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NOTE ON THE QUESTION 
 
 OF 
 
 PROHIBITING THE EXPORT OF 
 FOOD DURING FAMINE, 
 
 SIR GEORGE! CAMPBELL. 
 '< 
 
 LONDON: 
 G. PHIPPS, PRINTEfW3 & 14, TOTHILL STEEET, WESTMINSTER. 
 
 1874. 
 
MY NAME has been much coupled with the 
 question of the prohibition of the export of food 
 grains from Bengal. And it has been several times 
 remarked that the arguments by which I supported 
 that course have never been made known. The 
 truth is, that I have never fully argued the matter. 
 In the first instance, I strongly recommended the 
 prohibition ; but at that time, in dealing with the 
 great calamity which had befallen the country, I did 
 not stop to argue at length, I rather looked on the 
 measure as one, the advantages of which were self- 
 evident, and in respect of which the onus of proof, 
 as it were, lay on the other side, i.e., so manifest 
 advantages must be met by the allegation of counter- 
 . acting disadvantages which did not occur to me. 
 
 His Excellency the Viceroy, on the other hand, 
 seemed to look on the matter as one not admitting 
 of argument. On all other subjects connected with 
 the threatened famine, His Excellency invited free 
 discussion with the Government of Bengal and its 
 principal officers. On this one subject he precluded 
 discussion. I can well imagine that to a man bred in 
 the inner sanctum of that great modern commercial 
 school, which has done so much to benefit the world, 
 but the doctrines of which may, I think, like other 
 things, be pushed to extreme, the proposition which 
 
 M43327 
 
I made may have seemed like a rude assault on the 
 fundamental doctrines of religion a thing not to be 
 argued. At any rate, at that time, His Excellency 
 declined to argue the matter, and, considering dis- 
 cussion and agitation of the subject very inexpedient, 
 he met the proposal by a simple but very decided 
 negative. As a loyal subordinate, I forebore from 
 argument at that time. I gave up the case as 
 altogether hopeless ; it really might be that the rise 
 of prices would check exports, and I applied myself 
 to the abundant work which lay before me in the 
 course prescribed by superior authority. 
 
 At a later period, the then Secretary of State, 
 the Duke of Argyll, in announcing to me that to His 
 Grace and his advisers the course followed by the 
 Government of India seemed to be the right one, 
 remarked: " to be sure, we have not heard the 
 arguments on the other side/' and then I felt that 
 perhaps I was wrong in not having put my views fully 
 on record. A man who is overwhelmed by much 
 action may, however, perhaps be excused the 
 omission of detailed argument. By the time it was 
 apparent to me that argument might not have been 
 out of place, Her Majesty's Government in England 
 had decided the matter. The time had passed 
 when, in my view, the prohibition would have been 
 a clear gain, and there was no longer room for 
 argument. 
 
 Now that the question has, for the present, 
 wholly passed by and become matter of history, 
 and when I have ceased to hold the office in which 
 it was raised, I think that I may properly state the 
 
arguments by which I justify the proposal for which 
 I am responsible. The exports did continue to an 
 amount even greater than I had feared, and after 
 much experience of, and reflection on the matter, 
 after narrowly watching all that has been said on 
 the other side, I must say that I am more firmly 
 than ever convinced that the course which I urged 
 was the right one, and would have been attended 
 with overwhelming advantages and no considerable 
 disadvantages. In this view, then, I wish to state 
 my case. I shall be pardoned if I argue it with perfect 
 freedom, speaking as if I were my own counsel. 
 
 First, I will put briefly the facts of the case. 
 To begin with it, must be quite understood that 
 the proposal to prohibit the export of food involved 
 no violation of the law, nor any exercise of power 
 for which express provision is not made. The 
 power to prohibit the export of any article whatever 
 is very expressly given by law, to the Governor- 
 General of India in Council ; and this not by some 
 antiquated and forgotten law, nor by on'e of a 
 political character, but by a very modern re- 
 enactment, expressed in clear and unmistakable 
 terms, the consolidated law regulating customs' 
 duties and commercial matters. I proposed, then, 
 but an action for which the wisdom ^of the Legis- 
 lature had provided. 
 
 My first proposal was to prohibit the export of 
 food grains from all India. At that time (in October) 
 it was not improbable that the famine would have 
 been very much greater than has, we hope, proved 
 to be the case. There was an absolute concurrence 
 
6 
 
 of all the most reliable opinions that without rain the 
 cold weather crops could not be sown. Throughout 
 almost the whole of Bengal proper there was 
 universal fear of an extreme failure of the rice 
 crops. If these fears had been realized to the full, 
 there can be no question that every grain available 
 throughout the Indian dominions would have been 
 most emergently wanted. As it is, I think, general 
 prohibition for a time would have been very bene- 
 ficial, for it would have enabled us to obtain an 
 immediate considerable supply from Burmah, with- 
 out waiting for the new crops; whereas, in fact, 
 we were unable, from the limited stores of the 
 old crop, to get much without violent disturbance 
 of the market. We did not get it ; and consequently, 
 in the early part of the season, very much most 
 valuable time was lost, and much expense incurred 
 in importing from Saigon, at an excessive price. 
 As things turned out, I would have relaxed the 
 prohibitions in Burmah, in time for the opera- 
 tions of the new crops. I might also, possibly, 
 have made an exception in favour of the trade 
 between Madras and Ceylon. 
 
 Seeing the hopelessness of any acceptance of my 
 first proposition, I submitted, a few days later, 
 another definite proposal, viz., that the exports 
 of food grains from Bengal only should be prohibited. 
 I omit farther argument on my first proposal, and 
 take my stand on this latter only. 
 
 It is this, then, that I shall argue, viz., the 
 prohibition of export of food grains from Bengal. 
 
 That measure not having been adopted, the 
 
export proceeded in November, and it was very brisk 
 throughout the months of December, January, and 
 February. It was not so great as in a plentiful year, 
 it is true, but the difference was less than might 
 have been expected. The previous year, 1872-3, 
 was one of plenty, in which the exports much ex- 
 ceeded the average, the comparison, therefore, is 
 hardly fair, but, comparing these two years, a 
 return prepared for the Government of India shows 
 that from 1st October, 1873, to 28th February, 1874, 
 173,161 tons of food grains were exported from 
 Bengal against 241,618 tons in the corresponding 
 period of the previous year. The reduction is only 
 a little more than one-fourth about 28 per cent. 
 
 Omitting October (since my proposal was not 
 made till the latter part of that month), but including 
 March, the export from Bengal from 1st November 
 to end of March was a little over 172,000 tons. I 
 may assume that, before the end of the season, it 
 will exceed 200,000 tons ; but I will take that round 
 figure for argument. It is true that, against this 
 export we may set a still larger import made by 
 Government. We have seen the strange spectacle 
 (and to my view it is a spectacle so unnatural as 
 forcibly to suggest something wrong) of fleets of 
 ships carrying away rice from the Hooghly crossing 
 other fleets carrying rice into the Hooghly. Yet, 
 when we come to compare dates, we find that the 
 compensation is by no means complete. 
 
 Private import trade there has been practically 
 none ; with the exception of a very few small parcels 
 and samples, the imports have been entirely on 
 
8 
 
 Government account. Of this Government import 
 there was scarcely any in November and December, 
 and but little in January, to set against the great 
 exports. It was not till February that the Govern- 
 ment imports became large and weighed against the 
 exports. Still, at the end of February the imports 
 were scarcely more than half the exports, counting 
 from the commencement of the scarcity. In March 
 the imports were very large, while the exports fell 
 off, and thus the imports and exports were brought 
 to an equality. But it was not till the end of March 
 that this result was effected. Throughout the 
 previous months the grain supply of the country 
 was very seriously diminished by exports, and the 
 flow of grain being seawards, the flow north to the 
 distressed districts was prevented. There happened, 
 what I from the very first pointed out must happen, 
 that is to say, throughout the period from the end 
 of October to February, the means of transport were 
 most insufficiently used, the railway was not working 
 up to anything like its full power, and much precious 
 time was thus lost, while later in the season the 
 Government supply is more than can be carried 
 without great interference with the private trade. 
 
 Great authorities, both official and non-official, 
 have asked why we did not buy up the grain which 
 was exported, and send it up to the famine districts, 
 instead of letting it be carried away. My answer is 
 very simple. I tried to do this, but found it impos- 
 sible to do so without producing the very famine 
 which I sought to avert. In all countries Govern- 
 ment operations seem to affect the market more 
 
than those of private individuals, in India it is so 
 especially. Imports being delayed, I tried to buy, 
 and did buy, as much as possible in the country, in 
 order to send up food at once. I found the very 
 greatest difficulty in getting some 40,000 tons ; it 
 was only by constant search in every market that we 
 got so much, and then the result was to bring up 
 the price to a point higher than it has reached 
 before or since. Foreigners will pay for food, to go 
 to countries where wages are high, a price that is 
 famine price to a starved Bengalee. I have no 
 hesitation in saying that if we had persevered in 
 buying more than we did in November and December, 
 we should have had a famine then instead of now. 
 
 What happened then, was this, a large quantity 
 of grain was taken out of the Bengal markets, and 
 exported early in the season ; that grain was re- 
 placed by imports, at a great expense, later in the 
 season. I say that neither in point of early supply 
 to the distressed districts, nor in point of finance, is 
 this later supply the same thing. 
 
 The advantages of retaining the food needed by 
 a starving people are, I still think, self-evident. 
 The only question is, do the disadvantages of the 
 course proposed preponderate ? And this is the 
 view taken by Her Majesty's Government in Eng- 
 land. I have not at this moment the letter to refer 
 to, but it amounted to this, that the advantages 
 were not sufficient to justify the great evils attending 
 interference with the free course of trade. The 
 question then reduces itself again to this, what 
 are these evils ? I have nowhere seen them cate- 
 
10 
 
 gorically stated ; but, by diligent search, I have been 
 able to discover only those which I give below. I 
 do not take into account the ethical sin against the 
 principles and dogmas of free trade. I look only to 
 practical, material evils ; and, in this light, I boldly 
 affirm that there really would have been no evils of 
 much weight. 
 
 I was first led to suspect what I venture to think 
 the weakness of the opposite side of the case by 
 observing the very roundabout and fanciful character 
 of the only argument which for some time held pos- 
 session of the field, that put forward by my re- 
 spected friend, Sir B. Frere, who said that the pro- 
 hibition would prevent imports, since no one would 
 import with the fear before him that he would not 
 be permitted to re-export. This is very simply 
 answered by the fact that, although there was no 
 prohibition, there have been no imports worth men- 
 tioning, and, consequently, no re-exports or question 
 of re-exports. The expectation of private trade 
 from beyond sea has proved a mere delusion. 
 
 Next, there comes a very grave and serious argu- 
 ment. Trade, it is said, is a delicate plant or, 
 perhaps, it would be a simile more easily applied, to 
 say a shy bird ; interfere with her, refuse her a 
 resting place for a season, and she will fly away, and 
 never come back again. I admit that this may be, 
 and sometimes is, the case in respect of very special 
 and peculiar articles of manufacture which owe their 
 seat to fashion or accident. But I utterly deny that 
 it is so in regard to an article of the primest and 
 most universal necessity the most cosmopolitan of 
 
11 
 
 food grains. I say that if, in Europe or America, 
 the export of wheat from any country were stopped 
 for a year the customers would not, in disgust, fly 
 away for ever. They would act on no such senti- 
 mental or bird-like feeling. They would come back 
 the moment the cheapest and best wheat is offered. 
 Still more so is it with rice an article for which the 
 demand is continually increasing, and for which all 
 the western world must come to India. 
 
 There is one result of this kind, and only one, 
 which might, possibly, to some extent have followed 
 the prohibition of the export of rice from Bengal. 
 Some of our customers in the West Indies, Mau- 
 ritius, &c., have what may, perhaps, be called a 
 prejudice in favour of the particular kinds of rice grown 
 in Bengal they will have these kinds, and nothing 
 else. The prohibition might have driven them to 
 Burmah ; they might have learned to eat Burmah 
 rice, and hereafter they might have dealt in Bengal 
 rice with less reference to prejudice, and with more 
 regard to its real merits and cheapness. 
 
 If this had happened, I very greatly doubt if the 
 effect would have been bad. Our Bengal provinces 
 are so densely populated, and they produce so many 
 valuable articles sought for in commerce, that the 
 difficulty is not to use our land, but to find land for 
 all that it is desired to grow without interfering with 
 the food of the population. The demand for jute 
 seems to go on increasing without limit the cry is 
 that it is displacing rice to a dangerous extent. In 
 the cultivation of indigo and opium, and other things, 
 the constant struggle is to get more land. There is 
 
12 
 
 hardly an indigo planter in the country who would 
 not at once double his cultivation if he could get the 
 land. When there is this struggle among the more 
 valuable staples, the rice export is only valuable in 
 so far as it gives us a surplus to fall back upon in times 
 of scarcity. But if we have, as the present season 
 has shown to be the case, inconvenient customers, 
 who will carry off our rice whether we need it our- 
 selves or not, the sooner we get rid of such customers 
 the better. I say, cure them of their prejudices as 
 soon as possible ; we want no custom for food 
 depending on prejudice. Let them judge our rice 
 by its merits. If Bengal rice is better and cheaper 
 than any other rice they can get, let them take it 
 when we can spare it ; when they can get more for 
 their money in Burmah, let them go there. They 
 will find there a country whose capacities are for 
 rice capacities almost unlimited, if they be but deve- 
 loped by some of the populations which India can well 
 spare a country which will supply them, and, sup- 
 plying them, will add very greatly to the Indian 
 revenues and resources. 
 
 In the above I have incidentally met the argu- 
 ment that if we had prohibited the export of Bengal 
 rice our colonies must have been starved they would 
 have gone to Burmah, and got there the rice which 
 the Government has now taken. They would not 
 have gone to Saigon for the rice which our Govern- 
 ment has procured there, because it has cost much 
 dearer. In truth, the Saigon production is small 
 compared to the Indian, and it has no chance against 
 Burmah rice in the markets west of Singapore. 
 
13 
 
 Only in case of prohibition of export from Burmah 
 also, would our colonies have gone to Saigon and 
 California. 
 
 Another argument against prohibitions, is, that 
 it would unduly interfere with private bargains, 
 and disarrange private interests. Merchants who 
 come to India are bound to take notice of the law 
 which enables Government to prohibit exports if 
 need be. But still I admit, that to have adopted 
 such a measure in the height of the trading season 
 would have been a great evil. It so happened, 
 however, that the time at which I recommended the 
 prohibition was that at which the trade is the 
 dullest. In October the past season's bargains have 
 nearly come to a close, the ships with orders for 
 the new season have not arrived. At that time the 
 prohibition might have been proclaimed with the 
 very minimum of disturbance of private interests. 
 In fact, there would have been scarcely any such 
 disturbance. In addition to the natural dulness 
 of the season, there was a sudden rise of prices and 
 lull in bargains. The great majority of the merchants 
 were in favour of prohibition. I believe there would 
 have been scarcely any complaint. The producers 
 certainly would not have complained. Native 
 opinion was absolutely unanimous on the subject. 
 Another suggestion is incidentally thrown out by 
 Lord Northbrook, viz., that the prohibition by 
 cheapening prices would have unduly stimulated 
 consumption. I must respectfully express my belief 
 that the cheapening in lower Bengal would have 
 gone no farther than to promote a healthy flow of 
 
14 
 
 trade to the distressed districts, and would not have 
 led to an undue and excessive consumption by poor 
 people, to whom the price would have been but a 
 little less severe than, in fact, it has been. I will 
 return to that point presently. I can honestly say 
 that, cast about as I may, I have been able to find 
 no farther arguments |against prohibition than the 
 above, and it will be seen that by these I am not 
 convinced. 
 
 I will now attempt to compare the effects which 
 would have followed the prohibition of exports, with 
 those which have in fact attended the opposite 
 course. It is clear that the prohibition would have 
 retained in the country some 200,000 tons of food, 
 which have been, or shortly will be exported, and 
 which it has been necessary to replace at a great 
 cost. The quantity may not be so very great when 
 compared with the consumption of the whole of the 
 Bengal provinces; but as a quantity which must 
 have been brought to market, it would have much 
 affected the course of trade. While I have never 
 believed in private importations of food from beyond 
 sea, because the conditions are against any such 
 trade, I have always had great faith in the activity 
 of the internal trade. The cases in which that trade 
 has failed are extremely exceptional. Orissa was 
 extraordinarily isolated and peculiarly unmercantile, 
 but the Indian races are generally mercan- 
 tile in the extreme, all the Hindustanees are par- 
 ticularly so. I may say that in all the famines 
 of the north-west provinces, food has been supplied 
 by the private trade alone, Government only 
 
15 
 
 finding labour and wages. Throughout the present 
 scarcity nothing has been more marked than 
 the very great readiness with which the petty 
 native dealers have acted on every turn of the grain 
 market ; they have even imported into Behar both 
 from the Punjab and from Bengal, when it was 
 difficult to see in the prices much margin of profit. 
 Whenever they have ceased to do so, or done so 
 to but a limited extent, it has been because prices 
 clearly did not admit of prudent transactions. The 
 produce available for export was the rice surplus of 
 the coast districts of Bengal, which the drought 
 did not affect, and some wheat which was ex- 
 ported from Bhagurpore and other districts of 
 Behar, even when the people were starving there. 
 This wheat would have been retained where it was 
 wanted, and I need say nothing more of that. 
 The surplus rice of the coast districts would have come 
 into the market as usual, and not being permitted 
 to flow out seawards, being as it were dammed 
 up on that side, it would have flowed out on the 
 other side (that is to the distressed districts) as 
 surely as water, dammed upon one side, will flow 
 out on the other to find its level. I feel it to be a 
 matter as certain as a mathematical demonstration, 
 that if the accumulation in Calcutta of rice usually 
 exported had established, in the cold weather 
 months, a difference of 20 or even 10 per cent, 
 in price between Calcutta and the famine dis- 
 tricts, the railways would have been overburdened 
 with the traffic to the latter districts, as they were 
 before and after. The fact was otherwise ; the demand 
 
16 
 
 for export brought the Calcutta price almost or quite 
 to a level with the Patna prices, and the trade 
 upwards was almost stopped for some months. 
 It was like an attempt to draw from a reservoir 
 with a great gap in its rear. 
 
 If the railways and rivers would certamiy 
 have carried to the north the dammed up 
 surplus of lower Bengal, I look on it as equally 
 certain that the petty local dealers would have 
 most efficiently distributed this food in the distressed 
 tracts. In Behar (a Hindustanee country, and the 
 tract of greatest need) I can answer, from personal 
 observation, that great merchants may not undertake 
 great mercantile operations in European style beyond 
 the line of railway ; but I never saw a country where 
 the local and popular trade more actively utilized 
 even the smallest margin of profit. When I was 
 in Tirhcot, in March, the bazaars were abundantly 
 supplied with foreign grain (chiefly from the coast, 
 where export to sea had not drained the supply) 
 brought in by every crevice, on cart, and bullock and 
 donkey-back, till the great Government pressure for 
 carriage began to interfere with this trade. I am 
 satisfied that all the rice which could have been 
 deposited at railway stations, at a price leaving a 
 profit on importation into the distressed tracts in the 
 north, would have been greedily carried off. As it 
 was, very little rice was imported. Nothing but the 
 western grains seemed to have reached the famine 
 tracts of Tirhoot. 
 
 If private traders were willing so to import, Govern- 
 ment might have, at least, by so much diminished 
 
17 
 
 its supply and left the carriage and the work to 
 them. I believe I am safe in saying that 200,000 
 tons thus privately imported by a good and healthy 
 flow, commencing early in the season, would have 
 done more good than 300,000 tons imported later by 
 Government with much pressure and interference 
 with private trade ; for all the recent reports show 
 that this trade has been most seriously interfered 
 with. 
 
 If I had had my way then, I would have secured this 
 200,000 tons by natural flow, and would have con- 
 fined Government importations to the more moderate 
 quantities required for the actual use of the people, 
 to whom I would still have given work, and to some 
 extent, perhaps, for poor-houses for the very poor 
 needing support in a country well supplied by private 
 trade. I would also have established, later in the 
 season, some considerable reserves in Calcutta, which 
 might be sold to advantage, in case of scarcity, in 
 unforeseen quarters or re-exported at comparatively 
 little loss, if, happily, such need did not arise. More 
 than this, I believe, I should not have thought it 
 necessary to do, as things have turned out. The 
 whole operation would have involved a comparatively 
 small expense, and infinitely less derangement of 
 trade and interference with the habits and self- 
 reliance of the people than the other course must, I 
 fear, necessitate. 
 
 Let us see, then, that other course. I understand 
 its main defence to be this, that it was unnecessary 
 to prohibit exportation, because the same end is 
 gained by Government importation. I at once 
 
18 
 
 admit that the Government of India has arranged 
 to import and to supply to the distressed districts all 
 that I have deemed it prudent to ask for, and 
 more. I state frankly that my estimates have been 
 exceeded. I am now sanguine that, by very great 
 exertions, we have so arranged our transport that 
 the great quantities ordered may be distributed to 
 the relief centres in time. If, unhappily, disaster 
 should arise, I am inclined to think that it is more 
 likely to result (perhaps where we least expect it) 
 from the stoppage of trade which the great Govern- 
 ment pressure for carriage is now causing in some 
 quarters, than from deficiency in those quarters 
 which the Government has undertaken to supply. 
 But putting aside such possible evils, which I trust 
 may never be realized, is the result the same as the 
 other ? I think not. It seems to me that there is too 
 great a disposition on the part of some people who 
 have not to pay the bill to put the question of cost 
 out of sight, to treat the matter as if the Viceroy were 
 a benevolent person who says, "I will not feed these 
 people from one source, because I do not think it is 
 for their good ; but from another source I will feed 
 them amply, and it comes to the same thing." 
 In truth, the bill of cost is a very different thing. I 
 submit that the course of buying and importing and 
 distributing a supply of food, which the mere prohi- 
 bition of exports would have provided without cost, 
 involves a loss of several millions sterling, which, 
 until the British taxpayer is willing to pay, the 
 Indian Kyot must pay, and that is no light matter. 
 Then I say that the distribution, late in the 
 
19 
 
 season, of immense quantities of food by Govern- 
 ment, is not only a most difficult task, but must 
 have an effect in pauperising the people and dimin- 
 ishing their habits of self-reliance far greater than 
 would have been the case if we could have relied on 
 private trade for the general supply, and confined 
 ourselves to giving work and food to those willing to 
 work, and charity to proper objects of charity. I 
 say, farther, that the excessive provisions offered by 
 Government must lead to demands in the future, 
 and to financial embarrassments far greater than 
 those which directly result from the expenditure of 
 the present season. 
 
 This, then, is my case. I argue that by the 
 simple, legal, and inexpensive step of stopping the 
 export of food grains from Bengal in the end of 
 October last, of which no one would have complained, 
 we might have diminished by two-thirds the supply 
 of Government grain now deemed necessary ; might 
 have saved the greater part of the expense which we 
 have incurred; might have avoided interference with, 
 and, on the contrary, greatly promoted, the internal 
 private trade ; and need not have directly assisted 
 the people to nearly so great an extent as must now 
 be the case, nor so much have trenched on their 
 independence and so much have taught them to rely 
 on the Government. 
 
 Liberavi animam meam. I trust that I have zea- 
 lously, and to the very best of my ability, followed out 
 the course which has been prescribed to me, and 
 done my utmost to render that course successful. 
 Although it has not been permitted to me to see 
 
20 
 
 that success finally achieved, I am very hopeful that 
 I have left the preparations so forward that success 
 may reasonably be looked for. I trust that I have 
 acted loyally, and I heartily testify to the zeal and 
 energy of the Viceroy in saving the people com- 
 mitted to his charge ; but, on the one point on 
 which we have seriously differed in opinion, I 
 have now tried to show that, by the course 
 which I recommended, the end, which we all sought, 
 might have been more advantageously attained. 
 
 GEOEGE CAMPBELL. 
 
 STEAMER 
 
 IN THE EED SEA, 
 April 22nd, 1874. 
 

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