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: CITY LmOINEER :

THE LIBRARY
OF

THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES

THE

PANAMA CANAL

COMPRISING ITS HISTORY AND CONSTRUC-
TION, AND ITS RELATION TO THE NAVY,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCE

REUBEN E. BAKENHDS, S. B.

Corps op Civil Engineers, United States Navy
Public Works Officer, Navy Yard, Boston, Mass.
Formerly Assistant in Civil Engineering, Massachusetts Institute op Technology

HARRY S. KNAPP

Captain United States Navy; Formerly Member
Naval War College Staff

EMORY R. JOHNSON, Ph. D., Sc. D.

Professor of Transportation and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania
Member of Public Service Commission of Pennsylvania
Special Commissioner on Panama Canal Traffic and Tolls, 1911-1913

With Maps and Illustrations

FIRST EDITION

FIRST THOUSAND

NEW YORK
JOHN WILEY & SONS, Inc.

London: CHAPMAN & HALL, Limited
1915

^ LIBRARY

< OF THE

: CITY ENGINEE

PASADENA, - CALIF.

REUBEN E. BAKENHUS, HARRY S. KNAPP

AND

EMORY R. JOHNSON

Stanbope ipreas

F. H.GILSON COMPANY
BOSTON, U.S.A.

SUP

PREFACE

Although much has been published on the Panama
Canal, it is this very wealth of literature which makes
another book desirable. The reader who would thor-
oughly understand the canal, its history, where and
how it was built, what it means to commerce and to
the navy and where it stands in the council of nations
would" perhaps, wade through many pages of pictur-
esque and interesting descriptions more or less accurate,
find a part well described here and a part there and
yet, in the end, might not have a complete understand-
ing of the mammoth enterprise. The authors of this
volume have endeavored to take the comprehensive
view, excluding non-essential details which, though in-
teresting, apply to many other enterprises as well as to
the canal. They have included, however, the impor-
tant principles, laws and facts to which the canal owes
its existence. That such a treatise may hold the inter-
est of the reader the authors are led to believe because
of the many kind and genuine commendations from
those who read the subject-matter when it first ap-
peared in print.

It may be of added interest to know that the articles
which have been gathered under one cover to form
this book were originally published in the Proceedings
of the United States Naval Institute, a voluntary pro-

iii

Preface

fessional organization of naval officers. No body of
men in the country is more vitally interested in all
phases of the Panama Canal than the officers of the
United States Navy. With this in mind the Board of
Control of the Naval Institute requested the prepara-
tion of a series of articles on the canal that would
comprehend not only the history and the engineering
features of the great work, but also the position of the
canal in international law, in commerce and in its
relation to the national defense. Their reception has
been so favorable outside the naval service, as well as
inside, that the material is now presented in book
form for the general reader.

The articles have been thoroughly reviewed and,
with additional information included therein, are pre-
pared for the press at a time when the canal is all but
complete and the first vessels have already passed
through. Many years of study and experience in lines
directly allied to the subjects discussed and much hard
work were preparatory for this publication and if the
authors have in any way met a want or filled a gap in
the extensive literature on the canal they will feel
well repaid.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Acknowledgment is due the Board of Control of the
Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md., for permission to pub-
lish in book form the material which originally appeared
as articles in the Proceedings of the Naval Institute,
and to the Secretary, Lieutenant Commander Ralph
Earle, U. S. Navy, for his unfailing interest in the work.

The annual and special reports of the Isthmian Canal
Commission are replete with information and have been
a most valuable aid in preparation of parts of this
volume.

To Col. George W. Goethals, U. S. Army, formerly
Chairman of the Isthmian Canal Commission and now
Governor of the Panama Canal, and to Civil Engineer
H. H. Rousseau, U. S. Navy, formerly member of the
Isthmian Canal Commission and now engineer of ter-
minals, as well as to many others connected with the
work, thankful acknowledgment is made of many cour-
tesies extended in connection with inspection of the
canal operations and access to the official records.

The maps and the photographs, where not otherwise
noted, are reproduced from official sources.

Digitized by the Internet Archive

in 2014

https://archive.org/details/panamacanalcomprbyre

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I

HISTORICAL

Page

Introductory 3

Early History 4

Modern Canal Projects 11

French Contribution to the Enterprise 15

Transfer of Control to the United States 21

PART II

THE ROUTE — THE DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION

Physical Characteristics of the Canal Route... 29

The Choice of Type 35

Comparative Data — Sea-level and Lock Canal

(Table) 37

General Description of the Canal 41

Gatun Lake 46

The Gatun Dam 54

Gatun Spillway 59

Excavation of Culebra Cut 63

Analysis of Cost of Excavating Culebra Cut

(Table) 64

Geology and the Slides 71

MlRAFLORES LAKE 78

The Canal Locks 80

Lock Operating Machinery 85

Constructing the Locks 88

Locks as the Limiting Feature 91

The Sea-level Sections and the Terminals 94

Control of Water During Construction 100

Aids to Navigation 104

vii

Table of Contents

PART III

SANITATION — COSTS OF WORK — ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS —
CONCLUSION

Page

Sanitation 109

Costs of Work 112

Total Expenditures to June 30, 1913 (Table) 116

The Elements of Success 117

In Conclusion 120

PART IV

THE NAVY AND THE PANAMA CANAL

The Navy and the Panama Canal 125

PART V

THE PANAMA CANAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Panama Canal in International Law 157

The Suez Canal Treaty 182

The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty 187

The Hay-Bunau Varilla (Panama) Treaty 190

PART VI

COMMERCIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE PANAMA CANAL

Commercial Importance of the Panama Canal 205

Distances and Time Saved by the Panama Canal 206

Panama Traffic, American and Foreign 216

Effect of Panama Canal upon Transcontinental

Rates by Railroads and Carriers by Water. 222

Effect of Fuel Costs upon Usefulness of the

Panama Canal 228

Panama Canal Tolls and Revenue 232

Exemption of the Owners of Coastwise Ships . . . 236

APPENDIX
NEUTRALITY PROCLAMATION

Proclamation of Neutrality of Canal Zone by

President Wilson 241

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Fia. Facing Pa.gb

1. The Canal at Empire under French Control in 1885 .. . 14

2. Culebra Cut at Culebra in January 1912 20

3. Culebra Cut at Culebra in February 1912, Showing

" Break" 20

4. Culebra Cut at Empire in January 1913 26

5. A Slide in Culebra Cut, February 1913, Showing Shovel

at Work 32

6. A Slide in Culebra Cut, February 1913, Near View 32

7. Culebra Cut at Culebra Showing Dredges Making Final

Excavation at Cucaracha Slide 36

8. Gatun Lower Lock under Construction and Sea-level

Canal 40

9. Gatun Upper Lock under Construction and Gatun Lake 46

10. Gatun Spillway Dam 58

11. Pedro Miguel Lock and Miraflores Lake 66

12. Miraflores Upper Locks Showing Steam Shovels and

Construction Cranes 74

13. Concrete Handling Cranes at Miraflores 74

14. A Gatun Lock in Use as a Dry Dock 80

15. Towing Locomotives Handling Coal Barge at Gatun

Locks 84

16. Operation of Gatun Locks Showing Panama R.R.

Steamer A llianca 90

17. Emergency Dam at Pedro Miguel Locks 96

18. Pedro Miguel Locks Control House 100

19. Toro Point Breakwater under Construction 116

20. American and French Canals at Intersection at Mindi

Excavation 116

LIST OF MAPS AND PLANS

For greater convenience in reference all maps and plans are bound

at end of book.

Plate No.

I. The Isthmus with Completed Canal.

II. Atlantic End of Canal with Gatun Locks and Dam and
Toro Point Breakwater.

III. Panama End of Canal with Miraflores Lake, Locks and

Naos Island Breakwater.

IV. Cross Sections of Canal.

V. Profile of Canal from Atlantic Ocean to Pacific Ocean.
VI. General Plans, Profiles and Sections of Gatun Locks.

THE PANAMA CANAL

Part I
HISTORICAL

REUBEN E. BAKENHUS, S. B.

CIVIL ENGINEER U. S. NAVY

THE PANAMA CANAL

HISTORICAL

INTRODUCTORY

There could be no better introduction to a book
on the Panama Canal than the enthusiastic words of
Ambassador Bryce in a recent chapter on the Isthmus
of Panama, where he says, in referring to the canal :

There is something in the magnitude and the methods of this
enterprise which a poet might take as his theme. Never before
on our planet have so much labour, so much scientific knowledge,
and so much executive skill been concentrated on a work de-
signed to bring the nations nearer to one another and serve the
interests of all mankind.

In no previous age could an enterprise so vast as this have
been carried through; that is to say, it would have required a
time so long and an expenditure so prodigious that no rational
government would have attempted it.

It is true we have elsewhere done work of comparable
magnitude — the tunnels under the Hudson and East
Rivers, the great railroads and terminals, the Erie
Canal, the city subways and water-supply systems,
the reclamation projects and great bridges — but these
are all intimately interwoven with our daily life and
progress. The canal is a project crystallized from the
vast multitude of enterprises and is indisputably the
greatest of them all.

With a subject so vast, one that has attained his-
toric interest, and ranks as an engineering work of

THe Panama Canal

such magnitude, it seems necessary to give a resume
of the early history, and to consider it in relation to
events that may be well known in other connections.

EARLY HISTORY

One of the most interesting subjects connected with
the Panama Canal is the history of the canal idea.
. To study its conception carries us back to the Middle
Ages — to the conditions so well described by Fiske
in his " Discovery of America," when Genoa and
Venice were the great commercial rivals and Spain
was a rising power. Following Marco Polo's marvel-
ous travels from 1269 to 1295, throughout kf4% and
that of his adventurous successors, a great trade de-
veloped with the Orient, which proceeded unchecked
via the Mediterranean and the ancient overland routes
until the hostile Mohammedan Turk, recovering from
two centuries of repression from the Crusades, over-
flowed his own dominions and entered the Balkan
peninsula. In 1453 Constantinople was taken by the
Turks, and the alliance between that city and Genoa
was broken. This great commercial metropolis, through
the persistent attacks of the Turks, was gradually de-
prived of her route to the Orient and thus of her com-
merce. The commerce of Genoa's great and only rival,
Venice, had a similar fate.

Tremendous pressure developed for the finding of
some new route to Cathay, as the other conditions for
trade were most favorable. The world's ideas of geog-
raphy at that time were of the crudest fashion. America
was unknown. Africa had not been circumnavigated;

Historical

its southern limits were enveloped in a haze of con-
jecture and ignorance. It was known that Asia did
not extend indefinitely to the East and was not bounded
by limitless swamps, as had been supposed. With the
increasing hazards of the route to Cathay and the
lands of spices, and the rising expectations of wealth
and riches fed by the avaricious and adventurous spirit
of the Middle Ages, the minds of men were forced to
think of the possibility of other routes.

In the discovery by Dias, in 1486, and the confirma-
\ tion by Vasco de Gama, in 1496, of the route to India
by circumnavigating Africa, we are not now interested
except to know that the presence on the first of these
voyages of the brother of Christopher Columbus acted
as a stimulus to the mind of the great explorer. He,
as we know, put the unique idea of reaching Cathay
by sailing westward to the test of four actual sea voy-
ages. The results are familiar, but we must bear in
mind that the discovery of the American continent
was a mere incident and that what Columbus was
really seeking was a passage to the Orient, and for this
he continued his search on his three subsequent voy-
ages. His ships ran their prows into the bays and inlets
in the hope that they might find a strait and forge on
to the desired lands. The full truth was never known
to Columbus; he little realized, when his ships were at
Porto Bello, that only forty miles overland were the
waters — could he only reach them — which would
carry him to his much-sought-for goal, and thence to
Spain. Succeeding explorers continued these efforts,
and every indentation of the eastern coast line of the

TKe Panama Canal

Americas was explored by Spanish, Portuguese, Eng-
lish and Dutch ships, only to dim the hopes that the
passage could ever be found.

It remained for Balboa, led on by tales of friendly
Indians, to gain the knowledge of what lay beyond,
after an overland journey not far distant from the site
of the present canal. The discovery of the Pacific in
1513 only intensified the mariners' desires to penetrate
with their ships.

The discovery in 1520, by Magellan, of the straits
named after him, his entry into the Pacific, and the
completion of the circumnavigation of the globe in
1522 by a part of his expedition did not solve the
problem and only emphasized the desirability of a
conveniently located passage.

The actual results of the epoch-making discoveries
overshadowed the original aims of the explorers. From
being a primary aim, the search for the interoceanic
passage, with the gradual ushering into the known
world of the two continents, became secondary. The
exploration and development of the newly found lands
afforded a boundless outlet for the restless spirit of the
times. The canal idea, having had its genesis in such
great world events, was now to enter the next stage
of its development.

It is remarkable that the desire for the passage has
persisted throughout all these centuries. The increase
in geographic knowledge, the correct understanding of
the relation of the Americas to Europe and Asia, polit-
ical history, the invention and building of railroads,
and finally the phenomenal development of the Amer-

Historical

ican continent itself, have all brought out new phases
of the problem and altered the point of view; but in
all its phases it has remained one of the great ambitions
of the human race.

The Americans did not have the honor of sending
the first ship ^crjoss^he,Is^thmus. Balboa and his suc-
cessor, J3il Gonzales de Avila, both carried ships
across — Balboa after building them near the source of
lumber supply on the Atlantic side and then dismant-
ling and re-erecting them on the Pacific side, and de
Avila after dismantling the ships that had carried him
across the ocean. Their enterprise and- energy are
greatly to be admired. Untold difficulties beset the
journeys through the jungle, and in Balboa's first
crossing, one authority states the number of deaths
amongst the Indian cargadores to have been five hun-
dred, and another places the number at two thousand.
The object in crossing the Isthmus was exploration on
the Pacific side, especially investigations of the reputed
gold in Peru. Subsequently there was much traffic
with the Pacific coast, which was carried across the
Isthmus and reshipped.

Charles V of Spain, who succeeded to the throne in
1516, encouraged the explorations of the South Sea, as
the Pacific was then known, and urged his American
governors, if possible, to discover a strait by systematic
exploration. The expedition of Gil Gonzales de Avila
along the Pacific shores had this object. He discovered
Lake Nicaragua, which has played such an important
part in the interoceanic canal question. No strait
being found after years of search, Charles in 1534, by

THe Pa nama Canal

a royal decree directed examination to be made of the
land between the Atlantic town of Chagres and the
Pacific with a view to the establishment of water con-
nection. It is reported that even as early as 1520 sur-
veys were ordered by the Emperor. The result of the
royal decree was that the local governor declared the
work to be impracticable and beyond the resources of
any sovereign.

H*In the meantime a considerable commerce developed
across the Isthmus. The city of Panama was founded
on the Pacific side in 1517, and Nombre de Dios,
founded in 1519, was the most important post on the
Atlantic side. Between the two a road was built and
a series of posts established. Later Porto Bello, due to
a better harbor and superior location, was made the

tlantic terminus and a new road to Panama was built

ox such a character that portions of it may be used to
this day. Subsequent to 1534 a partial water route
was established for boats and light-draft vessels up
the Chagres as far as Cruces by removal of obstruc-
tions from the river. This is the identical stream and
valley which nearly four hundred years later is being
utilized as the Atlantic end of the Isthmian Canal.
The establishment of the partial water route did not
lead to the discontinuance of the paved way. With
the conquest of Peru by Pizarro in 1533-1535, the
trans-isthmian trade grew in amount and value and
the Spanish colonies continued to prosper. Panama
became a great collecting and distributing center for
Spanish commerce.

So lucrative and so extensive did the trade become

Historical

that under Philip II, who succeeded to the throne o
the abdication of Charles V in 1555, the search for a
strait was given up and all idea of a canal abandoned.
With untold treasures coming to Spain by the existing
means of transport, the Emperor did not desire to seek
new means of intercourse which might benefit a rival
nation as much as, or more than Spain, and furthermore
all the energies of the people were fully occupied in
developing the existing sources of treasure and none
seemed available for new enterprises. The same
policy continued for about two centuries.

In the meantime trade developed and the terminal
towns grew. Panama in its day was the great metropolis
of the New World, having pretentious stone churches,
monasteries and numerous dwellings of wood. Its mar-
kets and those of Porto Bello were the meeting-places
for the merchants of Peru, the Isthmus and of Spain.
Great quantities of silver and gold passed eastward
and supplies from Spain came in the opposite direction.
The transportation across the Isthmus was by mule
train. All others than Spanish were excluded from the
traffic.^ The richness of the trade and the overbearing
stand of the Spaniards encouraged piratical attacks by
the seamen of the northern nations on the shipping of
the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, and even on the over-
land mule trains. Between the years 1570 and 1596
Sir Francis Drake made numerous privateering attacks,
which were very much of the nature of piracy. The
Spaniards were sending their merchant ships in fleets
twice a year, convoyed by six and eight armed vessels.
Drake was followed in his enterprise by the buccaneers

THe Panama Canal

who reached the limit of their power under Henry
Morgan. Morgan with great energy and daring cap-
tured Nombre de Dios and immediately after con-
ducted operations against Porto Bello. He turned
what was nearly a failure into a cruel success, and a
year later, in 1671, according to his threatened promise
to the governor of Panama, he returned to ransack the
city of Panama. After a wretched trip across the
Isthmus, almost without food, the city was attacked
and fell into the hands of Morgan. As a result of his
raid the city was destroyed, and to this day the ruins
of old Panama, the massive stone walls, the towers of
churches, monasteries and forts still remain as mute
and impressive evidences of the constructive energy of
the Spaniards and of the wicked, destructive energy of
the English buccaneers. After a systematic plunder
of all the valuables of the city, Morgan left. The
town was never rebuilt on the old location.

The trade of Panama suffered a period of decline
after the Indian empires had been stripped of their
valuables. A royal cedula in 1593 forbade trade with
China and the East Indies; the development of local
industries was forbidden through rival influences at
home; corrupt governors did the colonies no good,
and there were various governmental restrictions on
trade and growth. Even the roadway across the
Isthmus entered a period of disuse, and the traffic
between Spain and the western ports went via the
Cape of Good Hope or Cape Horn, except a certain
amount crossing at Tehuantepec.
x: ^In the latter part of the eighteenth century certain

Historical

desultory efforts were made toward a canal, including
an examination of the Nicaragua route from 1779 to
1781, followed by a discouraging report. Notwith-
standing this, a company was formed to undertake the
project and a route utilizing Lake Nicaragua was se-
lected. By 1823, when all the continental colonies had
secured their independence by revolt, all Spanish effort
and influence ceased.

MODERN CANAL PROJECTS

With the demise of Spanish authority on the conti-
nent there was an early active revival of canal project^
In fact, as early as 1825 the minister of the then Cen-
tral American Republic to the United States addressed
the Secretary of State, inviting attention to the willing-
ness of the Republic to receive the cooperation of the
United States in the building of a canal by a group of
American merchants. The United States gave a favor-
able reply, but nothing resulted at that time. In 1826,
however, the Republic of Central America actually ac-
cepted the proposals of an association for the building of
the canal under liberal terms. The attempt to organize a
company with a capital of $5,000,000 proved unsuccess-
ful. In 1830 the Central American Republic negotiated
with a Netherlands company, and the United States,
hearing of this, informed the Republic that it would
expect the same rights and privileges of passage through
the canal as other nations. In 1835, at the initiative
of the United States, some investigations were begun,
but were dropped in 1837 upon the advice that the
time was not propitious. Another project started in

TTHe Panama Canal

1838, and a still further investigation and an estimate
of $25,000,000 were made in President Van Buren's
administration, but the Isthmian country was too un-
settled and revolutionary for any definite progress to
be made. There are records of still other efforts in
1826, 1827 and 1838. (in the latter year a concession
was granted to a French company to build roads or
canals. | Asa result a canal was recommended by Na-
poleon Garella with a starting-point in Limon Bay,
thence to a connection with the Chagres River below
Gatun.j The divide was to be crossed by means 6f a
series of eighteen locks on the Atlantic side and sixteen
on the Pacific side, with a summit level 158 feet above
the sea, and the highest part of the divide penetrated
by a tunnel over three miles long. The report of actual
conditions by Garella discouraged the promoters. ^

During all this period the United States was peopled
only on the Atlantic seaboard and was interested in
commerce which started or terminated in Atlantic
ports only. ( In the middle of the century events oc-
curred which were destined to greatly increase the im-
portance of the Isthmus, and to have a strong influence
in pushing the canal idea to the point where its actual
execution was bound to follow.] It was the acquisition
of California, the discovery of gold therein, the ex-
ploration and settlement of the Northwest Territory
and, to a lesser extent, the purchase of Alaska, which
led the United States on to its destiny as a Pacific as
well as an Atlantic power and thus established the
conditions that ultimately made the canal a certainty.
The trans-isthmian route for freight and passengers

Historical

regained its old-time importance, and curiously enough
it was again the search for gold that gave the impetus.
A railroad across the Isthmus was established, promoted
by Americans. The success of this road was continuous
on account of the increasing amount of traffic. Even
the establishment of the transcontinental railroads did
not vitiate the importance of the trans-isthmian road,
nor did any of the railroads have a real deterrent
influence on the canal scheme.

Almost innumerable projects, examinations and re-
ports were made during the latter half of the nine-
teenth century, in which the United States, France and
Great Britain led. Prior to 1850 no extensive and
accurate surveys had been made. After that date
work was done in earnest; no longer were the results
of reconnoissances afoot or on horseback sufficient; the
methods of modern engineering were taking their first
grip upon large enterprises, and no company or gov-
ernment could entertain a proposition not based on
surveys by engineers and on detailed estimates of cost.
Several companies were incorporated, including the
American, Atlantic and Pacific Ship Canal Company
in 1850. All failed from one reason or another to do
much more than organize or conduct surveys. Always
some insuperable obstacle was met. It is no doubt
true that very few fully realized the enormous difficul-
ties that subsequent experience disclosed, and fortu-
nately so, since the enthusiasm for the idea might have
received a setback from which it could not easily have
recovered. A predicted cost of $400,000,000 would
have made the enterprise seem impossible.

THe Panama Canal

In 1869, official recognition was given to the subject,
and President Grant's first message to Congress called
attention to the advisability of an American canal on
American soil. The appointment of a commission, known
as the Inter-Oceanic Canal Commission, was authorized
by Congress; this commission not only examined all
available data previously gathered by others, but had
new data collected and had access to new surveys made
principally under the direction of officers of the army
and navy, covering the Panama, Nicaragua and Darien
routes. In 1876, after six years work, the commission
reported that " After a long, careful, and minute study
of the several surveys of the various routes, the one
known as the Nicaragua route . . . possesses, both
for the construction and maintenance of a canal,
greater advantages and offers fewer difficulties from
engineering, commercial, and economic points of view
than any of the other routes."

A further survey of the Nicaragua route was made
in 1885 by order of the Secretary of the Navy. This
was followed in two years by the organization of the
Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua, incorporated
by Congress and having a concession from the Nica-
raguan government. The company actually dug a por-
tion of the canal on the Atlantic side, but failing to
secure government aid the concession lapsed and the
property reverted to the State.

I In 1895, the Nicaragua Canal Board was appointed by
the President by authority of Congress.^ The board
visited Nicaragua, conducting investigations, but in
the six months allowed them did not have sufficient

Photo by Underwood and Underwood, New York.

Fig. 1. — The canal, Culebra Cut, looking north from Empire in 1885, under
French control.

Historical

time for further necessary explorations, for collecting
the vast amount of information and reaching a definite
conclusion on so momentous a matter, and accordingly
recommended a further board. lAs a result the Nica-
ragua Canal Commission of 1897 was appointed, and in
its report of May, 1899, proposed a route which fol-
lowed closely the one suggested in 1852.X The United
States was apparently committed to the Nicaragua
route. (The Panama route had been pre-empted by
the French, but their hold was loosening.\ Congress
in its next step authorized a further commission with
greatly extended authority, to consider the Panama as
well as the Nicaragua route and to evaluate work done
by any private company, having in mind the French.
The first Isthmian Canal Commission was accordingly
appointed in 1899 — a distinct broadening in scope and
title from those of the previous boards and commissions.

FRENCH CONTRIBUTION TO THE ENTERPRISE

At this point it is well to pause in the account of
American doings, to consider briefly what the French
had contributed since the middle of the century to the
canal idea and to construction. In 1844 a French
engineer, after surveys having both a railway and a
canal in view, made an accurate report concerning
Panama, all in the interests of a French company
holding concessions. Like so many others the project
failed and the concessions lapsed.

At the Congress of Geographical Science in 1875, in
Paris, M. Ferdinand de Lesseps came upon the scene
with the sweeping announcement that in his opinion

XKe Panama Canal

the authors of all plans up to that time had committed
the serious error of examining only canal routes with
locks, and that the interoceanic canal in order to meet
the requirements of navigation, must be constructed at
sea level like the Suez. Thus early did he show that
the elements of his character — force, unbridled en-
thusiasm, convictions without investigation, and a
sublime faith in himself — which had carried him on
to a magnificent success in the straightforward problem
at Suez, were, in the infinitely more difficult problems
at Panama, to make of him a consummate blunderer
and a deceiver, brushing aside and ignoring the advice
and estimates of competent and trained engineers
when they did not follow his own preconceived ideas,
and leading many unfortunate investors, including
himself, to financial ruin. Under such a leader the
French project was foredoomed to failure. De Lesseps,
so far as the French were concerned, made the project
his own; he dominated the committees, moulded a
popular sentiment, all being eager to follow his lead;
if doubts arose, his was the reassuring word, and at his
solicitation the subscriptions to the stock of the com-
pany poured in. His success at Suez was his most
valuable asset and had indeed placed him on a pinnacle.
He was a man of undoubted ability, but lacked an
element of discrimination which should have caused
him to appreciate the true magnitude of the problems
before him. De Lesseps having attempted great proj-
ects must be measured by great standards. He did
not lack strong opposition nor able expert advice, but
he beat them down with the same indiscriminating

Historical

ability as he did natural obstacles and the financial
troubles that interfered with his idealized delusion of
a sea-level canal.

In 1876, a French committee with de Lesseps at the
head was formed; also, in 1876, a civil association
undertook actual surveys, which were under the direc-
tion of Lieut. L. N. B. Wyse. In May, 1878, after
completing the surveys, Lieutenant Wyse secured for
his association a concession from the government of
Colombia for a ship canal. This was the real beginning
of the canal which, after many vicissitudes, is now the
American canal. An international congress of surveys
was held in Paris in 1879, and after elaborate discus-
sion decided on the route from the Bay of Limon to
the Bay of Panama, and that it should be at sea level.
The decision for the sea-level canal was by no means
unanimous. "When one reads the reports of the ses-
sions of that commission, one constantly recognizes the
inspiration of M. de Lesseps, one perceives the action
of his will, so persistent in forming a general opinion in
favor of a plan for a canal on a level." There were
those who foresaw the difficulties and who advocated
a lock canal. In fact, de Lesseps had against him the
majority of the engineers and contractors. The pre-
dicted cost was 1,200,000,000 francs, and the time
twelve years. About three months later the Universal
Interoceanic Canal Company was formed, but less than
one-tenth the stock was subscribed on the first attempt.
De Lesseps did not have a bed of roses; he consented
to new surveys and new estimates, and he personally
went to the Isthmus in December, 1879, accompanied

THe Panama Canal

by the International Survey Commission. The surveys
were accomplished and the conclusions reached in a
time so incredibly short as to cast doubt upon their
reliability. The estimate of cost was 834,000,000 francs,
and of time eight years, both remarkably lower than
those of the year before by the technical commission.
The estimate of cost was still further reduced to 685,-
000,000 francs by de Lesseps himself, leaving it less
than sixty per cent of the original estimate, which was
considered low by competent persons. Later a firm of
contractors, Couvreux & Hersent, favorable to the
views of de Lesseps, estimated the cost of the canal to
be 500,000,000 francs not including general adminis-
tration and financing, and they undertook a contract
on a cost-plus-profit basis. The annual revenue of the
completed canal was estimated at 90,000,000 francs.
The stock issue of 300,000,000 francs was doubly sub-
scribed. The contractors performed the two years of
preparatory work at cost plus six per cent. By the
end of that time, December, 1882, it was clear that the
predicted unit costs and rates of progress could not be
reached, and the contract was annulled on the con-
tractors' proposal.

The Superior Advisory Commission, composed of
men eminent as engineers and technicians, was formed
in 1881. This commission was dominated by de Les-
seps through his personal force, and their acts did not
result in clearing the situation.

To carry on the work abandoned by the closing of
the contract, the canal company in 1883 secured the
services of M. Dingier, an able engineer, to supervise

Historical

and direct the operations on the Isthmus. The devel-
opments of the next few years were : a voluminous report
by the chief engineer on the sea-level canal project;
discovery that the quantity to be excavated was 120,-
000,000 cubic meters, rather than the 75,000,000 esti-
mated by the International Commission, or the 45,000-
000 estimated by the International Congress; the
award of a series of small contracts and establishment
of work yards; the realization in July, 1885, that less
than one-tenth of the excavation had been completed
although four of the eight years allowed for construc-
tion had elapsed; the return to the former estimate of
1,200,000,000 francs; a reorganization involving the
award of large contracts for completing the canal in
five sections by 1889; the announcement by de Les-
seps, m|1886, after a visit to Panama, of his utmost
confidence in the speedy completion of the canal; fur-
ther successful bond issues; renewed attacks on the
feasibility of the sea-level canal, based on reports by
expert engineers of incontrovertible facts, but inef-
fective on de Lesseps; the weakening of public and
financial support, and the final capitulation of de Les-
seps to the lock-canal idea, but only as a temporary
expedient to hasten completion and to be followed by
a deepening to sea level. These events were followed
by the ineffectual attempt to issue a series of lottery
bonds on authority of the Chamber of Deputies, which
foreshadowed the financial debacle of the enterprise.
Receivers were soon appointed and the affairs of the
company were wound up. De Lesseps and his son were
tried, convicted and sentenced by the courts of France

TKe Panama Canal

to pay a fine and serve a term of five years imprison-
ment. The sentence against the son was reversed, and
that against the father was never executed. He be-
came a complete wreck, both physical and mental, and
died in 1893. The company had actually expended
about 1,300,000,000 francs and had accomplished about
55,000,000 cubic yards of excavation on the permanent
work, or less than one-half the total on the French
plan.

After careful investigation and a great deal of diffi-
cult work, the receiver, in 1894, launched a new com-
pany to complete the lock canal. An extension of time
had been secured from the Colombian government
through the agency of Lieutenant Wyse. The first
step of the new company was to reinvestigate the whole
subject of the canal, which was done through the ap-
pointment of the " Comite Technique " of engineers
of international eminence, including two Americans.
Their work was most thorough, comprehensive and
to the point. Later, in accordance with the charter of
the company, a commission of five members was
appointed to make final recommendations, who re-
ported:

. . . that the adopted project is practicable under the condi-
tions of time and expense indicated, and that the New Company
has demonstrated that by works which will not exceed an outlay
of about one hundred million dollars, and a duration of about ten
years, it is possible to open the Panama Canal to extensive com-
merce, to remove the obstacle which the Isthmus opposes to inter-
national communication, and thus to complete an immense work
that interests all the nations of the world and is the greatest
which human genius has ever planned.

Fig. 2. — Culebra Cut, Culebra, showing steam shovels working at elevation

+73. Looking east, January 27, 1912.

Fig. 3. — Culebra Cut, Culebra, showing break in east bank of canal. Amount
of material involved, 320,000 cu. yds. February 11, 1912.

Historical

There was to be a summit level and an artificial lake
at Bohio with the necessary locks, 738 feet long and
82 feet wide, and sea-level connections. There is every
reason to believe that the enterprise was feasible and
would have been carried through. The company, as a
matter of fact, did only enough work to care for the
extensive plant and excavated about 5,000,000 cubic
yards in five years, but the valuable and necessary
progress made was in the way of gathering scientific
and engineering information that was absolutely essen-
tial and which the old company did not have, and which
later proved of the greatest benefit to the United States.
The financing of the enterprise became impracticable,
due to the United States coming into the field as a
probable canal builder. The French were truly leading
a forlorn hope and finally their only chance lay in selling
out to the United States.

TRANSFER OF CONTROL TO THE UNITED STATES

The Isthmian Canal Commission of the United
States, in the two and one-half years from June, 1899,
to November, 1901, made most elaborate investiga-
tions of the whole canal problem, covering the first
Darien route from the Gulf of San Bias to the Gulf of
Panama; the second Darien route from Caledonia Bay
to San Miguel Bay, an arm of the Gulf of Panama;
the Panama route from Limon Bay to Panama Bay;
and the Nicaragua route from Greytown via the San
Juan River and Lake Nicaragua to Brito on the
Pacific, and other less important routes. An immense
amount of literature, reports and surveys turned out

THe Panama Canal

by previous boards was accessible, including the most
excellent and complete data in the hands of the New
French Company. Besides all this, much additional
surveying and investigation was a necessity.

The commission evaluated the French property as
follows:

Useful Canal Excavation $21,020,386

Chagres Diversion 178,186

Gatun Diversion 1,396,456

Railroad Diversion 300,000

Contingencies 4,579,005

Panama Railroad Stock 6,850,000

Maps, Drawings and Records 2,000,000

Total $36,324,033

Add about 10 per cent to cover omissions 3,675,967

Grand total $40,000,000

The French company submitted an estimated valua-
tion for purpose of discussion with a view to sale to
the United States, of $109,141,500. The commission
estimated the cost of completing the Panama Canal
to be $144,233,358, to which must be added the
commission's evaluation of the French property, or a
total of $184,233,358, or adding the company's offer
to the cost of completion, a total of $253,374,858.
The commission estimated the cost of building the
Nicaragua Canal to be $189,864,062.

A lock type was found to be obligatory on the
Nicaragua route, and either a sea-level or lock canal
was found possible on the Panama route, but the com-
mission strongly recommended the lock canal and

Historical

reported on the relative advantages of the two schemes
as follows:

The estimated annual cost of maintaining and operating the
Nicaragua Canal is $1,300,000 greater than the corresponding
charges for the Panama Canal.

The Panama route would be 134.57 miles shorter from sea to
sea than the Nicaragua route. It would have less summit eleva-
tion, fewer locks, 1568 degrees and 26.44 miles less curvature.
The estimated time for a deep-draft vessel to pass through is
about 12 hours for Panama and 33 hours for Nicaragua. These
periods are practically the measure of the relative advantages of
the two canals as waterways connecting the two oceans, but not
entirely, because the risks to vessels and the dangers of delay are
greater in a canal than in the open sea.

Except for the items of risks and delays, the time required
to pass through the canals need to be taken into account only
as an element in the time required by vessels to make their
voyages between terminal ports. Compared on this basis, the
Nicaragua route is the more advantageous for all trans-isthmian
commerce except that originating or ending on the west coast of
South America. For the commerce in which the United States
is most interested, that between our Pacific ports and Atlantic
ports, European and American, the Nicaragua route is shorter by
about one day. The same advantage exists between our Atlantic
ports and the Orient. For our Gulf ports the advantage of the
Nicaragua route is nearly two days. For commerce between
North Atlantic ports and the west coast of South America the
Panama route is shorter by about two days. Between Gulf ports
and the west coast of South America the saving is about one day.

The commission's recommendation was that:

After considering all the facts developed by the investigations
made by the commission and the actual situation as it now stands,
and having in view the terms offered by the New Panama Canal
Company, this Commission is of the opinion that "the most
practicable and feasible route' * for an Isthmian Canal, to be
" under the control, management, and ownership of the United
States," is that known as the Nicaragua route.

THe Panama Canal

When this information reached Paris the French
company were at our mercy and capitulated with a
cabled offer to sell to the United States for $40,000,000.
The Isthmian Commission then made a supplementary
report, dated January 18, 1902, as follows:

The unreasonable sum asked for the property and rights of the
New Panama Canal Company when the Commission reached its
former conclusion overbalanced that route, and now that the
estimates by the two routes have been nearly equalized the Com-
mission can form its judgment by weighing the advantages of
each and determining which is the more practicable and feasible.
.. . . After considering the changed conditions that now exist,
the Commission is of opinion that "the most practicable and
feasible route" for an Isthmian Canal, to be "under the control,
management, and ownership of the United States," is that known
■as the Panama route.

The report and plans of the commission of 1899-1901
are most comprehensive, covering the subject from the
earliest times and forming a veritable mine of in-
formation.

The American desire for a trans-isthmian canal had
now become a determination. The demands of com-
merce were intensified, and the trip of the U. S. S.
Oregon around South America had made clear the im-
mense potential value of the canal to the navy. During
the succeeding moves the American side of the case was
handled with great skill and acumen, for which the able
report of the Isthmian Commission had paved the way.

The Spooner law became effective on June 28, 1902,
and authorized:

(a) The purchase of the rights and property of the
New Panama Canal Company at $40,000,000, includ-
ing the stock of the Panama Railroad.

Historical

(b) Acquiring from the Republic of Colombia per-
petual control of a strip of land, together with all water
rights, and the right to build and perpetually maintain
a canal, together with the right to exercise sanitary
control over the strip of land and the cities at either
end.

(d) The making of all arrangements for the complete
building of a canal on the Nicaragua route, should the
negotiations with Colombia or with the New Panama
Canal Company prove unsuccessful.

(e) The creation of an Isthmian Canal Commission
of seven members, four of whom were to be skilled
engineers, and of the four, one to be an officer of the
Engineer Corps of the United States Army, and one an
officer of the United States Navy.

(f) The act appropriated $10,000,000, to be im-
mediately available, and authorized a further sum of
$135,000,000 (besides the $40,000,000 for purchase
of the canal company's property) in case of adoption
of the Panama route, or of $185,000,000 in case of
adoption of the Nicaragua route.

During the negotiations with Colombia the hopes of
the stockholders in the French company were alter-
nately raised and dashed as the trend of affairs indi-
cated the adoption of the Panama or the Nicaragua
route. The Colombian government, which had the
sovereign rights over the Isthmus, failed to ratify the
treaty, and soon thereafter the Department of Panama
led a successful revolt. The new Panama government,

TKe Panama Canal

after being recognized by the United States, concluded
a treaty which was very satisfactory and which was
proclaimed February 26, 1904. The purchase from the
French Canal Company was soon consummated, and
on May 4, 1904, the United States took possession of
the site and property. The occasion was a momentous
one. The men who had accomplished so much in
clearing the way for the building of the canal looked
forward with confidence to its speedy and successful
construction. There were many others who looked
with fear and trepidation upon the undertaking.
There was a general feeling that after almost four
centuries of reports, investigations, surveys and failures,
it was time for the dirt to fly immediately. Fortunately
those placed in charge of the work were trained in the
scientific planning of large undertakings, and while
certain excavation work was done to appease the pop-
ular demand, and also to secure experimental data for
excavating and planning, the great problems of the
moment were recognized as three in number: first, to
decide on the type, form and exact location of the
canal; second, to outline the method of attack and to
purchase and assemble the vast amount of equipment
and material; third, to perfect an organization of the
administrative and working forces.

THE PANAMA CANAL

Part II

THE ROUTE
THE DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION

REUBEN E. BAKENHUS, S. B.

CIVIL ENGINEER U. S. NAVY

THE ROUTE
THE DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION

PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CANAL ROUTE

While the size and character of the canal were open
questions, the general location was determined. The
line of cut adopted by the French had been selected by
some of the early exploiters; the Panama Railroad
had been located in the same valleys and depressions;
and the French had actually begun to build along this
line. At this point it is well to consider briefly the
character and topography of the canal route and adja-
cent territory as it was before any work was done, but
bearing the future canal in mind.

The Isthmus of Panama, if it joined the two conti-
nents by the shortest line, would extend northwest
toward North America and southeast toward South
America; but it does not follow the shortest line, and
on the map looks as if South America had been pushed
northwestward and the narrow part of the Isthmus on
the end toward South America had been bent out of
shape with a bulge to the north and the concave side
to the south, almost forming a semicircle enclosing the
Gulf of Panama. (See plan No. 1.) Near the head of
this gulf is an indentation known as the Bay of Panama.
This bay touches that part of the rough semicircle
where the Isthmus sweeps to the northeast toward the
top of the semicircle, and where a line at right angles

The Panama Canal

to the Isthmus is about northwest. This northwest
line from the Bay of Panama ends in the Limon Bay,
on the Atlantic side, and happens to pass through the
region where the Continental Divide is much lower
than anywhere else and where the Isthmus is less than
36 miles wide, only 5 miles wider than at the very
narrowest point. The line if slightly distorted may be
made to pass for three-fourths of its length along the
valley of the Rio Grande River on the Pacific side, and
the valley of the lower Chagres on the Atlantic side,
except that the Chagres before reaching Limon Bay
turns off to the left to its mouth, seven miles west of
the bay, while the line continues straight to Limon
Bay. This is in general terms the course of the canal.

Limon Bay faces almost directly north, and has an
opening^ three miles wide into the Caribbean Sea,
and extends five miles inland of the full width.
The depth of the water varies from 5 feet to 36 feet.
(See plan No. 2.) The Atlantic end of the French
canal was cut through the swamps along the east shore
of Limon Bay and extended into the bay, so as to
make use of Colon as a protection from northerly seas.
Limon Bay, on the westerly and inland sides, is sur-
rounded by much higher land, except that the lowlands
of the small Mindi River valley extend inland from
the above-named swamps almost through the ridge,
which is here very low. The narrow strip of lowland
continues inland beyond the Mindi River valley and
dips into the Chagres valley near Gatun. One would
almost have expected the Chagres River to seek outlet
straight ahead in Limon Bay, only three miles distant;

Rovite, Design and Construction 31

but the little ridge between the Chagres and the head-
waters of the Mindi River prevented this, and so the
Chagres follows the lowlands behind the ridges sur-
rounding Limon Bay and discharges into the Caribbean
Sea about seven miles west of the bay. At Gatun,
where the line of the canal first meets the Chagres, the
valley is about a mile and a half wide, but as we follow
upstream it becomes very much wider. The stream is
sluggish and winds in and out amongst the swamp
lands.

Just above Gatun the Chagres on its right bank
receives an important tributary, the Gatun River. It
was of some importance in the plans for any canal of
which the sea-level portion extended inland beyond
Gatun, for the canal had either to cross the river, to
take its flow, or otherwise the river must be turned off
before reaching the canal by a new channel or diver-
sion to the sea parallel to the canal. The French actu-
ally built a very wide diversion to the sea, 8 miles long.
The Trinidad River enters the Chagres from the other
side, about three miles above Gatun.

Throughout this portion of the Chagres the water-
surface is but little above sea level, and it so con-
tinues inland as far as Bohio, 16 miles by the canal
line from Colon. At Bohio the valley contracts, and
this was the site selected for the locks and dams in the
French canal, and in one of the early American plans.
The land surface from Bohio upstream becomes grad-
ually more undulating and the slopes of the valleys
become steeper. At Bas Obispo, 13 miles inland from
Bohio by canal line, or 29 miles from Colon, the low

XKe Panama Canal

water level of the river rises to 45 feet above the sea.
Up to this point the Chagres valley leads in a fairly
direct line toward the Pacific Ocean, and fortunately
approaches the low point of the Continental Divide.
Now the canal line must leave the Chagres, for the
river makes an abrupt turn, and to follow it to its
sources would carry us into the mountains to the
northeast, that is, into the apex of the roughly semi-
circular part of the Isthmus. The canal builder can-
not dismiss the river from his mind at the point where
the line of the canal leaves the valley, for some of the
most important problems of the canal are dependent
upon the character of the stream above Obispo.

At Bas Obispo the Chagres River is joined by its
tributary, the Obispo River, the valley of which offers
the best opportunity for continuing the canal for the
next 4 miles. The continental ridge begins at Bas
Obispo, and with it the hills become higher. The
stream is tortuous, and the canal line cannot follow it,
but must be cut on more direct lines to avoid objec-
tionable curvature.

The elevation of the ground is constantly increasing,
reaching a low summit at Empire, and the highest
summit at Culebra, where the future canal passes
between Gold Hill and Contractors Hill. The highest
elevation of the ground on the center line is 312 feet
above sea level, but the highest part of the sloping
sides will be 554 feet above sea level. Culebra is
about 6 miles from Obispo, and about 35 miles from
Colon. The country falls much more rapidly on the
Pacific side, and 3 miles beyond Culebra, close to

Photo by L. E. G.

Fig. 5. — A slide, showing shovel at work, February, 1913.

Photo by L. E. G.

Fig. 6. — A slide — near view, February, 1913.

Route, Design and Construction 33

Pedro Miguel, the level is lower than at Obispo, 8
miles back.

The Continental Divide covers a distance of 9 miles
from Bas Obispo through Empire and Culebra to Pedro
Miguel, and of this the deepest part is 6 miles in length,
from Las Cascades to a point near Pedro Miguel, and
forms the heaviest part of the so-called Culebra Cut.
From Pedro Miguel to Miraflores, a distance of 1J
miles, the land continues to fall, and the canal fortu-
nately finds the low valley of the Rio Grande as an
available path to the Pacific. This valley from Mira-
flores to the sea is very little above the sea level, and
beyond the lowlands is lined on both sides with much
higher ground and hills, of which Sosa Hill and Ancon
Hill are the best-known. The distance from Colon to
Miraflores is about 39 J miles, and from Miraflores to
the Pacific is 5| miles, or a total of about 45 miles
from Colon to the shores of the Pacific.

The waters of Panama Bay vary in depth from 7 to
32 feet, and the bottom slopes off into the deeper
waters of the Gulf of Panama and the Pacific Ocean.
(See plan No. 3.) About 2\ miles off shore from the
mouth of the Rio Grande is a group of islands with
both lowlands and mounds. The question as to
whether the canal should pass to the east or to the
west of them was decided one way by the French and
the opposite way by the Americans, the reasons for
which will develop later.

Having thus observed the principal natural features
of the canal route, we may note to what extent the to-
pography was affected by the French operations, pay-

THe Panama Oanal

ing but little attention to the period from 1889 to
1904, for the New Panama Canal Company, aside
from its comprehensive preparatory technical work,
wisely did only enough excavation to hold the charter.

As already noted, the French canal was excavated
from Colon through the lowlands on the easterly shore
of Limon Bay, and as far as Gatun it was later used
by the Americans for carrying materials to the locks.
It was partly excavated as far as Bohio, a total dis-
tance of about 17 miles.

The bottom width of the canal was not over 72 feet,
and the depth of water averaged about 20 feet for half
the length, and over the part toward Bohio, where the
ground was higher, did not go below sea level. The
canal crossed the Chagres River at several points, and
the river water flowed freely into the canal. At Gatun,
where the canal on its way to Colon leaves the river
bed, about one-third of the flow continued through the
canal. The large bend in the river where it sweeps
toward Gatun is "short-circuited" by a cut-off known
as the Chagres diversion. Deadening this bend elim-
inated two river crossings and shortened the distance
to the mouth of the river. A part of this diversion is
utilized in the spillway channel of the completed canal.
There were also a number of other such diversions.
At Bohio considerable rock excavation was done after
the sea-level canal was given up in favor of a lock canal.
From Bohio to Bas Obispo the canal excavation cut
the course of the Chagres a great many times. Across
the Continental Divide the French cut a comparatively
narrow trench, which at its deepest point was 165 feet

Roiate, Design, and Construction 35

below the original surface, and left about 190 feet
more of cut to accomplish a sea-level canal, and over
100 feet for the French lock canal. On the Pacific
end a partial channel was dredged, and also the neces-
sary diversions on each side, which captured the water
from the river branches and discharged it into the
bay before it could reach the canal. A total amount
of 80,000,000 cubic yards of excavation was done
all along the canal. Some of it was deposited on
the line of the much wider canal finally adopted by the
Americans, and required re-excavating; some of the
channels were partially filled by silting. Besides exca-
vation, the French left behind them some 2000 buildings
and a vast amount of equipment. Much of it was
overgrown with a dense jungle during the 15 years of
inactivity, and was lost until years after.

THE CHOICE OF TYPE

With this brief excursion across the Isthmus, ob-
serving the various natural and artificial features of
importance, and which an examination of the maps
will aid in fixing in the mind, we are in a better posi-
tion to consider the problems that confronted the
United States when it was necessary to decide on the
type of canal. The choice lay between a sea-level and
a lock canal. The United States was determined to
have the best canal, regardless of cost or trouble. The
French ideal was a sea-level canal which they epito-
mized as the "Straits of Panama." But their resources
would not allow them to attain their ideal, so they
adopted a lock canal as a makeshift and temporary

THe Panama Canal

expedient. Knowing this, the American tendency was
to regard the sea-level canal as something more diffi-
cult to attain and, therefore, as something more valu-
able and more desirable. Furthermore, the average
citizen or average official is unfamiliar with locks, and
these devices convey to him an idea of something
vague and hazardous. These feelings had first to be
overcome before the nation was ready to consider the
question on its true merits. In view of this, and of
the vital necessity to the success of the enterprise of
deciding the question of the type of canal correctly,
the President appointed an International Board of
Consulting Engineers to advise in the decision as to
type and probable cost. The board was presided over
by a retired major-general of the United States Army,
and included in the membership seven American and
five foreign engineers, all most eminent in their profes-
sion and experienced in the problems involved in the
construction of the canal.

The divided report of the board was unexpected and
in a way disappointing. Five of the American engineers
favored the lock type, but they were in the minority,
as the chairman, the two remaining American engineers
and all the five foreign engineers voted for the sea-level
canal. Five members of the Isthmian Canal Commis-
sion and the chief engineer approved and recommended
the lock canal, while the other member favored the
sea-level type. On a poll of individuals of both bodies,
nine were for the sea-level and eleven for the lock canal.
It remained for the Secretary of War and the President
to consider, with the various reports of facts and state-

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Route, Design and Construction 37

merits of relative advantages and disadvantages before
them, which type was to be adopted.

The essential facts regarding the two types of canal
can be most clearly set forth in a table such as the
following, to which is added a third column showing
the characteristics of the canal as actually built:

COMPARATIVE DATA

Sea-level canal and lock canal as proposed by the Board of Consulting Engineers and canal
as built.

Item

Sea-level canal

Lock-canal 85-foot
summit

Lock canal as built
85-foot summit

$247,000,000

$140,000,000

$375,000,000*

Depth

40 feet

40 to 45 feet

1000 feet, none

1000 feet, 19 miles

1000 feet, 16 miles

800 feet, none

800 feet, 4 miles

500 feet, 5 miles

500 feet, 12 miles

500 feet, 22 miles

300 feet, 4 miles

300 feet, 7 miles

300 feet, 8 miles

200 feet, 19 miles

200 feet, 7 miles

200 feet, none

150 feet, 21 miles

150 feet, none

Total volume of water within

limits of canal in cubic yards. . .

100,664,000

303,600,000

Number of pairs of locks

Dimensions of locks in feet

1000X100

900X95

1000X110

Highest current, miles per hour. . .

2.6

Inappreciable

Time to complete

12 to 20 years

9 years

Gamboa in upper

Gatun, Pedro

Chagres valley

Miguel, Balboa

Miguel, Mira-

flores

* Includes sanitation, civil government, land damages and purchase price from French, not
included in first two columns.

Not only was the sea-level canal of inferior dimen-
sions and greater cost, but its winding channel would
not be conducive to easy or safe navigation, and the
time which a vessel in the high-level canal would lose
in the locks would be lost in the sea-level canal in
slowing down for passing other vessels on account of
the very narrow channels; in fact, two vessels of any
size could not pass in the 21 miles of 150-foot width
unless one of them tied up in specially provided turn-

The Panama Canal

outs, similar to the custom in the Suez Canal. The
sea-level canal was not considered superior from the
standpoint of safety; the sinking of a single ship
could block the canal indefinitely; the many stream
diversions along the banks of the canal and the great
dam at Gamboa were potential sources of danger in
time of flood to a canal which was in the lowest part
of the valley, and would form the receptacle for flood
debris.

It is illuminating to read the following extract from
the comment of Secretary of War Taft, on the report
of the Board of Consulting Engineers:

The majority of the Board makes objection that locks are un-
safe for the passage of the great seagoing vessels contemplated
by the act, due to the disastrous consequences that might result
if the gates are injured by vessels entering; that the lifts pro-
posed are beyond the limit of prudent design for safe operation
and administrative efficiency; that locks delay transit.

Lock navigation is not an experiment. All the locks are du-
plicated, thereby minimizing such dangers, and experience shows
that with proper appliances and regulations the dangers are
more imaginary than real. The locks proposed have lifts of
about 30 feet, or less than those heretofore advocated by en-
gineers of such high standing that the objection is believed to be
not well founded. The delays due to lockages are more than
offset by the greater speed at which vessels can safely navigate
the lakes formed by the dams than is possible in the sea-level
canal, and the argument on this point in the minority report
seems to me to be the more weighty.

J The advocates of the sea-level canal express doubt as to the
stability of the dams at Gatun and at La Boca, if founded on the
natural soil, and advance the opinion that "no such vast and
doubtful experiment should be indulged in."

It appears, however, that the dams proposed are to be founded
on impervious materials, thereby conforming to the views of the

Route, Design and Construction 39

majority, and are to have such ample dimensions as to insure
the compression of the mud and clay rather than its displacement.
Furthermore, the estimates include an allowance for additional
safeguards against seepage if subsequent detailed investigations
show the necessity for extra precautions. The construction of
earth dams to retain water 85 feet deep is not experimental, and
as the dams proposed have greater mass and stability than sim-
ilarly constructed dams of greater heights, it appears that the
apprehensions as to the safety of the dams are unnecessary.

When I visited the Isthmus a year and a half ago and went
over the site and talked with the then chief engineer, I received
a strong impression that the work of construction upon which the
United States was about to enter was of such world-wide im-
portance and so likely to continue in active use for centuries to
come, that it was wise for the government not to be impatient
of the time to be taken or of the treasure to be spent. It seemed
to me that the sea-level canal was necessarily so much more
certain to satisfy the demands of the world's commerce than a
lock canal that both time and money might well be sacrificed to
achieve the best form, and this feeling was emphasized by reading
the very able report of the majority. But the report of the mi-
nority, in showing the actual result of the use of the locks in ship
canals, in pointing out the dangers of so narrow and contracted
a canal prism as that which the majority proposes, and in making
clear the great additional cost in time and money of a sea-level
canal, has led me to a different conclusion.

We may well concede that if we could have a sea-level canal
with a prism from 300 to 400 feet wide, with the curves that
must now exist reduced, it would be preferable to the plan of
the minority, but the time and the cost of constructing such a
canal are in effect prohibitory.

I ought not to close without inviting attention to the satis-
factory character of the discussion of the two types of canal by
the greatest canal engineers of the world, which insures to you
and to the Congress an opportunity to consider all the arguments,
pro and con, in reaching a proper conclusion.

The following is the essential part of the decision by
President Roosevelt, dated February 19, 1908, which

XKe Panama Canal

with the reports of the board he transmitted to
Congress:

It will be noticed that the American engineers on the Consult-
ing Board and on the Commission by a more than two to one
majority favor the lock canal, whereas the foreign engineers are
a unit against it. I think this is partly to be explained by the
fact that the great traffic canal of the Old World is the Suez
Canal, a sea-level canal, whereas the great traffic canal of the
New World is the Sault Ste. Marie Canal, a lock canal. Al-
though the latter, the Soo, is closed to navigation during the
winter months, it carries annually three times the traffic of the
Suez Canal. In my judgment the very able argument of the
majority of the Board of Consulting Engineers is vitiated by their
failure to pay proper heed to the lessons taught by the construc-
tion and operation of the Soo Canal.

It must be borne in mind, as the Commission points out, that
there is no question of building what has been picturesquely
termed "the Straits of Panama that is, a waterway through
which the largest vessels could go with safety at uninterrupted
high speed. Both the sea-level canal and the proposed lock canal
would be too narrow and shallow to be called with any truthful-
ness a strait, or to have any of the properties of a wide, deep
water strip. Both of them would be canals, pure and simple.
Each type has certain disadvantages and certain advantages.
But, in my judgment, the disadvantages are fewer and the ad-
vantages very much greater in the case of a lock canal substan-
tially as proposed in the papers forwarded herewith. . . .

A careful study of the reports seems to establish a strong
probability that the following are the facts: The sea-level canal
would be slightly less exposed to damage in the event of war, the
running expenses, apart from the heavy cost of interest on the
amount employed to build it, would be less, and for small ships
the time of transit would probably be less. On the other hand,
the lock canal at a level of 80 feet or thereabouts would not cost
much more than half as much to build and could be built in
about half the time, while there would be very much less risk
connected with building it, and for large ships the transit would
be quicker; while, taking into account the interest on the amount

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IVovite, Design and Construction 41

saved in building, the actual cost of maintenance would be less.
After being built, it would be easier to enlarge the lock canal
than the sea-level canal. Moreover, what has been actually dem-
onstrated in making and operating the great lock canal, the Soo,
a more important artery of traffic than the great sea-level canal,
the Suez, goes to support the opinion of the minority of the Con-
sulting Board of Engineers and of the majority of the Isthmian
Canal Commission as to the superior safety, feasibility, and desira-
bility of building a lock canal at Panama.

The law now on our statute books seems to contemplate a
lock canal. In my judgment a lock canal, as herein recommended,
is advisable.

On June 27, 1906, Congress passed a joint resolution
which approved the lock canal proposed by the minor-
ity, and finally closed the case. This was more than
one year after the appointment of the Board of Con-
sulting Engineers. Many details, as well as many
problems of importance, were not finally determined
by the board and required consideration by the Isth-
mian Canal Commission. It will not be necessary to
describe the detailed processes and the steps by means
of which these matters were finally determined, except
incidentally when studying some of the important ele-
ments of the canal. A general account of the canal as
it is actually being built will now be given, to be
followed by descriptions of its important parts.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE CANAL

The sea-level approach channel from the Caribbean
Sea lies within Limon Bay for 4| miles. (See plan
No. 2.) It is 500 feet wide on the bottom, with side
slopes of one vertical to three horizontal, and having a
depth of 41 feet below mean sea level. (See plans Nos.

THe Panama Canal

4 and 5.) The range of the tide is about 2 feet. The
alignment is straight for 5| miles from the entrance as
far as the Mindi Hills, at which point the American
canal intersects the comparatively insignificant old
French canal. There is a slight bend of long radius
at Mindi Hills, and then a straight run of 1| miles to
Gatun Locks. We have passed from the valley of the
Mindi River into the valley of the Chagres, and are
face to face with one of the great problems of the canal
construction, namely, the handling of the torrential
Chagres River. After weighing several other schemes,
that finally adopted consists of the formation of a lake
measuring about 24 miles on the canal axis from Gatun
to Bas Obispo. The length of the lake in the other
direction will be over 30 miles. The lake is formed by
the construction of an earth dam of unusual dimensions
extending across the valley at Gatun. The dam does
not seem artificial to the eye, but appears as one of the
major features of the landscape. After the lake is
filled, the flow of the Chagres into it will be discharged
by the carefully designed concrete spillway, which cuts
through the middle of the great earth dam at a point
where a rocky eminence afforded a safe location. The
normal water surface of Gatun Lake will be 85 feet
above mean sea level, but provisions are made so that
the water surface can be carried at any elevation
between 80 feet and 87 feet.

Ships will be passed into Gatun Lake by means of a
series of three locks at Gatun, each of which in turn
will raise the vessel an average of 28J feet. The locks
are close together and the ships will pass directly from

Route, Design and Construction 43

one lock into the next. The three locks are in dupli-
cate; that is, a vessel may go up either one flight or
the other of the duplicate locks, or one flight may be
used for ascending vessels and the other for descending
vessels. The corresponding locks adjoin and there is
only a dividing wall between them. After the ship has
passed into the lower lock, and while it is being raised,
the following ship, if close behind, may be tied up at
the approach wall 1200 feet long, formed by an exten-
sion of the dividing wall. Each lock has a net or usable
length of 1000 feet, and a net or usable width of 110
feet, but the dimensions of the ship must be somewhat
less than this to provide for fenders and clearances.

The formation of the lake with the water 85 feet
above the sea level obviated all digging for 17 miles,
except the top of an occasional mound. (See plan No.
5.) The alignment of the channel in the lake was
determined by the position of hills, changed into
islands by the rising water.

At the locks, the canal axis makes a slight bend to
the left and the channel of 1000 feet width and 75 feet
depth extends in a straight line for 3| miles to the
first bend in the lake. This bend is followed by a
straight channel of the same width but reduced depth
for a distance of miles, almost to Bohio, where a
further turn to the left is made. The course does not
run straight to Bohio from the locks, because Tiger
Hill and Lion Hill are in the way. After a two-mile
run from Bohio to Buena Vista, 1000 feet wide, there
is a turn to the right, the course continuing straight
for a distance of 2§ miles to a point opposite Frijoles.

THe Panama Canal

Here there is a further turn to the right, with a straight
course of miles, still 1000 feet wide, to a point near
Tabernilla; then a turn to the left, with a reduction in
width to 800 feet, and a straight reach of 3 miles to a
point near San Pablo. The lake has now become a
narrow arm, occupying the region where the valley of
the Chagres had much steeper banks. At San Pablo
there is a turn to the left with a short run 800 feet
wide of 1 mile; then a turn to the right, another short
run of 1 mile, with a further turn to the right; then
a longer reach of 3 miles, with width reduced to 500
feet, passing the submerged town of Gorgona; then
a right turn and a 1-mile run to a point near Gamboa.
From Gatun to Gamboa there are 23 crossings of the
former course of the Chagres, showing that the canal
has practically followed the course of the river, but
with the aid of steam shovels has selected a much
straighter course than the one carved by the river
along the lines of least resistance.

At Bas Obispo, which is close to Gamboa, we enter
the great Culebra Cut. The minimum width of the
canal up to this point has been 500 feet, but through
the following 8.1 miles the bottom width is reduced to
300 feet to save excavation. A width of only 200 feet
was originally contemplated but was wisely increased
to 300 feet. The banks of the canal become higher
and higher as we pass on, until at Gold Hill, the ele-
vation of the highest land on one side is 554 feet above
sea level, and the other side, 410 feet, while the land
over the center of the canal was formerly 312 feet
above sea level, or 227 feet above the bottom of the

IVomte, Design and Construction 45

canal. The minimum depth of the canal on the entire
upper section is 45 feet at normal lake level, or 40 feet
at low lake level, but throughout Gatun Lake the
depth is in excess of these. The Culebra Cut and the
85-foot elevation of the water both end at the Pedro
Miguel Lock. In passing through the cut, from Bas
Obispo to Pedro Miguel, there are eight straight
reaches connected by easy curves, three to the right
and four to the left. It is most remarkable that so
large a portion of this run is on straight lines, and that
the total degree of curvature has been kept so low.

At Pedro Miguel there is one lock in duplicate which
lowers the vessel to the 55-foot elevation of Miraflores
Lake. The Pedro Miguel Lock has approach walls
formed by 1200-foot extensions in both directions of
the dividing-wall between the locks. Miraflores Lake
is comparatively small, and a run of 1| miles, in a
500-foot channel 45 feet deep, takes the ship to Mira-
flores. At this point there are two locks in duplicate,
with approach walls at the upper and lower levels, the
same as at Pedro Miguel and Gatun. The two locks
at Miraflores lower the vessel to tidewater, a drop of
45 feet at high tide, or 65 feet at low tide. (See plan
No. 3.) The 20-foot tides on the Pacific coast have
made the problem more difficult than on the Atlantic
coast, where the tide is only 2 feet. One-half mile
beyond Miraflores Locks, the canal makes a turn to
the right and extends for a distance of 2| miles to
Balboa, where it makes a turn to the left and extends
for 4J miles to deep water in the Bay of Panama.
The Pacific sea-level section is all of 500 feet width,

TKe Panama Canal

and the depth of the water is 55 feet at high tide and
35 feet at low tide, and is usually stated to be 45 feet
deep, referring to mean tide.

The total length of the canal, measured along its
axis, is 50.4 miles. The portion within the shore lines
is only 41.5 miles, and the remainder consists of
dredged channels in Limon Bay and Panama Bay.
Of the total length, 14| miles are at sea level, over
23 J miles in Gatun Lake, nearly 3 miles in the locks or
alongside approach walls, 1| miles in Miraflores Lake
and 8 miles in the Culebra Cut. In the total length
there are 22 bends, with a total curvature of 600 de-
grees and 51 minutes. The average length of the
straight reach is a little over 2 miles. At each bend
the canal is widened by cutting away on the inside of
the bend, the shape and amount of cutting having
been determined after observations of vessels actually
rounding turns.

The time required for a vessel to pass through was
estimated to be from 10 to 12 hours, of which 3 hours
are required for passing the locks, and these estimates
have been verified by experience. Through the Culebra
Cut the vessel must reduce speed, but for most of the
remaining distance may approach full speed.

GATUN LAKE

Less attention, it is believed, has been paid to Gatun
Lake by those describing the canal than the subject
really deserves. (See plan No. 1.) It forms the pre-
ponderant element in the American project. The
great dam at Gatun, the spillway, and the locks are

Route, Design and Construction 47

incidental to the lake, and by virtue of it, the amount
of excavation and the attendant difficulties in the
Culebra Cut are greatly reduced.

The lake provides 23 J miles of canal channel, or
nearly half the total length, and gives a width of 1000
feet for 16 miles, 800 feet for 4 miles, and 500 feet for
the remaining 4 miles; the average width is nearly
900 feet, while the rest of the canal averages less than
450 feet. Not only in width, but also in depth the
lake channel offers an advantage, for while the rest of
the channel is limited to an ample depth of 45 feet,
the lake offers a maximum depth of about 75 feet, and
is nowhere less than 45 feet along the navigable channel.
These generous dimensions will facilitate navigation
and will allow vessels to approach their ocean speed.

Besides being such a valuable asset to navigation,
Gatun Lake solves one of the most difficult and most
vital of all the problems involved in the canal con-
struction. We are familiar with the characteristics of
the Chagres River. This wild and variable stream is
immediately tamed and calmed on entering Gatun
Lake. Its waters, which form and replenish the lake,
may be likened to a beast of burden quietly carrying
the ships to and fro, supplying the lifting force that
passes them through the locks, and the power to drive
the generators which light the canal, operate the
machinery, and which may, later, operate the railroad.

While great ideas and great accomplishments may
be briefly abstracted in picturesque terms, the knowl-
edge so given is superficial if unaccompanied by a
more intimate consideration of the principles involved,

XKe Panama Canal

and of the studies and investigations which attended
them. Nothing may be left to surmise or conjecture,
no assumptions may be made, unsupported by masses
of the best evidence available. Where the problems
are new and no direct evidence can be obtained, the
best engineering judgment, based on experience, must
be brought into play.

An investigation had first to be made as to the suf-
ficiency of the water supply. The lake, once it is
formed, will suffer losses from at least five different
sources: 1st, evaporation; 2d, seepage, or groundflow;
3d, leakage through the lock gates and spillway gates;
4th, water required to pass ships through the locks,
and 5th, water to develop power, if a sufficient amount
remains available.

Evaporation depends on the wind and the hygro-
metric state of the air, and also on the area of the lake.
At the normal elevation of 85 feet above sea level, the
area of the lake is 163 square miles. For certain rea-
sons that will be discussed later, the elevation of the
lake may, when actually placed in service, vary from
80 to 90 feet above sea level, and the area of the lake
will vary correspondingly from 153 to 173 square
miles. Evaporation continues from day to day, and,
unfortunately, is the greatest when rainfall is the least.
The length of the dry season is, therefore, of importance.
To provide for the driest future year, the weather
records as far back as available are studied, and the
driest year taken as a standard, with an allowance for
even more unfavorable conditions. Fortunately, the
French under the New Company, differing from the

Route, Design and Construction 49

de Lesseps Company, made continuous and careful
observations of all meteorological and hydrological
features of value. The Americans have continued
these observations with great care and completeness.
Evaporation pans have also been exposed to secure
direct evidence which would bear some relation to the
rate of evaporation from the lake. From the best evi-
dence available at the time, the probable rate of evap-
oration was found to be about one-fourth of an inch
per 24 hours. This has been computed to equal a loss
of 930 cubic feet per second, continuing during the
dry season. Later observations indicate one-sixth of
an inch daily during the dry season, thus reducing the
computed probable loss.

The loss by seepage is dependent on the character
of the soil forming the bottom of the lake, and upon
the head or pressure of water at any particular point.
To clearly understand its character, we may note that
an ordinary river in reality includes more than the
flowing water which is visible between its banks, in
that the ground along the river contains water which
to the eye seems quiescent, but which actually has a
flow, extremely slow, but always moving toward the
river and down the valley with the river. Its rate of
flow depends on the character of the material, the
frictional resistance, and the distance to be traveled;
it is comparatively rapid in sand or gravel, and is re-
duced to a minimum in clays and rocks. The seepage
from Gatun Lake will be of an allied nature, and it
remains to estimate the amount. The engineers made
careful studies of thfc bottom of the lake by borings,

XHe Panama Canal

test pits, and geological surveys. Specially careful ex-
aminations were made at those points where the ridges
between the lake and the adjoining valleys are narrow
and low. It was perfectly possible that gravel strata
or porous coral deposits might exist which, communi-
cating with the sea, might discharge the waters of the
lake as through a sieve. The engineers satisfied them-
selves that no ; such condition existed, and their
judgment was confirmed by a Board of Consulting
Engineers appointed in 1908 by President Roosevelt.
The probable seepage was estimated to be 85 cubic feet
per second, or less than one-tenth the rate of evapora-
tion during the dry season.

The loss of water through leaks and imperfect seat-
ings in the many valves and miter-gates of the locks,
and the 14 gates of the spillway, depends on the accu-
racy with which the devices are made and the care
used in the maintenance. The commission followed
correct principles in using the utmost care in designing
and constructing them, and yet assuming a rather
heavy loss of water from incomplete closure or accident.
The amount lost is estimated to be 275 cubic feet per
second, the equivalent of 500 ordinary city fire streams.

The amount of water found necessary for developing
electric current for lighting the canal, and operating all
the machinery is estimated at 275 cubic feet per second,
based on the required amount of current and the effi-
ciency of the apparatus.

The amount of water required for lockages is de-
pendent on the design of the locks, the amount of
traffic, and the size of the vessels, for the locks are so

Route, Design and Construction 51

divided that small vessels may use short sections, or
several small vessels pass through the whole lock to-
gether. Assuming the traffic equal to the maximum
capacity of the locks, and utilizing records of experi-
ence with the Sault Ste. Marie Canal, the Board of
Consulting Engineers estimated the traffic at 80,000,000
register tons per year, as against 30,000,000 tons for
the "Soo" Canal, and an actual maximum at that time
of 15,500,000 tons for the Suez.* The amount of water
required for lockage was found by the designing engi-
neers to be about 2618 cubic feet per second, which
means about one lockage in each direction per hour,
but the assumed maximum traffic will not be reached
for many years.

Adding the total losses from all causes gives a total
of 4183 cubic feet per second, applicable during the
dry months, when evaporation is the greatest. The
question now arises: Where is this rather enormous
quantity of water coming from? The input into
Gatun Lake comes from rainfall directly on the lake,
which is absent in the dry season, however, and from
the flow of Chagres River and of minor streams. The
data desired for this purpose pertains to the driest
period that may be reasonably expected, and the best
way to predict it is from records of the flow of the
Chagres in past years. The records of the New French
Panama Canal Company furnish much reliable infor-
mation, while that obtained from the old company is
fragmentary and incomplete.

* The Suez Canal passed 5373 vessels in 1912, about 12 per day, with a
total tonnage of 28,008,945 the largest year of record. The tonnage in 1913
was less.

XKe Panama Canal

The driest consecutive four months in the available
records of 19 years showed a flow, on an average, of 1190
cubic feet per second into the lake. Unfortunately, a
19-year period is hardly sufficient to determine the
future probable minimum, and the average of 1190
cubic feet which occurred in 1908, the year the com-
putations were made, was followed in 1912 by an aver-
age flow for four months of less than 900 cubic feet
per second, or about 25 per cent less. This will not
affect the problem adversely, because of the liberal
allowances made in determining losses and the possi-
bility of using an oil-fired steam plant in place of
water power.

It is apparent that the 900 cubic feet per second
supplied to Gatun Lake will not provide the 4183
cubic feet per second to be consumed. The balance,
or 3283 cubic feet per second, will be obtained by
filling Gatun Lake to a level of 87 feet above the sea
(the gates and copings are 92 feet) before the end of
the rainy season, and then, during the succeeding dry
season, drawing the lake down gradually to a level of
80 feet above sea level, if need be. The storage capac-
ity of the lake between these two levels, at an average
area of about 159 square miles, will supply this amount
of water with a slight margin. The problem is iden-
tical, in many respects, with that involved in the great
impounding reservoirs of modern city water works,
such as those of Boston and New York, where storage
tides over the dry season.

It may be noted that this drawing off of the upper
5 feet of the lake explains one reason why the depth of

Route, Design, and Construction 53

channel through the Culebra Cut was made 45 feet at
normal lake level. The water level in the cut is the
same as in the lake, and when the lake falls to 80 feet,
the channel in the cut will have 40 feet depth of water.

At this point it becomes clear that one of the great-
est responsibilities of the canal operating force will be
the conservation of the water. The operator must be
thoroughly versed in problems of rainfall and hydrol-
ogy, and should begin the dry season with a full lake,
and he must be careful not to be caught by an unex-
pectedly early or unusually dry season; he must each
year be prepared for the worst. No apprehension need
be felt that the water supply will give out, however,
if reasonable care is taken. Should increased storage
capacity for water be required to meet new conditions
of the distant future, it may be obtained by building a
reservoir on the upper Chagres, with a dam at Alha-
juela, where some of the flood waters of the Chagres,
which now waste over the spillway, may be stored until
needed in the dry season. It was here that the French
proposed building a reservoir for supplying the highest
level of their canal through a tunnel.

It is seen that Gatun Lake can be kept full, but the
designing engineer was required to determine that it
could be filled initially. An examination of the records
of flow of the Chagres for all available years left no
doubt that the water in the rainy season in excess of all
losses was more than sufficient to fill the lake in two
successive years. The driest rainy season of record,
1911-1912, afforded an average flow of 6556 cubic feet
per second, which would have filled Gatun Lake in

THe Panama Canal

about 400 days, or two rainy seasons, making deduc-
tions for reduced losses on account of there being no
lockages, no hydraulic power plant in operation, and
less leakage, evaporation, and seepage, due to reduced
lake area and head of water. Two rainy seasons
were actually taken to fill the lake, although in fact
the rate of filling depended more on the contingencies
of construction work than on the amount of water
available.

THE GATUN DAM

The Gatun Dam, which made Gatun Lake possible,
is the key to the American Panama Canal scheme.
(See plan No. 2.) The lock-level canal might have
been built with a dam at a different location, 9 miles
upstream at Bohio adopted by the French in their final
scheme and selected by the first Isthmian Commission
on the lock canal alternative; but the area of the lake
would have been very much less, with a consequent
loss of opportunity to navigate in wide, unrestricted
channels, and a great loss in storage capacity. The
dam at Bohio could have been built of masonry on a
rock foundation, for which the French made consider-
able excavation. A masonry dam on rock foundation
was not possible at Gatun, because the rock is too far
below the surface. It was only after advice had been
obtained of some of the ablest engineering talent in
the world, familiar with similar problems elsewhere,
that an earth dam at Gatun was decided on. This
decision was probably the most momentous one in
connection with the canal construction. Elaborate
investigations were made of the character of the under-

Route, Design and Construction

lying material through test pits and innumerable bor-
ings. It was found that the top layer consisted of fine
sand intermixed with a large proportion of clay, which
extended to a maximum depth, at one point, of practi-
cally 80 feet. Below this, for a distance of 100 feet or
more, is a thick deposit of impervious blue clay, con-
taining a little sand with a quantity of shells inter-
spersed. Below the clay, and directly overlying the
bed rock, is a miscellaneous layer of variable thickness
up to 20 feet, consisting of boulders and gravel consoli-
dated with finely divided clays and silts.

Several important factors enter into the design of
this dam and the determination of its dimensions.
The dam itself must be impervious to water, or, on
finer analysis, it would be more accurate to say the
seepage must be a minimum. If a well, extending
below the ordinary level of the ground water, and
without tapping subterranean water channels, is
pumped, the ground water in the surrounding territory
will flow towards the well and its level will gradually
fall and assume a curve joining the surface of the water
in the well with the normal ground-water level some
distance away. The slope of this curve depends upon
the character of the material and the amount of fric-
tion which it exerts against the flow. Deeper pumping
will lower the curve and extend it farther back. To
maintain a fixed level of water in the well will require
a fixed rate of pumping, equal to the seepage through
the ground, so long as no rain falls on the area affected
by the well. The conditions at the Gatun Dam are
similar, with the ground-water level in the valley below

THe Panama Canal

the dam corresponding to the water in the well and the
water in the lake corresponding to the normal ground-
water level, and the slope curve passing through the dam.

To prevent loss of water, the materials of which the
dam is built must be selected from the available local
deposits and placed in such a way as to retard, to the
greatest possible extent, the flow of water. In very
fine silts, the rate of flow is so minute that they are
generally classed as impervious. Capillary attraction is
a force which must be considered. It is this which keeps
the surface of ordinary ground moist. The evapora-
tion from the surface removes the moisture, but it is
promptly replaced by capillary attraction from the
ground-water reservoir below. With no rain, the ground
water is thus gradually lowered until the capillary
forces are no longer sufficient to raise the water from
the increased depth to the surface which then becomes
dry. This force must also be considered, although to a
minor extent, in the design of the dam.

Unfortunately, the ordinary materials which are
classed as impervious have a faculty for absorbing
water, which softens them and reduces their capacity
for self-support. With the height of water furnished
by Gatun Lake, there is ample opportunity for the
contents of the dam to become saturated, and mate-
rials subject to disintegration, or with a tendency to
absorb, would settle and not maintain the side slopes.
Clay or fine silt is particularly treacherous in its nature;
yet it is upon these materials that the imperviousness
of Gatun Dam must depend. The solution of this
problem is to build the center of the dam of impervious

Route, Design and Construction 57

material and the outer portion on both sides of a ma-
terial capable of maintaining the predetermined slopes
wet or dry, but necessarily allowing water to pass. On
the lake side, it must be faced with a lining to resist
wave action.

Yet this is not all. The weight of the dam might
produce so great a pressure on the original surface of
the earth that it would sink and cause the earth to rise
just beyond the toe of the dam. This actually hap-
pened only a short distance away with embankments
for the Panama Railroad. The remedy was to counter-
weight the rising area of soft material at the toe of the
embankment with fill material and thus prevent any
further rise. With a structure like the Gatun Dam,
settlement of this character would have dislodged the
parts of the dam already built, would have created
possible fissures and avenues for future flow, and
would have aroused the greatest doubt in the minds of
the public as to its strength and safety; therefore,
the question must be investigated and settled in ad-
vance. The rising of the material is prevented by first
removing any soft material, and further by making
the dam very wide, with a thin extended toe, thus
making the counterweight a part of the dam itself.
Even with the greatest precautions, a slip in the rock
fill due to the giving way of soft material near the old
French canal occurred and caused great popular
alarm, and led the President to order a board of emi-
nent engineers to Panama. Their report was most re-
assuring and confirmed, in the main, the judgment of
the commission.

THe Panama Canal

Not only the dam itself must be impervious, but
also the material upon which it is built must prevent
the water from flowing underneath it. To increase
imperviousness, the commission drove a line of sheet
piling twenty feet into the earth; but on the advice of
the special board of engineers this was omitted and,
instead, a trench was dug along the middle, which was
filled by the core of the dam.

The generous dimensions of the dam, however, prin-
cipally contribute the imperviousness and stability.
As finally built, the crest is 100 feet wide and 20 feet
above normal water level; the thickness of the dam at
the water surface is 400 feet, and it increases to a
thickness of nearly one-half mile at its deepest part.

The dam, after clearing the 573 acres of site, was
constructed by first building long mounds at the outer
lines of the dam with the proper exterior slope. The
material was spoil from the Culebra Cut, the locks
and the spillway, and was dumped from trestles.
When the mounds were carried to sufficient height,
the interior space was filled with silty material from
nearby deposits by the hydraulic dredging process.
Where the course of the Chagres crosses the dam, two
lines of sheet piling were driven, and the material
between them, which was not of a suitable character,
was excavated and replaced.

The design of the Gatun Dam was not decided on
until elaborate tests had been made of the actual seep-
age through the material to be used in the construc-
tion. These seepage tests were made by drilling holes
into the deposits that were later to form the core of

Fig. 10. — Gatun Spillway Dam, under construction, showing three perma-
nent crest gates in position, January, 1913. The water is issuing from tempo-
rary culverts, which were permanently closed at a later date.

R.o\ite, Design and Construction 59

the dam, and pumping a measured amount of water
into them, and noting the loss and rate of flow under
fixed pressures. The natural flow of the ground water
through the soil was also studied. Several model dams
were built and experiments made to determine the
slope of the water through the material of the dam,
caused by the miniature lake on one side. Test pits
were dug in the deposits, and the flow into the test
pits was pumped out and measured, while at the same
time, observations on the level of the ground water
were taken in the neighborhood.

The dimensions of the cross-section of the dam were
twice changed. The height of 135 feet above sea level,
as originally proposed, was at first reduced to 115 feet,
and finally to the adopted height of 105 feet. The
surface slopes and width at the bottom were also
changed.

GATUN SPILLWAY

During the rainy season the influx of water into
Gatun Lake is much greater than the amount con-
sumed, and the spillway through the Gatun Dam pro-
vides the outlet. It might have been placed anywhere
on the rim of the lake and a channel to the sea con-
structed, but a favorable site on rock foundation was
found on the line of the dam, which allowed the use of
the bed of the Chagres for carrying the water to the
sea. (See plan No. 2.)

The spillway consists of a concrete dam with means
for overflow, and a concrete channel to lead the water
away. It is a most important adjunct to Gatun Lake,
for it not only will safely relieve the lake of dangerous

The Panama Canal

flood waters, but also will control the level of the water
surface, thus accomplishing the storage of a part of
the flood waters for use in the dry season. Its dis-
charge capacity must be made equal to that of the
greatest possible flood. To determine the amount of
water, we must again seek information in the records
of the New French Company and the succeeding
records by the Americans. It is to be deplored that
the old company obtained no record of the Chagres
flood of 1879, known to be larger than any covered by
subsequent records. The engineers' report states that,
"The maximum momentary discharge of the Chagres
River at Gatun is calculated from the measured Bohio
discharge to be 182,000 cubic feet per second." This
is over 200 times the minimum dry-weather flow.

An overflow type of spillway to carry off this amount
of water would be over 2,000 feet long, and even so, its
discharge capacity at the highest floods would not be
sufficient, and the lake might rise five feet. For these
reasons, the commission adopted a spillway with a
crest that is semi-circular in plan and has fourteen
openings cut through the upper part, closed by gates.
The elevation of the bottom of the openings is at 69
feet above sea level, or 16 feet below the normal level
of the lake. Each opening is about 45 feet wide.
They are so wide, in fact, that the top of the spillway
is really composed of a series of piers, with the open-
ings containing the valves between them. When the
gate is shut, its top is at elevation 88 feet above sea
level, making the gate 19 feet in its vertical dimension.
The gate may be raised 22J feet, or clear of a 90-foot

Route, Design and Construction 61

depth of water in the lake. This device for discharg-
ing water from the lake is far superior to the plain
crest without gates, because the amount of water pass-
ing through may be very nicely controlled; further-
more, any increase in the depth of the water in the lake
from sudden floods would tend to increase the capacity
of each opening of the spillway, because the amount of
water discharged through a weir is dependent upon the
head or elevation of water which is acting on the weir.

When the lake is at elevation 87 a single gate will
discharge 11,000 cubic feet per second, or 154,000
cubic feet per second for the lot. The maximum known
flow of the Chagres is less than this amount; in fact, is
only 137,500 cubic feet for any prolonged period, such
as 33 hours. The momentary discharge may be much
greater than this and has been determined as high as
186,000 cubic feet per second, but, in designing a spill-
way, the momentary maximum is not what is wanted.
Should any flood occur which will exceed the capacity
of 154,000 cubic feet per second, then, of course, the
lake will begin to rise; but as it rises, the capacity of
the spillway is increased until, with the lake at the
improbable elevation of 92 feet, above which the water
would flow over the miter gates and into the locks, the
rate of discharge of the crest will be 222,000 cubic feet
per second. In addition to this, water can be passed
through the lock culverts both at Gatun and Pedro
Miguel. The length of the period over which records
of flow of the Chagres are available is insufficient to
predict with any degree of certainty the probable max-
imum flood at some future time, and the commission

THe Panama Canal

has again shown its wisdom in designing for a capacity
which is quite far in advance of that required by
recorded floods.

The gates themselves are constructed of heavy and
massive steel work. They are of the so-called Stoney
gate-valve type. The sliding frictional resistance of
ordinary valves of this size would be very great. The
Stoney pattern of valve overcomes this by using roller
trains upon which the valve travels. Passing length-
wise along the dam and underneath the gates is a tun-
nel in which all the machinery for operating the gate
valves is placed. A chain is fastened to each side of
the gate and passes over a sprocket wheel on the ad-
joining pier, and then down through a vertical well to
the machinery tunnel. A large screw is fastened to
the end of the chain and passes through a worm. A
heavy counterweight hangs on the lower end of this
screw rod, leaving only frictional resistance to be over-
come. The motor for operating the worms is located
midway between the screw rods, thus applying equal
lifting force to each end of the gate.

After passing over the crest the water slides over the
face of the spillway, which is so designed as to fit the
normal curve of the water. At the bottom the con-
crete work is curved so as to give the stream a hori-
zontal direction. About 21 baffle piers are built
within this area to retard the rapid flow. At the same
time, the channel becomes contracted from a width of
414 feet, which is the length of the inside of the crest,
to a width of 285 feet. The water is carried in a long
sluiceway, lined with heavy concrete walls and paved

Route, Design and Construction

with a concrete floor, and is discharged at a safe dis-
tance from the dam into the old French Chagres di-
version and then into the bed of the Chagres River,
whence it continues to the sea. During the dry season
of four months very little water will pass through the
spillway, but in the rainy season varying amounts will
pass. The average flow will be about 10,000 cubic feet
per second, increased momentarily to almost 15 times
that amount during periods of high flood. Over the
tops of the piers which separate the gate openings, a
bridge and roadway have been built, so that traffic may
be carried the full length of the Gatun Dam.

So important to the success of the canal is this spill-
way that the commission's engineers constructed a
model of the same for experimental purposes, one
thirty-second of the size of the original. It was tested
under various conditions and the facts thus gained
were of value in making the final designs.

EXCAVATION OF CULEBRA CUT

The Culebra Cut is very generally and very justly
considered the most important part of the canal con-
struction work. (See plan No. 5.) The date of com-
pletion of the cut practically determined that of the
whole canal. It was in charge of the Central Divison
of the canal organization, which covered also the small
amount of dredging and excavation within the limits of
Gatun Lake. Total expenditures are a good measure of
the magnitude and relative importance of the various
items and, as given in the table elsewhere, show that
about half the amount applied to construction work

64 XKe Panama Canal

direct, was for the Culebra Cut. There might be added
to the total for the Culebra Cut $20,000,000 of the
payment for the French property, which applied to ex-
cavation, thus indicating that the cut comprised over
one-half of the construction work of the canal proper.

A typical American tool developed largely on rail-
road work, namely, the steam shovel, solved one of the
vital parts of the excavation problem. Its function
was to pick up the soft material or blasted hard mate-
rial and place it aboard the cars. It performed its
function so well that the rate of progress was dependent
on keeping the shovels supplied with cars and disposing
of the material on the dumps. Again allowing the cost
of the various items into which excavation may be
analyzed to indicate their relative importance, the fol-
lowing table, taken from the records for the fiscal year
1912, is given with the items arranged in the order of
cost:

ANALYSIS OF COST OF EXCAVATING CULEBRA CUT, TAKEN FROM
RECORDS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1912

Cost per Cubio
Yard.,

1. Transportation $0.1331

2. Drilling and blasting 0. 1157

3. Tracks 0.0885

4. Loading by steam shovels 0.0681

5. General expense and supervision 0.0503

6. Dumps 0.0479

7. Plant, arbitrary 0.0395

8. Drainage, structures and clearing . 0045

Total unit cost $0.5496

The clearing of the site in preparation for excavation
work was of minor importance. After the loose mate-

Rx>\ite, Design and Construction

rial had been cut away by the shovels, the drilling and
blasting followed. Of the total of 93,000,000 cubic
yards of material removed from the cut prior to July
1, 1912, about 66,500,000 cubic yards, or 71 § per cent,
required drilling and blasting. The power for drilling
was supplied by a large compressed-air main, which
was tapped at convenient points and the lines laid to
the drills. The work was most carefully studied and
planned. Systematic records were kept of the amount
drilled by each crew daily. Familiarity with the ma-
terial and trial of various methods indicated exactly
the setting of the holes and the depths to which they
should be drilled to obtain the greatest economy. All
loading of holes and firing was placed in the charge of
a special crew of trained men, and the firing was done
by current from the electric station at Empire. There
was a serious accident during the early stages of the
work, due to a premature discharge of a vast quantity
of dynamite that had been placed in the holes and left
there for firing at a convenient time. From some ob-
scure cause, such as the overheating of the dynamite,
it exploded and killed a large number of men. There-
after, the dynamite was fired within a few hours after
being placed, with the result that in three years only
eight men were killed by dynamite, although a total
of 19,000,000 pounds of explosives was used in the
Central Division during that time. A knowledge of
the handling of explosives, as in the case of many
other important public works, formed an asset of great
importance. Various kinds of explosives were used,
including saltpeter dynamite with 60 per cent nitro-

THe Panama Canal

glycerin, saltpeter dynamite with 40 per cent nitro-
glycerin and Trojan powder. The total amount of
explosives used on the entire canal work to June 30,
1913, reached the enormous total of 56,000,000 pounds.
When the blasting did not break up the material small
enough for handling by steam shovel, it was further
broken up by so-called "dobe" shots, which consisted
in laying a small stick of dynamite on the top of the
rock and detonating it with a safety fuse.

The shovels worked on short pieces of track, which
were extended as the work progressed, while the cars
for receiving the material were handled on parallel
tracks next to the shovel. So rapidly did the shovels
load cars that the handling of dirt trains into and out
of the cut was a problem in railroad transportation of
the very first order. Within the limits of the cut there
were nine parallel tracks to carry the traffic, having a
total length of over one hundred miles. Where two or
more shovels were working on one line, the empties
came in on one end of the track, so that each shovel
had a train of cars. As soon as any shovel filled its
train, all were immediately shoved ahead so as to get
the full train out of the way. By adhering to this sys-
tem the first train was always the one to be loaded
first. All trains were handled by a train dispatcher
and his assistants, who were located in a tower in a
commanding position and provided with telephones,
flags, and other forms of signalling apparatus. A great
deal depended on the manner in which the train dis-
patcher handled his work. There were empties to
get into the cut over a complicated system of tracks

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Route, Design and Construction 67

to the proper shovel; there were loaded trains to be
moved on, and loaded trains to be passed out of the
cut; there were workmen's trains, accident cases, spe-
cial locomotives, and other traffic to handle. There
was scarcely a moment when some definite action,
affecting the economy of the entire operation, was not
expected of the train dispatcher. The trains were
passed on to the construction tracks and thence to the
main line of the Panama Railroad. The dirt trains
invariably had the right-of-way. To observe the work
of these train dispatchers, and to see the constant pro-
cession of dirt trains and empties rolling along the
main line of the Panama Railroad, was most impres-
sive. The traffic was probably equal to that on the
main lines of the important trunk lines of the United
States. The amount of traffic is indicated by consid-
ering the average number of locomotives and cars in
use during a typical year, namely 1912, as shown by
the following table:

Average Daily

LOCOMOTIVES AND CARS Number in

Use, 1912

Locomotives handling spreaders 6

Locomotives handling unloaders 10

Locomotives handling track shifters 3

Locomotives handling dirt and miscellaneous trains. . . 117

Lidgerwood flat cars, average per day 2403

Large steel dump cars 320

Small steel dump cars 973

The largest number of cars handled in one day
during the year 1912 was 4896. In other years the
total was even larger. The number of shovels in
use during this year was 46, of which nearly half were

THe Panama Canal

95-ton shovels with a dipper capacity of 5 cubic yards.
The highest daily yardage for one shovel was 4465
cubic yards. The highest annual record was 543,481
cubic yards. The average amount of material handled
per shovel per hour increased from 121 cubic yards in
1908 to 165 cubic yards in 1912. In the meantime
the average cost per cubic yard of excavation dropped
from $0,725 in 1908 to $0.55 in 1912.

The disposal of the excavated material required
most careful thought and involved considerable en-
gineering ability. The rate of progress on the Culebra
Cut, and, therefore, the rate of progress on the whole
canal, at various times depended upon the speed at
which the trains could dispose of their loads of dirt.
Where the material could possibly be of any use,
trestles were built and the material was deposited
without rehandling directly where it was needed, as in
the Gatun Dam, the back fill behind the lock walls,
the embankments of the new Panama Railroad, and
in raising the level of swamp lands, making land, and
building a breakwater at the Pacific entrance of the
canal. The vast bulk of the material was wasted.
The principal dumps were at Tabernilla, Gatun, Mira-
flores, Balboa and the Panama Railroad relocation.
Each of these dumps took from 5,000,000 to 18,000,000
cubic yards. Trestles were first built to dump material
off the cars; and as the level of this fill rose, the track
was removed from the trestle and shifted always
toward the edge of the bank. It was the constant
shifting of track and extension of trestles which caused
the delays in disposal of material. The ingenious

Route, Design and Construction 69

methods that had been developed on railroad work
and elsewhere were utilized on the dumps. A small
amount of the material was handled in steel side-
dump cars which landed the material alongside the
track. Air pressure from a locomotive was used in
dumping these cars. Another and a more ingenious
method for unloading them was by means of a large
plow. The cars were flat and had a bulkhead on one
side only; to balance this the other side overhung
slightly more. When a train arrived at the dump an
enormous plow of the full width of the car was set on
one end of the train, and a cable led to the other end.
The winding of the cable drew the plow the full length
of the train and discharged all the material on the
ground next to the track.

A further operation was necessary, because the
track could not then be laid directly on the brink of
the dump. The material which was piled up by the
dumping of the cars was shoved off the edge of the
embankment by means of an enormous plow, sus-
pended over the area alongside the track from a special
car, and pushed along by powerful locomotives. When
the dump had been widened to a point where the plow
or spreader could no longer slide the material out of
the way, it was necessary to shift the track. Here
again railroad experience was brought into play, and
the work of hundreds of men was done by a small
crew with a track shifter. This machine had two
booms; the first lifted the track off the ground, the
second was slewed, and a line passing over it was made
fast to the track and drew the track into its new

TTHe Panama Canal

location. The length of the booms was sufficient so that
the weight of the shifter itself, which ran on the track,
did not affect the work.

Special problems were encountered in some of the
dumps, of which one of the most interesting was the
disposition of silt and clays taken from the Chagres
section of the Central Division. It became very soft
when exposed during the rainy season, and the slope
was found in some cases to be as flat as 1 vertical to
22 horizontal. It was impossible to maintain tracks
on such material. Accordingly, a track was laid along
the banks of the Chagres on hard ground, and when the
material was dumped, it was thoroughly wetted by
means of a 4-inch water pipe, whereupon the saturated
material slid slowly but firmly into the Chagres River.
The current was sufficient to carry it along and deposit
it at points where it could do no harm.

In September 1913 steam shovel work in the Culebra
Cut was completed, the decision having been reached
to flood the cut and do the remaining digging by means
of dredges. Controlling factors in this decision were:
first, it was hoped that the weight of the water in the
cut would have a deterrent effect on some of the slides
and breaks; second, the remaining material required no
drilling and blasting and could, therefore, be more
economically handled by dredges; and third, the canal
could be used for traffic while excavation was still in
progress which would be impossible with shovels at
work. The step forms a connecting link between canal
construction and canal maintenance, since dredges will
be continually at work to maintain the various channels.

Rovite, Design and Construction 71

The French began excavating the Culebra Cut on Janu-
ary 20, 1882 and with the exception of the six years from
1889 to 1895 it has been in continuous progress cover-
ing a period of over 32 years.

GEOLOGY AND THE SLIDES

The material through which the Culebra Cut passes
is very variable. The region of the Isthmus was once
geologically very active, and each period of activity is
marked by material typical of the conditions under
which it was formed. Fortunately, as in so many
other parts of the world that were once the scene of
geologic or volcanic activity, the Isthmus is now in a
quiescent period and the great geologic forces are in a
condition of comparatively stable equilibrium. When
the canal project was being agitated there was great
apprehension on the part of those not familiar with
conditions as to possible volcanic eruptions or earth-
quakes. In allaying this feeling, the photographer of
the flat arch in the ruins of the old Santo Domingo con-
vent in Panama played a very important part. The
fact that the arch has stood for so many years, while
the roof and windows have disappeared and the ma-
sonry has deteriorated, adds to the impressiveness.
Equally important, as proving the absence of seismic
disturbances, is an almost exactly similar arch in a
nearby church which still carries its superimposed floor
load. Being in a different plane adds to the force of
the evidence.

The comparatively infinitesimal forces controlled by
the hand of man in a few localities produced minor

THe Panama Canal

conditions of instability that have resulted in so-called
" slides" or " breaks." Fortunately, man controls the
means to restore equilibrium. This phase of the canal
work will be more fully described later on.

From the reports of the commission's geologists it
is learned that the oldest rocks are exposed along the
canal in the Atlantic end of the Culebra Cut in the
region about Bas Obispo. There is also a smaller out-
crop of these rocks near Miraflores at the Pacific end
of the Culebra Cut and the evidence is that the two
are joined by deep-lying rocks of the same character.
These are of a type known as volcanic breccia, with
local deposits of meta-conglomerates, and originally
composed of fragments from volcanic craters but which,
in the course of ages, have been compacted and ce-
mented into a fairly hard rock. The whole in past
ages has been under heavy stresses, which have caused
faults and shears; that is, the rocks have cracked and
the parts have slid by one another vertically, and this
has resulted in very much broken masses.

From Empire to Paraiso, at the head of Miraflores
Lake, and thus including the greater part of the Cu-
lebra Cut, there existed in a former age a great basin or
sag. This basin no longer forms a valley, for during
succeeding geologic periods it was filled with new forma-
tions. These are not of a regular character and the
variations in the rocks and in their disposition are
greater than in many other parts of the world. A com-
plete and detailed description would interest only the
geologist or the engineer in advance of his constructive
operations. The basin rocks are overlaid by the next

iVo\ite, Design and Construction 73

younger formation, composed of light gray limy sand-
stones and sandy limestones in beds or lenses, and
separated from each other by thin beds of friable shale
with occasional masses of carbonaceous matter. These
formations contain fossils of marine fauna which also
occur at other points entirely across the Isthmus,
and as these are formed only in the shallow estuaries
of the sea, it is proved that the materials in which the
fossils are now lodged were deposited under water;
and their disposition across the Isthmus is considered
by geologists as proof that the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans were joined at that time. The latest marine-
deposited rock is composed of coral and shell limestones
and is of non-continuous occurrence. During succeed-
ing ages, these formations slowly rose, as they are now
above the level of the sea. There was then aerially
deposited a thick bed of greenish fine-grained volcanic
clay rock, which fills the depressions in the marine-
deposited rocks — the remains, probably, of former es-
tuaries and channels. This deposit is also not uniform,
but contains beds of gravel, sandstone and lava flow.
The whole is weak and crumbly.

The most recent geologic formations consist of masses
of volcanic rock; molten lava from below forced its
way through the softer rocks along the lines of least
resistance, sometimes spreading between the layers of
softer rock and sometimes breaking through in great
rifts, forming dikes. Great volcanic masses have also
risen, due to the pressure exerted from below, and,
forcing their way upward in a cold condition through
several hundred feet of softer overlying rocks, are said

THe Panama Canal

to have formed such elevations as Gold Hill and
Contractors Hill.

The geologically recent volcanic eruptive rocks are
generally hard, and they fortunately serve to greatly
strengthen the banks of the canal. The various rocks
are in irregular formation, and have in some cases
been dislodged from their former relative position by
faults or vertical sliding of unstable masses, and by
the breaking and cracking into blocks of masses of
contiguous rocks.

With this brief description of the local geology, the
problem ahead of the engineer in planning and making
the Culebra Cut becomes a little clearer. It is to be
remembered that most of the information now avail-
able was unknown before the excavation exposed ma-
terials hundreds of feet below the surface. Where the
canal passes through a deep cut, the exact slopes to
be given to the sides are of the greatest importance.
If they are too steep the material will slide or fall into
the canal, and if the slope is flattened, even a little,
unnecessary excavation and greater cost will be in-
curred, increasing rapidly with the depth of the cut.
The side slopes must be determined in advance of
excavation, as far as possible, because the shovels in
the beginning cover the full width and gradually work
to the lower and narrower levels. The cutting of any
additional material from the side to flatten the slope
will be hazardous and costly. As the cut progressed,
the bulk of the side slopes proved stable. But as
already mentioned, certain areas of instability devel-
oped into breaks and slides.

Fig. 12. — Miraflores upper locks, general view, looking north from lower
locks. Steam-shovel excavation for lower locks in foreground. November 8,
1911. The two cranes on extreme left and on extreme right are the "berme"
cranes containing concrete mixers. The two center cranes are chamber cranes
and handle materials to center part of the locks.

Fig. 13. — Concrete handling cranes at Miraflores. The booms on the right
carry the buckets which pick up the sand and stone from the storage piles and
dump in bins over the mixers in center of crane. The booms on the left carry
the concrete for dumping in the lock walls. The whole crane travels on a track.
The booms on the left move through a small angle horizontally.

Route, Design and Construction 75

The slides as a feature of the canal operations have
received, perhaps, more than their share of attention,
and have been made use of by alarmist press agents.
Whereas the amount of American excavation for the
whole canal is 232,353,000 cubic yards, the total addi-
tional amount of material to be removed, due to the
slides, is estimated to be approximately 29,431,000
cubic yards, or about 12J per cent of the total excava-
tion, or a little over 22 per cent of the dry excavation,
or about 30 per cent of the excavation in the Culebra
Cut. This is, relatively, the same condition that would
be encountered on a difficult sewer or water-pipe
trench. Recent activity of the slides will increase the
amounts.

The slides are not to be minimized, however, as the
amount of material involved is equivalent to the exca-
vation for 60 of the largest dry docks and they have
served to considerably prolong the time of completing
the Culebra Cut. Careful attention has been given
them by the commission, and the geologist employed
by them has made a thorough examination and report
on the subject.

Slides have developed at those points where the side
slopes of the canal excavation were left too steep; that
is, where not enough material was taken out to
provide a stable bank, having in view the soft or weak-
ened character of the material. By removing addi-
tional material, stability of the banks results and the
slides are thus resolved into a problem of the ultimate
amount of excavation. Very large areas are involved.
The West Culebra slide, for instance, covers 68 acres

THe Panama Canal

and involves the excavation of over 11,000,000 cubic
yards. The Cucaracha slide covered over 50 acres
and involved over 5,300,000 cubic yards. The East
Culebra slide covers an area of 55 acres and will mean
a total excavation of about 8,000,000 cubic yards.
The slides are uncertain. It was thought that the
Cucaracha slide would come to rest because of some
strengthening dikes of hard rock, but the pressure of
the material above was sufficient to break or shear the
rocks, allowing the material to move, which it did
very rapidly, filling the almost completed canal.

The slides are of four different characters, each due
to different conditions. The first is produced where a
bed of clayey materials, with or without superimposed
formations, rests on a bed of harder material which
pitches toward the canal. If the surface is sufficiently
lubricated by the ground waters, the superincumbent
mass slowly moves into the canal. The second class re-
sults where faults or great geologic cracks in the rocks
occur, and where the fault is at such an angle that the
material in the canal prism held the rocks from sliding
and, upon excavation of this material, there is nothing
to prevent a sliding into the canal. The third and
most subtle and difficult form of slide, which is locally
known as a break or structural break, begins by a verti-
cal settling of the banks. Cracks form in the surface of
the ground and the material between cracks settles a
little more on the side toward the canal, causing the
cracks to open and a series of steps to form ; at the same
time the bottom of the canal rises. The rocks in which
this phenomenon occurs are some of the weakest in

IVo\xte, Design and Construction 77

the canal and are composed of loosely cemented
rounded particles. Very little stress will break the
cementitious material, and the rounded particles then
flow freely on one another; there is nothing to prevent
their sliding, as would be the case if they interlocked
like pieces of broken stone. The masses do not slide
directly into the canal, but the high part of the bank
drops vertically, slides some, and forces the bottom of
the excavation to rise. It reaches a state of equilib-
rium by a different method than the normal sliding
mass. The fourth form of slide is that due to erosion
and weathering induced both by physical and by chem-
ical forces. Just as every cliff has as its foot a talus of
broken bits of weathered rock, so the banks of the canal
will weather, and limited amounts of material will wash
into the canal. Vegetation will retard this. The
rest will have to be dug or later dredged from the canal.

The serious problems of the slides will have been
solved when the canal is entirely finished. No one can
predict with certainty, however, that they will have
been altogether eliminated by that time.* New slides
may develop or old ones extend. But the slides are
usually slow to develop, and the material can be rapidly
excavated should any occur. The commission will no
doubt leave for the maintenance force a fleet of dredges
and other excavating apparatus, with which the prob-
lems could be met should they arise.

It may be added that it is most fortunate that we
did not adopt the sea-level canal, for with 85 feet
greater depth the slides in the cut might easily have

* A slide in October, 1914, temporarily closed the canal to traffic, after
vessels had been regularly passing through for several weeks.

THe Panama Canal

been fourfold the present extent, and they might, in-
deed, have been a problem of the first magnitude.

MIRAFLORES LAKE

Miraflores Lake is a very much smaller body of
water than Gatun Lake, and lies between the locks at
Pedro Miguel and those at Miraflores. (See plan No.
1.) It is a little over miles long and about 1| miles
wide at its widest part. It was at first intended to
have the lower locks built close to Balboa instead of
at Miraflores. If this had been done, the lake would
have had an area of 7 square miles instead of, as built,
only one square mile, and would have afforded a very
good navigable channel of 5 miles, instead of onlyl^
miles, as at the present time. This was the scheme
proposed by the Board of Consulting Engineers in
their report of 1906. The change from the board's
plan to the one finally adopted involved an increased
cost of about $10,000,000, and was apparently disad-
vantageous, so far as the physical characteristics of
the canal are concerned. The reasons for the change
were that close to Balboa the locks would be subject
to hostile gun-fire from the Bay of Panama, and that
the preliminary work on the dam at Balboa connecting
with Sosa Hill showed that a suitable foundation did
not exist.

The water level of Miraflores Lake will be carried
at an elevation 55 feet above mean tide. Miraflores
Lake occupies a portion of the valley of the Rio Grande
River, and at its lower end the Miraflores locks have
been constructed in the line of this valley. Dams

R,o\ite, Design and Construction

extend from the lock walls to neighboring hills, which
are close by, so as to enclose the lake. The dam on
the west side of the locks makes an apparently un-
necessary sweep to the south, but the object is to cap-
ture the flow of the Cocoli River for use in the lake and
to prevent the water from giving trouble in the valley
below the locks. The flow from the Rio Grande and
Pedro Miguel Rivers, and from one or two other smaller
streams, also enters the lake. The water from Gatun
Lake which is used in the single lock at Pedro Miguel
will flow into Miraflores Lake. The water consump-
tion from Miraflores Lake is that due to evaporation
and lockages through the two sets of locks at Mira-
flores, and the amount used will be in excess of the
supply from the rivers during the dry season. The
difference will be made up from water allowed to flow
into Miraflores Lake from Gatun Lake. During the
rainy season there may be an excess of water, and this
will be discharged through a spillway having gates
exactly like those for the Gatun Dam spillway. The
capacity of the gates was not, however, designed from
the estimated flow thus obtained, but was based on the
larger flow which would enter Miraflores Lake in case
all the gates in one of the Pedro Miguel locks should be
wrecked, and the full head of water from Gatun Lake
should flow uninterruptedly through one of the Pedro
Miguel locks. The discharge from the spillway is into
the old channel of the Rio Grande River, over which
the spillway is built. After following the old channel
for about one mile, the water will be carried through
the Rio Grande diversion for about If miles, when it

THe Panama Canal

will again enter a part of the old river channel and
find its way to the sea close to the mouth of the canal.

THE CANAL LOCKS

The passage of a vessel through locks wherein it
remains continually water-borne is simple, as com-
pared with the usual process of placing vessels in dry
dock, involving the removal of water from the dock
and support of the ship on blocking. The percent-
age of accidents in both cases is found to be exceed-
ingly small. About 90 per cent of the accidents in
locking vessels are due to failure of signals from the
bridge to the engine room, and these will be eliminated
at Panama through the adoption of a part of the process
in common use in docking; namely, the vessel will not
move into the lock under its own steam, but will come
to a full stop at the approach wall, and the movement
of the ship will then be controlled by the lock opera-
tives. Two lines to the bow and two to the stern will
be used, the strains being obtained from four electric
locomotives with winches on board, running on rack
railroads on the edge of the lock walls, two on each
side of the lock. For large ships more lines and more
locomotives may be found necessary. The process is
not dissimilar to towing canal boats, but with amplifi-
cations. With experience there will no doubt be de-
veloped the proper order of seamanship to handle all
vessels expeditiously under these novel conditions.
(See plan No. 6.)

The canal has in all twelve lock chambers, two
flights of three each at Gatun, two flights of one each

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Route, Design and Construction

at Pedro Miguel, and two flights of two each at Mira-
flores. The twelve locks are alike in their principal
features, but variations occur from differences in ar-
rangements of gates and protective devices. The lock
chamber must have at least one gate at each end, to
separate it from the adjoining chamber or from the
adjoining body of water. The minimum number of
gates that would fulfil this condition for the arrange-
ment of locks adopted is 18. The actual number used
is, for various reasons to be explained later, increased
to 46.

Each lock has a chamber 110 feet wide and 1000
feet long, but as about 95 per cent of all ocean-going
vessels are under 600 feet long, the locks are divided
by a second set of gates into two parts, one 400 feet
long and the other 600 feet long. There is no saving
of time in filling a small chamber rather than the full
1000-foot lock, since all filling is done at the rate of
2 feet per minute; but advantage in the use of divided
locks arises from the great saving in water, which is
an element of importance, as we have seen in consid-
ering Gatun Lake. This feature adds ten pairs of lock
gates to the installation. One duplicate lock, namely,
the lower one at Miraflores, is not provided with the
dividing gates. This is because the designing engineers
found that the cost of the gates and additional length
of concrete structure in this particular lock, due to
tidal conditions, outweighed the saving in water.

Should a vessel approaching the first lock of any
flight not come to a stop through some misunderstand-
ing, a collision with the lock gate will be prevented by

THe Panama Canal

a chain of 3-inch iron stretched from one side of the
lock to the other. The impact will be taken up by
hydraulic cylinders in the lock walls to which the ends
of the chain will be attached. The resistance is suffi-
cient to stop a 10,000-ton vessel moving at 4 knots
per hour in a length of 73 feet. When not in use the
chain will rest in a groove in the floor and side walls.
If the chain should give way, or not be in position, the
impact would be received by a pair of guard or safety
gates, which it is expected would check the vessel and
prevent it from injuring the next set of gates. Should
the inconceivable accident happen of a vessel passing
both the guard chain and safety gate and wrecking the
next one while all the other gates in the lock were open,
due to a vessel having just passed through, then
Gatun Lake would begin to flow out to the full ca-
pacity of the channel now formed by the lock, and
similarly for Lake Miraflores. Four guard gates are
required to protect the entrances to the four lock
chambers adjoining Gatun Lake at Gatun and Pedro
Miguel, and four more to protect the exits from the
same locks, as an accident at the exits would have the
same consequences as at the entrances. Similarly,
two gates each are required at the entrances and exits
of the upper Miraflores lock chambers, or a total of
twelve guard gates.

A guard gate is also constructed at the lower en-
trance of each flight of locks, and the leaves of this
gate point away from the lock. Each of these gates is
a guard for vessels approaching from below and also
may be used in unwatering the lock.

Route, Design and Construction

Even the well-nigh impossible combination of cir-
cumstances described above would not wreck the
canal. The mitering lock gates could, of course, not be
closed against the flowing stream, therefore, to stop the
flow the emergency dam would be brought into play.
The emergency dam is in the form of a bridge resting
on a turntable on the side wall of the lock. It may be
turned so as to span the lock and then be firmly bed-
ded on each side. A series of steel girders with the
upper ends fastened to the bridge would be lowered
by cables into position, having the lower ends on a
concrete sill provided for the purpose. Then steel
plates would be forced down one by one, supported by
the girders, and the opening would thus be gradually
closed by a steel wall and the flow practically stopped.
A floating caisson such as is used with dry docks
would then be placed at the lake end of the lock on a
seat provided for the purpose. The caisson carries a
pumping plant for unwatering the lock, and repairs
may thus be made. In the meantime traffic would
use the other series of locks in both directions.

The locks are some of the most massive concrete
work in the world. The dividing wall between the
flights of three locks at Gatun, with the approach
walls which are in extension of the dividing wall,
forms a mass of concrete 60 feet thick, about 81 feet
high, and over If miles long. The approach walls
are of cellular construction. The dividing wall is built
with the faces vertical and is solid for over half the
height. Above the solid portion the center of the
wall is filled with earth, except three superimposed

THe Panama Canal

tunnels. The lowest tunnel is used for drainage of the
upper ones, the center tunnel for electric light and
power cables, and the upper one as a passageway for
employees to reach the various chambers containing
machinery for operating the miter gates and the many
valves. The exterior walls of the locks are of equal
height with the central wall, and are from 45 feet to
50 feet thick at the floor-level; they diminish by steps
on the back to a thickness of 8 feet at the top. The
thickness of the floor is variable but is approximately
13 feet.

The emptying and filling of the locks is done through
circular openings in the floor, each 3 feet 10 J inches in
diameter and having an area of 12 square feet. There
are five of them in each line across the lock, and the
lines are spaced 32 feet to 36 feet apart. In one 1000-
foot lock there are in all 105 openings, with a total area
of 1260 square feet. Each row of five openings com-
municates with a cross-tunnel under the floor. Eleven
of these cross-tunnels in each lock lead to the outside
wall and there open into a culvert 18 feet in diameter,
without the interposition of valves. The remaining
ten tunnels, alternating with the others, lead to the
center wall where a cylindrical valve allows each tunnel
to communicate with the culvert in the center wall,
which is also 18 feet in diameter. The center-wall
culvert receives the tunnels from both locks. It ex-
tends the full length of the three locks at Gatun, and
at the upper end it opens into Gatun Lake, while the
lower end discharges into the sea-level canal. There
are control valves at each end and also in the line of

Rxmte, Design and Construction 85

the culvert at intermediate points corresponding to the
locks. It is evident that, with a proper adjustment of
the culvert valves, the water in any two lock chambers
may be equalized by opening the cylindrical valves
that allow the floor tunnels to communicate with the
center culvert. This allows a very considerable saving
of water in operation. With all culvert valves open,
the center culvert may be used to discharge water
from Gatun Lake into the sea. The side-wall culverts
also extend the full length of the locks, and have con-
trol valves at the ends and at points corresponding to
the ends of the locks, and at the subdivision points.
They may be used in equalizing the water in any two
locks that adjoin endwise, or in passing water into and
out of the end locks. (See plan No. 6.)

LOCK-OPERATING MACHINERY

All machinery connected with the locks is operated
by electricity and has been specially designed for the
canal work, based largely on previous experience with
locks. There are 114 rising stem gate valves, 120 cy-
lindrical valves, and 92 machines for operating the in-
dividual leaves of the large miter gates. The apparatus
is equipped with remote control and position indicators,
which show at the control switchboard the positions of
the gates and valves during operation. Indicators also
show the various water levels. All regular operating
machinery will be controlled by means of interlocking
switches, with one central switchboard for each of the
three groups of locks at Gatun, Pedro Miguel and
Miraflores. There is also local control and hand oper-

TKe Panama Canal

ation where feasible. The whole installation is a good
example of electric operation.

Realizing that a great deal of the machinery was of
new type and that the operating conditions in a trop-
ical climate would be unusually severe, the greatest
care was exercised before finally deciding on the type
and character of the apparatus. In most cases a
sample piece was first made and actually tried out
under the severest working conditions, and changed if
necessary before the order for the whole lot was
given.

The cylindrical gate valves controlling the tunnels
from the center-wall culvert consist essentially of a
vertical cylinder placed in a chamber adjoining the
culvert. The cylinder is seated at the bottom, and
directly beneath it is a well to the floor culvert. A
short lift gives a large waterway under the edges of the
cylinder.

The great advantage of the cylindrical type is that
it is very quick opening, and that the water pressures
are balanced and do not tend to prevent either open-
ing or closing. On the canal a special form is used
which does not involve carrying the full diameter of
the cylinder above the water surface.

The larger openings to the main culverts are con-
trolled by rising stem gate valves of the Stoney pat-
tern, similar to those used in the crest of the Gatun
spillway dam. The gate is made of heavy structural
steel, and the water pressure is taken by a train of
rollers at the back of the valve upon which the gate
moves. Leakage is prevented by means of a metal

Route, Design and Construction

water-seal extending around the face of the valve.
This seal is fastened to the valve and slides on the
wall of the opening and forms the only sliding friction
of the whole valve.

Each mitering lock gate consists of two leaves hinged
to the walls at opposite sides of the lock, and each leaf
is 65 feet long; that is, longer than half the width of
the lock, so that when the two leaves are closed, they
form an angle pointing against the water pressure.
The 92 leaves weigh in the aggregate 60,000 tons, a
weight in excess of that of two modern dreadnoughts.
If all the gates were laid flat in a pile, it would be 644
feet high.

The joints at the hinges are made water-tight by
means of Babbitt metal. Embedded on the sill of the
lock is a heavy block of wood, against which a similar
block along the lower end of the gate fits. The water-
tight joint, however, is made by means of a seal on the
under side of the block on the gate in the form of a
rubber flap \ inch thick, which is forced against the
seat by the water pressure itself. The weight of the
gates is decreased by water-tight compartments near
the bottom, which give flotation. A trunk extends
from the deck to these compartments. Some of the
upper water-tight chambers may be filled so as to
control the buoyancy of the gates for different levels
of water. When in motion the gates hang simply on
their hinges, and there are no rollers on the floor of the
lock, the weight being carried principally by the
buoyancy of the chambers.

THe Panama Canal

CONSTRUCTING THE LOCKS

In deciding on the site for the locks, extensive and
elaborate borings were made, indicating the exact
character of the material. In every case a rock foun-
dation was selected.

The Gatun locks were constructed somewhat ear-
lier than those at Pedro Miguel and Miraflores, and
the method of building them also differed from that
used for the others. The conditions were not so favor-
able for economical work. The three Gatun locks and
the approach walls contain over 2,000,000 cubic yards
of concrete. For purpose of comparison it may be
stated that a large modern dry dock^ contains less than
one-tenth this amount.

The broken stone was obtained from quarries at
Porto Bello, which were opened particularly for the
lock work. The material was quarried and crushed
at Porto Bello, and was transported on barges in tow
of commission tugs and carried through the old French
canal, which happened to pass very close to the site
selected for the locks. On account of the silting in of
the old canal and the long haul, the cost of transpor-
tation was quite materially increased. The cost of the
stone delivered at Gatun, including cost of plant and
overhead charges, averaged $2.40 per cubic yard. The
sand was dredged at Nombre de Dios and similarly
transported on barges, at a total cost of about $2.10
per cubic yard. Cement was shipped from the United
States to Colon, transferred by train and placed in
storehouses at Gatun. The mixing of the concrete

F^ovite, Design and Construction 89

was done at a stationary mixing plant. The stone,
sand and cement were transferred by gravity, in proper
proportions for each batch, to cars which dumped the
materials into the mixers. After thorough mixing, the
concrete was discharged into buckets on electric cars
which ran on an automatically operated electric rail-
road. The cars were carried to tracks parallel to the
locks and were stopped at the proper point. To
transfer the concrete to the desired location in the
lock, a number of aerial cableways were used, extend-
ing from one side to the other of the locks. The cable
at one end was fastened to the top of a movable tower
which contained hoisting apparatus, and at the other
end the cable was fastened to a tower that was also
movable but contained no machinery. The concrete
was lifted from the cars, and by a trolley operating on
the cableway was carried over the point of deposit,
lowered and dumped.

The forms for the interior face of the side walls con-
sisted of a heavy steel frame with steel face plates
which were moved into position. The full height of
the wall for the length of the form was then con-
structed, whereupon the form was moved to the next
section. The cost of concrete on the Gatun locks was
$6.64 per cubic yard in 1911 and $7.76 in 1912.

For the Miraflores locks broken stone was brought
from a very large quarry opened high up on the side
of Ancon Hill, where a satisfactory quality of stone
was found. About 5,000 cubic yards of stone were
turned out daily. Heavy blasts were set off above the
berm, and steam shovels then loaded the material into

THe Panama Canal

railroad dump cars, which were switched farther down
the hill by locomotives to the top of a crusher, and
then dumped directly into it. "Dobe" shots were
fired off in the cars to split the stones which were too
large. The crusher could take stones equal in size to
that of an ordinary chair. The crushed material was
screened, and that of proper size was carried by a rub-
ber belt to a sorting-screen and passed into the storage
bins underneath for the various sizes. The material
from the large crusher which was rejected by the
screen passed into four small gyratory crushers, and
from these on to the same belt for transfer to the
sorting-screen. With this efficient and well-arranged
plant the cost of stone delivered at the site of the locks
was about $0.82 per cubic yard. The capacity of the
Panama Railroad was insufficient to supply this mate-
rial to the works at Gatun on the other side of the
Isthmus.

Sand for the Miraflores locks was obtained by dredg-
ing at Chame, transferred by barges to Balboa, where
it was unloaded by means of grab buckets and placed
in overhead storage bins for transfer by rail to the lock
site. The total cost in storage at the locks was about
$0.76 per cubic yard.

To handle the stone and sand in building the Mira-
flores locks, an elevated trestle was built parallel to
the locks and about 200 feet away. The cars dumped
the stone on the side toward the locks, and the sand
on the side away from them. On the bank between
the locks and the storage pile a large cantilever crane
operated on a track. The tower contained bins and

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Rcvute, Design and Construction 91

hoppers and two large concrete-mixers. One canti-
lever arm overhung the storage piles, and a grab bucket
kept the bins full. The other cantilever arm overhung
the nearest lock wall and transferred the concrete from
the mixers to the lock wall. The cement was taken
directly from the cars to the tower without first going
into storage. In the lock chamber was another canti-
lever crane, which transported concrete to those parts
of the lock beyond the reach of the mixing-crane. The
entire plant was probably one of the most perfect ever
devised for handling concrete. The cost of the concrete
in place was $4.68 per cubic yard in 1911 and $4.77 in
1912.

LOCKS AS THE LIMITING FEATURE

The locks fix the maximum size ship that may use
the canal. They will pass the largest now built or
building, but will not, for instance, pass the floating
dry dock Dewey, which passed through the Suez Canal
on the way to the Philippine Islands. The size of the
locks was determined from the provisions of the Act
of Congress approved June 28, 1902, which state:
"Such canal shall be of sufficient capacity and depth
as shall afford convenient passage for vessels of the
largest tonnage and greatest draft now in use, and
such as may be reasonably anticipated. ..."

In considering the limiting dimensions of the locks,
and thus of the canal, it must be borne in mind that
there has been a steady increase in the size of ships,
upon which great emphasis has been laid. If curves
are plotted to show the growth in length, width, depth
and tonnage, especially if the maximum ship of each

XKe Panama Canal

period is taken, and if these curves are extended to
show future developments, the predictions are alarm-
ing. However, when the curves are produced beyond
a certain point other factors not hitherto considered,
and having no influence on the curves as plotted, are
likely to enter. Shipbuilding has undergone an almost
untrammelled development; building facilities, capital
and cost have, seemingly, not retarded growth. Har-
bors have been deepened, channels have been widened,
wharves, docks, locks and wet basins have been in-
creased in size, to make way for the leviathans. The
impetus toward larger vessels has undoubtedly been
from economic reasons. Shipowners have found that
with the larger and better equipped ships, having in
view passenger traffic and advertising effects as well
as freight, their ratio of income has increased and there
has been nothing to curb their efforts. Communities
and governments have, in their striving for all-im-
portant commercial growths, paid the bills for harbor
development. As economic conditions have brought
about the steep rise in the ship-growth curve, so eco-
nomic conditions, but in another field, will tend to
flatten the curve. There must be a limit beyond which
harbor development cannot economically go, and be-
yond which the sum of the cost of shipping and build-
ing and the cost of construction and maintenance of
port works will increase rather than decrease. It will
be difficult to determine when this point is reached,
especially because the same interests do not provide
capital for both enterprises. There are already occa-
sional indications that this factor is entering. The

Route, Design and Construction 93

difficulty in providing for the largest ships in New
York harbor, while from one standpoint a physical one,
is in the last analysis economic.

There is now no commercial necessity why the Pan-
ama Canal should accommodate the largest ships; the
largest ships may be regarded as ocean ferries with
fixed ports. The total estimated traffic capacity of
80,000,000 tons can be handled in ships under 600 feet
long, which comprise 95 per cent of the world's ton-
nage, but within the next generation the canal may
become one of the elements which exercise a retardant
influence on the maximum size of ships, depending on
developments in the commerce of the world.

More important is the effect of the canal on the size
of naval vessels. Battleships of the United States
have increased in beam from 76 feet in 1900 (date of
authorization) to 80 feet in 1905, 88 feet in 1908, and
about 98 feet in 1912; and if this ratio of increase is
maintained, the limiting beam would be reached in
ships authorized in about 1915.

It is worthy of note that the locks of the enlarged
Kaiser Wilhelm Canal from the Baltic to the North
Sea are 1082 feet long and 147 feet wide, but the lift is
very much less than at Panama.

Before leaving the subject of the locks as the limit-
ing features, it is important to note that no physical
obstacle will prevent the engineer of the coming gen-
eration from building an additional series of locks,
should experience show wider or longer locks to be a
real necessity. The cost will be great but not prohib-
itive and will be but a small fraction of the original

XKe Panama Canal

cost of the canal. So far as commercial needs are con-
cerned the present provisions are extremely liberal.
So far as naval needs are concerned no one can foretell
what results the rapid and radical developments of the
present decade may disclose.

THE SEA-LEVEL SECTIONS AND THE TERMINALS

Limon Bay, through which the Atlantic sea-level
section passes, faces directly north and is open to the
northerly storms and seas, which are quite severe at
certain times. Protection was necessary in order: first,
that ships might enter the canal in quiet water; second,
to provide a quiet anchorage; third, to make traffic in
small boats feasible and safe between the shore and
ships at anchor; fourth, to prevent the movement of
silts and sands by the seas and the attendant dredging
expenditure. (See plan No. 2.)

To give this protection, Toro Point breakwater has
been constructed, extending from Toro Point in a
northeasterly direction for a distance of about 2 miles.
The outer end does not quite cover the entrance to the
canal. The breakwater protects the greater part of
Limon Bay from the northerly storms, but the easterly
portion is still exposed, especially to waves and trade
winds from a northeasterly direction. The construc-
tion of a breakwater to close this part of the bay was
postponed to await the results of actual experience
with the one at Toro Point. It seemed probable at
the time that this breakwater would ultimately be
built, as the protection was not sufficient, especially
for boating, and as the effects of wave action cause

Route, Design and Construction 95

silting of the channel. It was actually found as a
result of the experience of the navy that it would be
dangerous and at times impossible for small boats and
coal barges to lie alongside ships. Furthermore, an
estimate showed that 2,200,000 cubic yards of material,
costing several hundred thousand dollars to remove,
had been deposited in the finished channel during
twelve months' action of the waves. The construction
of the east breakwater was accordingly decided upon.

The Toro Point breakwater was constructed from a
trestle supported on creosoted piles 85 feet long and
having two tracks. The piles were driven by a railroad
pile-driver with very heavy hammer, which could reach
all of the piles from either track. Stone from a Toro
Point quarry was carried in cars on the trestle and
dumped overboard, and forms the core of the break-
water. Porto Bello stone, which is harder and much
more durable, was transported a distance of about 28
miles on barges and carefully deposited on the exte-
rior by means of derricks. The breakwater is 20 feet
in width on top, and is built in water from 35 to 50
feet in depth. The height of the top above the surface
of the water is about 16 feet. The total quantity of
material placed to December 31, 1912, when the
breakwater was nearly completed, was 954,500 cubic
yards, at an average cost of $2.20 per cubic yard.
In addition, 620,000 cubic yards of rock dredged from
the canal were deposited in the vicinity of the break-
water. During the fiscal year 1912 the Toro Point
rock cost $1.38 per cubic yard, and the Porto Bello
rock, $4.31.

XKe Panama Canal

A large anchorage basin is provided between Cris-
tobal and the canal channel. The wharfage space at
Cristobal is being increased. New piers are built on
steel cylinders which were excavated inside by hand
and gradually forced down. The cylinders, upon
reaching the proper depth, were filled with concrete,
and a superstructure of reinforced concrete was built
upon them.

To complete the Atlantic sea-level section, from the
outer end to its terminus at the Gatun Locks, required
the excavation of over 32,000,000 cubic yards by
dredging, costing over $7,600,000, or about 24 cents
per cubic yard; and over 2,000,000 cubic yards by
steam shovel, costing over $1,450,000, or about 67 cents
per cubic yard.

The Pacific sea-level section from the Miraflores
Locks to Panama Bay cuts the winding channel of the
Rio Grande River and then continues through the bay.
The land is all very low. This channel up to Decem-
ber 31, 1912, when the work was well in hand, had
required the excavation of over 34,500,000 cubic yards
by dredging, at a total cost of over $8,500,000, or
about 25 cents per cubic yard; over 2,500,000 cubic
yards by steam shovel, at a cost of over $2,000,000,
or about 80 cents per cubic yard, and in addition over
1,500,000 cubic yards by hydraulic excavation, at a
total cost of over $1,100,000, or about 72 cents per
cubic yard. The hydraulic excavation consisted in
dislodging the earth by means of powerful streams of
water and carrying the material, water-borne, to suc-
tion pumps which discharged it on the neighboring

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Romte, Design and Construction

swamps. A great deal of submarine rock was exca-
vated, partly through the use of a Lobnitz rock-
breaker, which shattered the rock by dropping a
heavy cylindrical shaft, and partly through the usual
process of submarine drilling and blasting. (See plan
No. 3.)

It was originally intended to carry the canal into
deep water on the easterly side of the group of islands
Naos, Culebra and Flamenco, which lie about 3 miles
off the Pacific shore. A study of the conditions devel-
oped the fact that the strong littoral currents carried
silt in a westerly direction, and as the shores of the
bay are lined with a very fine mud, this action would
cause the dredged channel to fill rapidly. For these
reasons it was decided to carry the channel to deep
water on the west of the group of islands, and to build
a breakwater or dike from the shore at Balboa to Naos
Island, about parallel to the canal. The object of the
breakwater was not to give protection from seas or
storms, for these are unknown on the Pacific side of
the Isthmus, but to prevent the movement of silt into
the canal, to shut off the swift tidal currents which
would carry vessels at right angles to their course and,
incidentally, to provide a roadway from the mainland
to the fortifications on the islands. An ample amount
of material was available from the excavations in the
Culebra Cut, which necessarily required disposal some-
where. The breakwater, or dike, was built by means of
a trestle of creosoted timber piles, from which railroad
cars dumped their material into the water. The
trestle was over three miles in length, and as stated

TKe Panama Canal

in the annual reports of the commission, was driven
for a greater part of its length in blue mud, varying
from a few feet to 102 feet in depth. The mud par-
ticles are exceedingly fine, and the substance feels
greasy and slippery, and has a very low coefficient of
friction. The mud was not able to carry the weight of
the stone dumped from the trestle, and the stone and
trestle were continually sinking and shifting laterally.
At one locality, the total vertical displacement aggre-
gated 125 feet in a single year. In some cases the
lateral displacement of the trestle was as much as 300
feet. The pressure of the stone was most effective when
a 20-foot tide was out, and the displacements usually
occurred at low water. The rock in settling caused
parallel ridges of mud to rise about 80 feet from the
center of the track. At one point a record was kept of
the amount of material required to bring the stone fill
up to the required height of 29 feet above the original
bottom, and it was actually ten times as much as com-
putations taking no account of settlement indicated
necessary. Such occurrences might have been very
serious, but in this case unlimited material was avail-
able from the cut, and the total cost of the work was
not excessive. In fact, the total cost of the dike up to
December 31, 1912, was $300,000 for 1,121,000 cubic
yards, or at the rate of about 27 cents per cubic yard,
or about $13.00 per lineal foot. Costs are exclusive of
the amount that would have been spent to dispose
of the materials on the ordinary dumps.

The principal ship repair plant will be on the Pacific
end of the canal. There will be a large dry dock, equal

Route, Design and Construction

in capacity to that of the locks, with an entrance of at
least 110 feet clear width and a clear length of 1,000
feet. A smaller dry dock may also be built. The ship
repair yard is designed to afford repair facilities for
all of the Panama Canal plant, and for visiting ships.
It will comprise foundries, machine shops, equipment
for shipfitting, woodworking, paint shops, storehouses,
and all the other necessary outfit for the great variety
of work that it will be called upon to do. Its general
character will be similar to that of a large navy yard.
The plant will be a valuable asset to the United States
Navy, especially in time of war. There is at present a
small dock and repair plant at the Atlantic end.

Unloading piers are being provided at Balboa in
addition to the present facilities, as at Cristobal. It is
probable that there will be an anchorage basin near the
dock yard, though rock bottom is a deterrent influence.

Two of the largest floating cranes in the world, Ger-
man built, form a part of the equipment, and these are
of the revolving type. They have a lifting capacity of
250 tons at 22 feet reach, or 150 tons at 62 feet reach,
and 100 tons at 82 feet, with a hook 100 feet above the
surface of the water. Their stability will be retained
under any and all conditions of loading, without shift-
ing ballast or counterweight, except that the revolving
structure will be counterweighted. The two cranes
acting together will be able to lift any one of the
enormous leaves of the mitering lock gates.

The coaling plant at the Pacific end will have a
total storage capacity of 135,000 tons, of which 75,000
tons will be subaqueous. Arrangements are made for

100

THe Panama Canal

separate storage of coal belonging to different owners.
The capacity of the plant for unloading from colliers
will be 500 tons per hour, and the total issuing capacity
will be 1000 tons per hour. It is proposed to furnish
coal by sale to passing vessels. The Cristobal coaling
plant will be larger, and will have a total storage
capacity of about 240,000 tons, of which 125,000 tons
will be subaqueous. The capacity for unloading from
colliers will be 1000 tons per hour, and the total issuing
capacity will be 2000 tons per hour. While private
owners and steamship companies will be permitted to
store their own coal in this plant, the government will
do all the handling. The government will own and
operate a large number of coal and oil lighters at each
end of the canal. Oil storage and an oil pipe line
across the Isthmus will also be provided.

CONTROL OF WATER DURING CONSTRUCTION OF THE CANAL

One of the serious problems that arose in connection
with the actual construction of various parts of the
canal has not been mentioned in describing items such
as the locks, dams, and Culebra Cut, because it can be
better treated as an individual subject. We realize
that the canal is built in the valleys of the Chagres and
Rio Grande Rivers, and that the route selected is the
very lowest one that could be found. Knowing the
character of tropical rainstorms and river floods, it
needs but a moment's thought to make clear the seri-
ousness of the problem of keeping the storm waters
and the floods away from the construction work. Im-
properly or insufficiently controlled, these waters

Route, Design and Construction 101

would have the power to destroy a great deal of what
had been laboriously done.

The Culebra Cut forming the low point for many
square miles of territory, and coinciding for a consid-
erable distance with the Obispo River valley, would
naturally collect vast quantities of water were steps
not taken to prevent it. The course of the Obispo
River was artificially changed, beginning at the point
where it approached the cut. The total length of the
new river channel as originally built was 5i miles,
from a point on the east side of the Culebra Cut, near
the foot of Gold Hill, to a point clear of the cut, and
finally discharging into the Chagres River. On account
of slides encountered during construction work, the^
Obispo diversion gave way, and the flow of the river
entered the cut for three days, causing inconvenience
and damage. A new diversion channel was constructed
with great speed. That the Obispo diversion was no
small problem may be noted from the fact that in six
years a total of 1,200,000 cubic yards of excavation
was necessary, of which nearly 40 per cent was in rock
and the total cost was over $1,000,000. The diver-
sion was able to carry 6000 cubic feet of water per
second. The Camacho diversion on the opposite side
of the cut was similarly built.

These two diversions take waters which flow toward
the Atlantic. The Rio Grande River formerly flowed
through part of the area excavated on the Pacific side of
the Continental Divide. It was similarly diverted, and
a dike was constructed across the south end of the
canal to prevent access of the river water. Keeping

102

TKe Panama Canal

water out of the cut also kept out the silt which would
inevitably have come down with the freshets.

The elevation of the bottom of the cut was 40 feet,
which was lower than the Chagres River where it joined
the canal, and a dam was built across the cut with its
crest at elevation 73 to prevent the river from flowing
into it.

The natural streams being thus prevented from en-
tering the work, it only remained to get rid of the
water which originated along 8J miles of cut. This
was done by means of centrifugal pumps at low points
in the cut, which discharged the water over the dams.
Excavation at a new level was always preceded by the
cutting of a pioneer trench down the middle of the
canal, in which all the water was collected and carried
to the pumping stations. The summit during con-
struction was at Culebra. Drainage to the south was
carried to Pedro Miguel until August, 1911, when the
flow was taken through the center-wall culvert of the
Pedro Miguel Lock. The drainage to the north was
disposed of by pumping.

The Chagres had no opportunity to interfere with
the Culebra Cut, but had ample opportunity by virtue
of its location, to threaten the work on the Gatun
Dam. This problem was handled with ingenuity by
the engineers. The portions of the dam not accessible
to the river were constructed first. The spillway was
built with its foundations on rock and with the river
kept out by cofferdams and otherwise. In the mean-
time the Chagres River flowed through the west diver-
sion built by the French. When the spillway, in 1911,

Route, Design and Construction

103

had been constructed to elevation 10 feet above sea
level, and the earth dam well above this elevation, the
channels of the Chagres were closed by carrying the
dam across, and the water then rose in Gatun Lake
until it flowed over the concrete work of the spillway
during the rainy season. This depth kept the Panama
Railroad, still on the old line in the Chagres valley, free
of water. During the following season the railroad was
transferred to the relocated or high line above the final
level of Gatun Lake. The earth dam was continually
kept at an elevation well above that of the concrete
work of the spillway, and the next step during the dry
season consisted of constructing four very large culverts
in a part of the spillway~temporarily protected from the
flow of the water and controlled by gates. There were
provisions for placing stop planks for closing the
openings at some future time. When these culverts
were completed, the dry-weather flow of the river
was carried through them, and the remaining concrete
work of the spillway progressed as long as the dry
season lasted, and as long as the culverts were able to
carry the flow. During the rainy season the flow was
again over the concrete work of the spillway now
carried to elevation 50. Proceeding thus, the spillway
was completed, and the final step, when the spillway
was entirely done, consisted in placing the stop planks
before the entrance to the four culverts and filling them
with concrete.

The Gatun Locks extend to a depth of about 55 feet
below mean sea level, and the water was kept off the
site by means of a temporary dam to the north of the

104

THe Panama Canal

locks. This was built so that the excavation for the
flare-walls might be done by dredges, as the material
was too soft to hold steam shovels. Inasmuch as the
dredges could not dig the full depth of 70 feet, a small
lake was formed over the area of the flare-walls, and
its elevation was lowered by pumping until the dredge
could reach the bottom. This lake was kept from flow-
ing into the partially completed locks by means of a
temporary concrete dam, built between the center and
side walls near the lower end of the Gatun Locks.

AIDS TO NAVIGATION

The Atlantic entrance is marked by a light of the
fourth magnitude placed on the end of the Toro Point
Breakwater, where there will also be a compressed-air
fog whistle and a submarine bell. The tangents in the
canal are defined by range lights. Vessels going in op-
posite directions use different ranges giving courses 250
feet apart. There are also side lights, spaced about 1
mile apart on each side of the channel. In the Culebra
Cut the range lights are omitted, due to the tangents
being so short and the banks too steep for placing them.
There will be, instead, 35 concrete beacons at tangent
points and at intermediate locations. By a system of
screening, only those lights will be visible to the navi-
gator which are necessary to define the channel where
the ship may be.

The sides of the canal are further marked by acety-
lene, flashing gas buoys of 450 candlepower, and inter-
mediate spar buoys.

The range lights involved much clearing of forest

Route, Design and Construction 105

growth, since the trochas are in general of the full width
of the canal at the start, narrowing down to 480 feet
at the rear light.

All lights, beacons and buoys are white, and are dis-
tinguished from one another by characteristic flashes.
Gas and electricity are used for illumination, preferably
electricity where feasible. Inaccessible lights are oper-
ated by means of compressed acetylene dissolved in
acetone.

The locks are illuminated by means of 400-watt
tungsten lamps on concrete posts, with concrete re-
flectors, having a lighting effect superior to that of an
ordinary arc lamp. The lamp is 30 feet above the
coping and is screened by concrete skirts, so as to cut
off the direct light rays longitudinally of the locks,
thus keeping the glare out of the navigator's eyes.

THE PANAMA CANAL

Part III

SANITATION — COSTS OF WORK — ELEMENTS OF
SUCCESS — CONCLUSION

REUBEN E. BAKENHUS, S. B.

CIVIL ENGINEER U. S. NAVY

SANITATION— COSTS OF WORK— ELEMENTS
OF SUCCESS— CONCLUSION

SANITATION

To regard the sanitation work as a mere contributory
element to a successful culmination of the canal con-
struction work does not, perhaps, place it upon the
high plane that it deserves. Rather should we regard
it as one manifestation of the great progressive move-
ment that is now pervading civilization and that re-
gards the prevention of disease as of more importance
than its cure, and in its execution requires the co-
operation of the physician, the bacteriologist, the en-
gineer, and the administrator. The Panama Canal is
undoubtedly the most marked single example the
world has seen of the intelligent and thorough appli-
cation of the principles of sanitation. In many other
parts of the world, and for years, such principles have
been applied in preventing contamination of water
supplies, in the purification of sewage, in the control
of epidemics and in other important sanitary measures;
but none have had the opportunity to display in so
marked and convincing a way the great benefits to be
derived, especially with the example of the French
experience for a background. In no case has more
been done to educate the world in general in the need
and effectiveness of the application in a practical
way, under control of experts, of the scientific prin-

109

110

THe Panama Canal

ciples of sanitary science. We can with truth, there-
fore, say that the sanitary work on the Isthmus has
extended beyond the confines of the Canal Zone and
of canal construction, and that its good effects on the
whole human race rival those of the canal accomplish-
ment itself.

The very title of the "Department of Sanitation"
is indicative of the new era; in the old days there
would have been a department of hospitals. The new
era gives a department of health and its preservation,
of sickness and its prevention and cure, while the old
merely gave a department for the care of the sick.

Of some of the numerous activities of the Depart-
ment of Sanitation, such as the Colon and Ancon
hospitals, the system of vital statistics, the control
and inspection of foods, the discovery and isolation
of infectious diseases, and the handling of accident or
emergency cases, we may only note in passing that all
are well administered and rank with the best of their
class in the world. The phases of the work which
interest us more are the control of yellow fever and
malaria.

The Americans in Cuba proved that yellow fever
was communicated only through the stegomyia mos-
quito. It had been proved that malaria was commu-
nicated through another type of mosquito known as
the anopheles. Knowing these facts, the fight against
yellow fever resolved itself into several elements: First,
to prevent the introduction of yellow fever into the
Isthmus by strict quarantine; second, to isolate all
yellow fever cases within doubly screened rooms, to pre-

Sanitation, Costs, Etc

111

vent the stegomyia from gaining access to yellow fever
germs and thus gaining the power to communicate it
to others; third, to screen all living spaces, so as to
prevent access of the dangerous mosquitoes to the well;
fourth, to study the habits of the mosquitoes and ex-
terminate them as far as possible, especially those which
have been in the presence of yellow fever.

In accordance with these principles, all hospitals,
hotels, dwellings and offices were most carefully
screened ; the yellow fever rooms in the hospitals were
separated by screens from the rest of the hospital.
Most careful and comprehensive inspections and studies
led to the finding of the breeding-places of the danger-
ous mosquitoes and to the removal of the pools of
water. In the cities all open cisterns and accidental
lodgments for pools of water were removed. In the
open country swamps were drained or filled; extensive
systems of ditches were established and maintained;
pools that could not be removed were coated with a
disinfectant that prevented breeding; underground
drains were placed to run off the water before it could
ooze to the surface and form pools. Larvicide was lib-
erally distributed on stagnant water that could not be
drained; it was manufactured in concentrated form,
was carried to the brooks in the mountains, and was
arranged to drip automatically on the streams, so that
if pools should form, the film of destructive liquid would
already be there. Near all habitations, underbrush and
grass were cut, so that the sun might dry up possible
pools and the mosquitoes be deprived of shade, and
perish. Fish were thus experimented with as to their

112

XKe Panama Canal

destructive effect on mosquito larvae. The cities were
cleaned, sewered, paved, and provided with water. In
fine, no possible precaution that intelligence and ex-
treme diligence could devise was overlooked.

The result was the banishment of the hitherto prev-
alent yellow fever, a marked diminution in the amount
of malaria, and generally healthful conditions accom-
panied by a low death rate.

Sanitation work is expensive; the cost, to June 30,
1913, was $16,250,000.

COSTS OF WORK

One of the most effective and widely used means for
determining the degree of efficiency in the performance
of work is obtained through the careful study and
analysis of the costs of work. The commission in
1907 established a very complete system of engineer-
ing cost keeping devised for the purpose of disclosing
the unit costs of the various elements of work. The
cost of excavating in the Culebra Cut for instance,
which was referred to in the description of the exca-
vation was computed monthly. The quantities exca-
vated and the amount of supplies used were measured
and recorded as well as the moneys expended. Similar
records were kept and unit costs determined for the
elements of a great variety of operations including
dredging and delivering of sand, quarrying and crush-
ing of rock, making of concrete, dredging channels,
laying railroad tracks and many other items of work.
From these records combined with their knowledge of
the conditions, the engineers could determine whether

Sanitation, Costs, Etc.

113

the work was being done better or worse than in pre-
vious periods and also where efforts must be made to
bring up the efficiency or where plant changes must be
made. The unit costs on the canal work compare very
favorably with similar costs elsewhere which is absolute
proof, if any be needed, that the various operations were
carried on efficiently. A few of the interesting unit
costs are as follows:

Excavating Culebra Cut per cu. yd. to June 30, 1909 $0.9155

" " " "fiscal year 1910 0.6682

" " " " " " " " 1911 0.5865

" " " " " " " " 1912 0.5147

Dredging by sea-going suction dredge per cu. yd. fiscal year 1911 . . 0.0452

« « « u u u « u a tt tt i9i2.. 0.0637

" dipper dredge per cu. yd. fiscal year 1911.... 0. 1346

" " " " " " " " <* 1912 0.2548

Hydraulic excavation per cu. yd. . 3485

Plain concrete Gatun spillway, per cu. yd. 1911 6.7044

" " " " " " " 1912 7.0133

" Gatun locks " " "1911 6.5919

" " " " " " " 1912 7.1317

" " Pedro Miguel locks per cu. yd. 1911 4.7040

" " " " " " 1912 5.7183

It must be remembered that the proper weighing of
unit cost records requires experience, knowledge of
local conditions and general good judgment. The con-
crete costs on the Atlantic end were greater, due to
the necessarily high production costs of stone and
sand. A dredge cutting a shallow layer of material
would necessarily be operating at a higher unit of cost
than if working on a layer of sufficient thickness to
develop the full capacity of the dredge, and a hard
sandy clay would cost more to dredge than river mud.

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THe Panama Canal

It is interesting to compare the predicted costs of
the various branches of the work as made by the
minority of the board of consulting engineers and the
estimates of the final project made by the commission
with the actual records of cost to June 30, 1913, when
the great bulk of the work was nearly completed.
The following table shows such a comparison :

COMPARATIVE ESTIMATES

1906,

February,

Actual cost to

Board

1908, Estimates

June 30, 1913

$35,445,000

$68,564,000

$53,504,000

Central Division

48,867,000

88,458,000

83,943,000

28,109,000

47,985,000

47,355,000

Panama R. R

3,709,000

8,164,000

14,200,000

Land damages

300,000

500,000

Administration, engineering

23,284,200

84,095,000

24,181,000

Totals

$139,705,200

$297,766,000

$223,183,000

Sanitation

20,053,000

16,250,000

7,382,000

6,438,000

French Company

40,000,000

Panama Republic

10,000,000

Totals

$375,201,000

$295,871,000

Deduct expected reimbursement

15,000,000

$360,201,000

The differences are large but readily explained. The
increases in the 1908 estimate over that of 1906 are
principally due to changes in plan resulting in improve-
ments. In the Atlantic Division the locks were made
larger and wider and provided with additional gates,
the Toro Point breakwater was changed in location
and increased in size, the cost of channel excavation
was greater, due to larger quantities in earth and rock

Sanitation, Costs, Etc.

115

excavation, the Gatun Dam cost more, due to use of
rock in part and due to addition of items. In the
Central Division the width of channel in the Culebra
Cut was increased from 200 to 300 feet, a concrete re-
vetment was added and there were other increases in
excavation. In the Pacific Division there was the same
increase in the size of the locks as in the Atlantic Divi-
sion and, in addition to this, there was a very large in-
crease in the dredging, due to moving the locks and
dams farther inland for military reasons, thus increasing
the length of the dredged channel and reducing the size
of Miraflores Lake. The Panama Railroad developed
into a most important adjunct of the canal and ab-
sorbed greater amounts of funds. The estimate of
1908 also included many items of general expense not
directly chargeable to construction and not included in
the consulting engineers' estimates, because not re-
quired for purpose of comparing the lock canal with
the sea-level canal.

The actual costs have in general been less than the
commission's estimated costs of 1908. While this
may, in part, be due to the estimated amounts being
very liberal, it is principally due to the remarkable
efficiency attained in execution. Otherwise it would
not have been possible to complete the removal of the
slides and do other additional work at the terminals
and elsewhere within the allotted appropriation.

The following is a record of the actual cost of various
items to the close of the fiscal year 1913:

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TKe Panama Canal

TOTAL EXPENDITURES TO JUNE 30, 1913

(Including plant and distributed overhead charges)

I. Direct charges to Construction
Atlantic Division

Dry Excavation, Canal Prism . . $1,480,000

Dredging Canal Prism 8,515,000

Gatun Dam and Spillway 11,573,000

Gatun Locks 28,343,000

Toro Point Breakwater 2,643,000

Miscellaneous 950,000

Total Atlantic' Division $53,504,000

Central Division (Gatun to Pedro Miguel)

Dry Excavation, Culebra Cut . . $83,749,000
Dredging, Gatun Lake, channel,
etc 194,000

Total Central Division (Culebra Cut) $83,943,000

Pacific Division

Dry Excavation, Canal Prism . . $ 3,388,000

Dredging Canal Prism 11,249,000

Pedro Miguel Locks and Dams. 11,665,000

Miraflores Locks and Dams . . . 18,236,000

Naos Island Breakwater 405,000

Terminal Facilities, Balboa 2,125,000

Miscellaneous 287,000

Total Pacific Division $47,355,000

General Construction Items

Lighting, buoying, oil and
transmission fines, etc $ 514,000

Total direct charges to Construction $185,316,000

II. Expenditures not chargeable directly to Construction

Department of Sanitation $16,250,000

Civil Administration and Law 6,438,000

Payment to French Company 40,000,000

Payment to Republic of Panama 10,000,000

Panama Railroad, Improvements, Relocat 1 ' )n, etc. 14,200,000

Steamers purchased and repaired 2,680,000

Canal Zone Buildings 10,288,000

Canal Zone Water Works, Roads and Improve-
ments 9,647,000

Miscellaneous Items 1,052,000

Total of Items not directly chargeable to Con-
struction $110,555,000

Total Expenditures on Fortifications (incomplete) 3, 1 14,000

Grand Total of all Expenditures $298,985,000

Photo by R. E. B.

Fig. 19. — Toro Point Breakwater, two miles long, showing two-track
construction trestle and rock fill.

Fig. 20. — Mindi Excavation, view looking north from west bank, showing
intersection of French and American canals. Atlantic entrance of canal in
distance. March, 1913.

Sanitation, Costs, Etc.

117

THE ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS

A consideration of the elements to which the under-
taking owes its accomplishment is most important and
interesting, in order to comprehend correctly how suc-
cess was achieved. It must first be admitted that
fortune favored us. We did not apply our determina-
tion to build the canal to actual construction work
until after the world had fully developed the mosquito
theory, and Cuba had given us an opportunity to
apply it to practical sanitation.

Two generations of railroad building, river and
harbor improvement, water works, and other large con-
struction, together with the coincident growth of the
great technical schools, had developed a body of engi-
neers and constructors with the technique and capacity
for conceiving and executing large works, and with a
strongly formed spirit of loyalty and devotion that al-
lowed them to be welded into the nucleus of a great
organization. Everywhere on the work are evidences
of the standard practice developed by engineers on
other undertakings and adapted to local conditions.
Without these years of preliminary engineering train-
ing, the Panama Canal as built would have been
impossible.

The management of the enterprise was first placed
in the hands of engineers and others who had been
eminently successful in great works conducted by pri-
vate capital. They were undoubtedly able men and
contributed enormously to the primary work, and are
deserving of great credit. They had not had experi-

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THe Panama Canal

ence in conducting work under the many restrictions
imposed by the government, and in dealing with su-
periors who were representatives, not of capital and
business, but of the people of the United States. The
large body of engineers in the employ of the United
States was at first passed over when the greatest and
most responsible engineering positions ever at the dis-
posal of the government were to be filled. They had
devoted their lives to the service and were now ignored.
After but a short interval a change came, and the
management was turned over to government engineers.
The selections were made from the oldest and, as a
body, the most experienced organization of engineers
in the government service, the Corps of Engineers of
the United States Army, and to a lesser extent, from
the Corps of Civil Engineers of the United States
Navy. The results of the work are a sufficient tribute
to the wisdom of the selection.

The evidence is clear that a strong national senti-
ment pervades the force, which lends inspiration to
self-sacrificing cooperation, to hard work, and to con-
tentment under discomforts — a sentiment intensified
through isolation in a foreign land. It finds expression
not only in the canal employee, but in every American
who admires and looks up to his fellow citizen who
has worked on the canal. This element of success is
fundamental, and rarely has an enterprise given so
good an opportunity for its display. It might easily
have been smothered by ill-advised administration,
but the organization is blessed with a leader who says
that "we" are building the canal, and whose inspira-

Sanitation, Costs, Etc.

tion leads all to take the same view. It is remarkable
to note the extent to which a feeling of loyalty to the
work exists, rather than to the individual or to any
division. Even a company agent resident on the
Isthmus, in referring to the Pacific Division, stated
that "we put in 4500 cubic yards of concrete on the
locks yesterday/ ' This general feeling of loyalty in
no way excludes a healthful rivalry for each crew or
division to excel. The individual who would ordinarily
be disgruntled or dissatisfied soon leaves the Isthmus,
or he finds those feelings pushed into the background
or smothered by the all-pervading spirit of loyalty to
the work. The whole is an interesting phenomenon,
which only a visit to the Isthmus can disclose in all
its force.

In the valuation by the Americans of the French
canal company's property, one notable item, though
an intangible one, is missing — the value to us of the
French endeavor, the lessons learned by them through
their years of bitter experience. It is, of course, impos-
sible now to state what costly mistake we might have
made or what untoward conditions we might have
overlooked if we had begun the canal as pioneers;
there can be no doubt that the knowledge of what the
French had done aided us in making up our minds
what to do and what not to do. One of the greatest
errors of the French, and one that contributed most
largely to their failure, was that they did not realize
until too late the magnitude of the enterprise.

In a material way the most valuable contributions
to the elements of success were the well-developed

119

120

The Panama Canal

state of the art of making concrete, the perfected
steam shovel, compressed-air tools and numerous other
mechanical devices.

IN CONCLUSION

There is so much of interest connected with the
Panama Canal that the most difficult problem in writ-
ing a limited work on the subject is to decide what to
omit. The organization of the forces, the system of
accounting and cost keeping, the method of civil gov-
ernment, the Panama Railroad, the administration of
the subsistence and storekeeping divisions, and many
other subjects, offer a wealth of material, sufficient for
separate essays, and are well worthy of study. All
branches pertaining to the execution of the work have
been studied out to a point of maximum possible effi-
ciency, and that this has been possible is largely due to
the absence of hidebound precedents and to the fact
that control was left to the man on the ground.

The canal will soon be completed and begin its
history as an actuality. Study and statistics throw
much light upon what its history will be. No one
may venture to predict what momentous influence it
may have in war or in preventing war. Whatever may
be the detailed events in which the canal may take
a part, there can be no doubt that it is one more step
in the westward trend of civilization. The prophecy
of sixty years ago by that farseeing statesman, William
H. Seward, made in a speech in the Senate, is still in
remarkable process of fulfillment:

Sanitation, Costs, Etc

121

Even the discovery of this continent and its islands, and the
organization of society and government upon them, grand and
important as these events have been, were not conditional, pre-
liminary and ancillary to the more sublime result now in the act
of consummation, the reunion of the two civilizations, which,
parting on the plains of Asia 4000 years ago, and travelling
ever after in opposite directions around the world, now meet
again on the coasts and islands of the Pacific Ocean. Certainly
no mere human event of equal dignity and importance has ever
occurred upon the earth. It will be followed by the equalization
of the condition of society and the restoration of the unity of the
human family. Who does not see that henceforth, every year,
European commerce, European politics, European thought and
activity, although actually gaining greater force, and European
connections, although actually becoming more intimate, will ulti-
mately sink in importance; while the Pacific Ocean, its shores,
its islands, and the vast regions beyond, will become the chief
theater of events in the world's great hereafter?

THE PANAMA CANAL

Part IV

THE NAVY AND THE PANAMA CANAL

HARRY S. KNAPP

CAPTAIN U. S. NAVY

THE NAVY AND THE PANAMA CANAL

The formal opening of the Panama Canal is so nearly
at hand that the time is appropriate for a discussion of
the effect of the canal upon the Navy.

Because it has the widest appeal the question of
how the canal will affect the strength of the Navy
will be considered first and at most length. To those
outside of professional circles it has a more direct and
personal application than any other, because upon the
answer will depend the appropriations that the tax-
payer must provide. The canal has been an expensive
undertaking for the United States, and the people of
the country, in thinking of its bearing upon the Navy,
naturally anticipate that its completion may consid-
erably modify the appropriations for the upkeep of
the naval establishment. Everybody is familiar in a
general way with the shortening of sea routes via the
Panama Canal from our Atlantic to our Pacific coast;
for instance, that the direct distance from New York
or Philadelphia to San Francisco is reduced from
about 13,000 miles via Magellan to about 5000 miles
via Panama, or that the distance from New Orleans
to San Francisco is about 9000 miles less via the canal
than via Magellan. From such general and obvious
knowledge it is an easy step to the conclusion that the
strength of the Navy with the canal may be much less
than it would necessarily be without the canal; or,

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126

The Panama Canal

what amounts to the same thing, that the appropria-
tions for the Navy may be greatly reduced as soon as
the canal is opened. Recently, within a week of one
another, the writer has heard two members of Congress
publicly refer to this very matter, one of them saying,
in effect, that the canal would increase the effective-
ness of the Navy two or threefold, while the other
thought its effectiveness would be doubled. The writer,
while prepared to admit that these remarks were
rather an after-dinner facon de parler than the expres-
sion of a deliberately formed opinion, yet believes they
indicate a somewhat general impression that careful
study of the situation will not justify.

A prerequisite to the formation of any intelligent
conclusion on this question is an understanding of the
conditions that govern the strength of the Navy.
The ultimate, dynamic use of the Navy is to beat the
enemy in war; the everyday political use of the Navy
in peace is to avert war by reason of its existence
ready for war. Neither purpose will be served unless
the Navy be adequately strong in material and person-
nel, and unless the personnel be trained and efficient;
the Navy itself is responsible for trained efficiency, but
the country at large, through Congress, is responsible
that adequate strength be provided.

Wars do not merely happen; they usually result
from the clash of some definite policies. In an attempt
to fix the strength of our Navy the national policies
of our government that affect other countries are a
prime factor to be considered. The United States has
the following definite policies in its external relations:

The Navy and the Panama Canal 127

First, the avoidance of entangling alliances; second, the
Monroe Doctrine; third, the Open Door in the Far
East; fourth, Asiatic exclusion; fifth, the control and
protection of the Panama Canal itself. Where any of
these policies affect adversely the interests of other
nations there is the possibility of friction, and where
friction arises there is always the possibility of war.

The first of the policies mentioned above may be
dismissed with a word, for it is distinctly one of absten-
tion, and so is not apt to be the cause of diverse in-
terests. Its effect is, however, that we must play a lone
hand, and that effect is not without a bearing on the
strength of the Navy. The second policy was recog-
nized in a manner by England in the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty of 1850, and to a greater degree in the Hay-
Pauncefote treaty of 1901. But other nations do not
accept it as international law, and it is not infrequently
the subject of unfriendly comment. The Monroe Doc-
trine may be the occasion of friction, and so of war,
with European nations, and there is a possibility that
it may be with Japan, or at a later day with China.
The relation of the Monroe Doctrine to the Navy was
pointedly indicated by Mr. Secretary Meyer, when he
said in effect, for his words are not before the writer,
that the Monroe Doctrine is just as strong as the Navy
and no stronger. The third policy is one that may
cause friction with both European and Asiatic nations.
The fourth concerns our relations with Asiatic nations
only. The fifth policy is a result of a duty we have
assumed single-handed for manifest reasons of advan-
tage, and we consulted no nation about it excepting

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XKe Panama Canal

Great Britain. It has a very direct bearing upon the
strength of the Navy, upon which it throws an added
responsibility.

The extension of our foreign trade that is now being
so urgently advocated in connection with the change
of our tariff laws cannot be placed, perhaps, under the
same head as the policies just mentioned. But foreign
trade certainly does involve relations with foreign
nations; and, as a matter of fact, commercial and
trade rivalries are most fruitful causes of misunder-
standing between nations.

What has just been said does not by any means ex-
haust all sources of possible wars, as it does not exhaust
all of our external relations. Enough has been said,
however, to show reasons why war is not an improb-
ability — certainly it is a possibility — with nations in
Europe and Asia. European nations will hardly attack
us in force in the Pacific, nor will any nation fronting
on the Pacific be apt to attack us in force in the Atlan-
tic. We have, therefore, to anticipate the possibility
of war in the Atlantic with a European nation, and in
the Pacific with an Asiatic nation.

This leads us to the formulation of a policy for the
strength of the Navy. It should be strong enough to
safeguard our interests and meet any probable attack
in either ocean and not leave our interests unguarded
in the other. With reference to the last clause it may
be said that a full consideration of the subject should
not stop short of the possibility of a simultaneous
attack in both oceans, however improbable; a war
with allied nations in the Atlantic and Pacific is not

THe Navy and tKe Panama Canal 129

impossible. It is especially the duty of men in the
military branches of the government to have their
eyes open to every contingency.

In considering possible antagonists in the Atlantic
Great Britain may be eliminated from consideration.
In the first place, it would take us many years to catch
up with her in material strength if we tried, and would
entail an enormous expense; in the second, war with
us would be a blow to her commercial interests and
sources of supply that she can ill afford to suffer;
and, in the third, we have a hostage in Canada worth
many battleships. There are, moreover, powerful in-
terests of a more sentimental nature that are yet very
real. No such strong reasons exist for eliminating any
other European nation from the list of possible antag-
onists and the formula, therefore, becomes, in its final
and definite statement, that our Navy should be strong
enough to meet in the Atlantic the maritime nation of
Europe next strongest to Great Britain, and in the
Pacific the strongest nation in that ocean.

As affecting the strength of the Navy it is well to
keep in mind also the position of the United States in
the two oceans. In the Atlantic, aside from the main-
tenance of the Monroe Doctrine, we have a great
material interest in Porto Rico, which is our own ter-
ritory; and toward Cuba and Panama we have a duty
in the protection of their independence. Then there
is the canal itself. All of these interests are compara-
tively near to us, and very much nearer than is any
European adversary. In the Pacific we are in a differ-
ent case. There we have Alaska, the Hawaiian Islands,

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THe Panama Canal

Guam, the Philippines, and Tutuila, the nearest 2000
miles and the most distant 7000 miles from our coast,
and some much nearer possible adversaries in that
ocean than ourselves. The distance of our outlying
Atlantic interests has vastly less bearing on the strength
of our fleet in that ocean than has the distance of our
outlying Pacific interests on the strength of the fleet
in the Pacific.

If the Atlantic and Pacific were closed oceans the
formula reached above for the strength of the Navy
would mean that in each there should be maintained
a force (that may be called the Standard Atlantic
Fleet and the Standard Pacific Fleet, for brevity)
sufficient for the duty in that ocean, which is the Two-
ocean Standard, pure and simple.

Neither here nor elsewhere in this chapter will a con-
crete estimate be undertaken of the strength in numbers
of ships of the " standard" fleets. Such an estimate
is not reached by a simple matching of ship by ship,
but is influenced also by such considerations as the
probable situation of the theater of war, the possibility
that the assumed antagonist may not be able to have
his entire strength present in that theater for political
or other reasons, and the morale of the antagonist.
This may not impossibly result in the conclusion that
our own necessary strength in ships is less than that
of some possible antagonists and greater than that of
others. For the present purpose no such concrete esti-
mate is necessary and it is enough to say that the
strength should be " sufficient for the duty."

Without the canal the requirements are practically

THe Navy and tKe Panama Canal 131

the same as if the Atlantic and Pacific were closed
oceans. For, although the possibility exists of rein-
forcement in one ocean from the other, yet the long
distance to be traversed by the reinforcement by what-
ever route, the difficulties about fueling en route, and
the danger, especially to a force coming from the
Pacific, of finding the enemy between the reinforce-
ment and the body it is attempting to join, all militate
so greatly against a successful issue that it would be
imprudent to count upon it.

With the canal in operation, however, a different
situation arises. The route of the reinforcements will
be shortened from 8000 to 10,000 miles by the canal,
and that route will lie on interior lines. Fuel can be
taken at stations under our own flag, separated by
distances less than those representing the sea endur-
ance of the fleet; the embarrassment arising from the
necessity of avoiding any semblance of violating neu-
trality in fueling will thus be avoided. Junction is
possible from 40 to 60 days sooner, and the enemy
need not be passed to effect it. Put in another way:
Guantanamo is at practically the same distance from
the English channel that it is from San Francisco via
the canal; or, again, the nearest Asiatic port to Hon-
olulu is only about 1250 miles nearer than Panama,
but is about 8700 miles nearer to Honolulu than our
nearest Caribbean port by way of Magellan. In the
face of such facts it would be difficult to maintain that
the canal will have no effect on the strength of the
Navy, for that would be tantamount to the claim that
the canal has no military value to the United States.

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THe Panama Canal

On the other hand, the claim that the canal will
double or more than double the effectiveness of the
Navy is a great exaggeration. Though such state-
ments probably result from a loose use of language
rather than a careful study of the situation, they are
dangerous, for they are apt to be taken literally by the
layman, and the Navy cannot afford to have such an
impression gain ground. To show their fallacy it is
only necessary to consider the matter of distances. It
is quite true that the canal will enable the fleet to be
transferred from one ocean to the other in a few hours,
but that is only the beginning of the problem. The
added strength that the canal will give to the Navy
must be measured by the facility the canal affords in
enabling reinforcements to arrive in time to be of use
tactically; that is, as a part of the entire force in battle
with the enemy. The canal will be of little use if the
reinforcements arrive so late that the battle has already
been won by the enemy. The Atlantic terminal is
about 700 miles from Guantanamo, 1200 miles from the
most distant part of the Caribbean, and 2000 miles
from New York, no inconsiderable distances in them-
selves. On the Pacific side the condition is very much
less favorable, for the Pacific terminal is about 3250
miles from San Francisco, 4700 from Honolulu, 8000
from Guam, and 9350 from Manila. Merely to be able
to get the fleet rapidly from one ocean to another is a
great gain, a very great gain; but it is not by any
means the whole problem. Allowing the fleet an aver-
age speed of 12 knots from departure to destination,
which is high, considering the time necessary to coal

THe Navy and tHe Panama Canal 133

and effect repairs and the necessity that all the fighting
components arrive together and ready for action, this
means that, from the time of leaving the canal until its
arrival where it would probably be needed, the shortest
time interval to any of the places mentioned above is
about 58 hours to Guantanamo, and the longest is
about 33 days to Manila, during which the enemy will
not have been idle. The canal will be a great military
asset in war, and an equally great one in anticipation
of war; but it is quite beside the mark to say that it
will double the effectiveness of the Navy, or do any-
thing approaching that.

The truth, as usual, lies between these two extreme
views just examined, and the writer believes that the
former is much nearer the truth than the latter. By
its very nature the problem of determining just what
will be the effect of the canal upon the strength of the
Navy cannot be mathematically demonstrated. The
solution is largely one of opinion, and will be modified
as greater or less weight is given to the several consid-
erations on which it is based. If the general formula
advanced above for fixing the strength of the navy be
accepted, then manifestly, canal or no canal, the min-
imum permissible strength of the Navy is that which
will enable us to meet, with our entire force, our
strongest probable enemy, wherever situated. Under
the same conditions the maximum strength that can
be claimed as necessary is the sum of that of the
Standard Atlantic Fleet plus that of the Standard
Pacific Fleet (Great Britain being excluded for reasons
above given). This amounts to saying that the max-

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THe Panama Canal

imum strength that can be claimed as necessary is
that which will enable us to conduct a war with pros-
pect of success in both oceans at once, which is the
Two-ocean Standard again. If the possible antago-
nists in the two oceans, in relation to whom our formula
for strength is founded, were equally strong, our min-
imum permissible Navy would be half as strong as
the maximum Navy that will ever be necessary.
They are not equally strong, however, and our Stand-
ard Atlantic Fleet should now, and the condition is
probably permanent, be stronger than the Standard
Pacific Fleet need be. The Standard Atlantic Fleet,
therefore, is the measure of our minimum permissible
strength; and, to avoid any misunderstanding, the
words " minimum permissible strength" are used in
the narrow sense of indicating the very least strength
that can logically be believed allowable by anybody
who believes in a Navy at all for well-founded reasons.
The Standard Atlantic Fleet does not represent the
writer's views of what our minimum naval strength
should be.

Our total naval strength at this minute is not equal
to that of what is called above the Standard Atlantic
Fleet. Hence, the completion of the canal should have
no immediate effect upon our building. It remains to
find an answer to the question: What effect will it
have upon our building policy for the future?

The writer's personal opinion is that, when the canal
is finished, our policy should be to have eventually,
and as soon as possible, a total strength not less than
that of the Standard Atlantic Fleet plus three-quarters

THe Navy and tKe Panama Canal 135

that of the Standard Pacific Fleet. These so-called
" standard" fleets are not fixed quantities, but will
vary from year to year as foreign nations increase
their own naval strength. The policy itself can, how-
ever, be fixed, and some policy should be established.

The reasons that have appealed to the writer in
reaching this conclusion are as follows:

(a) With no canal our total strength should be the
sum of both the Standard Atlantic Fleet and the
Standard Pacific Fleet.

(b) The canal so greatly shortens distances between
the two oceans that some reduction of strength below
that of (a) is justifiable when it shall be finished, in
view of the heavy financial burden imposed by a great
navy, and the rather remote possibility of simultaneous
war in both oceans.

(c) This reduction should not be sufficient to leave
the nation in a hopeless case in either ocean if war
broke out in one while war was being waged in the
other.

(d) As the strength of the Standard Atlantic Fleet
must be maintained in any event, the Pacific Fleet is
the one in which to make the reduction in strength.

(e) Our interests are so great, and are scattered over
such immense distances in the Pacific, that anything
less than three-quarters of the Standard Pacific Fleet
would make even a defensive war in that ocean hopeless.

(f) With three-quarters of the Standard Pacific
Fleet a defensive war, a containing war so to speak,
would not be hopeless while waging a war on equal
terms in the Atlantic.

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TKe Panama Canal

(g) If there were no prospect of war in the Pacific
at a time when engaged in war in the Atlantic, then
one-half of the Standard Pacific Fleet, and perhaps
less, would suffice to guard our interests in the Pacific,
leaving the rest of the fleet in that ocean free to rein-
force the Atlantic Fleet and give in the Atlantic a
marked superiority of force.

(h) If at war in the Pacific with no prospect of war
in the Atlantic, a great superiority of force could be
maintained in the Pacific that would be the more
valuable, owing to the distances over which the Navy
would have to operate in that ocean.

The composition of the fleet will be little affected by
the existence of the finished canal. All classes of
fighting ships will be as much needed after the canal
as before, and the numbers and proportions deemed
requisite for the duty in either ocean will be necessary,
canal or no canal. It is not improbable that the de-
fense of the canal itself may demand a limited number
of certain classes of vessels that would not otherwise
be necessary. But in its large aspect the composition
of the fighting fleet can hardly be affected by the com-
pletion of the canal. Even in the matter of auxiliaries
the same thing appears to be true. If the Navy de-
pended upon its own auxiliaries for the transfer of
supplies and fuel from one ocean to the other, the
canal would naturally serve to diminish the number of
supply and fuel ships; but such cargoes are practically
all sent by contract. Other auxiliaries are based in
number on the fighting ships they have to serve, and

THe Navy and tKe Panama Canal 137

distance has little to do with the question. Speaking
in a broad way, then, the existence of the canal will
have no effect on the composition of the fleet.

It is more than probable that the completion of the
canal will effect some changes in the disposition of the
fleet in time of peace. It has already been pointed out
that the Navy is not now as strong as is theoretically
necessary in the Atlantic alone; so that for a consid-
erable time to come, whatever building program may
be adopted, it will be necessary to concentrate our
entire fighting fleet in time of war, trusting to Provi-
dence that the part sent to the threatened ocean will
not be needed during the war in the ocean from which
it is withdrawn. In effecting this concentration the
canal will be a very great military advantage to us.
Even in time of peace, however, the completion of the
canal will enable some desirable changes to be made in
the present disposition of the fleet. The disposition
hitherto, while dictated by reasons of convenience under
the conditions then existing, has yet not been very
logical considered in the light of all-round preparedness
for war. One suggested disposition is the maintenance
of a force of fixed strength in each ocean, with a shift-
ing squadron that will go first into one and then into
the other. This can be so managed as to keep in both
oceans a force better balanced in all its components of
fighting strength than is now the case with either.
The outcome in accord with the best professional opin-
ion, however, would be the organization under one
command of the entire military fleet, with the exception

138

THe Panama Canal

of the few units, none of first importance, that are
needed in Asiatic waters. By the aid of the canal this
single fleet could cruise as a whole in either ocean at
will, or detachment could be sent from one ocean to
the other if occasion demanded. A great advantage
arising from either disposition will be the possibility of
having parts of the Navy appear on the Pacific coast
that could not well be sent there in the past. The
people on the Pacific coast are as vitally interested in
the Navy as are those in the East; yet they have ha-
bitually seen the least powerful and least modern of our
ships. It is natural and, indeed, commendable, that
they should wish to have in their own waters at one
time or another the flower of the Navy. The comple-
tion of the canal will enable this to be done; and it will
further be good policy for the Navy to do it, and so
stimulate the friendly interest in the Navy that is
always in evidence on the Pacific coast.

Another advantage that will accrue in connection
with the transfer of ships from one ocean to another
is the possibility of making between our own ports,
and without taxing the hospitality of foreign nations,
the long voyages in fleet that we believe in our service
to be so advantageous as a means of fleet discipline
and fleet preparedness. The entire battle fleet could
easily go from New York to Seattle, stay ten days at
San Francisco and ten in Puget Sound, and be back
in New York in a little more than three months. As
a long-distance cruise this would have many advan-
tages over a cruise to Europe and back, not the least
of which would be the experience gained in logistics

THe Navy and tHe Panama Canal 139

over a route that the fleet may have to follow some day
in one direction or the other when the errand is not
peaceful.

The completion of the canal will be advantageous to
the Navy in still another way connected with the dis-
position of the ships of the fleet. Corinto, on the Pa-
cific coast of Nicaragua, is less than 100 miles further
distant from New York via Panama than it is from
San Francisco. All the Pacific coast of Central America
outside of Mexico is 1000 miles or more nearer Panama
than it is to San Francisco. It will, therefore, be possible
generally to send ships more quickly from the Atlantic
to the Pacific coast of Central America in times of dis-
turbance there than it will be to send them from San
Francisco, and this is even more true if ships on the
Pacific side must come from Puget Sound.

The preponderance of our naval strength will prob-
ably continue to be in the future, as it has been in the
past, habitually kept in the Atlantic. That ocean is
the better one for the upkeep, drill and administration
of the battle fleet for many reasons. But the canal
will permit of many changes of disposition, some of
them permanent and some temporary, that will be
advantageous and that have not been found practicable
under present conditions.

The completion of the canal should serve to bring
home to everyone the importance of our naval bases
in the West Indies and the Pacific. That their im-
portance has not been adequately realized is evidenced
by the lack of funds provided to put them in an effi-

140

TTie Panama Canal

cient condition. The Monroe Doctrine was an old
story before the war of 1898; but few people realized
that it extended our military frontier beyond the At-
lantic and Gulf coasts, for it is a mental conception
and not a tangible thing appealing to the senses.
After 1898 and the acquisition of Porto Rico there was
a visible projection of our frontier into the Caribbean;
and after the Hay-Pauncefote treaty in 1901, which
gave the United States undivided responsibility for the
canal, another visible and material interest appeared
still further to the front. It has always been clear to
the naval mind that our military frontier extends far
beyond our continental borders; and now, irrespective
of the Monroe Doctrine, it extends from the Atlantic
coast around Porto Rico to the canal. It has been
equally clear that, for the security of that frontier, a
naval base somewhere on the outer edge of the Carib-
bean is a necessity. After careful consideration, the
site for such a base was selected several years ago at
Guantanamo as being the suitable harbor situated fur-
thest to the front on the edge of the Caribbean. Con-
gress has not yet recognized its appreciation of the
necessity for Guantanamo by the provision of an ade-
quate program for its defense and equipment, although
there are some signs of such an appreciation. Nor do
the people of some of the gulf states realize that the
frontier has advanced more than a thousand miles
from their coast, and that the New Orleans and Pen-
sacola naval stations no longer serve any useful mili-
tary purpose, if one may judge by their arguments
against the action of the Navy Department in closing

THe Navy and tHe Panama Canal 141

them during the last administration. When the canal
becomes a great utility in regular operation instead of
an interesting engineering work, when trade has settled
into the new routes the canal will make possible, and
when business men have occasion to think of it daily
as a vital link in their transportation problems, a
juster appreciation will arise of the necessity of a
naval base at Guantanamo for the protection of the
canal and of the trade routes converging toward it, as
well as for the maintenance of our general interests in
the Caribbean; and that appreciation will doubtless
find expression in a complete scheme for the defense
and equipment of Gauntanamo.

If, as it almost surely will, the canal serves to place
in the Pacific a greater force and one of larger ships
than is now kept there, the question of bases in that
ocean must be considered, even though the ships be kept
there only a part of the time. In the Pacific, excepting
our limited plant in the Philippines, there are three
bases — Mare Island, Bremerton and Pearl Harbor.
To these should be added a fortified station at Guam
to make our situation secure in that ocean. To care for
any considerable force in peace, and, what is more im-
portant, to care for it in war, the established bases are
all too few. Pearl Harbor is in the making, and
Bremerton is not yet a first-class base. San Francisco >y
Bay is the place above all others on our Pacific conti-
nental coast that is suited for a naval base by reason
of its strategic situation geographically and the advan-
tages attending the proximity of a large city. But the
Mare Island Navy Yard is impossibly situated for this

142

XHe Panama Canal

purpose. It has neither the depth of water in its
approaches needed for modern capital ships nor a suf-
ficient area of water of suitable depth opposite the yard
for the safe anchorage and maneuvering of such ships,
while its distance from San Francisco and lack of a rail-
way connection are handicaps in the supply of labor
and in the economical handling of freight and building
supplies. At the present time * the available depth is
22 feet at mean lower low water, and the channels con-
stantly and rapidly silt up. It is even difficult to keep
the entrance to the new dry dock deep enough for the
safe docking of ships that can enter it. The adopted
departmental policy is to^ have 40 feet depth from the
sea to our navy yards, and that depth of channel is be-
ing urged at our important commercial ports in the in-
terests of commerce. To all except those who will not
see it has been increasingly evident during the last ten
years that the Mare Island Navy Yard is doomed for
the service of modern capital ships, and it is equally
evident that a new location, somewhere in San Fran-
cisco Bay, on deep water near the city, must eventually
be provided for their docking and repair. If the people
of California desire and expect to see any considerable
part of our modern fleet habitually visiting in their
waters after the canal is finished, they cannot too soon
bestir themselves to provide in the deep water of San
Francisco Bay the naval facilities that are required for
the supply, upkeep and repair of modern capital ships.
Mare Island does not afford them for the simple reason
that recent capital ships cannot safely go there, if for

* Written in the spring of 1913. Some dredging has since been done.

THe Navy and tKe Panama Canal 143

no other. Men cannot drive rivets on a ship 20 to 30
miles away. The completion of the canal should help
to force this conclusion home if the people of Cali-
fornia are not prepared to accept it now.

Of Pearl Harbor and Bremerton there is less occa-
sion to speak in this connection. Congress is treating
Pearl Harbor in a liberal spirit, and the facilities at
Bremerton are gradually increasing. The development
of both should go on to provide for the increased naval
shipping that may naturally be expected to follow the
completion of the canal; but, above all, to provide for
the greatly increased demand upon them in the event
of war in the Pacific.

In the present uncrystallized state of opinion con-
cerning the ultimate status to be conferred upon the
Philippines, it is open to question whether it is worth
while to add materially to our naval facilities in those
waters just now. But whether the Philippines remain
a dependency, become a territory, or be made inde-
pendent, each of which things is a possibility and has
its advocates, the United States will have a direct
responsibility for them. The responsibility is visible as
long as our flag flies over the Philippines. It will be
moral in any event, and probably contractual if inde-
pendence be granted; for it is inconceivable that the
United States will abandon the new and weak nation
to which it may give birth, and leave it a prey to the
ambitions of strong nations, able to subdue it, and
even now suspected of casting covetous eyes in its di-
rection. Should aggression come the United States
must resist it with the fleet; and if occasion arise for

144

THe Panama Canal

the fleet to go to the Philippines for belligerent purposes
the way must be open for it to make safe passage, and,
more than that, to arrive ready for action. Honolulu
(Pearl Harbor) is more than 4750 miles from Manila
by the shortest route, — an impracticable distance over
which to conduct operations without an intermediate
point of support. Guam, under our own flag, offers
such a point; but Guam unfortified would be a broken
reed in time of war. The value of Guam to the United
States is as a place of rest and supply on the long
voyage to the Far East for the fighting fleet, and for
the ships that keep up the continual stream of per-
sonnel and supplies necessary to maintain its efficiency,
and as a base for the naval ships required to safeguard
the long line of communications. Guam in the hands
of an enemy would be a most serious obstacle to any
hope of success for the United States in a campaign in
the Philippines. Both to make it a secure point of
support for our own Navy and to deny it to an enemy
Guam should be fortified, and fortified and garrisoned
so effectively that it cannot be captured by an enemy
before our fleet can arrive for its relief. The value of
the canal in connection with Guam lies in the reduc-
tion by two months, made possible by it, of the time
that Guam must be able to hold out under its own re-
sources before a relieving fleet from the Atlantic can
arrive on the scene.

The consideration that, perhaps, comes most naturally
to mind in connection with the canal is the immense
shortening of distances effected by it in most cases

THe Navy and tKe Panama Canal 145

between points in the Atlantic and Pacific. This con-
sideration was, of course, the reason for building it.
What may be termed the commercial routes from New
York to Hong Kong, those that take in ports of call,
are practically the same length via Panama and Suez,
the difference between them being less than 20 miles
in favor of Suez; but the Panama route is the shorter
from New York to Shanghai and the ports of Japan.
From New York to Manila the Panama route is
shorter than that by Suez unless the former go by way
of Honolulu and Yokohama. The further east the
point in the Pacific, the greater the gain in distance to
New York by the Panama route. Valparaiso is 3750
miles nearer New York via Panama than via Magellan.
Speaking generally, the distance is shortened via the
canal from New York to any point in the Pacific
north of a line drawn from Magellan Strait, through
Australia and the Philippines, to Hong Kong. As
affecting naval movements this means more than
time and fuel saved, though both economies are of
prime importance. It means the possibility of sending
ships from the Atlantic to almost any place where
they will be needed in the Pacific by a route that has
fuel stations under our flag along the entire distance,
no two of which are further apart than the fuel en-
durance of our capital ships. This is an enormous
advantage, for the problem of fueling our naval ships
in time of war on a passage from the Pacific to the
Atlantic, or vice versa, would be a staggering one by
either the Suez or Magellan route, and the attitude of
neutrals might make it almost an unsolvable one.

146

TTKe Panama Canal

The canal will eliminate the question of neutrality
altogether, and for that reason alone it is of incalculable
benefit to the Navy.

The question of economy is, however, one not to be
ignored. Between New York and San Francisco, in
either direction, Panama and Guantanamo would
probably be ports of call for a fleet. A study of the
saving of time, fuel and money effected by sending a
fleet between Panama and Guantanamo through the
canal instead of through Magellan gives some aston-
ishing results. Such a study has been made, based on
the movement of 25 capital ships with attendant
cruisers, destroyers and auxiliaries. It is too long to
give more than the results, but they are sufficiently
interesting.

The time saved under the assumptions is about 60
days. This could be considerably shortened by in-
creasing the assumed sea speed, but this would involve
a considerable increase in the amount of fuel burned
to cover the same distance, with the attendant in-
creased cost and necessity of fueling oftener. The
route via Magellan that the fleet would follow between
Guantanamo and Panama requires nearly 900 actual
steaming hours at 12 knots, or 37 days. This makes
no allowance for necessary time to refuel and repair,
so that 60 days is not an unreasonable gain in time to
allow in favor of the canal, in view of the fact that
refueling on the Magellan route would have to be
carried on at places outside the territorial limits of
neutrals, and often under disadvantageous circum-
stances. This might be time enough to enable the

XKe Navy and tKe Panama Canal 147

enemy to finish the campaign in his favor. At the
best, the long sea voyage via Magellan would be
wearing upon personnel and material, and the prob-
lem of supply would be very difficult.

The saving in coal is about 290,000 tons, and in
fuel oil about 54,000 tons. At the present * market
values of these fuels taken for the conditions, this
means a money saving of nearly $3,000,000. Not to
overestimate this saving, and assuming that an over-
supply of 20 per cent has been allowed, the saving in
coal would still be 240,000 tons, in oil 45,000 tons, and
in money $2,500,000.

The gain in time is the all-important economy, but
the saving in money is itself important. In view of
our lack of a merchant marine, however, the simplifi-
cation in the supply of fuel via the canal is of vastly
greater moment than the money saving. The United
States can furnish whatever money the circumstances
of war may demand, but it cannot build over-night a
merchant marine for the service of the fleet. This
subject could be greatly elaborated, but enough has
been said to show what a valuable military asset the
canal is in its bearing on fleet logistics.

Simply for the ordinary service of the fleet in time
of peace the canal will effect very large savings to the
naval appropriations. A fair average price for eastern
coal of a kind fit for naval use is $8.45 per ton at
San Francisco, Puget Sound and Honolulu. While no
exact prediction can be made, competent authorities
believe that, when the canal is in operation, the price

* Spring of 1913.

148

THe Panama Canal

at which eastern coals can be laid down at these places
will be not more than $6.20 per ton. Taking as a
basis the amount of coal on naval account sent to the
Pacific in the last fiscal year, 160,000 tons, the saving
amounts to $360,000. Nor does the advantage end
there; a collier can take a cargo via the canal to the
Pacific coast, discharge and be back at Norfolk in the
time she would take to make the voyage out via Magel-
lan. This roughly divides by two the tonnage neces-
sary for any given supply of coal at those ports. In
time of war in the Pacific, this will be of inestimable
advantage, considering our woful lack of a merchant
marine. With respect to other bulky naval supplies,
like provisions, the same thing does not hold true, for
they can be delivered equally well and at little differ-
ence in cost on either coast from their points of origin.
Even ammunition and guns, which are practically all
manufactured in the east, would very probably be sent
by rail to the Pacific in order to save time, although
the expense would be greater. But with oil fuel,
again, the advantage to the Navy is apparent, and
this time the gain is in movement toward the Atlantic.
In the last few months the price of oil has markedly
increased. California produces more oil than any
other state and its price is lower than eastern oils.
This fact, in addition to the important fact that a
large oil-producing area has been set aside for naval
purposes in California,* points to the possibility that
the Navy may soon be using California oil in the

* A decision rendered early in June, 1914, by Judge Dooling of the Federal
District Court, San Francisco, will invalidate the Government's title to the
naval reservation of oil lands unless it is reversed by the higher court.

THe Navy and tKe Panama Canal 149

Atlantic, which would hardly be possible without the
canal. The demand for oil increases every day and
many of the older wells are falling off in production;
the Navy may not improbably have great occasion in
the years to come to congratulate itself that the canal
will make the Pacific coast fields available.

Modifications of trade routes that will follow the
completion of the canal are sure eventually to cause a
reduction in freight rates, and so act as a stimulus to
trade. The increased trade will, in turn, demand a
greater tonnage, although this demand will be partially
met at first by the ability of the same amount of
shipping to provide for a greater trade because of the
shortened distances via the canal. Still it can hardly
be doubted that the opening of the canal will create a
demand in time for an amount of shipping consider-
ably greater than exists now in order to provide for
the increased trade. The opinion has been advanced
that the United States merchant marine will be greatly
stimulated by the operation of these causes. The
Navy earnestly hopes that this may be true, for a
large merchant marine is a necessity for a strong
navy only in a less degree than the auxiliary ships
especially designed for its service; and anything what-
ever that can properly be done to increase the mer-
chant marine should have the active support of the
Navy. In so far as the coasting trade is concerned
there seems to be good reason to expect an increase
of United States shipping, for that trade is certain to
grow rapidly upon the opening of the canal, and for-

150 The Panama Canal

eigners cannot take any part in it. Already some
ships have been built for this trade in anticipation of
the completion of the canal, and others are being
built. But the writer has been unable to convince
himself that the opening of the canal will alone serve
to draw American capital into a form of investment
from which it has persistently kept aloof, and under
present conditions and laws* he anticipates little or no
resultant increase in that part of the merchant marine
of the United States engaged in foreign trade. With-
out any close examination of the reason why, it seems
to be a fact that Americans either cannot or else do
not care to compete with other maritime nations in
the sea carriage of foreign trade, and it is not apparent
that the opening of the canal will by itself change
that condition. That we should have a flourishing
merchant marine is a matter of such vital interest to
the Navy that it will anticipate with satisfaction the
increase of shipping engaged in coastwise trade due to
the opening of the canal; and, as remarked above, the
Navy should exert its influence in favor of every proper
measure tending to put American ships on the ocean in
the foreign trade.

However interesting and profitable it may be to
dwell upon the military advantages to the United
States attending the opening of the canal, that feature
is not the most vital one to the Navy. The canal puts
an added and very great responsibility upon the Navy,
and this fact is one that the Navy and its friends must
always keep in mind.

* Written before the outbreak of war in Europe.

THe Navy and tHe Panama Canal 151

The canal is being built, and it will be operated and
controlled, solely by the United States government,
and its protection falls solely upon the United States.
In the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901, the neutraliza-
tion rules are embodied in Article 3, in which the lan-
guage is: "The United States adopts, as the basis of
the neutralization of such ship canal, the following
rules. . . We are, therefore, the sole guarantors of
the neutralization of the canal. Again Article 1 of the
treaty of November 18, 1903, with Panama reads:
"The United States guarantees and will maintain the
independence of the Republic of Panama." Finally,
the United States trade passing through the canal
will be very great. Here are new and great responsi-
bilities, all flowing from the canal, and all dependent
upon the Navy for their realization. The Navy is the
outer line of defense of the canal as it is of the country.
The inner line of defense of the canal resides in the
fortifications and garrison at the canal itself. If our
Navy is driven from the sea and made negligible, an
enemy with a great army can undertake with impunity
the transportation of the troops necessary to overcome
the inner line of defense and complete the victory
begun on the ocean. The task may not be easy for
him, but its possibility must be conceded if the sea is
closed to us and open to the enemy. The only possible
and final assurance of safety for the canal is in a Navy
strong enough to meet the enemy, beat him, and pre-
vent him from ever getting near it. The following
words, quoted from Admiral Mahan, indicate the alter-
native: "Permanent [naval] inferiority means inevit-

152

TTie Panama Canal

ably ultimate defeat, which fortifications can only
delay. " And a few lines later he uses these words:
"If the United States desires peace with security, it
must have a Navy second to none but that of Great
Britain; to rival which is inexpedient, because for
many reasons unnecessary.' 1

The United States is not a military nation. There
is little consideration and less understanding among
the people at large of military matters. The govern-
ment has no defined military policy, using " military "
in its wide sense, and it has no defined naval policy.
By this is meant that there is no soberly thought-out
relation between our military strength and our situa-
tion in the world — between our declared external
political policies and the only means yet found effica-
cious to uphold them — that manifests itself as a
guiding principle in Congress, or even in the recom-
mendations of departmental heads to Congress. There
should be such a military policy, and it should carry
on from administration to administration, from Con-
gress to Congress, and be considered a part of our for-
eign affairs policy, as little open to attack from within
our own household as the external policies on which it
is founded. Our form of government, the immensity
of our country, and our isolated position, almost in-
sular as far as other first-class nations having great
military strength are concerned, all doubtless conspire
to cause the general lack of interest of our people in
foreign affairs, which is the ultimate cause why there
is so little appreciation of the underlying need for a
strong Navy. The Navy is popular just now, and to

TKe Navy and tHe Panama Canal 153

that degree it is fortunate; but the roots of its exist-
ence should lie in deeper ground than popularity. It
is to be hoped that the completion of the canal may
serve to broaden the national outlook, and that we
may be able to look back to it in coming years as the
period in which a reasoned national policy, founded on
national aims, shall have had its birth in the country
at large.

There would be no excuse for a failure of the Navy
itself to have a " reason for the faith that is in us";
nor can that reproach be laid at the door of the Navy,
which has for years had a definite, consistent policy
as expressed by the responsible naval advisers of the
Navy Department. Moreover, the effect of the canal
upon that policy has been carefully kept in mind since
the day the canal was started.

THE PANAMA CANAL
Part V

THE PANAMA CANAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

HARRY S. KNAPP

CAPTAIN U. S. NAVY

THE PANAMA CANAL IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW

The Hay-Pauncefote treaty,* negotiated in 1901
between the United States and Great Britain, is the
basis of the international status of the Panama Canal.
It superseded the Clayton-Bulwer treaty f of 1850 be-
tween the same nations. In another place $ the writer
has made a study of the two treaties, and a summary
of the conclusions reached will be given here, for it is
important to have a knowledge of the antecedent his-
tory to appreciate the full bearings of the present
treaty obligations of the United States with respect to
the canal.

Long before 1850 the desirability and eventual ne-
cessity of a canal joining the Atlantic and the Pacific
had been recognized, but no sentiment had developed
in the United States for exclusive control by this
nation. On the contrary, the utterances of represent-
ative men were quite in the opposite sense; i.e.,
toward a guarantee by all the great commercial na-
tions that the canal should be free and open to all.
Shortly before 1850 Great Britain, already having a
foothold in Central America at Belize, assumed a pro-

* Compilation of Treaties in Force, 1904, p. 609.
f Ibid., p. 380.

% The Real Status of the Panama Canal as Regards Neutralization. U. S.
Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 36, No. 1; Whole No. 133, March,
1910.

157

158

XKe Panama Canal

tectorate over the Mosquito Indian country, claiming
as far south as the San Juan River. This greatly irri-
tated the people of the United States; for, in addition
to being an infringement upon the Monroe Doctrine,
it would, if allowed, put Great Britain in control of
the eastern end of what was then considered to be the
most practicable route for a canal. The attitude of
the two nations was one of mutual jealousy, each
fearing that the other would attempt to get for itself
some advantage not possessed by the other, with
respect to a canal, although neither actually sought a
monopoly of political control. In other words, it was
not a question of what either nation did want to get
for itself alone, but of what each suspected that the
other nation might be trying to get for itself alone.

The Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850 settled that
point, the first sentence of Article I reading: "The
Governments of the United States and Great Britain
hereby declare that neither the one nor the other will
ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control
over the said ship-canal." Other stipulations were
that neither would erect or maintain fortifications
commanding, or in the vicinity of the canal; nor
occupy, fortify, colonize, assume or exercise any do-
minion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito
Coast, or any part of Central America, nor to that
end make use of any intimacy or alliance; the powers
jointly engaged to protect the finished canal from in-
terruption, seizure or unjust confiscation, and to guar-
antee that the canal should be ever open and free;
they engaged to invite other powers to join them in

Panama Canal in International Law 159

similar stipulations; and they established a " general
rule" by agreeing to extend their protection, not alone
to a canal at Nicaragua (the then favored site), but
to any other practicable communication, whether by
canal or railway, across the Isthmus.

In a memorandum* of the Secretary of State, Mr.
Olney, written in 1896, it is pointed out that the
United States desired, in negotiating the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty, to overcome two difficulties: one, the
rights asserted by Great Britain on the Mosquito
Coast; the other, the inability to get in this country
the capital necessary to prosecute the work of canal
construction by the American company in whose
favor the United States had obtained concessions
from Nicaragua by treaty in 1849, or to get capital
abroad as long as the canal enterprise was conducted
under purely American auspices. After stating that
the treaty secured the two objects desired, he goes on
to say: "In short, the true operation and effect of the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty is that, as respects Central
America generally, Great Britain has expressly bound
herself to the Monroe Doctrine, while, as respects all
water and land interoceanic communications across
the Isthmus, the United States has expressly bound
itself to so far waive the Monroe Doctrine as to admit
Great Britain to a joint protectorate." The waiver of
the Monroe Doctrine was even greater than Mr. Olney
states, for Article VI opens with the words: "The
contracting parties in this convention engage to invite
every state, with which both or either have friendly

* Moore's International Law Digest, Vol. Ill, Sec. 364.

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intercourse, to enter into stipulations with them sim-
ilar to those which they have entered into with each
other." If it was a waiver of the Monroe Doctrine
in any degree to enter into a joint protectorate of the
canal with Great Britain, it was certainly a waiver to
a greater degree to engage to invite every other state
to do likewise.

For a decade after 1850 there was friction between
the United States and Great Britain over the inter-
pretation of some features of the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty, which were not directly connected, however,
with canal matters. In 1860 these sources of friction
were satisfactorily adjusted, and then the Civil War
engaged this country's attention to the exclusion of
everything not of immediate importance. After the
Civil War there were signs of a change of sentiment
in the United States regarding the control of the
canal. It began to be appreciated that our interests
demanded our exclusive control of the canal, instead
of sharing that control with foreign nations, or with
one such nation, as Great Britain. Such a complete
reversal of sentiment took time to develop. In 1877,
in President Grant's administration, a draft treaty
looking to neutralization was prepared "to which it
was proposed to obtain the accession of the principal
maritime powers." * In his message of March 8, 1880,
President Hayes enunciated the new and contrary
policy in these plain words: "The policy of this coun-
try is a canal under American control. The United
States cannot consent to the surrender of this control

* Moore's International Law Digest, Vol. Ill, p. 187.

Panama Canal in International Law 161

to any European power, or to any combination of
European powers"; * and further on he used the words
so often quoted since: "It (the canal) will be . . .
virtually a part of the coast line of the United States."
This policy directly contravened our engagements with
Great Britain in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and it be-
came our object to get rid of those engagements in
order to have the free hand we desired. For twenty
years the matter was agitated until, in the Hay-
Pauncefote treaty, our wishes were met by Great
Britain, and very fully met as will be seen by a perusal
of the treaty which is quoted at the end of this chapter.

I This treaty, as stated at the outset, is the basis of
the international status of the canal. With a knowl-
edge of the conditions before the treaty was negotiated
it is difficult to see in what manner the United States
has been worsted in its provisions, as has recently been
claimed. Almost invariably treaties are compromises,
and almost invariably for favors granted there is, ex-
pressed or implied, a quid pro quo which carries obliga-
tions complementary to the favors. In the Hay mem-
orandum,! sent to the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations while the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was under
consideration, it is said: " These rules (those of Article
III) are adopted in the treaty with Great Britain as a
consideration for getting rid of the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty." In the Hay-Pauncefote treaty Great Britain
definitely renounced her legal right, existent under the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, of sharing with the United

* Moore's International Law Digest, Vol. Ill, p. 188.
f Senate Document No. 746, 61st Congress, 3d Session.

162

THe Panama Canal

States in the control and protection of the canal. In
consenting to the supersession of the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty she gave up the only treaty right with the
United States known to the writer by which a non-
American nation had a voice in, and consequent possi-
bility of interference with, matters in this hemisphere
external to those covered by direct treaties between
the several non-American and American nations. And
more than this, — Great Britain gave up the right,
the duty even, of inviting other nations to join with
her and the United States in stipulations similar to
those of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. It is plain that
the United States not only gained the free hand she
wanted in canal matters when the Hay-Pauncefote
treaty was concluded, but also that the Monroe Doc-
trine was immensely strengthened, not to say rehabil-
itated. The impairment of the Monroe Doctrine by
the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, whether due to force of
circumstances at the time or done without a realiza-
tion of its import, has now been remedied, and the
United States can maintain it with no embarrassing
exception to explain.

With the obstacle presented by the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty cleared away, everything bade fair for the at-
tainment of the wish of this country to build and
control the canal. After much discussion the Panama
route was decided upon, which was doubtless good
engineering, although with that we are not concerned
here; it was certainly good statesmanship to dispose
of any possible rival, both in a business sense and with
a view to obviating any possible future diplomatic dis-

Panama Canal in International Law 163

agreements. No great difficulty was anticipated in
reaching an agreement with Colombia, which was
bound to be greatly benefited by the canal and was
too weak financially to dream of undertaking it alone.
But negotiations dragged, for Colombia insisted on
terms that were considered unreasonable in this coun-
try. Then one morning Panama was born, and the
United States hastened to make with the infant re-
public a canal treaty that was concluded November
18, 1903, two years to a day after the Hay-Pauncefote
treaty was concluded. This treaty with Panama,
quoted at the end of this chapter, is the second one
upon which the international status of the canal rests.
It is the only treaty with an American nation, as the
Hay-Pauncefote treaty is the only one with a non-
American nation, that directly enters into stipulations
concerning the Panama Canal. It is true that the
35th Article of the treaty of 1846 with New Grenada,
now Colombia, bore upon the transit across the Isth-
mus of Panama; but the successful revolution of
Panama carried with it the assumption by Panama
of all the rights and obligations of that article to the
exclusion of Colombia, on the principle that treaties
run with the land. The treaty of 1903, moreover,
covers these points more fully than did the treaty of
1846.

There is one other treaty and two protocols that are
concerned with transit over the Isthmus. The Gads-
den treaty of 1853 with Mexico contains in Article
VIII stipulations concerning transit over "a plank and
rail road across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec." This

164

THe Panama Canal

has no bearing on the Panama Canal. The two proto-
cols were identical, concluded December 1, 1900, with
Costa Rica and Nicaragua, and looked to more definite
later engagements concerning a canal by the Nicaragua
route. They were anticipatory only and have no bear-
ing on the Panama Canal, as the canal to which they
referred has not been built.

, It thus appears that with two nations only have we
direct treaty engagements concerning the Panama
Canal — Great Britain and Panama. We are not
legally answerable by reason of contractual obligations
to any other nation for our control and operation of
the canal. The only possible exception to this state-
ment that occurs to the writer is that "most favored
nation" treatment might possibly be held to apply to
canal matters, although it is difficult to see how. The
wording of Article III (1) of the Hay-Pauncefote
treaty, confirmed by that of Article XVIII of the
treaty with Panama, does, however, undoubtedly place
upon us a moral obligation toward all the nations of
the earth until those treaties are denounced or super-
seded. What has been said heretofore has been inspired
by no desire to lessen that obligation, but simply to
point out its different character, which is moral toward
the world at large in so far as matters are concerned
about which we have made declarations affecting all
nations in our treaties with Great Britain and Panama;
legally we are under obligations to those two countries
only.

Of the two the Hay-Pauncefote treaty is the one the
more likely to give rise to international and diplomatic

Panama Canal in International Law 165

questions, for the treaty with Panama followed after
and was based upon it. Of the four essential articles
of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, Article I concerns Great
Britain and the United States only. Article IV enun-
ciates the mutual agreement providing that no change
of sovereignty or of the international relations of the
country traversed by the canal shall affect the general
principle of neutralization or the obligation of the high
contracting parties. It is not inconceivable that this
article may at some time give rise to international
questions of gravity; but it is so improbable that it
needs no further mention than to point out that the
opening words of the article, "It is agreed," point to
a joint responsibility of the two nations that they
shall work to the same end in the settlement of such
a question, should it arise. The canal is being built
by the United States, "directly at its own cost," pur-
suant to Article II, which also provides that "subject
to the provisions of the present treaty" the United
States "shall have and enjoy all the rights incident to
such construction, as well as the exclusive right of
providing for the regulation and management of the
canal." The vital provisions that limit the powers of
the United States are found in Article III, and it is
this article that is most apt to give rise to diplomatic
questions, as it has already given rise to the question
of tolls. With this mere mention of tolls the subject
will be dismissed, for it would be manifestly improper
for the writer to discuss it at the present time and in
these pages.*

* Written in the last days of the Taft administration.

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XKe Panama Canal

Article III enunciates certain rules to govern the
conduct of the canal, and it is worth while to observe
very carefully the reading of the opening sentence
preceding the rules themselves. In the first place, the
rules are adopted "as the basis of the neutralization
of such ship canal/ ' and for no other stated pur-
pose whatever; i.e., the rules are in pursuance of the
" 'general principle' of neutralization" cited in the
preamble of the treaty. In the second place, the open-
ing words of the article are "The United States adopts,"
not "the High Contracting Parties adopt," or "it is
agreed," or any such words implying dual responsi-
bility. By virtue of this language in the treaty the
United States adopts alone, with the assent of Great
Britain, the rules governing that status of the canal
termed neutralization, and in consequence the United
States is alone responsible for maintaining that status
itself. In the third place, the wording regarding the
rules is "the following Rules, substantially as embodied
in the Convention of Constantinople." The rules of
the Hay-Pauncefote treaty are not said to be substan-
tially those embodied in the Convention of Constan-
tinople, but substantially as. In other words, the
rules of the Constantinople Convention are not all
(that might apply) adopted, but those that are adopted
are substantially as they appear in that instrument.
This is a very real distinction that has not always
been kept clearly in mind by writers on canal matters.
Thus the right of the United States to fortify the canal
has been challenged at home and abroad, although never
by any government, and the prohibition of fortifica-

Panama Canal in International Law 167

tions in the Constantinople Convention has been
urged as a reason why fortifications at Panama would
violate the spirit of the rules of the Hay-Pauncefote
treaty. That question has been settled and the work
on the Panama Canal fortifications is now in progress.
Again there are those who hold that the United States
in war would have to permit the ships of her enemy to
pass freely through the canal because of the wording
of Rule I of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, taken in con-
nection with the reference to the rules of the Con-
stantinople Convention in the opening sentence of
Article III. In Article IV of the Constantinople Con-
vention occur the words "The Maritime Canal re-
maining open in time of war as a free passage, even to
the ships of war of belligerents . . . the high contract-
ing parties agree that no right of war, no act of hos-
tility, nor any act having for its object to obstruct the
free navigation of the canal, shall be committed in the
canal and its ports of access, as well as within a radius
of three marine miles from those ports, even though the
Ottoman Empire should be one of the belligerent powers. 71 *
No such words as those italicized appear in the Hay-
Pauncefote treaty rules; and, if the remarks recently
made at a public banquet by a gentleman high in the
councils of state are any indication of governmental
policy, no such suicidal thing is apt to occur as per-
mitting a free passage through the canal of our own
enemy's ships of war, on an errand inimical to us.

Considered as a question of language the writer
does not believe that the word "neutralization" is

* Italics the writer's.

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XKe Panama Canal

applicable to the present status of the Panama Canal.
" Neutralized" and "neutralization" imply a status
maintained by mutual agreement of so many powerful
nations that there can be no hope of a successful vio-
lation of that status by any one, or by any combina-
tion. At Panama the United States stands alone.
But whatever the word used the thing aimed at is
perfectly plain, and the word "neutralization" may
be accepted for want of a better. The United States
is sole sponsor for the neutralization of the canal.

Considering now the rules themselves it will be
noted that all but the first have reference to a state of
war. This is to be expected because the idea of neu-
tralization is correlative to that of a state of war;
neutralization is imposed to meet the conditions arising
in actual war or in anticipation of those that may
arise in a future war. A first reading of Rule 1 leads
to the impression that it is out of place in rules pro-
viding for neutralization; but closer consideration
shows that it belongs properly enough where it is.
By the very omission of reference to time of war the
intention is evident that the rule is intended to cover
all times, including time of war. A very important
exception to this last statement must be made, how-
ever: the rule does apply to times of war in which the
United States herself is not a belligerent, but does not
apply to her enemy' 's war vessels when she is a belligerent.
This limitation is not expressly stated but it is borne
out by the history of the rule, which had its prototype
in Article I of the Constantinople Convention.* That

* Printed at the end of this chapter.

Panama Canal in International Law 169

article reads in part: "The Suez Maritime Canal shall
always be free and open, in time of war as in time of
peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without
distinction of flag. Consequently the High Contract-
ing Parties agree not in any way to interfere with the
free use of the Canal in time of war as in time of peace.
The words "always" and "in time of war as in time of
peace" of this article are absent from Rule 1 of the
Hay-Pauncefote treaty. It will be remembered that
the original draft of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was
made in 1900 and contained rules for the neutraliza-
tion of the canal. Rule 1 of the original draft, in
general tenor similar to Rule 1 of the accepted treaty,
did contain the words "in time of war as in time of
peace." That draft was materially amended in the
Senate, and, as amended, it was unacceptable to Great
Britain. One of the Senate amendments provided
"that none of the immediate foregoing conditions and
stipulations . . . shall apply to measures which the
United States may find it necessary to take for securing
by its own forces the defense of the United States and
the maintenance of public order." The original draft
also provided, in Rule 7, that "no fortifications shall
be erected commanding the Canal or the waters adja-
cent." Great Britain held that the amendment re-
ferred to above, called the Davis amendment, and
Rule 7 were incompatible. In the Hay memorandum,
previously cited, which went to the Senate Committee
in explanation of the later and accepted draft of the
treaty, Mr. Hay said:

170

THe Panama Canal

His Majesty's Government . . . thought that ... it would
be impossible to determine what might be the effect if one clause
permitting defensive measures and another clause (which has
now been omitted) prohibiting fortification of the canal were
allowed to stand side by side in the same convention.

This amendment was strenuously objected to by Great Britain
as involving a distinct departure from the principle of neutral-
ity .. .

No longer insisting upon the language of the Davis amend-
ment — which had in terms reserved to the United States express
permission to disregard the rules of neutrality prescribed, when
necessary to secure its own defense, which the Senate had appar-
ently deemed necessary because of the provision in Rule 1, that
the canal should be free and open "in time of war as in time of
peace" to the vessels of all nations — it was considered that the
omission of the words "in time of war as in time of peace" would
dispense with the necessity of the amendment referred to, and
that war between the contracting parties, or between the United States
and any other power, would have the ordinary effect of war upon
treaties when not specially otherwise provided, and would remit both
parties to their original and natural right of self-defense and give to
the United States the clear right to close the canal against the other
belligerent, and to protect it and defend itself by whatever means
might be necessary*

The statement just quoted was made by one nego-
tiator of the treaty and was presented to the Senate
Committee having the treaty in charge, and there can
be no reasonable doubt that the Senate ratified the
treaty with a clear understanding of this matter. It
is thus seen that the exception noted above to the
general interpretation of Rule 1 is fully justified. If
it be objected that this represents the views of only
one party to the treaty, the words of Lord Lansdowne
in his memorandum of August 3, 1901, may carry the

* Italics the writer's.

Panama Canal in International Law 171

conviction that this interpretation was understood by
Great Britain also. In that memorandum* he says:

I understand that by the omission of all reference to the matter
of defense the United States Government desires to reserve the
power of taking measures to protect the Canal, at any time when
the United States may be at war, from destruction or damage at
the hands of an enemy or enemies. On the other hand, I conclude
that, with the above exception, there is no intention to derogate
from the principles of neutrality laid down by the rules. As to
the first of these propositions I am not prepared to deny that
contingencies may arise when, not only from a national point of
view, but on behalf of the commercial interests of the whole
world, it might be of supreme importance to the United States
that they should be free to adopt measures for the defense of
the Canal at a moment when they were themselves engaged in
hostilities.

It may be added that Lord Pauncefote, the British
plenipotentiary in the negotiation of the treaty, was
one of the British representatives in the negotiation of
the Constantinople Convention, and must be assumed
therefore to have been especially qualified to note the
effect of the deviation in the Hay-Pauncefote treaty
rules from those of the rules governing the Suez Canal.

Taken collectively the Hay-Pauncefote treaty rules
define the attitude of the United States in the man-
agement of the canal to be built. Rule 1 opens the
canal on terms of equality to the vessels of commerce
and of war of all nations " observing these rules." If
any nation, or its citizens or subjects, declines or fails
to observe the rules it may not use the canal. The
rule is silent as to specific times when it is applicable,

* Supplement, American Journal of International Law, Vol. V, No. 3,
July, 1911.

172

THe Panama Canal

times of war or times of peace; the manifest inference
is that free passage in time of war is permissible, to
which the exception already noted must be added.
The rule may be stated to mean, in effect, that the
canal shall be free and open to the vessels of com-
merce and of war of all nations observing these rules,
on terms of entire equality, provided the voyage of the
vessel be innocent in character as toward the United
States, so that, etc.

By inference the interpretation above leaves in the
category of vessels entitled to free passage through
the canal those private vessels of enemies of the United
States in war that are engaged in voyages of an inno-
cent character. For instance, supposing a war be-
tween France and the United States, a French vessel
loaded with guano, on a voyage from Peru to Canada,
would be freely entitled to passage through the canal.
The writer believes this interpretation to be correct.
In the present development of international law the
question is rather academic, for the French master
would scarcely run the risk of capture by United States
ships outside the three mile limit at the canal ends.
But if the principle of the inviolability of private
property at sea becomes established in international
law the question will at once be a practical one. It is
not entirely academic now, as will be seen from a
perusal of Article XII of the treaty of 1871 between
the United States and Italy which reads :

The High Contracting Parties agree that in the unfortunate
event of a war between them the private property of their re-
spective citizens and subjects, with the exception of contraband

Panama Canal in International Law 173

of war, shall be exempt from capture or seizure on the high seas
or elsewhere by the armed vessels or by the military forces of
either party, it being understood that this exemption shall not
extend to vessels and their cargoes which may attempt to enter
a port blockaded by the naval forces of either party. (Treaties
in Force, 1904, p. 453.)

The remaining five rules are essentially prohibitions
of a nature similar to those the United States would
enforce in her own territorial waters for the preserva-
tion of national neutrality in a war between other
nations. The effect of them all is that the United
States will not permit the canal to be used as a base
by either belligerent in a war between foreign powers.

When the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was negotiated
the canal routes lay through foreign territory in which
the exercise of sovereignty could only legally apper-
tain to the nation, or nations, through whose territory
the canal would pass. This condition was entirely
changed by the treaty with Panama, made two years
later. The changed condition cannot, in equity, be
regarded as making any change in the attitude of the
United States toward Great Britain in the interpreta-
tion of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty; for the treaty with
Panama came after it, was made possible by it, and in
Article XVIII expressly states that the canal shall be
opened in conformity with all the stipulations of it.
But toward every other nation the treaty with Panama
very materially changed the rights of the United States
in her control and management of the canal, as will be
seen by an examination of its provisions.

In Article II* Panama " grants to the United States

* See text following this chapter.

174

THe Panama Canal

in perpetuity the use, occupation and control" of cer-
tain lands, land under water and waters for canal pur-
poses. In Article IV Panama grants in perpetuity a
monopoly for any system of interoceanic communica-
tion by canal or railroad across its territory. In
Article III

The Republic of Panama grants to the United States all the
rights, power and authority within the zone mentioned and de-
scribed in Article II of this agreement and within the limits of
all auxiliary lands and waters mentioned and described in said
Article II which the United States would possess and exercise if
it were the sovereign of the territory within which said lands and
waters are located to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the
Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power or
authority.

The title to the lands and waters, the use of which
is ceded, still vests in Panama, and the compensation,
including an annual rental, is provided for in Article
XIV; but the abstract right of title does not affect
the concrete right of the United States to exercise
sovereignty in the Canal Zone to the exclusion of
Panama. The Canal Zone is thus virtually and legally
as much a part of the United States as is the Missis-
sippi Valley, and the United States has the same inter-
est and right, and indeed the same obligation, to take
measures against the violation of the neutrality of the
Canal Zone, and against hostile acts toward her prop-
erty there, by belligerents, that she has for ensuring
the same objects in the Mississippi Valley or any other
part of her territorial possessions. Great Britain can
legally hold us to the duty of maintaining neutrality
In the Canal Zone by virtue of the terms of the Hay-

Panama Canal in International Law 175

Pauncefote treaty; on the other hand, as far as the
rest of the world is concerned, we have that right and
duty naturally in consequence of the treaty with
Panama, whether the Hay-Pauncefote treaty be in
existence or not.

The cities of Colon and Panama with their adjacent
harbors are not included in, but are expressly excluded
from, the grant of the Canal Zone. Even in them,
however, Panama has yielded some attributes of sov-
ereignty to the United States, as will be seen from a
reading of Articles VII and X.

The treaty with Panama is largely occupied with
matters that are of interest only to the two countries
concerned in making it. There are, however, several
things of international interest that have not yet been
touched upon. The most important of these is the
subject of Article I, which reads: "The United States
guarantees and will maintain the independence of the
Republic of Panama." This imposes a serious duty upon
the United States that was not without some bearing
on the question of fortifications and a permanent gar-
rison in the Canal Zone, now happily settled. The
guarantee is of great importance to Panama; and it is
also of great importance to the United States, for it
ensures for the future that no embarrassing questions
will arise from the possibility of an attack upon Panama
by a more powerful neighbor; the announcement of
the guarantee will probably suffice to attain the object,
but the means will be at hand to enforce the guarantee
if necessary. It would be intolerable to have a war of
aggression going on in the vicinity of the canal, and

176

XKe Panama Canal

the guarantee is worth the assumption of the respon-
sibility involved.

The language of Article I is unqualified, and the
announcement that the United States "will maintain"
the independence of Panama, read by itself, is capable
of the interpretation that the United States will main-
tain that independence even against the wishes of
Panama to the contrary; and very good reasons are
apparent why such an interpretation would be to the
interest of the United States. But the language of
the second paragraph of Article XXIV shows that the
guarantee of independence is not intended to prohibit
Panama from merging her independence in another
state if she so wishes; for it expressly provides that, in
such a contingency, the rights of the United States
under this treaty shall remain unimpaired. As the
treaty must be interpreted as a whole, the plain mean-
ing of Article I is that the independence of Panama is
guaranteed and will be maintained against the assaults
of any enemy of that state.

The first paragraph of Article XXIV provides that
no change in the treaties of Panama shall, " without
the consent of the United States, affect any right of
the United States under the present convention, or
under any treaty stipulation between the two coun-
tries that now exists or may hereafter exist touching
the subject matter of this convention." This is an
evident matter of international interest, looking to the
future. In a similar way, looking to the past, Article
XX provides for annulment or modification of any
treaty in relation to the territory of the Isthmus of

Panama Canal in International Law 177

Panama, the obligations of which have descended to
or been assumed by the Republic of Panama, whereby
any privilege or concession is granted relative to means
of interoceanic communication that is incompatible
with the terms of the treaty under discussion. The
writer does not know of any formal announcement that
the provisions of Article XX have been complied with.
If they have not there is a possibility of interesting
diplomatic questions arising out of that article.

Article IX provides on the part of the United States
that the ports at the canal entrances, and on the part
of Panama that the towns of Colon and Panama, shall
be free ports for vessels using or passing through the
canal, with exceptions covering canal tolls, articles
destined for other parts of the Republic of Panama,
and vessels touching at Colon and Panama without
passing through the canal.

Articles XXIII and XXV may be considered to-
gether, as both bear upon the protection of the canal.
Article XXIII explicitly permits the United States to
use her police and her land and naval forces, and to
establish fortifications to ensure the safety and protec-
tion of the canal and its auxiliaries. This bears upon
the right of the United States to fortify the canal, if
that right needs further argument; for it is plain that
the negotiators of this treaty with Panama would never
have put in the authorization to establish fortifica-
tions if they had believed fortifications were forbidden,
by implication or otherwise, by the Hay-Pauncefote
treaty. In Article XXV Panama agrees to sell or lease
lands for naval and coaling stations "to the end of

178

The Panama Canal

the efficient protection of the Canal and the preser-
vation of its neutrality." The use of the word "sell"
in this article is noteworthy; it carries with it the pos-
sibility of the actual transfer of title, and with the
title sovereignty in a transaction of this kind between
one government and another. The title to the Canal
Zone did not pass under the provisions of Article III.
Both Article XXIII and Article XXV point to a belief
of the two governments that something more than a
mere dictum of the United States is necessary to en-
able her to ensure the safety and protection of the
canal, and to maintain its neutrality.

Summing up, the international status of the canal
appears to the writer to be as follows:

(a) The canal is free (for passage but not in respect
of tolls) and open to all private vessels of nations ob-
serving the rules of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty.

(b) The canal is similarly free and open to men-of-
war, even to those of belligerents when the United
States is not a party to the war.

(c) To these permissive conditions the exception
may be anticipated that the United States, when her-
self engaged in war, will not allow the war vessels of
her enemies to use the canal, nor her enemies' private
vessels, unless the character of the voyage be innocent
as regards the United States.

(d) The other conditions are prohibitive, and of the
nature that the United States would enforce in her own
ports for the preservation of neutrality and the protec-
tion of her own property. They are so explicitly stated
that nothing more than a reference to them, Rules 2 to
6 inclusive, Article III, is necessary here.

Panama Canal in International Law 179

(e) The United States stands alone as the guarantor
that the canal shall be kept free and open in accordance
with the Hay-Pauncefote rules.

(f) The canal will be protected by permanent forti-
fications and a military garrison.

The Suez Canal afforded the only precedent for es-
tablishing the status of the Panama Canal. The two
are alike in the fact that each is an artificial waterway
connecting two great oceans, whereby trade routes
may be shortened thousands of miles. The two are
very unlike in several other particulars. The Panama
Canal is being constructed by the United States as a
government enterprise; the Suez Canal was built and
is now owned by a private company of which the
British Government later became a large stockholder,
but is not now sole proprietor. . The Suez Canal is
comparatively near to several strong European States
having diverse interests, while the Panama Canal is
separated by the width of a great ocean from any first-
class power. The Suez Canal is on the common short-
est route of several European powers to their important
colonies; this is not the case with the Panama Canal
as regards European countries, but the United States
has a vital interest in it because it makes a short route
between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. The Suez
Canal is in Egypt, which is a suzerainty of Turkey,
whose territorial rights are expressly reserved in Article
XXII of the Constantinople Convention; the Panama
Canal passes through territory in which the United
States exercises sovereignty to the exclusion of such
exercise by Panama. Enough has been said to show

180

THe Panama Canal

the wide differences in important particulars of the
two great artificial waterways. Such differences in
physical status are quite sufficient to account for
differences in international status.

The text of the Constantinople Convention govern-
ing "the free navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal"
is printed at the end of this chapter, and the reader can
compare for himself its provisions with those of the
Hay-Pauncefote treaty. A few of the more noticeable
divergencies may be pointed out, however. In the
first place the Suez Canal is really neutralized by a
concert of nine European powers, although the words
"neutralization" and "neutrality" are carefully omit-
ted, and the language is "free and open," "open . . .
as a free passage," or "free use"; Turkey, the sov-
ereign power, is one of the nine signatories. On the
other hand, the Panama Canal is not neutralized by
a concert of powers, although the word "neutraliza-
tion" is used in the Hay-Pauncefote treaty; the United
States is the sole guarantor of the condition so charac-
terized. Again, Turkey expressly gives up, in Article
IV, the right to exercise any war right or commit any
act of hostility in the .canal situated in her own sov-
ereign territory; the United States is not so restricted by
the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. Permanent fortifications
are forbidden by the Constantinople Convention, Article
VIII and Article XI ; they are not forbidden by the Hay-
Pauncefote treaty. Comment has already been made
upon the omission in the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of the
words "in time of war as in time of peace" found in
Article I of the Constantinople Convention.

Panama Canal in International Law 181

The natural cause of these divergencies may be
found in the entirely different relation borne to the
Panama Canal by the United States from that borne
to the Suez Canal by any one European state. The
Panama Canal is of paramount importance to us for
commercial and military reasons, and the latter were
very freely advanced before construction began, al-
though they are now somewhat forgotten in the discus-
sion of commercial matters. The Suez Canal was begun
purely as a commercial enterprise in which the inter-
ests of many nations ran parallel, and military ad-
vantage was incidental. Put in another way, the
Panama Canal was a necessity for us; the Suez Canal
was a great convenience to Europe. For these reasons,
and also because of the Monroe Doctrine, it was worth
while to undertake single-handed the guarantee at
Panama that the European nations collectively under-
took at Suez. It very naturally follows that guns and
soldiers are necessary to enable a single nation to
maintain what the pronouncement of a concert of
nations will effect by moral suasion. And it equally
follows by every rule of common sense and self-preser-
vation that the United States in undertaking such a
responsibility will not be quixotic enough to maintain
a canal for the use of her own enemies in war.

Notwithstanding divergencies the great fact stands
out that the management of both canals is on a basis
of equal treatment to all with special advantage to none.
Unless the United States be herself at war the inter-
national status of the two canals is practically the same.

The President's Neutrality Proclamation concerning the Panama Canal is
given in the Appendix.

CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, GERMANY,
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, SPAIN, FRANCE, ITALY, THE
NETHERLANDS, RUSSIA, AND TURKEY, RESPECT-
ING THE FREE NAVIGATION OF THE SUEZ MARI-
TIME CANAL*

Signed at Constantinople, October 29, 1888.

{Ratifications deposited at Constantinople, December 22, 1888.)

HER Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland, Empress of India; His Majesty the Emperor
of Germany, King of Prussia; His Majesty the Emperor of Aus-
tria, King of Bohemia, &c., and Apostolic King of Hungary;
His Majesty the King of Spain, and in his name the Queen Regent
of the Kingdom; the President of the French Republic; His Maj-
esty the King of Italy; His Majesty the King of the Nether-
lands, Grand Duke of Luxembourg, &c. ; His Majesty the Emperor
of All the Russias; and His Majesty the Emperor of the Otto-
mans; wishing to establish, by a Conventional Act, a definite
system destined to guarantee at all times, and for all the Powers,
the free use of the Suez Maritime Canal, and thus to complete
the system under which the navigation of this Canal has been
placed by the Firman of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, dated
the 22nd February, 1866 (2 Zilkade, 1282), and sanctioning the
Concessions of His Highness the Khedive, have named as their
Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

( Here follow the names of the several Plenipotentiaries.)

Who, having communicated to each other their respective full
powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the fol-
lowing Articles:

* Parliamentary State Papers, Commercial, No. 2 (Suez Canal), 1889.
[C.-5623.]

182

Panama Canal in International Law 183

Article I

The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open, in
time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of
war, without distinction of flag.

Consequently, the High Contracting Parties agree not in any
way to interfere with the free use of the Canal, in time of war as
in time of peace.

The Canal shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right
of blockade.

Article II

The High Contracting Parties, recognizing that the Fresh-
Water Canal is indispensable to the Maritime Canal, take note
of the engagements of His Highness the Khedive towards the
Universal Suez Canal Company as regards the Fresh-Water
Canal; which engagements are stipulated in a Convention bear-
ing date the 18th March, 1863, containing an expose and four
Articles.

They undertake not to interfere in any way with the security
of that Canal and its branches, the working of which shall not be
exposed to any attempt at obstruction.

Article III

The High Contracting Parties likewise undertake to respect
the plant, establishments, buildings, and works of the Maritime
Canal and of the Fresh- Water Canal.

Article IV

The Maritime Canal remaining open in time of war as a free
passage, even to the ships of war of belligerents, according to the
terms of Article I of the present Treaty, the High Contracting
Parties agree that no right of war, no act of hostility, nor any act
having for its object to obstruct the free navigation of the Canal,
shall be committed in the Canal and its ports of access, as well as
within a radius of 3 marine miles from those ports, even though
the Ottoman Empire should be one of the belligerent Powers.

Vessels of war of belligerents shall not revictual or take in

184

TKe Panama Canal

stores in the Canal and its ports of access, except in so far as may-
be strictly necessary. The transit of the aforesaid vessels through
the Canal shall be effected with the least possible delay, in ac-
cordance with the Regulations in force, and without any other in-
termission than that resulting from the necessities of the service.

Their stay at Port Said and in the roadstead of Suez shall not
exceed twenty-four hours, except in case of distress. In such case
they shall be bound to leave as soon as possible. An interval of
twenty-four hours shall always elapse between the sailing of a
belligerent ship from one of the ports of access and the departure
of a ship belonging to the hostile Power.

Article V

In time of war belligerent Powers shall not disembark nor
embark within the Canal and its ports of access either troops,
munitions, or materials of war. But in case of an accidental
hindrance in the Canal, men may be embarked or disembarked
at the ports of access by detachments not exceeding 1000 men,
with a corresponding amount of war material.

Article VI

Prizes shall be subjected, in all respects, to the same rules as
the vessels of war of belligerents.

Article VII

The Powers shall not keep any vessel of war in the waters of
the Canal (including Lake Timsah and the Bitter Lakes).

Nevertheless, they may station vessels of war in the ports of
access of Port Said and Suez, the number of which shall not
exceed two for each Power.

This right shall not be exercised by belligerents.

Article VIII

The Agents in Egypt of the Signatory Powers of the present
Treaty shall be charged to watch over its execution. In case of
any event threatening the security or the free passage of the
Canal, they shall meet on the summons of three of their number

Panama Canal in International Law 185

under the presidency of their Doyen, in order to proceed to the
necessary verifications. They shall inform the Khedivial Govern-
ment of the danger which they may have perceived, in order that
that Government may take proper steps to insure the protection
and the free use of the Canal. Under any circumstances, they
shall meet once a year to take note of the due execution of the
Treaty.

The last-mentioned meetings shall take place under the presi-
dency of a Special Commissioner nominated for that purpose
by the Imperial Ottoman Government. A Commissioner of the
Khedive may also take part in the meeting, and may preside
over it in case of the absence of the Ottoman Commissioner.

They shall especially demand the suppression of any work or
the dispersion of any assemblage on either bank of the Canal, the
object or effect of which might be to interfere with the liberty
and the entire security of the navigation.

Article IX

The Egyptian Government shall, within the limits of its powers
resulting from the Firmans, and under the conditions provided
for in the present Treaty, take the necessary measures for insuring
the execution of the said Treaty.

In case the Egyptian Government should not have sufficient
means at its disposal, it shall call upon the Imperial Ottoman
Government, which shall take the necessary measures to respond
to such appeal; shall give notice thereof to the Signatory Powers
of the Declaration of London of the 17th March, 1885; and shall,
if necessary, concert with them on the subject.

The provisions of Articles IV, V, VII, and VIII shall not inter-
fere with the measures which shall be taken in virtue of the present
Article.

Article X

Similarly, the provisions of Articles IV, V, VII, and VIII shall
not interfere with the measures which His Majesty the Sultan
and His Highness the Khedive, in the name of His Imperial
Majesty, and within the limits of the Firmans granted, might
find it necessary to take for securing by their own forces the
defence of Egypt and the maintenance of public order.

186

THe Panama Canal

In case His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, or His Highness the
Khedive, should find it necessary to avail themselves of the excep-
tions for which this Article provides, the Signatory Powers of the
Declaration of London shall be notified thereof by the Imperial
Ottoman Government.

It is likewise understood that the provisions of the four Articles
aforesaid shall in no case occasion any obstacle to the measures
which the Imperial Ottoman Government may think it necessary
to take in order to insure by its own forces the defence of its
other possessions situated on the eastern coast of the Red Sea.

Article XI

The measures which shall be taken in the cases provided for
by Articles IX and X of the present Treaty shall not interfere
with the free use of the Canal. In the same cases, the erection of
permanent fortifications contrary to the provisions of Article VIII
is prohibited.

Article XII

The High Contracting Parties, by application of the principle
of equality as regards the free use of the Canal, a principle which
forms one of the bases of the present Treaty, agree that none of
them shall endeavor to obtain with respect to the Canal territo-
rial or commercial advantages or privileges in any international
arrangements which may be concluded. Moreover, the rights of
Turkey as the territorial Power are reserved.

Article XIII

With the exception of the obligations expressly provided by
the clauses of the present Treaty, the sovereign rights of His
Imperial Majesty the Sultan, and the rights and immunities of
His Highness the Khedive, resulting from the Firmans, are in no
way affected.

Article XIV

The High Contracting Parties agree that the engagements re-
sulting from the present Treaty shall not be limited by the dura-
tion of the Acts of Concession of the Universal Suez Canal
Company.

Panama Canal in International Law 187

Article XV

The stipulations of the present Treaty shall not interfere with
the sanitary measures in force in Egypt.

The High Contracting Parties undertake to bring the present
Treaty to the knowledge of the States which have not signed it,
inviting them to accede to it.

The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall
be exchanged at Constantinople within the space of one month,
or sooner if possible.

In faith of which the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed
the present Treaty, and have affixed to it the seal of their arms.

Done at Constantinople, the 29th day of the month of October,
in the year 1888.

TREATY TO FACILITATE THE CONSTRUCTION OF A

SHIP CANAL

Concluded November 18, 1901; ratification advised by Senate De-
cember 16 } 1901; ratified by President December 26, 1901;
ratifications exchanged February 21, 1902; proclaimed February
22,1902.

Article XVI

Article XVII

[L. S.
[L. S.
[L. S.
[L. S.
[L. S.
[L. S.
[L. S.
[L. S.
[L. S.

W. A. White.

Radowitz.

Calice.

Miguel Florez Y Garcia.

G. DE MONTEBELLO.

A. Blanc.
Gus. Keun.
Nelidow.
M. Said.

188

THe Panama Canal

Articles

I. Convention of April 19, 1850. IV. Change of sovereignty.
II. Construction of canal. V. Ratification.

III. Rules of neutralization.

The United States of America and His Majesty Edward the
Seventh, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland,
and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, King, and Emperor
of India, being desirous to facilitate the construction of a ship
canal to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, by whatever
route may be considered expedient, and to that end to remove
any objection which may arise out of the Convention of the 19th
April, 1850, commonly called the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, to the
construction of such canal under the auspices of the Government
of the United States, without impairing the "general principle"
of neutralization established in Article VIII of that Convention,
have for that purpose appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The President of the United States, John Hay, Secretary of
State of the United States of America:

And His Majesty Edward the Seventh, of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond
the Seas, King, and Emperor of India, the Right Honourable
Lord Pauncefote, G. C. B., G. C. M. G., His Majesty's Ambas-
sador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States;

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers,
which were found to be in due and proper form, have agreed upon
the following Articles:

Article I

The High Contracting Parties agree that the present Treaty
shall supersede the afore-mentioned Convention of the 19th
April, 1850.

Article II

It is agreed that the canal may be constructed under the aus-
pices of the Government of the United States, either directly at
its own cost, or by gift or loan of money to individuals or Corpora-

Panama Canal in International Law 189

tions, or through subscription to or purchase of stock or shares,
and that, subject to the provisions of the present Treaty, the said
Government shall have and enjoy all the rights incident to such
construction, as well as the exclusive right of providing for the
regulation and management of the canal.

Article III

The United States adopts, as the basis of the neutralization of
such ship canal, the following Rules, substantially as embodied in
the Convention of Constantinople, signed the 28th October, 1888,
for the free navigation of the Suez Canal, that is to say:

1. The canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce
and of war of all nations observing these Rules, on terms of entire
equality, so that there shall be no discrimination against any such
nation, or its citizens or subjects, in respect of the conditions or
charges of traffic, or otherwise. Such conditions and charges of
traffic shall be just and equitable.

2. The canal shall never be blockaded, nor shall any right of
war be exercised nor any act of hostility be committed within it.
The United States, however, shall be at liberty to maintain such
military police along the canal as may be necessary to protect it
against lawlessness and disorder.

3. Vessels of war of a belligerent shall not revictual nor take
any stores in the canal except so far as may be strictly necessary;
and the transit of such vessels through the canal shall be effected
with the least possible delay in accordance with the Regulations in
force, and with only such intermission as may result from the
necessities of the service.

Prizes shall be in all respects subject to the same Rules as
vessels of war of the belligerents.

4. No belligerent shall embark or disembark troops, munitions
of war, or warlike materials in the canal, except in case of acci-
dental hindrance of the transit, and in such case the transit shall
be resumed with all possible dispatch.

5. The provisions of this Article shall apply to waters adjacent
to the canal, within 3 marine miles of either end. Vessels of war
of a belligerent shall not remain in such waters longer than twenty-
four hours at any one time, except in case of distress, and in such
case, shall depart as soon as possible; but a vessel of war of one

190

THe Panama Canal

belligerent shall not depart within twenty-four hours from the
departure of a vessel of war of the other belligerent.

6. The plant, establishments, buildings, and all work neces-
sary to the construction, maintenance, and operation of the canal
shall be deemed to be part thereof, for the purposes of this Treaty,
and in time of war, as in time of peace, shall enjoy complete im-
munity from attack or injury by belligerents, and from acts
calculated to impair their usefulness as part of the canal.

Article IV

It is agreed that no change of territorial sovereignty or of the
international relations of the country or countries traversed by
the before-mentioned canal shall affect the general principle of
neutralization or the obligation of the High Contracting Parties
under the present Treaty.

Article V

The present Treaty shall be ratified by the President of the
United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate
thereof, and by His Britannic Majesty; and the ratifications shall
be exchanged at Washington or at London at the earliest possible
time within six months from the date hereof.

In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed
this Treaty and thereunto affixed their seals.

Done in duplicate at Washington, the 18th day of November,
in the year of Our Lord one thousand nine hundred and one.

John Hay. [seal]
Pauncefote. [seal]

CONVENTION FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SHIP

CANAL

Concluded November 18, 1903; ratification advised by the Senate
February 23, 1904; ratified by President February 25, 1904;
ratifications exchanged February 26, 1904; proclaimed February
26,1904.

Panama Canal in International Law 191

Articles

I. Independence of Panama. XVI. Extradition.

II. Canal zone. XVII. Ports of Panama.

III. Authority in canal zone. XVIII. Neutrality rules.

IV. Subsidiary rights. XIX. Free transport.

V. Monopoly for construction, XX. Cancellation of exist-

etc. ing treaties.

VI. Private property. XXI. Anterior [debts, conces-

VII. Panama; Colon; harbors. sions, etc.

VIII. Panama Canal Company XXII. Renunciation of rights
and railroad. under concessionary

IX. Ports at entrance of canal. contracts.

X. Taxes, etc. XXIII. Protection of canal.

XI. Official dispatches. XXIV. Change in government,

XII. Access of employees. laws, etc.

XIII. Importation into zone. XXV. Coaling stations.

XIV. Compensation. XXVI. Ratification.
XV. Joint commission.

The United States of America and the Republic of Panama
being desirous to insure the construction of a ship canal across the
Isthmus of Panama to connect the Atlantic and Pacific oceans,
and the Congress of the United States of America having passed
an act approved June 28, 1902, in furtherance of that object, by
which the President of the United States is authorized to acquire
within a reasonable time the control of the necessary territory
of the Republic of Colombia, and the sovereignty of such terri-
tory being actually vested in the Republic of Panama, the high
contracting parties have resolved for that purpose to conclude a
convention and have accordingly appointed as their plenipoten-
tiaries, —

The President of the United States of America, John Hay,
Secretary of State, and

The Government of the Republic of Panama, Philippe Bunau-
Varilla, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the
Republic of Panama, thereunto specially empowered by said gov-
ernment, who after communicating with each other their respec-
tive full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed
upon and concluded the following articles :

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XKe Panama Canal

Article I

The United States guarantees and will maintain the inde-
pendence of the Republic of Panama.

Article II

The Republic of Panama grants to the United States in per-
petuity the use, occupation and control of a zone of land and
land under water for the construction, maintenance, operation,
sanitation and protection of said Canal of the width of ten miles
extending to the distance of five miles on each side of the center
line of the route of the Canal to be constructed; the said zone
beginning in the Caribbean Sea three marine miles from mean
low water mark and extending to and across the Isthmus of
Panama into the Pacific ocean to a distance of three marine
miles from mean low water mark with the proviso that the cities
of Panama and Colon and the harbors adjacent to said cities,
which are included within the boundaries of the zone above de-
scribed, shall not be included within this grant. The Republic
of Panama further grants to the United States in perpetuity the
use, occupation and control of any other lands and waters out-
side of the zone above described which may be necessary and
convenient for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanita-
tion and protection of the said Canal or of any auxiliary canals
or other works necessary and convenient for the construction,
maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of the said
enterprise.

The Republic of Panama further grants in like manner to the
United States in perpetuity all islands within the limits of the
zone above described and in addition thereto the group of small
islands in the Bay of Panama, named Perico, Naos, Culebra and
Flamenco.

Article III

Panama Canal in International Law 193

Article II which the United States would possess and exercise if
it were the sovereign of the territory within which said lands and
waters are located to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the
Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power or
authority.

Article IV

As rights subsidiary to the above grants the Republic of Panama
grants in perpetuity to the United States the right to use the
rivers, streams, lakes and other bodies of water within its limits
for navigation, the supply of water or water-power or other pur-
poses, so far as the use of said rivers, streams, lakes and bodies
of water and the waters thereof may be necessary and convenient
for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and
protection of the said Canal.

Article V

The Republic of Panama grants to the United States in per-
petuity a monopoly for the construction, maintenance and opera-
tion of any system of communication by means of canal Or railroad
across its territory between the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific
ocean.

Article VI

The grants herein contained shall in no manner invalidate the
titles or rights of private land holders or owners of private prop-
erty in the said zone or in or to any of the lands or waters granted
to the United States by the provisions of any Article of this treaty,
nor shall they interfere with the rights of way over the public
roads passing through the said zone or over any of the said lands
or waters unless said rights of way or private rights shall conflict
with rights herein granted to the United States in which case the
rights of the United States shall be superior. All damages caused
to the owners of private lands or private property of any kind by
reason of the grants contained in this treaty or by reason of the
operations of the United States, its agents or employees, or by
reason of the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation
and protection of the said Canal or of the works of sanitation and

194

THe Panama Canal

protection herein provided for, shall be appraised and settled by
a joint Commission appointed by the Governments of the United
States and the Republic of Panama, whose decisions as to such
damages shall be final and whose awards as to such damages
shall be paid solely by the United States. No part of the work on
said Canal or the Panama railroad or on any auxiliary works
relating thereto and authorized by the terms of this treaty shall
be prevented, delayed or impeded by or pending such proceed-
ings to ascertain such damages. The appraisal of said private
lands and private property and the assessment of damages to
them shall be based upon their value before the date of this
convention.

Article VII

The Republic of Panama grants to the United States within
the limits of the cities of Panama and Colon and their adjacent
harbors and within the territory adjacent thereto the right to
acquire by purchase or by the exercise of the right of eminent
domain, any lands, buildings, water rights or other properties
necessary and convenient for the construction, maintenance,
operation and protection of the Canal and of any works of sani-
tation, such as the collection and disposition of sewage and the
distribution of water in the said cities of Panama and Colon,
which, in the discretion of the United States may be necessary
and convenient for the construction, maintenance, operation,
sanitation and protection of the said Canal and railroad. All
such works of sanitation, collection and disposition of sewage
and distribution of water in the cities of Panama and Colon
shall be made at the expense of the United States, and the gov-
ernment of the United States, its agents or nominees shall be
authorized to impose and collect water rates and sewerage rates
which shall be sufficient to provide for the payment of interest
and the amortization of the principal of the cost of said works
within a period of fifty years and upon the expiration of said
term of fifty years the system of sewers and water works shall
revert to and become the properties of the cities of Panama and
Colon respectively, and the use of the water shall be free to the
inhabitants of Panama and Colon, except to the extent that

Panama Canal in International Law 195

water rates may be necessary for the operation and maintenance
of said system of sewers and water.

The Republic of Panama agrees that the cities of Panama and
Colon shall comply in perpetuity with the sanitary ordinances
whether of a preventive or curative character prescribed by the
United States and in case the Government of Panama is unable
or fails in its duty to enforce this compliance by the cities of
Panama and Colon with the sanitary ordinances of the United
States the Republic of Panama grants to the United States the
right and authority to enforce the same.

The same right and authority are granted to the United States
for the maintenance of public order in the cities of Panama and
Colon and the territories and harbors adjacent thereto in case
the Republic of Panama should not be, in the judgment of the
United States, able to maintain such order.

Aeticle VIII

The Republic of Panama grants to the United States all rights
which it now has or hereafter may acquire to the property of the
New Panama Canal Company and the Panama Railroad Company
as a result of the transfer of sovereignty from the Republic of
Colombia to the Republic of Panama over the Isthmus of Panama
and authorizes the New Panama Canal Company to sell and
transfer to the United States its rights, privileges, properties and
concessions as well as the Panama Railroad and all the shares or
part of the shares of that company; but the public lands situated
outside of the zone described in Article II of this treaty now
included in the concessions to both said enterprises and not
required in the construction or operation of the Canal shall
revert to the Republic of Panama except any property now owned
by or in the possession of said companies within Panama or Colon
or the ports or terminals thereof.

Article IX

The United States agrees that the ports at either entrance of
the Canal and the waters thereof, and the Republic of Panama
agrees that the towns of Panama and Colon shall be free for all
time so that there shall not be imposed or collected custom house

196

THe Panama Canal

tolls, tonnage, anchorage, lighthouse, wharf, pilot, or quarantine
dues or any other charges or taxes of any kind upon any vessel
using or passing through the Canal or belonging to or employed
by the United States, directly or indirectly, in connection with
the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protec-
tion of the main Canal, or auxiliary works, or upon the cargo,
officers, crew, or passengers of any such vessels, except such tolls
and charges as may be imposed by the United States for the use
of the Canal and other works, and except tolls and charges im-
posed by the Republic of Panama upon merchandise destined to
be introduced for the consumption of the rest of the Republic of
Panama, and upon vessels touching at the ports of Colon and
Panama and which do not cross the Canal.

The Government of the Republic of Panama shall have the
right to establish in such ports and in the towns of Panama and
Colon such houses and guards as it may deem necessary to col-
lect duties on importations destined to other portions of Panama
and to prevent contraband trade. The United States shall have
the right to make use of the towns and harbors of Panama and
Colon as places of anchorage, and for making repairs, for loading
unloading, depositing, or transshipping cargoes either in transit
or destined for the service of the Canal and for other works
pertaining to the Canal.

Article X

The Republic of Panama agrees that there shall not be im-
posed any taxes, national, municipal, departmental, or of any
other class, upon the Canal, the railways and auxiliary works,
tugs and other vessels employed in the service of the Canal,
store houses, work shops, offices, quarters for laborers, factories
of all kinds, warehouses, wharves, machinery and other works,
property, and effects appertaining to the Canal or railroad and
auxiliary works, or their officers or employees, situated within
the cities of Panama and Colon, and that there shall not be
imposed contributions or charges of a personal character of any
kind upon officers, employees, laborers, and other individuals in
the service of the Canal and railroad and auxiliary works.

Panama Canal in International Law 197

Article XI

The United States agrees that the official dispatches of the
Government of the Republic of Panama shall be transmitted
over any telegraph and telephone lines established for canal pur-
poses and used for public and private business at rates not higher
than those required from officials in the service of the United
States.

Article XII

The Government of the Republic of Panama shall permit the
immigration and free access to the lands and workshops of the
Canal and its auxiliary works of all employees and workmen of
whatever nationality under contract to work upon or seeking
employment upon or in any wise connected with the said Canal
and its auxiliary works, with their respective families, and all
such persons shall be free and exempt from the military service
of the Republic of Panama.

Article XIII

The United States may import at any time into the said zone
and auxiliary lands, free of custom duties, imposts, taxes, or
other charges, and without any restrictions, any and all vessels,
dredges, engines, cars, machinery, tools, explosives, materials,
supplies, and other articles necessary and convenient in the con-
struction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of
the Canal and auxiliary works, and all provisions, medicines,
clothing, supplies and other things necessary and convenient for
the officers, employees, workmen and laborers in the service and
employ of the United States and for their families. If any such
articles are disposed of for use outside of the zone and auxiliary
lands granted to the United States and within the territory of
the Republic, they shall be subject to the same import or other
duties as like articles imported under the laws of the Republic
of Panama.

Article XIV

As the price or compensation for the rights, powers and privi-
leges granted in this convention by the Republic of Panama to
the United States, the Government of the United States agrees

198

TKe Panama Canal

to pay to the Republic of Panama the sum of ten million dollars,
($10,000,000) in gold coin of the United States on the exchange
of the ratification of this convention and also an annual payment
during the life of this convention of two hundred and fifty thou-
sand dollars ($250,000) in like gold coin, beginning nine years
after the date aforesaid.

The provisions of this Article shall be in addition to all other
benefits assured to the Republic of Panama under this convention.

But no delay or difference of opinion under this Article or any
other provisions of this treaty shall affect or interrupt the full
operation and effect of this convention in all other respects.

Article XV

The joint commission referred to in Article VI shall be estab-
lished as follows:

The President of the United States shall nominate two persons
and the President of the Republic of Panama shall nominate two
persons and they shall proceed to a decision; but in case of dis-
agreement of the Commission (by reason of their being equally
divided in conclusion) an umpire shall be appointed by the two
Governments who shall render the decision. In the event of the
death, absence, or incapacity of a Commissioner or Umpire, or
of his omitting, declining or ceasing to act, his place shall be
filled by the appointment of another person in the manner above
indicated. All decisions by a majority of the Commission or by
the umpire shall be final.

Article XVI

The two Governments shall make adequate provision by future
agreement for the pursuit, capture, imprisonment, detention and
delivery within said zone and auxiliary lands to the authorities of
the Republic of Panama of persons charged with the commitment
of crimes, felonies or misdemeanors without said zone and for the
pursuit, capture, imprisonment, detention and delivery without
said zone to the authorities of the United States of persons charged
with the commitment of crimes, felonies and misdemeanors within
said zone and auxiliary lands.

Panama Canal in International Law 199

Article XVII

The Republic of Panama grants to the United States the use
of all the ports of the Republic open to commerce as places of
refuge for any vessels employed in the Canal enterprise, and for
all vessels passing or bound to pass through the Canal which may
be in distress and be driven to seek refuge in said ports. Such
vessels shall be exempt from anchorage and tonnage dues on the
part of the Republic of Panama.

Article XVIII

The Canal, when constructed, and the entrances thereto shall
be neutral in perpetuity, and shall be opened upon the terms pro-
vided for by Section 1 of Article three of, and in conformity with
all the stipulations of, the treaty entered into by the Governments
of the United States and Great Britain on November 18, 1901.

Article XIX

The Government of the Republic of Panama shall have the
right to transport over the Canal its vessels and its troops and
munitions of war in such vessels at all times without paying
charges of any kind. The exemption is to be extended to the
auxiliary railway for the transportation of persons in the service
of the Republic of Panama, or of the police force charged with the
preservation of public order outside of said zone, as well as to
their baggage, munitions of war and supplies.

Article XX

If by virtue of any existing treaty in relation to the territory
of the Isthmus of Panama, whereof the obligations shall descend
or be assumed by the Republic of Panama, there may be any
privilege or concession in favor of the Government or the citizens
and subjects of a third power relative to an interoceanic means
of communication which in any of its terms may be incompatible
with the terms of the present convention, the Republic of Panama
agrees to cancel or modify such treaty in due form, for which
purpose it shall give to the said third power the requisite notifi-
cation within the term of four months from the date of the present

200

THe Panama Canal

convention, and in case the existing treaty contains no clause
permitting its modifications or annulment, the Republic of Panama
agrees to procure its modification or annulment in such form
that there shall not exist any conflict with the stipulations of the
present convention.

Article XXI

The rights and privileges granted by the Republic of Panama
to the United States in the preceding Articles are understood to
be free of all anterior debts, liens, trusts, or liabilities, or concessions
or privileges to other Governments, corporations, syndicates or
individuals, and consequently, if there should arise any claims
on account of the present concessions and privileges or other-
wise, the claimants shall resort to the Government of the Repub-
lic of Panama and not to the United States for any indemnity or
compromise which may be required.

Article XXII

The Republic of Panama renounces and grants to the United
States the participation to which it might be entitled in the
future earnings of the Canal under Article XV of the conces-
sionary contract with Lucien N. B. Wyse now owned by the
New Panama Canal Company and any and all other rights or
claims of a pecuniary nature arising under or relating to said
concession, or arising under or relating to the concessions to the
Panama Railroad Company or any extension or modification
thereof; and it likewise renounces, confirms and grants to the
United States, now and hereafter, all the rights and property
reserved in the said concessions which otherwise would belong to
Panama at or before the expiration of the terms of ninety-nine
years of the concessions granted to or held by the above men-
tioned party and companies, and all right, title and interest which
it now has or may hereafter have, in and to the lands, canal,
works, property and rights held by the said companies under
said concessions or otherwise, and acquired or to be acquired
by the United States from or through the New Panama Canal
Company, including any property and rights which might or
may in the future either by lapse of time, forfeiture or otherwise,

Panama Canal in International Law 201

revert to the Republic of Panama under any contracts or con-
cessions, with said Wyse, the Universal Panama Canal Company,
the Panama Railroad Company and the New Panama Canal
Company.

The aforesaid rights and property shall be and are free and
released from any present or reversionary interest in or claims of
Panama and the title of the United States thereto upon con-
summation of the contemplated purchase by the United States
from the New Panama Canal Company, shall be absolute, so far
as concerns the Republic of Panama, excepting always the rights
of the Republic specifically secured under this treaty.

Article XXIII

If it should become necessary at any time to employ armed
forces for the safety or protection of the Canal, or of the ships
that make use of the same, or the railways and auxiliary works,
the United States shall have the right, at all times and in its
discretion, to use its police and its land and naval forces or to
establish fortifications for these purposes.

Article XXIV

No change either in the Government or in the laws and trea-
ties of the Republic of Panama shall, without the consent of the
United States, affect any right of the United States under the pres-
ent convention, or under any treaty stipulation between the two
countries that now exists or may hereafter exist touching the
subject matter of this convention.

If the Republic of Panama shall hereafter enter as a constitu-
ent into any other Government or into any union or confedera-
tion of states, so as to merge her sovereignty or independence in
such Government, union or confederation, the rights of the
United States under this convention shall not be in any respect
lessened or impaired.

Article XXV

For the better performance of the engagements of this conven-
tion and to the end of the efficient protection of the Canal and
the preservation of its neutrality, the Government of the Repub-

202

XKe Panama Canal

lie of Panama will sell or lease to the United States lands ade-
quate and necessary for naval or coaling stations on the Pacific
coast and on the western Caribbean coast of the Republic at
certain points to be agreed upon with the President of the United
States.

Article XXVI

This convention when signed by the Plenipotentiaries of the
Contracting Parties shall be ratified by the respective Govern-
ments and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington at
the earliest date possible.

In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed
the present convention in duplicate and have hereunto affixed
their respective seals.

Done at the City of Washington the 18th day of November in
the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and three.

John Hay. [seal]
P. Bunau Varilla. [seal]

THE PANAMA CANAL

Part VI

COMMERCIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE PANAMA

CANAL

EMORY R. JOHNSON, Ph.D., Sc. D.

COMMERCIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE
PANAMA CANAL

Each individual's interest in the Panama Canal,
and his estimate of the importance of the canal, is
necessarily determined by the point of view. The
diplomat and statesman concerned with the promo-
tion of the peaceful development of Latin American
countries, politically and economically, and desirous
of seeing the United States become increasingly help-
ful to the countries south of the Rio Grande, will study
the canal with regard to the effect it may have upon
the international relations of American countries; the
military expert will seek to understand how the water-
way across the Isthmus will or may augment the
offensive and defensive strength of the American
Navy, what forts need to be constructed, what naval
bases and coaling stations need to be established,
what increases need to be made in the Army and the
Navy to enable the Panama Canal to enhance the
military power and naval prestige of the United
States; while the producers and traders, although not
without interest in the political and military changes
that the canal may effect, are especially desirous of
knowing how the shortened ocean route between the
north Atlantic and the Pacific will assist the world's
trade, will enable American industries to produce for
wider domestic and foreign markets, and will reduce

205

206

TKe Panama Canal

freight rates by rail within the country and by water
beyond and between the seaboards.

The commercial importance of the canal, or the
assistance it will render the industry and trade of the
people of the United States and other countries, can
be indicated: (1) by showing what effects the new
route will have upon the length and time of ocean
voyages; (2) by stating conservatively the volume of
shipping, foreign and American, international and
coastwise, that may be expected to use the canal;
(3) by estimating the influence which the Panama
Canal will have upon the freight rates by rail between
the two seaboards of the United States and by ocean
carriers engaged in American intercoastal and foreign
commerce; (4) by showing how much the ocean car-
riers will save in fuel costs by using the Panama route
and by pointing out how the cheaper fuel costs by way
of the Isthmus will assist the Panama Canal in com-
peting with alternative routes via the Straits of Ma-
gellan, the Cape of Good Hope, and the Suez Canal;
(5) by studying the relation of tolls to the traffic and
revenues of the canal; and (6) by considering what
policy the Government should adhere to in the manage-
ment of the canal in order that the canal may best
serve the welfare of the entire country.

I. - Distances and Time Saved by Panama Canal

The Panama Canal is being constructed to shorten
the length and time of ocean voyages between the
countries of the north Atlantic and those of the north
and south Pacific. To recite textually and in detail

Commercial Importance of Canal 207

the distances from the several Atlantic ports, American
and foreign, to the leading ports of each of the principal
countries bordering the Pacific would be wearisome to
writer and reader; but by resorting to a few short
tables, which the reader may skip or may study in
accordance with the degree of his interest, it will be
possible to present with satisfactory completeness the
changes which the canal will make in distances and in
sailing time.*

The maximum effect of the Panama Canal upon
ocean distances will be the reduction in the length and
time of voyages between the Atlantic-Gulf seaboard of
the United States and the Pacific coast of the United
States and South America. Table I gives the saving
for trips from New York and New Orleans to San
Francisco and to four selected ports having central
and southern locations upon the west coast of South
America.

The saving in time is given both for freight steamers,
most of which are run at an average speed of 9 to 12
knots, and for steamers that carry both freight and
passengers, which usually average 14 to 16 knots.
Except upon the north Atlantic, passenger steamers
seldom average above 16 knots. In calculating the
saving in time of voyages, as stated in the table, a half
day is deducted to allow for the detention due to
passing through the canal.

* The tables are taken from Chapter XI of the Report upon Panama
Canal Traffic and Tolls. Chapters I and XI discuss fully the effect of the
Panama Canal upon ocean distances.

208

THe Panama Canal

TABLE I. — DISTANCES AND TIME SAVED VIA THE PANAMA CANAL AS COM-
PARED WITH THE STRAITS OF MAGELLAN BETWEEN THE ATLANTIC-
GULF PORTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE WEST COAST
OF NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA

From New York.

To-

San Francisco

Callao

Iquique

Valparaiso. . . ,
Coronel

Distance
saved.

Miles.

7,873
6,250
5,139
3,747
3,296

knots.

35.9
28.4
23.3
16.8
14.7

Days saved for vessels of •

10
knots.

32.3
25.2
20.9
15.1
13.2

12
knots.

26.8
21.2
17.3
12.5
10.9

14
knots.

22.9
18.1
14.8
10.6
9.3

knots.

20.0
15.7
12.9
9.2
8.1

To —

San Francisco

Callao

Iquique

Valparaiso. . . ,
Coronel

Distance
saved.

Miles.

8,868
7,245
6,134
4,742
4,291

From New Orleans.

Days saved for vessels of ■

knots.

40.5

36.4

30.2

25.8

22.5

33.0

29.7

24.7

21.1

18.4

27.9

25.0

20.8

17.7

15.4

21.4

19.2

16.0

13.6

11.8

19.4

17.4

14.4

12.3

10.7

On a trip between San Francisco and New York a
10-knot freight steamer will be able to save 32 days by-
using the Panama Canal instead of going around by
the Straits of Magellan. A 16-knot passenger steamer
will be able to make the voyage in 20 days less. The
saving in time and distance will be greater for New
Orleans than for New York; because Gulf ports are
nearer to the canal than are the Atlantic ports. From
New York to the great nitrate port of Iquique 9- and
10-knot freight steamers will save from 23 to 21 days
by using the Panama Canal instead of going by way of
the Straits of Magellan; and even for Valparaiso, the

Commercial Importance of Canal 209

principal port of the agricultural section of Chile, the
10-knot steamer from New York will save 15 days by
using the Panama Canal. The reduction in time and
distance between the Atlantic-Gulf seaboard of the
United States and the west coast of North and South
America will be so great that the traffic between these
two sections will, without question, use the Panama
Canal.

TABLE II. — DISTANCES AND TIME SAVED VIA THE PANAMA CANAL AS COM-
PARED WITH THE STRAITS OF MAGELLAN BETWEEN EUROPEAN
PORTS AND THE WEST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA

To-

From Liverpool.

Distance
saved.

Days saved for vessels of —

knots.

10
knots.

12
knots.

knots.

Callao

Miles.

4,043
2,932
1,540 '
1,089

18.2
13.1
6.6
4.5

16.3
11.7
5.9
4.0

13.5
9.7
4.8
3.3

11.5
8.2
4.1
2.7

10.0
7.1
3.5
2.3

To —

From Antwerp.

Distance
saved.

Days saved for vessels of —

knots.

10
knots.

12
knots.

knots.

16
knots.

Miles.

Callao

3,905

17.6

15.8

13.1

11.5

9.7

2,794

12.4

11.1

9.2

7.8

6.8

1,402

6.0

5.3

4.3

3.5

3.1

951

3.9

3.4

2.8

2.3

1.9

To-

From Gibraltar.

Distance
saved.

Days saved for vessels of —

knots.

10
knots.

12
knots.

14
knots.

knots.

Miles.

Callao

3,327

14.9

13.3

11.0

9.4

8.1

Iquique

2,216

9.7

8.7

7.2

6.1

5.2

Valparaiso

824

3.3

2.9

2.3

1.9

1.6

Coronel

373

1.2

1.0

0.8

0.6

0.5

210

THe Panama Canal

Table II illustrates the effect which the canal will
have upon the length and time of voyages between
European ports and those of the west coast of South
America. From Liverpool and from Antwerp, repre-
sentative ports of north Europe, a 10-knot freight
steamer can save between 11 and 12 days by using the
Panama Canal to the nitrate ports. For trips to Val-
paraiso, the saving in time will be only about half as
great as the saving in time for trips to the nitrate
ports; and, if saving in distance and time were the
only factor affecting the choice of routes, it is probable
that the tolls that have been established for the use of
the Panama Canal would divert the traffic between
Europe and Chile to the Magellan route; but the
cheaper cost of fuel by the Panama route, and the
greater possibility of trading at intermediate ports by
taking the Panama route instead of going through the
Straits of Magellan, make it practically certain that
but a small part of the traffic between Europe and the
west coast of South America will continue to use the
Magellan route after the opening of the Panama Canal.

Tables III and IV show how the Panama Canal will
affect the length of routes and the time of voyages to
Australia and New Zealand from New York and New
Orleans and from a representative European port,
Liverpool.

Commercial Importance of Canal

211

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212

TKe Panama Canal

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Commercial Importance of Canal 213

The traffic between the Atlantic-Gulf coast of the
United States and Australia is now carried by way of
the Cape of Good Hope. The short route from New
York to Wellington is by way of the Straits of Magel-
lan. It is certain that practically all, if not all, ship-
ping engaged in the trade of the eastern seaboard of
the United States with Australia will use the Panama
route. If vessels went out from New York to Adelaide
and from there directly back to New York without
going on to Melbourne or Sydney, it is probable that
the present route by way of the Cape of Good Hope
might continue to be used; but, as a matter of fact,
the great port of Australia is Sydney and most vessels
outbound to Australia make the port of Sydney,
which not only has the largest tonnage of traffic but
which, also, being situated near Newcastle, has cheap
coal. Moreover, as will be pointed out later, the fuel
expenses of steamers will be less via Panama than via
the Cape of Good Hope. The trade between the At-
lantic coast of the United States and New Zealand
will use the Panama route, both because of the shorter
distance and the lower fuel costs.

Australia, as is shown by Table IV, is nearer Europe
by way of Suez than via Panama; but it will be ob-
served that Sydney, the principal port of Australia, is
less than a day's run for an ordinary steamer farther
from Liverpool via Panama than via Suez, with calls
at the intermediate ports at which vessels usually find
it advantageous to stop for coal or traffic. New Zea-
land is 6 days nearer to Liverpool for a 10-knot freight
steamer via Panama than by way of Suez; but the

214

The Panama Canal

distance from Wellington to Liverpool by way of the
Straits of Magellan is only 550 miles greater than by
way of Panama. Thus, the Panama route will have
to compete for the European-New Zealand traffic not
only with the Suez Canal but with the Straits of Ma-
gellan route. The high cost of coal by way of the
Straits of Magellan will probably prevent that route
from being used to much extent for this traffic. The
division of the traffic between the Suez and Panama
routes will depend largely upon the extent to which
the New Zealand commerce is handled by vessels en-
gaged only in that trade or by vessels which are en-
gaged in both Australian and New Zealand commerce.

Under present conditions the eastern part of the
United States, where most of the exported goods are
manufactured, competes with Europe for the trade of
Japan and China at a great disadvantage. The Suez
route is used for the Oriental trade both by Europe
and by the producers and traders located in the eastern
part of the United States. The opening of the Panama
Canal, as is shown by Table V, will remove the present
handicap which America has in trading with the
Orient.

A 10-knot freight steamer can make the voyage to
Yokohama from New York in 15 days less than it now
takes to make the run by way of Suez. For New
Orleans the Panama Canal will save 23 days. The
distance from New York to Shanghai is much less by
way of Panama than by Suez. Hongkong and Manila,
however, are equally distant from New York via
Panama and Suez. The choice of routes taken by

Commercial Importance of Canal

215

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THe Panama Canal

vessels outbound from New York to Hongkong or
Manila will depend partly upon whether vessels wish
to trade at intermediate ports and partly upon the
relative costs of coal via Panama and Suez.
! The Panama Canal will evidently not be used to
much extent by the commerce of Europe with the
Orient. Table VI shows that the entire Orient, in-
cluding Japan, is nearer Europe by way of Suez than
via Panama.

If relative distances alone determined the choice of
routes, none of Europe's trade with the Orient, not
even any of that with Japan, would use the Panama
Canal; but it is a well-known fact that distance is only
one of the forces that determine the routes taken by
vessels engaged in trade between widely . separated
parts of the world. Even under pre-canal conditions,
an appreciable tonnage of shipping moved from the
Far East by way of America to Europe. After the
opening of the Panama Canal, the shipping making
the trip from the Orient to Europe by way of America
will increase; and, as will be shown in a later connec-
tion, the lower fuel costs by way of Panama, as well as
the possibilities of engaging en route in the commerce
between the United States and Europe, may be ex-
pected to cause a considerable tonnage of shipping to
move both eastward and westward via the Panama
Canal between the Orient and Europe.

II. Panama Traffic, American and Foreign

The most concrete measure of the commercial im-
portance of the Panama Canal will be the volume of

Commercial Importance of Canal

217

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218

THe Panama Canal

traffic or tonnage of shipping making use of the water-
way. In the latter part of 1911 and in the early months
of 1912, a detailed investigation was made of entrance
and clearance statistics kept by the United States and
other countries for the purpose of ascertaining how
much shipping would have passed through a Panama
Canal had one been in existence during the year 1909-
1910, the latest year for which complete information
was obtainable. The following table summarizes the
results of an elaborate statistical investigation:

TABLE VII.— NET REGISTER TONNAGE OF VESSELS THAT
MIGHT HAVE ADVANTAGEOUSLY USED A PANAMA

CANAL IN 1909-1910

Europe with —

Western South America

Western Central America and Pacific

Mexico

Pacific United States, British Columbia

and Hawaii

Pacific United States via Suez Canal ....
Oriental countries east of Singapore, and

Oceania

Eastern United States Coast with —
Western South America, Pacific Mexico

and Hawaii ,

Pacific Coast of United States (via Cape

Horn) 2

Pacific Coast of United States and Hawaii
(via American-Hawaiian S. S. Co.). . . .
Oriental countries east of Singapore, and

Oceania

Panama traffic

Eastern Canada with Alaska, Chile and

Australia

Total

1 Figures furnished by the Suez Canal Co. It is not possible to divide the
total into entrances and clearances.

2 Not including Hawaii.

Total
entrances.

Total
clearances.

Total
entrances

and
clearances.

1,553,887

1,594,513

3,148,400

80,788

118,714

199,502

419,865

269,853

689,718
158,000!

1,174,585

618,704

555,881

300,909

166,686

467,595

117,311

55,344

172,655

181,713

363,426

600,000
158,558

900,000
259,932

1,500,000
418,490

13,410

22,248

35,658

4,045,145

4,124,884

8,328,029

Commercial Importance of Canal 219

The figures presented in Table VII show that about
10| per cent of the total tonnage of shipping that
would have used a Panama Canal in 1909-1910 would
have consisted of vessels serving the trade between the
two seaboards of the United States, i.e., vessels which
carried traffic via Cape Horn, via the Straits of Ma-
gellan, or to and from the Isthmuses of Panama and
Tehuantepec. The vessels employed in the trade of
the United States with foreign countries contributed
about 33 per cent of the total Panama tonnage for the
year 1910. Over 56 per cent of the shipping that would
have used the canal during the year in question was
employed in handling commerce that did not touch
the shores of the United States. The importance of
the west coast South American trade and the large
place occupied by Europe in that trade are indicated
by the fact that 38 per cent of the total shipping that
would have used a Panama Canal in 1909-1910 con-
sisted of vessels serving the trade of Europe with the
west coast of South America.*

To estimate the probable traffic of the Panama
Canal during the early years of its operation and at
the end of 5- and 10-year periods, it is necessary to
apply to the tonnage that would have used the canal
in 1910 such a rate of increase as is justified by the
growth of the world's commerce.

* Since this was written the great European war has temporarily stopped
most of the maritime foreign trade of Continental Europe and has interfered
with the commerce of Great Britain. The trade of Europe with the Pacific
coast of North and South America forms such a large share of the commerce
that will use the Panama Canal that the war in Europe must necessarily
reduce the tonnage of Panama Canal traffic for one or two years at least.

220

TKe Panama Canal

An investigation made by the Isthmian Canal Com-
mission from 1899 to 1901 showed that the available
Panama Canal traffic in 1899 was about 5,000,000
tons. Records kept for a period of years by the Suez
Canal Company showed practically the same available
tonnage. Thus, the increase in available Panama
Canal traffic during the eleven years ending in 1910
amounted to 66| per cent and was at the rate of 59 per
cent per decade. The trade of the United States with
non-European countries increased 67 J per cent in value
during the decade 1900-1910. The commerce of the
Atlantic-Gulf ports of the United States with Pacific
countries rose in value 63.1 per cent, while the ton-
nage of the Suez Canal advanced 70.26 per cent during
the decade ending with 1910 and 78.4 during the 10
years closing with 1912. These and other facts that
might be adduced indicate that an increase of 60 per
cent per decade in the traffic of the Panama Canal
may conservatively be assumed. If that rate of
growth shall prevail down to 1915, the tonnage of
shipping available for the use of the canal will then be
10,500,000 net tons per annum.

It is important to know what part of this total ton-
nage will probably be made up of shipping engaged in
the intercoastal trade of the United States, and how
much of the remaining tonnage will consist of Amer-
ican and foreign shipping. Table VIII contains an
estimate of the probable tonnage of the Panama Canal
in 1915, 1920 and 1925, so classified as to show what
part of the total will consist of shipping in the Amer-
ican coastwise trade and what portions of the total

Commercial Importance of Canal 221

will consist of American ships and foreign ships engaged
in American and foreign trade.

TABLE VIII .—CLASSIFICATION OF ESTIMATED NET TONNAGE
OF SHIPPING USING THE PANAMA CANAL IN 1915,

1920 AND 1925

Average per
annum during
1915 and 1916.

1920.

1925.

Coast-to-coast American shipping. .

American shipping carrying for-
eign commerce of the United
States

1,000,000

720,000
8,780,000

1,414,000
910,000
11,020,000

2,000,000
1,150,000
13,850,000

Foreign shipping carrying com-
merce of the United States and
foreign countries

Total

10,500,000

13,344,000

17,000,000

The figures given in the above table for American
coast-to-coast shipping are obtained by assuming that
the shipping employed in carrying the water-borne
commerce that moved between the two seaboards of
the United States in 1910 will have somewhat more
than doubled by 1915. Should the rate of increase
that has prevailed during 1911 and 1912 continue to
1915, the intercoastal traffic will have more than dou-
bled during the 5-year period. In constructing Table
VIII, it was also thought conservative to assume that
the traffic between the two seaboards by way of the
Panama Canal would double during the first decade
and, thus, reach 2,000,000 tons in 1925. This again is
believed to be an estimate well on the safe side of what
will happen. In estimating the growth in the total
Panama Canal traffic during the first 10 years of the
canal's operation an increase of only 60 per cent has
been assumed. Should only this rate of growth be

222

TTHe Panama Canal

realized, which is much less than the actual rate of
increase of the traffic of the Suez Canal after that
waterway has been in operation for more than four
decades and its tonnage has become large, the traffic
of the Panama Canal, in 1925, will amount to 17,000,000
net tons of shipping, of which not less than 2,000,000
tons will consist of vessels operated in the coast-to-
coast trade. There will be about 1,150,000 tons of
American ships employed in the foreign commerce
of the United States, and probably 13,850,000 tons of
vessels under foreign flags engaged in carrying the
commerce of other countries and the foreign trade of
the United States.

III. Effect of Panama Canal upon Transconti-
nental Rates by Railroads and Carriers by

Water

The Panama Canal will be of benefit to American
producers and traders by providing new and cheaper
transportation facilities. It is also expected that, at
least, some of the transcontinental shipments by rail
will move at cheaper rates than would be charged if
there were no Panama Canal. The commercial value
of the canal may, thus, be measured by its effect upon
services and rates by water and by rail.

Whatever may be the effect of the canal upon the
rates actually charged by the coastwise carriers, it is
certain that the costs of transportation by water
between the two seaboards will be largely reduced.
The rates between New York and San Francisco by way
of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec are said to average

Commercial Importance of Canal

223

about $11.50 per ton of 2,000 pounds. The agreement
between the American-Hawaiian Steamship Company
and the Mexican National Railroad provides that
one-third of the through rate shall be paid to the rail-
road across the Isthmus of Tehauntepec for transfer-
ring the cargo from the steamer in one ocean to the
steamer in the other ocean. Thus, the cost of transfer at
the Isthmus, while varying for different kinds of cargo,
probably averages about $3.50 per ton of 2000 pounds.

Through traffic by way of the Isthmus of Panama is
handled on through rates, the Panama Railroad Com-
pany taking a proportional of the through tariff. The
average cost of transferring cargo from one steamer to
another at the Isthmus of Panama probably is about
$3.00 per ton. Thus, the absence of a canal across the
Isthmus increases the transportation cost between the
two seaboards of the United States from $3.00 to $3.50
per cargo ton. As vessels carry on an average nearly
two tons of cargo for each net vessel ton, the transfer
costs across the Isthmus are equivalent to six or seven
dollars per net vessel ton. The double handling of
traffic at the Isthmus often damages goods; articles
may be lost; and, in time of congested traffic, delays
may occur that are annoying and expensive to ship-
pers and consignees. The tolls fixed for the use of the
Panama Canal are $1.20 per net vessel ton, which is
probably less than one-fourth of the saving which the
canal will effect in the cost of transportation between
the two seaboards of the United States.

The reduction in freight rates coastwise between the
two seaboards will not necessarily be equal to the de-

224

XKe Panama Canal

crease which the canal will effect in the cost of the
service. If the competition between the steamship
lines were keen and unrestrained, the rates would be
based upon the cost of the service; but the competi-
tion of the steamship lines will be carefully regulated
in their " conferences." The rates between the two
seaboards will be the same by the several lines. For a
part of their traffic, the regular steamship lines will
have to meet the competition of individual vessels
owned or chartered by producers and shippers whose
business is large enough to enable them to ship goods
in full cargo lots. This competition, however, will be
limited, and only a minor part of the rates of the reg-
ular lines will be regulated by the cost of transporting
goods in vessels owned or chartered by the large
shippers.

There will be competition between the transconti-
nental railroads and the coastwise steamship lines, but
it remains to be seen how active that competition will
be. Will it be the policy of the railroads to reduce
their rates generally from coast to coast in order to
hold traffic against the active competition of the steam-
ship lines, or will the railroads maintain their through
rates practically at the present level, knowing that
they will thereby lose such traffic between the two sea-
board sections as can secure satisfactory service and
lower rates from the carriers by water? If the rail-
roads elect to maintain their present rate schedules,
will the steamship lines, acting through their confer-
ences, maintain their common rates at such differen-
tials under the stable schedules of railroad tariffs as

Commercial Importance of Canal 225

will cause the rates by water to attract to the coast-
wise lines the volume of traffic needed to fill the ships
in service? In other words, will the coastwise lines
operated via the canal so compete with each other and
with the railroads as to bring rates as low as the cost
of service will allow, or will the coastwise lines restrict
their competition with each other and fix and maintain
their rates, not with reference to the cost of the service,
but with regard to what the traffic will bear — with
regard to what shippers can pay, and what they will
pay, for transportation by water rather than by rail?

These questions are not easy to answer in advance
of experience; but the history of rate making by rail-
roads and by steamship lines does not presage keen
competition either between the through transconti-
nental rail lines, or between the coastwise steamship
companies, or between the railroads and the steam-
ship lines. It is probable that the railroads will main-
tain most of their through rates between the two
seaboard sections.

Only a comparatively small percentage of the traffic
of the transcontinental railroads originates in the sea-
board sections of the country. Of the westbound
traffic carried through to the Pacific, only 20 to 22
per cent originates east of the Buffalo-Pittsburgh ter-
ritory, and only 35 per cent originates in the eastern
section and in the Buffalo-Pittsburgh territory. More
than two-thirds of the through westbound traffic of the
transcontinental lines is shipped from the central West.
Similarly, only a small portion of the traffic originating
on the Pacific coast is carried through to the section

226

XKe Panama Canal

east of Pittsburgh and Buffalo. Most of the shipments
from the far West are to the middle West.

Another reason for anticipating that the railroads
will not seriously disturb their present rates for the
purpose of meeting the competition of coastwise lines
through the canal is that for most commodities the
same rates are charged to the Pacific coast and Moun-
tain States from the entire section of the United States
east of the Missouri River. In order to put the indus-
tries and railroads of the middle West on an equal foot-
ing with the industries and railroads of the Eastern
States, railroad rates to the far West have been blan-
keted over the eastern half of the United States.
Thus, if the rail rates from the Atlantic section to the
West are cut to meet canal competition, like reductions
will have to be made from the middle West, or the rail-
roads will have to do what they probably will not do
— abolish the present blanketing of rates.

A third reason for thinking that the railroads will
probably not make large reductions in their rates to
meet the competition of the coastwise lines is that the
eastern trunk line railroads will not be in favor of join-
ing with their western connections in low, through,
transcontinental rates. It will be to the advantage of
the eastern railroads to haul traffic from points within
500 miles of the Atlantic to the seaboard for shipment
thence by water, rather than to divide with their
western connections low, through, all-rail rates from the
Atlantic to the Pacific. Otherwise stated, it will be to
the interest of the eastern railroads to join with the
coastwise lines in through services at profitable rates,

Commercial Importance of Canal 227

instead of fighting the steamship lines by uniting with
the western railroads in through rail services at low
rates.

It was suggested above that the steamship lines will
probably not base their charges upon the cost of serv-
ice, but that they will make the rates what the traffic
will bear. If the railroads maintain their rates and do
not seriously attempt to prevent traffic from moving
by water, it can hardly be doubted that much, if not
most, of the general commodity traffic handled by the
coastwise lines will be at rates that are less than the
railroad charges only by such a differential as experience
shows to be necessary. The rates via the Tehuan-
tepec route have been, as a matter of fact, adjusted
with reference to the railroad tariffs, and there is little
reason to suppose that this policy of the coastwise
carriers will be abandoned after the canal is opened.

It is not, however, to be inferred from this analysis
that the rates between the two seaboards will not be
lower after the canal is opened than they are at the
present time. The lower cost of the service, the in-
creased volume of traffic, and the larger number of
steamship lines, will affect the policy of the steamship
companies in making rates. Although the companies
will, unless prevented by the effective enforcement of
anti-trust legislation, regulate their competition in
rates and services by means of conferences, the com-
petition to be regulated after the canal is opened will
be stronger than it is at the present time; and the
force of public sentiment will undoubtedly have its
effect — at least, some effect — upon the policy of the

228

THe Panama Canal

coastwise carriers. The most that can be expected,
however, is that competition will somewhat limit
monopoly in the coastwise rates. If the public is to
secure as low freight rates as the coastwise carriers
can profitably afford to give — rates as low as the
public is entitled to receive — it will be necessary to
regulate the services and charges of the coastwise
steamship companies much the same as the railroad
services and charges are now regulated. It may
safely be predicted that within a few years there will
be a strong public demand for the effective regulation
of the coastwise carriers.

IV. Effect of Fuel Costs upon Usefulness of

the Panama Canal

The usefulness of the Panama Canal will depend
upon the economies that shipping can effect by taking
the Panama Canal instead of some alternative route.
Economies can result from shortening the distance and
time of ocean voyages, from enabling vessels to trade
en route at intermediate ports more advantageously,
and, fortunately, in the case of the Panama Canal,
from a reduction in fuel costs — the largest expense
incurred in the operation of steamships. Fuel costs by
the way of the Straits of Magellan are especially high,
there being practically no native coal on the east coast
of South America; and only inferior coal can be ob-
tained on the west coast. The cost of coal at the Suez
Canal will certainly be higher than at the Isthmus of
Panama. The coal sold at Suez and at Mediterranean
stations is Welsh and English coal, which costs more

Commercial Importance of Canal 229

than does American coal at home ports, and which has
to pay higher freight rates to the Mediterranean and
the Isthmus of Suez than will have to be paid upon
American coal from the Atlantic-Gulf seaboard to the
Isthmus of Panama. The best way to measure the
advantages of the Panama route in the matter of fuel
costs is to compare the outlay which a freight steamer
would have to make for coal via the Panama and the
alternative or competitive route.

As there will be no question as to the use of the
Panama Canal for all traffic between the two seaboards
of North America and for practically all traffic between
the Atlantic-Gulf seaboard of the United States and
the west coast of South America, it is not necessary to
compare fuel expenses via Panama and the alternative
Straits of Magellan route. For the trade between
Europe and the west coast of South America, however,
particularly for the Chilean commerce, the use of the
canal is certain to depend, in part, upon relative fuel
costs via that route and the Straits of Magellan. In
the first part of this chapter, it was pointed out that
freight vessels will save only five or six days by taking
the Panama route instead of going through the Straits
of Magellan on voyages between Liverpool and Valpa-
raiso. The saving due to reduction of time would not
be sufficient to justify the payment of $1.20 per net
ton for the use of the Panama Canal; but the fuel
expenses by Panama would be so much less than via
Magellan as to make certain the use of the Panama
route by practically all ships en route between Europe
and Chile.

230

THe Panama Canal

A 10-knot freight steamer ; whose daily coal con-
sumption averages 30 tons, would, in 1912, have saved
$9,300 in fuel expenses by using a Panama Canal for a
round trip between Liverpool and Valparaiso. The
saving in fuel expenses would nearly equal the amount
of tolls which this vessel would have to pay for passing
through the canal on its outbound and return voyages.

Although Natal coal can be obtained cheaply by
vessels making the run from New York to Australia
by way of the Cape of Good Hope, fuel expenses will
be less between New York and Australia via Panama
than by way of the Cape of Good Hope. With the
coal prices that prevailed in 1912, a 10|-knot freight
steamer having an average daily coal consumption of
38 tons while at sea, could save about $3,500 in coal
expenses by taking a Panama route instead of one
around the Cape of Good Hope for a round-trip voyage
between New York and Adelaide. This would have
nearly paid this ship's tolls one way. Adelaide is
taken for this illustration, because it is that one of the
three large Australian ports that will derive least ad-
vantage from the Panama Canal. Melbourne, and
especially Sydney, which is the largest of the Aus-
tralian ports, are brought so much nearer to the
Atlantic-Gulf coast of the United States by the Panama
Canal than they are by the Cape of Good Hope route
that the use of the canal by their commerce is certain.

The location of the Islands of New Zealand is such
that the trade of the Atlantic-Gulf seaboard of the
United States with those islands is certain to be car-
ried on by way of Panama; but the usefulness of the

Commercial Importance of Canal

231

Panama Canal to the trade of New Zealand with
Europe will depend largely upon the relative fuel
expenses via Panama and alternative routes. As was
pointed out above, the distance from Liverpool to
Wellington is only 550 miles more by way of the
Straits of Magellan than via Panama; but the fuel
expenses are so much higher via the Straits of Magellan
that a 10-knot steamer using 30 tons of coal a day
while at sea would, on a basis of 1912 prices, save
$8,470 in fuel expenses by making the round trip be-
tween Liverpool and Wellington via the Panama Canal.
The saving in coal bills would nearly equal the tolls
which this ship would have to pay for two passages
through the Panama Canal.

Manila and Hongkong being equally distant from
New York via Panama and via Suez, it is certain that
the choice of routes will be largely influenced by the
relative fuel costs. Fortunately for the Panama Canal,
the cost of coal via the Panama route will be much
less. On a basis of 1912 prices, the lOJ-knot freight
steamer mentioned above would save $4,041 in fuel
expenses for a round trip between New York and
Manila by using the Panama instead of the Suez route.
This would be half the tolls payable for the round trip.

It is shown by Table VI that the Panama Canal will
not reduce the distance between Europe and Japan
and China. The Suez route will be shorter than the
one via Panama. Fuel expenses by the two routes,
moreover, will average about the same. For voyages
between Europe and China, fuel expenses via Suez
will be somewhat lower, while for voyages from British

232

TKe Panama Canal

and other North-European ports to Japan the coal
costs will be somewhat less via Panama. This fact
will influence freight vessels leaving Yokohama with
full cargoes for Europe to select the Panama route,
provided, as is probable, the tolls at Panama are no
higher than those charged at Suez.

V. Panama Tolls and Revenue

The proclamation issued by the President of the
United States, November 13, 1912, established the
following schedule of tolls:

"1. On merchant vessels carrying passengers or
cargo one dollar and twenty cents ($1.20) per net
vessel ton — each one hundred (100) cubic feet — of
actual earning capacity.

"2. On vessels in ballast without passengers or cargo
forty (40) per cent less than the rate of tolls for vessels
with passengers or cargo.

"3. Upon naval vessels, other than transports, col-
liers, hospital ships and supply ships, fifty (50) cents
per displacement ton.

"4. Upon Army and Navy transports, colliers, hos-
pital ships and supply ships one dollar and twenty
($1.20) per net ton, the vessels to be measured by the
same rules as are employed in determining the net
tonnage of merchant vessels."

In fixing the charges payable by merchant vessels
for the use of the Panama Canal, the tolls were ad-
justed with reference to the fulfillment of three condi-
tions: That the tolls should be low enough to enable
the canal to compete successfully with alternative

Commercial Importance of Canal 233

routes; that the charges should not be high enough to
burden commerce unduly or seriously to restrict the
usefulness of the canal; and that the rates should be
high enough to yield revenues that will, within a rea-
sonable period of time, make the canal commercially
self-supporting.

The facts presented above regarding the effect
which the canal will have upon the length and time of
ocean voyages, and the facts concerning the relative
costs of coal via the Panama Canal and the alterna-
tive routes that may be taken by traffic most sensitive
to tolls, are, possibly, sufficient to show that the rates
of toll, as fixed by the President, will not prevent the
canal from competing with alternative routes, and will
not unduly burden traffic or restrict the use of the
canal. Whether the revenues derivable from the esti-
mated volume of shipping served by the canal will
enable the waterway to carry itself financially can be
indicated by comparing the probable yearly revenues
with the annual capital and current expenses.

The estimated revenues that might be secured from
the Panama Canal, if all ships paid tolls, during 1915,
1920 and 1925 are classified in the following table with
reference to the nationality of shipping employed in
American and foreign commerce:

234

TKe Panama Canal

TABLE IX. — CLASSIFICATION OF ESTIMATED REVENUE OF THE
PANAMA CANAL AT A TOLL OF $1.20 PER NET TON

Average per
annum during
1915 and 1916.

1920.

1925.

Coast-to-coast American shipping. .

American shipping carrying for-
eign commerce of the United
States

$ 1,200,000

864,000
10,536,000

$ 1,696,800
1,092,000
13,224,000

$ 2,400,000
1,380,000
16,620,000

Foreign shipping carrying com-
merce of the United States and
foreign countries

Total

$12,600,000

$16,012,800

$20,400,000

It is estimated that $20,750,000 will be required an-
nually to make the canal commercially self-sustaining.
This total is made up of $4,000,000 for operating and
maintenance expenses, $1,500,000 for sanitation and
Zone government, $250,000 for the annuity payable
to Panama under the treaty of 1903, $11,250,000 to
pay 3 per cent on the $375,000,000 invested in the
canal, and $3,750,000 for an amortization fund of 1 per
cent per annum upon the cost of the canal.

During the first year or two of the canal's operation
the annual net tonnage of the shipping passing through
the canal will presumably amount to about 10,500,000
tons.* Of this amount about 1,000,000 net tons will
consist of shipping engaged in the coastwise trade of
the United States. By the end of the first decade,
that is, in 1925, the total net tonnage of shipping
passing through the canal annually will be about
17,000,000 tons, of which at least 2,000,000 tons will
be contributed by the coastwise shipping.

* As stated in the footnote on page 219, the European war will inevitably
make the initial tonnage of canal traffic less than it otherwise would have been.

Commercial Importance of Canal 235

It is thus possible that about $12,600,000 per annum
will be secured from tolls during the first two or three
years of the canal's operation, if all vessels, American
and foreign, are required to pay the tolls fixed by the
President in his Proclamation of November 13, 1912.
If the Panama Canal Act of August 24, 1912, had not
been amended by the act of June 15, 1914, and the
coastwise shipping had been exempted from tolls, the
initial receipts from the canal would have amounted
to less than $10,500,000 per annum.

In all probability the rate of tolls will, by 1925,
have been reduced to $1.00 per net ton upon merchant
vessels. It will not be wise to charge higher tolls at
Panama than are levied at Suez. The tolls at Suez
are now $1.20 (6.25 francs) per net ton and they have
been reduced four times since 1902. It is probable
that the prophecy of de Lesseps will be realized and
that the Suez tolls will, eventually, be brought down
to 5 francs, about $1.00 per net ton. There will thus
be a probable revenue of $17,000,000 per annum in 1925,
obtainable from canal tolls, if all ships are required to
pay the dues. The exemption of the coastwise ship-
ping would have reduced the revenue in 1925 to about
$15,000,000 a year, or to less than the estimated annual
outlay for operation, Zone sanitation and government,
the Panama annuity and the interest on the amount in-
vested in the canal. The revenues would have yielded
no surplus for betterment and nothing for the amorti-
zation of the $375,000,000 or more which the people of
the United States will have paid for the canal.

These calculations indicate clearly that the United

236

THe Panama Canal

States will need to collect tolls from the owners of the
ships engaged in the American coastwise trade in order
to secure revenues, within a reasonable time after the
opening of the canal, large enough to meet the canal's
current expenses and its capital charges.

VI. The Exemption of the Owners of Coast-
wise Ships from Tolls Would Have Been an
Unnecessary and Unwise Subsidy

The provision which exempted the owners of ships
engaged in the American coastwise trade from the
payment of Panama tolls was included in the Canal
Administration Act of August 24, 1912, presumably,
because it was thought that such a provision was needed
in order to enable the canal to be of satisfactory service
to the industries and trade of the United States, and
because it was the desire of Congress to aid the Amer-
ican merchant marine. Would the rates paid by pro-
ducers and shippers of most articles of commerce have
been less because of exempting the coastwise steam-
ship companies from Panama tolls; and did or do
those companies need the subsidy that it was proposed
to give them?

The exceptionally large producers and traders who
ship goods in vessels which they own or charter would
probably enjoy lower transportation charges beween
the two seaboards of the United States, if the Govern-
ment relieved them from the payment of Panama
tolls; and in so far as the railroads compete with char-
tered vessels for lumber, coal, ore and similar traffic
the canal tolls would be of advantage to the railroads.

Commercial Importance of Canal 237

This advantage, however, would be more theoretical
than real, for it is not probable that the railroads can
compete with the carriers by water for bulk cargoes
of lumber, coal, ore and similar products. The rail-
roads will be obliged to allow that traffic to go by
water and the charter rates on such shipments will not
be affected by rail competition.

The effect which canal tolls upon coastwise shipping
will have upon rail and water rates, and the adjustment
of the charges of coastwise carriers and the railroads
engaged in handling traffic between the two seaboards
of the United States may be summarized as follows:

The rates on traffic handled by regular steamship
lines between the two seaboards will be but slightly
affected by canal tolls. Only such producers and
traders as use vessels which they own or charter for
the shipment of full cargoes would profit by the ex-
emption of the coastwise shipping from tolls. Prob-
ably 99 out of every 100 shippers would pay the same
rates whether there are tolls or not. Most of the inter-
coastal traffic will consist of general commodities and
package freight handled by the established steamship
lines. Bulk cargoes of lumber, coal, ore and heavy
steel products will comprise a relatively small share of
the total traffic. The rates charged by the several
steamship lines will be the same. The charges will be
regulated by agreements among the competing com-
panies and will be fixed primarily with reference to
the cost of the service to the carriers. The several
steamship lines will maintain relatively stable sched-
ules of charges which will ordinarily be adjusted with

238

XKe Panama Canal

reference to the even more stable schedule of com-
modity and class rates maintained by the transconti-
nental railroads and their eastern rail connections. If
the regular steamship lines are required to pay Panama
tolls, their payments to the Government will be a part
of their operating expenses, which will thus be increased
by the amount of the tolls. If the steamship compa-
nies were exempted from the payment of tolls they
would thereby receive a subsidy equal to the amount
of the tolls not collected by the Government.

The policy of toll exemption for the owners of the
coastwise ships was urged upon Congress by appeals
to patriotism. It was held to be a duty to aid the
merchant marine under the American flag; and a sub-
sidy in the form of toll exemption was granted to the
owners of coastwise ships. No assistance was to be
given vessels serving the foreign trade of the United
States. The carriers that were to have been given this
subsidy have a monopoly of the coastwise traffic, no
foreign-owned ships being allowed to enter the domestic
trade. Was the subsidy necessary or was it justifiable?

Senator Root, in the eloquent and forceful speech
which he delivered in the Senate January 21, 1913,
characterized the coastwise shipping business as "the
most highly and absolutely protected special industry
in the United States/ ' This industry, moreover, is
prosperous, not languishing. There are over 3,500,000
tons of ships enrolled for the domestic trade, on the
Atlantic and Pacific seaboards, and the opening of the
Panama Canal will cause a large addition to be made
to the coastwise fleet. It would seem that our navi-

Commercial Importance of Canal 239

gation laws now give the shipping owned by the coast-
wise carriers sufficient aid and protection. At least,
the burden of proof is upon the coastwise steamship
companies to show need of further assistance.

It is important that business principles should be
adhered to in the management of the Panama Canal.
Indeed, it ought to be accepted as axiomatic that the
United States Government should operate the canal in
a business-like way; that the tolls charged by the
Government should, if possible, be such as will stimu-
late traffic and at the same time safeguard the owners
of the waterway against an annual deficit. If it were
a private enterprise, it would be well to insist upon its
being managed, if possible, so as to yield its owners a
profit; but the canal being a government undertaking,
it will be best for the United States to collect such
revenues as are needed to meet operating and main-
tenance expenses and interest charges, and to provide
a sinking fund that will eventually return to the
treasury the sum invested in the canal.

In advocating the policy of adhering to business
principles in the management of the Panama Canal,
it is not recommended that the rate of tolls should be
high. Indeed, the schedule of charges fixed by the
President establishes relatively low rates — rates that
will not unduly restrict the use of the canal. The
owners of the vessels that serve the coastwise trade will
derive greater benefit from the canal than will the
owners of any other vessels. Rates double those es-
tablished by the President might be imposed without
preventing the canal from being used by the coastwise

240

THe Panama Canal

carriers. In view of these facts, it seems just that
those who derive immediate benefit from the use of
the canal should pay reasonable tolls. Congress acted
wisely when, by the act of June 15, 1914, it repealed
the provision of the law of August 24, 1912, which had
exempted the shipping engaged in the coastwise trade
of the United States from the payment of Panama
Canal tolls.

APPENDIX

NEUTRALITY OF PANAMA CANAL ZONE]

Since this book went to press the President of the
United States has issued a proclamation prescribing
"|Rules and Regulations Governing the Use of the
Panama [Canal by Vessels of Belligerents and the
Maintenance of Neutrality by the United States in
the Canal Zone." It is noteworthy that a proclamation
of this kind has been necessary so soon after the actual
opening of the Canal to traffic. The proclamation is of
general interest in connection with the subject matter
of this book, and it is of especial interest just at the
present time. The text of the proclamation follows:

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION

WHEREAS, the United States is neutral in the present war and
Whereas the United States exercises sovereignty in the land and
waters of the Canal Zone and is authorized by its treaty with
Panama of February twenty-six, nineteen hundred and four, to
maintain neutrality in the cities of Panama and Colon, and the
harbors adjacent to the said cities:

Now, Therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the
United States of America, do hereby declare and proclaim the
following Rules and Regulations Governing the Use of the Panama
Canal by Vessels of Belligerents and the Maintenance of Neutrality
by the United States in the Canal Zone, which are in addition to
the general "Rules and Regulations for the Operation and Navi-
gation of the Panama Canal and Approaches Thereto, including

241

242

THe Panama Canal

all Waters under its jurisdiction" put into force by Executive
Order of July 9, 1914, and I do bring to the attention of all con-
cerned the Protocol of an Agreement between the United States
and the Republic of Panama, signed at Washington, October 10,
1914, which protocol is hereunto annexed.

Rule 1. A vessel of war, for the purposes of these rules, is de-
fined as follows : a public armed vessel, under the command of an
officer duly commissioned by the government, whose name appears
on the list of officers of the military fleet, and the crew of which are
under regular naval discipline, which vessel is qualified by its
armament and the character of its personnel to take offensive
action against the public or private ships of the enemy.

Rule 2. In order to maintain both the neutrality of the Canal
and that of the United States owning and operating it as a govern-
ment enterprise, the same treatment, except as hereinafter noted,
as that given to vessels of war of the belligerents shall be given to
every vessel, belligerent or neutral, whether armed or not, that
does not fall under the definition of Rule 1, which vessel is em-
ployed by a belligerent Power as a transport or fleet auxiliary or
in any other way for the direct purpose of prosecuting or aiding
hostilities, whether by land or sea; but such treatment shall not
be given to a vessel fitted up and used exclusively as a hospital
ship.

Rule 3. A vessel of war of a belligerent, or a vessel falling under
Rule 2 which is commanded by an officer of the military fleet,
shall only be permitted to pass through the Canal after her com-
manding officer has given written assurance to the Authorities of
the Panama Canal that the Rules and Regulations will be faith-
fully observed.

The authorities of the Panama Canal shall take such steps as
may be requisite to insure the observance of the Rules and Regu-
lations by vessels falling under Rule 2 which are not commanded
by an officer of the military fleet.

Rule 4- Vessels of war of a belligerent and vessels falling under
Rule 2 shall not revictual nor take any stores in the Canal except
so far as may be strictly necessary; and the transit of such vessels
through the Canal shall be effected with the least possible delay in
accordance with the Canal Regulations in force, and with only
such intermission as may result from the necessities of the service.

Appendix

243

Prizes shall be in all respects subject to the same Rules as vessels
of war of the belligerents.

Rule 5. No vessel of war of a belligerent or vessel falling under
Rule 2 shall receive fuel or lubricants while within the territorial
waters of the Canal Zone, except on the written authorization of
the Canal Authorities, specifying the amount of fuel and lubricants
which may be received.

Rule 6. Before issuing any authorization for the receipt of fuel
and lubricants by any vessel of war of a belligerent or vessel falling
under Rule 2, the Canal Authorities shall obtain a written declara-
tion, duly signed by the officer commanding such vessel, stating
the amount of fuel and lubricants already on board.

Rule 7. Supplies will not be furnished by the Government of
the United States, either directly, or indirectly through the in-
tervention of a corporation, or otherwise, to vessels of war of a
belligerent or vessels falling under Rule 2. If furnished by private
contractors, or if taken from vessels under the control of a belli-
gerent, fuel and lubricants may be taken on board vessels of war
of a belligerent or vessels falling under Rule 2 only upon permission
of the Canal Authorities, and then only in such amounts as will
enable them, with the fuel and lubricants already on board, to
reach the nearest accessible port, not an enemy port, at which they
can obtain supplies necessary for the continuation of the voyage.
The amounts of fuel and lubricants so received will be deducted
from the amounts otherwise allowed in the ports under the juris-
diction of the United States during any time within a period of
three months thereafter. Provisions furnished by contractors
may be supplied only upon permission of the Canal Authorities,
and then only in amount sufficient to bring up their supplies to the
peace standard.

Rule 8. No belligerent shall embark or disembark troops,
munitions of war, or warlike materials in the Canal, except in case
of necessity due to accidental hindrance of the transit. In such
cases the Canal Authorities shall be the judge of the necessity, and
the transit shall be resumed with all possible dispatch.

Rule 9. Vessels of war of a belligerent and vessels falling under
Rule 2 shall not remain in the territorial waters of the Canal Zone
under the jurisdiction of the United States longer than twenty-
four hours at any one time, except in case of distress; and in such

244

Trie Panama Canal

case, shall depart as soon as possible; but a vessel of war of one
belligerent shall not depart within twenty-four hours from the
departure of a vessel of an opposing belligerent.

The twenty-four hours of this rule shall be construed to be
twenty-four hours in addition to the time necessarily occupied in
passing through the Canal.

Rule 10. In the exercise of the exclusive right of the United
States to provide for the regulation and management of the Canal,
and in order to ensure that the Canal shall be kept free and open
•on terms of entire equality to vessels of commerce and of war,
there shall not be, except by special arrangement, at any one time
«t greater number of vessels of war of any one nation, including
those of the allies of a belligerent nation, than three in either termi-
nal port and its adjacent terminal waters, or than three in transit
through the Canal; nor shall the total number of such vessels, at
nny one time, exceed six in all the territorial waters of the Canal
Zone under the jurisdiction of the United States.

Rule 11. When vessels of war or vessels falling under Rule 2,
belonging to or employed by opposing belligerents, are present
simultaneously in the waters of the Canal Zone, a period of not
less than twenty-four hours must elapse between the departure
of the vessel belonging to or employed by one belligerent and the
departure of the vessel belonging to or employed by his adversary.

The order of departure is determined by order of arrival, unless
the vessel which arrived first is so circumstanced that an extension
of her stay is permissible.

A vessel of war of a belligerent or vessel falling under Rule 2 may
not leave the waters of the Canal Zone until twenty-four hours
after the departure of a private vessel flying the flag of the adver-
sary.

Rule 12. A vessel of war of a belligerent or vessel falling under
Rule 2 which has left the waters of the Canal Zone, whether she
has passed through the Canal or not, shall, if she returns within a
period of one week after her departure, lose all privileges of pre-
cedence in departure from the Canal Zone, or in passage through the
Canal, over vessels flying the flag of her adversaries which may
enter those waters after her return and before the expiration of one
week subsequent to her previous departure. In any such case the
time of departure of a vessel which has so returned shall be fixed

Appendix

245

by the Canal Authorities, who may in so doing consider the wishes
of the commander of a public vessel or of the master of a private
vessel of the adversary of the returned vessel, which adversary's
vessel is then present within the waters of the Canal Zone.

Rule 13. The repair facilities and docks belonging to the United
States and administered by the Canal Authorities shall not be
used by a vessel of war of a belligerent, or vessels falling under
Rule 2, except when necessary in case of actual distress, and then
only upon the order of the Canal Authorities, and only to the
degree necessary to render the vessel sea-worthy. Any work
authorized shall be done with the least possible delay.

Rule H. The radio installation of any vessel of a belligerent
Power, public or private, or of any vessel falling under Rule 2,
shall be used only in connection with Canal business to the exclu-
sion of all other business while within the waters of the Canal Zone,
including the waters of Colon and Panama Harbors.

Rule 15. Air craft of a belligerent Power, public or private, are
forbidden to descend or arise within the jurisdiction of the United
States at the Canal Zone, or to pass through the air spaces above
the lands and waters within said jurisdiction.

Rule 16. For the purpose of these rules the Canal Zone includes
the cities of Panama and Colon and the harbors adjacent to the
said cities.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused
the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington this thirteenth day of
November in the year of our Lord one thousand
[Seal.] nine hundred and fourteen and of the independence
of the United States the one hundred and thirty-
ninth.

WOODROW WILSON

By the President:
W. J. Bryan
Secretary of State

Protocol of an agreement concluded between Honorable Robert
Lansing, Acting Secretary of State of the United States, and Don
Eusebio A. Morales, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Pleni-
potentiary of the Republic of Panama, signed the tenth day of
October, 1914.

246

THe Panama Canal

The undersigned, the Acting Secretary of State of the United
States of America and the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Panama, in view of the close
association of the interests of their respective Governments on the
Isthmus of Panama, and to the end that these interests may be
conserved and that, when a state of war exists, the neutral obliga-
tions of both Governments as neutrals may be maintained, after
having conferred on the subject and being duly empowered by
their respective Governments, have agreed:

That hospitality extended in the waters of the Republic of
Panama to a belligerent vessel of war or a vessel belligerent or
neutral, whether armed or not, which is employed by a belligerent
power as a transport or fleet auxiliary or in any other way for the
direct purpose of prosecuting or aiding hostilities, whether by land
or sea, shall serve to deprive such vessel of like hospitality in the
Panama Canal Zone for a period of three months, and vice versa.

In testimony whereof, the undersigned have signed and sealed
the present Protocol in the city of Washington, this tenth day of
October, 1914.

Robert Lansing [l. s.]
Eusebio A. Morales [l. s.]

INDEX

Accidents in locks, 80.

Adelaide, distances and time saved

via Panama or Suez Canals to,

211, 212.
Aids to navigation, 104.
American, Atlantic, and Pacific Ship

Canal Co., 13.
Anterior debts, concessions, etc.,

waived by Panama treaty, 200.
Antwerp, distances and time saved

via Panama Canal from, 209.
Approach walls for locks, 83.
Appropriations for Navy, affected

by canal, 126.
Appropriations, original, for canal, 25.
Asiatic exclusion, 127.
Atlantic sea-level section, 96.
Australia, time and distances saved

by various routes, 211, 212.
Authority of U. S. in Canal Zone, 192.
Avila, Gil Gonzales de, 7.

Balboa, 6, 7.

Battleships, increase in beam, 93.
Belligerents and the Panama Canal,
189.

Blockade of Panama Canal forbidden,

by treaty, 189.
Bohio site for locks and dams, 31.
Breaks in canal banks, character of,

76.

Breakwater, Toro Point, 94, 95.

East, 95.

Naos Island, 97.
Bremerton, naval base, 141, 143.
Bryce, Ambassador, 3.
Bunau-Varilla, P., signatory of Pan-
ama treaty, 191, 202.
Buoys in Panama Canal channel, 104.

Caisson for locks, floating, 83.
California, influence on canal idea,
12.

as source of oil fuel, 148.
Callao, distances and time saved via

canal to, 208, 209.
Camacho River diversion, 101.
Canal, effect of, on size of Navy, 132,

133.

Canal forms the military coast line of

the U. S., 161.
Canal idea, history of, 4.
Canal location, 30, 42.
Canal projects, modern, 11.
Canal route, 29.
Canal tolls, and revenues, 232.

determination of, influenced by
competitive routes, 233.
Canal Zone sovereignty, 174, 192.

established by treaty, 192.
Cancellation of previous treaties by

Panama, 199.
Cathay, route to, 4, 5.
Cement as used at Gatun, 88.

as used at Miraflores, 91.
Central Division in charge of Culebra

Cut excavation, 63.
Chagres, town of, 8.
Chagres River, a great problem in

canal construction, 42.

dammed af Culebra Cut, 102.

description of, 31.

diversions, 31, 34.

dry weather flow, 52.

early traffic on, 60.

outlet, 30.

threatens Gatun Dam during con-
struction, 42.
Chain fender in locks, 82.

247

248

Index

Change in government, laws, etc., does

not affect U. S treaty rights, 201.
Charles V of Spain urges discovery

of strait, 7.
China, distances and time saved via

Panama or Suez canals to, 215,

217.

Choice of type of canal, 35.
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 127, 157,
158, 162.

Coal, price of, affected by Canal,
147.

Coal, see also Fuel.

Coaling plants, Cristobal, 100.

land for, 177, 201.

Pacific end, 99.
Coastwise shipping, exemption of,

from canal tolls, 236.
Colombia fails to ratify treaty with
U. S., 25, 163.

grants canal concession, 17.

grants extension of time, 20.
Colon, a free port, 177, 195.
Columbus, 5.

Comite technique of engineers, 20.

Commerce across isthmus, early, 8.
of U. S. with non-European coun-
tries, increase in, 220.

Commercial importance of Panama
Canal, 205, 206.

Commercial routes via Panama
Canal, 145.

Compensation for Canal Zone, etc.,
paid by U. S. to Panama, 197.

Competition between transcon-
tinental railroads and Panama
Canal steamship lines, 224, 226.

Composition of fleet as affected by
canal, 136.

Concentration of fleet, canal a mili-
tary advantage in, 137.

Concession from Colombia for canal,
17.

Concessionary rights under old canal
contracts renounced by Panama,
177, 200.

Conclusion, 120.

Concrete costs, Gatun locks, 89, 113.

Gatun spillway, 113.

Miraflores locks, 91.
Congress and naval policy, 152.
Congress of Geographical Science,
1875, 15.

Congress, requirement by, as to size of
canal, 91.

Constantinople Convention, as to
Suez Canal, 166.
copy of, 182.

neutralizes Suez Canal, 168.
provisions of, as to Suez Canal, 167.
Consulting Engineers, International
Board of, comment by President
Roosevelt on report of, 40.
comment by Secretary of War

Taft on report of, 38.
comparative data by, on sea-level

versus lock canals, 37.
report of, on type of canal, 36.
Continental Divide, 32, 33.
Contract for canal construction by

French company, 18.
Control of canal by U. S., 157.
Control of water during construction,
100.

Coronel, distances and time saved via

canal to, 208, 209.
Cost keeping records, 112.
Cost of canal, comparative estimates

of, 114

Costs of operating Panama Canal,

estimated, 234.
Costs, actual, of breakwater stone,

95.

broken stone, 88, 90.

concrete, 91, 113.

dredging, 96, 113.

excavating Culebra Cut, 64, 113.

hydraulic excavation, 96, 113.

Naos Island breakwater, 98.

sand, 90.

sanitation, 112.

work, 112.

Index

249

Costs of work, actual, by divisions,

classified, 116.
Couvreux & Hersent contract for

French Canal, 18.
Cuba, 129.

Culebra the canal summit, 32.
Culebra Cut, analysis of excavation

costs, 64.
disposal of excavated material, 68,

97.

excavation of, 63.

general description, 44.

proportion of blasted material, 65.
Culebra Cut and geology of the Isth-
mus, 74.
Cylindrical valves for locks, 86.

Dam between Culebra Cut and

Chagres River, 102.
Dam, Gatun, see Gatun Dam.
Defense of canal by Navy, 151.
de Lesseps, Ferdinand, announces
speedy completion of canal, 19.
capitulates to lock idea, 19.
committee formed by, in 1876,
17.

dominates committees, 16.

enters on scene, 15.

predicts tolls of $1.00 per ton for

Suez, 235.
tried and convicted by courts, 19.
visits Isthmus, 17, 19.
Depth of canal channel in Culebra

Cut, 52.
Dingier, M., engineer, 18.
Discovery of America, 5.
Disposition of fleet as affected by

canal, 137.
Distance, not only factor in choice of

route, 216.
Distance tables, 208, 209, 211, 212,
215, 217.

Distances and time saved, by Pana-
ma Canal, 125, 206.

Distances and time saved via Pana-
ma and Suez Canals compared,
211, 212, 215, 217.

Distances between ports, as affecting
the Navy, 131, 132, 139.
shortened, 125, 145.

Distances, maximum effect of Pana-
ma Canal on, 207.

Distances via Magellan Straits and
Panama Canal, 125, 145, 208.

Diversion of rivers see Chagres River,
Rio Grande River, Obispo River.

Drake, Sir Francis, 9.

Dredging, Atlantic sea-level section,
96.

Pacific sea-level section, 96.
Dredging in Culebra Cut, 70.
Dry docks at Pacific end of canal, 98.
Dumps for excavated material,

methods of handling dirt at, 69,

70.

Dynamite, premature discharge, 65.
firing, 65.

amount used, 65, 66.

history of canal, 4.
Earthquakes, absence of, 71.
Economic conditions, influence of, on

ships and harbors, 92.
Economies in fuel via Panama Canal

route, 228.
Economy in fuel for Navy due to

canal, 146.
Effect of canal on naval building
policy, 134.
on Navy, 132, 133.
Effect of fuel cost upon usefulness

of Panama Canal, 228.
Egyptian government and Suez

Canal, 184, 185.
Elements of success, 117.
Elevation of ground at Culebra, 32.
Emergency dam, 83.
Empire, low summit of canal at, 32.
Enemy's ships passing through canal,
167.

Early

250

Index

England, treaties of 1850 and 1901
with, 127.

Entrance and clearance statistics,
possible traffic through canal
based on, 218.

Estimated probable tonnage of Pana-
ma Canal, 219, 220, 221, 234.

Estimated revenues of Panama Canal,
234.

Estimates of cost of Nicaragua Canal,
22.

Estimates of cost of Panama Canal
by Consulting Engineers' Board,
114.

by de Lesseps, 18.
by International Survey Commis-
sion, 18.

by Isthmian Canal Commission,

22, 114.
comparative, 114.
Estimates by French Company of
value of French work, 22.
by Isthmian Canal Commission of
value of French work, 22.
European-New Zealand traffic not

much affected by canal, 214.
Excavation by the French, 35.
Exemption of coastwise shipping
from Panama Canal tolls, an un-
wise subsidy, 236.
reduction in canal revenue, due to,
235.

Expenditures to June 30, 1913, 116.
Extradition, provisions of Panama
treaty, 198.

Fleet, composition of, as affected by

canal, 136.
Floating caisson for locks, 83.
Floating cranes — 250 tons, 99.
Floating dry dock Dewey, 91.
Foreign trade and foreign relations,

128.

Formula for strength of Navy, 129.

Fortifications forbidden by Clayton-

Bulwer treaty, 158.
Fortifying canal, effect of Hay-
Pauncefote treaty on, 166.
Hay memorandum, 169.
Lord Lansdowne memorandum,
170.

permitted by Panama treaty, 177,
201.

to maintain independence of Pana-
ma, 175.

Fortifying Suez Canal forbidden, 180.
Freight rates via Panama Canal, how

probably fixed, 224.
French Canal Company, 17.
French Canal, evaluation of, 22.
location of Atlantic end, 30.
proposed lock-level plan, 21.
used to construct locks, 88.
French concession, canal and roads,

1838, 12.
French contribution to canal, 15.
errors, 119.
operations, 33, 34.
Frontier, military, 140.
Fuel costs, effect of, on usefulness of
Panama Canal, 228.
high via Straits of Magellan, 214.
influence traffic, 216.
less via Panama than via Cape of
Good Hope or Straits of Magel-
lan, 213, 230.
via Panama Canal and Straits of

Magellan, affecting traffic, 229.
via Panama less than via Suez,
228, 231.
Fuel problem for Navy, 145.
Fuel stations for Navy, 131, 145.
Fueling naval vessels, 145.

Gadsden treaty with Mexico, 163.
Garella, Napoleon, recommends canal,
12.

Gates for locks, 81, 82, 87.

Index

251

Gatun Dam, characteristics of, 58.

comment by Secretary of War
Taft, 38.

description, 54.

forms Gatun Lake, 42.

tests of models and soils, 58, 59.

threatened by river during con-
struction, 102.
Gatun Lake as a storage reservoir,
52.

description of, 46.
evaporation, 48.

formation of, and level of water,
42.

loss of water by leaks, 50.
seepage loss, 49.

sufficiency of water supply, 48, 53.

water required by lockages, 50.
Gatun Locks, construction of, 88, 103.

general description, 42.
Gatun Spillway, channel in Chagres
diversion, 34.

construction of, 103.

description of, 59.

discharge capacity, 61.
General description of Panama Canal,
41.

Geology, description of formations, 71.
Gibraltar, distances and time saved

via canal, 209.
Government of Panama, free passage

through canal and over railroad,

199.

Grant, President, official recognition
of canal by, in 1869, 14.

Great Britain and the Monroe Doc-
trine, 159.

Guam, 130, 141, 144.

Guantanamo, 132, 140, 146.

Guard gates for locks, 82.

Harbors at canal terminals, 94.
Hay memorandum as to defense of
canal, 170.

Hay-Pauncefote treaty, based on
canal being in foreign territory,
173.
copy of, 188.

supersedes Clayton-Bulwer treaty,
161.

see also 127, 151, 157, 164.
Hayes, President, policy as to canal,

160.
Historical, 3.

Hong Kong, distances and time saved
via Panama Canal to, 215.
distances and time saved via Suez
Canal to, 217.

Hydraulic excavation, 96.

Illumination of canal and locks, 104,
105.

Immigration into Canal Zone, 197.
Importations into Canal Zone by

U. S. free by treaty, 197.
Income from Panama Canal tolls,

probable, 235.
Increase in size of ships, 91.
Independence of Panama guaranteed

by U. S., 175, 176, 192.
International law and the canal, 157,

178.

International status of Panama and
Suez Canals compared, 179, 180,
181.

International status of Panama

Canal, 157, 178.
Interoceanic Canal Commission rec-
ommends Nicaragua route, 14.
Interoceanic passage, desire for, 6.
Iquique, distances and time saved via

canal to, 208, 209.
Isthmian Canal Commission, author-
ized by Spooner law, 25.
first appointed, 1899, 15.
investigations, 1899-1901, 21.
vote on type of canal, 36.
Isthmus of Panama, increase in im-
portance of, 12.
description of, 29.

252

Index

J apan, distances and time saved via
Panama Canal to, 215, 217.

Joint commission for valuation of
private lands in Canal Zone,
198.

Kaiser Wilhelm Canal locks, 93.
Kiel Canal locks, 93.

Iiand damages in Canal Zone, 194.
Lands for naval and coaling stations,
Panama agrees to sell, 177, 201.
Lansdowne, Lord, on right to fortify

canal, 170.
Larvicide used, 111.
Length of canal, 33, 46.
Lighting canal, 104.
Limiting dimensions of locks, 91.
Limon Bay, description of, 30, 94.
Liverpool, distances and time saved,
via Panama Canal to, 209, 212.

via Suez Canal to, 217.
Lobnitz rock-breakers used, 97.
Lock operating machinery, 85.
Lock type of canal, adopted by de
Lesseps, 19.

comparative data with sea-level
type, 37.

obligatory at Nicaragua, 22.

recommended by commission for
Panama, 22.

versus sea-level type, 37.
Locking vessels, accidents in, 80.

method used in Panama Canal, 80.
Locks, additional in the future, 93.

as the limiting feature, 91.

construction of, 88.

emptying and filling, 84.

general description of, 80.

illumination of, 105.

unwatering, 82, 83.
Locomotives for towing vessels, 80.
Long voyages by navy in fleet, 138.

lllachinery for operating locks, 85.
Magellan, 6.

Magellan Straits, naval route via,
145, 146.

Mahan, Admiral, 151.

Malaria and yellow fever, 110.

Management of canal enterprise, 117.

Manila, distances and time saved via
Panama Canal to, 215.
via Suez Canal to, 217.

Mare Island — naval base, 141, 142.

Maritime Canal Company of Nicara-
gua, 14.

Melbourne, distances and time saved

via Canal to, 211, 212.
Merchant marine and the canal, 149.

and the navy, 150.
Merchantmen, status of, in war, 172.
Meyer, Secretary, 127.
Military frontier of U. S., 140.
Military policy of U. S., 152.
Miraflores Lake, area and elevation

of, 78.

detailed description of, 78.
general description of, 45.
Miraflores Locks, construction of, 88,
89, 90.
general description of, 45.
Modern canal projects, 11, 13.
Monopoly of U. S. for construction of
canals or railroads in Panama,
193.

Monroe Doctrine infringed by Great
Britain, 158.
upheld by Hay-Pauncefote treaty,

162.
waiver of, 159.
see also 127, 129, 140, 181.
Moral obligations of U. S. as to canal,
164.

Morgan, Henry, 10.

Mosquito, the yellow fever, 110.

Naos Island, 97.

Naos Island breakwater, 97, 98.

Index

253

Naval auxiliaries, effect of canal on,
136.

Naval bases in West Indies and

Pacific, 139, 141.
Naval policy of U. S., 152.
Naval strength of U. S., desirable,

134.

Navigation, aids to, in canal, 104.

of sea-level canal, 37.
Navy and the Panama Canal, the,

125, 150.
Navy, duty to protect canal, 150.

on Pacific Coast, 138.
New French Company, formed by
receiver, 20.
gathers data, 21.
sells canal to U. S., 26.
New Granada, treaty with, 163.
New Orleans, distances and time
saved via canal to, 208, 211, 215.
naval station, 140.
New York, distances and time saved

from, via canal, 208, 211, 215.
New Zealand, time and distances
saved to, by various routes, 211,
212.

Neutrality, as affecting fueling navy,
146.

of Canal Zone, duty of maintaining,
174.

of Canal Zone, Panama treaty, 199.
of Canal Zone, proclamation by
President, 202, 241.
Neutralization of canal, U. S. sole

sponsor, 168.
Neutralization policy by President

Hayes, 160.
Neutralization rules for canal, 151,
168.

Neutralization rules in Hay-Paunce-

fote treaty, 166.
Nicaragua Canal Board appointed

1895, 14.

Nicaragua Canal Commission ap-
pointed 1897, 15.

Nicaragua canal route, examined in
1779, 11.
locks obligatory, 22.
Nicaragua canal route, recommended
in 1876, 14.
recommended in 1901, 23.
surveys in 1885, 14.
Nicaragua Canal versus Panama

Canal, 23.
Nicaragua Lake discovered, 7.
Nombre de Dios founded, 8.

Obispo River, 32, 101.
Obispo River diversion, 101.
Oil fuel for navy via canal, 148.
Olney, Secretary of State, 159.
Open door in Far East policy, 127.
Operating costs of Panama Canal, 234.

Pacific Coast and the Navy, 138.
Pacific sea-level section, 96.
Panama, copy of treaty with, 190.

grants of Canal Zone lands, 178.

independence of, guaranteed by
U. S., 175, 192.

revolts from Colombia, 25, 163.

treaty with U. S., 26, 163, 173.

U. S. protection, 129.
Panama Bay, description of, 33.
Panama Canal in international law,
157.

in war, 168.

route recommended by commission

in 1902, 24.
status compared with Suez Canal,

179, 180, 181.
versus Nicaragua Canal, 23.
Panama city, a free port, 177, 195.
Panama, old city of, early metropo-
lis, 9.

founded, 8.
ransacked, 10.
Panama Railroad, 29, 90, 115.
amount of traffic on, 67.
established, 13.

rights over, ceded by Panama, 195.

254

Index

Panama tolls and revenue, 232.
Panama traffic, American and For-
eign, 216.
Pauncefote, Lord, 171.
Pearl Harbor naval base, 141, 143.
Pedro Miguel, 33.

Pedro Miguel lock, construction of, 89.
general description of, 45.

Pensacola naval station, 140.

Philip II, canal idea abandoned by, 9.

Philippine Islands, 130, 141, 143.

Philippine Islands, distances and time
saved via Panama and Suez Ca-
nals to, 215, 217.

Physical characteristics of canal
route, 29.

Piratical attacks on Isthmus, 9.

Pizarro, conquest of Peru, 8.

Policies of the United States, 127.

Porto Bello, quarry, 88. .
stone, 95.

town of, 5, 8, 9, 10.
Porto Rico, 129.

Ports at canal entrances declared free

by treaty, 195.
Preponderance of naval strength in

Atlantic, 139.
Private land holders in Canal Zone,

193.

Private property, at sea, 172.
inviolability of, at sea if at war
with Italy, 172.
Prize vessels, Hay-Pauncefote treaty,
189.

Probable tonnage of Panama Canal,
219, 220, 221.

Probable traffic through Panama
Canal, 219.

Proclamation by President Wilson on
Canal Zone neutrality, 202.
copy of, 241.

Protection of canal by U. S., per-
mitted, 177. See also Fortifying
canal.

Protectorate by Great Britain in
Central America, 157.

Purchase by U. S. of Canal Zone from
Panama, 197.

Purchase of canal from French Com-
pany, 26.

Quarantine to control yellow fever,
110.

Quarry at Ancon, 89.
at Porto Bello, 88.
at Toro Point, 95.

Railroad rates via transcontinental
lines, effect of Panama Canal on,
222, 226.

Range lights, 104.

Rates for freight via Panama Canal,
how probably fixed by steamship
lines, 224.

Rates via Isthmus of Tehuantepec,
222.

via Panama Railroad, 223.
Regulation and management of canal

vests in U. S., 165.
Regulation of Panama Canal freight

rates probable, 228.
Revenue and tolls, Panama Canal

232.

Revolution by Panama, 25, 163.
Rio Grande River, diversion, 79, 101.

path of canal to Pacific, 33, 96.

takes Miraflores spillway flow, 79.
Road across Isthmus, 8, 10.
Roosevelt, President, discussion of

type of canal by, 39.
Route, design and construction of

canal, 29.

San Francisco, distances and time

saved via canal to, 208.
San Francisco Bay, suitable for naval

base, 141.
Sand, Chame", 90.

cost of, 90.
Sanitation, 109.
cost of, 112.

Index

255

Sanitation of Panama and Colon
placed under U. S. by treaty, 194.

Santo Domingo convent, arch in,
shows absence of earthquakes, 71.

Sault Ste. Marie Canal, 40.

Saving in fuel by Navy using canal,
147.

Saving in time and distance by

Panama Canal, 206.
Saving in time, one-half day deducted

for canal passage, 207.
Screening dwellings, etc., 111.
Sea-level canal, advocated by de Les-

seps, 16.
attacks on feasibility of, 19.
comparative data with lock type,

37.

French ideal, 35.

versus lock canal, 37.
Sea-level sections, Atlantic end, gen-
eral description of, 41, 96.

Pacific end, general description of,
45,96.

Sentiment in canal organization,

national, 118.
Seward, Wm. H., speech of, in senate,

120.

Sewerage and water supply for Pan-
ama and Colon provided by
U. S., 194.
Shanghai, distances and time saved
via Panama Canal to, 215.
distances and time saved via Suez
Canal to, 217.
Ship repair plant, 98, 99.
Shortening of sea routes, 125.
Singapore, distances and time saved

via Suez Canal to, 215, 217.
Slides, amount of material in, 75.
at Cucaracha, 76.
at West Culebra, 75.
causes and description, 74.
of varying character, 76.
Sovereignty, change of, in Panama,
no effect on canal, 190.
over Canal Zone, 174.

Speed of passenger and freight steam-
ers, 207.

Spooner law, provisions of, 24, 25.
Standard Atlantic fleet, 130.
Standard Pacific fleet, 130.
Status of Suez and Panama canals

compared, 179, 180, 181.
Steam shovels, in Culebra Cut, 66.

work in cut completed, 70.
Stone, broken, cost of, 88.

from Ancon, 89.

from Porto Bello, 88.
Stone crushing plant at Ancon, 89.
Stoney gate valves, 62, 86.
Straits of Magellan, 145, 146.

distances via, 208.
Straits of Panama, 35, 40.
Strength of the Navy, affected by
canal, 125, 131, 133.

affected by various conditions, 130.
Submarine rock excavation, 97.
Success, elements of, 117.
Suez Canal, 16, 38, 91, 145.

distances and time saved via, 211,
212, 215, 217.

international status fixed by Con-
stantinople Convention, 182.

naval route via, 145.

neutralization rules, 167.

neutralized by concert of nine
European powers, 180.

open in war and peace, 183.

status compared with Panama
Canal, 179.

tolls, 235.
Superior Advisory Commission, 18.
Sydney, distances and time saved
via canal to, 211, 212.

Taft, Secretary of War, discussion
by, of type of canal, 38.

Taxes by Panama on Canal Zone
property forbidden by treaty,
196.

256

Index

Terminals, 94.

Tide, range of, in Atlantic, 42.

range of, in Pacific, 45.
Time and distances, saved by Panama

Canal, 206.
Time of vessel passing through canal,
as compared with Nicaragua
Canal, 23.
estimated, 46.
Tolls and revenue, Panama Canal, 232.
Tolls for Panama Canal fixed at $1.20

per ton, 223, 232.
Tonnage, estimated amount of, pass-
ing through Panama Canal, 234.
of vessels 1909-1910 that might have
advantageously used Panama
Canal, 218.
Topography of canal route, 29.
Toro Point breakwater, 94.
Trade of Panama, 8, 10.
with Orient, early European, 4.
see also Traffic.
Traffic, American and foreign via
Panama, 216.
amount of, Sault Ste. Marie Canal,
51.

amount of, Suez Canal, 51.

between Atlantic and Gulf coasts
and Australia, 213.

between Europe and Australia, 213.

between Europe and China, fuel
costs via Suez less than via Pan-
ama, 231.

between Europe and New Zealand
via Panama Canal, influence of
fuel costs on, 231.

between Europe and Orient, 216.

between Europe and west coast of
South America likely to use canal,
210; influence of fuel costs on,
229.

estimate for Panama Canal, 51,
93.

of transcontinental railroads, small
amount of, originates on sea-
board, 225.

Traffic through Panama Canal, effect
of European war (footnote), 219.
through Panama Canal, probable,

219, 220, 221.
through Panama Canal, probable
amount of in 1909-1910 if canal
had been open, 218.

Train dispatchers in Culebra Cut, 66.

Transcontinental railroad rates, effect
of Panama Canal on, 222.

Transcontinental railroad traffic,
small amount originates on sea-
board, 225.

Treaty engagements as to canal, with
Great Britain and Panama only,
164.

Treaty to facilitate construction of a
ship canal (Hay-Pauncefote),
187.

Treaty with Panama, 151, 173.
copy of, 190.

excepts Colon and Panama from

Canal Zone, 175.
grants Canal Zone to U. S., 174.
Tutuila, 130.

Two-ocean standard fleet, 130, 134.
Type of canal, choice of, 35.

United States in isolated position,
152.

United States trade with Orient, dis-
advantage removed by canal,
214.

Universal Interoceanic Canal Co., 17.
Unwatering locks, 82, 83.

Valp araiso, distances and time saved

via canal to, 208, 209.
Valves for locks, 85, 86.

for spillway, 62.
Vessels, private, status of, in war, 17.

Wars, possible, 126, 128, 129.
Water, control of, during construction,
100.

Index

257

Water, amount of, required by lock-
ages, 50.

Water systems and sewerage for

Panama and Colon provided by

U. S., 194.
Wellington, distances and time saved

via canal to, 211, 212.
West Indian naval bases, 139.
Wilson, President, proclamation by, on

Canal Zone neutrality, 202, 241.

Work done by French, 22, 34.
Wyse, Lieut. L. N. B., secures con-
cession, 17.
secures extension, 20.

Yellow fever, 110.
Yokohama, time and distances, via
Panama Canal to, 215.
via Suez Canal to, 217.

Naranjitos

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Area of Gatun Lake at
f/ex ~8Srt ,163.38 S<jM.

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ISTHMIAN CANAL COMMISSION
— MAP SHOWING

ISTHMUS WITH COMPLETED CANAL.

LPAN

SCALE
Miles

so'

,jCh«Tera

Kilometres

• LQnuiTdQi wfir\r/ro* *A-e£(!^£L

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Water Surface Meat? Sea Level'

Mindi River to Gatun Locks Mile4.S to7.i5
Miraf lores to Pavama Bay Mile 41 4-7 to 45.5

Color? Harbor Mile o to 4.5

Ar»gle Nortb of San Pablo to Ar79le Nortb of Juar> Grande- Mile 23.66 to 27.5

Cro»» Section of Culebra Cut Sowing Largest Effect of Slide (1912)

Angle Nortb of Joan Grande to Angle at Bas Obispo Mile 27.5 to 31.5

PANAMA CANAL

CROSS SECTIONS

300' • — <\

Typical Cross Section of Culebra CVit
Bas obispo,Mile3l.s to Pedro Migoel. Mile 39.6

PLa.te Y

PANAMA CANAL-PROFILE

VERTICAL SCALE IOO TIMES HORIZONTAL SCALE

Mai E!ev rfl7'

Plate Vf

Mean Sea Lev. LtevtQ

Side Wall Elevation

GATUN LOCKS

GENERAL PLAN, PROFILES & SECTIONS

REC'O

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