UC-NRLF 
 
 SB SMI 2D7 
 
 
THE 
 
 OUTBREAK OF REBELLION 
 
CAMPAIGNS OF THE CIVIL WAR. I. 
 
 THE OUTBREAK 
 
 REBELLION 
 
 BY 
 
 JOHN G. NICOLA Y 
 
 PRIVATE SECRETARY TO PRESIDENT LINCOIJf 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 CHARLES SCRIBNER S SONS 
 
 743 AND 745 BROADWAY 
 
 1890 
 
COPYRIGHT BT 
 
 CHARLES SCRIBNEITS SONS 
 1881 
 
 TROW 8 
 
 PRINTING AND BOOKBINDING COMPANY, 
 NEW YORK. 
 
PEEFACE. 
 
 UPON urgent and repeated request from the publishers, 
 the author consented to lay aside temporarily a larger and 
 more important literary task, to write for them this initial 
 volume of the " Campaigns of the Civil War." Personal 
 observation and long previous investigation had furnished! 
 him a great variety of new material for the work ; and this 
 was opportunely supplemented by the recent publication of 
 the Official War Eecords for 1861, both Union and Confed 
 erate, opening to comparison and use an immense mass of 
 historical data, and furnishing the definite means of verify 
 ing or correcting the statements of previous writers. 
 
 Under these advantages the author has written the pres 
 ent volume, basing his work on materials of unquestioned 
 authenticity books, documents, and manuscripts and, in 
 deed, for the greater part, on official public records. His 
 effort has been a conscientious and painstaking one, making 
 historical accuracy his constant aim. If, unfortunately, he 
 has committed any errors, he hopes they may prove only 
 
Vi PREFACE. 
 
 such as from the meagreness or conflicting nature of the 
 evidence any one might fall into. He would gladly have 
 appended to his pages full references and citations, but want 
 of space absolutely forbade. 
 
 So many kind friends have encouraged and aided him, 
 that he finds it impossible to acknowledge their services in 
 detail, and therefore takes this occasion to return to one and 
 all his sincere thanks. Government officials, especially, of 
 all grades, have with uniform courtesy afforded him every 
 facility in their power. Without free access to the various 
 departments and archives and, above all, to the vast histori 
 cal treasures of the Library of Congress it would have been 
 exceedingly difficult to gather and verify the numerous facts, 
 quotations, names, and dates, which his narrative required. 
 
 WASHINGTON, B.C., 
 
 February Z6, 1881. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. PAGB 
 
 SECESSION, 1 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 CHARLESTON HARBOR, 17 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 THE CONFEDERATE STATES REBELLION, .... 39 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 LINCOLN, 45 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 SUMTER, 56 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 THE CALL TO ARMS, 69 
 
 CHAPTER VIL 
 BALTIMORE, : . . 82 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 WASHINGTON, 91 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 ELLSWORTH, . . 105 
 
viii CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER X. PAGE 
 
 MISSOURI, 115 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 KENTUCKY, . ; . 126 
 
 CHAPTER XIL 
 WEST VIRGINIA, 137 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 PATTERSON S CAMPAIGN, 155 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 MANASSAS, 169 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 BULL RUN, 181 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 THE RETREAT, 197 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 CONCLUSION. 9 200 
 
LIST OF MAPS. 
 
 PAOB 
 
 CHARLESTON HARBOR, 21 
 
 ROUTE OP THE MASSACHUSETTS SIXTH THROUGH BALTI 
 MORE, 85 
 
 ROUTES OF APPROACH TO WASHINGTON, . . . .93 
 FIELD OF THE WEST VIRGINIA BATTLES, .... 148 
 
 PATTERSON S CAMPAIGN, 159 
 
 BULL RUN THE FIELD OF STRATEGY, .... 177 
 BULL RUN BATTLE OF THE FORENOON, .... 184 
 BULL RUN BATTLE OF THE AFTERNOON, . . . 189 
 
U w * 
 
 \^iiSI ..^v,^ 
 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 CHAPTER L 
 
 SECESSION. 
 
 THE fifth day of October, 1860, is the initial point of the 
 American Rebellion. Its conception, animus, and probably 
 its plans, lay much farther back. It had been seriously 
 proposed once or twice before, but it was then that its for 
 mal organization was begun. On that day Governor Gist, 
 of South Carolina, wrote a confidential circular letter, which 
 he despatched by the hand of a special messenger, to the 
 governors of what were commonly designated the Cotton 
 States. In this letter he asked an interchange of opinions 
 which he might be at liberty to submit to a consultation of 
 leading men of South Carolina. He said South Carolina 
 would unquestionably call a convention as soon as it was 
 ascertained that a majority of Lincoln electors were chosen 
 in the then pending presidential election. "If a single 
 State secedes," he said, " she will follow her. If no other 
 Btate takes the lead, South Carolina will secede (in my opin 
 ion) alone, if she has any assurance that she will be soon 
 followed by another or other States ; otherwise it is doubt 
 ful." He asked information, and advised concerted action. 
 
 North Carolina was first to respond. The people would 
 I.-l 
 
2 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 not, so wrote the governor under date of October 18th, con 
 sider Lincoln s election a sufficient cause for disunion, and 
 the Legislature would probably not call a convention. The 
 Governor of Alabama, under date of October 25th, thought 
 Alabama would not secede alone, but would secede in co 
 operation with two or more States. The Governor of Mis 
 sissippi, under date of October 26th, wrote : " If any State 
 moves, I think Mississippi will go with her." On the same 
 day the Governor of Louisiana answered : "I shall not advise 
 the secession of my State, and I will add that I do not think 
 the people of Louisiana will ultimately decide in favor of 
 that course." The Governor of Georgia, under date of Octo 
 ber 31st, advocated retaliatory legislation, and ventured his 
 opinion that the people of Georgia w r ould wait for some 
 overt act. Florida alone responded w T ith anything like en 
 thusiasm, but only after the lapse of a month. Her gover 
 nor said that Florida was " ready to wheel into line with the 
 gallant Palmetto State, or any other Cotton State or States," 
 and thought she would unquestionably call a convention. 
 
 The discouraging tone of these answers establishes, beyond 
 controversy, that, excepting in South Carolina, the rebellion 
 was not in any sense a popular revolution, but was a con 
 spiracy among the prominent local office-holders and politi 
 cians, which the people neither expected nor desired, and 
 which they were made eventually to justify and uphold by 
 the usual arts and expedients of conspiracy. 
 
 Directly and indirectly, the South had practically con 
 trolled the government during its whole existence. Excited 
 to ambition by this success, she sought to perpetuate that 
 control. The extension of slavery and the creation of addi 
 tional Slave States was a necessary step in the scheme, and 
 became the well-defined single issue in the presidential elec 
 tion. But in this contest the South for the first time me. 
 
SECESSION. 3 
 
 overwhelming defeat. The choice of Lincoln was a conclu 
 sive and final decision, in legal form and by constitutional 
 majorities, that slavery should not be extended ; and the 
 popular vote of 1860 transferred the balance of power irre 
 vocably to the Free States. 
 
 In the political discussions throughout this presidential 
 campaign, as well as in preceding years, the South had made 
 free and loud use of two leading arguments, always with 
 telling effect : the first, to intimidate the North, was the 
 threat of disunion ; the second, to " fire the Southern heart," 
 was the entirely unfounded alarm-cry that the North, if suc 
 cessful, would not merely exclude slavery from federal terri 
 tories, but would also destroy slavery in the Slave States. 
 The unthinking masses of the South accepted both these 
 arguments in their literal sense ; and Southern public opin 
 ion, excited and suspicious, became congenial soil in which 
 the intended revolt easily took root. 
 
 The State of South Carolina, in addition, had been little 
 else than a school of treason for thirty years. She was, 
 moreover, peculiarly adapted to become the hotbed of con 
 spiracy by the fact that of all the States she was least re 
 publican in both the character of her people and the form 
 of her institutions. She was exclusive, aristocratic, reaction 
 ary ; had a narrow distrust of popular participation in gov 
 ernment, and longed for the distinctions of caste and privi 
 lege in society. 
 
 It would seem that, before the governors replies were all 
 received, the consultation or caucus for which they were 
 solicited was held, and the programme of insurrection agreed 
 upon. Circumstances rendered a special session of the 
 South Carolina Legislature necessary. The election was 
 held during the month of October. Local fanaticism toler 
 ated no opposition party in the State, and under the manipu- 
 
4 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 lation of the conspirators the prevailing question was, who 
 was the most zealous "resistance" candidate. To a legis 
 lature elected from this kind of material, Governor Gist, on 
 November 5th, sent a defiant, revolutionary message the 
 first official notice and proclamation of insurrection. He 
 declared that "our institutions" were in danger from the 
 hostility of the " fixed majorities " of the North ; and recom 
 mended the calling of a State convention, and the purchase 
 of arms and material of war. 
 
 A lingering doubt about the result of the presidential 
 contest appears in the formal choice by the Legislature, of 
 electors who would vote for Breckinridge and Lane. But 
 that doubt was short-lived. The morning of November 7th 
 brought the certain news of the election of Lincoln and 
 Hamlin on the previous day, and the rejoicings which 
 would have been uttered over their defeat became jubila 
 tions that their success offered the long-coveted pretext for 
 disunion. 
 
 From this time forth everything was managed to swell the 
 revolutionary furor. The Legislature immediately ordered 
 a convention, made appropriations, passed military bills. 
 The federal office-holders, with much public flourish of their 
 patriotic sacrifice, resigned their offices. Military companies 
 enrolled themselves in the city ; organizations of minute- 
 men sprang up in the rural neighborhoods. Drills, parades, 
 meetings, bonfires, secession harangues, secession cockades, 
 palmetto flags, purchase of fire-arms and powder, singing 
 of the Marseillaise there is not room to enumerate the fol 
 lies to which the general populace, especially of Charleston, 
 devoted their days and nights. There was universal satis 
 faction : to the conspirators, because their schemes were 
 progressing; to the rabble, because it had a continuous 
 holiday. 
 
SECESSION. 5 
 
 Amid unflagging excitement of this character, which re 
 ceived a daily stimulus from similar proceedings beginning 
 and growing in other Cotton States, November and the first 
 half of December passed away. Meanwhile a new governor, 
 Francis W. Pickens, a revolutionist of a yet more radical 
 type than his predecessor, was chosen by the Legislature 
 and inaugurated, and the members of the Convention au 
 thorized by the Legislature were chosen at an election held 
 on December 6th. The South Carolina Convention met at 
 Columbia, the capital of the State, according to appoint 
 ment, on December 17, 1860, but, on account of a local epi 
 demic, at once adjourned to Charleston. That body was, 
 like the Legislature, the immediate outgrowth of the cur 
 rent conspiracy, and doubtless counted many of the conspira 
 tors among its members. It therefore needed no time to 
 make up its mind. On the fourth day of its term it passed 
 unanimously what it called an Ordinance of Secession, in 
 the following words : 
 
 u We, the people of the State of South Carolina, in convention 
 assembled, do declare and ordain, and it is hereby declared and or 
 dained, that the ordinance adopted by us in convention on the 23d 
 day of May, in the year of our Lord 1788, whereby the Constitution of 
 the United States of America was ratified, and also all Acts and parts 
 of Acts of the General Assembly of this State ratifying amendmenta 
 of the said Constitution, are hereby repealed ; and that the Union 
 now subsisting between South Carolina and other States, under the 
 name of the United States of America, is hereby dissolved." 
 
 Conscious that this document bore upon its face the plain 
 contradiction of their pretended authority, and its own pal 
 pable nullity both in technical form and essential principle, 
 the convention undertook to give it strength and plausi 
 bility by an elaborate Declaration of Causes, adopted a few 
 
 days later (December 24th) a sort of half -parody of Jeffer- 
 
 " * 
 
 T 
 
6 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 son s masterpiece. It could, of course, quote no direct 
 warrant from the Constitution for secession, but sought to 
 deduce one, by implication, from the language of the Decla 
 ration of Independence and the Xth Amendment. It re 
 asserts the absurd paradox of State supremacy persistently 
 miscalled " State Eights "which reverses the natural order 
 of governmental existence ; considers a State superior to the 
 Union; makes a part greater than the whole; turns the 
 pyramid of authority on its apex ; plants the tree of liberty 
 with its branches in the ground and its roots in the air. 
 The fallacy has been a hundred times analyzed, exposed, and 
 refuted ; but the cheap dogmatism of demagogues and the 
 automatic machinery of faction perpetually conjures it up 
 anew to astonish the sucklings and terrify the dotards of 
 politics. The notable point in the Declaration of Causes is, 
 that its complaint over grievances past and present is against 
 certain States, and for these remedy was of course logically 
 barred by its own theory of State supremacy. On the other 
 hand, all its allegations against the Union are concerning 
 dangers to come, before which admission the moral justifi 
 cation of disunion falls to the ground. In rejecting the 
 remedy of future elections for future wrongs, the conspiracy 
 discarded the entire theory and principle of republican gov 
 ernment. 
 
 One might suppose that this exhausted their counterfeit 
 philosophy but not yet. Greatly as they groaned at un 
 friendly State laws seriously as they pretended to fear 
 damage or spoliation under future federal statutes, the bur 
 den of their anger rose at the sentiment and belief of the 
 North. "All hope of remedy," says the manifesto, "is ren 
 dered vain by the fact that the public opinion at the North 
 has invested a great political error with the sanctions of a 
 more erroneous religious belief." This is language one 
 
SECESSION. 7 
 
 might expect from the Pope of Eome ; but, that an American 
 convention should denounce the liberty of opinion, is not 
 merely to recede from Jefferson to Louis XTV. ; it is flying 
 from the town-meeting to the Inquisition. 
 
 Nor can the final and persistent, but false assumption of 
 the South, be admitted, that she was justified by prescriptive 
 privilege ; that, because slavery was tolerated at the forma 
 tion of the government, it must needs be protected to perpe 
 tuity. The Constitution makes few features of our system 
 perpetually obligatory. Almost everything is subject to 
 amendment by three-fourths of the States. The New World 
 Republic was established for reform not for mere blind 
 conservatism, certainly not for despotic reaction. The 
 slavery question, especially, was ever since 1808 broadly 
 under the control of the people. On the one hand, Congress 
 had legal power to tolerate the African slave trade ; on the 
 other, three-fourths of the States might lawfully abolish 
 slavery, as was done near the close of the Rebellion. To 
 efiect necessary and salutary political changes, in the ful 
 ness of time, by lawful and peaceful election through con 
 stitutional majorities, as a prudent alternative to the violence 
 and horror of revolution, is one of the many signal blessings 
 which republican representative government confers on an 
 intelligent nation. 
 
 The Ordinance of Secession of South Carolina was passed 
 in secret session, a little after mid-day, on December 20th. 
 The fact was immediately made public by huge placards 
 issued from the Charleston printing-offices ; and by special 
 direction of the convention, the event was further celebrated 
 by firing guns, ringing bells, and other jubilations. To 
 cany this studied theatrical effect to its fullest extent, a 
 session of the convention was held that same night, to which 
 the members marched in procession, where the formal sign- 
 
8 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 ing of the Ordinance was sought to be magnified into a 
 solemn public ceremony; after which the chairman pro 
 claimed South Carolina an "independent commonwealth." 
 With all their affectation of legality, formality, and present 
 justification, some of the members were honest enough to 
 acknowledge the true character of the event as the culmina 
 tion of a chronic conspiracy, not a spontaneous revolution. 
 " The secession of South Carolina," said one of the chief 
 actors, "is not an event of a day. It is not anything pro 
 duced by Mr. Lincoln s election, or by the non-execution of 
 the Fugitive Slave Law. It is a matter which has been 
 gathering head for thirty years." This, with many similar 
 avowals, crowns and completes the otherwise abundant proof 
 that the revolt was not only against right, but that it was 
 without cause. 
 
 The original suggestion of Governor Gist in his circular 
 letter, for a concerted insurrection, fell upon fruitful soil. 
 The events which occurred in South Carolina were in sub 
 stance duplicated in the neighboring States of Georgia, 
 Morida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. These States, 
 however, had stronger and more formidable union minorities 
 than South Carolina ; or rather, if the truth could have been 
 ascertained with safety, they had each of them decided ma 
 jorities averse to secession, as was virtually acknowledged by 
 their governors replies to the Gist circular. But during the 
 presidential campaign, the three Southern parties, for fac 
 tional advantage, had vied with each other in their denuncia* 
 tions of the hated "Black Republicans" they had berated 
 each other as " submissionists " in secret league or sympathy 
 with the Abolitionists. The partisans of Breckinridge 
 generally either active or latent disunionists were ready, 
 positive, and relentlessly aggressive ; the adherents of Bell 
 and of Douglas were demoralized and suspicious. When 
 
SECESSION. 9 
 
 Lincoln s election was, so unexpectedly to many, rendered 
 certain, they could not recover in time to evade the search 
 ing question which the conspirators immediately thrust at 
 them. " whether they would submit to Black Republican 
 rule." A false shame and the inexorable tyranny of South 
 ern public opinion made many a voter belie the honest con 
 victions of his heart, and answer No, when at the very least 
 he would gladly have evaded the inquiry. 
 
 The prominent office-holders, governors, senators, con 
 gressmen, judges, formed in each State a central clique of 
 conspiracy. The governors had official authority to issue 
 proclamations, to convene legislatures, to call out and com 
 mand such militia as existed. Had their authority been 
 wielded in behalf of the Union, no general revolt would 
 have been possible ; but, exercised without scruple or rest to 
 promote secession, insurrection began with an official pres 
 tige which swept the hesitating and the timid irresistibly 
 into the vortex of treason. Even then it was only by per 
 sistent nursing, management, and in many cases sheer deceit 
 that a semblance of majorities was obtained to justify and 
 apparently indorse the conspirators plots. Legislatures 
 were convened, commissioners sent from State to State, con 
 ventions called, military bills passed, minute-men and vol 
 unteer companies organized. Deliberative bodies were ha 
 rangued by the conspirators emissaries, and showered with 
 inflammatory telegrams. After the meeting of Congress the 
 fire-eaters of Washington held almost nightly caucuses, and 
 sent addresses, solicitations, and commands from the capital. 
 Individual opinion was overawed ; the government was not 
 only silent, but constantly yielding ; legislative deliberation 
 became, in secret session, legislative intrigue ; pretexts were 
 invented to defer and omit all proper scrutiny of election re 
 turns. The " State " was the idol of the hour. " The State 
 1* 
 
10 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 commands " was as despotic a formula as " The king com 
 mands " ; and the voter s personal judgment, the very basis 
 and life-giving principle of republics, was obliterated between 
 the dread of proscription and the blighting mildew of the 
 doctrine of supreme State allegiance. 
 
 Certain features of the struggle deserve special exj3lana- 
 tion. The " irrepressible conflict" between North and 
 South, between freedom and slavery, was not confined to the 
 two sides of Mason and Dixon s line ; it found a certain ex 
 pression even in the Cotton States themselves. Most of 
 these States embrace territory of a radically different quality. 
 Their southern and sea-coast front is a broad belt of sea- 
 islands, marshes, river-swamps, and low alluvial lands, ex 
 ceedingly unhealthy from malarial fevers in the hot season, 
 but of unsurpassed fertility, and possessing the picturesque 
 aspects of an exuberant half -tropical vegetation. This is the 
 region of the great cotton, rice, and sugar plantations which 
 have made the South rich and famous ; here the St. Clairs 
 and Legrees of real life counted their slaves by hundreds, 
 and aspired to sybaritic lives in ample, hospitable mansions, 
 surrounded by magnificent and venerable live-oak and mag 
 nolia groves, avenues of stately palms, princely gardens of 
 native and exotic bloom, and illimitable hedge-lines of the 
 Cherokee rose ; a swarm of house-servants to minister to pam 
 pered indolence and dispense a lavish hospitality ; a troop 
 of field-hands to fill the cotton, rice, or sugar houses ; a blend 
 ing of Arcadian simplicity and feudal pretension ; every plan 
 tation with its indulgent master, its exacting overseer, its 
 submissive slaves. These were the lights of the picture; 
 abler pens have painted the horrible background of bloody 
 slave-whips, barbarous slave-codes, degrading slave-auctions, 
 yellow fever, cypress -swamps, the bloodhound hunt, and 
 the ever-present dread of servile insurrection. From such 
 
SECESSION. 11 
 
 surroundings came the morbid dreams of an unholy league 
 between perpetual bondage and free trade, which should rear 
 a gigantic slave empire, before which the intellect, the 
 power, the splendor, and the government of all preceding 
 ages and nations should fade and wane. 
 
 The northern half of the Cotton States was very different ; 
 here were thin, sandy uplands of meagre productiveness ; 
 monotonous forests of pine and scrub-oak, running again in 
 to the more varied and romantic scenery of the subsiding 
 spurs of the Alleghanies ; blue crags, bright streams, shin 
 ing waterfalls, and the changing, deciduous foliage of the 
 North. Great slave-plantations could not flourish here ; 
 white population predominated ; agriculture was varied ; tho 
 husbandman had a sterner struggle with nature ; and com 
 munities were burdened with all the economic and social 
 detriments of the slave system, having none of its delights. 
 
 A dense slave population and ultra secessionism were, 
 therefore, the rule in the southern, and white majorities and 
 union feeling in the northern districts of the Cotton States. 
 Therefore, also, political power lay in the slave region, which 
 again was allied to the commercial interests clustering about 
 southern seaports. All the leverage was in the hands of 
 treason offices, ostracism, advantage in representation, com 
 mercial ambition, party ascendancy. The wonder is, not that 
 secession succeeded in the struggle, but that there was any 
 serious contest at all. With all this, there is strong ground 
 for belief that insurrection gained its ends at last only 
 through chicane, deceit, and fraud. Not a single Cotton 
 State but Texas dared to submit its Ordinance of Secession 
 to a direct vote of the people. 
 
 The struggle assumed its most determined phase in Geor~ 
 gia. She was the Empire State of the South, and, therefore, 
 indispensable to the conspiracy, in which distinguished citi- 
 
12 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 zens of hers Governor Brown, Secretary Cobb, Senators 
 Toombs and Iverson, and others were conspicuous ring 
 leaders. The more rabid fire-eaters desired that the Legis 
 lature should at once pass an act of secession ; Stephens and 
 other conservatives opposed this course. " The Legislature 
 were not elected for such a purpose," said he. " They came 
 here to do their duty as legislators. They have sworn to 
 support the Constitution of the United States. They did 
 not come here to disrupt this government. I am, therefore, 
 for submitting all these questions to a convention of the peo 
 ple." In due time a convention was called by unanimous 
 vote of the Legislature. Then followed a spirited campaign 
 to elect delegates. It early became evident that, while the 
 people of Georgia were irritated to the point of demanding 
 new guarantees for slavery, they were decidedly against dis 
 union. Thereupon the conspirators invented a bold trick. 
 "The truth is," explains Alexander H. Stephens, "in my 
 judgment the wavering scale in Georgia was turned by a sen 
 timent the key-note to which w r as given in the words, We 
 can make better terms out of the Union than in it. .... 
 This one idea did more, in my opinion, in carrying the State 
 out, than all the arguments and eloquence of all others com 
 bined. Two-thirds at least of those who voted for the Ordi 
 nance of Secession, did so, I have but little doubt, with a 
 view to a more certain reformation of the Union." The 
 heresy of supreme State allegiance was, however, the final 
 and all-conquering engine of treason. Mr. Stephens him 
 self, in his memorable speech in defence of the Union, is 
 the striking illustration of Gulliver helpless in the cobwebs 
 of Lilliput. To secede, he declared, was to break the Con 
 stitution. Good faith required the South to abide the elec 
 tion in peace. Lincoln could do her no harm against an ad 
 verse House and Senate. He adjured them not to rashly try 
 
SECESSION. 13 
 
 the experiment of change ; for liberty, once lost, might never 
 be restored. These were words of sober wisdom, and, fear 
 lessly adhered to by a few firm men, they might have para 
 lyzed the revolt. Yet in the same speech he declared that, 
 if Georgia seceded, he should bow to the will of her people 
 in other words, break the Constitution, break faith, and 
 lose liberty. On this "easy descent" Georgia slid to her 
 ruin. Under such examples the convention passed the se 
 cession ordinance, 208 to 89. 
 
 While thus in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Ala 
 bama, Florida, Mississippi, and Louisiana, the conspiracy 
 made pretentious efforts to clothe rebellion in the robes of 
 law, and hide it behind the shield of constitutional forms, it 
 pursued an altogether bold and unblushing course of usur 
 pation in the State of Texas. The famous and somewhat 
 eccentric General Houston was governor. His own long 
 struggle to bring Texas into the Union made him loth to 
 join in its destruction. He resisted the secession conspir 
 acy; but his southern pro-slavery prejudices also imbued 
 him with the prevalent antagonism to the Republican party. 
 He therefore nursed a scheme to carry Texas back into inde 
 pendent sovereignty, and, with her territory and population 
 as a basis, to undertake the conquest and annexation of 
 Mexico. 
 
 But the conspirators, ignoring all restraint, without a 
 shadow of legality, assembled a revolutionary State conven 
 tion, and on February 1st passed an ordinance of secession, 
 with a provision submitting it to a popular vote. Houston, 
 pursuing his side intrigue, approved a joint resolution of 
 the State Legislature (February 4th) to legalize the conven 
 tion, but accompanied his approval with a protest that it 
 should have no effect except to elicit public decision on the 
 single question of adherence to the Union. When in due 
 
14 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 lime an alleged vote (taken on February 23d) ratifying the 
 ordinance was submitted to him, he refused to recognize fur 
 ther acts of the convention ; whereupon the enraged conven 
 tion (March IGth) declared his office vacant, and empowered 
 the lieutenant-governor to seize the executive authority. 
 
 Meanwhile General Twiggs, commanding the Federal 
 troops in Texas, by treasonable connivance, on February 
 18th surrendered the military posts and property to a hasty 
 collection of about a regiment of rebels in arms, purporting 
 to act by authority of the convention, and set the various 
 scattered detachments of the army in motion to evacuate the 
 State. Before this had taken place, the newly inaugurated 
 Lincoln administration sent a messenger to Houston, who 
 was still reputed by public rumor to be loyal, and offered to 
 concentrate a strong body of the United States troops under 
 the new commander, Colonel Waite, form an entrenched 
 camp, and sustain his authority as governor. Houston, 
 however (March 29th), refused the offer ; and having neither 
 the United States Government nor the peox^le of Texas to 
 lean upon, the conspirators relentlessly pushed him into an 
 ignoble obscurity and transferred the State to the military 
 domination of the Rebellion. 
 
 Thus, by easy stages and successive usurpations of author 
 ity, rebellion accomplished the first step of its operations 
 unmolested and unopposed. South Carolina, as we have 
 seen, seceded on December 20, 1860 ; Mississippi on January 
 9, 1861 ; Florida on January 10th ; Alabama on January llth ; 
 Georgia on January 19th ; Louisiana on January 26th ; and 
 Texas on February 1st. The various ordinances are in sub 
 stance that devised and adopted by South Carolina. All the 
 States put on the airs of independent republics, though this 
 pretence was of short duration, as was designed and arranged 
 by the conspiracy. 
 
SECESSION. 15 
 
 But the mere perversion of elections, the adoption of a 
 secession ordinance, and the assumption of independent au 
 thority, was not enough for the Cotton Republics. Though 
 they hoped to evade civil war by shrewd intrigue, they well 
 understood they had no certain immunity from it. It was 
 therefore essential to possess the arms and military posts 
 within their borders. There were in the seceded States one 
 quite extensive navy-yard, at Pensacola, Florida ; twelve to 
 fifteen harbor-forts along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, capa 
 ble of mounting a thousand guns, and having cost over five 
 millions ; half a dozen arsenals, containing an aggregate of 
 one hundred and fifteen thousand arms, transferred there 
 from northern arsenals by Secretary Floyd about a year be 
 fore, on pretence of danger from slave insurrections. In ad 
 dition there were three mints, four important custom-houses, 
 three revenue-cutters on duty at the several seaports, and a 
 variety of other miscellaneous property. This estimate does 
 not include the already mentioned public property surren 
 dered by General Twiggs in Texas, which of itself formed an 
 aggregate of eighteen military posts and stations, and arms 
 and stores to a large amount and value. 
 
 This property had been purchased with the money of the 
 Federal Government ; the land on which the buildings stood, 
 though perhaps in some instances donated, was vested in 
 the United States, not only by the right of eminent domain, 
 but also by formal legislative deeds of cession from the 
 States themselves. 
 
 It was now assumed that the heresy of State supremacy, 
 through which the States pretended to derive their authority 
 to pass secession ordinances, also restored to them the right 
 of eminent domain, or that they had always retained it ; that 
 therefore they might, under the law of nations, justifiably 
 take possession, holding themselves responsible in money 
 
1C THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 damages to be settled by negotiation. The hypothesis and 
 its parent dogma were of course both palpably false and 
 absurd. The Government of the United States, unlike other 
 great nations, has steadily opposed the maintenance of a large 
 military force in time of peace. The whole regular army 
 amounted to only a little over seventeen thousand men. 
 These, as usual, were mainly occupied in defence of the west- 
 em frontier against hostile Indian tribes. Consequently, but 
 three of these southern forts were garrisoned, and they by 
 only about a company each. An equal force was stationed 
 for the protection of the arsenals at Augusta, Ga., Mt. 
 Yernon, Ala., and Baton Rouge, La. 
 
 As a necessary part of the conspiracy, the governors of the 
 Cotton States now, by official order to their extemporized 
 militia companies, took forcible possession of these forts, 
 arsenals, navy-yard, custom-houses, and other property, in 
 many cases even before their secession ordinances were 
 passed. This was nothing less than levying actual war 
 against the United States, though as yet attended by no vio 
 lence or bloodshed. The ordinary process was, the sudden 
 appearance of a superior armed force, a demand for sur 
 render in the name of the State, and the compliance under 
 protest by the officer in charge salutes to the flag, peaceable 
 evacuation, and unmolested transit home being graciously 
 permitted as military courtesy. To this course of proced 
 ure three exceptions occurred : first, no attempt was made 
 against Fort Taylor at Key West, Fort Jefferson on Tortugas 
 Island, and Fort Pickens at Pensacola, on account of the dis 
 tance and danger ; second, part of the troops in Texas were 
 eventually refused the promised transit and captured ; and 
 third, the forts in Charleston Harbor underwent peculiar vi 
 cissitudes, to be specially narrated in the next chapter. 
 
CHAPTER tt 
 
 CHARLESTON HARBOR. 
 
 CONSPIRACY was not confined to South Carolina or the Cot 
 ton States ; unfortunately, it had established itself in the 
 highest official circles of the national administration. Three 
 members of President Buchanan s cabinet Cobb of Georgia, 
 Secretary of the Treasury, Floyd of Virginia, Secretary of 
 War, and Thompson of Mississippi, Secretary of the Interior 
 had become ardent and active disunionists. Grouped about 
 these three principal traitors were a number of subordinate 
 and yet influential functionaries, all forming together a 
 central secession cabal, working, in daily and flagrant viola 
 tion of their official oaths, to promote the success of the 
 Southern conspiracy. After the meeting of Congress, on the 
 first Monday of December, the Senators and Representatives 
 from the Cotton States were in Washington to counsel, 
 prompt, and assist this cabinet cabal, and the President was 
 subjected to the double influence of insidious suggestion 
 from within, and personal pressure from without his adminis 
 tration, acting in regulated concert. 
 
 No taint of disloyal purpose or thought appears to attach 
 to President Buchanan ; but his condition of mind predis 
 posed him in a remarkable degree to fall under the control 
 ling influence of his disloyal counsellors. He possessed the 
 opposing qualities of feeble will and stubborn prejudice; 
 advancing years and decreasing vigor added to his irresolu 
 
18 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 tion and embarrassed his always limited capabilities. In the 
 defeat of Breckenridge, whom he had championed, and in 
 the sweeping success of the Republicans, he had suffered 
 scorching rebuke and deep humiliation. His administration 
 was condemned, his policy was overthrown ; his proud party 
 was a hopeless wreck. He had no elasticity of mind, 110 
 buoyancy of hope to recover from the shock. Withal he 
 had a blind disbelief in the popular judgment ; he refused 
 to recognize the fact of an adverse decision at the ballot-box. 
 After his long affiliation with Southern men in thought and 
 action, he saw., as it were, through Southern eyes ; his mind 
 dw r elt painfully on the fancied wrongs of the South. His 
 natural impulse, therefore, was to embarrass and thwart the 
 Republican victory by such official utterance and adminis 
 tration as would occur in his brief remainder of office ; and 
 this w r as probably also the first and natural feeling of even 
 the loyal members of his Cabinet, who were prominent and 
 devoted Democratic partisans. 
 
 The presidential election decided, it was necessary to be 
 gin the preparation of his annual message to Congress, 
 which would convene in less than a month. Just about this 
 time came the thickening reports of Southern insurrection 
 and the ostentatious resignations of the Charleston Federal 
 officials. The first expressions from loyal members of the 
 Cabinet were that rebellion must be put down. But this 
 remedy grated harshly on Buchanan s partisan prejudices. 
 He had aided these Southern malcontents to intrigue for 
 slavery, to complain of oppression, to threaten disunion. 
 To become the public accuser of his late allies and friends, 
 under disaster and defeat, doubtless seemed desertion and 
 black ingratitude. The Cabinet traitors had no such scru 
 ples. They were ready enough to desert the President, but 
 they wanted first to use him. 
 
CHARLESTON HARBOR. 19 
 
 When, on December 3d, the President s message was laid 
 before Congress, it was found to contain the most unjust 
 and indefensible allegations, the most glaringly inconsistent 
 and irreconcilable doctrines, the most childish and useless 
 suggestions. He charged that Southern discontent was 
 caused by " long-continued and intemperate interference of 
 the Northern people with the question of slavery in the 
 Southern States," in face of the well-known fact that South 
 ern interference in free territory was the cause of the crisis. 
 He declared that, while a State had no right to secede, the 
 Constitution gave no right to coerce a State into submission 
 when it had withdrawn, or was attempting to withdraw, from 
 the confederacy. This was raising a false issue. The ques 
 tion was not of acting against a State for either constitu 
 tional or unconstitutional efforts, but of suppressing insur 
 rection and punishing individuals for violation of United 
 States laws. Finally, he argued that, to enforce United 
 States laws, a United States Court must first issue a writ 
 and a United States Marshal execute it ; and that where 
 judges and marshals had resigned, and a universal popular 
 feeling opposed, such execution became impossible. In 
 this he ignored the fact that he had power to instantly 
 appoint new judges and marshals, and make the whole army, 
 navy, and militia of the nation a posse comitatus to execute 
 their process ; and within one month after signing this mes 
 sage, he, himself, actually nominated a citizen of Pennsylva 
 nia Collector of the Port of Charleston, in signal defiance of 
 his own theory. As a fitting climax to such puerile reason 
 ing, he urged an amendment of the Constitution that would 
 give slavery the very concession in repudiation of which the 
 people had just overwhelmingly elected Lincoln. As a 
 Specimen of absurdity, stupidity, and wilful wrong-headed- 
 ness, this message is not equalled in American political lit- 
 
20 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 erature. For this extraordinary state paper, which effectu 
 ally tied the hands of the administration and opened to re 
 bellion a pathway free from obstruction or danger, the trio 
 of conspirators in the Cabinet, Cobb, Floyd, and Thompson, 
 may be reasonably held responsible. How they beguiled a 
 President of waning mental powers and naturally feeble pur 
 pose, may be easily enough imagined ; but how they silenced 
 the honest logic of their loyal colleagues, is yet one of the 
 riddles of history. 
 
 The first and chief solicitude of the South Carolinians was 
 to gain possession of the Charleston forts. To secede, to 
 organize their little State into a miniature republic, was in 
 deed a vast achievement in their own eyes ; but they were 
 shrewd enough to perceive that their claim to independence 
 and sovereignty would be ridiculed by the family of nations 
 if they could not control their own and only seaport. That 
 alone would give them a free highway to the world at large ; 
 with that they could offer the benefits of commerce, security 
 from tempests, refuge from the perils of war, to ships of 
 other nations; could negotiate advantageous treaties, and 
 perhaps conclude powerful alliances. " We must have the 
 forts " was therefore the watchword of the secret caucus ; 
 and before long, from every street-corner in Charleston, came 
 the impatient echo, "The forts must be ours." 
 
 The city of Charleston lies on a tongue of land between 
 the Ashley and Cooper rivers ; from their confluence the 
 bay extends eastward some four miles to the open sea. 
 Three forts defend the harbor. The first and smallest is Cas 
 tle Pinckney, an old-time structure of brick, and of insignifi 
 cant strength in modern warfare. It lies one mile from the 
 city ; it was capable of holding a war garrison of 100 men ; 
 and its armament of twenty -two guns was at the time com 
 plete. Farther out is the second in size and importance, 
 
CHARLESTON HARBOR. 
 
 21 
 
 Fort Moultrie, situated on Sullivan s Island, some four miles 
 from the city, very near the mouth of the harbor, on its 
 northern side. It dates back in name and heroic reputation 
 to the Revolution, when, however, it was little else than an 
 extemporized battery of palmetto-logs and sand. In mod 
 ern times it has been rebuilt in brick, under scientific con 
 struction, and though lying disadvantageously low, it had 
 been changed into an effective channel defence, capable of 
 mounting fifty-five guns en barbette and holding a garri 
 son of 300 men. The third and most important work was 
 
 IIS **/STAH OF THE WEST 
 
 N D J BATTERV 
 
 Map of Charleston Harbor. 
 
 Fort Sumter, also of brick, but of more imposing size. It 
 was situated about the middle of the harbor entrance, and 
 back half a inile from its mouth ; it was erected on a shoal 
 
22 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 raised to an artificial island ; the walls were eight feet thick 
 and forty feet high, with two tiers of casemates ; it was five- 
 sided, enclosing a space of about 300 by 350 feet, and in its 
 casemates and on its rampart it was designed for 140 guns ; 
 its proper war-garrison was 650 men. In addition to these 
 forts in the harbor, there were two government buildings 
 in the city of Charleston : the Custom-House and the Uni 
 ted States Arsenal, the latter containing a total of 22,430 
 arms. 
 
 To guard and hold possession of this property, there were 
 in the arsenal a military storekeeper and fourteen enlisted 
 men. Castle Pinckney was occupied only by an ordnance 
 sergeant and his family ; Fort Sumter by one or two engi 
 neer officers, employing one hundred and ten workmen in re 
 pairs ; Fort Moultrie alone, in addition to another party of 
 fifty workmen employed by the engineer officer in charge, 
 had a garrison of sixty-nine soldiers and nine officers under 
 Major Robert Anderson, who had command of the whole 
 harbor and all the forts. The walls of Moultrie were low, 
 and at one place almost submerged in the drifting sand 
 banks of Sullivan s Island ; a storming party, the comman 
 dant reported, could run like rats over the ramparts. Par 
 ties of Charlestonians frequently visited it to spy out its 
 weak points ; volunteer companies were organized in the 
 city for the expedition of capture ; scaling-ladders were pre 
 pared to make the attempt a certainty ; the talk of the street- 
 rabble and the newspapers made no concealment of their 
 exulting confidence that they held Moultrie in the hollow 
 of their hand. Hospitable fire-eaters went even so far as to 
 invite Major Anderson to comfortable dinners, and to tell 
 him, in confidential frankness over their wine, that they re 
 spected him as an officer and loved him as a Southerner, but 
 that they "must have the fort." 
 
CHARLESTON HARBOR. 23 
 
 For the time being, however, the inner councils of the con 
 spiracy seem to have frowned upon any rash or premature 
 attempt upon Moultrie, and to have sagely relied on obtain 
 ing possession through intrigue and negotiation, since the 
 latter method would not carry with it any danger of reprisal 
 or punishment. A most important advantage in this direction 
 had already been gained by Mr. Buchanan s adoption of the 
 doctrine of non-coercion ; the next essential step was to pre 
 vent any reinforcements from coming into Charleston Harbor. 
 
 Though not perhaps susceptible of historical proof, strong 
 inference warrants the belief that Floyd, Secretary of War, 
 inspired by the Washington cabal of traitors, procured the 
 appointment of Anderson to the command with the hope that 
 as a Southern man he would lend himself to an easy surren 
 der of the forts. To Floyd, also, seems to have been com 
 mitted the further supervision of the intrigues respecting 
 them. He still avowed himself a unionist ; but he disproved 
 his public declarations by a steady series of services and 
 favors to the rebellion, of whose design he could not have 
 remained in ignorance. 
 
 Congress had met, the message had been delivered, the 
 fatal doctrine of non-coercion conceded by the President and 
 adopted as an administration policy. Under its protecting 
 promises treason not only proceeded with accelerated or 
 ganization in the Cotton States, but made its avowals, its 
 boasts, and its threats in Congress. South Carolina and se 
 cession were the topics of the hour Moultrie and Anderson 
 the central and growing objects of anxiety ; and at length 
 the North, through its senators and representatives, and still 
 more loudly through its newspaper press, began to bring its 
 influence upon the President for reinforcement and prepara 
 tion. At the same time the secessionists congregated at 
 Washington were no less alert and active ; they obtained 
 
24 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 Buchanan s tacit promise that he would send no reinforce 
 ments unless Moultrie were attacked, and had hampered 
 Anderson with confidential instructions from Floyd, to take 
 no offensive measures until in the nature of things, through 
 a sudden assault, he would be overwhelmed and powerless. 
 
 These conflicting efforts brought on a Cabinet crisis and 
 forced the President to a direct official decision. General 
 Cass, the Secretary of State, had his home in Michigan ; and 
 feeling the stiffening influence of Northwestern sentiment, 
 and having, besides, his own somewhat sluggish though 
 patriotic blood roused by the high-handed and unchecked 
 intrigues of the conspirators, began to insist that reinforce 
 ments be sent to Charleston. Buchanan becoming also a 
 trifle anxious over the situation, sent for Floyd. Floyd, 
 suave and deceitful, dallied, evaded, pooh-poohed the danger, 
 had resort to chivalric bombast. The South Carolinians, he 
 said, were honorable gentlemen. They would scorn to take 
 the forts. They must not be irritated. At length, finding 
 the President growing unusually obstinate in his new fancy, 
 Floyd sought refuge in the suggestion that General Scott be 
 consulted. Scott was a Virginian ; Floyd secretly thought 
 he would fall in with the current secession drift, and perhaps 
 officially advise the surrender or evacuation of the forts to 
 " conciliate " South Carolina. 
 
 General Scott, scarcely able to rise from his sick bed in 
 New York, hastened to Washington on. December 12th. Floyd 
 had hitherto with studied neglect kept him excluded from 
 knowledge of War Department affairs ; but now, for the first 
 time consulted, and recognizing the gravity of the situation, 
 the General heartily joined Cass in recommending that rein 
 forcements be instantly sent. 
 
 Floyd was surprised, disappointed, disconcerted. He 
 summarily rejected the advice of Scott, as he had opposed 
 
CHARLESTON HARBOR. 25 
 
 that of Cass. Seizing adroitly upon a phrase of Buchanan s 
 message, which affirmed the duty of the President to protect 
 public property, he said : True, it is simply a question of 
 property. You need no army to assert that. Place an ord 
 nance sergeant in the fort ; he will represent the sovereignty 
 and the proprietary rights of the United States as well as a 
 regiment. This was a subtle and skilful thrust. Mr. Bu 
 chanan s slow intellect was both flattered and confused by 
 having his own misstatement of a vital political principle 
 quoted and turned upon him. He had not the wit to rejoin 
 that neither political sovereignty nor proprietary right were 
 longer complete if possession was once lost. Nevertheless, 
 Buchanan had a dim consciousness of treachery. He con 
 tinued to plead with his secretary that he ought to send re 
 inforcements ; warning him that a loss of the forts under 
 the circumstances would cover the name of Floyd "with 
 an infamy that all time can never efface." 
 
 Floyd was well nigh in despair. He turned upon the 
 President all his florid Southern rhetoric, all the final armory 
 of offended Southern dignity, and the ever-ready threats of 
 Southern resort to violence. Send troops to Charleston, ho 
 concluded, and the swarming and enraged South Carolinians 
 would not leave one brick of Moultrie upon another. Nor 
 was Floyd content to risk the issue upon his own eloquence. 
 He gave the note of alarm to every prominent traitor in 
 Washington, and without delay they flocked around the 
 doubting, hesitating President Hunter, Mason, Jefferson 
 Davis the whole busy cabal of plotting, caucusing conspir 
 ators, filling him alternately with such deceitful promises 
 of good behavior and such terrible visions of revolutionary 
 violence, that Mr. Buchanan was both frightened and soothed 
 into a reluctant compliance with their advice. It was the 
 scene of the wily Vivien and the yielding Merlin re-enacted ; 
 
26 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 and while the Sage of Wheatland slept in doting confidence, 
 every conspiring secessionist cried "Fool ! " and wrought 
 
 "the charm 
 Of woven paces and of waving hands," 
 
 to complete their secret web of conspiracy. 
 
 The issue was decided in the Cabinet meeting of December 
 13th ; after a spirited re-argument, the President told his 
 Secretary of State that he was sorry to differ with him, but 
 that he could not order reinforcements to Charleston ; where 
 upon General Cass tendered his resignation and retired from 
 official life. Cobb had resigned from the Cabinet a few days 
 before. Black, the Attorney-General, was now made Secre 
 tary of State ; Thomas of Maryland, Secretary of the Treas 
 ury ; and Edwin M. Stanton appointed Attorney-General. 
 
 If Mr. Buchanan flattered himself that his concession to 
 Floyd, Davis, and the cabal, would stay the tide of disunion 
 in the South, he was quickly undeceived. At the very time 
 the Cabinet meeting was holding its final discussion of the 
 question of reinforcements, a mysterious paper was being 
 circulated for signature through the two houses of Congress, 
 and on the second day following, the newspapers wiiich an 
 nounced the retirement of Cass also contained the first defi 
 nite and authentic proclamation of concerted revolution by 
 the Cotton States, and the proposal to form a Southern re 
 public.* It was a brief document, but pregnant with all the 
 
 * U TO OUR CONSTITUENTS. 
 
 " WASHINGTON, December 14, I860. 
 
 "The argument is exhausted. All hope of relief in the Union, through the 
 agency of committees, congressional legislation, or constitutional amendments, is 
 extinguished, and we trust the South will not be deceived by appearances or the 
 pretence of new guarantees. In our judgment the Republicans are resolute in 
 the purpose to grant nothing that will or ought to satisfy the South. We are 
 satisfied the honor, safety, and independence of the Southern people require the 
 
CHARLESTON HARBOR. 27 
 
 essential purposes of the conspiracy. It was signed by about 
 one-half the Senators and Bepresentatives from the States of 
 North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Missis 
 sippi, Louisiana, Florida, Texas, and Arkansas, and is the 
 " official " beginning of the subsequent " Confederate States," 
 just as Gist s October circular was the " official " beginning 
 of South Carolina secession. 
 
 On the fifth day after the publication of this manifesto, the 
 South Carolina Convention passed, signed, and published its 
 ordinance of secession, as already related ; and now it was 
 resolved to demand possession of the Charleston forts as an 
 incident of sovereignty and independence. It was assumed 
 that the President would not refuse to yield them up after 
 peaceful diplomatic negotiation, and upon an offer to ac 
 count for them as property in a regular business settlement 
 between the two governments. The convention, acting up 
 on this theory, appointed three commissioners to proceed 
 to Washington to treat for the delivery of the forts, maga 
 zines, light-houses, and other real estate, for an apportion 
 ment of the public debt, for a division of all other property, 
 and generally to negotiate about other measures and ar 
 rangements. 
 
 All this proceeded with the decorum and mock solemnity 
 
 organization of a Southern confederacy a result to be obtained only by separate 
 State secession that the primary object of each slaveholding State ought to be its 
 speedy and absolute separation from a Union with hostile States." 
 (Signed by : 
 
 Representatives Pugh, Clopton, Moore, Curry, and Stallworth, of Alabama ; 
 Senator Iverson and Representatives Underwood, Gartrell, Jackson, Jones, 
 and Crawford, of Georgia ; Representative Hawkins, of Florida ; Represent 
 ative Hindman, of Arkansas ; Senators Jefferson Davis and A. G. Brown, 
 and Representatives Barksdale, Singleton, and Reuben Davis, of Mississippi ; 
 Representatives Craige and Ruffin, of North Carolina ; Senators Slidcll and 
 Benjamin, and Representative Landruca, of Louisiana; Senators Wigfall 
 and Hemphill, and Representative Reagan, of Texas ; RepreBentatives Bonr 
 ham, Miles, McQueen, and Ashinore, of South Carolina.) 
 
28 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 in which children play at kings and queens. The commis 
 sioners reached Washington on December 26th, and Mr. Bu 
 chanan, with all the curiosity and palpitation of an actor in 
 a new drama, seems to have looked upon it not as the miser 
 able farce of conspiracy which it was, but as a real piece of 
 government business. The commissioners immediately made 
 their presence known, and the President appointed an inter 
 view for them at one o clock next day. Before that hour ar 
 rived, however, news of a totally unlooked-for event gave their 
 intended negotiation an entirely new direction and result. 
 
 That event was the sudden military movement by Major 
 Anderson, transferring his entire garrison from Fort Moul- 
 trie to Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbor, on the night of 
 the commissioners arrival in Washington, December 26. 
 Daily observation left him no doubt that Moultrie was to be 
 assaulted ; every day strengthened the design, increased the 
 preparation, augmented the drilled and undrilled forces to 
 be joined in the undertaking. There was no longer hope 
 that the President would heed his repeated calls and send 
 him reinforcements. There was, however, one resource yet 
 available. Sumter was the real key to the harbor. Cap 
 tain Foster and his engineer force of workmen and mechan 
 ics had now prepared it for occupancy, and could soon make 
 it ready for defence. Its guns commanded Moultrie. There 
 was no approach to it except by boats, and, for a time, at 
 least, he would be beyond the reach of the Charleston mob 
 and its improvised scaling-ladders. Thoughts like these, 
 long-present and familiar to his mind, were once more care 
 fully revolved and re-examined, when on Christmas night he 
 returned from a neighboring holiday merrymaking to his 
 somewhat cheerless quarters in Moultrie ; and before he re 
 tired to his sleep, he took his secret resolve to abandon 
 Moultrie and take post in Sumter. 
 
CHARLESTON HARBOR. 29 
 
 The 26th of December was a busy day for the comman 
 dant. There were vessels to be hired, and an excuse invented 
 to send away the families, the baggage, the unnumbered im 
 pedimenta of the garrison. For this, one or two chosen staff- 
 officers must be let into the secret. Finally, boats must be 
 provided and concealed on the beach, in which to cross the 
 men. Anderson s personal care was extended to every detail, 
 and every item of preparation moved like clock-work. The 
 families and baggage were got off in the afternoon. A sunset 
 parade of the men was ordered, ostensibly to be on the alert 
 against assault, a species of exercise with which the garri 
 son had become somewhat sorely familiar. The supper stood 
 smoking on the officers mess-table, when Captain Doubleday, 
 second in command, was hastily called to Major Anderson, 
 who now for the first time told him that he must have his 
 company under arms and ready to march to the beach in 
 twenty minutes. Everything proceeded as had been ar 
 ranged, without delay and without accident ; even the rebel 
 guard-boats, which had recently been set to patrolling the 
 bay to render such a movement impossible, failed to make 
 any discovery. By nine o clock that night the transfer was 
 an assured success ; the officers sat down to eat the supper 
 in Sumter which had been cooked for them in Moultrie. A 
 small detail of men and an officer were left behind to spike 
 guns, burn carriages, cut down the flag-staff, and to com 
 plete during the night the removal of needed supplies ; they 
 finished their work and joined their comrades in Sumter a 
 little after sunrise next morning. 
 
 This movement filled the Union sentiment of the country 
 with the liveliest exultation. It was a spontaneous, uncalcu- 
 lating act of patriotism which will enshrine the name of An 
 derson in grateful recollection so long as American history 
 shall be read. Advance news of the event was sent from 
 
30 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 Charleston to the commissioners on the morning of December 
 27th; and they immediately communicated it to Mr. Bu 
 chanan, whom it threw into a most embarrassing perplexity. 
 He postponed the commissioners interview, and summoned 
 his Cabinet to consider the situation. Floyd at once declared 
 the movement to be in violation of orders ; and the Presi 
 dent himself, in his chagrin that his Southern friends should 
 have a new burden of complaint, was half -inclined to peremp 
 torily order Anderson back to Moultrie. He was prudent 
 enough, however, to suspend his judgment until Anderson 
 could be heard ; for he had lately become cognizant of the 
 equivocal and double-tongued instructions which Floyd, 
 without his knowledge, had sent him, and which he inferred 
 might at least technically justify xlnderson s movement. 
 
 On Friday, December 28th, he gave the commissioners 
 their promised interview. Mr. Buchanan, himself, writes 
 that " on their introduction he stated that he could recog 
 nize them only as private gentlemen, and not as commission 
 ers from a sovereign State; that it was to Congress, and 
 to Congress alone, they must appeal. He nevertheless ex 
 pressed his willingness to communicate to that body, as the 
 only competent tribunal, any propositions they might have 
 to offer." He does not appear to have realized that this pro 
 posal was in reality a quasi-recognition of South Carolina s 
 claim to independence, and a misdemeanor meriting im 
 peachment. 
 
 What is a thousand times more astounding, however, is 
 that, on their part, the commissioners were too stupid to 
 perceive the vast advantage of this concession and offer. It 
 would have placed the President before the public, and be 
 fore foreign powers especially, in the attitude of their apolo 
 gist, if not their advocate. It would have committed him to 
 refrain from any hostile action against South Carolina dur- 
 
CHARLESTON HARBOR. 31 
 
 ing the pendency of such debate as the proposition might 
 provoke in Congress. It would have thrust a firebrand into 
 Congress, to complicate and divide every faction and element 
 in politics except their own friends ; in short, it would have 
 made Washington City the principal centre of revolution. 
 Fortunately for the country, their blindness lost to secession 
 its only possible chance of peaceful success. 
 
 Under the impression that Mr. Buchanan was completely 
 within the domination of the Cabinet cabal, the commis 
 sioners made an angry complaint against Anderson, and 
 haughtily demanded "explanations," threatening that, if 
 these were not satisfactory, they would suspend their nego 
 tiations. Such a threat from applicants for recognition and 
 favor was the very acme of stupidity and maladdress. 
 
 Anderson little suspected perhaps never knew how nar 
 rowly he escaped disavowal and disgrace by the President 
 of the United States, for his act of fidelity and patriotism. 
 The conspirators had shrewdly calculated on their influence 
 over Mr. Buchanan. For two days he hesitated, leaning evi 
 dently to the counsels of his secession advisers. There were 
 protracted Cabinet sessions, acrimonious debates, and a final 
 struggle between the President s disloyal counsellors from 
 the South and the loyal ones from the North, over the pos 
 session and control of their temporizing, vacillating chief. 
 It was not till the latter were on the point of resigning that 
 the President was brought to a direct decision against the 
 conspirators ; even then, but for an outside complication, 
 the result might have been doubtful. For about a week 
 Floyd and Thompson had both been in bad odor. A trans 
 action, in which near a million dollars worth of Indian 
 Trust Bonds were abstracted from a safe in the Interior De 
 partment and replaced by Floyd s premature acceptances, 
 looked so much like official theft that it was occupying the 
 
32 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION. 
 
 attention of the courts and greatly exercising the mind of 
 the President. 
 
 The spell was finally broken on December 31st, when Mr. 
 Buchanan accepted Floyd s resignation, which the latter re 
 luctantly tendered on the 29th ; he also sent the commissioners 
 their definite answer, namely : that, whatever might have been 
 his first inclination, the Governor of South Carolina had, since 
 Anderson s movement, forcibly seized Fort Moultrie, Castle 
 Pinckney, and the Charleston Arsenal, Custom-House, and 
 Post-Office, and covered them with the Palmetto flag ; that 
 under such circumstances he could not and would not with 
 draw the Federal troops from Sumter. This ended the rebel 
 mission. They departed abruptly for home, leaving behind 
 them an insolent rejoinder to the President s letter, charging 
 him with tacit consent to the scheme of peaceable secession. 
 
 Governor Pickens (newly chosen by the Legislature, De 
 cember 14th) was perhaps the most daring revolutionist 
 in South Carolina, and as commander-in-chief of the State 
 forces he at once assumed and exercised dictatorial powers. 
 Within three or four days after his seizure of the forts he or 
 dered the selection of suitable points on the islands forming 
 the bay, and the commencement of batteries to command the 
 ship-channels against reinforcements. It was the beginning 
 of the long and eventful siege of Sumter. Moultrie was soon 
 restored to its offensive powers ; Castle Pinckney passed into 
 his hands undamaged ; with a working force of volunteers 
 impelled by fanatical zeal, supplemented by the more effi 
 cient labor of large gangs of slaves freely furnished from the 
 city and plantations of the neighborhood, battery after bat 
 tery rose around Anderson s stronghold, unmolested and un 
 checked for three long months, until, in an encompassing ring 
 of fire, and under the sheer overweight of metal and num 
 bers, the proud flag of Sumter went down in temporary hu- 
 
CHARLESTON HARBOR. 33 
 
 miliation. And that the drama should not lack its interludes 
 of grotesque farce, all through this continuation of contu 
 macy, insurrection, rampart-building, gun-planting, and ac 
 tual repeated firing on the flag of the United States, the "Be- 
 public" of South Carolina, through its governor, its legisla 
 ture, its convention, and its partisans, clamorously insisted 
 and reiterated that the Government was waging war upon it. 
 
 The Cabinet crisis of December 31st, and the retirement of 
 Floyd, greatly changed the attitude of the Government to 
 ward rebellion. Holt was made Secretary of War, and be 
 came at once the Hercules of the national defence. Black, 
 though as Attorney-General he had in November written an 
 official opinion against coercion, was so far changed that ho 
 now zealously advocated the reinforcement of Sumter. All 
 the unionists of the Cabinet Black, Holt, Stanton, even 
 Toucey in a mild way, and not long afterward Dix with 
 memorable vigor joined heartily in preparation to vindicate 
 the national authority. General Scott was placed in military 
 control ; and the President, being for a period kept by loyal 
 advice in a more patriotic mood, permitted various precau 
 tionary measures to be taken, among which, a well-designed, 
 though finally abortive effort to reinforce Sumter, was per 
 haps the most noteworthy. 
 
 Various plans to send men and provisions to Anderson were 
 discussed, and it was at last decided to attempt stratagem. 
 A swift merchant-steamer, the " Star of the West " was char 
 tered in New York, loaded with the needed supplies and two 
 hundred and fifty recruits ; thus prepared, she sailed on her 
 errand on the night of January 5, 1861. The effort to keep 
 the expedition an entire secret had not succeeded. Notice of 
 her departure went to Charleston from New York ; and in 
 addition to this, Thompson, the conspiring Secretary of the 
 Interior, who at the last moment learned the fact in Cabinet 
 
34 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION. 
 
 meeting, also warned his Charleston friends of her coming. 
 Anderson does not seem to have received his notice, though 
 he gathered from newspapers that some such enterprise 
 was being matured. He was, therefore, not greatly sur 
 prised, when on the morning of January 9th he was hastily 
 informed that a strange vessel was entering the harbor, 
 and hurrying upon the rampart, saw her steaming up the 
 channel in the direction of Sumter. She presented no war 
 like appearance ; men and supplies were hidden below decks. 
 But in these nine days of January the rebels had repaired 
 Moultrie and completed one or two sand-batteries at the 
 harbor entrance, and, thoroughly informed of the character 
 and destination of the vessel, they began a vigorous fire 
 upon her as soon as she came within range. At this, finding 
 concealment no longer important, her captain ran up a large 
 United States flag, a signal which dispelled all doubts An 
 derson may have had that she indeed came to bring him the 
 wished-for relief. He gave orders to man his guns and pre 
 pare to fire on the batteries ; meanwhile the steamer, though 
 hit once or twice, had passed the first batteries without 
 serious damage. Now, however, the course of the channel 
 would oblige her to steam directly toward the ready guns 
 of Moultrie, and the sight of this new peril seems to have 
 daunted the courage of the officer in charge. Anderson saw 
 with deep chagrin that, just as he was ready to cheer and 
 greet the new-comer by returning the rebel fire, the steamer 
 suddenly slackened her speed, then put about, and ran once 
 more unharmed past the rebel batteries and through the hos 
 tile cannon-balls out to sea. 
 
 Anderson s blood was hot with the insult his own eyes had 
 witnessed to the flag and sovereignty of the United States. 
 He sat down and wrote a brief note to the Governor of South 
 Carolina, demanding to know if the firing on the vessel and 
 
CHARLESTON HARBOR. 35 
 
 the flag had been by his order, and declaring that, unless the 
 act were disclaimed, he would close the harbor with the guns 
 of Sumter. It would have been better to have left the threat 
 unuttered. Governor Pickens was more than a match for 
 him in bravado; he immediately avowed and justified the 
 act, Anderson in a second note so far receded as to say that 
 he had made up his mind to first ask his government for 
 instructions, and requested safe-conduct for a bearer of dis 
 patches. This emboldened the governor to a second trial of 
 bluster ; next day he sent Anderson a formal demand for tho 
 surrender of Sumter. Anderson replied rather meekly that 
 he could not comply with the demand ; but that, if the gov 
 ernor saw fit "to refer this matter to Washington," he would 
 depute an officer to accompany the messenger. 
 
 The Charleston conspirators, never at a loss to talk or 
 intrigue, were really not yet ready to fight. They caught 
 eagerly at this truce which Anderson offered them ; it would 
 renew the negotiations which their commissioners had so 
 unceremoniously abandoned ; above all, it would afford them 
 ample time to complete their harbor batteries and collect 
 troops against further expeditions of reinforcement or attack. 
 On January 12th, therefore, I. W. Hayne, the Attorney- 
 General of South Carolina, proceeded to Washington as an 
 envoy to carry to President Buchanan the governor s demand 
 for the surrender of Sumter, with authority to give in return 
 the pledge "that the valuation of such property will be ac 
 counted for by this State upon the adjustment of its relations 
 with the United States." 
 
 Hayne had, however, scarcely reached his destination 
 when a superior influence took control of him and his mis 
 sion. By the middle of January most of the Cotton States 
 had passed ordinances of secession, seized the undefended 
 military posts within their limits, and were addressing each 
 
36 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION. 
 
 other as independent States. But no amount of official va 
 poring or local ostentation could convince even themselves 
 of either dignity or power ; especially it could not, in the 
 eyes of the world, magnify petty cotton republics into serious 
 importance or influence. However they might temporarily 
 paralyze the laws of the Union, the constitutional rights of 
 the nation were unbroken, and the military power of the 
 Government slumbered like a mighty giant. To brave his 
 terrible awakening the necessity of early combination in 
 some system of common defence was too apparent to need ar 
 gument. The senators and representatives of seceded States, 
 though some of them had already withdrawn from Congress, 
 were yet lingering in Washington as the most central point 
 for observation and consultation. The formation of a South 
 ern confederacy was, from the first, a recognized purpose, 
 announced in their manifesto of December 14th, and again 
 repeated in letters from a secret caucus held January 5th. 
 
 Indeed, the whole programme probably dated back to the 
 early days of the session, when it may be presumed the plan 
 was elaborated by a few of the leading spirits. So far, 
 though some of their combinations had failed, yet in the 
 main the scheme had moved on with ever-growing strength 
 from success to success. By the middle of January the con 
 spirators in Washington realized that they must hurry the 
 completion of their organization during the brief continu 
 ance of the expiring administration. Even the belligerent 
 Governor Pickens was made to understand the advantage of 
 such a course. "Mr. Lincoln," he wrote, "cannot possibly 
 do more for us than Mr. Buchanan has done." When there 
 fore, most unexpectedly, South Carolina obtained through 
 Anderson s offer a new chance to propose negotiation, the 
 central cabal at Washington resolved to make it the means 
 of gaining time to set a common provisional government in 
 
CHARLESTON HARBOR 37 
 
 motion, without on their part furnishing the pretext for any 
 military movement which might threaten or check their 
 plans. They therefore met in a caucus, and appointed a 
 committee consisting of Senators Fitzpatrick, Mallory, and 
 Slidell ; this committee began and carried on a dilatory cor 
 respondence with Mr. Hayne and with the President, which 
 they managed to prolong into February, all that while keep 
 ing open the Anderson truce by the assumption that nego 
 tiations were pending. Mr. Buchanan, always indisposed to 
 act, always welcoming any excuse to postpone decision, fell 
 easily into the toils of this side intrigue for delay. Some of 
 his counsellors must have seen through the transparent 
 game with much impatience, for the whole affair was at last 
 rather abruptly ended. On February 6th, Secretary Holt 
 wrote for the President to Hayne, that neither the proposed 
 sale of Fort Sumter, nor its relinquishment under South 
 Carolina s claim of eminent domain, could for a moment be 
 thought of, since it was not a mere question of property, as 
 had been assumed, but involved political rights of the high 
 est national importance. This closed the correspondence, 
 and Hayne went home to report the second failure to obtain 
 the forts by diplomacy. 
 
 But the conspirators had gained their main point. This 
 negotiation paralyzed and postponed all the plans and prepa 
 rations to send help to Anderson, upon which some of the 
 Cabinet members had labored with zeal and earnestness ; 
 while on the other hand, on February 4th, two days preced 
 ing Hayne s dismissal, the Provisional Congress of the rebel 
 States assembled at Montgomery, Ala., and by the 18th 
 of that month had completed and inaugurated the provi 
 sional government under which the local insurrections of the 
 Cotton States became an organized rebellion against the 
 government of the Union. 
 
38 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 Nor was this the only advantage which the conspiracy had 
 secured. Since the 12th of January a condition of things 
 existed in the harbor of Pensacola, Fla., similar to that 
 at Charleston. The insurgents had threatened, and the offi 
 cer in charge had surrendered the Pensacola Navy Yard. 
 Lieutenant Slemmer, of the army, with a little garrison of 
 forty-six men, held Fort Barrancas. Finding he could not 
 defend his post, nor Fort McEee, also on the mainland, 
 he, with a loyal courage which will ever render his name il 
 lustrious, repeated the strategy of Anderson, and moved his 
 slender command, augmented by thirty ordinary seamen 
 from the navy yard, on the morning of January 10th, to 
 Fort Pickens, a large and more defensible work standing at 
 the harbor entrance, on the western end of Santa Eosa Isl 
 and. The Government hurriedly sent a few ships of war 
 to assist him, while the rebels began gathering an army to 
 assault the fort. Under cover of the Hayne negotiation, Sen 
 ator Mallory managed to draw the President into an agree 
 ment, embodied in formal orders dated January 29th, that 
 Fort Pickens should not be reinforced unless it were as 
 saulted by the rebels, or preparations were made to do so. 
 
 The Hayne business disposed of, there was once more a 
 little flurry of war consultations at the Executive Mansion to 
 devise and dispatch a new expedition to reinforce Sumter. 
 This time a few small vessels belonging to the Coast Survey 
 were to be assembled and placed under command of Captain 
 Ward, of the navy, for that purpose ; the details of the plan 
 do not appear to have transpired. But the President s ener 
 getic moods were lamentably short ; by the 23d of February 
 this scheme, also, was definitely abandoned, probably for 
 the overruling reason that but nine days remained of Mr. 
 Buchanan s presidential term. 
 
CHAPTER ILL. 
 
 THE CONFEDERATE STATES REBELLION. 
 
 ON the fourth day of February, 18G1, while the Peace Con 
 ference met in Washington to consider propositions of com 
 promise and concession, the delegates of the seceding States 
 convened in Montgomery, Ala., to combine and solidify the 
 general conspiracy into an organized and avowed rebellion. 
 
 Such action had been arranged and agreed upon from the 
 beginning. The congressional manifesto from Washington, 
 as far back as December 14th, advised that "we are .satisfied 
 the honor, safety, and independence of the Southern people 
 require the organization of a Southern confederacy a re 
 sult to be obtained only by separate State secession." This 
 agreement of the Washington caucus was steadily adhered 
 to. The specious argument invented in Georgia, that " we 
 can make better terms outside of the Union than in it," and 
 the public declaration of Mississippi s commissioner in Bal 
 timore, that secession " was not taken with the view of break 
 ing up the present government, but to assure to her (Missis 
 sippi) those guarantees and principles of liberty which had 
 been pledged to her by the fathers of the Revolution," were 
 but tricks of the conspiracy for local use and effect. The 
 managers well understood that if the States were once com 
 mitted to secession, the mere revolutionary momentum of 
 the crisis would carry them to whatever combination they 
 might devise. 
 
40 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 The whole plan appears to have been more fully matured 
 and adopted in a Washington caucus held on the night of 
 January 5, 1861, at which time four important points were 
 arranged : 1st, the Cotton States should immediately secede ; 
 2d, that delegates should be chosen to meet in Montgomery, 
 "to organize a confederacy," not later than February 15th; 
 3d, that the conspirators would remain in Congress as long 
 as possible, to obstruct coercive legislation; and 4th, that 
 Jefferson Davis, Slidell, and Mallory be appointed a com 
 mittee to carry out the objects of the caucus. Thus, more 
 than a month before his inauguration as rebel president, the 
 leader of the conspiracy was entrusted with the supervision 
 and management of the plot. The caucus programme was 
 executed with but slight deviation. The States seceded, 
 appointed delegates to Montgomery, and the conspirators 
 withdrew from Congress at the last moment to assume the 
 more active control of the rebellion in their respective 
 States. 
 
 As events progressed it became evident to the leaders that 
 it was important to complete their new government before 
 the expiration of Mr. Buchanan s term. They understood 
 perfectly his temper and purpose. Though he denied them 
 the treasonable complicity they had hoped and asked, and 
 discontinued the important concessions with which he began, 
 he still stood committed to non-coercion. What his successor 
 might decide was uncertain. Kepeated efforts had been 
 made to draw from Lincoln some expression of his intention 
 some forecast of his policy, but they had been uniformly 
 unsuccessful. 
 
 Accordingly the secession delegates met in Montgomery 
 on February 4th, instead of the 15th, as had been first ar 
 ranged, and organized a provisional Congress, and a few 
 days thereafter (February 8, 1861) adopted a provisional 
 
THE CONFEDERATE STATES REBELLION. 41 
 
 government, to be known as " The Confederate States of 
 America." There was little difficulty in arriving at this re 
 sult ; most if not all the seceders State conventions had de 
 clared a wish that their proposed new government should be 
 modelled on that of the United States. 
 
 From this they proceeded to the work of framing a per 
 manent constitution. This was a somewhat slower process, 
 though it was also completed and adopted by the provisional 
 Congress on March 11, 1861. Few changes from the Con 
 stitution of the United States were made. The new consti 
 tution professed to be established by " each State acting in 
 its sovereign and independent character," instead of simply 
 by "We the people." It provided that in newly acquired 
 territory " the institution of negro slavery, as it now exists 
 in the Confederate States, shall be recognized and protected 
 by Congress and by the Territorial Government " ; also for 
 the right of transit and sojourn for " slaves and other prop 
 erty," and the right to reclaim " slaves and other persons " 
 to service or labor. It did not, as consistency required, pro 
 vide for the right of secession or deny the right of coercion ; 
 on the contrary all its implications were against the former 
 and in favor of the latter, for it declared itself to be the 
 supreme law of the land, binding on the judges in every 
 State. It provided for the punishment of treason ; and de 
 clared that no State should enter into any treaty, alliance, or 
 confederation, grant letters of marque and reprisal, coin 
 money, lay duties, keep troops or ships of war in time of 
 peace, make any compact with another State or with a foreign 
 power a sweeping practical negation of the whole heretical 
 dogma of State supremacy upon which they had built their 
 revolt. 
 
 The day after the rebel Congress adopted its provisional 
 government, it elected (February 9, 1861) Jefferson Davis, 
 
42 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 of Mississippi, President, and Alexander H. Stephens, of 
 Georgia, Vice-President of the new Confederacy. The re 
 ported vote for Davis is unanimous ; but it is historically 
 related by Stephens that Howell Cobb and Robert Toombs 
 were also aspirants, and that Davis himself preferred the 
 chief command of the rebel armies. For the moment, how 
 ever, offices were plenty, and each of the leaders received a 
 prominent station. Cobb remained presiding officer of the 
 rebel Congress ; Toombs became Secretary of State ; and if 
 not completely satisfied, all acquiesced in the distribution of 
 honors. Davis was sent for and inaugurated at Montgomery, 
 on Monday, February 18th. In his inaugural address he in 
 timated that they would permit the non-seceded Slave 
 States to join their confederacy ; " but, beyond this," ho con 
 tinued, " if I mistake not the judgment and will of the peo 
 ple, a reunion with the States from which we have separated 
 is neither practicable nor desirable." 
 
 If the remotest doubt remained, from previous indications 
 and this official hint, that the whole purpose and animus of 
 the revolt was the establishment of a powerful slaveocracy, 
 that doubt was removed by the public declaration of Mr. 
 Stephens, the new Vice-President. In a speech which lie 
 made at Savannah, Ga., on the 21st of March, he defined 
 the ruling idea of the conspiracy in the following frank lan 
 guage : 
 
 " The prevailing ideas entertained by him (Jefferson) and 
 most of the leading statesmen at the time of the formation 
 of the old constitution, were that the enslavement of the 
 African was in violation of the laws of nature ; that it was 
 wrong in principle, socially, morally, and politically. It was 
 an evil they knew not well how to deal with ; but the gen 
 eral opinion of that day was, that somehow or other, in the 
 order of Providence the institution would be evanescent and 
 
THE CONFEDERATE STATES REBELLION. 43 
 
 pass away. This idea, though not incorporated in the Consti 
 tution, was the prevailing idea at that time. The Constitu 
 tion it is true, secured every essential guarantee to the insti 
 tution while it should last, and hence no argument can be 
 justly urged against the constitutional guarantees thus se 
 cured, because of the common sentiment of the day. Those 
 ideas, however, were fundamentally wrong. They rested 
 upon the assumption of the equality of races. This was an 
 error. It was a sandy foundation, and the government built 
 upon it fell when the storm came and the wind blew. Our 
 new government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea ; 
 its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests, upon the great 
 truth that the negro is not equal to the white man ; that slave 
 ry, subordination to the superior race, is his natural and 
 normal condition. This, our new government, is the first in 
 the history of the world, based upon this great physical, 
 philosophical, and moral truth." 
 
 Mr. Stephens was no less enthusiastic in his estimate of 
 the material resources of the new confederacy. " We have 
 all the essential elements of a high national career," con 
 tinued he. " The idea has been given out at the North, and 
 even in the Border States, that we are too small and too weak 
 to maintain a separate nationality. This is a great mistake. 
 In extent of territory we embrace 504,000 square miles and 
 upwards. This is upwards of 200,000 square miles more than 
 was included within the limits of the original thirteen States. 
 It is an area of country more than double the territory of 
 France or the Austrian Empire. France, in round numbers, 
 has but 212,000 square miles ; Austria, in round numbers, has 
 but 248,000 square miles. Ours is greater than both com 
 bined. It is greater than all France, Spain, Portugal, and 
 Great Britain, including England, Ireland, and Scotland to 
 gether. In population we have upwards of 5,000,000, accord- 
 
44 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 ing to the census of 1860 ; this includes white and black. 
 The entire population, including white and black, of the 
 original Thirteen States was less than 4,000,000 in 1790, and 
 still less in 177G, when the independence of our fathers was 
 achieved. If they, wiLh a less population, dared maintain 
 their independence against the greatest power on earth, shall 
 we have any apprehension of maintaining ours now ? " 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 LINCOLN. 
 
 FROM the false political principles and the perilous official 
 neglect of the old administration from the dissensions and 
 impotence of Congress, and from the threatening attitude 
 and the hostile preparations of the South, all parties and 
 persons now turned to the President-elect and the incoming 
 administration. During the winter many earnest but over- 
 hasty patriots had besought him to intervene by some pub 
 lic declaration. But Mr. Lincoln preserved a discreet si 
 lence, though in confidential letters to responsible personal 
 friends of opposing politics he repeated his former assertions 
 that, while adhering tenaciously to the Republican doctrine 
 of " No extension of slavery," he bore no ill-will to the 
 South, meditated no aggression on her rights, and would on 
 the contrary treat her with liberal indulgence in matters of 
 minor controversy. 
 
 As the day of inauguration approached, various legisla 
 tures of the Free States by formal resolutions invited him 
 to visit their capitals on his way to Washington ; a call which 
 his deep popular sympathy moved him to accept. Starting 
 from home on the llth of February, he accordingly passed 
 through the principal cities between Springfield and New 
 York, and between New York and Washington. 
 
 Unprecedented crowds came forth to see the new Chief 
 
46 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 Magistrate. Could the quick intelligence of the American 
 people be otherwise than intensely curious to behold this 
 remarkable man, whose strange career they had heard out 
 lined in the recent election speeches ? His obscure birth in 
 the deep seclusion of the Kentucky forests; how he read 
 Weems Life of Washington by the flickering firelight in an 
 humble pioneer cabin in Indiana ; how, as a tall emigrant- 
 boy, he split rails to fence his father s clearing in Illinois ; 
 now, launching his solitary canoe on the Sangamon, he sought 
 nis own fortune, becoming flatboatman, postmaster, deputy 
 county surveyor, and captain of volunteers in the Black 
 Hawk Indian "War ; how, commencing with a borrowed 
 Blackstone, he argued cases before neighborhood juries, fol 
 lowed itinerant Circuit Courts from county to county, and 
 gradually became the first lawyer in his State ; how in a 
 primitive community, where politics dealt with every office 
 from postmaster to President, he rose in public service from 
 Eepresentative in the Vandalia Legislature to President 
 elect of the nation. 
 
 The people had also heard how this elevation was tried by 
 the touchstone of sleepless rivalry, of unscrupulous criticism, 
 of a mighty political conflict of party and of principle. How, 
 in the momentous slavery discussion of the day, he was the 
 champion who had overcome Douglas, the hitherto victori 
 ous Philistine of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill ; his matchless 
 definition of the political injustice of slavery, applicable to 
 all nations and ages : " When the white man governs himself, 
 that is self-government ; but when he governs himself and 
 also governs another man, that is more than self-govern 
 ment that is despotism ; " his irrefutable statement of the 
 natural right of every man " to eat the bread, without leave 
 of anybody else, which his own hand earns ; " his prophetic 
 statesmanship, in declaring that " the Union cannot perrna- 
 
LINCOLN. 47 
 
 nently endure half slave and half free," four months before 
 "Win. H. Seward proclaimed the " irrepressible conflict." 
 
 So much, the newspapers, campaign documents, and 
 stump speakers had told the country. The remainder, which 
 his intimate Illinois neighbors could have related, the peo 
 ple half divined from what they heard. That he had risen 
 from obscurity to fame, from ignorance to eloquence, from 
 want to rulership, uncontaminated by vice, undenled by 
 temptation, without schools, without family influence, with 
 out wealth ; championed by no clique, fraternity, or sect ; 
 clinging to no skirt of corporation, interest, or combination ; 
 conspicuous without affectation, winning popularity without 
 art, and receiving consideration without parade ; rendering 
 his party not only every service it requested, but, by his tal 
 ent, leading it from despondency to success, and from suc 
 cess to renown ; meanwhile, at every stage of his career, 
 walking among his fellow-men with such irreproachable per 
 sonal conduct, that his very name grew into a proverb of in 
 tegrity, and passed among the people of his entire State as 
 the genuine coin-current and recognized token of social, 
 moral, and political uprightness. 
 
 Malicious gossip and friendly jest had both, during the 
 campaign, described the " railsplitter " candidate as possess 
 ing great personal ugliness ; this was now seen to be an utter 
 mistake. The people beheld in the new President a man six 
 feet four inches in height, a stature which of itself would be 
 hailed in any assemblage as one of the outward signs of 
 leadership ; joined to this was a spare but muscular frame, 
 and large and strongly marked features corresponding to his 
 unusual stature. Quiet in demeanor, but erect in bearing, 
 his face even in repose was not unattractive ; and when lit up 
 by his open, genial smile, or illuminated in the utterance of 
 a strong or stirring thought, his countenance was positively 
 
48 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 handsome. His voice, pitched in rather a high key, but of 
 great clearness and penetration, made his public remarks 
 audible to a wide circle of listeners. His speeches were 
 short ; but his pithy, epigrammatic sentences, full of logical 
 directness and force, presented the questions of the hour in 
 new and unwonted aspects, which the exhaustive discussions 
 of the campaign had not yet reached. 
 
 It would be impossible within any short space to give an 
 analytic summary of the twenty to thirty short addresses he 
 delivered on this journey. But, so long as the nation shall 
 live, every American ought to remember his thrilling key 
 note of that crisis, uttered in his very first speech at Indian 
 apolis ; an admonition equally valuable to statesmen or peo 
 ple in every emergency which the future may bring. " The 
 people," said he, "when they rise in mass in behalf of the 
 Union and the liberties of their country, truly may it be said, 
 The gates of hell cannot prevail against them. In all try 
 ing positions in which I shall be placed and doubtless I 
 shall be placed in many such my reliance will be upon you 
 and the people of the United States ; and I wish you to re 
 member, now and forever, that it is your business and not 
 mine ; that if the Union of these States and the liberties of 
 this people shall be lost, it is but little to any one man of 
 fifty-two years of age, but a great deal to the thirty millions 
 of people who inhabit Lhese United States, and to their pos 
 terity in all coming time. It is your business to rise up and 
 preserve Union and liberty for yourselves, and not for me." 
 
 For one thing Mr. Buchanan and his Cabinet should be re 
 membered with gratitude. All winter long there had been 
 fears and rumors that the conspirators were maturing a plot 
 to seize the capital, the public buildings, and the archives, 
 forcibly prevent the inauguration of Lincoln, and thus make 
 themselves the de facto successors of the Buchanan adminis 
 
LINCOLN. 49 
 
 tration. There were indeed many threats, boasts, and warn 
 ings, to justify apprehension on this score, but an investiga 
 tion held by a Committee of Congress, disclosed no traceable 
 combination. Under such apprehension, however, Mr. Bu 
 chanan authorized General Scott to assemble sufficient 
 troops at Washington to insure both a peaceable count of 
 the electoral votes on Febmary 13th, and the peaceable in 
 auguration of the President-elect, which latter event took 
 place with due formalities, and in the presence of great 
 crowds, on the 4th of March, 1801. 
 
 Mr. Lincoln s inaugural address made a frank declaration 
 of his policy on the leading points of controversy. Ho re 
 peated that he had no purpose, directly or indirectly, to in 
 terfere with the institution of slavery in the States where ifc 
 existed. But he also asserted that the Union is perpetual ; 
 that secession resolves or ordinances are legally void ; that 
 acts of violence, within any State or States, against the au 
 thority of the United States, are insurrectionary or revolu 
 tionary ; and that to the extent of his ability he should cause 
 the laws to be faithfully executed in all the States. The 
 Union would defend itself, hold its property and places, and 
 collect the duties and imposts ; " but, beyond what may be 
 necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion, no 
 using of force against or among the people anywhere." 
 There should be no bloodshed or violence, unless forced up 
 on the national authority. Temporary discontent he would 
 tolerate ; the exercise of offices in disaffected districts he 
 would forego ; he would continue to furnish the mails unless 
 repelled ; he would endeavor to preserve that sense of per 
 fect security most favorable to calm thought and renewed 
 allegiance. An unanswerable argument against disunion 
 and an earnest appeal to reason and lawful remedy, he fol 
 lowed by a most impressive declaration of peace and good- 
 
 " i. a 
 
50 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 will : "In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, 
 and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The 
 Government will not assail you. You can have no conflict 
 without being yourselves the aggressors. You have no oath 
 registered in heaven to destroy the Government; while I 
 shall have the most solemn one to preserve, protect, and 
 defend it." 
 
 Unhappily the burden and difficulty of administration was 
 already heavier than he or the public were aware. He had 
 come into office sharing the general belief that Major Ander 
 son was secure in his stronghold of Sumter until the rebel 
 batteries should become powerful enough to drive him out. 
 On the contrary, a subtler and more unfailing enemy than 
 the rebels starvation was rapidly forcing the brave little 
 garrison to surrender. On the morning after inauguration 
 letters from Sumter were put into the President s hands, 
 showing that the fort contained provisions for only a little 
 more than a month longer, and adding the professional 
 opinion of Anderson and his officers that a well-appointed 
 fleet and an army of twenty thousand men would be needed 
 to raise the siege, so formidable had the encircling rebel 
 batteries already become. 
 
 Such a fleet and such an army were not in existence, nor 
 could they be organized for many months. After mature 
 consideration General Scott advised the President that it was 
 practically impossible to relieve or reinforce Sumter, and 
 that, as a mere military question, it was necessary to order its 
 evacuation. 
 
 To Mr. Lincoln, who had only a few days before publicly 
 promised the nation that he would " hold, occupy, and pos 
 sess, the property and places belonging to the Government," 
 this was indeed a trying alternative. He ordered a re-ex 
 amination of the whole subject, and Cabinet, military, and 
 
LINCOLN. 51 
 
 naval officers joined in its discussion. Among the plans of 
 relief was one urged by Captain G. V. Fox, who, even under 
 General Scott s adverse criticism, convinced the President 
 and a majority of the Cabinet that he could, by means of 
 open boats and small tugs, in a dark night throw a small 
 quantity of provisions and a few men into the fort. The po 
 litical aspects of the case, however, remained still to be con 
 sidered. The President, therefore, on March 15th propounded 
 to his Cabinet the written question, " Assuming it to be 
 possible to provision Fort Sumter, is it wise under all the 
 circumstances of the case to attempt to do so ? " To this 
 the Cabinet made written replies, five members arguing 
 against the policy of attempting relief, and only two in its 
 favor. The majority, led by Mr. Seward, argued that any 
 possible relief would only be temporary, and that a disastrous 
 failure, and the eventual loss of the fort would produce more 
 damaging political results, than to give it up at once under 
 the imperative military necessity already existing, and for 
 which the new administration was in no wise responsible. 
 
 Two or three collateral questions connected themselves 
 with the main one. The exposed situation of Fort Pickens 
 had become known to Lincoln, and one of his earliest official 
 acts was to order its reinforcement from the fleet ; but of the 
 conditions of the January truce he was not informed. He was 
 therefore waiting in painful anxiety to receive news that his 
 order had been executed and Pickens reinforced, for the suc 
 cessful strengthening of that point would have an important 
 influence in deciding the question of Sumter. 
 
 Another secondary consideration was the attitude of Vir 
 ginia. Eebel influences in her Legislature had ordered a 
 State convention, to which convention her people had elected 
 a large majority of professedly loyal members. Their loyal 
 ty, however, was of a qualified sort, deeply tinctured with 
 
52 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION, 
 
 factional prejudice, and irritated with the imaginary wrongs 
 of the South. Upon this element, rebel intrigue and con 
 spiracy were working with telling effect ; and instead of de 
 claring and practising frank and direct adherence to the 
 Government, the union members were fulminating baseless 
 complaints, demanding impossible guarantees, and pleading 
 indulgent excuses for the course of South Carolina and the 
 Cotton Republics. And this condition of misdirected and 
 unstable loyalty was also wide-spread among the leaders and 
 people of the Border States of Maryland, Kentucky, and 
 Missouri. 
 
 How to deal with such a morbid and disturbed public sen 
 timent how to treat this unnatural, contradictory, and half 
 hearted allegiance, was a problem of direct bearing on the 
 Sumter question. Mr. Seward, optimist by nature, believed 
 and argued that the revolution throughout the South had 
 spent its force and was on the wane ; and that the evacuation 
 of Sumter, and the manifestation of kindness and confidence 
 to the Eebel and Border States, would undermine the con 
 spiracy, strengthen the union sentiment and union majori 
 ties, and restore allegiance and healthy political action with 
 out resort to civil war. 
 
 Mr. Lincoln shared Seward s pacific inclinations, but not 
 his optimism. He deferred his decision ; gathered informa 
 tion from Anderson, from Charleston, from Richmond, waited 
 in anxious suspense for news from Pickens. No substantial 
 encouragement, however, reached him from any quarter. 
 Anderson had no faith in a relief expedition. All union sen 
 timent had disappeared from South Carolina. The Virginia 
 Convention was evidently playing fast and loose with treason ; 
 and finally, General Scott was so far wrought upon by the 
 insane cry for concession to gratify the morbid patriotism 
 which yet found expression in the South, that he advised 
 
LINCOLN. 53 
 
 the evacuation of Pickens as well as Sumter. To crown all, 
 news came that the commander of the fleet at Pensacola had 
 refused to allow the reinforcement of Fort Pickens from the 
 ships, because of Buchanan s January truce, and of the tech 
 nical objection that General Scott s order had not come 
 through the regular channels of the Navy Department. 
 
 Amid these growing difficulties and dangers Mr. Lincoln 
 felt that the time for decisive action had arrived. On March 
 29th a second and final cabinet discussion was held, in which 
 there appeared a change of sentiment. Four of his seven 
 counsellors now voted for an attempt to relieve Anderson, 
 and at the close of the meeting the President ordered the 
 preparation of the expedition proposed by Captain Fox. 
 Three ships cf war, with a transport and three swift steam- 
 tugs, a supply of open boats, provisions for six months, and 
 two hundred recruits, were fitted out in New York with all 
 possible secrecy, and sailed from that port, after unforeseen 
 delays, on April 9th and 10th, under sealed orders to ren 
 dezvous before Charleston Harbor at daylight on the morn 
 ing of the 11 tli. 
 
 Coincident with this, the President, deeming the safety of 
 Fort Pickens no less essential than that of Sumter, at once 
 sent new and peremptory orders to the commander of the 
 fleet, and also ordered the secret preparation of another and 
 separate naval expedition to still further strengthen that 
 post. The simultaneous preparation of the two produced a 
 certain confusion and mutual embarrassment ; but the latter 
 was got off first, and, arriving safely, increased the garrison 
 of Fort Pickens, including those already landed from the 
 fleet, to 858 men, with provisions for six months, thus ren 
 dering it impregnable to rebel assault. 
 
 If we may credit abundant indications, the authorities at 
 Montgomery did not believe they would need to resort to 
 
54 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 their guns. As soon as the provisional government was or 
 ganized, three rebel commissioners were appointed to pro 
 ceed to Washington to negotiate for " recognition," for " ad 
 justment of differences," and for possession of the federal 
 forts. Two efforts to obtain Sumter by intrigue had failed ; 
 nevertheless, they still had faith a third attempt might suc 
 ceed with the new administration. 
 
 Through a conspirator who still professed loyalty, they 
 presented their application to Mr. Seward, Secretary of 
 State. Mr. Seward answered courteously, but decidedly, 
 that the new administration could have nothing to do either 
 with the rebel government or its emissaries ; and to a written 
 paper sent to the State Department by the commissioners, 
 he wrote an unofficial " memorandum " reply of the same 
 purport. This properly finished the negotiation ; but the 
 commissioners, authorized to do so by the government they 
 affected to represent, sought excuse to delay their departure, 
 and Associate Justice Campbell, of the Supreme Court of the 
 United States, volunteered to act as an unofficial intermedi 
 ary in continuing to press their errand upon the Secretary of 
 State. Campbell had at the beginning publicly opposed se 
 cession and still professed loyalty ; and in that friendly and 
 patriotic guise was admitted by the Secretary of State to an 
 intimacy he could never have gained under his true colors. 
 It seems that Seward, in this unofficial intimacy, did not hesi 
 tate to tell Campbell of his own willingness to give up Sum 
 ter, and of his belief that the President, upon the recom 
 mendation of General Scott, would order its evacuation. 
 This was about the time of the first Cabinet discussion of 
 the direct proposition, when five members voted for evacua 
 tion and only two against it, and the general situation of 
 affairs strongly supported Mr. Seward s course of reasoning. 
 
 Whatever may have been his language, a patriot could not 
 
LINCOLN. 55 
 
 havo misunderstood it. But Campbell had meanwhile be 
 come so far committed to the cause of the conspiracy, that 
 he conveyed his information to the commissioners as a vir 
 tual pledge of the evacuation of Sumter, and they sent tho 
 news to Montgomery in high glee. 
 
 As a matter of fact, President Lincoln had not at that date 
 decided the Sumter question ; he was following his own sa 
 gacious logic in arriving at a conclusion, which was at least 
 partially reached on the 29th of March, when, as we have 
 seen, he made tho order to prepare the relief expedition. 
 By this time, Campbell, in extreme impatience to further re 
 bellion, was importuning Seward for explanation ; and Sew- 
 ard, finding his former prediction at fault, thought it best 
 not to venture a new one. Upon consultation, therefore, the 
 President authorized him to carry to Campbell the first and 
 only assurance the Administration ever made with regard to 
 Sumter namely that he would not change the military 
 status at Charleston without giving notice. 
 
 This, be it observed, occurred on the 1st of April, about 
 which time the policy of Seward favoring delay and concilia 
 tion finally and formally gave way before the President s 
 stronger self-assertion and his carefully matured purpose to 
 force rebellion to put itself flagrantly and fatally in the 
 wrong by attacking Fort Sumter. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 SUMTER. 
 
 GOVERNOR PICKENR, of South Carolina, began about the 1st 
 of January to build batteries to isolate and reduce Fort 
 Sumter ; and the newly made General Beauregard was on 
 the 1st of March sent by the rebel government to Charleston 
 to assume direction of military affairs and to complete the 
 preparations for its capture. The Governor had been ex 
 ceedingly anxious that the capture should be attempted be 
 fore the expiration of Mr. Buchanan s presidential term 
 that is, between the 12th of February and the 4th of March. 
 " Mr. Buchanan cannot resist," wrote the Governor to Jeffer 
 son Davis, " because he has not the power. Mr. Lincoln 
 may not attack, because the cause of quarrel will have been, 
 or may be considered by him, as past." But the rebel Presi 
 dent doubtless thought it unwise to risk offending and alien 
 ating his party friends at the North by placing the responsi 
 bility of such an affront and loss upon their administration. 
 Even when General Beauregard came, the Governor was ad 
 monished that no attack must be attempted without mature 
 preparation, as a failure would seriously demoralize and per 
 haps prematurely wreck the rebellion. 
 
 Beauregard found, as he reports, that Sumter was natu 
 rally " a perfect Gibraltar," and that only the weakness of 
 the garrison rendered its capture reasonably feasible. He 
 
SUMTER. 57 
 
 therefore set himself to work, first of all, to devise obstruc 
 tions and defences against expected reinforcements, and sec 
 ondly, to build batteries to breach the walls. He was him 
 self a skilful engineer ; many of the works were already well 
 advanced ; there was an ample supply of guns and mortars ; 
 he had but to make requisitions to obtain unlimited slave 
 labor to do the drudgery of ditching and raising embank 
 ments ; his improvised volunteer army could give all their 
 time to drill and artillery practice ; and, most favorable of all, 
 this work went on in certain immunity from any molestation 
 except through the chance of a relieving expedition to come 
 by sea. The commander was ambitious, the men were en 
 thusiastic, and the Governor untiring in his revolutionary 
 ardor and impatience. It is, therefore, little wonder that, 
 after a month of laborious effort and co-operation, Bcaurc- 
 gard telegraphed (April 1st) to Montgomery: "Batteries 
 ready to open Wednesday or Thursday. What instructions?" 
 
 Up to this time the rebel government indulged the pleas 
 ing hope that Lincoln would give up the fort and save them 
 the dreaded ordeal of war. Justice Campbell had ingeni 
 ously misreported the sense and purport of Seward s conver 
 sations ; and the commissioners and their Washington cronies, 
 with equally blind zeal, sent rosy despatches on the strength 
 of exaggerated street-rumors. So confident were they of 
 such a result that- Governor Pickens, Secretary Walker, and 
 General Beauregard found some difficulty in settling among 
 themselves the exact conditions upon which they would per 
 mit Anderson and his garrison to depart when the order to 
 evacuate Sumter should be sent him. 
 
 The illusion began to fade away on the 1st of April, when 
 Commissioner Crawford telegraphed to Governor Pickens : 
 " I am authorized to say this Government will not undertake 
 to supply Sumter without notice to you." This language 
 
58 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 did not resemble the order for evacuation they had been im 
 patiently expecting, and the rebel authorities at once deter 
 mined to make Anderson feel the pressure of the siege. 
 Next day, orders were issued to stop all courtesies to the 
 garrison ; to prohibit all supplies from the city ; to permit 
 no one to depart from the fort, and to establish the rigid 
 surveillance of hostile lines. 
 
 Anderson himself, relying upon rebel rumors and Craw 
 ford s baseless despatches, appears to have made up his mind 
 that the garrison would bo withdrawn; and he expresses 
 himself as being " greatly surprised " when on April 7th ho 
 received a confidential letter, drafted by Lincoln, but copied 
 and signed by Cameron, under date of April 4th, informing 
 him that a relieving expedition would be sent ; requesting 
 him to hold out, if possible, till its arrival ; stating also, 
 however, that the President desired to subject him and his 
 command to no unusual danger or hardship beyond those 
 common in military life, and therefore authorizing him to 
 capitulate when in his judgment it might become necessary. 
 One of the few faults chargeable to Anderson is that to this 
 thoughtful and considerate instruction, framed by Lincoln 
 himself (but which he supposed to be the language of Cam 
 eron), he replied in a petulant and ill-natured spirit, writing: 
 "I frankly say that my heart is not in the war which I see is 
 to be thus commenced." His subsequent gallantry, and 
 steadfast loyalty, however, justify his countrymen in a lib 
 eral forgiveness of the passing indiscretion. It turned out 
 curiously enough that Anderson s letter was, through a dis 
 honorable trick of the rebels, captured by them and sent 
 to Montgomery, where during the whole war it remained 
 buried in the Confederate archives, and hence the offensive 
 sentence never came to the knowledge of the kind-hearted 
 and generous Lincoln. 
 
SUMTER. 59 
 
 Following the notice received through Crawford, the re 
 bels were for about a week in a tantalizing fever of sus 
 pense and uncertainty. The most contradictory telegrams 
 came from their commissioners and secret advisers in Wash 
 ington ; the most perplexing and misleading rumors reached 
 them from New York. The war powers of the Union were 
 clearly enough astir; troops were moving and ships were 
 loading ; but for what object ? Was their destination Sum- 
 tor or Pickens, New Orleans, or St. Domingo? Different 
 circumstances pointed to any or either of those places, but 
 the most subtle espionage failed to obtain the certain clue. 
 
 The mystery was finally solved on the evening of April 8th. 
 A government messenger arrived in Charleston, reported 
 himself to Governor Pickens, and was immediately admitted 
 by him to an interview at which General Beauregard was 
 present. The messenger read to them an official communi 
 cation, drafted by President Lincoln. It ran as follows : 
 
 " I am directed by the President of the United States to 
 notify you to expect an attempt will be made to supply Fort 
 Sumter with provisions only, and that if such attempt be 
 not resisted, no effort to throw in provisions, arms, or am 
 munition will be made without further notice, or in case of 
 an attack upon the fort." 
 
 The next morning after this notice was read to Governor 
 Pickens and General Beauregard in Charleston, the main 
 portion of the relieving expedition, under command of Cap 
 tain G. V. Fox, sailed from New York Harbor. It consisted 
 of the transport Baltic with the provisions and contingent 
 reinforcements, the war-steamers Pawnee, Pocahontas, Har 
 riet Lane, and the steam-tugs Uncle Ben, Yankee, and Free- 
 born. The fleet had orders to rendezvous ten miles east of 
 Charleston Harbor on the morning of April llth. The in 
 structions to Captain Fox were short, but explicit : " You will 
 
60 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION. 
 
 take charge," wrote the Secretary of War, " of the transports! 
 in New York, having the troops and supplies on board, and 
 endeavor in the first instance to deliver the subsistence. If 
 you are opposed in this, you are directed to report the fact 
 to the senior naval officer of the harbor, who will be in 
 structed by the Secretary of the Navy to use his entire force 
 to open a passage, when you will, if possible, effect an en 
 trance, and place both troops and supplies in Fort Sumter." 
 Lincoln s notice having been communicated to the Con 
 federate authorities in Montgomery, Jefferson Davis and his 
 compeers in revolution resolved to begin the war without 
 further delay. To permit provisions to be sent to Anderson, 
 after three months of battery-building, would jeopardize the 
 confidence and adhesion of the ultra fire-eaters, and suffer 
 the insurrection to collapse. The notice was received on 
 the evening of April 8th ; next day, the 9th, appears to have 
 been spent in deliberation and in verifying the situation by 
 inquiries from the rebel commissioners in Washington ; on 
 the 10th, Beauregard was instructed to demand the evacua 
 tion of Sumter, and, in case of refusal, to reduce it. At two 
 o clock in the afternoon of the following day (April llth), he 
 sent two of his aids to make the demand, in answer to which 
 Anderson, with the unanimous concurrence of his officers, 
 wrote a prompt refusal. The occasion seems to have called 
 out some general conversation, in the course of which An 
 derson said to the aids : "I will await the first shot, and if 
 you do not batter us to pieces, we will be starved out in a 
 few days." The remark repeated to Beauregard and to 
 Montgomery, caused the impression that Anderson desired 
 to capitulate, and another message was sent him, offering to 
 permit him to do so at his own convenience, if he would 
 designate the time, and agree in the meanwhile not to use 
 his guns against the rebels unless they should fire on Sum 
 
SUMTER. 61 
 
 fcer. Anderson was shrewd enough to see that this would 
 leave their guns free to beat back the fleet, and shaped his 
 reply accordingly. He stated that he would evacuate the 
 fort by noon on the 15th of April, " and that I will not, in 
 the meantime, open my fires upon your forces, unless com 
 pelled to do so by some hostile act against this fort or the 
 flag of my Government, by the forces under your command, 
 or some portion of them, or by the perpetration of some act 
 showing a hostile intention on your part against this fort or 
 the flag it bears, should I not receive, prior to that time, 
 controlling instructions from my Government, or additional 
 supplies." This reply was, of course, unsatisfactory to the 
 rebels. 
 
 The interchange of these several messages had consumed 
 the afternoon and night of April llth, and at 3:20 A.M., of 
 the morning of April 12th, Beauregard s aids handed Ander 
 son a note stating that he would open fire upon Sumter in 
 one hour from that time. 
 
 The inhabitants of Charleston had now for more than 
 three months followed the development of secession and re 
 bellion with unflagging zeal and daily interest, until they 
 began to regard the affairs of Sumter as their own pet and 
 exclusive drama. It had afforded them excitement upon ex 
 citement speeches, meetings, drills, parades, flag-raisings, 
 bonfires, salutes, music, and banners ; reaching into their 
 social and family life, it had carried their fathers, sons, 
 brothers, and friends away into the camps and trenches. 
 Sumter had been their daily talk and nightly dream ; and 
 this interest grew into a morbid curiosity as the drama ap 
 proached its long-predicted climax. There had been little 
 or no effort to conceal the changing aspects of preparations 
 and orders during the last few days ; and, as a result, the 
 general populace of the city became informed, almost as welj 
 
 
 
62 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 as the officers, of the precise hour when the bombardment 
 would begin. In the gray and yet uncertain twilight of this 
 April morning, therefore, the Charlestonians of all ages and 
 sexes came thronging down the streets to the wharves of the 
 city, to find favorable locations for viewing the coming spec 
 tacle, in something of the spirit in which Home of the 
 Caesars crowded to the Coliseum to witness the savage and 
 sanguinary combats of the arena. 
 
 At half-past four o clock, on the morning of April 12th, 
 1861, while yet the lingering night lay upon the waters of 
 the bay, leaving even the outline of Fort Sumter scarcely 
 discernible, the assembled spectators saw a flash from the 
 mortar battery near old Fort Johnson, on the south side of 
 the harbor, and an instant after a bombshell rose in a slow, 
 high curve through the air, and fell upon the fort. To the 
 beholders it was the inauguration of the final scene in their 
 local drama ; to the nation and world at large, it began a 
 conflict of such gigantic proportions and far-reaching conse 
 quence, that it will forever stand as one of the boldest land 
 marks in history. Gun after gun responded to the signal, 
 until, in the course of another hour, all the encircling rebel 
 batteries were in the heat and activity of a general bombard 
 ment. 
 
 Universal wonder was created at the time, and continued 
 curiosity has been excited since, by the fact that this bom 
 bardment, ending in the surrender of the fort, should have 
 continued for the space of thirty-six hours without the loss 
 of a single life in the besieged garrison. The apparent mys 
 tery is easily enough understood when we come to study 
 and comprehend the exact conditions and course of the 
 fight. 
 
 Fort Sumter was a work dating from comparatively recent 
 times, built of brick upon an artificial island formed in the 
 
SUMTER. 63 
 
 shallows nearly midway at the entrance of Charleston har 
 bor. It was a five-sided structure, about three hundred by 
 three hundred and fiity feet in size ; its walls were some 
 eight feet thick and forty feet high. It was capable of 
 mounting one hundred and forty guns, two tiers in case 
 mates and one behind the parapet. When Anderson took 
 possession of it the preceding Christmas, the casemates 
 were in an unfinished condition, and only a few guns were 
 mounted. Captain Foster, the accomplished engineer of the 
 fort, had, however, since then, by the many expedients 
 known to military science, and by help of a considerable 
 force of workmen and laborers, pushed its defences forward 
 to a state of relative completeness, even with the limited 
 means and materials within the fort. Most of the embra 
 sures of the lower tier of casemates were closed. A total 
 armament of forty-eight guns was ready for use. Of these 
 twenty-one were in the casemates, and twenty -seven on the 
 rampart, en barbette. The garrison consisted of nine com 
 missioned officers, sixty-eight non-commissioned officers and 
 privates, eight musicians, and forty-three non-combatant 
 workmen, to whom, during the last ten days, the besiegeis 
 had refused permission to depart, in order that they might 
 help consume Anderson s small stock of provisions, and thus 
 hasten the process of reducing the fort by starvation. 
 
 The rebels had built their siege-works on the approaching 
 points of the islands forming the harbor. These lay in a sort 
 of triangle about the fort : Sullivan s Island, containing Fort 
 Moultrie, to the northeast at a distance of 1,800 yards ; Cum- 
 ming s Point, on Morris Island, to the south at a distance of 
 1,300 yards ; and on James Island, near old Fort Johnson, to 
 the west at a distance of 2,500 yards. Their total armament 
 embraced forty-seven guns. 
 
 Thus, in numbers, the armaments appeared about equal, 
 
64 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 but the existing conditions created an immense disparity. 
 Anderson s fire was diffused ; the rebel fire was concentrated. 
 Anderson s barbette guns, more than half his pieces, were 
 exposed ; most of the rebel guns were sheltered in bomb- 
 proofs of palmetto logs and sand ; some protected with slop 
 ing roofs of railroad iron. Anderson had only a garrison of 
 128 souls all told ; while a volunteer force of from four to 
 six thousand supported the rebel batteries. The greatest 
 difference, however, was in the quality of the ordnance. 
 Anderson s guns could only deliver a horizontal fire against 
 the besiegers earth-walls and bomb-proofs. But seventeen 
 of the rebel pieces were mortars, delivering what is termed 
 a vertical fire; that is, throwing their bursting shells by 
 means of a high curve through the air, so as to drop down 
 upon the parapet and inside the walls of the besieged fort. 
 
 The garrison of Sumter, notwithstanding its tedious con 
 finement, was in excellent spirit, and, since the long appre 
 hended contest had finally come, was quite ready to make a 
 manful resistance. Even the forty-three non-combatant 
 workmen caught the impulse of fight and freely volunteered 
 their help. The needful preparations had been already 
 made, and since the 10th every one had by order changed 
 his quarters into the gun casemates. Here they were se 
 curely housed when at 4.30 A.M. the rebel cannonade began. 
 It was not yet daylight, and for some hours the fort made 
 no reply, but lay in the morning twilight as silent and ap 
 parently as unconcerned as if it were tenantless. The ra 
 tions had already become uncomfortably short ; the last bar 
 rel of flour was issued two or three days before, and now 
 there was little left to subsist upon except pork and water. 
 On this mainly the command made a breakfast, and at about 
 seven o clock Captain Abner Doubleday fired the first gun 
 from the fort at an iron-clad battery on Cumming s Point. 
 
SUMTER. 65 
 
 Reliefs were stationed at other guns, and soon Sumter was 
 sending back a spirited reply. 
 
 The three hours of unopposed bombardment from the 
 rebel batteries had by this time already determined one im 
 portant phase of the fight. Carefully watching the effect of 
 the enemy s cannonade, it was apparent, without further ques 
 tion, that under the concentrated missiles of their guns, and 
 particularly because of the precision of their vertical fire, it 
 would be folly to expose the gunners on the rampart or the 
 open parade of the fort. Had Sumter contained a full war 
 garrison, new men could have replaced those killed or dis 
 abled ; but, with his slender force, Anderson decided that ho 
 could not afford this risk, and therefore at once ordered an 
 abandonment of all the barbette guns and a few mounted on 
 the parade to throw shells, restricting the men rigidly to the 
 casemates. Thus at one swoop his righting armament was 
 reduced more than one-half. This, however, was not the 
 worst ; it practically annihilated the offensive strength of the 
 fort. Of the twenty -one casemate guns but four were forty- 
 two pounders , the rest only thirty-twos, a weight of metal of 
 little avail against the enemy s strong earthworks and iron 
 roofs. 
 
 In this way the cannonade went actively on during the 
 forenoon of April 12th, without much damage or effect, ex 
 cept upon the buildings in both Sumter and Moultrie, ordi 
 narily occupied as barracks and quarters. Sumter suffered 
 most in this respect : the balls striking the face of its walls 
 merely buried themselves in the brick-work, without passing 
 through ; but those which nearly or quite grazed the para 
 pet, in their fall took the buildings or wall in reverse, com 
 ing as they did from three sides. The men, however, while 
 sheltered in casemates, were beyond the reach of these mis 
 siles. So too of the bombs. Falling on the parapet and the 
 5 
 
66 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 open parade of Sumter and exploding, their destructive force 
 spent itself upon mere inanimate material. 
 
 About noon Anderson s men found they had been working 
 with too much ardor ; that their stock of 700 cartridges would 
 soon be exhausted. They set themselves to work to remedy 
 this deficiency, though with small speed, for they had only 
 six needles in the fort with which to sew up cartridge-bags. 
 
 Toward one o clock a new hope cheered them ; they saw 
 two ships, and soon after a third, bearing the stars and 
 stripes, appear off the harbor ; it was a part of the relieving 
 expedition they had been warned to expect. Unfortunately, 
 it proved unable to succor the fort either on that or the suc 
 ceeding day. Through a confusion of orders, the flagship of 
 the squadron with its commanding officer, and the instruc 
 tions for this emergency, and having on board also the sail 
 ers who were required to man the boats to carry the supplies 
 and soldiers to Sumter, had been detached from this duty 
 and sent to the Gulf of Mexico. A severe storm delayed 
 some of the vessels, and prevented the tugs from reaching 
 the harbor ; and this storm also prevented the officers from 
 making use of the limited resources remaining. Therefore, 
 to their chagrin, they and their men were forced by these 
 untoward circumstances, and through no neglect of their 
 own, to remain for twenty-four hours little else than specta 
 tors of the bombardment to its close. 
 
 During the afternoon of the first day Sumter kept up its 
 fire, though with greatly slackened speed. Only six guns 
 were kept in action for the remainder of the day : two 
 against Cumniing s Point on the south, and four against Fort 
 Moultrie and other batteries on Sullivan s Island to the 
 north. At nightfall even these ceased, as also did most of 
 the guns in the rebel batteries ; their mortars, however, 
 keeping up a sullen and steady discharge of bombs upou 
 
SUMTER. 67 
 
 tlic fort at intervals of about ten minutes, the whole of the 
 dark and stormy night which followed. 
 
 On the morning of the second day, April 13th, the rebels 
 began their general cannonade with both increased vigor 
 and increased precision ; to which the garrison, after its 
 breakfast of pork and water, and having somewhat replen 
 ished its stock of cartridges, again made a " spiteful" reply. 
 It is impossible to estimate how long this mere interchange 
 of shot and shell might have continued, had not other ele 
 ments intervened to bring the combat to a close. 
 
 On three of the five sides of Sumter, just inside the walls, 
 stood long and substantial buildings used as barracks, offi 
 cers quarters, and for other purposes. These had been sev 
 eral times set on fire by hot shot during the first day, though 
 as often readily extinguished by the garrison. The rebels 
 had not failed to notice the effect ; and on the second morn 
 ing their use of these missiles became more frequent. About 
 nine o clock of the second day these buildings were once 
 more in a blaze, and this time the fire caught in a portion 
 of the roof of the officers quarters which it was not imme 
 diately possible for the men to reach. The flames were 
 quickly bsyond control ; and now the serious problem was 
 to remove as much powder from the magazine as might be 
 needed for use, before that proceeding should become im 
 possible. Fifty barrels were thus obtained and distributed 
 about the casemates, when it was necessary to close and se 
 cure the door of the magazine. 
 
 Thus, by noon of the second day, the inmates of the fort 
 were exposed, not alone to the peril of the enemy s shot and 
 shell, but also to the immediate discomfort and danger of a 
 serious conflagration. Within the limited area of the fort 
 the heat became intense ; the air was filled with floating 
 cinders ; and, blown downward by the current of the sea- 
 
68 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 breeze, a stifling, blinding smoke finally drove the men into 
 the casemates, and even to these retreats the floating fire- 
 flakes pursued them. The situation became too dangerous 
 to keep the fifty barrels of powder rescued from the maga 
 zine ; by order of Anderson, all but five were rolled out of 
 the embrasures into the sea. 
 
 About one o clock the flagstaff of the fort was shot away, 
 having been hit a number of times previously ; and, although 
 the flag was soon after again raised on a jury-mast on the 
 parapet, the clouds of smoke concealed it from the rebel 
 view. Seeing the great conflagration, the disappearance of 
 the flag, and a total cessation of fire from Sumter s guns, 
 they not unreasonably concluded that the garrison was 
 ready to surrender. The eccentric Senator Wigfall, doing 
 duty as a volunteer aid on one of the islands, was sent by a 
 subordinate officer to ascertain the fact ; and, being brought 
 before the commander, with more grandiloquence than au 
 thority, offered to permit Anderson to name his own terms of 
 evacuation. Anderson replied that he would accept the 
 terms offered him by Beauregard at the time of his first 
 summons, on the llth. Wigfall thereupon returned to his 
 post, where, in turn, with more enthusiasm than memory, he 
 reported an unconditional surrender. Meanwhile, three aids 
 arrived direct from Beauregard, with an offer of assistance 
 to extinguish the flames, and the misunderstanding became 
 apparent. Anderson, in some anger, was disposed to renew his 
 fight ; upon suggestion of the aids, however, he waited till the 
 blunder could be referred to Beauregard. This commander 
 reconciled all difficulty by agreeing to Anderson s proposal ; 
 and at noon of the following day, Sunday, April 14, 1861, the 
 faithful commander and his faithful garrison, with an impres 
 sive ceremony of prayer and salute, hauled down the flag of 
 the United States, and evacuated Fort Sumter. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE CALL TO ARMS. 
 
 TIDE assault upon Fort Sumter had doubtless been ordered 
 by the rebel government under the hope, if not the belief, 
 that it would not provoke immediate or widespread civil 
 war. It is probable that they anticipated it would bring on 
 military movements and measures of a local and defensive 
 character ; but neither the size of the Federal army, nor the 
 very limited war organization set on foot by the rebel con 
 gress, pointed as yet to hostilities on an extended scale. 
 The South well knew that the frontier could not be entirely 
 stripped of regulars; they assumed, or so pretended, that 
 existing laws authorized no call of the militia ; and, judging 
 from the neglect of Congress, at its recent session, to pass a 
 force bill, they might reasonably infer that it would be dif 
 ficult for the new administration to obtain coercive legisla 
 tion. Most of all, however, they relied upon a friendly feel 
 ing toward the South from their late Democratic party 
 allies. Throughout the last presidential election, Northern 
 Democrats had magnified Southern complaints as insuffer 
 able grievances, and predicted the coming revolution as a 
 terror to obstinate voters. President Buchanan even went 
 so far in his annual message as to assert that a neglect of 
 Northern States to repeal their personal liberty laws would 
 justify the South in revolutionary resistance. Tho news- 
 
70 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 paper press was full of kindred echoes. Potent public 
 voices had declared that the North would not entertain 
 nay, would not permit, a policy of subjugation. Ex- Presi 
 dent Franklin Pierce Buchanan s predecessor had given 
 Jefferson Davis very broad confidential assurances on this 
 head. "Without discussing the question of right," wrote 
 he, January 6, 1860, " of abstract power to secede, I have 
 never believed that actual disruption of the Union can occur 
 without blood; and if, through the madness of Northern 
 Abolitionism, that dire calamity must come, the fighting 
 will not be along Mason s and Dixon s line merely. It [will] 
 be within our own borders, in our own streets, between tlio 
 two classes of citizens to whom I have referred. Those who 
 defy law and scout constitutional obligations will, if we ever 
 reach the arbitrament of arms, find occupation enough au 
 home." 
 
 As the oracle of another faction, Douglas had made an 
 elaborate argument in the Senate to show that the President 
 possessed no right of coercion; repeating the theory of Bu 
 chanan s message, that the army and navy and the militia of 
 the States could not move except behind a marshal with his 
 writ, and that both the tongue and the arms of justice were 
 dead in South Carolina. Similar encouragement came from 
 many individuals of lesser note. It even appeared that the 
 spirit of secession was finding a lodgment in the North. A 
 member had declared on the floor of Congress that the Em 
 pire State would set up her own separate sovereignty ; while 
 in a still more radical ambition the Mayor of New York City, 
 in an official message, proposed the secession of that me 
 tropolis, and its assumption of territorial independence as a 
 " free city." The firing on the Star of the AVest, in January, 
 had in a slight degree touched the national pride, and some 
 what checked the gathering current of seditious utterance ; 
 
THE CALL TO ARMS. 71 
 
 but there was no lack of cliques and coteries in the great 
 cities of the North who secretly nursed plots and projects 
 contingent on possible insurrectionary commotions and 
 chances. One of the rebel commissioners to Washington, in 
 the interim during which Justice Campbell relieved them of 
 their labors of diplomatic intrigue, visited New York, where 
 he was waited upon by the spokesman of one of these North 
 ern cabals, who poured into the ears of his credulous lis 
 tener the recital of a most marvellous scheme of local con 
 spiracy. Two hundred of New York s best citizens, he said, 
 were at that moment elaborating a plan to secede from both 
 the Union and the State, seize the navy yard at Brooklyn, 
 and the forts in the harbor, and declare New York a free 
 city. The informant was perhaps an adventurer anxious to 
 pocket a liberal subsidy ; yet, as an echo of Mayor Wood s 
 official proposition, the incident was not without its signifi 
 cance, and the eager commissioner repeated the tale by let 
 ter to Jefferson Davis, countersigned by his own personal 
 faith that there was " something in it." 
 
 Jefferson Davis was by far too shrewd a leader to look for 
 a literal fulfilment of any of these extravagant predictions 
 or projects ; but they afforded him a substantial basis for the 
 belief that this class of sentiment would at least oppose and 
 thwart the new administration in any quick or extended 
 measures to suppress the " confederate " revolt. 
 
 On the part of the North, also, there had been grave mis 
 apprehension of the actual state of Southern opinion. For 
 ten years the Southern threats of disunion had been empty 
 bluster. The half-disclosed conspiracy of 1856 did not 
 seem to extend beyond a few notorious agitators. The more 
 serious revolutionary signs of the last three months the re 
 tirement of Southern members from Congress, the secession 
 of States, the seizure of federal forts and the formation of 
 
72 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 the Montgomery provisional government were not realized 
 in their full force by the North, because of the general con 
 fusion of politics, the rush and hurry of events, the delusive 
 hopes of compromise held out by Congressional committees 
 and factions, and the high-sounding professions of the 
 Washington peace conference. More potent than all was 
 the underlying disbelief of the North that the people at 
 large in the South felt the stress of any real grievance. The 
 loss of slave runaways was their most tangible accusation. 
 Would that evil be cured by moving the Canada line down 
 to the Ohio ? If separate nationality was the object, could 
 ten millions overcome twenty millions ? could precarious 
 Southern credit cope with the solid accumulations of North 
 ern capital? could a monotonous Southern agriculture try 
 expedients with the famous mechanical skill of the Free 
 States ? could cotton crops feed armies like the great corn, 
 wheat, hay, pork, and cattle regions ? and finally, would the 
 great West permit a foreign flag to close or cover the mouth 
 of the Mississippi ? The bare suggestion seemed, and was, 
 nonsense. They indeed saw clearly enough the ambition, 
 treachery, and desperation of certain Southern leaders ; but 
 the North did not believe that these leaders could, in Yan- 
 cey s language, " precipitate the Cotton States into a revolu 
 tion " ; that passing chagrin over a lost election could goad 
 the whole Southern people, without substantial cause, into 
 the horror and ruin of a hopeless civil war. 
 
 The firing on Sumter cleared up the political atmos 
 phere as if by magic. The roar of Beauregard s guns 
 changed incredulity into fact. There was no longer room 
 for doubt. This was no mere emeute. Seven seceding 
 States, with their machinery of local government and the 
 crazy zeal of an inflamed reaction, stood behind the guns. 
 The cool deliberation of the assault betokened plan, pur 
 
THE CALL TO ARMS. 73 
 
 pose, and confidence. The conspiracy had given way to 
 revolution. 
 
 The news of the assault on Stimter reached Washington 
 on Saturday, April 13th ; on Sunday morning, the 14th, the 
 President and Cabinet were met to discuss the surrender 
 and evacuation. Sunday, though it was, Lincoln with his 
 own hand immediately drafted the following proclamation, 
 which was dated, issued, telegraphed, and published to the 
 whole country on Monday morning, April 15th. 
 
 "PROCLAMATION 
 
 "BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 "Whereas, the laws of the United States have been for some time 
 past and now are opposed, and the execution thereof obstructed in the 
 States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Lou 
 isiana, and Texas, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by 
 the ordinary course of judicial procsedings, or by the powers vested in 
 the marshals by law : now therefore, I, ABHAIIAM LINCOLN, President 
 of the United States, in virtue of the power in me vested by the Con 
 stitution and the laws, have thought fit to call forth, and hereby do call 
 forth the militia of the several States of the Union, to the aggregate 
 number of seventy-five thousand, in order to suppress said combina 
 tions and to cause the laws to be duly executed. 
 
 " The details for this object will be immediately communicated to the 
 State authorities through the War Department. I appeal to all loyal 
 citizens to favor, facilitate, and aid this effort to maintain the honor, 
 thejjitegrity, and existence of our National Union, and the perpetuity 
 of popular government, and to redress wrongs already long enough en 
 dured. I deem it proper to say that the first service assigned to the 
 forces hereby called forth will probably be to repossess _the fpjL ts, 
 j>lac.s, and property which have been seized from the Union ; and_in 
 every event the utmost care will be observed, consistently with the ob 
 jects aforesaid, to avoid any devastation, any destruction of, or inter- 
 L 4 
 
74 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 ference with property, or any disturbance of peaceful citizens in any 
 part of the country ; and I hereby command the persons composing the 
 combinations aforesaid to disperse and retire peaceably to their respec 
 tive abodes within twenty days from this date. 
 
 " Deeming that the present condition of public affairs presents an ex 
 traordinary occasion, I do hereby, in virtue of the power in me vested 
 by the Constitution, convene both Houses of Congress. Senators and 
 Representatives are therefore summoned to assemble at their re 
 spective chambers at twelve o clock, noon, on Thursday, the fourth day 
 of July next, then and there to consider and determine such measures 
 as, in their wisdom, the public safety and interest may seem to de 
 mand, 
 
 "In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the 
 seal of the United States to be affixed. 
 
 "Done at the City of Washington, this fifteenth day of April, in the 
 year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, and of the 
 independence of the United States the eighty-fifth. 
 
 "ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 
 " By the President. 
 
 " WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State," 
 
 The possible contingency foreshadowed by Lincoln in his 
 Trenton address had come ; and he not only redeemed his 
 promise to " put the foot down firmly," but he took care to 
 place it on a solid foundation. Nominally the call of the 
 militia was based on the Act of 1795. But the broad lan 
 guage of the proclamation was an " appeal to all loyal citi 
 zens to favor, facilitate, and aid this effort to maintain the 
 honor, the integrity, and existence of our National Union, and 
 the perpetuity of popular government." The President had 
 taken care to so shape the issue so to strip it of all provo 
 cation or ingenious excuse, as to show the reckless malignity 
 of the rebellion in showering red-hot shot on a starving gar 
 rison ; he now asked the people to maintain their assaulted 
 dignity and outraged authority; touching not merely the 
 machinery of forms and statutes, but invoking directly that 
 
THE CALL TO ARMS. 75 
 
 spirit of free government to preserve itself, against which in 
 his opinion " the gates of hell " could not prevail. 
 
 The correctness of his faith was equal to the wisdom of 
 his policy ; for now there was seen one of those mighty 
 manifestations of national will and national strength that 
 mark the grand epochs of civilized history. The whole 
 country seemed to awaken as from the trouble of a feverish 
 dream, and once again men entered upon a conscious recog 
 nition of their proper relations to the Government. Cross- 
 purpose and perplexed counsel faded from the public mind. 
 Parties vanished from politics. Universal opinion recog 
 nized but two rallying-points the camps of the South 
 which gathered to assail the Union, and the armies of the 
 North that rose to defend it. 
 
 From every Governor of the Free States came a prompt re 
 sponse of readiness to furnish to the President the desired 
 quota of militia. In almost every county of the North was 
 begun the enlistment of volunteers. Meetings, speeches, 
 and parades voiced the public exhortation to patriotism. 
 Flags and badges symbolized an eager and universal loyalty. 
 Munificent individual donations, and subscriptions, and lib 
 eral appropriations from State Legislatures and municipal 
 councils, poured forth lavish contributions to arm, clothe, 
 and equip the recruits. More than double the number of 
 men required tendered their service. Before the lapse of 
 forty-eight hours, armed companies and regiments of volun 
 teers were in motion toward the expected border of conflict. 
 Public opinion became intolerant of dissent and cavil ; in 
 many instances tumultuous mobs silenced or destroyed 
 newspapers which had ventured to print disloyal or treason 
 able language. There was not the slightest sign or move 
 ment of the predicted division of Northern sentiment. New 
 York joyfully ranged herself under the flag in a monster 
 
76 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 meeting of two hundred thousand of her people. Before 
 the surging crowds that filled the streets, and drowned all 
 noises in their huzzas for the Union, the New York Herald 
 displayed the stars and stripes, and changed its editorials 
 from a tone of sneering lament to a fierce and incessant 
 war-cry. Every prominent individual in the whole North 
 was called or came voluntarily to prompt espousal of the 
 Union cause by public letter or speech. Ex-President 
 Buchanan, ex-President Pierce, Edward Everett, General 
 Cass, Archbishop Hughes, Mayor Fernando Wood, John A. 
 Dix, Wendell Phillips, Kobert J. Walker, Wm. M. Evarts, 
 Edward D. Baker, David Dudley Field, John J. Crittenden, 
 Caleb Gushing, Hannibal Hamlin, Democrats and Republi 
 cans, conservatives and radicals, natives and foreigners, 
 Catholics and Protestants, Maine and Oregon, all uttered a 
 common call to their countrymen to come to the defence of 
 the Constitution, the Government, and the Union. Of all 
 these recognized public leaders, however, the most energetic 
 and powerful, next to Lincoln, was Stephen A. Douglas, who 
 in the late election had received 1,128,049 Northern votes, 
 and 163,525 Southern votes for President. As already men 
 tioned, he had, in a bold Senate speech, announced himself 
 as opposed to a policy of coercion. But the wanton bom 
 bardment of Sumter exhausted his party patience, and 
 stirred his patriotic blood to fresher and healthier impulses. 
 On Sunday, April 14th, when the proclamation had not yet 
 been many hours written and signed, he sought his life 
 long political antagonist, Abraham Lincoln, now President of 
 the United States, and, in a long, confidential interview, as 
 sured him of his readiness to join him in unrelenting war 
 fare against rebellion. The next morning s telegraphic de 
 spatches gave the country an authorized notice of the patri 
 otic alliance. In a few days he started to his home in Illi- 
 
THE CALL TO ARMS. 77 
 
 nois ; and everywhere on his journey, and until his sudden 
 death a few weeks later, he scarcely ceased his eloquent ap 
 peal to his fellow-citizens to rise in vindication of good 
 faith, of system, of order in government ; declaring, with sen 
 tentious vigor, " every man must be for the United States or 
 against it ; there can be no neutrals in this war only pa 
 triots and traitors." 
 
 Such was the grand uprising of the North. The South, 
 already for three months past in the turmoil of insurrection, 
 was once more quickened to a new activity in her fatal enter 
 prise. SheJeltJhat the -assault on Sumter was her final cast 
 of the die. Her people are proud and impetuous, stronger 
 in physical than in moral courage, more prone to daring in 
 behalf of error than of suffering to sustain truth. This qual 
 ity was shrewdly recognized by one of the conspirators when 
 he gave his hesitating confederates the brutal watchword : 
 "You must sprinkle blood in the faces of the people." 
 Sumter was a bloodless conquest, but it nevertheless filled 
 tkeJSputli with the intoxication of combat. All sentiment 
 adverse to secession and Southern independence had long 
 since disappeared under the repression of a despotic public 
 opinion ; but now the fervor of a fanatical crusade transfused 
 the whole Southern population ; and their motley array of 
 palmetto banners, rattlesnake flags, and almost as eccentric 
 varieties of " stars and bars," became, in their wild political 
 lunacy, the symbols of a holy deliverance. 
 
 The Sumter bombardment, Lincoln s proclamation, and 
 the enthusiastic war-spirit of the North, left the Confeder 
 ate authorities at Montgomery no further hope of obtaining 
 peaceable separation by diplomacy or intrigue. In their 
 scheme of independence, while counting, with much greater 
 accuracy than outsiders, upon the latent military resources 
 >t the South, they nevertheless seeni to have based their 
 
78 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 ultimate reliance upon foreign intervention in tlieii* behalf. 
 " Cotton is king," they argued ; Europe cannot exist without 
 it ; therefore, when American civil war locks up that daily 
 food of European looms, and takes the means of earning 
 daily bread from foreign labor, dividends from foreign capi 
 tal, and activity from foreign commerce, European govern 
 ments must open our ports by recognizing and protecting 
 our flag, especially if, in addition to their needed manufac 
 turing staple, we tempt them with the commercial harvest 
 of free trade. 
 
 As the entering wedge to this policy, Jefferson Davis, on 
 the 17th of April, issued his proclamation, offering letters of 
 marque and reprisal, "under the seal of these Confederate 
 States," to armed privateers of any nation. The commercial 
 classes of England had, since the secession of South Caro 
 lina, manifested a strong sympathy for the rebellion, and ha 
 doubtless expected that the seas would soon swarm with pred 
 atory adventurers under shelter of the "stars and bars." A 
 few vessels of this character did, in the subsequent years of 
 the war, inflict incalculable damage upon shipping sailing 
 under the Federal flag ; but the extravagant scheme, of 
 which this privateering proclamation was the key -note, with 
 ered in an early blight. Two days after its appearance 
 President Lincoln issued a counter-proclamation, instituting 
 a rigid blockade of the insurgent ports, and threatening that 
 Jefferson Davis privateers should be " held amenable to the 
 laws of the United States for the prevention and punish 
 ment of piracy " a warning which, from motives of public 
 policy and the humane personal instincts of the President, 
 was not literally enforced. The unexampled increase of the 
 United States Navy, the extraordinary efficiency of the block 
 ade, the vigilant foreign diplomatic service of the adminis 
 tration, and, above all, its vigorous prosecution of the war, 
 
THE CALL TO ARMS. 79 
 
 left foreign powers no sufficient excuse, and overawed all 
 passing temptations to intervene. And when the hour of 
 distress and trial finally came to the industrial classes of 
 England, the noble devotion of the Manchester cotton oper 
 atives to universal liberty put to shame and impotence the 
 greedy cupidity of the cotton merchants of Liverpool. 
 
 In addition to the six or seven thousand rebel troops as 
 sembled at Charleston to aid in the reduction of Sumter, and 
 the four or five thousand sent to Pensacola to undertake the 
 capture of Fort Pickens, Jefferson Davis Secretary of War 
 had, in anticipation of the results of the bombardment, on the 
 8th of April called upon the seceded States for a contingent 
 of 20,000, to which there was again, on the 16th of April, added 
 a further call of 34,000 volunteers. In seizing the Southern 
 arsenals the seceded States had become possessed of over one 
 hundred thousand "serviceable" arms; at least thirty thou 
 sand others had been secured by purchase from Secretary 
 Floyd. The arsenals also contained considerable quantities of 
 military equipments. A variety of military stores were among 
 the property surrendered by Twiggs in Texas ; the seaboard 
 forts, particularly those in Charleston Harbor, furnished a 
 supply of heavy guns. Southern recruits were abundant ; 
 and out of these ready materials the Montgomery authorities 
 proceeded as rapidly as possible, with the assistance of many 
 skilful officers resigned or deserted from the Federal service, 
 to improvise an army. Diplomatic agents were sent in haste 
 to European courts. Measures were taken to thoroughly 
 fortify the coast ; permission was sought from the neighbor 
 ing States to blockade the Mississippi River as high as Yicks- 
 burg and Memphis. The Confederate Congress was con 
 vened in special session ; and on April 29th Jefferson Davis 
 sent them his message, announcing that he had " in the field, 
 at Charleston, Pensacola, Forts Morgan, Jackson, St. Philip, 
 
80 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION. 
 
 and Pulaski, nineteen thousand men, and sixteen thousand 
 are now en route for Virginia." Also, that he further pro 
 posed " to organize and hold in readiness for instant action," 
 an army of one hundred thousand men. 
 
 Between the fall of Sumter, however, and the date of this 
 message, the whole revolution had undergone a remarkably 
 rapid development, which essentially changed the scope and 
 character of the contest. Hitherto the Border Slave States, 
 as they were called Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, 
 Tennessee, Kentucky, Arkansas, and Missouri though from 
 the beginning also deeply agitated, had taken no decisive 
 action. Their people were divided in sympathy and interest ; 
 they favored slavery, but they also loved the Union. Every 
 expression through a popular vote indicated strongly pre 
 ponderant loyalty ; but with one exception their State offi 
 cials were already secretly leagued with the secession con 
 spirators. Upon them, too, the bombardment of Sumter fell 
 like a sudden touchstone. The proclamation of President 
 Lincoln, and the requisition of the Secretary of War for 
 their quota of Union volunteers, left them no further chance 
 of concealment. Compelled to take sides, their various gov 
 ernors replied to the call in an insulting and contumacious 
 refusal. From that time forward Virginia, North Carolina, 
 Tennessee, and Arkansas were practically part and parcel of 
 the rebellion, though some of these did not immediately 
 make a pretence of formal adhesion by ordinances or mili 
 tary leagues. It would be both tedious and needless to 
 detail the various steps and phases of their seeming revolt ; 
 it is a record of bold conspiracy, shameless usurpation, and 
 despotic military domination, made possible by the sudden 
 rush of popular excitement and passion consequent upon 
 the fall of Sumter. The three others, Maryland, Kentucky, 
 and Missouri, and also the western half of Virginia, were 
 
THE CALL TO ARMS. 81 
 
 eventually saved to the Union, partly by the inherent loyalty 
 of their people, partly by the quick and sustaining presence 
 of the Union forces. 
 
 By these adhesions the revolution at a single bound aug 
 mented its area almost one-half, and nearly doubled its sup 
 porting population, its material resources, its claim to the 
 serious attention of foreign nations. Its chiefs and leaders 
 were, of course, correspondingly elated and hopeful. With 
 a territory nearly four times as large as France ; with five 
 and a half millions of whites, and three and a half millions of 
 blacks ; producing by her agriculture a single staple, cotton, 
 valued at two hundred million dollars annually ; with a greatly 
 diversified climate ; with a long sea-coast, with several impor 
 tant harbors and many navigable rivers ; with mountains, with 
 mines, with forests containing the most valuable ship-timber 
 in the world ; with a greater variety of field and garden pro 
 ducts than usually falls to the lot of a single people they be 
 lieved that they possessed the substantial elements of a homo 
 geneous, prosperous, and powerful nation. 
 G 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 BALTIMORE. 
 
 OF all the Border Slave States, Virginia held the most 
 equivocal and deceptive attitude. Beyond all doubt a ma 
 jority of her people desired to adhere to the Union, and at 
 an election for members of a State convention held in Feb 
 ruary the majority of professedly Union men chosen was as 
 three to one. But when this convention met, it appeared 
 that many of these so-called Unionists had trifled with their 
 constituents, and finally betrayed their trust; they were 
 Unionists only upon conditions to which the Union would 
 never consent. Governor Letcher, of Virginia, also labored 
 in secret activity to promote secession. There was a pestif 
 erous clique of radical disunionists about Eichrnond, and, 
 tinder an outward show of qualified loyalty, the conspiracy 
 was almost as busy and as potent in the " Old Dominion " as 
 in the Cotton States themselves. When Sumter fell, all this 
 hidden intrigue blazed out into open insurrection. The 
 convention, notwithstanding many previous contrary votes, 
 held a secret session on April 17th, and passed an ordinance 
 of secession, eighty-eight to fifty-five. The gradual but sys 
 tematic arming of the State militia had been going on for a 
 year past. Governor Letcher insultingly refused the Presi 
 dent s call for troops on the 16th, and immediately set mili 
 tary expeditions in movement to seize the United States 
 
BALTIMORE. 83 
 
 Navy Yard at Norfolk, and the United States Armory at Har 
 per s Ferry. The convention made a pretence of submitting 
 the question of secession to a popular vote, to be taken on 
 May 23d following ; and then, as if in mockery, entered at 
 once into a secret military league with the Confederate 
 States " on April 24th, placing Jefferson Davis in control of 
 all her armies and military affairs, and filling the State with 
 "foreign" regiments from the South. 
 
 In the Border State of Maryland the situation was some 
 what different. The Unionists were also in the majority, 
 with an active and influential minority for secession. Hero, 
 as elsewhere, conspiracy had been at work for months, and 
 gained many of the prominent leaders in politics. The Le 
 gislature was believed to be unreliable. Treason had so far 
 taken a foothold in the populous city of Baltimore, that a 
 secret recruiting office was sending enlisted men to Charles 
 ton. But all local demonstration was as yet baffled by the 
 unwavering loyalty of the Governor of Maryland, Thomas 
 Holliday Hicks. He had refused and resisted all the subtle 
 temptations and schemes of the traitors, especially in declin 
 ing to call the Legislature together to give disunion the 
 cloak of a legal starting-point. 
 
 To understand correctly the series of sudden and startling 
 events which now occurred in quick succession, it is neces 
 sary to bear in mind that the ten miles square of Federal 
 territory known as the District of Columbia, in which the 
 capital of the country, Washington, is situated, lies between 
 Virginia and Maryland, and was formed out of the original 
 territory of those States. 
 
 In all wars, foreign or domestic, the safety of the capital, 
 its buildings, archives, and officers, is, of course, a constant 
 and a paramount necessity. To guard the City of Washing 
 ton against a rumored plot of seizure by the conspirators, 
 
81 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 President Buchanan had in January permitted Secretary 
 Holt and General Scott to concentrate a small number of 
 regular troops in it. Some of these had ever since remained 
 there. As soon as President Lincoln decided to send pro 
 visions to Sumter, he had, in anticipation of coming dangers^ 
 ordered General Scott to take additional measures for the 
 security of the capital, and to that end authorized him to 
 muster into the service of the United States about fifteen 
 companies of District militia. When Surnter fell and the 
 proclamation was issued, as a still further precaution the 
 first few regiments were ordered directly to Washington. 
 
 To the Massachusetts Sixth belongs the unfading honor 
 of being the first regiment, armed and equipped for service, 
 to respond to the President s call. Mustering on Boston 
 Common, on Tuesday morning, April 16th, it embarked on 
 railroad cars on Wednesday evening, April 17th, and, after a 
 continuous popular ovation along the route, it reached Phila 
 delphia Thursday evening, April 18th. Friday, April 19th, 
 was the anniversary of the battle of Lexington, famous in 
 American history. Early that morning, after a short bivouac, 
 the regiment was once more on its way. It had been warned 
 of danger in Baltimore ; the unruly populace was excited by 
 a series of secession meetings ; part of an unarmed Pennsyl 
 vania regiment had, in its transit, been hooted and stoned 
 the evening before. As the train approached the city, Col 
 onel Jones, commanding the Sixth, ordered his men to load 
 and cap their rifles, and instructed them to pay no attention 
 to insults or even ordinary missiles, but to vigorously return 
 any attack with firearms. 
 
 A misunderstanding existed about the method of proceed 
 ing. Colonel Jones expected that his regiment would march 
 in a body through the open streets, and had made his dispo 
 sitions accordingly. When, therefore, the train halted, he 
 
BALTIMORE. 85 
 
 was surprised and disconcerted to find that the cars wore 
 suddenly detached from the train and from each other, and, 
 with the troops still in them, were rapidly drawn by horses 
 through the streets on a track running from the Philadelphia 
 depot to the Washington depot, the two being about a mile 
 apart. Himself and the regimental officers were in the first 
 car ; others followed, and, until eight cars had thus passed, 
 no detention or demonstration occurred. But an excited 
 
 Route of the Massachusetts Sixth through Baltimore. 
 
 crowd meanwhile gathered along the track ; the ninth car 
 was received with hootings and insults, was detained by 
 slight obstructions, and, before it finally reached the Wash- 
 ington depot, its windows were smashed by stones and 
 bricks, and some of its occupants wounded by gun- and 
 pistol-shots, the soldiers having also returned the scattering 
 lire. 
 
 By this time the crowd, grown to formidable proportions, 
 and fully maddened, succeeded in placing more permanent 
 
8G THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 obstructions on the track sand, paving-stones, heavy an 
 chors from a wharf near by, and in one place had partially 
 torn up a small bridge. Four companies still remained be 
 hind ; and these were now notified by the railroad employees 
 of the dangers ahead, and the impossibility of proceeding 
 in the cars as the preceding companies had done. The offi 
 cers thereupon consulted together, and determined to under 
 take the trip on foot; and, placing Captain Follansbee in 
 command, they descended from their cars, formed deliber 
 ately on the sidewalk, and started forward. 
 
 Almost at the outset they encountered an improvised pro 
 cession of the mob following a secession flag, and in an in 
 stant there was a quick and short metie. Disentangling 
 themselves from this, the officers urged the men into a 
 double-quick, which, however, only encouraged the rioters, 
 who looked upon it as a sign of fear and flight. New and 
 increased crowds were soon met ; they were threatened in 
 rear and front, and a discharge of firearms began from side 
 walks and windows. Then the order was given to return 
 the fire. There was struggle, confusion, smoke, hooting, 
 yells of "nigger thieves," "traitors," men dropping on tho 
 sidewalk and falling from windows, and wounded soldiers 
 crawling feebly away under the feet of the rushing, howling 
 mob. 
 
 Into the midst of this terror there suddenly came a little 
 ray of hope and help. People began to shout, " Here comes 
 the Mayor ! " The city authorities, who had been waiting at 
 the Washington Depot, had heard of the riot and were has 
 tening to the rescue. The crowd fell back ; a man came up, 
 shook hands with Captain Follansbee, saying, " I am the 
 Mayor of Baltimore." Mayor Brown courageously placed 
 himself beside the captain, and, by voice and gesture, en 
 deavored to quell the tumult, but to little purpose. Tha 
 
BALTIMORE. 87 
 
 straggling, fighting column pushed ahead doggedly a square 
 or two farther, the attack increasing rather than diminishing. 
 The Major s own patience and temper was exhausted, and, 
 seizing a gun from the hands of a soldier, he fired at and 
 brought down one of the rioters. 
 
 At this point, Captain Follansbee states, the Mayor disap 
 peared most probably, as it would seem, because of the 
 fortunate arrival of more effective help. Marshal Kane, 
 chief of police, also hastening to the relief, here arrived on 
 the scene of conflict with a squad of fifty policemen. Tak 
 ing advantage of a favorable instant, he deployed his men in a 
 line across the street, opened their ranks to allow the troops 
 to pass through, and then, closing his line again, confronted 
 the advancing mob with drawn revolvers. The movement 
 diverted a moment s attention and checked the onward rush ; 
 the Lamer held firm, the column of soldiers passed quickly 
 on, and, though it met one or two slight additional attacks, 
 it made its way to the Washington Depot. Here also there 
 was a great crowd and excited tumult ; the men were got 
 into cars, and the train put into motion toward "Washington 
 under much difficulty ; but no bloodshed occurred till at the 
 last moment, when a shower of stones or a pistol-shot pro 
 voked a return volley from a window of the rear car, killing 
 a prominent citizen. The number of casualties was never 
 correctly ascertained. The soldiers lost four killed and some 
 thirty wounded ; the citizens probably two or three times as 
 many. 
 
 With the departure of the Massachusetts Sixth, the Chief 
 of Police supposed his immediate troubles at an end. But 
 not yet ; he was again notified that a new riot was beginning 
 at the Philadelphia Depot, Hurrying there, he found that 
 the regimental band had been left behind ; and worse still, 
 that a large number of cars constituting the rear end of tho 
 
88 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 train, yet contained Small s Pennsylvania Brigade, number 
 ing some thousand men, all unarmed. The former had 
 already been driven from their car and scattered ; the latter 
 were just beginning to debark, entirely ignorant of what 
 had happened. Gathering such of his policemen as were in 
 the neighborhood, Marshal Kane intervened actively and 
 with success for their temporary protection ; and a hasty 
 conference having been held with the railroad officers, tho 
 train was, by common consent, backed out of the depot and 
 speedily despatched on its return toward Philadelphia. 
 
 These events took place in the forenoon, between ten and 
 twelve o clock. As the intelligence of the riot and its blood 
 shed was diffused through the great city, it called into im 
 mediate action the worst passions of the populace. For tho 
 remainder of the day the city was virtually at the mercy of 
 the mob. By good fortune no general or widespread dam 
 age or spoliation occurred ; but many minor acts of injury 
 and law-breaking were perpetrated with impunity. Persons 
 were maltreated, newspapers were mobbed, and stores and 
 gunshops were broken into and robbed of their contents. 
 
 The secession conspirators were prompt in their endeavor 
 to turn the incident to their own advantage. Under their 
 management a mass meeting was called to meet that after 
 noon at four o clock, in Monument Square, where, at the ap 
 pointed hour, an immense concourse assembled. All tho 
 sweeping tide of popular sentiment ran against the Union 
 and the North. There was not a National flag to be seen. 
 The State flag of Maryland was displayed above the rostrum. 
 In substance, most of the speeches were secession harangues. 
 Denunciation of the soldiers, eulogies of the South, appeal 
 and protest against invasion and coercion, met stormy ap 
 plause. Governor Hicks was called to tho stand, and yield 
 ing to the toiTont of treasonable fury, made a short address 
 
BALTIMORE. 89 
 
 which chimed in with the current outburst of hostile feeling. 
 He intimated that the Union was broken, and that he was 
 ready to bow before the will of the people. He would rather 
 lose his right arm than raise it to strike a sister State. 
 
 Finding the Governor thus giving way, and the populace 
 of Baltimore rising in response to their revolutionary 
 promptings, the conspirators pushed forward their scheme 
 of insurrection with all diligence, and succeeded in placing 
 Maryland in a state of thorough revolt against the General 
 Government, which lasted nearly a week. They prevailed on 
 the Governor to call out the militia, which, under officers 
 mostly inclined to secession, put all military acts and au 
 thority directly against the Union. They induced him to 
 call a special session of the Legislature, and under the revo 
 lutionary terror of the hour, at a special election held in 
 Baltimore the following week, a farcical minority vote was 
 made to result in the choice of a city delegation to the Lower 
 House, from among the rankest disunionists. They con 
 trolled the City Council, which, under plea of public defence, 
 appropriated half a million to purchase and manufacture 
 arms and gather the material of war. From Baltimore the 
 furor spread to the country towns, where companies were 
 raised and patrols established under the instructions and 
 command of the secession militia general of Baltimore. 
 Within a few days the United States flag practically disap 
 peared from Maryland. 
 
 Their most effective act remains yet to be noticed. Near 
 midnight of the day of the riot (April 19, 1861), the Mayor 
 and police authorities made an official order (secret at the 
 time, but subsequently avowed) to burn the nearest bridges 
 on the railroads leading into Baltimore from the Free States, 
 and immediately sent out different parties (the Chief of 
 Police himself leading one of them), to execute the order. 
 
90 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 Before daylight next morning, the bridges at Melvale, Relay 
 House, and Cockeysville, on the Harrisburg road, and over 
 the Bush and Gunpowder Eivers and Hams Creek on the 
 Philadelphia road, were accordingly destroyed by fire, com 
 pletely severing railroad communication with the North. 
 The excuse was that they feared reprisal and revenge from 
 the Northern armies ; the real motive appears to have been 
 the stronger underlying spirit of insurrection. Mayor 
 Brown claimed that Governor Hicks approved the order ; 
 the Governor soon afterward publicly and officially denied it. 
 Whether Mayor Brown was a secession conspirator seems 
 doubtful ; but it is hard to resist the inference that the revo 
 lutionists influenced his action. The controlling animus of 
 the deed is clearly enough revealed in a telegram sent out 
 that night by Marshal Kano : 
 
 " Thank you for your offer; bring your men in by the first 
 train and we will arrange with the railroad afterward. 
 Streets red with Maryland blood. Send expresses over tho 
 mountains and valleys of Maryland and Virginia for the rifle 
 men to come without delay. Fresh hordes will be down on 
 us to-morrow (the 20th). We will fight them and whip them, 
 or die." This language at night, from the man who that 
 morning had risked his life to protect the Massachusetts sol 
 diers, sufficiently shows the overmastering outbreak of revo 
 lutionary madness. 
 
CHAPTER VIIL 
 
 WASHINGTON. 
 
 IN celebrating the attack and tlio fall of Sumter at Mont 
 gomery by a congratulatory speech and an official salute, 
 the rebel Secretary of War ventured to predict that the Con 
 federate flag would float over the capitol at Washington 
 before the first of May. Whether this was to be accom 
 plished by plot, by open military campaign, or through 
 mere insurrectionary reversion, he did not explain. Tho 
 idea, however, by long nursing and repeating, had become 
 one of the fixed hopes of the rebellion. When the news 
 of the Baltimore riot reached the South, the fulfilment of 
 the prophecy was believed to be at hand. The revolt, 
 which for a few days continually grew until it spread over 
 all Maryland, served to deepen the universal impression. 
 The Baltimore conspirators themselves were animated to 
 fresh daring by their flattering local prospects. They sent 
 at once to Richmond for a supply of arms. Governor 
 Letcher responded with alacrity to their request. Senator 
 Mason hastened to Baltimore to give them encouragement 
 and advice. Two thousand muskets were forwarded with 
 all possible despatch for their use. Twenty heavy guns 
 were also ordered to be sent them a few days later, though 
 it does not appear that the order could be fully executed. 
 Meanwhile the Virginia rebels had possessed themselves of 
 
92 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 Harper s Ferry and established a camp there, and from this 
 vantage-ground they arranged a system of confidential com 
 munication with Baltimore. Nor was Richmond alone hope 
 ful. Even Montgomery became inspired by the apparently 
 favorable opportunity. Jefferson Davis telegraphed (April 
 22d) to Governor Letcher : " Sustain Baltimore, if practica 
 ble. We reinforce you," and ordered thirteen regiments to 
 be concentrated in the "foreign country" of Virginia; and 
 with all the confidence of a positive secret understanding, 
 the rebel Secretary of War issued his requisitions upon the 
 non-seceded Border Slave States to furnish a portion of this 
 force. 
 
 In the North the bloody act of Baltimore raised the 
 already seething war excitement to a pitch bordering on 
 frenzy, and the public expressions of indignant wrath were 
 in many instances disfigured by intemperate clamor for 
 sweeping and indiscriminate vengeance upon that city. 
 These ebullitions of hot blood were, however, everywhere 
 wisely turned into increased ardor and effort to forward 
 speedy relief and ample reinforcement to the Federal capi 
 tal. The monster meeting of New York was held on the fol 
 lowing day, at which a Union Defence Committee was formed 
 from the foremost citizens of the great metropolis ; and by 
 this committee, money, ships, supplies, and marching regi 
 ments were provided and prepared to meet the threatening 
 requirements of the hour. 
 
 Troops were, however, already on the way. Brigadier- 
 General Butler, with the Eighth Massachusetts Regiment, 
 reached Philadelphia on the afternoon of the riot. The 
 famous Seventh Regiment of New York, under Colonel Lef- 
 ferts, also arrived there on the following morning. Here 
 the railroad officials gave the two commanders certain infor 
 mation of the burning of the railroad bridges and the inv 
 
WASHINGTON. 
 
 93 
 
 possibility of reaching Washington, or even Baltimore, by 
 the ordinary route, advising them, as an alternative, to pro 
 ceed by water to Annapolis, and thence march overland to 
 
 Richmon 
 
 /FT. MONROE 
 
 Norfolk 
 
 Koutes of Approach to Washington 
 
 the capital. Acting as yet under separate State authority, 
 and unable to agree, the two regiments proceeded there by 
 different routes, one descending and the other ascending 
 Chesapeake Bay, Butler arriving in Annapolis harbor before 
 
94 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION. 
 
 daylight, on Sunday morning, April 21st, and Lefferts join 
 ing him there next morning, Monday, April 22d. 
 
 On communicating with the shore, they were met by a 
 protest from Governor Hicks, warning them not to land 
 With all his stubborn and ingrained loyalty, the Governor 
 was of a timid and somewhat vacillating nature, and for the 
 moment the clamor of the Baltimore mob overawed his 
 cooler judgment. In this conflict between lawful duty and 
 popular pressure, he, too, caught at the flimsy plea of " State " 
 supremacy, and, in addition to presuming to forbid the 
 national flag on Maryland soil, wrote a letter to the Presi 
 dent, asking that the troops be ordered elsewhere, and 
 suggesting that Lord Lyons, the British Minister, be re 
 quested to mediate between the Government and the rebels, 
 a proposal which was at once answered by a dignified rebuke 
 from Mr. Seward. 
 
 The administration at Washington had not been unmind 
 ful of the dangerous condition of Maryland ; but great reli 
 ance was placed upon the discretion and loyalty of Governor 
 Hicks to avert danger. He had held several personal con 
 sultations with the President and Secretary of War; had 
 agreed to hold his people in check, and furnish four Mary 
 land regiments of picked Union men under the call ; and to 
 make his compliance easier, the authorities consented that 
 these should not be ordered South, but kept on sendee in 
 their own State, or in the District of Columbia. The Gover 
 nor was frank enough to acknowledge his failure to keep his 
 engagement. "We were arranging and organizing forces," 
 he wrote, " to protect the city and preserve order, but want 
 of organization, of arms, prevented success. They had arms, 
 they had the principal part of the organized military forces 
 with them ; and for us to have made the effort under the cir 
 cumstances, would have had the effect to aid the disorderly 
 
WASHINGTON. 95 
 
 clement. They took possession of the armories, have the arms 
 and ammunition, and I therefore think it prudent to decline 
 (for the present) responding affirmatively to the requisition 
 made by President Lincoln for four regiments of infantry." 
 
 Unfortunately the disaster at Baltimore did not come sin 
 gle-handed. At the picturesque little town of Harper s 
 Ferry, where the Potomac River flows through one of the 
 gateways in the Blue Ridge, the United States had an exten 
 sive armory, containing much valuable machinery for tho 
 manufacture of rifles and muskets, originally located there 
 because of the convenient and cheap water-power which tho 
 river affords. The town was famous as the scene of John 
 Brow r n s invasion and capture. The seizure of this place 
 with its w r orks and its supposed strategical importance was 
 an essential item in the conspiracy. A small company of 
 regulars had been guarding it since January. One of Gen 
 eral Scott s first orders was to have a volunteer regiment 
 detached to reinforce it, a precaution which could not bo 
 taken earlier because of the want of troops. With the quick 
 secession of Virginia, how T ever, the proposed help came too 
 late. Governor Letcher pushed forward his State forces to 
 menace the place with such haste, that, on the night of April 
 18th, Lieutenant Jones set fire to the establishment and 
 withdrew his sixty men through Maryland into Pennsylva 
 nia. The Rebels immediately took possession, and though 
 the fire had done much damage, the principal part of the 
 machinery was rescued by them and afterward sent to Rich 
 mond. As already mentioned, a rebel camp was immedi 
 ately established, and its force in a few days augmented to 
 two thousand four hundred men doubtless with a view to 
 join rebellious Maryland in a descent upon Washington. 
 
 Serious as was the loss of Harper s Ferry, a sacrifice of 
 infinitely greater proportions almost immediately followed. 
 
96 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 Near Norfolk, Ya., was one of the principal naval stations 
 of the Government, the Gosport Navy Yard. This, too, was 
 one of the prizes coveted by the conspirators ; its build 
 ings, supplies, machinery, dry dock, and especially a number 
 of valuable ships, constituted a money value amounting to 
 many millions ; and the importance of their possession and 
 use to either the insurgents or the Government, in a rebel 
 lion, was of course immeasurable. Beyond mere occupancy 
 by a few officers and a little handful of marines, the place 
 was without substantial protection. The Lincoln adminis 
 tration had fully realized its exposure, but for want of troops 
 could send it no early reinforcements. Such measures of 
 precaution as were possible had long since been taken. The 
 officers had been admonished to vigilance, and preparation 
 made to bring away the more valuable ships. It was Gen 
 eral Scott s design to advance troops to its support the 
 moment Fortress Monroe shou]d be secure. 
 
 Under these circumstances occurred the sudden fall of 
 Sumter, the President s proclamation, the secession of Vir 
 ginia, and the immediate movement of Governor Letcher s 
 State forces against both Harper s Ferry and Gosport. As a 
 preliminary act, he thought to absolutely prevent the escape 
 of the ships by obstructing Elizabeth River with small 
 sunken vessels. The device did not completely succeed, 
 though it greatly enhanced the danger. It is possible that 
 all might yet have been ultimately saved, but for a contin 
 gency against which foresight was impossible. The ships 
 were ready to move out ; the most valuable of them the Mer- 
 rimack had steam up and was on point of sailing, when, 
 by the treachery and false counsel of his subordinate offi 
 cers, Commandant McCauley, of the navy yard, whose loy 
 alty had hitherto not been suspected, revoked his permission 
 to let her depart. 
 
WASHINGTON. 97 
 
 The officers charged with the removal hurried to Washing 
 ton to obtain superior orders ; bub their absence and the 
 necessary delay only rendered the situation worse. When 
 they returned with a ship-of-war and a regiment, they found 
 that, through a repetition of treasonable advice, the ships had 
 been scuttled and were sinking. It was decided that neither 
 rescue nor defence was now possible ; and on the night of 
 April 20th, the officers of the relieving expedition undertook 
 to destroy the yard, property, and all the ships, except one, 
 in a great conflagration, to prevent their falling into rebel 
 hands an attempt, however, which proved only partially 
 successful. Whether or not the actual emergency justified 
 this enormous sacrifice, will perhaps always remain an open 
 question among military experts. It was as necessary for 
 the Administration to confide to the officers this discretion, 
 as similar discretion in any military enterprise. They seem 
 to have acted in good faith and upon their best judgment, 
 and their action was accepted, perhaps with regret, but with 
 full acquittal of duty conscientiously discharged. 
 
 It may well bo imagined that the authorities and inhabi 
 tants of the national capital watched the development of re 
 bellion in the neighboring States of Virginia and Maryland 
 with the keenest anxiety. Washington, in tradition, tone, 
 and aspiration, was essentially a Southern city. Slavery ex 
 isted and the local slave-trade flourished here ; in latter 
 times the maintenance of the institution in the District of 
 Columbia formed a distinct plank in Democratic platforms. 
 Southern arrogance and Southern ambition had long domi 
 nated official society. All the cant and all the sneers of the 
 ha ut ton of the capital were vented against mercenary Yan- 
 keedom, and the rustic and provincial West, which had won 
 the late presidential election. The confusion and contro 
 versy of faction exhibited during the winter session of Con- 
 L 5 
 
98 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 gress shook the faith of many a political veteran. The se 
 cession harangues of conspicuous fire-eaters were openly ap 
 plauded from the House and Senate galleries. As the social 
 lights faded one by one from, the Congressional corridors 
 and the promenades of Lafayette Park and Pennsylvania 
 Avenue, the social sympathies of Washington to a large ex 
 tent followed them into the eclipse of their "foreign" con 
 federacy. These too, notwithstanding their complaints and 
 defiance, departed with an evident reluctance and regret 
 into a country without a capital, and whose social and offi 
 cial circles were yet in embiyo. A few were so unguarded 
 as to distribute confidential nods and winks that they ex 
 pected soon to return ; while no doubt all nursed the long 
 ing hope that at no distant day they might reclaim and re- 
 enter the city as their proper and natural heritage. It was 
 this almost universal Southern feeling which found expres 
 sion in the prediction of the rebel Secretary of War, that the 
 rebel flag would float over the dome of the capitol before 
 the first of May. 
 
 There was, therefore, great doubt about the disposition 
 and loyalty of the resident population ; and the startling 
 succession of disasters to the Union cause created a pro 
 found impression. Virginia s secession on the 17th; Har 
 per s Ferry lost on the 18th; Baltimore in arms, and the 
 North effectually cut off on the 19th ; the Gosport Navy 
 Yard sacrificed on the 20th where would the tide of misfor 
 tune stop? Wavering Unionists found no great difficulty 
 in forecasting the final success of rebellion ; sanguine seces 
 sionists already in their visions saw the stars and stripes 
 banished to the north of Mason and Dixon s line. 
 
 Whatever the doubt, there was no other present resource 
 but to rely largely upon the good faith and order of W T ash- 
 ington City. The whole matter had been under the almost 
 
WASHINGTON. 99 
 
 constant investigation of General Scott and his subordinates 
 since January ; and officers of earnestness and good judg 
 ment assured him that the local militia would stand by tho 
 Government and the flag. In that assurance fifteen compa 
 nies of volunteers had, since the 9th of April, been enlisted, 
 equipped, and armed for the defence of the city. A few in 
 dividuals out of these companies refused, at the last moment, 
 to take the oath of enlistment, and were publicly disgraced ; 
 but the remainder went into the service cheerfully, and, so 
 far as is known, served their term loyally and honorably. 
 
 Chiefly, however, General Scott relied on some six com 
 panies of troops from the regular army, which he had con 
 centrated from various parts of the country in scattering 
 driblets, among them being two light batteries of exception 
 ally good discipline and drill. These, together with a small 
 force of marines to guard the marine barracks, were stationed 
 at the critical points in the city ; secret instructions were 
 issued to designated officers to hurry, in case of alarm, to 
 the charge and command of various public buildings spe 
 cially prepared to resist sudden ingress or capture, and 
 stored with ammunition and provisions against temporary 
 siege ; and pickets and patrols were sent out to watch all the 
 leading roads and bridges. 
 
 To aid these, there had arrived in the city two detach 
 ments of volunteers from other States ; the first, some three 
 or four hundred Pennsylvanians, on the evening of April 18th, 
 who were armed and equipped after their arrival ; the second, 
 the compact and courageous Massachusetts Sixth Regiment, 
 on the evening of April 19th, after having, as already de 
 tailed, fought its way through Baltimore. This regiment 
 was at once quartered in the Senate Chamber at the Capitol, 
 which, with its extemporized barricades, began to take on 
 the frowning aspect of a fort. 
 
100 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 From tlie officers and men of this regiment the President 
 and other authorities learned verbally the dangerous charac 
 ter and proportions of the Baltimore riot. This occurred on 
 Friday. Saturday brought him not only many letters and 
 telegrams setting forth the details and increasing signs of 
 disaffection, but a committee from the Baltimore authorities, 
 to verbally represent the unrestrained turbulence of the city, 
 and to urge that further bloodshed be avoided by stopping 
 the transit of troops. General Scott, to whom the request 
 was at once referred, desiring the speedy presence of volun 
 teers to defend Washington rather than to fight a battle in 
 Baltimore, suggested that they might be marched around, 
 instead of being brought through, that city. To this sugges 
 tion President Lincoln readily agreed, and the committee 
 assented to the arrangement. On the following day, Sunday, 
 however, local riot had risen to general insurrection in Mary 
 land, and the authorities of Baltimore, called to Washington 
 by the President, now put forth the request that no moro 
 troops be brought through Maryland. This demand tlio 
 President and Cabinet summarily rejected. It was agreed, 
 however, that, if no resistance were offered to their march, 
 either around Baltimore or by way of Annapolis, they would 
 not be forced through the city, and with that assurance the 
 committee departed. 
 
 Pending this discussion rumors came that a portion of the 
 Pennsylvania forces were advancing on Baltimore by way of 
 the route from Harrisburg, and the committee soon returned, 
 reporting a fresh turmoil in Baltimore, and an arming en 
 masse to resist their passage. The movement was unknown 
 to the President ; and to disabuse the Baltimoreans of any 
 possible imputation of bad faith, Lincoln ordered that the 
 detachment complained of should return to Harrisburg, and 
 come round by way of Annapolis ; also, however, giving tlio 
 
WASHINGTON. 101 
 
 committee formal notice that lie would not thereafter agaiu 
 interfere to change mere military details. This order was, 
 at the time, the occasion of much outcry against the Presi 
 dent from excited critics who totally misapprehended its 
 scope and spirit. It simply changed a dangerous, perhaps 
 impossible march, to one practicable and comparatively se 
 cure ; it did not surrender a general right, but only yielded 
 a non-essential point to gain a real military advantage for 
 Washington. 
 
 The burning of the railroad bridges east and north of Bal 
 timore had permanently interrupted communication before 
 daylight, on the morning of Saturday, April 20th ; on Sun 
 day night, April 21st, the insurrectionary authorities in the 
 same place took possession of the telegraph offices and 
 wires, and Washington went into the condition of an isolated 
 and blockaded city. Both from the Virginia and the Mary 
 land side there came exaggerated rumors of gathering hos 
 tile forces, and preparations for a coup de main against tho 
 capital ; and, though not actually or visibly threatened, the 
 city was in the very nature of things forced into the priva 
 tions and inconveniences of a siege. Military arrangements 
 and military regulations became everywhere tho rule. Tho 
 public buildings were hedged with barricades and guarded 
 by sentinels. The little steamers on* the Potomac, and the 
 stores of flour and grain in the Georgetown mills were 
 seized by the Government. Squads of cavalry dashed 
 through the streets. Business practically ceased; the life 
 and bustle of the city was hushed. Mere sojourners, and 
 even many residents, took alarm, and hurried away by pri 
 vate conveyance. The hotels, which had a week before 
 been thronged to overflowing, became deserted, or wcro 
 haunted by only a few mute and white-faced guests, who 
 looked like apparitions in contrast with their recent gayety. 
 
102 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 As the gloom increased there began to be talk of general 
 military impressment for the defence of the city. This had 
 the effect of finally exposing the loyalty or disloyalty of 
 many Washington officers, clerks, residents, and habitues 
 who had maintained a dubious silence. On Monday, April 
 22d, quite a stampede took place into Virginia and the 
 South; some hundreds of clerks from the various depart 
 ments of Government, and a considerable number of officers 
 of the army and navy, hitherto unable to decide between 
 their treasonable inclinations and the attractions of their 
 salaries, finally resigned, and cast their fortunes with the 
 Rebellion. 
 
 The routine work of the departments went on with its 
 machine-like monotony ; the cabinet members called on the 
 President and discussed chances and rumors ; General Scott 
 conferred with his subordinates, and made daily confidential 
 reports to Lincoln. The situation, however, revealed noth 
 ing certain or definite. From the windows of the Executive 
 Mansion a rebel flag could be seen flying at Alexandria. 
 One rumor asserted that a hostile detachment was being as 
 sembled near Mount Vernon ; a second, that an attack on 
 Fort Washington was imminent ; a third, that an investing 
 force was being brought down from Harper s Ferry. Per 
 contra, there came the welcome information that there were 
 ships and volunteers at Annapolis ; but it was clouded with 
 the rumor that their landing would be disputed and their 
 inarch obstructed by Baltimore roughs and Maryland militia. 
 A pioneer train reported the railroad safe to the Junction, 
 but nothing could be learned of its condition beyond ; while 
 several messengers, despatched to reach Annapolis, had re 
 turned unsuccessful. What was transpiring in the outer 
 world could only be surmised; whether danger lurked far 
 or near was a mystery incapable of present solution. Never- 
 
WASHINGTON. 10,1 
 
 tlieless, the President and Cabinet were not only calm, but 
 hopeful, under General Scott s assurance that, with his pres 
 ent force, the city and all the public buildings were entirely 
 safe against ten thousand troops not better than the District 
 volunteers. 
 
 In point of fact, after some diplomacy with the Governor 
 and Mayor, the Massachusetts Eighth and New York Seventh 
 had really landed at Annapolis on Monday afternoon, April 
 22d ; and, after still further delay in sifting threatening ru 
 mors, in a somewhat deliberate local reconnoissance, and in 
 repairing a disabled locomotive, the two regiments started 
 on their march toward Washington, on Wednesday, the 24th. 
 A year or two later this would have been considered tardy 
 movement under the requirements of urgent danger ; but, 
 considering the surprise, the anxiety, the suspicions and un 
 certainties, and the want of preparation amid which they 
 acted, there is much to excuse their caution and delay. 
 They had few rations and no transportation. Full of high, 
 patriotic zeal, they were new to the trials and privations of 
 an actual campaign, even of so mild a type. Once started, 
 however, they pushed ahead with pluck and perseverance, 
 and by daylight next morning reached Annapolis Junction 
 a distance of some twenty miles without opposition, having 
 repaired the railroad track as they advanced. At the Junc 
 tion they found a railroad train in waiting, which, two hours 
 later, landed the famous "Seventh" at the capital. Then 
 came their hour of peaceful triumph, in which they forgot 
 their hunger and thirst, their "bridge-building in the broiling 
 sun, and their foot-sore scouting through the tedious mid 
 night hours. Debarking from the cars amid the welcome- 
 shouts of an assembled throng, and forming with all the 
 ready precision of their holiday drill, they marched with ex 
 ultant music and gayly fluttering banners up Pennsylvania 
 
104 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 Avenue to the Executive Mansion, to receive the President s 
 thankful salute. With their arrival, about noon of the 25th 
 of April, all the gloom, and doubt, and feeling of danger to 
 the capital, vanished. In comparison with the unmurmuring 
 endurance that trudged through the Yazoo swamps, and the 
 iinflinching courage that faced the dreadful carnage of the 
 Wilderness, later in the war, this march of the "Seventh* 
 was the merest regimental picnic ; but it has become historic 
 because it marked a turning-point in the national destiny, 
 and signified the will of the people that the capital of the 
 Union should remain where George Washington planted it. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 ELLSWORTH. 
 
 IT has already been related in a previous chapter ho vf 
 the incidents immediately following the fall of Sumter and 
 the President s Proclamation the secession of Virginia and 
 the adhesion of other Border States had doubled the 
 strength and augmented the war preparations of the Eebel- 
 lion. Upon the Government and the people of the North 
 the experience of those eventful days was even more deci 
 sive. Whatever hope President Lincoln and his Cabinet may 
 have entertained at the beginning, that secession could be 
 controlled by the suppression of sporadic insurrections and 
 the reawakening of the slumbering or intimidated loyalty of 
 the South, necessarily faded out before the loss of Virginia, 
 North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas, and the dangerous 
 uprising in Maryland. Not alone prompt measures to save 
 the capital of the nation were imperatively dictated by the 
 sudden blockade and isolation of Washington, but wide 
 spread civil war, waged by a gigantic army and navy, must 
 become the inevitable price of maintaining the Union. For 
 this work the seventy-five thousand three-months militia 
 were clearly inadequate. It marks President Lincoln s 
 accurate diagnosis of the public danger, and his prompt 
 courage and action to avert it, that, as early as April 2Gth, 
 ten days after the first proclamation, the formation of a new 
 
106 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 army had already been resolved upon ; and the War Depart 
 ment began giving official notice that volunteers in excess of 
 the first call could only be received for three years or during 
 the war, the details of the new organizations, to consist of 
 42,034 volunteers, 22,714 regulars, and 18,000 seamen, being 
 publicly announced on May 3d. No express provision of law 
 existed for these measures, but Lincoln ordered them with 
 out hesitation, because the exigency did not admit of even 
 the short delay of awaiting the assemblage of Congress. He 
 was too true a type and representative of the people to doubt 
 one instant their sure support and approval of a step which 
 the Constitution covered with its paramount authority, and 
 its imperative personal mandate to the President of the 
 United States to "preserve, protect, and defend the Consti 
 tution of the United States." 
 
 Following the march of the Seventh Regiment, the An 
 napolis route remained permanently open to the Union 
 troops from the North. Day by day vessels arrived in An 
 napolis Harbor with volunteer regiments, with provisions 
 and supplies for their maintenance, with war material for 
 their equipment. These were transferred rapidly over the 
 repaired railroad to Washington City, and it was not long 
 before the National Capital resembled a great military camp. 
 Troops found temporary lodgment in the various public 
 buildings ; citizen recruits wrote letters home on the sen 
 ators desks, spouted buncombe for pastime from the mem 
 bers seats in the House of Representatives, spread their 
 blankets for bivouac in the ample corridors of the Patent 
 Office ; clusters of tents filled the public squares ; regimental 
 tactics, practice in platoon-firing and artillery-drill went on 
 in the surrounding fields ; inspection and dress parade be 
 came fashionable entertainments ; military bands furnished 
 unceasing open-air concerts ; the city bloomed with national 
 
ELLSWORTH. 107 
 
 flags. The presence of an army brought an influx of civil 
 ians that at once perceptibly augmented the floating popula 
 tion ; and this Yankee invasion of a sleepy Southern city 
 gave Washington a baptism of Northern life, activity, busi 
 ness, trade, and enterprise, which, for the first time after 
 half a century of sickly pining, made the metropolitan dreams 
 of its founder a substantial hope and possibility. 
 
 Under the vast enlargement of military operations to 
 which the defence and maintenance of the Government was 
 now driven by inexorable events, the utility and employment 
 of the three-months volunteers became necessarily limited 
 and confined to a few local objects. The mature experience 
 and judgment of General Scott decided that it would be 
 useless, considering their very short term of service, to 
 undertake with their help more than the garrisoning of Fort 
 Monroe, the protection of the Potomac, the defence of Wash 
 ington City, the restoration of the military routes through 
 Baltimore to the North and West, the political control of 
 Maryland, and possibly the recapture of Harper s Ferry a 
 programme forming practically one combined measure the 
 defence of the military frontier or line of the Potomac, from 
 the sea to the mountains. Larger projects must be post 
 poned for preparation ; ships must be improvised or built to 
 enforce the blockade ; a new army must be gathered to open 
 the Mississippi and restore authority in the South. 
 
 The rebels, though now seriously checked, were yet indus 
 triously working their local conspiracy in Maryland to secure 
 the final complete insurrection and adhesion of that State. 
 The Legislature, apparently under their control, had met at 
 Frederick, and was devising legislation under which to set 
 up a military dictatorship. But the Administration at Wash 
 ington allowed them no time to gather strength at home, or 
 draw any considerable supplies or help JErom Virginia. The 
 
108 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 President authorized General Scott to suspend the privilege 
 of the writ of habeas cwpus within certain limits, and em 
 powered him to arrest or disperse the Legislature in case 
 they attempted treason. Annapolis was garrisoned and 
 lightly fortified ; a military guard was pushed along the rail 
 roads toward Baltimore simultaneously from the South and 
 the "North; and, on May 13th, General Butler, by a bold, 
 though entirely unauthorized movement, entered the city in 
 the dusk of evening, while a convenient thunder-storm was 
 raging, with less than a thousand men, part of whom were 
 the now famous Massachusetts Sixth, and during the night 
 entrenched himself on Federal Hill, General Scott repri 
 manded the "hazardous" movement; nevertheless, the little 
 garrison met no further molestation or attack, and soon, 
 supported by other detachments, open resistance to the 
 Government disappeared from the entire State. Indepen 
 dent regiments of Maryland volunteers entered the Federal 
 service ; a sweeping political reaction also set in, demonstrat 
 ing that the Union sentiment was largely predominant ; be 
 tween which and the presence of Union troops the legisla 
 tive intrigue was blighted, and the persistent secession 
 minority and almost irrepressible local conspiracy were ef 
 fectually baffled, though not without constant vigilance and 
 severe discipline throughout the remainder of the year. 
 
 While the Government was thus mainly occupied in re 
 storing its authority in Maryland, the rebels were busy in 
 military organization in various parts of Virginia. Among 
 the resignations from the Federal army were two officers of 
 especial prominence Joseph E. Johnston, Quartermaster- 
 General, of the rank of Brigadier-General, and Robert E. 
 Lee, lately promoted to be Colonel of the First Cavalry. 
 Lee was an officer of great promise, and a personal favorite 
 of General Scott, who at once conceived the idea of putting 
 
ELLSWORTH. 100 
 
 him at the head of the Union army about to take the field ; 
 and, on Saturday, April 20th, an informal and unofficial ten- 
 dor of this honor appears to have been made to him by 
 Francis P. Blair, senior, as coming from President Lincoln. 
 In a letter written subsequent to the war, Lee says that he 
 declined this offer. That same evening he wrote a resigna 
 tion from Arlington, and on Monday hurried off to Bich- 
 mond, where he was appointed by Governor Letclier, and, 
 on April 23d, publicly installed to command the military 
 forces of Virginia. 
 
 Lee did not share the radical clamor of many of the Rich 
 mond conspirators for an immediate advance to capture 
 Washington. He discouraged mere reckless enthusiasm, 
 and urged a defensive policy and methodical and thorough 
 military preparation. Carrying out this policy in his orders, 
 directions were issued, and officers sent to different localities 
 to call out and organize the State militia, to drill recruits, 
 and collect materials and stores. Under his management 
 companies and regiments soon sprang up, and Virginia, like 
 the other Southern States, gradually became a general camp. 
 It was not a great while before the presence of a military 
 force at the principal points along the Potomac became evi 
 dent. Its concentration and offensive action either to close 
 the river to navigation, or, when sufficiently strong, against 
 Washington, was, of course, only a question of time. The 
 contact of hostile armies unavoidably provokes conflict. 
 
 These changing conditions of Virginia required new pre 
 cautions for the defence of Washington. As early as May 
 3d it was ascertained by the local officers and engineers that 
 the Capitol building was only three and a half miles from 
 Arlington Heights on the Virginia side of the river, the 
 Executive Mansion and various department buildings but 
 two and a half, and Georgetown within one mile. The en- 
 
110 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 emy already had a detachment quartered at Alexandria ; re 
 inforcements from the South might, in a single night, occupy 
 the heights and destroy the Virginia end of the bridges, 
 and, speedily erecting mortar batteries, could destroy the 
 city with bombs, unless they were attacked at a disadvantage 
 and dislodged. It was, therefore, decided that the Union 
 forces must occupy Arlington Heights to insure the safety 
 of the city, though the necessary troops could not as yet 
 be spared from the operations to secure Maryland; and 
 by reason of various delays, three weeks more passed away 
 before the full preparations for the enterprise were com 
 pleted. 
 
 Finally, at two o clock on the morning of May 24th, three 
 columns crossed the Potomac and entered on the "sacred 
 soil " of the Old Dominion : three regiments by the Aque 
 duct at Georgetown, four regiments by the Long Bridge 
 from Washington, and one regiment, Ellsworth s Zouaves, 
 from their camp below the city directly by steamer to 
 Alexandria, the war steamer Pawnee being anchored oil 
 shore to protect the landing. The movement met no oppo 
 sition ; no considerable rebel force was stationed at tho 
 bridges, and the detachment at Alexandria, excepting a small 
 troop of cavalry, which was captured, evacuated that place 
 on receiving a notice, sent without authority by the com 
 mander of the Pawnee, to surrender or retire. 
 
 It had been a beautiful moonlight night ; all the regi 
 ments were filled with an eager enthusiasm for the march ; 
 the preparations were careful, the officers to supervise it 
 intelligent and competent, the movements promptly begun 
 and successfully completed. The whole enterprise seemed 
 on the very point of conclusion without an accident, when 
 sudden news of the assassination of Colonel Ellsworth not 
 only saddened the camps on both sides of the Potomac, but 
 
ELLSWORTH. HI 
 
 cast a new gloom, and spread a feeling of bitter vindictive* 
 ness throughout every loyal State. 
 
 Colonel Ellsworth was a young man of twenty -four, who, 
 by the possession of a phenomenal combination of genius, 
 energy, and self-confidence, had won the attention and ad 
 miration of the whole country. But a few years ago, foiled 
 by misfortune in an attempt to begin professional life in 
 Chicago, he had suddenly found himself without money or 
 friends almost without bread. By the endurance of ex 
 treme privations, the pittance which he managed to earn 
 with some temporary writing kept off starvation. His ener 
 getic nature made active occupation a necessity ; and per 
 haps as much to consume the evening hours, as with any 
 other fixed purpose, he became interested in studying and 
 teaching others the manual of military drill. This led to the 
 formation of a little volunteer company of about sixty Chi 
 cago youths clerks and business employees under his com 
 mand. Into their instruction he threw such a degree of 
 enthusiasm, such originality in remodelling and adapting old 
 methods, such a grasp of purpose, and such a genius of con 
 trol, that, after about a year s training, he not only carried 
 off the prizes for drill at the fairs and exhibitions in the 
 neighboring counties, but confidently formed the bold pro 
 ject of showing to the public of the great cities that he had 
 the best-drilled company in America. 
 
 They had no money, no commissariat, no transportation, 
 but a friendly railroad gave them free tickets from Chicago 
 to Detroit ; from there the proceeds of an exhibition drill 
 carried them to the next city, and so on. At every step of 
 their progress, their actual dexterity in the manual of arms 
 carried admiration and applause by storm. Arrived at New 
 York, they achieved a double triumph ; first before the uni 
 formed city militia in the open field, and afterward at night 
 
112 TPIE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 on the stage of the Academy of Music, before as fashionable 
 an audience as ever packed the walls or split their kid gloves 
 to encore the most famous prima donna. For three days the 
 metropolitan newspapers were full of descriptions of their 
 performance and their personal appearance and history 
 above all, of their youthful commander, Ellsworth, the visible 
 creator, embodiment, and inspiration of their admirable 
 accomplishment. Determined to leave no test unchallenged, 
 they wenb even to show their proficiency to the military 
 school at West Point, where the only criticism that could be 
 passed upon them was that they did not follow the "regu 
 lar " drill of the text-books. When they finally returned to 
 Chicago, after a full tour, in which they had reaped uninter 
 rupted encouragement and acclaim, the name and fame of 
 Ellsworth and his " Chicago Zouaves " were a part of the 
 just interest and pride of the whole country. 
 
 Nevertheless, no one appreciated better than Ellsworth 
 himself that this was but a possible beginning of better 
 things. He had no ambition to remain either a mere drill- 
 master or a raree showman, though his necessities had com 
 pelled him to make a somewhat spectacular beginning. 
 There is not room here to trace his higher purposes and 
 ideals of a general militia reform ; it is sufficient to say that 
 for the brain of a boy of twenty-four they were serious and 
 comprehensive. There was then no thought of war; and 
 when Lincoln became President, Ellsworth sought his favor 
 and w r as readily permitted to accompany him to Washington 
 as one of his suite. The inauguration over, the President 
 made him a second lieutenant of dragoons. Then came 
 Sumter and the call for volunteers, and Ellsworth saw his 
 opportunity. Hastening to the city of New York, he called 
 together and harangued the fire companies of the metropo 
 lis; in three days he had twenty-two hundred names in- 
 
ELLSWORTH. H3 
 
 scribed on his recruiting lists; out of these he carefully 
 selected a regiment of eleven hundred men, who chose him 
 their colonel, and, bearing half a dozen beautiful presenta 
 tion flags, one of them publicly donated by Mrs. Astor, 
 followed him to Washington, where they were mustered into 
 the service among the earliest three years volunteers. 
 
 It was at the head of this regiment that Colonel Ellsworth 
 entered Alexandria at daylight of May 24th. The rebels 
 received notice of his coming, and most of them retired with 
 sufficient promptness to escape capture. Having seen the 
 town securely occupied and pickets posted to prevent sur 
 prise, Colonel Ellsworth remembered the rebel flag which 
 had been for weeks flaunting an insulting defiance to the 
 national capital. It was hoisted over the Marshall House, 
 the principal hotel of Alexandria, and the Colonel was seized 
 with the whim to take it down with his own hands a foolish 
 fancy, perhaps, when considered in cool judgment, but one 
 very natural to the heated enthusiasm of those early days of 
 burning patriotic ardor. " Whose flag is that flying over 
 this house?" demanded he, as he entered and ascended the 
 stairs. "I don t know," was the only response he could ob 
 tain ; but the demon of a hellish purpose lurked under the 
 answer. He mounted to the roof with one or two compan 
 ions, cut the halyards, and started down with the treasonable 
 emblem on his arm. The stairs were narrow and winding 
 they could descend only in single file a soldier preceded 
 and followed him. As he reached the third step above the 
 landing on the second iloor, a side door flew open, and the 
 owner of the house, a man named Jackson, who had been 
 lurking there in concealment like a tiger for his prey, sprang 
 out, and levelling a double-barrelled shotgun, discharged it 
 full in the Colonel s breast the fatal charge driving almost 
 into his very heart a gold presentation badge inscribed "Non 
 8 
 
114 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 nobis sed pro patria. " Ellsworth fell forward in death with 
 out even a groan ; but the murder did not go unavenged, for 
 in that same instant his assassin also expired by the double 
 effect of a musket-charge and a bayonet-thrust from Ells 
 worth s foremost companion. 
 
 If there remained a possibility of a sensational climax of 
 deeper import than Sumter and Baltimore, it was furnished 
 by this hideous tragedy at Alexandria. The North had sup 
 posed that the first exhausted the cold-blooded recklessness 
 of conspiracy. The second manifested the sudden fury of 
 sectional excitement. But this last opened an unlooked-for 
 depth of individual hatred, into which the political animosi 
 ties of years between the North and South had finally 
 ripened after four months of uninterrupted manipulation by 
 the conspiracy. Under this unwelcome revelation there was 
 no longer room to doubt the existence of widely pervading 
 elements of an enduring civil war. Ellsworth was buried 
 with imposing honors, from the famous East Room of the 
 Executive Mansion, the President, Cabinet, and high officers 
 of Government attending as mourners ; and as the telegraph 
 filled the newspapers with details of the sad event, every 
 household in the North felt as if the dark shadow of a 
 funeral had lowered over its own hearthstone. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 MISSOURI. 
 
 CONSPIRACY had been working with untiring persistence in 
 every Slave State since, and even before, the formal seces 
 sion of the Cotton States in January, and had everywhere 
 made considerable advances, notably in the State of Mis 
 souri. Governor Jackson, of that State, had leagued himself 
 with the secession plot, though still concealing his purpose 
 with outward professions of loyalty. Many subordinate of 
 ficers and members of the Legislature were secretly aiding 
 him. Together they were leading Missouri through the 
 usual and well-established paths to ultimate treason, by 
 means of official recommendations from the Governor and 
 various shrewdly devised laws passed by the Legislature. 
 They made a serious miscalculation, however, in the stereo 
 typed and hitherto always successful expedient of a State 
 Convention. When that body was elected and met (Febru 
 ary 28th), it showed such an overwhelming majority of Union 
 members, that the plotters of treason were quite willing to 
 hide their defeat in joining certain pointed declarations by 
 the convention against secession, and adjourning its sittings 
 to the following December, trusting their chances to a more 
 pliant and treasonable legislature ; hoping to bring about 
 a policy of arming the State under pretence of local de 
 fence, and committing it to a neutral attitude under plea of 
 
116 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 local security. In all their efforts, however, they met the 
 constant and determined watchfulness and opposition of 
 zealous and fearless Unionists, among whom Frank P. Blair, 
 junior, was a conspicuous leader. 
 
 It so happened, also, that in this State a small detachment 
 of the regular army was, for the first time, rendered useful 
 in thwarting the local development of disunion. At the 
 city of St. Louis was an arsenal belonging to the United 
 States, containing a considerable quantity of arms and am 
 munition. To obtain these was from the beginning, as in 
 other States, a prime object of Governor Jackson and hia 
 co-conspirators. They had in January, as they believed, 
 j>erfected an intrigue for the surrender of the arsenal, by 
 the officer in charge, into their hands and control. That 
 arrangement was soon blighted by the arrival of reinforce 
 ments ordered there by General Scott to protect the place, 
 under command of an officer afterward famous Captain 
 Nathaniel Lyon, of the Second United States Infantry. 
 
 Lyon was a man of outspoken anti-slavery principles, of 
 unswerving loyalty to his flag, and of unsleeping vigilance 
 over his post and the Government interests. By the middle 
 of February enough recruits had been added by General 
 Scott to his own company of eighty trained regulars to raise 
 his force to four hundred and eighty-eight men. 
 
 Holding the same political convictions and patriotic im 
 pulses, Lyon and Blair became quickly united in an inti 
 mate personal friendship ; and very soon, also, Lyon s regu 
 lars and Blair s " Home Guards " sustained each other in a 
 mutual reliance and protection. Their common watchful 
 ness over the arsenal was by no means wasted. Governor 
 Jackson was determined to establish by force what he had 
 failed to accomplish by intrigue. He sent two trusty agents 
 to the Rebel President to solicit help in arms and arnmum- 
 
MISSOURI. 117 
 
 tion. "After learning," wrote Jefferson Davis, in reply, 
 April 23d, " as well as I could from the gentlemen accred 
 ited to me, what was most needful for the attack on the ar 
 senal, I have directed that Captains Green and Duke should 
 be furnished with two twelve-pounder howitzers and two 
 thirty-two-pounder guns, with the proper ammunition for 
 each. These, from the commanding hills, will be effective, 
 both against the garrison, and to breach the enclosing walls 
 of the place." 
 
 Encouraged by this co-operation, the Governor, as his 
 next step, instructed one of his militia generals, D. M. 
 Frost, a West Point graduate, to assemble the available or 
 ganized and equipped volunteer companies of the State in 
 a camp of instruction at St. Louis. The Governor had also 
 convened his Rebel Legislature to meet in extra session on 
 May 2d. The day following, May 3d, began the assembling 
 of the militia in "Camp Jackson," so named in honor of tlio 
 Governor. Two regiments and part of a third soon arrived ; 
 and though some of the companies were either without po 
 litical bias, or of Union sentiment, a general spirit of seces 
 sion pervaded the camp, and its avenues were christened 
 " Davis " and " Beauregard." The object of the organiza 
 tion soon became unmistakably known to Lyon, Blair, and 
 the Union Safety Committee, who, by the aid of skilful de 
 tectives, gained information of all its movements. On the 
 night of May 8th, the cannon, ammunition, and some mus 
 kets furnished by Jefferson Davis, were landed from a New 
 Orleans steamer, in boxes marked "marble," and immedi 
 ately loaded upon drays and hauled out to the camp. 
 
 Under this threatening disclosure, the Unionists felt they 
 could no longer dally with the conspiracy. Already three 
 weeks before, the United States Arsenal at Liberty, Mo., 
 had been robbed of its arms by the disuuionists, and Jeff. 
 
118 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 Thompson was known to be actively drilling rebel com 
 panies at St. Joseph. They could not afford to allow a con 
 centration of these and other treasonable forces. In the 
 meanwhile the Washington authorities, receiving Governor 
 Jackson s insulting refusal to furnish troops, had ordered 
 the enlistment of Blair s " Home Guards " into the United 
 States service, to the number of four regiments, which order 
 was soon increased to ten thousand men. 
 
 With this force Lyon felt himself strong enough to crush 
 the budding insurrection. On the morning of May 9th he 
 disguised himself in female garb, and, seating himself be 
 side a friend in a barouche, was driven out into Camp Jack 
 son, personally and leisurely inspecting its strength, situa 
 tion, and military approaches. The next day the arsenal 
 and the various volunteer armories were alive with military 
 preparation, and, at two o clock in the afternoon, Lyon, at 
 the head of his battalion of regulars, with six pieces of ar 
 tillery and six regiments from the lately organized Missouri 
 Volunteers and Keserve Corps (as they were respectively 
 called), marched rapidly through various streets of St. Louis, 
 in two columns, concentrating at Camp Jackson. Before 
 General Frost was well awsfre of the coming event, these 
 regiments had surrounded his camp and posted the batteries 
 on commanding elevations. The camp thus invested, with 
 batteries and arms ready for instant action, Lyon sent Frost 
 a note, stating that his command was regarded as hostile to 
 the United States, and demanding an immediate surrender, 
 " with no other conditions than that all persons surrendering 
 under this demand shall be humanely and kindly treated," 
 and allowing half an hour s time for compliance. The cir 
 cumstances left Frost no alternative, and before the expira 
 tion of the half-hour he gave notice of his unconditional 
 surrender. 
 
MISSOURI. 119 
 
 So far everything had gone as harmlessly as if the affair 
 were merely a gala parade ; but now a most deplorable oc 
 currence succeeded. The march, the halt, and the capture 
 greatly excited a vast crowd which the occasion drew to 
 gether; and scarcely had .the homeward march with tho 
 prisoners begun, when the troops were assailed by secession 
 rowdies with abusive language, stones, missiles, and finally a 
 pistol shot or two. This last provoked a return volley with 
 out orders from one or two companies, by w T hich, and tho 
 desultory shots succeeding, fifteen to twenty innocent by 
 standers and several soldiers were instantly killed. The 
 untoward incident caused a dangerous ferment in the city, 
 but the courageous efforts of the police prevented a general 
 riot. 
 
 The telegraphic news of the capture of Camp Jackson 
 threw the Governor s revolutionary cabal and disloyal legis 
 lature sitting at Jefferson City into the utmost consternation. 
 The Governor immediately sent out and caused a bridge on 
 the railroad from St. Louis to be burned, to prevent any 
 sudden descent by Lyon upon the capital ; and during the 
 afternoon and night, the Legislature in secret session rushed 
 through several acts specially designed to promote rebellion, 
 which they had before been concocting with more circum 
 spection. A few days later, a military bill, virtually making 
 the Governor an irresponsible military dictator, was formally 
 passed ; and having thus, as the conspirators thought, made 
 all necessary legal preparations, the session was finally ad 
 journed on May 15th. 
 
 General Harney, the ranking officer in the Department of 
 the West, who had been temporarily called away, returned 
 to St. Louis the day after tho Camp Jackson affair, thus super 
 seding Lyon in command. It must be explained that events, 
 and particularly antecedent conditions, had most unfortu- 
 
120 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 nately divided the Missouri Unionists into two bitterly an 
 tagonistic factions, which, indeed, continued throughout the 
 whole four years war. The Eadicals, embracing the large 
 German population of St. Louis, and who formed the bulk 
 of the Home Guard, were mainly of democratic antecedents, 
 and strong anti-slavery sentiment ; these followed the leader 
 ship of Blair and Lyon. The Conservatives, more generally 
 of American nativity, belonging rather to the wealthy and 
 the business classes of the city, largely of Whig antecedents 
 and strongly tinged with the " Know-Nothing " prejudices of 
 former years, and holding very tolerant if not actually 
 favorable sentiments toward slavery, grouped themselves 
 about General Harney. The Kadicals believed in defending 
 the Government with steel and lead; the Conservatives 
 trusted to reclaim their erring brethren with forbearance and 
 moral suasion. Cold after-criticism finds both factions 
 chargeable with extremes of feeling and speech ; but if the 
 former were prone to excessive zeal, the latter were yet more 
 culpable in a stupid over-caution. Such deep local antago 
 nisms, however, of nationality, class, and life-long political 
 prejudice, can hardly be expected to act with moderation in 
 the blinding atmosphere of revolution. 
 
 Harney was a loyal and courageous soldier, but lacked the 
 quick, instinctive judgment of the statesman. Beset by noisy 
 clamor on both sides, he vibrated to acts of conflicting 
 rather than consistent administration. His first impulse was 
 to order the disbandment of the Home Guards. Convinced 
 that this was beyond his power, he soon after (May 14th) 
 issued his proclamation justifying the capture of Camp 
 Jackson, denouncing the Military Bill as an indirect seces 
 sion ordinance, and declaring that " Missouri must share the 
 destiny of the Union." He also announced his determina 
 tion to uphold the Government of the United States " at all 
 
MISSOURI. 121 
 
 times and under all circumstances ; " but his measures to 
 cany out this loyal policy were not chosen with wisdom. 
 
 Governor Jackson had at once proceeded to organize the 
 militia of Missouri under his dictatorial military bill ; and 
 Frost s military laurels having withered at Camp Jackson, 
 the Governor made ex-Governor Sterling Price his general- 
 in-chief. Price was less scrupulous in political strategy 
 than Harney, and within a week he had entrapped the un 
 wary Union commander into an agreement which tied up 
 the Government forces in a role of mere idle lookers-on, 
 while Governor Jackson s Missouri militia should without 
 hinderance place the State in active insurrection. 
 
 " General Price," so ran the agreement, signed on May 
 21st, " having by commission full authority over the militia 
 of the State of Missouri, undertakes, with the sanction of 
 the Governor of the State, already declared, to direct tho 
 whole power of the State officers to maintain order within 
 the State among the people thereof ; and General Harney 
 publicly declares that, this object being thus assured, ho 
 can have no occasion, as he has no wish, to make military 
 movements which might otherwise create excitements and 
 jealousies, which he most earnestly desires to avoid." 
 
 This was to be done " in subordination to the laws of tho 
 General and State Governments ; " but it gave the conspira 
 tors the right of initiative, and left them for a season the un 
 controlled, and even unobserved masters of tho whole State 
 outside of St. Louis. Governor Jackson and General Price 
 made such prompt use of their time, that before the end of 
 the month reports of outrageous indignities upon Union 
 men came from all parts of the State, and finally the threat 
 ening rumor that a rebel invasion from the Arkansas border 
 was being encouraged and rapidly formed ; and as fast as 
 
 Haraey brought the facts to the notice of Price, that dis- 
 I. 6 
 
122 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 sembling conspirator waved them aside with an unvarying 
 denial. 
 
 This state of affairs was terminated on May 30th. Mis 
 souri matters had been watched with intense and daily solici 
 tude at AYashington. Each of the Union factions of that 
 State had a spokesman in the Cabinet, Postmaster-General 
 Blair favoring Lyon and his friends, Attorney-General 
 Bates those of Harney ; and the President therefore heard 
 the complaints and justifications of both sides. Acting thus 
 on full information, Lincoln, on May 18th, entrusted Frank 
 P. Blair, junior, with a confidential discretionary order to 
 relieve Harney whenever he might deem it necessary. On 
 May 30th, amid the thickening perils from the conspiracy, 
 Blair felt himself justified in acting upon this discretion; 
 Harney was relieved, and Lyon once more placed in com 
 mand under a newly issued commission as brigadier-general 
 of volunteers, a position to which the first four Missouri 
 regiments had unanimously chosen him. 
 
 "With Lyon once more in power, the conspirators felt that 
 the crisis of their intrigues had come. Governor Jackson 
 and General Price therefore solicited an interview with the 
 new commander, which being granted, and a safeguard be 
 ing furnished them, they visited St. Louis on June llth, and 
 were met by Lyon and Blair, in a conference of several hours 
 duration. As might have been expected, their views and 
 objects were utterly at variance. The Governor proposed to 
 neutralize Missouri by excluding United States troops and 
 disbanding the Home Guards ; Lyon, on the contrary, insist 
 ed that the Governor should disband his Missouri militia, and 
 give the Government forces full liberty of movement and con 
 trol throughout the State. Separating upon these irrecon 
 cilable propositions, Governor Jackson and General Price 
 hastened back to Jefferson City that same night, burning tha 
 
MISSOURI. 123 
 
 railroad bridges behind, them to prevent pursuit ; and on the 
 following day, Juno Il2th, the Governor issued a revolution 
 ary proclamation, calling fifty thousand militia into active 
 sendee to " repel invasion." 
 
 Lyon evidently expected little else from the rebellions 
 Governor, for he seems to have been ready with plans and 
 preparations to act against the open insurrection that func 
 tionary so defiantly proclaimed. The Missouri Eiver fur 
 nished a convenient military highway to the capital of the 
 State ; and by the afternoon of June 13th, Lyon had an ex 
 pedition of three swift river steamer.-,, containing a company 
 of his regulars and several battalions of volunteers, in mo 
 tion. They arrived before Jefferson City on the 15th of 
 June, landed without opposition, occupied the town, and 
 once more raised the Union flag over the State House. 
 Governor Jackson and his Secretary of State precipitately 
 fled, carrying with them only the great seal of the State, to 
 use in certifying their future publications under the pre 
 tended authority of Missouri. 
 
 Learning at Jefferson City that the Governor and General 
 Price were gathering a force and preparing to make a stand 
 at Boonville, a town fifty miles farther up the Missouri 
 Eiver, Lyon, on June 16th, the day following his arrival, 
 leaving but a small guard at the capital, again hurriedly 
 embarked his men, numbering about two thousand, and 
 pushed energetically ahead, determined to leave the enemy 
 no time to recruit an army. The steamers passed over the 
 intervening distance during the night, and early next morn 
 ing (June 17th) Lyon made an unopposed landing four miles 
 below Boonville. The Governor s rallying call had indeed 
 already been responded to by several thousand Missourians, 
 being, however, almost totally without organization, and 
 very poorly armed. Half-way from his landing-place to the 
 
124 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 town Lyon found a rebel line strongly posted ; a spirited 
 fusillade quickly ensued, and for about twenty minutes the 
 Union advance, composed of perhaps five hundred men. was 
 held in check. The enemy could, however, not long with 
 stand the fire of a regular Lattery which was brought up, 
 and which, with the well-delivered volleys of the better- 
 drilled Union volunteers, soon routed them in a general 
 panic and flight. General Price early retired from Boon- 
 ville on plea of illness ; while Governor Jackson, who viewed 
 the battle from a convenient hill some two miles off, seeing 
 the disastrous result, once more betook himself to flight. 
 Two on the Union, and fifteen on the rebel side, were re 
 ported killed, with the usual corresponding number of 
 wounded. Twenty prisoners, two six-pounder guns, two se 
 cession flags, and the various supplies of the rebel camp, 
 furnished the Union force substantial trophies of victory. 
 Moving cautiously forward, Lyon occupied the town of Boon- 
 ville, and issued a quieting proclamation to its terror-stricken 
 inhabitants, while the immature and boyish prisoners he had 
 captured were released on parole. This battle of Boonvillo 
 ends the administration of Governor Jackson he had long 
 before forfeited his honor and authority by covert treason ; 
 from henceforth his role is not only that of an open traitor, 
 but also of a mere fugitive pretender. 
 
 The insurrection and flight of the State officers left Mis 
 souri without local government. It happened, fortunately, 
 that the State Convention, when in March it took a recess to 
 the following December, empowered a select committee to 
 call it together at any time upon a pressing emergency. 
 The emergency having thus come, the committee issued its 
 call ; and the convention, minus some of its disloyal mem 
 bers, but yet having a full constitutional quorum, met once 
 more in Jefferson City, on the 22d of July. It proceeded bj 
 
MISSOURI 125 
 
 ordinance to declare the State offices vacant, to abrogate the 
 Military Bill and other treasonable legislation, and provide 
 for new elections ; and finally, on the 31st of July, it elected 
 and inaugurated a provisional government, which thereafter 
 made the city of St. Louis its official headquarters. Hamil 
 ton E. Gamble, a Conservative, was made Governor ; he an 
 nounced his unconditional adherence to the Union, and his 
 authority was duly recognized by all those portions of the 
 State which were not under military control of the rebels 
 during the fluctuating fortunes of the local guerilla warfare 
 by which Missouri was so long tormented and desolated. 
 
CHAPTER XL 
 
 KENTUCKY. 
 
 THE Alleghany or Appalachian mountain chain, a hundred 
 miles broad and a thousand miles long, extending from New 
 York to Alabama, naturally separated the country into two 
 principal military divisions : that of the East, comprising 
 the Atlantic Coast and the Atlantic States ; that of the West, 
 comprising the Mississippi River and its tributaries, and the 
 whole immense territory of the Mississippi Valley. In the 
 East, the line of hostility quickly established itself along 
 the Potomac River, with Washington as its strategical cen 
 tre ; this grew partly out of the paramount necessity of de 
 fending the capital, but also largely from the fact that the 
 line from the sea to the mountains was not more than a hun 
 dred miles long, and could therefore be occupied and ob 
 served without delay. In the West the distance from the 
 mountains to the Mississippi River was nearly ten times as 
 great. This alone w r ould have retarded the definition of the 
 military frontier ; but the chief element of uncertainty and 
 delay was furnished by the peculiar political condition of 
 the State of Kentucky, which of itself extends the whole 
 distance from Virginia to Missouri. 
 
 It cannot perhaps be affirmed with certainty that Governor 
 Magoffin of Kentucky was a secession conspirator ; but his 
 own language leaves no doubt that in opinion and expecta- 
 
KENTUCKY. 1 07 
 
 tion lie was a disunionist. lie had remonstrate tl against tlio 
 rash and separate movements of South Carolina and tho 
 Cotton States; but since their movement was made, ho 
 looked upon it as final and irrevocable, and committed him 
 self unqualifiedly against coercing them back to obedience. 
 More than this, he argued that Kentucky was no longer 
 safe in the Union, and declared she "will not and ought 
 not to submit to the principles and policy avowed by tho 
 Republican party, but will resist, and resist to the death, if 
 necessary." 
 
 In this view, he recommended to the Legislature, which 
 met in January under his call, the project of a " Sover 
 eignty" State Convention, appropriations to purchase arms, 
 and the immediate and active organization of the militia. 
 None of these suggestions were, however, adopted by the 
 Legislature, which contented itself for the present by pro 
 testing against coercion as unwise and inexpedient, and rec 
 ommending a call for a national convention. "While Ken 
 tucky sentiment was deeply pro-slavery, and business and 
 commerce bound her strongly to the South, the patriotic 
 example and teachings of Henry Clay had impressed upon 
 her people a love and reverence for the Union higher and 
 purer than any mere passing interest or selfish advantage. 
 
 Nevertheless, as rebellion progressed, the State became 
 seriously agitated and divided. When Sumter fell and the 
 President issued his call for troops, Governor Magoffin in 
 sultingly refused compliance. This action in turn greatly 
 excited the people of the three Border Free States of Ohio, 
 Indiana, and Illinois, who thus beheld a not remote pros 
 pect of having civil war brought to their own doors. They 
 therefore looked immediately to the protection and control 
 of the Ohio River. Their enthusiastic response to the Presi 
 dent s call had filled their capitals with volunteers, which 
 
128 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION, 
 
 were being armed and equipped by the Government. Ohio 
 hurried off her earliest levies to Cincinnati ; those of Indi 
 ana were sent to her several exposed river towns. At the 
 extreme southern point of Illinois was the city of Cairo, 
 small in population and commerce, but in a military point 
 of view the commanding centre and key of the whole west 
 ern river system. Its value was comprehended both east 
 and west. No sooner had the Border Slave State Governors 
 forwarded their disloyal refusals, than Secretary Cameron 
 (April 19th), by telegraph requested the Governor of Illinois 
 to send a brigade of four regiments to occupy it. There 
 was not yet that total of militia in the whole State; but 
 within forty-eight hours an improvised expedition, number 
 ing five hundred and ninety-five men and four six-pounders, 
 started from Chicago to carry out the Secretary s orders, 
 arriving at Cairo on the morning of April 23d, where they 
 were speedily reinforced to the required numbers. 
 
 Under the Sumter bombardment, the President s call, and 
 Magoffin s refusal, Kentucky was, for the moment, simply 
 in a hopeless bewilderment, irresolution, and conflict of 
 opinion. A strong minority, arrogating to itself much more- 
 than its numerical importance through noise and self-asser 
 tion, labored with zeal and energy for secession, but could 
 make no substantial progress against the overwhelming un 
 dercurrent of Union sentiment ; and these opposing factions, 
 with the ultimate hope of influencing and gaining the waver 
 ing or undecided, joined somewhat unavoidably in an en 
 deavor to commit the State to an attitude of strict neutrality. 
 
 Governor Magoffin and his personal adherents were ready 
 to lend their official influence to carry the State into rebel 
 lion. The Governor sent an agent to the Governors of 
 Arkansas and Louisiana to solicit arms ; and by way of 
 justifying the act, he made a similar application to tha 
 
KENTUCKY. 129 
 
 Governors of Indiana and of Missouri. No substantial suc 
 cess, however, attended these efforts ; and the Governor s 
 application to the banks for money also resulted, in the 
 main, in a discouraging refusal, largely due to the domi 
 nating Union sentiment, which suspected him of treasonable 
 designs. A second endeavor to influence the Legislature 
 remained equally ban-en. That body, which had only ad 
 journed on the 5th of April, was by proclamation once more 
 called to meet in a second special session, beginning May 
 2d. The Governor s message, reciting the startling events 
 which had occurred, stigmatized the President s defence of 
 the Government as " extraordinary usurpations," the enthusi 
 astic patriotism of the loyal States as the frenzy of fanati 
 cism," and asserted with dogmatic stubbornness that " the 
 late American Union is dissolved ; " recommending, as be 
 fore, a State convention, military appropriations, and organ 
 ization of the militia. He also sent a messenger to ask the 
 Governors of Ohio and Indiana to join him "in an effort to 
 bring about a truce between the General Government and 
 the seceded States;" to which Governor Morton worthily 
 responded, "I do not recognize the right of any State to 
 act as mediator between the Federal Government and a re 
 bellious State." 
 
 The Unionists had a controlling majority in the Legisla 
 ture, and, considering the deep agitation and serious divi 
 sions in Kentucky, used their power with great moderation 
 and tact, doing as much both to aid the Government and to 
 embarrass the conspirators as was perhaps practicable under 
 the circumstances. To still the prevailing neutrality clamor, 
 the House of Representatives, on May IGth, passed resolu 
 tions declaring that Kentucky " should, during the contest, 
 occupy the position of strict neutrality," and also approving 
 Governor Magoffin s refusal to furnish troops. In substan- 
 9 
 
130 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 tial legislation, however, the Governor received little aid or 
 comfort. His most active lieutenant in contemplated trea 
 son was Simon B. Buckner, who about a year before had 
 succeeded in obtaining the passage of a rather energetic mili 
 tia law, under which the Governor appointed him Inspector- 
 General and ranking commander in the State. It was his 
 and the Governor s project to put into the field and manip 
 ulate the "State Guard" which this law authorized, so as to 
 precipitate Kentucky into rebellion. 
 
 The Legislature, ignoring the Governor s request for a 
 State Convention, addressed itself mainly to the task of 
 turning the influence and support of the militia system from 
 secession to union. A bill was framed and became a law 
 May 24th, authorizing a loan of one million to purchaso 
 arms and munitions, but associating a, controlling Union 
 Board of Commissioners with the Governor to regulate its 
 disbursement and the distribution of arms ; authorizing 
 the formation of Home Guards for local defence ; and while 
 it provided that the arms and munitions should not be used 
 against the United States, nor against the Confederate 
 States, unless to protect Kentucky against invasion it re 
 quired that both officers and men of the Home Guards and 
 State Guards should alike swear to support the Constitution 
 of the United States and of Kentucky the former law hav 
 ing required such an oath from the officers alone. 
 
 While Kentucky was thus settling clown into an attitude 
 of official neutrality, active popular undercurrents were busy 
 in contrary directions. The more ardent secession leaders 
 who raised companies to serve in the field, despairing of ob 
 taining commissions, arms, and active duty from Governor 
 Magoffin, quietly departed to obtain enlistment in the 
 various rebel camps of the South. On the other hand, there 
 were many unconditional Unionists in Kentucky who 
 
KENTUCKY. 131 
 
 openly scouted the policy of neutrality, and who from the 
 first were eager that the Government should begin enlist 
 ments and gather an armed force to support the Union sen 
 timent in the State. Colonels Outline and Woodruff opened 
 a recruiting office on the Ohio side of the river, and as early 
 as May 6th mustered two regiments into service, nominally 
 as the First and Second Kentucky Volunteers, though in 
 reality the men were principally from Ohio and Indiana. 
 
 Notwithstanding the contumacious refusals of the Gover 
 nors of the Border Slave States, President Lincoln was not 
 disposed to give up those States as lost. "We have seen that, 
 both in Maryland and Missouri, he authorized direct enlist 
 ments under the supervision of United States officers. Lead 
 ing men having informed him of the actual state of Ken 
 tucky sentiment, he, on May 7th, specially commissioned 
 Major Anderson, of Fort Suniter fame, to proceed to Cincin 
 nati and muster into service all loyal volunteers who might 
 offer themselves from Kentucky and West Virginia. Nor 
 was he content with such merely negative encouragement. 
 He felt a deep solicitude to retain Kentucky on the Union 
 side. Very soon also the leading Kentuckians, who at the 
 beginning had been most pertinacious to insist on neutrality, 
 saw that it would be impossible for the State to maintain 
 such an utterly absurd attitude. Mr. Lincoln, therefore, 
 with their knowledge and consent, by the middle of May 
 sent five thousand muskets to Kentucky in charge of 
 Lieutenant William Nelson, and a committee of prominent 
 Union leaders superintended their distribution to companies 
 of loyal Kentucky volunteers which were being secretly 
 formed in various parts of the State ; and since this venture 
 proved successful, larger shipments soon followed. As yet 
 all this was done quietly and secretly; for an election 
 Was pending in the State, and the Unionists wished to avoid 
 
132 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 the animosities which open warlike preparations would be 
 sure to create. The elections once over, however, further 
 disguise was thrown off, and at the beginning of July Lieu 
 tenant Nelson openly established "Camp Dick Eobinson" 
 in Central Kentucky. Into this he quickly gathered several 
 thousand Union volunteers already previously recruited. Be 
 fore Secessionists or neutral Conservatives were well aware 
 of the fact, he had formed a self-sustaining military post af 
 fording a secure rallying-place and support to Kentucky 
 loyalists. Governor Magoffin wrote an official letter to 
 President Lincoln, urging the removal of this and other 
 Union camps from the State ; but the President replied that 
 the force was composed exclusively of Kentuckians defend 
 ing their own homes, and that, in accordance with the evi 
 dent popular sentiment of the State, he must decline to 
 order them away. 
 
 Under these various influences the hopes and schemes of 
 Governor Magoffin and his conspiring secession adherents 
 withered and failed. The "State Guard" of Buckner lan 
 guished, and the loyal "Home Guards" grew in numbers 
 and effective military strength. So far it had been a contest 
 of quiet, but very earnest political strategy, and the result 
 was in exact conformity to the dominant popular sentiment 
 manifested in the late elections by decisive Union majorities. 
 Sustained by this sentiment, the effort could not well have 
 failed ; but failure was rendered impossible, and the result 
 greatly hastened, by the constant presence of a considerable 
 number of Northern troops at Cairo, Cincinnati, and inter 
 mediate towns on the border, ready to intervene with active 
 and decisive force, had the necessity at any time become 
 imminent. 
 
 Meanwhile surrounding events were rapidly maturing to 
 force Kentucky from her neutral attitude. Not only had 
 
KENTUCKY. 133 
 
 hostilities commenced east of the Alleghanies, but active 
 minor campaigns, closing with somewhat important battles, 
 had taken place on each side of Kentucky. Eastward the 
 rebels were driven out of West Virginia with disaster during 
 July ; while, to the west, a serious invasion of Missouri was 
 checked in August by the hardy, though over-daring courage 
 of Lyon, who threw back a combined rebel column moving 
 from Arkansas northward, unfortunately at the costly sacri 
 fice of his own life. Unlooked-for success at Bull Eun had 
 greatly encouraged the rebellion, but it felt the menace of 
 growing danger in the West. Fremont had been sent to St. 
 Louis, and, with a just pride in his former fame, the whole 
 Northwest was eager to respond to his summons, and follow 
 his lead in a grand and irresistible expedition down the 
 Mississippi Eiver in the coming autumn, which should 
 open the Father of Waters to the Union flag and sever the 
 territory of the Confederacy a cherished plan of General 
 Scott. 
 
 The rebel General Pillow somewhat wordy, but exceed 
 ingly active, and as yet the principal military authority in 
 Tennessee had long been warning Jefferson Davis to pre 
 pare against such an enterprise. He had been working with 
 great energy to fortify Memphis, and, by the middle of 
 May, reported that he would soon have twenty pieces in bat 
 tery. But at the same time he prophesied that "an effort 
 will be made to effect a lodgment at Columbus, fortify that 
 place, and, with a strong invading column, turn my works, 
 attack them in reverse, crush my supporting force, capture 
 the guns, and open the river. The northern portion of Ten 
 nessee is unfavorable, from the extent of open country." 
 He said he had asked Governor Magoffin for permission to 
 fortify Columbus, adding: "If he should withhold his con 
 sent, my present impression is that I shall go forward and 
 
134 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 occupy the work upon the ground of its necessity for pro 
 tecting Tennessee." 
 
 But Jefferson Davis had too great hopes of Kentucky to 
 create enmity by forcing her neutrality, and Pillow s scheme 
 was necessarily postponed. As the autumn approached, 
 however, Kentucky was clearly lost to the " Confederates." 
 Of the members of Congress chosen at the election held 
 June 20th, nine out of ten were loyal. At the general elec 
 tion held on the first Monday of August, the Unionists 
 gained three-fourths of the members of each branch of the 
 Legislature. Meanwhile the danger of a great Mississippi 
 expedition from the North grew formidable. The lower 
 Mississippi flows generally between level shores, and offers 
 few points where the stream may be effectually obstructed 
 by fortifications. It was, therefore, desirable to secure all 
 that were available, and the Richmond authorities now re 
 solved to seize and hold Columbus, notwithstanding the fact 
 that it lay in " neutral " Kentucky. 
 
 Since July 4th the defence of the Mississippi Biver had 
 been specially entrusted to General Leonidas Polk, formerly 
 a bishop in the Protestant Episcopal Church, but who, since 
 the outbreak of the rebellion, preferred to utilize his early 
 West Point education, by laying aside his clerical functions 
 and accepting a major-general s commission in the Confed 
 erate service. On September 5th he began moving his 
 forces northward, violating the neutrality of Kentucky by 
 occupying the town of Hickman, on the Mississippi, within 
 that State. The movement did not pass unobserved; the 
 Union commander at Cairo had, with equal vigilance, been 
 studying the possibilities of the river system in his neigh 
 borhood. On the following day, Brigadier-General Grant 
 proceeded, with two gunboats and an infantry force, to take 
 possession of the town of Paducah, at the confluence of the 
 
KENTUCKY. 135 
 
 Cumberland and Tennessee Elvers with the Ohio a move 
 ment which bore important fruit a few months later. Gen 
 eral Polk, 011 his part still marching northward, reached and 
 occupied Columbus, on the Mississippi, on September 7th. 
 Having hastily procured the endorsement of this step from 
 Jefferson Davis, General Polk, on the 9th, formally notified 
 Governor Magoffin of his presence in Kentucky. 
 
 By this time also, the Unionists of the State had com 
 pleted and compacted their organization and authoritv, and 
 demonstrated their strength and predominance. A new mili 
 tary department, consisting of Kentucky and Tennessee, 
 and named the Department of the Cumberland, was, on 
 August 15th, created at Washington and placed under the 
 command of General Anderson, and since September 1st 
 that officer had made Louisville his headquarters. On the 
 other hand, Buckner had abandoned his professed neutrality 
 and his militia command, and formally entered the rebel 
 service as a brigadier-general. Stationing himself just 
 within Tennessee, south of Middle Kentucky, he was collect 
 ing the rebel members of his " State Guard " for a hostile 
 expedition against the homes of his former friends and 
 neighbors. Another rebel force gathering under Zollicoffer, 
 in East Tennessee, was watching its opportunity to advance 
 into Kentucky through Cumberland Gap. 
 
 Under these threatening aspects Governor Magoffin com 
 municated to the Legislature, then in session, General Polk s 
 announcement of his arrival at Columbus. The altogether 
 illogical and false role of Kentucky neutrality was necessari 
 ly at an end. The Legislature, by express resolutions under 
 date of September 14th, instructed the Governor to demand 
 the unconditional withdrawal of the rebel forces from Ken 
 tucky, while other resolutions called on General Anderson to 
 enter at once upon the active defence of his native State. A 
 
136 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 little later, Kentucky still further and finally identified her 
 self with the loyal North. Enlistment under the Confede 
 rate flag was by law declared a misdemeanor, and the inva 
 sion of Kentucky by Confederate soldiers a felony, and 
 heavy punishments were prescribed for both offences. And 
 since the Home Guards had only been organized for local 
 protection, the Legislature now formally authorized the en 
 listment of forty thousand volunteers to " repel invasion," 
 providing that they should be mustered into the service of 
 the United States, and co-operate with the armies of the 
 Union. 
 
CHAPTEE XH. 
 
 WEST VIRGINIA. 
 
 PRICE to 1861, the State of Virginia the " Old Dominion " 
 extended from Chesapeake Bay westward to the Ohio 
 River. This broad limit, however, gave her a defective 
 boundary. The Alleghany Mountains, running through the 
 very middle of the State, from northeast to southwest, com 
 pletely bisected her territory into two divisions somewhat 
 unequal in size, and greatly different in topographical fea 
 tures and character. East of the mountains, the land rises 
 from a broad, low tide-water belt on the sea-coast, in a tolera 
 bly regular gradation of plains and plateaus, first to the 
 Blue Ridge, then to the main Appalachian chain ; west of 
 the dividing crest, the country retains its mountainous 
 characteristics, a succession of ridges and a medley of hills, 
 till it reaches the Ohio River. Not alone through earlier 
 settlement, but also by reason of climate, soil, and situation, 
 East Virginia remained the region of large plantations, heavy 
 slave population, and profitable agriculture, especially in 
 production of tobacco ; West Virginia, on the other hand, 
 became the home of hunters, pioneers, lumbermen, miners, 
 and in latter times the seat of a busy manufacturing indus 
 try developing a diversified agriculture for local consump 
 tion, rather than the production of great staples for export. 
 With preponderant population and wealth, East Virginia 
 
138 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 absorbed political power, and selfishly laid and expended 
 taxes to her local advantage, so that West Virginia was made 
 to stand in the relation of a tributary province, rather than 
 an integral and equally favored part of the commonwealth. 
 
 So too grew up essential differences in social tradition and 
 aspiration. The tide-water population developed family 
 estates, pretentious manor-homes, aristocratic exclusiveness, 
 ancestral pride peculiarities which could not thrive in 
 hunters camps, or the shanties of miners and lumbermen. 
 The whole world over, and in all ages, mountain and forest 
 life has bred a spirit of self-reliance, of personal indepen 
 dence, of the recognition of individual equality, and rights 
 of simple manhood. 
 
 More than anything else, however, the system of slavery 
 antagonized the two sections of the State. By the census of 
 1860, East Virginia contained 472,494 slaves; while West 
 Virginia, with half as much free population, embraced a total 
 of only 18,371 slaves. It is therefore not surprising that se- 
 cessionism was rampant in the east, and that unionism pre 
 vailed in the west. Of the 55 final votes against the secret 
 Ordinance of Secession in the Virginia Convention, 32 were 
 cast by the West Virginia delegates, 14 others were con 
 tributed from other mountain counties ; the populous plains 
 and lowlands of the east supplied only 9. As in other parts 
 of the South, the fungus of treason grew rankest in the hot 
 beds of the heavy slave counties ; the poison of conspiracy 
 infected the centres of accumulated wealth, of inherited 
 family pride, of over-fattened political ambition ; it was the 
 Tylers, the Wises, the Floyds, the Masons, who, stuffed to 
 repletion with political benefits, turned with ungrateful 
 hearts to destroy the temple of government, wherein as 
 selfish and hypocritical priests they had conducted a dis 
 sembling and perverted worship. 
 
WEST VIRGINIA. 139 
 
 While the Convention of Virginia was carrying on its ec 
 centric and fluctuating political intrigues under guise of 
 public deliberation, one of the West Virginia members of 
 fered resolutions making a somewhat startling, but entirely 
 germane application of the heretical theory of secession. 
 " The right of revolution," he wrote, " can be exercised as 
 well by a portion of the citizens of a State against their State 
 government, as it can be exercised by the whole people of a 
 State against their Federal Government." "And that any 
 change of the relation Virginia now sustains to the Federal 
 Government, against the wishes of even a respectable 
 minority of her people, would be such an act of injustice 
 perpetrated upon the rights of that minority as to justify 
 them in changing their relation to the State Government by 
 separating themselves from that section of the State that 
 had thus wantonly disregarded their interests and defied 
 their will." 
 
 The conspirators in the convention wilfully shut their 
 eyes to the pertinency of this logic, but among the people 
 of West Virginia it remained a quick and pervading princi 
 ple of action. The Convention at Richmond passed its 
 secret Ordinance of Secession on April 17th ; within a week 
 popular movements were already on foot in the towns and 
 populous counties of West Virginia, looking to a division of 
 the State. Numerous causes contributed to this result. 
 Political jealousy and injustice, though a powerful influ 
 ence, was not everything. Geography had already ordained 
 separation by a formidable mountain-barrier. Her people 
 felt themselves an integral part of the Great West. They 
 responded to the impulse of its commercial ambition, its 
 material development, its expansive business energy. Wheel 
 ing aspired to rival Pittsburgh and Cincinnati, not Richmond. 
 They acknowledged neither tobacco nor cotton as kings; 
 
140 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 lumber, coal, iron, salt, petroleum, were their candidates 
 for supremacy in trade. Their commerce followed their 
 streams into the Ohio. The Mississippi Valley was a 
 broader market than the Atlantic sea-coast. Their busi 
 ness reached out for St. Louis, St. Paul, and Denver, as 
 well as Memphis and New Orleans. 
 
 The effort, therefore, of the tide-water slaveholding aristo 
 crats to carry them into a cotton confederacy, met an in 
 stantaneous and almost unanimous protest. The proposi 
 tion was hardly a subject for discussion. To secede from 
 secession was the common wish and determination. The 
 only question was how to put their negative into effective 
 operation. Eapid popular organization followed ; the Gov 
 ernment at Washington was appealed to, and promised 
 countenance and support ; and on May 13th, delegates from 
 twenty-five counties met at Wheeling to consult and devise 
 further action whereby they might fully and finally repudi 
 ate the treasonable revolt of East Virginia. 
 
 Circumstances favored their design. Under President 
 Lincoln s call, the large and populous State of Ohio, West 
 Virginia s nearest neighbor, was organizing thirteen regi 
 ments of three months volunteers. This quota entitled her 
 to a major-general ; and to this important command Gov 
 ernor Dennison appointed a young officer of thorough West 
 Point training and varied experience Captain George B. 
 McClellan. He was also a personal favorite of General 
 Scott, who had such confidence in his ability that he soon 
 (May 3d) placed him in command of the Military Depart 
 ment of the Ohio, created to include the three States of 
 Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, with headquarters at Cincin 
 nati, and to which West Virginia was not long after attached. 
 The blockade of Washington, and other incidents, had served 
 to keep Western quotas of troops on the Ohio line, and the 
 
WEST VIRGINIA. 141 
 
 Unionists of West Virginia thus found a substantial military 
 force at once in their immediate vicinity, with a command 
 ing officer instructed to give them encouragement and sup 
 port, and carefully studying the possible opportunities of 
 service in their midst. 
 
 Although the convention proceedings must have made 
 the Bichniond authorities acquainted with the prevailing 
 union sentiment of West Virginia, it is probable that they 
 did not anticipate a general disaffection ; not only did 
 Governor Letcher s proclamations for State militia include 
 that section with apparent confidence, but he at an early 
 day despatched officers there to collect and organize it. 
 Relatively, population was sparse and the country moun 
 tainous and hilly; there were, therefore, two principal 
 localities, or lines of transit, travel, and business, where 
 concentration could be best effected one the line of the 
 Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, the other the valley of the 
 Great Kanawha River and to these districts Governor 
 Letcher sent his agents. Discouraging reports were, how 
 ever, soon returned : that feeling was very bitter ; that 
 union organizations existed in most of the counties; that 
 that section of the State was " verging on actual rebellion." 
 Fragments of rebel companies were indeed here and there 
 springing up, but it became evident that no local force suffi 
 cient to hold the country would respond to the Confederate 
 appeal. On the other hand, the open disaffection, and the 
 ominous gathering of forces at several points along the Ohio 
 side of the river, pointed to a short tenure of Confederate 
 authority. 
 
 The Richmond officials were, however, unwilling to lose 
 their control without a struggle, and, in default of local 
 military support, determined to maintain themselves with 
 forces from East Virginia. To that end they now sent a 
 
142 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 few available companies, with some extra arms and supplies, 
 from Staunton at the southern end of the Shenandoah Val 
 ley, by the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike, a tolerably 
 direct route, over the mountains, a distance of seventy-five 
 to a hundred miles to Beverly, from which point they might 
 menace and overawe Grafton, the junction of the main stem 
 of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad with its branches to 
 Parkersburg and Wheeling. 
 
 But the reaction against secession, the reawakening of 
 union feeling, the growth and organization of the party 
 which favored a permanent division of the State, largely 
 outran all the conspirators efforts and measures. Coun 
 ter-revolution being positive and aggressive, was not only 
 stronger, but more active than the revolution which had 
 given it birth and opportunity. The inhabitants showed 
 more alacrity to take up arms for the Government than for 
 Letcher and Lee. A West Virginia regiment, formed by 
 Colonel Kelly to fight for the Union, gathered recruits 
 more rapidly at Wheeling, than the rebel camps which 
 Colonel Porterfield had been sent to command and con 
 centrate between Beverly and Grafton. 
 
 It will be remembered that the Richmond Convention 
 had appointed the 23d of May (that being also a general 
 election for members of the Legislature) as the day on 
 which the people of Virginia should vote to ratify or reject 
 the Ordinance of Secession. A curiously sophistical and 
 Pharisaical argument and appeal, published by Senator 
 Mason in behalf of ratification, shows conclusively that 
 the conspirators were in great apprehension lest their 
 treason should be repudiated at the polls. But, with the 
 State transformed to a camp, and filled with Jefferson 
 Davis "foreign" regiments, the result could hardly be in 
 doubt. Under complete militaiy domination, East Virginia 
 
WEST VIRGINIA. 143 
 
 voted to ratify ; West Virginia, comparatively free, voted to 
 reject the Secession Ordinance. 
 
 This event both justified and sustained the movements 
 of the "West Virginia Unionists and the Government. If 
 General McClellan had needed any further reasons for an 
 active military interference, they were furnished by the fact 
 that Porterfield began burning bridges on the Baltimore 
 and Ohio Railroad. Eealizing that delay was becoming 
 dangerous, and prompted by directions from Washington, 
 McClellan, on the 26th, ordered two regiments to cross the 
 river at Wheeling, and two others at Parkersburg, and to 
 simultaneously move forward by the branch railroads from 
 each of these points to their junction at Grafton. Owing to 
 the necessity of repairing burnt bridges, their progress was 
 cautious and slow. This gave ample time for Porterfield 
 to become fully informed of the movement ; whereupon 
 he retired with his small command, stores and spare arms, 
 to Philippi, on a country road, about fifteen miles directly 
 south of Grafton, hoping to find there a secure retreat 
 about which to gather a sufficient force to return and more 
 thoroughly cut, harass, or control, the railroad. 
 
 But the Union forces, being in superior numbers, and as 
 sisted with ready information by friendly local sentiment, 
 gave the rebels little respite. General McClellan had for 
 warded additional regiments to Grafton, with Brigadier- 
 General Moms, an educated West Point officer, to command ; 
 and he now adopted and completed an expedition already 
 projected before his arrival by Colonel Kelly, who, with his 
 West Virginia regiment, had a thorough knowledge of the 
 country. Under pretence of an advance on Harper s Ferry, 
 Colonel Kelly, at the head of about two regiments, started 
 eastward by rail on the morning of June 2d ; that evening a 
 similar detachment under Colonel Dumont started west- 
 
144 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 ward ; both columns, however, soon left the cars, and by dif 
 ferent roads began a rapid march southward against Philip- 
 pi. A furious rain-storm during the night greatly impeded, 
 but also completely concealed, their unexpected advance. 
 They arrived on opposite hills commanding the town, almost 
 simultaneously at daylight of June 3d, though, by a mistake 
 of the proper route, not in a position to cut off retreat. 
 Here they found Porterfield s command, something over a 
 thousand strong, carelessly awaiting the arrival of morning 
 and the abatement of the storm, to begin a retreat which the 
 rebel officers had informally resolved on the previous even 
 ing. The surprise was complete, and the attack so sudden 
 and sharp as to force the rebels to disperse in utter rout 
 and disorganization. Their loss in killed and captured was 
 small, owing to the fatiguing night march which left the 
 Union troops too thoroughly exhausted to make pursuit. 
 
 The complete success of this first dash at the enemy not 
 only had the happiest effect in inspiriting the Union troops, 
 but it also encouraged and fortified the West Virginia 
 Unionists in their political scheme of forming a new State. 
 On the day after the " Philippi races," as the skirmish was 
 facetiously nicknamed, a previously concerted agreement to 
 elect delegates was carried out. These, representing about 
 forty counties lying between the crest of the Alleghanies and 
 the Ohio Biver, met in a formal convention at Wheeling, on 
 June llth. Its first step (June 13th), was to repudiate the 
 treasonable usurpations of the Eichmond Convention and 
 Governor Letcher, to pronounce their acts without authority 
 and void, and to declare as vacated all executive, legislative, 
 and judicial offices in the State held by those " who adhere 
 to said convention and Executive." The second step was 
 the adoption of an ordinance (June 19th) reorganizing the 
 State government. On the following day the convention 
 
WEST VIRGINIA. 145 
 
 appointed F. H. Pierpoint Governor, with an advisory 
 council of five, to wield executive authority. A legislature 
 was constituted by calling together, on July 1st, at Wheeling, 
 such members chosen at the election of May 23d as would 
 take a prescribed oath of allegiance to the United States and 
 the restored government of Virginia, and providing for filling 
 the vacancies of those who refused. A similar provision con 
 tinued or substituted other State and county officers. After 
 adding sundry ordinances of urgent necessity to this 
 groundwork of restoration, the convention on the 25th took 
 a recess till August. The Legislature, however, met ac 
 cording to call, and took up the difficult task of devising 
 legal enactments suitable to the revolutionary crisis ; and 
 on July 9th, it chose two United States Senators, who, four 
 days later, were admitted and took part in the national legis 
 lation. 
 
 So far, the work was simply a repudiation of secession, 
 and a restoration of the usurped government of the whole 
 * State. But the main motive and purpose of the counter 
 revolution was not allowed to halt or fail. In August the 
 Wheeling Convention reassembled, and on the 20th adopted 
 an ordinance creating the new State of Kanawha, and pro 
 viding for a ratifying popular vote to be taken on the ques 
 tion in the following October. It is not the province of this 
 volume to follow further the political transformation of tho 
 " Old Dominion," thus inaugurated, except to add that tho 
 proposed " State of Kanawha " became the " State of West 
 Virginia," and was duly admitted to the Union about two 
 years later. 
 
 Governor Peirpoint, the head of the provisional govern 
 ment thus organized at Wheeling, made a formal applica 
 tion under the Constitution, to the Government of the 
 United States, for aid to suppress rebellion and protect the 
 I. 7 
 
146 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 people against domestic violence ; and in furtherance of this 
 object General McClellan ordered additional forces into the 
 State from his Department. Local enlistments had also bv 
 this time increased West Virginia s own contingent to three 
 I regiments under his command. In addition to affording 
 protection to Union sentiment, this military occupation was 
 designed to insure the safety of the Baltimore and Ohio 
 Eailroad, not alone of Graf ton as a strategical point, but 
 also of the valuable railroad bridge across the Cheat Eiver, 
 and numerous important tunnels in the mountains imme 
 diately east of it. The precaution was nowise superfluous ; 
 for the Eebel Government had some weeks before ordered 
 a special expedition to destroy them and permanently break 
 this important line of communication. General Lee still had 
 his eye on such a possibility, and wrote to his new com 
 mander, under date of July 1st, " the rapture of the railroad 
 at Cheat River would be worth to us an army." 
 
 To effect this, and to hold West Virginia or at least to 
 prevent the Union forces from penetrating through the 
 mountains in the direction of Staunton the rebel authori 
 ties now sought to repair the Philippi disaster by sending 
 two new commanders to that region : Ex-Governor Henry A. 
 Wise, invested with the rank of brigadier-general, to the 
 Kanawha Valley, and General Garnett, formerly a major in 
 the Federal Army, to Beverly, to gather up and reorganize 
 the debris of Porterfield s command, which they also took 
 immediate measures to reinforce. 
 
 Garnett, arriving near the end of June, found that Porter- 
 field had retreated across an outlying mountain range into 
 the Cheat River Valley, in which Beverly is situated. The 
 turnpike from Staunton to Beverly is the central and prin 
 cipal mountain route within a long distance, both to the 
 north and to the south. From Beverly northwestward the 
 
WEST VIRGINIA. 147 
 
 turnpike branches, one line going to Buckhannon through a 
 pass over Rich Mountain, the other going to Philippi 
 through a pass in the same range, but which is there named 
 Laurel Hill, the latter being some seventeen miles farther 
 north. " I regard these two passes," wrote Garnett, "as the 
 gates to the northwestern country." Here, then, he proposed 
 to fortify himself, to forage on the country beyond, and to 
 leisurely watch his chance of breaking the railroad. His 
 circumstances were not the most favorable. The troops 
 which he found at Huttonsville on his arrival were "in a 
 miserable condition as to arms, clothing, equipments, in 
 struction, and discipline." " The Union men," he also 
 wrote, "are greatly in the ascendancy here, and are much 
 more zealous and active in their cause than the Secession 
 ists. The enemy are kept fully advised of our movements, 
 even to the strength of our scouts and pickets, by the coun 
 try people, while we are compelled to grope in the dark as 
 much as if we were invading a foreign and hostile country." 
 Nevertheless, he began a vigorous reorganization ; Lee im 
 mediately sent him reinforcements. In a short time he had 
 Colonel Pegram established in the pass at Rich Mountain, 
 with a regiment and six guns, while he himself held the 
 pass at Laurel Hill with three or four regiments, leaving a 
 detachment at Beverly. 
 
 This was the situation when, early in July, General McClel- 
 lan resolved to take the offensive and drive the rebels from 
 West Virginia. He had arrived on the scene of action about 
 the same time with Garnett ; and though he had a largely 
 preponderating force in the State, it was considerably de 
 pleted by the local garrisons necessary to protect the rail 
 road, and to give confidence to Unionists in exposed towns. 
 For the immediate work in hand General Morris had five or 
 six regiments at Fhilippi, confronting Garnett ; McClellau 
 
148 
 
 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 Field of the West Virginia Battles. 
 
WEST VIRGINIA. 149 
 
 directed him to take an advanced position within two miles 
 of the enemy s works at Laurel Hill, to give an impression 
 that he intended the main attack, and to be ready to pursue, 
 should they retreat. 
 
 Meanwhile McClellan himself moved to Buckhannon with 
 some seven regiments, with the design of turning the 
 enemy s position on Eich Mountain. On the evening of 
 July 9th he pushed forward to Bearing Creek, two miles 
 from Pegram s entrenched camp. A reconnoissance on the 
 10th showed the enemy strongly posted in a mountain defile, 
 where, with the large force he was supposed to have, a direct 
 attack in front could only be made at great sacrifice. That 
 evening Brigadier-General Eosecraus proposed a plan to 
 turn the position, and McClellan (with some reluctance, it 
 is said) permitted him to attempt it. 
 
 At daylight of July llth, Eosecrans, with portions of four 
 regiments a total of nineteen hundred men set out, and, 
 amid a well-nigh continuous rain-storm, by eleven o clock 
 cut and climbed their way through a pathless forest and 
 thicket to the very crest of Eich Mountain. Their ascent 
 was made south of the turnpike, while Pogram was expect 
 ing the attempt on the north. To guard against either con 
 tingency, however, as his own camp and entrenchments were 
 near the west base of the mountain, Pegram had sent a de 
 tachment of three hundred and ten men and two guns back 
 to where the turnpike crosses the summit, two miles in his 
 rear. There, at the farm of a man named Hart, they had 
 scarcely had time to throw up some slight entrenchments 
 for their guns, w T hen Eosecrans force, advancing toward the 
 road from the south, encountered them. The rebels made a 
 plucky resistance, but the Unionists had such advantage in 
 numbers that the contest was quickly decided. " We formed 
 at about three o clock," reports Eosecrans, " under cover of 
 
150 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 our skirmishers, guarding well against a flank attack from 
 the direction of the rebels position, and after a brisk fire 
 which threw the rebels into confusion, carried their position 
 by a charge, driving them from behind some log breast 
 works, and pursued them into the thickets on the mountain. 
 We captured twenty-one prisoners, two brass six-pounders, 
 fifty stand of arms, and some corn and provisions. Our loss 
 was twelve killed and forty-nine wounded." He also places 
 the reported burials of the rebels killed at one hundred and 
 thirty-five, with about twenty wounded. 
 
 McClellan had moved all his force up to Pegram s front, 
 and was waiting to begin a direct assault when he should 
 learn that Eosecrans had commenced the attack on the rear. 
 But Eosecrans fight on the very top of Eich Mountain dis 
 concerted the arrangement. The messenger sent to com 
 municate between McClellan and himself rode unsus 
 pectingly up to a rebel picket-guard, and was captured. 
 McClellan waited all day in vain for the rear attack to be 
 gin ; for when the engagement on the mountain was over, 
 the day was already so far advanced, and Eosecrans men 
 were so thoroughly worn out with their toilsome ascent pre 
 ceding the fight, that it was deemed most prudent to go 
 into bivouac on the field of battle. McClellan was not in 
 formed of the fight and its result until the following day, 
 July 12th, when it was also ascertained that the whole rebel 
 camp and position had been precipitately evacuated ; he 
 was therefore now able, not only to secure their abandoned 
 guns and supplies, but to push without opposition along the 
 turnpike entirely over the mountain and occupy Beverly. 
 
 Pegram had, on the llth, personally gone to the moun 
 tain-top only, however, to witness the defeat and disper 
 sion of his little detachment. Seeing himself thus in a trap, 
 with McClellan in front and Eosecrans in secure possession 
 
WEST VIRGINIA. 151 
 
 of the road behind him, he returned to his camp, and spiking 
 his four guns, abandoned his camp and equipage and under 
 took to escape, with the remainder of his command about 
 six hundred men by marching northward along the moun 
 tain to join Garnett at Laurel Hill. For the moment he suc 
 ceeded in eluding both the Federal commanders, and after 
 a laborious eighteen hours march over an almost impassable 
 route, found himself within three miles of Leedsville. Here, 
 however, he received news that Garnett had also retreated, 
 and that a strong Union column was in pursuit. Thus he 
 was once more caught between two Union armies ; and see 
 ing no further avenue of escape, he that night, July 12th, 
 sent a proposal of surrender to General McClellan, who, on 
 the following morning (July 13th), received Pegram and his 
 command, a total remainder of five hundred and sixty men 
 and thirty-three officers, as prisoners of war, at Beverly, 
 where the half-famished rebel fugitives were only too glad 
 to once more receive comfortable quarters and rations. 
 
 The earliest fugitives who escaped from the battle of Bich 
 Mountain, on the afternoon of July llth, carried the news 
 of that disaster to Beverly, enabling the rebel regiments 
 stationed there to retreat southward, and also, as is prob 
 able, communicating the intelligence to Garnett at Laurel 
 Hill. That officer, already seriously threatened by General 
 Morris in his immediate front, thereupon perceived that his 
 position was no longer tenable, and ordered an immediate 
 retreat. When Garnett reached Leedsville on the afternoon 
 of the 12th, and heard that McClellan was at Beverly, he 
 saw that his own further retreat to the south was also cut 
 off. There w r as now no resource left but to adopt the rather 
 desperate alternative of turning to the north and attempting 
 to reach St. George and West Union by a rough and difficult 
 mountain road. His command of thirty-three hundred men 
 
152 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 and cumbrous trains thereby necessarily became very much 
 scattered and disorganized. Although he had some fifteen 
 hours the start of the Union pursuit, an advance column of 
 three Federal regiments, led by Captain Benham of the En 
 gineers, gained rapidly on the fugitives. Notwithstanding 
 every effort of the rebels to impede them by felling trees in 
 the narrow mountain defiles, the Union advance came up 
 with their wagon-train at Carrick s Ford, one of the crossings 
 of Cheat Eiver, twenty -six miles northwest of Laurel Hill, 
 about noon of July 13th. Here Garnett in person faced 
 about his rear-guard (a single regiment, according to the 
 rebel report), and taking post on a favorable and precipi 
 tous elevation of the right river bank, fifty to eighty feet 
 high, planted three guns to command the ford and approach 
 ing road, and prepared to defend his retreat. 
 
 Steedman s regiment, with two guns, was leading the Union 
 advance, and came up on the low, narrow approach, within 
 close musket-range, before they discovered the rebel line. 
 A brisk engagement at once ensued, and the other two regi 
 ments soon arrived. Owing to the restricted space, Milroy s 
 regiment was obliged to take position where it could only 
 deliver an oblique fire and at a greater distance. Dumont s 
 regiment was thereupon ordered to advance and scale a diffi 
 cult height in order to turn the enemy s left flank. Two 
 companies had well-nigh gained the coveted position, when 
 Benham received a mistaken report that the ascent was im 
 practicable. He therefore ordered Dumont to return, to 
 march his regiment along the very base of the hill on which 
 the rebels were posted, to their right flank, and make the 
 ascent there. The manoeuvre was gallantly executed, and 
 scarcely had Dumont begun mounting the height, when the 
 rebel line broke and fled, abandoning one of their guns. 
 
 Retreat and pursuit were once more commenced ; and at 
 
WEST VIRGINIA. 153 
 
 the next ford, perhaps a quarter of a mile farther on, there 
 occurred an interchange of desultory skirmish-fire between 
 small parties of sharpshooters, in which Garnett himself was 
 killed. 
 
 At this resnlt the Federals abandoned further pursuit, 
 satisfied with the capture of tho baggage-train, one gun, two 
 stands of colors, and fifty prisoners ; the casualties being thir 
 teen killed and forty wounded of the Federals, and twenty 
 killed and ten wounded of the rebels. McClellan had 
 ordered yet another column to be gathered up along tho 
 railroad to intercept the flying enemy at West Union ; but 
 no substantial result followed the effort, and the remainder 
 of Garnett s command escaped. 
 
 Counted according to mere numbers, the battles of Eich 
 Mountain and Carrick s Ford fall into a ridiculous insigni 
 ficance in contrast with the great battles of the rebellion 
 during the next three years. Hundreds of engagements, of 
 greater magnitude and much more serious loss of life, pre 
 ceded or followed the main contests of the war, of which 
 history will hardly make a note. But this petty skirmish 
 with three hundred rebels on Kich Mountain, and this rout 
 of a little rear-guard at Carrick s Ford, were speedily fol 
 lowed by large political and military results. They closed 
 a campaign, dispersed a rebel army, recovered a disputed 
 State, permanently pushed back the military frontier. They 
 enabled McClellan to send a laconic telegram, combining in 
 one report* the scattered and disconnected incidents of 
 
 * " HUTTONSVILLE, VA., July 14, 1801. 
 "COLONEL TOWNSENB: 
 
 " Garnett and forces routed ; his baggage and one gun taken : his army demoral 
 ized ; Garnett killed. We have annihilated the enemy in Western Virginia, and 
 have lost thirteen killed, and not more than forty wounded. We have in all 
 killed at least two hundred of the enemy, and their prisoners will amount to at 
 
154 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 three different days and happening forty miles apart, which 
 (without exaggerating literal truth except as to the Union 
 losses and number of prisoners) gave such a general impres 
 sion of professional skill and achievement as to make him 
 the hero of the hour, and which started a train of circum 
 stances that, without further victories, made him General-in- 
 Chief of all the Armies of the United States, on the first 
 day of November following. 
 
 McClellan s campaign in West Virginia ends with the 
 death of Garnett and the dispersion of his army. About a 
 week afterward he was called to a new field of duty at Wash 
 ington City. There is not room in this volume to further 
 describe military operations in West Virginia during the 
 remainder of the year 18G1. Various movements and enter 
 prises occurred under command of Wise, Floyd, and Lee, on 
 the rebel side ; and under Cox, Eosecrans, Milroy, and other 
 gallant officers of the Union army. With somewhat fluctu - 
 ating changes, the rebels were gradually forced back out of 
 the Great Kanawha Valley; and the aggregate result left 
 West Virginia in possession of the Federal troops, her own 
 inherent loyalty having contributed largely to this condi 
 tion. The union sentiment of the people was everywhere 
 made more and more manifest, and the new State govern 
 ment was consolidated and heartily sustained, ending, as 
 has already been mentioned, by her ultimate admission as a 
 separate member of the Federal Union, in June, 18G3. 
 
 least one thousand. Have taken seven guns in all. I fitill look for the capture 
 of the remnant of Garnett s army by General Hill. The troops defeated are the 
 crack regiments of Eastern Virginia, aided by Georgians, Tennesseeans, and Caro 
 linians. Our success is complete, and secession is killed in this country. 
 
 "GJEO. B. McCLELLAN, 
 
 "Major-General Commanding." 
 
CHAPTER 
 
 PATTERSON S CAMPAIGN. 
 
 UNDER the President s three months call the State of Penn 
 sylvania was required to furnish sixteen regiments. This 
 entitled her to two major-generals, and one of these, ap 
 pointed by the Governor, was Eobert Patterson. He had 
 served with credit as a lieutenant and captain in the war of 
 1812, and as a major-general in the Mexican War; General 
 Scott regarded him as "an excellent second in command;" 
 his selection seemed, therefore, natural and proper. Not 
 withstanding he had now reached the age of sixty-nine, he 
 entered at once with alacrity on the task of organizing the 
 three months volunteers in the city of Philadelphia. After 
 the Baltimore riot and the Maryland uprising, it became 
 necessary to create the military " Department of Pennsylva 
 nia," comprising Pennsylvania, Delaware, and part of Mary 
 land, and Patterson was assigned to its command, with direc 
 tions to co-operate in restoring Union authority in Maryland. 
 
 Sundry joint military movements projected to accomplish 
 this object, were happily soon rendered unnecessary by the 
 rapid accumulation of troops at Washington, Butler s occu 
 pation of Baltimore, and the sweeping political reaction in 
 Maryland. But, meanwhile, the rebels had established a 
 strong camp at Harper s Ferry, and Patterson s close atten 
 tion was thus very naturally transferred to that point. The 
 
156 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 three months troops could not be used in distant undertak 
 ings. Here, however, was a worthy enterprise at the very 
 threshold of Pennsylvania, which, successfully prosecuted, 
 would protect Maryland, relieve the Baltimore and Ohio Kail- 
 road, encourage Virginia Unionists, and recover lost prestige. 
 Patriotic pride, political security, and military advantage 
 seemed, to the minds of both Patterson and Scott, to present 
 combined reasons for an early recapture of Harper s Ferry. 
 
 For this purpose, Patterson, about the first of June, con 
 centrated his available troops at Chambersburg, Pa. , and 
 on the third of that month issued an address to the regi 
 ments under his command, announcing that "you will 
 soon meet the insurgents." Orders from General Scott, 
 however, held him back until strong reinforcements could 
 be sent, and an important diversion organized to aid him ; 
 and while thus assisting, the General also admonished him 
 to every prudence, reminding him that his expedition was 
 " well projected, and that success in it would be an impor 
 tant step in the war ; but, there must be no reverse." 
 
 With the increase of his force, and a closer survey of his 
 task, Patterson s own estimate of his enterprise grew in mag 
 nitude. " Remember, I beseech you," he wrote to the Sec 
 retary of War, under date of June 10th, " that Harper s Ferry 
 is (as I have said from the first) the place where the first 
 great battle will be fought, and the result will be decisive of 
 the future. The insurgents are strongly intrenched, have 
 an immense number of guns, and w T ill contest every inch of 
 
 ground The importance of a victory at Harper s 
 
 Ferry cannot be estimated. I cannot sleep for thinking about 
 
 it I beseech you, therefore, by our ancient 
 
 friendship, give me the means of success. You have the 
 means ; place them at my disposal, and shoot me if I do not 
 use them to advantage." 
 
PATTERSON S CAMPAIGN. 157 
 
 With such professions of a fighting spirit, the Administra 
 tion looked with some confidence for an offensive campaign, 
 and sent its best regiments and officers to take part in it. 
 Both General Scott arid General Patterson were, however, de 
 ceived in their expectation that the rebels meant to risk a bat 
 tle at that point. With a total force of something over seven 
 teen regiments, Patterson at length began his forward move 
 ment via Hagerstown and Williamsport. But so leisurely 
 were his preparations and advance, that the rebels had every 
 knowledge of his coming; and when, on June 15th, ho 
 finally reached the Potomac River, he found, instead of the 
 "desperate resistance" which had been looked for, that 
 Johnston had hastily evacuated Harper s Ferry after destroy 
 ing the railroad bridge and spiking his heavy guns, and had 
 retreated upon Winchester. 
 
 Patterson and his officers were greatly mystified by this 
 withdrawal of the enemy. "I believe it is designed for a 
 decoy," wrote Fitz John Porter, Chief of Staff, to Cadwala- 
 der, second in command. " There may be a deep-laid plot 
 to deceive us." " The whole affair is to me a riddle," wrote 
 Cadwalader back to Porter. Advancing with a painful over- 
 caution, as if Johnston were the invader, a part of the army 
 crossed the Potomac on the IGth of June. 
 
 Finding the rumor of the evacuation true, Patterson took 
 sufficient courage to report a victory. " They have fled, and 
 in confusion," he wrote. " Their retreat is as demoralizing 
 as a defeat ; and, as the leaders will never be caught, more 
 beneficial to our cause. Harper s Ferry has been retaken 
 without firing a gun." 
 
 "What movement, if any, in pursuit of the enemy, do you 
 propose to make, consequent on the evacuation of Harper s 
 Ferry ? " asked General Scott by telegraph. " Design no 
 pursuit ; cannot make it," replied Patterson. That deter- 
 
158 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 ruination necessarily ended this first part of the campaign ; 
 and General Scott thereupon ordered the extra reinforce 
 ments back to Washington. 
 
 If the evacuation of Harper s Ferry was a mystery to Pat 
 terson, it was a plain and common-sense necessity to the 
 rebel commander. Occasionally an idea finds a tenacious and 
 almost ineradicable lodgment in the public mind, without 
 a shadow of reason or truth to justify it. Because the fan 
 atic John Brown selected Harper s Ferry as the scene of his 
 wild exploit, the public mind jumped to the conclusion that 
 that spot was a natural stronghold, a Gibraltar, a Thermo 
 pylae. Now, the single mountain-line called the Blue Ridge, 
 crossing the Potomac River at Harper s Ferry, is as far from 
 being a mountain stronghold as a straight line of picket- 
 fence across a brook is from being a block-house. John 
 Brown was as unsound in war as in politics. But it would 
 seem that, even in highly civilized nations, there lingers a 
 remnant of the savage superstition that insanity is inspira 
 tion ; for strong minds caught at the suggestion that he had 
 recognized in Harper s Ferry a negro Thermopylae. 
 
 This was apparently the light in which the rebel authori 
 ties regarded the place, and its occupancy and retention was 
 made a prime object at the beginning. Jefferson Davis him 
 self sent Johnston, one of his best officers, to command it. 
 "My conversations with General Lee, in Richmond," says 
 Johnston, "and the President s [Jefferson Davis] oral in 
 structions to me in Montgomery, had informed me distinctly 
 that they regarded Harper s Ferry as a natural fortress, com 
 manding the entrance into the Valley of Virginia from Penn 
 sylvania and Maryland, and that it was occupied in that idea, 
 and my command not that of a military district and active 
 army, but of a fortress and its garrison." 
 
 "When Johnston arrived, however, and made a personal in- 
 
PATTERSON S CAMPAIGN. 
 
 159 
 
 Patterson s Campaign. 
 
160 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 spection of the neighborhood, he at once recognized the 
 error of this assumption. " There is no danger of attack in 
 front," he wrote (May 26th), "but the position is easily 
 turned by crossing the river above or below. The present 
 force is not sufficient for defence against a superior one at 
 tacking from the Virginia side. Belief, in case of invest 
 ment, could not be furnished. Considered as a position, I 
 regard Harper s Ferry as untenable against a strong enemy. 
 We have outposts at the Point of Rocks, near the ferry at 
 Williamsport, and the bridge at Shepherdstown, the extreme 
 points being at least thirty miles apart." Two days later he 
 repeated his statement, his engineer reporting that " to hold 
 this post, then, either as a fortress, a point d appui, or as a 
 condition of the defence of the Virginia Valley, we require a 
 force of from twelve to fifteen thousand men." 
 
 Lee did not relish the alternative ; he sent him two addi 
 tional regiments, and wrote him that the abandonment of 
 Harper s Ferry "would be depressing to the cause of the 
 South." But Johnston held stubbornly to his opinion, and 
 wrote on June 6th, that, though the abandonment of Harper s 
 Ferry might be depressing to the cause of the South, the loss 
 of five or six thousand men would be more so. "And if 
 they remain here," he added, " they must be captured or 
 destroyed veiy soon after General McClellan s arrival in the 
 valley." The opinion was evidently based on the current 
 rumors that McClellan would bring Western troops to join 
 Patterson. 
 
 This decided warning had its effect on the rebel authori 
 ties, and under date of June 13th they authorized Johnston 
 to retire upon Winchester, after destroying everything at 
 Harper s Ferry, "whenever the position of the enemy shall 
 convince you that he is about to turn your position." But 
 they coupled the permission with another strong reminder : 
 
PATTERSON S CAMPAIGN. Id 
 
 "The position of Harper s Ferry, as lias been heretofore 
 stated, is deemed valuable because of its relation to Mary 
 land and as the entrance to the Valley of Virginia, the pos 
 session of which by the enemy will separate the eastern and 
 western sections of the State from each other, deprive us of 
 the agricultural resources of that fertile region, and bring in 
 its train political consequences which it is well believed you 
 cannot contemplate without the most painful emotions." 
 With Patterson on the point of moving against him, how 
 ever, Johnston allowed political consequences to take care of 
 themselves, destroyed Harper s Ferry on June 13th and 14th, 
 and retired even before his permission was received. " We 
 are twelve miles in advance of Winchester," he reported on 
 the 17th ; " my only hope from this movement is a slight 
 delay in the enemy s advance. I believe his force to bo 
 about eighteen thousand ; ours is six thousand five hundred." 
 Patterson admits that he had seventeen regiments a force 
 fully capable of the brilliant and important blow he had 
 been ambitious to strike, but which he had neither the skill 
 nor courage to direct. 
 
 The succeeding two weeks furnish no incidents worthy of 
 note in this connection. Practically the two armies re 
 mained in observation, inactive, and without definite plans. 
 Wlien General Scott withdrew the temporary reinforcements 
 he had given Patterson to enable him to fight a battle, the 
 latter once more retired to the north bank of the Potomac. 
 For the moment military attention was directed elsewhere. 
 McClellan w r as preparing his campaign in West Virginia ; 
 McDowell was strengthening the Federal occupation of 
 Arlington Heights and Alexandria ; the President and 
 General Scott were deliberating upon possible operations 
 against Manassas. In this interim Johnston remained in 
 camp about Winchester, pushing his picket-line close up 
 11 
 
162 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 to the Potomac, and keeping himself well informed by scouts 
 and spies. Meanwhile the Confederate authorities, still 
 anxious to hold the Shenandoah Valley, and having also in 
 view a possible junction with Beauregard at Manassas, sent 
 forward reinforcements which raised Johnston s army to the 
 effective strength of nine thousand, besides twenty -five hun 
 dred local militia in process of organization. 
 
 Toward the end of June a movement against Manassas was 
 resolved on at Washington. As a preliminary, General Scott 
 once more suggested a definite task to Patterson. "Ke- 
 main in front of the enemy," he telegraphed on June 25th, 
 " while he continues in force between "Winchester and the 
 Potomac. If you are in superior or equal force, you may 
 cross and offer him battle." Two days later he gave further 
 emphasis to the suggestion by saying, " I had expected your 
 crossing the river to-day in pursuit of the enemy." But 
 Patterson complained that Johnston outnumbered him, and 
 clamored for reinforcements and batteries. Reinforcements 
 and batteries were ordered to join him., and he was also in 
 formed of the intended movement on Manassas ; upon which 
 he again put on a bold front and crossed the Potomac at 
 Williamsport, moving to Martinsburg, with sufficient oppo 
 sition to bring on a smart skirmish at Falling Waters, the 
 enemy retiring toward Winchester as he advanced. 
 
 From this point, during the short time he yet remained in 
 command, Patterson s military conduct becomes the subject 
 of criticism and controversy. It is military usage perhaps 
 military necessity establishes the usage that orders and di 
 rections from superior to subordinate officers are conveyed in 
 brief words expressing or suggesting only the objects to be 
 accomplished, and leaving methods largely at the discretion 
 of him who has to perform the task. Following this estab 
 lished usage, General Scott, by his orders and directions 
 
PATTERSON S CAMPAIGN. 163 
 
 from July 1st to the 13th, informed Patterson that McDowell 
 would make an advance against Beauregard, and that John 
 ston must be defeated or detained in the Shenandoah Valley, 
 in order that their two armies might not unite and defeat 
 McDowell. " I telegraphed to you yesterday," was Scott s 
 language, " if not strong enough to beat the enemy early 
 next week, make demonstrations so as to detain him in the 
 valley of Winchester ; but if he retreats in force toward 
 Manassas, and it be too hazardous to follow him, then con 
 sider the route via Key s Ferry, Leesburg, etc." That Pat 
 terson correctly understood the order is shown by his reply : 
 " I have thus far succeeded in keeping in this vicinity the 
 command under General Johnston, who is now pretending 
 to be engaged in fortifying at Winchester, but prepared to 
 retire beyond striking distance if I should advance too far. 
 To-morrow I advance to Bunker Hill preparatory to the other 
 movement. If an opportunity offers, I shall attack ; but, un 
 less I can rout, shall be careful not to set him in full retreat 
 upon Strasburg." 
 
 But the wishes of the Administration and General Scott 
 were not allowed to depend alone on the customary orders. 
 Patterson s former indecision and hesitancy had created a 
 doubt of his disposition to fight ; and a similar hesitancy 
 was once more manifesting itself in his complaints, requests, 
 and especially in his growing exaggeration of his antago 
 nist s strength. It is always deemed hazardous to change 
 commanders on the eve of battle, and therefore the alterna 
 tive was adopted of sending General Sandford to him with 
 additional reinforcements ; who, waiving his rank, should 
 take command under Patterson, and prompt him in pushing 
 forward the army. Sandford, accepting the duty, reported to 
 Patterson with four regiments from Washington, about July 
 10th ; the independent column under General Stone also 
 
 TTf 
 
164 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 joined him immediately afterward, so that Patterson s army 
 now numbered eighteen thousand two hundred according 
 to his own estimate, or over twenty-two thousand according 
 to the estimate of others, opposed to the rebel army, which, 
 altogether, Johnston states to have been less than twelve 
 thousand men. 
 
 It would appear that at this time two impulses struggled 
 for mastery in Patterson s mind. Apparently he was both 
 seeking and avoiding a battle. He had called a council of 
 war at Martinsburg on the 9th ; and verifying the military 
 adage that a council of war never fights, his officers had ad 
 vised him that he was on a " false line," and that he could 
 most advantageously threaten Johnston from Charlestown. 
 Accordingly, on July 12th, Patterson asked permission to 
 transfer his forces to that line ; while a dispatch from Gene 
 ral Scott of the same date, in reply to a former letter, in sub 
 stance accorded him the permission, but accompanied it 
 with the significant reminder : " Consider this suggestion 
 well, and except in an extreme case do not recross the Poto 
 mac with more than a sufficient detachment for your sup 
 plies on the canal." 
 
 Such a movement upon Charlestown, made promptly at 
 that date and under the then existing conditions, might have 
 been judicious. But Patterson s dispatches show that from 
 this on he found nothing but reasons for fear and justifica 
 tion for inaction and retreat. He wanted a regiment of reg 
 ulars ; he said the time of the three months regiments was 
 about to expire ; that his men were barefooted ; that the 
 enemy was reinforced and fortified ; that " to attack under 
 such circumstances, against the greatly superior force at 
 Winchester, is most hazardous." 
 
 Under these renewed manifestations of timidity General 
 Scott s patience began to give way, and he now sent Patter- 
 
PATTERSON S CAMPAIGN. 165 
 
 son two prompting telegrams, which ought to have warmed 
 the sluggish blood of even sixty-nine years to action. " Do 
 not let the enemy amuse and delay you with a small force in 
 front," he telegraphed July 17th, " whilst he reinforces the 
 [Manassas] Junction with his main body. McDowell s first 
 ilay s work has driven the enemy beyond Fairfax Court 
 House. The Junction will probably bo carried to-morrow." 
 And again on the following day : " I have certainly been ex 
 pecting you to beat the enemy. If not, to hear that you had 
 felt him strongly, or, at least, had occupied him by threats 
 and demonstrations. You have been at least his equal, and 
 I suppose superior in numbers. Has he not stolen a march 
 and sent reinforcements toward Manassas Junction ? A 
 week is enough to win victories." Unfortunately, Patterson, 
 even before he received the first of these, had already com 
 mitted the fatal military blunder of a retreat. But the 
 questions were so searching, and so x>lainly conveyed a rep 
 rimand, that he replied in a tone of offended dignity : "The 
 enemy has stolen no march upon me. I have kept him 
 actively employed, and, by threats and reconnoissances in 
 force, caused him to be re-enforced. I have accomplished in 
 this respect more than the General-in-Chief asked, or could 
 well be expected in face of an enemy far superior in num 
 bers, with no line of communication to protect." The 
 answer was admirable in form and spirit, but it lacked the 
 essential element of correctness. The enemy did not out 
 number him was, in fact, only two-thirds as strong and 
 was at that moment actually making a rapid " stolen march " 
 to Manassas, which Patterson did not discover till two days 
 afterward. 
 
 Understanding fully, both from General Scott s telegrams 
 and General Sandford s personal explanations, that an ad 
 vance against Manassas Junction was in progress, which 
 
166 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 would lead to a heavy battle between McDowell and Beaure- 
 gard, Patterson had moved from Martinsburg on July 15th, 
 directly toward Johnston at Winchester, as far as Bunker 
 Hill, within nine miles of the enemy. On the following day 
 he ordered a slight reconnoissance. Until the night of the 
 16th it was believed by his officers that the advance meant 
 fight. Every one understood that the critical moment had 
 come, or was at hand. The time for elaborate strategy or 
 new combinations had passed. Confronting the enemy 
 there were but three alternatives admissible under his im 
 perative duty : to hold him, to fight him, or to follow him. 
 
 It is sad to relate that, with the complete advantage of 
 numbers and position, he did neither. In justice to him, 
 however, it should always be remembered that his personal 
 instinct was right, and .that he was led into his fatal error 
 mainly by the influence of his chief-of-staff, Fitz John Por 
 ter. His senior aid-de-camp, in his testimony before the 
 Committee on the Conduct of the War, relates the circum 
 stances under which he took his final decision : 
 
 " At one time, General Patterson had given an order to 
 move from Bunker Hill to Winchester. He was very unwil 
 ling to leave Johnston, even at Winchester, without attacking 
 him ; and on the afternoon before w r e left Bunker Hill he 
 decided to attack him, notwithstanding his strong force. 
 
 " Question. Behind his intrenchments ? 
 
 " Answer. Yes, sir ; it went so far that his order was 
 written by his assistant adjutant-general, Colonel Porter. 
 It w r as veiy much against the wishes of Colonel Porter, and 
 he asked General Patterson if he would send for Colonel 
 Abercrombie and Colonel Thomas, and consult them on the 
 movement. General Patterson replied: No, sir; for I 
 know they will attempt to dissuade me from it, and I have 
 made up my mind to fight Johnston under all circum- 
 
PATTERSON S CAMPAIGN. 167 
 
 stances. That was the day before we left Bunker Hill. 
 Then Colonel Porter asked to have Colonel Abercrombie 
 and Colonel Thomas sent for and consulted as to the best 
 manner to cany out his wishes. He consented, and they 
 came, and after half an hour they dissuaded him from it." 
 
 With his intentions thus changed, Patterson late that 
 night ordered a retrograde movement; and the next day, 
 July 17th, his army marched to Chaiiestown nominally as a 
 flank movement, but practically in retreat, since it about 
 doubled the distance between himself and the enemy. It 
 adds neither excuse nor credit to himself or hivS advising 
 subordinates that, as a partial justification, they had gulped 
 down an absurd rumor about the enemy being forty thou 
 sand strong, without taking any efficient means to ascertain 
 its correctness. And so lifeless and inefficient had tho 
 whole army become under such influences and management, 
 that not till July 20th did Patterson learn the humiliating 
 fact that he had wrecked the fair military reputation of a 
 lifetime by permitting the enemy to escape through utterly 
 inexcusable lack of energy and want of judgment. And if 
 that reflection could be still further embittered, it was done 
 by the early realization that his stupendous blunder had lost 
 to the Union cause Hie first important battle of the war. 
 
 Johnston was at "Winchester, in daily anticipation of Pat 
 terson s attack, when, a little after midnight of July 17th, 
 lie received orders from the Confederate authorities to go at 
 once to the help of Beauregard. Just twenty- four hours had 
 elapsed since Patterson s order to retreat, and the Union 
 army was already at Charlestown. By nine o clock on tho 
 morning of July 18th, Johnston s scouts brought him reports 
 indicating clearly the actual situation. At noon of that day 
 he had his whole effective force of nine thousand men on 
 the march ; at nightfall his advance passed through Ashby s 
 
168 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 Gap of the Blue Kidge; by eight o clock on the 19th it 
 was at Piedmont, the nearest station of the Manassas Gap 
 Railroad, and embarking here in cars, seven regiments were 
 in Beauregard s camp, at Manassas, that afternoon. John 
 ston himself, with another detachment, arrived at Manassas 
 at noon of Saturday, July 20th ; and most of the remainder 
 of his force reached the battle-field of Bull Eun in the nick 
 of time to take a decisive part in that famous conflict, about 
 three o clock on Sunday, July 21st. It was these nine thou 
 sand men of Johnston s army which not merely decided, but 
 principally fought the battle. Patterson could and ought 
 either to have defeated or held them at "Winchester, Only 
 a little more than a month had elapsed since he had written 
 to the Secretary of War, "Give me the means of success. 
 You have the means ; place them at my disposal, and shoot 
 me if I do not use them to advantage." He would have 
 fared ill under a literal enforcement of his own offer. 
 
CHAPTEK XIV. 
 
 MANASSAS. 
 
 ON the 23d of May, 1861, according to the conspirators 
 programme, Virginia was put through the dumb show of 
 indorsing the Secession Ordinance by a nominal popular 
 vote; and almost immediately thereafter, about June 1st, 
 the Confederate seat of government was transferred from 
 Montgomery to Richmond. The reasons for this course 
 were palpable ; it gratified the local pride of the Old 
 Dominion secessionists; it gave the reins of local military 
 domination definitely into Jefferson Davis personal grasp ; 
 it placed him on the most advantageous frontier to meet the 
 expected Union advance from Washington. This, as previ 
 ously related, had already seized upon Alexandria and Ar 
 lington Heights, which were now being extensively fortified. 
 Making a short speech to a serenade on the evening of June 
 1st, the rebel chief announced that Virginia was "to become 
 the theatre of a great central camp, from which will pour 
 forth thousands of brave hearts to roll back the tide of this 
 despotism." 
 
 The local campaign had already taken shape before his 
 arrival. Since Lee was placed in command he had followed 
 a policy which looked less to the capture of Baltimore than 
 to the obstruction of the Potomac. His first and principal 
 task had been to organize the volunteers which Gover- 
 1. 8 
 
170 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 nor Letcher called into service; and the earliest levies of 
 Northern Virginia were posted at Manassas Junction, where 
 railroads from Eichmond, from Alexandria, and from the 
 Shenandoah Valley met. On examination, its strategical 
 value was found to be much greater than was suspected at 
 the beginning ; Colonel Cocke, the local commander, first 
 pointed out to Lee its important relation to the Shenandoah 
 Valley. " These two columns," he writes, under date of May 
 15th, "one at Manassas and one at Winchester, could readily 
 co-operate and concentrate upon the one point or the other, 
 either to make head against the enemy s columns advancing 
 down the valley, should he force Harper s Ferry ; or, in case 
 we repulse him at Harper s Ferry, the Winchester support 
 ing column could throw itself on this side of the mountains, 
 to co-operate with the column at Manassas." 
 
 With the great increase of Federal troops at Washington, 
 and their seizure of Alexandria and Arlington Heights, the 
 post at Manassas Junction became of such prominence and 
 importance, that Beauregard was sent to take command of it 
 about June 1st. Beauregard was an officer of curiously un 
 equal merit : thoroughly educated, and highly skilful in the 
 science and art of military engineering, he had little capacity 
 for administration, or sound judgment in the conception of 
 large field-operations. Giddy to intoxication with laudation 
 for his cheap victory at Surnter, he now invited upon his 
 own head the contempt of the world, and of history, by pub 
 lishing a proclamation in which, without provocation, he 
 charged the Union armies to have abandoned " all rules of 
 civilized warfare," and to have made "Beauty and Booty" 
 their war-cry. His next exploit was to excite the distrust of 
 the Richmond authorities upon his military ability, by pro 
 posing a series of aggressive movements intended to annihi 
 late the Union armies and capture Washington ; liable, how- 
 
MANASSAS. 171 
 
 ever, to the objection, noted thereon by Jefferson Davis, that 
 " the plan was based on the improbable and inadmissible 
 supposition that the enemy was to await everywhere, isolated 
 and motionless, until our forces could effect junctions to 
 attack them in detail." Meanwhile he rendered his superi 
 ors a real service in pointing out that the defence of his 
 position should be made, not with earthworks at Manassas, 
 but with troops on the line of Bull Kun, and for this he was 
 urgent in demanding large reinforcements. 
 
 As has been already mentioned, it was General Scott s 
 opinion that the Government ought not to engage in any 
 military undertakings with the three months volunteers, be 
 yond those to which these forces had been already assigned 
 and distributed, namely : to protect Washington and fortify 
 Arlington Heights ; to garrison Fort Monroe and, if chance 
 should offer, recapture the Gosport Navy Yard at Norfolk ; 
 to hold Baltimore and Maryland ; to prosecute Patterson s 
 campaign against Harper s Ferry ; to recover West Virginia 
 through McClellan s campaign ; to guard the Ohio line, and 
 control Kentucky and Missouri. Larger and more distant 
 operations, he believed, ought to be undertaken only with 
 new armies formed of the three years volunteers, giving the 
 summer to drill and preparation, and entering on combined 
 movements in the favorable autumn weather. 
 
 Important reasons, partly military, partly political, con 
 flicted with so deliberate a programme. As events had 
 shaped themselves, it seemed necessary to aid Patterson. 
 The possibility that Beauregard and Johnston might unite 
 their armies was clearly enough perceived ; hence, a column 
 to threaten Manassas was proposed. Indications were also 
 manifesting themselves that rebel batteries at narrow places 
 might soon seriously embarrass the navigation of the Poto 
 mac. Chiefly, however, the highly excited patriotism of the 
 
172 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 North, eager to wipe out national insult and vindicate 
 national authority, was impatient of what seemed tedious 
 delay. The echoes of the Sumter bombardment were yet in 
 the air ; the blood on the Baltimore paving-stones was cry 
 ing loudly to heaven. For half a century the nation had 
 felt no close experience of war. The conquests of peace had 
 grown almost miraculous in speed and certainty. Eivers 
 and mountains, distance and time, had become the obedient 
 ministers of creative ingenuity and bold enterprise. Forget 
 ting that the achievements of peace encountered the oppos 
 ing obstacles, not of man, but of nature alone, the North de 
 manded speedy as well as signal redress. It saw rebellion 
 enthroned in the capital of Virginia; it saw a numerous 
 Union army gathered at Washington ; the newspapers raised 
 the cry of " On to Richmond ; " and the popular heart beat 
 in quick and well-nigh unanimous response to the slogan. 
 Latterly a detachment sent out by General Butler from 
 Fortress Monroe had met a repulse at Great Bethel, and near 
 "Washington a railroad-train under General Schenck had ran 
 into an ambush at Vienna station ; both were trifling losses, 
 but at the moment supremely irritating to the pride of the 
 North, and the fires of patriotic" resentment once more 
 blazed up with fresh intensity. 
 
 General Scott s first project of an expedition against 
 Manassas was made about the beginning of June, the object 
 then being not to fight a battle, but merely make a threaten 
 ing diversion to aid Patterson. There were at that time only 
 some six thousand rebels at Manassas, according to Beaure- 
 gard s report. Before the design could take final shape, 
 Johnston had evacuated Harper s Ferry, and Patterson s 
 first movement was thereby terminated. This occurred 
 about the middle of June. 
 
 From that time on, the plan grew into the idea of a larger 
 
MAN ASS AS. 173 
 
 and more decisive movement. Beanregard was receiving 
 large reinforcements ; nevertheless, the strength of the 
 Union army at Washington was such that it seemed entirely 
 possible to provide every chance of success. McDowell, 
 raised in rank from the grade of major to that of brigadier- 
 general, and placed in command at Arlington Heights, sub 
 mitted a formal plan, at the request of the General-in-Chief, 
 about June 24th. His plan assumed that the secession forces 
 at Manassas and its dependencies would number twenty-five 
 thousand ; that they would unavoidably become apprised of 
 the movement, and every effort would be made to increase 
 Beauregard s strength ; but that " if General J. E. John 
 ston s force is kept engaged by Major-General Patterson, 
 and Major-General Butler occupies the force now in his 
 vicinity (Fortress Monroe), I think they will not be able to 
 bring up more than ten thousand men." Against such an 
 array he proposed to move with a force of thirty thousand of 
 all arms, and a reserve of ten thousand. 
 
 The project was elaborately discussed, and finally agreed 
 upon, at a council of war at the Executive Mansion, on June 
 29th, in which President Lincoln, his Cabinet, and the prin 
 cipal military officers took part. As already mentioned, 
 General Scott was opposed to the undertaking ; but, after it 
 was once resolved upon, he joined with hearty good-will in 
 every effort to make it a success. McDowell was emphatic 
 in his protest that he could not hope to beat the combined 
 armies of Johnston and Beauregard ; upon which Scott gave 
 him the distinct assurance : " If Johnston joins Beauregard, 
 he shall have Patterson on his heels." With this understand 
 ing, the movement was ordered to begin a week from that 
 day. 
 
 The enterprise did not escape the usual fate of unforeseen 
 delay ; it marks great energy in McDowell that his expedi- 
 
174 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 tion was only deferred a little over a week beyond the ap 
 pointed time. On the 16th of July he issued his orders to 
 march that afternoon. His army was organized as follows : 
 
 First Division, commanded by TYLEK : an. aggregate of 
 9,936 men, divided into four brigades, respectively under 
 Keyes, Schenck, Sherman, and Richardson. 
 
 Second Division, commanded by HUNTER : an aggregate of 
 2,648 men, divided into two brigades, under Porter and 
 Burnside. 
 
 Third Division, commanded by HEINTZELMAN : an aggre 
 gate of 9,777 men, divided into three brigades, under Frank 
 lin, Willcox, and Howard. 
 
 Fourth Division, commanded by EUNYON : an aggregate of 
 5,752 men ; no brigade commanders. 
 
 Fifth Division, commanded by MILES : an aggregate of 6,207 
 men, divided into two brigades, under Blenker and Davies. 
 
 Thus, the total of his command, not including four regi 
 ments left in the Alexandria and Arlington forts, was 34,320 
 men. From this number, however, Runyon s division may 
 at once be deducted ; it was left behind to guard his com 
 munications, its most advanced regiment being seven miles 
 in rear of Centreville. McDowell s actual moving column 
 may therefore be said to have consisted of 28,568 * men, in 
 cluding artillery, a total of forty-nine guns, and a single bat 
 talion of cavalry. 
 
 * From this number it is entirely just to make yet another deduction. The 
 period of enlistment of the Fourth Pennsylv.inia Regiment, and of Captain Va- 
 rian s Battery of (New York) Light Artillery having expired, they were dis 
 charged by official order at Centreville, July 20th, the day before the battle. 
 
 It will thus be seen that, instea i of the thirty thousand he asked for, McDowell 
 had, perhaps, less than twenty-eight thousand men, with forty-nine guns ; and 
 official reports show that, instead of the thirty-five thousand rebels he expected 
 to meet at Manassas, there were on the field thirty-two thousand men, with 
 fifty-seven guns less than his estimate, but about four thousand more than his 
 own army. 
 
MAN ASS AS. 175 
 
 Of all machines, an army develops, perhaps, the greatest 
 inefficiency from mere friction, or the greatest usefulness 
 from action and thoroughness of organization. The value 
 of a veteran consists as much of his habitual expertness in 
 the routine of camp and march, as of coolness and confidence 
 under fire. Two principal causes rendered the advance 
 very slow. The first was the want of practice in marching. 
 "They stopped every moment to pick blackberries or get 
 water," says McDowell ; " they would not keep in the ranks, 
 order as much as you pleased ; when they came where water 
 was fresh, they would pour the old water out of their can 
 teens, and fill them with fresh water ; they were not used to 
 denying themselves much ; they were not used to journeys 
 on foot." The second cause was, perhaps, yet more potent. 
 " The affair of Big Bethel and Vienna had created a great 
 outcry against rushing into places that people did not know 
 anything about. I think the idea of every one was that we 
 were to go into no such things as that that we were to feel 
 our way," again says McDowell. Precaution on this point 
 was particularly emphasized in his instructions. " The three 
 following things," says his marching order, "will not be par 
 donable in any commander : 1st, to come upon a battery or 
 breastwork without a knowledge of its position ; 2d, to be 
 surprised; 3d, to fall back." Moving forward with such 
 painful wariness, a surprise of the enemy was, of course, 
 equally out of the question. In obedience to Beauregard s 
 orders, his outposts everywhere retired, though, in several 
 instances, with such precipitation as to leave their tents, 
 knapsacks, and even their freshly cooked rations behind. 
 
 Manassas Junction lies thirty-five miles southwest of 
 Washington, on a high, open plateau ; there the rebels had 
 some slight field-works, armed with fourteen or fifteen 
 heavy guns, and garrisoned by about two thousand men. 
 
176 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 Bull Run flows in a southeasterly direction, some three 
 miles east of Manassas, with wooded heights coming gen 
 erally close up to its west bank. The stream is winding and 
 sluggish, and, though here and there it has steep, sometimes 
 precipitous and rocky banks, it is fordable in many places. 
 Beauregard s main army, increased now to over twenty thou 
 sand, was posted at the various fords of Bull Run, in a line 
 some eight miles long, and extending from, the Manassas 
 Railroad to the Stone Bridge on the Warreuton turnpike.* 
 
 * At Union Mills Ford, Swell s brigade of three regiments ; at McLean s Ford, 
 Jones brigade of three regiments ; at Blackburn s Ford, Longstreet s brigade 
 of five regiments ; above Mitchell s Ford, Bonham s brigade of five regiments ; 
 at Lewis Ford, Cocke s brigade of portions of six regiments ; at Stone Bridge, 
 Evans demi-brigade of a regiment and a half ; Early s brigade of four regiments 
 was posted as a reserve in rear and support of Longstreet and Jones. All the 
 above, together with some seven other regiments and portions, not brigaded, con 
 stituted Beauregard s "Army of the Potomac." His official report states the 
 total effective, on the morning of the battle (July 21st), to have been 21,833, and 
 29 guns. 
 
 Holmes brigade, an independent command ordered up from Acquia Creek, 
 consisted of two regiments, reported by Beauregard at a total of 1,355, and 6 
 guns. It was posted as a support for Evvell. 
 
 Johnston s "Army of the Shenandoah " consisted of Jackson s brigade of five 
 regiments, posted as a support for Bonham ; and Bee s brigade of four regiments, 
 posted as a support for Cocke. These had arrived and were in camp on the 
 morning of the battle (July 21st). Beauregard reports their round number?, 
 ready for action, at 6,000 men and 20 guns. In addition, there arrived at 
 Manassas about noon, and on the battle-field between two and four o clock, 
 Fisher s Sixth North Carolina, 634, and Kirby Smith s brigade (afterward led by 
 Elzey), of 1,700 men and 2 guns ; and also Hill s Virginia Kegiment, 550. 
 
 Men. Guns. 
 
 Recapitulation : Beauregard s army 21,833 29 
 
 Johnston s army 8,884 22 
 
 Holmes 1 brigade 1,355 6 
 
 32,072 57 
 
 To which may be added sundry detachments, the numbers of which are not given 
 in official reports. 
 
MANASSAS. 
 
 177 
 
 It was McDowell s intention to turn this position on the 
 South. To conceal his purpose, and create the impression 
 of a contemplated attack in front, he directed his march upon 
 Centreville on the Warrcnton turnpike. On Thursday morn- 
 
 Bull Run The Field of Strategy. 
 
 ing, July 18th, Tyler moved upon Centreville, but, arriving 
 there at nine o clock, he found that it, too, had been evacu 
 ated, and that Beauregard s entire army was behind Bull 
 Run. Centreville being situated on a hill, Tyler could see 
 the whole valley spread out before him, with Manassas on 
 12 
 
178 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 the high plateau beyond. The main body of the enemy, he 
 learned, had retired down the road running directly toward 
 that point, crossing the stream at Mitchell s and Blackburn s 
 fords. 
 
 Tyler s unopposed advance had perhaps inspired him and 
 his officers with an over-confidence or undue elation ; per 
 haps it suggested the belief that the enemy did not feel 
 strong enough to make a stand. Under instructions to 
 " observe well the roads," but to bring on no engagement, 
 it occurred to him to make a reconnoissance in the direction 
 of the retreat. 
 
 As often happens under such circumstances, the spirit of 
 combat overcame discretion. Accompanied by Richardson, 
 one of his brigade commanders, Tyler first went out with 
 a squadron of cavalry and two companies of light infantry, 
 Finding a favorable situation to try artillery, they sent back 
 for a batteiy, and Eichardson s brigade to support it. About 
 noon of the 18th they were within a mile of Blackburn s ford. 
 Then followed the ever-recurring experience of such affairs. 
 First, an experimental cannonade from, a couple of field- 
 pieces, before which the enemy s guns retired; next the 
 advance of a skirmish-line, before which the enemy s skir 
 mishers retired ; then an advance of some of the field-pieces 
 and the planting of a stronger battery ; the posting of a 
 regiment to support the skirmishers, and, soon after, the 
 posting of the entire brigade to support the regiment, fol 
 lowed by calling up a reserve brigade to support the first. 
 Thus the afternoon s work drifted quickly from a reconnois 
 sance to a skirmish, and from a skirmish to a preliminary 
 battle. It was not until some sixty men had fallen, until 
 the two exposed field-pieces were with difficulty extricated, 
 until one regiment had retreated in confusion and the other 
 
MANASSAS. 179 
 
 three were deployed in line of battle to make a new charge, 
 that Tyler heeded his instructions, and withdrew his reluc 
 tant officers and men from the fight, partly demoralized and 
 generally exasperated, and returned to Centreville. In point 
 of fact, the loss, the damage, the demoralization, had been 
 equal on both sides. The rebel reports show that three regi 
 ments of Longstreet s brigade, which bore the first assault, 
 were so much shaken that Eaiiy s reserve brigade of three 
 fresh regiments was called up and relieved them, that one of 
 these regiments was thrown into confusion, and that the rebel 
 loss was sixty-three killed and wounded. Undecisive as it was, 
 the battle of Blackburn s Ford had an important effect. It 
 confirmed Beauregard in his previous impression that the 
 principal Union attack would be made at that point on the 
 centre of his long line. On the other hand, McDowell, receiv 
 ing from his officers reports of rifle-pits and breastworks, be 
 came convinced that a direct assault was unwise. The affair of 
 Blackburn s Ford thus proved something more than a pre 
 liminary defeat ; it augmented the causes of a great disaster. 
 Upon hearing the cannonade, McDowell had immediately 
 ordered all the divisions forward to Centreville. He had 
 already in his own mind given up the plan of turning the 
 enemy s right, because of the unfavorable nature of the ground 
 and roads. The necessity of finding an unfortified crossing 
 seemed now also demonstrated. Meeting his division com 
 manders at Centreville, that same night of Thursday, July 
 18th, McDowell informed them confidentially that he had 
 abandoned his original plan, and had resolved to make the 
 attack by marching northward and turning Beauregard s left 
 flank instead of his right. 
 
 As an incident of this resolve, however, it was even more 
 essential than before to continue to threaten the enemy s 
 
180 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 centre ; and thus Eichardson s brigade was once more posted 
 in the direction of Blackburn s Ford. Meanwhile the engi 
 neers were busy all of Friday and Saturday in efforts to find 
 an unfortified ford over Bull Run. They were not success 
 ful till a late hour on Saturday ; and this delay deferred the 
 main battle till Sunday, July 21st. Could a similar attack 
 have been made a day earlier, the result would probably 
 have beeii altogether different. 
 
CHAPTER XV. 
 
 BULL RUN. 
 
 AT Centreville, on Saturday night, McDowell called his 
 officers together and announced to them his plan of battle 
 for the following day. The Warrenton turnpike ran almost 
 directly west from Centreville to Gainesville station on the 
 railroad. He was yet unaware that Johnston had joined 
 Beauregard, and sought to prevent such junction by seizing 
 Gainesville. Beauregard s army lay in detachments behind 
 Bull Kun, at five different fords, along a line of eight miles. 
 His left and northernmost flank was at the stone bridge 
 where Warrenton turnpike crosses Bull Bun, though Mc 
 Dowell supposed it to extend to the first ford above. The 
 bridge was a solid stone structure of two arches, of consider 
 able size and height, connecting the precipitous and rocky 
 eastern bank of the stream with a broad piece of level bottom 
 land on the west. The bridge was thought to be defended 
 in force, and said to be prepared for blowing up. The en 
 gineers had information, however, that Sudley Ford, two or 
 three miles above, could be readily carried and crossed by 
 an attacking column. McDowell therefore ordered that 
 Tyler, with the heaviest division, should advance from Cen 
 treville directly to Stone Bridge, three and a half miles dis 
 tant, and make a feigned attack ; while Hunter and Heintzel- 
 man should make a secret and circuitous night march north- 
 
182 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 ward, cross Sudley Ford, and, rapidly descending on tho 
 enemy s side of Bull Kun, should clear away the batteries at 
 the stone bridge by a rear attack, and thus enable Tyler s 
 division to cross and join in the combined march on Gaines 
 ville, or continue the attack on Beauregard s left. If the 
 stone bridge were blown up, the engineers had timbers 
 ready to repair it. The division of Miles should remain in 
 reserve at Centreville, and the brigade of Eichardson con 
 tinue to threaten Blackburn s Ford. 
 
 In the rebel camp, the Confederate commanders were at 
 the same time equally intent on a scheme of their own to 
 attack and surprise McDowell. No sooner had Johnston 
 arrived at Manassas with the second detachment of the Army 
 of the Shenandoah, about noon of Saturday, July 20th, than 
 Beauregard explained to him the character and course of 
 Bull Run, and the situation of the five principal fords be 
 hind which his various brigades were posted ; and since a 
 practicable road from each of these five fords converged upon 
 Centreville, he proposed a simultaneous advance and attack 
 on the Union army, in its camps, early Sunday morning. 
 
 Johnston, who now as ranking officer assumed command, 
 adopted Beauregard s plan. Part of the Army of the Shen 
 andoah had arrived before and with him ; the remainder was 
 expected that night. He had every reason to suppose that 
 Patterson would promptly follow him to join McDowell. 
 To secure the fruit of his own movement, he must therefore 
 crush McDowell before Patterson could arrive. The orders 
 for such an advance and attack were duly written out, and 
 Johnston signed his approval of them in the gray twilight 
 of Sunday morning. 
 
 An hour or two, however, revealed to him the uselessness 
 of these orders, on which the ink was scarcely dry. At sun 
 rise he heard Tyler s signal-guns, and soon received notice 
 
BULL RUN. 183 
 
 that McDowell had taken the offensive. The remainder of 
 his Army of the Shenandoah had not arrived, as he hoped. 
 Under these circumstances his plan of attack must be aban 
 doned. Beauregard thereupon proposed a modification of 
 the plan to attack with their right from the region of 
 Blackburn s Ford, and to stand on the defensive with their 
 left in the neighborhood of the stone bridge. This sugges 
 tion, again, Johnston adopted and ordered to be carried out. 
 
 But the Union forces had already taken the initiative. A 
 little past midnight McDowell s army was astir, and the 
 three designated divisions started. Unluckily, at the very 
 outset, Hunter and Heintzelman were delayed two or three 
 hours by the first division not getting out of its camps in 
 time, and failing to clear the road for them. The route 
 proved unexpectedly long ; it was nine o clock when the ad- 
 yance reached Sudloy Ford. The crossing, however, was 
 not opposed, and was easily effected. From the ford the 
 Sudley road ran south toward Manassas, crossing the War- 
 renton turnpike at right angles about a mile and a quarter 
 west of the stone bridge. A little stream, called Young s 
 Branch, also crosses both roads at this intersection, makes a 
 circle to the northeast, and, returning, flows to the southeast 
 into Bull Run. This was the destined battle-field. 
 
 It happened that the stone bridge was but slenderly de 
 fended. The timber had been felled to form a heavy abattis 
 behind the bridge ; but Evans, the rebel officer in charge, 
 had only a regiment and a half, with four guns, for his en 
 tire guard. Tyler appeared in force before the bridge, and 
 began his demonstration ; but made it so feebly that Evans 
 soon became convinced no real assault was intended ; and 
 having learned the actual crossing at Sudley Ford, he at 
 about nine o clock withdrew all but four companies and two 
 guns from the bridge, and hastened to the rear to throw 
 
184 
 
 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION. 
 
 himself across Hunter s path. The Union approach having 
 become plainly discernible, Evans posted his eleven com 
 panies on the ridge immediately north of the Warrenton 
 turnpike and Young s Branch, his left resting on the Sud- 
 ley road, with one gun at his left, and the other some dis- 
 
 Bull Run Battle of the Forenoon.* 
 
 tance behind his right, on the point of a hill south of 
 Young s Branch. 
 
 * In these maps the topographical features are copied from the accurate official 
 maps published by the Engineer Bureau of the War Department. The position 
 of the troops is of course only conjectural, but based on the descriptions and 
 inferences in the official reports of both armies. 
 
BULL RUN. 185 
 
 At ten o clock Hunter s advance emerged from the woods 
 into open fields, about a mile north of the Warrenton turn 
 pike, the scattering shots of the skirmishers having already 
 opened the conflict. On both sides everything was raw and 
 awkward officers and men, staff and line. There was 
 undue excitement and impetuosity, mixed with unnecessary 
 confusion and delay. None of the reports specify how the 
 battle began ; the mere momentum of the march seems to 
 have carried the advance regiments under the first shower of 
 rebel shells and bullets at distances varying from five hun 
 dred to one thousand yards. A preliminary artillery duel 
 sprang up, under which Burnside led his four regiments 
 after his battery into the fields to the left of the Sudley 
 road. With a little more deliberation and a united onset, 
 these would easily have brushed away Evans thin line ; but, 
 in the delay incident to the first actual experiment of battle, 
 the rebels gained opportunity to bring up substantial rein 
 forcements. Four regiments and two companies of John 
 ston s Army of the Shenandoah, under General Bee, hurried 
 up and formed to the right and a little in advance of Evans 
 original line, while Iinboden s battery of four guns took 
 position on a hill in the rear, south of the Warrenton turn 
 pike. Thus disposed, with little disparity in strength be 
 tween attack and defence, the first stubborn contest of the 
 day appears to have taken place, lasting perhaps from eleven 
 o clock till noon. The Union troops pressed forward with 
 determined courage ; the rebels resisted with such spirit 
 that Burnside became apprehensive for his Ehode Island 
 battery, and Sykes battalion of regulars was sent to 
 strengthen his left. By this time Hunter had sent Porter s 
 brigade into the fields to the right of the Sudley road, 
 where Griffin s battery could engage the rebel field-pieces ; 
 Heintzelman was hurrying up with an advance regiment and 
 
186 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 Ricketts battery. Under this combined pressure the Con- 
 federate line wavered, yielded, and finally broke. Their left 
 retreated stubbornly down the hill, and, rallying again, 
 endeavored to make a stand behind a stone house at the 
 intersection of the two roads ; but a vigorous Union charge 
 down the Sudley road completed their dispersion. The 
 whole first formation of the enemy was swept southward 
 more than half a mile, entirely across and out of the valley 
 of Young s Branch. But the advantage was not won with 
 out considerable damage to the Union troops, the demoraliza 
 tion of several regiments, and the serious loss of valuable offi 
 cers. General Hunter himself was wounded by a shell at the 
 very beginning of the action, compelling his retirement from 
 the front, and devolving the command of his division on Porter. 
 McDowell, who carne upon the field by way of Sudley Ford 
 as the battle began, had already sent back word to Tyler to 
 press his attack at the stone bridge. Such an attack, how 
 ever, was now no longer necessary. We have seen how Evans 
 had withdrawn to oppose Hunter; and the four companies 
 he left behind had also retired southward. Avoiding the 
 bridge with its abattis, Tyler led Sherman s and Keyes bri 
 gades across Bull Eun half a mile above, where the stream 
 was fordable for infantry, and, marching over a mile of level 
 bottom-land, so directed their course by the firing that they 
 effected a safe junction with Hunter s division, Keyes remain 
 ing on the extreme left. They approached the morning s bat 
 tle-field from the northeast ; Sherman reported to McDowell, 
 and joined the general pursuit, directing his march to the right. 
 Keyes remained on the left, and under Tyler s personal orders ; 
 and thus it turned out that this single brigade became and re 
 mained an independent detachment during the whole day, sep 
 arated by a wide interval from the main battle in the afternoon, 
 and not being in a position to receive orders from McDowell. 
 
BULL RUN. 187 
 
 It has been explained that the first rebel line was com 
 posed mainly of Johnston s troops. As they retreated up 
 the hill south of Young s Branch, Jackson s brigade of five 
 regiments, also of Johnston s army, was just arriving there 
 on its way to guard the stone bridge, and only at that mo 
 ment learning the true state of affairs. This hill south of 
 Young s Branch was a higher and stronger position than 
 that from which Evans and Bee had been driven. Its crest 
 ran in a westerly curve from the Robinson house, near the 
 "Warrenton turnpike, past the Henry house near the Sudley 
 road, both being within the southeastern angle of the inter 
 section. The two roads cross in the valley at Young s Branch, 
 and from their crossing ascend gently to the east, west, 
 north, and south. 
 
 On this crest, Jackson, with the ready instinct of combat, 
 formed a new line. His five regiments and two batteries, 
 stretched from the Robinson to the Henry houses, formed 
 a solid-looking protection, behind which some of the flying 
 rebels gathered courage and rallied in little driblets. Bee s 
 five regiments had shrunk to about four companies, and the 
 remaining fugitives were moving in hopeless panic down the 
 Sudley road toward Manassas, spreading direful tidings of 
 disaster. Jackson s line was rendered yet stronger by hav 
 ing Hampton s battalion that morning arrived from Rich 
 mond on its extreme right in the turnpike before the 
 Robinson house ; and behind these, Bee s fragments were 
 gathered into a sheltering ravine. 
 
 At this period of the day, a little after noon, the advan 
 cing Union columns had their best co-operation and strong 
 est momentum. Keyes brigade was advancing on the left 
 toward the Robinson hill. Sherman was moving diagonally 
 across the centre of the morning s field. Porter s still 
 aggressive brigade was pushing down the Sudley road. 
 
18S THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 The compact brigades of Franklin and Willcox were coming 
 to the front on the right. Moreover, Griffin s and Ricketts 
 batteries had obtained favorable positions near the Dogan 
 house, with an enfilading fire against Hampton. Toward 
 two o clock two regiments of Keyes brigade made a charge 
 up the Robinson hill and drove Hampton out of the tangle 
 of fences and hedges about the Robinson House, though 
 newly planted rebel batteries farther to the rear made it 
 impossible to hold the position. The whole Union line 
 swung forward to the Warrenton turnpike ; and while the 
 rebel reports pass it over with the merest allusions, it seems 
 probable that, like Hampton, other portions of Jackson s line 
 were moved somewhat farther back, to find better shelter 
 from the annoying fire of the Union batteries. This mid 
 day Union success seemed, and was, sweeping and complete ; 
 but it proved seriously deceptive in the further operations 
 of the afternoon, which it naturally suggested and provoked. 
 
 A little before this time the Confederate commanders woke 
 up to the true nature of the conflict. Beauregard was yet 
 W T aiting impatiently to hear that his right was advancing on 
 Centreville, when, toward eleven o clock, word came that, 
 through a miscarriage of orders, that enterprise was just 
 being commenced. Realizing now that McDowell s attack 
 was not a mere feint, they countermanded the Centreville 
 movement, ordered all available reserves forward to the 
 main battle, and themselves hurriedly galloped to the front. 
 Here they now put their personal exertions, encouragement, 
 and example, into the somewhat unpromising task of miti 
 gating a disastrous defeat, rather than with even remote 
 hope of turning the scale to victory. 
 
 The Confederates had been literally driven into the woods, 
 the edge of which formed a sort of semicircle on the second 
 ridge south of Warrenton turnpike and east of the Sudley 
 
BULL RUN. 
 
 189 
 
 road. But this reverse brought -certain important advan 
 tages. Their retreat not only concentrated their regiments ; 
 it also, for the first time during the day, concentrated their 
 artillery, thirteen pieces of which were posted near together 
 to the centre and right, so as to give a partial cross-fire at 
 
 Bull Run Battle of the Afternoon. 
 
 a distance of three hundred to six hundred yards over the 
 whole open plateau or hill about the Henry house and to 
 ward the Kobinson house. Under the personal directions 
 of Johnston and Beauregard, they now formed their line 
 along this semicircular edge of woods, with the advantage 
 of a fringe of second-growth pines in their front to afford 
 
190 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION, 
 
 them almost perfect concealment. Their right extended 
 to where the hill descends to Young s Branch; their left 
 reached nearly to the Sudley road. It is needless to specify 
 the several corps in detail ; the nearest reinforcements were 
 already arriving ; Johnston s report sums up the strength of 
 this completed line at twelve regiments, twenty-two guns, 
 and two companies of cavalry. The formation well begun, 
 Beauregard took personal command, while Johnston, as 
 chief, returned to the rebel headquarters to keep his eye on 
 the entire field. 
 
 Hedueed by losses, McDowell s numbers were now little, 
 if any, superior to the enemy ; for the brigade of Keyes was 
 separated from him, working its way southward along 
 Young s Branch in the hope to make a flank attack on the 
 rebel right; in reality it rendered no further substantial 
 help. Howard s brigade, held back as a reserve, was not 
 yet at hand. McDowell s effective force consisted of the 
 brigades of Porter, Franklin, Willcox, and Sherman, a total 
 of fourteen regiments, but several of which were already 
 seriously demoralized ; these were massed in sheltered situ 
 ations in the valley along the turnpike and Young s Branch, 
 mainly west of the intersection of the roads. All the advan 
 tages of position during the day had been with McDowell ; 
 now they were suddenly turned against him by the very 
 success he had gained. The enemy was on the height, he 
 at the foot of the hill. The enemy needed only to defend a 
 stationary line ; he must move forward under a prepared 
 fire. They were concealed in chosen positions ; he must 
 mount into open view. They could repel in combination ; 
 he must risk successive assaults. His men had been under 
 arms since midnight most of them had made a march of 
 ten miles through the sweltering July heat. They were 
 flushed with victory, but also lulled thereby into the false 
 
RULL RUN. 191 
 
 security of thinking their work accomplished, when in reality 
 its sternest effort was merely about to begin. 
 
 The situation naturally dictated an attack on the rebel 
 centre and left flank, and, had this been unitedly and solidly 
 made, it must unquestionably have succeeded even against 
 the disadvantage already mentioned. But right here the 
 want of proper staff organization and discipline, and the 
 rawness of the troops in manoeuvre, proved a fatal defect ; 
 and the severe conflict of the next hour and a half resolved 
 itself into a somewhat spasmodic and intermittent struggle 
 on both sides. 
 
 When, at about half-past two o clock, the batteries of 
 Eicketts and Griffin were ordered to move forward from the 
 Dogan heights across the valley to the top of the Henry hill, 
 they did so with the feeling that the two regiments ordered 
 to follow and support them were tardy, inadequate, and un 
 reliable. Other regiments, moving forward to the flank at 
 tack, could not well be observed, because of the uneven 
 ground and the intervening woods and bushes. The rebels 
 had disappeared ; there was a complete lull in the battle. 
 But danger was no less at hand. Hardly had Ricketts taken 
 his post before his cannoneers and horses began to fall 
 under the accurate fire of near and well-concealed rebel 
 sharpshooters. Death puffed from bushes, fences, build 
 ings ; and yet the jets of flame and wreaths of smoke were 
 the only visible enemy to assail. Officers and cannoneers 
 held on with a desperate courage ; some moved to new po 
 sitions to foil the rebel range. Griffin s battery came and 
 took place alongside ; eleven Union guns and thirteen Con 
 federate guns were confronted at short range in a stubborn 
 and exciting duel. But now the rebel regiments, seeing the 
 dangerous exposure of the Union batteries, were tempted to 
 swarm out of their cover. They pressed cautiously but 
 
192 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 tenaciously upon Ricketts. Griffin, absorbed in directing 
 the fire of two of his guns against the rebel batteries, was 
 suddenly startled at seeing a regiment advancing boldly on 
 his right, in open view. Their very audacity puzzled him. 
 They could hardly be friends, he thought ; yet was it pos 
 sible that foes were so near and would take such a risk ? 
 Instinctively he ordered his guns to be charged with canister 
 and trained upon them. Yet at the dreadful thought of 
 pouring such a volley upon a Union regiment, he once more 
 hesitated, and held a brief colloquy with Major Barry, chief 
 of artillery. " Captain," said Barry, " they are your battery 
 support." " They are Confederates," replied Griffin, in in 
 tense excitement ; " as certain as the world, they are Confed 
 erates." " No," answered Barry ; " I know they are your 
 battery support." Griffin spurred forward, and told his 
 officer not to fire. The mistake proved fatal. During this 
 interval of doubt the Confederate regiment had approached 
 to point-blank range, and levelled their muskets just as 
 Griffin gave his order to desist. Griffin s canister would 
 have annihilated the regiment ; but now the tables were 
 turned, and in an instant the regiment s volley had annihi 
 lated Griffin s and Eicketts batteries. Officers and men fell 
 smitten with death and wounds, and horses and caissons 
 went tearing in wild disorder down the hill, breaking and 
 scattering the ascending line of battle. Under this sudden 
 catastrophe the supporting regiment stood a while spell 
 bound with mingled astonishment and terror. They were 
 urged forward to repel the advance on the guns ; but the un 
 expected disaster overawed them ; under the continued and 
 still advancing volleys of the same rebel regiment, they fired 
 their muskets, turned, and fled. 
 
 These disabled batteries, visible to both armies, now be 
 came the centre and coveted prize of an irregular contest, 
 
BULL RUN. 193 
 
 which surged back and forth over the plateau of the Henry 
 hill ; but, whether because of confusion of orders, or the 
 broken surface of the ground, or more probably the mere 
 reciprocal eagerness of capture and rescue, the contest was 
 carried on, not by the whole line, but by single regiments, 
 or at most by two or three regiments moving accidentally 
 rather than designedly in concert. Several times the fight 
 raged past and over the prostrate body of Kicketts, lying 
 wounded among his guns, and who was finally carried away 
 a prisoner to Kichmond. The rebels would dash forward, 
 capture the batteries, and endeavor to turn the pieces on the 
 Union lines; then a Union regiment would sweep up the 
 hill, drive them back, and essay to drag the guns down into 
 safe possession. And a similar shifting and intermitting 
 fight went on, not merely on this single spot, but also 
 among the low concealing pines of the middle ground in 
 front, as well as in the oak-woods on the Union right, where 
 at times friend became intermingled with foe, and where 
 both sides took occasional prisoners near the same place. 
 
 In this prolonged and wasteful struggle the Union strength 
 was slowly and steadily consumed. Arnold s battery crossed 
 the valley to the support of Griffin and Ricketts, but found 
 itself obliged to again withdraw. The Rhode Island battery 
 took part in the contest as well as it might from the hill 
 north of Young s Branch. Brigade after brigade Sher 
 man s, Franklin s, "Willcox s, and finally Howard s reserve, 
 were brought forward regiment after regiment was sent up 
 the hill three times the batteries were recovered and 
 again lost. It speaks volumes for the courage of the raw, 
 undisciplined volunteers, that, in the face of these repeated 
 failures, they continued to go perseveringly against what 
 seemed to them a hidden and unattainable barrier, until a 
 stronger wave of rebel bullets or bayonets, surging suddenly 
 I. 9 
 
194 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 forward in the pine thicket, would meet and force them 
 back. 
 
 In the endeavor to outflank and envelop the rebel left, 
 the Union right had become so strongly turned southward 
 that it was nearly parallel to the Sudley road. Near the 
 beginning of this final contest, Johnston received notice that 
 the long-expected remainder of his Army of the Shenan- 
 doah had at length come ; and before it was half over, Elzey, 
 with Kirby Smith s brigade of three regiments, arrived near 
 the battle-field from Manassas by the Sudley road. By 
 this time, too, four other regiments, two from Cocke s and 
 two from Bonhani s brigades, also came up from the nearer 
 fords. These seven fresh regiments, thrown opportunely by 
 the rebel commander into the woods west of the Sudley 
 road, directly against the exposed Union right flank, created 
 a numerical overweight, which affords sufficient explanation 
 of the Union repulse at that point. 
 
 But now, at half-past four in the afternoon, when the 
 Union reinforcements were exhausted, the rebel accessions 
 still continued : Early with three regiments arrived from the 
 lower fords ; Holmes with two regiments, and Ewell with 
 three others, were rapidly approaching. Before the arrival 
 of these last the battle was already decided. Early s brigade 
 was sent cautiously through the woods, still farther to the 
 rebel left, and suddenly appeared with Beckham s battery 
 on the heights near the Chinn house, three-quarters of a mile 
 west of the Sudley road, and entirely beyond and in the rear 
 of the Union right. 
 
 The Union troops, having approached the second stage of 
 the battle in such a flush of success, and with such an appar 
 ent assurance of victory, could not for a time realize the 
 stern fact that the contest was turning against them. Offi 
 cers of experience and sagacity, indeed, became seriously 
 
BULL RUN. 195 
 
 alarmed for the final result, when Griffin s and Ricketts 
 batteries were destroyed ; but for the greater part it was 
 looked upon as an untoward accident, and operated rather 
 to inspire the already related efforts for their recovery. The 
 feeling of course gradually changed with the successive fail 
 ures to gain and permanently hold the hill. As brigade 
 after brigade melted away in the repeated efforts, even the 
 men in the ranks could not omit to note the rapid diminu 
 tion of the available strength. Some of the repulsed regi 
 ments kept their organization and returned heroically to the 
 charge. Others, on the contrary, not having that slowly 
 acquired force of discipline which makes cohesion a second 
 nature of the soldier and creates an instinctive reliance on 
 mutual support as the surest means of safety, considered 
 their duty done with a single charge, and, once driven back, 
 went to pieces like the adjournment of a mass meeting. In 
 this shortcoming, officers were as culpable as the men, for 
 war combines art with science, and the superior work of the 
 veteran comes through long years of practice. It must be 
 remembered that these were only three months volunteers, 
 and besides, as such, the most impulsive and independent 
 men in their several communities, whose innate promptness 
 of thought and action had brought them to the very fore 
 front of the civil war. Lacking long drill and discipline, 
 they acted upon individual judgment and impulse, rather 
 than as organized bodies merely executing the orders of 
 their officers. This explains to us the remarkable statement 
 of Captain Woo dbury, that, "at four o clock, on the 21st, 
 thsre were more than twelve thousand volunteers on the 
 battle-field of Bull Run who had entirely lost their regi 
 mental organization. They could no longer be handled as 
 troops, for the officers and men were not together. Men 
 and officers mingled together promiscuously; and it is 
 
196 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 worthy of remark that this disorganization did not result 
 from defeat or fear." One other fact must be remembered 
 in extenuation : that with the long night march, the burning 
 heat of the day, and the new and intense excitements of the 
 battle-field, the men, famished with hunger and thirst, were 
 becoming physically exhausted. 
 
 When, therefore, at half -past four o clock, the two fresh 
 Confederate brigades had repulsed the Union flank attack 
 west of the Sudley road, and Early s rebel brigade with 
 Beckham s battery suddenly burst through the woods near 
 the Chinn house, still farther to the west, with a vigorous 
 and startling attack on the Union flank and rear, throwing 
 into quick confusion and retreat a detachment of Union 
 cavalry stationed in apparent retirement and safety, the 
 battle came to a speedy termination by a sort of universal 
 consent; a realization and acknowledgment of coming de 
 feat pervaded the whole army, and found instant expression 
 in increased disorganization and immediate movement to 
 ward a general retreat. Whatever may have been the other 
 discouragements, the main impulse of this movement came 
 from the universal belief that Johnston s army had now 
 arrived, and that success had thereby become hopeless. 
 The question of Johnston s possible presence in the battle 
 had run through the Centre ville camps, and there were 
 rumors of his coining on Saturday night; but the army 
 apparently had no suspicion that it was fighting him all 
 day Sunday, till the moment of the attack on the extreme 
 left by one of Beauregard s brigades. That attack from an 
 unexpected quarter seemed convincing proof of the presence 
 of a new and additional force, and therefore roused the 
 quick instinct of retreat, not so much in acknowledgment of 
 actual defeat, as in prudent avoidance of irresistible slaugh 
 ter or capture by overwhelming numbers. 
 
CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 THE RETREAT. 
 
 THE suddenness of their victory was entirely unexpected 
 by the rebels. Signs of disaster to themselves were as 
 strong as to the Federals to the very last. Intense curiosity 
 and solicitude had brought Jefferson Davis from Richmond. 
 It is related that, as he was riding to the battle-field from 
 Manassas, at about four o clock that afternoon, he met such 
 a stream of panic-stricken rebel soldiers, and heard such 
 direful tidings from the front, that his companions were 
 thoroughly convinced the Confederates had lost the day, and 
 implored him to turn back for personal safety. He went on, 
 against their advice, to find that the conflict was already 
 over, and to learn, with mingled amazement and joy, that 
 the Union army had, by a sudden and unexplained impulse, 
 ceased fighting, and half inarched, half run from the field. 
 
 McDowell was no less astounded at his own overwhelming 
 reverse. A little before Elzey and Early appeared on his 
 right to outflank him, there had been a lull in the Confed 
 erate firing that led him to hope the enemy was giving way. 
 At the very worst there seemed no doubt of his ability to 
 hold the "Warrenton turnpike and stone bridge and main 
 tain free communication with Centreville. For this abun 
 dant resources were yet available. Burnside s brigade had 
 remained in reserve on the morning s battle-field, and, after 
 
198 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 four hours rest, was vet capable of effective service. Keyes 
 brigade beyond the hill, on his left, was substantially un 
 harmed. Schenck had an almost fresh brigade at the stone 
 bridge. Miles had a brigade at Centreville, which could be 
 replaced from Kunyon s division near Vienna. The engi 
 neers had cleared away the abattis at the stone bridge. The 
 hills north of the Warrenton. turnpike were excellent defen 
 sive positions. It needed but morale among the troops to 
 hold the battle-ground, and holding this would have com 
 pelled the enemy to retreat. 
 
 Unfortunately the Union army had lost its morale. The 
 mere disorder of the final repulse was slight ; but the de 
 moralization and loss of discipline had been growing during 
 the whole afternoon, until, of a sudden, the army was half- 
 dissolved. The impulse of retreat once started, there was 
 no checking or controlling it. Despite the efforts and ap 
 peals of McDowell and his officers, the various detachments 
 began moving from the field. The commander yielded to 
 necessity, made the best dispositions he could to cover the 
 retreat, and passed the word to reassemble in the old camps 
 at Centreville, not doubting that he could there make a 
 rally. 
 
 The way thither by the Warrenton turnpike was open and 
 straight ; the distance four and a half miles. But, through 
 the perversity of fate, each detachment now retreated by the 
 same road over which it had come. Thus the bulk of the 
 army the brigades of Porter, Bumside, Franklin, "Willcox, 
 and Howard went back over the long detour of ten miles 
 round by Sudley Ford; these had with them, as yet, two 
 batteries a total of ten field-pieces ; for only the batteries 
 of Eicketts and Griffin were lost in the main battle. Sher 
 man s brigade, on the other hand, marched eastward, over 
 the ground of the morning s conflict, and recrossed Bull 
 
THE RETREAT. 199 
 
 Run at the ford, half a mile above the stone bridge, by 
 which they had approached. Keyes brigade, becoming 
 aware of the general retreat, also returned by that route. 
 These two, with Schenck s brigade, soon reached the War 
 rantor! road, making a comparatively easy march to Centre- 
 ville. 
 
 It also becomes necessary to mention here that, while the 
 main battle of the afternoon was going on, a second engage 
 ment had been fought at Blackburn s Ford. The brigades 
 of Richardson and of Davies were sent there in the morning, 
 to make such demonstrations as would mask McDowell s 
 real movement. In the afternoon, however, their purpose 
 became apparent ; and to relieve the stress of the main bat 
 tle, the Confederate commander sent orders to Jones bri 
 gade to cross Bull Run and make a demonstration. At about 
 four o clock, Jones, with his three regiments, crossed at 
 McLean s Ford, and endeavored, by a flank movement, to 
 capture Hunt s battery stationed with Davies brigade. Da- 
 vies quietly watched the oncoming rebel regiments, rear 
 ranged his lines, and held his fire in reserve till the enemy 
 were deploying to form line of battle. They had advanced 
 within five hundred yards, only, however, to find themselves 
 embarrassed by woods and broken ground. In this situa 
 tion and dilemma Davies ordered Hunt s battery of six guns 
 to open upon them with grape and canister. The rebel of 
 ficial report characterizes it as a " murderous shower," and, 
 no doubt, correctly. It scattered the attacking column as if 
 by enchantment ; in thirty minutes there was not a soldier 
 of them to be seen, and Jones modestly reports a loss in the 
 affair of fourteen killed and sixty-two wounded. 
 
 It was now near sundown. Miles, commanding at Centre- 
 ville, either through illness or drunkenness, had become in 
 capable of duty a situation whoso serious consequences 
 
200 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 were averted by the prudence and good behavior of the 
 three brigade commanders. But, from this cause, prema 
 ture orders were received by the two brigades of Davies and 
 Richardson to fall back on Centreville ; while to Blenker 
 the more judicious order was given to advance his brigade 
 toward Stone Bridge, which he did, deploying it in line of 
 battle across the Warrenton turnpike, half-way between 
 Centreville and Cub Run. 
 
 As soon as Johnston and Beauregard had sufficiently re 
 covered from their astonishment at seeing the Union army 
 in unmistakable retreat, they ordered pursuit to be made, 
 but, as it would seem, with the greatest caution. In truth, 
 McDowell s vanquished brigades marched from the imme 
 diate battle-field only half -disbanded ; there remained, in 
 most instances, a little nucleus at least of each organization, 
 which yet, for a time, held together, while several of the 
 brigades were nearly intact. Thus it happened that, while 
 the battalion of rebel cavalry under Stuart was ordered to 
 pursue along the Sudley road, they found the Union forces 
 generally so compact, and the rear so well protected, that 
 they could only dash in here and there and pick up or scat 
 ter isolated squads of stragglers. Another reserve battalion 
 of rebel cavalry under Radford was sent in pursuit from the 
 vicinity of Ball s Ford up toward the turnpike ; while John 
 ston also sent orders to Bonham to take the remainder of 
 his own and Longstreet s brigades, and move against the line 
 of retreat at Centreville. Radford, like Stuart, saw that the 
 retreating brigades of Sherman, Keyes, and Schenck were 
 too formidable to attack ; and Bonham, on nearing Centre 
 ville, found the brigades of Blenker, Richardson, and Davies 
 so well posted, and so superior in numbers, that he was quite 
 content to stop with a mere reconnoissance, and at nightfall 
 returned to his camps behind Mitchell s and Blackburn s 
 
THE RETREAT. 201 
 
 Fords. Meanwhile, though the Confederate pursuit could 
 nowhere venture a serious assault, an accident served to 
 greatly enlarge their harvest of trophies. 
 
 The business of w r ar was such a novelty, that McDowell s 
 army accumulated an extraordinary number of camp-fol 
 lowers and non-combatants. The vigilant newspapers of the 
 chief cities sent a cloud of correspondents to chronicle the 
 incidents of the march and conflict. The volunteer regi 
 ments earned with them personal sympathies and compan 
 ionships unknown to regular armies. Congress had met in 
 special session ; and senators and representatives, full of the 
 patriotic hope and pride of their several States, no less than 
 their own eager political solicitude, in several instances 
 joined in w T hat many rashly assumed would be a mere tri 
 umphal parade. McDowell s unopposed and apparently ir 
 resistible advance through the enemy s outposts lured them 
 on to Centreville in a false security ; and the uniformly 
 favorable reports which went back to Washington even 
 brought out a fresh accession of the same material on Sun 
 day morning of the battle. 
 
 By that time, however, the situation had become more 
 serious, and generally made the non-combatants somewhat 
 circumspect. Only a few of hardier courage followed to 
 the battle-field ; most of them remained at Centreville until 
 the cannonade announced the beginning of the fight, and 
 then drifted gradually down the turnpike toward the stone 
 bridge, not nearer than a mile and a half to the actual fight 
 ing, but where they could hear the volleys, see the smoke 
 and dust, and perhaps the occasional manoeuvres of Schenck s 
 and Keyes brigades. In a certain sense they were under 
 fire, because the long-range shells of the field-pieces ren 
 dered even that locality somewhat dangerous. From this 
 situation were written many highly sensational, but purely 
 
202 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 imaginary and most grotesquely confused accounts of the 
 battle, first published in the newspapers. A famous corre 
 spondent of the London Ti?nes, who earned the sobriquet of 
 "Bull Run Russell," wrote his description of the affair for 
 European readers, after a leisurely lunch at Centreville, and 
 a stroll of perhaps a mile toward Stone Bridge, taking his 
 departure with the earliest fugitives. 
 
 It also happened that on the afternoon of the battle a 
 considerable number of provision, baggage, and ammuni 
 tion wagons, together with some private vehicles of the 
 non-combatants heretofore mentioned, had been sent down 
 the Warrenton turnpike from Centreville, toward the stone 
 bridge. When finally the first wave of fugitives brought 
 unfavorable news from the front, these began a general 
 movement in return, which unavoidably produced quick 
 confusion and blockade ; and it was chiefly among these 
 that the disgraceful panic and flight, which has furnished 
 the nearly universal theme of criticism of the battle, first 
 broke out. Naturally the tide of disaster rose quick and 
 high ; the retreating brigades, and nearer approach of can 
 nonade and musketry, soon confirmed the worst fears of 
 overwhelming defeat and pressing pursuit, and started a 
 veritable scramble and stampede for safety. Arms and 
 clothing were thrown away by those on foot ; wagons were 
 abandoned, and even ambulances with wounded soldiers 
 left standing in the road, while the frightened teamsters 
 rode away at headlong speed, on horses unhitched or cut 
 out of their harness. 
 
 It would seem that things had already come to this pass 
 before the columns which were retreating around the long 
 detour by way of Sudley Springs and Ford once more came 
 in sight of the Warrenton turnpike, at a point between 
 Stone Bridge and Cub Run. Cub Run seems to have been 
 
THE RETREAT. 203 
 
 a difficult little stream, provided with a " suspension bridge" 
 of some kind where the turnpike crosses it. Bradford s cav 
 alry had not only been hovering along and occasionally dash 
 ing in on the turnpike, but a rebel light battery succeeded 
 in establishing itself where it commanded the " suspension 
 bridge." When the retreating column from Sudley Ford 
 came in sight, they found to their consternation that it was 
 necessary to run the gauntlet of this artillery fire. " The 
 enemy opened fire," says Burnside s report, "upon the re 
 treating mass of men. Upon the bridge crossing Cub Eun, 
 a shot took effect upon the horses of a team that was cross 
 ing. The wagon was overturned directly in the centre of 
 the bridge, and the passage was completely obstructed. 
 The enemy continued to play his artillery upon the train, 
 carriages, ambulances, and artillery w T agons that filled up 
 the road, and these were reduced to ruin. The artillery 
 could not possibly pass, and five pieces of the Ehode Island 
 battery, which had been safely brought off the field, were 
 here lost." The four pieces of Arnold s battery were also 
 abandoned here from this cause. Four pieces of Carlisle s 
 battery were apparently lost in the same neighborhood, 
 though from a charge of Radford s cavalry. This " suspen 
 sion bridge" over Cub Bun was distant some three miles 
 from the main battle-field, and it was here that the enemy 
 made his largest capture of guns and wagons. 
 
 It may be imagined that at Confederate headquarters that 
 night the measure of satisfaction was well-nigh full. Yet 
 that their rejoicing was tempered with a serious alloy of 
 rebel danger and losses, is also clearly enough revealed in 
 Jefferson Davis telegraphic bulletins. " A terrible battle is 
 raging," said his first. "We have won a glorious, though 
 dear-bought victory," was the language of his second. In 
 his third he repeated, "Night has closed upon a hard- 
 
204 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION 
 
 fought field. Our forces have won a glorious victory." He 
 forbore to add, what the official reports and correspondence 
 afterward developed, namely : that not only was the field 
 "hard-fought" and the victory "dear-bought," but they 
 were by no means confident it was final. On the contrary, 
 the rebel headquarters was in serious apprehension lest 
 McDowell should turn from Centreville and once more 
 assail the Confederate right flank at or below Blackburn s 
 Ford. To meet this reported danger, Ewell and Holmes 
 were that night ordered post-haste back to Union Mills. 
 "You will not fail to remember," afterward wrote Jefferson 
 Davis to Beauregard, " that, so far from knowing the enemy 
 was routed, a large part of our forces was moved by you, in 
 the night of the 21st, to repel a supposed attack upon our 
 right, and the next day s operations did not fully reveal what 
 has since been reported of the enemy s panic." 
 
 When McDowell left the battle-field his intention and 
 orders were to rally at Centreville. But, arriving there, he 
 found the conditions less favorable than he anticipated. It 
 had been designed that Blenker s brigade should, during 
 the day, throw up intrenchments ; this was not done, because 
 the necessary tools did not get forward as expected. Next 
 he found that Davies and Richardson had left their stations 
 at Blackburn s Ford and were falling back. " Great God ! 
 Richardson," exclaimed McDowell, on meeting that officer, 
 "why didn t you hold on to the position at Blackburn s 
 Ford?" "Colonel Miles ordered me to retreat to Centre 
 ville, and I obeyed the order ; Colonel Miles is continually 
 interfering with me, and he is drunk, and is not fit to com 
 mand," was the reply. The officer stood justified, for Mc 
 Dowell had already suspended Miles from command. The 
 retrograde movement was stopped, the brigades were faced 
 about and put in the best possible line of defence, with 
 
THE RETREAT. 205 
 
 orders to hold the position. Repairing again to Centreville, 
 McDowell found still further discouragement in the loss of 
 the thirteen guns at Cub Run and the increased disorder 
 among the troops. When, toward nine o clock just about 
 night-fall for that season the last brigade reached Centre 
 ville, and the various commanders were called together, it 
 was generally agreed that it was unwise to undertake to 
 make a stand, as contemplated. " The condition of our 
 artillery and its ammunition," says McDowell s report, 
 "and the want of food for the men, who had generally 
 abandoned or thrown away all that had been issued the day 
 before, and the utter disorganization and consequent de 
 moralization of the mass of the army, seemed to all who 
 were near enough to be consulted division and brigade 
 commanders and staff to admit of no alternative but to fall 
 back." If these reasons might be questioned, there was 
 still another absolutely conclusive. The enlistment of the 
 three months men was expiring. The Pennsylvania Fourth, 
 which had insisted upon and received its discharge that very 
 morning, while the army was advancing to battle, " moved to 
 the rear to the sound of the enemy s cannon." " In the next 
 few days," continues McDowell, " day by day I should have 
 lost ten thousand of the best armed, drilled, officered, and 
 disciplined troops in the army." The practical logic of war 
 is stern and swift. Even while the officers were deliberating, 
 the disorganized fugitives, in a contagious and increasing 
 panic, were already on the march. Toward ten o clock Mc 
 Dowell began to distribute his orders to retire from Centre 
 ville ; and a little after midnight Richardson s and Blenker s 
 brigades marched away from that village in a deliberate and 
 orderly retreat, maintaining their organization as a steady 
 and effective rear-guard till they once more reached the 
 Potomac camps. 
 
CHAPTER XVII. 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 THE official reports show a loss to the Union side in the 
 battle of Bull Run of 25 guns (the Confederates claim 28), 
 481 men killed, 1,011 men wounded, and 1,460 wounded and 
 other Union soldiers sent as prisoners to Richmond. On 
 the Confederate side the loss was 387 killed, 1,582 wounded, 
 and a few prisoners taken. 
 
 These simple figures prove the engagement to have been 
 well contested and fought with equal courage and persist 
 ence by both sides. Greatly ridiculed and denounced 
 when it occurred, the battle of Bull Run is gradually find 
 ing its vindication. General Sherman says it was " one of 
 the best-planned battles of the war, but one of the worst- 
 fought," and that "both armies were fairly defeated." Gen 
 eral Johnston says : "If the tactics of the Federals had been 
 equal to their strategy, we should have been beaten." To 
 the military student. Bull Run, with its extended field of 
 strategy, its quick changes of plan, its fluctuating chances 
 and combinations, and its rapidly shifting incidents and ac 
 cidents, is a most interesting, and likely to become a typical, 
 " game of war " between volunteer armies. 
 
 The loyal people in Washington were rejoicing over a vic 
 tory, steadily reported during the greater part of the day, 
 when suddenly, at about five o clock, came the startling tele- 
 
CONCLUSION. 207 
 
 gram : " General McDowell s army in full retreat through 
 Centreville. The day is lost. Save Washington and the 
 remnants of this army." General Scott refused to credit the 
 astounding and unwelcome intelligence. Nevertheless he 
 put the Alexandria and Arlington camps into activity, sent 
 confidential notice to Baltimore, called reinforcements from 
 Harrisburg and New York, and suggested to McClellan to 
 " come down to the Shenandoah Valley with such troops as 
 can be spared from Western Virginia." By midnight, officers 
 and civilians who were lucky enough to have retained 
 horses began to arrive, and the apparent proportions of the 
 defeat to increase. It was a gloomy night, but yet gloomier 
 days followed. Next day, Monday, the rain commenced 
 falling in torrents, and continued for thirty-six hours with 
 but slight intermission. Through this rain the disbanded 
 soldiers began to pour into Washington City, fagged out, 
 hungry, and dejected, and having literally nowhere to turn 
 their feet or lay their head. History owes a page of honor 
 able mention to the Federal capital for its unselfish gener 
 osity on this occasion. The rich and poor, the high and low 
 of her loyal people, with one quick and entirely unprompted 
 impulse opened their doors and dealt out food and refresh 
 ment to the footsore, haggard, and half-starved men, whom 
 ill-luck rather than their own delinquency had so unexpect 
 edly reduced to tramps and fugitives. 
 
 The evil was, however, quickly remedied. By Monday 
 noon the full extent of the disaster, though not yet certainly 
 known, could be reasonably estimated, since indications be 
 gan to show that the enemy had not pressed their pursuit 
 in force. But, in due preparation for the worst, and in addi 
 tion to all possible precautions for local defence, General 
 McClellan was called to Washington to take command, Mc 
 Dowell being continued in charge of the defenses on the 
 
208 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 Virginia side of the Potomac. Patterson s time having ex 
 pired, he was mustered out of the service ; Banks was sent 
 to Harper s Ferry, Dix put in command at Baltimore, and 
 .Bosecrans in West Virginia. 
 
 Coming to Washington under the favorable acquaintance 
 ship and estimate of General Scott, and with the prestige of 
 his recent success in West Virginia, McClellan s arrival was 
 hailed by officials and citizens with something more than 
 ordinary warmth and satisfaction. This good opinion was 
 greatly augmented by the General s own personal conduct. 
 He exhibited at once a promising energy and industry in 
 repairing the shattered army organization ; cleared Wash 
 ington City of stragglers ; established a more perfect military 
 discipline than had hitherto been maintained ; displayed 
 great tact in his first intercourse with both junior and senior 
 officers ; was free, affable, kind, patient, and attentive to all ; 
 manifested great talent and unceasing watchfulness in the 
 details of military administration ; and being young, vigi 
 lant, cheerful, intelligent, and apparently possessed of great 
 professional skill, he reaped, almost at a single harvest, a 
 well-nigh universal popularity. 
 
 It is in its political aspects that Bull Run becomes a great 
 historical landmark. To say that the hope and enthusiasm 
 of the North received a painful shock of humiliation and 
 disappointment, is to use but a mild description of the popu 
 lar feeling. This first experience of defeat or recognition 
 of even the possibility of defeat was inexpressibly bitter. 
 Stifling the sharp sorrow, however, the great public of the 
 Free States sent up its prompt and united demand that the 
 contest should be continued and the disgrace wiped out. 
 Impatience and over eagerness were chastened and repressed ; 
 and the North reconciled itself to the painful prospect of a 
 tedious civil war all the more readily because of the necessity 
 
CONCLUSION. 209 
 
 of bending every energy to immediate preparation on a 
 widely extended scale. 
 
 If the North was cast down by the result of Bull Run, the 
 South was in even a greater ratio encouraged and strength 
 ened. Vanity of personal prowess is a weakness of Southern 
 character ; and Bull Run became to the unthinking a demon 
 stration of Southern invincibility. To the more cautious 
 leaders the event was yet sufficiently flattering to inspire 
 them with full confidence in ultimate success. Perhaps the 
 most potent influence of the battle was upon foreign nations, 
 who now looked upon the Confederate States as a belligerent 
 of " great expectations ; " while speculative foreign capital 
 turned somewhat eagerly to this promising new field of con 
 traband trade. 
 
 An important event, so silent in its operation that the 
 public was scarcely conscious it was occurring, now became 
 the pivot and controlling force of military operations. 
 This was the disbandment of the three months volunteers. 
 Within a few weeks almost the whole seventy-five thou 
 sand men were mustered out and returned to their homes. 
 Only a few regiments re-enlisted with organizations even 
 approximately unbroken ; but out of the whole number of 
 troops thus suddenly dissolved a considerable proportion 
 immediately entered the three years service as individuals, 
 and in many instances their drill and experience secured 
 them election or appointment as officers in the new regi 
 ments. Thus the disappearance of an army brought a cer 
 tain compensation ; it not only furnished the new volunteers 
 a quickening leaven, but that portion which went home to 
 every Free State, and to some of the Border Slave States, 
 served to greatly strengthen and correct public opinion in 
 their several localities. 
 
 The three years quota, and the increase of the regular 
 14 
 
210 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 army, called by President Lincoln in advance of strict au 
 thority of law at the beginning of May, had so far progressed 
 that garrisons and camps suffered no serious diminution. 
 Congress, being convened in special session, now legalized 
 their enlistment, perfected their organization, and made 
 liberal provision for their equipment and supply. It author 
 ized an army of five hundred thousand men, and a national 
 loan of two hundred and fifty millions of dollars ; it pro 
 vided an increase of the navy to render the blockade vigi 
 lant and rigorous ; and enforcement, revenue, confiscation, 
 and piracy laws were enacted or amended to meet the exi 
 gencies of active rebellion. 
 
 Pending the change and transformation of the volunteer 
 forces from the three months to the three years service, 
 military operations necessarily came to a general cessation. 
 Washington City, especially, and the fortified strip of terri 
 tory held by tho Union armies on the Virginia side of the 
 Potomac, once more became a great military camp. Here, 
 under McClellan s personal supervision, grew up that famous 
 Army of the Potomac, about which future volumes of this 
 series will have much to say. But in its formation, organi 
 zation, complete equipment, and thorough drill the second 
 half of the year 1861 passed away. A few intensely exciting 
 incidents occurred, of which the Ball s Bluff disaster was, 
 perhaps, the chief; but their consideration in detail does 
 not fall within the scope of the present volume. 
 
 In the rebel camps, also, inaction was both a policy and a 
 necessity during the remainder of the year. The trophies of 
 Bull Eun having been gathered up, and its glory vaunted in 
 Southern newspapers and stump speeches, the rebel com 
 mander once more advanced his outposts to the positions 
 held before the battle, while the bulk of his army turned 
 Manassas into a fortified camp. Some of the earliest rea- 
 
CONCLUSION. 211 
 
 sons for this course are explained by Johnston with blunt 
 frankness. "The Confederate army," he writes, "was more 
 disorganized by victory than that of the United States by 
 defeat. The Southern volunteers believed that the objects 
 of the war had been accomplished by their victory, and that 
 they had achieved all that their country required of them. 
 Many, therefore, in ignorance of their military obligations, 
 left the army, not to return. Some hastened home to exhibit 
 the trophies picked up on the field ; others left their regi 
 ments without ceremony to attend to wounded friends, fre 
 quently accompanying them to hospitals in distant towns. 
 Such were the reports of general and staff officers and rail 
 road officials. Exaggerated ideas of victory prevailing 
 among our troops cost us more men than the Federal army 
 lost by defeat." 
 
 It would appear that, about a month after the battle of 
 Bull Bun, the rebel commanders invited Jefferson Davis to 
 Manassas to discuss a plan of active operations for the 
 autumn. Generals Johnston, Bcauregard, and G. W. Smith 
 proposed "the concentration there of all the available forces 
 of the Confederate States, crossing the Potomac into Mary 
 land at the nearest ford with this army, and placing it in rear 
 of Washington. This," writes Johnston, " we thought would 
 compel McClellan to fight with the chances of battle against 
 him. Success would bring Maryland into the Confederacy, 
 we thought, and enable us to transfer the war to the north 
 ern border of that State, where the defensive should be re 
 sumed." Davis conclusive reply was, " that the whole coun 
 try was applying for arms and troops ; that he could take 
 none from other points for that army." 
 
 Of the larger aspects of the civil war during the fall and 
 winter of 1861, this volume does not afford further room to 
 give even a suniniary. Starting with a series of favorable 
 
212 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. 
 
 accidents in the spring, the rebellion had confidently ex 
 pected to hold every slave-holding State. So far from real 
 izing this hope, the end of the year witnessed the substantial 
 loss to the conspiracy of the four important Border States of 
 Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri. This, 
 together with the effective blockade instituted on the sea 
 board, and the lodgment gained by the brilliant naval vic 
 tories at Hatteras and Port Eoyal, already presaged the fate 
 of disunion. In a rough and hasty measurement of strength 
 and unity, political and military, the relative proportions of 
 population, wealth, and skill, and the no less potent elements 
 of devotion to freedom, justice, and humanity, had already 
 so far turned the scale as to foreshadow, with unerring cer 
 tainty, that the seceding States would ultimately fail in their 
 desperate appeal from the ballot to the bullet. For the 
 present, however, both the contestants remained confident, 
 determined, and unceasingly active in gathering the huge 
 armies destined, in the coming spring, to renew the mighty 
 conflict. 
 
APPENDIX A. 
 
 ORGANIZATION OF THE UNION AEMY AT THE BATTLE OF BULL 
 EUN, VA., JULY 21, 1861. 
 
 BRIGADIER- GENERAL IRVTN" McDOWELL COMMANDING. 
 
 STAFF. 
 
 CAPTAIN JAMES B. FRY, Assistant Adjutant-General. 
 MAJOR W. H. WOOD, 17th Infantry, Acting Inspector-General 
 CAPTAIN O. H. T1LLINGHAST, Assistant Quartermaster. 
 CAPTAIN H. F. CLARKE, Chief Commissary of Subsistence. 
 SUHGEON W. S. KING. 
 ASSISTANT SURGEON D. L. MAGRUDER. 
 MAJOR J. G. BARNARD, Chief Engineer. 
 LIEUTENANT FRED. E. PRIME, Engineer. 
 CAPTAIN A. W. WHIFFLE, Topographical Engineer. 
 LIEUTENANT H. L. ABBOT, Topographical Engineer. 
 LIEUTENANT H. S. PUTNAM, Topographical Engineer. 
 LIEUTENANT GEORGE C. STRONG, Ordnance Officer. 
 MAJOR A. J. MYER, Signal Officer. 
 
 MAJOR WILLIAM F. BARRY, 5th Artillery, Chief of Artillery. 
 MAJOR JAMES S. WADSWORTH, Volunteer Aid-de-Camp. 
 MAJOR CLARENCE S. BROWN, Volunteer Aid-de-Camp. 
 LIEUTENANT H. W. KINGSBURY, 5th Artillery, Aid-de-Camp. 
 LIEUTENANT GUY V. HENRY, Aid-de-Camp. 
 MAJOR MALCOLM McDOWELL, Acting Aid-de-Camp. 
 
 FIRST DIVISION. 
 BRIGADIER-GENERAL DANIEL TYLER. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 
 Colonel ERASMUS D. KEYBS. 
 2d Maine, Colonel Charles D. Jameson. 
 1st Connecticut, Colonel George S. Burnham. 
 2d Colonel Alfred H. Terry. 
 
 3d Colonel John L. Chatfield. 
 
 1 For the complete and correct compilation herewith for the first time printed, 
 the author is indebted to Colonel Robert N. Scott, U. S. A., in charge of the pub 
 lication of the Official War Records. 
 
214 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION. 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 
 Brigadier- General ROBERT C. SCHENCK. 
 2d New York (militia). Colonel George W. B. Tompkins. 
 1st Ohio, Colonel A. McD. McCook. 
 2d " Lient.-Colonel Rodney Mason. 
 Company E, 2d U. S. Artillery, Captain J. H. Carlisle. 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 
 Colonel WILLIAM T. SHERMAN. 
 13th New York, Colonel Isaac F. Quinby. 
 
 6 .th " Col. Michael Corcoran (wounded and captured), Capt. James Kelly, 
 
 Titth " Colonel Jarnes Cameron (killed). 
 
 2d Wisconsin, Lieut. -Colonel Henry \V. Peck. 
 Company E, 3d U. S. Artillery, Captain R. B. Ayres. 
 
 Fourth Brigade. 
 
 Colonel ISRAEL B. RICHARDSON. 
 1st Massachusetts, Colonel Robert Cowdin. 
 12th New York, Colonel Ezra L. Walrath. 
 2d Michigan, Major Adolphus VV. Williams. 
 3d Colonel Daniel McConnell. 
 Company G, 1st U. S. Artillery, Lieutenant John Edwards. 
 Company M, 2d U. S. Artillery, Captain Henry J. Hunt. 
 
 SECOND DIVISION. 
 
 (1.) COLONEL DAVID HUNTER (wounded). 
 (2.) COLONEL ANDREW PORTER. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 Colonel ANDREW PORTER. 
 8th New York (militia), Colonel George Lyons. 
 14th " (militia), Colonel Alfred M. Wood (wounded and captured), Lieut.- 
 
 Colonel E. B. Fowler. 
 
 27th " Colonel H. W. Slocum (wounded), Major J. J. Bartlett. 
 Battalion U. S. Infantry, Mrijor George Sykos. 
 Battalion U. S. Marines. Major John G. Reynolds. 
 Battalion U. S. Cavalry. Major I. N. Palmer. 
 Company D, 5th U. S. Artillery, Captain Charles Griffin. 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 
 Colonel AMBROSE E. BCRNSIDE. 
 
 2d New Hampshire. Col. Gilman Marston (wounded), Lieut.-Col. Frank S. Fiske. 
 1st Rhode Island, Major Joseph P. Balch. 
 2d (with battery), Colonel John S. Slocum (killed), Lieut.-Colonel 
 
 Frank Wheaton. 
 71st New York (with two howitzers), Colonel Henry P. Martin. 
 
 THIRD DIVISION. 
 COLONEL SAMUEL P. HEINTZELMAN (wounded). 
 
 Fir&t Brigade. 
 
 Colonel WILLIAM B. FRANKLIN. 
 5th Massachusetts, Colonel Samuel C. Lawrence, 
 llth " Colonel George Clark, Jr. 
 
 1st Minnesota, Colonel W. A. Gorman. 
 
 CompaTiy I, 1st U. S. Artillery, Captain James B. Ricketts (wounded and cap 
 tured), Lieutenant Edmund Kirby. 
 
APPENDIX A. 215 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 
 Col. ORLANDO B. WILLCOX (wounded and captured), Col. J. H. HOBART WARD. 
 llth New York, Lieut. -Colonel Noah L. Farnham. 
 
 SHth " Colonel J. H. Hobart Ward, Lieut.-Colonel Addison Farnsworth. 
 
 l>t Michigan, Major Alonzo F. Bidwell. 
 4th Colonel Dwight A. Woodbury. 
 Company 1), 2d U. S. Artillery, Captain Richard Arnold. 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 
 Colonel OLIVER O. HOWARD. 
 3d Maine, Major Henry (!. Staples. 
 4rh " Colonel Hiram G. Berry. 
 5th " Colonel Mark II. Dunnell. 
 2d Vermont, Colonel Henry Whiting. 
 
 FOURTH (RESERVE) DIVISION. 1 
 BRIGADIER-GENERAL THEODORE RUNYON. 
 
 1st New Jersey, 2 Colonel A. J. Johnson. 
 2d 2 Colonel Henry M. Baker. 
 
 3d 2 Colonel William Napton. 
 
 4th 2 Colonel Matthew Miller. Jr. 
 
 1st 3 Colonel William II. Montgomery. 
 
 2d 3 Colonel George W. McLean. 
 
 JM :t Colonel George W. Taylor. 
 
 41st New York, 3 Colonel Leopold von Gilsa. 
 
 FIFTH DIVISION.* 
 COLONEL DIXON 8. MILES. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 Colonel Louis BLKNKER. 
 
 8th New York (volunteers), Lieut.-Colonel Julius Stahel. 
 29th " Colonel Adolph vou Steimvehr. 
 
 :! .tih " Colonel Frederick G. D Utassy. 
 
 27th Pennsylvania. Colonel Max Einstein. 
 Company A, 2d U. S. Artillery, Captain John C. Tidball. 
 Bookwood s New York Battery, Captain Charles liookwood. 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 Colonel THOMAS A. DAVIE^. 
 1fith New York, Lieut.-Colonel Samuel Marsh. 
 IfSth " Colonel William A. Jackson. 
 
 31st " Colonel Calvin E. Pratt. 
 
 32d " Colonel Boderic Matheson. 
 
 Company G, 2d U. S. Artillery, Lieutenant Oliver D. Greene. 
 
 1 Not engaged. 
 
 2 Three months 1 militia. 
 
 3 Three years volunteers. 
 
 4 In reserve at Centreville and not engaged in the battle proper. Had ome 
 skirmishing with the enemy during the day and while covering the retreat of the 
 army. 
 
APPENDIX B. 
 
 ORGANIZATION, AT THE DATES INDICATED, OF THE CONFEDERATE 
 FORCES COMBINED AT THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS, UNDER THE 
 COMMAND OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL! JOHNSTON, C. S. ARMY. 
 
 AKMY OF THE POTOMAC (AFTERWARDS FIRST 
 CORPS), JULY 21, 18G1. 1 
 
 BRIGADIER- GENERAL G. T. BEAUREGARD, 
 
 INFANTRY. 
 
 First Brigade. Second Brit/ade. 
 
 Brigadier- General M. L. BONHAM. Brigadier-Oeneral R, S. EWELL. 
 
 llth North Carolina. 5th Alabama. 
 
 2d South Carolina. 6th 
 
 3d " " Oth Louisiana. 
 
 7th " " 
 
 8th 
 
 Third Brigade. Fourth Brigade. 
 
 Brigadier-General D. R. JONES. Brigadier- General J. LONGBTREET. 
 
 17th Mississippi. 5th North Carolina. 
 
 18th 1st Virginia. 
 
 5th South Carolina. llth " 
 
 l?th " 
 
 Fifth Brigade. Sixth Brigade. 
 
 Colonel P. ST. GEORGE COCKB. Colonel J. A. EARLY, 
 
 1st Louisiana Battalion. 13th Mississippi. 
 
 8th Virginia, seven companies* 4th South Carolina, 
 
 18th tk 7th Virginia. 
 
 19th " 24th 
 28th " 
 49th " three companies. 
 
 Holmes l s Reserve Brigade. 
 Brigadier- General T. H. HOLMES, 
 <id Tennessee. 
 1st Arkansas. 
 Walker s Battery. 
 
 1 Prom a field return for that date, but dated September 25, 1861. The report* 
 following show other combinations during the battle. 
 
APPENDIX B. 
 
 217 
 
 Troops not brigaded. 
 
 7th Louisiana Infantry. 
 
 8th 
 
 Hampton Legion (South Carolina) Infevntry. 
 
 30th Virginia Cavalry. 
 
 Harrison s Battalion Cavalry. 
 
 Independent Companies (ten) Cavalry. 
 
 Washington (Louisiana) Battalion Artillery. 
 
 ARTILLERY. 
 
 Kcmper s Battery. 
 Latham s Battery. 
 
 Camp Pickens Companies. 
 
 Loudoun Battery. 
 Shields a Battery. 
 
 ABMY OF THE SHENANDOAH (JOHNSTON S DIVI 
 SION), JUNE 30, 1861. 
 
 BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 Colonel T. J. JACKSON. 
 2d Virginia Infantry. 
 4th 
 
 5th " " 
 
 27th " 
 
 Pendleton s Battery. 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 Brigadier- General B. E. BEE. 
 4th Alabama Infantry. 
 2d Mississippi " 
 llth u " 
 
 1st Tennessee * 
 Imboden s Battery. 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 Colonel F. S. BARTOW. 
 7th Georgia Infantry. 
 8th 
 
 9th " 
 
 Duncan s Kentucky Battalion. 
 Pope s Kentucky Battalion. 
 Alburtis s Battery. 
 
 Fourth Brigade. 
 Colonel A. ELZEV. 
 1st Maryland (Battalion) Infantry. 
 3d Tennessee Infantry. 
 10th Virginia " 
 13th " * 
 
 Grove s Battery. 
 
 Not brigaded. 
 1st Virginia Cavalry. 
 33d " Infantry. 
 
 1 From return of that date. 
 
 I. 10 
 
INDEX. 
 
 ABERCROMBIE, Colonel, 166 
 Alabama, attitude of with regard 
 to secession, 2, 8 ; secession of, 
 14 
 
 Alexandria, Va., 103 ; fortified, 167 
 Alleghany Mountains, 136, 137 
 Anderson, Major Robert, 33; 
 transfers his forces to Fort 
 Sum tor, 38 et seq. ; his letter 
 to Governor Pickens, 35 ; his 
 reply to President Lincoln s 
 letter, 58 ; his reply to Con 
 federate authorities, 61, 131, 
 135 
 Annapolis, 100, 103 et seq.; route 
 
 by, to the capital, 106 et seq. 
 Arkansas, 80, 131 
 Arlington Heights, Va., occupied 
 by Union forces, 110 ; forti 
 fied, 169 
 Ashby s Gap, 168 
 
 BAKER, EDWARD D.,76 
 Ball s Bluff, engagement at, 210 
 Baltimore, 83 ; attack on the Mas 
 sachusetts soldiers in, 85 et 
 seq., 98 ; authorities burn R.R. 
 bridges, 89 
 
 Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 141 
 Bates, Attorney-General, 123 
 
 Banks, General N. P., 208 
 
 Barrancas, Port, 38 
 
 Beauregard, General G. T., 56 ; di 
 rects operations against Fort 
 Sumter, 57, 59 ; placed in com 
 mand at Manassas, 170 ; his 
 first measures, 170, 171 ; his 
 plan for the battle of Bull 
 Run, 176 et seq. ; composition 
 of his army, 176, note 
 
 Beckham, Lieut., 194 
 
 Bee, General, 185 
 
 Bell, adherents of, 8 
 
 Benham, Captain, 153 
 
 Beverly, 143, 146, 151 
 
 Black, Secretary, 36, 33 
 
 Blackburn s Ford, 176, note ; en 
 gagement at, 178 
 
 Blair, Francis P., 109 
 
 Blair, Frank P., Jr., 116 ct seq., 
 133 
 
 Blair, Montgomery, 133 
 
 Blair s Home Guards, 118 
 
 Blenker, General L., 174 
 
 Boonville, battle of, 123 
 
 Border Slave States, 80 
 
 Breckinridge, John C. , Southern 
 electoral votes cast for, 4, 8 
 
 Breckinridge party, character of, 8 
 
 Brown, John, 158 
 
220 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Brown, Governor, of Georgia, 12 
 
 Brown, Mayor, of Baltimore, 86, 
 89 et seq. 
 
 Buchanan, James, President, char- j 
 acter of, 17 et seq., Southern | 
 sympathy of, 18 ; his message 
 to Congress, 19, 23 et seq. ; in 
 terview with the South Caro 
 lina Commissioners, 28, 30, 31 ; 
 correspondence with the Wash 
 ington Cabal, 37 ; justifies the 
 revolution of the South, 69 ; 
 his Union sentiment as ex- 
 president, 76 
 
 Buckhannon, 147 
 
 Buckner, Simon B., 130, 132, 135 
 
 Bull Run, 133 ; position and course 
 of, 176 ; battle of, 181 et seq. ; 
 its effects, 206, 208 
 
 Burnside, General A. E., 174 
 
 Bunker Hill, Va., 163 
 
 Butler, General B. F., 92 et seq , 
 108 
 
 CABINET, decision of, with regard 
 to Fort Sumter, 51 
 
 Cadwalader, General, 157 
 
 Cairo, 128, 132, 134 
 
 Campbell, Justice, 54 ; his treach 
 ery, 35, 57, 69 
 
 Carrick s Ford, 152 et seq. 
 
 Cass, General, Secretary of State, 
 24 ; resigns, 26 ; supports the 
 Union cause, 76 
 
 Centre ville, Va., 177 
 
 Charleston, S. C., situation of, 20, 
 79 
 
 Cheat River, 146, 152 
 
 Chinn House, the, 194 
 
 Chambersburg, Pa. , 156 
 
 Cincinnati, 132, 140 
 
 Clay, Henry, 127 
 
 Cobb, Secretary Howell, 12, 17, 20, 
 26, 42 
 
 Cockeysville, 90 
 
 Columbia, District of, 83 
 
 Columbus, 134 et seq. 
 
 Confederacy, Southern, first for 
 mal proposal of, 26 ; estab 
 lished, 41 ; military resources 
 of, 79 ; sends diplomatic agents 
 to Europe, 79 ; natural resour 
 ces of, 81 
 
 Confederates resolve to begin the 
 war, 60 
 
 Constitution of the Confederate 
 States adopted, 41 
 
 Cox, General J. D., 154 
 
 Crawford, Commissioner, 57 
 
 Crittenden, John J., 76 
 
 Cub Run, 200 
 
 Cumberland, Depart.ment of the, 
 135 
 
 Cumberland Gap, 135 
 
 Cummings Point, 63 et seq. 
 
 Cushing, Caleb, 76 
 
 DAVIES, General T. A., 174 
 
 Davis, Jefferson, 25 et seq., 40; 
 elected President of the Con 
 federacy, 41 ; opposes the at 
 tack on Fort Sumter, 56 ; be 
 lief of Northern aid, 71 ; offers 
 letters of marque and reprisal, 
 78 ; call for volunteers, 79 ; his 
 message to Governor Letcher, 
 92 ; letter to Governor Jackson, 
 117, 158 ; speech of, at Rich 
 mond, 169 
 
 " Declaration of Causes " by South 
 Carolina, 5 et seq. 
 
 Dennison, Governor, 140 
 
 Dix, Secretary John A., 33, 76, 
 
INDEX. 
 
 221 
 
 Doubleday, Captain (afterward 
 General) Abner, 29, 64 
 
 Douglas, Stephen A., adherents of, 
 8 ; his interview with Presi 
 dent Lincoln, 76 
 
 Dogan Heights, 191 
 
 Duke, Captain, 117 
 
 Dumont, Colonel, 143, 153 
 
 ELLSWORTH, Col. E. E., 110 et 
 seq. ; shot at Alexandria, 1 13 ; 
 buried from the White House, 
 114 
 
 Ellsworth s Zouaves, 110 
 
 Elzey, General, 194 
 
 Evans, Colonel, 183 
 
 Evarts, Wm. M., 76 
 
 Everett, Edward, 76 
 
 FALLING WATERS, W. Va., skir 
 mish at, 162 
 
 Federal Hill, Baltimore, 108 
 
 Field, David Dudley, 76 
 
 Fitzpatrick, Senator, 37 
 
 Florida, attitude of, with regard to 
 secession, 2, 8 ; secession of, 14 
 
 Floyd, Secretary, 6, 17, 20, 23 et j 
 seq., 26, 30; his malfeasance 
 in office, 31 ; resigns, 32 
 
 Follansbee, Captain, 86 et seq. 
 
 Foster, Captain, 28, 63 
 
 Fox, Captain G. V., 51 ; sails in 
 command of expedition for re 
 lief of Fort Sumter, 59 
 
 Franklin, General W. B., 174 
 
 Fremont, General J. C., 133 
 
 Frost, D. M., 117 et seq. 
 
 GAINESVILLE, Va., 181 
 Gamble, Hamilton R., 125 
 Garnett, General, 146, 154 
 
 Georgia, attitude of, with regard 
 to secession, 2, 8, 12 ; seces 
 sion of, 13 et seq. 
 
 Gist, Governor of South Carolina, 
 his circular letter, 1, 8, 27 
 
 Gosport Navy Yard, destruction 
 of, 96 et seq. 
 
 Graf ton, 142 et seq., 146 
 
 Grant, General U. S., 134 
 
 Great Bethel, Va., engagement at, 
 172 
 
 Green, Captain, 117 
 
 Griffin, Captain, 188, 191, 193 
 
 Guthrie, Colonel, 131 
 
 HAQERSTOWN, Md., 157 
 
 Hamlin, Hannibal, 76 
 
 Harney, General, 119 et seq. 
 
 Harper s Ferry, United States Ar 
 mory at, 83 ; capture of, by 
 rebels, 95, 98 ; retaken from 
 the rebels, 157; weakness of, 
 158 ; destroyed by Johnston, 
 161 
 
 Harrisburg, 100 
 
 Hayne, I. W., 35, 37 
 
 Heintzelman, General S. P., com 
 mands Third Division on ad 
 vance to Manassas, 174 
 
 Henry House, the, 187 
 
 Hickman, Ky., 134 
 
 Hicks, Governor, 83, 88 et seq., 04 
 
 Houston, Governor, his scheme of 
 independent sovereignty for 
 Texas, 13 ; deposed from office, 
 14 
 
 Holt, Secretary, 33, 37, 84 
 
 Howard, General O. O., 174 
 
 Hughes, Archbishop, 76 
 
 Hunter, General David, commands 
 Second Division, 174 
 
 Hunter, R.M.T., U.S. Sen., Va., 25 
 
222 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Huttonsville, 147 
 
 ILLINOIS, 127 
 Imboden, General, 185 
 Indiana, 127 ; volunteers, 128 
 Iverson, Secretary, 12 
 
 JACKSON, Camp, 117 ; captured by 
 General Lyon, 118 et seq. 
 
 Jackson, Fort, 79 
 
 Jackson, General T. J. ("Stone 
 wall"), 187 
 
 Jackson, Governor, 115 et seq., 
 119, 121 ct seq., 124 
 
 Jackson, murderer of Ellsworth, 
 113 
 
 Jefferson City, 123 
 
 Jefferson, Fort, on Tortugas Island, 
 16 
 
 Johnston, General Joseph E., re 
 signs from Federal army, 108 ; 
 in command at Harper s Ferry, 
 158 ; destroys Harper s Ferry, 
 161; movements of, before Pat 
 terson, in the Shenandoah Val 
 ley, 162 et seq. ; his march to 
 Manassas, 168 ; in command at 
 Bull Run, 182 et seq. ; opinion 
 of, on the battle of Bull Run, 
 211 
 
 Jones, Colonel (of the Massachu 
 setts Sixth), 84 
 
 Jones, Lieutenant, 95 
 
 KANAWHA, proposed State of, 146 
 Kanawha River, the Great, 141 ; 
 
 valley, 146 
 
 Kane, Marshal, 87, 88 et seq. 
 Kelly, Colonel, 142 et st-q. 
 Kentucky, 80 ; attitude of, with 
 
 regard to secession, 52, 129 et 
 
 seq. ; Union Legislature of, 
 
 130 et seq., 134 
 Keyes, General E. D., 174 
 Key s Ferry, Va., 163 
 
 LAUREL HILL, 147, 151 et seq. 
 
 Lee, General Robert E. , 108 ; ap 
 pointed to command of Vir 
 ginia forces, 109 ; his plans in 
 W. Va., 146; plans of, 109, 170 
 
 Leedsville, 151 
 
 Leesbnrg, Va., 163 
 
 Lefferts, Colonel, 92 et seq. 
 
 Letcher, Governor, 82, 91, 109, 141 
 
 Lewis Ford, 17(5, note 
 
 Liberty, Mo., United States Arse 
 nal at, 117 
 
 j Lincoln, Abraham, election of, 4 ; 
 his progress to Washington, 
 
 45 et seq.; his early career, 
 
 46 ; his character and per 
 son, 47 et seq. ; his speeches 
 before inauguration, 48 ; in 
 auguration of, 49 ; anxiety 
 about Fort Sumter, 50 et seq. ; 
 orders the relief of Forts Sum 
 ter and Picken s, 53 ; his lirial 
 resolution with regard to Fort 
 Sumter, 55 ; his letter to Ma 
 jor Anderson, 58 ; communi 
 cation to Gov. Pickens, 09 ; 
 his first war proclamation, 73 ; 
 interviews with Douglas, 76 ; 
 blockades the insurgent ports, 
 78 ; interview with Baltimore 
 committee, 100 ; issues a sec 
 ond call for volunteers, 106; 
 his orders to P. F. Blair, Jr., 
 1 22 ; his measures to s j,ve the 
 Border States, 131 
 
 Liverpool cotton merchants, 79 
 Longstreet, General, 179 
 
INDEX. 
 
 223 
 
 Louisiana, attitude of, with regard 
 to secession, 2, 8 ; secession of, 
 14 
 
 Louisville, 135 
 
 Lyon, Captain Nathaniel, 116 et 
 seq., 122 et seq., 123 
 
 Lyons, Lord, 94 
 
 MAGOFFIN, Governor, 126 et seq., 
 
 132, 13 let seq. 
 
 Mallory, Senator, 37 et seq., 40 
 Manassas, first movement against, 
 102 et seq. ; description of, 175 
 et seq. 
 
 Manchester, Eng., cotton opera 
 tors of, 79 
 
 Martinsburg, W. Va., 162, 163 
 Maryland, attitude of, with regard 
 to secession, 52, 83, 80 ; rebel 
 conspiracies to gain, 107, 108 ; 
 Union enlistments in, 131 
 Mason, Senator, 25, 1)1, 142 
 Massachusetts Eighth Infantry, 
 
 92, 103 
 
 Massachusetts Sixth Infantry, 84 ; 
 attack upon, in Baltimore, 85 
 et seq. ; map of its route 
 through Baltimore, 85, 99 
 McCauley, Commandant, 96 
 McClellan, Gen. George B., placed 
 in command of Dcpt. of the 
 Ohio, 140; in West Va., 143, 
 146 et seq., 153 et seq. ; ap 
 pointed to command the army 
 of the Potomac, 207, 208 
 McDowell, General Irvin, in com 
 mand at Arlington Heights, 
 173 ; his plan and movements, 
 173 et seq. ; his report cited, 
 175 ; plan of battle at Bull 
 Run, 177; change in his plans, 
 179, 181 ; his action during 
 
 and after the battle, 1 SI -205 ; 
 in charge of the Virginia de 
 fences, 208 
 
 McLean s Ford, 176, note 
 
 McRee, Fort, 38 
 
 Memphis, 133 
 
 Miles, General D. S., commands 
 Fifth Division on advance to 
 Manassas, 174 ; misconduct 
 and suspension of, 199, 204 
 
 Militia, first call for, 73 et seq. 
 
 Milroy, Colonel, 152 et seq. 
 
 Melvale, 90 
 
 Mississippi, attitude of, with re 
 gard to secession, 2, 8 ; seces 
 sion of, 14 
 
 Missouri, attitude of, with regard 
 to secession, 52, 80, 115 ; 
 Unionists of, 120 ; without lo 
 cal government, 124; rescued 
 from secessionists, 125, 131, 133 
 
 Mitchell s Ford, 176, note 
 
 Montgomery, 92 
 
 Morgan, Fort, 79 
 
 Morris, General, 143, 147, 151 
 
 Morton, Governor, 129 
 
 Moultrie, Fort, 21 et seq., 28; 
 seizure of, 32 
 
 NATIONAL property in the South 
 ern States, 15 ; seizure of, by 
 secessionists, 16 ; S. Carolina 
 Commissioners treat for deliv 
 ery of, 27 
 
 Nelson, Lieut. William, U. S. N., 
 131 et seq. 
 
 New York City, proposition for 
 secession of, 71 ; war meeting 
 in, 92 
 
 New York Seventh Regiment, 103 
 
 Norfolk Navy Yard, 83 ; destroyed, 
 96 
 
224 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 North Carolina, attitude of, with 
 regard to secession, 1, 80 
 
 Price, Sterling, 121 et seq., 124 
 Provisional Congress of the rebel 
 
 North, its misapprehension of j States, 37, 39 et seq. 
 
 Southern opinion, 71 et seq. 
 
 OHIO levies, 128 
 
 Ohio, Military Department of the, 
 
 140 
 Ohio River, 127 
 
 PADUCAH, 134 
 
 Palmetto flag, 32 
 
 Parkersburg, 142 
 
 Patterson, General Robert, 155 ; 
 map of his campaign, 159; 
 indecision of, 161 ; Scott s or 
 ders to, 163 et seq. 
 
 Pawnee, the, 110 
 
 Pegram, Colonel, 147 
 
 Peirpont. F. H., Governor, 145 
 
 Pensacola, 38, 79 
 
 Pennsylvania, Military Depart 
 ment of, 155 
 
 Philippi, 143 et seq. ; battle of, 
 144, 146 et seq. 
 
 Phillips, Wendell, 76 
 
 Pickens, Fort, at Pensacola, 16, 
 38, 51, 53 
 
 Pickens, Francis W., Governor of 
 South Carolina, 5, 32; de 
 mands surrender of Fort Sum- 
 ter, 35, 56etseq., 59 
 
 Pierce, ex-President, 76 
 
 Pillow, General, 133, 134 
 
 Pinckney, Castle, 20 ; seizure of, 32 
 
 Polk, General Leonidas, 134 et seq. 
 
 Porter, General Andrew, 174 
 
 Porter, General Fitz-John, 157, 166 I 
 
 Porterfield, Colonel, 142 et seq., j 
 146 
 
 Potomac River, 126 
 
 Pulaski, Fort, 
 
 REBELLION, the beginning of, 1 ; 
 first formal proposal of, 26 
 
 Relay House, 90 
 
 Richardson, General J. B., 174, 
 178 
 
 Richmond, 92 ; Confederate seat of 
 government transferred to, 
 169 
 
 Rich Mountain, 147, 151, 153 
 
 Ricketts, Captain, 188, 191, 192 
 
 Roaring Creek, 149 
 
 Robinson, Camp Dick, 132 
 
 Robinson House, the, 187 
 
 Rosecrans, General W. S., 149, 154, 
 208 
 
 Runyon, General Theodore, com 
 mands Fourth Division in ad 
 vance to Manassa,s, 174 
 
 Russell, Dr. W. H., 202 
 
 SANDFORD, General, 163 
 
 Santa Rosa Island, 38 
 
 Schenck, General R. C., 74 
 
 Scott, General Winfield, at Wash 
 ington, 24, 49 ; views on the 
 relief of Fort Sumter, 51 ; or 
 ders the reinforcement of Har 
 per s Ferry, 95 et seq. ; concen 
 trates troops in Washington, 
 99 et seq.; protects St. Louis, 
 116 ; orders and suggestions to 
 Patterson, 162 et seq. ; hia 
 campaign plans, 171, 172 
 
 St. George, W. Va., 151 
 
 St. Louis, 116 
 
 St. Philip, Fort, 79 
 
INDEX. 
 
 225 
 
 Secession, causes of, 1 et seq. ; 
 passage of ordinance of, in 
 South Carolina, 5 et seq., 14 ; 
 true character of, 8 ; cabal in 
 Washington, 17, 23, 36 
 
 Seventh Regiment, N. Y. State 
 Militia, 92 et seq. 
 
 Seward, Secretary, opposes reliev 
 ing Fort Sumter, 51 ; his idea ; 
 of the conspiracy, 53 ; his re- j 
 ply to the rebel commission 
 ers, 54 ; interview with Judge 
 Campbell, 54, 94 
 
 Shepherdstown, 1GO 
 
 Sherman, General W. T., 174 
 
 Slavery, false assumption of the 
 South with regard to, 7 ; the 
 corner-stone of the Confeder 
 acy, 43 
 
 Slidell, Senator, 37, 40 
 
 Slemmer, Lieutenant, 38 
 
 Small s Pennsylvania Brigade, 88 
 
 Smith, General G. W., 211 
 
 Smith, General Kirby, 194 
 
 South Carolina, attitude of, with 
 regard to secession, 1 ; seces 
 sion of, 5, 14 
 
 South Carolina Commissioners 
 have an interview with Presi 
 dent Buchanan, 30 ; their 
 blindness to their opportunity, 
 31 
 
 Southern States, their differences 
 of territory, etc., 10 et seq. 
 
 Stan ton, Edwin M., 20, 33 
 
 " Star of the West," 33 
 
 State supremacy, doctrine of, 6 
 
 Staunton, Va., 143, 146 
 
 Steedman, Colonel, 152 
 
 Stephens, Alexander H., 12; 
 elected Vice-President of the 
 Confederacy, 42 
 
 Stone Bridge, the, over Bull Run, 
 176 and note 
 
 Stone, General, 163 
 
 Strasburg, Va., 163 
 
 Sudley Ford, Bull Run, 182 
 
 Sudley road, the, 187 
 
 Sullivan s Island, 21 et seq. 
 
 Sumter, Fort, 21 et seq. ; expedi 
 tion for the relief of, 53 ; Pres 
 ident Lincoln s decision with 
 regard to, 55 ; preparations for 
 the siege of, 56 ; its evacua 
 tion demanded, 60 ; siege be 
 gun, 62 ; strength of, 63 ; its 
 disadvantages in the siege, 65 ; 
 surrender of, 68 ; the effect at 
 the North of the attack on, 72 
 
 TAYLOR, Fort, at Key West, 16 
 
 Tennessee, 80, 133 et seq. ; East, 
 135 
 
 Texas, course of the conspirators 
 in, 13 ; ordinance of secession 
 submitted to popular vote, 13 ; 
 attitude of, with regard to se 
 cession, 13 et seq. ; secession 
 of, 14 
 
 Thomas, Secretary, 26 
 
 Thomas, Colonel, 166 
 
 Thompson, Jeff., 118 
 
 Thompson, Secretary, 17, 20, 30, 
 33 
 
 Toombs, Senator, 12, 42 
 
 Toucey, Secretary, 33 
 
 Townsend, Colonel, 153 
 
 Twiggs, General, treachery of, 14 
 
 Tyler, General Daniel, commands 
 First Division in the advance 
 on Manassas, 174 ; hia advance, 
 177, 178 
 
 UNION Mills Ford, 176, note 
 
226 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 VARIAN, Captain, 174 
 
 Vernon, Mount, Va., 103 
 
 Vienna Station, Va., ambush at, 
 172 
 
 Virginia, attitude of, with regard to 
 secession, 51 et seq., 80; seces 
 sion, 98 ; extent and character 
 of, 137 et seq. , 1G9 
 
 Virginia, East, 137 ; vote on Seces 
 sion Ordinance, 143 
 
 Virginia, West, 131, 133, 137, 141 ; 
 vote on Secession Ordinance, 
 143 ; organized as separate 
 State, 144 et seq. ; map of 
 West Virginia battles, 148; 
 admitted into the Union, 154 
 
 Volunteers, first enlistment of, 75 ; 
 new, called for, 100 
 
 WALKER, Secretary, 57, 91 
 Walker, Robert J., 76 
 Ward, Capt., TJ. S. K, 38 
 Warrenton Turnpike, the, 176 
 Washington, 83 ; character of, 97 ; 
 
 defence of, 98 et seq. ; threat 
 ened, 101 ; arrival of the Mas 
 sachusetts Sixth and New 
 York Seventh regiments at, 
 103 et seq. ; becomes a camp, 
 106 et seq. 
 
 Washington, Fort, 103 
 
 West Union, W. Va., 151 
 
 Wheeling, 139, 142 et seq. 
 
 Wigfall, Senator, 68 
 
 Willcox, General O. B., 174 
 
 Williamsport, Pa., 157 
 
 Williamsport, W. Va., 162 
 
 Winchester, Va,, 157, 100 
 
 Wise, ex-Governor Henry A., 146, 
 154 
 
 Wood, Mayor Fernando, 71, 73 
 
 Woodbury, Captain, cited, 195 
 
 Woodruff, Colonel, 131 
 
 YOUNG S Branch, 183 
 
 ZOLLICOFFER, General, 135 
 Zouaves, Ellsworth s, 110 
 
 
 
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