I
THE
VAISESHIKA APHORISMS
OP
KANADA
WITH COMMENTS FROM THE UPASKARA OF S~AN-KARA-MIS"RA
AND THE VIVRITTI OF JAYA-NARAYANA-
TARKAPANCHANANA,
TRANSLATED BY
ARCHIBALD EDWARD GOUGH, B. A.
LATE SCHOLAR OP LINCOLN COLLEGE, AND BODEN SANSKRIT SCHOLAR, POSET AND
ELLERTON HEBREW SCHOLAR, KENNICOTT HEBREW SCHOLAR, AND DENYER AND
JOHNSON THEOLOGICAL SCHOLAR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD :
ANGLO-SANSKRIT PROFESSOR IN THE GOVERNMENT
COLLEGE, BKNARSS, N. W. P.
BENARES:
E. J. LAZARUS & CO.
LONDON : TRUBNER & CO.
1873.
PRINTED BY E. J. LAZARUS & Co., AT THE MEDICAL HALL PRESS, BENARES.
PREFACE.
The following pages will, it is trusted, facilitate to
Sanskrit students the perusal of the original text, and to
general readers an estimate, of one of the schools of
Indian thought. Such interest as they may claim, will be
historical, as a picture of a low stage of metaphysical cul-
ture. The system must be judged from its proper place in
the history of philosophy ; not hastily condemned from a
modern point of view. The Indian cosmologies, imper-
fect in analysis, and hasty in synthesis, may be compa-
red to the pre-Socratic schemes among the Greeks.
In India the Socratic reform in method has been wanting,
and speculation has lapsed into a fruitless scholasticism.
By these systems, however, it is that Indian thinkers are
formed, and we may well remember that in mental dis-
cipline "speculation is higher than speculative truth", and
that where philosophers "have not realised truth, they,
have always determined exertion." *
The technical terms employed in translation are
necessarily rather suggestive than reproductive of the
original. The artificial groupings, or (to use Locke's ex-
pression) mixed modes, of European and of Indian thought,
intersect and overlap, rather than coincide with, one an-
other. The reader should bear this in mind, that he may
avoid the misleading associations of an English termi-
nology.
See Sir W. Ham ilton's Discussions, pp. 40-42.
20G50G4
II
A brief indication of the conceptions dominant in the
Vaiseshika system, may be useful to the uninitiated. These
are the transition of souls from everlasting through new
embodiments and new spheres of being ; therein reaping
in pleasures and pains the fruits of merits and demerits
ever reproduced as seed by plant and plant by seed ; the
atomic aggregates which make up the object world, eter-
nally disintegrated and redintegrated by the efficacy of
works, with or without for it is questioned the inter-
vention of a creator spirit. Thus in bondage to sensuous
experience, painful at the best, the soul must wait its re-
lease until, the understanding purified by good works, it
attains to knowledge of the modes of being. This know-
ledge disengages the soul from its appetent and active
functions, and merges it in the absolute.
English readers will find abundant information, for
further guidance, in Colebrooke's Essays on the Religion
and Philosophy of the Hindus, the Rev. K. M.
Banerjea's Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy, Dr. Fitz-
edward Hall's Rational Refutation of Hindi! Philoso-
phy translated from the Hindi of the Rev. Nehemiah
Nila-kantha, Professor Max Miiller's Essay on Indian
Logic appended to Abp. Thomson's Laws of Thought,
and the articles on the Vaiseshika and other Indian phi-
losophies in Chambers's Eneyclopsedia. Those who read
Sanskrit will find a useful epitome of the Vaiseshika
doctrines in the Tattva-padartha-sara the work of an
illustrious pandit of the present day, Jaya-ntirayana-tar-
kapanchanana late professor of Hindu Philosophy in the
Government Sanskrit College Calcutta ; the author of the
Ill
Vivritti from which many of the comments hi the follow-
ing pages are reproduced.
The translation of the Vaiseshika Aphorisms is re-
printed from the 'Pandit,' a monthly publication of the
Benares Sanskrit College. It was undertaken at the
instance of Mr. R. T. H. Griffith, the learned principal of
the Benares College, as supplementary, in however imper-
fect a manner, to the text-books of the other Indian sys-
tems translated by the late Dr. Jas. Ballantyne. The text
followed is that of Dr. Boer and Pandit Jaya-ndrdya'na-
tarkapanch^nana published in the Bibliotheca Indica.
Its re-appearance is due to Dr. E. J. Lazarus, proprie-
tor of the Benares Medical Hall Press, to whom Indian
literature is already largely indebted for similar en-
couragement.
BENARES COLLEGE, }
Jan. 3rd 1873. (
THE
VAISESHIKA APHORISMS
OF
KANADA.
FIRST BOOK, FIRST DAILY LESSON.
INTRODUCTION.' All students who wish to shim the multi-
tude of pains engendered in this world by birth, old age, death and
the like, learn from revelation, tradition, the epics, the Puranas and
and other sources, that the means of escaping them is investigation
of the real nature of soul. Now, certain disciples who had in the
prescribed manner studied the Vedas and their subordinate sciences,
unenvious, and attentive hearers, in quest of knowledge reverenti-
ally approached the great and holy sage Kanada. The sage full of
compassion taught them the system of the ten sections. Enuncia-
tion, definition, investigation [of the adequacy of definitions], such
is the threefold method of this system. Division is only a particular
kind of enunciation ; hence there is no addition [to be made.] Al-
though description of the categories is the chief object of this trea-
tise, yet from the importance of merit as the instrumental cause
of real knowledge of the categories, he in the first place promises
a description of that. Vivriti.
^raiHT OT au<3Jrreim: n 1 n
A ph. 1. Now, then, we will explain [what] merit [is.]
( 2 )
1 " ' Now,' means after being requested by his disciples.
1 Then/ since pupils quick in hearing &c., and unenvious have ap-
proached. Or else .the word 'Now' (atha) has an auspicious
sense. Thus it is said. " The syllable (Jm and the word atha,
these two cleft of old the throat of Brahma and issued forth ; there-
fore both are of happy omen." Upaskdra.
Merit defined. *W $WT3S:*ra: * *W II 5? ||
sa **
Aph. 2. Merit is that from which [results] attainment of
elevation and of the highest good.
2 It might be objected that because merit is net productive
of any result, a description of it is useless. Hence he states its
characteristic, shewing that to merit belongs the attainment of the
highest object of man. Exaltation is paradise ; the highest good
is emancipation ; that cause from which [results] the attainment
production , of these is merit : and therefore it is fitting that
merit should be explained, inasmuch as, by reason of its effecting
the highest object of man which consists of paradise and libera-
tion [of the soul], it is to be acquired by those who are desirous
of enjoyment and of emancipation. V.
3 Exaltation is knowledge of the truth ; the highest good is
final cessation of pain ; that from which both [result] is merit. The
highest good is [attained] by means of exaltation. If this be
arasrm
ORt *J \m:
^r n WT
: n
( 3 )
the meaning, the compound \abhyuday a-nihsreyasa] has an ellipse
of a central member or is a Tat-purusha ablatively dependent,
and merit is implied to be characterised by Cessation, [of pain] ;
but if merit to be attained by practices such as devout meditation
&c., and [synonymous with] the result of good actions done in a
former state of being, then the compound is regular in form. U.
Note. Exaltation according to the Upaskara means either
knowledge of the truth (tattva-jnana) or the result of good works
done in a former birth (adrishta). If it signify knowledge of the
truth, the aphorism must be translated, ' That is merit from which
[results] the highest good by means of exaltation.' If the result
of actions done in a former life be intended by exaltation, the
aphorism is to be rendered as above.
1 The attainment of paradise by merit is with visible means,
while the attainment of liberation is by means of knowledge of the
truth ; consequently there is a distinction. V.
2 He proceeds to remove the doubt, What proof is there of
[the existence of] merit and of its being the means of attaining to
knowledge of the truth &c. If you say, the Veda, we reply not
so, for the authority of that is doubted, and accordingly an apho-
rism of Aksha-charana says, That [Veda] is unauthoritative being
vitiated by falsity, self-contradictoriness, and repetition. V.
riSe Veda auth " Hf^TOWTO HTIHBTO II 3 II
f
Aph. 3. Authoritativeness belongs to revelation because it
is a declaration of that.
3 The word that (tat} signifies God though he has not been
previously mentioned, it being inferred from his being universally
fsrahr: 11
z 5R VJW rlSI fTTcnffTTTk^T^STc ^ sR JTTST 33f 53 JTRr fr?
Wtt
r-* )
known, just as in the aphorism of Gautama, ' That is unauthorita-
tive being vitiated by falsity, self-contradictoriness and repetition/
by the word ' That' the Veda is signified though not previously
mentioned. Accordingly authoritativeness belongs to revelation
the Veda , because it was declared by him revealed by God.
Or else ' That' signifies the contiguous [word] merit, and accord-
ingly authoritativeness belongs to revelation the Veda because
it declares expounds merit : for whatever statement sets forth a
matter of certain knowledge is an authority. U.
1 By the word ' That' expressive of something already
known God is signified, though not previously mentioned. And
accordingly the sense is that the authoritativeness of the Veda must
necessarily be admitted since it was declared by an everlasting,
all-wise, and all holy Spirit. V.
II 8 II
Aph. 4. The highest good [results] from knowledge of the
truth which springs from particular merit [and is obtained] by
means of the similarity and dissimilarity of the categories, sub-
stance, attribute, action, generality, particularity, and inhesion.
1 Such knowledge of the truth depends upon the Vais*eshika
system, hence even causation of the highest good belongs to that
rf*QK4U TH!I*RT3T*3T3W 5I3W tTWUP BgT
OfT
: i
( 5 )
[system]. Between the system and the highest good the connection
of relation of cause to effect, between the system and knowledge of
the truth the connection of relation of agency to the agent, between
the highest good and knowledge of the truth the connection of
relation of effect to cause, between the categories substance &c.
and the system the connection of relation of matter expounded to
exposition, is understood to exist. It is from knowledge of these
connections that in this world seekers of the the highest good
apply themselves to this system. The highest good is final
cessation of pain. Finality of cessation of pain is non-simultanei-
ty with antecedent non-existence (potential existence) of pain in
the common substratum, or simultaneity with subsequent non-
existence (destruction) of all particular qualities of soul which are
produced at the same time and have a common substratum. Or
emancipation [of the soul] is potential existence of pain terminated
by cessation of all particular qualities [of the soul]. In the second
aphorism of Gautama it is stated that on the successive removal of
pain, birth, activity, faults [i. e. desires and aversions] and false
knowledge, and on their consequent non-existence emancipation
ensues. Here the argument from non-existence of cause to non-exis-
tence of effect proves emancipation to be characterised by antecedent
non-existence of pain, for with respect to the removal of activity,
consequent upon the removal of vice, the removal of birth on the
removal of activity and the removal of pain on the removal of birth,
such removal is not subsequent non-existence but non -prod action,
err wrR: i
SFOTtrra: ^^TOT t^T^ni ^RHTOIT vsra: sR^-Tra: HT g urn-
ScT I
; srresr
( 6 )
and non-production is antecedent non-existence. ' From knowledge
of the truth which springs from particular merit, such is the spe-
cial character of that [knowledge], and accordingly particular merit
is merit differentiated by finality : but if by knowledge of the truth
the [VaiSeshika] system be intended (the truth being known by
means of that system), then particular merit must be explained as
characterised by the ordinance and grace of God, for it is a tradi-
tion that the great saint Kanada revealed the system in conse-
quence of having obtained the ordinance and grace of God U.
1 Particular merit is particular good works done either in this
life or in a former state of existence. By special good works
knowledge of the truth is produced by means of the similiarity
and dissimilarity of substance and the other categories. Next
meditation on the soul is produced ; next by means of meditation,
a [mental] presentation of the soul is produced ; and after that,
by means of destruction of false knowledge &c., emancipation
ensues. In this place there is mention of six categories spoken
of as existing, but in reality non-existence is also implied by the
sage as another category. Accordingly there is no discrepancy in
such aphorisms as the following, in the second daily lesson, ' From
non-existence of cause is non-existence of effect', and in the ninth
book, [' An effect has no antecedent existence] because of the
non-existence of ascription to it of actions and attributes'. V.
of sub-
8tance - ?!H anfai n u 11
Aph. 5. Earth, water, light, air, ether, time, space, soul, and
the internal organ, are the substances.
rTH
?FrT
( 7 )
1 The particle iti is expressive of limitation, therefore the
the meaning is that there are nine substances, neither more nor
less. If it be objected, What is the use of the particular iti when.
the exclusion of a lesser or greater number [of substances] is ef-
fected by the mere force of the division ? this is to be determined,
that it is because the particle iti is employed to^indicate the logical
subject in the construction of the aphorism, and only in order
to elucidate the purport of the division since gold &c., and God
are included in this [enumeration], and since it is explained [in,
V. 2, 19] that darkness, suspected [by some] of being additional,
is a non-existence. The construction without the use of compound
words is to shew the importance of all [the substances] ; and the
author of the aphorisms himself will point out their definitions
when treating of their dissimilarities. U.
Note. Cp. the Muktavali on Bhasha-parichchheda 3. 8 If
it be objected. There is a tenth substance, darkness ; why is it
not enumerated ? for it is cognised by preception ; and substantia-
lity belongs to it because it is possessed of colour and action ; and,
because devoid of odour, it is not earth ; and, because it possesses
dark colour, it is not water &c. ; and the eye deprived of light is
the organ [used] in perceiving it. We reply that it is not so,
because it is illogical to imagine another substance, when it is
necessarily produced by non-existence of light. The notion that
?wr sfa
HvT tTcltjm IJHH I rTBl
irs*reRi?9Tfj
i f i incr^gRH SWTSRT
it is possessed of colour is erroneous. The notion that it possesses
action is also an error occasioned by the departure of light. It
will be declared how it is that gold is included in light.
Darkness was affirmed to be a substance by the S^nkhyas ;
gold by the Mimansakas.
1 The construction without the use of compound words is
designed to sliew that all the substances independently of one
another produce particular effects, or is intended to teach that
they all equally produce effects which inhere in them. Among
these nine divisions of substance, ether, time, and space do not
form any class since they have only a single existence, but the rest
form classes. V.
Qualities enumer-
&ted -
3<m: n n
Aph. 6. Colour, taste, smell and touch, numbers, exten-
sions, individuality, conjunction and disjunction, priority and
posteriority, intellections, pleasure and pain, desire and aversion,
and volitions are qualities.
J By the particle cha he implies in addition to these gravity,
fluidity, viscidity, self-restitution, merit, demerit, and sound ;
cIT I WiT
cIT
( 9 )
for those being well known to be qualities are not expressly men-
tioned. He will explain in the proper place from their character-
istic and from their form that these are qualities. The compound
' colour taste, smell, and touch/ is intended to point out that
there is no common substratum of synchronous colours, tastes,
smells, and touches. Numbers and extensions are not made a
compound word and are named in the plural number, the
design being to indicate that contemporaneous numbers and exten-
sions have a common substratum. Although the common substra-
tum of unity is not another unity, and the common substratum of
greatness and length, is not another greatness and length, yet
duality &c. are the common substratum of each other, and in great-
ness, length &c., is a common substratum for two heterogeneous
extensions. Although individuality is the common subMratum
for the individuality of two &c., and should accordingly be specified
in the plural like numbers, yet the singular is employed to indi-
cate its difference from numbers, on account of its being characterised
by the implying of limitation. Conjunction and disjunction are
expressed by [one word in] the dual to indicate that, though two,
they are produced by one action [or motion.] Priority and poste-
riority are expressed in the dual to imply that they are relative
to one another, and to imply that they are indifferently properties
of space and time. Tho plural intellections is intended to
expel the doctrine of the Sankhyas that intellection is one
only, on the grounds of their division into knowledge &c.
The dual term pleasure and pain is used to establish [the
doctrine] that they, though two, produce one effect to be dis-
tinguished as fruition, that they indifferently bring to pass the
consequences of actions done in a former state, and that even
pleasure must be accounted pain. Desire and aversion are in
the dual to, indicate that both are causes of activity. The
plural form of volitions implies that they are the cause of merit
from ten kinds of lawful and prohibited objects, and the cause of
sin from ten kinds of objects. Or else colour, taste, smell,
and touch are mentioned in a compound word to teach that they
are the cause of the relation between the elements and the organs
of sense, or else to establish the effects which are prod uced by
heat. ffhere is a contrariety in number which consists of
duality, plurality &c. : it is to imply the denial of this that
[number] is mentioned in the plural. Inojividuality is enumera-
ted separately to denote that it is manifold by reason of the plural-
ity of numbers, and to imply that its difference from number
consists in revealing the knowledge of a limit. In the case of,
extension the plural is used to deny that there is any contrariety
between length, breadth, &c. Conjunction and disjunction are
in the dual to denote their mutual opposition. U.
Enumeration of ^^i^T^R 3*1^ HlHlfllfil 5R-
actions. ^fjg || 9 ||
Aph. 7. Throwing upwards, throwing downwards, contract-
ing, expanding and going are the actions.
1 Actions by reason of their production by substances and by
qualities, and from their inhesion in substances possessed of co-
lour, are known by perception. Accordingly after the enumera-
tion of substances and qualities [Kanada] declared the enuncia-
tion and division of actions. U.
( 11 )
1 Iti as before expresses limitation. Action as a class is cog-
nised by perception, so also are throwing upwards &c., according
to the author of the Muktavali. Going is a particular class com-
prising revolution, evacuation, dropping, flaming upwards, bending
up and down &c. V.
ty, and action. |^ ^,^,3^^^. c
Aph. 8. Existence, transitoriness, inhesion in substance,
effect, cause, and possession of generality and particularity are
the common element of substances, qualities, and actions.
* After iti the word pratyaya is to be supplied. The general
is existence, the particular is substantiality. The notion * exis-
tence' &c, is applicable to quality and action as well as to sub-
stance, in this there is no particularity. Therefore existence, op-
position to subsequent non-existence [or to destruction], the posses-
sion of substance as a coiuherent [or material] cause, opposition to
antecedent non-existence, causality, and the constituting of a class
contained under existence, is that which is similar in substances,
qualities, and actions. Although transitoriness, inhesion in sub-
stance, effect, and cause, are not comprehended in an eternal sub-
stance or quality, or causality in an atom, yet it is here meant that
transitoriness is a condition of such members of the categories as
HvJT *Jd 44 ret U ill rcfT
wig: i
rrmftr
9RT
exist in virtue of a being opposed to subsequent non-existence, inhesi-
on in substance is a condition of such members of the categories as
exist in virtue of substance as their coinherent cause ; the being an
effect is a condition of such members of the categories as exist in
virtue of a being opposed to antecedent non-existence ; and causali-
ty is a condition of such members of the categories as exist as coin-
herent or non-coinherent causes. V.
< II
Common element in
substances and quali-
ties.
Aph. 9. The common property of substance and quality
is that thev originate things of the same class.
*/ o o
1 Terrene atoms originate a terrene aggregate of two atoms ;
blue colour and the like in an atom produce blue colour and the
like in an aggregate of two atoms. Such is the origination by
substance and quality of things of the same class. Although
this cannot be predicated of ether &c., and of simple substances,
and of the qualities of these, yet the meaning is that there is a
similarity in the conditions of the divisions of the categories
* existing by reason of the origination of homogeneous things. V.
Cp. Muktavali on Bhasha-parichchheda 14, *That which is
of atomic dimension is not the cause of anything, for that
would originate an extension in substance originated by its own
substratum [the atom]. But this is impossible, for one exten-
sion is productive of another extension exceeding that which
belongs to things of its own class, as from a great tiling a greater
is originated ; and so consequently that which would be pro-
JTH ^^mfe^JTKWH ^frT S^Jur^T: H^ITrftUTCWSica *n3?T7
ii
*n' 5f
3Wc(f?T I
I
nvan H
( 13 )
duced from an atom would be smaller than an atom. The same is
to be understood to be the case with respect to infinitely great ex-
tension, and generality transcending sense, and particularity.
for^gl^oHim! 16 ^fa 5^^^!^^ JUJT^ TROTHS II 1' II
Aph. 10. Substances originate another substance, and
qualities another quality.
1 He elucidates what was said before. The sense is obvi-
ous. V.
gh^Str* 01 "" ** wfcnw * fraS H 11 it
Aph. 11. An action cannot be effected by an action.
1 The meaning is that there is no proof that one action can
be effected by another, as there is that substances and qualities
are originated by things of the same class. It is here intended to
be said that if one action produced another, it would produce it
after being iv.self produced, as in the case of sound. Now, as the
former action produced a disjunction from conjunct substances,
fiom what would the second action produce a disjunction ? For
disjunction is preceded by conjunction, and there is not another
conjunction produced in the same substratum ; but if [by the
subsequent action] there is no production of disjunction, the
definition of action is violated. U.
The characteristic of action is that it is the immediate cause
of conjunction and disjunction.
u n
actions.
Aph. 12. A substance is not destroyed either by its effect or
by its cause.
I eRIT life cfiB 5t5TCJ?T ^npTT*re?rT**ra 5FWFJ SISSSRJ I rTOT
Fcwin aff'TH fg^a %& v* si Fgwr
R
( 14 )
1 The meaning is that between two substances which have
entered into the relation of effect and cause there is not the relation
of destroyer and destroyed, inasmuch as the destruction of a sub-
stance is due to the destruction of its substratum, and the destruc-
tion of its originative conjunction. U.
Continued. SWOT JHJT: II H3 II
Aph. 13. Qualities [are destroyed] in both [the above] man-
ners.
2 [Qualities] are destroyed by their effects, and are destroyed
by their causes. First sounds &c., [in a series] are destroyed by
their effects, but the last is destroyed by its cause, for the last
sound but one destroys the last. U
Continued. SfiTgfaf T?tJ 3W U <18 II
Aph. 14. An action is opposed to its effect.
3 He declares that an action is destroyed by its own effect.
The sense is that an action is subject to opposition, i. e. destruc-
tion, wrought by its effect which consists of a subsequent conjunc-
tion. V.
o
Aph. 15. The definition of substance is that it is possessed
of actions and qualities, and is a coinherent cause.
4 ' Possessed of actions and qualities because actions and
qualities exist in it. In this place the word characteristic (lak-
IlBef >2IrelJT'J I riM 3153^ SI^IFl Tn&TfT II
I cFTa^rTrR^Tn^W 3iHT *JT
( 15 )
shana) denotes a sign and a particular distinctive property
excluding objects of the same and of different classes, according
to the force of the etymology, It is discerned (lakshyate) by
means of this. Accordingly by means of action it is -discerned
that such and such a thing is a substance, and by the possession
of qualities substance is discerned as excluded from things of the
same and of different classes. The" five categories, quality &c.,
[quality, action, generality, particularity, and inhesion] belong
to the same class by reason of the notion of existence, while
non-existence is of a different class. Substance, then is different
from quality &c., because it possesses qualities. That which is
not different from [quality &c., does not possess qualities, as
quality &c. And although there is not possession of qualities in
a compound substance during its first moment, yet opposition to
absolute non-existence of qualities is meant to be stated, for
absolute non-existence of qualities is opposed also to antecedent
and subsequent non-existence of qualities. In like manner the
being a coinherent cause is a characteristic of the category sub-
stance, distinguishing it from the [other] six categories. U.
Characteristic o*
*nu*ra*ow u <K n
Aph. 16. That it has substance as a substratum, that it is
without qualities and that it is not a cause of conjunctions and
disjunctions being unconcerned with them, is the definition of
quality.
1 Having substance as a substratum, because its character
*rra: H^ sw jnuiwiT fvNr jTmetrgrTrj ws ronfewT fcrera
i
u
OT sft
( 16 )
is to inhere in substance. But this would apply to substances
also, accordingly it is said to be without qualities. But this is
predicable also of action, therefore it is stated not to be a cause
of conjunctions and disjunctions. U.
Characteristic of TO*"* $HlfiwmWnWTOKI!lfilf?f **'
actioa. raS!* II HS II
Aph. 17. That it abides in one substance, is without quali-
ties, and is the absolute cause of conjunctions and disjunctions,
is the definition of action.
1 That which has one substance for its substratum abides in
one substance. No action has more than one substratum, as
compound substances and conjunctions and other qualities have
more than one substratum. V.
u ^ n
. 18. Substance is the common cause of substance,
quality, and actions.
8 The meaning is that substance, quality and action exist
in one substance as their coinberent cause. A common property of
the three is their . forming a class existing in substance as a coin-
herent cause. U.
Continued. H^3T TO: II R< II
Aph. 19. Likewise quality (is the common cause of sub-
stances, qualities, and actions).
3 A common property of the three is their forming a class
existing in quality as a non-coinherent cause. Of substances the
non-coinherent cause is conjunction. Of qualities which are effects
sroraw u
( 17 )
such as colour, taste, smell, touch, number, extension, indivi-
duality &c., the non-iuherent cause is homogeneous causative qua-
lities. Of the qualities of the soul such as intellections &c., the
non-inherent cause is conjunction with the internal organ. The
non-coinherent cause of the qualities of terrene atoms is conjunction
with fire. The non-coinherent cause of actions is slight contact with
fire, a blow, gravity, fluidity, self-restitution, conjunction with soul
influenced by actions done in a former state, conjunction with
soul exerting volition, &c. Sometimes even a single quality
originates the three, substance, quality, and action, as, for in-
stance, conjunction with a ball of cotton possessed of impetus
produces action [i. e. motion] in another ball of cotton, and ori-
ginates a substance consisting of an aggregate of two balls of
cotton and the extension of that aggregate. Sometimes a single
quality originates a substance and a quality, e. g. conjunction
which may be described as aggregation independent of impetus,
with a ball of cotton, originates a substance consisting of an
aggregate of two balls of cotton and the extension of that sub-
stance. U.
Effects of action. ^IJTnFWRiWU 5RW SWTTO II ^ II
Aph. ?0. Action is the common [cause] of conjunctions
disjunctions, and impetus.
1 The action [motion] which is produced in a bow &c., pro-
duces disjunction of the arrow from the bow, and conjunction
elsewhere, and impetus in the arrow. V.
arson
B
( 18 )
Dissimilarity be- . .
'tween action and ?? jJSBTQIT 3R*I II ^H II
substance. ,
Aph. 21 Action is not [a cause^j of substances.
'Continued. SdfliT^ II ^ I)
Aph. 22. Because it is excluded [from them.]
1 Because it is excluded because of the non-existence of
action at the time of the production of substance. The action
which produces an originative conjunction of constituent parts is
-destroyed at the 'time of the production of the substance [consti-
tuted by those parts] subsequent to conjunction, for conjunction
is destructive to disjunction. Nor can it be maintained that
action, though non-existent at the time of its effect, from having
existed the previous moment is the cause [of the substance so
constituted.] For after the destruction of a large piece of cloth
there is non-existence of action in the constituent parts at the
moment previous to the production of fragments of cloth. In
reality action is not the cause even of a substance depending on.
an originative conjunction produced by action, for it is to be
considered that [the substance] is produced otherwise, [viz.] by
conjunction. V.
Continued. sCSIUDT %& 3RT HUtt^m II ^3 II
Aph. 23. Substance is the common effect of substances.
*?ro?trsT3iftra: ^ata<u sfi fissflirTj sfiwdr mrmH sm??: SRJT
T ^iTT SRRTff ^STTnS^^TfH^IrgTf^ffT VZKH II
3RT?
%f?f ssufcd mi swnnf i r?^ gywif
i sf^^rPW^T sftr
( 19 )
1 Having stated that many things may originate one,
[Kanfida] now declares that one product may be originated by many.
Of substances, i.e. of two or more substances. Thus by two
threads a piece of cloth consisting of two threads, and similarly
by many threads, one piece of cloth, is originated. If it be object-
ed that cloth may be seen which is made of one thread, in which
the woof and the warp are made of one and the same thread, we
reply that it is not so, for there can be no cloth produced in this
case, there being no non-coinherent cause, for there can be no con-
junction of a single object. U.
Continued. TOlwrci SRWUT 3W II ^8 II
Aph. 24 Action because of its dissimilarity from quality is
not [an effect] of actions.
2 It has been stated that the similarity between substance
and quality is that they originate things of the same class. Also
this has been denied of actions, in the aphorism 'An action is not
effected by another action.' This is here repeated. U.
Aph. 25. Numbers from duality upwards, individuality, con-
junction, and disjunction [are originated by more than one sub-
stance.]
3 He states that certain qualities also are originated by more
than one substance. Here the word individuality means the
individuality of two or more objects. Accordingly the sense is that
numbers, from duality to the highest, individuality of two of
more objects, conjunctions, and disjunctions are originated by
more than one substance. V.
1 ssajnprr: 55TTrftzrn:w5Rr5J srawrfi rFsi srppr
|fi? SWOT
( 20 )
fsracra n 35
Aph. 26. Action is not the common effect [of several sub-
stances] because it does not inhere [ in more than one substance.]
! Action is not a common effect originated by more than
one, because it does not inhere in two or more. It is established
by experience that action is different in different substances.
I 3 H
Aph. 27. Substance is the effect of conjunctions.
* One substance consisting of a piece of cloth &c, is the
effect of many conjunctions of threads &c. U.
3 This is to be understood with the exception of the con-
junctions of impalpable substances, of those of final wholes, and of
those of heterogeneous substances. V.
n 3* n
Aph. 28. A colour is the effect of colours (more than one.)
4 The word colour in both places implies also taste, smell,
touch, viscidity, intrinsic fluidity, unity, individuality of units,
extension, velocity, elasticity and gravity. One colour &c., then,
as a complex whole is produced by many colours &c., having
become its coinherent cause. V.
Aph. 29. Throwing upwards (is the effect) of gravity, voli
tion, and conjunction.
_
cRTTUTT JWTSTFT
fire SKIT
gfw S5rafw?zra: n
5
( 21 )
' Here gravity existing in the hand, a clod of earth &c., is
the instrumental cause ; conjunction with soul possessing volitions
is the non-coinherent cause of the throwing upwards of the hand ;
the throwing out of the hand is the non-coinherent cause of the
throwing upwards of the clod. Here also the terra throwing
upwards is applicable to throwing downwards &c. U.
1 Gravity in that which is to be thrown upwards, volition in
the thrower, and expulsion of the thrown from the hand, these
are the three causes of throwing upwards. Hence in the case of
action also the existence of more than one cause must be
admitted. V.
II 3 II
Aph. 30. Conjunctions and disjunctions (are the effects) of
actions. *
3 It might be asked, By means of what property is there an
inference of supersensual objects such as the courses of the sun,
the moon, &c., as there is in inference of fire and other causes
from smoke and other effects, for an action has no effects ? He
therefore recalls to mind the previously mentioned effects of ac-
tions. The word 'and' implies in addition to conjunctions and
disjunctions impetus and elasticity. V.
II 39 II
Aph. 31. In (treating of) causes in general action is said
not be a cause of substances and actions.
rT'TT Fii
Tirci
( 22 )
1 By the term 'causes in general,' the section treating thereof
is indicated ; therefore in the section treating of causes in general
the non-causality of action with regard to substance and action
is affirmed,' but it is not meant that action is in no way a cause so
that aphorism, conjunctions and disjunctions (are the effects) of
actions, should be set aside. U.
FIRST BOOK, SECOND DAILY LESSON.
Causation. eRT^mTgiR KT17TVIT9: II 1 II
Aph. 1. From non-existence of cause is non-existence of
effect,
* It may be said, In the foregoing daily lesson similarity
between the categories, substance, quality, and action, as constitut-
ed by the notion of effect and the notion of cause, has been
explained. How is this possible ? for while the relation between.
effect and cause is not demonstrated it is like talking about the
horn of a hare. To obviate this Kanada establishes the relation
between effect and cause. V.
3 For it is seen that even when earth, a potter's wheel, water
nfn SRW^T seRHcmc^jTH i a ^renmcRRJirTg ^wfr gg?r IR
fi
Sfa ^TTWTTS^TTWTS:
iftr H37Mig: f^TT^raR5iT3ivn strj-
SRra5RK5JWT5rWT3 Wjt T ^JTrr cTOT
( 23 )
a potter, thread &c., are brought together, from non-existence of a
potter's staff there is non-existence of the pot ; and though earth
water &c., be brought together, from non-existenoe of a seed
there is non-existence of a shoot: This relation between the
potter's staff and the pot, and between the seed and the shoot, is
impossible without the relation of cause and effect ; for otherwise-
there would be non-existence of the pot also in the case of non-
existence of a loom, and non-existence of the shoot even in the
case of non-existence of a fragment of stone &c. Moreover it is
observed that a pot, a piece of cloth, and the like exist only from
time to time. This too would be impossible without the relation
between cause and effect ; for the temporary existence- of things
which are, which consists in their being at one time and not being
at another, is impossible without connexion with a> cause. For
in this case (were there no connexion with a cause), a thing might
be or not be, but could not be from time to time, since an existing
thing is not non-existent, nor does it come into existence without a
cause, nor does it come into existence fortuitously, nor does it come
into existence from anything unreal such as the horn of a hare, but
from a really existing assignable determinant such as a staff or a loom,
as is seen in effects such as a pot or a piece of cloth. Now the limit
or determinant is the cause. Moreover were there no relation of cause
and effect there would no activity or inactivity, for in such a case
the universe would be desireless, since without a knowledge of the
means of attaining that which is desired there would be no such
thing as activity, and without the knowledge of the means of
avoiding that which is undesired there would be no such thing as
inactivity. U.
Continued, ?? r? WSTqTWToTTH SRWHTOTSr: II ^ Ij.
N x
Aph. 2. But there is not from non-existence of effect non
existence of cause.
( 24 )
1 If there were not a restriction in the relation between cause
and effect, it would follow also that if the effect should not exist,
the cause would not exist. The rule is not that non-existence of
effect results in non-existence of cause, but that non-existence of
cause results in non-existence of effect. Therefore the practical
application of this introductory section of two aphorisms is that
persons desirous of emancipation are concerned in non-existence
of birth for the sake of non-existence of pain, in non-existence of
activity for the sake of non-existence of birth, in non-existence
of faults for the sake of non-existence of activity, in the cessation
of false knowledge for the sake of non-existence of faults, and in
forming a mental presentation of the soul for the sake of cessation
of false knowledge. U.
and
Aph. 3. Generality and particularity both depend upon
intellection.
5 After the enunciation and definition of the first three
categories he now states the definition of the category gene-
rality formerly enunciated. Generality is twofold, highest
and not highest. The highest is being, the not-highest is subs-
tantiality &c., contained under being. The distinguishing property of
generality and particularity is intellection. Extensive intellection
is that of generality, exclusive intellection is that of particularity.
* Generality is the highest, and particularity the not highest
I Welf?T fT3T
va irH5TigTrR'nrro
nt fercra: wti
i ?nr
( 25 )
generality. Accordingly there are two kinds of generality.
That is dependent upon intellection which has intellection for its
characteristic. Generality then, is twofold, highest and not highest.
The highest generality is being, the not-highest generality is sub-
stantiality &c. The distinguishing property of the highsst and
not highest kinds of generality is intellection, the intellection of
extensiveness being the characteristic of generality i. e. of high-
est generality, and. the intellection of non-extensiveness the
chracteristic of particularity (i. e. of not highest generality).
Extensiveness is existence in many places, non-extensiveness is
existence in few places. Being, therefore, is the highest, because it
exists in more places than any . other universal, and the tclasses
substantiality &c., are not-highest because they exist in fewer
places than the notion of earth &c., so that, generality or the
highest and particularity or the not highest universals are not
absolute but relative to intellection. The following hindrances
to universality are enumerated by the Nyaya teachers, ' Indi-
visibility of the individual, identity, confusion, infinite re-
gression, loss of form, and absence of connection are the aggre-
gate of things preventing universality.' Thus the notion of ether
is not a class because it exists only as one individual. The
notions of a pitcher and a water-pot are not two universals, because
there are neither more nor less individuals under either. The
notions of matter and form are not one universal, because of the
( 26 )
confusion pervading the one individual by reason of two common
substrata of absolute- mutual non-existerice. Generality is not a.
universal, for if so there would be a regress to infinity. The notion
of particularity is prevented from being a universal by loss of form,,
for particularity is naturally exclusive ...... The notion of co-inhesion
is not a class, because of the non-existence of connection by co-in-
hesion, for from the assumption- that co-inhesion inheres in- anything
else a regression to infinity would follow. V.
Cp. the Muktavali on Bhasha-parichchheda, 8. ' The cha-
racteristic of generality is co-inhesion in more than one, together
with eternity. It is said, 'Together with eternity ,' because co-inhe-
sion in more than one belongs also to conjunction &c. It is said
'In more than one,' because co-inhesion together with eternity be-
longs also to ether, to extension, and the like.
xistenceisuni ' 8*9- smtsrosr n w
ver.
Aph. 4. Existence is general, only,, for it is a cause of ex-
tensive intellection.
2 Existence being [is general]' because it is a cause of ex-
tensive intellection- of the notion of existing in many places, the
word only (eva) excludes the notion of existence in few placea. V.
^SETrcT JHOrel 5Rltrcl5g STSTailft feiftVTTC tl U II
Aph. 5. The essences of substance, quality, and. action, are
general and particular.
3 The particle ' and' (eha) implies in addition the notions of
earth &c., the classes contained in substance; the notions of
I rT^55H rZlrr SraSRSwrlrclH I
I f^RJrt efftffl I forQrQ ^fr?
u
: n
TT:
tf^ 3Ri7n?r3n?ft:
( 27 )
colour &c. the classes contained in quality ; and the notions of
throwing upwards &c., the classes contained in action. U.
sna^T^WT fasrcrwr: n 5 u
Aph. 6. With the exception of the ultimate particulars.
1 The words general and particular [in the preceding
aphorism] are to be understood with the exception of those parti-
culars that are said to exist as eternal substances. According to
the teachers [of this system] they are ultimate, because they exist
in the end or conclusion [of the division of a compound sub-
stance], and there is [then] nothing further which causes non-exten-
sive conception. According to the authors of the Vritti they are
ultimate because they exist at the end or conclusion of production
and destruction, and are ultimate particulars because they exist in
eternal substances. For those particulars only are causes of non-
extensive conception, and are not at the same time general in their
character. U.
urn sajjmsR *n wtn n o ti
Aph. 7. That is existence from which [there arises the con-
viction] with respect to substances, qualities, and actions, that
they are existent.
*
sub PR TOT II * II
stance &c.
Aph. 8. Existence is something different from substances,
qualities, and actions.
1 It might be said, Existence is not apprehended by means
( 28 )
of its being something distinct from substance, quality, and ac-
tion. Therefore existence is one or other of those three. For
whatever is different from anything else is apprehended by means
of its difference from it, as a water-pot [by means of its difference]
from a piece of cloth, whereas existence is not apprehended by
means of its difference from them. Consequently it is identical
with them. For this reason [Kanada] proclaimed [the above
aphorism.] substance &c., is not extensive, existence is extensive.
Accordingly its difference from them may be established by the
consideration of their opposite properties characterised by exten-
siveness and non-extensiveness. U.
Continued. TO 5? JHO: II < II
Aph. 9. Existence is neither an action nor a quality, be-
cause it exists in qualities and actions.
1 When it is said neither an action nor a quality the proposi-
tion negatively implies that neither is it a substance. For an
action does not exist in actions, nor a quality in qualities
nor a substance in quality or action. But existence is in quali-
ty and action. Existence, then, is different from them, for it dif-
fers in property from substance, quality, and action. U.
Continued.
q
Aph. 10. And by reason of the non-existence [in existence]
of generality and particularity.
* Substance &c., have been previously stated to be general
and particular. Therefore from the non-existence in it of sub-
stance &c., existence is not identical with substance &c. V.
5*
srr gini 5^ i ETT anar TOBT swfiir srr
The essence of sub- TT ^,-. if ..--. Ii yui^irrxn n QQ 11
stance not identical ^*eiTCM S<*4fCtTHH
with substance &c.
Aph. II. The essence of substance is explained by means of
its inherence in many substances.
1 He states that the universal in substance [or substantiality]
also is not identical with substance &c., [i. e. with substances,
qualities, and actions]. Inherence in many substances is inferred
from connexion with co-inhesion, and eternity from generality.
Accordingly substantiality as well as existence, is explained to be
different from substance &c., on the grounds of its co-inhesion in
many substances and of its eternity. V.
Continued.
Aph. 12. And by reason of the non-existence [in the essence
of substance] of generality and particularity.
2 If substantiality as a universal were a class identical with
substance &c., the general and particular entities of earth, water,
light, and the like would exist in that class. U.
3 The universal in substance in not identical with substance
&c., because of the non-existence [in that essence] of the essence of
substance, quality, action, earth, water, light, and the like. V.
^The notion of qua- ^ ^ HimjlBWIIffi^ (| ^ f|
Aph. 13. In like manner the universal in quality is explained
from its existence in qualities.
4 He explains the universal in quality. The universal in quality,
TTTCT cTOT
imS4luTTpHftcf jpiTrT CfaT
J II
: n
fwr
( 30 )
like existence, is declared to be distinct from substances, quali-
ties, and actions on account of its existence or co-inhesion in qua-
lities only. (J.
w n
Aph. 14. Also by the non-existence [in it] of generality
and particularity.
1 He states another distinction. If tbe universal in quality
were not something over and above substances, qualities, and
actions, it would then be apprehended as constituting a class con-
tained under one or other of the universals, substance, quality, or
action. U.
The essence of ac- -^ ^^ 5^^^ c^
tion. \ -v s >.
Aph. 15. The essence of action is explained from its exis-
tence in actions.
2 He states the distinction of the universal in action from sub-
stances, qualities, and actions. The essence of action is also explain
ed, like existence, to be another class distinct from substances,
qualities, and actions, on account of its existence or co-inhesion in
action only. U.
n IS u
Aph. 16. Also by the non-existence [in it] of generality
particularity.
3 If the essence of action were identical with substances &c.,
the generality and particularity of substances &c., would inhere
*rari3T
I 5CTT?5R JTTSJTrT
^: n
( 31 )
in it. It is to be understood that these tour aphorisms alike in
form [viz. 10, 12, 14, 16,] are stated in one section to explain
the distinction from substances, qualities, and actions, of the
four universals existence, substantiality the univereal in quality and
the universal in action. U.
Existence is one.
a: !i <*s II
Aph. 17. Because of the non-particularity of the property
of being, and of the non-existence of a particular property therein
there is [only] one existence.
1 A conception in the form of being or the applicability of
that word is the property of existence. This conception is com-
mon, without distinction, in regard to substances, qualities, and
actions. Hence existence or being abides in them as only one.
For otherwise either being would not exist, or they would not exist,
for existence is in the same number of individuals as substance &c.
Because of the non-existence of a particular property : the mean-
ing of this is that from the non-existence of a property or ground of
inference in particularity or distinction, there is no distinction. For
there is no particular property in existence, like the particular pro-
perty or distinction of extension of length and shortness in the case
of the inference, ' That is the selfsame lamp.' U.
SECOND BOOK, FIRST DAILY LESSON.
Qualities of earth. ^*ITH*reH?TO3r ?l3T II 9 II
Aph. 1. Earth is possessed of colour, taste, smell and touch.
SrTT
5f?TH
i: w
( 32 )
1 The colour of the earth is of many kinds, blue, yellow &c.
Hence the characteristic of possessing universality contained under
the universality of substance and being the general substratum of
blue colour. So also there is in the earth taste of various kinds,
pungent, astringent &c. Hence the characteristic of possessing a
universality contained under the universal existence and being the
general substratum of pungent taste. In like manner by the sub-
stitution of the words ' astringent' &c., other characteristics are to be
Inferred. Smell is of two kinds, fragrant and unfragrant. Hence the
characteristic of possessing a universality contained under the uni-
versal substantiality and being the general substratum of smell.
Thus too it will be seen that the notion of substance is a substratum
of classes which are substrata not general of qualities which are
substrata general or not general of odour. It must not be object
ed that as smell and taste are not observed in a stone &c., both
these qualities are not invariably present. For even though smell
and taste accidentally be not observed in it, they are observed in
its ashes. The self-same particles which were originally constitu-
ent of the stones are also originally constituent of its ashes.
Therefore the presence of these attributes is not merely occasional.
If it be asked How then is a breeze fragrant, und water mixed
with Karavella [a kind of gourd] bitter? This is no objec-
tion, for the taste and smell of those are conditions produced by
qftiwir 53 i rnn
*raisiw 53 TO: sfizefraFnsRsrcrenrcsR: tjfermor
53
i *r*n fgfero:
3T50 HdTUIrir
oh IW t?t
filffl UrftfrrfrfH
53
( 33 )
the eartli. There is a touch in the earth, neither hot nor cold, but
temperate. Hence the characteristic of possessing a universality
contained under the universal substance and being the general sub-
stratum of the feeling of temperate warmth. Temperate warmth
may be clearly explained by another description, that it is the touch
of the earth ; another description is clearer, viz., that it is a species
of touch residing in the flowers of the Sirisa, Lavangi &c. U.
Qualities of water. ^qW^3?q ^TCT ?3T: ^T: II ^ II
Aph. 2. Water is possessed of colour, taste, and touch and
is fluid and viscid.
1 In water the colour is white, the taste sweet, the touch
cold, the fluidity natural. Thus in the aphorism on water by the
enumeration of five qualities, five characteristics of water are
implied by the sage. The characteristics of water are that it is a
class preceptibly contained under the universal substance and exist-
ing in possession of colour riot the general substratum of bright
and white but the general substratum of blue colour. It is a class
perceptibly contained under the universal substance existing as
something sweet and not existing as something bitter. It is pos-
sessed of cold touch, of intrinsic fluidity and of viscidity. If there
is no natural fluidity in ice, hail, &c., it must be understood that
they belong to a class included under the universal substance and
existing in the possession of intrinsic fluidity. The observation of
blue colour in the sea, the water of the Kalindi (Yamuna) &c., is
an illusion produced by the conditions of the substratum, for when
it is tossed into the air it is perceived to be white. Though no taste
be perceived in water, yet after eating astringent substances such
as yellow myrobalan, sweetness is observed in water, for it is
distinguished by that [taste.] The hot touch which appears in
water through conjunction with the sun's rays &c., belongs proper-
ly to the sun's rays &c. Though it might be asked, inasmuch as
fluidity is not perceived in ice, hail &c., how it is possible that it
should be contained in water, yet when the ice, hail &c., are melted
with heat, it is proved sensibly to be water. The author of the
Muktavali maintains that its fluidity is not derived from conjunc-
tion with celestial light, but the appearance of solidity is in those
cases an illusion. But some contend that through conjunction
with celestial light there are produced in ice &c., successively from
aqueous atoms an aggregate of two atoms, an aggregate of three
atoms and so forth, and that such aggregates of two or more atoms
are destitute of fluidity, and solid, and that accordingly the
appearance of solidity is not an illusion. There is also viscidity
in water, and that of clarified butter and the like is the viscidity
of the water which is one of the ingredients. It is through the
excess of this that clarified butter &c. is highly inflammable.
That kind of conjunction which is called agglomeration, and which
consists in meal, sand &c., becoming globular, is caused by viscidity
accompanied with fluidity. Were it caused by fluidity alone, it
would be produced from the fluidity of glass, gold &c. Nor is it
produced by viscidity alone, for then it would follow that it would
be produced also by thickened clarified butter &c. V.
Qualities of light. at ^<JWa3H II 3 H
Aph. 3. Light has colour and touch.
1 Light [or heat] is possessed of luminous colour and hot touch.
If it be objected, Luminousness is the giving of light to other
bodies, and such colour is not found in heat or in such light as in
exists in gold, in a frying-pan, or in water. White colour is nowhere
found in these, nor is a hot feel found in moonlight or gold. How
then is this so ? We reply that it may be inferred that luminous
colour exists in heat &c., because they are light. If it bo said,
Luminosity is not proved to exist in .these 'by their own
colour, we reply that it is inferred from their possessing a hot feel.
If it be asked, How is the luminosity [proved to exist in
gold?] We reply that it will be explained that it is because it is
inferred to be light "from its boiug a distinctive substratum of
fluidity which is produced, but not destroyed, by the closest con-
junction with fire ; and that the existence of light in a frying-pan
&c., is inferred from the possession of heat to the touch. For
light is of four kinds: that in which colour and touch predomi-
nate, as sunlight ; that in which colour predominates and touch does
not, as moonlight ; that in which neither colour nor touch pre-
dominates, as the eye ; that in which colour does not, but touch
does, predominate, as the hot season, and light as existing in water,
. a frying-pan, and the like. U.
With respect to the relation between light and heat, cp.
?r
Differ scinra win i ^ra? ^ ^T ^ufterc rirj ^mfrfsfn iN swrcb w-
I
%?J FT* WT^K^HTi rftl
:iy rM
( 36 )
Mulctavali on Bhasha-parichchheda, v. 40. ' Heat is a particular
clas^ existing in touch, and is known by perception. So also
light is a particular class which is the inherent cause of the
feeling of generated heat. It is not to be maintained that the
possession [by light] of a hot feel cannot be predicated of the
rays of the moon &c.; for heat exists there too, but is not recognised
because it is overpowered by the touch of the water which they
contain. In like manner it is not recognised in the brilliance of a
gem, because it is overpowered by an earthy feel ; nor in the
eye &c., because it does not there predominate.
Quality of air. W^T*? cITO! II 8 II
Aph. 4. Air is possessed of touch.
1 We are here to understand a touch that is .neither temperate,
nor hot, nor cold. A touch of a different class belonging to the air
is understood. The possession of such a heterogeneous touch is the
characteristic of air, and the heterogeneity of the touch of the air
is know a by perception. V.
Ether. ? snraiir ^ faara n $
Aph. 5. Those [qualities] do not exist in ether.
" Those [qualities] colour, taste, smell, and touch do not exist
in ether. The appearance in ether of whiteness like that of co-
agulated milk, is an illusion caused by the whiteness of the rays of
*! snfafaihn i
farfa areiw i rRiftr ^TWW BraTr* i
: u
sn
( 37 )
the sun. The appearance also of blueness in the sky is an illusion
occasioned by the blueness of the sapphire peak situated on the
south side of mount Mem. Some maintain that this appearance
is occasioned by the blueuess of the pupil of the eye, from the eye's
falling upon its own pupil after travelling to a distance and return-
ing. This is not the case, for those whose eyes are tawny have the
same perception. V.
n
Aph. 6. The fluidity, through conjunction with fire, of clari-
fied butter, lac, and wax, is common to them and water.
1 The fluidity which belongs to clarified butter &c., is due to
a special cause, the conjunction of them with fire and is not intrinsic.
Such intrinsic fluidity is the characteristic of water. Only fluidity
is common to earth and water, not natural fluidity. Hence there
is not too much asserted. U.
2 The fluidity of clarified butter &c., which is due to a special
cause, is like the intrinsic fluidity existing in water, because the
class constituted by the universal fluidity exists in both, but
there is in clarified butter &c., no possession of natural fluidity.
Fluid in the' aphorism on water (II. 1.2.) has the special mean-
ing of natural fluidity. Accordingly there is no discrepancy. V.
ii s ii
Aph. 7. The fluidity, through conjunction with fire, of tin,
lead, iron, silver, and gold, is common to them with water.
T?T
UT 5T9Rn SSrWT^rT istJT iw 9TWT =! ?J
( 18
1 By the use of the plural number of the word gold, white
copper, copper, brass, quicksilver, &c., are implied. The explanation
of this aphorism is to be understood as similar to that of the for-
mer. V.
i <= ii
A ph. 8 That she has horns, a hump, a tail hairy at the ex-
-
tfemity, and a dewlap is the received mark of being a cow.
* As in the case of the universal cow the marks of possessing
horns &c., are generally received or universally assumed means of
proof ; so with respect to air the mark of touch &c., is also the means
of proof. This is the inner meaning of this and the following aphor.
ism. In the former of these aphorisms in the mention of the cow's
having horns the verb ' to be' is implied. Accordingly a particular
kind of horn, not common to the buffalo, is understood, and this is
a mark of being a cow, as also'is the possession of a hump. That
it has a tail hairy at the extremity, according to 'the derivation
'the hair is situated at the extremity in this,' a peculiarity of the
body, constituted by the tail, is asserted. That is a particular cow
with a tail hairy at the extremity, whose tail is hairy and particular-
ly so at the extremity. With respect to the tail of the sheep &c.,
there is not hairiness at the extremity, for the whole tail is hairy.
( 39 )
As there is nothing remarkable, on account of pendulousness &c.
in the tail of the buffalo &c., a peculiarity in the tail is a mark of
being a cow. The dewlap is a particular formation in the neck,
the possession of which is a mark of the class cow. By the word
' iti' is pointed out the distinctive attribute of being an object com-
monly known by the possession of horns &c. The practical cognition
is, This is a cow because it possesses horns, a hump, a particular
kind of tail, or a dewlap, as was the case with particular cows
formerly observed. V.
1 As with respect to the universal cow, the horns &c. are
properties [marks] recognised as predicable of the whole class
[known to prevade it] ; so also the properties [marks] of air and the
other five supersensible substances [viz. ether, space, time, soul, and
the internal organ] recognised generally, come to be a means of
proof. U.
****** * : <
A ph. 9. Also touch is [a mark] of air.
2 Having stated the validity of [this form of] inference which
effects the requirements of common life, he proves by it the exist-
ence of air. The word mark is to be supplied. The particle
and implies also sound, wafting, and agitating. The sense of the
aphorism is, therefore, that the existence of the air is inferred
from a heterogeneous touch, from the rustling of leaves &c., from
the wafting aloft of grass, cotton, &c. and from the agitation of
branches &c. V.
u <{ n
Aph. 10. And it is net the touch which belongs to visible
things, therefore air has an invisible mark.
ufn farcmuT^fa farfa ^T?fac*nft?retTfs? ?TOT
wra: u
( 40 )
1 This touch which is made the ground of inference, does
not belong to earth, water, and light which are visible, for it is
unaccompanied with colour. Accordingly, since it must be inferred
that this touch has some substratum, air has an invisible mark or
a mark that is observed generally, and is ascertained to exist
from the force of the properties of the ground of the inference. U.
2 That touch from which, as being its substratum, air is
inferred [to exist], does not belong to visible things; viz., earth
water, and light. For this reason air has an invisible mark. It
has, as being a substratum, a mark which is not visible, wherefore
the resultant sense is that air has for its mark a touch which
does not exist in visible thins. V.
Air a substance. ^aiaR ^SW II <W II
Aph. 11.. It is a substance because of its not inhering in
any substance.
3 That of which a substance is the substratum is said to in-
here in that substance ; that of which a substance is not the sub-
stratum does not inhere in a substance. The sense is that air
is not inherent in any substance. Accordingly the substance
nir has, like ether, an atomic characteristic. For all other catego-
ries inhere in substance, and inherence belongs to all except the
eternal substances ; for according to this explanation, since a com-
bination of two atoms is originated by primary atoms, the material
1 ^ STCJT u: Tig: fatn^ 5 ^tSTRT qfasH^gror * wgffi
T ciTO war.
gig: trgvn
sra gT*3iT*u?roT swtan s STOT
aw
.e of the origin of a large integrate whole is a succession of
combinations of two or more atoms. U.
Continued. faitlTar?3Tsf*U5lTG!F53 II H^ U
s>
Aph. 12. Also [air is a substance] from its possessing actions
and qualities.
1 The words The aerial atom is a substance are to be supplied.
It must be admitted that there exist in the primary atom the pos-
session of qualities such as conjunction originative of combina-
tions of two atoms &c., and the possession of action in conformity
with those qualities. This is not a doubtful and undemonstrated
assertion, but the means of establishing the existence of primary
atoms are a mote in a sunbeam and the like, which mote is com-
posed of parts because it is a substance that may be seen with
the eye, like a water pot. The portions of a mote are like a half-jar
[both integrate and integrant] since they are small portions com-
posed also themselves of parts. Therefore as in earth &c. there is a
primary atom, so it must be, allowed equally in the case of the air,
since there are in each case similar series of portions and combina-
tions of portions. V.
>. Aph. 13. [Air], is said to be eternal because it does not in-
here in any substance.
2 Air in its primary atomic character is to be- supplied. A
substance is destroyed by the destruction of either its co-inherent or
its non-coinherent cause. A primary atom, not being composed of
grgtrer
sren UTWTUIWST <yiyw<rf sfa
II
: u
,( 42 )
parts, has neither .such cause. Therefore, there being nothing to
destroy it, it is not liable to destruction. The being composed of
parts is a condition of which the cause is the possession of actions
and qualities. U.
1 Of the primary aerial atom, is to be supplied. That which
has no substance as its co-inherent cause, is said to differ in that res-
pect from that which has a substance as its co-inherent cause. V.
II H8 II
Aph. 14. The concurrence of air with air is a mark of its
multiplicity.
2 Concurrence of wind with wind, or conflict of winds, is a kind
of conjunction. This conjunction is the meeting two winds of equal
velocity, but coming in different directions and different in their action
[or motion.] It is inferred from the flying upwards of grass, cotton
&c. For the upward motion and concurrence of two winds is in-
visible. But it is inferred that the visible action characterised
by the flying upward of visible gra*s &c., is produced by either a
blow or impulse of substance possessing touch and velocity. The
upward motion of the two winds, the character of which is to move
horizontally, being impossible unless they repel each other, proves
a mutual repulse. U.
II TJ II
Aph. 15. Inasmuch as in the contact with air there is no act
of perception there exists [in it] no visible mark.
: qir 33B SJTcnaafiTOirrim asu ?refcz
: u
cfTtinsiTfRT ^T
: I
1 For where there is a visible mark there is a perception of
pervasion [universal concomitance] as of fire by smoke ; but in the
present case of contact with air, perception of pervasion of air is im-
possible because air transcends sense. Accordingly there is no
mark in air universally concomitant and cognised by perception,
and air has therefore an invisible mark. V.
SnCTSWT f ^T53Tfa*te : H 1$ II
Aph. 16. And inasmuch as its existence is known by general
inference it is not a particular.
1 Not particular means devoid of particularity, not parti-
cularised by particularity, and particular is the particular class
included in the universal substance, i. e. the universal of air. And
by inferring from the notion of touch that the touch which is experi-
enced must have some substratum, as also that it cannot be one of the
other [substances], the notion of its inhesion in a substance other than
the eight substances being established, air isproved to be a substance
other than the eight substances, with respect to the subject which
determines that which is to be proved. By general inference means
from a mark different from the relation of cause and effect, or from
a mark other than that of invariable sequence. In the Nyaya
Aphorisms it is taught that inference is of three kinds, from the
antecedent, from the subsequent, and that which is drawn generally
*r* CZJTIH: ufog w^ri *ren
^ OTWolfrT
clTST ^T^rltra^refaifT cUJJTCTH
?tm:
( 44 )
That which is from antecedence, [or progressive inference] has for
its mark a cause, or an invariable sequence. That which is from
subsequence, [or regressive inference] has an effect for its mark, or
the incompatibility of other causes. That which is general has for
its mark something distinct from cause and effect, or is from con-
comitance and incompatibility. V.
II IS II
Aph. 17. It is therefore declared by revelation.
1 Since the existence of air is not inferred by means of a
class having for its form the aerial, the name air is given by revela-
tion, proclaimed by the Veda. V.
Q The existence of ^^ WW%fiTOT!T fa^W II ^ II
Aph. 18. But word and work are the mark of those beings
who are distinguished from ourselves.
1 The word but implies the exclusion of the marks of touch &c.
A word is a name ; a work an effect such as the earth &c. Both of
these are a mark of the existence of God and the great sages who
are more excellent than ourselves. U.
3 The word but expresses a division of the sections, and
implies that the section treating of the Deity is now commenced
A word is a name such as air, a boar, barley, a reed, and the
like ; a work is an effect, as the earth, a blade of grass
&c. These are both marks inferring the existence of God
and the great sages, who are distinguished from ourselves, who
<ts=iTwsiif*ni FT s
wrat i
?raT
( 45 )
are able to produce this and that effect, and are possessed of omni-
science and omnipotence. Or the particle but may express the
exclusion of other marks. According to this when the existence
of God and the great sages is proved, the authority of the Veda,
Smriti, &c., must be acknowledged, because they were promulgated
by them. Although this has been stated before, it is repeated for
the sake of confirming it and of stating the [mode of] inferring the
existence of God, &c. V.
: II *W II
Aph. 19. Because words and works are know by perception"
to be produced.
1 In this place also by the aggregative, copulative compound
word and work, existence as a single object is denoted, with the
purpose of implying that the framer of names and the maker
of the work are indivisible. He of whose perception paradise,
requitative efficacy &c. are objects, wills to frame the terms para-
dise, unforseen results, &c. As when the bodies of Chaitra, Maitra
and others are objects of perception to a father and others, the
names Chaitra, Maitra, &c., are given ; so the giving of names to
a water-pot, a piece of cloth, &., is dependent on the will of
God. Whatever word God wills to be the name of anything
is applicable to it, in the same manner that every herb that
is touched by the edge of an ichneumon's teeth is an antidote
to the venom of a snake. Therefore a name of this kind is
ssi ?R
sTfessf
IT. SISST aJSKTU Sfjfffi: H JTST W%'. mTT UT
9T H5IT sfa Stftcll* ^^WrTT^ ^3TT
U5R UT sfa INTfareirT ftRT ? faircraf ^TT sftr
eR
fl
a mark inferential of those beings which arc distinguished
from ourselves and others. The names also of Maitra and the
like, which are given by a father to a son are virtually given
by God by means of- such precepts as, Let a father on the twelfth
d^iy give a name to his child. Thus it is established that
a name is a mark of the existence of God. In like manner a
work being a product is a mark of the being of a God, for the earth
&c., being effects, must have a maker, as is the case with a water-
pot. U.
1 It may be asked, How is the omniscience of the maker of
words and works proved ? Accordingly it is stated..... A name is
produced on perceiving the thing named, and an effect is produced
on perceiving the material cause. A father and others on seeing
the* body of a son &c., give it a name such as Chaitra or
Maitra ; and in like manner a potter and others on seeing a piece
of earthenware, &c., make a water-pot, &c. So it is concluded
from the nature of the case that the framer of all applicable names
and the maker of the earth &c., which are effects, must be om-
niscient, for he must know by perception all such things named,
and the material -causes of earth, &c. V.
ether! 6XiStenCe "* ^FTO WJWlfTOiTTOI *^W II
Aph. 20. Egress and ingress, such is the mark of the
existence of ether.
2 Here the word such, expressive of a class, includes also
throwing upwards, &c. It is a doctrine of the Sankhyas that the
sfrr
( 47 )
motion of tangible bodies, i. e. their egress and ingress, being im-
possible without the existence of ether which is a unoccupied, ena-
bles us to infer that there is another substance called ether. V.
Aph. 21. That is not a mark [of the existence of ether,] for
an action inheres in one substance only.
1 This opinion of the Sankhyas is rejected. That egress, &c.
is not a mark, is not a mark of existence of ether. Since action
lias one solid substance as its site, action which inheres only in
that which is solid cannot warrant an inference of the existence
of ether as underlying it. For an effect which is inherent implies
a co-inherent [or material] cause, and there is not between ether and
action the relation of inherence and subsistence. V.
5RTT*OT;rn:Rsfifnt\iJzh5a n ^ n
** < *
Aph. 22. Also because the properties [of ether] differ from
the mark of another cause.
2 It might be urged that egress, ingress, &c., infer the exist-
ence of ether, as being its uon-coinherent cause. Hence this
statement is made. [Egress and ingress are not a mark of the exist-
ence of ether] because its properties differ from the mark of another
cause, viz., of a non-coinherent cause. U.
3 Agreement (anuklripti) is an abstract term formed by a pri-
mary (krit) affix. The meaning is, therefore, that since there exists
?TrT teRJHDTfW *W? WraiTSI^l 5f Uel-
SfoEWT^T 3FJ rTrcrrH rTSJT ^ WHWH5rT eJW
( 48 )
in ether a difference of properties, in consequence of its being a
substance, from quality and action which are another universally
acknowledged cause, viz. the non-coinherent cause, therefore egress
&c., cannot infer the existence of ether as being its non-inherent
cause. V.
: u ^3 u
Aph. 23. Non-existence of action results from conjunction.
1 It is stated that action does not infer the existence of
ether as its instrumental cause. Since after conjunction there is
non-existence, i. e. non-production, of action, ether is not in rela-
tion to action an instrumental cause. The sense is that since it is
observed that action (or motion) does not come into being in fruits,
leaves, &c., after their conjunction with the ground, the instrument
tal cause of motion is the non-existence of a particular kind of
conjunction, &c., and not ether, for the negation of ether does not
involve the negation of action, ether being universally diffused. V.
gnttowiraisR : sRT^nmi 5*2 : u \8 n
s e\ vi
Aph. 24. The quality of an effect is observed to be pre-exist-
ent in the quality of the cause.
2 The way is prepared for the statement that it is sound that
necessitates the inference of the existence of ether. The particular
quality of an effect is observed to pre-exist in the cause, as the
colour of a water-pot, &c. in portions of the water-pot &c. Ac-
cordingly the particular quality or sound which is apprehended by
the organ of hearing, having no prior existence as the quality of
i IRT:
5HT=KT:tr * Siwftu fafwrToRTTOrrfSra: i ICQ
wig: u
3153 53 ^n^TTinmiqi sr?afavrr<;f *tfrrfiTmreaf?T i sfimsi 5i
TT gtinm: TrTi^wH rim
ff: 5I53T
( 49 )
a cause, is not the quality of an effect, but of an eternal substance.
Thus it is proved that ether, as being that in which sound exists,
is an eternal substance. V.
sfiTsbrjnmiwsrra ^55: Fraraawnn: 33 u
Aph. 25. Sound is not a quality of tangible things, since there
appears no other effect.
1 It might be urged that sound is observed in a lute, flute, ta-
bour, conch shell, drum &c., which are effects, and that consequent-
ly it exists previously as a quality of their cause. Hence this
statement is made. Let this be so, then as colour, taste, &c., are
observed in threads, in the portions of a pot, &c., and as other homo-
geneous colour, taste, &c., are perceived in a piece of cloth, a
water-pot, &c., so a sound homogeneous with that which is observed
in the integrant parts of a lute, flute, tabour &c., will be found in
the integrate whole, in the lute, flute, tabour, &c. But this is not
the case. On the contrary it is seen that a lute &c., has its origin
in integrant parts destitute of sound, whereas it does not appear
that a piece of cloth, a water-pot, &c., have their origin in threads
and pieces of earthenware destitute of colour. Moreovei if sound
were a particular quality of tangible things, a relation of high and
higher and low and lower tones would not be observed ; for colours
&c., existing in a single complex substance are not perceived to be
various in degree ; therefore sound is not a particular quality of
tangible things. U.
sin? i wrasi *rzu
?reT
T ^RTomOTTf^fn ^TTS^T
H
D
( 50 )
II rC II
Aph. 26. Since it inheres in something else and is known
by perception, sound is neither a quality of the soul nor a quality
of the internal organ.
1 If sound were a quality of the soul there would be such
cognitions as I am played by the breath or by the hand, I am sound-
ing ; as there are such cognitions as I am happy, I will, I know, I
wish, &c. But this is not the case, whereas it appears to all that a
conch shell is played with the breath, and a lute with the hand.
Moreover sound is not a quality of the soul, because it
is, like colour, apprehended by an external organ. So too if sound
were a particular quality belonging to the soul, it would be, like
pain, &., perceived by a deaf man. It. is therefore fairly stated
that it must inhere in something else. The reason that it is not
a quality of the internal organ is stated to be that it is known by
perception. The reason that the words soul and internal organ
are not, as they might have been, made into one compound word
(atma-manase), is that they may both with equal propriety be
said to be known by perception. For the same reason it is implied
that sound is a quality of space and time. U.
II x$
Aph. 27. It remains that sound is a mark of ether.
2 Sound is to be supplied. Sound must exist in something,
5TR
OTTH WSSrB WnT HWcnaifT WTTJTnrfr IrTJTTg
% > t ^ . .
5RH5SI
t i 'WTfTtr 7753:
I
11
( 51 )
because it is a quality, like colour, &c. Thus it is proved by a
general inference that there is another substance over and above
the eight substances [earth, water, light, air, time, space, the soul,
and the internal organ.] Sound is a quality because, like colour
&c., it constitutes a class known by one external organ. It will be
proved hereafter from its inhering without continuity in an eter-
nal substance, that, like knowledge, it is not eternal. The sub-
stance proved by the residuary method is eternal, since there is no
proof of its being formed of parts, and universally diffused, inas-
much as sound is perceived everywhere. U.
II ^ II
Aph. 28. The substantiality and eternity of ether are ex-
plained by air.
1 To prove by analogy that the substance that has sound for
its mark is a substance and eternal, it is stated that as air is eternal
because it does not inhere in any substance, so also is ether, and that
as air is a substance because it has qualities, so also is ether. U.
2 As the primary aerial atom is eternal because it does not in-
here in any substance, and because it has qualities, so also is ether. V.
Ether a unit. Hf5 WT5R II ^<
Aph. 29. Its unity is explained by existence.
3 As being or existence is one, so also is ether only one. U.
U 3 tl
Aph. 30. Also because sound, its mark, is not particular, and
because there does not exist a particular mark of ether.
ST uzreRT froTeRTSiwaraiWcrrQ*i: n
( 52 )
1 The unity of ether is established is to be understood. It
being ascertained that it is an eternal substance, and that all
sounds have that one only substratum, it follows that the hypothesis
of another substratum would be superfluous. Moreover in the
conception of ether sound is regarded as its mark, and this mark is
not particular, and there is no other mark establishing its particu-
larity or establishing its divisibility. It will be stated hereafter that
though knowledge &c. are a non-particular mark of souls, yet there
is a proof of the plurality of souls in another mark which is differ-
ence of condition. U.
2 As plurality of souls is proved by the consideration that in
one soul at one time an effect is produced in the form of pleasure,
and in another soul an effect is produced in the form of pain, and "
so there is a difference in two effects of soul, pleasure and pain ; so
is it established, by the absence of proof to the contrary, and by
the simplicity of the hypothesis, that ether is not manifold but exists
as a unit ; inasmuch as there is no particularity in sound, which is
the mark of ether, by which the multiplicity of ether might be
proved, there being no other mark demonstrative of the multiplicity
of ether. V.
31 U
Aph. 31. In conformity with this is its individual unity.
: inra
VtS&RTSI
it
8 *TOT
sura
W T
H^IT
t ii
( 53 )
1 The individual unity of ether is proved by its unity, from
the consideration of the universal presence of the attribute indivi-
dual unity wherever unity exists. V.
2 The proof of its individual unity is that individual unity
necessarily follows unity. The particle iti indicates the completion
of the daily lesson. The scope of this section is to state the cha-
racteristics of particular substances which possess qualities and
are not objects of the cognition of the internal organ. Therefore
the characteristics of earth, water, light, ether, and in connection
with them that of the divine soul, are stated in this daily lesson.
Accordingly the earth has been said to be possessed of fourteen
qualities. These qualities are colour, taste, smell, touch, number,
extension, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, highest and not
highest generality, gravity, fluidity, and self-restitution. Exactly
the same number of qualities, with the exception of smell, and
with the addition of viscidity, belong to water. These same qualities
with the exception of taste, smell, viscidity, and gravity, belong to
light ; and with the exception of smell, taste, colour, gravity, visci-
dity and fluidity, to air. With the addition of sound, number and the
four following qualities "[extension, individuality, conjunction and
disjunction,] belong to ether. Only number and the four following
qualities belong to time and space. Number and the four following
qualities, accompanied with highest and not highest generality, and
impetus, belong to the internal organ. Number and the four
following qualities, and knowledge, desire, and volition belong to God.
?ni3r*<Aim4
TiTTrT
I ?TT-
IJcf 15*1 JTtJTFI 5EHT ^TfttrnT I *TH ^ *<i*<^nprcii*Mm**i ctatjS I
( 54 )
SECOND DAILY LESSON.
Natural and com-
municated qualities.
Aph. 1. A flower and a garment being brought into contact,
the non-appearance in the garment of another quality is a mark of
the non-existence of smell in the garment.
1 With the purpose of investigating smell &c., the charac-
teristics of the elements, it is now established that smell &c. are
natural and communicated. Colour, taste, smell, and touch being
natural where they are produced in the order of qualities proceed-
ing from causes, become in such cases characteristics, but not in
other cases. For the fragrance experienced in a breeze, or the
cold experienced on the surface of a stone, or the warmth expe-
rienced In water, is not a characteristic. Therefore it is said, A
flower and a garment being brought into contact, or when a gar-
ment is brought into contact with a golden ketaki (Pandanus Odo-
ratissimus) flower, the fragrance of the golden ketaki which is
then experienced does not belong to the garment ; for it is not
produced from the garment in the order of a quality proceeding
from a cause, but is communicated through contiguity with the
golden ketaki flower. For the non-existence of smell in the ketaki
is not a mark of the non-existence of smell in the garment. What
then is the mark ? It is said to be the non-appearance of smell
fa
: i i cnsrar: ^nwjUTaaRm rrgwgw fsfc frfi
i f^i
grafrT: ufe fa
JTWJ ^U^fWlR ^ fTO ^TMlg^: WTrTeTr rra^Q^ rT
: ROT ^ fesiTciT'OTTfe^T T*IT
( 55 )
from another attribute i. e. its non-appearance or non-production
from a quality which is a cause. For if the smell which is smelt
in the garment be natural, it will be perceived before the contact
with the ketaki, in the threads which are its constituent parts.
This is not the case and therefore the smell in question does not
inhere in the garment, inasmuch as the particular quality is not
produced by the qualities of the integrant parts, as is the case in
cold and hot touch and the like. U.
Aph. 2. Smell is established as the mark of earth.
1 The characteristic of earth is stated to be its natural smell.
Smell discriminated by its disjunction from and junction with
other things, and by its excluding things of similar and dissimilar
classes, is established as the characteristic of earth. For the earth
indeed has smell and only the earth has smell. It is therefore estab-
lished that smell, which excludes earth from water and the next
seven substances which are of the same class, and from quality
and the four following categories which are of a different class, is
natural to earth. U.
Analogously heat is ^.^ _
the characteristic of QfRTUUHl O&TCTTrlT II 3 II
light.
Aph. 3. By this heat is explained.
* It is stated that the method of establishing that smell is a
natural quality may be analogously applied to heat as the character-
istic of light (or fire). This analogy is to be regarded as holding
good with respect to cold &c. as characteristics of water &c. U.
i
TgiHaT
ira3r?ftf?T rre^r
wr
*
( 56 )
1 It is stated that the characteristic of light [or tire] which
consists of a hot feel is, like the characteristic of earth, not univer-
sally predicable of water, &c. V.
II 8 II
Aph. 4. Heat is [the characteristic] of light.
* The characteristic of light is examined. It is meant that
natural heat is the characteristic of light. Colour also, white and
luminous, is implied. U.
3 Heat belongs to light alone not to any thing else. There-
fore the characteristic of light cannot be universally affirmed of
any thing else. V.
the cbaracteristic
ofwter II J* II
Aph. 5. Cold is [ the characteristic] of water.
4 Natural cold is the characteristic of water. Therefore it
cannot be also universally affirmed of the surface of stone, sandal-
wood, &c. By cold also its colour and taste are characterised, and
viscidity and natural fluidity are also implied. U.
5 Cold belongs to water, not to any thing else. Therefore the
characteristic of light cannot be universally affirmed also of the
surface of stone &c., inasmuch as its appearance there is communi-
cated \i. e. not natural.] V.
: I rim
wg: i
( 57 )
11*11
Aph. 6. The notions of posteriority in relation to posteriority
of simultaneity, of slowness, and quickness are marks of the exist-
ence of time.
1 The particle iti implying a kind of notion has relation to
each individual word, so that the meaning is that the conception
of posteriority, the conception of simultaneity, the conception of
slowness, and the conception of quickness, are marks of the
existence of time. By posteriority in relation to posteriority we
are to understand also priority in relation to priority. The sense
is therefore as follows : if in relation to an old man, between
whose birth and the present time there is an interval of many
revolutions of the sun, we make a youth the term of relation,
a notion of priority is evolved, and this must have some non-co-
inherent cause. In like manner if the old man be made the
term of comparison with reference to the youth, we shall find
that a notion of posteriority is evolved. Simultaneously means
at the same time, during the same revolutions of the sun, or during
the same time other than a revolution of the sun, with reference
to such judgments as, 'They are born at the same time, ' They
stand at the same time/ 'They make something at the same
time.' Revolutions of the sun which have not yet taken place are
not thus determinant nor are those revolutions actually presented.
The substance then, which determines such particular notions, be-
cause otherwise they could not be produced, is time. U.
cTOT ^TCRwJT UrUUT
: fatfw??? Hens: fgtrfwfrr Traitr: eirrafsrff'Rtera: i
i gmrfefo
( 38 )
eternal n
Aph. 7. Its substantiality and eternity are explained by air.
1 As the primary aerial atom is a substance because it pos-
sesses qualities, and eternal because it is a substance not inhering
in any other substance (cp. II. 1, 12 & 13), so also is time. U.
5 Time is, like the primary aerial atom, a substance because a
subject in which qualities exist, and eternal because it has no
parts. V.
Unity of time. Href *TT3^ II II
Aph. 8. Its unity is explained by existence.
3 The sense is that time, like existence, is one because the
conception of quickness &c. which are the marks of its existence,
are in every case not particular, and because there exists no parti-
cular mark like that of the plurality of souls (cp. II. 1,30). It
may be objected, Time is manifold according to its division into
moments, aggregates of two moments, hours, watches, days, days
and nights, lunar fortnights, months, seasons, half years, years, &c.,
bow then can it be one ? This is no valid objection, for the appear-
H^TT cfil<<f~
9 cuy<u*4iuiifr:<3
ll
( 59 )
ance of a division is caused by an accident. It is to be understood
that as one and the same crystal, by accidentally reflecting the
colour of a China rose, tapinja (Xanthochymus Pictorius) &c.,
appears to be divided, so also time though one only appears, by
reason of division marking the course of the sun, &c., and
the division marking . the effects of such and such cause, to be
divided. It may be objected, Yet time is threefold according
to the division into, past, future, and present, for itis said
in the Veda, The three times return, The three times are unac-
complished, &c. This is no valid objection, for the ordinary
conception of time as threefold rests upon the distinguishing of
things as antecedently non-existent or potentially existent, and
subsequently non-existent i. e. as having ceased to exist. For
the time occupied by a thing existent is its present, the
time occupied by its antecedent non-existence is its future,
and the time distinguished by its destruction or subsequent non-
existence is its past; so that the ordinary conception of time as
threefold rests upon trinal nature of the distinction. U.
Time a cause of non- WT9TH 5RTt 5RT*IT-
eternal substances. 73lfR II < II
Aph. 9. The term time is applicable to a cause, inasmuch as
it exists not in eternal and exists in not eternal things.
1 The term time is applicable to a cause, the cause of all things
produced. The reason is stated to be that it does not exist in
things eternal, and exists in things not eternal. For since with
regard to etornal substances such as ether, there is no such notion
HT?<jFTWfcfinT& cRTO ^rHH3n I trpT
sria:
fern 5n?r. rnhr STTH
fua
ITRT
iifu ?
( 60 )
as produced simultaneously, produced slowly, produced quickly,
produced now, produced during the day, produced at night
whereas notions of simultaneity and the like do exist with regard
to substances not eternal such as a water-pot, a piece of cloth, &c.;
time is proved by an inclusive and an exclusive (i. e. by an affir-
mative and a negative) argument to be a cause. It should be un-
derstood that time is the efficient cause of all things produced, not
only in virtue of such notions as simultaneity, but also in virtue
of the terms hibernal, vernal, pluvial, &c., as applied to flowers
fruits, &c. U.
^Existence of space ^ ^fofa q^f^ f~p ,, 4.
Aph. 10. The mark pertaining to space is that whence the
knowledge arises that one thing is remote or not remote from
another.
1 Pertaining to space belongiug to space, causing us to infer
the existence of space. For that substance is space from which,
with reference to two bodies in a determinate position and existing
simultaneously, there springs the knowledge that one in which
there is there the conjunction with more numerous conjunct objects,
is more remote than one in which there is conjunction with less numer-
ous conjunct object, and that that body in which there are less
numerous conjunctions of conjunct objects is more remote than that
body in which there are more numerous conjunctions of conjunct
objects. For unless such a substance exist there is nothing to account
for the two bodies having more or less numerous conjunctions with
conjunct objects. Unless this be accounted for, there can exist no
such thing as the conception of each body so characterised ; and
1 faro ^t few fsn-puraw <?HT
trur ^?TSTO ^rrtHsrai TO u tr# Tfvio
OT
fs
-T ^ niJtRttwmMU ?fTTr^t f xf
n
( 61 )
without such a notion a highest and not highest [generic and specific]
form of generality is impossible ; but if that were impossible there
would not be, as there actually are, cognitions speculative and prac-
tical characterised by such generality. U.
1 The words near or remote are to be supplied after one thing
from another. The mark, then, of space is the conception of local
contiguity or remoteness, according to which we know that one
thing is far from, or near to, another. Space, therefore, like time,
is proved to exist inasmuch as it is that in which conjunction takes
place, ajid the not inherent cause of local propinquity or remote-
ness. Space moreover, though one, being divided according to
difference of concomitants gives rise to the common distinction of
east &c. The quarter adjacent to this concomitant i. e. to the
mountain behind which the sun rises, is the east. That which is
remote from this mountain is the west. The region adjacent
to mount Meru is the north. That which is remote from mount
Meru is the south. That which is adjacent to the mountain behind
which the sun rises, and remote from mount Meru, is the south-
east. The region remote from Meru, and remote from the moun-
tain behind which the sun rises, is the south-west. That which is
adjacent to Meru, and remote from the mountain behind which the
sun rises, is the north-west. That which is adjacent to Meru and
adjacent to the mountain behind which the sun rises, is the
north-east. That in which the conjunction takes place which is
produced by the conjunction of soul with requitative efficacy and
sra:
HT
fefi
( 62 )
by the rites of fire is above ; that in which the conj unction caused
by falling takes place is below. V.
II 11 II
Aph. 1 1 . The substantiality and eternity [of space] are ex-
plained by air.
1 It is a substance because possessed of attributes, and eternal
because it has no substratum [cf II. 2. 7.J U.
II 1x II
Aph. 12. Its unity [is explained] by existence.
2 The unity of space, like that of existence, is proved by its
having a not particular mark, and by the non-existence in it of a
particular mark. From this its individual unity may be inferred
[cf II. 1.31.] U.
SRTZjfgiaoi S?RTrgiT II 13 II
Aph. 13. Its diversity is [caused to be conceived] by the dif-
ference of its effects.
3 It is explained why, whereas space is one only, there is the
practical assurance of east, &c. Its diversity, the common diverse
conceptions of east &c., is caused by the difference of its effects,
the accidental qualities of produced bodies. But in reality space is
one only. V.
^TfewwmijrroiigFgTzjHT vraisa mgt n 18 u
t&.
Aph. 14. [Space is regarded as] east because of a past,
future, or present conjunction of the sun.
fsu 5^fr3 sfti
( 63 )
1 The east [prdchi] is so called because the sun moves
[anchati] forward [prdlc] there. Accordingly the space in which
conjunction first takes place of the sun in its course from east to
west of Meru, whether such conjunction be past, future, or present,
is east. Mention is here made of these three divisions of time,
which rest upon the division of human observation. One man has
the practical assurance that this is the east, because the conjunction
of the sun in the orient first took place yesterday. Another has
the notion of the east from observing that the conjunction of the
sun in the orient will firs,t take place tomorrow. Another has the
notion of the east from observing that there is a present conjunc-
tion of the sun now taking place in that quarter. TJ.
rt*IT gann qnig 33 g II HU II
Aph. 15. So likewise [space is regarded as] south, west and
north.
2 In like manner the practical assurance of the south arises
from past, future, or present conjunction of the sun with the moun-
tains, &c., in the southern quarter. So also the notion of west and
north may be analogously accounted for. U.
3H* fkl?ttn*!Tfa aJT^Trnfa II 1$ U
Aph. 16. By this [similiarly] the intermediate divisions of
space are explained.
3 The notion of the south-east quarter arises from combining
?roT
irem
: TTZHT
: u
T fsfnf??
?TT fe^TfR SWffTSnSJ OTr^nfert FeJtrllfTt U
the characteristics of the eastern and southern quarters. So also
the south-west, and north-east may be inferred. It is explain-
ed at length in the Kanada-rahasya that space is that by which, as
an eternal substance, these and other conjunctions of the sun are
manifested. U.
Nature of doubt.
n is u
A ph. ] 7. Doubt [arises] from perception of a general, non-
perception of a particular, and remembrance of particuliarity.
1 Doubt arises from perception or knowledge of a general i. e.
of a common property, from non-perception or ignorance of a par-
ticular included in one of two alternatives, and from remembrance
or knowledge of two alternatives. With reference to doubt there-
fore, the cause is knowledge of a common property, absence of cer-
tainty as to something comprised in one of two alternatives, and
knowledge of two alternatives. The word ' and' implies the addi-
tion of knowledge of a non-general property, and of opposed pro-
positions, which are mentioned in the Nyaya Aphorisms. V.
Aph. 18. That which is seen, and that which was formerly
seen [are causes of doubt.]
2 Doubt is twofold, that which has an external, and that
TJTTTrf
FlH^T^TrJ HSTOT Wgrftfo ifo: I JTOT
: ^fi: u
stf%fgtraiT s^fgufq^sg sfafeHnriftr sfa
?nr
: ^T irFrT
ssrraRR
( 65 )
which has an internal object. That again which has an external
object relates to something of which the propeities are perceived,
or to something of which the properties are unperceived. That
which relates to something of which the properties are perceived,
is such as when on seeing a determinate object and hav-
ing tallness as an attribute, the doubt arises whether the ob-
ject be a post or a man. That which relates to an object the pro-
perties of which are not perceived, is such as when on seeing merely
the horns * bolonging to a cow, gayal, or other animal in a forest
where it is concealed by the intervention of bushes, &c., the doubt
arises whether it be a cow or a gayal. But in the latter case the
doubt really relates to the quality of the horn, whether the horn
belong to a cow or to a gayal, and consequently the statement of
this distinction is due merely to a refinement of language. The
general [i. e. common property] which is the cause of doubt, gives
rise to doubt either when observed in several objects or in one.
The first statement is therefore explained in this aphorism. Height
perceived is [in the former case] the cause of the doubt. The
height, that is to say, which is perceived in a present object, and
which belonged equally to a post and to a man previously seen is
the cause of the doubt. U.
Aph. 19. That which is perceived in a certain way [is a
cause of doubt] because it is [at another time] perceived not in
that way.
1 That which is seen in a certain way, gives rise to doubt by
reason of its being perceived not in that way. For instance
Chaitra being seen in a certain manner, with hair, is at another time
seen not in that manner, but without hair. When in the course of
zrar
I
watffi JsbjsniHrTfl? ^fisn fa 0*^1 iifrr cr? ft! iNirgf SWRT vw:
*N;icr %vz f rsftre 53 "gfifffar &z: ^rai?p a
E
time Chaitra is seen with his head covered with his garments, a
doubt arises whether this Chaitra have hair or no. In this case
the being Chaitra is a common property which gives rise to doubt,
and this common property is seen in one object. The cause of the
doubt therefore is seen in one undivided object. U.
1 It is stated that a property may exist under two alternative
conditions in one object. For if Chaitra be seen with his head
muffled up, a doubt arises whether he have hair or no, and the
cause of this doubt is the knowledge of the notion Chaitra, ac-
companied by the notion of hair or of the absence of hair. V.
n ^ n
Aph. 20. Dou~>t also [arises] from knowledge and want of
knowledge.
2 Internal doubt is produced "by knowledge and the want of
knowledge. For instance, an astronomer predicts truh 7 , and pre-
dicts untruly, eclipses, of the moon &c. Accordingly a 'doubt arises
in his mind as to his knowledge, whether it be correct or not. Or
knowledge is sometimes science, and sometimes not science, wanting
demonstration ; and consequently a doubt arises with respect to
something, whether, inasmuch as it is known, it exists or not. U.
^T^Wlfil *JT rf: *? ^55: II rl n
Aph. 21. The object which is apprehended by hearing is
Sound.
3 It is now established by means of a definition that sound is
T wrarg i wsrfrr fs
f? fcfsii sfgajTwri Hcrf?? tren
HSFIT OT srran
fig 9r5rf^%3JT 5F5lfe3ejfc[3JT 3UJWT Wolff* fT^T
U
vfirim ^rguTw^si sacreuTjiiffT i ^TW n&n sir
; i
( 67 )
possessed of properties. It is apprehended by hearing, that is,
is an object of ordinary perception produced in the organ of hearing.
The notion of sound, being of the same kind, is an object, and is
therefore a class. The full definition, then, of sound is that it is a
class included in the notion of a quality which exists as the object
of common perception produced in the organ of hearing. V.
Doubt with respect
to souud answered.
Aph. 22. Since the particular [class of sound] is perceived
both in things homogeneous and in things heterogeneous [a doubt
arises with respect to it.]
1 ' A doubt arises with respect to sound' is to be supplied, and
by ' sound' must also be understood the notion or class of sound
and the notion of its being apprehended by the organ of hearing.
Since, then, the exclusion of particularity or difference of sound is
percei v ed in things homogeneous, i. e. in the twenty-three qualities,
and in things heterogeneous, i. e. in substances and actions, sound
gives rise to a doubt respecting itseli, whether it be a quality, a
substar, :o, or an action. U.
2 Some have maintained that, inasmuch as there exist names
and notions of low and loud oounde, sound is a substance. The
refutation of this opinion is here cojnmenced. Since there is per-
u
3J 1 *: I
^irrfsrwr
'5I53fclT3T
5Fra?hFfT war: n
( 68 )
ceived no particularity in the nature of sound apprehended in sound,
both in the twenty-three things homogeneous, i. e. in the qualities,
colour, &., and in things heterogeneous i. e. in substances and ac-
tions, which are distinguished 'by belonging to the ^ class substance
and other classes, 'a doubt arises' for these words are to be sup-
pliedwhether sound be a substance or no. The knowledge of
the existence in the nature of sound of particularity, in the form of
exclusion from that of which both alternatives are distinguished,
gives rise to such a doubt. V.
Aph. 23. Since it inheres in one substance only, [sound] is
not a substance.
1 That of which one substance is. the substratum, inheres in
one substance only. Inasmuch, therefore, as no substance has only
one cause of inhesion, sound, since it differs in properties from
substance, is not a substance. U.
8 The opinion that sound is a substance is here rejected. Sound
is not a substance, for it inheres in one substance, i. e. resides in
one only ; whereas it is well known that no substance abides in
one other substance only. V.
u SB n
Aph. 24. Now is it an action, for it is invisible.
3 Sound is not an action, for the perception of which sound is
the object is not visual, i. e. is produced by some other external or-
gan than the eye. The class sound, therefore, does not belong to
: u
31533* ZGOfQ rceifT I 3I53T sf SfcUH
( 69 )
action, because like the class taste &c. it exists as a class not in-
cluded in things visually perceived. U.
ynw SHT merit: sfnifa: HTOWW u su u
Aph. 25. The transiency of [sound] which is a quality, is a
property common also to actions.
1 It may be objected that sound is an action, since like throw-
ing upwards &c. it comes rapidly to an end. The answer is as fol-
lows : Transiency is rapid destruction. This in the class quality
is dependent, like qualities [such as pleasure and pain, and the
like], on rapid occurrence of being and ceasing to be. It is, there-
fore, only a property common also to actions, but not the whole es-
sence of action. Rapid destruction, which you advance as an
argument, is found in other instances besides action, as is shown by
the conception of duality by pleasure and paiii, &c. U.
II rS II
Aph. 26. Since there is no mark of [sound as] existing [before
utterance, it does not so exist.]
2 Meeting the objection : Let it be allowed that sound is a
quality ; yet it is not a mark of the existence of ether ; for
it would justify the inference of the existence of ether, only if it
were an effect of ether ; whereas it is eternal, its occasionally not
beino- observed being due to the non-existence of something to
make it known, it is stated : If sound existed previously to its
'5153ft sR
?Frr
3J53T JTH^TSTT ^raTaTSKnifajpy ^T3iTW Fl
zm nfs ?rca *n Fn?T fo^r fa?a sa
i nfe fi 3^iT?:iirTfj urm ^53
win i gT^^ms^sn^T wssT3 ffmqurfer nwrf? Bra
iffl II
( 70 )
utterance, there would be a mark or another proof of it as an exist-
ing thing. There is no proof of Si'ind in the case of its net being
heard. It is not therefore manifested as- pre-existent. U.
1 The doctrine of the Mimansakas that sound is not produced,
but eternal ; but that it is sometimes unperceived because there is
nothing to make it known, is rejected. Because there is no mark
of sound as existing, means because there exists no proof establish,
; ng the eternity of sound. V.
n xs u
Aph. 27. Since [sound] differs from the eternal [it does not
exist previously to utterance.]
2 A difference is perceived between sound and the eternal.
For it is inferred by what is spoken, that Chaitra, Maitra and
others exist even when concealed, because Chaitra speaks ; but it is
never inferred from that which is made known, as a water pot and
the like, that that which makes known, such as a lamp and the like,
exists. Therefore sound is produced, but is not made known as
previously existent. U.
3 After the statement of the absence of a proof, a proof of
the contr. .ry is stated. Sound is not eternal because it differs from
the eternal, i. e. because it ceases to be : foi that it ceases to be is
established by the evidence of sense. V.
Aph. 28. It is not eternal, for it has a cause.
( 71 )
1 Because its production ' _>m a cause is observed, is to be sup-
plied. For a sound is observed becoming manifest by the conjunc-
tion of a drum and drumstick, and the like. It is, therefore, not eter-
nal, because it is produced. Or 'for it has a cause' implies that the
reason is that it possesses a cause. U.
2 Sound is rot eternal, because it has a cause. For eternal
things have no causes. V.
II ^ II
Aph. 29. This is not unproved by change.
3 It must not be argued that there" is no proof that sound has
a cause, since, inasmuch as it is lo-id of soft, a change is perceived.
For a loud or soft sound is perceived in consequence of the hard-
ness or softness of the beating 1 of a drum with a drumstick, and
the like. But the loud ness &c. of that which is manifested, is
not dependent on the loudness &c. of that which makes known.
From its cause or change, therefore, it is inferred that it is pro-
duced, not that its existence is made known. U.
4 That sound has a cause is not disproved by its change or
existence as loud, soft, &c. For in the absence of hardness or soft-
ness in the beating of a drum with a drumstick and the like, there
rr wx straws
HOT itTrcrfcmTGfTsfa^rT wfirfcT
H
2 3T53 sfsTfH: SRTUUrT: RT^5R?nfefcf ST^fJ T fii
alawaifewra:
5155
( 72 )
could not be observed to exist loudness or softness of sound. It is
impossible that loudness, softness, &c. should exist in sound as a
consequence of the loudness, softness, &c. of that which manifests
it. It must therefore be admitted even by an opponent that sound
is produced from a cause, this cause being the beating &c. of a
drum with a drumstick, &c. V.
n 3 n
Aph. 30. Since in its manifestation there would be a de-
fect [sound is not manifested.]
1 If sound were manifested, an unalterable relation of evol-
vent and e volute in things co-extensive and apprehended by the
same sense would be wrongly conceived to exist. But no such un-
alterable relation is observed to exist among such objects. If this
be not assented to, it will follow that when one letter (as ka) is
manifested, all letters will be manifested. The objection that an
unalterable relation of that which manifests and that which is
manifested is observed to exist between the existent, a man, and a
Brahman, which are co-extensive, and are manifested according to
their diverse natures, places, aud origins is invalid. For they are
not co-extensive, for the extension of the human and the Brah-
manical, is not so great as that of the existent. U.
: u 3<i n
Aph. 31. Sound is produced by conjunction, disjunction and
[other] sound.
z By conjunction by the conjunction of a drum and drurn-
rre: far?! ^ ^ m<piRT wfT5niri5G35i*oUirc( gt^sczjT vni
H3T 5R3?KTTHozjTfiT Hiorct
5 issirafc? ire HUT H^T^S^ifcjiMT^Tfj ^ fn
ff5(
( 73 )
stick, and the like. By disjunction in a bamboo when being split,
for in this case conjunction is not the cause of the first sound, for
no such conjunction exists ; and consequently disjunction of the two
pieces of bamboo is the efficient cause, and the non-coinherent [or
extrinsic or immaterial] cause is the disjunction between the piece
split off and the ether. When sound is produced at a distance on
a lute &c., it is propagated by continual reproduction till arriving at
that space in ether which is limited by the outer ear, it is perceived.
Sound therefore is produced also from sound. U.
Aph. 32. Sound is not eternal, because of its mark.
1 Articulate sound is not eternal, because, though constituting
a class, it is apprehended by the organ of hearing, as in the case of
a lute &c. U".
th9 u 35 n
Aph. 33. But [were sound quickly destructible] the activi-
ties of two would not exist.
2 The objection of a Mimansakais stated. Of two of teach-
er, and pupil, the activities the activity of the teacher in teach-
ing and of the pupil in learning would not exist, would follow to
be non-existent. Since such expressions as The teacher teaches
r?wT?r
ii
gnf TfWsfii STsST sfarSi aTTFcTTr^ *J?H ^T-sWI^IrclTrf gtarnfsvgfaolfefZrei: U
I gqTJvBpaQT:
TfT 3*:
R: n^rr^nroain 1 ?vw* ^rqsr mcr wra: u
his pupils the Veda, and The teacher gives his pupils the Veda, are
recognised to be identical in sense, teaching is nothing else than
giving. As, therefore, if sound were rapidly destructible it
would be impossible to give and receive it, there would exist no
activity in relation to teaching and learning, the permanency of
sound must, therefore, be admitted. It also follows from the absence
of a proof of destruction of sound, no destroying agent being ob-
served. The eternity of sound is also established by the argument.
It has so long existed, who shall destroy it after this ? V.
ll 58 II
Aph. 34. From the word ' first' [it follows that sound is eter-
nal.]
1 The eternity of sound must be admitted, Inasmuch as in
the Vedic text, " He thrice recited the first, and thrice the last," it
is affirmed that the first and last texts recited at the arlding of fuel
to the sacred fire were thrice pronounced ; for to pronounce them
thrice would be impossible, unless sound were eternal. Therefore
its eternity is established according to the argument previously
employed. V.
*n=qffiqffWT3T53 ii 33 ii
Aph. 35. Also from the existence of recognition.
2 The permanence of sound necessarily follows from the exist-
ence of recognition or recollection. Such recognitions as that
Maitra is reading the same verse as Chaitra read, or that this is
the same letter lea, would be impossible unless sound were pejr-
manent. V.
FsifscT?gTrr i fs
( 75 )
Aph. 36. A plurality existing, [these arguments] are doubtful.
1 A plurality, diversity, and non-permanency existing in the
particular motions of the limbs in dancing and the like, teaching,
learning, and recognition are observed to exist in regard to them.
Therefore teaching &c. the arguments or middle terms for the per-
manence of sound are doubtful, that is, undistributed. For other-
wise from such observations as "He learns dancing" "He dances
thrice" "Maitra is performing the same dance as was performed
by Chaitra", permanence would be proved similarly of all these
actions. V.
TOnmsr: sraraw: 11 is u
Aph. 37. The existence [in sound] of number, [results] from
generality.
2 It may be said, " There are fifty letters, texts of eight and
texts of three syllables, and the anushtubh metre of eight syllables.
How, if letters be not eternal, can they be infinite according to
diversity of utterance?" The reply is as follows. "The" existence of
number i. e. of the numbers fifty and the like, results from univer-
sality, from the letters ka, ga, &c. existing as classes. Though there
be an infinity of the letters lea &c., the things belonging to the class
ka, ga, &c. exist as fifty or three or eight, just as substance, quality
&c. exist as nine or twenty-four in virtue of a division of that
which is included in the class." U.
TRIc^f sftT *BWI SlftffT
( 76 )
THIRD BOOK, FIRST DAILY LESSON.
sI^HTOT: ii 1 ii
Aph. 1. The objects of sense are universally known.
5 Having in the second book completed his investigation of ex-
ternal substances, the author according to the order of enunciation
now proceeds to lay the foundation for an inquiry respecting the
soul. The objects of sense, smells, tastes, colours, feels and sounds
are cognisable by the several exterior organs of sense. That object
which is apprehended by the organ of hearing is sound. It having
been shown that sound is universally known, it is in like manner
demonstrated that objects from odour to touch [i. e. smells, tastes,
colours, touches] are universally known. Thus the object, which is
apprehended by the olfactory organ is odour ; the object which is
apprehended by the organ of taste is savour ; the object which is
apprehended by the eye alone is colour ; the object which is appre-
hended by the organ of touch alone is feel. By the word object
there is every where intended an actual subject of attributes, and
therefore there is in the above aphorism no excess of predication
which would apply also to- the idea of smell and to the non-existence
of smell. It is therefore to be understood that the nature of smell
is that of a species included under the genus quality and existing as
something apprehended by the olfactory organ, and so also with
regard to taste, &c. Consequently there is not wanting a subaudi-
tion of supersensual odour &c. U.
sjssuftrar
smouwr w ra: 3 iw: *?FrcrnT QT s
ZIT m:
y wf HT^vr?T ssra
( 77 )
1 The objects of the senses are colour, taste, smell, touch and
sound. 'Universally known' means 'objects of assurance given in
perception.' That immediate presentation to the mind which has
for its objects colour &c., is allowed by all. V.
^F^ronfsf|ftF^TCiwT sih^tTOi tg: u ^ u
Aph. 2. The universal cognition of the objects of sense is
an argument for [the existence of] another object than the objects
of sense.
2 The application of the doctrine of universal cognition of ob-
jects of sense to the inquiry respecting the soul is here explained.
By an ' argument' is meant a ' mark of the existence' of another
object, which other object is the F ul ; a mark of the existence of the
soul which is an object other than the senses and their objects, than
colour &c., and the substrata of colour &c., though it is implied here
that knowledge is the mark of the existence of the soul ; yet inas-
much as there being a universal cognition of the objects of sense,
the immediate presentation to the mind of colour &c., being more
commonly known, the mark or evidence of there being a soul,
is described as constituted by that universal cognition. This uni-
versal cognition must inhere in something, either as an effect as
a water-pot, or as an attribute, or as an action. Since it is an ac-
tion in the same manner as cutting is an action, it must be produced
by an instrument. The instrument of universal cognition is sense,
and that, being an instrument, must be employed by an agent, as
: wfierarr:
: srafieret ^fa wig: u
: i safer TTR*ra THrTi fas
faiUIrcTTgT QT
rif^Nr^ ?r^
a: airmail sRt^m^f ^TTRT ^ <HT?*TT u
( 78 )
an axe and the like are employed. Now, tliat in which this uni-
versal cognition resides and which employs for its instruments the
olfactory and other organs is the soul. U.
H l ii
Aph. 8. That is an invalid argument [which affirms that
sensible cognition is an attribute either of the body or of the sen-
ses.]
' In anticipation of the objection :- " Let the body or the or-
gans of sense be that in which cognition resides ; for, these being
both more manifestly related to cognition than their negations are,
why should we imagine any other cognising subject? For conscious-
ness is an attribute of the body being, like its colour, &c., one of its
effects ; and the same may be said to be the case with regard to
the organs of sense as attributes/' it is stated that this is an invalid
argument, i. e. the appearance of an argument, inasmuch as, the
middle term being undistributed, it is as uncertain that cognition is
the effect of the body or the senses, as that knowledge of an object
is generated by the lamp [by the light of which it is seen.] U.
2 That the argument to establish the existence of cognition
in the body is a fallacious argument the mere appearance of an
argument. For a water-pot, a piece of cloth and the like do not
in virtue of being effects of the body reside in the body. It can-
not be proved that cognition exists in the body, for this would be
a violation of the argument just stated. V.
U 8 II
Aph. 4. Because there is unconsciousness in the causes.
( 79 )
1 It is meant that cognition cannot reside in the body or iu
the organs of sense because of the unconsciousness or absence
of consciousness in the causes, or constituent parts, of the body^
such as the hands, feet, &c. It is observed that the particular qua-
lities of earth and the other substances are determined by the pre-
vious qualities of the cause of the substances. In like manner
if there existed consciousness in the causes of the body, it might
possibly exist also in the body itself. But this is not the case.
Should it be urged that consciousness must also exist in the
constitutive portions of the body, it may be denied on the ground
.of the want of unanimity which would ensue, for unanimity is never
observed between many sentient beings, [whereas it is observed in
'the actions of the body.] Moreover were the hand for instance cut
off, there would be no recollection of that which was experienced at
the amputation according to the maxim, One does not remember
that which is experienced by another. Again when the body per-
ished there would, as >a consequence, be no fruition of the results
of injuries and the like done therein, for Maitra does not experience
the results of the evil done by Cbaitra ; and actions would ac-
cordingly be lost, and there would come to pass events not
determined by former acts. U.
sKizhr ^rairi ii U n
o v
Aph. 5. Because there would be consciousness in the effects.
2 Anticipating the objection that consciousness exists in a mi-
err
?TOT
fg
?T ^ nrm
n
=rr
i afe srdTJcRroSr ^wi i?isrf
( 80 )
nute degree in the causes of the body, and is manifest in the boi'y,
and that there is , not therefore the absence of a prior existence of
the quality in the causes, nor the impossibility of unanimity, it is
stated that if consciousness existed in the atoms which are the pri-
mary causes of the body, it would exist also in the water-pots and
like products or effects which derive their origin from it ; and also
consciousness would exist in products such as water-pots and the
like, because the particular attributes of the earth pervade all terres-
trial existence. But consciousness is not observed to exist in these
products. U.
31313153 II S II
Aph. 6. And because it is not known [that any minute degree
of consciousness exists in products of matter.]
1 In anticipation of the objection that consciousness may exist
in an inappreciable degree in water-pots and other material products,
it is stated that inasmuch as it is not known by any kind of evi-
dence, there is no consciousness in a water-jar and the like. Other-
wise it might have to be admitted that a hare has horns, if we are
to allow what is unwarranted by any form of evidence. For by no
kind of evidence is it known that there exists consciousness in a
water-jar and the like. U.
2 ' It is not known,' means ' because there is no form of evi-
dence conveying the notion of consciousness as existing in the va-
rious products.' The word 'and' implies that such an hypothesis is
iTOT g
gs
u
( 81 )
unnecessary. It is more fitting to conceive some one other sub-
stance as the subject of consciousness than to imagine a varied con-
sciousness existing in various portions of matter. V.
e II
Aph. 7. The means of proof is something else [than has
been supposed] : this is not a valid argument.
1 It may be urged : It has been, affirmed that a ruling soul
is inferred from the organ of hearing and other instruments. This
is not a legitimate inference, for the auditory and other organs are
neither identical with, nor produced by, the soul ; and unless one of
these alternatives be admitted, there is no proof of any inseparable
co-existence of these organs and the soul ; and unless there be such
inseparable co-existence, there can be no valid inference of this kind.
To this it is replied that tl^e means of proof can but be something
else than that which is to be proved. It cannot be identical with,
that which has to be proved, for were it so it would follow that
there would be no difference between the means of proof and the
thing proved. A means of proof constituted by identity with that
which is to be proved, is no means of proof, is invalid as an argu-
ment. U.
ii c ii
Aph. 8. One thing cannot be an argument [of the existence
of another thing with which it is wholly unconnected.]
2 It might be asked by an objector how quality not produced
H3?*lf?raT
( 82 )
by that which is to be proved can warrant any inference ; for were
this the case smoke &c., might prove the existence of an ass &c., or
as well as that of fire. It is therefore stated that one thing or
kind of substance, cannot be an argument for the existence of ano-
ther thing or another kind of substance. Thus smoke, &c. if the
existence of ass is to be proved, would be fallaciously adduced as
a means of proof, being void of invariable concomitance with asses,
&c. But with reference to fire &c. it would not be so, for in that
case there would exist a concomitance. In the present case there
must be a concomitance, there is not merely an accidental re-
lation. V.
wiFTOWen^ishmaTFqfgnfu ^ u <t 11
Aph. 9. The conjunct, the inherent, the co-inherent in one
thing, and the contradictory [are means* of proof.]
1 Such form of proof as : The body has skin because of
its corporeality, is that of conjunction. For skin is described as a
natural integument of matter capable of growth and decay, and is
neither a cause nor an effect of the body, but merely produced to-
gether with the body and invariably conjoined with it. In like
manner the form of proof from inhesion is such as : Ether
possesses extension, because of its substantiality, like a water-pot,
&c. Here extension which has to be proved is established by sub-
stantiality a property essential to ether. Or another example would
be : The divisibility of extension must somewhere cease; therefore
the atomic, as a degree of extension is proved ; whence it is
inferred that atoms exist in which the atomic inheres. The inference
f5TTr*RT 5*1* 5RTW3
( 83 )
from sound, of ether, and from knowledge &c,, of soul, is not given
as an inference of cause from effect. U.
1 The conjunct means the means of proof connected with
conjunction. Is a means of the proof is to be supplied after each
term of the aphorism. That which is connected by conjunction
i. e. the mark of the existence of that which is dependent on con-
junction, is included in the conjunction. Otherwise how could
there be such inferences as that in a particular place there are
charioteers, because there are chariots excellently driven there ?
Here the relation determining the conclusion is the connection by
Conjunction with the conjunct. In like manner the inherent is a
mark of the existence of that in which it inheres. Else how in the
case of seeing a mere portion of an animal &c., could it be inferred
from such determinate part that the whole is an animal &c. ?
Nor can it be argued that there being in the case of conjunction
of the sight with that portion, a conjunction with the whole
object^ it is difficult to prove that such an inference as this is not
a mere perception ; for it is possible only where there is a desire
to infer. Since, therefore, a chariot and the like are not effects or
products of a charioteer, &c., and are different from the charioteer'
&c., but invariably accompanied by the charioteer &c., the being
invariably accompanied by an object, i. e. the being inferrible from
it, is not astricted to the case of identity with or production by that
object. V.
fk^ftrfa i&tm: \ ?nn
i irsn
( 84 )
Aph. 10. One effect is [a mark of the existence] of another
effect.
1 An effect, colour for instance, is a mark of the existence of
a-riother effect, such as touch. It is implied also that that which is
not an effect, the unity of ether, is a mark of the existence of the
individual unity of ether which is not an effect, and so in the case
of infinite magnitude. U.
1 A.n effect or product of the earth, such as smell, is a mark of
the existence for these words are to be supplied of another effect
such as taste. Co-inhesion in one object is juxtaposition constituted
by in-coexistence. In like manner invariable taste &c. should be
regarded as a mark of the existence of invariable colour &c. Since,
therefore, there is in smell &c., an invariable concomitance with
taste, &c. which is not indifferent from or produced by smell, it is
proved that invariable concomitance is not astricted to the cases of
identity and causality. V.
fat TUWH SRFJ n W ii
Aph. 11. A non-existent contradictory [is a mark] of the
existent.
3 The contradictory mark of co-existence or middle term is ex-
emplified. Rain which has not fallen, is a mark of there having
been no conjunction of air and clouds. In like manner the recita-
1 ERTZJ Tg
*TR - nj*'Z 1 zirW
GJJT
( 85 )
tion of a sacred text is preventive of a tumour &c., and accordingly
there not having existed a tumour &c., is a mark of there having
been a recitation of a sacred text. U.
1 It is exemplified how the contradictory may be employed as a
middle term. The non-existent, or non-adjacent or in other words
non-adjacency of the contradictory is a mark for these words are
to be supplied of the existent, of that which has come into or re-
mains in existence. The illation assumes the following form. This
wood is combustible when conjoined with fire, because gems &c.
(said to have the power of extinguishing fire) do not co-exist, as in
the case of other substances reduced to ashes. This district contains
unintimidated snakes, for though there are snakes there are no
ichneumons, as there are in certain other countries where there are
venomous serpents. V.
II <K U
Cv e\
Aph. 1 2. That which has been [is a mark] of that which has
not been.
* Another contradictory argument is exemplified. A tumour &c.
which has been, is a mark of the recitation of a sacred text which
has not been ; so also conjunction which has existed between wind
and clouds, is a mark that there has not been rain ; there having
been a fire is a mark that there has not been extinction of fire by
means of gems &c. Similar instances may be inferred. CJ.
frT
( 86 )
1 That which has been, that which has come into or remains in
existence, is a mark that there has not been its contradictory ; a mark,
in other words, of the non-adjacency of its opposite. For ex-
amples : This wood is not co-existent with gems &c., for it burns,
This district has no ichneumons, for it has unintimidated snakes ;
and so forth. V.
VTrTW II <U II
c\ c\
Aph. 13. That which has been [is a mark of something
repugnant] which has been.
1 Another mark of concomitance or middle term is exemplifi-
ed. There is sometimes inference from an existing opposite to an
existing opposite, as when on seeing a snake swelling with anger
it is inferred that there is an ichneumon behind a bush. In this
case the snake excited is in existence, and the ichneumon hidden
by the bush is in existence. There is therefore an existent object as
the mark of an existent object. On the other hand, rain cannot exist
at the same time as conjunction of clouds and wind, nor can
tumours &c. co-exist with recitation of sacred .texts. U.
ii 18 n
Aph. 1A [These forms of inference are valid] because the
mark is preceded by knowledge [of invariable concomitance.]
3 Knowledge is recollection of invariable concomitance (vyapti).
The mark of this co-existence is the middle torm. There is there-
ST *5Tvrasi farrfv^T
C\ S3 w\
mm ERTISST *4*ini<4mfafsHT enssrairj *tf
n
i fgsnn^Ng fgrrfvifr
*HW ^^ f?
VTHT
3T
WQWHUT
( 87 )
fore expressed by that member of the syllogism which states the
argument, or by the subsumptiou, a middle term characterised
by invariable concomitance mentally resuscitated Therefore
the argument, as has been stated, has for its antecedent some
general knowledge. In the above instanced inference, then,
of the soul as a governing element from its instruments such as
the organ of hearing, and of the soul as a substratum from
qualities such as knowledge, there is an invariable concomitance ;
but when you attempted to prove, by the mark of its being an
effect of the body, that knowledge is a quality of the body, there
was no invariable concomitance.
It may be asked, What is this invariable concomitance ? It is
not merely a relation of coextension ; for coextensiveness, or incom-
patibility with absence of that which is to be predicated in the
conclusion, is not recognised where only positive conditions of
concomitance are found ; for unsusceptibility of incompatibility with
that which is to be so predicated may be such an exclusively posi-
tive condition of concomitance. Smoke also contains in itself in-
compatibility with various predications in the conclusion. Nor is
it the relation of inseparability, for that is either non-existence
of the mark or middle term in the absence of that which is to be
proved [viz. the major which has to be proved of the minor] ; or
existence of the mark argued from the existence of that which
is to be predicated in the conclusion. And if you say that
a definite relation of condition and conditioned, positive or negative,
may be asserted, between smoke and an ass, because smoke some-
times does not exist where an ass does not exist, and exists where
an ass exists ; we deny it, for such would be the case only if we
found any determinate relation.
wig: SRV sJitflH rU335qnreTT?re*a^: wajr^TT^ HT-
va i r<w i merer*? reT
( 86 )
Nor 'is it the relation of totality or integrity. If you say that
invariable concomitance is the connection of the middle term with
the whole of the major term, such connection does not exist in the
case of smoke &c., where the concomitant objects are not co-exten-
sive [for though fire exists wherever smoke exists, smoke is said not
always to exist where fire exists, not bein-g found in red-hot
iron &c.] Let it be connection of the whole middle term with
the major, but this is impossible for there does not exist in the
whole of the middle term connection with the individuals de-
noted by major [e. g. all fire does not exist in a hearth, in a cattle-
station, a mountain &c., but exists in the whole aggregate of places
where smoke exists, as also elsewhere.] Let it be connection of
the whole major with the whole middle term. This also it cannot
be, for it is impossible that there should be connection between
each extensive part of the middle and each extensive part of the
major. In the case of the concomitant oljects not being co-
extensive the definition that invariable concomitance is connection
by totality would be unduly restricted.
i =mzifci=nwT5r. i ^r fi srwor feRT mitr en %m:
WT^T en vm^arfa sraf^sT^wm SWTOJT?T
?
an ^awsr WT^TT o(T tf
^riT^: risnfti ^waig ioJuftfT: ^ fi
5eta?5tTrJ ^5^^?^ sftj SIJ
^TTrT
fg
Nor is it natural conjunction. For the nature of a thing is
the thing's proper mode of being or its being in itself. If by the
secondary affix be meant its being produced in such and such a
place, our definition will be too narrow to apply to invariable
concomitance constituted by in-coexisteuce. If by the secondary
affix be meant co-inherence in any thing, the definition will be too
narrow to include co-inhesion, for co-inhesion is not co-inherent
with anything else. For conjunction neither inheres in, nor is
produced by, smokiness the character of the middle term.' Nor is it
'connection as a general predicate. The general predicate is
difficult to explain and were it easy, would be difficult to understand.
And were it easy to conceive yet there would be a reciprocal in-
herence or logical see-saw, being based on an induction of what did
not pervade the middle term, though pervading the major. In-
variable concomitance is not merely connection. For since fallacious
connection includes particular place and particular time, knowledge
ef such connection, even were it an invariable concomitance,
would be useless in illation, for we should prescribe only such
invariable concomitance as is the object of cognition causative of
illation.
fs gsH^fenfafSfg^T^^ci^ws: efiswH =nfri
mw^fasrcirnfvireiTOfSf fg
en
^
CI3RTSITCaFTJ?rT?
an
( 90 )
Nor is invariable concomitance in-coexistence of the major
which is absent only when there is absolute non-existence of that
of which the middle is predicated, fire for example being absent
where there is an absolute non-existence of things smoky: for
volcanic fire can but be non-existent in a kitchen hearth though
smoky. For in such an instance as This is conjunct for it is a
substance the definition would be unduly restricted, for otherwise
absence of conjunction would reside in the same objects as the
middle term conjunction. It may be said that invariable con-
comitance is in-coexistence of the predicate of the conclusion absent
where there is absolute non-existence of an appropriate subject
repugnant to such absent predicate, absolute non-existence of
conjunction not being repugnant to such absent predicate. This
we deny, for absolute non-existence of conjunction is repugnant to
such absent predicate, for otherwise it will be useless to imagine
any kind of distinctive attribute, as it is not imagined that there
is any distinctive attribute discriminating between the produced and
the non-eternal.
% I VHt-l WTTlfcren:*!! I rU^fl I WTeJTTtff?mftTHI
sftr 5raTfn?creT*rRrei mranjffi-
?T3-
i um
T i i
( 91 )
Nor is invariable concomitance the not being a subject of in-
compatibility with the predicate, since incompatibility with a
predicate does not exist in an inference from only positive conditions
for such incompatibility means containing that which does not
contain the predicate.
Nor is invariable concomitance the possession of a form deter-
mined by the same connection as something else, as for instance
the fiery is determined by connection with smoke. This is not the
case, for the fiery is more extensive [fire existing where there is no
smoke, as in a heated lump of iron.] Were it the case there
would be observed a wider extension [of the nature of fire] charac-
terised by invariable co-existence [with smoke], there being a wide
extension of the nature of smoke [or vapour] inasmuch as there
exists smoke [or vapour] pendant on the surface of the sky [cf Megha-
duta, v. 5. where it is said that a cloud is a mass of vapour, light,
water, and air.] If a distinction be made for the purpose of exclu-
ding such instances, it must be allowed that that which is charac-
terised by invariable concomitance is allowed to be characterised
by existence of connection, and there is thus only an identical
affirmation.
mm: nur:
T rTrl
^FcT S^ftaH ^TO ^TOOTfa^ngSRSTHSFTm^rH^HH*: I QW HZT
*o c\ c\ ^
: ITZIT
fi HTT i H^ii^rr^T T ug?iT rfz ug?
II
( 92 )
If the statement that- invariable concomitance, consists in
compatibility [or the subject's susceptibility of the predicate] has
been thus shown to be fallacious, we may here proceed to state that
invariable co-existence is a nob accidental connection. By being
not accidental is meant in-coexistence of the predicate failing, that
is, too widely or too narrowly affirmed, only, where the argument
fails. Or, in other words, it is in-coexistence of the predicate
determined by absolnte non-existence dependent on absolute non-
existence of all that which is in-coexistent therewith. The meaning
of the last two expressions is in-coexistence of the predicate, such
in-coexistence being neither more nor less extensive than the argu-
ment. In other words, it is anextensiveness as extensive as the
predicate. If you object that this is difficult to understand
by reason of the relative compound employed, you must look at it
and consider it again.
In other words invariable concomitance is in-coexistence of
the predicate absent where there is absolute non-existence of that
which contains the mark or argument. By absolute non-exis-
tence is meant non-existence of that which has as a common
characteristic a universal entity such as the fiery, &c. It is therefore
no objection to our definition that the smoke of a culinary hearth
is compatible with non-existence of the smoke of a mountain,
for there never arises the conviction that there is not fire in that
which has smoke. Substantiality never has a common substratum
with absolute non-existence of connection, for we have the convic-
tion that there is no substance which is not conjunct. Though
conjunctions singly are not included, the nature of conjunction in
general is so included, and may be predicated universally of sub-
stance.
It may be objected that the being not contingent is absence
of a concomitant and that it is difficult to describe a concomitant.
This we disallow, for an accident [or special condition] is that which
does not invariably exist in the mark of concomitance whereas it
( 93 )
does invariably exist in that which is to be proved. Accordingly
it has been said : A concomitant is accidental in relation to a
mark of co-existence, and not accidental in relation to that which
is to be proved. It may be objected : This definition does not
include an accident which is only not invariably present in that
which is to be proved, as in the instance, Air is perceptible, for
there exists in it perceptible touch, where the having an appreci-
able colour is [a concomitant of that which has to be proved, i. e-
of the perceptibility of air] ; or in the instance, " He is black, for he
is the son of Mitra [a tow caste woman] where the production of
blackness by cooking herbs [might be a special condition of
blacknes?.] For possession of an appreciable colour is not invariably
concomitant with perceptibility, since it does not exist in the percep-
tibility of soul, quality and action ; nor is the being produced by
cooking herbs invariably concomitant with blackness, inasmuch as
it does not exist in a black crow, cuckoo, cloud, fruit of the rose-
apple, &c. This objection will not hold. For it was meant that a
special condition is invariably present in that which is finally deter-
mined as what is to be proved, and not invariably present in the
means of proof. That which is finally determined as that which is
to be proved, has as a condition the universal presence in it of the
conditions which are special. The possession of appreciable colour,
in the first instance is universally present in the perceptible qualified
by external substantiality, and is a positive and negative condition
[of the perceptible ; i. e. it may be asserted that wherever there is
appreciable colour there is perceptibility, and wherever there is not
appreciable colour there is not perceptibility of external substances. ]
In the second instance we may make a similar inference from its
being observed on the authority of the Charaka and the SusVuta
[two medical works] that the fact of being produced by eating
herbs is an attribute universally present in that which is to be
proved, which is determined to be an accidental darkness in men.
It may be said that this is not the meaning of the word coil-
( 94 )
comitant for a concomitant is that of which the attributes appear
in some other object, as a China rose &c. [seen reflected] in crystal
&c. ; as in the universal co-existence of one thing with another, which
other thing does not always co-exist with the first [as in the co-
existence of fire with smoke which is said to be invariable, while
that of smoke with fire is not invariable] the concomitant not being
inseparable, does not appear in the argument. This is true. The
term concomitant is used in its primary meaning only where there
is a mutually implied co-existence, as of fire produced from moist
fuel [for wherever there is such fire there is also smoke, and vice
versa]. In other cases the word is employed in a secondary sense.
The secondary sense expresses that which is casual or accidental,
according to the rule That is accidental in an object which is
accidental to that which is universally present in that object. The
evidence of concomitance is accidental in an accident inseparable
from that which is to be shewn to be concomitant. Hence from the
hypothesis that the evidence of concomitance is accidental to that
which is to be proved, and according to the rule that what is not
included in what is invariably concomitant with an object is not
included in that object, we are led to conclude that there is no
proof of such concomitance, or there results the possibility of a
contrary argument. For if a concomitant inseparable from the
predicate be not in the subject, it is an argument that the predi-
cate is not in the subject. It has accordingly been said : The res-
pondent may bring forward an accident determining another
conclusion, inconsistent with the establishment of the thesis
maintained by the defendant, such accident being equivalent to a
germinal vitiation of the thesis and this may be upheld by
arguments adverse to the absence of erroneous and fallacious argu-
ments in its favour.
It may be said that that is a concomitant by the accidentalness
of which the argument is accidental in relation to that which is
to be proved. But in this definition the third [or instrumental]
case is not employed to express instrument, means, form, or defini-
tion. Nor is the construction to be completed thus, That is an
accident by the accidentalness of which being known the argu-
ment is known to be accidental in relation to that which is to be
proved. For this definition would not apply to obvious cases of
the accidental, not applying to the unknown accidental. A fitting
sense is difficult to discover in these words, since it is impossible to
express an accident without stating that it is casual or accidental.
The being other than the subject, though included in the definition
of an accident, is not the definition of an accident, for it would
involve a contradiction. Where there is an uncertain applicability
to the subject, as in such a case if it be not uncertain it is not the
subject, and since if it be the subject it must be doubtful, there is
certainty of doubtful applicability. That which remains to be said,
may be sought in ihe Mayukha. U.
f
: u w n
Aph. 15. Fallacious arguments are the unobserved, the non-
existent, and the dubious.
1 For the discrimination of past and future marks of co-existence
from fallacious arguments, the author proceeds to commence the
section on fallacies. The unobserved is that which is unaccom-
panied, that with which no universal concomitance has been obser-
ved, and the contradictory is that to which there is a repugnant
universal concomitance. In this term unobserved are included
that of which the inclusion is unestablished, and the contrary. The
non-existent is that which is not in the subject, or that which is
WTTWWT5J llTfl I 'Htrf^S 1 f?T
%m: srarrewgm^srihrahTr SITST.
( 96 )
not an attribute of the subject. This is sometimes due to the
absence of an essential from, and sometimes to the non-existence of
uncertainty and the desire of proving that which is to be proved.
The dubious is that which gives rise to a doubt as to the two
alternatives of the existence or non-existence of the predicate in
the subject of the question. Doubt arises sometimes from obser-
vation of a common attribute, sometimes from observation of a
not common attribute, and sometimes from observation that the
argument is accompanied by the predicate or the non-existence of
the predicate only in respect to such an.d such a particular subject.
The first is general inconclusiveness, the second is particular incon-
clusiveness, and the third is non-existence. U.
u 'is n
Aph. 16. Because this has horns, therefore it is a horse.
1 An example is here given of the fallacies of want of proof
of inclusion, of contrary arguments, and of want of proof respect-
ing the nature of the argument. U.
* Where a hare or the like is the subject, and the being a
horse that which is to be proved, and the notion of having horns
the argument, in such a case there exist all the five fallacies. V.
Aph.. 17. And Because it has horns, therefore it is a cow is
an example of the [fallacy of] pluiality of consequents [or undistri-
buted middle.]
3 Non-distribution is exemplified. Where taking as the subject
a buffalo it is concluded that it is a cow because it has horns, there
zr* Tircn: ng:
( 97 )
is general plurality of consequents [or possibility of more than one
conclusion.] ' Where it is argued that ether is eternal because sound
exists in it, there is particular many-sidedness. So also in such
examples as Sound is non-eternal because it is sound, there being
no condition observed there is particular plurality of consequents.
But when, by employment of argumentation to show that there
exist no contrary instances, it is proved that the predicate is in
the subject, and it is known to exist in parallel, instances there
is a valid middle term ; for the subject has parallel in-
stances. An argument which is not ascertained to belong to the
subject pervaded is the fallacy of the not certainly known or
the unproved. This is of threS kinds, want of proof regarding
the included, want of proof regarding the nature [of the argu-
ment or middle term], and want of proof regarding the subject.
Of these, want of proof regarding inclusion is where no invariable
concomitance has been observed, whether because the concomitance
though real has not been observed, or whether there be no con-
comitance. Hence the divisions of the unproved, such as absence
of favourable probable reasonings. And this same fallacy of absence
of proof may be divided a thousand, ways according to the
diversity of impossibility of predicate, impossibility of subject,
impossibility of both subject and predicate, uncertainty or impos-
sibility of predicate, uncertainty or impossibility of subject, and
uncertainty or impossibility of predicate and subject. In every
one of these cases there must arise absence of proof. Now this
principle, I mean the argument, is of three kinds according to
5gcraferr?T
: S3^;crrfi=r\jr:
smniwerrea 3*nrr sftr
: i srra; arg ?Ts?TTorrT
n^rot am wfofcrTftrv
: f
G
its division into the purely positive, the positive and negative, and
the purely negative. Among these the purely positive is an
attribute existing in all subjects of attributes, such as knowable-
ness, naineableness, subjectibility, predicability, destruction of
anything containing absolute non-existence of eternal substances
and absolute non-existence by cessation of destructible qualities,
&c. For there is no such thing as that in which these properties
do not exist. The purely positive is therefore th;it which exists
everywhere or that which cannot be absolute non-existence.
Though these exist in themselves, that is no objection. It has
been said, Validity of reasoning is recourse to existence, not the
being different or indifferent. That argument, therefore, is purely
positive, that which is to be proved by which is purely positive.
Of this the four forms, existence of the subject, existence of si-
milar instances, absence of contrary instances, and absence of con-
trary but equally susceptive -subjects, lead to conviction. Of an
argument positive and negative, together with non-existence of
contrary instances, there are five forms ; of the purely negative,
together with the exclusion of existence of similar instances,
there are four forms. An apparent argument or fallacy is, there-
fore, that which is void of one or other of the forms which deter-
mine illative assurance ; and similarly fallaciousness is void ness of
one or other of the forms which determine illation. Doubt accom-
panied by assurance of the voidness of one or other of the forms
^rs
mfni
prevents inference, and proves the inconclusiveness of the defendant's
argument. Fallaciousness is not incident upon voidness of one or
other of the two arguments, tbe purely positive and the purely
negative, because of the non-existence of that which leads to the
conviction of there not being contrary instances in the purely
positive, and of there being similar instances in the purely nega-
tive. Absence of proof respecting the subjects, respecting the
nature of the argument, and partial inconclusiveness, are fallacies
by reason of the absence of that form which is existence of the
subject. Absence of proof of inclusion, self-contradiction, and
general plurality of consequents, are fallacies due to the form which
is non-existence of contrary instances. Particular diversity of
result and non-exclusion are fallacies due to the failure of similar
instances. Impossibility [where the predicate does not exist in the
subject], and possibility of a contrary subject, are fallacies due to the
absence of possibility and of impossibility of contrary subjects; In-
like manner accidentalness and inapplicability in an argument'
fail to determine illation, because of the absence of certainty o
55? ST^Fg^gm^Fcf^WsFg^^TnTmTSTRT HT5' Ir^mTH'
FTST
sFe\s
ITH ^ ^fl^T ?T^ ^TVI <nT^nnFg^ncR55TF;rT5F c(T.
igFfT
?Fri
: ii
the non-existence of contrary instances. Absence of favourable,
and unfavourable probable argumentation also fail to determine
illation, because of the absence of certitude as to the non-existence
of contrary instances. In like manner apparent but unreal
examples inadequate in regard to that which is to be proved, or in
regard to the argument, invalid as being fallacious, are so through
the uncertainty of the existence of similar instances. If they are
immediately invalid as being examples in appearance only, yet
are they so mediately through the arguments, on account of the
uncertainty of the existence of similar instances. Arguments
where neither positiveness nor negativeness can be shown, are
concluded by urging the objection that time is insufficient or not
to be obtained. Petitio principii, arguing in a circle, and argu-
ments which involve an infinite regression, though they should
afford conviction of a universal concomitance being deficient of one
or other of the forms or conditions of valid argumentation, i. e. of
existence of similar instances or non-existence of contrary instances,
involve fallaciousness. The fallacy which gives rise to doubt with
respect to the alternatives of the existence or non-existence of
the predicate in the subjects, is that of including too much or too
little in the enunciation of a sumption.. The fallacy which results
in certainty of the non-existence of that which is to be proved
in the subject, is the contradictory. Absence of certain know-
ledge of what are the attributes of a subject of a general
proposition, is the unproved. But in the opinion of Kalyapa the
impossible and the existence of contrary but equally valid subjects,
are not independent fallacies. Of these the impossible is deter-
mined to be included in absence of proof as regards the subject, or
plurality of consequents. Therefore it has been said, An impossi-
ble or too extensive attribute of the subject as an argument, leads
to diverse results. Valid counter-subject also, showing the doubt-
fulness of the universal concomitance he determines to be included
in plurality of consequents. The author of the Vritti asserts that
the particle and in the aphorism, Fallacious arguments are the un-
proved, the non-existent and the dubious, implies the addition of
the impossible, and possibility of a real contradictory subject. He
therefore follows the doctrine of Gautarna: The five merely appa-
rent arguments are that of which the extension is too great or too
small, that which involves a contradiction, that which is identical
with the subject, that which is identical with the major term, and
that the time of which is the past. But the author's own view of
the fallacious appears from such statements as that Ka^yapa declar-
ed the self-contradictory, the unproved, and the doubtful to be no
arguments, and the particle and in reality serves to connect the
aphorism with the preceding aphorisms. Prolixity has been avoided
in this note from fear of needlessly encumbering the treatise. Full
details may be sought in the Mayukha. U.
. Aph. 18. That which is effectuated from the connection of
soul with objects of sense is other [than a fallacious argument.]
1 The result of the distinction drawn between fallacies is now
stated. It is by connection of the soul with objects of sense that
knowledge is produced ; and knowledge, the argument for existence
of the soul, is other than the unproved, the contradictory, and plu-
rality of consequents, i. e. it- is not an argument in appearance only.
Knowledge, then, is in two ways a mark of the existence of the soul ;
either because knowledge must exist in knowing subject, because
it is an effect, like colour, or because it assumes the form of recol-
lection, I who saw am the same as I who am touching. In the for-
i
faf JT WR srafaTlf^ 5RTtTF5TT|crrf33f3FrT STT
ST siwsrra HT sit ^zsmftfa H^ iTRn?? sRWrci ^rrfes
cTH
( 102 )
me* case, that knowledge is an effect is not unproved, knowledge
being designated in the text as that which is produced ; nor is it
contradictory, for there can be no contradiction with regard to
what is universally observed ; and on the same grounds it is not-
many-sided. Knowledge, then, mediately through its nature as be
ing an effect or an attribute, is a mark of the existence of the soul.
Again recollection being .excluded from diverse agents is limited to
a. single agency. U,
Plurality of souls. fl^rlgsg JTtSmw fi
Aph. 19. Activity and inactivity observed in one's own soul
are the mark of the existence of other souls.
1 The inference of the existence of soul being explained, the
mode in which the-existence of other souls is inferred, is now stated.
Activity and inactivity generated by desire and aversion are
modes of volition. By activity and inactivity bodily functions
having for their end attainment of the pleasant and avoidance of
the unpleasant, and characterised by muscular action, are produced.
Therefore when we see muscular action in the body of another, we
infer in the following manner the existence of another soui.
This muscular action is generated by volition, being a muscular
action like our own muscular action ; and this volition is produced
by, or exists in soul, being a volition like our own volitions. U.
3 Though in going and other actions activity only, and not in-
activity, is seen to be the cause, yet muscular action in such forms
i
<srwrn?a
(TOT
cTT
$TTI
( 103 )
as the expulsion of insects with a fly-flapper from places of resort
for the sake of inactivity in regard to injury, is observed. There is,
therefore no want of proof that inactivity is a motive of muscular
action. V.
SECOND DAILY LESSON.
Examination of the
iutarual sensory. ^ f_
Aph. 1. Existence and non-existence of knowledge on contact
of the soul with the objects of sense, are the mark of the existence
of an internal organ.
1 Distinction of real and fallacious arguments is the object of
the preceding daily lesson. In order now to bring the investigation
of soul to a conclusion, by a breach of the order of enunciation (i. e.
of the order in which the substances were enumerated), an exami-
nation of the internal organ is instituted. It \vill be shown that
movement of this organ is the mark of the existence of the soul.
If the interior sensory be examined as being an instrument of
ft ^TrWrT ^S W=rrTfr?3^ aiJT5T|j5T?T I
ufw^r ^f^mgf^^ iri^w wrst 3^13: w^rfg^cs ITT-
?fr? ^
HTti ?f
T sfu eRTnTwr^^ ^fn irg 3ffiTrTTrciTrr
cognition, and as having form, then soul is proved to exist as that
by which the internal organ is actuated when it is brought into
connection with an organ of sense apprehensive of its proper ob-
ject in consequence of the other organ. This is the reason of the
breach of the order of enumeration. That is the internal organ
which being in connection with an organ of sense, when there is
contact of the soul and an object of sense, knowledge exists or
comes into being, and which not being in connection with an organ
of sense knowledge does not exist, or does not come into being. It
may be argued that though the internal organ were an all-pervad-
ing substance, all cognition would not necessarily be simultaneous,
because of its property as an instrument ; further, that the inter-
nal organ is an all-pervading substance, because, like time, it is a
substance void of any peculiar attribute ; because, like soul, it is
the site of conjunction with the non-coinhesive cause of knowledge ;
because, like ether, it possesses absolute negation of sound ; and so
forth. If this argument to prove that it is an all- pervading sub-
stance be adduced, we reply that were the internal sensory an
all-pervading substance, then as it would be in contact with all
sensual organs, cognition would be one only and composed of all
sensation. If it be replied that such is not the case because there
is a contrariety among the effects, we deny this, for the instrument
is not concerned with contrariety or non-contrariety, so that one
should be apprehensive of a contrariety between visibility and
sapidity and the rest, or that there should be a variegated form, as
there is a variegated colour. If you object that there is a plurali-
ty of simultaneous sensations in the case of eating a long ear of
corn [which is at once seen and tasted], we deny this, for in that
case also distraction is observed. If you ask how it is that you are
conscious of synchronous perception of colour, taste, smell, and
touch, we reply that neither is this the case, for this is merely a
sense of simultaneity in five cognitions represented in memory an!
produced successively by the rapidly shifting internal organ. If
be urged that the distraction depends on the property of the in-
( 105 )
strument, we deny this, for the answer has been already stated. If
it be maintained that the distraction depends on the desire of know-
ing, we deny this, for on that supposition it would follow that when
there was a desire to know all there would be a total presentation
of all objects, whereas the only result of a desire to know is con-
nection of the internal organ with the sense organ percipient of
its proper object. Inasmuch, therefore, as non-simultaneity of cog-
nition would be otherwise impossible, the internal organ is proved
to possess atomic dimension. U.
3TSRT
Aph. 2. Its substantiality and eternity are explained by air.
1 It may be urged that the internal organ which is proved to
exist by the inference that a sense of pleasure &c. is effected by an
instrument because it is an action, like the sense of colour &c., or
because simultaneous cognition is impossible, is proved to exist as
an instrument : whence, then, its substantiality and eternity ? It
is therefore stated that, as an aerial atom inferred to exist by reason
of the compound substance air, is a substance because it posses-
ses qualities and actions, so the internal sensory inferred from im-
possibility of simultaneous cognitions is a substance because it pos-
sesses qualities. For without conjunction with the organs of sense
it would not be productive of cognition, so that there would be no
possession of qualities. Moreover presentation of pleasure &c. must
have a sensitive organ as its instrument, because, like the presenta-
tion of colour &c., it is a presentation. Therefore the internal sen-
faWTfclTrT
am
nuj 3^13
f%
( JOG )
sory is proved to exist as an organ. The nature of an organ is to
be a site of conjunction of the internal sensory with the cause of a
cognition. It is therefore established without any difficulty that
the internal organ is a substance. Its eternity is proved by its
having no substratum ; and that it lias no substratum follows from
the absence of any warrant in imagining portions constituent of
it. U.
1 As there is in an aerial atom substantiality, inasmuch as it
possesses originative conjunction and other attributes; and eternity,
inasmuch as there is no warrant for assuming that it has con-
stituent parts ; so the substantiality and eternity of the internal
organ follow from its possession of conjunction productive of cogni-
tion, and its possession of other attributes, and from absence of
proof of its production and destruction. V.
n 3 u
Aph. 3. Because of non-simultaneity of volitions, and non-
simultaneity of cognitions it is one [in each body.]
1 A decision is stated with reference to the doubt whether
internal organ be one in individual bodies or more than one. The
words internal organs and in each body are to be supplied. If
there were in each single body many internal organs or common
sensories there would be simultaneity of cognitions and volitions.
The opinion that many volitions are simultaneously exerted, since
we see simultaneous action in the arms, legs, fingers and toes of a
dancer, is erroneous, for this arises merely from the rapid transition
of the internal organ. U.
* HrJ ?5R UTHSRtmSRJrafi gfa
ira: BsH^forafa SKI* srgfa wiife
1
1 The unity of the internal organ in individual bodies is es-
tablished. When there is conjunction between the mind and any
member of the body, a volition is exerted in restriction to that mem-
ber, and not in restriction to other members. It must not, there-
fore, be said that there being a plurality of internal sensories two
volitions may be simultaneously exerted, because conjunction be-
tween the mind and each of two members at the same time is pos-
sible ; and that as determined by the ten fingers and ten toes twen-
ty acts of volition are produced at the same time [for otherwise how
would the corresponding actions be produced ?] ; for the feeling of
simultaneity in those actions, as of that in the scattering of the
hundred petals of a lotus, is illusory inasmuch as they are produced
in successive moments merely by the rapid transition of the inter-
nal sensory. So, if the internal organ were manifold, then since
each internal organ might be in conjunction with synchronous sen-
sations of smell, taste &c. simultaneous production of cognitions
derived from the organs of smell, taste, &c. would be possible. The
internal sensory therefore, is in each individual body one only and
not manifold. If it be objected that the internal organ must neces-
sarily be manifol4 since \ve observe action in the two parts of a
scorpion and the like when cut in two, we reply that this is not the
: swim
FT31
fsisrFrr:
( 108 )
case, for such action is possible through the mere accession of a new
internal organ by the influence of requitative efficacy ; and because
a plurality of internal organs cannot be allowed, as is evidenced by
the non-simultaneity of volition, and non-simultaneity of cognitions.
Some have held that simultaneity and non-simultaneity of volitions
to cognitions are the result of the contraction and expansion of the
inner organ after the manner of a tortoise and an elephant's trunk.
This is not.satisfactory, for the hypothesis of endless particles, of
their previous and subsequent non-existences, and of their endless
atoms is too operose. V.
Existence of soul
proved - TT: w:ter<rcRsn*g gi?*RT fa ift n 8 u
Aph. 4. The ascending and descending vital airs, the opening
and closing of the eyes, life, motions of the internal organ, affec-
tions of the other organs of sense, pleasure and pain, desire and
aversion, and volition, are marks of the existence of soul.
1 The completion of the remainder of the inquiry into the soul
is commenced ; showing the purpose of the transgression -of the
order in which the substances were enumerated. It is not to be
supposed that consciousness or knowledge alone is the mark of tha
existence of the soul. The ascending vital air and the rest also are
marks of the existence of the soul. For that is soul in consequence
of the volition of which the upward and downward motions in the
Wcl 5Rc[5WTrFRT faf faffl =T W^rTSE! UTHITSST sftT H^rT STTfJFRT ?5Tf ifa
^c
f?
err <TOnw5Tw HWI gir ^s^ m vv&* crrgfrtrviT err
ira nnnTnT^T^iTOTiTf?t ?f?r ^ rT^T^f ^inniticnwTg sfcr
: IWW
( 109 )
air moving within the body, and known as the upward and down-
ward vital air, take place, not being produced otherwise than by
volition, just as the throwing upwards and downwards of a pestle
&c. in a mortar &c., is not produced without volition. For the
nature of this air which is to move horizontally could not be thus
( no )
changed except by volition. Nor can it be objected that two airs
with differently directed motion may, like two pieces of confluent
water, have an upward motion. Were this the case there would be
an upward but not a downward motion, or in exsufflations and the
like there would be horizontal motion. There is then a being, who,
by his volition, impels the vital air upwards or downwards. It is
no valid objection to ask how there could be upward and downward
motions of the vital air in a condition of dreamless sleep ; for at
that time though volition proper does not exist, there exists another
kind of volition, which is called automatic conation. In like man-
ner the opening and closing of the eyes causes us to infer a ruler
of the body, for closing the eyes is an action productive of conjunc-
tion of the eyelids, and the opening of the eyes is an action pro-
ductive of disjunction of the eyelids. These two actions being
constantly manifested without any visible cause such as motive
force, are not produced otherwise than by conation. As the dan-
cing of a doll depends upon the volition of a subject willing, so also
does the movement of the eyelids. Therefore a being who exerts
volition is inferred. Similarly vitality is a mark of the existence
of the soul, for by the word life the effects of vitality such as growth,
reparation of muscular lesion &c., are indicated by implication.
For as the owner of a house builds up the broken edifice or enlarges
a building which is too small, so the ruler of the body effects by
food &c., the increase or enlargement of the body which is to him
in the stead of a habitation, and with medicine and the like causes
what is wounded to grow again, and partially dissevered hands or
feet to re-coalesce. Thus like the master of a house is proved a
guardian of the body. In a like manner the motions of the inter-
nal sensory are also a mark of the existence of the soul. For it
has been shown in the foregoing section that the internal organ is
possessed of form and of indivisibility. Its appliance to an instru-
ment of sense cognisant of its proper object, depends on desire and
effort. The desire and effort which actuate the internal or^an are
( 111 )
inferred to be identical with the soul. This may be exemplified by
a child standing in a corner of a room, who throws a ball or a hand-
ful of red powder about the room. It may be objected that the dancer
of the doll, the master of the house, and the child are not other
than body that they should be examples, and that it is in the body
that consciousness resides, inasmuch as the body is an object of self-
consciousness the conviction of being pale, stout and the like is pro-
duced by the juxta-position of the body with self-consciousness
Moreover, (it may be urged), that which was experienced in child-
hood is remembered in youth or in old age, whereas in the case of
separate bodies as those of Chaitra and Maitra there would be no
act of memory, as it is said, One man remembers not that which
another saw. In the latter case there will be no recollection, be-
cause Chaitra and Maitra are the offspring of different parents;
but though childhood and youth be different, the act of recollection
will take place in the order of cause and effect, because there is
but one individual. To this we reply that it would follow on the
same premisses, that the son would remember what was experienced
by the father. If it be rejoined that perception of difference of
body prevents this, we reply that an old man, by having a body
different from that which he had as a child, through perception of
his body would be incapable of remembering what he experienced
as a child. A child that never knew his father has no perception
of difference of body. The notion my body as generally in the
case of the word my belongs to the self-consciousness. If you re-
ply that so also does the notion my soul, we reply that such is not
the case, for the word my is usual tropically, since the genitive may
be used where no numerical difference is implied as in the case of
Rahu's head [where Rahu and Rahu's head are one and the same
thing]. Moreover on your supposition there would result the loss
of merits and requital unmerited, for the body is constantly dif-
ferent in the transmigratory state ; but it is admitted that the
harm done by a conscious subject, cannot have its the result unful-
( H2 )
filled. It is also inferred from affections of the other organs that
, there is a soul,- for after experiencing the particular taste which ac-
companies the particular colour of an orange or chira-villa fruit,
on again observing such fruit, there arises in one desirous of tasting
it a watering in the mouth. This can only take place by an infer-
ence respecting the acid flavour, the inference only by recalling
the invariable coexistence of the colour and taste, the revocation
only by a permanent impression, the permanent impression only
by experience of the universal co-existence, and experience only
by seeing it repeatedly ; and this series of cognitions, in the order
of cause and effect is impossible unless there be one and the same
agent in all. Accordingly the aphorism of Gautama, From the
affection of other organs of sense. Pleasure and the like are also
to be regarded, like knowledge, as arguments of the existence of
the soul. For pleasure and the like must inhere in something, that
is, reside in some substratum, being products or qualities like colour
&c. Hence a general inference accompanied by a residual inference
takes for its object inherence in a substance other than eight sub-
stances. For the proposition that desire, which does not inhere in
earth and seven other substances, inheres in a substance, is incom-
plete unless it assumes as its object inhesion in a substance other
than those eight substances. But if the residual method be not
first employed, inhesion in a substance other than eight substances
will have to be argued by negative probation and thus the division
will be made. It is absurd to say that inference has for its form
only that which is essential to universal co-existence, for that is the
form of conviction without which the conviction is incomplete.
Otherwise there could be no inference having for its object inhesion
in what is uncaused, such as that a binary atomic aggregate which
does not inhere in anything caused or produced, inheres in some-
thing, because it is composite. U.
gro??T aiTWH n u u
Aph. 5. Its substantiality and eternity are explained by air.
( 113 )
1 It may be said, Granted that the soul is perdurable, why is it
eternal, and why a substance ? It is therefore stated, that as there is
no warrant for assuming that an aerial atom has parts, and therefore
it is eternal, so also is soul eternal ; and that as an aerial atom is
a substance because it possesses attributes, so also is soul a sub-
stance. U.
Objections to the
preceding arguments. fg^jR || l|
A ph. 6. In the contact [of the organs of sense and the
object] from which the judgment This is Yajna-datta is derived,
there being no perception, there exists no visible mark.
2 There being contact, if in the judgment This is Yajna-datta
there is no act of perception, there is no visible mark, no mark by
which a universal co-existence is ascertained from perception.
There is no visible mark establishing the existence of soul, as
there is a visible mark in the case of fire, viz. smoke observed
concomitant with fire perceived. U.
3 Though there be contact of the eye and other organs with
the body of Yajna-datta, yet, since there is no visual or other per-
ception of the soul which presides over that body, there is no visible
mark, i. e. no mark which being invariably attended by predicate,
is aa object of perception. How, then, is an inference of the exis-
tence of the soul possible ? For, there being contact with fire &c.,
*Tr*n ferr. srri faca ^f?r aw:
ujTTnurm fairer frai
: u
*f?T -vv iresTT ?f?r iff npag Tifer
usrr g%^i Urugin H^RHT TI&W vim afn
wig: u
H
( ru )
-after the perception of it, an inference as to fire &c.' meets with nc
obstacle because universal concomitance therewith has been
observed ; but' this is net the case with the present inference. V.
n s
'A ph. 7. Moreover, from that which is observed generally
'there results no distinction.
1 Though thei-e is a generally observed mark, yet there is no
proof therefrom of the existence of the soul, from its nature as soul,
or as a substance over and above ight substances. It would be
thereby established only that desires &c. must inhere in something,
but there is nothing to suggest the thought of a soul. Therefore
it is stated that theue results no distinction. U.
2 From that which is generally observed, L e. from observation
of inclusion under something determined by a general attribute,
there results no distinction, i. e. no inference from a peculiar pro-
perty, according to the rule that there must l?e observed in that
-which determines the character of the subject determination by the
predicate under which the middle term is contained. V.
: n e u
A ph. 8. Therefore the soul is proved to exist by revelation.
3 The existence of the soul &c. rests on revelation, for, inas-
much as there 4s no mark of an observed universal concomitance
any inference of the existence of the soul is impossible. The exis-
6UrtH
II
3 ^Tnfjrfa?
: n
tence, then,, of the soul rests solely ou the authority of revelation
Thus this system for cogitation on the soul is useless. V.
Aph. 9. Existence of the soul being the conditio sine qud
non of the use of the word I, is not evidenced only by revelation.
2 Revelation is not the sole evidence of the existence of the
soul ; but that there is a soul is evinced also by the inference that
the word I ; or the word soul must denote some object, because it is
a term, like the terms water-pot &c. It might be said, Let
earth &c. be the objects which it denotes. Hence the words because
it is the conditio sine qua non of the use of the word, I, that is,
because the term I is excluded from earth &c. For there never
arises any such supposition or assurance as I am earth, I am
water, I am light, I am air, I am ether, I am time, I am
space, I am mind. If you object that such assurance arises in
relation to the body, we reply that it is . not so, for it would be
equally applicable to the bodies of others; if, that it arises with
m
: ^ arg: srewrarrany srg E.?*:
3T irrft McIfilffT ^U^mlT fTf^^fTH ^mtT HefrTtfrT
irafcrarara^
: =r r? ^jT^WTm gr
wa: i
sufwFri
if'? 51 gntfafWrcTWH ?rHig3FqW^ II
respect to one's own body we reply that this is not so, for there is not
intended a self different from soul, and because the term my body
involves a difference of substrata. If you urge that this also is
merely observed generally, and therefore, not being determined by
a peculiar attribute, involves a fallacy ; we reply that it is not so,
for in the term I egoity or spirituality is the form or essence; and
.hat as an attribute of the subject it is determined that the ego
is the cause of activity, and this is not common to other objects,
being a proof of a particular object. In like manner there is proof
of the particular even from the generally observed, accompanied
with the argument from impossibility. Whereas it is said, From
merely hearing results presentation of soul what need of this
proof? this is wrong; for without reflection the dross of un-
belief in wavering minds cannot be purged away ; without this
purification there can be no aptitude for profound meditation
on this object ; and without profound meditation there can be no
presentation of truth competent to eradicate false knowledge to-
gether with its impressions. For it is by consuetude only that the
sad lover can represent in imagination his beloved. For knowledge
from verbal information or from inference is unable to uproot false
knowledge,' as in seen in the case of illusion in regard to direction
in space, and similar instances, If it be asked, how whereas soul
is invisible, a sign of its existence can be apprehended, we rejoin :
Who has maintained that the soul is unknowable by perception?
But soul is cognised by its j uxta-position with conjunctions with
the internal organ : else how such assurances as I am happy, I know,
I desire, I will, I am in pain ? since such assurance is not
without object or of doubtful object, for like an assurance of blue-
ness &c. it has a definite object. Nor is it derived from argu-
ment, for it arises without any knowledge of an argument. Nor is
it derived from verbal communication, for it does not follow upon
desire of such knowledge. If it be maintained that it is a mere
illusory perception, we reply that there must be some object not
( 117 )
merely apparent, for it will be shown in the sequel that that which
is not an object of certain knowledge cannot be erroneously
surmised in another object. U.
II 1 II
Aph. 10. If the cognition I am Devadatta, I am Yajnadatta
is a visual presentation [what need of any inference ?]
1 An opponent says, If this be so, what need of an inference ?
The word iti marks the form of the cognition, and the word drishta
ends in the affix Ida used iti a passive sense. Presentation means
perception. The sense, therefore, is as follows. If the perception
which has for its form I am Devadatta, I am Yajnadatta, is only a
perception, what occasion is there for the trouble of making an
inference ? For on seeing an elephant, those who infer do not infer
him to be one from. his screamin. U. ,
faff S5R US f SfcTTrl UWgr^H HtSS: II <W II
Aph. 11. If a mark of the existence of the soul were seen,
there could be but one assurance, for it would be as evident as a
percept.
2 The anticipated objection is refuted. The sense as a whole
is that if a mark of the soul's existence were observed or apprehend.
WTE I ^rT ST53T
2 *HTST|;T
sfti
( H8 )
ed by the internal organ, even were there an inferencp, there
would be one and one only primary conviction, as in relation to
a percept in the case of perception. Whence its primary nature ?
The being a primary conviction or being of recognised validity,
results from its certitude or power of removing doubts of invalidity.
As, for instance, when the distant water of a lake &c. has been seen,
there arises a doubt as to the objective value of such a perception,
there being a feeling of uncertainty whether it may not be a
mirage or the like ; and when afterwards there arises the inference
from cranes, &c. the mark of its being a lake, the doubt ceases on
the recognition of the evidence by means of reflection; so, although
the soul is perceived, a doubt arises as to the validity of the per-
ception, on account of counter probabilties &c., but afterwards, the
jsoul being inferentially cognised, the certitude of such cognition, is
easily demonstrated, such certitude consisting of competency to re-
move suspicion of invalidity through the recognition in that case of
validity by means of argumentation. It has accordingly been
declared by the sage : The logicians desire to understand by infer-
ence even that which is fully established by perception. V.
u q^ u
Aph. 12. The cognition Deva-datta goes, Yajna-datta goes,
is applied tropically to the body.
1 It may be objected that if the cognition I Yajna-datta refers
to the soul, a judgment of compatibility with motion, such as
Yaj oa-datta goes is impossible. It is therefore stated that there
are such judgments as I am fair-complexioned, I am stout, and
there are such complex concepts as my body. Of these in the
5-gfnfrT
traim qzrro sst
judgment Devadatta goes, the conception and enouncement of"
compatibility with movement is secondary, wheivns tlie expression
mine is used in its primary application. Although the nature of
Deva-datta is a universal existing in the body, and accordingly the
expression Deva-datta moves is correct even, in its primary sense,
as also the judgment ; if the term Deva-datta be employed with
regard to the soul determined thereby, it is then to be understood
in a secondary application U.
1 It may be asked how, if such a notion as I Yajna-datta has
the soul for its object the judgment Yajua-datta goes can apply to
the soul, for the soul has not the power of motion. It is therefore
stated that the sense conveyed by the proposition Deva-datta goes,
arises from the observation that the word Deva-datta implies cor-
poreality. Since such propositions as Deva-datta knows, wishes,
acts, hates &c., are used in their primary sense, the term Deva-datta
must have the power of denoting a soul appropriated to a deter-
minate body. For, as in the meaning of these propositions there
is a manifold application the- complication of this hypothesis is
inoperative i. e. does not invalidate it-; and it ntay be considered
that the primary sense possibly belongs to such application to the
pression of "volition in the proposition He goes. V.
n 9-3
t
Aph. 13. The secondary application, however, is doubted.
z The word however indicates the view of an opponent. Tire
name and notion of the Ego are known to relate both to the soul
?T5T
TT^rTtfcT
: I
?fr? n^: it
( 120 )
and the body. The doubt in this case is which is the primary and
which the secondary application. U.
: II 18 II
Aph. 1 4. The cognition of the Ego is a perception of a dis-
tinctive entity, since it applies to self-reflective soul, and not to
aught else.
1 A presentation in which a distinctive entity of the nature
of soul is given, is a perception of a distinctive entity. The
meaning is as follows. Since the presentation of the Ego is rela-
tive to one's own soul, and not to another's, it is proper to regard
the reference to the distinctive entity, i. e. to one's own soul, as
primary. If, on the, other hand,, the primary reference were to
the body, the notion would be produced by the external organs
of sense, for the body is not an object of internal perception,
and the presentation of the Ego is subjective being produced
without any operation of the external organs of sense. Such
cognitions as I am sorry, I am glad, 1 know, I will, I wish,
arise from the internal sensory viewing as its object the soul
accompanied with its perceptible discriminative attributes.
Such a cognition is not inferential, being produced without
TTrUT
nr*
. nfe H sitf* great SJT?T
MTsr: i faR5g qfe irtft WT irnr-
5o|
seeking any mark ofconeomitan.ee. It is not verbally communica-
ted, being produced without reflection on words. It, therefore,
belongs to the internal organ, and to the internal organ independent
of the external organs, not being concerned with the body, &c.
Moreover if it be urged that if it referred to the body it would refer
to the bodies of others, and if it be referred to one's own soul it
would refer to the souls of others ; we deny this, for the soul of one
man is beyond the senses of another, since its particular attributes
cannot be externally perceived, and the soul itself could be perceiv-
ed only by apprehension of particular attributes appropriate to the
several senses. Nor is this the nature of soul only, but of all
substances, for substance becomes perceptible by apprehension of
particular attributes appropriate to the several senses. If you rejoin
that on this ground ether also should be perceptible by the apprehen-
sion of sound, we reply that such would be the case were the organ
of hearing capable of apprehending a substance, or if ether possessed
colour. If you object that the soul is equally devoid of colour, we
reply that it is in the case of external substances only that posses \
sion of colour is a requisite with regard to perceptibility. U.
1 The cognition of the Ego and the expressions I Yajoa-datta
am happy &c., are the cognitions of a distinctive object, the per-
ception or presentation of an ulterior object, of one different from
the body &c., since they produce verbal information the object of
which is different from the body. Such is the sense resulting frorn
the aphorism. The application, accordingly, to the soul as to
something ulterior to the body is primary, that to the body is
secondary. Why so ? The answer is because of existence, viz., the
existence of pleasure, &c. in one's own soul, and because of non-
3rT3T?:
wgRj vr*m fri
rTZIT
WTclTrT TrJ ^13: Sr<3TrI HT^T sp* MTcITrT
rTOT ^ wfTUamRITfW^
StftffT
)
existence, viz., the non-existence of pleasure, &c., else where, i. e.-
in the body. There i& not therefore so much as the shade of a doubt
that of the diverse applications, since pleasure and the like exists
in the soul only, the application to the soul is primary, and that.
to the body, &c., secondary. V.
i^fir: n <*a ir
Qf|
A-ph. 15. From, the secondary application, through self-
eonsciousness, of the expression Deva-datta, goes, it follows that
self-consciousness is presentative of the- body.
1 Again a doubt is raised, Self-consciousness, is the con*
sciousness of the Ego, This- is presentative of the body, and that
is presentative of the body, wherein the object of perception is the
body. You have concluded that the proposition or judgment
Deva-datta goes is enounced in a secondary, application : but this se-
condary application is really relative to the soul for the judgments
and propositions I am fair-complexioned, I am stout, I am thin,
I am fortunate, and the notion of repeated births cannot be of
secondary application. U.
sfefOTRW: II 9S u
\
Aph. 16. The secondary application however, is doubted.
2 This word however, indicates the real fact. This secondary
T:R: THH i *^TTT srnirfo irera: H w Tjfotiratn <jrfrt
I 3[cJ3^T TT^(Tt<^'^3TTTfT fTTorcf U^TH: tfram
ZIHT fg mr. wi: &w. irvnfnT st
_ ^
fn i^ H^nag^3^fi5TTTcr ?nf
( 123 )
application may be relative to the soul, but whereas it has been
said that this conception of the Ego refer to the body, there is a
doubt ou this subject. Since, therefore, the notion is on both
sides a false witness, we must endeavour to find some special
principle of determination. Since on -making this endeavour we
are conscious of the presentation of the Ego even when the eyes
are closed, we must hold that it refers to an object different from the
body, and not to an object of the external organs of sense. If it
related to the body, it would refer to the bodies of others also,
and would not be independent of the body. If it be asked how we
should then justify the verbal collocation I who am stout (or thin)
am happy, we reply that in this case the body may be cognised as
accidentally associated with pleasure, as in the words This forest
is resonant with the roar of a lion. The notion of the Ego being
in juxta-position with the internal organ is affirmed in a secondary
sense of the body, just as the heat presented by the organ of touch
in the judgments The water is hot, The body is hot. U.
* The secondary application is doubted. It is doubted whether
the secondary application be in Yajua-datta goes, or in I Yajna-
datta am happy, and because, there being no criterion of the
diverse application to the body and the soul, it is impossible to
adopt either alternative as final. The word however is intended to
point out a fixed principle. V.
ro u HS u
Aph. 17. But the knowledge of Yajna-datta and Vishnu-
mitra does not, in consequence of the difference of their bodies,
become an object.
( 124 )
1 The word knowledge tacitly indicates the attributes of soul,
sensible pleasure, pain and the like. As the bodies of Yajua-datta
and Vishnu-mitra are separate from one another, so are their know-
ledge, pleasure and the like separate. Accordingly as the cogni-
tion This is Yaj oa-datta's body, is an object, so though no know-
ledge, pleasure &c. be produced in Yajna-datta, the cognitions I
feel pleasure, I know, I will, I wish, will be objects ; because,
the body being an object to the appropriate senses, its knowledge
&c., like its colour &c., may be perceptible. But this is impossible.
Therefore there is, such is the meaning, to be maintained a subject
of knowledge, pleasure and the like, other than the body. U.
2 The knowledge of Yajna-datta and Vishnu-mitra does not in
consequence of the difference of their bodies, in consequence, that is,
of their bodies being different objects, become an object, during the
perception of the body. The word knowledge implies generally
all the particular sensible attributes of the soul. Therefore, as in
our presentation of soul &c., knowledge &c. is the object, it being
universally allowed that there are such cognitions as I know, I
wish, I will, I feel pleasure. I am in pain, I hate &c. ; so
would there be in like manner, were the body denoted by the word
I, and did it possess the attributes knowledge &c., a cognition of
knowledge &c. even in the visual perception of body. But no one
HOT
sittt uTsnfw^ HOT TfT^pnfeRTrfa firmer HOT g HOT
?IOT H^T^I TTM StsHST 3T S-TrCri St f <sft 51T^ HH
HclfcT nnnmt^fcmqeKriR rTStU^infcrgTl
I ^ HWcrffT rTOTTfT frT^t^TeTtaT SlftTre^ ^clTWr ^TfioJt ?rT WTcT. H
* * H T fi srifafgirtffij sifkfgiNFawasRfciTrT HTr^rifgwfFr^T^T^iTftr
ra^UiniI5T?TT^mnT ROT
W^fcT ^
fg
( 125 )
has a visual preservative cognition in the form, I, the stout
Yajna-datta, know. Therefore the use of the words I &c. in re-
ference to the body is only by a secondary application, and accord-
ingly we do not surrender the matter of our thesis. V.
: u 9 n
Aph. 18. The knowledge of th3 Ego, being individually
established, like sound as a conditio sine qua non neither too
narrowly nor too widely affirmed, by its predominant and sensible
attributes, does not depend upon revelation.
1 The following objection might be raised. The soul is not an
object of perception, since, like ether, it is a colourless, or a simple
substance. Of the cognition I am thin, or pale, the body must
be affirmed to be the object. Whereas there is sometimes the
judgment I feel pleasure &c., it is proper to suppose that plea-
sure and the like, becoming manifest without their substratum, are
HWRTTJ
fi
ITrJTfa THTTT& FITrT f
3
gr|f^
( 126 )
attributed by metaphor to the body : as in the notion Hot, fra-
grant water, heat and fragrance appearing without a substratum,
are metaphorically attributed to water. But in this case, there
being such attribution, in the notion of water there is not another
object independent of common water. In the case, therefore, of
the Ego, the notion I is real only in reference to the body, but
pleasure and the like are sometimes metaphorically attributed to
the body. There is, then, with reference to soul, no knowledge of it
in the form of perception. That then which we must assume as the
substratum of pleasure and the like, must be established by revela-
tion. There is no means of directly cognising it. The reply to this
objection is the following. The cognition 1 feel pleasure, I am in
pain, is not by revelation, by verbal communication, or by inference,
for it arises independently of any attention to words or arguments.
Whereas it has been said that colourlessness, and simplicity are pre-
ventive of perception, this holds true only in the case of perception
by the external organs, for of this the possession of colour, and the
existence of a plurality of substances are the necessary conditions.
Internal perception is independent of these conditions. It may be
objected that this would be. the case were there any proof of the
existence of the soul, but there is none. Accordingly the words
Being individually established, like sound, as a conditio sine qua
non, neither too narrowly nor too widely affirmed. As sound, as a
conditio sine qud non, is not unduly restricted or extended, so as
to apply to the substances, earth &c., and is decisive, and there is
thereby proof of a particular substance, viz. ether, as excluded
from other eight substances, as the substratum of sound ; in like
manner, since the exclusive argument from desire does not fail by
applicability to earth &c., the substratum of desire must be exclud-
ed from other eight substances. Lest it be argued that all this
shows that the soul is an object of inference, not an object of
perception, the words The knowledge of the Ego from its predo-
minant and sensible attributes are employed. By tho particle iti
( 127 )
die form of the cognition is stated. The knowledge of the Ego
1/herefore, which arises, independently of any attention to words
or arguments, in one whose eyes are closed, must be produced by
an original attribute of egoity, sensible or established by proof ;
bat is not produced by the body, inasmuch as the exclusive argu-
ment from desire does not fail by applicability to it. After the
v/ords From its predominant and sensible attributes, the words
To be established, are to be supplied. Many proofs of the exis-
tence of soul, omitted for fear of encumbering this treatise, should
bo sought in the Mayukha. IT.
1 The Vedantins maintain that soul is nothing but eternal
knowledge, according to the sacred text, This imperishable soul
is true knowledge, the in finite supreme spirit, and that in the course
of things, being divided by the products of illusion, the acci-
dents of the form of the internal organ, it appears manifold, ac-
cording to such texts as, One only without a second, One more-
over, the inmost soul of all beings, became the counterpart of every
5rf slifl <?frf Vft: *T ^ gJrTJTrOT niJT ifa
cT trfrWlfrr SaFWSTfjJrTtzm <????
5W5T ^raTfTSTHftranrT'SrrT W&1 I
sfu
m3T
( 128 )
form. This doctrine is here refuted. After The knowledge of the
Ego, the words Is the object of perception, are to he supplied. The
object, therefore, of such common internal perceptions as I am hap-
py, is not proved by revelation, and inseparable from God who is
declared in such texts as, True knowledge, the infinite supreme
spirit. The reason of this is stated in the words From its predo-
minant and sensible attributes &c. : because of the proof of parti"
culanty, i. e. because of the proof of separateness from God, by
that which is predominant and sensible, i. e. by pleasure and pain.
Pleasure is among objects of desire predominant, because it is the ob-
ject of desire not dependent on other desires; and pain is predomi-
nant among objects of aversion, because it is the object of aversion
not dependent on other aversions. Appropriateness is the being an
object of perception. This is mentioned to remove doubt as to
absence of proof of the argument, and to prevent a fallacious ap-
plication in case of the assumption of eternal bliss in reference to
God : for eternal bliss is not appropriate, and consequently gene-
rated pleasure and pain is the proof of the difference between the
individual soul and God. This generated pleasure and pain implies
something more, and generated knowledge, desire, volition, and aver-
sion are to be regarded as proofs of the separateness of the indivi-
dual soul and God. It may be urged that in such arguments as The
soul, the object of the perception of the Ego is different from God,
because it possesses generated pleasure &c, there being no example
and consequently no observation of congruity of similar instances
with the universal affirmation, the knowledge of a universal conco-
mitance is impossible. Hence the words As a conditio sine qua
non neither too narrowly nor too widely affirmed, that is because of
the universality of the exclusion. The conditions necessary to the
proof may be universally affirmed in the proof of the particular.
Though, therefore, there be no example of the universal affirmation,
since by exclusion God may be the example, an inference with res-
pect to the matter in hand is possible, through observation of a um-
. ( 129 )
versal exclusion, dependent on observation of concomitance wfth
exclusion. To remove the doubt that the proof by a universally
exclusive argument of the separateness from God is not applicable,
the words Like sound, are- added, meaning As is the case with sound
and the like. As ether is proved to exist by its mark, viz. sound,
which is known by means of the form of universal exclusion ; so
the proof of the separateness of the individual soul from God, is
from the possession by the soul of generated pleasure, &c. V.
Alleged unity of soul. ^^^^gR^nWfqg'JTRrrWSr II H< H
S s* V
Aph. 19. Because of the indifference of the origin of pleasure,
pain, and knowledge, soul is one.
1 The section treating of the investigation of soul being com-
pleted, that treating of the plurality of souls is commenced. This
aphorism sets forth an adverse doctrine. There is according to this
doctrine but one soul, though the bodies of Chaitra, Maitra, and
others be numerically diverse. Why ? Because of the indif-
ference of the origin of pleasure, pain, and knowledge ; since
the origin of pleasure, pain and knowledge, as determined by all
bodies, is not particular. If there were another mark probative of
the separateuess of the soul, its separateness might be proved, but
there is not ; just as, in the production of sound, as determined in
such and such places, its mark, sound, being non-particular, ether
is one ; as, its mark, the notions of simultaneity &c., being non-parti-
cular, time is one ; and, as its mark, the notions of posteriority and
priority being non-particular, space is one. U.
Plurality of souls. SEt3^ITHT ?U?!T II X II
Aph. 20. Because of its circumstances soul is manifold.
R fHI'T?r?t W5JrJ ?13T 79\33TrW3: ?T ^ f?cffer
rsan^i^T.oraraTS^i 5^1 SFT^I:
u
I
( 130 )
1 The doctrine is stated that souls are manifold. Why ? Because
of their circumstances. Circumstances are the several conditions,
as one is rich, another mean, one is happy, another unhappy, one is
of high, another of low, birth, one is learned, another reads badly.
These circumstances being impossible without a diversity of souls,
evince a plurality of souls. It cannot be maintained that as are
the circumstances of one soul, due to various states of being, to
childhood, youth, aud old age, so are the circumstances of one soul
in the divers bodies of Chaitra, Maitra &c., for it is by difference of
time only that the existence in one subject of contradictory attri-
butes is possible. U.
TnT$*ronOT53 n H n
Aph. 21. And on the authority of the Sastra.
, f t
2 The Sastra means revelation (Sruti.) For, in the declaration
of diversity of soul, it is revealed, that Two spirits are to be known,
&c. U.
FOURTH BOOK, FIRST DAILY LESSON.
srasrrcnjgfarq* n i u
Aph. 1. The eternal is existent and uncaused.
5 Some say that the existent is produced from the non-existent.
~ t STrH
CHIT ^w^Tsiw sa
"
^FrT
: H
Their view is as follows. A seed &c. is not productive of a sprout &c:
as its effect, for were this the case there would be produced a sprout
&c. from a seed &c. in a granary. But inasmuch as the shoot is pro-
duced after the destruction of the seed when sown, by the dis-
junction of its constituent parts, it is the destruction of the seed &c.
which is the cause of the sprout, &c. Accordingly the aphorism of
Gautama enunciatory of an adverse doctrine, From non-existence is
production of existence : for without destruction is no manifestation.
In refutation of this doctrine a prefatory discourse is set up,
treating of atoms &c. The existent means anything which is ; un-
caused, unproduced ; the eternal, matter which does not by de-
struction cease to exist. The sense is that the primary cause of inte-
grate wholes is not the non-existent ; for were destruction or sub-
sequent non-existence the cause, a sprout would be produced even
from a seed which had been ground into meal. \ 7 ".
ii ? u
Aph. 2. The effect thereof is the mark of its existence.
1 Thereof of an atom an effect or product, a water-pot or
the like, is the mark of existence. Accordingly the aphorism of
Gautama, From the evolved is the production of the evolved, on the
evidence of perception. Thus is the sequence of integrant and
integrate wholes. If this series were unlimited there would be no
HOT ^ TrirHrs |r
ufg
ram
WTrT
HUTJlfa HTel^grSrTmJTTfJ fTclr! cfiUTHof^a cTWTrT
: u
( 132 )
difference hi size between mount Mern and a grain of mustard seed,
for they would both be indifferently originated by an infinity of
parts. Nor can it be argued that the difference depends on an ag-
gregation of extensions, for without a difference of number they
would be impossible. If it be said that annihilation may be the
limit of the series of integrant and integrate bodies, we object that
there existing indivisibility in some ultimate element, annihilation
is impossible, for it is only disjunction of its constituent parts or
decomposition that can destroy matter. Nor is disjunction the
limit, for it is impossible that it should reside in a single object. A
substance, therefore, without parts, must be the limit, and this is an
atom. A mote is not the limit, for a mote has magnitude and is
composed of substances more than one, being a visible substance.
For magnitude is a condition of visual perception, only as it presup-
poses multiplicity of substance. Else magnitude would not exist,
and what would be the cause ? Nor are the constituent parts of a
mote atoms, for we must infer that those constituent parts as
originative of a substance possessing magnitude, are composed of
parts, like threads, or the halves of water-pots. Therefore what-
ever is a generated substance IB composed of parts, and whatever
is composed of parts is a produced substance. In whatever part,
then, there ceases to be the nature of a product, there ceases
also to be that of containing parts ; and this is the proof of the
existence of invisible atoms. U.
1 Thereof means of the primary cause ; the effect, a mote or
other produced substance ; the mark, that which determines an in-
ference. If the series of integrant and integrate wholes were end-
*5R~?r3t
: lit? grap;
SKtrT5T5lfef3JST5rRsr
: i 3 awm rraaracrvjinfii few?
n
( 133 )
less, it would follow that Mem and a grain of mustard seed would be
equal, inasmuch as they would both indifferently originate in an
infinity of constituent parts. We must, therefore, allow a termina-
tion at some point. But the termination cannot be in a mote, inas-
t
much as it is proved to have parts, viz. binary atomic aggregates
according to the inference that a mote has parts, for it is a visible
substance like a water-pot. Nor can the series terminate in binary
atomic aggregates, for by the inference that the constituent parts of
a mote must have parts, because they are parts possessed of magni-
tude, like the halves of a water-pot, it is proved that of an aggregate
of two atoms there is a part, an atom as the primary material cause.
It cannot in a like order be proved that this has a series of parts, for
the hypothesis is impossible, involving an infinite regression, and
wanting confirmatory circumstances. V.
n 3 n
Aph. 3. From existence of the cause is existence of the
effect.
1 From the existence of colour &c. in the cause, results its exis-
tence in the effect, for the qualities of the cause are antecedent
to those of the effect, as is observed in the case of a waterpot, a piece,
of cloth, and the like. U.
2 From the existence of the cause, of the primary cause, results
the existence or being of the effects, compound substances . Other-
wise, as the material cause of earth is earthy, it would in like man-
ner follow that, by having the non-existent for a material cause, no
product or complex whole would exist. V.
3ifar*i ^fn fa^hra: wfatrawa: n 8 n
Aph. 4. The negation Non-eternal is of the particular.
5RTW SeWTsrirT srra
: II
( 134 )
1 The negation Non-eternal is of the particular, relates lo
particular things, and hence arises the negation A compound sub-
stance is not eternal. But a universal negation, Every thing is
uot eternal, is impossible. V.
ii u u
Aph. 5. [The supposition that atoms are non-eternal is] nes-
cience.
8 The following objections may be raised. An atom is not eter-
nal for it is matter, like a water-pot. Similarly the possession of col-
our, taste &c. may be adduced as arguments. So also, by simulta-
neous conjunction with six other atoms an atom has six facets or
parts ; and consequently from its possession of parts, and from its
being the substratum of conjunction partially inherent we may infer
that atoms are non-eternal. Moreover if there be ether inside an
atom, then inasmuch as it has an interior it has parts ; but if there be
not ether inside an atom, it follows that ether is not omnipresent.
...Also the non-eternity of an atom follows from the inference which
establishes the doctrine of tran si tori ness, that whatever is, ft momen-
tary. If then, there be such a series of inferences, how can it be
maintained that an atom is eternal? The answer is as follews.
Every inference having for its object the non-eternity of an atom is
.nescience in the form of error, since it springs from a fallacy. This
fallacy is occasionally prevention of proof including the subject ; al-
tTCJTTiTR fZT. ^HrcTTcT H^cTfT 5 ^tMT6HW3T5Terg: THRR IrTel
i
RTTJ=?T riarr^iTsjFiTe^nHegag^: i irfcr
TOT^FtrfTT 31T ifrTTcI^ ^gUT^CRPTn ?T3T
WTI i
( 135 )
ways absence of proof of inclusion due to want of evidence preven-
tive of contrary instances ; sometimes absence of proof as to the
predicate. This and other matters may be sought iu the Saiua.ua-
taiitra. U.
! Nescience is want of proof, viz. the inference of non-eternity
of sound ; for it arises from a fallacy, inasmuch as all the aforesaid
arguments are vitiated by plurality of consequents. V.
ception^ 0118 fper " W^^WSR^SOrSlTSTg W^T*3T5*J: H S H
Aph. 6. Perception is of the great, in consequence of its
containing substances more than one, and in consequence of colour.
2 Perception visual and tactual presentation cakes place
(for these words are to be supplied) in relation to the great, that is,
in relation to that which has great extension. There is, accordingly,
no perception of an atom inasmuch as it has no magnitude. It
might be asked why there is no perception of air &c., there being
great extension ; accordingly the words 7n consequence of colour,
that is in consequence of appreciable colour, and thus though there
be colour in the eye &c, there is no perception of it. It might be
asked how there exists magnitude in a mote whereas there is none
in an atom ; accordingly the words In consequence of its containing
substances more than one. Since then containing substances more
than one is the positive condition with regard to produced magni-
tude, and this does not exist in an atom &c., magnitude does not
exist in an atom, &c. The containing substances more than one is
the being a a substratum in which a plurality of substances co-in-
here. V.
^UWT STOTrT nmmTCfafcfT-jTrn <Jt3rnre?crTfT tr
WT5T: H
3TJSff5tJ:
?r3TWTerT^ !Ir3^F*T??T VJTcT.
T3iT?T sipzi ^ u Ferrer 3rff ^mfcrfrT 33HrT'Jif3F!ra: HT ^smsi tr rsr fa
fr? HOT
( 136 )
Aph. 7. The non -perception of air, though there be therein
substantiality and magnitude, is in consequence of the non-existence
of the impression of colour.
1 Such being the case there should, it may be urged,
also be perception of the light of a torch at midday, or of the light
of the eye, in which colour inheres in consequence of the inhesion
of touch, and which has magnitude. The answer is as follows. : By
the term impression of colour is intended inhesion, or apprecia-
bility. or non-obscuration, of colour. Though, therefore the self-
same inhesion in air of touch is inhesion of colour, yet it is not
qualified by colour, for there is in it absolute non-exi.stence of co-
lour. In the li-rht of the eye there is no impression, that is no
appreciability, of colour. In the light of the torch at midday
there is no impression, that is no non-obscuration, of colour. Of
these, therefore, there is no perceptibility. In like manner impres-
sion of colour is to be analogously applied to the hot season, hey.t or
fire within a cooking utensil, gold, &c. U.
2 Impression of colour, or impressed colour (according to the
i
: i &* unfa ortjlr H35 snfcKRttot TS
5- r r4?=Rn::
rule that a past passive participle may be employeda djectively)
amounts to appreciable or to unoltscured colour. This not existing,
or in other words there being non-existence of the nature of a
substratum having such colour for its essential property, there is no
perception or sensuous presentation of air. Nor can it be objected :
Why is there not in air the nature of a substratum^ of colour, inas-
much as the existence of a connection determines the existence of
the connected object ? For this is contradictory to the non-existence
of colour given in the presentative cognition that in air there is no
colour ; and there is nothing to prove that air is a substratum of
colour, there being no cognition that air possesses colour. It must
be understood that existence of a connection determines the exis-
tence of the connected object in such cases only wheae there is no
impossibility and where there is another proof. In fine, to affirm
the existence of substantiality is to imply the existence of connec-.
tiou with colour. To affirm the existence of great existence is to
imply the existence of a cause of perception. To predicate appre-
ciability is to deny perception of fire within culinary utensils &c.,
and of the hot weather, heat, &c. To predicate inappreciabilty is
to deny perception of the light of a torch at midday and the
like. V.
Aph. 8. Perception of colour is consequent on co-inhesion
of substances more than one, and on particularity of colour.
1 Particularity of colour is particularity residing in colour.
This is appreciability and non-obscuration. On it perception is
consequent. The words co-inhesion of substances more than one
are added, to meet the possible objection that the colour of an
Fsrwr
: i ?r?ra
rfi=esrcrnnrT
33*51: ^tnssraranqnraT gnriia SOT surSiTasjuzi: 11
( 138 )
atom and of a binary atomic aggregate would be likewise per-
ceived. The term more than one indicates plurality. Perception
therefore, is consequent on the co-inhesion of a plurality of sub-
stances from a tertiary atomic aggregate and upwards, of which, as
their substratum, are substances more than one or a plurality of
substances. Water-pots and the like, originating in two constituent
parts, as viewed in regressive order comprehend of a plurality of
substances. Visual perceptibility has no relation to taste, touch &c.
inasmuch as there does not exist therein the essence of colours.
It has no relation to the light of the eye, in consequence of the
absence of appreciability. Appreciability is a kind of universal
entity residing in a particular quality of colour &c. and included
in the essence of colour. U.
Minima sensibilia. HR tSTTOWNT ^R Sn^TFW II < II
ss v
Aph. 9. By this is explained cognition in the case of taste
smell, and touch.
1 Of the senses other than touch co-inhesion in the same
substratum with colour is the positive condition of perceptibility
to the external organs. For this reason the conditions of percep-
tion of colour thus stated, are here extended to other cases. By
this means by knowledge afforded by perception of colour. As per-
ception of colour is consequent on a particular kind of colour, that
is on non-obscuration and appreciability in the essence of colour, so
perception of taste is contingent upon a particular kind of savour,
that is, upon the distinctive qualities of non-obscuration and appre-
315*117
mw na
( 139 )
ciability in the essence of taste. This remark is to be applied in the
ether cases (viz. those of smell, and touch), and co-inhesion of a
plurality of substances is to be extended to them. From inap-
preciability to the organs of smell, taste, and touch, results non-
apprehension of smells, tastes and touches. It is from their
inappreciability in a stone and the like, that smell and taste are
not there perceived ; for they are perceived in the ashes of the
stone, &c. Some maintain that they are perceived indeed in the
stone &c. but not distinctly. From inappreciability of colour in a
substance, included in its disjunct elements, results its non-presen-
tation. This is the case likewise with taste. In hot water in con-
sequence of appreciability of light or fire, and of its obscuration by
touch, is non-perception of light or fire. In comminuted cam-
phor, champaka perfume, &c., in consequence of their iuapprecia-
bility is non-perception of colour, taste and touch. U.
: u <{* n
Aph. 10. Because of the non-existence of this, there is no
deviation.
1 Gravity also is inherent in a plurality of substances, and
has a common substratum with colour and magnitude. Why is it
not perceptible ? This objection is obviated. Because of the non-
existence in gravity of the universal appreciability which is the
nature of colour, gravity is not perceptible.
It might be said that granted that the essence of colour &c.
does not exist, yet there may be perception. Accordingly the
r Tr?n?
i SHI
HOT
: <rm
IT5F51T3: WTUrQ^fR?! fraq: II
( 140 )
words no deviation are added ; for it is a law that there is no
deviation (or unduly wide or narrow assertion) of the five universal
entities, the essences of colour &c., in relation to apprehensibility
by the respective organs of sense. For there only where there is
one of the five classes, colour &c., is there apprehensibility by the
respective exterior organs, according to the logical form, that
whereby absence of the one infers absence of the other. Gravity,
by reason of the obscurity of the subject of the aphorism, by
Pras"astadeva classed among things transcendental, is by Valla-
bhacharya said to be perceived by touch. U.
It might be asked why there is no perception of gravity &c,,
since magnitude and appreciable colour exist there in a relation
of juxta-position in a common substratum. Accordingly the an-
swer is given. In this place by the word this there is reflection
upon a number of causes not stated in the text, but which are well
known as positive conditions of realisations of the effect. From the
non-existence of this complement of causes results non-deviation
(i. e., neither excess nor defect of predication) ; that is on the
hypothesis of the causal relation of appreciable colour &c. there is
deviation of affirmation in relation to gravity &c. By reason there-
fore of the relation of common objectivity to perception in general,
and the necessity of admitting that the nature of gravity &c. is
preventive of the presentation of gravity and the like, which are
transcendental, and by reason of the non-existence in gravity of
the mutually exclusive non-existence of these, there being no in-
strument, there is no perception of gravity &c. By Vallabhachar-
ya this aphprisin is otherwise explained and maintained, viz., that
of gravity &c. there is tactual perception. V.
Common ^* T: ^ft*^ W* t* WTIjfeWlh TO3T-
sensibles. ,^-g ^ g ^f^g^^^.^ gjg^ftj, ^
Aph. 11. Numbers, extensions, separateness, conjunction
and disjunction, priority and posteriority, and action, as inhering
1n coloured substance, are visible.
1 Tilings perceptible by one organ of sense having being
discussed, those perceptible by two are enumerated. The absence
of compounds is to indicate the mutual independence of these as
visible and tangible. Though magnitude is supposed, it is not by
the nature of extension. The word and involves the addition of
viscidity, fluidity, and velocity. The term visible implies tangi-
bility, or the particle and may be applicable here after visible.
The word numbers in the plural comprehends all numbers from
unity upwards. If it be held that unity is a universal entity, and
not a quality, then if it exist in substance only, it is existence as
of neither less nor greater extent than the nature of substance ; if,
on the other hand, it exist in qualities and actions also, it is exis-
tence as of neither less nor greater extent than real existence. If
it be asked how then in the former case there is the nature of unity
&c., in quality &c., it may be answered that it is by unity imputed ;
or that by reason of the notion of co -inherence in one substance, the
nature of unity is justly affirmed. This unity is eternal in eternal
substances, in non-eternal substances it has* for its non-coinherent
or external cause causal unity. Duality &c. is resultant from
relative cognition. Relative cognition is the mental basis of various
unities, when two homogeneous or heterogenous substances are in
contact with the organ of vision. U.
2 Things perceptible by two organs of sense are enumerated
i
sfer
nor
TOPRWlIITTfa cWH FT3T
5R*j rifi
: SROT
After the word visible the preceding particle and is to be con-
strued. The meaning is, then, that these entities, beginning with
sound and ending with action inherent in coloured substance, are
visible and tangible. The particle and after the word action,
includes by implication viscidity, velocity, fluidity and their uni-
versal essences. The word coloured indicates appreciability and
consequently there is no incongruity in the fact that these entities,.
when existent in atoms &c., are not perceptible. V,
Rr II
Aph. 12. In uncoloured substances they are imperceptible
to sight.
1 The invisibility of these when existing- in inappropriate, i. e.
uncoloured, substances, though involved in the preceding apho-
rism, is stated for the sake of perspicuity. The meaning is that
these are invisible and intangible in uncoloured or inappropriate
subjects. It is not said- that they are imperceptible, because of the
arising of an internal perception of the unity of soul, V.
Aph. 13. By this it is explained, that knowledge in regard
to quality and existence is of all the senses.
2 Existence means being ; of all the senses, produced by all
the senses ; knowledge, perception. The sense is, therefore, that
these inasmuch as they are appropriate to, are cognised by, all the
senses. V.
itena:
wra: ^TTTf^ra S3f%qgRm TTT^ w?zr^ ?TOT ^ am:
HT5i: K
SECOND DAILY LESSON.
u H u
Aph. 1. The aforesaid product substance, earth and the like,
is threefold, under the names of body, organ, and object.
1 Of these corporeity is a kind of universal attribute, an ab-
solute whole possessing action, and having for its non-coinherent
cause conjunction with soul endowed with volition, but corporeity
is not a universal entity, for terrestriality does not admit of the
generic and specific. The nature of an organ is adaptability to the
common sensory causative of knowledge other than reminiscence ;
or susceptibility of conjunction with the internal organ causative
of knowledge, accompanied with insusceptibility of the appreciable
particular qualities other than sound. In regard to the light of
the eye of animals that prowl at night, another kind of light must
be admitted, and in regard to visuality the words insusceptibility of
appreciable particular qualities other than sound and colour are to
be added. While the nature of an object is to be the means of
phsenomenal experience, that is to say, to be an object of ordinary
presentation, which is common to substance, quality, action, gene-
rality, and non-existence ; it is, in accordance with the aphorism,
product substantiality the object of common internal presentation, for
it is stated in the aphorism that earth and other product substances
are three-fold. Objectivity also, then, is not a universal entity. U.
err
: u
' Of these corporeity is a universal existing in that which
possesses muscular action existing only in an absolute whole. In
this definition the second existing is intended to exclude existence
as in a hand, terrestriality, substantiality, existence &c. The term
existing in that which possesses muscular motion, is intended to
exclude conjunction of water-pots, bodies, &c. The universal, there-
fore, in the definition is applicable to human and other bodies, by
consideration of humanity, the nature of Chaitra, and other univer-
sals. There exists in trees &c. organic motion through connection
with divine air, otherwise fractures and wounds in them would not
close up. From the multiplicity of the man-lion's (Vishnu's) body,
according to the division of aeons, the definition may be applied to
it by consideration of the universal nature of the man-lion. But
corporeity is not to be defined only as universal, for thus there
would be confusion with terrestriality &c. ; nor as the substratum of
muscular motion, for the definition would be too narrow in relation
to body deprived of organic movement. The nature of an organ
also, is not to be defined only as universal, for there would thus re-
S*r&5T
5TTTH:
foHpiffT
suit a confusion with terrestriality &c., but as the site of conjune*-
tion with the common sensory causative of cognitions, and not the
site of appreciable particular qualities other than sound. The
words not the site &c. are intended to prevent an unduly wide predi-
cation in regard to the cuticle, and the soul; the causes of cognitions
being conjunction of the common sensory and the external organs
of sense, conjunction of the cuticle and the internal organ, and
conjunction of the soul and the internal organ ....... The nature of
an object is product substantiality, being the means of experiences
in an immediate succession. Though it exists in body and organs,
it is separately enumerated to give a more distinct conception to>
the learner. V.
TJ>gTrR5R * ^m II 3 U
Aph, 2. The body is not composed of the five elements, for.
the conjunction of things perceptible and imperceptible is imper-
ceptible.
1 The author now proceeds to refute the assertion that the-
body is composed of three or four elements. Were the body, by
reason of its odour, moisture, heat, breath, and compressibility, com-
posed of five elements, the body would be imperceptible in the same
manner in which conjunction of wind with trees is imperceptible.
The aphorism employs an example. After the word is the word
body is to be supplied. Moisture, digestive heat and the other qua-
lities exist only in their respective substances water, fire &c. Such:
is the case also with regard to- four elements. Let it then, it may
sifter
?3 Sift* wirT ?T3T
^WFIT
R ^ fasra ^ff? 'srdtfrrffT ircr: alcf
( 146 )
be urged, consist of three elements, for three elements are percep-
tible. This is not the case for an integration out of heterogeneous
elements is denied. One quality in a whole is not originative of
other qualities. If therefore the commencement were from earth
and water, that which they originate would be void of odour and
taste. In like manner if it originated in earth, and air, it would
be destitute of smell, taste, colour and touch. Such and other in-
ferences are obvious. U.
T*OFTrT:roT3Wgra ^ ^ZlTrRSW II 5 II
s> x.
Aph. 3. The body is not composed of three elements, be-
cause there is not manifested another quality.
1 A body originated by quality, perceptible earth, water, and
light, might be perceptible, if there were manifested in it another
quality having for its antecedent a quality of the cause. This is
not the case, for it has been already stated that a single odour &c.
is not originative. Therefore the body is not composed of three ele-
ments nor originated by three coloured substances. U.
II 8 II
Aph. 4. A conjunction of atoms is not denied.
y How then do we observe digestive heat &c. in one single
body? The answer is given in the text. A mutual conjunction of
the five elements -as receptive of one another is not denied. But
siftt trarajwrefa trfe ?nf
(TOT
2
VTrTRT
( 147 )
it is not affirmed that two heterogeneous atoms are the non-coinhe-
rent cause of a substance. It is, therefore, in consequence of the
receptivity of those that vital heat &c. is observed in the body. If
it be asked then, of what nature the human body is, we cite the
aphorism of Gautama : That the body is terrestrial, for the
particular quality (of earth) is observed. Odour the particular
quality of earth is observed in the human body as not departing
from it till its dissolution. Vital heat &c. is not observed in
the decayed body. These qualities, therefore, are accidental, but
its odour is essential according to the constitution of terrestriali-
ty. U.
?R srnt %fsra SnfasmijTftsfsg 11 n n
Aph. 5. Of these, body is twofold uterine and non-uterine.
1 Of these among terrestrial, aqueous, and other bodies the
terrestrial body is twofold. What are the two kinds ? It is an-
swered in the text that they are uterine and non-uterine. Aqueous,
igneous, and aerial bodies, known in the spheres of Varuna, the sun,
and air, are exclusively non-uterine. The bodies of gods and sages
are non-uterine, according to the text of revelation, Manu and
others the sensorial sons of Brahma. If it be asked how there
can be an effect without a cause, we reply that the womb is not a
rfoi w&i uif^s 'siftt fgFcraw SR g fsra ^rsnrr-
i OT??T5w*iTfa5T*lrFfT
JTRHT
sfn ^rrtHtiT ^sr aajiitr ^rraai xfcr
nf?nT
( 148 )
cause essential- to corporeity ; for the affirmation that is was so
would be erroneous in regard to the bodies of worms, mosquitoes &c.
generated by warmth. No difference of constitution is known, for
our bodies are not different in appearance from those of the divine
sages. The uterine is twofold, viviparous and oviparous. Vivipa-
rous are the bodies of men and animals wild and domestic. The
bodies of birds and reptiles are oviparous. Snakes, worms, fishes
&c. are called reptiles, because it is their nature to creep about.
Though trees &c. are. a kind of bodies, being subjects of frui-
tion, for life, death, sleep, waking, the use of medicine, seminal
propagation, desire of the agreeable, aversion from the disagree-
able, &c. are impossible without a subject of fruition and growth,
and the dosing up of fractures are manifest means of fruition ; and
there is the sacred text, The Sarala and Arjuna trees which grow
on. the banks of the Narmada, from contact with the waters of the
river attain to the highest state hereafter &c. ; and such as In the
burning-ground grows a tree haunted by herons and vultures ; yet
germinant bodies do not evidently possess muscular motion and
sensitive organs, and they are not therefore, in common usa^e
called bodies. U.
on " uteriuebodies
n 5 n
. \ "*
Aph. 6. Because (the non-uterine body) has antecedents of
indeterminate time and space ;
1 It might be asked how the non-uterine body of Manu and
?R
Sam anreftur
SRT:
fg
: n
( 149 )
others is produced, seeing that it is atoms originative of semen and
blood that are originative of a particular body, and that these do
not there exist. In anticipation of this difficulty the aphorism is
stated. Atoms indeterminate in time and space are those
which are not astricted to particular time and space. From having.
these for their antecedents or conditions, there exist non-uterine bo-
dies, such being the connection of the four aphorisms succeeding the
fifth with the tenth. There exist, therefore, in the sphere of Varuna
&c. non-uterine bodies, aqueous, igneous, aerial, sensprial. To
meet the question as to whence come the atoms originative of
beings whose production is independent of semen, blood &c., it be-
ing seen that in the case of uterine bodies it is only seminal and
sanguineous atoms that are originative, the following statement
has been made. Atoms terrene, aqueous, igneous, and aerial, exist
in all quarters and are in all places, and there being no local deter-
mination of these, there is no lack of atoms in the production of
non-uterine bodies. For it is not true that no atoms other than.
seminal or sanguineous are originative of bodies, since, were it so,"
it would follow that there was no production of the bodies of gnats,
musquitoes, trees, shrubs, &c. V.
11 s u
Aph. 7. Also because of peculiar merit.
1 The sense is that in creation &c., motion arises in the atoms
in consequence only of conjunction of soul with the fruits of actions
done in a former state of being ; and that the atoms having by
that action come together originate, in the order of binary atomic
ao-o-reo-ates &c., the non-uterine bodies of divine sages and others.
OO O
The following implication is also to be considered, that it is in conse-
( 150 )
quence of peculiar demerit that the tortured bodies of musquitoes
and other insects generated by heat are produced. U.
II II
Aph. 8. Also because names exist.
1 Because names or terms are or exist, without an ancestor or
father to bestow them, for these words, are to be supplied. For not
all names are imposed by a father &c., such terms as water-pot,
cloth, not being thus assigned. It is therefore the samaGod who
imposed names on water-pots, cloth, and other inanimate things,
that imposed the names Manu, Marichi &c. on non-uterine bodies.
V.
Aph. 9. Because the name is without beginning.
2 By means of the primordial name Brahma &c. which be-
came manifest in creation &c., it is known that non-uterine body
exists. For there are not parents of Brahma, by whom the name
Brahma should be invented. U.
Aph. 10. There exist non-uterine bodies.
3 Here is pointed out that which is established by the four
preceding aphorisms. The words peculiar bodies of Manu,
Marichi, and others are to be supplied. V.
n Hi ii
Aph. 11. (This follows) also from the evidence of the Veda.
fg^tfa ihr: * fa
. H?rr. ftnnfs'tor fsrafojHT: ^J3ire7f3;H i 3T5TT?rroTrgT*rraTrT FTOT ^ Jw-
wig: ii
fa <^3T si^r^f JTT?nfcraTT ^FT: mwif a^TTfafHirT grn wTfefrT wist: u
1 It is known from evidence or communication in the form of
the Veda, from such texts as The Brahman was his mouth, He
created the Brahman from his mouth, that there exist particular
non-uterine bodies. But aqueous, igneous, and aerial bodies pos-
sess a sensitive apparatus, haying the support of terrene particles.
The terrene organ is that of smell, and this apprehends odour and the
universals contained in odour. The organ of smell is earthy, because
in the midst of colours &c. it manifests odour only, in the same
manner as clarified butter &c. manifests the scent of saffron, or like
the fragrant particles wafted by the wind. The organ of taste is
aqueous, because, while it does not manifest extraneous colour &c.,
it does reveal extraneous taste, in the same manner as water which
cTCTTrT rT^TT
^T: srdrfsraruT: s^
tnf&r
iz?in<Ttffi
ir^TfJ '
t tf^ffTC
frf
i^ WFITR
'HTrJTfc!5n?rT5 i a HWPlffT H
( 152 )
reveals the flavour of grain fried and ground. This is cognisant of
taste and the classes contained under it. Smell and taste have no
power to cognise matter. The organ of vision is igneous, for where-
as it does not manifest odour &c. it does manifest colour, in the
same manner as the light of a lamp. This organ, by contact in the
form of conjunction, cognises substances of appreciable colour and
possessed of magnitude. It cognises also, by contact in the form
of co-inherence in the conjunct, colour, number, extension, indivi-
duality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, velocity,
viscidity, fluidity, motion, and generality existing in such substan-
ces. By contact in the form of co-inherence in the co-inherent in the
conjunct it cognises universal entities existent in that which exists
in the existent (such as the nature of the class cow, such nature exist-
ing in the class which exists in its constituent members.) By being
qualitative of the conjunct, by being qualitative of the coinherent
in the conjunct &c. it cognises universal non-existences (viz. antece-
dent, subsequent, and absolute non-existence) which are non-exis-
tent in the existent, and also reciprocal non-existences (such as the
non-existence of a water-pot as a piece of cloth) which are non-exis-
tent in the non-existent residing in the existent. According to the
system of Kanada there is no perception of co-inherence. The organ
of touch pervades the body, and is cognisant of appreciable touches
and the classes therein contained. . It thus cognises the objects cog-
nisable to the eye, with the exception of colour and the universal
entities residing in colour only. According to the moderns it also
cognises air. Its contact (with the tactile object) is as described
above. The form of inference respecting it is, therefore, as fol-
lows : This organ is aerial, for while it does not manifest colour
&c. it does manifest touch, like the wind from a fan which mani-
fests coldness in the perspiration adhering to the limbs. In all the
aforesaid inferences the clause beginning with while or whereas
is inserted to prevent an undue applicability to soul the internal
organ, &c. So also, to prevent undue applicability to contact, we
( 153 )
must add the qualification there being substantiality. The organ
of hearing is ether limited to the outer part of the ear. This
cognises sounds by co-inherence and the universals contained in
sounds by co-inherence in the co-inherent. Whatever organ is cog-
nisant of anything, is cognisant also of the universal non-existen-
ces in it non-existent, and of the reciprocal non-existences residing
in it. So much for the five external organs. The common sensory
is an internal organ, and by conjunction cognises soul tinged with
its peculiar attributes. By co-inherence in the conjunct it cognises
thought, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition, and a uni-
versal viz. the nature of soul. By co-inhesion in the co-inherent in
the conjunct it cognises the universals existent in thought, &c. A
full discussion of the subject may be sought elsewhere. V.
FIFTH BOOK, FIRST DAILY LESSON.
Ti6Cl, ^
Aph. 1. Action in the hand is by means of conjunction with,
and volition of, soul,
1 The object of the fifth chapter is the investigation of action
The investigation of action determinable by volition is that of the
first daily lesson. In this there are sections treating of (1) throw-
ing upwards, (2) throwing upwards effected without volition, (3) of
action which has merit for its cause, (4) of actions good, bad
and indifferent. The aphorism is propounded m relation to a parti-
cular kind of muscular action. Action in the hand as its co-inherent
cause is by means of conjunction with soul, and of volition of soul
Of this action the non-coinherent cause is conjunction with soul
emmrar wTrRW sraTrranT HTWIT
possessing volition. "Volition is the efficient cause. This is mus-
cular action ; for muscular action is action whose non-coinherent
cause is conjunction with soul possessing volition, or action pro-
duced by volition of a subject other than the tangible which is not
coinherent with, or excluded from, self. II.
<ro ^srewTT^a gai 35* ii ^ it
Aph. 2. In like manner, and from conjunction with the
hand, is action in the pestle.
1 By the particle and gravity is implied as another efficient
cause. In like manner from conjunction with the hand may also
mean from conjunction with the hand possessed of upward mo'tion.
In this instance the non-coinherent cause is conjunction of the pestle
with the hand conjunct with soul possessing volition. The co-inhe-
rent cause is the pestle. The efficient causes are volition and
gravity. U.
n 3 u
Aph. 3. la the action produced in a pestle and the like by
impact, conjunction with the hand is not a cause, being excluded
from it.
* The cause of the sudden upward motion which is produced
in the pestle when struck by the mortar, is stated. In this in-
stance though there is conjunction of the hand with the rising
5TCTJTT
U
3Picr?n I??TCT frawr stzjfer fr^n sfa H ^
^RinJT *JH ^gfeRj?? w% i
uusr:
( 155 )
pestle, such conjunction is superfluous if regarded as a cause, The
impact of the mortar is only the non-coinherent cause. It may
be asked why this is the case. It is therefore stated that it is so
because of the exclusion, that is, because volition would too wide-
ly or too narrowly predicated. If there were 'volition in this case,
there would be no sudden upward motion in the pestle'. By a vo-
lition to hold the pestle and mortar apart there would be a mere
sustention of the pestle ; or the upward motion of the pestle would
depend upon volition. U.
II 8 II
Aph. 4. In like manner conjunction with soul in relation to
action iu the hand (is not a cause.)
1 The aphorism is stated with the purpose of specifying a
particular cause of the action of the hand as it flies upwards with
the pestle, and of disproving the con-coinherent causality of con-
junction with soul exercising volition. The meaning is that con-
junction with soul, that is conjunction with soul exercising volition,
is likewise not a cause of action in the hand as it suddenly rises
with the pestle. The term not a cause is in the preceding apho-
rism. The words in like manner are used to imply analogy. U.
Aph. 5. The action in the hand is from impact, and from
conjunction with pestle.
* An answer is furnished to the question : Whence then at
i 1^ HSTPJcT^WH *SfTS I SHIT *JS$ 3rTr?fcT
rTOT I^T sftj rT3TfCTHf?T ^TfrraTrTSISSJT *HT*raTfrafafT.
fl
: H
( 156 )
that time the upward motion of the hand ? The hand rises at that
time in the same manner in which the 'metal at the end of the
pestle rises. By the word impact, is elliptically expressed recoil
produced by impact. A recoil is produced in the pestle as its sub-
stratum by the vigorous action in the pestle accompanied with the
impact. The upward motion in the hand also is consequent upon
conjunction of the hand and pestle, in relation to the recoil so
effected, as its non-coinherent cause. But this upward motion has
not for its uon-coinherent cause conjunction with soul exercising
volition, for the hand rises involuntarily together with the pestle.
U.
SlTrffSilt ^5^11153 II II
Aph. 6. Action of the soul is also from conjunction with the
hand.
1 An answer is furnished to the objection : In the case of
the action which is produced in the body or in a part of the body,
conjunction with soul exercising volition is the cause, why is it not
so in the present instance ? The term soul tropically signifies a.
portion of the body. The impossibility of literal construction is
the germ of tropical interpretation. The action then of the
soul, that is of a member of the body, that is of the hand, results
from conjunction of the hand and pestle. The word and implies
also velocity. In the action of the hand conjunction with the
hand is the non-coinherent cause. There is here no unduly wide
or narrow predication. This conjunction is at some times conjunc-
tion with the soul willing, at others conjunction with the pestle pos-
sessed of velocity, as is the case with the limbs of one who has
the gout. U.
err tirSRwiuam H^ TTU5r2crTr*mmT: SRRTTTJT
sirs i 'HTrWsics: srdncfticit
HOT ^T?WH: sidrraacfsnfa ISFTSJ
: H
( 157 )
n a n
Aph. 7. In the absence of conjunction falling results from
gravity.
1 By the term conjunction impediments of whatever kind are
also implied. In the absence, therefore, of impediments, in con-
sequence of gravity as its non-coinherent cause, falling, an action
resulting in conjunction below, is produced. Here in fruit &c.
possessing gravity, the impediment is conjunction ; in a bird &c.
sustentative volition is the impediment to falling ; in an arrow
discharged it is the recoil that is the impediment to falling. The
sense is that falling is dependent on gravity in the absence of
these obstructives. U.
2 In the case of a body resting upon a tree or other high
place, falling in consequence of the breaking of the bough &c.
which supports it, or by accidentally slipping, it is gravity which
is the cause, not conjunction with soul exercising volition, for that
does not occasion falling but sometimes prevents it. Hence it is
that in the case of birds &c. soaring in the sky, in consequence of
conjunction with soul possessing volition as an impediment, there
is no fall. In like manner it is from conjunction with God posses-
sing volition as an impediment, that the earth and other worlds do
not fall. V.
n <= u
Aph. 8. No upward or sideward motion takes place without
a particular impulse.
F35RTF2RT u??
( 158 )
1 The perpendicular or horizontal motion which takes place in
a clod of earth, an arrow &c., though they possess gravity, results
from a particular, that is a violent, impulse. In the case of the fall-
ing, therefore, of a fruit, a bird, an arrow &c., in the absence of
conjunction, volition, and recoil, there does not exist a particular
impulse, and consequently there is no vertical or lateral motion. U.
n <? n
Aph. 9. Particular impulse results from particular volition.
n <i u
Aph. 10. From particular impulse results particular casting
upward.
a As for particular impulse, whence is it produced ? This
question is answered. Particular impulse is produced by particular
volition, of which the cause is the desire to throw sidewards
or upwards, far or near. By this impulse &c., perpendicular or hori-
zontal movement is produced in a substance such as a clod of earth.
Casting upwards is throwing far upwards. U.
u n n
Aph. 11. By the action of the hand, the action of a child is
explained.
3 The action which is produced in the hand together with the
pestle by the impact of the mortar, is not preceded by volition,
wrsr: n
iifcr
ci n^rfu
: n
( 159 )
or a cause of merit and demerit. The analogy of this motion to a
child's movement in the play of its hands and feet, is pointed out.
Though a child's movement of its hands and feet, has volition for
its antecedent, it has no good or evil result, and is not a cause of
merit or demerit. Such is the meaning of the analogy. U.
ii ^ n
Aph. 12. In like manner in the case of the bursting open of
one burnt.
1 In a house which has been set on fire by a felon, when a man
has there been burnt, and his body torn open by the fire, the action
which is produced in the hand &c., by the will to kill the felon, is
neither a cause of merit, nor a cause of demerit ; as it has been
said, In the slaying of a felon there is no sin in him that slays
openly or covertly : wrath encounters wrath. An incendiary, a
poisoner, an assasin, a thief, a ravisher of wife or field, these six
are felons. U.
tion nvohmtary m aasTini irg^w TOTO ii 13 ii
Aph. 13. Movement of the sleeping takes place in the absence
of volition.
* Movement, action such as the sideward or upward moving
of the limbs, takes place in the sleeping, in the body possessing a
state of profound slumber, even in tha absence of volition genera-
ted by such desire as to throw upwards. A particular volition is
not, therefore, always the cause of such motion. V.
r i
: n
2 3*2 r
3rQ33H T?ira: rHIT
: u
( 160 )
n 98 n
Aph. 14. Action takes place in grass from conjunction with
wind.
1 The actions of the body being explained, those of other
objects are treated of. All such objects as trees, shrubs, climbing
plants, are implied in the term grass. U.
u W it
ev o. *
Aph. 1 5. The movement of the gem, and the approach of
the needle, are caused by destiny.
2 By the term gem are intended vessels made of gold &c.
and filled with water. To such a vessel magicians apply incanta-
tions for the recovery of stolen property. The tradition of ..the
ancients is that the vessel is set on the ground, and some other
person lays his hand upon it. The vessel accompanied with the
hand, in consequence of the efficacy of the incantation, turns towards
the spot where the stolen property has been deposited. The
reason of the movement of such a vessel is not a particular volition,
but the efficient cause is the merit of the former possessor or the
demerit of the thief. The non-coinherent cause is conjunction of
such a vessel with soul possessing such destiny (or results of actions
done in previous states of existence) ; and the co-inherent cause is
VWT facsf?! fT3Tjfr
JTrSTT fet WclrftfcT ST^T fcR
3tER?r on
i:
such a vessel. In like manner destiny is also the cause of the
attraction towards a loadstone, which takes place in needles or
metallic rods when in proximity to the magnet. If it be asked
in consequence of whose destiny (or previous merits and demerits)
motion takes place in needles &c., the reply is that it is the destiny
of him to whom benefit or injury accrues by the motion, that is
the cause. The term needle implies other objects, iron in general
attracted by the loadstone being ; intended. It is to be inferred
that destiny is the cause of the motion of pieces of grass attracted
by amber, of the upward flaming of fire, of the horizontal motion
of wind, and of the action of the primordial atoms at creation. V_
tg: n H n
Aph. 10. Particular non-simultaneous conjunctions in an
arrow are the cause of the diversity of its action.
1 The sense of this aphorism is as follows. After conjunction,
of arrows &c. moving with velocity, with a wall, and the like, a
cessation of motion is observed, though the arrows &c. continue to
exist. In this case it is not destruction of the substratum that is
destructive of motion, for the substratum continues to exist. Also
no other contrary property is observed. It, therefore, follows that
it is a self- produced conjunction that destroys the action of the
arrow. This conjunction produced in the fourth moment destroys
the action in the fifth moment. The meaniug, therefore, is that
the production of the action, then disjunction, next the destruction
of the prior conjunction, the subsequent conjunction, and the
destruction of the action, make known the diversity of the action.
!T fllSfJ H
K
( 162 )
Particular conjunctions, means peculiarity in conjunction, of self-
production. Otherwise, were conjunction in general destructive of
action, action could not abide anywhere. U.
f r
II
Aph. 17. The first action of the arrow is from impulse, the
next is from self-reproduction caused by that action, and in like
manner the next and the next.
1 The first action in an arrow when discharged is produced
by a bowstring drawn by human volition. In this case the impulse
is the non-coinherent cause ; the arrow is the co-inherent cause ;
volition and gravity are the efficient causes. By this first action
self-reproduction termed velocity is produced in the same sub-
stance. This is established by the perception that it is the arrow
moves with velocity. By this self-reproduction action is produced
in the arrow. Of this the non-coinherent cause is the self-repro-
duction ; the co-inherent cause is the arrow ; and the efficient
cause is a particular keen impetus. In like manner a succession
of actions one after the other is produced by the self-reproduction,
which continues until the arrow falls. A single self-reproduction
produces a succession of actions, for when an action is destroyed by
subsequent conjunction produced by itself, the self-reproduction
produces another action. It is not proper to suppose a succession
?ngn>ztn trafyai^ranr srasiiirRTaj SRW STTOH ?nr
5B*rar
tmw.
HWT
of self-reproductions like the succession of actions, for the
hypothesis is unnecessary. To show this the words In like
manner the next and the next, are added, and term Self-reproduc-
tion caused by that action is in the singular number. In the
Nyaya doctrine which affirms a succession of self-reproductions
like the succession of actions, there is complexity (or a violation of
the law of parcimony). The reason that of two arrows simul-
taneously discharged the velocity of the one is swift and that of
the other slow, is the swiftness or slowness of the impetus. U.
TORltTUTi J^r^TR HrR* II <(* II
Aph. 18. Falling results from gravity in the absence of
self-reproduction.
1 It might be objected that in such a case the arrow would
continue in motion and never fall. The answer is as follows. There
being non-existence, that is destruction, of the self-reproduction,
the velocity produced by the first action, from gravity as its cause,
there results falling in an arrow &c. ; that is, the time during which
the particular velocity lasts, determined as the final moment, de-
stroys such velocity. In some cases also conjunction with another
substance is destructive of velocity. It was in consequence, then ?
of the existence of a preventive velocity that there was no pre-
vious fall of the arrow &c., but a succession of motions. There
was in consequence of the destruction of the cause of the action of
moving, no subsequent movement, but falling results from the ab-
sence of an obstructive. In this there is no impossibility. V.
wnr
: rTOT
tre; TITTS'T xrrR sR^rr irrWrUT ^ra?T ^rT^^ira''?? wrarwtin FTTHI
^
( 164 )
SECOND DAILY LESSON.
Aph. 1. Action in earth results from impulse, impact, and
conjunction with the conjunct.
1 In earth, in a bamboo &c., action is sometimes produced by
the impulse of fare &c., and sometimes from the impact of an axe
&c. Similarly action is produced in a chariot &c., through con-
junction with the conjunct, through conjunction with the harness
conjunct with the horses as they move. In the first of these in-
stances, that of action in a bamboo &c., the impulse of fire &c., is
the non-coinherent cause, the bamboo &c., the co-inherent cause,
destiny the efficient cause. In the second, the blow with the hat-
chet &c., is the non-coinherent cause. In the third, conjunction
with the harness conjunct with the horses is the non-coiuherent
cause. V.
n * n
Aph. 2. That action which is produced in a different man-
ner from these, is caused by destiny.
2 That which, as an earthquake &c., is produced in a different
manner, to the exclusion of these, of impulse, impact, and conjunc-
tion with the conjunct, is caused by destiny, i. e. has for its non-
coinherent cause conjunction with soul destined ; since it is the
destiny of him to whom pleasure or pain results from the earth-
quake, that is the particular cause of the earthquake. V.
iT ersnih
TOT^TT
5ITH ?7fT
: VTSRWR nw ^
a:*sr cii WSTH as^w r^THTOK^MTCqifciTrera ra: u
IP
( 165 )
n 3 u
Aph. 3. The falling of water results from gravity in the ab-
sence of conjunction.
1 The section investigative of action co-inherent in fluids is
here commenced. In this it is stated that the falling of water, in
the form of rain, has gravity for its non-coinherent cause. This
takes place when there is absence of conjunction, of conjunction
with a cloud. The absence of conj unction is, therefore, the efficient
cause. U.
8 U
Aph. 4. Flowing results from fluidity.
2 It may be asked how there is in drops of rain action produc-
tive of mutual conjunction. The answer is therefore given. The
flowing or distant progression of the stream or great aqueous whole
composed by mutual conjunction of the fallen waters or raindrops,
is produced by fluidity as its non-coinherent cause, and by gravity
as its efficient cause, in the waters as its co-inherent oj material
cause. U.
n u u
Aph. 5. The sun's rays cause the ascent of water through
conjunction with air.
II II
Aph. 6. Through the impress of the impulse, and conjunc-
tion with the conjunct.
i sn
TT5rcrmW3Tfa5RH:i!I5FW cTFT ^THPI WgH^TlTBnwm H?H W^ff?
: II
( 166 )
|
1 It may be asked how the sun's rays have such power as to
draw up waters situated on the earth. Through the impress, the
congress by means of the impulse, the impulse of a strong wind,
waters conjunct with the sun's rays conjunct with the wind, fly up-
wards ; as the rays of fire driven by the wind draw up boiling water
in a caldron. The particle and means as ; and the example of
water in a caldron is to be, considered. U.
n s n
Aph. 7. The circulation in trees is caused by destiny.
2 The circulation in tree of waters sprinkled on the root is
caused by destiny. The action by which the waters rise and cause
the growth of the tree, results from conjunction of destiny with the
souls of those in whose souls pleasure or pain is effected by the
growth of the leaves, stem, fruit, flowers &c., as its non-coinherent
cause ; from destiny as its efficient cause ; and in water as its co-
inherent cause. U.
Aph. 8. The freezing and thawing of water results from con
junction with light.
Z M?*nS5T5ni7UTH
fT eRrT^Wf? 1TT1
iwn
W^frT fTTT
UrRcTW
rTrl
cnteffwirTT:
yz&tr. n
cirl SROT Helfft IN eROT
: u
( 167 )
1 Aqueous atoms originating a binary atomic aggregate, in con_
sequence of being impeded by the light of the sky, do not originate
in these aggregates fluidity. Snow, hail &c. void of fluidity, are
thus originated by constituent elements void of fluidity, and succes-
sively by binary and other aggregates. They are consequently ob-
served to be hard. It might be asked what proof there is that snow
hail &c. are water. The words and thawing from conjunction with
light are therefore added. Action is produced in the atoms origina-
tive of snow, hail &c. by powerful conjunction with light. From
this action results disjunction. Then in the course of destruction
of the originative conjunction, results destruction of the larger con-
stituent parts of the snow, hail &c. Next in consequence of the
departure of the conjunction with light, which prevents fluidity,
these same atoms originate fluidity in the binary atomic aggregates,
from which results the thawing of the snow, and hail &c. thus en-
dowed with fluidity. Of this the efficient cause is the powerful
ingress of light. U.
Aph. 9. In these the rolling of thunder is a mark.
2 In these in the waters of the sky the rolling of thunder
is a mark of the ingress of the light of the sky ; that is, it is the
pealing of thunder which warrants the inference. The excessive
( '168 )
brilliance of lightning is perceptible, and after that follows the
thunder which also is perceptible. It is therefore inferred that
lightning, the light of the sky, has entered into the cloud from
which the hailstones appear. In consequence of this is the pre-
vention of fluidity in the water originative of hail. U.
Aph. 10. There is also Vedic [authority establishing this.]
n w u
Aph. 11. [The rolling of thunder results] from conjunction
with water and disjunction from a cloud.
1 It may be asked how thunder is produced, for no impact nor
any kind of disjunction causative of sound is observed. The
answer is here given. Thunder results from conjunction, with water,
that is from its being struck by wind, and from disjunction from a
cloud. V.
13 u
Aph. 12. The action of light and the action of air, are ex-
plained by the action of earth.
2 Conjunction with soul destined has been pronounced the
cause of earthquakes. In like manner in the case of the action
which is produced in light which causes a sudden confLagration,
and in wind which causes a sudden agitation of trees &c., the non-
coinherent -cause is conjunction with soul influenced by destiny ;
air and fire are the co-inherent causes; and destiny is the efficient
cause. U.
fawTn?5ranid
: II
( 169 )
3 \\
Aph. 13. The upward flaming of fire, the sideward blowing
of wind, and the first action of atoms and of the internal organ, are
caused by destiny.
1 The word first means existing in the earliest time of creation.
There being no impulse, impact &c., at that time, it is conjunction
with soul influenced by destiny that is in these the non-coiriherent -
cause. The word first applies also to blazing upwards and blowing
sidewards. It is proper to hold that velocity is the cause of other
actions of blazing and blowing ; for there being a visible cause,
there is no occasion for an unseen cause (or destiny as a cause.) U.
^3)jhnT *ra*r: SRJT arT^Trro \\ H8 \\
Aph. 1-4. The action of the internal organ is explained by
the action of the hand.
3 As the action of the hand in the throwing upwards of a
pestle &c., has for its non-coinherent cause conjunction with soul
possessing will ; in like manner the action of the mind, which has
for its purpose contact with the organ percipient of the desired
object, also has for its non-coinherent cause conjunction with soul
exerting volition. Although the internal sensory as an organ is not
an immediate object of volition, it is to be considered that action is
produced in the internal sensory by volition acting upon the
channel which conveys the internal organ. It must be admitted
3fT3J|n:3t*H
W s Tjgf'3rT
\\
tTZTT
( 170 )
that this channel is perceptible to the sense of touch, else the
transmission of what is eaten and drunk, by means of volition
acting upon the channel of the breath, would be impossible. V.
3*$T:3rer ii in n
Aph. 15. Pleasure and pain result from contact of soul,
sense, mind, and object.
1 Pleasure and pain imply other states. Cognitions and voli-
tions are also to be considered. The infinity of the internal organ
has been previously disproved, and its atomic minuteness proved.
It has been stated that the impossibility of simultaneous cognitions
is the mark of the existence of an internal organ. There can, then,
be no pleasure and pain without conjunction with the internal sen*
sory determined to such and such an organ of sense. Were there
no action in the internal organ there could be no feeling, such as of
pleasure in the foot, of pain in the head &c. Although every parti-
cular attribute of the soul depends upon contact with the internal
organ, pleasure and pain are alone expressly mentioned, these being
in consequence of their producing acute affections, more obtrusive
than the others. U.
u 1S u
Aph. 16. Absence of action in the internal sensory repos-
ing in the soul ; non-existence of pain in the body, this is union.
2 It might be objected that if the internal sensory be of a
mobile nature, it must be impossible to restrain it, and conse-
quently a system of meditation must be useless, emancipation
! 3'R'R1trfTTg
TW *
^r fanfs
( m )
being impossible, since a presentatiou of soul is impossible. To
this an answer is furnished. When the internal sensory abides in
the soul, when by sixfold union the internal sensory quitting
the exterior organs &c. abides in the soul alone, there results the
non-commencement or non-production of the action of the inter-
nal sensory. The sensory then becomes immovable. In this state
there is non-existence of pain in the body ; that is, pain is not pro-
duced in relation to the body. This is called the conjunction or
union with soul of the internal organ excluded from all things ex-
ternal. This is established by the words of the Skanda-purana :
The internal organ is smitten by the breath : he should not there-
fore sigh. He should therefore restrain his breath for the sake of
immobility of the interior sensory. That he may restrain his breath,
let him practise sixfold union. Sitting, checking the vital airs,
abstraction, suspension of the faculties, meditation, and contempla-
tion, these are the six elements of union. After this, then, there
being cessation of false cognition by the arising of a presentation of
soul, final emancipation is unimpeded ; and a system of meditation
is not therefore fruitless. V.
II IS II
Aph. 17. The egress and ingress (of internal sensories from
and into bodies), conjunctions with things eaten and drunk, and
conjunctions with other effects, all these things are caused by
destiny.
1 Egress, the issuing forth of the internal organ from the
rT3T fTHRTTW fWI W. aOTlU'SRT'CW ^-TcSTS: ?T3T JTT
: sraim *n sam am
HfUT*nionTT fa&urihs ^if?T T JT^snn^j fcnscpjimfff wig: u
smew
?f?r
( 172 )
body at the time of death ; ingress, the entrance of the internal
organ into another body when it is produced ; conjunctions with
food and water eaten and drunk ; and conjunctions of other effects,
with the body that is, of the sensual organs and vital airs ; the
actions from which these conjunctions arise, for these words are to
be supplied, these actions are caused by destiny, that is, have for
their non-coinherent cause conjunction with soul destined. V.
wra: u ^ it
Aph. 18. Where there is non-existence of this (that is, of
destiny), there is non-existence of conjunction, and non-existence
of manifestation, emancipation.
1 Where there is non-existence of this, that is of destiny, where
there is destruction of other than fructescent results of actions by
presentation of soul, and of fructescent results by fruition, there is
non-existence of conjunction, a severance from connection with the
stream or series of bodies. After this there is non-manifestation,
that is to say non-production of pain ; and from the absence of the
body and of destiny as causes, at that time emancipation or libera-
tion is possible. Emancipation, therefore, is not chimerical like
the horns of a hare. V.
Darkness. 55qyn^rlwn3WTg*rW: II H< II
Aph. 19. Darkness is a non-entity being dissimilar to the
production of substance, quality, and action.
2 It may be objected : The action of a substance is observed
also in darkness, there being such cognitions as The shadow moves.
?rcnnTWTci:
nrer. snran: HWcrat snroranrei sragcrmrawFracT Wot: u
3 ST-T rWHTsfa 355IF7 cROT ?TO^ ^frl ^T&ffT tffamrT cRT
( 173 )
In such cases there is no volition, no impulse or impact, and no
gravity or fluidity ; another efficient cause must therefore be posit-
ed, but this does not appear. The reply is here supplied. By this
also is confirmed the observation that there are only nine sub-
stances. The production of substances is dependent only on tangi-
ble substances, and no touch is observed in darkness. Nor is there
in darkness a touch, but inappreciable touch ; for where colour is
appreciable, touch must also needs be appreciable. If it be object-
ed that this is the rule with regard to earth, but darkness is a
tenth substance ; we reply thut this is not the case, for no other
substance is a substratum of blue colour, and gravity is inseparable
from blue colour, as also are taste and smell. If it be urged that
as ether has sound only as its differencing attribute, and darkness
may in like manner have blue colour for its peculiar property, we
reply that it is not so, for there is ,a contradiction to visibility ; for
were darkness merely something possessing blue colour, or blue
colour, it would not be perceived by the eye without an accompany-
ing perception of external light. U.
u ^ u
Aph. 20. And because of the obscuration of light by another
substance.
1 It may be asked : What then occasions the notion of motion
T <ifaomwii fami: *TrT*?j
crefamfr ?nn rrirnfa
fe fl jft^HPlclWtH ^tJTTcl clT rWt WTrJ 5rTSRTefin *TT{ U&
II
: n
( 174 )
of darkness ? The reply is therefore furnished. Light being ob-
scured by another substance in motion, and non-existence of light
not being observed in the east and being observed in the west, and
thus resembling a moving substance, an erroneous conception of
motion results, but there is no real motion in the case, or this ap-
pears from an inclusive and exclusive argument. Darkness is ab-
solute non-existence of all light in that which possesses appreciable
colour. U.
n ^1 n
Aph. 21. Space, time, and ether, are also inactive, being dis-
similar to that which possesses action.
1 The collateral section, comprising two aphorisms on dark-
ness, being completed, the section treating of voidness of ac-
tion is stated. The word also implies the addition of soul. The dis-
similarity from that which possesses action, is the illimitation of
space &c., for action resides only in the concrete. U.
n v< n
Aph. 22. By this are explained actions and qualities.
2 The inactivity of qualities and actions is stated. By this
means by dissimilarity from that which possesses action. Illimitation '
the dissimilarity from that which possesses action, belongs also
to qualities and actions, and they also are explained to be inac-
tive. U.
*roona: SRWWT faftr?: n *3 n
c*
Aph. 23. The co-inherence of things inactive is excluded from
actions.
fasmm: n
( 175 )
1 It might be objected : If qualities and actions are inactive,
how can there be any connection between them and substance ?
connection by conjunction would be possible, but that depends on
action only. Hence it is stated thafr co-inherence is the only con-
nection of qualities and actions which are inactive, and that this
is excluded from actions. Of this connection -there is not even the
production, much less dependency upon action. U.
r: n x 11
Aph. 24. But qualities as a cause are non-coinherent.
2 It might be objected : If qualities, as being immaterial, are
not a co-inherent cause of actions, how are qualities and actions
produced by qualities ? For causation in the form of being some-
thing over and above a co-inherent cause is not possible. The reply
to this is therefore furnished. Qualities are a non-coinherent
cause, not a co-inherent cause also, that they should be the sites of
actions. Non-coinherent causality sometimes results from co-in-
herence in the same object with the effect, as that of conjunction
with soul in the particular attributes of sounds, or of sound in con-
junction and disjunction in sound; in other cases it results from co-
inherence in the same object with the cause, as that of the colours
&c. of the parts of a water-pot &c., in the colour &c. of a water-pot
&c. U.
u su n
Aph. 25. By qualities space is explained.
?T3T cTTwr 35331 =fi
5ROTT\5to ^trBcT 'HTl WEsKUTUTi ?U9fiOTI!IT
etr ?r
6\ \3
fl
tl^T
1 An objection might be raised. In virtue of such cognitions
as, Action is produced here, Action is produced now, time and
space also are co-inherent causes of action. Else how could they
be its site? It is therefore stated that as the qualities gravity &c.,
being unlimited are not co-inherent causes of action, so it follows
also from its illimitation that space is not a co-inherent cause of
action. That to be a site does not imply co-inherence is proved by-
such instances as those of cotton in a bowl, curdled milk in a bowl,.
the roaring of a lion in a forest. U.
II r II
Aph. 26. By cause time [is explained.]
2 The words Is explained to be inactive are to be supplied ac-
cording to an altered construction. By the words by cause exis-
tence is indicated. Time, then, as an efficient cause is merely the
site of action, but not co-inherent with action. U.
SIXTH BOOK, FIRST DAILY LESSON.
H 1 H
Aph. 1. There is in the Veda a composition of sentences
consequent upon design.
*OT
: ii
( irr )
1 The object matter of the sixth book is the investigation
of merit and demerit the primary causes of transmigration. Merit
and demerit may be conceived as existing in virtue of such pre-
cepts and prohibitions as Let him that desires paradise offer sacri-
fices, Let him- not eat kalanja, assuming the authoritativeness of
such injunctions and prohibitions. Such authoritativeness is estab-
lished by the prior existence of the distinguishing attribute in the
speaker of accurate knowledge of tlie meaning of the words.
Absolute authoritativeness being denied, the author proceeds in the
first place to prove the quality determinant of the Veda. Compo-
sition of sentences, framing of propositions, is consequent upon in-
tention, preceded by the speaker's accurate knowledge of the
meaning of the sentences, because it is a composition of sentences,.
like the composition by ourselves and others of such sentenc s as
There are five fruits on the river's bank. In the Veda means in
the aggregate of sentences. Of this the composition of the aggre-
gated sentences is the subject ; and there is no unduly assumed
causality in the priority of the intention of ourselves and others.
Eor in such instances as Let him that desires paradise offer sacri-
fices, the means of attaining the desired object or the fact of its
being an effect are not objects of the intellect of ourselves or of
our fellow-creatures. Therefore there is established in the case of
the Veda the prior existence of an absolute author, and the defini-
tion of the Veda is words of authority, not derived 'from knowledge
of the meaning of propositions composed of words, accompanied,
msrivrrrcrra:
: 5RTd3fITm
33 fH\3jf?T 5?
HffT
( 178 )
with the nature of that which is not an object of certain know-
ledge derived from evidence other than of words and of the evi-
dence upon them dependent. U.
ar^HS risrrwl fafgra^* n 55 u
Aph. 2. The formation of names in the Brahmana is an evi-
dence of design.
1 It is stated in another manner that the words of the Veda
had intelligence as their antecedent. The Brahmana hero denotes
a portion of the Veda. The formation there of terms, or making
of names, points to the intention of the derivatist, just as the
making in ordinary language of such names as Long-ear, ' Long-
nose, Long-neck. U.
33CT?i: n 5 u
s ->^
A.ph. 3. The words He gives have intelligence as their
antecedent.
2 The injunction to make gifts in such precepts as, He that
desires paradise should give a cow, is derived from the knowledge
of the causal efficiency of such gifts. The particular employment
of the root in the form He gives, implies giving, the sense of the
root. U.
: n 8 11
Aph. 4. Likewise reception.
3 The sacred texts enjoining reception also imply an intelli
( 179 )
gent antecedent. The word reception implies a sacred text of
which it is the subject. Sacred texts eijoining acceptance of lauds
&c. indicate its efficacy to the welfare of the receiver. Sacred texts
setting forth the reception of the skin of the black antelope &e.,
imply efficacy to that which is undestred by the recipient. The
efficacy to the desired and the undesired cannot be merely objects
iu the minds of modern persons. U.
II U II
Aph. 5. Because the attributes of one soul are not a cause
with regard to another soul.
1 Because the attributes of one soul, its merits and demerits,
such as sacrifices injuries &c., are not a cause of the attributes
of pleasure and pain in another soul, pleasure and pain are produced
by such merit and demerit only as exist in each several soul, not by
merit and demerit inhering in different subjects. Otherwise, inas-
much as one by whom a sacrifice was not offered nor a wrong done
would receive its recompense, there would result a loss of what
was done and requital for what was not done. U.
ii s n
xj
Aph. 6. That does not exist in the case of the eating of the
wicked.
2 That denotes the fruit of a benediction. When evil Brah-
mans, unworthy recipients, are fed at the obsequial rites, no fruit
accrues from this to the ancestor ; or the meaning is simply that
the result of the obsequial rites does not accrue to the ancestor. TJ.
T*R T
Motfcl
( 130 )
nwrom H a n
v> v
Aph. 7. The evil has reference to wrong.
1 Has reference to wrong implies prohibited actions in gene-
ral. It shoud therefore be understood that a man occupied in
forbidden action is the wicked. U.
Aph. 8. Demerit results from association with him.
2 It is stated that not only is there absence of fruit in the
partaking of an unworthy Brahman invited to the obsequial rite,
but also sin accrues. Demerit or guilt results from association,
characterised as eating in the same row, sleeping, reading and the
like, together with him, i. e. with a Brahman occupied in illicit
action. U.
Aph. 9. This does not exist in the case of one not un-
worthy.
3 This guilt does not exist, that is, does not accrue in the case of
a Brahman not unworthy, i. e. one who acts according to sacred
precepts, invited to partake in the obsequial rite. U.
: n 9 u
Aph. 10. Again the procedure should be in relation to that
which is excellent.
r farass sw
t "
fift^t sRw
MT5TH
( 181 )
' If excellent persons, those who regulate their conduct ac-
cording to sacred precepts, are procured at obsequial rites or in
receiving gifts, a man should avoid those who are censurable though
they may have been invited. The text A man should not reject
those who are invited, refers to worthy recipients. But a man should
gratify blameable persons, when invited, by giving money, &c. U.
ii 19 it
Aph. 11. Again the procedure should be in relation to an,
equal or an inferior.
2 Where persons more excellent than oneself are not procured
at obsequial rites, it is explained that the procedure in obsequial
rites, alms &c., should be in relation to an equal, one like one-
self, or an inferior, one less in point of merit &c., than oneself.
Persons prohibited are by all means to be avoided, but not the
unblemished whether they be equals or inferiors. U.
u <K u
Aph. 12. By this is explained reception of property from
another, from inferior, equal, and superior, virtuous persons.
3 Merit, a serial increase of merit, results in the acquisition
of land &c., whether from an inferior, or an equal, or one more excel-
err MsjtszT iraTOTCgnigsRTOTO afe
WlHJrT T fsmfcffrIF; WrOrraraffrfT ?frf
rTTT
( 182 )
eiit than oneself, being virtuous. Acquisition is the reception of
property or wealth from another. According to the author of the
Vritti, by the reception of property from another the taking of
property by theft &c., is explained. In conformity with this is
the text From a Sudra on the seventh day, from a Vaisya on the
tenth, from a Kshatriya on the fifteenth, from a Brahman in case
of danger to life. To save himself or his family when starving
a man may steal the food of a Sudra, when he has been without
food for seven days ; when he has been .without food for ten
days, that of a Vaisya ; when he has been fifteen days wjthout
food, that of a Kshatriya. When his life is in danger, stealing
food from a Brahman tends not to demerit. U.
: n 13 n
Aph. 13. Likewise the making away with those who are
contrary.
1 Not only is the taking of others' property, when in danger
to life, not forbidden, but in such circumstances those who do not
give anything to take away, should even be put to death. And
by all this there is no loss of merit, or manifestation of demerit.
In such a case those who are contrary, those who act in the con-
trary manner, are to be put to death. Therefore it has been said :
Let a man save himself when in despair by whatsoever deed, fair
or foul ; when he is able let him practise righteousness. U.
^R ire rum n 18 n
Aph. 14. Making away with another has reference to an
inferior.
2 If another who does not give anything to take away is inferi-
or to oneself, he, the Sudra &c., may be put to death. U.
5R5R WTCfNeq 1 tTC^ncTTs 1 ^T sfiir rt^JT
HOT cJ^TSftT HRTnh =T fTTcIHT
cIT
r sr STS
( 183 )
5TT II W II
Aph. 1 5. In the case of an equal, suicide, or the destruction,
of the other.
1 If the opposite party be one's equal but only if he be a
Brahman in such a case suicide the destruction of oneself by
fasting &c., is to be committed. If there appear no means of
preserving oneself or one's family, and the opposite party be an
equal, he is to be made away with, or destroyed. U.
?frl II 95 II
Aph. 16. In the case of a superior suicide [is to be com-
mitted.]
2 In the case of an opposite party superior to oneself, distin-
guished by study of the Veda &c., suicide alone is lawful ; though
there be danger to life, a man may design only his own death, but
must not slay a Brahman. U.
SECOND DAILY LESSON.
f ^Tf TSITOT5RT3T f ^mii H*U5RRWJ3reTS II 9 II
Aph. 1. Of action of which the motives are seen and un-
seen, a motive, where there is none seen, tends to exaltation.
3 Actions where the motives are seen are agriculture, mer-
vrafa
w-
: u
mzi
chandise service of the king, &c. Actions where the motives are
unseen are sacrifice, charity, chastity, &c. Among these actions
where a visible motive is not observed, an invisible motive is to be sup-
posed, and such a motive conduces to exaltation, or knowledge of the
truth. Or the dative case to exaltation may be employed in the
sense of the nominative, in which case the sense will be that exal-
tation is the result. An unseen result is a remote consequence.
If this be produced by asceticism, the exaltation is presentation of
soul ; if by sacrifice, almsgiving &c., the exaltation is paradise.
In this instance such actions as sacrificing, giving alms, continence
-&c., do not immediately bear fruit, as such actions as milking, cook-
ing &c., have immediate results, and such actions as sowing,
ploughing &c., after a while bear fruit ; for there is no such proxi-
mate result observed. Nor is gain &c., through being known as
virtuous, the result. For those who practise secret continence &c.,
do not design such results. The result therefore is the remotely
future paradise &c., and this does not immediately suceed the
action which rapidly ceases to exist. It results therefore that
there is in the interim a common site of the action and the fruit,
viz. requitative efficacy. U.
u ^ n
Aph. 2. Inaugurations, fasting, continence, residence in the
family of a spiritual guide, life in the forest, sacrifice, almsgiving,
oblation, the cardinal points, constellations, sacred texts, seasons, and
religious observances, conduce to invisible result.
wsfrr
: faRHTUT
usa tjcqoreq u
( 185 )
1 Of those, some of the actions of which the result is unseen,
are pointed out. These actions conduce to, that is produce, unseen
results. Among these inauguration is the sprinkling of kings ;
fasting, the abstinence of the Siva-ratri ; continence, abstinence
from sexual intercourse ; residence in the house of a spiritual guide
that of religious students for the purpose of studying . the Veda ;
living in the forest, the actions of those who set out at the close of
life for the forest ; sacrifice, the Raja-suya &c. ; almsgiving, at the
beginning of the month A'shadha ; oblation, of rice, cattle &c. ; the
cardinal points, orientation of meals &c. ; constellations, the obse-
quial rites of the tenth lunar asterism Magha &c. ; sacred texts,
the holy monosyllable Om, the Gayatri &c. ; seasons, the Chatur-
rnasya rites &c. ; religious observances, purifications, contentment,
penance, study, and meditation on the Deity. By the word and,
are to be understood also those not here enumerated, but which
are prescribed by revelation and tradition. V.
" 3
Aph. 3. The duty of the four periods of religious life [has
been declared.] Fidelities and infidelities [are causes of merit and
demerit.]
2 The duty of the four periods of religious life is the conduct
prescribed in these four stages, viz., those of the religious student,
householder, hermit, and mendicant. This has been already de-
clared : such are the words to be supplied. Infidelities are defects
*rem straro:
era:-
faflft 3r3iOT Hf
: u
( 180 )
of faith ; fidelities non-deficiencies of faith, efficient causes of
merit and demerit. V.
sren J^STT u & u
Aph. 4. A deficiency of faith is an infidelity ; a non-defi-
ciency a fidelity.
1 Deficiencies of faith, lust, anger, covetousness, infatuation,
intoxication, envy &c., are expressed by the terra infidelity ; nori-
deficiencies of faith, freedom from negligence and sloth, tranquilli-
ty of mind &c., are to be understood by the term fidelity. V.
n y n
Aph. 5. That which is of prescribed colour, taste, smell and
touch, the aspersed, and the sprinkled, are pure.
2 That colour &c., which is enjoined by revelation and tradi-
tion is prescribed. The substance to which such colour &c., be-
longs as such is pure. Of these colour is prescribed in such texts
as, He buys the soma for a cow, ruddy, one year old, with tawny
eyes ; He should take a white goat. The aspersed is that which
is sprinkled with water during the recitation of a sacred text ;
the sprinkled, that which is sprinkled with water without a sacred
text. The word and implies that which is lawfully acquired. This
is such as is denoted by such precepts as that a Brahman should
acquire wealth by performing sacrifices, by teaching, and by
receiving presents. U.
^rerarfa *rfgf?nfa: n 5 n
N S
Aph. 6. Impure denotes the negation of the pure.
: n
fcffeft tl^T 35EJW rTrlOT
( 187 )
1 The contrary of such substance as is pure is impure. A
substance of wrong colour, taste, smell, or touch, one not aspersed
or sprinkled, or sprinkled with forbidden water, or unlawfully
acquired, as the property of a Brahman acquired by agriculture
or merchandise, is impure. U.
ii o ii
Aph. 7. And something else.
2 That which is vitiated by speech or by disposition even in
that which is of excellent colour, taste, smell, or touch, or in that
which is aspersed or sprinkled, or justly acquired, is also impure. U.
u n
Aph. 8. To the unrestrained there accrues no exaltation
from eating what is pure, inasmuch as there is an absence of re-
ligious observance ; or it accrues, because restraint is something
else.
3 To the unrestrained means to one deficient in restraint, or
wanting in self-control. The eating of one void of the restraint
denoted by such a rule as, A man should eat after washing his
hands and feet, and rinsing his mouth, restrained in speech, When
food is presented to him, though pure, he should twice rinse his
r. ii
2
3!rT
cfT amrfflHTHTfl^ MT5R
UHT VW. fTOT
( 188 )
mouth, does not tend to exaltation, but to sin. It may be asked
why, the answer accordingly is furnished. Inasmuch as there is
an absence of religious observance, in consequence of the non-
existence of the religious observance, the secondary cause. That
which takes place where the observance is performed is stated. Or
it accrues, exaltation accrues only in the case of eating with the
accompaniment of the prescribed restraint. It may be asked why,
hence it is stated that it is because restraint is something else,
that is, is something else than eating. The sense, therefore, .is,
that without the accessory cause there is no realisation of the
result, and that with it there is. U.
Aph. 9. For there is non-existence [of exaltation"! where
[the eating of pure food] does not exist.
1 Though there be restraint, where the eating of pure food is
not, there is non-existence of exaltation : such is the completion
of the eMipse. Restraint and eating are therefore both causes of
merit. The word eating designates secondarily other actions.
Restraint and religious observance are accessories also of sacrifice,
almsgiving, ablutions, oblations and other acts prescribed by reve-
lation and tradition. U.
I: u H n
Aph. 10. From pleasure arises desire.
* Restraint having been specified as an accessory with regard
< ih*: Hm ^r SOT
?g& wioRftrrgtrereirr 9TH3T?iimT
IUT wfacmi s^RiiwT u
iirir
{ ungxrorgi:
n
( 189 )
to merit and demerit, the origin of defects is stated, with the pur-
pose of specifying defects as accessories. "Desire or wish arises
from pleasure generated by attachment to garlands, sandal -wood,
women, and other objects of sensr, or in the pleasures of those
successive kinds, or in the means of those pleasures. It is also to
be considered that aversion arises from pain begotten by snakes,
thorns &c., in those pains, or in the means of those pains. Desire,
aversion, and infatuation, in virtue of being incentives to activity,
are called defects. Accordingly the aphorism of .Gautama, Defects
have for their characteristic incitement to activity. U.
Aph. 11. Also through that being engrained.
1 The words desire and aversion arise are to be supplied
That which is engrained is a particular powerful reproduction en-
gendered by use of objects of sense, by the influence of which it is
that the unhappy lover, who does not win his mistress, sees his be.-
loved in every object ; and he who has been once bitten by a snake,
in consequence of the forcible reproduction, sees snakes everywhere
It has therefore been said : Habituation to an object is its lumino-
us revelation external or internal. U.
Aph. 12. Also through destiny.
3 The words desire and aversion arise are to be supplied.
Though destiny be a universal cause, yet in relation to these it
sometimes assumes the nature also of a special cause. Such cases
S &*
'( 190 )
fire to be inferied as the desire of a mistress at the commencement
of youth, even in one who has not experienced in this birth the
pleasures of love ; the aversion towards snakes even in those who
have not experienced pain from snake-bites, &c. U.
n 93 u
Aph. 13. Also through particularity of race.
1 Another accessory is stated. Thus on the part of the hu-
man race there is desire towards rice &c., on that of deer towards
grass &c., on that of camels towards briers, &c. In all these cases
destiny which determines such and such a race is the cause ; but
race, or particular birth is only a means. Similarly the desire of
pigeons &c., for refuse. So also the" aversion of buffaloes towards
a horse, of dogs towards a jackal, of ichneumons towards a snake
&c., is to be inferred. U.
II 18 I!
Aph. 14. Activity in merit or demerit has for its antecedents
desire and aversion.
2 A-Ctivity in a lawful action has desire for its condition ; in
an unlawful action, injury &c., activity has aversion for its con-
dition. Activity determined by desire in sacrifice &c. begets merit ;
activity detei mined by aversion in injury &c. begets demerit.
These same desire and aversion cause th\' series of transmigrations.
rrn: *OT5n?TtaPTT rjTrn-
*TTT: rmi wuraTrttara gc^ir.
II
imn
: H^IT ^ ITTHjftli J5RJT tT^fH^FrafewftnTW: ?frT
?ffzi ftr^ fsHfwfNnnin ^^rsrJTficrawfSfTiTFTfH TJTTJT
( 191 )
Accordingly the aphorism of Gautama Activity is energy of word
thought and body. Verbal activity is energy of voice : it is me-
ritorious so far forth as it is true, kind, and useful ; evil so far
forth as untrue, unkind, useless. By thought intelligence, by which
we think or know, is intended. Sensorial activity, therefore, is com-
passion towards all creatures, &c. Bodily activity is almsgiving
ministration &c., evil in ten ways, and good in ten ways. U.
Aph. 15. By these are conjunction and disjunction.
1 Existence in a future state is now declared to be the occa-
sion of merit and demerit. By these by merit and demerit
conjunction, that is birth, is caused. By conjunction is here intend-
ed connection with non-previous pains of bodily organs. Dis-
junction is the disjunction of body and the internal sensory, cha-
racterised as death. The meaning is therefore that this transitory
world, a series of births and deaths, otherwise termed existence in
a future state, is caused by merit and demerit. U.
aHWTfi: n IS u
<0 S
Aph. 16. Emancipation is declared as dependent on the
actions of the soul.
2 This it is which is the separation of body and soul. When
there exist the actions of the sou), emancipation ensues. The
actions of the soul are as follows : hearing, meditation, the prac-
^4 Ml' WITOJTOT: TOTSR trewTorcrT^ i cnwii VUTTOTTWH
fTT-
tnnTwrrerr
( T92: )
tice of devotion, abstraction, a sitting posture, restraining the vital
airs, of acquistion of quietism and self-subjugation, the presen-
tation of one's own and others' souls, knowledge of merit and
demerit previously acquired, whereof there must be fruition in
other bodies and places, the formation of various bodies suitable to.
the fruition thereof, the destruction of merit and demerit by fruir
tion, and emancipation characterised as removal of pain consequent
on the cessation of birth, resulting from the cessation of activity
in consequence of the non-production of further merit and deme-
rit, by overcoming the mist of defects characterised as desire and
aversion. Of these the primary act of soul is knowledge of tha
real nature of the six categories. U.
SEVENTH BOOK, FIRST DAILY LESSON.
Aph. 1. The qualities have been stated.
1 Deskous of investigating the qualities in the seventh book
the author reminds us of their enunciation and definition. The
meaning is that the qualities have been stated, that is, enunciated,
and defined. V.
Aph. 2. Also the colour, taste, smell, and touch of the earth,
&c., inasmuch as substances are non-eternal, are non-eternal.
2 The colour, taste, semll, and touch of earth ; the colour
touch, and taste of water ; the colour and touch of light or fire; and
JTHIT
: u
(193 )
the touch of air; these, inhering in the non -eternal are non-eternal,
inasmuch as they cease to be on the cessation of the existence of
their substrata. The particle also implies unity, individual unity,
extension, gravity, natural fluidity, and viscidity. These also are, in,
the non-eternal, non-eternal. V.
Aph. 3. By this is declared their eternity in things eternal.
1 By this by the affirmation that their non-eternity is caused
by the non-eternity of their substrata, the eternity of colour &c. in
eternal substrata is declared, that is virtually asserted, being
involved. The reading adopted by the author of the Vritti is Non-
eternity in things eternal. In this opinion colour &c. are non-
eternal in things eternal, that is in atoms, inasmuch as colour and
the other qualities above mentioned are destructible by conjunc-
tion with fire. But it is to be considered that in this reading there
is no congruity between the words by this and is declared. V.
II 8 (I
Aph. 4-. They are eternal in water, light, and air, inasmuch
as the substances are eternal.
1 It may be objected : Why, whereas colour and the other
qualities residing in terrene atoms are destructible by conjunction
with fire, is it universally stated that they are eternal in things
eternal? The things eternal are therefore characterised. The
sense is that colour and the other qualities are not eternal when
existing in eternal earth, but are stated in the preceding aphorism
to be eternal only when residing in eternal water, light and air. V.
snnsfcri
UT5 JIH^fo STfifaffT ^ SfrT =T WcfcftfrT
M
( 194 )
II U II
Apb. 5. In things non-eternal they are non-eternal, because
the substances are non-eternal.
1 It may be asked whether qualities other than colour &c. exis-
ting in things non-eternal are eternal, in which case conjunction
&c. would be eternal. It is therefore stated that all qualities which
reside in things non-eternal, are non-eternal, in consequence of this
non-eternity of their substratum ; and that consequently there
are no eternal qualities in things non -eternal. U.
: n n
^ v
Aph. 6. [Colour, taste, smell, and touch] produced by com-
bustion in earth, have for their antecedents the qualities of their
causes.
2 It is implied that the colour, taste, smell, and touch residing
*Jjfafi(JTrTT TOUT: T3R
H H 53rrf^f?IT
: II
513131 clHcldTH^ UTITT?R7t eFTSa
( 195 .)
in wholes, have for their antecedents the qualities of their cause';
that is, that they become manifest from the homogeneous qualities
which are attributes of the parts, which are the cause of their own
substratum. It is thus to be understood that the presentation of
colour, taste, smell, and touch residing in the parts which are the
non-coinherent causes of colour, taste, smell, and touch, existing
in the wholes, is by the connection of co-inhesion with the co-
inherent. In anticipatfon of the question how in a dark water-pot
&c. after powerful conjunction with fire there is production of red
colour &c., it is stated that in earth those qualities produced by
burning also for the word also is to be supplied colour, taste,
smell, and touch in earth, even when produced by burning, have
for their antecedents the qualities of their causes. Burning is
an extraordinary conjunction with fire resulting in change of colour,
&c. This also is a non-coinherent cause of colour, &c. On this
subject those who maintain the combustion of atoms hold that it is
in the atom that the change of colour &c. consequent on combus-
tion takes place, and not in the whole. According to their doctrine
the red colour &c. is produced in the atom, after the dissolution of
the whole into binary atomic, aggregates by destruction of the
originative conjunction consequent upon an extraordinary conjunc-
tion with fire ; and after this ensues again production beginning
with binary aggregates and terminating in the whole possessed of
magnitude, in the progressive order of originative conjunction &c.
caused by the production of action &c., conformable to originative
conjunction in consequence of an extraordinary conjunction with
fire. Those who maintain the combustion of wholes such as the
pot, teach that, the wholes being porous, it is in them that the
i
ferarorwii
T sfa 3 r3 1 fd Wl
j w
( 106 )
change of colour &c. takes place in consequence of conjunction
with the particular kind of fire; and that there is in this case
no destruction of the wholes; for this would be contrary to obsei'va-
tion. The order of combustion is here omitted to avoid voluminous
prolixity, and may be sought elsewhere. According to the doctrine
of those who teach that particular blue colours &c. are only indivi-
dually eternal, the cognition and expression that blue colour has
ceased to exist and dark colour has been produced is improper,
inasmuch as connection by co-inherence is eternal, and the pro-
duction of such a cognition and expression, with connection by
co-inhesion as its object, is impossible. Else, were it possible, the
eternity and unity of water-pots &c. would follow. There being
a cognition of difference in the nature of the colour of a water-
pot, there cannot but be a difference in the attribute and then
in the subject of the attribute. In a piece of cloth &c. origina-
ting in various threads &c. of blue, yellow, and other colours,
there is produced a composite colour, for were such cloth colourless
&c., its visual presentation would be impossible. In conformity with
this, they say, is the verse : That is said to be a blue ox which is
ruddy in colour in the face, yellowish in the tail, and white in the
horns and hoofs. Taste and smell are never composite, there
being no harm if it be but allowed that wholes originated by parts
possessing various tastes &c. are tasteless, &c. A composite touch
must be allowed according to the analogy of colour. V.
II a II
Aph. 7. Because there is only one substance.
1 In reply to the objection : How can the qualities of the cause,
as not existing in the effect, be productive of the qualities of the
wra: H
( 197 )
effect, there being a difference of substratum ? it is stated that it
is because there exists that whereof there is one substance as the
substratum, that is because there is a common substratum. Not-
withstanding, therefore, that the qualities of the cause do not exist
in the relation of immediate co-inherence in the effect, yet inas-
much as, in the relation of community of substratum characterised
as co-inherence with the co-inherent, they do exist in the effect,
the production by them of the qualities of the effect is not impos-
sible. V.
faci an^TH n ii
Aph. 8. The perception and non-perception of the atomic
and of that which has magnitude, have been explained to be con-
stant.
1 The word eternal or constant refers, as to a section to that
which contains it, to the fourth book which treats of eternity
The respective application of the words perception and non-percep-
TTOKT H3=f ^RI "ftsn
TcrfriTTimTfir &* g crf^ciTT^ ircJTT*!TOiR7
( 198 )
tion is according to the rule : That which is connected with another,
is connected with the more remote. Non-perception of the atomic
is thus obtained. In the presentative cognition therefore, determined
as a large blue water-pot, the extension is just as much an object as
the blue colour ; and by means of this, extension termina-
ting in the atomic as a minimum is inferred, as also from substanti-
ality. Moreover of the perceptibility of substance the cause is coloured
extension, for without magnitude substance cannot be perceived. Ac-
cordingly it is decided that, as being a cause of perceptibility of sub-
stance, and as being of itself perceptible, extension is a quality. For
were the form of a water-pot &c., its extension, a man would bring
a water-pot, when he was told to bring the great ; and thus there
would be a contradiction in the order and the apprehension of it,
and likewise by the term water-pot, extension would be conveyed,
or by the term extension a water-pot. The notion of magnitude
is that of a particular cause of the usage of measurement, or that
of a universal quality existing in objects and the cause of the pre^-
sentation of substance. The usage of measurement is the usage of
cubits, spans &c., not the usage of weights, numbers &c. This ex-
tension is of four kinds, the great,, the small the long, and the
short. Of these, infinite greatness and infinite length exist in the
four pervading substances, absolute smallness and absolute short-
ness exist in atoms. Intermediate smallness and intermediate
shortness exist in binary atomic aggregates. Greatness and length
reside in substances, from tertiary atomic aggregates upwards to
composite wholes. In this manner all substances whatever pos-
sess two extensions or dimensions. The notion of smallness in a
vilva or amalaka fruit and of shortness in fuel, sugar-canes &c., is
relative. The relativity in this case is the existence or non-existence
of greater size. There is non-existence in a jujube of the greater
size, of which there is existence in an emblic myrobalan. There
does not exist in an emblic myrobalan the greater size which exists
in a vilva-fruit. This as containing as parts both the primary antf
( 190 )
secondary magnitudes, is described by the term relative magni-
tude. U.
Aph. 9. Also in consequence of a plurality of causes, exten-
sion is produced.
1 The particle also implies the addition of magnitude and coal-
escence. Extension is produced is the ellipse to be supplied in
the aphorism. Among these, plurality of causes alone produces
greatness and length in a tertiary aggregate, since greatness and
accretion do not exist in their cause. The plurality is derived
from the relative cognition of the Deity. The influence of parti-
cular destiny determines a plurality of objects in the divine cogni-
tion. Similarly duality existing in two atoms is productive of
extension in a binary atomic aggregate. In a piece of cloth origi-
nated by two threads not coalescent, it is magnitude alone which
is the non-coin herent cause, inasmuch as plurality and coalescence
do not there exist. But where a ball of cotton is originated by
two balls of cotton, in this case coalescence is the cause, for there
is here observed an increase of extension, and there is no plurality ;
and magnitude even though it existed, could not be an occasion of
increase of extension. Such being the case even were magnitude
here a cause, there would be no failure in the argument. Hence
it has been said : By two, by one, or by all. Coalescence is an
?=raTir:,
( 200 )
4
originative conjunction, and is defined as conjunction in an object of
some of its constituent parts towards itself, in which object some
of the constituent parts are non-conjunct towards itself ; for it is
said that this conjunction of constituent parts involves a lax con-
junction of its own portions, is productive of extension, and ia
involved in the origination of qualities and actions. U.
1 II
Aph. 10. The contrary of this is the minute.
1 That which is the contrary of this, that is of -great extension
established by perception, is minute extension. The contrariety
arises from imperceptibility, and contrariety of causes ; for the
causes of magnitude are magnitude, plurality, and coalescence ; and
the cause of minuteness is duality produced by the relative conception
of the Deity residing in the cause. By this is also to be understood
shortness the contrary of length, and in this case also the contra-
riety is as aforesaid. U.
ii <w ii
Aph. 11. The notions greater and smaller [arise] in this con-
ception [of a relatively great and a relatively small object] from
the existence of particularity, and from the non-existence of parti-
cularity.
* The word iti refers to the usage. There is, then, a practical
, *4^rc
^f?rci53[T cQcrwrcuraT srarafH, HI
T sftfl, cHT
irr? I Fc45JUW rHfTiTTcfTrT,
fT^TWTofTrT
S3HT5ITfJ fgWTWTcITf f
( 201 )
assurance that a jujube is small in relation to a bel-fruit, an em-
blic myrobalan great in relation to a jujube, and a bel-fruit great
in relation to an emblic myrobalan. Among these the principal
notion is that of greatness. The reason of this is stated to be that
there exists particularity ; that is, that there exists particular mag-
nitude, because there is a relation of more and less. But among
these the notion of smallness is relative. The reason of this is
said to 'be the non-existence of particularity, that is the non-exis-
tence there is of particular smallness. For minuteness as a pro-
duct resides only in binary atomic aggregates, and as eternal
abides only in the ultimate particles. But this does not exist in a
jujube, &c. In other words, it is because there exist in the particles
of the jujube &c. plurality, magnitude and coalescence of constitu-
ent elements, which are a particular cause of magnitude ; and because
there does not exist in the jujube &c. duality not having a common
substratum with magnitude, which duality is the cause of small-
ness. U.
S3i3n5Tr3TR U 1* II
Aph. 12. Because the time is one.
1 The greatness and smallness are both experienced at one time,
and these greatness and smallness being contrary to one another
cannot exist together in one substratum. Therefore, inasmuch as
there exists a cause of greatness, the conception of magnitude is
in this instance primary and the notion and usage with regard to
smallness are derivative or relative only. U.
I^T^TI^ ii 13 u
Aph. 13. Also because of the example.
2 It is seen likewise that in the natural order of things there
( 202 )
must be a practical conception of a great, greater, and greatest, in
the jujube, emblic myrobalan, and bel-fruits which posssess magni-
tude, just as in the course of things there is a conventional notion
of white, whiter, and whitest, in a piece of cloth, a conch shell,
crystal &c., which are white. U.
r: n 18 n
v> -O s>
Aph. 14. The non-existence of greatness and smallness in
greatness and smallness, is explained by greatness and smallness.
1 It may be objected that in virtue of the practical notion
of small and great extension, it is known that in magnitude as an
extension there exists magnitude, and in smallness as an extension
there exists smallness. How then can these exist in substance
alone, or how does not the contradiction emerge of the existence of
quality in quality ? In answer to this it is stated that as quality
and action do not possess quality and action, so also greatness and
smallness do not possess greatness and smallness, and that such a
conventional notion is to be regarded as tropical. U.
: n W u
Aph. 15. Actions are explained to be [void] of actions, and
qualities of qualities.
2 It may be urged that as qualities are possessed of qualities
and how else could there be such conventional notions as a loud
sound, one sound, twenty-four qualities &c.? and as actions are
:, a^nrafir
lr^W^Tg *af<J =T rTga't ^JTrn
ifti
( 203 )
possessed of actions and how else could there be such cognitions ^
as, It goes quickly, It goes rapidly ? so in like manner greatness
and smallness must also be possessed of greatness and sinallness.
In answer to this it is stated that actions are not possessed of ac-
tions, nor are qualities possessed of qualities, and that in like man-
ner greatness and smallness are not possessed of greatness and
smallness, but the conventional notion is in all these cases tro-
pical. U.
snsrFgHTa^TWfi TOTTO* SJI^TRT: u HS u ,
N>
Aph. 16. Actions moreover and qualities are explained to be
[void] of small ness and greatness.
1 It may be mged that in virtue -of such conventional notions
as small actions, great actions, small qualities, great qualities, the
extension greatness and smallness must be concluded to exist in
action and quality. It is therefore stated that as the extensions great-
ness and smallness do not exist in the extensions greatness and
smallness, in like manner neither of those extensions exists in action
or in qualities ; and that the aforesaid conventional notions have as
their objects increase and diminution. "V.
r
m* 5h*ra*cJr% SQT^rm II IS) II
Aph. 17. By this length and shortness are explained.
* It is stated that shortness and length are similar to smallness
and greatness. As smallness and greatness are proved to exist by
the conventional notions of great and small, so shortness and length
are proved to exist by the conventional notions of long and short.
In like manner also the nction and convention that one thing is
shorter or is longer than another, have for their object increase anef.
diminution. V.
Aph. 18. In the non-eternal [extensionj'is non-eternal.
1 Extension is non-eternal in the non-eternal. It is in conse-
quence of the destruction of its substratum that it ceases to exist.
It is not to be maintained that in a water-pot and the like, where
there is an increase or diminution by two, three or more atoms,.
there is another extension recognised by perception, on the ground
that there is in this case no destruction of the water-pot &c. inas-
much as there exists in regard to it the recognition that it is the
same water-pot. For in the case of a diminution or increase of the
atoms there is necessarily a destruction commencing in the tertiary
.atomic aggregates and terminating in the composite wholes, there
being necessarily a destruction of the binary aggregates ; for the sum
of destroying causes fails not in obtaining its effect through any diffi-
culty with regard to the recognition. In the case of an increase in the
body &c. there is necessarily a destruction of the composite whole,
inconsequence of the necessity of the destruction of the non-coin-
herent cause. Nor can it be urged : Where there is not destruction
of a piece of cloth &c., bow can there be an addition of extension
resulting from conjunction with other threads ? For in this instance
( 20S )
there must needs be destruction of the piece of cloth resulting from the
destruction of the conjunction of the threads, which conjunction is
the non-coinherent cause; such destruction being caused by the strik-
ing of the loom, &c. Moreover if that other thread were a portion of
that cU>th, the cloth of which it is the thread would not previously
exist, since the thread which is its cause would not exist. But if that
thread be not a part, there can be thereby no addition to its exten-
sion, as is the case with other conjunct substances. It must, there-
fore, necessarily be admitted that in this case, when conjunction
with another thread takes place, there results production of another
piece of cloth from destruction of the former piece of cloth. The
recognition of the composite whole is caused by the homogeneity
of the former and latter wholes, as in the recognition of the con-
tinuous identity of the flame of a lamp. Nor is it to be maintain-
ed that the former threads, through the subsidiary agency" of the
other threads, originate a new piece of cloth during the existence of
the former piece of cloth, for it would involve the contradiction of
two substances at the same time occupying the same space. V.
Aph. 19. In the eternal it is eternal. .
1 The extension which exists in things eternal, that is in ether
&c. and in atoms is eternal, for there is nothing to destroy it. U.
ft?** qfcrag33 n r ii
Aph. 20. Atomic extension is eternal.
2 The word parimandala technically designates atomic exten-
sion, and an atom characterised by such extension. An atom, that
is a 'substance consisting of an ultimate particle characterised by
atomic extension, is eternal : there is therefore no scarcity of eternal
rtfarrf fcHTSr^WTctTrT II
( 206 )
substance. The eternity thereof has also previously been decla-
red. V.
fesufapr n xl u
Aph. 21. Ignorance, moreover, is an indication of knowledge;
1 It may be asked why should we admit substance in the form
of atoms, since it cannot be perceived ; and may be maintained that
only such substance as is cognised by perception, such as tertiary
atomic aggregates &c., is to be admitted. To this the reply is fur-
nished : Ignorance, the absence of certain knowledge, that is such
cognition as that earth is eternal or that water is eternal, having a
composite whole as its object, is a mark or indication of the'exis-
tence of the science or certain knowledge, the object of which is
atomic, that earth is eternal ; inasmuch as certain knowledge has
always for its antecedent the absence of certain knowledge, for such
an error as that earth is eternal cannot arise in one that has no notion
of eternity. This mode of proving accidentally but really the exis-
tence of atoms, which has been formerly described, merits atten-
tion. V.
fgHen^w^RTSfirasTOT gj?m n ^ n
Aph. 22. Ether, in consequence of its universal pervasion, is
infinitely great ; and so likewise is soul.
2 Ether, as pervading all things, in consequence of conjunction
350
ITOTOT
HfotrpiffI
: n
2 fgworrrj t5 w ^H^nr
( 207 )
with all finite things is infinitely great, or possesses infinitely great
extension. This extension is eternal, since ether is eternal. Did
there not exist in ether conjunction with all matter, the production
of sound limited to various places would be impossible, for conjunc-
tion with ether in respective places is the non-coinherent cause of
respective sounds. In like manner soul also is possessed of eternal
and infinitely great extension, being all-pervasive. The universal
pervasion of soul is proved, inasmuch as conj unction with soul in-
fluenced by Destiny is the cause of action in the atoms at the time of
creation. V.
Aph. 23. In consequence of non-existence of that [universal
pervasion] the internal organ is absolutely small.
1 It may be urged : The internal organ is also, like soul, an all-
pervading substance, inasmuch as it is the substratum of conjunc-
tions which are the non-coinherent causes of cognitions &c ; why
therefore has not its infinite greatness been enounced ? In reply to
this it is stated, that in consequence of the non-existence of that
universal pervasion, the internal sensory is absolutely small, is not
possessed of infinitely great extension. The proof that the internal
organ, as determinant of non-simultaneity of cognitions, is abso-
lutely small, results from the impossibility of evidence cognisant of
an object of the forementioned inference probative of universal
pervasion. V.
Aph. 2-4. By its qualities space is explained [to be all-com-
prehensive.]
\ffiFhrani3rtmTin facnvjHcJnfsfrr wa: n
( 208 )
1 By its qualities characterised as priority and posteriority
existing in all finite things, and consisting of the common prior,
posterior, and other conceptions of beings existent in all divisions
of the universe, space also is explained to be all-comprelieu.sive. If
it be asked how the notion and expression of ten spaces or quarters
of the compass arise, whereas it is to be stated that relative con-
ception, having for its object the more and the less in conjunctions
with the conjunct, is the cause of the production of priority and
posteriority, and whereas the conception of a plurality of spaces is
contravened by the complexity of the conception or needlessness
of the hypothesis ; to this we reply that this is no valid objection,
inasmuch as it has been stated that the conception is determined by
the particular accidents of space. U.
: n ^y u
Aph. 25. Time relates to a cause.
2 The designation time relates to a substance which is the
cause of the cognitions of the prior, posterior, reciprocal, simulta-
neous, non-simultaneous, slow, and fast. Such a cognition, com-
mon to persons in all places, would be impossible unless time were
universally pervasive. Its universal pervasion is possession of
infinite magnitude. Or (it may be argued) that in virtue of such
1 TTCJI:
cor: fenfu
TO elf's 3
II
asa
i g
UHttlH
I
Z&X 3!T*nTsZlfrT
( 209 )
cognitions as born now &c., time is the occasional cause of all
that is produced, and this is dependent on universal pervasion ; for
an occasional cause is the condition of the apprehension of the
co-inherent and non-coinherent cause. Or another argument
might be, that the notion of past, present, and future is applicable
to all objects, and therefore time is existent everywhere. Or that
the designation time relates to the conventional divisions of mo-
ments, lavas, hours, watches, days, days and nights, lunar fort-
nights, seasons, half-years, years &c., and this conventional division
being of universal application, time is everywhere existent, and
consequently infinitely great. It has been explained that the
conception of a plurality of times is contravened by the complex-
ity of the hypothesis. U.
SECOND DAILY LESSON.
II 1 II
Aph. 1. Because of the exclusion of colour, taste, smell, and
touch, unity is a different object.
1 The investigation of number, and individuality is commen-
ced after that of extension, because magnitude is the cause of the
perceptibility of number, &c. Unity is a different object, different
from colour &c., not having colour &c. for its form. The term
unity implies number and the four succeeding qualities, viz. exten-
sion, individuality, conjunction, and disjunction. The object of
such cognitions as Space is one, Time is one &c., must be allowed
to be some quality different from colour &c., because of the exclu-
sion of colour, taste, smell, and touch, that is because of the non-
fa *
?RT-
N
( 210 )
existence of colour &c., in space &c. It cannot be urged : What
is the case with such cognitions as one generality, one particularity,
one co-inhesion, one non-existence &c. ; for we must admit in
regard to these independently a notion of unity, constituted by
their being the object of a modification of the intellect. V.
u ^ n
Aph. 2. Likewise individuality.
1 The similarity of the quality individuality to number is
stated. Individuality also is, like number, another quality. In
this quality single individuality is like the number unity, and
dual individuality &c. is like the numbers duality, &c. Nor is it
to be argued that, there being observed a community of object in
the cognitions, The water-pot is individually apart from the piece
of cloth, or other than, or different from it, individuality is only
reciprocal non-existence, and not another quality ; for did the
negative particle signify no difference from the word apart as an
adverb, there could be no dissimilarity between the cognitions, This
is apart, and This is not. V.
: II 3 II
Aph. 3. The non-existence of unity, and single individuality
in unity and single individuality is explained by smallness and
greatness.
2 It may be objected that in virtue of such cognitions as one
rllttlT*!Ifer
: II
( 211 )
unity, there exists unity in unity, and in like manner in virtue of
such cognitions as that single individuality is individuality apart
from dual individuality, single individuality must be admitted to
exist in single individuality ; and that consequently there is a
difficulty involved in their being qualities, inasmuch as^ they
exist in qualities. In answer to this it is stated that as smallness
and greatness do not exist in smallness and greatness, so also
unity and single individuality do not exist in unity and single
individuality, but this cognition is to be shown possible in some
other manner. V.
fa:wr?aTH gwynrai sUsRra * fecra n 8 u
Aph. 4. Unity does not exist in all things, for actions and
qualities are void of number.
1 It may be asked as the notion of unity is common to
qualities and to actions, what reason there is to conclude that the
unity which exists in substances does not exist in qualities, &c.
Unity does not exist in all things. If it be asked why, it is replied
that it is because actions and qualities are destitute of number.
Numberlessness is the state of those things that transcend number,
that is, that are without number. Accordingly actions and quali-
ties are without number. Inasmuch as number is a quality, number
does not exist in qualities. Nor does it exist in actions, for
qualities are denied of actions, for otherwise it would follow that
actions were substances ; and it has been demonstrated that num-
ber is a quality, and unity a number. U.
n??i HH n il n
Aph. 5. That [notion] is erroneous.
( 212 )
1 It may be asked : How then the notion of one colour, one
taste &c. ? It is stated in reply "that the notion of unity in relation
to qualities and actions is erroneous. In the aphorism there is aa
ellipse of the Word notion, this being the subject previously-
mentioned. The notion thus applied is derivative and derived
from essential inseparability ; but this is not unity, for it has
been stated to be other than unity. U.
asra u S it
Aph. 6. In consequence of non-existence of unity, second-
ariness does not exist.
* It may be asked : Say that this notion of unity be secondary
or derivative in relation to substances also, and the cognition be
erroneous in relation to them, then what of unity ? To this the
reply is a follows. If unity be no where taken in its primary sense,
the notion thus applied cannot be secondary, for the secondary
has for its antecedent the .primary. Nor is the conception
erroneous, for error has for its antecedents certain knowledge, it
being the certainly known that is erroneously attributed, for
imputation of the unreal [as taught by the Vedantins], is rejected
by the establishment of imputation of the elsewhere experienced
[as taught by the VaiSeshikas].
H s n
Aph. 7. Of cause and effect there is not unity and single
individuality, in consequence of the non-existence of unity and
single individuality.
frRfwffHinr. ufgiTitrdrugjrarsgf Btnirej HTHJJ
n
[Tn7:
MT5i; II
( 213 )
1 With the purpose of parenthetically rejecting the Sankhya
doctrine of the unity, and single individuality and indivisibility
of integrant parts and integrated wholes, it is stated that there
is neither unity nor single individuality in cause and effect, that
is, there resides no unity or single individuality in .both the cause
and its effect. For this the reason assigned is that there do not
exist in the cause and its effect unity and single individuality.
Unity is indivisibility, single individuality is non-dissimilarity.
Since these do not exist in the sum of constituent parts and the
constituted whole, the parts and the whole are not identical ; for
it is allowed on all hands that the thread is cognised as separate
from .the cloth, and dissimilar to it. V.
II UI--
Aph. 8. This is explained in relation to non-eternal [cause
and effect.]
2 This the possession of non-existence of unity and single
individuality, by reason of possession of non-existence of indivisi-
bility and non-dissimilarity is affirmed of non-eternal cause and
effect, Accordingly on the hypothesis of the indivisibility of the
threads and cloth, it would follow .that in the case of the production
: n.
?T?ITfgWToPPI
( 214 )
of the threads the cloth would be cognised and said to be produced ;
in the case of the production of the cloth, the thread would be
cognised and said to be produced ; in the case of the destruction
of the threads, the cloth would be cognised and said to be destroyed ;
and in the case of the destruction of the cloth, the threads would
be cognised and said to be destroyed. Nor can it be maintained that
production and destruction are no proofs, because it is possible
that the cognition of these is caused merely by appearance and
disappearance ; for on the hypothesis of an appearance of an
appearance there will result a regress to infinity. On the hypo-
thesis of. their production, therefore, what fallacy is there involved
in the production of the cloth &c. ? And if the appearance in
appearance be not allowed to be production, it follows that appear-
ance is constant, but the constancy of appearance is not admitted
even by the Sankhyas. In fact, the universal experience that the
cloth is produced and destroyed and so forth, is proof of production
and destruction ; for if experience of one object be allowed to
have another object for its object, we must deny also the water-pot
cloth, &c. This error has been sufficiently discussed. V.
Conjunction. ^TOr^oR*?^ 3XT33RJT5f ; TT^ffg WXW. II < II
Aph. 9. Conjunction is produced by the action, of one of the
two conjunct objects, by the action of both, and by conjunction.
1 TJncontradicted cognition of the conjunct, is proof of the
existence of conjunction. As results may be inferred substance as
ironn
*ror
TWJT
^frm: ejgf^a siiwxT HTiRaR: wrn STRWIH
( 215 )
proof of conjunction of integrant parts ; colour &c. produced by
burning as proof of conjunction with fire ; particular extension as
proof of accretion, sound as proof of the conjunction of a kettle-
drum and ether, and so forth. Conjunction is not mere contiguous
production; as excluding momentary interruption and modification,
conjunction is contact haying non-contact as its antecedent. This
is produced by the action of one of the conjunct objects, as the con-
junction of a hawk in motion with a motionless post, or the con-
junction of one in motion with one not in motion towards him, as
conj unction of a runner with back of another person running. Con-
junction is also produced by the action of both conjunct objects,
as that of two rams or of two wrestlers, this being produced by
both, each having individually acquired the power. The third kind
?j5rniT3HwaTltieRTwrf| SRhngiiwHidJH sm urfiSsmzraT:
?nwri ^rchmw
en
UFBT SIT foRTO*?? H^TIT^I Hm^nrf'o^'c
: fcRSH fe-
H-TJ&U f^r H-
Welfrl ^^3H ?T5T^3tig3iWlIIT O^T cT^TcnTWISF^raTITJTTTi:
HcfT dt^TlX OTf^^TTTrf ^WWmrfWWWW gJTtreTr<niTWCT ^WW 5T-
t I rfotJT^qtra ^THclTni5fiKm ; TT3lTdtlf feTHT^T-grM^: ^JTcnfQ^
SBJTW f^wgr jjur*4nw
( 216 )
of conjunction or conjunction produced by conjunction is such as
conjunction of the hand with a tree resulting from conjunction of a
finger with the tree. This moreover results from one conjunction,
as the conjunction of a piece of cloth with the grass may result
from the conjunction of a thread and the grass. In some cases
one conjunction is produced by two conjunctions, as two conjunc-
tions with ether may be produced by two threads, and by these two
conjunctions a single conjunction of a piece of cloth made of two
threads with the ether. In other cases a single conjunction is origi-
nated by a plurality of conjunctions, as when ten conjunctions
with ether originated by ten threads, originate a single conjunc-
tion between a piece of cloth made of ten threads and the ether.
Sometimes, on the other hand, two conjunctions are produced from
one single conjunction as their non-coinherent cause, as when there
having first taken place a non-originative conjunction between two
atoms terrene and aqueous, subsequently two conjunctions origina-
tive of binary atomic aggregates are produced, a conjunction in
the terrene atom with another terrene atom, and in the aqueous
atom with another aqueous atom. By these two conjunctions exis-
ting in homogeneous objects two binary atomic aggregates are
simultaneously produced. In these by the one non-originative
conjunction produced in the terrene and aqueous atoms, a single
conjunction of the terrene atom with the aqueous binary atomic
aggregate, and another conjunction of the aqueous atom with the
terrene atomic aggregate, are produced simultaneously with the
production of colour &c. in the two binary aggregates ; for the con-
junction of a cause and non-cause must necessarily produce a con-
junction of an effect and non-effect. The conjunction of all-per-
vading entities with limited objects is produced by reciprocal
action only. Of two all-pervading substances there is no conjunc-
tion, for there is no cause of conjunction. There exists in them no
cation, therefore there results in them no conjunction of effect and
non-effect from conjunction of cause aud non-cause. An eternal
r 217 )
conjunction is impossible, for conjunction is contact having non-
contact as its antecedent, and this is repugnant to the nature of
the eternal. Also in this case (were eternal conjunction pos-
sible), no disjunction could be therein produced. Nor can it be al-
lowed (as involving no objection, that no disjunction is therein
produced) ; for conjunction and disjunction reciprocally repugnant
and of indestructible condition, are impossible. Moreover previous
uncounecteduess is a necessary condition of conjunction, and
this consists in the individual movement of one or other of two ob-
jects, or co-inherence in the substratum of the object joined. De-
struction results from disjunction in-coexistent with conjunction, or
from disintegration of the site of the conjunction in some instances,
as when after the conjunction of two threads, action is produced
in that portion of a thread which constitutes its extremity ; by
this action there is effected disjunction from what now becomes the
extremity ; from this disjunction results destruction of the origi-
nant conjunction ; from this results destruction of the thread ;
from destruction of the thread results destruction of the conjunc-
tion, where two threads having been long conjoined action is not
produced in them. Some have maintained that when by action
in the portions of the thread there is effected destruction of the
conjunction originant of the thread, the conjunction is destroyed
by destruction of the substratum and disjunction simultaneously
produced, inasmuch as action is conceived to exist in another thread.
This is impossible : for disjunction is impossible at the moment
of the destruction of the co-inherent or material cause, it being
a law that the co-inherent cause is of equal duration with the effect.
This conjunction is absolute in the origination of substances, and
relative in the origination of qualities and actions, non-existent in
the case of the absolute non-existence of its proper substratum ;
for it is observed to be so. The conjunction existing between an
ape and a great sacred fig-tree limited to conjunction with the
branches only, exists, inasmuch as it is observed that there exists
( 218 )
in the sacred fig-tree conjunction with the ape. For were it to
be accounted for otherwise than by such mere limitation, con-
junction might possibly reside in an ultimate particle, and conse-
quently be not cognisable. Locality is an accidental difference
of all-pervading substances ; and conjunction as determined -in
position must be less than co-extensive with them. Of conjunc-
tion residing in an ultimate particle, space &c. may be regarded
as determinant. U.
*m?r Famm anwa: u 1* n
Aph. 10. By this disjunction is explained.
1 The analogy of conjunction to disjunction is stated. 'Dis-
junction also is of three kinds, as divided into that produced by
the action of one of the disjunct objects, that produced by the ac-
tion of both, and that produced by disjunction. Of these the first
is instanced in the disjunction of a hawk from a mountain ; the
second in that of two rams retiring from conflict ; the third is of
two kinds, being ether produced by the disjunction of causes only,
or by the disjunction of causes and non-causes. Of these disjunc-
tions produced by disjunction, the former class is exemplified where
f%fcT>J:
mizn:
\w ????:
??r grem ^fT^w^^EWTnafiggciMTneimsgBrciFi ^ra Sea
t u
( 219 )
firstly action is produced in one of the two halves of a water-pot,
thence disjunction of the two halves of the vessel, therlce destruc-
tion of the conjunction originant of the water pot, thence destruc-
tion of the water-pot, then by disjunction of the two halves of the
water-pot disjunction of the halves from the circumjacent ether
&c., thence destruction of the conjunction of the halves with ether
&c., thence conjunction with another place, thence destruction of
the action. Nor is it to be urged in objection : How is it that dis-
junction of the halves of the water-pot from the ether in which
they were situated while component parts of the vessel, is not pro-
duced by the primary action in the halves of the water-pot ? - For
one action productive of disjunction repugnant to the originative
conjunction, is contradictory to production of disjunction repug-
nant to non-originative conjunction (such as that of the halves of
the vessel with the ether circumjacent) ; since otherwise there
would follow the possibility of the breaking of the buds of a full-
blown lotus. The action, then, in the halves of the vessel cannot
produce disjunction repugnant to the non-originative conjunction
of the halves of the water-pot and the ether, inasmuch as such
action produces disjunction repugnant to the conjunction origina-
tive of the water-pot. Nor can it be objected : Whence is it that
disjunction of the halves of the vessel and the ether is not pro-
duced by the mere disjunction of the two halves, previously to the
destruction of the water-pot ? For disjunction from another place
is impossible in an existing substance, in any portion possessed
of disjunction repugnant to the originative conjunction. Disjunc-
tion produced by disjunction of causes and non-causes is exemplified
where by action of the hand disjunction of the hand from a tree"
is produced, and by this mediately disjunction of the body from the
tree. In this disjunction the action of the hand is not the cause,
for there is a difference of substratum. But there is not at that
time action in the body, for the action of a composite whole is
determined as the action of the sum of the constituent parts. In
( 220 )
this case, therefore, there is produced by disjunction of cause and
non-cause a disjunction of effect and nen-effeet. This same quality,
disjunction, is proved to exist by the presentative cognition that
one object is disjoined from another, and is not therefore other-
wise accounted for or unnecessarily assumed. V.
H: n n u
Aph. 11. The non-existence of conjunction and disjunction*
in conjunction and disjunction is explained by smallness~and great-
ness.
1 Conjunction and disjunction are not possessed of conjunc-
tion and disjunction, as smallness and greatness are not possessed
of smallness and greatness, for qualities have no qualities. V.
u 1* ir
Aph. 12. Actions [are explained to be void] of actions and
qualities by smallness and greatness.
2 The aphorism Actions &c. is repeated for clearness, or to
aid the memory. Its meaning has been already expounded
(VII. 1. 15.) V.
u 93 u
Aph. 13. Inasmuch as there is non-existence of unconnect-
edness, there exist not conjunction and disjunction in an effect and
its cause.
3 A solution of the difficulty why there should not be con-
: u
fRT WZTO WTOTO ^T g^^rfiW "Zwtfi: TTTTraTfMf%?i: II
i
( 221 )
Junction and disjunction in constituent parts and constitutes
wholes, is stated. Unconnected ness is the state of two objects
void of mutual connection. Conjunction and disjunction do not
exist in a cause and its effect, that is in the constituent parts and
the constituted whole, inasmuch as there is non-existence of un-
Connectedness. For a constituted whole, a water-pot and the like
does not remain in existence out of connection with its constituent
parts, the two halves of the vessel &c., that conjunction and dis-
junction should be possible in the integrant parts and the integrate
whole. V.
TO^TH ii 98 H
Aph. 14. Inasmuch as it is a quality [a word has not conjunc-
tion with the object which it denotes.]
1 A previously supposed view is here stated, with the purpose
of establishing that there exists between a term and its designates a
connection of power, in obviation of the difficulty > How can there
be a conjunction between a verbal sign and its siguificate ; for a word
or sound being a quality cannot possess any quality ; nor is it to be
replied that there exists not between them any conjunction, for were
that the case there might result from such a verbal sign as water-pot
the verbal apprehension of a piece of cloth, there being no speciality
of connection. The term denotative being a quality, there can ex-
ist therein no conjunction with the object denoted, that is, with the
water-pot, &c. V.
Aph. 15. A quality also is implied.
: win
( 222 )
1 Moreover the object is sometimes characterised as as a colour,
taste, &c., and with this conjunction is not possible, no quality being
allowed to exist in a quality. Hence it is said that a quality also is
an object these words having to be supplied ; a quality, as colour
&c. may be the object of a word, but with this there can be no
conjunction or connection. Or the sense may be that a quality also
is implied or denoted by a word, and that the word can have no con-
junction or connection with this quality. U.
II HS H
Aph. 1 6. Inasmuch as there is no action [in the term and the
object denoted by it, there exists no conjunction between them.]
* Similarly connection by conjunction can not exist in substan-
ces such as ether denoted by such words as sky; for conjunction
which is produced by action, is impossible in the term designating
and the object designated, these being void of action. V.
Aph. 17. Inasmuch also as the expression is not is used of the
non-existent.
3 Conjunction is impossible inasmuch as the object designated
may not exist. It is therefore said : Inasmuch also as it is observed
that the expression is not and in virtue of the particle also is to
be understood will be is used of the non-existence, of that which
fcfwrsFu
i romsfii fairo ^f?ranr. ronrsfrr ^surfo srssrei fejwr
: sgi rouisfa 51535?
: u
qfn u i dj
i
! afiTrF3H?SlWfftffI ^ TraT'l4Ul*TfT rr^fT^TfTtfT^J ^TT'fif Hlfe?
qi wtfn^nnri^^Tin'aT M^fa ^ra aiwif
: n
( 223 )
is not known to be. Thus by reason of the expressions, The past
water-pot does not now exist, Tomorrow the water-pot will exist,
there results a cognition of a past and a future water-pot, and
there can be no conjunction &c. between them and words. V.
Aph. 18. The word and its meaning are without connection.
1 If there be conjunction between the word and its meaning
it follows that the Avord and its meaning are without connection. U.
n i<* u
Aph. 19. [The cognition] of that which possesses conjunc-
tion [results from knowledge of the conjunct as] from a staff ; and
[the cognition] of that which possesses co-inhesion [results] from
the particular.
2 It is stated that there is no cognition conversant about con-
junction and other connections between a word and its meaning.
From a staff being conversant about a staff results a cognition
(for these words are to be supplied) of that which possesses con-
junction of a man possessing conjunction with the staff; and from
the particular being conversant about a particular constituent ele-
ment results a cognition of tnat which possesses co-inherence of
a constituted whole. There is, then, no cognition of the term water-
pot as possessing a water-pot, or of a water-pot as possessing the
word water-pot, as there is a cognition, conversant about connec-
n
auft
faTT
?fznrr H
tion by conjunction, of a man with a staff, and a cognition conver-
sant about connection by co-inherence, of an elephant with a trunk,
current among men. Therefore there is no connection of conjunc-
tion or of co-inhesion between the denotative term and the object
denoted. V.
II 3 II
Aph. 20. The recognition of a meaning from a word is con-
ventional.
1 It may be asked, If there be neither conjunction nor co-in-
herence between a word and, its meaning, by what connection does
a term convey a determinate sense ? To this the reply is furnished.
It is conventional. Convention is the arbitrary dispensation of
the Deity, that by such and such a word such and such a sense is
to be understood. Whatever word was arbitrarily assigned by the
Supreme Being to any meaning, conveys that meaning : it is the
vmeicrr
^TTa^
UT ^Jifg^Tafy: HT sehsfg H^fcr^ if^ H^ ^rwa:
^FrlrcITrT WBT^fTTclfT (^53
iff? eF3fe3tWT=n?T ZJ^IT
5TTfr?T^
5ITHT 5DTOT ^TWJ^lffR: fon SITrlf^ TfTfTT
( 225 )
will of God that is the connection between term and its significa-
tion. This connection is a convention, that is, it is dependent upon
convention, as whatever plant the ichneumon touches with his
teeth is an antidote to poison. This convention is sometimes deri-
ved from common usage, as for instance when any one gives the
order Bring the water-pot, and a child standing by infers the cog-
nition of another who receives the order and brings an object pos-
sessing a tubular neck ; the child inferring that this activity of tha
bringer is produced by knowledge, inasmuch as it is an activity
like its own activity, and that this knowledge is produced by the
words of the person who gives the order, because it is brought into
being subsequently to those words. The child's knowledge of the
meaning of water-pot, piece of cloth, is by the process of inser-
tion and elimination of words, in that the object of this know-
ledge is an object possessing a tubular neck denoted by the word
water-pot. At other times this convention results from direct testi-
mony, as that this tubular-necked object is designated by the
term water-pot. At other times it results from comparison or re-
cognition of similarity, as through the judgment of similarity that
a gayal is like a cow, mudga-parni (a kind of bean) is like mudga,
ma'sha-parni (a leguminous plant) is like a bean. At other times
it results from opprobrious language, as when after hearing, the
camel with pendulous upper lip and long neck, the eater of hard
thorns, the vilest of animals, on seeing such an object there ensues
the verbal knowledge that it is a camel. At other times it results
from collocation with terms of known import, as when after hearing
the proposition, The bee is sipping sweets in the cloven lotus-blos-
som, it is inferred that this must be that which is denoted by the
word bee, inasmuch as this is the agent in the drinking of nectar in
the cleft hollow of the lotus, or as in the common example, The
cuckoo sings sweetly in the mango-tree. This is, therefore, an infer-
ence or even a mere sound producing etymological knowledge, through
the force of collocation with words known import. Or it is a kind
O
( 226 )
of knowledge by comparison, through subsumption of similarity to
other individual bees &c., viz. agency in the drinking of nectar.
The convention, according to the followers of Tutata has reference
only to the universal, being applied to the individual only by a
transference. According to the Prabhakaras the denotative capa-
city is expressive of both the class and the individual, but is cognised
in relation to'the universal, and by its essential form determines the
cognition of tlte individual. The ancients teach that the conventioa
is the verbal power, and that objects are universals which are the
forms of 'the individuals. This is the case with terms like cow &c.,
but the object of words expressive of qualities, actions &c., is both
the universal aad the particular, as is detailed-in the Hayiikha.. U.
1 That connection between words and objects winch produces
.verbal knowledge, is now pointed out. The knowledge of the
( 227 )
meaning of words is conventional, or determined by the connection
of convention. It is, therefore, a connection of convention between,
the term and the object, that determines verbal knowledge. Con-
vention is arbitrary arrangement. This is of two kinds, eternal
and modern. Eternal arbitrary arrangement is verbal power ;
modern arbitrary symbolism is terminology. The arbitrary symbo-
lism takes for its form, that such and such a sense is to be understood
by such and such a word, or such and such a term shall convey
such and such a signification. It has therefore been said : Arbi-
trary symbolism has been declared twofold, original and modern.
The original is eternal, herein is that which is called power ; but
the modern is occasional, imposed by scientific writers and others.
The apprehension of power is from common usage, &c. It has,
therefore, been said : The ancients have declared the apprehen-
sion of power to be from grammatical analysis, from knowledge of
comparison, from lexiocography, from testimony, and from
usage, from contiguity to a term of know import, from the
context, and from, explication. The apprehension of the power
of roots, crude forms, and affixes, results from grammatical
STTOH
sen: eRftsrannf^R: n ?f?r
-3:13* srfwra
( 228 )
analysis, as the knowledge from such rules as, The second
case is used of the object, The transitive verb is of the agent,
or that the accusative case &c. is used of the object of the action
&c. From knowledge of comparison there results, from
knowledge of similarity to a cow &c. the apprehension of
the power of the terms gayal &c. in restriction to the classes gayal,
&c. According to such lexicographical information as White and
other terms connecting qualities, in the masculine denote the subject
of the attribute, Cold is a quality, The words chill, cool, and
benumbed imply possession of that quality, and Powder is that
which is triturated, Routed and panic-striken denote extreme
confusion, according to such information there results appre-
hension of the power of the words white &c. in reference to the
white, &c. Apprehension of the power of the terms pika <&c. in
reference to a cuckoo &c., results from testimony such as, A cuckoo
is signified by the word pika. From the practical relation of
one who gives and one who receives an order, results apprehen-
sion of the power of the terms cow &c. in reference to objects
possessing the essential characters of a cow, &c. For instance
when an adult 'giving an order says Bring the cow, and another
adult receiving the order brings the cow, a child standing by, ob-
serving this, reflects that the bringing of a cow is implied by the
words Bring the cow ; and afterwards by substitution of one word
and elimination of the other in the phrase, Tie up the cow
Bring the horse, he apprehends the power of the terms cow &c. in
reference to cows characterised by a dewlap &c. From collocation
with words of know\i import, in such propositions as Air is colour
less and tactile, He who gives a girl in marriage with due cere-
mony and fittingly adorned is called kukuda, there results appre-
hension of the power of the terms air &c. in reference to objects
colourless, tangible &c., and of the terms kukuda &c. in relation to
those who give girls in marriage &c. Similarly also apprehension
of verbal power results from the context of words. Thus since
( 229 .)
the term barley is employed in the common usage of barbarians
to denote panic seed, and in that of civilized men to denote the
long-awned cereal, if a doubt arise *in regard to the word barley
is such sacred texts as Charu (a kind of oblation) is made of
barley, it being impossible to restrict it to one meaning, and
illogical to understand it equivocally ; apprehension that the
power of the term barley is to denote the long-awned cereal only,
arises from the sequel of the the sentence which supplies the full
sense of the injunction, viz. : In spring the leaves of all kinds of
grain wither away, and the pleasant, bearded barley still remains.
Or for example apprehension of the power of the terms elysium
&c. to designate a particular kind of bliss, results from such words
as That bliss which is not interrupted by pain, which is not forth-
with destroyed, and which is obtained by desire, is the object of
the term elysium, according "to the sense of the context : Let
him that desires the lordship of heaven sacrifice an agni-shtoma.
Apprehension of the power of terms sometimes also results from
explication, as that of the personal terminations of the verb to
designate action ; as from He performs culinary operations, as a
proposition identical with He cooks. According to the Miman-
sakas verbal power conveys the universal only, and not the indivi-
dual, for did it apply to the individual it would be either unduly
restricted or infinite in extension. According to the doctrine of
the Prabhakaras on this point, in such sentences as Bring the cow,
there is a knowledge of the individual, a knowledge of the uni-
versal apart from the particular being impossible, the act and
object of cognition being equal. According to the doctrine of
Bhatta there is first a knowledge of construction of the cow &c.
as the object of the verb, by means of the connection of verbal
collocation, and afterwards an inference that it is the cow that is the
object of the verb. According to the doctrine of Mandanacba'rya
the individual is designated by implication. This doctrine of
these authorities, that verbal power designates the universal, is not
( 230 )
correct, for unless in such instances as Bring the cow, the power
had reference to the individual, the fact that the individual is
the object of verbal knowledge could not be established as it is
by experience. Nor does the knowledge of the individual arise
from implication, for if the word be not used in its denotative
function, to use it in its implica+ive function is impossible. Nor
is a knowledge of the individual possible by equality of the act
and the object of knowledge ; for while the being an object of
verbal knowledge which is an effect, must have a cause, the
equality of the act and object of cognition which is a necessary
condition cannot be the cause. We must therefore acquiesce in
the doctrine that the power of the terms cow &c. is denotative of
an individual characterised by the form of the universal. It has
therefore been laid down in the aphorism of Gautama that
particulars characterised by the form of the universal, are the
object of the term. V.
and pos "
II VI II
Aph. 21. The prior and posterior [are produced] by two
objects occupying the same space and time and near and remote.
1 The term prior and posterior is used in an abstract sense.
The words are produced are to be supplied ; also the prior and
^T3TP75IT^IcrfelfT$T:
aT^
f^ranr
TO
?f?i
posterior may be an elliptical expression for the convention of the
prior and posterior, the particle iti having, to be supplied. By
two objects occupying the same space, that, is of. which there is
the same space,, and occupying the same time, that is, synchro-
nous, by these priority and posteriority are produced,, or are
cognised and named. It is- therefore stated that they are produced.
by two objects near and remote, that is possessed of contiguity or
paucity of conjunctions with thecoujunct t and of remoteness, that.
is of plurality of conjunctions with the conjunct. Hereby the
co-inherent cause is stated. The non-coinherent cause is the conr
UTHT
ft? gqir^fTrnTrrHrnra WTH ncftqw g trc-
RW ?THT
fs^fon^fgWtJT^THT q^T trTr5WTm^?rT?T S3T
en:
( 232 )
junction of the object with space. For example, there are pro-
duced in a man standing with his face to the east priority and
posteriority in relation to the plurality of conjunct conjunctions in
one of two bodies situated in the east, and to paucity of conjunct
conjunctions in another. The non-coinherent cause has thus been
stated. In the words near and remote, there is by the object an
indication of the subjective cognition. It is accordingly stated
that the efficient cause is the cognition of relativity. Priority and
posteriority are produced only between objects situated in the
same space ; they do not therefore arise everywhere. The relative
conception belongs to only one observer ; therefore they do not
appear everywhere, for as determined by relative conception they
are not everywhere produced. It being evinced by perception
that they are produced in consequence of the power of their causes,
they are not reciprocally dependent : otherwise they would not be
produced or would not appear, for there could be no genesis or
cognition of two objects each supposing the other as a pre-requisite
whereas priority and posteriority do appear, and this appearance
without their production would be impossible. The words by two
objects occupying the same time, have reference to priority and
posteriority in time. This priority and posteriority is produced
by two objects one young and the other old, in which there is exis-
ZJST
u*?RT3j:
: aaren
rTSniT
zrnti3f*Rrwi:
5TTTT57
rT^U
: n
tence at the same time. Their contiguity is the being born at an in-
terval of fewer revolutions of the sun, their remoteness is the be-
ing born at an interval of more revolutions of the sun. There is
in this case also indicated by the object a subjective intellection.
The two objects young and old are, therefore, the co-inherent cause.
The conjunction between time and these objects is the non-coin-
Lereiit cause. The conception of the being born at an interval of
fewer revolutions of the sun is the efficient cause of priority, and
the conception of the being born at an interval of more revolutions
of the sun is the efficient cause of posteriority. This priority and
this posteriority arise also in objects of determinate position in
space. Of these there is a seven-fold destruction of priority and
posteriority in space, but the production of the two is simultane-
ous, else there would be a regress to infinity. Their destruction
results from destruction of the relative conception, from destruc-
tion of the non-coinherent cause of the conjunction, from destruc-
tion of the substance which is the co-inherent cause, from destruc-
tion of the efficient, and uou-coinherent causes, from destruction of
the efficient and co-inherent causes, and from the destructions of
the efficient, non-coiuherent, and co-inherent causes. From de-
struction of the relative conception, thus : the destruction of the
cognition of relativity is from the production of posteriority, that
is from the general knowledge of posteriority ; from the destruc-
tion of the relative conception there results destruction of the
posteriority in cognising a substance qualified by posteriority ; and
the whole process may be inferred according to the analogy of the
destruction of duality. From destruction of the non-coinherent
cause as when first there is a cognition of relativity, then
action in the object which is the substratum of posteriority, thence
disjunction of the object and space when posteriority is produced,
thence destruction of the conjunction between space and the object,
thence in consequence of the simple cognition destruction of the cog-
nition of relativity, then from the destruction of the conjunction of
( 234 )
tlie object with space, destruction of the priority and posteriority..
In this instance the conception of relativity, though synchronous
with the destruction of posteriority, is- not destructive of it. If it
Le urged that there is much, confusion involved' in< the supposition!
of the destruction of reproduction, necessity &c., consequent or**
destruction of the conjunction of the soul and the internal organ,
in the destruction of qualities resulting from the destruction ofl
the non-coin herent cause, we reply that it is not so ; for inasmuch,
as posteriority is pervaded by remoteness, there must needs be a-
cessation of posteriority consequent on non-existence of remote-
ness on the removal of the substratum of posteriority. Nor is-
there at that time another agent of destruction, for it is the de-
struction of conjunction which is conceived as the agent of destruc-
tion, such destruction being otherwise impossible. Inasmuch as-
we observe long afterwards memory, pleasure &c;, the effect of re-
production, necessity &c., we cannot suppose these to> be destroy-
ed. This also implies the percipient as a limit, and posteriority
and priority are destroyed by the destruction of the conjunction be-
tween the percipient and space, this, being equally efficient. De-
struction of posteriority sometimes also results from destruction of
the co-inherent cause, as for instance when by action- produced in-
a portion of a body there is produced disjunction- from another
portion, then a conception of relativity ; from- this disjunction^
results destruction of the conjunction- originative of the- body and
production of posteriority ; in the succeeding- moment from de-
struction of the conjunction there results destruction of the sub-
stance, and the universal conception of posteriority; from the de-
struction of the substance there results destruction of posteriority
and destruction of the cognition of relativity results from the sim-
ple cognition. Destruction of posteriority, therefore, does not re-
sult from destruction of the cognition of relativity, for they are-
simultaneous. Destruction of posteriority is sometimes by destruc-
tion of the substance and of the cognition of relativity, as for in-
( 235 )
stance when there arises in the portion of a body a relative cogni-
tion of action ; thence disjunction from other constituent parts and
production of posteriority ; thence destruction of the originative
conjunction and a simple cognition ; thence destruction of the sub-
stance and of the relative cognition, thence destruction of posteri-
ority. Sometimes destruction of posteriority is by destruction of
the substance and of conjunction, as when there arises disjunction
of the constituent parts of a substance ; then production of action
in the body and of a relative cognition ; next the production of de-
struction of the conjunction of the parts, of disjunction between
the body and space, and of posteriority ; thence destruction of the
substance, destruction of the conjunction of the body, a universal
cognition of posteriority ; thence destruction of posteriority by de-
struction of the cognition of the body and space and destruction
of the substance, according to the rule that a simple cognition
destroys a relative cognition. Destruction of posteriority is some-
times by destruction of conjunction and of the relative cognition,
as when there successively ensue production of posteriority and
action in the body, a simple cognition and disjunction, destruction
of the relative cognition and of the conjunction of the body with
space, and thence destruction of posteriority. Destruction of pos-
teriority at other times results from destruction of the co-inherent,
nou-coinherent, and efficient causes, as when there simultaneously
arise production of posteriority, disjunction of the parts of the
body, and action in the body ; next a universal cognition of poste-
riority, destruction of the conjunction of constituent parts, and
disjunction of the body from space ; next from simultaneously pro-
duced destruction of the relative cognition, of the substance, and
of the conjunction of the body with space, there results destruction
of priority or posteriority in space. Of priority and posteriority in
time there is no destruction dependent upon destruction of the
non-coinherent cause, nor is there destruction of contiguity and
remoteness in temporal priority and posteriority, as there is destruc-
( 236 )
tion of contiguity and remoteness in priority and posteriority in
space, where there is destruction of the conjunction of the body with
space. The three cases, therefore, of destruction of temporal priority
and posteriority, from destruction of the co-inherent cause, from
destruction of the relative cognition, and by both conjointly, are to
be inferred according to the analogy of the preceding. U.
1 The notion and expression of prior and posterior is produced
by two bodies occupying the same space, that is, having the same
space as their site, and contiguous or remote, that is' objects of a
( 237 )
cognition of inherence in a substratum of more or less conjunction-
with the sun. The efficient cause, therefore, of posteriority in
space is the cognition of the substratum of more numerous con-
junctions with the sun ; the non-coinherent cause is conjunction of
space in the body which is the substratum of this quality of post-
eriority, and the co-inherent cause is the matter which is the ob-
ject of such cognition. The efficient cause of priority in space is
the cognition of a substratum of fewer conjunctions of the sun ;
its co-inherent cause is the body which is the object of such a
cognition ; the non-coinherent cause is conjunction of space in
such matter. For there is such a practical assurance as that to
one living at Pataliputra, Kali is nearer than Prayaga, and
Prayaga further than KaSi. The object of this cognition,
posteriority, arises in reference to Prayaga, because Prayaga
is there cognised as the site of more numerous conjunctions with
the sun ; and the priority in reference to Kas*i arises from its being
known that Ka^i is the site of less numerous conjunctions with the
sun. The notion and expression of prior and posterior is produc-
ed by two bodies occupying the same time, that is, by two bodies
which have one time to conjoin them, contiguous and remote, that
is cognised as substrata of more or less numerous revolutions of
the sun. For there arise such cognitions and expressions as that
an old man is posterior in relation to a young man, and a young
man prior in relation to an old man. The old man is the co-in-
herent cause of the posteriority which is the object of this cogni-
tion ; the non-coinherent cause is conjunction with a greater time ;
the efficient cause is the cognition of the substratum of more
numerous revolutions of the sun. The young man is the co-in-
herent cause of priority ; the non-coinherent cause is the conjunc-
tion of the body of the young man with a great time ; the efficient
cause is the cognition of the young man as the substratum of less
numerous revolutions of the sun than those inherent in the old
man. Although bodies differ according to childhood, youth, and
( 238 )
old age, and there is consequently possible therein the contrariety
of the revolutions of the sun existent in the old man and the
young ; yet it is the cognition of heterogeneity in the common
substratum of more numerous conjunctions with the sun, that is
the cause of temporal posteriority in the old man ; and the cogni-
tion of heterogeneity in the substratum of less numerous conjunc-
tions with the sun, that is the cause of priority in the youth. It
cannot, therefore, be asked in objection, why posteriority is not
produced in an atom, as compared with a water-pot &c., inasmuch
as there is cognised in the atom the possession of the universal
nature terrestriality &c., the common substratum of more numer-
ous movements of the sun. For by this is meant possession of a
universal nature non-existent in two contemporaneous common sub-
strata of more numerous movements of the sun. Such a universal
nature is the being Chaitra, &c., The solar motion is also to be
characterised as other than that which is subsequent to that time.
Hence it is that there is not produced posteriority in Maitra as a
youth a hundred years old, as compared with Chaitra an old man
of eighty. Or remoteness may be defined as production prior to
revolutions of the sun, and contiguity as production subse-
quent Ihereto. Production prior to the revolution of the sun
which was the substratum of the production (i. e. year of the
birth) of Chaitra the young man &c., exists in the old man
Maitra &c. and therefore there is priority in the senior. Pro-
duction subsequent to the revolution of the sun which was the
substratum of the production of Maitra the senior, exists in Chai-
tra' the junior &c., and posteriority is therefore produced in him.
Inasmuch as there is in the unsentient, non-existence of the cogni-
tion of priority and posteriority in time, we must add to the de-
finition the condition of there being sentiency. Undue width in
the definition, when we consider such and such a particular body,
is to be prevented by the addition of a certain universality. It is
to be observed that the author of the Muktavali states that the de-
( 239 )
Struction ef the cognition of relativity is destructive of priority
and posteriority in both their forms, that is, of both local and tem-
poral priority and posteriority ; while in the Upaskara it is laid
down that it is the destruction of their three-fold causes that is
destructive of priority and posteriority. V.
5EK*niiTCrclI53 II ^ H
Aph. 22. [Priority and posteriority result] from posteriority
<rf the cause, and from priority of the cause.
1 Time is the cause of priority and posteriority. There is
here stated by indication conjunction with time as the non-coin-
herent cause of posteriority, and conjunction with time as the non-
coinherent cause of priority, in relation to the priority and posteriori-
ty of the time. Otherwise there would be no connection between
the words of the aphorism ; for priority and posteriority could not be
produced merely by priority and posteriority. The terms priority
and posteriority have, therefore, by implication, the meaning of
conjunction with time productive thereof. U.
i
SJT-
Aph. 23. The non-existence of priority and posteriority in
priority and posteriority, is explained by minuteness and great-
ness.
11 ^8 n
Aph. 24. Actions [are void] of actions.
: U xU II
S3 O
Aph. 25. Qualities [are void] of qualities.
fWTrT
( 240 )
: n t$ u
Aph. 26. That is co-inherence by virtue of which it may be
said of cause and effect that the one is in the other.
1 The investigation of co-inherence is described, though to the neg-
5? rrra3T3it
513-
JtT-
r5T1T
sot
550^3?? 5iWccfT2ai2lT5a3qH fT3rHJT
?T?T ^UTVJT^ irFfi
eJTl: Tltrtq 5rTWTfWMTcJ^lToT H TOlriFT Si
fT3
rTr
WTcITfT rlif? WrT% ^^TVTTcI ^rB^TFq HOcfTq: e^^T^t clT
"
H IHrU-drd^TcT^TrctTtTO'a^ T^ W^rZ fT^T
rdoj ifFsjissnTpi H^^JT^TFofk WT^T: ?nr qf3 ^
H3T
t fTcf iftJfeU H TWTT'flt ZfTQ
J II
( 241 )
lect of thought which is the next subject in order, in favour of the
desire of the student to know what co-inherence is, it having been
stated that priority and posteriority co-inhere in objects only, and
that knowledge, pleasure &c. co-inhere in the soul. The words
cause and effect have an implicative force, and are to be consider-
ed to apply also to non-cause and non-effect ; as it has been stated
in the section entitled the Locality of the Categories, that the
relation of unconjoined objects subsistent and inherent is co-inhe-
rence. The cause of the cognition of the here, non-unconnected-
ness, is the non-existence of two unconjoined objects. Inasmuch
as the thought of clarified butter here present in the bowl ; as
that of jujubes here present in the bowl ; of cloth here present m
the threads ; of grass here in the blades ; of substance, quality,
and action here in substance ; of the essence of a cow here in the
cow ; of cognition here in the soul ; of sound here in the ether ;
this thought of the here which is thus produced, cannot be pro-
duced without some connection, it is inferred that there is some
connection. This connection is not mere conjunction, for the ac-
tions &c. of one only of the two objects cannot produce it ; its exis-
tence does not terminate in disjunction ; connected objects may be
non-conjunctly effected, they must be conceived to have a determi-
nate substratum ; it is not perceptible, and it is one, and eternal.
If it be objected that if co-inherence be one it follows that there is
a confusion with regard to substantiality, inasmuch as the essence
of action &c. may co-inhere as well as the essence of substance in
substance ; we reply that it is not so. According to the relation of
subsistence and inherence, there can be no confusion. For though
that co-inherence which is the co-inherence of the essence of sub-
stance, be the co-inherence of the essences of quality, action &c.; yet
substance is not the substratum of these latter essences, inasmuch
as they are not manifested in substance. The essence of sub-
stances, or substantiality, appears only in substances ; the essence
of qualities, only in qualities ; the essence of actions only in ac-
P
( 242 )
tions, and nowhere else ; accordingly from the observation of this
concomitance and its negation, there results a determination of the
relation of subsistence and inherence. As there being an ordinary
conjunction between a vessel and clarified butter, it is the vessel which
is the substratum or receptacle, not the clarified butter, and therefore
there is a determination, the relation of containing and contained ;
so this limitation is here possible only as a consequence of the
difference of the power of manifesting and of being manifested.
For the essence of action &c. is not manifested by substance, as the
essence of substance is. Hence it has been said, All-powerful
consciousness is our resource in the apprehension of things. For
there is no contradictory intuition in relation to the nature of
substrata, since there arises no intuition that substance becomes
action, or that the threads are in the cloth ; nor in the case of air
does there appear the nature of a substratum because in the co-in-
herence with colour, colour is in air. It is therefore natural
power which in every instance determines the relation between the
substratum and that which inheres in it. This same co-inherence is,
eternal, since it has no cause ; for the co-inherent cause is the con-
dition of the production of existences, and the non-coinherent and
and efficient causes are subsidiary thereto. If, moreover, there
ware a co-inherent cause of co-inherence, this must exist in virtue
of another co-inherence or of same co-inherence. It is not the
former, for there would thus emerge a regress to infinity. It is not
the latter, for this same co-inherence could not co-inhere with
itself, for thus there would be constantly recurring co-inherence.
If we be asked how there arises the cognition of the co-inherence
of the cloth in the threads, and of the colour in the cloth, we re-
ply that it is by an essential connection, for on the hypothesis of a
second co-inherence there would be a regress to infinity. If it be
objected : In that case the cognition of the locally present also,
as that there is here the colour of the cloth, must also be by essen-
tial connection : we reply that it is not so, there being a non-exis-
( 243 )
fence which renders a further connection impossible. If, then, it
be objected : In the cognition that there is here on this spot non-
existence of a water-pot, there is a co-inherence or other connec-
tion : we reply that it is not so-,- for this may be produced by es-
sential connection ; for on the contrary supposition there would
follow a universality of the absolute and reciprocal non-exis-
tences of the water-pot, eternal, and co-inherent in a- plurality of
objects, and emergent non-existence might be destructive as being a
co-inherent effect, and antecedent non-existence might be destruc*.
tive as being not produced by the co-inherent. The nature of
existence is not in this case the condition, for possibility belongs to-
the nature of existence.
The Bhattas maintain that there is in non-existence another con-
nection, called possession of attributes or predicates. On this hy-
pothesis did possession of attributes belong to all individual non-
existences, it would follow that we should cognise non-existence of
a water-pot even where a water-pot existed ; and the possession of
the character of non-existence as a water-pot, might exist merely
in virtue of the possession of the character of non-existence as a
piece of cloth. If it be replied that the water-pot in this case
prevents the thought of the non-existence of the water-pot, it may
be replied, that there is in this case non-existence of the preven-
tive by reason of the connection of possession of the attributes.
Nor is the nature of the substratum such that there should not
be there a manifestation, of the non-existence of the water-pot;
for after the water- pot has been removed there appears in this
substratum, that is, in the place where the water-pot had stood;
the non-existence of the water-pot.
If it be objected : How: is it that after the destruction of colour,
on your hypothesis, there is not a cognition of the coloured, inas-
much as co-inherence is eternal and one? we reply that the non-
appearance of the coloured is possible in consequence of the de-
struction of colour only. U
( 244 )
1 The connection of cause and effect, of part and whole,
wherefrom there results the cognition that such a thing is in such
a place, is co-inherence. For a cognition such as those of the cloth
in the threads, the water-pot in its halves, the grass in its blades,
has for its object the existence of the threads &c. in the cloth &c.
This existence is determined by a special kind of connection, for
else it would follow that there might be such cognitions as of the
water-pot in the threads, the existence of the threads &c., residing
by a temporal connection in the water-pot, &c. Connection,
therefore, determining existence in a given mode, is co-inherence ;
for between whole and part conjunction is impossible. The
words cause and effect have an implicative power, and ' it is
therefore to be held that, that also which determines the relation of
action and agent, of essence and individual, of eternal substance and
particular object, and of containing and contained is co-inherence.
The proof of co-inherence is determinate cognition, the object of
which is the relation of character and characterised or predicate and
subject. From determinate cognition such as of a man with a staff
there results an inference. In this inference, conj unction &c., being
( 245 )
impossible, there is given a proof of co-inherence. It cannot be
maintained that by essential connection we are to understand a dis-
tinct entity, there being a complexity involved in the conception of
a connection of endless essential forms ; and that according to this
method there could not be proved a distinct connection of non-exis-
tence. For it is impossible that the connection of non-existence
should be eternal, as that of co-inherence is, for were this the case,
it would follow that after a water-pot had been brought to a spot
where one had not previously stood, there would be the cognition
of the non-existence of the water-pot, in Consequence of the eternity
of the non-existence of the water-pot and of its conection. Nor
can it be admitted that there belongs another non-eternal connec-
tion to non-existence ; for we should then have to imagine, in the
case of a water-pot being brought and taken away a thousand times
to and from a spot, a thousand connections. We must therefore
maintain that the connection of non-existenc^ of the water-pot, be-
longs to the essential form of the spot at the time the water-pot is
removed. Inasmuch as the time when the water -pot is there does
not effect this connection, at the time the water-pot is there, there
is no cognition of the absolute non-existence of the water-pot. Thus
it being necessary to allow an essential connection of non-existence
of the water-pot on the ground &c., there must in the case of
other non-existence be a connection with the essential form ; for it
is evinced by experience that the cognitions of non-existences are
conversant about one uniform kind of connection. V.
i: n rs n
Aph. 27. The negation of the essence of substance and
quality is explained by existence.
1 It may be urged : Let co-inherence be included in substance,
3fca
ju: n
( 246 )
or in quality &e., why should it be assumed to be an additional
category? In reply it is stated that the negation, that is, the non-
existence of the essence of substance and quality is explained, that
is, is declared by existence or being. As, therefore, existence is
-void of the essence of substance and of 'quality as being the object
-of a differently characterised cognition ; so also co-inherence, as
being the object of a- differently characterised cognition, does not
possess the character of substance, &c. There is here an indica-
tion, the negation of the essence of action &c. requiring to Ue un-
derstood. V.
II x II
Aph. 28. -Its reality [is explained] by existence.
1 The words is explained are to be supplied. Its reality, that
. -
is its unity, is explained by existence, that is by being. For as it
is, one existence that in all cases excites the cognition of the exis-
tent, so is there one co-inherence that in all cases excites the cog-
nition of -the co-inherent, inasmuch as there is no difference in the
marks or characters by which its existence is inferred, and there is
non-existence of a particular mark. For we reckon no particular
mark or differentiating character, by which we should apprehend
variety of co-inherences. Hence it is eternal, inasmuch as non-
eternity is inapplicable to that which is indivisible, though there
be a division according to space, time &c., as is the case with exis-
tence. It may be objected that if this co-inherence be merely a
conjunction, there may be disjunction of threads and cloth or of the
cloth and its colour. This is not the case, since in the absence of
13*3*1
( 247 )
previous unconjoinedness disunion is impossible, for colour and the
object coloured, or the parts and the whole do not exist out of mutual
connection, that there should be a disunion between them. If it
be replied that such unconjoinedness is possible ; we deny this, for its
possibility is absurd inasmucfi as it has never been experienced. U.
EIGHTH BOOK, FIRST DAILY LESSON.
nr auwr* ii 1 u
Aph. 1. Cognition was explained among substances.
1 The foregoing digression was intended to gratify the curiosi-
ty of the learner. The order of enunciation is again embraced.
c
rTTWJT TTHCT
WRIT: ?f?r
H3?Tcr.
a:
a:
IR \srfcif?T
rmrfig ^fesjssrT crfs ^vzi?fi?rdfrr
a ?frT
fi ^srg
wm
( 248 )
According to this the examination of intellection is the object of
the eighth book. Intellection has been previously described. The
present aphorism is stated with the purpose of recalling this. By
the words Among substances, through the object, the third book
which treats of that object, i. e. of substances, is implied. The
meaning is that cognition has been explained by the two aphorisms
The universal notion of organs and their objects is a mark of an
entity other than organs and objects, and, That which is brought into
being from contiguity of soul, organ, and object, is other than they.
In the common declaration of intellection that intellection, appre-
hension, cognition, and affection, are synonyms, the equivalent terms
are enumerated in order to contravene the Sankhya doctrine. For
the Sankhyas maintain a distinction of meaning in the terms in-
telligence, &c. Thus the plastic principle is a state of equipoise
between purity, passion, and darkness. This is one, and one only,
while spirits are divided to infinity. These spirits are uniform,
constant, unchangeable, characterised by eternal consciousness.
These moreover are lame, being incapable of modification, while
the plastic principle is blind, being unsentient. When there arises
in the plastic principle a desire of the fruition of sense-objects, or
the wish to see the difference between the plastic principle and
spirit, the plastic principle is modified in virtue of throwing as it
were a tint of colour upon spirit. The first modification of the plas-
tic principle is intellection, a kind of internal sense. Intellection
it is that is the great principle, wherefore it has been said, From
the plastic principle the great. This intelligence is like a clear
mirror, and the particular modification in the form of an ob-
ject such as a water-pot, a piece of cloth &c., by the channel of
the external organs of intelligence, is called the cognition, the
function, of intelligence. Apprehension is according to them that
particular conceit, whereby, in consequence of tte non-discrimi-
nation of spirit or consciousness by reason of the cognition existing
in pure intelligence, it is affirmed I know. Affection is the par-
( 249 )
ticular modification of intelligence, in the form of pleasure, pain
&c., by the channel of the sense-organs, in consequence of the
presence of objects of sense such as garlands, sandal wood, and the
like. Hence it is that all the particular modifications of intelli-
gence, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, remini-
scence, merit, and demerit existing only in the plastic principle in
their minute proportions, according to diversity of conditions, appear
and disappear ; while spirit, like a lotus-leaf free from stain, reflects
them externally in intelligence. This doctrine which they hold, is
rejected by the evidence indicated in the enumeration of the con-
vertible terms. If, then, the word intelligence be derived from
agency, inasmuch as it is the instrument of understanding, it may
be concluded that it is identical with the internal sense, and the
internal sense is not perceptible. But intelligence is known by
the internal perception I understand. Moreover the qualities cog-
nition &c., do not belong to the internal organ, for they are proved
to exist only as being qualities of an agent. For the phenomena
of personal knowledge, personal sensation, personal apprehension,
are manifested only as having personality or egoity as their com-
mon substratum. If they reply that this phenomenon is conceit,
we rejoin that there is nothing to prove the impossibility of the
reality. If they say that spirit is unsusceptible of adventitious
modes, and unmodified, and that this shews the impossibility of
their reality ; we deny this, eternity being compatible with the
nature of a substratum of adventitious modes. For substance and
attribute are not one single principle, that production and de-
struction of the attribute should be production and destruction of
the subject. He then who is conscious, understands, knows, ap-
prehends, and conceits. The hypothesis, therefore, of a distinct
entity is not allowable. U.
rRTrHT JRTOTCrs II ^ II
Aph. 2. Therein soul and the internal sense are imperceptible.
( 250 )
This cognition moreover is twofold science and nescience.
Science is of four kinds, viz. perception, inference, memory and
testimony. Nescience likewise is of four kinds, viz. doubt, uncer-
tainty, sleep, and inattention. Of these kinds of science, that which
is inferential is not produced by the sense-organs. Why this is so,
is stated in the text. The soul is here either the soul of another or one's
own. The imperceptibility of one's own soul has been already de-
clared, inasmuch as such occasional personal cognitions as that of
.one's own paleness, attenuation, length of arm &c. have been reject-
ed in relation to the soul. The particle and implies the applicabili-
ty of the predicate to ether, time, space, air, and atoms. Sensible
a fercni -diTddiT ^ feran
?nr
UlTrRT ^STTrWT cJT
i Tiff?
. cwfa
fs
C 251 )
knowledge is of two degrees, omniscient, and non-omniscient. Om-
niscient is the knowledge of such and such complements of objects,
by presentation determined by the merit springing from devotion.
Thus atoms fall within its sphere, as demonstrable, nameable, and
existent. If it be objected : Since there is no apparatus of such
unbounded sense-knowledge, how can this be the case ? and whereas
magnitude is the cause of perception, and atoms possess no magni-
tude ; and whereas possession of colour is the cause of common
perception, and space &c, have no colour ; how can this be so ?
We reply that this objection is invalid, this omniscience being
possible by means of the internal sense auxiliary ( to the merit pro-
duced by devotion ; or by means of the eye &c. in consequence of
the acquisition thereof ; for the merit engendered by devotion be-
ing of inconceivable efficacy, requires no other auxiliary. The
man in question is not omniscient, being a man like myself: this
and similar propositions are not to the point, there being no argu-
ment which would render contrary instances impossible, as is the
case with the proposition A follower of Prabhakara is not designa-
ted a Mimansaka being a man like myself &c. Non-omniscient
presentation is of two kinds, discriminative and non-discriminative.
Kirti-dinnaga and others maintain that discriminative cognition
conveys no evidence, for it is manifested as apparent through con-
nection with names. But there can be no connection of the mean-
ing with the designation or name, that a cognition should be co-
loured, as it were, by the name water-pot or piece of cloth. More-
over the universal or essential &c. is not really existent, that the
being characterised by it should be apprehended in objects by the
sense-organ ; and the self-characterised existent can have no con-
nection with the non-existent ; and the non-existent is no object
of sense. Sight therefore is produced by the organs of sense, and
the discriminative cognition (which recognises the class of its
object) while in process of being produced by magnitude of vision,
is said to be perceptible, and to convey assurance. This is impos-
( 252 )
sible ; the phenomenon must be cognisable by connection with its
designation, and the condition that evidence be produced by conti-
guity of organ and object is doubtful. The being characterised by
a name is a possible object of (acquired) visual perception, being pos-
sible in the same manner as such a presented cognition as that of cool
sandal wood. Or it may be maintained that the being character-
ised by a term does not appear in perceptive knowledge, and that
there is only recollection of the name, the distinctive appellation
being recalled only, in like manner as there is recollection of the
absent object in the cognition of non-existence. Also it may be
maintained the universal &c. has a real existence, and that there
is therefore a discriminative perception produced by apposition of
object and organ. It may be objected : Non-discriminative cog-
nition neither excites to activity, nor is an -object of activity ? what
proof therefore is there that it exists ? We reply that its proof is
found in discriminative cognition, for this is a determinate cogni-
tion, and this is not produced without a knowledge of pre-
dicates, for it is observed that knowledge of the predicates, appo-
sition to the modified sense-organ, and the non-apprehension of
non-connection of such knowledge and such apposition, is the cause
of determinate conition. U.
n 3 ii
Aph. 3. The mode in which cognition is originated has been
stated in the enunciation of cognition.
1 The mode in which cognition is originated, that is the pro-
cess by which knowledge is produced, has been explained in the
enunciation of cognition, that is, in the third book, where the state-
ment of knowledge was made. The c^yases of knowledge were
( 253 )
stated iu the aphorism, That which is produced by contiguity of
soul, sense-organ, and object, is other than those. The soul, then,
is the co-inherent or material cause of cognition ; conjunction of
the soul and the internal sense, is the uon-coinherent cause ; appo-
sition of the object is the occasional or efficient cause. This was
declared in that aphorism. It is, therefore, to be understood that
the causality of contacts in relation to perception has already been
laid down. V.
n ii
Aph. 4. Qualities and actions being brought into contact
(with the organs of sense), substance is the cause of production of
cognition.
2 Substance is the cause of the cognition which is produced of
qualities, as colour &c., and of actions, as upheaving, &c. These
are both apprehended only as situate in present substance ; the
presence, therefore, of the substance is a requisite of cognition. It
is by substance, moreover, that their contact is constituted, they
being apprehended as conjunctly co-inherent. Although there is
apprehended the odour of dispersed particles of the champaka-
flower, and of portions of camphor which are imperceptible, yet
it is substance, imperceptible though it be, which effects their con-
tact. Although perceptibility of substance is not a requisite of
the apprehension of sound, yet sound is only apprehended as in-
herent in substance, and this is the requisite. If it be asked,
Why assume a contact which is invisible ? we reply that the pro-
duction of knowledge, being an effect, necessitates the hypothesis of
a cause. U.
fcraisra ?nr asti gnnfr
igfaqf
ra3g
uaaftr
H fa?3H ?f?I tt ITRfoora: eRTifa fl
( 254 )
u u n
Aph. 5. Inasmuch as in universals and particulars there
exist not universals and particulars, cognition of general and speci-
al essences results thence [from contact effected by substance.]
1 Another mode is stated in which cognition originates. The
universal is existence, the particulars or species, are the essences
of substance, quality, and action. Similarly these being also unir
versals or subaltern genera, their particulars or species are the
essences of earth &c., of colour &c., and of upheaving &c. Of these
essences residing in substances, there results perception common
to all the senses, thence, that is> from the particular perceptible
substratum, from their cause, form conjunct co-inherence, from co-
inherence in the conjunctly co-inherent, and from co-inherence in
the co-inherent. Knowledge common to all the senses, of the es-
sence of qualities, arises from co-inherence in the conjunctly co-
inherent; of the essence of sound, and of lea and other particular
sounds, from co-inherence in, the co-inherent ; of existence, from
conjunct co-inherence, from co-inherence in the conjunctly co-inr
herent, and from co-inherence in the co-inherent. Conjunct co-in-
herence and co-inherence are not presentative of the essence of
quality. It may, therefore, be urged that the knowledge of it is.
impossible through contact with, its substratum, since in the uni-
versal or highest-essence, existence, and in the particulars or sub-
i WTJTRI 9 TIT HFJ fainn
?nf
a HgrfiH*TgT9TH,
ITR mnra ^
TTRJT
ri?T H
Ucl irafTTT^Fflf^ ^FrT
II
( 255 )
altern genera, the essence of substance, quality, and action, and
in the essences of earth &c. there are universals and particulars.
In anticipation of this objection, the words Inasmuch as there
exist not therein universals and particulars, have been added. For
there exist not in universals and particulars other universals and
particulars essences that is of the essence of objects ; for thus there
would result a regression to infinity. The appearance of mutual
difference between these essences proceeds from their proper form,
or from difference of essential attributes existing, for instance, in
all cows, there being non-existence of such attributes in objects
other than cows ; and similarly with the . essence of water-pots and
other objects. U.
u 5 n
Aph. G. [Cognition] of substances, qualities, and actions
supposes the universal and particular.
1 It may be asked whether the cognition of substances, qua-
lities and actions is also absolute, in the same manner as the
knowledge of universals and particulars is absolute, inasmuch as
there exist not in them universality and particularity. It is sta-
ted that it is not. Cognition is produced : these words are to be
supplied. Of substances, qualities, and actions there is an appre-
hension determined by the natures of substances, qualities, and
actions. 'Now, a determinate cognition is produced by contact of
subject, attribute, and sense-organ ; the universal and particular
are therefore necessarily supposed in it. For there exists such
determinate cognition as This is a substance, This is a quality,
This is an action. U.
ssafws
wra: u
( 25G )
Aph. 7. [Cognition] of substance supposes substance, quali-
ty and action.
' In the cognition, The white cow with bells is walking, the
bell a substance is an attribution, white is a quality, is walking is
an action. There is, therefore, no determinate cognition without
a determinatinon apprehended ; nor can such exist without con-
nection with a determination. Substances, qualities and actions*
are therefore supposed in the cognition of a substance. U.
11 u
Aph. 8. Inasmuch as there exist no qualities and actions in
qualities and actions, there is no cognition thereof which sup-
poses qualities and actions.
2 The aphorism is given in reply to the question : Why therev
fore do not quality and actions suppose quality and action ? There
is an ellipsis of the word cognition. Inasmuch as of quality there
is no conception determined by quality, and of action no conception
determined by action, there is no conception thereof which suppo-
ses qualities and actions. For quality does not exist in quality, or
action in action, that it should appear therein as a predicate or de-
termination. U.
it <? u
\
Aph. 9. The cognition of a white object results from the
whiteness of the substratum, and from the cognition of whiteness ;
and these same stand in a relation of cause and effect.
U35H y*!<iic<T^ snSfi'RT'Tc^rft 'SUW rT^f cJoS
sra? ^?? nr:
ar ciwsrai5rra5y5ffiT?w?T waer SCEJITR sfoanujoFRrogri wra: u
2 RR M THu*wui uTi raneFwragr %trre i sn^fjiffirajtn i TOXT n
?T51T
( 257 )
1 From the whiteness or white colour of the substratum, and
from the cognition of whiteness or the cognition of an attribute
consisting of white colour, there results in relation to a white ab-
ject, a conch-shell &e. possessed of white colour, a cognition that
it is white, that is, a sense-given certainty determined by white
colour. The possession, therefore, of white CDlour, and the cogni-
tion of white colour are the causes of an effect, viz. of sense-given
certainty the form of which is white colour. The relation, then,
of co-inherence affords no conditions of sense-given assurance in
the form of white colour, viz. possession of white colour, and cog-
nition of white colour. There is, therefore, in consequence of the
absence from qualities and actions of qualities and actions as deter-
minations, no perceptive assurance in the form of qualities and
actions. V.
o 1 ii
Aph. 10. [Cognitions] of substances are not causes one of
the other.
8 It might be urged that in cases where after the perception,
This is a water-pot, there arises the perception, This is a piece
of cloth, the knowledge of the water-pot is a cause of the know-
ledge of the piece of cloth, inasmuch as it is antecedent to it, and
that consequently there could be no knowledge of the piece of cloth
without a knowledge of the water-pot. This collateral objection
5?fZlfw>JRTf| HJ5RTCS eFTWHTOT^ I r^TTO
MToiT?
3JS*3T3T
MTI: H
Q
( 258 )
Is denied. Cognitions for this word is to be supplied are not the
causes one of the other, that is, the mutual causes, in the case of
cognitions of substances not determinant of substances fixed in the
relation of prior and posterior among substances. Though, there-
fore, the knowledge of the water-pot be antecedent to the know-
ledge of the piece of cloth, it is not its cause, inasmuch as it is not
its invariable antecedent. V.
II W li
Aph. 11. The sequence of the cognitions of the water-pot,
piece of cloth &c., resulting from non-simultaneity of the causes
[of the cognitions], and from the sequence of their causes, does not
result from a relation of cause and effect.
1 The sequence, constituted by priority and posteriority, of the
cognitions of the water-pot, piece of cloth &c., does not result from
the relation of reason and consequent, or of cause and effect, but
from the sequence, that is from the priority and posteriority, of the
atw: trrdrnractr:
: aw
IF? ?r
mmra
cIT
FMSIH
rfgrlt F^^rTRilT^nTclTgF?Tf?THofFfT WKfr %Fg>J
: u
( 259 )
contacts &a of "the water-pot, piece of cloth &c., which are the
causes of such cognitions. The particle and implies the 'addition
of an unmentioned non-simultaneity, and this word is to be con-
strued after the term sequence. The meaning is, therefore, that the
non-simultaneity of the cognitions of the water-pot, piece of cloth
&c., results from the non-simultaneity of the contacts &c. with
these that are the causes of those cognitions. But where there is
a simultaneity of contacts &c. of water-pots, pieces of cloth &c.,
there is produced simultaneously a cognition which is a support or
basis of an aggregate, and which has for its objects the things in
contact so many as they may be. It is, therefore, to be understood
that there results from simultaneity of cause simultaneity of effect,
and from non-sequence of cause non-sequence of effect. Intelli-
gence is primarily divided into experience, and memory. Experi-
ence, according to the doctrine of Kauada is of two kinds, being
divided into perception and inference. Perception is of six kinds,
as derived from smelling &c. [from the five external, and from the
internal sense] ; and is twofold as discriminative and non-discrimi-
native ; and twofold as divided into physical and hyperphysieal.
Inference is threefold, as produced by illation from only positive
conditions, from only negative conditions, and from both positive and
negative conditions. For example : This is a proposition inasmuch
as it is knowable &c., is an illation from only positive conditions ;
.Earth differs from other substances inasmuch as it is possessed
of odours, &c. is an illation from only negative conditions ;
The mountain is fiery inasmuch as it smokes &c., is an illa-
tion from both positive and negative conditions. Memory is
uniform, dependent on the reproduction called permanent mental
impression, the universal form whereof is dependent on assurance
not characterised by inattention. In another point of view also
intelligence is twofold, science, and nescience. Science is a cognition
in a certain form of that which has that form. Nescience is a cogni-
tion in a certain form of that in which there is non-existence of that
( 200 )
form. Intelligence is also twofold, accordingly as it is divided into
certainty and uncertainty. Uncertainty is a cognition whereof the
form is mutually repugnant existence and non-existence in one
and the same subject of attributes ; certainty in regard to a
thing is cognition in the form thereof, and not in the form of the
non-existence thereof. According to this doctrine in the case of
cognition of similarity, and in that of knowledge of terms, an in-
ference takes place by the production of a judgment respecting a
mark or middle term, subsequently thereto. Evidence is of two
kinds, perception and inference, and accordingly science is correct
experience, as will be explained by the author of the aphorisms
himself in the sequel. V.
SECOND DAILY LESSON.
Aph. 1. This, That, Done by thee, Feed him, such expres-
sions are relative to cognition.
1 It is stated that certain cognitions are determinant of other
cognitions. The cognition This is a water-pot, This is a piece of
cloth, is relative to cognition, that is determinant of a cognition.
This and that being capable of being made objects of perception,
cognition in the form of perception, is a determination of such a
cognition. The word Thou being capable of being made the ob-
ject of the speaker's intention, inasmuch as it is the substratum of
a self-manifested knowledge, the cognition produced by the expres-
sion Done by thee, is determinant of a cognition. In the behest
Feed him, also, the cognition produced by the word him, which has
the sense of this one, is determinant of a cognition which is a
perception. V.
HZ
( 261 )
n ^ n
Aph. 2. Inasmuch as [such expressions] exist in reference to
objects seen, and do not exist in reference to objects unseen.
' It is shown that this is inductively proved by concomitance
and exclusion. When there exists the contiguous object of the
cognition This, and the remote object of the cognition That;
when there exists the contiguous agent, the object of the cognition
By thee, and the object of the action, the object of the notion.
Done ; and when there exist the giver and the receiver of the
order, the objects of the notion Feed, in contiguity ; then a cogni-
tion of this kind (i. e. one determined by another cognition) is
produced. But in the case of unseen objects these cognitions are
not manifested. This therefore may be inferred by the methods
of agreement and disagreement. U.
1 That these terms are applicable to an object differentiated by
a mode constituted by cognition, may be inferred by the methods of
agreement and disagreement. These expressions have applicabi-
lity to an object differentiated by modes constituted by cognition,
inasmuch as the use of the words This &c., exists in relation to
objects seen, or known, that is essentially determined by modes con-
sistino- of cognition ; and inasmuch as such use does not exist in re-
lation to objects unseen, or unknown, that is not essentially deter-
mined by modes consisting of cognition. V. ,
fatra:
fsrora: fgafr?^: srf^Fiss: ^HT fgtw:
l fsrtra: wra^f^f^OT^fatrnFFTTT fawtr s^wf
Sjt jfy;rM33fl *^g ?J faWig STrTT
l<i<.*>i<r I'E I
r3ir<
HOT
( 2C2 )
frf ^OTxrni^TO II 3 M
Aph. 3. The term object applies to substances, qualities and
actions.
II 8 II
Aph. 4. Under substances identity with the five elements
was denied.
1 This aphorism is stated as the basis of a treatment of the
sense-organs, their nature, and the nature of the objects which
they apprehend. Under substances, that is, in the aphorisms
describing substances, identity with the five elements, possession of
the matter of the five elements, was denied or impugned. No sub-
stance, then, whether the body or any other, has the nature of the
five elements, but all bodies and organs of sense have the nature
of some one or other single element. V.
II H II
Aph. 5. In the cognition of odour earth is the matter, inas-
much as it possesses plurality and odour.
2 Accordingly it is stated that the organ of smell apprehends
only smell among the qualities, and has the nature of earth only.
The cognition of odour means that from Avhich the cognition, or
sensation, of smell is derived, that is the organ of smell. Earth
the subtile element is the nature or material cause, inasmuch as it
fi Teti+4 4Q 1 'd*!*! fyTwMIH tft3 ^ilTrf I 2f5a]J
T5RT35H
T-sl H<*FrI5fiS : irrllTT! I
UT^c*ifTT5' ; J' : 'T
duiehr5iT?T
: II
( 263 )
has plurality, or is originated by particles not overpowered by
water &c., and possesses odour. The olfactory organ is not origi-
nated by water &c., inasmuch as it does not apprehend taste &c
Possession of odour exists therein inasmuch as, in its relation as
percipient, it apprehends odours. In like manner the organ of
smell is terrestrial, inasmuch as it reveals odour only among colour
and the other qualities, just as clarified butter, &c. manifests the
odour of saffron. By this inference it is established that earth is
the material cause of the organ of smell. V,
rH!Tq^iT3T3*g TSl^qprfifasroTg II 5 II
Aph. 6. In like manner water, light, and air, are [the ma-
terial causes of the organs of taste, sight, and touch] inasmuch as
they have no difference from taste, colour, and touch.
1 The words Are the material causes of the organs of taste,
sight, and touch, are to be supplied. Water &c. are respectively
the material causes of the organs of taste &c., inasmuch as they
respectively apprehend those determinate objects. In these plura-
lity is the condition of the determination. It has been declared
that it is determination by possession of the particular qualities of
apprehensible kind that is the proof of the possession of taste &c.
by the organs of taste &c. In like manner the organ of hearing
is a part of ether essentially determined by the outer ear influenced
by particular destiny. U.
NINTH BOOK, FIRST DAILY LESSON.
fjRUTjnioqTiiT&THTara mira<j n i 11
Aph. 1. [An effect] is antecedently non-existent, inasmuch
as there is non-existence of assertion of actions and qualities.
J u-
3353
( 264 )
1 The words an effect are to be supplied. Antecedently, that
is, before the production of an effect, an effect or product, such as
a water-pot or piece of cloth, is non-existent, that is non-existent
by self-determined negation during that time. The reason assigned
is the absence of predication of actions and qualities. If the effect,
the water-pot &c., were existent during that time, it would be affir-
med to possess actions and qualities ; as in the case of a water-pot
already produced, such affirmations are made as that the water-pot is
is at rest, or in motion, or seen to be coloured. There is no such
assertion antecedent to its production. It is therefore inferred that it
is during that time non-existent. While straws are in course of
weaving, or threads of joining, or when clay is placed on the potter's
wheel, while the work of the potter &c. is it yet going on, there is
a universally experienced sensitive cognition that there will be in
that place a mat, or a piece of cloth, or a water-jar, inasmuch as it
is producing during the tension of the eyes. Herein a cognition
constituted either by conjunction, or by co-inherence, could not be
efficient ; the presentation is therefore a possession of determina-
. trrfnFrT grim?^: tngj SRTO rareTfe iron
afe
g oorofew?T
^ffznfs&c
mzra
wfgraf?*r*
: ?r<Rif fsmrairrraf rTFarft^r: wrftHi g fararw-
ra-
wr-
JTWlcl:
WTH
( 2G5 )
tions related to the sense-organs. Such is the condition of such a
cognitive act. If it be objected that we are arguing in a circle, in-
asmuch as the cognition thereof depends on the determination, and
the determination on the cognition ; we reply that such is not the
ease, for the determination is the proper form of both the cogni-
tion and its object, and is capable of producing a proximate assur-
ance, and this proper form has an existence antecedent to the
cognition. It has accordingly been stated in the Nyaya-varttika
that in co-inherence, and in non-existence, there is a relation of cause
and effect. This antecedent non-existence produces a non-existent,
for when a water-pot has been produced, that self-same water-pot
is not then brought into existence, for even if there exist therein
another cause, an ensuing defect of the cause must follow tha
defect of its own anterior non-existence. If this self-same water-
pot is what prevents the production of that water-pot, then its
causality is inevitable by reason of the non-existence of anything
which prevents. It may be urged that if there be in the water-
pot non-existence of the same, then it follows that it will emerge
when the water-pot is destroyed. This we deny, inasmuch as the
very destruction of the water-pot is repugnant thereto. For one of
two contradictories cannot be manifested during the existence of
the other contradictory. For between these two there is no repug-
nance effected by space, i. e. no exclusion, that as in the case of the
real natures of the cow and the horse, there could be a simultanei-
ty. How then could there be a repugnance effected by time and
how could there be a synchronous existence ? U.
1 This aphorism is stated as a basis for a description of per-
ception of non-existence. An effect, as a water-pot and the like
U rU^l wfwfviflfjTeRTWT^ I ydlfd*Ttr
STTH *ren
?rjT
( 266 )
is non-existent previous to its production, inasmuch as there is non-
existence of the assertion or expression of action and quality. There
is antecedently no such expression of qualities and action, as there
is after the pot is produced, as that the jar is at rest, or in motion,
or that it is dark. Thus the doctrine of the pre-existence of effects
in their causes is rejected. Previous, therefore, to the production
of the water jar, there is antecedent non-existence thereof, and
this produces a non-existent. Else how, when there exists another
cause could there not be reproduction of the produced ? A percep-
tion such as that there will presently exist a water-pot in this
place, is a proof of antecedent non-existence. V.
II r II
A ph. 2. The existent [becomes] non-existent.
1 It is stated that another non-existence is established by the
force of perception. It is proved by perception and inference that
an existent product, such as a water-pot, after the operation of a
hammer &c. which destroys it, is now non-existent, in like manner
as it is proved by perception and inference that an effect is, pre-
vious to the operation of its cause, non-existent. This mode of
non-existence is commonly called destruction (or subsequent or
emergent non-existence) ; for there are such cognitions as that a
water-pot is destroyed, or that the letter ga previously heard is
now no more. U.
ii 3 ii
Aph. 3. [Existence] is a thing distinct from non-existence,
inasmuch as actions and qualities are not ascribed [to the non-
existent.]
5RT*c!intiTTTfT ti urtitjiwTsnwr oRrywr^Ti TTWJH ROT
atrrg ^rcrf
iftun wsfa fe
wa: n
( 267 )
1 It may be objected that it is the water-pot that under parti-
cular conditions produces the conventional notion of destruction,
but the destruction of the water-pot is nothing else than the water-
pot itself. The aphorism is therefore laid down. The. word Exis-
tence is to be supplied. Existence, then, is a thing distinct from
non-existence. If it be asked why, it is stated that it is so because
actions and qualities are not ascribed to the non-existent. For
there are not employed during subsequent non-existence, such phra-
ses as, The water-pot exists, There is a water-pot, The water-pot is
now possessed of colour, Bring the water-pot. In consequence of
this difference, the existent is a thing different from the non-exis-
tent. U.
u 8 n
Aph. 4. The existent also is non-existent.
J Antecedent and subsequent non-existence being vindicated,
the present aphorism is laid down with the purpose of evincing
reciprocal non-existence. When the words Is not are asserted of
an existent water-pot, there appears an absence of identity. For
there are such cognitions as that a horse is not identical with a
cow, a cow is non-existent as a horse, a piece of cloth is non-exis-
tent as a water-pot, a piece of cloth is not a water-pot, a cow is
not a horse, a horse is not a cow. There appears, then, in such a
rajS \2rersigiTt *>*rfrr
\
t
trearawihftr cr?m ^re:
cR aT3TFTOTMTci: WcftOH W^ffT fg
13T ^J^TcITflT 'WZ'. VZ'
rT I d I rKITJTToHir?TTWT
: WclffT fg <I%T
( 268 )
cognition the fact that a cow possesses reciprocal non-existence
with a horse, a water-pot is reciprocally non-existent with a piece
of cloth ; and this reciprocal non-existence is otherwise designated
absence of identity. The identity then in this case is essentially
non-existent, and this non-existence is in-coexistent with the
non-existent object ; for there are such cognitions as that the water-
pot is not the ground on which it is placed. This non-existence is
eternal, for it is impossible that there could ever be identity be-
tween a water-pot and a piece of cloth. U.
U II
Aph. 5. Whatever else, moreover, than these is non-existent,
is [absolutely] non-existent.
' The fourth non-existence, called absolute non-existence, is
here described. Whatever else than these, that is, than the three
fore-mentioned non-existences is non-existent, that is, is absolutely
non-existent. The final and complete sense of the aphorism,
therefore, is that the non-existence which is distinct from these
three non-existences is absolute non-existence. Of these, antece-
dent non-existence has'a subsequent limit ; subsequent non-existence
has an anterior limit ; reciprocal non-existence in-coexists with
that which is non-existent ; but absolute non-existence differs
from all the three, and is therefore a fourth non-existence. V.
* That which is non-existent, repugnant to existence, other
thau the three forementioned non-existences, is non-existent, abso-
nror: HTSWTITMTCJ e trocreTs: rr* unwrap*
*J?T <HHrT WrareiT HSSrT llfa^rTTHT WTefTI-
TOW ini
( 2G9 )
lutely non-existent. That usually refers to the existent. The
complete sense is that it is technically designated absolute non-
existence. This absolute non-existence is the fourth non-existence,
and is eternal. There are three things repugnant to absolute non-
existence, the object non-existent, and its prior and posterior non-
existences. According to the ancients the cognitions that dark
colour does not exist in a red water-pot, and that red colour does
not exist in a dark water-pot, are conversant about the subsequent
and antecedent non-existences ; while the moderns have maintained
that the subsequent and antecedent non-existences are not repug-
nant to absolute non-existence, arid that consequently there may
be absolute non-existence even during the time of subsequent
non-existence. They (the moderns) hold that when a water-pot &c.
previously removed is brought back to a place, there is during the
existence there of the water-pot no notion of absolute non-existence
of the water-pot, inasmuch as the time during which the water-pot
is there constitutes no connection with non-existence. Some have
taught that when there has formerly stood in any place a water-pot,
&c. and this has been removed and brought back again, there ap-
pears in this case a fourth kind of universal non-existence charac-
terised by production and destruction, and designated temporary
non-existence, and not absolute non-existence. V.
*RSiHflnFvjRr*raraR n g u
v ^
Aph. 6. [Perception] that a thing is non-existent results
from non-existence of a past perception, and reminiscence of the
past, like the perception of a repugnant object.
V4dlf<J<* ^-
inc vr?T5f ^ra wsid*
: n
( 270 )
1 Another section is here commenced, in which this aphorism
is stated enouncing the apparatus of the perception of emergent
non-existence. Cognition in the form of perception is implied by the
particle iti. There is therefore a perceptive cognition that a wa-
ter-pot, for instance, is non-existent, that a water-pot has been
destroyed, or that a water-pot is subsequently non-existent. This
is exemplified by perception of the repugnant, there being as clear
and distinct a perception of a repugnant (or at present non-exis-
tent) water-pot &c. as of its subsequent non-existence. The rea-
son of this is non-existence of a past perception, the absence that
is to say of a past, produced and destroyed, water-pot and the
like. The experience is thus accounted for. The following hypo-
thetical argument is confirmatory of this : If there were a water-
pot here it would be seen as the place is seen, but it is not seen,
and consequently there is none. Another subsidiary is stated to
be reminiscence of the past, by which is meant recollection of a
past, and now non-existent, water-pot and the like, the recollec-
tion of a thing non-existent. U.
2 The four kinds of non-existence being analysed, the per-
ception of subsequent non-existence is analysed. Such percep-
( 271 )
tions as that a thing is non-existent, a water-pot is non-existent,
a water-pot is destroyed, a water-pot has ceased to be, are, like the
perception of the repugnant, that is like the perception of a not now
existing water-pot, given by experience, or produced by ordinary
contact, (of subject and object). Of these, perception of an object
non-existent is produced by conjunction with the eye &c., while per_
ception of emergent non-existence is produced by determination re-
lated to the eye &c. Such is one difference ; another is stated to be
that the perception of subsequent non-existence results from non-
existence of past perception, that is from a cause in the form of pos-
sible non-apprehension consequent on non-existence of perception
of a past, foregone, now non-existent water-pot, and also from a
reminiscence of a past water-pot &c., that is from a cognition,
which is a recollection, of a non-existent object. The perception,
therefore, of subsequent non-existence is produced by non-appre-
hension of a non-existent object, and by knowledge of a non-exis-
tent object ; but the perception of a. non-existent object is not so,
there bein a difference. V.
n s u
Aph. 7. Likewise also from perception of existence in non-
existence.
1 She word non-existence, through expressive of non-existence
in general, is ascertained from the context to denote antecedent
non-existence or poteutial existence. There is then perceptive
knowledge of antecedent non-existence, as there is of emergent
non-existence. Why ? Because there is a perception of existence,
a perception of the straws in course of weaving (into a mat,
jrrrorrcrorc:
TnTWT5fa SRHt HTcJWFErarcTTrT WTclW
( 272 )
which is potentially existent in them), these being made the object
of perception. Or it may mean that the perception of antecedent
nc-n-existence results from the perception or perceptibility of exis-
tence, that is, of the substratum and the object therein non-exis-
tent, since perceptibility of the substratum and of the object non-
existent is the condition of apprehension of general non-existence.
The particle also implies recollection of the absent non-existent
object, and the hypothetical reasoning aforesaid. Antecedent non-
existence without beginning also, and emergent non-existence with-
out end, are perceptible only under particular circumstances. U.
1 There being a restriction of the general term non-existence
to antecedent non-existence, so is there also of perception. There
is a perceptive knowledge of antecedent, as of subsequent, non-
existence, by means of experience rendered possible by apposition
of the sense-organ and its object, and of knowledge of the non-exis-
tent. It may be asked : Inasmuch as antecedent non-existence has
no beginning, how is it that there is no perception of it long before
the production of conjunction of the two halves of a water-jar &c.,
the forementioned causes of such perception being possible at that
time also ? It is therefore stated that such perception results from
perception of existence. The affix ghan (in the word bhdva, ' exis-
tence) denotes the material cause, the source of being. Existence
is the ultimate sum of conditions ar causal apparatus, and that
only is perceptible which is perceptible thereby, inasmuch as it
must be manifested by the ultimate causal apparatus. Such is the
resultant meaning of the aphorism. It is to be considered that
nnwra
5mm rRIT OTlWT5?$i:ftfZr5: I
3iKlIIT5
( 273 )
the particle also is added to prevent the supposition of perception
of supersensible antecedent non-existence of air &c. ; and that
perceptibility as an absent object is thereby additionally im-
plied. V.
s^TqzTS *hroil33 Sandra: n u
Aph. 8. Hereby are explained the negations not a water-pot,
not a GOW, and demerit.
1 The perceptibility of reciprocal non-existence, is declared.
The word Hereby suggests recollection of the absent object, appre-
hension of the substratum (or site of the absent object), and the
forementioiied hypothetical reasoning. Non-observation of the
perceptible is common to all these cases ; the particle and imply-
ing the aforesaid addition. By the word demerit, while the per-
ceptibility of reciprocal non-existence of merit, though supersen-
sible, in its substratum or site, knowledge, pleasure &c. is affirmed,
it is at the same time declared that perceptibility of the absent
object is not a condition of the apprehension of reciprocal non-
existence, and thus it is suggested that the perceptibility of the
substratum (or site of the absent object) is the only requisite of
such apprehension. How else could there be apprehended reci-
JE?TW
K
( 274 )
procal negation of a fiend in a post, when it, it is recognised that
that a post is not a fiend ? For since non-apprehension of the
fiend as identical with the post, causes apprehension of their reci-
procal non-existence, and since that same non-apprehension is re-
pugnant to the existence of the absent object, it would be impos-
sible were the post identical with a fiend, that there should be such
non-apprehension. It may argued : Identity with a fiend is not
in this instance the absent object, may it then be the fiend ? and
supposing him though being in the post, to be, like its gravity, not
apprehended, then the non-apprehension of him will not be repug-
nant to the existence of the absent object. We reply that this
argument is invalid, for non-perception of that of which the. essen-
tial characteristic is the being an absent object is, like non-obser-
vation of the absent object, a cause of apprehension of non-exis-
tence. If it be urged that reciprocal non-existence depends on the
apprehension of the absence of an object ; that absence of an ob-
ject (or the state of an object which is non-existent), is identity
with exemption from reciprocal non-existence ; we reply that this
is not the case, for it is an attribute which is cognised as non-exis-
tent in any given substratum that has for its essential characteristic
the nature of being an absent object, but the condition of the per-
ception of that attribute is not the having for its essential character-
istic the nature of being an absent object. U.
1 The recognition of reciprocal non-existence, the form of
fa^tr aa
tlrj
?Tsn HTH trrcmir
: H
( 275 )
which recognition is such as that a piece of cloth is not a water-
pot, a horse is not a cow, pleasure is not demerit, has been already
explained by the description of the perception of emergent and
of antecedent non-existence. Such is the sense of the aphorism
as a whole. The causes, then, of the apprehension of reciprocal
non-existence, are possession of characters in relation with the
sense-organs, non-observation of the absent object, and cognition
of the absent object. The greatest difference is that the perceptibili-
ty of the absent object is the condition of apprehension of general
non-existence, whereas it is the perceptibility of the substratum
that is the condition of apprehension of reciprocal non-existence.
Thus, though merit be a supersensible thing, there is no impossibi-
lity in perceiving its reciprocal non-existence in pleasure &c., its
sensible substratum. Whereas some have taught that perceptibi-
lity of both the absent object and its substratum or site is requi-
site to the apprehension of general non-existence, this is untrue,
inasmuch as were this the case, the perception of non-existence of
fragrance in a stone, of non-existence of bitterness in treacle, of
O ' *
non-existence of colour in air, and of non-existence of touch and
sound in ether, would be impossible, since the respective substrata
are not perceptible to the several sense-organs. It was from this
consideration that Paksha-dhara MiSra maintained the perception
of the destruction or, cessation of the touch of the air, character-
ised by time conjunct with the skin (the organ of touch.) V.
Aph. 9 [The negation] Is not designates nought else than
that which has not been.
1 The recognition that what has been no longer is, reposes
upon emergent non-existence, and is not conversant about the
5TT-
( 276 )
having been ; while the recognition by perception simply that
such and such a thing is not, rests upon absolute non-existence. The
expression that which has not been points out independence of
production and destruction. Designating nought else means pur-
porting that only. For example : There exists not in water terres-
triality, There exists not in earth aqueousness, for if there existed
terrestriality in that whereof the particles are aqueous it would be
observed, whereas it is not observed, wherefore it is not ; a refer-
ence to such arguments is to be observed in this aphorism. Thus
we must hold that there is non-existence of an object where such
object will never be and has never been. The recognition that an
object is not relates to the substratum, and is the support of emer-
gent and antecedent non-existence, of that which has been, and
will be therein. Hence it is that this absolute non-existence is
desinated as of trinal time. U.
sitr fit ?Fr? *rai wm Jr^rcmiifH^: n 1 n
Aph. 10. [The proposition] that there is not a water-pot in
a house, is a negation of connection between an existent water-pot
and the house.
1 It may be urged that non-existence of a water-pot in any
given house is not absolute non-existence, inasmuch as a water-pot
exists sometimes there ; nor is it antecedent or emergent non-exis-
tence, inasmuch as these reside only in material causes ; nor is it
absolute non-existence characterised as production and destruction,
5QT 5T oHryrl fl a^ncjqg 'Zwra SCTTfT 3HHWTTT
mmrran-
( 277 )
since there is a contradiction between the absolute and that which
comes into being and ceases to be ; nor is this the fourth kind of
non-existence, general non-existence, inasmuch as that is repugnant
to the threefold division. Accordingly this aphorism is stated. U.
ii 11 it
Aph. 11. Perception of the soul [results] from a particular
conjunction between the soul and the internal organ in the soul.
1 Common perception of existence and non-existence having
been described, another section is commenced with the purpose of
describing the perception of ascetics. The words cognition is pro-
duced, are to be supplied. Ascetics are of two kinds, those who
have meditated on the internal organ, and are called united, and
those who have not meditated on the internal organ, and are called
disunited. Of these the united having reverently fixed their mind
on the object to be presented to it, are engaged in meditation ; and
in them cognition of soul, whether of their own soul or of that of
others, is produced. Perception of soul is that cognition wherein
the soul is the percept or object of presentation. Although there
is in ourselves and others occasionally a cognition of spirit, this
being obscured by nescience has been declared to be virtually
non-existent. From a particular conjunction between the soul and
the internal organ, means from that particular contiguity between
the soul and the internal organ which is the mental state produc-
ed by union [with infinite spirit]. U.
fosrar zirfntrara
a faw=RT
jHsRSJT?
'HTfTTT Ur^g: meJlr*frcreWT fHT
( 278 )
?TOT ^aiTj Redraw ii <K H
Aph. 12. Likewise perception of other substances.
1 It might be asked how, if the knowledge of those who are
united be of the soul only, they can possess omniscience. Accor-
dingly the aphorism is stated. The words Cognition is produced
are implied by the nature of the topic. There is, therefore, by
means of the internal organ accompanied with the merit acquired
by asceticism, perception of other subtances, that is, of the four
atomic substances, of the internal organ, air, space, time and ether.
The term substance comprehends the qualities, actions, and uni-
versal entities residing in substance, the category of particularity,
co-inherence, gravity, elasticity &c. residing in perception, and
spontaneous activity, indiscriminative mental retenta, merit and
demerit residing in the soul. For the possession of the merit pro-
duced by asceticism is equivalent to a perceptive apparatus ; other-
wise omniscience would not be affirmed of those ascetics who are
said to be united. U.
Aph. 13. In those also whose internal organ is not medita-
tive, and in those whose meditation is consummated [there is per-
ception of soul &c.]
2 Those whose internal organ is not meditative, are those
whose inner sense is destitute of meditation ; and they whose me-
faKTTTrJT^oT rfiTSTT <3T* rTrT aRrTt HT^5lfCTf?IfT -flr? I
=r w?r n
ihsri
: n
( 579 )
ditation is consummated, perfected, or rendered fruitful, ia whom
are produced the various perfections which are the fruit of medi-
tation, attain perception of souls and other substances. Such is
the sense to be gathered from the aphorism. In fine, the ascetic
who is in course of union requires contemplation, while he who is
united has no need of meditation which is identical with contem-
plation. V.
clrSWaTSTrl SRWirinU II 18 II
s. s> \>
A ph. 14. [Perception] of actions and qualities [arises] from
co-iiiherenee therein.
1 It might be urged that omniscience is not possible in an as-
cetic, for though there be perception of substances, there is no such
cognition of qualities and actions. To this the reply is furnished.
From co-inherence therein, that is, in conjunction with the internal
organ assisted by merit acquired by asceticism, there is produced
in the ascetic, whether in course of union or united, the perception,
of qualities and actions. For the efficacy of the merit acquired
by asceticism is inconceivable. By the power thereof the sage
Agastya drank up the ocean, Saurabhi assumed a multitude of
bodies, and Vasishtha discovered the curse of Dilipa by Surabhi.
The production, therefore, by merit acquired by asceticism, of pre-
sentation of all the categories is not impossible. The term actions
and qualities involves more, and universality &c. is to be under-
stood. In a like manner we are to understand perception effected
by supersensual cognition in the form of general implication, and
implication of cognition. V.
i HCT
: trKToTR tltfr
u <w n
Aph. 15. [Perception] of the attributes of the soul [arises]
from co-inherence in soul.
1 This aphorism is stated inasmuch as it might be asked
whether ascetics have not also the common perception. The con-
clusion gathered is that there arises in ascetics also the common
perception of the attributes of the sou], that is, of pleasure and
the other attributes which reside in the soul from co-inherence in
soul, that is, from co-inherence in the soul conjoined with the in-
ternal organ, being accomplished by that as its instrument. V.
SECOND DAILY LESSON.
T**rr qznf*T feufa *roaifa ifa SfffSRij u H u
Aph. 1. Inferential cognition is that one thing is the effect
or cause of, conjunct with, repugnant to, or co-inherent in, another.
* In the preceding daily lesson the perception of ascetics and
of non-ascetics was described according to its cause, its nature, and
its characteristic. Assurance having been formerly divided into
perceptive and inferential, the description of inferential assurance
is here commenced. The term cognition is to be supplied, being
the subject treated of. Inferential knowledge is that which is pro-
duced from a mark or middle term. The mark is that attribute of
the subject of the conclusion, which is characterised by pervasion.
Pervasion is said to exist therein. The subject is that wherein
there is non-existence of assurance repugnant to that which there
is desire to prove. Such assurance is proof and disproof, for the
minor term is that wherein there is non-existence of both proof and
fsft ShfnsTT %TFoRijnr?irer i *Tg?ft?*ifT ^T^ i
rTrTOTWJZIT ^rTraflsfT SwsfrlEFi: II
2 rrete 3rr%% SnfmTroraHihfirowgrs^ SRR^H:
( 281 )
disproof. For where there exists probative or disprobative assurance,
no one feels uncertainty or desire of demonstration. The ancients
therefore defined the subject of the question to be an object possess-
ing the attributes of the predecate uncertainly, or an object the
possession whereby of the attributes of the major is required to be
proved. According to Jivanatha Misra the subject is that wherein
there is non-existence of probation obstructive to the genesis of
doubt terminable by decision of the possible comprehension of the
major. Some hold that the subject is that wherein there is non-
existence of demonstrative evidence backed by absence of desire
of proof. According to this doctrine the nature of a subject would
exist even in the case of repugnancy. This, then, may be seen in.
irsr u ? ff?r ug
OT^ OTT^KR gj srarnir
: fiarinvifcniT err ^rr^g ef^wrvnwr vurf
IRI H l^f ?f?T ^%?T iid^Ja ^TVIW^sftl tl^HT
H
T?T
5RR5ITcffl
t m5T5T33T3T
( 282 )
the Anumana-mayukha. The attribute of this subject is called
the mark or argument. The mark is that which being seen, infer-
red, or heard, produces cognition, other than memory, and this cog-
nition is inferential. Hence it has been said : That which is con-
nected with the inferrible, and which is generally known as in the
concomitant ; but in the absence thereof, there is no illative argu-
ment. It is, therefore, the mark which is the instrument of illa-
tion ; not the sumption, inasmuch as that not having the function,
cannot be an instrument ; whereas this function belongs to the
mark or argument.
If it be asked how, where smoke &c. the argument is past
or future, there can be illation; we reply .that this is no "valid
objection, as in this case we infer that the designate of the pre-
dicate of the conclusion also as past or future. If it be asked
how there can be illation where, in consequence of an impe-
diment in the case, it is not ascertained whether the smoke &c.,
be past, future or present ; we admit that there can in no wise be
such illation, inasmuch as there is uncertainty in such an instance
also as to the major. If it be asked how an illation can take place
where there is certainty as to a previous and a following day, and
uncertainty as to the intermediate day ; we reply, that it results
from inferring the existence of fire &c., limited to those days from
smoke &c. limited to those days, in consequence of observing such
causality in the pervasion or invariable concomitance asserted in
the sumption. It it be asked how illation results from a column
of dust mistaken for smoke ; we reply that it is because that which
is understood to be pervaded (i. e. the column of dust, supposed to
be smoke and therefore pervaded by fire), is the mark or middle
term, and because the inference is correct or incorrect according
o
to the correctness or incorrectness of such experience (the logical,
not involving the material, truth) ; else how should your own
sumption be the instrument in such a case. If it be asked how
in the case of a supersensible mark, the sumption not being pro-
( 283 )
ducible thereby, the mark can have such a function ; we reply that
it is because the existence of a practical argument demonstrative
of the reality thereof, effects the function in such an instance ;
else it would not be possible that there should exist in hearing &c.,
the function of co-inherence.
Inference results from a mark which is an effect, as the infer-
ence of fire &c. from smoke, light &c.; also from a mark which is a
cause, as where a deaf man infers a sound from a particular con-
junction of a drum with the drumstick ; or where a righteous man
infers merit, paradise &c., from the due performance of sacrifice,
ablution &c. ; or where rain is inferred from the due performance
of a sacrifice in which the fruit of the Capparis Aphylla is employ-
ed ; or where the efflux of water is inferred from a channel which
men are digging out from a river full of water ; or the inference of
the rising of a stream from the observation of rain overhead.
This single connection, then, characterised as the relation of cause
and effect, has been stated in two ways. Inference from a conjunct
object is such as inference of the organ of touch from observation
of an animal body. Inference from a repugnant object is such as
inference of an ichneumon concealed by bushes &c., from observa-
tion of an excited snake. Inference from a co-inherent object is
such as the inference of fire connected with water, from the heat of
the water. U.
II ^ II
Aph. 2. That one thing belongs to another, the connection
of cause and effect, arises from a portion.
1 This aphorism is stated to meet the objection that this dis-
tribution of middle terms is inexhaustive, since it does not include
the inference of the heaving of the ocean from the rising of the
moon, the rise of Canopus from the tranquillity of the waters, the
srf?
( 284- )
rising of the moon from the expansion of the Nyrnphsea, the set-
ting of fourteen of the lunar mansions from the rising of the other
fourteen, of colour from taste, or of a particular taste from a parti-
cular colour. The words That one thing belongs to another ex-
press the cause, the meaning being that this fire &c. to be inferred,
belongs to this smoke &c. the inferential mark, or that this perva-
ded smoke &c. belongs to this pervading fire &c. It is therefore,
the observation of pervasion generally that is the condition of
illation, not the relation of cause and effect &c. The words The
connection of cause and effect are added, lest it might be objected
that the enumeration in the preceding aphorism is consequently
irregular ; and by these the other connections also are implied,
The term connection has a subjective implication, and therefore
iror
H=T
STTt!
grr5aprr?T!iwTorT3:
3!JTtZIr5JT
FTST ufH?(T
isw uFri t
( 285 )
means the suggestion of connection. It will be asked whence this
suggestion arises. It is therefore stated that it arises from a por-
tion, that is from a particular instance or mere example.
According, then, both to this system and those of the Sankh-
yas and others, the suggestion of connection, whether the relation
of cause and effect or other, arises in conformity with the example.
Thus, then, pervasion (or the being pervaded, as the mark by that
of which it is the mark) is the possession of a natural connection,
the natural being that which is not accidental. This intrinsic
nature is known from its being ascertained that certain percep-
tible objects do not pervade (or are not invariably concomitant
with) that which is to be proved (or that*which is denoted by the
major term), while it is ascertained that certain perceptible objects
do pervade the inferential mark. Of supersensible objects estab-
lished by evidence some are pervasive of both, non-pervasive of
both, pervasive only of the inferential mark, or non-pervasive only
of that which is to be inferred. Among these the non-accidental
nature of the first is to be ascertained from their pervading the
inferential mark ; of the second from their not pervading that
which is to be inferred ; and of the fourth also from their pervad-
ing the inferential mark This inference is is of two kinds, for
the sake of oneself (or logical), and for the sake of another (or
rhetorical). Of these, inference for the sake of oneself arises from
investigating for oneself the pervasion or sumption, and the deter-
mination of the minor by the middle ; and inference for the sake
of another results from knowledge of the pervasion, and of the
qualification of the minor, derived from a syllogism enunciated by
another.
A syllogism is a sentence which conveys verbal knowledge
which is the cause of the third recognition of the inferential mark.
The members thereof are five, viz., the question, argument, fti-
stance, application, and conclusion. Of these the question is a
proposition, a member of the syllogism, conveying verbal know-
( 28G )
ledge the object whereof is neither less nor more than the conclu-
sion to be afforded ; the argument is a member of the syllogism
ending in the fifth or ablative case of the middle term under con-
sideration ; the instance or example is a member of the syllogism
declaratory that the given major is not absent from the middle ;
the application or subsumption is a member of the syllogism decla-
ratory that the minor is characterised by the middle thus charac-
terised by non-absence of the major ; and the conclusion is that
member of the syllogism which declares the minor to be charac-
terised by the given major. The syllogism proceeds as follows :
Sound is non-eternal (the question) ; because it is producible (the
argument) ; whatever is oroducible is non-eternal (the instance) ;
and sound is characterised by producibleness pervaded by non-
eternity (the application) ; therefore it is non-eternal (the conclu-
sion..) The descriptive appellations given by the Vais'eshikas to
these five members, are the question (pratijnd), reason (apadesa),
example (nidarsana), application (anusandhdna), and conclu-
sion (pratydmndya). The mode of procedure in colloquy, dispu-
tation, and controversy, and the definitions of misconstruction,
futile reply, and failure in argumentation, may be sought in the
V adi-vinoda. U.
n 3 n
Aph. 3. By this verbal knowledge is explained.
1 Another section is commenced with the view of including
under inferential knowledge other forms of evidence. That know-
ledge which under the name of verbal knowledge, knowledge whereof
words are the instrument, is approved by the Naiyayikas and
ZTZIT oqTftHtrevmrntfffTF^Tf nra *h5R ZTOT srrsawfa
( 287 )
s, is explained by this, by the nature of illation, that is, as
derived from an inferential mark. Verbal knowledge, like inferen-
tial, requires consideration of pervasion or invariable concomitance,
and of the nature of the attributes of the subject of the question.
For example, such and such verbal meanings are mutually connect-
ted, inasmuch as they are recalled by terms involving an ellipse
<fec., as in the aggregate of verbal meaning, Drive the cow hither,
la this instance a man infers the mutual connection, on recogni-
sing that there is something recalled by a plurality of terms
requiring others to complete the sense, pervaded by mutual con-
nection of the meaning of the terms. U.
1 By this, by the explanation of inferential knowledge, verbal
knowledge or cognition produced by knowledge, of words, is ex-
plained. The Naiyayikas and others hold that there is a kind of
experiential cognition termed apprehension of construction, differ-
ing both from perception and inference. In the teaching of the
Vaileshikas this is not admitted. In the case of verbal knowledge
they hold, that what takes place is inference regarding contiguity
of the senses of terms. For instance upon hearing the proposition
The cow exists, it is inferred that the cow is characterised by exis-
tence inasmuch as this is recalled by the term wherein resides
implication of words to be supplied favourable to apprehension of
construction characterised by the notion of existence in the proper
object qualified, as in the familiar instance of a water-pot ; or the
inference results from what is recalled by the term cow, this term
being uttered together with exists, as in the case of the eye ; but
there is no peculiar kind of cognition produced by words. For
rrmfs
( 288 )
according to the doctrine of the Naiyayikas also, apprehension* of
construction is impossible unless there be assurance that terms
were pronounced consecutively in virtue of their forming a sen-
tence, since such assurance is a pre-requisite. V.
^rrcretn F^ mnnr 3n:*nFwrg?raT?fR*r n 8 u
Aph. 4. There is no difference of meaning in argument,
reason, mark, evidence, and instrument.
1 Though the term reason (apadeSa) applies in technical
language to merely apparent argument or fallacy, yet it applies
also to a term, according to the derivation, something being rea-
soned or affirmed thereby. It is of inferential knowledge that a
term, in its character of inferential mark, is the cause. A term
is also the instrument of illative certainty. Similarly instrumen-
tality resides in a term in its character as inferential mark. There
is no difference of meaning, therefore, in argument, reason, mark,
evidence, and instrument. These terms denote only the inferen-
tial mark, and do not denote only that which is fallacious. There
is therefore no impossibility in the fallacious not producing an in-
ference, and the term producing an inference, and great accor-
dingly is the error of the objector. V.
^3 ggroferwsra u u u
Aph. 5. Because they are implicated in the notion of this
belonging to that.
2 It is laid down that recognition through similarity (upamdna)
and other processes are included in inference, because their nature
5153
wrrar ^TnrwfSRTn SH SRST ^SRW n^i irrvrarT:
r
I
srraT OUT fiTrrfj
( 289 )
is such that there arises respecting them an implication of the no-
tion that such and such an argument included, belongs to such and
such a major inclusive ; in fine, because they involve a knowledge
of pervasion or universal concomitance. It is to be supplied as an
ellipse, that the nature of inference belongs to the cognitions in-
stanced as recognition through similarity, disjunctive reasoning,
probability, and traditional teaching. Of these the cognition
produced by recognition through similarity is the perceptive cog-
nition of a rustic, after the fir-st conjunction of his eye with a
gayal, that it is like a cow. Next ensues recollection of the sen-
tence indicatory of analogy, viz. that by the term gayal an animal
like a cow is designated. The cognition that arises that an animal
of the present kind is- designated by the term gayal, is a recognL
tion through similarity. Thus the followers of the Nyaya doctrine.
In the teaching of Kanada this is merely an illation, because there
is produced at that time only an inference of- the designation of
the term gayal, by means of similitude to a cow as an inferential
mark included under designation by the term gayal ; while the
notion of the applicability of the term gayal does not so much as
come into being under the circumstance of absence of the notion
of pervasion. Or else, the term, gayal, after perception of a
s
( 290 )
gayal, occasions a sense of the nature of a gayal, it having no
other function, since it has been applied to that object by the an-
cients, just as the term cow is the occasion of a sense of the nature
of a cow. Or it may be that the occasion of the sense of the
nature of a gayal appears from the force of the attribution con-
cerning the subject of the question, by means of the inference
that the term gayal is an occasion of a practical acceptation inas-
much as it is a legitimate term.
The Mimansakas hold that disjunctive reasoning is another
form of evidence. For instance, when it has been ascertained
from astrology that Deva-datta is to live for a hundred years, and
from observation that he has no house to live in, it is next ^presu-
med that, inasmuch as his living a hundred* years is otherwise im-
possible, he must live in the open air. This, as being a fact of im-
plication, is not accepted by them as an inference. In this exam-
ple, inasmuch as the notion of living involves the notion of living
either in a house or in the open air, and inasmuch as it is impossi-
ble that he should live in a house, the other alternative being
established, iris living in the open air appears in the process of
illation. In like manner in the familiar example Deva-datta is
stout but does not eat by day (therefore he eats at night), it
being settled that he must eat, since stoutness is observed to be
pervaded or universally accompanied by eating, and it being con-
f?r i 53 H*HirffT?TOTifii TrannTJTRr^ STO^ tfRifm^iT: rroifg swrafr
trot Hwraf?? w&m fear swrgfo ^'esf srajr*
rrf\jr
( 291 )
trary to the hypothesis that he should eat by day, it follows that he
eats at night. Similarly the Paurauikas hold probability and tra-
ditional teaching to be other forms of evidence. Probability is a
cognition dependent on a plurality of concomitances, as for in-
stance learning is probable in a Brahman, and a hundred instances
are probable among a thousand, while there is no pervasion or
universal concomitance necessitated. Such is their view. In like
manner traditional teaching, which is delivered in the form Thus
indeed they have declared, for this is a proposition derived through
a succession of witnesses and having no determinate author. For
instance In every sacred fig-tree a Yaksha dwells &c. This in the
view of the Pauraaikas, being ascertained as having been declared
by competent authority, is not included under verbal knowledge.
This doctrine of theirs is not correct, for traditional teaching
being a kind of verbal knowledge is included under inference.
Probability, also, so far as it involves a pervasion is included under
inference ; and so far as it is irrespective of universal concomi-
tance, is not a form of evidence at all. Accordingly it is declared
in the aphorisms of Gautama : Inasmuch as traditional teaching is
not a different thing, it is not denied of verbal knowledge, and in-
asmuch as disjunctive argumentation, probability, and impossibility
are not different things, they are not denied of inference.
According to the doctrine of Bhatta and that of the Vedanta
non-observation is also another form of evidence, and apprehen-
sion of non-existence takes place thereby. This doctrine also can-
not be accepted. In the case of non-observation it is perception
that arises by means of a presentation of attribution connected
with the organs of sense. We do not controvert the fact that this
is the cause of non-observation, but to maintain that non -observa-
tion is an independent form of evidence does not belong to the
course of propriety. V.
sjfk: n S n
( 292 )
Aph. 6. Reminiscence results from a particular conjunction
of the soul with the internal organ, and from reproduction.
1 The wo'rd results is to be supplied. The particular conjunc-
tion is reflection and other attention. From this, as the non-coin-
herent cause, reminiscence, a kind of knowledge, is produced in
the soul, as the co-inherent cause. The instrumental cause is
stated in the words from reproduction, and by the particle and the
active element of former experience is involved. This recollection
or reminiscence simulates the correctness or incorrectness of the
previous experience ; such being the recollection of one who mis-
takes a rope for a snake and flees from it. Reminiscence does not
take place always in every case, since it depends on the resuscita-
tion of a mental retentum. The knowledge of inspired sages
is not separately denned by the author of the aphorisms, being in-
cluded in the perception of ascetics but it is stated in the section
intitled Enunciation of the categories, that the presentative cog-
nition which is declared to belong to inspired sages, the promul-
gators of revelation, resulting from particular merit, from conjunc-
tion of the soul and the internal organ irrespective of inferential
marks &c., and conversant about supersensible objects past, present,
and to come, about merit &c., and about the contents of books,
is called the knowledge of inspired sages. This belongs also at
times to ordinary people, as when a young maiden says My heart
assures me that my brother will depart tomorrow. U.
T $rfmr?aigrFrWTfg?T
fTR
gj w KTT?U
( 293 )
1 Reminiscence arises from a particular conjunction of the
soul and the internal organ, that is, from a conjunction of the
soul and the internal organ accompanied with a desire of recol-
lection, from reproduction in its common form called resuscitation,
and from an excitant implied by the particle arid. The instru-
ment therein is purpose, not identical with disregard ; the opera-
tion is reproduction ; the excitants are the concomitants (or asso-
ciated ideas) ; the non^coinherent cause is conjunction of the soul
and the internal organ ; and the instrumental cause is reflection
&c., consisting of the desire of recollection. V.
Aph. 7. So also dreaming.
1 As reminiscence results from a particular conjunction of tho
soul and the internal organ, so also does cognition in dreaming.
Dreaming consciousness is the intellection of the internal organ,
which arises by means of the organs of sense in one whose senses
are at rest, and whose internal organ is absorbed. This is of three
kinds. It arises partly from intensity of reproduction, whatever
WcRTWIH ^TTT3 TVJSRT^SI wcW^rT rl^T
__
U \ST5Fr5TtTrEJT5iTTIT
x
II
( 294 )
object one in love or anger thinks of intently when Be goes to
sleep, taking with him in that state the form of perceptive cogni-
tion, through the influence of mental reproductive power produced
by previous hearing of the legendaries (Purdnas) &c., in the form
This is the contest between Karna and A.rjuna, and the like. It
arises partly from derangement of the bodily affections wind, bile
and phlegm. Of these, one under disorder of flatulency experi-
ences transit through the air, wandering about on the earth, fleeing
with fear from tigers &c., another by the excess of the derange-
ment caused by inordinate secretion of bile experiences entrance
into fire, the embracing of flames of fire, and sees golden mountains,
the corruscations of flashing lightning, the conflagration of the
spheres &c. ; another through predominance of phlegmatic disorder
experiences passages through the sea, immersions in rivers and sprink-
lings with showers of rain, and sees mountains of silver and the
like. Through the influence of merits also, in the cognition which
is produced in the internal organ immersed in the experi-
ences of this or former states of being, arises auspicious imagina-
tion, due to merit, and having as its objects the riding upon ele-
phants, ascent of mountains, assumption of the princely umbrella,
feasting upon rice and milk, interviews with the sovereign, and the
like ; while through demerit arises dreaming imagination of unc-
tion with oil, the falling through blindness into a well, riding upon
camels, immersion in mire, the sight of one's own nuptials and the
like. Herein the three are conjointly causes, and this division is
to be considered as reposing on the relation of predominance among
the qualities. U.
Aph. 8. [So also] consciousness in dreaming.
1 Some one may say : The cognition which arises during
a dream, in the form of recollection of that which is experienc-
sanmzi
( 295 )
ed in dreaming cognition, has not the nature of dreaming, inas-
much as it is an experience of dreaming ; whence then does it
arise ? The answer is furnished in the aphorism. The words So
also are to be taken in from the preceding aphorism. The mean-
ing, therefore, is that as dreaming, so also the consciousness in
dreaming, arises from a particular conjunction of the soul with the
internal organ, and from reproduction. The difference extends
thus far that cognition in dreaming results from reproduction pro-
duced by former experience, while consciousness in dreaming re-
sults from reproduction produced by experience arising at the very
time, It has therefore been stated by PraSasta-devacharya that
from looking back upon past cognitions recollection only results ;
and the author of the Vritti says that cognition in dreaming, be-
ing a flash of experienced objects, is not a different thing from re-
miniscence. Some teach that consciousness in dreaming is know-
ledge amounting to certitude during dreams, such as that one is
lying in bed. U.
II II
Aph. 9. Also from merit.
1 A cause of dreams and of consciousness in dreaming is ad-
ded. The particle also implies the addition of demerit. The ex-
planation of this has already been given.
^f^TiiuTTH sssirrcinin^TfgsJT n 1 n
Aph. 10. Nescience results from derangement of the organs
of sense, and from imperfection in reproduction.
Wi f C 1 33 <T3Tfi
i <iraaimTOiirc:
( 296 )
1 -'Intelligence according to another mode is divided into two
kinds, certitude and incertitude. Of these, the cause of incerti-
tude is stated. Derangements of the organs of sense are ophthal-
mia &c. Imperfection in reproduction is the resulting from erro-
neous experience. The particle and implies the addition of such
imperfections as remoteness &c., and as sumptions of which the in-
ferential mark is illegitimate. The cause then of nescience or in-
certitude is imperfection ; and imperfection, as consisting of bili-
ousness, remoteness &c., is of various kinds. "V.
u 11 ti
s
Aph. II. This is imperfect cognition.
2 This, an uninflected word, employed pronominally refers to
nescience. This nescience is defective cognition, cognition unduly
extended or restricted, cognition determined by a, form of which it
is not susceptible and asserting that this is in that, a cognition the
determination of which does not reside in the thing to be deter-
mined. Imperfection is defined as being uncertainty of cognition.
Suspense, therefore, though admitting of one valid alternative, is
vicious, being identical with inattention. The four forms of nes-
cience, therefore, known as suspense, erroneous assurance dreamino-
O*
and non-apprehension are hereby implied. U.
Aph. 12. Free from imperfection it is science.
frsrramm: 3iTC*imTi i
cTTfc
3HST:
: U
( 297 )
1 The word cognition is to be supplied from the preceding
aphorism. Science is experience of that whereof there is cogni-
tion free from imperfection, that is, produced by organs of sense
which are not deranged ; recognition of a character in its proper
subject ; or experience the form of which resides in a common sub-
stratum ; or experience such that that which is not its form does
not reside in its subject ; and this is of two kinds intuitive and
inferential. U.
5UiS fag sshsg OTBT: u H3 u
Aph. 13. The knowledge of inspired sages, and perfect vi-
sion result from merits.
1 Some might ask wherefore the knowledge of ascetics is not
nescience, since imperfection of the objects, as remoteness &c., is
possible in such cognition. To this the answer is furnished in tho
aphorism. The knowledge of inspired sages, which is produced by
merit acquired by asceticism, the perfect vision, the vision of all
objects perfect or real, arises from merits. If it be suggested thafc
demerit may be the cause thereof, we deny this, for such knowledge
is never erroneous, and demerit is the cause of error. But the
knowledge of ascetics, depending solely upon merit, arises solely
in the form of certitude, inasmuch as remoteness and the like, the
defects of the object, cannot effect erroneousness therein, and we
r u<jfw
3T
mfn;ri fTT^f gpismfcren * wcrf?r
i
wgf?r
( 298 )
feel assured that defects beget error only by the assistance of de-
merit. Some maintain that the vision which results by means of a
spell, as by means of a particular kind of ball of collyrium over
which a sacred text has been recited, results only from merits, like
the knowledge of inspired sages. The verse of the Raghu-vansa,
[ch. 3. 41,] The son of Dilipa acquired the vision of supersensible
objects &c., well accords with this exposition. Hence they explain
the meaning to be that such knowledge also, as depending only
upon, merit, arises solely in the form of certitude. V.
TENTH BOOK, FIRST DAILY LESSON.
nfgntfra firo: *raf ^TraT^rrcma: n 1 u
Aph. 1. Inasmuch as causes desirable and undesirable are
different and opposed, the relation of pleasure and pain is that of
reciprocally different objects.
' The object of the tenth book is the exposition of the divi-
sion of the attributes of the soul according to their cause. The
division of pleasure and pain is first stated among these, with the
purpose of rejecting the error that pleasure differs not from pain,
which error might arise from the omission of pleasure in the apho-
wrr
^tzmnn ^
yr<*H.UI cT^J
: i xd*RidHUT:
?THT
flrT H^STW ?f?T
^r% gtamFcnTn't srrrinii
n
( 299 )
rism of Gautama which enumerates the objects of certitude. Soul,
body, organ of sense, object of sense, intelligence, internal organ,
activity, fault, transmigration, recompense, pain, and emancipation
are the objects of certitude. There exists between pleasure and
pain the mutual relation of different objects, difference, or variety.
Should it be asked why it is so, it is stated that it is because there isa
difference in causes desirable and undesirable, that is, because there
is a distinction between a desirable cause such as garlands, sandal-
wood, women &c., and an undesirable cause, such as snakes, thorns
&c. Difference of effect necessarily depends upon difference of
cause. Another ground of the distinction in laid down in the op-
position, for pleasure and pain are never experienced simultaneously
in one and the same soul. By the particle and the difference of the
effects of pleasure and pain is implied also as a ground for distin-
guishing between them. For instance, complaisance, the embrace,
clearness of the eyes &c. are the effects of pleasure, while despon-
dency and a sullied countenance are the effects of pain ; wherefore
pleasure and pain must differ. It has therefore been stated by
Prasasta-devacharya : Pleasure has complaisance as its characteris-
tic ; and is that which is produced through conjunction of the soul
and internal organ supposing merit &c., or through the contiguity
of the organ and the object of sense in the recognition of some-
thing desirable produced, where garlands and other desirable ob-
jects are at hand ; and is productive of complaisance, embraces,
clearness of the eyes &c. In the case of past objects, such as gar-
lands, sandal -wood, and the like, pleasure arises from reminis-
cence ; in the case of future objects, from purpose or resolution. The
non-enumeration of pleasure in the aphorism of Gautama is to
promote indifference ; since indifference would arise in one who
should account even pleasure as pain. U.
?g: n ^ n
Aph. 2. Non-inclusion in doubt and assurance is a mark
that [pleasure and pain] are different from cognition.
( 300 )
1 The mark that pleasure and pain are different from cogni-
tion, distinct from the attribute knowledge, is that they are not
included under doubt and assurance, that is, that they do not fall
under either certainty or uncertainty. For the attribute knowledge is
of two kinds, doubt and assurance ; and neither pleasure nor paia
c*n be included under either of those kinds. For neither pleasure
nor pain has the form of two repugnant alternatives, that it should
be probable that they have the nature of doubt, nor has either pos-
session of. a given form together with absence of the negation of
that form, that it should be likely that they have the nature of
assurance or certainty. The supposition of a third form of cogni-
tion is chimerical, and consequently neither pleasure nor pain can
come under knowlede. V.
u 3 u
Apb. 3. The production thereof [i. e. of doubt and assu-
rance] is by means of perception and inference.
2 The production thereof, that is of doubt and assurance, re-
sults from perception, and from an inferential mark. IS either plea-
: I TtT^n^lfg %fc!>JT S^fJT f^^tngfrf ?ffg
gwira =f% *pt <;:*gr err
5TT?tf rTSWTclTHgiTCsR HrfH HcfiTTcfi 5FI
n
ciT
elT WTH 5g5R5Q9R 3T 51T3J:
( 301 )
sure nor pain is produced by the presentative or inferential appa-
ratus. For pleasure is of four kinds, sensuous, accompanying de-
sire, relating to self-esteem, or resulting from consuetude. Of the
last three of these origination from juxtaposition of the object to
the organ of sense cannot be predicated. And should it be con-
tended that the first is cognition inasmuch as it is generated by
contiguity of the organ and object of sense, we reply that it is not
so, for part only of the causal apparatus cannot prove homogeneity
in the product, else all products would be uniform as having time
and space as their common antecedents. Moreover, if pleasure
were cognition, the pleasure which is not produced through conti-
guity of the organ and object of sense, would be either non-discri-
minative or discriminative ; but it cannot be the former, for then it
would be supersensible, nor can it be the latter, inasmuch as it
does not consist of a judgment respecting two objects in the relation
of subject and predicate. Again, as pleasure and pain are neces-
sarily accompanied with sensibility, were they forms of cognition
there would be involved in the notion of a sensibility of cognition
a regression to infinity. The inferential means an argument, as the
objective means an object. The author of the Vritti explains the
aphorism thus, that the origin of these, that is of cognition and
pleasure, is explained by perception and inference, that is, by per-
ceptive and inferential cognition ; and that whereas perceptive' cog-
nition is produced by the senses, and inferential by arguments, it is
otherwise with pleasure, &c. U.
&,
Aph. 4. The notion of the past also [is a difference between
cognition and pleasure and pain.]
1 A difference depending upon a difference of form in pleasure
IRRT
s3rV5JH
( 302 )
&c., as compared with inferential knowlege is here stated. The
word iti means the form ; and the word also adds another form,
that of the future. A form, therefore, past &c., is observed in in-
ferential knowledge, as that fire has been or will be in the moun-
tain ; but pleasure or pain produced under this form has never
been observed. U.
n y n
Aph. 5. Also [pleasure and pain are not forms of cognition]
inasmuch as the effect is not [always] observed, where [the antece-
dents] are.
1 Another difference is added. Pleasure and pain are not
merely perception or merely inference, since the effect, pleasure or
pain, is not always observed where the antecedent, contiguity of
organ and object of sense, or attention to the universal concomi-
tance and the attribution respecting the subject of the question,
exists. The meaning, therefore, is as follows. Pleasure and pain
are not cognition in general ; while particular cognition is either
perceptive knowledge, or knowledge, in the form of inference.
Pleasure and pain are not the former, inasmuch as there is some-
times no experience of the pleasurable, where there is contiguity of
the object and organ of sense, as where there is perception of gar-
lands, sandal-wood &c. ; nor are they the latter, since there is some-
times no experience of either the pleasurable or the painful, where
there exists an inference respecting sandal-wood &c. or an inference
respecting fire &c. Since, therefore, pleasure and pain are not always
experienced in the particular perception or in the particular inference,
they are not those particular perceptions and inferences. U.
err
51T wisfofflSli 5TT
=1
en
( 303 )
II 5 II
Aph. 6. Because [pleasure and pain] are observed to depend
on other causes co-inherent with the same object.
1 Another differentiating character is described. The words
pleasure and pain are to be supplied. In relation to pleasure par-
ticular causes co-inherent with the same object are merit, desire
of pleasure, wish for the cause of pleasure, volition directed upon
the material cause of pleasure, and cognition of garlands, sandal-
wood &c. In relation to pain particular causes are demerit, cogni-
tion of the undesirable, as thorns &c. The meaning is that plea-
sure and pain differ from inferential cognition, inasmuch as they
are observed in causes co-inherent with the same object. But non-
discriminative cognition does not require a cause co-inherent with
the same object, and a particular cause ; while discriminative cog-
nition supposes a knowledge of attribution or judgment, but this is
not another cause, that is, is not a cause of its own peculiar kind.
Conjunction with the internal organ, as being a cause common to
pleasure and pain with cognition, may be discounted. Though re-
miniscence supposes mental retenta, yet the difference thereform is
obvious, inasmuch as on interrogating consciousness, the difference
is recognised. Although there are required in inference a recol-
lection of pervasion or invariable concomitance, and knowledge of
the nature of the characters of the subject of the question, yet
these are excluded by the word other. The conclusive meaning
of the aphorism is, therefore, that pleasure and pain differ from
TTHt
?raTfti
( 304 )
cognition, inasmuch as they are derived from a peculiar cause of
its own kind, having its own common substratum, as is the case
with reminiscence, with the first sound in a series of sounds, and
the like. U.
s^ii ^sRfoR fro TOgst Trmnn B%$resR?|-
smw: ii o it
Aph. 7. The head, the back, the stomach, and the vitals are
in one part, in one [body ] ; their difference results from the dif-
ference thereof [that is, from the difference of their causes.]
1 It may be urged that if the difference between pleasure and
pain and cognition depend on a difference in the causes, and if the
difference between pleasure and pain be like that between a post
and a water-pot and the like, there can be no mutual difference
between the body and its parts, as the head, feet, back, stomach,
&c., there being in regard to these no difference in the ultimate
particles, binary atomic aggregates &c., or the causes of blood
and semen. Accordingly the statement of the aphorism. In one
part means in one constituent portion ; in one, in one body. The
head is one part ; the stomach, the back, and the vitals, imply the
muscles &c. The difference of these, that is, their heterogeneity,
results from the difference thereof, that is, from the difference of
their causes. For the co-inherent cause of the stomach, the back
&c., is not of the same kind as that of the head ; just as the he-
terogeneity of a piece of cloth, a water-pot, &c. results from hete-
: FTTH rHT ? tnCOTUFl CpRT
'
HUT
crarrfi
lSST^^ftl H5^itlT^rratJT^T^3TTfmf? U^^JTTT
HIT
( 305 )
rogeneity in the threads, the half-jars &c., which are their co-inhe-
rent causes ; the heterogeneity of which threads, half-jars, &c"., re-
sults again from heterogeneity in the fibres, lime &c. of which they
are composed. Heterogeneity is- thus to be sought in the succes-
sive material causes, for while the atoms may be common, the
heterogeneity of the respective material causes invariably gives
rise to heterogeneity in the material effects ; but homogeneity ia
respect of substance in the material causes does not cause such
heterogeneity. U.
SECOND DAILY LESSON.
553 sFTtrairamra n 9 u
Aph. 1. The position, with regard to a substance, that it is a
cause, results from the co-inherence of its effects.
1 The discrimination of the three kinds of cause is here col-
laterally instituted. -The cognition and expression, as applicable
to a substance, that it is a cause, that is, that it is a co-inherent
cause ; whence, it may be asked, are these derived ? It is there-
fore stated that they are derived from the co-inhesion of the effect,
inasmuch as there co-inhere therein substances, qualities und
actions. U.
II r II
Aph. 2. Or from conjunction.
3 It might be asked whether only co-inherent causality per-
tains to substances. The reply is furnished in the Aphorism. As
?T? * H*rcnrerr*Wrwr* sanmiiTfT <*ntJ i
TI<:3iU:t!Tf^
^nr irfh
T
( 306 )
co-inherent causality, so also operative causality, belongs to the
threads, in the production of a piece of cloth. Inasmuch as con-
junction of the shuttle and the thread is also a cause of the cloth,
the shuttle and the thread, are mediately through the conjunction,
operatively causative of the piece of cloth. The particle or is used
conjunctively. Through the thread be the co-inherent cause of the
conjunction of the shuttle and the thread, it is an operative cause
of the piece of cloth, mediately through such conjunction. U.
u 3 n
Aph. 3. Through co-inherence in the cause actions [are non-
coinherent causes.]
1 It is explained that causality resides in action. The words
Are non-coinherent causes are to be supplied. Non-coinherent
causality is causality co-inherent in one object connected with the
relation of cause and effect. Such causality results either from co-
inherence in the same object with the effect, or from co-inherence
in the same object with the cause. Of these the former is called in
the terminology of the VaiSeshikas the lesser, the latter the greater.
If it be asked how the non-coinherent causality of action in regard
to conjunction, disjunction, and reproduction is recognised ; it is
here replied that it is through co-inherence in the cause, that is,
through co-inherence in the co-inherent cause of conjunction &c.
Non-coinherent causality, therefore, resides in action, with respect
to conjunction &c., by the lesser relation characterised as co-inhe-
rence in the same object with the effect. U.
II H
rTSTl I
5RT-
srssrr
( 307 )
Aph. 4. Also, likewise, through co-inherence in the same ob-
ject with the cause in regard to colour.
1 This aphorism is stated in anticipation of the questions as
to what causality pertains to colour and other qualities residing in
the parts, in relation to the qualities &c., of the wholes. By the
words In regard to to colour, taste, smell, touch, number, extent,
separateness, gravity, fluidity, viscidity and the like, are also in-
dicated. The word likewise extends the application of non-coin-
herent causality. Colour and the rest in the whole commence by
the greater relation, by co-inherence in one object together with
that whole which is the co-inherent cause of the colour &c. of the
whole ; as, for instance, the colour &c., of the half-jar originates
the colour &c. in the jar, and similarly in all other cases. The
word also adds to these occasionally operative causality. U.
n a n
Aph. 5. Conjunction through co-inherence in the cause [is
the non-coinherent cause] of a piece of cloth.
1 It is stated that the lesser relation belongs to conjunction
which is the non-coinherent cause in the origination of a substance.
Conjunction, through co-inherence in the cause, that is, in the co-
inherent cause, is the non-coiuherent cause of the effect or product
by the relation characterised as co-inherence in a same object
with the effect. By the term piece of cloth product substance
*iK<lJrT fU Uxd I U I HTS I
HI
^ai
H
sresrf &rzrrefajnT> i snw
( 308 )
generally is indicated. A certain author maintains that if con-
junction of part with part be a non-coinherent cause of the cloth
&c., then co-inherence in the same object with the cause is also
a non-coinherent cause. U.
n s 11
A ph. 6. Also through co-inherence with the cause of the
cause.
1 It is stated that causality by the greater relation sometimes
pertains to conjunction. The conjunction technically termed co-
alition, and residing in the constituent portions of a ball of cotton,
originates magnitude in the ball of cotton ; and there is therein
the relation of co-inherence in the same object as the cause. U.
n s n
N V
Aph. 7. The differentiating character of fire [is an operative
or efficient cause] through co-inherence with the conjunct.
2 Operative causality is described. The differentiating charac-
ter of fire, that is heat which is its peculiar attribute, is through
co-inherence with the conjunct, the efficient cause of colour &c
produced by baking. Hot touch, then, -is the operative cause of
qualities produced by baking, by the relation of conjunction with
its own substratum. The general definition of an efficient cause
is to be understood to be a eause other than the co-inherent and
non-coinherent causes. V.
n c n
Aph. 8. The employment of visible observances, the uses
f?i
( 309 )
whereof are visible, m the absence of visible results tends to exal-
tation.
1 The employment, or performance, of observances, such as
sacrifice, almsgiving, penance &c., which are visible, that is, which
are duly celebrated, and the uses whereof are visible, that is, the
utility of which is known by imperative precepts, in the absence
of visible results of these respective observances, where such re-
sults are impossible in consequence of absence of desire for such
and such consequences, tends to exaltation, that is, to a resultant
desire of knowledge induced by purity of intellect. Observances,
.therefore, whose utility is determined as elysian bliss &c., enjoined
by such precepts as Let him who desires paradise offer the sacrifice
ef horses, when performed disinterestedly, do not produce elysian
bliss &c. as their fruit, but produce as their result purity of intel-
lect and the like, according to the Vedic text They desire know-
ledge, and the traditional text When wordly attachment has by
.observances born its fruits, knowledge is afterwards produced. V.
n < ii
Aph. 9. [It has been stated that] authoritativeness pertains
to revelation because declared by Him.
* The word iti indicates the conclusion of the system. Au-
thoritativeness pertains to revelation, that is to the Veda, because
TTTFT
: 11
( 310 )
declared, that is promulgated, by Him, the divine being. For it
is proved that the Vedas have a personal author, inasmuch as
they are an enouncement. Nor can beings like us be the enuncia-
tors of these, appropriated to a thousand branches. Moreover
their objects transcend the senses, and beings of our nature can-
not behold objects that transcend the senses. The Vedas, again,
are rightly affirmed, inasmuch as they are received by the highest
authorities. That which is not rightly affirmed is not received by
the highest authorities, but these being received by such, are
rightly affirmed. To be rightly affirmed is to be promulgated by an
independent personal author ; and to be received by the highest au-
thorities is to be an object in course of performance by persons attach-
ed to all the systems. It has been stated that non-existence of
result sometimes accrues from the disparity of the action, the agent,
and the means. If it be denied that this is so, the agent not being
remembered ; we refuse such denial it having been already
proved that the agent is remembered. The promulgation thereof
by him is proved inasmuch as it could be promulgated only by an
intelligent personal author, while such independent power to pro-
mulgate the Vedas in their thousand branches, is, as has been
said, impossible for beings of our nature. Inasmuch, moreover, as
certitude has excellence for its condition, the certitude of the Veda
must have excellence for its condition, and the excellence must in
this case be pronounced to be the enunciator's right knowledge of
the matter of the enouncement. The enunciator of the Veda
must be one who has an intuition of elysium, requitative efficacy,
and the like, and there is none such but God alone. U.
re
5r*ra?TtepfirrrrT i fa&a TWIST
g TOTTT
ere en^i u: w< i u<y ideroq^srreTfSRTCsnr'r FT^srag ^nsr^ ?rr 55 u
FINIS.
i.
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A 000104422 1