o. '/A m^v&?\J^i/^Y^ Q^/^ r cyo. .^yfio^r:^^ ^^A^^i^n^^ri^ ^ i^ r FINAL FEENCH STRUGGLES IN INDIA. Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2007 with funding from IVIicrosoft Corporation http://www.archive.org/details/finalfrenchstrugOOmallrich FINAL FRENCH STEUGGLES IN INDIA' %\\^ on tlje Indian Seas; [NCLUDINQ AN ACCOUNT OF THE CAPTURE OF THE ISLES OF FRANCE AND BOURBON, AND SKETCHES OF THE MOST EMINENT FOREIGN ADVENTURERS IN INDIA UP TO THE PERIOD OF THAT CAPTURE, WITH AN APPENDIX CONTAINING AN ACCOUNT OF THE EXPEDITION FROM INDIA TO EGYPT IN 1801. BY COLONEL G. B. MALLESON, C.S.L AUTHOR OF THE "HISTORY OF THE FRENCH IN INDIA," "historical sketch of the native states of INDIA." "The sun, the soil, but not the slave, the same Unchanged in all except its foreign lord." Childe Harold, NEW EDITION. LONDON: W. H. ALLEN & CO., 13 WATERLOO PLACE, PALL MALL. S.W. 1884. M (9 HENRY MORSE STEriMUi DEDICATION. Dear Mrs. Spencer, You may perhaps remember our conversa- tions on the subject of my historical writings when you were staying with me on the Nilghiri Hills nearly twenty months ago. You then expressed your surprise that— considering the careers, full of strange and varied incident, of the sailors and adventurers who followed Dupleix and Lally in the struggle against the English — I had not continued and completed my History of the French in India. I was unable at the moment to take up your idea ; but some months later I made it my own. That idea has now developed into a book, and the book is about to appear. Considering the circumstances of its origin, you will not, I feel assured, think me too presuming if I now ask you to accord to the young aspirant the privilege of introduction to the public under the auspices of your favour and of your protection. Believe me, Dear Mrs. Spencer, Very sincerely yours, G. B. MALLESON. 27, West Cbomwell Road, \st February, 1878. To Mrs. Almeriq Spencer. 512782 CONTENTS. PAGE Introduction, v Book I. — French Mariners on the Indian Seas, - 1 Book II. — The Isle of France and her Privateers, - 79 Book III. — Foreign Adventurers in India, - - 158 Appendix — Expedition from India to Egypt, 1801,^ - 253 Index, 277 INTRODUCTION. The present work supplies a suppressed chapter of Anglo-Indian history. It undertakes, that is to say, to describe, in detail, the final struggle of the French, terminating in September, 1783, for empire in Southern India ; the successful efforts of the same nation during the wars of the Revolution and the Empire to destroy British commerce in the Indian Seas ; the suppression of those efforts accomplished by the capture of the Isles of France and Bourbon. It concludes with a sketch of the most famous adventurers who strove, often success- fully, to train and discipline on the European model the soldiers of those native princes who, towards the close of the last century, seemed the most likely to come into hostile contact with the British. It is strange, indeed, that in the standard English histories of India these later efforts of England's most persistent rival should have been dismissed in a few VI INTRODUCTION. lines. It is stranger still when we consider how formidable those efforts appeared to contemporary writers, how nearly they approached success, how injuriously they did affect Anglo-Indian interests.. The author of a book called Transactions in India, published in 1786, describes in clear and vivid language events in which he himself was an actor, and he paints the effect produced on the minds of the English by the daring exploits of Suffren. The French version of the same story, differing only in unimportant details, and styled Histoire de la derniire guerre, was published in 1787. Colonel Wilks, who wrote his admirable history of Southern India in the early days of the present century; who was in India when Suffren fought his five battles with his English rival and when Stuart was reduced to extremities at Kadaltir, describes in eloquent and impartial language the dangers incurred by the Presidency of Madras in 1783, and how it was saved from those dangers only by the timely suspension of arms which preceded the Treaty of Versailles. These are, so to speak, the contemporary records of the period. The case for the English is stated in the Transactions, that for the French in the Histoire, INTRODUCTION. vil and the events they record are summarised by an English writer, likewise an eye-witness. Yet the reader of the earlier editions of Mill's History of India would rise from the perusal of his description of the war terminated in 1783, and of its details, without the smallest suspicion that the supremacy of the English in Southern India had been greatly endangered. The account is more than meagre. It induces a belief that important events were unimpor- tant. In a word, it suppresses the point of the subject of which it professes to treat. A writer so honest and so conscientious as the late Professor H. H. Wilson could not pass over this omission without notice. The foot-note in which he gives to the subject its true point, although short, is most suggestive. " It seems probable,'' he writes, ** that but for the opportune occurrence of peace with " France the South of India would have been lost " to the English. The annihilation of the army at " Cuddalore would have been followed by the siege " of Madras, and there was little chance of defending ** it successfully against Tippoo and the French." The conclusion arrived at by Professor Wilson is so fully borne out by the facts of the case that the omission VIU INTRODUCTION. of details referring to those facts by the writers of the standard histories of India is very difficult to account for. Some of my friends, indeed, who read a portion of this book in the pages of the Calcutta Review, have not hesitated to tell me that they regard as unpatriotic the attempt of an Englishman to search out and record events which may contrast favourably a rival nation with his own. But history is either a record of events which have happened or it is romance. If it assume to be a record of events which have happened it must record the evil as well as the good, misfortune as well as gain, defeat as well as victory. No one will dispute this broad axiom. But, to take a narrower view, it may with confidence be affirmed that the truly patriotic writer is he who does not attempt to hide the shortcomings of his own countrymen or the virtues of their enemies. It is the writer who attempts to lessen the merits of the enemy who is really guilty of want of patriotism. For, if the enemy were as contemptible as he is often described to have been by the purely insular writer, the merits of those who conquered him need not have been very considerable. In attempting then to restore a suppressed chapter INTRODUCTION. IX of Indian history, in which the French navy appears to very considerable advantage, and a French admiral contesting the seas not unequally with an English admiral, finally out-manoeuvres and beats him ; in which events are recorded which all but upset English domination in Southern India ; whilst I narrate facts which bring into strong light the virtues of individual Frenchmen, I relate the history of a struggle which ended in the triumph of England. There must have been some English virtues counterbalancing the French virtues, or some French defects greater than the French virtues, to enable the English to gain that triumph. For, by the admission of contemporary writers, our countrymen were reduced to extremities when, as if by the stroke of a magician's wand, they recovered all that they had lost. For the virtues and the defects, so nearly balancing each other on either side, I must refer the reader to the story itself. If success be a criterion of merit it is clear that the balance must, on a general consideration^ be in favour of England. The second Book is devoted to the description of a later attempt on the part of the French of a very different character indeed, but equally directed against X INTRODUCTION. English interests. I allude to the efforts made by their privateers to destroy British commerce in the Indian seas ; the success of those efforts ; and, finally, the capture of the islands which had nurtured the daring corsairs, and whence they made their spring on the merchantmen of their rivals. It happened that whilst engaged in writing this portion of my book (1877) a debate occurred in the House of Commons on the subject of privateering. It would appear that there are some who still believe that by continuing to adhere to those stipulations of the Treaty of Paris which abolished privateering, England is placing herself at considerable disadvantage with other nations. I cannot but think that the perusal of my book will have the effect of changing the views of those who entertain this opinion. The note I have appended to page 81 shows that during the five years from 1793 to 1797 inclusive, whilst the French privateers captured 2266 English merchant- men, the English captures from her rival amounted only to 375 ! And this mainly happened, be it remembered, after Lord Howe's victory had annihilated the French navy, when England was the undisputed mistress of the seas. Is it possible to question the INTRODUCTION. xi evidence offered by these figures that the nation which carries the largest amount of the commerce of the world must always be the chief sufferer from privateers ? If, indeed, further evidence to the same effect be required it will be found in the pages which follow the note I have quoted. The losses suffered by English traders in the Indian seas during the first sixteen years of the war were computed by millions. That these losses were caused by French privateers is not only shown in the text but is borne out by the fact that when, by the capture of the nest whence the corsairs sallied out to burn and to destroy, privateering was suppressed, the English merchantship was able to pursue her way in safety. The damage effected on the commerce of England by the light squadrons and single ships of her enemy was small. The privateers did all the mischief, and, as I have said, that mischief ceased when those daring cruisers were deprived of a base of operations. If the advice urged by Marquess Wellesley in 1800-1 had been followed the depredations upon British commerce in the Indian seas would have ceased at a much earlier period. It was the rejection of Xll INTRODUCTION. that advice which caused to the British mer- cantile community those losses which, I have already stated, were to be counted by millions ► When, ten years later, convinced against his will. Lord Minto, following in the lines of the great Marquess, carried out his views, the capture of the islands was found to be an operation comparatively easy, effected with but little bloodshed, and with a force which, large in comparison with the number of the defenders, was yet considerably smaller than the authorities both in England and in India had deemed necessary. The second Book, which professes to tell the story of the most famous of the privateers, fitly concludes then with the account of the successful expedition against the islands which were their home. From a national point of view the results are not dissimilar to those arrived at in the first Book. We see evidences of the same gallantry on the part of individual Frenchmen, and yet a conclusion favourable to England. In the third Book I have endeavoured to give some detail of the careers of those foreign adventurers who disciplined and trained the armies which contested India with England at Aligarh, at Dehli, at Laswari, INTEODUCTION. Xlli at Assaye, and at Argaum. There can be no question that in the last quarter of the last century there was in India scarcely any limit to the ambitious aspirations of an European adventurer who might possess even ordinary ability. When we see how men like Thomas and Perron, both originally common sailors, both devoid of abilities of the first-class, rose to the front rank ; how one became the independent ruler of a principality, and the other governed, for Sindia, a portion of India comprehending roughly the country now known as the North-west Provinces; we gather an idea of the relative practical character of the European and the Asiatic at that epoch. But the sketches of the lives of these adventurers are not less interesting from another point of view. They give a remarkable insight into the mode of administration peculiar to the natives of Hindostan. Beading them, we can form some idea of the condition to which the whole of India would have been reduced, had Lake been beaten at Laswari and Wellesley at Assaye. We can see how intrigue ruled supreme; how moral character went for nothing ; how audacity, recklessness, corruption, always triumphed; how combined in one man, they were irresistible. The sense entertained by the XIV INTRODUCTION. natives themselves of the condition of hfe and property at that period is clearly shown in the proverb which has survived in some parts to the present day ; ** The buJBfalo is to the man who *' wields the bludgeon.** In my humble opinion, formed after a service in India of thirty-five years, during which I have mixed freely and on the most intimate terms with the natives, the seventy odd years which have intervened between the battle of Laswari and the present day have wrought no considerable change in the general character of the people. Not that amongst them there have not been, and are not, men of the highest moral character; whose friendship is an honour, who know what is right and who act up to their knowledge. But these men form an inconsiderable minority. In a time of confusion they would be swept away. The love of intrigue still survives, and I write my own personal experience when I state that in the present decade, as much as in any that preceded it, intrigue uses falsehood and slander to move from high places men who strive earnestly and with all their power to eradicate those blots in the native character which were the curse of past generations. INTRODUCTION. XV In the last pages of this third Book I have endeavoured to show how in consequence of these vices it was inevitable that India should fall under the domination of a foreign master, and how the course of events caused that foreign master to be British. No one can deny that, however dimly the ultimate consequences may at the time have been foreseen by our countrymen, we fought for the position which we now occupy. It was with design that we crushed the hopes of the French; with design that we conquered Bengal ; with design that we subdued Tippu ; with design that in 1802-3 we contested Hindostan with Sindia and Holkar. Then, apparently for the first time, alarmed at the empire at our feet, we attempted to hold our hand. We withdrew from the princes of Eajputana the protection which Marquess Wellesley had promised them. What was the consequence ? Thirteen years of oppression, of tyranny, of misgovernment in its worst form in central and in western India ; the licensed atrocities of Amir Khan, the robberies of the Pindaris, dire spoliation by Maratha chieftains and their followers. In spite of ourselves we had again to step in. With the defeat and deposition Xvi INTRODUCTION. of the Peshwa, the overthrow of the Marathas and Pindaris, the Marquis of Hastings closed a campaign, which restoring British protection to Eajputana, placed us formally on the pinnacle we now occupy. Thenceforward we were forced to go onwards. We annexed the Panjab, annexed Bind, and sucked in Sattara, the dominions of the Bhonsla, and Oudh. Suddenly the overgrown army of mercenaries we had created, feeling its power, rose in revolt. Again did England designedly assert her supremacy. The mutiny crushed, we found ourselves face to face with a new order of things. Thenceforward there were to be no more annexations. But the crushing of the mutiny had been but a continuation of the policy of Clive, of Hastings, of Wellesley, of Hardinge, of Dalhousie — a continuation forced upon us, but still a continuation. We thus possess India by our own act; we took the responsibility upon ourselves, and we are morally bound by it. On whom else could we cast it, if we would? We would not make it over to any European power; we could not, without assuming the fearful responsibility of a terrible and inevitable future, resign it to a native prince ! No — we have gained it and we must keep it. For my part INTRODUCTION. XVll I regard India as the brightest jewel in the diadem of the Queen of England. I believe that the natives of India are not solitary in deriving benefit from their connection with England ; that directly and indirectly England greatly gains by it. But upon this large question I shall not here enter. We are in India and we must stay there; and that we are there for the benefit alike of the princes and the people is a fact which the wise and thoughtful Indian will be the first to admit. Many of them may perhaps have forgotten the days when their country was divided into armed camps, each led by a Pindari marauder or a Maratha freebooter ; when justice was openly bought, when no man could say in the day that his house would belong to him on the morrow, when human life was uncared for, and when readiness to commit the vilest crimes was a sure road to Court favour. But these are matters which it is well not to forget. Eecalling them to the memory the thinking reader will draw a contrast between that Maratha period of Indian history, peculiarly favourable to reckless and unprincipled adventurers, Native as well as European, and that which has succeeded it, when as a rule the buffalo is b Xviii INTRODUCTION. to the honest and frugal peasant, and when the higher appointments under Government fall to the intelligent, the well instructed, and the conscientious citizen. One word as to the authorities upon which I have drawn. The deeds of Suffren have been painted by four eminent French writers, Hennequin, Canat, Trublet, and Eoux. I have carefully compared the statements made by these biographers with Dr. Campbell's naval history of the period, with the accounts given by the authors of the Transactions in India, and of the Histoire de la derniere guerre, by Wilks {History of Southern India), and with the information procured for me from the naval archives of France. For the second Book, I am indebted mainly to Canat {Histoire de Surcouf), to Gallas {Les Corsair es Frangais sous la Bepublique), to the Asiatic Annual Register, and to the files of Indian papers of the last century which are stored up in the Public Library of Calcutta. The contents of the third Book are based mainly on the memoirs of de Boigne, on a very curious record of the services of his brother officers under native princes during the last century by Major Ferdinand Smith, on the INTRODUCTION. XIX Asiatic Annual Register, and on the newspaper files above alluded to. To the work as it stands I have added an Appendix, giving a plain didactic account of the expedition from India to Egypt in 1801. It is true that the events recorded in this Appendix have only an indirect connection with the main subject of the book. But the French occupation of Egypt may fairly be considered an integral part of the efforts made by France to disturb the supremacy of England in India. When, moreover, it is remembered that we live in a time when the Eastern question is the burning question of the day, I shall be excused for thinking that a plain statement of an expedition from India to Egypt organised by a Wellesley, carried into execution by a Baird, and approved of by a J, Wellington, may not be altogether out of place or out of season. My authorities for the account of this expedition are the Life of Sir David Baird, the memoirs of the Comte de Noe, the British despatches, and the Asiatic Annual Register. G. B. MALLESON. 27, West Cromwell Road, Is* February, 1878, BOOK I. FRENCH MARINERS on the INDIAN SEAS. I I. In the history of the French in India I have brought the story of the struggle for empire in the East of that gallant and high-spirited people to the year 1761. From that date the land contest really ceased. For although, in 1782, France did despatch a considerable force to aid Haidar Ali, the decrepitude of its leaders and the death of Haidar combined to render its efforts fruitless. From 1761, indeed, the French ceased to be principals in the contest. Thenceforth the adventurous sons of her soil were forced to content themselves with the position of auxiliaries to native princes. The foremost amongst them, levying contingents of their own countrymen, 1 2 FRENCH MARINERS took service in the courts which showed the greatest inclination to resist the progress of the increasing power of the English. Thus the younger Lally, Law, Kaymond, de Boigne, Perron, Dudrenec, and many others became the main supports upon which Haidar Ali, the Nizam, Sindia, and Holkar rested their hopes for independence, if not for empire. But, after all, although in many cases these adventurers accomplished much in the way of organising resistance to the English, they did not succeed in their own secret views. They failed entirely to resuscitate the dream of successful rivalry to England. One by one they disappeared before the steady advance of the foe they had once hoped to conquer. Sometimes, as at Haidarabad, dismissed on the requisition of an English governor; again, as in 1802, beaten by the English general, they gradually renounced the cause as hopeless, and finally ceased to pursue the struggle. The hopes which had glimmered but very faintly after the death of Haidar, which had again been somewhat rekindled by the prudent measures of Madhaji Sindia, were dealt a fatal blow by Lord Lake at Aligarh and at Dehli, and were finally crushed by that stalwart soldier on the field of Laswari. But there was another element upon which the fortunes of France still flourished even after the blow dealt at her in 1761. Strange, indeed, it was, that during the contest which terminated in that vear, she had never sent simultaneously to the field of action a capable general and a capable admiral. It is true that La ON THE INDIAN SEAS. 6 Bourdonnais combined both qualities in his own person, and the great things he had then been able to effect ought to have served as an example for the times that were to follow. But they did not. La Bourdonnais' stay in the Indian seas was short. He was succeeded by the feeble Dordelin. And subsequently, when the Government of Louis XY. made the greatest effort France had till then made to establish an empire in India ; when it sent out a general who had won distinc- tion on the battle-fields of Flanders, and soldiers who had helped to gain Fontenoy and Laffeldt, it selected as the colleague of the general an admiral of whom it has been written that ''to an unproductive brain he added infirmity of purpose.'' '^^i/^ Subsequently to the capture of Pondichery in 17ol, the position was reversed. When, eighteen years later, Bussy, gouty, infirm, and whom self-indulgence had made halting and undecided, was sent to command the land forces, he had as his naval colleague a man whose name, covered with an eternal ray of glory, still shines as one of the most illustrious, if not the most illustrious, in the naval annals of France. I allude to Pierre Andre de Suffren. -^ The Treaty of Paris, signed on the 10th February 1763, had restored Pondichery to France, but it was a Pondichery dismantled, beggared, bereft of all her influence. During the fifteen years which followed this humiliating treaty, Pondichery had been forced to remain a powerless spectator of the aggrandisement of 1 A 4 FRENCH MARINERS her rival on Indian soil. Even when, in 1778, the war was renewed, the Government of France was but ill prepared to assert a claim for independence, still less for dominion, in Eastern and Southern India. The natural results followed. Chandernagor fell without a blow (10th July 1778). Pondichery, ably defended for forty days against vastly superior forces by its Governor, Bellecombe, surrendered in the month of September following ; the fleet commanded by M. de Tronjoly, — a feeble copy of Count d'Ache, — abandoned the Indian waters without even attempting to save Mahe. All seemed lost. The advantages gained by the English appeared too great to be overcome ; when the marvellous energy of Haidar Ali, the Mahomedan ruler of Mysore, gave a turn to events which upset the most carefully laid calculations, and communicated to his French allies the most brilliant hopes. On the 4th April 1769 Haidar Ali had dictated peace to the English under the walls of Madras. By one of the articles of this treaty the contracting parties bound themselves to assist each other in defensive wars. But when, during the following year, Haidar was attacked and was hardly pressed by the Marhatas, the English refused their aid. Haidar never forgave this breach of faith. When, therefore, some nine years later, he saw the English embroiled alike with the French and the Marhatas, Haidar resolved to take his revenge. He first sent to the English an intimation that he should regard ON THE INDIAN SEAS. 5 an attack on the French settlement of Mahe, contiguous to his own possessions on the western coast, as equivalent to an attack upon himself. The English notwithstanding took Mahe and endeavoured apparently to pacify the ruler of Mysore by sending to him ambassadors charged with presents. These latter were however little calculated to produce such an effect. They consisted of a pigskin saddle and a rifle which it was found impossible to load. Haidar returned them with contempt, and prepared for war. His first efforts in the autumn were eminently successful. Outmanoeuvring the English general, Munro, he defeated and took prisoners (9th and 10th September, 1780) a detachment of 3720 men, of whom upwards of 500 were Europeans, under the command of Colonel Baillie, at Perambakam. He then captured Arcot and some minor places. But the ruler of Mysore had not been unmindful of the French alliance. Early in the year he had intimated to the representatives of that nation in India his determination to strike a decisive blow at their rivals, — a blow which must be fatal, i^ the French would only sufficiently aid him. But the ministers of Louis XYI. were not alive to the importance of the stake to be played for. In that year, when England was engaged in a life and death struggle with her own children in America, a fleet under Suffren and 3000 men under a skilled leader such as De Boigne, would have sufficed to clear of her rivals the whole country south of the b 6 FRENCH MARINERS Vindhya range. But though roused by the exhortations of Haidar, and catching, though dimly, a feeble idea of the possibilites before her, France, instead of sending a fleet and an army to India, contented herself with the despatch of a squadron and a regiment to guard the isles of France and of Bourbon, which the English had not even threatened. This squadron, commanded by M. Duchemin de Ohenneville, found on its arrival at its destination that the French islands were perfectly well protected by the small detachment of vessels commanded by the French admiral on the Indian station, the Chevalier d'Orves. This officer, who had succeeded de Tronjoly, at once assumed the command of the new arrivals. He had then at his disposal six serviceable men of war, one frigate, and two corvettes. It was not a large fleet, but it carried with it one of the finest regiments in the French army, a regiment such as, if landed in India, should have sufficed to render the campaign of 1781 decisive. A glimmering of the chances thus possibly awaiting him seems to have decided d'Orves to take this small fleet and this regiment to the Coromandel coast. He sailed then from the islands on the 14th October and sighted the coast near Kadalur on the 25th January following (1781.) Before referring to his subsequent conduct, let us take a glance at the position of afi'airs on the mainland on that date. Haidar, having outmanoeuvred Munro, beaten Baillie, ON THE INDIAN SEAS. 7 and captured Arcot, had laid siege to Ambur, Vellor, Wandewash, Permacol, and Chinglepat. The first named of these places surrendered on the 13th January, but on the 18th, Haidar, having received intelligence that the new English general. Sir Eyre Coote, had left Madras the previous day, with the intention of attacking him, raised the siege of the other places, and massed his forces. Haidar at first manoeuvred to cut off Sir Eyre Coote from Madras, but Coote, careless of this, marched upon Pondichery — the inhabitants of which had shaken off the English yoke, and had begun to arm the natives — revictualling the fortified places on his route. Haidar turned, and, following, overtook him on the 8th February, cutting him off from the country inland. As they approached Kadalur, marching in almost parallel lines, Haidar caught a glimpse of the French fleet under d'Orves, guarding the coast, and preventing the possibility of any supplies reaching the English by sea. At last, he thought, he had them. Coote possessed only the ground on which his army marched. He was between the sea guarded by d'Orves, and the grain-producing country shut out from him by Haidar. Sir Eyre Coote has recorded his opinion as to the fatal nature of his position. There seemed but one chance open to him, and that was that Haidar might be tempted to fight him. He tried then every expedient to induce that warrior to quit his lair. But the Asiatic was far too wary. He knew that, barring accidents, his enemy must surrender without firing a shot. 8 FBENCH MARINERS Haidar, meanwhile, had communicated with d'Orves and had begged him to land the regiment he had on board. He had pointed out to him likewise all the advantages of his position, the fact that the last army of the English was at their joint mercy, and that Madras was guarded by but 500 invalids. Never had France such an opportunity. It was an absolute certainty. There was neither risk nor chance about it. The English fleet under Sir Edward Hughes was off the western coast. D'Orves had but to remain quietly where he was for a few days and the English must be starved into surrender. Sir Eyre Coote saw it; Haidar Ali saw it ; every man in the army saw it; every man in the fleet saw it, excepting one. That man was d'Orves himself. Of all the positions in the world that one which most requires the possession of a daring spirit is the com- mand of a fleet. That Government is guilty of the greatest crime which sends to such a post a man wanting in nerve, deficient in self-reliance. Once before had France committed the same fault by entrusting in 1757, to the feeble d'Ache, the task of supporting Lally. But at least d'Ache fought. His feebler successor, d'Orves, was not required to fight. He was required to ride at anchor in the finest season of the year, a time when storms are unknown in the Indian seas, and see an enemv starve, — and he would not. D'Orves, described by his own countrymen as a man ** indolent and apoplectic," saved Sir Eyre Coote. In spite of the protestations of Haidar, he sailed for the ON THE INDIAN SEAS. y islands on the 15th February , taking away every man he brought with him, and having accomplished nothing. The English force at once obtained supplies from Madras.* Haidar, thus left to himself, fought Coote on the 1st July at Chilambram, and, after a desperate contest, was beaten. On the 27th August following he again engaged Coote at Parambakam, and this time not unequally. Haidar, however, left the field to the enemy. On the 18th February following (1782) Colonel Braith- waite's detachment, after combating for three days, succumbed to the superior numbers of Tippu Sahib. It was about the period of this last encounter that France appeared once again upon the scene, better though not perfectly represented ; for while she entrusted her fleet to the greatest of all her admirals, she committed the * The Viscomte de Souillac, at that time Governor of the Isle of France, has thus recorded his opinion of d'Orves, in a memoir in the Archives of the French Navy: "By this astonishing obstinacy of M. d'Orves, which I reported to the ministry at the time, we lost an opportunity such as will never recur, of becoming absolute masters of the Coromandel coast. This army of Kadaltir (Sir Eyre Coote's) 14,000 strong, of which 3000 to 4000 were English, comprised all the troops the English had in this part of India. Madras could not have held out, and the junction of our forces with those of Haidar Ali would have enabled us to conquer Tanjore and Masulipatam with all their dependencies." An English writer, the author of Memoirs of the late War in Asia, published in 1788, and who himself took part in the campaign, writes as follows — " Had the French admiral left only two frigates to block up the road of Cuddalore, consequences might have happened as fatal to the interests of Great Britain in the East Indies, as flowed in North America from the convention of Saratoga." 10 FRENCH MARINERS charge of her army first to an incapable sailor, only to replace him by a gouty sexagenarian. But to recount the causes which led to this powerful intervention we must for a moment retrace our steps. ON THE INDIAN SEAS. H n. Still unconscious of the fact that the War of Indepen- dence in America offered them the rarest opportunity for striking a decisive blow at the English power in India, the French Government were nevertheless alive to the necessity of preserving from attack the Cape of Good Hope, then belonging to their allies, the Dutch, and of maintaining a respectable force in the Indian Seas. Early, then, in 1781, a squadron of five men of war* was fitted out, and on the 22nd March sailed from Brest, under the command of the Commandant de Suffren. This illustrious sailor was born at St. Cannat in Pro- vence on the 13th July, 1726, the third son of the Marquis de Suifren de Saint Tropez. Destined for the navy he entered that service in 1743, and in the Solide, of 74 guns, joined the French fleet in the Mediterranean. He took part in an engagement with the English fleet under Admiral * They were : Le HeroSy .. 74 Guns. Commandant de Suffren. UAnnibal, . . 74 „ Capitaine de Tr^migon. UArtesieUy . . 64 „ „ de Cardailhac. Le VengeuTf ..64 „ ,, de Forbin. Le S])hinxy ,. 64 ,, „ du Chilleau. 12 FRENCH MARINERS Matthews. Transferred to the frigate Pauline, he again had several opportunities of displaying his courage. The same year, serving on board Le Monarque, he was taken prisoner. After the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle he was released, and proceeding to Malta became one of the Knights of the order of St. John of Jerusalem. During the Seven Years' War he took part in the siege and capture of Port Mahon (29th July, 1756), and was for the second time made prisoner at the combat of Lagos (1759). Returning to France after a captivity of two years, he was promoted to the command of the Cameleon of twenty guns, and sent to the Mediterranean to protect the French commerce. Subsequently, in the Singe, he so distinguished himself as to be promoted to the grade of commander fcapitaine de fregatej. The seven years which followed offered little occupation to his warlike nature. In 1772 he was promoted to the rank of pos captain fcapitaine de vaisseauj, and in 1778, in com- mand of Le Fantesque, he joined the squadron under Count d'Estaing, sent to aid the colonists of America. In the campaign which followed he so distinguished himself that he was granted a pension and marked for future command. A short cruise with two men of war in 1780 added to his reputation alike as a daring and skilful sailor and an unsurpassed manager of men. When, therefore, it was decided to send a squadron to the Indian seas, the choice of the minister fell naturally upon one who had shewn himself the most promising captain in the royal navy of France. ON THE INDIAN SEAS. 13 Such had heen the services of the man who was now starting with a squadron of five line of battle ships to maintain the honour of his country in the Eastern seas. Setting sail on the 22nd March, in company with the fleet destined for the American waters under the Count de Grasse, Suffren separated from that admiral at Madeira, and continued his course towards the Cape of Good Hope. He had under his charge seven transports conveying detachments of the regiment of Pondichery, and overlooking these was a corvette of 16 guns, La Fortune, He had it very much at heart to reach the Cape •as quickly as possible, so as to anticipate the arrival there of Commodore Johnstone, who, he had been informed, had sailed for that place from St. Helena with thirty-seven ships of sorts.* Commodore Johnstone had sailed from Spithead on the 13th March, 1781, with orders to attack the Dutch possessions at the Cape. Arriving at St. lago, one of the Cape de Verde islands, he deemed it necessary to stop there in order to take in wood, water, and livestock for his voyage. He accordingly put into Porto Praya early in April. It so happened that one of Suflfren's men of war, the Artesien, had been originally destined for the fleet sailing to the American waters, and her supplies of * The squadron consisted of one ship of 74 guns, one of 64, three of 50, and three frigates. The remainder were armed transports. The names were the Hero, 74 ; the Monmouth, 64 ; the Isis, Jupiter, and Romney of 50 each. The three frigates carried each 32 guns, and the transports had 112 guns amongst them. — CamphelVs Naval History 14 FRENCH MARINERS water had been regulated accordingly. As the French squadron approached the island of St. lago, the com- mander of that vessel, M. de Cardailhac, suggested to his chief the advisability of his putting into the bay of La Praya, in order to complete his supplies. Suffren assented, and ordered Cardailhac to stand in. At the same time, to guard against any possible danger, he followed in his track with the rest of the squadron.* On the morning of the 16th April, favoured by a breeze from the north-east, the Artesien had just passed between the islands of Maio and St. lago, when her captain discovered at anchor at the entrance of the roadstead an English vessel, and almost immediately afterwards there burst upon his view the thirty-seven ships of war and transports which Commodore John- stone had brought from England. Cardailhac at once signalled to his commander that enemies were in sight. It was a great opportunity for Suffren. He doubted not that the English were quite unprepared to receive him ; that they were dreaming of nothing less than of an attack ; that the crews would probably be dispersed in search of water and provisions. And this was actually the fact. Of the crews of the English vessels nearly * Campbell (Naval History) states that the French had received "by some means or other " information that Johnstone had put into Porto Praya ; but his statement is quite unsupported. The same reason which had prompted Johnstone himself to put in, and that reason alone, guided the movements of Suffren. ON THE INDIAN SEAS. X5 fifteen hundred were out foraging; and Commodore Johnstone himself so little expected an attack that he was at the moment engaged in giving directions for altering the position of some of his ships which had drifted too near to each other.* Suffren did not forego his chance. Despatching La Fortune to collect and guard the transports, he, at half- past ten in the morning, led the way in the Heros, and standing in close to the shore, followed by the other ships of his squadron, he made for the largest English vessel, also called the Hero^ and cast anchor between her and the Monmouth. The concentrated fire of the English squadron was for a few moments directed on the daring invader ; but very quickly the Annibal came to her aid, and diverted to herself much of the enemy's attention. The Artesien, which was following, was not fortunate. The smoke of the combat caused her captain, Cardailhac, to mistake one of the armed transports for a man-of- war. He was about to board her, when he was shot dead through the heart. La Boixiere who replaced him was incompetent. He, too, mistook another transport for a frigate. "Whilst engaged in boarding her, the freshening breeze took both his vessel and his prize quite out of the line of fire. The Vengeur, which had followed, went along the line of the enemy, exchanging broadsides, but her cap- tain's order to anchor not having been attended to, she * Campbell. 16 FRENCH MARINERS made the tour of the roadstead, and then quitting it, found herself unable to return. The Sphinx, owing to the mistake or disobedience of her captain, did not anchor. She endeavoured to main- tain her position by manoeuvring, keeping up at the same time a heavy fire ; but she rendered little effectual aid. Sufiren found himself then with two anchored vessels, and one unanchored, and therefore comparatively use- less, engaged with the whole English squadron. The odds were tremendous, but he still possessed the advan- tage always given by a surprise, and he continued, for an hour and a half, to maintain the unequal combat. At last, when the Annihal had lost her main and mizen masts, and her captain had been disabled ; w^hen the Heros had received considerable damage in her rigging, and had lost eighty-eight men killed and wounded ; and when all hope of effectual aid from the other three vessels of his squadron had disappeared, he deemed it advisable to discontinue the contest. Signalling, therefore, to the Annihal to follow him, he slowly sailed out of the road- stead, still keeping up a tremendous fire. The Annihal essayed to follow him ; but, as she passed between the Hero and the Monmouth, her remaining mast fell by the board. Fortunately the wind had shifted and was now blowing strongly from the south- west. She managed thus to rejoin, though slowly, her consorts outside. It was about half-past twelve o'clock in the day when ON THE INDIAN SEAS. 17 * Suffren reunited his squadron outside the harbour and began to repair damages. Three hours later Commodore Johnstone followed him and appeared inclined to attack in his turn. SufFren, however, placing the Annibal in the centre of his line, offered so bold a front, that the English commodore, whose ships, especially the Isis, had suffered severely, drew off and returned to La Praya.* Suffren then continued his voyage without molestation, and on the 21st June cast anchor in Table Bay. The convoy arrived nine days later. Having landed his troops at the Cape ; having secured the colony against attack ; having completely repaired his damages, and having been joined by two corvettes, the Consolante and the Fine, Suffren sailed for the islands of France and Bourbon on the 28th August. He cast anchor in Port Louis on the 25th October following. * Dr. Campbell states that Johnstone " pursued the French, but he was not able to overtake them." The French authorities, on the other hand, assert that their fleet put on so bold a front that Johnstone stayed his advance, although he was within two cannonshot of their ships. " It was only at night," says Eoux, " that the French continued their route, lighting their fires to provoke the enemy to follow them. The English, who had the advantage of the wind, dared not accept the challenge, but returned precipitately to La Praya." It is clear, considering the disabled state of the Annibal^ and that the English commodore had the advantage of the wind, that he could have forced an action had he desired to do so. On his return to the roadstead. Commodore Johnstone recaptured the transport taken by VArtesien. Much has been said by English writers regarding the fact that the Cape de Verde islands were neutral ground. It is perfectly true, but in this respect the French only did as they had been done by. The harbour of Lagos, in which the vessel on board of which Suffren served in 1759 had taken refuge, was equally neutral ground, and yet the French had been attacked in it by the English. 2 18 FRENCH MARINERS He found there six men of war, three frigates, and some corvettes. But at their head was the indolent and incapable d'Orves, the same who, we have seen, had already thrown away the most splendid chance of establishing a French India ! It was under this man that Suffren was to serve as second in command ! Meanwhile the French Government had tardily decided to make in 1782 an attempt which could scarcely have failed if hazarded in 1780. It had resolved to strike another blow, this time in concert with Haidar Ali, for domination in Southern India. With this object in view it had roused from his retreat the Marquis de Bussy, the man who in his youth and middle age had gained honour and glory and wealth in that fairy land, but who now, gouty, worn out, and querulous, was incapable alike of decision and enterprise.* The designs of the Court of Versailles had been com- municated early in the year to M. de Souillac, Governor of the islands, and it had been intimated that transports containing troops would gradually arrive at his Governor- ship, and that, concentrating there, they would proceed to India, escorted by a powerful fleet under the command of Count d'Orves. De Souillac, who was enterprising and patriotic, had at once set to work to organise a force with the resources at his command from among the colonists ; and at the period of the arrival of SufFren, he had drilled and armed a corps of 2868 men. Bussy had * Bussy was then only sixty-four years old ; but twenty years of sloth and luxury had quite impaired his faculties. ON THE INDIAN SEAS. 19 not then arrived. De Souillac therefore conferred the command of this force upon M. Duchemin. It was an unfortunate choice. Duchemin was a sailor rather than a soldier. But he was strong neither on the sea nor on the land. He was as weak mentally as physically. A terrible fear of responsibility acted upon a constitution unable to bear the smallest fatigue. A man of moderate abilities would have sufficed for the occasion. The abilities of Duchemin were not even moderate. These 2868 men, well commanded, and escorted to a given point by Suffren, would have sufficed to give the preponderance to Haidar Ali in his struggle with the English. But moments were precious. The war with the American colonists still indeed continued, but many things presaged that its duration would not be long. It was necessary, then, that the French should strike at once, and should strike with vigour and precision. Of this necessity no one was more convinced than the Governor of the islands, de Souillac. He hastened his preparations, so that on the 7th December, 1781, the French fleet, consisting of eleven men of war, three frigates, three corvettes, one fireship, and nine tran- sports containing troops, was able to set out for its destination. What was its destination ? Suffren, with a precision natural to him, had advised that it should sail direct for Madras, and attempt to take that town by a coup de main. But the cautious and feeble d'Orves had over- ruled him. He would only proceed by degrees. He 2 A 20 FRENCH MARINERS would feel his way. It was too much for him even to take a straight look at India. He therefore directed the fleet upon Trincomali. But Providence had one good turn in store for the French. Happily for the success of the expedition d^Orves died on the way (9th February, 1782). He made over the command to Suffren who had just received the rank of commodore {chef d'escadre). Suflfren at once altered the course to Madras. Before this event had happened, Suffren himself in his ship, the Heros, had pursued and captured an English man-of-war of 50 guns, called the Hannibal, She was at once added to the French fleet under the title of Le petit Annihal. From the officers of this vessel Suffren learned, for the first time, that large reinforce- ments were on their way to the English squadron in the East. Passing Pondichery, Suffren despatched to that town, in a corvette, Lieutenant- Colonel Canaple, with instruc- tions to communicate at once toHaidar Ali the intelligence of his arrival and his hopes. On the 15th February, just three days before Colonel Braithwaite's detachment succumbed to Tippu Sahib, his fleet came in sight of Madras.* Anchored in front of Fort St. George, and protected by its guns, he descried eleven t ships of war, — * The currents and a southerly breeze had taken his squadron con- siderably to the north of Madras. Coming again under the influence of the N.-E. Monsoon he approached Madras from the north. + Dr. Campbell mentions only nine. The other two were probably frigates. ON THE INDIAN SEAS. 21 the squadron of Sir Edward Hughes. Suffren formed his ships in line of battle till he arrived within two cannonshots of the English fleet. He then anchored and summoned all his captains on board the Heros to a council of war. It must always be remembered that the fleet of M. de Suffren was escorting transports conveying a corps d'armee, and that it was a main object with him to land his troops and disembarrass himself of his transports before attempting an equal combat with the enemy. The proposal then of the captain of the Fine, M. Perrier de Salvart, to attack Sir Edward Hughes, lying as he was under the cover of the guns of Madras, appeared to him too hazardous. He determined therefore to direct the transports on towards Porto Novo, covering their course with his fleet. In pursuance of this decision the fleet commenced its southward course that same evening. But as the breeze freshened, Suffren observed the English vessels hoist their sails and follow him. Kightly conceiving that their object was to cut off his transports, Suffren gave the order that these should range themselves between the shore and his fleet, covered by the corvette the Pourvoyeuse, and make all sail for Porto Novo, whilst the Fine should watch the enemy's movements. In spite of these precautions, however. Sir Edward Hughes, favoured by the darkness of the night, glided unperceived between the French squadron and the tran- sports. These latter crowded sail to escape, and when 22 FRENCH MARINERS day broke they and their pursuers had sailed almost out of sight of Suffren's squadron. Suddenly, however, the look-out man on board the Fine signalled the enemy to the south. Immediately every sail was set, and the Heros, followed by the rest of the squadron, soon approached the pursuers and the pursued. Sir Edward, thus baulked of this prey,* hove to, and ordered the chase to be discontinued. In the battle now about to engage, the French had the advantage of two ships, having eleven against nine of the English. Yet this advantage, great as it was, was balanced, partly by the superior organization of the English, partly also by the jealousy and dislike enter- tained towards Suffren by the officers of the ships which had joined him at the islands. The jealousy, so often evinced in the time of Dupleix, which could not subor- dinate personal feelings to duty, manifested itself in the manner now to be described in the course of the action. The French fleet was formed into two divisions ; the first was composed as follows : — Le Heros 74 guns, carrying the commodore's broad pennant. UOrient 74 ,, one of ihe ships brought from Port Louis. Le Sphinx 64 ,, brought by Suffren from Brest. Le Vengeur 64 ,, ditto ditto. Le petit Annihal 50 „ captured from the English. * Dr. Campbell says vaguely that he captured *' several of them ; " but the French accounts shew that all the troops were disembarked sub- squently at Porto Novo. ON THE INDIAN SEAS. 23 The second division, commanded by the captain of the Annibal, de Tromelin, consisted of : — 74 guns, brought by Suffren from Brest. ,, from Port Louis. „ by Suffren from Brest. ,, from Port Louis. ,, ditto, ditto. UAnnibal 74 Le Severe 64 UArtesien 64 L^Ajax 64 Le Brillant 64 Le Flamand 54 )» The armament amounted to 710 guns. The English fleet was thus composed : — The Superb 74 guns, Flagship. The Hero 74 „ The Monarch 74 „ The Exeter 64 „ The Eagle 64 „ The Monmouth 64 guns. The Worcester 64 ,, The Barford 64 „ The Isis 54 ,, or a total armament of 596 guns. It was half-past three o'clock in the afternoon before the wind, which was light and variable, allowed Suffren to approach his enemy. Seeing even then that some of his captains had not occupied the post assigned to them, he signalled to them to take the place in the line which each could reach the most quickly. Eapidly advancing then, he exchanged a broadside with the Exeter, but noticing the flag of the English admiral, he directed the Heros towards the vessel that bore it, at the same time signalling to the second division to close within pistol-shot of the enemy. The combat lasted from half-past three to seven o'clock in the evening. But it was not till quite the close of the action that all the French ships came into the line of fire. The entire first division consisting of 24 FRENCH MARINERS five ships was engaged throughout ; but of the second the Flamand and the Brillant alone came to close quarters, the remaining four, disobeying the direct orders of the commodore, keeping up only a distant fire. On the part of the English the brunt of the attack was borne by the Exeter and the Superb. The former, fought splendidly by Captain King, was terribly riddled. Her loss in killed and wounded was very great. The Superb, too, sufi'ered severely. At seven o'clock the combat ceased as if by mutual consent. Darkness had come on, and Sufiren was too ill-satisfied with the conduct of five of his captains to risk a continuance of the contest. Sir Edward Hughes on his side was well content that it should cease. He was expecting reinforcements from England and by bearing down to the south he was likely to meet them. An opportunity would then offer to renew the battle on more advantageous terms. Taking advantage then of the quiescent attitude of the enemy he made all sail to the south. It is probable that on this occasion, for the first and only time in his life, Sufiren missed a great opportunity. He had on the whole had the advantage in the action. He had reduced one of the enemy's ships to an almost sinking condition * and their losses had been heavier than his own. * " At the close of the action when she (the Exeter)h8id been most dread- fully cut up, two fresh vessels of the enemy's squadron bore down upon her. The Master asked Commodore King what he should do withher under the circumstances. His reply was " there is nothing to be done but to fight till she sinks." Just at this moment the two French ships were recalled. Campbell, ON THE INDIAN SEAS. 25 He knew that the Enghsh were expecting reinforcements. Why then did he not promptly pursue them ? He did not do so because he could not trust all his captains. The following morning Suffren summoned his captains on board the Heros. Those inculpated promised better conduct for the future. The squadron then quietly pursued its course to Porto Novo. Here Suffren dis- embarked his troops, negotiated the terms of an alliance with Haidar Ali, and on the 23rd, having re-victualled his ships and been joined by one man-of-war and three frigates, sailed for the south, protecting some trans- ports he was despatching to the islands, and hoping to meet again his English rival. On the 8th April his wishes in this respect were fulfilled. With his twelve line of battle ships he sighted, on the morning of that day, the eleven ships composing the squadron of Sir Edward Hughes* standing for Trincomali. For three days they continued in sight, Suffren finding it impossible to force an action. But on the morning of the 12th, Hughes, changing his course to gain Trincomali, unavoidably gave the Frenchman the advantage of the wind. Of this advantage Suffren made prompt use. The action began about half-past twelve o'clock. Seven of the French ships were immediately engaged. But two, the Vengeur and the ArUsien, notwithstanding the repeated signals of the commodore, kept at a distance, and their example was for some time followed * The French ships carried 972 guns ; those of the English 737. 26 FRENCH MARINERS by the Severe, the Ajax and the Annihal, At last these three came up, and the action became general. In the early part of the day fortune seemed to incline to the French. The Monmouth was dismasted and compelled to quit the line, having had 45 men killed and 102 wounded. The S'ltperZ? was greatly damaged. The English admiral then gave orders to the squadron to wear. By this manoeuvre, the position of the rival fleets was reversed. Still, however, the battle continued; when suddenly at six o'clock a tremendous storm burst upon both fleets, enveloping them in darkness, and forcing them, close to a lee shore, to pay attention to their own safety. Suffren at once signalled to anchor. In this battle the English lost 137 killed and 430 wounded ; the French 130 killed and 364 wounded. The Heros, the Orient and the Brillant had sufi'ered severely. Nevertheless the next morning Suffren offered battle to Sir Edward, but the English admiral, having a large convoy under his charge, declined it. Suffren then sailed southward, whilst the English squadron entered the harbour of Trincomali. As to the captains of the Vengeur and the Artesien, Captains de Forbin and de Maurville, Suffren reported their conduct to the Minister of Marine. Subsequently, it will be seen, he deprived them of their commands and sent them to France, where, on arrival, they were imprisoned. A little more than a fortnight after this battle, Suffren brought his squadron into the anchorage of Batacola, a Dutch port in the island of Ceylon, about twenty leagues ON THE INDIAN SEAS. 27 I to the south of Trincomali, to which place the English squadron had repaired. By taking up this position Suifren gained all the advantage of the wind which was just beginning to set in from the south. He had previously despatched a brig, the Chasseur, to the islands to demand of M. de Souillac men and munitions of war, of which latter there did not remain to him a sufficient quantity for a single action. Here, at Batacola, Suffren received despatches from France directing him to proceed to the islands to escort Bussy to the Indian coast.* But there were grave reasons which urged Suffren to defer obedience to these instructions. In the first place he could not place confidence in many of his captains. The senior next to himself. Captain de Tromelin, was a man whom he had reason specially to mistrust. To leave to such a man the charge of a squadron wanting in men and ammuni- tion, at a time when an English squadron of almost equal force was ready to dispute with it the mastery of the Indian Seas, and when nearly 3000 French troops, but just landed, required the support of French ships, was a course which prudence and patriotism alike spurned. Suffren preferred then to take upon himself the responsibility of not obeying the minister's order. He justified this line of action in a letter to the Grovernor of the Isles of France and Bourbon. i * These despatches were brought to Suffren by Villaret-Joyeuse, subsequently distinguished as the admiral who, with a revolutionary jBieet, fought the battle of the 1st June against Lord Howe. 28 FRENCH MARINERS Fortunately for France the Governor of the islands was a man endowed with a cool judgment, a clear understanding, and large and comprehensive views. He in his turn justified the action of Suffren to the Minister of Marine. After detailing the various reasons which would render the absence of Suffren from the scene of action not only inexpedient but dangerous to French interests, he thus concluded : ** It may truly beafiirmed that the course M. de Suffren has taken will save India and pave the way for the success of the Marquis de Bussy." The French fleet remained in the anchorage of Batacola till the 1st June. It was a trying time for Suffren. His greatest enemies were the recalcitrant captains who were sighing for the luxurious diet, the graceful forms, and the smiling faces of the Isle of France. These offered a covert resistance to all the plans of their commodore. But Suffren saw through their motives, and being a plain speaker, he told thetn bluntly that he would rather sink the squadron before the forts of Madi'as than retire before Admiral Hughes. ** If there are any,'' he added, /'who have formed the conception of such an infamy let them give me their reasons and I shall know how to answer them." It was in putting down the intrigues formed by these men, in repairing and re-victualling his ships, in tending on the shore the sick and wounded, and finally in welcoming re-inforce- ment of men and munitions, that the six weeks at Batacola were spent. ON THE INDIAN SEAS. 29 Meanwhile the troops under the feeble Duchemin, disembarked at Porto Novo the 20th April, had begun their operations. It had been arranged between the French commodore and Haidar Ali that 6000 infantry and 4000 cavalry of the Mysore army should join the French force, and that these united should, under the command of the French general, act in concert with Haidar Ali, the latter furnishing supplies both in money and kind. These arrangements were quickly carried out. Haidar had wished that the Freneh corps d'armee should at once attack Negapatam, a most important town on the coast, and the capture of which could then have been easily effected. Duchemin, however, pre- ferred the easier conquest of Kadalur. This place surrendered on the 6th May. A junction was then effected with Haidar Ali, and the united armies besieged and took Permacol, and a few days later invested Wandewash. Then occurred another instance of the crime of intrust- hag important military operations to a man without brains and without nerve. Probably in private life Duchemin was amiable and inoffensive. He was certainly not tor- K mented by a constant desire to dare. These somewhat ^ negative qualities ought to have engendered a doubt as to the possession of the sterner faculties which fit a man for command. It has indeed been conjectured that he might have owed his selection to there not being a better man on the spot. Yet, judging by results, such a surmise must be a libel on all and every one of the 2868 men he led to India. 80 FRENCH MARINERS Just imagine his position. The English had but one army in Southern India. That army consisted of about 12,000 men, of whom little more than 2000 were Europeans. It was commanded by Sir Eyre Coote, a man who had been very good in his day, but who was then utterly broken down in health. That army defeated, and Southern India would become Mysorean and French. On the the other side was the army of Haidar Ali, 60,000 strong, flushed with victory over Braithwaite, and but just joined by about 2000* Frenchmen under Duchemin. For this army a defeat was comparatively unimportant ; for the Englisli had not the men to follow up the victory, and Haidar had another army to fall back upon. It was just the occasion when it was the policy of the English to avoid a decisive action, of the allies to force one on. Yet, it is scarcely credible that, whilst the English general so far played into his enemy's hands as to offer battle to them, the French commander declined it. If success justifies the neglect of all rule, then, and then alone, was Coote warranted in offering battle. Defeat would have ruined him. Yet his part, at least, was a noble and a daring part. But what can justify Duchemin ? Look again at the position. Haidar Ali and Duchemin with an army of over 60,000 men were besieging Wande- wash ; Sir Eyre Coote thought that Wandewash must be saved at any price. He therefore advanced with his * Deducting the sick in hospital. ON THE INDIAN SEAS. 31 army, 12,000 strong, and offered battle to the allies. His position was of no great strength. He had no advan- tages. He was over-matched in cavalry, in infantry, and in artillery. Haidar, old as he was, was eager to accept the challenge. Duchemin refused. Why did he refuse ? The fate of French India was in his hands. He had but to tell his countrymen to fight, as Frenchmen will fight, and, in all probability, Wande- wash would have been the grave of the English. Why then did he refuse ? It was an opportunity at which Suffren would have clutched, which the least of the generals of Napoleon would have made decisive. Un- happily for France, Duchemin was less than the least of her warrior children. In reply to the urgent requisition of Haidar, Duchemin pleaded his health ; he pleaded his instructions not to fight before the arrival of Bussy; he pleaded, not in words, but in a manner not to be misunderstood, his own innate incapacity. Haidar AH saw it — saw it with disdain . In compliance with the urgent solicitations of the Frenchman, he ab- stained from attacking Coote, and, raising the siege of Wandewash, retreated towards Pondichery, and occupied a strongly fortified position close to Kalinur. But the loss of the opportunity chafed him. Such allies were useless to him. He determined to show them he could fight the English without them. The occasion soon presented itself. Sir Eyre Coote, foiled in his endeavours to force on a battle before 32 FRENCH MARINERS Wandewash, determined to make an attempt on the magazines of Haidar at Arni. There were all his stores ; there his supplies of ammunition and weapons of war. To surprise that place would in very deed give a deadly wound to his enemy. Coote resolved to attempt it. His chances seemed good, for he had gained over the com- mandant of Arni. Coote set his army in motion for that purpose on the night of the 30th May. But Haidar had had good infor- mation and had penetrated his plan. Whilst then he sent by forced marches Tippu and his own French contingent under the younger Lally to protect Arni, he broke up from his camping ground at Kalinur, and marched on the track of Coote, hoping to take him in rear. He did not even ask the opinion of Duchemin, but left him and his corj^s d'armee behind.* Haidar Ali overtook the English force on the 2nd June just as they were in sight of Arni. The English leader was surprised. He had Tippti and Lally in front of him, and Haidar Ali in his rear. His troops were tired. Haidar had never had such a chance. But the skill of Coote and the valour of the English baffled him. By dexterous manoeuvring Coote made it a day of skirmish- ing, in the course of which he captured one of Lally' s guns stuck fast in the bed of the river. In his main object, however, Coote was baffled. Haidar saved Arni. Four days later Haidar took his revenge for the loss of * To mark his sense of Duchemin's conduct Haidar suspended the supply of provisions to the French army during his own absence. ON THE INDIAN SEAS. 8S his gun by tempting the English into an ambuscade. They fell into the snare, and lost 166 men, 54 horses, and two guns. Haidar's loss was about 60 men. After this action Sir Eyre Coote returned to the vicinity of Madras. Haidar, unable to conquer the repugnance to action of Duchemin, proceeded to push on the siege of Yellor. 84 FBENCH MARINERS III. It was whilst the events just recorded were progressing on land that intelligence from time to time reached Haidar Ali of the gallant contests which Suffren had been delivering on the sea. The enthusiasm of the tried, and gallant old warrior knew no bounds. "At * last," he said to his confidants, "at last the English * have found a master. This is the man who will aid * me to exterminate them : I am determined that two ' years hence not one of them shall remain in India, ' and that they shall not possess a single inch of Indian ' soil.'* Then turning to the French agent in his camp, M. Piveron de Morlat, he begged him to write at once to his master, and to tell him of his own great desire to see him, to embrace him, to tell him how much he esteemed him for his heroic courage. Before this message could reach the French commo- modore, Suffren had sailed with his refitted and augmented squadron in the direction of Kadaltir. It had been his original intention to do the work which Duchemin had declined to attempt, viz,, to take pos- session of Negapatam, which would have formed an important depot for the operations of the land and sea ON THE INDIAN SEAS. 35 forces. But the course of events induced him to change his determination. The French fleet, consisting of twelve ships of the line and four large frigates, sailed first to Tranquebar, and then, making several captures en route, arrived, on the 20th June, at Kadalur. Here for the first time Sufiren became acquainted with the misconduct of Duchemin. Eesolved, by some daring measure, to atone for the shortcomings of this incapable soldier, Suffren embarked on board his transports, besides siege materials, 1200 men of the line, 400 of the levies of the islands, two companies of artillery, and 800 sepoys, intending to make a dash at Negapatam. He was on the point of sailing when intelligence reached him that the English fleet, emerging from Trincomali, had passed Kadalur, and was bearing up northward in the direction of the place which he had hoped to surprise. Disappointed, but still determined, Suffren at once set sail in pursuit of the enemy. Coming in sight, on the 5th July, of Negapatam, he beheld the English fleet lying at anchor in the roadstead. Determined at all hazards to force on an action, Suffren signalled to clear decks and to be ready to anchor. His own ship, the Heros, was leading, when at three o'clock, a sudden squall caused to the Ajax, which was following, the loss of her main and mizen topmasts. These, and other damages, almost as serious, forced her to drop out of the line. The squall settling into a steady breeze gave the English admiral the advantage of the wind. He accord - 3 A 86 FRENCH MARINERS ingly weighed anchor and stood out to sea. That night the two fleets anchored within two cannonshots of each other. When the morning of the 6th July broke, the first care of the French commodore was to ascertain the con- dition of the Ajax, His rage may be imagined when he found that the necessary repairs remained uncompleted. The rage was increased to fury when he received from her captain a request that his vessel might be allowed to stand in for the nearest roadstead, and this in the pre- sence of an enemy and when an engagement was impending ! He refused absolutely. Meanwhile the English admiral, finding the enemy of about equal strength with himself,* determined to use his advantage of the wind and to force on an engagement. At ten minutes past seven, then, he formed line ahead, and signalled to his captains that each ship should bear down as directly as possible upon her opponent and endeavour to bring her to close action. Suffren on his side tacked, putting the head to the wind, in order to form a new line. As he did this, he had the mortification to see the captain of the Ajax stand right away from him. It was not till about half-past nine o'clock that the English ships came within range of their enemy. Both fleets opened fire simultaneously at long distances. * The French fleet consisted, besides the Ajax which took no part in the battle, of eleven ships of the line, carrying 706 guns, and of four frigates. The English had eleven line of battle ships, carrying 746 guns, •and one frigate. ON THE INDIAN SEAS. 37 Soon, however, the fight closed. The Flamand, 50, drew upon herself the fire, which she returned, of the Hero, 74, and the Exeter, 64 ; whilst the Annihal, 74, engaged in a murderous conflict with the Isis, 56. Simultaneously the Severe, 64, and the Barford, 74:; the Brillant, 64, and the Sultan, 74 ; the French com- modore's ship, the Heros, 74, and the English admiral's ship, the Superb, 74; engaged in an almost hand to hand encounter. Of the other vessels it may be noted that the SpJiifix, 64, fought the Monarca, 74 ; but the position of this latter, on the starboard quarter of the Superb, rendered it impossible for her to deliver any but an oblique fire. The Worcester, the Monmouth, the Eagley and the Magnamine, which followed in her wake, could only form a line at an angle of forty-five with the French line. It followed that the fire between these and the Petit Annibal, the Artesien, and the Vengeur was at a long distance, whilst the Bizarre and the Orient, not- withstanding the efi'orts of their captains, remained in forced inaction. The Flamand was the first French ship to feel the weight of her two powerful antagonists. She managed, however, to forge ahead and clear herself, and they were in too crippled a condition to follow her. The Brillant at the same time was suffering much from the well-directed fire of the Sultan, when Sufi*ren, signalling to the Sphinx to replace him alongside the Superb, came to her rescue. The fight was then renewed with extra- ordinary vigour ; when at one o'clock the wind suddenly 38 FRENCH MARINERS changed, and threw both the combating parties into disorder. This change of wind, according to the English writers, saved the French fleet from certain defeat. The French on their side, whilst admitting the shameful conduct of some of their captains, contend that the battle was still uncertain, and that they were combating with equal chances when the wind came to part them. The state of affairs after the change of wind had operated, as stated by one of the English writers of the period, a decided partisan, shows, I think, that there could have been little to choose between the condition of the rivals. *' After much manoeuvring,'' he writes, **and the con- '' tinuation of a partial engagement between such of the '* two fleets as came within reach of each other, the ** English admiral made the signal for the line of battle ** ahead, and was preparing, at half-past one o'clock, to " renew the attack; but seeing, at two, the enemy " standing in shore, and collecting their ships in a close ^' body, while his were much dispersed, and several of " them ungovernable, he relinquished that design, and *' thought only of getting into such a condition as should " prove decisive to the service next morning. Then, " however, the French were observed under sail, on " their way to Cuddalore, while our fleet was utterly " incapable of preventing or pursuing them."* If this does not imply that the English ships had been at least * Transactions in India. London: 1786. Campbell says: *' The action was obstinate, well fought, but indecisive." ON THE INDIAN SEAS. 89 as much damaged as their enemies in the previous encounter there is no meaning in language. The French statement corroborates substantially the account from which I have just quoted. '^ Sir Edward Hughes," it relates, '* abandoning to us the field of ** battle, endeavoured to concentrate his ships between '* Negapatam and Naour, whilst Suffren, lying to, and *' seeing the English squadron disappear, gave orders to '' anchor off Karikal, two leagues to windward of it." Suffren himself attributed the indecisive nature of the action to the conduct of his captains. He accordingly placed under arrest and sent to France the following three of their number, viz., M. de Maurville of the Artesien, for having on the 6th July aggravated the faults he had committed on the 17th February, the 12th April, and the 5th June ; M. de Forbin, for having on this occasion rivalled his misconduct on the 12th April; and M. de Cillart for having unbecomingly hauled down his flag. * M. Bouvet, who had not brought the Ajax into action at all, was deprived of his command, whilst three other inferior officers were sternly reprimanded. Having rid himself of these worse than incapable captains, Sufi'ren anchored in the roadstead of Kadaltir * This occurrence is thus summarised from the French authorities : ** In one of the isolated encounters le Severe was sustaining a fierce combat with the Sultan. All at once, in spite of the proximity of VAnnibalj le SphinXy and VHeros, de Cillart ordered his men to haul down his flag. Fortunately his cowardice, which betrayed itself by unmistakeable signs, remained without result. Two officers rushed to him, and apostrophis- ing him severely, rehoisted the flag and continued the combat." 40 FRENCH MABINEES and devoted all his efforts to repair the damages his ships had sustained in the action. Yet, whilst actively engaged in this prosaic work, his brain, never idle, had conceived one of the most daring projects which ever entered into the head of a naval commander. Long had he noticed with envy the possession by the English of the only harbour on the eastern coast of Ceylon, capable of containing a large fleet, at the same time that it was strong enough to defy any hostile attack. He lay before Kadalur in an open roadstead, liable to the storms of the ocean and the attacks of a superior force of the enemy. In this open roadstead he had to carry out all his repairs. The English admiral, he knew well, was about to be joined by the Sceptre of 64 guns and the San Carlos of 44. Were he to be attacked by the force thus increased to a very decided superiority, how could he effectually resist? Considerations of this nature pointed to the advisability of securing a harbour at once large, commodious, and safe. These advantages were possessed by Trincomali. Suffren then resolved to capture Trincomali. It was a bold, almost an audacious venture. After the combat of the 6th July the English admiral had kept the sea for nearly a fortnight to the windward of Negapatam.* With his ships much battered and * The only English writer who attempts to justify the English admiral's delay before Negapatam, the author of Transactions in Indian says that the situation of the army may have rendered this inaction necessary. But there are no grounds for this supposition. The English army was then likewise in a state of complete inaction. ON THE INDIAN SEAS. 41 urgently needing repair it is not easy to imagine why Sir Edward Hughes wasted that precious fortnight in idle bravado. This at least is certain, that it gave Suffren the opportunity he was longing for. The state of his vessels and the necessity for procuring ammunition rendered it impossible for Sir Edward Hughes to keep the sea for more than a fortnight. He steered then for Madras and reached that place on the 20th July. He at once took the necessary measures for the repairs of his fleet. Here also he was joined by the Sceptre and the San Carlos. Sir Edward Hughes thought, and he seemed to have reason for his opinion, that he had sufficient time before him. He knew to a great, though not to the fullest extent, the diffi- culties his rival had to encounter at Kadalur. Had he known the whole truth, he would have felt still more confident, for, on the 30th July, ten days subsequently to his own arrival at Madras, the state of the French ships of war was so miserable, and the resources at the disposal of Suffren were so limited, that action for the remainder of the year seemed for them impossible. On that date Suffren thus wrote to the Governor of the Isle of France, M. de Souillac : ** I assure you it is * no easy matter to keep the sea on a coast, without * money, without magazines, with a squadron in many ' respects badly furnished, and after having sustained ' three combats. * * I am at the end of my re- * sources. Nevertheless we must fight to gain Ceylon ; * the enemy have the wind of us and we have so many 42 FRENCH MARINERS '^ slow sailers that there is little hope we shall gain that '* advantage. * '^ The squadron has 2000 men in ** hospital of whom 600 are wounded." Even before thus writing Suffren had broken up his prizes and transports, and had demolished houses and other buildings in Kadaliir to provide himself with the means of repairing his damaged ships ! Whilst thus engaged in these important duties, intelligence reached Suffren (25th July) that the great sovereign of Mysore had arrived within a few miles of Kadalur in the hope of seeing him and of concerting plans for the future. The French commodore at once despatched an officer of rank to congratulate Haidar Ali, and the next day he landed himself in state, to pay him a visit of ceremony. His reception was magnificent. Met on landing by the principal nobles of Mysore, escorted by Haidar Ali^s own bodyguard of European cavalry, he was greeted on the threshold of the state-tent by that prince himself. The appearance of Haidar Ali was the signal for a general presentation of arms on the part of the troops drawn up in battle array. The drums beat, the trumpets sounded, the attendants sang hymns recording the prowess of the French. Not a single mark of respect or of honour was omitted. The interview lasted three hours. Towards the close of it Suffren suggested to Haidar that he should come down to the sea shore to look at the French fleet dressed out in his honour. But Haidar, who was suffering, and ON THE INDIAN SEAS. 4B who did not care to undergo the exertion that would be necessary, replied that he ** had left his camp for one *^ object only, that of seeing so great a man, and that '' now that he had seen him there was nothing remain- '^ ing that he cared to see/' The two following days were spent in giving and receiving presents, and in arranging as to the operations which should take place on the arrival of Bussy. They were actually engaged in discussing this question, when intelligence was received of the arrival at Point de Galle of the advanced guard of Bussy's fleet under M. d'Aymar. Bussy, in fact, had set out from Cadiz in December 1781 with two men-of-war, three transports, and a large convoy. His misfortunes set in early. The convoy was attacked, dispersed, and in part destroyed by English cruisers, so much so that only two ships laden with artillery joined him afc the Cape.* He still, however, had the soldiers who had embarked on his three transports. Terrified, however, at a report that the English were about to attack the Cape with an army of 6000 men, he left there 650 of his small detachment. Sailing then to the islands, the perusal of the despatches just arrived from Suffren seemed to give him new courage. In concert, then, with the Governor, M. de Souillac, he detached under M. d'Aymar, two men of war, the St. Michael, 64, and the Illustre, 74, one frigate, the Consolante, and nine storeships, carrying 800 men and laden with supplies and ammunition, to * Many subsequently made their way to the islands. 44 FRENCH MARINERS proceed at once to join Suffren, and to announce that he himself would shortly follow with the hulk of his troops. It was of the arrival of this squadron at Galle that Suffren received information at Kadalur on the 28th July, whilst still discussing affairs with Haidar AH. He lost no time in delay. Some preparations were still necessary. But these were soon completed, and on the morning of the 1st August, the French fleet leaving the roadstead in which it had patched up its repairs, fired a parting salute to the great warrior her commodore was never destined again to behold. Suffren had two objects in view, the one avowed, the other concealed : the first to effect a junction with d'Aymar ; the second to capture Trincomali : the first appeared certain ; the second could only be accomplished by ** great daring.*' Passing Karikal, Naotir, and Negapatam, the fleet arrived at Batacola, twenty leagues south of Trincomali, on the 9th August. Here it was joined by the Bellona, a frigate of 36 guns, just returning from an indecisive hand-to-hand encounter with the Coventry, 32. Her captain, M. de Pierrevert, a nephew of Suffren, had been killed in the action. Suffren waited at Batacola till the 21st August, when he was joined by the St. Michael and the Illustre, escorting seven transports with troops and stores, and accompanied by the corvette La Fortune, Whilst lying at Batacola he received despatches from France and ON THE INDIAN SEAS. 46 the islands. Amongst those from the latter was one from Bussy in which that general pointed out how much to be regretted it was that the French possessed no harbour on the eastern coast equal to Trincomali. It cannot be said that this letter decided Suffren, for his mind had been previously made up ; but it is probable that this opinion of a man who had a great reputation on matters connected with India greatly strengthened his determination to strike for Trincomali. The reinforcements brought by d'Aymar did not remain long in Batacola. One day was spent in distributing to the several ships the munitions and stores of which they were in need. The next day, 22nd August, the entire fleet set sail, and the same evening cast anchor in front of Trincomali. Early on the morning of the 25th Suffren, having well examined the fortifications, moved his fleet to the east of the forts protecting the town, with the intention to land there his troops, to the number of 2400. This was effected without opposition the same evening. On the 26th batteries were con- structed to play on the eastern face of the fort. On the 27th, 28th, and 29th, fire was opened and continued until, on the evening of the last-named day, a breach had been effected in the fortifications. Early on the following morning Suffren summoned the com- mandant to surrender. After a long debate, the commanding officer. Captain Macdowel, seeing that further resistance was useless, agreed to give up the place on the condition that he and his troops should be 46 FBENCH MARINERS transported to Madras and be free to serve in the war. The French then entered into possession. Trincomali capitulated on the 31st August. It was occupied by the French on the 1st September. On the 2nd the fleet of Sir Edward Hughes appeared in sight of the place. ON THE INDIAN SEAS. 47 IV. We have seen that Sir Edward Hughes, after delaying for nearly a fortnight before Negapatam, at last took his fleet to Madras to refit. He arrived there on the 20th July, and there he was joined by the Sceptre and San Carlos. The damages which many of his ships had sustained were considerable, and he was forced to make extra- ordinary exertions to repair them. It had occurred to him that the French commander might take advantage of the state of his vessels, and the gain of a fortnight's time, to make an attempt upon Trincomali. To guard as much as possible against such an attempt, he des- patched the Monmouth and the Sceptre with supplies of men and ammunition to that place.* Thinking this sufficient, his anxiety on the subject ceased. It was soon roused, however, to a greater extent than ever. I have mentioned that the French frigate Bellona fought an indecisive action with the Coventry off Batacola; but I did not then state that the combating vessels had approached sufficiently near to that place to enable the * These ships were descried by the French fleet on the 3rd of August off Negapatam. It is probable that they did not go further. 48 FRENCH MARINERS captain of the latter ship to see the whole French fleet at anchor. He at once crowded on sail to carry the news quickly to Madras. He reached Madras in the middle of August, and gave the first intimation to Sir E. Hughes of the dangerous proximity to Trincomali of his enemy. Sir Edward used all the despatch possible to hasten his departure for Ceylon. At length he set out, but, delayed by contrary winds, he arrived before Trincomali only to see the French flag flying on all the forts, and the French fleet at anchor in the bay. Sufi'ren saw, not unmoved, the English fleet in the offing. It was not necessary for him to go out and fight it, for he had succeeded to the fullest extent of his expec- tations. He had taken Trincomali. There were not wanting officers in his fleet to urge upon him to run no further risk. The party which, ever since his departure from the islands, had constantly endeavoured to thwart his measures, had been weakened but not annihilated, by the deportation to France of de Cillart, de Maurville, and de Forbin. The head of this party was his second in command, M. de Tromelin, captain of the ship Annibal. Supported by de St. Felix of the Artesien, by de la Landelle of the Bizarre, and others, de Tromelin urged upon the commodore the advisability of resting upon his laurels. ** The issue of a combat," he said, ** was uncertain, and might deprive them of all that '* they had gained." Such was their ostensible reason; but it cannot be doubted that it was used to cover alike their jealousy of their chief, and their longing desire to ON THE INDIAN SEAS. 49 return to the soft beauties of the Isle of France. As for de Tromelin, he had held back in every action, and it was a matter of surprise that he had not been deported with the others after the last engagement. It is necessary to give this summary of the debates which preceded the action, because they exercised a momentous influence on the action itself. Before giving a decisive answer to his peace-pleading captains, Suffren determined to ascertain the number of the enemy's vessels. He accordingly signalled to the frigate Bellona to reconnoitre. The Bellona in a very short space of time signalled back that there were twelve English ships. This decided Suffren. He had fourteen.* Turning to his advisers, he said, ''If the enemy had '' more ships than I have, I would abstain; if he had an equal number, I could scarcely refrain ; but as he has fewer, there is no choice ; we must go out and fight him." The fact is that Suffren saw, though his captains would not or could not see, that a grand opportunity, possibly the last, now offered to strike a decisive blow for dominion in Southern India. Could he but destroy, * The French fleet consisted of le Heros, 74 ; Vlllustre, 74 ; VOrient 74 ; VAnnibal, 74 ; VArtesien, 64 ; le Severe, 64 ; le St. Michel, 64 ; le Brillant, 64 ; le Sphinx, 64 ; VAjax, 64 ; le Vengeur, 64 ; le Bizarre, 64 ; le Petit Annibal, 50 ; and four frigates, carrying in all 1038 guns. The English fleet comprised the Hero, 74 ; the Burford, 74 ; the Sultan, 74 the Superb, 74 ; the Monarca, 74 ; the Exeter, 64 ; the Sceptre, 64 the Eagle, 64 ; the Magnamine, 64 ; the Monmouth, 64 ; the Isis, 56 the Worcester^ 54 ; and five frigates and one corvette, carrying in all 976 guns. 4 a (( 50 FRENCH MARINERS or eflFectually disable, the fleet of Sir Edward Hughes, everything was still possible. Bussy was on the point of arriving; Haidar Ali still lived, threatening the English possessions all round Madras ; the attenuated English army, deprived of its fleet, would be unable to keep the field ; and there was nothing to prevent the victorious French fleet from sailing with the monsoon wind to Madras, and crushing out the domination of the English in the countries south of the river Krishna. There was the one obstacle ofi'ered by the twelve ships of Sir Edward Hughes ; and Suffren had fourteen. That Sufi'ren entertained such hopes is beyond a doubt. Writing to a friend on the 14th, after the battle I am about to describe, and alluding to the excellent conduct of the captain of the Illustre M. de Bruyeres de Chalabre, he used this expression : '* No one could have " borne himself better than he did ; if all had done like ** him, we should have been masters of India for '' ever."* But let us now turn to the events of this memorable day. Decided by the signal from the Bellona to fight, Suffren, after a short exhortation to his captains, weighed anchor, and stood out towards the enemy who appeared inclined to entice him gently away from the harbour. As he approached, he signalled to form line in the pre- arranged order. This signal, though repeated again and again, was so badly executed by some of the * This letter was published in the Gazette de France of 31st March, 1783. ON THE INDIAN SEAS. 51 malcontent captains, that it appeared to the English as if their enemy was about, after all, to decline an engagement. At length, however, their intentions became clear. Their line, though badly formed — the ships being at unequal distances from each other, here crowded, there separated by a long interval — approached till within cannonshot. Suffren, dissatisfied with the unequal formation his ships had taken up, signalled then to his captains to reserve their fire till they should be at close quarters with the enemy. He endeavoured to enforce this order by firing a gun. The signal was misunderstood to signify the immediate opening of fire. The fire accordingly opened simultaneously along the whole line of the fleet. The compliment was quickly returned, and in a few minutes the action became general. Leaving for a moment the van and rear guards of both fleets, we will turn our attention to the centre, in which the rival commanders were opposed to each other. The French centre was composed of the Heros, the Illustre, the Sphinx, the Flamand, and the Petit Annihal. Of these five the Sphinx and the Petit Annihal had, by bad seamanship or ill-will on the part of their captains, mixed themselves with the vanguard, the Flamand had tacked herself on the rearguard, whilst, on the other hand, the Ajax, of the rearguard, had joined the centre. It was then, with only three vessels, the Ileros, the Illustre, and the Ajax, that Sufi'ren came to close quarters with the English admiral. ' 4 A 62 FRENCH MARINERS Here he found ready to receive him, and arranged with that care for discipline and obedience to orders which is one of the glories of the English services, the Burford, the Superb, the Sultan, the Eagle, the Hero, and the Monarca, For one hour the unequal combat lasted, fought with admirable courage on both sides ; at the end of that period Suffren saw that the odds were too great, and that, unless he received prompt assistance, he must succumb. He signalled, therefore, to the St. Michel, commanded by d*Aymar, and to the Annihal, commanded by de Tromelin, to come to his aid. Neither obeyed. De Kersaison, however, brought up the Brillant, though not in a position to offer the most effectual assistance. Whilst this murderous hand-to-hand conflict was going on in the centre, the two extremities continued pounding at each other at long distances. In this the French had somewhat the advantage. The Exeter was disabled, and forced to draw out of the line ; the Isis suffered severely, and her captain, Lumley, was killed ; the Worcester, who lost her captain. Wood, and the Monmouth, were riddled. On the French side, the Con- solante, a 40-gun frigate, which had been brought into action, lost her captain, Pean ; the Vengeur, having fired away all her ammunition, withdrew from the line, and caught fire, with difficulty extinguished ; the re- mainder of the squadron continued to fire without order, and at long distances, notwithstanding that the signal for close action was still flying on the commodore's ship. ON THE INDIAN SEAS. 68 At four o'clock in the afternoon, the fight having lasted then one hour and a half, the situation of the French commodore had become extremely critical. The Ajax had been so riddled as to be able to retire only with the greatest difficulty. The Heros, the Illustre, and the Brillant had to bear unsupported the weight of the concentrated fire of the centre division of the English fleet. At four o'clock the Artesien came to the com- modore's rescue ; but even then the odds were too great. About five o'clock the mainmast, the fore topmast, and the mizen topmast of the Heros came down with a tremendous crash. The hurrahs of the English first showed Sufi'ren that they thought he had struck his flag. Not for long did they remain under this delusion. Bushing on the poop, Sufiren cried with a voice that sounded above the roar of the combat: *^ Bring flags; ** bring up all the white flags that are below and cover my ^' ship with them." These words inspired his men with renewed energy. The contest continued with greater fury than ever. The Burford, the Sultan, and the Superb had already felt, and now felt again its efi'ects. Hope was beginning to rise, when at the moment it was whispered to Sufi'ren that he had already expended 1800 rounds of shot, and that his ammunition was exhausted ! Powder, however, remained, and with powder alone he continued the fire, so as to delude the enemy. But he had begun to despair; already he was thinking of spiking the guns, and, enticing the enemy's ships close 64 FRENCH MARINERS to him, of blowing up his ship and her neighbours with her, when an event occurred which changed the fortunes of the day. Suddenly, at half-past five, the wind shifted from the south-west to the east-south-east. This enabled the vanguard of the French fleet to come to the aid of, and to cover, its centre. At the same time the English fleet wore. But on resuming its position it had no longer the hardly- pressed ships of the French centre to encounter, but those of the vanguard which till then had only engaged at a distance and were comparatively fresh. The battle then re-engaged. But now it was the turn of the French. The Hero lost her mainmast at twenty minutes past six and her mizenmast soon after. The maintopmast of the Worcester was shot away about the same time. The Superb, the Btirford, the Eagle, and the Morimouth had previously been disabled. At length night fell, and the engagement ceased — another drawn battle. Both fleets remained all night near the scene of action. The next morning that of the French entered the harbour of Trincomali, the English set sail for Madras.* • It is very difficult to reconcile the accounts given by the rival actora of the latter part of the action. The English writeis assert that the French entered the harbour that very night. Vice-Admiral Bouet-Wil- laumez and the French authorities of the time assert that Suffren signalled to chase the English, but that they got away ; and that the French entered Trincomali the next morning. Truth would appear to be that both sides were thoroughly exhausted, and were glad to discon- tinue the battle ; that both anchored that night near to where they had fought, and that the French entered the harbour early in the morning. ON THE INDIAN SEAS. 65 Such was the great sea fight off Trincomali. That the majority of the French captains behaved disgracefully was broadly asserted by Suffren, and was admitted by his adversaries. In the English accounts published in India at that period those captains were stigmatised as being *' unworthy to serve so great a man," whilst even in the Calcutta Gazette it was admitted that Suffren had been very badly seconded. There can scarcely be a doubt that he was right in saying as he did in the letter I have already referred to, that if all had fought like the captain of the Illustre he would have mastered Southern India. As it was, the battle was not without his effect on the campaign. The Madras Government was so sensible of the damages sustained by the English fleet, and so cognizant of the enterprising spirit of the French commodore, that they ordered their army to fall back on Madras. Had there been at the head of the French land forces a man possessing but the atom of a brain, the dream of Dupleix, of Lally, and of Suffren, might even then have been realised ! The consequences to some of the French captains were serious. On the 13th September de Tromelin of the Annihal, de St. Felix of the Artesien, and de la Landelle of the Bizarre, were shipped off the Isle of France. They were accompanied by de Galles of the Petit Annibal, whose health rendered necessary the change. The French fleet having repaired damages, and 66 FRENCH MARINERS having lost one of its vessels (V Orient) ^ which struck on a rock the morning after the action, sailed from Trincomali on the 30th September, and arrived ojQf Kadalur on the 4th October. Here Suffren had the misfortune to lose the Bizarre which, taken too near the shore, ran aground. On the 15th, he set out with the remainder ©f his ships to winter at Achin. He arrived there on the 7th November. It is time now to take a glance at the land operations. ON THE INDIAN SEAS. 57 V. We left the French auxiliary land force under Duchemin in the strongly fortified position of Kalinur, — a position in which Haidar Ali had left them in disgust at the conduct of their commander, to go in person with his own troops alone to baffle the designs of Coote on Arni (2nd June, 1782). We have seen how he accomplished that task. Shortly after the action which took place before that fortress, and the more trifling skirmishes that followed, the English army retired to the vicinity of Madras. P On his side Haidar Ali cantoned his main army on the high ground near the river Poni, sixteen miles north of Arcot, conducting thence the siege of Vellor. Thence also he despatched his son Tippu, with a considerable force, to counteract the manoeuvres of the English on the western coast. The French auxiliary force under Duchemin remained intrenched near Kadalur in a state of complete inactivity. Here on the 13th September Duchemin, who had been long ailing, died. He was succeeded by Count d*Offelize, the colonel of the regiment of Austrasia, a man respected for his judgment and good sense. 58 FRENCH MARINERS But it was soon seen that active hostilities had by no means ceased. Taking advantage of the absence of Haidar at Kadaliir, whither he had repaired for his interview with the French commodore, Sir Eyre Coote had succeeded by a sudden and rapid march, in intro- ducing a six month^s supply of stores and ammunition into the threatened fortress of Vellor. Haidar, who had too late received intelligence of his enemy's movement, hastened to attempt to defeat it, but arrived only in time to witness its successful execution. Haidar then returned to his camp on the river Poni. Coote, waiting until the excitement caused by his recent raid should have subsided, thought it might just be possible to steal a march upon the ruler of Mysore, and, pouncing upon Kadaliir, not only to seize that fortified depot, but to destroy at a blow the French auxiliary force. He had every hope that in this attempt he would be supported by the frigate and transports containing stores and a battering train, which had been expedited from Madras for that purpose. He therefore attempted it. Succeeding in eluding the vigilance of Haidar, Coote found himself, on the 6th September, on the red hills near Pondichery. He commanded thence a complete view of the sea. But to his disappointment not a sail was to be seen. There was but a march between him and the French encampment. Without a battering train, however, the chances of success were slight, and repulse would be fatal, for Haidar would not long delay to act on his communications. As it was, even, his ON THE INDIAN SEAS. 59 position was full of peril. Still he maintained it for some days, straining his eyes towards the sea. Nor did he cease to hope, until an express from Madras informed him that Trincomali had fallen into the hands of the enemy, and that the fleet, badly treated in an encounter before that place, was in full sail for Madras. He at once resigned hope and fell back on the presidency town. Seldom, it may be safely affirmed, have English interests in Southern India been exposed to greater danger than they were on this occasion. Haidar was encamped in an impregnable position within easy distance of Madras ; two thousand of the famed horsemen of Mysore encircled the