13th Edition lor 19 13. 
 
 UC-NRLF 
 
 WILLIS'S 
 
 WORKMEN'S 
 
 COMPENSATION. 
 
THE 
 
 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 
 1906. 
 
REFORTS-CASES-STATUTES-RULES 
 FORMS. 
 
 BUTTEEWOETHS' 
 
 YEARLY WORKMEN'S 
 
 COMPENSATION SERIES, 
 
 FOR 1913 
 
 C03IPBISENG 
 
 No. 1. QUARTERLY ADVANCE SHEETS. 
 
 Butterworths' Workmen's Compensation Cases, 
 edited by DOUGLAS KNOCKER, Barrister-at-Law. 
 (Issued three or four times a year.) 
 
 No. 2. ANNUAL VOLUME COMPLETE. 
 
 Butterworths' Workmen's Compensation Cases, 
 edited by His Honour Judge RUEGG, K.C., and 
 DOUGLAS KNOCKEB, Barrister-at-Law. (Issued 
 Annually about November.) 
 
 No. 3. WILLIS'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT. 
 By W. ADDINGTON WILLIS, LL.B. (LOND.), 
 Barrister-at-Law. (Issued Annually in January.) 
 
 For Special Subscription Rates, Apply to 
 
 BUTTERWORTH & CO., 
 BELL YABD, TEMPLE BAB, W.C. 
 
THE 
 
 Compensation 
 
 1906. 
 
 WITH NOTES, 
 KULES, ORDERS, AND REGULATIONS. 
 
 BY 
 
 W. ADDINGTON WILLIS, LL.B. [Lond.], 
 
 Of the Inner Temple and the North Eastern Circuit, Sarrister-at-Law. 
 
 BEING THE 
 
 Thirteenth Edition 
 
 OF 
 
 " SBfllts'a OTorfcmen's OTompensatton Sets." 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 BUTTEEWOETH & CO., 
 BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 
 
 SHAW & SONS, 
 7 & 8, FETTER LANE, E.G. 
 
 Xaw printers an& Ipublt0ber0, 
 1913. 
 
First Edition 
 
 Third Edition 
 Fourth Edition . 
 Fifth Edition 
 Sixth Edition 
 Seventh Edition . 
 Eighth Edition . 
 Ninth Edition 
 Tenth Edition 
 Eleventh Edition . 
 Twelfth Edition . 
 Thirteenth Edition 
 
 August 31, 1897. 
 November 5, 1897. 
 February 7, 1898. 
 April 20, 1898. 
 July 13, 1898. 
 May, 1899. 
 June, 2001. 
 February, 1903. 
 February, 1907. 
 July, 1907. 
 November, 1910. 
 January, 1912. 
 January, 1913. 
 
PREFACE TO THE THIRTEENTH 
 EDITION. 
 
 fT!HE new cases incorporated in this Edition in- 
 *- elude English, Scottish and Irish cases, the 
 reports of which have been published down to, 
 and including, the 21st, llth, and 14th days of 
 December, 1912, respectively. 
 
 Attention is called to Appendix A, which con- 
 tains s. 11 of the National Insurance Act, 1911, 
 and notes thereon. 
 
 A Table of the terms of purchase of immediate 
 life annuities through the Post Office Savings 
 Bank has been added in Appendix H. 
 
 The Author will be glad to receive criticisms 
 and suggestions made with the object of increasing 
 the practical utility of the work. 
 
 W. A. W. 
 
 1, KING'S BENCH WALK, 
 
 TEMPLE, E.G. 
 December 21, 1912. 
 
 256836 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 PREFACE .......... v 
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS ........ vii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES .:....... ix 
 
 THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. 
 
 (6 EDW. 7, c. 58.) 
 ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS. 
 
 SECTION 
 
 1. Liability of employers to workmen for injuries . . 2 
 
 2. Time for taking proceedings ...... 61 
 
 3. Contracting out ........ 70 
 
 4. Sub-contracting . . . . . . .73 
 
 5. Provision as to cases of bankruptcy of employer . . 85 
 
 6. Remedies both against employer and stranger ... 88 
 
 7. Application of Act to seamen 93 
 
 8. Application of Act to industrial diseases .... 101 
 
 9. Application to workmen in employment of. Crown . .110 
 
 10. Appointment and remuneration of medical referees and 
 
 arbitrators ........ Ill 
 
 11. Detention of ships . . . . . . .111 
 
 12. Returns as to compensation . . . . .113 
 
 13. Definitions . 114 
 
 14. Special provisions as to Scotland . . . . .131 
 
 15. Provisions as to existing contracts and schemes . .132 
 
 16. Commencement and repeal . . . . . .132 
 
 17. Short title . . . 133 
 
 SCHEDULES 
 
 I. Scale and conditions of compensation . . . .134 
 II. Arbitration, etc 181 
 
viii TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 A. SECTION 11 OF THE NATIONAL INSURANCE ACT, 1911, WITH 
 
 NOTES ......... 207 
 
 B. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RULES, 1907-1912 . . 209 
 
 C. REGULATIONS AS TO MEDICAL REFEREES, DATED JUNE 24, 
 
 1907 325 
 
 D. REGULATIONS AS TO THE DUTIES AND FEES OF CERTIFYING 
 AND OTHER SURGEONS, AND AS TO REFERENCES TO, AND 
 REMUNERATION AND EXPENSES OF, MEDICAL REFEREES, 
 IN ENGLAND AND WALES, AS AMENDED BY LATEPV REGULA- 
 TIONS 333 
 
 E. REGULATIONS, DATED JUNE 28, 1907, AS TO MEDICAL 
 
 EXAMINATIONS OF WORKMEN ..... 346 
 F. RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT AS TO APPEALS . . 346 
 G. ORDER IN COUNCIL GIVING EFFECT TO THE CONVENTION 
 BETWEEN HlS MAJESTY AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE 
 FRENCH REPUBLIC BY MODIFYING THE WORKMEN'S COM- 
 PENSATION ACT, 1906, IN ITS APPLICATION TO WORKMEN 
 
 WHO ARE FRENCH CITIZENS 348 
 
 H. TABLE OF PURCHASE OF IMMEDIATE LIFE ANNUITIES . 350 
 L TEXT OF THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906 . 351 
 INDEX [1] 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 NOTE. The asterisk denote* a decision which is not under the Workmen's 
 Compensation Acts. 
 
 A. 
 
 PAGE 
 ABERDEEN Steam Trawling and Fishing Co., Ltd. v. Gill, [1908] S. 0. 
 
 328 ; 45 S. L. R. 2 47; 1 B. W. C. 0. 274, C. S. (Sc.) ... 97 
 Abram Coal Co. o. Southern, [1903] A. C. 306 ; 72 L. J. (K. B.) 691 ; 89 
 
 L. T. 103 : 19 T. L. R. 579 ; 5 W. C. C. 125, H. L. . . 137 
 
 A'lams v. Shaddock, [1905] 2 K. B. 859 : 75 L. J. (K. B.) 7 ; 93 L. T. 725 ; 
 
 54 W. R. 97 ; 22 T. L. R. 15 ; 8 W. C. C. 58, C. A. . . . 2 
 
 Adams v. Thomson (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 19, C. A 4 
 
 Addie & Sons v. Coakley. See Coakley. 
 
 Addte & Sons' Collieries. Ltd. v. Trainer (1904), 7 F. 115; 43 S. L. R. 
 
 85, C. S. . . 129 
 
 Admiral Fishing Co. v. Robinson, [1910] 1 K. B. 540; 79 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 551 ; 102 L. T. 203 ; 54 S. J. 305 ; 26 T. L. R. 299 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 
 
 247, C. A 97 
 
 Allan v. Thomas Spowart & Co., Ltd. (1906), 8 F. 811; 43 S. L. R. 
 
 599, C. S 174 
 
 Ambridge v. Good (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 691 ; [1912] W. Rep. 374, C. A. 176 
 Amys v. Barton, [1912] 1 K. B. 40 ; 81 L. J. (K. B.) 65; 105 L. T. 619 ; 
 
 28 T. L. R. 29 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 117 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 22, C. A. 22, 25, 40 
 Anderson v. Baird & Co., Ltd. (1903), 5 F. 373; 40 S. L. R. 263, 
 
 , C. 8 157 
 
 v. Balfour, [1910] 2 Ir. R. 497 ; 44 Ir. L. T. 168 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 
 
 588, C. A. (Ir.) 5. 6, 24 
 
 . Darngavil Coal Co., [1910] S. C. 456; 47 S. L. R. 342, 
 
 C. S 154 
 
 v. Fife Coal Co., [1910] S. C. 8 ; 47 S. L. R. 3 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 
 
 539, C. S 13 
 
 v. Lochgelly Iron and Coal Co., Ltd. (1904), 7 F. 187; 42 
 
 S. L. R. 147, C. S. (Sc.) 82 
 
 Andrew v. Failsworth Industrial Society, Ltd., [1904] 2 K. B. 32; 
 
 68 J. P. 409; 73 L. J. (K. B.) 510; 90 L. T. 611 ; 52 W. R. 451 ; 
 
 20 T. L. R. 429; 6 W. C. C. 11, C. A 4,23 
 
 Andrews v. Andrews and Mears, [1908] 2 K. B. 567; 77 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 974 ; 99 L. T. 214 ; 24 T. L. R. 709 ; 1 B. W. C. C. "264, C. A. . 83 
 
 * Anglo- Argentine Livestock and Produce Agency v. Temperley Steam 
 
 Shipping Co., [1899] 2 Q. B. 403; 68 L. J. (Q. B.) 900; 81 L. T. 
 296; 48 W. R. 64; 8 Asp. M. C. 595 [Bighara, J.] ... 96 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Anglo-Australian Steam Navigation Co., Ltd. v. Richards, [1911] 4 
 
 B. W. C. C. 247, C. A 162 
 
 Annie, The. [1909] P. 176 [Bargrave Deane, J.] .... 93 
 Anslow r. Cannock Chase Colliery Co., [1909] A. C. 435 ; 78 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 679; 100 L. T. 786; 53 S. J. 519; 25 T. L. R. 570; 2 B. W. C. C. 
 
 365, H. L 144. 150 
 
 Appleby r. Horseley Co., [1899] 2 Q. B. 521 ; 68 L. J. (Q. B.) 892 ; 80 
 L. T. 853; 47* W. R. 614; 15 T. L. R. 410; 1 W. C. C. 103, 
 
 C. A 85, 150 
 
 Armitage r. Lancashire and Yorkshire Rail. Co., [1902] 2 K. B. 178; 
 
 66 J. P. 613; 71 L. J. (K. B.) 778; 86 L. T. 883; 18 T. L. R. 648; 
 
 4 W. C. C. 5, C. A 22 
 
 Arnott v. Fife Coal Co., Ltd., [1911] S. C. 1029; 48 S. L. R. 828; 4 
 
 B. W. C. C. 361, C. S 172 
 
 r. (1912), 49 S. L. R. 902; [1912] W. C. Rep. 
 
 355, C. S 154 
 
 Arranging Debtor. Re an, Ex parte Reid (1911), 45 Ir. L. T. 247, C. A. 
 
 (Ir.) 87 
 
 Arrol & Co., Ltd. v. Kelly (1905), 7 F. 906; 42 Sc. L. R. 695, 
 
 C. S. (Sc.) 127 
 
 Ashley v. Lilleshall Co.. Ltd. (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 85, C. A. . . 3 
 Astley jr. Richard Evans & Co., [1911] 1 K. B. 1036 ; 80 L. J. (K. B.) 731 ; 
 
 104 L. T. 373; 4 B. W. C. C. 209, C. A.; affirmed, [1911] A. C. 
 
 674; 105 L. T. 385; 55 S. J. 687; 27 T. L. R. 557; 49 S. L. R. 
 
 675 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 319, H. L 17, 38, 39 
 
 Atkinson r. Lumb, [19')3] 1 K. B. 861 ; 67 J. P. 414; 72 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 460; 88 L. T. 789; 51 W. R. 516; 19 T. L. R. 412; 5 W. C. C. 
 
 106, C. A 83 
 
 *Austin v. Olsen (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 208; 37 L. J. (M. c.) 34; 16 
 
 W. R. 426 ; 9 B. & S. 46, Div. Ct 95 
 
 B. 
 
 BABCOCK & Wilcox v. Young, [1911] S. C. 406; 48 S. L. R. 298; 4 
 
 B. W. C. C. 367, C. S. . ". 143 
 
 Back c. Dick, Kerr & Co., Ltd., [1906] A. C. 325 ; 75 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 569 ; 94 L. T. 802 ; 22 T. L. R. 548 ; 8 W. C. C. 40, H. L. . . 82 
 Bagnall v. Levinstein, Ltd., [1907] 1 K. B. 531; 76 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 234; 96 L. T. 184; 23 T. L. R. 165; 9 W. C. C. 100, C. A. 117. 123, 124 
 Bailey v. Kenworthy, [1908] 1 K. B. 441 ; 77 L. J. (K. B.) 236; 98 L. T. 
 
 327 ; 24 T. L. R. 186 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 351, 371, C. A. 144, 145, 151 
 
 r. Plant (No. 1), [1901] 1 K. B. 31 ; 65 J. P. 52 ; 70 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 63 ; 83 L. T. 459 ; 49 W. R. 103 ; 17 T. L. R. 48 
 
 3 W. C. C. 209, C. A 198 
 
 v. (No. 2) (1901), 17 T. L. R. 449 ; 3 W. C. C. 207, C. A. 194 
 
 Baird & Co. v. Birsztan or Savage (1906), 8 F. 438 ; 43 S. L. R. 300, C. S. 133, 
 
 149 
 
 , Ltd. v. Burley, [1908] S. C. 545; 45 S. L. R. 416; 1 
 
 B. W. C. C. 7, C, S 22 
 
 v. Dempster. [1909] S. C. 127 ; 46 S. L. R. 119 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 
 
 144*018. 54,159 
 
 e. Higginbotham & Co. (1901), 38 S. L. R. 479; 3 F. 673, 
 
 C. S 45 
 
TABLE OF CASES. xi 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Baird & Co., Ltd. v. Kane (1905), 7 F. 461; 42 S. L. R. 347, C. S. . 170 
 
 v. Kerr. See Kerr. 
 
 v. M'Ewan. See M'Ewan. 
 
 v. M'Whinnie, [1908] S. C. 440; 45 S. L. R. 338; 1 
 
 B. W. C. C. 109, C. S 196 
 
 . v . Stevenson, [1907] S. C. 1259 ; 44 S. L. R. 864, C. S. . 174 
 
 Baker v. Danielsen (1910), 128 L. T. Newsp. 366, C. C. . . 124 
 v. Jewell, [1910] 2 K. B. 673 ; 79 L. J. (K. B.) 1092 ; 103 L. T. 173 ; 
 
 3 B. W. C. C. 503, C. A . .174 
 
 Ball v. Wm. Hunt & Sons, Ltd., [1912] A. C. 496 ; 81 L. J. (K. B.) 782 ; 
 
 56 S. J. 550 ; 28 T. L. R. 428 ; 49 S. L. R. 711 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 
 459; [1912] W. C. Rep. 261, reversing C. A., [1911] 1 K. B. 1048; 
 80 L. J. (K. B.) 655 ; 104 L. T. 327; 55 S. J. 383 ; 27 T. L. R. 323, 
 
 4 B. W. C. C. 225 ; H. L 2, 154 
 
 Banknock Coal Co. v. Lawrie, [1912] A. C. 105; 81 L. J. (p. c.)89; 106 
 
 L. T. 283 ; 28 T. L. R. 136 ; 49 S. L. R. 98 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 209 ; 
 
 [1912] W. C. Rep. 1, H. L. (s. c.) 131 
 
 Barclay, Curie & Co., Ltd. v. M'Kinnon (1901), 38 S. L. R. 321; 
 
 3 F. 436, C. S 82 
 
 Bargewell v. Daniel (1907), 98 L. T. 257, C. A 125 
 
 Barker v. Holmes (1904), 6 W. C. C. 52; 117 Newsp. L. T. 158, C. C.. 66 
 Barnabas v. Bersham Colliery Co. (1910), 102 L. T. 621 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 
 
 216, C. A. ; affirmed 103 L. T. 513 ; 55 S. J. 63 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 119 ; 
 
 48 S. L. R. 727, H. L 36 
 
 Barnes v. Nunnery Colliery Co., [1910] W. N. 248 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 43, 
 
 C. A.; affirmed, [1912] A. C. 44; 81 L. J. (K. B.) 213; 56 S. J. 
 
 159; 105 L. T. 961 ; 49 S. L. R. 688; 28 T. L. R. 135; 5 B. W. 
 
 C. C 195 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 90 19, 30 
 
 Barren v. Carmichael (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 437 ; [1912] W. C. 312, 
 
 C. A 57 
 
 Bartell v. Gray & Co., [1902] 1 K. B. 225 ; 66 J. P. 308 ; 71 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 115; 85 L. T. 658; 50 W. R. 310; 18 T. L. R. 70; 4 W. C. C. 95, 
 
 C. A 80 
 
 Barton v. Scott and Hodgson (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 15, C. A. . .187 
 Bate v. Woraey, Bayliss, Third Party (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 276 ; [1912] 
 
 W. C. Rep. 194, C. A 92 
 
 Bates v. Davies' Executors (1909), 126 L. T. Newsp. 454 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 
 
 459, C. C. 21 
 
 Bates-Smith v. General Motor Cab Co., Ltd. See Smith v. Same. 
 Bathgate v. Caledonian Rail. Co. (1902), 4 F. 313; 39 S. L. R. 246; 
 
 [1903] W. N. 161, C. S. . 82 
 
 Baxter v. Norris (1907), 9 W. C. C. 33 ; 122 L. T. Newsp. 301, C. C. 59 
 Beadle v. Milton (1903), 5 W. C. C. 55 ; 114 L. T. Newsp. 550, C. C. 65 
 v. Owners of S.S. Nicholas (1909), 101 L. T. 586 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 
 
 102, C. A. . 187, 191 
 
 Beaumont v. Underground Electric Railways Co., of London (1912), 
 
 5 B. W. C. C. 247 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 123, C. A. . . . 31, 38 
 Beckley v. Scott & Co., [1902] 2 Ir. R. 504; 36 Ir. L. T. R. 130, C. A. 
 
 (Ir.) 46 
 
 Bee v. Ovens & Sons (1900), 37 S. L. R. 328 ; 2 F. 439, C. S. . . 80 
 Beech v. Bradford Corporation (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 236, C. A. . 197 
 Bender v. Owners of S.S. Zent, [1909] 2 K. B. 41 ; 78 L. J. (K. B.) 533 ; 
 
 100 L. T. 639; 2 B. W. C. C. 22, C. A 32,33,40 
 
 Bennett v. Wordie & Co. (1899), 36 S. L. R. 643 ; 1 F. 855, C. S. . 67 
 
xii TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Benson v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Rail. Co., [1901] 1 K. B. 242 : 
 68 J. P. 149; 73 L. J. (K. B.) 122; 89 L. T. 715; 52 W. R. 243; 
 20 T. L. R. 139 ; 6 W. C. C. 20, C. A. . . . 10,15,21 
 
 Berwickshire County Council v. Middlemiss (1900), 37 S. L. R. 297 ; 
 
 ' 2 F. 392, C. S 83 
 
 Berry r. Canteen and Mess Co-operative Society, Ltd. (1910), 3 
 
 B. W. C. C. 449, C. A 73 
 
 Bevan v. Crawshay Brothers (Cyfartha), Ltd., [1902] 1 K. B. 25 ; 
 
 85 L. T. 496 ; 71 L. J. (K. B.) 49 ; 50 W. R. 98 ; 18 T. L. R. 17 ; 
 
 4 W. C. C. 110, C. A 152 
 
 Bevan v. Energlyn Colliery Co., [1912] 1 K. B. 63 ; 81 L. J. (K. B ) 
 
 172 : 5 B. W! C. C. 169 ; 28 T L. R. 27; 105 L. T. 654 ; [1912] 
 
 W. C. Rep. 126, C. A 159, 160 
 
 Biggart r. S.S. Minnesota (Owners of) (1911) 5 B. W. C. C. 68, C. A. 29 
 Binning v. Easton & Sons (1906), 8 F. 407 ; 43 S. L. R. 312, C. S. . 197 
 Birmingham Cabinet Manufacturing Co. v. Dudley (1910), 102 L. T. 
 
 619; 3B. W. C. C. 169, C. A 161 
 
 Bist v. London and South Western Rail. Co., [1907] A. C. 209 ; 76 L. J. 
 
 (K. B.) 703 ; 96 L. T. 750 ; 23 T. L. R. 471 ; 9 W. C. C. 19, H. L. 
 
 48, 49, 51 
 Black v. Fife Coal Co., Ltd., [1909] S. C. 152 ; 46 S. L. R. 191 ; 
 
 2 B. W. C. C. 456, C. S 60 
 
 r. Merry and Cuuniughame. See Merry. 
 
 Blackwell v. Howell. See Howell. 
 
 Blain v. Greenock Foundry Co. (1903), 5 F. 893 ; 40 S. L. R. 639, 
 
 C. S 46 
 
 Blake r. Heid (1912), 106 L. T. 822; 28 T. L. R. 321 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 
 
 303; [1912] W. C. Rep. 198, C. A 24 
 
 Blake v. Midland Rail. Co., [1904] 1 K. B. 503 ; 68 J. P. 215 ; 90 L. T. 
 
 433; 73 L. J. (K. B.) 179; 20 T. L. R. 191; 6 W. C. C. 163, 
 
 Div. Ct 194 
 
 Blakey r. Robson, Eckford & Co. See Robson, Eckford & Co. 
 
 Blovelt r. Sawyer, [1904] 1 K. B. 271 ; 68 J. P. 110 ; 73 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 155; 89 L. T. 658; 52 W. R. 503; 20 T. L. R. 105; 6 W. C. C. 
 
 16, C. A 16, 27 
 
 Boaa: r. Lockwood Collieries, Ltd., [1910] S. C. 51 ; 47 S. L. R. 47 ; 
 
 3 B. W. C. C. 549, C. S 173 
 
 Boardman v. Scott and Whitworth, [1902] 1 K. B. 43 ; 66 J. P. 260 ; 71 
 
 L. J. (K. B.) 3 ; 85 L. T. 502 ; 50 W. R. 184 ; 18 T. L. R. 57 ; 4 
 
 W. C. C. 1, C. A 5 
 
 Boase Spinning Co. r. M'Avan. See M'Avan. 
 
 Boon v. Quance & Co. (No. 1) (1909), 102 L. T. 443 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 106, 
 
 C. A 120 
 
 Borland r. Watson, Gow & Co., Ltd. (1911), 49 S. L. R. 10; [1912] S. C. 
 
 15; 5B. W. 0. C. 514; C. S 154 
 
 Boswell v. Gilbert (1909), 127 L. T. Newsp. 146; 2 B. W. C. C. 251, 
 
 C. A 117 
 
 *Bound v. Lawrence (1891), 60 L. J. (M. c.) 137 .... 124 
 Bowhill Coal Co. (Fife), Ltd. r. Malcolm (Xo. 1), [1909] S. C. 426 ; 46 
 
 S. L. R. 354; 2 B. W. C. C. 
 131, C. S. ... 57 
 
 - r. (No. 2), [1910] S. C. 447 : 47 
 
 S. L. R. 449 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 
 562, C. S. . . 161, 176 
 
TABLE OF CASES. xiii 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Bowhill Coal Co. (Fife), Ltd. v. Neish, [1909] S. C. 252 ; 46 S. 1,. R. 
 
 250 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 253, C. S 128 
 
 Boyd i7. Doharty, [1909] S. C. 87; 46 S. L. B. 71 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 257, 
 
 C. S 121 
 
 Bradbury v. Bedworth Coal and Iron Co. (1900), Times, March 17; 
 
 2 W. C. C. 138, C. A -. 53, 174 
 
 *Bradley v. Essex and Suffolk Accident Indemnity Society (1911), 27 
 
 T. L. E. 455 [Bray, J.] ; affirmed [1912] 1 K. B. 415 ; [1912] W. C. 
 
 Rep. 6, C. A 87 
 
 Braithwaite v. Kirk & Cox (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 77, C. A. . . 175 
 
 Bramley v. Evans & Sons (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 34, C. A. . . .64 
 Brandy v. " Kaphsel " S.S., [1911] 1 K. B. 376 ; 80 L. J. (K. B.) 217 ; 103 
 
 L. T. 746 ; 11 Asp. M. C. 5-11 ; 27 T. L. B. 127 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 6, 
 
 C.A.; affirmed, [191 1], A. C. 413; 55 S. J. 579; 105 L. T. 116; 27 
 
 T. L. R. 497 ; 49 S. L. R. 625 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 307, H. L. . 145 
 
 Branford v. N. E. Rail. Co. (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 84, C. A. . .196 
 
 Breakwell v. Glee Hill Granite Co., Ltd. (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 133, 
 
 C. A 66 
 
 Brennan v. Dublin United Tramways Co., [1901] 2 I. R. 241 ; 34 Ir. 
 
 L. T. B. 113, C. A 80 
 
 Brice v. Edward Lloyd, Ltd., [1909] 2 K. B. 804 ; 79 L. J. (K. B.) 37 ; 101 
 
 L. T. 472 ; 53 S. J. 744 ; 25 T. L. B. 759 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 26, 
 
 C. A 27 
 
 Briggs v. Mitchell, [1911] S. C. 705 ; 48 S. L. B. 606 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 400, 
 
 C. S . 129 
 
 Brine r. Corry & Son (1905), Times, May 5 ; 7 W. C. C. 130 . 186 
 
 Brintons, Ltd. v. Turvey, [1905] A. C. 230 ; 74 L. J. (K. B.) 474 ; 92 L. T. 
 
 578; 53W.R. 641; 21 T.L.R. 444, H. L. ; 7 W. C. C. 1, H. L. . 2,7 
 British and South American Steam Navigation Co., Ltd. v. Neil (1910), 
 
 3 B. W. C. C. 413, C. A 72 
 
 Broderick v. L. C. C., [1908] 2 K. B. 807 ; 99 L. T. 569 ; 24 T. L. B. 
 
 822 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 219, C. A 8 
 
 Brooker v. Warren (1906), 23 T. L. B. 201 ; 9 W. C. C. 26, C. A. . 48 
 Brookfield Linen Co., Ltd. v. Clugston (1909), 44 Ir. L. T. 10, C. A. 
 
 (Ir.) 159 
 
 Brooks v. Andrew Knowles & Sons, Ltd. (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 15. C. A. 57 
 Brown (Jno.) v. Hunter (1912), 49 S. L. B. 695; [1912] S. C. 996; 
 
 5 B. W. C. C. 588 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 318, C. S. . . 56 
 
 - v. Kidman (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 199, C. A 37 
 
 v. Lochgelly Iron and Coal Co., Ltd., [1907] S. C. 198 ; 44 S. L. R 
 
 180, C. S 66 
 
 - v. Scott (1899), Times (June 12); 1 W. C. C. 11, C. A. . . 19 
 
 - v. Thornycroft & Co., Ltd. (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 386 ; [1912] 
 
 W. C. Bep. 314, C. A 160, 173 
 
 v. S. E. and C. Bail. Co.'s Managing Committee (1910), 3 B. W. 
 
 C. C. 428, C. A 180 
 
 - & Co. Ltd. v. Orr, [1910] S. C. 526 ; 47 S. L. R. 437 ; C. S. . 199 
 Bryce v. O'Connor (1904), 7 F. 193; 42 S. L. R. 154, C. S. 160, 162, 171, 172 
 
 *Brydon v. Stewart (1855), 2 Macq. H. L. 30, H. L 12 
 
 Bryson v. Dunn and Stephen, Ltd. (1905), 43 S. L. R. 236 ; 8 F. 226, C. S. 159 
 Buckley v. London and India Docks (1909), 127 L. T.'Newsp. 521 ; 
 
 2 B. W. C. C. 327, C. A. . . . . . . .151 
 
 Bullen v. London United Tramways, Ltd. (1906), 121 L. T. Newsp. 
 
 415; 8 W. C. C. 103, C. C 158 
 
xiv TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Burgess r. Jewell (1911). 4 B. W. C. C. 145, C. A 156 
 
 Burley r. Baird & Co., Ltd. See Baird. 
 Burnham & Co. v. Taylor. See Taylor. 
 Burns r. Manchester and Salford Wesleyan Mission (1908), 99 L T. 579 ; 
 
 1 B. W. C. C. 305, C. A 122 
 
 r. North British Kail. Co. (1900), 37 S. L. R. 418 ; 2 F. 629, C. S. 79 
 
 Burrell v. Hollowav Brothers (London), Ltd. (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 239, 
 
 C.A. . '. . . 64,65 
 
 Burton o. Chapel Coal Co., Ltd., [1909] S. C. 430; 46 S. L. R. 375; 
 
 2 B. W. C. C. 120, C. S 45, 46 
 
 Bur A ash r. F. Leylaud & Co.. Ltd. (1912), 28 T. L. R. 546; 56 S. J. 
 
 703 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 663 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 400, C. A. . . 33 
 
 Bush v. Hawes, [1902] 1 K. B. 216; 66 J. P. 260; 85 L. T. 507; 
 
 71 L. J. (K. B.) 68 ; 50 W. R. 31 1 ; 4 W. C. C. 33. C. A. . 79, 80 
 Butler v. Burton-on-Trent Union (1912), 106 L/T. 824; 5 B. W. C. C. 
 
 355 ; [1912] AY. C. Rep. 222, C. A 23 
 
 Butt v. Gellyceidrini Colliery Co., Ltd. (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 44, C. A. 65, 
 
 66 
 
 Byles v. Poole (1909), 126 L. T. Xewsp. 286; 2 B. W. C. C. 484, C. C. 152 
 Byrne v. Baltinglass Rural District Council and Kelly (1911), 45 
 
 Ir. L. T. 06 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 566, C. A. (Ir.) . . . 81, 118, 121 
 Byrne, In the Goods of, (1910) 44 Ir. L. T. 98 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 591, 
 
 K. B. D. (Ir.) 117 
 
 C. 
 
 CADESHEAD v. Ailsa Shipbuilding Co., Ltd., [1910] S. C. 1129; 47 
 
 S. L. R. 784, C. S 174 
 
 Cadzow Coal Co., Ltd. v. Gaffney (1900), 38 S. L. R. 40 ; 3 F. 72, C. S. 139 
 
 , r. O'Hara. See O'Hara. 
 
 Cain v. Leyland & Co., [1908] 1 K. B. 441 ; 98 L. T. 327 ; 77 L. J. 
 
 (K. B.)"2;;6 ; 24 T. L. R. 186 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 351, 368, C. A. . . 142 
 Caledon Shipbuilding and Engineering Co., Ltd. v. Kennedy (1906), 
 
 43 S. L. R. 430, 687 ; 8 F. 597, 960, C. S v . 56 
 
 v. Crossan. See 
 
 Crossan. 
 
 Caledonian Rail. Co. v. Bathgate. See Batbgate. 
 Calico Printers' Association v. Higham, [1912] 1 K. B. 93; 81 L. J. 
 
 K. B. 232 : 105 L. T. 734; 56 S. J. 89 ; 28 T. L. R. 53 ; 5 B. W. 
 
 C. C. 97 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 104, C. A 160, 178 
 
 Callaghau v. Maxwell (1900), 37 S. L. R. 313 ; 2 F. 420, C. S. . 21, 48 
 Cambroke v. George (1903), 5 W. C. C. 26 ; 114 L. T. Xewsp. 550, C. C. 32 
 Cameron v. Port of London Authority (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 416; [1912] 
 
 W. C. Rep. 305, C. A 146 
 
 Cammell, Laird & Co. v. Platt (1908), 2 B. W. C. C. 368, C. A. . .158 
 Caminell v. Kelsall Bros, and Beeching (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 667, 
 
 t . A. . 97 
 
 Cauimick v. Glasgow Iron and Steel Co.. Ltd. (1901), 4 F. 198 ; 39 
 
 8. L. K. 138, C. S 195 
 
 Campbell r. Cak-donian Rail. Co. (1899), 36 S. L. R. 699 ; 1 F. 887, C. S. 47 
 
 v. Fife Coal Co. (1902), 5 F. 170; 40 S. L. R. 143, C. S. . 139 
 
 Cannavan r. Owners of S.S. Universal (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 357, C. A. 29 
 
TABLE OF CASES. . xv 
 
 PAGE 
 Cardiff Corpn. v. Hall, [1911] 1 K. B. 1009; 80 L. J. (K. B.) 644; 104 
 
 L. T. 467 ; 27 T. L. R. 339 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 159, C. A. . . 161 , 162 
 Carlin v. Stephen & Sons, Ltd., [1911] S. C. 901 ; 48 S. L. R. 862, 
 
 5 B. W. C. C. 486 ; C. S 162 
 
 Carolan v. Harrington & Son, [1911] 2 K. B. 733; 105 L. T. 271 ; 27 
 
 T. L. R. 486 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 253, C. A 202 
 
 Carroll v. Gray & Sons. See Gray & Sons. 
 
 Carswell v. Sharpe. See Sharpe. 
 
 Carter v. Lang, [1908] S. C. 1198 ; 45 S. L. R. 938; 1 B. W. C. C. 379, 
 
 C. S 145, 151 
 
 Case v. Colonial Wharves (1905), 53 W. R. 514; 8 W. C. C. 114, C. A. 188 
 Casey v. Humphries (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 625; [1912] W. C. Rep. 366, 
 
 C. A 183, 186 
 
 Castle Spinning Co., Ltd. v. Atkinson, [1905] 1 K. B. 336 ; 74 L. J. 
 
 (K. B.) 265; 92 L. T. 147; 53 W. R. 360; 21 T. L. R. 192; 7 
 
 W. C. C. 124, C. A 178 
 
 Caton v. Summerlee and Mossend Iron Co., Ltd. (1902), 39 S. L. R. 
 
 762 ; 4 F. 989, C. S ' . . .13 
 
 Cattermole v. Atlantic Transport Co., [1902] 1 K. B. 204; 66 J. P. 4; 
 
 71 L. J. (K. B.) 173; 85 L. T. 513; 50 W. R. 129; 18 T. L. R. 
 
 102 ; 4 W. C. C. 28, C. A 59 
 
 Cawdor and Garoant Collieries, Ltd. v. Jones (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 59, 
 
 C. A 174 
 
 Challis v. London and South Western Rail. Co., [1905] 2 K. B. 154 ; 74 
 
 L. J. (K. B.) 569 ; 93 L. T. 330 ; 53 W. R. 613 ; 21 T. L. R. 486 ; 7 
 
 W.C. C. 23,0. A 4,24,25,26 
 
 Chambers v. Whitehaven Harbour Commissioners, [1899] 2 Q. B. 132 ; 
 
 15 T. L. R. 341 ; 68 L. J. (Q. B.) 740; 80 L. T. 586; 47 W. R. 533 ; 
 
 1 W. C. C. 47, C. A 82 
 
 Chander v. G. W. R. Co. (1912), 106 L. T. 479 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 254 ; 
 
 [1912] W. C. Rep. 169, C. A 38 
 
 Chandler v. Smith, [1899] 2 Q. B. 506 ; 15 T. L. R. 480 ; 68 L. J. (Q. B.) 
 
 909 ; 81 L. T. 317 ; 47 W. R. 677 ; 1 W. C. C. 19, C. A. . 58, 186 
 Charing Cross, Euston, and Hampstead Rail. Co. v. Boots, [1909] 2 K. B. 
 
 640 ; 78 L. J. (K. B.) 1115 ; 101 L. T. 53 ; 25 T. L. R. 683 ; 2 B. W. 
 
 C. C. 385, C. A . . .174 
 
 Charles v. Walker, Ltd. (1909), 25 T. L. R. 609 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 5, 
 
 C.A 146 
 
 Charvil v. Manser & Co., Ltd. (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 385 ; [1912] W. C. 
 
 Rep. 193, C. A 35 
 
 Cheek v. Harmsworth Bros. (1901), 4 W. C. C. 3, C. C. . . . 7 
 Chisholm v. Walker & Co., [1909] S. C. 31 ; 46 S. L. R. 24 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 
 
 261, C. S. 121 
 
 Clark v. Gas Light and Coke Co. (1905), 21 T. L. R. 184 ; 7 W. C. C. 
 
 119, C. A 155, 160 
 
 Clarke v. Jamieson. See Jamieson. 
 
 Clatworthy v. Green (1902), 66 J. P. 596 ; 18 T. L. R. 641 ; 86 L. T. 702 ; 
 
 50 W. R. 610 ; 4 W. C. C. 152, C. A 57 
 
 *Claydon v. Green (1868), L. R. 3 C. P. 511 ; 37 L. J. (c. p.) 226 ; 18 L. T. 
 
 607 ; 16 W. R. 1126 75 
 
 Clayton v. Jones Sewing Machine Co., Ltd., [1908] W. N. 253 ; 126 L. T. 
 
 Newsp. 142, C.A 185 
 
 & Shuttle worth, Ltd. v. Dobbs, (1908), 2 B. W. C. C. 488 ; Times, 
 
 Dec. 17, C. C. . ..... 156 
 
xvi TABLE OF 'CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Clelland v. Singer Manufacturing Co. (1905), 7 F. 975 ; 42 S. L. B. 757, 
 
 C. S 161, 175 
 
 "Clements v. London and North Western Kail. Co., [1894] 2 Q. B. 482 ; 
 
 58 J. P. 816 ; 9 B. 223 ; 42 W. B. 338, C, A 73 
 
 Cleverley v. Gas Light and Coke Co., Ltd. (1907), 24 T. L. B. 93 ; 1 
 
 B. W. C. C. 82, H. L 198 
 
 Clifford p. Joy, [1909] 43 Ir. L. T. 193 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 32, C. A. (Ir.) 22, 30 
 Clover, Clayton & Co., Ltd. v. Hughes, [1910] A. C. 242 ; 79 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 470 ; 102 L. T. 340 ; 54 S. J. 375 ; 26 T. L. B. 359 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 
 
 275 ; 47 S. L. B. 885, H. L 5, 6, 9 
 
 Coakley v. Addie & Sons, Ltd., [1909] S. C. 545 ; 46 S. L. B. 408 ; 2 
 
 B. W. C C. 437, C. S 194, 195, 199 
 
 Cochrane v. Traill & Sons (No. 1) (1900), 37 S. L. B. 662 ; 2 F. 794, C. S. 56, 
 
 198 
 
 v. Traill (No. 3). See Traill v. Cochrane. 
 Coe v. Fife Coal Co., Ltd., [1909] S. C. 393 ; 46 S. L. B. 325 ; 2 
 
 B. W. C. C. 8, C. S 7, 9 
 
 Cogdon v. Sunderland Gas Co. (1907), 1 B. W. C. C. 156, C. C. . . 27 
 Cohen v. Seabrook Brothers (1908), 25 T. L. B. 176 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 155 
 
 (Darling, J.) 60 
 
 Cokolon v. Owners of S. Kentin (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 658; [1912] 
 
 AY. C. Bep. 380, C. A 20 
 
 Cole v. Evans, Son, Lescher and Webb, Ltd. (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 138 ; 
 
 C. A. 22 
 
 r. Shrubsall & Wakeley Bros., Ltd. (1912), 5 B. AY. C. C. 337 ; 
 
 [1912] W. C. Bep. 226, C. A 120 
 
 Collins v. Collins, [1907] 2 I. B. 104 ; 41 Ir. L. T. B. 3, C. A. (Ir.) . 24 
 Colquhoun v. Woolfe. See Woolfe. 
 
 Colville & Sons, Ltd. v. Tigue. See Tigue v. Colville & Sons, Ltd. 
 Coudron v. Gavin Paul & Sons, Ltd. (1903), 6 F. 29 ; 41 S. L. B. 33, C. S. 51 
 Connell & Co. v. Barr (1903), 116 L. T. Newsp. 127, C. S. . . . 146 
 Connor v. Meads (1912), 5 B. AY. C. C- 435 ; [1912] AY. C. Bep. 381, C. A. 191 
 Conway v. Pumpherston Oil Co., Ltd., [1911] S. C. 660; 48 S. L. B. 
 
 632 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 392, C. S IS 
 
 *Cook v. North Metropolitan Tramways Co. (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 683; 
 
 51 J. P. 630; 56 L. J. (Q. B.) 309; 56 L. T. 448; 57 L. T. 476; 
 
 35 W. B. 577, Div. Ct. 123, 124 
 
 Cooper v. McGovern. See McGovern. 
 
 Corbet v. Glasgow Iron and Steel Co. (1903), 5 F. 782 ; 40 S. L. B. 601, 
 
 C. S . 159 
 
 v. Hains and Strange. See Hains and Strange. 
 
 Cornish v. Lynch (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 345, C. A 190 
 
 Cory & Sons, Ltd. v. France Fenwick & Co., Ltd., [1910] 1 K. B. 114; 
 
 80 L. J. (K. B.) 341 ; 103 L. T. 649 ; 11 Asp. M. C. 499 ; 55 S. J. 
 
 10; 27 T. L. B. 18, C. A 92 
 
 Cory Bros. & Co., Ltd. v. Hughes, [1911] 2 K. B. 738 ; 105 L. T. 274 ; 
 
 27 T. L. B. 498 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 291, C. A 154,161 
 
 Cosgrove v. Anglo-American Oil Co., Ltd. (1900), 34 Ir. L. T. B. 56, 
 
 C.A. (Ir.) 82 
 
 Costello v. Kelsall Bros, and Beeching, Ltd. (1912), 56 S. J. 720 : 5 B. AY. 
 
 C. C. 667; [1912] W. C. Bep. 381, C. A 97 
 
 Cotter v. Johnson (1911), 45 Ir. L. T. 259 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 568 ; C. A. (Ir.) 124 
 Coulson v. AYorshipful Co, of Drapers (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 136, 
 
 C. A. 189 
 
TABLE OF CASES. xvii 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Coultuard v. Consett Iron Co., Ltd., [1905J 2 K. B. 869 ; 75 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 60 ; 93 L. T. 756 ; 54 W. B. 139 ; 22 T. L. R. 25 ; 8 W. C. 0. 87, 
 
 C. A 128 
 
 Cowan v. Simpson (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 4 155 
 
 Cox v. Braithwaite and Kirk (1912), 5 B. W, C. C. 648, C. A. . . ]73 
 
 Coylton Coal Co. v. Davidson (1905), 7 P. 727, C. S 82 
 
 Cranfield v. Ansell (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 57, C. A 175 
 
 Craske v. Wigan, [1909] 2 K. B. 635 ; 78 L. J. (K.-B.) 994 ; 100 L. T. 6 ; 
 
 53 8. J. 560 ; 25 T. L. K. 632 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 35, C. A. . 22, 25 
 
 Cremins v. Guest, Keen and Nettlefold, [1908] 1 K. B. 469 ; 77 L. J. 
 
 (K. B.) 326 ; 24 T. L. E. 189 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 160, C. A. . . 11 
 
 Cribb v. Kynochs, LtJ., [1908] 2 K. B. 551 ; 77 L. J. (K. B.) 1001 ; 99 
 
 L. T. 216 ; 24 T. L. R. 736 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 43, C. A. 44, 45,46, 47, 59 
 Crocker v. Plymouth Corporation, [1906] 1 K. B. 494; 70 J. P. 204; 
 
 75 L. J. (K. B.) 375 ; 94 L. T. 734 ; 54 W. R. 391 ; 4 L. G. R. 571 ; 
 
 22 T. L. R. 336, Div. Ct 130 
 
 Cronin v. Silver (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 221, C. A 17 
 
 *Crossan v. Caledon Shipbuilding and Engineering Co., [1906] W. N. 
 
 104 ; 43 S. L. R. 852, H. L 55 
 
 Crossfield & Sons, Ltd. v. Tanian, [1900] 2 Q. B. 629 ; 69 L. J. (Q. B.) 
 
 790 ; 82 L. T. 813 ; 48 W. R. 609 ; 16 T. L. R. 476 ; 2 W. C. C. 141, 
 
 C. A. " 173 
 
 Cross, Tetley & Co. v. Catterall (1905), not reported, but see [19051 2 
 
 K. B. 141, H. L 10, 12, 14 
 
 *C. S. Butler, The (1874), L. R. 7 A. & E. 238 ; 23 W. II. 113 ; 31 L. T. 
 
 549 96 
 
 Cunningham v. McGregor (1901), 3 F. 775 ; 38 S. L. R. 574, C. S. . 128 
 v. M'Naughton and Sinclair, [1910] S. C. 980 ; 47 S. L. R. 
 
 781 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 576, 577, C. S 154, 171 
 
 Curtis v. Black & Co., [1909] 2 K. B. 529 ; 100 L. T. 977 ; 78 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 1022 ; 53 S. J. 576 ; 25 T. L. R. 621 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 239, C. A. 98, 107 
 Curtis v. Talbot and Kidderminster Infirmary Committee (1911), 5 B. W. 
 
 C. C. 41, C. A. 30 
 
 D. 
 
 DAFF v. Midland Colliery Owners' Mutual Indemnity Co., Ltd. (1912), 
 
 5B. W. C.'C. 671, C. A 87 
 
 Dailly v. John Watson, Ltd. (1900), 37 S. L. R. 782 ; 2 F. 1044, C. S. 48, 51 
 Darlington v. Roscoe & Sons, [1907] 1 K. B. 219 ; 76 L. J. (K. B.) 371 ; 
 
 96 L. T. 179 ; 23 T. L. R. 167 ; 9 W. C. C. 1, C. A. . . 126 147 
 David v. Windsor Steam Coal Co., Ltd. (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 177, C. A. 156 
 Davidson v. Summerlee and Mossend Iron and Steel Co., Ltd. (1903), 
 
 5 F. 991 ; 40 S. L. R. 764, C. S 171 
 
 Davies v. Gillespie (1911), 105 L. T. 494 ; 28 T. L. R. 11 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 
 
 64, C. A 23 
 
 v. Main Colliery Co. See Main Colliery Co. v. Davies. 
 
 v. Point of Ayr Collieries, Ltd. (1909), 2 B. W. C. C. 157, C. A 64 
 
 v. Rhymney Iron Co., Ltd. (1900), 16 T. L. R. 329; 2 W. C. C. 
 
 22, C. A 11 
 
 Dean v. L. N. W. Rail. Co. (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 353, C. A. . 37, 146 
 Dempster v. Wm. Baird & Co., Ltd., [1908] S. C. 722 ; 45 S. L. R. 432 
 
 1 B. W. C. C. 62, C. S T>8 
 
xviii TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Dempster v. Baird & Co. See Baird. 
 
 v. Hunter & Sons (1902), 39 S. L. R. 395 ; 4 F. 580 ; [1903] 
 
 W. N. 163, C. S 80 
 
 Devine v. Caledonian Kail. Co. (1899), 1 F. 1105 ; 36 S. L. K. 877, C. S. 20 
 
 v. Metcalfe (1911), 45 Ir. L. T. 271, (Recorder of Dublin) . 109 
 
 Devitt r. Owners of S.S. Bainbridge, [1909] 2 K. B. 802 ; 78 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 1059; 101 L. T. 299; 2 B. W. C. C. 383, C. A 170 
 
 Devlin v. Pelaw Main Collieries (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 349; [1912] W. 
 
 C. Rep. 225, C. A 128 
 
 Devons v. Anderson, [1911] S. C. 181 ; 48 S. L. R. 187 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 
 
 354, C. S 70 
 
 Dewhurst v. Mather, [1908] 2 K. B. 754; 77 L. J. (K. B.) 1077; 99 
 
 L. T. 568 ; 24 T. L. R. 819 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 328, C. A. . . . 124 
 Dickenson v. " Barmak," Ltd. (1908), 124 L. T. Newsp. 403, C. A. . 12 
 Dinnington Main Coal Co., Ltd. v. Bruins (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 367 ; 
 
 [1912] W. C. Rep. 173, C. A 161 
 
 Dittmar v. Wilson, Sons & Co. ; Dittmar v. The Owners of the Ship V. 
 
 393 (Wilson & Sons). [1909] 1 K. B. 389; 78 L. J. (K. B.)523; 
 
 100 L. T. 212 ; 25 T. L. R. 188 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 178, C. A. 75, 77, 78 
 Dixon v. Owners of S.S. Ambient (.1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 428: [1912] 
 
 W. C. Rep. 224, C. A 35 
 
 v. Patten (1905), 120 L. T. Newsp. 170, C. A. (Ir.) . . .179 
 
 Dobby v. Wilson, Peace & Co. (1909), 2 B. W. C. C. 370, C. A. . . 161 
 Dobson v. British Oil and Cake Mills, Ltd. (1912), 106 L. T. 922 ; 5 B. . 
 
 W. C. C. 40S; [1912] W. C. Rep. 207, C. A. . . .140 
 r. United Collieries, Ltd. (1905), 43 S. L. R. 260; 8 F. 241, 
 
 C. S 50 
 
 Doggett v. Waterloo Taxicab Co., Ltd., [1910] 2 K. B. 336 ; 26 T. L. R. 
 
 491 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 373, C. A 120 
 
 Doharty v. Boyd. See Boyd. 
 
 Donaghy v. Ulster Spinning Co. (1912), 46 Ir. L. T. 33 ; [1912] W. C. 
 
 Rep. 183 ; C. A. (Ir.) 40 
 
 Donaldson Brothers v. Cowan, [1909] S. C. 1292; 46 S. L. R. 92; 
 
 2 B. W. C. C. 390, C. S 174 
 
 Donnachie v. United Collieries, Ltd., [1910] S. C. 503 ; 47 S. L. R. 412, 
 
 C. S 48, 49, 52 
 
 Donnelly v. Wm. Baird & Co., Ltd., [1908] S. C. 536; 45 S. L. R. 394 ; 
 
 1 B. W. C. C. 95, C. S 157 
 
 Dornan v. James Allan & Sons (1900), 38 S. L. R. 70 ; 3 F. 112, C. S. 55 
 Dothie v. MacAndrew & Co., [1908] 1 K. B. 803 ; 77 L. J. (K. B.) 388 ; 
 
 98 L. T. 495 ; 24 T. L. R. 326 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 308, C. A. . 137 
 
 Dotzauer v. Strand Palace Hotel, Ltd. (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 389, C. A. 5, 6, 
 
 8,9 
 Douglas r. United Minera Iron Co., Ltd. (1900), Times, February 20 ; 
 
 2 W. C. C. 15, C. A 17, 19, 39, 48 
 
 Dowds v. Bennie & Son (1903), 5 F. 268 ; 40 S. L. R. 239, C. S. . 154, 
 
 156, 202 
 Doyle v. Beattie & Sons (1900), 37 S. L. R. 915 ; 2 F. 1166, C. S. . 149 
 
 v. Cork Steam Packet Co. (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 350 ; [1912] W. 
 
 C. Rep. 203, C. A 158 
 
 * Duncan v. Fife Coal Co. (1905), 42 S. L. R. 822, C. S. . .64 
 
 Dundee and Arbroath Joint Rail. Co. v. Carlin (1901), 3 F. 843 ; 38 
 
 S. L. R. 632, C. S 79 
 
 Steam Trawling Co., Ltd. v. Robb(1910). 48 S. L.R. 11, C. S. 40, 145 
 
TABLE OF CASES. xix 
 
 PAGE 
 Dunham v. Clare, [1902] 2 K. B. 292; 66 J. P. 612; 71 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 683; 86 L. T. 751 ; 50 W. R. 596; 18 T. L. R. 645; 4 W. C. C. 
 
 102, C. A 145 
 
 Dunlop & Co. v. M'Cready (1900), 2 F. 1027 ; 37 S. L. R. 779, C. S. . 121 
 v. Rankin and Blackmore (1901), 4 F. 203 ; 39 S. L. R. 146, 
 
 C.S. . 53 
 
 Dunnigan v. Cavan & Lind, [1911] S. C. 579; 48 S. L. R. 459; 4 
 
 B. W. C. C. 386, C. S . . .146 
 
 Durham v. Brown Brothers & Co. (1898), 1 F. 279 ; 36 S. L. R. 190, 
 
 C. S ... 16 
 
 Duris v. Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co. See Macdonald v. Same. 
 
 E. 
 
 EATON v. Evans (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 82, C. A 64 
 
 Eaves v. Blamclydack Colliery Co., [1909] 2 K. B. 73 ; 78 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 809 ; 100 L. T. 751 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 329, C. A 155 
 
 Edge v. John Gorton, Ltd., [1912] 3 K. B. 360 ; 107 L.T. 340 ; 56 S. J. 719 ; 
 
 28 T. L. R. 566 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 614 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 392, C. A. 140 
 Edmondsons, Ltd. . Parker (1911), 5 B. \V. C. C. 70, C. A. . . 175 
 Edmunds v. Owners of S.S. Peterston (1911), 28 T. L. R. 18 ; 5 
 
 B. W. C. C. 157, C. A 20, 183 
 
 Edwards v. Alyn Steel Tinplate Co., Ltd. (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 141, 
 
 C.A 176 
 
 Edwards v. Godfrey, [1899] 2 Q. B. 333 ; 68 L. J. (Q. B.) 666 ; 80 L. T. 
 
 672 ; 47 W. R. 551 ; 15 T. L. R. 365 ; 1 W. C. C. 32, C. A. 44, 
 
 45, 46, 59 
 
 Vf Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds, Ltd., [1904] 1 K. B. 339 ; 
 
 68 J. P. 297 ; 73 L. J. (K. B.) 165 ; 90 L. T. 49 ; 52 W. R. 
 
 356 ; 20 T. L. R. 160; 6 W. C. C. 140, C. A. . . . 171 
 
 v. International Coal Co., Ltd. (1899), Times, November 13 ; 
 
 5 W. C. C. 21, C. A 39 
 
 Egerton v. Moore, [1912] 2 K. B. 308; 81 L. J. (K. B.) 696; 106 L. T. 
 
 663 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 284 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 250, C. A. . . 65, 66 
 
 Eke v. Hart-Dyke, [1910] 2 K. B. 677 ; 80 L. J. (K. B.) 90; 103 L. T. 
 
 174 ; 26 T. L. R. 613 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 482, C. A 8 
 
 Elliott v. Curry and Dodd (1912), 46 Ir. L. T. 72 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 584 ; 
 
 [1912] W. C. Rep. 188, C. A. (Ir.) 161 
 
 v. Liggena, [1902] 2 K. B. 84: 87 L. T. 29; 71 L. J. (K.B.)483; 
 
 50 W. R. 524 ; 18 T. L. R. 514 ; 4 W. C. C. 11, Div. Ct. . 58, 89, 
 
 162 
 
 Ellis v. Joseph Ellis & Co., [1905] 1 K. B. 324 ; 74 L. J. (K. B.) 229 
 92 L. T. 718 ; 53 W. R. 311 ; 21 T. L. R. 182 ; 7 W. C. C. 
 
 97, C.A 119 
 
 v. Knott (1900), Times, April 9 ; 2 W. C. C. 116, C. A. . 155 
 
 v. Lochgelly Iron and Coal Co., Ltd., [1909] S. C. 1278; 46 
 
 S. L. R. 960 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 136, C. S. (Sc.) .... 55 
 Emmerson v. Donkins & Co. (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 74, C. A. . . 175 
 Eumanw. Dalziel & Co., [1912] S. C. 966; 49 S. L. R, 693; [1912] 
 
 W. C. Rep. 328, C. S 186 
 
 *Enropean and Australian Royal Mail Co. v. Peninsular and Oriental 
 Steam Navigation Co. (1866), 14 L. T. 704 ; 14 W. R. 843 ; 12 Jur. 
 (N. s.) 909 ; 2 M. L. C. 351 96 
 
 W.C.A. c 
 
xx TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Evans (Richard) & Co. r. Astley. See Astley. 
 
 Evans B. Cook, [1905] 1 K. B. 53; 74 L. J. (K, B.) 95; 92 L. T. 43; 53 
 
 W. R. 81 ; 21 T. T,. R. 42 ; 7 W. C C. 41, C. A. . . 84 
 v. Cory Bros. & Co., Ltd. (1912) 5 B. W. C. C. 272 ; [1912] W. C. 
 
 Rep. 199, C. A ... 155 
 
 v. Dodd (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 305; [1912] W. C. Rep. 149, 
 
 C. A 7 
 
 v. Gwauncaegurwen Colliery Co.. Ltd. (1912), 106 L. T. 613: 
 
 5 B. W. C. C. 441 : [1912] W. C. Rep. 215. C. A. . . 191 
 r. Penwyllt Dinas Silica Brick Co. (1901), 18 T. L. R. 58 ; 4 
 
 W. C. C. 101, C. A 120, 121 
 
 ?;. Vickers, Sons and Maxim, [1910] 1 K. B. 554; 79 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 417; 102 L. T. 199; 26 T. L. R. 275; 3 B. W. C. C. 126, C. A.; 
 affirmed, [1910] A. C. 444: 103 L. T. 292; 26 T. L. R. 548; 3 
 
 B. W. C. C. 405 ; 48 S. L. R. 697, H. L 17<i 
 
 *Ev-rard . Kendall (1870), L. R. 5 C. P. 428; 39 L. J. (c. P.) 234 ; 22 
 
 L. T. 408 ; 18 W. R. 892 96 
 
 Eyre r. Houston Main Colliery Co., [1910] 1 K. B. 695; 79 L. J. 
 (K. B.) 698 ; 102 L. T. 385 ; 54 S. J. 304 ; 26 T. L. R. 302 ; 3 B. W. 
 
 C. C, 250, C. A 161, 186 
 
 F. 
 
 FAGAN v. Reed Bros. (1899), Times. June 5, C. A. . . . 44,59 
 
 Falconer r. 'London and Glasgow Engineering and Iron Shipbuilding 
 
 Co. (1901), 3 F. 561 ; 38 S. L. R. 381, C. S. . . . 21, 22 
 
 Farmer r. Stafford Allen & Sons, Ltd. (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 223, C. A. 37 
 Fenn r. Miller, [1900] 1 Q. B. 788 ; 64 J. P. 356 ; 69 L. J. (Q. B.) 439 ; 
 
 82 L. T. 284 ; 48 W. R. 369 ; 16 T. L. R. 265 ; 2 W. C. C. 55, C. A. 82, 
 
 186, 
 Fennah r. Midland Great Western Railway of Ireland (1911), 45 Ir. 
 
 L. T. R. 192 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 440, C. A. (Ir.) .... 36 
 Fenton c. Thorley & Co., Ltd., [1903] A. C. 443 ; 72 L. J. (K. B.) 787 ; 
 
 89 L. T. 314 ; 52 W. R. 81 ; 19 T. L. R. 684; 5 W. C. C. 1, H. L. 3, 4 
 *Ferguson, Ex parte (1871), L. R. 6 Q. B. 280 ; 40 L. J. (Q. B.) 105 ; 24 
 
 L. T 96 ; 19 W. R. 746 ; 1 Asp. M. C. 8 . . .96 
 
 v. Barclay & Co., Ltd. (1902), 40 S. L. R. 58, C. S. . . 83 
 
 c. John G. Stein & Co., Ltd. S. C. as M'Kee i: Same. 
 
 Fcrrier r. Gourlav Brothers (1902), 4 F. 711 ; 39 S. L. R. 453, C. S. 171, 
 
 175 
 Field r Lon^den & Sons, [1902] 1 K. B. 47 ; 66 J. P. 291 ; 85 L. T. 
 
 571 ; 71 L. J. (K. B.) 120 ; 50 W. R. 212 ; 18 T. L. R. 65 : 4 W. C. C. 
 
 20, C. A 56 
 
 Fife Coal Co., Ltd. v. Davidson. [1907] S. C. 90 ; 44 S. L. R. 108, C. S. 198 
 
 v. Lindsay, [1908] S. C. 431; 45 S. L. R. 317; 1 
 
 B. W. C. C. 117, C. S. . . 196 
 
 r. Wallace, [1909] S. C. 682 ; 46 S. L. R. 727 ; 
 
 2 B. W. C. C. 264, C. S 129 
 
 Finnic r. Duncan (1904), 7 F. 254 ; 42 S. L. R. 192, C. S. . . .170 
 (Archibald) & Son v. Fulton, [1909] S. C. 938 ; 46 S. L. R. 665, 
 
 C. S 198 
 
 Fitzgerald t\ Clarke & Son, [1908] 2 K. B. 796; 99 L. T. 101 ; 77 L. J. 
 
 (K. B.) 1018 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 197, C. A 9, 22 
 
TABLE OF CASES. xxi 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Fitzgerald o. Murphy (1911), 45 Ir. L. T. 200, C. A. (Ir.) ... 37 
 Fitzpatrick v. Hindley Field Colliery Co. (1901), 4 W. C. C. 7, C. A. 14 
 Fleming v. Lochgelly Iron and Coal Co., Ltd. (1902), 4 F. 890 ; 39 
 
 S. L. R. 684, C. S .139 
 
 Fletcher v. Owners of S.8. Duchess. See Hewitt v. Same. 
 
 Ford v. Wren and Dunham (1903), 5 W. C. C. 48; 115 L. T. Newsp. 
 
 357 [Wright, J.] 54 
 
 Forrester & Co. v. McCullum (1901), 3 F. 650 ; 38 S. L. R. 448, C. S. . 149 
 
 Fowler v. Hughes (1903), 5 F. 394, C. S 54, 55 
 
 Fox v. Battersea Borough Council (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 201, C. A. . 56, 
 
 185, 195 
 Fraser v. Great North of Scotland Rail. Co. (1901), 3 F. 908 ; 38 
 
 S. L. R. 653, C. S 67, 155 
 
 Freeland v. Macfarlane, Lang & Co. (1900), 2 F. 832 ; 37 S. L. R. 599, 
 
 C. S 160 
 
 . Summerlee Iron Co., Ltd., [1912] S. C. 1145 ; 49 S. L. R. 
 
 841 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 598 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 225, C. S. . . . 57 
 French v. Underwood (1903), 19 T. L. R. 416 ; 5 W. C. C. 119, C. A. . 126 
 Frith v. Owners of S.S. Louisianian, [1912] 2 K. B. 155; 81 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 701 ; 106 L. T. 667; 28 T. L. R. 331 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 410 ; [1912] 
 
 W. C. Rep. 285, C. A 29 
 
 Fry v. Cheltenham Corporation (1911), 105 L. T. 495; 81 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 41 ; 10 L. G. R. 1 ; 28 T. L. R. 16 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 162 ; [1912] 
 
 ) W. C. Rep. 103: C. A 66, 183 
 
 Furness, Withy & Co. v. Bennett (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 195, C. A. . 154 
 Furniss v. Gartside & Co. (of Manchester), Ltd. (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 
 
 411, C. A 22, 30 
 
 Furnival v. Johnson's Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 43, 
 
 C. A. . 34 
 
 G. 
 
 GAM ANT Anthracite Collieries, Ltd. v. Rees. See Garnant. 
 
 Gane v. Norton Hill Colliery Co., [1909] 2 K. B. 539; 78 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 921 ; 100 L. T. 979 ; 25 T. L. R. 640 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 42, C. A. 13, 187 
 *Gapp v. Bond (1886), 19 Q. B. D. 200 ; 56 L. J. (Q. B.) 438 ; 57 L. T. 
 
 437 ; 35 W. R. 683, C. A. .' 96 
 
 Gardner v. Cox (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 245, C. A 191 
 
 Garnant Anthracite Collieries Co., Ltd. v. Rees, [1912] 3 K. B. 372 ; 
 
 107 L. T. 279 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 694 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 396, C. A. 153 
 Garrett v. Waddell & Son, [1911] S. C. 1168 ; 48 S. L. R. 937 ; 5 B. W. 
 
 C. C. 507, C. S. 107 
 
 *Gas Float Whitton, The (No. 2), [1897] A. C. 337 ; affirming [1906] P. 
 
 42, H. L 96 
 
 Gatton v. Limerick Steamship Co., [1910] 2 Ir. R. 561 ; 44 Ir. L. T. 
 
 141, C. A. (Ir.) . 35 
 
 Geary v. W. Dixon, Ltd. (1899), 4 F. 1143 ; 36 S. L. R. 640, C. S. . 159 
 Gellyceidrim Colliery Co., Ltd. v. Rogers (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 62 . 186 
 George v. Glasgow Coal Co., Ltd., [1909] A. C. 123 ; 78 L. J. (p. o.) 47 ; 
 
 99 L. T. 782 ; 46 S. L. R. 28 ; 25 T. L. R. 57 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 125, 
 
 H. L . . . 48, 49, 51 
 
 Gibb v. Dunlop & Co., Ltd. (1900), (1902), 4 F. 971 ; 39 S. L. R. 750, 
 
 C. S. .... 150 
 
xxii TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Gibson v. Dunkerley Bros. (Lees and Sykes, third parties) (1910), 102 
 L. T. 587 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 347, C. A. ; affirmed sub nom. 
 
 Lees v. Dunkerley, q.v. H. L 61, 89 
 
 v. Wilson (1901), 3 F. 661 ; 38 S. L. R. 450, C. S. . . .11 
 
 v. Wormald and Walker, [1904] 2 K. B. 40 ; 68 J. P. 382 ; 73 
 
 L. J. (K. B.) 491 ; 91 L. T. 7 ; 52 W. E. 661 ; 20 T. L. B. 452 ; 6 
 
 W. C. C. 155, C. A 183, 184 
 
 Gibson & Co. v. Gorman. See Gorman. 
 
 Gilbert v. Owners of Steam Trawler Nizam, [1910] 2 K. B. 555; 79 
 L. J. (K. B.) 1172; 103 L. T. 163; 26 T. L. R. 604; 3 B. W. C. 0. 
 
 455, C. A . . . .' . 26, 35 
 
 Gilbey v Great Western Rail. Co. (1910), 102 L. T. 202 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 
 
 135, C. A 40 
 
 Giles v. Belford Smith & Co., [1903] 1 K. B. 843 ; 67 J. P. 399 ; 72 
 L. J. (K. B.) 569; 88 L. T. 754; 51 W. R. 692; 19 T. L. B. 422; 
 
 5 W. C. 0. 136. C. A 149 
 
 Gill v. Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing Co. See Aberdeen, 
 
 etc. 
 Gilmour v. Dorman, Long & Co., Ltd. (1911), 105 L. T. 54 ; 4 B. W.C. C. 
 
 279, C. A 10,11,12 
 
 Gilroy v. Mackie and others (Leith Distress Committee), [1909] S. C. 
 
 466 ; 46 S. L. R. 325 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 269, C. S. . . . 122, 158 
 Glasgow Coal Co. v. Sneddon. See Sneddon. 
 
 and South Western Rail. Co. v. Laidlaw (1900), 2 F. 708; 37 
 
 S. L. R. 503, C. S 51 
 
 Godwin v. Admiralty Commissioners, [1912] 2 K. B. 26; 81 L. J. (K.B.) 
 532 ; 106 L. T. 136 ; 56 S. J. 307 ; 28 T. L. R. 229 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 
 
 229 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 49, C. A 73, 132 
 
 Goff v. Airds, Ltd. (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 277; [1912] W. C. Rep. 382, 
 
 C. A 187 
 
 Golder v. Caledonian Rail. Co. (1902), 40 S. L. R. 89, C. S. . . 146 
 Goodall and Clarke v. Kramer (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 317, C. A. . 154, 175 
 Goodlet v. Caledonian Rail. Co. (1902), 4 F. 986 ; 39 S. L. R. 759, 
 
 C. S. 21 
 
 Gorley v. Owners of Backworth Collieries (1905), 93 L. T. 360 ; 21 
 
 T. L. R. 494 ; 7 W. C. C. 19, C. A 7 
 
 Gorman v. Gibson & Co , [1910] S. C. 317; 47 S. L. R. 394, C. S. . 116 
 Goslan v. James Gillies & Co. (1906), 44 S. L. R. 71 ; [1907] S. C. 68, 
 
 C. S 19 
 
 Gough v. Crawshay Bros., Cyfartha, Ltd., [1908] 1 K. B. 411; 77 
 L. J. (K. B.) 236; 48 L. T. 327; 24 T. L. R. 186; 1 B. W. C. C. 
 
 351, 374, C. A 142 
 
 Gourlay v. Murray, [1908] S. C. 769 ; 45 S. L. R. 577 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 
 
 335, C. S 152, 153 
 
 Gourlay Bros. v. Ferrier. See Ferrier. 
 
 (Dundee), Ltd. v. Sweeney. See Sweeney. 
 
 Grant and Aldcroft v. Conroy (1904),' 6 W. C. C. 153 . . . . 178 
 
 v. Glasgow and South Western Rail. Co., [1908] S. C. 187 ; 45 
 
 S. L. R. 128; 1 B. W. C.C. 17 34,39 
 
 Gray .v. Shotts Iron Co.. Ltd. (1912), 49 S. L. R. 906 ; [1912] W. C. 
 
 Rep. 359, C. S 172 
 
 Gray & Sons v. Carroll, [1910] S. C. 700 ; 47 S. L. R. 646 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 
 
 572, C. S. 202 
 
 *Great Eastern S.S. Co.. fle The (1886), 53 L. T. 594 ... 95 
 
TABLE OF CASES. xxiii 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Great Northern Bail. Co. v. Dawson, [1905] 1 K. B. 331 ; 74 L. J. (K. B.) 
 271; 92 L. T. 145; 53 W. B. 309; 21 
 T. L. B. 193 ; 7 W. C. C. 114, C. A. . 137 
 v. Whitehead (1902), 18 T. L. B. 816; 4 
 
 W. C. C. 39 [Darling, J.] 92 
 
 Greene v.Shaw (1911), [1912] 21. B. 430 ; 46lr.L.T. 18; 5B.W.C. C. 
 
 573; [1912] W. C. Bep. 25, C. A. (Ir.) . . . . 23, 26 
 
 Greenhill v. Caledonian Bail. Co. (1900), 2 F. 736; 37 S. L. B. 524, 
 
 C. S 79 
 
 Gree3iwood v. Greenwood (1907), 97 L. T. 771; 24 T. L. B. 24; 1 
 
 B. W. C. C. 247, D. C 60 
 
 *Greenwood (John), Ltd. v. Hawkings (1906), 23 T. L. B. 72 [Big- 
 ham, J.] 84 
 
 Greer v. Lindsay Thompson, Ltd. (1912), 46 Ir. L. T. 89 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 
 
 586 ; [1912] W. C. Bep. 272, C. A. (Ir.) 19 
 
 Griffiths v. Atkinson (1912), 106 L. T. 852; 5 B. W. C. C. 345 ; [1912] 
 
 W. C. Eep. 277, C. A 66 
 
 v. North's Navigation Collieries (1889), Ltd., (1912) 5 B. W. 
 
 C. C. 21, C. A 41 
 
 . Wynnstay Collieries (1909), 2 B. W. C. C. 450, C. A. . 186 
 
 v. Davis & Sons, Ltd. (1899), Times, November 13, C. A. . 126 
 
 Griga v. Owners of S.S. Harelda (1910), 26 T. L. B. 272 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 
 
 116, C. A. . . . 175 
 
 Groves v. Burroughes and Watts, Ltd. (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 185, C. A. 36 
 Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds, Ltd. v. Winsper (1911), 4 B. W. C. 0. 289, 
 
 C. A 162 
 
 Guthrie v. Boase Spinning Co. (1901), 3 F. 769 ; 38 S. L. B. 483, C. S. 48 
 
 H. 
 
 HADDOCK v. Fisher & Sons (1900), Times, May 7 ; 2 W. C. C. 43, C. A. 200 
 
 v. Humphrey (1899), Times, August 1 ; 1 W. C. C. 117, C. A. 188 
 
 Haius & Strange v. Corbet (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 372 ; [1912] W. C. Bep. 
 
 288, C. A 173 
 
 Haley v. United Collieries, Ltd., [1907] S. C. 214 ; 44 S. L. B. 193, C. S. . 13 
 Hall v. Snowden, Hubbard & Co. (No. 1), [1899] 1Q. B. 593; 68 L. J. 
 
 (Q. B.) 363 ; 47 W. B. 322 ; 80 L. T. 
 256 ; 15 T. L. B. 244; 1 W. C. C. 
 
 114, C. A 187 
 
 . (No. 2), [1899] 2 Q. B. 136 ; 15 T. L. B. 
 
 326 ; 68 L. J. (Q. B.) 645 ; 80 L. T. 554 ; 47 W. B. 486 ; 1 W. 
 
 C. C. 73, C. A 82 
 
 v. Tamworth Colliery Co., [1911] 1 K. B. 341 ; 80 L. J. (K. B.) 304 ; 
 
 103 L. T. 782 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 107, C, A. but varied, [1911] A. C. 
 665 ; 81 L. J. (K. B.) 159 ; 105 L. T. 449 ; 55 S. J. 615 ; 49 S. L. B. 
 626 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 313 ; [1912] W. C Eep. 79, H. L. . 126, 127, 152 
 Halls v. Furness, Withy & Co. (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 72, C. A. . .196 
 Halvorsen v. Salvesen (1911), 49 S. L. B. 27; [1912] S. C. 99; 5 
 
 B. W. C. C. 519, C. S 30 
 
 Hancocks v. British Westinghouse ElectricCo. (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 210, 
 
 C. A 65 
 
 Handford v. Clarke & Co., Ltd., [1907] 1 K. B. 181; 96 L. T. 175; 9 
 
 W. C. C. 136, C. A. . ... 188 
 
xxiv TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Hanley v. Niddrie and Benhar Coal Co. See Niddrie. 
 *Hanna, The (1866), L. K. 1 A. & E. 283, Adm. Ct. ... 96 
 
 Hapelman v. Poole (1908). 25 T. L. R. 155 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 48, C. A. . 4, 
 
 20,25 
 Hardford v. County Dublin County Council (1910), 45 Ir. L. T. 150, 
 
 C. A. (Ir.) 76, 83 
 
 Harding v. Brynddu Colliery Co. Ltd., [1911] 2 K. B. 747; 105 L. T. 
 
 55; 27T.L.E.500; 55 8. J. 599; 4 B. W. C. C. 269. C. A. 17,18 
 v. Royal Mail Steam Packet Co., (1910) 4 B. W. C. C. 59, 
 
 C. A 170 
 
 Hardy v. Moss and Fidler (1903), 6 W. C. C. 68 ; 116 L. T. Newsp 201, 
 
 C. C 80 
 
 Hargreave v. Haughhead Coal Co., [1912] A. C. 319; 81 L. J. (p. c.) 
 
 167 ; 106 L. T. 468 ; 56 S. J. 379 ; 49 S. L. R. 474 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 
 
 445; [1912] W. C. Rep. 275, H. L. (Sc.) 175 
 
 Harland and Wolff v. Radcliffe, [1909] 43 Ir. L. T. 166 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 
 
 374, C. A. (Ir.) 165 
 
 Harrison v. Whitaker Bros., Ltd. (1899), 64 J. P. 54; 16 T. L. R. 108 ; 
 
 2 W. C. C. 12, C. A 19 
 
 Hartshorne v. Coppice Colliery Co. (1912), 106 L. T. 609; 5 B. W. C. C. 
 
 358 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 255, C. A 194 
 
 Harwood o. Abrahams, [1901] 2 K. B. 304 ; 70 L. J. (K. B.) 746 ; 84 L. T. 
 
 857 ; 3 W. C. C. 205, C. A 187 
 
 Hathaway v. Argus Printing Co., [1901] 1 Q. B. 96 ; 64 J. P. 804; 17 
 
 T. L. R. 42; 70 L. J. (Q. B.) 12; 83 L. T. 465; 49 W. R. 113; 
 
 3 W. C. C. 177, C. A 149 
 
 Hawkes v. Richard Coles & Sons (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 163, C. A. 47, 53, 55 
 Hawkins v. Powell's Tillery Steam Coal Co., [1911] 1 K. B. 988; 80 
 
 L. J. (K. B.) 769 ; 104 L. T. 365 ; 55 S. J. 329 ; 27 T. L. R. 282 ; 4 
 
 B. W. C. C. 178, C. A 31, 37 
 
 Haworth V.Andrew Knowles & Son, Ltd., Accident Society (1903). 19 
 
 T. L. R. 658 ; 5 W. C. C. 57, C. A .73 
 
 Hayden v. Dick (1902), 5 F. 150 ; 40 S. L. R. 95, C. S. . . 120 
 
 Haylett v. Vigor, [1908] 2 K. B. 837 ; 77 L. J. (K. B.) 1132; 99 L. T. 
 
 674 ; 24 T. L. R. 885 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 282, C- A 108 
 
 Hays Wharf (Proprietors of), Ltd. v. Brown (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 84, 
 
 C. A. " , 183 
 
 Healy v. Galloway, [1907] 41 Ir. L. T. R. 5, C. A. (Ir.) ... 69 
 Heaton v. Tomlinson & Son (1904), 117 L. T. Newsp., p. 3 . .68 
 
 Henderson v. Glasgow Corporation (1900), 2 F. 1127 ; 37 S. L. R. 857, 
 
 C. S 9, 59 
 
 Hendry v. Caledonian Rail. Co., [1907] S. C. 732 ; 44 S. L. R. 584, C. S. . 21 
 
 v. United Collieries, Ltd. See United Collieries, Ltd. v. Hendry. 
 
 v. (No. 2), [1910] S. C. 709 ; 47 S. L. It. 
 
 635 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 567, C. S. 14, 30 
 Henneberry v. Doyle Bros. (No. 1), 46 Ir. L. T. 61 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 
 
 135, C. A. (Ir.) 188 
 
 . _ __ (Xo. 2), [1912] 2 I. R. 529 ; 47 Ir. L. T. 70 ; 
 
 5 B. W. C. C. 580 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 147 ; C. A. (Ir.) . . 21 
 
 Henricksen v. Owners of S.S. Swanhilda (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 233, 
 
 C. A 202 
 
 Hensey v. White, [1900] 1 Q. B. 481; 63 J. P. 804; 69 L. J. (Q. B.) 
 
 188; 81 L. T. 767 ; 48 W. R. 257; 16 T. L. R. 64; 2 W. C. C. 1, 
 
 C.A 3,4 
 
TABLE OF CASES. xxv 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Herd v. Summers (1905), 7 F. 870 84 
 
 Hewitt v. Owners of Ship Duchess, [1910] 1 K. B. 772 ; 79 L. J. (K. B.) 
 867; 102 L. T. 201; 54 S. J. 325 ; 26 T. L. R. 300; 3 B. W. C. C. 
 239,0. A.; affirmed sub nom. Fletcher v. Same, [1911] A. C. 671 ; 
 81 L J. (K. B.) 83 ; 105 L. T. 121 ; 55 S. J. 598 ; 27 T. L. R. 508 ; 
 49 S. L. R. 627 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 317 ; [1912] W. O. Rep. 16, H. L. 29, 
 
 35, 39 
 
 Hewlett 0. Hepburn (1899), 16 T. L. R. 56; 2 W. C. C. 123, C. A. . 149 
 Hey wood v. Broadstone Spinning Mill, (1910) 128 L. T. Newsp., p. 134, 
 
 C.C 27 
 
 Higgins v. Campbell and Harrison, Ltd., [1904] 1 K. B. 32; 68 J. P. 
 409 ; 73 L. J. (K. B.) 510 ; 90 L. T. 611 ; 52 W. R. 451 ; 
 
 20 T. L. R. 429 ; 6 W. C. C. 1, C. A 4, 8 
 
 . Poulson (No. 1), 5 B. W. C. C. 66, C. A 56 
 
 . (No. 2), [1912] 2 K. B. 292; 81 L. J. (K. B.) 690 ; 
 
 106 L. T. 518 ; 28 T. L. R. 323 ; 5 B. W. 0. C. 340 ; [1912] W. C. 
 
 Rep. 244, C. A 183, 283 
 
 Hill v. Begg, [1908] 2 K. B. 802; 77 L. J. (K. B.) 1074; 99 L. T. 104; 
 
 24 T. L. R. 711 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 320, C. A 124 
 
 v. Ocean Coal Co., Ltd. (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 29, C. A . . . . 155 
 
 Hoare v. Owners of Barge "Cecil Rhodes" (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 49, 
 
 C. A. 120 
 
 v. Arding & Hobbs (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 36, C. A. . . .66 
 
 Hoddinott v. Newton Chambers & Co., Ltd., [1901] A. C. 49; 70 L. J. 
 (Q. B.) 150 ; 84 L. T. 1 ; 49 W. R. 380 ; 17 T. L. R. 134 ; 3 W. C. 0. 
 
 74, H. L I 
 
 Hodgson ?;. West Stanley Colliery, [1910] A. C. 229 ; 79 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 356; 102 L. T. 194 ; 54 S. J.403; 
 26 T. L. R. 333 ; 47 S. L. R. 881 ; 
 3 B. W. C. C. 260, H. L. . 148, 152 
 
 v. * (No. 2) (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 394, 
 
 C. A .189 
 
 Holmes v. Great Northern Rail. Co., [1900] 2 Q. B. 409 ; 64 J. P. 532 ; 
 
 16 T. L. R. 412 ; 69 L. J. (Q. B.)854 ; 88 L. T. 44 ; 48 W. R 681 ; 
 
 2 W. C. C. 19, C. A 10, 11 
 
 Holness v. Machay and Davis, [1899] 2 Q. B. 319; 15 T. L. R. 351 ; 
 
 68 L. J. (Q. B.) 724 ; 80 L. T. 831 ; 47 W. R. 531 ; 1 W. C. C. 13, 
 
 C. A . ' 12, 13 
 
 Holt u. Yates and Thorn (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 75, C. A. . . .155 
 Homer v. Gough (1911), [1912] 2 K. B. 303; 105 L. T. 732; 5 B. W. 
 
 C. C. 51; [1912] W. C. 30, C.A. .... 88,185,187 
 
 Honor v. Painter (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 188, C. A 37 
 
 Hopwood v. Olive and Partington, Ltd. (1910), 102 L. T. 790 ; 3 
 
 B. W. C. C. 359, C. A 52 
 
 Horn v. Admiralty Commissioners, [1911] 1 K. B. 24; 80 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 278 ; 103 L. T. 614 ; 27 T. L. R. 84 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 1, C. A. . . 73 
 Horsman v. Glasgow Navigation Co., Ltd. (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 27, C. A. 158 
 Hosegood v. Wilson, [1911] 1 K. B. 30 ; 80 L. J. (K. B.) 519 ; 103 L. T. 
 
 616 ; 27 T. L. R. 88 ; 4 B. W. 0. C. 30, C. A. . . . 174, 180 
 Hoskins v. J. Lancaster (1910), 26 T. L. R. 614; 3 B. W. C. C. 476, 
 
 C. A . . . ' . . 12, 13 
 
 Houghton v. Button Heath and Lea Green Collieries Co. ,[1901] 1 Q. B. 
 
 93 ; 65 J. P. 134 ; 70 L. J. (Q. B.) 61 ; 83 L. T. 472 ; 49 W. K. 196 ; 
 
 17 T. L. R. 54; 3 W. C. C. 173, C. A 137 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Howarth v. Sir B. Samuelson & Co. (1911), 104 L. T. 907 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 
 
 287, C. A 185 
 
 Howe r. Fornhill Collieries, Ltd. (1912), 107 L. T. 508; 5 B. W. C. C. 
 
 629 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 408, C. A 38 
 
 Howell v. Bradford & Co. (1911), 104 L. T. 433; 4 B. W. C. C, 203, 
 
 C. A 53, 147 
 
 - v. Blackwell's Executors (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 293; [1912] 
 
 W. C. Eep. 186, C. A 177, 185, 187 
 
 Howells v. Vivian (1901), 50 W. R. 163 ; 85 L. T. 529 ; 18 T. L. R. 36 ; 
 
 4W. C. C. 106, C. A 127 
 
 Hubball v. Everitt & Sous, Ltd. (1900), 16 T. L. R. 168; 5 W. C. C. 
 
 145 n., C. A 187 
 
 Huckle v. L. C. C. (1910), 26 T. L. R. 580 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 536, Div. Ct. ; 
 
 affirmed 4 B. W. C. C. 113, C. A 53, 91 
 
 Hughes v. Clover, Clayton & Co. See Clover, Clayton & Co. 
 
 - v. Cced Talon Colliery Co., Ltd., [1909] 1 K. B. 957 ; 78 L. J. 
 
 (K. B.) 539 ; 100 L. T. 555 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 159, C. A. 63, 65 
 
 v. Poatleth waite (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 105, C. A. . . . 120 
 
 v. Summerlee and Mossend Iron and Steel Co., Ltd. (1903), 
 
 5 F. 784 ; 40 S. L. R. 602, C. S. (Sc.) . . . .152 
 v. Vothey Quarry Co. (1908), 125 L. T. Newsp. 471 ; 1 B. W. 
 
 C, C.416,CC. ... 53 
 
 Hugo v. H. W. Larkine & Co. (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 228, C, A. . 37, 145 
 Humb 3 r Steam Towing Co. v. Barclay (1911). 5 B. W. C. C. 142, C. A. 156 
 Humphreys v. City of London Electric Lighting Co. (191 1), 4 B. W. C. C. 
 
 275, C. A .159 
 
 *Hunt r. Great Northern Rail. Co., [1891 ] 1 Q. B. 601 ; 55 J. P. 470 ; 
 
 60 L. J. (Q. B.) 216 ; 64 L. T. 418, Div. Ct 123 
 
 Hunter v. J. Brown & Co., Ltd. See Brown. 
 v. Darnell Coal Co., Ltd. (1900), 3 F. 10 ; 38 S. L. R. 6, C. S. 
 
 (Sc.) > . . .55 
 
 Husband v. P. P. Campbell (1903), 5 F. 1146 ; 40 S. L. R. 822, C. S. 
 
 (Sc.) 175 
 
 Hyndman v. Craig & Co. (1910), 45 Ir. L. T. 11; 4 B. AV. C. C. 438, 
 
 C.A.(lr.) .29 
 
 I. 
 
 IBRAHIM SAID v. J. H. Welsford & Co., Ltd. (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 233, 
 
 C. A 198 
 
 Illingworth v. Walmsley, [1900] 2 Q. B. 142 ; 1C T. L. R. 281 ; 69 L. J. 
 
 (Q. B.) 519 : 82 L. T. 647 ; 2 W. C. C. 118, C. A. . . . 09, 159 
 * Incorporated Council of Law Reporting, Inre Duty on Estate of (1888), 
 
 22 Q. B. D. 279 ; 53 J. P. 1 19 ; 58 L. J. (Q. B.) 90 ; 60 L. T. 505 ; 
 
 37 W. E. 382 76 
 
 Irons r. Davis aiU Timmins. Ltd., [1899] 2 Q. B. 330 ; 68 L. J. (Q. B.) 
 
 673 ; 80 L. T. 673 ; 47 W. R. 616 ; 1 W. C. C. 26, C. A. . 58, 159 
 Isaacson v. New Grand (Claphain Junction), Ltd., [1903] 1 K. B. 539 ; 
 
 19 T. L. R. 150 ; 72 L. J. (K. B.) 227 ; 88 L. T. 291 ; 5 W. C. C. 35, 
 
 Div.Ct 45 
 
 Ismay, Imrie & Co. r. Williamson, [1908] A. C. 437; 99 L. T. 595 ; 77 
 
 L. J. (P. c.) 107 : 24 T. L. R. 881 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 232 ; 42 Ir. L. T. 
 
 213 ; 146 S. L. R. 699, II. L 4, 5, 9 
 
TABLE OF CASES. xxvii 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Ivey v. Ivey, [1912] 2 K. B. 118; 81 L. J. (K. B.) 819: 106 L. T. 485 ; 
 
 5 B. W. C. C. 279 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 293, 0. A. . . 164, 167 
 
 J. 
 
 J., Re, a Debtor; Ex parte Reid (1911), 45 Ir. L. T. 247 . . . 87 
 Jackson v. General Steam Fishing Co., Ltd., [1909] A. C. 523 ; 46 
 S. L. E. 90] ; 78 L. J. (P. c.) 148 ; 101 L. T. 401 ; 53 S. J. 763 ; 25 
 T. L. K. 787 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 56, H. L. . . . . 10, 16, 29 
 "Jackson v. Hill & Co. (1884), 13 Q B. D. 618 ; 49 J. P. 119, Div. Ct. 123 
 
 v. Eodgcr & Co. (1899), 1 F. 1053 ; 36 S. L. K. 851, C. S. (Sc.) 80 
 
 v. Scotstoua Estate Co., [1911] S. C. 564; 48 S. L. R. 446; 
 
 4 B. W. C. C. 381, C. S .202 
 
 v. Vickers, Ltd. (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 433 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 
 
 274, C. A 63, 65 
 
 James v. Ocean Coal Co., [1904] 2 K. B. 213; 68 J. P. 431; 73 L. J. 
 (K. B.) 915: 90 L. T. 834; 52 W. R. 497; 20 T. L. R. 483: 6 
 
 W. C. C. 128, C. A 160 
 
 Jamieson v. Clark (1908), 46 S. L. R. 73; [1909] S. C. 132 ; 2 B. W. 
 
 C. C. 228, C. S 97, 120 
 
 v. Fife Coal Co., Ltd. (1903), 5 F. 958 ; 40 S. L. R. 704, C. S. 160 
 
 *Jane and Matilda (The) (1823), 1 Hagg. Adm. 187 . . . .95 
 Jenkins v. Standard Colliery Co. (1911), 105 L. T. 730 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 
 
 71 ; 28 T. L. R. 7, C. A 36, 37 
 
 Jenkinson v. Harrison, Ainslie & Co., Ltd. (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 194; 
 
 C. A 17 
 
 Jessop v. Maclay, [1911] W. N., p. 196 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 139, C. A. . 189 
 Job;on v. W. Cory & Sons, Ltd. (1911), 131 L. T. Newsp., p. 147; 4 
 
 B. W. C. C. 284, C. A 147 
 
 John v. Albion Coal Co., Ltd. (1901), 65 J. P. 788; 18 T. L. R. 27; 4 
 
 W. C. C. 15, C. A 49, 51 
 
 John Greenwood, Ltd. v. Hawkings (1906), 23 T. L. R. 72, [Bigham, J.] 84 
 Johnson (Pauper) v. Marshall, Sons & Co., Ltd., [1906] A. C. 409; 94 
 L. T. 828 ; 75 L. J. (K. B.) 868 ; 22 T. L. R. 565 ; 8 
 
 W. C. C. 10, H. L 47-49, 51 
 
 v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., Ltd. (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 
 
 322; [1912] W. C. Rep. 162, C. A 165,199 
 
 v. Owners of S.S. Torrington (1905), 3 B. W. C. C. 68, C. A. 3, 
 
 5,9 
 
 - v. Wootton (1911), 27 T. L. R. 487 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 258, C. A. 45, 68 
 Johnston v. Mew. Langton & Co., [1907] W. N., p. 156 ; 98 L. T. 517; 
 
 24 T. L. R. 175 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 133, C. A. . . . 199 
 
 v. Mouasterevan General Store Co., [1908] 2 Ir. R. 108 ; 42 
 
 Ir. L. T. 268 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 183, C. A. (Ir.) . . .124 
 Johnstone v. Cochrane & Co., Ltd. (1904), 6 F. 854; 41 S. L. R. 644, 
 
 C. S. . . 202 
 
 v. James Spencer & Co., [1908] S. C. 1015 ; 45 S. L. R. 802 ; 
 
 1 B. W. C. C. 302, C. S 129 
 
 Jones v. Ebbw Vale Steel, Iron and Coal Co., Ltd. (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 
 
 181, C. A 345 
 
 v. Great Central Rail. Co. (1901). 18 T. L. R. 65 ; 4 W. C. C. 23, 
 
 C. A 55, 191, 194 
 
xxviii TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Jones v. L. X. W. Kail. Co. (1901), 4 W. C. C. 140, C. A. . . 159 
 
 v. New Brynmally Colliery Co. (1912), 106 L. T. 524 ; 5 B. W. 
 
 C. C. 375 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 281, C. A 154 
 
 v. Ocean Coal Co., [1899] 2 Q. B. 124 ; 68 L. J. (Q. B.) 731 ; 80 
 
 L. T. 582 ; 47 W. R. 484 ; 15 T. L R. 339 ; 1 W. C. C. 94, 
 
 C. A 150 
 
 v. Owners of S. Alice and Eliza (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 496, C. A. 118, 
 
 120 
 
 v. Tirdonkin Colliery Co. (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 3, C. A. . 175,186 
 
 Joyce v. Wellingborough Iron Co. (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 126, C. A. . 19 
 Ju'dd r. Metropolitan Asylum Board (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 420 ; [1912] 
 
 W. C. Rep. 220. C, A ,.70 
 
 Jury v. Owners of S.S. Atalanta, [1912] 3 K. B. 366 ; 28 T. L. R. 562 ; 
 56 S. J. 703 ; 107 L. T. 366 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 681 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 
 389, C. A 140 
 
 K. 
 
 KANE v. Merry & Cunninghame.Ltd., [1911J S. C. 533 ; 48 S. L. R. 430 ; 
 
 4 B. W. C. C. 379, C. S 30 
 
 Karemaker v. Owners of S.S. Corsican (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 295, C. A. . 24 
 Keane v. Xah (No. 1) (1902), 5 W. C. C. 53; 114 L. T. Xewsp. 102, 
 
 C. C 60 
 
 Vm (No. 2) (1903), 88 L. T. 790 ; 19 T. L. R. 419 ; 5 
 
 W. C. C. 142, C. A 184 
 
 Kearon v. Kearon (1911), 45 Ir. L. T. 96 ; 4 B, W. C. C. 435, C. A. (Ir.) 20 
 Keast v. Barrow Hsematite Steel Co., Ltd. (1899), 63 J. P. 56; 15 ' 
 
 T. L. R. 141 ; 1 W. C. C. 99, C.. A 150 
 
 Keeling v. Eastwood & Co. (1904), 116 L. T. Newsp. 595; 6 W. C. C. 
 
 167. C. A 195 
 
 v. New Monckton Collieries. See Xew Monckton Collieries. 
 
 *Keen v. Millwall Dock Co. (1882), 8 Q. B. D. 482; 46 J. P. 435; 51 
 
 L. J. (Q. B.) 277 ; 30 W. R. 503 ; 46 L. T. 472 . . . 63 
 
 Keenan v Flemiiigton Coal Co. (1902), 40 S. L. R. 144, C. S. . .16 
 Kelly v. Arrol & Co., Ltd. See Arrol & Co., Ltd. 
 
 v. Auchenlea Coal Co., Ltd., [1911] S. C. 864; 48 S. L. R. 768; 
 
 4 B. W. C. C, 417, C. S 5. 8 
 
 v. Hopkins, [1908] 2 Ir. R. 84, C. A. (Ir.) . . . .129 
 
 r. Kerry County Council (1908), 42 Ir. L. T. 23 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 
 
 194, C. A. (Ir.) 24 
 
 v. Owners of the Ship Foam Queen (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 113, 
 
 C. A 21, 26 
 
 Kempson v. Owners of S. Moss Rose (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 101, C. A. i;>8 
 Kendall & Gent, Ltd. v. Pennington (1912), 106 L. T. 817 ; 5 B. W. 
 
 C. C. 335 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 144, C. A 177 
 
 Kennedy v. Caledon Shipbuilding and Engineering Co . Ltd. See 
 
 Caledon. 
 Kenny v. Harrison, [1902] 2 K. B. 168 ; 71 L. J. (K. B.) 783 ; 87 L. T. 
 
 318; 4 W. C. C. 60, C. A. 186 
 
 Kent . Porter (1901), 38 S. L. R. 482, C. S 82 
 
 Kerr v. Stewart (1909), 43 Ir. L. T. 119; 2 B. W. C. C. 454, C. A. (Ir). 188 
 ,.. w m . Baird & Co., Kd., [1911] S. C. 701 ; 48 S. L. R. 646; 4 
 
 B. W. C. C. 397. C. S. ... . . . .17 
 
TABLE OF CASES. xxix 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Keyserv. Burdick & Co. (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 87, C. A. ... 20 
 Kilpatrick v. Wemyss Coal Co., Ltd., [1907] S. C. 320 ; 44 S. L. R. 255, 
 
 C. S 67 
 
 King e. Phumix Assurance Co., Ltd., [1910] 2 K. B. 666 ; 80 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 44 ; 103 L. T. 53; 3 B. W. C. C. 442, C. A 87 
 
 v. United Collieries, Ltd., [1910] S. C. 42 ; 47 S. L. K. 41 ; 3 
 
 B. W. C. C. 546, C. S 171 
 
 Kitchenham v. " Johannesburg " S.S., [1911] 1 K. B. 523 ; 80 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 313 ; 103 L. T. 778 ; 55 8. J. 124 ; 27 T. L. K. 124 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 
 
 91, C. A.; affirmed [1911] A. C. 417; 105 L. T. 118; 55 S. J. 599; 
 
 27 T. L. R. 504 ; 49 S. L. R. 626 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 311, H. L. . 28, 29 
 Knight v. Cubitt & Co., Ltd., [1902] 1 K. B. 31 ; 66 J. P. 52; 71 L. J. 
 
 (K. B.) 65 ; 85 L. T. 526 ; 50 W. R. 113 ; 18 T. L. R. 26 ; 4 W. C. C. 
 
 42, C. A. 79 
 
 Kniveton v. Northern Employers' Mutual Indemnity Co., Ltd., [1902] 
 
 1 K. B. 880; 18 T. L. R. 504; 71 L. J. (K. B.) 588 ; 86 L. T. 721 ; 
 
 50 W. R. 704 ; 4 W. C. C. 37, Div. Ct. . . . . .184 
 
 Knott <\ Tingle, Jacobs, & Co. (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 55, C. A. . . 138 
 *Krzus r. Crow's Nest Pass Coal Co., [1912] A. C. 590, P. C. . 133 
 
 Kyle i\ M'Gintys. See M'Gintys. 
 
 LANGLEY v. Reeve (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 175, C. A. . . . 9, 40 
 
 Lankester v. Miller, Hetherington (third party) (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 80, 
 
 C. A 91 
 
 Lawrie v. Banknock Co., Ltd. See Banknock. 
 
 v. James Brown & Co., Ltd., [1908] S. C. 705 ; 45 S. L. R. 477 ; 
 
 1 B. W. C. C. 137, C. S. (.Sc.) 56, 198 
 
 Leach v. Hickson (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 153, C. A 64 
 
 Vt Oakley Street & Co., [1911] 1 K. B. 523 ; 80 L. J. (K. B.) 313 ; 
 
 103 L. T. 779 ; 55 S. J. 124 ; 27 T. L. R. 124 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 91, 
 
 C. A 28, 29 
 
 Lee v. Cortonwood Colliery Co., Ltd. (1901), 4 W. C. C. 32 ; Times, 
 
 November 11, C. A. . . ' 68 
 
 *Lee v. Lanes, and Yorks. Rail. Co. (1871), L. R. 6 Ch. 527, C. A. . 53 
 
 - /\ Owner 9 f S.S. Bessie, [1912] 1 K. B. 83; 81 L. J. (K. B.) 114; 
 
 12 Asp. M. C. 89 ; 105 L. T. 659; 5 B. W. C. C. 55 ; [1912] 
 
 W. C. Rep. 57, C. A 127, 128, 129 
 
 - v. Stag Line, Ltd. (1912), 107 L. T. 509 ; 55 S. J. 720 ; 5 B. W. 
 
 C. C. 660; [1912] W. C. Rep. 398, C. A 33 
 
 - v. Win. Baird & Co., Ltd., [1908] S. C. 905; 45 S. L. R. 717; 1 
 
 B. W. C. C. 34 153 
 
 Leeds and Liverpool Canal Co. v. Hesketh (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 303, 
 
 C. A 154 
 
 Lees v. Dunkerley, [1911] A. C. 5; 80 L. J. (K. B.) 135; 103 L. T. 
 
 467 ; 55 S. J. 44 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 115 ; 48 S. L. R. 724, H. L. (31, 89 
 
 v. Waring and Gillow, Ltd., Ferguson (third party) (1909), 127 
 
 L. T. Newsp. 495 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 474, C. C 109 
 
 Legget & Sons v. Burke (1902), 4 F. 693; 39 S L. R. 448, -C. S. . 126, 127 
 Leishman v. Dixon, Ltd., [1910] S. C. 498 ; 47 S. L. R. 410 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 
 
 560, C. S 49, 52 
 
 Leonard v. Baird & Co, (1901), 3 F. 890 ; 38 S. L. R. 649, C. S. . . 150 
 
xxx TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 *Lewis r. Great Western Rail. Co. (1877), 3 Q. B. D. 195 ; 47 L. J. (Q. B.) 
 
 131 ; 37 L. T. 774 ; 26 W. R. 255 49 
 
 Lindsay v. M'Glashen & Son, Ltd., [1908] S. C; 762; 45 S. L. R. 559; 
 
 1 B. W. C. C. 85 128 
 
 Little v. MacLellan, Ltd. (1900), 2 F. 387: 37 S. L. R. 287, C. S. 45, 47, 55, 60 
 
 Littleford v. Connell ( 1 909), 3 B. TV. C. C. 1, C. A 152 
 
 Lloyd r. Sugg, [1900] 1 Q. B. 486 ; 69 L. J. (Q. B.) 190 ; 81 L. T. 768 ; 
 
 48 W. R. 257 ; 16 T. L. R. 65 ; 2 W. C. C. 5, C. A. . 4, 153 
 Lochgelly Iron and Coal Co., Ltd. v. Sinclair (1906). See Sinclair. 
 r. ,[1909] S. C. 922; 46 
 
 S. L. R. 665, C. S. . 176 
 
 Logue v. Fullarton, Hodgart and Barclay (1901), 3 F. 1006 ; 38 S. L. R. 
 
 738, C. S 19, 48, 50 
 
 London and Edinburgh Shipping Co. r. Brown (1905), 7 F. 488; 42 
 
 S. L. R. 357, C. S 20 
 
 London and Glasgow Engineering Co. v. Falconer. See Falconer. 
 London and North Western Rail. Co. v. Taylor (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 11 ; 
 
 C. A. ; affirmed [1912] A. C. 242 : 81 L. J. (K. B.) 541 ; 49 S. L. R. 
 
 1020 ; 106 L. T. 354; 56 S. J. 323; 28 T. L. R. 290; 5 B. W. C. 0. 
 
 218; [1912] W. C. Rep. 95, H. L 174,175 
 
 Losh r. Evans & Co., Ltd. (1902), 19 T. L. R. 142; 51 W. R. 243; 5 
 
 W. C. C. 17, C. A 17 
 
 Lovelady v. Berrie (1909), 2 B. W. C. C. 62, C. A 35 
 
 Low v. General Steam Fishing Co., Ltd. Sep. Jackson v. Same. 
 Lowe v. M. Myers & Sons. [1906] 2 K. B. 265 : 75 L. J. (K. B.) 651 ; 95 
 
 L. T. 35 : 22 T. L. R. 614 ; 8 W. C. C. 22, C. A. . . 2, 67, 69 
 r. Pearson, [1899] 1 Q. B. 261 ; 68 L. J. (Q. B.) 122 ; 47 W. R. 193 ; 
 
 79 L. T. 654 ; 15 T. L. R. 124 ; 1 W. C. C. 5, C. A. . . 17, 18 
 
 Lowestoft Corpn. r. Aldridge (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 329 ; [1912] W. C. 
 
 Rep. 317, C. A 191 
 
 Lowry c. Sheffield Coal Co., Ltd. (1907), 24 T. L. R. 142 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 
 
 1, C. A 13, 15 
 
 Lowth v. Ibbotson, [1899] 1 Q. B. 1003 ; 15 T. L. R. 264 ; 68 L. J. (Q. B.) 
 
 465 ; 80 L. T. 341 ; 47 W. R. 506 ; 1 W. C. C. 46, C. A. . 81, 82 
 Lunt r. Sutton Heath and Lee Green Collieries, Ltd., (1911) 4 B. W. C. C. 
 
 219, C. A ' 194 
 
 Lynch v. W. Baird & Co. (1904), 6 F. 271 ; 41 S. L. R. 214, C. S. . 50 
 Lysons r. Andrew Knowles & Son, Ltd., [1900] 1 Q. B. 780; 69 
 
 L. J. (Q. B.) 170 ; 64 J. P. 292 ; 16 T. L. R. 250 ; 82 L. T. 189 ; 48 
 
 W. R. 408; 2 W. C. C. 101, C. A.; reversed. [1901] A. C. 79; 17 
 
 T. L. R. 156 ; 84 L. T. 65 : 70 L. J. (Q. B.) 170 ; 65 J. P. 388 ; 49 
 
 W. R. 636; 3 W. C. C. 1, H. L 2, 139, 149 
 
 M. 
 
 *Mac, The (1882), 7 P. D. 126 ; 51 L. J. Adm. 81 ; 46 L. T. 907 ; 4 Asp. 
 
 M. C. 555, C. A. . . 96 
 
 Macandrew v. Gilhooley, [1911] S. C. 448 ; 48 S. L. R. 511 ; 4 B. W.C. C. 
 
 370, C. S 53, 55 
 
 M'Adam t. Harvey, [1903] 2 Ir. R. 511 ; 36 Ir. L. T. R. 89, C. A. (Ir.) 82 
 M 'Allan r. Perthshire C. C., Western District (1906), 8 F. 783; 43 
 
 S. L. R. 592, C. S 17 
 
 M- Avail v. Boase Spinning Co., Ltd. (1901), 3 F. 1048; 38 S. L. R. 772. 
 
 C. S 171, 172 
 
TABLE OF CASES. xxxi 
 
 PAGE 
 
 M'Caffery v. Great Northern Bail. Co., Ltd. (1902), 36 Ir. L. T. K. 27, 
 
 C.A. (Ir.) 48,50,51 
 
 M'Callum v. Quinn, [1909] S. C. 227 ; 46 S. L. R. 141 ; 2 B. W. 0. C. 
 
 339, C. S 176 
 
 McCarthy v. Norcott (1908), 43 Ir. L. T. 17 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 279, C. A. 
 
 (Ir.) 124 
 
 u. Stapleton-Bretherton (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 281, C. A. . 194 
 
 M'Cready v. Dunlop. See Dunlop v. M'Cready. 
 
 M'Cue v. Barclay, Curie & Co., Ltd. See M'Hugh. 
 
 M'Daid v. Steel, [1911] S. C. 859; 48 S. L. R. 765; 4 B. W. C. C. 412, 
 
 C. S 30 
 
 McDerraott v. Owners of S.S. Tintoretto, [1911] A. C. 35 ; 80 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 161 ; 103 L. T. 769; 11 Asp. M. C. 515; 55 S. J. 124; 27 T. JU R. 
 
 149 4 B. W. C. C. 123, reversing the C. A., [1909] 2 K. B. 704 ; 101 
 
 L. T. 90 ; 78 L. J. (K. B.) 1144 ; 53 S. J. 650; 25 T. L. R. 691 ; 
 
 2 B. W. C. C. 208, H. L 98, 158 
 
 MacDonald v. Fairfield Shipbuilding, etc. Co., Ltd. (1905), 8 F. 8; 43 
 
 S. L.R.I, C. S. . 195 
 
 M'Donald v. James Dunlop & Co. (1900), Ltd. (1905), 7 F. 533 ; 42 
 
 S. L. R. 394, C. S 46 
 
 McDonald v. Owners of S.S. Banana, [1908] 2 K. B. 926 ; 78 L. J. 
 
 (K. B.) 26 ; 99 L. T. 671 ; 24 T. L. R. 887 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 185, C. A. 21, 
 
 34,39 
 Macdonald or Duris v. Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co., [1912] A. C. 513; 
 
 81 L. J. (P. c.) 188 ; 56 S. J. 550 ; [1912] S. C. 708 ; 28 T. L. R. 431 ; 
 
 5 B. W. C. C. 478 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 302, H. L. (Sc.) . . 173 
 M'Dougall v. M'Dougall, [1911] S. C. 426 ; 48 S. L. R. 315 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 
 
 373, C. S 125 
 
 M'Ewan v. Baird & Co., [1910] S. C. 436 ; 47 S. *L. R. 430, C. S. . 195, 197 
 M'Geown v. Workman, Clark & Co., Ltd. (1911), 45 Ir. L. T. 165 . 194 
 M'Ginn v. Udston Coal Co. [1912], S. C. 668 ; 49 S. L. R. 531 ; 5 B. W. 
 
 C. C. 559 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 134, C. S 108 
 
 M'Ginty v. Kyle, [1911] S. C. 589: 48 S. L. R 474; 4 B. W. C. C. 
 
 389, C. S 59 
 
 M'Ghee v. Summerlee Iron Co., Ltd., [1911] S. C 870; 48 S. L. R. 807; 
 
 4 B. W. C. C. 424, C. S 172 
 
 MacGillivray v. N. Counties Institute for the Blind, [1911] S. C. 897; 
 
 48 S. L. ; R. 811 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 429, C. S. . . . . 122, 138 
 M'Govern v. Cooper & Co. (1901), 4 F. 249 ; 39 S. L. R. 102 ; [1903] 
 
 W. N. 160, C. S 80 
 
 M'Gowan . Smith, [1907] S. C. 548 ; 44 S. L. R. 384, C. S. . . 45 
 
 M'Gregor v. Dansken (1899), 1 F. 536 ; 36 S. L. R. 393, C. S. . 75, 120 
 M'Groarty v. John Brown & Co., Ltd. (1906), 8 F. 809; 43 S. L. R. 
 
 598, C. S 49 
 
 M'Hugh v. Barclay, Curie & Co. (1902), 39 S. L. R. 690; sub nom. 
 
 M'Cue, 4 F. 909 ; [1903] W. N. 170, C. S 149 
 
 M'Innes v. Dunsmuir and Jackson, Ltd., [1908] S. C. 1021 ; 45 S. L. R. 
 
 804 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 226, C. S 5, 9 
 
 M'lntyre v. Rodger & Co. (1903), 6 F. 176 ; 41 S. L. R. 107, C. S. . 22 
 Mackay v. Rosie (No. 1), [1908] S. C. 174 ; 45 S. L. R. 178. ; 1 B. W. C. C. 
 
 52, C. S 53, 57 
 
 v. Rosie (No. 2) (1911), 105 L. T. 682; [1912] S. C. 7 ; 49 S. 
 
 L. R. 48; 56 S. J. 87; 5 B. W. C. C. 181; [1912] W. C. Rep. 41, 
 
 H. L. (Sc.) . 133 
 
xxxii TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 M'Kee r. Great Northern Rail. Co. (1908), 42 Ir. L. T. 132; 1 B. W 
 
 C. C. 165, C. A. (Ir.) 13 
 
 - v. John G. Stein & Co., Ltd., [1910] S. C. 38 ; 47 S. L. R. 39 ; 3 
 
 B. W. C. C. 544, C. S 139 
 
 M-Keuna c. United Collieries, Ltd. (1906), 43 S. L. R. 713. . . 60 
 M'Keown r. M'Murray (1911), 45 Ir. L. T. 190, C. A. (Ir.) ... 17 
 Mackenzie v. Coltness Iron Co., Ltd. (1903), 6 F. 8 ; 41 S. L. R. 6, 
 
 C. S 13 
 
 M'Kinnon r. Barclay, Curie & Co. See Osborne r. Same. 
 
 Mackinnon v. Miller, [1909] S. C. 373 ; 46 S. L. R. 299 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 
 
 64, C. S 31, 116 
 
 McKiill r. Howard & Jones (1909), 2 B. W. C. C. 460, C. C. . 26, 27 
 
 M'Laren r. Caledonian Rail Co., [1911] S. C. 1075; 48 S. L. R. 885; 
 
 5 B. W. C. C. 492, C. S 30 
 
 M-Lauchlan v. Anderson, [1911] S. C. 529 ; 48 S. L. R. 349 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 
 
 376, C. S 20 
 
 McLaughlin r. Clayton (1899), Times, February 28 ; 1 W. C. C. 116, 
 
 C.A 188 
 
 M'Lean r. Allan Line S.S. Co., [1912] S. C. 256 ; 49 S. L. R. 207; 5 B. 
 
 "NY. C. C. 527 : [1912] W. C. Rep. 37, C. S. . . 194 
 
 v. Carse and Holmes (1899), 1 F. 878 ; 36 S. L. R. 678, C. S. . 65 
 
 McLean r. Moss Bay Iron and Steel Co., [1909] 2 K. B. 521 ; 78 L. J. 
 
 (K. B.) 849 ; 100 L. T. 871 ; 25 T. L. R. 633 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 282, 
 
 C. A. overruled, [1910] W. N. 102 ; 54 S. J. 441, H. L. . . 148 
 McXanmra & Co., Ltd. r. Burtt (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 151, C. A.. . 162 
 M'Xaughton and Sinclair r. Cunningham. See Cunningham. 
 M-Xeice v. Singer Sewing Machine Co., [1911] S. C. 12; 48 S. L. R. 
 
 15; 4 B. W. C. C. 351, C. S. 26 
 
 McXicholas v. Dawson & Son, [1899] 1 Q. B. 773; 15 T. L. R. 242 ; 
 
 68 L. J. (Q. B.) 470 ; 80 L. T. 317 ; 47 W. R. 500 ; 1 W. C. C. 80, 
 
 C.A 16,33,48,186 
 
 M'Nicol v. Spiers, Gibb & Co. (1899), 1 F. 604 ; 36 S. L. R. 428, C. S. . 50 
 M'Quibban r. Menzies. See Menzies r. M'Quibban. 
 
 M'Vey i: Dixon, Ltd., [1910] S. C. 544 ; 47 S. L. R. 463, C. S. . . 197 
 Maginn r. Carlingford "Lough S.S. Co., Ltd., [1909] 43 Ir. L. T. 123 ; 2 
 
 B. W. C. C. 224, C. A. (Ir.) 99, 107, 108 
 
 Mahomed v. Maunsell (1907), 1 B. W. C. C. 269, C. C. . . .90 
 Main Colliery Co. r. Davies (1899), 80 L. T. 674 ; 1 W. C. C. 92. C. A. ; 
 
 affirmed [1900] A. C. 358 ; 65 J. P. 20 ; 16 T. L. R. 460 ; 69 L. J. 
 (Q. B.) 755 ; 83 L. T. 83 ; 2 W. C. C. 108, H. L. . . . . 126 
 Malcolm r. Bowhill Coal Co. (Fife), Ltd. (No. 1). See Bowhill Coal 
 
 Co. (Fife), Ltd. 
 
 r. (No. 2). See Bowhill Coal 
 
 Co. 
 Mallinder c. J. Moores & Sons, Ltd. [1912] 2 K. B. 124; 81 L. J.(K. B.) 
 
 714 ; 106 L. T. 487 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 362 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 257, C. A. 109 
 Malone r. Cayzer, Irvine & Co., [1908] S. C. 479 ; 45 S. L. R. 351 ; 
 
 1 B. W. C. C. 27, C. S 145 
 
 Manchester r. Carlton Iron Co.. Ltd. (1904), 68 J. P. 209 ; 20 T. L. R. 
 
 155 ; 89 L. T. 730 ; 52 W. R. 291 ; 6 W. C. C. 135, C. A. . 164, 167 
 Marks r. Came, [1909] 2 K. B. 516 ; 78 L. J. (K. B.) 853 ; 100 L. T. 950 ; 
 
 25 T. L. R. 620 ; 53 S. J. 561 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 186, C. A. . 77, 81, 126 
 Marno r. Workman. Clark & Co. (Xo. 1) (1899), 33 Ir. L. T. R. 183; 
 
 affirmed 34 Ir. L. T. R. 183 ; [1899] 2 Q. B. 194 n., C. A. (Ir.) . 67 
 
TABLE OF CASES. xxxiii 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Humor. Workman, Clark & Co. (No. 2) (1900), 34 Ir. L. T. B. 14, 
 
 C. A. (Ir.) 63 
 
 Marriott v. Brett and Beney, Ltd. (1911), 5 I*. W. C. C. 145, C. A. 18, 186 
 
 Marsh v. Boden (1905), 7 W. C. C. 110, C. A 148 
 
 Marshall v. East Holy well Coal Co., Ltd. (1905), 93 L. T. 360; 21 
 
 T. L. R. 494 ; 7 W. C. C. 19, C. A 7 
 
 Vm Orient Steam Navigation Co., [1910] 1 K. B. 79 ; 79 L. J. 
 
 (K. B.) 204 ; 101 L. T. 584 ; 54 S. J. 64 ; 26 T. L. R. 70 ; 
 
 3 B. W. C. C. 15, C. A 157 
 
 v. Owners of.S.S. Wild Rose, [1909] 2 K. B. 46 ; 78 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 536 ; 100 L. T. 739; 53 S. J. 448 ; 25 T. L. R. 452 ; 11 Asp. M. C. 
 
 251 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 76, C. A. ; affirmed [1910] A. C. 486 ; 79 L. J. 
 
 (K. B.) 912; 103 L. T. 114 ; 11 Asp. M. C. 409; 54 S. J. 678; 26 
 
 T. L. R. 608 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 514 ; 48 S. L. R. 701, H. L. . 32, 34 
 Martin v. Barnett (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 146, C. A 154 
 
 - v. Fullerton, [1908] S. C. 1030 ; 45 S. L. R. 812 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 
 
 168, C. S 30 
 
 v. Manchester Corporation, [1912] W. N. 105 ; 106 L. T. 741 ; 
 
 76 J. P. 251 ; 28 T. L. R. 344 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 259; [1912] W. C. 
 
 Rep. 289, C. A 8 
 
 Mastermau v. Ropner & Sons, Ltd. (1909), 127 L. T. Newsp., p. 8, C. A. 197 
 Matthews v. Baird & Co., Ltd., [1910] S. C. 689 ; 47 S. L. R. 627 ; 3 
 
 B. W. C. C. 566, C. S 195 
 
 Maundrell v. Dunkeston Collieries Co.,Ltd. (1910), 4 B. W. C. C.76, C. A. 194 
 Maver v. Park. tSee Park. 
 
 Mawdsley v. West Leigh Colliery Co., Ltd. (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 80 
 
 C. A 17, 18 
 
 Mead v. Lockhart, Ltd. (1909), 2 B. W. C. C. 398 . . . .173 
 Meier v. Dublin Corporation, [1912] 2 Ir. R. 129 ; 46 Ir. L. T. 236, 
 
 C.A.(Ir.) 84 
 
 Menzies v. M'Quibban (1900), 2 F. 732 ; 37 S. L. R. 526, C. S. . . 20 
 
 Mercer v. Hilton (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 6. C. A 57 
 
 Merry and Cunningham, Ltd. v. Black, [1909] S. C. 1150 ; 46 S. L. E. 
 
 812 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 372, C. S 161 
 
 Middlemiss v. Berwickshire County Council. See Berwickshire County 
 
 Council. 
 Midland Rail. Co. v. Sharpe, [1904] A. C. 349 ; 73 L. J. (K. B.) 666 ; 91 
 
 L. T. 1-81 ; 53 W. R. 114; 20 T. L. R. 546; 42 8. L. R. 478; 6 
 
 W. C. C. 119, H. L 138 
 
 *Mignotti v. Colvill (1879), 4 C. P. D. 233 ; 48 L. J. (c. P.) 695 ; 40 
 
 L. T. 747 ; 27 W. R. 744 ; 14 Cox C. C. 305 . . . . 69 
 Millar v. Refug-e Assurance Co. See Refuge Assurance Co. 
 Millers v. Nortli British Locomotive Co., [1909] S. C. 698; 46 S. L. B 
 
 755 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 80, C. S 39 
 
 Mitchell v. Glamorgan Coal Co.. Ltd. (1907), 23 T. L. B. 588; 9 
 
 W. 0.0.16,0. A. 32,35,37 
 
 v. Owners of S.S. Saxon (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 623 ; [1912] 
 
 W. C. Rep. 368, C. A 35 
 
 v. Whitton, [1907] S. C. 1267 ; 44 S. L. R. 955, C. S. . .51 
 
 Molloy v. S. Wales Anthracite Colliery Co. (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 65, 
 
 C. A ' . . .15 
 
 Monaghan v. United Collieries, Ltd. (1900), 3 F. 149 ; 38 S. L. B. 92, C. S. 82 
 Mooney v. Edinburgh and District Tramways Co., Ltd. (1901), 4 F. 
 
 390 ; 39 S. L. B. 260, C, 8 82 
 
xxxiv TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Mooney r. Sheehan (1903;, 37 Ir. L. T. B. 166, C. A. (Ir.) . . .121 
 Moore (Pauper) v. Manchester Liners, Ltd., [1910] A. C. 498 ; 79 L. J. 
 
 (K. B.) H75 ; 108 L. T. 226 ; 26 T. L. B. 618 ; 54 S. J. 703 ; 3 B. W. 
 
 C. G. 527; 48 S. L. B. 709; overruling the C. A., [1909] 1 K. B. 
 
 417 ; 78 L. J. (K. B.) 463 ; 100 L. T. 164 ; 25 T. L. K. 202 ; 2 
 
 B. W. C. C. 87, H. L 9, 28, 29 
 
 Moore v. Naval Colliery Co., Ltd., [1912] 1 K. B. 28. 81 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 149; 105 L. T. 838; 5 B. W. C. C. 87; [1912] W. C. Eep. 81, 
 
 C. A .69 
 
 Morgan v. Dixon, [1911] S. C. 403 ; 48 S. L. B. 296 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 363, 
 
 C. S. ; affirmed [1912] A. C. 74; 81 L. J. (p. c.) 57 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 
 
 184 ; 105 L. T. 678 ; 56 S. J. 88 ; 28 T. L. B. 64 ; [1912] S. C. 1 ; 
 
 49 S. L. B. 45; [1912] W. C. Kep. 43, H. L. (Sc.) . . .163 
 *Morgan r. Loudou General Omnibus Co. (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 832 ; 48 
 J. P. 503; 53 L. J. (Q. B.) 352; 51 L. T. 213; 32 W. B. 
 
 759, C. A 123 
 
 v. Owners of the S.S. Zenaida (1909), 25 T. L. B. 446; 2 B. W. 
 
 C. C. 19, C. A 4, 23 
 
 Morris v. Lambeth Borough Council (1905), 22 T. L. B, 22 ; 8 W. C. C. 1, 
 
 C. A 16, 27 
 
 r. Northern Employers' Mutual Indemnity Co., Ltd., [1902] i 
 
 K. B. 165 ; 71 L. J. (K. B.) 733 ; 50 W. B. 545 ; 86 L. T. 748 ; 6b 
 
 J. P. 644; 18 T. L. B. 635 ; 4 W. C. C. 38, Div. Ct. . . . 184 
 Morrison v. Clyde Navigation Trustees (1908), 46 S. L. B, 38; [1909] 
 
 S. C. 59 ; 2 B. W. C. 0. 99, C. S 21, 30 
 
 Mortimer v. Secretan, [1909] 2 K. B. 77 ; 78 L. J. (K. B.) 521 ; 100 
 
 L. T. 721 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 446, C. A 196 
 
 Morton & Co., Ltd. r. Woodward, [1902] 2 K. B. 276 ; 66 J, P. 660 ; 
 
 71 L. J. (K. B.) 736 : 86 L. T. 878 , 51 W. B. 54 ; 4 W. C. C. 143, C. A. 174 
 Moss v. G.E.B. Co., [1909] 2 K. B. 274 ; 78 L. J. (K. B.) 1048 ; 100 
 
 L. T. 747 ; 25 T. L. B. 466 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 168, C. A. . 72, 132, 184, 185 
 Moss & Co. i: Akers (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 294. C. A. . . . 157 
 
 Mountain r. Parr, [1899] 1 Q. B. 805 ; 47 W. B. 353 ; 15 T. L. B. 262 ; 
 
 68 L. J. (Q. B.) 447 ; 80 L. T. 342 ; 47 W. B. 353 ; 1 W. C. C. 
 
 110, C. A 185, 189 
 
 Mowlem (John) & Co. v. Dunne, [1912] 2 K. B. 136 ; 81 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 777; 106 L. T. 611 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 382; [1912] W. C. Bep. 298, 
 
 C. A 183, 221 
 
 Moyes v. W. Dixon, Ltd. (1905), 7 F. 386 ; 42 S. L. B. 319, C. S. . 127 
 Mulhollaud v. Whitehaven Colliery Co., [1910] 2 K. B. 278 ; 79 L. J. 
 
 (K. B.) 987; 102 L. T. 663; 26 T. L. B. 462; 3 B. W. C. C. 319, 
 
 C. A 158, 182, 197 
 
 Mullen v. D. Y. Stewart & Co., Ltd., [1908] S. C. 991 ; 45 S. L. B. 
 
 729 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 204, C. S 20, 22 
 
 Mulligan v. Dick & Son (1903), 6 F. 126; 41 S. L. B. 77, C. S. . .90, 91 
 Mulrooney c. Todd und Bradford Corporation, [1909] 1 K. B. 165 ; 78 
 
 L. J. (K. B.) 145; 100 L. T. 99 ; 73 J. P. 73; 25 T. L. B. 103; 2 
 
 B. W. C. C. 191, C. A 76,77, 78, 130 
 
 Murphy r. Berwick (1909), 43 Ir. L. T. 126; 2 B. W. C. C. 103, 
 
 C. A. (Ir.) ......... 24 
 
 v. Enniscorthy Board of Guardians, [1908] 2 Ir. B. 60f- 7:: 
 
 J. P. 63 ; 42 Ir. L* T. 246 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 291, C. A. (Ir.) . 119, 130 
 Murray v. Denholm & Co., [1911] S. C. 1087 ; -48 S. L. B. 896 ; 5 B. W. 
 
 C. C. 496 ; C. S 5, 6 
 
TABLE OF CASES. xxxv 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Murray v. Gourlay. See Gourlay. 
 
 -v. North British Kail. Co. (1904), 6 F. 540; 41 S. L. R. 383, 
 
 C. S 90, 91 
 
 N. 
 
 NASH v. Hollinshead, [1901] 1 Q. B. 700 ; 49 W. R. 424 ; 84 L. T. 483 ; 
 70 L. J. (K. B.) 571 ; 65 J. P. 357 ; 17 T. L. R. 352 ; 3 W. C. C. 125, 
 C. A 75 
 
 National Telephone Co. v. Smith, [1909] S. C. 1363 ; 46 S. L. R. 988 ; 
 
 2 B. W. C. C. 417, C. S 178 
 
 Naylor v. Musgrave Spinning Co., Ltd. (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 286, C. A. 17 
 
 Neagle v. Nixon's Navigation Co., [1904] 1 K. B. 339 ; 68 J. P. 297 ; 
 
 73 L. J. (K. B.) 165 ; 90 L. T. 49 ; 52 W. R. 356 ; 20 T. L. R. 160 ; 
 
 6 W. C. C. 140, C. A 171 
 
 Neale v. Electric and Ordnance Accessories Co., [1906] 2 K. B. 558 ; 75 
 
 L. J. (K. B.) 974 ; 95 L. T. 592 ; 22 T. L. R. 732 ; 8 W. C. C. 6, C. A. 43, 
 
 45, 47, 54 
 Nelson v. Belfast Corporation (1908), 42 Ir. L. T. 223 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 
 
 158, C. A 11,15 
 
 v. Kerr and Mitchell (1901), 3 F. 893 ; 38 S. L. R. 645, C. S. 137 
 
 v. Summerlee Iron Co., Ltd., [1910] S. C. 360 ; 47 S. L. R. 344, 
 
 C. S 176 
 
 Nettleingham & Co., Ltd. v. Powell & Co. (1912), Times, Nov. 21, 
 
 [Phillimore, J.] 92 
 
 New Monckton Collieries v. Keeling, [1911] A. C. 648 ; 105 L. T. 
 337 ; 27 T. L. R. 551 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 332, reversing C. A., [1911] 
 1 K. B. 250; 80 L. J. (K. B.) 539; 103 L. T. 622; 27 T. L. R. 
 90 ; 49 S. L. R. 664 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 49, H. L. . . 127, 128, 129 
 Newhouse & Co. v. Johnson (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 137, C. A. . 174,187 
 Nicholson v. Piper (No. 1), [1907] A. C. 215 ; 76 L. J. (K. B.) 856 ; 97 
 
 L. T. 119 ; 23 T. L. R. 620 ; 9 W. C. C. 123, H. L. 57, 
 
 173, 174, 175 
 
 v. (No. 2) '(1907), 24 T. L. R. 16 ; 9 W. C. C. 132, 
 
 C. A 188 
 
 Vm Thomas (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 452, C. A. . . . 191 
 
 Niddrie and Benhar Coal Co., Ltd. v. Hanley, [1910] S. C. 875; 47 
 
 S. L. R. 726, C. S. . 55, 195, 197 
 
 v. M'Kay (1903), 5 F. 1121 ; 40 
 
 S. L. R. 798, C. S. . 171, 202 
 
 v. Peacock (1902), 4 F. 443; 39 
 
 S. L. R. 317; [1903] W. N. 
 
 62, C. S 149 
 
 v. Young (1912), 49 S. L. R. 518 ; 
 
 [1912] S. C. 644 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 552 ; [1912] \V. C. Rep. 177, C. S. 128 
 Nimmo & Co., Ltd. v. Fisher, [1907] S. C. 890 ; 44 S. L. R. 641, C. S. . 196 
 Nisbet v. Rayne and Burn, [1910] 2 K. B. 689 ; 103 L. T. 178 ; 54 
 
 S. J. 719 ; 26 T. L. R. 632 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 507, C. A. . . 5, 6, 25, 27 
 Noden v. Galloways, Limited, [1912] 1 K. B. 46 ; 81 L. J. (K. B.) 28 ; 
 55 S. J. 838; 105 L. T. 567; 28 T. L. R. 5; 5 B..W. C. C. 7; 
 
 [1 I] W. C. Rep. 63, C. A. 41, 154 
 
 *Xoel v. Redruth Foundry Co., [1896] 1 Q. B. 453 ; 65 L. J. (Q. B.) 330 ; 
 
 74 L. T. 196 ; 44 W. R. 407 138 
 
 W.C.A. d 
 
xxxvi TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Nolan r. Porter & Sons (1909), 2 B. W. C. C. 106, C. A. . . .11 
 Norman & Burt r. Walder, [1904] 2 K. B. 27 ; 68 J. P. 401 ; 73 
 
 L. J. (K. B.) 461 ; 90 L. T. 531 ; 52 W. R. 402; 20 T. L. R. 427 ; 
 
 6 W. C. C. 124, C. A 160 
 
 0. 
 
 O'BRIEN t\ Star Line, Ltd., [1908] S. C. 1258 ; 45 S. L. R. 935 ; 1 B. W. 
 
 C. C. 177, C. S 34, 39 
 
 O'Callaghan v. Martin (1904), 38 Ir. T. L. R. 152, C. A. (Ir.) . 55, 174 
 O'Donovan v. Cameron, Swan & Co., [1901] 2 I. R. 633 ; 34 Ir. L. T. R. 
 
 169, C. A. (Ir.) 147 
 
 O'Hara v. Cadzow Coal Co., Ltd. (1903), 5 F. 439 ; 40 S. L. R. 355, C. S. . 48 
 
 v. Hayes (1910), 44 Ir. L. T. 71 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 586, C. A. (Ir.) 7, 37 
 
 O'Keefe v. Lovatt, [1901] W. N. 223 ; 18 T. L. R. 57 ; 4 W. C. C. 109, 
 
 C. A 147 
 
 Oliver r. Nautilus Steam Shipping Co., Ltd., [1903] 2 K. B. 639 ; 72 
 
 L. J. (K. B.) 857; 89 L. T. 318; 52 W. R. 200 ; 9 Asp. M. C. 436 ; 
 
 19 T. L. R. 697 ; 5 W. C. C. 65, C. A 90, 91 
 
 O'Neill v. Anglo-American Oil Co., Ltd. (1909), 2 B. W. C. C, 434, C. A. . 196 
 
 v. Bansha Co-operative Agricultural and Dairy Society, Ltd., 
 
 [1910] 2 Ir. R. 324 ; 44 Ir. L. T. 52, C. A. (Ir.) . . 152 
 v. Motherwell, [1907] S. C. 1076; 44 S. L. R. 764, C. S. . . 68 
 
 v. Ropner & Co. (1908), 43 Ir. L. T. 2; 2 B. W. C. C. 334, C. A. 
 
 (Ir.) 154 
 
 Orrell Colliery Co. v. Schofield, [1909] A. C. 433 ; 78 L. J. (K. B.) 677 ; 
 
 100 L. T. 786 ; 53 S. J. 518 ; 25 T. L. R. 569 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 294, H. L. 128, 
 
 129 
 Osborn v. Barclay, Curie & Co., [1901] A. C. 269 ; 85 L. T. 286 ; 4 W. 
 
 C. C. 149; sub nom. M'Kinnon, 38 S. L. R. 611. H. L. . 203 
 
 v. Tickers, Son, and Maxim, [1900] 2 Q. B. 91 ; 16 T. L. R. 333 ; 
 
 69 L. J. (Q. B.) 606 ; 82 L. T. 491 , 2 W. C..C. 130, C. A. . . 163 
 Osmond v. Campbell and Harrison, Ltd., [1905] 2 K. B. 852 ; 75 L. J. 
 
 (K. B.) 1 ; 54 W. E. 117 : 93 L. T. 724 ; 22 T. L. R. 4 ; 8 W. C, C. 
 
 95, C. A 127, 152 
 
 *Owen Wallis. The (1874), 30 L. T. 41 96 
 
 P. 
 
 PACIFIC Steam Navigation Co. v. Pugh & Son (1907), 9 W. C. C. 39 ; 23 
 
 T. L. R. 622, C. A 80 
 
 Paddington Borough Council r. Stack (1909), 2 B. W. C. C. 402, C. A. 157 
 Page v. Burtwell, [1908] 2 K. B. 758 ; 99 L. T. 542 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 
 
 267, C. A 89. 90, 91 
 
 Panagotis r. Owners of S.S. Pontiac (No. 1), [1912] 1 K. B. 74 ; 81 
 
 L. J. (K. B.) 286 ; 12 Asp. M. C. 92 ; 105 L. T. 689; 56 S. J. 71 ; 
 
 28 T. L. R. 63; 5 B. W. C. C. 147 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 74, C. A. . 101, 
 
 113, 185 
 
 Panagotis v. Owners of S.S. Pontiac (No. 2), 5 B. W. C. C. 147. C. A. . 101 
 Park r. Maver (1905), 8 F. 250 : 43 S. L. R. 191, C. S. . . .67 
 
TABLE OF CASES. xxxvii 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Parker v. Dixon, Ltd. (1902), 4 F. 1147 ; 39 S. L. R. 663, C. S. . . 159 
 
 v. Hambrook, [1912] W. N. 205; 56 S. J. 750 ; 107 L. T. 249; 
 
 5 B. W. C. C. 608 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 369, C. A. . . 18 
 
 v. Pout or Pont (1911), 105 L. T. 493 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 45, C. A. 11, 
 
 21,30 
 Parkes v. Army and Navy Co-operative Society (1906), unreported, 
 
 C.A. 29 
 
 Parry v. Rhynmey Iron and Coal Co., Ltd. (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 632 ; 
 
 [1912] W. C. Rep. 331, C. A 175 
 
 Paterson v. Lockhart (1905), 7 F. 954 ; 42 S. L. R. 755, C. S. . .121 
 
 v. A. G. Moore & Co., [1910] S. C. 29 ; 47 S. L. R. 30 ; 3 B. 
 
 W. C. C. 541, C. S. . 160 
 
 Pattinson v. Stevenson (1900), 109 L. T. Newsp. 106; 2 W. C. C. 156; 
 
 affirmed, C. A 178 
 
 Pattison v. White & Co., Ltd. (1904), 20 T. L. R. 775 ; 6 W. C. C. 61, 
 
 C.A 82 
 
 Payne v. Clifton (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 439, C. A. . . . 187 
 
 v. Fortescue & Sons, Ltd., [1912] 3 K. B. 346; 107 L. T. 136; 
 
 5 B. W. C. C. 634 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 386, C. A. . . .56 
 Peacock v. Niddrie and Benhar Coal Co., Ltd. See Niddrie. 
 Pearce . London and South Western Rail. Co., [1900] 2 Q. B. 100 16 
 T. L. R. 336; 69 L. J. (Q. B.) 683; 82 L. T. 487; 48 W. R. 599- 
 
 2 W. C. C. 47, C. A 79 
 
 Peel *<. Lawrence (1912), 106 L. T. 482 ; 28 T. L. R. 318 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 
 
 274 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 141, C. A 22 
 
 Peggie v. Wemyss Coal Co., Ltd., [1910] S. C. 93; 47 S. L. R. 149, 
 
 C. S 69 
 
 Penn v. Spiers and Pond, Ltd., [1908] 1 K. B. 766 ; 77 L. J. (K. B.) 542 
 98 L. T. 541 ; 24 T. L. R. 354 ; 42 Ir. L. T. 176 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 401, 
 
 C.A 138 
 
 Perry v. Anglo-American Decorating Co. (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 312, 
 
 C. A 10, 189 
 
 v. Clements (1901), 49 W. R. 669 ; 17 T. L. R.524 ; 3 W. C. C. 56 
 
 [Ridley, J.] 63,67,90 
 
 v . Ocean Coal Co., Ltd. (1912), 106 L. T. 713; 5 B. W. C. C. 
 
 421 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 212, C. A 31 
 
 r. Wright, [1908] 1 K. B. 441 ; 98 L. T. 327 ; 77 L. J. (K. B.) 236 ; 
 
 24 T. L> R. 186 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 351, 363, C. A. . . 139143 
 - & Co., Ltd. v. Lacey (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 1, C. A. . . . 188 
 Peters v. Owners of S.S. Argol (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 414 ; [1912] W. C. 
 
 Rep. 172, C. A 183 
 
 Phillips v. Vickers Son and Maxim, [1912] 1 K. B. 16 ; 81 L. J. (K. B) 
 123; 105 L. T. 564 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 23; [1912] W. C. Rep. 
 
 71, C.A 194 
 
 v. Williams (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 143, C. A. . . -15 
 
 Pierce v. Provident Clothing and Supply Co., [1911] 1 K. B. 997; 80 
 L. J. (K. B.) 831 ; 104 L. T. 473; 55 S. J. 363 ; 27 T. L. R. 299 ; 4 
 
 B. W. C. C. 242, C. A 26 
 
 Plant v. Oldnall Colliery Co. (1903), 114 L. T. Newsp. 284, C. A. . 56 
 Pollard v. Goole and Hull Steam Towing Co., Ltd. (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 
 
 362, C. A ' . .117 
 
 Polled 17. G. N. R. Co., (No. 1) (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 115, C. A. . . 187 
 
 Vm (No. 2) (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 620 ; [1912] W. C. 
 
 Rep. 379, C. A 186 
 
xxxviii TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Pomfret v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Rail. Co., [1903] 2 K. B. 
 
 718; 72 L. J. (K. B.) 729; 89 L. T. 176 ; 52 W. E. 66; 19 T. L. R. 
 
 649 ; 5 W. C. C. 22, C. A. . . . . . . . 31.32.yi 
 
 Pomphrey v. South wark Press. [1901] 1 Q. B. 86 ; 65 J. P. 148 ; 17 
 
 T. L. R. 53; 70 L. J. (Q. B.) 48 ; 83 L. T. 468; 3 W. C. C. 194. 
 
 C.A 138,159,160,175 
 
 Pope v. Hill's Plymouth Co. (1910), 102 L. T. 632 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 
 
 341, C. A. ; affirmed 105 L. T. 678 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 175 ; [1912] 
 
 W. C. Rep. 15, H. L 21.30 
 
 Popple v. Frodingham Iron & Steel Co., [1912] 2 K. B. 141 ; 81 L. J. 
 
 (K. B ) 769; 106 L. T. 703; 5 B. W. C. C. 394; [1912] W. C. 
 
 Rep. 231, C. A 194 
 
 Porton v. Central (Unemployed) Body for London, [1909] 1 K. B. 173 : 
 
 78 L. J. (K. B.) 139 ; 100 L. T. 102 ; 73 J. P. 43 ; 25 T. L. R. 102 : 
 
 2 B. W. C. C. 296, C. A . 122 
 
 Poulton r. Kelsall. [1912] 2 K. B. 131 ; 81 L. J. (K. B.) 774; 106 L. T. 
 
 522; 28 T. L. R. 329 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 318; [1912] \V. C. Rep. 295, 
 
 C. A 11, 12, 25 
 
 Powell v. Brown, [1899] 1 Q. B. 157: 79 L. T. 631 ; 68 L. J. (Q. B.) 
 
 151 ; 47 W. R. 145"; 15 T. L. R. 65 ; 1 W. C. C. 44, C. A. 81 
 r. Brynddu Culliery Co. (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 124, C. A. . . :;u 
 
 r. Lanarkshire Steel Co., Ltd. (1904), 6 F. 1039; 42 S. L. R. 
 
 231, C. S . . . . 22. 48 
 
 r. Main Colliery Co., Ltd. [1900], 2 Q. B. 145 ; 69 L. J. (Q. B.) 
 
 542 ; 48 W. R. 534 ; 64 J. P. 323 ; 82 L. T. 340 ; 16 T. L. R. 
 282 ; 2 W. C. C. 25, C. A. ; reversed [1900] A. C. 366 ; 65 
 J. P. 100 ; 69 L. J. (Q. B.) 758 ; 83 L. T. 85 ; 49 W. R. 49 ; 
 16 T. L. R. 466 ; 2 W. C. C. 29, H. L. . . 1,63,07.68 
 v. Ryan (1903), 37 Ir. L. T. R. 9, C. A. (Ir.) . . . .150 
 
 Duffiryn Steam Co., Ltd. r. Edwards (1900), Times, July 2:;. 
 
 C. A 155 
 
 Powers v. Smith (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 470, C. A 37 
 
 Praties v. Broxburn Oil Co. (1907), 44 S. L. R. 408, C. S. . . . .'0 
 
 Price v. Burnyeat, Brown & Co. (1907), 2 B. W. C. C. 337, C.A. . . 154 
 
 v. Marsden & Sons, [1899] 1 Q. B. 493; 68 L. J. (Q. B.) 307 ; 47 
 
 W. R. 274 ; 80 L. T. 15 ; 15 T. L. R. 184 ; 1 W. C. C. 108, C. A. 142. 150 
 Proctor & Sons r. Robinson (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 41, now reported, [1911] 
 
 1 K. B. 1004; SOL. J. (k. B.) 641, C.A ". 161 
 
 Pryce v. Penrikyber Colliery Co., Ltd. [1902] 1 K. B. 221 ; 66 J. P. 
 
 198 ; 71 L. J. (K. B.) 192 ; 50 W. R. 197 ; 18 T. L. R. 54 ; 85 L. T. 
 
 477 ; 4 W. C. C. 115, C. A 148 
 
 Pumpherston Oil Co., Ltd. v. Cavaney (1903). 5 F. 963 ; 40 S. L. R. 721. 
 
 C, S. 174 
 
 Q. 
 
 QUEEN v. Clarke, [1906] 2 I. R. 135, C. A. (Ir.) 128 
 
 Quinn r. John Brown & Co., Ltd. (1906), 8 F. 855 ; 43 S. L. R. 643, 
 
 C. S 60 
 
 - r. Flynn (1910), 44 Ir. L. T. 183 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 594, C. A. (Ir.) 202 
 r. M'Callum. See M'Callum. 
 
TABLE OF CASES. xxxix 
 
 R. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 RADCLIFFE i-. Pacific Steam Navigation Co., [1910] 1 K.B. 685 ; 79 L. J. 
 
 (K. B.) 429 ; 102 L. T. 206 ; 54 S. J. 404 ; 26 T. L. R. 319 ; 3 B. W. 
 
 C. C. 185, C. A 173 
 
 Rankine v. Alloa Coal Co., Ltd. (1904), 6 F. 375 ; 41 S. L. R. 306, C. S. 66 
 Raphael S.S. (Owners of) v. Brandy. See Brandy. 
 
 Ravman v Fields (No. 1) (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 119, C. A. . . . 180 
 __: r . (No. 2) (1910), 102 L. T. 154 ; 26 T. L. R. 274 ; 3 
 
 B. W. C. C. 123, C. A 41, 146, 154 
 
 Reed v. Great Western Rail. Co., [1909] A. C. 31 ; 78 L. J. (K. B.) 31 ; 
 
 99 L. T. 781 ; 25 T. L. R. 36 ; 46 S. L. R. 700 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 
 
 109, H. L 21 
 
 v. Smith, Wilkinson & Co. (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 223, C. A. . 117, 118 
 
 Reeks v. Kynochs, Ltd. (1901), 50 W. R. 113 ; 18 T. L. R. 34 ; 4 W. C. 
 
 C. 14, C. A 49 
 
 Rees v. Consolidated Anthracite Collieries, Ltd. (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 
 
 403 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 205, C. A 195 
 
 - v. Owen (1907), 9 W. C. C. 35 ; Times, February 11 [Warring- 
 ton, J.] . . .72 
 
 r. Penrikyber Navigation Colliery Co., Ltd., [1903] 1 K. B. 
 
 259 ; 67 J. P. 231 ; 51 W. R. 247 ; 19 T. L. R. 113 ; 72 L. J. 
 (K. B.) 85 ; 87 L. T. 661 ; 1 L. G. R. 173 ; 5 W. C. C. 117, C. A. 129 
 
 i: Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Co., Ltd. (1900), 64 J. P. 164 ; 
 
 Times, January 29, 1900, C. A. .... 49, 51 
 
 r. Richards (1899), Times. August 8 ; 1 W. C. C. 118 . . 187 
 
 v. Thomas, [1899] 1 Q. B. 1015 ; 15 T. L. R. 301 ; 68 L. J. (Q. B.) 
 
 539 ; 80 L. T. 578 ; 47 W. R. 504 ; 1 W. C. C. 9, C. A. . . 20 
 Refuge Assurance Co.. Ltd. v. Millar (1911), 49 S. L. R. 67; [1912] 
 
 S. C. 37 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 522, C. S 26, 66 
 
 Rendall v. Hills' Dry Dock and Engineering Co., Ltd., [1900] 2 
 Q. B. 245; 64 J. P. 45; 69 L. J. (Q. B.) 544; 82 L. T. 521 ; 48 
 W. R. 530 ; 16 T. L. R. 638 ; 2 W. C. C. 40, C. A. ... 68 
 Rennie v. Reid, [1908], S. C. 1051 ; 45 S. L. R. 814 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 
 
 324, C. S. 124, 125 
 
 Revie v. Gumming, [1911] S. C. 1032; 48 S. L. R. 831 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 
 
 483, C. S 17 
 
 Reyners, Ltd. r. Makin (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 267, C. A. . . . 175 
 
 *R. v. County L'outh JJ., [1900] 2 I. R. 714 124 
 
 - v. Crossley, [1909] 1 K. B. 411 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 451 ... 183 
 *_ r< Judge of City of London Court (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 339 ; 59 
 
 L. J. (Q. B.) 427 ; 63 L. T. 492 ; 38 W. R. 638 ; 6 Asp. M. C. 547 95 
 *_ r . Xegus (1873), L. R. 2 C. C. R. 34 ; 42 L. J. (M. c.) 62 ; 28 L. T. 
 
 646 ; 21 W. R. 687 ; 12 Cox C. C. 492 118 
 
 r. Owen, [1902] 2 K. B. 436; 71 L. J. (K. B.) 770 ; 87 L. T. 298 ; 
 
 1ST. L. R. 701 ; 51 W. R. 168 ; 4 W. C. C. 150, Div. Ct. 184, 200 
 
 r. Templer, Ex parte Howarth,[1912] I K. B.351 ; 81 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 399 105 L. T. 905 ; 28 T. L. R. 410 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 242 ; 
 [1912] W. C. Rep. 114, Div. Ct. ; affirmed [1912] 2 K. B. 
 444; 81 L. J. (K. B.) 805 ; 106 L. T. 855 ; 56 S. J. 501 ; 28 
 T. L. R. 410 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 455 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 209, 
 
 C. A 176 
 
 Rhodes v. Soothill Colliery Co., Ltd., [1909] 1 K. B. 191 ; 78 L. J. 
 
 (K. B.) 141 ; 100'L. T. 14 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 377, C. A. . . 165, 193 
 
xl TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Rice v. Owners of S.S. Swansea Vale (1910), 102 L. T. 270; 26 
 
 T. L. R. 276; 3. B. W. C. C. 152, C. A. affirmed [1912] A. C. 238 ; 
 
 81 L. J. (K. B.) 672; 104 L. T. 658; 55' S. J. 497; 12 Asp. M. C. 
 
 47; 27 T. L. R. 440; 4 B. W. C. C. 298; [1912] W. C. Rep. 242: 
 
 48 S. L. R. 1095, H. L 33 
 
 Richard, Evans & Co. v. Astley. See Astley. 
 
 Richards v. Sanders & Sons (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 352 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 
 
 407, C. A 41, 186 
 
 Richardson v. S.S. Avonmore, Owners of, (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 34, 
 
 C. A .34 
 
 Risby &Co. v. Cox (No. 1), [1904] 1 K. B. 358; 68 J. P. 195: 73 
 L. J. (K. B.) 80; 89 L. T. 717; 52 W. R. 195 : 
 20 T. L. R. 136 ; 6 W. C. C. 158, C. A. . . 184 
 v. (No. 2), [1904] 2 K. B. 208 ; 68 J. P. 385 ; 73 L. J. 
 
 (K. B.) 690 ; 91 L. T. 72 ; 20 T. L. R. 461 ; 6 W. C. C. 161, Div. Ct. 176 
 Rigel, The, [1912] P. 99; [1912] W. C. Rep. 351 ; 106 L. T. 648 ; 28 T. 
 
 L. R. 251 [Barirrave Deane, J.] 92, 93 
 
 Riley r. Wm. Holland & Sons. Ltd., [1911] 1 K. B. 1029 ; 80 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 814 ; 104 L. T. 371 : 27 T. L. R. 327 : 4 B. W. C. C. 155, C. A. . 15 
 Rimmer v. Premier Gas Engine Co. (1907), 97 L. T. 226 ; 9 W. C. C. 
 
 56; 23 T. L. R. 610, C. A 82 
 
 Rintoul v. Dalmeny Oil Co., [1908] S. C. 1025 ; 45 S. L. R. 809 ; 1 
 
 B. W. C. C. 340, C. S 149 
 
 Roberts and Ruthven, Ltd. r. Hall (1912), 106 L. T. 769 ; 5 B. W. i . 
 
 C. 331 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 269, C. A 162 
 
 Roberts v. Benham (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 430, C. A 154 
 
 v. Crystal Palace Football Club, Ltd. (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 51, 
 
 C.A .69 
 
 Robertson v. Allan Brothers & Co. (Liverpool and London), Ltd. (19rS), 
 77 L. J. (K. B.) 1072; 98 L. T. 821 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 172. 
 
 C. A 17. 20. 30, 39 
 
 - r. Hall Bros. Steamship Co. (1910), 3 B. W. C, C. 370, C. A. 126, 
 
 151 
 
 v. Henderson & Sons, Ltd. (1905), 7 F. 776, C. S. . . 54 
 
 Robson, Eckford & Co. v. Blakey, [1912] S. C. 334; 49 S. L. R. 254: 
 
 5 B. W. C. C. 536 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 86. C. 8. . . . ' >. 24 
 
 Rodger v. Paisley School Board, [1912] S. C. 584 ; 49 S. L. R. 413 ; 
 
 5 B. W. C. C. 547 : [1912] W. C. Rep. 157, C. S. ... 24 
 
 Rogers r. Cardiff Corporation, [1905] 2 K. B. 832 ; 70 J. P. 9; 75 L. J. 
 (K. B.) 22 ; 54 W. R, 35 ; 93 L. T. 683 ; 4 L. G. R. 1 ; 22 T. L. R. 
 
 9 ; 8 W. C. C. 51, C. A 2. 83 
 
 Roles r. Pascall, [1911] 1 K. B. 982; SOL. J.(K.B.)728; 104 L. T. 298; 
 
 4 B. W. C. C. 148, C. A 66, 70 
 
 Roper v. Greenwood & Sons (1900), 83 L. T. 471 ; 3 W. C. C. 23, C. A. 3, 4 
 Rose v. Morrison and Mason, Ltd. (1911), 105 L. T. 2: 4 B. W. C. 
 
 277. C. A 16, 27 
 
 Rosenqvist r. Bowring & Co., Ltd.. [1908] 2 K. B. 108; 77 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 545 ; 98 L. T. 773 ; 24 T. L. R. 504 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 395, C. A. . 137 
 Rosewell Gas Co. v. M'Vicar (1904), 7 F. 290 ; 42 S. L. R. 233, C. S. . 180 
 Rosie v. Mackay (No. 1) (1908), 46 S. L. R. 999; 2 B. W. C. C. 150, 
 
 C. S. (Sc.) 57 
 
 i: (No. 2), [1910] S. C. 714 ; 47 S. L. R. 654, C. S. . 175 
 
 r. (No. 3). S'.-- Mackay v. Rosie (No. 2). 
 
 Kothwell r. Davis (1903), 19 T. L. R. 423 ; 5 W. C. C. 141, C. A. . 157 
 
TABLE OF CASES. xli 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Rouse v. Dixon, [1904] 2 K. B. 628 ; 68 J. P. 406 ; 73 L. J. (K. B.) 662 ; 
 
 91 L. T. 436 ; 53 W. R. 237 ; 20 T. L. R. 553 ; 6 W. C. C. 44, Div. 
 
 Ct 46, 47 
 
 Rowland v. Wright, [1909] 1 K. B. 963 ; 77 L. J. (K. B.) 1071 ; 99 L. T. 
 
 758 ; 24 T. L. R. 852 ; 1 B. W C. C. 192, C. A. . . . 16, 25, 27 
 Ruabon Coal Co. v. Thomas (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 32, C. A. . . 157 
 *Euby (The) (No. 2), [1898] P. 59; 67 L. J. P. 28; 78 L. T. 235 ; 46 
 
 W. R. 687 ; 8 Asp. M. C. 421 [Jeune, F.] 96 
 
 Rumboll v. Nunnery Colliery Co., Ltd. (1899), 63 J. P. 132; 80 L. T. 
 
 42 ; 1 W. C. C. 28, C. A 50, 51 
 
 Russell v. M'Cluskey (1900), 2 F. 1312 ; 37 S. L. R. 931, C. S. . . 149 
 Ryan v. Hartley [1912], 2 K. B. 150; 81 L. J. (K. B.) 666; 106 
 L. T. 702; 5 B. W. C. C. 407; [1912] W. C. Rep. 236, 
 
 C. A 54, 199 
 
 v. Tipperary County Council, (1912) 46 Ir. L. T. 69 ; 5 B. W. 
 
 C. C. 578 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 195, C. A. (Ir.) . . . .121 
 
 S. 
 
 SAPCOTE AND SONS i>, Hancox (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 184, C. A. . . 171 
 Schofield v. Orrell Colliery Co., Ltd. See Orrell. 
 
 v. W. C. Clough & Co., (1912) 5 B. W. C. C. 417 ; [1912] W. 
 
 C. Rep. 301, C. A 199 
 
 Schwartz v. India Rubber, Gutta Percha and Telegraph Works Co., 
 
 [1912] 2 K. B. 299; 81 L. J. (K. B.) 780 ; 106 L. T. 706; 28 T. L. 
 
 R. 331 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 390 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 190, C. A. . . 3 
 Scotstoun Estate Co. v. Jackson. See Jackson. 
 
 Segura (Owners of S.) v. Blampied (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 192, C. A. . 196 
 Seniors. Fountains and Burnley, Ltd., [1907] 2 K. B. 563 ; 76 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 928 ; 97 L. T. 562 ; 23 T. L. R. 634; 9 W. C. C. 116, C. A. . . 148 
 Shannon v. Banbridge Weaving Co. (1910), 45 Ir. L. T. 74, C. 
 
 A. (Ir.) 65 
 
 Sharman v. Holliday and Greenwood, Ltd., [1904] 1 K. B. 235 68 J. P. 
 
 151 ; 73 L. J. (K. B.) 176 ; 90 L. T. 46 ; 20 T. L. R. 135 ; 6 W. C. C, 
 
 147, C. A 160, 173 
 
 Sharp v, Johnson, [1905] 2 K. B. 139 ; 74 L. J. (K. B.) 566 ; 92 L. T. 
 
 675 ; 53 W. R. 597 ; 21 T. L. R, 482 ; 7 W. C. C. 28, C. A. . . 10, 14 
 Sharpe v. Carswell, [1910] S. C. 391 ; 47 S. L. R. 335 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 
 
 552, C. S 95, 97, 119 
 
 Shaw v. Wigan Coal and Iron Co., Ltd. (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 81, C. A. 24 
 Shea v. Drolenvaux (1903), 88 L. T. 679 ; 19 T. L. R. 473 ; 5 W. C. C. 
 
 144, C. A 187 
 
 Shearer v. Miller & Sons (1899), 2 F. 114 ; 37 S. L. R. 80, C. S. . . 65 
 Sheerin or Sheeran v. Clayton, [1910] 2 Ir. R. 105 ; 44 Ir. L. T. 23 ; 
 
 3 B. W. C. C. 583, C. A. (Ir.) 5 
 
 Sherwood v. Johnson (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 686, C. A. . .38 
 
 Shirt v. Calico Printers' Association, [1909] 2 K. B. 51 ; 78 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 528 ; 100 L. T. 740 ; 53 S. J. 430 ; 25 T. L. R. 451 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 
 
 342, C. A ' . . 4, 146 
 
 Shore v. Owners S.S. Hyrcania (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 207, C. A. . . 194 
 Sidney v. W. Collins, Son & Co. (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 190, C. A. . J83 
 
 Silvester v. Cude (1899), 15 T. L. R. 434 ; 1 W. C. C. 120, C. A. . 69 
 
xlii TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Simiuonds r. Stourbridge Brick and Fireclay Co., Ltd., [1910] 2 
 K. B. 269 ; 79 L. J. (K. B.) 997 ; 102 L. T. 732 ; 26 T. L. R. 430, 
 
 Div.Ct 162 
 
 Simmons r. Faulds (1901), 65 J. P. 371 ; 17 T. L. R. 352 ; 3 W. C. C. 
 
 169, C. A 120 
 
 v. Heath Laundry Co.. [1910] 1 K. B. 543; 79 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 395 ; 102 L. T. 210 ; 54 S. J. 392 : 26 T. L. R. 326 : 3 
 
 B. W. C. C. 200, C. A 118,119,122,145 
 
 o. White Bros.. [1899] 1 Q. B. 1005; 15 T. L. R. 263; 68 
 
 L. J. (Q. B.) 507 ; 80 L. T. 344 : 47 W. R. 513 ; 1 W. C. C. 89, C. A. 126, 
 
 147. 186 
 Simpson r. Ebbw Yale Steel, Iron and Coal Co.. [1905] 1 K. B. 453 ; 
 
 74 L. J. (K. B.) 347 ; 92 L. T. 282 ; 53 W. R. 390 ; 21 T. L. R. 209 ; 
 
 7 \V. C. C 101, C. A 117, 122, 123 
 
 Sinclair r. Locheelly Iron and Coal Co., Ltd. (1906), 44 S. L. E. 2 : 
 
 [1907] S. C.^3, C. S . .198 
 
 Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Clelland. See Clelland. 
 
 Skailes r. Blue Anchor Line, [1911] 1 K. B. 360 ; 80 L. J. (K. B.) 442; 
 
 103 L. T. 741 ; 55 S. J. 107; 27 T. L. R. 119; 4 B. W. C. C. 16, 
 
 C. A, 123, 138 
 
 Skates v. Jones & Co., [1910] 2 K. B. 903 ; 26 T. L. R, 643 ; 3 B. W. 
 
 C. C. 460, C. A 75. 77, 79 
 
 Skeggs v. Keen (Xo. 1) (1899), Times, May 16 ; 1 W. C. C. 119, C, A. . 187 
 
 - v. (Xo. 2) (1899). Times, June 19 ; 1 W. C. C. 35, C. A. . 60 
 
 Skipper v. Nicholson (1909), 127 L. T. Xewsp., p. 202, C. C. . . 164 
 Slavin v. Train and Taylor (1911), 49 S. L. R. 93, 577; [1912] S. C. 
 
 754 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 525 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 167, C. S. . .- 60 
 Small r. M'Cormick and Ewing (1899), 1 F. 883 ; 36 S. L. R. 700, C. S. 149 
 Smith r. Abbey Park Steam Laundry Co., Ltd., 2 B. W. C. C. 142, 
 
 C. A 56, 190 
 
 * v. Associated Omnibus Co.. [1907] 1 K. B. 916 ; 76 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 574 ; 71 J. P. 239 ; 96 L. T. 675 ; 23 T. L. R. 381, Div. Ct. 124 
 IT. Coed Talon Colliery Co., Ltd. (1900), Times, February 6 : 
 
 2 W. C. C. 121, C. A 154, 156 
 
 v. Coles, [1905] 2 K. B. 827 ; 22 T. L. R. 5 ; 75 L J. (K. B.) 16 ; 
 
 54 W. R. 81; 93 L. T. 754 ; 8 W. C. C. 116, C. A. . . 2 
 v. General Motor Cab Co., Ltd.. [1911] A. C. 188 ; 80 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 839; 105 L. T. 113; 55 S. J. 439; 27 T. L. R. 370; 
 
 49 S. L. R. 618 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 249, H. L. . . 118, 120 
 r. Lancashire and Yorkshire Rail. Co., [1889] 1 Q. B. 141 ; 68 
 
 L. J. (Q. B.) 51 ; 47 W. R. 146; 79 L. T. 633; 15 T. L. R. 
 
 64; 1 W. C. C. 1, C. A 9,21,186 
 
 r. Morrison, (1911) 5 B. W. C. C. 161, C. A 26 
 
 r . Normanton Colliery Co., Ltd., [1903] 1 K. B. 204 : 51 W. R. 
 
 209; 19 T. L. R. 128; 88 L. T. 5; 72 L. J. (K. B.) 76; 67 
 
 J. P. 381 ; 5 W. C. C. 14. C. A 12, 30 
 
 - v. Pearson and Shipley (1909), 2 B. W. C. C. 468, C. C. . 70, 164 
 Smith's Dock Co. r. John Readhead & Sons, [1912] 2 K. B. 323; 106 
 
 L. T. 843 ; 81 L. J. (K. B.) 808 ; 28 T. L. R. 397 ; 5 B. W. 0. C. 
 
 450; [1912] W. C, Rep. 2 17 [Bray, J.] 92. 
 
 Sneddon v. Glasgow Coal Co., Ltd. (1905). 7 F. 485 ; 42 S. L. R. 365, 
 
 C. S ' 50 
 
 r. Greenfield Coal and Brick Co.. [1910] S. C. 362 ; 47 S. L. R. 
 
 337 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 557. C. S 34 
 
TABLE OF CASES. xliii 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Sueddon v. Eobert Addie & Son's Collieries (1904), 6 F. 992 ; 41 
 
 S. L. E. 826, C. S 128 
 
 Sorensen v. John Gaff & Co., [1912] S. C. 1163 ; 49 S. L. K. 896 ; 
 
 [1912] W. C. Rep. 342, C. S 158 
 
 Southall v. Cheshire County News Co., (1912) 5 B. W. C. C. 251 ; 
 
 [1912] W. C. Eep. 101,*C. A . 38, 40 
 
 Southhook Fireclay Co. v. Laughland, [1908] S. C. 831 ; 45 S. L. E. 
 
 664 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 405, C. S 175, 176 
 
 *Southport Corporation v. Morris, [1893] 1 Q. B. 359 ; 57 J. P. 231 ; 
 
 62 L. J. (M. c.) 47 ; 5 E. 201 ; 68 L. T. 221 ; 41 W. R. 382 ; 7 
 
 Asp. M. C. 279 96 
 
 Spacey v. Dowlais Gas and Coke Co., Ltd., [1905] 2 K. B. 879 ; 75 
 
 L. J. (K. B.) 5 ; 54 W. E. 138 ; 93 L. T. 685 ; 22 T. L. E. 29 ; 8 
 
 W. C. C. 29, C. A 82 
 
 Spence v. Wm. Baird & Co., [1912] S. C. 343; 49 S. L. E. 278; 5 B. 
 
 W. C. C. 542 ; [1912] W. C. Bep. 18,, C. S 38 
 
 Spiers v. Elderslie Steamship Co., Ltd., [1909] S. C. 1259 ; 46 S. L. E. 
 
 893 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 205, C. S. 78 
 
 Stalker v. Wallace (1900), 2 F. 1162 ; 37 S. L. E. 898, C. S. . . 75 
 Standing v. Eastwood & Co., Ltd., (1912) 106 L. T. 477 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 
 
 268; [1912] W. C. Eep. 200, C. A 117, 120 
 
 Stanland v. North Eastern Steel Co., Ltd. (1906), 23 T. L. E. 1 ; 9 
 
 W. C. C. 133, C. A 187 
 
 Stapleton v. Dinnington Main Coal Co., Ltd., (1912) 107 L. T. 247 ; 
 
 5 B. W. C. C. 602 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 376, C. A. ... 36 
 Staveley Coal and Iron Co. v. Elson, (1912) 5 B. W. C. C. 301 ; [1912] 
 
 W. C. Eep. 228, C. A 178 
 
 Stead v. Moore and Others (1900), Times, June 18, C. A. . . .75 
 Steel v. Cammell, Laird & Co., Ltd., [1905] 2 K. B. 232 ; 74 L. J. (K. B.) 
 610 ; 93 L. T. 357 ; 53 W. E. 612 ; 21 T. L. E. 490 ; 7 
 W. C. C. 9, C. A. . 7 
 
 - v. Oakbank Oil Co., Ltd. (1902), 5 F. 244 ; 40 S. L. E. 204, 
 
 C. S 174 
 
 Steele i: Bilham (1910), 128 L. T. Newsp., p. 416, C. C. . . . 156 
 Stephens v. Dudbridge Ironworks Co., Ltd., [1904] 2 K. B. 225 ; 68 
 J. P. 437 ; 73 L. J. (K. B.) 739; 90 L. T. 838 ; 52 W. R. 644; 20 
 
 T. L. E. 492 ; 6 W. C. C. 48, C. A 54 
 
 Stevens v. Insoles, Ltd., [1912] 1 K. B. 36 ; 81 L. J. (K. B.) 47 ; 5 
 
 B. W. C. C. 164; 105 L. T. 617; [1912] W. C. Eep. Ill; 
 
 C. A 63 
 
 Stewart v. Dublin and Glasgow Steam Packet Co. (1902), 5 F. 57 ; 40 
 
 S. L. R. 41, C. S ' . . 80 
 
 - P. Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co. (1902), 5 F. 120 ; 40 S. L. E. 80, 
 
 C. S 4, 5 
 
 Stinton r. Brandon Gas Co. (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 426 ; [1912 j W. C. 
 
 Eep. 132, C. A 65 
 
 Strannigan v. W. Baird & Co., Ltd. (1904), 6 F. 784 ; 41 S. L. E. 609, 
 
 C. S. 171 
 
 Stronge v. Hazlett (1909), 44 Ir. L. T. E. 10; 3 B. W. C. C. 581, C. A. 
 
 (Ir.) 65 
 
 Sudell v. Blackburn Corporation (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 227, C. A. . 125 
 Summerlee and Mossend Iron and Coal Co., Ltd. v. Caton. See Caton. 
 v. Hughes. See 
 
 Hughes. 
 
xliv TABLE <F CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Sutton v. Great Northern Bail. Co. (Xo. 1), [1909] 2 K. B. 791; 79 
 
 L. J. (K. B.) 81; 101 L. T. 175: 
 2 B. W, C. C. 428, C. A. . .183 
 
 v. (No. 2) (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 
 
 160 188 
 
 * v. Sutton (1882), 22 Ch. D. 513 75 
 
 Swannick v. Trustees of the Congested Districts Board for Ireland 
 
 (1912), 46 Ir. L. T. 253, C. A. (Ir.) 178 
 
 Swansea Vale S.S. Owners v. Kice. See Bice. 
 
 Sweeney v. Gourlay Bros. & Co. (Dundee), Ltd. (1906), 8 F. 597, 965 ; 
 
 43 S. L. R. 690, C. S 56 
 
 v. Pumphereton Oil Co. (1903), 5 F. 972 ; 40 S. L. R. 721, 
 
 C. S 157 
 
 Swinbank r. Bell Bros., Ltd. (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 48, C. A. .41 
 
 Symon r. Wemyss Coal Co., Ltd. Bee Wemyss, &c. 
 
 T. 
 
 TAFF Yale Bail. Co. r. Lane (Xo. 1) (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 259, C. A. . 189 
 
 v. (Xo. 2), (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 299, C. A. . 173 
 
 Tarn worth Colliery Co. r. Hall. See Hall r. Tamworth Colliery Co. 
 Taylor r. Bolckow, Yaughan & Co., Ltd. (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 130, 
 
 C. A. , . 186 
 
 r. Burnham & Co. (Xo. 1), [1909] S. C. 704 ; 46 S. L. R. 482 ; 
 2B. W. C. " 
 
 C, 247, C. S. 107 
 
 - r. (No. 2), [1910] S. C. 705 ; 47 S. L. B. 643 ; 
 
 3 B. W. C, C. 569. C. S UK 121 
 
 v. Hamstead Colliery Co., [1904] 1 K. B. 838 ; 68 J. P. 300 : 
 
 73 L. J. (K. B.) 469 ; 90 L. T, 363 ; 52 W. B. 417 ; 20 T. L. R. 
 
 338 ; 6 W. C. C. 34, C. A. . , . . , 47. 72 
 
 r. L. N. W. R. Co. See L. N. \V. R. Co. r. Taylor. 
 
 Thackway r. Connelly & Sons (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 37, C. A. . . 36 
 Thoburn r. Bedlington Coal Co. Ltd. (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 128, C. A. . 145 
 Thomas v. Cory Bros. & Co., Ltd. (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 5, C. A. . . 191 
 
 o. Fairbairne, Lawson & Co., Ltd. (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 195, 
 
 C. A. . ..... 160 
 
 Thompson v. Ashington Coal Co.. Ltd. (1901), 84 L. T. 412 ; 65 J. P. 
 
 356 ; 3 W. C. C. 21 : 17 T. L. R. 345, C. A. . 4 
 
 r. Baird & Co., Ltd. (1903), 6 F. 142 ; 41 S. L. R. 152, C. S. 03 
 
 (Pauper) v. R. W. Gould & Co., [1910] A. C. 409 ; 79 L. J. 
 
 (K. B.) 905i; 54 S. J. 599 ; 103 L. T. 81 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 394 : 
 26 T. L. R. 526; 48 S. L. R. 685; reversing C. A.. 25 
 
 T. L. R. 163 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 166, H. L 7 
 
 * : v. Hart (1890), 28 S. L. R. 28 ; 18 Ct. of Sess. Cas. (4th ser.) 
 
 Justiciary Cases, 3 95 
 
 v. North Eastern Marine Engineering Co., Ltd., [1903] 1 
 
 K. B. 428: 19 T. L. R. 206; 72 L. J. (K. B.) 222 ; 88 L. T. 239; 
 
 5 W. C. C. 71 (Kennedy, J.) 92 
 
 Thomson r. Flemington Coal Co., Ltd., [1911] S. C. 823 ; 48 S. L. R. 
 
 740 : 4 B. W. C. C. 406, C. S -" 
 
 Thranmere Bay Development Co , Ltd. v. Brennan (1909), 2 B. AV. C. C. 
 
 403, C. A/ 173 
 
TABLE OF CASES. xlv 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Tibbs v. Watts, Blake, Bearne & Co., Ltd. (1909), 2 B. W. C. C. 164, 
 
 C. A. . . 65, 66, 69 
 
 Tigue v. Colville & Sons, Ltd. (1905), 43 S. L. E. 129; 8 F. 179, 
 
 C.S 199 
 
 Timmins v. Leeds Forge Co., Ltd. (1900), 83 L. T. 120 ; 16 T. L.K. 521 ; 
 
 2 W. C. C. 10, C. A 5 
 
 Tindall v. Great Northern Steam Fishing Co. (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 
 
 667. C. A 97 
 
 Tobin v. Hearne, [1910] 2 Ir. K. 639 ; 44 Ir. L. T. 197, C. A. (Ir). . 19 
 Todd v. Caledonian Kail. Co. (1899), 1 F. 1047 ; 36 S. L. E. 784, 
 
 C. S. . 11,50 
 
 Tomalin v. S. Pearson & Son, Ltd., [1909] 2 K. B. 61 ; 78 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 863 ; 100 L. T. 685 ; 25 T. L. E. 477 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 1, C. A . 2 
 Tombs v. Bomford (1912), 106 L. T. 823; 5 B. W. C. C, 338; [1912] 
 
 W. C. Rep. 229, C. A 124 
 
 Tong v. Great Northern Rail. Co. (1902),- 66 J.P. 677; 18 T. L.R.566; 
 
 86 L. T. 802 ; 4 W. C. C. 40 [Wright, J.] 89 
 
 Toole v. Owners'of Ship Isle of Erin (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 110, C. A. . 148 
 Topping v. Rhind (1904), 6 F. 666 ; 41 S. L. R. 573, C. S. . . .84 
 *Tozeland v. West Ham Guardians, [1907] 1 K. B. 920; 71 J. P. 194; 
 
 76 L. J. (K. B.) 514 ; 96 L. T. 519; 5 L. G. R. 507 ; 23 T. L. R. 
 
 325, C. A 122 
 
 Traill v. Cochrane (1901), 3 F. 1091 : 38 S. L. R. 848, C. S. . . 194 
 
 Trainer v. Addie & Son's Collieries. See Addie, etc. 
 
 Traynor v, Addie & Sons, [1911] 48 S. L. R. 820 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 357, 
 
 C.S 39 
 
 Trehearne v. Ocean Coal Co., Ltd. (1905), 21 T. L. R. 621 ; 7 W. C. C. 
 
 34, C. A. . . . 73 
 
 Trodden v. I. M. Lennard & Sons, Ltd. (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 190, C. A. 5, 
 
 36 
 Tucker v. Oldbury Urban District Council, [1912] 2 K. B. 317 ; 81 
 
 L. J. (K. B.) 668 ; 106 L. T. 669 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 296 ; [1912] W. C. 
 
 Rep. 238, C. A 40 
 
 Turnbull v. Lambton Collieries, Ltd. (1900), 64 J. P. 404 ; -16 T. L, R. 
 
 369^ 82 L. T. 589; 2 W. C. C. 84, C. A 82 
 
 Turner v. G. Bell & Sons, Ltd. (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 63, C. A. . . 197 
 
 v. Brooks and Doxey, Ltd. (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 22, C. A. . 155 
 
 v. Miller and Richards (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 307, C. A. 126, 151, 
 
 186 
 
 Turners, Ltd. v. Whitefield (1904), 6 F. 822 ; 41 S. L. R. 631, C. S. , 128 
 Turvey v. Brintons, Ltd., [1904] 1 K. B. 328; affirmed H. L. sub nom. 
 
 Brintons, Ltd. (q.v.) ......... 4 
 
 Tutton v. Owners of S.S. Majestic, [1909] 2 K. B. 54 ; 78 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 530 ; 100 L. T. 644 ; 53 S. J. 447 ; 25 T. L. E, 482 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 
 
 346, C. A 157 
 
 Tynron (Owners of S.S.) v. Morgan, [1909] 2 K. B. 66 ; 78 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 857 ; 100 L. T. 641 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 406, C. A 175 
 
 U. 
 
 UNITED Collieries, Ltd. v. M'Ghie (1904), 6 F. 808; 41 S. L. R. 705, 
 
 C. S 50, 51 
 
xlvi TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 United Colleries. Ltd. v. Hendry or Simpson. [1909] A. C. 383 ; 78 
 L. J. (P. C.) 129 ; 101 L. T. 129 ; 53 S. J. 
 630; 25 T. L. R. 678 ; 46 S. L. R. 480 ; 2 
 B. W. C. C. 308, H. L. (Sc.) . . .147 
 
 i: King. See King. 
 
 Upper Forest and Western Street and Tinplate Co. r. Thomas, [1909] 2 
 
 K. B. 631 ; 78 L. J. (K. B.) 1113 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 414, C. A. . . 174 
 Upper Forest and Worcester S f eel and Tinplate Co.. Ltd. r. Grey 
 
 (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 424, C. A 154, 156 
 
 V. 
 
 VALENTI v. Win. Dixon, Ltd.. [1907] S. C. 695 ; 44 S. L. R. 532, C. S. . 55 
 Vamplew r. Parkgate Iron and Steel Co., Ltd., [1903] 1 K. B. 851 ; 67 
 
 J. P. 417 ; 72 L. J. (K. B.) 575 ; 88 L. T. 756 ; 51 W. R. 691 ; 19 T. 
 
 R. 421 ; 5 W. C. C. 114, C. A 118, 12(> 
 
 Van der Plas v. Goedhart Bros., Ltd. (1910), 128 L. T. Xewsp., p. 203, 
 
 C. C 133 
 
 Vaughan r. Xicoll (1906), 8 F. 464: 43 S. L. R. 351, C. S. . . .51 
 
 Tickers, Sons, and Maxim, Ltd. r. Evans. See Evans. 
 
 Victor Mills, Limited v. Shackleton, [1912] 1 K. B. 22 : 105 L. T. 613 ; 
 
 81 L. J. (K. B.) 34 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 30 ; [1912] W. C. Rep. 33, C. A. 178, 
 
 179 
 Victoria (Owners of) v. Barlow (1911), 45 Ir. L. T. 260; 5 B. W. C. C. 
 
 570, C. A. (Ir.) 118 
 
 *Villar r. Gilbey, [1907] A. C. 139; 76 L. J. (CH.) 339; 96 L. T. 511 ; 
 
 23 T. L. R. *392, H. L 129 
 
 WABY r. Sheffield Mineral Water Syndicate, not reported, C. A. . 33 
 
 Waddell r. Coltness Iron Co. Ltd. (1912), 50 S. L. R. 29, C. S. . 50, 52 
 Wainwright r. Crichton (1904), 117 L. T. Xewsp., p. 2, C. A. . . 14S 
 Waites v. Franco-British Exhibition (1909), 25 T. L. R. 441 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 
 
 199. C. A 78. 119 
 
 Walker r. Crystal Palace Football Club, Ltd., [1910] 1 K. B. 87 ; 79 
 
 L. J. (K. B.) 229 ; 101 L. T. 645 ; 54 S. J. 65 ; 26 T. L. R. 
 
 71 ; 3 B. W; C. C. 5o. C. A 119 
 
 r. Hockney Bros. (1909), 2 B. W. C. C. 20, C. A. . . . 7 
 
 . Lilleshall Coal Co., [1900] 1 Q. B. 488; 64 J. P. 85; 69 
 
 L. J. (Q. B.) 192; 81 L. T. 769; 48 W. R. 257; 16 T. L. R. 
 
 108 ; 2 W. C. C. 7, C. A 4 
 
 v. Mullins (1908), 42 Ir. L. T. 168; 125 L. T. Xewsp. 207; 1 
 
 B. W. C. C. 211, C. A. (Ir.) 3, 8 
 
 r. Murrays, [1911] S. C. 825; 48 S. L. R. 741 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 
 
 409, C. S 38 
 
 Wallace v. Fife Coal Co. See Fife Coal Co. 
 
TABLE OF CASES. xlvii 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Wallace -a. Glenboig Union Fireclay Co., Ltd., [1907] S. C. 967; 44 
 
 S. L. R. 726, C. S 50 
 
 r. R. and W. Hawthorne, Leslie & Co., Ltd., [1908] S. C. 713 ; 
 
 45 S. L. E. 547 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 249, C. S 132 
 
 Wallis & Sons v. M'Xeice (1912), 47 Ir. L. T. 202; [1912] W. C. Eep. 
 
 372, C. A. (Ir.) 161 
 
 *Wallis, In re, Ex parte Sully (1885), 14 Q. B. D. 950 ; 52 L. T. 625 ; 
 
 33 W. E. 733 ; 2 Morr. B. C. 79 75 
 
 Walsh v Hayes (1909), 43 Ir. L. T. 114; 2 B. W. C. C. 202, C. A. (Ir.) 77, 
 
 78 
 
 Walters v. Staveley Coal and Iron Co. (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 89, C. A. ; 
 affirmed, 105 L. T. 119; 55 S. J. 579; 49 S. L. E. 623; 4 
 
 B. W. C. C. 303, H. L. 10, 11, 12 
 
 Walton v. South Kirby, Featherstone and Hemsworth Colliery, Ltd. 
 
 (1912), 107 L. T. 337; 5 B. W. C. C. 640; [1912] W. C. Rep. 383; 
 
 C. A I .... 173 
 
 Warby v. Piaistowe & Co. (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 67, C. A. . . . 170 
 
 Ward v. Miles (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 182, C. A 155 
 
 Warncken v. Moreland, [1909] 1 K. B. 184 ; 78 L. J. (K. B.) 332 ; 100 
 
 L. T. 12 ; 25 T. L. R. 129 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 350, C. A. . . . 157 
 Warner v. Couchman, [1911] 1 K. B. 351 ; 80 L. J. K. B. 526 ; 103 
 
 L. T. 693; 55 S. J. 107 ; 27 T. L. R. 121 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 32, C. A. ; 
 
 affirmed, [1912] A. C, 35 ; 81 L. J. (K. B.) 45 ; 105 L. T. 676 ; 56 
 
 S. J. 70; 49 S. L. R. 681; 28 T. L. E. 58; 5 B. W. C. C. 177; 
 
 [1912] W. C. Eep. 28, H. L 4. 5, 22, 23, 24 
 
 Warnock v. Glasgow Iron and Steel Co., Ltd. (1904), 6 F. 474; 41 
 
 S. L. R. 359, C. S 146 
 
 Warren v. Eoxburg (1912), 106 L. T. 555 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 263; [1912] 
 
 W. C. Eep. 306, C. A 198 
 
 Warwick S.S. Co. v. Callaghan (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 283; [1912] 
 
 W. C. Eep. 316, C. A 161 
 
 Watkin v. Guest, Keen & Nettlefolds, Ltd. (1912), 106 L. T. 818 ; 5 
 
 B. W. C. C. 307; [1912] W. C. Rep. 150, C. A. . . . 17, 18 
 Webster v. Sharpe & Co., [1905] A. C. 284 ; 74 L. J. (K. B.) 776 ; 92 
 
 L. T. 373; 7 W. C. C. 118, H. L 159 
 
 Weighill v. South Hetton Coal Co., [1911] 2 K. B. 757 n. ; 4 B. W. C. C. 
 
 141, C. A 18 
 
 Weir v. North British Rail. Co. (1912), 49 S. L. E. 772 ; [1912] S. C. 
 
 1073 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 595 ; [1912] W. C. Eep. 332, C. S. . 175, 187 
 Welland v. Great Western Rail. Co. (1900), 16 T. L. R. 297; 2 
 
 W.C. C. 145, C. A 184 
 
 Wells v. Cardiff Steam Collieries Co., Ltd. (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 104, 
 
 C. A 154 
 
 Wemyss Coal Co. v. Peggie. See Peggie. 
 
 Ltd. v. Symon, [1912] S. C. 1239; "49 S. L. R. 921 ; 
 
 [1912] W. C. Rep. 336, C. S 30 
 
 Westcott & Lawrence Lines, Ltd. v. Price (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 430 ; 
 
 [1912] W. C. Rep. 280, C. A 186 
 
 Wheeler, Ridley & Co. v. Dawson (1912), 107 L. T. 339 ; 5 B. W. 
 
 C. C. 645, C. A 157,188 
 
 Whelan v. Great Northern Steam Fishing Co., Ltd. (1909), 78 L. J. 
 (K. B.) 860 ; 100 L. T. 913 ; 25 T. L. R. 619 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 
 
 235, C. A ... 97 
 
 v. Moore (1909), 4:3 Ir. L. T. 205 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 114, C. A. (Ir.) 17 
 
xlviii TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Whitbread v. Arnold (1908), 99 L. T. 103 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 317, C. A. . 10 
 White and Sons v. Harris (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 39, C. A. . . . loo 
 
 White r. Sheepwash (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 384, C. A 5 
 
 v. Wiseman, [1912] 3 K. B. 352 ; 56 S. J. 703 ; 28 T. L. E. 542 ; 
 
 107 L. T. 277; 5 B. W. C. C. 654.' [1912] W- C. Eep. 403, C. A. 145 
 Whitehead v. Eeader, [1901] 2 K. B. 48 ; 84 L. T. 514 ; 70 L. J. (K. B.) 
 546 ; 49 W. E. 562 ; 65 J. P. 403 ; 3 W. C. C. 40 ; 17 T. L. E. 387,. 
 
 C. A. 18, 50 
 
 Whitton v. Bell and Sime (1899), 1 F. 942 ; 36 S. L. E. 754, C. S. . 82 
 Wicks v. Dowell & Co., Ltd., [1905] 2 K. B. 225 ; 21 T. L. E. 487 ; 74 
 
 I,. J. (K. B.) 572 ; 92 L. T. 677 ; 53 W. E. 515 : 7 W. C. C. 14. C. A. 5. 
 
 24,41 
 
 Wilkes v. Dowell & Co., Ltd. See Wicks v. Same. 
 William Baird & Co., Ltd. See Baird & Co., Ltd. 
 Williams v. Army and Navy Auxiliary Co-operative Society, Ltd. 
 
 (1907), 23 T. L. E. 408 ; 9 W. C. C. 134, C. A. . . 61 
 
 r. Ocean Coal Co., Ltd.. [1907] 2 K. B. 422; 76 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 1073 ; 97 L. T. 150 ; 23 T. L. B. 584 ; 9 W. C. C. 44, 
 
 C.A 128 
 
 v. Poulson (1899), 63 J. P. 757 ; 16 T. L. E. 42 ; 2 W. C. C. 
 
 126, C. A 149 
 
 t-. Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Co. (1902), not reported, but see 
 
 113 T. L. Newsp., p. 196, C. A.- 
 
 v. Yauxhall Colliery Co.^Ltd., [1907] 2 K. B. 433 ; 76 L. J. 
 
 (K. B.) 854; 97 L. T. 559; 23 T. L. E, 591 ; 9 W. C. C. 
 
 120, C.A 54,147,150,174 
 
 , . Wigan Coal & Iron Co., Ltd. (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 65. 
 
 C.A 30 
 
 r. Wynnstay Collieries, Ltd. (1910), 3 B. W. C. C., 473, C. A. 143 
 
 Willmott r. Paton, [1902] 1 K. B. 237 ; 71 L. J. (K. B.) 1 ; 66 J. P. 197 : 
 
 85 L. T. 569 ; 50 W. E. 148 : 18 T. L. E. 48 ; 4 W. C. C. 65, C. A. 81 
 Wilson v. Jackson's Stores, Ltd. (1905), 7 W. C. C. 122 . .160 
 
 r Laing-, [1909] S. C. 1230 ; 46 S. L. E. 843 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 118, 
 
 C. S 22 
 
 v. Ocean Coal Co., Ltd. (1905), 21 T. L. E. 195 : affirmed, ibid. 
 
 621 ; 7 W. C. C. 34, C. A. 73 
 
 Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co.. Ltd. v. Cairnduff, [1911] S. C. 647; 48 
 
 S. L. E. 500", C. S 173 
 
 Winters c. Addie & Sons' Collieries, [1911] S. C.474 ; 48 S. L. E. 940; 
 
 5 B. W. C. C. 511, C. S . . .107 
 
 Wolsey r. Pethick Bros. (1908), 1 B. W. C. C. 411, C. A. . . 40, 186 
 Wood r D. Davis & Sons, Ltd. (1911)5 B. W. C. C. 113, C. A. . . 38 
 Woolfe v. Colquhoun, [1912] S. C. 1190 ; 49 S. L. E, 911 ; [1912] W. C. 
 
 Eep. 342, C. S .97 
 
 Wright . John Bagnall & Sons, Ltd., [1900] 2 Q. B. 240; 64 J. P. 420; 
 
 69 L. J. (Q. B.) 551 ; 82 L. T. 346 ; 48 W. E. 533 ; 16 T. L. E. 327 ; 
 
 2 W. C. C. 36, C. A 67, 68 
 
 Wright v. Kerrigan, [1911] 2 Ir. E. 301 ; 45 Ir. L. T. 82 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 
 
 432, C. A. (Ir) 40 
 
 t,. Lindsay, [1912] S. C. 189; 49 S. L. E. 210 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 
 
 531, C. A 91 
 
 \VrMey v. Bagley and Wright, [1901] 1 K. B. 780 ; 65 J. P. 372 ; 70 
 
 'L. J. (K. B.) 538 ; 84 L. T. 415 ; 49 W. E, 472 ; 3 W. C. C. 61, C. A. 80, 81 
 
TABLE OF CASES. xlix 
 
 Y. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 * YARMOUTH v. France (1887), 19 Q. B. D. 647 ; 57 L. J. (Q. B.) 7 ; 36 
 
 W. E. 281 124 
 
 Yates v. South Kirkby, Featherstone and Hemsworth Collieries, Ltd., 
 
 [1910] 2 K. B. 538 ; 79 L. J. (K. B.) 1035; 103 L. T. 170; 26T.L.E. 
 
 596 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 418, C. A 5, 155 
 
 * Yewens v. Noakes (1880), 6 Q. B. D. 530 ; 45 J. P. 468 ; 50 L. J. 
 
 (Q. B.) 132 ; 44 L. T. 128 ; 28 W. E. 562, C. A 119 
 
 Young v. Niddrie & Benhar Coal Co. See Niddrie. 
 
 Ystradowen Colliery Co. v. Griffiths, [1909] 2 K. B. 533 ; 78 L. J. (K. B.) 
 
 1044 ; 100 L. T. 869 ; 25 T. L. B. 622 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 357, C. A. . 153 
 
 Z. 
 
 ZTJGG v. J. & J. Cunningham, Ltd., [1908] S. C. 827 ; 45 S. L. E. 690 : 
 
 1B.W.C.C. 257," C. S 77,78 
 
THE 
 
 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 
 1906. 
 
 THE 
 
 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. 
 
 (6 ED\V. 7, c. 58.) 
 
 An Act to consolidate and amend the Law with respect to Com- 
 pensation to Workmen for Injuries suffered in the course 
 of their Employment. 
 
 [21st December 1906.] 
 
 BE it enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and 
 with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and 
 Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament 
 assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows : 
 
 Interpretation. The following dicta on the interpretation of the 
 Act will be fpund useful. 
 
 "It appears to nie that the statute deliberately and designedly 
 avoided anything like technology " (Earl of HALSBURY, L.C., in 
 Powell v. Main Colliery Co., [1900] A. C., at p. 371, when dealing with 
 what amounted to a "claim" under s. 2 (1) of the Act of 1897; 2 
 W. C. C. 29). 
 
 " The only way to construe the Act is to read it fairly, taking the 
 words hi their common and ordinary signification, and . . . the court 
 ought not to strain the language in order to bring in or to exclude any 
 particular case, however arbitrary or unscientific the line of demarca- 
 tion drawn by the Act may seem to be " (per Lord MACNAGHTEN in 
 Hoddinott v. Newton Chambers & Co., Limited, [1901] A. C. 49, at 
 p. 57 ; 3 W. C. C. 74). 
 
 " The language of the statute we are called upon to construe must 
 be interpreted in its ordinary and popular meaning. The use of 
 language preceded scientific investigation " (.per Earl of HALSBURY, 
 
 W.C.A. B 
 
2 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 1 (1) 
 
 L.C., in construing the word "accident" in Brinton's, Limited v. 
 Turvey, [1905] A. C., at pp. 232, 233 ; 7 W. C. C. 1). 
 
 " It ought to be remembered that the Workmen's Compensation 
 Acts are expressed not in technical but in popular language, and 
 ought to be construed not in a technical but in a popular sense" (per 
 EOMER, L.J., in Smith v. Coles, [1905] 2 K. B., at pp. 830, 831 ; 8 
 W. C. C. 116 ; and see to the same effect Pagers v. Cardiff Corpora- 
 tion, ibid., at p. 836 ; 8 W. C. C. 51). 
 
 " This court would be slow to adopt an interpretation of the Act 
 which would introduce exceptions that have not been made by the 
 legislature " (per MATHEW, L.J., ibid., pp. 831, 832). 
 
 " The first thing, I think, one has to do is to apply one's mind to 
 what is the substantive intention and meaning of this statute " (Lysons 
 v. Andrew Knowles & Sons, Limited, [1901] A. C. 79, at p. 85, per 
 EARL OF HALSBURY, L.C.). 
 
 " You must not resort to the Schedule for the purpose of cutting 
 down the right to compensation (Ball v. Win. Hunt & Sons, 
 Limited, [1912] A. C. 496 at p. 500, per LORD MACNAGHTEX). 
 
 " We have been told by the House of Lords to give the terms used 
 in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, their practical, popular 
 meaning, and not to put a technical construction on them " (per 
 COLLINS, M.E., in Adams v. Shaddock, [1905] 2 K. B., at p. 865 ; 8 
 W. C. C. 58). 
 
 To similar effect see the judgments hi Lowe v. M. Myers & Sons, 
 [1906] 2 K. B. 265 ; 8 W. C. C. 22, where it is also stated that the 
 documents in arbitration proceedings under the Act (1897) ought not 
 k> be treated with the nicety and strictness of pleadings in judicial 
 proceedings in the High Court. 
 
 Application of the Act. See p. 133, post . 
 
 1. Liability of employers to workmen for injuries.'] 
 (1) If in any employment personal injury by accident 
 arising out of and in the course of the employment is caused 
 to a workman, his employer shall, subject as herein-after 
 mentioned, be liable to pay compensation in accordance with 
 the First Schedule to this Act. 
 
 "IN ANY EMPLOYMENT." 
 
 Employments Affected. The repealed Acts of 1897 and 1900 
 applied only to certain specified employments. The present statute 
 applies to all employments, subject to certain exceptions, for which 
 see p. 123, post. 
 
 Employment Abroad. Except in the case of seamen (see p. 93, 
 post], the Act has no application to accidents happening during 
 emplovrnent beyond the territorial limits of the United Kingdom 
 (Tomalin v. S," Pearson & Son, Limited, [1909] 2 K. B. 61; 2 
 
Sect. 1 (1)] "PERSONAL INJURY BY ACCIDENT." 3 
 
 B. W. C. C. 1), and a British ship on the high seas is not to be 
 regarded as British territory for the purpose of the application of the 
 Act (Schwartz v. India Rubber, Gutta Percha and Telegraph Works 
 Co., [1912] 2 K. B. 299 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 390). 
 As to the application of the Act to foreigners, see p. 133, post. 
 
 "PERSONAL INJURY BY ACCIDENT." 
 
 Definition Of " Accident." The Court of Appeal formerly held that 
 the word " accident " involved the idea of something fortuitous and 
 unexpected, and, therefore, that an injury suffered while doing 
 ordinary work in the ordinary way, although the work might be more 
 arduous than usual, was not an injury caused by accident within 
 the meaning of the Act (Hensey v. White, [1900] 1 Q. B. 481 ; 2 
 W. C. C. 1 ; Roper v. Greenwood (1900), 83 L. T. 471 ; 3 W. C. C. 23). 
 
 The application of the word "fortuitous" to the term " injury by 
 accident " was criticised and objected to by the House of Lords in 
 Fenton v. Thorley d Co., Limited, [1903] A. C. 443 ; 5 W. C. C. 1, 
 as being either superfluous or misleading, and not warranted by 
 anything in the statute (ibid., at p. 446). In that case a workman 
 had by over-exertion ruptured himself in trying to turn the wheel of a 
 machine, in the ordinary course of his employment. The House of 
 Lords held that he had suffered an " injury by accident " within the 
 meaning of the Act, and laid it down that the word " accident," as 
 used in the Act, was used " in the popular and ordinary sense of the 
 word as denoting an unlooked-for mishap or an untoward event which 
 is not expected or designed" (per Lord MACNAGHTEN, ibid., at p. 
 448) ; or as denoting or including " any unexpected personal injury 
 resulting to the workman in the course of his employment from any 
 unlooked-for mishap or occurrence " (per Lord SHAND, ibid., at p. 
 451) ; or " any unintended and unexpected occurrence which produces 
 hurt or loss " (per Lord LINDLEY, ibid., at p. 453). 
 
 Question of Law and Fact. Whether or not an injury is 
 sustained by accident is a mixed question of law and fact (Roper v. 
 Greenwood (1900), 83 L. T. 471 ; 3 W. C. C. 23 : per COLLINS and 
 STIRLING, L.JJ.). The question of the existence of the personal injury 
 and of its cause or causes is one of fact, but "the question whether 
 such cause or causes amount to an accident within the meaning of the 
 Act is a question of law on which the decision of the county court 
 judge is not final, and is not a question of fact on which his decision 
 is not open to appeal" (Fenton v. Thorley & Co., Limited, [1903] 
 A. C. 443, at p. 453 : per Lord LINDLEY; 5 W. C. C. 1. See, also, 
 Johnson v. Owners of S.S. Torrington (1905), 3 B. W. C. C. 68; 
 Walker v. Mullins (1908), 42 Ir. L. T. 168 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 211 ; Ashley 
 v. Lilleshall Coal Co., Limited (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 85). 
 
 Effects of the Wider Definition. All the refinements of the 
 earlier cases have been swept away by the extended meaning which is 
 now given to the word " accident." Eecent decisions have worked 
 closer to the opinion expressed by Lord M'LAEEN that, "if a 
 
4 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 1 fl) 
 
 workman in the reasonable performance of his duties sustains a 
 physiological injury as the result of the work he is engaged in ... 
 this is accidental injury in the sense of the statute" (Stewart v. 
 Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co., Limited (1902), 5 F. 120, which case 
 was approved and the above opinion cited in Fentonv. Thorley & Co., . 
 Limited, [1903] 443, 449 ; 5 W. C. C. 1 ; and see the dissenting 
 judgment of FLETCHER MOULTON, L.J., in Warner v. Couchman, 
 [1911] 1 K. B. at p. 356 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 32), subject, it would appear, 
 to two exceptions, namely, intentionally self-inflicted injuries, and 
 injuries produced by disease. The causes of the accidents are wholly 
 immaterial, except when considering whether the accidents arise out 
 of and hi the course of the employment. 
 
 Illustrations of Injuries "by Accident." Note that the 
 
 expression is not "by an accident." Attention was drawn to this in 
 the House of Lords in Warner v. Couchman, [1912] A. C. 35 ; 5 
 B. "W. C. C. 177. The term "by accident" includes (1) personal in- 
 jury sustained under circumstances which can be referred to as " an 
 accident," and it also includes (2) cases in which there are no such 
 circumstances capable of being so described but in which the results 
 of the occurrence are so unexpected that they may be fairly con- 
 sidered as accidental. 
 
 Instances of the former kind are injuries or death caused : by a 
 mis-hit (Lloyd v. Sugg d Co., [1900] 1 Q. B. 486; 2 W. C. C. 5) ; 
 by indiscriminate stone throwing (Cliallis v. London and South 
 Western Rail. Co., [1905] 2 K. B. 154 ; 7 W. C. C. 23) ; by lightning 
 (Andrew v. Fails-worth Industrial Society, Limited, [1904] 2 K. B. 
 32 ; 6 W. C. C. 11) ; by sunstroke (Morgan v. Owners of S.S. Zenaida 
 (1909), 25 T. L. R. 446 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 19) ; by an anaesthetic 
 administered for the purpose of an operation (Shirt v. Calico Prin- 
 ters' Association, Limited, [1909] 2 K. B. 51 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 342) ; 
 by the introduction of foreign matter into the flesh (Thompson v. 
 Ashington (1901), 17 T. L. R. 345 ; 3 W. C. C. 21), or eye (Adams 
 v. Thompson (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 19), or of a germ or poison into 
 the svstem through a break in the skin (Higgins v. Campbell d- Har- 
 rison, and Turoey v. Brinton's, Limited, [1904] 1 K. B. 328; 6 
 W. C. C. 1, the latter being affirmed by the House of Lords, [1905] 
 
 A. C. 230 ; 7 W. C. C. 1, and overruling Walker v. LiUeshall Coal 
 Co., [1900] 1 Q. B. 488 ; 2 W. C. C. 7, where a workman in the 
 ordinary course of his work had to use red lead, which came in con- 
 tact with a blistered finger, in which case the Court of Appeal had 
 held there was no accident) ; by the bite or attack of an animal 
 (Hapelman v. Poole (1908), 25 T. L. R. 155 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 48). 
 
 Instances of the latter kind are injuries or death caused by 
 exhaustion consequent on excessive heat coming from a boiler upon a 
 man of low vitality and inexperienced in the work and the precautions 
 to be taken (Ismay, Imrie & Co. v. Williamson, [1908] A. C. 437 ; 1 
 
 B. W. C. C. 232) ; by over-exertion or strain hi the ordinary course 
 of work causing rupture or the like injury (Fenton v. Thorley & Co., 
 Limited, [1903] A. C. 443; 5 W. C. C. 1, overruling Hensey v. White, 
 T1900] 1 Q. B. 481; 2 W. C. C. 1, and Roper v. Greenwood <t Sons 
 
Sect. 1 (1)] "PERSONAL INJURY BY ACCIDENT." 5 
 
 (1900), 83 L. T. 471 ; 3 W. C. C. 23, to the contrary ; Timmins v. 
 Leeds Forge Co., Limited (1900), 83 L. T. 120; 2 W. C. C. 10; 
 Boardmanv. Scott and Whitworth, [1902] 1 K. B. 43 ; 4 W. C. C. 1 ; 
 Williams v. Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Co. (1902), 113 L. T. Newsp., 
 p. 196; Stewart v. Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co. (1902), 40 S. L. E. 80), 
 or causing an attack of cerebral hgemorrhage (M'Innes v. Dunsmuir 
 and Jackson, -Limited (1908), 45 S. L. E. 804; 1 B. W. C. C. 226), or 
 causing rupture of the aorta already diseased and likely to cause death 
 at any moment (Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes [1910] , A. C. 242 ; 
 3 B. W. C. 0. 275, and see p. 6, post; Trodden v. I. M. Lennard S 
 Sons, Limited (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 190); by drinking excessive 
 quantities of water whilst working as a fireman in a stoke-hole, causing 
 cerebral haemorrhage (Johnson and Others v. Owners of the S.S. 
 Torrington (1905), 3 B. W. C. C. 68) ; by a criminal attack by 
 poachers (Anderson v. Balfour, [1910] 2 Ir. E. 497 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 
 588), or murder by a robber (Nisbet v. Eayne & Burn, [1910] 2 
 K. B. 689 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 507) ; by witnessing the effects of an 
 accident on a fellow- workman whereby nervous shock resulted (Yates 
 v. South Kirkby, Feather stone, & Hemsivorth Collieries, Limited 
 (1910), 103 L. T. 170; 3 B. W. C. C. 418); by washing up crockery 
 in hot water with softlsoap and caustic soda by a man who, unknown 
 to himself, had a peculiarly sensitive skin (Dotzauer v. Strand 
 Hotel, Limited (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 389) ; by poisonous fumes after 
 shot-firing in a mine, the presence of such fumes being unusual and 
 unexplained (Kelly v.' Auchenlea Coal Co. (1911), 48 S. L. E. 768 ; 4 
 
 B. W. C. C. 417). 
 
 The Irish Court of Appeal have held that a workman who con- 
 tracted a sudden chill while working in the water of a mill race 
 sustained an injury by accident within the principles of Ismay's 
 Case (Sheerin v. Clayton <& Co., [1910] 2 Ir. E. 105 ; 3 B. W. 
 
 C. C. 583). But it is important to notice that HOLMES, L.J., expressed 
 the opinion that "if the deceased, after working in the water, caught 
 an ordinary cold or chill, which, from weakness of his constitution, he 
 was unable to shake off, and ultimately led to his death," his Lordship 
 would be unable to hold that compensation would be recoverable. 
 
 An injury' caused by the wearing of hard or tight boots has been 
 held not to be a personal injury by accident (White v. Sheepivash 
 (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 384). 
 
 The Court of Session have disagreed with the decisions in Nisbet 
 and Anderson's Cases, and .have held that injury sustained by a 
 workman during an attack on the works* by strikers is not an injury 
 by accident (Murray v. Denholm & Co. (1911), 48 S. L. E. 896). 
 
 Whilst a fit is not an accident, the fact that the seizure takes 
 place under such circumstances as to cause unexpected injuries, will 
 bring such injuries within the category of accidental injuries ; e.g. 
 where a labourer working near an open hatchway was so seized and 
 fell down the hold (Wicks v. Dowell & Co. Ltd., [1905] 2 K. B. 225 ; 
 7 W. C. C. 14). 
 
 Whether something in the nature of a frost-bite sustained by a van- 
 driver is injury by accident was discussed but not decided in Warner 
 v. Couchman, [1911] 1 K. B. 351 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 32. 
 
6 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 1 (1) 
 
 In Scotland an attack of heat-apoplexy sustained by a plumber 
 whilst bending at his work in a trench in the open air during a hot 
 day, was thought by the Court not to be injury by accident, but the 
 real ground of the decision was that, if so, it was not caused by 
 accident arising out of the employment (Robson, EcJtford & Co. v. 
 Blakey (1911), 49 S. L. E. 254; 5 B. W. C. C. 536). 
 
 The Occurrence must be Judged from the Workman's Point of 
 
 View. Applying the above definition of accident to the case where 
 a man suffering from serious aneurism ruptured it by an ordinary 
 exertion (Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes, [1910] A. C. 242; 3 
 B. W. C. C. 275), it was said that the event was unexpected in the 
 sense that a sensible man would not have expected it from the nature 
 of the work being done, and that it was not correct to ask whether a 
 medical man knowing the condition of the workman would have 
 expected it. 
 
 Similarly in NisbeVs Case the attack of a murderer was an event 
 which so far as the victim, though not the murderer, was concerned, 
 was neither designed nor expected (Nisbet v. Eayne and Burn, [1910] 
 2 K. B. 689 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 507). A like decision had been previously 
 given by the Court of Appeal in Ireland, where it was held that an 
 injury sustained by a gamekeeper through an attack by poachers was 
 an injury by accident (Anderson v. Balfour, [1910] 2 Ir. B. 497 ; 3 B. 
 W. C. C. 588). A further illustration is that of Dotzauer v. Strand 
 Palace Hotel, Ltd., p. 8, post. 
 
 Nisbet and Anderson's Cases have been disapproved by the Court of 
 Session (Murray v. Denliolm & Co., p. 5, ante). 
 
 Intentionally Self-inflicted Injuries. Deliberate self-maiming 
 and suicide are obviously not accidental injuries. Suicide may, how- 
 ever, be consequential on an injury sustained by accident (see p. 145, 
 post). 
 
 INJURY BY DISEASE. 
 
 Disease as a Cause. Under the original Act no disease was 
 recognised as a cause of injury unless it could be shown to have 
 been occasioned by accident arising out of and in the course of 
 the employment. This shut out of the statute, all those cases of 
 injury or inability to work caused by diseases commonly known 
 as industrial or occupation diseases, or .those physical conditions 
 which arise by a gradual and 'natural process from the effects of the 
 workman's occupation. These could not in the proper sense of the 
 term be described as accidents or be ascribed to accidents ; neither 
 could it be said that they were " unexpected " events within the 
 meaning of the definition of " accident " given by the House of Lords, 
 even though their results affected some persons and not others, or 
 some to a greater degree than others. Further than that, the 
 provisions of the Act which required notice of accident to be given 
 pointed to the fact that to constitute an accident there must be some 
 event the date of which could be fixed with some amount of definite- 
 ness, and this could not be done in industrial diseases. 
 
Sect. 1 (1)] INJURY BY DISEASE:. 7 
 
 For the above reasons it was held that the occupation diseases o f 
 " beat hand " (Marshall v. East Holyivell Coal Co., Limited (1905), 
 93 L. T. 360; 7 W. C. C. 19), "beat knee" (Gorley v. Owners of 
 Backworth Collieries, ibid.), and lead poisoning (Steel v. Cammell, 
 Laird & Co., Limited, [1905] 2 K. B. 282; 7 W. C. C. 9), were not 
 within the original statute. 
 
 Some of such diseases are now specially provided for by section 8 
 of the present Act (see p. 101, post), with the protective provision 
 that the workman may proceed under section 1 of the Act in any 
 case in which he can show that the disease is a personal injury by 
 accident within the meaning of the Act (s. 8, sub-s. (10)). This 
 section, however, only applies, comparatively speaking, to a few 
 occupation or industrial diseases, and for this reason, as well as for 
 the application of the proviso, it is necessary to consider the subject 
 of disease as a personal injury by accident. 
 
 1. Idiopathic Diseases. In the first place, idiopathic diseases are 
 excluded from the Act (see the judgment of Earl of HALSBURY, L.C., 
 in Brinton's, Limited v. Turvey, [1905] A. C. 230 ; 7 W. C. C. 1). 
 " ' Idiopathic ' is a term sometimes applied to a morbid condition 
 when the antecedents giving rise to it are entirely unknown" 
 (Quain's Dictionary of Medicine). 
 
 A workman had for years been suffering from progressive heart 
 disease. Whilst hurrying to the station with a parcel in the course 
 of his employment he was taken ill and died. It was held that the 
 death was attributable to the disease, and that there was no evidence 
 of accident within the meaning of the Act (O'Hara v. Hayes (1910), 
 44 Ir. L. T.:71 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 586). 
 
 2. Industrial or Occupation Diseases. In the next place, a 
 disease which is gradually produced as a natural result of being 
 engaged in a particular employment is not within the Act unless it 
 falls within the provisions of section 8, e.g. paralysis of the leg caused 
 through the continued exertion of riding a heavy carrier tricycle 
 (Walker v. Hockney Bros. (1909), 2 B. W. C. C.'20) ; cardiac break- 
 down brought about by repeated excessive exertion (Coe v. The Fife 
 Coal Co., Limited (1909), 46 S. L. E. 325 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 8) ; eczema 
 caused gradually by the exposure of the skin to chemical fumes or 
 splashes (Evans v. Dodd (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 305). 
 
 3. Diseases caused by Accidental Circumstances. But, thirdly, 
 if it can be shown that the disease was sustained owing to a circum- 
 stance or combination of circumstances which may be described as " by 
 accident " within the meaning given to that term, the result of that 
 accident will be none the less a personal injury because it is called 
 a disease. In the words of Earl of HALSBURY, L.C. : " It does not 
 appear to me that by calling the consequences of an accidental injury 
 a disease one alters the nature or the consequential results of the 
 injury that has been inflicted " (Brinton's, Limited v. Turvey, [1905] 
 A. C. 230 at pp. 233, 234; 7 W. C. C. 1). 
 
 In this case the House of Lords held, affirming the Court of Appeal, 
 that where a workman contracted the disease of anthrax by a germ 
 
8 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 1 (1) 
 
 settling on his eye, whilst sorting wool which was infected with 
 anthrax, he had suffered " injury by accident," and was entitled to 
 compensation. See also Higgins v. Campbell and Harrison, Limited, 
 p. 4, ante, where the only difference! was that the germ settled on 
 a sore which the workman had on his neck. 
 
 The element of accident in these two cases did not lie in the disease 
 itself, but in the circumstances causing and preceding the infection 
 which eventually developed into disease. It was accidental, for 
 instance, that the germ was hi the wool at all ; that it escaped expul- 
 sion by the draught of the ventilating fan ; and that it alighted upon 
 a particularly sensitive part of the man's anatomy. 
 
 Other instances are : where a gardener contracted the disease of 
 tetanus whilst working with a wound in his foot caused by a nail 
 (Walker v. Mullins (1908), 42 Ir. L. T. 168; 1 B. W. C. C. 211); 
 where a scullion had to wash up crockery in hot water with soft 
 soap and caustic soda, and was suffering, unknown to himself, from 
 a disease to his skin which made it peculiarly sensitive, so that after 
 working for a few hours his hands became inflamed, his nails came off, 
 and he was disabled (Dotzaver v. Strand Palace Hotel, Limited (1910), 
 3 B. W. C. C. 389) ,- where a miner was poisoned by fumes generated 
 by firing a shot in a mine, the occurrence being unusual and unex- 
 plained (Kelly v. Auclienlea Coal Co. (1911), 48 S. L. K. 768; 4 
 B. W. C. C. 417). 
 
 4. Other Diseases than above. There still remain for considera- 
 tion cases in which a workman contracts a disease in his employment 
 without any of those chance circumstances which are found in 
 the above cases. 
 
 It is now well established by the decisions of the Court of Appeal 
 that unless the applicant can show the particular time, place and 
 circumstance hi which the alleged injury by accident happened, he 
 must fail. Hence the applicant was held not to be entitled to 
 compensation : where the workman engaged in the London sewers 
 contracted enteritis from inhaling sewer gas (Broderick v. London 
 County Council, [1908] 2 K. B. 807; 1 B. W. C. C. 219); where 
 deceased had been poisoned by sewer gas while emptying cesspools 
 (Eke v. Hart-Dyke, [1910] 2 K. B. 677 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 482) ; where a 
 porter at a fever hospital, whose duty was to clean out the mortuary 
 and attend in the scarlet fever wards, developed scarlet fever shortly 
 after cleaning out the mortuary, there being no evidence to con- 
 nect the disease with that particular occasion (Martin v. Manchester 
 Corpn. (1912), 28 T. L. B, 344; 5 B. W. C. C. 259). 
 
 Disease Aggravated or Accelerated by Accident. The fact 
 
 that at the time of the occurrence the workman was suffering from 
 a bodily condition which made him most susceptible to injury 
 from even moderate exertion will not prevent the occurrence being 
 accidental. It is " enough if it appears that the employment is one 
 of the contributing causes without which the accident which actually 
 happened would not have happened, and if the accident is one of the 
 contributing causes without which the injury which actually followed 
 
Sect. 1 (l)] " ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF." 9 
 
 would not have followed " (Clover, Clayton & Co., Limited v. Hughes, 
 [1910] A. C. 242, at p. 245, per LORD LOREBURN, L.C.). In that 
 case a workman was suffering from aneurism which was ruptured 
 whilst he was tightening a nut with a spanner. The arbitrator found 
 that his death was caused by a strain arising out of his ordinary work 
 operating upon such a condition of the body as rendered the exertion 
 fatal. It was held that this was an injury by accident. See also 
 M'Tnnes v. Dunsmuir and Jackson, Limited, (1908) S. C. 1021 ; 
 1 B. W. C. C. 226, p. 5, ante ; Ismay, Imrie d- Co. v. Williamson, 
 [1908] A. C. 437; 1 B. W. C. C. 232, p. 4, ante; Lloyd v. Sugg, 
 [1900] 1 Q. B. 486 ; Dotzauer v. Strand Palace Hotel, Limited, p. 3, 
 ante; Coe v. Fife Coal Co., Limited (1909), S. C. 393, p. 7, ante. 
 See further on this subject, p. 153, post. 
 
 "ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF THE 
 EMPLOYMENT." 
 
 Question Of Fact. The accident which results in the injury 
 must arise both out of and in the course of the employment, and 
 whether or not it falls within the description is a question of fact for 
 the, arbitrator (Smith v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Hail Co., [1899] 
 1 Q. B. 141 ; 1 W. C. C. 1 ; Henderson v. Glasgow Corporation 
 (1900), 2 F. 1127 ; Johnson v. Owners of S.S. Torrington (1905), 
 3 B. W. C. C. 68 ; Langley v. Reeve (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 175 ; 
 Wright v. Scott (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 431). 
 
 " In the Course of." The expression " in the course of the em- 
 ployment " points to the time, place, and circumstances under which 
 the accident takes place (Fitzgerald v. Clarke, [1908] , 2 K. B. 796 ; 1 
 B. W. .C. C. 197, per BUCKLEY, L.J.),ior as expressed by the Lord 
 Chancellor in Moore v. Manchester Liners, Limited, [1910] A. C. 498 ; 
 3 B. W. C. C. 527, an accident happens to .a workman "in the 
 course of his employment "if it occurs while he is doing what a man 
 so employed may reasonably do within a time during which he is 
 employed, and at a place where he may reasonably be during that 
 time. 
 
 " Arising out Of." These words point to the origin or cause of 
 the accident, and are descriptive of the character or quality of the 
 accident, indicating that the accident is in some sense due to the 
 employment (Fitzgerald v. Clarke, [1908] , 2 K. B. 796, at p. 799, per 
 BUCKLEY, L.J.). They indicate accidents which arise from acts or 
 omissions of the injured workman himself, or of his fellow-workmen, 
 which acts or omissions are within, or, at least, are not entirely out- 
 side, the scope of the employment which such workmen are engaged, 
 either expressly or by implication, to perform ; and they also include 
 such accidents, however and by whomsoever caused, as may naturally 
 arise out of the character of the employment itself-, or from those 
 risks which may reasonably be contemplated as incidental to that 
 employment. This involves a consideration of what is and what is 
 not within the scope of the employment, and of risks which may be 
 regarded as incidental to the employment. 
 
10 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 1 (1) 
 
 Treatment Of Subject The consideration of what is involved 
 in the expression " in the course of " is so closely connected with the 
 subject of the scope of the employment, and therefore with the subject 
 of " arising out of the employment," that a separate treatment of 
 these expressions would lead to unnecessary repetition. To avoid 
 this as much as possible it is proposed to consider the whole subject 
 under the following heads : I. Duration of Employment ; II. Scope of 
 Employment ; III. Risks incidental to the Employment ; IV. Exten- 
 sion of the Act in favour of coal miners. 
 
 I. DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT. 
 
 Questions for Consideration It is essential that the accident 
 should have happened during the period of employment. So the first 
 matter to be considered under this head is the time when the employ- 
 ment begins and ends, always remembering that there may be a 
 difference between the beginning of a man's employment and the 
 beginning of his actual work (see Holmes v. Great Northern Rail. 
 Co., [1900] 2 Q. B. 409 ; 2 W. C. 0. 19, per A. L. SMITH, L.J. ; Cross, 
 Tetley, & Co. v. Catterall, a decision of the House of Lords, not 
 reported, but referred to in Sharp v. Johnson, [1905] 2 K. B. 139 ; 
 7 W. C. C. 28, and at p. 14, post). 
 
 The next question to be determined will be whether at the time of 
 the accident there has or has not been a break in the employment, or 
 a temporary cessation of the employment. 
 
 (1) COMMENCEMENT AND TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT. 
 
 General Rule. As a general rule it will be found that a man's 
 employment does not begin until he has reached the place where he 
 has to work or the ambit, scope, or scene of his duty, and that it does 
 not continue after he has left, and that the periods of going and 
 returning are generally excluded (Benson v. Lancashire and Yorkshire 
 Bail. Co., [1904] 1 K. B. 242; 6 W. C. C. 20; Low or Jackson 
 v. General Steam Fishing Co., Limited, [1909] A. C. 528, at pp. 531, 
 533 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 56 ; Walters v. Staveley Coal Co. (1911), 105 L. T. 
 119; 4B. W. C. C. 303; Gilmour v. Dorman, Long < Co. (1911), 105 
 L. T. 54; 4B. W. C. C. 279). 
 
 Hence employment was held not to have commenced or continued : 
 where an accident happened whilst a shepherd was being conveyed, 
 according to custom and the terms of his engagement, to his new 
 home in a vehicle provided by his employer (Whitbread v. Arnold 
 (1908), 99 L. T. 103; 1 B. W. C. C. 317); where a man having been 
 engaged in loading a van was promised a further job in the unloading 
 of it at its destination if he reached that place by the time the van 
 arrived, and on the way met with an accident (Perry v. Anglo- 
 American Decorating Co. (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 312) ; where an 
 engine-driver on his way to the engine-shed left the usual path and 
 went in the opposite direction to speak to a signalman, it being no 
 part of his duty to do so (Benson v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Hail. 
 Co., supra) ', where a workman, taking his usual short cut to his 
 
Sect. 1 (1)] DUKATION OF EMPLOYMENT. 11 
 
 place of work, slipped whilst crossing a piece of vacant ground, which 
 was vested in his employers, but was separated from their premises by 
 a railway company's line (Gilmourv. Dorman, Long <& Co., p. 10, ante) ; 
 where a workman was injured, whilst on his way to work, at a place 
 three-quarters of a mile from the site of his labours (Walters v. Staveley 
 Coal Co. (1911) 105 L. T. 119 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 303) ; where a workman 
 was injured whilst climbing the boundary wall of the place where he 
 was to work (Gibson v. Wilson (1901) 3 F. 661) ; where a workman, 
 whilst returning home from work, was attacked in the street by 
 strikers (Poulton v. Kelsall, [1912] 2 K. B. 131 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 318). 
 
 Exceptions to the Above Rule. There may, however, be cases 
 in which the workman's employment exists before the commence- 
 ment, or continues after the termination, of his actual work, and 
 even before he has arrived at, or after he has left, the scene of his 
 labours. Such cases may arise from the express or implied terms of 
 his contract with his employers, or from the necessities and circum- 
 stances of the case. 
 
 First Exception. The contract of employment, cither expressly 
 or impliedly, m-ay include the time taken by a ivorkman in getting to 
 and from his place of work. 
 
 Such will be the case where the employers contract, either expressly 
 or impliedly, to provide free carriage by train for the workman to 
 the place of work, in which event the employment will be held to 
 begin when the workman enters the train (Holmes v. G. N. Rail. Co., 
 [1900] 2 Q. B. 409 ; 2 W. C. C. 19), and it may even begin or continue 
 while he is waiting on the platform for the train so provided (Cremins 
 v. Guest, Keen, and: Nettle fold, [1908] 1 K. B. 469; 1 B. W. C. C. 
 160). There need not for this purpose be any obligation on the part 
 of the workman to use the train (ibid.), ibut there must be a contract 
 which at least implies an obligation on the part of the employer to 
 provide free conveyance, so that the mere right to use gratuitously, 
 for the purpose of going and returning, a train belonging to the 
 employers, but which they are under no obligation or contract to 
 provide, will not, per se, extend the period of employment to such user 
 (Davies v. Ehymney Iron Co., Limited (1900), 16 T. L. E. 329; 
 2 W. C. C. 22; and see Parker v. Pout, p. 30, post), nor will the 
 provision by the employers of a return ticket, if that is a merely 
 gratuitous concession on their part (Nolan v. Porter & Sons (1909), 
 2 B. W. C. C. 106). 
 
 The contract will also be taken to extend the period of employment 
 when the workman is paid for the time spent in going to or returning 
 from his work, as in the case of the workman who had to report 
 himself at a railway station before proceeding home, and there was 
 evidence that he was entitled to wages for overtime until he actually 
 reached his home (Todd v. Caledonian Rail. Co. (1899), 1 F. 1047) ; 
 and in the case of the man who was required to go for -his pay to the 
 tramway depot situate in a public road some distance from the place 
 of his work, he being paid for the time spent in going and returning to 
 and from the place of payment (Nelson v. Belfast Corporation (1908), 
 42 Ir. L. T. 223 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 158). In this latter case the workman 
 
12 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 1 (1) 
 
 was injured whilst returning to his work from such place and while 
 alighting from a tramcar which he had boarded by mistake. 
 
 An agreement made by employers with a workman, who continues 
 at work during a strike, that they will be responsible for any injuries 
 sustained in so doing, may give rise to a cause of action, but does not 
 extend the continuance of employment to the periods of going to and 
 returning from work (Poidton v. Kelsall, "1912" 2 K. B. 131 ; 5 B. W. 
 C. C, 318). 
 
 Commercial Travellers. As a rule commercial travellers may be 
 regarded as acting in the course of their employment so long as they 
 are travelling on their employers' business, including the whole period 
 of time between their starting from and returning to their place of 
 business or home, as the case may be (Dickinson v. " Barmak," 
 Limited (1908), 124 L. T. Kewsp. 403). 
 
 Second Exception. There must in all cases be an interval of 
 time and space in going to or returning from the scene of his labours 
 during and in which the employment of the workman lasts. 
 
 Although no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down on the subject it 
 may generally be supposed that so long as the workman is lawfully 
 upon premises under the control of his employers, so that a duty exists 
 in respect thereof from them to him, his employment will continue ; 
 as, for instance, where a workman is injured on the ground floor of 
 the factory of his employer whilst going to his work on an upper floor 
 (see judgments in Holness v. Mack ay die Davis, [1899J 2 Q. B. 319 ; 
 1 W. C. C. 13; Brydonv. Stewart (1855), 2 Macq. 30; Cross, Tetley 
 (6 Co. v. Catterall, p. 14, ^os). "Whether, and how much further, 
 it may be taken to continue will depend upon the circumstances of 
 the case, and it cannot be assumed that the Act extends to workmen 
 on anv part of the employer's property (Hoskins v. /. J. Lancaster 
 (1910.f, 26 T. L. E, 612 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 476). 
 
 i% "Whilst the workman is physically engaged in making his exit from 
 the place where he is employed, I think the employment would still 
 continue for the purposes of the Act, and the workman would still be 
 entitled to the protection thereby given . . . but there must come a 
 tune . . . when he can no longer be said to be engaged in the 
 employment. ... It appears to me to be a question of fact where the 
 line is to be drawn" (per COLLINS, M.E., in Smith v. Xormanton 
 Colliery Co., [1903] 1 K. B., at p. 207; 5 W. C. C. 14, cited p. 30, 
 post). 
 
 The fact that the employers allow their men to use a certain right 
 of way over land of the employers as a short cut to their work, there 
 being no contract to allow such user and no obligation on the work- 
 men to use it, does not extend the period of employment to the 
 crossing of that land or make the employers liable for an accident 
 then and there occurring (Walters v. Stavelcij Coal and Iron Co. (1911), 
 105 L. T. 119; 4 B. W. C. C. 303; Gilmour v. Dor-man, Long & Co. 
 (1911) 105 L. T. 54 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 279). 
 
 Under the original Act, when it was necessary to show that the 
 accident arose out of and in the course of employment on, in, or about 
 the locality of the work, it was held that employment had not 
 
Sect. 1 (1)] DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT. 13 
 
 commenced or continued where a workman had been injured while 
 walking on a railway line 150 yards from the siding where his 
 employers were widening the line for the railway company (Holness 
 v. MacMy <& Davis, [1899] 2 Q. B. 319,; 1 W. C. C. 13) ; where a 
 workman, having finished his day's work, was walking home along 
 a private branch of railway in the occupation of his employers, 
 leading from their colliery to the main line of a railway company, 
 and was knocked down by an engine of his employers 230 yards 
 from the place where he had been working (Caton v. Summerlee (6 
 Mossend Iron Co., Limited (1902) 39 S. L. R. 762) ; where a miner 
 going home took a short cut by a way neither authorised nor pro- 
 hibited, but which took him by neither of the roads provided, and led 
 across sidings belonging to his employers' mine, where he was injured 
 (Haley v. United Collieries, Limited (1907), 44 S. L. E. 193). Under 
 the same statute employment was held to exist where a miner, whose 
 work was underground, was injured whilst walking on the tramway 
 belonging to the mine at a point thirteen feet from the horizontal 
 passage leading into the mine (Mackenzie v. Colt ness Iron Co., 
 Limited (1903), 6 F. 8), and where a miner, lawfully proceeding on 
 his employer's premises for the purpose of going to the office to receive 
 his pay, was injured by an engine, belonging to a railway company, 
 which was steaming along a line that ran through the employer's 
 premises (Lowry v. Sheffield Coal Co., Limited (1907), 24 T. L. R. 
 142; IB. W. C. C. 1). 
 
 Under the present Act the following cases have been decided in 
 favour of the workman or his dependants on the ground that his 
 employment continued: When a workman was killed on his em- 
 ployer's premises whilst leaving them by a short cut which he had 
 never used before, but which other men were in the habit of using 
 (M'Kce v. Great Northern Railway Co. (1908), 42 Ir. L. T. 132; 1 
 
 B. W. C. C. 165) ; where a workman returning home after his work 
 took a course which he need not have taken, but one which he usually 
 took to the knowledge of his employers, and which led across lines 
 on the premises and under the control of his employers, where he 
 was injured by a truck (Gane v. Norton Hill Colliery Co., [1909] 
 
 2 K. B. 539 ;' 2 B. W. C. C. 42) ; where a collier injured himself on 
 his employer's premises while passing through a gate which was 
 about 100 yards from the lamp room where the applicant had first 
 to go (Hoskins v. /. J. Lancaster (1910), 26 T. L. E. 612; 3 B. W. 
 
 C. C. 476). See also the cases of workmen returning to their sphere 
 of labour after temporary absence, p. 27, post . 
 
 Rule in Scotland. In Scotland a much sterner rule is adopted, 
 and the soundness of the English cases has been doubted. " There 
 are only two ways of looking at it. Either you must have a rule that 
 the moment a man enters the premises of his master he is then in 
 the course of his employment, or you must have a rule that he must 
 come to some point at which he enters upon the work which he has 
 to do, and that only then does he begin to be in the course of his 
 employment" (Anderson v. Fife Coal Co., Ltd., [1910] S. C. 8; 
 
 3 B. W. C. C. 539). In this case a miner going to his work by the usual 
 
14 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 1 (1) 
 
 way was crossing a railway belonging to his employers at a place 
 which was part of the mine within the meaning of the Coal Mines 
 Regulation Act, 1887, and which was a place where the miner might 
 have been required to work under his contract of service. His actual 
 place of work was underground, and his duties did not in fact 
 commence until he had obtained his safety lamp at the lamp cabin 
 which was some 360 yards away from the place of the accident. It 
 was held by the Court of Session that there was evidence to support 
 the finding of the Sheriff-substitute that the accident did not arise out 
 of or in the course of the employment. 
 
 In another case, a miner making his way from the pit, instead of 
 taking the recognised exit, crossed a waste-heap which was slippery, 
 and the track down which was not formed but worn into uneven steps. 
 He there slipped, fell, and was fatally injured. The use of the way 
 was neither sanctioned nor prohibited, nor was there any evidence 
 that its use was known to the employers. It involved, as the deceased 
 must have known, considerable danger. The arbiter found that the 
 accident did not arise out of or in the course of the employment, and 
 with this view the Court of Session agreed, expressing the opinion 
 that the accident did not even arise in the course of the employment 
 (Hendry (Simpson's Executrix) v. United Collieries, Ltd. (Xo. 2) 
 (1910), 47 S. L. R. 635 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 567). 
 
 Third Exception. The period of employment may be taken to have 
 commenced although the hour for actual work has not struck, if the 
 workman's arrival on the premises is either not unreasonably early, 
 or is necessitated by the circumstances of the employment, or if, at 
 the time of the accident, he is doing something on the employer's 
 premises which is necessary to be done to equip himself for his woi'k, 
 and u'hich is done in the interests of his employer. 
 
 Thus, in Sharp v. Johnson, [1905] 2 K. B. 139; 7 W. C. C. 28, the 
 workmen had to come to the place of their work by a train arriving 
 twenty minutes before work actually commenced, and it was their 
 practice, recognised by the employers, to deposit their tickets on the 
 ledge of the office pigeon-hole, and then, if so minded, to breakfast at 
 a mess cabin provided by the employers. A workman, while under 
 such circumstances depositing his ticket, was injured by falling into 
 an excavation. He was held entitled to recover compensation under 
 the Act. 
 
 In Cross, Tetley & Co. v. Catterall (a decision of the House of Lords, 
 not reported, but referred to in Sharp's Case, supra, at pp. 141, 145), 
 it was held that where a miner was injured by accident while using a 
 bridge, provided by the employers for the convenience of their work- 
 men, on his way to a lamp cabin for a lamp before commencing work, 
 he was entitled to succeed under the Act ; and where a miner had 
 obtained his lamp and his "tallies," and was waiting at the pit-brow 
 to descend, his emplovment was held to have commenced (Fitzpatrick 
 v. Hindlcy Field Colliery Co. (1901), 4 W. C. C. 7). 
 
 Fourth Exception. A workman who has to return to his em- 
 ployer's premises for some legitimate purpose justified by the terms 
 
Sect. 1 (1)] DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT. 15 
 
 of his employment is, whilst so doing, acting in the course of his 
 employment. 
 
 A. workman will be acting " in the course of " his employment when 
 having ceased actual work he returns to the premises to obtain his 
 pay, the terms of his contract or the course of his employer's business 
 requiring him to. do so (Loiury v. Sheffield Coal Co., Limited (1907), 
 24 T. L. E. 142 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 1 ; Eiley v. William Holland d Sons, 
 Limited, [1911] 1 K. B. 1029; 4 B. \V. C. C. 155), even though on 
 such ceasing of actual work the relationship of master and servant 
 also terminated (Riley v. William Holland & Sons, Limited, supra ; 
 Molloy v. South- Wales Anthracite Colliery Co. (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 
 65) ; or during the period spent in going to and returning from the pay 
 office some distance away from his place of work, when he is required 
 so to do and is paid for the time so spent (Nelson v. Belfast Corpora- 
 tion (1908), 1 B. W. C. C. 158 ; but not when he goes to his employer's 
 premises about a dispute as to his wages with the intention of not 
 resuming work unless the dispute is determined in his favour, and it 
 is not so determined (Phillips v. Williams (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 143). 
 
 (2) INTERRUPTION OF EMPLOYMENT. 
 
 When the Employment is or is not Suspended. In some cases 
 the workman's employment is of a continuous nature, for example, in 
 the case of sailors and resident domestic servants. In others the 
 employment is intermittent, being for stated hours, as in the case of 
 daily workmen or daily domestics. In the former of these cases the 
 workman's period of employment will generally include hours when 
 the workman is not actually engaged in work or on duty. In the 
 latter the period of employment is generally commensurate with the 
 working hours, and " from the time when he leaves off work, say, in 
 the evening, until he arrives at the spot where his employment is to 
 commence again next morning, he is in the same position as regards 
 his employers, as any other member of the public, and is not within 
 the protection of the Act" (Benson v. Lancashire and Yorkshire 
 Rail. Co., [1904] 1 K. B. 242 ; 6 W. C. C. 20, per COLLINS, M.E.). 
 
 In both cases there may be an interruption of actual work, or there 
 may be a temporary suspension of employment altogether. This 
 depends upon whether or not the interruption is legitimate. 
 
 Legitimate Interruptions of Employment. In giving judgment 
 
 in Benson v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Rail Co., [1904] 1 K. B. 242 ; 
 6 W. C. C. 20, MATHEW, L. J., said (at p. 251) : " I do not think that the 
 protection given by the Act can be confined to the time during which 
 a workman is actually engaged in manual labour, and that he would 
 not be protected during the intervals of leisure which may occur in 
 the course of his daily employment. A workman is not a machine, 
 and must be treated as likely to act as workmen ordinarily would 
 during such intervals ; and, as regards any reasonable use which, 
 while on the employer's premises, he ; may make of moments when he 
 is not actually working, I must not be supposed to say that he would 
 be thereby deprived of the protection of the Act." 
 
16 WMKKMKN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 1 (T> 
 
 The employment has therefore been or may be held to continue 
 where a workman avails himself of the liberty of taking his meals on 
 the employer's premises (Blovelt v. Sawyer, [1904] 1 K. B. 271 ; 
 6 W. C. C. 16; Rowland v. Wright, [1909] 1 K. B. 963 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 
 192), or on the scene of his labours (Morn* v. Lambeth Borough 
 Council (1905), 22 T. L. E. 22 ; 8 W. C. C. 1), even though he is not 
 paid for the period of meals (Blovelt v. Sawyer, supra] ; or, perhaps, 
 where owing to the exigencies of his employment it is necessary for 
 him to leave the premises to obtain food (see Low or Jackson v. 
 General Steam Fishing Co., [1909] A. C. 523; 2 B. W. C. C. 56) ; or 
 where his actual work is interrupted by the necessity of getting a 
 drink (Keenan v. Fleming ton Coal Co. (1902), 40 S. L. E. 144), or 
 of relieving nature (Ease v. Morrison & Mason, Limited (1911), 105 
 L. T. 2 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 277). 
 
 See as to whether in such cases the accident arises out of the 
 employment, p. 27, post. 
 
 Unlawful Interruptions of Employment. If the interruption 
 
 of employment cannot be justified by the express or implied terms of 
 the engagement, or as being under the circumstances a reasonable 
 course to adopt, the interruption will amount to a temporary sus- 
 pension of the employment altogether. A sailor who goes ashore 
 without leave, or a resident servant who leaves her employer's 
 premises without permission, or the day labourer who temporarily 
 absents himself from his work unauthorised, is guilty of a breach of 
 contract, and so long as this continues is unable to say that he is 
 acting "in the course of his employment." The subject is very 
 important when considering the question of when his employment is 
 resumed (see p. 27, post). 
 
 II. SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT. 
 
 General Rule. In order that the accident maybe one arising out 
 of the employment it must be shown that it is brought about by an 
 act or omission on the part of a workman which he is authorised by 
 his employer to perform or omit. Included in this will be an act 
 which is not covered by express authorisation, but is reasonably 
 necessary or proper to be done (see p. 20,^osf). 
 
 Difference between Scope and Method. There is a clear dis- 
 tinction to be drawn between an order which defines what work shall 
 be done by a workman, and an order which merely defines how the 
 work shall be done. A breach of the former generally disentitles a 
 workman to compensation under the Act. 
 
 A breach of the latter kind of order does not of itself negative 
 the fact that the accident arises out of and in the course of the employ- 
 ment, though it may in some cases (see p. 47, post) give rise to a 
 defence of serious and wilful misconduct on the part of the workman. 
 For example, the adoption of a wrong and dangerous method of doing 
 his work will not of itself deprive the workman of compensation 
 (Durham v. Brown, Bros. & Co. (1898), 1 F. 279; McNicholas v. 
 Dawson & Son, [1899] 1 Q. B. 773; 1 W. C. C. 80, cited p. 33, post; 
 
Sect. 1 (1)] SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT. 17 
 
 Douglas v. United Minera Mining Co., Limited (1900), Times, 
 February 20th ; 2 W. C. C. 15, cited p. 39, post ; Robertson v. Allan 
 Bros. & Co., Limited (1908), 77 L. J. K. B. 1072 ; 1 B. W. C. C, 172, 
 and p. 20,jpos; Astley v. R. Evans <& Co., Limited, [1911] 1 K. B. 
 1036 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 209, affirmed, [1911] A. C. 674 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 319). 
 Ill cases of death and of serious and permanent disablement, serious 
 and wilful misconduct within the scope of the employment does not 
 constitute a defence (s. 1 (2) (c)), but such misconduct outside the 
 sphere of employment does not bring the Act within that sphere 
 (Harding v. Brynddu Colliery Co., [1909] 2 K. B. 804 ; 4 B. W. 
 0. C. 269, per COZENS-HARDY, M.R.) For illustrations of this, see 
 Mawdsley v. West Leigh Colliery Co., p. 18, post ; Harding v. 
 Brynddu Colliery Co., p. 18, post ; and WatJcin v. Guest, Keen 
 & Nettlefolds, Limited, p. 18, post. 
 
 Workman acting Outside the Sphere of his Employment. 
 
 The workman cannot increase the responsibility of his employer 
 under the Act by voluntarily taking upon himself work which is quite 
 outside the character of the particular class of work which his 
 employer has allotted to him ; and this is so although his self -imposed 
 task may be in furtherance of his employer's business. 
 
 The question whether, and how far, one sphere of labour is marked 
 off from another is a question of fact (Losli v. Evans <& Co., Limited 
 (1902), 19 T. L. R. 142 ; 5 W. C. C. 17). 
 
 Thus, the accident was held not to have arisen out of the employ- 
 ment because the act causing it was beyond the scope of employment 
 of the injured workman; where an unskilled labourer, contrary to 
 instructions, took on himself to clean machinery, for the purpose of 
 filling spare time (Lowe v. Pearson, [1899] 1 Q. B. 261 ; 1 W. C. C. 5) ; 
 where a labourer temporarily undertook the duties of an engine-man, 
 without lawful authority, and this although the accident consisted in 
 slipping while getting down from the engine (M' Allan v. Perthshire 
 County Council (1906), 43 S. L. E. 592) ; where thfc driver of a canal 
 boat took the part of steering and managing the boat contrary to 
 instructions (Whelan v. Moore (1909), 43 Ir. L. T. 205 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 114) ; 
 where a brakesman, whose duty it was to walk continuously at the 
 rear of a lorry, rode by the side of the driver, and fell when getting 
 down to put on the brakes (Eevie v. Gumming (1911), 48 S. L. R. 831 ; 
 5 B. W. C. C. 483) ; where a flagman whose duty it was, when not 
 walking in front of the traction-engine, to ride in a rear van, rode on 
 the draw-bar, which he had been warned not to do (M'Keown v. 
 M' Murray (1911), 45 Ir. L. T. 190) ; where in breach of rules a 
 miner fired a shot in a mine, this being the duty of a specially 
 appointed shot-firer (Kerr v. Wm. Baird & Co. Limited, [1911] 
 S. C. 701 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 397) ; where a man in an electrical power- 
 house dusted the switchboard, contrary to orders, and fell against 
 the live gear (Jenkinson v. Harrison, Ainslie < Co. Limited 
 (1911)., 4 B. W. C. C. 194) ; where a woman employed to work 
 solely on one machine, tried to work another to see if she could 
 manage it (Cronin v. Silver (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 223) ; where a boy 
 cleaned machinery which it was not his duty to do (Naylor v. 
 
 W.C.A. C 
 
18 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 1 (1) 
 
 Musgrave Spinning Co. Limited (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 286) ; where a 
 baker requiring an engine to be started to mix his dough, in the 
 absence of the engine-man, started it himself, as he had often done 
 before, though expressly forbidden to do so (Marriott v. Brett & 
 Beney, Limited (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 145) ; where deceased had beer 
 told to work at one part of a mine and for his own advantage had gone to 
 another part where the coal was softer (Weighill v. South Hetton Coal 
 Co., [1911] 2 K. B. 757 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 141) ; where a man employed to 
 dig flints on a farm, and being paid according to the number obtained, 
 persisted in digging in a dangerous trench after being specially told 
 not to do so, his reason being that there were more flints to be got 
 there, and also that there was more shelter from the rain (Parker v. 
 Hambroolc (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 608). 
 
 There are many cases in which the line of division between skilled 
 and unskilled labour is not clearly denned, and in which, therefore, it 
 is open to the arbitrator to find that the accident did arise out of and 
 in the course of the employment. 
 
 Such is the case of Whitehead v. Reader, [1901] 2 K. B. 48 ; 
 3 W. C. C. 40. It was part of the workman's duties to sharpen his 
 tools on a grindstone rotated by a band driven by steam power. The 
 workman was told not to touch the machinery. The band having 
 slipped off the stone the workman tried to replace it, and was injured 
 in the attempt. The Court of Appeal refused to disturb a finding in 
 favour of the workman. They held that it was not every breach of 
 a master's orders which would terminate the servant's employment, 
 but that regard must be had to the character and effect "of the 
 master's orders. In this case the order did not limit the sphere of 
 employment so as to forbid contact with the machinery, as was the 
 case in Lowe v. Pearson, supra ; indeed it was part of the workman's 
 duty to work at the machinery, and the act of the workman in re- 
 placing the band was not so remote from his ordinary duties that it 
 could be fairly said that it did not arise out of his employment. Besides 
 this, he may on the impulse of the moment have forgotten the order. 
 This case was followed with approval by the Court of Session where 
 the deceased workman, requiring a pick for his work, went with a 
 naked light to fetch it from a part of the mine in which he had left it, 
 although to his knowledge that part had been fenced off owing to an 
 accumulation of gas, and he had been expressly warned not to go there 
 (Conwayv. Pumpherston Oil Co. Limited, [1911] S. C. 660 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 
 392), and later the Court of Appeal came to a like conclusion in cases : 
 where a man, employed to drill a hole into a stall below to let out an 
 accumulation of gas, entered the stall from below in order to ascertain 
 the direction of the drill, although the entrance had been closed and 
 he had been ordered not to enter (Harding v. Brynddu Colliery Co. 
 Limited, [1911] 2 K. B. 747 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 269) ; where a man whose 
 duty it was to oil machinery was forbidden to oil it when in motion, 
 and yet did so and was injured (Mawdsley v. West Leigh Colliery Co. 
 (19ll), 5 B. W. C. C. 80) ; where a collier riding in a train in the 
 course of his employment got out on to the footboard, which he was 
 expressly forbidden to do, some 50 yards from the platform where he 
 was to alight, and fell and lost his hands (Wafkin v. Guest, Keen & 
 
Sect. 1 (1)] SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT. 19 
 
 Nettlef olds, Limited (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 307) ; and (in Ireland) where 
 a woman, part of whose work it was to clean machinery in a factory, 
 finding the fence removed from another part of the machinery which 
 she was not required to touch, proceeded to clean that when station- 
 ary, and was injured by the starting of the machinery (Greer v. 
 Lindsay Thompson, Limited (1912), 46 Ir. L. T. 89 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 586). 
 
 Another illustration is that of Goslan v. James Gillies Co. (1906), 
 44 S. L. E. 71. The duties of the applicant were those of a clerk and 
 book-keeper, and the weighing of goods which were brought by other 
 workmen to the weighing-machine of which he had charge. On one 
 occasion he helped to carry some heavy metal to the weighing- 
 machine, and was injured in doing so. It was held that the accident 
 arose out of and in the course of his employment. 
 
 Two other cases may be mentioned in which the Court of Appeal 
 refused to disturb a finding in favour of the appli cants, apparently on 
 the ground that there was no clearly defined limit to the applicants' 
 employment. In Brown v. Scott (1899), Times, June 12th ; 1 W. C. 
 C. 11, a boy was induced, by the false representation of a fellow work- 
 man as to an order, to undertake the cleaning of machinery which, it 
 was said, was not part of his regular work, but, " he seemed, in fact, to 
 be a jack-of-all-trades, and the oiling of machines seemed to have 
 been at least one of his various duties " (per A. L. SMITH, L.J.). In 
 Harrison v. WhitaTcer Bros., Limited (1899), 16 T. L. E. 108; 
 2 W. C. C. 12, a boy, whilst waiting for more trucks to grease, attempted 
 to shift railway points, which was not part of his usual employment. 
 
 So in Ireland a boy machinist was told by a superior to take an 
 imperfectly moulded article to another part of the factory to be 
 remoulded. The operator of the moulding machine was temporarily 
 absent. The boy attempted to remould the article and was injured. 
 There was a general order that machinists were not to change from 
 one machine to another, but there was no order expressly forbidding 
 the boy to work this particular machine. The Court of Appeal 
 reversed the decision of the arbitrator and awarded compensation 
 (Tobin v. Hearn, [1910] 2 Ir. E. " 
 
 Acting contrary to Rules. The mere fact that the act causing 
 the injury is done contrary to rules will not suffice to deprive the 
 workman of compensation (Barnes v. Nunnery Colliery Co., [1912] 
 A. C. 44 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 195), especially if the rules are not explicit 
 (e.g. see Joyce v. Wellingborough Iron Co. (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 
 126) ; nor will compensation be denied on the ground of a breach 
 of rules if it was the practice of the workmen, to the knowledge of 
 the employers, to ignore such rules and to act in the particular 
 manner which caused the injury (see Johnson v. Marshall, p. 48, 
 post-, Logue v. Fullarton, ibid.; Douglas v. United Minera Co., 
 Limited, ibid.). But if the thing which is done disobediently is 
 different in kind from anything which the workman -was required or 
 expected to do, and has been put outside his range of service by a 
 genuine prohibition, the accidental injury will not arise out of his 
 employment ; and all this is a question of fact (Barnes v. Nunnery 
 Colliery Co., supra, per Lord LOREBURN, L.C.). 
 
20 WORKMEN^ COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 1 (1) 
 
 Acting in an Emergency. To the rule that a workman imi^t 
 not act beyond the sphere of his employment there is an exception 
 where an accident happens to him, who, whilst engaged in his master's 
 employment and on his master's work, voluntarily does upon an 
 emergency an act in the interests of his master outside the scope of 
 his ordinary employment. Such are the cases of Rees v. Thomas. 
 [1899] 1 Q. B. 1015^; 1 W. C. C. 9, and Define v. Caledonian Rail. 
 Co. (1899), 1 F. 1105, where the workmen were injured in trying to 
 stop their employers' runaway horses; Men ties v. M'Qidbban (1900\, 
 2 F. 732, where an unskilled labourer assisted a machinist in difficulty ; 
 London and Edinburgh Shipping Co. v. Broicn (1905), 42 S. L. R. 
 357. where a labourer, engaged on a quay unloading the employers' 
 vessel, went on board the vessel to rescue a fellow-workman hi the 
 hold and was suffocated by fumes ; Hapclman v. Poole (1908), 25 
 T. L. R. 155 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 48, where a man was killed in trying to 
 get an escaped lion back into its cage. But the above principle does 
 not apply where the emergency is brought about by workmen 
 "larking" (Mullen v. D. Y. Stewart and Co., Ltd. (1908)." 45 S. L. R. 
 729; 1 B. W. C. C. 204). 
 
 Acts Necessary Or Reasonable. An act which under the cir- 
 cumstances can be regarded as reasonable or necessary will be 
 considered as within the scope of the employment. 
 
 Cases where acts have been held reasonable and proper have 
 been : where a man has availed himself of legitimate interruptions 
 of employment in a reasonable manner (see pp. 15 and 16, ante] ; where 
 a man riding on waggons drawn by a traction engine jumped 
 down to pick up his pipe which lie had dropped (M'Lauchlan v. 
 Anderson, ^1911] S. C, 529 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 376) ; where a workman, 
 used to ships, wishing to go ashore, and finding the vessel moved a short 
 distance from the quay and no gangway available, adopted the same 
 course as his mate and slipped down a rope fastened to the quay, 
 and was injured by the rope breaking (Keyser v. Burdick d Co. 
 (1910), 4 B. "W. C. C. 87) ; where a sailor finding no other means of 
 getting on board ship jumped from the pier to the vessel (Kearon v. 
 Kcaron (1911), 45 Ir. L. T. 96; 4 B. W. C. C. 435) ; where an engineer 
 on board ship was allowed a fire in his cabin during the day but was 
 forbidden to have one at night, but, notwithstanding this, did light it 
 on a night when there were thirty degrees of frost, and when it was 
 necessary to have lighted stoves in the officers' cabins, and in con- 
 sequence of lighting the fire the workman was suffocated (Edmunds 
 v. Owners of S.S. Peterston (1911), 5 B. AY. C. C. 157 ; where a sailor 
 was washing his clothes in a dark alley-way and fell down an open 
 hatchway (Cokolon v. Owners of S. Kentra (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 658). 
 
 An act has also been held reasonable when it has been recognized 
 as a regular practice, though but for this it would have fallen within 
 the class of unnecessary or unreasonable acts (see p. 29, post), as 
 where a sailor, returning to his ship in a state of intoxication, 
 attempted to board it by using the cargo skid instead of the hatchway, 
 this being a method habitually adopted by the crew (Robertson v. 
 Allan Brothers d- Co. (Liverpool and London), Limited (1908), 98 
 
Sect. 1 (1)] SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT. 21 
 
 L. T. 821 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 172) ; and where, whilst engaged in a 
 common transaction, the workman of one employer exchanged work 
 with the workman of another employer, such exchange of work being 
 a practice known to and not forbidden by the employer of the injured 
 man (Henneberry v. Doyle (No. 2) (1912), 46 Ir. L. T. 70 ; 5 B. "W. 
 C. C. 580). 
 
 Workman acting for his own Purposes. The workman cannot 
 
 increase the responsibility of the employer under this Act by doing 
 something for his own purposes, and which it is no part of his duty to do, 
 or at least is not necessary or reasonable for the proper discharge of his 
 duties ; and if he be injured under these circumstances he will not be 
 entitled to compensation (Smith v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Hail. Co., 
 [1899] 1 Q. B. 141 ; 1 W. C. C. 1, where a ticket collector for his own 
 pleasure got on to the footboard of a moving train to speak to a friend, 
 and was killed in jumping off; fieedv. Great Western Hail. Co., [1909] 
 
 A. C. 31 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 109, where an engine-driver left his engine to 
 speak to a fireman on business of his own and was killed whilst return- 
 ing). See also Benson v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Rail. Co., p. 10, 
 ante; Callaghan v. Maxwell (1900), 2 F. 420 and p. 48,ppst ; Falconer 
 v. London and Glasgow Engineering and Iron Shipbuilding Co. (1901), 
 3 F. 564 ; Hendry v. Caledonian Rail. Co. (1907), 44 S. L. E. 584 ; Kelly ^ 
 v. Owners of S. Foam Queen, p. 26, post ; McDonald v. Owners of 
 the S.S. Banana, p. 34, post ; Parker v. Pout, p. 30, post. 
 
 Smith v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Hail. Co. was. distinguished in 
 the Scottish case of Goodlet v. Caledonian Bail. Co. (1902), 39 S. L. E. 
 759. An engine-driver brought his engine into the station about 
 10.10 P.M., and was ordered to take it into a particular lye. Having 
 done so, he crossed some lines to speak to a traffic regulator about the 
 company's business. He then crossed two more sets of rails to con- 
 verse for a moment or two with another employee about matters 
 having no connection with his duties as an engine-driver. His next 
 duty was to take out a train at 11 P.M. Immediately after leaving the 
 employee, and whilst crossing the rails, he was knocked down by an 
 engine and killed. It was held that the accident arose out of and in 
 the course of 'his employment. Compare with this Benson v. Lanca- 
 shire and Yorkshire Rail. Co., p. 10, ante. 
 
 Whilst leaving his employer's dock premises and still upon them, a 
 workman attempted to climb on to a waggon travelling on a com- 
 pany's railway which passed through the docks, and was injured. 
 The arbitrator found that he did so for his own pleasure and not for 
 his employer's business. He was held not to be entitled to recover 
 (Morrison v. Clyde Navigation Trustees (1908), 46 S. L. E. 38 ; 2 
 
 B. W. C. C. 99 ; approved 'in Pope v. Hill's Plymouth Co., p. 30, post). 
 In the county court it has been held that an employee, who was 
 
 injured in a street through which he had to pass on his employer's 
 business, was not injured by accident arising out of a.nd in the course 
 of his employment, when he had been loitering and chatting with 
 friends, and had taken two hours to cover a mile (Bates v. Dames' 
 Executors (1909), 126 L. T. Newsp. 454; 2 B. W. C. C. 459). 
 
 A case very near the border line was decided by the Court of Appeal 
 
22 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 1 (1) 
 
 in Ireland. A domestic servant, who was fatally injured by her sleeve 
 catching fire whilst she was drying her hair, and at the same time 
 taking charge of a baby in a cradle, was held not to have sustained an 
 injury by accident arising out of her employment, as the drying of 
 her hair was not an incident of the employment (Clifford v. Joy 
 (1909), 43 Ir. L. T. 193; 2 B. W. C. C. 32). See, also, Peel v. 
 Lawrence & Sons, Limited, infra. 
 
 Workmen " Larking." It is not within the scope of employment 
 for workmen, whether boys or men, to indulge in horse-play, and 
 injury thereby sustained by a workman, even though he is not a party 
 to the "larking," is not an injury by. accident arising either in the 
 course of or out of the employment (Armitage v. Lancashire and 
 Yorkshire Rail. Co., [1902] 2 K. B. 178; 4 W. C. C. 5, where a boy 
 was injured by a lad throwing a piece of metal at another boy which 
 missed its ami and struck the applicant while he was working ; 
 Falconer v. London and Glasgow Engineering and Iron Shipbuild- 
 ing Co. (1901), 3 F. 564, where the facts were similar, but the parties 
 were men, not boys ; Poivell \. Lanarkshire Steel Co., Limited 
 (1904), 6 F. 1039, where boys were playing with waggons ; Fitz- 
 gerald v. Clarke, [1908] 2 K. B. 796 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 197, where 
 a practical joke was played on applicant by hoisting him up by 
 a crane; Mullen v. D. Y. Stewart & Co., Limited, p. 20, ante; 
 Wilson v. Laing (1909), 46 S. L. R. 843 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 118, where a 
 domestic servant was injured by a child's ball thrown at her in play 
 by the nursemaid ; Baird & Co., Limited v. Burley (1908), 45 S. L. R. 
 416 ; 1 B. "\Y. C. C. 7, where applicant was injured in trying to regain 
 a waggon which two of his mates were carrying off in play ; Furniss 
 v. Gartside d Co., Limited (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 411, boy playing 
 with cog-wheels ; Cole v. Evans, <6c., Limited (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 
 138, where, whilst larking, a boy accidentally started a machine). 
 
 Falconer's Case was distinguished in M'Intyre v. Rodger & Co. 
 (1903), 6 F. 176, where injury was caused to a workman by a fellow 
 workman angrily pulling a brush out of the former's hands, and he 
 was held entitled to compensation. 
 
 II L PasKS INCIDENTAL TO THE EMPLOYMENT. 
 
 General Rule. Assuming it to be proved that the accident has 
 happened during the period of employment (see pp. 10-16, ante), 
 it then becomes necessary to see whether it has arisen out of the 
 employment. " It is not enough for the applicant to say ' the accident 
 would not have happened if I had not been engaged in that employ- 
 ment or if I had not been in that particular place.' He must go 
 further and must say ' the accident arose because of something I was 
 doing in the course of my employment or because I was exposed by 
 the nature of mv emplovment to some peculiar danger ' " (Craske v. 
 Wigan, [1909] 2^ K. B. 635 ; at p. 638, per COZENS-HARDY, M.R. ; 2 
 B. W. C. C. 35 ; Warner v. Couchman, \ 1911] 1 K. B. 351, at p. 353 ; 
 4 B. W.-'C. C. 32 ; Amys v. Barton, [1912]" 1 K. B. 40 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 117 ; 
 Peel v. Lawrence and Sons, Limited (1912), 106 L. T. 482 : 5 B. W. 
 
Sect. 1 (1)] KISKS INCIDENTAL TO EMPLOYMENT. s 23 
 
 C. C. 274). In the .last case a workman, before actually commencing 
 work, proceeded to take off his socks, which workmen usually did 
 partly for their own comfort and partly for the better discharge of 
 their duties. He sprained his finger in so doing. It was held that 
 this was not a risk incidental to the employment. 
 
 Generally it may be said that " the ordinary incidents of life are 
 not matters arising out of employment ; " and so it was held, revers- 
 ing the decision of the county court judge, that the accident did not 
 arise out of the employment, where a workhouse master, during his 
 term of duty, whilst sitting smoking at the top of a flight of steps, 
 was seized with a fit of coughing, turned giddy, and fell down the 
 stairs (Butler v. Burton-on-Tr ent Union (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 355; 
 and see Greene v. Shaw, [1912] I. E. 430 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 573). 
 
 The accident may naturally and directly result from the acts or 
 omissions which the workman, or his fellow workman, is authorized 
 to do as being acts within the scope of his employment (see pp. 16- 
 22, ante), or it may directly result from a risk which is incidental 
 to his presence on the employer's premises during the employment, 
 or to the employment itself. In such cases it will be found generally, 
 if not invariably, that the accident arises out of the employment. 
 But beyond these direct risks of the employment there are acts and 
 events which are only indirectly connected with the employment, and 
 these must be specially mentioned in order to determine whether the 
 consequent accident is within the terms of the statute. 
 
 Accidents arising from an Act of God or the Forces of 
 Nature. If the character of the employment be such as to create or 
 intensify the risks that arise from extraordinary natural causes, it 
 seems only fair to say that an accident under such circumstances is 
 one arising out of the employment. In dealing with the results of 
 the severity of weather it is necessary " to consider whether the 
 accident arose out of the employment or was merely a consequence 
 of the severity of the weather to which persons in the locality, and 
 whether so employed or not, were equally liable. If it is the latter 
 it does not arise ' out of the employment,' because the man is not 
 specially affected by the severity of the weather by reason of his 
 employment " (per FLETCHER MOULTON, L.J., in Warner v. Couchman, 
 [1911]' 1 K. B. 351, at p. 357 ; approved in the House of Lords, 
 [1912] A. C. 35 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 177). 
 
 It has, therefore, been held that the accidental injuiry arose out of 
 the employment when a man was struck by lightning whilst working on 
 a scaffold, it being found that in this position he was subjected to more 
 than an ordinary risk of being struck (Andrew v. Fails worth Indus- 
 trial Society, Limited, [1904] 2 K. B. 32 ; 6 W. C. C. 11) ; where a man 
 in the tropics sustained sunstroke, while painting the side of a ship, 
 he being subject to a greater risk of sunstroke in this position owing 
 to the reflection of the heat from the side of the vessel (Morgan v. 
 Owners of 8.8. Zenaida (1909), 25 T. L. R. 446; 2'B. W. C. C. 19) ; 
 where in the tropics sunstroke was sustained by reason of the man 
 having to stand on the steel deck of a ship without shelter for five 
 hours, and having to bend over the hatchway (Dames v. Gillespie 
 
? 
 24: WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 1 (1) 
 
 (1911), 105 L. T. 494 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 64 ); where a man afflicted with 
 an epileptic seizure whilst working near the open hatchway of a 
 vessel, fell into the hold (Wicks v. Do well & Co., [1905] 2 K. B. 225 ; 
 7 TV. C. C. 14). 
 
 On the other hand, if the character of the employment cannot 
 fairly be said to create or intensify the risks that arise from natural 
 causes, so as to expose the workman to some peculiar or extraordinary 
 danger, the alleged accident will not be one arising out of the employ- 
 ment. For instance, where a roadman was killed while working on a 
 road by being struck bv lightning (Kelly v. Kerry County Council 
 (1908), 42 Ir. L. T. 23 ; IB. W. C. C. 194) ; where a van-driver's hand 
 was affected by the cold whilst driving in Kent on a winter afternoon 
 (Warner v. Couchman, [1911] IK. B. 351 ; 4B. W. C. C. 32; affirmed 
 1 1912] A. C. 35 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 177) ; when a seaman sustained frost- 
 Site while working during winter on his ship at Halifax, Nova Scotia 
 (Karemaker v. Owners of S.S. Corsican (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 295) ; 
 where a plumber was seized with heat apoplexy while bending at his 
 work in a trench in the open ah' during a hot July (Robson, Eckford 
 & Co. v. Bldkey [1912] , S. C. 334 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 536) ; where an old 
 man, overcome with heat, fell on the pavement in the street (Rodger 
 v. Paisley School Board [1912], S. C. 584; 5 B. W. C. C. 547. In 
 these cases there was nothing in the nature of the employment which 
 exposed the applicants to anything more than the ordinary risk run 
 by other persons not so employed, and being about the same place at ' 
 the same time. 
 
 Assaults. An injury resulting from a tortious or felonious act 
 committed in the course of the employment but having no relation to 
 the employment does not arise out of the employment, whether the 
 act is committed by a fellow-workman, a stranger, or the employer 
 himself. 
 
 The following assaults, besides those referred to on p. 22 under the 
 heading of " Workmen ' Larking,' " have been held to have no rela- 
 tion to the employment : where a workman went to the assistance of 
 his employer in the street, who was being assaulted by roughs whilst he 
 was protesting against then* destroying his property, and the workman 
 was stabbed and killed in the brawl (Collins v. Collins, [1907] 2 I. B. 
 104) ; where a cook in a hotel injured her ami in trying to avoid a 
 customer who had trespassed into the kitchen and had rushed at her 
 (Murphy v. Berwick (1909), 43 Ir. L. T. 126; 2 B. AY. C. C. 103) ; 
 where workman A. deliberately assaulted workman B., who, in trying 
 to avoid falling over a mooring-rope, threw up his hand in which he 
 carried a hammer and accidentally injured A. (Shaw v. Wig an Coal 
 and Iron Co., Limited (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 81) ; where an employer 
 (presumably sane) attacked his errand boy with a chopper (Blake v. 
 Head (1912), 28 T. L. B. 321 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 303). 
 
 The following assaults have been held to have relation to the 
 employment : where an engine-driver on a railway was injured by a 
 stone wilfully dropped by a mischievous boy from a bridge on to the 
 engine (ChaUis v. L. S. W. Bail. Co., [1905] 2 K. B. 154 ; 7 W. C. C. 
 23) ; where a gamekeeper was attacked by poachers (Anderson v. 
 
Sect. 1 (1)] KLSKS INCIDENTAL TO EMPLOYMENT. 25 
 
 Balfonr, [1910] 2 1. E. 497 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 588) ; where a colliery 
 cashier was murdered in a railway train whilst travelling on one of 
 his periodical journeys with the money for wages (Nisbet v. Eayne 
 and Burn, [1910J 2 K. B. 689 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 507). 
 
 It must not be supposed from Challis's Case that every accident 
 due to stone-throwing by a stranger will in the case of every employ- 
 ment come within the Act. The character of the employment has to 
 be considered. See the remarks to this effect of COZENS-HARDY, M.E. 
 (then L.J.), in Chalks' s Case ([1905] 2 K. B. at p. 159). 
 
 Injury caused by an assault by strikers upon a workman who 
 continued at work was assumed to be accidental injury, but no 
 decision was given as to such an assault being a risk incidental to the 
 employment, the case having been decided on another point (Poulton 
 v. Kelsall, [1912] 1 K. B. 131 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 318). 
 
 Attacks by Animals, etc. The danger of being bitten or other- 
 wise injured by animals will be a risk incidental to the employment if 
 the charge of the animal is part of the workman's duty, or if the 
 animal is ordinarily kept on the premises by the employer so that the 
 workman's employment brings him into contact with it (Hapelman 
 v. Poole (1908), 25 T. L. E. 155; 2 B. W. C. C. 48; Rowland v. 
 Wright [1909] , 1 K. B. 963 ; 1 B. W. C, C. 192). In the former 
 case the man was injured by a lion of which he had temporary charge, 
 and which he was trying to get back into the cage from which it had 
 escaped ; and in the latter a stableman was bitten by a cat which was 
 kept as part of the necessary furniture of the stable. The applicant 
 succeeded in both cases. 
 
 The risk of an animal trespassing on the premises, and biting a 
 workman engaged there, would apparently not be an incidental risk 
 (Rowland v. Wright, supra, per COZENS-HARDY, M.R.) ; unless (it 
 is suggested) the employment or business on the premises had some 
 special attraction for the animal. 
 
 A lady's-maid, in the course of her employment, sat at an open 
 window, sewing. A cockchafer flew into her face, and in raising her 
 hand to protect her eyes the maid accidentally struck and injured her 
 eye. It was^held that this was not an accident arising out of her 
 employment (CrasJce v. Wigan, [1909] 2 K. B. 635 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 35). 
 It would seem that the sting of a wasp sustained by a farm labourer 
 would be an accident arising out of his employment only if the 
 employment was such as to occasion .the disturbance of the insect 
 (see Amysv. Barton [1912] , 1 K. B. 40 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 117). 
 
 As to injuries by animals in the public streets, see infra. 
 
 Accidents happening beyond the Employer's Premises- 
 Street Risks. We have seen (p. 15, ante) that the period of 
 employment may, in fact, continue during the absence of the workman 
 from the premises of his employer ; but an accident then happening 
 will not be one " arising out of " the employment unless the workman 
 is at the time on his employer's business ; is in the place where that 
 business reasonably takes him ; and is injured by an accident which 
 may fairly be regarded as incidental to his presence in that place and 
 to that business. Perhaps the test istated by COLLINS, M.E., in 
 
26 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 1 (1) 
 
 Challis' s Case (p. 24, ante) may be applied here, namely : " whether 
 it was within the scope of the employment of the workman to submit 
 to the risk of such an accident." 
 
 Where a man was sent to a named post office to obtain a postal 
 order, and being unable to get one there went to another post office 
 half a mile away, it was held that the employer was not liable to pay 
 compensation for injury sustained on this part of the journey (Smith 
 v. Morrison (1911), 5_B. W. C. C. 161). So it appears from the short 
 report of this case. But in the absence of express instructions to the 
 contrary one would have thought that, if a workman was sent to a 
 post office to get a postal order of a certain value and was unable to 
 get it there, it would be a reasonable performance of his duty to go to 
 the nearest place where he could get it. The object of sending him 
 at all was to get a specific thing and not to view a specific post office, 
 Too much reliance should not be placed on this case as reported. 
 
 If the employment is such as to subject the workman to the risks 
 of the streets, it would seem that he will be entitled to compensation 
 for injuries received in ordinary street accidents, as where an employee 
 who, to the knowledge of his employers and not being forbidden to 
 do so, rode a bicycle whilst on his employers' business, and was 
 knocked off it bv a collision with a tram-car (Pierce v. Provident 
 Clothing and Supply Co., Limited, [1911] 1 K. B. 997 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 
 242), or was kicked by a passing horse (M'Neice v. Singer Sewing 
 Machine Co., Limited, [1911] S. C. 12 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 851). But 
 compare these cases with Greene v. Shaw [1912] , 2 I. E. 430 ; 5 
 
 B. W. C. C. 573, where a herd, having to visit distant farms, used a 
 bicycle for the purpose and was thrown from it by his own dog just 
 as he was leaving his home. It was held that the accident did not 
 arise out of his employment. 
 
 An agent who is making a house-to-house collection of premiums, 
 and who meets with accidental injury whilst so doing, is entitled to 
 compensation {Refuge Assurance Co., Limited v. Millar (1911), 49 
 S. L. E. 67; 5 B. W. C. C. 522).. 
 
 The mere permission of the employer to the workman to be absent 
 for the latter's purposes will not make the employer liable for street 
 risks. Thus, a sailor on leave who falls on a public quay is not 
 entitled to compensation (Kelly v. Owners of S.S. Foam Queen 
 (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 113; and see further "Returning to Premises 
 or Work after Temporary Absence," p. 27,^;os). It has also been 
 held that the facts that there is implied permission to a man to leave 
 the employer's premises for dinner ; that' he cannot get dinner on his 
 employer's premises ; and that he must have dinner to fit him for his 
 work, do not justify a finding that such absence is in the course of 
 the employment, or that an accident happening to the workman 
 during such absence is one arising out of and in the course of the 
 emplovment (Gilbert v. Owners of Steam Trawler Nizam (1910), 2 
 T. L. E, 604 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 455). 
 
 In a county court it was decided that an accident which happened 
 to a law-writer in the street during the luncheon interval did not arise 
 out of the employment (McKrill v. Howard & Jones (1909). 2 B. W. 
 
 C. C. 460), and such decision is no doubt sound. 
 
Sect. 1 (1)] EISKS INCIDENTAL TO EMPLOYMENT. 27 
 
 The injury sustained must be one caused by a risk which is inci- 
 dental to the employment outside the premises. Whether robbery 
 with violence would be an incidental risk would probably depend on 
 the amount of temptation offered by the workman to the criminal. 
 If such an " accident " happened to a bank-messenger while carrying 
 a bag which indicated valuable contents, the case of Nisbet v. Rayne 
 and Burn, p. 25, ante, would be an authority for awarding compen- 
 sation. But it seems that an unusual experience, such as being 
 attacked by a cat in the public street, would not be an incidental risk 
 (Eowland v. Wright, [1908] 1 K. B. 963 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 192). 
 
 Accidents during Meal-times and other Intervals. The 
 
 period of employment may continue although actual work may be 
 temporarily suspended (see p. 15, ante), and if during such an 
 interval the workman remains on his employers's premises or the 
 scene of his labours, the natural risks of so doing will be risks of his 
 employment, such as the risk of a wall or other erection falling on 
 him (Blovelt v. Sawyer, [1904] 1 K. B. 271 ; 6 W. C. C. 16 ; Morris 
 v. Lambeth Borough Council (1905), 22 T. L. E. 22 ; 8 W. C. C. 1), 
 or of an animal kept on the premises biting him (Rowland v. Wright, 
 [1909] 1 K. B. 963 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 192). 
 
 But he will not be entitled to recover compensation for accidents 
 caused by his acting unreasonably or unlawfully, or by incurring 
 unnecessary risks, as where the workman took his meals seated on a 
 tank in a pump-room, where he had no right to go, although there 
 was no express prohibition against his going there (Brice v. Edward 
 Lloyd, Limited, [1909] 2 K. B. 804; 2 B. W. C. C. 26) ; or where, 
 instead of going to the nearest w.c. provided, he went to a space under 
 an engine, and was injured by putting his foot into a sunken tank of 
 boiling water (Thomson v. Fleming ton Coal Co., Limited (1911), 
 48 S. L. E. 740; 4 B. W. C. C. 406), or climbed into the structure 
 of a hoist, and put himself, not by inadvertence, into a position of 
 danger (Rose v. Morrison <& Mason, Limited (1911) 105 L. T. 2 ; 4 
 B. W. C. C. 277) ; and generally the accident will not arise out of his 
 employment if he leaves the employer's premises for any of the 
 purposes which justify a cessation of work, as by going to a friend's 
 house to relieve nature (see in the county court Gog don v. Sunderland 
 Gas Co. (1907), 1 B. W. C. C. 156), or if the accident arises from 
 ordinary street risks (see p. 25, ante, and in the county court 
 McKrill v. Howard & Jones (1909), 2 B. W. C. C. 460, where a clerk 
 was injured in the street during the luncheon interval). 
 
 A curious case on this subject was one in which a workman was 
 injured during working hours by the bursting of a bottle of herb beer 
 just as he was about to take it for the purpose of drinking. He was 
 working in a very high temperature, and it was a recognised practice 
 for workmen to supply themselves with beverages to be imbibed 
 during their employment. He was held, in the county court, to be 
 entitled to recover compensation (Heywood v. Broadstone Spinning 
 Mill (1910), 128 L. T. Newsp. p. 134). 
 
 Returning to Premises or Work after Temporary Absence. 
 
 Much discussion has taken place as to the position under the Act of 
 
28 WORKMEN'S COMPILATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 1 (1) 
 
 sailors when absent on shore for their own purposes, and when return- 
 ing to their vessels after such absence. The matter is lucidly dis- 
 cussed by FLETCHER MOULTOX, L.J., in Kitchenham \. Owners of 
 S.S. Johannesburg ; Leach v. Oakley, Street Co., [1911] 1 K. B. 523 ; 
 4 B. \V. C. C. 91), and his lordship's judgment in these cases has 
 been unanimously accepted by the House of Lords (see p. 29, post) as 
 a correct exposition of the law on the subject. The principles there 
 laid down apply not only to sailors but to all workmen in a similar 
 position. 
 
 A sailor who leaves his ship and goes on shore for his own purposes 
 does so either with leave or without leave. In the former case his em- 
 ployment continues ; in the latter it is suspended. In both cases, 
 however, so long as he is away from the ship he subjects himself to risks 
 which are not incidental to the employment, and he is not entitled to 
 compensation in respect of any accident so incurred. But the differ- 
 ence of having or not having leave of absence is most material in 
 considering the dividing line between street risks and ship risks. 
 
 A sailor who leaves his ship and goes ashore without permission 
 temporarily suspends his employment, and it would appear that from 
 the moment he sets his foot on the gangway leading to the quay with 
 the intention of absenting himself without leave until he is actually 
 back on the ship again, in other words until he has reinstated himself 
 in that position which he ought not to have left, nothing that occurs 
 to him can impose a liability on his employer to compensate him 
 under the Act. If he fell off the gangway, either when going out or 
 returning, it would be an accident neither in the course of nor arising 
 out of his employment. It was no part of his duty or employment 
 to be using the gangway for such purposes. 
 
 The position of a sailor who is returning after leave of absence is 
 different. It is his duty and is part of his employment to return to 
 his ship and to use all reasonable means for so doing. There comes 
 a moment, often difficult to determine, when the street risks, in 
 respect of which he cannot claim compensation, cease, and the ship 
 risks or risks of his employment begin. The principle for deter- 
 mining the commencement of the latter is thus stated by FLETCHER 
 MOULTON, L.J. ( [1911] 1 K. B. at p. 527) : " The return to the ship is in 
 the course of his employment, but the risks do not become risks 
 arising out of his employment until he has to do something specifi- 
 cally connected with his employment in the ship. Thus, if the risk 
 is one due to the means of access to the ship, as in Moore v. 
 Manchester Liners. Limited ([1909] 1 K. B. 417; [1910 A. C. 498), 
 the accident is rightly said to arise out of his employment ; but if 
 the accident is shown to arise from something not specifically con- 
 nected with the ship it cannot be said to arise out of his employ- 
 ment. I do not think that the dividing line is when he actually 
 touches the ship or the special means of access thereto. For instance, 
 if it was shown that when the sailor returned to the ship there was a 
 dense fog, and that in trying to find the gangway, which I will suppose 
 was not lighted, he fell into the water and was drowned, I think that 
 the accident would arise out of his employment. But if all that is 
 shown is that it occurred during his return to the ship, but while he 
 
Sect. 1 (1)] BISKS INCIDENTAL TO EMPLOYMENT. 29 
 
 AVtis still on shore, and before he had taken any specific step towards 
 getting on board the vessel, I think that it would not thereby be 
 established that the accident arose out of his employment." 
 
 The following cases illustrate the above principles as applied to 
 sailors and others returning after absence with leave. The accident 
 was held to have arisen out of the employment where the sailor fell 
 while crossing the gangway leading to his ship from another (Leach 
 v. Oakley, Street <& Co., [1911] 1 K. B. 523 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 91) ; where 
 a watchman's duties required him occasionally to leave the trawlers 
 he was minding and to go on the quay against which they were 
 moored, and on his return he fell from a ladder leading from the quay 
 to one of the trawlers (Jackson v. General Steam Fishing Co., Limited, 
 [1909] A. C. 523 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 56) ; where a sailor fell while climb- 
 ing a ladder leading from the quay to the ship (Moore v. Manchester 
 Liners, Limited, [1910] A. C. 498 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 527) ; where the sailor 
 had passed the gangway and was astride the rail of the ship before he 
 fell (Canavan v. Owners of S.S. Universal (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 857). 
 
 But the accident was held not to i have arisen out of his employment 
 when the access to the ship was well lighted and there was no 
 evidence whether he had or had not reached the gangway leading to 
 the ship at the tijne he fell (Kitclienham v. Oivners of S.S. Johannes- 
 burg, [1911] 1 K. B. 523 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 91 ; affirmed, [1911] A. C. 
 417 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 311) ; where a man fell off the quay while 
 waiting for a boat to take him to his ship (Hewitt v. Owners of S.S. 
 Duchess, [1910] 1 K. B. 772 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 239 ; affirmed sub. nom. 
 Fletcher v. Same, [1911] A. C. 671 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 317) ; where a 
 man, having reached the deck of his ship, reeled overboard owing to 
 his state of intoxication (Frith v. Oivners of S.S. Louisianian, [1912] 
 2 K. B. 155 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 410) ; where a seaman having gone ashore 
 with leave for his own purposes, on his return found his ship moved 
 to another part of the dock, and while making his way to it was 
 injured by a train in the docks some 200 yards from the ship (Biggart 
 v. Oivners of S.S. Minnesota (1911) 5 B. W. C. C. 68). 
 
 Whether it is sufficient that a seaman has reached one part of his 
 ship, when his duties lie in another part, is a question yet to be decided 
 ([1912] 2 K. B,, at p. 159, per COZENS-HARDY, M.E.). 
 
 The report of the Irish case of Hyndman v. Craig <& Co. (1910), 45 
 Ir. L. T. 11 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 438, does not say whether the absence of 
 the sailor (who fell from the gangway) was with leave or without. 
 If the former, the decision that the accident did not arise out of and 
 in the course of employment is not consistent with the above principles 
 as accepted by the House of Lords. 
 
 Unnecessary or Unreasonable Acts. An act which is done 
 
 during the period of employment but which is wholly unnecessary 
 or is unreasonable cannot be regarded as a risk of the employment, 
 Upon this ground compensation has been denied to a workman who 
 has been injured through sliding down the hand-rail of the stairs 
 instead of walking down them (Parses v. Army < Navy Co-operative 
 Society, Limited (1906), C. A., May 30, but not reported); who, 
 having been dismissed from work and told to wait at the bottom of 
 
30 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 1 (1) 
 
 the pit until he could be taken up, has loitered elsewhere and been 
 injured (Smith v. Normanton Colliery Co., Limited, [1903] 1 K. B. 
 205 ; 5 W. C. C. 14) ; who, instead of using the gangway has tried to 
 jump from the quay to his ship, which was a forbidden practice 
 (Martin v. Fullerton & Co. (1908), 45 S. L. E. 812 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 168, 
 and compare this with Robertson v. Allan Brothers & Co. (Liverpool 
 d* London] Limited, p. 20, ante)', who, having been paid by mistake 
 the wages of another employee, sought to give them to him by jumping 
 on to an engine moving at five miles an hour (Williams v. Wigan 
 Coal <6 Iron Co., Limited (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 65) ; who, passing on 
 liis way home or to his place of work through his employers' premises, 
 has attempted to jump on to moving trams, contrarv to regulations 
 (Pope v. Hill's Plymouth Co. (1910), 102 L. T. 682 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 341 ; 
 affirmed 105 L. T. 678 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 175 ; Earnest. Nunnery Colliery 
 Co., [1910] W. X. 248; 4 B. W. C. C. 43; affirmed [1912] A. C. 44; 
 5 B. W. C. C. 195 ; Kane v. Merry & Cunningliame, [1911 1 S. C. 533; 
 4 B. W. C. C. 379 ; and see Morrison v. Clyde Navigation Trustees, 
 p. 21, ante) ; who rode on the couplings of two trains contrary to the 
 colliery rules (Powell v. Brynddu Colliery Co. (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 124 ; 
 who, working at a machine, played with the cog-wheels contrary to 
 express orders (Furniss v. Gartside < Co., Limited (1910), 3 B. W. 
 C. C. 411) ; who, instead of going by the ordinary route along a road, 
 took a shorter way by walking along a railway line where he was run 
 over by an engine (M'Laren v. Caledonian Rail. Co. (1911), 48 S. L. 
 B. 885; 5 B. W. C. C. 492; and see Hendry v. United Collieries 
 Limited, p. 14. ante) ; who, being sent with goods to deliver at a 
 kitchen on the third floor of an infirmary, used the goods lift, which 
 he knew he had no right to do, instead of the ordinary means of 
 access (M'Daid v. Steel (1911), 48 S. L. E. 765 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 412) ; 
 who has voluntarily submitted himself to an operation, e.g. of an X-ray 
 apparatus, for experimental purposes -(Curtis v. Talbot and Kidder- 
 minster Infirmary Committee (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 41) ; who, going 
 from one of his employer's farms to another, sought to get a lift in a 
 cart of his employer, and was injured whilst climbing into it (Parker 
 v. Pout (1911), 105 L. T. 493 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 45) ; who, returning to 
 his ship, tried to get there by paddling a large rowing-boat with the 
 rudder, and got carried out to sea and drowned (Halvorsen v. Salvesen 
 (1911), 49 S. L. E. 27 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 519) ; who, sent on an errand 
 and authorised to take a tramcar, was injured by trying to jump on 
 to a moving car knowing that there was a notice on the car forbidding 
 passengers to do so (Wemyss Coal Co., Limited v. Symon (1912), 49 
 8. L. B, 921). 
 
 See further cases cited under " Accidents during Meal-times and 
 other Intervals,' 1 '' p. 27, ante, and compare with cases cited under 
 " Acts Necessary or Reasonable," p. 20, ante. 
 
 In the Court of Appeal in Ireland it has been held that the risk of 
 taking fire which a domestic servant incurred when engaged in drying 
 her hair after washing it was not one incidental to her employment 
 (Clifford v. Joy, p. 22, ante). 
 
Sect. 1 (1)] PROOF otf ACCIDENT ARISING OUT OF, ETC. 31 
 
 IV. EXTENSION OF ACT IN FAVOUR OF COAL MINERS. 
 
 It is provided by the Coal Mines Act, 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 50), as 
 follows : 
 
 " B. 110. (1) Where provision has been made in pursuance- of 
 regulations under this Act, or under any order which has effect as if 
 made under this Act, for the formation or training of a rescue 
 brigade, any accident caused to a workman emplo3 7 ed in or about a 
 mine who is with the consent of his employer being trained as a 
 member of a rescue brigade, and arising out of and in the course of 
 his training, shall, for the purposes of the Workman's Compensation 
 Act, 1906, be deemed to arise out of and in the course of his 
 employment in the mine. 
 
 " (2) Any workman engaged in any rescue work or ambulance 
 work at a mine shall, for the purposes of the Workmen's Compen- 
 sation Act, 1906, be deemed while so engaged to be employed by the 
 owner of the mine." 
 
 V. PROOF OF ACCIDENT ARISING OUT OF, ETC., THE 
 EMPLOYMENT. 
 
 Onus of Proof. The onus of proving his case "rests upon the 
 applicant and upon nobody else, and if he leaves the case in doubt 
 as to whether those conditions are fulfilled or not, where the known 
 facts are equally consistent with their having been fulfilled or not 
 fulfilled, he has not discharged the onus which lies upon him " 
 Pomfret v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Hail. Co. (No. 1), [1903] 2 K. B.) 
 718; 5 W. C. C. 22). Claimants "have to prove their case; that is 
 to say, they must show with reasonable clearness that the accident 
 actually did come from the employment " (Hawkins v. Powell's Tillery 
 Steam Coal Co., [1911] 1 K. B. 988, at p. 995, per FLETCHER MOULTON, 
 L.J.) ; and if the arbitrator rejects the applicant's story of alleged 
 accidental circumstances he is not entitled to conjecture without 
 evidence that the click which he believes the applicant (a man 
 suffering from severe heart desease) heard was the result of accident 
 and was not 'the result of the applicant's diseased cbndition (Beau- 
 mont v. Underground Electric Bailivays Co. of London (1912), 5 
 B. W. C. C. 247). "Although a county court judge may act, 
 and must act, and ought to act, in many cases without any direct 
 evidence, and although he ought and in many cases must act upon 
 indirect evidence, which justifies his drawing the inference, there is 
 nothing to justify him in that which is really a case of merely 
 balancing up probabilities, in saying, In all probability it is this,' 
 and, ' I do not know whether it is a strain ; I do not know whether 
 it may not have been some other exertion ; I do not find as an 
 inference of fact that it occurred while he was in the south level 
 during the working ; all I say is that some time before, in some place 
 or other, I think there must have been some strain or some act of 
 exertion which ultimately developed this strangulated hernia when he 
 was in the north level ' " (Perry v. Ocean Coal Co., Limited (1912), 5 
 B. W. C. C. 421, at p. 424,_per COZENS-HARDY, M.E.). 
 
o2 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 1 (1) 
 
 The onus is none the less because the workman who could give the 
 best information is dead. On the other hand, the applicant is not 
 bound under this Act, any more than he is bound in other cases, to 
 prove by positive and direct evidence that the accident answers to the 
 description required by the statute. It will suffice if he puts before 
 the arbitrator evidence from which the arbitrator can reasonably infer 
 that the accident was of the necessary character. What facts will be 
 sufficient for the purpose ? The cases seem to be capable of being 
 grouped under four propositions. 
 
 Proposition 1. If the known facts are equally consistent with 
 cither alternative, namely, that the accident has, or on the other hand 
 has not, arisen out of and in the course of the employment, there is no 
 room for inference either way, and the onus of 2^'oof has not been 
 discharged (see Pom fret v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Sail. Co., 
 (Xo. 1) F1903] 2 K. B. 718; 5 W. C. C. 22; Mitchell v. The Glamor- 
 gan Coal Co., Limited (1901), 23 T. L. R. 588; 9 W. C. C. 16), unless 
 the proved facts raise the presumption stated in Proposition 3, post. 
 
 Proposition 2. If the proved facts are not equally consistent 
 with either alternative, but point rather in one direction than in the 
 other, the arbitrator is entitled to apply his knowledge of what happens 
 in ordinary life, and must consider the probabilities of the 
 accident having happened in one way or the other (Mitchell v. 
 The Glamorgan Coal Co., Limited, supra}. 
 
 General remarks. The difficult task of drawing inferences from a 
 given set of facts has naturally led to a number of appeals. It is not 
 easy, if, indeed, possible, to glean from the cases any more specific 
 rules than those stated in the Propositions and under the head of 
 " Onus of Proof," on p. 31, ante. The most that can be done is to 
 state shortly the facts of the various cases and the inferences, 
 allowed or not allowed, to be drawn from them, and for the purpose 
 of convenience the cases are grouped under suitable headings. 
 
 Disappearance of Seamen at Sea. Upon this subject two dicta 
 
 from the judgments in the cases of the Zent (p. 33) and the Wild Rose 
 (p. 34) are useful. In the former FLETCHER MOULTON, L.J., said: " If 
 one of the watch on a stormy night was found to be missing, I should 
 have very little difficulty in drawing the inference that the probable 
 cause of the accident was the increased danger to which the seaman 
 was subjected by having to do the duty of a seaman on watch in such 
 perilous circumstances. But, in the present case, the weather was 
 fine; it was daylight, and there is no suggestion that any portion 
 of this man's duties would lead him into a position of danger at all. 
 All we know is that he was missing" ([1909] 2 K. B. at pp. 44 and 
 45). In the latter FARWELL, L.J., said : '."If an ordinary sailor is a 
 member of the watch and is on duty during the night and disappears, 
 the inference might fairly be drawn that he died from an accident 
 arising out of his employment. But if, on the other hand, he was not 
 a member of the watch, and was down below and came up on deck 
 when he was not required for the purpose of any duty to be performed 
 
Sect. 1 (1)] PROOF OF ACCIDENT ARISING OUT OF, ETC. 33 
 
 on deck and disappeared without our knowing anything else, it seems 
 to me that there is absolutely nothing from which any Court could 
 draw the inference that he died from an accident arising out of his 
 employment " (ibid., p. 50). 
 
 In the following cases the facts were held not to justify an inference 
 that there was death by accident arising out of the employment : A 
 cook was lost overboard ; at 5.25 a.m. he was seen looking over the 
 side ; his usual time for turning out was 5.80 a.m. ; he was last seen 
 going aft at 5.35 ; the weather was fine, the sea smooth, the vessel 
 perfectly steady ; the likelihood of an accidental fall overboard was 
 very remote, perhaps impossible (Bender v. Owners of 8.S. Zent, [1909] 
 2 K. B. 41 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 22) ; a ship's cook disappeared at sea ; his 
 duties lay in the galley, where he was last seen, and from which he 
 could not fall overboard ; the weather was rough ; he suffered from a 
 disease necessitating frequent micturition ; to get to the w.c. he had 
 to go to the open deck in the dark ; this was 8 feet from the gangway, 
 which was 3 feet 7 inches high (Bur wash v. F. Leyland <& Co., Limited 
 (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 663, and compare with .Lee v. Stag Line, Limited, 
 p. 33). 
 
 An inference that there was an accident arising out of the 
 employment was held to be justified by the following factr, : A ship's 
 officer, while on duty and in charge of the vessel, disappeared over- 
 board ; the weather was fine ; a short time before he had complained 
 of headache and giddiness, had taken some medicine, and had returned 
 to his duties on deck (Rice v. Owners of 8.S. Swansea Vale (1910), 
 102 L. T. 270 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 152 ; affirmed [1912] A. C. 238 ; 4 
 B. W. C. C. 298) ; a ship's fireman, in the tropics, who was unused 
 to the work and was working longer hours than usual owing to the 
 ship being short-handed, disappeared; he was seen to come up on 
 deck for water shortly before being last seen in the stoke-hole ; it was 
 usual for firemen to come on deck for fresh air (Lee v. Stag Line, 
 Limited (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 660 ; distinguished from Burwash v. 
 F. Leyland & Co., Limited., supra, because it was hi the discharge 
 of his duties to come up on deck for air and water). 
 
 Pound Drowned or Killed. Dependants succeeded in obtaining 
 an inference in their favour from the facts of the following cases 
 respectively : Deceased was killed two minutes after starting his 
 engine ; no one could say how he got into the machinery ; circum- 
 stances pointed to the probability of his trying to take a short cut to 
 a door which he was forbidden to use (McNicholas v. Dawson <& Son, 
 [1899] 1 Q. B. 773 ; 1 W. C. C. 80) ; a man whose duty it was to 
 skim a vat, was found dead, lying with his face in the water, and 
 with his hands gripping the edge of the vat (Waby v. Sheffield 
 Mineral Water Syndicate, C. A. June 3, 1902, not reported ; but see 
 113 L. T. Newsp. p. 196) ; deceased fell from a railway train during 
 his employment ; the only evidence was that of a witness who said 
 that when deceased got into the train he had a basket, and that he 
 stood up to put it on the rack, and whilst doing so the train moved 
 on ; that the witness next saw him with his face towards the window, 
 but could not see what he was doing with his hands, or whether he 
 
 W.C.A. D 
 
34 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 1 (1) 
 
 did anything to the door ;and that the witness heard a noise and 
 deceased had disappeared (Pom fret v. L. & Y. R. Co., [1903] 2 K. B. 
 718 ; 5 "W. C. C. 22) ; a railway policeman's duties took him to various 
 parts of the station premises, including the sidings ; he went into the 
 town on lawful business ; returning, it would appear that he passed 
 through a gate leading on to the sidings, which gate was usually kept 
 closed but on this occasion was open ; he was found on the sidings run 
 over and killed (Grant v. Glasgow & South Western Bail Co. (1907), 
 45 S. L. E. 128 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 17 ; approved by Cozens-Hardy, M.R., 
 in the Zent Case, see p. 33, ante) ; deceased was a miner and the 
 cage by which he was lowered stopped at two levels only, the lower 
 of which was the one he required to get to his work ; he got out at 
 the higher level and was too late to re-enter the cage ; he sought his 
 proper level by means of a ladder in a " blind " pit a few yards away ; 
 on reaching the bottom for some unexplained reason he took a road 
 leading away from the place of his work, and 200 yards further on 
 met his death (Sneddon v. Greenfield Coal <& Brick Co., Limited, [1910 j 
 S. C. 362 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 557, reversing the finding of the arbitrator 
 to the contrary) ; a workman went from his furnace to the black- 
 smith's shop, the way running along a canal bank ; he disappeared 
 and was found drowned in the canal at a place between the furnace 
 and the shop (Furnivallv. Johnson's Iron <6 Steel Co., Limited, (1911), 
 5 B. W. C. C. 43) ; a watchman had to attend to the ship and to the 
 mooring ropes, the latter duty taking him on to the quay ; he was 
 seen there one evening, with a parcel, at a time when he usually 
 attended to the shore-end of the mooring ropes ; next day he was 
 found drowned in the dock, 40 yards from the ship, between the 
 gangway and the shore-end of the mooring ropes, the parcel being 
 found between the mooring ropes and the gangway (Richardson v. 
 Owners of S.S. Avonmore (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 34). 
 
 Inference that there was death by accident arising out of the employ- 
 ment was negatived in each of the following cases : A sailor returning 
 to his ship fell off the gangway leading from the shore and was killed ; 
 no evidence was given to show for what purpose he had been ashore, 
 and in the absence of this it could not be presumed that he had been 
 on his employer's business (McDonald v. Owners of S.S. Banana, 
 [1908] 2 K. B. 926 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 185) ; a seaman, having gone 
 ashore without leave, returned to his ship drunk ; he went to his 
 bunk ; he was found next day fatally injured in No. 1 hold ; it was 
 suggested that he might have been going to the lavatory ; the only 
 way of reaching the hold w r as by going through a door which had been 
 locked, but was found broken open (O'Brien v. Star Line, Ltd. (1908), 
 45 S. L. E. 935 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 177) ; an engineer came on board his 
 vessel in port at 10 P.M. ; he had to get up steam at midnight ; he 
 went below and took off his clothes, except his trousers, shirt and 
 socks ; later he came up and said he was going on deck for fresh air ; 
 men usually sat on the starboard quarter against the fish-board ; his 
 body was found next day just under this place (Marshall v. Owners 
 of S.S. Wild Rose, [1909] 2 K. B. 46; 2 B. W. C. C. 76, affirmed by 
 the H. L. [1910] A. C. 486 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 514. Compare this with 
 Maclcinnon v. Miller (1909), 46 S. L. E. 299 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 64, where 
 
Sect. 1 (1)] PROOF OF ACCIDENT ARISING OUT OF, ETC. 35 
 
 the facts were very similar, but the decision was in favour of the 
 dependants) ; a master of a ship, lying in Bangor Roads owing to stress 
 of weather, went on shore in the evening, and after stopping at a 
 hotel for an hour, returned and hailed his ship from the quay, and 
 whilst waiting for a boat fell into the water and was drowned ; he 
 had a right to be on shore, but there was no evidence that he was 
 there on the ship's business (Hewitt v. Owners of S. Duchess, [1910] 
 1 K. B. 772 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 239 ; affirmed sub. nom. Fletcher v. Same, 
 [1911] A. C. 671 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 317) ; an engineer left his ship, which 
 was in dry dock, to go to dinner ; he was seen later on his return to 
 the dock, but was never seen again alive ; his dead body was found in 
 the dry dock ; he apparently fell when seeking to board the ship 
 (Gilbert v. Owners of Steam Trawler Nizam, [1910] 2 K. B. 555 ; 
 3 B. W. C. C. 455) ; a night watchman on board a* ship whose hours 
 were from 7 P.M. to 7 A.M., was last heard on the ship at 5.30 A.M. ; 
 the deck was slippery ; there was ice near the rope ladder which was 
 the means of descending to any boat that might come alongside; 
 deceased's cap was found on the hatch some distance from the boat ; 
 the cook had come aboard in a boat at 6.30 A.M. ; deceased's body was 
 found in the harbour some months afterwards (Gatton v. Limerick 
 S.S. Co. (1910), 44 Ir. L. T. 441, but the Court of Appeal, whilst 
 upholding the arbitrator's finding, also held that a contrary inference 
 might reasonably have been drawn) ; a workman, with his mate, was 
 in charge of a barge near a wharf ; he left the cabin at 5.30 and 
 was not seen alive again ; there was a strong tide running out ; his 
 body was found 150 feet from the barge, up the river ; the arbitrator 
 found that the body could not have been carried away by the adverse 
 tide (Charvil v. Manser & Co., Limited (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 385); a 
 seaman, returning to his ship, was on a quay hailing the ship for a 
 boat ; he had a parcel of food with him ; he fell from the quay and 
 was drowned ; there was no evidence whether he was on shore with 
 leave or not (Dixon v. Owners of S.S. Ambient (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 
 428) ; a sailor left his ship at the quay-side to get provisions ; next 
 morning his body was recovered from the dock, 10 or 15 feet from 
 the gangway of the ship, and 3 feet from the quay-side (Mitchell v. 
 Owners of S.S. Saxon (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 623). 
 
 Cause of Death, Injury Or Disease. The death, injury or disease 
 was inferred to have been caused by accident arising out of the 
 employment under the following sets of facts respectively : Two hours 
 after being set to work in a hold, a workman, who had previously been 
 healthy and steady, climbed the ladder of the hold, apparently in pain, 
 and was sent home ; marks were found on his ribs ; three days later 
 he died from pneumonia, which the doctor attributed to the injury to 
 his side (Lovelady v. Berrie (1909), 2 B. W. C. C. 62) ; upon leaving 
 home to go to work in a mine on the night of July 17th, and at the 
 time of starting work, deceased had nothing the matter with his 
 hand ; on his return the next morning at the usual hour he had a 
 crushed finger with broken skin which his wife poulticed ; he con- 
 tinued to work until July 27th ; blood poisoning set in and he died from 
 it on August 3rd (Mitchell v. Glamorgan Coal Co., Limited (1907), 23 
 
36 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 1 (1) 
 
 T. L. E. 588 ; 9 W. C. C. 16 ; compare this with Jenkins v. Standard 
 Colliery Co., p. 87, post) ; a workman had undergone an operation and 
 returned to work before the wound was perfectly healed ; he worked 
 the lever of a machine ; immediately after blood was seen flowing 
 from the operation wound ; septic poisoning followed and death ; the 
 arbitrator inferred that the mischief was caused by the working of 
 the lever (Groves v. Burrouglies <& Watts Limited (1911), 4 B. W. 
 C. C. 185) ; a workman was descending the side of a ship by a rope 
 ladder ; the ladder twisted suddenly and he fell into the water ; 
 he was dead when picked up and the cause of death was heari 
 failure ; his heart was in such a condition that any slight exertion 
 might have caused failure (Trodden v. J. McLennard <& Sons 
 Limited (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 190) ; an elderly engine driver was 
 tightening a nut ; he was next seen lying onithe permanent way with his 
 legs doubled up ; he died within five minutes ; there was no evidence 
 explaining why he fell ; on three previous occasions he had collapsed 
 in a fault and been unconscious for several minutes ; he had a few 
 days before been examined and passed as sound ; no post-mortem 
 examination was held and without it it was impossible to state the 
 cause of death (Fennali v. Midland and G. W.Eail. of Ireland (1911), 
 45 Ir. L. T. 192 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 440) ; a collier started work on 
 August 14th, with nothing the matter with him so far as known ; 
 later he came out of the stall where he was working alone, complain- 
 ing that his foot hurt him ; the headman discovered a piece of rock 
 in the stall which had fallen during working hours ; deceased finished 
 his shift, went home and complained to his wife about his foot ; he 
 worked next day but made no complaint ; on the 16th his foot was 
 swollen, with marks of bruises and a sore or scratch on the side ; on 
 the 19th, a doctor examined the foot and found a wound which might 
 have been caused by a falling stone ; on the 26th, the collier died of 
 tetanus (Stapleton v. Dinnington Main Coal Co., Limited (1912) 5 
 B. W. C. C. 602). 
 
 In the following cases it was held that the facts did not justify 
 an inference in favour of the applicants : An omnibus driver 
 fell from his seat; the medical evidence agreed that his heart was 
 abnormal but was absolutely contradictory on the subject whether the 
 fall preceded the heart failure, or the heart failure caused the fall 
 (Thackway v. Conelly & Sons (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 37) ; a collier 
 died of apoplexy at his work ; the medical evidence was that his 
 arteries were very diseased, that apoplexy might have come upon him 
 under any circumstances ; there was no evidence of the collier 
 sustaining a strain at his work ; and the cause of death was, therefore, 
 equally consistent either with or without an accident (Barnabas v. 
 Bersham Colliery Co. (1910), 102 L. T. 621 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 216 ; 
 affirmed 103 L. T. 513 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 119) ; there was a conflict of 
 medical testimony as to whether a wound in the hand on April 17th 
 could cause erysipelas of the face on July 7th ; a medical referee being 
 called said that micro-organisms of erysipelas could have lain dormant 
 for that period, but that the erysipelas might have come from other 
 causes ; there was no evidence that the organisms had lain dormant, 
 and applicant's doctor did not express the opinion that they had done 
 
Sect. 1 (l)] PROOF OF ACCIDENT ARISING OUT OF, ETC. 37 
 
 so (Hugo v. H. W. Lai-kins & Co. (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 228) ; a gas- 
 fitter inhaled some gas ; three days later he suffered from paralysis 
 due to cerebral haemorrhage and died shortly after ; seven months 
 previously he had had a slight similar attack from the same cause ; 
 the arbitrator was unable to connect the death with the alleged 
 " gassing " (Dean v. L. N. W. E. Co. (1910) 3 B. W. C. C. 351) ; a man 
 was apparently thrown out of a cart when his horse fell ; he walked with 
 the horse up a hill and died there from syncope ; it was impossible to 
 say what caused the syncope (Powers v. Smith (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 
 470) ; a workman had suffered for years from progressive heart disease ; 
 he died while hurrying with a parcel to the railway station on 
 behalf of his employer (O'Hara v. Hayes (1910), 44 Ir. L. T. 71 ; 
 3 B. W. C. C. 586) ; an elderly man was engaged in pushing trucks 
 up an incline, and tumbling them off the rails ; he then started 
 cutting a timber prop ; a few minutes later he felt pain ; he died 
 the same day of angina pectoris ; medical evidence showed that there 
 was heart disease, possibly of long standing, that in his case a slight 
 exertion might have brought on a fatal attack, and that the symptoms 
 of the attack did not necessarily appear immediately (Hawkins v. 
 Powell's Tillery Steam Coal Co., Limited, [1911] 1 K. B. 988; 4 
 B. W. C. C. 178, reversing the finding of the arbitrator) ; a carman 
 fell from his van and sustained injuries ; he died three weeks later ; 
 there was no medical evidence to directly connect the death with the 
 fall (Honor v. Painter (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 188) ; a man fell from a 
 cart and was injured ; he died nine days afterwards ; medical evidence 
 was indefinite, but did not attempt to connect the death with the fall 
 (Broivn v. Kidman (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 199, reversing the finding of 
 the arbitrator) ; a man at work shouted out that he had hurt his 
 back ; no one saw any accident ; he complained of pains in the back 
 and stomach ; he "died of intestinal obstruction a week later ; he had 
 previously had illnesses and pains in the stomach (Farmer v. Stafford, 
 Allen & Sons, Limited (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 223) ; a workman 
 returning home had a mark or scratch behind the ear ; he worked for 
 a week suffering pain, and died at the end of a fortnight of acute 
 blood-poisoning ; evidence was given that he had a pimple behind his 
 ear, and that if he scratched it and dirt got in blood-poisoning would 
 arise (Fitzgerald v. Murphy (1911), 45 Ir. L. T. 200) ; a collier returned 
 home from a night shift with a red patch on his wrist, the first sign of 
 the blood-poisoning from which he died ; the blood-poisoning was due 
 to an abrasion on his thumb ; there had been a fall of stone during his 
 shift, about four hours before he got home ; medical evidence showed 
 that twelve hours at the least, and more probably two or three days, 
 must have elapsed between the abrasion and the appearance of the 
 red patch (Jenkins v. Standard Colliery Co. (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 71, re- 
 versing the finding of the arbitrator on the ground that the medical 
 evidence negatived the inference as drawn in Mitchell 1 s Case, p. 35) ; 
 a collier on his return from work had a scratch on his knee 
 and a large lump on his groin ; he died from blood poisoning, which 
 started from the scratch ; there was no evidence how he got the 
 scratch ; medical evidence proved that the scratch could not have 
 caused the lump if the scratch had only been made 011 the day the 
 
38 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 1 (1) 
 
 lump appeared (Wood v. D. Davis <& Sons, Limited (1911), 5 B. W. 
 C. C. 113, reversing the finding of the arbitrator) ; a rupture became 
 strangulated during the course of employment, but there was nothing 
 more than conjecture upon which to base the contention that the 
 strangulation was caused by the exertions attending the employment 
 (Walker v. Hurrays (1911), 48 S. L. E. 741) ; a workman suffered 
 from heart disease and had to leave off work ; he alleged that he had 
 strained himself while doing certain work ; the arbitrator disbelieved 
 this part of the evidence ; there was no other evidence of accident 
 (Beaumont v. Underground Electric Railways Co. of London, 
 Limited (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 247, reversing the finding of the 
 arbitrator) ; a railway fireman had cut his finger at home ; this was 
 followed by blood-poisoning, which might have been caused by his 
 dirty employment or in many other ways ; there was no particular 
 probability as to the former (Chandler v. G. W. R. Co. (1912), 106 L. T. 
 479 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 254) ; a workman considerably exerted himself 
 in lifting a hutch on to some rails ; he felt a sharp pain and left off 
 work ; he became permanently disabled ; he had advanced heart 
 disease of long standing, which was bound to manifest itself sooner or 
 later, and might do so without exertion (Spence v. W. Baird <& Co., 
 Limited (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 542) ; a workman having been injured 
 by accident was affected in his sight and mind ; he was found 
 drowned ; in the absence of evidence there was no inference that he 
 had committed suicide as a consequence of his injury (Southall v. 
 Cheshire County News Co. (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 251) ; a collier died 
 of blood-poisoning due to an abscess in his knee ; beyond the fact 
 that his work necessitated kneeling there was no evidence that he had 
 sustained injury in the mine (Howe v. Fernhill Collieries, Limited 
 (1912) 5 B. W. C. C. 629); a game-keeper had to look after his 
 employer's sporting dogs ; he also acted as an amateur veterinary 
 surgeon for other people ; in these two capacities he handled the 
 carcases of animals on July 31, Aug. 2, 3 and 5, the first and last 
 being his employer's animals ; it was proved that the animal handled 
 on the last date died of anthrax ; there was no evidence as to what 
 the other animals died of ; the game-keeper fell ill on Aug. 11 of 
 anthrax and died on Aug. 18; there was evidence that these dates 
 were within the period of incubation of anthrax ; the arbitrator found 
 that there was no accident and that if there was it did not arise out 
 of the employment, and the Court of Appeal held that there was 
 evidence to justify this (Sherwood v. Johnson (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 686). 
 
 Proposition 3. In the case of a death claim, if it is shown that 
 up to the time of the accident the deceased workman had been actually 
 engaged in his employer's work, and that the accident was caused by an 
 act which was consistent witli a continuance of that work, the proper 
 presumption is that the workman was doing that act in continued 
 performance of his work, and not for some other purpose (Astley v. 
 Evans & Co., Limited, [1911] 1 K. B. 1036 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 209, per 
 FLETCHER MOULTON, L.J.) ; but no such presumption arises unless it 
 is shown by evidence that immediately previous to the accident the 
 workman had been so actually engaged (ibid, per COZENS-HARDY, 
 
Sect. 1 (I)] PUOOF OF ACCIDENT ARISING OUT OF, ETC. 39 
 
 M.R.; McDonald v. Owners of S.S. Banana, [1908] 2 K. B. 926; 1 
 B. W. C. C. 185). 
 
 Two trains were running together, uncoupled, towards some points, 
 in order to shunt into a siding. The brakesman of one or other of the 
 trains would have to move the points. The deceased brakesman 
 endeavoured to climb from the truck in which he was riding on to 
 the brake-van of the other train. In so doing he fell and was killed. 
 No one was able to say why deceased attempted, to climb as he did. 
 A majority of the Court of Appeal decided that the proper inference to 
 draw from the facts was that the act of the j deceased which caused his 
 death was done in the exercise of his employment and arose out of it 
 (Astley v. R. Evans & Co., Limited, [1911] A. C. 674; 4 B. W. C. C. 
 319). 
 
 For illustrations of the latter part of the proposition, see McDonald 
 v. Owners of S.S. Banana, p. 34, ante; He-witt v. Owners of S.S. 
 Duchess, p. 35, ante; O'Brien v. Star Line, Limited, p. 34, ante. 
 
 Proposition 4. If the facts shoiu that at the time of the accident 
 the injured workman was doing something outside the usual limits 
 of his employment, or that he was at a place where he would not 
 usually be found in the course of his enjoyment, the onus of proof 
 is not discharged until the applicant has shown affirmatively that 
 the act or the position of the 'workman was justified by lawful orders 
 or recognised practice or the like (Edwards v. International Coal 
 Co., Limited, (1899), Times, Nov. 13th ; 5 W. C. C. 21). 
 
 In Douglas v. United Minera Co., Limited, (1900), Times, February 
 20th ; 2 W. C. C. 15, a man was killed while being hoisted up a shaft 
 of a mine. It was a wrong course for him to adopt, but it was found 
 to be a common practice and a recognised custom. The Court of 
 Appeal upheld the decision of the arbitrator that the dependants had 
 established their claim to compensation. 
 
 To a similar effect is Robertson v. Allan Brothers & Co. (Liverpool 
 and London), Limited, p. 20, ante. 
 
 The arbitrator found that the deceased, a craneman, had no right to 
 be at the place where his dead body was found, unless he had some 
 special order, or unless the other craneman was not on duty. No 
 such order was proved, and the other craneman was on duty. It was 
 held that the accident did not arise out of or in the course of his 
 employment (Millers v. North British Locomotive Co., Limited (1909), 
 46 S. L. R. 755 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 80). See also Tray nor v. Addie & 
 Sons (1911), 48 S. L. R. 820, where a miner was killed at 11.45 a.m. 
 through a blasting operation while at a spot at which he was told to 
 refrain from working by 10 o'clock owing to the danger of the opera- 
 tion, there being no evidence to explain his presence there. 
 
 Shifting the Onus Of Proof. There is a useful passage in Lord 
 Low's judgment in Grant's Case (1907), 45 S. L. R. 128; 1 B. W. C. C. 
 17, which seems both reasonable and in accordance with all the cases : 
 " The onus may be shifted, especially when the claim is by a dependant 
 of a workman who has been killed, and whose evidence is therefore 
 not available. If in such a case facts are proved, the natural and 
 
40 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 1 (l) 
 
 reasonable inference from which is that the accident happened while 
 the deceased was engaged in his employment, I think that it falls 
 upon the employer, if he disputes the claim, to prove that the contrary 
 was the case." 
 
 In this connection it may be stated that as suicide is a crime the 
 presumption is against it (Bender v. Owners of S.S. Zent, [1909] 
 2 K. B. 41, per FARWELL, L.J., at p. 45 ; Southall \. Cheshire County 
 News Co., (1912) 5 B. W. C. C. 251). 
 
 Evidence. Statements by a man of the sensations which he is 
 experiencing, such as a pain in the head, are admissible in evidence ; 
 but statements as to the origin of the facts in issue, there being no 
 duty to make them, for example, as to the cause of the injury, are not 
 admissible as evidence that he sustained injury by accident (Gilbey \. 
 Grreat Western Rail. Co. (1910), 102 L. T. 202; 3 B. W. C. C. 
 135 ; Wohey v. Petliick Bros. (1908), 1 B. W. C. C. 411 ; Amys v. 
 Barton, [1912] 1 K. B. 40 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 117, and p. 25, ante) ; and 
 in a case where statements of the possible cause of the injury were 
 admitted in evidence because they were not objected to, but such 
 statements were inconsistent with each other, and did not all show 
 that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment, 
 the Court of Appeal held that there was no evidence upon which 
 the arbitrator could hold that it did (Langley v. Reeve (1910), 3 B. W. 
 C. C. 175). 
 
 The headnote in Wright v. Kerrigan, [1911] 2 Ir. B. 301, repre- 
 sents the Court of Appeal in Ireland as deciding that the statements 
 of the deceased workman to a doctor that his injuries were the result 
 of an accident which he described ; but only one of the L. JJ. goes so 
 far as to say that statements as to the cause of the accident are 
 admissible, and his opinion has been dissented from by the C.A. in 
 England (Amys v. Barton, supra), and also in Ireland (Donaghy v. 
 Ulster Spinning Co. (1912) 46 Ir. L. T. B. 33). 
 
 The right of dependants to compensation is not derived from the 
 deceased workman. It is a direct statutory, right (see p. 146, post). 
 Consequently the statements of a deceased workman negativing an 
 accident are not admissible on behalf of the employers in proceedings 
 taken bv the dependants (Tucker v. Oldbury Urban District Council, 
 [1912] 2 K. B. 317 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 296). Nor are such statements 
 admissible as being declarations against interest, unless it can be 
 shown that the deceased knew that they were contrary to his pecuniary 
 interests, and such cannot be the case where there has been no claim 
 made, and no reason to believe that the deceased knew that he would 
 ever be able to make a claim (ibid). Hence, where deceased died 
 owing to some disease or injury to his thumb, evidence was disallowed, 
 on the above grounds, of a statement by deceased to the respondents' 
 manager that he had a whitlow on his thumb and had not hammered 
 it. A further ground for disallowing the evidence was that the 
 -tatement was not necessarily against his interests since it did not 
 destroy his chance of making a claim if he had not died (ibid). 
 
 The entry in the register of deaths as to the cause of death does 
 not, in the absence of the doctor, prove its own correctness (Dundee 
 
Sect. 1(1)] " PERSONAL INJURY ... is CAUSED." 41 
 
 Steam Trawling Co., Limited v. Robl (1910), 48 S. L. B. 11) ; and 
 medical certificates cannot be put in unless the doctor who gave them 
 is going to be called (Richards v. Sanders & Sons (1912), 5 B. W. 
 C. C. 352). 
 
 "PERSONAL INJURY ... is CAUSED." 
 
 Proof. This subject and the amount of proof necessary will be 
 found dealt with in discussing the compensation when death or inca- 
 pacity " results from the injury," see post, pp. 145 and 153, respectively. 
 
 Whether the injury has been caused by the alleged accident is a 
 question of fact (Rayman v. Fields (No. 2), 102 L. T. 154; 3 B. W. 
 C. C. 123 ; Griffiths v. Norths Navigation Collieries (1889), Limited 
 (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 21 ; Swinbank v. Bell Bros., Limited (1911), 
 ibid., 48; and see cases on p. 154, post). 
 
 What is the " Cause " ? The cause of the injury to be regarded 
 is the immediate cause, and not some remote cause which might 
 possibly be discovered by going back along a train of circumstances. 
 Wicto v. Dowell <& Co., Limited, [1905] 2 K. B. 225 ; 7 W. C. C. 14, 
 is an excellent illustration of this principle. Wicks was employed in 
 unloading a ship, and in the course of his work had to stand by an open 
 hatchway. He was seized with an epileptic fit and fell into the hold. 
 The proximate cause of his injuries was the fall from the deck, but it 
 was contended that one ought to go back and discover the remote 
 cause of his falling, that is, the fit. The court, however, held that 
 regard must be had to the proximate cause of the accident, and that 
 the court " ought not to go back along the train of circumstances and 
 trace the accident to some remote source when it is plain that the 
 man was in fact injured by falling from the place where he was 
 standing, and where it was his duty to stand, in discharge of his duty 
 to his employer " (per MATHEW, L.J., ibid., at p. 230). 
 
 " His EMPLOYER SHALL ... BE LIABLE." 
 
 Employer Liable to Pay Compensation. In general the em- 
 ployer who is liable to pay compensation is the employer in whose 
 service the workman is at the time of the accident, and if the accident 
 is a second accident he must claim in respect of that, even though the 
 first accident was a contributory cause of the second, and he cannot 
 base his claim on the original accident (Noden v. Galloways, Ltd., 
 [1912] 1 K. B. 46 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 7). 
 
 When a " principal " under s. 4 has a claim made against him, 
 or proceedings taken against him, for compensation under the Act 
 by the injured workman of a contractor, all references in the Act 
 to the employer are to apply equally to the "principal" (s. 4 and 
 p. 74, post). 
 
 As to who is the employer when the services of a workman are 
 temporarily lent or let on hire, see s. 13 and pp. 114 and 117, post. 
 
 As to which employer is liable in cases of industrial disease, see 
 p. \(fi,post. 
 
4i ; WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 1 (2) 
 " IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FIRST SCHEDULE." 
 
 Liability under the Schedule. The liability under the Schedule 
 is to pay the prescribed compensation " where death results from 
 the injury," and " where total or partial incapacity for work results 
 from the injury." As to the meaning of the word "results " in each 
 of these phrases, see respectively pp. 145 and 153, post. 
 
 Scale of Compensation. See p. 134, post. 
 
 (2) Provided that 
 
 (a) The employer shall not be liable under this Act in 
 
 respect of any injury which does not disable the 
 workman for a period of at least one week from 
 earning full wages at the work at which he was 
 employed : 
 
 (b) When the injury was caused by the personal 
 
 negligence or wilful act of the employer or of some 
 person for whose act or default the employer is 
 responsible, nothing in this Act shall affect any 
 civil liability of the employer, but in that case the 
 workman may, at his option, either claim com- 
 pensation under this Act or take proceedings 
 independently of this Act ; but the employer 
 shall not be liable to pay compensation for 
 injury to a workman by accident arising out of 
 and in the course of the employment both indepen- 
 dently of and also under this Act, and shall not be 
 liable to any proceedings independently of this Act, 
 except in case of such personal negligence or 
 wilful act as aforesaid : 
 
 (c) If it is proved that the injury to a workman is 
 
 attributable to the serious and wilful misconduct of 
 that workman, any compensation claimed in 
 respect of that injury shall, unless the injury 
 results in death or serious and permanent disable- 
 ment, be disallowed. 
 
Sect. 1 (2)] LIMITATIONS ON EMPLOYEE'S LIABILITY. 43 
 LIMITATIONS ON EMPLOYEE'S LIABILITY 
 
 Sub-section (2) contains the limitations to the liability imposed on 
 the employer by the first sub-section. There are three of them, but 
 a fourth is added by s. 8, which deals with industrial diseases ; and a 
 fifth is added by s. 6, which relates to proceedings against a stranger 
 who has caused the injury. 
 
 No compensation is payable under the Act where : (1) The injury 
 is trivial ; (2) the workman has elected to proceed against his employer 
 by action for damages ; (3) the workman is injured through his own 
 serious and wilful misconduct, except in certain serious cases ; (4) the 
 workman who is incapacitated through an industrial disease has 
 fraudulently represented himself as never having previously suffered 
 from it; (5) the workman has recovered damages from a stranger 
 who has caused the injury. 
 
 1. WHERE THE INJURIES ARE TRIVIAL. 
 
 The injury must be so serious as to disable the workman for at 
 least a week from earning full wages at the work at which he was 
 employed. With this sub-clause (a) must be read proviso (a) to 
 Sched. I., paragraph (1) (b), .which provides that "if the incapacity 
 lasts less than two weeks no compensation shall be payable in 
 respect of the first week." 
 
 2. WHERE THE WORKMAN HAS ELECTED TO PROCEED AGAINST HIS 
 EMPLOYER BY ACTION. 
 
 Effect Of Sub-section (2) (b). This clause of the sub-section 
 preserves to the workman the right of proceeding against his employer 
 by action for damages either at common law or under the Employers' 
 Liability Act, 1880, by giving him an option to so proceed or to claim 
 compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
 
 In order to' understand correctly the rights of the workman it is 
 necessary to read with this clause sub-s. (4) of s. 1, which provides 
 that where the action is dismissed " the court in which the action is 
 tried shall, if the plaintiff so choose, proceed to assess such compensa- 
 tion, but may deduct from such compensation all or part of the costs 
 which, in its judgment, have been caused by the plaintiff bringing the 
 action instead of proceeding under this Act." Sub-section (4) then 
 proceeds to require a certificate to be given by the court, " and such 
 certificate shall have the force and effect of an award under this Act." 
 
 The workman's position was clearly explained by the MASTER OF 
 THE ROLLS in Neale v. Electric and Ordnance Accessories Co. Limited, 
 [1906] 2 K. B. 558 ; 8 W. C. C. 6. " The procedure .provided for in 
 s. 1 of that Act involves an option to be exercised by the workman. 
 It was competent for the legislature, when giving to workmen an 
 entirely new right t.o compensation for injury as against their 
 employers, to clog that right with any conditions which they thought 
 
44 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 1 (2) 
 
 fit to impose. Such a condition is imposed by s. 1, sub-s. (2), of the 
 Act." After stating it, the MASTER OF THE EOLLS proceeded: "That 
 sub-section gives the workman, in cases to which it applies, an option 
 whether he will claim compensation under the Act or take proceed- 
 ings against the employer independently of the Act ; but, having that 
 option, he must take it subject to the condition upon which it is 
 given, namely, that, though he may have one of two modes of relief, 
 he cannot have both. Therefore a concluded election to accept one 
 of these modes of relief operates to debar him from claiming the 
 other. If the section had stopped there, it would seem that possibly 
 an election by the workman to take proceedings independently of 
 the Act might, even if such proceedings proved unsuccessful, have 
 prevented him from afterwards having recourse to the alternative 
 remedy given by the Act. In view, apparently, of the possibility of 
 that result, the legislature has thought fit to mitigate any hardships 
 that might thus be occasioned by introducing the qualification con- 
 tained in sub-s. (4), the effect of which appears to be that, ... if 
 those proceedings prove unsuccessful at the trial, the workman shall 
 have a right, S he chooses, to recur to his remedy under the 
 Workmen's Compensation Act on the condition laid down by the 
 sub-section, namely, that he shall then and there make an application 
 for compensation under that Act, and obtain an assessment of such 
 compensation by the judge. The result of such an application, and 
 an award of compensation thereupon made by the judge, seems to me 
 to be that the option given to the workman by the Act is conclusively 
 exercised" ([1906] 2 K. B., at pp. 564, 565). 
 
 When a Claim under the Act is Barred by Action brought 
 
 against Employer. It is now well established that if a workman 
 prosecutes an action against his employer to a final issue, he has con- 
 clusively elected his remedy, and if unsuccessful in that action he 
 must then and there ask the court to assess compensation under 
 sub-s. (4) of s. 1 or forego it for ever (Edwards v. Godfrey, [1899] 
 2 Q. B. 333 ; 1 W. C. C. 32 ; Cribb v. Kynochs, Limited, [1908] 
 2 K. B. 551 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 43 ; see also Fagan v. Reed Bros. 
 (1899), Times, June 5th). In CriWs Case notice was given under the 
 Act, and more than six months later an action at common law was 
 commenced in which the plaintiff secured a verdict which was reversed 
 on appeal. Arbitration proceedings were then commenced under the 
 Act and compensation was awarded. The award was, however, set 
 aside on the ground that the applicant had already exercised her 
 option by prosecuting an action to a final determination. 
 
 It is submitted that there may be a concluded election to proceed 
 by action, although the proceedings have not come to a final issue 
 after trial. The sub-section rather indicates that the workman must 
 make his choice at the outset (see the judgment of BUCKLEY, L.J., in 
 Cribl \. Kynochs, Limited, [1908], 2 K. B. 551 at p. 560), and the 
 Court of Appeal have held that the object of the sub-section is to 
 protect the employer against double proceedings (Cribb v. Kynochs, 
 Limited, supra. Such a protection is of little value if the work- 
 man may prosecute an action through all its interlocutory stages 
 
Sect. 1 (2)] WORKMAN'S ELECTION OF REMEDY. 45 
 
 until the actual trial, or at least the setting of it clown for trial. The 
 question was raised in Johnson v. Wodtton (1911) 27 T. L. E. 
 487 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 258, but the appeal was dismissed without an 
 opinion being expressed on the poin't. The applicant had deliberately 
 issued a writ against his employer, but the action was subsequently 
 dismissed with costs for want of prosecution. The county court 
 judge held that the applicant had made his election, and was barred 
 from bringing proceedings under the Act. This decision seems to be 
 in accordance with the principles of the judgments in CribVs Case. 
 
 There still remains the question whether an unsuccessful plaintiff 
 can in any way protect his right to have compensation assessed under 
 s. 1, sub-s. (1) pending an appeal in the action. It has been decided 
 that if he makes his application and is awarded compensation he cannot 
 proceed further in the action by way of appeal (Neale v. Electric and 
 Ordnance Accessories Co., Limited, [1906] 2 K. B. 558 ; 8 W. C. C. 6). 
 But can he ask_pro forma for compensation and obtain an adjourn- 
 ment of the hearing of such application pending appeal in the action ? 
 A Divisional Court has decided that he has a right to protect his 
 interests under the Act in this way (Isaacson v. New Grand (Clapham 
 Junction), Limited, [1903] 1 K.B. 539 ; 5 W. C. C. 35), but the Court 
 of Appeal have not decided the point. In Nettle's Case the Lords 
 Justices distinguished | Isaacson's Case on the ground that in the latter 
 there was no award made to act as an estoppel. Their lordships 
 refused to express an opinion on the decision, but it is difficult to 
 reconcile it with the judgment of the MASTER OF THE BOLLS in 
 Neale 1 s Case, (or with the decision in Edwards v. Godfrey, and Cribb 
 \. KynocJis, Limited, supra. 
 
 In a Scottish case, where an action had been dismissed on the 
 ground that the workman had previously elected to take compensation 
 under the Act, and the plaintiff appealed but the Court of Session 
 dismissed the appeal, the court remitted the case to the sheriff to 
 adjust the j compensation due (Little v. MacLellan, Limited (1900), 
 2 F. 387). In another case ten weeks after an unsuccessful appeal an 
 application was made to the Court of Session craving the court to 
 assess compensation, but was dismissed as being too late (Baird v. 
 Higginlotliom & Co. (1901), 38 S. L. B. 479 ; followed in M'Gowan v. 
 Smith (1907), 44 S. L. B. 384, where the application was made within 
 a fortnight). 
 
 As to the course adopted when a workman has been successful in 
 his action below but has failed on appeal, see p. 60, post . 
 
 As to other ways in which arbitration under the Act may be 
 barred, see p. 57, post. 
 
 When Action against Employer ia. Barred. When a workman 
 who has a right to claim compensation under the Act prosecutes such 
 claim to a decision, he cannot, if unsuccessful in that claim, proceed 
 by action against his employer. This has been expressly decided by 
 the Court of Session in Scotland in a case where a claimant having 
 failed under the Act, owing to a finding of serious and wilful miscon- 
 duct, attempted to bring an action against his employer for negligence 
 (Burton v. Chapel Coal Co., Limited, [1909] S. C. 430 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 
 
46 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 1 (2) 
 
 120). The point has not come directly before the Court of Appeal in 
 England, but having regard to the judgments in Cribb's Case (p. 44, 
 ante) there can be no doubt that it. will be decided in the same way. 
 " I think that the true meaning of the Act is that a workman cannot 
 proceed to trial under the Act and fail, and then proceed by common 
 law action, and also cannot proceed by common law action and, having 
 failed in that action, then proceed under the Act (Cribb v. Kynochs, 
 Limited, [1908] 2 K. B. at p. 555 ; 1 B. W. C, C. at p. 45, per 
 COZENS-HARDY, M.E.). 
 
 A majority of the Court of Appeal in Ireland have, however, held 
 that the purpose and effect of sub-s. (2) (b) of s. 1 are to protect the 
 employer against double payment and not against double proceedings 
 (BecMey v. Scott <t Co., [1902] 2 I. B. 504). A Divisional Court in 
 England approved the reasoning of this decision, and declared that 
 the decision was not inconsistent with Edwards v. Godfrey (Rouse 
 v. .Di.ro??, [1904] 2 K. B. 628; 6 W. C. C. 44) ; but both the Court of 
 Appeal in England and the Court of Session in Scotland have 
 unanimously disapproved of that reasoning (Cribb v. Kynochs, Limited, 
 supra ; Burton v. Chapel Coal Co, Limited, p. 45, ante). 
 
 As we have stated the proposition, it is limited to cases where the 
 workman has a right to claim compensation under the Act. Accord- 
 ing to the Court of Session this is a proper qualification to make. The 
 section presupposes the existence of a choice of remedies, and if a work- 
 man has no right or title under the Act at all he does not by taking 
 mistaken proceedings thereunder debar himself afterwards from pro- 
 ceeding by action. He is then in the position of a person who has 
 adopted a wrong remedy, and there is no principle of law which prevents 
 his taking a right one when he has discovered his mistake. Hence it 
 was held in Scotland that where a claim under the Act of 1897 was 
 unsuccessful because the claimant was only partially dependent, and 
 there were total dependants who ousted him, he was held entitled to 
 bring a subsequent action for damages and solatium (Blain v. GrcenocJc 
 Foundry Co. (1903), 5 F. 898 ; M' Donald v. James Dunlop & Co. 
 (1900), Limited (1905), 42 S. L. B. 394, approved but distinguished in 
 Burton v. Chapel Coal Co., Limited, [1909] S. C. 430 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 
 120). Upon this ground the decision, though not the reasoning, of 
 Becltley v. Scott, supra, can be supported, inasmuch as in that case 
 the workman had not, according to the decisions of that time, any 
 right to claim under the Act because he had been in his employment 
 less than a fortnight. In the same way the decision of Rouse v. 
 Dixon, supra, can be supported because Rouse was not engaged in an 
 employment under the Act, he being engaged on a building less than 
 the required statutory height. 
 
 Whether the Court of Appeal in England will recognise the distinc- 
 tion between these two classes of cases remains to be seen. The 
 judgments in Cribb 1 s Case did not touch the point. It is true that the 
 language used by the Lords Justices is very wide in its terms, but it is 
 only fair to assume that it was used in respect of the facts of the case, 
 which were that the plaintiff had a right to compensation under the 
 Act, and could have obtained it if the proper steps had been 
 taken, 
 
Sect. 1 (2)] " SERIOUS AND WILFUL MISCONDUCT/* 47 
 
 Further, if after an unsuccessful action the plaintiff asks for 
 and is awarded compensation by the Court under s. 1, sub-s. (4) 
 of the Act, he cannot proceed to appeal in the action, but is 
 bound 1 by his election even though he be an infant (Neale v. Electric 
 and Ordnance Accessories Co., Limited, [1906] 2 K. B. 558 ; 
 8 W. C. C. 6). 
 
 Again, there will be a concluded, election, and subsequent action 
 will be barred if the workman has claimed, or has by a valid and binding 
 agreement agreed to accept, compensation under the Act, and has 
 been paid compensation in respect thereof (Campbell v. Caledonian 
 Kail. Co. (1899), 1 F. 887; Little v. MacLellan, Limited (1900), 2 F. 
 387) ; or if he has accepted a scheme which has been duly certified 
 under the Act (Taylor v. Hamstead Colliery Co., [1904J 1 K. B. 838; 
 6 W. C. C. 34). 
 
 A mere agreement without satisfaction by payment will not amount 
 to a bar (HawJces v. Richard Coles & Sons (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 163). 
 "Whether or not there has been a valid and binding agreement is a 
 question! to be determined by the arbitrator. 
 
 See generally as to agreements, p. 53, post, and particularly as to 
 agreements with infants, p. 54, post. 
 
 A request for arbitration filed but withdrawn before hearing, does 
 not amount to a concluded election, and does not constitute a bar to a 
 subsequent and substituted action for damages (Souse v. Dixon, 
 [1904] 2 K. B. 628 ; 6 W. C. C. 44 ; a decision of a Divisional Court 
 which was not overruled, but distinguished in Cribb v. Ky nocks, 
 Limited, p. 44, ante). 
 
 Election by Infants. See p. 54, post. 
 
 ' 3. WHERE THE INJURY is ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE WORKMAN'S 
 SERIOUS AND WILFUL MISCONDUCT. 
 
 Onus* of Proof. It lies upon the employer to prove that the injury 
 was attributable to the serious and wilful misconduct of the workman 
 (Johnson (Pauper) v. Marshall, Sons & Co., Limited, [1906] A. C. 
 409; 8 W. C. C. 10). He must, therefore, show serious misconduct, 
 wilful misconduct, and that the injury was attributable to the serious 
 and wilful misconduct alleged. 
 
 Serious Misconduct. In the first place, the misconduct must be 
 serious, and this means not merely that the consequences are 
 serious but that the misconduct itself is serious (Johnson (Pauper) v. 
 Marshall, Sons & Co., Limited, supra). 
 
 No general principle or rule can be enunciated which will enable 
 one to discriminate between an act which is " serious " and one which 
 cannot be so termed. Each case must depend on its peculiar facts. 
 The breach of a rule may provide the opportunity for the happening of 
 an injury, yet, at the same time, it does not follow that the breach of 
 the rule will, as a matter of course, necessitate an increase or certainty 
 of risk. For example, a factory hand might be forbidden to cross a 
 
48 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 1 (2) 
 
 particular part of the factory, and if while so doing, contrary to the rule, 
 he were injured by accident, that disobedience would not of necessity 
 constitute "serious misconduct" (McNicholas v. J?. F. Dawson & 
 Son, [1899] 1 Q. B. 773 ; 1 W. C. C. 80). 
 
 Another illustration is that of Johnson (Pauper] v. Marshall, Sons 
 & Co., Limited, p. 47, ante, in the House of Lords. A workman was 
 killed in using a lift. A notice forbad the use of the lift by any one 
 unless he was in charge of a load. He used the lift, as other work- 
 men often did, without a load. It was assumed, for the purpose of 
 the decision, that the employers had no knowledge of, and did not 
 countenance, such practice on the part of their men. The House of 
 Lords held that the mere breach of this rule did not amount to serious 
 misconduct. The fact that deceased did without a load what he might 
 rightly have done with a load did not increase the danger. See also 
 Logue v. FuUarton, Hodgart and Barclay (1901), 3 F. 1006, a case 
 of using a hoist contrary to notice but in accordance with general 
 practice; and Douglas v. United Minera Mining Co., Limited, 2 
 W. C. C. 15 ; Times, February 20th, 1900, a case of using a wrong way 
 out of a mine. 
 
 On the other hand, where there is a deliberate and unmistakable 
 act of disobedience to an express order, or where there is a deliberate 
 breach of a law or rule, which is framed in the interests of the work- 
 men and for the express purpose of securing their safety, it will 
 usually be held that such a breach or such disobedience amounts to 
 serious misconduct ; but there can be no rule of law on the point, and 
 each case must be determined on the facts (George \, ,The Glasgow 
 Coal Co., Limited, [1909] A. C. 123 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 125, per Lord LORE- 
 BURN, L.C., but see the remarks of the Lord PRESIDENT on this dictum 
 in Donnachie v. United Collieries, Ltd., [1910] S. C. 503, at p. 505). 
 
 An illustration of this is found in the case of Bist v. London 
 and South Western Rail. Co., [1907] A. C. 209 ; 9 W. C. C. 19, where 
 (under the original Act) it was held that it was serious and wilful mis- 
 conduct when an engine-driver was guilty of deliberate disobedience 
 of a rule that " Enginenien and firemen must not leave the footplate 
 of their engine when the latter is in motion." 
 
 Other cases are those of CaUaghan v. Maxwell (1900), 2 F. 420, 
 where a girl bidden to stop in a certain place, and warned of the 
 danger of moving about, did leave it to speak to a comrade ; Guthrie 
 v. Boase Spinning Co. (1901), 3 F. 769, where a workman was guilty 
 of a breach of a well-known rule against cleaning machinery in 
 motion ; McCaffrey v. Great Northern Rail. Co. (1902), 36 Ir. L. T. R. 
 27, where labourers worked a lorry on a wrong set of metals contrary 
 to the company's rules ; Powell v. Lanarkshire Steel Co., Limited 
 (1904), 6 F. 1039, where boys disobediently played about a waggon- 
 way ; Dailly v. John Watson, Limited (1900), 2 F. 1044, where a miner 
 contrary to colliery rules carried together an explosive cartridge and a 
 naked light ; O'Hara v. Cadzow Coal Co., Limited (1903), 5 F. 439, 
 where miners were guilty of a breach of a rule which required sprags 
 or props to be set; Brook&r v. Warren (1906), 23 T. L. R. 201; 9 
 AY. C. C. 26, where a workman persisted in refusing to use a fence to 
 a steam saw to prevent wood flying, and was killed in consequence ; 
 
Sect. 1 (2)] " SERIOUS AND WILFUL MISCONDUCT." 49 
 
 George v. Glasgow Coal Co., Limited, [1909] A. C. 123 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 
 125, where a miner broke a rule that he should not open a certain gate 
 until the cage had come to a standstill at the level of the working ; 
 Leishman v. William Dixon, Limited, [1910] S. C. 498 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 560, 
 where a miner crossed a working shaft whilst the cage was raised, it 
 being a very risky and unnecessary thing to do, and in practice never 
 done unless the cage was at its seat, but there was no special rule 
 against so doing ; Donnachie v. United Collieries, Limited, [1910] 
 S. C. 503, where a miner counted his charges of powder with a 
 naked light in his cap near-by, contrary to a special rule. 
 
 Being drunk and unfit to work is serious and wilful misconduct 
 according to the Scottish courts (M'Groarty v. Jno. Brown & Co., 
 Limited (1906), 43 S. L. E. 598). 
 
 It would further appear that an arbitrator would be justified in 
 finding a workman guilty of such misconduct who, being warned of 
 an existing and on-coming danger, risks life and limb by not heeding 
 the warning. Such is the case of John v. Albion Coal Co., Limited 
 (1901), 18 T. L. E. 27 ; 4 W. C. C. 15, where a miner, being warned at 
 the first manhole that a journey of trams was coming, persisted in 
 continuing his walk, and was killed at the seventh manhole. The 
 Court of Appeal refused to disturb a finding of serious and wilful 
 misconduct, although in a previous case the same court had reversed 
 a similar finding, where, under similar facts, the workman did not 
 heed the warning and was injured by the tram-cable slipping (Rees v. 
 Powell Du/ryn Steam Coal Co., Limited (1900), 64 J. P. 164). 
 
 " Wilful Misconduct."" ' Wilful misconduct ' means misconduct 
 to which the will is a party, something opposed to accident or negli- 
 gence ; the misconduct, not the conduct, must be wilful. It has been 
 said, and I think, correctly, that, perhaps, one condition of ' wilful 
 misconduct ' must be that the person guilty of it should know that 
 mischief will result from it. But to my mind there might be other 
 ' wilful misconduct.' I think it would be wilful misconduct if a man 
 did an act not knowing whether mischief would or would not result 
 from it. I do I not mean when in a state of ignorance, but after being 
 told, ' Now this may or may not be a right thing to do.' He might 
 say, ' Well, I do not know which is right, and I do not care. I will 
 do this.' I am much inclined to think that that would be ' wilful 
 misconduct,' because he acted under the supposition that it might be 
 mischievous, and with an indifference to his duty to ascertain whether 
 it was mischievous or not. I think that would be wilful misconduct " 
 (Lewis v. Great Western Hail. Co. (1877), 3 Q. B. D. 195, per BRAM- 
 WELL, L.J., at p. 206). 
 
 " The word ' wilful ' . . . imports that the misconduct was de- 
 liberate, not merely a thoughtless act on the spur of the moment " 
 (Johnson (Pauper) v. Marshall, Sonsfo Co., Limited, [1906] A. C. 409: 
 per Lord LOREBUEN, L.C., at p. 411. See also the judgment of Lord 
 JAMES OF HEREFORD, Bist's Case, p. 48, ante). Hence ignorance will 
 negative misconduct, and negligence, inadvertence, impulse, and error 
 of judgment will not as a rule constitute it. 
 
 Illustrations will be found in the cases of Reeks v. Kynochs, Limited 
 
 W.C.A. E 
 
50 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 1 (2) 
 
 (1901), 50 W. E. 133 ; 4 W. C. C, 14, where a boy on sudden impulse 
 reached across a circular saw contrary to orders ; Whitehead v. Reader, 
 cited p. 18, ante; Todd v. Caledonian Sail Co. (1899), 1 F. 1047, 
 where an engine-driver, accustomed to the risks of the railway, walked 
 011 the lines with his back to a train of which he had received warning ; 
 Runiboll v. The Nunnery Colliery Co. (1899), 80 L. T. 42 ; 1 W. C. C. 
 28, where miners, having in accordance with directions propped up a 
 dangerous working, removed the props into what they thought was a 
 safe position, such removal being necessary in order to comply with 
 orders to go on working : Lynch v. W. Board & Co. (1904), 6 F. 271, 
 where a workman ignorant of the mechanism of a detonator tried to 
 pull out the wires ; Logue v. Fnllarton, Hodgart and Barclay (1901), 
 3 F. 1006, using a hoist contrary to notice but in accordance with 
 general practice; Praties v. Broxburn Oil Co. (1907), 44 S. L. E. 408, 
 omitting to set props in a mine- 
 
 The Court of Session in Scotland has generally taken a very strict 
 view of cases involving a breach of special rules framed for the protec- 
 tion of workmen, and has decided that in such cases ignorance of the 
 rule will not avail the workman (Dobson v. United Collieries, Limited 
 (1905), 43 S. L. E. 260); neither will absent-mindedness (United 
 Collieries, Limited v. M'Ghie (1904), 6 F. 808) ; nor error of judgment 
 (Waddell v. Coliness Iron Co., Limited (1912). 50 S. L. E. 29). 
 
 In the former case the court expressed dissent from the decision in 
 IL-Nicol v. Spiers, Gibb <t Co. (1899), 1 F. 604, where a miner in 
 breach of a rule (of which he might have known but did not know) 
 against entering a place within a certain time of a blasting charge 
 missing fire, returned to the place in the belief that there was no 
 danger. Further, in Lynch v. Baird, supra, they would have 
 decided against the workman if they had thought that his act 
 amounted to a breach of a special rule against unramming a charge in 
 a hole. 
 
 " Attributable." Having established the serious and wilful mis- 
 conduct of the workman, the employer must show that the injury was 
 attributable to it. He must show that the misconduct was the cause 
 of the injury. It need not be the sole cause, but it must be such a 
 cause that the injury would not have happened without it, and was the 
 natural result of it. 
 
 An illustration is found in Sneddon v. Glasgow Coal Co., Limited 
 (1905), 42 S. L. E. 365. Miners, in contravention of a special rule, 
 were riding on loaded hutches in the tunnel of a mine and were 
 injured by a fall of the roof. In the absence of evidence that the fall 
 had any connection with the breach of the rule, the employers failed 
 in the defence of serious and wilful misconduct, because the injury 
 was not attributable to it. See also Wallace v. Glenboig Union 
 Fireclay Co.. Limited, [1907] S. C. 967. 
 
 In W Caff cry v. Great Northern Bail. Co. (1902), 36 Ir. L. T. E. 27, 
 the Court of Appeal in Ireland refused to accept the argument that it 
 was competent to consider questions of contributory negligence in 
 applying the word " attributable." " If a man does a thing that is 
 wrong and exposes himself to an injury, and injury results, it would 
 
Sect. 1 (2)] " SEKiotiS AND WILFUL MISCONDUCT." 51 
 
 be a perversion of the law of contributory negligence to permit him 
 to say ' it would not have happened if you had done something else.' 
 I cannot give to this word ' attributable ' the narrow meaning of the 
 causa causans of the accident ; it means, that the injuries suffered by 
 a man would never have been sustained but for his own serious and 
 wilful misconduct " (per FiTzGiBBON, L.J.)'. 
 
 Whether a Question of Fact, or of Law. Tffe question whether 
 
 or not the conduct amounts to "serious and wilful misconduct" is,' 
 according to the English courts, a question of fact ; and, in order to 
 dispute in the Court of Appeal the finding of a county court judge on 
 this subject, it is necessary to satisfy the court that there was no 
 evidence on which the arbitrator could rightly have found as he has 
 'found (Johnson (Pauper) v. Marshall, Sons & Co., Limited, [1906] 
 A. C. 409 ; 8 W. C. C. 10 ; Bist v. London and South Western Rail. 
 Co., [1907] A. C. 209 ; 9 W. C. C. 19 ; George v. The Glasgow Coal 
 Co., Limited, [1909] A. C. 123 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 125 ; Eumboll v. 
 Nunnery Colliery Co., Limited (1899), 80 L. T. 42 ; 1 W. C. C. 28. 
 And see, in the Irish Courts, M l Caffery v. Great Northern Rail Co. 
 (1902), 36 Ir. L. T. E. 27). 
 
 In RumbolVs Case it was said that an appeal against a finding 
 negativing misconduct could hardly ever be successful ; and such has 
 been the experience. Only in one case has such an appeal succeeded, 
 and in this the deceased workman had deliberately refused, and 
 persisted in refusing, to use a protection to a steam saw,' notwith- 
 standing the protests of the employer and of the factory inspector, 
 whereby a piece of wood flew up and killed him (Brooker v. Warren 
 (1906), 23 T. L. E. 201 ; 9 W. C. C. 26). 
 
 Findings of serious and wilful misconduct have been reversed on 
 the ground that there was no evidence to support them in Johnson 
 (Pauper] v. Marshall, Sons ( Co., Limited, p. 48, ante, and in Rees 
 v. Powell.Duffryn Steam Coal Co., Limited (1900), 64 J. P. 164. 
 
 In the latter case the facts were that a miner, warned that a 
 journey of trams was coming, persisted in walking along the line, and 
 was injured by the cable slipping. But in another case (John v. 
 Albion Coal Co., Limited (1901), 65 J. P. 788; 4 W. C. C. 15), the 
 court refused to disturb a similar finding where a miner had been 
 Warned in the same way at the first manhole, but had persisted in 
 going on, and was caught by the waggons and killed at the seventh 
 hole. The difference between the two cases appears to have been in 
 the fact that the slipping of the cable was a more unexpected occur- 
 rence than the being overtaken by the trams. 
 
 In earlier Scottish cases the opinions of the Court of Session seem 
 to have varied as to whether the question of serious and wilful mis- 
 conduct is one of fact, or of law, or of both (see Glasgow and South 
 Western Rail. Co. v. Laidlaw (1900), 2 F. 708 ; Dailly v. John Wat- 
 son, Limited (1900), 2 F. 1044; Condron v. Gavin Paul & Sons, 
 Limited (1903), 6 F. 29 ; United Collieries, Limited v. M'Ghie (1904), 
 6 F. 808 ; Vaughan v. Nicoll (1906), 8 F. 464 ; Mitchell v. Whitton, 
 [1907] S. C. 1267). 
 
 In later cases the Court of Session have dealt with them as raising 
 
52 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 1 (3) 
 
 merely questions of fact, upon which a decision cannot be disturbed 
 if there be evidence to support it (Leishman v. Dixon, Limited, [1910] 
 S. C. 498 ; Donnachie v. United Collieries, Limited, [1910] S. C. 503 ; 
 3 B. W. C. C. 560 ; WacUell v. Coltness Iron Co., Limited (1912), 50 
 S. L. R, 29). 
 
 When the Defence is not Available. The defence cannot be set 
 
 up against a deceased workman's representatives, but it can be set 
 up against a claim by the injured workman himself, unless he can 
 show that his disablement is " serious and permanent " (s. 1 (2) (c)). 
 No indication is given as to what is to be covered tyy this description, 
 but it should be noticed that the term " disablement " is not restricted 
 to that which is total disablement. 
 
 Where a boy lost the top joint of the first and third fingers it was 
 held that the arbitrator was justified in regarding that as a serious 
 and permanent disablement within the meaning of the sub-section 
 (Hop wood v. Olive and Partington, Limited (1910), 102 L. T. 790; 
 3-B. W. C. C. 359). Compare with this Waddell v. Coltness Iron Co., 
 Limited (1912), 50 S. L. R. 29, where the workman practically lost 
 the sight of one eye but was found not seriously and permanently 
 disabled. 
 
 4. WHERE THE WORKMAN HAS BEEN GUILTY OF FRAUD IN 
 RESPECT OF AN INDUSTRIAL DISEASE. 
 
 Xo compensation is payable in respect of the death or incapacity of 
 a workman through any of the industrial diseases to which the Act 
 applies, if it can be proved that he has at the time of entering the 
 employment wilfully and falsely represented himself in writing as not 
 having previously suffered from the disease (s. 8 (1) (b), p. 102, post). 
 
 5. WHERE THE WORKMAN HAS RECOVERED DAMAGES FROM A 
 STRANGER. 
 
 See on this subject, s. 6 and p. 88, post. 
 
 (3) If any question arises in any proceedings under this 
 Act as to the liability to pay compensation under this Act 
 (including any question as to whether the person injured is 
 a workman to whom this Act applies), or as to the amount or 
 duration of compensation under this Act, the question, if 
 not settled by agreement, shall, subject to the provisions of 
 the First Schedule to this Act, be settled by arbitration, in 
 accordance with the Second Schedule to this Act. 
 
 METHODS OF SETTLING QUESTIONS. 
 
 There are two methods of settling outstanding questions, between 
 the workman and his employer, namely, by agreement or by arbitra- 
 
Sect. 1 (3)] " SETTLED BY AGREEMENT." 53 
 
 tioii. Such questions may relate to the liability to pay compensation, 
 the amount of compensation, and the duration of its payment (s. 1, 
 sub-s. (3)) ; the amount of compensation payable to partial dependants 
 (Sched. I. (1) (ii.)) ; the question as to who are dependants (Sched. I. 
 (8)) ; the review of weekly payments (Sched. I. (16)) ; the redemption 
 of weekly payments (Sched. I. (17)). 
 
 1. BY AGREEMENT. 
 
 Form and Effect of Agreements. Agreements may be expressed 
 verbally or in writing, or they may be implied from the facts and 
 circumstances of the case. 
 
 Whether or not there has been a binding agreement is a question 
 to be determined by the arbitrator, and the effect of his decision in 
 the affirmative is to bar the right of the workman to proceed against 
 his employer either by action (see p. 47, ante), or by any proceedings 
 under the Act, except for the purpose of having a memorandum of the 
 agreement recorded under Sched. II. (9) (Dunlop v. BanJein (1901), 
 4 F. 203; Bradbury v. Bedworth Coal and Iron Co. (1900), Times, 
 March 17th; 2 W. C. C. 138). 
 
 Evidence of Agreement. An agreement may be evidenced by the 
 production of the document or documents in which it is alleged to be 
 contained, and it is for the arbitrator or judge to determine whether 
 it amounts to a valid agreement. A receipt is not an estoppel, and 
 the court can investigate the real facts (see Lee v. Lancashire and 
 Yorkshire Bail. Co. (187 L), L. E. 6 Ch. 527, and Hoioell v. Bradford 
 d- Co. (1911), 104 L. T. 433; 4 B. W. C. C. 203; Macandrew v. Oil. 
 hooley, [1911] S. C. 448 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 370 ; Huclde v. London County 
 Council, p. 91, post). 
 
 If the agreement purports to put an end to all claims there must 
 be satisfaction as well as accord. An agreement to pay a lump sum 
 by way of compensation is not satisfied if a part of that sum is found 
 to represent arrears of wages. Indeed, in such a case there is no 
 genuine agreement at all (Hawkes v. Bichard Coles & Sons (1910), 
 3 B. W. C. C, 163). 
 
 An agreement to release the employer from further liability requires 
 consideration to support it, and the previous payment of money for 
 which the employers were then legally liable is not such consideration 
 (Hughes v. Vothey Valley Co. (1908), 125 L. T. Newsp. 471 ; 
 1 B. W. C. C. 416 C. C.). 
 
 Implied Agreements. An agreement may be implied from the 
 facts and circumstances of the case, subject to the power of the Court 
 to set aside or disregard an alleged agreement entered into under 
 such circumstances as to make it inequitable to hold the parties 
 bound by it (see p. 55, post). 
 
 Thus, the receipt of half wages for six months, the workman knowing 
 that he was receiving them under a statutory obligation imposed on the 
 employer, and there being no circumstances to show that the employer 
 had taken advantage of the workman, is ample evidence of an election 
 of remedies without the production of written receipts (MacJcay v. 
 
54 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1006. [Sect. 1 (3) 
 
 Eosie (1907), 45 S. L. R. 178; 1 B. W. C. C, 52). and generally- 
 speaking a long succession of payments and receipts will be conclusive. 
 (Fowler v. Hughes (1903), 5 F. 394). 
 
 An agreement may also be implied from the fact that the workman 
 has received wages for the period in question, as was the case in 
 Baird < Co. v. Dempster, [1909] S. C. 127 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 144. The 
 workman in that case returned to work at less wages than before the 
 accident, but the amount exceeded the maximum compensation. He 
 remained thus for seven years, during which time he occasionally but 
 unsuccessfully asked for something to make up the deficiency. After 
 incapacity had ceased he brought proceedings claiming some com- 
 pensation during the seven years, and was awarded a lump sum of 
 .100. It was held that he was barred personali exceptione from so 
 claiming. 
 
 But an agreement to release the employer from further liability 
 cannot be implied merely from the fact that the injured workman 
 has. after receiving compensation for some time, returned to work 
 without anything being said on either side as to the cessation or the 
 continuance of the compensation (Williams v. VauxTiall Colliery Co., 
 Limited, [1907] 2 K. B. 433 ; 9 TV. C. C. 120). 
 
 Agreements with Infants. Infants are not bound at common 
 law by contracts which are not for their benefit, and the fact that the 
 definition of ' ; workman " given by the Act includes an apprentice 
 does not alter the common law rule for the purposes of the Workmen's 
 Compensation Act. So that if an infant can show that his election 
 under this sub-section is not for his benefit he will not be bound by 
 it, and will be able to bring an action, notwithstanding an agreement 
 to accept, and actual acceptance of, payments under it (Stephens v. 
 Dudbridge Ironworks Co., [1904] 2 K. B. 225 ; 6 W. C. C. 48 ; Ford 
 v. Wren and Dunham (1903), 5 W. C. C. 48, per WRIGHT, J. See also 
 Robertson v. Henderson d Sons. Limited (1905), 7 F. 776). 
 
 An option to claim compensation after an unsuccessful action 
 exercised by the next friend of an infant under s. 1, sub-s. 4, is a 
 statutory bar, and stands on a different footing from a contract made 
 with an infant, and is binding upon him (Neale v. Electric and 
 Ordnance Accessories Co., Limited, p. 47, ante). As to compromise 
 after an appeal has been lodged, see p. 189, post. 
 
 Agreements with " Insured Persons." As to the duty of 
 employers under the National Insurance Act, 1911, see Appendix A., 
 p. 207, post. 
 
 Recording Agreements. The recording of a memorandum of 
 agreement in the proper county court is highly advisable though 
 not obligatory. In certain cases registration is necessary if the 
 employer wishes to protect himself (see Sched. II. (10), "p. 193, post)< 
 
 A settlement of all disputes made before any weekly payments have 
 been made does not require registration to be effective (Rya?i v, 
 Hartley (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 407, and see p. 133, post). 
 
Sect, i (3)] "SETTLED BY AGREEMENT." 55 
 
 Setting aside Agreements. It is always competent to the 
 
 workman to ask for relief from what purports to be an agreement, on 
 the ground that it was obtained from him by. fraud or undue influence, 
 or similar improper means, or was entered into under such circum- 
 stances as would render it inequitable to hold him bound by its terms 
 (Hunter v. Darngavil Coal Co., Limited (1900), 3 F. 10 ; Fowler v. 
 Hughes (1908), 5 F. 394 ; and see the judgments in Little v. MacLellan 
 (1900), 2 F. 387, and in Dornan v. Allan & Son (1900), 3 F. 112. 
 See also Crossan v. Caledon Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. (1906), 
 43 S. L. E. 852; Valcnti v. William Dixon, Limited (1907), 44 
 S. L. E. 532; Hawlces v. Richard Coles & Sons (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 
 163, p. 53, ante ; Niddrie and Benhar Coal Co. v. Hanley, p. 197, 
 post; Macandrew v. Gilhooley, [1911] S. C. 448; 4 B. W. C. C. 370). 
 
 For this purpose it is not necessary to take proceedings inde- 
 pendently of the Act, since the validity of the agreement is a question 
 as to the liability of the employer to pay compensation within s. 1, 
 sub-s. (3) of the Act. A workman signed a discharge which purported 
 to be in full satisfaction of all claims past and future, in the belief 
 that he was signing a receipt for compensation in arrear. The 
 employer's cashier took the receipt, thinking that the man had 
 recovered, whereas he was still totally incapacitated. On appeal from 
 an award granting compensation, it was argued that the arbiter was 
 bound to apply the discharge as such until it was reduced by proper 
 legal process. It was held that the arbiter had not misdirected him- 
 self in law, and that the question as to the validity of the discharge 
 was a question as to liability to pay compensation within s. 1 (3) of 
 the Act (Ellis v. The Lochgelly Iron and Coal Co., Limited (1909), 
 46 S. L. E. 960; 2 B. W. C. C. 136). 
 
 Where there was only one payment and receipt, and the workman 
 averred that he had signed the receipt without being aware of its 
 terms, the Court of Session held that there was no binding agreement 
 sufficient to bar proceedings (Fowler v. Hughes (1903), 5 F. 394) ; so 
 where the arbitrator found that the workman had signed a final dis- 
 charge after seven weeks' payment, ' believing that he was merely 
 giving a receipt, and without any idea that he was signing away 
 his statutory rights (O'CallagJian v. Martin (1904), 38 Ir. L. T. B. 
 152). 
 
 The mere fact that medical opinion on both sides has been proved 
 to have been mistaken will not of itself afford a ground for rendering 
 an agreement of discharge null and void (Dornan v. Allan & Son 
 (1900), 3 F. 112). 
 
 The Act gives wide powers to the Eegistrar of the county court in 
 which it is sought to record an agreement to act on any information 
 which he considers sufficient, and to refuse to register the agreement 
 in certain cases and on certain grounds without an order of the judge 
 to do so (Sched. II. (9) (d), and p. 192, post), and in similar cases 
 and circumstances the judge may, within six months of the recording 
 of a memorandum of agreement, order the removal of the record 
 (Sched. II. (9) (e), p. 193, post). 
 
 Enforcing Agreement. A recorded agreement is enforceable as 
 
56 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 1 (?>) 
 
 a county court judgment. An unrecorded agreement can only be 
 used as an answer to a request for arbitration or as a defence in an 
 action. It cannot be itself the subject of an. action (Coclirane v. Traill 
 & Sons (No. 1) (1900), 2 F. 794). 
 
 By agreement the workman was to be given, in lieu of weekly pay- 
 ments, a lump sum and regular employment as a foreman at certain 
 wages. After three years he was dismissed, owing to a dispute, and 
 brought an action for breach of the agreement. It was held that the 
 action was irrelevant on the ground that there had been no breach of 
 agreement, as the employers had given regular emplojTiient for a con- 
 siderable time, and was incompetent because an agreement under the 
 Act could only be enforced under the Act (Laivrie v. James Br< 
 Co., Limited (1908), 45 S. L. E. 477 ; 1 B. \V. C. C. 137). 
 
 See further as to the effect of registering agreements, p. 197, post. 
 
 2. BY ARBITRATION. 
 
 "If any Question arises." It is a condition precedent to the 
 jurisdiction of the arbitrator that a question should exist at the time 
 of launching the application for arbitration (Higgins v. Poulson 
 (No. 1) (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 66), either as to the liability of the 
 employer to pay. or as to the amount or duration of compensation. 
 
 Hence it has been held that the arbitrator has no jurisdiction to 
 entertain an arbitration or to make an award : where employers pro- 
 mise to continue payments under the Act to the full amount, and 
 so long as the period of incapacity shall continue (Field v. Longden 
 < Sons, [1902] 1 K. B. 47; 4 W. C. C. 20; Jones v. Great Central 
 Pail. Co. (1901), 18 T. L. E. 65 ; 4 W. C. C. 23), or so long as the 
 employers are paying the proper compensation (Field v. Longden, 
 supra), even though at the time of making payments they from time 
 to time intimate their opinion that the incapacity has ceased (Sweeney 
 v. Gourlay Bros. & Co. Dundee), Limited (1906), 43 S. L. E. 690), 
 or say that they are only going to continue compensation so long as 
 their own medical man says there is incapacity (Payne v. N. Fortescue 
 & Sons, Limited, [1912" 3 K. B. 346 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 634 ; but see in 
 Scotland, /. Brown rf Co., Limited v. Hunter (1912), 49 S. L. E. 695 ; 
 5 B. W. C. C. 588) ; where a registrar, subsequently supported by 
 the judge, wrongly refused to register an agreement on the ground 
 that it was not " genuine " (see p, 194, post), (Fox v. Battersea 
 Borough Council (1911), 4 B. W. 0. C. 261) ; when a workman, 
 satisfied with the payments he had been receiving for months was 
 urged by the trades union to try and get more (Plant v. Oldnall 
 Colliery Co. (1903), 114 L. T. Newsp. 284) ; where the employer has 
 had no opportunity of either paying or disputing his liability, as 
 where a notice of accident was given on one day and proceedings 
 for arbitration were taken the next day (Caledon Shipbuilding 
 and Engineering Co., Limited v. -Kennedy (1906), 43 S. L. E. 430, 
 687) ; where a workman being in receipt of half wages it was 
 discovered that being a minor he was entitled to full wages, and the 
 respondents immediately tendered the money, which was refused, as 
 costs alleged to be due were not also tendered (Smith v. The Alley 
 
Sect. 1 (3)] " SETTLED BY ARBITKATION." 57 
 
 Park Steam Laundnj Co., Limited, 2 B. W. C. C. 142) ; where an 
 employer agreed to pay the compensation claimed, but refused to 
 sign a form of agreement, and the registrar having regard to the rule 
 then in force (Rule 42a (4) of 1908 (No. 2) now withdrawn) refused to 
 record a memorandum (Mercer v. Hilton (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 6), 
 
 On the other hand a question was held to have arisen so as to give the 
 arbitrator jurisdiction : when, under the original Act, the employers 
 refused to pay a widow until she had taken out letters of administra- 
 tion or otherwise qualified herself for giving a discharge (Glatwortliy 
 v. Green (1902), 86 L. T. 702 ; 4 W. C. C. 152, but this cannot arise 
 now having regard to Sched. I. (5)) ; where the correspondence 
 relied upon as being an agreement which ousted the jurisdiction 
 to entertain the arbitration did not amount in law to an agreement 
 (Brooks v. Andrew Knoivles /& Sons, Limited (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 
 15) ; where payment was tendered only on condition of the workman 
 signing a particular form of receipt expressing that liability was 
 admitted only for the compensation to the date of payment, and that 
 further liability was to be determined week by week (Freeland v. 
 Summarise Iron Co., Limited (1912), 49 S. L. R. 841 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 
 598) ; where at the time of making application for arbitration there 
 was no question in dispute but one was raised by the answer (Barron 
 v. Carmichael (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 437). 
 
 An admission of liability, to a certain date, accompanied by a 
 request to terminate further liability, raises a question for settlement 
 (Bowliill Coal Co. (Fife), Limited v. Malcolm (No. 1) (1909), 46 
 S. L. R. 354 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 131). 
 
 By the Rules under the Act it is now necessary to state concisely 
 in the request for arbitration the question which has arisen between 
 the parties (W. C. R. 8, p. 212,.pos). 
 
 See further on the procedure in arbitrations, p. 183, post. 
 
 When Proceedings for Arbitration are Barred. Proceedings 
 for arbitration may be barred by the workman having elected to 
 proceed by action (see p. 44, ante) ; or by a valid agreement between 
 the parties (see p. 53, ante) ; or by an award finally determining the 
 matter (Nicholson v. Piper, [1907] A. C. 215 ; 9 W. C. C. 123, and 
 see p. 174, post) ; or by having adopted a certified scheme under the Act 
 (see p. 72, post) ; or by having recovered damages from a third party 
 under s. 6 (see p. 88, post). It would also appear that the circum- 
 stances may be such as to create an estoppel. Thus, a workman 
 brought an action but was held barred by his having elected to accept 
 payments under the Act (see Mackay'v. Rosie, p. 53, ante). Thereupon 
 an agreement was recorded. It was held that he could not claim 
 compensation for the period before the recording of the agreement 
 as he had acquiesced in the discontinuance of payments during the 
 subsistence of the action (Rosie v. Mackay (1908), 46 S. L. R. 999; 
 2 B. W. C. C. 150). 
 
 It appears from a decision in the Scottish Courts that to operate as 
 a bar to arbitration proceedings the agreement must be a subsisting 
 agreement applicable to the circumstances. Thus, a workman received 
 compensation for fourteen months. No agreement was registered, 
 and there was no evidence of its having been ended or varied. He 
 
58 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 1 (4) 
 
 returned to work, and so continued for seven years when he became 
 totally incapacitated as a result of the original injury. It was held 
 that a claim for compensation was maintainable ; and that it was not 
 barred by failure to register the original agreement, as it could not 
 have been contemplated that the terms of the original agreement 
 should apply to the circumstances (Dempster v. William Baird& Co., 
 Limited (1908), 45 S. L. E. 432 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 62). 
 
 Arbitration Proceedings. See Sched. II., p. 181, post. 
 
 Where a workman has lodged a claim against his employer, but 
 does not follow it up by legal proceedings, it is open to the employer 
 to make an application for the settlement of any matter by arbitra- 
 tion. As to the procedure in such applications, see W. C. E. 10, 14 
 (2), 17 (5), 18 (8), and 25. 
 
 As to the Liability to pay Compensation. It may happen that 
 the injured workman cannot at the time show that he is entitled to 
 any pecuniary payment, because his employer is, out of compassion, 
 paying him full wages. The Court of Appeal have laid it down that in 
 such a case the workman is entitled to an award declaring the liability 
 but adjourning the question of amount or to an award for a nominal 
 sum (Chandler v. Smith, [1899] 2 Q. B. 506; 1 W. C. C. 19, and 
 p. 40, ante ; Irons v. Davis and Timmins, Limited, [1899] 2 Q. B. 
 330 ; 1 W. C. C. 26). The Scottish Courts do not approve of this 
 method : see p. 175, post. In practice the same effect is obtained by 
 insisting upon a memorandum of agreement being recorded. 
 
 No Claim for Wages in addition to Compensation. A work- 
 man who has received compensation under the Act cannot claim 
 wages during the time for which he has been incapacitated (Elliot v. 
 Liggens, [1902] 2 K. B. 84 ; 4 W. C. C. 11). 
 
 (4) If, within the time hereinafter in this Act limited for 
 taking proceedings, an action is brought to recover damages 
 independently of this Act for injury caused by any accident, 
 and it is determined in such action that the injury is one for 
 which the employer is not liable in such action, but that he 
 would have been liable to pay compensation under the 
 provisions of this Act, the action shall be dismissed ; but the 
 court in which the action is tried shall, if the plaintiff so 
 choose, proceed to assess such compensation, but may deduct 
 from such compensation all or part of the costs which, in its 
 judgment, have been caused by the plaintiff bringing the 
 action instead of proceeding under this Act. In any pro- 
 ceeding under this sub-section, when the court assesses the 
 compensation it shall give a certificate of the compensation 
 
Sect. 1 (4)] COMPENSATION AFTER UNSUCCESSFUL ACTION. 59 
 
 it has awarded and the directions it has given as to the 
 deduction for costs, and such certificate shall have the force 
 and effect of an award under this Act. 
 
 COMPENSATION AFTER UNSUCCESSFUL ACTION. 
 
 Effect of Suti-section. The meaning and effect of this sub-section 
 have already been discussed (p. 43, ante). The application for 
 compensation after an unsuccessful action must be made then and 
 there to the court hearing the action, and the unsuccessful plaintiff 
 cannot at a subsequent date initiate independent proceedings against 
 his employer by a request for arbitration under the Act (Edwards v. 
 Godfrey, [1899] 2 Q. B. 333; 1 W. C. C. 32; Cribb v. Kynochs, 
 Limited, [1908] 2 K. B. 551 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 43 ; and see also 
 Pagan v. Reed Bros., Times, June 5th, 1899). 
 
 The Court of Session have decided that the privilege given by this 
 sub-section is a personal privilege, and that where an action was 
 brought by an alleged dependant within the six months and was 
 dismissed more than a year after the accident, and was followed 
 by an application for an assessment of compensation, it was not 
 competent for the sheriff to add as applicants therein other alleged 
 dependants who had taken no steps during the period allowed by the 
 statute (M'Ginty v. Kyle, [1911] S. C. 589; 4 B. W. C. C. 389). 
 
 As to whether an unsuccessful plaintiff, can protect his rights 
 under this sub-section pending appeal, see p. 45, ante. 
 
 " Determined in such Action." Under the former Act it was 
 quite conceivable that in the ordinary course of an action at common 
 law, or under the Employers' Liability Act, it might not be shown by 
 evidence that a liability existed under the Workmen's Compensation 
 Act. Where this had happened in a Scottish case, it was urged on 
 appeal that the sheriff had no power to convert the action into 
 arbitration proceedings with a view to determining liability under the 
 Act, but the/ Court of Session held that, though not the preferable 
 course, it was one which the sheriff was entitled to adopt (Henderson 
 v. Glasgow Corporation (1900), 37 S. L. R. 857) ; and this is quite a 
 usual course in the English courts, and a plaintiff is entitled to call 
 further evidence to establish his claim to compensation under the Act 
 when that is necessary. See, for example, a county court case 
 of Baxter'^. Norris (1907), 9 W. C. C. 33. 
 
 Deduction' of Costs. The power of the court as to costs is not 
 in any way limited by the provisions of this sub-section ; but the 
 court has full power to deal with the costs of the action and of the 
 proceedings for the assessment of compensation, either under s. 113 of 
 the County Courts Act, 1888, or under s. 5 of the Judicature Act, 
 1890, as the case may be (Cattermole v. Atlantic Transport Co., 
 [1902] 1 K. B. 204 ; 4 W. C. C. 28). In this case the action had 
 been dismissed ; but the judge had ordered the defendants to pay all 
 .the costs, and had not ordered any costs to be deducted from the 
 
HO WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 1 (4) 
 
 compensation. The Court of Appeal, whilst stating that in general 
 this would not be right," refused to interfere with the judge's exercise 
 of discretion, which was not shown to have been exercised on a wrong 
 principle. In Skeggs v. Keen (No. 2), Times, (1899), June 19th ; 1 
 W. C. C. 35, a refusal to allow an unsuccessful plaintiff any costs of 
 assessing compensation, on the ground that all the costs were incurred 
 by bringing the action, was upheld by the Court of Appeal. 
 
 In a county court case it was decided that the proper course is to 
 tax the defendant's bill of costs, and then to tax a hypothetical bill 
 of the costs that would have been incurred if the plaintiff had pro- 
 ceeded under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and the amount by 
 which the former exceeds the latter is the proper sum to be deducted 
 (Keane v. Na*li (No. 1), (1902) 5 W. C. C. 53). 
 
 For an instance of the application of the provision as to deducting 
 costs in the Scottish courts, see M l Kenna v. United Collieries, 
 Limited (1906), 43 S. L. E. 713. The pursuer did not in his action 
 claim alternatively under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and the 
 defenders had not admitted liability under it. The action failed, and 
 no evidence had been given upon which to assess compensation, which 
 was, however, subsequently agreed. The court gave the costs of the 
 action to the defenders down to the date when the verdict was applied, 
 but none to either party for the subsequent matters. 
 
 In another Scottish case defenders were held entitled to costs when 
 they had tendered to pursuers before action, brought at common law 
 and alternatively under the Employers' Liability Act, 1880, a sum to 
 which they admitted pursuers were entitled under the Workmen's 
 Compensation Act, the pursuers having succeeded, to the extent of 
 that sum under the Employers' Liability Act (Black v. Fife Coal Co. 
 Limited (1908), 46 S. L. E. 191 : 2 B. W. C. C, 456). This case went 
 to the House of Lords but the present point did not arise there. 
 
 " The Court in which the Action is Tried." This includes the 
 
 High Court (Cohen v. Sedbrook Bros. (1908), 25 T. L. E. 176; 2 
 B. W. C. C. 155). 
 
 Where the plaintiff has been successful in the court below, but un- 
 successful on the defendants' appeal from that judgment, the case is 
 remitted to the court below to assess the compensation. A workman 
 appealed to a Divisional Court from the county court, and was 
 unsuccessful, and asked for compensation to be assessed. The 
 Divisional Court gave leave to appeal, and extended the time for 
 appealing until after the hearing and determination of an application 
 in the Court below to assess compensation, intimating that in their 
 opinion the Court below is the proper tribunal to assess the compensa- 
 tion (Greenwood v. Greenwood (1907), 97 L. T. 771 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 
 247. See, in the Scottish courts. Little v. MacLellan, Limited 
 (1900), 2 F. 387, and Quinn v. John 'Brown & Co. (1906), 8 F. 855). 
 
 A workman's action was unsuccessful ; a bill of exceptions was 
 taken but refused ; defenders moved the court to apply the verdict ; 
 pursuers asked to have the compensation assessed, and it was held 
 that the application was in time (Star in v. Train Taylor (1911), 
 49 S. L. E. 93 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 525). 
 
Sect. 2 (1)] PROCEEDINGS FOR COMPENSATION. 61 
 
 "The Court . . . shall give a Certificate." This is to have 
 the- force and effect of an award under the Act. It is to be given 
 according to Form 44 in the Appendix to the Rules (W. C. R. 51 (1) ), 
 and the registrar must, on its receipt, record the certificate in like 
 manner as if it were an award made by the judge (W. C. R. 51 (2). 
 Seep. 234, post). 
 
 As to enforcing an award, see Sched. II. (9), p. 192, post, and 
 W. C. R. 6769. 
 
 Appeal. An appeal on the ground that the county court judge 
 has deducted costs which it is alleged he has no power to deduct must 
 be taken to the Court of Appeal and not to the High Court, such 
 decision being one under the Act (see Sched. II., para. 4, p. 184, post, 
 and Williams v. The Army and Navy Auxiliary Co-operative Society, 
 Limited (1907), 23 T. L. R. 408; 9 W. C. C. 134). 
 
 (5) Nothing in this Act shall affect any proceeding for a 
 fine under the enactments relating to mines, factories, or 
 workshops, or the application of any such fine. 
 
 Penalties under Statutes. Criminal liability, and the applica- 
 tion of fines under statutes, continue notwithstanding this Act. See 
 the Factory and Workshop Act, 1901, s. 136; the Coal Mines Regula- 
 tion Act, 1887, s. 70 ; and the Metalliferous Mines Regulation Act, 
 1872, s. 38. 
 
 The infliction of a penalty does not relieve the offender from 
 liability to an action based upon the breach of the statutory duty 
 (Gibson v. DunJcerley Bros. (Lees & SyJces, Third Parties) (1910), 102 
 L. T. 587 ; 8 B. W. C. C. 347 ; affirmed sub nom. Lees & Sy~kes v. 
 DunJcerley Bros., [1911] A. C. 5 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 115). 
 
 2. Time for taking proceedings^} (1) Proceedings for the 
 recovery under this Act of compensation for an injury shall 
 not be maintainable unless notice of the accident has been 
 given as soon as practicable after the happening thereof and 
 before the workman has voluntarily left the employment in 
 which he was injured, and unless the claim for compensation 
 with respect to such accident has been made within six 
 months from the occurrence of the accident causing the 
 injury, or, in case of death, within six months from the time 
 of death : 
 
 Provided always that 
 
 (a) the want of or any defect or inaccuracy in such notice 
 shall not be a bar to the maintenance of such 
 
62 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect, 2 
 
 proceedings if it is found in the proceedings for 
 settling the claim that the employer is not, or 
 would not, if a notice or an amended notice were 
 then given and the hearing postponed, be pre- 
 judiced in his defence by the want, defect, or 
 inaccuracy, or that such want, defect, or in- 
 accuracy was occasioned by mistake, absence from 
 the United Kingdom, or other reasonable cause ; 
 and 
 
 (b) the failure to make a claim within the period above 
 specified shall not be a bar to the maintenance of 
 such proceedings if it is found that the failure was 
 occasioned by mistake, absence from the United 
 Kingdom, or other reasonable cause. 
 
 (2) Notice in respect of an injury under this Act shall 
 give the name and address of the person injured, and shall 
 state in ordinary language the cause of the injury and the 
 date at which the accident happened, and shall be served on 
 the employer, or, if there is more than one employer, upon 
 one of such employers. 
 
 (3) The notice may be served by delivering the same at, 
 or sending it by post in a registered letter addressed to, the 
 residence or place of business of the person on whom it is to 
 be served. 
 
 (4) Where the employer is a body of persons, corporate or 
 unincorporate, the notice may also be served by delivering 
 the same at, or by sending it by post in a registered letter 
 addressed to, the employer at the office, or, if thefe be more 
 than one office, any one of the offices of such body. 
 
 XDITIOXS PRECEDENT TO HECOVERY OF COMPENSATION. 
 Proceedings for the Recovery of Compensation. The Court of 
 
 Appeal in Ireland have held that an application to register an agree- 
 ment under Sched. II. (8) (now paragraph (9) ) is such a proceeding, 
 and must be made within six months from the date of the accident 
 
Sect. 2 (1-4)] THE NOTICE OF ACCIDENT. 63 
 
 (Marno v. Workman, Clark & Co. (No. 2) (1900), 84 Ir. L. T. R. 14) ; 
 but whether this decision is correct or not, it could not apply in 
 a case where a claim to compensation had been made within the 
 six months (see Powell v. Main Colliery Co., [1900] A. C. 366; 2 
 W. C. C. 29, and p. 67, post). 
 
 1. THE NOTICE OF ACCIDENT. 
 
 Notice of Accident. The notice must be in writing (Hughes v. 
 Coed Talon Colliery Co., Limited, [1909] 1 K. B. 95.7 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 
 159, following Keen v. Millwall Dock Co. (1882), 8 Q. B. D. 482). 
 Particulars of an accident entered in a book by a manager in the 
 presence of the injured workman, who has reported the accident in 
 accordance with rules, is sufficient notice (Stevens v. Insoles, Limited 
 [1912] 1 K. B. 36 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 164) ; but verbal notice given to a 
 " kind of foreman " is invalid as a notice (Jackson v. Vickers, Limited 
 (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 433). 
 
 The ;Court of Session in Scotland have held that a notice given 
 expressly under this Act is not good as a notice under the Employers' 
 Liability Act, 1880 (Thompson v. Baird & Co., Limited (1903), 6 F. 
 142) ; and it would appear that a notice given expressly under the 
 Employers' Liability Act, 1880, would not be good as a notice under 
 this Act, apart at least from the provisions relating to defective 
 notice. 
 
 A mere notice of accident does not amount to a " claim " (Perry v. 
 Clements (1901), 17 T. L. E. 524 ; 3 W. C. C. 56). 
 
 As to notice in the case of accidents to seamen, see s. 7 and p. 93, 
 post. As to notice of death, disablement, or suspension from work, 
 owing to an industrial disease which is brought within the Act, see s. 
 8, and p. 109,^os. 
 
 Contents of Notice. The notice must contain the name and 
 address of the persons injured; the cause of the injury; and the 
 date of the accident. 
 
 In case of disablement or suspension from work arising from one of 
 the industrial diseases to which the Act applies, the date of the 
 accident is regulated by s. 8 (1) (a) and (4). See pp. 102 and W4:,post, 
 as to this, and also as to the contents of notices of such disablement 
 or suspension. 
 
 Forms Of Notice. The following forms of notice are suggested as 
 being in accordance with the provisions of the Act in all cases, except 
 those of injuries through industrial diseases, as to which see s. 8 and 
 p. 109, 
 
 1. In a case where the workman has been killed on the spot. 
 
 To Mr. John Smith (employer), 
 
 of The Pelican Works, Battersea, S.W. 
 
 Please x take notice that 011 the 1st day of July, 1907, Thomas Jones, of 
 226, Cromer Street, Lambeth, who was a workman in your employment, 
 was killed by the breaking of a scaffold. 
 
 Yours 'truly, 
 2nd day of July, 1907. MARTHA JONES. 
 
64 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 2 (1-4) 
 
 2. In a case where the workman has been injured. 
 
 To the Northumberland Colliery Company, Limited (employer), 
 
 of 83, Johnson Street, Newcastle-on-Tyne. 
 
 Please take notice that on the 1st day of July, 1907, Robert Watson, of 
 10, Duke Street, Jarrow, who was a workman in your employment, was 
 personally injured by a fall of coal. 
 
 Yours truly, 
 
 2nd day of July, 1907. JOHN WATSON. 
 
 If death occur before the sending of the notice add at the end " from 
 which injury he has since died." 
 
 If the person giving the notice has determined to claim under 
 the Act and not to take other proceedings by action, he may add 
 to either of these forms a demand for compensation under the 
 statute, and this will amount to a valid " claim." See p. 67, post. 
 
 " As SOOn as Practicable." Whether a notice is given " as soon 
 as practicable " must depend upon circumstances. Two months delay 
 has been held fatal (Burrell v. Holloway Brothers (London) Limited 
 (1911), 4 B. TV. C. C. 239), and so has a month (Leach v. Hickson 
 (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 153). 
 
 Before Voluntarily Leaving the Employment. This pro- 
 vision does not apply in cases of incapacity through such industrial 
 diseases as are brought within the statute. See s. 8 (1) (e), p. 103, 
 post. 
 
 Service of Notice of Accident. The proviso to s. 2 (1) which 
 
 has just been discussed, will clearly extend to meet the case of a 
 want of notice arising from bad service, and doubtless the workman 
 would be relieved against the consequences of such bad service, 
 provided he had done his best to comply with the requirements of the 
 Act. The notice may be served by registered post or by hand. In all 
 cases the onus of proving service will rest on the applicant. 
 
 As to service of notice in the case of seamen, see s. 7, and p. 97, $)ost. 
 
 A notice addressed to a company, but enclosed in an envelope 
 directed in the name of the cashier who had charge of the local 
 office at which it was delivered, was held to be a good notice under 
 the Employers' Liability Act, 1880, which contains provisions 
 similar to those of this Act (Duncan v. Fife Coal Co. (1905), 42 
 S. L. R. 822). 
 
 Waiver of Notice. The employer may waive his right to notice, 
 and he will be taken to have done so when, after verbal notice, he pays 
 and the workman accepts weekly payments during incapacity (Davies 
 v. Point of Ayr Collieries, Limited (1909), 2 B. W. C. C. 157). 
 
 Want of or Defect in Notice. The arbitrator is the sole judge 
 to determine whether or not the want of, or the defect or inaccuracy 
 in, a notice shall bar the proceedings. His decision is one of fact 
 which cannot be appealed from, except on the ground that there is no 
 evidence to support it (Bramley v. Evans < Sons (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 
 34 ; Eaton v. Evans (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 82). In arriving at his 
 
Sect. 2 (14)] THE NOTICE OF ACCIDENT. (>5 
 
 decision he must hear evidence and act upon it. He cannot jump 
 to conclusions without it, or assume, e.g., that the employer will or 
 will not be prejudiced (McLean v. Carse <& Holmes (1899), 1 F. 878). 
 Where notice was not given until two months after the accident the 
 Court of Appeal reversed a finding of the county court judge that 
 the employer had not been prejudiced (Burrell v. Holloway Brothers 
 (London) Limited (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 239) ; and so they did when 
 the only alleged notice was a verbal one given immediately after the 
 accident to a person incompetent to receive it, and no other notice 
 was given during the succeeding four months (Jackson v. Vickers 
 Limited (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 433). 
 
 Prejudice of Employer Onus of Proof. The onus of proving 
 
 that the employer has not been prejudiced lies in the first instance on 
 the workman (Hughes v. Coed Talon Colliery Co., Limited, [1909] 
 1 K. B. 957 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 159 ; Tibbs v. Watts, Blake, B-urne & Co., 
 Limited (1909), 2 B. W. C. C. 164; Stronge v. Hazlett (1909), 44 
 Ir. L. T. E. 10 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 581 ; Shannon v. Banbridge Weaving 
 Co. (1910), 45 Ir. L. T. 74 ; Egerton v. Moore, [1912] 2 K. B. 308 ; 5 
 B. W. C. C. 284). 
 
 " The claimant is put to prove a negative, and I should think that 
 very slight evidence would be sufficient to shift the onus on the 
 employer, who certainly is in a position to prove the prejudice, if 
 any, which he may have suffered " (Shearer v. Miller & Sons (1899), 
 37 S. L. E. 80 : per Lord ADAM). 
 
 A man was injured and was away from work for several weeks, and a 
 year and a half later he died from the effects of the accident. Xo written 
 notice was given of the accident. A clerk or cashier of the employers 
 knew of the accident shortly after its occurrence, visited the workman 
 when he was ill, paid him full wages during his absence, and appointed 
 and paid a substitute. It was held that there was evidence upon 
 which the arbitrator could find that the employers had not been 
 prejudiced (Butt v. Gellyceidrim Colliery Co. Limited, (1909), 3 
 B. W. C. C. 44 ; and similarly Stinton v. Brandon Gas Co. (1912), 5 
 B. W. C. C. 426). 
 
 On October 2nd, 1909, a workman was discharged. On October llth 
 he saw a doctor who found him suffering from rupture. Two days later 
 he gave written notice to his employers that he had met with an 
 accident on July 14th, 1909. The man's doctor admitted that it was 
 possible that the rupture commenced earlier than that date. It was 
 alleged that a complaint had been made before October to a man from 
 whom he took orders that applicant had strained himself. It was 
 held, reversing the award, that applicant had not discharged the onus 
 of proving that his employers were not prejudiced in their defence 
 (Hancock v. British Westinghouse Electric Co. (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 
 210). 
 
 Where it was proved that the employer knew of the accident and 
 advised applicant to go to a hospital, and that subsequently a foreman 
 knew of the accident, it was held, in a county court, that the applicant 
 was entitled to relief (Beadle v. Milton (1903), 5 W. C. C. 55). 
 
 Where the delay in giving notice has deprived the employer of his 
 
 W.C.A. F 
 
66 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 2 (14) 
 
 right to indemnity under an insurance policy he has, in a county court, 
 been held to be prejudiced (Barker v. Holmes (1904), 6 W. C. C. 52). 
 It is submitted that this decision was wrong. The Act does not say 
 that the applicant must show that his employer is not prejudiced 
 in his pocket but in his defence. See the judgment of COZENS- 
 HARDY, M.R., in Butt v. Gellyceidrim Colliery Co., Limited (1909), 
 3 B. W. C. C. 44, where this point appears to have been described 
 as " not relevant." 
 
 Mistake or other Reasonable Cause. If the want, etc., of notice 
 
 is due to mistake, absence from the United Kingdom, or other 
 reasonable cause, it is immaterial to consider whether the employer 
 has been, or has not been, prejudiced. Belief that the injury is 
 trivial is a good excuse for not giving notice (Earikine v. Alloa Coal 
 Co., Limited (1904), 6 F. 375 ; Brown v. Lochgelly Iron and 
 Coal Co., Limited (1906), 44 S. L. E. 180 ; Refuge Assurance Co. v. 
 Millar (1911), 49 S. L. E. 67 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 522 ; Hoare v. Arding 
 d- Hobbs (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 36) ; and so is the fact that at the 
 time of the accident there was no apparent injury (Tibbs v. Watts. 
 Blake, Bearne & Co., Limited (1909), 2 B. W. C. C. 164 : Fry v. 
 Cheltenham Corporation (1911). 5 B. W. C. C 162). 
 
 But as soon as the workman realises that he is suffering from an 
 ailment upon which he may be entitled to base a claim for compensa- 
 tion he ought to give notice of it, and by delay he forfeits the right to 
 excuse his conduct on the ground of " mistake or other reasonable 
 cause." A laudable desire to keep on working or a disinclination 
 not to lodge a claim against his employers will not improve his 
 position (Egerton v. Moore. [1912] 2 K. B. 308 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 284; 
 in which case some of the remarks on the subject of " mistake " made 
 by Lord Adam in Rankine v. Alloa Coal Co., supra, were dissented 
 from). With this case should be compared Breakivell v. Clee Hill 
 Granite Co., Limited (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 133. The facts of this case 
 were somewhat special. The man was an old man and a cripple, 
 having lost a foot, and he had been employed practically all his life 
 by the same employers. Having met with an accident he did not 
 give notice or make a claim, fearing lest the insurance company would 
 not let him return to his old employers and hoping he would get 
 better, in which case he would make no claim. He did not learn for 
 three months that he never would get better and then he gave notice 
 and made a claim. It was held that under all the circumstances the 
 failure to give notice was due to mistake or other reasonable cause. 
 
 Ignorance of the workman as to his rights under the Act is neither 
 " mistake " nor " reasonable cause " (Roles v. Pascall S Sons. [1911 ! 
 1 K. B. 982 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 148). 
 
 A working plumber who was engaged by a piece-master, who hi 
 turn was employed by a builder, gave notice to the piece-master, 
 believing that he would communicate it to the builder. No such 
 communication was made to the builder, who did not hear of the 
 matter for five months afterwards. It was held that there was no 
 evidence here of either "mistake" or " reasonable cause" (Griffiths 
 v. Atkinson (1912), 5 B, W. C, C, 3401. 
 
Sect. 2 (14)] THE CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION. 67 
 
 Medical Examination. As to the right of the employer to require 
 a workman who has given notice of accident to submit himself to 
 medical examination, see Sched. I. (4), and p. 162, post. 
 
 2. THE CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION. 
 
 Claim. The words " the claim for compensation " are not confined 
 to the initiation of proceedings before the tribunal by which the com- 
 pensation is to be assessed, but also include notice of a claim for 
 compensation sent to the workman's employer (Powell v. Main 
 Colliery Co., [1900] A. C. 366; 2 W. C. C. 29). 
 
 There is nothing in the Act which requires a claim to be made in 
 writing (Lowe v. M. Myers <& Son, [1906] 2 K. B. 265 ; 8 W. C. C. 22). 
 It need not specify any definite amount (Thompson v. H. W. Goold 
 & Co., Limited, [1910] A. C. 409 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 394, overruling to 
 this extent Bennett v. Wordie & Co. (1899), 1 F. 855 ; Marno v. Work- 
 man, Clarke & Co. (No. 1) (1899), 34 Ir. L. T. E. 83 ; Park v. Maver 
 (1905), 8 F. 250 ; Kilpatrick v. Wemyss Coal Co., Limited (1907), 
 44 S. L. R. 255). It would seem that any communication from 
 which the employer can see that a demand is being made upon 
 him to pay compensation in respect of an accident will amount to a 
 sufficient claim. 
 
 Possibly a bare notice of intention to make a claim would still be 
 held not sufficient (Bennett v. Wordie ; Marno v. Workman, 
 Clarke & Co., supra, both of which cases were approved by the House 
 of Lords in Powell's Case). 
 
 A mere notice of accident is not a claim (Perry v. Clements (1901), 
 49 W. R. 669 ; 3 W. C. C. 56) ; but an application for arbitration is 
 a claim, and does not require to be preceded by any other form of 
 claim (Fraser v. Great North of Scotland Hail. Co. (1901), 3 F. 908). 
 
 Where there has been no written claim, the fact of whether or not 
 a satisfactory claim has been made, may, like any other finding of 
 fact, be gleaned from the surrounding circumstances. Thus, in a case 
 in which a workman was unable to give evidence, having become a 
 lunatic, the employers in their answer to a request for arbitration 
 admitted having paid the workman compensation under the Act, but in 
 another paragraph of the same answer set up the defence that there had 
 been no proper claim made within s. 2. The arbitrator dismissed the 
 application made by the workman, through his wife as next friend, on 
 the ground that there was no evidence of a claim having been made 
 within the statutory period. But the Court of Appeal held that the 
 admission of the employers that they had paid some compensation 
 under the Act was some evidence, upon which the applicant could 
 rely, of a claim having been made, and the case was remitted to the 
 county court for rehearing (Lowe v. M. Myers <& Sons, [1906] 2 K. B. 
 265 ; 8 W. C. C. 22, and see Wright v. Bagnall, infra). 
 
 A workman brought an action against his employer in respect of an 
 injury. This action was dismissed for want of prosecution. Many 
 months later he started arbitration proceedings. In giving evidence 
 therein he did not suggest that he had made any claim under the Act 
 
68 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 2 (14) 
 
 within six months after the accident. His wife alleged that she had 
 said to her husband's employer within the six mouths : " If you can't 
 compensate my husband, won't you compensate me and my children." 
 The Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the arbitrator that there 
 was evidence of a claim having been made (Johnson v. Wootton (1911), 
 27 T. L. E. 487 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 258). 
 
 An employer may initiate proceedings if the workman does not do 
 more than lodge an informal claim (see the judgments in Powell's 
 Case. p. 67, ante). Eules have been framed for the purpose of pro- 
 ceedings by employers (W. C. R. 10, 14 (2), 17 (5), 18 (8), 25). 
 
 As to the making of a claim by seamen or by the dependants of 
 seamen, see s. 7, and pp. 98 and 99, post. 
 
 Limit of Time. The claim for compensation must be made within 
 six months from the occurrence of the accident, or, in the case of 
 death, from the time of death. But, even apart from the statutory 
 provisions granting relief against the consequences of failure to make 
 a claim, this provision is not necessarily an absolute bar to proceed- 
 ings for the assessment of compensation, and the arbitrator has 
 jurisdiction to inquire whether there are any circumstances in the 
 case to estop the employer from raising that defence (Wright v. John 
 Baynall & Sons, Limited, [1900] 2 Q. B. 240; 2 W. C. C. 36; Lee v. 
 Carton-wood Collieries Co. (1901), 4 W. C. C. 32). An agreement, 
 arrived at between the parties shortly after the accident, that there 
 is a statutory liability on the employer to pay compensation, the 
 amount of compensation being left open for future settlement, is 
 evidence upon which the arbitrator may properly find that the em- 
 ployer is estopped from setting up the defence that the request for 
 arbitration was not filed within six months of the accident (ibi<l.}. 
 But where the employers paid the workman weekly through an 
 insurance company one-half the amount of his wages, taking a receipt 
 which expressed that the money was received " on account of com- 
 pensation which may be or become due to me under the Workmen's 
 Compensation Act, 1897," and continued such payments for ten 
 months after the accident, and then stopped them, it was held that 
 there was no evidence of admission on the part of the employers of 
 their liability under the Act to pay compensation, and that they were 
 not estopped from taking the objection that the request for arbitration 
 was out of time (Kendall v. Hill's Dry Dock and Engineering Co., 
 Limited, [1900] 2 Q. B. 245; 2 W. C. C. 40; O'Neill v. Mother well, 
 [1907] S. C. 1076). The Wright and Kendall Cases were decided 
 before the decision of the House of Lords in Powell's Case (see p. 67, 
 af"), and on the assumption that the word " claim " meant " request 
 for arbitration proceedings." The former decision may still be useful, 
 but it may be doubted whether the Court of Appeal would now follow 
 the latter decision. It would probably be said that the employers 
 had waived then: right to insist on a formal claim, or else that by 
 then* conduct they had led the workman to believe that such a formal 
 claim was unnecessary, as was the case in Heatonv. Tomlimon& Son 
 (1904), 117 L. T. Xewsp., p. 3. At any rate, the fact of payment 
 would be evidence upon which the arbitrator could find that a claim 
 
Sect. 2 (14)] THE CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION. 69 
 
 had been made (Lowe v. Myers <fc Sons, supra) ; and it would also 
 be a " reasonable cause " within s. 2 (1) (b). 
 
 The Court of Appeal in Ireland have adopted similar principles, and 
 have held that an employer who voluntarily pays half wages to an 
 injured workman is not prevented from relying on the defence that 
 no claim for compensation was made within the statutory limits of 
 time, unless the payments have been made in such a manner as to 
 induce the workman to abstain from making a claim (Healy v. 
 Galloway (1907), 41 Ir. L. T. E. 5). 
 
 An objection that the applicant is out of time must be set up in 
 the answer to the request for arbitration (Illingivorth v. Walmsley, 
 [1900J 2 Q. B. 142 ; 2 W. C. C. 118). The arbitrator is not bound to 
 allow an amendment (Silvester v. Cude (1899), 15 T. L. R. 434 ; 1 
 W. C. C. 120). 
 
 By " months " is meant calendar months (Interpretation Act, 1889 
 (52 & 53 Viet. c. 63), s. 3). The last day for lodging the claim will be 
 that day in the sixth month which corresponds in number with the 
 day of the month on which the accident happened. If the sixth 
 month contain no such corresponding day, then the last day of that 
 month will terminate the period (Mignotti v. Colvill (1879), 4 C. P. D. 
 233). 
 
 A workman was injured at 11.30 A.M. on November 24th, 1908. No 
 claim was made until May 24th 1909, when a first claim was put in at 
 5.30. P.M. and another at 11 P.M. They were held to be in time 
 (Peggie v. Wemyss Coal Co., Limited, [1910] S. C. 93). 
 
 As to the time for making a claim by the dependants of a deceased 
 seaman, see s. 7, p. 98, post. 
 
 Onus of Proof. The onus of proving that a claim was made within 
 the time limit rests on the applicant, and if he does not do this, he 
 must show that he is entitled to relief (Roberts v. Crystal Palace Foot- 
 ball Club, Limited (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 51). 
 
 Failure to Make a Claim. Failure to make a claim is not to 
 be a bar to the proceedings taken to recover compensation, if it be 
 found " that the failure was occasioned by mistake, absence from 
 the United Kingdom, or other reasonable cause." The question where 
 or not the employer has been prejudiced is immaterial. 
 
 The fact that at the time of the accident there was no apparent 
 injury is a reasonable cause for the absence of a claim (Tibbs v. Watts, 
 Blake, Bearne & Co., Limited (1909), 2 B. ^y. C. C. 164). 
 
 If the claim is made in respect of incapacity arising from an indus- 
 trial disease, and the certifying surgeon has fixed the date of the 
 disablement (see s. 8 (1) (a), p. 102, post) more than six months before 
 the date of the certificate, this circumstance amounts to a " reasonable 
 cause " for the delay in making the claim, unless the workman has 
 been guilty of unduly delaying his visit to the certifying surgeon 
 (Moore v. Naval Colliery Co., Limited, [1912] 1 K. B. 28 ; 5 B. W. 
 C. C. 87). 
 
 In the county court it was held that when a wife was living abroad 
 at the time of her husband's death from an accident, and owing to 
 
70 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 3 (!) 
 
 that fact and to her ignorance of the legal requirements she had 
 failed to make a claim in time, she was entitled to relief (Smith v. 
 Pearson and Shipley (1909), 2 B. W. C. G. 468) ; but ignorance of 
 rights under the Act is neither "mistake" nor "reasonable cause" 
 (Boles v. Pascall < Sons, T1911] 1 K. B. 982 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 148 ; Judd 
 v. Metropolitan Asylums'Board (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 420). The real 
 reason for the delay is a question of fact (ibid). 
 
 The Court of Session refused to disturb the refusal of an arbitrator 
 to give relief when the six months had been allowed to expire while 
 the workman, who had refused to accept compensation under the Act, 
 was endeavouring to recover damages by threatening to bring an 
 action (Devons v. Anderson <t Sons, [1911] S. C. 181 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 
 354). 
 
 National Insurance Act, 1911. As to the powers of an adminis- 
 tering society or committee to take proceedings for compensation 
 when an insured person does not, see Appendix A., p. 207, post. 
 
 3. Contracting out.] (1) If the Registrar of Friendly 
 Societies, after taking steps to ascertain the views of the 
 employer and workmen, certifies that any scheme of com- 
 pensation, benefit, or insurance for the workmen of an 
 employer in any employment, whether or not such scheme 
 includes other employers and their workmen, provides scales 
 of compensation not less favourable to the workmen and 
 their dependants than the corresponding scales contained in 
 this Act, and that, where the scheme provides for contribu- 
 tions by the workmen, the scheme confers benefits at least 
 equivalent to those contributions, in addition to the benefits 
 to which the workmen would have been entitled under this 
 Act, and that a majority (to be ascertained by ballot) of the 
 workmen to whom the scheme is applicable are in favour of 
 such scheme, the employer may, whilst the certificate is in 
 force, contract with any of his workmen that the provisions 
 of the scheme shall be substituted for the provisions of this 
 Act, and thereupon the employer shall be liable only in 
 accordance with the scheme, but, save as aforesaid, this Act 
 shall apply notwithstanding any contract to the contrary 
 made after the commencement of this Act. 
 
 (2) The registrar may give a certificate to expire at the 
 end of a limited period of not less than five years, and may 
 from time to time renew with or without modifications such 
 
Sect. 3 (08)] CERTIFIED SCHEMES. 71 
 
 a certificate to expire at the end of the period for which it 
 is renewed. 
 
 (3) No scheme shall be so certified which contains an 
 obligation upon the workmen to join the scheme as a con- 
 dition of their hiring, or which does not contain provisions 
 enabling a workman to withdraw from the scheme. 
 
 (4) If complaint is made to the Kegistrar of Friendly 
 Societies by or on behalf of the workmen of any employer 
 that the benefits conferred by any scheme no longer conform 
 to the conditions stated in sub-section (1) of this section, or 
 that the provisions of such scheme are being violated, or 
 that the scheme is not being fairly administered, or that 
 satisfactory reasons exist for revoking the certificate, the 
 Eegistrar shall examine into the complaint, and, if satisfied 
 that good cause exist for such complaint, shall, unless the 
 cause of complaint is removed, revoke the certificate. 
 
 (5) When a certificate is revoked or expires, any moneys 
 or securities held for the purpose of the scheme shall, after 
 due provision has been made to discharge the liabilities 
 already accrued, be distributed as may be arranged between 
 the employer and workmen, or as may be determined by 
 the Eegistrar of Friendly Societies in the event of a difference 
 of opinion. 
 
 (6) Whenever a scheme has been certified as aforesaid, it 
 shall be the duty of the employer to answer all such in- 
 quiries and to furnish all such accounts in regard to the 
 scheme as may be made or required by the Kegistrar of 
 Friendly Societies. 
 
 (7) The Chief Eegistrar of Friendly Societies shall include 
 in his annual report the particulars of the proceedings of the 
 Eegistrar under this Act. 
 
 (8) The Chief Eegistrar of Friendly Societies may make 
 regulations for the purpose of carrying this section into 
 effect. 
 
72 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 3 (18) 
 
 CERTIFIED SCHEMES. 
 
 Contracting Out. A certified scheme is the only way in which 
 contracting out of the Act is allowable. This section relates to con- 
 tracts entered into on or after July 1st, 1907, the date when the Act 
 came into operation. 
 
 An agreement to submit questions of incapacity in the future to a 
 medical referee and to do all things necessary for that purpose, and 
 in default of doing so to forfeit further rights to compensation is a 
 contracting out and is invalid (British and South American Steam 
 X'lut'yation Co., Limited v. Neil (1910), 3 B. AY. C. C. 413). 
 
 The whole scheme must be certified, including everything defining 
 the -benefits which the workman is to accept as a substitute for the 
 provisions of the Act (Moss v. Great Eastern Sail. Co., [1909] 2 K. B. 
 274; 2B. W. C. C. 168). 
 
 Schemes Contemplated. The scheme which the Act contemplates 
 is one entered into betw r een a definite employer and his workmen, 
 and not one between a number of employers in a district and all 
 the workmen in that district (Pecs v. Owen (1907), 9 W. C. C. 35, per 
 WARRINGTON, J.). 
 
 Provisions of a Certifiable Scheme. The 1 present Act is more 
 
 stringent in its provisions as to the contents of a scheme than was the 
 original Act. Formerly the Kegistrar had to consider the general 
 character of the scheme and to decide whether it was on the whole 
 not less favourable to the general body of workmen and their depen- 
 dants than the provisions of the Act, and had to see that joining the 
 scheme was not made a condition of being employed. 
 
 Under the present section the registrar has to see : (1) that the 
 scale of compensation under the proposed scheme is not less favour- 
 able to both workmen and then* dependants than the statutory scale ; 
 (2) that if a workman is required to contribute under the scheme 
 he must get under the scheme benefits at least equal to his contribu- 
 tions, in addition to the statutory benefits that he would get without 
 a scheme ; (3) that a majority of the workmen to be affected by the 
 scheme approve it by ballot taken; (4) that the scheme does not 
 compel a workman to join the scheme as a condition of his hiring ; 
 and (5) that the scheme contains provisions enabling a workman to 
 withdraw from it. 
 
 Employer shall be Liable only in Accordance with the 
 
 Scheme. The effect of a workman entering an employment under a 
 contract to accept the provisions of a scheme in substitution for the 
 provisions of the Act, amounts to an election, which will bar his right 
 to take legal proceedings on the part of himself or of his representatives 
 (Taylor v. Eamstead Colliery Co., [1904] 1 K. B. 838; 6 W. C. C. 
 34). And see further on election, p. 43, ante. 
 
 Infants, also, will in general be bound by a certified scheme to 
 which they are parties by their contract of employment (see 
 
Sect. 4 (1)] CERTIFIED SCHEMES. 73 
 
 Clements v. London and North Western Rail. Co., [1894] 2 Q. B. 
 482). 
 
 A complete certified scheme ousts the jurisdiction of the county 
 court, not only as to the amount of compensation, but also as to the 
 question of liability which must be determined solely by the scheme 
 (Horn v. Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, [1911] 1 K. B. 24 ; 
 
 4 B. W. C. C. 1 ; Godwin v. Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, 
 [1912] 2 K. B. 26 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 229), unless, it would seem, the scheme 
 in itself admits of an appeal to the courts. Thus, it may be that the 
 rules of the scheme do not provide that the committee of management 
 shall have power to determine finally all matters in dispute between 
 the parties. In such a case a dissatisfied workman will be entitled to 
 proceed at common law to recover the amount which he alleges is 
 due to him under the scheme, and in respect of which the decision 
 of the committee is not by the rules made final (Haworth v. Andrew 
 Kno'ivles & Son, Limited, Accident Society (1903), 19 T. L. E. 658 ; 
 
 5 W. C. C. 57). 
 
 What Amounts to Acceptance by Workman of Scheme. 
 
 A workman had agreed to come in under a certified scheme under 
 which a month's notice of withdrawal from it was required. The 
 scheme expired at the end of 1903, and in December, 1903, its renewal 
 was certified by the Registrar. Defendants posted up a notice that 
 workmen might enrol under the scheme. The workmen gave no 
 notice of withdrawal, and did not enrol under the renewed scheme. 
 In an action to recover deductions from his wages as his contribution 
 under the renewed scheme it was held that there was no contract by 
 the workman to accept the renewed scheme, and that the defendants 
 were not entitled to make the deductions (Wilson v. Ocean Coal Co., 
 Limited (1905), 21 T. L. R. 195 ; affirmed in Court of Appeal, ibid., 
 621 ; 7 W. C. C. 34) ; and upon the same facts it was held that a work- 
 man had not contracted himself out of the Workmen's Compensation 
 Act (Trchearne v. Same, ibid., 621 ; 7 W. C. C. 34). 
 
 A contract to accept a scheme need not be in writing (B erry v. Canteen 
 and Mess Co-operative Socy., Limited (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 449). 
 
 Renewal of Schemes. Upon renewal of a scheme under sub-s. (2) 
 it is not necessary to take the ballot provided for by sub-s. (1) (Godwin 
 v. Admiralty Commissioners, [1912] 2 K. B. 26 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 229). 
 As to re-certified schemes, see s. 15 (2), p. 132, post. 
 
 Regulations. The Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies has 
 issued regulations and forms relating to the certifying or re-certifying 
 of schemes. 
 
 4. Sub-contracting.] (1) Where any person (in this section 
 referred to as the principal), in the course .of or for the 
 purposes of his trade or business, contracts with any other 
 person (in this section referred to as the contractor) for the 
 execution by or under the contractor of the whole or any 
 
74 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 4(1 4) 
 
 part of any work undertaken by the principal, the principal 
 shall be liable to pay to any workman employed in the 
 execution of the work any compensation under this Act 
 which he would have been liable to pay if that workman had 
 been immediately employed by him ; and where compensa- 
 tion is claimed from or proceedings are taken against the 
 principal, then, in the application of this Act, references to the 
 principal shall be substituted for references to the employer, 
 except that the amount of compensation shall be calculated 
 with reference to the earnings of the workman under the 
 employer by whom he is immediately employed : 
 
 Provided that, where the contract relates to threshing, 
 ploughing, or other agricultural work, and the contractor 
 provides and uses machinery driven by mechanical power 
 for the purpose of such work, he and he alone shall be liable 
 under this Act to pay compensation to any workman em- 
 ployed by him on such work. 
 
 (2) Where the principal is liable to pay compensation 
 under this section, he shall be entitled to be indemnified by 
 any person who would have been liable to pay compensation 
 to the workman independently of this section, and all 
 questions as to the right to and amount of any such in- 
 demnity shall in default of agreement be settled by arbitra- 
 tion under this Act. 
 
 (3) Xothing in this section shall be construed as preventing 
 a workman recovering compensation under this Act from the 
 contractor instead of the principal. 
 
 (4) This section shall not apply in any case where 
 the accident occurred elsewhere than on, or in, or about 
 premises on which the principal has undertaken to execute 
 the work or which are otherwise under his control or 
 management. 
 
Sect. 4 (1 4)] EMPLOYMENT UNDER CONTRACTORS. 75 
 
 EMPLOYMENT UNDER CONTRACTORS. 
 
 Object of the Section. The primary object of the section is to 
 prevent an employer from escaping liability by contracting with some 
 one else to provide labour or to execute work, and to give a workman, 
 employed by a contractor, a double security for his compensation, 
 which, but for this provision, he might lose through the poverty of 
 his direct employer. 
 
 Criticism Of the Drafting. The section corresponds to s. 4 of 
 the original Act, but it has been re-cast in an attempt to avoid the 
 confusion created by the drafting of the original section. The attempt 
 has been only partially successful, and the section still remains what 
 it originally was, a " very difficult section " to construe (per COZENS- 
 HARDY, M.R., in Dittmar v. Owners of Ship V. 593, [1909] 1 K. B. 
 389 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 178). 
 
 Looking at the marginal note (which, though it forms no part of the 
 statute itself, and is not binding as an explanation or as a construction 
 of the section (Claydon v. Green (1868), L. K. 3 C. P. 511 ; Sutton v. 
 Button (1882), 22 Ch. D. 513), is supposed to have some relation to the 
 subject of the provisions in the section), one might imagine that the 
 section deals with the narrow relationship of contractor and sub- 
 contractor. This, however, is not so (see p. 77, post). 
 
 "Any Person ... in the Course of, etc., his Trade or 
 Business." From these words it would appear that the person to be 
 regarded as " the principal " must be carrying on some trade or 
 business; so that the private individual who enters into a contract 
 with a builder to erect a house for him will not be a " principal " under 
 this section, so as to render him liable to compensate the injured 
 servants of the building contractor. Such was also the law under the 
 original Act (see McGregor v. Danslcen (1899), 1 F. 536; Stead v. 
 Moore, (1900) Times, June 18th). It would seem, however, that if a 
 builder desired to build a house for himself and engaged a contractor 
 to do part of the work for him, the builder would be a " principal " 
 within the section (per COZENS-HARDY, M.R., in Skates v. Jones & Co. 
 (1910), 26 T. L. R. 643 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 460 ; and see Stalker v. 
 Wallace (1900), 2 F. 1162). 
 
 It is scarcely possible to define in the abstract the terms " trade " 
 and " business." It is clear that they are not synonymous, but that 
 the latter has a wider meaning than the former. A farmer,, for 
 instance, does not carry on a trade (Nash v. Hollinshead, [1901] 1 
 Q. B. 700 ; 3 W. C. C. 125), though in the majority of cases he carries 
 on a business. See cases cited under " Casual Employees," p. 124, 
 post). 
 
 A person who occupied a residence, where he carried on farming and 
 market gardening for his pleasure, and made a profit out of selling 
 the surplus produce, after supplying his household wants^ was held not 
 to be carrying on a " trade or business " within the meaning of the 
 Bankruptcy Act, 1883 (In re Wallis, Exparte Sully (1885), 14 Q. B. D. 
 
76 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 4 (14) 
 
 950) . But it would have been otherwise had he farmed with a view to 
 a profit as a means of livelihood (ibid.). 
 
 But whilst, generally speaking, a trade or business is carried on for 
 the purpose of making, or of trying to make, profits, it is not absolutely 
 essential that that should be the intention and purpose of canning it 
 on, much less that profit should in fact result. (See In re Duty on. 
 Estate of Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and 
 Wales (1888), 22 Q. B. D. 279, at pp. 293, 294.) 
 
 At least it seems safe to say that an occupation cannot be called a 
 " business " unless it is one of the serious purposes in life of the 
 person who carries it on, as distinguished from a mere hobby or 
 pastime ; and, further, that there is involved in the term some 
 continuity of operations. 
 
 Trade or Business of Local and other Public Authorities. 
 
 Section 13 (see p. 116) provides that " the exercise and performance 
 of the powers and duties of a local or other public authority shall, for 
 the purposes of this Act, be treated as the trade or business of the 
 authority." 
 
 The effect of this provision will be to make such authorities 
 " principals " under this section. It is scarcely conceivable that under 
 any circumstances a local authority could contract intro vires for 
 something to be done by a contractor which would not bring them 
 within the liabilities of this section, and, of course, within the 
 corresponding rights to be indemnified. 
 
 A municipal corporation desired to extend their market by pulling 
 down an old mill which occupied a plot of land belonging to them. 
 They advertised for some one to purchase the bricks and clear the site. 
 Todd's offer was accepted, and in the work one of his workmen was 
 killed. The dependants claimed against the corporation and Todd. 
 It was held that the corporation were liable under ss. 4 and 13 of the 
 Act ; (1) because the contract was one for clearing the site, and not 
 one merely for the sale of the bricks ; (2) because the work fell within 
 the description of the trade or business of the corporation as defined 
 in s. 13 (Mulrooney v. Todd and Bradford Corporation, [1909 1 
 K. B. 165 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 191). 
 
 A county council employed E. to quarry stones from a quarry in 
 the county, and deliver suitable stones on the roads being repaired by 
 the council. R. was paid by the cubic foot of stones so delivered. 
 One of his workmen was injured in the quarry, and the council were 
 held liable under the Act (Hardford v. County Dublin County 
 Council (1910), 45 Ir. L. T. 150). 
 
 Further notes on the liabilities of local and other public authorities 
 will be found on p. 130, post. 
 
 " For the Execution ... of any Work undertaken by the 
 
 Principal." What is meant by the expression " work undertaken by 
 the principal " ? Looking at the marginal note, one might suppose 
 that it referred to work which the principal had undertaken or 
 contracted to do for third persons, and this would limit the section to 
 the relationship between a contractor and his sub-contractor. 
 
Sect. 4 (14)] EMPLOYMENT UNDER CONTRACTORS. 77 
 
 This view has been adopted by the Court of Appeal in Ireland 
 (Walsh v. Hayes, p. 78, post) ; by the Lord President of the Court of 
 Session in Scotland (Zugg v. J. and J. Cunningham, p. 78, post) ; and 
 in a dictum of BUCKLEY, L.J., in Marks v. Game, p. 8, post; but has 
 since been rejected by the Court of Appeal. " If s. 4, sub-s. (1), stood 
 alone without the proviso, I think that there would be great force in 
 the contention that the section was intended to operate only in cases 
 where you had first a contract and then a sub-contract, and the 
 marginal note to the section lends colour to that view. But that 
 view is impossible, and it was admitted to be impossible, when the 
 section is read as a whole with the proviso as regards agricultural 
 work, for which the farmer is never a contractor " (Mulrooney v. Todd 
 [1909] , 1 K. B. 165 ; at pp. 169, 170, per COZENS-HARDY, M.E. : 2 B. 
 W. C. C. 191, 195. See also Dittmar v. Owners of Ship V. 593, 
 [1909] 1 K. B. 389, at p. 396 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 178, at p. 182 ; Skates 
 v. Jones & Co. (1910), 26 T. L. R. 643 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 460). 
 
 The opposite extreme of interpretation is that the expression will 
 cover everything that a principal may order to be done by a contractor 
 in connection with or incidental to the carrying on of his business. 
 
 There is nothing in the judgments in any of the cases which have 
 come before the Court of Appeal in England to give support to 
 this view, and it has been negatived by that court. "It is not 
 everything done in the interest of the trade or business which falls 
 within this section. I shrink from saying that a cotton- spinner who 
 finds one of his boilers out of order and contracts with a boiler-maker 
 to replace it with a new boiler is liable to pay compensation to one of 
 the workmen employed by the boiler-maker. That work was required 
 by the cotton-spinner, but not ' undertaken ' by him. He never 
 held himself out as a boiler-maker. It was not part of his ti^de or 
 business to erect boilers, and the whole section has no application to 
 him " (Skates v. Jones d Co. (1910), 26 T. L. E. 643 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 460). 
 And so it was there held that where two shop-keepers and the keeper 
 of a billiard saloon ventured on a speculation in running a skating- 
 rink, and employed a builder to remove an iron structure which they 
 had bought for the venture, they were not liable to compensate the 
 workman of the builder when injured during the course of the 
 work (ibid). 
 
 Previously to this case the following cases had been decided 
 which were inconsistent with the wide interpretation referred to 
 above. 
 
 Capt. Lovelace entered into an agreement with the respondents to 
 exhibit and control an airship at their exhibition. He was to pay the 
 wages of a turnstile man, a servant of respondents. Admission was 
 by tickets provided by respondents or through the turnstile which 
 belonged to them. The respondents' collectors collected daily the 
 money taken. Lovelace was to have half the gross receipts, and to 
 pay any employees he engaged. Respondents took the other half. 
 Lovelace had a right of user merely of the allotted space ; he had no 
 legal interest or estate hi it. One of his employees was a lecturer and 
 was killed by an explosion of the airship. It was held that deceased, 
 a lecturer, was not a person under a contract of service within the 
 
7* WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 190P,. [Sect. 4 (14) 
 
 meaning of the Act, and was not a workman ; and that, if he had 
 been, the respondents were not liable under s. 4, because this side 
 show was merely let to Lovelace and it was not a part of their 
 business (Waites v. Franco-British Exhibition (1909), 25 T. L. B. 
 441 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 199). The MASTER OF THE ROLLS said that it was no 
 doubt within the objects of the appellant corporation to carry on side 
 show's of this character, but the fact that it was intra vires was beside 
 the mark. The question was whether they undertook the particular 
 side show as part of their business and employed Lovelace for the 
 purposes of their business to execute work which they had undertaken 
 to do. All that they in fact did was to let the side show to Lovelace. 
 The Court of Appeal in Ireland have also held that the engagement 
 by a farmer of a contractor to thresh his corn by machinery, which 
 (in their view) was not driven by mechanical power, was not an 
 engagement for "work undertaken by the principal" within the 
 meaning of the section (Walsh v. Hayes (1909), 43 Ir. L. T. 114; 2 
 B. AY. C. C. 202) ; whilst the Court of Session have held that the work 
 of scaling the boilers of steamships is not work undertaken by a ship- 
 owner, even though some shipowners do that work for themselves 
 (Spiers v. Elderslie Steamship Co., Limited (1909), 46 S. L. B. 893 ; 2 
 
 B. W. C. C. 205). 
 
 The alleged principal was a manufacturer of sulphuric acid, etc. 
 Part of the works, large chambers, had to be tarred at long intervals 
 for the purpose of preserving them and keeping them water-tight. 
 The alleged principal employed a contractor to do this work as he 
 had done on previous occasions. It was held that the case was 
 not within the section as the contract was not one made for the 
 purposes of his trade or business (Zugg v. /. and J. Cunningham, 
 Limited, [1908] S. C. 827; 1 B. W. C. C. 257). 
 
 In Mulrooney v. Todd, p. 76, ante, the Court of Appeal expressly 
 reserved for future consideration the application of the section to an 
 individual trader, and confined their judgments to the application of 
 the section to the "trade or business" of a municipal corporation as 
 defined by the Act in the widest of terms. They considered such 
 application in the following case. 
 
 Wilson & Co. were colliery proprietors. They had coal depots in 
 various parts of the world. It was necessary for then* business to 
 have lighters there. They had two lighters built in England for use 
 at St. Vincent. They contracted with Glover to take them out under 
 their own sail. Glover was to do this for a lump sum, paying his 
 own expenses and crew. He took one himself and entrusted the 
 other to a third person. A man on board the latter was injured. It 
 was held that the work which Wilson & Co. had contracted with 
 Glover to do was part of the work proper to their undertaking, and 
 was in that sense undertaken by them, and that they were therefore 
 liable (Dittmar v. Wilson, Sons d Co.; Dittmar v. The Owners of 
 the Ship V. 393 (Wilson and Sons), [1909] 1 K. B. 389; 2 B. W. 
 
 C. C. 178). 
 
 Suggested Interpretation. The interpretation of the section is 
 therefore to be found somewhere between the two- extremes above 
 
Sect. 4 (1 4)] EMPLOYMENT UNDER CONTRACTORS. 79 
 
 stated. It is not possible to define any limits at present, but the view 
 which was expressed in the three previous editions of this work appears 
 to have been strengthened by the few T decisions which have been 
 given, and particularly by the one last quoted, and by Skates v. 
 Jones & Co., p. 77, ante. The view is that, although the section 
 in the original Act has been altered in drafting, the effect of the 
 present section is practically the same as that of the original 
 section, and that a distinction has still to be drawn between work 
 which is merely ancillary or incidental to the trade or business and 
 work which is a part of, or process in, the principal's trade or business. 
 
 Without resorting to the cumbrous and unsatisfactory phraseology 
 of the corresponding section in the original Act, it may be shortly 
 stated, that if a person, carrying on an employment which was within 
 the Act, engaged a contractor to do any part of the work of that 
 employment, such person might be compelled to compensate the 
 injured workmen of the contractor. But to this there was an exception. 
 He was not to be so liable if the work executed by the contractor was 
 "merely ancillary or incidental to," and was "no part of, or process 
 in, the trade or business carried on " by the person employing the 
 contractor. 
 
 Numerous decisions were given on the meaning of this exception. 
 
 In connection with railways, the erection of a railway station was 
 held to be work which was merely ancillary or incidental to and no 
 part of or process in the trade or business of a railway company 
 (Pearce v. London and South Western Hail. Co., [1900] 2 Q. B. 100 ; 2 
 W. C. C. 47). The Court of Session followed this case in Dundee and 
 Arbroath Joint Bail Co. v. Carlin (1901), 3 F. 843, holding that the 
 work of erecting a wall to prevent a bank from falling and obstructing 
 access to a signal cabin belonging to the railway was merely ancillary 
 work. In this case the court refused to follow their previous decision 
 that the work of erecting signals on a new siding, which a railway 
 company were constructing on their own ground, and as part of their 
 existing line, was part of the company's undertaking (Burns v. North 
 British Hail Co. (1900), 2 F. 629). In another case a railway company, 
 charging for the conveyance of goods through rates inclusive of all 
 charges for 'delivery and collection, were held liable to compensate, 
 for injury sustained at their station, the workman of their contractor 
 who contracted for the carting of goods on the terms of receiving a 
 certain portion of the through rates on goods collected or delivered by 
 them and sent by the railway (GreenJiill v. Caledonian Hail. Co. 
 (1900), 37 S. L. R. 524). 
 
 In connection with the building trade, the demolition by a con- 
 tractor of a building, which the principals had contracted to demolish 
 and rebuild, was held not to be within the exception (Knight v. Cubitt 
 & Co., Limited, [1902] 1 K. B. 31 ; 4 W. C. C. 42). But this case 
 was distinguished in Bush v. Hawes, [1902] 1 K. B. 216 ; 4 W. C. C. 
 33, where the respondent, a builder, contracted to. erect a building 
 with an iron roof, and sub-contracted the work of constructing the 
 roof. The arbitrator found that the erection of such a roof was no 
 part of the ordinary business of the respondent (the builder), but that it 
 was part of such business as ordinarily carried on, and held, therefore, 
 
80 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 4 (14) 
 
 that it was not merely ancillary to the business carried on by the 
 respondent. This decision was reversed, the Court of Appeal holding 
 that the test to determine whether a sub-contract was for work 
 ancillary to the business carried on by the undertaker was whether 
 the work was that of the particular undertaker, and not whether it 
 was generally undertaken by persons carrying on a similar business. 
 See a county court case in which decorative stencilling was held to 
 be no part of the work of a builder who had undertaken to do the 
 repairs, including decorative work, of a church (Hardy v. Moss ami 
 Fuller (1903), 6 W. C. C. 68). 
 
 In connection with the business of a factory, the work of carting 
 goods to and from the factory was held to be part of the trade or 
 business carried on in the factory (Bee v. Ovens & Sons (1900), 2 
 F. 439; M'Govern v. Cooper & Co. (1901), 4 F. 249); but window 
 cleaning was held not to be part of the business of a factory, and it 
 was doubted whether it was even ancillary or incidental thereto 
 (Dempster v. Hunter & Sons (1902), 39 S. L. R. 395). The work of 
 fixing a new driving wheel to an engine of a factory was held to be 
 merely incidental to the business of the factory (Wrigley v. Bagley 
 and Wright, [1901] 1 Q. B. 780 ; 3 W. C. C. 61). 
 
 In the shipbuilding trade, the putting in of engines by contractors 
 for shipbuilders who had contracted to build a steamship was held to 
 be part of the process of shipbuilding (Jackson v. Rodger (Xo. 1) 
 (1899), 1 F. 1053) ; but the repairing of ships has been said to be 
 merely ancillary to the business of shipowners (Bartell v. Gray, [1902] 
 1 K. B. 225 : per MATHEW, L.J., at p. 232 ; 4 W. C. C. 95). 
 
 The putting up of a stoking machine for the use of a tramway 
 company was held in Ireland to be merely ancillary to their trade or 
 business (Brennan v. Dublin United Tramways Co., [1901] 2 I.E. 241). 
 
 The supply of coals to a steamer was held to be merely ancillary to 
 the business of the shipowners (Stewart v. Dublin and Glasgow Steam 
 Packet Co. (1902), 5 F. 57), but the hauling of truck loads of coal 
 along a quay to be tipped into a steamer was apparently not merely 
 incidental to such business (see Pacific Steam Navigation Co. v. 
 Pugh tfc Son (1907), 23 T. L. E. 622 ; 9W. C. C. 39). 
 
 If the decisions just quoted be considered, it will be seen that the 
 principle upon which they were given was, that the work in question 
 did or did not fall within the class of work which the various employers 
 did actually engage in for the purposes and in the course of their 
 business. In other words, the question was whether it Was or was 
 not the work which they undertook to do in their business. As we 
 have seen in the case of Bush v. Hawes, p. 79, ante, the Court of 
 Appeal reversed the decision of the arbitrator because he applied as 
 a test the question whether the work was such as was generally 
 undertaken by persons in the trade, and not whether the work was 
 such as was undertaken by the employer in the particular case to be 
 decided. 
 
 With these decisions before them the legislature, whilst omitting to 
 draw any express distinction between ancillary or incidental work on 
 the one side, and work which is a part of or process in the employer's 
 business on the other, have adopted an expression, viz., " any work 
 
Sect. 4 (14)] EMPLOYMENT UNDER CONTRACTORS. 81 
 
 undertaken by the principal," which shortly describes the principle 
 upon which those cases were decided. 
 
 It appears, therefore, that the expression limits the application of 
 the section to such work as the principal may fairly be said to under- 
 take the execution of, or to engage in, in the ordinary course of 
 following his particular trade or business, and to exclude all work 
 which he cannot reasonabljpbe said to undertake as part of his 
 trade or business. 
 
 " Principal shall be Liable to Any Workman Employed." 
 If the workman is not within the definition of the Act he cannot 
 recover against the " principal," e.g. where he is a member of the 
 contractor's family dwelling in his house (Marks v. Game, [1909] 
 2 K. B. 516 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 186), or an independent contractor (Byrne 
 v. Baltinglass Rural District Council and Kelly (1911), 45 Ir. L. T. 
 206). 
 
 Limitations on the Principal's Liability. The principal is not 
 liable to pay compensation to the workman of a contractor : 
 
 (1) Where the contract relates to agricultural work and the con- 
 
 tractor provides and uses machinery driven by mechanical 
 power for the purpose of such work (s. 4 (1, proviso)) ; or 
 
 (2) Where the accident occurs elsewhere than on, or in, or about 
 
 premises on which the principal has undertaken to execute 
 the work or which are otherwise under his control or manage- 
 ment (s. 4 (4)). 
 
 "Agricultural Work." This term is not defined by the statute. 
 The proviso is taken from the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1900, 
 and that statute defined " agriculture " to include horticulture, forestry, 
 and the use of land for any purpose of husbandry, inclusive of the 
 keeping or breeding of live stock, poultry, or bees, and the growth of 
 fruit and vegetables. 
 
 " Machinery Driven by Mechanical Power." This means 
 machinery driven by steam, water, gas, electricity or any other 
 similar agency, as distinguished from hand power or horse power. 
 See Wrigley v. Bagley, [1901] 1 K. B. 780; 3 W. C. C. 61 ; Willmott 
 v. Paton, [1902] 1 K. B. 237 ; 4 W. C. 0. 65. 
 
 " About Premises." The expression " about premises " evidently 
 means here, as a similar term was held to mean in the original Act, 
 "in close or physical proximity to " the premises; and, whether or 
 not in a particular case an accident occurs " about " the premises will 
 be a question of fact to be determined by the arbitrator, and the Court 
 of Appeal will not interfere with his finding if there be evidence to 
 support it (Powell v. Brown, [1899] 1 Q. B. 157 ; 1 W. C. C. 44 ; 
 Lowth v. Ibbotson, [1899] 1 Q. B. 1003 ; 1 W. C. C. 46). 
 
 The following cases, decided under the original Act^ may be useful 
 as showing the application of the word " about." 
 
 Loading a cart in the street close to the entrance of a factory was 
 held to be employment " about " the factory (Poioell v. Broiun, supra ; 
 
 W.C.A. G 
 
82 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 4 (14) 
 
 Cosgrove v. Anglo -American Oil Co., Limited (1900), 34 Ir. L. T. E. 
 56 ; and see Hall v. Snoivden, Hubbard & Co. (No. 2), [1899] 2 Q. B. 
 136; 1 W. C. C. 73). 
 
 But an accident a mile or thereabouts from the premises would not 
 be "about" them (Lowth v. Ibbotson, supra ; Chambers v. White- 
 haven Harbour Commissioners, [1899] 2 Q. B. 132 ; 1 W. C. C. 47 ; 
 Pattison v. White & Co. Limited (1904)020 T. L. E. 775 ; 6 W. C. C. 
 61 ; Whitton v. Bell and Sime, Limited (1899), 36 S. L. E. 754; and 
 see also Barclay, Curie & Co., Limited v. M'Kinnon (1901), 38 
 S. L. E. 321 ; and Kent v. Porter (1901), 38 S. L. E. 482) ; nor 700 
 yards away from the site of engineering works as then existing 
 (Back v. Dick, Kerr & Co., Limited, [1906] A. C. 325 ; 8 W. C. C. 40) ; 
 nor even if only 110 to 160 yards away from the premises (Fenn v. 
 Miller, [1900] 1 Q. B. 788 ; 2 W. C. C. 55 ; and see M'Adam v. Harvey, 
 ! 1903] 2 I. B. 511 ; Rimmer v. Premier Gas Engine Co., Limited 
 (1907), 97 L. T. 226 ; 9 W. C. C. 56). 
 
 As a carter was leaving a railway station his horse took fright and 
 bolted just outside the gate of the station, and in consequence the 
 carter was injured 315 yards further on. The Court of Session held 
 that the accident did not occur " about " the railway (Bathgate v. 
 Caledonian Rail. Co. (1902), 4 F. 313). 
 
 An accident to a driver of a coal train on a private railway con- 
 necting a colliery with a railway system, three -fourths of a mile from 
 the mine, was held not to have occurred about the mine (Turnbull v. 
 Lamlton Collieries (1900), 82 L. T. 589; 2 W. C. C. 84). But 
 compare Monaghan v. United Collieries, Limited (1900), 3F. 149, where 
 an engine-man of a colliery company, engaged in work which the 
 company had contracted to do, but which was not part of the proper 
 business of the colliery, was injured on a main line of railway at or 
 near the entry of the private siding of the colliery, which was eighty 
 yards long. It was held that he was engaged locally about a mine. 
 For other cases, see Anderson v. Lochgelly Iron and Coal Co., Limited 
 (1904), 7 F. 187 ; Coylton Coal Co. v. Davidson (1905), 7 F. 727. 
 
 A man employed on a gas main a quarter of a mile away from the 
 gasworks was held not to be employed " about " the gasworks (Spacey 
 v. Dowlais Gas and Coke Co., [1905] 2 K. B. 879 ; 8 W. C. C. 29). 
 
 " Where the business of a factory involves the use of some land 
 beyond the actual physical limits of the buildings, employment on 
 that land, which may be regarded as a ^wasi-curtilage of the factory, 
 would be employment ' about' the factory" (Fenn v. Miller, [1900] 1 
 Q. B. 788, at p. 793 : per COLLINS, L.J. ; 2 W. C. C. 55 ; and see 
 Mooney v. Edinburgh and District Tramway Co., Limited (1901), 4 F. 
 390) ; but the Court of Appeal in Ireland decided otherwise (Cosgrove 
 v. Anglo-American Oil Co., Limited (1900), 34 Ir. L. T. E. 56). In 
 this case the respondents owned premises of fifteen acres, all within 
 the same curtilage, where they manufactured and stored barrels for 
 the purposes of their trade. The barrels were manufactured by 
 machinery in a building, and then piled on the premises outside. A 
 workman injured on the premises whilst moving a barrel from a pile 
 to a building for the purpose of being painted was held not to 
 be employed " about " the factory. 
 
Sect. 4 (14)] EMPLOYMENT UNDER CONTRACTORS. 83 
 
 A shed used in connection with a factory but half a mile from it 
 would not be part of the factory (Ferguson v. Barclay <fc Co., Limited 
 (1902), 40 S. L. R. 58). 
 
 " Premises on which the Principal has undertaken to Execute 
 the Work or which are otherwise under his Control or Manage- 
 ment." It will be for the arbitrator to say as a matter of fact what 
 premises in any particular case are within the description. 
 
 It will probably be found that a wide interpretation will be given to 
 the word "premises," and that it will be extended to include the 
 whole physical area of work which is undertaken. Such as, for 
 example, the area staked out and taken possession of by a contractor 
 on behalf of the principal for the laying of water pipes, as in the case 
 of AtMnson v. Lumb, [1903] 1 K. B. 861 ; 5 W. C. C. 106 ; the area 
 or section of roads being repaired by a local authority through a 
 contractor, as in Berwickshire County Council v. Middlemiss (1900), 37 
 S. L. E. 297 ; the line of electric tramway wires, as in Ilogers v. Cardiff 
 Corporation, [1905] 2 K. B. 832 ; 8 W. C. C. 51 ; and it is even con- 
 ceivable that an arbitrator may be supported in a finding that an 
 accident occurring on a mudhopper, engaged in carrying out to sea 
 the mud dredged from a harbour, although the accident happens a 
 long distance from the harbour itself, is within the description. 
 
 But the fact that a person in performing the work in question has 
 to use the public streets for the purpose of passage will not bring 
 such streets within the meaning of the expression " premises on which 
 the principal has undertaken to execute the work." 
 
 Mears contracted to cart rubbish from works near the Albert Hall, 
 Knightsbridge. He contracted with Andrews to cart some of the 
 rubbish away and tip it where he chose. Mears himself had a rubbish 
 shoot at Stamford Green. A workman in the employ of Andrews 
 while carting the rubbish to a place which was not under the control 
 of Mears, fell off his cart in the public highway and was killed. This 
 was about two miles from the Albert Hall. It was held that Mears 
 was not liable as " principal," because it could not be said that he 
 had undertaken to execute the work on any part of the public streets 
 through which the carts might pass ; and the case fell within the excep- 
 tion of sub-s. (4) (Andrews v. Andrews and Mears, [1908] 2 K. B. 
 567; IB. W. C. C. 264). 
 
 The words " or which are otherwise under his control or manage- 
 ment " will, in many cases of contracts to do work for local authorities, 
 prevent this limitation from applying to them. See p. 76, ante, as to 
 the liability of such authorities under this section, and see Hardford 
 v. County Dublin County Council (1910), 45 Ir. L. T. 15, and p. 76, 
 ante, where the council were held liable to compensate the workman 
 of a contractor who was injured in a quarry from which the contractor 
 was, by his contract, to obtain stones for the repair of the council's 
 roads. 
 
 The Workman's Double Remedy. Sub-section (3) preserves to 
 
 the workman the right of recovering compensation, either from the 
 principal or from the contractor who employs him directly, but not 
 from both. 
 
84 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 4 (14) 
 
 In England the Rules framed under the Act contemplate that the 
 workman may wish to make both principal and contractor respondents 
 in proceedings. See W. C. R. 2 (2), p. 210,._pos. 
 
 In Scotland it was held under the former Act that the workman 
 must determine the person against whom he had a remedy before he 
 brought his case into court, and that he could not claim against both 
 undertaker and contractor " jointly and severally or severally " (Herd 
 v. Summers (1905), 7 F. 870). 
 
 In Ireland it has been held that the liability of the principal and 
 contractor is neither joint nor joint and several, and that if the 
 workman obtains an award against one he cannot proceed against the 
 other in the event of the award being unproductive (Meier v. Dublin 
 Corporation, [1912] 2 I. R. 129), 
 
 Amount of Compensation. References to the principal are to be 
 substituted for references in the Act to the employer whenever com- 
 pensation is claimed from, or proceedings are taken against, a principal 
 under this section ; so that the principal will have all the rights that 
 the employer has under the Act as to notice and claim, medical 
 examination, and the like. The compensation to be paid by him is 
 not to be based on what he pays his workmen, but is to be calculated 
 with reference to the earnings of the workman under the contractor 
 directly employing him. As to scale of compensation, see p. 134, post. 
 
 Right of Principal to be Indemnified. The principal who has to 
 
 pay compensation to a contractor's workman may claim an indemnity 
 against the contractor, and all disputes between them must be settled 
 by arbitration under the Act. This method of settling disputes 
 between them is new, inasmuch as formerly the person claiming 
 indemnity might bring an action instead of claiming in the arbitra- 
 tion proceedings (Evans v. Cook, [1905] 1 K. B. 53 ; 7 W. C. C. 41). 
 
 The contractor from whom indemnity is claimed by the principal 
 can successfully resist the claim on the ground that the accident was 
 due to the fault of the principal, e.g., his negligence or that of his 
 workmen. See John Greenwood, Limited v. Hawhings (1906), 23 
 T. L. E. 72, and the opinion of Lord KINXEAR in Topping v. Eldnd 
 (1904), 6 F. 666. 
 
 If the accident has been caused by the tortious act of a stranger so 
 as to give the workman a right of action against him, the principal 
 paying compensation, or the contractor indemnifying the principal 
 under s. 4, is entitled to proceed against the stranger on the indemnity 
 given by s. 6 of the Act. See p. 89, post. 
 
 Procedure on Indemnity. See W. C. E. 1923, pp. 218, 219, 
 
 post ; and, where the employer is the applicant, r. 25, at p. 220, post . 
 
 In any case in which both the principal and a contractor with him 
 are alleged to be liable to pay compensation under the Act, Order III., 
 r. 2, of the Countv Court Rules, 1903, as to the joinder of parties, is 
 applied (W. C. R. 2 (2)). 
 
 Where a respondent claims to be entitled to indemnity against 
 another respondent, notice of such claim must be given as if the other 
 respondent were a third party (W. C. E. 26, giving effect to the 
 
Sect. 5 (13)] INSOLVENCY OF EMPLOYER. 85 
 
 decision in Applely v. Horseley Co., [1899] 2 Q. B. 521 ; 1 W. C. C. 
 103). 
 
 Medical Examinations. As to the right of the principal to require 
 the workman to submit himself for medical examination, see Schech I., 
 paragraph (4), at p. 162, post, and paragraphs (14) and (15), at pp. 168, 
 169, post. 
 
 5. Provision as to cases of bankruptcy of employer.'] 
 (1) Where any employer has entered into a contract with 
 any insurers in respect of any liability under this Act to any 
 workman, then, in the event of the employer becoming 
 bankrupt, or making a composition or arrangement with his 
 creditors, or if the employer is a company in the event of the 
 company having commenced to be wound up, the rights of 
 the employer against the insurers as respects that liability 
 shall, notwithstanding anything in the enactments relating 
 to bankruptcy and the winding up of companies, be trans- 
 ferred , to and vest in the workman, and upon any such 
 transfer the insurers shall have the same rights and remedies 
 and be subject to the same liabilities as if they were the 
 employer, so however that the insurers shall not be under 
 any greater liability to the workman than they would have 
 been under to the employer. 
 
 (2) If the liability of the insurers to the workman is less 
 than the liability of the employer to the workman, the work- 
 man may prove for the balance in the bankruptcy or 
 liquidation. 
 
 (3) There shall be included among the debts which under 
 section one of the Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Act, 
 1888, and section four of the Preferential Payments in Bank- 
 ruptcy (Ireland) Act, 1889, are in the distribution of the 
 property of a bankrupt and in the distribution of the assets 
 of a company being wound up to be paid in priority to all 
 other debts, the amount, not exceeding in. any individual 
 case one hundred pounds, due in respect of any compensation 
 the liability wherefore accrued before the date of the re- 
 ceiving order or the date of the commencement of the winding 
 
86 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1^)06. [Sect. 5(-l >) 
 
 up, and those Acts aud the Preferential Payments in 
 Bankruptcy Amendment Act, 1897, shall have effect accord- 
 ingly. Where the compensation is a weekly payment, the 
 amount due in respect thereof shall, for the purposes of this 
 provision, be taken to be the amount of the lump sum for 
 which the weekly payment could, if redeemable, be re- 
 deemed if the employer made an application for that purpose 
 under the First Schedule to this Act. 
 
 (4) In the case of the winding up of a company within 
 the meaning of the Stannaries Act, 1887, such an amount 
 as aforesaid, if the compensation is payable to a miner or the 
 dependants of a miner, shall have the like priority as is con- 
 ferred on wages of miners by section nine of that Act, and 
 that section shall have effect accordingly. 
 
 (5) The provisions of this section with respect to pre- 
 ferences and priorities shall not apply where the bankrupt 
 or the company being wound up has entered into such a 
 contract with insurers as aforesaid. 
 
 (6) This section shall not apply where a company is 
 wound up voluntarily merely for the purposes of recon- 
 struction or of amalgamation with another company. 
 
 INSOLVENCY OF EMPLOYER. 
 Object and Operation of Section. The object of the section 
 
 is to extend to an injured workman some protection against loss of 
 compensation arising from the insolvency of his employer. The 
 character and extent of that protection depend upon whether or not 
 the employer is insured in respect of any liability under the Act. 
 
 In the case of the employer being au individual or a partnership 
 firm, the section begins to operate as soon as the employer becomes 
 bankrupt, or makes a composition or arrangement with his 
 creditors. 
 
 A person becomes bankrupt when a receiving order is made against 
 him. but upon this being made the bankruptcy has relation back to, 
 and commences at. the time of the act of bankruptcy being committed 
 on which the receiving order is made ; or, where there is more than 
 one act of bankruptcy proved, the bankruptcy relates back, and com- 
 mences at the time of the first of those acts of bankruptcy proved to 
 have been committed by the bankrupt within three months next 
 
Sect. 5 (1 6)] INSOLVENCY OF EMPLOYER. 87 
 
 preceding the date of the presentation of the bankruptcy petition 
 (Bankruptcy Act, 1883, s. 43). 
 
 If the employer is a company the section operates on the date 
 of the commencement of the winding-up ; but the section has no 
 application to the voluntarily winding-up of a company for the 
 purposes of reconstruction or amalgamation with another company 
 (s. 5 (6)). 
 
 By s. 139 of the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908 (8 Edw. 7, 
 c. 69), " a winding-up of a company by the court shall be deemed 
 to commence at the tune of the presentation of the petition for 
 the winding-up." 
 
 By s. 183, " a voluntary winding-up shall be deemed to com- 
 mence at the time of the passing of the resolution authorising the 
 winding-up." 
 
 Where the Employer is Insured. Assuming bankruptcy to 
 have occurred in the case of an employer who is insured, the section 
 transfers to, and vests in, the workman, all the rights of the em- 
 ployer against the insurers, who thereupon have the same rights and 
 remedies, and are subject to the same liabilities, as if they were the 
 employer. 
 
 The right of the workman is commensurate with that of the 
 employer, and all terms and conditions of the policy bind the work- 
 man as they bound the employer. Thus, if the policy contains an 
 arbitration clause that must be given effect to as against the workman 
 (King v. Phcenix Assurance Co., [1910] 2 K. B. 666 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 
 442) ; and so a workman has no rights against his employer's indem- 
 nifying company when the employer's rights thereunder have been 
 validly determined by his failure to pay a call made upon him (Daff 
 v. Midland Colliery Owners' Mutual Indemnity Company, Limited 
 (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 671). He cannot recover from the insurers more 
 than they are liable for to the employer, but the workman* may prove 
 in the bankruptcy or liquidation for any deficiency. 
 
 As to the effect in an insurance policy of a condition that the names 
 and wages of workmen are to be kept inia wages book, see Bradley v. 
 Essex < Suffolk Accident Indemnity Society, Limited (1911), 27 
 T. L. R. 455, affirmed [1912] 1 K. B. 415. 
 
 Where the Employer is not Insured. In this case, and only 
 in this case (see sub-s. (5)), the protection afforded by the Act is 
 that of placing the compensation among those debts which, in the 
 case of bankruptcy or liquidation, are required to be paid in full in 
 priority to all other debts ; subject, however, to the amount of com- 
 pensation being limited to 100, and to the liability to pay compensa- 
 tion having accrued before the date of the receiving order or the date 
 of the commencement of the winding-up. 
 
 Where the compensation consists of a weekly sum, the amount 
 due in respect of it is to be ascertained as if the liability therefor 
 was being redeemed under Schedule. I., para. (17) ; as to which see 
 p. 177, post. See by way of illustration Re J. an Arranging Debtor ; 
 exparte Eeid (1911), 45 Ir. L. T. 247. 
 
S8 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 6(1) 
 
 Xo composition or scheme can be approved by the court which does 
 not provide for the payment in priority to other debts of all debts 
 directed to be so paid in the distribution of the property of a bankrupt 
 (Bankruptcy Act, 1883, s. 3 (14)). 
 
 Preferential Payments. There has been a modification of the 
 statutes referred to in sub-ss. (3) and (4). So far as they relate 
 to companies, the Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Act, 1888 
 (51 & 52 Viet. c. 62), s. 3, the Preferential Pavments in Bankruptcy 
 (Ireland) Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Viet. c. 60), s. 4", are repealed, and the 
 Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Amendment Act, 1897 (60 & 61 
 Viet. c. 19), which affected companies only, is wholly repealed, by the 
 Companies (Consolidation) Act. 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 69). Section 209 
 of that Act now contains the statutory provisions on the subject so 
 far as companies are concerned. 
 
 In the Stannaries. Section 9, and s. 10 "which is referred to hi 
 s. 9, of the Stannaries Act, 1887 (50 & 51 Viet. c. 43) are repealed 
 by the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, supra, and s. 240 thereof 
 is now applicable. 
 
 Procedure. AV. C. E. 35, p. 224, post, provides the method by 
 which a workman can obtain the examination of his employer as to 
 the existence of any contract of insurance, and regulates the pro- 
 ceedings for the settlement of any question as to the liability of the 
 insurers or the amount of their liability. 
 
 It seems that under this section the county court judge has only 
 power to award the amount payable to a workman, and that he cannot 
 make an order on the liquidator in the case of a voluntary winding-up 
 to pay such amount. To obtain such payment proceedings should 
 be taken before the Registrar in winding-up (Homer v. Gough, [1912] 
 2 K. B. 303 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 51). As to an appeal from an order made 
 by a county court judge under this section, see p. 185, post. 
 
 6 Remedies both against employer and stranger.] Where 
 the injury for which compensation is payable under this 
 Act was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability 
 in some person other than the employer to pay damages in 
 respect thereof 
 
 (1) The workman may take proceedings both against that 
 person to recover damages and against any person 
 liable to pay compensation under this Act for such 
 compensation, but shall not be entitled to recover 
 both damages and compensation ; and 
 
Sect. 6 (2)] INJURY CAUSED BY STRANGER. ,st 
 
 (2) If the workman has recovered compensation under 
 this Act, the person by whom the compensation was 
 paid, and any person who has been called on to pay 
 an indemnity under the section of this Act relating 
 to sub-contracting, shall be entitled to be indemni- 
 fied by the person so liable to pay damages as afore- 
 said, and all questions as to the right to and amount 
 of any such indemnity shall, in default of agreement, 
 be settled by action, or, by consent of the parties, by 
 arbitration under this Act. 
 
 INJURY CAUSED BY STRANGER. 
 
 Rights of Workman. When the injury has been caused to a 
 workman by the tortious act of a person other than the employer (see 
 infra), this section preserves to the workman both his right of action 
 against the wrongdoer and his right to compensation against his 
 employer. Under the original Act he had merely an option to 
 proceed against the one or the other " but not against both." 
 Under this Act he may take proceedings against both concurrently, 
 "but shall not be entitled to recover both damages and com- 
 pensation." 
 
 If the workman recovers compensation from his employer he will 
 not be able to sue the stranger for damages for loss of wages or for 
 pain and suffering, although such matters are not included in such 
 compensation (Tong v. Great Northern Eail. Co. (1902), 86 L. T. 
 802 ; 4 W. C. C. 40 : WRIGHT, J. And see Elliott v. Liggens, p. 58, 
 ante). 
 
 National Insurance Act, 1911. As to the right of an adminis- 
 tering society or committee to take proceedings in the event of an 
 " insured person " not doing so, see Appendix A., p. 207,_pos. 
 
 " Circumstances Creating a Legal Liability in some Person 
 Other than the Employer." The " stranger " referred to in the 
 side note of the section will include any one other than the employer 
 himself. It includes a fellow-workman who has caused the injury, and 
 a right of action for indemnity under this section is available by the 
 employer against a workman whose breach of statutory duty has 
 caused the accident (Gibson v. Dunkerley Bros. (Lees < SyJces, Third 
 Parties) (1910), 102 L. T. 587 : 3 B. W. C. C. 347, affirmed sub nom 
 Lees v. Dunkerley Bros., [1911] A. C. 5 ; 4 B. W. C. 'C. 115). 
 
 The words " creating a legal liability " do not mean that the legal 
 liability must be determined judicially. They refer to a primu facie 
 case of liability, or to circumstances which are alleged to create a 
 liability (Page v. Burtwell, [1908] 2 K. B. 758 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 267) 
 
90 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 6 (1, 2) 
 
 " May take proceedings ... but shall not be entitled to 
 recover both damages and compensation."-~The proceedings here 
 
 mentioned are not to be confined to' legal proceedings actually 
 prosecuted. A claim made against the person other than the 
 employer will suffice (Page v. Burtwell, supra.) 
 
 To " recover " does not necessarily mean recover by legal pro- 
 ceedings. A payment of money by way of damages or compensation 
 in compliance with a demand made will suffice. Thus, a workman 
 arranged with a company on whose premises he had been injured, but 
 who were not his employers, that if he made no legal claim against 
 them they would pay his wages during incapacity and his medical 
 expenses, for a specified period, but an allowance was to be made for 
 anything that he mi^ht be entitled to recover from his employer or 
 the contractor. It was held that the workman had " recovered " 
 damages from the third persons and could not proceed against his 
 employer under the Act (Page v. Burtwell, [1908] 2 K. B. 758 ; 1 B. 
 W. C. C. 267 : see also Mulligan v. Dick and Son (1903), 6 F. 126 ; 
 Murray v. North Brit. Rail. Co. (1904), ibid., 540, decisions to 
 similar effect under the original Act). 
 
 Similarly, " if there is a payment and a receipt of money under the 
 Workmen's Compensation Act, and that receipt is in no way qualified, 
 I think that is sufficient to bring the case within the operation of s. 6. 
 and put the workman in the position of having proceeded against 
 his employer for compensation, and recovered it " (per VAUGHAN 
 WILLIAMS, L.J., in Oliver v. Nautilus Steam Shipping Co., [1903] 2 
 K. B. 639, at p. 650, cited with approval in Page v. Burtwell, supra. 
 See also Mahomed v. Maunsell (1907), 1 B. W. C. C. 269, in the county 
 court). 
 
 The receipt of wages, which an employer voluntarily continued to 
 pay to his injured workman after notice of the accident, was held not 
 to prevent the workman from proceeding against the stranger under 
 the original Act (Perry v. Clements (1901), 17 T. L. R. 525 ; 3 W. C. 
 C. 56 : RIDLEY, J.), and there seems to be no reason why this should 
 not still be the law. 
 
 There still remains the question whether a workman can preserve 
 his right of proceeding against a stranger or his employer by accepting 
 payments " without prejudice." It will be noticed that under the 
 section a person who pays compensation under the Act to the injured 
 workman has a right of indemnity against the stranger who has 
 brought about the injury and has thus rendered himself liable to pay 
 damages. The stranger, however, who pays damages can have no 
 right of indemnity against the employer. Consequently a workman 
 who makes a binding settlement with the stranger deprives his 
 employer of the fruits of his indemnity, because a settlement would 
 be none the less binding because the workman gave a receipt without 
 prejudice to any rights he might have against his employer. On the 
 other hand, a workman who takes weekly payments from his employer 
 "without prejudice" to his rights against the stranger, does not 
 deprive the stranger of anything and does not in any way increase his 
 liability. These considerations explain the decisions of such cases as 
 have deeii decided. 
 
Sect. 6 (1, 2)] INJURY CAUSED BY STRANGER. 91 
 
 Oliver v. Nautilus Steam Shipping Co., [1903] 2 K. B. 639; 5 
 W. C. C. 65, a case under the original Act, decides that payments 
 accepted from an employer " without prejudice " do not bar the 
 remedy of the workman against a stranger ; and in Huclde v. London 
 County Council (1910), 26 T. L. E. 580; 3 B. W. C. C. 536, a 
 Divisional Court took a like view under the present Act. In Page v. 
 Burtwell, [1908] 2 K. B. 758 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 267, the correspondence 
 was capable of being construed as meaning that the damages taken 
 from a stranger were taken without prejudice to claims against the 
 employer (see p. 90, ante). If this construction was put upon the 
 correspondence the case is an authority for saying that as against the 
 employer such an arrangement does not preserve the rights of the 
 workman to recover compensation under the Act. The report, how- 
 ever, does not indicate that such a view was taken. 
 
 In Scotland it was held under the original Act that the acceptance 
 of damages from a person not liable to pay compensation under the 
 Act without prejudice to the right to recover compensation from the 
 person who was so liable did not preserve the workman's rights 
 against the latter (Mulligan v. Dick Son (1903), 6 F. 126; Murray 
 v. North British Bail. Co. (1904), 6 F. 540), but it has been held 
 under the present Act that the acceptance of weekly payments from 
 an employer without prejudice to his rights against a negligent 
 stranger does not amount to a "recovery" of compensation so as 
 to debar the workman from taking action against the stranger ( WrigJt t 
 v. Lindsay (1911), 49 S. L. E. 210 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 531). 
 
 Recovery a Question Of Fact. It has been held by a Divisional 
 Court that the plaintiff is entitled to have left to the jury the facts 
 and circumstances relied upon as establishing that he has " recovered " 
 damages within the meaning of the section, e.g., whether he understood 
 the nature and effect of the receipts which he had signed, and that 
 it is not competent to the judge at the trial to withhold the case from 
 the jurv and to determine the question as a matter of law (Buckle v. 
 London County Council (1910), 26 T. L. E, 580; 3 B. W. C. C. 536, 
 and affirmed 4 B. W. C. C. 113). 
 
 Procedure. If it is proved during the hearing of the action against 
 a stranger that the plaintiff' has already recovered compensation from 
 his employer, it is submitted that the judge is bound to give effect to 
 the section and to give judgment for the defendant ; and that this 
 right to judgment is not prejudiced by the fact that the defendant 
 had knowledge of such recovery, and has not given notice of the 
 defence under s. 82 of the County Court Act, 1888, and r. 18 of the 
 County Court Rules, 1903-1911. 
 
 The Indemnity. The right to be indemnified by the stranger is 
 given to the person by whom the compensation has been paid, and also 
 to the person who has had to pay under the indemnity given by s. 4 
 of the Act (p. 74, ante). If disputed, the matter may be settled by 
 action, or by arbitration under the Act, if both parties consent to that 
 course, as was done in Lankester v. Miller (Hetherington, Third 
 
92 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 6 (12) 
 
 Party) (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 80; and Bate v. Worsey (Baylis, 
 Third Party) (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 276. 
 
 The section does not impose upon the stranger any liability to the 
 injured workman which did not exist before ; consequently, he will be 
 able to set up against the claim for indemnity, such defences as he 
 might have set up against the workman if he had brought an action, 
 e.g., contributory negligence. Nor does the section give to an 
 employer tort-feasor a right of action against a third-party joint 
 tort-feasor (Cory d Sons, Limited v. France. Fin wick & Co., Limited 
 (1910), 27 T. L. R, 18). 
 
 But it has been held by BRAY, J., that when once it is established that 
 there was a liability on the part of a stranger to the injured workman, 
 who has since died in consequence of the injury, the liability of the 
 stranger under this section to indemnify the employer extends to a 
 case where compensation has been paid under the Act to a person 
 (e.g., an illegitimate daughter) who herself could have no right of 
 action against the stranger at common law or under the Fatal Acci- 
 dents Act, 1846, but is entitled under the Workmen's Compensation 
 Act to receive compensation in respect of the death of the workman 
 (Smith's Dock Co. v. John Readhcad d Sons, 1912" 2 K. B. 328; 5 
 B. W. C. C. 450). 
 
 The indemnity will cover not only the amount of compensation 
 pavable under the award, but also the costs of the arbitration pro- 
 ceedings, if any (Great Northern Rail Co., v. TI hitehead (1902), 18 
 T. L. E. 816 ; 4 W. C. C. 39 ; DARLING, J.). 
 
 Indemnity may be claime/l although the compensation has been 
 settled by agreement, but in such case it will be open to the de- 
 fendant in the action for indemnity to say : (1) that the accident was 
 not caused by his default ; (2) that the payment was not compensation 
 paid under the Act, if he can show that it was greater than the Act 
 permitted ; and (3) that, although the amount of the payment was 
 within the limits of the Act, it was not such an amount which it was 
 reasonable for the employer to have agreed to pay (Thompson v. Xorth 
 Eastern Marine Engineering Co., Limited, [1903] 1 K. B. 428 ; 5 
 W. C. C. 71 : KENNEDY, J.). 
 
 Procedure on Indemnity. Eule 24 of the W. C. B., p. 219, post, 
 
 relates generally to such procedure ; and Eule 25, p. 220, post, relates 
 to cases where the employer is applicant. 
 
 Eule 24 provides that if the person liable to pay the compensation 
 intends to claim indemnity against the stranger, he must give him 
 notice in accordance with Eule 19. Failure to comply will not defeat 
 the statutory right to indemnity where an action upon it is brought in 
 the High Court (Nettleingham Co., Limited v. Poivell dc Co. (1912), 
 Times, November 21). There is some doubt whether it will if the 
 action is brought in the county court, having regard to the power 
 given to make rules " generally for carrying into effect this Act so 
 far as it affects the county court" (Sched. II., par. (12)). At any 
 rate one effect of the failure to comply with the rules is that the 
 stranger is not bound by any decision in the arbitration (see The 
 Rig el, [1912] P. 99). Unless the stranger admits his liability and 
 
Sect. 7 (1)] APPLICATION OF THE ACT TO SEAMEN. 9o 
 
 consents to the judge dealing with the claim for indemnity, the 
 judge has no power as between the respondent and the third party 
 to do more than to make an order that the third party shall not 
 be entitled in any future proceedings between the respondent and 
 himself to dispute" the validity of the award as to any matter which 
 the judge has jurisdiction to decide in the arbitration as between 
 the applicant and the respondent (W. C. E. 24 (5), p. 220, post). 
 
 Shipowner's Indemnity. See as to this, s. 7 and p. 94, post. 
 
 As to the liability of the owner of a wrong-doing ship to pay 
 as damages the amount of compensation under the Act, see The Annie 
 [19091 , P. 176 ; The Eigel, [1912] P. 99. 
 
 7. Application of Act to seamen.] (1) This Act shall 
 apply to masters, seamen, and apprentices to the sea service 
 and apprentices in the sea-fishing service, provided that such 
 persons are workmen within the meaning of this Act, and 
 are members of the crew of any ship registered in the United 
 Kingdom, or of any other British ship or vessel of which the 
 owner, or (if there is more than one owner) the managing 
 owner, or manager resides or has his principal place of 
 business in the United Kingdom, subject to the following 
 modifications: 
 
 (a) The notice of accident and the claim for compensation 
 
 may, except where the person injured is the master, 
 be served on the master of the ship as if he were 
 the employer, but where the accident happened and 
 the incapacity commenced on board the ship it 
 shall not be necessary to give any notice of the 
 accident : 
 
 (b) In the case of the death of the master, seaman, or 
 
 apprentice, the claim for compensation shall be made 
 within six months after news of the death has been 
 received by the claimant : 
 
 (c) Where an injured master, seaman, or apprentice is 
 
 discharged or left behind in a British possession or 
 in a foreign country, depositions respecting the cir- 
 cumstances and nature of the injury may be taken 
 by any judge or magistrate in the British possession, 
 and by any British consular officer in the foreign 
 
94 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 7 (i) 
 
 country, and if so taken shall be transmitted by the 
 person by whom they are taken to the Board of 
 Trade, and such depositions or certified copies 
 thereof shall in any proceedings for enforcing the 
 claim be admissible in evidence as provided by 
 sections six hundred and ninety-one and six hundred 
 and ninety-five of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, 
 and those sections shall apply accordingly : 
 
 (d) In the case of the death of a master, seaman, or 
 
 apprentice, leaving no dependants, no compensation 
 shall be payable, if the owner of the ship is under 
 the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, liable to pay the 
 expenses of burial : 
 
 (e) The weekly payment shall not be payable in respect 
 
 of the period during which the owner of the ship is, 
 under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, as amended 
 by any subsequent enactment, or otherwise, liable 
 to defray the expenses of maintenance of the injured 
 master, seaman, or apprentice : 
 
 (f) Any sum payable by way of compensation by the 
 
 owner of a ship under this Act shall be paid in full 
 notwithstanding anything in section five hundred 
 and three of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 
 (which relates to the limitation of a shipowner's 
 liability in certain cases of loss of life, injury, or 
 damage), but the limitation on the owner's liability 
 imposed by that section shall apply to the amount 
 recoverable by way of indemnity, under the section 
 of this Act relating to remedies both against em- 
 ployer and stranger, as if the indemnity were 
 damages for loss of life or personal injury : 
 
 (g) Subsections (2) and (3) of section one hundred and 
 
 seventy-four of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 
 (which relates to the recovery of wages of seamen 
 
Sect. 7 (2, 3)] APPLICATION OP THE ACT TO SEAMEN. 95 
 
 lost with their ship), shall apply as respects proceed- 
 ings for the recovery of compensation by dependants 
 of masters, seamen, and apprentices lost with their 
 ship as they apply with respect to proceedings for 
 the recovery of wages due to seamen and apprentices ; 
 and proceedings for the recovery of compensation 
 shall in such a case be maintainable, if the claim is 
 made within eighteen months of the date at which 
 the ship is deemed to have been lost with all hands : 
 
 (2) This Act shall not apply to such members of the crew 
 of a fishing vessel as are remunerated by shares in the profits 
 or the gross earnings of the working of such vessel. 
 
 (3) This section shall extend to pilots to whom Part X. of 
 the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, applies, as if a pilot when 
 employed on any such ship as aforesaid were a seaman and a 
 member of the crew. 
 
 APPLICATION OF THE ACT TO SEAMEN. 
 
 1. WHO ARE AND WHO ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE SECTION. 
 
 " Master." No definition is given in this Act, either expressly or 
 by reference, but by the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Viet, 
 c. 60), s. 742, " ' master ' includes every person (except a pilot) having 
 command or charge of any ship." 
 
 The fact that he owns shares in the ship of which he is master will 
 not deprive him of the right to compensation (Sharpe v. Carswell, 
 [1910] S. C.-391 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 552). 
 
 " Seaman." The word "seaman" has the same meaning as in 
 the Merchant Shipping, Act, 1894, supra (s. 13, pjrt.15, post), where it is 
 described by s. 742 to include " every person (except masters, pilots 
 and apprentices duly indentured and registered) employed or engaged 
 in any capacity on board any ship." 
 
 The definition will apparently include : a stevedore (E. v. Judge of 
 City of London Court (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 339,j>er Lord COLERIDGE, 
 C.J.) ; a person whose engagement as a seaman has not fulfilled the 
 formalities required by the Merchant Shipping Act (Austin v. Olsen 
 (1868), L. E. 3 Q. B. 208; Be The Great Eastern Steamship Co. 
 (1886), 53 L. T. 594) ; and a storekeeper of a ship Whilst in port, but 
 who has not yet been engaged for the voyage (Thompson v. Hart 
 (1890), 28 S. L. E. 28) ; a female cook or a stewardess (The Jane and 
 Matilda (1823), 1 Hagg. Adm. 187). A ship's husband is not (The 
 
96 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 7 (13) 
 
 Ruby (No. 2), [1898^ P. 59). As to the position of a man who is not 
 a sailor but who works his passage by doing what work he is capable 
 of performing, see The Hanna (1866), L. B. 1 A. & E. 283. 
 
 Note that for the purposes of this Act the seaman must also be 
 a member of the crew. Cattlemen engaged to look after cattle on 
 a cattleship were held not to be members of the crew (Anjlo- 
 Aryentine Live Stock and Produce Agency v. Temperley Shipping 
 Co., [1899] 2 Q. B. 403). 
 
 As to the application of the Act to foreigners, see p. 133, post. 
 
 u Pilot." The pilots to whom the section extends are those " to 
 whom Part X. of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, supra, applies, 
 as if a pilot when employed on any such ship as aforesaid were a 
 seaman and a member of the crew " (sub-s. (3) ). 
 
 Part X. of that Act (s. 572) " extends to the United Kingdom and 
 the Isle of Man only, but applies to all ships British and foreign," 
 and "pilot" by s. 742 of the same Act "means any person not 
 belonging to a ship who has the conduct thereof." 
 
 " Provided such Persons are Workmen." See, for who are and 
 
 who are not workmen within the Act, s. 13, and p. 133, post. 
 
 " Ship " " Vessel." These terms have the same meaning as in 
 the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, supra (see s. 13 and p. 115, post). 
 " Ship " is defined by that Act (s. 742) to include " every description 
 of vessel used in navigation not propelled by oars," and " vessel " is 
 denned to include " any ship or boat, or any other description of 
 vessel used in navigation." 
 
 The Workmen's Compensation Act applies to the members of the 
 crew of : (1) any ship registered in the United Kingdom ; (2) any other 
 British ship or vessel of which the owner or managing owner or 
 manager resides or has his principal place of business in the United 
 Kingdom, subject to the exception in s. 7 (2). 
 
 As to what ships are exempt from registry, see s. 3 of the Merchant 
 Shipping Act, 1894, supra ; and as to what is included in the term 
 " British ship," see ss. 1 and 2 of that Act. 
 
 The expression "ship" has been held to include a hopper con- 
 structed to be towed and with a rudder for steering (The Mac (1882), 
 7 P. D. 126) ; a fishing coble fitted with masts and sails for sea-going 
 purposes, and fitted with oars for use in getting in and out of harbour 
 (Ex parte Ferguson (1871), L. R. 6 Q. B. 280) ; but not to include a 
 stationary coal hulk (The European and Australian Royal Mail Co. 
 v. Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co. (1866), 14 L. T. 
 704) ; or a dumb barge propelled by oars (see The Owen Wallis 
 (1874), 30 L. T. 41 ; Everard v. Kendall (1870), L. B. 5 C. P. 428 ; 
 Gapp v. Bond (1887), 19 Q. B. D. 200) ; or a baUast lighter which 
 was not sea-going (The C. S. Butler (1874), L. R. 7 A. & E. 238) ; or 
 a gas float buoy (The Gas Float Whitton (No. 2), [1897] A. C. 337). 
 
 Upon the words " used in navigation," see The Gas Float Whitton 
 (No. 2), supra, and particularly the judgment of Lord ESHER, M.R., 
 in the Court of Appeal. [1896] P. 42 ; and Southport Corporation v. 
 Morris, [1893] 1 Q. B. 359. 
 
Sect. 7 (1 3)] APPLICATION OF THE ACT TO SEAMEN. 97 
 
 " Manager." This word is defined (s. 13, p. 115, post) to mean, 
 in relation to a ship, the ship's husband or other person to whom the 
 management of the ship is entrusted by or on behalf of the owner. 
 
 Crew of Fishing Vessel Remunerated by Shares. The Act 
 
 has no application to such members of the crew of a fishing vessel as 
 are remunerated by shares in the profits or the gross earnings of the 
 working of such vessel (s. 7, sub-s. (2) ). 
 
 A fisherman is not excluded merely because he is an owner of one 
 of the sixty-fourth shares in the vessel (Sliarpe v. Car swell, [1910] 
 S. C. 391 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 552) ; but according to the Court of Appeal 
 in England, he is excluded if any part of his remuneration consists of 
 shares, even though the amount of shares is guaranteed to be equal 
 to a fixed sum (Admiral Fishing Co. v. Robinson, [1910J 1 K. B. 540 ; 
 3 B. W. C. C. 247), or is only a small addition to a substantial weekly 
 wage (Costello v. Kelsall Bros. & Beeching ; Canwell v. Same; 
 Tindall v. Great Northern Steam Fishing Co. (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 667 ; 
 Costello's Case is under appeal to the House of Lords). The Court 
 of Session, on the other hand, hold it to be a question of fact for 
 the arbitrator to determine whether or not the fisherman can be 
 said fairly and reasonably to be remunerated by shares (Aberdeen 
 Steam Trawling <& Fishing Co., Limited v. Gill, [1908] S. C. 328 ; 
 1 B. W. C. C. 274 ; Woolfe v. Colquhoun (1912), 49 S. L. R. 911). 
 
 The position of a share fisherman is that of a co -adventurer, 
 interested in the totality of the venture and not merely in a part of 
 it, and so long as he is doing work which may be considered a part 
 of that venture he is within the exception (Whelan v. Great 
 Northern Steam Fishing Co., Limited (1909), 78 L. J. K. B. 860 ; 2 
 B. W. C. C. 235). 
 
 " Pishing Vessel." For the purpose of Part IV. of the Merchant 
 Shipping Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Viet. c. 60), which deals with fishing 
 boats, "the expression 'fishing boat' means a vessel of whatever 
 size, and in whatever way propelled, which is for the time being 
 employed in sea fishing or in the sea-fishing service, but save as 
 otherwise expressly provided, that expression shall not include a vessel 
 used for catching fish otherwise than for profit " (Merchant Shipping 
 Act, 1894, s. 370). A boat employed for carrying cargoes of fish 
 between the curing stations and vessels lying off shore is not a " fish- 
 ing vessel " within the section (Jamieson v. Clark (1908), 46 S. L. R. 
 73; 2B. W. C. C. 228). 
 
 2. COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES AND INCAPACITY. 
 
 Notice of Accident. No notice of accident need be given where 
 the accident happened and the incapacity commenced on board the 
 ship. In other cases it must be served on the owners, and this may 
 be done effectually by serving the managing owner -or manager for 
 the time being of the ship, or (except where the master is claim- 
 ing compensation) on the master of the ship ; and s. 696 of the 
 Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, supra, sub-s. (1), applies to service on 
 the master of the ship (W. C. R. 36 (6), p. 225, post}. 
 
 W.C.A. H 
 
98 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 7 (18) 
 
 The injured master gives notice to the owners in the manner 
 described in W. C. E. 36 (6) (p. 225, pout). 
 
 See generally as to " Notice of Accident," p. 63, ante. 
 
 As to who is the employer when a vessel is chartered, see p. 116, 
 post. 
 
 Claim. The claim may be served by the injured person on the 
 master of the ship or upon the managing owner or manager for the 
 time being of the ship (W. C. E. 36 (6), p. 225, post). The injured 
 master serves his claim on the owners in the manner described in 
 W. C. E. 36 (6) (p. 225, post). 
 
 See generally as to " Claim," p. 67, ante. 
 
 Weekly Compensation When not Payable. The weekly com- 
 pensation is not payable in respect of the period during which the 
 shipowner is liable, under the Merchant Shipping Acts, to defray 
 the expenses of maintenance of the injured master, seaman, or 
 apprentice (sub-s. (1) (e)). 
 
 By section 34 (1) of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1906 (6 Edw. 7, 
 c. 48), which came into operation on June 1st, 1907, " if the master 
 of, or a seaman belonging to, a ship receives any hurt or injury in 
 the service of the ship, or suffers from any illness (not being venereal 
 disease, or an illness due to his own wilful act or default or to his own 
 misbehaviour), the expense of providing the necessary surgical and 
 medical advice and attendance and medicine, and also the expenses of 
 the maintenance of the master or seaman until he is cured, or dies, or 
 is returned to a proper return port, and of his conveyance to the port, 
 and in the case of death the expense (if any) of his burial, shall be 
 defrayed by the owner of the ship, without any deduction on that 
 account from his wages." 
 
 " Port," by s. 742 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, supra 
 " includes place," and this is the meaning which the word has for 
 the purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act. See s. 13, p. 115, 
 post. 
 
 The date of the seaman's discharge at the return port is the com- 
 mencement of the period for which compensation is payable under 
 the Workmen's Compensation Act, and in assessing compensation the 
 arbitrator cannot consider either wages paid or any payments made 
 under the Merchant Shipping Act (McDermott v. Owners of S.S. 
 Tintoretto, [1911] A. C. 35 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 123 ; reversing [1909] 2 
 K. B. 704 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 208). See further, p. 158, post. 
 
 Industrial Disease. The provisions of the Act relating to industrial 
 diseases (s. 8) do not apply so as to benefit a sailor who contracts such 
 a disease at sea (Curtis v. Black & Co., [1909] 2 K. B. 529 ; 2 
 B. W. C. C. 239). 
 
 3. COMPENSATION ON DEATH. 
 
 Claim. This must be made within six months after news of the 
 death has been received by the claimant (s. 7 (1) (b)) ; and by the 
 
Sect. 7 (13)] APPLICATION OF THE ACT TO SEAMEN. 99 
 
 Rules framed under the Act the claim for compensation must state 
 the date at which news of the death was received (W. C. E. 36 (2)). 
 
 Sub-ss. (2) (3) of s. 174 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (57 
 & 58 Viet. c. 60), are as follows : 
 
 " (2) In any proceeding for the recovery of the wages, if it is shown 
 by some official return produced out of the custody of the Registrar- 
 General of Shipping and Seamen, or by other evidence, that the ship 
 has twelve months or upwards before the institution of the proceed- 
 ing left a port of departure, she shall, unless it is shown that she has 
 been heard of within twelve months after that departure, be deemed 
 to have been lost with all hands on board, either immediately after 
 the time she was last heard of, or at such later time as the court 
 hearing the case may think probable. 
 
 " (3) Any duplicate agreement or list of the crew made out, or state- 
 ment of a change of the crew delivered, under this Act, at the time 
 of the last departure of the ship from the United Kingdom, or a 
 certificate purporting to be a certificate from a consular or other 
 public officer at any port out of the United Kingdom, stating that 
 certain seamen and apprentices were shipped in the ship from the 
 said port, shall, if produced out of the custody of the Registrar- 
 General of Shipping and Seamen, or of the Board of Trade, be, in 
 the absence of proof to the contrary, sufficient proof that the seamen 
 and apprentices therein named as belonging to the ship were on board 
 at the time of the loss." 
 
 The claim for compensation and the particulars appended and 
 annexed to the request for arbitration are required to state the 
 date at which the ship was lost or is deemed to have been lost (W. 
 C. R. 36 (3)). 
 
 The application may be made before the lapse of twelve months 
 during which the ship has not been heard of, if, by the ordinary rules 
 of evidence, the death of the seaman would be presumed (Maginn v. 
 Carlingford Lough S.S. Co., Limited (1909), 43 Ir. L. T. 123; 2 
 B. W. C. C. 224). 
 
 When no Cpmpensation Payable on Death. if there are no 
 dependants, Sched. I., paragraph (1) (a) (iii), pp. 135 and 153, post, 
 provides for the payment of the reasonable expenses of medical 
 attendance and burial, not exceeding W. 
 
 In cases where any of the Merchant Shipping Acts make the owner 
 " liable to pay the expenses of burial " no compensation is payable 
 under the above provisions (s. 7 (1) (d)). The section which now 
 imposes such liability on the owner is s. 34 of the Merchant Shipping 
 Act, 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 48), for which see p. 98, ante. 
 
 4. LIMITATION OF AMOUNT OF INDEMNITY. 
 
 Whilst the shipowner has to pay compensation in full, the amount 
 of indemnity (see ss. 4 and 6) claimable is to be limited by s. 503 of 
 the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, as if the indemnity were damages 
 for loss of life or personal injury. These provisions limiting liability 
 
100 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 7 (13) 
 
 have been extended by the Merchant Shipping (Liability of Ship- 
 owners) Act, 1898 (61 & 62 Viet. c. 14), to ships during the period 
 between launching and registering them. 
 
 5. DEPOSITIONS AS EVIDENCE IN PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 Depositions, taken as described in s. 7 (1) (c), are to be admissible 
 in evidence as provided by ss. 691, 695, of the Merchant Shipping 
 Act, 1894, supra, as follows : 
 
 " S. 691. Depositions to be received in evidence when witness 
 cannot be produced.] (1) Whenevef in the course of any legal pro- 
 ceeding instituted in any part of Her Majesty's dominions before any' 
 judge ... or before any person authorised by law or by consent 
 of parties to receive evidence, the testimony of any witness is required 
 in relation to the subject matter of that proceeding, then upon due 
 proof, if the proceeding is instituted in the United Kingdom that 
 the witness cannot be found in that kingdom, . . . any deposition 
 that the witness may have previously made on oath in relation to the 
 same subject matter before any justice or magistrate in Her Majesty's 
 dominions, or any British consular officer elsewhere, shall be admis- 
 sible in evidence, provided that 
 
 (a) if the deposition was made in the United Kingdom, it shall not 
 be admissible in any proceeding instituted in the United 
 Kingdom. . . . 
 
 " (2) A deposition so made shall be authenticated by the signature of 
 the judge, magistrate, or consular officer before whom it is made. . . . 
 
 " (3) It shall not be necessary in any case to prove the signature or 
 official character of the person appearing to have signed any such 
 deposition. . . . 
 
 " (4) Nothing herein contained shall affect any case in which deposi- 
 tions taken in any proceeding are rendered admissible in evidence by 
 any Act of Parliament. . . . 
 
 "695. Admissibility of Documents in Evidence.] (1) Where a 
 document is by this Act declared to be admissible in evidence, such 
 document shall, on its production from the proper custody, be admis- 
 sible in evidence in any court or before any person having by law or 
 consent of parties authority to receive evidence, and, subject to all 
 just exceptions, shall be evidence of the matters stated therein in 
 pursuance of this Act or by any officer in pursuance of his duties as 
 such officer. 
 
 " (2) A copy of any such document or extract therefrom shall also be 
 so admissible in evidence if proved to be an examined copy or extract, 
 or if it purports to be signed and certified as a true copy or extract by 
 the officer to whose custody the original document was entrusted, and 
 that officer shall furnish such certified copy or extract to any person 
 applying at a reasonable time for the same, upon payment of a 
 reasonable sum for the same, not exceeding fourpence for every folio 
 of ninety words, but a person shall be entitled to have 
 
Sect. 8 (1)] INDUSTRIAL DISEASES. 101 
 
 (a) a certified copy of the particulars entered by the registrar in 
 
 the register book on the registry of the ship, together with a 
 certified statement showing the ownership of the ship at the 
 time being ; and 
 
 (b) a certified copy of any declaration, or document, a copy of which 
 
 is made evidence by this Act, 
 
 on payment of one shilling for each copy." 
 
 ****** 
 
 An Order in Council, dated July 4, 1908, has provided that the 
 power of a British Consular officer to take evidence may be exercised 
 in Northern Nigeria, by the Cantonment Magistrate at Lokoja ; in 
 the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, at Calabar and Warri by the 
 Police Magistrate, and at other ports of the Protectorate by the 
 District Commissioner of the District ; in the East Africa Protectorate, 
 by the Chief of Customs ; in Uganda, by the Principal Judge ; in 
 Somaliland, by the District Officer at Berbera ; in Nyasaland, the 
 Comptroller of Customs ; in Weihaiwei, by the Magistrate ; and in 
 Cyprus, by the President of the District Court of Nikosia. 
 
 6. RULES OF PROCEDURE. 
 
 Rules. Rule 36 of the W. C. R., besides dealing with the contents 
 of claims and particulars (see ante), relates to the description of 
 owners in documents and proceedings, and to the service of docu- 
 ments and proceedings on the owners of a ship. 
 
 Proceedings under s. 7 are exclusive. If proceedings are taken 
 under s. 7 the applicant can only succeed when he shows that he 
 comes within that section, and he is not entitled in such proceedings 
 to say that he claims compensation apart from that section (Panagotin 
 v. Owners of S.S. Pontiac (No. 2) (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 147). 
 
 8. Application of Act to industrial diseases.] (1) Where 
 
 (i) the certifying surgeon appointed under the Factory 
 and Workshop Act, 1901, for the district in which 
 a workman is employed certifies that the workman 
 is suffering from a disease mentioned in the Third 
 Schedule to this Act and is thereby disabled from 
 earning full wages at the work at which he was 
 employed; or 
 
 (ii) a workman is, in pursuance of any special rules or 
 regulations made under the Factory and Workshop 
 
102 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 8 (1 > 
 
 Act, 1901, suspended from his usual employ- 
 ment on account of having contracted any such 
 disease; or 
 
 (iii) the death of a workman is caused by any such 
 disease ; 
 
 and the disease is due to the nature of any employment in 
 which the workman was employed at any time within the 
 twelve months previous to the date of the disablement or 
 suspension, whether under one or more employers, he or his 
 dependants shall be entitled to compensation under this Act 
 as if the disease or such suspension as aforesaid were a 
 personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course 
 of that employment, subject to the following modifications : 
 
 (a) The disablement or suspension shall be treated as the 
 
 happening of the accident ; 
 
 (b) If it is proved that the workman has at the time of 
 
 entering the employment wilfully and falsely repre- 
 sented himself in writing as not having previously 
 suffered from the disease, compensation shall not be 
 payable ; 
 
 (c) The compensation shall be recoverable from the 
 
 employer who last employed the workman during 
 the said twelve months in the employment to the 
 nature of which the disease was due : 
 Provided that 
 
 (i) the workman or his dependants if so required 
 shall furnish that employer with such information 
 as to the names and addresses of all the other 
 employers who employed him in the employment 
 during the said twelve months as he or they may 
 possess, and, if such information is not furnished, 
 or is not sufficient to enable that employer to take 
 proceedings under the next following proviso, that 
 
Sect. 8 (1)] INDUSTRIAL DISEASES. 103 
 
 employer upon proving that the disease was not 
 contracted whilst the workman was in his employ- 
 ment shall not be liable to pay compensation ; 
 and 
 
 (ii) if that employer alleges that the disease 
 was in fact contracted whilst the workman was in 
 the employment of some other employer, and not 
 whilst in his employment, he may join such other 
 employer as a party to the arbitration, and if the 
 allegation is proved that other employer shall be 
 the employer from whom the compensation is to 
 be recoverable ; and 
 
 (iii) if the disease is of such a nature as to be 
 contracted by a gradual process, any other em- 
 ployers, who during the said twelve months 
 employed the workman in the employment to the 
 nature of which the disease was due, shall be liable 
 to make to the employer from whom compensa- 
 tion is recoverable such contributions as, in default 
 of agreement, may be determined in the arbitra- 
 tion under this Act for settling the amount of the 
 compensation ; 
 
 (d) The amount of the compensation shall be calculated 
 
 with reference to the earnings of the workman 
 under the employer from whom the compensation 
 is recoverable ; 
 
 (e) The employer to whom notice of the death, disable- 
 
 ment, or suspension is to* be given shall be the 
 employer who last employed the workman during 
 the said twelve months in the employment to the 
 nature of which the disease was due, and the notice 
 may be given notwithstanding that the workman has 
 voluntarily left his employment ; 
 
104 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 8 (24) 
 
 (f) If an employer or a workman is aggrieved by the 
 action of a certifying or other surgeon in giving or 
 refusing to give a certificate of disablement or in 
 suspending or refusing to suspend a workman for the 
 purposes of this section, the matter shall in accord- 
 ance with regulations made by the Secretary of State 
 be referred to a medical referee, whose decision shall 
 be final. 
 
 (2) If the workman at or immediately before the date of 
 the disablement or suspension was employed in any process 
 mentioned in the second column of the Third Schedule to 
 this Act, and the disease contracted is the disease in the first 
 column of that Schedule set opposite the description of the 
 process, the disease, except where the certifying surgeon 
 certifies that in his opinion the disease was not due to the 
 nature of the employment, shall be deemed to have been due 
 to the nature of that employment, unless the employer 
 proves the contrary. 
 
 (3) The Secretary of State may make rules regulating the 
 duties and fees of certifying and other surgeons (including 
 dentists) under this section. 
 
 (4) For the purposes of this section the date of disable- 
 ment shall be such date as the certifying surgeon certifies as 
 the date on which the disablement commenced, or, if he is 
 unable to certify such a date, the date on which the certificate 
 is given : Provided that 
 
 (a) Where the medical referee allows an appeal against 
 
 a refusal by a certifying surgeon to give a 
 certificate of disablement, the date of disablement 
 shall be such date as the medical referee may 
 determine : 
 
 (b) Where a workman dies without having obtained a 
 
 certificate of disablement, or is at the time of death 
 
Sect. 8 (58)] TNDUSTP^AL DISEASES. 105 
 
 not in receipt of a weekly payment on account of 
 disablement, it shall be the date of death. 
 
 (5) In such cases, and subject to such conditions as the 
 Secretary of State may direct, a medical practitioner 
 appointed by the Secretary of State for the purpose shall 
 have the powers and duties of a certifying surgeon 
 under this section, and this section shall be construed 
 accordingly. 
 
 (6) The Secretary of State may make orders for extending 
 the provisions of this section to other diseases and other 
 processes, and to injuries due to the nature of any employ- 
 ment specified in the order not being injuries by accident, 
 either without modification or subject to such modifications 
 as may be contained in the order. 
 
 (7) Where, after inquiry held on the application of any 
 employers or workmen engaged in any industry to which 
 this section applies, it appears that a mutual trade insurance 
 company or society for insuring against the risks under this 
 section has been established for the industry, and that a 
 majority of the employers engaged in that industry are 
 insured against such risks in the company or society and 
 that the company or society consents, the Secretary of State 
 may, by Provisional Order, require all employers in that 
 industry to insure in the company or society upon such 
 terms and under such conditions and subject to such excep- 
 tions as may be set forth in the Order. Where such a' 
 company or society has been established, but is confined 
 to employers in any particular locality or of any particular 
 class, the Secretary of State may for the purposes of this 
 provision treat the industry, as carried on by employers in 
 that locality or of that class, as a separate industry. 
 
 (8) A Provisional Order made under this section shall be 
 of no force whatever unless and until it is confirmed by 
 Parliament, and if, while the Bill confirming any such Order 
 
100 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, ACT, 1906. [Sect. 8 (!. i) 
 
 is pending in either House of Parliament, a petition is pre- 
 sented against the Order, the Bill may be referred to a 
 Select Committee, and the petitioner shall be allowed to 
 appear and oppose as in the case of Private Bills, and any 
 Act confirming any Provisional Order under this section 
 may be repealed, altered, or amended by a Provisional Order 
 made and confirmed in like manner. 
 
 (9) Any expenses incurred by the Secretary of State in 
 respect of any such Order, Provisional Order, or confirming 
 Bill shall be defrayed out of moneys provided by Parlia- 
 ment. 
 
 (10) Nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a 
 workman to recover compensation in respect of a disease to 
 which this section does not apply, if the disease is a personal 
 injury by accident within the meaning of this Act. 
 
 APPLICATION OF ACT TO INDUSTPJAL DISEASES. 
 Diseases to which the Section Applies. The original list of 
 
 diseases to which the section applies will be found in the Third 
 Schedule to the Act (see p. 204, post) ; but the Secretary of State has 
 power by Order to extend this list (s. 8 (6)), and this has been done 
 (see pp. 204, 205, post). 
 
 It must be remembered that any disease which can be shown to be 
 the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of the 
 employment, is a personal injury within the meaning of s. 1 of the Act 
 and right to compensation for such is expressly preserved by s. 8 (10). 
 
 Conditions under which Compensation becomes Payable. 
 
 The right to compensation arises to the deceased workman (or his 
 representatives) when 
 
 (a) he is certified to be suffering from, and to be disabled from 
 
 earning full wages by, such disease ; 
 
 (b) he is suspended from employment owing to such disease ; 
 
 (c) he dies from such disease ; 
 
 Provided the disease is due to the nature of any employment in 
 which he was employed at any time within the twelve months previous 
 to the date of disablement or suspension (s. 8 (1)). 
 
 Under these circumstances the disease is regarded as a personal 
 injury by accident arising out of and hi the course of his employment. 
 
 Where a certificate of disablement or a certificate of or relating to 
 suspension has been given, a copy thereof must on demand be 
 furnished to the employer (W. C. E. 39 (2)). 
 
Sect. 8 (l io)] INDUSTRIAL DISEASES. 107 
 
 It has been held in Scotland that the condition of obtaining a 
 certificate is satisfied if the certificate is obtained during the arbitration 
 proceedings (Taylor v. BurnJiam <$ Co. (No. 1) (19D8), 46 S. L. B 482 ; 
 2B. W. C. C. 247). 
 
 Seaman not Entitled. As the condition relating to obtaining 
 the necessary certificate cannot be fulfilled by a seaman who contracts 
 an industrial disease at sea, he cannot recover compensation under 
 this section (Curtis v. Black & Co. [1909] , 2 K. B. 529 ; 2 B. W. C. 
 C. 239). 
 
 Appeal from Decision of Certifying Surgeon. if an employer 
 or workman is aggrieved by the action of a certifying or other surgeon 
 in giving or refusing a certificate of disablement, or in suspending or 
 refusing to suspend a workman, the matter is to be referred, in accord- 
 ance with regulations made by the Secretary of State, to a medical 
 referee, whose decision is final (s. 8 (1) (f)). 
 
 It has been held in Scotland that on such an appeal the medical 
 referee has no power to restrict his decision by a finding that the 
 workman has since become capable of doing his work, or any similar 
 restriction, and that such a restriction does not prevent the workman 
 from making a request for arbitration (Garrett v. Waddell d Son 
 (1911), 48 S. L. B. 937 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 507 ; Winters v. Addie rf 
 Sons' Collieries (1911), 48 S. L. B. 940 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 511 ; see also 
 M'Ginn v. Udston Coal Co. (1912), 49 S. L. B. 531 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 
 559, and see p. 108, post). 
 
 For provisions as to the powers of the Secretary of State in respect 
 of certifying and other surgeons and dentists, see sub-ss. (3), (5). 
 
 W. C. B. 82 relates to references to medical referees (see p. 253, 
 post). 
 
 For the regulations made by the Secretary of State and the 
 Treasury as to the duties and fees of certifying and other surgeons, 
 see Appendix D., p. 333, post. 
 
 Date when Right to Compensation Accrues. The disablement 
 or suspension is treated as the happening of the accident (s. 8 (1) (a)). 
 The date of disablement is (s. 8 (4)) : 
 
 (a) that fixed by the certifying surgeon ; 
 
 (b) if he cannot fix 'it, the date of the certificate ; 
 
 (c) if the medical referee allows an appeal from a refusal to grant 
 
 a certificate, the date fixed by him ; or, 
 
 (d) in case of death without a previous certificate of disablement, or 
 
 when the workman is not in receipt of weekly payments, the 
 date of the death. 
 
 From which Employer Compensation is Recoverable. 
 
 Primd facie from the employer who last employed the workman 
 during the twelve months previous to the disablement or suspension, in 
 the employment to the nature of which the disease is due (s. 8 (1) (c)). 
 If at or immediately before the date of disablement or suspension the 
 workman was employed in a process named in the second column of the 
 
108 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 8 (110) 
 
 Third Schedule (see pp. 204, 205, post, for the Schedule and its exten- 
 sions), and the disease contracted is the disease in the first column of 
 that Schedule set opposite the description of the process, the disease is to 
 be deemed to have been due to the nature of that employment, unless : 
 
 (a) the certifying surgeon certifies his opinion to the contrary ; or 
 
 (b) the employer proves the contrary (s. 8 (2)). 
 
 Therefore, if the workman obtains from the certifying surgeon an 
 unqualified certificate that he is suffering from a disease mentioned in 
 the first column of the Schedule, and was at or immediately before 
 the date of disablement or suspension engaged in the process 
 mentioned in the second column, there is a presumption that the 
 disease was due to the employment in that process. No more is 
 required of the workman, but the employer may rebut the presump- 
 tion. If, however, the certificate states the opinion of the certifying 
 surgeon to be that the disease is not due to the employment, the 
 presumption goes, and the workman must prove affirmatively that it 
 is so due. Should there be an appeal to the medical referee from an 
 unqualified certificate and the medical referee certifies that the work- 
 man (e.g., a collier) is suffering from the certified and scheduled 
 disease (e.g., nystagmus), but that in his opinion it is not a form of 
 disease due to the employment (e.g., is not miner's nystagmus but 
 some other kind), such certificate is not final within s. 8 (1) (/), on 
 this latter point, and the workman is entitled to prove if he can that 
 the disease is due to the employment stated opposite to it in the 
 second column of the Schedule (McGinn v. Udston Coal Co. (1912), 49 
 S. L. E, 531 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 559). 
 
 Sub-section 2 does not relieve the applicant of the burden of proving 
 that the death or incapacity is the proximate or ultimate result of the 
 industrial disease. It is only when he has done so that the sub-section 
 raises the presumption in his favour. Thus, the death of a painter 
 was the immediate result of granular kidney, which condition is a 
 sequela of lead-poisoning and also of other complaints. The applicant 
 did not prove that lead poisoning was the cause of death, but on the 
 other hand the employers did not prove the contrary. It was held 
 that the applicant had not discharged the onus of proof (Haylett v. 
 Vigor & Co., [1908] 2 K. B. 837 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 282). 
 
 The workman or his dependants must, on request, supply such 
 information, as he or they may possess, of the names and addresses 
 of all other employers who employed him in the employment during 
 that period, and, failing the supply of information adequate for the 
 purpose of proceeding as described in the next paragraph, the employer 
 is exonerated if he prove that the disease was not contracted whilst 
 the workman was in his employment. 
 
 Where the particulars gave wilfully false names and addresses, it 
 was held that this did not bar the workman's claim when the 
 employers had not in fact been prejudiced (Taylor v. Bnrriliam (6 Co. 
 (No. 2), [1910] S. C. 705 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 569). 
 
 Shifting the Burden of Liability. The employer, if he alleges 
 that the disease was not contracted in his employment but in the 
 employment of another, may join that other as a party to the 
 
Sect. 8 (110)] INDUSTRIAL DISEASES. 109 
 
 arbitration, and if he succeeds in establishing his allegation, the other 
 employer is the person from whom the compensation is recoverable 
 (s. 8 (1) (c) (ii)). . For procedure see W. C. E. 39 (4), p. 228, post. 
 
 Contribution to Compensation by other Employers. In the 
 case of a disease which arises from a gradual process, all employers 
 who employed the workman during the previous period of twelve 
 months in an employment to the nature of which the disease was due, 
 are liable to make to the employer, from whom compensation is 
 recoverable, contributions to the compensation. Disputes as to this 
 are to be settled by arbitration under the Act (s. 8 (1) (c) (iii)). See 
 W. C. E. 39 (5) as to procedure (p. 229, post). 
 
 Notice the difference between shifting the burden of liability under 
 s. 8 (1) (c) (ii) and claiming contribution in case of a disease by gradual 
 process under s. 8 (1) (c) (iii). In the former case the respondent 
 employer has to prove that the disease was contracted hi the employ- 
 ment of the employer whom he joins as a party. In the latter case 
 this proof is not necessary (Mallinder v. J. Moores & Sons, Limited, 
 [1912] 2 K. B. 124 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 362). 
 
 His Honour Judge PARRY has decided that a fair principle to be 
 adopted in computing compensation when there is no special risk or 
 amount of poison in either employment, is to take the period of em- 
 ployment by each employer as the basis (Lees v. Waring <& Gillow, 
 Limited, Ferguson, Third Party (1909), 127 L. T. Newsp., 495; 2 
 B. W. C. C. 474). 
 
 Notice Of Disablement, etc. Generally as to notices, see p. 
 63, ante. 
 
 The notice of death, disablement, or suspension is to be given to the 
 employer who last employed the workman, during the previous twelve 
 months, in the employment to the nature of which the disease is due 
 (s. 8 (1) (e)). It may be given although the workman has voluntarily 
 left his employment. It must state the date and cause of the dis- 
 ablement or suspension, and where a certificate of disablement, or a 
 certificate of or relating to suspension, has been given, a copy thereof 
 must on demand be furnished to the employer (W. C. E. 39 (2)). 
 
 The Eecorder of Dublin has held that notice may be given by the 
 workman before he has been examined by, or has obtained a certifi- 
 cate from, the certifying surgeon, and that he may give a further 
 notice after such examination if it takes place (Devine v. Metcalfe 
 (1911), 45 Ir. L. T. 271). 
 
 Forms Of Notice. The following forms of notice are suggested as 
 being in accordance with the requirements of the Act : 
 
 1. In a Case of Certified Disablement. 
 
 To Messrs. Potter & Co., 
 
 of the Pottery Works, Hanley. 
 
 Please take notice that John Jones, of 24, Paradise Eow, Hanley [was on 
 the day of certified to be suffering from lead poisoning, and has 
 
110 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 9 (l, i') 
 
 been disabled since the day of , 1907, from earning full wages 
 
 at the work at which he was employed". 
 
 This notice is served upon you as being the employers who last employed 
 him in an employment to the nature of which the disease is due. 
 
 Yours truly, 
 
 July 3rd, 1907. JOHN JOSES. 
 
 2. In the Case of Suspension. 
 
 The same as above, substituting the following in place of the words in 
 square brackets : 
 
 " Was on the 1st day of July, 1907, suspended from his usual employ- 
 ment on account of having contracted lead poisoning." 
 
 3. In the Case of Death. 
 
 The same as in 1, substituting for the words in square brackets the 
 following, and altering the signature : 
 
 " Died on the 1st day of July, 1907, from lead poisoning." 
 
 Computation of Compensation. Compensation is calculated on 
 the basis of the earnings of the workman under the employer from 
 whom it is recoverable (s. 8 (1) (d)). 
 
 See for scale of compensation, Sched. I., p. 134, post. 
 
 Procedure. See W. C. R. 89. p. 228, post. 
 
 Forfeiture of Eight to Compensation. This occurs when it is 
 
 proved that a workman on entering the employment has wilfully and 
 falsely represented himself in writing as not having previously suffered 
 from the disease (s. 8 (1) (b)). 
 
 9. Application to workmen in employment of Crown.] (1) 
 This Act shall not apply to persons in the naval or military 
 service of the Crown, but otherwise shall apply to workmen 
 employed by or under the Crown to whom this Act would 
 apply if the employer were a private person : 
 
 Provided that in the case of a person employed in the 
 private service of the Crown, the head of that department 
 of the Royal Household in which he was employed at 
 the time of the accident shall be deemed to be his 
 employer. , 
 
 (2) The Treasury may, by warrant laid before Parliament, 
 modify for the purposes of this Act their warrant made 
 
Sect. 11 (1)] DETENTION OF SHIPS. Ill 
 
 under section one of the Superannuation Act, 1887, and 
 notwithstanding anything in that Act, or any such warrant, 
 may frame schemes with a view to their being certified by 
 the Eegistrar of Friendly Societies under this Act. 
 
 Treasury Warrant, 1907. The Treasury have exercised their 
 powers under sub-s. (2) of modifying their warrant made under the 
 Superannuation Act, 1887 (50 & 51 Viet. c. 67), s. 1, and have issued 
 a warrant, dated August 21st, 1907, declaring that no award shall be 
 made under the original warrant, and amending warrants, in cases to 
 which the Workmen's Compensation Act applies. 
 
 Procedure See W. C. E. 79, p. 251, post, as to proceedings where 
 
 the Crown is a party. 
 
 10. Appointment and remuneration of medical referees and 
 arbitrators.} (1) The Secretary of State may appoint such 
 legally qualified medical practitioners to be medical referees 
 for the purposes of this Act as he may, with the sanction of 
 the Treasury, determine, and the remuneration of, and other 
 expenses incurred by, medical referees under this Act shall, 
 subject to regulations made by the Treasury, be paid out of 
 moneys provided by Parliament. 
 
 Where a medical referee has been employed as a medical 
 practitioner in connection with any case by or on behalf of 
 an employer or workman or by any insurers interested, he 
 shall not act as medical referee in that case. 
 
 (2) The remuneration of an arbitrator appointed by a judge 
 of county courts under the Second Schedule to this Act shall 
 be paid out of moneys provided by Parliament in accordance 
 with regulations made by the Treasury. 
 
 Regulations. For the Eegulations relating to medical referees, 
 see Appendix C, p. 325, post. 
 
 11. Detention of ships.] (1) If it is alleged that the 
 owners of any ship are liable as such owners to pay com- 
 pensation under this Act, and at any time that ship is found 
 in any port or river of England or Ireland, or within three 
 
112 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 11 (2, 3) 
 
 miles of the coast thereof, a judge of any court of record in 
 England or Ireland may, upon its being shown to him by any 
 person applying in accordance with the rules of the court 
 that the owners are probably liable as such to pay such 
 compensation, and that none of the owners reside in the 
 United Kingdom, issue an order directed to any officer of 
 customs or other officer named by the judge requiring him to 
 detain the ship until such time as the owners, agent, master, 
 or consignee thereof have paid such compensation, or have 
 given security, to be approved by the judge, to abide the 
 event of any proceedings that may be instituted to recover 
 such compensation and to pay such compensation and costs 
 as may be awarded thereon ; and any officer of customs or 
 other officer to whom the order is directed shall detain the 
 ship accordingly. 
 
 (2) In any legal proceeding to recover such compensation 
 the person giving security shall be made defendant, and the 
 production of the order of the judge, made in relation to 
 the security, shall be conclusive evidence of the liability of 
 the defendant to the proceeding. 
 
 (3) Section six hundred and ninety-two of the Merchant 
 Shipping Act, 1894, shall apply to the detention of a ship 
 under this Act as it applies to the detention of a ship under 
 that Act, and, if the owner of a ship is a corporation, it shall 
 for the purposes of this section be deemed to reside in the 
 United Kingdom if it has an office in the United Kingdom 
 at which service of writs can be effected. 
 
 Effect of Section. By this section the injured workman is 
 enabled to find some one against whom he can take proceedings to 
 obtain compensation in cases where, without some such provision, 
 he would be without remedy. Upon the ship being detained some 
 one must come forward, if the ship is to be released at all, to pay 
 the compensation or to give security to abide the event of the pro- 
 ceedings, and the person giving the security is then made the respondent 
 to the arbitration proceedings. 
 
 An employer who has paid compensation, or from whom compensa- 
 tion is claimed, may also obtain an order for the detention of a ship 
 under this section. 
 
Sect. 12 (1)] RETURNS AS TO COMPENSATION. 113 
 
 Section 692 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Viet, 
 c. 60), is as follows : 
 
 "Enforcing Detention of Ship.](l.) Where under this Act 
 a ship is to be or may be detained, any commissioned officer on 
 full pay in the naval or military service of Her Majesty, or any officer 
 of the Board of Trade, or any officer of customs, or any British 
 consular officer may detain the ship, and if the ship after detention 
 or after service on the master of any notice of or order for detention 
 proceeds to sea before it is released by competent authority, the 
 master of the ship, and also the owner, and any person who sends 
 the ship to sea, if that owner or person is party or privy to the offence, 
 shall be liable for each offence to a fine not exceeding one hundred 
 pounds. 
 
 " (2) Where a ship so proceeding to sea takes to sea when on board 
 thereof in the execution of his duty any officer authorised to detain 
 the ship, or any surveyor or officer of the Board or Trade or any 
 officer of customs, the owner and master of the ship shall each 
 be liable to pay all expenses of and incidental to the officer or 
 surveyor being so taken to sea, and also to a fine not exceeding one 
 hundred pounds, or, if the offence is not prosecuted in a summary 
 manner, not exceeding ten pounds for every day until the officer or 
 surveyor returns, or until such time as would enable him after 
 leaving the ship to return to the port from which he is taken, and 
 the expenses ordered to be paid may be recovered in like manner as 
 the fine. 
 
 " (3) When under this Act a ship is to be detained an officer of 
 customs shall, and where under this Act a ship may be detained an 
 officer of customs may, refuse to clear that ship outwards or to grant 
 a transire to that ship. 
 
 " (4) Where any provision of this Act provides that a ship may 
 be detained until any document is produced to the proper officer 
 of customs, the proper officer shall mean, unless the context other- 
 wise requires, the officer able to grant a clearance or transire to such 
 ship." 
 
 Procedure. See W. C. E. 37, p. 226, post. 
 
 A county court judge acting under the powers of this section is 
 acting as judge and not as arbitrator under the Act. An appeal from 
 an order made under this section lies to the Divisional Court and not 
 to the Court of Appeal (Panagotis v. Owners of 8.S. Pontiac (No. 1), 
 [1912] 1 K. B. 74 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 147). 
 
 12 Returns as to compensation^ (1) Every employer 
 in any industry to which the Secretary of State may direct 
 that this section shall apply shall, on or before such day in 
 every year as the Secretary of State may direct, send to the 
 Secretary of State a correct return specifying the number of 
 injuries in respect of which compensation has been paid by 
 
 W.C.A. I 
 
114 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1900. [Sect. 13 
 
 him under this Act during the previous year, and the amount 
 of such compensation, together with such other particulars 
 as to the compensation as the Secretary of State may direct, 
 and in default of complying with this section shall be liable 
 on conviction under the Summary Jurisdiction Acts to a fine 
 not exceeding five p ounds. 
 
 (2) Any regulations made by the Secretary of State con- 
 taining such directions as aforesaid shall be laid before both 
 Houses of Parliament as soon as may be after they are 
 made. 
 
 Regulations. Regulations, dated January 15th, 1908, have been 
 issued. 
 
 13. Definitions.] In this Act, unless the context other- 
 wise requires, 
 
 "Employer" includes any body of persons corporate or 
 unincorporate and the legal personal representative 
 of a deceased employer, and, where the services of a 
 workman are temporarily lent or let on hire to another 
 person by the person with whom the workman has 
 entered into a contract of service or apprenticeship 
 the latter shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed 
 to continue to be the employer of the workman whilst 
 he is working for that other person ; 
 
 " Workman " does not include any person employed other- 
 wise than by way of manual labour whose remunera- 
 tion exceeds two hundred and fifty pounds a year, or 
 a person whose employment is of a casual nature and 
 who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of 
 the employer's trade or business, or a member of a 
 police force, or an outworker, or a member of the 
 employer's family dwelling in his house, but, save as 
 aforesaid, means any person who has entered into or 
 works under a contract of service or apprenticeship 
 with an employer, whether by way of manual labour, 
 
Sect. 13] DEFINITIONS. 115 
 
 clerical work, or otherwise, and whether <the contract 
 is expressed or implied, is oral or in writing ; 
 
 Any reference to a workman who has been injured shall, 
 where the workman is dead, include a reference to his 
 legal personal representative or to his dependants or 
 other person to whom or for whose benefit compensa- 
 tion is payable ; 
 
 "Dependants" means such of the members of the work- 
 man's family as were wholly or in part dependent upon 
 the earnings of the workman at the time of his death, 
 or would but for the incapacity due to the accident 
 have been so dependent, and where the workman, 
 being the parent or grandparent of an illegitimate child, 
 leaves such a child so dependent upon his earnings, or, 
 being an illegitimate child, leaves a parent or grand- 
 parent so dependent upon his earnings, shall include 
 such an illegitimate child and parent or grandparent 
 respectively ; 
 
 " Member of a family " means wife or husband, father, 
 mother, grandfather, grandmother, step-father, step- 
 mother, son, daughter, grandson, granddaughter, step- 
 I3on7~step -daughter, brother, sister, half-brother, half- 
 sister ; 
 
 " Ship," " vessel/' " seaman," and " port " have the same 
 meanings as in the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 ; 
 
 " Manager," in relation to a ship, means the ship's hus- 
 band or other person to whom the management of the 
 ship is entrusted by or on behalf of the owner ; 
 
 " Police force " means a police force to which the Police 
 Act, 1890, or the Police (Scotland) Act, 1890, applies, 
 the City of London Police Force, the Eoyal Irish Con- 
 stabulary, and the Dublin Metropolitan Police Force ; 
 
116 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 13 
 
 " Outworker " means a person to whom articles or materials 
 are given out to be made up, cleaned, washed, altered, 
 ornamented, finished, or repaired, or adapted for sale, 
 in his own home or on other premises not under the 
 control or management of the person who gave out the 
 materials or articles ; 
 
 The exercise and performance of the powers and duties of 
 a local or other public authority shall, for the purposes 
 of this Act, be treated as the trade or business of the 
 authority ; 
 
 " County court," " judge of the county court," " registrar 
 of the county court," " plaintiff," and " rules of court," 
 as respects Scotland, mean respectively sheriff court, 
 sheriff, sheriff clerk, pursuer, and act of sederunt. 
 
 EMPLOYER. 
 
 Owner and Charterer of Vessel. The registered owner of a 
 steam tug chartered her to another. By the charter-party the owner 
 provided and paid the crew, and he alone could dismiss them ; but the 
 possession, control, and management of the vessel under the charter- 
 party belonged to the person to whom it was chartered. It was held 
 that the owner, and not the charterer, was the employer of a member 
 of the crew (Mackin?ion v. Miller (1909), 46 S. L. R. 299 ; 2 B. W. 
 C. C. 64). 
 
 Shipping Agents. Shipping agents acted as managers of a 
 vessel lying in harbour, and entered into a contract to have the 
 same properly loaded. They contracted with a firm of merchants 
 to load and carry a cargo of coal. A squad of trimmers loaded. By 
 the harbour regulations the trimmers were chosen by a gaffer nomi- 
 nated by the harbour commissioners. The gaffer could dismiss the 
 men. The trimmers were directly under the control and superintend- 
 ence of the shipping agents who also paid them. The commissioners 
 were under no responsibility for the conduct of the trimmers. The 
 expenses of loading were deducted from the freight, the balance of 
 which, less charges, was paid by the agents to the owners of the 
 vessel. While loading coal a trimmer was injured. He was held to 
 be in the employment of the shipping agents, and entitled to com- 
 pensation against them (Gorman v. Gibson, [1910] S. C. 317). 
 
 Stevedore or Ship-Owners. A workman was paid by a steve- 
 dore who worked for respondents and other people. The stevedore 
 gave evidence that he paid the workmen for the convenience of the 
 respondents, who, however, denied this. The arbitrator found as a 
 
Sect. 13] "WOKKMAN." 117 
 
 fact that the respondents were the employers, and it was held that the 
 question was one of fact and that there was evidence to support the 
 finding (Pollard v. Goole and Hull Steam Towing Co., Limited 
 (1910), 3B. W. C. C.362). 
 
 " Workman Temporarily Lent or Let on Hire." There must 
 
 be a subsisting contract of service between the workman and the 
 lender or person letting on hire, at the time of such lending or letting. 
 It is not sufficient that the alleged lender has sent on an application 
 for work to another person (Boswell v. Gilbert (1909), 127 L. T. Newsp. 
 146; 2B. W. C. C. 251). 
 
 Respondents let out threshing machines to farmers. They were 
 bound by statute to provide three men, two to look after the engine 
 and one as " road man." Applicant was the " road man " engaged 
 by respondents. He got a shilling a journey, and it was the practice 
 for the third hand to work as " trusser-hand " during the threshing 
 operation, and to be paid so much a day by the farmer. The county 
 court judge held that the third hand was, with the knowledge of the 
 respondents, let with the machine', and that he was in the employ- 
 ment of the respondents although at the time of the accident he 
 was acting as " trusser-man." The Court of Appeal held that it was 
 a question of fact and that there was evidence to support the finding 
 (Reedv. Smith, Wilkinson & Co. (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 223). 
 
 " Legal Personal Representative of a Deceased Employer."- 
 
 Where there was no legal personal representative other than an 
 executor de son tort, who refused to take out letters of administration, 
 the court in Ireland, on the application of the injured workman, gave 
 leave to a nominee of the workman to take out a grant of letters of 
 administration under s. 78 of the Probate Act, 1857, for the purpose 
 only of substantiating the proceedings proposed to be taken by the 
 workman for the recovery of compensation (In the Goods of Byrne, 
 , 44 Ir. L. T. 98 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 591). 
 
 Estoppel. Weekly payments made by a person do not estop him 
 ' from setting up in proceedings the defence that he was not the 
 employer (Standing v. Eastivood <& Co., Limited (1912), 106 L. T. 
 477; 4B. W. C. C. 268). 
 
 " WORKMAN." 
 Meaning under the Original Act. No real definition was given 
 
 of the word " workman " in the original Act. It was assumed that 
 everybody knew what a workman was, and the legislature contented 
 themselves by saying that the term should "include" a certain 
 description of persons. Hence it was held that to be a workman 
 within that Act the person must belong to the working classes, arid 
 that the term would not include a certificated manager of a mine paid 
 by salary (Simpson v. Ebbw Vale Steel, Iron and Coal Co., [1905] 1 
 K. B. 453 ; 7 W. C. C. 101) ; or an expert chemist in a dye works also 
 paid by salary (B agnail v. Levinstein, Limited, [1907] 1 K. B. 531 ; 9 
 W. C. C. 100). 
 
118 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 13 
 
 Present Definition. In the present Act a definition is given, and 
 it is provided that, subject to certain exceptions (see p. 123, post), the 
 word " workman " " means any person whd has entered into or works 
 under a contract of service or apprenticeship with an employer, whether 
 by way of manual labour, clerical work, or otherwise, and whether the 
 contract is expressed or implied, is oral or in writing." 
 
 In its terms the definition covers, subject to tie few exceptions 
 referred to below (p. 123, post), every class of sendee, whether in 
 business or trade, or in domestic life; but there are dicta which 
 throw doubt on the scope of its application. See p. 122, post, 
 " Whether by way of Manual Labour, Clerical Work, or Otherwise" 
 
 It will be noticed that a reference to a workman includes (when he is 
 dead) a reference to his legal personal representative (see p. 1 
 
 Contract of Service or Apprenticeship with an Employer. 
 The cardinal rule under the definition is that there must be the 
 relationship of master and servant. Whether or not that relationship 
 exists is a question of fact (E. v.. Negus (1873). L. 1;. K. 34; 
 
 Vamplew v. Parlcgate Iron and Steel Co., [1903] 1 K. B. 851; 5 
 W. C. C. 114; Smith v. General Motor Cab Co., Limited. 1911 A. C. 
 188 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 249) ; and a finding one way or the other cannot 
 be disturbed if there be evidence to support it (V ample u: \. ParTtgate 
 Iron and Steel Co., supra; Reedv. Smith, Willdmon d Co. (1910), 
 3 B. W. C. C. 223; Simmons v. Heath Laundry Co., infra; Jones v. 
 Owners of S. Alice and Eliza (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 496 ; By, 
 Baltinglaxs Rural District Council and Kelly (1911), 45 Ir. L. T. 206 ; 
 Owners of the " Victoria" v. Barlow (1911), 45 Ir. L. T. 260). 
 
 For the purpose of determining this question of fact it is necessary 
 to consider carefully the character and terms of the engagement ; the 
 payment of wages or remuneration ; the power of dismissal ; and the 
 power of controlling the work of the alleged servant. 
 
 Contract of Service. Attention must, be called to the difference 
 between a contract of service and a contract for services. The latter 
 does not fall within the definition. The difference has been briefly 
 illustrated by the MASTER OF THE ROLLS. "An usher in a private 
 school, or a teacher in a provided or non-provided school, or a nursery 
 governess would, under ordinary circumstances, be entitled to claim 
 the benefit of the Act. On the other hand, it would, I think, be 
 absurd to hold that a skilled music master who gives lessons to a 
 pupil, either in his own house or in the pupil's house, is to be regarded 
 as the ' workman,' and the pupil as the 'employer.' In such a case 
 there may be a contract for services, but there is not a contract of 
 service. In any particular case it will be for the arbitrator, after 
 considering all the circumstances, to decide whether the injured 
 professional person is or is not a * workman.' This is not a question 
 of law, but a question of fact, and, unless the arbitrator has mis- 
 directed himself, this court ought not to interfere Heath 
 
 Laundry Co., [1910] 1 K. B. 543, at p. 548, per COZEKS-HARDY. M.li. ; 
 6 L. W. C. C. 200)/ 
 
 ' A servant is a person subject to the command of his master as to 
 
Sect. 13] "WORKMAN." 119 
 
 the manner in which he shall do his work " (Yewens v. Noakes (1880), 
 6 Q. B. D. 530, at p. 532 : per BRAMWELL, L.J.) ; and " the greater 
 the amount of direct control exercised over the person rendering the 
 services by the person contracting for them the stronger the grounds 
 for holding it to be a contract of service, and similarly the greater the 
 degree of independence of such control the greater the probability that 
 the services rendered are of the nature of professional services, and 
 that the contract is not one of service " (Simmons v. Heath Laundry 
 Co., supra, at p. 550 : per FLETCHER MOULTON, L.J.). 
 
 A contract of service was held not to exist where a laundry maid 
 supplemented her earnings by giving music lessons every Saturday 
 to children at their parents' home (Simmons v. Heath Laundry Co., 
 ibid.) ; where a lecturer was engaged to explain an airship, and the 
 exploits of the aeronaut, although he was paid a weekly salary of 
 .2 10s. (Waites v. Franco -British Exhibition (Incorporated) (1909), 
 25 T. L. R. 441 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 199, cited more fully on p. 77, ante) ; 
 where a dispensary medical officer was employed by the guardians of 
 the poor at a salary, payable partly out of the rates and partly out of 
 the local taxation account, and who was removable by the Local 
 Government Board for good cause (Murphy v. Enniscorthy Board 
 of Guardians, [1908] 2 Ir. E. 609 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 291). 
 
 A professional football player engaged by a club for a year at a 
 weekly wage has been held to be a workman (Walker v. Crystal' Palace 
 Football Club, Limited, [1910] 1 K. B. 87 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 53). 
 
 Whilst discussing contracts of service it is necessary to consider 
 the position of partners and co-adventurers, bailees, independent con- 
 tractors, persons whose services are compulsory, persons whose 
 .services are voluntary and gratuitous, and persons assisted by 
 charitable institutions. 
 
 Partners. There is not, as a rule, the relationship of master and 
 servant between a partner and the partnership firm of which he is a 
 member. Thus it was held that a member of a partnership who, by 
 arrangement with his co-partners, worked for wages payable out of 
 the profits of the business, was not entitled to compensation from the 
 partnership 'of which he was a member. " A person cannot for the 
 purposes of the Act occupy the position of being both employer and 
 employee " (Ellis v. Joseph Ellis & Co., [1905] 1 K. B. 324 ; 7 W. C. C. 
 97). See the remarks of Lord GUTHRIE as to the application of this 
 case under Scottish law (Sharpe v. Car swell, [1910] S. C. 391, at 
 p. 395 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 552, and p. 79, ante). 
 
 A firm employed B. to work a " flitboat " for the purpose of carry- 
 ing fish from vessels to the curing-sheds, and authorised him to find 
 another man to assist. R. employed deceased, and between them they 
 had two-thirds of the gross earnings of the boat, the remaining third 
 going to the owners, who maintained the boat, which, with the men, 
 was subject to their orders. When not employed by the owners, the 
 boat did "flitting " for other curers, such work being undertaken by 
 R,. as skipper on behalf of the boat, and the rates charged were the 
 same as those paid by the owners to the boat for similar work. The 
 men were sometimes employed ashore by the owners. R. and 
 
120 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 13 
 
 deceased found no capital, and were not liable for loss. It was held 
 that deceased was not a partner, but a workman (Jamieson v. Clark 
 (1908), 46 S. L. K. 73 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 228). . 
 
 Bailees Co-adventurers. There are cases in which the alleged 
 workman is entrusted with property belonging to another, to whom 
 he pays a share of the profits or takings. The question whether there 
 is a contract of service is determined by the amount of control exer- 
 cised over the alleged workman. 
 
 A contract of service was held not to exist where the captain of a 
 vessel could take cargoes to any place he pleased ; the owner received 
 one-third of the gross profits, and did necessary repairs ; the captain 
 took two-thirds, and out of this sum paid and fed the crew, and paid 
 harbour dues ; he engaged the crew (Boon v. Quance & Co. (No. 1) 
 (1909), 102 L. T. 443 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 106; Hughes v. Postlethwaite 
 (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 107 ; Hoare v. Owners of Barge Cecil Rhodes 
 (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 49; Standing v. Eastwood & Co., Limited 
 (1912), ibid., 268; Cole v. Shrubsall d WakeUy Bros., Limited (1912) , 
 ibid., 337 ; and compare with these, Jones v. Owners of S. Alice and 
 Eliza, p. 118, ante, where no evidence was given by the owners) ; 
 where a taxi-cab driver took out a cab on the terms that he was to pay 
 over to the proprietor 75 per cent, of his takings and to pay for 
 petrol used ; he could go where he pleased ; except by refusing to 
 allow the driver to take out a cab the next tune he asked for one, the 
 proprietors had no control over the driver (Doggett v. Waterloo 
 Taxi-Cab Co., Limited [1910] , 2 K. B. 336 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 373 ; Smith 
 v. General Motor Cab Co., Limited, [1911] A. C. 188 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 
 249). 
 
 Independent Contractors Piece-workers. An independent 
 
 contractor is not within the definition, even though he may volun- 
 tarily assist in the work himself (Simmons v. Faulds (1900), 
 65 J. P. 371; 3 W. C. C. 169; H'Gregor v. Dansken (1899), 36 
 S. L. R. 393; Evans v. Pcnwijllt Dinas Silica BricTc Co. (1901), 18 
 T. L. R. 58 ; 4 W. C. C. 101) ; but the difficulty of determining 
 between a case of independent contract and the relationship of master 
 and servant is often one of great difficulty, especially where the 
 remuneration is based upon the amount of work performed. In such 
 cases the power of control will generally prove to be the decisive 
 testi 
 
 In the following cases applicants were held to be independent 
 contractors : two labourers agreed to do a specific piece of work in 
 a quarry at so much per cubic yard ; they worked themselves and 
 paid an assistant ; the quarry master found plant, but did not control 
 the men, and they were not tied down to hours (Hay den v. Dick 
 (1902), 40 S. L. R. 95) ; a man was engaged under a sub-contract 
 whereby he was paid for breaking up steel and cinders on the ton- 
 nage broken, and had men and boys working under him (Vample-w v. 
 Parl-gate Iron and Steel Co., Limited, [1903] 1 K. B. 851 ; 5 W. C. C. 
 114) ; the applicant was engaged to bring a horse and drag logs, for 
 which he was paid a fixed sum per day for himself and horse ; he was 
 
Sect. 13] " WOBKMAN." 121 
 
 not obliged to work himself ; was not obliged to come on any parti- 
 cular day; and could be told not to come until he was wanted 
 (Chisholm v. Walker & Co., [1909] S. C. 31 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 261 ; and 
 a similar case, Ryan v. Tipper 'ary County Council (1912), 46 Ir. L. T. 
 69 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 578) ; K. entered into a contract with a council to 
 erect labourers' cottages ; he arranged with B., a slater and mason, 
 to do the building and slating, within a limited time, and to the 
 satisfaction of the council ; subject to this B. could work for others ; 
 he was paid at a certain rate per day (Byrne v. Baltinglass Rural 
 District Council and Kelly (1911), 45 Ir. L. T. 206). 
 
 But the control exercised by the head employer may be such as to 
 negative the existence of an independent contract, and to constitute a 
 species of employment (Durilop & Co. v. M'Cready (1900), 37 S. L. E. 
 779), or the terms of engagement may show that the persons engaging 
 him regarded him as a workman (see Evans's Case, infra). 
 
 In the following cases the applicants were held to be workmen : 
 an estate owner engaged a man to quarry on the estate in order to 
 provide stone for estate requirements in such quantities as the owner's 
 factor should direct ; he was to be paid at the rate of 5s. a day, and 
 might employ assistants to be paid through him at the same rate ; a 
 note was kept for the owner of the days the applicant worked ; tools 
 were supplied partly by the quarrymen and partly by the estate ; he 
 was told where to work, but was free to choose the part of the quarry 
 where the excavation was to be made (Pater son v. LocWiart (1905), 
 7 F. 954) ; applicant was a quarryman engaged under a written agree- 
 ment whereby he was paid for every ton of material which he 
 worked ; tools were found for him, and he hired and discharged the 
 men who worked under him ; being in doubt whether he would come 
 under the Act he gave notice to terminate his agreement, but was 
 assured by his employers that he would receive compensation for 
 accidents (Evans v. Pemvyllt Dinas Silica Brick Co. (1901), 18 T. L. 
 E. 58 ; 4 W. C. C. 101) ; a carter who found his own horse and cart 
 and was engaged to carry hay at 9d. a ton (Mooney v. Sheehan 
 (1903), 37 Ir. L. T. E. 166) ; applicant was a fixer of enamel letters ; 
 for a year he had been in the habit of calling on a firm who made 
 and dealt in such letters ; when they gave him work he was paid by 
 the piece ; he was under no obligation to go to them, or to take 
 their work if proffered, and could work for other persons ; he frequently 
 canvassed for orders for the firm (Taylor v. Burnham & Co. (No. 2), 
 [1910] S. C. 705 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 569) ; respondent was engaged to 
 break stones for road metal by appellant who had contracted to supply 
 road metal to a local authority ; respondent was paid a fixed rate per 
 cubic yard of metal which should satisfy the requirements of the 
 authority's surveyor ; he was under appellant's order, and liable to 
 be dismissed by him (Boyd v. Doharty (1908), 46 S. L. E. 71 ; 2 B. 
 W. C. C. 257). 
 
 Compulsory Services. Where a person is compelled by law to 
 perform services as directed by those in authority, the relationship of 
 master and servant does not exist, e.g., a pauper in a workhouse 
 doing labour which he is compelled under penalties to perform when 
 
122 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 13 
 
 ordered to do so (Tozeland v. West Ham Union, [1907] 1 K. B. 920). 
 So, also, in the case of prisoners engaged in performing tasks. 
 
 Voluntary Services. It seems fairly clear that a person who 
 volunteers his gratuitous services will not, by the performance of 
 those services, create the relationship of master and servant, or 
 constitute himself a workman within the meaning of the Act. Such 
 are the cases of the members of voluntary fire brigades ; but in many 
 cases of so-called volunteers it will be found that their services are 
 not gratuitous, but their attendance is secured as occasion may 
 require by some species of payment. In such cases it will be neces- 
 sary to consider carefully the exact terms of the arrangement between 
 them and the local authorities before deciding whether or not they 
 are " workmen " within the Act. See as to volunteer brigades in 
 connection with coal mines, p. 31, ante. 
 
 Persons engaged by Religious or Charitable Institutions. 
 
 The terms of engagement and the legal position of persons engaged in 
 church and chapel work are so numerous, varied and complicated, that 
 it is not practicable to deal with them in detail or even in the abstract, 
 or to do more than to say that the principles enunciated in these 
 pages must in each of these cases be applied. 
 
 A person put to work by a Central (Unemployed) Body constituted 
 under the Unemployed Workmen Act, 1905, is a workman in the 
 service of that body, and is within the Act (Porton v. Central 
 (Unemployed) Body for London, [1909] 1 K. B. 173; 2 B. W. C. C. 
 296; Gilroy v. Mackie and Others (Leiili Distress Committee] (1909), 
 46 S. L. B, 325 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 269). 
 
 A contract of service was held not to have been established by 
 showing that a charitable institution instituted a labour-yard, and, in 
 return for labour there, provided board and lodging, and sometimes 
 gave trifling sums of money (Burns v. Manchester and Salford 
 Wesleyan Mission (1908), 99 L. T. 579 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 305 ; but 
 compare this with the Scottish decision in MacGillivray v. Northern 
 Counties Institute for the Blind. (1911), 48 S. L. B. 811 ; 4 B. W. 
 C. C. 429). 
 
 "Whether by Way of Manual Labour, Clerical Work, or 
 
 Otherwise." In the case of Simmons v. Heath Laundry Co., p. 118, 
 ant>:, BUCKLEY, L.J., appears to have adopted the view that the 
 considerations which applied when determining whether a person was 
 i a workman under the original Act, prevailed also under the present 
 statute ([1910] 1 K. B., at p. 551), and his lordship adopted the 
 words of COLLINS, M.E., in Simpson v. Ebbw Vale Steel, Iron and 
 Co., p. 117, ante: "The Act presupposes a position of depen- 
 dence ; it treats the class of workman as being in a sense inopes 
 cn-mUiii and the legislature does for them what they cannot do for 
 themselves ; it gives them a sort of State insurance, it being assumed 
 that they are either not sufficiently intelligent, or not sufficiently in 
 funds, to insure themselves. In no sense can such a principle 
 extend to those who are earning good salaries. It is, of course, very 
 
Sect. 13] EXCLUDED WORKMEN. 123 
 
 difficult to draw the exact line, but it is easy in a particular case to 
 say on which side of the line it falls." 
 
 It is respectfully doubted whether the dictum that the con- 
 siderations which prevailed in Simpson's and BagnalVs Cases are 
 still relevant is altogether accurate. As has been already pointed out 
 (see p. 118, ante), the present definition of workman has been entirely 
 remodelled. The legislature have specifically determined who are to 
 be regarded as workmen for the purposes of the Act. They no 
 longer leave the term to be determined by the " man in the street." 
 Apart from manual labourers, who are always to be regarded as 
 " workmen," and apart from certain special exceptions, the legis- 
 lature have, it is submitted, fixed arbitrarily a sum which marks the 
 dividing line to separate a statutory "workman" from servants 
 outside the privileges of the Act. The limit fixed is the sum of .250 
 per annum, earned under a contract of service from an employer. 
 
 In their later decisions the Court of Appeal have stated that they 
 are prepared to construe the words " or otherwise " in the widest 
 manner. If that be so, it seems immaterial to regard the character of 
 the work done, or the social or educational status of the alleged 
 workman, in determining whether there is a contract of service ; or at 
 least, it is submitted that, if from other facts a contract of service is 
 established, the fact that it is not usual to apply the term workman 
 to the person rendering such services ought not to take him out of the 
 definition. 
 
 PERSONS EXCLUDED FROM THE DEFINITION OF "WORKMAN." 
 
 List of Excluded Persons. For persons specially excluded from 
 the definition of " workman," see p. 114, ante. 
 
 Persons whose remuneration exceeds 250 a Year. A person 
 who earns more than .250 a year is not a workman unless he is 
 engaged hi manual labour. The word " remuneration " appears to 
 include all such receipts under contracts of service as can be taken 
 into account as " earnings " for the purpose of assessing compensation 
 (see Skailes v. Blue Anchor Line, Limited, [1911] 1 K. B. 360 ; 4 
 B. W. C. C. 16, and p. 138, post). 
 
 There is a difference between " manual labour " and " manual work." 
 Everybody does manual work, but everybody is not a " manual 
 labourer." The distinction has been illustrated in several cases, and 
 it has been stated that the real substantial business of the plaintiff 
 must be looked at (Cook v. North Metropolitan Tramway Co. (1887), 
 18 Q. B. D. 683). So that if the person earns his money mainly 
 through the confidence that his employers repose in his honesty, such 
 as an omnibus conductor (Morgan v. London General Omnibus Co. 
 (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 832) ; or through his skill as in the case of a 
 tramcar driver (Cook v. North Metropolitan Tramway Co., supra), or 
 a railway guard of a goods train (Hunt v. Great Northern Rail Co., 
 [1891] 1 Q. B. 601); or through his skill and practical scientific 
 knowledge (see Jackson v. Hill & Co. (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 618 ; 
 
124 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 13 
 
 Bayuall v. Levinstein, p. 117. ante) ; or through both skill and con- 
 fidence as in the case of a grocer's assistant (Bound v. Lawrence 
 (1891), 60 L. J. M. C. 137), or of a hairdresser (S. v. County Louth JJ., 
 [1900] 2 I. E. 714) ; the fact that he does, in the exercise of such 
 confidence, skill and knowledge, also execute manual work will not of 
 itself constitute his engagement as one of " manual labour." 
 
 On the other hand, a wharfinger's carman whose duty was not only 
 to drive but also to load and unload the goods which he carried in his 
 van, was held to be engaged in manual labour (Yarmouth v. France 
 (1887), 19 Q. B. D. 647) ; and so was the driver of a motor omnibus 
 who had, when out with the omnibus, to do such repairs as were 
 necessary and within his capacity (Smith v. Associated Omnibus Co., 
 [1907] 1 K. B. 916, distinguishing Cook .v. North Metropolitan 
 Tramway Co.. p. 123, ante). 
 
 Casual Employees. This exception embraces two conditions : 
 the casual nature of the employment, and that the employment is not 
 for the purposes of the employer's trade or business. Both of these 
 conditions must be present. 
 
 The temporary employment of a person to clean windows at 
 irregular intervals, even though extending over a long period of time, 
 is only casual employment (Hill \. Begg, [1908] 2 K. B. 802 ; 1 
 
 B. W. C. C. 320) ; and so it was held where the cleaner came about 
 once a month without any express directions on each occasion, it 
 being shown that respondent might have refused him admission, 
 or engaged another cleaner at anv time (Eennie v. Reid (1908), 45 
 S. L. E. 814; 1 B. W. C. C. 324 f see by way of further illustration 
 a county court case, Baker v. Danielsen (1910), 128 L. T. Newsp. 
 366). On the other hand, employment on the Friday of every week 
 and on the Tuesday in alternate weeks is regular and not casual 
 employment (Dewhurst v. Mather, [1908] 2 K. B. 754; 1 B. W. 
 
 C. C. 328). 
 
 Deceased, whilst effecting repairs for respondent at his private house 
 at 5s. a day, agreed that when he had finished that job he would cut 
 down some trees for respondent at the same rate of pay. Some of the 
 trees were cut down by other men while deceased was doing the 
 repairs and subsequently he started to cut down the remaining trees, 
 and on the fourth day of such work he was killed. It was held that 
 this emplovment was merely casual (M'Carthy \. Norcott (1908), 
 43 Ir. L. T.' 17 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 279). 
 
 Probaby a fair test is to ask whether a refusal to work on the one 
 hand, or a refusal to allow the workman to work on the other hand, 
 at the tunes in question, would amount to a breach of contract. 
 
 The expression "for the purposes of the employer's trade or 
 business " has been held to include : the repairs of the roof of business 
 premises (Johnston v. Monasterevan General Store Co. (1908), 42 Ir. 
 L. T. 268 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 183) ; the lopping of trees to protect the 
 wall of a haggard (Cotter \. Johnson (1911), 45 Ir. L. T. 259) ; the 
 cutting of a hedge belonging to respondent which had overgrown 
 applicant's garden (Tombs v. Bomford (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 338). 
 
 But the fact that some of the windows cleaned by a casual worker 
 
Sect. 13] EXCLUDED WORKMEN. 125 
 
 were windows of the surgery at a doctor's house did not make the 
 employment one for the purposes of the doctor's business (Rennie v. 
 Reid (1908), 45 S. L. E. 814; 1 B. W. C. C. 324). 
 
 A person who was co-owner of several houses let to weekly tenants, 
 and who managed that property, collected the rents, and accounted 
 for the same to the other co-owners without fee or reward, was held 
 not to be carrying on business within the meaning of the definition, 
 and consequently was not liable to compensate a workman casually 
 employed in repairing the premises (Bargewell v. Daniel (1908), 98 
 L. T. 257). 
 
 Policemen. These are : 
 
 (1) Members of a police force to which the Police Act, 1890 (53 & 54 
 
 Viet. c. 45), applies ; 
 
 (2) Members of a police force to which the Police (Scotland) Act, 
 
 1890 (ibid., c. 67), applies ; 
 
 (3) City of London Police ; 
 
 (4) Eoyal Irish Constabulary ; 
 
 (5) Dublin Metropolitan Police. 
 
 By the Police Act, 1890 (s. 33 and Sched. III.), the expression 
 "police force" means a force maintained by one of the police 
 authorities mentioned in the said Schedule ; and these forces are : 
 
 (a) Metropolitan police ; 
 
 (b) County police ; 
 
 (c) Borough police ; 
 
 (d) Police of a town not being a borough and maintaining a separate 
 
 police force under any local Act of Parliament ; 
 
 (e) The police of the river Tyne within the limits of the Acts relating 
 
 to the Tyne Improvement Commissioners. 
 
 'The Police (Scotland) Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Viet. c. 67), applies to the 
 police of a county, and of a borough or police burgh. 
 
 Under the Police Acts, 1890, supra, and 1893 (56 & 57 Viet. c. 10), 
 a policeman may undertake fireman's duty, and whilst so acting he is 
 deemed to be in the execution of his duty as a policeman, and is 
 entitled to a police pension if injured whilst so acting as fireman. He 
 therefore cannot claim compensation under the Workmen's Compen- 
 sation Act for such injury (Sudell v. Blackburn Corporation (1910), 
 3 B. W. 0. C. 227). 
 
 Outworkers. See the definition of these, p. 116, ante. 
 Members of an Employer's Family dwelling in his House. 
 
 The " members of a family " are defined in the section on p. 115, ante. 
 
 The fact that, at the time of the accident, the member of the family 
 was temporarily residing elsewhere for the purposes of his employer's 
 work, does not take him out of the exception (M'Dougall v. M'Dougall, 
 [1911] S. C. 426; 4 fc. W. C. C. 373). 
 
 No provision is made in this definition for illegitimacy, as there is in 
 the case of dependency, and it therefore seems that an illegitimate child 
 might be a workman entitled 'to compensation from his father, whilst 
 a legitimate child in the same household would not be so entitled. 
 
126 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 13 
 
 If by such membership the person cannot claim from his direct 
 employer, he cannot claim from the principal under s. 4, where the 
 direct employer is a contractor (Marks \. Carne, p. 81, ante). 
 
 Death of Workman. As to the rights of dependants, see p. 146, 
 post. 
 
 The fact that the legal personal representative of a dependant is 
 not mentioned in the definition does not prevent proceedings by that 
 representative in a proper case, and if a sole dependant of a deceased 
 workman has made a claim, but has died before an award on that 
 claim has been made, the legal personal representative of the depen- 
 dant is entitled to the compensation so claimed (Darlington v. Rosc.oe 
 <fc Sons, [1907J 1 K. B. 219 ; 9 W. C. C. 1 ; and see p. 147, post). 
 
 " DEPENDANTS." 
 
 What is a " Dependant " ? Whether there is dependency is 
 entirely a question of fact in each case (Main Colliery Co. v. Davies, 
 infra; Turner v. Miller & Richards (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 307; 
 Robertson v. Hall Bros. S.S. Co. (1910), ibid., 370; Tamworth Colliery 
 Co. v. Hall, [1911] A. C. 665 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 313), irrespective of the 
 standard of living in the neighbourhood or the class to which the 
 family belong. The Act sets up no such standard ; and the actual 
 means of living and expenditure need alone be regarded. So a father, 
 whilst himself earning wages, may be a part dependant of his child ; 
 and when it is proved that a child contributes to the family wages 
 fund, and that the father receives the contribution and spends it in 
 maintaining himself and his family, that is sufficient evidence upon 
 which to find that the father is such a dependant (Main Colliery Co., 
 Limited^. Davies, [1900] A. C. 358 ; 2 W. C. C. 108, discussing Simmons 
 v. White Bros., [1899] 1 Q. B. 1005 ; 1 W. C. C. 89). 
 
 " What the family was in fact earning, what the family was in fact 
 spending, for the purpose of its maintenance as a family seems to me 
 to be the only thing which the county court judge could properly 
 regard " (per Earl of HALSBURY, L.C., in Main Colliery Co., Limited 
 v. Davies, [1900] A. C., at p. 362). To the extent to which it lays 
 down a proposition involving the consideration of the standard in 
 life, Simmons' s Case must be taken as over-ruled. See also Griffiths 
 v. Davis & Sons, Limited, Times, November 13th, 1899 ; Legget & 
 Sons v. Burke, infra; French v. Underwood (1903), 19 T. L. B. 416; 
 5 W. C. C. 119. 
 
 But the Main Colliery Case does not lay it down as a principle of 
 law that if the father receives a contribution to the family fund there 
 must of necessity be dependency (Tamworth Colliery Co., Limited v. 
 Hall, supra). The arbitrator must consider all the circumstances. 
 The principles upon which he should proceed are best exemplified by 
 the last cited case. 
 
 A boy earned 6s. lid. a week, which he contributed to the family 
 fund. He also assisted his father in a business as a barber, which the 
 father earned on during available hours. The boy was killed, and 
 
Sect. 13] " DEPENDANTS." 127 
 
 the arbitrator refused to award compensation to the father as a partial 
 dependant because the 6s. lid. was not more than sufficient to main- 
 tain the boy, and in his opinion the boy earned nothing else. The 
 majority of the Court of Appeal, following their decision in Osmond 
 v. Campbell and Harrison, Limited ( [1905] 2 K. B. 852 ; 8 W. C. C. 
 95), he-Id that the arbitrator was wrong in taking into account the 
 cost of the boy's keep, and the case was remitted to the arbitrator. 
 The Court were also divided in opinion as to whether the voluntary 
 services of the boy in the barber's shop were earnings which could be 
 regarded, the majority thinking that they were not (Hall v. Tamwortli 
 Colliery Co., Limited, [1911] 1 K. B. 341). On appeal to the Lords 
 it was decided that it was not right to say that the arbitrator must 
 exclude the cost of maintenance in deciding the question of depen- 
 dency ; that the arbitrator was entitled to say that if as a net result 
 the father gained nothing from the son's contributions, after setting 
 off the cost of his keep, he was not a dependant at all ; and that as 
 against the cost of maintenance might be set the pecuniary value (if 
 any) of the voluntary services rendered by the son in the father's 
 business (Tamivorth Colliery Co., Limited v. Hall, [1911] A. C. 655 ; 
 4 B. W. C. C. 313, overruling Osmond's Case, supra). 
 
 Dependency may exist where the alleged dependant can maintain 
 himself and family without assistance from the deceased (Howells v. 
 Vivian (1901), 85 T. L. 529 ; 4 W. C. C. 106) ; or where a daughter 
 lives at home with her father, for whom she keeps house in return for 
 board and lodging, but receiving no wages (Moyes v. W. Dixon, Limited 
 (1905), 42 S. L. E. 319) ; or where the dependency would not have 
 arisen but for the fact that the father (dependant) supported a cripple 
 son who lived with him and the deceased (Legget & Sons v. Burke 
 (1902), 4 F. 693). 
 
 The last case was distinguished in Arrol & Co., Limited v. Kelly 
 (1905), 7 F. 906, in which the Court of Session held that there was 
 no dependency where father and son lived apart and each earned on 
 an average an equal weekly amount, but the son made payments to his 
 father which averaged 10s. a week. 
 
 See other cases as to total and partial dependency, pp. 148, 151, post. 
 
 Dependent " at the Time of his Death." The inclusion of 
 these words in the definition fixes the moment to be regarded in 
 determining the fact whether or not the claimant was dependent upon 
 the deceased. 
 
 No Presumption of Dependency. In all cases dependency is a 
 question of fact : it is not to be presumed from any legal obligation to 
 support the alleged defendant (New Monckton Collieries v. Keeling, 
 [1911] A. C. 648; 5 B. W. C. C. 332, reversing the decision of the 
 Court of Appeal, [1911] 1 K. B. 250; 4 B. W. C. C. 49), whether the 
 alleged dependant be wife or child (Lee v. Owners of.S. Bessie, [1912] 
 1 K. B. 83 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 55), and whether the latter be legitimate or 
 illegitimate. 
 
 In this, as in any other case, the arbitrator may draw inferences of 
 dependency from the facts before him, and for this purpose he ought 
 
128 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sect. 13 
 
 to regard the practical, as opposed to the theoretical, value of the 
 legal obligation to support (Lee v. Owners of S. Bessie, [1912] 1 K. B. 
 at pp. 88, 89, per FLETCHER MOULTON, L.J.), that is, he ought to 
 regard the existence of such obligation (if any), the probability that it 
 would have been discharged, either voluntarily or by compulsion, and 
 the probability, in the case of a wife, that she would have enforced 
 her right to maintenance (New Monclcton Collieries v. Keeling ; Lee 
 v. Owners of S. Bessie, supra). In the case of children this practical 
 value of the legal obligation is more likely to survive their absence 
 from the father than in the case of the wife, who is in a position to 
 submit to or to effect separation or to take, or abstain from taking, 
 steps to enforce her legal rights (Lee v. Owners of S. Bessie, [1912] 1 
 K. B. at p. 89, per FLETCHER MOULTON, L.J.) 
 
 It would appear from the judgments in the House of Lords in 
 Kf .ling's Case, that inferences of dependency may arise : where the 
 separation of husband and family is due to the former going away to 
 seek work and without any intention of permanent separation (see e.g., 
 Coultliard v. Consett Iron Co., Limited, [1905] 2 K. B. 869; 8 
 W. C. C. 87; Williams v. Ocean Coal Co., Limited, [1907] 2 K. B. 
 422 ; 9 W. C. C. 44 ; Queen v. ClarJce, [1906] 2 I. E. 135) ; where there 
 has been desertion by a husband of a wife wholly unable to do any- 
 thing for her own support (see e.g., Sneddon v. Robert Addie & Sons' 
 Collieries (1904), 6 F. 992) ; where the wife has been deserted for three 
 years with no means of livelihood and has had to depend on charity 
 and occasional employment (e.g., Cunningham v. McGregor & Co. 
 (1901), 3 F. 775) ; where persistent and more or less successful efforts 
 have been made to compel the father to support an illegitimate child 
 (Bowhill Coal Co. (Fife), Limited, v. Neisli (1908), 46 S. L. E. 250; 
 2 B. W. C. C. 253) ; or where there was a clear intention of the father 
 to marry the mother of the illegitimate child (Orrell Colliery Co. v. 
 Schofield, [1909] A. C. 433 ; 2 B. W. C, C. 294). 
 
 Although the decisions, but not, perhaps, the grounds of the 
 decisions, of the first five cases cited in the last paragraph seemed to 
 meet with the approval of the House of Lords, it has since been held 
 that dependency is negatived where a wife has been deserted and 
 forced into the workhouse for seven years (Devlin v. Pelaw Main 
 Collieries (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 349) ; and where a wife was deserted in 
 1907. obtained a decree of aliment after 1909, arrested a small sum of 
 wages under the decree, but was unable to find the husband before 
 his death in 1911 (Niddrie and Benhar Coal Co., Limited v. Young 
 (1912), 49 S. L. E. 518 ; 5 B. \y. C. C. 552). It seems, therefore, that 
 the appellate courts will not disturb the finding of an arbitrator who 
 insists upon proof of actual financial support at the time of death to 
 establish dependency. 
 
 There is no dependency where a wife voluntarily separates from her 
 husband and supports herself and children (Lindsay v. M'Glashen & 
 Son, Limited, [1908] S. C. 762 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 85) ; Reeling's Case, 
 supra; Polled v. G. N. E. Co., (No. 2), 5 B. W. C. C. 620); or is 
 supported by an illegitimate child or by the man with whom she is 
 living (Turners, Limited v. WJiitefield (1904), 6 F. 822; Leev. Owners 
 of S. Bessie, [1912] 1 K. B. 83 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 55) ; or where an 
 
Sect. 13] "DEPENDANTS." 129 
 
 illegitimate child is adopted without payment and is supported by the 
 adopter, although the mother has promised to contribute to its 
 support and has paid trifling sums (Briggs v. Mitchell, [1911] S. C. 
 705 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 400, approved in Keeling' s Case). 
 
 In giving judgment in Lee v. Owners of S. Bessie, [1912] 1 K. B. 
 p. 89, FLETCHER MOULTON, L.J., expressed the opinion that in dis- 
 cussing the practical value of the existence of the legal obligation to 
 support, it makes no difference that the compulsion of the obligation 
 is indirect, e.g., that, in the case of a child, the compulsion can only 
 be effected through the medium of the poor law. It would, therefore, 
 seem that dependency may be inferred where a husband has sup- 
 ported his wife up to the time of her removal to a lunatic asylum (e.g. 
 Kelly v. Hopkins, [1908] 2 I. K. 84). But there would be no such 
 inference if, previously to the maintenance by the guardians, there 
 had been no support, either at all or for years, by the deceased work- 
 man (Lee v. Owners of S. Bessie, [1912] 1 K. B. at p. 92) ; and the 
 mere fact that guardians can compel a son to support his father and 
 mother when he or she becomes chargeable to the union does not 
 make the pauper a dependant of the son (Rees v. PenriJcyber Naviga- 
 tion Colliery Co., [1903] 1 K. B. 259; 5 W. C. C. 117 ; Robert Addie 
 & Sons' Collieries, Limited v. Trainer (1904), 7 F. 115). 
 
 " Or would but for the Incapacity due to the Accident have 
 been SO dependent." These words are inserted to provide for a 
 case in which the workman lives for some tune after the accident and 
 then dies as a result of it. The words remove any doubt (if indeed 
 any ever existed) that in such a case a person who would have been 
 a dependant, if the workman had been killed outright by the accident, 
 does not cease to bs so because during the intervening inability to 
 earn wages, the injured workman was not in fact able to support the 
 persons dependent upon him. 
 
 Illegitimacy. It is competent and proper for the arbiter in 
 Scotland as well as in England to determine the question of whether 
 an alleged dependant is an illegitimate child of the deceased (John- 
 stone v. James Spencer & Co., [1908] S. C. 1015 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 302) ; 
 but it was doubted in the Court of Session whether it was competent 
 in such arbitration for the arbiter to consider and decide whether the 
 claimant had proved by evidence of cohabitation, habit, and repute, 
 that she was married to the deceased, in respect of whose death she 
 claimed compensation (Fife Coal Co., Limited v. Wallace (1909), 46 
 S. L. B. 727 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 264). 
 
 Posthumous Child. A child en venire sa mere at the time of the 
 father's death is deemed to have been born, so far as it is for the 
 benefit of such child {see Villar v. Gilbey, [1907] A. C. 139). This 
 rule applies to cases under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and a 
 posthumous child of a deceased workman is one of his dependants 
 (Williams v. Ocean Coal Co., Limited, [1907] 2 K. B. 422 ; 9 W. C. C. 
 44. See also Orrell Colliery Co. v. Scliofield, supra). 
 
 Rights of Dependants. See p. 146, post. 
 
 W.C.A. K ' 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1900. [Sect. 13 
 
 " SHIP " " VESSEL " " SEAMEN " " PORT." 
 
 These words have the same meanings as in the Merchant Shipping 
 Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Viet. c. 60). For such meanings, see as to " ship," 
 "vessel," p. 96, ante; "seamen," p. 95, ante ; and "port," p. 98, 
 ante. 
 
 LOCAL OR OTHER PUBLIC AUTHORITY. 
 
 No definition is given of the term local or public authority, but it 
 would probably include all authorities whose powers are conferred, 
 and whose duties are imposed, upon them by local or public statutes, 
 and such statutes contain definitions of the authorities to which they 
 refer. 
 
 Everybody in the employment of such authorities, provided the 
 relationship of master and servant exists (see p. 118, ante), is a " work- 
 man" within the meaning of the Act, unless he comes within the 
 list of persons specially excluded. See p. 123, ante. 
 
 In this connection it must be remembered that some officials, 
 though paid by the local authority, are removable only by the Local 
 Government Board, and therefore are not under a contract of service 
 with the 'local authority. See Murphy v. EninscortTiy Board of 
 Guardians, p. 119, ante, and see the case of a teacher in a non- 
 provided school, p. 131, post. 
 
 Trade or Business of the Authority. It must be specially 
 
 noticed that by s. 13 the Act provides that "the exercise and per- 
 formance of the powers and duties of a local or other public authority 
 shall, for the purposes of this Act, be treated as the trade or business 
 of the authority." This description is not limited to positive duties. 
 It includes everything which the local authority may determine to do 
 within their powers, whether absolute or discretionary (Mulrooney \. 
 Todd, [1909] 1 K. B. 165; 2 B. W. C. C. 191). 
 
 The effect of this is, that if the authority contract for the execution 
 of work which is done in exercising then* powers, or performing their 
 duties, as such, they will be " principals " within the meaning of s. 4, 
 and be liable to compensate the injured workmen of their contractor 
 (see p. 76, ante) ; and further than this, in many cases the limit to 
 the liability of the " principal " under that section will not apply to 
 reduce the liability of the authority, because the work will often, and 
 indeed generally, be done by the contractor on premises which are 
 under their control or management. See p. 83, ante. 
 
 Casual Employments. Another important result flowing from 
 the description of the authority's "trade or business" concerns the 
 employment by them of casual labour. A person whose employment 
 is of a casual nature is not a "workman," unless he is engaged for 
 the purposes of the employer's trade or business, As everything 
 
Sect. 14] SPECIAL PROVISIONS AS TO SCOTLAND. 131 
 
 the authorities do is, or ought to be, within the powers conferred, 
 or the duties imposed, upon them, it is difficult to see how any person 
 employed by them in casual work (such as the engagement of the 
 " unemployed" to clear snow from the streets) will be excluded from 
 the definition of " workman." 
 As to firemen, and paupers at work, see pp. 121, 122, ante. 
 
 Education Authorities. The education authority will be liable 
 to compensate all teachers in provided schools, whose salaries do not 
 exceed ^250 per annum ; but in the case of non-provided schools, it 
 has been held that the Education Act, 1902 (2 Edw. 7, c. 42), s. 7, does 
 not create privity of contract between the teacher and the local educa- 
 tion authority, although the salary of the teacher is paid direct by that 
 authority ; and that the teacher cannot maintain an action for salary 
 against the local education authority (Crocker v. Plymouth Corpora- 
 tion, [1906] 1 K. B. 494). It would, therefore, appear that the 
 managers of a non-provided school are the persons to pay compensa- 
 tion under the Act to an injured teacher. According to a letter issued 
 by the Board of Education (see 71 J. P. N. p. 329), the managers are, 
 in the opinion of the Board, entitled to be indemnified in respect 
 of such payment by the local education authority as part of the 
 maintenance expenses of the school. The point, however, is very 
 arguable. 
 
 14. Special provisions as to Scotland.] In Scotland, where 
 a workman raises an action against his employer indepen- 
 dently of this Act in respect of any injury caused by 
 accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, 
 the action, if raised in the sheriff court and concluding for 
 damages under the Employers' Liability Act, 1880, or alter- 
 natively at common law or under the Employers' Liability 
 Act, 1880, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in that 
 Act, not be removed under that Act or otherwise to the 
 Court of Session, nor shall it be appealed to that court 
 otherwise than by appeal on a question of law ; and for 
 the purposes of such appeal the provisions of the Second 
 Schedule to this Act in regard to an appeal from the decision 
 of the sheriff on any question of law determined by him as 
 arbitrator under this Act shall apply. 
 
 Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act, 1907. As to the effect of this 
 
 statute (7 Edw. 7, c. 51), upon the above section, see Banknock Coal 
 Co. v. Lcwrie, [1912] A. C. 105 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 209. 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1900. [Sects. 15, 16 (l) 
 
 15. Provisions as to existing contracts and schemes.] (1) 
 Any contract (other than a contract substituting the pro- 
 visions of a scheme certified under the Workmen's Com- 
 pensation Act, 1897, for the provisions of that Act) existing 
 at the commencement of this Act, whereby a workman 
 relinquishes any right to compensation from the employer 
 for personal injury arising out of and in the course of his 
 employment, shall not, for the purposes of this Act, be 
 deemed to continue after the time at which the workman's 
 contract of service would determine if notice of the determi- 
 nation thereof were given at the commencement of this Act. 
 
 (2) Every scheme under the Workmen's Compensation 
 Act, 1897, in force at the commencement of this Act shall, 
 if re-certified by the Eegistrar of Friendly Societies, have 
 effect as if it were a scheme under this Act. 
 
 (3) The registrar shall re-certify any such scheme if it is 
 proved to his satisfaction that the scheme conforms, or has 
 been so modified as to conform, with the provisions of this 
 Act as to schemes. 
 
 (4) If any such scheme has not been so re-certified before 
 the expiration of six months from the commencement of this 
 Act, the certificate thereof shall be revoked. 
 
 Schemes Existing on July 1, 1907. The cases decided on this 
 
 section have ceased to be of any present interest. They were : 
 Wallace v. B. and W. Hawthorn, Leslie & Co., Limited, [1908] S. C. 
 713 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 249 ; Moss v. Great Eastern Rail. Co., [1909] 
 2 K. B. 274 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 168. 
 
 Re-certified Schemes. In re-certifying an existing scheme under 
 s. 16 (2) it is not necessary to take the ballot required by s. 3 (1) 
 (Godwin v. Admiralty Commissioners, [1912] 2 K. B. 26 ; 5 
 \\. W. C. C. 229). 
 
 16. Commencement and repeal.'] (1) This Act shall come 
 into operation on the first day of July nineteen hundred and 
 seven, but, except so far as it relates to references to medical 
 referees, and proceedings consequential thereon, shall not 
 apply in any case where the accident happened before the 
 commencement of this Act. 
 
Sect; 17] APPLICATION OF THE ACT. 133 
 
 (2) The Workmen's Compensation Acts, 1897 and 1900, 
 are hereby repealed, but shall continue to apply to cases 
 where the accident happened before the commencement of 
 this Act, except to the extent to which this Act applies to 
 those cases. 
 
 APPLICATION OF THE ACT. 
 Employment Abroad. See p. 2, ante. 
 
 Aliens. A person otherwise entitled to the benefits of the Act is 
 not to be deprived of them on the ground that he is an alien. See 
 William Baird & Co., Limited v. Savage or Birsztan (1906), 43 
 S. L. E. 300 ; Krzus v. Crow's Nest Pass Coal Co., Limited, [1912] 
 A. C. 590, and a county court case, Van der Plas v. Goedhart Bros., 
 Limited (1910), 128 L. T. Newsp., p. 203. 
 
 Whether a foreign seaman on a foreign ship, not registered in this 
 country and with no managing owner in this country, can claim under 
 s. 7 in respect of an accident happening in British waters is a difficult 
 question yet to be decided (Panagotis v. Owners of S.S. Pontiac 
 (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 147, at p. 155, per COZENS-HARDY, M.B.). In 
 the county court it has been held that he cannot (Van der Plas v. 
 Goedhart Bros., Limited, supra). 
 
 Anglo-French Convention. As regards French citizens employed 
 as workmen in Great Britain and Ireland, and their dependants, a 
 Convention has been concluded between His Majesty the King and 
 the President of the French Eepublic, and to give effect thereto a 
 statute has been passed empowering His Majesty, by Order in 
 Council, to make such modifications in the Workmen's Compensation 
 Act, in its application to French citizens, as are necessary to give 
 effect to the ' Convention ; and the Act is made applicable to such 
 citizens, subject to the modifications contained in the Order (Work- 
 men's Compensation (Anglo-French Convention) Act, 1909, 9 Edw. 7, 
 c. 16). The Order in Council made thereunder will be found in 
 Appendix G., p. 348, post. The Eules relating to procedure are Eules 
 86-93, pp. 254-25 7, post. 
 
 " Proceedings Consequential Thereon." Where an accident 
 happened before July 1, 1907, and a reference was directed to a 
 medical referee, it was held that the present Act did not apply so as 
 to give a right of appeal to the House of Lords (Mackay v. Rosie 
 (No. 2) (1911), 105 L. T. 682 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 181). 
 
 17. Short title.'] This Act may be cited as the Workmen's 
 Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
134 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. I. (1) 
 
 [NOTE. For the convenience of reference, headings in square brackets 
 have been put to paragraphs, or groups of paragraphs, but these 
 do not appear in the Schedules to the Act as printed.] 
 
 SCHEDULES. 
 
 FIRST SCHEDULE. 
 
 SCALE AND CONDITIONS OF COMPENSATION. 
 
 (1) The amount of compensation under this Act shall be 
 
 (a) where death results from the injury 
 
 (i) if the workman leaves any dependants wholly 
 dependent upon his earnings, a sum equal to his 
 earnings in the employment of the same employer 
 during the three years next preceding the injury, 
 or the sum of one hundred and fifty pounds, 
 whichever of those sums is the larger, but not 
 exceeding in any case three hundred pounds, pro- 
 vided that the amount of any weekly payments 
 made under this Act, and any lump sum paid in 
 redemption thereof, shall be deducted from such 
 sum, and, if the period of the workman's employ- 
 ment by the said employer has been less than the 
 said three years, then the amount of his earnings 
 during the said three years shall be deemed to be 
 one hundred and fifty- six times his average weekly 
 earnings during the period of his actual employ- 
 ment under the said employer ; 
 
 (ii) If the workman does not leave any such 
 dependants, but leaves any dependants in part 
 dependent upon his earnings, such sum, not ex- 
 ceeding in any case the amount payable under the 
 foregoing provisions, as may be agreed upon, or, 
 
 
Sched. I. (2)] SCALE, ETC., OF COMPENSATION, 135 
 
 in default of agreement, may be determined, on 
 arbitration under this Act, to be reasonable and 
 proportionate to the injury to the said dependants ; 
 and 
 
 (iii) if he leaves no dependants, the reasonable 
 expenses of his medical attendance and burial, not 
 exceeding ten pounds ; 
 
 (b) where total or partial incapacity for work results from 
 the injury, a weekly payment during the incapacity 
 not exceeding fifty per cent, of his average weekly 
 earnings during the previous twelve months, if he 
 has been so long employed, but if not then for any 
 less period during which he has been in the employ- 
 ment of the same employer, such weekly payment 
 not to exceed one pound : 
 Provided that 
 
 (a) if the incapacity lasts less than two weeks no com- 
 
 pensation shall be payable in respect of the first 
 week ; and 
 
 (b) as respects the weekly payments during total in- 
 
 capacity of a workman who is under twenty-one 
 years of age at the date of the injury, and whose 
 average weekly earnings are less than twenty shil- 
 lings, one hundred per cent, shall be substituted 
 for fifty per cent, of his average weekly earnings, 
 but the weekly payment shall in no case exceed 
 ten shillings. 
 
 (2) For the purposes of the provisions of this schedule 
 relating to " earnings " and " average weekly earnings " of 
 a workman, the following rules shall be observed : 
 
 (a) average weekly earnings shall be computed in such 
 manner as is best calculated to give the rate per 
 week at which the workman was being remunerated. 
 Provided that where by reason of the shortness of 
 the time during which the workman has been in 
 the employment of his employer, or the casual 
 
136 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. I. (3) 
 
 nature of the employment, or the terms of the 
 employment, it is impracticable at the date of the 
 accident to compute the rate of remuneration, regard 
 may be had to the average weekly amount which, 
 during the .twelve months previous to the accident, 
 was being earned by a person in the same grade 
 employed at the same work by the same employer, 
 or, if there is no person so employed, by a person 
 in the same grade employed in the same class of 
 employment and in the same district ; 
 
 (b) where the workman had entered into concurrent 
 
 contracts of service with two or more employers 
 under which he worked at one time for one such 
 employer and at another time for another such 
 employer, his average weekly earnings shall be 
 computed as if his earnings under all such contracts 
 were earnings in the employment of the employer 
 for whom he was working at the time of the 
 accident ; 
 
 (c) employment by the same employer shall be taken to 
 
 mean employment by the same employer in the 
 grade in which the workman was employed at the 
 time of the accident, uninterrupted by absence from 
 work due to illness or any other unavoidable cause ; 
 
 (d) where the employer has been accustomed to pay to 
 
 the workman a sum to cover any special expenses 
 entailed on him by the nature of his employment, 
 the sum so paid shall not be reckoned as part of the 
 earnings. 
 
 (3) In fixing the amount of the weekly payment, regard 
 shall be had to any payment, allowance, or benefit which 
 the workman may receive from the employer during the 
 period of his incapacity, and in the case of partial incapacity 
 the weekly payment shall in no case exceed the difference 
 between the amount of the average, weekly earnings of the 
 workman before the accident and the average weekly amount 
 
Sclied. I. (13)] EARNINGS." 137 
 
 f which he is earning or is able to earn in some suitable 
 employment or . business after the accident, but shall bear 
 such relation to the amount of that difference as under the 
 circumstances of the case may appear proper. 
 
 Preliminary Remarks. Before considering the various methods 
 of assessment, it is convenient to ascertain what is meant by 
 " earnings " and by " average weekly earnings." 
 
 " EARNINGS." 
 
 Description. By " earnings " is meant " gross earnings " ; so 
 that where 6d. a week was deducted from the gross wages for lamp 
 oil supplied by the employers, it was held that the deduction could 
 not be taken into account in computing the compensation (Houghton 
 v. Sutton Heath and Lee Green Collieries Co., [1901] 1 Q. B. 93 ; 
 3 W. C. C. 173) ; nor can account be taken of deductions by agree- 
 ment of sums for cleaning lamps, supply of oil, sharpening picks and 
 checking weights (Abratn Coal Co. v. Southern, [1903] A. C. 306 ; 
 
 5 W. C. C. 125, approving Houghton's Case). " The word ' earnings ' 
 is used, not in the sense in which economical writers use it, but in a 
 popular sense. . . . The difficulties would be endless if the court had 
 to find out in each case the net remuneration received by the work- 
 man, or the balance left for him to spend on himself and his family " 
 (ibid., per Lord MACNAGHTEN, ibid., at pp. 307, 308). 
 
 So, also, the value to a workman of the use of uniform is an 
 element which must be taken into account in estimating his earnings 
 (Great Northern Bail. Co. v. Daivson, [1905] 1 K. B. 331 ; 7 W. C. C. 
 114). 
 
 On the same principles the " earnings " of domestic servants will 
 not be merely their nominal wages, but the value of their board and 
 lodging in the employer's household must be added ; and, similarly, 
 in the case of the coachman who lives rent free in the lodge or over 
 the stables o'f his employer something must be added to represent the 
 value of the use of such privileges. 
 
 The test in all such cases is not what the workman saves by being 
 provided with board and lodging and materials, but what in fact is 
 the actual worth of such things supplied to him (Dothie v. Mac Andrew 
 
 6 Co., [1908] 1 K. B. 803 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 308). The actual cost of 
 these things to the employer may, in some cases, be a fair test of 
 their value to the workman, but it must not be taken as the proper 
 test in all cases, and probably in the majority of cases it will be found 
 that the things supplied are worth more to the workman than the 
 amount of their cost price to the employer. See Rosenqvist v. 
 Bowring & Co., Limited, [1908] 2 K. B. 108 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 395. 
 
 A workman was assisted by his son, who in fact was paid nothing 
 by his father ; it was held that no deduction of the usual wages paid 
 for such assistance could be made (Nelson v. Kerr and Mitchell 
 (1901), 3 F. 893). 
 
138 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. I. (i MJ 
 
 Whilst " earnings " will include matters the value of which is 
 capable of being estimated in money (see the cases referred to above ' 
 and also Noel v. Rcdruth Foundry Co., [1896] 1 Q. B. 453), it will 
 not include such as cannot be so estimated, e.g. the value of tuition 
 (Pomphrey v. Southwark Press, [1901] 1 Q. B. 86 ; 3 W. C. C. 194) ; 
 and for this reason special provision is made by the present Act in 
 respect of compensation for total incapacity to be paid to workmen 
 under twenty-one years of age whose " earnings " are small. See 
 proviso (b) of Sched. I. (1) (b), and p. 135, ante. 
 
 In Charitable Institutions. Where the only evidence was that 
 the monetary consideration allowed to the inmates of a charitable 
 institution for their work was supposed to represent 20 per cent, of 
 their average earnings, it was held that this might be taken as the 
 basis of calculation (MacGillii-ray v. Northern Counties Institute for 
 the Blind (1911), 48 S. L. E. 811 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 429). 
 
 Tips Bonuses Perquisites. Tips may be taken into account 
 in estimating earnings if the employment be of such a nature that 
 the habitual giving and receiving of tips is open and notorious, and 
 recognised by the employer ; in other words, when the circumstances 
 are such that there is an implied understanding that the employee 
 may retain the tips in addition to wages. But tips which are illicit, 
 or which involve or encourage a neglect or breach of duty on the part 
 of the employee to his employer, or which are casual and spasmodic 
 and trivial in amount, cannot be included in the computation (Penn 
 v. Spiers and Pond, Limited, [1908] 1 K. B. 766 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 401). 
 " Tips " received by a carman outside his ordinary employment, but 
 habitually received to the knowledge of his employers, may be included 
 (Knott v. Tingle, Jacobs <k Co. (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 55). 
 
 The bonus given to a purser by his employers at the end of the 
 voyage, when everything was reported satisfactory, and the profit he 
 was allowed to make for himself on the sale of whisky during the 
 voyage, were both held capable of being taken into account in esti- 
 mating his remuneration (Skailes v. Blue Anchor Line, Limited, 
 [1911] 1 K. B. 360 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 16). 
 
 Special Expenses. It is expressly provided in paragraph (2) (d) 
 that a payment by an employer to a workman of a sum to cover any 
 special expenses entailed on him by the nature of his employment, is 
 not to be reckoned as part of his earnings. 
 
 It is believed that this provision does not affect the cases which we 
 have been referring to on the subject of deductions from, wages for 
 sharpening tools and the like, but that it refers to such a case as that 
 of Midland Pail Co. v. Skarpe, i 1904 j A. C. 349 ; 6 W. C. C. 119. In 
 tliis case a railway guard was paid, in addition to his wages, a fixed 
 sum whenever his duties required him to lodge away from home, and 
 110 inquiry was made whether he spent that or any sum. It was held 
 that these fixed sums were part of his ' earnings." Under the present 
 Act this decision is not to be followed. 
 
Sched.'l. (l 3)] "AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS." 139 
 
 The cost of explosives which a miner purchased for his work from 
 his employers, and which was deducted from his wages, was held not 
 to be included in this term " special expenses " (M'Kee v. John G. 
 Stein & Co., Limited, [1910] S. C. 38; 3 B. W. C. C. 544). 
 
 PRINCIPLES FOR COMPUTING "AVERAGE WEEKLY 
 EARNINGS." 
 
 (1) GENERAL. 
 
 " Weekly Earnings." The word " weekly " will generally mean 
 "by the calendar week," but the custom of a particular trade may 
 give it a different signification. See the order of the House of Lords 
 in Lysons' Case, p. 133, ante. In Scotland the courts laid it down 
 under the original Act that the week is not the calendar week, as 
 seems to have been assumed in Cadzow Coal Co., Limited v. Gaffney 
 (1900), 3 F. 72, but the trade week, i.e., the week for which, by the 
 custom of the particular trade, the workman is usually paid (Fleming 
 v. Lochgelly Iron and\ Coal Co., Limited (1902), 39 S. L. K. 684 ; 
 Campbell v. Fife Coal Co. (1902), 40 S. L. K. 143). 
 
 Probably under the present Act such points may not arise, but it is 
 conceivable that these remarks may be useful in a few instances. 
 
 The Dominant Principle. The dominant principle is that the 
 average must be computed in such a manner "as is best calculated to 
 give the rate per week at which the workman was being remunerated " 
 (Sched. I. (2) (a)). This principle overrides all other considerations, 
 whether it is or is not practicable to arrive at an average from the 
 facts and circumstances peculiar to the workman in respect of whose 
 earnins the calculation is to be made. 
 
 
 Method of Computation. If such computation is impracticable, 
 " you must, estimate, as best you can, the rate per week at which the 
 workman was being remunerated, and to assist you in making an 
 estimate you may have regard to analogous cases. . . . The rate of 
 remuneration may have to be ascertained or estimated, not merely 
 at the date of the accident, but during some earlier period. . . . The 
 analogous cases referred to in the proviso by way of guides are the 
 average weekly amount which during the twelve months previous to 
 the accident was being earned by a person in the same grade employed 
 at the same work by the same employer, or, if there is no person so 
 employed, by a person in the same grade employed in the same class 
 of employment and in the same district" (Perry v. Wright, [1908] 1 
 K. B. 441, at p. 451, per COZENS-HARDY, M.E. ; 1 B, W. C. C. 351, 363) 
 
 Present Wages not Sole Test. " The wages earned at the date 
 of the accident cannot be the sole test. Such a test would operate 
 most unfairly, sometimes for and sometimes against the workman. 
 There are many employments in which work is more plentiful and 
 
140 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. I. (1 3) 
 
 wages are higher at some seasons of the year than in other seasons " 
 (Perry v. Wright, [1908] 1 K. B. 441, at p. 452, per COZENS-HARDY, 
 M.R. ; 1 B. W. C. C. 351, 363). 
 
 Applicant was a grinder by trade. He worked for three weeks 
 partly as a grinder and partly as a day labourer, and then continu- 
 ously for the same employer as a labourer for 14 days, when he was 
 injured. It was held that the arbitrator was right in computing the 
 total earnings in both grades of employment for the five weeks and 
 basing the compensation on the total average weekly earnings (Dobson 
 v. British Oil (6 Cake Mills, Limited (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 405) ; a 
 workman commenced first as a casual carter ; a month later he was 
 made a regular carter with a different wage ; again, a month later he 
 was temporarily employed as a tearnsnian, during which last employ- 
 ment he was killed ; the employers were the same throughout ; the 
 county court judge ascertained the average weekly earnings by adding 
 together all the actual earnings in the three species of employment, 
 and divided the result by the number of weeks actually worked, and 
 it was held that there was no misdirection (Edge v. John Gorton, 
 Limited, ^1912] 3 K. B. 360 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 614) ; a hobbler was 
 temporarily employed as a mate and was drowned whilst so acting ; 
 compensation was based upon his earnings as a mate, that being his 
 present grade of employment ; it was held that this was a misdirection 
 and that the proper course was to assess compensation based upon 
 his earnings during the previous twelve months (Jury v. Owners of 
 S.S. Alalanta, [1912] 3 K. B. 366 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 681). 
 
 2. WHERE COMPUTATION is PRACTICABLE. 
 
 Principles. The computation is practicable when the period of 
 time of employment by the same employer (see p. 142, post) is 
 sufficiently long to afford an adequate basis for the calculation, or 
 where, whatever the period of actual employment has been, there is 
 an existing contract which will, or is contemplated to, continue, and 
 which fixes the rate of remuneration for a period of sufficient length. 
 For example, if a man is employed for a year at a weekly salary, the 
 agreement for service may afford all the necessary material for the 
 computation. 
 
 The general principles above mentioned will apply. 
 
 3. WHERE COMPUTATION is IMPRACTICABLE. 
 
 When this happens. This may be due to the shortness of time 
 during which the employment has lasted, or to the casual nature of 
 the employment, or to the terms of the employment (par. (2) (a-)) ; or 
 it may be due to other circumstances such as death, loss of books, 
 and the like. Whether the task is " impracticable " must be decided 
 as at the date of the accident (Perry v. Wright, supra, per COZENS- 
 HARDY, M.R., at p. 451). 
 
 "In the same Grade." The term " grade " refers to the particular 
 rank in. the industrial hierarchy occupied by the workman (e.g. a 
 shepherd, a carter, or a common labourer on a farm, or a mason, a 
 
Sched. I. (!-})] "AvKTCACE WEEKLY EARNINGS." 141 
 
 bricklayer, or a bricklayer's labourer in the building trade), and not 
 to his greater or less excellence in that rank. Whether there is a 
 grade, and if so, to what grade the workman belongs are questions of 
 fact. Even if there be no grade, an estimate of earnings must be made 
 (Perry v. Wright, supra, at p. 451). 
 
 An increase or decrease of wages does not necessarily indicate a 
 change in grade ; and consequently, if there has been no change in 
 grade, the increase or decrease in wages must be regarded in arriving 
 at an average (see Perry v. Wright, [1908] 1 K. B. 441, per MOULTON, 
 L.J., at p. 457 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 351, at p. 358). 
 
 The Personal Element. When it has been found that the man 
 has a particular grade, and when it has been ascertained what the 
 earnings are in that grade, the arbitrator may consider whether the 
 workman in question is an average man, or is above or below 
 the average. " You cannot reject evidence of the skill and efficiency 
 of the individual workman. Where payment is at so much per hour 
 for every man in a particular grade, the skill . and efficiency of the 
 individual may perhaps be disregarded, though I am not prepared to 
 say that the age and the habits of the individual may not have such 
 an influence upon his chance of employment as to deserve considera- 
 tion " (Perry v. Wright, [1908J 1 K. B. 441, at p. 452, per COZENS- 
 HARDY, M.K.). 
 
 Illustrations. Perry was a casual dock labourer. He had only 
 worked two days for Wright at the date of the accident. He had no 
 regular employment, but worked for any employer who could give 
 him a job. The arbitrator found that there were no definite grades 
 among dock-labourers, but that the men formed themselves into 
 grades of good and bad, the former earning on an average 30s. a week 
 and the latter about 15s. a week. He found that Perry was a man of 
 poor physique owing to drink, and that he did not stick to his work. 
 On so finding the arbitrator put Perry in the "bad" grade, and 
 awarded compensation on the basis of 15s. a week. The Court of 
 Appeal held that this was wrong, and remitted the case to the 
 arbitrator to decide whether casual dock labourers form a distinct 
 grade, and if so what were the average earnings in that grade ; but 
 directed that the arbitrator would not be bound to award on the basis' 
 of those average earnings but must have regard to them. If he 
 should find that such labourers did not form a distinct grade he was 
 to make the best estimate he could (Perry v. Wright, [1908] 1 K. B. 
 441; IB. W. C. C. 351, 363). 
 
 Cain was a casual shipwright. He was killed on the first day of 
 his then period of employment by the respondents, but had worked 
 for them previously as a casual hand. The arbitrator found that the 
 respondents employed casual and regular hands as shipwrights. The 
 standard union rate of wages for shipwrights, whether casual or 
 regular, was 7s. a day, with extra pay for overtime. The arbitrator 
 found that the casual shipwrights were divisible into two classes, the 
 good and the indifferent. The former earned an average of .2 2s. Od. 
 a week ; the latter earned an average of 18s. a week. He found that 
 
142 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 190(1 [Sched. I. (1 3) 
 
 the mean between these sums, namely, 30s., was the average weekly 
 amount which during the twelve months previous to the accident was 
 being earned by an average good shipwright casually employed in the 
 same district as the deceased, of which description he found the 
 deceased to be. He therefore based his award on that sum. It was 
 held that, as the arbitrator had not apparently bound himself, as a 
 matter of law, to adopt the average wages as a basis, and as there was 
 110 evidence that Cain was either better or worse than that average, 
 there was no misdirection in having accepted that basis, and that the 
 award should stand (Cain v. Frederick Lculand cf- Co. (1900). Limited, 
 [1908] 1 K. B. 441 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 351, 368). 
 See also Gough' s Case, infra. 
 
 Compensation cannot be added. If a workman has returned to 
 work after an accident for light employment in a different grade and 
 at a lower rate of wages than formerly, together with the payment 
 of some compensation, and is injured or killed in another accident, 
 the lower rate of earnings cannot be supplemented by adding thereto 
 
 the weekly compensation then being paid (Gough v. Crawshay Bros., 
 Cyfartha, Limited, [1908] 1 K. B. 441 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 37^ 
 
 374). 
 
 Period of " Employment by the same Employer." This term 
 
 is defined to mean " employment by the same employer in the grade 
 in which the workman was employed at the time of the accident, 
 uninterrupted by absence from work due to illness or any other 
 unavoidable cause" (Sched. I. (2) (c)). 
 
 Formerly, an alteration in the character of the employment was 
 held not to break the continuity of employment (Price v. Marsden 
 and Sons, [1899] 1 Q. B. 493 ; 1 W. C. C. 108). But for the purpose of 
 assessing compensation under the present Act an alteration in the 
 grade of employment requires the period before the alteration to be 
 disregarded. " Any step up or down from one grade to another is 
 to be regarded as commencing a fresh emplovment " (Perry v. 
 Wriqht, [1908] 1 K. B. 441 ; per COZENS-HARDY, M.R., at p. 453; 
 1 B.'W. C. C. 351, 363). 
 
 Gough was a collier. He met with an accident and received 15s. Sd. 
 a week as compensation. He returned to light employment with the 
 same employers under an agreement whereby that compensation was 
 to be reduced to one-half the amount of the difference between 1 
 11s. 4(7. per week and the average earnings from the light employ- 
 ment, such difference not to exceed 15s. Sd. It was also agreed that 
 the employers should pay compensation at the rate of 15s. Sd. a week 
 during any incapacity to follow 1 the light employment. Gough was 
 put to carry batteries in the mine, and while so engaged was killed 
 by accident. The arbitrator found and held that Gough was not 
 working as a collier, but in a separate grade of work, and he based 
 the compensation on the average weekly sum paid for that work. It 
 was held that the arbitrator had not misdirected himself, as it could 
 not be said, as a matter of law, that there could not be a grade of 
 battery carriers (Gough v. Crawshay Bros., Cyfartha, Limited, [1910] 
 
Sched. I. (l 3)J " AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS." 143 
 
 1 K. B. 441 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 351, 374. See also Williams v. Wynnstay 
 Collieries, Ltd. (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 473). 
 
 A boiler-maker was engaged as such for four weeks. He was then 
 engaged by the same employers as a labourer at a labourer's wage for 
 fifteen weeks, at the end of which time he was injured. It was held 
 that in calculating compensation his wages as a boiler-maker must 
 not be included (Babcock & Wilcox, Limited v. Young, [1911] S. C. 
 406 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 367). But see the cases of temporary employment 
 in different grades cited p. 140, ante. 
 
 Striking the Average. Having ascertained the actual or esti- 
 mated earnings of the workman during a given period, by what 
 number is the total to be divided in order to arrive at the average, 
 when during part of that period no work has been done ? " For 
 instance, if the workman has been in the employment of the same 
 employer prior to the accident for fifteen weeks, in which period there 
 have been holidays amounting to one week or to two half- weeks, or 
 in which he has been absent from work for a week, is the totality 
 of his earnings during that period to be divided by 15 or 14 ? ... 
 The dominant note is, in my opinion, the provision that ' the average 
 weekly earnings shall be computed in such manner as is best calcu- 
 lated to give the rate per week at which the workman was being 
 remunerated.' ... If a person who is in receipt of .2 per week 
 chooses not to go to work during a particular week, and therefore does 
 not receive any remuneration for it, it does not alter the fact that the 
 rate at which he was being remunerated was d2 a week. I have 
 therefore come to the conclusion that in the case to which I have 
 referred the divisor is to be the number of weeks worked, namely 
 14 " (Perry v. Wright, [1908] 1 K. B. at pp. 458, 459, per FLETCHER 
 MOULTON, L.J.). 
 
 But this would not be the right method if the cessation from work 
 arose from the nature of the employment itself if it was an incident 
 of the employment. 
 
 " Let me take, for example, a person who is employed by one 
 employer only, but is employed by him in a discontinuous manner 
 say, for example, a man who is employed to assist in working a ferry 
 on market days or when the river is high, an employment which 
 requires him to be ready to work when called upon, but does not 
 employ him for a fixed period per week. If such a man were paid by 
 the day his average weekly earnings would be the totality of his earn- 
 ings during the relevant period divided by the number of weeks in 
 that period. His normal week would not be a week in which he was 
 employed through the whole of the six days, but would be a week in 
 which he was employed for an average time. And this would be just 
 and equitable, because the fact that the work was discontinuous, and 
 that he was only to be paid when he worked, would regulate the rate of 
 wages. His wages during the days in which he was employed must 
 cover and remunerate him for the enforced unemployment of the 
 intervening period. Similarly, the average weekly earnings of a char- 
 woman would not be six times her daily charge ; "because it would be 
 an incident of her employment to be employed only on so many days 
 
144 Womorex's COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. I. (13) 
 
 in the week as she could find jobs, and the effect of this discontinuity 
 would generally be to make her average week include some idle time " 
 (Hid., at p. 459). 
 
 Similarly, where it is an incident of the employment that there 
 should be breaks in the employment, as in the case of " wakes weeks " 
 in Lancashire, the wages earned in a year in which there are two 
 weeks' holidays, are represented by fifty times the weekly wage and 
 not by fifty-two times, and this fact must be recognised in striking an 
 average, so that if two workmen were employed at the same wages for 
 periods which in the one case included such a break in the continuity 
 of the employment and in the other did not, the average must be 
 obtained in the same way in both cases (see ibid, at p. 461 ; Anslow 
 v. Cannock Chase Colliery Co., Limited, [1909] A. C. 435 ; 2 B. W. 
 C. C. 365, and infra). 
 
 Bailey was an operative spinner. He had been employed in the 
 same capacity for more than twelve months. His actual receipts 
 from the same employers for twelve months amounted to J683 2s. Id. 
 He was paid by the piece and not by time. During the year there 
 were stoppages : (1) by reason of the bursting of a canal ; (2) during 
 the "wakes week" when all mills were closed; (3) by reason of 
 accidents to boilers and machinery ; (4) on Bank holidays. The 
 arbitrator computed the compensation by dividing the ,83 2s. Id. by 
 fifty -two. It was held that this was wrong. According to FLETCHER 
 MOOLTON, L.J., whose calculation has since been adopted by the 
 Court of Appeal and the House of Lords (see Anslow' s Case, infra), 
 the proper course was to divide the total earnings by the number of 
 weeks worked by the applicant, which would give his average wages ~ 
 earned in a week of full work. But as this result would give a higher 
 average than the average weekly earnings in the employment, since 
 it was an incident of the employment that there should be enforced 
 idleness for two weeks in the year, a deduction must be made for this, 
 but not for stoppages which were not incidents of the employment 
 (Bailey v. G. H. Kenworthy, Limited, [1908] 1 K. B. 441 ; 3 B. W. 
 C. C. 351, 371). 
 
 A miner had been employed for over 12 months in the same grade 
 andjn the same employment. He earned ^68, but only worked for 
 33 weeks. The remainder of the 52 weeks were accounted for by 14 
 weeks of stoppage, 2 weeks of public holidays, 2 weeks' absence owing 
 to illness, and one week's voluntary holiday. The weeks of stoppage 
 and public holiday were found to be normal and recognised incidents 
 of the employment. It was held that the proper way to compute his 
 average weekly earnings was to divide the .68 by 33, and then to 
 make a fractional deduction of if, the true calculation being repre- 
 sented by the fraction 2 of 4 (Anslow v. Cannock Chase Colliery Co., 
 Limited, [1909] A. C. 435 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 365, following the suggestion 
 of FLETCHER MOOLTON, L.J., in Bailey v. Kenworthy, [1908] 1 K. B. 
 441, at p. 466). 
 
 A workman was employed by the same employers in the same 
 grade of employment for 13 weeks and tw r o days, when he was injured. 
 There were short periods during this time when, either owing to 
 illness or to general holidays, he had earned nothing. The arbiter 
 
Sched. I. (l 3)] COMPENSATION IN CASE OF DEATH. 145 
 
 found that the employment had during this time been continuous and 
 uninterrupted, and he divided the total sum earned by the number of 
 weeks, namely 13. It was held that this computation was wrong, as 
 it did not allow for the stoppages. The case was remitted to the 
 arbiter to inquire whether the period of work was or was not too short 
 to establish a proper average, and if the latter was found, to estimate 
 from the wages earned by other persons in the same grade, so as to 
 find what the applicant would earn fairly one week with another, and 
 not confining his attention to the few weeks preceding the date of 
 the accident (Carter v. John Lang & Sons (1908), 45 S. L. E. 938 ; 1 
 B. W. C. C. 379, approving the principles laid down in Bailey v. 
 Kenworthy, supra). 
 
 The variation of the amount of work owing to slackness of trade is 
 an incident of employment to be taken into account (White v. Wiseman 
 1 1912] , 3 K. B. 352 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 654). 
 
 " Concurrent Contracts Of Service." The concurrent contracts 
 must be contracts of service, and additions to earnings from other 
 sources which cannot be described as contracts of service must not 
 be included (Simmons v. Heath Laundry Co., [1910] 1 K. B. 543 ; 
 
 3 B. W. C. C. 200, cited on p. 118, ante). 
 
 A. retainer paid to a workman as a member of the Eoyal Naval 
 Eeserve must be regarded as earnings under a concurrent contract of 
 service (Brandy v. Owners of S.S. Raphael, [1911] 1 K. B. 376 ; 
 
 4 B. W. C. C. 6 ; affirmed, [1911] A. C. 413 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 307). 
 
 COMPENSATION IN CASE OF DEATH. 
 
 1. GENERAL. 
 "Where Death results from the Injury." Proof. The 
 
 principles which have deen enunciated in connection with the onus 
 of proving that an accident has arisen out of and in the course of 
 employment (see p. 31, ante) apply also to the proof necessary to 
 show that the death resulted from the accidental injury, and the 
 onus of so doing rests on the claimant (see Hugo v. LarHns & Co., 
 cited, p. 37, ante ; and Dundee Steam Trawling Co. v. Bobb (1910), 
 48 S. L. E. 11). 
 
 It is not necessary to show that the death was the natural or 
 probable consequence of the injury, so long as the chain of causation 
 is complete and is not broken by any novus actus interveniens. Thus, 
 death results from the injury where it is caused: by erysipelas 
 following the injury (Dunham v. Clare, [1902] 2 K. B. 292 ; 4 W. C. C. 
 102) ; by suicide consequent upon a break-down of the nervous system 
 following on blindness caused by the injury (Malone v. Cayzer, Irvine 
 & Co. (1908), 45 S. L. E. 351 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 27)' ; by bronchitis 
 following influenza due to the debilitated state of deceased consequent 
 on the injury (Thoburn v. Bcdlington Coal Co., Limited (1911), 5 
 B. W. C. C. 128). 
 
 So, again, death was held to have resulted from the injury when 
 W.C.A. L 
 
146 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, I'JOG. [Sched. I. (1 3; 
 
 the deceased died from a disease which must have proved fatal in a 
 few years, but which was accelerated by the shock of the accidental 
 injury (G 'older \. Caledonian, Rail. Co". (1902), 40 S. L. B. 89; and 
 see Council & Co. \. Barr (1903), 116 L. T. Xewsp. 127, where the 
 man was suffering from chronic alcoholism, but was able to work up 
 to the time of the accident). 
 
 Death under an anaesthetic, administered to perform a reasonable 
 operation, will be held to have resulted from the injury, even though 
 the operation is experimental (Shirt v. Calico Printers' 1 Associa- 
 tion, Limited, [1909] 2 K. B. 51; 2 B. W. C. C. 342). In this case 
 the man died under a second operation " a bold experiment " which 
 the surgeons hoped would prevent contraction of his injured hand 
 following upon a previous operation which had been successful. It 
 was said that the true test was whether the step taken to obviate the 
 consequences of the accident and to make the man able-bodied was a 
 reasonable step to take. 
 
 An instance of a new cause intervening to bring about death is 
 the case of Charles v. Walker, Limited (1909), 25 T. L. B. 609; 2 
 B. W. C. C. 5. In this case a workman had been put under an 
 anesthetic for the amputation of a finger rendered necessary by an 
 accident. Whilst he was about to recover from the anaesthetic after 
 the amputation, the surgeons decided to remove a tooth of which the 
 man had complained. Further anaesthetics were administered, and 
 shortly afterwards the man died. The evidence was equally con- 
 sistent with the death having resulted from a spasm induced by an 
 attempt to swallow the blood caused by the attempted extraction/ and 
 with the anaesthetic administered for the first operation. In these 
 circumstances the arbitrator held that the applicants had not dis- 
 charged the burden of proof (see p. 145, ante), that death had resulted 
 from the accident, and this the Court of Appeal upheld. 
 
 The question whether death has resulted from or been accelerated 
 by the accident is a pure question of fact (Warnock v. Glasgow Iron 
 -feel Co., Limited (1904), 6 F. 474; and see Rayman v. Fields 
 (No. 2) (1910), 102 L. T. 154; 3 B. W. C. C. 123; Dean v. London 
 North-Western Rail. Co. (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 353 ; Cameron v. Port 
 of London Authority (1912), 5 B. AY. C. C. 416) ; and the arbitrator 
 is bound to find one way or the other. It is insufficient for him to find 
 that but for the accident the man would not have died how and 
 when he did die (Dunnigan v. Cavan <& Lind. [1911] S. C. 579; 
 4 B. W. C. C. 
 
 The Rights of Dependants. Subject to certain limitations, the 
 rights to compensation which the dependants have on the death of 
 a workman are separate and distinct from those of the workman 
 himself, and nothing that the workman may do during his lifetime 
 will affect the rights of the dependants, though it may reduce the 
 amount of compensation payable on his death. Thus, an agreement 
 or an award under the Act for compensation obtained by the work- 
 man, and payment thereunder ; the redemption of weekly payments 
 by a lump sum received by the workman ; the termination of weekly 
 payments by agreement or order of the court, will not destroy the 
 
Sched. I. (13)] COMPENSATION TO TOTAL DEPENDANTS. 147 
 
 right of the dependants to compensation in the event of his dying 
 from the injury sustained by the accident giving rise to his claim for 
 compensation (Williams v. Vauxhall Colliery Co., Limited, [1907] 
 2 K. B. 433 ; 9 W. C. C. 120 ; Ho well v. Bradford & Co. (1911), 104 
 L. T. 433 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 203 ; Jobson v. W. Cory & Sons, Limited 
 (1911), 131 L. T. Newsp. p. 147 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 284 ; and O'Keefe v. 
 Lovatt, [1901] W. N., p. 223 ; 4 AV. C. C. 109). 
 
 The limitations referred to are : (1) that the employers are not 
 liable beyond the statutory maximum provided in Sched. I. (1) (a) ; 
 (2) that they are entitled to credit for weekly payments or sums in 
 redemption thereof paid to the workman (Sched. I. (1) (a) ) ; and it is 
 submitted (3) that they are under no liability to the dependants if the 
 employers have settled with the workman in proceedings taken by 
 him independently of the Workmen's Compensation Act (see Howell 
 v. Bradford d Co. (1911), 104 L. T. 433 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 203). As to 
 how far dependants are bound by admissions made by the deceased, 
 see p. 40, ante. 
 
 Eight to Compensation survives on Death of Dependant. 
 
 The right to compensation vests in the dependant immediately upon 
 the death of the workman. It is not contingent upon a claim having 
 previously been made. It is a right transmissible as property, and 
 upon the death of the dependant, either with or without a claim 
 having been made by that dependant, it passes to his executor or 
 administrator. This is the law throughout the United Kingdom 
 (United Collieries, Limited v. Simpson or Hendry, [1909] A. C. 383 ; 
 2 B. W. C. C. 308, approving Darlington v. Eoscoe & Sons, [1907] 
 1 K. B. 219 ; 9 W. C. C. 1, and disapproving 0' Donovan v. Cameron, 
 [1901] 2 I. E. 633). 
 
 Dependency, a Question of Fact. Whether any applicant is a 
 dependant is a question of fact to be determined in each particular 
 case (see p. 126, ante). So, also, is the amount to which the several 
 dependants are entitled (ibid., and Simmons v. White Bros., [1899] 
 1 Q. B. 1005 ; 1 W. C. C. 89). 
 
 For the manner in which questions of who are dependants, and the 
 amounts of their shares, are to be settled, see Sched. I. (8). 
 
 Payment of Death Claims. All sums payable as compensation 
 in case of death (except agreed sums for medical and burial expenses) 
 must be paid into court (Sched. I. (5), and p. 163, post). 
 
 Investment and Application of Compensation for Death. 
 
 See, as to the powers of the court to deal with moneys paid into court 
 as compensation in these cases, Sched. I. (5), (8), and (9). 
 
 Procedure. The procedure on an application by dependants is 
 regulated by W. C. E. 4, 5, pp. 210, 211, post. 
 
 2. AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION WHERE THE DEPENDANTS ABE 
 WHOLLY DEPENDENT. 
 
 Test Of " Wholly " Dependent. It has been said that the test 
 to determine whether the dependant is wholly dependent on deceased's 
 
148 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. I. (1 3) 
 
 earnings, is whether what the workman was earning at the time of 
 his death was the sole source to which the dependant could look for 
 maintenance at that time ; and the fact that money comes to the 
 dependant on the death of the workman cannot, therefore, be taken 
 into consideration (Prycc v. Penrikyber Colliery Co., Limited, [1902] 
 1 K. B. 221 ; 4 W. C. C. 115). 
 
 It was formerly held that where other members of the family had 
 contributed to the household funds sums more than enough to keep 
 and clothe such other members, so that the household was, better main- 
 tained than it would have been otherwise, this did not prevent the 
 widow of a deceased workman from being " wholly dependent " upon 
 the husband (Senior v. Fountains and Burnley, Limited, [1907] 2 
 K. B. 563 ; 9 W. C. C. 116 ; McLean v. Moss Bay Iron and Steel Co.. 
 Limited, [1909] 2 K. B. 521 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 282 ; Toole v. Owners of 
 the Ship Isle of Erin (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 110) ; but it has now 
 been decided by the House of Lords that the question is one of fact, 
 and the obligation of the husband to support his wife does not prevent 
 her from being a dependant of other members of the family at the 
 same time. Thus, a husband and his two sons each contributed over 
 d2-per week to the common fund of a family numbering ten in all. 
 The husband and his said two sons were killed in the same accident. 
 The wife claimed as being partially dependent on each of the three, 
 and asked for compensation in respect of each. On a special case stated, 
 the Court of Appeal held (2 B. W. C. C. 275), on the authority of its 
 previous decisions, that as the assistance to the husband given by the 
 contributions of the children did not prevent the wife from being 
 wholly dependent upon him, she could not claim as partially de- 
 pendent on either her husband or the two sons. The House of Lords 
 reversed this decision, holding that, as the mother and surviving 
 children were in fact dependent upon the earnings of each and all 
 of the three deceased workmen, she and the surviving children could 
 claim in respect of each of the deaths (Hodgson v. Owners of the West 
 Stanley Colliery, [1910] A. C. 229 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 260, overruling 
 Senior v. Fountains, and McLean v. Moss Bay Co., supra). 
 
 Total dependency was held on the following facts : Applicant was 
 an only daughter, living with her father, who rented a house and 
 owned the furniture. He gave his earnings, 18s., to applicant. The 
 rent and rates came to 3s. 6d. a week. Applicant kept the house. 
 There was a lodger paying 16s. a week, yielding about 4s. profit, and 
 he continued as lodger after the workman's death (Marsh v. Boden 
 (1905), 7 W. C. C. 110). 
 
 In deciding the question of total dependency the capacity of the 
 alleged dependant to work and earn something is to be considered, 
 e>g. where a father had ceased to work upon an agreement with his 
 son that the latter should support him (Wainwright v. Crichton 
 (1904), 117 L. T. Newsp., p. 2). 
 
 A widow had five sons, all at work and all of full age. She lived 
 with one of them, and was, in fact, entirely supported by his earnings 
 at the time of his death. It was held that the fact that the other four 
 were able to contribute to her support, and were in law liable so to do. 
 did not prevent her from being wholly dependent on the deceased 
 
Sched. I. (13)] COMPENSATION TO TOTAL DEPENDANTS. 149 
 
 (Hiiiloiil v. Dalmeny Oil Co., Limited (1908), 45 S. L. E. 809 ; 1 
 B. W. C. C. 840). 
 
 Earnings by a wife take her out of the category of total dependants 
 (Baird d Co. v. Birsztan (1906), 8 F. 438). 
 
 Continuous Employment. It was held under the former Act, and 
 apparently the same rule will apply under this Act, that the period of 
 employment for the purposes of the Act must be a practically con- 
 tinuous employment during which the relationship of master and 
 servant substantially existed between the employer and workman 
 (Jones v. Ocean Coal Co., [1899] 2 Q. B. 124 ; 1 W. C. C. 94). " The 
 real question is, whether there has been a break in that relation (of 
 master and servant). To answer that question, we may put this test : 
 Are the facts such that we can assume that the workman, if called 
 upon to work, will do so, or that the employer, if asked to give 
 employment, will allow the man to work ? If there is a period of 
 time during which that could not be truly assumed, then the relation 
 of master and servant will have come to an end, and it is impossible 
 to deal with any period of time during which the master and servant 
 have respectively ceased to be willing to give and accept employment " 
 (ibid., per VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, L.J.) ; and any period antecedent to 
 such a break in the continuity cannot be regarded (ibid.). 
 
 See, to a similar effect, Giles v. Belford, Smith & Co., [1903] 1 
 K. B. 843 ; 5 W. C. C. 136, and the judgment of COLLINS, L.J., in 
 Hathaway v. Argus Printing Co., [1901] 1 Q. B. 96 ; 3 W. C. C. 177, 
 in which case it was held that the employment need not be de die in 
 diem provided there was an obligation to work on certain days of each 
 week, although on other days the workman was at liberty to work for 
 others ; but continuity of contractual engagement does not seem to be 
 essential to a continuity of employment. See the judgment of 
 VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, L.J., in Hewlett v. Hepburn & Co. (1899), 16 
 T.'L. E. 56; 2 W. C. C. 123. 
 
 Continuity of employment is a question of fact (Williams v. 
 Paulson (1899), 63 J. P. 757 ; 2 W. C. C. 126; Small v. M'Cormick 
 and Eioing (1899), 36 S. L. E. 700; Eussell v. M'ClusJcy (1900), 2-F. 
 1312; and see Niddrie and Benliar Coal Co. v. Peacock (1902), 4 F. 
 443 ; M'Hugh v. Barclay, Curie & Co. (1902), 39 S. L. E. 690). 
 
 Limits Of Compensation. -Paragraph (1) (a), (i), which deals with 
 this subject, consists of two parts. The former part provides for the 
 assessment of compensation where the deceased has been in the 
 employment of the same employer for the three or more years pre- 
 ceding the injury, and it fixes a maximum sum of .300 and a minimum 
 of .150. The latter half relates to cases when the period of employ- 
 ment has been less than three years, and whilst no. mention is there 
 made of maximum and minimum sums there can be no doubt that 
 both limits are applicable. See a dictum of Lord MACNAGHTEN in 
 Ly sons' Case, [1901] A. C., at p. 93 ; Forrester & Co. v. McCullum 
 (1901), 3 F. 650, reconsidering and disapproving Doyle v. Beattie 
 (1900), 37 S. L. E. 915, in which it had been decided that the 
 
150 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. I. (l ,3) 
 
 minimum limit was not applicable where the employment was for 
 less than three years. 
 
 The minimum was held to be payable even though the deceased had 
 not in fact earned anything, having been killed as soon as he got 
 on the premises and before commencing work (Leonard v. Baird 
 (1901), 3 F. 890) ; but no difficulty can arise on this score under the 
 new Act, because a method is provided for assessing earnings in cases 
 of short employment. See paragraph (2) (a), and p. 135, ante. 
 
 Deductions from the Compensation. From the amount of com- 
 pensation must be deducted any weekly payments, which have been 
 made to the workman during his lifetime under the Act in respect of 
 the injury from which he dies, and also " any lump sum paid in 
 redemption thereof." This latter provision is new to the text of the 
 Schedule, but it was decided under the former statute that such 
 deduction must be made (Williams v. Vauxhall Colliery Co., Limited, 
 '1907] 2 K. B. 433; 9 \V. C. C. 120). 
 
 (a) Where the Employment has lasted Three Years. 
 
 " In the Employment of the same Employer." The calculation 
 
 of the amount of compensation payable to the wholly dependent will 
 depend upon whether the deceased workman had or had not been 
 during the three years next preceding the injury " in the employment 
 of the same employer " ; and this expression is to be taken to mean 
 " employment by the same employer in the grade (see p. 142, ante] 
 in which the workman was employed at the time of the accident, 
 uninterrupted by absence from work due to illness or other unavoid- 
 able cause " (Sched. I. (2) (c)). 
 
 Break in Employment. Under the original Act there was held to 
 be a break hi the employment when a workman was absent from work 
 for some months owing to illness (Appleby v. Horseley Co., [1899] 
 2 Q. B. 521 ; 1 W. C. C. 103 ; Gibb v. Dunlop & Co., Limited (1902), 
 4 F. 971) ; or was absent owing to a strike which terminated the con- 
 tract (Jones v. Ocean Coal Co., p. 149, ante) ; or where the work was 
 stopped for three weeks owing to frost (Powell v. Ryan (1903), 37 Ir. 
 T. L. E. 9) ; but not necessarily where the absence was due to a 
 holiday (Keast v. Barrow Hcematite Steel Co. (1899), 63 J. P. 56 ; 
 1 W. C. C. 99). 
 
 Under the present Act a break in the employment is brought about 
 by a change hi the grade in which the workman was employed 
 (which was not formerly the case : Price v. Marsden, [1899] 1 Q. B. 
 493 ; 1 W. C. C. 108), or by absence from work due to illness or any 
 other unavoidable cause (Sched. I. (2) (c.)). 
 
 It would seem that the words " anj r other unavoidable cause " are 
 to be construed ejusdem generis with illness, and that they do not 
 include stoppages of work owing to recognised holidays or to the 
 work being Hmited by slackness of trade, although these things are 
 unavoidable so far as the workman is concerned (see Anslow v. Can- 
 nod- Chase Colliery Co., Limited, [1909 , A. C. 435 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 365 ; 
 
Sched. I. (1 3)] COMPENSATION TO TOTAL DEPENDANTS. 151 
 
 Carter v. John Lang & Sons (1908), 45 S. L. K. 938; 1 B. W. C. C. 
 379; Bailey v. Kenworthy, [1908] 1 K. B. 441, per FLETCHER 
 MOULTON, L.J., [1908] 1 K. B. at p. 466; 1 B. W. C. C. 351, 371). 
 On the other hand, in the last-named case, COZENS-HARDY, M.B., seems 
 to have thought that " unavoidable " included anything which was so 
 describable from the workman's point of view (see ibid., at p. 454). 
 
 Amount of Compensation. Where the workman has been 
 engaged in the employment by the same employer, in the grade in 
 which he was at the time of the accident, for a continuous period of 
 three years previous to the injury, the calculation is simple. The 
 compensation is to be a sum equal to his earnings in that employment, 
 subject to the limits before mentioned, and subject to the deductions 
 referred to on p. 150, ante. It will be seen that there is here no 
 necessity to go into the question of " average weekly earnings," and 
 consequently earnings under concurrent contracts with other employers 
 cannot be taken into account (Buckley v. London and India Docks 
 (1909), 127 L. T. Newsp. 521 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 327). 
 
 (6) Where the Employment has been less than Three 'Years. 
 
 Amount Of Compensation. Where the workman has not been in 
 the employment of the same employer as above described during a 
 period of three years next preceding the injury, the compensation is 
 to be (subject to the same limits and deductions) the amount of 156 
 times his average weekly earnings during the period of actual employ- 
 ment under the same employer, in the same grade in which the 
 workman was at the time of the accident. This necessitates following 
 the rules laid down in paragraph (2) for the calculation of " average 
 weekly earnings," including (by virtue of paragraph (2) (b)) in 
 addition to the earnings from that employer the further earnings from 
 any other employers with whom the workman may have entered into 
 concurrent contracts during the whole or any part of such period. 
 See p. 139, ante, as to the calculation of " average weekly payments," 
 and p. 145, ante, as to earnings under concurrent contracts. 
 
 3. AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION WHERE DEPENDANTS ARE PARTIALLY 
 DEPENDENT. 
 
 Persons Wholly and Partially Dependent.- By Sched. I (8) 
 
 compensation may now be allotted partly to the total and partly to 
 the partial dependants. 
 
 Question Of Fact. Partial dependency, like dependency in general, 
 is a question of fact. It is not absolutely necessary that immediately 
 before his death the deceased should have in fact contributed some- 
 thing to his dependants if he had done so in the past, and there was a 
 prospect of his doing so again in the immediate future (Robertson v. 
 Hall Bros. S.8. Co. (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 370; and see Turner v. 
 Miller and Richards (1910), ibid. 307). 
 
 A receipt of weekly poor relief will prevent a person from being 
 
152 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched I. (13) 
 
 totally dependent on a workman (Births v. Pool C1909), 126 L. T 
 Xewsp. 286 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 484- C. C .'). 
 
 Dependent on more than One Deceased. A person who is 
 
 partially dependent on more than one person killed in the same 
 accident, may claim in respect of each death, and may recover in 
 respect of each such compensation as he may be entitled to, even 
 though the aggregate recovered may exceed the limit of 300 (Hodg- 
 son v. West Stanley Colliery, [1910] A. C. 229; 3 B. W. C. C. 260).' 
 
 Amount Of Compensation. In this case there is no minimum sum 
 payable, but the amount must not exceed the amount payable under 
 the provisions of Sched. (1) (a). It is submitted that the amount 
 referred to is the amount of the three years' earnings, or 156 times the 
 average weekly earnings, as the case may be, within the maximum of 
 300, and that an arbitrator should not start his calculation on the 
 basis of .150, which is an arbitary minimum fixed solely for the 
 purpose of total dependency. Subject to these limitations, it is, also, 
 submitted that in fixing the amount " reasonable and proportionate 
 to the injury " to the dependants the arbitrator is not limited in his 
 inquiry to a period of three years. 
 
 In making his calculation the arbitrator may allow something for 
 funeral and medical expenses, provided that the maximum is not 
 exceeded (Bevan v. Crawshay, [1902] 1 K. B. 25 ; 4 W. C. C. 110 ; 
 Hughes v. Summerlee and Mossend Iron and Steel Co., Limited- 
 (1903), 5. F. 784; and see Gourlay v. Murray, [1908] S. C. 769; 1 
 B. W. C. C. 335). 
 
 Principle of Assessing the Compensation. The proper course 
 
 for the arbitrator to take is to look at all the circumstances and say 
 to what extent, if at all, the claimant was dependent upon the 
 deceased's earnings. This will involve the consideration of the 
 cost of maintenance of the deceased and the value of any services 
 rendered to the claimant by deceased (Tamwortli Colliery Co., 
 Limited v. Hall, [1911] A. C. 665 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 313, varying the 
 order of the Court of Appeal ( [1911] 1 K. B. 341) in so far as it ordered 
 that the cost of maintenance and value of services ought not to be 
 taken into account, and dissenting from Osmond v. Campbell and 
 Harrison, Limited, [1905] 2 K. B. 852 ; 8 W. C. C. 95, if, and so far 
 as, it decided that the deduction of the cost of maintenance could not 
 be made ; O'Neill v. Banslia Co-operative Agricultural and Dairy 
 Society (1910), 44 Ir. L. T. 52). 
 
 The calculation of the amount due to partial dependants is a ques- 
 tion of fact (Littleford v. Connell (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 1). An 
 award for an amount based upon the deceased's full earnings for 
 three years, less a deduction of 6s. a week for a like period, which 
 weekly sum of 6s. represented income from sources other than the 
 deceased, was upheld (ibid.} ; but it will be noticed that this decision 
 was given at a time when it was decided that no deduction could be 
 made for maintainance. It is submitted that it does not accord with 
 the principles now laid down by the House of Lords. 
 
Sched.I.(l 3)] COMPENSATION FOR DISABLEMENT. 153 
 
 Illegitimate Child. If the only evidence of dependency of an 
 illegitimate child is an affiliation order, the amount of compensation 
 should be based upon that, unless there is evidence that the deceased 
 voluntarily recognised an obligation to contribute more than the sum 
 ordered (Gourlayv. Murray, [1908] S. C. 769; 1 B. W. C. C. 335). 
 
 4. AMOUNT OP COMPENSATION WHERE THERE ARE NO DEPENDANTS. 
 
 Medical and Burial Expenses. If medical and burial expenses 
 have been incurred, paragraph (1) (a) (iii) provides for their payment 
 to the extent of .10. The person entitled to any sum so due will bo 
 the legal personal representative if there be one, or, if there be no 
 such person, the person or persons to whom such expenses are due. 
 See Sched. I. (5), and W. C. E. 6, p. 211, post. 
 
 In this case it is not necessary to pay the money into court if the 
 parties otherwise agree (Sched. I. (5)). 
 
 No payment is required to be made under this head by a shipowner 
 if he is liable under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1906, to defray the 
 expenses of burial. See further on this, p. 98, ante. 
 
 Procedure. W. C. E. 6, p. 211, post, relates to procedure to settle 
 by arbitration the sums payable for medical and burial expenses. If 
 the amount awarded is not sufficient to settle the whole of such 
 expenses, it is to be apportioned as the judge or arbitrator shall direct 
 (W. C. E. 6 (2)). 
 
 COMPENSATION IN CASE OF DISABLEMENT. 
 
 I. INCAPACITY AND ITS CAUSES. 
 
 " Where . . . Incapacity results from the Injury." The prin- 
 ciples stated on p. 145, ant-e, " Where Death Results from tlie Injury ," 
 apply. Therefore, incapacity was held to result from the accident : 
 where a miner contracted chest trouble and pneumonia through 
 having to crawl home on a cold day in consequence of injury to his 
 knee (Ystradowen Colliery Co. v. Griffiths, [1909] 2 K. B. 533 ; 2 
 B. W. C. C. 357) ; where incapacity to work underground was due to 
 increased susceptibility to nystagmus consequent on the attack of 
 that disease contracted in the employment (Garnant Anthracite 
 Collieries, Limited v. Bees, [1912] 3 K. B. 732 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 694). 
 
 The effects of the injury and consequent incapacity may be 
 aggravated by the man's peculiar bodily condition at the time of the 
 injury, for example : where he was of a gouty diathesis (Lloyd v. Sugg, 
 [1900] 1 Q. B. 486 ; 2 W. C. C. 5) ; where a workman having a 
 progressive disease in the left eye, and being injured in the right eye, 
 the combination of the two conditions prevented him from doing the 
 same amount of work as before the accident (Lee v. Wm. Baird d- Co., 
 Limited (1908), 45 S. L. E. 717 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 34). See also p. 8, 
 ante : " Disease Aggravated or Accelerated by Accident." 
 
154 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. I. (I 3) 
 
 Onus of Proof. See the general principles stated on pp. 31 39, 
 ante. A workman claiming in respect of incapacity owing to tendency 
 to nystagmus must prove that the tendency is due to previous attacks 
 of the disease as opposed to his natural tendency to it (Jones v. New 
 Brynmally Colliery Co., Limited (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 375). 
 
 Employers seeking termination of compensation must prove that 
 there is 110 incapacity from the accident ; e.g., where there was partial 
 permanent incapacity (injury to the hand) and the workman was 
 taken back into light employment, which he had to give up owing to 
 heart disease unconnected with the injury (Con/ Brother* <( Co., 
 Limit*',! v. Hughes, [1911] 2 K. B. 738 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 291) ; and when 
 resisting a claim, based upon an alleged strain to a knee, which had been 
 injured in another employment three years before, they must show 
 that no new injury has been caused (Borland v. Watson, Gow & Co.. 
 Limited (1911), 49 S. L. B. 10; 5 B. W. C. C. 514). 
 
 Incapacity from Second Accident. If the injury causing in- 
 capacity arises from a second accident in the employment of the same 
 employers, to which the original accident was a contributory cause, 
 compensation must be claimed on the second accident only, and not 
 on the first (Nod en v. Galloways, Limited, [1912] 1 K. B. 46 ; 5 
 B. W. C. C. 7). 
 
 Meaning of " Incapacity for Work."" Incapacity for work " is 
 
 not the same thing as " incapacity to work." It means the loss or 
 diminution of wage -earning capacity, and it includes inability to get 
 work if that be the result of the accidental injury. So compensation 
 is awardable for obvious disfigurement reducing the chances of getting 
 work, e.g. the removal of an eye, whether its sight had previously 
 been impaired (Martin v. Barnett (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 146), or 
 whether it was previously, but not apparently, a blind eye (Ball v. 
 William Hunt d Sons. Limited, 1912] A. C. 496 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 459, 
 reversing the Court of Appeal [1911] 1 K. B. 1048 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 225). 
 
 Incapacity a Question of Fact. Whether incapacity has resulted 
 or continues from the injury is a question of fact (Hay-man v. Fields 
 (No. 2) (1910), 102 L. T. 154; 3 B. W. C. C. 123; Smith v. Coed 
 Talon Colliery Co., Limited (1909), 2 W. C. C. 121; Dowds v. Bennie 
 and Son (1903), 5 F. 268 ; Price v. Burnyeat, Brown d Co. (1907), 
 2 B. W. C. C. 337; Wells v. Cardiff Steam Coal Collieries Co., 
 Limited (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 104 ; Furness, Withy d Co. v. Bennett 
 (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 195 ; Leeds and Liverpool Canal Co. v. Hesketh 
 (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 303 ; Goodall and Clarke \. Kramer (1910), 
 Hid. 317 ; Anderson v. Darngavil Coal Co., Limited, [1910] S. C. 456; 
 Cininingliam v. M'Naughton and Sinclair (1910), 47 S. L. B. 781 ; 3 
 B. W. C. C. 577 ; O'Neill v. Ropner <& Co. (1908), 43 Ir. L. T. 2 ; 2 B. W. 
 C C. 334; Upper Forest and Worcester Steel and Tinplate Co., Ltd. 
 v. Grey, p. 156, post; Sober t s v. Benham (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 430; 
 Arnott v. Fife Coal Co., Limited (1912), 49 S. L. B. 902). 
 
 The arbitrator is obliged to come to a decision one way or the other 
 on ixhe question of incapacity for work. On a review of compensation 
 
Sched. I. (l 3)] COMPENSATION FOR DISABLEMENT. 155 
 
 he cannot make an award in favour of the workman on the ground 
 that, owing to the conflict of medical evidence, he is unable to make up 
 his mind whether or not the workman is able to do work which is 
 offered to him (Co-wan v. Simpson (1909), 8 B. W. C. C. 4) ; nor must 
 he assume that a man was at a certain period totally unable to work 
 simply 011 the ground that his medical attendant advised him during 
 that period not to work (Evans v. Cory Bros. & Co., Limited (1912), 
 5 B. W. C. C. 272). 
 
 Incapacity from Nervous Effects. The fact that the incapacity 
 arises from the nervous effects produced by the accident does not 
 deprive the workman of his right to compensation during such 
 incapacity (Eaves v. Blaenclydach Colliery Co., Limited, [1909] 2 
 K. B. 73 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 329 ; Turner v. Brooks and Doxey, Limited 
 (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 22) ; but where the arbitrator found that the 
 workman's inability to work was caused by his brooding over the 
 effects of the accident, and that this was not incapacity within the 
 . meaning of the Act, the Court of Appeal approved the decision (Holt 
 v. Yates and Thorn (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 75). 
 
 Nervous shock alone may constitute personal injury, as where it 
 is caused by witnessing the results of an accident to another man 
 (Yates v. South Kirkby, Featherstone and Hemsworth Collieries 
 (Limited), [1910] 2 K. B. 538 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 418). 
 
 An arbitrator held that the respondent could not work at the same 
 employment as before, or earn at that employment the same wages, 
 and that he ought not to compel him to go back to the employment 
 to which he objected to go, even though the employer offered to make 
 things easy for him and to pay him full wages. An appeal against 
 this decision failed (Ellis v. Knott, 2 W. C. C. 116 ; Times, April 9th, 
 1900). A similar decision was upheld in Scotland (Fraser v. Great 
 North of Scotland Bail. Co. (1901), 3 F. 908). But in another case 
 under similar facts, the arbitrator stayed the payments on an appli- 
 cation to review, and the Court of Appeal refused to interfere (Powell 
 Duffryn Steam Co., Limited v. Edwards, Times, July 23rd, 1900). 
 
 Incapacity from Misconduct. If an injured workman, who has 
 been taken back into his employer's service at full wages, has been 
 dismissed for misconduct, the proper course appears to be to make an 
 award for a nominal sum until such time as the workman can show 
 that he comes within the principle of Clark v. The Gas Light and CoJce 
 Co., p. 160, post (Hill v. Ocean Coal Co., Limited (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 
 29), but the Court of Appeal refused to support an award which so 
 reduced the compensation on the ground of a single act of misconduct 
 (W. White & Sons v. Harris (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 39). 
 
 A waitress, whose injury to her finger had made her clumsy, 
 returned to her former work, but being grumbled at for her 
 clumsiness, left her employment, and claimed compensation without 
 attempting to obtain other employment. The Court of Appeal 
 refused to disturb an award made in her favour on the basis of partial 
 disablement (Ward v. Miles (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 182). 
 
 In the county court compensation has been suspended during the 
 
156 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. I. (1 3) 
 
 time that the workman was serving a term of imprisonment, on the 
 ground that the incapacity was no longer due to the accident (Clayton 
 ami Shuttle worth, Limited v. Dobbs (1908), 2 B. W. C. C. 488; 
 Times, December 17th). 
 
 Incapacity through Loafing. If a man's incapacity, e.g. the 
 soft condition of his muscles, is brought about by loafing, the 
 arbitrator may justly terminate his compensation (David v. Windsor 
 Steam Coal Co., Limited (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 177). 
 
 Incapacity through Neglect to follow Medical Advice. A 
 
 workman, whose incapacity was due to the neglect to comply with 
 certain simple medical directions which had been given him, was 
 deprived of compensation (Dowds v. Bennie & Son (1903), 5 F. 268). 
 See also Smith v. Coed Talon Colliery Co., Limited, Times, February 
 6th, 1900 ; 2 AY. C. C. 121 ; Steele v. Bilham (1910), 128 L. T. Xewsp~, 
 p. 416, where an arbitrator refused compensation to a woman who had 
 acted unreasonably in not exercising and working her injured hand ; 
 and Upper Forest and Worcester Steel and Tinplate Co., Ltd. v. Grey 
 (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 424, a similar case in the C. A. 
 
 If a man has had alternatives offered him for improving his physical 
 condition and refuses both, this may justify the reduction of his 
 compensation to a nominal sum ; but where employers applied for a 
 review on the ground that the man's incapacity was due to his 
 unreasonable refusal to return to work which, according to their 
 view, would benefit his condition, and in the meantime the workman 
 on medical advice underwent an operation to improve his condition, 
 the Court of Appeal held that there was no justification for an award 
 reducing the compensation to a nominal sum (Burgess d Co., Limited 
 v. Jewell (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 145). 
 
 Incapacity from Defective Medical Treatment Incapacity 
 
 resulting from a bond fide and reasonable exercise of medical skill 
 when treating the accidental injury will generally be incapacity in 
 respect of which compensation is payable ; but when it is contended 
 that the workman would have recovered from the effects of the acci- 
 dental injury if it had not been for the negligent or unreasonable 
 treatment of the patient by the medical practitioner, the question of 
 novus actus interveniens arises. So, where it was alleged that the 
 present incapacity of the workman was due to the negligence of a 
 bone-setter, the Court of Appeal defined the issue to be tried as 
 follows : " Is, or is not, the condition of this man, at the time when it 
 conies before me (the arbitrator), due, substantially, not to the original 
 accident, but to the mismanagement of the bone-setter?" (Hinnlicr 
 Steam Towing Co. v. Barclay (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 142). 
 
 Incapacity through Refusal to undergo Surgical Operation. 
 
 In cases where the workman refuses to undergo a surgical operation 
 the question to be decided is whether under the circumstances he is 
 acting reasonably or unreasonably in so doing. In other words, the 
 question is whether his continued disability is due to the accident or 
 
Sched. I (13)] COMPENSATION FOR DISABLEMENT. 157 
 
 to his unreasonableness in refusing to submit to the operation. The 
 question is not whether on the balance of medical evidence the 
 operation is a reasonable one to be performed (Tutton v. Oivners of 
 S.S. Majestic, [1909] 2 K. B. 54 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 346). 
 
 The onus of proving that the present incapacity is due to the refusal 
 to undergo some previous operation lies upon the employer (Marshall 
 v. Orient Steam Navigation Co., Limited, [1910] 1 K. B. 79 ; 3 
 B. W. C. C. 15). So, where the arbitrator found that the man was 
 unreasonable, in the first place, in refusing to undergo a slight 
 operation, but that on the evidence it was impossible to say that the 
 proposed operation would have saved the amputation of the finger, it 
 was held that the workman was entitled to an award (ibid.). 
 
 In all cases the question is one of fact for the arbitrator, and no 
 appeal will be successful unless there is no evidence to support the 
 finding, or the arbitrator has misdirected himself (Ruabon Coal Co. v. 
 Thomas (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 32; Tutton v. Owners of S.S. Majestic, 
 supra; Moss & Co. v. Alters (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 294; Wheeler, 
 Ridley <& Co. v. Daivson (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 645). 
 
 A workman is not unreasonable in refusing to undergo an operation 
 when his refusal is based on the advice of his own medical man, who 
 is of opinion that there is some risk to life (Tutton v. Owners of S.S. 
 Majestic, supra; Rothwell v. Davies (1903), 19 T. L. B. 423; 5 
 W. C. C. 141, as explained in WarncJcen v. Richard Moreland and 
 Son, Limited, [1909] 1 K. B. 184 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 350), or where a 
 reliable and impartial medical man has advised against it (Sweeney v. 
 Pumpherston Oil Co., Limited (1903), 5 F. 972), or if his own medical 
 man advises that the suggested remedy would be useless (Moss & Co. 
 v. Alters, supra). 
 
 But an arbitrator is justified in finding that the workman is acting 
 unreasonably when all the medical witnesses advise an operation, which 
 does not involve appreciable risk, and which an ordinary individual 
 would submit to in his own interests (Wa/mcken v. R. Moreland and 
 Son, Limited, supra ; following and approving Donnelly v. William 
 Baird & Co. Limited (1908), 45 S. L. E. 394; 1 B. W. C. C. 95; 
 Paddington'Borough Council v. Stack (1909), 2 B. W. C. C. 402 ; and 
 see also Anderson v. Baird & Co., Limited (1903), 5 F. 373). 
 
 II. THE COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY. 
 
 Amount Of Compensation. During incapacity the workman is 
 entitled to receive weekly compensation, not exceeding 50 per cent, 
 of his average weekly earnings during the previous twelve months, or 
 other less period, of his employment, and not exceeding 1 ; except 
 that a workman who was under twenty-one years of age at the date 
 of the injury, and whose average weekly earnings were less than 20s., 
 is, during total incapacity, entitled to 100 per cent, of such earnings, 
 provided that sum does not exceed 10s. 
 
 See, also, the provision in Sched. I. (16), p. 173, post, for increasing 
 the amount of compensation payable to a workman who was under 
 age at the date of the accident when a review is asked for more than 
 twelve months after the accident. 
 
158 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. I. (13) 
 " During 1 the Period of his Incapacity." Beading s. 1 (2) (a) 
 
 with Sched. I. (1) (b), proviso (a), it is seen that no compensation is 
 payable at all if the incapacity lasts less than a week ; that if it lasts 
 more than a week but less than two weeks, no compensation is pay- 
 able in respect of the first week; but that if it lasts a fortnight or 
 more, compensation is payable from the date of the accident. 
 
 When applied to seamen the words "during the period of incapacity " 
 apply to the period for which the employer is liable under this Act 
 to pay compensation, i.e. from the date of discharge of the seaman 
 (McDcrmottv. Owners ofS.S. Tintoretto, [1911] A. C. 35 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 
 123). 
 
 Incapacity is not confined to incapacity to do his former work 
 (Cammell, Laird <6 Co. v. Plait (1908), 2 B. W. C. C. 368). 
 
 "Regard shall be had to any Payment, Allowance, or 
 
 Benefit." In fixing the amount of compensation regard must be 
 had to any payment, allowance, or benefit which the workman may 
 receive from the employer during incapacity (Sched. I. (3)). This does 
 not mean that such payments, etc., must be deducted, but merely that 
 the arbitrator must have regard to them, the mode and extent of that 
 regard being left to his discretion (McDermott v. Owners of S.S. 
 Tintoretto, [1909] 2 K. B. 704 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 208). 
 
 Regard must not be had to expenses of maintenance and medical 
 attendance and wages payable by a ship-owner to an injured seaman 
 under the Merchant Snipping Act, 1894, pending his proper discharge 
 (McDermott v. Owners of S.S. Tintoretto, [1911] A. C. 35 ; 4 B. W. 
 C. C. 123 ; and see p. 98, ante) ; nor to poor law relief which the workman 
 may be receiving during his incapacity (Gilroy v. Mackie and others 
 (Lcith Distress Committee) (1909), 46 S. L. E. 325 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 269) ; 
 nor, it is submitted, to weekly payments which are payable out of a 
 mutual aid fund to which both workman and employer contributed 
 (see E alien v. London United Tramways (1901), Limited (1906), 
 121 L. T. Xewsp. 415 ; 8 W. C. C. 103, under the original Act, in 
 which case His Hon. Judge HOWLAND ROBERTS took this view) ; and 
 where full weekly payments have been made and accepted between 
 the parties up to a certain date, and the workman seeks compensation 
 for a later period, the arbitrator is not entitled, in assessing compensa- 
 tion for that period, to take into account the fact that, in his opinion 
 on the evidence, the workman has been receiving more compensation 
 prior to that date than in strictness he was entitled to (Doyle v. Cork 
 Steam Packet Co. (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 350). See further as to excess 
 payments of compensation, p. 180,_po*)- 
 
 But regard may be had to payments made by the employers to a 
 hospital in return for the maintenance of an injured workman, even 
 though at the time of his admission he was unconscious (Kempson v. 
 Owners of the S. Moss Rose (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 101 ; Sorensen v. Gaff 
 ,i- Co. (1912), 49 S. L. E. 896), and to a sum paid by way of settlement 
 under an agreement which was refused registration (Ho rs in an v. 
 Glnujow Navigation Co., Limiinl (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 27). 
 
 Lump Sum. The arbitrator cannot award a lump sum (Mulhvlland 
 
Sched.I. (1 o)] COMPENSATION FOR DISABLEMENT. 159 
 
 v. Whitehaven Colliery Co., [1910] 2 K. B. 278; 3 B. W. C. C. 319; 
 Baird Co., Limited v. Dempster (1909), 46 S. L. R. 119; 2 B. W. 
 C. C. 144), except in the case of the redemption of weekly payments 
 under para. (17) of Sched. I. 
 
 Compensation for Partial Disablement. Where the incapacity 
 
 is partial the weekly payment must not exceed the difference between 
 the amount of the average weekly earnings before the accident, and 
 the average weekly amount which he is earning, or is able to earn, in 
 some suitable employment or business after the accident, "but shall 
 bear such relation to the amount of that difference as under the 
 circumstances of the case may appear proper " (Sched. I. (3)). 
 
 The words above in inverted commas did not appear in the original 
 Act. They are an important limitation on the arbitrator's powers. 
 He is bound to take into account extraneous circumstances of a 
 general character, although they may have arisen since the date of 
 the accident, which affect the amount the workman would reasonably 
 have been earning if there had been no incapacity. A general fall in 
 wages owing to legislation is such a circumstance. The fact that the 
 work of a collier is further from the pit's mouth than it was before 
 the accident, or any other circumstance peculiar to the colliery or 
 personal to the workman ought not, it seems, to be regarded (Bevan 
 v. Energlyn Colliery Co., [1912] 1 K. B. 63 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 169). 
 
 What Part of Difference is Awardable. Paragraph (3) does not, 
 
 when read with paragraph (1) (b), operate so as necessarily to cut 
 down the maximum rate of compensation allowed by the latter 
 paragraph, and the workman may be awarded any difference between 
 his weekly earnings before and after the accident so long as the 
 maximum fixed by paragraph (1) (b) is not exceeded (Illingworth v. 
 Walmsley, [1900] 2 Q. B. 142 ; 2 W. C. C. 118 ; Jones v. London and 
 North Western Rail. Co. (1901), 4 W. C. C. 140; Geary v. W. Dixon, 
 Limited (1899), 4 F. 1143 ; Parker v. Same (1902), 4 F.-1147 ; Corbet 
 v. Glasgow Iron and Steel Co., Limited (1903), 5 F. 782; Bryson v. 
 J. Dunn and Stephen, Limited (1905), 8 F. 226; BrooTtfield Linen 
 Co., Limited v. Clugston (1909), 44 Ir. L. T. 10). The report of the 
 judgment of COLLINS, L.J., in Pomphrey's Case, [1901] 1 K. B., at p. 
 91, that " the maximum that can be awarded is one-half the difference 
 so ascertained," is incorrect (see [1902] 1 K. B. 61). 
 
 Discretion Of Arbitrator. So long as the arbitrator exercises 
 his discretion without misdirecting himself in law, his finding cannot 
 be interfered with (Humphreys v. City of London Electric Lighting 
 Go. (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 275), but he must exercise his discretion in 
 each case, and cannot lay down a general rule that he will award the 
 maximum amount of the difference within the limits of the provisions 
 (Webster v. Sharpe # Co., [1904] 1 K. B. 218, affirmed in H. L., [1905] 
 A. C. 284 ; 7 W. C. C. 118). 
 
 He cannot award a weekly sum for life, unless both parties agree 
 (Irons v. Davis and Timmins, [1899] 2 Q. B. 330 ; 1 W. 0. C. 26). 
 
160 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. I. (13) 
 
 "Earnings before the Accident." The earnings before the 
 accident are those actually received by the workman when calculated 
 as provided by the Schedule. Under the original Act they could not 
 be affected bj 7 fluctuations in scale wages which occurred since the 
 accident (James v. Ocean Coal Co., [1904] 2 K. B. 213 ; 6 W. C. C. 
 128; Jamieson v. Fife Coal Co., Limited (1903), 5 F. 958, but see now 
 Sevan v. Energlyn Colliery Co., supra). 
 
 "Earnings after the Accident." Except in one case (see 
 
 Sched. I. (16), p. 173, post), the arbitrator cannot consider the earnings 
 that the workman would probably have been obtaining if he had not 
 met with the accident (Pomphrey v. Southward Press, [1901] 1 K. B. 
 86 ; 3 W. C. C. 194 ; but in Scotland it has been held that such 
 considerations are relevant : Freeland v. Macfarlane, Lang ' < Co. 
 (1900), 37 S. L. B. 599) ; nor can he consider the reduced wages which 
 the workman would have been earning owing to his advanced age 
 (Jamieson v. Fife Coal Co., Limited, (1903) 5 F. 958). 
 
 " Able to Earn in some Suitable Employment or Business." 
 
 It is not necessary that the amount being earned by the workman 
 after the accident should be salary or wages paid by an employer, 
 but it will lalso include anything that he is able to make in a 
 business of his own. This was so decided under the former Act 
 (Xnnnan S Burt v. Walder, [1904] 2 K. B. 27 ; 6 W. C. C. 124), 
 and effect is given to this decision in the above expression. 
 
 The Court of Session take a narrower view. Where the arbitrator 
 refused compensation on the ground that the profits of the business 
 carried on by the injured workman exceeded his former earnings, the 
 case was remitted in order to ascertain what services the workman 
 actually performed in the business, and what those services would 
 have been worth if, instead of serving himself, he had been serving 
 an employer (Paterson v. A. G. Moore <6 Co., [1910] S. C. 29 ; 
 3 B. W. C. C. 541 ; a view adopted by FLETCHER MOULTON, L.J., in 
 Calico Printers' Association, Limited v. Higham, [1912] 1 K. B. at 
 p. 102). 
 
 It is not sufficient to find that physically a man is able to earn 
 something, but -the arbitrator is entitled to find, and ought to find, 
 if the facts justify it, that the workman's opportunity of getting 
 employment has been narrowed in consequence of the accident (Clark 
 v. Gas Light and Coke Co. (1905), 21 T. L. K. 184 ; 7 W. C. C. 119 ; and 
 Bryced Co. v. O'Connor, [1904] 4 F. 193; Sharman v. Holliday and 
 Greenwood, Limited, cited p. 173, post ; Thomas v. Fairbairne, 
 Lawson & Co., Limited (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 195) ; and if a skilled 
 workman has been driven to casual work, the arbitrator is not bound 
 to regard his maximum casual earnings as a fixed quantity, but may 
 consider the probability that he may not always be able to earn that 
 sum (Brown v. Thorneycroft & Co., Limited (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 
 
 Even the fact that a workman has been taken back by his employers 
 at wages equal to those before the accident is not conclusive evidence 
 of his ability to earn that amount (Wilson v. Jackson's Stores, Limited 
 
Sched. I. (1 3)] COMPENSATION FOR DISABLEMENT. 161 
 
 (1905), 7 W. C. C. 122; Clelland v. Singer Manufacturing Co. (1905), 
 7 F. 975 ; Bowhill Coal Co. (Fife), Limited v. Malcolm (1910) (No. 2), 
 47 S. L. E. 449 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 562 ; Birmingham Cabinet Manu- 
 facturing Co. v. Dudley (1910), 102 L. T. 619; 3 B. W. C. C. 169 ; 
 Warwick 8.8. Co. v. Callaghan (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 283); nor 
 apparently is it sufficient to shift the burden of proof so as to require 
 the workman to show that his continued incapacity is due to the 
 accident (Cory Brothers & Co., Limited v. Hughes, [1911] 2 K. B. 
 738; 4 B. W. C. C. 291). 
 
 If the difference in the amount of earnings before and after the 
 accident is due to a general fall in the rate of wages, this does not 
 entitle the workman to compensation (Merry & Cunningham, Limited 
 v. Black (1909), 46 S. L. E. 812 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 372). So where a 
 workman in receipt of reduced compensation and part wages was dis- 
 missed owing to slackness of work, it was held that the proper test 
 was the inability to get work on the ground of physical disability, 
 not on account of the state of the labour market (Dobby v. Wilson 
 Pease S Co. (1909), 2 B. W. C. C. 370; Cardiff Corporation v. Hall, 
 [1911] 1 K. B. 1009; 4 B. W. C. C. 159). 
 
 "Suitable Employment." Suitability of employment "is a 
 question of fact in each case for the learned judge, having regard 
 not merely to the physical condition of the man, but also to the nature 
 and character of his occupation before the accident and the nature 
 of the work which is offered after the accident" (Eyre v. Houghton 
 Main Colliery Co., Limited, [1910] 1 K. B. 695, at pp. 697, 698, per 
 COZENS-HARDY, M.E. ; 3 B. W. C. C. 250 ; Dinning ton Main Coal Co., 
 Limited v. Bruins (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 367 ; Elliott v. Curry < Dodd 
 (1912), 49 Ir. L. T. 72 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 584 ; Wallis & Sons v. M'Neice 
 (1912), 46 Ir. L. T. 202). FLETCHER MOULTON, L.J., agreed, and added 
 his own opinion that "you cannot consider an employment suitable 
 that a reasonably careful man desirous of earning his living is entitled 
 to reject because it exposes him to risks so serious in their conse- 
 quences that he feels he is not doing his duty to himself and his 
 family in encountering them" ([1910] 1 K. B. p. 700). BUCKLEY, 
 L.J., thougKt that the question is a mixed question of fact and law. 
 A refusal of an offer of suitable work at the old rate of wages in a 
 branch business of the employers in another town was held, in 
 Ireland, to justify a reduction of compensation to a nominal sum 
 (Wallis & Sons v. M l Neice (1912), 46 Ir. L. T. 202). 
 
 Ability to do "Light Work" Onus of Proof. The onus of 
 
 proving that the workman is capable of doing " light work " lies upon 
 the employer alleging it. It seems that if the effect of the injury is 
 to leave the workman in such a condition as to be a nondescript or 
 " odd lot " in the labour market, or to be so limited in the range of 
 his possible occupation as to make his engagement therein highly 
 improbable or difficult, the employer ought to show what particular 
 light work the man could do and that he could get it in his present 
 condition in the labour market (Proctor <$ Sons v. Robinson (1909), 
 3 B. W. C. C. 41, and now reported, [1911] 1 K. B. 1004, and see 
 W.C.A. M 
 
162 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. I. (4) 
 
 Bryce <t Co. v. O'Connor (1904), 7 F. 193) ; but that if the physical 
 condition of the workman is such as to leave open to him the whole 
 field of " light labour," it is sufficient to prove this only (Cardiff 
 Corporation v. Hall, [1911] 1 K. B. 1009 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 159; Guest, 
 Keen & Nettle/olds, Limited v. Winsper (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 289; 
 and see in Scotland Carlin v. A. Stephen & Sons, Limited (1911), 
 48 S. L. E. 862 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 486). 
 
 Evidence of the amount that can be earned in light work does not 
 seem necessary, but the arbitrator must make the best estimate he 
 can for the purpose of deciding the amount of reduction (see Cardiff 
 Corporation v. Hall, supra, and Carlin v. A. Stephen & Sons, Limited, 
 supra) ; and for this purpose may act upon his general knowledge of 
 the labour market, the conditions of any particular trade and the like 
 (Roberts & Ruthven, Limited v. Hall (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 331). 
 
 Reduction of compensation is justified when the employer has 
 offered light work and the workman has refused it (McNamara & Co., 
 Limited v. Burtt (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 151) ; and where the man is 
 capable of light work but has never attempted to obtain it, and 
 although there was no evidence of an offer of light work or that it 
 was obtainable (Anglo -Australian Steam Navigation Co., Limited \. 
 Richards (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 247). 
 
 Supplementary Action. A workman who has received or is re- 
 ceiving compensation cannot sue for any of his wages during the 
 period of incapacity (Elliott v. Liggens, [1902] 2 K. B. 84 ; 4 W. C. C. 
 11). But it seems that he may sue on a contract which only becomes 
 operative on the happening of the accident. Thus, a workman 
 claimed the value of an allowance of coal which according to a custom 
 of the colliery district was due to him during incapacity through 
 accident. He alleged that he was entitled to a load of coal for every 
 twenty-four hours while at work, and a load every five weeks during 
 incapacity caused by accident. He was paid compensation under the 
 Act, but claimed in an action the coal or its value. It was held that 
 he was not barred by the Act from bringing his action (Simmonds v. 
 Stourbridge Brick and Fire Clay Co., Limited, [1910] 2 K. B. 
 269). 
 
 Compensation to " Insured Person." As to the effect of this 
 under the National Insurance Act, 1911, see Appendix A, p. 207, x>ost. 
 
 [PRELIMINARY MEDICAL EXAMINATION.] 
 
 (4) Where a workman has given notice of an accident, he 
 shall, if so required by the employer, submit himself for 
 examination by a duly qualified medical practitioner pro- 
 vided and paid by the employer, and, if he refuses to submit 
 himself to such examination, or in any way obstructs the 
 same, his right to compensation, and to take or prosecute 
 
Sched. I. (5)] PAYMENT OF DEATH CLAIMS. 163 
 
 any proceeding under this Act in relation to compensation, 
 shall be suspended until such examination has taken place. 
 
 Preliminary Medical Examination. Only the employer to whom 
 
 notice of accident has been given can require the workman to undergo 
 this preliminary examination. This will include the "principal" 
 under s. 4 of the Act if the workman claims, or takes proceedings, 
 against him, because, by that section, all provisions relating to the 
 employer are to relate to " the principal " under such circumstances. 
 
 Employers may require the workman to submit himself to this 
 examination where he has started proceedings without giving notice 
 of accident ; and the arbitrator has no jurisdiction (except, perhaps, 
 in very special cases) to impose any terms on the employers as a 
 condition of the workman being bound to do so, e.g. by requiring the 
 employers to pay a fee for the attendance of a medical man on behalf 
 of the workman (Osborn v. Viewers, Sons and Maxim, [1900] 2 Q. B. 
 91 ; 2 W. C. C. 130). So it has been held in Scotland that, except 
 in special circumstances, the workman cannot insist on his own 
 medical man being present at the examination (Morgan v. Dixon, 
 Limited, [1911] S. C. 408 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 363). This decision was 
 upheld in the House of Lords, where it was held that there is no 
 absolute right in the workman to have the attendance of his medical 
 man, and that the question whether his refusal without such attendance 
 is reasonable or not is a question of fact (ibid., [1912] A. C. 74 ; 5 
 B. W. C. C. 184). 
 
 By paragraph (15) the preliminary examination is to be made in 
 accordance with regulations to be made by the Secretary of State. 
 It must be at reasonable hours (see Appendix E, p. 346, post). For 
 further provisions as to medical examinations, including the prelimi- 
 nary one, see pp. 168-172, post. 
 
 " Shall be Suspended." Not only are his rights to compensation 
 and to take proceedings suspended, but he also forfeits all com- 
 pensation in respect of the period of suspension (Sched. I. (20)). 
 
 Procedure. -The application to stay proceedings or to suspend 
 weekly payments under this paragraph is regulated by W. C. B. 55. 
 
 [PAYMENT OF DEATH CLAIMS.] 
 
 (5) The payment in the case of death shall, unless other- 
 wise ordered as hereinafter provided, be paid into the county 
 court, and any sum so paid into court shall, subject to rules 
 of court and the provisions of this Schedule, be invested, 
 applied, or otherwise dealt with by the court in such manner 
 as the court in its discretion thinks fit for the benefit of the 
 persons entitled thereto under this Act, and the receipt of 
 
164 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. I. (5) 
 
 the registrar of the court shall be a sufficient discharge in 
 respect of the amount paid in : 
 
 Provided that, if so agreed, the payment in case of death 
 shall, if the workman leaves no dependants, be made to his 
 legal personal representative, or, if he has no such representa- 
 tive, to the person to whom the expenses of medical attendance 
 and burial are due. 
 
 "Unless otherwise ordered as hereinafter provided." This 
 
 refers to the provisions in Sched. II. (16), which enable the Secretary 
 of State by order to confer powers on committees (see p. 202, post}. 
 It is not thought that these words apply to Sched. II. (14), so as to 
 justify the payment of an agreed death claim to dependants directly 
 and without payment into court. 
 
 " Shall be Invested," etc. As to the manner of investment, see 
 paragraphs (10) (13) of this Schedule. A sum ordered to be invested 
 for the benefit of the person entitled is subject to the powers of the 
 court to vary the order (Sched. I., paragraph 9), so the beneficiary 
 has not an absolute title to it and cannot assign it (Ivey v. Ivey, 
 [1912] 2 K. B. 118 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 279). 
 
 " For the Benefit of the Persons entitled." It was held under 
 
 paragraph (6) of the former Schedule that the arbitrator had no power 
 to direct payment of the compensation in such a way as to exclude 
 some of the dependants, unless such persons were sui juris and assented 
 to this course (Manchester v. Carlton Iron Co., Limited (1904), 89 
 L. T. 730 ; 6 W. C. C. 135) ; and there does not seem to be power 
 under this paragraph to do so. But having made an order applying 
 the money "for the benefit of the persons entitled thereto under this 
 Act," power is given by paragraph (9), p. 166, post, to vary such order 
 from tune to tune as circumstances may warrant. 
 
 In a county court it was held that though a dependant was barred 
 from taking proceedings by reason of failure to make a claim within 
 the prescribed period of time, he was still able, as a person entitled, 
 to claim against the compensation when that had been ascertained 
 (Smith v. Pearson and Shipley (1909), 2 B. W. C. C. 468). 
 
 A division of money between two illegitimate inf ants was refused by 
 a county court judge, because if one died during infancy its share would 
 devolve to the Crown. The money was kept in court and invested in 
 a joint account (SMpper v. Nicholson (1909), 127 L. T. Newsp.202). 
 
 The Proviso. This refers to the sum not exceeding .10 which is 
 to be paid for medical and funeral expenses under Sched. I. (1) (a) (iii), 
 p. 153, ante. As to when such sum is not payable under the Act in 
 the case of seamen, see s. 7, and p. 98, ante. 
 
Sched. I. (6, 7)] POWER TO ORDER WEEKLY PAYMENTS. 165 
 
 Weekly Payments in Court The provisions of this paragraph 
 apply when weekly payments are ordered to be paid into court, for 
 which see paragraph (7). 
 
 Redemption of Weekly Payments. The provisions of this para- 
 graph, and of Eules 56A and 56s framed under it, are also applied to 
 the investment and application of lump sums paid for the redemption 
 of weekly payments (W. C. E. 59). 
 
 Procedure. W. C. E. 56A and 56s, pp. 237, 238, post, relate to 
 payment into court, investment, and application of payment in case 
 of death. The latter Eule applies when liability is admitted, but the 
 amount is not ascertained. A new Eule, 56c, applies when liability 
 is denied (see p. 240). Under these Eules the registrar may consider 
 whether the amount paid in is adequate, and for this purpose may 
 make inquiries and obtain such information as he can (W. C. E. 56 B. 
 (3), 56 c. (3)). It seems that medical reports obtained by employers 
 are privileged and that the registrar is not entitled to demand their 
 production (see Johnson v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., Limited 
 (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 332, per BUCKLEY, L.J.). 
 
 There is no need, and it is not proper, to make the employer a 
 party to proceedings for the distribution of the money which has 
 been agreed as the proper sum and has been paid into court. Upon 
 such payment the employer has no interest in the matter (Rhodes v. 
 Soothill Wood Colliery Co., Limited, [1909] 1 K. B. 191 ; 2 B. W. 
 C. C. 377). In the absence of a corresponding Eule in Ireland it was 
 held that where the employers agreed as to the amount payable on a 
 death claim, and were desirous of paying it into court, an award made 
 in arbitration proceedings commenced after such agreement should be 
 set aside, and the matter remitted for the purpose of obtaining an 
 order to bring the money into court to the credit of the applicants 
 and respondents and for the purpose of distributing the same (Harland 
 and Wolff v. Radcliffe (1909), 43 Ir. L. T. 166 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 374). 
 
 [TRANSFER OF MONEY FROM ONE COURT TO ANOTHER.] 
 
 (6) Eules of court may provide for the transfer of money 
 paid into court under this Act from one court to another, 
 whether or not the court from which it is to be transferred 
 is in the same part of the United Kingdom as the court to 
 which it is to be transferred. 
 
 Procedure. See W. C. E. 76, p. 250, post. 
 
 [POWER TO ORDER WEEKLY PAYMENTS INTO COURT.] 
 
 (7) Where a weekly payment is payable under this Act 
 to a person under any legal disability, a county court may, 
 
166 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. I. (8, 9) 
 
 on application being made in accordance with rules of court, 
 order that the weekly payment be paid during the disability 
 into court, and the provisions of this Schedule with respect 
 to sums required by this Schedule to be paid into court 
 shall apply to sums paid into court in pursuance of any 
 such order. 
 
 Application of Other Provisions. The provisions of the Schedule 
 relating to the payment of death claims are to apply to payments into 
 court under this paragraph. These provisions will be found in para- 
 graphs (5), (9), and (10) (18). 
 
 Procedure. See W. C. R. 57, p. 240, post. 
 
 [DETERMINING DEPENDANTS AND THEIR SHARES.] 
 
 (8) Any question as to who is a dependant shall, in default 
 of agreement, be settled by arbitration under this Act, or, if 
 not so settled before payment into court under this Schedule, 
 shall be settled by the county court, and the amount payable 
 to each dependant shall be settled by arbitration under this 
 Act, or, if not so settled before payment into court under 
 this Schedule, by the county court. Where there are both 
 total and partial dependants nothing in this Schedule shall 
 be construed as preventing the compensation being allotted 
 partly to the total and partly to the partial dependants. 
 
 Procedure for Settling Questions. If, before the compensation 
 money has been paid into court, a dispute arises either as to who are 
 dependants or as to the amount of their respective shares, the 
 question is to be settled by arbitration in any of the methods provided 
 by Sched. II. (1) (3). See also Sched. II. (16) as to the powers of 
 committees. 
 
 If the dispute arises after the money has been paid into court, the 
 judge will settle it, presumably as arbitrator under the Act. 
 
 " Payment into Court under this Schedule." See para- 
 graph (5). 
 
 Procedure. See W. C. E. 5, p. 211, post. 
 
 [POWER OF COURT TO VARY ORDERS.] 
 
 (9) Where, on application being made in accordance with 
 rules of court, it appears to a county court that, on account 
 
Sched. I. (10, 11)] PROVISIONS AS TO INVESTING MONEYS. 167 
 
 of neglect of children on the part of a widow, or on account 
 of the variation of the circumstances of the various depen- 
 dants, or for any other sufficient cause, an order of the court 
 or an award as to the apportionment amongst the several 
 dependants of any sum paid as compensation, or as to the 
 manner in which any sum payable to any such dependant 
 is to be invested, applied, or otherwise dealt with, ought 
 to be varied, the court may make such order for the variation 
 of the former order or the award, as in the circumstances of 
 the case the court may think just. 
 
 Alteration. Formerly, the arbitrator having made an order had 
 no power to vary it (Manchester v. Carlton Iron Co., Limited (1904), 
 89 L. T. 730; 6 W. C. C. 135). 
 
 "Appears to a County Court." As to which court has jurisdic- 
 tion, see paragraph (11) of Sched. II., p. 199, post. 
 
 Variation of Circumstances. If a sum has been apportioned 
 between a widow and children and vested in a trustee for their benefit, 
 and the widow dies intestate, the court may vary the original order 
 so as to give the children the benefit of the residue of the widow's 
 portion (Ivey v. Ivey, [1912] 2 K. B. 118 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 279). 
 
 Weekly Payments in Court. By paragraph (7), p. 165, ante, 
 weekly payments may be ordered into court in cases where the 
 recipient is under legal disability, and paragraph (9) then applies. 
 
 Procedure. See W. C. K. 58, p. 240, post. 
 
 [PROVISIONS AS TO INVESTING MONEYS IN COURT.] 
 
 (10) Any sum which under this Schedule is ordered to be 
 invested may be invested in whole or in part in the Post 
 Office Savings Bank by the registrar of the county court in 
 his name as registrar. 
 
 (11) Any sum to be so invested may be invested in the 
 purchase of an annuity from the National Debt Commis- 
 sioners through the Post Office Savings Bank, or be accepted 
 by the Postmaster- General as a deposit in the name of the 
 registrar as such, and the provisions of any statute or regu- 
 lations respecting the limits of deposits in saving banks, and 
 the declaration to be made by a depositor, shall not apply to 
 such sums. 
 
168 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. I. (12-15) 
 
 (12) No part of any money invested in the name of the 
 registrar of any county court in the Post Office Savings 
 Bank under this Act shall be paid out, except upon authority 
 addressed to the Postmaster-General by the Treasury or, 
 subject to regulations of the Treasury, by the judge or 
 registrar of the county court. 
 
 (13) Any person deriving any benefit from any moneys 
 invested in a post office savings bank under the provisions 
 of this Act may, nevertheless, open an account in a post 
 office savings bank or in any other savings bank in his own 
 name without being liable to any penalties imposed by any 
 statute or regulations in respect of the opening of accounts 
 in two savings banks, or of two accounts in the same savings 
 bank. 
 
 "Under this Schedule ordered to be Invested." See para- 
 graphs (5), (7) and (9) of Sched. I. 
 
 [MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS DURING PAYMENTS.] 
 
 (14) Any workman receiving weekly payments under this 
 Act shall, if so required by the employer, from time to time 
 submit himself for examination by a duly qualified medical 
 practitioner provided and paid by the employer. If the 
 workman refuses to submit himself to such examination, or 
 in any way obstructs the same, his right to such weekly 
 payments shall be suspended until such examination has 
 taken place. 
 
 (15) A workman shall not be required to submit himself 
 for examination by a medical practitioner under paragraph (4) 
 or paragraph (14) of this Schedule otherwise than in accord- 
 ance with regulations made by the Secretary of State, or at 
 more frequent intervals than may be prescribed by those 
 regulations. 
 
 Where a workman has so submitted himself for examina- 
 tion by a medical practitioner, or has been examined by a 
 
Sched.I.(i5)] MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS DURING PAYMENTS. 169 
 
 medical practitioner selected by himself, and the employer 
 or the workman, as the case may be, has within six days 
 after such examination furnished the other with a copy of 
 the report of that practitioner as to the workman's condition, 
 then, in the event of no agreement being come to between 
 the employer and the workman as to the workman's condition 
 or fitness for employment, the registrar of a county court, on 
 application being made to the court by both parties, may, on 
 payment by the applicants of such fee not exceeding one 
 pound as may be prescribed, refer the matter to a medical 
 referee. 
 
 The medical referee to whom the matter is so referred 
 shall, in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary 
 of State, give a certificate as to the condition of the workman 
 and his fitness for employment, specifying, where necessary, 
 the kind of employment for which he is fit, and that 
 certificate shall be conclusive evidence as to the matters 
 so certified. 
 
 Where no agreement can be come to between the employer 
 and the workman as to whether or to what extent the 
 incapacity of the workman is due to the accident, the 
 provisions of this paragraph shall, subject to any regulations 
 made by the Secretary of State, apply as if the question were 
 a question as to the condition of the workman. 
 
 If a workman, on being required so to do, refuses to submit 
 himself for examination by a medical referee to whom the 
 matter has been so referred as aforesaid, or in any way 
 obstructs the same, his right to compensation and to take or 
 prosecute any proceeding under this Act in relation to com- 
 pensation, or, in the case of a workman in receipt of a weekly 
 payment, his right to that weekly payment, shall be suspended 
 until such examination has taken place. 
 
 Eules of court may be made for prescribing the manner in 
 which documents are to be furnished or served and applica- 
 tion made under this paragraph and the forms to be used for 
 
170 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. I. (15) 
 
 those purposes and, subject to the consent of the Treasury, 
 as to the fee to be paid under this paragraph. 
 
 " Receiving Weekly Payments." Paragraph (14) applies when 
 
 compensation is actually being paid. The right to have a preliminary 
 medical examination when notice of accident has been given has been 
 provided for in paragraph (4). 
 
 Required by the Employer. By virtue of the provisions of 
 
 s. 4 (p. 74, ante), the " principal" from whom the workman is claim- 
 ing compensation may require examinations under paragraphs (14) 
 and (15), as well as the preliminary examination under paragraph (4). 
 But such examination will be governed by the regulations framed 
 by the Secretary of State (Sched. I. (15), and see W. C. R. 82, p. 253, 
 post). For such regulations, see Appendix C, p. 325, post, and 
 Appendix E, p. 346, post. 
 
 " Provided and Paid by the Employer.' 1 See the case of Balrd 
 
 (C- Co., Limited v. Kane, infra, as to the right to have travelling 
 expenses paid. 
 
 " Refuses to Submit ... or Obstructs the Same." Absence 
 
 from the United Kingdom was, under the former Act, held to amount to 
 obstruction of an examination under such provisions (Finnic Son v. 
 Duncan (1904), 7 F. 254). But this case was distinguished in Em.nl 
 & Co., Limited v. Kane (1905), 7 F. 461, where the workman, having 
 gone to Ireland from Glasgow, offered to submit himself to a medi- 
 cal man near the place where he was residing in Ireland, but refused 
 to come to Glasgow for examination unless his expenses were 
 paid. It was said that it was the duty of the employer to select 
 a medical man within reasonable reach of the workman to be 
 examined. 
 
 It is expressly provided by Sched. I. (18) of this Act that a 
 workman ceases to be entitled to receive weekly payments when he 
 ceases to reside in the United Kingdom, unless a medical referee 
 certifies that the incapacity is likely to be of a permanent nature. 
 See p. 179, post. 
 
 A refusal to be examined by the employer's medical practitioner 
 except in the presence of his own medical man is not a refusal or 
 obstruction by the workman under this paragraph (Devitt v. Owners 
 of S.S. Bainbridge, [1909] 2 K. B. 802 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 383), nor is a 
 refusal to attend at the residence of the employer's medical man 
 accompanied by an offer to submit himself for examination at his 
 own doctor's (Harding v. Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. (1911), 
 4 B. W. C. C. 59) ; but a refusal by a workman to be examined, 
 except upon the condition that the examination takes place at his 
 solicitor's office, or in his solicitor's presence, is such a refusal 
 (Warby v. Plaistowe <6 Co. (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 67). 
 
 Suspension of Weekly Payments. No compensation is recover- 
 able at any time in respect of the period of suspension (Sched. I. 
 (20)). 
 
Sched. I. (15)] MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS DURING PAYMENT 171 
 
 Reference to Medical Referee. There was no obligation on the 
 workman under paragraph (11) of the former Schedule to submit himself 
 to a medical referee after going to the employer's medical practitioner 
 (Ncanle v. Nixons Navigation Co., Limited; Edwards v. Guest, Keen 
 and Nettle/olds, Limited, [1904] 1 K. B. 339 ; 6 W. C. C. 140 ; Niddrie 
 and Benhar Coal Co., Limited v. M'Kcvy (1903), 5 F. 1121 ; Stran- 
 nigan v. Baird & Co., Limited (1904), 6 F. 784, disapproving Davidson 
 v. Summerlee and Mossend Iron and Steel Co., Limited (1903), 5 F. 
 991, to the contrary). Under the new provision, the registrar may, on 
 application by both parties, and on payment by the applicants of a 
 fee to be prescribed, refer the matter to a medical referee. No 
 obligation, therefore, exists even under the new provisions, but their 
 utility lies in the fact that the medical referee's decision can be 
 obtained under them in a summary way, which was not pr eviously 
 available. On the other hand, if either party refuses to allow the 
 case to be sent to such a referee as provided, it will be disposed of by 
 the arbitrator, who will use his discretion in the matter by either 
 deciding it himself on evidence taken, with or without a medical 
 referee sitting as assessor, or by sending it to the medical referee. 
 
 The fee payable by the applicants above referred to is prescribed by 
 W. C. E. 54 (9), p. 236, post. They are not payable by French citizens, 
 see p. 349, post. 
 
 Effect of Submission to Medical Referee by Agreement. 
 
 Where both parties agree to submit the man's condition for the 
 report of a medical man they are bound by such report, and cannot 
 ask for the recording of a memorandum of agreement the effect of 
 which is destroyed by such report (Cunningham v. M'Naugliton and 
 Sinclair (1910), 47 S. L. R. 781 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 576, 577). 
 
 " On Application being made to the Court by both Parties." 
 
 The effect of this is not to settle the matter by agreement so as to 
 prevent an application for arbitration in a proper case (King v. United 
 Collieries, Limited, [1910] S. C. 42 ; and see infra). 
 
 Certificate shall be Conclusive Evidence. The judge cannot 
 
 entertain evidence contradicting the report (Sapcote & Sons v. Hancox 
 (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 184). Where the medical referee certified that 
 the workman " will never be able for any work for which unimpaired 
 vision is essential, but he is quite able to undertake his ordinary work 
 as a labourer," and the compensation was thereupon reduced, it was 
 held, on appeal, that the certificate was conclusive evidence that the 
 incapacity had ceased to the effect of disentitling him to a continu- 
 ance of the compensation at the then rate (Ferrier v. Gourlay Brothers 
 (1902), 4 F. 711; see also M'Avan v. Boase Spinning Co., Limited, 
 infra ; Bryce & Co. v. O'Connor, p. 162, ante}. 
 
 But it would appear that the certificate is conclusive solely as to the 
 condition when given, and that it does not prevent a future appli- 
 cation for compensation on the ground that incapacity has recurred 
 owing to the original injury, unless in the meantime the compensation 
 has been finally ended (King v. United Collieries, Limited, [1910] 
 S. C. 42 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 546) ; nor does it prevent an application for 
 
172 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. I. (16) 
 
 compensation, based upon the report, if the applicant thinks he can 
 show loss of earning power owing to the injury (Arnott v. Fife Coal 
 Co., Limited (1911), 48 S. L. E. 828; 4 B. W. C. C. 361), but he 
 must show this (Gray v. Shotts Iron Co., Limited (1912), 49 S. L. E. 
 906). If the workman proves incapacity posterior to the medical 
 certificate reporting complete recovery, the onus is on the workman to 
 show that the present incapacity is not due to some supervening cause 
 (McGhee v. Summerlee Iron Co., Limited (1911), 48 S. L. E. 807 ; 
 4 B. W. C. C. 424). 
 
 Question whether Incapacity due to the Accident. The 
 
 question whether the present incapacity is due to the accident is one 
 which may be determined by a medical referee, under the same 
 provisions as apply to questions as to the condition of the workman. 
 His report will, therefore, be conclusive in the former as well as in the 
 latter case. 
 
 In a Scottish case the medical referee's report was that, although 
 the workman was suffering from partial disability for work, such 
 disability was not connected with the injuries, but was " the result of 
 deficient natural vigour of constitution together with advancing years." 
 It was held (Lord YOUNG dissenting) that this was conclusive against 
 any further claim for compensation (M'Avan v. Boase Spinning Co., 
 Limited (1901), 3 F. 1048. See also Bryce & Co. v. O'Connor, 
 [1904] 7 F. 193). 
 
 Refusing or Obstructing Examination by a Medical Referee. 
 
 The same penalties attach as in refusing or obstructing examination 
 by the employer's medical practitioner, namely, suspension of all 
 rights to compensation, or to take proceedings under the Act, and, 
 further, forfeiture of all payments in respect of the period of 
 suspension (Sched. I. (20)). 
 
 See note "Refuses to Submit or Obstructs the Same," on p. 170, ante. 
 
 Procedure. The application to stay proceedings or to suspend 
 payments under paragraphs (14) and (15) is regulated by W. C. E. 55. 
 
 W. C. E. 54, p. 235, post, relates to applications for references to 
 medical referees, under paragraph (15) and the procedure thereon ; and 
 W. C. E. 82 (p. 253, post) makes further provisions for such references. 
 
 Regulations. The Eegulations will be found in Appendix C, 
 p. 325, post, and Appendix E, p. 346, post. 
 
 [BEVIEW OF WEEKLY PAYMENTS.] 
 
 (16) Any weekly payment may be reviewed at the request 
 either of the employer or of the workman, and on such 
 review may be ended, diminished, or increased, subject to 
 the maximum above provided, and the amount of payment 
 shall, in default of agreement, be settled by arbitration under 
 this Act : 
 
Sched. I. (16)] REVIEW OF WEEKLY PAYMENTS. 173 
 
 Provided that where the workman was at the date of the 
 accident under twenty-one years of age and the review takes 
 place more than twelve months after the accident, the amount 
 of the weekly payment may be increased to any amount not 
 exceeding fifty per cent, of the weekly sum which the work- 
 man would probably have been earning at the date of the 
 review if he had remained uninjured, but not in any case 
 exceeding one pound. 
 
 " Any Weekly Payment." These words mean any weekly pay- 
 ment in existence and not any payment awarded or fixed by agree- 
 ment (Nicholson v. Piper, p. 175, post : per COZENS-HARDY, L.J.). 
 
 Altering Basis of Original Calculation. If, on the original 
 application, the judge makes a mistake in fixing the amount of earnings 
 before the accident, he cannot rectify this mistake on an application 
 to review (Hains and Strange v. Corbet (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 372). 
 
 Change in Circumstances Necessary An application to review 
 cannot be entertained when there has been no change in the circum- 
 stances of the case since the weekly payments were awarded ; such 
 a course would amount to an appeal from the award (Crossfield d- Sons, 
 Limited v. Tanian, [1900] 2 Q. B. 629 ; 2 W. C. C. 141 ; and see 
 Cox v. Braithwaite and Kirk, 5 B. W. C. C. 648). 
 
 But evidence of a change of circumstances justifies an application 
 for review. There will be such a change of circumstances if the work- 
 man can show that by reason of his injury he has been unsuccessful 
 in his attempts to obtain employment (Sharman v. Holliday and 
 Greenwood, Limited, [1904] 1 K. B. 235 ; 6 W. C. C. 147 ; Macdonald 
 or Duris v. Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co., [1912] A. C. 513 ; 5 B. W. C. 0. 
 478, overruling Boag v. LocTfivood Collieries, Limited, [1910] S. C. 
 51 ; 3 B. W. -C. C. 549) ; or that the original award or decision or agree- 
 ment was based upon medical or other opinion which has since been 
 falsified (Mead v. LocJchart, Limited^ (1909), 2 B. W. C. C. 398; 
 Thranmere Bay Development Co., Limited v. Brennan (1909), 2 B. 
 W. C. C 403 ; Eadcliffe v. Pacific Steam Navigation Co., [1910] 
 1 K. B. 685 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 185 ; Walton v. South Kirby, Feather- 
 stone and Hemsworth Colliery Co., Limited, [1912] 5 B. W. C. C. 640 ; 
 Brown v. Thornycroft & Co., Limited (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 386; 
 and see the remarks of COLLINS, M.R., in Sharman v. Holliday and 
 Greenwood, supra) ; or that the original decision took into account 
 certain expenses which, owing to subsequent arrangements, no longer 
 exist (Taff Vale Bail. Co. v. Lane (No. 2) (1910), 3 B, W. C. C. 299). 
 
 Effect Of Application to Review. An application l?y employers 
 to review does not operate as, or entitle the employer to, a suspension 
 of weekly payments which are payable under an award or recorded 
 agreement (Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co., Limited v. Cqirnduff, [1911] 
 
174 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. I. (16) 
 
 S. C. 647) ; nor can the employer, if successful in obtaining a 
 reduction of weekly payments as from an anterior date, deduct from 
 future payments the amount by which the actual payments have 
 exceeded the amount of the payments so reduced (Hosegood v. Wilson, 
 [1911] 1 K. B. 30; 4 B. W. C. C. 30). His remedy, if any, is by 
 action (ibid.). 
 
 " When the Right to Review is Barred." A right to review is 
 
 barred by an agreement between the parties which arranges terms of 
 payment or ends it (Bradbury v Bedworth Coal and Iron Co., Times, 
 March 17th, 1900; 2 W. C. C. 138, considered in O'Callaghan v. 
 Martin (1904), 38 Ir. L. T. R. 152) ; but the mere fact that a workman 
 has gone back to work without anything being said on either side 
 amounting to an agreement that no further compensation shall be 
 paid does not justify a finding that the workman has abandoned his 
 right to compensation for all time (Williams v. Vauxhall Colliery 
 Co., Limited, [1907] 2 K. B. 433 ; 9 W. C. C. 120) ; nor, in a case 
 where a workman has been permanently injured, e.g. by the loss of an 
 eye, does the fact of his resuming work at his original wages amount 
 to an estoppel, so as to disentitle him to an award for a nominal sum 
 (Caiudor and Garnant Collieries, Limited v. Jones (1909), 3 B. W. 
 C. C. 59). See generally as to the effect of an agreement on the rights 
 of either party under the Act, p. 53, ante. 
 
 The right is also barred by an order which in effect puts an end to 
 the workman's claim to compensation (Nicholson v. Piper, [1907] 
 A. C. 215 ; 9 W. C. G. 123 ; Taylor v. L. N. W. R. Co., [1912] A. C. 
 242 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 218 ; and see Cadenhead v. Ailsa Shipbuilding 
 Co., Limited (1910), 47 S. L. R. 784). 
 
 " May be Ended, Diminished," etc. The principles upon which 
 
 the review is made are the same as those under which compensation 
 for disablement is originally granted (see pp. 157-162, ante). 
 
 The order may be made to date from the date of the application to 
 review or at any subsequent date up to the hearing (Morton & Co., 
 Limited v. Woodward, [1902] 2 K. B. 276 ; 4 W. C. C. 143), but not 
 from a date antecedent to the date of the application, unless the 
 application expressly asks this (Upper Forest and Western Steel and 
 Tinplate Co., Limited v. Thomas, [1909] 2 K. B. 631 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 
 414; Charing Cross, Euston, and Hampstead Hail Go. v. Boots, 
 [1909] 2 K. B. 640 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 385) ; nor from a future date 
 (Baker v. Jewell, [1910] 2 K. B. 673 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 503 ; Allan v. 
 Thomas Spowart & Co., Limited (1906), 8 F. 811) ; nor may the order 
 be based (except by consent) on a sliding scale according to actual 
 future earnings (Newhouse & Co. v. Johnson (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 137). 
 
 In Scotland it is decided that in the case of a recorded agreement 
 or award made, the arbiter may vary the agreement or award from 
 the date of the application, but not from an earlier date (Donaldson 
 Bros. v. Cowan, [1909] 46 S. L. R. 920 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 390 ; over- 
 ruling Steel v. Oakbank Oil Co., Limited (1902), 5 F. 963 ; Pumpherston 
 Oil Co., Limited v. Cavaney (1903), 5 F. 963 ; Baird & Co., Limited 
 v. Stevenson, [1907] S. C. 1259) ; but that where no agreement is 
 
Sched. I. (16)] EKVIEW OF WEEKLY PAYMENTS. 175 
 
 recorded or award made the compensation may be terminated as from 
 the date when incapacity ceased (Southhook Fireclay Co., Limited v. 
 Laughland, [1908] S. C. 831; 1 B. W. C. C. 405). 
 
 Permanent or Temporary Ending of Payments. The order 
 
 terminating weekly payments may be permanent or temporary ( Taylor 
 v. L. N. W. R. Co., [1907] A. C. 242 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 218 ; Nicholson 
 v. Piper, [1907] A. C. 215; 9 W. C. C. 123). If the former, the 
 award should declare the payments to be ended, and, technically, it 
 is erroneous to order the agreement (if any) to be terminated, though 
 the effect is the same (Taylor v. L. N. W. R. Co., supra). If the latter, 
 the order may direct the payment to be ended until further order, or 
 may award a nominal payment to keep the matter alive (ibid.). 
 
 A full Court of Session formerly decided that an interim nominal 
 award could not be made if either party objected (Rosie v. Mackay, 
 [1910] S. C. 714, approving Clelland v. Singer Manufacturing Co. 
 (1905), 7 F. 975, which disapproved Farrier v. Gourlay Bros. (1902), 
 4 F. 711, to the contrary), but since Taylor v. L. N. W. R. Co., this 
 decision cannot stand (Weir v. North Brit. Rail. Co. (1912), 49 S. L. E. 
 772). 
 
 An award temporarily ending or suspending payments should be 
 made where the workman is earning as much as before the accident, 
 and the chances of subsequent incapacity are not negatived (Pomplirey 
 v. Southward Press, [1901] 1 K. B. 86 ; 3 W. C. C. 194 ; Owners of 
 S.S. Tynron v. Morgan, [1909] 2 K. B. 66 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 406 ; Griga 
 v. Owners of 8. Harelda (1910), 26 T. L. R. 272 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 116). 
 
 An award permanently ending payments may be, and ought to be 
 (Husband v. Campbell (1903), 40 8. L. R. 822), made when the work- 
 man has fully recovered from the effects of the accident without any 
 likelihood of their recurrence (London and N. W. R. Co. v. Taylor 
 (1910), 4B. W. C. C. 11, affirmed [1912] A. C. 242; 5 B. W. C. C. 
 218; Nicholson v. Piper, supra; Reyners, Limited v. MaJcin (1911), 
 4 B. W. C. C. 267 ; Cranfield v. Ansell (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 57) ; or 
 where the subsequent developments have no connection with the 
 accident (Haxgreave v. Haughhead Coal Co., Limited, [1912] A. C. 
 319; 5 B. W. C. C. 445); but not where the arbitrator finds the 
 possibility of future incapacity and ignores it on the ground that it 
 can be prevented by an operation (Braitliwaite v. Kirk and Cox 
 (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 77). 
 
 Whether payments should be permanently terminated or a suspen- 
 sory award made is a question of fact, and the Court of Appeal will 
 not disturb the decision if there be evidence to support it (Emmerson 
 v. Donkin & Co. (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 74 ; Edmondsons, Limited, v. 
 Parker (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 70; Jones v. Tirdonkin Colliery Co. 
 (1911), ibid. 3 ; Parry v. Eliymney Iron and Coal Co., Limited 
 (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 632). 
 
 Care should be taken in making a suspensory award that it should 
 not be used as a means of extorting money from the emplovers 
 (Goodall (6 Clarke v. Kramer (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 317). 
 
 .Review of Payments under Agreements. Where employers 
 
176 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. I. (ifi) 
 
 have stopped payments made under an unrecorded agreement, they 
 are entitled to a review in order to terminate the compensation or 
 to have it reduced, even though at the time of such application 
 payments are not in fact being made (Nelson v. Summerlie Iron 
 Co., Limited, [1910] S. C. 360; following Southhook Fireclay Co., 
 Limited v. Laugliland, supra; and the dictum to the contrary hi 
 Lochgelly Iron and Coal Co., Limited v. Sinclair, [1909] S. C. 922 
 at p. 931, not assented to). 
 
 Where the agreement to pay compensation has been recorded the 
 onus of proving that the workman has recovered from his injuries is 
 upon the employer, and he must prove it affirmatively (M'Callum 
 v. Quinn, [1909] S. C. 227 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 339). 
 
 " The Weekly Sum which the Workman would probably have 
 
 been Earning." These words do not limit the inquiry to what the 
 workman would have been earning in the same employment under the 
 same employer (Vickers, Sons, & Maxim, Limited v. Evans, [19101 
 A. C. 444; 3 B. W. C. C. 405, affirming [1910] 1 K. B. 554; 3 B. 
 W. C. C. 126). 
 
 Further, these words are an addition to paragraph (3) of the 
 Schedule, and the amount awardable is not limited to the difference 
 between what the workman was earning before and able to earn after 
 the accident. In applying the proviso to paragraph (3) it appears 
 to be necessary to substitute " probable earnings " for the words 
 " earnings before the accident " in that paragraph (Edwards v. Alyn 
 Steel Tinplate Co., Limited (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 141). 
 
 The Court of Session have also held that where a workman under 
 twenty- one returns to work with his employers at the same rate of 
 wages' as before the accident, that fact does not entitle the employers 
 to have the compensation declared at an end, but the arbitrator should 
 consider all the circumstances to see whether the workman's earning 
 capacity was the same as or less than it would have been if he had 
 not been injured (Bowliill Coal Co. v. Malcolm, (Xo. 2) (1910), 47 
 S. L. R. 449 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 562). 
 
 Under the proviso the workman cannot get more than 50 per cent, 
 of the probable earnings (Ambridge and Good (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 
 691). 
 
 Costs. The county court judge has no jurisdiction to give a 
 general direction to the registrar, that the costs of all applications 
 under this paragraph are to be treated as mere interlocutory applica- 
 tions in the matter of the arbitration, and not as an original arbitra- 
 tion or proceeding (Rigby & Co. v. Cox, [1904] 2 K. B. 208 ; 6 W. C. 
 C. 161). 
 
 Review after Award by Committee. A county court judge has 
 
 jurisdiction to review weekly payments ordered by the award of a 
 committee, provided that the workman has given notice in writing 
 objecting to the committee dealing with the matter of review (R. v. 
 Templer, Ex parte Howarth, [1912] 1 K. B. 351 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 242 ; 
 affirmed, [1912] 2 K. B. 444 ; 5 B. W.C. C. 455). 
 
Sched. I. (17)] EEDEMPTION OF WEEKLY PAYMENTS. 177 
 
 Procedure. For form of application to review, see W. C. E. 
 Form 5, p. 264, post. 
 
 [EEDEMPTION OF WEEKLY PAYMENTS.] 
 
 (17) Where any weekly payment has been continued for 
 not less than six months, the liability therefor may, on 
 application by or on behalf of the employer, be redeemed by 
 the payment of a lump sum of such an amount as, where 
 the incapacity is permanent, would, if invested in the pur- 
 chase of an immediate life annuity from the National Debt 
 Commissioners through the Post Office Savings Bank, pur- 
 chase an annuity for the workman equal to seventy-five per 
 cent, of the annual value of the weekly payment, and as in 
 any other case may be settled by arbitration under this Act, 
 and such lump sum may be ordered by the committee or 
 arbitrator or judge of the county court to be invested or 
 otherwise applied for the benefit of the person entitled 
 thereto: Provided that nothing in this paragraph shall be 
 construed as preventing agreements being made for the 
 redemption of a weekly payment by a lump sum. 
 
 Redemption of Weekly Payments. It will be noticed that the em- 
 ployer alone has power to apply for a redemption of the weekly payments. 
 Subject to the time condition, he has an absolute right to redeem 
 (Kendall & Gent, Limited v. Pennington (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 335). 
 
 Such payments may be commuted by an agreement or by arbitra- 
 tion. In the latter case, the assessment of the amount depends upon 
 whether the incapacity is permanent or not. 
 
 The sum paid by way of redemption is as absolutely protected as 
 are the weekly payments themselves (Sched. I. (19)). 
 
 A " principal " under s. 4 of the Act has, by virtue of that section, 
 the rights of an employer to require redemption ; and probably a 
 stranger, required by s. 6 to indemnify the employer, would have a 
 right to redemption through the employer, if, indeed, the words " on 
 behalf of the employer" would not enable him to obtain it in his 
 own name. 
 
 " Not Less than Six Months." If the workman agrees to 
 the application being heard within this period it is a consent order 
 from which there is no appeal (Hoiuell v. BlackiveWs Executors (1912), 
 5 B. W. C. C. 293). 
 
 W.C.A. K 
 
178 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. I. (17) 
 " Where the Incapacity is Permanent." In such a case there is 
 
 no room for arbitration, but the amount is fixed according to the scale 
 mentioned, and for this see Appendix H, p. 350, post. But this scale 
 should not be regarded unless the arbitrator is satisfied that the 
 incapacity is permanent (Sivannick v. Trustees of the Congested Dis- 
 tricts Board for Ireland (1912), 46 Ir. L. T. 253). 
 
 It should be noticed that there is no provision that the permanent 
 incapacity is to be total. It may be partial (Calico Printers' Associa- 
 tion, Limited v. Higham, [1912] 1 K. B. 93 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 97. Where a 
 workman had lost an arm, the arbitrator on application for redemption 
 fixed an amount as a lump sum on the footing of permanent incapacity 
 without inquiring whether the workman was capable of working or of 
 earning anything, and the Court of Session, by a majority, held that 
 in so doing he had not exceeded his powers (National Telephone Co., 
 Limited v. Smith (1909), 46 S. L. E. 988 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 417). The 
 Court of Appeal have disagreed with this decision. In their view a 
 preliminary inquiry should be made in order to ascertain whether the 
 incapacity will continue during the remainder of the workman's life, 
 and before an award based upon permanent incapacity can be made 
 there must be evidence that such incapacity is permanent (Calico 
 Printers' Association, Limited v. Higham, supra ; Staveley Coal and 
 Iron Co. v. Elson (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 301). 
 
 In other Cases when not Agreed. Here the matter is to be 
 
 determined by arbitration. 
 
 No maximum limit is placed upon the amount which the 
 arbitrator may award, and an employer cannot, when applying for the 
 redemption, fetter the discretion of the arbitrator by fixing a maximum 
 sum as a limit to his application (Castle Spinning Co., Limited v. 
 Atkinson, [1905] 1 K. B. 336 ; 7 W. C. C. 124). 
 
 Commutation based upon the actuarial value of weekly payments, 
 less a deduction in respect of the contingency of his dying at an 
 earlier age than the average of human life contemplated in the 
 actuarial value, was confirmed by the Court of Appeal (Pattinson v. 
 Stevenson (1900), 109 L. T. Newsp., p. 106; 2 W. C. C. 156; C. A., 
 June 30th, 1900, but not reported). 
 
 According to the opinion of His Honour Judge PARRY, the amount 
 by way of redemption should not be based on the actuarial value, but 
 on a common-sense business basis (Grant and Aldcroft v. Conroy 
 (1904), 6 W. C. C. 153). 
 
 Under the original Act it was held to be erroneous to value the 
 amount of redemption by estimating the sum that would be awarded 
 as damages at the time of the accident, and then to deduct the weekly 
 payments, giving an award for the balance (Victor Mill, Limited v. 
 ShacUeton, [1912] 1 K. B. 22 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 30). It seems that under 
 the present Act, also, all that the arbitrator has to do is to assess the 
 amount of redemption money as from the date when the application 
 to redeem is made. 
 
 Redemption by Agreement. This right is preserved, but such an 
 agreement must be registered, otherwise the employer is not exonerated 
 
Sched. I. (18)] WORKMAN BESIDING ABROAD. 179 
 
 from continuing the weekly payments, unless he proves that the 
 failure to register was not due to any neglect or default on his part 
 (Sched. II. (10)). 
 
 Redemption under the Act Of 1897. Where payments are being 
 made in respect of accidental injuries sustained before July 1st, 1907, 
 their redemption is effected under the provisions of the original Act 
 (see W. C. A., 1906, s. 16 (1)). The method to be adopted is clearly 
 stated by FARWELL, L. J., in Victor Mitt, Limited v. Shackleton, supra. 
 
 Procedure. For form of application, see W. C. E., Form 5, 
 p. 264, post. As to the investment and application of a lump sum 
 paid in redemption of weekly payments, see W. C. E. 59. The 
 provisions of paragraph (5) of this Schedule and of Eule* 56 are 
 thereby applied. 
 
 It has been held by the Court of Appeal in Ireland that an 
 employer may discontinue his proceedings for redemption at any 
 time as in the case of other proceedings, subject, of course, to the 
 payment of costs (Dixon v. Patten (1905), 120 L. T. Newsp. 170). 
 
 See as to redemption in the case of French citizens, W. C. E. 91, 
 p. 255, post, and Appendix G, p. 348, post. 
 
 [WORKMAN EESIDING ABROAD.] 
 
 (18) If a workman receiving a weekly payment ceases to 
 reside in the United Kingdom, he shall thereupon cease to 
 be entitled to receive any weekly payment, unless the 
 medical referee certifies that the incapacity resulting from 
 the injury is likely to be of a permanent nature. If the 
 medical referee so certifies, the workman shall be entitled to 
 receive quarterly the amount of the weekly payments 
 accruing due during the preceding quarter so long as he 
 proves, in such manner and at such intervals as may be pre- 
 scribed by rules of court, his identity and the continuance of the 
 incapacity in respect of which the weekly payment is payable. 
 
 French Citizens. See as to these, the Order in Council (paragraph 
 6) under the Workmen's Compensation (Anglo-French Convention) 
 Act, 1909, Appendix G, p. 348, post, and W. C. E. 91-93, p. 255, post. 
 
 Procedure. W. C. E. 60 relates to the procedure to be adopted 
 when a workman intends to cease to reside in the United Kingdom, 
 and desires to have payments remitted to him. 
 
 Regulations. See Eegulations, Appendix C, p. 325, post. 
 
180 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. I. (19-21) 
 
 [PROVISION AGAINST CHARGING, ETC. PAYMENTS.] 
 
 (19) A weekly payment, or a sum paid by way of redemp- 
 tion thereof, shall not be capable of being assigned, charged, 
 or attached, and shall not pass to any other person by 
 operation of law, nor shall any claim be set off against the 
 
 same. 
 
 i 
 
 Employer's Costs. An employer cannot set off against com- 
 pensation a sum awarded as expenses against a workman in an appli- 
 cation ipr diminution of weekly payments (Rose well Gas Coal Co., 
 Limited v. M' Vicar (1904), 7 F. 290); but a workman may consent 
 to his landlord employer deducting his rent from the weekly payments 
 (Brown v. S. E. & C. R. Co.'* Managing Committee (1910), 3 B. W. 
 C. C. 428). 
 
 Excess Payments. Where weekly payments have been reduced 
 as from an antecedent date, and the employer between that date and 
 the date of the order for reduction has made the higher rate of 
 payment, he cannot claim to apply the excess payments in part 
 payment of the future reduced sums (Hosegood & Sons v. Wilson, 
 [1911] 1 K. B. 30; 4 B. W. C. C. 30), though possibly he has a right 
 of action for the overpayments (ibid). 
 
 Deductions under National Insurance Act, 1911. Advanced 
 benefits may be deducted under this Act : see Appendix A, p. 207, post. 
 
 [No COMPENSATION FOR PERIOD OF SUSPENSION.] 
 
 (20) Where under this schedule a right to compensation 
 is suspended no compensation shall be payable in respect of 
 the period of suspension. 
 
 Suspension of Right to Compensation. This is made the penalty 
 
 for refusing or obstructing a medical examination under Sched. I., 
 paragraphs (4), (14), (15). 
 
 [CERTIFIED SCHEMES AND FRIENDLY SOCIETIES.] 
 
 (21) Where a scheme certified under this Act provides 
 for payment of compensation by a friendly society, the 
 provisions of the proviso to the first sub-section of section 
 eight, section sixteen, and section forty-one of the Friendly 
 Societies Act, 1896, shall not apply to such society in respect 
 of such scheme. 
 
Sched. II. (I, 2)] ARBITRATION. 181 
 
 Friendly Societies Act, 1896 (59 & 60 Viet. c. 25) .--The 
 
 proviso referred to is one which forbids a friendly society, which 
 contracts with any person for the assurance of an annuity exceeding 
 50 per annum, or of a gross sum exceeding 200, to be registered 
 under the Act (s. 8 (1)). Section 16 refers to a friendly society assuring 
 a certain annuity, and forbids its registry, unless the tables of con- 
 tributions for the assurance, certified by the actuary to the National 
 Debt Commissioners, or by some actuary approved by the Treasury, 
 are sent to the registrar with the application for registry. Section 41 
 limits the amount which a member of a society or societies may 
 receive from it or them. This section and the above-mentioned sub- 
 section have been amended by the Friendly Societies Act, 1908 
 (8 Edw. 7, c. 32). 
 
 [APPLICATION OF ACT TO IRELAND.] 
 
 (22) In the application of this Act to Ireland the 
 provisions of the County Officers and Courts (Ireland) Act, 
 1877, with respect to money deposited in the Post Office 
 Savings Bank under that Act shall apply to money 
 invested in the Post Office Savings Bank under this Act. 
 
 SECOND SCHEDULE. 
 
 ARBITRATION, ETC. 
 
 (1) For the purpose of settling any matter which under 
 this Act is to be settled by arbitration, if any committee, 
 representative of an employer and his workmen, exists with 
 power to settle matters under this Act in the case of the 
 employer and workmen, the matter shall, unless either party 
 objects by notice in writing sent to the other party before 
 the committee meet to consider the matter, be settled by the 
 arbitration of such committee, or be referred by them in their 
 discretion to arbitration as herein-after provided. 
 
 (2) If either party so objects, or there is no such committee, 
 or the committee so refers the matter or fails to settle the 
 matter within six months, from, the date of the claim, the. 
 
182 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. II. (3) 
 
 matter shall be settled by a single arbitrator agreed on by 
 the parties, or in the absence of agreement by the judge of 
 the county court, according to the procedure prescribed by 
 rules of court. 
 
 (3) In England the matter, instead of being settled by 
 the judge of the county court, may, if the Lord Chancellor 
 so authorises, be settled according to the like procedure, by 
 a single arbitrator appointed by that judge, and the arbitrator 
 so appointed shall, for the purposes of this Act, have all the 
 powers of that judge. 
 
 Kinds of Arbitrators. There are four possible kinds of arbi- 
 trators : (1) A representative committee ; (2) an agreed arbitrator ; 
 (3) the county court judge ; and (4) an arbitrator appointed by a 
 county court judge. 
 
 Committee as Arbitrator. Authority is given to the Secretary 
 of State to confer upon committees in respect of any matter in which 
 they act as arbitrators the powers conferred by the Act exclusively on 
 county courts and judges of county courts. See Sched. II. (16). 
 
 The appointment of a committee representative of an employer and 
 his workman, referred to in paragraph (1), and the making of an award 
 by them, does not amount to a contracting out of the Act, or to a 
 scheme which requires to be certified under s. 3 of the Act. It is 
 machinery for giving effect to the provisions of the Act, and so long 
 as the committee exercise their powers in accordance with the pro- 
 visions of the Act. their award cannot be interfered with by a county 
 court judge. He has no jurisdiction as a Court of Appeal from their 
 decisions, but must treat their award as if it were an agreement to be 
 recorded, and he cannot review, modify, or set it aside under paragraph 
 (9) (d) of Schedule II. But sec us where the decision of the committee 
 is ultra vires, e.g. by awarding a lump sum otherwise than by way 01 
 redemption. He may then refuse to record it (Mulliolland v. White- 
 haven Colliery Co., [1910] 2 K. B. 278 ; 3 B. W. C. C 319). An infant 
 is bound by the lawful decision of such a committee (ibid.). 
 
 Arbitration by an agreed Arbitrator. The power of such an 
 
 arbitrator to examine witnesses on oath is derived from 14 & 15 Viet. 
 c. 99, s. 16 ; but he has no means of compelling the attendance of 
 witnesses or the production of documents. 
 
 If for any reason it becomes necessary to appoint a new arbitrator, 
 the judge of the county court is to do this (Sched. II. (8)). 
 
 The County Court Judge as Arbitrator. See paragraph (4) of 
 
 this Schedule as to his powers, and paragraph (11) as to his 
 jurisdiction. 
 
Sched. II. (4)] APPEALS. 183 
 
 Arbitrator appointed by County Court Judge. He is appointed 
 
 under paragraph (3), and has for the purposes of the Act the powers of 
 a county court judge. He is to be paid out of moneys provided by 
 Parliament in accordance with regulations made by the Treasury. 
 See s. 10 (2), p. Ill, ante. 
 
 As to the appointment of an arbitrator by the judge, see W. C. E. 
 29, and as to procedure after appointment, see W. C. E. 30, 31. 
 
 An appeal does not lie from him direct to the Court of Appeal 
 (Gibson v. Wormald and Walker, [1904] 2 K. B. 40 ; 6 W. C. C. 155). 
 See p. 184, post. 
 
 Procedure. There is no power to order interrogatories (Button v. 
 G. N. Bail. Co. (No. 1), [1909] 2 K. B. 791 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 428). 
 
 The proceedings are judicial and a witness giving false evidence on 
 a material question may be indicted for perjury (R. v. Crossley, [1909J 
 1 K. B. 411 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 451). 
 
 The arbitrator cannot order a new trial or re -open the case : see 
 p. 185, post. 
 
 The judge has wide discretion as to amendments, but it ought not 
 to be exercised to enable a party to set up a case quite different- from 
 that raised in the particulars (Proprietors of Hay's Wharf, Limited 
 v. Broivn (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 84) ; and if a party is taken by sur- 
 prise by the amendment there ought to be an adjournment (Casey v. 
 Humphries (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 625). 
 
 No amendment is necessary of particulars which state accurately 
 the nature of the injury but state its effect inaccurately (Sidney v. 
 Collins (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 433). 
 
 The Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, does not apply to 
 proceedings under this Act (Fry v. Cheltenham Corporation (1911), 
 28 T. L. E. 16 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 162). 
 
 The judge ought not to delegate to the registrar the duty of taking 
 the evidence in a case (Edmunds v. Owners of S.8. Peterston (1911), 
 28 T. L. E. 18 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 157). 
 
 The judge, after commencing to give his judgment, may recall a 
 witness to give evidence on an essential point (Peters v. Owners of 
 S.S. Argol (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 414). 
 
 Form 24 in the Appendix to the W. C. E. awarding compensa- 
 tion " to continue during the total or partial incapacity" is not ultra 
 vires (Higgins v. Poulson (No. 2), [1912] 2 K. B. 292; 5 B. W. C. C. 
 840). 
 
 The judge may alter his award at any time up to its being signed 
 and sealed under W. C. E. 28 (1), but not afterwards, except to correct 
 clerical errors (John Mowlem & Co., Limited v. Dunne, [1912] 2 K. B. 
 136; 5B.W. C. C, 382). 
 
 [APPEALS.] 
 
 (4) The Arbitration Act, 1889, shall not apply to any 
 arbitration under this Act ; but a committee or an arbitrator 
 
134 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. II. (4) 
 
 may, if they or he think fit, submit any question of law for 
 the decision of the judge of the county, court, and the decision 
 of the judge on any question of law, either on such submission, 
 or in any case where he himself settles the matter under this 
 Act, or where he gives any decision or makes any order 
 under this Act, shall be final, unless within the time and in 
 accordance with the conditions prescribed by Eules of the 
 Supreme Court either party appeals to the Court of Appeal ; 
 and the judge of the county court, or the arbitrator appointed 
 by him, shall, for the purpose of proceedings under this Act, 
 have the same powers of procuring the attendance of witnesses 
 and the production of documents as if the proceedings were 
 an action in the county court. 
 
 Appeal from Arbitrator other than a Judge. An appeal does 
 
 not lie direct to the Court of Appeal upon the award of an arbitrator 
 appointed by a county court judge under paragraph (3) (Gibson v. 
 Wormald and Walker, [1904] 2 K. B. 40 ; 6 W. C. C. 155). In this 
 and in every other case decided by an arbitrator (including a com- 
 mittee) other than a judge of a county court, the only course of 
 appealing is by a submission of any point of law for the decision of 
 the county court judge ; but from the latter's decision on such sub- 
 mission an appeal will lie to the Court of Appeal, even though no 
 award has been made (Moss v. Great Eastern Bail. Co., [1909] 2 K. B. 
 274 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 168). 
 
 Procedure on Appeal from Arbitrator. For the procedure to be 
 
 followed in the submission of any point of law, see W. C. B. 32. 
 
 Appeal from any Decision or Order of Judge. It was formerly 
 
 held that appeals from any order or decision not arising in or out of 
 arbitrations under the Act should go to the High Court and not to the 
 Court of Appeal (Rex v. His Honour Judge Owen, [1902] 2 K. B. 436; 
 4 W. C. C. 150, an application for a rule to show cause why the county 
 court judge should not hear an application for arbitration ; Wella/nd 
 v. Great Western Rail. Co. (1900), 16 T. L. B. 297 ; 2 W. C. C. 145, 
 application for an order on a judge to give directions for the taxation 
 of costs ; Morris v. Northern Employers' Mutual Indemnity Co., 
 Limited, [1902] 2 K. B. 165 ; 4 W. C. C. 38 ; Kniveton v. Same, [1902] 
 1 K. B. 880 ; 4"W. C. C. 37, appeal in respect of an order on insurers 
 under s. 5 of the Act of 1897 ; Rigly & Co. v. Cox (No. 1), [1904] 1 
 K. B. 358; 6 W. C. C. 158; Keane v. Nash (No. 2) (1903), 88 L. T. 
 790 ; 5 W. C. C. 142, appeal against refusal of a county court judge to 
 direct a review of taxation). But under the amended paragraph an 
 appeal lies to the Court of Appeal direct where the judge " gives any 
 decision or makes any order under this Act." 
 
Sched. II. (14)] APPEALS. 185 
 
 If a decision is given the paragraph applies, and the appeal lies to 
 the Court of Appeal (Moss v. Great Eastern Bail. Co., [1909] 2 K.B. 
 274 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 168) ; but if the appeal is from a mere refusal by 
 the county court judge to entertain the matter at all, as where he 
 refused to hear and determine a matter on the ground that he had no 
 jurisdiction to entertain an application for review when the original 
 award had been made by a committee, the appeal still lies to the 
 Divisional Court (Howartli v. Sir B. Samuelson d Co. (1911), 104 L. T. 
 907; 4 B. W. C. C. 287). 
 
 An appeal from a county court judge making an award that the 
 receiver and liquidator in a voluntary winding up (see sect. 5, p. 85, 
 ante) should pay the workman a certain sum, is not an appeal under 
 the Workmen's Compensation Act, and does not lie to the Court of 
 Appeal (Homer v. Gough, [1912] 2 K. B. 303; 5 B. W. C. C. 51), 
 neither does an appeal from an order relating to the detention of a 
 ship (Panagotis v. Owners of S.S. Pontiac, [1912] 1 K. B. 74 ; 5 
 B. W. C. C. 147). 
 
 There is no appeal from a consent order nor will an appeal be per- 
 mitted which, if decided in the appellant's favour, will affect an order 
 made by consent (Hoivellv. BlackweU's Executors (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 
 293). 
 
 Arbitrator cannot Order New Trial. An appeal is the only 
 remedy open, and the county court judge has no power to grant a 
 new trial or to re-open the arbitration (Mountain v. Parr, [1899] 1 
 Q. B. 805 ; 1 W. C. C. 110). But see p. 189, post, " Setting aside Aivard 
 or Order." 
 
 Procedure on and after Appeal from Judge. The appeal to the 
 
 Court of Appeal is regulated by the Kules of the Supreme Court, 
 namely, Ord. 58, rule 20, incorporating Ord. 58, rule 8, and Ord. 59, 
 rules 10, 12, 14, and 16 (see Appendix F, p. 346, post). The procedure 
 to be followed after the Court of Appeal have given their decision is 
 provided for by W. C. E. 72, p. 248, post. 
 
 Time for Appealing. The time for appealing runs from the date 
 when the award is signed by the judge, and not from the date of the 
 delivery of the judgment by which the award is given (Clayton v. 
 Jones Seiving Machine Co., Limited, [1908] W. N. 253 ; 126 L. T. 
 Newspaper, p. 142). 
 
 Where a judge refused in November, 1910, to order the registration 
 of an agreement on the ground that it was not genuine, and subse- 
 quently in January, 1911, entertained an application for arbitration, 
 and the employers appealed from both decisions, by notice of appeal 
 within 21 days from the later decision, it was held that both decisions 
 were part of one and the same proceeding and that the employers 
 were entitled to appeal as they had done (Fox v. Battersea Borough 
 Council (1911), 4.B. W. C. C. 261). 
 
 Entry of Appeal. The appeal is entered at the Crown Office 
 department of the Central Office by lodging a copy of the notice of 
 appeal, and paying a fee of 2. 
 
186 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. II. (i l) 
 
 Three copies of the application to the county court and of the 
 answer must be supplied for the use of the Lords Justices (Practice 
 Note, [1907] W. N. 245). 
 
 Notes of Evidence. It is the absolute duty of the county court 
 judge to take notes in cases under the Act, whether such notes are 
 asked for or not (Brine v. Carry & Son, Times, May 5th, 1905 ; 7 
 W. C. C. 130 ; Rayman v. Fields (No. 1) (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 119 ; 
 Turner v. Miller and Richards (1910), ibid. 307) ; and such duty is 
 now declared by the Eules under the Act (W. C. E. 34). A copy of 
 such notes may be obtained by any party to the proceedings, at his 
 own expense, whether a notice of motion by way of appeal has been 
 served or not (ibid.). 
 
 .Where there are no notes, or no intelligible notes, the case is usually 
 remitted for proper notes to be supplied, or for a new trial (Rayman v. 
 Fields, supra; Gellyceidrim Colliery Co., Limited v. Rogers (1909), 3 
 B. W. C. C, 62; Griffiths v. Wynnstay Collieries (1909), 2 B. W. C. C. 
 450) ; or for the judge's signature to the shorthand notes (if any) 
 (Polled v. G. N. R. Co. (No. 2) (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 620). 
 
 The Judge ought to state the grounds of his decision in his notes 
 (Jones v. Tirdonkin Colliery Co. (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 3). 
 
 Further evidence on affidavit will not be allowed in the Court of 
 Appeal (Westcott and Lawrence Lines, Limited v. Price (1912), 5 
 B. W. C. C. 430; Casey v. Humphries (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 625). 
 
 Grounds Of Appeal. There is no appeal except on questions of 
 law (Smith v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Rail. Co., [1899] 1 Q. B. 141, 
 at p. 143 ; 1 W. C. C. 1 ; and see cases cited below). 
 
 Questions of law arise when the judge misdirects himself in his 
 ruling of law, or' in giving a finding which has no evidence to support 
 it (Fenn v. Miller, [1900] 1 Q. B. 788 ; 2 W. C. C. 55 ; Chandler v. 
 Smith, [1899] 2 Q. B. 506, at p. 510; 1 W. C. C. 19; Simmons v. 
 White Brothers, [1899] 1 Q. B. 1005, at p. 1007 ; 1 W. C. C. 89 ; Kenny 
 v. Harrison, [1902] 2 K. B. 168 ; 4 W. C. C. 60 ; Taylor v. BolcJcow, 
 VaugJian & Co., Limited (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 130; Euman v. Dal- 
 ziel & Co. (1912), 49 S. L. E. 693) ; or in holding that there is no 
 evidence which, if the case were being tried before a jury, is fit to be 
 submitted to a jury (McNicholas v. Dawson, [1899] 1 Q. B. 773, at 
 p. 778 ; 1 W. C. C. 80) ; or in receiving evidence which is not admis- 
 sible, there being no other evidence to support the award (Wolsey v. 
 Petliick Brothers (1908), 1 B. W. C. C. 411), or if such inadmissible 
 evidence may have influenced the arbitrator (Richards v. Sanders and 
 Sons (1912), "5 B. W. C. C. 352). 
 
 The fact that the Court of Appeal would have decided otherwise on 
 the evidence is no ground for disturbing a finding if there be reason- 
 able evidence to support it (Eyre v. Houghton Main Colliery Co., 
 [1910] 1 K. B. 695, at pp. 701, 702, per BUCKLEY, L. J. ; 3 B. W. C. C. 
 250; Marriott v. Brett d Beney, Limited (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 145) ; 
 but where an arbitrator has found all the facts, the Court of Appeal 
 are entitled to review the inference which he has drawn from them, 
 
Sched. II. (14)] APPEALS. 187 
 
 and to come to a different conclusion (Gane v. Norton Hill Colliery 
 Co., [1909] 2 K. B. 539 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 42). 
 
 Points not taken below cannot be taken in the Court of Appeal 
 (Payne v. Clifton (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 439 ; Homer v. Gongh, [1912] 
 2 K. B. 303 ; 5 B. W. C. 0. 51), except such a point as want of juris- 
 diction, and in this case the successful appellant may expect to be 
 deprived of the costs of appeal (Netuhouse & Co. v. Johnson (1911), 
 5 B. W. C. C. 137). 
 
 If the grounds of appeal are insufficiently stated in the notice of 
 appeal, the appeal will be dismissed (Barton v. Scott <& Hodgson (1910), 
 4 B. W. C. C. 15; Goff v. Airds, Limited (1912), 5 B. W. C. G. 277). 
 
 A case decided on a decision subsequently reversed will, if necessary, 
 be remitted to the arbitrator for re -consideration (Weir v. North Brit. 
 Bail. Co. (1912), 49 S. L. R. 772 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 595; Polled v. 
 G. N. B. Co. (No. 1), 5 B. W. C. C. 115). 
 
 There is no appeal from a consent order (Hoivell v. BlackwelVs 
 Executors (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 293). 
 
 Appeal as to Costs If an order as to costs is made part of an 
 award an appeal therefrom in a proper case will lie, e.g. where an arbi- 
 trator awarded a lump sum by way of costs which he had no power 
 to do (Beadle v. Owners of S.S. Nicholas (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 102). 
 
 Security for Costs. The appeal to the Court of Appeal is not in 
 the nature of a motion for a new trial in which security for costs will 
 not be ordered (Harwoodv. Abrahams, [1901] 2 K. B. 304; 3 W. C. C. 
 205). Application, for security for costs is made to the Court of Appeal 
 by motion ; and before service of such notice of motion, where the 
 ground of the application is the poverty of the appellant, there ought 
 to be a request for security and a refusal. In a case where such a 
 course had not been adopted the court made the costs of the applica- 
 tion the appellant's costs in the appeal, so that if successful on the 
 appeal she would get the costs of the application, and if unsuccessful, 
 she would not have to pay them (Stanland v. North-Eastern Steel 
 Co., Limited (1906), 23 T. L. R. 1 ; 9 W. C. C. 133). 
 
 Security for costs of the appeal will, as a rule, be required by the 
 court if the appellant be shown to be unable to pay the respondents' 
 costs in the event of the appeal being unsuccessful (Hall v. Snowden, 
 Hubbard & Co. (No. 1), [1899] 1 Q. B. 593 ; 1 W. C. C. 114 ; Bees v. 
 Richards (1899), Times, August 8 ; 1 W. C. C. 118) ; but the power to 
 order such security is discretionary, and where a workman was not 
 poor enough to sue in forma pauperis, but his poverty was caused 
 by the accident, the court refused to order security (Skeggs v. Keen 
 (No. 1), Times, May 16th, 1899; 1 W. C. C. 119). An order was 
 also refused where the arbitrator had invited an appeal and had stayed 
 execution (Hublall v. Everitt & Sons (1900), 16 T. L. R. 168 ; 5 
 W. C. C. 145 n.) ; but there is not a rule to this effect (Shea v. Drolen- 
 vaux (1903), 88 L. T. 679 ; 5 W. C. C. 144). The amount is usually 
 fixed at W or 15. 
 
 Security for costs will be ordered, although the case is being 
 supported by a trade union who have paid the costs of the arbitration 
 
188 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. II. (5) 
 
 (Haddock v. Humphrey, Times, August 1st, 1899 ; 1 W. C. C. 117 ; 
 McLaughlin v. Clayton, ib., February 28th, 1899 ; 1 W. C. C. 116). 
 
 The order takes the form of dismissing the appeal unless the security 
 is given within the fixed period, generally 14 days ; and in case of 
 non-compliance the court cannot entertain any application without 
 consent, not even where the appellant has obtained leave to appeal in 
 forma pauperis, but the order for this has not been drawn up until after 
 the expiration of the time for giving security (Perry d; Co., Limited v. 
 Lacey (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 1). 
 
 Appeal on behalf of Lunatic. It was decided in Ireland that 
 the Court of Appeal could not entertain an appeal from an order by ' 
 which the rights of a lunatic had been affected, unless a guardian ad t 
 litem to the lunatic were appointed, and that an appeal by the super-' 
 intendent of the asylum in which the lunatic lived was not competent 
 (Kerr v. Stewart (1909), 43 Ir. L. T. 119 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 454). 
 
 Appeal In Forma Pauperis. An appellant may, by leave, appeal, 
 and a respondent may, by leave, oppose an appeal, in forma pauperis, 
 on proof that he is not worth .25, apart from his wearing apparel 
 and the subject matter of the proceedings. For the practice see 
 R. S. C. Order 16, rr. 22 31. The opinion of counsel must be obtained 
 that there are reasonable grounds for appealing before leave will be 
 given to an appellant, but the like opinion is not necessary in the case 
 of a respondent (Hand ford v. Clarke d Co., Limited, J1907] 1 K. B. 
 181 ; 9 W. C. C. 136). 
 
 Extending Time for Appeal. The Court of Appeal in England 
 have absolute discretion as to extending the time for appealing (R. S. C., 
 Order 58, r. 15). Before 1909 special leave to appeal out of time was 
 only granted under very special circumstances, of which a mistake by 
 legal advisers was not one (Nicholson v. Piper (No. 2) (1907), 24 
 T. L. R. 16; 9W. C. C. 132). 
 
 As to the Court of Appeal in Ireland, see Henneberry v. Doyle Bros. 
 (No. 1), (1912), 46 Ir. L. T. 61. 
 
 In one case an extension of time for appealing was made conditional 
 on the appellant paying the costs in any event (Wheeler, Ridley & Co. 
 v. Dawson (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 645). 
 
 Costs of Appeal. Unless the Court of Appeal order that the 
 costs awarded in that court to the employer on an interlocutory 
 appeal shall be the employer's costs in the arbitration in any event, 
 the arbitrator has no power to set off such costs against the costs of 
 the workman in the subsequent arbitration (Button v. Great Northern 
 Bail. Co. (Xo. 2) (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 160). The costs of this second 
 appeal were ordered to be set off against the employer's costs in the 
 earlier appeal. 
 
 As a rule the unsuccessful appellant's costs of appeal will be set off 
 against his costs (if any) in the court below (Case v. Colonial Wharves 
 (1905), 53 W. R, 514 ; 8 W. C. C. 114). 
 
Sclied. II. (I 4)] APPEALS, 189 
 
 Allowing Appeal to Stand Over. The Court of Appeal allowed 
 
 an appeal to stand over until the next time that such appeals were 
 taken, on the ground that there had been difficulty in obtaining the 
 judge's notes (Taff Vale Bail. Co. v. Lane (No. 1) (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 
 259). 
 
 Compromise Of Appeal Infants. Where infants are concerned 
 a suggested compromise is sent to the official solicitor for his con- 
 sideration and report (Coulson v. Worship/id Company of Drapers 
 (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 136). 
 
 Reinstating Appeal. An application on behalf of a workman to 
 reinstate an appeal in the list on the ground that, owing to the 
 solicitor's illness, its original appearance in the list had been over- 
 looked, was refused except on the terms that the costs of the abortive 
 hearing were paid into court. These terms not being accepted the 
 application was dismissed with costs, but without any special order 
 that such costs should be set off against weekly payments, which 
 were then due to the workman (Perry v. Anglo-American Decorating 
 Co. (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 312). 
 
 Remitting Case to Another Court. The Court of Appeal have 
 
 power, when remitting a case for re-hearing, to send it to a court other 
 than the one in which it was originally heard (see R. S. C. Ord. 59, 
 r. 16, p. 337, post). This was done in Jessop v. Maclay, [1911] W. N. 
 p. 196 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 139. 
 
 Appeal from the Court Of Appeal. An appeal lies from the 
 Court of Appeal to the House of Lords. 
 
 As to similar appeals from the appellate courts of Scotland and 
 Ireland, see respectively Sched. II. (17) and (18), pp. 203, 204, post. 
 
 When necessary, an order of the House of Lords will, on applica- 
 tion, be made an order of the Court of Appeal (Hodgson v. Owners of 
 West Stanley Colliery Co. (No. 2) (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 394). 
 
 Setting Aside Award or Order. Although the judge has no 
 
 power to grant a new trial or to re-open the arbitration (Mountain v. 
 Parr, p. 185, ante), the W. C. R., by Rule 70, p. 247,jpos, make provision 
 for enabling the judge to set aside an award or order which has been 
 improperly obtained. The grounds upon which it is provided this 
 may be done are : " fraud or other improper means " ; that a person 
 has been included as a dependant who is not in fact a dependant ; or 
 that a dependant has been omitted. An application to set aside an 
 award or order cannot be made after six months of its date, except by 
 leave of the judge ; and such leave is only to be granted when the 
 delay has been occasioned by mistake, absence from the United 
 Kingdom, or other reasonable cause. See as to this pp. 66, 69, ante. 
 As to setting aside or varying any award made against an absent 
 third party, see W. C. R. 21, p. 219, post. 
 
190 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906 [Sched. II. (57) 
 
 [MEDICAL ASSESSOR.} 
 
 (5) A judge of county courts may, if he thinks fit, summon 
 a medical referee to sit with him as an assessor. 
 
 Procedure. See "SV. C. R. 52, p. 234, post. Any party to an 
 arbitration may request the judge to summon a medical referee as 
 assessor. 
 
 Regulations. The remuneration of a medical referee sitting as 
 assessor, is provided for by Regulations (see App. C, p. 325, post). 
 
 [APPEARANCE AT ARBITRATIONS.] 
 
 (6) Rules of court may make provision for the appearance 
 in any arbitration under this Act of any party by some other 
 person. 
 
 Rules Of Court. The subject is dealt with in Rule 33, p. 223, post. 
 
 [COSTS.] 
 
 (7) The costs of and incidental to the arbitration and 
 proceedings connected therewith shall be in the discretion 
 of the committee, arbitrator, or judge of the county court, 
 subject as respects such judge and an arbitrator appointed 
 by him to rules of court. The costs, whether before a com- 
 mittee or an arbitrator or in the county court, shall not 
 exceed the limit prescribed by rules of court, and shall be 
 taxed in manner prescribed by those rules and such taxation 
 may be reviewed by the judge of the county court. 
 
 Discretion. It was contended against a successful employer that 
 he was not entitled to costs on the ground that he was not personally 
 liable to pay costs inasmuch as he was insured and was indemnified 
 against them. It was held that there was no violation of any principle 
 of law in awarding costs under such circumstances (Cornish v. Lynch 
 (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 345). 
 
 If there be no dispute there is no power to order respondent to pay 
 costs (see Smith v. Abbey Park Steam Laundry Co., Limited, 2 B. W. 
 C. C. 142) ; nor is there power to give costs against a successful 
 
Sched. II. (8, 9)] RECORDING AGREEMENTS. 
 
 respondent (Jones v. Great Central Bail. Co. (1901), 18 T. L. B. 65 ; 
 4 W. C. C. 23), or applicant (Evans v. Gwauncaegurwen Colliery Co., 
 Limited (1912), 106 L. T. 613 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 441), though separate 
 costs may be awarded on separate issues (ibid.}. If an applicant is 
 only partially successful the costs are entirely in the discretion of the 
 arbitrator (Connor v. Meads (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 435 ; Thomas v. 
 Cory Bros., Limited (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 5) ; and if an application is 
 dismissed on technical grounds, the arbitrator may refuse costs to the 
 successful party whose conduct has been unsatisfactory, and has led 
 to the application (Lowestoft Corporation v. Aldridge (1912), 5 
 B. W. C. C. 329). 
 
 Apart from a violation of some principle of law the Court of Appeal 
 will not interfere with an order as to costs (Nicholson v. Thomas 
 (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 452). 
 
 Lump Sum. There is no power to award a lump sum by way of 
 costs. They must be taxed (Beadle v. Owners of S.S. Nicholas 
 (1909), 101 L. T. 586; 3 B. W. C. C. 102). See as to the right of 
 appeal from such an award, p. 187, ante. But if the costs are then 
 and there taxed by the registrar there is 110 objection to the amount 
 being stated as a lump sum in the award (Gardner v. Cox (1910), 3 
 B. W. C. C. 245). 
 
 See as to deducting the costs of an interlocutory appeal from the 
 costs of the arbitration, p. 188, ante. 
 
 Rules Of Court. See W. C. B. 6166, pp. 243-246, post ; and see 
 also in the Index " Costs." 
 
 [APPOINTMENT OF NEW ARBITRATOR.] 
 
 (8) In the case of the death, or refusal or inability to act, 
 of an arbitrator, the judge of the county court may, on the 
 application of any party, appoint a new arbitrator. 
 
 Procedure. See W. C. E. 40, p. 229, post, as to the procedure for 
 obtaining the appointment of a new arbitrator under this paragraph. 
 
 [RECORDING AGREEMENTS.] 
 
 (9) Where the amount of compensation under this Act 
 has been ascertained, or any weekly payment varied, or any 
 other matter decided under this Act, either by a committee 
 or by an arbitrator or by agreement, a memorandum thereof 
 shall be sent, in manner prescribed by rules of court, by the 
 committee or arbitrator, or by any party interested, to the 
 
192 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. II. (9) 
 
 registrar of the county court who shall, subject to such rules, 
 on being satisfied as to its genuineness, record such memo- 
 randum in a special register without fee, and thereupon the 
 memorandum shall for all purposes be enforceable as a county 
 court judgment. 
 
 Provided that 
 
 (a) no such memorandum shall be recorded before seven 
 
 days after the despatch by the registrar of notice to 
 the parties interested ; and 
 
 (b) where a workman seeks to record a memorandum of 
 
 agreement between his employer and himself for 
 the payment of compensation under this Act and 
 the employer, in accordance with rules of court, 
 proves that the workman has in fact returned to 
 work and is earning the same wages as he did 
 before the accident, and objects to the recording of 
 such memorandum, the memorandum shall only be 
 recorded, if at all, on such terms as the judge of the 
 county court, under the circumstances, may think 
 just; and 
 
 (c) the judge of the county court may at any time rectify 
 
 the register ; and 
 
 (d) where it appears to the registrar of the county court, 
 
 on any information which he considers sufficient, 
 that an agreement as to the redemption of a weekly 
 payment by a lump sum, or an agreement as to the 
 amount of compensation payable to a person under 
 any legal disability, or to dependants, ought not to be 
 registered by reason of the inadequacy of the sum 
 or amount, or by reason of the agreement having 
 been obtained by fraud or undue influence, or other 
 improper means, he may refuse to record the memo- 
 randum of the agreement sent to him for registration, 
 and refer the matter to the judge who shall, in 
 accordance with rules of court, make such order 
 
Sched. II. (9, 10)] EECOKDING AGREEMENTS. 193 
 
 (including an order as to any sum already paid 
 under the agreement) as under the circumstances 
 he may think just ; and 
 
 (e) The judge may, within six months after a memorandum 
 of an agreement as to the redemption of a weekly 
 payment by a lump sum, or of an agreement as to 
 the amount of compensation payable to a person 
 under any legal disability, or to dependants, has 
 been recorded in the register, order that the record 
 be removed from the register on proof to his satis- 
 faction that the agreement was obtained by fraud or 
 undue influence or other improper means, and may 
 make such order (including an order as to any sum 
 already paid under the agreement) as under the 
 circumstances he may think just. 
 
 (10) An agreement as to the redemption of a weekly 
 payment by a lump sum if not registered in accordance with 
 this Act shall not, nor shall the payment of the sum payable 
 under the agreement, exempt the person by whom the 
 weekly payment is payable from liability to continue to 
 make that weekly payment, and an agreement as to the 
 amount of compensation to be paid to a person under a legal 
 disability or to dependants, if not so registered, shall not, nor 
 shall the payment of the sum payable under the agreement, 
 exempt the person by whom the compensation is payable 
 from liability to pay compensation, unless, in either case, he 
 proves that the failure to register was not due to any neglect 
 or default on his part. 
 
 Agreement with Persons under Legal Disability or Depen- 
 dants. An agreement with infants or other persons under legal 
 disability is conditional only unless and until a memorandum thereof 
 has been recorded (W. C. E. 42 (6), and see Rhodes v. Soothill Wood 
 Colliery Co., Limited, [1909] 1 K. B. 191 ; 2 B. W. C. 'C. 377). 
 
 An agreement with dependants ought not to be signed by their 
 solicitor on their behalf (ibid.). 
 
 Agreement with " Insured Persons." See s. 11 of the National 
 W.C.A. o 
 
194 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. II. (9, 10) 
 
 Insurance Act, and notes thereon, p. 207, 2 )o st. One of its effects is 
 to apply paragraph (9) (d) to such agreements when the agreed 
 payment is under 10s. a week. 
 
 Recording the Memorandum. It is the memorandum of the 
 agreement and not the agreement itself which is to be recorded. But 
 no memorandum is required if the award itself is sent for registration 
 (Bailey v. Plant (No. 2) (1901), 17 T. L. B, 449 ; 3 W. C. C. 207). 
 
 A memorandum of an oral or an implied agreement may be regis- 
 tered, and, if necessary, a proof may be allowed (Traill v. Cochrane 
 (1901), 3 F. 1091 ; Jones v. Great Central Bail. Co. (1901), 18 T. L. B. 
 65 ; 4 W. C. C. 23). 
 
 There is no time stipulated within which the memorandum of 
 agreement must be tendered for registration, provided it be " genuine," 
 as to the meaning of which see infra. 
 
 The memorandum must coincide with the real agreement (Lunt \. 
 Button Heath and Lee Green Collieries, Limited (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 
 219 ; M'Geown v. Workman, Clark & Co., Limited (1911), 45 Ir. L. T. 
 165). An agreement to pay during total incapacity does not entitle 
 a workman to the registration of a memorandum of agreement 
 extending also to partial incapacity (Maundrell v. Du?ikeston Collieries 
 Co., Limited (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 76 ; McCarthy v. Stapleton-Br ether- 
 ton (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 281 ; Hartshorne v. Coppice Colliery Co. 
 (1912), 106 L. T. 609 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 358 ; M'Lean v. Allan Line 8.S. 
 Co. (1911), 49 S. L. R. 207 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 527), or of a memorandum 
 including the words " until the same shall be ended, diminished or 
 increased by order of court or by agreement between the parties 
 (Shore v. Owners of S.S. Hyrcania (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 207) ; and 
 an agreement to pay full compensation on the production of a medi- 
 cal certificate of total incapacity does not justify registration of a 
 memorandum of an agreement to pay full compensation " every week 
 from the date of the accident" (Phillips v. Vickers, Son, d- Maxim. 
 [1912] 1 K. B. 16; 5 B. W. C. C. 23). 
 
 District Of Registry. See paragraph (11), post. 
 
 " Satisfied as to its Genuineness." The word " genuine " implies 
 not merely that an agreement has in truth been made, but also that 
 it is one capable of being enforced as a county court judgment. " The 
 registrar must be satisfied that the agreement is a subsisting agree- 
 ment' in this sense, that either at the moment when application 
 to record is made there is, or at some future date there may be, 
 ground for applying to the county court to enforce the memorandum 
 as a judgment " (Popple v. Frodingham Iron and Steel Co., [1912] 
 2 K. B. 141, per COZENS-HAEDY, M.B. ; 5 B. W. C. C. 394). 
 Consequently an agreement to pay during total incapacity ought 
 not to be registered if at the time of application to register the total 
 incapacity has ceased (Popple v. Frodingliam Iron and Steel Co., supra, 
 distinguishing, or, if necessary, disapproving, Coakley v. Addie & 
 Sons, [1907] S. C. 545, and distinguishing Blake v. Midland Rail. 
 Co., [1904] 1 K. B. 503 ; 6 W. C. C. 163, where the agreement was 
 for payment during total or partial incapacity (see 90 L. T. 433)). 
 
Sched. II. (9, 10)] RECORDING AGREEMENTS. 195 
 
 The same principle applies equally to an agreement to pay during 
 total or partial incapacity, and the workman must therefore obtain 
 registration whilst the agreement is operative. 
 
 Keeling v. Eastwood & Co. (1904), 116 L. T. Newsp. p. 595; 6 
 W. C. C. 167, must be regarded as overruled. It decided that an 
 original agreement ought to be recorded although it had been 
 superseded by a later agreement. 
 
 Some Scottish cases indicate that the word " genuine " is limited 
 to mean " in truth made " (see Cammick v. Glasgow Iron and Steel 
 Co., Limited (1901), 4 F. 198 ; Macdonald v. Fairfield Shipbuilding 
 and Engineering Co., Limited (1905), 48 S. L. R. 1 ; Coakleyv. Addie 
 d- Sons, p. 194, ante). In others there is an indication that the agree- 
 ment should be a subsisting one (szeMcEiuan v. William Baird d- Co., 
 [1910] S. C. 436 ; Niddrie and Benhar Coal Co. v. Hanley (1910), 47 
 S. L. K. 726). 
 
 It is not a ground for impeaching the genuineness of an agreement 
 that the workman is getting less than 50 per cent, of his wages, 
 because no man is entitled as of right to the maximum amount of 
 compensation, and, moreover, the Act does not give to either registrar 
 or judge a parental or paternal jurisdiction in the matter (Fox v. 
 Battersea Borough Council (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 261) ; and it is 
 submitted that the registrar ought not to be influenced by the fact 
 that the agreement awards more than the statutory limit (see 
 Macdonald v. Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering Co., Limited 
 (1903), 43 S. L. R. 1) ; but he ought to refuse to register an agreement 
 which amounts to a contracting out of the Act (see p. 72, ante). 
 
 As to the authentication of the memorandum of agreement, see 
 W. C. R. 42, p. 230, post. 
 
 " Has in Fact Returned to Work, etc." It was proved that 
 
 the workman had returned to work at higher wages than before the 
 accident ; that he was dismissed a few weeks after his return upon a 
 reduction of the staff; that he had earned no wages since his dis- 
 missal; but that no incapacity had arisen. The Court of Session 
 held that the' Sheriff was right in refusing to record a memorandum 
 sought by the workman, except with conditions (Matthews v. Baird & 
 Co., Limited, [1910] S. C. 689; 3 B. W. C. C. 566). 
 
 Recording Agreement' after Return to Light Work. A work- 
 man having received compensation at a certain rate, and having 
 subsequently been taken back to light work, sought to record an 
 agreement to pay compensation at the certain rate. The employers 
 objected, and subsequently the workman started arbitration proceed- 
 ings to recover the difference between the certain rate and a higher 
 rate which he claimed. The employers, without notice to him, with- 
 drew their said objection, and the agreement was recorded, and the 
 application for arbitration dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The 
 case was remitted to ascertain whether there was or was not any 
 agreement (Rees v. Consolidated Anthracite Collieries, Limited (1912), 
 5 B. W. C. C. 403). 
 
196 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. II. (9, 10) 
 Effect of returning to Work after Agreement recorded. 
 
 If, after an agreement to pay compensation has been recorded, the 
 workman returns to work, the safe and proper course is to record the 
 further agreement accordingly. If the workman is to receive his full 
 wages, the new agreement will provide either for a final determination 
 of all matters where the parties agree that the workman has entirely 
 recovered beyond fears of any future developments, or for a total 
 suspension of compensation, or the payment of a nominal sum in the 
 meantime, where such developments are possible. If, however, the , 
 workman is to receive less than his former wages the new agreement 
 should provide for the payment in the meantime of some sum by way 
 of compensation in addition to his wages. 
 
 But even if no such new agreement is recorded the workman cannot 
 take advantage of the omission so as to claim full compensation under 
 the recorded agreement, because a suspension, or at any rate a reduc- 
 tion of compensation, will be implied from his returning to work (Wm. 
 Baird & Co., Limited v. M l Whinnie (1908), 45 S. L. E. 338; 1 
 B. W. C. C. 109 ; Nimmo & Co., Limited v. Fisher (1907), 44 S. L. E. 
 641) ; but in the event of his having to leave his employment again 
 his rights under the recorded agreement will revive so long as that 
 agreement stands unaltered (Fife Coal Co. v. Lindsay (1908), 45 
 S. L. E. 317 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 117). 
 
 An agreement to do light work and that in the event of total 
 incapacity recurring the workman's rights under the Act should 
 revive, is completely terminated l>y the recurrence of total incapacity 
 and a claim for compensation therefor, and does not afterwards revive 
 (Branford.v. North Eastern Rail. Co. (1910), 4 B. W. C. 0. 84). 
 
 Power of the Judge on Application to Record. in dealing 
 
 with an application to record an agreement for the redemption of a 
 weekly payment the judge can only order or refuse an order to record 
 the agreement. He cannot treat the application or the agreement as 
 a submission to him to determine what sum ought to be paid 
 (Mortimer v. Secretan, [1909] 2 K. B. 77 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 446) ; nor 
 can he on an application to register an agreement for a weekly sum 
 alter the amount or treat the agreement or application as a submission 
 to him to do so (Halls v. Furness, Withy & Co. (1900), 3 B. W. C. C. 
 72), unless the parties consent, in which case the consent should be 
 clearly expressed and be incorporated in the award (ibid.). 
 
 If the registrar refuses to record an agreement on the ground of 
 its apparent inadequacy, the judge is bound to inquire whether 
 it is adequate or not (Owners of 8. Segura v. Blampied (1911), 
 4 B. W. C. C. 192). 
 
 Where a workman in receipt of a maximum weekly paymentof 17s. 3d. 
 a week agreed to accept .175 by way of redemption, the judge refused 
 to order the registration of the agreement on the ground of inadequacy. 
 It was held that he had misdirected himself, because he had assumed 
 that the weekly payment was permanent, and the agreement was 
 ordered to be recorded (O'Neill v. Anglo-American Oil Co., Limited 
 (1909), 2 B. W. C. C. 434). 
 
 The workman's application to register a memorandum was met by 
 
Sched. II. (i), 10)] EECORDING AGREEMENTS. 197 
 
 the employers setting up an agreement for discharge, to which the 
 workman replied that such discharge, if given, was given under essential 
 error. It was held that the arbitrator was bound to consider the 
 validity of the alleged discharge before ordering the memorandum to 
 be recorded (Niddrie and Benhar Coal Co., Limited v. Hanley (1910), 
 47 S. L. B. 726). 
 
 On an application by a workman to record an agreement it is open to 
 the employer to apply to have the compensation terminated or reviewed, 
 and the arbitrator may hear the applications simultaneously ; or he 
 may grant the warrant to record, suspending its operation until the 
 employer's application has been heard' ; or he may postpone the one 
 application so as to hear it with the other (M'lVivan v. Baird & Co., 
 [1910] S. C. 436; M'Vey v. Dixon, Limited, [1910] S. C. 544). 
 Binning v. Easton (1906), 8 F. 407, does not apply to the present 
 Act (ibid.}. 
 
 If the judge refuses to record an agreement for redemption on the 
 ground of apparent inadequacy, the parties are relegated to their 
 original rights under the Act, and upon a subsequent application for 
 compensation, the judge is not estopped from finding that the 
 applicant is no longer entitled to compensation (Beech v. Bradford 
 Corporation (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 236). 
 
 After an arbitration in which the judge awarded in favour of the 
 employers, the workman tendered a memorandum of agreement for 
 registration based upon the fact that the employers had paid com- 
 pensation before the arbitration. The judge refused leave to record 
 the agreement, and the Court of Appeal held that the questions were 
 questions of fact, and dismissed the appeal (Turner v. G. Bell & Sons, 
 Limited (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 63). 
 
 Award of Committee. The county court judge has no power to 
 review the award of a committee which is submitted for registration, 
 provided that the matter involved is subject to settlement by arbitra- 
 tion under the Act. If it is outside the province of the committee the 
 judge can and ought to review it. So where a committee within six 
 months of the accident awarded a lump sum to the workman, it was 
 held that they had no jurisdiction to do so, and that a memorandum 
 thereof could not be recorded (Mulliolland v. Whitehaven Colliery 
 Co., [1910] 2 K. B. 278; 3 W. C. C. 319). 
 
 Effect of Registration Execution. Apart from considera- 
 tions of mistake and fraud, when a memorandum of agreement has 
 been duly recorded, either by agreement between the parties or by an 
 order of the registrar or judge, the matter is finally determined, and 
 cannot be re-opened for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not 
 the recorded agreement was one binding in law or was only nudum 
 />(!( fnm (Masterman v. Ropner and Sons, Ltd. (1909), 127 L. T. 
 Newsp., p. 8, in the C. A.). AVhen registered the memorandum is for 
 all purposes enforceable as a county court judgment. That is to say, 
 execution may issue against the goods of the employer in default of 
 payment and the judge may make an order for committal under the 
 
198 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. II. (9, 10) 
 
 Debtors Act, 1869, s. 5 (Bailey v. Plant (No. 1), [1901] 1 Q. B. 31 ; 
 3 W. C. C. 209). See also W. C. E. 6769, p. 246, post. 
 
 Upon an application for leave to issue execution on a default to pay 
 compensation under a recorded agreement to pay during incapacity, 
 the employers are entitled to give evidence to show that the incapacity 
 has ceased (Ibrahim Said v. /. H. Welsford (6 Co., Limited (1910), 3 
 ]>. "\V. C. C. 233). In this case it was questioned whether an appli- 
 cation for leave to issue execution can be made ex parte. 
 
 It seems that if the employer raises the question that incapacity 
 has ceased the registrar cannot order execution (Warren v. Roxburgh 
 (1912), 106 L. T. 555 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 263). An appeal on this lies -to 
 the judge qua judge ; and from him to the Divisional Court. Neither 
 registrar nor judge has jurisdiction to decide the question of incapa- 
 city on such application or appeal. That must be done by the 
 statutory arbitrator (ibid.). 
 
 For a case of execution on failure to pay under a recorded agreement 
 as amended by an unrecorded agreement reducing the payments, see 
 Fife Coal Co., Limited v. Davidson, [1907] S. C. 90, where the Court 
 of Session upheld the proceeding. The Court of Session have held 
 that a charge for payment under a recorded agreement will not be 
 suspended in respect of the period since the recording, but that as to 
 the previous period a proof will be allowed if it is averred that the 
 workman has acquiesced in any variation or discontinuance as pro- 
 vided by the agreement, and upon the averment being proved the 
 charge will be suspended (Locligelly Iron & Coal Co., Limited v. 
 Sinclair, [1909] S. C. 922; Finnic v. Fulton, ibid., 938). 
 
 A registered agreement to pay a man half wages, followed by actual 
 payments, does not estop the employers in proceedings by dependants 
 after the death of the workman from showing that the death was 
 due to disease, and not from the effects of the accident (Cleverley v. 
 Gas Light and Coke Co., Limited (1907), 24 T. L. E. 93 ; 1 B. W. 
 C. C. 82). 
 
 The Court of Session have held that an action cannot be brought 
 to compel performance of an agreement to pay compensation under 
 the Act (Cochrane v. Traill (No. 1) (1900), 37 S. L. E. 662 ; Lawric 
 v. James Brown & Co., Limited, [1908] S. C. 705; 1 B. W. C. C. 
 137), and a similar decision would probably be given in the English 
 courts. 
 
 Unrecorded Agreement. If a memorandum of an agreement 
 has not been recorded, the agreement cannot be regarded as a basis 
 for arbitration proceedings. So that, where payments had been made 
 under an unrecorded agreement to December 14th, 1904, and then 
 stopped on the ground that incapacity had ceased, and in the following 
 March arbitration proceedings were brought in which the sheriff 
 awarded compensation from December 14th, 1904 (at which date he 
 found that incapacity had ceased) up to the date of his award, it was 
 held that the award was wrong. The grounds were : (1) that he had 
 no power to enforce the unrecorded agreement in this way ; and 
 (2) that he could not, in arbitration proceedings, give compensation 
 
Sched. II. (11)] JURISDICTION OF COUNTY COURTS. 199 
 
 after incapacity had ceased (Colville & Sons, Limited v. Tigue (1905), 
 8 F. 179). 
 
 Redemption v. Compromise. The Court of Appeal have drawn 
 
 a distinction between an agreement to substitute a lump sum in satis- 
 faction of current weekly payments, and an agreement to accept a 
 lump sum in satisfaction of a claim under the Act before any weekly 
 payments have been made. The 'former requires registration; the 
 latter does not (Euan v. Hartley, [19121 2 K. B. 150 ; 5 B. W. C. C. 
 407). 
 
 Rectifying the Register. If an agreement has been recorded 
 for payment on the basis that the workman is an infant, and the 
 employers subsequently discover that he is not an infant, the judge 
 cannot alter the amount of compensation. This is not a subject for 
 rectification under para. 9 (c), but comes under para. 9 (e) (Schofield 
 v. W. C. dough <& Co. (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 417). 
 
 Procedure. For proceedings on application to the registrar to 
 record a memorandum, see W. C. R. 41 47 ; on an application to the 
 judge to record a memorandum, or to rectify the register, Rule 48 ; for 
 procedure when an agreement presented for registration is referred by 
 the registrar to the judge, Rule 4.9 ; for proceedings on an application 
 to the judge for the removal of an agreement from the register, 
 Rule 50. 
 
 For the purpose of determining whether the payment is adequate, 
 the registrar is not entitled to the production of medical reports 
 obtained by employers (Johnson v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., 
 Limited (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 322, per BUCKLEY, L.J.). 
 
 Appeal from Order as to Registration. in England an appeal 
 
 lies from the order of a county court judge either granting or refusing 
 the registration of a memorandum of agreement (Johnston v. Mew, 
 Langton < Co. (1907), 98 L. T. 517 ; 1 B. W. C. C. 133). It formerly 
 lay to the Divisional Court, but under the present Act it lies direct to 
 the Court of Appeal. See paragraph (4) of Sched. II. 
 
 In Scotland, also, it has now been decided that the act of the 
 sheriff in ordering a memorandum to be recorded is a judicial act and 
 not a ministerial one, and is the subject of appeal under the statute 
 (Goakley v. Addie & Sons, Limited, [1909] S. C. 545 ; 2 B. W. C. C. 
 437 ; John' Brown & Co., Limited v. Orr, [1910] S. C. 526). Formerly 
 it was decided otherwise. 
 
 [JURISDICTION OF COUNTY COURTS.] 
 
 (11) Where any matter under this Act is to be done in a 
 county court, or by, to, or before the judge or registrar of a 
 county court, then, unless the contrary intention appear, the 
 same shall, subject to rules of court, be done in, or by, to, or 
 
200 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. II. (12) 
 
 before the judge or registrar of, the county court of the 
 district in which all the parties concerned reside, or if they 
 reside in different districts the district prescribed by rules of 
 court, without prejudice to any transfer in manner provided 
 by rules of court. 
 
 " District." The question whether an English county court had 
 jurisdiction when the respondents lived in Ireland was raised, but 
 not decided, in Haddock v. Fisher <& Sons, Times, May 7th, 1900 ; 2 
 W. C. C. 43. It was afterwftrds decided that the word " district " did 
 not mean merely " county court district," and that a workman injured 
 in England might file a request for arbitration against a respondent 
 resident in Scotland (Eex v. His Honour Judge Owen, [19021 2 K. B. 
 436 ; 4 W. C. C. 150). 
 
 Rules Of Court. See W. C. B, 73 as to the court in which 
 proceedings may be taken ; Eule 74 as to proceedings in one court in 
 relation to matters recorded in another court ; Eule 75 as to transfer 
 of proceedings ; and Rule 76 as to the transfer of money paid into 
 court. 
 
 [DUTY OF JUDGE AND EULES OF COURT.] 
 
 (12) The duty of a judge of county courts under this Act, 
 or in England of an arbitrator appointed by him, shall, 
 subject to rules of court, be part of the duties of the county 
 court, and the officers of the court shall act accordingly, and 
 rules of court may be made both for any purpose for which 
 this Act authorises rules of court to be made, and also 
 generally for carrying into effect this Act so far as it affects 
 the county court, or an arbitrator appointed by the judge of 
 the county court, and proceedings in the county court or 
 before any such arbitrator, and such rules may, in England, 
 be made by the five judges of county courts appointed for 
 the making of rules under section one hundred and sixty- 
 four of the County Courts Act, 1888, and when allowed by 
 the Lord Chancellor, as provided by that section, shall have 
 full effect without any further consent. 
 
 Rules of Court. For these see p. 209, post. 
 
 Doubt has been cast upon the validity of the Eule 18 (10), allowing 
 submission to award or payment into court with denial of liability, 
 but it is submitted that the above powers are ample for that purpose. 
 
Sched. II. (lo 15)] PAYMENT, ETC., OF COMPENSATION. 201 
 
 [COURT FEES.] 
 
 (13) No court fee, except such as may be prescribed under 
 paragraph (15) of the First Schedule to this Act, shall be pay- 
 able by any party in respect of any proceedings by or against 
 a workman under this Act in the court prior to the award. 
 
 Exception. This is the fee for reference to a medical referee 
 made on the application of both parties by the registrar. See p. 169, 
 ante, and W. C. K. 54 (9), p. 236, post. 
 
 County Court Pees. A Treasury Order, dated May 30th, 1907, 
 regulating fees in county courts under this Act, has been issued. Its 
 provisions will be found incorporated in the Tables of Fees in the 
 " Yearly County Court Practice," and similar works. 
 
 See as to the application of this paragraph to French citizens, 
 Appendix G, p. 348, post. 
 
 [PAYMENT AND PROTECTION OF COMPENSATION.] 
 
 (14) Any sum awarded as compensation shall, unless paid 
 into court under this Act, be paid on the receipt of the 
 person to whom it is payable under any agreement or award, 
 and the solicitor or agent of a person claiming compensation 
 under this Act shall not be entitled to recover from him any 
 costs in respect of any proceedings in an arbitration under 
 this Act, or to claim a lien in respect of such costs on, 
 or deduct such costs from, the sum awarded or agreed as 
 compensation, except such sum as may be awarded by the 
 committee, the arbitrator, or the judge of the county court, 
 on an application made either by the person claiming com- 
 pensation, or by his solicitor or agent, to determine the 
 amount of costs to be paid to the solicitor or agent, such 
 sum to be awarded subject to taxation and to the scale of 
 costs prescribed by rules of court. 
 
 "Unless Paid into' Court." See paragraphs (6), (7), of Sched. I. 
 Rules of Court. See W. C. K. 65, 66, pp. 245, 246, post. 
 
 [SUBMISSION TO MEDICAL PIEFEREE.] 
 
 (15) Any committee, arbitrator, or judge may, subject to 
 regulations made by the Secretary of State and the Treasury, 
 
202 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. II. (16) 
 
 submit to a medical referee for report any matter which 
 seems material to any question arising in the arbitration. 
 
 " Any Matter." This includes the submission of a question 
 relating to the cause of death, although the regulations may not 
 contemplate or provide for such a submission (Carolan v. Harrington 
 A Son, [1911] 2 K. B. 733 ; 4 B. W. C, C. 253). 
 
 Effect of the Report. The report of a medical referee on a case 
 submitted to him is not to be taken by the arbitrator as final and 
 conclusive, but is to be considered by him along with the other 
 evidence before him (Dowds v. Bennie & Son (1903), 5 F. 268 ; John- 
 stone v. Cochrane & Co., Annan, Limited (1904), 6 F. 854; Niddrie 
 and Benhar Coal Co. v. WKay (1903), 5 F. 1121 ; Quinn v. Flynn 
 (1910), 44 Ir. L. T. 183 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 594), even though the 
 form of reference impliedly invites the medical referee to say whether 
 the cause of death was natural or accidental (Jackson v. Scotstoun 
 Estate Co., [1911] S. C. 564 ; 4 B. W. C. C. 381). 
 
 Evidence Necessary. Evidence must be taken before a matter 
 can be submitted to a medical referee (Gray & Sons v. Carroll, [1910] 
 S. C. 700 ; 3 B. W. C. C. 572). 
 
 Rules Of Court. See W. C. E. 82, and p. 253, post. 
 
 Regulations. Regulations as to references under this paragraph 
 have been issued and will be found in Appendix C, p. 325, 
 post. 
 
 If the arbitrator thinks that a report of a medical referee is desirable 
 and likely to assist him in determining a matter of medical character, 
 he is entitled to obtain it (Henricksen v. Owners of S.S. Swanhilda 
 (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 233). 
 
 [POWERS OF COMMITTEES.] 
 
 (16) The Secretary of State may, by order, either un- 
 conditionally or subject to such conditions or modifications 
 as he may think fit, confer on any committee representative 
 of an employer and his workmen, as respects any matter in 
 which the committee act as arbitrators, or which is settled 
 by agreement submitted to and approved by the committee, 
 all or any of the powers conferred by this Act exclusively 
 on county courts or judges of county courts, and may by the 
 order provide how and to whom the compensation money 
 is to be paid in cases where, but for the order, the money 
 would be required to be paid into court, and the order may 
 exclude from the operation of provisoes (d) and (e) of 
 
Sched. II. (17)] APPLICATION TO SCOTLAND. 203 
 
 paragraph (9) of this Schedule agreements submitted to and 
 approved by the committee, and may contain such incidental, 
 consequential, or supplemental provisions as may appear to 
 the Secretary of State to be necessary or proper for the 
 purposes of the order. 
 
 Order of Secretary of State. Such an order was made, dated 
 June 25, 1907, conferring powers on a committee representative of the 
 Durham Colliery Owners' Mutual Protection Association and the 
 Durham Miners' Association. 
 
 [APPLICATION TO SCOTLAND.] 
 
 (17) In the application of this Schedule to Scotland 
 
 (a) "County court judgment" as used in paragraph (9) 
 
 of this Schedule means a recorded decree arbitral : 
 
 (b) Any application to the sheriff as arbitrator shall be 
 
 heard, tried, and determined summarily in the 
 manner provided by section fifty-two of the Sheriff 
 Courts (Scotland) Act, 1876, save only that parties 
 may be represented by any person authorised in 
 writing to appear for them and subject to the 
 declaration that it shall be competent to either 
 party within the time and in accordance with the 
 conditions prescribed by act of sederunt to require 
 the sheriff to state a case on any question of law 
 determined by him, and his decision thereon in 
 such case may be submitted to either division of 
 the Court of Session, who may hear and determine 
 the same and remit to the sheriff with instruction as 
 to the judgment to be pronounced, and an appeal 
 shall lie from either of such divisions to the House 
 of Lords : 
 
 (c) Paragraphs (3), (4), and (8) shall not apply. 
 
 Appeal to the House Of Lords. There was formerly no -such 
 appeal (Osborn v. Barclay, Curie & Co., [1901] A. C. 269 ; 4 W. C. C. 
 149 : sub nom. M'Kinnon (1901), 38 S. L. R. 611). 
 
204 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 190(1 [Sched. III. 
 
 [APPLICATION TO IRELAND.] 
 
 .(18) In the application of this Schedule to Ireland the 
 expression "judge of the county court" shall include the 
 recorder of any city or town, and an appeal shall lie from 
 the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords. 
 
 THIRD SCHEDULE. 
 
 Description of Disease. 
 
 Description of Process. 
 
 Anthrax 
 
 Lead poisoning or its se- 
 
 Handling of wool, hair, bristles, hides, and 
 
 skins. 
 Any process involving the use of lead or its 
 
 quelae. preparations or compounds. 
 
 Mercury poisoning or its j Any process involving the use of mercury or 
 
 sequelae. its preparations or compounds. 
 
 Phosphorus poisoning or its Any process involving the use of phosphorus 
 
 sequelae. or its preparations or compounds. 
 
 Arsenic poisoning or its se- ' Any process involving the use of arsenic or 
 
 quelas. its preparations or compounds. 
 
 Ankylostomiasis Mining. 
 
 Where regulations or special rules made under any Act of 
 Parliament for the protection of persons employed in any 
 industry against the risk of contracting lead poisoning 
 require some or all of the persons employed in certain pro- 
 cesses specified in the regulations or special rules to be 
 periodically examined by a certifying or other surgeon, then, 
 in the application of this Schedule to that industry, the 
 expression "process" shall, unless the Secretary of State 
 otherwise directs, include only the processes so specified. 
 
 Extension of Schedule. Under the power conferred by s. 8 (6), 
 this Schedule has been extended by Orders dated May 22iid, 1907, and 
 December 2nd, 1908. Subject to certain qualifications noted below the 
 extensions are as follows : 
 
Sched. III.] EXTENSION OF SCHEDULE. 
 
 205 
 
 Description of Disease or Injury. 
 
 Description of Process. 
 
 1. Poisoning by nitro- and amido- 
 
 derivatives of benzene (dinitro- 
 benzol, anilin, and others), or 
 its sequelae. 
 
 2. Poisoning by carbon bisulphide 
 
 or its sequelae. 
 
 3. Poisoning by nitrous fumes or 
 
 its sequelae. 
 
 4. Poisoning by nickel carbonyl or 
 
 its sequelae. 
 
 5. Arsenic poisoning or its sequelae. 
 
 6. Lead poisoning or its sequelae. 
 
 7. Poisoning iby Gonioma Kamassi 
 
 (African boxwood) or its 
 sequelae. 
 
 8. Chrome ulceration or its sequelae. 
 
 9. Eczematous ulceration of the 
 skin produced by dust or 
 liquids, or ulceration of the 
 mucous membrane of the nose 
 or mouth produced by dust. 
 
 10. Epitheliomatous cancer or ulcer- 
 
 ation of the skin or of the cor- 
 neal surface of the eye, due to 
 pitch, tar, or tarry compounds. 
 
 11. Scrotal epithelioma (chimney- 
 
 sweeps' cancer). 
 
 12. Nystagmus. 
 
 13. Glanders. 
 
 14. Compressed air illness or its 
 
 sequelae. 
 
 15. Subcutaneous cellulitis of the 
 
 hand (beat hand). 
 
 16. Subcutaneous cellulitis over the 
 
 patella (miners' beat knee). 
 
 17. Acute bursitis over the elbow 
 
 (miners' beat elbow). 
 
 18. Inflammation of the synovial 
 
 lining of the wrist joint and 
 tendon sheaths. 
 
 19. Cataract in glassworkers. 
 
 20. Telegraphists' cramp. 
 
 Any process involving the use of a 
 nitro- or amido-derivative of ben- 
 zene or its preparations or com- 
 pounds. 
 
 Any process involving the use of 
 carbon bisulphide or its prepara- 
 tions or compounds. 
 
 Any process in which nitrous fumes 
 are evolved. 
 
 Any process in which nickel car- 
 bonyl gas is evolved. 
 
 Handling of arsenic or its prepara- 
 tions or compounds. 
 
 Handling of lead or its preparations 
 or compounds. 
 
 Any process in the manufacture of 
 articles from Gonioma .Kamassi 
 (African boxwood). 
 
 Any process involving the use of 
 chromic acid or bi-chromate of 
 ammonium, potassium, or sodium, 
 or their preparations. 
 
 Handling or use of pitch, tar, or 
 tarry compounds. 
 
 Chimney-sweeping. 
 
 Mining. 
 
 Care of any equine animal suffering 
 from glanders ; handling the car- 
 case of such animal. 
 
 Any process carried on in com- 
 pressed air. 
 
 Mining. 
 
 Mining. 
 Mining. 
 Mining. 
 
 Processes in the manufacture of 
 glass involving exposure to the 
 glare of molten glass. 
 
 Use of telegraphic instruments. 
 
200 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. [Sched. III. 
 
 In the description of the ninth disease in the earlier Order the 
 words "caustic or corrosive" were inserted before the word " liquids," 
 but they were deleted by the later Order without prejudice to cases 
 already arisen 
 
 The qualifications referred to above are (1) that a glass-worker 
 suffering from cataract shall be entitled to compensation for a period 
 not longer than six months in all nor for more than four months unless 
 he has undergone an operation for cataract; and (2) that in the 
 application of the provisions of section 8 to telegraphists' cramp, so 
 far as regards a workman employed by the Postmaster-General, the 
 Post Office Medical Officer under whose charge the workman is placed 
 shall, if authorized to act for the purposes of the said section by the 
 Postmaster-General, be substituted for the Certifying Surgeon. (See 
 Order dated December 2, 1908.) As to the fee of such officer, see 
 p. 324, post. 
 
( 207 ) 
 
 APPENDIX A. 
 
 NATIONAL INSURANCE ACT, 1911. 
 
 (1 & 2 GEO. 5, c. 55.) 
 
 Sect. 11. (1) Where an insured person has received or recovered, or 
 is entitled to receive or recover, whether from his employer or any other 
 person, any compensation or damages under the Workmen's Compensa- 
 tion Act, 1906, or any scheme certified thereunder, or under the 
 Employers' Liability Act, 1880, or at common law, in respect of any 
 injury or disease, the following provisions shall apply : 
 
 (a) No sickness benefit or disablement benefit shall be paid to such 
 
 person in respect of that injury or disease in any case where 
 any weekly sum or the weekly value of any lump sum paid or 
 payable by way of compensation or damages is equal to or 
 greater than the benefit otherwise payable to such person, and, 
 where any such weekly sum or the weekly value of any such 
 lump sum is less than the benefit in question, such part only 
 of the benefit shall be paid as, together with the weekly sum or 
 the weekly value of the lump sum, will be equal to the benefit : 
 
 (b) The weekly value of any such lump sum as aforesaid may be 
 
 determined by the society or committee bj^ which the sickness 
 and disablement benefits payable to such person are adminis- 
 tered, but, if the insured person is aggrieved by such determina- 
 tion, the matter shall be settled in manner provided by this 
 Part of this Act for settling disputes between insured persons 
 and societies or committees : 
 
 (c) Where an agreement is made as to the amount o^such compensa- 
 
 tion as aforesaid, and the amount so agreed is less than ten 
 shillings a week, or as to the redemption of a weekly payment 
 by a lump sum, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, 
 the employer shall, within three days thereafter, or such longer 
 time as may be prescribed, send to the Insurance Commissioners, 
 or to the society or committee concerned, notice in writing of 
 such agreement giving the prescribed particulars thereof, and 
 proviso (d) to paragraph (9) of the Second Schedule of the 
 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906 (which relates to the 
 powers of registrars of county courts to refuse to record 
 memoranda of agreements and to refer the matter to the judge) 
 shall, in cases where the workman is an insured person, apply 
 to agreements as to the amount of compensation in like manner 
 as to agreements as to the redemption of weekly payments by 
 lump sums. 
 
208 APPENDIX A. 
 
 (2) Where an insured person appears to be entitled to any such 
 compensation or damages as aforesaid and unreasonably refuses or 
 neglects to take proceedings to enforce his claim, it shall be lawful for 
 the society or committee concerned, either 
 
 (a) at its own expense, to take in the name and on behalf of such 
 
 person such proceedings, in which case any compensation or 
 damages recovered shall be held by the society or committee 
 as trustee for the insured person ; or 
 
 (b) to withhold payment of any benefit to which apart from this 
 
 section such person would be entitled. 
 
 In the event of the society or committee concerned taking proceedings 
 as aforesaid and failing in the proceedings, it shall be responsible for 
 the costs of the proceedings as if it were claiming on its own account. 
 
 (3) Nothing in this section shall prevent the society or committee 
 paying to an insured person benefit by way of advance pending the 
 settlement of his claim for compensation or damages, and any advance 
 so made shall, without prejudice to any other method of recovery, be 
 recoverable by deductions from or suspension of any benefits which 
 may subsequently become payable to such person. 
 
 Preliminary. The notes on this section are limited to such matters as 
 are likely to be of practical value in understanding and carrying into effect 
 the section in so far only as it affects liability under the Workmen's Com- 
 pensation Act. The references in these notes are to the National Insurance 
 Act, unless otherwise stated. 
 
 Object of Section. The primary object of the section is to relieve the 
 statutory insurance fund from paying sickness or disablement benefit in 
 respect of which sickness or disablement the insured person has received, 
 is receiving, or is entitled to receive, compensation or damages. 
 
 " Insured Persons." These include persons whose insurance is com- 
 pulsory (" employed contributors ") and those whose insurance is effected 
 voluntarily (" voluntary contributors "). The subject is much too intricate 
 to be treated in detail in a note, and reference should be made to the Act, 
 and particularly to sections 1 and 2, and the First Schedule thereof. The 
 vast majority of workmen within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensa- 
 tion Act will be " employed contributors." Of the remainder many will 
 be found to be " voluntary contributors," and this can only be ascertained 
 by inquiry of the workman. Persons under 16 cannot be employed " con- 
 tributors " (s. 1 (1)). 
 
 " Sickness benefit." This includes periodical payments to be made to 
 an insured person whilst rendered incapable of work by some specific disease 
 or by bodily or mental disablement, of which notice has been given, com- 
 mencing from the fourth day after being so rendered incapable of work, and 
 continuing for a period not exceeding 26 weeks (s. 8 (1) (c) ). 
 
 The benefit is not payable to the insured person " unless and until 26 
 weeks have elapsed since his entry into insurance, and at least 26 weekly 
 contributions have been paid by or in respect of him " (s. 8 (8) (b)). 
 
 " Disablement benefit." This consists of periodical payments to be 
 made in the case of the disease or disablement continuing after the determi- 
 
NATIONAL INSURANCE ACT, 1911. 209 
 
 nation of sickness benefit, and it continues so long as the insured person is 
 rendered incapable of work by the disease or disablement (s. 8 (1) (d) ). 
 
 The benefit is not payable to the insured person " unless and until 104 
 weeks have elapsed since -his entry into insurance, and at least 104 weekly 
 contributions have been paid by or in respect of him " (s. 8 (8) (c) ). 
 
 Rates of benefits. The ordinary rates of benefit are : sickness benefit 
 for men 10s., and for women 7s. Qd. a week ; disablement benefit for men 
 and women 5s. a week (s. 8 (2) and Sched. IV., Part I.) ; but there are 
 reduced rates in the case of unmarried minors, persons over 50 in certain 
 cases, married women, and under certain special circumstances (see generally 
 ss. 9, 10, 13, and Sched. IV., Part I.). 
 
 No benefit is payable to a person of 70 years of age and over (s. 8 (3) ), 
 or to a person absent from the United Kingdom, except (under conditions) 
 in the Isle of Man and Channel Isles (s. 8 (4) ). 
 
 Recurrence of Disease or Disablement. This is regarded as a continua- 
 tion of the previous disease or disablement unless in the meanwhile 12 months 
 have elapsed and at least 50 weekly contributions have been paid (s. 8 (5) ). 
 
 Agreements with Insured Persons. See s. 11 (c), supra. The section 
 relates only to agreements for a weekly sum of less than 10s., and to agree- 
 ments for redemption (see W. C. A., 1906, Sched. II., para, (9) ). Formerly, 
 agreements for weekly payments could only be considered, and their registra- 
 tion refused on the ground of inadequacy, &c., by the registrar, when they 
 were made by persons under any legal disability (see ibid. (9) (d), and 
 p. 192, ante). 
 
 At present no longer lime than three days has been prescribed by the 
 Insurance Commissioners, during which notice of the agreement is to be sent, 
 nor have any particulars of such notice been prescribed. 
 
 Proceedings by Society or Committee. The proceedings are to be in 
 the name of the insured person, so that there will be nothing on the record to 
 show that they are taken by the society or committee, unless new rules are 
 made to compel adequate disclosure of the fact. 
 
 APPENDIX B. 
 
 THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RULES, 1907-1912. 
 
 DATED THE FIRST DAY OF JUNE, 1907, AS AMENDED BY THE RULES OP 
 
 MARCH 14 AND NOVEMBER 24, 1908, MAY 19, 1909, MARCH 31, 1911; 
 
 AND JULY 26, 1912. 
 
 NOTE. A Rule, sub-Rule, or portion thereof, in square brackets denotes an 
 amendment of, or addition to, the original Rule. The date, at the end thereof 
 denotes the date of amendment or addition. 
 
 Former Rules, how far annulled. The Workmen's Compensation Rules, 
 1898, the Workmen's Compensation Rules, 1899, and the Workmen's 
 Compensation Rules, 1900, are hereby annulled, but shall continue to apply 
 
 W.C.P. P 
 
210 APPENDIX B. [1-4 
 
 to cases whore the accident happened before the commencement of the 
 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, except so far as the provisions of 
 that Act and of these Rules relating to references to medical referees and 
 proceedings consequential thereon apply to those cases. 
 
 Preliminary. 
 
 1. Effect, short title, commencement, and construction of Rides. (1) The 
 following Rules shall have effect under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 
 1906 (in these Rules referred to as the Act), with reference to any matter 
 or proceeding for the regulation of which Rules of Court may be made under 
 the Act, and generally for carrying the Act into effect so far as it affects the 
 County Court or an arbitrator appointed by the judge of the County Court, 
 and proceedings in the County Court or before any such arbitrator. 
 
 (2) These Rules may be cited as the Workmen's Compensation Rules, 
 1907, and shall come into operation on the first day of July one thousand 
 nine hundred and seven ; but they shall not, except so far as they relate 
 to references to medical referees and proceedings consequential thereon, 
 apply to any case where the accident happened before the commencement 
 of the Act. 
 
 (3) Expressions used in these Rules shall have the same meaning as 
 the same expressions used in the Act. 
 
 (4) The Interpretation Act, 1889, shall apply for the purpose of the 
 interpretation of these Rules as it applies for the purposes of the interpreta- 
 tion of an Act of Parliament. 
 
 (5) These Rules shall also be read and construed with the County 
 Court Rules, 1903, and the County Court Rules of subsequent date amending 
 the same ; and any Order and Rule referred to by number in these Rules 
 shall mean the Order and Rule so numbered in the County Court Rules, 
 1903, or in any County Court Rules of subsequent date, as the case may be. 
 
 Parties to Arbitration before Judge or Arbitrator appointed by Judge. 
 
 2. Parties to arbitration. (1) When application is made for the settle- 
 ment by the judge, or by an arbitrator appointed by the judge, of anj r matter 
 which under the Act is to be settled by arbitration, the party making such 
 application shall Jbe called " the applicant " ; and, subject to these rules, 
 all other persons whose presence at the arbitration may be necessary to 
 enable the judge or arbitrator effectively and completely to adjudicate 
 upon and settle all the questions involved shall be made parties to the 
 application, and shall be called " the respondents." 
 
 (2) In any case in which both the principal as defined by the Act and a 
 contractor with him are alleged to be liable to pay compensation under 
 the Act, Order III., Rule 2, as to joinder of parties, shall apply. 
 
 3. Joinder of applicants. More persons than one may be joined as 
 applicants in one arbitration, in any case in which such persons might 
 be joined in one action as plaintiffs under Order III., Rule 1 ; and that 
 Rule, and Rules 18 and 19 of Order XLIV., shall, with the necessary 
 modifications, apply to any such arbitration. 
 
 4. Application by dependants. (1) An application on behalf of the de- 
 pendants of a deceased workman for the settlement by arbitration of the 
 amount payable as compensation to such dependants may be made by the 
 legal personal representative, if any, of the deceased workman on behalf 
 
5-7] WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION KULES, 1907-1912. 211 
 
 of such dependants, or by the dependants themselves ; and in either case 
 the particulars to be filed as hereinafter mentioned shall contain particulars 
 as to the dependants 011 whose behalf the application is made. 
 
 (2) Provided, that if there is any conflict of interest between the depen- 
 dants themselves, or if any dependants neglect or refuse to join in ar. applica- 
 tion, the application may be made by or on behalf of some only of such 
 dependants, the other dependants in either case being named as respondents. 
 
 (3) In the construction of this Rule the term " dependants " shall 
 include persons who claim or may be entitled to claim to be dependants, 
 but as to whose claim to rank as dependants any question arises. 
 
 . Application by dependants under Act, Sched. 1, par. 8, where amount 
 of compensation agreed or ascertained. (1) In any case in which the amount 
 payable as compensation to the dependants of a deceased workman has 
 been agreed upon or ascertained, but any question arises as to who are 
 dependants, or as to the amount payable to each dependant, an application 
 for the settlement of such question by arbitration may be made either by 
 the legal personal representative, if any, of the deceased workman on behalf 
 of the dependants or any of them, or by such dependants or any of them, 
 against the other dependants, and the persons claiming or who may be 
 entitled to claim to be dependants, but as to whose claim to rank as such 
 a question arises ; or such application may be made by the persons claiming 
 to be dependants, but as to whose claim to rank as such a question arises, 
 or any of them, against the legal personal representative, if any, of the 
 deceased workman, and the dependants, and such of the persons claiming 
 or who may be entitled to claim to be dependants as are not applicants. 
 
 (2) In any such case, if the employer has paid the agreed or ascertained 
 amount of compensation, it shall not be necessary to make him a respondent, 
 but if such compensation or any part thereof is still in his hands he shall be 
 made a respondent. 
 
 (3) The employer, if made a respondent, may pay the amount of com- 
 pensation in his hands into court, to be dealt with as the judge or arbitrator 
 shall direct, and thereupon further proceedings against him shall be stayed. 
 
 [(4.) The registrar shall within twenty-four hours from the time of pay- 
 ment made pursuant to the last preceding paragraph send notice thereof 
 to the applicant and to the other respondents (if any), and the employer shall 
 not be liable to any costs otherwise than in accordance with paragraph 5 (c) 
 of Rule 18]. (March 14, 1908.) 
 
 6. Parties 'to arbitration as to sum payable for medical attendance and 
 burial. Act, Sched, 1, par. 1, (a) (iii). (1) An application for the settlement 
 by arbitration of the sum payable in respect of medical attendance on and 
 the burial of a deceased workman who leaves no dependants shall be made 
 by the legal personal representative, if any, of the deceased workman. If 
 there is no such legal personal representative, the application may be made 
 by any person to whom any such expenses are due. In the latter case 
 any other person known to the applicant as a person to whom any such 
 expenses are due shall be joined in the application either as applicant or 
 respondent. 
 
 Apportionment of such sum. (2) In any case in which application is 
 made for the settlement by arbitration of such amount, the amount awarded, 
 if insufficient for the payment of such expenses in full, shall be apportioned 
 between the persons to whom such expenses are due in such manner as the 
 judge or arbitrator shall direct. 
 
 7. Parties under disability, and partners ; representation of parties having 
 the same interest. (1) The provisions of Rules 7 and 8 of Order III. as to 
 
212 APPENDIX B. [8-10 
 
 parties suing or defending on behalf of other persons having the same 
 interest, and the provisions of the County Court Rules as to persons under 
 disability and partners suing and being sued, shall, with the necessary 
 modifications, apply to proceedings by % way of arbitration under the Act. 
 NOTE. See Rule 78A. 
 
 [(2) Judge may direct infant to appear as if he were of full aye. Provided 
 that the judge may at any time direct that an infant shall appear either 
 as applicant or respondent in the same manner as if he were of full age.] 
 (July 26, 1912.) 
 
 Application for Arbitration. 
 
 8. Request for arbitration. (1) An application for the settlement of any 
 matter by arbitration shall not be made unless and until some question 
 has arisen between the parties, and such question has not been settled by 
 agreement. 
 
 (2) Where any question has arisen and has not been settled by agree- 
 ment, an application for the settlement of the matter by arbitration shall 
 be made by the applicant filing with the registrar a request for arbitration, 
 intituled in the matter of the Act and in the matter of the arbitration, 
 which request shall state concisely the question which has arisen, and shall, 
 with the subsequent proceedings thereon, be recorded in the special register 
 hereinafter mentioned. 
 
 (3) Particulars. Particulars shall be appended or annexed to the 
 request, containing 
 
 (a) A concise statement of the circumstances under which the application 
 
 is made, and the relief or order which the applicant claims ; 
 
 (b) The date of service of notice of the accident on the employer, or, 
 
 if such notice has not been served, the reason for such omission ; 
 and 
 
 (c) The full names and addresses of the respondents and of the applicant. 
 
 and of his solicitor, if the proceedings are commenced through a 
 solicitor. 
 
 9. Forms of request and particulars. Forms 1 to 11. (1) The request 
 and particulars shall be according to such one of the forms in the Appendix 
 as shall be applicable to the case, with such modifications as the nature of 
 the case may require. 
 
 (2) A copy of the notice of the accident shall be appended or annexed 
 to the particulars. If this Rule cannot be complied with, the reason for 
 the omission shall be stated in the particulars. 
 
 10. Application by employer. (1) Where an employer on whom a claim 
 for compensation has been made desires to make an application for the 
 settlement of any matter by arbitration, he shall file a request for arbitration 
 in accordance with Rule 8, to which the workman, or the legal personal 
 representative, if any, and the persons claiming or who may be entitled to 
 claim to be dependants of a deceased workman, or the other persons (as the 
 case may be) on whose behalf the claim was made, shall be respondents. 
 
 (2) Particulars shall be appended or annexed to the request, con- 
 taining 
 
 (a) A concise statement of the circumstances under which the application 
 
 is made ; 
 
 (b) A statement whether the applicant admits his liability to pay com- 
 
 pensation, or denies such liability, wholly or partially, with (in 
 
11-14] WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RULES, 1907-1912. 
 
 the latter case) a statement of the grounds on and extent to which 
 he denies liability ; 
 
 (c) A statement of the matters which the applicant desires to have 
 
 settled by arbitration ; and 
 
 (d) The full names and addresses of the respondents and of the applicant, 
 
 and of his solicitor, if the proceedings are commenced through a 
 solicitor. 
 
 11. Copies for judge and respondents. The applicant shall deliver to 
 the registrar with the request and particulars a copy thereof for the judge or 
 arbitrator, and a copy for each respondent to be served. 
 
 12. Where applicant is illiterate. Where the applicant is illiterate and 
 unable to furnish the required information in writing, the request and 
 particulars and copies shall be filled up by the registrar's clerk. 
 
 [12A. County Court Mules as to security for costs not to apply. Order V., 
 Rules 10 and 11, and Order XII., Rule 9, of the County Court Rules, as to 
 security for costs, shall not apply to proceedings under the Act and these 
 Rules.] (July 26, 1912.) 
 
 Proceedings on Arbitration before Judge. 
 Fixing Day and Place for Arbitration. 
 
 13. Fixing day and place for arbitration. (1) On the filing of a request 
 for arbitration, the registrar shall transmit a copy of the request and par- 
 ticulars to the judge, who shall as soon as conveniently may be (if he decides 
 to settle the matter himself), appoint a day and hour for proceeding with 
 the arbitration. Such day shall be so fixed as to allow the copies of the 
 request and particulars to be served on the respondents at least twenty 
 clear days before the day so fixed. 
 
 (2) The arbitration shall, subject as hereinafter mentioned, be held at 
 the place at which the court is held. 
 
 (3) Provided, that the judge may direct that the arbitration shall be 
 held at any other place within the district of the court, on application in 
 that behalf made by any party to the arbitration, and on such party filing 
 an undertaking to provide at his own expense a place to the satisfaction of 
 the judge in which the arbitration may be held, and to pay the necessary 
 expenses of the judge and officers of the court attending at such place. 
 
 (4) If such direction is given before the notices mentioned in the next 
 following Rule are issued, the registrar shall insert in such notices the place 
 at which the arbitration has been so directed to be held. 
 
 (5) If such direction is given after such notices have been issued, the 
 registrar shall forthwith send notice by post to the parties of the place at 
 which the arbitration has been so directed to be held. 
 
 Notice of Day Fixed. 
 
 14. Notice to parties. Forms 12, 13. (1) On the day for proceeding 
 with an arbitration being fixed, the registrar shall give or send by post 
 notice in writing to the applicant, stating the place at which and the day and 
 hour on and at which the arbitration will be proceeded with, and shall 
 issue the copies of the request and particulars, under the seal of the court, 
 for service on the respondents, together with notices under the seal of the 
 court, stating the place at which and the day and hour on and at which 
 the arbitration will be proceeded with, and that if the respondents do not 
 
214 APPENDIX B. [15, 16 
 
 attend in person or by their solicitors such order will be made and proceedings 
 taken as the judge may think just and expedient. 
 
 Nate. Signature of registrars is no longer required (March 14, 1908). 
 
 (2) Notice where employer is applicant. Form 13. Where the request 
 is filed by an employer, the notices to be served on the respondents shall be 
 modified by the omission of the words therein relating to the denial or 
 admission of liability to pay compensation. 
 
 Service on Respondents. 
 
 15. Service on respondents. (1) The copies and notices mentioned in 
 the last preceding Rule shall be served on the respondents at least twentj' 
 clear days before the day fixed for proceeding with the arbitration. 
 
 (2) The copies and notices mentioned in the last preceding Rule may be 
 served 
 
 (a) By a bailiff of a court ; 
 or, at the request of the applicant or his solicitor, 
 
 (6) By the applicant, or some clerk or servant in his permanent and 
 exclusive employ ; or 
 
 (c) By the applicant's solicitor, or a solicitor acting as agent for such 
 solicitor, or some person in the employ of either of them, or some 
 person employed by either of them to serve such copies and notices, 
 who might be so employed to serve a writ in an action in the 
 High Court. 
 
 (3) Service may be effected either in accordance with the Rules as to 
 service of default summonses, or by registered post in accordance with the 
 provisions of sub-sections 3 and 4 of section 2 of the Act with reference to 
 service of notice in respect of an injury, and the provisions of those sub- 
 sections shall apply to such service. 
 
 (4) Where service effected otherwise than by bailiff. Where service is 
 effected otherwise than by a bailiff, a copy of the document served, with 
 the date and mode of service endorsed thereon, shall within three clear days 
 next after the date of service, or such further time as may be allowed by 
 the registrar of the court issuing such document, be delivered or transmitted 
 to such registrar by the applicant. The applicant shall also (unless the 
 respondent files an answer) after the time limited for filing an answer, 
 deliver or transmit to the registrar an affidavit of the service of such document, 
 according to Form 37 in the Appendix to the County Court Rules, with such 
 variations as the circumstances of the case may require. 
 
 (5) Service by post. Where a document is served by post it shall, unless 
 the contrary be proved, be deemed to have been served at the time when 
 the letter containing the same would have been delivered in the ordinary 
 course of post, and in proving the service of such document it shall be 
 sufficient to prove that the same was properly addressed and registered. 
 
 (6) Service on respondent in Scotland or Ireland. Where the accident 
 occurred in England, and any respondent resides in Scotland or Ireland, 
 service on such respondent may be effected in accordance with this Rule, 
 and service so effected shall be deemed to be sufficient. 
 
 Stay of Proceedings. 
 
 16. Stay of proceedings in other arbitrations to abide decision as to liability 
 in atlecttd arbitration. Where several reqxiests for arbitration are filed by 
 
17, 18] WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BULKS, 1907-1912. 215 
 
 different applicants against the same respondent in the same court in respect 
 of matters arising out of the same circumstances, the respondent may, 
 on tiling an undertaking to be bound, so far as his liability to pay compen- 
 sation is concerned, by the award in such one of the said arbitrations as 
 may be selected by the judge, apply to the judge under Order VIII. Rule 2, 
 for "an order to stay proceedings in the arbitrations other than the one so 
 selected until an award is made in such selected arbitration ; and Rules 
 2 to 6 of Order VIII. shall, with the necessary modifications, apply accordingly. 
 
 Answer by Respondent. 
 
 17. Answer by respondent. Form 14. (1) If any respondent desires to 
 disclaim any interest in the subject-matter of an arbitration, or considers 
 that the applicant's particulars are in any respect inaccurate or incomplete, 
 or desires to bring any fact or document to the notice of the judge, or intends 
 to rely on the fact that notice of the accident, or of death, disablement, 
 or suspension, was not given as required by the Act, or that the claim for 
 compensation was not made within the time limited by the Act, or intends 
 to deny (wholly or partially) his liability to pay compensation under the 
 Act, he shall, ten clear days at least before the day fixed for proceeding 
 with the arbitration, file with the registrar an answer, stating his name and 
 address, and the name and address of his solicitor (if any), and stating 
 that he disclaims any interest in the subject-matter of the arbitration, or 
 stating in what respect the applicant's particulars are inaccurate or incom- 
 plete, or stating concisely any fact or document which he desires to bring 
 to the notice of the judge, or on which he intends to rely, or the grounds on 
 and extent to which he denies liability. 
 
 (2) The respondent shall with such answer file copies thereof for the 
 applicant and the judge, and one copy for each of the other respondents ; 
 and the registrar shall within twenty-four hours after receiving such copies 
 transmit the same by post to the applicant and the judge and the other 
 respondents respectively. 
 
 (3) Subject to any answer so filed, and to the provisions of the next 
 following paragraph, the applicant's particulars, and, in the case of a claim 
 for compensation, the liability to pay compensation under the Act, shall be 
 taken to be admitted. 
 
 (4) Provided, that in case of non-compliance with this Rule, and of 
 the applicant's not consenting at the arbitration to permit a respondent 
 to avail himself of any matter of which he should pursuant to this Rule 
 have given notice by filing an answer, the judge may, on such terms as he 
 shall think fit, either proceed with the arbitration and allow the respondent 
 to avail himself of such matter, or adjourn the arbitration to enable the 
 respondent to file such answer. 
 
 (5) Answer where employer is applicant. The provisions of this Rule 
 shall, with the necessary modifications, apply to a case in which a request 
 for arbitration is filed by an employer ; but a respondent who fails to file 
 an answer shall not be taken to admit the truth of any statement in the 
 applicant's particulars in which he denies, wholly or partially, his liability 
 to pay compensation. 
 
 Submission to Award, or Payment into Court by Respondent. 
 
 18. Submission to award or payment into court by respondent. Form 15. 
 (1) Where a respondent from whom compensation islaimed admits liability 
 he may at any time before the day fixed for proceeding with the arbitration 
 
216 APPENDIX B. [18 
 
 (a) Where the application is made by an injured workman, file with 
 
 the registrar a notice that the respondent submits to an award 
 for the payment of a weekly sum, to be specified in such notice ; 
 or 
 
 (b) Where the application Ls made on behalf of the dependants of a 
 
 deceased workman, or for the settlement of the sum payable in 
 respect of medical attendance on and the burial of a deceased 
 workman who leaves no dependants, pa}- into court such sum of 
 money as the respondent considers sufficient to cover his liability 
 in the circumstances of the case. 
 
 (2) Forms 16, 17. The registrar shall within twenty-four hours from 
 the time of any notice filed or payment made pursuant to the last preceding 
 paragraph send notice thereof (with, where a notice is filed, a copy of such 
 notice) to the applicant, and to the other respondents (if any). 
 
 (3) Acceptance of weekly payment offered. Form 18. If the applicant 
 is a workman, and elects to accept in satisfaction of his claim the weekly 
 payment specified in the respondent's notice, he shall send to the registrar 
 and to the respondent b}' post, or leave at the registrar's office and at the 
 residence or place of business of the respondent, a written notice according 
 to the form in the Appendix, stating such acceptance, within such reason- 
 able time before the day fixed for proceeding with the arbitration as the time 
 of filing of notice of submission by the respondent has permitted. 
 
 (4) Acceptance of sum paid into Court. Form 18. If the application 
 for arbitration is made on behalf of the dependants of a deceased workman, 
 or for the settlement of the sum payable in respect of medical attendance 
 and burial as aforesaid, and the applicant is willing to accept the sum paid 
 into court in satisfaction of the compensation payable to the dependants, 
 or hi respect of such medical attendance and burial (as the case may be), 
 he shall send to the registrar and to the respondent by post, or leave at the 
 registrar's office and at the residence or place of business of the respondent, 
 a written notice of such willingness, according to the form in the Appendix, 
 within such reasonable time before the day fixed for proceeding with the 
 arbitration as the time of payment into court by the respondent has 
 permitted. 
 
 If there are any other respondents, the applicant shall in like manner 
 give notice of such willingness to such respondent ; and if any of such 
 respondents are willing to accept the sum paid into court in satisfaction 
 of such compensation as aforesaid, they shall in like manner give notice 
 of such , willingness to the registrar and to the applicant and the other 
 respondents. 
 
 (5) Procedure if weekly payment offered or sum paid in is accepted. If 
 the applicant is a workman, and elects to accept in satisfaction of his claim 
 the weekly payment submitted to by the respondent, or if in any other 
 case the applicant and all the respondents give notice of their willingness to 
 accept the sum paid into Court, the following provisions shall apply : 
 
 (a) Where the respondent submits to an award for the payment of a 
 weekly sum, the judge may, on application made to him in or out 
 of court, forthwith make an award directing payment of such 
 weekly sum accord ingly ; 
 
 (6) WTiere the respondent has paid money into court, further proceedings 
 
 against such respondent shall be stayed, except as hereinafter 
 mentioned ; and 
 
 (i) If the applicant and the other respondents agree as to the apportion- 
 ment and application of such sum, the judge may, on application 
 
18] WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION EULES, 1907-1912. 217 
 
 made to him in or out of court on behalf of or with the consent 
 of all such parties, forthwith make an award for such apportion- 
 ment and application ; 
 
 (ii) In any other case the arbitration may proceed as between the 
 applicant and the other respondents. 
 
 (c) Costs payable by respondent. In any 'such case the judge may, in 
 
 his discretion, by his award order the respondent tiling notice of 
 submission to an award or paying money into court to pay such 
 costs as the applicant and the other respondents, or any of them, 
 may have properly incurred before the receipt of notice of submission 
 to an award or payment into court, [and his or their costs 
 properly incurred in relation to the notice of submission to an 
 award or payment into court and to the notice of acceptance,] 
 including, if the judge on consideration of the facts of the case 
 shall so order, any items which might have been allowed by order 
 of the judge at the hearing of the arbitration. (March 31, 1911.) 
 
 (d) Form 18. If the applicant or any respondent intends to apply 
 
 for any such costs, he shall give notice of his intention in his notice 
 of acceptance, according to the form in the Appendix ; or where 
 the time of filing notice of submission to an award or the time of 
 payment ioto court by the respondent does not permit of notice 
 of acceptance being given, the applicant or any respondent may 
 apply for such costs without giving such notice. 
 
 (6) Acceptance at any time before arbitration opened. Costs. Where 
 any party has not given notice of acceptance in accordance with this Rule, 
 he may nevertheless accept the weekly payment which the respondent has 
 submitted to pay, or the sum paid into court, at any time before the arbitra- 
 tion is called on and opened, subject to the payment of any costs which may 
 have been reasonably incurred by the respondent since the date of filing notice 
 of submission or the date of payment into court, and which may be allowed 
 by the judge ; and the judge may order any costs so allowed to be paid by 
 the party so accepting, and may order such costs to be set off against any 
 costs payable to such party, or to be deducted from any weekly payment or 
 compensation awarded to such party. 
 
 (7) Procedure and costs if weekly sum offered or sum paid in is not accepted. 
 In default of notice of acceptance by the applicant and all the respondents, 
 the arbitration paay proceed ; but if no greater weekly payment or compensa 
 tion is awarded than that which the respondent has submitted to pay or 
 has paid into court, such respondent shall not be liable to pay any further 
 costs than such as he might have been ordered to pay if the weekly payment 
 offered or sum paid into court had been accepted ; and the judge may order 
 anj 7 costs incurred by such respondent after notice of submission to an 
 award or payment into court to be paid by any party who has not given 
 notice of acceptance of such weekly payment or sum, and may order such 
 costs to be set off against any costs payable to such party, or to be deducted 
 from any weekly payment or compensation awarded to such party. The 
 judge may also order any costs incurred after notice of payment into court 
 by any party who has given notice of acceptance to be paid by any other 
 party who has not given such notice, and to be deducted from any com- 
 pensation awarded to such last-mentioned party. 
 
 (8) Submission to award or payment into Court where employer is applicant. 
 The provisions of this Rule shall, with the necessary modifications, apply 
 to a case in which an employer who has filed a request for arbitration admits 
 liability to pay compensation. 
 
218 APPENDIX B. [19, 20 
 
 [(9) Payment into court in case of injury to workman. Where in the case 
 of an injured workman an employer admits liability-, he may at any time- 
 before the time fixed for proceeding with the arbitration, instead of filing 
 a notice that he submits to an award for the pa3 T ment of a weekly sum, 
 file a notice that he submits to an award for the payment of a lump sum, 
 to be specified in the notice, which he considers to be sufficient to cover his 
 liability in the circumstances of the case, and may thereupon pay such 
 sum into court ; and the provisions of this Rule shall with the necessary 
 modifications apply to a case in which an employer files a notice and pays 
 money into court under this paragraph. 
 
 (10) Submission to award or payment into court with denial of liability. 
 An employer who denies liability may file a notice of submission to an 
 award or pay money into court in accordance with this Rule, accompanied 
 by a notice stating his name and address, and further stating that not- 
 withstanding such submission or payment he denies his liability, together with 
 as many copies of such notice as there are parties to whom notice of such 
 submission or payment is to be sent ; and the provisions of this Rule shall 
 with the necessary modifications apply to a case in which an employer 
 files a notice of submission to an award or pays monej T into court under this 
 paragraph ; and a copy of the notice denying liability shall be sent by the 
 registrar to every person to whom notice of submission to an award or 
 payment into court is to be sent.] (May 19, 1909.) 
 
 Notice to Parties against whom Indemnity claimed under section 4. 
 
 19. Notice of claim to indemnity under section 4. Form 23. Where a 
 respondent claims to be entitled under section 4 of the Act to indemnity 
 against any person not a party to the arbitration, he shall, ten clear days at 
 least before the day fixed for proceeding with the arbitration, file a notice of 
 his claim according to the form in the Appendix ; and the registrar shall 
 seal such notice and deliver it to the respondent, who shall serve the same, 
 together with a copy of the applicant's request and particulars, and of the 
 notice served on the respondent under Rules 14 and 15, upon the person 
 against whom such claim is made ; and the provisions of paragraphs 2 to 6 of 
 Rule 15 shall apply to such service. 
 
 20. Appearance by third party. If any person served with a notice under 
 the last preceding Rule (hereinafter called the third party) desires to dispute 
 the applicant's claim in the arbitration as against the respondent on whose 
 behalf the notice has been given, or his own liability to such respondent, he 
 must appear before the judge on the day fixed for proceeding with the 
 arbitration, or on any day to which he may have received notice from the 
 registrar that the arbitration has been adjourned or postponed ; and in 
 default of his so doing he shall be deemed to admit the validity of any award 
 made against such respondent as to any matter which the judge has juris- 
 diction to decide in the arbitration as between the applicant and the respon- 
 dent, whether such award is made by consent or otherwise, and his own 
 liability to indemnify the respondent to the extent claimed in the notice 
 served on him by the respondent. 
 
 Where notice not served in due time. Provided, that if it appears to the 
 judge before or at the arbitration that the notice of claim has, not been 
 served on the third party in time to enable him to appear on the day here- 
 inbefore mentioned, or that for any other sufficient cause the third party 
 is unable to appear on such day, the judge may adjourn the proceedings 
 in the arbitration on such terms, as to costs and otherwise, as may be just. 
 
21-24] WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RULES, 1907-1912. 219 
 
 21. Proceedings on default of appearance by third party. If the third 
 party fails to appear on the day mentioned in Rule 20, or, if the proceedings 
 are adjourned under that Rule, on the day to which the proceedings are 
 adjourned, then if the arbitration results in an award in favour of the appli- 
 cant, or the arbitration is finally decided in favour of the applicant otherwise 
 than by an award, the judge may on the application of the respondent make 
 such award as the nature of the case may require in favour of the respondent 
 against the third party : but execution thereon shall not issue without leave 
 of the judge until after satisfaction by the respondent of the aw^ard against 
 him, or the amount recovered against him. 
 
 Provided, that the judge may set aside or vary any award made against 
 the third party under this Rule upon such terms as may be just. 
 
 22. Application for directions. What directions may be given. The third 
 party or the respondent may apply before or at the arbitration to the judge 
 for directions : and the judge, upon the hearing of the application, may, 
 if satisfied that there is a question proper to be determined as to the liability 
 of the third party to make the indemnity claimed, in whole or in part, 
 order the question of such liability as between the third party and the 
 respondent giving the notice to be determined at or after the arbitration, 
 and if not so satisfied may make such award as the nature of the case may 
 require in favour of the respondent giving the notice against the third party : 
 or the judge may, if it appears desirable so to do, give the third party leave 
 to resist the claim of the applicant against the respondent upon such terms 
 as may be just, or to appear at the arbitration and take such part therein 
 as may be just, and generally may give such directions as he may think 
 proper for having the question most conveniently determined, and as to the 
 mode or extent in or to which the third party shall be bound or made liable 
 by the award in the arbitration. 
 
 23. Costs. The judge may decide all questions of costs as between a 
 third party and the other parties to the arbitration, and may order any one 
 or more to pay the costs of any other or others, or give such directions as to 
 costs as the justice of the case may require. 
 
 Notice to Parties against whom Indemnity claimed under section 6, 
 or otherwise. 
 
 24. Notice of claim to indemnity under section 6, or otherwise than under 
 section 4. Form 23. (1) Where a respondent claims that if compensation 
 is recovered against him he will be entitled under section 6 of the Act, or 
 otherwise than under section 4, to indemnity against any person not a party 
 to the arbitration, he shall file and serve a notice of his claim in accordance 
 with Rule 19. 
 
 (2) If person served makes default in appearing, he is to be deemed to admit 
 validity of award against respondent. If any person served with a notice 
 under the last preceding paragraph (herein-after called the third party) 
 desires to dispute the applicant's claim in the arbitration as against the 
 respondent on whose behalf the notice has been given, he must appear 
 before the judge on the day fixed for proceeding with the arbitration, or on 
 any day to which he may have received notice from the registrar that 
 the arbitration has been adjourned or postponed ; and in default of his 
 so doing he shall be deemed to admit the validity of any award made against 
 such respondent as to any matter which the judge has jurisdiction to decide 
 in the arbitration as between the applicant and the respondent, whether 
 such award is made by consent or otherwise. 
 
 Where notice not served in due time. Provided, that if it appears to 
 
220 APPENDIX B. [25 
 
 the judge before or at the arbitration that the notice of claim has not 
 been served on the third party in time to enable him to appear on the 
 day hereinbefore mentioned, or that for any other sufficient cause the 
 third party is unable to appear on such day, the judge may adjourn the 
 proceedings in the arbitration on such terms, as to costs or otherwise, as 
 may be just. 
 
 (3) Applications to judge for directions as to conduct of arbitration. 
 The third party or the respondent may apply before or at the arbitration 
 to the judge for directions ; and the judge, upon the hearing of the applica- 
 tion, may, if it appears desirable so to do, give the third party leave to resist 
 the claim of the applicant against the respondent upon such terms as may 
 be just, or to appear at the arbitration and take such part therein as may 
 be just, and generally may give such directions as he shall think proper. 
 
 (4) Costs. If the third party obtains leave to resist the claim of the 
 applicant against the respondent, the provisions of Rule 23 as to costs shall 
 apply. 
 
 (5) Judge how far empowered to decide questions as to liability of third 
 party. Nothing in this rule shall empower the judge to decide (otherwise 
 than by consent) any question as to the liability of the third party to 
 indemnify the respondent, or to make any award in favour of the respondent 
 against the third party, or to make any further or other order than that 
 the third party shall not be entitled in any future proceedings between the 
 respondent and such third party to dispute the validity of the award as to 
 any matter which the judge has jurisdiction to decide in the arbitration as 
 between the applicant and the respondent. 
 
 (6) Provided, that with the consent of the respondent and the third 
 party, 
 
 (a) If the arbitration results in an award in favour of the applicant, 
 or is finally decided in favour of the applicant otherwise than by 
 an award, and the third party admits his liability to indemnif}- 
 the respondent, the judge may, on application made to him at 
 or after the hearing of the arbitration or the final decision thereof, 
 make such award as the nature of the case may require in favour 
 of the respondent against the third party ; but execution thereon 
 shall not issue without leave of the judge until after satisfaction 
 by the respondent of the award against him, or the amount recovered 
 against him ; or 
 
 (6) The judge may, on an application for directions, order any question 
 as to the liability of the third party to make the indemnity claimed 
 to be settled, as between the respondent and the third party, by 
 arbitration after the arbitration between the applicant and the 
 respondent, and may on such subsequent arbitration make such 
 award as the nature of the case may require in favour of either 
 party against the other. 
 
 (c) In any such case the judge may decide all questions of costs as 
 between the respondent and the third party, and may order 
 either of such parties to pay the costs of the other (including any 
 costs payable by such party to any other party to the arbitration), 
 or give such directions as to such costs as the justice of the case may 
 require. 
 
 Third Party Procedure where Employer is Applicant. 
 
 25. Third party procedure where employer is applicant. The provisions 
 of Rules 20 to 24 shall, with the necessary modifications, apply to a case in 
 
26-29] WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RULES, 1907-1912. 221 
 
 which an employer Avho has filed a request for arbitration claims to be entitled 
 to indemnity against any person not a party to the arbitration. 
 
 Claim to Indemnity as between Respondents. 
 
 26. Claim to indemnity as between respondents. (1) Where a respondent 
 claims to be entitled to indemnity against any other respondent, a like 
 notice shall be issued and the like procedure shall thereupon be adopted for 
 the determination of questions between the respondents as might be issued 
 and adopted against such other respondent if such last -mentioned respondent 
 were a third party. 
 
 (2) Nothing herein contained shall prejudice the rights of the applicant 
 against any respondent. 
 
 Abridgment of Time for Service, etc. 
 
 [2iQa. Abridgment of time for service, answer, etc. The judge or registrar 
 may for good cause shown abridge the time for service of a request for 
 arbitration on any respondent or the time for filing an answer or serving a 
 third party notice under these rules ; and if an order is made to that effect 
 a copy of the order shall be annexed to and served with the notice to be 
 served on the respondent.] (March 31, 1911.) 
 
 Procedure on Arbitration. 
 
 27. Procedure on arbitration. (1) Subject to the special provisions of 
 these Rules, the procedure in an arbitration shall be the same as the pro- 
 cedure in an action commenced in the county court by plaint and summons 
 in the ordinary way, and determined by the judge without a jury [in so far as 
 such procedure is applicable to proceedings by way of arbitration] ; and the 
 statutory provisions and rules for the time being in force relating to such 
 actions shall, with the necessary modifications, apply to such arbitration 
 accordingly ; and in the application of such provisions and rules the appli- 
 cant's request for arbitration shall be deemed to be a summons with par- 
 ticulars annexed, the day fixed for proceeding with the arbitration shall be 
 deemed to be the return day, and the applicant and respondents shall be 
 deemed to be plaintiff and defendants respectively. (March 31. 1911.) 
 
 (2) Burden of proof of facts not admitted. Provided, that the burden of 
 proof of any facts which are not admitted shall be the same, whoever the 
 party may be by whom the request for arbitration is filed. 
 
 Award. 
 
 28. Award. Form 24. (1) The award of the judge on any arbitration 
 shall be prepared and settled by the registrar, and shall be signed by the 
 judge, and shall be sealed and filed, and sealed copies thereof shall be served 
 on all persons affected thereby in accordance with Rule 7 of Order XXIII. ; 
 and such award shall be enforceable in the same manner as a judgment or 
 order of the court. 
 
 (2) The judge shall have power at any time to correct any clerical 
 mistake or error in such award arising from any accidental slip or omission. 
 NOTE. See John Mowlem & Co. v. Dunne, p. 183, ante. 
 
 Proceedings before Arbitrator appointed by Judge. 
 Appointment of Arbitrator by Judge. 
 
 29. Appointment of arbitrator by judge. With respect to the appoint- 
 ment of an arbitrator by the judge, the following provisions shall apply : 
 
222 APPENDIX B. [30, 31 
 
 () If with respect to any court the Lord Chancellor, by general order, 
 authorises the settlement by an arbitrator appointed by the judge 
 of matters which, in default of such authorisation, would be settled 
 by the judge, the judge may from time to time, on an application 
 being made for the settlement of any matter, either settle the same 
 himself, or he may, with the approval of the Lord Chancellor, 
 appoint, by writing under his hand, and filed in the court, an 
 arbitrator to settle such matter. 
 
 (b) If with respect to any court, the Lord Chancellor makes no such 
 
 general order as aforesaid, then, on an application being made for 
 the settlement of any matter, the judge may (if from the state of 
 business in the court, or for any other reason, he is unable to settle 
 such matter within a reasonable time) apply to the Lord Chancellor 
 to authorise the settlement of such matter by an arbitrator ap- 
 pointed by the judge. 
 
 (c) If the Lord Chancellor does not grant such authority, the judge shall 
 
 proceed to settle the matter in accordance with the Act and these 
 Rules. 
 
 (d) If the Lord Chancellor grants such authority, the judge may, with 
 
 the approval of the Lord Chancellor, appoint, by writing under 
 his hand, and filed in the court, an arbitrator to settle such matter. 
 
 (e) In case of the death or refusal or inability to act of an arbitrator 
 
 appointed under this Rule, the judge may, on the application of 
 any party, appoint a new arbitrator in accordance with this Rule. 
 
 Fixing day for Arbitration. 
 
 30. Fixing day and place for proceedings before arbitrator, Where any 
 matter is to be settled by an arbitrator, the judge shall return the copy of 
 the request for arbitration to the registrar, with the appointment of such 
 arbitrator, to be transmitted to the arbitrator ; and the registrar shall 
 transmit the copy of the request and a copy of the appointment to the 
 arbitrator, who shall, as soon as conveniently may be, appoint a day and 
 hour for proceeding with the arbitration, in accordance with Rule 13, and 
 the provisions of that Rule as to the place where an arbitration shall be held 
 shall apply. Provided, that where the arbitration is to be held at the place 
 where the court is held, the day appointed for the arbitration shall, if possible, 
 be one on which the court or other suitable accommodation in the court 
 house will be available for the arbitration. 
 
 Procedure before Arbitrator. 
 
 31. Procedure before arbitrator. (1) On the day for proceeding with an 
 arbitration being fixed the registrar shall proceed according to Rule 14, and 
 thenceforward the arbitration shall proceed in the same manner as an arbitra- 
 tion before the judge ; and these Rules shall apply and the officers of the 
 court shall act accordingly, with the substitution of the arbitrator for the 
 judge. 
 
 (2) Provided that 
 
 (a) In any case coming within the provisions of paragraph 5 (a) or 
 paragraph 5 (6) (i) of Rule 18, or in any other case in which, 
 after an arbitrator has been appointed, but before the day fixed 
 for proceeding with the arbitration, the parties agree upon an 
 award, the judge may, on application made to him in or out of 
 
32,33] WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION KULES, 1907-1912. 223 
 
 court on behalf of or with the consent of all parties, settle the 
 matter himself ; and thereupon the functions of the arbitrator 
 as to such matter shall cease, and the registrar shall forthwith 
 inform liim that the matter has been settled ; and 
 (&) Any application for the enforcement of or for staying proceedings 
 on an award, which would in the case of an award made by the 
 judge be required to be made to the judge, shall, in the case of 
 an award made by an arbitrator, be in like manner made to the 
 judge. 
 
 Submission of Question of Law by Committee or Arbitrator 
 to Judge. 
 
 32. (1) Submission of question of law by committee or arbitrator to judge. 
 Act, Sched. 2, par. 4. Where a committee or an arbitrator (whether agreed 
 on by the parties or appointed by the judge) submits any question of law 
 for the decision of the judge under paragraph 4 of the second schedule to 
 the Act, such submission shall be in the form of a special case. 
 
 (2) Statement of case. The case shall be intituled in the matter of the 
 Act and of the arbitration, and shall be divided into paragraphs numbered 
 consecutively, and shall state concisely such facts and documents as may 
 be necessary to enable the judge to decide the question of law raised there- 
 by. Upon the argument of the case the judge and the parties shall be at 
 liberty to refer to the whole contents of such documents, and the judge 
 shall be at liberty to draw from the facts and documents stated in the case 
 any inference, whether of fact or of law, which might have been drawn 
 therefrom if proved at the hearing of an arbitration. 
 
 (3) Fixing day for hearing. Form 25. The case shall be signed by the 
 chairman and secretary of the 1 committee or by the arbitrator, and sent to 
 the registrar, who shall transmit the same to the judge, and the judge shall 
 as soon as conveniently may be appoint a day and hour for hearing the 
 case, and instruct the registrar to give notice thereof forthwith to the parties. 
 The day shall be so fixed as to allow notice to be given ten days at least 
 before the day fixed for the hearing, unless the judge shall, with the consent 
 of all parties, fix an earlier day. 
 
 (4) Copies of case. The registrar shall, on the application and at the 
 cost of any party, furnish him with a copy of the case. 
 
 (5) Power of judge on hearing of case. On the hearing of the case the 
 judge may, after deciding the question submitted to him, remit the case 
 with a memorandum of his decision to the committee or arbitrator, for 
 them or him to proceed thereon in accordance with the decision ; or if the 
 decision of the judge on the question submitted to him disposes of the whole 
 matter, he may himself make an award in the arbitration in accordance 
 with such decision. 
 
 (6) Re-statement. The judge may remit the case to the committee or 
 arbitrator for re-statement or further statement. 
 
 (7) Costs of special case. The judge shall have the same power over the 
 costs of a special case as he has over the costs of an arbitration, or he may 
 direct that such costs shall be dealt with as costs attending the arbitration ; 
 and the provisions of the Act and these Rules as to such costs shall apply 
 accordingly. 
 
 Appearance of Parties in Arbitration. 
 33. Appearance of parties. (1) A party to any arbitration under the 
 
'2'2 APPENDIX B. [34, 35 
 
 Act [whether before a committee or an agreed arbitrator, or before a judge 
 or an arbitrator appointed by a judge] may appear 
 
 (a) In person : 
 
 (6) By any solicitor who would be entitled to appear for such party in 
 an action hi the county court : 
 
 (c) By counsel : 
 
 Or, by leave of the judge or arbitrator, a party may appear 
 
 (d) By a member of his family : 
 
 (e) By a person in the permanent and exclusive employment of such party : 
 ( / ) In the case of a company or corporation, by any director of the 
 
 company or corporation, or by the secretary or any other officer 
 or any person in the permanent and exclusive employment of the 
 company or corporation : 
 
 (g) By any officer or member of any society or other body of persons of 
 which such party is a member or with which he is connected [or, 
 where death results from the injury, by any officer or member of 
 any society, or other body of persons of which the deceased work- 
 man was a member or with which he was connected] ; or 
 (h) Under special circumstances, by any other person. (Nov. 24, 1908.) 
 (2) No person other than a solicitor who appears or acts on behalf of 
 any party in anj r arbitration under the Act shall be entitled to have or 
 recover any fee or reward for so appearing or acting, other than such travel- 
 ling expenses and (in the case of a workman or a member of his family) 
 allowance for time (if any) as may be allowed by the judge or arbitrator : 
 provided that nothing in these Rules contained shall affect the right of 
 counsel to appear or act in any arbitration, or the right of any solicitor to 
 recover costs in respect of his employment of counsel to appear or act as 
 aforesaid, . 
 
 NOTE. See Rule 78A. 
 
 Duty of Judge as to taking Notes. 
 
 34. Note to be taken of question of law raised, etc., and copy furnished. At 
 the hearing of any arbitration or special case the judge shall make a note of 
 any question of law raised, and of the facts in evidence in relation thereto, 
 and of his decision thereon, and of his decision in the arbitration or on the 
 hearing of the case : and he shall, at the expense of any party to such 
 arbitration or case, furnish a copy of the note so taken to or allow a copy of 
 the same to be taken by or on behalf of such party, and shall sign such copy, 
 whether a notice of motion by way of appeal has been served or not. 
 
 Proceedings against Insurers under Section 5. 
 
 35. (1) Where rights of bankrupt, etc., employer against insurers vest in 
 ivorkman under section 5. Where under section 5 of the Act the rights of 
 an employer against any insurers under a contract entered into by the 
 employer with the insurers in respect of any liability under the Act to any 
 workman are transferred to and vest in the workman, the following pro- 
 visions shall have effect. 
 
 (2) Examination of employer as to insurance. Where a workman who is 
 or claims to be entitled to compensation from an employer to whom section 5 
 of the Act applies is unable to ascertain whether such employer has entered 
 into a contract with insurers in respect of his liability, he may apply to the 
 court on affidavit intituled in the matter of the Act, and setting forth the 
 facts on which the application is made, for an order for the examination of 
 
59, 60J WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RULES, 1907-1912. 241 
 
 the first schedule to the Act may be made by [or on behalf of] any person 
 interested. (Nov. 24, 1908.) 
 
 (2) Farm 55. The application shall be made in court on notice in 
 writing, stating the circumstances under which the application is made, and 
 the relief or order which the applicant claims. 
 
 (3) The notice shall be filed with the registrar, and notice thereof shall 
 be served on all persons interested in accordance with Rule 48 ; and the 
 provisions of that Rule and of Rule 56 shall apply to the proceedings on 
 such application. 
 
 Investment and Application of Lump Sum paid in Redemption of Weekly 
 Payment, Schedule I., Paragraph 17. 
 
 59. Investment and application of sums paid in redemption of weekly 
 payments. Act, Sched. 1, par. 17. Where pursuant to paragraph 17 of the 
 first schedule to the Act a lump sum payable for the redemption of any 
 weekly payment is ordered by a committee or an arbitrator, or by the judge, 
 to be invested or applied for the benefit of the person entitled thereto, such 
 sum shall be paid into court ; and the provisions of paragraph 5 of the first 
 schedule to the Act and of Rule 56 shall apply to the investment and applica- 
 tion of such lump sum. 
 
 Proceedings where Workman receiving Weekly Payment intends to cease to 
 reside in United Kingdom, Schedule I., Paragraph 18. 
 
 60. Where workman receiving weekly payment intends to cease to reside in 
 United Kingdom. Act, Sched. 1, par. 18. (1) Where a workman receiving 
 a weekly payment intends to cease to reside in the United Kingdom, the 
 following provisions shall have effect under paragraph 18 of the first schedule 
 to the Act. 
 
 (2) The workman may apply to the registrar to refer to a medical referee 
 the question whether the incapacity of the workman resulting from the 
 injury is likely to be of a permanent nature. 
 
 [(3) Form 56A. The application shall be made on notice in writing, 
 according to the form in the Appendix, which shall be filed with the registrar, 
 and shall be accompanied by a report of a medical practitioner selected by 
 the workman, , setting out the nature of the incapacity alleged to be the 
 result of the injury ; and a copy of the application and of the report shall 
 be served on the employer or his solicitor in accordance with Rule 48 ; and 
 the applicant shall file a copy of the application and of the report for the use 
 of the medical referee. 
 
 (4) The employer may, on being served with notice of the application, 
 require the workman to submit himself for examination by a medical 
 practitioner provided and paid by the employer, in accordance with para- 
 graph 14 of the first schedule to the Act ; and if the employer requires the 
 workman to submit himself for such examination he shall before or at the 
 hearing of the application furnish the workman with a copy of the report of 
 that practitioner as to the workman's condition, and file a copy of the report 
 for the use of the medical referee. 
 
 (4A) The workman and the employer respectively may before or at the 
 hearing of the application submit to the registrar such statements in writing 
 as they may think fit, with copies of such statements for the use of the 
 medical referee. 
 
 (5) Form 5?A. On the hearing of the application the registrar, on being 
 
 W.C.A. K 
 
242 APPENDIX B. [60 
 
 satisfied that the applicant has a bond fide intention of ceasing to reside in 
 the United Kingdom, shall make an order referring the question to a medical 
 referee ; and if he is not so satisfied, he may refuse to make an order, but in 
 that case he shall, if so requested by the applicant, refer the matter to the 
 judge, who may make such order or give such directions as he may think fit. 
 
 (6) Form 50. If the registrar or the judge makes an order referring the 
 question to a medical referee, he shall also make an order directing the work- 
 man to submit himself for examination by the medical referee, subject to and 
 in accordance with any regulations made by the Secretary of State ; and the 
 provisions of paragraphs 3 to 6 of Rule 54 shall with the necessary modifica- 
 tions apply. 
 
 (6A) The registrar shall with the order of reference forward to the medical 
 referee copies of any statements submitted to him by either partjr. 
 
 (7) Form 51. The medical referee shall forward his certificate in the 
 matter to the registrar by registered post, specifying therein the nature of 
 the incapacity of the workman resulting from the injury, and whether such 
 incapacity is likely to be of a permanent nature ; and the registrar shall 
 thereupon proceed in accordance with paragraph 8 of Rule 54.1 (Mar. 14, 
 1908.) 
 
 (8) Where the medical referee certifies that the incapacity resulting 
 from the injury is likely to be of a permanent nature, the registrar shall on 
 application furnish the workman 
 
 (a) with a copy of the certificate of the medical referee, sealed Avith the 
 seal of the court and certified by the registrar in his own hand- 
 writing to be a true copy ; and 
 
 (6) with a copy of the award, memorandum, or certificate under which 
 the weekly payment is payable, sealed with the seal of the court 
 and certified by the registrar in his own handwriting to be a true 
 copy ; and 
 
 (c) Form 58. with a certificate of identity according to the form in the 
 
 Appendix ; and 
 
 (d) Forms 59, 60, 61. with a notice according to the form in the Appen- 
 
 dix, annexing thereto forms of certificate and declaration according 
 
 to the forms in the Appendix ; 
 
 and shall procure from the workman a specimen of his signature, and file 
 the same for reference. 
 
 (9) Form 60. A workman who desires to have the weekly payments 
 payable to him remitted to him while residing out of the United Kingdom 
 shall at intervals of three months from the date to which such payments 
 were last made submit himself to examination by a medical practitioner in 
 the place where he is residing, and shall produce to him the copy of the 
 certificate of the medical referee and the certificate of identity furnished 
 under the last preceding paragraph, and shall obtain from him a certificate 
 in the form in the Appendix that the incapacity of the workman resulting 
 from the injury continues ; and such certificate shall be verified by declara- 
 tion by the medical practitioner, in the presence of the workman, before a 
 person having authority to administer an oath. 
 
 (10) Form 61. The workman shall also make a declaration of identity 
 according to the form in the Appendix before a person having authority to 
 administer an oath, producing to such person the copy and certificate above 
 mentioned, and the certificate of the medical practitioner by whom he has 
 been examined. 
 
 (11) Form 62. The workman shall forward the certificate and declara- 
 tion in the two last preceding paragraphs mentioned to the registrar, with 
 
60A, 61] WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RULES, 1907-1912. 243 
 
 a request, according to the form in the Appendix, for the transmission to 
 him of the amount of the weekly payments due to him, specifying the place 
 where and the manner in which the amount is to be remitted, which request 
 shall be signed by the workman in his own handwriting. 
 
 (12) On receipt of the certificate, declaration, and request the registrar 
 shall examine the same, and may if not satisfied that the same are in order 
 return the same for correction. 
 
 (13) Form 63. If the registrar is satisfied that the certificate, declara- 
 tion, and request are in order, or when they are returned to him in order, he 
 shall send to the employer a notice according to the form in the Appendix, 
 requesting him to forward the amount due ; and the employer shall there- 
 upon forward the amount to the registrar, who shall remit the same, less 
 any fees payable to the registrar and the costs of transmission, to the work- 
 man at the address and in the manner requested by him, such remittance 
 being in all cases at the cost and risk of the workman. 
 
 [Payment of Arrears of Weekly Payments on Death of Workman residing 
 out of United Kingdom. 
 
 6CU. Payment of arrears of weekly payments on death of workman residing 
 out of United Kingdom. (1) In the event of the death of a workman in 
 receipt of weekly payments while residing out of the United Kingdom, his 
 representatives shall, for the purpose of obtaining payment of the arrears due 
 to the workman, forward to the registrar a certificate of the death of the 
 workman, and documents showing that they are entitled to such arrears, 
 verified by declaration before a person having authority to administer an 
 oath, with a request for payment of such arrears, specifying the place where 
 and the manner in which the amount is to be remitted to them. 
 
 (2) For the purposes of this Rule the expression "representatives " shall 
 mean 
 
 (a) If the workman leav.es a will, the executors of such will ; or 
 (6) If the workman dies intestate, the persons who are according to law 
 entitled to his personal estate, and payment of the arrears may be 
 made to such persons without the production of letters of adminis- 
 tration. 
 
 (3) On the receipt of the certificate and documents mentioned in this 
 Rule the registrar shall examine the same, and may, if not satisfied that the 
 same are in order, return the same for correction. 
 
 (4) If the registrar is satisfied that the certificate and documents are in 
 order, or when they are returned to him in order, he shall send to the employer 
 a notice requesting him to forward the amount due, and the employer shall 
 thereupon forward the amount to the registrar, who shall remit the same, 
 less any fees payable to the registrar and the costs of transmission, to the 
 representatives of the workman at the address and in the manner requested 
 by them, such remittance being in all cases at the cost and risk of such 
 representatives . 
 
 (5) Form 59A. Form 59 in the Appendix shall be amended by the addi- 
 tion thereto of the paragraph in the Appendix]. (March 31, 1911.) 
 
 / 
 
 Costs. 
 
 61. Costs. Act, Sched. 2, par. 7. (1) Any costs of and incident to an 
 arbitration and proceedings connected therewith directed by a committee 
 or by an arbitrator (whether agreed on by the parties or appointed by the 
 
244 APPENDIX B, [62, 63 
 
 judge), or by the judge, to be paid by one party to another shall, in default 
 of agreement between the parties as to the amount of such costs, be taxed 
 according to such one of the scales of costs applicable to actions in the 
 county court as the committee, arbitrator, or judge shall direct ; and in 
 default of such direction shall be taxed according to the scale which would 
 be applicable if the proceeding had been an action in the county court : and 
 the statutory provisions and rules for the time being in force as to the 
 allowance and taxation of costs in such actions, and as to objections and 
 review of taxation by the registrar, shall apply accordingly. Proceedings 
 in an arbitration shall be within Order LIU., Rules 7 and 8, and the word 
 '! judge " in those rules shall include a committee and an arbitrator. [Where 
 costs are directed to be taxed under Column A., a fee for advising on evidence, 
 and allowances under Order LIU., Rules 43 and 44, to expert or scientific 
 witnesses, and for plans, etc., may be allowed by special order of the judge, 
 committee, or arbitrator, in like manner as if costs had been directed to be 
 taxed under Column B.] (Nov. 24, 1908.) 
 
 (2) Where the subject matter of an arbitration is not a capital sum, the 
 committee, arbitrator, or judge shall determine what, for the purpose of the 
 allowance and taxation of costs, shall be considered to be the amount of 
 the subject matter of the arbitration ; and in default of such determination 
 the amount shall be fixed by the registrar by whom the costs are to be 
 taxed, subject to review by the judge. 
 
 [(2a.) Where proceedings are taken for which no provision is made by 
 these rules or by the scales of costs, reasonable costs may be allowed in 
 respect of such proceedings by the registrar, subject to review by the judge, 
 or by special order of the judge, not exceeding those which may under the 
 scales be allowed in respect of proceedings of a like nature.] (July 26, 1912.) 
 
 (3) The committee, arbitrator, or judge, in dealing with the question of 
 costs, may take into consideration any offer of compensation proved to have 
 been made on behalf of the employer. 
 
 (4) Where any workman is examined by a m.edica-1 referee on a 'reference 
 under paragraph 15 of the first schedule to the Act, and the certificate of 
 the referee is used in any subsequent arbitration, any reasonable travelling 
 and other expenses incurred by the workman in obtaining such certificate 
 (if not otherwise provided for) may, by order of the committee, arbitrator, 
 or judge, be allowed as costs in the arbitration. 
 
 (5) Where a workman is ordered to submit himself for examination by 
 a medical referee appointed to report under paragraph 15 of the second 
 schedule to the Act, any reasonable expenses incurred by such workman in 
 travelling to attend on such referee for examination may, by order of the 
 committee, arbitrator, or judge, be allowed as costs in the arbitration. 
 
 62. Taxation of costs awarded by committee or arbitrator agreed on by 
 parties. Where any costs are awarded by a committee or an arbitrator 
 agreed on by the parties, it shall be the duty of the registrar of the court in 
 which a memorandum of the decision of the committee or arbitrator is 
 recorded pursuant to paragraph 9 of the second schedule to the Act, on 
 application made to him, to tax such costs, and to enter in the register the 
 amount of such costs allowed on taxation ; and such entry shall be deemed 
 to be part of such memorandum, and shall be enforceable accordingly. 
 
 Review .of Taxation by Judge. 
 
 63. Review of taxation. (1) An application to the judge to review any 
 taxation of costs shall be made on notice in writing, which shall be served 
 
64, 65] WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION KULES, 1907-1912. 245 
 
 on the opposite party two clear days at least before the hearing of the 
 application, unless the judge or registrar gives leave for shorter notice. 
 
 (2) Such application shall be heard and determined upon the evidence 
 which has been brought in before the registrar, and no further evidence 
 shall be received on the hearing thereof unless the judge otherwise directs. 
 
 (3) The costs of and incident to the application shall be in the discretion 
 of the judge. 
 
 (4) The result of such review shall be entered in the register, 
 
 64. As to authority of solicitor to receive costs payable by adverse party. 
 Where any party to whom costs are awarded acts by a solicitor, such solicitor 
 shall have the same authority to take out of court or receive any sum paid 
 into court or payable in respect of such costs by the party against whom 
 such costs are awarded as he would have if such costs were awarded in an 
 action. 
 
 Costs of Solicitor or Agent under Schedule II., Paragraph 14. 
 
 65. Application to determine costs payable to solicitor or agent. Act, 
 Sched. 2, par. 14. (1) The following provisions shall apply to an application 
 under paragraph 14 of the second schedule to the Act for the determination 
 of the amount of costs to be paid to the solicitor or agent of a person claiming 
 compensation under the Act. 
 
 (2) Where the sum awarded as compensation has been awarded by a 
 committee or an arbitrator agreed on by the parties, the application shall 
 be made to such committee or arbitrator. 
 
 (3) Where the sum awarded as compensation has been awarded by the 
 judge or by an arbitrator appointed by him, the application may be made 
 
 (a) to the judge or arbitrator at or immediately after the hearing of the 
 
 arbitration ; or 
 (6) at a subsequent date, but in that case it shall be made only to the 
 
 judge. 
 
 (4) Where a sum has been agreed on as compensation, the application 
 shall be made to the judge. 
 
 (5) Form 64. An application made to the judge, other than an applica- 
 tion under paragraph 3 (a) of this Rule, shall be made in court on notice in 
 writing in accordance with Rule 48. 
 
 (6) Such notice shall be served on the person for whom the solicitor or 
 agent acted in accordance with the said Rule, and the provisions of the said 
 Rule shall apply to the proceedings on such application. 
 
 (7) On the hearing of any application under this Rule, the committee, 
 arbitrator, or judge may award costs to the solicitor or agent, and may 
 make an order declaring such solicitor or agent to be entitled to recover 
 such costs from the person for whom he acted, or to be entitled to a lien for 
 such costs on any sum awarded as compensation to such person, or to be 
 entitled to deduct such costs from any such sum, or may make such order 
 or give such directions as may be just. 
 
 (8) Any costs awarded to a solicitor or agent on any such application 
 shall, in default of agreement between the parties as to the amount of such 
 costs, be taxed according to such one of the scales of costs applicable to 
 actions in the county court as 'the committee, arbitrator, or judge shall 
 direct ; and in default of such direction such costs shall be taxed according 
 to the scale which would be applicable if the proceeding had been an action 
 in the county court ; and the statutory provisions and rules for the time 
 being in force as to the allowance and taxation of costs in such actions, and 
 
246 APPENDIX B. "66,67 
 
 as to objections and review of taxation by the registrar, shall apply ac- 
 cordingly ; and any taxation shall be subject to review by the judge according 
 to Rule 63. 
 
 (9) Where the subject matter of the arbitration is not a capital sum, the 
 committee, arbitrator, or judge shall determine what, for the purpose of the 
 allowance and taxation of such costs, shall be considered to be the amount 
 of the subject matter of the arbitration ; and in default of such determina- 
 tion the amount shall be fixed by the registrar by whom the costs are to be 
 taxed, subject to review by the judge. 
 
 66. Provisions as to order declaring lien, etc. Where an order is made by 
 a committee, arbitrator, or judge awarding costs to a solicitor or agent, and 
 declaring such solicitor or agent to be entitled to recover such costs from 
 the person for wiiorn he acted, or to be entitled to a lien for such costs on 
 any sum awarded or agreed as compensation, or to be entitled to deduct 
 such costs from any such sum, the following provisions shall apply : 
 
 (a) The registrar shall, on application made to him, tax such costs. 
 
 (b) A copy of the order, and, when the amount to which such solicitor 
 
 or agent is entitled has been ascertained by taxation, a memoran- 
 dum of such amount, shall, at the request and cost of the solicitor 
 or agent, be issued by the registrar for service on the party liable 
 to pay the sum awarded or agreed as compensation ; and service 
 thereof may be effected on such party in accordance with Rule 15. 
 
 (c) A memorandum of such order, and when such amount has been 
 
 ascertained a memorandum of such amount, shall be recorded in 
 the register in which the memorandum or award under which the 
 sum awarded as compensation is payable is recorded, and such 
 last mentioned memorandum or award shall have effect subject 
 to such order and memorandum. 
 
 (d) The party liable to pay such compensation shall on demand pay to 
 
 the solicitor or agent the amount to which he is entitled, but so 
 that such party shall not be liable to pay any amount in excess of 
 that which he^is liable to pay for compensation, or to pay such 
 amount by any other instalments than those by which he is liable 
 to pay such compensation 
 
 (e) If the party liable to pay such compensation fails on demand to pay 
 
 any amount which he is liable to pay to such solicitor or agent, the 
 judge may, on application made to him on notice to such party in 
 accordance with Rule 48, and on proof of the order having been 
 served on and demand for payment made to such party, order 
 such party to pay such sum ; and in default of payment the judge 
 may order execution to issue to levy such amount. 
 
 ( / ) Payment made by or execution levied on the party liable to pay 
 such compensation shall be a valid discharge to him, as against the 
 party entitled to such compensation, to the amount paid or levied. 
 
 (g) Where the sum awarded as compensation has been paid into court, 
 the amount to which the solicitor or agent is entitled shall be paid 
 to him out of such sum. 
 
 Execution. 
 
 67. Execution. Form 65. (1) When a party liable to pa} T compensation 
 or costs under an}- award, memorandum, or certificate has made default in 
 payment of the amount awarded, or where payment is to be made b}- 
 
68-70] WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION EULES, 1907-1912. 247 
 
 instalments, of any instalment, execution may issue against his goods 
 without leave for the amount in payment of which he has made default. 
 
 (2) Where -such sum is not payable into court, the party applying for 
 execution shall satisfy the registrar, by affidavit or otherwise, as to the 
 amount in payment of which default has been made. 
 
 (3) Where the parties liable to pay compensation or costs under any 
 award, memorandum, or certificate are a firm, the provisions of Order XXV., 
 Rule 11, shall, with the necessary modifications, apply to execution under 
 this Rule. 
 
 Proceedings under Debtors Act, 1869, Section 5. 
 
 68. Proceedings under Debtors Act, 1869. 32 & 33 Viet. c. 62, section 5. 
 (1) Where proceedings by way of judgment summons under section 5 of the 
 Debtors Act, 1869, are taken against a party liable to pay compensation or 
 costs under any award, memorandum, or certificate, who has made default 
 in payment of the amount awarded, or, where payment is to be made by 
 instalments, of any instalment, the County Court Rules for the time being 
 in force as to the committal of judgment debtors shall, with any necessary 
 modifications, apply to such proceedings ; Provided, that the court shall 
 not alter the terms or mode of payment of any sum to become payable hi 
 future under any award, memorandum, or certificate, otherwise than by 
 consent, or under paragraph 16 of the first schedule to the Act. 
 
 (2) Where the amount in payment of which default has been made is 
 not payable into court, the party applying for a judgment summons shall 
 satisfy the court, by affidavit or otherwise, as to the amount in payment of 
 which default has been made. 
 
 (3) Form 66. A judgment summons issued under this Rule shall be 
 according to the form in the Appendix. 
 
 (4) Where the parties liable to pay compensation or costs are a firm, the 
 provisions of the County Court Rules as to judgment summonses on a 
 judgment or order against a firm shall, with the necessary modifications, 
 apply to proceedings by way of judgment summons under this Rule. 
 
 Other Proceedings for Enforcement of Award, Memorandum, or Certificate. 
 
 69. Other proceedings for enforcement of award, etc. The County Court 
 Rules for the time being in force as to proceedings for the enforcement of or 
 the recovery of money due under judgments or orders of the county court 
 otherwise than by execution or committal shall, with the necessary modifica- 
 tions, apply to proceedings for the enforcement of or the recovery of money 
 due under any award, memorandum, or certificate. 
 
 Setting aside Award or Order improperly obtained. 
 
 70. Rules as to neiv trials not to apply. (1) Notwithstanding anything 
 in these Rules contained, the statutory provisions and rules relating to new 
 trials in actions in the county court shall not apply to arbitrations under 
 the Act. 
 
 (2) When aivard or order may be set aside or varied. Where the judge is 
 satisfied 
 
 (a) that any award, or any order as TO the application of any amount 
 awarded or agreed upon as compensation, made by the judge or 
 by an arbitrator appointed by him, has been obtained by fraud or 
 other improper means ; or 
 
248 APPENDIX B. [71-73 
 
 (6) that an} 7 person has been included in any award or order as a depen- 
 dant who is not in fact a dependant as defined by the Act ; or 
 (c) that any person who is in fact a dependant as denned by the Act has 
 
 been omitted from any award or order, 
 
 the judge may set aside or vary the award or order, and may make such 
 order (including an order as to any sum already paid under the award or 
 order) as under the circumstances he may think just. 
 
 (3) An application to set aside or vary an award or order under this 
 Rule shall be made in court on notice in writing, and the provisions of Rule 
 48 shall apply to the proceedings on such application. 
 
 (4) An application to set aside or vary an award or order under this 
 Rule shall not be made after the expiration of six months from the date of 
 the award or order, except by leave of the judge ; and such leave shall not 
 be granted unless the judge is satisfied that the failure to make the applica- 
 tion within such period was occasioned by mistake, absence from the United 
 Kingdom, or other reasonable cause. 
 
 Appeals. 
 
 71. Appeals. Act, Sched. 2, par. 4. Appeals under paragraph 4 of the 
 second schedule to the Act shall be had in accordance with the provisions of 
 the Rules of the Supreme Court relating thereto. 
 
 72. Deposit of order of Court of Appeal with registrar, and procedure 
 thereon. (1) When the Court of Appeal has given judgment on any appeal, 
 any party may deposit the order of the Court of Appeal, or an office copy 
 thereof, with the registrar : and the registrar shall file such order or copy, 
 and shall transmit a copy thereof to the judge : and such order shall have 
 the same effect as if it had been a decision of the judge. 
 
 (2) If such order has the effect of an award, decision, or order in the 
 matter in favour of any party, such order shall be served and recorded, and 
 may be proceeded on, in the same manner as if it had been an award, decision, 
 or order of the judge. 
 
 (3) If such order be to the effect that an award be made or a decision 
 given or order made in favour of any party, the judge shall make such award 
 or give such decision or make such order accordingly. 
 
 (4) If such order directs or involves a re-hearing or further hearing of an 
 arbitration or special case or other matter, the judge shall as soon as con- 
 veniently maj' be appoint a day and hour for such re-hearing or further 
 hearing, and shall instruct the registrar to give notice thereof forthwith to 
 the parties. 
 
 (5) Generally the judge shall make such award or give such decision or 
 make such order and give such directions and take or direct to be taken 
 such proceedings in the matter, as may be necessary to give effect to the 
 order of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 In what Court Proceedings may be taken. 
 
 73. In what court proceedings inay be taken. Act, Sched. 2, par. 11. (1) 
 Any matter which under the Act or these Rules is to be done in a county 
 court, or by to or before the judge or registrar of a county court, shall be 
 done in the county court, or by to or before the judge or registrar of the 
 county court, 
 
74] WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RULES, 1907-1912. 249 
 
 (1) of the district in which all the parties concerned reside ; or 
 (ii) if the parties concerned reside in different districts, 
 
 (a) of the district in which the accident out of which the matter arose 
 occurred ; or 
 
 (&) in the case of any such workman as in paragraph 1 of Rule 39 
 mentioned, of the district in which the workman was last em- 
 ployed in the employment to the nature of which the disease 
 was due ; or 
 
 (c) if the accident out of which the matter arose occurred at sea, 
 
 (1) of the district in which the ship shall be when the matter is to 
 
 be done ; or 
 
 (2) of the district comprising the port of registry of the ship ; or 
 
 (3) of the district in which the workman or the dependants of the 
 
 workman by whom or on whose behalf the matter is to be 
 done, or some or one of them resides or reside ; 
 without prejudice to any transfer in manner provided by these Rules. 
 
 (2) Detention of ships. 5 Edw. 7, c. 10. Act, section 11. An application 
 for an order for the detention of a ship may, subject to the provisions of the 
 rules for the time being in force under the Shipowners' Negligence (Remedies) 
 Act, 1905, be made to the judge of any court. 
 
 (3) Proceedings against persons giving security. 5 Edw. 7, c. 10. Act, 
 section 11. Where proceedings by w f ay of arbitration for the recovery of 
 compensation are taken against the persons giving security pursuant to the 
 Shipowners' Negligence (Remedies) Act, 1905, or section 11 of the Act and 
 Rules 37 and 38, such proceedings may be commenced. 
 
 (i) in the county court of the district in which all the parties concerned 
 
 reside ; or 
 (ii) if the parties concerned reside in different districts, 
 
 (a) in the county court of the district in which the accident occurred ; 
 
 or 
 (6) if the accident occurred at sea, 
 
 (1) in the county court of the district in which the vessel is or was 
 
 detained, or in which the order for detention was made or 
 applied for ; or 
 
 (2) in the county court of the district in which the workman or the 
 
 dependants of the workman, or some or one of them resides 
 or reside ; 
 without prejudice to any transfer in manner provided by these Rules. 
 
 Proceedings in one Court as to subject matter of Award, Memorandum or 
 Certificate recorded in another Court. 
 
 74. Filing of certified copy of memorandum, etc., recorded in one court under 
 Act, Sched. 2, par. 9, before taking subsequent proceedings in another court. 
 Where an award, or a memorandum under paragraph 9 of the second schedule 
 to the Act, or a certificate under sub-section 4 of section 1 of the Act, has 
 been recorded in any court, and any party desires to take any subsequent 
 proceedings with reference to the subject matter of such award, memoran- 
 dum, or certificate in any other court, he shall before taking such proceed- 
 ings obtain from the registrar of the first- mentioned court a certified copy 
 of such award, memorandum, or certificate, and shall file the same in the 
 court in which he desires to take proceedings, and the registrar of such 
 last- mentioned court shall record the same as if it had been an award made 
 in the court. 
 
250 APPENDIX B. [75-77 
 
 Transfer of Proceedings. 
 
 75. Transfer. If the judge is satisfied by any party to any matter under 
 the Act pending in his court that such matter can be more conveniently 
 proceeded with in any other court in England, Scotland, or Ireland, he may 
 order such matter to be transferred to such other court ; and thereupon the 
 registrar shall forthwith transmit by registered post to the registrar of the 
 court to which such matter is transferred all original documents filed in such 
 matter, and a certified copy of all records made with reference to such matter, 
 and shall transfer to such last-mentioned court any money invested in his 
 name as registrar : and thenceforth such matter shall be proceeded with in 
 the court to which it is transferred in the same manner as if it had originally 
 been commenced therein. The provisions of Order VIII., Rule 9, shall 
 apply to any such transfer or application for a transfer. 
 
 Transfer of Money paid into Court. 
 
 76. Transfer of money paid into court. Act, Sched. I, par. 6. (1) The 
 provisions of the last preceding Rule shall apply to the transfer of money 
 paid into court from one court to another pursuant to paragraph 6 of the 
 first schedule to the Act or otherwise, and to proceedings with respect to the 
 application of such money. 
 
 (2) Where any money ordered to be transferred from one court to 
 another is invested in the Post Office Savings Bank in the name of the 
 registrar, such money shall be transferred into the name of the registrar of 
 the court to which the money is ordered to be transferred in accordance 
 with regulations to be made by the Postmaster-General with the consent of 
 the Treasury : and where any money ordered to be transferred is not so 
 invested it shall forthwith be so invested, and shall when invested be trans- 
 ferred in accordance with this Rule. 
 
 Filing and Service of Documents and Notices. 
 
 77. (1) Where any document is to be filed with the registrar under these 
 Rules, that document may be so filed by delivering it at the office of the 
 registrar, or by sending it by post addressed to the registrar at his office. 
 
 (2) Where any document is to be filed, there shall be filed with the 
 original document as many copies of the document as there are persons to 
 whom copies of the document or any part thereof are to be sent by the 
 registrar, and in addition a copy for the use of the judge or arbitrator. 
 
 (3) Where any document is under these Rules to be sent to any person 
 by the registrar, that document may be sent by post. 
 
 (4) Any proceeding, document, or notice which is under these Rules to 
 be served on any party may be served on such party by the opposite party 
 or his solicitor ; and where no special provision as to the mode of service is 
 made by these Rules, any such proceeding, document, or notice may be 
 served on such party, or where he acts by a solicitor, on his solicitor, in 
 manner provided by sub-sections 3 and 4 of section 2 of the Act with reference 
 to service of notice in respect of an injury ; and the provisions of Order 
 LIV., Rule 2, shall apply to the service of any such proceeding, document, 
 or notice. 
 
78-81] WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION EULES, 1907-1912. 251 
 
 Procedure Generally. 
 
 78. Provisions as to parties acting by solicitors, and as to substituted service 
 and notice in lieu of service. The provisions of Order XXIII., Rule 6, Order 
 LIV., Rules 1 and 3 to 6, and Order VII. , Rule 40, as to parties acting by 
 solicitors, and as to substituted service and notice in lieu of service, shall 
 apply to proceedings under the Act. 
 
 [78A. Rules 7 and 33 to apply to all proceedings under Act and .Rules. 
 Rules 7 and 33 of the principal Rules shall apply to all proceedings under 
 the Act and these Rules in the like manner as to proceedings by way of 
 arbitration.] (Nov. 24, 1908.) 
 
 79. Proceedings where Crown a party. (1) In any proceedings under the 
 Act or these Rules arising out of an injury to a workman employed by or 
 under the Crown, in which, if the employer were a private person, such 
 employer would be a necessary party, the h'ead of the department by in or 
 under which the workman was employed, or, where the department is 
 administered by a Board or by Commissioners, such Board or Commissioners, 
 shall be made a party under his or their official title as representing the 
 Crown. 
 
 (2) Service of documents, etc. In any such case any proceeding, docu- 
 ment, or notice to be served on the head of the department, or on the Board 
 or Commissioners, may be served on the permanent secretary to the depart- 
 ment, subject to the provisions of these Rules as to service on parties acting 
 by solicitors. 
 
 80. Procedure where not otherwise provided for. Where any matter or 
 thing is not specially provided for under these Rules, the same procedure 
 shall be followed and the same provisions shall apply, as far as practicable, 
 as in a similar matter or thing under the County Courts Act, 1888, and 
 the rules made in pursuance of that Act, [in so far as such procedure 
 and provisions are applicable to proceedings by way of arbitration.] 
 (March 31, 1911.) 
 
 Record of Proceedings. Special Register. 
 
 81. Record of proceedings'* before judge or arbitrator. Special register. 
 Form 67. Proceedings under the Act before the judge or an arbitrator 
 appointed by him shall be recorded in the books of the court in the manner 
 in which other proceedings in the court are recorded ; and the registrar 
 shall also keep a special register for the purposes of the Act, in which he 
 shall record 
 
 (1) A memorandum of every application made to the judge for the 
 
 settlement of any matter by arbitration ; 
 
 (2) A memorandum of every appointment of an arbitrator to settle any 
 
 such matter made by the judge ; 
 
 (3) A memorandum of every proceeding taken in any arbitration before 
 
 the judge or an arbitrator appointed by him prior to the award ; 
 
 (4) A memorandum of every appointment of a medical referee by the 
 
 judge or arbitrator, and of his report, and if a medical referee is 
 summoned or requested to attend any proceeding in the arbitra- 
 tion, of such summons or request and attendance ; 
 
 (5) A memorandum of every award made by the judge, or by an arbitrator 
 
 appointed by him ; 
 
252 APPENDIX B. [81 
 
 (6) A memorandum of every special case submitted to the judge, and of 
 
 the proceedings and order thereon ; 
 
 (7) A memorandum of every judgment given by the Court of Appeal on 
 
 any appeal ; 
 
 (8) A memorandum of every application to the court for the examination 
 
 .of an employer pursuant to Rule 35, paragraph 2, and of the order 
 and proceedings thereon ; 
 
 (9) A memorandum of every application to the court for the detention 
 
 of a ship pursuant to section 11 of the Act and Rules 37 and 38, 
 and of the order and subsequent proceedings thereon ; 
 
 (10) A memorandum of every application to the judge for the appoint- 
 
 ment' of an arbitrator in case of the death or refusal or inability to 
 act of an arbitrator agreed on by the parties, and of the pro- 
 ceedings and order thereon ; 
 
 (11) A copy of every memorandum sent to the registrar pursuant to 
 
 paragraph 9 of the Second Schedule to the Act, and of the report 
 (if any) of the medical referee annexed thereto, with a note stating 
 whether such memorandum was recorded without further proof, 
 or after inquiry, or by order of the judge ; 
 
 (12) If such memorandum is recorded after inquiry, a memorandum of 
 
 the inquiries made and of the result thereof ; 
 
 (13) If such memorandum is recorded by order of the judge, a memo- 
 
 randum of the application to the judge, and of the order made 
 thereon ; 
 
 (14) If in the case of a memorandum of an agreement the registrar refers 
 
 the matter to the judge, a memorandum of such reference, and of 
 the directions of the judge, and the subsequent proceedings and 
 order thereon ; 
 
 (15) A memorandum of the result of every taxation or review of taxation 
 
 of costs under any such memorandum, or under any award or 
 order; 
 
 (16) A memorandum of every application to rectify the register in respect 
 
 of any memorandum, and of the proceedings and order thereon ; 
 
 (17) A memorandum of every application or report with reference to the 
 
 removal of the record of a memorandum of an agreement from the 
 register, and of the subsequent proceedings and order thereon ; 
 
 (18) A memorandum of every application* to the judge or arbitrator, 
 
 under paragraph 14 of the second schedule to the Act, to determine 
 the amount of costs to be paid to a solicitor or agent, and of the 
 proceedings and order thereon, and of the result of any taxation or 
 review of taxation under such order ; 
 
 (19) A copy of every certificate under sub-section 4 of section 1 of the 
 
 Act given by the court or sent to the registrar from any other 
 court ; 
 
 (20) A memorandum of every proceeding taken in the court for the 
 
 enforcement of any award, order, memorandum, or certificate, and 
 of the result of such proceeding ; 
 
 (21) A memorandum of every application to refer a matter to a medical 
 
 referee pursuant to paragraph 15 of the first schedule of the Act, 
 and of the order and subsequent proceedings thereon ; 
 
 (22) A memorandum of every application to the court for the suspension 
 
 of the right to compensation or to take or prosecute any pro- 
 ceedings under the Act in relation to compensation, or of the right 
 to weekly payments, and of the proceedings and order thereon ; 
 
82] WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RULES, 1907-1912. 253 
 
 (23) A memorandum of every sum paid into court pursuant to paragraph 
 
 5 of the first schedule to the Act, or under any award, memo- 
 randum, or certificate ; 
 
 (24) A memorandum of every application made to the court with refer- 
 
 ence to any such sum, and of every order made on such application, 
 and of the manner in which such sum is invested, applied, or 
 disposed of ; 
 
 (25) A memorandum of every application for the payment of any weekly 
 
 payment into court, and of the proceedings and order thereon, and 
 of the directions given as to the payment out or application of any 
 such weekly payment ; 
 
 (26) A memorandum of every application for variation of an order of the 
 
 court as to the apportionment, investment, or application of any 
 sum paid as compensation, and of the proceedings and order 
 thereon ; 
 
 (27) A memorandum of every application to refer a matter to a medical 
 
 referee pursuant to paragraph 18 of the first schedule to the Act 
 in the case of a workman intending to cease to. reside in the United 
 Kingdom, and of the order and the proceedings thereon ; and of 
 every certificate and declaration of identity and request for pay- 
 ment received from such workman, and of the proceedings thereon ; 
 
 (28) A memorandum of every application to set aside or vary an award or 
 
 order under Rule 70, and of the proceedings and order thereon ; 
 
 (29) A memorandum of every certified copy given pursuant to Rule 74, 
 
 or a copy of every certified copy filed pursuant to that Rule ; 
 
 (30) A memorandum of every application for transfer, and of the order 
 
 thereon, and the proceedings under such order ; 
 
 (31) A memorandum of the transmission of documents and certified 
 
 copies pursuant to paragraph 11 of Rule 37 or paragraphs (iii) or 
 (iv) of Rule 38 ; 
 
 (32) A memorandum of the transfer of any money paid into court to any 
 
 other court ; 
 
 (33) The like memorandum as to every matter transferred, or document 
 
 or certified copy transmitted or money transferred to the court, as 
 would have been recorded as to such matter, document, or money 
 if it had been originally commenced and prosecuted in or trans- 
 mitted to or paid into the court ; 
 
 (31) A memorandum of any other matter which the judge shall order to 
 be recorded with reference to any matter brought into or proceeding 
 taken in the court under the Act. 
 
 References to Medical Referees. 
 
 82. (1) References to medical referees. Where a medical referee is sum- 
 moned as an assessor, or any matter is referred to a medical referee, such 
 referee shall be summoned or the matter shall be referred subject to and in 
 accordance with any regulations made by the Secretary of State and the 
 Treasury ; and any such regulations shall so far as they affect the county 
 court or an arbitrator appointed by the judge of the county court, and pro- 
 ceedings in the county court or before any such arbitrator j be deemed to be 
 Rules of Court, and shall have effect accordingly. 
 
 (2) References under Act, section 8 (1) (/). In particular, if such regula- 
 tions as in the preceding paragraph mentioned provide that an employer or 
 a workman who desires any matter to be referred to a medical referee under 
 
254 APPENDIX B. [83-89 
 
 paragraph ( / ) of sub-section 1 of section 8 of the Act shall apply to the 
 registrar of a count}- court for the matter to be so referred, it shall be the 
 duty of the registrar to refer the same in accordance with such regulations. 
 (3) Record and returns as to references. The registrar shall keep a record 
 in the form prescribed by regulations made by the Secretary of State of all 
 cases in which medical referees are summoned as assessors or matters are 
 referred to medical referees, and shall forward a copy of the same to the 
 Secretar\- of State at such times as may be prescribed by such regulations. 
 
 blatters, how distinguished. 
 
 83. Matters, how distinguished. Every matter brought into the court 
 under the Act shall be intituled in the matter of the Act, and shall be dis- 
 tinguished by a separate number ; and all documents tiled and subsequent 
 proceedings taken in the court with reference to such matter shall be intituled 
 in like manner, and shall be distinguished by the same number ; and the 
 entries made in the special register with respect to each such matter shall 
 be entered together, and shall be kept separate from the entries with respect 
 to any other matter. 
 
 Forms. 
 
 84. Forms hi Appendix or like forms may be used. The forms in the 
 Appendix, where applicable, and where they are not applicable forms of the 
 like character, with such variations as the circumstances may require, may 
 be used in proceedings under the Act. 
 
 [Supply and filling up of Forms. 
 
 85. Supply of forms. (1) The registrar of any court may apply to the 
 Treasury for any of the forms required to be used by parties to proceedings 
 in court under the Act, notwithstanding that such forms are marked in the 
 Appendix as " not to be printed," and if such application is granted may 
 obtain such forms and supply the same without charge for the use of parties 
 to such proceedings. 
 
 (2) Filling up of forms. Where any party to any proceeding is illiterate, 
 and unable to fill up any form required to be used, it shall be the duty of the 
 registrar or his clerk to'fill up such form.] (March 31, 1911.) 
 
 [The Workmen's Compensation (Anglo-French Convention] Act, 1909, and 
 Order in Council (November 22, 1909). 
 
 86. Special provisions as to French citizens. 9 Edw. 7, c. 16. Order in 
 Council, Nov. 22, 1909. Where a request for arbitration is filed by or on 
 behalf of a workman who is a French citizen, or by or on behalf of the de- 
 pendants of a deceased workman who was a French citizen, the following 
 provisions shall apply. 
 
 87. Request and particulars. The request and particulars shall state that 
 the workman is or the deceased workman was a French citizen. 
 
 88. In what court proceedings to be taken. The court in which proceedings 
 are to be taken shall be determined in accordance with Rule 73 of these Rules. 
 
 89. Answer where respondent relies on Order in Council, par. 1. A respon- 
 dent who intends to rely as a defence on paragraph (1) of the Order in Council 
 dated the 22nd day *of November, 1909, made under the Workmen's 
 
 
90-93] WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RULES, 1907-1912. 255 
 
 Compensation (Anglo-French Convention) Act, 1909 (in these Rules referred 
 to as " the Order in Council "), shall state the facts on which he intends to 
 rely in his answer in accordance with Rule 17 of these Rules. 
 
 " 90. Investment in Post Office annuity of lump sum payable in redemption 
 vf weekly payment. Order in Council, par. 3. Post Office Regulations, 1888 
 and 1895. Any lump sum payable in redemption of a weekly payment 
 payable to a workman who is a French citizen, which is to be paid into 
 court pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Order in Council, shall when so paid be 
 invested by the registrar in the purchase of two immediate annuities of 
 equal value on the life of and in the name of the workman from the National 
 Debt Commissioners through the Post Office Savings Bank, the first half- 
 yearly instalment of the first of such annuities to be payable on the second 
 quarterly day of payment next following the day of purchase, and the first 
 half-yearly instalment of the second of, such annuities to be payable on the 
 third quarterly day of payment next following the day of purchase. 
 
 When applying to the Post Office Savings Bank for the purchase of any 
 such annuities the registrar shall inform the department that the case is one 
 under the Order in Council ; and the workman shall sign such documents 
 and furnish such evidence as may be required by the Post Office Annuity 
 and Insurance Regulations, 1888 and 1895, to enable such annuities to be so 
 purchased. 
 
 91. Transmission to France of lump sum payable in redemption of weekly 
 payment to French citizen who returns to reside in France. Order in Council, 
 par. 4. Form 55A. Where a lump sum payable in redemption of a weekly 
 payment to a workman who is a French citizen has been paid into court, 
 then, if the workman returns to reside in France, such sum (unless the same 
 has been invested in pursuance of the last preceding Rule) shall, on the 
 application of the workman, be paid over by the registrar to the " Caisse 
 Nationale Franchise des Retraites pour la Vieillesse " (in these Rules referred 
 to as " the Caisse "). 
 
 Any such sum shall be transmitted by the registrar to the Caisse by regis- 
 tered post letter, inclosing a crossed cheque for the total sum due to the work- 
 man, and shall be accompanied by a certificate according to the form in the 
 Appendix, and the registrar shall on the application of the workman forward 
 to him a copy of the certificate. 
 
 92. Transmission to France of sum payable as compensation to dependants 
 of French citizen who reside in or return to France. Order in Council, par. 4. 
 (1) Where a sum payable as compensation to the dependants of a deceased 
 workman who was a French citizen has been paid into court, then, if the 
 dependants resided in France at the time of the death of the workman, or 
 subsequently return to reside in France, such sum shall, on the application 
 of the dependants, be paid over to the Caisse. 
 
 (2) Any such sum shall be transmitted in accordance with the last 
 preceding Rule, and the registrar shall, on the application of the dependants, 
 forward to them a copy of the certificate. 
 
 93. Where workman in receipt of weekly payments intends to return to 
 reside in France. Order in Council, par. 5. Form 56s. (1) Where a work- 
 man who is a French citizen is in receipt of a weekly payment, and such 
 workman intends to return to reside in France, the following provisions shall 
 have effect under paragraph 5 of the Order in Council. 
 
 (2) The payments of the amount of compensation due to the workman 
 shall be made at intervals of three months. 
 
 (3) The workman may apply to the registrar for a certificate of a medical 
 referee as to the nature of the incapacity resulting from the injury. 
 
256 APPENDIX B. [93 
 
 (4) The application shall be made on notice in writing, according to the 
 form in the Appendix, which shall be filed with the registrar ; and a copy of 
 the application shall be served on the employer in accordance with Rule 48 ; 
 and the applicant shall file a copy of the application for the use of the medical 
 referee. 
 
 (5) The employer may, on being served with notice of the application, 
 require the workman to submit himself for examination by a medical practi- 
 tioner provided and paid by the employer, in accordance with paragraph 14 
 of the First Schedule to the Act ; and if the employer requires the workman 
 to submit himself for such examination he shall before or at the hearing of 
 the application furnish the workman with a copy of the report of that practi- 
 tioner as to the workman's condition, and file a copy of the report for the 
 use of the medical referee. 
 
 (6) The workman and the employer respectively may before or at the hear- 
 ing of the application submit to the registrar such statements in writing as they 
 may think fit, with copies of such statements for the use of the medical referee. 
 
 (7) Form 57fi. On the hearing of the application the registrar shall make 
 an order referring the question to one of the medical referees appointed for 
 the area comprising the district of the court. The order of reference shall 
 be according to the form in the Appendix, and shall state the injury in respect 
 of which the award was made, so far as it appears on the records of the court : 
 and the registrar shall forward the order to the medical referee by registered 
 post, accompanied by a copy of the application and of any reports and state- 
 ments submitted to him by either party. 
 
 (8) Form 50. The registrar shall also make an order directing the work- 
 man to submit himself for examination 03' the medical referee, subject to and 
 in accordance with any regulations made by the Secretary of State ; and 
 the provisions of paragraphs 5 and 6 of Rule 54 shall apph*. 
 
 (9) Form 51. The medical referee shall forward his" certificate in the 
 matter to the registrar by registered post, specifying fully therein the nature 
 of the incapacity (if any) of the workman resulting from the injury ; and the 
 registrar shall thereupon proceed in accordance with paragraph 8 of Rule 54. 
 
 (10) Forms 57 c, 5~D. Where the medical referee certifies that the work- 
 man is suffering from incapacity resulting from the injury, the registrar shall, 
 on the application of the workman, made on notice in writing and served on 
 the employer two clear days at least before the hearing of the application, 
 fix the intervals at which the workman shall be bound to produce, in support 
 of his demand for payment of the amount of compensation due to him,, a 
 medical certificate that the incapacity resulting from the injury continues. 
 These certificates shall be required at such intervals, not being less than 3 
 months nor more than 12 months from the date to which payment was last 
 made, as the registrar may determine, having regard to the nature of the 
 incapacity. 
 
 (11) Form 57c. On the intervals being fixed, the registrar shall send a 
 copy of the order to the workman and to the emploj'er, and shall on applica- 
 tion furnish the workman with 
 
 (a) a copy of the certificate of the medical referee, sealed with the seal of 
 
 the court and certified b}* the registrar in his own handwriting to 
 be a true copy ; 
 
 (b) a copy of the award under which the weekly payment is payable, 
 
 sealed with the seal of the court and certified by the registrar'in his 
 own handwriting to be a true copy ; 
 
 (c) Form 58A. a certificate of identity according to the form in the 
 
 Appendix ; and 
 
36] WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION Jiur/ES, 1907-1912. 225 
 
 the employer, and the court may make an order accordingly ; and the 
 provisions of Order XXV., Rules 71 and 72 shall apply in the same manner 
 as if the employer were a debtor liable under a judgment or order. 
 
 (3) [Arbitration between workmen and insurers. Form 11. Subject to 
 the provisions of the contract between the employer and the insurers as to 
 the settlement of differences or disputes between the employer and the 
 insurers, the provisions of the Act and these Rules as to the settlement of 
 matters by arbitration shall with the necessary modifications apply to the 
 settlement by arbitration, as between the workman and the insurers, of any 
 question as to the liability of the insurers to the workman or the amount 
 of their liability, and of any other question which would under the Act be 
 the subject of arbitration between the workman and the employer if the 
 rights, remedies, and liability of the employer had not been transferred to 
 the insurers.] (March 31, 1911.) 
 
 Masters, Seamen, Apprentices, and Pilots. Section 7. 
 
 36. (1) Masters, seamen, apprentices, and pilots. In the application of 
 the Act and these Rules in the case of masters, seamen, and apprentices to 
 the sea-service and apprentices in the sea-fishing service, who are workmen 
 within the meaning of the Act, and who are members of the crew of any 
 such ship as in section 7 of the Act mentioned, and to pilots when employed 
 on any such ship, the following provisions shall have effect. 
 
 (2) Claim for compensation in case of death. In the case of the death of 
 a master, seamen, apprentice, or pilot the claim for compensation shall state 
 the date at which news of the death was received by the claimant. 
 
 (3) Where master, etc., lost with ship. The claim for compensation on 
 behalf of dependants of a master, seaman, apprentice, or pilot lost with his 
 ship, and the particulars appended or annexed to the request for arbitration, 
 shall state the date at which the ship was lost or is deemed to have been lost. 
 
 (4) Forms of request for arbitration. Forms 6, 7.- A request for arbitra- 
 tion shall be according to such one of the forms in the Appendix as shall be 
 applicable to the case, with such modifications as the nature of the case 
 shall require. 
 
 (5) Description of owners in documents and proceedings. In any docu- 
 ment, notice, or proceeding it shall be sufficient to describe the owners of 
 the ship as " the owners of the ship " ; and the provisions of the 
 County Court 'Rules as to disclosure of the names of partners shall with the 
 necessary modifications apply to the disclosure of the names of such owners. 
 
 (6) Service of documents and proceedings. Subject to the provisions of 
 paragraph (a) of section 7 of the Act as to service of the notice of accident 
 and the claim for compensation, any document, notice, or proceeding to be 
 served on the owners of a ship shall be deemed to be sufficiently served if 
 served on the managing owner or manager for the time being of the ship, or 
 (except where the master is claiming compensation) on the master of the 
 ship ; and section 696 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, sub-section (1), 
 shall apply to service on the master of the ship, and where the master is 
 claiming compensation, and there is no managing owner of the ship, service 
 may be effected in accordance with paragraph (c) of the said sub-section. 
 
 Note. Section 696, sub-section (1) of the Act mentioned is as follows : 
 
 Service of documents. (1) Where for the purposes of this Act any 
 
 document is to be served on any person, that document may be served 
 
 (a) in any case by delivering a copy thereof personally to the person to 
 
 be served, or by leaving the same at his last place of abode ; and, 
 
 W.C.A. Q 
 
226 APPENDIX 15. [37 
 
 (6) if the document is to be served on the master of a ship, where there 
 is one, or on a person belonging to a ship, by leaving the same for 
 him on board that ship with the person being or appearing to be 
 in command or charge of the ship ; and, 
 
 (c) if the document is to be served on the master of a ship, where there 
 is no master, and the ship is in the United Kingdom, on the 
 managing owner of the ship, or, if there is no managing owner, 
 on some agent of the owner residing in the United Kingdom, or 
 where no such agent is known or can be found, by affixing a copy 
 thereof to the mast of the ship. 
 
 Detention of Ships. Section 11. 
 
 37. Application for detention of ship. Act, section 11. 5 Edw. 7, c. 10. 
 (1) An application for an order for the detention of a ship under section 11 
 of the Act shall be made in accordance with the rules for the time being in 
 force under the Shipowners' Negligence (Remedies) Act, 1905 ; and those 
 rules, with the necessary modifications, shall apply accordingly. 
 
 (2) Subject to any such rules ag in the last preceding paragraph men- 
 tioned, an application for an order for detention shall be made in accordance 
 with the following Rules. 
 
 (3) Application and evidence. Form 26. The application may (subject 
 to the provisions of paragraph 9 of this Rule) be made ex parte either in or 
 out of court, according to the form in the Appendix, and shall be supported 
 by affidavit or other evidence showing, to the satisfaction of the judge, the 
 grounds on which the application is made. 
 
 (4) Undertaking as to damages. Form 27. The judge may, before 
 granting the application, require the applicant to give or procure an under- 
 taking, to the satisfaction of the judge, to abide by any order as to damages 
 and costs which may be thereafter made, in case any person affected by the 
 order for detention shall sustain any damages by reason of the order which 
 the applicant ought to pay. 
 
 (5) Order and execution thereof. Form 28. An order for detention shall 
 specify the amount for which security shall be given, and shall be according 
 to the form hi the Appendix, and shall be issued in triplicate ; one copy 
 shall be delivered to the applicant, and the other two copies to the officer 
 named by the judge ; and one of such last-mentioned copies shall be 
 delivered by the officer to the person who is at the time of the execution of 
 the order apparently in charge of the ship, or, if there is no person apparently 
 in charge, shall be nailed or affixed on the main mast or on the single mast 
 of the ship ; and the other copy shall be retained by the officer. 
 
 (6) Rescission of order. The judge may at any time on good cause 
 shown rescind any order for detention made by him. 
 
 (7) Security. Form 29. The provisions of sections one hundred and 
 eight and one hundred and nine of the County Courts Act, 1888, and of 
 Order XXIX., as to security, shall with the necessary modifications apply 
 to the giving of security ; and the approval by the judge of any security 
 shall be signified in writing signed by him. Where security is given by 
 bond, such bond shall be according to the form in the Appendix. 
 
 (8) Release. Form 30. If the judge rescinds any^ order for detention, 
 or is satisfied that satisfaction has been made, or when security has been 
 given and approved, or in any other case if the applicant so requires, the 
 judge shall deliver to the party applying for the same an order according 
 to the form in the Appendix, directed to the officer named in the order for 
 
37] WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RULES, 1907-1912. 227 
 
 detention, authorising and directing him, upon payment of all costs, charges, 
 and expenses attending the custody of the ship, to release it forthwith. 
 
 (9) Notice of application to agent or solicitor of owner. (a) With respect 
 to notice of application for an order for detention, and to undertakings to 
 give security, the following provisions shall have effect. 
 
 (b) Notwithstanding anything in this Rule contained, a person intending 
 to apply for an order for detention shall, if the name and address of an 
 agent in England for the owners of the ship, or of a solicitor in England 
 authorised to act for the owners, agent, master, or consignee of the ship, 
 are known to him, give to such agent or solicitor, by post, telegram, or 
 otherwise, such notice of the time and place at which the application for an 
 order for detention is intended to be made as may be practicable in the 
 circumstances of the case. 
 
 (c) Undertaking by solicitor. Form 30A. If a solicitor in England repre- 
 sents that he is authorised to act for the owners, agent, master, or consignee 
 of the ship, and signs an undertaking according to the form in the Appendix, 
 to put in or give security for an amount agreed on between the parties or 
 fixed by the judge, then on such undertaking being filed in court, 
 
 (i) the judge may in his discretion refuse to make an order for detention ; 
 
 or 
 (ii) if an order for detention has been made, but not executed, the judge 
 
 may rescind it ; or 
 (iii) if an order for detention has been made and executed, the judge 
 
 may deliver to the party applying for the same an order of release 
 
 in accordance with paragraph 8 of this Rule. 
 
 (d) Filing of undertaking. An undertaking given in accordance with 
 the last preceding paragraph shall be filed in the court to which the applica- 
 tion for an order for detention is made or is intended to be made. 
 
 (e) Attachment for non-compliance with undertaking. A solicitor who 
 fails to put in or give security in pursuance of his undertaking to do so shall 
 be liable to attachment. 
 
 (10) Particulars to state circumstances under which persons giving security 
 are made respondents. Form 8. Where proceedings by way of arbitration 
 for the recovery of compensation are taken against the persons giving 
 security, the request for arbitration and particulars shall state concisely 
 the circumstances under which the persons giving security are made 
 respondents. 
 
 (11) Transmission of documents, etc., where proceedings commenced in 
 court other than that in which order for detention -made or applied for. Where 
 proceedings are commenced in any court in England, Scotland, or Ireland 
 other than that in which the order for detention was made or applied for, 
 the registrar of the court in which the order was made or applied for shall 
 on request transmit by registered post to the registrar of the court in which 
 the proceedings are commenced all original documents filed in the matter, 
 and a certified copy of all records made with reference to the matter, and 
 any bond by way of security given in the matter, and shall transfer to such 
 last-mentioned court any money paid into court by way of security in the 
 matter ; and the provisions of Order VIII., Rule 9, as to the costs of copies 
 and the costs of transmission shall apply to any transmission under this 
 paragraph. 
 
 (12) Costs of application for order for detention. The costs incurred by 
 any party in relation to an application for an order of detention and any 
 proceedings consequent thereon may in any subsequent proceedings by way 
 of arbitration be allowed as costs of the arbitration. 
 
228 APPENDIX B. [38,39 
 
 Proceedings where Employer who has paid Compensation, or from whom 
 Compensation is claimed, desires to obtain Order for Detention of Ship 
 (5 Edw. 7, c. 10). 
 
 38. Application by employer for detention of ship. 5 Edw. 7, c. 10. 
 Where an employer who has paid compensation or against whom a claim 
 for compensation has been made under the Act desires to make an applica- 
 tion for the detention of a ship under the Shipowners' Negligence (Remedies) 
 Act, 1905, the provisions of the last preceding Rule shall apply, subject to 
 the rules for the time being in force under the last-mentioned Act, ar.'.d to 
 the following modifications, viz. : 
 
 (i) Forms 31, 32, 33. An application for an order for detention, an 
 order for detention, and a bond given by way of security, shall be 
 according to the forms in the Appendix. 
 
 (ii) Form 23. Where proceedings by way of arbitration for the recovery 
 of compensation are taken against the employer, he may bring 
 in the persons giving security as third parties in accordance with 
 Rule 24, and the provisions of that Rule shall apply accordingly, 
 (iii) Where such proceedings are taken against the employer in any 
 court other than that in which the order for detention was made 
 or applied for, and the employer brings in the persons giving 
 security as third parties, the provisions of paragraphs 11 and 12 
 of the last preceding rule shall apply. 
 
 (iv) Where the employer has paid compensation in respect of the injury, 
 all questions as to his right to indemnity against the persons giving 
 securitj 7 , and as to the amount of such indemnity, shall in default 
 of agreement be settled by action, or by consent of the parties, by 
 arbitration in accordance with 'the Act and these Rules; and if 
 such questions are settled by arbitration, the provisions of para- 
 graphs 10 to 12 of the last preceding Rule shall apply. 
 
 Industrial Diseases. 
 
 39. Application of Act and Rules to cases of industrial diseases. (1) In 
 the application of the Act and these Rules in the case of a workman disabled 
 by or suspended on account of his having contracted any disease mentioned 
 in section 8 of and the Third Schedule to the Act [or in any order of the 
 Secretary of State made under sub-section (6) of the said section, or disabled 
 by or suspended on account of his having sustained any injury due to the 
 nature of any employment specified in any such order, not being an injury 
 by accident, or in the case of a workman] whose death has been caused by 
 any such disease [or injury as above-mentioned] the following provisions 
 shall have effect. (Mar. 14, 1908.) 
 
 (2) Notice of disablement. The notice required by section 2 of the Act 
 shall state the date and cause of the disablement or suspension ; and where 
 a certificate of disablement or a certificate of or relating to suspension has 
 been given, a copy thereof shall on demand be furnished to the employer. 
 
 (3) Forms of request for arbitration. Forms 9, 10. A request for 
 arbitration shall be according to such one of the forms in the Appendix as 
 shall be applicable to the case, with such modifications as the nature of the 
 case may require. 
 
 (4) Adding respondent under Act, section 8 (1) (c) (ii). Forms 19, 20. 
 (a) If the employer desires to add any other employer as a party to the 
 arbitration, pursuant to proviso (ii) to paragraph (c) of sub-section (1) of 
 section 8 of the Act, he shall file with the registrar in duplicate a notice 
 
40] WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RULES, 1907-1912. 229 
 
 according to the form in the Appendix : and thereupon the registrar shall 
 make an order adding such other employer as a respondent, and may, if 
 necessary, adjourn the hearing of the arbitration for such time as may be 
 necessary to enable such other employer to be duly served. 
 
 (b) Notice of order, and service on added respondent. Forms 21, 22. 
 Where a respondent is added under the last preceding paragraph, copies of 
 the notice pursuant to which he is so added, and of the order, shall be sent 
 by post to the applicant and the original respondent ; and the like copies, 
 together with a copy of the applicant's request and particulars, and of the 
 notice served on the original respondent under Rules 14 and 15, and a notice 
 according to the form in the Appendix as to the place at which and the day 
 and hour on and at which the arbitration will be proceeded with, shall be 
 issued by the registrar for service on the added respondent ; and such copies 
 and notices shall be served on the added respondent in accordance with 
 Rule 15, with the substitution of the original respondent for the applicant. 
 
 (c) Application of Rules to added respondent. The provisions of these 
 Rules as to respondents shall apply to the added respondent from the date 
 of service on him as if he had been originally made a respondent. 
 
 (d) Procedure at arbitration. Costs. At the hearing of the arbitration 
 the judge or arbitrator shall decide all questions as between the applicant 
 and the original and added respondents, and may make such award as may 
 be necessary effectively and completely to adjudicate upon and settle -all the 
 questions involved in the arbitration, and may make such order as to costs 
 as between the applicant and the respondents, and as between the respon- 
 dents themselves, as may be just. 
 
 (5) Claim to contribution under Act, section 8 (1) (c) (iii). Form 23. 
 Where the employer claims under proviso (iii) to paragraph (c) of sub-section 
 (1) of section 8 of the Act to be entitled to contribution from any other 
 employer, he may bring in such other employer as a third party in accordance 
 with Rules 19 to 23, 25 and 26 ; and the provisions of those Rules shall with 
 the necessary modifications apply to any such claim to contribution in like 
 manner as they apply to claims to indemnity. 
 
 Appointment of Arbitrator by Judge in place of Arbitrator agreed on 
 by the Parties under Schedule II., Paragraph 8. 
 
 40. ( 1 ) Application for appointment. Form 34. In case of the death 
 or refusal or inability to act of an arbitrator agreed on by the parties, any 
 party to the arbitration who desires to make an application to the judge to 
 appoint a new arbitrator shall apply in writing to the registrar to fix a time 
 and place for the hearing of such application. 
 
 (2) Fixing of hearing by registrar. The registrar shall fix the hearing of 
 the application before the judge for any court appointed to be held within 
 fourteen days from the date of the application to the registrar, but so that 
 he shall not, except by consent, fix the hearing for a day less than seven days 
 from the date of the application. 
 
 (3) Fixing of hearing by judge. If there is no available court, the 
 registrar shall send notice of the intended application to the judge, who 
 shall as soon as conveniently may be fix a time and place- for the hearing of 
 the application. Such time shall not, except by consent, be less than seven 
 days from the date of the application to the registrar. 
 
 (4) Summons to other party. Form 35. On the time and place for the 
 hearing of the application being fixed, the registrar shall issue to the applicant 
 a summons under the seal of the court according to the form in the Appendix 
 
230 APPENDIX B. [41, 42 
 
 addressed to the other party to the arbitration, and requiring him to attend 
 on the hearing of the application. 
 
 (5) Service of summons. Such summons shall be served by the applicant 
 on the other party in accordance with Rule 15 of these Rules not less than 
 four clear days before the day fixed for the hearing, unless such party agrees 
 to accept shorter service. 
 
 (6) Hearing of application. On the day fixed for the hearing the judge 
 shall dispose of the application on hearing the parties, or on hearing the 
 applicant and on proof of service of the summons on the other party, if such 
 other party does not appear. 
 
 (7) Ascertainment of icillinyness to act. Before appointing any person 
 to act as arbitrator, the judge shall ascertain that such person is willing to 
 serve if appointed. 
 
 (8) Order. The appointment may be made by indorsement on the 
 summons, or by a separate order. 
 
 (9) Costs. The costs of the application shall be in the discretion of the 
 judge, who may order the same to be paid by one party to the other, or to 
 be dealt with as costs attending the arbitration. Such costs, if allowed, 
 shall be taxed on such scale as the judge shall direct. 
 
 Memorandum under Schedule II., Paragraph 9. 
 
 [41. Memorandum to be sent to t registrar. Act, Sched. 2, par. 9. 
 Form 36. (1) The memorandum as to any matter decided by a committee 
 or by an arbitrator or by agreement, which is by paragraph 9 of the second 
 schedule to the Act required to be sent to the registrar, shall be according 
 to such one of the forms 36 (i) to 36 (iv) in the Appendix as is applicable to 
 the circumstances of the case, and shall be left at the office of the registrar, 
 or sent by post by registered letter addressed to the registrar at his office, 
 as soon as may be after the matter has been decided. 
 
 (2) Where the matter is decided after a medical referee has been appointed 
 to report on any matter under paragraph 15 of the second schedule to the 
 Act, a copy of the report of the referee shall be annexed to the memorandum 
 and recorded therewith ; and if the referee attended any proceeding in the 
 arbitration, it shall be so stated in the memorandum. 
 
 (3) In case of an agreement as to any matter referred to in paragraph 1 
 of Rule 49, a separate statement as required by that paragraph shall be left 
 or sent with the memorandum of the agreement]. (May 19, 1909.) 
 
 [42. (1) Authentication of memorandum of decision of committee or 
 arbitrator. If the matter is decided by a committee or an arbitrator, the 
 memorandum shall be authenticated by the signatures of the chairman and 
 secretary of the committee, or by the signature of the arbitrator ; and it 
 shall be the duty of the committee or arbitrator, as soon as may be after the 
 decision, to draw up such memorandum and to sign the same or cause it to 
 be signed as aforesaid, and to leave or send the same as aforesaid, or to 
 deliver the same to some party interested, to be by him so left or sent. 
 
 (2) Authentication of memorandum of agreement. If the matter is 
 decided by agreement, the memorandum shall be authenticated by the 
 signatures or signature of the parties to the agreement or one of them, or, 
 in the case of employers, by the signature of some official or other person in 
 their employ duly authorised to sign on their behalf, or, in the case of 
 persons under disability, by the signature of their next friend on their behalf. 
 
 (3) Copies. There shall be left or sent with the memorandum a copy 
 thereof for every party interested, other than the party (it any) by whom 
 the memorandum is left or sent. 
 
43-47] WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RULES, 1907-1912. 231 
 
 (4) Production of original agreement. Where the matter is decided by 
 agreement, the registrar may, if the original agreement is in writing, and is 
 not left or sent to be recorded, require such original agreement to be pro- 
 duced ; but he shall not be entitled to retain the same where a memorandum 
 thereof is left or sent to be recorded. 
 
 (5) Memorandum may be lodged by insurers. An agreement or memo- 
 randum of an agreement may be left with or sent to the registrar by insurers 
 on behalf of the parties interested. 
 
 (6) Agreement on behalf of person under disability. An agreement made 
 by or on behalf of any person under any legal disability shall be conditional 
 only unless and until a memorandum thereof has been recorded in accordance 
 with the Act and these Rules.] (May 19, 1909.) 
 
 43. Notice to parties interested of memorandum having been received. 
 Form 37. On the receipt of the memorandum the registrar shall send one 
 of the copies thereof to every party interested, with a notice according to 
 the form in the Appendix, requesting such party to inform him within seven 
 days from the date, of the notice whether the memorandum is genuine, or 
 whether he disputes it, and, if so, in what particulars, or objects to its being 
 recorded, and, if so, on what grounds. 
 
 44. Recording of memorandum, if not disputed. If all the parties interested 
 admit the genuineness of the memorandum, or do not within such period of 
 seven days dispute it or object to its being recorded, the registrar shall, 
 subject to proviso (d) to paragraph 9 of the second schedule to the Act, and 
 to Rule 49, record it without further proof. 
 
 45. W here memorandum disputed, or employer objects to its being recorded. 
 Act, Sched. 2, par. 9 (b). Form 38. If any party interested disputes the 
 genuineness of the memorandum, or if, where a workman seeks to record 
 a memorandum of agreement between his employer and himself, the employer 
 alleges that the workman has in fact returned to work and is earning the 
 same wages as he did before the accident, and objects to the recording of 
 the memorandum, such party or employer shall within seven days from the 
 date of the notice mentioned in Rule 43 file with the registrar a notice 
 according to the form in the Appendix that he disputes the genuineness of 
 the memorandum or that he objects to its being recorded, and shall with 
 such notice file a copy thereof for each of the other parties interested. 
 
 46. Notice of dispute or objection. Form 39. On the receipt of any such 
 notice as in the last preceding Rule mentioned, the registrar shall send a 
 copy thereof to each of the other parties interested, together with a notice 
 according to the form in the Appendix, informing such party that the 
 memorandum will not be recorded except with the consent in writing of 
 the party or employer disputing the same or objecting to the same being 
 recorded, or by order of the judge. 
 
 47. Subsequent proceedings. (1) If the consent mentioned in the las^ 
 preceding Rule is obtained, the registrar shall, subject to proviso (d) to 
 paragraph 9 of the second schedule to the Act, and to Rule 49, record the 
 memorandum without further proof. 
 
 (2) If such consent cannot be obtained, any party interested may apply 
 to the j udge to order the memorandum to be recorded. 
 
 [(3) Amendment of memorandum by consent. Provided that if all parties 
 interested consent in writing to any amendment of the memorandum, and 
 to the recording of the same as so amended, the registrar may amend the 
 memorandum accordingly, and record the same without further proof.! 
 (May 19, 1909.) 
 
!232 APPENDIX B. [48, 49 
 
 Proceedings for Record of Memorandum or Rectification of Register. 
 
 48. Proceedings on application for record of memorandum or rectification 
 of register. Form 40. The following provisions shall apply to an applica- 
 tion for an order that a memorandum be recorded, or an application to the 
 judge to rectify the register pursuant to paragraph 9 of the second schedule 
 to the Act. 
 
 (a) The application shall be made in court on notice in writing, stating 
 
 the relief or order which the applicant claims. 
 (6) The notice shall be filed with the registrar, and copies thereof shall 
 
 be served 
 
 (i) in the case of an application for an order that a memorandum be 
 recorded, on the party disputing the memorandum or objecting 
 to its being recorded, and on all other parties interested ; 
 (ii) in the case of an application to rectify the register, on every party 
 who would be affected by such rectification, subject to the pro- 
 visions of these Rules as to the parties to an arbitration ; 
 or on the solicitor of such party, ten clear days at least before the 
 hearing of the application, unless the judge or registrar gives leave 
 for shorter notice. 
 
 (c) On the hearing of the application, witnesses may be orally examined 
 
 in the same manner as on the hearing of an action. 
 
 (d) On the hearing of the application the judge may make such order or 
 
 give such directions as he may think just, regard being had, in the 
 case of an application for an order that a memorandum of an 
 agreement be recorded, to proviso (d) to paragraph 9 of the second 
 schedule to the Act. 
 
 (c) The provisions of the Act and these Rules as to the costs of an 
 arbitration before the judge shall apply to any such application. 
 
 Reference of Agreement presented for Registration to the Judge. 
 Schedule II., Paragraph 9, Proviso (d). 
 
 [49. (1) Where memorandum of agreement relates to matter within Act, 
 Sched. 2, par. 9, proviso (d), or I & 2 Geo. 5, c. 55, s. 11 (1) (c). Form 36A. 
 \Yhere' a memorandum of agreement as to the redemption of a weekly 
 payment by a lump sum, or as to the amount of compensation payable 
 to a person under any legal disabilit}*, or to dependants, or as to the 
 amount of compensation payable in the form of a weekly payment or of a 
 lump sum to a workman who is an insured person within the meaning of 
 the National Insurance Act, 1911, is presented for registration, there shall 
 be left or sent with the memorandum a separate statement according to 
 the form 36A in the Appendix, of such of the particulars mentioned in 
 that form as are applicable to the case. Where an agreement with a 
 workman is presented for registration, it shall be stated in par. (a) of 
 Part A of the said form 36A whether he is or is not an insured person 
 within the meaning of the said Act. 
 
 (la) Inquiry by registrar, and proceedings thereon. In any such case the 
 registrar shall, before recording the memorandum, make such inquiries and 
 obtain such information as he may think necessary in order to satisfy himself 
 that the memorandum may properly be recorded, regard being had to 
 proviso (d) to par. 9 of the Second Schedule to the Act, as applied by 
 
50] WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RULES, 1907-1912. 233 
 
 section 11, sub-section (1) (c), of the National Insurance Act, 1911 : and it 
 shall be the duty of the parties to the agreement to answer such inquiries 
 and give such information accordingly. 
 
 (2) Where it appears to the registrar that the memorandum ought not 
 to bt recorded for any reason mentioned in the said proviso, as so applied, 
 he shall make a report to the judge in writing, stating the information 
 which he has obtained, and the grounds on which it appears to him that 
 the memorandum ought not to be recorded.] (July 26, 1912.) 
 
 (3) If on consideration of the registrar's report it appears to the judge 
 that the memorandum may properly be recorded, he may so direct, and it 
 shall be recorded accordingly. 
 
 (4) Form 41. If on consideration of the registrar's report it appears to 
 the judge that the memorandum should not be recorded without further 
 inquiry, the registrar shall send notice to the parties to the agreement 
 according to the form in the Appendix, informing them that he has referred 
 the matter to the judge, and requiring them to attend on a day to be named 
 in the notice, when the matter will be inquired into by the judge. 
 
 [(4a.) Where the registrar has refused to record a memorandum of agree- 
 ment by reason of the inadequacy of the amount of compensation agreed 
 to be paid in the form of a weekly payment or of a lump sum to a work- 
 man who is an insured person within the meaning of the National Insurance 
 Act, 1911, paragraph (a) of the form referred to in the last preceding para- 
 graph shall be altered accordingly.] (July 26, 1912.) 
 
 (5) The notices shall be sent to the parties or their solicitors ten clear 
 days at least before the day fixed for the inquiry, unless the judge directs 
 shorter notice to be given. 
 
 (6) At the inquiry witnesses may be orally examined in the same manner 
 as on the hearing of an action. 
 
 (7) At the inquiry the judge may make such order or give such directions 
 as he may think just. 
 
 (8) The provisions of the Act and these Rules as to the costs of an 
 arbitration before the judge shall apply to any such inquiry. [And in 
 particular, if it appears that a report of the registrar has been rendered 
 necessary by the neglect or refusal of any party to an agreement to furnish 
 any information reasonably required of him by the registrar, such party 
 may be ordered to pay the costs of the inquiry.] (Nov. 24, 1908.) 
 
 Proceedings for Removal of Record of Memorandum of Agreement from Register 
 under Schedule II., Paragraph 9, Proviso (e). 
 
 50. (1) Application for removal of agreement from register. Act, Sched. 2, 
 par. 9, proviso (e). Form 42. An application to the judge by or on behalf 
 of any party for the^ removal from the register of the record of a memo- 
 randum of an agreement under proviso (e) to paragraph 9 of the Second 
 Schedule to the Act shall be made in court on notice in writing : and the 
 provisions of Rule 48 shall apply to the proceedings on such application. 
 
 (2) Notice where inquiry directed by judge. Form 43. If it appears to 
 the judge on a report by the registrar without such application as in the last 
 preceding paragraph mentioned that the record of a memorandum of an 
 agreement should be removed from the register pursuant to the said proviso, 
 the registrar shall send notice to the parties to the agreement according to 
 the form in the Appendix, requiring them to attend on a day to be named 
 in the notice, when the matter will be inquired into by the judge. 
 
234 APPENDIX B. [5CU-52 
 
 (3) Such notice shall be sent and the inquiry held in accordance with 
 the provisions of the last preceding Rule, and the provisions of that Rule 
 shall apply to any such inquiry. 
 
 Payment into Court and Application of lump Sum payable by Agreement in 
 lieu or for Redemption of weekly payment payable to a person under legal 
 disability. 
 
 [50A. Payment into court and investment and application of lump sum 
 payable under agreement in lieu of or in redemption of weekly payment to person 
 under disability. Act, Sched. 1, pars. 5, 17. Where an agreement is made 
 for the payment of a lump sum in lieu of a weekly payment to a person 
 under any legal disability, or for the redemption by a lump sum of a weekly 
 payment payable to a person under any legal disability, and a memorandum 
 thereof has been recorded in accordance with the Act and these Rules, such 
 sum shall be paid into court, and shall be invested, applied, or otherwise 
 dealt with by the court in such manner as the court in its discretion thinks 
 fit for the benefit of the person entitled thereto, and the receipt of the 
 registrar of the court shall be a sufficient discharge in respect of the amount 
 paid in : and the provisions of paragraph 5 of the first schedule to the Act 
 and of Rule 56A shall apply to the paj^ment into court and the investment 
 and application of such lump sum.] (May 19, 1909.) 
 
 Certificate under Section 1, Sub-s. 4. 
 
 51. Certificate under Act, section 1, sub-section 4. Form 44. (1) Where 
 an action is brought in the county court to recover damages independently 
 of the Act for injury caused by any accident, and the court proceeds under 
 sub-section 4 of section 1 of the Act, the certificate given by the court shall 
 be according to the form in the Appendix. 
 
 (2) The registrar shall, on receiving a certificate given by any other 
 court under the said sub-section, record the same in like manner as if such 
 certificate were an award made by the judge. 
 
 Summoning Medical Referee a-s Assessor under Schedule II., Paragraph 5. 
 
 52. (1) Application for assessor. Act, Sched. 2, par. 5. Form 45. 
 Any party to an arbitration may eight clear days at least before the day 
 fixed for proceeding with the arbitration file with the registrar an application 
 according to the form in the Appendix, requesting the judge to summon a 
 medical referee to sit with him as an assessor under paragraph 5 of the 
 second schedule to the Act. 
 
 (2) Assessor to be summoned if judge approves. On the receipt of an 
 application for an assessor the registrar shall forward a copy of the same to 
 the judge, who if he thinks fit shall return the same with his approval, and 
 thereupon the registrar shall forthwith summon an assessor. 
 
 (3) Notice where judge does not approve. Form 46. If the judge does 
 not think fit that an assessor shall be summoned, notice thereof shall be 
 given by the registrar to the applicant, according to the form in the Appendix. 
 
 (4) Summoning of assessor if judge approves or so directs. If the judge 
 thinks fit, either on the application of any party to an arbitration or on his 
 own motion, to summon a medical referee to sit with him as an assessor, the 
 registrar shall forthwith summon one of the medical referees appointed by 
 the Secretary of State for the area comprising the district of the court in 
 
53, 54] WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION KULES, 1907-1912. 235 
 
 which the arbitration is pending, by sending to such medical referee by post 
 a summons according to the form in the Appendix. 
 
 (5) Where assessor fails to attend. If at the time and place appointed 
 for the arbitration the medical referee summoned does not attend, the judge 
 may either proceed with the arbitration without the assistance of an assessor, 
 or he may adjourn the hearing. 
 
 Appointment of Medical Referee to Report under Schedule II., 
 Paragraph 15. 
 
 53. Appointment of medical referees to report under Act, Sched. 2, par. 15. 
 (1) Subject to and in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary 
 of State and the Treasury under paragraph 15 of the second schedule to the 
 Act, the judge may submit to a medical referee for report any matter which 
 seems material to any question arising in an arbitration. 
 
 (2) When any matter is submitted as aforesaid, the judge may, subject 
 to and in accordance with such regulations, order the injured workman to 
 submit himself for examination by the medical referee ; and it shall be the 
 duty of the workman, on being served with such, order, to submit himself 
 for examination accordingly. 
 
 Application for Reference to Medical Referee under Schedule I., 
 Paragraph 15. 
 
 54. Application for reference to a medical referee under Act, Sched. 1, par. 
 15. (1) With respect to applications to the registrar pursuant to paragraph 
 15 of the first schedule to the Act to refer any matter to a medical referee, 
 the following provisions shall have effect. 
 
 (2) Form 48. An application to the registrar to refer any matter to a 
 medical referee shall be made in writing, and shall contain a statement of 
 the facts which render the application necessary, according to the form in 
 the Appendix, and shall be accompanied by a copy of the report of every 
 medical practitioner who has examined the workman either on behalf of 
 the employer or on the selection of the workman. The application shall be 
 signed by or on behalf of both parties ; and the applicant shall file copies of 
 the application and reports for the use of the medical referee. 
 
 (3) Form 49. On the hearing of the application the registrar shall refer 
 the matter to one of the medical referees appointed for the area comprising 
 the district of the court : and shall forward to such medical referee by 
 registered post one of the filed copies of the application and reports, with 
 an order of reference according to the form in the Appendix. 
 
 (4) Form 50. The registrar shall also make an order directing the 
 workman to submit himself for examination by the medical referee, subject 
 to and in accordance with any regulations made by the Secretary of State. 
 
 (5)' Before making such order the registrar shall inquire whether the 
 workman is in a fit condition to travel for the purpose of examination, and 
 if satisfied that he is in a fit condition shall by the order direct him to attend 
 at such time and place as the referee may fix, and if satisfied that he is not 
 in a fit condition to travel shall so state in the order of reference ; and it 
 shall be the duty of the workman, on being served with the order, to submit 
 himself for examination accordingly. 
 
 (6) The registrar shall deliver or send by registered post to each party a 
 copy of the order of reference, and shall send to the workman a copy of the 
 order directing him to submit himself for examination. 
 
236 APPENDIX B. [55 
 
 (7) The medical referee shall forward his certificate in the matter to the 
 registrar by registered post. 
 
 (8) Form 51. On the receipt of the certificate of the medical referee the 
 registrar shall inform the parties by post that it has been received, and shall 
 permit any party to inspect the same during office hours, and shall on the 
 application and at the cost of either party furnish him with a copy of the 
 certificate, or allow him to take a copy thereof. 
 
 (9) The fee payable by the applicant shall be calculated at the rate of 
 one shilling in the pound on 26 times the amount of the weekly payments 
 claimed by or payable to the workman, so that the total fee shall not exceed 
 one pound. 
 
 (10) The costs of any application to the registrar, including the fee paid 
 under the last preceding paragraph, may be allowed as costs in any subse- 
 quent arbitration for the settlement of the weekly payment to be made to 
 the workman, or, where the application is made after the weekly payment 
 has been settled, as costs in any subsequent arbitration as to the review of 
 such weekly payment. 
 
 Suspension of Proceeding's or Weekly Payments on Refusal to Submit to 
 Examination under Schedule I., Paragraph 4, Paragraph 14, or Para- 
 graph 15. 
 
 55. Application to stay proceedings or suspend weekly payments on refusal 
 of workman to submit to examination under Act, Sched. 1, par. 4, par. 14, or 
 par. 15. (1) In any case in which a workman has given notice of an accident, 
 or is receiving weekly payments under the Act, and the employer alleges 
 that the workman refuses to submit himself to medical examination in 
 accordance with paragraph 4, paragraph 14, or paragraph 15 of the first 
 schedule to the Act, or in any way obstructs such examination, the employer 
 may apply for a suspension of the right to compensation and to take or 
 prosecute any proceedings under the Act in relation to compensation, or of 
 the right to the weekly payments, until such examination has taken place, 
 in accordance with this Rule. 
 
 (2) Where proceedings are pending before a committee or an arbitrator 
 agreed on by the parties, the application shall be made to such committee 
 or arbitrator. 
 
 (3) Where the workman has given notice of an accident, but no pro- 
 ceedings are pending, or proceedings are pending before the judge or an 
 arbitrator appointed by him, the application shall be made to the judge. 
 
 (4) Where the workman is receiving weekly payments under an award, 
 memorandum, or certificate, then 
 
 (a) If proceedings for the review of the weekly payment are pending 
 before a committee or an arbitrator agreed on by the parties, the 
 application shall be made to such committee or arbitrator ; 
 
 (6) If no proceedings for review are pending, or if proceedings for review 
 are pending before the judge or an arbitrator appointed by him, 
 the application shall be made to the judge. 
 
 (5) Form 52. Where the application is to be made to the judge, it may 
 be made in or out of court in accordance with Rule 48 ; and the provisions 
 of the said rule shall apply to the proceedings oh such application, with the 
 following modification : 
 
 (a) The notice shall be served on the workman or his solicitor five clear 
 days before the hearing of the application, unless the judge or 
 registrar gives leave for shorter notice. 
 
56A] WORKMEN'S COMPENSATIOX BULES, 1907-1912. 237 
 
 Payment into Court and Investment and Application of Money payable in case 
 of Death. Schedule /., Paragraph 5. 
 
 56A. Payment into court, investment, and application of payment in case of 
 death. Act, Sched. 1, par. 5. (1) Where any payment in the case of death 
 is to be paid into the county court pursuant to paragraph 5 of the First 
 Schedule to the Act, the following provisions shall have effect. 
 
 (2) Where any money is to be paid into court under an award made by 
 the judge or an arbitrator appointed by him, payment shall be made in 
 accordance with the directions contained in the award. 
 
 (3) In any other case payment shall be made into the court in which the 
 memorandum of the decision, award, or agreement under which the money 
 is to be paid, or the certificate under which the money is to be paid, has been 
 or is to be recorded. 
 
 [(4) Form 53. W 7 here money is to be paid into court under this Rule, 
 the employer shall lodge with the registrar a preecipe in duplicate according 
 to the form 53 in the Appendix, and shall annex to one copy of the prsecipe 
 a form of receipt, and the registrar, on receipt of the sum paid in, shall sign 
 the receipt and return the same to the employer ; and the employer shall 
 forthwith give notice to the persons interested in the sum paid in of such 
 payment having been made. 
 
 (5) Form 53B (i). On the payment of money into court, the registrar 
 shall forthwith send by post to each of the persons appearing by the award, 
 memorandum, or certificate to.be interested in such money a notice of the 
 said payment according to the form 53s (i) in the Appendix. Provided 
 that in the case of infant dependants residing with their mother or guardian 
 it shall be sufficient to send such notice to the mother or guardian only. 
 
 (6) If all questions as to who are dependants and the amount payable 
 to each dependant have been settled by arbitration before payment into 
 court, the sum paid into court shall be allotted between the dependants in 
 accordance with the award, and the amount allotted to each dependant 
 shall be invested, applied, or otherwise dealt with by the court for the 
 benefit of the person entitled thereto in accordance with paragraph 5 of the 
 first schedule to the Act. 
 
 (7) If all questions as to who are dependants have been settled by 
 agreement before payment into court, the amount payable to each depen- 
 dant shall be settled by the court, and the amount allotted to each dependant 
 shall be invested, applied, or otherwise dealt with by the court for the 
 benefit of the person entitled thereto in accordance with paragraph 5 of the 
 first schedule to the Act. 
 
 (8) If any such questions have not been settled before payment into 
 court, then 
 
 (a) If all the persons interested in the sum paid into court agree to leave 
 the application thereof to the court, or if no question arises as to 
 who is a dependant or as to the amount payable to any dependant, 
 or otherwise as to the application of the sum paid into court, but 
 any of the persons interested in the said sum are absent or under 
 disability, the amount paid into court shall, on application by or 
 on behalf of the persons interested therein, be allotted, invested, 
 applied, or otherwise dealt with by the court for the benefit of the 
 persons interested therein in accordance with paragraph 5 of the 
 first schedule to the Act. 
 
 (&) If any question arises as to who is a dependant or as to the amount 
 
238 APPENDIX B. [56B 
 
 payable to any dependant, or otherwise as to the application of 
 the sum paid into court, such question shall be settled by arbitra- 
 tion in accordance with the Act and these Rules ; and the amount 
 allotted to each dependant shall be invested, applied, or otherwise 
 dealt with by the court for the benefit of the person entitled thereto 
 in accordance with paragraph 5 of the first schedule to the Act]. 
 (May 19, 1909.) 
 
 [(9) Where any question is settled by the court by arbitration in accor- 
 dance with the last preceding paragraph, an application for the investment 
 or application of any sum allotted to any person on such arbitration may be 
 made at or immediately after the hearing of the arbitration. 
 
 (10) (a) Form 53c. Where application is not so made, or in any other 
 case coming within paragraph 5 of the first schedule to the Act, an applica- 
 tion for the investment or application of an} 7 sum paid into court, or of the 
 amount allotted to any person, shall be made in court on notice in writing, 
 stating on whose behalf the application is made, and the order which the 
 applicant asks, according to the form in the Appendix. 
 
 (6) The notice shall be filed with the registrar, and where the application 
 is made by or on behalf of some only of the persons interested, notice thereof 
 shall be served on all other parties interested, or on their solicitors, five clear 
 days at least before the hearing of the application, unless the judge or 
 registrar gives leave for shorter notice. 
 
 (c) On the hearing of the application witnesses may be orally examined 
 in the same manner as on the hearing of an action. 
 
 (d) On the hearing of the application the. judge may, after making or 
 directing such inquiries as to the dependants and on such evidence of title 
 and identity as he may think necessary, make such order under paragraph 5 
 of the first schedule to the Act and this Rule as he may think fit. 
 
 (e) The provisions of the Act and these Rules as to the costs of an arbitra- 
 tion shall apply to any such application. 
 
 (11) An employer paying money into court under this Rule shall not be 
 liable to any costs incurred by any person interested in such money after 
 the receipt of notice of payment into court ; but the judge may, in his dis- 
 cretion, order such employer to pay the costs of any such person properly 
 incurred before the receipt of such notice. 
 
 (12) Every order for the investment or application of money paid into 
 court shall reserve liberty to the parties interested to apply to the court as 
 they may be advised. 
 
 (13) Where any sum allotted to any person under paragraph 5 of the 
 first schedule to the Act or this Rule is ordered to be paid out to or applied 
 for the benefit of the person entitled thereto, by weekly or other periodical 
 payments, such payments may be made to the person entitled to receive 
 the same either at the office of the registrar, or, on the written request of 
 such person, by crossed cheque or Post Office order addressed to such 
 person and forwarded by registered post letter, payment by post being in 
 all cases at the cost and risk of the person requesting the same.] (Mar. 14, 
 1908.) 
 
 [56s. Payment into court where liability admitted, but amount not ascer- 
 tained. (1) If there is no dispute as to the liability to pay compensation, 
 but the amount payable has not been ascertained or decided either by a 
 committee or by arbitration or by agreement, the employer may pay the 
 amount which he admits to be payable as compensation into court to which, 
 if an agreement had been come to in the matter, a memorandum of such 
 agreement would be sent to be recorded. 
 
56if| WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RULES, 1907-1912. 239 
 
 (2) Form 53 A. Where money is to be paid into court under this Rule, 
 the employer shall lodge with the registrar a praecipe in duplicate according 
 to the form 53A in the Appendix, containing a statement of the particulars 
 mentioned in that form, and stating in what manner the sum admitted to 
 be payable as compensation has been arrived at. The employer shall annex 
 to one copy of the prsecipe a form of receipt, according to the said form, and 
 the registrar, on receipt of the sum paid in, shall sign the receipt and return 
 the same to the employer ; and the employer shall forthwith give notice to the 
 persons interested in the sum paid in of such payment having been made. 
 
 (3) On the payment of money into court under this Rule the registrar 
 shall make such inquiries and obtain such information as he may think 
 necessary to satisfy himself whether the amount paid in is adequate in the 
 circumstances of the case ; and it shall be the duty of the employer and of 
 the persons interested in the money paid in to answer such inquiries and 
 give such information accordingly. 
 
 (4) Form 53s (ii). Where it appears to the registrar that the amount 
 paid in is adequate, he shall forthwith send by post to each of the persons 
 appearing by the prsecipe to be interested in such money a notice of the said 
 payment according to the form 53s (ii) in the Appendix. Provided that in 
 the case of infant dependants residing with their mother or guardian it shall 
 be sufficient to send such notice to the mother or guardian only. 
 
 (5) Where it appears to the registrar that the amount paid in is in- 
 adequate, he shall make a report to the judge in writing, stating the informa- 
 tion he has obtained and the grounds on which it appears to him that the 
 amount paid in is inadequate. 
 
 (6) If on consideration of the registrar's report it appears to the judge 
 that the amount paid in is adequate, he may direct the registrar to send to 
 the parties interested notice of payment in accordance with paragraph 4 of 
 this Rule. 
 
 (7) Form 53AA. If on consideration of the registrar's report it appears 
 to the judge that further inquiry should be made, the registrar shall send 
 notice to the employer and to the parties appearing by the prsecipe to be 
 interested in the money paid into court, according to the form 53AA in the 
 Appendix, informing them that he has referred the matter to the judge, 
 and requiring them to attend on a day to be named in the notice, when the 
 matter will be inquired into by the judge. On such inquiry the judge may 
 make such order (including an order as to the money paid into court) as 
 under the circumstances he may think just ; and paragraphs 5, 6, and 8 of 
 Rule 49 shall apply. 
 
 (8) Where notice of payment into court is sent in accordance with 
 paragraph 4 or paragraph 6 of this Rule, then 
 
 (a) If any question arises as to the adequacy of the amount paid into 
 court, the question as to the amount payable as compensation, 
 and all questions as to who are dependants and the amount payable 
 to each dependant, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance 
 with the Act and these Rules ; and the amount allotted to each 
 dependant shall be invested, applied, or otherwise dealt with by 
 the court for the benefit of the persons entitled thereto in accor- 
 dance with paragraph 5 of the first schedule to the Act and para- 
 graphs 9, 10, 12, and 13 of the .last preceding Rule.' 
 
 (I) If no question arises as to the adequacy of the amount paid into 
 court, the amount paid into court shall be allotted, invested, 
 applied, or otherwise dealt with by the court in accordance with 
 paragraphs 8 to 10, 12 and 13 of the last preceding Rule. 
 
240 APPENDIX B. [56<-58 
 
 (9) An employer paying money into court under this Rule shall not 
 (except under paragraph 8 of Rule 49, or where a question arises as to the 
 adequacy of the amount paid in, and such question is decided adversely to 
 the employer by arbitration under paragraph 8 of this Rule) be liable to 
 any costs incurred by any person interested in such money after receipt of 
 notice of payment into court ; but the judge may, in his discretion, order 
 such employer to pay the costs of any such person properly incurred before 
 the receipt of such notice.] (May 19, 1909.) 
 
 [56c. Payment into court where liability denied. (1) Where a claim for 
 compensation has been made by or on behalf of dependants, and the employer 
 denies liability, but is willing to pay an amount in settlement of the claim, 
 and such of the dependants as are not under disability are willing to accept 
 such amount in settlement, the employer may pay such amount into the 
 court to which, if an agreement had been come to in the matter, a memoran- 
 dum of such agreement would be sent to be recorded. 
 
 (2) Form 53D. Where money is to be paid into court under this Rule, 
 the emplo}*er shall lodge with the registrar a prsecipe, in duplicate, according 
 to the Form 53o in the Appendix, containing a statement of the particulars 
 mentioned in that form. The employer shall annex to one copy of the prae- 
 cipe a form of receipt according to the said form, and the registrar on receipt 
 of the sum paid in shall sign the receipt and return the same to the employer, 
 and the employer shall forthwith give notice to the persons interested in the 
 sum paid in of such payment having been made. 
 
 (3) On the payment of money into court under this Rule, the registrar 
 shall proceed according to paragraph 3 of the last preceding Rule, and the 
 provisions of that Rule shall apply to proceedings subsequent to such 
 payment.] (March 31, 1911.) 
 
 Payment into Court and Application of Weekly Payments payable to person 
 under Legal Disability. Schedule I., Paragraph 7. 
 
 57. Application for payment into court of weekly payment to person under 
 legal disability. Act, Sched. 1, par. 1. (1) An application under paragraph 
 7 of the first schedule to the Act for an order that a weekly payment payable 
 under the Act to a person under any legal disability shall during the dis- 
 ability be paid into court may be made either by the person liable to make 
 such payment, or by or on behalf of the person entitled to such payment. 
 
 (2) If the weekly payment is awarded by the judge, the application may 
 be made at or immediately after the hearing of the arbitration. 
 
 (3) Form 54. In any other case the application may be made in or out 
 of court on notice in writing, which shall be served on the other party or his 
 solicitor five clear days at least before the hearing of the application, unless 
 the judge or registrar gives leave for shorter notice ; and the provisions of 
 Rule 48 shall apply to any such application. 
 
 (4) Where any weekly payment is ordered to be paid into court, the sums 
 paid in shall be paid out by the registrar to or otherwise applied for the 
 benefit of the person entitled thereto in such manner as the judge shall 
 direct ; and the provisions of the last preceding Rule as to the payment out 
 or application of sums by weekly or other periodical payments shall apply. 
 
 Application for Variation of Order under Schedule I., Paragraph 9. 
 
 58. Application for variation of order. Act, Sched. 1, par. 9. (1) An 
 application for the variation of an order of the court under paragraph 9 of 
 
93] WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION KULES, 1907-1912. 257 
 
 (d) Form 59s. a notice according to the form in the Appendix ; 
 and shall procure from the workman a specimen of his signature, and file the 
 same for reference. 
 
 (12) For the purpose of obtaining payment of the compensation due to 
 him, an injured workman who is a French citizen, and has returned to reside 
 in France, shall at intervals of three months from the date to which such 
 payment was last made produce to the mayor of the commune in which he 
 resides the certificate of identity furnished under the last preceding paragraph, 
 and shall obtain from the mayor a certificate that such workman was alive 
 on the day when the certificate of identity was produced. He shall also, at 
 the intervals fixed by the registrar, obtain from a medical practitioner 
 employed in an official capacity in the Department in which the workman 
 resides a certificate that the incapacity specified in the certificate of the medi- 
 cal referee as resulting from the injury still continues. 
 
 (13) The certificate of the mayor mentioned in the last preceding para- 
 graph, and, where a certificate of a medical practitioner is required under 
 that paragraph, such certificate (which certificate or certificates must be 
 authenticated by a vise of the Prefecture of the Department attesting the 
 official status of the mayor and medical practitioner respectively), shall be 
 forwarded, with a request for payment of the amount of the weekly payments 
 due to the workman, to the French consular authority for the district in 
 which the court is situated, to be by him transmitted to the registrar. 
 
 (14) In the event of the death of a workman in receipt of weekly payments 
 who is a French citizen residing in France, his representatives shall, for the 
 purpose of obtaining payment of the arrears due to the workman, forward a 
 certificate of the death of the workman and documents showing that they 
 are entitled to such arrears, with a request for payment of such arrears, to 
 the consular authority, to be by him transmitted to the registrar. 
 
 (15) Form 63. On receipt of the documents mentioned in paragraph 13 
 or paragraph 14 the registrar shall send to the employer a notice according 
 to the form in the Appendix, requesting him to forward the amount due ; and 
 the employer shall thereupon forward the amount to the registrar, who shall 
 remit the same without charge to the consular authority, to be remitted to 
 the workman or his representatives. 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 FORM 1. 
 
 APPLICATION FOR ARBITRATION BY INJURED WORKMAN WITH RESPECT TO 
 
 THE COMPENSATION PAYABLE TO HIM. 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 In the matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
 No. of Matter 
 
 In the matter of an Arbitration between 
 A.B. 
 
 of (address] (description] Applicant, 
 
 and 
 
 C.D. & Co., Limited, 
 
 of (address) (description) Respondent. 
 
 W.C.A. S 
 
258 APPENDIX E. 
 
 1. On the day of personal injury by accident arising out of 
 and in the course of his employment was caused to A.B. a workman 
 employed by C.D. & Co., Limited, [or .by , a contractor with 
 C.D. & Co., Limited, for the execution of work undertaken by them.] 
 
 2. A question has [or Questions have] arisen 
 
 [here state the questions, specifying only those which have arisen, e.g.] 
 
 (a) as to whether the said A.B. is a workman to whom the above- 
 
 mentioned Act applies : or 
 
 (b) as to the liabilit} 7 of the said C.D. & Co., Limited, to pay 
 
 compensation under the above-mentioned Act in respect of the 
 said injury : or 
 
 (c) as to the amount [or duration] of the compensation payable by the 
 
 said C.D. & Co., Limited, to the said A.B. under the 
 
 above-mentioned Act in respect of the said injury. 
 [or a$ the case may be.~\ 
 
 3. An arbitration under the above-mentioned Act is hereby requested 
 between the said A.B. and the said C.D. Co., Limited, for the 
 settlement of the said question [or questions]. 
 
 4. Particulars are hereto appended [or annexed]. 
 
 PABTICULABS. 
 
 1. Name and address of applicant. 
 
 2. Name, place of business, and nature of business of respondent. 
 
 3. Nature of employment of applicant at time of accident, and 
 whether employed under respondent or under a contractor with him. 
 [// employed under a contractor who is not a respondent, name and 
 place of business of contractor to be stated.] 
 
 4. Date and place of accident, nature of work on which workman 
 was then engaged, and nature of accident and cause of injury. 
 
 5. Nature of injury. 
 
 6. Particulars of incapacity for work, whether total or partial, 
 and estimated duration of incapacity. 
 
 7. Average weekly earnings during the twelve months previous to 
 the injury, if the applicant had been so long employed under the em- 
 ployer by whom he was immediately employed, or if not, during any 
 less period during which he has been so employed. 
 
 8. Average weekly amount which the applicant is earning or is 
 able to earn in some suitable employment or business after the 
 accident. 
 
 9. Payment, allowance or benefit received from employer during 
 the period of incapacity. 
 
 10. Amount claimed as compensation. 
 
 11. Date of service of statutory notice of accident on respondent, 
 and whether given before workman voluntarily left the employment 
 in which he was injured. [A copy of the notice to be annexed.] 
 
 12. If notice not served, reason for omission to serve same. 
 
 The names and addresses of the applicant and his solicitor are : 
 Of the Applicant, 
 Of his Solicitor, 
 
 The name and address of the respondent to be served with this applica- 
 tion are : 
 
 Dated this day of (Signed) Applicant. 
 
 [Or, Applicant's Solicitor.] 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION KULES, 1907-1912. 259 
 
 FORM 2. 
 
 APPLICATION FOR ARBITRATION BY OR ON BEHALF OF DEPENDANTS OF 
 DECEASED WORKMAN, WITH RESPECT TO THE COMPENSATION PAYABLE 
 IN RESPECT OF THE INJURY TO SUCH DEPENDANTS, WHERE DEATH HAS 
 RESULTED FROM AN INJURY TO THE WORKMAN, AND THE SETTLEMENT 
 OF QUESTIONS AS TO WHO ARE DEPENDANTS, AND THE APPORTIONMENT 
 AND APPLICATION OF SUCH COMPENSATION. 
 
 In the County Court of , holden at 
 
 In the matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
 No. of Matter 
 
 In the matter of an Arbitration between 
 E.F. 
 
 of (address) (description) Applicant, 
 
 and 
 C.D. & Co., Limited, of (address) (description) 
 
 and 
 G.H. 
 
 of (address) (description) Respondents. 
 
 [or as the case may be ; see Rule 4.] 
 
 1. On the day of personal injury by accident arising out of 
 and in the course of his employment was caused to A.B. late of , 
 deceased, a workman employed by C.D. & Co., Limited, [or by 
 
 a contractor with C.D. & Co., Limited, for the execution of work under- 
 
 taken by them,] and on the day of the death of the said A.B. 
 
 resulted from the injury. 
 
 2. A question has [or Questions have] arisen 
 
 [here state the questions, specifying only those which have arisen, e.g.] 
 
 (a) as to whether the said A.B. was a workman to whom the above- 
 
 mentioned Act applied ; or 
 
 (b) as to the liability of the said C.D. & Co., Limited, to pay com- 
 
 pensation under the above-mentioned Act to the dependants of 
 the said A.B. in respect of the injury caused to them by the 
 
 death of the said A.B. ; or 
 
 (c) as to the amount of compensation payable by the said C.D. & Co., 
 
 Limited, to the dependants of the said A.B. under the above- 
 
 mentioned Act in respect of the injury caused to them by the death 
 of the said A.B. ; or 
 
 > (d) as to who are dependants of the said A.B. within the meaning 
 
 of the above-mentioned Act ; or 
 
 (e) as to the apportionment and application of the compensation payable 
 by the said C.D. & Co., Limited, to the dependants of the said 
 
 A.B. in respect of the injury caused to them by the death of 
 
 the said A.B. 
 
 [or as the case may be.] 
 
 3. An arbitration under the above-mentioned Act is hereby requested 
 between E.F. , the legal personal representative of the said A.B. 
 
 , acting on behalf of the dependants of the said A.B. , [or 
 
 between E.F. , a dependant of the said A.B. ] and the said 
 
 C.D. & Co., Limited, , and G.H. , who claims or may be entitled 
 
 to claim to be a dependant of the said A.B. , 
 
 [or as the case may be ; see Rule 4.] 
 for the settlement of the said question [or questions]. 
 
 4. Particulars are hereto appended [or annexed]. 
 
260 APPENDIX B. 
 
 PARTICULARS. 
 
 1. Name and late address of deceased workman. 
 
 2. Name, place of business, and nature of business of respondent ' 
 from whom compensation is claimed. 
 
 3. Nature of employment of deceased at time of accident, and j 
 whether employed under respondent or under a contractor with him. | 
 [// employed under a contractor who is not a respondent, name and place 
 of business of contractor to be stated.] 
 
 4. Date and place of accident, nature of work on which deceased 
 was then engaged, and nature of accident, and cause of injury. 
 
 5. Nature of injury to deceased, and date of death. 
 
 6. Earnings of deceased during the three years next preceding the 
 injury, if he had been so long in the employment of the employer by 
 whom he was immediately employed, or if the period of his employ- 
 ment had been less than the said three years, particulars of his average 
 weekly earnings during the period of his actual emploj^ment under j 
 the said employer. 
 
 7. Amount of weekly payments (if any) made to deceased under 
 the Act, and of any lump sum paid in redemption thereof. 
 
 8. Name and address of applicant for arbitration. 
 
 9. Character in which applicant applies for arbitration, i.e., > 
 whether as legal personal representative of deceased or as a depen- i 
 dant, and if as a dependant, particulars showing how he is so. 
 
 10. Particulars as to dependants of deceased by whom or on i 
 whose behalf the application is made, giving their names and addresses 
 and descriptions and occupations (if any), and their relationship to 
 the deceased, and if infants, their respective ages, and stating whether 
 they were wholly or partially dependent on the earnings of the 
 deceased at the time of his death. 
 
 11. Particulars as to any persons claiming or who may be entitled 
 to claim to be dependants, but as to whose claim a question arises, 
 and who are therefore made respondents, with their names, addresses, 
 and descriptions and occupations (if any). 
 
 12. Particulars of amount claimed as compensation, and of the 
 manner in which the applicant claims to have such amount appor- 
 tioned and applied. 
 
 13. Date of service of statutory notice of accident on respondent 
 from whom compensation is claimed, and whether given before 
 deceased voluntarily left the employment in which he w r as injured. 
 [A copy of the notice to be annexed.] 
 
 14. If notice not served, reason for omission to serve same. 
 
 The names and addresses of the applicant and his solicitor are : 
 Of the Applicant, 
 Of his Solicitor, 
 
 The names and addresses of the respondents to be served with this 
 application are : 
 
 C.D. & Co., Limited. 
 G.H., 
 
 Dated this day of . (Signed) Applicant. 
 
 [Or, Applicant's Solicitor.] 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RULES, 1907-1912. 261 
 
 FORM 3. 
 
 APPLICATION FOR ARBITRATION AS -TO WHO ARE DEPENDANTS, OR AS TO 
 THE AMOUNT PAYABLE TO EACH DEPENDANT, WHERE THE TOTAL 
 AMOUNT PAYABLE AS COMPENSATION TO THE DEPENDANTS OF A DE- 
 CEASED WORKMAN HAS BEEN AGREED OR ASCERTAINED. 
 
 In the County Court of , holden at 
 
 In the matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
 No. of Matter 
 
 In the matter of an Arbitration between 
 E.F., 
 
 of (address) (description) Applicant,^ 
 
 and 
 C.D. & Co., Limited, 
 
 of (address) (description) 
 
 and 
 G.H., 
 
 ' of (address) (description) 
 
 J.K., 
 
 of (address) (description) 
 
 and 
 L.M., 
 
 of (address) (description) Respondents. 
 
 [or as the case may be ; see Rule 5.] 
 
 1. On the day of personal injury by accident arising out of 
 and in the course of his employment was caused to A.B., , late of 
 
 , deceased, a workman employed by C.D. & Co., Limited, [or 
 
 by , a contractor with C.D. & Co., Limited, for the execution 
 
 of work undertaken by them,] and on the day of the death of 
 
 the said A.B. resulted from the injury. 
 
 2. The amount of compensation payable by the said C. D. & Co., Limited, 
 to the dependants of the said A.B. under the above-mentioned Act, 
 in respect of the injury caused to them by the death of the said A.B. 
 
 has been agreed [or ascertained], but a question has [or questions have] 
 
 arisen 
 
 [here state the questions, specifying only those which have arisen ; e.g.] 
 
 (a) as to who are dependants of the said A.B. within the meaning 
 
 of the above-mentioned Act ; or 
 
 (b) as to the apportionment and application of the compensation pay- 
 
 able to the dependants of the said A.B. 
 [or as the case may be.] 
 
 3. An arbitration under the above-mentioned Act is hereby requested 
 between E.F. , the legal personal representative of the said A.B. 
 acting on behalf of N.O. P.R. etc., dependants of the said 
 A.B. [or between E.F. N.O. P.R. etc., dependants 
 of the said A.B. ], and the said C.D. & Co., Limited, and G.H. 
 
 J.K. and L.M. , who are or claim or may be entitled to 
 
 claim to be dependants of the said A.B. 
 
 [or as the case may be ; see Rule 5.] 
 for the settlement of the said question [or questions]. 
 
 4. Particulars are hereto appended [or annexed]. 
 
262 APPENDIX B. 
 
 PARTICULARS. 
 
 1. Name and laic address of deceased workman. 
 
 2. Name and place of business of employer by whom compensa- 
 tion has been paid or is payable. 
 
 3. Date of accident to deceased, and date of death. 
 
 4. Agreed or ascertained amount of compensation to be paid to 
 dependants of deceased. 
 
 5. Particulars as to whether the compensation money is still 
 payable by the employer or has been paid by him, and if so, to 
 whom, and in whose hands it now is. 
 
 6. Character in which the applicant applies for arbitration, i.e., 
 whether as legal personal representative of deceased or as a depen- 
 dant, and if as a dependant, particulars showing how he is so. 
 
 7. Particulars as to the dependants or persons claiming to be depen- 
 dants by whom or on whose behalf the application is made, giving 
 their names and addresses, and descriptions and occupations (if 
 any), and their relationship to the deceased, and if infants, their 
 respective ages, and stating whether they were or claim to have 
 been wholly or partially dependent on the earnings of the deceased 
 at the time of his death. 
 
 8. The like particulars as to any dependants who are made 
 respondents. 
 
 [NOTE. // there is a legal personal representative, and he is not 
 the applicant, he must be made a respondent.] 
 
 9. Particulars as to any persons claiming or who may be entitled 
 to claim to be dependants, but as to whose claim a question arises, 
 and who are therefore made respondents, with their names, addresses, 
 descriptions, and occupations (if any). 
 
 10. Particulars of the manner in which the applicant claims to 
 have the amount of compensation apportioned and applied. 
 
 The names and addresses of the applicant and his solicitor are : 
 Of the Applicant, 
 Of his Solicitor, 
 
 The names and addresses of the respondents to be served with this 
 application are : 
 
 C.D. & Co., Limited. 
 
 G.H. 
 
 I.K. 
 
 L.M. 
 
 [or as the case may 6e.] 
 Dated this day of 
 
 (Signed) Applicant. 
 
 [Or, Applicant's Solicitor.] 
 
 FORM 4. 
 
 APPLICATION FOR ARBITRATION WITH RESPECT TO THE COMPENSATION 
 PAYABLE IN RESPECT OF EXPENSES OF MEDICAL ATTENDANCE AND 
 BURIAL, WHERE DECEASED WORKMAN LEAVES NO DEPENDANTS. 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 In the matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
 No. of Matter 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION EULES, 1907-1912. 263 
 
 In the matter of an arbitration between 
 E.F., 
 
 of (address) (description) Applicant, 
 
 and 
 C.D. & Co., Limited, 
 
 of (address) (description) 
 
 and 
 G.H., 
 
 of (address) (description) Respondents. 
 
 1. On the day of personal injury by accident arising out of 
 and in the course of his employment was caused to A.B. , late of 
 
 , deceased, a workman employed by C.D. & Co., Limited, 
 [or by , a contractor with C.D. & Co., Limited, , for the execu- 
 
 tion of work undertaken by them,] and on the day of the 
 
 death of the said A.B. resulted from the injury. 
 
 2. The said A.B. left no dependants within the meaning of the 
 above-mentioned Act. 
 
 3. A question has [or Questions have] arisen 
 
 [here state the questions, specifying only those which have arisen ; e.g.~\ 
 
 (a) as to whether the said A.B. was a workman to whom the 
 
 above-mentioned Act applied ; or 
 
 (b) as to the liability of the said C.D. & Co., Limited, to pay 
 
 compensation under the above-mentioned Act in respect of the 
 reasonable expenses of the medical attendance on and the burial 
 of the said A.B. ; or 
 
 (c) as to the amount of compensation payable by the said C.D. & Co., 
 
 Limited, under the above-mentioned Act in respect of 
 
 the reasonable expenses of the medical attendance on and the 
 burial of the said A.B. ; or 
 
 (d) as to the apportionment and application of the compensation 
 
 payable by the said C.D. & Co., Limited, under the above- 
 
 mentioned Act in respect of the reasonable expenses of the medical 
 attendance on and the burial of the said A.B. 
 [or as the case may be.} 
 
 4. An arbitration under the above-mentioned Act is hereby requested 
 between E.F. and the said C.D. & Co., Limited, and G.H. 
 
 for the settlement of the said question [or questions]. 
 
 5. Particulars are hereto appended [or annexed]. 
 
 PARTICULARS. 
 
 1. Name and late address of deceased workman. 
 
 2. Name, place of business, and nature of business of respondent 
 from whom compensation is claimed. 
 
 3. Nature of employment of deceased at time of accident, and 
 whether employed under respondent or under contractor with him. 
 [// employed under a contractor who is not a respondent, name and 
 place of business of contractor to be stated.] 
 
 4. Date and place of accident, nature of work on which deceased 
 was then engaged, and nature of accident and cause of injury. 
 
 5. Nature of injury to deceased, and date of death. 
 
 6. Name and address of applicant for arbitration. 
 
 7. Character in which applicant applies for arbitration, i.e., 
 whether as legal personal representative of deceased, or as a person 
 to whom expenses in respect of which compensation is payable are 
 
264 APPENDIX B. 
 
 due ; and if the latter, particulars must be given of the circum- 
 stances under which the expenses are claimed to be due to the 
 applicant. 
 
 8. Particulars as to any other persons who claim that expenses in 
 respect of which compensation is payable are due to them, and who 
 are therefore made respondents, with their names and addresses. 
 
 9. Particulars of amount claimed as compensation, and of the 
 manner in which the applicant desires such amount to be apportioned 
 and applied. 
 
 10. Date of service of statutory notice of accident on respondent 
 from whom compensation is claimed, and whether given before 
 deceased voluntarily left the employment in which he was injured. 
 [A copy of the notice to be annexed.} 
 
 11. If notice not served, reason for omission to serve same. 
 
 The names and addresses of the applicant and his solicitor are : 
 Of the Applicant, 
 Of his Solicitor, 
 
 The names and addresses of the respondents to be served with this 
 application are : 
 
 C.D. & Co., Limited. 
 G.H. 
 Dated this day of . (Signed) , Applicant. 
 
 [Or, , Applicant's Solicitor.] 
 
 FORM 5. 
 
 APPLICATION FOB ARBITRATION WITH RESPECT TO THE REVIEW, TERMI- 
 NATION, DIMINUTION, INCREASE, OR REDEMPTION OF A WEEKLY 
 PAYMENT. 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 In the matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
 No. of Matter 
 
 In the matter of an Arbitration between 
 C.D. & Co. Limited, 
 
 of (address) (description) Applicants, 
 
 and 
 A.B., 
 
 of (address) (description) 
 
 [or as the case may be ; see Act, Sched. 1, pars. 16, 17.] 
 An arbitration under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, is hereby 
 requested between C.D. & Co., Limited, and A.B. 
 
 [or as the case may be ; see Act, Sched. 1, pars. 16, 17.] 
 with respect to the review and termination [or diminution, increase, or 
 redemption, as the case may be] of the weekly payment payable to the 
 said A.B. under the said Act in respect of personal injury caused 
 
 to him by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. 
 Particulars are hereto appended [or annexed]. 
 
 PARTICULARS. 
 
 1. Name and address of injured workman. 
 
 2. Name and place of business of employer by whom compensation 
 is payable. 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION EULES, 1907-1912. 265 
 
 :>. Date and nature of accident. 
 
 4. Date of agreement, decision, award, or certificate fixing weekly 
 payment, amount of such payment, and date from which it com- 
 menced. 
 
 5. Relief sought by applicants, whether termination, diminution, 
 increase, or redemption. 
 
 6. Grounds on which termination, diminution, or increase is 
 claimed. 
 
 The names and addresses of the applicants and their solicitors are : 
 Of the Applicants, 
 Of their Solicitor, 
 
 The name and address of the respondent to be served with this application 
 are : 
 
 Dated this day of . (Signed), , Applicants. 
 
 [Or, , Applicant's Solicitor.] 
 
 FORM 6. 
 
 APPLICATION FOR ARBITRATION BY AN INJURED MASTER, SEAMAN, 
 APPRENTICES OR PILOT, WITH RESPECT TO THE COMPENSATION PAYABLE 
 TO HIM. 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 In the matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
 No. of Matter 
 
 In the matter of an Arbitration between 
 A.B. 
 
 of (address) (description) Applicant, 
 
 and 
 The owners of the Ship " Respondents. 
 
 1. On the day of personal injury by accident arising out of 
 and in the course of his employment was caused to A.B. , the master 
 of the ship " " [or a seaman [or an apprentice to the sea service 
 or an apprentice in the sea- fishing service] and a member of the crew of 
 the ship " '"] [or a pilot employed on the ship " "]. 
 
 2. A question has [or Questions have] arisen 
 
 [here state the questions, specifying only those which have arisen ; e.g.] 
 
 (a) as to whether the said A.B. is a workman within the meaning 
 
 of the above-mentioned Act ; or 
 
 (b) as to ^the liability of the owners of the said ship to pay compensa- 
 
 tion under the above-mentioned Act in respect of the said injury ; 
 or 
 
 (c) as to the amount [or duration] of the compensation payable by the 
 
 owners of the said ship to the said A.B. under the above- 
 
 mentioned Act in respect of the said injury. 
 [or as the case may be.] 
 
 3. An arbitration under the above-mentioned Act is hereby requested 
 between the said A.B. and the owners of the said ship for the settle- 
 ment of the said question [or questions]. 
 
 4. Particulars are hereto appended [or annexed]. 
 
266 APPENDIX B. 
 
 PARTICULARS. 
 
 1. Name ami address of applicant. 
 
 2. Name of ship of which applicant was master [or of the crew 
 of which applicant was a member or on which applicant was employed 
 as pilot] at the time of accident, and port of registry. 
 
 3. Nature of employment at time of accident. 
 
 4. Date and place of accident, nature of work on w r hich applicant 
 was then engaged, and nature of accident and cause of injury. 
 
 5. Nature of injur} T . 
 
 6. Particulars of incapacity for work, whether total or partial, 
 and estimated duration of incapacity. 
 
 7. Average weekly earnings during the twelve months previous 
 to the injury, if the applicant has been so long employed under the 
 same owners, or if not, during any less period during which he has 
 been so employed. 
 
 8. Average weekly amount w r hich the applicant is earning or is 
 able to, earn in some suitable employment or business after the 
 accident. 
 
 9. Payment, allowance or benefit received from employer during 
 the period of incapacity. 
 
 10. Amount claimed as compensation. 
 
 11. Date of service of statutory notice of accident, and whether 
 given before applicant voluntarily left the employment in which he 
 was injured. [A copy of the notice to be annexed.'] 
 
 12. If notice not served, reason for omission to serve same. 
 
 The names and addresses of the applicant and his solicitor are : 
 Of the Applicant, 
 Of the Solicitor, 
 
 The name and address of the person to be served with this applicatioi 
 as representing the owners of the ship are : 
 
 [State name and address of managing owner or manager, or of master of ship 
 See Rule 36 (6).] 
 
 Dated this day of (Signed) Applicant. 
 
 [Or, Applicant's Solicitor. 
 
 FORM 7. 
 
 APPLICATION FOR ARBITRATION BY OR ON BEHALF OF DEPENDANTS OF 
 DECEASED MASTER, SEAMAN, APPRENTICE, OR PILOT. 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 In the matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
 No. of Matter 
 
 In the matter of an Arbitration between 
 E.F. 
 
 of (address) (description) Applicant, 
 
 and 
 The owners of the Ship " 
 
 and 
 G.B. 
 
 of (address) (description) Respondents. 
 
 [or as the case may be ; see Rule 4.] 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RULES, 1907-1912. 267 
 
 1. On the day of personal injury by accident arising out of 
 and in the course of his employment was caused to A.B. , late of 
 
 , deceased, the master of the ship " " [or a seaman] [or an 
 
 apprentice to the sea service or an apprentice in the sea-fishing service] 
 and a member of the crew of the ship " " [or a pilot employed on 
 
 the ship " "], and on the day of the death of the said 
 
 A.B. resulted from the injury. 
 
 [or 1. The ship " " which left the port of on or about the 
 
 day of , was lost with all hands on or about the day 
 
 of [or was last heard of on or about the day of , and 
 
 is believed to have been lost with all hands.] 
 
 When the said ship left the said port A.B. , late of , was 
 
 the master thereof [or a seaman] [or an apprentice to the sea service or an 
 apprentice in the sea-fishing service] and a member of the crew of the said 
 ship [or a pilot employed on the said ship.] 
 
 2. A question has [or Questions have] arisen 
 
 [here state the questions, specifying only those which have arisen ; e.g.'} 
 
 (a) as to whether the said A.B. was a workman within the meaning 
 
 of the above-mentioned Act ; or 
 (6) as to the liability of the owners of the said ship to pay compensation 
 
 under the above-mentioned Act to the dependants of the said 
 
 A.B. in respect of the injury caused to them by the death 
 
 of the said A.B. ; or 
 
 (c) as to the amount of compensation payable by the owners of the said 
 
 ship to the dependants of the said A.B. under the above- 
 
 mentioned Act in respect of the injury caused to them by the 
 death of the said A.B. ; or 
 
 (d) as to who are dependants of the said A.B. within the meaning 
 
 of the above-mentioned Act ; or 
 
 (e) as to the apportionment and application of the compensation payable 
 
 by the owners of the said ship to the dependants of the said A.B. 
 in respect of the injury caused to them by the death of the 
 said A.B. 
 
 [or as the case may 6e.] 
 
 3. An arbitration under the above-mentioned Act is hereby requested 
 between E.F. , the legal personal representative of the said A.B. 
 
 [or between E.F. a dependant of the said A.B. ] and 
 
 the owners of the said ship, and G.B. , who claims or may be entitled 
 
 to claim as a dependant of the said A.B. 
 
 [or as the case may be ; see Rule 4.] 
 for the settlement of the said question [or questions]. 
 
 4. Particulars are hereto appended [or annexed]. 
 
 PARTICULARS. 
 
 1. Name and address of master, seaman, apprentice, or pilot. 
 
 2. Name of ship of which deceased was master [or of the crew 
 of which deceased was a member or on which deceased was em- 
 ployed as pilot] at time of accident or loss of ship, and port of registry. 
 
 3. Nature of employment at time of accident or loss of ship. 
 
 4. Date and place of accident, nature of work on which deceased 
 was then engaged, and nature of accident and cause of injury [or date 
 and place when and where ship was lost or is deemed to have been lost]. 
 
 5. Nature of injury to deceased and date of death [or date when 
 ship was lost or is deemed to have been lost]. 
 
268 APPENDIX B. 
 
 <>. Earnings of deceased during the three years next preceding 
 the injury or date of loss, if he had been so long employed under 
 tin- same owners, or if the period of his employment had been k-ss 
 than the said three years, particulars of his average weekly earnings j 
 during the period of actual employment under the said owners. 
 
 7. Amount of weekly payments (if any) made to deceased under the j 
 Act, and of any lump sum paid in redemption thereof. 
 
 8. Name and address of applicant for arbitration. 
 
 9. Character in which applicant applies for arbitration, i.e., 
 whether as legal personal representative of deceased or as a depen- 
 dant, and if as a dependant, particulars showing how he is so. 
 
 10. Particulars as to the dependants of deceased by whom or on 
 whose behalf the application is made, giving their names and 
 addresses, and descriptions and occupations (if any), and then 1 
 relationship to the deceased, and if infants, their respective ages, 
 and stating whether they were wholly or partially dependant on the 
 earnings of the deceased at the time of his death. 
 
 11. Particulars as to any persons claiming or who may be entitled 
 to claim to be dependants, but as to whose claim a question arises, 
 and who are therefore made respondents, with then- names, addresses, 
 and descriptions and occupations (if any). 
 
 12. Particulars of amount claimed as compensation, and of the 
 manner in which the applicant claims to have such amount appor- 
 tioned and applied. 
 
 13. Date of service of statutory notice of accident, and whether 
 given before deceased voluntarily left the employment in which he | 
 was injured. [A copy of the notice to be annexed.] 
 
 14. If notice not served, reason for omission to serve same. 
 
 The names and addresses of the applicant and his solicitor are : 
 Of the Applicant, 
 Of his Solicitor, 
 
 The names and addresses of the respondents to be served with this 
 application are : 
 
 As representing the owners of the ship 
 
 [Stale name and address of managing owner or manager, or of master of 
 ship. See Rule 36 (6).] 
 and G.B., 
 
 Dated this day of . (Signed) Applicant. 
 
 [Or, Applicant's Solicitor.] 
 
 FORM 8. 
 APPLICATION FOR ARBITRATION WHERE SECURITY HAS BEEN GIVEX ox 
 
 BEHALF OF THE OWNERS OF A SHIP UNDER SECTION 11. 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 In the matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
 No. of Matter 
 
 In the matter of an Arbitration between 
 A.B. 
 
 of (address) (description) Applicant, 
 
 and 
 (names and addresses of person* giving security) 
 
 Respondents. 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION EULES, 1907-1912. 269 
 
 1. On the day of personal injury by accident arising out of 
 and in the course of his employment was caused to A.B. , of , 
 and the said A.B. claims that the owners of the ship " " are 
 liable under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, to pay compensation 
 in respect of the said injury. 
 
 2. The respondents have given security to abide the event of any pro- 
 ceedings that may be instituted in respect of the said injury, and to pay 
 such compensation and costs as may be awarded thereon. 
 
 3. A question has [or Questions have] arisen 
 
 [here state the questions, specifying only those which have arisen ; e.g.] 
 
 (a) as to whether the said A.B. is a workman to whom the above- 
 
 mentioned Act applies ; or 
 
 (b) as to the liability of the owners of the said ship to pay compensation 
 
 under the above-mentioned Act in respect of the said injury ; or 
 
 (c) as to the amount [or duration] of the compensation payable to the 
 
 said A.B. under the above-mentioned Act in respect of the 
 
 said injury. 
 
 [or as the case may be.] 
 
 4. An arbitration under the above-mentioned Act is hereby requested 
 between the said A.B. and the respondents for the settlement of the 
 said question [or questions]. 
 
 5. Particulars are hereto appended [or annexed]. 
 
 PARTICULARS. 
 
 [Here insert particulars of circumstances under which the application is 
 made, and of the relief or order which the applicant claims, adapting the 
 particulars in the preceding forms to the circumstances of the case.] 
 
 The names and addresses, etc. [as in Form 1.] 
 
 NOTE. This form to be adapted as required to an application for arbitra- 
 tion as between the dependants of a deceased workman and the persons giving 
 security. 
 
 FORM 9. 
 
 APPLICATION FOR ARBITRATION BY WORKMAN DISABLED BY OR SUSPENDED 
 ON ACCOUNT OP HAVING CONTRACTED INDUSTRIAL DISEASE COMING 
 WITHIN SECTION 8. 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 In the matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
 No. of Matter 
 
 In the matter of an Arbitration between 
 A.B. 
 
 of (address) (description) Applicant, 
 
 and 
 C.D. & Co., Limited, 
 
 of (address) (description) Respondents. 
 
 1. On the day of Mr. , the certifying surgeon appointed 
 
 under the Factory and Workshop Act, 1901, for the district of [or 
 
 Mr. , one of the medical referees appointed by the Secretary of State 
 
 for the purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906,] certified 
 that A.B. of was suffering from , a disease coming within 
 
 section 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, and was thereby dis- 
 abled from earning full wages at the work at which he was employed. 
 
270 APPENDIX B. 
 
 I. ^U maunder the Facto^ 
 ' 
 
 a . 
 
 tlSoi, suspendedfrom his usual employment on account of hs 
 having contracted , a disease commg within section 8 
 
 > '' that the above-mentioned disease is due 
 
 to the date of disablement or suspension by C.D. & Co., Lim 
 3 A question has [or Questions have] arisen 
 
 > A 
 
 compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906 
 in respect of the said disease [or suspension] ; or 
 
 (c) as "ether the said disease was in fact contracted ^whilst the 
 said ^.B was hi the employment of the said C.D. & 
 
 -SSfc 
 
 f 
 
 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906 in respect of the said disease. 
 [or as the case may be.] 
 
 4. An arbitration under the above-mentioned Act is hereby requested 
 between the said A.B. and the said C.D & Co., Limited, 
 
 the settlement of the said question [or questions]. 
 
 5. Particulars are hereto appended [or annexed]. 
 
 PARTICULARS. 
 
 Na pnd natnre of business of respondents. 
 I'. XatTreoT employment of applicant under respondents to 
 which the disease was due. 
 4. Nature of disease. 
 
 i ^ffl^ss^te^&Ss 
 
 s employed in the same employment during the twelve months 
 
 total or partial, 
 
 applicant is earning or is 
 isiness. 
 ;ived from employer 
 
 during period of incapacity. 
 
 11. Amount claimed as compensation. 
 
WOKKMEN'S COMPENSATION RULES, 1907-1912. 271 
 
 12. Date of service of statutory notice of disablement or suspension 
 on respondents. [A copy of the notice to be annexed.] 
 
 13. If notice not served, reason for omission to serve same. 
 
 The names and addresses, etc. [as in Form 1.] 
 
 FORM 10. 
 
 APPLICATION FOR ARBITRATION BY OR ON BEHALF OF DEPENDANTS OF 
 DECEASED WORKMAN WHOSE DEATH HAS BEEN CAUSED BY INDUSTRIAL 
 DISEASE. 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 In the matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
 No. of Matter 
 
 In the matter of an Arbitration between 
 E.F. 
 
 of (address) (description) Applicant, 
 
 and 
 C.D. & Co., Limited, 
 
 of (address) (description) 
 
 and 
 G.H. 
 
 of (address) (description) Respondents. 
 
 [or as the case may be ; see Rule 4.] 
 
 1. On the day of Mr. , the certifying surgeon under 
 the Factory and Workshop Act, 1901, for the district of [or Mr. 
 
 one of the medical referees appointed by the Secretary of State for 
 the purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906,] certified that 
 A.B. of was suffering from , a disease coming within 
 
 section 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, and was thereby 
 disabled from earning full wages at the work at which he was employed ; 
 and on the day of the said A.B. died, his death being 
 
 caused by the said disease. 
 
 [Or 1. On the day of A.B. of was in pursuance 
 
 of special rules [or regulations] made under the Factory and Workshop 
 Act, 1901, suspended from his usual employment on account of his having 
 contracted ,, a disease coming within, section 8 of the Workmen's 
 
 Compensation Act, 1906, and on the day of the said A.B. 
 
 died, his death being caused by the said disease.] 
 
 [Or 1. On the day of A.B. late of died, his 
 
 death being caused by , a disease coming within section 8 of the Work- 
 
 men's Compensation Act, 1906.] 
 
 2. The applicant alleges that the above-mentioned disease was due to 
 the nature of the employment of the said A.B. in [describe 
 employment], and that he was last employed in such employment within 
 the twelve months previous to his disablement or suspension [or, if the 
 workman died without having obtained a certificate of disablement, or was 
 not at the time of his death in receipt of a weekly payment on account of dis- 
 ablement, within the twelve months previous to his death] by C.D. & Co., 
 Limited, of 
 
 3. A question has [or Questions have] arisen 
 
 [here state the questions, specifying only those which have arisen ; e.g.] 
 (a) as to whether the said A.B. was a workman to whom the 
 
 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, applied ; or 
 
U7- APPENDIX B. 
 
 (6) as to the liability of the said C.D. & Co., Limited, to pay 
 
 compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1908, 
 to the dependants of the said A.B. in respect of the injury 
 
 caused to them by the death of the said A.B. ; or 
 
 (c) as to whether the said disease was in fact contracted ^whilst the 
 
 said A.B. was in the employment of the said C.D. & Co., 
 
 Limited, ; or 
 
 (d) as to whether the said disease was due to the nature of the em- 
 
 ployment of the said A.B. under the said C.D. & Co., 
 
 Limited, ; or 
 
 (e) as to whether the death of the said A.B. was in fact caused 
 
 by the said disease ; or 
 
 (/ ) as to the amount of compensation payable by the said C.D. & Co., 
 
 Limited, to the dependants of the said A.B. under 
 
 the above-mentioned Act in respect of the injury caused to them 
 
 by the death of the said A.B. ; or 
 
 (g) as to who are dependants of the said A.B. within the meaning 
 
 of the above-mentioned Act ; or 
 
 ' (h) as to the apportionment and application of the compensation pay- 
 able by the said C.D. & Co., Limited, to the dependants 
 
 of the said A.B. in respect of the injury caused to them 
 
 by the death of the said A.B. 
 
 [or as the case may be.] 
 
 4. An arbitration under the above-mentioned Act is hereby requested 
 between E.F. , the legal personal representative of the said A.B. 
 
 , acting on behalf of the dependants of the said A.B. [or 
 
 between E.F. , a dependant of the said A.B. ,] and the said 
 
 C.D. & Co., Limited, and G. H. , who claims or may be entity 
 
 to claim to be a dependant of the said A.B. 
 
 [or as the case may be ; see Rule 4.] 
 for the settlement of the said question [or questions]. 
 
 5. Particulars are hereto appended [or annexed]. 
 
 PABTICULAES. 
 
 1. Name and late address of deceased workman. 
 
 2. Name, place of business, and nature of business of respondents 
 from whom compensation is claimed. 
 
 3. Nature of employment of deceased under respondents to which 
 the disease was due. 
 
 4. Nature of disease. 
 
 5. Date of disablement, and date of death. 
 
 6 Earnings of deceased during the three years next preceding 
 disablement, if he had been so long in the employment of the 
 respondents, or if the period of his employment had been less than 
 the said three years, particulars of his average weekly earnings 
 during the period of his actual employment under the respondents. 
 
 7. Names and addresses of all other employers by whom deceased 
 was employed in the same employment during the twelve months 
 previous to the date of disablement. 
 
 8. Amount of weekly payments (if any) made to deceased uncle 
 the Act, and of any lump sum paid in redemption thereto. 
 
 9. Name and address of applicant for arbitration. 
 
 10. Character in which applicant applies for arbitration, i.e., 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RULES, 1907-1912. 273 
 
 whether as legal personal representative of deceased or as a depen- 
 dant, and if as a dependant, particulars showing how he is so. 
 
 11. Particulars as to dependants of deceased by whom or on 
 whose behalf the application is made, giving their names and 
 addresses, and descriptions and occupations (if any), and their 
 relationship to the deceased, and if infants, their respective ages, 
 and stating whether they are wholly or partially dependent on the 
 earnings of the deceased at the time of his death. 
 
 12. Particulars as to any persons claiming or who may be 
 entitled to claim to be dependants, but as to whose claim a question 
 arises, and who are therefore made respondents, with their names, 
 addresses, and descriptions and occupations (if any). 
 
 13. Particulars of amount claimed as compensation, and of the 
 manner in which the applicant claims to have such amount appor- 
 tioned and applied. 
 
 14. Date of service of statutory notice of disablement. [^4 copy 
 of the notice to be annexed.'] 
 
 15. If notice not served, reason for omission to serve same. 
 
 The names and addresses, etc. [as in Form 2], 
 
 FORM 11. 
 
 APPLICATION FOB ARBITRATION WHERE RIGHTS OF EMPLOYER AGAINST 
 INSURERS ARE TRANSFERRED TO WORKMAN UNDER SECTION 5. 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 In the matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
 No. of Matter 
 
 In the matter of an Arbitration between 
 A.B. 
 
 of (address) (description) Applicant, 
 
 and 
 
 (name and address of Insurers) Respondents. 
 
 1. On the day of personal injury by accident arising out of 
 
 and in the course of his employment was caused to A.B. , a work- 
 
 man employed by of (name and address of employer), [or by 
 
 of , a contractor with (name and address of employer) 
 
 for the execution of work 'undertaken by him], and the said A.B. 
 claims that the said (employer) thereupon became liable to pay com- 
 
 pensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, to the said 
 A.B. in respect of such injury. 
 
 [Or, where weekly payment has been settled, 
 
 1. Under an agreement [or a decision or an award or a certificate] 
 recorded in this court on the day of a weekly payment of 
 
 is payable by of (name and address of employer) to the above- 
 
 mentioned A.B. as compensation for personal injury caused to the 
 
 said A.B. by accident arising out of and in the course of his employ- 
 
 ment as a workman employed by the said (employer) [or by 
 
 of , a contractor with the said (employer) for the execution 
 
 of work undertaken by him]^ 1 
 
 2. The respondents are insurers of the said (employer) in respect 
 of his [or their] liability to pay such compensation. 
 
 W.C.A. T 
 
274 APPENDIX B. 
 
 3. The said (employer) has become a bankrupt [or made a com- 
 position or arrangement with his creditors] [or, if the employer is a company. 
 The said has commenced to be wound up] ; and the rights of the said 
 
 (employer) against the respondents as such insurers in respect of his 
 [or their] liability to the said A.B. have by virtue of section 5 of the 
 
 said Act been transferred to and vested in the said A.B. 
 
 4. A question has [or Questions have] arisen 
 
 [here state the questions, specifying only those which have arisen ; e.g.] 
 
 (a) as to whether the said A.B. is a workman to whom the above- 
 
 mentioned Act applies ; or 
 
 (b) as to the liability of the said (employer) to pay compensation 
 
 under the above-mentioned Act in respect of the said injury ; or 
 
 (c) as to the liability of the respondents as such insurers as aforesaid to 
 
 the said A.B. ; or 
 
 (d) as to the amount [or duration] of the liability of the respondents 
 
 as such insurers as aforesaid to the said A.B. 
 [or as the case may be.] 
 
 5. An arbitration under the above-mentioned Act is hereby requested 
 between the said A.B. and the respondents for the settlement of the 
 said question [or questions]. 
 
 6. Particulars are hereto appended [or annexed]. 
 
 PARTICULARS. 
 
 (Here insert particulars containing a concise statement of the circum- 
 stances under which the application is made, and of all matters necessary 
 to be stated in order to bring the questions to be settled properly before the 
 judge or arbitrator, and of the relief or order which the applicant claims, adapting 
 the particulars given in the preceding forms to the circumstances of the case.) 
 The names and addresses of the applicant and his solicitor are : 
 Of the Applicant, 
 Of his Solicitor, 
 
 The name and address of the respondents to be served with this applica- 
 tion are : 
 
 Dated this day of . (Signed) Applicant. 
 
 [Or, Applicant's Solicitor.] 
 
 NOTE. This form to be adapted as required to an application for arbitra- 
 tion as between the dependants of a deceased workman and insurers. 
 
 FORM 12. 
 
 NOTICE TO APPLICANT OF DAY UPON WHICH ARBITRATION WILL 
 BE PROCEEDED WITH. 
 
 [Heading as in Request for Arbitration.] 
 
 TAKE NOTICE that the judge of this court [or Mr. the arbitrator 
 
 appointed by the judge of this court] will proceed with the arbitration in 
 this matter at on the day of at the hour of 
 
 o'clock in the noon. 
 
 Dated this day of 
 
 To of Registrar. 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RULES, 1907-1912. 275 
 
 FORM 13. 
 NOTICE TO RESPONDENT OF DAY UPON WHICH ARBITRATION WILL 
 
 BE PROCEEDED WITH. 
 
 [Heading as in Bequest for Arbitration.] 
 
 TAKE NOTICE that the judge of this court [or Mr. the arbitrator 
 
 appointed by the judge of this court] will proceed with the arbitration 
 applied for in the request and particulars, a sealed copy of which is served 
 herewith at on the day of at the hour of 
 
 o'clock in the noon : and that if you do not attend either in person 
 
 or by your solicitor at the time and place above mentioned such order will 
 be made and proceedings taken as the judge [or arbitrator] may think just 
 and expedient. 
 
 And further take notice that if you wish to disclaim any interest in the 
 subject-matter of the arbitration, or consider that the applicant's particulars 
 are in any respect inaccurate or incomplete, or desire to bring any fact or 
 document to the notice of the judge [or arbitrator], or intend to rely on 
 any fact, or to deny (wholly or partially) your liability to pay compensation 
 under the Act, you must file with me an answer, stating your name and 
 address and the name and address of your solicitor (if any), and stating 
 that you disclaim any interest in the subject-matter of the arbitration, or 
 stating in what respect the applicant's particulars are inaccurate or incom- 
 plete, or stating concisely any fact or document which you desire to bring 
 to the notice of the judge [or arbitrator], or on which you intend to rely, 
 or the grounds on and extent to which you deny liability to pay com- 
 pensation. 
 
 Such answer, together with a copy thereof for the judge [or arbitrator] 
 and a copy for the applicant and for each of the other respondents, must be 
 filed with me ten clear days at least before the day of 
 
 If no answer is filed, and subject to such answer, if any, the applicant's 
 particulars and your liability to pay compensation will be taken to be 
 admitted. 
 
 Dated this day of 
 
 To of Registrar. 
 
 FORM 14. 
 
 ANSWER BY RESPONDENTS. 
 
 [Not to be printed, but to be used as a Precedent."] 
 
 [Heading as in Bequest for Arbitration.'] 
 TAKE NOTICE 
 
 That the respondent, G.H., disclaims any interest in the subject- 
 
 matter of the above arbitration. 
 
 Or, 
 
 That the respondents, C.D. & Co., Limited, state that the appli- 
 
 cant's particulars filed in this matter are inaccurate or incomplete in the 
 particulars hereto annexed. 
 
 Or, 
 That the respondents, C.D. & Co., Limited, desire to bring to the 
 
276 APPENDIX B. 
 
 notice of the judge [or arbitrator] the facts stated in the particulars hereto 
 annexed. 
 
 Or, 
 
 That the respondents, C.D. & Co., Limited, intend at the hearing 
 
 of the arbitration to give evidence and rely on the facts stated in the 
 particulars hereto annexed. 
 
 Or, 
 
 That the respondents, C.D. & Co., Limited, deny their liability to 
 
 pay compensation under the Act in respect of the injmy to A.B. 
 mentioned in the applicant's particulars, on the grounds stated in the 
 particulars hereto annexed. 
 
 PABTICULABS. 
 
 1. Particulars in which the particulars filed by the Applicant are 
 inaccurate or incomplete. 
 
 2. Facts which the Respondents desire to bring to the notice of the 
 Judge [or Arbitrator]. 
 
 That the applicant, A.B. refuses to submit himself to medical 
 
 examination as required by [or obstructs the medical examination required 
 by] the respondents, C.D. & Co., Limited, in accordance with para- 
 
 graph 4 of the first schedule to the Act [or refuses to submit himself for 
 examination by a medical referee as ordered [or obstructs the examina- 
 tion by a medical referee ordered] in accordance with paragraph 15 of the 
 first schedule to the Act. 
 
 [or as the case may be.] 
 
 3. Facts which the Respondents C.D. & Co., Limited, intend to give in 
 evidence and rely on at the hearing of the Arbitration. 
 
 That notice of the alleged accident [or of death, disablement, or suspen- 
 sion] was not given to the respondents as required by the Act ; or 
 
 That the claim for compensation was not made on the respondents within 
 the time limited by the Act ; or 
 
 That a scheme of compensation [benefit or insurance] for the workmen 
 of the respondents, C.D. & Co., Limited, has been duly certified by 
 
 the Registrar of Friendly Societies, and such certificate was in force at the 
 date of the alleged accident, and the said C.D. & Co., Limited, con- 
 
 tracted with the applicant A.B. [or with the deceased workman], by 
 
 a contract which was in force at the date of the^ alleged accident, that the 
 provisions of the said scheme should be substituted for the provisions of 
 the Act, and the said C.D. & Co., Limited, are consequently liable 
 
 only in accordance with the said scheme. 
 
 [or as the case may be.] 
 
 4. Grounds on which the Respondents deny their Liability to pay 
 Compensation. 
 
 (i) That the applicant A.B. is [or the deceased workman was] 
 
 not a workman to whom the Act applies ; or 
 
 (ii) That the injury to the applicant [or to the deceased workman] 
 was not caused by accident arising out of and in the course of 
 his employment ; or 
 
 (iii) That the injury to the applicant [or to the deceased workman] 
 was attributable to the serious and wilful misconduct of the 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION EULES, 1907-1912. 277 
 
 applicant [or of the deceased workman], and did not result in 
 death or serious and permanent disablement ; or 
 
 (iv) That at the time of the alleged accident the applicant [or the 
 deceased workman] was not immediately employed by the 
 respondents, but was employed by of , a contractor 
 
 with the respondents for the execution by or under such con- 
 tractor of work undertaken by the respondents, and the accident 
 occurred elsewhere than on, in, or about premises on which the 
 respondents had undertaken to execute the work or which were 
 otherwise under the control or management of the respon- 
 dents ; or 
 
 (v) That the injury to the applicant [or to the deceased workman] 
 was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability hi a 
 person* other than the respondents, to wit, [name and 
 
 address of such person] to pay damages in respect thereof, 
 and the applicant [or the deceased workman] has taken pro- 
 ceedings against that person and has recovered damages from 
 him ; or 
 
 in case of industrial disease, 
 
 (vi) That the applicant [or the deceased workman] at the time of entering 
 the employment of the respondents wilfully and falsely repre- 
 sented himself in writing as not having previously suffered 
 from the disease mentioned in the applicant's particulars ; 
 or 
 
 (vii) That the disease mentioned in the applicant's particulars was not 
 contracted whilst the applicant [or the deceased workman] was 
 in the employment of the respondents ; or 
 
 (viii) That the disease mentioned in the applicant's particulars was not 
 due to the nature of the employment in which the applicant 
 [or the deceased workman] was employed by the respondents : 
 
 [or as the case may be.] 
 
 And further take notice, that the names and addresses of the said 
 respondents and their solicitors are : 
 of the Respondents, . 
 C.D. & Co., Limited, 
 of their Solicitors, 
 
 Datd this day of (Signed) 
 
 Solicitors for the Respondents, 
 
 C.D. & Co., Limited. 
 To the Registrar of the Court, and 
 To the Applicant, A.B., and 
 To the Respondents 
 
 (if any, naming them). 
 
 FORM 15. 
 
 NOTICE BY RESPONDENT ADMITTING LIABILITY, AND SUBMITTING TO AN 
 AWARD FOB PAYMENT OF A WEEKLY SUM, OR PAYING MONEY INTO 
 COURT. 
 
 [Not to be printed, but to be used as a Precedent.] 
 
 [Heading as in Request for Arbitration.] 
 TAKE NOTICE 
 
 That the respondents, C.D. & Co., Limited, admit their liability 
 
 to pay compensation in the above-mentioned matter. 
 
278 APPENDIX B. 
 
 And they hereby submit to an award for payment by them to the 
 applicant, A.B., of the weekly sum of such weekly payment 
 
 to commence as from the day of and to continue during the 
 
 total or partial incapacity of the said A.B. for work, or until the 
 
 same shall be ended, diminished, increased, or redeemed in accordance with 
 the provisions of the above-mentioned Act. 
 
 And for payment by them to the applicant forthwith after the 
 
 award of the amount of such weekly payments calculated from the 
 day of until the first Saturday [or other utual pay day] after the 
 
 date of the award, and for the payment thereafter of the said sum of 
 to the applicant on Saturday [or other usual pay day] in every week. 
 
 [Or, And the said C.D. & Co., Limited, herewith pay into Court 
 
 the sum of in satisfaction of such liability.] 
 
 Dated this day of 
 
 (Signed) 
 
 Solicitors for the Respondents, 
 
 C.D. & Co., Limited. 
 To the Registrar of the Court, and 
 To the Applicant, A.B., and 
 To the Respondents 
 
 (if any, naming them). 
 
 FORM 16. 
 NOTICE OP FILING OF SUBMISSION TO AN AWARD. 
 
 [Heading as in Request for Arbitration.] 
 TAKE NOTICE 
 
 That the respondents, C.D. & Co., Limited, have this day tiled 
 
 with me a notice (copy of which Is sent herewith) that they admit their 
 liability to pay compensation in the above-mentioned matter, and submit 
 to an award for payment by them to you of the weekly sum of 
 
 If you elect to accept such weekly sum in satisfaction of your claim, 
 you must send to the registrar of this Court, and to the said C.D. & Co., 
 Limited, a written notice forthwith by post, or leave such notice at 
 
 the office of the registrar, and at the residence or place of business of the 
 said C.D. & Co., Limited. 
 
 If you send such notice, the judge of this Court will, on application made 
 to him, make an award directing payment of such weekly sum to you, and 
 you will be liable to no further costs. 
 
 In default of such notice, the arbitration will be proceeded with ; and 
 if no greater weekly payment is awarded to you, you will be liable to be 
 ordered to pay the costs incurred by the respondents subsequent to the 
 receipt by you of this notice. 
 
 Dated this day of . Registrar. 
 
 To the Applicant, A.B. 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION EULES, 1907-1912. 279 
 
 FORM 17. 
 
 NOTICE OF PAYMENT INTO COURT. 
 [Heading as in Request for Arbitration.] 
 TAKE NOTICE 
 
 That the respondents, C.D. & Co., Limited, have this day filed 
 
 with me a notice that they admit their liability to pay compensation in the 
 above-mentioned matter, and they have paid into Court the sum of 
 in satisfaction of such liability. 
 
 If you are willing to accept the sum so paid into Court in satisfaction of 
 the compensation payable in the above-mentioned matter, 'you must send 
 to the registrar of this Court, and to the said C.D. & Co., Limited, 
 and to the other respondents [or, tvhere this notice is sent to a respondent, 
 to the applicant and other respondents], a written notice forthwith by 
 post, or leave such notice at the office of the registrar, and at the residence 
 or place of business of the said C.D. & Co., Limited, and at the resi- 
 
 dence or place of business of each of the other respondents [or of the applicant 
 and each of the other respondents]. 
 
 If you and all the other respondents [or, If you and the applicant and 
 all the other respondents] send such notice, and agree as to the apportion- 
 ment and application of the said sum of , the judge of this Court will, 
 on application made to him, make an award for such apportionment and 
 application, and you will be liable to no further costs. 
 
 If you and all the other respondents [or, If you and the applicant and 
 all the other respondents] send such notice, but do not agree as to the 
 apportionment and application of the said sum of , the arbitration 
 
 will be proceeded with as between you and such other respondents [or, as 
 between the applicant and yourself and such other respondents]. 
 
 In default of such notice being sent by you and all the other respondents 
 [or, by the applicant and yourself and all the other respondents], the 
 arbitration will be proceeded with : and if no greater amount than the 
 said sum of is awarded as compensation, the parties who do not 
 
 send such notice will be liable to be ordered to pay the costs incurred by 
 the respondents, C.D. & Co., Limited, subsequent to the receipt 
 
 by such parties of this notice, and also any costs incurred subsequent to the 
 receipt of this notice by any parties who send notice of their willingness 
 to accept the said sum of in satisfaction of the compensation payable 
 
 in the above-mentioned matter. 
 
 Dated this day of . Registrar. 
 
 To the Applicant, A.B., 
 
 [or, To the Respondent, G.H.] 
 (or as the case may be). 
 
 FORM 18 (AMENDED MARCH 31, 1911). 
 
 NOTICE OP ACCEPTANCE OP WEEKLY SUM OFFERED, OR OP WILLING- 
 NESS TO ACCEPT SUM PAID INTO COURT. 
 
 [Not to be printed, but to be used as a Precedent.] 
 
 [Heading as in Bequest for Arbitration.] 
 TAKE NOTICE 
 
 That the applicant, A.B. accepts the weekly sum offered by the 
 
 respondents, C.D. & Co., Limited, in satisfaction of his claim in the 
 
 above-mentioned matter [or, that the applicant E.F. [or, the respondent 
 
280 APPENDIX B. 
 
 G.H.] is willing to accept the sum of paid into Court by the re- 
 
 spondents, C.D. & Co., Limited, in satisfaction of the compensation 
 
 payable in the above-mentioned matter.] 
 
 But the applicant [or the said respondent, G.H. ] will apply 
 
 to the judge to include in his award 'an order directing the said respondents, 
 C.D. & Co., Limited, to pay the costs properly incurred by the 
 
 applicant [or the said respondent G.H. ] before the receipt 
 
 of notice of the offer of the said weekly sum [or of notice of payment of 
 the said sum of into Court], *and his costs properly incurred in 
 
 relation to the notice of the offer of the said weekly sum [or the notice of 
 payment of the said sum of into court] and to this notice, and 
 
 in attending at the court to obtain an award. 
 
 Dated this day of . (Signed , Applicant, 
 
 or 
 
 To the Registrar of the Court, and Respondent. 
 
 To the Respondents, C.D. & Co., Limited, and 
 
 To the Applicant, A.B., and 
 
 To the Respondents (naming them). 
 
 * Note. The words following were added March 31, 1911. 
 
 FORM 19. 
 
 APPLICATION FOR ADDITION OF EMPLOYER AS RESPONDENT UNDER 
 SECTION 8, SUB-SECTION (1), PARAGRAPH (c), PROVISO (ii). 
 
 [Xot to be printed, but to be used as a Precedent.] 
 
 [Heading as in Request for Arbitration.'] 
 TAKE NOTICE 
 
 That the respondents, C.D. & Co., Limited, allege that the disease 
 
 mentioned in the applicant's particulars filed hi this matter was in fact 
 contracted while the applicant [or the deceased workman] was in the em- 
 ployment of of , and not whilst in the employment of the said 
 C.D. & Co., Limited. 
 
 And the said C.D. & Co., Limited, hereby apply for an order that 
 
 the said be joined as respondents in the above arbitration, and if 
 
 necessary for an adjournment of the hearing of the arbitration. 
 Dated this day of 
 
 (Signed) C.D. & Co., Limited. 
 
 By Secretary. 
 
 [Or, 
 
 Solicitors for the Respondents, 
 
 C.D. & Co., Limited.] 
 To the Registrar of the Court. 
 
 FORM 20. 
 
 ORDER ADDING RESPONDENTS. 
 [Heading as in Request for Arbitration.] 
 
 It is this day ordered on the application of the respondents, C.D. & Co., 
 Limited, that of be added as respondents to this arbitration 
 
 [and that the hearing of this arbitration be adjourned to the day of 
 
 at o'clock in the noon]. 
 
 Dated this day of . Registrar. 
 
WOKKMEN'S COMPENSATION UULES, 1907-1912. 281 
 
 FORM 21. 
 
 NOTICE TO APPLICANT AND ORIGINAL RESPONDENTS OF ADDITION 
 OP RESPONDENTS. 
 
 [Heading as in Request for Arbitration.'} 
 
 TAKE NOTICE 
 
 That by order dated the day of it was ordered on the appli- 
 
 cation of the respondents, C.D. & Co., Limited, (a copy whereof is 
 
 hereto -annexed), that of be added as respondents to this 
 
 arbitration [and that the hearing of this arbitration be adjourned to the 
 
 day of at o'clock in the noon]. 
 
 Dated this day of . Registrar. 
 
 To the Applicant 
 
 and 
 
 The Respondents, 
 C.D. & Co., Limited. 
 
 FORM 22. 
 
 NOTICE TO PARTIES WHO ARE ADDED AS RESPONDENTS. 
 [Heading as in Request for Arbitration.'} 
 
 To Messrs. of (address and description). 
 
 TAKE NOTICE 
 
 That by an order of this Court, dated the day of a copy of 
 
 which order is hereunto annexed, together with a copy of the request and 
 particulars filed by the applicant in this matter, and a copy of the applica- 
 tion on which the said order was made, you were ordered to be added as a 
 respondent in the above arbitration. 
 
 And further take notice, that the hearing of the above arbitration has 
 been appointed for the day of at o'clock in the 
 
 noon, and that if you do not attend, either in person or by your 
 solicitor, at the court house at upon the day and at the hour above- 
 
 mentioned such order will be made and proceedings taken as the judge [or 
 arbitrator] may think just and expedient. 
 
 And further take notice, that if you wish to disclaim any interest in the 
 subject matter of the arbitration, or consider that the applicant's particulars 
 are in any respect inaccurate or incomplete, or desire to bring any fact or 
 document to the notice of the judge [or arbitrator], or intend to rely on 
 any fact, or to deny (wholly or partially) your liability to pay compensation 
 under the Act, you must file with me an answer, stating your name and 
 address and the name and address of your solicitor (if any), and stating 
 that you disclaim any interest in the subject-matter of the arbitration, 
 or stating in what respect the applicant's particulars are inaccurate or 
 incomplete, or stating concisely any fact or document which you desire to 
 bring to the notice of the judge [or arbitrator], or on which yo*u intend to 
 rely, or the grounds on and extent to which you deny liability to pay 
 compensation. 
 
 Such answer, together with a copy thereof for the judge [or arbitrator], 
 and a copy for the applicant and for each of the other respondents, must be 
 filed with me ten clear days at least before the day of 
 
282 APPENDIX B. . 
 
 If no answer is filed, and subject to such answer, if any, the applicant's 
 particulars and your liability to pay compensation will be taken to be 
 admitted. 
 
 Dated this day of 
 
 To of Registrar. 
 
 FORM 23. 
 
 NOTICE BY RESPONDENT TO THIED PARTIES. 
 
 [Xot to be printed, but to be used as a Precedent.] 
 
 [Heading as in Request for Arbitration.] 
 
 To Mr. , of (address and description). 
 
 TAKE NOTICE 
 
 That A.B. of, etc., , has filed a request for arbitration 
 
 (a copy whereof is hereto annexed) as to the amount of compensation 
 
 paj-able by the respondents, C.D. & Co., Limited, to the said A.B. 
 
 in respect of personal injury caused to the said A.B. by accident 
 
 arising out of and in the course of his employment. 
 
 [Or, That E.F. of has filed a request for arbitration (a copy 
 
 whereof is hereto annexed) with respect to the compensation payable to 
 the dependants of A.B. deceased, in respect of the injury caused to 
 
 the said dependants by the death of the said A.B. which resulted 
 
 from injury caused to the said A.B. by accident arising out of and 
 
 in the course of his employment.] 
 
 [or as the case may be ; see forms of request for arbitration.] 
 
 The respondents, C.D. & Co., Limited, claim to be indemnified by 
 
 you against then* liability to pay such compensation, on the ground that at 
 the time of the injury in respect of which compensation is claimed the said 
 A.B. was not immediately employed by the said C.D. & Co., Limited, 
 
 but was employed by you in the execution of work undertaken by 
 the said C.D. & Co., Limited, in respect of which the said C.D. & Co., 
 
 Limited, had contracted with you for the execution thereof by or 
 
 under you. ^ , 
 
 [Or, on the ground that the injury for which compensation is claimed 
 was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability on your part [add, 
 if so, as the persons who have given security in respect of the liability of 
 the owners of the ship " "] to pay damages in respect thereof]. 
 
 [or as the case may be.] 
 
 [Or, in case of industrial disease, The respondents C.D. & Co., Limited, 
 claim to be entitled to contribution from you in respect of the 
 compensation claimed from them, on the ground that the disease mentioned 
 in the applicant's particulars was of such a nature as to be contracted by 
 a gradual process, and that the said A.B. was employed by you 
 
 during the twelve months previous to the date of disablement or suspension 
 in the employment to the nature of which the disease was due.] 
 
 And take notice, that if you wish to dispute the applicant's claim as 
 against the- respondents, C.D. & Co., Limited, or your liability to the 
 
 said respondents, you must appear before the judge [or arbitrator] at the 
 time and place mentioned in the notice, a copy of which is hereunto 
 annexed. 
 
 In default of your so appearing you will be deemed to admit the validity 
 of any award made in the said arbitration as to any matter which the judge 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION EULES, 1907-1912. 283 
 
 [or arbitrator] has jurisdiction to decide in such arbitration as between the 
 applicant and the respondents, C.D. & Co., Limited, whether such 
 
 award is made by consent or otherwise, and your own liability to indemnify 
 the said C.D. & Co., Limited, [or to contribute as above mentioned]. 
 
 Dated this day of 
 
 (Signed) C.D. & Co., Limited, 
 To By 
 
 Secretary. 
 
 of [Or, 
 
 Solicitors for the Respondents, 
 C.D. & Co., Limited.] 
 
 FORM 24. 
 AWARD. 
 
 [NOTE. These forms are intended for use in ordinary cases only. The award 
 in any special case must be settled under Rule 28, in accordance, with 
 the directions given by the judge or arbitrator.] 
 
 (i) IN CASE OF APPLICATION BY WORKMAN. 
 
 [Heading as in Request for Arbitration.'] 
 Having duly considered the matters submitted to me, I do hereby make 
 
 my award as follows : 
 
 [Here insert any introductory recitals of findings on which the award is 
 
 made which the judge or arbitrator may direct.] 
 
 1. I order that the respondents, C.D. & Co., Limited, do pay to the 
 applicant, A.B., the weekly sum of as compensation for personal 
 injury caused to the said A.B. on the day of , by accident 
 arising out of and in the course of his employment as a workman employed 
 by the said respondents, such weekly payment to commence as from the 
 
 day of , and to continue during the total or partial incapacity 
 
 of the said A.B. for work, or until the same shall be ended, diminished, 
 
 increased, or redeemed in accordance with the provisions of the above- 
 mentioned Act. 
 
 2. And I order that the said C.D. & Co. do forthwith pay to the 
 said A.B. the sum of being the amount of such weekly 
 payments calculated from the day of until the day of 
 
 [first Saturday or other usual pay day after date of award] and do thereafter 
 pay the said sum of to the said A.B. on Saturday [or other 
 
 usual pay day] in every week. 
 
 3. And I order that the said C.D. & Co. do pay to the registrar 
 of this Court, for the use of the applicant, his costs of and incident to this 
 arbitration, such costs, in default of agreement between the parties as to 
 the amount thereof, to be taxed by the registrar under column of the 
 scales of costs in use in the County Courts, and to be paid by the said 
 C.D. & Co. to the registrar within 14 days from, the date of the 
 certificate of the result of such taxation. 
 
 Dated this day of . Judge [or Arbitrator]. 
 
 NOTE. See Biggins v. Poulson (No. 2), p. 183, ante. 
 
APPENDIX U. 
 
 (ii) IN CASE OF APPLICATION BY DEPENDANTS. 
 
 [Heading as in Request for Arbitration.] 
 Having duly considered the matters submitted to me, I do hereby make 
 
 my award as follows : 
 
 [Here insert any introductory recitals of findings on which the award is 
 
 made which the judge or arbitrator may direct.'} 
 
 1. I order that the respondents, C.D. & Co., Limited, do pay the sum of 
 to the dependants of A.B., late of , deceased, as com- 
 pensation for the injury resulting to such dependants from the death of the 
 said A.B. , which took place on the day of from injury 
 caused to the said A.B. on the day of by accident arising 
 out of and in the course of his employment as a workman employed by the 
 said respondents. 
 
 2. And I declare that the persons hereinafter named are entitled to 
 share in such compensation as dependants of the said A.B. , that is 
 to say, J.B., the widow of the said A.B., and [name the 
 other persons]. 
 
 3. [Add, if so found.] And I declare that the respondent G.H. , 
 the of the said A.B. , is not entitled to share in such compen- 
 sation as a dependant of the said A.B. 
 
 4. And I order that the said sum of be apportioned between the 
 said J.B. and [name the other persons] in the proportions following, 
 that is to say : 
 
 I apportion the sum of to or for the benefit of the said J.B., ' 
 
 and the sum of to or for the benefit of the said [specify the persons 
 
 entitled and the sums apportioned to tJiem]. 
 
 5. And I order that the said C.D. & Co., Limited, do pay the said 
 sum of to the registrar of this court within 14 days from the date 
 of this award. 
 
 6. And I order that on payment to the registrar of the said sum of 
 , the registrar do forthwith pay to the said J.B. the sum of 
 hereby apportioned to her, [or the sum of out of the sum of 
 hereby apportioned to her, and that the balance of the last-mentioned 
 sum (less the fee for the investment thereof) be invested by the registrar 
 in his name in the Post Office Savings Bank for the benefit of the said J.B., 
 and that out of the sum so invested and the accruing interest thereof the 
 registrar do from time to time until further order pay to the said J.B. 
 
 the weekly [or fortnightly] sum of , the first payment to be made 
 
 on the day of " ]. 
 
 7. And I order that on payment to the registrar of the said sum of 
 the sums of and hereby apportioned to or for the 
 benefit of the said respectively (less the fees for the investment 
 thereof) be invested by the registrar in his name in the Post Office Savings 
 Bank for the benefit of the said and respectively, and that 
 interest arising from such investments be from time to time until further 
 order paid to the said J.B. to be by her applied for the maintenance, 
 education, or benefit of the said and respectively. 
 
 8. And I order that the said J.B. and the said or any of 
 them be at liberty to apply to the judge from time to time as they may be 
 advised for any further or other order as to the application of any of the 
 said sums so ordered to be invested and the accruing interest thereof. 
 
 9. And I order that the said C.D. & Co., Limited, do pay to the 
 registrar of this Court, for the use of the applicants, their costs of and 
 incident to this arbitration, such costs, in default of agreement between the 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RULES, 1907-1912. 285 
 
 parties as to the amount thereof, to be taxed by the registrar under column 
 of the scales of costs in use in the County Courts, and to be paid by 
 the said C.D. & Co., Limited, to the registrar within 14 days from 
 
 the date of the certificate of the result of such taxation. 
 
 [Add directions (if any given) as to costs occasioned by claim of person claiming 
 as a dependant whose claim is disallowed.'} 
 
 Dated this day of . Judge [or Arbitrator]. 
 
 (iii) IN CASE OF APPLICATION BY PERSON TO WHOM EXPENSES OF MEDICAL 
 ATTENDANCE OR BURIAL ARE DUE. 
 
 [Heading as in Request for Arbitration.] 
 Having duly considered the matters submitted to me, I do hereby make 
 
 my award as follows : 
 
 [Leave space for any introductory recitals of findings on which the award 
 
 is made which the judge or arbitrator may direct.'] 
 
 1. I order that the respondents, C.D. & Co., Limited, do pay the 
 sum of for or towards the expenses of medical attendance on and 
 the burial of A.B., late of , deceased, who died on the day 
 of from injury caused on the day of by accident arising 
 out of and in the course of the employment of the said A.B. as a 
 workman employed by the said C.D. & Co., Limited. 
 
 2. And I declare that the persons hereinafter named are entitled to share 
 in such compensation, that is to say : 
 
 The applicant, E.F., , in respect of charges amounting to 
 
 due to [or payable by] him for medical attendance on the said A.B. 
 and the respondent, G.H. , in respect of charges amounting to 
 
 due to him for the burial of the said A.B. 
 
 3. And I order that the respondents, C.D. & Co. y Limited, do pay 
 the said sum of to the registrar of this Court within fourteen days 
 from the date of this award, and that the said sum of be apportioned 
 between and paid to the said E.F. and G.H. in proportion to the amounts 
 due to them respectively as aforesaid. 
 
 4. And I order that the said C.D. & Co., Limited, do pay to the 
 registrar of this Court for the use of the applicant, E.F., and the respon- 
 dent, G.H., their respective costs of and incident to this arbitration, such 
 costs, in default of agreement between the parties as to the amount thereof, 
 to be taxed by the registrar under column of the scales of costs in 
 use in the County Courts, and to be paid by the said C.D. & Co., Limited, 
 
 to the registrar within fourteen days from the date of the certificate 
 of the result of such taxation. 
 
 Dated this day of . Judge [or Arbitrator]. 
 
 [Note. The above forms will serve as guides for framing awards in other 
 cases of arbitration.] 
 
 FORM 25. 
 NOTICE OF DAY UPON WHICH SPECIAL CASE WILL BE HEARD. 
 
 In the County Court of , holden at 
 
 [Heading as in Special Case.] 
 
 TAKE NOTICE that the judge of this Court will hear the special case 
 stated in the above-named matter at a Court to be holden at on 
 
 the day of at the hour of in the noon : and that if 
 
 you do not attend in person or by your solicitor at the place and time 
 
286 APPENDIX B. 
 
 above-mentioned, such order will be made and proceedings taken as the 
 judge may think just. 
 
 You may obtain a cojry of the case upon application at my office and 
 upon prepayment of the costs of such copy. 
 
 Dated this day of . Registrar. 
 
 To [The Applicant a/id fic*po>id.fiif*]. 
 
 FORM 26. 
 APPLICATION FOR ORDER FOR DETENTION OF SHIP. 
 
 [Xot to be printed, but to be used as a Precedent.] 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. Section 11. 
 
 The Ship " 
 
 Application is hereby made on behalf of of who alleges that 
 
 the owners of the ship " " which has been found in the port [or 
 
 river] of [or within three miles of the coast of England], are liable to 
 
 such owners to pay compensation under the Workmen's Compensation 
 Act, 1906, in respect of personal injury by accident arising out of and in 
 the course of his employment caused to of on the day of 
 
 in the port [or harbour] of , and who claims compensation 
 
 in respect of such injury, and alleges that none of the owners of the said 
 ship reside in the United Kingdom, for an order directed to an 
 
 officer of Customs or other officer named by the judge, requiring him to 
 detain the said ship until such time as the owners, agent, master, or con- 
 signee thereof have paid such compensation, or have given security, to be 
 approved by the judge, to abide the event of any proceedings that may be 
 instituted to recover such compensation, and to pay such compensation 
 and costs as may be awarded thereon, or until the said ship shall be other- 
 wise released by due course of law. 
 
 The grounds on which this application is made are set forth in the 
 affidavit of filed herewith [or will be given in evidence on the hearing 
 
 of the application]. 
 
 Dated this day of . (Signed) 
 
 [Xame and address of Applicant or Applicant's Solicitor.] 
 
 FORM 27. 
 
 UNDERTAKING AS TO DAMAGES. 
 [Not to be printed, but to be used as a Precedent.] 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. Section 11. 
 
 The Ship " 
 
 I, the undersigned , of , hereby undertake to abide by any 
 
 order which may hereafter be made as to damages, in case any person 
 affected by the order to be made on my application for the detention of the 
 ship " " shall sustain any damages by reason of such order which I 
 
 ought to pay. 
 
 Dated this day of . (Signed) 
 
 [Signature and Address of Applicant.] 
 
 [To be altered as required, if the undertaking is given by any person 
 other than the applicant.] 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION EULBS, 1907-1912. 287 
 
 FORM 28. 
 ORDER FOR DETENTION OF SHIP. 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1900. 
 
 The Ship " 
 
 Whereas it is alleged that the owners of the ship " "are liable as 
 
 such owners to pay compensation in respect of personal injury by accident 
 arising out of and in the course of his employment caused to of 
 
 in the port [or harbour] of : 
 
 And that the said ship has been found in the port [or river] of [or 
 
 within three miles of the coast of England] : 
 
 And whereas it has been shown to me, on the application of of 
 
 , who claims compensation in respect of such injury, that the owners 
 of the said ship are probably liable as such to pay such compensation, 
 and that none of the owners reside in the United Kingdom : 
 
 [And whereas the said has filed an undertaking to abide by any 
 
 order which may hereafter be made as to damages, in case any person 
 affected by this order shall sustain any damages by reason of this order 
 which the said ought to pay :] 
 
 Now I do hereby issue this order directed to you, the Chief Officer of 
 Customs at [or other officer named by the judge] requiring you to detain 
 
 the said ship until such time as the owners, agent, master, or consignee 
 thereof have paid compensation in respect of the said injury, or have given 
 security in the sum of , to be approved by the judge, to abide the 
 
 event of any proceedings that may be instituted to recover such compensation, 
 and to pay such compensation and costs as may be awarded thereon, or until 
 the said ship shall be otherwise released by due course of law. 
 
 Dated this day of Judge. 
 
 To the Chief Officer of Customs at 
 [or other officer named by the judge.] 
 
 FORM 29. 
 BOND BY WAY OP SECURITY. 
 
 [Not to be printed, but to be used as a Precedent.] 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
 The Ship " 
 
 Whereas it is alleged that the owners of the ship " , "are liable as 
 such owners to pay compensation in respect of personal injury by accident 
 arising out of and in the course of his employment caused to of 
 
 in the port [or harbour] of : 
 
 And whereas the judge of this Court has issued an order directed to the 
 Chief Officer of Customs at [or other officer named by the Judge], 
 
 requiring him to detain the said ship until such time as the owners, agent, 
 master, or consignee thereof have paid compensation in respect of the said 
 injury, or have given security in the sum of , to be approved by 
 
 the judge, to abide the event of any proceedings that may be instituted to 
 recover such compensation, and to pay such compensation and costs as may 
 
APPENDIX B. 
 
 be awarded thereon, or until the said ship shall be otherwise released by 
 due course of law : 
 
 Now, therefore, we [state- names, addresses, and descriptions of sureties] 
 jointly and severally submit ourselves to the jurisdiction of this Court, 
 or of any other competent Court in England or Ireland in which any pro- 
 ceedings may be instituted in respect of the said injury, and consent that 
 if the owners, agent, master, or consignee of the said ship shall not pay 
 all such compensation and costs as may be awarded thereon execution may 
 issue forthwith against us, our heirs, executors, and administrators, goods 
 and chattels, for a sum not exceeding pounds. 
 
 [Signatures of Sureties.] 
 
 This bail bond was signed by the said and the sureties, 
 
 the day of , 19 . 
 
 Before me, Registrar. 
 
 [or Clerk to the Registrar nominated 
 
 to 
 
 FORM 30. 
 ORDER OF RELEASE. 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
 The Ship " 
 
 You are hereby authorised and directed to release the ship " 
 now under detention by virtue of an order made on the day of , 
 
 upon the payment of all costs, charges and expenses attending the custody 
 thereof. 
 
 Dated this day of . Judge. 
 
 To the Chief Officer of Customs at 
 
 [or other officer named in the order for detention.} 
 
 FORM 30A. 
 
 SOLICITOR'S UNDERTAKING TO GIVE SECURITY. 
 [Not to be printed, but to be used as a Precedent.] 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 The Ship " 
 
 Whereas it is alleged that the owners of the ship " " are liable 
 
 as such owners to pay compensation in respect of personal injury by accident 
 arising out of and in the course of his employment caused to of 
 
 in the port [or harbour] of : 
 
 Now, therefore, I, L.M. , of (address) , solicitor for the 
 
 owners [agent, master or consignee] of the said ship, hereby undertake 
 within days from the date hereof to give security in the sum of 
 
 , to be approved by the judge, to abide the event of any proceedings 
 
 that may be instituted to recover such compensation, and to pay such 
 compensation and costs as may be awarded thereon. 
 
 Dated this day of . (Signed) L.M. 
 
WOEKMEN'S COMPENSATION EULES, 1907-1912. 289 
 
 FORM 31. 
 
 APPLICATION FOB ORDER FOR DETENTION OF SHIP BY EMPLOYER CLAIMING 
 
 INDEMNITY. 
 
 [Not to be printed, but to be used as a Precedent.} 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 The Shipowners' Negligence (Remedies) Act, 1905. 
 The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
 The Ship " ." 
 
 Application is hereby made on behalf of of , who alleges : 
 
 1. That on the day of personal injury by accident arising 
 out of and in the course of his employment was caused to of 
 
 in the port [or harbour] of : and 
 
 2. That the applicant, as the employer of the said has paid com- 
 pensation [or has had a claim for compensation made on him] in respect 
 of such injury under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906 : and 
 
 3. That the applicant is [or will become] entitled to be indemnified 
 under that Act by the owners of the ship " "on the ground that 
 the said injury was caused by the said ship [or sustained on in or about 
 the said ship], in consequence of the wrongful act, neglect, or default 
 of the owners of the said ship, or the master or officers or crew thereof, 
 or of some other person in the employment of the owners of the said ship, 
 or of some defect in the said ship or its apparel or equipment : and 
 
 4. That the said ship has been found in the port [or river] of [or 
 within three miles of the coast of England] : and 
 
 5. That none of the owners of the said ship reside in the United Kingdom : 
 for an order directed to an officer of Customs or other officer named by 
 the judge, requiring him to detain the said ship until such time as the 
 owners, agent, master, or consignee thereof have indemnified the applicant 
 or paid compensation in respect of the said injury, or have given security, 
 to be approved by the judge, to abide the event of any proceedings that 
 may be instituted in respect of the said injury or to recover such indemnity, 
 and to pay such compensation, indemnity, and costs as may be awarded 
 thereon, or until the said ship shall be otherwise released by due course 
 of law. 
 
 The grounds on which this application is made are set forth in the 
 affidavit of filed herewith [or will be given in evidence on the hearing 
 
 of the application]. 
 
 Dated this day of . (Signed) -. 
 
 [Name and Address of Applicant or Applicant's Solicitor.] 
 
 FORM 32. 
 
 ORDER FOR DETENTION OF SHIP ON APPLICATION OP EMPLOYER CLAIMING 
 
 INDEMNITY. 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 The Shipowners' Negligence (Remedies) Act, 1905. 
 The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
 The Ship " 
 Whereas it is alleged by of 
 
 W.C.A. U 
 
290 APPENDIX B. 
 
 1. That on the day of personal injury by accident arising 
 out of and in the course of his employment was caused to of 
 
 in the port [or harbour of : and 
 
 2. That the said as the employer of the said has paid com- 
 pensation [or has had a claim for compensation made on him] in respect 
 of such injury under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906 : and 
 
 3. That the said is [or will become] entitled to be indemnified 
 under that Act by the owners of the ship " ," on the ground that 
 the said injury was caused by the said ship [or sustained on hi or about 
 the said ship], in consequence of the wrongful act, neglect, or default 
 of the owners of the said ship, or the master or officers or crew thereof, 
 or of some other person in the employment of the owners of the said 
 ship, or of some defect hi the said ship or its apparel or equipment : and 
 
 4. That the said ship has been found in the port [or river] of [or 
 within three miles of the coast of England] : 
 
 And whereas it has been shown to me, on the application of the said 
 that the applicant probably is [or will become] entitled to be in- 
 demnified under the said Act, and that none of the owners of the said ship 
 reside in the United Kingdom : 
 
 [And whereas the said has filed an undertaking to abide by any 
 
 order which may hereafter be made as to damages, in case any person 
 affected by this order shall sustain any damages by reason of this order 
 which the said ought to pay] : 
 
 Now I do hereby issue this order directed to you, the Chief Officer of 
 Customs at [or other officer named by the judge'], requiring you to 
 
 detain the said ship until such time as the owners, agents, master, or con- 
 signee thereof have indemnified the said or paid compensation in 
 respect of the said injury, or have given security in the sum of , 
 to be approved by the judge, to abide the event of any proceedings that 
 may be instituted in respect of the said injury, or to recover such indem- 
 nity, and to pay such compensation, indemnity, and costs as may be 
 awarded thereon, or until the said ship shall be otherwise released by due 
 course of law. 
 
 Dated this day of . Judge. 
 
 To the Chief Officer of Customs at 
 
 [or other officer named by the judge']. 
 
 FORM 33. 
 
 BAIL BOND BY WAY OF SECURITY WHERE ORDER OF DETENTION MADE ON 
 APPLICATION OF EMPLOYER CLAIMING INDEMNITY. 
 
 [Not to be printed, but to be used as a Precedent.'] 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 The Shipowners' Negligence (Remedies) Act, 1905. 
 
 The Ship " 
 
 Whereas it is alleged : 
 
 1. That on the day of personal injury by accident arising 
 
 out of and in the course of his employment was caused to of in 
 
 the port [or harbour] of : and 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION EULES, 1907-1912. 291 
 
 2. That of as the employer of the said , has paid com- 
 pensation [or has had a claim for compensation made on him] in respect 
 of the said injury under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906 ; and 
 
 3. That the said is [or will become] entitled to be indemnified 
 under that Act by the owners of the ship " ," on the ground that the 
 said injury was caused by the said ship [or sustained on in or about 
 the said ship] in consequence of the wrongful act, neglect or default of the 
 owners of the said ship, or the master or officers or crew thereof, or of some 
 other person in the employment of the owners of the said ship, or of some 
 defect in the said ship or its apparel or equipment : 
 
 And whereas the judge of this Court has issued an order directed to the 
 Chief Officer of Customs at [or other officer named by the judge], requiring 
 
 him to detain the said ship until such time as the owners, agent, master or 
 consignee thereof have indemnified the said or^paid compensation in 
 
 respect of the said injury, or have given security in the sum of , to 
 
 be approved by the judge, to abide the event of any proceedings that may 
 be instituted in respect of the said injury, or to recover such indemnity, 
 and to pay such compensation, indemnity, and costs as may be awarded 
 thereon, or until the said ship shall be otherwise released by due course 
 of law. 
 
 Now, therefore, we [state names, addresses, and descriptions of sureties'] 
 jointly and severally submit ourselves to the jurisdiction of this Court, or 
 of any other competent Court in England or Ireland in which any pro- 
 ceedings may be instituted in respect of the said injury, or to recover such 
 indemnity, and consent that if the owners, agent, master or consignee of 
 the said ship shall not pay all such compensation, indemnity, and costs as 
 may be awarded thereon execution may issue forthwith against us, our 
 heirs, executors, and administrators, goods and chattels, for a sum not 
 exceeding pounds. 
 
 [Signatures of Sureties.] 
 
 This bail bond was signed by the said 
 
 and 
 
 the sureties, the day of 
 
 19 
 
 Before me, Registrar. 
 
 [or Clerk to the Registrar nominated 
 to take affidavits.] 
 
 FORM 34. 
 
 APPLICATION FOR APPOINTMENT OF NEW ARBITRATOR, 
 SCHEDULE II., PARAGRAPH 8. 
 
 [Not to be printed, but to be used as a Precedent.] 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 In the matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 In the matter of an Arbitration between 
 A.B. 
 
 of (address) (description) Applicant. 
 
 and 
 C.D. & Co., Limited, 
 
 of (address) (description) Respondents. 
 
292 APPENDIX B. 
 
 Application is hereby made to the judge on behalf of the above-named 
 to appoint a new arbitrator in the above-mentioned matter in the 
 place of Mr. , the arbitrator appointed therein, by reason of the 
 
 death [or refusal [or inability] to act] of the said Mr. 
 
 And the applicant hereby requests that a time and place may be fixed 
 for the hearing of the application. 
 Dated this day of 
 
 (Signed) Applicant. 
 
 [or Applicant's 
 
 FORM 35. 
 
 SUMMONS ON APPLICATION FOR APPOINTMENT OF NEW ARBITRATOR. 
 
 [Title as in Application.} 
 
 You are hereby summoned to attend before the judge in chambers at 
 
 on the day of at the hour of in the 
 
 noon, on the hearing of an application on the part of for the appoint- 
 
 ment by the judge of a. new arbitrator, in the above-mentioned matter in 
 the place of Mr. , the arbitrator appointed therein, by reason of the 
 
 death [or refusal [or inability] to act] of the said Mr. 
 
 And take notice, that in default of your attendance at the time and 
 place above-mentioned, the judge will, on proof of the service of this 
 summons, proceed to hear and dispose of the said application. 
 
 Dated this day of 
 
 To Registrar, 
 
 and to his [or their] 
 Solicitor. 
 
 FORM 36 (MAY 19, 1909). 
 FORM OF MEMORANDUM UNDER PARAGRAPH 9 OF SCHEDULE II. 
 
 (i.) In case of Injury to Workman by Accident. 
 
 To the Registrar of the County Court of holden at 
 
 In the matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, 
 
 and 
 In the matter of an Arbitration between (name) 
 
 of [address] [description] Applicant, 
 
 and [name] 
 
 of [address] [description] Respondents. 
 
 [Or, where the matter has been decided by agreement without arbitration], 
 In the matter of an Agreement between [name] 
 of [address] [description] 
 
 and [name] 
 of [address] [description]. 
 
 Be it remembered, that on the day of 19 , personal injury 
 
 was caused at (state place of accident) to the above-named , a workman 
 
 under no legal disability, [or an infant of the age of years,] by accident 
 
 arising out of and in the course of his employment. 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION EULES, 1907-1912. 293 
 
 And that on the day of 19 , the following agreement was 
 
 come to by and between the said and the said , that is to say : 
 
 [or And that on the day of 19 , the following decision was 
 
 given by a committee representative of the said and their workmen, 
 
 having power to settle matters under the above-mentioned Act hi the case 
 of the said and their workmen, that is to say :] 
 
 [or And that on the day of 19 , the folio whig award was made 
 
 and given by me, the undersigned , being an arbitrator agreed on by 
 
 the said and the said , that is to say :] 
 
 [Here set out copy of agreement, decision, or award.'] 
 
 [If a medical referee has been appointed to report, add : 
 A copy of the report of Mr. , a medical referee appointed to report 
 
 in the above-mentioned matter, is hereunto annexed.] 
 
 [Add, if so, The said Mr. attended the arbitration on the day 
 
 of 19 .] 
 
 - You are hereby requested to record this memorandum, pursuant to 
 paragraph 9 of the second schedule to the above-mentioned Act. 
 Dated this day of 19 . 
 
 [To be signed in accordance with Rule 42, pars. 1, 2.] 
 NOTE. This form to be adapted to the circumstances of the case and the 
 matter decided. 
 
 (ii.) In case of injury to Workman by Industrial Disease. 
 
 To the Registrar of the County Court of holden at 
 
 In the matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, 
 
 and 
 In the matter of an Arbitration between (name) 
 
 of (address) (description) Applicant, 
 
 and (name) 
 
 of (address) (description) Respondents. 
 
 [Or, where the matter has been decided by agreement without arbitration], , 
 In the matter of an Agreement between (name) 
 of (address) (description) 
 
 and (name) 
 
 of (address) (description) 
 
 Be it remembered, that on the day of , Mr. , the certi- 
 
 fying surgeon appointed under the Factory and Workshop Act, 1901, for 
 the district of [or Mr. , one of the medical referees appointed 
 
 by the Secretary of State for the purposes of the Workmen's Compensation 
 Act, 1906,] certified that A.B. of , a workman under no legal 
 
 disability [or an infant of the age of years,] was suffering from , 
 
 a disease coming within section 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 
 1906, and was thereby disabled from earning full wages at the work at which 
 he was employed. 
 
 [or That on 'the day of , A.B. of , a workman under 
 
 no legal disability [or an infant of the age of . years,] was, in pursuance 
 of special rules [or regulations] made under the Factory and Workshop 
 Act, 1901, suspended from his usual employment on account of his having 
 contracted , a disease coming within section 8 of the Workmen's 
 
 Compensation Act, 1906 ; 
 
 And that the said A.B. alleged that the above-mentioned disease 
 
 was due to the nature of his employment in [describe employment], 
 
 of 
 
294 APPENDIX B. 
 
 and that he was last employed in such employment within the twelve 
 months previous to the date of disablement or suspension by C.D. & Co., 
 Limited of 
 
 And that on the day of 19 , the following agreement was 
 
 come to by and between the said and the said , that is to 
 
 say: 
 
 [or And that on the day of 19 , the following decision was given 
 
 by a committee representative of the said and their workmen, having 
 
 power to settle matters under the above-mentioned Act in the case of the 
 said and their workmen, that is to say :] 
 
 [or And that on the day of 19 , the following award was made 
 
 and given by me, the undersigned , being an arbitrator agreed on by 
 
 the said and the said , that is to say :] 
 
 [Here set out copy of agreement, decision, or award.] 
 
 If a medical referee has been appointed to report, add : 
 A copy of the report of Mr. , a medical referee appointed to report 
 
 in the above-mentioned matter, is hereunto annexed. 
 [Add, if so, The said Mr. attended the arbitration on the day of 
 
 19 .] 
 
 You are hereby requested to record this memorandum, pursuant, to 
 paragraph 9 of the second schedule to the above-mentioned Act. 
 Dated this day of 19 . 
 
 [To be signed in accordance with Euk 42, pars. 1,2.] 
 
 NOTE. This form to be adapted to the circumstances of the case and the 
 matter decided. 
 
 (iii.) Where Death resulted from the Injury. 
 
 To the Registrar of the County Court of holden at 
 
 In the Matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, 
 
 and 
 In the matter of an arbitration between (name) 
 
 of (address) (description) Applicant, 
 
 and (name) 
 
 of (address) (description) Respondents. 
 
 [Or, where the matter has been decided by agreement without arbitration], 
 In the matter of an Agreement between (name) 
 of (address) (description) 
 
 and (name) 
 
 of (address) (description). 
 
 Be it remembered, that on the day of , 19 , personal injury 
 
 was caused at (state place of accident) to late of , deceased, by 
 
 accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and that on the 
 
 day of , 19 , the said died as the result of such injury. 
 
 And that on the day of , 19 , the following agreement was 
 
 come to by and between , the dependants of the said within 
 
 the meaning of the above-mentioned Act, and the said , that is to 
 
 say: 
 
 [Or, And that on the day of , 19 , the following decision was 
 
 given by a committee representative of the said and their workmen, 
 
 having power to settle matters under the above-mentioned Act in the case 
 of the said and their workmen, that is to say :] 
 
 [Or, And that on the day of , 19 ," the following award was 
 
 made and given by me, the undersigned being an arbitrator agreed 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION KULES, 1907-1912. 295 
 
 on by , the dependants of the said within the meaning of the 
 
 above-mentioned Act, and the said , that is to say :] 
 
 [Here set out copy of agreement, decision, or award.] 
 
 [If a medical referee has been appointed to report, add : 
 A copy of the report of Mr. , a medical referee appointed to report 
 
 in the above-mentioned matter, is hereunto annexed. 
 [Add, if so, The said Mr. attended the arbitration on the day of 
 
 19 .] 
 
 You are hereby requested to record this memorandum, pursuant to 
 paragraph 9 of the second schedule to the above-mentioned Act. 
 Dated this day of 19 . 
 
 [To be signed in accordance with Mule 42, pars. 1,2.] 
 NOTE. This form to be adapted to the circumstances of the case and the 
 matter decided. 
 
 (iv. ) Where Death resulted from Industrial Disease. 
 To the Registrar of the County Court of holden at 
 
 In the matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, 
 
 and 
 
 In the matter of an arbitration between (name) 
 of (address) (description) Applicant, 
 
 and (name) 
 
 of (address) (description) Respondents. 
 
 [Or, where the matter has been decided by agreement without arbitration], 
 In the matter of an Agreement between 
 of 
 
 and 
 of 
 
 Be it remembered, That on the day of , Mr. , the certify- 
 
 ing surgeon under the Factory and Workshop Act, 1901, for the district of 
 [or Mr. , one of the medical referees appointed by the Secretary 
 
 of State for the purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906], 
 certified that A.B. of was suffering from , a disease 
 
 coming within section 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, and was 
 thereby disabled from earning full wages at the work at which he was 
 employed ; and on the day of the said A.B. died, his 
 
 death being caused by the said disease ; 
 
 [Or, That on the day of A.B. of was, in pur- 
 
 suance of special rules [or regulations] made under the Factory and Workshop 
 Act, 1901, suspended from his usual employment on account of his having 
 contracted , a disease coming within section 8 of the Workmen's 
 
 Compensation Act, 1906, and on the day of the said A.B. 
 
 died, his death being caused by the said disease :] 
 
 [Or, That on the day of A.B. late of died, his 
 
 death being caused by , a disease coming within section 8 of the 
 
 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906 ; 
 
 And that the dependants of the said A.B. alleged that the above- 
 
 mentioned disease was due to the nature of the employment of the said 
 A.B. in (describe employment), and that he was last employed 
 
 in such employment within the twelve months previous to his disablement 
 or suspension [or, if the workman died without having obtained a certificate of 
 disablement, or was not at the time of his death in receipt of a weekly payment 
 on account of disablement, within the twelve months previous to his death] 
 by C.D. & Co., Limited, of .] 
 
296 APPENDIX B. 
 
 And that on the day of , 19 , the folio whig agreement was 
 
 come to by and between , the dependants of the said within 
 
 the meaning of the above-mentioned Act, and the said , , that is 
 
 to say : 
 
 [Or And that on the day of , 19 , the following decision was 
 
 given by a committee representative of the said and their workmen 
 
 having power to settle matters under the above-mentioned Act in the case 
 of the said and their workmen, that is to say :] 
 
 [Or And that on the day of , 19 , the following award was made 
 
 and given by me, the undersigned being an arbitrator agreed on by 
 
 , the dependants of the said within the meaning of the above- 
 
 mentioned Act, and the said , that is to say :] 
 
 [Here set out copy of agreement, decision, or award.'] 
 
 [If a medical referee has been appointed to report, add : 
 A cop}- of the report of Mr. , a medical referee appointed to report 
 
 in the above-mentioned matter, is hereunto annexed.] 
 [Add, if so, The said Mr. attended the arbitration on the day of 
 
 ,19 .] 
 
 You are hereby requested to record this memorandum, pursuant to 
 paragraph 9 of the second schedule to the above-mentioned Act. 
 
 Dated this day of ; 19 . 
 
 [To be signed in accordance with Rule 42, pars. 1, 2.] 
 
 NOTE. Thisiform to be adapted to the circumstances of the case and the 
 matter decided. 
 
 FORM 36A (MAY 19, 1909). 
 
 INFORMATION TO BE SUPPLIED WHERE A MEMORANDUM OF AN AGREEMENT 
 AS TO THE REDEMPTION OF A WEEKLY PAYMENT BY A LUMP SUM, OR 
 AS TO THE AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION PAYABLE TO A PERSON UNDER 
 ANY LEGAL DISABILITY, OR TO DEPENDANTS, IS PRESENTED FOR 
 REGISTRATION. SCHEDULE II., PARAGRAPH 9; RULES 41 (3), 49 (1). 
 
 A. In case of agreement unth injured workman. 
 [Heading as in Memorandum.'] 
 
 (a) A.B. named in the memorandum of agreement presented 
 
 for registration hi this matter was at the date of the accident [or disable- 
 ment or suspension] years of age. 
 
 (&) He was employed as , and his average weekly earnings computed 
 
 in accordance with the above-mentioned Act were 
 
 (c) He was injured by , and the nature of his injury was as follows : 
 
 (d) He was totally incapacitated for work for a period of , but 
 recovered and was fit to resume his ordinary work on the day of 
 
 , 19 : 
 
 [or He was and is at present totally incapacitated for work, but is ex- 
 pected to recover and to be fit to resume his ordinary work in about ] : 
 
 [or He was totally incapacitated for work for a period of , and is 
 
 now partially incapacitated, but such partial incapacity is not likely to be 
 permanent, and he is expected to recover and to be tit to resume his ordinary 
 work in about ] : 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RULES, 1907-1912. 297 
 
 [or He was and is totally incapacitated for work, and such incapacity is 
 likely to be permanent] : 
 
 [or He was totally incapacitated for work for a period of , and 
 
 is still partially incapacitated, and such partial incapacity is likely to be 
 permanent, but he is able to do light work, and it is estimated that he is 
 able to earn an average weekly amount of in some suitable employment 
 
 or business] : 
 
 [or as the case may be]. 
 
 [e] The said received the following payments, allowances, or 
 
 benefits from his employers previous to the date of the agreement, viz. : 
 [Here state payments made, and where a weekly payment has been made, the 
 amount of such payment, and the period for which it was paid.] 
 
 (To be signed in accordance with Rule 42, par. 2.) 
 Dated this day of , 19 . . 
 
 B. Where death resulted from the injury or industrial disease. 
 [Heading as in Memorandum.] 
 
 (a) A.B. named in the memorandum of agreement presented for 
 
 registration in this matter, was at the date of the accident [or disablement 
 or suspension or death] years of age. 
 
 (6) He was employed as , and his earnings in the employment of 
 
 during the three years next preceding the injury in the said 
 memorandum mentioned [or his average weekly earnings during the period 
 of his employment under ] were 
 
 (c) He left the following dependants wholly dependent upon his earnings, 
 and the following dependants partially dependent, viz. : 
 
 [Here state dependants, with their relationship to the deceased, and particulars 
 showing how and to what extent they were dependent.] 
 
 [Or He left no dependants wholly dependent upon his earnings, but left 
 the following dependants partially dependent, viz. : 
 [Here state dependants, with their relationship to the deceased, and particulars 
 showing how and to what extent they were dependent.] 
 
 (d) The said received the following payments, allowances, or 
 benefits from his employers after the accident [or disablement or 
 suspension] viz. : 
 
 (To be signed in accordance with Rule 42, par. 2.) 
 Dated this day of , 19 . 
 
 FORM 37. 
 
 NOTICE OF MEMORANDUM HAVING BEEN RECEIVED. 
 In the County Court of , holden at 
 
 [Heading as in Memorandum.] 
 
 TAKE NOTICE, that a memorandum, copy of which is hereto annexed, 
 has been sent to me for registration. 
 
 Such memorandum appears to affect you. 
 
 I have therefore to request you to inform me within seven days from 
 
298 APPENDIX B. 
 
 this date whether you admit the genuineness of the memorandum, or 
 whether you dispute it, and if so, in what particulars, or object to its being 
 recorded, and if so, on what grounds. 
 
 If you do not inform me in due course that you dispute the genuineness 
 of the memorandum or object to its being recorded, it may be recorded 
 without further inquiry, and will be enforceable accordingly. 
 
 If you dispute its genuineness or object to its being recorded, it will not 
 be recorded, except with your consent in writing, or by order of the judge 
 of this Court. 
 
 Dated this day of 
 
 To . Registrar. 
 
 FORM 38. 
 NOTICE DISPUTING MEMORANDUM, OB OBJECTING TO ITS BEING RECORDED. 
 
 [Nat to be printed, but to be used as a Precedent.} 
 In the County Court of , holden at 
 
 [Heading as in Memorandum.] 
 
 TAKE NOTICE, that the undersigned C.D. & Co., of etc., 
 
 dispute the genuineness of the memorandum sent to you for registration 
 in the above-mentioned matter in the following particulars : 
 
 [here state particulars.] 
 
 [or TAKE NOTICE, that the undersigned C.D. & Co., of etc., 
 
 object to the memorandum sent to you for registration in the above- 
 mentioned matter being recorded, on the following grounds : 
 
 [here state grounds see particularly Schedule 2, par. 9, proviso (6).] 
 Dated this day of 
 
 C.D. & Co., Limited, 
 
 by Secretary. 
 
 [or, Soli citors for C. D. & Co. , Limited. ] 
 
 To 
 The Registrar. 
 
 FORM 39. 
 
 NOTICE THAT MEMORANDUM is DISPUTED, OR OF OBJECTION TO ITS BEING 
 
 RECORDED. 
 
 [Heading as in Memorandum.} 
 
 TAKE NOTICE, that the genuineness of the memorandum in the above- 
 mentioned matter left with [or sent to] me for registration is disputed by 
 of , a party affected by such memorandum, in the following 
 
 particulars : 
 
 [here state particulars of dispute.] 
 [or that of , a party interested in the memorandum in the 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION KULES, 1907-1912. 299 
 
 above-mentioned matter left with [or sent to] me for registration objects 
 to the same being recorded, on the following grounds : 
 
 [here state grounds.} 
 
 The memorandum will therefore not be recorded, except with the consent 
 in writing of the said , or by order of the judge of this Court. 
 
 Dated this day of . Registrar. 
 
 To 
 
 FORM 40. 
 
 NOTICE OF APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF MEMORANDUM OR FOB 
 RECTIFICATION OF REGISTER. 
 
 [Not to be printed, but to be used as a Precedent.] 
 In the County Court of , holden at 
 
 [Heading as in Memorandum.] 
 
 TAKE NOTICE, that I intend to apply to the judge at on the 
 
 day of , at the hour of o'clock in the noon [in 
 
 case of notice by solicitor, on behalf of of ] for an order for the 
 
 registration of the memorandum sent to the registrar in the above-mentioned 
 matter [or for an order for the rectification of the memorandum recorded 
 in the above-mentioned matter] by [state particulars of rectification applied 
 for], and for consequential directions, and for costs. 
 
 Dated this day of 
 
 Applicant. 
 
 [Or Applicant's Solicitor.] 
 To the Registrar of the Court 
 and to 
 and to Messrs. (his [or their] solicitors). 
 
 FORM 41. 
 
 NOTICE TO PARTIES WHERE REGISTRAR REFERS THE QUESTION OF RECORDING 
 A MEMORANDUM OF AN AGREEMENT TO THE JUDGE UNDER SCHEDULE II. 
 PARAGRAPH 9, PROVISO (d). 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 [Heading as in Memorandum.] 
 
 TAKE NOTICE, that I have refused to record the memorandum sent to 
 me in this matter for registration, and have referred the matter to the 
 judge, pursuant to proviso (d) to paragraph 9 of the second schedule to 
 the Act, it appearing to me that the said memorandum ought not to be 
 registered by reason of 
 
 (a) the inadequacy of the lump sum agreed to be paid in redemption of 
 
 the weekly payment referred to in the memorandum ; or 
 
 (b) the inadequacy of the amount of compensation agreed to be paid 
 
 to , a person under legal disability ; or 
 
300 APPENDIX B. 
 
 (c) the inadequacy of the amount of compensation agreed to be paid to 
 
 and , dependants ; or 
 
 (d) the agreement having been obtained by fraud [or undue influence 
 
 or improper means]. 
 
 AND FURTHER TAKE NOTICE, that by order of the judge you are hereby 
 summoned to attend before the judge at a Court to be holden at on 
 
 the day of at the hour of in the noon, when 
 
 the matter will be inquired into by the judge ; 
 
 And that if you do not attend either in person or by your solicitor on 
 the day and at the hour above-mentioned such order will be made and 
 proceedings taken as the judge may think just and expedient. 
 
 Dated this day of . Registrar. 
 
 To [all parties concerned]. 
 
 FORM 42. 
 
 APPLICATION FOE REMOVAL OF RECORD OF MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT 
 FROM REGISTER UNDER SCHEDULE II., PARAGRAPH 9, PROVISO (e). 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 [Heading as in Memorandum.'] 
 
 TAKE NOTICE, that I intend to apply to the judge at on the 
 
 day of at the hour of in the noon, for an order 
 
 for the removal from the register of the record of the memorandum of the 
 agreement in the above-mentioned matter which was recorded on the 
 ,day of , pursuant to proviso (e) to paragraph 9 of the Second Schedule 
 
 to the above-mentioned Act, on the ground that the said agreement was 
 obtained by fraud [or undue influence or improper means], and for 
 
 consequential directions, and for costs. 
 
 Dated this day of Applicant. 
 
 [Or Applicant's Solicitor.] 
 To the Registrar of the Court 
 and to 
 
 and his [or their] Solicitor. 
 
 FORM 43. 
 
 NOTICE TO PARTIES WHERE JUDGE DIRECTS INQUIRY AS TO REMOVAL OF 
 RECORD OF MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT FROM REGISTER UNDER 
 SCHEDULE II., PARAGRAPH 9, PROVISO (e). 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 [Heading as in Memorandum.] 
 
 WHEREAS it has been made to appear to the judge that an inquiry 
 should be held as to the removal from the register of the record of the 
 memorandum of the agreement in the above-mentioned matter which was 
 recorded on the day of , pursuant to proviso (e) to paragraph 9 
 
 of the Second Schedule to the above-mentioned Act, on the ground that 
 the said agreement was obtained by fraud [or undue influence or improper 
 means] : 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BULES, 1907-1912. 301 
 
 TAKE NOTICE, that you are hereby summoned to attend before the 
 judge at a Court to be holden at on the day of at 
 
 the hour of in the noon, when the matter will be inquired into 
 
 by the judge ; 
 
 And that if you do not attend either in person or by your solicitor on 
 the day and at the hour above mentioned such order will be made and 
 proceedings taken as the judge may think just and expedient. 
 
 Dated this day of . Registrar. 
 
 To [all parties concerned]. 
 
 FORM 44. 
 
 FORM OF CERTIFICATE UNDER SECTION 1, SUB-SECTION 4. 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 No. of plaint. 
 Between 
 A.B., 
 
 of [address] [description] Plaintiff, 
 
 and 
 C.D. & Co., Limited, 
 
 of [address] [description] Defendants. 
 
 And in the matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 I hereby certify that on the day of the above-named plaintiff 
 
 commenced the above-named action against the above-named defendants 
 claiming ^ 
 
 [here state claim of plaintiff in action.] 
 
 And that, on the trial of the said action on the day of it was 
 
 determined that the injury in respect of which the plaintiff claimed damages 
 in the said action was one for which the defendants were not liable in the 
 said action, but that such defendants would have been liable to pay com- 
 pensation in respect of such injury under the above-mentioned Act ; 
 
 And that thereupon the said action was dismissed, but the Court, on 
 the request of the plaintiff, proceeded to assess the compensation which the 
 defendants would have been liable to pay under the said Act. 
 
 And that 'the Court assessed such compensation at the sum of 
 and directed [state directions given as to payment of compensation, and direc- 
 tions, if any given, as to costs, and as to the deduction from the compensation of 
 any costs which in the judgment of the Court were caused by the plaintiff bringing 
 the action instead of proceeding under the Act]. 
 
 Dated this day of . Registrar. 
 
 FORM 45. 
 APPLICATION FOR SUMMONS OF MEDICAL REFEREE AS ASSESSOR, 
 
 [Not to be printed, but to be used as a precedent.] 
 
 [Heading as in Request for Arbitration.] 
 
 The applicant [or respondent] applies to the judge to summon a medical 
 referee to sit with him as an assessor, on the ground that questions are 
 
302' APPENDIX B. 
 
 likely to arise in the arbitration as to the condition of the applicant or his 
 fitness for employment [or as the case may be], and that it is desirable that 
 the judge should have the assistance of a medical referee in the determination 
 of such questions. 
 
 Dated this day of 
 
 To the Registrar (Signed) A.B. Applicant. 
 
 of the Court 
 
 or 
 
 Solicitor for the Applicant 
 
 [or as the case may be] 
 
 I consent to a medical referee being summoned to sit with me as an 
 assessor. Judge. 
 
 FORM 46. 
 NOTICE OF REFUSAL TO SUMMON MEDICAL REFEREE AS ASSESSOR. 
 
 [Heading as in Request for Arbitration.] 
 
 I hereby give you notice that his Honour the Judge of this Court has 
 directed me to inform you that your application for a medical referee to be 
 summoned to sit with the judge as an assessor is refused, the judge being 
 of opinion that the summoning of a medical referee is unnecessary. 
 
 Dated this day of . Registrar. 
 
 To . [the applicant for an assessor.] 
 
 FORM 47. 
 SUMMONS TO MEDICAL REFEREE TO SIT AS ASSESSOR. 
 
 [Title as in Request for Arbitration.] 
 
 The day of 
 
 Sir, 
 
 You are hereby summoned to attend and sit with the judge as an 
 assessor at the court-house situate at on the day of 
 
 at the hour of in the noon. 
 
 I am, Sir, 
 
 Your obedient Servant, 
 To 
 
 Registrar. 
 
 FORM 48. 
 
 APPLICATION FOR REFERENCE TO MEDICAL REFEREE UNDER SCHEDULE I., 
 PARAGRAPH 15. 
 
 [Xot to be printed, but to be used as a precedent.] 
 
 in the county Court of holden at 
 
 In the matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RULES, 1907-1912. 303 
 
 In the matter of a claim for compensation made by A.B. of 
 
 , against C.D. & Co., Limited , of 
 
 [or, where an arbitration is pending, 
 
 In the matter of an arbitration between A.B. 
 
 of [address] [description] Applicant, 
 
 and 
 C.D. & Co., Limited 
 
 of [address] [description] Respondents. 
 
 [or, ivhere application is made after weekly payment has been settled,] 
 
 In the matter of an agreement [or a decision or award or certificate] 
 recorded in the above-mentioned court as to the weekly payment 
 pay able to A.B. , of , by C.D. & Co., Limited , of 
 Application is hereby made to the court on behalf of the above-named 
 A.B. and C.D. & Co., Limited, for a reference in the above-mentioned 
 matter to a medical referee pursuant to paragraph 15 of the first schedule 
 to the above-mentioned Act under the following circumstances : 
 
 1. On the day of notice was given by [or on behalf 
 
 of] the above-mentioned A.B. to the above-mentioned C.D. & Co., 
 
 Limited , of personal injury caused to the said A.B. by accident 
 
 arising out of and in the course of his employment, in respect of which injury 
 the said A.B. claims compensation from the said C.D. & Co., Limited, 
 
 under the said Act.] 
 [or, ivhere arbitration is pending, 
 
 1. An arbitration under the said Act is pending between the above- 
 mentioned A.B. and the above-mentioned C.D. & Co., Limited, 
 as to the amount of compensation payable to the said A.B. under 
 the said Act in-respect of personal injury caused to him by accident arising 
 out of and in the course of his employment.] 
 [or, where weekly payment has been settled, 
 
 1. Under an agreement [or a decision or award or certificate] in the 
 above-mentioned matter, recorded in this court on the day of , 
 a weekly payment is payable to the above-mentioned A.B. by the 
 above-mentioned C.D. & Co., Limited, as compensation in respect of 
 personal injury caused to the said A.B. by accident arising out of and in 
 the course of his employment.] 
 
 2. The weekly payment claimed by [or payable to] the said A.B. 
 is 
 
 3. A question has [or Questions have] arisen between the said A.B. 
 and the said C.D. & Co., Limited, as to the condition [or 
 
 fitness for employment] of the said A.B. [or as to whether [or to what 
 
 extent] the incapacity of the said A.B. is due to the accident], [or 
 
 as to the condition [or fitness for employment] of the said A.B. and 
 
 as to whether [or to what extent] the incapacity of the said A.B. is 
 
 due to the accident], and no agreement can be come to between the said 
 C.D. & Co., Limited, and the said A.B. with reference to such 
 
 question [or questions]. 
 
 4. The said A.B. has submitted himself for examination by a 
 medical practitioner provided by the said C.D. & Co., Limited, [or 
 has been examined by a medical practitioner selected by himself] [or if so, 
 the said A.B. has submitted himself for examination by a medical 
 practitioner provided by the said C.D. & Co., Limited, and has also 
 been examined by a medical practitioner selected by himself], and a copy 
 of the report of the said practitioner is [or copies of the reports of the said 
 practitioners are] annexed to this application. 
 
304 APPENDIX B. 
 
 The applicants request that an order may be made referring the matter 
 to a medical referee for his certificate as to the condition of the said A.B. 
 and his fitness for employment, specifying if necessary the kind of 
 employment for which he is fit [or for his certificate whether [or to what 
 extent] the incapacity of the said A.B. is due to the accident] [or for his 
 certificate as to the condition of the said A.B. and his fitness for em- 
 ployment, specifying if necessary the kind of employment for which he is 
 fit, and as to whether [or to what extent] the incapacity of the said A.B. 
 is due to the accident]. 
 Dated this day of 
 
 (Signed) 
 
 Applicant. 
 
 [or Applicant's Solicitor.] 
 C.D. & Co., Limited, 
 
 by Secretary. 
 
 [or 
 To the Registrar. Solicitors for C.D. & Co., Limited.] 
 
 FORM 49. 
 ORDER OF REFERENCE, SCHEDULE I., PARAGRAPH 15. 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 [Heading as in Application.] 
 
 On the application of A.B. of and C.D. & Co., Limited, 
 
 of (a copy of which is hereto annexed), I hereby appoint Mr. 
 
 of , one of the medical referees appointed by the Secretary of State 
 
 for the purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, to examine 
 the said [name of workman], and to give his certificate as to the 
 
 condition of the said and his fitness for employment, specifying if 
 
 necessary the kind of employment for which he is fit [or his certificate 
 whether [or to what extent] the incapacity of the said is due to the 
 
 accident] [or his certificate as to the condition of the said and his 
 
 fitness for employment, specifying if necessary the kind of employment for 
 which he is fit, and as to whether [or to what extent] the incapacity of the 
 said is due to the accident]. 
 
 Copies of the reports of the medical practitioners by whom the said 
 has been examined are hereto annexed. 
 
 The said , who is now at , has been directed to submit 
 
 himself for examination by the referee. 
 
 I am satisfied that the said is in a fit condition to travel for the 
 
 purpose of being examined, and he has been directed to attend on the 
 referee for examination at such time and place as may be fixed by 
 the referee. 
 
 [or The said does not appear to be in a fit condition to travel for 
 
 the purpose of being examined.] 
 
 The referee is requested to forward his certificate to the Registrar at the 
 County Court Office situate at on or before the day of 
 
 Dated this day of . Registrar. 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION KULES, 1907-1912. 305 
 
 FORM 50. 
 
 ORDER ON INJURED WORKMAN TO SUBMIT HIMSELF FOR EXAMINATION BY 
 MEDICAL REFEREE. 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 [Heading as in Application.} 
 
 To A.B. , of [address and description]. 
 
 TAKE NOTICE, that I have appointed Mr. , of one of the 
 
 medical referees appointed by the Secretary of State for the purposes of 
 the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, to examine you in accordance 
 with the application in the above-mentioned matter for a reference to a 
 medical referee. 
 
 You are hereby required to submit yourself for examination by the 
 referee [add where workman is in a fit condition to travel, and to attend for 
 that purpose at such time and place as may be fixed by him.] 
 
 Dated this day of . Registrar. 
 
 FORM 51. 
 
 NOTICE TO PARTIES OF CERTIFICATE OF MEDICAL REFEREE. 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 [Heading as in Application.'} 
 
 TAKE NOTICE, that I have received the certificate of the medical referee 
 appointed in this matter, and that you may inspect the same during office 
 hours at my office situate at , and may on request and at your own 
 
 cost be furnished with or take a copy thereof. 
 
 Dated this day of . Registrar. 
 
 To and 
 
 FORM 52. 
 
 NOTICE OF APPLICATION FOR SUSPENSION OF RIGHT TO COMPENSATION OR 
 TO TAKE OR PROSECUTE PROCEEDINGS IN RELATION TO COMPENSATION, 
 OR OF RIGHT TO WEEKLY PAYMENTS, UNDER SCHEDULE I., PARAGRAPH 4, 
 PARAGRAPH 14, OR PARAGRAPH 15, AND RULE 55. 
 
 [Not to be printed, but to be used as a Precedent.] 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 In the matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
 In the matter of a claim for compensation made by A.B. 
 of against C.D. & Co., Limited, of 
 
 [or, where an arbitration is pending, 
 
 W.C.A. X 
 
306 APPENDIX B. 
 
 In the matter of an arbitration between 
 A.B. 
 
 of [address] [description] Applicant. 
 
 and 
 C.D. & Co., Limited, 
 
 of [address] [description] Respondents.] 
 
 [or, where application is made after weekly payment ha-s been settled, 
 In the matter of an agreement [or a decision or an award or a certi- 
 ficate] recorded in the above-mentioned court as to the weekly 
 payment payable to A.B. of by C.D. & Co., Limited, 
 
 of .] 
 
 TAKE NOTICE, that I intend to apply to the judge at on 
 
 the day of at the hour of in the noon, [on behalf of 
 
 Messrs. C.D. & Co., Limited, of etc., ] for an order suspending your 
 
 right to compensation in the above-mentioned matter and to take or pro- 
 secute any proceedings under the above-mentioned Act in relation to 
 compensation [or suspending your right to weeldj- payments hi the above- 
 mentioned matter], on the ground that you refuse to submit yourself to 
 medical examination as required by me [or by the said C.D. & Co., Limited], 
 in accordance with paragraph 4 [or paragraph 14] of the first schedule to 
 the Act [or that you obstruct the medical examination required by me 
 [or by the said C.D. & Co., Limited,] in accordance with paragraph 4 [or 
 paragraph 14] of the first schedule to the Act], [or on the ground that you 
 refuse to submit yourself for examination by a medical referee as ordered 
 under paragraph 15 of the first schedule to the Act, or that you obstruct 
 the examination by a medical referee ordered under paragraph 15 of the 
 first schedule to the Act], and for consequential directions, and for costs. 
 
 Dated this day of 
 
 To A.B., of (Signed) C.D. & Co., Limited, 
 
 and to Messrs. by Secretary, 
 
 his solicitors. [or, 
 
 Solicitors for C.D. & Co., Limited.] 
 
 FORM 53. 
 PE^CIPE FOE PAYMENT INTO COURT UNDER SCHEDULE L, PARAGRAPH 5. 
 
 [Not to be printed, but to be used as a Precedent.] 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 In the matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, 
 
 and 
 
 In the matter of an arbitration between 
 A.B. 
 
 of, etc., Applicant. 
 
 and 
 C. D. & Co., Limited, 
 
 of, etc. Respondents. 
 
 or 
 
 [In the matter of an Agreement between 
 A.B. 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION EULES, 1907-1912. 307 
 
 of, etc. 
 
 and 
 
 C.D. & Co., Limited, 
 of, etc. 
 
 or 
 [In the matter of a Certificate given in an action in [state court}. 
 
 Between 
 A.B. 
 
 of, etc. Plaintiff, 
 
 and 
 
 C.D. & Co., Limited, 
 of, etc. Defendants] 
 
 [or as the case may 'be.'] 
 
 TAKE NOTICE, that C.D. & Co., Limited, of [or Messrs. 
 
 solicitors for C.D. & Co., Limited, of do pay into 
 
 court [when paid by solicitors, add at the request and by the authority 
 
 of the said C.D. & Co., Limited, ], the sum of [state sum in letters] 
 
 , being the sum awarded [or agreed or directed] to be paid by the 
 
 said C.D. & Co., Limited, as compensation in the above-mentioned 
 
 matter. 
 
 Dated this day of 
 
 (Signed) C.D. & Co., Limited, 
 
 by 
 
 Secretary. 
 [Or 
 
 Solicitors for C.D. & Co., Limited.] 
 To the Registrar. 
 Received the above-mentioned sum of 
 
 Registrar. 
 [Date.] 
 
 FORM 53A. (MAY 19, 1909). 
 
 PR^ECIPE FOR PAYMENT INTO COURT UNDER SCHEDULE I., PARAGRAPH 5, 
 AND RULE 56s, WHERE THERE is NO DISPUTE AS TO THE LIABILITY TO 
 PAY COMPENSATION, BUT THE AMOUNT PAYABLE HAS NOT BEEN AS- 
 CERTAINED OR DECIDED BY ARBITRATION OR AGREEMENT. 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 No. of matter. 
 In the matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, 
 
 and 
 In the matter of an injury by accident to A.B. late of , 
 
 which resulted in the death of the said A.B. 
 TAKE NOTICE 
 
 1. That on the day of personal injuryjby accident arising 
 
 out of and in the course of his employment was caused at (state place 
 
 of accident) to A.B. , late of deceased, a workman employed by 
 
 , [or by , a contractor with for the execution of work 
 
 undertaken by them,] and on the day of the death of the said 
 
 A.B. resulted from the injury. 
 
 [Or in case of industrial disease, 
 TAKE NOTICE 
 
 1. That on the day of Mr. the certifying surgeon 
 
 under the Factory and Workshop Act, 1901, for the district of [or 
 
308 APPENDIX B. 
 
 Mr. one of the medical referees appointed by the Secretary of State 
 
 for the purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906,] certified 
 that A.B. of was suffering from , a disease coming 
 
 within section 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, and was 
 thereby disabled from earning full wages at the work at which he was 
 employed ; and on the day of the said A.B. died, his 
 
 death being caused by the said disease.] 
 
 [Or, That on the day of A.B. , of was in pur- 
 
 suance of special rules [or regulations] made under the Factor}^ and Work- 
 shop Act, 1901, suspended from his usual employment on account of his 
 having contracted , a disease coming within section 8 of the Work- 
 
 men's Compensation Act, 1906, and on the day of the said 
 
 A.B. died, his death being caused by the said disease.] 
 
 [Or, That on the day of ' A.B. late died, his 
 
 death being caused by , a disease coming within section 8 of the 
 
 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906 ; 
 
 And that the dependants of the said A.B. allege that the above- 
 
 mentioned disease was due to the nature of the employment of the said 
 A.B. in (describe employment), and that he was last employed 
 
 in such employment within the twelve months previous to his disablement 
 or suspension [or, if the workman died without having obtained a certificate 
 of disablement, or was not at the time of his death in receipt of a weekly payment 
 on account of disablement, within the twelve months previous to his death] 
 by C.D. & Co., Limited, of .] 
 
 2. There is no dispute as to the liability of the said to pay com- 
 pensation under the above-mentioned Act to the dependants of the said 
 A.B. ' in respect of the injury caused to them by the death of the said 
 A.B. , but the amount payable as compensation has not been ascer- 
 tained or decided either by a committee or by arbitration or by agreement. 
 
 3. The said of [or Messrs. , solicitors for the said 
 of ] do therefore pay into court [when paid by solicitors, add 
 
 at the request of the said ] the sum of (state sum in letters) 
 
 being the amount admitted by the said to be payable by them as 
 
 compensation hi the above-mentioned matter. 
 
 4. (a.) The said A.B. was at the date of the accident [or disable- 
 ment or suspension or death] years of age. 
 
 (6) He was employed as , and his earnings in the employment of 
 
 the said during the three years next preceding the injury [or dis- 
 
 ablement or suspension or death] [or his average weekly . earnings during 
 the period of this employment under the said ] were 
 
 5. To the best of the knowledge and belief of the said the persons 
 interested in the said sum as dependants of the said A.B. are 
 
 [State dependants, with their ages and relationship to deceased workman, and 
 places of residence, as far as known.'] 
 
 6. The amount admitted by the said to be payable as compensa- 
 tion has been arrivetl at as follows, viz. : 
 
 Dated this day of 
 
 (Signed) 
 
 [or 
 
 Solicitors for .] 
 
 To the Registrar. 
 
 Received the above-mentioned sum of , subject to inquiry as 
 
 to adequacy. Registrar. 
 
 (Date. 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RULES, 1907-1912. 309 
 
 FORM 53AA. 
 
 NOTICE TO PARTIES WHERE REGISTRAR REFERS THE QUESTION OF 
 ADEQUACY OF AMOUNT PAID INTO COURT UNDER RULE 56s TO THE 
 JUDGE. 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 [Heading as in Prcecipefor Payment into Courts.'] 
 
 TAKE NOTICE, that I have referred the question of the adequacy of the 
 amount paid into Court in this matter to the judge. 
 
 AND FURTHER TAKE NOTICE, that by order of the judge you are hereby 
 summoned to attend before the judge at a Court to be holden at on 
 
 the day of at the hour of in the noon, 
 
 when the matter will be inquired into by the judge ; 
 
 And that if you do not attend either in person or by your solicitor on the 
 day and at the hour above mentioned such order will be made and pro- 
 ceedings taken as the judge may think just and expedient. 
 
 Dated this day of . Registrar. 
 
 To [the employer and the persons appearing by the prcecipe to be interested in 
 the amount paid in.~\ 
 
 FORM 53s. (MAY 19, 1909). 
 NOTICE BY REGISTRAR OF PAYMENT INTO COURT UNDER SCHEDULE I., 
 
 PARAGRAPH 5. 
 
 (i) Where amount payable has been ascertained or decided, and payment 
 into Court is made under Rule 56A. 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 [Heading as in Prcecipefor Payment into Court.'} 
 
 TAKE NOTICE, that the sum of has been paid into Court as com- 
 
 pensation in the above-mentioned matter. 
 
 Any person interested in the said sum may apply to the Court for an 
 order for the investment and application of the said sum for the benefit of 
 the persons entitled thereto in accordance with paragraph 5 of the first 
 schedule to the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, and the rules of Court 
 made under the said Act. 
 
 Dated this day of . Registrar. 
 
 To 
 
 Hours of attendance, &c. 
 
 (ii) Where amount payable has not been ascertained or decided, and payment 
 into Court is made under Rule 56s. 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 [Heading as in Prcecipe for Payment into Court.'] 
 
 TAKE NOTICE, that the sum of has been paid into Court as com- 
 
 pensation in the above-mentioned matter. 
 
310 APPENDIX B. 
 
 If any question arises as to the adequac\~ of the amount paid into Court, 
 such question, and all questions as to who are dependants, and the amount 
 payable to such dependants, must be settled by arbitration in accordance 
 with the above-mentioned Act and the Rules of Court made under the said 
 Act. 
 
 If no question arises as to the adequacy of the amount paid into Court, 
 any person interested in the said sum may apply to the Court for an order 
 for the investment and application of the said sum for the benefit of the 
 persons entitled thereto in accordance with paragraph 5 of the first schedule 
 to the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, and the rules of Court made 
 under the said Act. 
 
 Dated this day of . Registrar. 
 
 To 
 
 Hours of attendance, c. 
 
 FORM 53c. (MAR. 14, 1908). 
 
 APPLICATION FOB INVESTMENT OR APPLICATION OP MONEY PAID INTO 
 COURT UNDER SCHEDULE I., PARAGRAPH 5. 
 
 [Not to be printed, but to be used as a Precedent.] 
 (1) Application for Investment and Application of the Sum paid into Court. 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 [Heading as in Prcecipefor Payment into Court.] 
 
 TAKE NOTICE that I [name and address of applicant] intend to 
 apply to the judge at on the day of , at the hour 
 
 of in the noon, on behalf of myself and of [specify the 
 
 persons on whose behalf the application is made], as dependants of the above- 
 named A.B., for an order for the investment and application of the sum 
 paid into court in the above-mentioned matter, and for the allotment of 
 the same between the dependants of the said A.B. 
 
 To the best of my knowledge and belief the persons interested in the 
 said sum as dependants of the said A.B. are 
 
 [State dependants, with their ages and relationship to deceased u'orkman, and 
 places of residence.] 
 
 I intend to apply for an order for the investment and application of the 
 said sum, and for the allotment of the same between the dependants of 
 the said A.B. as follows, viz. : 
 
 [State how applicant wishes the sum to be dealt with.] 
 
 or in such other manner as the Court in its discretion thinks fit for the 
 benefit of the persons entitled thereto under the above-mentioned Act, 
 and for consequential directions. 
 Dated this day of 
 
 (Signed) 
 
 To the Registrar and (to any other parties 
 interested, where the application is made on behalf 
 offome only of the parties interested). 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RULES, 1907-1912. 311 
 
 (2) Application for Investment and Application of the Amount allotted to 
 
 any Person, 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 [Heading as in Prcecipe for Payment into Court.] 
 
 TAKE NOTICE, that I [name and address of applicant] intend to 
 
 apply to the judge at on the day of at the hour 
 
 of in the noon, on behalf of myself [or of ] for an order 
 
 for the investment and application of the sum paid into court in the above- 
 mentioned matter and allotted to me [or to the said ]. 
 
 I intend to apply for an order for the investment and application of 
 the said sum as follows, viz. : 
 
 [State how applicant wishes the sum to be dealt with] 
 
 or in such other manner as the court in its discretion thinks fit for my 
 benefit [or for the benefit of the said ], and for consequential directions. 
 
 Dated this day of 
 
 To the Registrar. (Signed) 
 
 FORM 53D. (MAR. 31, 1911). 
 
 PILECIPE FOB PAYMENT INTO COURT UNDER SCHEDULE I., PARAGRAPH 5, 
 AND RULE 56c, WHERE LIABILITY TO PAY COMPENSATION is DENIED, 
 BUT THE EMPLOYER is WILLING TO PAY A SUM IN SETTLEMENT. 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 In the matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, 
 
 and 
 
 In the matter of a claim for compensation made by the dependants 
 of A.B. , late of , deceased, against C.D. , of 
 
 TAKE NOTICE 
 
 1. That a claim has been made under the above-mentioned Act by 
 [or on behalf of] the dependants of A.B. , late of deceased, 
 against C.D. , of , for compensation in respect of the injury 
 caused to such dependants by the death of the said A.B. , who died 
 on the day of , 19 . 
 
 2. The said dependants allege that the death of the said A.B. 
 resulted from personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course 
 of his employment caused to the said A.B. on the day of 
 
 at (state place of accident) while he was employed as a workman by 
 
 the said C.D. [or by E.F. , a contractor with the said C.D. 
 
 for the execution of work undertaken by them]. 
 
 [Or, in the case of industrial disease]. 
 
 [2. The said dependants allege that the death of the said A.B. 
 was caused by , a disease coming within Section 8 of the Workmen's 
 
 Compensation Act, 1906, and that the above-mentioned disease was duo 
 to the nature of the employment of the said A.B. in (describe 
 
 employment), and that he was last employed in such employment within 
 the twelve months previous to his disablement [or suspension from his 
 usual employment] [or, if the workman died without having obtained a certi- 
 ficate of disablement, or was not at the time of his death in receipt of a weekly 
 payment on account of disablement, within the twelve months previous to 
 his death] by the said C.D. .] 
 
312 APPENDIX B. 
 
 3. The said C.D. deny their liability to pay compensation under 
 the above-mentioned Act to the dependants of the said A.B. , but to 
 avoid litigation are willing to pay the sum of in full settlement of 
 all claims to such compensation, and such of the dependants of the said 
 A.B. as are not under disability are willing to accept such sum in 
 settlement. 
 
 4. The said C.D. , of [or Messrs. , solicitors for the 
 said C.D. , of ], do therefore pay into court [when paid in by 
 solicitors add at the request of the said C.D. ] the sum of [state 
 sum in letters] being the amount which they are willing to pay in full settle- 
 ment of all claims to compensation in the above-mentioned matter. 
 
 5. (a.) The said A.B. was at the date of the accident [or disable- 
 ment or suspension or death] years of age. 
 
 (6.) He was employed as , and his earnings in the employment of 
 
 the said C.D. during the three years next preceding the injury [or 
 
 disablement or suspension or death] [or his average weekly earnings during the 
 period of his employment under the said C.D. ] were 
 
 (c.) To the best of the knowledge and belief of the said C.D. the 
 
 persons interested as dependants of the said A.B. are [state 
 
 dependants, with, their ages and relationship to deceased, so far as known}. 
 
 6. The grounds on which the said C.D. deny their liability to pay 
 compensation are as follows, viz. : 
 
 Dated this day of 19 . 
 
 (Signed) 
 
 [or 
 
 Solicitors for 
 
 ]. 
 To the Registrar, 
 
 County Court. 
 
 Received the above-mentioned sum of , subject to inquiry as to 
 
 adequacy. 
 
 Registrar. 
 (Date.) 
 
 FORM 54. 
 
 APPLICATION FOR ORDER FOR PAYMENT INTO COURT OF WEEKLY PAYMENT 
 PAYABLE TO PERSON UNDER DISABILITY. SCHEDULE I., PARAGRAPH 7. 
 
 [Not to be printed, but to be used as a Precedent.} 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 [Heading as in Award, Memorandum, or Certificate.'} 
 
 TAKE NOTICE, that I [name and address of applicant] intend to 
 
 apply to the judge at on the day of , at the hour of 
 
 in the noon, for an order that the weekly payment payable in the 
 
 above-mentioned matter to a person under legal disability [or to me] 
 
 be during his [or my] disability paid into court, and for consequential 
 directions. 
 
 Dated this day of . (Signed) 
 
 To the Registrar 
 
 and [to the parties interested]. 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION EULES, 1907-1912. 313 
 
 FORM 55. 
 
 APPLICATION FOR VARIATION OF ORDER UNDER SCHEDULE L, 
 PARAGRAPH 9. 
 
 [Not to be printed, but to be used as a Precedent.] 
 [Heading as in Award, Memorandum or Certificate.] 
 TAKE NOTICE, that I [name and address of applicant] intend to 
 
 apply to the judge at a Court to be holden on the day of , 
 
 at the hour of in the noon, for an order that the order of the 
 
 court [or the award] made in the above-mentioned matter on the 
 day as to the apportionment of the sum paid as compensation among 
 
 the dependants of A.B. deceased [or as to the manner in which the 
 
 sum payable to a dependant of A.B. deceased, should be 
 
 invested, applied or otherwise dealt with] may be varied by directing 
 
 [here state variation claimed by applicant] and for consequential directions. 
 And further take notice that the circumstances in which this application is 
 made are 
 
 [state particulars.] 
 Dated this day of 
 
 (Signed) Applicant. 
 
 [Or Applicant's Solicitor.] 
 
 To the Registrar, 
 
 and to [all persons interested]. 
 
 FORM 55A. (MAR. 31, 1911). 
 
 CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRAR WHERE LUMP SUM PAYABLE IN REDEMPTION 
 OF WEEKLY PAYMENTS TO FRENCH ClTIZEN OR SUM PAYABLE TO DE- 
 PENDANTS OF FRENCH CITIZEN is TO BE TRANSMITTED TO FRANCE. 
 RULES 91, 92. 
 
 In the matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, and the 
 Workmen's Compensation (Anglo-French Convention) Act, 1909. 
 
 No. of matter 
 In the matter of an arbitration between 
 
 A.B. of , Applicant, 
 
 and 
 
 C.D. of , Respondents. 
 
 I hereby certify 
 
 1. That on the day of an award was made by the Judge 
 of this Court in the above-mentioned matter, whereby the above-mentioned 
 C.D. were ordered to pay to the above-mentioned A.B. , a 
 French citizen, the weekly sum of as compensation for personal 
 injury caused to the said A.B. on the day of by accident 
 arising out of and in the course of his employment as a workman employed 
 by the said C.D. 
 
 2. And that on the day of a further a ward' was made by the 
 Judge of this Court in the above-mentioned matter, whereby the above- 
 mentioned C.D. were ordered to pay to the said A.B. the lump 
 sum of in redemption of the said weekly payment : 
 
 3. And that the said A.B. has signified to me his intention of 
 returning to reside in France. 
 
314 APPENDIX B. 
 
 [Or, in case of deceased workman, 
 I hereby certify 
 
 1. That on the day of an award was made by the Judge 
 of this Court hi the above-mentioned matter, whereby the above-mentioned 
 C.D. were ordered to pay to [here insert names of dependants, as 
 appearing in the award] 
 
 the dependants of 
 
 A.B. , late of , deceased, a French citizen, the sum of 
 
 as compensation for the injury resulting to such dependants from the death 
 of the said A.B. which took place on the day of from 
 
 hi jury caused to the said A.B. on the day of by accident 
 
 arising out of and in the course of his employment as a workman employed 
 by the said C.D. 
 
 2. And that the dependants of the said A.B. have signified to me 
 their intention of returning to reside in France [or resided in France at the 
 time of the death of the said A.B. ].] 
 
 I do therefore, pursuant to the Workmen's Compensation (Anglo-French 
 Convention) Act, 1909, and the Order hi Council made thereunder, herewith 
 pa y over to the Caisse Nationale des Retraites pour la Vieillesse the sum of 
 sterling, being the total sum due to the said A.B. [or to the 
 
 dependants of the said A.B. ] under the said award, to be applied in 
 
 accordance with the said Convention. 
 Dated this day of 
 
 Registrar. 
 To the Controller 
 
 Caisse Nationale Fran$aise des Retraites pour la Vieillesse, 
 Paris, France. 
 
 FORM 56A. (MAR, 14, 1908). 
 
 APPLICATION BY WORKMAN INTENDING TO CEASE TO RESIDE IN THE 
 UNITED KINGDOM FOB REFERENCE TO MEDICAL REFEREE UNDER 
 SCHEDULE I., PARAGRAPH 18. 
 
 [Not to be printed, but to be used as a Precedent.] 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 In the matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, 
 
 and 
 
 In the matter of an agreement [or a decision or an award or a certi- 
 ficate] recorded hi the above-mentioned court as to the weekly 
 payment payable to A.B. of by C.D. & Co., Limited, 
 
 of 
 
 TAKE NOTICE, that A.B. of , to whom under an agreement 
 
 [or a decision or an award or a certificate] in the above-mentioned matter 
 recorded in this court on the day of a weekly payment of 
 
 is payable by the above-mentioned C.D. & Co., Limited, as com- 
 
 pensation for personal injury caused to the said A.B. by accident 
 
 arising out of and in the course of his employment, intends to cease to 
 reside in the United Kingdom ; 
 
 And that the said A.B. intends to apply to the registrar at 
 
 on the day of , at the hour of in the noon, 
 
 for'an order referring to a medical referee the question whether the incapacity 
 of the said A.B. resulting from the injury is likely to be of a permanent 
 
 nature. 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION KULES, 1907-1912. 315 
 
 A report of a medical practitioner, setting out the nature of the incapacity 
 of the said A.B. resulting from the injury, is hereto annexed. 
 
 Dated this day of 
 
 (Signed) Applicant. 
 
 [Or Applicant's Solicitor.] 
 
 To the Registrar of the Court 
 and to (the employer). 
 
 FORM 56s. (MAR. 31, 1911). 
 
 APPLICATION BY WORKMAN IN RECEIPT OF WEEKLY PAYMENT, WHO is A 
 FRENCH CITIZEN AND INTENDS TO RETURN TO RESIDE IN FRANCE, FOR 
 REFERENCE TO MEDICAL REFEREE UNDER RULE 93 (4). 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 In the matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, 
 
 and 
 
 In the matter of an award recorded in the above-mentioned Court 
 as to the weekly payment payable to A.B. of by 
 
 C.D. & Co., Limited, of 
 
 TAKE NOTICE, that A.B. of , a French citizen, to whom 
 
 under an award in the above-mentioned matter recorded in this Court on 
 the day of a weekly payment of is payable by the above- 
 
 mentioned C.D. & Co., Limited, as compensation for personal injury 
 
 caused to the said A.B. by accident arising out of and in the course 
 
 of his employment, intends to return to reside in France ; 
 
 And that the said A.B. intends to apply to the registrar at 
 
 on the day of , at the hour of in the noon, 
 
 for a certificate of a medical referee as to the nature of the incapacity of 
 the said A.B. resulting from the injury. 
 
 Dated this day of 
 
 (Signed) Applicant. 
 
 [Or Applicant's Solicitor.] 
 
 To the Registrar of the Court 
 and to (the employer). 
 
 FORM 57A. (MAR. 14, 1908). 
 ORDER OF REFERENCE, SCHEDULE I., PARAGRAPH 18. 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 [Heading as in Application, Form 56A.] 
 
 On the application of of (a copy of which is hereto annexed), 
 
 I hereby appoint Mr. of , one of the medical referees 
 
 appointed by the Secretary of State for the purposes of the Workmen's 
 Compensation Act, 1906, to examine the said (name of workman) , 
 
 and to give his certificate as to whether the incapacity .of the said (name 
 of workman) resulting from the injury is likely to be of a permanent 
 
 nature. 
 
 A copy [or copies] of the report [or reports] of the medical practitioner 
 [or practitioners'] by whom the said has been examined is [or are] 
 
 hereto annexed.] 
 
316 APPENDIX B. 
 
 The said , who is now at , has been directed to submit himself 
 
 for examination by the referee. 
 
 I am satisfied that the said is in a fit condition to travel for the 
 
 purpose of being examined, and he has been directed to attend on the 
 referee for examination at such time and place as may be fixed by 
 the referee. 
 
 [or The said does not appear to be in a fit condition to travel 
 
 for the purpose of being examined.] 
 
 The referee is requested to forward his certificate to the Registrar at 
 the County Court Office situate at on or before the day of 
 
 , specifying therein the nature of the incapacity of the said 
 resulting froin the injury, and whether such incapacity is likely to be of a 
 permanent nature. 
 
 Dated this day of . Judge [or Registrar]. 
 
 FORM 57B (MAR. 31, 1911). 
 ORDER OF REFERENCE, RULE 93 (7). 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 [Heading as in Application, Form 56B.] 
 
 On the application of of (a copy of which is hereto annexed), 
 
 I hereby appoint Mr. of , one of the medical referees 
 
 appointed by the Secretary of State for the purposes of the Workmen's 
 Compensation Act, 1906, to examine the said [name, of workman} , 
 
 and to give his certificate as to the nature of the incapacity of the said [name 
 of workman] resulting from the injury. 
 
 The nature of the injury in respect of which the award was made, so far 
 as it appears on the records of the Court, was as follows 
 
 [state if] 
 
 A copy [or copies] of the report [or reports] of the medical practitioner 
 [or practitioners] by whom the said has been examined is [or are] 
 
 hereto annexed. [Add, if so, Copies of the statements submitted to me by 
 the parties are also hereto annexed.] 
 
 The said , who is now at , has been directed to submit 
 
 himself for examination by the referee. 
 
 I a in satisfied that the said is in a fit condition to travel for the 
 
 purpose of being examined, and he has been directed to attend on the 
 referee for examination at such time and place as may be fixed by the 
 referee. 
 
 [or The said does not appear to be in a fit condition to travel for 
 
 the purpose of being examined.] 
 
 The referee is requested to forward his certificate to the Registrar at 
 the County Court office situate at on or before the day of , 
 
 specifying fully therein the nature of the incapacity (if any) of the said 
 resulting from the injury. 
 
 Dated this day of . Judge [or Registrar]. 
 
I 
 
 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION KCJLES, 1907--1912. 317 
 
 FORM 57c. (MAR. 31, 1911). 
 
 APPLICATION BY FRENCH CITIZEN INTENDING TO RETURN TO RESIDE IN 
 FRANCE TO FIX INTERVALS AT WHICH CERTIFICATES OF CONTINUANCE 
 OF INCAPACITY ARE TO BE FURNISHED BY HIM. RULE 93 (10). 
 
 [Heading as in Form 56s.] 
 
 TAKE NOTICE, that I intend to apply to the registrar at on 
 
 the day of , at the hour of in the noon, for an 
 
 order fixing the intervals at which certificates of the continuance of the 
 incapacity specified in the certificate of the medical referee given in this 
 matter are to be furnished by me on my returning to reside in France. 
 Dated this day of 
 
 (Signed) Applicant. 
 
 To the Registrar of the Court 
 and to (the employer}. 
 
 FORM 57o (MAR. 31, 1911). 
 
 ORDER AS TO INTERVALS AT WHICH CERTIFICATES OF CONTINUANCE OF 
 INCAPACITY ARE TO BE FURNISHED BY FRENCH CITIZEN RESIDING IN 
 FRANCE. RULE 93 (10). 
 
 [Heading as in Form 56s.] 
 
 On the application of 
 
 I order that certificates of the continuance of the incapacity specified in the 
 
 certificate of the medical referee given in this matter are to be furnished by 
 
 the said , who intends to return to reside in France, at intervals of 
 
 months, the first of such certificates to be furnished on the day 
 
 of 
 
 Dated this day of 19 . Registrar. 
 
 To [the applicant and 
 the employer]. 
 
 FORM 58A (MAR. 14, 1908). 
 
 [To be printed on thick blue foolscap.'] 
 
 CERTIFICATE OF IDENTITY. 
 [To BE CAREFULLY PRESERVED.] 
 
 NOTICE. THIS CERTIFICATE is NO SECURITY WHATEVER FOR A DEBT. 
 
 No. of certificate 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 [Heading as in Award, Memorandum, or Certificate.] 
 
 This is to certify that A.B. late of [address and description] is 
 
 entitled to a weekly payment of from [name and address of employer] 
 
 as compensation payable to the said A.B. in respect of personal 
 
 injury caused to him by accident arising out of and in the course of his em- 
 ployment, such weekly payment to continue during the total or partial 
 incapacity of the said A.B. for work : 
 
 And that the description of the said A.B. and his incapacity for 
 
318 APPENDIX B. 
 
 work, as certified by the medical referee appointed in this matter, are as 
 follows : 
 
 Age, 
 
 Height, 
 
 Hair, 
 
 Eyes, 
 
 Nature of Incapacity, 
 [Describe nature of incapacity, as in certificate of medical referee.} 
 
 Dated this day of Registrar. 
 
 FORM 59. 
 
 NOTICE TO BE GIVEN TO WORKMAN INTENDING TO CEASE TO RESIDE IN 
 THE UNITED KINGDOM. 
 
 [Heading a-s in Award, Memorandum, or Certificate. 
 
 TAKE NOTICE, that if you desire to obtain paj-ment of the weekly pay- 
 ments payable to you under the award [memorandum or certificate] hereto 
 annexed while you are residing out of the United Kingdom, you must, at 
 intervals of three months from the date up to which such payments have 
 been made, submit yourself to examination by a medical practitioner in 
 the place where you are residing, and produce to him the copy of the 
 certificate of the medical referee and the certificate of identity hereto 
 annexed ; and you must obtain from such medical practitioner a certificate 
 in the form hereto annexed that he has examined you, and that your 
 incapacity resulting from the injury specified in the certificate of the medical 
 referee continues : and such certificate must be verified by the medical 
 practitioner by declaration in your presence before some such person 
 as hereinafter mentioned. 
 
 You must also attend before some such person as hereinafter mentioned, 
 and make a declaration in the form hereto annexed that you are the same 
 person as mentioned in the copy of the certificate of the medical referee 
 and in the certificate of identity hereto annexed, and in the certificate of 
 the medical practitioner by whom you have been examined, producing to 
 such person the copy and certificates above mentioned. 
 
 You must then transmit to me, at my office, situate at the certificate 
 
 of the medical practitioner by whom you have been examined, and your 
 declaration, together with a request for transmission to you of the amount 
 of the weekly payment due to you, specifying the place where and the 
 manner in which the amount is to be transmitted, according to the form 
 hereto annexed, which request must be signed in your own handwriting. 
 
 The persons before whom a certificate may be verified or a declaration 
 made are : 
 
 1. Amy person having authority to administer an oath in the place in 
 which you reside. 
 
 2. Any British ambassador, envoy, minister, charge d'affaires, or 
 ecretary of embassy or legation, exercising his functions in any foreign 
 
 place in which you reside, or any British consul-general, consul, vice- 
 consul, acting-consul, pro-consul, or consular agent exercising his functions 
 in any foreign place in which you reside. 
 
 Dated this clay of . Registrar. 
 
 To A.B. 
 
 of [address and description]. 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION KULES, 1907-1912. 319 
 FORM 59A. (MAE. 31, 1911). 
 
 PARAGRAPH TO BE ADDED TO FORM 59. RULE 00A (5). 
 
 In the event of your death while residing out of the United Kingdom, 
 your representatives must, in order to obtain payment of the arrears due to 
 you, transmit to me at my office, situate at , a certificate of your death, 
 
 and documents showing that they are entitled to such arrears, verified by 
 declaration before a person having authority to administer an oath, with 
 a request for transmission to them of the amount of such arrears, specifying 
 the place where and the manner in which such amount is to be transmitted 
 to them. 
 
 The expression " your representatives " means 
 (a) if you leave a will, the executors of such will ; or 
 (6) if you die intestate, the persons who are according to law entitled 
 to your personal estate ; and payment of the arrears may be 
 made to such persons without the production of letters of admini- 
 stration. 
 
 FORM 59s. (MAR. 31, 1911). 
 
 NOTICE TO BE GIVEN TO WORKMAN WHO IS A FRENCH ClTIZEN AND INTENDS 
 TO RETURN TO RESIDE IN FRANCE. RULE 93 (11). 
 
 [Heading as in Award.] 
 
 TAKE NOTICE, that if you desire to have the weekly payments payable 
 to you under the award hereto annexed remitted to you while you are 
 residing in France, you must at intervals of three months from the date up 
 to which such payments have been made produce to the Mayor of the Com- 
 mune in which you reside the certificate of identity hereto annexed, and 
 obtain from him a certificate that you were alive on the day when the 
 certificate of identity was produced. You must also at intervals of * 
 months from the date up to which such payments have been made obtain 
 from a medical practitioner employed in an official capacity in the Depart- 
 ment in which you reside a certificate that he has examined you, and that 
 your incapacity resulting from the injury, as specified in the certificate of 
 the medical referee hereto annexed, still continues. 
 
 You must then forward the certificate of the Mayor, and, where a certi- 
 ficate of a medical practitioner is required, such certificate (which certificate 
 or certificates must be authenticated by a ms of the Prefecture of the De- 
 partment attesting the official status of the Mayor and medical practitioner 
 respectively), with a request for payment of the weekly payments due to 
 you, to the French consular authority for the district in which the Court 
 is situated, to be by him transmitted to me. 
 
 In the event of your death while in the receipt of weekly payments, your 
 representatives must, in order to obtain payment of the arrears due to you, 
 forward a certificate of your death and documents showing that they are 
 entitled to such arrears, with a request for payment of such arrears, to the 
 consular authority, to be by him transmitted to me. 
 
 Dated this day of . Registrar. 
 
 To A.B. 
 
 [Address and description'.'] 
 
 * As fixed by the Registrar. 
 
320 APPENDIX ];. 
 
 FORM 60. 
 
 FOEM OF MEDICAL CERTIFICATE TO BE OBTAINED BY WORKMAN RESIDING 
 our OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. 
 
 [Heading as in Award, Memorandum, or Certificate.] 
 
 I [name, address, and medical qualification of medical practitioner] 
 hereby certify that I have this day examined A.B. of , whom 
 
 I conscientiously believe to be the same person as A.B. of , 
 
 described hi the copy certificate of the medical referee in the above-men- 
 tioned matter, dated the day of , and in the certificate of 
 identity dated the day of produced to me by the said A.B. 
 
 ; and that in my opinion the incapacity of the said A.B. 
 resulting from the injury described in the said certificate of the medical 
 referee still continues. 
 
 Dated this day of . (Signature). 
 
 Declared at this day of , in the presence of the said 
 
 A.B. , the copy of the certificate of the medical referee and the cer 
 
 tificate of identity above mentioned being at the same time produced, 
 Before me 
 
 [Signature and description of person before whom 
 the declaration is made.] 
 
 FORM 61. 
 
 DECLARATION OF IDENTITY BY WORKMAN RESIDING our OF 
 THE UNITED KINGDOM. 
 
 [Heading as in Award, Memorandum, or Certificate.] 
 
 I, A'B. of hereby declare that I am the same person as 
 
 A.B. of described in the copy of the certificate of the medical 
 
 referee in the above-mentioned matter, dated the day of , now 
 
 produced by me, and in the certificate of identity, dated the day 
 
 of , now produced by me, and the same person as A.B. of 
 
 described in the certificate of declared by the said in 
 
 my presence on the day of , and now produced by me. 
 
 (Signed) 
 
 A.B. 
 
 Declared at this day of , the certificates above 
 
 mentioned being at the same time produced, 
 Before me 
 
 [Signature and description of person before 
 wliom the declaration is made.] 
 
 FORM 62. 
 
 REQUEST FOR TRANSMISSION OF AMOUNT OF WEEKLY PAYMENTS BY 
 WORKMAN RESIDING OUT OF UNITED KINGDOM. 
 
 [Heading as in Award, Memorandum, or Certificate.'] 
 
 Sir, 
 
 I herewith enclose medical certificate and affidavit of identity, and 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BULKS, 1907-1912. 321 
 
 request that the amount of the weekly payments due to me in the above- 
 mentioned matter may be transmitted to me at 
 
 [give full address] 
 
 [state how transmission to be made,*as] 
 by Post Office order payable at 
 
 [name of post office'} 
 or by bankers' draft on the 
 
 [name and address of bank]. 
 
 I am, Sir, 
 
 Your obedient Servant, 
 
 A.B. 
 
 [To be signed by the workman in his own handwriting.] 
 To the Registrar of the County Court of holden at 
 
 [add address of registrar's office.] 
 
 FORM 63. 
 
 
 
 NOTICE BY REGISTRAR TO EMPLOYER OF RECEIPT OF MEDICAL CERTIFICATE 
 AND DECLARATION OF IDENTITY. 
 
 [Heading as in Award, Memorandum, or Certificate.] 
 
 TAKE NOTICE, that I have received proof of identity and of continuance 
 of incapacity in the above-mentioned matter.. 
 
 And I have to request you to transmit the sum of , being the 
 
 amount of weekly payments payable to A.B. under the above- 
 
 mentioned award [memorandum or certificate] from [the date to which 
 they were last paid ] to [13 weeks from that date] to me, to be 
 
 by me remitted to the said A.B. 
 
 Dated this day of . Registrar. 
 
 To [name and address of employer]. 
 
 FORM 64. 
 
 NOTICE OF APPLICATION FOR DETERMINATION OF AMOUNT OF COSTS 
 UNDER SCHEDULE II., PARAGRAPH 14. 
 
 [Not to be printed, but to be used as a Precedent.] 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 [Heading as in Award or Memorandum.] 
 
 TAKE NOTICE, that I intend to apply to the judge at on the 
 
 day of at the hour of o'clock in the noon, to determine 
 
 the amount of costs to be paid to me as solicitor [or agent] for you A.B. 
 
 in the above-mentioned matter ; and for an order declaring 
 
 that I am entitled to a lien for such amount on or to deduct such amount 
 
 from the sum awarded as compensation to you the said A.B. in the 
 
 above-mentioned matter, and for consequential directions. 
 
 Dated this day of . Applicant. 
 
 To the Registrar of the Court, 
 and to 
 A.B. of 
 
 W.C.A. Y 
 
322 APPENDIX B. 
 
 FORM 65. 
 EXECUTION ON AWARD OR MEMORANDUM OR CERTIFICATE. 
 
 In the County Court of , holden at 
 
 [Heading as in Award, Memorandum, or Certificate.] 
 
 Whereas on the day of an award was made in the above- 
 
 mentioned matter by the judge [or by Mr. , an arbitrator appointed 
 
 by the judge] whereby it was ordered [state operative parts of award] : 
 [or Whereas on the day of a memorandum was recorded in 
 
 this Court of an agreement [or a decision or an award] come to [or given or 
 made] in the above-mentioned matter, whereby it was agreed [or ordered] 
 [state operative parts of agreement, decision or award] : 
 
 [or Whereas on the day of a memorandum was recorded in 
 
 this Court of a certificate given by the County Court of , holden 
 
 at to the effect that [state operative parts of certificate] : 
 
 And whereas default has been made in payment of the sum of 
 payable by the said into Court [or to the said A.B. ] 
 
 according to the said award [or memorandum or certificate] ; 
 
 These are therefore to require and order you forthwith to make and levy 
 by distress and sale of the goods and chattels of [name the party 
 
 against whose goods execution is issued], wheresoever they may be found 
 within the district of this Court (except the wearing apparel and bedding 
 of him or his family, and the tools and implements of his trade, if any, to the 
 value of five pounds), the sum stated at the foot of this warrant, being the 
 amount due under the said award [or memorandum or certificate], together 
 with the costs of this execution ; and also to seize and take any money or 
 bank notes (whether of the Bank of England or any other bank), and any 
 cheques, bills of exchange, promissory notes, bonds, specialities or securi- 
 ties for money of the said which may there be found, or such part or 
 so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy this execution, and the 
 costs of making and executing the same, and to pay what you shall have 
 so levied to the Registrar of this Court, and to make return of what you 
 have done under this warrant immediately upon the execution thereof. 
 Given under the seal of the Court this day of 19 . 
 
 By the Court, 
 
 Registrar. 
 
 To the High Bailiff of the said Court, 
 and others the Bailiffs thereof. 
 
 s. d. 
 Amount in payment whereof default has been made - 
 
 Poundage for issuing this warrant - - - - 
 
 Total amount to be levied [with fees for execution of 
 
 warrant, as endorsed hereon.] 
 
 NOTICE. The goods and chattels are not to be sold until after the end of 
 five days next following the day on which they were seized, unless they 
 be of a perishable nature, or at the request of the said 
 
 Application was made to the Registrar for this warrant at minutes 
 
 past the hour of in the noon of the day of 19 . 
 
 SEE BACK. 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RULES, 1907-1912. 323 
 
 [To be endorsed on every warrant of execution.] 
 
 51 & 52 Viet. c. 43, s. 155 ; Order XXV., Rule 17. 
 
 FEES FOR THE EXECUTION OF THIS WARRANT. 
 
 The fees for keeping possession of the goods seized (including expenses 
 of removal, storage of goods, and all other expenses) is SIXPENCE IN THE 
 
 POUND PER DAY NOT EXCEEDING SEVEN DAYS ON THE VALUE OF SUCH 
 
 GOODS, to be fixed by appraisement in case of dispute, so that the total 
 fee does not exceed 105. per day although the value may exceed 20, and, 
 in addition, for feeding animals, the actual cost thereof. 
 
 If the debtor pays the amount to be levied, as stated on the other side, 
 within half an hour of the entry of the bailiff, he will not be required to 
 pay to him any further sum. 
 
 If possession is kept after the seventh day at the written request of both 
 parties, the fees and cost of keeping possession as above may be allowed 
 for a reasonable further time in respect of such possession. 
 
 If the goods are removed, the debtor will have to pay the appraisement 
 fee as undermentioned. 
 
 If the goods are sold, the following fees are chargeable for the appraise- 
 ment and sale, and no others : 
 
 For the appraisement, SIXPENCE IN THE POUND on the value of the 
 
 goods appraised, over and above the stamp duty. 
 For the sale, including advertisements, catalogues, sale and com- 
 mission, and delivery of the goods, ONE SHILLING IN THE POUND 
 
 ON THE NET PRODUCE OF THE SALE. 
 
 For advertising and giving publicity to any sale by auction, pursuant 
 to section 145 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, in addition to the last- 
 mentioned fee, the sum actually and necessarily paid. 
 
 Where no sale takes place by reason of the execution being withdrawn, 
 satisfied, or stopped, there may be allowed all charges actually and neces- 
 sarily incurred for inventory, appraisement, cataloguing, lotting, and 
 preparing for sale, not exceeding ONE SHILLING IN THE POUND on the value 
 of the goods seized, if such value does not exceed ten pounds, and EIGHT- 
 PENCE IN THE POUND on any excess above ten pounds, the value to be 
 fixed by appraisement in case of dispute, and in addition any sum actually 
 and necessarily paid for advertising pursuant to section 145 of the Bank- 
 ruptcy Act, 1883. 
 
 If the goods are removed, the bailiff is required to give the debtor a 
 sufficient inventory of the goods so removed, and to give him notice of the 
 time when and the place where such goods will be sold, at least twenty-four 
 hours before the time fixed for the sale. ' 
 
 If the goods are sold, the bailiff is required to furnish the debtor, on 
 request, with a detailed account in writing of the sale, and of the applica- 
 tion of the proceeds thereof. 
 
 [This form to be adapted to the circumstances of the case where execution 
 is ordered to issue under Rule 66, paragraph (e), for costs.] 
 
324 APPENDIX B. 
 
 FORM 66. 
 
 JUDGMENT SUMMONS ON AWARD, MEMORANDUM, OR 
 CERTIFICATE. 
 
 In the County Court of , holden at 
 
 [Heading as in Award, Memorandum, or Certificate.] 
 
 Whereas on the day of an award was made in the above- 
 
 mentioned matter by the judge [or by Mr. , an arbitrator appointed 
 
 by the judge], whereby it was ordered [state operative parts of award} : 
 [or Whereas on the day of a memorandum was recorded in this 
 
 Court of an agreement [or a decision or an award] come to [or given or 
 made] in the above-mentioned matter whereby it was agreed [or ordered] 
 [state operative parts of agreement, decision, or award] : 
 
 [or W T hereas on the day of a memorandum was recorded in this 
 
 Court of a certificate given by the County Court of holden at to 
 
 the effect that [state operative parts of certificate'] : 
 
 And whereas default has been made in payment of the sum of 
 payable by you the above-named into Court [or to the said A.B. ] 
 
 according to the said award [or memorandum or certificate] : 
 
 You the said are therefore hereby summoned to appear personally 
 
 in this Court at [place where court holden] on the day of 
 
 19 , at the hour of in the noon, to be examined on oath by 
 
 the Court touching the means you have or have had since the date of the 
 award [or memorandum or certificate] to pay the said sum, in payment of 
 which you have made default ; and also to show cause why you should not 
 be committed to prison for such default, or why a receiving order should 
 not be made against you pursuant to sub-section 5 of section 103 of the 
 Bankruptcy Act, 18831! 
 
 Dated this day of , 19 . 
 
 Registrar. 
 
 To [name and address of the party against whom the summons is issued]. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 Amount in payment of which default has been made - 
 Costs of this summons ______ 
 
 Total sum due 
 
 NOTE. This form to be adapted to the circumstances of the case where 
 a summons is issued under the County Court Rules, Order XXV., Rule 27, 
 against a person alleged to be a partner in or sole member of a firm, or to be 
 carrying on business in any name other than his own ; see Form 184 in the 
 Appendix to the County Court Rules. If an order of commitment is made 
 it should be according to Form 189 or Form 191 in the said Appendix, such 
 form being adapted to the case of default in payment of an amount due under 
 an award, memorandum, or certificate. 
 
 FORM 67. 
 REGISTER. 
 
REGULATIONS MEDICAL REFEKEES. 325 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 REGULATIONS, DATED JUNE 24, 1907, MADE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE 
 AND THE TREASURY AS TO THE DUTIES AND REMUNERATION OF MEDICAL 
 REFEREES IN ENGLAND AND WALES UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE 
 FIRST AND SECOND SCHEDULES TO THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 
 ACT, 1906. 
 
 Part I. Definitions and General Regulations. 
 
 \. In these regulations 
 
 (i.) " Medical Referee " means a medical practitioner appointed by 
 the Secretary of State to act as medical referee for the purposes 
 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 (ii.) " Reference " means 
 
 (a) in regulations in Part II., the appointment of a medical 
 referee by the registrar of a county court, to give a certificate, 
 in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (15) of the first 
 schedule to the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, as to the 
 condition of the workman and his fitness for employment or as 
 to whether or to what extent the incapacity of the workman 
 is due to the accident. 
 
 (6) in regulations in Part III., the appointment of a medical 
 referee by the registrar of a county court to give a certificate, 
 in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (18) of the first 
 schedule to the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, as to 
 whether the incapacity resulting from the injury is likely to 
 be of a permanent nature. 
 
 (c) in regulations in Part V., the appointment of a medical 
 referee by a committee, arbitrator or judge to report on any 
 matter material to any question arising in an arbitration under 
 the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
 (iii.) " Committee " means a committee representative of an employer 
 and his workmen, with power to settle matters under the Work- 
 men's Compensation Act, 1906, in the case of the employer and 
 worknten. 
 
 (iv.) " Agreed Arbitrator " means a single arbitrator agreed on by the 
 parties to settle any matter which under the Workmen's Com- 
 pensation Act, 1906, is to be settled by arbitration, 
 (v.) " Appointed Arbitrator " means a single arbitrator appointed by 
 
 the judge. 
 
 (vi.) " Judge " means county court judge. 
 
 (vii.) The words "district in which the case arises " mean the county 
 court district in which all the parties concerned reside, or, if 
 they reside in different districts, the district prescribed by 
 rules of court, subject to any transfer made under those rules. 
 2. In the case of any reference under these regulations, the medical 
 referee, in the absence of special circumstances, shall be one of those ap- 
 pointed by the Secretary of State for the county court circuit which includes 
 the district in which the case arises, and shall, if the circuit has been sub- 
 divided, and medical referees have been appointed for the sub-divisions, 
 be one appointed for the sub-division which comprises the aforesaid district. 
 
326 APPENDIX C. 
 
 Provided that, where there has been a previous reference in any case, any 
 subsequent reference in the same case shall, if possible, be made to the same 
 referee and be accompanied by the previous report or certificate, or copy 
 thereof, of the medical referee. 
 
 3. The medical referee shall not accept any reference under these regu- 
 lations unless signed or countersigned by the registrar of a county court 
 and sealed with the seal of the county court. 
 
 4. Forms I, J, K, and L. The medical referee shall send to the Home 
 Office at the end of each quarter statements, in the forms prescribed in the 
 schedule to these regulations, of the fees due to him for the quarter under 
 these regulations. 
 
 5. In cases where a claim is made under the regulations in respect of 
 travelling expenses, the medical referee, in submitting his quarterly state- 
 ments under regulation 4, shall certify the distance of the place to which 
 he was required to travel from his residence or other prescribed centre. 
 
 6. In cases involving special difficulty the medical referee may apply 
 to the Secretary of State for special expert assistance which may be granted 
 by the Secretary of State, if he thinks fit, on such terms as to remuneration 
 or otherwise as 'he may with the sanction of the Treasury determine. 
 
 7. Form M. The registrar of every county court shall keep a record, 
 in the form prescribed in the schedule, of all references made under these 
 regulations, and of all cases in which a medical referee is summoned to sit 
 as assessor, and shall send a copy thereof to the Secretary of State at the 
 end of each quarter. 
 
 8. These regulations shall come into force on the 1st day of July, 1907, 
 and shall apply to England and Wales. 
 
 Note. The Forms I, J, K, L, and M were altered by a Regulation 
 dated May 10, 1910. 
 
 Part II. Regulations as to References under Schedule I., paragraph (15). 
 
 9. Forms A and B. The medical referee shall, on receipt of a reference 
 duly signed and sealed, fix a time and place for the examination of the work- 
 man, and shall send notice accordingly to both the parties signing the appli- 
 cation on which the reference is made. 
 
 10. Before giving the certificate required by the reference, the medical 
 referee shall personally examine the workman and shall consider any state- 
 ments that may be made or submitted by either party. 
 
 11. Form C. The certificate given by the medical referee shall be 
 according to the form prescribed in the schedule to these regulations. 
 
 12. The medical referee shall forward his certificate to the registrar from 
 whom he received the reference. 
 
 13. The following shall be the scale of fees to be paid to medical referees 
 in respect of references under this part of the regulations : 
 
 (i.) For a first reference (to include all the duties per- 
 formed in connection therewith) ... ... 2 guineas. 
 
 (ii.) For a second or subsequent reference to the same 
 
 medical referee in the same case ... ... 1 guinea. 
 
 (iii.) Where hi order to examine the injured workman the medical 
 referee is compelled to travel to a place distant more than two 
 miles from his residence or such other centre as may be prescribed 
 by the Secretary of State, in addition to the above fees 5s. for 
 each mile beyond two, and up to ten, miles distant from such 
 residence or centre, and thereafter Is. for each mile distant 
 therefrom. 
 
KEGULATIONS MEDICAL EEFEREES. 327 
 
 Part III. Regulations as to References under Schedule I., paragraph (18). 
 
 14. Form D. The medical referee shall, on receipt of a reference duly 
 signed and sealed, fix a time and place for the examination of the workman, 
 and shall send notice accordingly to the workman. 
 
 15. Before giving the certificate required by the reference the medical 
 referee shall make a personal examination of the workman. 
 
 16. Form E. The certificate given by the meiiical referee shall be 
 according to the form prescribed in the schedule to these regulations. 
 
 17. The medical referee shall fonvard his certificate to the registrar 
 from whom he received the reference. 
 
 18. The fee to be paid to a medical referee in respect of a reference 
 (to include all the duties performed in connection therewith) under this part 
 of these regulations shall be one guinea. 
 
 Part IV. Regulation as to Remuneration of Medical Referee for sitting as 
 Assessor under Schedule II., paragraph (5). 
 
 19. Where a medical referee attends on the summons of the judge for 
 the purpose of sitting with the judge as an assessor, as provided for in para- 
 graph (5) of the second schedule to the Workmen's Compensation Act, 
 1906, he shall be entitled for such attendance (to include his services as 
 assessor) to a fee of 3 guineas, and where in order so to attend on the judge, 
 he is compelled to travel to a place distant more than two miles from his 
 residence or such other centre as may be prescribed by the Secretary of 
 State, he shall be entitled, in addition to the above fee, to 5s. for each mile 
 beyond two, and up to ten, miles distant from such residence or centre, 
 and thereafter to Is. for each mile distant therefrom. 
 
 Part V. Regulations as to References under Schedule II., paragraph (15). 
 Conditions of Reference. 
 
 20. Before making any reference, the committee, arbitrator, or judge 
 shall be satisfied, after hearing all medical evidence tendered by either side, 
 that such evidence is either conflicting or insufficient on some matter which 
 seems material to a question arising in the arbitration, and that it is desirable 
 to obtain a report from a medical referee on such matter. 
 
 Form and Mode of Reference. 
 
 21. Form F. Every reference shall be made in writing and shall state 
 the matter on which the report of the medical referee is required, and the 
 question arising in the arbitration to which such matter seems to be material. 
 Such reference shall be in accordance with the form prescribed in the schedule 
 to these regulations, or as -near thereto as may be. 
 
 The reference shall be accompanied by a general statement of the medical 
 evidence given on behalf of the parties ; and if such evidence has been given 
 before a committee or an agreed arbitrator, each medical witness shall sign 
 the statement of his evidence, and may add any necessary explanation or 
 correction. 
 
 22. Form G. On making the reference to the medical referee, the 
 committee, arbitrator or judge shall make an order in the form prescribed 
 in the schedule, directing the injured workman to submit himself for examina- 
 tion by the medical referee. Before making such order they shall inquire 
 whether he is in a fit condition to travel for the purpose of examination, 
 and if satisfied that he is in a fit condition, they shall by the same order 
 direct him to attend at such time and place as the referee may fix. 
 
APPENDIX C. 
 
 It shall be the duty of the injured workman to obey any such order. 
 If the committee, arbitrator or judge is satisfied that the workman is 
 not in a fit condition to travel, they shall so state in the reference. 
 
 23. The reference shall be signed, if made by a committee, \>y the chair- 
 man and secretary of the committee ; if made by an agreed arbitrator, by 
 the arbitrator ; if made by a judge or an appointed arbitrator, by the judge 
 or arbitrator, or by th^e registrar of the county court in which the arbitration 
 is pending. 
 
 24. A committee or an agreed arbitrator, making a reference, shall, 
 without naming a medical referee, address the reference in general terms 
 to " one of the medical referees appointed by the Secretary of State for the 
 purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906," and shall forward 
 it to the registrar of the county court of the district in which the case arises. 
 
 Duties of Registrar. 
 
 25. (1.) In the case of a reference by a committee or agreed arbitrator, 
 the registrar on receiving the reference 
 
 (a) Shall see that the reference is in accordance with these regulations, 
 
 and if it is not, shall return it for amendment ; 
 
 (6) Shall insert the name of the medical referee proper to be appointed ; 
 (c) Shall, when the reference is in accordance with these regulations, 
 countersign and seal it, and forward it forthwith to the medical 
 referee. 
 
 (2) In the case of a reference by a judge or an appointed arbitrator, 
 the registrar of the court in which the arbitration is pending shall sign (or 
 countersign) and seal it, and forward it forthwith to the medical referee. 
 
 26. The registrar, on receiving a report from a medical referee under 
 Regulation 28, shall forthwith file a copy at the court and transmit the report 
 to the committee, arbitrator, or judge by whom the reference was made. 
 
 If the committee, arbitrator, or judge shall direct that the parties be 
 at liberty to inspect the report, the registrar shall on receiving notice of such 
 direction permit such inspection to be made during office hours, and shall 
 on the application and at the cost of any party furnish him with a copy of 
 the report or allow him to take a copy thereof. 
 
 Report of Medical Referee. 
 
 27. Form H. The medical referee shall, on receipt of a reference duly 
 signed and sealed, appoint a time and a place for the examination of the 
 workman, and shall send him notice accordingly. 
 
 28. The medical referee shall give his report in writing, and shall forward 
 it to the registrar from whom he received the reference. 
 
 29. The committee, arbitrator, or judge may, by request signed and 
 forwarded in the same manner as the reference, remit the report to the 
 medical referee for a further statement on any matter not covered by the 
 original reference. 
 
 Fees. 
 
 30. The following shall be the scale of fees to be paid to the medical 
 referees in respect of references under this part of the regulations : 
 
 (i.) For a first reference, to include examination of the 
 
 injured workman and written report ... ... 2 guineas. 
 
 (ii.) For a further statement under regulation 29 on any 
 
 matter not covered by the original reference ... 1 guinea. 
 
REGULATIONS MEDICAL KEFEKEES. 329 
 
 (iii.) For a second or subsequent reference to the same 
 referee in a further arbitration on the same case, 
 to include examination, if necessary, and written 
 report 1 guinea. 
 
 (iv.) Where in order to examine the injured workman the medical 
 referee is compelled to travel to a place distant more than two 
 miles from his residence or such other centre as may be prescribed 
 by the Secretary of State, in addition to the above fees 5s. for 
 each mile beyond two, and up to ten, miles distant from such 
 residence or centre, and thereafter Is. for each mile distant 
 therefrom. 
 
 SCHEDULE. 
 FORM A. 
 
 NOTICE BY MEDICAL REFEREE TO EMPLOYER OR SOLICITOR SIGNING THE 
 APPLICATION ON EMPLOYER'S BEHALF (SCHEDULE I. (15)). 
 
 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 To 
 
 I hereby give you notice that in accordance with the Reference made to 
 me by the Registrar of the County Court of holden at , 
 
 under Schedule I., paragraph 15, of the above-named Act, in the case of 
 
 [name and address of workman] I propose to examine the 
 said at on the day of 
 
 at o'clock. 
 
 Any statements made or submitted by you [or, if notice is addressed to the 
 solicitor, by the employer], will be considered. 
 
 Dated this day of . (Signed) Medical Referee. 
 
 FORM B. 
 
 NOTICE BY MEDICAL REFEREE TO WORKMAN OR SOLICITOR SIGNING THE 
 APPLICATION ON WORKMAN'S BEHALF (SCHEDULE I. (15)). 
 
 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 To 
 
 I hereby give you notice that in accordance with the Reference made to 
 me in your case [or, if notice is addressed to the solicitor], in the case of 
 
 [name and address of workman], by the Registrar of the County 
 Court of holden at , under 
 
 Schedule I., paragraph (15), of the above-named Act, I propose to examine 
 you [or the said ] at on the day of 
 
 at o'clock. 
 
 And you are required to submit yourself [or the said is required 
 
 to submit himself] for examination accordingly. 
 
 Any statements made or submitted by you [or, if notice 'is addressed to the 
 solicitor, by the workman] will be considered. 
 
 Dated this day of . (Signed) Medical Referee. 
 
330 APPENDIX C. 
 
 FORM C. 
 
 CERTIFICATE OF MEDICAL REFEREE AS TO CONDITION OP WORKMAN AND 
 FITNESS FOR EMPLOYMENT, OR AS TO WHETHER OR TO WHAT EXTENT 
 INCAPACITY OF WORKMAN IS DUE TO THE ACCIDENT (SCHEDULE I. (15)). 
 
 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
 In accordance with the Reference made to me by the Registrar of the 
 County Court of holden at upon the application 
 
 of [names and addresses of parties] I have on the day 
 
 of examined the said [name of ivorkman] and I 
 
 hereby certify as follows : 
 
 1. The said is* 
 
 and his condition is such that he isf 
 
 2. The incapacity of the said ist 
 
 NOTE. Either paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 to be filled up, or both to be filled 
 up, according to the terms of the Reference. 
 
 Dated this day of . (Signed) Medical Referee. 
 
 * Describe state of health. 
 
 t State whether workman is fit for his ordinary or other work, specifying where necessary 
 the kind of work, or whether he is unfit for work of any kind. 
 
 { State whether or to what extent the incapacity is due to the accident (or, in cases coming 
 u-ithin section 8 of the Act, to the disease). 
 
 FORM D. 
 
 NOTICE BY MEDICAL REFEREE TO WORKMAN (SCHEDULE I. (18)). 
 
 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 To 
 
 I hereb}' give you notice that in accordance with the Reference made to 
 me in your case by the Registrar of the County Court of holden 
 
 at under Schedule L, paragraph (18), of the above-named 
 
 Act, I propose to examine you at on the day 
 
 of at o'clock, and you are required to submit yourself 
 
 for examination accordingly. 
 
 Dated this day of . (Signed) Medical Referee. 
 
 FORM E. 
 
 CERTIFICATE OF MEDICAL REFEREE (SCHEDULE I. (18)). 
 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
 In accordance with the Reference made to me by the Registrar of the 
 County Court of holden at 
 
 unde/Schedule I., paragraph (18), of the above-named Act, I have on 
 the day of examined 
 
 of [name and address of 
 
 ivorkman] and I hereby certify that his incapacity is [or is not] likely to be 
 of a permanent nature. 
 
 Dated this ^ ^ day of . (Signed) Medical Referee. 
 
As the 
 
 case 
 may be. 
 
 REGULATIONS MEDICAL KEFEKEES. 331 
 
 FORM F. 
 REFERENCE TO A MEDICAL REFEREE (SCHEDULE II. (15)). 
 
 In the matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, 
 
 and 
 
 In the matter of an Arbitration between 
 A.B. 
 
 (address) (description) Applicant, 
 
 and 
 C.D. 
 
 (address) (description) Respondent, 
 
 (a) We, a committee representative of and his 
 
 workmen, and empowered to arbitrate in the matter 
 arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act between 
 A.B. and C.D. ; 
 
 (6) I, , an arbitrator agreed upon by A.B. and C.D. to 
 
 arbitrate in the matter arising between them under the 
 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906 ; 
 
 (c) I, , Judge of County Courts ; 
 
 (d) I, , arbitrator appointed by a Judge of County 
 \ Courts, 
 
 having heard the evidence tendered by both parties, hereby certify that in our 
 [or my] opinion the medical evidence given before us [or me] is conflicting 
 [or insufficient]. on a matter which seems to us [or me] to be material to a 
 question arising in the above-mentioned arbitration, and that it is desirable 
 to obtain a report from a medical referee on such matter, as follows : 
 
 (A) On the day of personal injury was [or is alleged to have 
 
 been] caused to* by accident arising out of and in the course of his 
 
 employment, under the following circumstances : f 
 
 Or, in a case of industrial disease to which the Act applies 
 
 (A) On the day of the said* was, under section 8 of 
 the above-named Act, certified to be disabled by, or suspended from his 
 usual employment on account of his having contracted a disease to which 
 the said section applies, namely,^ 
 
 (B) The matter on which we are [or I am] satisfied that it is desirable 
 to obtain a report is 
 
 (c) Such matter seems to be material to the following question arising 
 in the arbitration, viz. : 
 
 We [or I] therefore appoint one of the medical referees appointed 
 
 by the Secretary of State for the purposes of the Workmen's Compensation 
 Act, 1906, to examine the said on the matter specified above, and 
 
 report to us [or me]. 
 
 A statement of the medical evidence given before us [or me] is appended. 
 
 We are [or I am] satisfied that the said who is now at , is 
 
 in a fit condition to travel for the purpose of being examined, and he has 
 been directed to attend on the referee for examination at such time and 
 place as shall be fixed by the referee ; or does not appear to be in a fit 
 condition to travel for the purpose of being examined. . 
 
 * Insert name of injured workman. 
 
 f Here state the facts of the accident as ascertained from the evidence. 
 J Name disease. 
 
 $ The name must, if the reference is made by a committee or agreed arbitrator, be left 
 in blank to be inserted by the Registrar. 
 
332 APPENDIX C. 
 
 The referee is requested to forward his report to 
 The Registrar, 
 
 County Court Office, 
 on or before the day of 
 
 Dated this day of 
 
 (Signed)** 
 or On behalf of the Committee 
 
 Chairman } t n 
 Secretary } of Committee. 
 
 Signature of Registrar and 
 
 Seal of Court. 
 
 A previous reference was made to a medical referee in this case on the 
 ,19 , and a copy of the report then given is attached. , 
 
 ** For signature of judge or arbitrator. 
 
 FORM G. 
 
 ORDER ON INJURED WORKMAN TO SUBMIT HIMSELF FOR EXAMINATION BY 
 MEDICAL REFEREE. 
 
 (Title as in reference.) 
 
 To (address) 
 
 of (description) 
 
 TAKE NOTICE 
 
 That the Committee [or arbitrator, or judge] have [or has] appointed 
 one of the medical referees under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 
 1906, to examine you for the purposes of the above-mentioned arbitra- 
 tion, and to report to them [or him]. 
 
 You are hereby required to submit yourself for examination by such 
 referee,* and to attend for that purpose at such time and place as may be 
 fixed by him. 
 
 Dated this day of 
 
 (To be signed in the same manner as reference.) 
 
 * Strike out from "aud to attend" when injured workman does not appear to be in a fit 
 condition to travel. 
 
 FORM H. 
 
 NOTICE BY MEDICAL REFEREE TO INJURED WORKMAN (SCHEDULE II. (15)). 
 
 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 To 
 
 I hereby give you notice that I have been appointed to examine and 
 report on your case under Schedule II., paragraph (15), of the above-named 
 Act, and that I propose to make such examination at on 
 
 the day of at o'clock. 
 
 (Signed) Medical Referee. 
 
REGULATIONS CERTIFYING SURGEONS. 333 
 
 APPENDIX D. 
 
 REGULATIONS, DATED JUNE 21ST, 1907, MADE BY THE SECRETARY OF 
 STATE AND THE TREASURY AS TO THE DUTIES AND FEES OF CERTIFYING 
 AND OTHER SURGEONS, AND AS TO REFERENCES TO, AND REMUNERATION 
 AND EXPENSES OF, MEDICAL REFEREES, IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 
 UNDER SECTION 8 OF THE ACT. 
 
 As AMENDED BY REGULATIONS DATED DECEMBER 2, 1908, AND 
 MAY 10, 1910. 
 
 Definitions. 
 
 1. In these regulations 
 
 Act" means the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
 Workman " means a workman as defined in section 13 of the Act. 
 
 Certifying Surgeon " means either the certifying surgeon men- 
 tioned in sub-section (1) (i) of section 8 of the Act, or a medical 
 practitioner appointed by the Secretary of State under sub- 
 section (5) of section 8 to have the powers and duties of a 
 certifying surgeon under the said section. 
 
 (iv) " Appointed Surgeon " means a surgeon having power, in pur- 
 suance of any special rules or regulations made under the 
 Factory and Workshop Act, 1901, to suspend a workman from 
 employment in the process or processes specified in such rules 
 or regulations. 
 
 (v) " Medical Referee " means a medical practitioner appointed by 
 the Secretary of State to act as medical referee for the purposes 
 of section 8 of the Act. 
 
 (vi) The words " disease to which the Act applies " mean a disease 
 mentioned in the Third Schedule to the Act or a disease or 
 injury (not being an injury by accident) to which the provisions 
 of section 8 of the Act have been extended by an Order made by 
 the Secretary of State under sub-section (6) of that section. 
 
 2. Forms 1 and 2. Where a workman applies to a certifying surgeon for 
 a certificate .(hereinafter called " a certificate of disablement ") that he is 
 suffering from a disease to which the Act applies, and is thereby disabled 
 from earning full wages at the work at which he was employed, the certi- 
 fying surgeon, on payment of the prescribed fee, and after obtaining the 
 particulars specified in the Schedule to these regulations and such further 
 information, if any, respecting the case as in the particular circumstances 
 he may deem necessary, shall either proceed at once, if the application is 
 made by the workman in person, to make a medical examination of the 
 workman, or shall appoint forthwith a time and place for making such 
 examination, and give notice thereof to the workman. Such notice, if given 
 in writing, shall follow, as closely as may be, the form prescribed in the 
 Schedule. 
 
 3. Forms 3 and 5. After personally examining the workman, the 
 certifying surgeon shall either give the workman a certificate of disablement 
 or shall certify that he is not satisfied that the workman is entitled to such 
 certificate, and shall in either case deliver his certificate to the workman. 
 The certificate given shall be in the form prescribed in the Schedule to these 
 regulations. 
 
334 APPENDIX D. 
 
 Note. When a Post Office medical officer gives such certificate to a 
 workman in respect of telegraphists' cramp (see p. 200, ante), he is entitled 
 to the fee under 7 (1) (a), post. (Regulation, dated December 2, 1908.) 
 
 4. Forms 6 and 8. Where, in pursuance of any special rules or regula- 
 tions made under the Factory and Workshop Act, 1901, the certifying or 
 appointed surgeon after having personally examined a workman, suspends 
 him from his usual employment on account of his having contracted any 
 disease to which the Act applies, or where in the case of a workman applying 
 to be suspended on account of his having contracted any such disease, the 
 surgeon as aforesaid, after having personally examined such workman, 
 refuses to order his suspension, he shall on the application either of the 
 employer or of the workman, and on payment of the prescribed fee, certify 
 such suspension or refusal to suspend in accordance with the form prescribed 
 in the Schedule to these regulations, and shall deliver such certificate to 
 the applicant. 
 
 5. Forms 4 and 7. Where a certificate of disablement is given or a work- 
 man is suspended, and the case is one in which, under the provisions of sub- 
 section (2) of section 8 of the Act as extended by any Order of the Secretary 
 of State, made under sub-section (6) of the said section, the disease contracted 
 by the workman will be deemed, unless the employer proves, or the certifying 
 surgeon certifies, to the contrary, to have been due to the nature of the 
 employment in the process in which at or immediately before the date of 
 the disablement or suspension the workman was employed, the certifying 
 surgeon, if he is of opinion that the disease contracted by the workman was 
 not due to the nature of such employment, shall certify accordingly. Such 
 certificate shall, where possible, be given simultaneously with, and included 
 in, the certificate of disablement or the certificate (if any) of suspension, but 
 may also be given separately on application by the employer and on payment 
 of the prescribed fee ; and in either case shall follow the form prescribed 
 in the Schedule to these regulations. 
 
 For the purposes of this regulation an appointed surgeon shall have the 
 same powers and duties as a certifying surgeon. 
 
 6. A copy of any certificate given by a certifying or appointed surgeon 
 under the foregoing regulations shall, together with any other documents 
 relating to the case, be retained and kept by the surgeon ; and copies of any 
 such certificate shall, on payment of the prescribed fee, be supplied by the 
 surgeon to the employer and the workman. 
 
 7. The fees which the certifying and appointed surgeons shall be entitled 
 to charge in respect of duties performed under section 8 of the Act shall be 
 as follows : 
 
 Fees payable by the Workman. 
 
 (i) For any certificate given under regulation 3 
 
 (a) in cases where the medical examination of the workman is made 
 
 by the surgeon in the performance of his duties under the Factory 
 and Workshop Act, 1901, a fee of 1*. ; 
 
 Note. See note to 3, ante. 
 
 (b) in all other cases, a fee of 5s., and where the workman is unable 
 
 to present himself for examination at the residence of, or other 
 nearer place fixed by, the certifying surgeon, for every mile or 
 portion thereof which the certifying surgeon is required to travel 
 therefrom for the purpose of examining the workman, an 
 additional fee of Is. 
 
REGULATIONS CERTIFYING SURGEONS. 335 
 
 (ii) For any certificate of suspension or refusal to suspend, under regula- 
 tion 4, when the medical examination of the workman is made 
 in pursuance of any special rules or regulations under the Factory 
 and Workshop Act, 1901, a fee of Is. 
 
 (iii) For a copy of any certificate obtained under regulation 6, a fee of Is. 
 
 Fees payable by the Employer. 
 
 (iv) For any certificate of suspension, or refusal to suspend, obtained 
 by the employer under regulation 4, a fee of Is. 
 
 (v) Where the employer applies under regulation 5 for a certificate that 
 the disease contracted is not due to the nature of the employment, 
 in respect of every such application (to include the certificate, if 
 given), a fee of 2s. Qd. 
 
 (vi) For a copy of any certificate obtained under regulation 6, a fee of Is. 
 
 References to Medical Referees. 
 
 8. Where an employer or workman is aggrieved by the action of a 
 certifying or appointed surgeon in giving or refusing to give a certificate 
 of disablement or in suspending or refusing to suspend a workman, he may 
 
 (a) if he is an employer, within seven days of the receipt of the notice 
 of disablement or suspension required to be given under the Act, 
 or, in a case of disablement, if the notice is not accompanied by 
 the certificate of the surgeon, or a copy thereof, and the employer 
 forthwith requires the workman to furnish him with a copy, within 
 seven days of the receipt of such copy, or 
 
 (6) if he is a workman, within seven days of the date on which the 
 surgeon has refused to give him a certificate of disablement or 
 suspension, 
 
 apply to the registrar of the county court for the district in which the work- 
 man was employed at the time of his examination by the surgeon, for the 
 matter to be referred to a medical referee ; provided that it shall be within 
 the discretion of the registrar, on good cause shown, to extend in any case 
 by not more than seven days the period within which an application is 
 required to be made. 
 
 9. Forms 9 and 10. (a) Any application under the foregoing regulation 
 shall be made in writing and shall state the grounds on which the reference 
 is asked for, in accordance with the form prescribed in the Schedule to these 
 regulations, or as near thereto as may be. 
 
 (6) The application shall be accompanied by the certificate or a copy 
 of the certificate obtained from the surgeon by whose action the applicant 
 is aggrieved, and by any available report or reports of any medical practi- 
 tioner by whom the workman has been examined ; and if the applicant is 
 an employer, by the notice of disablement or suspension served on him by 
 the workman, and by an undertaking to pay any reasonable travelling 
 expenses incurred by the workman in attending for examination by the 
 medical referee. 
 
 (c) The applicant shall also file with the registrar such copies of the 
 application and other documents as aforesaid as may be necessary for the 
 use of the medical referee and of the employer or workman, as the case may 
 be, hereinafter referred to as the respondent, who together with the applicant 
 is directly interested in the application. 
 
 (d) In the event of any dispute as to the amount of the travelling 
 expenses payable to the workman by the employer, the matter may be 
 referred to the registrar, whose decision shall be final. 
 
336 APPENDIX D. 
 
 10. Form 11. It shall be the duty of the registrar on receiving an 
 application to satisfy himself that it is duly made in accordance with the 
 foregoing regulations, and if it is not, to return it for amendment. If and 
 when the application is in accordance with the regulations, he shall refer 
 the matter forth with to a medical referee, and shall forward to such medical 
 referee by registered post one of the copies of the application and the other 
 documents filed therewith, with an order of reference according to the form 
 prescribed in the Schedule. 
 
 11. Form 12. The registrar shall also make an order directing the 
 workman to submit himself for examination by the medical referee. Before 
 making such order the registrar shall inquire whether the workman is in a 
 fit condition to travel for the purpose of examination, and if satisfied that 
 he is in a fit condition, shall by the order direct him to attend at such time 
 and place as the referee may fix, and if satisfied that he is not in a fit con- 
 dition to travel, shall so state in the order of reference ; and it shall be 
 the duty of the workman, on being served with the order, to submit himself 
 for examination accordingly. 
 
 12. The registrar shall deliver or send by registered post to both parties a 
 copy of the order of reference, and shall also send to the respondent copies 
 of the other documents forwarded to the medical referee, and shall send 
 to the workman a copy of the order directing him to submit himself for 
 examination. 
 
 13. In the case of a reference under these regulations, the medical referee 
 shall be one of those appointed by the Secretary of State for the county 
 court circuit, which includes the district in which the case arises, and if 
 the circuit has been sub-divided and medical referees have been appointed 
 for the sub-divisions, shall be one appointed for the sub-division comprising 
 the aforesaid district. Provided that if any medical referee is or has been 
 specially appointed by the Secretary of State, either for the circuit or 
 otherwise, for the purpose of deciding on any specified case or class of cases 
 in which a reference may be made under these regulations, the reference in 
 any such case shall be made to the medical referee so appointed. Provided 
 also that if the surgeon by whose action the applicant is aggrieved, has 
 been appointed a medical referee, the reference shall not be made to him, 
 but to such other medical referee as may be authorised to act.. 
 
 14. Forms 13 and 14. The medical referee shall, on receipt of an order of 
 reference, duly signed, by the registrar of a county court, together with 
 copies of the documents required to be sent therewith, fix a time and a place 
 for a personal examination of the workman, and shall send notice to the 
 employer and workman accordingly. It shall be the duty of the workman, 
 and, if the employer is the applicant, of the emploj^er or a person duly 
 authorised by him, to attend at the time and place fixed by the medical 
 referee, and in the event of failure on the part of the workman or employer 
 or both to appear as required by this regulation, the medical referee shall 
 decide on the matter referred to him forthwith upon such information as 
 shall be available and with or without a personal examination. Provided 
 that where the absence of the employer or his representative or of the 
 workman is shown to the satisfaction of the medical referee to be unavoidable, 
 or where the medical referee considers it necessary to apply for expert 
 assistance as hereinafter provided, it shall be open to him to adjourn the 
 inquiry on the reference and to resume it at such time and place as he may 
 fix, after giving due notice to all parties concerned. 
 
 15. Except as otherwise provided by regulation 14, the medical referee 
 shall, before deciding on the matter referred to him, make a personal 
 
KEGULATIONS CERTIFYING SURGEONS. 337 
 
 examination of the workman, and shall consider any statements made or 
 submitted by either party. 
 
 16. Farm 15. The medical referee shall, in the form prescribed in the 
 Schedule to these regulations (subject to such additions and modifications 
 as the circumstances of the case may require) notify in writing his decision 
 to the registrar of the county court, to the applicant and to the respondent. 
 
 17. Form 16. The medical referee shall send to the Home Office at the 
 end of each quarter a statement (accompanied by any vouchers necessary), 
 in the form prescribed in the Schedule to these regulations, of the fees due 
 to him for the quarter under these regulations. 
 
 Note. The Form was altered by Regulation dated May 10, 1910. 
 
 18. The following fees and allowances are authorised to be paid to medical 
 referees under these regulations : 
 
 (i) For deciding the matter referred to him in any reference and for all 
 duties performed in connection therewith, 2 guineas. 
 
 (ii) Where in order to examine the workman the medical referee is com- 
 pelled to travel to a place distant more than two miles from his 
 residence or such other centre as may be prescribed by the Secretarj' 
 of State, in addition to the above fee, 5s. for each mile beyond^ 
 two, and up to ten, miles distant from such residence or centre,* 
 and thereafter Is. for each mile distant therefrom. 
 
 (iii) In cases involving special difficulty the medical referee may apply 
 for special expert assistance, which may be granted by the Secretary 
 of State if he thinks fit, on such terms as to remuneration or other- 
 wise, as he may with the sanction of the Treasury determine. 
 
 19. In cases where a claim is made under regulation 18 (ii) in respect of 
 an examination of a workman, the medical referee, in submitting his quarterly 
 statement under regulation 17, shall certify the distance of the place where 
 the examination was made from his residence or other prescribed centre. 
 
 20. Form 17. The registrar of a county court shall keep a record, 
 in the form prescribed in the schedule, of all references made by him under 
 these regulations, and shall send the same to the Secretary of State at the 
 end of each quarter. 
 
 Note. See note to 17. 
 
 21. These regulations shall come into force on the 1st day of July, 1907, 
 and shall apply to England and Wales. 
 
 SCHEDULE. 
 
 FORM 1. 
 
 PARTICULARS TO BE OBTAINED BY CERTIFYING SURGEON UPON APPLICATION 
 BY WORKMAN FOR CERTIFICATE OF DISABLEMENT. 
 
 1. Name and address of workman. 
 
 2. Disease in respect of which certificate is applied for. 
 
 3. Symptoms complained of. 
 
 4. Employment to the nature of which disease is attributed. 
 
 5. Name and place of business of employer who last employed 
 workman in such employment. 
 
 6. [Where application is not made by workman in person] whether 
 workman is able to travel for purposes of examination. 
 
 W.C.A. -;. 
 
338 APPENDIX D. 
 
 FORM 2. 
 
 NOTICE TO WORKMAN OF TIME AND PLACE APPOINTED FOR HI* EXAMINATION 
 
 BY SURGEON. 
 
 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
 I hereby give you notice, with reference to }^our application for a certi- 
 ficate of disablement under section 8, sub-section (1), of the above-named 
 Act, that I propose to examine you at on the day of at 
 
 o'clock, and that you are required to submit yourself for examination 
 accordingly. 
 To [the Workman], (Signed) 
 
 FORM 3. 
 
 CERTIFICATE OF DISABLEMENT. 
 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
 I, [strike out portion of description inapplicable] as certifying surgeon 
 appointed under the Factory and Workshop Act, 1901, for the district 
 of (or as a medical practitioner appointed by the Secretary of State 
 
 to have the powers and duties of a certifying surgeon for the purposes of 
 section 8 of the Act), hereby certify that having personally examined 
 [name of workman] on the day of I am satisfied that [he or 
 
 she] is suffering from [name disease according to the terms in which it is 
 described in the third schedule to the Act or Order of the Secretary of State 
 adding it to the schedule] being one of the diseases to which the Workmen's 
 Compensation Act applies, and is thereby disabled from earning full wages 
 at the work at which [he or she] has been employed ; and I [if the surgeon 
 is unable to certify a date on which the disablement commenced, he should 
 strike out this part of the certificate. In that case the disablement will be 
 deemed to have commenced on the date on which this certificate is given. See 
 section 8 (4) of the Act] certify that the disablement commenced on the 
 day of 
 
 1. Full name and address of workman. 
 
 2. Process in which workman states he was employed at or 
 immediately before the date of disablement. 
 
 3. Name and place of business of employer stated by workman 
 to have last employed him hi process above-mentioned. 
 
 4. Leading sjonptoms of disease. 
 
 Dated this " day of . (Signed) 
 
 FORM 4. 
 
 CERTIFICATE (SUPPLEMENTARY TO A CERTIFICATE OF DISABLEMENT) TO 
 BE GIVEN BY CERTIFYING SURGEON IN CIRCUMSTANCES MENTIONED 
 IN REGULATION 5. 
 
 1. When the certificate is included in the certificate of disablement, it 
 should run as follows : 
 
REGULATIONS CERTIFYING SURGEONS. 339 
 
 But whereas the said workman appears to have been employed at or 
 immediately before the date of disablement in [name process] being a 
 process [mentioned in or added by an Order of the Secretary of State to] 
 the second column of the third schedule to the Act, and the disease con- 
 tracted by him, viz. [name disease] is a disease which [in the first column 
 of that schedule or under the provisions of the said Order] is set opposite 
 the above-mentioned process, I hereby certify that in my opinion the said 
 disease is not due to the nature of such employment. 
 
 Dated this day of . (Signed) 
 
 2. When the certificate is given separately on a subsequent application 
 of the employer, it should be in the following form : 
 
 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
 Whereas I, [strike out portion of description inapplicable] the certifying 
 surgeon appointed under the Factory and Workshop Act, 1901, for the dis- 
 trict of (or as a medical practitioner appointed by the Secretary of 
 State to have the powers and duties of a certifying surgeon, for the pur- 
 poses of section 8 of the above-named Act), on the day of 
 certified that [name of workman] was suffering from [name disease] being 
 a disease to which the Workmen's Compensation Act applies, and was 
 thereby disabled from earning full wages at the work at which he was 
 employed ; and whereas the said [name of workman] appears to have been 
 employed at or immediately before the date of disablement in [name pro- 
 cess] being a process [mentioned in or added by an Order of the Secretary 
 of State to] the second column of the third schedule to the Act, and the 
 disease above-named is a disease which [in the first column of that schedule 
 or under the provisions of the said Order] is set opposite the above-men- 
 tioned process, I hereby certify that, in my opinion, the said disease was 
 not due to the nature of such employment. 
 Dated this day of . (Signed) 
 
 FORM 5. 
 
 CERTIFICATE OF CERTIFYING SURGEON REFUSING TO GIVE CERTIFICATE OF 
 DISABLEMENT. 
 
 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
 I, [strike out portion of description inapplicable] as certifying surgeon 
 appointed under the Factory and Workshop Act, 1901, for the district of 
 (or as a medical practitioner appointed by the Secretary of State to 
 have the powers and duties of a certifying surgeon for the purposes of 
 section 8 of the above Act), hereby certify that having personally examined 
 [name workman], who has applied for a Certificate of Disablement in respect 
 of [describe disease], being a disease to which the Workmen's Compensation 
 Act applies, I am not satisfied that [he or she] is suffering from the said 
 disease so as to be disabled from earning full wages at the work at which 
 [he or she] has been employed. 
 
 1. Full name and address of workman. 
 
 2. Employment to nature of which disease complained of was 
 attributed. 
 
 3. Name and place of business of employer stated by workman 
 to have last employed him in such employment. 
 
 Dated this day of . (Signed) 
 
340 APPENDIX D. 
 
 FORM 6. 
 
 CERTIFICATE OF SUSPENSION BY CERTIFYING OR APPOINTED SURGEON. 
 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
 I, the [certifying or appointed] surgeon for [name works at which work- 
 man is employed] hereby certify that after personally examining [name 
 workman], I have on the day of in pursuance of the [name 
 
 the special rules or regulations governing the employment] made under the 
 Factory and Workshop Act, 1901, suspended the said [name workman] 
 from [his or her] usual employment on account of [his or her] having con- 
 tracted [describe disease] being a disease to which the Workmen's Com- 
 pensation Act applies. 
 
 1. Full name and address of workman. 
 
 2. Employment from which workman is suspended. 
 
 3. Name and place of business of employer. 
 
 4. Leading symptoms of disease. 
 
 Dated this day of . (Signed) 
 
 FORM 7. 
 
 CERTIFICATE TO BE GIVEN BY SURGEON IN CASES OF SUSPENSION IN 
 CIRCUMSTANCES MENTIONED IN REGULATION 5. 
 
 1. When tJie certificate is included in a certificate of suspension, it should 
 run as follows : 
 
 But whereas the said workman appears to have been employed at or 
 immediately before the date of suspension in [name process] being a process 
 [mentioned in or added by an Order of the Secretary of State to] the. 
 second column of the third schedule to the Act, and the disease contracted 
 by him, viz., [name disease] is a disease which [in the first column of that 
 Schedule or under the provisions of the said Order] is set opposite the 
 above-mentioned process, I hereby certify that in my opinion the said 
 disease is not due to the nature of such employment. 
 
 Dated this day of . (Signed) 
 
 2. When the certificate is given separately on an application by the employer 
 it should be in the following form : 
 
 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
 Whereas I, the [certifying or appointed] surgeon for [name works at 
 which workman was employed] on the day of in pursuance of 
 
 the [name special rules or regulations governing the employment] made 
 under the Factory and Workshop Act, 1901, suspended [name of workman] 
 from [his or her] usual employment on account of [his or her] having con- 
 tracted [describe disease] being a disease to which the Workmen's Com- 
 pensation Act applies, and whereas the said [name of workman] appears 
 to have been employed at or immediately before the date of suspension in 
 [name process'] being a process [mentioned in or added by an Order of the 
 Secretary of State to] the second column of the third schedule to the Act, 
 
EEGULATIONS CERTIFYING SURGEONS 341 
 
 and the disease above-named is a disease which [in the first column of 
 that schedule or under the provisions of the said Order] is set opposite 
 the above-mentioned process, I hereby certify that in my opinion the 
 said disease was not due to the nature of such employment. 
 Dated this day of . % (Signed) 
 
 FORM 8. 
 
 CERTIFICATE BY CERTIFYING OR APPOINTED SURGEON OF REFUSAL 
 TO SUSPEND. 
 
 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
 I, the certifying [or appointed] surgeon for [name works at which work- 
 man is employed] hereby certify that [name workman} having applied to 
 me to be suspended from his usual employment in pursuance of [name 
 the. code of special rules or regulations governing the employment] made under 
 the Factory and Workshop Act, 1901, on account of [his or her] having 
 contracted [describe disease] being a disease to which the Workmen's Com- 
 pensation Act applies, I have after personally examining the said [name 
 workman] refused to suspend [him or her]. 
 
 1. Full name and address of workman. 
 
 2. Name and place of business of employer. 
 
 3. Grounds for refusal to suspend. 
 
 Dated this day of . (Signed) 
 
 FORM 9. 
 APPLICATION BY EMPLOYER FOR REFERENCE TO MEDICAL REFEREE. 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 In the matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, 
 
 and 
 
 In the matter of a Certificate of Disablement [or Suspension] granted 
 in the case of [name and address of workman] in pursuance 
 
 of the provisions of section 8 of the above-mentioned Act and the 
 Regulations made thereunder by the Secretary of State. 
 Application for a reference in the above-mentioned matter to a medical 
 referee, pursuant to section 8, sub-section (1) (f), of the Act and to the 
 above-mentioned regulations, is hereby made on behalf of [name and 
 
 place of business of applicant] who states : 
 
 1. That on the day of Notice of Disablement [or Suspension] 
 was given to the applicant by the above-mentioned under the pro- 
 visions of the said Act. 
 
 2. That the said notice was consequent on a Certificate of Disablement 
 given [or order of suspension made], on the day of , in pur- 
 suance of the said Act and Regulations, by Mr. residing at 
 
 [full address], the certifying surgeon under the Factory and Workshop 
 Act, 1901, for the district of [or a medical practitioner appointed 
 
 by the Secretary of State to have the powers and duties of a certifying 
 surgeon under section 8 of the said Act, or a surgeon appointed in pur- 
 suance of [describe special rules or regulations under the Factory Act] 
 at [name of factory or other place of employment]. 
 
342 APPENDIX D. 
 
 3. That the applicant is aggrieved by the action of the above-mentioned 
 Mr. in giving the said certificate [or in making the said order of 
 
 suspension] and claims that the said had not contracted the disease 
 
 in respect of which the said certificate was given [or in respect of which 
 the said order was made] [or, in the case of a Certificate of Disablement, 
 was not suffering from the disease therein specified so as to be disabled from 
 earning full wages at the work at which he was employed], in support of 
 which claim he mentions the following circumstances [state grounds for 
 claim, e.g., report of any doctor employed by applicant.] 
 
 And applicant hereby undertakes, if the matter is referred to a medical 
 referee, to repay to the said [workman] any reasonable travelling 
 
 expenses he may incur in attending for examination by such referee. 
 
 Two copies of this application are annexed hereto, together with a copy 
 of the notice and certificate of disablement [or suspension]. (The above- 
 mentioned report of the medical practitioner employed by me, and two 
 copies thereof, are also annexed.) 
 
 Dated this da} 7 of . (Signed) Applicant. 
 
 To the Registrar. 
 
 FORM 10. 
 
 APPLICATION BY WORKMAN FOR REFERENCE TO MEDICAL REFEREE. 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 In the matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, 
 
 and 
 
 In the matter of a Refusal of a certifying [or appointed] Surgeon to 
 give a Certificate of Disablement to [or to suspend] [name and 
 
 address of applicant] in pursuance of the provisions of section 8 of 
 the above-mentioned Act and the Regulations made thereunder by 
 the Secretary of State. 
 
 Application for a reference in the above-mentioned matter to a medical 
 referee, pursuant to section 8, sub-section (1) (f), of the said Act and to 
 the above-mentioned Regulations, is hereby made on behalf of the said 
 who states : 
 
 1. That on the day of applicant applied to Mr. residing 
 at [full address] the certifying surgeon under the Factory and Work- 
 shop Act, 1901, for the district of [or a medical practitioner appointed 
 by the Secretary of State to have the powers and duties of a certifying 
 surgeon for the purposes of section 8 of the said Act, or a surgeon appointed 
 in pursuance of [describe special rules or regulations under Factory 
 Act] at [name of factory or other place of employment]], for a certificate 
 of disablement [or to be suspended] in respect of a disease to which 
 the provisions of section 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act apply. 
 
 2. That the said Mr. refused to give the applicant a certificate of 
 disablement [or to suspend the applicant] and certified to such refusal by 
 a certificate dated the day of , which is annexed to this appli- 
 cation. 
 
 3. That the applicant is aggrieved by the action of the said Mr. in 
 refusing to give him a certificate of disablement [or to suspend him] and 
 claims that he was suffering from the said disease, and was thereby disabled 
 from earning full wages at the work at which he was employed [or, in 
 the case of a refusal to suspend, that he had contracted the said disease and 
 was thereby entitled, in accordance with the special rules [or regulations] 
 
EEGULATIONS CERTIFYING SURGEONS. 343 
 
 made under the Factory and Workshop Act, 1901, for the process, in 
 which he was emploj-ed to be suspended] in support of which claim he 
 mentions the following circumstances [state grounds of claim, e.g., report, 
 if any, of doctor employed by applicant]. 
 
 4. That the employer on whom the applicant, if the matter is referred 
 to a medical referee and decided in favour of the applicant, would serve the 
 statutory notice of disablement [or suspension] is [name and place 
 
 of business of employer]. 
 
 Two copies of this application and the certificate of the surgeon 
 (together with the above-mentioned report of the medical practitioner 
 employed by applicant and two copies thereof) are annexed hereto. 
 
 Dated this day of . (Signed) Applicant. 
 
 To the Registrar. 
 
 FORM 11. 
 ORDER OF REFERENCE TO MEDICAL REFEREE. 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 [Heading as in application.] 
 
 On the application of (a copy of which is hereto annexed), I 
 
 hereby appoint Mr. of , one of the medical referees appointed 
 
 by the Secretary of State for the purposes of the Workmen's Compensation 
 Act, 1906, to decide on the matter arising on the said application. 
 
 Copies of the notice and certificate of disablement [or suspension] (and 
 of a report of a medical practitioner by whom the workman referred to in 
 the application has been examined), are hereto annexed. 
 
 Or, if the workman is the applicant, 
 
 A copy of the certificate of the surgeon referred to in the application 
 (together with a copy of a report of a medical practitioner by whom 
 applicant has been examined), is hereto annexed. 
 
 The said , who is now at , has been directed to submit 
 
 himself for examination by the referee. 
 
 I am satisfied that the said is in a fit condition to travel for 
 
 the purpose of being examined, and he has been directed to attend on 
 the referee for examination at such time and place as may be fixed by the 
 referee. 
 
 [Or the said does not appear to be in a fit condition to travel 
 
 for the purpose of being examined.] 
 
 Dated this day of . Registrar. 
 
 FORM 12. 
 
 ORDER ON WORKMAN TO SUBMIT HIMSELF FOR EXAMINATION BY 
 MEDICAL REFEREE. 
 
 In the County Court of holden at 
 
 [Heading as in Application.] 
 
 To A.B. , of [address and description]. 
 
 TAKE NOTICE, that I have appointed Mr. , of one of 
 
344 APPENDIX D. 
 
 the medical referees appointed by the Secretary of State for the purposes 
 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, to decide on the matter arising 
 on the above application. 
 
 You are hereby required to submit yourself for examination by the 
 referee [add, where workman is in a fit condition to travel, and to attend 
 for that purpose at such time and place as may be fixed by him]. 
 
 Dated this day of . Registrar. 
 
 13. 
 
 NOTICE BY MEDICAL REFEREE TO WORKMAN. 
 
 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
 I hereby give you notice that I have received from the Registrar of the 
 county court at , an order of reference appointing me to decide on 
 
 your appeal against the action of Mr. [name of surgeon] in refusing 
 
 to give you a certificate of disablement [or to suspend you]. 
 
 Or, if the employer is the appellant, 
 
 on the appeal made by [name of employer] against the action of 
 
 Mr. [name of surgeon} in giving you a certificate of disablement 
 
 [or in suspending you] ; 
 
 And that you are required to attend [or, if the workman has been ascer- 
 tained not to be in a fit condition to travel, to submit yourself] for examination 
 at on the day of at o'clock. 
 
 Any .statement made or submitted by 3~ou shall be considered. 
 
 (Signed) Medical Referee. 
 
 To 
 
 FORM 14. 
 NOTICE BY MEDICAL REFEREE TO EMPLOYER. 
 
 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. 
 
 I hereby give j'ou notice that I have received from the registrar of the 
 county court at , an order of reference appointing me to decide on 
 
 your appeal against the action of Mr. [name of surgeon] in giving 
 
 a certificate of disablement to [or in suspending] [name of workman]. 
 
 Or, if the workman is the appellant, 
 
 on the appeal made by [name of workman] against the action of 
 
 Mr. [name of surgeon] in refusing to give him a certificate of disable- 
 
 ment [or to suspend him] ; 
 
 And that I propose to examine [name of ivorkman] at on 
 
 the day of at o'clock. 
 
 Any statement made or submitted by you shall be considered. 
 Add, if the employer is the appellant, 
 
 You, or some person duly authorised by you, are hereby required to 
 attend at the above time and place. 
 
 Dated this day of . (Signed) Medical Referee. 
 
 To 
 
! 
 
 REGULATIONS CERTIFYING SURGEONS. 345 
 
 FORM 15. 
 
 DECISION OF MEDICAL REFEREE. 
 
 [Heading as in Application.'] 
 
 I hereby give you notice that having duly inquired into the above- 
 mentioned matter in accordance with the regulations of the Secretary of 
 State, I decide as follows : 
 
 I dismiss [or allow] the appeal of [name of employer] against the 
 
 certificate of disablement given to [name of workman] on the 
 
 day of , 
 
 or 
 
 I dismiss (or allow) the appeal of [name of employer] against the 
 
 suspension of [name of workman] on the day of , 
 
 or 
 
 I dismiss the appeal of [name of workman] against the refusal of 
 
 Mr. [name of surgeon] to give him a certificate of disablement in 
 
 respect of [name of disease], 
 
 or 
 
 I allow the appeal of [name of workman] against the refusal of 
 
 Mr. [name of surgeon] to give him a certificate of disablement in 
 
 respect of [name of disease], and I fix the day of as the 
 
 date on which the disablement commenced, 
 
 or 
 
 I dismiss (or allow) the appeal of [name of workman] against the 
 
 refusal of Mr. [name of surgeon] to suspend him on the day 
 
 of 
 
 Dated this day of 
 
 (Signed) Medical Referee. 
 
 To [the registrar], 
 and to [the employer], 
 and to [the workman]. * 
 
 NOTE. This form was criticised by the Master of the Rolls as being un- 
 satisfactory in the case of intermittent diseases, in that it required the medical 
 referee to decide the condition of the man at some previous time when he was not 
 attending him (Jones v. Ebbw Vale Steel, Iron, and Coal Co. (1910) 3 
 B. W. C. C. 181). 
 
346 APPENDIX E. 
 
 APPENDIX E. 
 
 REGULATIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, DATED JUNE 28, 1907, AS TO 
 
 EXAMINATIONS OF A WORKMAN BY A MEDICAL PRACTITIONER PROVIDED 
 AND PAID BY THE EMPLOYER UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE FlRST 
 
 SCHEDULE TO THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. 
 
 1. Where a workman has given notice of an accident or is hi receipt of 
 weekly payments under the Act, he shall not be required to submit himself 
 against his will, for examination by a medical practitioner provided by the 
 employer except at reasonable hours. 
 
 2. A workman in receipt of weekly paj^ments shall not be required, after 
 a period of one month has elapsed from the date on which the first payment 
 of compensation was made, or if the first payment is made in obedience to 
 the award of a committee or arbitrator, from the date of the award, to submit 
 himself, against his will, for examination by a medical practitioner provided 
 by the employer except at the following intervals : Once a week during the 
 second, and once a month during the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth months, 
 after the date of the first payment or the award, as the case may be, and 
 thereafter once in every two months. 
 
 Provided that where after the second month an application has been 
 made to the countj r (in Scotland, the sheriff) court or to a committee for a 
 review of the weekly payment, the workman may be required, pending and 
 for the purposes of the settlement of the application, to submit himself to 
 one additional examination. 
 
 APPENDIX F. 
 
 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT. 
 August, 1898. 
 
 ORDER LIV. Rule 1, A. 
 
 3. An application for the appointment of a new Arbitrator under para- 
 graph 7 of the second schedule of " The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897," 
 shall be made by summons. 
 
 ORDER LVIII. Rule 20. 
 
 Appeals under Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897. 60 <fc 61 Viet. c. 37, 
 Scliedule. II., Paragraph 4. 
 
 4. The following provisions shall apply to appeals to the Court of Appeal 
 from decisions of judges of the county courts on questions of law under the 
 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897 . . . : 
 
 (a) Every such appeal shall be by notice of motion in accordance with 
 Order LIX., Rule 10 ; and such notice of motion shall be served and 
 the appeal set down under Order LVIII., Rule 8, within the time 
 limited by Order LIX., Rule 12. 
 
EULES OF THE SUPREME COURT. 347 
 
 (6). It shall be the duty of the party appealing to apply to the judge of 
 the county court for a signed copy of the note made by him of any 
 question of law raised before him, and of the facts in evidence in 
 relation thereto, and of his decision thereon, and of his decision on 
 the question or matter submitted to him, and to furnish such copy 
 for the use of the Court of Appeal ; and such copy shall be used and 
 received at the hearing of the appeal. If such notes are not pro- 
 duced the Court of Appeal shall have power to hear and determine 
 the appeal upon any other evidence or statement of what occurred 
 before the judge of the county court, which the Court of Appeal 
 may deem sufficient. 
 
 (c) Order LIX., Rules 14 and 16, shall apply to any such appeal, with 
 
 - the substitution of the Court of Appeal for the High Court. 
 
 (d) Subject to the foregoing provisions, the rules for the time being in 
 
 force with respect to appeals from the High Court to the Court of 
 Appeal shall, so far as practicable, apply to and govern appeals 
 under the said Act to the Court of Appeal. 
 
 5. These rules may be cited as the Rules of the Supreme Court (August), 
 1898, or separately according to their respective headings, with reference to 
 the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883 ; and they shall come into operation 
 on the 24th day of October, 1898. 
 
 Note. The following are the Orders and Rules referred to above : 
 
 Order LIX., Rule 10. Every such appeal shall be by notice of motion, 
 and no rule nisi or order to show cause shall be necessary. The notice of 
 motion shall state the' grounds of the appeal, and whether all or part only of 
 the judgment, order, or finding is complained of. The notice of motion shall 
 be an eight days' notice, and shall be served on every party directly affected 
 by the appeal entered. 
 
 Order LVIII., Rule 8. The party appealing from a judgment or order 
 shall produce to the proper officer of the Court of Appeal the judgment or 
 order or an office copy thereof, and shall leave with him a copy of the notice 
 of appeal to be filed, and such officer shall thereupon set down the appeal by 
 entering the same in the proper list of appeals, and it shall come on to be 
 heard according to its order in such list, unless the Court of Appeal or a judge* 
 thereof shall otherwise direct, but so as not to come into the paper for hearing 
 before the day named in the notice of appeal. 
 
 Order LIX., Rule 12. The notice of motion shall be served and the appeal 
 entered within 21 days from the date of the judgment, order, or finding 
 complained of ; such period shall be calculated from the time at which the 
 judgment or order is signed, entered, or otherwise perfected, or from the 
 time at which the finding or any refusal is made or given. 
 
 Order LIX., Rule 14. The appeal shall not operate as a stay of pro- 
 ceedings under the decision appealed from unless the inferior court shall so 
 order or unless within 10 days after the decision a deposit shall be made of or 
 security given to the satisfaction of such inferior court for a sum to be fixed 
 by the said court, not exceeding the amount of the money or the value of the 
 property affected by the judgment order or finding appealed from. 
 
 Order LIX., Rule 16. The High Court shall have power to extend the 
 time for appealing, or to amend the grounds of appeal, or to make any other 
 order, on such terms as the court shall think just, to ensure' the determination 
 on the merits of the real questions in controversy between the parties. 
 
 Note. Generally, as to procedure on appeal, see " THE YEARLY PRACTICE 
 OF THE SUPREME COURT." 
 
348 APPENDIX G. 
 
 APPENDIX G. 
 
 ORDER IN COUNCIL GIVING EFFECT TO THE CONVENTION BETWEEN His 
 MAJESTY AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC BY MODI- 
 FYING THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906 (6 EDW. 7, c. 58), 
 
 IN ITS APPLICATION TO WORKMEN WHO ARE FRENCH CITIZENS. 
 
 At the Court of Buckingham Palace, the 22nd day of November, 1909. 
 * * * * * * 
 
 Now, therefore, in pursuance of the powers vested in Him by the above- 
 mentioned provisions of the Workmen's Compensation (Anglo-French 
 Convention) Act, 1909, His Majesty is pleased, by and with the advice of 
 His Privy Council, to order and prescribe as follows : 
 
 The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, hereinafter referred to as the 
 Act, shall in the case of workmen who are French citizens apply subject 
 to the following modifications : 
 
 (1) An employer having his principal place of business in France shall 
 not be liable to pay compensation under the Act for injury to a workman 
 who is a French citizen by accident arising out of and in the course of the 
 employment 
 
 (1) if the workman has been temporarily detached for employment 
 
 in the United Kingdom, and such employment has at the time of 
 the accident lasted less than six months ; 
 
 (ii) if the workman is engaged in transport service and is employed 
 at intervals whether regular or not in the United Kingdom. 
 
 (2) In all cases the question as to the liability to pay compensation 
 under the Act to a French citizen and as to the amount or duration of such 
 compensation, including the question of the redemption of weekly payments, 
 and in cases of death the question as to who is a dependant and as to the 
 amount payable to each dependant, shall be settled by the Judge of the 
 County Court and in no other manner. 
 
 (3) Where a weekly payment payable to a French citizen has been 
 redeemed by the payment of a lump sum of such amount as would, if invested 
 in the purchase of an immediate life annuity from the National Debt Com- 
 missioners through the Post Office Savings Bank, purchase an annuity 
 for the workman of upwards of four pounds, the lump sum shall be paid 
 into the County Court and invested in the purchase of an annuity for the 
 benefit of the workman. 
 
 (4) Where a lump sum payable either in the redemption of a weekly 
 payment or as compensation to the dependants of a deceased workman has 
 been paid into the County Court, then : 
 
 (a) if the workman returns to reside in France ; or 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. 349 
 
 (6) if the dependants resided in France at the time of the death of the 
 
 workman, or subsequently return to reside in France, 
 
 the total sum due to the injured workman or his dependants shall be trans- 
 ferred to the " Caisse Nationale Francaise des Retraites pour la Vieillesse." 
 
 (5) Where a workman receiving a weekly payment returns to reside 
 in France, the amount due by way of weekly payments shall, notwith- 
 standing anything in paragraph 18 of the First Schedule to the Act, be 
 remitted to him through the County Court at such intervals and in such 
 manner as may be agreed upon between the Secretary of State and such 
 persons as the President of the French Republic may authorise for the 
 purpose. 
 
 (6) No court fee or other charge shall be payable in the case of a workman 
 who is a French citizen in respect of any proceedings under the Act in 
 the County Court, whether under paragraph (15) of the First Schedule to 
 that Act, or subsequent to the award, or otherwise. 
 
 (7) The Registrar of every County Court shall, not later than the 31st 
 January in each year, send to the Secretary of State for the Home Depart- 
 ment, in a form prescribed by him, a record of all judicial decisions given 
 in the course of the preceding year under the Act in the case of French 
 citizens, and the said Secretary of State shall cause such record to be com- 
 municated to the " Departement du Travail et de la Prevoyance Sociale." 
 
 (8) The power of making rules under the Act shall include a power to 
 make such rules as may be necessary for the purpose of carrying this Order 
 into effect. 
 
 (9) In Scotland references to the Sheriff' Court shall be substituted 
 for references to the County Court, reference to the Sheriff for reference 
 to the Judge of the County Court, and reference to the Sheriff Clerk for 
 reference to the Registrar of the County Court. 
 
 (10) This Order shall apply to all accidents happening on and after 
 the date on which the Convention takes effect, and shall cease to have effect 
 on the expiration of one year from the date on which the Convention shall 
 have been denounced by one or other of the two contracting parties. 
 
350 
 
 APPENDIX H. 
 
 APPENDIX H. 
 
 IMMEDIATE LIFE ANNUITIES. 
 TABLE SHOWING THE SUM FOR WHICH AN IMMEDIATE LIFE ANNUITY OF 1 
 
 WILL BE GEANTED 
 When the average price of 100 of 2 % consolidated Stock is under 83. 
 
 AGE in Years \r A T T- ^ 
 at the time *ALES. 
 
 FEMALES. 
 
 AGE in Years 
 at the time 
 
 MALES. 
 
 FEMALES. 
 
 of Purchase, of j 
 the Person upon C S T OF AX COST OF AN 
 whose life the IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE 
 
 of Purchase, of the 
 Person upon COST OF A> 
 whose life the IMMEDI \TE 
 
 ' COST OF AX 
 IMMEDIATE 
 
 Annuity 
 is to depend. 
 
 LIFE AX- 
 XriTYOFl 
 
 LIFE AX- 
 XOTYOF1. 
 
 Annuity LIFE AX . 
 is to depend. NUTTY OF! 
 
 LIFE AX- 
 
 NUITYOFI. 
 
 s. d 
 
 ~~ ^ ^ 
 
 
 s. d 
 
 ~ W. cf. 
 
 5 and under 6 25 18 9 
 
 26 6 7' 
 
 45 and under 46 
 
 16 9 6 
 
 17 19 
 
 6 7 ! 25 14 9 
 
 26 3 
 
 46 47 
 
 16 3 3 
 
 17 13 1 
 
 7 8 25 10 8 
 
 25 19 5 
 
 47 48 
 
 15 16 10 ! 17 7 
 
 8 9 25 6 7 
 
 i 25 15 10 
 
 48 49 
 
 15 10 4 
 
 17 10 
 
 9 10 
 
 25 2 6 
 
 25 12 2 
 
 49 50 
 
 15 3 9 
 
 16 14 6 
 
 10 11 
 
 24 18 4 
 
 25 8 5 
 
 50 51 14 17 2 
 
 16 8 
 
 11 12 
 
 24 14 2 
 
 25 4 8 
 
 51 52 i 14 10 5 
 
 16 1 5 
 
 12 13 
 
 24 10 
 
 '25 11 
 
 52 53 14 3 8 
 
 15 14 9 
 
 13 14 
 
 24 5 10 
 
 24 17 2 
 
 53 54 
 
 13 16 10 
 
 15 8 
 
 14 15 
 
 24 1 7 
 
 24 13 5 
 
 54 55 13 10 
 
 15 1 1 
 
 15 16 
 
 23 17 4 
 
 24 9 7 
 
 55 56 13 3 
 
 14 14 
 
 10 IT 
 
 23 13 1 
 
 24 5 9 
 
 56 57 12 16 
 
 14 6 11 
 
 17 ,. 18 
 
 23 8 9 
 
 24" 1 11 
 
 57 58 12 9 
 
 13 19 9 
 
 18 19 
 
 23 4 5 
 
 23 18 
 
 58 59 12 2 
 
 13 12 6 
 
 19 20 
 
 23 1 
 
 23 14 1 
 
 59 60 11 15 
 
 13 5 2 
 
 20 ., 21 22 15 9 
 
 23 10 2 
 
 60 61 
 
 11 8 1 
 
 12 17 9 
 
 21 22 
 
 22 11 5 
 
 23 6 3 
 
 61 62 
 
 11 1 1 
 
 12 10 4 
 
 22 23 
 
 22 7 1 
 
 23 2 5 
 
 62 63 10 14 1 
 
 12 2 11 
 
 23 24 22 2 8 
 
 22 18 7 
 
 63 64 10 7 2 
 
 11 15 5 
 
 24 25 21 18 3 
 
 22 14 10 
 
 64 65 10 3 
 
 11 7 11 
 
 25 26 ! 21 13 10 
 
 22 11 
 
 65 66 9 13 5 
 
 11 4 
 
 26 27 21 95 
 
 22 7 3 
 
 66 67 9 6 7 10 12 10 
 
 27 28 
 
 21 4 11 
 
 22 3 6 
 
 67 68 8 19 11 
 
 10 5 5 
 
 28 29 
 
 21 5 
 
 21 19 8 
 
 68 69 8 13 3 
 
 9 17 11 
 
 29 30 
 
 20 15 10 
 
 21 15 10 
 
 69 70 8 6 8 
 
 9 10 7 
 
 30 31 
 
 20 11 2 21 12 
 
 70 71 8 3 
 
 933 
 
 31 32 20 6 6 
 
 21 8 
 
 71 72 7 13 11 
 
 8 16 
 
 32 ,. 33 20 1 9 
 
 21 3 11 
 
 72 73 7 7 8 
 
 8 8 10 
 
 33 34 19 16 11 
 
 20 19 9 
 
 73 74 7 1 6 
 
 8 1 9 
 
 34 35 
 
 19 11 11 
 
 20 15 5 
 
 74 75 
 
 6 15 7 
 
 7 14 10 
 
 35 36 
 
 19 6 10 
 
 20 11 
 
 75 76 6 9 8 
 
 780 
 
 36 37 19 1 7 
 
 20 6 5 
 
 76 77 
 
 640 
 
 7 1 4 
 
 37 38 18 16 3 
 
 20 1 8 
 
 77 78 5 18 5 
 
 6 14 10 
 
 38 39 19 10 10 
 
 19 16 10 
 
 78 79 5 13 
 
 685 
 
 39 40 18 5 3 
 
 19 11 10 
 
 79 80 5 7 9 
 
 623 
 
 40 41 
 
 17 19 7 
 
 19 6 8 
 
 80 or any 
 
 528 
 
 5 16 2 
 
 41 42 
 
 17 13 9 
 
 19 1 5 
 
 greater age. 
 
 
 
 42 43 
 
 17 7 10 
 
 18 16 
 
 
 
 
 43 44 
 
 17 1 10 
 
 18 10 6 
 
 
 
 
 44 45 16 15 9 
 
 18 4 10 
 
 ; 
 
 
 The cost of an Annuity of 1 is given above, and an Annuity of a 
 larger amount costs a larger sum in exact proportion. For instance, an 
 Annuity of 10 a vear would cost ten times the amount given above. 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. 351 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. 
 (6 EDW. 7, c. 58.) 
 
 An Act to consolidate and amend the Law with respect to Compensation to 
 Workmen for Injuries suffered in the course of their Employment. 
 
 [21st December 1906.] 
 
 BE it enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice 
 and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this 
 present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as 
 follows : 
 
 1. Liability of employers to ivorkmen for injuries.] (1) If in any employ- 
 ment personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the 
 employment is caused to a workman, his employer shall, subject as herein- 
 after mentioned, be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the 
 First Schedule to this Act. 
 
 (2) Provided that 
 
 (a) The employer shall not be liable under this Act in respect of any 
 
 injury which does not disable the workman for a period of at 
 least one week from earning full wages at the work at which he 
 was employed : 
 
 (b) When the injury was caused by the personal negligence or wilful 
 
 act of the employer or of some person for whose act or default 
 the employer is responsible, nothing in this Act shall affect any 
 civil liability of the employer, but in that case the workman 
 may, at his option, either claim compensation under this Act 
 or take proceedings independently of this Act ; but the employer 
 shall not be liable to pay compensation for injury to a workman 
 by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment 
 both independently of and also under this Act, and shall not be 
 liable to any proceedings independently of this Act, except in 
 case of such personal negligence or wilful act as aforesaid : 
 
 (c) If it is proved that the injury to a workman is attributable to the 
 
 serious and wilful misconduct of that workman, any compensa- 
 tion claimed in respect of that injury shall, unless the injur}' 
 results in death or serious and permanent disablement, be 
 disallowed. 
 
 (3) If any question arises in any proceedings under this Act as to the 
 liability to pay compensation under this Act (including any question as to 
 whether the person injured is a workman to whom this Act applies), or as 
 to the amount or duration of compensation under this Act, the question, 
 if not settled by agreement, shall, subject to the provisions of the First 
 Schedule to this Act, be settled by arbitration, in' accordance with the 
 Second Schedule to this Act. 
 
 (4) If, within the time hereinafter in this Act limited for taking pro- 
 ceedings, an action is brought to recover damages independently of this Act 
 for injury caused by any accident, and it is determined in such action that 
 the injury is one for which the employer is not liable in such action, but 
 
352 . APPENDIX I. 
 
 that he would have been liable to pay compensation under the provisions 
 of this Act, the action shall be dismissed ; but the court in which the action 
 is tried shall, if the plaintiff so choose, proceed to assess such compensation, 
 but may deduct from such compensation all or part of the costs which, in 
 its judgment, have been caused by the plaintiff bringing the action instead 
 of proceeding under this Act. In any proceeding under this sub-section, 
 when the court assesses the compensation it shall give a certificate of the 
 compensation it has awarded and the directions it has given as to the deduc- 
 tion for costs, and such certificate shall have the force and effect of an 
 award under this Act. 
 
 (5) Nothing in this Act shall affect any proceeding for a fine under the 
 enactments relating to mines, factories, or workshops, or the application 
 of any such fine. 
 
 2. Time, for taking proceedings.} (1) Proceedings for the recovery under 
 this Act of compensation for an injury shall not be maintainable unless 
 notice of the accident has been given as soon as practicable after the 
 happening thereof and before the workman has voluntarily left the employ- 
 ment in which he was injured, and unless the claim for compensation with 
 respect to such accident has been made within six months from the occur- 
 rence of the accident causing the injury, or, in case of death, within six 
 months from the time of death : 
 
 Provided always that 
 
 (a) the want of or any defect or inaccuracy in such notice shall not 
 be a bar to the maintenance of such proceedings if it is found 
 in the proceedings for settling the claim that the employer is 
 not, or would not, if a notice or an amended notice were" then 
 given and the hearing postponed, be prejudiced in his defence 
 by the want, defect, or inaccuVacy, or that such want, defect, 
 or inaccuracy was occasioned by mistake, absence from the 
 United Kingdom, or other reasonable cause ; and 
 
 (6) the failure to make a claim within the period above specified shall 
 not be a bar to the maintenance of such proceedings if it is 
 found that the failure was occasioned by mistake, absence 
 from the United Kingdom, or other reasonable cause. 
 
 (2) Notice in respect of an injury under this Act shall give the name 
 and address of the person injured, and shall state in ordinarj* language the 
 cause of the injury and the date at which the accident happened, and shall 
 be served on the employer, or, if there is more than one employer, upon 
 one of such employers. 
 
 (3) The notice may be served by delivering the same at, or sending it 
 by post in a registered letter addressed to, the residence or place of business 
 of the person on whom it is to be served. 
 
 (4) Where the employer is a body of persons, corporate or unincorporate, 
 the notice may also be served by delivering the same at, or by sending it 
 by post in a registered letter addressed to, the employer at the office, or, if 
 there be more than one office, any one of the offices of such body. 
 
 3. Contracting out.] (1) If the Registrar of Friendly Societies, after 
 taking steps to ascertain the views of the employer and workmen, certifies 
 that any scheme of compensation, benefit, or insurance for the workmen of 
 an employer in any employment, whether or not such scheme includes 
 other employers and their workmen, provides scales of compensation not 
 less favourable to the workmen and their dependants than the corresponding 
 scales contained in this Act, and that, where the scheme provides for con- 
 tributions by the workmen, the scheme confers benefits at least equivalent 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. 353 
 
 to those contributions, in addition to the benefits to which the workmen 
 would have been entitled under this Act, and that a majority (to be ascer- 
 tained by ballot) of the workmen to whom the scheme is applicable are in 
 favour of such scheme, the employer may, whilst the certificate is in force, 
 contract with any of his workmen that the provisions of the scheme shall 
 be substituted for the provisions of this Act, and thereupon the employer 
 shall be liable only in accordance with the scheme, but, save as aforesaid, 
 this Act shall apply notwithstanding any contract to the contrary made 
 after the commencement of this Act. 
 
 (2) The Registrar may give a certificate to expire at the end of a limited 
 period of not less than five years, and may from time to time renew with or 
 without modifications, such a certificate to expire at the end of the period 
 for which it is renewed. 
 
 (3) No scheme shall be so certified which contains an obligation upon 
 the workmen to join the scheme as a condition of their hiring, or which 
 does not contain provisions enabling a workman to withdraw from the 
 scheme. 
 
 (4) If complaint is made to the Registrar of Friendly Societies by or on 
 behalf of the workmen of any employer that the benefits conferred by any 
 scheme no longer conform to the conditions stated in sub-section (1) of this 
 section, or that the provisions of such scheme are being violated, or that 
 the scheme is not being fairly administered, or that satisfactory reasons 
 exist for revoking the certificate, the Registrar shall examine into the 
 complaint, and, if satisfied that good cause exist for such complaint, shall, 
 unless the cause of complaint is removed, revoke the certificate. 
 
 (5) When a certificate is revoked or expires, any moneys or securities 
 held for the purpose of the scheme shall, after due provision has been made 
 to discharge the liabilities already accrued, be distributed as may be arranged 
 between the employer and workmen, or as may be determined by the 
 Registrar of Friendly Societies in the event of a difference of opinion. 
 
 (6) Whenever a scheme has been certified as aforesaid, it shall be the 
 duty of the employer to answer all such inquiries and to furnish all such 
 accounts in regard to the scheme as may be made or required by the Registrar 
 of Friendly Societies. 
 
 (7) The Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies shall include in his annual 
 report the particulars of the proceedings of the Registrar under this Act. 
 
 (8) The Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies may make regulations for 
 the purpose of carrying this section into effect. 
 
 4. Sub-contracting.] (1) Where any person (in this section referred to 
 as the principal), in the course of or for the purposes of his trade or business 
 contracts with any other person (in this section referred to as the con- 
 tractor) for the execution by or under the contractor of the whole or any 
 part of any work undertaken by the principal, the principal shall be liable 
 to pay to any workman employed in the execution of the work any com- 
 pensation under this Act which he would have been liable to pay if that 
 workman had been immediately employed by him ; and where compensa- 
 tion is claimed from or proceedings are taken against the principal, then, 
 in the application of this Act, references to the principal shall be substituted 
 for references to the employer, except that the amount of compensation 
 shall be calculated with reference to the earnings of the workman under 
 the employer by whom he is immediately employed : ' 
 
 Provided that, where the contract relates to threshing, ploughing, or 
 other agricultural work, and the contractor provides and uses machinery 
 driven by mechanical power for the purpose of such work, he and he alone 
 
 W.C.A. 2 A 
 
354 APPENDIX I. 
 
 shall be liable under this Act to pay compensation to any workman em- 
 ployed by him on such work. 
 
 (2) Where the principal is liable to pay compensation under this section, 
 he shall be entitled to be indemnified by any person who would have been 
 liable to pay compensation to the workman independently of this section, 
 and all questions as to the right to and amount of any such indemnity shall 
 in default of agreement be settled by arbitration under this Act. 
 
 (3) Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing a workman 
 recovering compensation under this Act from the contractor instead of the 
 principal. 
 
 (4) This section shall not apply in any case where the accident occurred 
 elsewhere than on, or in, or about premises on which the principal has 
 undertaken to execute the work or which are otherwise under his control 
 or management. 
 
 5. Provision as to cases of bankruptcy of employer.'] (1) Where any 
 employer has entered into a contract with any insurers in respect of am r 
 liability under this Act to any workman, then, in the event of the employer 
 becoming bankrupt, or making a composition or arrangement with his 
 creditors, or if the employer is a company in the event of the company 
 having commenced to be wound up, the rights of the employer against the 
 insurers as respects that liability shall notwithstanding anything in the 
 enactments relating to bankruptcy and the Minding up of companies, be 
 transferred to and vest in the workman, and upon any such transfer the 
 insurers shall have the same rights and remedies and be subject to the 
 same liabilities as if they were the employer, so however that the insurers 
 shall not be under any greater liability to the workman than they would 
 have been under to the employer. 
 
 (2) If the liability of the insurers to the workman is less than the liability 
 of the emplo3 r er to the workman, the workman may prove for the balance 
 in the bankruptcy or liquidation. 
 
 (3) There shall be included among the debts which under section one 
 of the Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Act, 1888, and section four of 
 the Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy (Ireland) Act, 1889, are in the 
 distribution of the property of a bankrupt and in the distribution of the 
 assets of a company being wound up to be paid in priority to all other debts, 
 the amount, not exceeding in any individual case one hundred pounds, due 
 in respect of any compensation" the liability wherefor accrued before the 
 date of the receiving order or the date of the commencement of the winding 
 up, and those Acts and the Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Amend- 
 ment Act, 1897, shall have effect accordingly. Where the compensation 
 is a weekly payment, the amount due in respect thereof shall, for the 
 purposes of this provision, be taken to be the amount of the lump sum for 
 which the weekly payment could, if redeemable, be redeemed if the em- 
 ployer made an application for that purpose under the First Schedule to 
 this Act. 
 
 (4) In the case of the winding up of a company within the meaning of 
 the Stannaries Act, 1887, such an amount as aforesaid, if the compensation 
 is payable to a miner or the dependants of a miner, shall have the like 
 priority as is conferred on wages of miners by section nine of that Act, and 
 that section shall have effect accordingly. 
 
 (5) The provisions of this section with respect to preferences and 
 priorities shall not apply where the bankrupt or the company being wound 
 up has entered into such a contract with insurers as aforesaid. 
 
 (6) This section shall not apply where a company is wound up volun- 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. 355 
 
 tarily merely for the purposes of reconstruction or of amalgamation with 
 aaother company. 
 
 6. Remedies loth against employer and stranger.] Where the injury for 
 which compensation is payable under this Act was caused under circum- 
 stances creating a legal liability in some person other than the employer to 
 pay damages in respect thereof 
 
 (1) The workman may take proceedings both against that person to 
 
 recover damages and against any person liable to pay compensa- 
 tion under this Act for such compensation, but shall not be en- 
 titled to recover both damages and compensation ; and 
 
 (2) If the workman has recovered compensation under this Act, the 
 
 person by whom the compensation was paid, and any person who 
 has been called on to pay an indemnity under the section of this 
 Act relating to sub-contracting, shall be entitled to be indemnified 
 by the person so liable to pay damages as aforesaid, and all ques- 
 tions as to the right to and amount of any such indemnity shall, 
 in default of agreement, be settled by action, or, by consent of 
 the parties, by arbitration under this Act. 
 
 7. Application of Act to seamen.] (1) This Act shall apply to masters, 
 seamen, and apprentices to the sea service and apprentices in the sea- 
 fishing service, provided that such persons are workmen within the meaning 
 of this Act, and are members of the crew of any ship registered in the United 
 Kingdom, or of any other British ship or vessel of which the owner, or (if 
 there is more than one owner) the managing owner, or manager resides or 
 has his principal place of business in the United Kingdom, subject to the 
 following modifications : 
 
 (a) The notice of accident and the claim for compensation may, except 
 where the person injured is the master, be served on the master 
 of the ship as if he were the employer, but where the accident 
 happened and the incapacity commenced on board the ship it 
 shall not be necessary to give any notice of the accident : 
 
 (6) In the case of the death of the master, seaman, or apprentice, the 
 claim for compensation shall be made within, six months after 
 news of the death has been received by the claimant : 
 
 (c) Where an injured master, seaman, or apprentice is discharged or 
 
 left behind in a British possession or in a foreign country, deposi- 
 tions respecting the circumstances and nature of the injury may 
 be taken by any judge or magistrate in the British possession, 
 and by any British consular officer in the foreign country, and if 
 so taken shall be transmitted by the person by whom they are 
 taken to the Board of Trade, and such depositions or certified 
 copies thereof shall in any proceedings for enforcing the claim be 
 admissible in evidence as provided by sections six hundred and 
 ninety-one and six hundred and ninety-five of the Merchant 
 Shipping Act, 1894, and those sections shall apply accordingly : 
 
 (d) In the case of the death of a master, seaman, or apprentice, leaving 
 
 no dependants, no compensation shall be payable, if the owner of 
 the ship is under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, liable to pay 
 the expenses of burial : 
 
 (e) The weekly payment shall not be payable in respect of the period 
 
 during which the owner of the ship is, under the Merchant Shipping 
 Act, 1894, as amended by any subsequent enactment, or other- 
 wise, liable to defray the expenses of maintenance -of the injured 
 master, seaman, or apprentice : 
 
356 ArrKNDix I. 
 
 (/) Any sum payable by way of compensation by the owner of a ship 
 under this Act shall be paid in full notwithstanding anything in 
 section five hundred and three of the Merchant Shipping Act, 
 1894 (which relates to the limitation of a shipowner's liability in 
 certain cases of loss of life, injtir3% or damage), but the limitation 
 on the owner's liability imposed by that section shall apply to 
 the amount recoverable by way of indemnity under the section 
 of this Act relating to remedies both against employer and stranger 
 as if the indemnity were damages for loss of life or personal 
 injury. 
 
 (g) Subsections (2) and (3) of section one hundred and seventy-four of 
 the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (which relates to the recovery 
 of wages of seamen lost with their ship), shall apply as respects 
 proceedings for the recovery of compensation by dependants of 
 masters, seamen, and apprentices lost with their ship as they 
 apply with respect to proceedings for the recovery of wages due 
 to seamen and apprentices ; and proceedings for the recovery of 
 compensation shall in such a case be maintainable if the claim is 
 made within eighteen months of the date at which the ship is 
 deemed to have been lost with all hands. 
 
 (2) This Act shall not apply to such members of the crew of a fishing 
 vessel as are remunerated by shares in the profits or the gross earnings of 
 the working of such vessel. 
 
 (3) This section shall extend to pilots to whom Part X. of the Merchant 
 Shipping Act, 1894, applies, as if a pilot when employed on any such ship 
 as aforesaid were a seaman and a member of the crew. 
 
 8. Application of Act to industrial diseases. (1) Where 
 
 (i) the certifying surgeon appointed under the Factory and Workshop 
 Act, 1901, for the district in which a workman is employed 
 certifies that the workman is suffering from a disease men- 
 tioned in the Third Schedule to this Act and is thereby disabled 
 from earning full wages at the work at which he was employed ; 
 or 
 
 (ii) a workman is, in pursuance of any special rules or regulations 
 made under the Factory and Workshop Aot, 1901, suspended 
 from his usual employment on account of having contracted 
 any such disease ; or 
 
 (iii) the death of a workman is caused by any such disease ; 
 and the disease is due to the nature of any employment in which the work- 
 man was employed at anj* time within the twelve months previous to the 
 date of the disablement or suspension, whether under one or more employers, 
 he or his dependants shall be entitled to compensation under this Act as if 
 the disease or such suspension as aforesaid were a personal injury by accident 
 arising out of and in the course of that employment, subject to the following 
 modifications : 
 
 (a) The disablement or suspension shall be treated as the happening of 
 
 the accident ; 
 
 (&) If it is proved that the workman has at the time of entering the 
 employment wilfully and falsely represented himself in writing 
 as not having previously suffered from the disease, compensation 
 shall not be payable ; 
 
 (c) The compensation shall be recoverable from the employer who last 
 employed the workman during the said twelve months in the 
 employment to the nature of which the disease was due : 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. 357 
 
 Provided that 
 
 (i) the workman or his dependants if so required shall 
 furnish that employer with such information as to the 
 names and addresses of all the other employers Avho em- 
 ployed him in. the employment during the said twelve 
 months as he or they may possess, and, if such information 
 is not furnished, or is not sufficient to enable that employer 
 to take proceedings under the next following proviso, that 
 employer upon proving that the disease was not contracted 
 whilst the workman was in his employment shall not be 
 liable to pay compensation ; and 
 
 (ii) if that employer alleges that the disease was in fact 
 contracted whilst the workman was in the employment of 
 some other employer, and not whilst in his employment, 
 he may join such other employer as a party to the arbitra- 
 tion, and if the allegation is proved that other employer 
 shall be the employer from whom the compensation is to 
 be recoverable ; and 
 
 (iii) if the disease is of such a nature as to be contracted 
 by a gradual process, any other employers who during the 
 said twelve months employed the workman in the employ- 
 ment to the nature of which the disease was due shall be 
 liable to make to the employer from whom compensation 
 is recoverable such contributions as, in default of agree- 
 ment, may be determined in the arbitration under this Act 
 for settling the amount of the compensation ; 
 
 (d) The amount of the compensation shall be calculated with reference 
 
 to the earnings of the workman under the employer from whom 
 the compensation is recoverable ; 
 
 (e) The employer to whom notice of the death, disablement, or suspension 
 
 is to be given shall be the employer who last employed the work- 
 man during the said twelve months in the employment to the 
 nature of which the disease was due, and the notice may be given 
 notwithstanding that the workman has voluntarily left his em- 
 ployment ; 
 
 ( / ) If an employer or a workman is aggrieved by the action of a certify- 
 ing or other surgeon in giving or refusing to give a certificate of 
 
 : disablement or in suspending or refusing to suspend a workman 
 
 for the purposes of this section, the matter shall in accordance 
 with regulations made by the Secretary of State be referred to a 
 medical referee, whose decision shall be final. 
 
 (2) If the workman at or immediately before the date of the disable- 
 ment or suspension was employed in any process mentioned in the second 
 column of the Third Schedule to this Act, and the disease contracted is the 
 disease in the first column of that Schedule set opposite the description of 
 the process, the disease, except where the certifying surgeon certifies that 
 in his opinion the disease was not due to the nature of the employment, 
 shall be deemed to have been due to the nature of that employment unless 
 the employer proves the contrary. 
 
 (3) The Secretary of State may make rules regulating the duties and 
 fees of certifying and other surgeons (including dentists) under this 
 section. 
 
 (4) For the purposes of this section the date of disablement shall be 
 such date as the certify ing surgeon certifies as the date on which the 
 
358 . APPENDIX I. 
 
 disablement commenced, or, if he is unable to certify such a date, the date 
 
 on which the certificate is given : Provided that 
 
 (a) Where the medical referee allows an appeal against a refusal by a 
 certifying surgeon to give a certificate of disablement, the date of 
 disablement shall be such date as the medical referee may deter- 
 mine : 
 
 (6) Where a workman dies without having obtained a certificate of 
 disablement, or is at the time of death not in receipt of a weekly 
 payment on account of disablement, it shall be the date of 
 death. 
 
 (5) In such cases, and subject to such conditions as the Secretary of 
 State may direct, a medical practitioner appointed by the Secretary of 
 State for the purpose shall have the powers and duties of a certifying 
 surgeon under this section, and this section shall be construed accordingly. 
 
 (6) The Secretary of State may make orders for extending the pro- 
 visions of this section to other diseases and other processes, and to injuries 
 due to the nature of any employment specified in the order not being injuries 
 by accident, either without modification or subject to such modifications 
 as may be contained in the order. 
 
 (7) Where, after inquiry held on the application of any employers or 
 workmen engaged in any industry to which this section applies, it appears 
 that a mutual trade insurance company or society for insuring against the 
 risks under this section has been established for the industry, and that a 
 majority of the employers engaged in that industry are insured against such 
 risks in the company or society and that the company or society consents, 
 the Secretary of State may, by Provisional Order, require all employers 
 in that industry to insure in the company or society upon such terms and 
 under such conditions and subject to such exceptions as may be set forth 
 in the Order. Where such a company or society has been established, but 
 is confined to employers in any particular locality or of any particular 
 class, the Secretary of State may for the purposes of this provision treat 
 the industry as carried on by employers in that locality or of that class, as 
 a separate industry. 
 
 (8) A Provisional Order made under this section shall be of no force 
 whatever unless and until it is confirmed by Parliament, and if, while the 
 Bill confirming any such Order is pending in either House of Parliament, 
 a petition is presented against the Order, the bill may be referred to a 
 Select Committee, and the petitioner shall be allowed to appear and oppose 
 as in the case of Private Bills, and any Act confirming any Provisional 
 Order under this section may be repealed, altered, or amended by a Pro- 
 visional Order made and confirmed in like manner. 
 
 (9) Any expenses incurred by the Secretary of State in respect of any 
 such Order, Provisional Order, or confirming Bill shall be defrayed out of 
 moneys provided by Parliament. 
 
 (10) Nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a workman to 
 recover compensation in respect of a disease to which this section does not 
 apply, if the disease is a personal injury by accident within the meaning of 
 this Act. 
 
 9. Application to workmen in employment of Crown.~\ (1) This Act shall 
 not apply to persons in the naval or military service of the Crown, but 
 otherwise shall apply to workmen emploj-ed by or under the Crown to 
 whom this Act would appty if the emploj-er were a private person : 
 
 Provided that in the case of a person employed in the private service 
 of the Crown, the head of that department of the Royal Household in which 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. 359 
 
 he was employed at the time of the accident shall be deemed to be his 
 employer. 
 
 (2) The Treasury may, by warrant laid before Parliament, modify for 
 the purposes of this Act their warrant made under section one of the Super- 
 annuation Act, 1887, and notwithstanding anything in that Act, or any 
 such warrant, may frame schemes with a view to their being certified by 
 the Registrar of Friendly Societies under this Act. 
 
 10. Appointment and remuneration of medical referees and arbitrators.] 
 (1) The Secretary of State may appoint such legally qualified medical 
 practitioners to be medical referees for the purposes of this Act as he may, 
 with the sanction of the Treasury, determine, and the remuneration of, 
 and other expenses incurred by, medical referees under this Act shall, 
 subject to regulations made by the Treasury, be paid out of moneys pro- 
 vided by Parliament. 
 
 Where a medical referee has been employed as a medical practitioner 
 in connection with any case by or on behalf of an employer or workman or 
 by any insurers interested, he shall not act as medical referee in that 
 case. 
 
 (2) The remuneration of an arbitrator appointed by a judge of county 
 courts under the Second Schedule to this Act shall be paid out of moneys 
 provided by Parliament in accordance with regulations made by the 
 Treasury. 
 
 11. Detention of ships.] (1) If it is alleged that the owners of any ship 
 are liable as such owners to pay compensation under this Act, and at any 
 time that ship is found in any port or river of England or Ireland, or within 
 three miles of the coast thereof, a judge of any court of record in England 
 or Ireland may, upon its being shown to him by any person applying in 
 accordance with the rules of the court that the owners are probably liable 
 as such to pay such compensation, and that none of the owners reside in 
 the United Kingdom, issue an order directed to any officer of customs or 
 other officer named by the judge requiring him to detain the ship until 
 such time as the owners, agent, master, or consignee thereof have paid 
 such compensation, or have given security, to be approved by the judge, 
 to abide the event of any proceedings that may be instituted to recover 
 such compensation and to pay such compensation and costs as may be 
 awarded thereon ; and any officer of customs or other officer to whom the 
 order is directed shall detain the ship accordingly.* 
 
 (2) In any legal proceeding to recover such compensation, the person 
 giving security shall be made defendant, and the production of the order 
 of the judge, made in relation to the security, shall be conclusive evidence 
 of the liability of the defendant to the proceeding. 
 
 (3) Section six hundred and ninety-two of the Merchant Shipping Act, 
 1894, shall apply to the detention of a ship under this Act as it applies to 
 the detention of a ship under that Act, and, if the owner of a ship is a 
 corporation, it shall for the purposes of this section be deemed to reside in 
 the United Kingdom if it has an office in the United Kingdom at which 
 service of writs can be effected. 
 
 12. Returns as to compensation.] (1) Every employer in any industry 
 to which the Secretary of State may direct that this section shall apply 
 shall, on or before such day in every year as the Secretary of State may 
 direct, send to the Secretary of State a correct return specifying the number 
 of injuries in respect of which compensation has been paid by him under 
 this Act during the previous year, and the amount of such compensation, 
 together with such other particulars as to the compensation as the Secretary 
 
360 AlTENDIX I. 
 
 of State may direct, and in default of complying with this section shall be 
 liable on conviction under the Summary Jurisdiction Acts to a fine not 
 exceeding five pounds. 
 
 (2) Any regulations made by the Secretary of State containing such 
 directions as aforesaid shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament as 
 soon as may be after they are made. 
 
 13. Definitions.] In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, 
 
 " Employer " includes any body of persons corporate or unincorporate 
 and the legal personal representative of a deceased employer, 
 and, where the services of a workman are temporarily lent or let 
 on hire to another person by the person with whom the workman 
 has entered into a contract of service or apprenticeship, the latter 
 shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to continue to be 
 the employer of the workman whilst he is working for that other 
 person; 
 
 " Workman " does not include any person employed otherwise than 
 by way of manual labour whose remuneration exceeds two 
 hundred and fifty pounds a year, or a person whose employment 
 is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the 
 purposes of the employer's trade or business, or a member of a 
 police force, or an outworker, or a member of the employer's 
 family duelling in his house, but. save as aforesaid, means any 
 person who has entered into or works under a contract of service 
 or apprenticeship with an employer, whether by way of manual 
 labour, clerical work, or otherwise, and whether the contract is 
 expressed or implied, is oral or in writing ; 
 
 Any reference to a workman who has been injured shall, where the 
 workman is dead, include a reference to his legal personal repre- 
 sentative or to his dependants or other person to whom or for 
 whose benefit compensation is payable ; 
 
 " Dependants " means such of the members of the workman's family 
 as were wholly or in part dependent upjon the earnings of the 
 workman at the time of his death, or would but for the incapacity 
 due to the accident have been so dependent, and where the work- 
 man, being the parent or grandparent of an illegitimate child, 
 leaves such a child so dependent upon his earnings, or, being an 
 illegitimate child, leaves a parent or grandparent so dependent 
 upon his earnings, shall include such an illegitimate child and 
 parent or grandparent respectively ; 
 
 " Member of a family " means wife or husband, father, mother, 
 grandfather, grandmother, step-father, step-mother, son, daughter, 
 grandson, granddaughter, step-son, step-daughter, brother, sister, 
 half-brother, half-sister; 
 
 " Ship," " vessel," " seaman," and " port " have the same meanings 
 as in the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 ; 
 
 " Manager," in relation to a ship, means the ship's husband or other 
 person to whom the management of the ship is entrusted by or 
 on behalf of the owner ; 
 
 " Police force " means a police force to which the Police Act, 1890, 
 or the Police (Scotland) Act, 1890, applies, the City of London 
 Police Force, .the Royal Irish Constabulary, and the Dublin 
 Metropolitan Police Force ; 
 
 " Outworker " means a person to whom articles or materials are 
 given out to be made up, cleaned, washed, altered, ornamented. 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. 361 
 
 finished, or repaired, or adapted for sale, in his own home or on 
 other premises not under the control or management of the person 
 who gave out the materials or articles ; 
 
 The exercise and performance of the powers and duties of a local or 
 other public authority shall, for the purposes of this Act, be 
 treated as the trade or business of the authority ; 
 
 "County court," "judge of the county court," "registrar of the 
 county court," "plaintiff," and "rules of court," as respects 
 Scotland, mean respectively sheriff court, sheriff, sheriff clerk, 
 pursuer, and act of sederunt. 
 
 14. Special provisions as to Scotland.] In Scotland, where a workman 
 raises an action against his employer independently of this Act in respect 
 of any injury caused by accident arising out of and in the course of the 
 employment, the action, if raised in the sheriff court and concluding for 
 damages under the Employers' Liability Act, 1880, or alternatively at 
 common law or under the Employers' Liability Act, 1880, shall, notwith- 
 standing anything contained in that Act, not be removed under that Act 
 or otherwise to the Court of Session, nor shall it be appealed to that court 
 otherwise than by appeal on a question of law ; and for the purposes of 
 such appeal the provisions of the Second Schedule to this Act in regard to 
 an appeal from the decision of the sheriff on any question of law determined 
 by him as arbitrator under this Act shall apply. 
 
 15. Provisions as to existing contracts and schemes.] (1) Any contract 
 (other than a contract substituting the provisions of a scheme certified 
 under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, for the provisions of that 
 Act) existing at the commencement of this Act, whereby a workman relin- 
 quishes any right to compensation from the employer for personal injury 
 arising out of and in the course of his employment, shall not, for the purposes 
 of this Act, be deemed to continue after the time at which the workman's 
 contract of service would determine if notice of the determination thereof 
 were given at the commencement of this Act. 
 
 (2) Every scheme under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, in 
 force at the commencement of this Act shall, if re-certified by the Registrar 
 of Friendly Societies, have effect as if it were a scheme under this Act. 
 
 (3) The Registrar shall re-certify any such scheme if it is proved to his 
 satisfaction that the scheme conforms, or has been so modified as to con- 
 form, with the provisions of this Act as to schemes. 
 
 (4) If any such scheme has not been so re-certified before the expira- 
 tion of six months from the commencement of this Act, the certificate 
 thereof shall be revoked. 
 
 16. Commencement and repeal.] (1) This Act shall come into operation 
 on the first day of July nineteen hundred and seven, but, except so far as 
 it relates to references to medical referees, and proceedings consequential 
 thereon, shall not apply in any case where the accident happened before 
 the commencement of this Act. 
 
 (2) The Workmen's Compensation Acts, 1897 and 1900, are hereby 
 repealed, but shall continue to apply to cases where the accident happened 
 before the commencement of this Act, except to the extent to which this 
 Act applies to those cases. 
 
 17. Short title.] This Act may be cited as the Workmen's Compensation 
 Act, 1906. 
 
362 APPENDIX I. 
 
 SCHEDULES. 
 FIRST SCHEDULE. 
 
 SCALE AND CONDITIONS OF COMPENSATION. 
 
 (1) The amount of compensation under this Act shall be 
 (a) where death results from the injury 
 
 (i) if the workman leaves any dependants wholly dependent 
 upon his earnings, a sum equal to his earnings in the employ- 
 ment of the same employer during the three years next pre- 
 ceding the injury, or the sum of one hundred and fifty pounds, 
 whichever of those sums is the larger, but not exceeding in any 
 case three hundred pounds, provided that the amount of any 
 weekly payments made under this Act, and any lump sum paid 
 in redemption thereof, shall be deducted from such sum, and, 
 if the period of the workman's employment by the said em- 
 ployer has been less than the said three years, then the amount 
 of his earnings during the said three years shall be deemed to 
 be one hundred and fifty-six times his average weekly earnings 
 during the period of his actual employment under the said 
 employer ; 
 
 (ii) if the workman does not leave any such dependants, but 
 leaves any dependants in part dependent upon his earnings, 
 such sum, not exceeding in any case the amount payable under 
 the foregoing provisions, as may be agreed upon, or, in default 
 of agreement, may be determined, on arbitration under this Act, 
 to be reasonable and proportionate to the injury to the said 
 dependants ; and 
 
 (iii) if he leaves no dependants, the reasonable expenses of 
 his medical attendance and burial, not exceeding ten pounds ; 
 (6) where total or partial incapacity for work results from the injury, 
 a weekly payment during the incapacity not exceeding fifty 
 per cent, of his average weekly earnings during the previous 
 twelve months, if he has been so long employed, but if not then 
 for any less period during which he has been in the employment 
 of the same emploj'er, such weekly payment not to exceed one 
 pound : 
 Provided that 
 
 (a) if the incapacity lasts less than two weeks no compensation shall 
 
 be payable in respect of the first week ; and 
 
 (6) as respects the weekly payments during total incapacity of a 
 workman who is under twenty-one years of age at the date of 
 the injury, and whose average weekly earnings are less than 
 twenty shillings, one hundred per cent, shall be substituted for 
 fifty per cent, of his average weekly earnings, but the weekly 
 payment shall in no case exceed ten shillings. 
 
 (2) For the purposes of the provisions of this schedule relating to 
 '' earnings " and " average weekly earnings " of a workman, the following 
 rules shall be observed : 
 
 (a) average weekly earnings shall be computed in such manner as is 
 best calculated to give the rate per week at which the workman 
 was being remunerated. Provided that where by reason of the 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. 363 
 
 shortness of the time during which the workman has been in the 
 employment of his employer, or the casual nature of the employ- 
 ment, or the terms of the employment, it is impracticable at the 
 date of the accident to compute the rate of remuneration, regard 
 may be had to the average weekly amount which, during the 
 twelve months previous to the accident, was being earned by a 
 person in the same grade employed at the same work by the same 
 employer, or, if there is no person so employed, by a person in the 
 same grade employed in the same class of employment and in the 
 same district ; 
 
 (6) where the workman had entered into concurrent contracts of service 
 with two or more employers under which he worked at one time 
 for one such employer and at another time for another such 
 employer, his average weekly earnings shall be computed as if his 
 earnings under all such contracts were earnings in the employment 
 of the employer for whom he was working at the time of the 
 accident ; 
 
 (c) employment by the same employer shall be taken to mean employ- 
 
 ment by the same employer in the grade hi which the workman 
 was employed at the time of the accident, uninterrupted by 
 absence from work due to illness or any other unavoidable cause ; 
 
 (d) Where the employer has been accustomed to pay to the workman a 
 
 sum to cover any special expenses entailed on him by the nature 
 of his employment, the sum so paid shall not be reckoned as part 
 of the earnings. 
 
 (3) In fixing the amount of the weekly payment, regard, shall be had 
 to any payment, allowance, or benefit which the workman may receive from 
 the employer during the period of his incapacity, and in the case of partial 
 incapacity the weekly payment shall in no case exceed the difference between 
 the amount of the average weekly earnings of the workman before the 
 accident and the average weekly amount which he is earning or is able to 
 earn in some suitable employment or business after the accident, but shall 
 bear such relation to the amount of that difference as under the circum- 
 stances of the case may appear proper. 
 
 (4) Where a workman has given notice of an accident, he shall, if so 
 required by the employer, submit himself for examination by a duly qualified 
 medical practitioner provided and paid by the employer, and, if he refuses 
 to submit hftnself to such examination, or in any way obstructs the same, 
 his right to compensation, and to take or prosecute any proceeding under 
 this Act in relation to compensation, shall be suspended until such examina- 
 tion has taken place. 
 
 (5) The payment in the case of death shall, unless otherwise ordered 
 as hereinafter provided, be paid into the county court, and any sum so 
 paid into court shall, subject to rules of court and the provisions of this 
 schedule, be invested, applied, or otherwise dealt with by the court in such 
 manner as the court in its discretion thinks fit for the benefit of the persons 
 entitled thereto under this Act, and the receipt of the registrar of the court 
 shall be a sufficient discharge in respect of the amount paid in : 
 
 Provided that, if so agreed, the payment in case of death shall, if the 
 workman leaves no dependants, be made to his legal personal representative, 
 or, if he has no such representative, to the person to whom the expenses of 
 medical attendance and burial are due. 
 
 (6) Rules of court may provide for the transfer of money paid into 
 court under this Act from one court to another, whether or not the court 
 
364 APPENDIX I. 
 
 from which it is to be transferred is in the same part of the United Kingdom 
 as the court to which it is to be transferred. 
 
 (7) Where a weekly payment is payable .under this Act to a person 
 under any legal disability, a count} 7 court may, on application being made 
 in accordance with rules of court, order that the weekly payment be paid 
 during the disability into court, and the provisions of this schedule with 
 respect to sums required by this schedule to be paid into court shall apply 
 to sums paid into court in pursuance of any such order. 
 
 (8) Any question as to who is a dependant shall, in default of agree- 
 ment, be settled 03* arbitration under this Act, or, if not so settled before 
 payment into court under this schedule, shall be settled by the county court, 
 and the amount payable to each dependant shall be settled by arbitration 
 under this Act, or, if not so settled before payment into court under this 
 schedule, by the county court. Where there are both total and partial 
 dependants nothing in this schedule shall be construed as preventing the 
 compensation being allotted partly to the total and partly to the partial 
 dependants. 
 
 (9) Where, on application being made in accordance with rules of court, 
 it appears to a county court that, on account of neglect of children on the 
 part of a widow, or on account of the variation of the circumstances of the 
 various dependants, or for any other sufficient cause, an order of the court 
 or an award as to the apportionment amongst the several dependants of 
 any sum paid as compensation, or as to the manner in which any sum 
 payable to any such dependant is to be invested, applied, or otherwise dealt 
 with, ought to be varied, the court maj make such order for the variation 
 of the former order or the award, as in the circumstances of the case the 
 court may think just. 
 
 (10) Any sum which under this schedule is ordered to be invested may 
 be invested in whole or in part in the Post Office Savings Bank by the 
 registrar of the county court in his name as registrar. 
 
 (11) Any sum to be so invested may be invested in the purchase of an 
 annuity from the National Debt Commissioners through the Post Office 
 Savings Bank, or be accepted by the Postmaster- General as a deposit in the 
 name of the registrar as such, and the provisions of any statute or regula- 
 tions respecting the limits of deposits in savings banks, and the declaration 
 to be made by a depositor, shall not apply to such sums. 
 
 (12) No part of any money invested in the name of the registrar of 
 any county court in the Post Office Savings Bank under this Act shall be 
 paid out, except upon authority addressed to the Postmaster- General by 
 the Treasury or, subject to regulations of the Treasury, by the judge or 
 registrar of the county court. 
 
 (13) Any person deriving any benefit from any moneys invested in a, 
 post office savings bank under the provisions of this Act may, nevertheless, 
 open an account in a post office savings bank or in any other savings bank 
 in his own name without being liable to any penalties imposed by any statute 
 or regulations in respect of the opening of accounts in two savings banks, 
 or of two accounts in the same savings bank. 
 
 (14) Any workman receiving weekly payments under this Act shall, if 
 so required by the emploj-er, from time to time submit himself for examina- 
 tion by a duly qualified medical practitioner provided and paid by the 
 employer. If the workman refuses to submit himself to such examination, 
 or in any wa}~ obstructs the same, his right to such weekly payments shall 
 be suspended until such examination has taken place.* 
 
 (15) A workman shall not be required to submit himself for examina- 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. 365 
 
 tion by a medical practitioner under paragraph (4) or paragraph (14) of 
 this schedule otherwise than in accordance with regulations made by the 
 Secretary of State, or at more frequent intervals than may be prescribed by 
 those regulations. 
 
 Where a workman has so submitted himself for examination by a 
 medical practitioner, or has been examined by a medical practitiom T 
 .selected by himself, and the employer or the workman, as the case may 
 be, has Avithin six days after such examination furnished the other with 
 a copy of the report of that practitioner as to the workman's condition, 
 then, in the event of no agreement being come to between the employer 
 and the workman as to the workman's condition or fitness for employ- 
 ment, the registrar of a county court, on application being made to the 
 court by both parties, may, on payment by the applicants of such fee not 
 exceeding one pound as may be prescribed, refe* the matter to a medical 
 referee. 
 
 The medical referee to whom the matter is so referred shall in accord- 
 ance with regulations made by the Secretary of State, give a certificate as to 
 the condition of the workman and his fitness for employment, specifying, 
 where necessary, the kind of employment for which he is fit, and that 
 certificate shall be conclusive evidence as to the matters so certified. 
 
 Where no agreement can be come to between the employer and the 
 workman as to whether or to what extent the incapacity of the workman 
 is due to the accident, the provisions of this paragraph shall, subject to any 
 regulations made by the Secretary of State, apply as if the question were 
 a question as to the condition of the workman. 
 
 If a workman, on being required so to do, refuses to submit himself for 
 examination by a medical referee to whom the matter has been so referred 
 as aforesaid, or in any way obstructs the same, his right to compensation 
 and to take or prosecute any proceeding under this Act in relation to com- 
 pensation, or, in the case of a workman in receipt of a weekly payment, his 
 right to that weekly payment, shall be suspended until such examination 
 has taken place. 
 
 Rules of court may be made for prescribing the manner in which docu- 
 ments are to be furnished or served and applications made under this 
 paragraph and the forms to be used for those purposes and, subject 
 to the consent of the Treasury, as to the fee to be paid under this 
 paragraph,, 
 
 (16) Any weekly payment may be reviewed at the request either of 
 the employer or of the workman, and on such review may be ended, 
 diminished, or increased, subject to the maximum above provided, and the 
 amount of payment shall, in default of agreement, be settled by arbitration 
 under this Act : 
 
 Provided that where the workman was at the date of the accident under 
 twenty-one years of age and the review takes place more than twelve months 
 after the accident, the amount of the weekly payment may be increased to 
 any amount not exceeding fifty per cent, of the weekly sum which the 
 workman would probably have been earning at the date of the review if he 
 had remained uninjured, but not in any case exceeding one pound. 
 
 (17) Where any weekly payment has been continued for not less than 
 six months, the liability therefore may, on application by or on behalf of 
 the employer, be redeemed by the payment of a lump sum of such an 
 amount as, where the incapacity is permanent, would, if invested in the 
 purchase of an immediate life annuity from the National Debt Commis- 
 sioners through the Post Office Savings Bank, purchase an annuity for the 
 
366 APPENDIX F. 
 
 workman equal to seventy-five per cent, of the annual value of the weekly 
 payment, and as in any other case may be settled by arbitration under this 
 Act, and such lump sum may be ordered by the committee or arbitrator or 
 judge of the county court to be invested or otherwise applied for the benefit 
 of the person entitled thereto : Provided that nothing in this paragraph 
 shall be construed as preventing agreements being made for the redemption 
 of a weekly payment by a lump sum. 
 
 (18) If a workman receiving a weekly payment ceases to reside in the 
 United Kingdom, he shall thereupon cease to be entitled to receive any 
 weekly payment, unless the medical referee certifies that the incapacity 
 resulting from the injury is likely to be of a permanent nature. If the 
 medical referee so certifies, the workman shall be entitled to receive quarterly 
 the amount of the weekly payments accruing due during the preceding 
 quarter so long as he proves, in such manner and at such intervals as may 
 be prescribed by rules of court, his identity and the continuance of the 
 incapacity in respect of which the weekly payment is payable. 
 
 (19) A weekly payment, or a sum paid by way of redemption thereof, 
 shall not be capable of being assigned, charged, or attached, and shall not 
 pass to any other person by operation of law, nor shall any claim be set off 
 against the same. 
 
 (20) Where under this schedule a right to compensation is suspended 
 no compensation shall be paj'able in respect of the period of suspension. 
 
 (21) Where a scheme certified under this Act provides for payment of 
 compensation by a friendly society, the provisions of the proviso to the first 
 subsection of section eight, section sixteen, and section forty-one of the 
 Friendly Societies Act, 1896, shall not apply to such society in respect of 
 such scheme. 
 
 (22) In the application of this Act to Ireland the provisions of the 
 County Officers and Courts (Ireland) Act, 1877, with respect to money 
 deposited in the Post Office Savings Bank under that Act shall apply to 
 money invested in the Post Office Savings Bank under this Act. 
 
 SECOND SCHEDULE. 
 ARBITRATION, &c. 
 
 (1) For the purpose of settling any matter which under this Act is to 
 be settled by arbitration, if any committee, representative of an emploj'er 
 and his workmen, exists with power to settle matters under this Act in the 
 case of the employer and workmen, the matter shall, unless either party 
 objects by notice in writing sent to the other party before the committee 
 meet to consider the matter, be settled by the arbitration of such com- 
 mittee, or be referred by them in their discretion to arbitration as herein- 
 after provided. 
 
 (2) If either party so objects, or there is no such committee, or the com- 
 mittee so refers the matter or fails to settle the^ matter within six months 
 from the date of the claim, the matter shall be settled by a single arbitrator 
 agreed on by the parties, or in the absence of agreement by the judge of 
 the county court, according to the procedure prescribed by rules of court. 
 
 (3) In England the matter, instead of being settled by the judge of the 
 county court, may, if the Lord Chancellor so authorises, be settled according 
 to the like procedure, by a single arbitrator appointed by that judge, and 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. 367 
 
 the arbitrator so appointed shall, for the purposes of this Act, have all the 
 powers of that judge. 
 
 (4) The Arbitration Act, 1889, shall not apply to any arbitration under 
 this Act ; but a committee or an arbitrator may, if they or he think fit, 
 submit any question of law for the decision of the judge of the county 
 court, and the decision of the judge on any question of law, either on such 
 submission, or in any case where he himself settles the matter under this 
 Act, or where he gives any decision or makes any order under this Act, 
 shall be final, unless within the time and in accordance with the conditions 
 prescribed by rules of the Supreme Court either party appeals to the Court 
 of Appeal ; and the judge of the county court, or the arbitrator appointed 
 by him, shall, for the purpose of proceedings under this Act, have the same 
 powers of procuring the attendance of witnesses and the production of 
 documents as if the proceedings were an action in the county court. 
 
 (5) A judge of county courts may, if he thinks fit, summon a medical 
 referee to sit with him as an assessor. 
 
 (6) Rules of court may make provision for the appearance in any 
 arbitration under this Act of any party by some other person. 
 
 (7) The costs of and incidental to the arbitration and proceedings 
 connected therewith shall be in the discretion of the committee, arbitrator, 
 or judge of the county court, subject as respects such judge and an arbitrator 
 appointed by him to rules of court. The costs, whether before a committee 
 or an arbitrator or in the county court, shall not exceed the limit prescribed 
 by rules of court, and shall be taxed in manner prescribed by those rules 
 and such taxation may be reviewed by the judge of the county court. 
 
 (8) In the case of the death, or refusal or inability to act, of an arbitrator, 
 the judge of the county court may, on the application of any party, appoint 
 a new arbitrator. 
 
 (9) Where the amount of compensation under this Act has been ascer- 
 tained, or any weekly payment varied, or any other matter decided under 
 this Act, either by a committee or by an arbitrator or by agreement, a 
 memorandum thereof shall be sent, in manner prescribed by rules of court, 
 by the committee or arbitrator, or by any party interested, to the registrar 
 of the county court who shall, subject to such rules, on being satisfied as 
 to its genuineness, record such memorandum in a special register without 
 fee, and thereupon the memorandum shall for all purposes be enforceable 
 as a county court judgment. 
 
 Provided that 
 
 (a) no such memorandum shall be recorded before seven days after the 
 despatch by the registrar of notice to the parties interested ; and 
 
 (6J where a workman seeks to record a memorandum of agreement 
 between his employer and himself for the payment of compen- 
 sation under this Act and the employer, in accordance with rules 
 of court, proves that the workman has in fact returned to work 
 and is earning the same wages as he did before the accident, 
 and objects to the recording of such memorandum, the memo- 
 randum shall only be recorded, if at all, on such terms as the 
 judge of the county court, under the circumstances, may think 
 just ; and 
 
 (c) the judge of the county court may at any time rectify the register ; 
 
 and 
 
 (d) where it appears to the registrar of the county court, on any 
 
 information which he considers sufficient, that an agreement as 
 to the redemption of a weekly payment by a lump sum, or an 
 
368 APPENDIX 1. 
 
 agreement as to the amount of compensation payable to a 
 person under any legal disabilitj', or to dependants, ought not 
 to be registered b}- reason of the inadequacy of the sum or 
 amount, or by reason of the agreement having been obtained 
 by fraud or undue influence, or other improper means, he may 
 refuse to record the memorandum of the agreement sent to 
 him for registration, and refer the matter to the judge, who 
 shall, in accordance with rules of court, make such order (in- 
 cluding an order as to any sum already paid under the agree- 
 ment) as under the circumstances he may think just ; and 
 (e) The judge may, within six months after a memorandum of an 
 agreement as to the redemption of a weekly payment by a 
 lump sum, or of an agreement as to the amount of compen- 
 sation payable to a person under any legal disability, or to 
 dependants, has been recorded in the register, order that the 
 record be removed from the register on proof to his satisfaction 
 that the agreement was obtained by fraud or undue influence 
 or other improper means, and may make such order (including 
 an order as to any sum already paid under the agreement) as 
 under the circumstances he may think just. 
 
 (10) An agreement as to the redemption of a weekly payment by a 
 lump sum if not registered in accordance with this Act shall not, nor shall 
 the payment of the sum payable under the agreement, exempt the person 
 by whom the weekly payment is payable from liability to continue to make 
 that weekly payment, and an agreement as to the amount of compensation 
 to be paid to a person under a legal disability or to dependants, if not so 
 registered, shall not, nor shall the payment of the sum payable under the 
 agreement, exempt the person by whom the compensation is paj'able from 
 liability to pay compensation, unless, in eithfer case, he proves that the 
 failure to register was not due to any neglect or default on his part. 
 
 (11) Where any matter under this Act is to be done in a county court, 
 or by, to, or before the judge or registrar of a county court, then, unless the 
 contrary intention appear, the same shall, subject to rules of court, be done 
 in, or by, to, or before the judge or registrar of the county court of the 
 district in which all the parties concerned reside, or if they reside in different 
 districts the district prescribed by rules of court, without prejudice to any 
 transfer in manner provided by rules of court. 
 
 (12) The duty of a judge of county courts under this Act, or in England 
 of an arbitrator appointed by him, shall, subject to rules of court, be part 
 of the duties of the county court, and the officers of the court shall act 
 accordingly, and rules of court may be made both for any purpose for 
 which this Act authorises rules of court to be made, and also generally 
 for carrying into effect this Act so far as it affects the county court, or 
 an arbitrator appointed by the judge of the county court, and proceedings 
 in the county court or before any such arbitrator, and such rules may, 
 in England, be made by the five judges of county courts appointed for 
 the making of rules under section one hundred and sixty -four of the County 
 Courts Act, 1888, and when allowed by the Lord Chancellor, as provided 
 by that section, shall have full effect without any further consent. 
 
 (13) No court fee, except such as may be prescribed under paragraph (15) 
 of the First Schedule to this Act, shall be payable by any party in respect 
 of any proceedings by or against a workman under this Act in the court 
 prior to the award. 
 
 (14) Any sum awarded as compensation shall, unless paid into court 
 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906. 369 
 
 under this Act, be paid on the receipt of the person to whom it is payable 
 under any agreement or award, and the solicitor or agent of a person claim- 
 ing compensation under this Act shall not be entitled to recover from him 
 any costs in respect of any proceedings in an arbitration under this Act, 
 or to claim a lien in respect of such costs on, or deduct such costs from, the 
 sum awarded or agreed as compensation, except such sum as may be awarded 
 by the committee, the arbitrator, or the judge of the county court, on an 
 application made either by the person claiming compensation, or by his 
 solicitor or agent, to determine the amount of costs to be paid to the solicitor 
 or agent, such sum to be awarded subject to taxation and to the scale of 
 costs prescribed by rules of court. 
 
 (15) Any committee, arbitrator, or judge may, subject to regulations 
 made by the Secretary of State and the Treasury, submit to a medical 
 referee for report any matter which seems material to any question arising 
 in the arbitration. 
 
 (16) The Secretary of State may, by order, either unconditionally or 
 subject to such conditions or modifications as he may think fit, confer on 
 any committee representative of an employer and his workmen, as respects 
 any matter in which the committee act as arbitrators, or which is settled 
 by agreement submitted to and approved by the committee, all or any of 
 the powers conferred by this Act exclusively on county courts or judges 
 of county courts, and may by the order provide how and to whom the 
 compensation money is to be paid in cases where, but for the order, the 
 money would be required to be paid into court, and the order may exclude 
 from the operation of provisoes (d) and (e) of paragraph (9) of this Schedule 
 agreements submitted to and approved by the committee, and may contain 
 such incidental, consequential, or supplemental provisions as may appear 
 to the Secretary of State to be necessary or proper for the purposes of the 
 order. 
 
 (17) In the application of this Schedule to Scotland 
 
 (a) " County court judgment " as used in paragraph (9) of this 
 Schedule means a recorded decree arbitral : 
 
 (6) Any application to the sheriff as arbitrator shall be heard, tried, 
 and determined summarily in the manner provided by section 
 fifty-two of the Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act, 1876, save only 
 that parties may be represented by any person authorised in 
 writing to appear for them and subject to the declaration that 
 It shall be competent to either party within the time and in 
 accordance with the conditions prescribed by act of sederunt 
 to require the sheriff to state a case on any question of law 
 determined by him, and his decision thereon in such case may 
 be submitted to either division of the Court of Session, who 
 may hear and determine the same and remit to the sheriff with 
 instruction as to the judgment to be pronounced, and an appeal 
 shall lie from either of such divisions to the House of Lords : 
 
 (c) Paragraphs (3), (4), and (8) shall not apply. 
 
 (18) In the application of this Schedule to Ireland the expression " judge 
 of the county court " shall include the recorder of any city or town, and an 
 appeal shall lie from the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords. 
 
 W.O.A. 
 
 2 B 
 
370 
 
 APPENDIX 1. 
 
 THIRD SCHEDULE. 
 
 Description of Disease. 
 
 Description of Process. 
 
 Anthrax 
 
 Handling of wool, hair, bristles, hides, 
 and skins. 
 
 Lead poisoning or its sequelae . Any process involving the use of lead or 
 
 its preparations or compounds. 
 
 Mercury poisoning or its sequelae Any process involving the use of mercury 
 
 or its preparations or compounds. 
 
 Phosphorus poisoning or its Any process involving the use of phos- 
 sequelse phorus or its preparations or com- 
 
 pounds. 
 
 Arsenic poisoning or its sequelae Any process involving the use of arsenic 
 
 or its preparations or compounds. 
 
 Ankylostomiasis 
 
 Mining. 
 
 Where regulations or special rules made under any Act of Parliament 
 for the protection of persons employed in any industry against the risk of 
 contracting lead poisoning require some or all of the persons employed in 
 certain processes specified in the regulations or special rules to be periodically 
 examined by a certifying or other surgeon, then, in the application of this 
 schedule to that industry, the expression " process " shall, unless the Secre- 
 tary of State otherwise directs, include only the processes so specified. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 A. 
 
 ABILITY TO DO LIGHT WORK. See WORK. 
 
 " ABLE TO EARN IN SOME SUITABLE EMPLOYMENT OR 
 BUSINESS," 160. 
 
 " ABOUT " 
 
 premises, 81. 
 
 ABSENCE FROM UNITED KINGDOM, 
 
 accident during, 2. 
 
 as excuse, for failure to make claim, 62, 69. 
 
 want, etc., of notice of accident, 62, 66. 
 weekly payments to workman during, 179, 241. 
 
 in case of French citizens, 255. 
 
 payment of arrears on death of workman, 243. 
 
 rules of procedure to obtain order for, 241. 
 
 ACCEPTANCE. See ARBITRATION ; CERTIFIED SCHEME ; COMPEN- 
 SATION ; DAMAGES. 
 
 ACCIDENT. See INJURY. 
 
 " by accident," meaning of, 4. 
 
 arising out of and in the course of the employment. See 
 
 EMPLOYMENT. 
 " by accident," 4. 
 cause of 
 
 act of God, 23. 
 of stranger, 24. 
 
 anaesthetic for operation, 4. 
 
 angrily snatching tool, 22. 
 
 animal, attack by, 4. 
 
 trespassing, 25. 
 
 anthrax, 7. 
 
 assaults, 5, 6, 24, 25. 
 
 bicycle collision in street, 26. 
 
 bursting of bottle while drinking, 27. 
 
 catching cold, 5. 
 
 contracting chill in cold water, 5. 
 
 while driving, 5, 24. 
 
 drinking water, when overheated, 5. 
 
 di-ying hair by fire, 22, 30. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 cause of continued. 
 emergency, 20. 
 
 caused by larking, 20. 
 evidence of, 40. 
 
 exertion in course of work, 3, 4, 6, 9, 38. 
 fall through coughing, 23. 
 falling off ship, 29, 32 et seq. 
 fit in dangerous position, 5, 24, 41. 
 forces of nature, 23. 
 frost-bite, 5, 24. 
 fumes after shot -firing, 5, 8. 
 germ or poison. 4. 
 heat apoplexy, 6. 
 heat-stroke, 4. 
 idiopathic disease, 7. 
 illustrations, 4. 
 
 immaterial if accident arise out of, etc., 
 jumping from quay to ship, 30. 
 
 on to moving vehicles, 30 
 kick by horse in street, 26. 
 "larking," 22. 
 lightning, 4, 23. 
 
 loitering in forbidden place, 29. 
 mis-hit, 4. 
 
 must be immediate, not remote, 41. 
 nervous shock, 5, 155. 
 ordinary cold, 5. 
 ordinary work, 3, 9. 
 paddling boat with a rudder, 30. 
 paralysis by riding tricycle, 7. 
 poison, 4. 
 
 proof of. See EVIDENCE. 
 question of fact, 3. 
 red-lead on blistered finger, 4. 
 riding on wagon couplings, 30. 
 second accident, 41, 154. 
 self-inflicted injuries, 4, 6. 
 sewer gas, 8. 
 
 sliding down hand-rail, 29. 
 stone-throwing, 4, 25. 
 strain, 3, 4, 6, 9, 38, 154. 
 street dangers, 25, 26. 
 suicide, 6. 
 
 presumption against 40. 
 sunstroke, 4, 23, 24. 
 taking off socks, 23. 
 tetanus, 8. 
 
 thrown from bicycle by dog, 26. 
 tortious act, 24. 
 
 unnecessary or unreasonable acts, 29. 
 using goods lift as access, 30. 
 voluntary operation, 30. 
 washing solution on sensitive skin, 5, 8. 
 wasp-sting, 25. 
 
 [ 2 ] 
 
INDEX. 
 
 inued. 
 cause of continued. 
 
 wearing tight or hard boots, no accident, 5. 
 
 weather, severity of, 23. 
 
 what is the " cause," 41. 
 
 question of fact, 41. 
 
 when workman already diseased, 8. 
 
 witnessing catastrophe, 5, 155. 
 definition of accident, 3. 
 
 effects of wider, 3. 
 
 Lord M'Laren's, 3, 4. 
 happening beyond employer's premises, 25. 
 
 during meal-times, 15, 27. 
 
 outside United Kingdom, 2. 
 illustrations, 4. 
 murder as, 5, 6, 25. 
 
 must arise out of and in course of employment, 9. 
 necessary to be able to fix date of, 8. 
 notice of, 
 
 ** as soon as practicable," 64. 
 
 condition precedent to proceedings, 61. 
 
 contents of, 63. 
 
 copy of, to be annexed to particulars, or reason for 
 omission given, 212. 
 
 does not amount to a " claim," 63, 67. 
 
 forms of, 63. 
 
 in industrial diseases, 109. 
 
 master of ship, by, 97, 225. 
 
 may incorporate a " claim," 64. 
 
 must be in writing, 63. 
 
 seaman, by, q.v. 
 
 service of, 62, 64. 
 
 date of, to be given in particulars, 212. 
 onus of proof of, 64. 
 relief against bad, 64. 
 
 time for, 61, 64. 
 
 in cases of industrial diseases, 64, 103, 109. 
 
 to company, 62, 64. 
 
 waiver of, 64. 
 
 want of or defective, 61, 64-67. 
 
 must be explained in particulars, 212. 
 
 what amounts to, 63. 
 
 whether, under Employers' Liability Act, 1880, good under 
 
 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. .63. 
 "personal injury by," 3. 
 
 question of law and fact, 3. 
 
 second accident contributed to by former, 41, 154. 
 to be judged from workman's standpoint, 6. 
 unexpected results may be, 4. 
 whilst going to or returning from work, 11. 
 
 returning after absence, 27. 
 
 ACT OF GOD. See ACCIDENT. 
 
 ACTION, 
 
 against contractor 
 
 none by employer now, 74, 84. 
 C 3 ] 
 
INDEX. 
 
 ACTION conlin ued. 
 
 against employer by workman 
 bars remedy under Act, 44. 
 not barred by claim under Act withdrawn, 47. 
 preserved by the Act, 42. 
 when barred, 45. 
 against stranger 
 
 causing actionable injury to workman, 88. 
 employer's right of, 89, 91. 
 none if compensation recovered, 88, 89. 
 when barred, 89. 
 
 agreement not enforceable by, 56. 
 barred, by acceptance of certified scheme, 47.. 
 compensation, 47, 89. 
 agreement to accept compensation, 47. 
 unsuccessful claim under Act, quaere whether, 40. 
 option to bring, discussed, 43. 
 unsuccessful 
 
 award after, bars appeal, 45. 
 compensation after, 45, 59. 
 
 application for, bars infants, 54. 
 certificate of, 59, 61. 
 who may give, 60. 
 deduction of costs of, 59. 
 
 effect of asking pro forma for compensation after, 45. 
 no arbitration after, 44, 59. 
 when available during payment of compensation, 162. 
 
 ACUTE BURSITIS, 205. 
 ADJOURNMENT. See ARBITRATION. 
 AFFILIATION ORDER, See DEPENDANTS. 
 
 AGREEMENT, 
 
 action cannot be brought to enforce, 56, 198. 
 
 a method of settling questions, 52. 
 
 bars proceedings, 53. 
 
 compensation may be settled by, 52 
 
 consideration for, necessary, 53. 
 
 effect of, 53. 
 
 enforcing, 55. 
 
 evidence of. 53. 
 
 form of, 53. 
 
 for lump sum before payments made, 199. 
 
 need not be recorded, 54, 199. 
 for redemption of weekly payments, 192, 193. 
 
 must be recorded, 193. 
 for settlement with dependants, 192, 193. 
 
 must be recorded, 193. 
 implied, 53. 
 
 may be recorded, 194. 
 infants and persons under legal disability, 192, 193. 
 
 must be recorded, 193. 
 "insured persons," 54, 193, 207. 
 [4] 
 
INDEX. 
 
 AGREEMENT continued. 
 question of fact, 53. 
 recording, memorandum of, 194. 
 
 agreement itself not to be recorded, 194. 
 
 after return to light work, 195. 
 
 for more or less than statutory limit, 195. 
 
 must be operative at time of, 194. 
 
 which amounts to contracting out, 195. 
 
 with persons under disability conditional until 
 
 recorded, 192. 
 
 appeal from granting or refusing application for, 199. 
 application for, procedure on, 230 et wq. 
 power of judge on, 196. 
 authentication of, 230. 
 award itself need not be recorded, 194. 
 
 of committee, power of judge, 197. 
 
 consent of county court judge when necessary for, 192, 193. 
 duty of registrar on, in certain cases, 192, 232. 
 * to refer it to judge, if unsatisfactory, 192, 233. 
 
 procedure on, 233. 
 effect of, 192, 197. 
 
 does not estop employers denying liability 
 
 against dependants, 198. 
 refusing application for, 197. 
 returning to work after, 196. 
 enforceable as judgment, 192, 197. 
 "genuine," meaning of, 194. 
 "has in fact returned to work," etc., 195. 
 interval before, 192. 
 issuing execution on, 198. 
 memorandum may be lodged by insurers, 231. 
 
 must coincide with oral agreement, 194. 
 of certificate after unsuccessful action, 59, 61, 234. 
 
 implied or oral agreements, 194. 
 penalty for not, in certain cases, 193. 
 
 power of court to inquire into recorded agreement, 55, 193. 
 power of registrar on application for, 192, 231. 
 
 to inquire into certain agreements, 192, 
 
 232. 
 
 procedure for, 199, 230 et seq. 
 if disputed, 231. 
 if undisputed, 231. 
 
 memorandum to be sent to registrar, 230, 231. 
 production of original agreement, 231. 
 rectifying register, 199, 233. 
 removal from register of agreements obtained improperly, 
 
 199, 233. 
 
 returning to work after, effect of, 196. 
 " satisfied as to its genuineness," 194. 
 time for, 194. 
 
 unrecorded agreement, 198. 
 when obligatory, 193. 
 where workman has recovered, 192, 195. 
 review of payments under, 171. 
 satisfaction as well as accord, necessary, 53. 
 
 [5] 
 
INDEX. 
 
 AGREEMENT contin /<=</. 
 setting aside, 55. 
 unrecorded, not basis for arbitration proceedings, 198. 
 
 AGRICULTURE, 74, 81. 
 ANAESTHETIC. See ACCIDENT. 
 ANIMAL. See ACCIDENT. 
 ANKYLOSTOMIASIS, 204. 
 ANSWER. See ARBITRATION. 
 ANTHRAX. See ACCIDENT ; DISEASE. 
 
 " ANY PERSON ... IN THE COURSE OF OR FOR 
 THE PURPOSES OF HIS TRADE OR BUSINESS," 75. 
 
 APPEAL, 
 
 after unsuccessful action, 45. 
 assessment of compensation after, 60. 
 as to costs, 61, 187. 
 from any decision or order, 184. 
 
 arbitrator appointed by county court judge, 183, 184. 
 
 arbitrator other than a judge, 184. 
 
 certifying surgeon, 104, 107. 
 
 committee or agreed arbitrator, 184, 223. 
 
 county court judge, 184. 
 
 procedure after, 185, 248. 
 on, 185, 346. 
 
 Court of Appeal, 189. 
 
 deduction of costs after unsuccessful action, 61. 
 
 order as to levying execution under recorded agreement, 198. 
 
 order as to registration of agreement, 199. 
 
 order for detention of ship, 113. 
 
 order on liquidator in winding up, 185. 
 
 refusal to entertain matter, 185. 
 generally, 183. 
 note of evidence for, 186. 
 only on questions of law, 186. 
 rules of Supreme Court as to, 346. 
 to Court of Appeal 
 
 absence of, or incomplete notes, 186. 
 
 allowing appeal to stand over, 189. 
 
 as to costs, 187. 
 
 compromise of, for infant, 189. 
 
 costs of, 188. 
 
 court may draw inferences of facts found, 186. 
 
 entry of, 185. 
 
 evidence on affidavit not allowed, 186. 
 
 extending time for, 188. 
 
 grounds of appeal, 186. 
 
 must be sufficiently stated, 187. 
 
 in forma pauperis, 188. 
 
 [ 6] 
 
INDEX. 
 
 APPEAL conti nued. 
 
 to Court of Appeal continued. 
 
 none from consent order, 187. 
 
 notes of evidence for, 186. 
 
 on behalf of lunatic, 188. 
 
 points not taken below cannot be taken on appeal, 187. 
 except as to want of jurisdiction, 187. 
 
 procedure on and after, 185, 248, 346. 
 
 reinstating appeal, 189. 
 
 remitting case to another court, 189. 
 
 security for costs, 187. 
 
 time for appealing, 1 85. 
 
 date from which runs, 185. 
 to House of Lords from Appellate Court of 
 
 England, 189. 
 
 Ireland, 189, 204. 
 
 Scotland, 189, 203. 
 
 APPLICANTS. See ARBITRATION. 
 
 APPLICATION. See ARBITRATION ; ACTION ; COMPENSATION 
 PENALTIES UNDER STATUTES; SHIP; WORKMEN'S COMPEN- 
 SATION ACT. 
 
 APPORTIONMENT. See COMPENSATION ; EXPENSES. 
 APPRENTICES. See SEAMAN ; WORKMEN. 
 
 ARBITRATION, 
 
 Act of 1889 does not apply, 183. 
 adjournment, to allow answer to be filed, 215. 
 
 where indemnity notice not duly served, 220. 
 amendments in, 183. 
 answer, 215. 
 appeal, q.v. 
 
 appearance of parties in, 190, 223, 224. 
 infants, 212. 
 no fee or reward for, 224. 
 
 except counsel and solicitors, 224. 
 travelling expenses, 224. 
 applicants. See infra, parties, 
 application for, 212. 
 
 by dependants, 211. 
 how made, 212. 
 particulars in, 212. 
 
 to settle medical and burial expenses, 211. 
 where amount agreed or ascertained, 211. 
 interests of dependants conflict, 21.1. 
 some dependants neglect, etc., to join/ 211. 
 as to liability to pay compensation, 58. 
 award 
 
 by any arbitrator 
 
 to be recorded, 191. 
 by arbitrator appointed by judge, 223. 
 [7] 
 
INDEX. 
 
 AR BITR ATION cont inued. 
 award continuf-l. 
 
 by committee 
 
 power of judge over, 182, 197. 
 review of payments under, 176. 
 to be recorded, 191. 
 by judge, 221. 
 
 copies to be served on parties affected, 221. 
 
 declaring liability, 58. 
 
 enforceable as judgment or order, 221. And 
 
 EXECUTION. 
 
 errors in, may be corrected, 221. 
 for nominal sum, 175. 
 power to alter, 183. 
 prepared and settled by registrar, 221. 
 keeping on foot, 175. 
 setting aside or varying, 189, 247. 
 against absent third party, 219. 
 improperly obtained, 189, 247. 
 limit of time for-, 189, 247. 
 suspensory, 175. 
 terminating payments, 175. 
 barred, when, 57. 
 
 before arbitrator agreed on by parties, 182. 
 costs, 190. 
 
 power to appoint another in place of, 191, 229. 
 power to examine on oath, 182. 
 submission of points of law by, 184, 223. 
 before arbitrator appointed by judge 
 appointment of arbitrator, 182, 221. 
 
 power to appoint another in place of, 191, 229. 
 award by, application to enforce, 223. 
 
 stay proceedings on, 223. 
 costs, 190, 243. 
 fixing day and place for, 222. 
 no power to give leave to enforce award, 223. 
 
 stay execution on award, 223. 
 procedure before, 222. 
 remuneration of, 111. 
 stay of proceedings, 223. 
 submission of questions of law by, 184, 223. 
 where award agreed before hearing, 222. 
 before committee, 182. 
 
 appearance of parties, 224. 
 costs, 190, 243. 
 
 jurisdiction of judge over, 182, 197. 
 powers of judge may be conferred on, 202. 
 submission of point of law, 184, 223. 
 before judge 
 
 place for, the court of district, 213. 
 
 change of place on application, 213. 
 powers of judge. See COUNTY COURT JUDGE. 
 between workmen and insurers, 225. 
 burden of proof of facts not admitted, 221. 
 conditions precedent to, 56. 61. 
 * [ 8 ] 
 
INDEX. 
 
 ARBITRATION continued, 
 costs, q.v. 
 court fees, 201. 
 day for, fixing, 213, 214, 222. 
 depositions in. See SEAMAN. 
 directions, application for, 219, 220. 
 disputes between employer and workmen to be settled by, 52. 
 
 principals and contractor to be settled by, 74, 84. 
 documents in 
 
 filing and service generally, 250. 
 intituling, 254. 
 not technical pleadings, 2. 
 service on respondents, 215. 
 employer may request, 58, 212. 
 evidence, taking of, ought not to be delegated, 183. 
 indemnity against contractor must be settled by, 74, 84. 
 
 stranger may by consent be settled by, 89 , 93. 
 interrogatories not allowed, 183. 
 new trial cannot be ordered, 185. 
 none after unsuccessful action, 43, 59. 
 if no question in dispute, 56, 212. 
 notes in, copy to be furnished, 224. 
 
 duty of judge to take, 186, 224. 
 particulars 
 
 admitted subject to defences in answer, 215. 
 amendment of, 183. 
 
 in proceedings against person securing shipowner, 227. 
 of dependants in application for arbitration, 211. 
 of request for arbitration. See infra, request, 
 parties, 210. 
 
 applicants, dependants as, 211. 
 illiterate, 213. 
 infants as, 212. 
 joinder of, 211. 
 meaning of, 210. 
 
 persons entitled to medical, etc., expenses, 211. 
 legal personal representatives as, 211. 
 partners, 211. 
 
 persons under legal disability, 211. 
 representation of common interests, 211. 
 respondents 
 adding, 228. 
 answer by, 215. 
 dependants as, 211. 
 discharge of employers as, 211. 
 joinder of principal and contractor, 84, 210. 
 meaning of, 210. 
 service on, 214. 
 
 when legal personal representative made, 211. 
 when unnecessary to make employers, 165, 211. 
 payment into court 
 
 by employer applicant, 217. 
 
 by employer admitting liability, 211, 215-217. 
 
 acceptance of, 216, 217. 
 with denial of liability, 218. 
 
 [ 9] 
 
INDEX. 
 
 ARBITRATION continued. 
 
 payment into court continued. 
 of death claims, 163. 
 
 by employer, effect of, 211. 
 costs, 238, 240. 
 how to be made, 163. 
 
 investment and application of, 163, 164, 237, 238. 
 periodical payments out, how made, 238. 
 procedure on, 237 et seq. 
 under an award, 237. 
 
 of medical and burial expenses, not necessary, 164. 
 sum for redemption, 234, 241. 
 
 weekly payments when payable to person under dis- 
 ability, 165, 240. 
 
 transfer of, from one court to another, 165, 250. 
 variation of order of, 167, 249. 
 perjury in, 183. 
 place of, fixing, 213, 214, 222. 
 power to refer to medical referee, 201, 253. 
 premature proceedings for, 56. 
 procedure in, generally, 213, 221. 
 proceedings for, by employer, 58. 
 in, are judicial, 183. 
 record of, 251. 
 
 suspension of, 163, 169, 170, 180. 
 time for taking, 61. 
 when Crown a party to, 251. 
 proof in, burden of, 215, 221. 
 
 Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, not applicable to, 183. 
 request for, 212. 
 
 several pending against same respondent, 214. 
 to be filed, 212. 
 
 recorded in special register, 212, 251. 
 service on respondents, 214. 
 notice in lieu of, 251. 
 substituted, 251. 
 stay of proceedings to abide test case, 214. 
 
 against owner paying death claims into 
 
 court, 211. 
 on award by arbitrator appointed by judge, 
 
 223. 
 
 submission of points of law by committee or arbitrator, 184. 223. 
 appeal from, 184. 
 duty to take notes, 224. 
 submission to award, 215. 
 
 acceptance of weekly sums offered, 216, 217. 
 costs payable by respondent, 217. 
 for lump sum to injured workman, 217. 
 non-acceptance of, 217. 
 notice of, to applicant, 216. 
 where employer is applicant, 217. 
 with denial of liability, 218. 
 third parties 
 
 absent, procedure on, 219. 
 
 execution against, 220. 
 [ 10 ] 
 
INDEX. 
 
 ARBITRATION continued. 
 third parties continued. 
 
 procedure. See INDEMNITY. 
 
 applicable where contribution claimed under s. 8 . . 229. 
 where employer applicant, 220. 
 where leave necessary to issue execution, 220. 
 time for service, etc., power to abridge, 221. 
 taking proceedings, 61. 
 
 ARBITRATOR. See ARBITRATION. 
 
 " ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF THE EM- 
 PLOYMENT." See EMPLOYMENT. 
 
 ARSENIC POISONING, 204, 205. 
 
 ASSAULT. See ACCIDENT. 
 
 ASSESSMENT OF COMPENSATION. See COMPENSATION. 
 
 ASSESSOR. See MEDICAL REFEREE. 
 
 " ATTRIBUTABLE TO." See " SERIOUS AND WILFUL MISCON- 
 
 DUCT.V 
 
 AUTHENTICATION OF ' MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT. 
 
 See AGREEMENT. 
 
 AUTHORITIES, LOCAL AND PUBLIC. See EMPLOYER. 
 " AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS." See " EARNINGS." 
 AWARD. See ACTION ; ARBITRATION. 
 
 B. 
 
 BAILEES, 120. 
 
 BANKRUPTCY. See EMPLOYER. 
 
 "BEAT- HAND," "BEAT KNEE," "BEAT ELBOW," 7, 205. 
 
 BONUSES, 138. 
 
 BUILDING TRADE, 
 
 work merely ancillary or incidental to, 79. 
 
 BURIAL EXPENSES. See EXPENSES. 
 BUSINESS. See TRADE OB BUSINESS. 
 
 c. 
 
 CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. See EMPLOYMENT. 
 
 CATARACT, 
 
 in glass workers, 205. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 CAUSE. See ACCIDENT. 
 
 CERTIFICATE. See ACTION ; DISEASE; MEDICAL REFEREE. 
 
 CERTIFIED SCHEME, 70-73. 
 acceptance of 
 
 bars action, 47. 
 
 arbitration, 57. 
 
 must not be compulsory, 71, 72. 
 
 need not be in writing, 73. 
 
 what amounts to, 73. 
 
 completely ousts jurisdiction of courts, 72. 
 existing on July 1st, 1907 . . 132. 
 
 re -certifying, 132. 
 
 ballot not necessary for, 73, 132. 
 Friendly Societies Act, 1896, not applicable, 180. 
 infant bound by, 72. 
 what schemes contemplated, 72. 
 whole scheme must be certified, 72. 
 
 CERTIFYING SURGEON, 
 
 appeal from decision of, 104, 107. 
 
 regulations by Secretary of State, 104, 335. 
 certificate of, 101, 104, 106, 108. 
 duties and fees of, 104. 
 
 regulations as to, 333. 
 fixes date of disablement, 104, 107. 
 medical practitioner may be appointed with powers of, 105. 
 
 CHARGING PAYMENTS, 180. 
 CHIMNEY SWEEP'S CANCER, 205. 
 CHROME ULCERATION, 205. 
 
 "CIRCUMSTANCES CREATING A LEGAL LIABILITY IN 
 SOME PERSON OTHER THAN THE EMPLOYER," 89. 
 
 CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION. See COMPENSATION. 
 
 CO-ADVENTURERS, 97, 120. 
 
 COMMERCIAL TRAVELLERS. See EMPLOYMENT. 
 
 COMMITTEE. See ARBITRATION. 
 COMPANY. See EMPLOYER. 
 
 COMPENSATION, 
 
 acceptance of 
 
 bars action, 47, 89. 
 after unsuccessful action, 58, 59. 
 agreement for. See AGREEMENT. 
 application of fines not to affect, 61. 
 application of, power of court to vary, 166, 
 [12] 
 
INDEX. 
 
 COMPENSATION continued. 
 
 apportionment among dependants, 166. 
 power to vary, 161. 
 procedure, 240. 
 assessment of 
 
 after appeal, 45, 60. 
 
 as against " principal," 74, 84. 
 
 in case of death, see infra. 
 
 disablement, see infra. 
 industrial disease. See DISEASE. 
 average weekly earnings. See EARNINGS. 
 bankruptcy on, 85, 87, 88. 
 
 composition scheme must provide for, 88. 
 weekly payments, how dealt with, 86. 
 when insurance money less than compensation, 85. 
 claim for 
 
 after unsuccessful action, 45, 59. 
 against " principal." See " PRINCIPAL." 
 gives him rights of employer, 74, 84. 
 application for arbitration is, 67. 
 barred by action against employer, 44. 
 
 recovery of damages from stran- 
 ger, 90. 
 
 by seamen and their dependants. See SEAMAN. 
 death, on, 145. 
 
 hi vestment and application of money, 163. 
 payment of, 163. 
 defeated, effect on action, 46. 
 evidence of, 67. 
 
 failure to make, or to make in time, 62, 69, 70. 
 limit of time for, 61, 68. 
 
 may be incorporated with notice of accident, 64. 
 meaning, 67. 
 need not be hi writing, 67. 
 
 specific hi amount, 67. 
 
 not confined to initiation of legal proceedings, 67. 
 notice of accident is not, 67. 
 onus of proof, 69. 
 waiver of right to formal, 68. 
 what amounts to, 67. 
 whether mere notice of intention to make, suffices, 67. 
 
 satisfactorily made, question of fact, 67. 
 withdrawn before hearing, effect of, 47. 
 death, in case of 
 
 amount to total dependants, 134, 151. 
 
 partial dependants, 134, 152. 
 
 cost of maintenance to be considered, 152. 
 funeral and medical expenses allowable, 152. 
 principle of assessing, 134, 152. 
 application of, 163. 
 
 power of judge to vary orders as to, 166. 
 deductions from, 134, 150. 
 investment of, 163, 
 
 medical and burial expenses, 135, 153. 
 payment of, 163. 
 
 [ 13 J 
 
INDEX. 
 
 ( >MPEXSATION continued. 
 death, in case of continued. 
 right of dependants, 146. 
 
 survives on death of dependant, 147. 
 to be paid into court, 163. 
 
 except medical, etc., expenses, 164. 
 weekly payments to be deducted, 134, 150. 
 when amount agreed or fixed, 211, 237. 
 where no dependants, 135, 153. 
 
 deductions from, under National Insurance Act, 208. 
 disablement, in case of, 135, 157. 
 discretion of arbitrator, 159. 
 " during incapacity," 158. 
 
 extraneous circumstances may be regarded, 159. 
 lump sum cannot be awarded, 158. 
 payment, allowance, benefit to be regarded, 136, 158. 
 partial, amount of, 159. 
 
 ability to do light work, 161. 
 
 discretion of arbitrator, 159. 
 
 earnings before and after accident, 160. 
 
 " in some suitable employment or business," 161. 
 
 able to earn in, 160. 
 
 what part of difference awardable, 136, ] 59. 
 total, 135, 157. 
 
 of infants, 135, 157. 
 industrial disease. See DISEASE. 
 infants. See PERSONS UNDER LEGAL DISABILITY. 
 none during period of suspension, 180. 
 
 for first week of disablement less than two, 43, 135, 158. 
 if disablement less than a week, 43, 158. 
 not recoverable as well as damages from stranger, 88, 89. 
 payment of 
 
 bars action, 47, 88, 89. 
 
 excess, not to be deducted from future, 180. 
 on death, 163. 
 
 " without prejudice," effect of, 90, 91. 
 protection of, on bankruptcy, etc., 85 et seq. 
 returns as to, by employers, 113. 
 scale of, 134. 
 seamen, of, q.v. 
 
 settlement of, by arbitration, 56. 
 suspension of right to, 180. 
 during imprisonment, 156. 
 for refusing or obstructing medical examination, 163, 168, 
 
 170, 172, 236. 
 
 wages, fall in, effect on, 159. 
 wages not recoverable as well as, 58, 162. 
 weekly payments 
 
 cannot be charged, etc., 180. 
 
 pass by operation of law, 180. 
 claim cannot be set off against, 180. 
 costs cannot be set off against, 180, 201. 
 deducting rent from by agreement, 180. 
 difference "between earnings before and after accident, 160. 
 do not estop defence of employer, 117. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 COMPENSATION continued. 
 weekly payments continued. 
 
 do not estop defence to proceedings by dependants, 108. 
 
 excess payments not to be deducted, 174, 180. 
 
 for life, not awardable without consent, 159. 
 
 in case of seamen, q.v. 
 
 payment into court of, 165, 240. 
 
 payment of arrears on death of workman residing abroad, 
 
 243. 
 
 payments to be regarded in fixing, 158. 
 redemption of 
 
 agreement for, must be registered, 178, 193. 
 
 application of lump sum for, 177. 
 
 cannot be charged, 180. 
 
 computation of, basis, 177, 178. 
 
 costs cannot be set off against, 180. 
 
 does not pass by operation of law, 180. 
 
 investment and application of lump sum, 177, 241. 
 
 lump sum compromise before any weekly payments is 
 not, 199. 
 
 proceedings for 
 
 discontinuing, 179. 
 
 sum paid as, cannot be charged, etc., 180. 
 
 table of purchase of life annuities, 350. 
 
 under Act of 1897.. 179. 
 
 where incapacity not permanent, 178. 
 
 permanent, 178. 
 review of, 172. 
 
 " any weekly payment," 173. 
 
 cannot alter basis of original calculation on, 173. 
 
 change of circumstances necessary, 173. 
 
 costs, 176. 
 
 effect of application for, 173. 
 
 in case of injured infants, 173, 176. 
 
 keeping award on foot, 175. 
 
 " may be ended or diminished," 174. 
 
 on neglect to follow medical advice, 156. 
 - on refusal of light work, 162. 
 
 on refusal to undergo surgical operation, 156. 
 
 payments under agreements, 175. 
 
 " the weekly sum which the workman would probably 
 have been earning," 176. 
 
 termination of, 175. 
 
 time from which it dates, 174. 
 
 when payable under award of committee, 176. 
 
 when right to, is barred, 174. 
 
 where there is no recorded agreement, 176. 
 to be deducted from death claims, 134, 150. 
 workmen abroad. See ABSENCE FROM UNITED KINGDOM. 
 what to be considered in fixing, 136, 158, 159.. 
 
 COMPOSITION OR ARRANGEMENT WITH CREDITORS. See 
 
 EMPLOYEE. 
 
 COMPRESSED AIR ILLNESS, 205. 
 
 W.C.A. [ 15 ] 2 C 
 
INDEX. 
 
 COMPULSORY WORKERS, 121. 
 
 CONTINUOUS EMPLOYMENT. Set EMPLOYMENT. 
 
 CONTRACT. See AGRICULTURE, " PRINCIPAL," " CONTRACTOR." 
 concurrent, earnings of, to be considered, 145. 
 membership of Royal Naval Reserve, 145. 
 of, and for service, distinguished, 118. 
 relinquishing right to compensation, 132. 
 
 CONTRACTING OUT, 
 
 by contracts existing on July 1st, 1907 . . 132. 
 none except by certified scheme, 72. 
 
 " CONTRACTOR." See PRINCIPAL. 
 as respondent with principal, 84. 
 compensation may be claimed against, 74. 
 disputes with " principal," settled by arbitration, 74 
 employer cannot escape liability by engaging, 74, 75. 
 employment under, 74. 
 for agricultural work, who liable, 74, 81. 
 independent not " workman," 120 ei seq. 
 joinder of, with principal, as respondent, 84. 
 liability of, whether joint and several with principal's, 83, 84. 
 meaning of, 73. 
 object of s. 4 of the Act, 75. 
 piece-worker or, 120. 
 rights of workman against, preserved, 74. 
 under the Act of 1897 . . 79. 
 
 whether s. 4 is limited to "sub- contracting," 75. 77. 
 workman may proceed against, after failing against principal, 83. 
 of, when to be compensated 
 
 by " principal," 73 el seq. 
 
 calculation of compensation, 74, 84. 
 
 CONTRIBUTION. See DISEASE. 
 
 COSTS, 
 
 appeal as to, 61, 187. 
 
 application to determine, payable to solicitor or agent, 245. 
 
 between third party and others, 219, 220. 
 
 cannot be ordered against successful respondent, 190. 
 
 if no dispute, 190. 
 cannot be set off against weekly payments, 180, 201. 
 
 sum for redemption, 180. 
 confined to those awarded, 201. 
 
 deduction from compensation after unsuccessful action, 58, 59. 
 detention of ship. See SHIP. 
 discretion as to, 190. 
 
 expenses of examination by medical referee may be allowed, 244. 
 lien for, order declaring, 246. 
 lump sum as, 191. 
 of advising on evidence, 244. 
 
 appeal, security for, 187. 
 
 arbitration, 190. 
 
 expert witnesses, 244. 
 
 [ 16 ] 
 
INDEX. 
 
 COSTS continued. 
 
 of indemnity proceedings. See INDEMNITY. 
 
 plans, 244. 
 
 review of weekly payments, 176. 
 
 solicitor, under Sched. II. (14), 201, 245. 
 
 special case, 223. 
 
 travelling expenses for medical examination, 244. 
 offer of compensation to be considered, 244. 
 power of solicitor to receive, payable by adverse party, 245. 
 rules as to, 243. 
 scale to be fixed, 244. 
 setting off costs after appeal, 188. 
 special allowances where Scale A. fixed, 244. 
 taxation of, 190, 244, 245. 
 
 when offer of weekly payments or payment into court, 217. 
 subject matter is not a capital sum, 244. 
 
 COUNSEL, 
 
 can appear in arbitration without leave, 224. 
 
 COUNTY COURT, 
 
 district of, 199, 248. 
 
 fees, none prior to award, 201. 
 
 Treasury Order regulating, 201. 
 investment of moneys in, 167. 
 judge. See post. 
 jurisdiction of 
 
 detention of ships, 249. 
 generally, 251. 
 
 where award recorded in another, 249. 
 payment into. See ARBITRATION. 
 registrar of 
 
 answer to be transmitted by, 215. 
 duty to keep special register, 251. 
 
 register certificate after unsuccessful action, 61, 234. 
 power to refer to medical referee, 169, 235. 
 
 review agreements, 192. 
 ' rules, application of. See post. 
 transfer of money from one to another, 167, 250. 
 proceedings, 250. 
 
 COUNTY COURT JUDGE. See APPEAL ; ARBITRATION. 
 duty of, under Act, 200. 
 
 to take notes, 186, 224. 
 jurisdiction of, 199, 248. 
 
 must not delegate duty of taking evidence, 183. 
 power of, general, 182. 
 
 over decisions of committee, 182, 197. 
 to adjourn case, 215, 218, 220. 
 alter award, 183. 
 amend proceedings, 1S3. 
 appoint arbitrator, 182, 183. 
 
 new arbitrator when first fails, 191, 229. 
 apportion medical, etc., expenses, 211. 
 correct errors in award, 221. 
 [ 17 J 
 
INDEX. 
 
 ul.'NTY COURT JUDGE continued. 
 power of, general continued. 
 
 to hear special case, 184, 223. 
 
 order weekly payments into court, 1<>5. 
 order workman to be examined, 235. 
 recall witness after commencing judgment, 183. 
 rectify register, 193, 199, 233, 
 refer to medical referee, 201, 235. 
 remove agreement from register, 193, 233. 
 review agreements, 193, 233. 
 review payments ordered by committee, 17(3. 
 set aside or vary award. See ARBITRATION. 
 summon medical referee as assessor, 190, 234. 
 vary orders as to appb'cation, etc., of death claims, 166. 
 where no answer or incomplete, 215. 
 
 COUNTY COURT RULES, 
 
 application of, to 
 
 costs, 244. 
 
 detention of ship, 226, 227. 
 disclosure of names of shipowners, 225. 
 enforcing execution, 247. 
 
 against firm, 247. 
 
 under Debtor's Act, 247. 
 examination of bankrupt employer, 225. 
 filing and service of documents and notices, 251. 
 joinder of parties, 211, 212. 
 masters, seamen, etc., 225. 
 matters not provided for in W. C. R., 251. 
 notice in lieu of service, 251. 
 parties acting by solicitors, 251. 
 
 under disability, 211, 212. 
 partners, 211. 
 procedure generally, 251. 
 representation of same interests, 211, 212. 
 security on application for detention of ship, 226. 
 selection of test case, 215. 
 service of award on parties affected, 221. 
 
 documents, etc., 251. 
 substituted service, 251. 
 taxation of costs, 244. 
 
 review of, 244. 
 transfer of proceedings, 250. 
 transmission of documents (as to detention of ship), 227. 
 
 COURT, 
 
 dismissing action, application to, for compensation, 58 et seq. 
 in which compensation assessed after defendant's successful 
 
 appeal, 61. 
 rules of, to be made, 200. 
 
 " COURT IN WHICH THE ACTION IS TRIED," 60. 
 
 CRIMINAL ASSAULT. See ACCIDENT. 
 
 [ 18 ] 
 
INDEX. 
 
 CROWN, 
 
 power of Treasury to frame schemes, 110. 
 proceedings where, a party, 251. 
 workmen in employment of, 110. 
 
 D. 
 
 DAMAGES. See ACTION. 
 
 acceptance of, effect on claim, 90. 
 
 without prejudice, 90. 
 
 DEATH. See COMPENSATION. 
 accelerated by injury, 146. 
 by suicide, 145. 
 
 entry in register of cause of, 40. 
 
 need not be natural and probable consequence of the injury, 145. 
 new cause intervening, 145. 
 proof that, resulted from the injury, 145. 
 
 DEDUCTIONS FROM COMPENSATION. See COMPENSATION. 
 
 DEFENCES. See DISEASE; ELECTION; INCAPACITY; SERIOUS 
 AND WILFUL MISCONDUCT. 
 
 "DEPENDANTS." See COMPENSATION; ARBITRATION; AGREE- 
 MENT. 
 
 actual receipt of support to be considered, 126. 
 all circumstances to be considered, 126. 
 " at the time of his death," 115, 127. 
 child en venire sa mere, 1 29. 
 children as, 128, 129. 
 
 cost of maintenance to be considered, 127, 152. 
 daughter giving services for board, 127. 
 death of, survival of right to compensation on, 147 
 definition of, 115. 
 
 dependency a question of fact, 126, 127. 
 father and children, 128, 129. 
 father earning wages may be. 126. 
 husband and wife, 128. 
 husband in search of work, 128. 
 illegitimates as, 115, 129. 
 
 evidence of dependency, 153. 
 
 affiliation order as, 128, 153. 
 
 no presumption of dependency, 127. 
 illustrations of, 126, 127, 128. 
 included in " workman," 115. 
 legal obligation to support, 127-129. 
 on more than one deceased, 152. 
 " or would but for the incapacity due to the accident have been 
 
 so dependent," 115, 129. 
 
 partial, may be dependent on more than one deceased, 152. 
 may share with total, 166. 
 question of fact, 151. 
 pauper inmate of workhouse, 129. 
 posthumous child, 129. 
 
 [ 19] 
 
INDEX. 
 
 DEPENDANTS "continued. 
 
 presumption of dependency no longer recognised, 127. 
 
 future support as evidence of dependency, 128. 
 question of fact, 126. 
 questions between, how determined, 211. 
 refusing to join in application for arbitration, 211. 
 rights of, 146, 147. 
 
 survive on death of dependants, 147. 
 seaman, of, q.v. 
 
 share of, how determined, 166, 211. 
 standard of life cannot be considered, 126. 
 total, test of, 147. 
 
 amount of compensation to, 151. 
 value of voluntary services may be considered, 127. 
 who are, 115. 
 
 application to determine, 166, 211. 
 wife living apart, 128, 129. 
 
 no presumption of dependency, 127. 
 
 DEPENDENCY. See DEPENDANTS. 
 DEPOSITIONS. See SEAMAN. 
 DERMATITIS. See DISEASE. 
 DETENTION OF SHIP. See SHIP. 
 
 " DETERMINED IN SUCH ACTION," 59. 
 DINNER TIME. See EMPLOYMENT. 
 DIRECTIONS. See ARBITRATION; INDEMNITY. 
 DISABLEMENT. See INCAPACITY. 
 DISCRETION. See ACCIDENT ; COSTS. 
 
 DISEASE, 
 
 aggravated or accelerated by accident, 8. 
 
 aneurism, 9. 
 
 anthrax, 7. 
 
 as cause of injury or incapacity, 6: 
 
 as result of accident, 7. 
 
 cardiac breakdown, 7, 
 
 caused by accidental circumstances, 7. 
 
 continued exertion, 7. 
 cold in hand whilst driving, 5. 
 dermatitis through using caustic solution, 5, 8. 
 eczema caused by degrees, 7. 
 enteritis from sewer gas, 8. 
 frost-bite, 5. 
 gradually developed, 6. 
 heart, 7. 
 
 heat apoplexy, 6, 24. 
 heat-stroke, 4. 
 
 [ 20] 
 
INDEX. 
 
 DISEASE continued. 
 idiopathic, 7. 
 
 incapacity aggravated by, 153. 
 industrial or occupation, 7. 
 
 accident, disablement from disease treated as, 102. 
 
 acute bursitis over the elbow, 205. 
 
 ankylostomiasis is, 204. 
 
 anthrax is, 204. 
 
 appeal from certifying surgeon, 104, 107. 
 
 application of Act to, 106. 
 
 " beat elbow," 205. 
 
 " beat hand," 7, 205. 
 
 " beat knee," 7, 205. 
 
 certified to be suffering from, 101. 
 
 cataract in glassworkers, 205. 
 
 qualification as to, 200. 
 chimney-sweep's cancer, 205. 
 chrome ulceration, 205. 
 compensation 
 
 computation, 103, 110. 
 
 conditions under which payable, 106. 
 
 contribution by employers, 109. 
 
 third party procedure for, 228. 
 date when, accrues, 104, 107. 
 forfeiture of right to, 102, 110. 
 from which employer recoverable, 103, 107. 
 compressed air illness, 205. 
 death from, 102. 
 
 must be proved, 108. 
 description of, 7. 
 
 disablement or suspension owing to 
 certificate of, 101, 106. 
 
 copy of certificate of, to be given on demand, 106, 228. 
 date of, 104, 107. 
 is personal injury by accident, 102. 
 notice of, 103, 109. 
 
 forms of, 109, 110. 
 
 duty of workmen, etc., to supply information, 102, 108. 
 eczematous ulceration, etc., produced by dust, etc., 205. 
 employer may join other employer in proceedings, 103, 109. 
 shifting liability to another, 103, 108. 
 to whom notice to be given, 103, 109. 
 epitheliomatous cancer, 205. 
 extension of schedule, 204, 205, 206. 
 fraudulent representation as to, 102, 110. 
 glanders, 205. 
 gradual growth of, 103, 109. 
 
 contribution to compensation by employers, 103, 109. 
 which employer liable, 103, 107. 
 
 disputes, how settled, 109. 
 
 inflammation of synovial lining of wrist joint, etc., 205. 
 list of, may be extended, 105. 
 must be due to nature of employment during twelve 
 
 months previous, 102, 107. 
 must come within 3. 8. .7. 
 [ 21 ] 
 
INDEX. 
 
 DISEASE contin ued. 
 
 industrial or occupation contimi1. 
 notice of disablement, etc. 
 to whom given, 103, 109. 
 may be given though employment left voluntarily, 
 
 103, 109. 
 
 to state date and cause, 109. 
 nystagmus, 205. 
 origin of, tracing, 103. 
 
 presumption as to, 102, 108. 
 poisoning as 
 
 by amido-derivatives of benzene, 205. 
 arsenic, 204, 205. 
 carbon bisulphide, 205. 
 
 by Oonioma Kama#si (African boxwood), 205. 
 lead, 7, 204, 205. 
 mercury, 204. 
 nickel carbonyl, 205. 
 nitre-derivatives of benzene, 205. 
 nitrous fumes, 205. 
 phosphorous, 204. 
 
 presumption of employment by which caused, 102, 10. 
 proceedings for compensation 
 
 application of Act and rules to case of industrial 
 
 diseases, 228. 
 
 application of rules to added respondent, 229. 
 claim for contribution by employer, 109, 229. 
 
 third party procedure applies, 109, 229. 
 employer adding respondent, 228. 
 form of request for arbitration, 228. 
 notice of disablement, rules as to, 228. 
 notice of order and service on added respondent, 229. 
 procedure at arbitration, 229. 
 
 costs, 229. 
 
 scrotal epithelioma, 205. 
 seamen not entitled, 98, 107. 
 subcutaneous cellulitis of the hand, 205. 
 
 over the patella, 205. 
 telegraphists' cramp, 205. 
 
 qualifications as to, 206. 
 ulceration due to pitch, tar, etc., 205. 
 under original Act, 6. 
 what within Act, 106. 
 when not within Act, 6, 7. 
 which employer liable, 103, 107. 
 
 is a personal injury by accident, rights preserved.. 
 
 106. 
 
 inhaling poisonous fumes after shot firing, 5, 8. 
 kidney disease following working in cold water, 5. 
 lead poisoning. See supra. 
 not generally regarded as accident, 6. 
 paralysis through riding tricycle, 7. 
 progressive heart, 7. 
 scarlet fever, 8. 
 sunstroke, 4, 24. 
 
 [ 22] 
 
INDEX. 
 
 DISEASE continued. 
 tetanus, 8. 
 under original Act, 6. 
 
 DOCUMENTS. See ARBITRATION. 
 
 description of owners of ship in, 225. 
 filing of, 250. 
 
 service of, q.v . 
 
 DOMESTIC SERVANTS. See EMPLOYMENT. 
 DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT. See EMPLOYMENT. 
 
 E. 
 
 EARNINGS." ee WAGES. 
 after the accident, 160. 
 " average weekly "- 
 
 calculating, principles for, 139. 
 
 compensation cannot be added, 142. 
 
 concurrent contracts of service, 145. 
 
 employment refers to grade of employment, 140, 142. 
 
 method of computation, 139. 
 illustrations, 141. 
 
 period of employment by same employer, 142. 
 
 present wages not sole test, 139. 
 
 principles and rules of computation, 139 et seq. 
 
 special expenses not reckoned, 138. 
 
 striking the average, 143. 
 
 the dominant principle, 139. 
 
 the personal element, 141. 
 
 to give rate of earnings per week, 135. 
 
 weekly earnings, 139. 
 
 where computation practicable, 140. 
 
 not practicable, 140. 
 before the accident, 160. 
 bonuses, 138. 
 
 compensation cannot be added to ascertain, 142. 
 deduction from, 137. 
 description, 137. 
 
 difference between earnings before and after accident, 160. 
 gross earnings, 137. 
 in charitable institutions, 138. 
 
 includes money's worth if capable of estimation, 137, 138. 
 of coachmen, etc., 137. 
 
 domestic servants, 137. 
 perquisites, 138. 
 
 retainers of members of Royal Naval Reserve are, 145. 
 special expenses not included, 136, 138. 
 temporary employment in different grades, 140. 
 tips, 138. 
 
 value of tuition not included, 138. 
 use of uniform, 137. 
 voluntary services, 122. 
 
 [ 23] 
 
INDFA*. 
 
 " EARNINGS "continued. 
 " weekly," meaning, 139. 
 what cannot be deducted from, 137. 
 
 ECZEMATOUS ULCERATION, 205. 
 EDUCATION AUTHORITIES, 131. 
 ELECTION, 
 
 by accepting certified scheme, 47. 
 
 agreement, 47, 53. 
 
 question for arbitrator, 53. 
 
 filing request for arbitration, 47. 
 
 infant, 54. 
 
 prosecuting action against employer, 44. 
 
 receiving compensation, 47. 
 conclusive, 44. 
 
 effect of s. 1, sub-s. (2) (6), 43. 
 effect on right of appeal, 45. 
 
 of action or proceedings under the Act against employer, 44, 45. 
 what amounts io,4Aet seq. 
 
 whether unsuccessful arbitration bars action, 45 et seq. 
 See ACTION. 
 
 EMERGENCY. See EMPLOYMENT. 
 
 EMPLOYER, 
 
 application for arbitration by. See ARBITRATION. 
 authority, public or local, as, 76, 83, 130, 131. 
 bankruptcy of, 85, 88. 
 
 arbitration between workman and insurers, 225. 
 examination of, to ascertain whether insured, 88, 224. 
 
 procedure, 88, 224. 
 
 right of workman same as of employer, 85, 87, 224. 
 company as 
 
 notice of accident to, 62. 
 winding up of, 85-88. 
 
 examination to discover whether insured. 88, 224. 
 proceedings against insurers on, 88, 224. 
 voluntary, 86. 
 
 judge cannot make order on liquidator for pay- 
 ment, 88. 
 definition, 114. 
 duty to give information when scheme certified, 71. 
 
 make returns of injuries, etc., if required, 113. 
 " employment by the same," 142. 
 legal personal representative of deceased, 114, 117. 
 liability 
 
 under the Act of 1906. .2. 
 
 cannot escape by sub-contracting, 75. 
 does not extend civil liability, 42. 
 ^effect of, s. 1 (2) (b), 43. 
 for not registering certain agreements, 193. 
 how affected by serious and wilful misconduct, 42, 52. 
 limitations on, 43 ei seq. 
 not liable to action as well, 42. 
 to statutory fines remains, 61. 
 when scheme certified, 70. 
 [ 24 ] 
 
INDEX. 
 
 EMPLOYER continued. 
 
 may apply for arbitration, 58, 68, 212. 
 members of family of, when not workmen, 1 14, 125. 
 of workman lent or let on hire, 114, 117. 
 owner or charterer of vessel, 116. 
 paying wages out of charity, 58. 
 " principal " as, q.v. 
 
 respondent in claims by dependants, 211. 
 when discharged, 211. 
 
 unnecessary to make, 211. 
 shipowner, q.v. 
 shipping agents, 116/ 
 stevedore or shipowner, 116. 
 trade or business of, 75. 
 
 weekly payments by, not necessarily as estoppel, 117, 108. 
 who liable to pay compensation, 41. 
 
 EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT, 1880, 
 notice under, 63. 
 
 EMPLOYMENT, 
 abroad, 2. 
 absence from, on leave 
 
 returning after, 27. 
 without leave, 16. 
 accident must be during, 9. 
 affected by Act, 2. 
 agreement with strike-breaker, 12. 
 alteration in character of, 142. 
 " arising out of the," 9. 
 
 accident must be one, 9. 
 acting contrary to rules, 19. 
 for own purpose, 21. 
 
 in accordance with practice, 20, 21, 27, 48. 
 act of God, 23. 
 
 stranger, 24, 25. 
 
 acts necessary and reasonable, 20. 
 emergency, 20. 
 evidence of, 40. 
 inferences as to, 32 et seq. 
 meaning of, 9. 
 proof of, 31 et seq. 
 question of fact, 9. 
 authorities, by. See EMPLOYER. 
 break in, 136, 150. 
 
 by religious or charitable institutions, 122. 
 " by the same employer," 142. 
 casual, excluded generally, 114, 124. 
 
 unless in trade or business, 109, 124. 
 test of, 124. 
 under authorities, 130. 
 coal miners, of, extension of Act, 31. 
 commencement of, 10. 
 commercial travellers, of, 12. 
 compulsory services, 121. 
 continuous, 15, 149. 
 
 [ 25 ] 
 
INDEX. 
 
 EMPLOYMENT continued. 
 contract for service, 118. 
 of service, 118. 
 domestic servants, of, 15^ 
 duration of 
 
 agreement with strike-breaker, effect of on, 12. 
 commercial travellers, 12. 
 extensions of, 10 et seq. 
 general rules, 10. 
 going and returning, 11, 12. 
 rule in Scotland, 13. 
 excepted from Act, 114, 123. 
 
 grade of, to be considered in averaging earnings, 142. 
 illness causing break in, 136. 
 incidents of, 143, 144, 145. 
 in manual labour, 1 22, 123. 
 in non -provided school, 131. 
 "in some suitable," 160, 161. 
 intervals of, for meals, etc., 15, 16, 21, 27, 28. 
 accidents during, 27. 
 must act reasonably during, 27. 
 " in the course of the," 9. 
 
 " in the employment of the same employer," 150. 
 period of, for averaging earnings, 142. 
 rescue brigade in coal mines, 31. 
 returning to, after absence, 27. 
 risks of 
 
 accidental disease. See DISEASE. 
 accidents arising from, generally within Act, 23. 
 during meal times and intervals, 27. 
 happening beyond employer's premises, 25. 
 assaults, when, 24. 
 attacks by animals, 25. 
 beyond employer's premises, 25. 
 description of, 23. 
 during absence on leave, 28 et seq. 
 
 without leave, 16, 28. 
 general rule, 22. 
 incidental to, 22. 
 loitering in street, 21. 
 ordinary incidents of life not, 23. 
 returning to work after absence, 27. 
 severity of weather, rule as to, 23. 
 street dangers, 25, 26. 
 fight, 24. 
 robbery, 27. 
 
 strikers, attack by, 5, 25. 
 taking short cut to work, 10. 
 unnecessary or unreasonable acts, 27, 29. 
 voluntarily incurred for experiment, 30. 
 scope of 
 
 act must be within, 17. 
 
 done on emergency may be within, 20. 
 necessary or reasonable within, 20. 
 acting contrary to rules, 19. 
 [ 26] 
 
INDEX. 
 
 EMPLOYMENT- continued. 
 scope of continued. 
 
 breaking off work for personal convenience, 10. 
 
 distinction between scope and method, 16. 
 
 general rule, 16. 
 
 "larking, "22. 
 
 emergency occasioned by, 20. 
 
 loitering on errand, 21. 
 
 misconduct outside, effect of, 17. 
 
 orders defining sphere of labour, 16. 
 
 question of fact, 17. 
 
 recognised practice, 20. 
 
 sphere of labour, 17. 
 
 unnecessary or unreasonable acts, 29. 
 
 unskilled man interfering with skilled work, 17, 18. 
 
 workman acting for own purposes, 21. 
 outside sphere, 17. 
 
 recognised by practice, 20, 21, 27. 
 seamen, of. See SEAMEN. 
 strike-breaker, special agreement with, 12. 
 "suitable," 161. 
 suspension of, 15, 28. 
 termination of, 10. 
 under concurrent contracts, 145. 
 
 contractors, 75. 
 uninterrupted by absence, 142. 
 voluntary services, 122. 
 
 " whether by way of manual labour," etc., 122. 
 within Act, 114. 
 
 ENTERITIS. See DISEASE. 
 EPITHELIOMATOUS CANCER, 205. 
 
 ESTOPPEL, 
 
 barring proceedings, 57. 
 
 payments under recorded agreement no, when dependants 
 
 claim, 198. 
 weekly payments are no, of denial of employment, 117. 
 
 EVIDENCE, 
 
 admissibility of documents under Merchant Shipping Act, 100 
 affiliation order as, of dependency, 128, 153. 
 agreement, of, 53. 
 
 depositions, as hi case of seamen, 100. 
 duty of judge to take notes, 186, 224. 
 entry in death certificate, 40. 
 false, is perjury, 183. 
 
 fee for advice on, when Scale A allowed, 244. 
 inferences drawn from, 32 et seq. 
 medical certificates not, unless doctor called, 41. 
 necessary before remitting case to medical referee, 202. 
 proof of accident arising out of, etc., employment, 31. 
 / evidence, 40. 
 
 inferences drawn as, 32 et aeq. 
 
 onus of, 31. 
 
 [ 27 I 
 
INDEX. 
 
 E V IDENCE continued. 
 
 proof of accident arising out of, etc., employment continued. 
 presumption that employment continued when, 38. 
 propositions as to, 32, 38, 39. 
 shifting onus, 39. 
 proof that claim duly made, 69. 
 
 death was caused by injury, 32 et seq. 
 
 employer not prejudiced by want, etc., of notice, 05. 
 
 incapacity due to accident and injury, 35, 154. 
 
 refusal of operation, 157. 
 notice of accident was given, 64. 
 personal injury is caused, 32 et seq. 
 statements of deceased, when admissible, 40. 
 taking of, ought not to be delegated, 183. 
 that act arose out of, etc., the employment, 31 et s.eq. 
 weekly payments do not estop denial of employer, 117, 198. 
 
 EXECUTION, 
 
 as in county court actions, 247. 
 
 by judgment summons, 247. 
 
 on default under recorded agreement, 197. 
 
 proceedings for, 246. 
 
 when leave necessary against third parties, 219. 
 
 EXPENSES, 
 
 medical and burial, 131, 153. 
 
 application for, 211. 
 
 apportionment of, 211. 
 
 arbitration to settle, 211. 
 
 in case of seamen, 98, 153, 158. 
 
 may be allowed to part dependants, 152. 
 
 need not be paid into court, 164. 
 
 person entitled to, may apply for arbitration, 211. 
 
 procedure for obtaining, 211. 
 
 where no dependants, 211. 
 of medical examination allowed as costs, 244. 
 special, 136, 138. 
 
 F. 
 
 FACTORIES, 
 
 fines under statutes relating to, 61. 
 work merely incidental to business of, 80. 
 
 FACTORY AND WORKSHOP ACT, 1901 
 fines under, 61. 
 
 FAILURE. See ACCIDENT; COMPENSATION. 
 
 FAMILY, 
 
 "member ol a." 115, 125. 
 
 illegitimates not, except as dependants, 125. 
 meaning of, 115. 
 
 of employer living at home, 115, 125. 
 [ 28 ] 
 
INDEX. 
 FEES, 
 
 county court, 201. 
 
 none for French citizens, 349. 
 for execution of award, 323. 
 of medical referees, 328. 
 to certifying and other surgeons, 334, 335. 
 Treasury Order as to county court, 201. 
 
 FINE. See PENALTIES UNDER STATUTES. 
 FIRE BRIGADE. See WORKMAN. 
 
 " FISHING VESSEL," 95, 97. 
 
 crew of, remunerated by shares, 97. 
 
 FIT. See ACCIDENT. 
 
 "FOR THE EXECUTION OF ANY WORK UNDERTAKEN 
 BY THE PRINCIPAL," 76 et seq. 
 
 FORMS, 
 
 of notice of accident, general, 63, 64. 
 
 industrial diseases, 109, 110. 
 under regulations as to certifying surgeons, 337-345. 
 
 medical referees, 329-332. 
 Workmen's Compensation Rules, 257-324. 
 
 FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION. See AGREEMENT; 
 ARBITRATION; DISEASE. 
 
 FRENCH CITIZENS. See WORKMAN. 
 
 FRIENDLY SOCIETIES, 
 
 Act of 1896 not applicable to certified scheme, 180. 
 registrar of 
 
 duties and powers as to schemes, 70 et seq, 111, 132. 
 
 FROST-BITE. See ACCIDENT. 
 
 G. 
 
 GAME-KEEPER. See ACCIDENT. 
 
 GLANDERS, 205. 
 
 GOING TO AND FROM WORK. See EMPLOYMENT. 
 
 H. 
 
 HEART-DISEASE. See DISEASE. 
 " HEAT-STROKE." See ACCIDENT. 
 HOLIDAY. See EMPLOYMENT. 
 
 HUSBAND. See DEPENDANT. 
 
 [29 J 
 
INDEX. 
 I. 
 
 ID1OPATHIC DISEASE, 7. 
 " IF ANY QUESTION ARISES," 50. 
 ILLEGITIMATES. See " DEPENDANTS." 
 ILLITERATE PERSONS, 
 
 filling up forms for, 213, 254. 
 
 ILLNESS. See. EMPLOYMENT. 
 "IN ANY EMPLOYMENT," 2. 
 
 INCAPACITY. Xte DISEASE. 
 
 aggravated by workman's condition, 153. 
 arising from defective medical treatment, 156. 
 
 loafing, 156. 
 
 misconduct, 155. 
 
 neglect of medical advice, 156. 
 
 nervous effects, 155. 
 
 refusal to undergo operation, 156. 
 
 second accident, 41, 154. 
 
 cannot claim wages as well as compensation during, 58, 162. 
 for less than a fortnight, no compensation for first week, 43, 
 
 135, 148. 
 
 week, no compensation, 43, 158. 
 for work, meaning of, 154. 
 
 medical referee may decide whether due to accident, 172. 
 need not be natural or probable consequence of the injury, 153. 
 not confined to former work, 158. 
 opportunity of finding employment narrowed, 160. 
 partial, compensation for, 159. 
 proof that, is caused by the injury, 41, 153, 154. 
 question of fact, 154. 
 second accident, from, 41, 154. 
 serious and permanent disablement, 52. 
 surgical operations, 156. 
 through old age, 160. 
 
 INDEMNITY, 
 
 against contractor under Act of 1906 . . 74, 84. 
 stranger under Act, 89, 91. 
 covers costs, 92. 
 defences available, 92. 
 
 exists though compensation settled by agreement, 92. 
 extends to " principal " paying compensation, 89, 91. 
 how settled, 89. 
 
 claim to, as between respondents, 84, 221. 
 detention of ship. See SHIP. 
 failure to give notice of claim to, effect of, 92. 
 procedure against persons securing shipowners, 228. 
 under s. 4 (contractors), 83, 84, 218, 219. 
 under s. 6, or otherwise than under s. 4. .92, 93, 219, 
 
 220. 
 
 shipowners, how limited, 99. 
 what it covers, 92. 
 where employer is applicant, 220. 
 [30] 
 
INDEX 
 
 INDUSTRIAL OR OCCUPATION DISEASE. See DISEASE. 
 INFANTS. See PERSONS UNDER LEGAL DISABILITY. 
 
 INFLAMMATION, 
 
 of the synovial lining of the wrist joint and tendon sheaths, 205. 
 
 INJURY. See ACCIDENT ; DISEASE. 
 accelerating death, 146. 
 accidental, illustrations of, 4. 
 aggravated by condition of workman, 8, 153. 
 by accident, 4. 
 
 question of law and fact, 3. 
 by disease, 6. 
 
 existence of, question of fact, 3, 154. 
 from second accident, 41, 154. 
 " is caused," 41. 
 nervous shock as, 5, 155. 
 proof that death, etc., caused by, 35, 154. 
 self inflicted, 4, 6. 
 serious and permanent, 42, 52. 
 stranger, by, q.v. 
 trivial, 43. 
 
 INSOLVENCY. See EMPLOYER. 
 
 " IN SOME SUITABLE EMPLOYMENT OR BUSINESS," 160. 
 
 INSURANCE, 
 
 industrial diseases, power of Secretary of State to require, 105. 
 
 " INSURED PERSONS," 207, 208. 
 
 INSURERS. See EMPLOYER. 
 
 may lodge memorandum of agreement for registration, 231. 
 
 INTERPRETATION, 1. 
 INTERROGATORIES. See ARBITRATION. 
 INTERVALS. See EMPLOYMENT. 
 
 " IN THE COURSE OF " THE EMPLOYMENT. See EMPLOY- 
 MENT. 
 
 " IN THE SAME GRADE," 140. 
 
 INVESTMENT, 
 
 of moneys in court, 167. 
 
 payments on death, 163, 237 et aeq. 
 
 of sum fixed in redemption, 177, 241. 
 power of judge to vary order for, 167. 
 
 IRELAND, 
 
 appeal to House of Lords from courts of, 204. 
 application of Act to, 181. 
 
 Sched. II. to, 204. 
 service on respondents in, 214. 
 W.C.A. [ 31 ] 2 D 
 
INDEX. 
 J. 
 
 JOINDER OF PARTIES. See ARBITRATION. 
 JUDGE, See COUNTY COURT JUDGE. 
 JURISDICTION OF COURT. See COUNTY COURT. 
 
 L. 
 
 " LARKING." See ACCIDENT. 
 
 LEAD POISONING. See DISEASE. 
 
 LEGAL DISABILITY. See PERSONS FNDKR LEGAL DISABILITY. 
 
 LEGAL PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, 
 
 as applicant for arbitration, 210. 
 
 included in definition of " workman," 115, 126. 
 
 of deceased dependant, right of, 147. 
 
 employer, 114, 117. 
 when made respondent, 211. 
 
 LIEN FOR COSTS. See COSTS. 
 
 LIGHTNING. See ACCIDENT. 
 
 LOCAL AUTHORITIES. See EMPLOYER. 
 
 LUNATICS. See PERSONS UNDER LEGAL DISABILITY. 
 
 M. 
 
 "MACHINERY DRIVEN BY MECHANICAL POWER," 74, 81 
 
 " MANAGER," 97, 115. 
 
 of ship, service of documents or proceedings on, 225. 
 
 "MANAGING OWNER," 
 
 of ship, service of proceedings or documents on, 225. 
 
 MANUAL LABOUR, 123, 124. 
 
 MASTER OF SHIP. See SEAMAN. 
 
 MEAL TIMES. See EMPLOYMENT. 
 
 MEDICAL ASSESSOR. See MEDICAL REFEREE. 
 
 MEDICAL EXAMINATION. See MEDICAL REFEREE. 
 after notice of accident, 162 et seq. 
 during payment of compensation, 168 et seq. 
 regulations as to, 346. 
 
 MEDICAL EXPENSES. See EXPENSES. 
 '[ 32 ] 
 
INDEX. 
 
 MEDICAL PRACTITIONER, 
 
 must not act as medical referee in a case in which he is profession- 
 ally interested, 111. 
 power of certifying surgeon may be conferred on, 105. 
 
 MEDICAL REFEREE, 
 
 appeal to, from certifying surgeon, 104, 107, 335. 
 appointment of, 111. 
 
 as assessor with judge, 190, 234, 235, 327. 
 certificate of, conclusive, 171. 
 
 subjects of, 169, 172. 
 
 fixing date of disablement in industrial diseases, 104, 107. 
 may decide to what extent incapacity due to accident, 172. 
 must not act in a case in which he is interested, 111. 
 reference to, 201, 327. 
 
 "any matter," includes cause of death, 202. 
 
 conditions of, 327. 
 
 duties of registrar, 328. 
 
 evidence necessary before, 202, 327. 
 
 fees, 328. 
 
 in respect of industrial diseases, 335. 
 
 record to be kept by registrar, 251, 254. 
 
 regulations as to, 202, 326, 327. 
 
 rules of court as to, 235. 
 
 registrar may refer to, with consent of both parties, 169, 171, 
 172, 235. 
 
 duty of workman to present himself, 169, 172. 
 
 regulations, 325. 
 
 registrar's fee for order, 236. 
 remuneration of, 116, 326-328. 
 report of, 202, 328. 
 
 submission to by agreement, 169, 171. 
 workman residing abroad 
 
 certificate of incapacity, 179. 
 
 examination, 241. 
 
 "MEMBER OF A FAMILY." See FAMILY. 
 MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT. See AGREEMENT. 
 
 MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1894, 
 as to depositions, 99, 100. 
 
 detention of ship, 112, 113. 
 
 limitation of shipowner's liability, 94, 99. 
 
 pilots, 95, 96. 
 
 presumption of loss of ship, 99. , 
 
 service of documents, 225. 
 
 MERCHANT SHIPPING (LIABILITY OF SHIPOWNERS) 
 ACT, 1898.. 100. 
 
 MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1906.. 98. 
 MERCURY POISONING, 204, 
 
 MINES, 
 
 fines under statutes relating to, 61. 
 [ 33 ] 
 
INDEX. 
 
 MISCONDUCT. See " SERIOUS AND WILFUL MISCONDUCT." 
 MISREPRESENTATION. See DISEASE. 
 
 MISTAKE OR OTHER REASONABLE CAUSE. See ACCIDENT ; 
 COMPENSATION. 
 
 " MONTH," 69. 
 MURDER, 5, fi, 25. 
 
 N. 
 
 NATIONAL INSURANCE ACT, 1911, s. 11,207. 
 NERVOUS SHOCK. See ACCIDENT. 
 
 NEW TRIAL, 
 
 judge cannot give, 185. 
 
 NON-PROVIDED SCHOOL, 131. 
 
 NOTICE. See ACCIDENT; COMPENSATION; CROWN; INDEMNITY. 
 
 NYSTAGMUS, 205. 
 
 0. 
 
 ONUS OF PROOF. See EVIDENT r. 
 
 OPTION. See ELECTION. 
 
 ORDER IN COUNCIL, 
 
 under Workmen's Compensation (Anglo-French) Convention 
 Act, 1909.. 348. 
 
 OUTWORKER. See WORKMAN. 
 
 P. 
 
 PARTICULARS. See ARBITRATION. 
 
 PARTIES TO ARBITRATION. See ARBITRATION. 
 
 PARTNER, 
 
 application of rules to, 211. 
 
 not workman of co-partners, 119. 
 
 PAUPERS IN WORKHOUSE, 121. 
 
 [34] 
 
INDEX. 
 
 PAYMENT. See ARBITRATION ; COMPENSATION ; WAGES. 
 admission of, evidence of " claim," 67, 68. 
 " without prejudice," effect of, 90. 
 
 PENALTIES UNDER STATUTES, 61. 
 PERJURY, 183. 
 PERQUISITES, 138. 
 
 "PERSONAL INJURY BY ACCIDENT." See ACCIDENT; 
 DISEASE ; INJURY. , 
 
 " PERSONAL INJURY ... IS CAUSED," 41. 
 
 PERSONS UNDER LEGAL DISABILITY, 
 
 agreement with. See AGREEMENT. 
 infants 
 
 bound by acceptance of certified scheme, 72. 
 
 claiming compensation after unsuccessful action, 54. 
 
 election by, 54. 
 
 totally incapacitated, compensation to, 135, 157. 
 earning less than 1 . . 135, 157. 
 increasing compensation on review, 157, 173. 
 parties to arbitration, 211. 
 weekly payments to, power to order payment into court, 165, 240, 
 
 PHOSPHOROUS POISONING, 204. 
 
 PIECEWORK, 120. 
 
 PILOT. See " SEAMAN." 
 
 PLOUGHING, 74, 81. 
 
 POACHERS, 5, 6, 24. 
 
 POISONING. See DISEASE. 
 
 POLICEMAN. See WORKMAN. 
 
 " PORT," 98. 
 
 POSTHUMOUS CHILD. See DEPENDANT. 
 
 PREFERENTIAL PAYMENTS. See EMPLOYER. 
 
 " PREMISES ON WHICH THE PRINCIPAL HAS UNDER- 
 TAKEN TO EXECUTE THE WORK OR. WHICH ARE 
 OTHERWISE UNDER HIS CONTROL OR MANAGE- 
 MENT," 83. 
 
 ** about," meaning of, 81 et seq. 
 limits liability of " principal," 81. 
 " premises," meaning of, 83. 
 
 [ 35 ] 
 
INDEX. 
 
 "PRINCIPAL/ 5 See INDEMNITY. 
 
 any person ... in the course of his trade or business, 75. 
 
 as employer, 74. 
 
 as respondent with contractor, 83, 84. 
 
 authorities, as, 76, 130. 
 
 compensation by, how calculated, 84. 
 
 claimed from, rights and liabilities of, when, 74, 84. 
 contract by, for agricultural work, 74, 81. 
 " for the execution of any work undertaken by the," 76 ei seq. 
 his rights and liabilities of employer, when, 74, 84. 
 liability of, 74 et seq. 
 
 exists only as to " workmen," 81. 
 
 limitations of, 81. 
 
 shipowner as, 80. 
 
 whether joint and several, 83, 84. 
 meaning of, 73. 
 
 must be a person carrying on a trade or business, 75. 
 proceedings taken against, rights and liabilities of, when, 74, 92. 
 " shall be liable to any workman employed," 74, 81. 
 
 PRIORITIES. See EMPLOYER. 
 PRISONERS, 122. 
 
 PROCEDURE. See ARBITRATION ; INDEMNITY. 
 when not provided for hi W. C. R., 251. 
 
 PROCEEDINGS. See ACTION ; ARBITRATION ; COMPENSATION. 
 against contractor instead of principal, 74. 
 
 persons securing shipowners, 226, 227. 
 
 " principal," rights of principal, 74, 84. 
 
 stranger and employer, 88, 90. 
 at law against employer bars claim, 44. 
 for indemnity, q.v. 
 meaning of " taking " in s. 6. .90. 
 payment without taking, effect of, 90. 
 record of, 251. 
 special register, 251. 
 " to recover damages," 90. 
 where Crown a party, 251. 
 
 PROOF. See EVIDENCE. 
 PROVIDED SCHOOLS, 131. 
 
 PROVISIONAL ORDERS, 
 
 relating to industrial diseases, 105. 
 
 PUBLIC AUTHORITIES. See EMPLOYER. 
 
 PUBLIC AUTHORITIES PROTECTION ACT, 1893. See ARBI- 
 
 TRATION. 
 
 [ 36] 
 
INDEX. 
 Q. 
 
 QUESTIONS OF LAW. See APPEAL. 
 
 R. 
 
 EECORDING MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT. See AGREE- 
 MENT. 
 
 RECOVERY OF DAMAGES. See STRANGER. 
 
 REDEMPTION OF WEEKLY PAYMENTS. See COMPENSATION. 
 
 "REGARD SHALL BE HAD TO ANY PAYMENT, ALLOW- 
 ANCE, OR BENEFIT," 158. 
 
 REGISTRAR OF COUNTY COURT. See COUNTY COURT. 
 
 REGISTRAR OF FRIENDLY SOCIETIES. See FRIENDLY 
 
 SOCIETIES. 
 
 REGULATIONS, 
 
 as to certifying and other surgeons, 333. 
 
 ., medical referees, 325. 
 of Secretary of State as to medical examinations, 346. 
 
 returns by employers of injuries, etc., 
 
 113, 114. 
 Treasury as to remuneration of arbitrators, 111. 
 
 RELIEF. See ACCIDENT ; COMPENSATION. 
 
 REMUNERATION, 
 
 " by shares," 97. 
 
 exceeding 250 a year, 123. 
 
 how to find rate of, 135, 139. 
 
 of arbitrator appointed by judge, 111. 
 
 REPRESENTATIVE. See LEGAL PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE. 
 
 REQUEST FOR ARBITRATION. See ARBITRATION. 
 
 RESIDENCE ABROAD. See ABSENCE FROM UNITED KINGDOM. 
 
 RESPONDENT. See ARBITRATION. 
 
 RETURNING FROM WORK. See EMPLOYMENT. 
 
 RETURNS. See EMPLOYER. 
 
 REVIEW OF WEEKLY PAYMENTS. See COMPENSATION. 
 
 RISKS OF EMPLOYMENT. See EMPLOYMENT. 
 
 ROBBER, 5, 6, 25, 
 
 [ 37] 
 
INDEX. 
 RULES 
 
 for computing average weekly payments, 139. 
 of Supreme Court as to appeals, 346. 
 Workmen's Compensation, 209. 
 
 S. 
 
 SCALE OF COMPENSATION. See COMPENSATION. 
 SCHEME. See CERTIFIED SCHEME. 
 SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT. See EMPLOYMENT. 
 
 SCOTLAND, 
 
 appeal to House of Lords from courts of, 203. 
 application of Schedule II. to, 203. 
 service on respondents in, 214. 
 special provisions as to, 131. 
 
 SCROTAL EPITHELIOMA, 205. 
 
 SEA- FISHING SERVICE. See SEAMAN. 
 
 SEAMAN, 
 
 absent on leave, 28. 
 
 without leave, 16, 17, 28. 
 application of Act to, 93. 
 apprentices, 93. 
 character of employment, 15. 
 claim for compensation by, how made, 93, 98. 
 
 description of owners of ship in documents, 225. 
 
 injured master, 98, 225. 
 
 service of, 98, 225. 
 
 wages, etc., paid between accident and discharge not to be 
 
 deducted, 98, 158. 
 conditions of inclusion, 93. 
 crew of fishing vessel remunerated by shares, 97. 
 death of, application to presume, 99. 
 burial expenses, 94, 99. 
 claim for, when ship lost, 98, 99, 225. 
 limit of time for claim, 98. 
 description of owners of ship in documents, 225. 
 compensation when no dependants, 99. 
 presumption of, when ship lost, 95, 99. 
 when compensation not payable, 94, 98. 
 depositions hi proceedings by, 94, 100, 101. 
 disappearance of, at sea, 32 et seq. 
 "during the period of incapacity," 158. 
 evidence of ship lost, 99. 
 expense of burial of, 99. 
 falling off ship, 32 et seq. 
 
 industrial diseases, provisions not applicable, 98, 107. 
 liability of shipowner to pay compensation, 94, 98. 
 [ 38] 
 
INDEX. 
 
 SEAMAN continued. 
 
 maintenance of injured, by shipowner, 98. 
 master of ship has same rights as, 93. 
 
 even though he owns shares in the ship, 95, 
 meaning of, 95. 
 notice of accident by, 93, 97. 
 
 by injured master, 98, 225. 
 
 service of, 93, 225. 
 
 when not necessary, 93. 
 pilot has same rights as, 95, 96. 
 
 meaning of, 96. 
 
 returning to ship after absence, 27, 28. 
 service of documents and proceedings, 225. 
 when compensation not payable, 94, 99, 158. 
 
 SECRETARY OF STATE, 
 
 expenses of Provisional Orders under s. 8. .105. 
 
 power of 
 
 to appoint medical referees, 111. 
 
 confer powers of judge on committees, 202. 
 empower medical practitioners as certifying surgeons, 105. 
 extend s. 8 to other diseases, etc., 105. 
 
 to make Provisional Orders relating to industrial diseases, 105. 
 regulations as to appeals from certifying surgeon, 
 
 104, 333. 
 
 medical examinations, 169, 346. 
 medical referees, 326. 
 
 require employers in particular industries to insure, 105. 
 
 to make returns 
 of injuries, 
 etc., 113. 
 regulations to be deemed Rules of Court, 253. 
 
 SECURITY. See SHIP. 
 
 SERIOUS AND PERMANENT DISABLEMENT. 
 See INCAPACITY. 
 
 " SERIOUS AND WILFUL MISCONDUCT," 42, 47 
 attributable to, 42, 60. 
 how regarded hi Scottish courts, 51. 
 misconduct must be serious, 47. 
 onus of proof, 47. 
 serious, meaning of, 44. 
 what is, 48, 49. 
 what is not, 49. 
 
 what is serious and permanent disablement, 52. 
 when no defence, 42, 52. 
 whether a question of fact or law, 51. 
 " wilful misconduct," 49. 
 
 SERVICE, 
 
 distinction between contract for and contract of, 118. 
 [ 39] 
 
INDEX. 
 
 SERVICE continued. 
 
 of documents where Crown a party, 251. 
 on respondents, 214. 
 
 residing in Ireland, 214. 
 
 Scotland, 214. 
 shipowners, 225. 
 master of ship, 225. 
 
 notice of accident, 62, 64. See SEAMAN. 
 relief against bad, 61, 64. 
 substituted, 251. 
 
 SETTING ASIDE AGREEMENT. See AGREEMENT. 
 SEWER GAS. See ACCIDENT ; DISEASE. 
 
 " SHIP," 
 
 British, 96. 
 
 fishing vessel, 97. 
 not part of British territory, 3. 
 seaman returning to, after absence, 27, 28. 
 detention of, 111, 112, 113, 226. 
 
 application for, how made, 112, 226, 227. 
 
 by employer who has paid, or against whom claim is 
 
 made for compensation, 112. 
 in what court, 249. 
 order for, 112, 226. 
 appeal from, 113. 
 execution of, 226. 
 penalties for disobeying, 112. 
 rescission of, 226. 
 
 security, character and approval of, 226. 
 service of, 226. 
 proceedings against persons giving security, 1 12, 227, 249. 
 
 particulars to state circumstances, 227. 
 proceedings by employer for, 112, 228. 
 transmission of documents, etc., to court in which arbi- 
 tration proceedings taken, 227. 
 undertaking by solicitor representing owners, etc., 227. 
 
 attachment for non-compliance with, 227. 
 manager of, defined, 115. 
 master of. See SEAM AX. 
 meaning of, 96. 
 presumption of loss of, 99. 
 
 SHIPOWNER, 
 
 description of, in documents, 225. 
 disclosure of names of, 225. 
 indemnity of, against stranger, 94, 99. 
 liability for compensation not limited, 94, 99. 
 
 expenses of burial, 198. 
 
 maintenance of injured seaman, 98. 
 
 limitations on liability under Merchant Shipping Act, 1894. .94. 
 service of documents and proceedings on, 225. 
 work merely incidental to business of, 80. 
 
 [ 40] 
 
INDEX. 
 SHIPOWNERS' NEGLIGENCE (REMEDIES) ACT, 1905. 
 
 rules under (when made) to apply, 226. 
 SHIP'S HUSBAND, 97, 115. 
 
 SOLICITOR, 
 
 can appear in arbitration without leave, 224. 
 undertaking by. See SHIP. 
 
 SPECIAL CASE. See ARBITRATION. 
 
 SPECIAL EXPENSES. See EARNINGS. 
 
 SPECIAL REGISTER, 251. 
 
 SPHERE OF LABOUR. See EMPLOYMENT. 
 
 STATEMENTS. &ee EVIDENCE. 
 
 STAY OF PROCEEDINGS. See ARBITRATION. 
 
 STONE-THROWING. See ACCIDENT. 
 
 STRANGER. See ACCIDENT. 
 defences of, 92. 
 
 indemnity against, 92, 93, 219, 220. 
 injury by, 89. 
 " not entitled to recover both damages and compensation,' 
 
 meaning of, 88, 90. 
 proceedings against, 88. 
 
 effect of discovering compensation paid, 91. 
 
 none if compensation paid, 90 
 recovery of damages against, 90. 
 
 a question of fact, 91. 
 
 bars remedy against employer, 90. 
 
 what amounts to, 89, 90. 
 
 *' without prejudice," 90. 
 what amounts to " taking proceedings," 90. 
 who is, 89. 
 workman may proceed against employer and, 88, 89. 
 
 STREET RISKS. See EMPLOYMENT. 
 STRIKERS. See ACCIDENT ; EMPLOYMENT. 
 SUB-CONTRACTING. See CONTRACTOR." 
 SUBCUTANEOUS CELLULITIS, 205. 
 SUBMISSION. See ARBITRATION. 
 SUICIDE, 6, 40, 145. 
 " SUITABLE EMPLOYMENT," 161. 
 
 SUNSTROKE. See ACCIDENT ; DISEASE 
 
 [41 ] 
 
INDEX. 
 SUPERANNUATION ACT, 1887.. 111. 
 
 SURGEON. See. CERTIFYING SURGEON. 
 
 SURGICAL OPERATION, 
 
 as a novus actua, 146, 156. 
 death under anaesthetic, 146. 
 
 experimental, 146. 
 whether can be insisted on as condition of payments, 156, 157. 
 
 SUSPENSION. See COMPENSATION ; DISEASE. 
 
 T. 
 
 TEACHERS, 118, 131. 
 
 TELEGRAPHISTS' CRAMP, 205. 
 
 TETANUS. See DLSEA.SE. 
 
 THIRD PARTIES. See ARBITRATION. 
 
 THRESHING, 74, 81. 
 
 TIME. See ACCIDENT ; COMPENSATION. 
 
 TIPS, 138. 
 
 TRADE OR BUSINESS, 
 
 " any person ... in the course of or for the purposes of his," 
 
 75. 
 
 casual employment not for, excluded, 114, 124. 
 "for the purposes of his employer's," 124. 
 " in some suitable employment or business," 161. 
 " no part of or process in the," 79. 
 meaning, 75. 
 
 performance by authorities of powers and duties is, 76, 116, 130. 
 principal contracting for work in or for, 76. 
 work " merely ancillary or incidental to," 79, 80. 
 
 TRANSFER, See COUNTY COURT. 
 
 TREASURY, THE, 
 
 may frame regulations as to fees of arbitrators, 111, 183. 
 
 schemes under the Act, 110. 
 warrants, 111. 
 
 u. 
 
 UNITED KINGDOM, 
 
 statute operates within limits of, 2. 
 
 UNNECESSARY OR UNREASONABLE ACTS. See EMPLOYMENT. 
 
 UNSUCCESSFUL ACTION. See ACTION. 
 
 [42] 
 
INDEX. 
 V. 
 
 "VESSEL." See SHIP. 
 VOLUNTARY WORKERS, 122. 
 
 W. 
 
 WAGES. See COMPENSATION ; EARNINGS. 
 
 no claim for, during compensated period, 58, 162. 
 payment of, out of charity, 58. 
 
 WAKES WEEKS, 144. 
 
 " WEEKLY EARNINGS." See " EARNINGS." 
 WEEKLY PAYMENTS. See COMPENSATION. 
 WIFE. See " DEPENDANTS." 
 
 WILFUL MISCONDUCT. See "SERIOUS AND WILFUL MIS 
 CONDUCT." 
 
 WINDING-UP OF COMPANY. Se.e EMPLOYER. 
 
 WORK, 
 
 agricultural, contract for, 74, 81. 
 
 incapacity for, meaning of, 154. 
 
 light, ability to do, 161. 
 
 " merely ancillary or incidental to " a trade or business, 79. 
 
 " undertaken by the principal," meaning of, 76. 
 
 WORKMAN, 
 
 absence from United Kingdom, q.v. 
 aliens, 133. 
 apprentice is, 114, 118. 
 
 to sea or sea-fishing service, 93. 
 bailees, 120. 
 casual, 114, 124, 130. 
 
 when included and when excluded, 114, 124. 
 co-adventurers, 97, 120. 
 coal miners, extension of Act, 31. 
 commercial travellers, 12. 
 compulsory services, 121. 
 contract of and for service distinguished, 118. 
 control as a test, 119, 120. 
 co-partner is not, 119. 
 death of, effect, 115, 126. 
 definition of, 114, 118. 
 dispensary medical officer, when, 119. 
 excluded, 114, 124 et seq. 
 firemen 
 
 policeman as, 125. 
 
 voluntary brigade, 122. * 
 
 found drowned or killed, inferences of fact, 33. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 WORKMAN continued. 
 French citizens, 133. 
 includes persons who are entitled to compensation, 115. 
 
 representatives and dependants, 115. 
 independent contractors not, 120 et seq. 
 in employment of Crown, 110. 
 lent or let on hire, 114, 117. 
 meaning under original Act, 117. 
 member of employer's family living in employer's house, not, 
 
 114, 125. 
 must be employed by some one under a contract of service, 114, 
 
 118. 
 of authorities, 130. 
 
 contractor. See " PRINCIPAL " ; " CONTRACTOR." 
 outworkers, not, 114, 116. 
 paupers hi workhouse, 121. 
 
 persons earning more than 250 a year, 114, 123. 
 persons engaged by charitable or religious institutions, 1 22. 
 pieceworker, 120. 
 policeman, not, 114, 125. 
 
 as fireman, 125. 
 prisoners, 122. 
 
 professional football player, 119. 
 rescue brigade work in coal mines, 31. 
 seaman, q.v. 
 taxi-cab driver, 120. 
 voluntary services, 122. 
 
 " whether by way of manual labour, clerical work, or other- 
 wise," 122. 
 
 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906 
 application of, 132, 135. 
 contracting out forbidden, 72. 
 date of operation, 132. 
 extension of, in case of coal minors, 31. 
 interpretation, principles of, 1. 
 repeals existing Acts, 133. 
 short title, 133. 
 
 special provisions as to Scotland, 131. 
 text of, 351. 
 
 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (ANGLO-FRENCH) CONVKN 
 
 TION) ACT, 1909.. 133. 
 order under, 348. 
 
 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RULES, 209 et seq. 
 
 THE END. 
 
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