaa/iia). This stands to the concept in a relation similar to that in which the mathematical figure stands to that which is demonstrated by means of it, and only by the aid of such an image, joined with the feeling of the agreeable or dis- agreeable, can the reason act upon the appetitive faculty, i. e., become practical reason {DeAn., III. 10). The vovg, therefore, in man, has need of a Svvafug, or what may be called an unfilled region of thought, a tabula rasa, before it can manifest its form-giving activity {De An., III. 4 : \yovg k(jTi\ ypafi/idTEiov^ ij fiTj^kv inrdpxei EvepyEtq yEypanfiEvov). Accord- ingly, a distinction must be made between the passive reason {vovg TraOr/TiKdg), as the form- receiving, and the active reason {vovg noiTjTiKog), as the form-giving principle ; substantial, eternal existence belongs only to the latter {De Anima, III. 5 : 6 %'ovg ;f6)p«Tr6f ko: dTva^ijg nal afiLyrjg r^ ovalg tJv eve py Eta, ... 6 Se ■KO&TjTLKog vovg (p&apTog). How the active reason is related, on the one hand, to individual existence, on the other, to God, is not made per- fectly clear ; a certain latitude is left for a naturalistic and pantheistic or for a mor(j Aristotle's ethics and aesthetics. 169 spiritualistic and theistic interpretation, and each of these interpretations has found numerous representatives both in ancient and later times; yet it is scarcely possible to develop either of them in all its consequences, without running counter to other portions of Aristotle's teaching. § 50. The end of human activity, or the highest good for man, is happiness. This depends on the rational or virtuous activity of the soul throughout the whole of its life. With activity pleasure is joined, as its blossom and natural culmination. Virtue is a pro- liciency in willing what is conformed to reason, developed from the state of a natural potentiality by practical action. The development of virtue requires the existence of a faculty of virtue, and requires also exercise and intellisence. All virtues are either ethical or dlanoetic. Ethical virtue is that permanent direction of the will (or state of mind), which guards the mean proper for us, as determined for us by the reason of the intelligent ; hence it is the subordination of appetite to reason. Bravery is the mean between cowardice and temerity ; temperance, the mean between inordinate desire and stupid indiiference ; generosity, the mean between prodigality and parsimony, etc. The highest among the ethical virtues is justice or righteous- ness. This, in the most extended sense of the word, is the union of all ethical virtues, so far as they regard our fellow-men; in the narrower sense, it respects the equitable (toov) in matters of gain or loss. Justice in this latter sense is either distributive or commuta- tive ; the former respects the partition of possessions and honors, the latter relates to contracts and the reparation of inflicted wrongs. Equity is a complementary rectification of legal justice by reference to the individuality of the accused. Dianoetic virtue is the correct functioning of the theoretical reason, either in itself or in reference to the inferior psychical functions. The dianoetic virtues are reason, science, art, and practical intelligence. The highest stage of reason and science is wisdom in the absolute sense of the terra, tlie highest stage of art is wisdom in the relative sense. A life devoted only to sensual enjoyment is brutish, an ethico-political life is human, but a scientific life is divine. Man has need of man for the attainment of the practical ends of life. Only in the state is the ethical problem capable of solution. Man is by nature a political being. The state originated for the protection of life, but ought to exist for the promotion of morally upright living ; its principal business is the development of moral 170 akistotle's ethics and esthetics. capacity in the young and in all its citizens. The state is prior to the individual in that sense in which in general the whole is prior to the part and the end prior to the means. Its basis is the family. He who is capable only of obedience and not of intelligence must be a servant (slave). The concord of the citizens must be founded on unanimity of sentiment, not on an artificial annihilation of individual interests. The most practicable form of the state is, in general, a government in which monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic ele- ments are combined ; but in all individual cases this form must be accommodated to the given circumstances. Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Timocracy (or a Republic) are, under the appropriate circum- stances, good forms of government ; Democracy, Oligarchy, and Tyranny are degenerate forms, of which the latter, as being the cor- ruption of the most excellent form, is the worst. The distinguishing mark of good and bad forms of government is found in the object pursued by the rulers, according as this object is either the public good or the j^rivate interest of the rulers. It is right that the Hellenes should rule over the barbarians, the cultured over the uncultured. Art is of two kinds, useful and imitative. The latter serves three ends : recreation and (refined) entertainment, temporary eman- cipation from the control of certain passions by means of their excita- tion and subsequent subsidence, and, last and chiefly, moral culture. Of the ethics of Aristotle in general write Chr. Garve ( Uebers. nnd Erldut., Berlin, 1T98-1802), Sehleier- macher (in various passages of his Grundlinien einer KriUk der bishe7-ige7i Sittenlehre, Berlin, 1S03 ; cf. Ueber die iciss. Behandlung des Tit gendh eg riffs, in the Abh. der Acad., Berlin, 18'JO), K. L. Michelet {Die Ethik des Arisi. in ihrem Verhciltnifis sum System, der Moral, Berlin, 1827; cf. his Syy»t. der philoa. Moral, 1828, pp. 195-2:37), Ilartenstein ( Ueber den wiss. Werth der Arist. Ethik, in the Berichte iiber die Verhandlungen der K. Siichs. Gesellsch. der Wiss. zu Leipzig, p/iilol.-liisi. cl., 1859, pp. 49-107, and in H.'s JTist.-philos. Abh., Leipsic, 1870), Trendelenburg {Ueber Ilerbart's p>raktisdie J'hilos. und die Ethik der Alien, in the Abh. der Berl. Akad., 1856; cf. the 10th essay in T.'s Hist. Beitr. zur Philos., Vol. II., Berlin, 1855, Ueber einige Stellen im. 5 n. 6, Buche der Kikomach. Ethik, and the 9th Article in Vol. III. of the same, Berlin, 1S67; Zur Arist. Ethik., pp. 399-444), Dielitz {Qtiaestiones Aristoieleae, Progr. of the Sophien-gymn, Berlin, 1S67). Of the relation of Aristotle''s ethics and politics to the corresponding doctrines of Plato, and of Aris- totle's critique of the latter, treat Pinzger (Leipsic, 1822), H. VV. Broecker (Leipsic, 1824), W. Orges (Berlin, 1843), St. Matthies (Greifswald, 1848), A. J. Kahlert (Czernowitz, 1854), W. Pierson (in the Bhein. Mvs.f. Ph., new series, XIII., 1858, pp. 1-48 and 209-247) ; also, Fr. Guil. Engelhardt, Loci. Pliitmiici, qvonim Aris- toteles in conscribendis Politicis oidetur memor /uis.se, 'Da.ntz\c. 1S.5S; Siegfr. Lommatzsch, Quomodo Plato et Arist. religionis et reip. prineijna conjunverint, Berlin, 1863; C. W. Schmidt, Ueber die Ein- wurfe des Ariit. in der Kik. Ethik gegen Plat. Lehre vrni der Lust (G.-Pr.), Bunzlau, 1864; Kalmns, Ar. de volupt. doctr. {G.-Pr.), Pyritz, 1862; Rassow, IHe Pep. des Plato und der beste Sfaat des Arist, "Weimar, 1866. Cf. the dissertations by Gnst. Goldmann (Berlin, 1868), and Adolf Ehrlich (Halle, 1868). and the opuscule of Herm. Henkel on Plato's Zajm and the Politics of Aristotle {Gym. -Progr.). Seehauser, 1869. On Kant's Ethics as compared with Aristotle's, see Traug. Bruckner, De trihvs ethice.i locis, guibii^ differt Eantius ab Aristotele, diss, inaug.. Berlin, 1866, and Trendelenburg, Der Widerstreit zwischen Kant und Arist. in der Ethik, in his Histor. Beitruge zur Philosophie, Vol. III., 186T, pp. 171-214. Aristotle's ethics and esthetics. 171 Ch. E. Luthart, Die Ethik des Ariat. in ihrem Untersdded von der Moral dM ChristenthwM, Leipsic, 1869. Wilh. Oncken, Die StaaUUhre den Arint. in hvtt.-pol. Umriseen, Leipsic, 1870; Ar. u. «. L.v. Staai, in Viichow aud Hollzeudorfif's Savunlung yemeinverHtdndliche toins. Vortrdye. No. 103, Berlin, 1870. Of the ethical aud political principles of Aristotle treat Starke (Neu-Kuppin, 1S3S and I860), Holm (Berlin, 1853X Ueberweg (Das Arist., Kaiitisc/ie und Uerbartsche Moral-princip., in Fichte's Z., Vol. 24, Halle, 1854, p. 71 seq.); on the method and the bases of Aristotle's Ethics, of. Rud. Eucken {O.Pr^ Frank- fort-on-the-Mitin. 1870); on points of contact between the Ethics and Politics, J. Municr (G.-Pr., Mayence, 1358), Schutz (Potsd. 1860); on the Highest Good, Kruhl (Breslan, 1832 and 1833), Afzelius (Holmiae, 1888X Axel Nybliius (Lund, 1863), "Wenkel (Die Lehre den Ariat. uher das hdchste Gut oder die GlOck- seligkeit. G.-Pr., Sonderscausen. 1864); on the Eudaemonia of Ari.st., Herm. Hauipke (De Etulaemonui, Arist. moralis disciplina^ priiicipio, diss, inuug. BeroL, Brandenb. 1S6S). G. Teichiniilier (Die Einhett der Ar. Eiuiilmonie, from the Melanges grneco-rommns, I., II , St. Petersburg, 1859. in the Bulletin hist.-phil., t. XVI.. of the Imperial Acad, of Sciences, ibid. 1859), E. Laas (Diss. Brl., 1859), Chr. A. Thilo (in the Zeitschrift fur exacte PhiloH., Vol. 11., Leipsic, 1861, pp. 271-30J), Karl Kiiappe (Grundzixge der Arist. Lehre von dsr Ewdam., G.-Pr., Wittenberg, 1364-66): on A.'s conception of virtue, Nielander (G.-Pr., Herl'ord, 1861); on the theory of Duties, Carl. Aug. Mann (/>««. iiiavg., Berlin, 1867): on the conceptions (lecroTrjs and opflbs Aoyo?, G. Glogau (Halle, 1869); on the place of Sensation in Aristotle's doctrine, lloth (in Theolog. Studten -and Krit., 1850, Vol. I., p. 625 seq.)-. on Justice, A. G. Kastner (Leipsic. 1737), C. A. v. Droste-Hulehoff (Bonn. 1826), Herm. Ad. Fechner (Dreslauer Diss., Leipsic, 1865), Freyschmidt (Die Arist. Lehre von der Gerechtiglceit und das moderne Stuatsrecht, G.-Pr., Berlin, 1367), and Trendelenburg (in the above-cited works) ; cf. also the articles of H. Hainpke (in PhiloL, XVL 1860, pp. 60-84) and F. Hacker (in Miitzeirs Zeitschr. fiir das GymnUdtcesen, Berlin, 1862, pp. 513- 660) on the fifth book of the Nicom. Ethics, which treats of justice; on the place given to practical prudence in A.'s doctrine, Liidke (Stralsund, 1862) ; on the principle of division and arrangement followed in the classificatioii of moral virtues in the Nic. Eth., F. Hacker (Progr. des Coin. Real.-Gyrtm., Berlin, 1863, and in Mutzell's Zeitschr fur G.- W.. XVII., Berlin, 186-3, pp. 821-843) ; on the Dianoetic Virtues, Prantl (Munich, 1352), and A. Kuhn (Berlin, 1860); on Imputition, according to Aristotle, Afzelius (Upsalae, 1841); on Friendship, Breier (De amicprincipum, ad Ar. Eth. Me., 115Sa, G.-Pr., Lubeck, 1858} ; on Slavery, W. T. Krug (Leips. 1813), C. Gottling (Jena, 1821), Ludw. Schiller (Erlangen, 1847), S. L. Steinheim (Hamburg, 1853), and Wilh. Uhde (LHss. inaiig., Berlin, 1856); on the Arist. conception of Politics, Jul. Findeisen (LHss. inaug., Berlin, 1868); on Aristotle's Classification of Forms of Government, G. Teichmuiler (Progr. of the School of St. Ami at St. Petersburg, St. Petersburg and Berlin, 1859); on Aristotle's Theory of the State, J. Bendixen (Progr. der Plbner Gelehrtenschule. Hamburg, 1868); on the economic doctrines in the '• Politics" of Aristotle. Ludwig Schneider (Gyvin.-Progr.. Deutsch Crone, 1S68). Of the Arist. doctrine of poetry and art in general, treat Lessing (in his Ilamh. Dramatvrgie, Stiick 87 seq.. 46 seq., 74 seq.), Ed. MuUer (6^. d. Th. d. A'unst. b. d. A., II. pp. 1-18-3, 346-395. and 417), Wilh. Schrader (De artis apnd Arist. notione ae vi, Berlin, 1843), Franz Suseinihl ( Vortirig. Griefsw. lsi;2), Th. Striiter (in Fichtes Z. f. Ph., new series. Vol. XL. pp. 219-247; Vol. XLI., pp. 204-223,1862); of the conception of imitation, E. MuUer (in the volume above cited, pp. 1-23 and 346-361; also, in Die Idee der Aesthetikin ihrem historisch&n Ursprxmg, Eatibor, 1840), and W. Abeken (Gott. 1886) ; of A.'s I^oetics and modem, dramatists, F. v. Kaumer (read in the Berlin Acad. d. Wisa., 1828) ; of his doctrine of the tragedy, Lobel (Leips. 1786), A. Boeckh (Ges. Kl. Schriften, I. p. ISO seq., a discourse delivered in 1830). Starke (Neu- Kuppin, 1830), G. W. Nitzsch (Kiel, 1S46), Ileinrich Weil (in Verhandl. der 10 Versammlung deutscher Philologen, Basel, 1848, pp. 131-141), Wassmuth (Saarbrucken. 1852), Klein (Bonn, 1856), Jakob Bernays (Breslau, 1858, see above, ad § 46, and in the Ph. Mus., new series, XIV. pp. 867-877, and XV. p. 606 seq.), Ad. Stiihr (Arist u. d. Wirkwng der Trag., Berlin, 1S69, and notes to his translation of the Poetics, Stutt- gart, 1860), Leonh. Spengel (Ueber die icdflapo-tt riav naertixaTuiv, Munich, 1859, in Vol. IX. of the Abh. der Munchener Akad. d. Wiss., pp. 1-80, cf Rh. Mus., new series, XV. pp. 458-462); of these works and of other works by Liepert (Ari>it. und der Zweck der Knnst, G.-Pr., Passau, 1862), Geyer, and others, a critical account is given by F. Ueberweg (in Ficlite's Zeitschr. fur Phil-os., Vol. 86, 1860, pp. 260-291 ; a 2J0sitive complement to that article is furnished in my article on Dis Lehre des A. von dem Wesen und der Wirkiing der Kunst, ibid.. Vol. 50, 1867, pp. 16-89, and in Notes 23 and 25 to ray transl. of A.'s Poetics, Berlin, 18G9). Franz Susemihl (in N. Jahrb. fur Philol. u. Pa(/«{?., Vol. 85, 1862, pp. 395-425, .ind iu his edition and transl. of the Poetics), and A. Doring (in P.'iilol,, XXL, 1864, pp. 496-534, and XXVII., 1868, pp. 689-728). Gerh. Zillgenz, Arist. und das deutsche Drama. Wurzburg, 1865. Paul Graf York von Wartenburg, Die Katharsis dejt Arist. und der Oedipus Colonus des Sophokles, Berlin, 1866. Cf also R. Wachsmutli, De Arist. Studiis Homericis, Berlin, 1868, and the contributions to the critique and elucida- tion of Arist.'s Poetics, by Vahlen. Susemihl, Teichmuiler, and others (see above, p. 148). On Lessing's conception of the Aristotelian doctrine of Tragedy, cf. K. A. F. Sundelin, Upsala, 1668. On the Rhetoric of Aristotle in its relation to Plato's Gorgias, cf. H. Anton (in Rh. Mus. f. Ph., new 172 AKISTOTLe's ethics and iESXHETICS. Beries, Vol. XIV., 1859), and in its relation to Plato's Pfuiedriis and Gorgias, Georg Richard WiecLmaiii (Platonic et Arint. de arte rketwica doctrinae inter sc. comparatae, duss. inauy.^ Berlin, 1S64), and Sjjen- gel (Ueber diu> Studium der Bhetorik hei den Alien, in the Ahhundl. der Munch. Akad. d. W., 1M2, and Ueber die JthetorUc dea Arint, ibid., 1851 ; cf. also Spengel, Philol . XVIII. 1862, pp. 604-646 and the litera- ture there cited by him, p. 605 seq., on the Pseudo-ArisL, so-called Rhetofica ad Ale«am,drum, as the author of which, the rhetorician Anaxiuienos, a contemporary of Arist., is named by Victorius and, in modern times, by Spengel), Usener (Quaentiones Anaximeneae, Gott. 1856), and others. Sal. Kalischer, De Arist. Rhetor, et Eth. Nicom. (Diss, inatiy.), Halle, 1868. On the Aristotelian Theory of Education, cf. J . C. Orelli (in his Philol. Beitr. aiis d. Schveiz. ZmSch, 1819, I. pp. 61-130), Alex. Kapp (Arist. Staatspddagogik. Hamm, 1837), Fr. Chr. Schnize (Naumbiirg. 1844), Sal. Lefmann (De Arist. in hominum educatio^ie principiis, Bei'lin, 1864 j, Frid. Alb. Janke (Arisiotelet doctrinae paedagogicae pater, diss, inaug., Halle, 1866). In accordance with his general metaphysical doctrines respecting the relation of essence to end, Aristotle can determine the essence of morality only by considering what is the object or aim of moral activity ; the fundamental conception of his Ethics is accord- ingly that of the highest good, or rather, since ethics relates to human conduct, of the highest practical good attainable by man as an active being {to iravruv oKporarov rijv TTfiaKTcJv ayadcjv. Eth. Nic., I. 2); it is unnecessary, he observes, for the purposes of ethics, to speculate, after the manner of Plato, about the idea of the Good {ibid. I. 4). The aim of all moral action, says Aristotle, is admitted on all hands to be happiness or eudaemonia (evSacfiovia, to ev C,riv or eii TvpdrTttv). Eudaemonia results from the performance of the pecu- liar work which belongs to man as man {Eth. Nic, I. 6; X. 7). The peculiar work of man can not consist in merely living, for plants also live, nor in having sensations, for these are shared by man with the brute creation ; it can only consist in a life of action, under the control of reason (^w^ npaKTiKij rig -ov Aoyov txovToq). Since now it is in the sphere of the characteristic activity of each living being that we are to search for its peculiar excellence, it follows that man's rational activity (''I^XVC evepyeia Kara Aoyov), and none other, is at the same time honorable and virtuous activity {ipvxvi evepyeia kut' aperijv ; Eth. Nic., II. 5 : fj Toi' avdpuTTov apery ely av efif a airioi^ Kai tv trorol^ Kal roi^ aaA7Ay/inci SiKaiov or to 6iopdu-iK6v, b yiverai. h rolg avvaTiMy/naai Kat roig iKovaioig Kal rolg aKovcloig) is, indeed, likewise an equalizing principle (iffov), but proceeds by arithmetical and not by geometrical proportion, since it regards not the moral worth of the persons involved, but only the advantage gained or injury suffered by them; commutative justice removes the difference between the original possession and the diminished (or increased) possession, as occasioned by loss (or gain), by causing an equal gain (or loss), the latter increasing (or diminishing) the amount of the possession by so much as the first loss (or gain) diminished (or increased) it. The amount as thus restored (undiminished and unaugmented) is a mean be- tween the less and the greater according to arithmetical proportion (a — 7 : a = a : a + 7). In connection with this doctrine of Aristotle, cf. Plato. Leges, VI. p. 757, wlicre the geo- metrically proportional is recognized as the principle of political justice, but the arithmeti- cally proportional, as a political principle, is rejected : it is this arithmetical equality whose place in the economy of trade is justly vindicated by Aristotle. (Trendelenburg directs attention to this difference, Das Ebenmaass, etc., p. 17.) Equity {to iwietKEg) is a species of justice, not mere legality, but an emendation of legal justice, or a supplementing of the law, where the latter fails through the generality of its provisions (kirardpSufia v6fiov tJ iXXriirei. 610. to KadoAov). The provisions of the law are necessarily general, and framed with reference to ordinary circumstances. But not every particular case can be brought within the scope of these general provisions, and in such instances it is the part of equity to supply the deficiencies of the law by special action, and that, too, in the spirit of the lawgiver, who, if he were present, woidd demand the same action. The dianoetic virtues are divided by Aristotle into two classes. These correspond with the two intellectual functions, of which the one exercised by the scientific faculty {to kTTidTjjfioviKov), is tlic considcration of the necessary, and the other, exercised by the faculty of deliberation {to /MyioTiKdv), is the consideration of that which can be changed (by our action). The one includes the best or the praiseworthy s^eig of the scientific faculty, the other includes those of the deliberating faculty. The work of the scientific faculty is to search for the truth as such; the work of the practical reason (iidvota), which subserves the interests of practical action or artistic creation, is to discover that truth, which corresponds with correct execution. The best tieig or virtues 176 akistotle's ethics and aesthetics. of each faculty are therefore those, through which we approach nearest to the truth. These are — A. "With reference to that which is capable of variation: art and practical wisdom (rexv^ and (jtpdvr/ai^), which are related to each other as noieiv and rrpdrTEiv. npdrreiv (action, conduct) has its end in itself, while Trotslv (formation, creation) ends in a positive product (ipyov) distinct from the productive act {ivep-yeia, Eth. Nic., I. I ; VI. 5). Hence the value of the products of art is to be found in these products themselves, while the worth of the works of virtue lies in the intention. Art, as a virtue, is creative abihty imder true intellectual direction {i^iq fiera ?.6yov ah/^ov^ noiTp-iK?/, YI. 4) ; practical wisdom (or , or the man of good sense (VI. 11). EyKpareia (of which Book VII. of the Nic Ethics treats) is moral strength or self-control. Where this is wanting, that discrepancy arises between insight and action, which would be impossible if (as Socrates taught) knowledge possessed an absolute power over the will. The occasion for self-control arises in connection with whatever is pleasurable or painful ; in the latter case it is endurance {Kaprepia). Friendship {iptXia.) is of three kinds, according as it is based on the agreeable, the useful, or the good. The last is the noblest and most enduring {Eth. Nic, VIII. and IX.). The love of truth should have precedence before love to the persons of our friends {Eth. N., I. 4, 1096 a, 16; cf. Plat, Rep., X. 595 b, c). The natural community, to which the individual primarily belongs, is the family. The domestic economy includes, when complete, husband, wife, children, and servants. To the servants the master of the house should be an absolute ruler, not forgetting, however, to temper his mle with mildness, so that the man in the servant may also be respected. To the wife and children he must be as one who rules over freemen; to the former as an archon in a free commonwealth, to the latter as a king by right of aflfection and seniority Aristotle's etuics akd esthetics. 177 (Pol'l., I. ch. 4). It becomes him to care more for his family, as human beings, and for their virtue, than for gain {Pol., I. 5). The character of the family hfe is essentially dependent on the character of the civil government. Man is by nature a political animal {Pol, I. 2). The state is the most com- prehensive human society. This society should not be an undifferentiated unity, but an articulated whole (Pol, II. 1 seq.). The end of the state is good living (ev i^fjv), i. e., the morality of the citizens and their happiness as founded on virtue {Pol., VII. 8). The end of the state is of a higher order than are the actual causes which may have led to its existence {Pol., I. 2 : ?} noXi^ . . . yivofievy fisv ovv tov i^ip) evekq, ovaa 6e rov ev l^f/v). Since the highest virtue is intellectual, it follows that the pre-eminent duty of the state is, not to train the citizens to military excellence, but to train them for the right use of peace {Pol, VII. 2). The various Forms of Government are ranked by Aristotle (as he himself intimate?^ Pol., IV. 2) in the same order as by the author of the Politicus (p. 302 seq.), whom he de- nominates as rif T(Jv npoTepov (one who, before Aristotle, had treated of the same subject, by whom he can scarcely mean Plato, but rather some Platonist). But the point of view from which he enumerates them is not (as in the Politicus) that of legality or illegality, but that of the measure in which, in each, the rulers seek the common advantage of all, or only their own profit. "When the rulers seek rather the good of all, than their own profit, their government is good ; otherwise it is bad. In either case three forms of government are possible, according as the number of rulers is one, a few, or many. Hence these six forms of government, whose names are monarchy, aristocracy, and polity (7ro/liTfm, "the common name for all polities "), on the one hand ; and tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy, ou the other {Pol, III. 7). The placing of the government in the hands of all the citizens is justified by the principle, that power belongs to the free as such. The rule of the few, or of only one, may result either from wealth or from education, or both. For every par ticular state, that form must be sought which corresponds with the given conditions {ij es. Tuv vrroKei/xevom apiarrj). The ver}' best form of government, is the aristocracy of intel- lectual eminence and moral worth, whether these qualities, in their highest development, y, . be found in a few persons, or only in one. None but a brave people is capable of freedom, and only among cultured nations is a comprehensive and enduring political union possible. It is only where courage and cul- ture are combined (as in the Hellenes, who are thus distinguished from the Northern and Oriental nations), that a state can exist at once large and free, and it is only in this cast? that a nation is justified in extending its rule over peoples less advanced {Pol , VII. 7). The laws must accord with tlie form of the government {Pol, III. 11). The lawgiver must care most of all fur the education of the young {Pol, VIII. 1 seq.). The supreme end of all discipline should be virtue. Things which are serviceable for external ends may, however, and should also be made a subject of instruction, except where they tend to render the learner vulgar (i. e., disposed to seek external gain on its own account). Grammar, gymnastics, music, and drawing are the general elementary topics of instruction. Art {tsx'^v), in the wider sense of the term, as signifying that skill in giving form to any material, which results from or at least depends on the knowledge of rules, has a twofold object: it has either to complete what nature has been unable to complete, or it may imitate (Phys., II. 8: b?Mr rs y -Ixvil to fisv eTnTc7.el, a y (pvaiq c'uh'varel anspyd- aaadai, to. c^e fu/ielTai). Nature has left man naked and unarmed, but has imparted to him t he ability to acquire n early all varii'ti(-s of nrlistic skill,_and_has_ given liiin the hand, as t he instrument of instr uuuuis ^^J>, Part. An., \\ . 10). The useful arts subsorvi' ih«_> > h^ls ^if^ 12 ^^^ -^ "* '\l 178 Aristotle's ethics and esthetics. practical life. Imitative art supplies a refined amusement (Siayuy^) and recreation {aveaic, TT/c awToviag avcLTravaig); it emancipates (icddapai^) the soul from the pressure of pent-up feelings, through a harmless (and in other respects positively beneficial) excitation of them {Pol, VIII. 7). By Kadapaig (purification) is not to be understood a purification of the feelings from the bad that is in them, but rather the temporary removal, discharge, nullification of the feelings or passions themselves (cf. Pol., II. 1267 a, 5-7, where the satis- faction of a passionate desire is represented as producing a "healing effect "). While the representation draws to its artistic conclusion, the feelings excited in the susceptible spec- tator and auditor become, by a corresponding and natural movement, stilled. Works of art, in which subjects of more than ordinary beauty or elevation are imitated, may serve as a means of ethical culture (iraiSela, fxdd^ai^); so, in particular, certain kinds of music and painting, and, unquestionably, certain descriptions of poetry also. Art attains its ends by imitation (fiifiTjmg). That which it imitates, however, is not so much the particular, with which the accidental is largely connected, as, rather, the essence of its particular object, and, as it were, the tendency of nature in its formation ; in other words, art must idealize its subjects, each in its peculiar character. When this requirement is rightly met, the resulting work of art is beautiful, although the object imitated may be not (as in the case of the Tragedy) more beautiful and noble than ordinary objects, but (as in the case of the Comedy) only equal or even inferior to the latter in these respects. The good, when as such it is also agreeable, is beautiful (Rhet., 1. 9). Beauty implies a certain magnitude and order (Poet, ch. 7). The Tragedy is defined by Aristotle as the imitative representation of a weighty, finished, and more or less extended action, in language beautified by various species of ornamentation [meter and song], which are distributed separately to the difi'ereut parts of the work [the dialogical and choral], acted and not merely recited, and, by exciting pity and fear, purging the mind of such passions* (eariv ovv rpayudia /^Ifirjaig Trpa^eug oTTovSaiag Kal TfAe/af, fiiye^og kxoi'OJjr, ySvafcivu Adyco X'^P^i eKaaru tuv e16uv kv Tolg fiopioig ipuvruv Koi oh 6t aTzayyeTdar, &C tkiov koI (jtS^ov wtpaivovaa rfp Ttjv toiovtuv Tra'&Tj/j.druv m-dapatv, Poet, ch. 6). The definition requires that the subject-matter of the tragedy should be serious and morally elevated (Trpd^scjc arrovdaiag), and that its form should be esthetically pleasing {//6va/iievcj Tioyui). The last words indicate the cathartic operation of tragedy : the fear excited in the spectator by the tragical events represented and the consequent flow of sympathy in him are followed by the satisfaction and subsidence of the tendency to foster such feelings {i. e., feelings of fear and pity).f The irapaaKevd^eiv nddr] and the uddapaiq, * That, among other things, pity and also fear and menace should be inchided among the moral ele- ments of the tragedy had already been said by Plato, Phaedr., p. 268, where the addition of the third element (menace, aTreiArjTiKal pjjo-ets) indicates plainly that at least Plato did not contemplate the excitation in the spectator of fear on his own account — an interpretation erroneously given by Lessiug to the "fear" of Aristotle. Cf. Ar., Poet, 11, p. 1452a, 88 ; IS, p. 1453 a, 4. t The (caflapats Tiof iTa.6y]ti.a.Ttav is — as has been shown, in particular by J. Bernays — not a purification of the emotions, but a (temporary) emancipation of the Individual from their influence ; yet I would not define it, more specifically (with Bernays), as a relief from permanent emotional tendencies (fearfulncss, sym- pathetic disposition, etc.), obtained by giving way to them for the time, nor (with Heinrich Weil, who regards tujv toloutwi' TTaSr)fi.6.ruiv as the subjective Genitive, with man understood as the object) as merely a deliverance from the uneasiness which attends the want of, or the exhaustion which follows, emotional ex- citement, but rather (as shown by me in Fichte's Zeitschrift, Vol. 36, 1860, and in an article on Aristotle's doctrine of the nature and effect of art, ibid.. Vol. 50, 1867, and also by A. Doring, who a.gnes from the nedical use of the term, in the Philol., XXI. 1864), as a temporary removal, elimination, nullification of the emotions themselves. In Plato, P/uiedo, p. 69 c, icaSaptris riov riSoviiv — a deliverance (of the 80ul)/rom lusts; the (caflopTi); k\).TTo?iiuiv y-aBrjuaai iofui' (Soph., p. 230 e) is one who delivers y>'o?« such opinions as obstruct one's advance to true insight; the same eonstruction occurs in Arist., Hist. Anim., VI. 18 («<£#• Aristotle's ethics and esthetics. 179 the excitation and the natural subsidence of the feelings and their final counterpoise, tranquilization, and emancipation, will be the more surely and completely accomplished in Karaiiiiviav), which passage is rightly cited by Doring (Philol, XXI. p. 526) in illastration of the medical use of the term. Against Bernays' interpretation it may be urged that neither his argument for the ren- dering of KaBapcrii as ''relief obtained by giving way to," nor that for the rendering of iraBrmara as "emo- tional dispoaitions" can be regarded as demonstrative, and that, according to Pol., VIII. 7, p. 1342a, 1 seq, it Is not tlie Trdflij^io, but the iraflot, a form of •'motion'" ((/>cAfia9 717 p.ovjtkcou? xaX tou? oAu; (oAms tou??) n-aSrjTiicoin, ToOs 5e oAAovs Ka9' 6(tov e7ri/3aAAei twi' TO'.ot,'To>»' eKax>c!6pdaTov ng KpayfMTeiac didTie rdf o'lKeiaq inoOiatig fif Tavrbv avvayayuv). In his exposition of the doctrine of Aristotle (according to the testi- mony of the Neo-Platonist, Ammonius) he set out with logic, as the doctrine of demon- stration {aiTodei^iQ, or that form of philosophizing which is employed in all systems of philosophy, and must therefore be first known, cf Arist., Met., IV. 3, 1005 b, 11); the customary arrangement of the works of Aristotle (which in all probability originated with him), following this principle, begins with the Logic (Analytics) or " Organon." His pupil, Boethus (among whose friends belonged Strabo the geographer, an adherent of Stoicism), judged, on the other hand, that Physics was the doctrine most closely related to us and most easily understood, and maintained, therefore, that philosophical instruction should commence with it. Each of them lield fast to the axiom, that the Trpayfiarelai (complexes of related bodies of investigation, hence separate bodies of philosophical doc- trine, branch-sciences of philosophy) were to be arranged according to the principle of an advance from the TvpoTepov npbg rjfiaq (the prior for us) to the irporepov e disciplina Stoica cumsectia aliii collata, prefixed to his edition of the works of Antoninus, Cambridge, 165S), and others, of whom the most important is Dietr. Tiedemacn (Hyttem der stoixchen Philonophie, 8 vols., Leips. 1776). A snrvey of the whole historical development of Stoicism is given by L. Noack (Aiis der Sioa sum Eaiser- thum, ein Blick auf den WeUlauf der atoisclun Philosophies in the Psyche, Vol. V., Heft 1, 1S62. pp. 1-24). Of. D. Zimmermann, Quae, ratio philosophiae Stoicae sit cum religiotie Romana, Erlangen, 1S58; L. v. Arren, Qukl ad in/ormando/t moreJi valere 2)otuerit priorum St. doctHna, Colmar, 1S69; F. Ravaisson, E»8ai mir le Sioici^me, Paris. 1S56; F. Lcferriere, Memoire concernant Vinfluence du Sioicisme mir la doctrine des jurisoonsultes romains, Paris, 1860; J. Dourif, Ihi Stolcisme et du Christianimne consi- deres dans lewrs rapports, leurs differences et Vii\fl'uence respective quits ont eaercee snr les maurs, Paris. 1863. The most thorongh investisration of the subjoct of Stoicism and its representatives, is that of Zeller, Ph. d. Or.. 2d ed.. III. 1, 1865, pp. 26-340. 498-522. 606-684. [See The Stoicx. Epicureans, and Skeptics, translated from Zeller's Philos. der Griechen, by O. Reichel, London, 1869.— TV.] 186 THE MOST EMINENT STOICS. Zeno's works (on the State, the Life according to Nature, etc.), a list of which is found in Diog. L»ert., VII. 4, have all been lost. Of Zeno treat Ilemingius Forellus (Upsala, 1700), and G. F. Jenichen (Leips. 1T24) ; on his theology, cf. Krische, For»chun^en, I. pp. 365-404. There exist dissertations on Aristo of Chios, by G. Buchner (Leips. 1725), J. B. Carpzow (Leips. 1742), and J. F. Hiller (Viteb. 1761), and a more recent one by N. Saal (Cologne, 1852); on his theology, se« Krische, Forsdiungen, I. pp. 404-415. On nerillus, cf. W. Tr. Krug {Ilerilli de summo bono sententia explosa, non explodenda,in Symb. ad hist, philos., p. III., Leips. 1822), and Saal (Be Aristmie Ohio et Uerillo CarthaginieruA, Cologne, 1852). On Persjeus, see Krische, Forschungen, I. pp. 436-443. The hymn of Cleanthes to the supreme God has been edited by H. H. Cludius (Gott. 1766), J. F. H. Schwabe (Jena, 1819), Petersen (Kiel, 1825), Sturz and Merzdorf {Cleanthis hymnus in Jovem, ed. Sturz, Leips. 17S5, ed. 7ioi\ cur., Merzdorf. Leips. 1835), and others. The other works of Cleanthes (the titles of which are given by Diog. L., VII., 174 seq.) have been lost. Cf. Gottl. Cbr. Friedr. Mohnike {Kleanthes der Stalker, Vol. I., Greifswald, 1814), Wilh. Traugott Krug (Ve Cleanthe divinitatis ame/rtor» ac predicatore, Leipsic, 1819); Krische, Fonchunyen, I. pp. 415-436. On Chrysippus have written F. N. G. Baguet (Louvain, 1822), Chr. Petersen (Phil. Chrys.fundamenta, Altona and Hamb. 1827; cf. Trendelenburg's review in the Berl. Jahrb. f. iciss. Kritik, 1827, 217 seq.), Krische (Forsehungen, I. 443-481), Th. Bergk (De Chrynippi libris n-epi ano^avTiKuiv, Cassel, 1841), and Nicolai (De logicis Chrytnppi libris, Quedlinburg, 1859). The titles of the works of Chrysippus are recorded in Diog. Laert., VII. 189 seq. On Diogenes the Babylonian, cf. Krische, ^orscA-impw, I. pp. 482-491 ; on Antipater of Tarsus: A. Waillot (Leodii, 1S24), and F.Jacobs (Jena, 1827); on Pansetius: C. G. Ludovoci (Leips. 1734), and .also F. G. van Lynden (Leyden, 1802), whose work is the more complete of the two. The fragments of Posi- donlus have been edited by J. Bake (Leyden, 1810), and C. Miiller (in Fragm. Eist. Gr., III. Paris, 1819, p. 245 seq.). Paul Topelmann (in his Diss. Bonn., 1867), and E. Scheppig (De Posidomio Apamensi, rerum, gentium, terrarum scriptare, Berlin, 1870) treat of Posidonius. Of Stoicism among the Romans, HoUenberg (Leips. 1793), C. Aubertin (De sap. doctoribus. qui a (He. morte ad Nermiis princ. liomae vig., Paris, 1857), and Ferraz (De Stoica disciplina apud poetas Ro- manos, Paris, 1S63) have written. Cf. also, C. Martha, Les Moralistes sous Fempire Romain, philosoph^s et poetes, Ta.ns, 1864, 2. ed., 1866; P. tAontke., Le Stoicisme a Rome, Paris, 1865; Franz Knickenberg, /)« ratione Stoicti in Persii satiris apparente, diss, phil., Miinster, 1867 ; Herm. Schiller, Die stoische Oppo- sition unter Nero ("Programm" of the Wertheim Lyceum), "Wertheim, 1S67; Lud. Borchert, Num Aniis- tius Labeo, auctor scholae ProcuUanorwm, Stoicae philos. fuerit addictus (Diss, inaug. jur.), Berlin, Of the philosophical writings of L. Annajus Seneca, the following are extant: Quaestionum Ndtu- ralium Librd VII, and a series of moral and religious treatises. De procidentia, De bre-vitate vitae, and consolatory writings addressed ad Belviam matrem, ad Mareiam and ad Polybium ; also De vita beata, De otio out secessu sapientis, De animi tranquillitate, De constantia, De ira, De dementia, De benejiciis, and the Epistolae ad Lucilium. Editions of them by Gronovius (Amsterdam, 1662), Euhkopf (Leips. 1797-1811), Schweighauser (Zweibrucken, 1809), Vogel (Leipsic, 1829), Fickert (Leipsic, 1842-45), Haase (ibid. 1852-53), and others. Cf. E. Caro (Quid de beata vita senserit Seneca, Paris, 1852), Werner (De Semecae philosophia, Breslau, 1825), Wolfflin (in the PMlologii,s, Vol. VIII., 1853, p. 184 seq.), H. L. Lehmann (L. Annaeus Seneca und seine philos. Schriften, Philologus, Vol. VIII., 1853, pp. 309-328), F. L. Bohm (Annaeus Seneca und sein Werth auch filr itnsere Zeit, Progr. of the Fr.-Wilh.-Gymn. of Berlin, 1856), C. Aubertin (Sur les rapports supposes e7itre Seneque et St. Paul, Paris, 1S57 and 1869), Fickert (- raro^) among all the Stoics. He returned again toward dogmatism, blended Aristotelian and Platonic with Stoic doctrines, and took such pleasure in high-sounding discourse, that Strabo (III. p. 147) avers he was "inspired with hyperboles." About the same time lived the Stoic ApoUodorus Ephillus, or, rather, Eplielus (o iriAo^^ lentigiiwsiis). The Stoic Athenodorus of Tarsus was superintendent of the Pergamean Library, tmd 190 THE MOST EMINENT STOICS. afterward a companion and friend of the younger Cato {Uticensis), who approved the Stoic principles by his life. Besides him, Antipater of Tyre, who died at Athens about 45 B. c, was also a teacher of the younger Cato. The Stoic ApoUonides, a friend of Cato, was with the latter during his last days. Diodotus was (about 85 b. c.) a teacher of Cicero, and afterward (until his death, about 60 B. c.) a member of his family and his friend. Athenodonis, the son of Sandon, and perhaps a pupil of Posidonius, was (together with Arius of Alexandria, who is probably identical with the eclectic Platonist, Arius Didymus) a teacher of Octavianus Augustus. The Stoic Ileraclitus (or Heraclides), the author of the "Homeric Allegories" {ed. Mehler, Leyden, 1851), seems to have lived near or in the time of Augustus. Under Tiberius, Attains, one of Seneca's tutors, taught at Rome. An instructor of Nero was Chaeremon, who appears afterward to have presided over a school at Alexandria. L. Annasus Seneca, born at Cordova (in Spain), was the son of M. Annasus Seneca, the rhetorician, and lived a. d. 3-65. In philosophy, his attention was mainly directed to Ethics, which science, however, assumed in his hands rather the form of exhortation to virtue than that of investigation into the nature of virtue. Seneca resembled the Cynics of his time in the slight worth which he attributed to speculative investigations and systematic connection. The conception of earnest, laborious inquiry, as an ethical end possessing an independent worth in itself, is absent from his philosophy ; he knows only the antithesis: facere docet phihs&phia, non dicere; philosophiam ohlectamentum facere, quum remedium sit, etc., and thus illustrates the Stoic distaste for the Aristotelian conception of philosophizing, carried to its extreme. By his hopeless complaints over the corruptness and misery of human life, and by his indulgent concessions to human frailty, he is far removed from the spirit of the earlier Stoa. L. Ann^us Comutus (or Phurnutus) lived about a. d. 20-66 or 68 at Rome. He wrote in the Greek language. A. Persius Flaccus, the satirist (a. d. 34-62), was his pupil and friend. M. Annajus Lucanus (39-65), the son of Seneca's brother, was also among his scholars. To the Stoic circle belonged, further, the well-known Republicans Thrasea PfEtus (Tac, Ann., XVI. 21 seq.; Hist, lY. 10, 40) and Helvidius Prisons {Ann., XVI. 28-35 ; Hist, IV. 5 seq. ; 9, 53). C. Musonius Rufus of Volsinii, a Stoic of nearly the same type as Seneca, was, with other philosophers, banished from Rome by Nero (Tacitus, Annal., XV. 71). He was afterward recalled, probably by Galba. When Vespasian ordered the banishment of all philosophers from Rome, Musonius was allowed to remain. He stood also in relations of personal intimacy to Titus. His pupil Pollio (perhaps, according to Zeller, III. 1, 1865, p. 653, identical with Valerius Pollio, the grammarian, who lived under Hadrian) wrote arrofivT/fiovEvfzaTa Movaonuov, from which, probably, Stobaeus drew what he communicates respecting his teachings. Musonius reduced philosophy to the simplest moral teachings. One of his finest sayings is : "If thou doest good painfully, tliy pain is transient, but the good will endure ; if thou doest evil with pleasure, thy pleasure will be transient, but the evil will endure." Epictetus of Hieropolis (in Phrygia) was a slave of Epaphroditus, who belonged to the body-guard of the Emperor Nero. He was afterward set free, became a disciple of Musonius Rufus, and was s\ibsequently a teacher of philosophy at Rome, until the proscrip- tion of philosophers throughout Italy by Domitian in the year 94 (Gell., X. A., XIV. 11 ; cf. Suet., Domil., 10), after which he lived at Nicopolis in Epirus. There he was heard by Arrian, who recorded liis discourses. Epictetus emphasizes chiefly the necessity of holding the mind independent of all external goods, since these are not under our control. To this end we should bear and forbear {avexov km inrixov). Man should invariably strive to find THE LOGIC OF THE STOICS. 191 ■11 his goods in himself. He should fear most of all the god (feoc or 6atfiav) within hie own breast. The Sentences of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius are founded largely on those of Epic- tetus. His predilection for solitary contemplation. " in which man is alone in the presence of his Genius," gives to his views a certain relationship with the Neo-Platonic philosophy, which was soon afterward to arise. § 53. The Stoics make Logic and Physics in reality ancillary to Ethics, although they generally ascribe to Physics (including The- ology) a higher rank than to Ethics. Under Logic many of the Stoics include Dialectic and Rhetoric. The Stoic Dialectic is a theory of cognition. It is founded on the Analytics of Aristotle, which it sup- plements by certain investigations respecting the criterion of truth, the nature of sensuous perception, and certain forms of the syllogism (the hypothetical syllogism, in particular). Its changes in terminology, however, mark no scientific progress, their only use being perhaps to facilitate the work of elementary instruction ; greater intelligibility was not unfrequently purchased at the cost of profundity. The fun- damental criterion of truth, with the Stoics, is sensuous distinctness in the mental representation. All knowledge arises from sensuous perception ; the soul resembles originally a piece of blank paper, on which representations are afterward inscribed by the senses. In place of the Platonic theory of ideas and the Aristotelian doctrine of the conceptual essences of things, the Stoics teach the doctrine of subjec- tive concepts, formed through abstraction ; in the sphere of objective realitv onlv concrete individuals exist. For the ten categories of Aristotle the Stoics substitute four class-conceptions, to which they attribute the highest generality, viz. : Substratum, Essential Attri- bute or Quality, Condition, and Relation. The stoic conception of irp6K-i]<^i.<; is treated of by Roorda (Levden, 1S23, from the AnnnUs Acad. Lug- dun., 1822-23), the Stoic doctrine of categories by Trendelenburj; (Ge.ich. der KttUgorienlehre, Berlin, 1S46, pp. 217-232); cf PranO, in liis Get^cJi. d. Logik, Zcller, in his Ph. d. Gr., etc., also, J. II. Hitter, De St. doctr. pracs. de eorum logica, Breslau, 1S49, and Nicolai, De Log. C/irya. librix, G.-Pr., Quedl. 1859. The three parts into which philosophy was divided by the Stoics corresponded with the three species of virtue {nperr/), which, according to them, the philosopher must seek to acquire, namely : thoroughness in the knowledge of nature, in moral culture, and in logical discipline (Plutarch, De Plac. Philos., I. Proem: aperac rag yevcKcjrdrag rpeli' (pvaiK^', ^-^ikt/v, "koyiKyv). The Stoics employed the term Logic to denote the doctrine of 7,6yoig.i i. e., of thought and discourse, and divided it into Dialectic and Rhetoric (Diog. L., YII. 41 : rb ^i hyymbv fispog ^aclv evioi clg (Vvo diaipelo'&ai iiriaTTifiaq, e'lq ptfTopiK)/v koI elg lUnXeKTiid/v), Cleanthes enumerated six divisions of philosophy: Dialectic, Rhetoric, Ethics, Politics, Physics, and Theology ; he does not appear to liave reduced these, in any case, to the three above-named. To illustrate the nature and mutual relation of logic, ethics, and 192 THE LOGIC OF THE STOICS. physics, the Stoics (according to Diog. L., "VII. 40, and Sext. Emp., Adv. Math., VII. IT seq.) compared the tirst to the bones and sinews of the body, the shell of an q^^, or the fence inclosing a garden ; ethics, to the flesh of the body, the white of the egg (and the trees in the garden ?) ; and physics (especially when viewed as theology), to the soul, the yolk of the G^g (and the fruits of the garden ?) ; sonoe, however (e. g.., Posidonius), preferred the comparison of physics to flesh, the white of the egg, and the trees in the garden, and ethics to the soul, the yolk of the egg, and the fruits of the garden. In Dialectic the Stoics included the doctrine of language (grammar), and the doctrine of that which language expresses, representations and thoughts (theory of cognition, includ- ing the Aristotelian Logic as modified by them). In Grammar the Stoics accomplished very meritorious results, but these are in part of more significance for the history of positive philological inquiry than for the history of philosophy. Cf. the above-cited works of Lersch and Steinthal (p. 24). The fundamental question in the Stoic theory of cognition relates to the means by which truth is to be known as such [Kpirr/piov). A similar question was not unknown to Aristotle {Metaph., IV. 6 : -if 6 npivuv tov vyiaivovra Kal o/lwf tov nepl CKacTa Kpivovra opi?d)f;), but he classed it with such idle questions as whether we are now awake or asleep. "With the Stoics, on the contrary, and in Post-Aristotelian philosophy generally, the question as to the criterion of truth acquired a constantly increasing importance. The theories of the earliest Stoics respecting the conditions of the veracity of our cog- nitions, are rather indefinite. Zeno (according to Cic, Acad., II. 47) likened perception to the outstretched fingers, assent {pvyKaradeGiq) to the hand half closed, the mental apprehension of the object itself {KaTd/jpfur) to the hand fully closed (the fist), and knowl- edge to the grasping of the fist by the other hand, whereby it was more completely and surely closed. "V\''ith this accords the Stoic definition of knowledge as the certain and incontestable apprehension, through the concept, of the thing known (KaTaXr/ipic ac? arrb tov vTvdpxovTog Kal KaT' avTO to vrrdpxov evaTrofieuay/ievT) Kal EvaTrEacppayianevT!, oTvoia ovk av yevoiTO otto fj^ iiirdpxovTor). There remains, it is true, in every case the second question, whether a given representation is of the kind described or not ; it depends on our freo determination either to allow or to deny to a representation that assent (avyKaTddemC), by which we declare it true, and in this none but the sage will be sure never to commit an error. The next distinguishing element of correct representations is sensuous distinctness (ivdpyeia), which is usually wanting in representations which do not arise from an object, i. e., in the THE LOGIC OF THE STOICS. 193 mere images of the fancy {(pavrdajuaTa). But since it sometimes happens that false repre- Heutatious appear with all the force of true ones, the later Stoics (according to Sext. Emp., Adv. Math., VII. 253) found themselves constrained to add that the above description applied only to those representations against which no contrary instance could be alleged (uT/dEV f,:|;ow7rt EvaTTifia). Representation {(pavraaia) was defined by Zeno as an impression on the soul {rvnuaiq h ^>vxi)), and Cleanthes compared it to the impression made by a seal on wax ; but Chry- sipjjus opposed the definition of Zeno, lalcen in its literal sense, and himself defined (pavraaia as an alteration m tlie soul (erepoiuaig tpvxK, Sext. Emp., Adv. M., VII. 228 seq.). The 6nv-aaia is a state (rrnflo^) produced in tlie soul, to which it announces both its own existence and that of its object (Plutarch, De Plac. Philos., IV. 12). Through our percep- tions of external objects and also of internal states (such as virtuousness and viciousness, see Chrysippus, reported in Plut., De St. Repugn., 19, 2), the originally vacant soul is filled witli images and as if with written cliaracters (Plut., De Plac. Ph., IV. 11 : ua-ep xapriov ivepyov fif dnoypadr/v). After perceivmg an object, the memory {jivrjfirj) of it remains behind, though the object be removed. From the combination of similar memories arises experience [kfiireipla, defined as TO Tuv 6fio£i6(l)v n7J]&or). The concept (kvvoia) is formed from single perceptions by generalization, which act may be either spontaneous and unconscious f^'ivsTTLTExi'jTuq) or conscious and methodical {^C ^fisrepac 6a^aaKa?uag kuI kTrifiEleiaq); in the former case "common ideas" or "anticipations" (Koival kwoiai or Trpo?J;^Eir) are formed, in the latter, artificial concepts. " Common ideas " are general notions developed in the course of nature in all men (iari & r/ TTpo/.rppig ivvoia (pvaiKT/ tov Ka-&6'/MV, Diog. L., VII. 54). These ideas (although termed iuai kokoI aiperEpticiv avoiaig. 'A/lAd cry K.al to. ■KEpiaaa ETrlaraaaL apria ■^Eivai^ Kal KOdfiElg -a ukog/m, koI oh (ptAa col (pi?M, egt'lv. 'fl^e yap E'lg ev cnvavra cinnjpp.0K.ag kc&TM Kanolciv^ *i2(Ti?' iva yiyvEC&ai wavToiv Zoyov aiEV iovra, 'Ov (jtEvyovTEg euciv bcoi ■dvTjTcjv KaKoi eIclv, Avapopoi, ol -f aya-&€)V fuv asl KTijaiv Tvod^kovTeg Oiir' eaopiJai •&eov koivov vopov, ovte Kkvovciv, ^ill KEV TTEL'dopEVOi CVV VC) (iioV EC'^?X>V EXOtEV. AiiToi (T av^' bppuaiv avev Ka/xiii aA/jog ett' dAAa, 01 fiEV vnip 66^7jg CTTovdi/v dvctpicTov ixovTEg^ Ot (T ettI KEpSoavvag TETpap/iEvoi ovSevl KdcfKJ, ' AXaol J' eif avEctv Kal c^jiarog ydia ipya. 'AZ/id Zev TrdvfJwpe, KtTiatvEiptg apxiKspawE, 'KvdpuTTovg pEv pvov cnzEipoa'wTig cltvo 7.vyp^g, "Hv CTi', nuTEp, cKEt^aaov ipi'Xf/g drro, 6bg Se KVpijaai Tvupr/g, i) -Kicwog cv 6lKrjg pira Tvavra KV^Epvgg, '0« Stoicornim airafleia, Hclmst. 1679), Jos. Frunz Budde {De Erroribvs SfM-coruni in Philoa. Morali, Halle, 1695-96), C. A. Heumann (De avroxeipia I'hilosophorvm. maxims Stoicorum, Jena, 1703), Joh. Jac. Dornfeld {De fine hcmiitiis Sioico, Leipsic, 1720), Christoph Weiners {Ueber die Apathie der Staiker, in his Verm, pkilon. Schriften, Leips. 1775-76, 2d part, p. 130 seq.), Joh. Neeb ( Verhaltniss der Stoischen JUoral zur Religion, Mayence, 1791), C. Ph. Couz (Ahhandluiigen uber die Genchichte und das Eigenthiitnliche der spateren stoischen Philosophic, nehst eitiem Versnche iiber ehristliche, Kantische und Staische JUoral, Tub. 1794), J. A. L. Wegschneider {Ethices Stoicorwn recen- iiorum fundamenta cum principiis ethices Xantianae compar., Hamb. 1797), Ant. Kress (De Stoicomm supremo ethico jjrineipio, Witt., 1797), Christian Gaive (in the Introductory Essay prefixed to his transl. of Aristotle's Ethics, Vol. I., Breslau, 1798, pp. 54-89), E. G. Lilie {De Stoico7~um philosophia morali, Altona, ISOO), Wilh. Traug. Knig {Zenonis et Epieuri de summo bono doctrina cum Kantiana comp., Wittenb., ISOfl), Klippel (Doctrinae Stoicor-um ethicae atque Christ, expositio, Gott. 1823), J. C. F. Meyer (Stoicorum doctrina ethica cum Christ, comp., Gott. 1828), Deichmann {De paradoxo Stoicontm, otnnia peccata paria esse, Marb. 1833), Wilh. Traug. Krug (De formulis, quibus philosaphi Stoici mmmwu bonum deflnierunt, Leips. 1834), M. M. a Baumhauer (n-cpl t^s tvkoyov e'fayuy^s, veterum philos., prae- cipue Stoic, doctrina de murte vohintarin, Utrecht, 1842), Munding {Die Grundsutze der stoi«chen Moral, Eottweil, 1846, " Programm''), F. Kavaisson (De la morale des St., Paris, 1850), Guil. Gidionsen (De eo quod Stoici naturae convenienter xivendvm esse principinm ponunt, Leips. 1852), M. Heinze (5?o/- corwm de affectibus doctrina. Berlin, 1861, StmeL »o oaoAoyov^uEvwf). THE ETHICS OF THE STOICS. 199 Still, Diog. L. (VII. 87) says that Zeno, in his work Trept av^pi'aiv fK/'.o;.?)); that of Antipater of Tarsus required the unvarying choice of things conformable, and rejection of things uon-conforraable to nature, to the end of attaining those things which are to be preferred {!^yv EKlcyofievavg fiiv TO. Kara fvaiv, (nreKXeyojuevovg Se to. Tzapa ipixjcv Sir^vsKug Kal a-wapai3aTug Tvpbg to rvy- XavELV Tuv npoTiyiievov Kara (piaiv) ; Pana?tius recommended following the impulses of nature (rb ^f/v Kara rag dtdofievag I'/fuv rf/g (pvaeug a(pop/j.dg), and Posidonius required men to live, having in view the true nature and order of all things (rb ^ijv -deopovvra rrjv ruv b'Auv aTiTj-QeLav Kal rd^iv). Seneca was of opinion that the simple 6/iio?.oyovfi€vug was sufiQ- cient, since wisdom consisted "in always willing and rejecting tlie same things," and that the limitation "rightly" was also unnecessary, since "it was impossible for one to be always pleased with any thing which was not right." The true object of the original vital instinct in man is not pleasure, but self-conservation (Diog. L., VII. 85, expressing the doctrine of the first boolc of the Tvtpl re/.civ of Chry- sippus : Trpurov oIkeIov Eivai iravrl ^6(fi rfiv avrov cvcraaiv Kal rijv ravrrig awEiiTjciv). Plea- sure is the natural result {imykwrjfia) of successful endeavor to secure what is in harmony with our nature. Of the various elements of human nature, the highest is reason, through which we know the aU-controlliug law and order of the universe. Yet the highest duty of man is not simply to know, but to follow obediently the divine order of nature. Chry- sippus (op. Plutarch., De St. Repugn., ch. 2) censures those philosophers who regard the speculative life as having its end in itself, and affirms that in reality they practice only a finer species of Hedonism. (This only proves that to Chrysippus, as to the most of his contemporaries, the earnest labor of purely scientific investigation had become unfamiliar and incomprehensible.) Nevertheless, the Stoics affirm that the right praxis of him, whose life is conformed to reason {jii-og A.oyiKog), is founded on speculation (decjpia) and intimately blended with it (Diog. L., VII. 130). Virtue {recta ratio, Cic, Tusc, IV. 34) is a diadeaig, i. e., a property in which (as in straightncss) no distinction of more or less is possible (Diog. L., VII. 98 ; Simplic, in Ar. ^ Cat, fol. 61 b). It is possible to approximate toward virtue ; but he who only thus C approximates is as really unvirtuous as the thoroughly vicious ; between virtue and vice V (oper^ Kal KaKia) there is no mean (Diog. L., VII. 127). Cleanthes (in agreement with the "^ V f> k^- 200 THE ETHICS OF THE STOICS. (lynics) declared that virtue could not be lost {avan6(3X7rrov), while Chrysippua afiQrmed the contrary ((nro(i2.rjTr^, Biog. L., VII. 127). Virtue is sufficient for happiness (Cic, Parad., 2 ; Diog. L., VII. 127), not because it renders us insensible to pain, but because it makes us superior to it (Sen., Ep., 9). In his practical relation to external things, man is to be guided by the distinction between things to be preferred (TrpoT/y/xiva) and things not to be preferred {a-rr-po-KpoTjyueva, Diog. L., VII. 105 ; Cic, De Fin., III. 50). The former are not goods, but things possessing a certain value and which we naturally strive to possess ; among these are included the primary objects of our natural instincts {prima naturae). In our efforts to obtain them we are to be guided by their relative worth. An action (ev£p}'7j/ua), which is conformed to the nature of the agent and which is therefore rationally justifiable, is befitting {naOfjKov) ; when it results from a virtuous disposition or from obe- dience to reason, it is Ka6f/Kov in the absolute sense, or morally right action (KaTopdujua, Diog. L., VII. 107 seq. ; Stob., Ed., II. 158). No act as such is either praiseworthy or disgraceful ; even those actions which are regarded as the most criminal are good when done with a right intention ; in the opposite case they are wrong (Orig., c. Cels, IV. 45 ; correct, by this passage in Origen, the statements of Se.\t. Empir., Adv. Math., IX. 190; Pyrrh. Hyp., III. 245). Since life belongs in the class of things indifferent, suicide is per- missible, as a rational means of terminating life {cv7ioyo<; e^ayuyr/; cf. Cic, Be Fin., III. 60; Sen., Ep., 12; De Prov., ch. 6; Diog. L., VII. 130). All virtues were reduced by Zeno to (ppovrjaic, practical wisdom, which, however, took in various circumstances the form of (distributive) justice, prudence, and courage (Plut., De Stoic. Iiepugn.,1; Pint., Virt. Mor., ch. 2: opi^o/xevo^ T9/v (ppovrjatv iv fiev anovefirp-foig diKai' oavvjp), ev 6e alpeTioic cu^poovvrjv, tv 6e vTrofievereoic avdpiav). Later Stoics, adopting the Pla- tonic enumeration of four cardinal virtues, defined moral insight as the knowledge of things good, bad, and indifferent; courage as the knowledge of things to be feared, of things not to be feared, and of things neither to be feared nor not to be feared; prudence (self-restraint) as the knowledge of things to be sought or avoided, and of things neither to be sought nor avoided; and justice as llie distribution to every person of that which belongs to him {suxim cuique tribuens). In every action of the sage all virtues are united (Stob., Eel, II. 102 seq.). The emotions, of which the principal forms are fear, trouble, desire, and pleasure (with reference to a future or present supposed evil or good), result from the failure to pass the right practical judgment as to what is good and wliat evil ; no emotion is either natural or useful (Cic, Tusc, III. 9, and IV. 19; Sen., Ep., 116). The sage combines in himself all perfections, and is inferior to Zeus himself only in things non-essential. Seneca, De Prov., 1 : Bonus ipse tempore taiitum a Deo differt. Chry- sippus (according to Plut., Adv. St., 33) : " Zeus is not superior to Dio in virtue, and both Zeus and Dio, in so far as they are wise, are equally profited the one by the other." The fool should be classed with the demented (Cic, Paradox., 4; Tusc, III. 5). Without prej)idice to his moral independence, the sage is a practical member of that community, in which all rational beings are included. He interests himself actively in the affairs of the state, doing this with all the more willingness the more the latter approximates to the ideal state which includes all men (Stob., Ed., 11. 186). The distinction between the wise and the unwise was conceived most absolutely by Zeno, who is said to liave divided men peremptorily into two classes, the good {aTzovia'ioi) and the bad {i^nvloi, Stob., Ed., II. 198). With the confession, that in reality no sage, but only men progressing (ttpokottuv) toward wisdom could be found, goes hand in hand among the later Stoics (particularly from and after the time of Pana^tius) a leaning toward Eclecticism ; while, on the other hand, elements of Stoic doctrine were incorporated into the speculations of Platonists and Aristotelians. THE EPICUREANS. 201 § 56. Epicurus (341-270 b. c.) belonged to the Athenian Demos, Gargettos, and was a pupil of Kausiphanes, the Deniocritean. Adopting, but modifying, the Hedonic doctrine of Aristippus, and combining it with an atomistic physics, he founded the philosophy which bears liis name. To the Epicurean school belong Metro- dorus of Lampsacus, who died before Epicurus, Hermarchus of Mitylene, who succeeded Epicurus in the leadership of the school, Polysenus, Timocrates, Leonteus and his wife Themistia, Colotes of Lampsacus and Idomeneus, Polystratus, the successor of Hermarchus, and his successor, Dionysius ; also Basilides, Apollodorus, " the pro- fuse," author of more than four hundred books, and his pupil, Zeno of Sidon (bom about 150 b. c), whom Cicero distinguishes among the Epicureans, on account of the logical rigor, the dignity, and the adornment of his style, and whose lectures formed the principal basis of the works of Philodemus. his pupil ; two Ptolemies of Alexandria, Demetrius the Laconian, Diogenes of Tarsus, Orion, Phasdrus, con- temporary with Cicero, but older than he, Philodemus of Gadara in Coelesyria (about 60 b. c), T. Lucretius Cams (95-52 b. c), author of the didactic poem De Rerum Natura^ and many others. Epicureanism had very many adherents in the later Roman period, but these were, for the most part, men of no originality or indepen- dence as thinkers. EpUyuri wept <|)ucngel, Au€ den HereulaJt. Hollen : Philod. itefii. «vo-e3«ias, from the Trans, of the Munich Acad. (1364), Philol.-philos. Class, X. 1, pp. 127-167; Sauppe, De Philod. lihro De Pietate, Gottincen, 1804. Philodemi de Musica, de Vitiis, and other works, in the Ilerculanens. volum., torn. I., III., IV., V., VI., VIII., IX., X., XL, 1793-1865. iiAoSTJ/aou wept Koxiitv, '\viovvnov n€pl opy^s, etc., in the Iferculanenmum voluminum, p. I., IL, Oxford, 1824-25. Leonh. Spcngel, Das rierte Buch der Rhetorik des Philodemus in den Ilercukinensischen Rollen, in the Trans, of the Bavarian Academy (philos. CI.), Vol. III., 1st div., p. 207 seq., Munich, 1840. Philodemi n-epi ko-kiCiv liher decimva. ad vol. Ilercul. ejrempla Keapolitanum, et Oxoniente distinxit, supplecit, explicarit Ilerm. Sauppe, Leips. 185.3. Philod. Abh. ilber den Hodimuth and Theophr. Ilaush. u. CJuirakterbilder ; Greek te.xt and German translation by J. A. Hartung, Leips. 1857. Herculanensium voluminum quae supersunt collectio altera. Tom. I. seq.: Philodemi irepi kokimm v avTLKd.fi.ei'ujv apuTuiv, et: Trepi op-yij?, etc.. Nap. 1S61 seq. Philodemi Epicurei de ira liber, e piapiyro Ilercul. ad Jidem. exemplorum Oxon ieu.'iis et Xeapiolitani, ed. Theod. Gomperz, Leips. 1864. Ilereu- lanische Studien, by Theod. Gomperz, First Part: I'hilodem ilber Induction^sdtliisse ('tiAoiijjioj' irtpi cTDLfiiav Kttl v), nach der Ox/order mid Xeapolitaner Abschrift hrsg., Leips. 1865; Second Part; 202 THE EPICITREANS. PhiloJem uber Frommigkeit , ibid. 1866 (cf. Phaedr., above). Theophrasti Characteres et Philodemi d» viUis liber decimus, ed. J. L. Ussing, Leipsic, 186S. Recent eUitions of the De Rerum Natura of T. Lucretius Carus are those of C. LacbmaDn (Berlin, Ist ed., 1S50, witb Commentary), Jali. Bernays (Leips. 1852, 2(1 ed., 1857), and H. A. J. Miinro (Cumbr. 1866); translations (in German) by Knebel (Loips. 1821, 2d ed., 1831), Gust. Bossart-Oerden (Berl. 1865), Brieger (Book I., 1-369, Posen, 1806), and W. Binder (Stuttgart, 1868), and (in French) by M. de Ponger- ville (Paris, 1866), [Engl, transl. by J. S. Watson .ind J. M. Good, in Bohn's Classical Library. — TV.] Besides the works of the Epicureans, the principal source of our knowledge of Epicureanism is Book X. of the historical work of Diogenes of Laerta, together with Cicero's .accounts (Z)e Fin., L, De Nat. Deorwm, L, etc.). Modern writers on Epicureanism are: P. Gassendi {Exercitationum paradoxicanmi adv. AHs- toteleos, liber I., Grenoble, 1624; //. The Hague, 1659; Pe vita morihus et docirina Epicuri, Lyons, 1647; Animadv. in Diog. Z., X., Leyd., 1649; Syntagma philoaophiae Epicuri. The Hague, 1655), Sam. da Sorbiere (Paris, 1660), Jacques Eondel (Paris, 1679), G. Ploucquet (Tub. 1765), Batteux (Paris, 1758), War- nekrus (Greifsw. 1795), H. Wygmans (Leyden, 1834), L. Preller (in the Philol., XIV., 1859, pp. 69-90), and on the doctrine of Lucretius, in particular, A. J. Eeisacker (Bonn, 1847, and Cologne, 1855), Herni. Lotze (in the Philologus, VIL, 1852, pp. 696-732), F. A. Marcker (Berlin, 1S53), "W. Christ (Munich, 1855), E. Hallicr (Jena, 1857), J. Guil. Braun (Z. de aiomis doctr., diss, inaug., Miinster, 1857), E. de Suckau (Pe Lucr. metaph. et mor. doctr., Paiis, 1S57), T. Mont6e {Etude sur L. cons. c. moraliste, Paris, 1860), Susemihl and Brieger (in the Philologus, XIV., XXIII., and XXIV.), Hildebrandt( T. Liicr. deprimordiis doctrina. G.- Pr., Magdeb. 1864), H. Sauppe {Oamm. de Lucretii cod. Victoriano, Gottingen, 1864). Rud. Bouterwek (Lu- cret. quaest. gramm. et crit., Halle, 1861 ; De Liter, codice Victoriano, Halle, 1865), E. Heine {De Lucr. carmine de rerum natura, diss, inaug., Halle, 1865), Th. Bindseil {Ad Lucr: de rerum not. carm. libr. I. et II., qui sunt de atomis, diss, inaug., Halle, 1865 ; Quaest. Lucr., G.-Pr., Anclam, 1867). Cf., also, H. Pur- mann {G.-Pr., Cottbus, 1867), Jul. Jessen (Diss., Gott. 186S), and C. Martha {Le Poemede Luerece, Paris, 1868), and Bockemuller {Lucretiana, G.-Pr., Stade, 1863). According to Apollodorus (ap. Diog. L., X. 14), Epicurus was born Olymp. 109. .3, during the arclionship of Sosigenes, in the month of Gamelion (hence in December, ,342, or in January, 341 B. c). He passed his youth in Samos (according to Diog. L., X. 1), ■whither a colony had been sent from Athens, and it appears, also, that the place of his birth was not Athens, but Samos, since the colony was sent out in Olympiad 107.1 (352-51). His father, a school-teacher (jpafi/naToSiSdaKaXog), was drawn thither as a Kleruchos.* Epicurus is said to have turned his attention toward philosophy at the age of fourteen years, because his early instructors in language and literature could give him no intelligence respecting the nature of Hesiod's Chaos (Diog. L., X. 2). According to another and quite credible account {ibid. 2-4), he was at first an elementary teacher or an assistant to his father. At Samos Epicurus heard the Platonist Pamphilus, who, however, failed to convince him. Better success attended the efforts of Nausiphanes, the Democritean, who had also passed through the school of the Skeptics and who recommended a Skeptical bias, which should, however, do no prejudice to the acceptation of his own doctrine. According to Diog. L., X. 1 and 14, the Canonic (Logic) of Epicurus is founded on principles which he learned from Nausiphanes. Epicurus made himself acquainted with the writings of Democritus at an early age (Diog. L., X. 2). For some time he called himself a Democ- ritean (Plut., Adv. Colot, 3, after the accounts of Leonteus and other Epicureans) ; but he afterward attached so great importance to the points of difference between himself and Democritus, that he conceived himself justified in regarding himself as the author of the true doctrine in physics as well as in ethics, and in opprobriously designating Democritus by the name of Ar/poKpiTog (Diog. L., X. 2). In the autumn of 323, when he was eighteen years old, Epicurus went for the first time to Athens, but remained there only a short time. Xenocrates was then teaching in the Academy, while Aristotle was in Chalcis. It was asserted by some that Epicurus attended the lessons of Xenocrates ; others denied it [* A Kleruchos was a settler, to whom colonial possessions had been allotted, and who retained abroad the rights of Athenian citizenship. — 7>\] THE LOGIC OF EPICURUS. 203 (Cic, Be Nat. Bear., I. 26). According to Apoilodorua (ap. Diog. L., X. 14), Epicurus com. menced as a teacher of philosopliy at the age of thirty- two (310 or 309 B. c), in Mityleue, taught soon afterward at Lampsacus, and founded some years later (306 B. c, according to Diog. L., X. 2) his school at Athens, over which he presided until his death in Olymp. 127.2 (270 B. c). A cheerful, social tone prevailed in the school of Epicurus. Coarseness was pro- scribed. But in the choice of means of amusement no excess of scrupulousness was observed. Aspersive gossip respecting other philosophers, especially respecting the chiefs of other schools, seems to have formed a favorite source of entertainment ; Epi- curus himself, as is known, did not hesitate uncritically to incorporate into his writings a mass of evil reports, which were, for the most part, unfounded. He embodied the prin- ciples of his philosophy in brief formulae (Kvfjiai 66^ai), which he gave to his scholars, to be learned by heart. In the composition of his extremely numerous works, Epicurus was very careless, and so proved his saying, that "it was no labor to write." The ordy merit allowed to them was that they were easy to be understood (Cic, Be Fin., I. 5) ; in every other respect their form was universally condemned (Cic, Be Nat. Beorum, I. 26 ; Sext. Emp., Adv. Math., I. 1 et al.). They are said to have filled in all nearly three hundred volumes (Diog. L., X. 26). A list of the most important works of Epicurus is given in Diog. L., X 27 and 28. Diogenes names, in particular, besides the Kvpcat 66^ai, 1) works directed against other philosoj)hical schools, e. g., " Against the Megarians," " On Sects " {nepl aipiaeuv); 2) logical works, e. g., " On the Criterium or Canon;" 3) physical and theological works, e.g., " On Nature," in thirty-seven books (of which considerable remains have been found at Herculaneum ; a part of them are yet to be published), "On the Atoms and Empty Space," "On Plants," "Abridgment of the works on Physics," " Chaeredemus, or On the Gods," etc.; 4) works on moral sub- jects, e.g., "On the End of Action" {TVEpl teXov^), "On Upright Action," "On Piety," " On Presents and Gratitude," etc., besides several whose nature is not evident from their titles (such as " Neocles to Themista," " Symposion," etc), and Letters. Some of the latter have been preserved by Diogenes Laertius. The most important of the immediate disciples of Epicurus was Metrodorus of Lamp- sacus. His works, which were largely polemical, are named in Diog. L., X. 24. The other more considerable Epicureans (Hermarchus, etc.) are also named, ibid. X. 22 seq. In tte very front rank of the Epicureans belongs the Roman poet Lucretius. Horace also subscribed to the practical philosophy of the Epicureans. In the time of the emperors the Epicurean philosophy was very widely accepted. (Whether in the passage, Diog. L., X. 9, in which the Epicurean philosophy is spoken of as almost the only one stiU surviving, reference is intended to the time of Diogenes himself or to that of Diodes, his voucher, is doubtful.) § 57. Epicurus treats logic, in so far as lie admits it at all into his system, as ancillary to physics, and the latter, again, as ancillary to ethics. He considers the dialectical method incorrect and mis- leading. His logic, termed by him Canonic, proposes to teach tlie norms (Kanones) of cognition, and the means of testing and knowing the truth (criteria). As criteria Epicurus designates perceptions, representations, and feelings. All perceptions are true and irre- futable, Kepresentations are remembered images of past perceptions. 204 THE LOGIC OF EPICURUS. Beliefs are true or false, according as they are confirmed or refuted by perception. The feelings of pleasure and pain are criteria indi- cating what is to be sought or avoided. A theory of the concept and of tlie syllogism was omitted by Epicurus as superfluous, since no technical definitions, divisions, or syllogisms, could supply the place of perception. On the prolepsis of Epicurus, cf. Job. Mich. Kern (Gott. 1756) and Eoorda {Epicureorum et Stoicorvm de Anticipationibus Doctrina, Leyden, 1823, reprinted from the Annul Acad. Lvgd., 1822-23). Gom- pertz, in his Jle/rculan. SttuiieM (see above, § 56), treats of the Epicurean doctriue of the analogical and the inductive inference. According to Diog. Laert., X. 29, Epicurus divided philosophy into three parts: t6 tc KavoviKov Kal (pvaiKov Kal ijQcuov. Logic, or "Canonics," was placed before physics, as an introduction to the same (according to Diog. L., X. 30; Cic, Acad., IJ. 30; De Fin., I. 7; Sen., EpisL, 89). Rejecting dialectic, Epicurus (according to Diog. L., X. 31) declared it sufBcient: rotf Tiq, ib. X. 2; Diog. L., X. 40) ; it is Tdnoq (" place "), viewed as that in which a body is contained, and X^P"' ("room"), viewed as that which admits the passage of bodies through it. The most considerable of the points of difference between the Epicurean and the Democritean physics is, that Epicurus, in order to explain how the atoms first came in contact with each other, ascribes to them a certain power of individual or arbitrary self- determination, in virtue of which they deviated slightly from the direct line of fall (Lucrct., II. 216 seq. ; Cic, De Fin., I. 6, De Nat Deor., I. 25, etc.). He thus attributes in some sort to atoms that species of freedom (or rather that independence of law) which he attributes to the human will. The motion of the atoms is not directed by the idea of finality. The Empedoclean opinion (Arist., Phys., II. 8, De Part. Anim., I. 1), that among the numerous fortuitous creations of nature which first arose, only a few were capable of prolonged life and con- serveeic xpEvdEig), containing much that is incongruous with the idea of their immortaUty and blessedness (Epic, ap. Diog. L., X. 123 seq. ; Cic, Be Nat. Dear.. I. 18 seq.). The gods are formed of the finest of atoms, and dwell in the void spaces between the different worlds (Cic, De Nat. Bear., II. 23 ; Be Biv., II. 17 ; Lucret., I. 59; III. 18 seq.; V. 147 seq.). The sage finds his motive for revering them, not in fear, but in admiration of their excellence. The Soul is defined by Epicurus {ap. Diog. L., X. 63) as a cfjua ?.ETrTouEpec nap' o?mv to adpoiafia nafiEanapfikvov (see above, p. 206). It is most similar in nature to air; its atoms are very different from those of fire ; yet in its composition a certain portion of warm substance is united with the aeriform. In death the atoms of the soul are scattered (Epic, ap. Diog. L., X. 64 seq.; Lucr., III. 418 seq.). After this resolution of the soul into its constituent atoms, sensation ceases ; the cessation of which is death {(rrEprjaiq a'taOr/aEug). When death comes, we no longer exist, and so long as we exist, death does not come, so that for us death is of no concern (6 Odvanc ov6ev npbr fjfiac, Epic, ap. Diog. L., X. 124 seq.; Lucret., III. 842 seq.). JSJothing is immaterial except empty space, which can effect nothing ; the soul, therefore, which ia the agent of distinct operations, is material (Epic, ibid. X. 67). The doctrine of material effluxes from things and of images (eliW/.n), which were sup- posed necessary to perception, was sliared by Epicurus with Democritus. These images, types (rvnni), were represented as coming from tlie surface of things and making their way through the intervening air to the visual faculty or the understanding (e'lg rffi' oftv ^ rf/v didvoiav; Diog. L., X. 46-49; Epicuri frngni. libr. If. et XL, de natura. Lucret., IV. 33 seq.). There is no fate (eifiapiu.e:vTi) in the world. That which depends on us is not subject to 20S THE EPICUREAN ETHICS. the influence of any external power (to rrap' tjiuv a6iaTzorav), and it is our power of frea self-determination which makes us proper subjects of praise and blame (Epic, ap. Diog. L., X. 133; cf. Cic, Acad., II. 30 ; De Fato, 10. 21 ; De Nat. Deortim, I. 25). The interest of Epicurus in his natural philosophy turns essentially on the disproof of theological explanations and the establishment of the naturahstic principle, and not on the determination of completed scientific truth. § 59. The Epicurean Ethics is founded on the Ethics of the Cyre- naics. In it the higliest good is defined as happiness. Happiness, according to Epicurus, is synonymous with pleasure, for this is what every being naturally seeks to acquire. Pleasure may result either from motion or from rest. The former alone was recognized by the Cyrenaics ; but this pleasure, according to Epicurus, is only necessary when lack of it gives us pain. The pleasure of rest is freedom from pain. Pleasure and pain, further, are either mental or bodily. The more powerful sensations are not, as the Cyrenaics affirmed, bodily, but mental ; for while the former are confined to the moment, the latter are connected with the past and future, through memory and hope, which thus increase the pleasure of the moment. Of the desires, some are natural and necessary, others natural but not ne- cessary, and still others neither natural nor necessary. Not every species of pleasure is to be sought after, nor is every pain to be shunned ; for the means employed to secure a certain pleasure are often followed by pains greater than the pleasure produced, or involve the loss of other pleasures, and that, W'hose immediate effect is pain- ful, often serves to ward off greater pain, or is followed by a pleas- ure more than commensurate with the pain immediately produced. Whenever a question arises as to the expediency of doing or omit- ting any action, the degrees of pleasure and pain which can be foreseen as sure to result, whether directly or indirectly, from the commission of the act, must be weighed and compared, and the question must be decided according to the preponderance of pleasure or pain in the foreseen result. The correct insight necessary for this comparison is the cardinal virtue. From it flow all other virtues. The virtuous man is not necessarily he who is in the possession of pleasure, but he who is able to proceed rightly in the quest of pleasure. But since the attainment of the highest possible amount of pleasure in connection with the smallest possible amount of pain, depends on a correct praxis, and since the latter, in turn, is dependent on correct insight, it follows that the virtuous man alone is able to attain the end de- scribed ; on the other hand, the virtuous man will attain it without I THE EPICUREAN ETHICS. 209 failure. Virtue, then, is the only possible and the perfectly sure way to happiness. The sage, who as such possesses virtue, is consequently always happy. Duration of existence does not affect the measure of his happiness. The Mor.ll Philosophy of the Eplciir'^ans is specially treated of by Des CoDtures (Paris, 1685, another edition, enlartreil by I'Loiidel. Hui;ue, 1CS6), Batteux (Paris, ITOS), and Oarve (in connection with his transl. of A[istolk''8 Ethics. Vol. I., Breshiu, 1798. pp. 90-110); cf., also, E. Platner, i'eher die stoiache und Epi- tureisohe Erkldrung vom Ursprung des Vergnilgen, in the Neue Bibl. der tchoiien Wise., Vol. 19. Epicurus' own declarations respecting the principles of ethics may be read in Book X. of Diogenes L., especially in the letter from Epicurus to Menoeceus (X. 122-135). Exact- ness in definition and rigid deduction do not there appear as arts in which Epicurus was pre-eminent. Re utters his ideas loosely, in the order in which they occur to him, and with all the indeterminateness of imelaborated tliought. He takes no pains to be exact and systematic, his only aim being to provide rules of easy practical application. The principle of pleasure comes to view in the course of the progress of his discussion in the following terms (X. 128): riiovijv hpxvv kciI re'Aof; leyofiev elvai tov fuiKapiuq C,?)v, and in defense of it Epicurus adds (X. 129), that in pleasure we are cognizant of the good which is first among all goods and congenial to our nature (dyn^bv TrpuTov ml avy-yeviKov), the beginning of all our choosing and avoiding, and the end of all our action, sensation being the criterion by which we judge of every good. But previously to the formulation of this doctrine, many rules of conduct are given, the various species of desires are discussed, pleasure and freedom from pain are discoursed upon, and, in particular, the principle, by which we are to be guided iu our acts of choice or avoidance, is defined (X. 128) as health and mental tranquillity {jl TOV aufiarag vyleia kuI r) rf/c i/'''^W ctrapa^ia), in which happiness becomes complete (k~£l roi'To TOV fiaKapiu^ i^f/v ioTi relog). Epicurus nowhere states in the form of a definition what we are to understand by pleasure (r/6ov?'/), and what he saj'S of the relation of posi- tive to negative pleasure (as the absence of pain) is very indefinite. In the letter referred to, after an exhortation to all men to philosophize in every period of life, to the end that fear may be banished and happiness (rr/v evSai/wviav) attained (X. 122), follows, first (123- 127), instruction respecting the gods and respecting death, and then (127) a classification of desires (eindvfiiat). Of the latter, we are told that some are natural {(ivaiKai), other.s emptj'' (KEvai). Of the natural desires, some are necessary (civnyKalat), while the others are not necessary ((pvmKai fiavov). Those which are natural and necessary, are necessary either for our happiness (rrpof evfiaifinviav, which is obviously taken in a narrower sense than before), or for the preservation of the body in an untroubled condition {~poi; t/]v tov aoiuaTog ao,x^7}atai'), or for life itself (^rpof ni'To to Cyv). (In another place, Diog. L., X. 149, the desires are classified simply as either natural and necessary, or natural and not necessary, or neither natural nor necessary: desires of the first class aim at the removal of pain: those of the second at the diversification of pleasure; and those of the third at tlio gratification of vanity, ambition, and empty conceits generally. This classification is criti- cised with unjust severity by Cicero, Z)e.F., 11. ch. 9.) Proper attention to these distinc- tions, according to Epicurus (ap. IMog. L., X. 128), will lead to the right conduct of life, to health and serenity, and consequently to happiness {finnapio)^ l^f^'). For, he continues, the object of all our actions is to prevent pain either of the body or of the mind (ott^ fir/Te aTiyufiev, /ir/Te Tapftufia'). We have need of pleasure (f/AovT/) then, when its absenc brings us pain, and only then. Pleasure is, therefore, the starting-point and the end of happiness. (How the two statements: "Pleasure is the ethical principle" and '-We 14 210 THE EPICUREAN ETHICS. have need of it only when its absence brings \is pain," can be reconciled, or how one is the consequence of the other, it is difficult to say ; for if really the end of all our action is only to secure our freedom from pain, and if we have no need of pleasure oxcept when its absence Avould be painful, pleasure is obviously not an end but a means.) After the (above-given) brief justification of the hedonic principle (X. 129), Epicurus labors to disprove the mistaken idea that all kinds of pleasure are worthy to be sought after. He admits that every pleasure, without distinction, is a natural and therefore a good thing, and that every pain is an evil, but demands that, before deciding in favor of a given pleasure or against a certain pain, we weigh its consequences {avfi/uirpjjcic), and that we then adopt or reject it according to the preponderance of pleasure or pain in the result. In the light of this principle, Epicurus then recommends, with special emphasis, modera- tion, the accustoming of one's self to a simple manner of life, abstinence from costly and intemperate enjoyments, or, at most, only a rare indulgence in them, so that health may be preserved and the charm of pleasure may remain undiminished. To give greater force to his recommendations, he returns to the proposition, that the proper end of life is freedom from bodily and mental suffering {/nr/re alyelv Kara cuiin, /i^re rapdrTecdai Kara ijwxv^). Right calculation is the essence of practical wisdom, which is the highest result of phi- losophy and the source of all other virtues (Diog. L., X. 132). It is mipossible to live agreeably {r/<^(uc) without living prudently, decently, and uprightly (ipov) to society (Hermarchus, ap. Porphyr., Be Absiin., I. chs. 7-13; cf. Bernays, Theophr. Schri/t uber Frommigkeit, Berlin, 1866, p. 8 seq.). Epicurus distinguishes {ap. Diog. L., X. 136) between two species of pleasure, viz.: the pleasure of rest, KaraaTTjiiaTiKr ij^ovrj [stabiliias voluptatis, Cic, De Fin., II. 3), and the pleasure of motion, ?) /card k'lvticlv tj6ovti (voluptas in motu. Cic, ibid.) ; the former is defined as freedom from trouble and labor (arapa^la koc anovici), the latter as joy and cheerfulness {xapa Kal eixppoavv?/). In his conception of the "pleasure of rest," Epicurus varies, some- times identifying the latter with the momentary satisfaction which arises from tlie removal of a pain, and sometimes with the mere absence of pain. This uncertainty is the more unfortunate, since the term r/fW^/ (like voluptas and "pleasure") never receives in the ordinary usage the signification of absence of pain; Cicero's severe censure {De Fin., IT. 2 seq.) of the carelessness and obscurity of Epicurus in the employment of this term is, therefore, not imgrounded. Yet Cicero's accomit appears to be not wholly free from mis- apprehensions. Thus it can only be ascribed to an inexact apprehension of the doctrine of Epicurus, that Cicero should suppose that Epicurus identified the highest pleasure with the absence of pain as such {De Fin., I. 11; II. 3 seq.)-, Epicurus {ap. Diog. L., X. 141) only says that the complete removal of pain is inseparably connected with the highest THE EPICUREAN ETHICS. 211 intensification of pleasure (for which, indeed, it would be more exact to say that the latter always involves the former, but not conversely). It would appear from the accounts of Cicero (Be Fin., I. 7 and 17 ; II. 30) that Epicu- rus derived all psychical pleasure from the memory of past or the hope of future corporeal pleasures. This doctrine is not to be found in any of the writings of Epicurus now at hand, and it is quite possible that in this point he has been misunderstood. Memory and liope are, indeed, according to Epicurus, the ground of the higher worth of psychical pleasure, but he can scarcely have taught that they were the onh* source of such pleasure. It is right to say only (according to Epicurus), that all psychical pleasure originates in one way or another in sensuous pleasure. In a letter quoted by Diog. L. (X. 22), Epicurus declares with reference to himself, that his bodily pains are outweighed in his old age by the pleasure which the recollection of his philosophical discoveries affords him. The alleged averment of Epicurus in his work nepl re/un'c (see Diog. L., X. 6), that he did not know what he should imderstand by the good, if sensiious pleasures were taken away (hoaipuv ftev rdf did ;(v?.(Jv r/t^om^, CKfiaipuv 6^ Kal rag di' a(Pfjon/ra{/meuta, Leips. 1720-24), and, of more recent writers, Wachsniuth (De THinone Phliasio ceteritique sillogrup/iis Graecis, Leips. 1659); cf.. respecting the general subject ot SUloi among the Greeks, Franz Anton Wolke (Warschaii, 1S20), and Friedr. Paul (Berlin, 1S21). Fragments of the writings of Timon are found in the Anthology published by F. Jacobs, from the Palatine Codex (Leips, 1818-17). Cf. D. Zimmermann, Darntelliuig der Pyrrh. Ph., Erl. 1841 ; Ceher Vrtepir. v. Bedettturiig dtr Pyrrh. Ph., ib. 1843; CommenUUio, qua Timonis PIdkuii m/lorum reliquiae a Sexto Empirico traditae explaitantiM- (G.-Pr.), ib. I860. Saisaet treats of .finesidemus, in Le SceptieUime : Aenesideme, Pancal, Kant, 2d ed., Paris, 1S67. For the literature relating to the Middle Academy, see above, § 44, p. 134. For the editions of the two works of Sextus Empiricns (Pyrrhon. Infttitut. Lihr. III., and Contra ^(athematico/l lAbH XI.\ see above. § 7, p. 21. Cf. L. Kayser, Ueber Seictu-n Empir. Ik-hrift irpb? AoycKou?. in the Rhein. Miut. f. Ph.. titvr series. VII. 1850, pp. 161-190 ; C. Jourdain, Sea-t. Empir. et la Philosophic Scolastique, Paris. 1S5S. Cf. Tafel, Gesch. de« Sk-epticismun, Tiibingen, 1834; Uorman MaccoU, T7ie Greek Skeptics from Pyrrho to Sextus, London and Cambridge, 1869. Pyrrho of Elis (about 360-270 b. c.) is said (Diog. L., IX. 61, cf. Se.xt. Emp. Adv. Math., VIT. 13) to have been a pupil of Bryso (or Dryso), who was a son and disciple of Stilpo; yet this statement is very doubtful, since Bryso, if he was really a son of Stilpo, must have been younger tlian Pyrrho ; according to other accounts, Bryso was a disciple of Socrates or of Euclid of Megara, Socrat«s' disciple. Perhaps this Bryso, disciple of Socrates, was the Bryso of Heraclea, from whose dialogues, according to Theopompus, op. Athenseus, XI. p. 508, Plato was said to have borrowed considerabb' (perhaps, in particular, in the Theae- 214 SKEPTICISM. teius ?). He seems to have thought highly of the doctrines of Democritus, but to have hated most other philosophers, regarding them as Sophists (Diog. L., IX. 67 and 69). He accom- panied Anaxarchus, the Democritean, of the suite of Alexander the Great, on his military campaigns, as far as India. He became of the opinion, that nothing was beautiful or hate- ful, just or unjust, in reaUty (r^ alridsia, Diog. L., IX. 61, for which we find vaei, ib. 101, and in Sext. Emp., Adv. Math., XI. 140) ; in itself every thing was just as much and just as Uttle {ohdev fia/JMv) the one as the other ; every thing depended on human institution and custom. Hence Pyrrho taught that real things were inaccessible to human knowledge or incomprehensible (d/caraA?;i/'/a), and that it was our duty to abstain from judging (ettoj;)). The external circumstances of human life are all indifferent {a6ia(j)opov);*{t becomes the wise man, whatever may befall him, always to preserve complete tranquillity of mind, and to allow nothing to disturb his equanimity (arapaf/'a, Diog. L., IX. 61, 62, 66-68; cf. Cic, De Fin., 11. 13; III. 3 and 4; IV. 16: Pyrrho, qui virtute constituta, nihil omnino quod appetendum sit, relinquat). The Pyrrhonists were termed (according to Diog. L., IX. 69) doubters (aKopT/TiKoi), skeptics (cr/ce7rrL\on\a.Tu}v, Traj. ad Rhen. 18.36). Riumhauer (De Aristotelia vi in Cic scriptis, Utrecht, 1841), C. F. Hermann (De interpretntione Timaei dialogi a Cic. relicta, Progr., Gott. 1342). J. Klein (De foniihus Topicorwn Cice- ronis, Bonn, 1844), Legeay (31. TulUus Cicero philosophiae historicus, Leyden, 1846), C. Crome (QuiA Graecis Cicero in philosophia, quid sibi debuerit. G.-Pr., Dusseldorf, 1855), Havestadt (De Cic. primis principiis philosophiae moralis, G.-Pr., Emmerich. 1S.'>7), A. Desjanlins (De scientia civili apud Cic^ Beauvais, 18.57). Burmeister (Cic. als Neu-Akademiker, G.-Pr., 01d«nbure. 1860). Hoflg (Cicero's Anticht von der St-cuitsreUgion, G.-Pr., Krotoschin, 1868), C. M. Bernhardt (/)« Cicerone Qraecae philosophia 218 ECLECTICISM. — CICEEO. — THE SEXTIAN8, interprete, '■'■ Progr." of the Fr.-Wilh.-Gymn., Berlin, 1865), F. Hasler (Ueber das VerfuiUniss der heid- nischen unci christlichen Ethik auf Gi'wiid einer Vergleichimtj des Oiceronianischen Bu-c/ies />e Officii* mil dem gleichnwinigen des heiligen Ambrosiii^, Munich, 1866), G. Barzelotti {DeUe doUrine JilosoJicAe ne> Libri di Oicerone, Florence, 1867), J. "Walter {De An. Immoi't. quae praec. Cic. trad., Prague, 1867), G. Zietschmann (De Tusc. qu. fontibus. Diss., Ilalle, 1868). The inaugural dissertation of Hugo Jentsch (Aristotelis ex arte rhetorica quaeritur quid haheat Oicero, Berlin, 1866) contains noteworthy contribu' tions to the solution of the question, to what extent Cicero had read and understood Aristotle. On the philosopher Sextius, see De Burigny (Memoires de tAcad. des Inscript., XXXI.), Lasteyri' (Sentences de Sextius, Paris, 1842), and Meinrad Ott (Character und Ursprung der Spriicfie des Philoso- phen Sextius, G.-Pr., llottweil, 1861, and Die syrischen '^ auserlesenen Spriiche des IJerm Xistusi, BiscJiofs von Rom." nlcht eine Xistusschrift, sondem eine Uberarbeitete Sextiusschrift, O.-Pr., Bottweil and Tiibingen, 1862 and 1863). "When criticism had demonstrated the presence of untenable elements in all the great systems, the ineradicable need of philosophical convictions could not but lead either to the construction of new systems or to Eclecticism. In the latter it would necessarily end, if the philosophizing subject retained a naive confidence in his own " Unbefangenheit," i. e., in the directness of his natural perceptions of truth or in his sagacious tact in the ap- preciation of philosophical doctrines, while yet lacking the creative power requisite to the founding of a system. In particular, Eclecticism would naturally find acceptance with those who sought in philosophy not knowledge as such, but rather a general theoretical preparation for practical life and the basis of rational convictions in religion and morals, and for whom, therefore, rigid unity and systematic connection in philosophical thought were not unconditionally necessary. Hence the philosophy of the Romans was almost universally eclectic, even in the case of those who professed their adhesion to some one of the Hellenic systems. The special representative of Eclecticism is Cicero. M. TuUius Cicero (Jan. .Sd, 106 — Dec. 7th, 43 B. c.) pursued his philosophical studies especially at Athens and Rhodes. In his youth, he heard, first, Phaadrus the Epicurean and Philo the Academic, and was also instructed by Diodotus the Stoic (who was after- ward, with Tyrannio, an inmate of his house, Tiisc, V. 39, EjiisL, passim). He after- ward heard Antiochus of Askalon, the Academic, Zeno the Epicurean, and lastly (at Rhode.s), Posidonius the Stoic. In his latter years Cicero turned his attention again to philosophy, especially during the last three years of his life. Tusc, V. 2 : Philosophiae in sinum quum a primis iemporibtis aetatis nostra voluntas studiumque nos compuiisset, his gravissimis casihus in eundem portum, ex quo eramus egrtssi magna jactati tempestate con- fugimus. Cicero gives a list of his philosophical writings in De Div., II. 1. In his work entitled Ebrtensius, he had, as he here says, urged the study of philosophy ; in the Academics lie had indicated what he considered the most modest, consequent, and elegant mode of phi- losophizing (namely, that pursued by the Middle Academy) ; in the five books De Finihus Bonorum et Malorum he had treated of the foundation of ethics, the doctrine of the highest good, and of evil, after which he had written the five books of Tusculan Disputations, in which he had shown what things were necessary to the greatest happiness in life ; then had followed the three books De Natura Deorum, to which were to he joined the then unfinished work De Divinatione and the projected work De Faio. Among his philosophical works were also to be reckoned the six books De Republica (previously composed) and the works entitled Consolatio and De Senectute; to these might be added his rhetorical writings: the three books De Oratore, and Brutus (De Claris Oratoribus), constituting a fourth, and the Orator, constituting a fifth book on the same general topic. Cicero composed the work De Rep. (in six books) in the j-ears 54-52 B. c. About the third part of it has come down to us, most of which was first published by A. Mai, from ECLECTICISM. CICEKO. — THE 8EXTIANS. 219 the Palimpsest in the Vatican (Rome, Ist ed., 1822); a part of Book VI., the dream of Scipio, is preserved in Macrobius. Complementary to this work was the De Legihus, begun in 52 b. c, but never finished, and now extant only in a fragmentary form. Pos- sibly a.s early as the beginning of the year 46 B. c, but perhaps later, Cicero wrote th« small work called Paradoxa, which is not mentioned by him in De Div., II. 1. The Con- solatio and Hortensius were composed in 45 b. c, of both of which only a few fragments remain to us ; in the same year the Academics (now incomplete) and the Be Finibiis (which we possess entire) were written, and the Tuscnlan. Disp. and the De Nat. Deor. were begun ; the two last-named works were not completed till the following year. The date of the Coio Major sive De Senedute falls in the beginning of 44 a. c. ; that of the De Divinatmie (above-cited, intended as a complement to the work on the Nature of the Gods) falls in the same year, as also do the De Fafo (which has not come down to us entire), the lost work De Gloria, and the extant works : Laelius s. De Amicitia and De Offidis ; the treatise De Virtutibus (not extant) was probably composed immediately after the De Offidis. Among the youthful works of Cicero were the translations (now lost) of Xenophou's CEconomicus and Plato's Protagoras (which latter was still existing in the times of Priscianus and Dona- tus) ; but his translation of Plato's Timaezis, of which a considerable fragment is preserved, was written, after the Academica, in 45 (or 44) b. c. Of the rhetorical works, which are classed by Cicero himself with liis philosophical works, the De Oratore was written in the year 55, and Brutus and the Orator in 46 B. c. That Cicero in his philosophical writings depended on Grecian sources appears from his own confession, since he says of the former (Ad Atticum, XII. 52) : aTz6ypa(j>a sunt, minore labore fiunt, verba tantuTn affero, quibus abundo (yet cf. De Fin., I. 2. 6; 3. 7 ; De Off., I. 2. 6, where Cicero alleges his relative independence). It is still possible to point out the foreign sources of most of his writings (generally by the aid of passages in these writings themselves or in Cicero's ICpistles). The works De Pep. and De Legibus are in form imita- tions of the works of Plato bearing the same names ; their contents are founded partly on Cicero's own political experiences and partly on Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic doctrines, and, to a not inconsiderable extent, on the writings of Polybius. The Paradoxa discuss cer- tain well-known Stoic principles. The Consolatio is founded on Crantor's work irefil -rrh-dov^, the (lost) Hortensius, probably on the UporpeivTiKur, which Aristotle had addressed to Themi- son, king in one of the cities of Cyprus (see Bernays, Die Dialoge des Arist, p. 116 seq.), or, it may he, on the P)ohepticus of Pliilo of Larissa, the Academic (see Krischo, Ueber Cicero's Aca- demica, Gott. Studien, II., 1845, p. 191); the De FifiiTms (the best of the extant philosophical writings of Cicero), on the works of Phaidrus, Chrysippus, Carneades, Antiochus, as also on the results of the studies pursued by Cicero in his youth, when he listened to lectures and engaged in philosophical discussions; tlie Academica, on the writings and in part also on the discourses of the more distinguished of the Academics ; the Tvsc. Disp., on the works of Plato and Grantor, and on Stoic and Peripatetic writings ; the first book of the De Nahira Deorum, on an Epicurean work, which has been discovered in the Ilerculanoan Rolls, and was at first considered to be a treatise of Phasdrus irspl deuv. but has now been recognized as the work of Philodemus TTenlevaejieiaq; Cicero's critique of the Epicurean stand-point is founded on a work by Posidonius the Stoic; the second book of the De Nat. Deor. is founded particularly on tlie works of Cloantlies and Clirysippus ; the third, on those of Carneades and Clitomachus, the Academics ; the first of the two books De Divinatione is based on Chrysippus' work Trepl xPVCf^'^v, on the Trepl fiavrtKf/g of Posidonius, and on works com- posed by Diogenes and Antipater ; the second book, on the works of Carneades and of Panjetius the Stoic ; the treatise De Fato, on writings of Chrysippus, Posidonius, Cleanthes, and Carneades; and the Cato Major, on writings of Plato. Xenophon, Hippocrates, and 220 ECLECTICISM. — CICEKO, — THE SEXTIANS. Aristo of Chius. The Laelius of Cicero reposes especially upon the work of Theophrflstiis on Friendship, and also on the Ethics of Aristotle and the writings of Chrysippus; the two first books of the Le Ojfficiis were drawn principally from Panaitius ; the third, from Posi- donius ; but besides the writings of these men, those of Plato and Aristotle, and also those of the Stoics, Diogenes of Babylon, Antipater of Tyre, and Hecato, were employed in the composition of the De Officiis. From Skepticism, which Cicero was unable scientifically to refute, and to which he was ever being invited by the conflict of philosophical authorities, he was disposed to take refuge in the immediate certainty of the moral consciousness, the consensus gentium and the doctrine of innate ideas {notiones innaiue, natura nobis insitue). Characteristic are such decla- rations as tiie following from the De Legibus, I. 13 : Perturbatricera autem harum omnium rerum Academiam hanc ab Arcesila et Carnende receniem ezoremus ut sileat, nam si invaserit in haec, quae satis scite nobis instruda et composita videntur, nimias edet ruinas; quam quidc/n ego placare cupio, submovere non audeo. In physics Cicero does not advance beyond the stadium of doubt; still he regards the field of physical investigation as furnishing agreeable "pastime " for the mind, and one not to be despised {Acad..^ II. 41). That which most inter- ests him in natural science is its relation to tlie question of God's existence. The following noticeable passage is directed against atheistic atomism {De Nat. Deor., II. 37) : Hoc (viz., the formation of the world by an accidental combination of atoms) qui existimat fieri potuisse, non intelUgo cur non idem putet, si innumerabiles unius et viginti forvnae Htterarum vel aureae vel quales libet aliquo cotijiciantur, posse ex his in ierrani excussis annates Ennii, ut deinceps legi possint, effici. Cicero would have mythology purged of every thing unworthy of the gods (the story of the abduction of Ganymede, for example, Tusc, I. 26; IV. 33), but would, as far as possible, hold fast to that in which the beliefs of different peoples agree (7'msc., I. 13); he is particularly attached to the belief in providence and immortality {Tusc, I. 1. 2 seq. ; 49 et ul.\ but is not altogether free from uncertainty on these subjects, and with dispassionate impartiality allows the Academic philosopher, in his De Natura Deorum, to develop the grounds of doubt with the same minuteness and thoroughness with which the Stoic develops his arguments for dogmatism. Cicero defines the morally good (honestum) as that which is intrinsically praiseworthy {De Fin., II. 14 ; De Off., I. 4), in accordance with the etymology of the word, which to him, the Roman, represents the Greek naTiov. The most important problem in ethics with him is the question whether virtue is alone sufficient to secure happiness. He is inclined to answer this question, with the Stoics, in the affirmative, though the recollection of his own weakness and of the general frailty of mankind often fills him with doubts ; but then he reproaches himself for judging of the power of virtue, not by its nature, but by our effeminacy {Tusc, T. 1). Cicero is not altogether disinclined {De Fin., V. 26 seq.) to the distinction made by Antiochus of Aska- lon between the vita beata, which is made sure under all circumstances by virtue, and the vita beatissima, to which external goods are necessary, although he entertains ethical and logical scruples respecting it, and elsewhere (Tusc, V. 13) rejects it; but he contents him- self with the thought that all which is not virtue, whether it deserves the name of a good or not, is at all events vastly inferior to virtue in worth, and is of vanishing consequence in comparison with it {De Fin., V. 32 ; De Off'., III. 3). From this point of view the difference between the Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines sinks, in his view, to a mere difference of words, which Carneades (according to Cic, De Fin., III. 12) had already declared it to be. Cicero is more decided in opposing the Peripatetic doctrine, that virtue requires the reduction of the Tradr/ (translated by Cicero perturbationes) to their right proportions ; he demands, with the Stoics, that the sage should be without -rtadri. But he makes his demonstration easier, by including in the concept -Kddor {peHurbatio) the mark of faultiness {Tusc, Y. 6 : aversa a ECLECTICISM. — CICERO. — THE SEXTIAN8. 221 mcta ratione animi commotio), so that, in fact, he only proves what is self-evident, viz. : that that which is faulty is not to be suffered; but he misses the real point in dispute {Tusc, IV. 17 seq.). In another particular, also, he stands on the side of the Stoics, namely, in regarding practical virtue as the highest virtue. Cf. De Off., I. 44 : omne offieium, quod ad conjunctionem hominum et ad societatem tuendam valet, anieponendum e.st illi officio, quod cognitione et saentia continetur. lb., 45 : agere considerate pluris est, quam cogitara prudentur. Cicero's political ideal is a government made up of monarchical, aristocratic, and demo- cratic elements. He finds it realized approximately in the Roman state {De Rep., I. 29 ; II. 23 seq.). Cicero approves of auguries and the like, as an accommodation to popular beUef, as also of deceiving the people by allowing them only the ajjpearance of political liberty, since he regards the mass of men as radically unreasonable and unfit for freedom {De Nat. Dear., III. 2 ; De Divinat, II. 12, 33, 72 ; De Leg., II. 7 ; III. 12 et al). Cicero is most attractive in those parts of his works, in which in an elevated rhetorical style, and without touching upon subtle matters of dispute, he sets forth the truths and sen- timents which are universally affirmed by the moral consciousness of man. His praise of disinterested virtue, for example {De Fin., II. 4 ; Y. 22), is very successful ; so, in particular, is the manner in which the idea of the moral community of mankind (on which idea, taken by Cicero from the spurious letter of Archytas, Plato founds in the Rep. his demand that philosophers should enter practically into the affairs of the state) : non nobis solum nati sumus ortusque nostri partem patria vindicat, partevi amid, etc. {De Off., I. 7 ; cf. De Fin., II. 14), and the Aristotelian doctrine of man as a " political animal " {De Fin., V. 23) are presented. And, again, in his Tusculan Disp^s, the weakness of Cicero's argumen- tation and the dullness of his dialectic, especially as compared with the Platonic dialectic which he makes his model, are not more marked than the rhetorical perfection of the pas- sages in which he discourses of the dignity of the human mind {Tusc, I. 24 seq.; cf De Leg., I. 7 seq.). So, too, his enthusiastic panegyric of philosophy {Tusc, V. 2 : vitae phi- losophia dux! virtutis indagat)-ix expulfnxque vitiorum, etc. ; cf. De Leg., I. 22 seq. ; Acad., I. 2 ; Tusc, I. 26 ; II. 1 and 4 ; De Off., II. 2) contains much that is felicitous in thought and expression (e. g., est autem unus dies bene et ex praeceptis tuis actus peccanti immortalitati ante- ponendus, etc.) ; and although it is somewhat defaced by rhetorical exaggeration, it was inspired by a conviction which was deeply rooted in Cicero's mind at the time when he wrote the works just cited. Seneca {Nat. Quaest., VII. 32) says of the school of the Sextians, that after having com- menced its existence with great eclat, it soon disappeared. Q. Sextius (born about 70 B. c.) was the founder of tlie school, and Sextius, his son, Sotion of Alexandria (whose instruc- tions Seneca enjoyed about 18-20 .\. D.). Cornelius Celsus, L. Crassitius of Tarentum, and Papirius Fabianus, are named as his disciples. Q. Sextius and Sotion wrote in Greek. Sotion inspired his pupil, Seneca, with admiration for Pythagoras (Sen., Ej}., 108); absti- nence from animal food, daily self-examination, and a leaning toward the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, are among the Pythagorean elements in the philosophy of the Sextians. Their teaching seems to have consisted principally of exhortations to moral excellence, to energy of soul, and to independence with reference to external things. The sage, says Sextiu.s, goes through life armed by his virtues against all the contingencies of fortune, wary and ready for battle, like a well-ordered army when the foe is near (Sen.. Ep., 59). Virtue and the happiness which flows from it are not ideals without reality (as they had come to be regarded by the later Stoics), but goods attainable by men (f^on., Ep., 64). (The collection of aphorisms, which lias come down to us in the Latin translation of Rufinus, is the work of a Christian, who wrote not long before a. d. 200. It is first cited 222 PRINCIPAL DIVISIONS OF THE THIRD PERIOD. , by Orig., c. Celsum, VIII. 30, under the title : Scfrov yviJ/uai. A Syriac version of it exists aod is published in the Analeda Syriaca of P. de Lagarde, Leipsic, 1858. It appears to be founded on a few of the authentic sayings of Q. Sextius.) Third (Prevailingly Theological) Period of Greek Philosophy. THE NEO-PLATONISTS AND THEIR PREDECESSORS IN THEOSOPHICAL SPECULATION. § 62. To the Third Period of Greek philosophy, or the period of the predominance of theosophj, belong : 1) the Jewish-Greek phi- losophers, 2) the Neo-Pythagoreans and the Pythagorizing Platon- ists, 3) the Neo-Platonists. The Jewish-Greek philosophers sought to blend Judaism with Hellenism. The philosophy of the Neo- Pythagoreans, Pythagorizing Platonists, and Neo-Platonists was theosophic. To this the previous development of Greek ])hilosophy itself was alone sufficient to conduct them, when physical and mental investigation had ended in Skepticism and Eclecticism. This state of Greek philosophy (especially, in view of the close contact in this period of the West with the East) could not but induce a greater susceptibility to Oriental influences than had hitherto existed, and such influences did operate, in no insignificant measure, to determine the form and substance of the speculation of the period. On the Greek philosophers of this period, cf. the first section of E. W. Moller's Geschichte der Kosmo- logie in der griechischen Eirche bis auf Origene^, Halle, 1S60 (pp. 5-111). The influence of the Orient was an important co-operating factor in determining the character of the philosophy of this period (see Ritter, Ilibtory of Philosoj^hy, IV. p. 330 seq.) ; but there were also internal causes — to which Zeller rightly directs attention (Ph. d. Gr., 2d ed., Vol. III. b, pp. 56 seq., 368 seq.) — which produced a leaning toward a mythical theology. "The feeling of alienation from God and the yearning after a higher revelation are universal characteristics of the last centuries of the ancient world ; this yearning was, in the first place, but an expression of the consciousness of the decline of the classical nations and of their culture, the presentiment of the approach of a new era, and it called into life not only Christianity, but also, before it, pagan and Jewish Alexandrianism, and other related developments." But this same feeling of exhaustion and this yearning after extraneous aid, accompanied, as they were, by a diminished power of original thought, led, in religion, to the adoption of Oriental forms of worship and Oriental dogmas, and, above all, in speculation, to sympathy with the Oriental tendency to conceive God as the tran- scendent rather than as the immanent cause ef the world, and to regard self-abnegation as THE JEWISH- ALEXANDRIAN PHILOSOPHY. 2'23 the essential form of morality, while, under the same influence, special emphasis was placed on tlie kindred elements in Greek, and especially in the Platonic philosophy. Neo- Platonism is a philosophy of syncretism. Its elements are partly Oriental (Alexandrian- Jewish, in particular) and partly Hellenic ; its form is Hellenic. The religious philosophy of the Alexandrian Jews and the Gnosis of early Christianity are products of the same ele- ments, but under an Oriental form. Robert Zimmermann rightly remarks {Gesch. der Aesthetik, Vienna, 1858, p. 123), that Plato's attempt to translate Oriental mysticism into scientific speculation, ends in Neo-Platonism with a re-translation of thought into images. The traits common to the speculations of the Jewish-Greek philosophers and the Neo- Pythagoreans, the later Platonists and Neo-Platonists, are aptly enumerated by Zeller (Philos. der Griechen, 1st ed., III. p. 566 seq., 2d ed., III. b., p. 214) as follows: "The dualistic opposition of the divine and the earthly ; an abstract conception of God, excluding all knowl- edge of the divine nature ; contempt for the world of the senses, on the ground of the Pla- tonic doctrines of matter and of the descent of the soul from a superior world into the body; the theory of intermediate potencies or beings, through whom God acts upon the world of phenomena; the requirement of an ascetic self-emancipation from the bondage of sense, and faith m a higher revelation to man, when in a state called Enthtisiasm." From Plato's own doctrine these later forms of Greek philosophy, notwithstanding all their intended agreement with and actual dependence on it, are yet very essentially distinguished by the principle of revelation contained in them. To the Nec-Platonists the writings of Plato, the " God- enlightened " (Proel., Tlieol. Plat, I. 1), became a kind of revealed record. The most obscure and abstruse of them (e. g., the Pseudo-Platonic Parmenides, with its dry schema- tism and its sophistical play with the conceptions of One and Being) were to many of these philosophers the most welcome, and were regarded b}'' them as the most sublime docu- ments of Platonic theology, because they offered the freest room for the play of their unbridled imaginings concerning God and divine things. Granting that theosophical speculation, in comparison with the investigation of nature and man, may appear as the higher and more important work, still Neo-Platonism remains decidedly inferior to its precursors in the earlier Greek philosophy, since it did not solve its problem with the same measure of scientific perfection with which they solved theirs. § 63. There is as yet no distinct evidence of a combination of Jewish theology with Greek philosophemes in the Septnagint, or in the doctrines of the Essenes. Such a combination existed, possibly, in the doctrine of the Tfurapeutes, who held certain doctrines and usages in common with the Pythagoreans, and certainly in the teachings of Aris- tobulus (about IflO b. c), who appealed to (spurious) Orphic poems, into which Jewish doctrines had been incorporated, in support of the assertion (in which he agrees with Pseudo-Aristeas), that the Greek poets and philosopliei'S borrowed their wisdom from a very ancient translation of the Pentateuch. The biblical writings, says Aristo- bulus (who interprets them allegorically), were inspired by the Spirit of God. God is invisible; he sits enthroned in the heavens, and is not in contact with the earth, but only acts upon it by his power. He formed the world out of material previously existing. In de- 224 THE JEWISH-ALEXANDEIAN PHILOSOPHY. fending tlie observance of the Sabbath, Aristobulus employs a Pytha- gorizing numerical symbolism. The personification of the wisdom of God as an intermediate essence between God and the world, and pre-existing before the heavens and the earth, seems to have begun already with him. In the Book of Wisdom (of Pseudo-Solomon) wisdom is distinguished from the divine essence itself, as the power of God which works in the world. But Philo (born about 25 b. c.) was the first who set up a complete system of theosopl)y. With him the expounding of the books of the Old Testament is synonymous with the philosophy of his nation ; but in his own exposition he alle- gorically introduces into those documents philosophical ideas, partly derived from the natural, internal development of Jewish notions, and partly appropriated from Hellenic philosophy. He teaches that God is incorporeal, invisible, and cognizable only through the reason ; that he is the most universal of beings, the being to whom alone being, as such, truly pertains ; that he is more excellent than virtue, than science, or even than the good j9 from eternity, like God, and yet its genesis is not like our own and V that of all other created beings; it is the first-begotten son of God, V and is for us, who are imperfect, a God ; the wisdom of God is its v" THE JEWISn-ALEXANDRIAN PHILOSOPHY. 225 mother ; it is the older and the world is the younger son of God. Through the agency of the Logos, God created the Tvorld and has revealed himself to it. The Logos is also the representative of the world before God, acting as its high-priest, intercessor, and Para- y^"*. clete. The Jews are the nation to whom God revealed himself; from them the Greeks borrowed their wisdom. Knowledge and virtue are gifts of God, to be obtained only by self-abnegation on the part of ^ man. A life of contemplation is superior to one of practical, political -^ occupation. Ihe various minor sciences serve as a preparatory train- r ing for the knowledge of God. Of the philosophical disciplines, ' logic and physics are of little worth. The highest step in phi- losophy is the intuition of God, to which the sage attains through divine illumination, when, completely renouncing himself and leaving behind his finite self-consciousness, he resigns himself unresistmgly to the divine influence. On Judaism under the influence of Greek civilization, cf. the sections relating to this subject in Isaak Marcus Jost's Ge^ch. dex JvdentAums (Vol. I., Leips. 1S57, pp. 99-lOS; 844-361, etc.), and in the comprehen- sive work of II. Gratz, Genchichie der Juden (Vol. III., Lcips. 1S56, pp. 29S-342), as also in the works of Ewald (see above, p. IC) and others, and 11. Schultz, Die jildUche Religionxphilonophie his zur Zersiorung Jerusalems (in Gelzer's Prot. Monatsbl., Vol. 24, No. 4, Oct., 1864), and Wilhcl. Clemens, Die Tlterapeuten (Progr. of the Gyran. ^riderioanicm), Konigaborg, 1S69. Of Aristobulus and Aristeas tre.it Gerh. Jo. Voss (De hist. Graec, Frankfort-on-the-Main, 167T, I. ch. 10, p. 55 seq.), Is. Voss (De LAW. Interpret., The Hague, 1661 ; Obnerv. ad Pomp. Mel, London, 1686), Fabric (Bibl. Gr., III., p. 469), Rich. Simon {Hi-fi. erit. d. V. T., Paris, 1678, II. 2. p. 189 ; III. 23, p. 479), Humfred Hody (Contra Itistoriam Aristeae de, LXX. inteipretibus, etc., O.^ford, 1685. and De bibliorum text, oriy., rersionibua, etc.. ibid. 1705), Nic. de Nourry (Paris, 1703), Ant. van Dale (Amsterdam, 1705), Lndov. Casp. V.'ilckenaer, De Aristobuio Judaeo philosopho Peripateiico Alexandrino,ed.Jo. Luzac, Leyden, 1S06; cf. Lobeck, Aglaophamus, I. p. 447; Matter, ^.«.«fri hititor. »ur Tecole d'' Alexandrie,VsxT\%,\?>1(i, \o\. II. p. 121 seq. ; cf , also, the works of Gfrorer (II. 71 seq.) and Diihne (II. 73 seq.) cited below ; Georgii, in Illgcn's Zeitsclirift f. hist. Theol., 1839, No. 8, p. 86, and Eob. Binde, Ari-atobulische Studien (Gymn. Progr.), Glogau, 1869. On Pseud o-Phocylide9 (a poem of Jewish origin, devoted to moral philosophy), cf. Jak. Dernays, Leber dan Phokylideiscfie Gedicht, ein Beitrag znr hellenisiischen Litt, Berlin, 1856; Otto Gornm, De Psettdo- Phocylide, in the Philol, XIV., 1859, pp. 91-112; Leopold Schmidt, in Jahn's Jahrb., Vol. 75, 1857, p. 510 seq. where Schmid seeks to point out separately the Hellenistic or Jewish-Alcx-indrian and the purely Jewish elements in the principal passage of the poem, and excludes all but the last-named as interpolated. Philo's works have been edited by Thom. Mangey (London, 1742), A. P. Pfeiffer (ErI.angen, 1785-92, 2d ed , 1820), and C. E. Kichter (Leips. 1828-30), among others; a stereotyped edition w.is published at Leipsic In 1811-53; Philo's book on the creation of the world lias been published, pf'ecededby a careful intro- duction by J. G. Muller (Herlin, 1841); Philonea,ed. C Tischcndorf, Leipsic, 1S6S. On Philo's doctrine, cf., especially. August GfrOrer, PhUo iind die alexnndritn^he Theonophie, Stuttgart, 1831 (also under the title: Kritische Gesc/iicJde deH C}iristenthums,'Vo\. I.); Aug. Ferd. Pahne, Geschichtlich^ Darfielluvg der jiid inch- alexandrinisdien ReUgionsphiloHophie. Halle, 1884. See also Christian Ludw. Georgii, Ueber die iieuesten Ge^ensatze in Anffitmuiig der Alexundi'iniiidten lieligiorixphilosophie, inabeitondef-e da^ j'dd. AJexandrini.wius, in Illgcn's Zeitnchrift f. hi.st. Tlieol., 1889. No. 3. pp. 3-98, anil No. 4, pp. 3-98. Gross- man has written a number of works on Philo (Leips. 1829, 1830 seq.); other writers on the same subject are 11. Planck (De interpr. Phil, cdleg., GOtt. 1807), W. Scheffer (Qttaest. PhUon., Marburg, 1829, 1831), Fr. Creuzer (in Ullman and Umbreit's Theol. Sttid. v. Krit, Jahrgang V.. Vol. I., 1832, pp. 8-43, and in Creu- zer's work, Zur Gesch. der griech, u. rom. Litt., Darmst. and Leips. 1847, pp. 407-44C), F. Kefcrstein (Ph.''a Lehre von dem gottl. Slittelwesen, Leips. 1846), J. Bncher (PhiloniDch^ Studien, Tub. 1S4S), M. Wolff (Di4 Philonische Philosophie, etc., Leips. 1849; 2d ed., Gothenburg, 1868), L. Noack (Psydie, Vol.11., No. 5, 1859), Z. Frankel (Zur Ethik des Philo, in the Monntxehr. fur Gesch. u. Wi«a. des Judenthvms, July, 1S67), and Ferd. Delaunay (Philon d'Alexaiidrie, Paris, 1867). 15 226 THE JEWISH-ALEXANDRIAN PHILOSOPHY. For us, the earliest document of Jewish-Alexandrian culture is the Septuagint. The oldest parts of it, among which the translation of the Pentateuch belongs, reach back into the earliest period of the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus (who was king from 284 to 247 B. c). Aristobulus says (op. Eusebius, Fraepar. Evang., XIII. 12, in a fragment of his dedicatory epistle to the king, who — according to Euseb., Fraepar. Ev., IX. 6, with which Clem. Alex., Strom., I. p. 342, is to be compared — was Ptolemy Philometor), that before the time of Alexander, and also before the supremacy of the Persians in Egypt, the four last books of the Pentateuch had been already translated, Demetrius Phalereus taking the lead in the matter. According to a statement of Hermippus the Callimachean (Diog. L., V. 78), Demetrius lived at the court of PtolemsEUS Lagi only, but under Philadelphus was obliged to avoid the country. This account is not in contradiction with that of Aris- tobulus (and R. Simon, Hody, and others, are consequently at fault in arguing from the Bupposed contradiction, that the fragments of Aristobulus are spurious) ; we may, rather conclude from the two reports that preparations were made for the translation by Demetrius during the life of Ptolemajus Lagi (but probably not till the last part of his reign), and that it may have then been begun, but that it was principally accomplished imder Philadelphus; Josephus (Ant., XII. 2) places the commencement of the translation in the year 285 u. c. Whether certain parts of the Pentateuch were really translated into Greek still earlier is doubtful, but the}' were certainly not translated at so early an epoch as that named by Aris- tobulus. The translation of the principal canonical writings may have been completed under Ptolemy Euergetes, the successor of Philadelphus, soon after his accession to the throne (247). Parts were added to the Hagiographa at least as late as 130 B. c. (according to the Prologue of Siracides), and without doubt also very much later. Dahne (II. pp. 1-72) pro- fesses to have discovered in the Septuagint numerous traces of the Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy, which was subsequently more fully developed by Philo ; according to him, the authors of this translation of the Bible knew and approved the principal doctrines of this philosophy, contrived to suggest them by apparently insignificant deviations from the original text, and, foreseeing the method of allegorical interpretation, which was subse- quently to be adopted, endeavored by the construction of their translation to facilitate it. But the passages on which Dahne founds his argumentation by no means force us to this very doubtful hypothesis (see Zeller, Fh. d. Gr., 1st ed.. III., pp. 5G9-573, 2d ed., III. b., p. 215 seq.); we find only that, as a rule, the notion of the sensible manifestation of God is suppressed, anthropopathic ideas, such as the idea of God's repenting, are toned down in their expression, the distance between God, in his essence, and the world, is increased, and the ideas of mediating links between the two (in the form of diviuc potencies, angels, the divine Jofa, the Messias as a heavenly mediator) appear more fully developed than in the original text. In these peculiarities germs of the later religious philosophy may undoubt- edly be seen, but not as yet this philosophy itself. It is scarcely necessary, either, to see in them a union of Greek philosophemes with Jewish ideas. Such a union is first discoverable with certainty in the fragments of Aristobulus, the Alexandrian, who (according to Clem. Al. and Eusebius) was usually styled a Peripatetic. The passages in Eusebius, cited above, establish beyond a doubt that he lived under Ptole- mseus Philometor (181-145 B. c), notwithstanding several evidently erroneous authorities, which place him under Ptol. Philadelphus. He wrote a commentary on the Pentateuch, and dedicated it to Ptolemy (Philometor). Fragments of the same and of the dedicatory epistle are preserved in Clem. Alex., Strom., I. (12 and) 25; (Y. 20:) VI. 37, and in Euseb., Fraepar. Ev., VII. 13 and 14; VIII. 6 and 10; IX. 6, and XIII. 12. In the fragments furnished us bj Eusebius, Aristobulus cites a number of passages purporting to have been taken from the poems of Orpheus, Homer, Hesiod, and Linus, but which were evidently brought aito the THE JEWISH-ALEXANDEIAN PHILOSOPHY. 227 fann in which they are cited by some Jew, and perhaps by Aristobiihis himself. (Yet of. Jost, Gesch. lies Judenthums, I., p. ;569 seq., wIjo disputes the latter supposition.) The most extensive and important fragment is one which purports to be taken from the Upbg Tioyoc; of Orpheus (Eus., Praep. Ev., XIII. 12); the same fragment, in another form, has been preserved by Justin Martyr, De Monarchia (p. 37, Paris edition, 1742), so that it is still pos- sible to point out precisely the changes made in it by some Jew. The main doctrines of the poem are thus recapitulated by Aristobulus: All created things exist and are upheld by divine power, and God is over all things {dianpaTdadai deia Swafiei to. iravra koX yevTjTa vTTdfJx^iv Kal inl navTon' elvac rbv deov). But in the God who accomplishes and rules over all things (Koa/ioto rvTrurr/g . . . avrov 6' vno ndvra Te/ielrai, ev 6' avro'tc avrog TreptviaaeTai)^ Aristobulus recognizes not, with the Grecian poets and philosophers (especially the Stoics), the Deity himself, but only the Divine potency (dbvafiti), by whom the world is governed ; God himself is an extra-mundane being; he is enthroned in the heavens, and the earth is under his feet; he is invisible, not only to the senses, but to the eye of the human soul — the vovg alone perceives him (oiJe ng avrov elaopaa tln.ix<^v dvrjTuv, vtJ d' e'laopdaraC). In these theological and psychological propositions it is possible to discover a reversion to the Aristotelian doctrine and a modification of the Stoic, and, in so far, a justification of the denomination Peripatetic as applied to Aristobulus ; but they bear, at least to an equal extent, the impress of the religious faith of the Jewish nation. In interpreting the seven days' work of creation, Aristobulus interprets, metaphorically, the light, which was created on the first day, as symbolizing the wisdom by which all things are illumined, which some of the (Peripatetic) philosophers had compared to a torch ; but, he adds, one of liis own nation (Solomon, Prov. viii. 22 seq. 7) had testified of it more distinctly and finely, that it existed before the heavens and the earth. Aristobulus then endeavors to show how the whole order of the world rests on the number seven : 6C i^Sofiddov 6e koI ivdg 6 Koofwg KVKlslTai (Aristob., ap. Euseb., Pr. Ev., XIII. 12). Aristeas is the nominal author of a letter to Philocrates, in which are narrated the circumstances attending the translation of the sacred writings of the Hebrews by the seventy (or seventy-two) interpreters {ed. Sim. Schard, Basel, 1561; ed. Bernard, Ox- ford, 1692, and in the editions of Josephus ; also in Hody, De Bibl. Text. Orig., Oxford, 1705, pp. i.-xxxvi.). The letter states that Aristeas had been sent by the king of Egypt to Eleazar, the high-priest, at Jerusalem, to ask for a copy of the law and for men who would translate it. The letter is spurious, and the narrative full of fables. It was probably written in the time of the Asmoneans. In this letter, a distinction is made between the power {(ivvcifiig) or government ((Juvaarcm) of God, which is in all places {(hd Travruv eariv, ■ndvTa rdnav ■n-2.7}pol), and God himself, the greatest of beings (jiejiaTog), the lord over all things (o Kvpieiioiv dndvruv dedg), who stands in need of nothing {dirpoaSeyg), and is enthroned in the heavens. All virtue is said to descend from God. God is truly honored, not by gifts and offerings, but by purity of soul (V^';tW KadnpiorT/ri). — The allegorical form of interpreta- tion appears already brought to a considerable degree of perfection in Pseudo- Aristeas. In the Second Book of the Maccabees (ii. 39) — which is an extract from the history of the Syrian wars, written by Jason of Cyrene — the distinction made between God himself, who dwells in the heavens, and the divin» power, ruling in the temple at Jerusalem, recalls the similar Alexandrian dogma. Non- Alexandrian, on the contrary, are the belief in the resurrection, by divine favor, of the bodies of the just (vii. 9-14 ; xiv. 46), and in creation out of nothing (vii. 28), if, indeed, the latter doctrine is to be understood here in its strict dogmatic sense. Some have attempted, further, to point out analogies with Alexandrian doctrines in the third and fourth Books of Maccabees, in the third Book of Ezra, in the Jewish portions of the Sibyllincs, and (n the Wisdom of Siracides. The Pseudo-Solomonic 228 THE JEWISH-ALEXANDRIAN PHILOSOPHY, Book of Wisdom, which appears to have been composed before the time of Philo, describe* "wisdom as the reflected splendor of the divine light, as a mirror of the divine efiBciency, an etflux of the divine glory, and as a spirit diffused through the whole world, fashioning at: things with art and uniting itself to those souls who are pleasing to God. The pre- existence of individual souls is taught (i. 20, in the words: ayaddc oiv i]Wm eJf ciJua afiiavTov); the resurrection of all men, of the good to blessedness and of the bad to judg- ment, is taught, and men are referred for happiness to the future life. God created the world from a pre-existing matter (xi. 18). At what time the society of Essenes arose in Palestine and of Therapeutes in Egypt, is uncertain. Josephus first mentions the Essenes in his account of the times of Jonathan the Maccabean (about 160 b. c.) ; there existed, he says, at that time, three sects (alpeaei^) among the Jews, the Pharisees, the Sadducees, and the Essenes {Ant., XIII. 5). It seema necessary to regard the name of the Essenes as derived from chaschah, to be silent, mys . terious (conservers of secret doctrines, mystics). They sought to attain to the highest de- gree of holiness by the most rigid abstemiousness (after the example of the Nazarites), and transmitted to their successors a secret doctrine respecting angels and the creation (from which, as it appears, the Cabbala subsequently arose; cf. below, § 97). The Thera.- peutes (who were more given to mere contemplation in monastic retirement) sprung from the Essenes (rather than the latter from the former). The doctrine of the Therapeutes was related to the Pythagorean, and more especially to the Neo-Pythagorean doctrine. That the body is a prison for the (pre-existent and post-existent) soul — also the doctrine of cod. traries which are everywhere present in the world, are tenets belonging to ancient Pytha.- goreanism ; not so the Therapeutic inhibition of the oath, of bloody offerings, and of the use of meat and wine (at least, according to the testimony of Aristoxenus the Aristotelian, not the earliest Pythagoreans, but only the Orphists and a part of the Pythagoreans of the fifth and fourth centuries B. c, abstained from the use of meat), and the recommendation of celibacy, the doctrine of angels (demons), magic, and prophecy — traits which reappear in Neo-Pythagoreanism, and are unmistakably of Oriental origin. It is conceivable that (as Zeller assumes) these doctrines and customs were derived from the East by the Orphists and Pythagoreans, that before the time of the Maccabees they passed from the latter to the Jews m Palestine (the Essenes), and that the latter again delivered them to the Jews in Egypt (the Therapeutes). Still, it is improbable that Pythagoreanism, at a time when it had become nearly or quite extinguished (cf. Zeller, I., 2d edition, p. 215, 3d edition, p. 251), could have exerted so powerful influence on a portion of the Jewish nation, and it is more natural to suppose (with Hilgenfeld) that the Therapeutic doctrine of abstinence was transmitted without Grecian intervention from the Parsees — after they, for their part, had submitted in their doctrine to a Buddhistic influence — to the Jews of Palestme and from the latter to the Egyptian Jews. The existence of the Therapeutic sect may, however, on its part, have been among the causes which induced the rise of Neo-Pythagoreanism at Alexandria. Philo the Jew lived at Alexandria, which he calls " our Alexandria " (^fieripa 'A?ie§av- Apeia) in his work De Legatione ad Cajwn (ed. Mangey, vol. II. 567). According to Josephus {Ant, XVIII. 8 ; XX. 5), he was descended from one of the most illustrious families of the country; Eusebius {Hist. Eccl., II. 4) and Hieronymus (Catal. Scriptorum Eccles.) report that he belonged to a sacerdotal family. His brother held the office of Alabarches (superinten- dent of the Jews at Alexandria). In the first half of the year 40 Philo was at Rome as an ambassador from the Alexandrian Jews to the Emperor Caius ; he was then already ad- yanced in years [De Legat. ad Cajum, ed. Mang., II. 592), and at the period when he wrote his accouat of this embassy — probably soon after the death of Caius (a. d. 41) and during the THE JEWISH-ALEXANDKIAN PHILOSOPHY. 229 reign of Claudius — he classed himself among the old men [yipovrec). His birth falls. coii« sequently, in the third decade before Christ. The allegorical method of interpreting the sacred Scriptures, which had long prevailed among the more cultivated of the Alexandrian Jews, was adopted by Philo without restric- tion. His principle, that the prophets were only involuntary instruments of the spirit which spoke through them, was favorable to the freest use of this mode of exegesis. Philo criticises the attitude of tliose who merely hold fast to the literal sense of Scriptures as low, unworth}', and superstitious ; he denies, in opposition, obviously, to a claim of the orthodox, that this is "unvarnished piety without ostentation" (aKa/.?iUTTiarov evaipeiav ftera arv^taf), affirming this honoraVjle description as applicable, rather, to his mystical method of interpretation, and describing his opponents as being affected with the incurable disease of word-picking, and Winded by the deceptive influence of custom (De CJierubim, ed. Mang., I. 146). God can certainly not be said properly to go to and fro, or to have feet •with which to walk forwards, he, the uncreated author of all things, who fills all, etc. ; the anthropomorphitic representations of Scripture are only permitted as an accommodation to the wants of the sensuous man, Avhile for the discerning and spiritual it declares that God is not like a man, nor like the heavens, nor like the world ( Quod Deus sit immutabilis, ed. Mang., I. 280 seq.). Philo does not reject the literal sense in every case ; he often, especially in the case of historical statements, assumes both this and the higher or allegorical sense as equally true ; but the latter, in his view, is never absent. Yet, with the same positiveness with which Philo combats the literalists, does he also oppose those SymVjolists, who ad- vanced to a consequence which threatened to overthrow the positive content of Judaism, by ascribing not only to tlie doctrines, but also to the commands, of the ceremonial law, a merely figurative character, and by teaching that the literal observance of the latter was superfluous, and that it was only necessary to observe the moral precepts, which alone they were intended to inculcate. PhOo recognizes, it is true, that even in the commands of Scripture the literal sense is always accompanied by another, more profound and higher ; but, he says, they are to be observed according to the former as well as the latter sense, since both belong together, like soul and body. " Although circumcision properly sym- bolizes the removal of all passion and sensuality and impious thoughts, yet we may not therefore set aside the practice enjoined ; for in that case we should be obliged to give up the public worship of God in the temple, and a thousand other necessary solemnities " (De Migratiane Abrahami, ed. Mang., I. 450). Yet the inference rejected by Philo appeared later in the doctrine, that (Christian) faith, even without the works of the law, was suffi- cient to salvation. That the idea of God, which was alone worthy of Him, would one day create for itself another and more adequate "body" than that of the Mosaic cere- monial law, was a conviction to which Philo was unable to attain. The theology of Philo is a blending of Platonism and Judaism. While Philo contends that God is to be worshipped as a personal being, he yet conceives Him at the same time as the most general of existences: -u yEviKurardv iariv 6 Oeoq {Legis AUeg., II.). God is the only truly existent being, to bv {De Somn., I. 655, Mang.). But Philo, similarly to the Neo-Platonists of a later epoch, advances upon the Platonic doctrine by representing God as exalted not onlj" above all human knowledge and virtue — as Plato had done — but also above the idea of the Good — (/cpf/rTow re 17 aper^ Kal Kpeirruv rj iTTiarrjfiTi, koI Kpelrruv 1/ ni'To rayadov Kal avro to koMv, De Mundi Opijicio, I. 2, ed. Mang.) — with which Plato identifies Him — and by teaching that we do not arrive at the Absolute by scientific demonstration (^.dyuv (iTTodd^fi)^ but by an immediate subjective certainty (hapyeia, De post. Caini, 48. p. 258 Mang.). Still, a certain kind of knowledge of God, which, however, is only second in rank, results from the aesthetic and teleological view of the world, as founded on the Socrati* 230 THE JEWISH-ALEXANDRIAN PHILOSOPHY. principle that " no work of skill makes itself" {ovdev tuv texvikuv ipyuv aTratfro/iaTil^erai)t Grod is one and simple : 6 6ebg /j.6vog earl koI ev, oil aiiyKpifia, ) of the high-priest. Ordi- narily, however, he speaks only of the divine Logos without qualification or distinction, styling him Son and Paraclete, the Mediator between God and man, etc. (De Vita Mosis, IL 155, ed. Mang.; Quis Rerum Divin. Haeres sit, I. 501 seq., et pass.). The creation of the world was due to God's attribute of love. He created it, through the instrumentality of the Logos, out of unqualified matter, which is therefore of the nature of the unreal (o Oeoc alnov, ovk opyavov, to 6e yiyvofitvov 6C bpydvov fiev, viro 6e roi) aiTiov Trdvruc; ylyvtrat. • evpr/aeif alriov rov kog/jlov rbv 6e6v, bpyavov 6e Xoyov deov, iiXrjv de to. ri-rrapa ermint omnia: vita Apolhnii Tyanensis, etc. Accedunt Apollonii Ty(tn. epistolae, Eu,seOti liber adv. IJieroclem, etc., ed. Godofr. Olearius, Leipsic, 1709; ed. C. L. Kayser, Zui-ich (1844, 1846), 1858 : ed. Ant. Westermann, Paris, 1848. Iwan Miilier, Comm., qua de Philontr. in componenda memioria ApoUonii T. Jide qxiaeritur, Zwtibriicken, 1858-60. Of Apollonius treat: J. C. Herzog (Leips. 1719), S. G. Klose (Viteb. 1723-24), J. L. Mosheim (in his Ctnrimtnt., Hamb. 1751, p. 347 seq.), J. B. Luder- ■vvald (Halle, 1793). Ferd. Chr. Baur (Apollonius und Chrixtun^ Tiibinger ZeitKchrift fiir Theol.. 1832), A. Wellaur (in Jahn's ^rc/a». Vol. X., 1844, pp. 418-467); Neander (Ge^tch. der Christl. Religion, TJieil I., p. 172), L. Noack (in his Pm/che, Vol. I., No. 2, Giessen, 1858), P. M. Mervoyer (Etude sur A. de T., Paris, 1862), A. Chassang (Ze merTeilleux dans Pantiquite. A. de T.. sa vie, ses voyages, ses prodiges, jicir Phi- lostrate. et ses lettres, ovrrages tradtiits du grec, avec introduction, notes et eclaircissements, Paiis, 1862, 2d ed. 1S64) ; cf. Iv an Muller {Zur A])ollonins-Litteratur, in the Zeitsehr. fiir luth. Theol. u. Kirhe, ed. by Delitzsch and Guericke, Vol. 24. 1S65, pp. 412-428 and p. 592). Nicomachi Geraseni arithm eticae, libr. II., ed. Frid. Ast, in his edition of Jamblichi Chnlcidennig tlieologumena ar-ithmelicae, Leips. 1817. (An earlier edition of this work, NtKo^dxou Tepaar]voi apiOii-q- TiK^? /Si^Xta &V0, was published at Paris in 1538.) Ji iKOfiaxov Tepaayivov Ilv9ayopi.Kov apiflnTjTix^ iiyii, Jficornacfii Geraseni Pythagorei introduciionis arithmeticae lilir. II. rec. Rieardns Hoche, accednnt codieis Cizensis problemata arithm. Leips. 1866. 'lotavvov ypa/u./itaTiKoG 'AAefai'Spea)? (toC iAo7rdi'Ob) €19 TO TtpioTov T^? NiKo/xaxou opiflnTjTiK^t eiffaytoy^s. Prirmim ed. Rich. Hoche, Leipsic, 1864; in libr. 11. Nic. inirod. arithm. ed. idem {G.-Pr.), Wesel, 1867. The EyxeipiSiov dp^onK^s of Nicomachus has been edited by Meibom in his Musici Graeei. In the Bibl. of Photius (cod. 187) there is an extract from a work purporting to have been written by him, and entitled " TTieologumena Arith." THE NEO-PYTHAGOREANS. 233 Secundi (Atheniensis SophUtae) SenUntiae^ ed. Lucas Holstenins, together with the Sentences ol Demophilus and Democrates, Leyden, ICSy. p. 810 seq. ; ed. J. A. Schier (together with the Bio? 2«oii), in Demophili, Democr. et Sec. Sent., Leijis^ 1754, p. 71 seq.; Gr. et. Lot., ed. J. C. OreUi, in Opu»- cula Graecorum vet. sententiona et moralia. Leips. 1S19-21, Vol. I., p. 208 seq. Tischendorf has recognized a part of the Bios 'S.tKovvBov 4>i\o(T6ov on a sheet of papyrus discovered in Egypt, and belonging, as T. sup- jKises, to the second, or, at the latest, to the third century of the present era; cf. Hermann Sauppe, in the JViilol., XVII., 1861, pp. 149-154; Eud. Reicke has pullished an old Latin translation of this Life, from a Codex in the Kouigsberg Library, in the PhUologus, Vol. XVIIL, 1862, pp. 528-584. The return to older systems was, at Alexandria, a result in part of the learned investiga- tions carried on in connection with the Library, and in this respect Neo-Pythagoreanisra stands side by side with the renewal at Alexandria of the Homeric form of poetry. A consideration of more essential significance is, that a philosophy which conceived the divine under the form of the transcendent (or which at least admitted this conception side by side with the conception previously prevalent and gave to the former a constantly increasing weight) corresponded far better with the autocratic form of government and the Oriental conception of life than did the systems of the period next preceding, systems which presuppose a certain freedom in social and political life, and which at the time now under consideration had already been shaken to the foundation, even in their merely theoretical bearings, by the spirit of doubt. The satisfaction which was not found either in nature or in the individual subject, was now sought in an absolute object, represented as beyond tlie spheres of both. But for the purposes of this search, Pythagoreanism and also Platonism offered the appropriate points of support. Added to this, finally, was the influence of Oriental religious ideas, Egyptian, Chaldaic, and Jewish (the influence of the latter being the most important) arising through the meeting of various nationalities at the same place and in the same political union. Of P. Nigidius Figulus, who was also a grammarian (G«ll., K A.. XIX. 4), Cicero tells us (Tiin., 1) that he renewed the Pythagorean philosophy; but he cannot have exerted a very considerable influence, since Seneca ( Quaest. Nat, VII. 32) knew nothing of the existence of a Xeo-Pythagorean School. The school of the Sextians has been already mentioned (§ 61). That the predilection of the Libyan king lobates (probably Juba II. of the time of Augustus) for Pythagorean writings gave occasion to forgeries, is reported by David the Armenian {Schol. in Arist., p. 28 a, 13). Philo cites, already, the work attributed to Ocellus Lucanus. The work entitled ivpbq rovq aTvexofiivovg tuv crapKuv mentioned by Porphyry and written by Sextius Clodius, the teacher of Marcus Antonius the Triumvir, seems to have been directed against those Neo-Pythagoreans who abstained from the use of meat (see Jac. Bernays, Theophr. Schrift iiber Frommigkeit, Berlin, 1866, p. 12). A fragment from the work of ApoUonius of Tyana on Sacrifices is preserved in Euse- bius (Fraep. Ev., IV. 13). In it ApoUonius distinguishes between the one God, who exists separate from all things, and the other gods; to the former no offerings whatever should be brought, nay, more, he is not even to be named with words, but only to be apprehended by the reason. All earthly things are, on account of their material constitution, impure, and unworthy to come in contact with the supreme God. To the inferior gods ApoUonius seems to have required the bringing of bloodless offerings. The work on ApoUonius of Tyana, written by Flavins Philostratus (at the instance of the Empress Julia Domna, the wife of Septimius Severus), is a philosophico-religious romance, in which the Neo- Pythagorean ideal is portrayed in the person of ApoUonius, and is claimed to be superior to that of other schools and sects (referring especially to Stoicism, and, as it would appear, to Christianity). Moderatus of Gades, who was nearly contemporaneous with ApoUonius, sought to 234 THE ECLECTIC PLATONISTS. justify the incorporation into Pythagoreauism of Platonic and neo-theological doctrines, through the hypothesis that the ancient Pythagoreans themselves intentionally expressed the highest truths in signs, and for that purpose made use of numbers. The number one was the symbol of unity and equality, and of the cause of the harmony and duration of all things, while two was the symbol of difference and inequality, of division and change, etc. (Moderatus, ap. Porphyr. Vit. Pythag., 48 seq.). Nicomachus of Gerasa, in Arabia, who seems to have lived about 140 or 150 A. D., teaches (in Ariihm. Jntroduct, I. 6) the pre-existence of numbers before the formation of the world, in the mind of the Creator, where they constituted an archetype, in conformity with which He ordered all things. Nicomachus thus reduces the Pythagorean numbers, as Philo reduces the Ideas, to thoughts of God. Nicomachus defines number as definite quantity (nXfjOog upiafiivov, I. 7). In the QkohiyovfiEva apc6n?iTiKd, Nicomachus, accord- ing to Photius, Cod., 187, expounded the mystical signification of the first ten numbers, t according to which the number one was God, reason, the principle of form and goodness, and two, the principle of inequality and change, of matter and evil, etc. The ethical problem for man, he teaches, is solved by retirement from the contact of impurity and ^ reunion with God. To Secundus of Athens, the silent philosopher, who hved under Hadrian, are ascribed (in the Vita Secundi, a work of the second century after Christ, much read in the Middle Ages) certain answers (which he is reported to have made in writing) to philosophical questions raised by the Emperor, answers conceived in an ascetic and fantastic spirit, which is akin to the spirit of Neo-Pythagoreanism. § 65. Among the Pythagorizing and Eclectic Platonists, who, through their renewal and further development of the Platonic prin- ciple of transcendence, in especial opposition to Stoic Pantheism and Epicurean Naturalism, became the precursors of Neo-Platonism, the best-known are Eudorus and Arius Didymus (in the time of Au- gustus), Dercyllides and Thrasyllus (in the time of Tiberius), Theon of Smyrna and Plutarch of Chaeronea (in Trajan's time), Maximus of Tyre (under the Antonines), Apuleius of Madaura (in Kumidia), Alcinous, Albinus, and Severus (of nearly the same epoch), Calvisius Taurus and Atticus, Galenus, the physician (131-200 a. d.), Celsus, the opponent of Christianity (about 200 a. d.), and Numenius of Apa- mea (toward the end of the second century of the present era). On Eudorus, cf. Roper, in the Philologus, VII., 1852, p. 584 seq. ; on Alius Didymus, Meineke, in Mut- lelVa Zeituchr. fur das Gymn.-W., Berlin, 1S59, p. 563 seq. ; on Tlirasyllus, S6vin i31em. de Vacad. dM iiiser-ipt, torn. X), K. F. Hermann (/7J. 36, while holding the ofiBce of astrologer to the latter. He combined with Platonism a Neo-Pythagorean numerical speculation and the practice of magic, after the manner of the Chaldeans. Schol. in Juven., VI. 576 : Thrasyllus multarum artium sdentiam pro/essit-s postremo se dedit PlaUmicae sectae, et ddnde mathesi, qtm praecipue viguii apud Tiberium. The mathesis here spoken of was a superstitious, mystical doctrine, founded on speculations with numbers, and combined with a.strology. Albinus {Introd. in Platon. Dialogos, ch. 6), names, besides Thrasyllus, Dercyllides, as one of the authors of the division of the Platonic dialogues into Tetralogies ; the first tetralogy, at least (Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo), was arranged by Dercyllides. Ac- cording to Porphyry, ap. Simplic. ad Arist. Phys., f. 54 (SrhoL, ed. Brandis, p. 344 a), Dercyl- lides composed a work on Plato's philosophy, in the eleventh book of which he cited, from Hermodorus on Plato, a passage representing that Plato reduced matter, and the infinite or indefinite, to the More and Less (Magnitude and Smallness, etc.). The problem here discussed relates to one of the most important points of contact between Platonism and Pythagoreanism. Theon of Smyrna (in the second century a. d.) wrote a work, which is still extant, explaining the mathematical doctrine of Plato {ed. Bullialdus, Paris, 1644: ed. J. J. de Gelder, Leyden, 1827; ejusdem Lib. de Astronomia, ed. Th. IL Martin, Paris, 1849). H« 236 THE ECLECTIC PLAT0N18TS. was more a mathematician than a philosopher. His astronomical doctrines were for the most part borrowed from a work by Adrastus the Peripatetic. Plutarch of Chteronea, (born about 50, died about 125 a. d.), a pupil of Ammonius of Alexandria, who taught at Athens under Nero and Vespasian, developed his philosophical opinions in the form of an exposition of passages from Plato. In this exposition he be- lieved that he had reproduced Plato's meaning, and only that, just as subsequently the Neo-Platonists believed in regard to their work ; but his doctrines are far less removed from pure Platonism than theirs. He opposed the monism of the Stoics, and had recourse to the Platonic hypothesis of two cosmical principles, namely, God, as the author of all good, and matter, as the condition of the existence of evil. For the formation of the world it was necessary, he taught, that the " monad " (uovdg) should be combined with the ''indefinite duad " {6va^ aopioTog)^ or the form-giving with the form-receiving principle. The Ideas, according to him, were intermediate between God and the world ; matter was the chaotic substrate of creation, the ideas were the patterns and God the efficient cause (// fiev ovv v2.7] Tuv vnoKEifiivuv araKTOTaTov iariv • i/ & I6ea ruv TrapaSeiyfidroiv kciTJugtov ' 6 6e ^edg tuv a'lTMv apiarov, Quaest. Conv., VIII. 2. 4). God's essence is unknown to us {Be Pyth. Orac, 20) ; he sees, but is not seen [De Is. et Osir., 75), he is one and free from all differentiation {irEpoTTjg), he is the existent (6v), and has no genesis {De EI apud Delph. 20; De Is. et Osir.., 78). Only God's workings can be known by us. In itself matter is not bad, but indifferent ; it is the common place for good and evil ; there is in it a j'earning after the divine ; but it also contains another principle, the evil world-soul, which coexists with the good one, and is the cause of all disorderly motions in the world (De Is., 45 seq. ; De An. Frocreat., ch. 6 seq.). The gods are good. Of the demons (who are necessary as mediators between the divine and human), some are good and others are evil ; in the human soul both qualities are combined. Besides the one supreme God, Plutarch recog- nizes as real the popular divinities of the Hellenic and Non-Hellenic faiths. The moral element in Plutarch is elevated and without asperity. Maximus of Tjrre, who lived about one half-century after Plutarch, v/as more favorable to Syncretism in religion and to a superstitious demonology. Apuleius of Madaura, born probably between 126 and 132 A. D., taught that, besides God, the Ideas and Matter were the original principles of things. He discriminates as belonging to the sphere of the supra-sensible, or truly existent, God and his reason, which contains the ideal forms, and the soul; from these are contradistinguished all that is sen- sible or material. The belief in demons receives the same favor from him as from Maxi- mus. The third book of his work De Dogmate Platonis contains logical theorems, in which Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines are blended together. Marcianus Capella, who between A. D. 3,30 and 439 (and probably between 410 and 439) wrote a manual of the "seven liberal arts" (edited by Franz Eyssenhardt, Leipsic, 186G), also Isidorus, (see below, § 88), borrowed much from this work of Apuleius. Alcinous, who lived probably at about the same time with Apuleius, likewise names in his outline of the Platonic teaching {eiq ra rov 'n.?MTcjvuc Sdyfiara daayuyy), God, the ideas, and matter as the first principles. He uncritically mixes Aristotelian and Stoic with Platonic opinions. Albinus (whose instruction Galenus sought at Smyrna, in 151-152 A. D.) wrote an in- troduction to the Platonic Dialogues, which is of little value, and also commentaries on some of the works of Plato. Cf. Alberti, Ueher des Alb. Isagoge, in the Rh. Mus., new series, XIII. pp. 76-110. Severus, from whoso writings Eusebius (Pr. Ev., XIII. 17) has preserved us a frag- ment, combated single doctrines of Plato. In particular, he denied the genesis of the world THE ECLECTIC PLATONISTS. 237 (Prod, in Tim., II. 88), and aflBrmed the soul to be simple, like a mathematical figure, anc not compounded of two substances, tlie one capable the other incapable of being acted upon. "With his Platonism were blended Stoic doctrines. Calvisius Taurus (who taught at Athens about 150 a. d.) wrote against the Stoics and on the difference between the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle (A. Gellius, K A., XII. 5 ; Suidas, s. v. Tavpof). Gellius (born about 130), who was his pupil (in about the year 160), often mentions him. Atticus (said to have flourished about 176 A. n.) opposed the combination of Platonic with Aristotelian doctrines, and disputed violently against Aristotle (Euseb., Praep. Ev., XI. 1 et al). He held to the literal sense of the Tiviaeus (especially as to the doctrine of the temporal origin of the world). In his interpretation of the ethics of Plato, he seems to have assimilated it to that of the Stoics. A pupil of Atticus was Harpocration (Procl., in Tim., II. 93 b). Claudius Galenus (in the second half of the second century), the well-known teacher of medicine, cultivated also philosophy, and occupied himself with the minute exposition of works of Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Chrysippus. Galenus extols philosophy (which with him is identical with religion) as the greatest of divine goods [ProtrepL, ch. 1). In logic he follows Aristotle. The fourth syllogistic figure, named after him, was not first brought to light or " discovered " by him, but was obtained by a repartition into two figures of the modes included by Theophrastus and Eudemus in the first figure. In meta- physics, Galenus added to the four Aristotelian principles, matter, form, moving cause, and final cause, a fifth principle, namely, the instrument or means {6i' ov), which by (Plato and) Aristotle, as it appears, had been subsumed under the concept of the moving cause. With all his inclination to assent to the Platonic views respecting the immateriality of the soul, he was unable, in regard to this question, and, in general, in regard to all questions which conduct beyond the limits of experience, to overcome his tendency to doubt. The thing of principal importance, in his estimation, was to have a religious conviction of the existence of the gods and of an over-ruling providence. Celsus (perhaps about 200), the opponent of Christianity, whose arguments were con- troverted by Origen, was a Platonist ; he cannot have been an Epicurean. He does not deny the influence of the gods on the world, but only that God works directly on the world of sense. In antagonism to the divine causality stands that of matter, which latter is the source of an irresistible physical necessity. From this Celsus is to be distinguished the Epicurean of the same name, who lived about 170 a. d., and is mentioned by Lucian in the Pseudomantis. Numenius of Apamea in Syria, who lived in the second half of the second century after Christ, combined Pythagorean and Platonic opinions in such manner that, while him- self conceding to Pythagoras the highest authority and asserting that Plato borrowed the essential parts of his teachings from him, he made in fact the Platonic element predominant in his doctrine. Numenius traces the philosophy of the Greeks back to the wisdom of the Orientals, and calls Plato an Attic-speaking Moses [Muva^g arTiKti^uv, Clem. Alex., Strom., I. 3-42 ; Euseb., Praep. Ev., XI. 10). He was without doubt well acquainted with the doctrines of Philo and with the Jewish- Alexandrian philosophy in general. He wrote, among other things, :rept tuv H/ldTwvof anoppr/ruv, nspl rayoBov, and Tzepl rf/g ruv 'AKadij- fiaiKuv npbg JlXdruva Siarrraaeug (Euseb., Pr. Ev., XIII. 5 ; XIV. 5). The most note- worthy deviation of Numenius from Plato (but which was not recognized by him as such) consists in this : that he (following, perhaps, the precedent of the Christian Gnostics, espe- cially the Yalentinians, and indirectly influenced by the distinction made by the Jewish- Alexandrian philosophers between God himself and his power working in the world, tha 238 NEO-PLATONIC SCHOOLS. Logos) distinguished the world-builder {drifiiovpyoq) as a second God, from the highest deity. The first God is good in and through himself; he is pure thought-activity [vovc) and the principle of being {ovaiag apxv-. Euseh., Pr. Ev., XI. 22). The second God (6 6tvTEpo<; 6i6(: 6 6?j/uovpybg deog) is good by participation in the essence of the first {uerovaia roi- npurov) ; he looks toward the supersensuous archetypes and thereby acquires knowledge (iTriaTrjfirj) ; he works upon matter and thus forms the world, he being the principle of genesis or becoming (yrviceuQ apxv)- The world, the production of the Demiurges, is the third God. Numenius terms the three Gods, respectively, father, son, and grandson (ndn-T:oc, EK-yovoc, and anoyovog, Procl., in Plat. Tim., II. 93). Nuraenius ascribes this doctrine not only to Plato, but also even to Socrates (Euseb., Pr. Ev., XIV. 5). The descent of the soul from its incorporeal pre-existent condition into the body implies, according to him, pre- vious moral dehnquency. Cronius, who is often named in connection with Numenius, and is described by Porphyry (i>e Antro Kymph., 21) as his friend (sTalpog), seems to have shared with him in his opinions. He gave to the Homeric poems an allegorical and mythi- cal interpretation. Harpocration also followed Numenius in his doctrine of the three highest gods. The writings of the pretended Hermes Trismegistus {ed. Gust. Partliey, Berlin, 1854: of., respecting him, Bauragarten-Crusius, Progr., Jena, 1827; B. J. Hilgers, Bonn, 1855, and Louis Menard, Hermes Trismegiste, traduction complete, precedee d^une etude sur Forigine des livres hermetiques, Paris, 1866, 2d ed., 1868), which in religious and philosophical regards bear an entirely syncretistic character, belong to the time of Neo-Platonism. %QQ. Among the adherents of Neo-Platonism, a system founded on the principle of the transcendence of the Deity, and in which, not- ■withstanding its filiation upon Plato, the whole of philosophical science was brought under a new systematic form, belong, 1) the Alexandrian- E-oman school of Ammonius Saccas, the originator of the whole ^eo- Platonic movement, and of Plotinus, who was the first to develop the system on all its sides, 2) the Syrian School of Jamblichus, who fa- vored a fantastical theurgy, 3) the Athenian school of the younger Plutarch, and of Syrianus, and of Proclus and his successors, — in whose doctrines the theoretical element became again predominant, — together with the later Neo-Platonic commentators. On Neo-Platonjsm in general may be compared the essays or works of G. Olearius (annexed to his translation of Stanlei's History of Philosophy. Leips. 1711, p. 1205 seq.), J. A. Dietelmaier (lyogramma, quo geriem veterum in scliola Aleteandrina doctorum eocponit, WU\. XJiOi). Xhe. Iliatoive critique, del eclecti- ci»me ow des noiivee Philos. Novae Platon. Origine. Berlin. ISlb), F. Bouteiwek (Philosophorum Alexandrinorum ao Neoplatonicorum recenxio accnratior, in Comm. Soc. Peg. Gotting. rec., vol. V., pp. 227-258, Gottingen, 1821). Tzschirner (Per Fall des IJeiden- thums, Leips. 1829), K. Vogt {Keoplatonismus und Christenthum, Berlin, 18.36), Matter (Sur Tecole d'Alese- andrie. Paris, 1820, 2d ed., 1840-48), Jules Simon (Histoire de I'ecole d'Al., Paris, 1543-45, cf. Eniile Saisset in Pevue des DetuB Mondes, Sept. 1, 1844), J. Barth61emy St. Hilaire {Sur le concours ourert pnr I'Acad. des scienceJi morales et poUtiques sur Vecole d'Alexandrie. Paris. 1845), E. Vacherot (UiKtoire critiqu* de Vecole cTAl., Paris, 1846-51), Steinbart {Neuplat. Philosophie. in Panly's RealencycL dex dasB. Alter- thums). Cf.. also. Heinr. Kellner, HeUenismus^ind Christevthnm oder die geisfliche Reactiov de» antU'ett. Ueiaenthumti gegen da« Christenthu/m. Cologne, 1865, and Franz Hipler, Nenplaton. Stvdien, in the Vierte^ahrachr. fur kath. Theol., Vienna, 186S (and separately). AMMONIUS SACCAS AND HIS PUPILS. 239 It will scarcely be necessary to remark that the Neo-Platonic philosophy, although H sprung up after Christianity, belongs in its characteristics to the pre-Christian era. § 67. The founder of Neo-Platonism was Ammonius Saccas, the teacher of Plotiiius. Ammonius expounded his doctrine only orally, and its exact relation to that of Plotinus cannot be determined with certainty. The affirmation that no essential difference existed be- tween the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle is referred to him ; yet the correctness of this reference is also uncertain. Of the disciples of Ammonius, the most important, after Plotinus, are Origen the Neo-Platonist, Origen Adamantius the Christian, Erennius, and Longinus the philologist. Dehant, Ksmii hiiitoriqu,6 snr la vie et la doctrine (TAmmonius SaccaK Brussels, 1S36. G. A. Helgl, Der Bericltt des Porpkyrius iiber Origenes, Kegensburg. 1835. IHonys. Longinus: De Suhlimitate, e6 di(d. Plotini raticme, Halle, 1829; Meleiemata Plotinianu, diss. Pc/rt., Naum- burg, 1840; and Art. Plotin, in P.auly's Real-enc. d. cl. Alt.\ Ed. Miiller (in his Geseh. der Thearie der KwMt hei den Alten, II., pp. 286-315, Berlin, 1837), J. A. Neander (Ueber Ennead. II. 9: Gegen die Gnostiker. in the Abh. der Perl. Akad., Berlin, 1843, p. 299 seq.), F. Creuzer (in the Prolerjmn. to the Paris edition of the works of Plotinus), Ferd. Gregorovius (in Fichte's Zeitschr. f. Ph., XXVI., i)p. 112-147), Rob. Zimmermann {Gesch. der Aenth., Vienna, 1S58, pp. 122-147), C. Herm. Kirchner {Die J'/tiloxop/ne des Plotin, Halle, 1854), Starke (Plotini de amore senteiitia, Neu-Ruppin, 1854), R. Volkmann (Pie Hbhe der antiken Aesthetik, oder Plotin' s Abh. vom iSytonera, Stettin, 1800), Emil Brenning {Die Lehrevom, Schonen bei Plotin, im Zusammenhange seines Systems darge.'tellt, ein Beitrag zvr Geschichte der Aesthetik, Gottingen, 1864), A. J. Vitringa {De egregio quod in rebus corporeis constituit PloUnvs piilchri jirincipio, Amst. ISM), Ydlcntmer {Plotin v»d seine Ennead en nebst Vebersctzimg von Enn. II. 9., in Stncdien und Kritiken, 1864, p. 118 seq.), Arthur Richter {Neuplat. Studien ; I/e/t 1 ; iiber Leben vnd Geistesenticickelung des Plotin ; Ileftl: Plotin's Lehre vom Sein und die metaj^hys. Grundlage seiner Philosophie; IleftZ: die Theo^agiexind Physik des Plotin; Ilefti: die Psychologie des Plotin ; Heft 5: die Ethik de.'s Plotin, Halle. 1864-67), Kirm. Ferd. Mullcr {Ethices Plotinianae lineamenta Diss., Berlin, 1867), E. Grucker {De Plotinianis libris, qui inscribuntur -nepi toO KaAoO et Trepi toO •'otjtoO (taAAous, DUs., Strasbourg .and Paris, 1866). Porphyrii Vita Plotini, composed in 303. appeared first in connection with the Basel editions of the Enneads in 1580 and 1615, then in Fabric. Bibl. Gr., IV. 2, 1711, pp. 91-147, and in the 0.xford edition of the EnneadsUi 1835, but not in the Paris edition, again in Kirchoflf's edition, Leips. 1850, and in Cobet's Diog. Laert., Paris, 1850, append, pp. 102-118, ed. Ant. Westermann. Porphyrii Vit. Pyth. ed. Kiessling, in the ed. of Jambl. de Vit. Pythagorica, Leips. 1815-16; ed. Westermann, in Cobet's Diog. L., Paris, 1850, app. pp. 87-101. Porphyrii atpopfial npo^ to. wTiTa, ed. L. Holstenius, with the Vita Pythag., Rome, 1630, and in the Paris edition of Plotinus (1855). Porphyr. Epist. de Diis Daenionibus ad Anebotiem, in connection with Jambl. de Myst., Venice, 1497, and in Gale's ed. of the same work, O.vford, 1678. Por- phyr. de quinque ^locibtis sive in categor. Aristotelis introductio,Va.T\&,'i.^Z; the same is prefi.xed to most editions of the Org.anon, and is published in Vol. III. of the Berl. Akad.'s edition of Aristotle. Porphyr. de abstinentia ah esu animaliuin I. quatuor, ed. Jac. de Rhoer, Utrecht, 1767. Porphyr. epist. ad JIarcel. lam, ed. Angelus Maius, Milan, 1816 and 1831, ed. J. C. OrelIiu.s, in Opusc. Graec. Sententiosa, tarn. I., I^ips. 1819. Porphyrii de philosophia ex oraculis haurienda librorum reliquiae, ed. Gu.st. Wolflf, Berlin, 1866; cf. G. Wolff, De norissima oraculorum aetate, Berlin, 1854; Porphyr. de abstinentia et de antra nympharum, ed. Rud. Hercher (together with Aclian's De Nat. Animal., etc.), Paris, 1S5S; Porph. philos. Platonici opuscula tria rec, Aug. Nauck, Leips. 1860; Ullmann, ParalleUn aus den Schriften des Por- phyr's zicneutest. Stellen, in the Tlieol. Stud.u. Erit.,\. 1, 1832, pp. 376-394. On Porphyry, cf. Lucas Holsten {De vit. et scr. P., in the preface to his editions of Porphyry's works, Rome, 1630, Cambridge, 1655, and in Fabric. Bibl. Or., IV. p. 2, ch. 27), Brandis(^tA. d. Berl. Ak. d. Wiss., ph.-hist. CL, 1833, p. 219 .seq.), and Gust. Wolff ( Veber das Leben des Porphyr und die Abfassungseeit seiner Schriften, prefixed to Wolff's ed. of Porph. de philos. ex oraculis, etc., pp. 7-18, 14-37); on his rank among the rei>re8entativea of Neo- II PLOTINUS, AMELIUS, AND PORPHYRY. 243 PUtonism, cf. N. Bouillet (Porphyre, son role dans Vecole neoplatonicienne, sa lettre d MarceUa, traduitt en fr., Ext/r. de la Revue Crit. et Bibliogr., Paris, March. 1864) : on his relation to Christianity, see Kellner (in Kubn's Theol. QuartaUchr.^ 1860, No. 1), Jak. Bernays (TTieop/iraatos Sciirijt iU/er Frcnnmigkeit, ein Beitrag zur IieUgix)nsge«chichte^ rnit kritischen und erkliirenden Bemerkungen zu Porphyrios' Schriji u/ier Enthdltnamkeit. Berlin, 1866), and Adolf Schafer (De Porphyr in Plot. Tim. contmentario, Dixe., Bonn, 1868). Porphyr von der Ehithaltsamkeit, a. d. Oriech. m. Anm,., by E. Baltzer, Nordhausen, 1869. The native city of Plotinus was Lycopolis in Egypt (Eunap., Vit. Soph., p. 6, Boiss. et al.). He himself was unwilHng even to name his birthplace or his parents, or the time of his birth, for, says Porphyry, his disciple ( Vit. Plot, ch. 1), he despised these as terres- trial matters, and he seemed to be ashamed of being in the body. Porphyry states {ibid., ch. 2) that Plotinus died near the end of the second year of the reign of Claudius (269, assuming, as we may, that the year of his reign began with the civil year ; otherwise, 270), and that (according to information given to Eustochius, his own fellow-disciple) he was then sixty-six years old ; from these data Porphyry derives 204 (205 ?) as the birth-year of Plotinus. In his twenty-eighth year Plotinus applied himself to plnlosophy, and listened to the instructions of the men then famous at Alexandria, but none of them was able to satisfy him, till at last he came to Ammonius, in whom he found the teacher he had Bought. He remained with Ammonius till the year 242 or 243, when he joined himself to the expedition of the Emperor Gordian against the Persians, that he might learn the Persian philosophy. He was prevented from accomplishing this purpose by the unfortu- nate issue of the expedition, and was obliged to flee for his life to Antioch. The inference of some historians (Brucker, for example, see above, p. 27) that Plotinus was a disciple and adherent of the Potamo who is mentioned in Diog. L., I. 21, as the founder of an eclectic sect, is incorrect. Suidas says (s. v. Hord/iwi') : Hot. ' AAe^avSpeig yeyoviiq wpo Avynvarov Kal fzer' avrov, " Potamo, the Alexandrian, living before and after the time of Augustus," and he adds that he was the author of a commentary on Plato's Republic. If the statement of Suidas is correct, Diogenes Laertius must simply have copied the words of his authority (Diodes) without thought, and the reference in the words npb oAiyov Kal ekTiektlktj rig alpemg e'la^x^^ '^''^° UoTauuvog must be to the time of Augustus. This Potamo appears to be identical with the person mentioned by Plutarch (Akx., 61) as "Potamo the Lesbian," one of the teachers of Sotion the Sextian. At the age of forty years (243 or 244 a. d.) Plotinus went to Rome (Porphyr., Vit. Plot., ch. 3). He succeeded there in finding disciples, and, later still, he won over to his doctrine the Emperor Gallienus, as also his wife Salonina, so that he ventured to entertain the idea of founding, with the approval and support of tlio Emperor, a philosophers' city in Campania, wliich was to be called Platonopolis, and whose inhabitants were to live ac- cording to the Laws of Plato. He proposed to live in it himself, with his disciples. Gal- lienus was not indisposed to grant the philosopher the desired permission, but he was dissuaded from so doing by his counselors, and the plan remained unexecuted. Plotinus remained in Rome till the first year of the reign of M. Aurelius Claudius (268 A. D.), and then retired to Campania, where he died in the year 269, near Minturna;, at the country- seat of Castricius Firmus, liis admirer. It is evident from his writings that Plotinus had obtained an exact knowledge of the doctrines of all the philosophical schools of the Greeks, by reading their principal works; tliat, in particular, he had studied Aristotle with scarcely less zeal than he had studied Plato, is expressly certified by Porphyry ( Vila Plot, ch. 14). The works of Numenius exerted a powerful influence on him. Porphyry recognizes in Numenius a forerunner of Ammonius and Plotinus, but agrees witli Amelius and Longinus in repelling the charge raised by some against Plotinus, that he merely reproduced the teachings of Numenius; 2i4 PLOTINUS, AMELICS. AND PORPHTEr. oa the contrary, he says, Plotinus developed the Pythagorean and Platomc principles with far greater exactness, thoroughness, and distinctness, than any one of his predecessors ( Vita Plot, chs. 17 seq. ; 20 seq.). At the Synousiai Plotinus caused not only the writings of the Platonists Severus, Cronius, Numenius, Gains, and Atticus, but also those of the Peripatetics Aspasius, Alexander (of Aphrodisias ?), and Adrastus, to be read, and with these he connected his own speculations (Porphyr., Vit. Plot., ch. 14). Plotinus began the written exposition of his doctrines in his fiftieth year (253 a. d.) His manuscript was revised after his death and given to the public by his disciple Por- phyry ; yet a few copies made from the original had previously come into the hands of his more familiar disciples. There existed also in ancient times an edition by Eustochuis, respecting which the notice has come down to us that in it the psychological investigations contained in Ennead. IV. 3-5, and which belong together, were divided otherwise than in the Porphyrian revision, the third chapter coming nearer the commencement of the Er nead in the former than in the latter edition. All the manuscripts now extant are based on the edition of Porphyry. The works of Plotinus lack the artistic form of the Platonic Dialogues, and still mor*( their dialectical force; yet they possess a certain attractiveness from the earnest self-aban- donment of the writer to his thought and the unction of his style. Porphyry ascribes to the Plotinic diction terseness and wealth of ideas (avvTovog Kal noXvvov^) and sees in many parts rather the language of religions inspiration (rd noTila ivdovciuv koI eK-rradug (ppdCuv) than the tone of instruction. Longinus, who combated many of the doctrines of Plotinus, confesses, nevertheless (in a letter to Porphyry, given in the latter's Vita Plotin., ch. 19) his high appreciation of the Plotinic style of thought and expression {rbv 6e rvnov rf/g ypai?i,o>, Kal fiera tuv e/Jujyi/iujTdTov ayeiv rd tovtov ^t^Xla (pairiv kv 6elv Tovg CiT]TT;TiKovq). The subjects of the fifty-four opuscules of Plotinus, which Porphyry arranged together in six Enncads — following, as he himself says ( Vit. Plot, ch. 24), the method of Andronicus the Aristotelian, in bringing together those which related to similar subjects, and begin- ning with what was easiest to be understood — are the following : First Ennead. 1. What is meant by l^uov, or living being, in general, and the nature of man (in chronological order the 53d treatise). 2. Concerning the virtues (chronologically the 19th). 3. Concerning dialectic, or on the three steps in the process of rising to the intelligible (20). 4. On happiness (46). 5. Whether happiness increases with its duration (36). 6. On the beautiful (1). 7. Concerning the first good (primum bonum) and the other goods (54). 8. What objects evils are and what is the origin of evil (51). 9. On the unlawfulness of suicide (16). Porphyry designates [Vit Plot, ch. 24) the topics of the first Ennead in general as ethical (rd rjdiKUTEpa or rdf ydiKUTepag vTroOeaeig). The place assigned to them, however, is in scientific regards inappropriate, and is also scarcely justifiable on didactic grounds ; for Plotinus everywhere makes the ethical doctrine of the subjective ele- vation of the individual to goodness dependent on the previously developed doctrines of that which is good in itself, of being and of the soul (cf , in particular, Ennead. I. 3, 1 init). Second Ennead (tuv (j>vaiKvcnjq Ki: I. 8. 5). That material bodies possess a substratum {vTroKei/ievov), which, itself unchanged, is the subject of manifold changing forms, is inferable (as Plato teaches) from the transition of various kinds of matter into each other, whereby it is made obvious that there are no \ determinate forms of matter which are original and unchangeable, such as, for example, \ the four elements of Empedocles, but that all determination arises from the union of form i {liopfn) and unqualified matter {iih/}. Matter, in the most general sense of the word, i | is the basis or "depth" of each thing {rb (idOog EKaarov tj vmj). Matter is darkness, as \ the Logos is light. It has no real being (it is jiy bv). It is the qualitatively indeterminate {aKEipox), which is rendered determinate by the accession of form ; as deprived of form it is evil («aK(5v), as capable of receiving forms, it is of an intermediate nature between good and bad {/itaov ayaOov koI kukov). But the matter in the ideas is only in so far simi- lar to that which is in sensible objects, as both fall under the general designation of " the ^ dark depth ; " in other respects, the difference between these two kinds of matter is as great as that which exists between ideal and sensible form {6id(j>op6v ye fjijv to oKoreivov r6 re ev Tolg votjtoI^ t6 re kv voir aladiiTo'iq vwdpxov, 6td<^p6q te tj vXt/, baov Kai to eldog TO imKELfievov d/i(polv 6id(t>opov) ; as that form {fiopdfj) which is perceived by the senses is only an image {el6ulov) of ideal form, so also the substratum of the sensible world is only an image or shadow of the ideal substratum ; this latter has, like the ideal form, a true existence, and is rightly called ovaia, substance, while the designation of the substratum of sensible things as substance is incorrect {Ennead. II. 4). Plotinus subjects the Aristotelian and also the Stoic doctrine of categories to a minute criticism, of which the fundamental idea is that the ideal and the sensible do not fall under the same categories. He then offers, himself, a new doctrine of categories. In agreement with the (Platonic?) Dialogue Sophistejs (p. 257 seq.), he designates as funda- mental forms of the ideal : being, rest, motion, identity, and diflference {bv, ardaii, Kivrjcig, 250 PLOTINUS, AMELroS, AND PORPHYET. ravTOTTj^, and hepoTTjg). The categories which apply to the sensible world, taken in the sense here given to them, are not the same with those of the ideal world, yet they are not entirely different; they are homonymous with the latter, but are to be understood only in an analogous sense {Sei . . . Tavra avaXoyia Kal o/iuvvfiia TiafifidvEiv). Plotinus seeks to reduce the Aristotelian categories to these analoga of the ideal categories {Ennead. VI. 1-3). The essence of beauty consists not in mere symmetry, but in the supremacy of the higher over the lower, of the form over matter, of the soul over the body, of reason and goodness over the soul. Artistic representation imitates not merely sensible objects, but, in its highest development, the ideas themselves, of which sensible objects are images. In consequence of their descent into corporeality, the souls of men have forgotten their divine origin and become unmindful of the Heavenly Father. They wished to be inde- pendent, rejoiced in their self-lordship (rw avTE^ovc'nJ), and fell constantly farther and farther from God, forgetting their own dignity, and paying honor to that which was most contemptible. Hence the need of man's conversion to that which is the more excellent {Ennead. V. 1. 1). Man has not lost his freedom; the essence of freedom — says Plotinus, in agreement with Aristotle — is the absence of constraint, combined with knowl- edge {}i7] (Ha iiETo. Tov eldivac, Ennead. VI. 8. 1). Some men remain buried in the sen- suous, holding pleasure to be the only good and pain the only evil ; they seek to attain the former and to avoid the latter, and this they regard as their wisdom. Others, who are capable of rising to a certain point, but are yet unable to discern that which is above them, become only virtuous, and devote themselves to practical life, aiming merely to make a right choice from among those things, which are after all only of an inferior nature. But there is a third class of men of divine nature, who, gifted with higher power and keener vision, turn toward the radiance which shines from above and rise into its presence ; they rise above the region of obscuring mists and, despising all that is of the earth, sojourn there, where is their true fatherland and where they become partakers of true joy (Ennead. V. 9. 1). Virtue is defined by Plotinus, with Plato, as resemblance to God (few 6fzoio6f/vai, Ennead. I. 2. 1), and sometimes, also, as activity conformed to the nature of the agent {evepyslv Kara tijv ovaiav), or obedience to reason (knaiELv loyov), definitions wliich recall the doctrines of Aristotle and the Stoics. Plotinus distinguishes between civil and x'urifying virtues and virtues which render their possessor like God. The civil virtues [KO/iiTiKal aperaP) are practical wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice, the latter in the sense of " attention to one's own business, whether as a ruler or a subject " {oLKEionpayia apxv^ TTEpl Kal tov apxEadai) ; the purifying virtues {mdapaEiQ) deliver man from all sin {dfiapria), by making him to flee from whatever pertains merely to sense, while the third class of virtues end, not in deliverance from sin, but in identification with God (oi'/c e^cj dfiapTiac eh'ai, a/l/ld ^eov slvat). In the virtues of the last class those of the first are repeated in a higher sense (^ dmaioavvrj tj fiEi^uv to npog vovv ivEpyEiv, to 6e cuffjovEiv Tj Eiau) trpoq vovv arpocpT/, ^ ds avSpEia anddEia naff ofioiuaiv tov npb(' b (iTi^KEi^ dnadeq ov t7/v (pvatv, . . rrpb^ vovv /} bpaaig ao(j)ia nai ^povr/aic, Ennead. I. 2). The last and highest end for man is ecstatic elevation to the one truly Good. This elevation is not effectuated by thought, but by a higher faculty ; the intellectual cognition of the Ideas forms to it only a stepping-stone, which must be passed and left behind. The highest point which can be reached or aspired to is the knowledge of, or rather contact with, the Good itself (7 tov ayadov eIte yvuaig eIte £na(j>Tj)\ for the sake of this the soul despises even thought itself, which she yet prefers to all things except this; thought is a form of motion (Kivr/oic), but the soul desires to be unmoved, like the One itself {Ennead. VI. 7. 25 and 26). The soul resembles God by its unity {Ennead. III. 8. 9) and by its pos- PLOTINUS, AMELIU8, AND PORPHYRY. 251 aession of a centre (to ijvxm ohv Kevrpov, Ennead. VI. 9. 8), and hence arises the possi- bility of its communion with the One {Ennead. VI. 9. 10). When we look upon God we have reached our end and found rest, all disharmony is removed, we circle around God in the movements of a divinely-inspired dance {x^P^'^^ ivOeog), and behold in him the source of life, the source of the Xous, the principle of being, the cause of all good, the source and principle of the soul, and we enjoj' the most perfect blessedness {Ennead. VI. 9. 8 and 9). Yet this is not a beholding (dia/ua), but another manner of knowing; it is ecstasy, simpli fioation, contact with Good (eKCTaaig, airTMatg, d(b7/, Ennead. VI. 9. II). Not always are we able to abide in this blessed state; not yet completely loosed from the bonds of the earthly, it is only too easy for the earthly to win back our regards, and only rarely does the direct vision of the supreme God fall to tlie lot of the best of men, the virtuous and wise, the god-hke and blessed (Ennead. VI. 9. 10 and 11). According to the testimony of Porphyry, his disciple, Plotinus attained to this unifica- tion with God only four times in the six years which Porphyry spent with him (Porphyr., Vit. Plot., c. 23). One of the earliest disciples of Plotinus at Rome (2-46 seq.) was Amelius (G«ntilianu8, the Tuscan, from Ameria), who at the same time allowed also great authority to Nume- nius. He distinguished in the Nous three hypostases, which he styled three Demiurges or three kings : rbv bvra, tov Ixovra, tov o^uvra. Of these the second participated in the real being of the first, and tlie third in the being of the second, enjoying at the same time the vision of the first (Procl., in Plat. Tmi., 93 d). Amelius maintained the theory (opposed by Plotinus) of the unity of all souls in the world-soul (Jamblich., ap Stob., EcL, I. 886 ; 88S ; 898). The most important of the disciples of Plotinus was Porphyry. Born at Batanea, in Syria, or perhaps at Tyre, in the year 232 or 233 a. u., he received his education at Tyre. His original name was Malchus, which Longinus, whose pupil he was for a time (252-262), is said to have translated into Porphyrius (Eunap., Vit. Sojih.., p. 7, Boiss.). At Rome, in the year 262, he became a pupil and follower of Plotinus, and here, after liaving passed the years 267-270 in Sicily, he is said to have lived and died (about 304 a. d.). Porphyry lays claim less to the rank of an originator in philosophy than to that of an expositor and defender of the doctrine of Plotinus, which he regards as identical with that of Plato and substantially also with that of Aristotle. Porphyry wrote a work in seven books, entitled vepl TOV (liav elvai rijv IIAdrwvof /cat ' AptaroTtTuovq at/^eciv (according to Suidas, 5. v. Hopcpvptoc), and also expositions of Plato's Timaeus and Sophistes and of Aristotle's Cntegoriae and X>e Interpretatione, and the still extant Elcayuyr/ elf rd^ ('Aptaro-£?.ovf) Kan^yopiaq {Tvepl -yivov^ Kal eidotig Kai (ha(popdr /cat idiov Kal avjxfiejijiKoTOQ), which is usually printed in the beginning of the Orgaivon. An epitome, by Porphyry, of the Plotinic system, expressed in a series of aphorisms, is likewise now extant. Besides tliese. Porphyry wrote a number of original works. Eunapius {^Vita Porphyr., p. 8, Boiss.) ascribes to Porphyry, as his principal merit, that by his perspicuous and pleasing diction he brought within the range of the understanding of all men tlie doctrine of Plotinus, which in the language of its author had seemed difficult and obscure. The doctrine of Porphyry is, however, distinguished from that of Plotinus by its more practical and religious character ; the end of philoso- phizing, according to Porphyry, is the salvation of the soul (7 rfj^ ''I'^XVi aur^pia, Porphyr., ap. Euseb., Pr. Ev., IV. 7, et at). The cause of evil is to be found in the soul, in its desires after the low and base, and not in the body as such {Ad MarceUam, c. 29). The means of deliverance from evil are self-purification {KaOapcic) through asceticism and the philosophical cognition of God. To divination and theurgical initiations Porphyry con- cedes only a subordinate significance ; in his later years, especially, he was instant in 252 JAMBLICHUS AND THE STEIAN SCHOOL. warning his followers against their misuse (see, in particular, his epistla to Anebo, the Egyptian Priest). Porphj^ry recommends abstinence from animal food on religious grounds (see Bernays, Theophr. Schr. ilber Frommigkeit, mit kr. u. erkl. Bern, zu Porph. Sdir. uber EntJialt, pp. 4-35). Porphyry appears to have taught (in his six books nepl vT^nc) more distinctly than Plotinus the doctrine of the emanation of matter from the super- sensuous (and proximately from the Soul; Procl., in Tim., 109, 133, 139; Simplic, in Phys., f. 50 b). The doctrine that the world is without beginning in time was defended by Por- phyry against the objections of Atticus and Plutarch (Procl., in Tim., 119). During his residence in Sicily, Porphyry wrote a work kuto. xplotuivuv, distributed into fifteen Books, in which he attacked the doctrines of the Cliristians, and especially the doctrine of the divinity of Jesus. This work is often mentioned by the Church Fathers (Euseb., Hist. Eccles. VI. 19; Bemonstr. Evang., III. 6; Augustin., Civ. Dei, XIX. 23 et ah). In the twelfth book Porphyry declared the prophecies in the Book of Daniel (which appears to have been composed about 164 or 163 B. c.) to be prophecies after the event {vaticinia ex eventu). Methodius, Eusebius of Cffisarea, Apollinarius, and Philostorgius wrote works in reply to Porpliyry's. But neither these works, nor the work of Porphyry (which was burned by order of the Emperor Theodosius II., in the year 435) have come down to us. Cf. J Bernays, Theophr., etc., p. 133 seq. § 69. Jamblichus (died about 330 a, d.), a native of Chalcis in Coele-Syria and pupil of Porphyry, employed the Keo-Platonic phi- losophy simply as a means for confirming the polytheistic cultus. He attempted the speculative justification of superstition. He imitated Pythagoras more than Plato, his philosophy resting rather on mystical speculations with numbers, than on Platonic ideas. In his system not only did all the gods of the Greeks and Orientals (excepting the Christian God) and the gods of Plotinus find a place, but he also took a quite peculiar pleasure in adding to the number of superior divini- ties from the resources of his own fancv. For the disciples of Jamblichus, chief among whom were^desius, Chrysantbius, Maximus, Prisons, Eusebius, Sopater, Sallustius, and Julian the Apostate (who was Emperor from December, 361, to June, 363), and others, the practice of theurgy had in general more interest than philosophical speculation. Theodorus of Asine, one of the ear- liest of the disciples of Jamblichus, is the only one who labored for further development of the system. The immoderate and even deify- ing veneration of the heads of schools, and especially of Jamblichus, increased in proportion as the philosophic achievements of their dis- ciples became more insignificant. Those in this period who did most for philosophy were the commentators of the works of the ancient philosophers, Themistius being the most noteworthy among them. Jamhlichi Chalcidensiti de Vita Pythagorica Liber, ed. Theoph. Kiessling; aecedmit Porphyr. tAo iano philoitopho neo-phiionieo. Part I., O.-Pr.. Lauban. ISG'2. HierocHu Akxandrini Commentar. in Aur. Carm. Pyth. ed. Jo. (^iirteriu.s, Paris, l.")S;3 ; De Providenfia ei Fato, ed. V. Morelliiis, Paris, IMT ; Quae superifinit, ed. Pearson, London, lCr» and 1CT3 ; Comm. in Arir. Carm. Pyth. ed. Thorn. Guisford, in his edition of Stohanis, O.^iford, 1S60; ed. Mullach, Berlin, 1S53. Prodi in Plat. Tim. Comm. et in libros De Hep., Basel, 1534. (Published ns a supplement to tlio Basel edition of the Works of Plato. The Commentary on the Pep. is incomplete. ]ve?pectiiii: certain later, partially complementary, publication.s, see Bernars. In the appen Prodi fidmUia in Plat. Cratylum, ed. J. F Boissonade, Leipsic 1S20: In Plat. Alcih. iomm. ed. Fr. Crenzer. Frankfort. 1820 -'25; Prodi Opera, ed. Victor Cousin. Paris, lft20-2.'i; Prodi Comw. in Plat. Farm., ed. G. Stallbaum, in bis edition of the Parm., Leipsic, 1839, and separately, Leipsic, 1S40; In Plat. 256 THE ATHENIAN SCHOOL, AND NEO-PLATONIC COMMENTATORS. Timaeutn, ed. C. E. Chr. Schneider, Breslau, 1847; Procli philos. Platonici opera inedita, quae primus oUm e codicihufi mscr. Parisinis Italicisque vulgaverat, nunc secundin enris emend, et auxit Victor Cousin, Paris, 1S64. The Medicean Codex of the works of Proclus on the Rep. of Plato Is incomplete, but contains an index of the complete Commentary; cf. Val. Rose, in the Hermes II. 1867, pp. 96-101. A Codex, formerly in the possession of the Salviati at Florence, but now at Rome, contains the sections which are wanting in the Medicean Cod., yet with many gaps; of. Mai, Spicil. Horn. VIII., Praef. p. XX. and p. 664, in the copy of one of the "works" which is given by Mai. Marini Vita Procli, ed. J. F. Fabricius, Hamburg, 1700 ; ed. J. F. Boissonade, Lelpsic, 1814, and in the Cobet edition of Diog. L., Paris, ISoO. Cf A. Berger, Prociim, Hvpomtion de na Doctrine, Paris, 1S40; Hermann Kirchener, Pe Procli ncaplatonid metaphysica, Berlin, 1846 ; Steinhart, Art. Proclus, in Pauly's Real-Ene. d. cl. Alt., Vol. VI., pp. 62-76. Ammonii, I/ermiae JiUi, comment, in praedicamenta Aristotelis et Porphyrii Isagogen, Venice, 1545 seq., De Fato, ed. J. C. Orelli in his edition of the works of Alexander of Aphrodisias and others concerning Fate, ZQrich, 1824. Damascii, phihsophi Platonici, guaestionen de primis principiis, ed. Jos. Kopp, Frankfort-on-the- Main, 1S26. Cf Ruelle, Le philomphe Damaseitis, etude »ur sa vie et sea ouvrages, Paris, 1S61. Simplicii comment, in Arist. cu}u, Venice, 1816, Part IV.; (r^oAta eis ^aiSiava, ibid. Part V.; Comm. in Plat. Alciliadem. ed. F. Creuzer, in his edition of the Comm. of Proclus on the Alcib. II. Frankfort, 1821; Scholia in PI. Phiiedonem, ed. Chsto. Eberh. Finckh, Heilbronn, 1847; Schol. in PI. Gorgiam ed. Alb. Jahn, in Jahn's Archiv. Vol. XIV., 1848. Joannis Philoponi Comm. in Arist. libros De Generatione et Interitu, etc., Venice (Aid.), 1527 ; in Ar. Analyt. Post., Yenice (Aid.), 1534; contra Procl. de Mimdi Aetemitate, erf. Trincavellus, Venice, 1535; Comm. in prim OS quatuor libros Arist. de Nat. Ai^scuUatione, ed. Trincavellns, Venet. 1535; Comm.. in Arist. libros De Anima, ed. Trincavellns, Venice, 1535; Comm. in Arist. Anril. Priora, ed. Trincavellua, Venice, 1536; Comm. in prim. Meteorolog. Arist. libr., etc., Venice (Aid.), 1551 ; Comm. in Arist. metaph. lat. ex interpret. F. Patricii, Ferrara, 1583; Comm. in Nichomachi Arithm. ed. E. Hoche, Leipsic, 1864 (See above, § 64.) For the literature relative to Boethius, see below, ad § 88. Cf., further, C. Jonrdain, De Torigine det traditions sur le Christianisme de Boice. Paris, 1861; G. Friedlein, Gerbert,die Geometrie des Bo'ithiitu mid die indischen Ziffern, Erlangen, 1861 (cf. Jahn's Jahrb., Vol. LXXXVIL 1863, pp. 425-427); M. Can. tor, Math. Beitr. zum Culturleben der Volker, Halle, 1863, Sect. XIII. Plutarch of Athens, the son of Nestorius, born about 350, died 433, and snrnnmed by later Neo-Platonists " the Great,'' in distinction from the historian and Platonic philoso- pher, who lived in the reign of Trajan, and from others of the same name, was, perhaps, a pupil of Priscus, who (according to Eunap., Vit. Soph., p. 102) was still teaching at Athens after the death of Julian. Plutarch (according to Procl., In Farm., VI. 21) distinguished between the One, the Nous, the Soul, the forms immanent in material things, and matter, and in so far seems not to have departed from the Plotinic form of doctrine. His son Hierius and his daughter Asclepigeneia taught with him at Athens. Syrianus of Alexandria, pupil of Plutarch and teacher of Proclus, regarded the Aristo- telian philosophy as a stepping-stone to the Platonic. He recommended, therefore, the study of the works of Aristotle as a preparation {Tzporeleia and lUKpa. ^vcT-qpia) for the Pythagorean-Platonic philosophy or theology (a prelude to the scholastic employment of the Aristotelian philosophy as a handmaid to Christian theology). This view and use of Aristotle continued among the pupils of Syrianus, and in the same spirit Proclus calls Aristotle 6atyL6vLoq, or, of demoniac rank, but Plato (and Jamblichus) duoq, divine. In his 1 THE ATHENIAN SCHOOL, AND NEO-PLATONIC COMMENTATOE8. 257 commentary on the Aristotelian Metaphysics, Syrianus seeks to defend Plato and tho Pythagoreans against the attacks of Aristotle. His commentaries to Plato are no longer in existence. Hierocles of Alexandria (about 430, to be distinguished rom the Hierocles who was governor of Bithynia under Diocletian and figured as an opponent of Christianity) was another pupil of Plutarch (Phot., Bibl. Cod., 214). Since he ascribes to Ammonius Saccas, the founder of Neo-Platonism, the demonstration that Plato and Aristotle agreed substan- tially with each other, we may presume that he too was occupied with the endeavor to prove the same agreement. In the fragmentary remains of his writings he appears more particularly in the character of a moralist. A disciple of Syrianus was Hermias of Alex- andria, who afterward taught at the Museum in Alexandria, and was married to ^desia, likewise an adherent of Neo-Platonism, and a relative of Syrianus. Another pupil of Syrianus was Domninus, the mathematician. Proclus, born at Constantinople about 411, of Lycian descent, and brought up at Xan- thus, in Lycia (whence his surname "Lycius"), was in philosophy a pupil of Olympiodorus (the elder) at Alexandria, of the aged Plutarch at Athens, and afterward of Syrianus. He taught at Athens, where he died, A. d. 485. Oppressed by the great mass of transmitted doctrines, all of which he nevertheless attempted to work into his system, he is said often to have expressed the wish that nothing had been preserved from antiquity, except the Oracles {7<.6yia xc-^^c-'-'^^i on which Proclus wrote very full allegorical commentaries) and the Timaevs of Plato. The principal momenta in the dialectical process by which, according to Proclus, the formation of the world was accomplished, are the issuing of a thing from its cause and its return to the same. That which is brought forth is at the same time like and imlike its cause : in virtue of its likeness it is contained and remains in the cause (wov^) ; in virtue of its unlikeness it is separated from it (TrpooJof) ; it must return to its cause (eTriaTpoifiT/) by becoming like it, and in this return the same stadia are involved as in the previous forward or out-coming movement {Prodi croixdiMiq BeoloyiK^, chs. 31-38). All reality is subject to this law of triadic development. But the oftener the process is repeated the less perfect is the result. What is first is highest, the last is the lowest in rank and worth. The devel- opment is a descending one, and may be symbolized by the descending course of a spiral line (while the Pythagorean and Speusippic development, and in modern times the Hege- lian, is an ascending one). The primordial essence is the unity, which lies at the foundation of all plurality, the primal good, on which all good depends, the first cause of all existence {Tnstit., ch. 4 seq.). It is the secret, incomprehensible, and ineffable cause of all tilings, which brings forth all things and to which all tend to return. It can only be defined by analogy ; it is exalted above all possible affirmation or negation ; the conception of unity is inadequate fully to express it, since it is exalted even above unity, and so also are the conceptions of good and of cause (it is avacriog alriov; Plat. Theoi, III. p. 101 seq.; In Paryn., VI. 81; In Tim., 110 e ; it is naartq aiyrj^ a'p'pjjToTepov kol ■nda/i^ iTapiecj^ ay-voaroTepov, Plot. TJieoL, II. p. 110). Out of this first essence Proclus represents, not (with Plotinus) the intelligible world, nor (with Jamblichus) a single One, inferior to the first, but a pluralit}' of luiities (evader) as issuing, all of them exalted above being, life, reason, and our power of knowledge. The precise number of these unities (evdrfef) is not given by Proclus, but they are less numer- ous than the Ideas, and they so exist in each other as, notwithstanding their plurality, to constitute together but one unity. While the absolute, first essence is out of all relation to the world, these unities operate in the world ; they are the agents of providence (/fi*t 17 258 THE ATHENIAN SCHOOL, AND NKO-PLATONIC COMMENTATORS. TJieol, 113 seq.). They are the gods (deoi) in the higliest sense of this word (ibid., 129). The rank of the dififerent unities is determined according to the greater or less nearness in which they stand to the first essence (Inst, 126). The unities are followed by the triad of the intelligible, intelligible-intellectual, and intel- lectual essences (to votjtuv, to vot/tov a/j.a Kal varpov, to voepov, Plat. TheoL, III. 14). The first of these falls under the concept of being (ovaia), the second under that of life (sw?)), the third under that of thought (Imi., 103 and 138; Plat. Theol, III. p. 127 seq.). Between these three essences or classes of essences there exists also, notwithstanding their unity, an order of rank ; the second participates in the first, the third in the second (Plat. Theol., IV. 1). The Intelligible in the narrower sense of the term, or Being (ovcia) includes three triads, in each of which the two first terms are "limit" (Trcpac:) and " illimitation " (aTveipuv), the third terms being, in the first triad, the "union" of the two first, or "being" (fnnTdv or ovaia), in the second, "hfe" (C^?/), and in the third, "ideas," or "that which has hfe in itself" (iSeai or avT6(^(Mv). In each of these triads, the first or limiting term is also denominated by Proclus (who follows in this particular the precedent of Jamblichus) "Father" (Trar^yp), the second or unlimited term is called "Power" (Mvaiuir), and the tliird or mixed term, " Reason " (vovc). The intelligible-intellectual sphere, falling under the concept of life (C^^), contains, according to Proclus, feminine divinities, and is subdivided into the following triads : One, Other, Being («', iTepov, ov), the triad of original numbers ; One and Many, "Whole and Parts, Limit and Illimitation, the triad of '• gods who hold together " (awtKTiKol 6eoi) ; and ?; rd ia^aTa ep^ovaa liioT-qq, t) Kara to teXelov and r/ KaTo. to axviia, the triad of "perfecting Gods" (TETieaiovpyol -dEoi, ProcL, In Tim., 94; Theolog. Platan., IV. 37). The intellectual essences, lastly, falling under the concept of reason (vovg), are arranged according to the number seven, the two first terms in the triadic division, or the terras which correspond respectively with Being and Life, being each subject to a threefold subdivision, while the third term remains undivided. By a further, sevenfold division of each of the seven terms (or "Hebdomas ") thus obtained, Proclus obtains seven intellectual Hebdomades, with the members of which he connects by allegorical interpreta- tion some of the deities of the popular faith and certain Platonic and Neo-Platonic fictions, e. g., with the eighteenth of the fortj'-nine members, which he calls the " source of life " (TTT/yy ipvx'ov), the mixing-vessel in the Timaeus of Plato, in which the Deraiurgos com- bines the elements of the substance of the soul with each other. The Psychical emanates from the intellectual. Every soul is by nature eternal and only in its activity related to time. The soul of the world is composed of divisible, indivisible, and intermediate substance, its parts being arranged in harmonious proportions. There exist divine, demoniacal, and human souls. Occupying a middle place between the sen- suous and the divine, the soul possesses freedom of will. Its evils are all chargeable upon itself. It is in the power of the soul to turn back toward the divine. Whatever it knows it knows by means of the related and corresponding elements in itself; it knows the One through the supra-rational unity present in itself. Matter is in itself neither good nor evil. It is the source of natural necessity. When the Demiurgos molds it according to the transcendent, ideal prototypes, there enter into it forms which remain immanent in it (Aoyoe, the Xoyoi cTrspfinTiKui of the Stoics, Prod, in Tim., 4 c, seq. ; In Parmen., IV. 152). Proclus only repeats here the Plotinic doctrines. Under Marinus (of Flavia Neapolis or Sichem in Palestine), the successor of Proclus, it is related that the Neo-Platonic school at Athens sunk very low (Damasc, Vita Isidori, 228). Marinus seems to ha^e occupied himself with theosophical speculations less than Proclus, but more with the theory of ideas and with mathematics (ibid., 275). Con- disciples with Marinus were Asclepiodotus, the physician, of Alexandria, who afterward THE ATHENIAN SCHOOL, AND NEO-PLATONIC COMMENTATORS, 259 lived at Aphrodisias, and the sons of Hermias and ^desia, Heliodonis and Ammoniiis, who afterward taught at Alexandria; such also were Severianus, Isidonis of Alexandria, Hegias, a grandson of Plutarch, and Zenodotus, who taught with Marinus at Athens. Isidorus, who had also heard Proclus and who became the successor of Marinus in the office of Scholarch, paid greater attention to theosophy, but soon gave up his ofiSce and returned to Alexandria, his native city. The next Scholarch at Athens was ITegias. and the next after Ilcgias and the last of all was Damascius of Damascus (from about 520 on). The special object of the speculation of Damascius respecting the first essence was to show (in agreement with Jarablichus and Proclus) that the same was e.\alted above all those con- traries which inhere in the finite. Damascius did not long enjoy the liberty to teach. The Emperor Justinian, soon after his accession to the throne (a. d. 527), instituted a persecution directed against heretics and non-Christians, and in 529 forbade instruction to be given in philosophy at Athens, and confiscated the property of the Platonic school. Soon afterward (531 or 532) Damas- cius, Simplicius of Cilicia, the industrious and exact commentator of Aristotle, and five other Neo-Platonists (Diogenes and Hermias of Phoenicia, Eulamius or Eulalius of Phrygia, Priscianus, and Isidorus of Gaza) emigrated to Persia, where, from the traditions of the country, they hoped to find the seat of ancient wisdom, a people moderate and just, and (in King Khosroes) a ruler friendly to philosophy (Agathias, Be Rebus Jmiiniani, II. ch. 30). Undeceived hj sorrowful experiences, they longed to return to Athens, and in the peace concluded between Persia and the Roman Empire in the year 533, it was stipulated tliat they should return without hindrance and retain complete liberty of belief; but the prohibition of philosophical instruction remained in force. The works of the ancient thinkers never became entirely unknown in Greece ; it is demonstrable that, even in the period immediatel}'^ following, Christian scholars of the aries liberales at Athens studied also philosophy; but from this time till the renaissance o? classical studies, Hellenic phi- losophy (except where, as in the case of Sj-nesius and Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita, it assumed a Christian exterior) remained scarceh^ more than a subject of mere erudition (as in the cases of the Christian commentator of Aristotle, Johannes Philoponus, who was nearly contemporaneous with Simplicius, and David the Armenian, who flourished about 500 A. n. ; see below, § 96); gradually it, and especially the Aristotelian philosophy, won a growing influence on the scliolastic and formal treatment of Christian theology, and in part also on the substance of theological doctrines. One of the last Nco-Platonists of antiq^iity Avas Boethius (470-525, educated at Athens, 480-498), who, through his Consolatio, as also through his translation and exegesis of some of the logical writings of Aristotle anil through his annotations to his own translation of the Isagogc of Porphyry and to that of Marius Victorinus (a rhetorician and grammarian, who lived about 350), became the most influential medium for the transmission of Greek philosophy to the Occident during the first centuries of the Middle Ages. His Corwiolatw is founded on the Platonic and Stoic idea, that the reason should conquer the emotions. " Tu, quoque si vis lumine claro cernere verum tramite recto carpere callem : gaudia pelk, peUe timorem spemque fugato ne dolor ad'it: Nubila mens est vinctaque freiiis, liaec uhi regnant ! '' (Of. below, § 88). v/- >/ > PART II. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN EPA. INTRODUCTION. § 71. The religious facts, ideas, and doctrines of Christianity gave a new impulse to philosophical investigation. The philosophic thought of Christian times has been mainly occupied with the theo- logical, cosmological, and anthropological postulates of the biblical doctrine of salvation, the foundation of which is the consciousness of the law, of sin, and of redemption. On the whole philosophy of Christian times, see Heinrich Eitter, Die cJirisUiche Philosophie, 2 vols., Gottiniren, 1S5S-59; cf. the more minute exposition in Eitter's Geschidite der Philosophie^ Vol. V. seq^ Hamburg, 1S41 seq., as also the volumes relating to this subject in the works of Brucker, Buhle, Tenne- mann, Hegel, and others mentioned above, p. 8 seq. J. G. Mussman's Grundriss'Ier allg. GescJi. der christL Philosophie (Halle, 1S30) may also be mentioned here. Ferd. Baur, in Vol. V. of the Vieolog. Jahrb. (Tu- bingen, 1846, pp. 29-115 and 183-233) treats in a very comprehensive manner of the nature of Christian philosophy, and of the principal stages in the history of its development, ivith special reference to the oi>inions of Eitter; c{., per contra, Heinr. Eitter, in Theol. Studien u. Kritiken, Jahrg. XX., Vol. 2, 1S47, pp. 557-648. Cf, also, the works on ecclesiastical history and the history of dogmas, cited below, § 73, p. 268. § 72. The primitive creative epoch in the history of Christianity was followed in the Middle Ages by a period especially characterized by the evolution of the consciousness of opposition between God and the world, priests and laity, church and state, and, in general, between the human spirit, on the one hand, and God, the human spirit itself and nature, on the other, and hence by the evolution of the sense of the limitation and bondage of man. The period of Modern Times, on the contrary, is marked, in the main, by the development of the consciousness of restored unity, and lience of the reconciliation and freedom of the human spirit. In the patristic period, philosophic thought stands in tlie closest union with theological speculation, and co-operates in the development of Christian dogma. In the Scho- lastic period it passes into the service of theology, being employed merely to reduce to scientiiic form a body of dogmatic teaching for 262 PERIODS OF CHRISTIAJf PHILOSOPHY. the most part already at hand, by introducing a logical arrangement and bringing to its support philosophical doctrines from ante-Chris- tian antiquity. In Modern Philosophy it gradually acquires, with reference to Christian theology and ancient philosophy, the character of an independent science, as regards both form and content. Rightly to discriminate between that which belongs to the history of philosophy and that which belongs to the history of theology, in the Patristic and Scholastic periods, is a work of uo little difiiculty. The same difficulty also arises in attempting to distinguish between what pertains to the history of philosophy and what to the history of the natural sciences in modern times, when these sciences are so closely interwoven with philosophy. Yet the definition of philosophy as the science of principles furnishes a sufficiently accurate criterion. It is necessary that the exposition of the philosophy of early Christian times should be preceded and introduced by a consideration of the religious and theological bases on which society then newly reposed, and the presentation of the beginnings of Christian philosophy itself must necessarily include fundamental portions of the history of dogmas, unless the living organism of the new development of rehgious thought introduced by Christianity is to be arbitrarily dealt with, by separating, as was afterward done, a "-theo- logia naturalis " fi-om " theologia revelata.'' It is only thus that an insight into the genesis and connection of Christian ideas becomes possible. The dogmas of the Church were developed in the course of the contest waged by its defenders against Jews and Greeks, against Judaizers, Gnostics, and heretics of all sorts. To this development philosophical thought lent its aid, being employed before the Council of Nice in elaborating and perfecting the fundamental doctrines, and subsequently in ex- panding them into a comprehensive complex of dogmas. Whatever was new and peculiar in the doctrine of Augustine was the result of the contest in which he was engaged, either inwardly or outwardly against the doctrines of the Manicheans, Neo-Platonists, Donatists, and Pelagians. But when the belief of the Church had been unfolded into a complex of dogmas, and when these dogmas had become firmly established, it remained for the School to systematize and verify them by the aid of a corresponding reconstruction of ancient philosophy ; in this lay the mission of Scholasticism. The distinction between the Patristic and the Scholastic philosophy is indeed not an absolute one, since in the Patristic period, in proportion as the dogmas of the Church became distinctly developed, thought was made subservient to the work of arranging and demonstrating them, while, on the other hand, in the Scholastic period, these dogmas, not having previously become com- pletely determined in every particular, received a certain additional development, as the result of the then current theologico-philosophioal speculation. Still, the close relation of the two periods does not set aside the dift'erence between them, but only serves to demonstrate what is found to be verified in detail, namely, that the beginnings of the scholastic manner of philosophizing recede into the time of the Church Fathers (witness Augustine, who in several passages of his writings enunciated the Scho- lastic principle that that which faith already holds to be certain should also be compre- hended, if possible, by the light of the reason, while, in the work De Vera Religione, he asserts the unity of philosophy and true religion, and in none of his writings excludes reason as a way to faith), and that, on the other hand, the most important Scholastics may, in a certain, though inferior, measure, be regarded as fathers of the Church and of its doctrines (some of which men have indeed received from the Church this title of honor ; cf. below, § 76). PEINCIPAL DIVISIONS OF THE PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY. 263 FiEST Period of the Philosophy of the Chbistian Eka. PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY. § 73. The Patristic Period is the period of the genesis of Christian doctrine. It may be regarded as extending from the time of the Apostles to that of Charlemagne, and may be divided into two Sec- tions, separated by the Council of Nice (a. d. 325). The first section includes the time of the genesis of the fundamental dogmas, when philosophical and theological speculation were inseparably interwoven. The second covers the period of the further development of the doc- trines of the Church on the basis of the fundamental dogmas already established, in which period philosophy, being used to justify these dogmas and co-operating in the further development of new ones, j begins to assume a character of independence with reference to the dogmatic teaching of the Church. The works of certain of the Church Fathers were among the earliest books printed. Dc-siderius Eras- mus (lived 14G7-1536), especially, did a service to Patrology by his editions (published at Basel) of Hiero- nymus, Hilarius, Anibrosins, and Augustine. Afterward, mostly upon the initiative of Ecclesiastical Orders, complete editions were set on foot, the earlier of which contained, for the most part, only the works of comparatively little magnitude, while in the later editions greater completeness was constantly aimed at. We may mention here the editions of Margarinus de la Bigne (Paris, 1575-79; 6th ed. 16.54, 17 vols, fol.), Andr. Gallandius (Venice, 1765-71, 14 vols, fol.), and J. P. Migne (Pairnlogiae OursuD Completus, Paris, 1S40 seq.). The edition of Grabe {Spicilegium Patrnm et Haereticorum saec., I.-IJI., Oxford, 1698), and T>'anwi\''% Analecta Ante-Nicaena (London, 1854) are confined to the works of the first three centuries. Compare, further, the Corpus ncriptorum eccl. Latinorum ed. cotisiUo et ivipemHs academiae lilt., Caesareae VitidobonensU (Vol. I.: Sulpiciua Severua exrec. C. Halmil, Vienna, 1866 ; Vol. II.: Minucius Felix et Firmicua Maternus, ex rec. C. Ualmii, ibid. 1867). Extracts and clire.stomathies have been published by Eosler (Bihliothek der Kirchenvdter, 10 vols., Leips. 1776-86), August! (Chrextomathia Pa- tri.reieinigkeit und Mvnschwerdung GoUm ibid., 1341-43, and many other theological writings. Alb. Stockl, Gesch. der Philoxnphie der patristischen Zeit., Wurzburg, 1858. Joh. Huber, JHe Philoa. der Kirclunvdter, Munich, 1S5S. 264 JESUS AND HIS APOSTLES. § 74. Of all the nations of antiquity, the religious sense of the distinction and antagonism between holiness and sin was most promi- nent among the Hebrews. The ethical ideal of the Hebrews was, however, inseparably connected with their ritual law, and the revela- tion of God was supposed by them to be confined to the chosen people of the children of Israel. The Alexandrian philosophy, which arose through the contact of Judaism with Hellenic culture, prepared the way for the breaking down of the barriers which restricted the moral and religious life of the people, and Christianity completed the work. At the time when Greek culture had destroyed the intel- lectual exclusiveness, and the Roman Empire had annihilated the political independence of the nations, there arose in Christianity, in opposition to the reality of the kingdom of the world, the idea of a kingdom of God, founded on purity of heart. The expectation of the Messiah among the Jewish people was spiritualized, repentance and moral improvement were recognized as the condition of the sal- vation of the soul, and the principle of all commandments was found in the law of love^ whence the ceremonial law, and with it all national, political, and social distinctions lost their earlier positive significance; to the poor the gospel was preached, participation in the kingdom of heaven was promised to the oppressed, and the conscious- ness of God as the Almighty Creator, the holy law-giver, and just judge was completed by the consciousness of redemption and divine sonship, through the working and indwelling of God in Christ and in the community of believers. For the literature of this topic we mnst here refer particularly to the theological manuals. Of. — hesidei the Introductions to the Biblical writings, by De Wette, Hug, Reuss, etc.— especially, Carl August Credner's Gexchichte de« neutestamentlicfien Jawon, ed. by G. Volkmar, Berlin, 1S60, and Adolf Hilgenfeld's I>er Kanon und die Kritik des Ne^im TextammU in ihrer geechichtlkihen Au^hildung und GestaUung, Halle, 186.3 ; and, on the other hand, the numerous works on the didactic forms and the logical doctrines of the New Testament, as also monographs like those of Carl Niose on the Johannean Psychology (Progr. of the '' Landesschule'' at Pforta, Naumburg, 1865), and R. Rohricht, Zur johanneischen Log oslehre, in Theol. Studien u. EHUken, 1868, pp 299-814. Neander (Christl. Bogmengesch., ed. by J. Jacobi, Berlin, 1867, and often in others of his writings; cf., also, Neander, Ueber das Verhdltniss der hellenischen Ethik zum Christen- thum, in his Wissensch. Abhandlungen, ed. by J. Jacobi, Berlin, 1851), consciously adopting the views of Schleiermacher and not uninfluenced, whether consciously or not, by Hegelian conceptions, sees the peculiarity of Christianity in the idea of "redemption, the conscious- ness of the unification of the divine and human," and remarks with reference to the relation of Christianity to Judaism and Hellenism {ibid., p. 36) : " The religious stand-point of Juda- ism represents in general the positive consciousness of alienation from God and of the schism in man's nature, while Hellenism, on the contrary, is the embodiment of youthful natural life, as yet unconscious of its opposition to God. For those occupying the former JESD8 AND HIS APOSTLES. 265 Stand-point Christianity aims at removing the sense and the fact of opposition and discord, through redemption : for tliose occupying the stand-point of Hellenism, it first brings to consciousness tlie sense of discord, and provides for the communication of divine life lo humanity, through the removal of this discord." (In the same place Xeander designates as the fundamental trait of Orientalism, in the Hindoo and other natural religions, the "schism and unrest of the human mind, as manifested in the language of sorrow and melancholy, in view of the limits of human nature, and in imcontroUed longings after the infinite and for absorpliou into God.") Cf. above, § 5. In his own teaching, which was expressed especially in aphorisms and parables, Jesus laid chief emphasis on the necessity of rising above the legal righteousness of the Pharisees (Matt. v. 20) to the ideal completion of the law through the principle of love, and to the real fulfillment of the law as thus completed. The commandments and prohibitions of Moses (including those of the ceremonial law), and even many of the injunctions of his successors, were thus left substantially untouched (altliough in the matter of things purely external and of no immediate ethical or rehgious significance, such, in particular, as the observance of the Sabbath and various forms of purification and sacrifice, actual observance was made by the Messiah no longer obligatory for the subjects of his "kingdom of God," Mark ii. 23-28 ; vii. 14-23, etc.) ; but that which Moses had allowed on account of the liardness of heart of his people remained no longer lawful, but was to be regulated in accordance with the ideal ethical law, which took cognizance of the intentions of men. Thus the peremptoriness of the requirements of ethics was made to appear not in the least relaxed, but rather increased. (Hence the declaration in Matt. v. IS — true, of course, only in a figurative sense — that till the end of the world no jot or tittle of the law should be abrogated, if indeed this verse, in the form here given, is authentic and has not been em- phasized by the reporter, in opposition to a party of Pauline or ultra-Pauline Antinomians, so as to make the declaration more positive than it was as delivered by Jesus, and more in accordance with the sentiment of the Jewish Christians, who required that even the Mes- sias should keep the whole law.) It is not that Moses had given only a ceremonial law and that Christ had recognized on/y the moral law ; the law of love was taught, although in more limited form, already by the former (Lev. xix. 18; cf Deut. vi. 5, xxx. IG, on love to God, and such passages as Is. Iviii. 7, in tlie writings of the prophets who foreshadowed and prepared the way for the ideality of the Christian law), and the ritual retains a certain authoritj' with the latter (at least, according to the Gospel of Matthew ; Mark and Luke do not affirm the continuing authority of the Law). But the relative importance of the two elements becomes reversed in consequence of the radical significance attached by Christ to the law of love (Matt. xxii. 34 secj. ; Mark xii. 28 seq. ; Luke x. 25 seq.) and also in conse- quence of the name of Father, by which he (in a manner at most only suggested in the Old Testament) indicated that the relation of man to God should be one of friendly intimacy. Sometimes Jesus appeals directly to passages of the Old Testament (such as 1 Sam. xv. 22 and xxi. G, IIos. vi. 6, in Matt. ix. 13, xii. 3); the prophetic picture of the Messianic kingdom, in which peace and joj' were to reign, and strife should no longer dwell (Is. ix. et al.), involved the idea of actualized, all-embracing love ; the Nazarite's vow of the Old Testament implied the insufficiency of common righteousness and the necessity of ex- ceeding it by tlie practice of abstinence ; and perhaps also the principles and regimen of the Essenes exerted (through John the Baptist) some influence on Jesus (cf. A. Hilgenfeld, Der Essdismus und Jesns, in the Zeitschr. f. wiss. TheoL, X. 1, 1867, pp. 97-111). Jesus, the disciple of John, feeling liimsclf, from the time of his baptism by John, the herald of the Messiah, to be himself the Messiah, not inferior even to Moses in dignity (according to Deut. iviii. 15), and intrusted by God with imperishable authority and an eternal king- 266 JE8U8 AND HIS APOSTLES. dom (Dan. vii. 13, 14), believed himself called and had the courage to found a kingdom of God, to gather about him the weary and heavy-laden, to advance beyond all established forms, and to teach and live rather in accordance with the suggestions of his own moral consciousness and the wants of the people, with whom he was in sympathy, than accord- ing to traditional institution. The principle of pure love to man prevailed over conceptions of Oriental derivation and in spite of the lack of developed notions of labor, and of inde- pendence, property, right, and state, as reposing on labor. In the love with which he worked for his friends, in his unconditional opposition to the previous leaders of the people and to all other hostile powers, and in his death thus brought about, yet willingly accepted in the confident expectation that he should return, and while fearlessly avow- ing, in the face of death, his Messianic authority, the life of Jesus appears as a picture of perfect righteousness. His prayer that God might forgive his judges and enemies involved the unshaken conviction of his absolute right, and the same conviction continued after his death among his disciples. In the kingdom of God founded by the Messiah, blessedness was to dwell together with holiness. Jesus prayed that God's name might be sanctified, his kingdom come, his will be done, and that earthly need might be re- moved, together with sin. To the weary and heavy-laden relief was promised through the removal of the weight of external tyranny and of personal poverty, sickness, and sinfulness, and tlirough the confirmation in the relation of sonship to God and in the hope of eternal blessedness of all such as belonged to the kingdom of God. Jesus pre- supposed for those, to whom his preaching was addressed, the same immediate possibility of elevation to purity of heart and to moral perfection, i. e., to the image of the perfect God, the Heavenly Father, of which he was conscious in his own case. The moral doctrine and life of Jesus involved, as logical consequences, the obsolescence of the Mosaic law of rites, and with this the overtiirow of the national barriers of Judaism. These consequences were first expressly enunciated by Paul, who in proclaiming them was always conscious of his dependence on Christ (" not I, but Christ in me," Gal. ii. 20). On the ground of his own personal experience, from which he dogmatically drew general conclusions for all men, Paul declared that the power necessary for tlie fulfillment of the purely moral law and the way to true spiritual freedom were to be found only in faith in Christ. Paul denies the dependence of salvation on law and nationality or on an3'thing whatever that is external (here "there is neither Jew nor Greek, neither bond nor free, neither male nor female," Gal. iii. 28; cf vi. 15: ohre nEpiTOfifj ovf aKpofivarla, aXXa Kacvij KTiaic, and also Rom. x. 12 ; 2 Cor. v. 17). Positively, he makes it dependent on the free grace of God, the appropriation of which on the part of the individual is effected through faith in Christ as the Redeemer. The law was the schoolmaster to bring us to Christ {Traidayuyoc f£f Xpiarov, Gal. iii. 24). Through faith the inner man is built up (6 eau avdpuTrog, Rom. vii. 22; Ephes. iii. 16; cf Rom. ii. 29 ; 1 Pet. iii. 4; cf also 6 evrbc avdpunor in Plat., Rep. IX., p. 589 a — wliere, however, this expression is based on a developed comparison — and o iau Aoyog in opposition to i^o) Xoyog in Arist., Analyt. Post, I. 10). The law furnishes no deliverance from the schism between the spirit, which wills the good, and the flesh, which does what is evil ; but through Christ this schism is removed, the impotence of the flesh is overcome by his Spirit dwelling in us (Rom. vii. and viii.). Faith is reckoned to man by God as righteousness, and by making man a recipient of the Spirit of Christ, it restores to him the power, lost since the time of Adam's fall, truly to fulfill the moral law. "With con- secration to Christ, the Redeemer, there arises, in place of the servile condition of fear in view of the penalty threatened against the transgressor of the law, the free condition of sonship, of communion with God in love, the state of justification by faith. The believer, Bays Paul, has put on Christ in baptism; Christ is to be formed in him; as Christ desce nded JESUS AND HIS APOSTLES. 267 into death and rose again, so the believer, by virtue of hia union with him, dies unto sin, crucifies the flesh, with its lusts and desires, and rises to a new moral life in the spirit, the fruits of which are love, joy, peace, long-sufi'ering, geutleuess, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance (Gal. ii. 17; iii. 27; iv. 19; v. 22-24; Rom. vi. 1; viii. 12 seq. ; xiii. 14). But the believer has in this life only the first-fruits of the Spirit [cnzapxri rov nvevftarog, Rom. viii. 23) ; we are indeed saved, but only in hope, and we walk in patience (Rom. viii. 24 seq.) ; we walk still by faitli, not by sight {6ia. Tziartuc; TTEpnraTovfiev, ov did el6ovc, 2 Cor. v. 7). The new life is (according to 1 Cor. xv. 23) to be introduced by the second coming of Christ (when, according to 1 Thess. iv. 17, the living and those raised from the grave are to ascend on clouds to the presence of the Lord, cf John's Rev. xi. 12). Paul, like Christ, sees in love the substance of the moral law (Gal. v. 14: 6 yap Trdf vouoq iv tvl Xoyi^ ■n'kripovTai^ iv rCi ayaTcljaeii; tov rrXT/aiov cov ug iavrov^ Gal. vi. 2 : tov vdfiov Toil XpiOTov, Rom. xiii. 8—10: 6 aya~uv rov erepov, v6/nov tz en ATjpuKE- . . . nXijpufia ovv vdfiov T] aydirri, cf. 1 Cor. ix. 21 ; Rom. iii. 27 ; viii. 2). Love is the last and supreme word of Christianity; it is superior even to faith and hope (1 Cor. xiii. 13). Love is the active expression of faith (Gal. v. C : niaric cW dyd~7/g ivepyov/iivr/). The Pauhne doctrine of the relation between faith and love was of a nature calculated powerfully to stimulate thought with reference to the question as to the bond connecting these two elements of the religious life. If love or a morally perfect will is logically involved in the very conception of faith (as may be inferred from Gal. iii. 26 ; v. 6 ; Rom. vi. 3 seq. ; viii. 1 seq. ; 1 Cor. xii. 3), and if, therefore, the justification which is by faith means the divine recognition of an essential righteousness contained in it (i. e., in other words, if the divine justifying sen- tence — to follow, as may be and has been done, the Kantian terminology — is an " analytical judgment respecting the subjective moral quality of the believer "), then, on the one hand, the necessary connection of essential moral goodness with the historic and dogmatic ele- ments involved in faith in Jesus as the Messiah and the son of God, is not demonstrated, and, on the other, we seem rather to be led to the non-Pauline sequence of faith, begin- ning of regeneration and sanctification, and relative justification in proportion to the degree of sanctification already attained, than to the Pauhne one of faith, justification, and sancti- fication. But if, on the contrary, faith does not necessarily involve love (as may appear from Rom. iv. 19; x. 9, etc.), and enters only as a new statutory element, a Christian substitute for Jewish offerings and ceremonies [i. e., if God's justification of believers is only a ^^ synthetic judgment" an imputation of another's righteousness), then the miprove- ment of the will and life remains indeed a thing required, but no longer appears as a necessary consequence of faith, and the moral advantage possessed by him who believes in the real death and resurrection of Christ, and considers himself redeemed from guilt and punishment by the merit of Christ, over those who are not of the same faith, can only be arbitrarily asserted, since it is by no means verified in all instances by the facts of experience. It follows also, in case the believing sinner, to whom righteousness has been imputed, fails to advance to real righteousness, that the divine justification of the morally unimproved believer, together with the condemnation of others, must appear arbitrarj-, partisan, and unjust, and unrestricted liberty is left to men for the frivolous mis- use of forgiving grace as a license to sin. At a later period, when attempts were made to transform the half-mystic and half-religious ideas of Paul respecting dying and rising again with Christ into dogmatic conceptions, this difficulty of interpretation (which in recent times Schleiermacher sought to solve by defining justifying faith as the appropriation to one's self of the perfection and beatitude of Christ, i. e., as the giving up of one's self to the Christian ideal) appeared with increasing distinctness, and gave occasion to manifold theological and philosophical attempts at explanation, as the Epistle of James may witness. 268 JESDS AND HIS APOSTLES. The Early Catholic Church went forward to the point of making the moral law and tiieo- retical dogmatic faith co-ordinate, while in Aiigiistinism, in the Reformation, and again in the theological and philosophical ethics of modern times, the dialectic resulting from the Pauline conceptions has repeatedly reappeared in ever-varying form. Although Paul recognized love (which, first implied in the requirement to give to the poor and in tlie principle of community in the possession of goods, rose subsequently, through idealization and generalization, to the rank of a pure conception) as the highest element in Christianity, he nevertheless treats in his Epistles chiefly of faith, as of that by which the law is abolished. In the Epistles of John, on the contrary, and in the (fourth) Gospel, which bears his name, love occupies the central position. God, says John, is love (1 John iv. 8, 16). His love has been made known in the sending of his Son, in order that all who believe on Him may have eternal life (1 John iv. 9 ; Jolin's Gosp. iii. 16). He who abides in love abides in God and God in him. The new commandment of Christ is love. He who loves God must love his brother also. Our love to God is manifested when we keep his commandments and walk in the light (John xiii. 34 ; xv. 12 ; 1 John i. •? ; iv. 16, 21 ; v. 2). Believers are born of God. They are hated of the world; but the world lies in wickedness (John xv. 18 et al. ; 1 John v. 19). In place of the contest waged by Paul against single concrete powers, especially against the continued validity of the Mosaic law, we have here a contest against the "world" in general, against all tendencies opposed to Christianity, against unbelieving and hostile Jews and Gentiles. The distinc- tion between the chosen Jewish people and the heathen is that between believers in Christ, who walk in the light, and unbelievers and children of darkness, and the temporal distinction between the present period and the future is changed into the ever-present dis- tinction between the world and the kingdom of God, which is the kingdom of the Spirit and of truth. The belief that Jesus is the Christ is made the power that overcomes the world. That the law came by Moses, but grace and truth by Jesus (John i. 17) appears already as an assured conviction. The law is abrogated, religious life is no longer to be nourished and filled up with offerings and ceremonies; and into the place thus left vacant enters, together with the practical activity required by love, a form of theoretical specula- tion arrived at through the development of the doctrine of faith. In the Gospel named after Matthew, Jesus is styled the Messiah, the Son of David, who as such is also the Son of God ; this phraseology is here employed with immediate reference to the expectations of the Jewish nation. In the Gospel according to Mark, he is generally spoken of as the Son of God, the expression " Son of David " being employed only once (x. 47 seq., in the mouth of the blind man of Jericho). In this Gospel the con- tinuing validity of the Jewish law is no longer affirmed. The recognition of Christ as the Son of God in the Epistles of Paul and in the Gospel of Luke, which bears the impress of Pauline ideas, is an expression of the sense of the universal or absolute character of the Christian religion. In the Epistle to the Hebrews (which is likewise Pauline in character and was possibly written by Barnabas or ApoUos) the superiority of Christianity in dignity to Judaism and of the New Covenant to the Old Covenant, with its laws, which are no longer binding on Christians, is expressed by the affirmation of the personal exaltation of Jesus above Moses and above the angels, through whose agency the law was given. In this Epis- tle it is said of Christ as the Son of God, that by him the world-periods (aliJvec) were created, that he is the brightness of the divine glory, the image of the divine nature {a-rravyaafia Kal XnpaKTj/p Tjjg iTToaraaEuq)^ the eternal high-priest after the order of Melchisedek, king of priests, to whom even Abraham made himself subject, and to whom therefore the Levites, as children of Abraham, are also inferior. Repentance and turning away from dead works, and faith in God, are reckoned by the author of this Epistle as the elementary requirements JESUS AND HIS APOSTLES. 2fi9 of Christianity, as the milk or foundation from which it is necessary to advance to '• strong meat '' or " perfection." This Epistle contains already the seeds of the later Gnostic doc- trines. The fourth Gospel, named after the Apostle John, teaches the pure spirituality of God's nature, and demands that God should be worshiped in spirit and in truth. It recog- nizes in Christ the Logos become flesh, who was from eternity with God and through whom God created the world and reveals himself to man; the Logos became flesh and "of his full- ness (f/c Toi) TrXr/pufiaTog avTov) have all we received, and grace for grace." Yet, however weighty and pregnant may have been the conceptions which Christ's immediate and indirect disciples may have formed of his person, it is, nevertheless, not true that "the proper basis and the vital germ of Christian doctrine" are to be sought m them (see Huber, in his excellent work entitled Fhilosophie der Kirchenviiter, Mumch, 1859, p. 8 ; on p. 10 Huber affirms, adopting the sentiment expressed by Schelling in his Philos. der Offmibarung, Werke, II. 4, p. 35, that " Christ was not the teacher and founder, but the content of Christianity ") ; this basis and this germ are contained rather in Jesus' ethical requirement of inward righteousness, purity of heart, and love, and in liis own practice of the things he required (and Huber, on p. 8 of the work cited above, justly acknowledges that the source of those conceptions [of Christ's person] was the life and doctrine of Jesus — which acknowledgment, however, involves an essential limitation of Huber's assent to Schelling's doctrine). Without prejudice to the essential originality and independence of the principles of Christianity, it must be admitted that previous to their formal enunciation they liad been foreshadowed and the ground had been prepared for them partly in the general principles of Judaism, and partly and more particularly in connection with the attempt among the Jews to revive the ancient gift of prophecy (a movement to which Parsee influences con- tributed, and which lay at the foundation of Essenism) and (after the time of Paul and of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and especially after the first development of Gnosticism and the production of the fourth Gospel) in the religions philosophy of the Alexandrian Jews, which arose througli the contact of Judaism with Hellenism. The essential object of the allegorical interpretation of Scripture and of theosophy was to spiritualize the ideas con- tained in the Old Testament. The sensible manifestations of God were interpreted as manifestations of a divine power distinct from God and operating in the world. As in Aristobulus and in the Book of Maccabees (iii. 39) the power (diva/ui^) of God, which dwells in the world, is distinguished from God in his extra-mundane, absolute existence, and as in the Proverbs (viii. 22 seq.) and the Book of Wisdom (vii. seq.) the Wisdom of God is distinguished from God himself, so Paul proclaims Christ as tlie power and wisdom of God (I Cor. i. 24 : Kr/pvaaoinev Xpiarov Gfof; Avvafiiv /cat Qeoi) Hoipiav). Philo terms God the cause (alTiov) of the world, by (inrb) w-hom it had its origin, distinguishing from him the Logos, through {(ha) whom he formed it, and the four elements which constitute it mate- rially ; in like manner, in the Epistle to the Hebrews the Son of God is represented as he through whom {(h' ov) God creates, and according to the Gospel of John all things that were created were created through (J«i) the Logos (John i. 3 and 10: 6i' avrov). But the Alexandrian theosophy did not admit the possibility of the incarnation of the divine Logos, nor could it admit this, since, according to it, matter was impure, and the descent of the soul into a mortal body was the penalty of moral delinquency on the part of the former. For the adherents of this theosophy, therefore, the identification of the Messiah with the divine Logos was impossible. They were waiting for the coming of the Messiah at the time when Jesus recognized himself as the Messiah already come. They did not perceive in the commandment of love to man the radical and positive expression for the spirituali- eation of the law. They did not draw from their spiritualization of the law, the (Pauline) 270 JE6US AND HIS APOSTLES. consequence, that now, since the Messiah had appeared, the ancient law in its literal sense was no longer binding on those who believed in him. They did not suffer the ceremonial worship of the God revealed to the Jews to be replaced by the worship of God in spirit and in truth. These radical differences indicate that the Alexandrian philosophy belongs to the ante-Christian period, and it can only be regarded as one of the stepping-stones, although it must at the same time be received as the last and nearest stepping-stone, to Christianity. Cf. above, § 63. Monotheism as a world-religion could only go forth from Judaism. The triumph of Christianity was the triumph over polytheism of the religious idea of the Jewish people, stripped of its national limitations and softened and spiritualized. This triumph was com- pletely analogous to that won by the Hellenic language, and by Hellenic art and science, in the kingdoms founded by Alexander the Great and afterward reduced under Roman supremacy, only that the struggle in the field of religion was all the more severe and wearisome, as the elements of permanent worth which were contained in the polytheistic religioHS were more numerous. "When national exclusiveness had once given way to the active commerce of nations and to the unity of the world-empire, it was necessary that, in place of a plurality of forms of culture existing side by side, one of them should gradually become dominant, which was strongest, most elevated, and most developed, or, in other words, that Greek language, art, and science, Roman law (and also, for the West, the Roman language), and either Greco-Roman or the (universalized, denationalized) Jewish religion should become predominant. The Jews — especially those outside of Palestine — although still holding on to monotheism, had begun to feel the unfitness of the further maintenance of the positive law, and the circumstances of tlie time even necessitated its abrogation. So soon, therefore, as an authority for such abrogation — an authority at once satisfactory to the religious consciousness of the Jews and not repugnant to non-Jews (who would have nothing to do with Judaism as traditionally constituted) — was found in the divine-human Messiah, the superior of Moses and Abraham (albeit that the Messiah, while on earth, had not pronounced this abrogation, perhaps had not willed it, and had only furnished for it a possible 2'>oint dfappui through his new commandments, which went beyond the requirements of mere positive legality), so soon as this condition was met, as it was by the Apostle Paul, it was inevitable that the contest of religions should begin. It was necessarily more difficult for the new tendency to make headway within the sphere of Judaism and among those behevers who held fast to the letter of the commandments of the Messiah who had personally lived among them, than within the sphere of Hellenism, althovigh the latter did not jield to it without violent opposition, and, when it finally yielded, .so filled the new movement with essential elements of its own, that in a certain sense Chris- tianity, although sprung from Judaism, can justly be called the synthesis and product of both Judaism and Hellenism — a synthesis superior to either of its elements. These two factors, under the influence of new motives that afterward arose, were at a later period again arrayed in opposition within the fold of Christianity, and primitive Catholicism was the first victorious reconciliation of them. As contrasted with Judaism, Christianity was marked by its greater spirituality, and hence struck the positivists of the ancient faith, who could not bring themselves to approve the Pauline abrogation of the law, as a free-thinking scandal {aitm'6aA.ov, 1 Cor. i. 23). To the cultivated Hellenes the doctrine of a crucified God of Jewish race was a superstitious folly (jiopia, ibid.), for which reason not many of high station accepted it (1 Cor. i. 26 seq.). But the weak, the heavj'-laden, and oppressed heard gladly the tidings cf the God who had descended to their low condition and the preaching of a future resur- rection to beatific life. Not the religion of cheerful contentment, but consolation in mis' JEWISH AND PAULINE CHRI8TIANITT. 271 fortune, was what their wants demanded. Their opposition to their oppressors found in faith in Christ a spiritual support, and llio commandment of love furnished to the principk of mutual lielp a powerful motive. And now after the destruction of the poUtical inde pendence of the cities and nations which had before been either constantly engaged in feuds and wars with each other, or else had existed entirely apart from each other, far greater importance was attached than before to the material and spiritual interests of the individvxjl^ to personal morality and happiness. The union of men of like mind from among the most different peoples and civil communities in one religious society now first became possible, and acquired a higher spiritxial charm. The existence of a world- monarchy was favorable to the idea of religious imity and to the preaching of concord and love. A religion which in its tlieoretical as well as its positive groundwork should rest, not on ancient national conceptions, but on the more comprehensive, less poetic, and more reflective consciousness of the present, became a necessity. It could not be otherwise than that the more simple and popular doctrine of the Gospel should triumph over such artificial attempts in the interest of an intellectual aristocracy and foreign to the popular belief, among the later Stoics and the Neo-Platonists, as were made to furnish new interpretations and combinations of pagan doctrines. The authors of these attempts did not dare, and were unable to guard unchanged the Old-Hellenic principle in the presence of Christianity ; for the allegorical interpretation of the myths of Paganism was only a proof that those who professed to believe tliem were ashamed of them, and thus prepared the way for the triumph of Christianity, which openly rejected them. But after the dissolution of the ethical harmony which characterized the bloom of Hellenic antiquity, and as a consequence of the increasing moral degeneracy of the times, moral health, salvation, was held to depend primarily on self-purification through renunciation of the W'orld, on the "cruci- fixion of the lusts and desires," and on self-consecration to an etliical ideal, whose charac- teristic was not that it artistically transfigured the present natural life, but that it ele- vated the spirit above it. With many the fear of the tlireatened pains of hell and the hope of the promised salvation and blessedness of the members of the kingdom were very powerful motives. It should also be added that the blood of the martyrs became, through the attention and respect transferred from their persons to their cause, a seed of the church. ^_ § 75. The opposition between Judaism and Hellenism reappeared, though in a sense and in a measure which were modilied by the com- munity of the opposing parties in Christian principle, within the circle of Christianity itself, in the division of the Jewish from the Gentile Christians. Jewish Christianity united with faith in Jesus as the Mes- siah the observance of the Mosaic law. Gentile Christianity, on the contrary, arose from the Pauline conception of Christianity as con- sisting in justification and sanctification through Christ, without the works of the law. But both parties agreeing in the recognition of Jesus as the Messiah and in the adoption of the moral law of love as promulgated by him, this opposition yielded to the desire for Chris- tian unity (which sentiment was most powerful in mi.xed churches, like that at Rome). A canon of the writings of all the Apostles, differ- ing but little from our own, was constituted, in which the Johannean 272 JEWISH AND PAULINE CHRISTIANITY. Gospel was added to the three first of our Gospels, all others heing rejected, and with these a collection of Apostolical writings was com- bined. Finally, the early Catholic Church was founded, which con- ceived Christianity as essentially contained in the new law of love; the Mosaic law of ceremonies was abolished, as no longer binding on those who should believe in Christ, and in connection with the development and completion of a new hierarchical constitution, a rule of faith was established, having the form of a law. The rule of faith related chiefly to the objective conditions of salvation. The conceptions of God, and of his only-begotten Son and of the Holy Ghost — conceptions which, chiefly through the formula of baptism, were becoming universally fixed in the Christian consciousness — lay at its basis, and it was directed against Judaism, on the one hand, and, on the other, against those speculations of the Gnostics, which were not in correspondence with the common sentiment of the Chris- tian churches. Aug. Neander, Allgemeine Oeschichte der chriitlichen Religion imd Kircke, 3d ed., Gotha, 1856 ; Oesch. der PJians'iing nnd Leitung der ckristMchen Kirche diirch die Apostel, Hamburg, 1882, 5th ed., Gotha, 1862; OhriKt. Dogmengesch., hrsg. van J. L. Jacobi, Berlin, 185T. Rich. liothe, I>i« Anfange der chr-istl. Kirche tmd ihrer Verfassung, Vol. I., Wittenberg, 1S37. Ferd. Christian Baur, Paulus der ApostelJemi Christi, Tiibingen, 1845; Lehrbiich der christl. Dogmengesch., 2d ed., Stuttgart, 1868; Vor- lenungen iiber die neutestamenil. TTieologie, hrsg. von Ferd. Friedr. Baiir, Leips. 1864 ; Vorl. ilber die christl. Dogmengesch. (posthumous publication), Tiibingen, 1865; Das Ch7-istenthum -und die christl. Kirche der drei ersteii Jahrhtinderte, 3d ed., ibid. 1863 ; Die christl. Kirche vom Anfang des vierten bis sum Ernie des sechsteti Jahrhunderts, 2d ed., il/id. 1868. Albert Schwegler, Das nachapostolische Zeitalter in den Hatiptmomenten seiner Ent/wickelu7ig, Tubingen, 1846. Albrecht Eitschl, Die Entstehung der alt- katholischen Kirche, 2d cd., Bonn, 1857. Ad. Hilgenfeld, Das Urchristenthum in den IJauptwende- punkten seines Entwickltingsganges, Jena, 1855. Cf. the numerous articles of Hilgenfeld in his Zeitschr. f. wiss. Theol., and Heinrich Holtzmann's Judenthum 7ind Chrinienthiim, Leipsic. 1867. Ph. Sohaff, Oe- schichte der Apost. Kirche, 'id ed., Leipsic, 1854 ; Geschichte der alten Kirche, 3 vols., 2d ed., Leipsic, 1869. [The same in English, New York.] The early Catholic Church, although numbering both Jewish Christianity and Paulinism among its antecedents, and containing certain elements derived from both, was neverthe- less more immediately an outgrowth from the latter, or from Gentile Christianity. In the abrogation of the Mosaic law and of national barriers on the ground of the new principle of faith in Christ, it was in material agreement with Paulinism. But in form it was less removed from Judaism and from Jewish Christianity, on account of the legal character with which it invested the Christian principle in matters of faith, charity, and church order. For it Christianity was essentially a new law (John xiii. 34: kvTolri naivfj; cf. Gal. vi. 2, where Paul speaks of that love which manifests itself in acts of mutual assistance, as the "law of Christ," in distinction from the Mosaic law, and 1 Cor. xi. 25, 2 Cor. iii. 6, and Heb. viii. 1 3 : Kaivfj diadijKT), Epist. Barnabae, II. 4 ; nova lex Jesu Christi). The pre- dilection for the legal form in matters of faith, practice, and constitution, may be explained partly by the influence which the legal religion and hierarchy of the Old Testament, how- ever modified and idealized by Christianity, could not but exert on the Gentile Christians (and this, too, without conscious " concessions " to the opposing party, which were only jf:wish and pauline Christianity. 273 made incidentally and far more by a fraction of the Jewish Christians than by the Gentile Christians), as also by the influence of early Christian tradition, especially that of the '/.oyLd KvpinKn, or "Words of the Lord," and partly b}- the ecclesiastical necessity which existed of advancing from the subjective conceptions of Paul to objective norms and by the moral reaction which took place against ultra-Pauline Antinomianism.* In like manner, precisely, the transition from Luther's faith to Luther's articles of faith, and, later, to the symbols of the Lutheran Church, was due partly to the surviving influence of the old Cluu-ch, in spite of all the opposition which was directed against it, and partly to the inherent necessity of objective norms and to the reaction excited by extreme reformatory attempts. The Jewish Christians, who united with the observance of tlie Mosaic law a belief in the Messianic dignity of Jesus, were divided, after the commencement of Paul's ministry, into two factions. The more rigid of them denied the apostolic character of Paul, and refused to recognize as members of the Messiah's kingdom those Christians who were born in heathenism, except upon the condition of their being circumcised ; the less rigid of them, on the contrary, conceded the authority of Paul to labor among the Gentiles, and only demanded of believers converted from heathenism the observance of those things which had been prescribed by the Jews for the proselytes of the gate (in accordance with the so-called decree of the Apostles, Acts xv. 29 : aTzix^c^Oai n^uAoOiruv koI al/iuTog nai wviKTov Kul Topveiaq, whereas in Gal. ii. 10 only the contribution for the poor at Jerusalem * NeaTider designates, in addition to the fact of the diminished power and purity of tlie religious spirit in the post-ApostoUc times, the example of the Old Testament, whose influence was first and most directly manifest in the constitution of the Church, as the cause of the development of a new discipline of law in the early Catholic Church. Baur and Schwegler emphasize most the idea of the successive development and reconciliation of the opposition between Jewish Christianity and Panlinism, but both of them (and espe- cially Schwegler) ascribe to JewLsli Chiisti.inity (which is chiefly of historical import;ince only as having directly preceded Panlinism) in the post-Pauline period (in which, under the name of Ebionitism, it con- tinued to be powerful until near the year 185, after which it was scdrcely more than a rapidly-declining remnant of the jiast) perhaps a more widespread acceptation and influence than are actually demonstrable or internally probable. Albert Ritschl, on the other hand, is a prominent representative of those who argue that Catholic Christianity was not the result of a reconciliation effected between Jewish and Gentile Cbrii- tian;^, but a stage in the history of Gentile Christianity alone. The transformation of Panlinism into Catholic Christianity was occasioned, says Pitschl, by the need in the Church of norms of thought and life which should possess universal validity, 'With Paul the theoretical and the practical were blended, with u touch of mysticism, in the conception of faith, and this blending was in harmony with the peculiaritie,'; of his character and experience. What with Paul, therefore, was living and mobile, the church sousht to express in fixed fornmlas, a result which could only be attained at the expense of the peculiar warmth and elevation of the Christianity of Panl (Ritschl, Entntehntig der ultkuth. Kirche, 1st ed,, p, 273), In the second edition of his work Pitschl maintains thr.t the qnestiim is not whether the early Catholic Church was developed on the basis of Jewish Christianity or on that of P.aulinism, but whether it was developed out of Jewish or out of Gentile Christianity, The jieculiar marks of Gentile Christianity, as he further remarks, were the rejection of Jewish customs and the entertainment of the belief that tliev, the Gentile Christians, had entered into the place of the Je«s in the covenant relation with God (both of which were rendered possible only tlirongh the initiative taken by Paul), and he continues: "The Gentile Oiristians needed first to be instructed concerning the unity of God and the history of his covenant-revelation, con- cerning moral righteousness and judgment, sin and redemption, the kingdom of God and the Son of God, before they could besrin to attend to the dialectical relations between sin and law, grace and _'ustiflcntion, faith and righteousness'' (2d ed., p, 27'2) ; they accepted tlie equal authority of all the Apo.