• II ^ { C-CM T \ TJY : CITY LmOINEER : THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES THE PANAMA CANAL COMPRISING ITS HISTORY AND CONSTRUC- TION, AND ITS RELATION TO THE NAVY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCE BY REUBEN E. BAKENHDS, S. B. Corps op Civil Engineers, United States Navy Public Works Officer, Navy Yard, Boston, Mass. Formerly Assistant in Civil Engineering, Massachusetts Institute op Technology HARRY S. KNAPP Captain United States Navy; Formerly Member Naval War College Staff EMORY R. JOHNSON, Ph. D., Sc. D. Professor of Transportation and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania Member of Public Service Commission of Pennsylvania Special Commissioner on Panama Canal Traffic and Tolls, 1911-1913 With Maps and Illustrations FIRST EDITION FIRST THOUSAND NEW YORK JOHN WILEY & SONS, Inc. London: CHAPMAN & HALL, Limited 1915 ^ LIBRARY < OF THE : CITY ENGINEE PASADENA, - CALIF. Copyright, 1914 BY REUBEN E. BAKENHUS, HARRY S. KNAPP AND EMORY R. JOHNSON Stanbope ipreas F. H.GILSON COMPANY BOSTON, U.S.A. SUP PREFACE Although much has been published on the Panama Canal, it is this very wealth of literature which makes another book desirable. The reader who would thor- oughly understand the canal, its history, where and how it was built, what it means to commerce and to the navy and where it stands in the council of nations would" perhaps, wade through many pages of pictur- esque and interesting descriptions more or less accurate, find a part well described here and a part there and yet, in the end, might not have a complete understand- ing of the mammoth enterprise. The authors of this volume have endeavored to take the comprehensive view, excluding non-essential details which, though in- teresting, apply to many other enterprises as well as to the canal. They have included, however, the impor- tant principles, laws and facts to which the canal owes its existence. That such a treatise may hold the inter- est of the reader the authors are led to believe because of the many kind and genuine commendations from those who read the subject-matter when it first ap- peared in print. It may be of added interest to know that the articles which have been gathered under one cover to form this book were originally published in the Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, a voluntary pro- iii iv Preface fessional organization of naval officers. No body of men in the country is more vitally interested in all phases of the Panama Canal than the officers of the United States Navy. With this in mind the Board of Control of the Naval Institute requested the prepara- tion of a series of articles on the canal that would comprehend not only the history and the engineering features of the great work, but also the position of the canal in international law, in commerce and in its relation to the national defense. Their reception has been so favorable outside the naval service, as well as inside, that the material is now presented in book form for the general reader. The articles have been thoroughly reviewed and, with additional information included therein, are pre- pared for the press at a time when the canal is all but complete and the first vessels have already passed through. Many years of study and experience in lines directly allied to the subjects discussed and much hard work were preparatory for this publication and if the authors have in any way met a want or filled a gap in the extensive literature on the canal they will feel well repaid. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Acknowledgment is due the Board of Control of the Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md., for permission to pub- lish in book form the material which originally appeared as articles in the Proceedings of the Naval Institute, and to the Secretary, Lieutenant Commander Ralph Earle, U. S. Navy, for his unfailing interest in the work. The annual and special reports of the Isthmian Canal Commission are replete with information and have been a most valuable aid in preparation of parts of this volume. To Col. George W. Goethals, U. S. Army, formerly Chairman of the Isthmian Canal Commission and now Governor of the Panama Canal, and to Civil Engineer H. H. Rousseau, U. S. Navy, formerly member of the Isthmian Canal Commission and now engineer of ter- minals, as well as to many others connected with the work, thankful acknowledgment is made of many cour- tesies extended in connection with inspection of the canal operations and access to the official records. The maps and the photographs, where not otherwise noted, are reproduced from official sources. Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2014 https://archive.org/details/panamacanalcomprbyre TABLE OF CONTENTS PART I HISTORICAL Page Introductory 3 Early History 4 Modern Canal Projects 11 French Contribution to the Enterprise 15 Transfer of Control to the United States 21 PART II THE ROUTE — THE DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION Physical Characteristics of the Canal Route... 29 The Choice of Type 35 Comparative Data — Sea-level and Lock Canal (Table) 37 General Description of the Canal 41 Gatun Lake 46 The Gatun Dam 54 Gatun Spillway 59 Excavation of Culebra Cut 63 Analysis of Cost of Excavating Culebra Cut (Table) 64 Geology and the Slides 71 MlRAFLORES LAKE 78 The Canal Locks 80 Lock Operating Machinery 85 Constructing the Locks 88 Locks as the Limiting Feature 91 The Sea-level Sections and the Terminals 94 Control of Water During Construction 100 Aids to Navigation 104 vii Table of Contents PART III SANITATION — COSTS OF WORK — ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS — CONCLUSION Page Sanitation 109 Costs of Work 112 Total Expenditures to June 30, 1913 (Table) 116 The Elements of Success 117 In Conclusion 120 PART IV THE NAVY AND THE PANAMA CANAL The Navy and the Panama Canal 125 PART V THE PANAMA CANAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW The Panama Canal in International Law 157 The Suez Canal Treaty 182 The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty 187 The Hay-Bunau Varilla (Panama) Treaty 190 PART VI COMMERCIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE PANAMA CANAL Commercial Importance of the Panama Canal 205 Distances and Time Saved by the Panama Canal 206 Panama Traffic, American and Foreign 216 Effect of Panama Canal upon Transcontinental Rates by Railroads and Carriers by Water. 222 Effect of Fuel Costs upon Usefulness of the Panama Canal 228 Panama Canal Tolls and Revenue 232 Exemption of the Owners of Coastwise Ships . . . 236 APPENDIX NEUTRALITY PROCLAMATION Proclamation of Neutrality of Canal Zone by President Wilson 241 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Fia. Facing Pa.gb 1. The Canal at Empire under French Control in 1885 .. . 14 2. Culebra Cut at Culebra in January 1912 20 3. Culebra Cut at Culebra in February 1912, Showing " Break" 20 4. Culebra Cut at Empire in January 1913 26 5. A Slide in Culebra Cut, February 1913, Showing Shovel at Work 32 6. A Slide in Culebra Cut, February 1913, Near View 32 7. Culebra Cut at Culebra Showing Dredges Making Final Excavation at Cucaracha Slide 36 8. Gatun Lower Lock under Construction and Sea-level Canal 40 9. Gatun Upper Lock under Construction and Gatun Lake 46 10. Gatun Spillway Dam 58 11. Pedro Miguel Lock and Miraflores Lake 66 12. Miraflores Upper Locks Showing Steam Shovels and Construction Cranes 74 13. Concrete Handling Cranes at Miraflores 74 14. A Gatun Lock in Use as a Dry Dock 80 15. Towing Locomotives Handling Coal Barge at Gatun Locks 84 16. Operation of Gatun Locks Showing Panama R.R. Steamer A llianca 90 17. Emergency Dam at Pedro Miguel Locks 96 18. Pedro Miguel Locks Control House 100 19. Toro Point Breakwater under Construction 116 20. American and French Canals at Intersection at Mindi Excavation 116 ix LIST OF MAPS AND PLANS For greater convenience in reference all maps and plans are bound at end of book. Plate No. I. The Isthmus with Completed Canal. II. Atlantic End of Canal with Gatun Locks and Dam and Toro Point Breakwater. III. Panama End of Canal with Miraflores Lake, Locks and Naos Island Breakwater. IV. Cross Sections of Canal. V. Profile of Canal from Atlantic Ocean to Pacific Ocean. VI. General Plans, Profiles and Sections of Gatun Locks. xi THE PANAMA CANAL Part I HISTORICAL BY REUBEN E. BAKENHUS, S. B. CIVIL ENGINEER U. S. NAVY THE PANAMA CANAL HISTORICAL INTRODUCTORY There could be no better introduction to a book on the Panama Canal than the enthusiastic words of Ambassador Bryce in a recent chapter on the Isthmus of Panama, where he says, in referring to the canal : There is something in the magnitude and the methods of this enterprise which a poet might take as his theme. Never before on our planet have so much labour, so much scientific knowledge, and so much executive skill been concentrated on a work de- signed to bring the nations nearer to one another and serve the interests of all mankind. In no previous age could an enterprise so vast as this have been carried through; that is to say, it would have required a time so long and an expenditure so prodigious that no rational government would have attempted it. It is true we have elsewhere done work of comparable magnitude — the tunnels under the Hudson and East Rivers, the great railroads and terminals, the Erie Canal, the city subways and water-supply systems, the reclamation projects and great bridges — but these are all intimately interwoven with our daily life and progress. The canal is a project crystallized from the vast multitude of enterprises and is indisputably the greatest of them all. With a subject so vast, one that has attained his- toric interest, and ranks as an engineering work of 3 4 THe Panama Canal such magnitude, it seems necessary to give a resume of the early history, and to consider it in relation to events that may be well known in other connections. EARLY HISTORY One of the most interesting subjects connected with the Panama Canal is the history of the canal idea. . To study its conception carries us back to the Middle Ages — to the conditions so well described by Fiske in his " Discovery of America," when Genoa and Venice were the great commercial rivals and Spain was a rising power. Following Marco Polo's marvel- ous travels from 1269 to 1295, throughout kf4% and that of his adventurous successors, a great trade de- veloped with the Orient, which proceeded unchecked via the Mediterranean and the ancient overland routes until the hostile Mohammedan Turk, recovering from two centuries of repression from the Crusades, over- flowed his own dominions and entered the Balkan peninsula. In 1453 Constantinople was taken by the Turks, and the alliance between that city and Genoa was broken. This great commercial metropolis, through the persistent attacks of the Turks, was gradually de- prived of her route to the Orient and thus of her com- merce. The commerce of Genoa's great and only rival, Venice, had a similar fate. Tremendous pressure developed for the finding of some new route to Cathay, as the other conditions for trade were most favorable. The world's ideas of geog- raphy at that time were of the crudest fashion. America was unknown. Africa had not been circumnavigated; Historical 5 its southern limits were enveloped in a haze of con- jecture and ignorance. It was known that Asia did not extend indefinitely to the East and was not bounded by limitless swamps, as had been supposed. With the increasing hazards of the route to Cathay and the lands of spices, and the rising expectations of wealth and riches fed by the avaricious and adventurous spirit of the Middle Ages, the minds of men were forced to think of the possibility of other routes. In the discovery by Dias, in 1486, and the confirma- \ tion by Vasco de Gama, in 1496, of the route to India by circumnavigating Africa, we are not now interested except to know that the presence on the first of these voyages of the brother of Christopher Columbus acted as a stimulus to the mind of the great explorer. He, as we know, put the unique idea of reaching Cathay by sailing westward to the test of four actual sea voy- ages. The results are familiar, but we must bear in mind that the discovery of the American continent was a mere incident and that what Columbus was really seeking was a passage to the Orient, and for this he continued his search on his three subsequent voy- ages. His ships ran their prows into the bays and inlets in the hope that they might find a strait and forge on to the desired lands. The full truth was never known to Columbus; he little realized, when his ships were at Porto Bello, that only forty miles overland were the waters — could he only reach them — which would carry him to his much-sought-for goal, and thence to Spain. Succeeding explorers continued these efforts, and every indentation of the eastern coast line of the 6 TKe Panama Canal Americas was explored by Spanish, Portuguese, Eng- lish and Dutch ships, only to dim the hopes that the passage could ever be found. It remained for Balboa, led on by tales of friendly Indians, to gain the knowledge of what lay beyond, after an overland journey not far distant from the site of the present canal. The discovery of the Pacific in 1513 only intensified the mariners' desires to penetrate with their ships. The discovery in 1520, by Magellan, of the straits named after him, his entry into the Pacific, and the completion of the circumnavigation of the globe in 1522 by a part of his expedition did not solve the problem and only emphasized the desirability of a conveniently located passage. The actual results of the epoch-making discoveries overshadowed the original aims of the explorers. From being a primary aim, the search for the interoceanic passage, with the gradual ushering into the known world of the two continents, became secondary. The exploration and development of the newly found lands afforded a boundless outlet for the restless spirit of the times. The canal idea, having had its genesis in such great world events, was now to enter the next stage of its development. It is remarkable that the desire for the passage has persisted throughout all these centuries. The increase in geographic knowledge, the correct understanding of the relation of the Americas to Europe and Asia, polit- ical history, the invention and building of railroads, and finally the phenomenal development of the Amer- Historical 7 ican continent itself, have all brought out new phases of the problem and altered the point of view; but in all its phases it has remained one of the great ambitions of the human race. The Americans did not have the honor of sending the first ship ^crjoss^he,Is^thmus. Balboa and his suc- cessor, J3il Gonzales de Avila, both carried ships across — Balboa after building them near the source of lumber supply on the Atlantic side and then dismant- ling and re-erecting them on the Pacific side, and de Avila after dismantling the ships that had carried him across the ocean. Their enterprise and- energy are greatly to be admired. Untold difficulties beset the journeys through the jungle, and in Balboa's first crossing, one authority states the number of deaths amongst the Indian cargadores to have been five hun- dred, and another places the number at two thousand. The object in crossing the Isthmus was exploration on the Pacific side, especially investigations of the reputed gold in Peru. Subsequently there was much traffic with the Pacific coast, which was carried across the Isthmus and reshipped. Charles V of Spain, who succeeded to the throne in 1516, encouraged the explorations of the South Sea, as the Pacific was then known, and urged his American governors, if possible, to discover a strait by systematic exploration. The expedition of Gil Gonzales de Avila along the Pacific shores had this object. He discovered Lake Nicaragua, which has played such an important part in the interoceanic canal question. No strait being found after years of search, Charles in 1534, by 8 THe Pa nama Canal a royal decree directed examination to be made of the land between the Atlantic town of Chagres and the Pacific with a view to the establishment of water con- nection. It is reported that even as early as 1520 sur- veys were ordered by the Emperor. The result of the royal decree was that the local governor declared the work to be impracticable and beyond the resources of any sovereign. H*In the meantime a considerable commerce developed across the Isthmus. The city of Panama was founded on the Pacific side in 1517, and Nombre de Dios, founded in 1519, was the most important post on the Atlantic side. Between the two a road was built and a series of posts established. Later Porto Bello, due to a better harbor and superior location, was made the tlantic terminus and a new road to Panama was built ox such a character that portions of it may be used to this day. Subsequent to 1534 a partial water route was established for boats and light-draft vessels up the Chagres as far as Cruces by removal of obstruc- tions from the river. This is the identical stream and valley which nearly four hundred years later is being utilized as the Atlantic end of the Isthmian Canal. The establishment of the partial water route did not lead to the discontinuance of the paved way. With the conquest of Peru by Pizarro in 1533-1535, the trans-isthmian trade grew in amount and value and the Spanish colonies continued to prosper. Panama became a great collecting and distributing center for Spanish commerce. So lucrative and so extensive did the trade become Historical 9 that under Philip II, who succeeded to the throne o the abdication of Charles V in 1555, the search for a strait was given up and all idea of a canal abandoned. With untold treasures coming to Spain by the existing means of transport, the Emperor did not desire to seek new means of intercourse which might benefit a rival nation as much as, or more than Spain, and furthermore all the energies of the people were fully occupied in developing the existing sources of treasure and none seemed available for new enterprises. The same policy continued for about two centuries. In the meantime trade developed and the terminal towns grew. Panama in its day was the great metropolis of the New World, having pretentious stone churches, monasteries and numerous dwellings of wood. Its mar- kets and those of Porto Bello were the meeting-places for the merchants of Peru, the Isthmus and of Spain. Great quantities of silver and gold passed eastward and supplies from Spain came in the opposite direction. The transportation across the Isthmus was by mule train. All others than Spanish were excluded from the traffic.^ The richness of the trade and the overbearing stand of the Spaniards encouraged piratical attacks by the seamen of the northern nations on the shipping of the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, and even on the over- land mule trains. Between the years 1570 and 1596 Sir Francis Drake made numerous privateering attacks, which were very much of the nature of piracy. The Spaniards were sending their merchant ships in fleets twice a year, convoyed by six and eight armed vessels. Drake was followed in his enterprise by the buccaneers 10 THe Panama Canal who reached the limit of their power under Henry Morgan. Morgan with great energy and daring cap- tured Nombre de Dios and immediately after con- ducted operations against Porto Bello. He turned what was nearly a failure into a cruel success, and a year later, in 1671, according to his threatened promise to the governor of Panama, he returned to ransack the city of Panama. After a wretched trip across the Isthmus, almost without food, the city was attacked and fell into the hands of Morgan. As a result of his raid the city was destroyed, and to this day the ruins of old Panama, the massive stone walls, the towers of churches, monasteries and forts still remain as mute and impressive evidences of the constructive energy of the Spaniards and of the wicked, destructive energy of the English buccaneers. After a systematic plunder of all the valuables of the city, Morgan left. The town was never rebuilt on the old location. The trade of Panama suffered a period of decline after the Indian empires had been stripped of their valuables. A royal cedula in 1593 forbade trade with China and the East Indies; the development of local industries was forbidden through rival influences at home; corrupt governors did the colonies no good, and there were various governmental restrictions on trade and growth. Even the roadway across the Isthmus entered a period of disuse, and the traffic between Spain and the western ports went via the Cape of Good Hope or Cape Horn, except a certain amount crossing at Tehuantepec. x: ^In the latter part of the eighteenth century certain Historical 11 desultory efforts were made toward a canal, including an examination of the Nicaragua route from 1779 to 1781, followed by a discouraging report. Notwith- standing this, a company was formed to undertake the project and a route utilizing Lake Nicaragua was se- lected. By 1823, when all the continental colonies had secured their independence by revolt, all Spanish effort and influence ceased. MODERN CANAL PROJECTS With the demise of Spanish authority on the conti- nent there was an early active revival of canal project^ In fact, as early as 1825 the minister of the then Cen- tral American Republic to the United States addressed the Secretary of State, inviting attention to the willing- ness of the Republic to receive the cooperation of the United States in the building of a canal by a group of American merchants. The United States gave a favor- able reply, but nothing resulted at that time. In 1826, however, the Republic of Central America actually ac- cepted the proposals of an association for the building of the canal under liberal terms. The attempt to organize a company with a capital of $5,000,000 proved unsuccess- ful. In 1830 the Central American Republic negotiated with a Netherlands company, and the United States, hearing of this, informed the Republic that it would expect the same rights and privileges of passage through the canal as other nations. In 1835, at the initiative of the United States, some investigations were begun, but were dropped in 1837 upon the advice that the time was not propitious. Another project started in 12 TTHe Panama Canal 1838, and a still further investigation and an estimate of $25,000,000 were made in President Van Buren's administration, but the Isthmian country was too un- settled and revolutionary for any definite progress to be made. There are records of still other efforts in 1826, 1827 and 1838. (in the latter year a concession was granted to a French company to build roads or canals. | Asa result a canal was recommended by Na- poleon Garella with a starting-point in Limon Bay, thence to a connection with the Chagres River below Gatun.j The divide was to be crossed by means 6f a series of eighteen locks on the Atlantic side and sixteen on the Pacific side, with a summit level 158 feet above the sea, and the highest part of the divide penetrated by a tunnel over three miles long. The report of actual conditions by Garella discouraged the promoters. ^ During all this period the United States was peopled only on the Atlantic seaboard and was interested in commerce which started or terminated in Atlantic ports only. ( In the middle of the century events oc- curred which were destined to greatly increase the im- portance of the Isthmus, and to have a strong influence in pushing the canal idea to the point where its actual execution was bound to follow.] It was the acquisition of California, the discovery of gold therein, the ex- ploration and settlement of the Northwest Territory and, to a lesser extent, the purchase of Alaska, which led the United States on to its destiny as a Pacific as well as an Atlantic power and thus established the conditions that ultimately made the canal a certainty. The trans-isthmian route for freight and passengers Historical 13 regained its old-time importance, and curiously enough it was again the search for gold that gave the impetus. A railroad across the Isthmus was established, promoted by Americans. The success of this road was continuous on account of the increasing amount of traffic. Even the establishment of the transcontinental railroads did not vitiate the importance of the trans-isthmian road, nor did any of the railroads have a real deterrent influence on the canal scheme. Almost innumerable projects, examinations and re- ports were made during the latter half of the nine- teenth century, in which the United States, France and Great Britain led. Prior to 1850 no extensive and accurate surveys had been made. After that date work was done in earnest; no longer were the results of reconnoissances afoot or on horseback sufficient; the methods of modern engineering were taking their first grip upon large enterprises, and no company or gov- ernment could entertain a proposition not based on surveys by engineers and on detailed estimates of cost. Several companies were incorporated, including the American, Atlantic and Pacific Ship Canal Company in 1850. All failed from one reason or another to do much more than organize or conduct surveys. Always some insuperable obstacle was met. It is no doubt true that very few fully realized the enormous difficul- ties that subsequent experience disclosed, and fortu- nately so, since the enthusiasm for the idea might have received a setback from which it could not easily have recovered. A predicted cost of $400,000,000 would have made the enterprise seem impossible. 14 THe Panama Canal In 1869, official recognition was given to the subject, and President Grant's first message to Congress called attention to the advisability of an American canal on American soil. The appointment of a commission, known as the Inter-Oceanic Canal Commission, was authorized by Congress; this commission not only examined all available data previously gathered by others, but had new data collected and had access to new surveys made principally under the direction of officers of the army and navy, covering the Panama, Nicaragua and Darien routes. In 1876, after six years work, the commission reported that " After a long, careful, and minute study of the several surveys of the various routes, the one known as the Nicaragua route . . . possesses, both for the construction and maintenance of a canal, greater advantages and offers fewer difficulties from engineering, commercial, and economic points of view than any of the other routes." A further survey of the Nicaragua route was made in 1885 by order of the Secretary of the Navy. This was followed in two years by the organization of the Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua, incorporated by Congress and having a concession from the Nica- raguan government. The company actually dug a por- tion of the canal on the Atlantic side, but failing to secure government aid the concession lapsed and the property reverted to the State. I In 1895, the Nicaragua Canal Board was appointed by the President by authority of Congress.^ The board visited Nicaragua, conducting investigations, but in the six months allowed them did not have sufficient Photo by Underwood and Underwood, New York. Fig. 1. — The canal, Culebra Cut, looking north from Empire in 1885, under French control. Historical 15 time for further necessary explorations, for collecting the vast amount of information and reaching a definite conclusion on so momentous a matter, and accordingly recommended a further board. lAs a result the Nica- ragua Canal Commission of 1897 was appointed, and in its report of May, 1899, proposed a route which fol- lowed closely the one suggested in 1852.X The United States was apparently committed to the Nicaragua route. (The Panama route had been pre-empted by the French, but their hold was loosening.\ Congress in its next step authorized a further commission with greatly extended authority, to consider the Panama as well as the Nicaragua route and to evaluate work done by any private company, having in mind the French. The first Isthmian Canal Commission was accordingly appointed in 1899 — a distinct broadening in scope and title from those of the previous boards and commissions. FRENCH CONTRIBUTION TO THE ENTERPRISE At this point it is well to pause in the account of American doings, to consider briefly what the French had contributed since the middle of the century to the canal idea and to construction. In 1844 a French engineer, after surveys having both a railway and a canal in view, made an accurate report concerning Panama, all in the interests of a French company holding concessions. Like so many others the project failed and the concessions lapsed. At the Congress of Geographical Science in 1875, in Paris, M. Ferdinand de Lesseps came upon the scene with the sweeping announcement that in his opinion 16 XKe Panama Canal the authors of all plans up to that time had committed the serious error of examining only canal routes with locks, and that the interoceanic canal in order to meet the requirements of navigation, must be constructed at sea level like the Suez. Thus early did he show that the elements of his character — force, unbridled en- thusiasm, convictions without investigation, and a sublime faith in himself — which had carried him on to a magnificent success in the straightforward problem at Suez, were, in the infinitely more difficult problems at Panama, to make of him a consummate blunderer and a deceiver, brushing aside and ignoring the advice and estimates of competent and trained engineers when they did not follow his own preconceived ideas, and leading many unfortunate investors, including himself, to financial ruin. Under such a leader the French project was foredoomed to failure. De Lesseps, so far as the French were concerned, made the project his own; he dominated the committees, moulded a popular sentiment, all being eager to follow his lead; if doubts arose, his was the reassuring word, and at his solicitation the subscriptions to the stock of the com- pany poured in. His success at Suez was his most valuable asset and had indeed placed him on a pinnacle. He was a man of undoubted ability, but lacked an element of discrimination which should have caused him to appreciate the true magnitude of the problems before him. De Lesseps having attempted great proj- ects must be measured by great standards. He did not lack strong opposition nor able expert advice, but he beat them down with the same indiscriminating Historical 17 ability as he did natural obstacles and the financial troubles that interfered with his idealized delusion of a sea-level canal. In 1876, a French committee with de Lesseps at the head was formed; also, in 1876, a civil association undertook actual surveys, which were under the direc- tion of Lieut. L. N. B. Wyse. In May, 1878, after completing the surveys, Lieutenant Wyse secured for his association a concession from the government of Colombia for a ship canal. This was the real beginning of the canal which, after many vicissitudes, is now the American canal. An international congress of surveys was held in Paris in 1879, and after elaborate discus- sion decided on the route from the Bay of Limon to the Bay of Panama, and that it should be at sea level. The decision for the sea-level canal was by no means unanimous. "When one reads the reports of the ses- sions of that commission, one constantly recognizes the inspiration of M. de Lesseps, one perceives the action of his will, so persistent in forming a general opinion in favor of a plan for a canal on a level." There were those who foresaw the difficulties and who advocated a lock canal. In fact, de Lesseps had against him the majority of the engineers and contractors. The pre- dicted cost was 1,200,000,000 francs, and the time twelve years. About three months later the Universal Interoceanic Canal Company was formed, but less than one-tenth the stock was subscribed on the first attempt. De Lesseps did not have a bed of roses; he consented to new surveys and new estimates, and he personally went to the Isthmus in December, 1879, accompanied 18 THe Panama Canal by the International Survey Commission. The surveys were accomplished and the conclusions reached in a time so incredibly short as to cast doubt upon their reliability. The estimate of cost was 834,000,000 francs, and of time eight years, both remarkably lower than those of the year before by the technical commission. The estimate of cost was still further reduced to 685,- 000,000 francs by de Lesseps himself, leaving it less than sixty per cent of the original estimate, which was considered low by competent persons. Later a firm of contractors, Couvreux & Hersent, favorable to the views of de Lesseps, estimated the cost of the canal to be 500,000,000 francs not including general adminis- tration and financing, and they undertook a contract on a cost-plus-profit basis. The annual revenue of the completed canal was estimated at 90,000,000 francs. The stock issue of 300,000,000 francs was doubly sub- scribed. The contractors performed the two years of preparatory work at cost plus six per cent. By the end of that time, December, 1882, it was clear that the predicted unit costs and rates of progress could not be reached, and the contract was annulled on the con- tractors' proposal. The Superior Advisory Commission, composed of men eminent as engineers and technicians, was formed in 1881. This commission was dominated by de Les- seps through his personal force, and their acts did not result in clearing the situation. To carry on the work abandoned by the closing of the contract, the canal company in 1883 secured the services of M. Dingier, an able engineer, to supervise Historical 19 and direct the operations on the Isthmus. The devel- opments of the next few years were : a voluminous report by the chief engineer on the sea-level canal project; discovery that the quantity to be excavated was 120,- 000,000 cubic meters, rather than the 75,000,000 esti- mated by the International Commission, or the 45,000- 000 estimated by the International Congress; the award of a series of small contracts and establishment of work yards; the realization in July, 1885, that less than one-tenth of the excavation had been completed although four of the eight years allowed for construc- tion had elapsed; the return to the former estimate of 1,200,000,000 francs; a reorganization involving the award of large contracts for completing the canal in five sections by 1889; the announcement by de Les- seps, m|1886, after a visit to Panama, of his utmost confidence in the speedy completion of the canal; fur- ther successful bond issues; renewed attacks on the feasibility of the sea-level canal, based on reports by expert engineers of incontrovertible facts, but inef- fective on de Lesseps; the weakening of public and financial support, and the final capitulation of de Les- seps to the lock-canal idea, but only as a temporary expedient to hasten completion and to be followed by a deepening to sea level. These events were followed by the ineffectual attempt to issue a series of lottery bonds on authority of the Chamber of Deputies, which foreshadowed the financial debacle of the enterprise. Receivers were soon appointed and the affairs of the company were wound up. De Lesseps and his son were tried, convicted and sentenced by the courts of France 20 TKe Panama Canal to pay a fine and serve a term of five years imprison- ment. The sentence against the son was reversed, and that against the father was never executed. He be- came a complete wreck, both physical and mental, and died in 1893. The company had actually expended about 1,300,000,000 francs and had accomplished about 55,000,000 cubic yards of excavation on the permanent work, or less than one-half the total on the French plan. After careful investigation and a great deal of diffi- cult work, the receiver, in 1894, launched a new com- pany to complete the lock canal. An extension of time had been secured from the Colombian government through the agency of Lieutenant Wyse. The first step of the new company was to reinvestigate the whole subject of the canal, which was done through the ap- pointment of the " Comite Technique " of engineers of international eminence, including two Americans. Their work was most thorough, comprehensive and to the point. Later, in accordance with the charter of the company, a commission of five members was appointed to make final recommendations, who re- ported: . . . that the adopted project is practicable under the condi- tions of time and expense indicated, and that the New Company has demonstrated that by works which will not exceed an outlay of about one hundred million dollars, and a duration of about ten years, it is possible to open the Panama Canal to extensive com- merce, to remove the obstacle which the Isthmus opposes to inter- national communication, and thus to complete an immense work that interests all the nations of the world and is the greatest which human genius has ever planned. Fig. 2. — Culebra Cut, Culebra, showing steam shovels working at elevation +73. Looking east, January 27, 1912. Fig. 3. — Culebra Cut, Culebra, showing break in east bank of canal. Amount of material involved, 320,000 cu. yds. February 11, 1912. Historical 21 There was to be a summit level and an artificial lake at Bohio with the necessary locks, 738 feet long and 82 feet wide, and sea-level connections. There is every reason to believe that the enterprise was feasible and would have been carried through. The company, as a matter of fact, did only enough work to care for the extensive plant and excavated about 5,000,000 cubic yards in five years, but the valuable and necessary progress made was in the way of gathering scientific and engineering information that was absolutely essen- tial and which the old company did not have, and which later proved of the greatest benefit to the United States. The financing of the enterprise became impracticable, due to the United States coming into the field as a probable canal builder. The French were truly leading a forlorn hope and finally their only chance lay in selling out to the United States. TRANSFER OF CONTROL TO THE UNITED STATES The Isthmian Canal Commission of the United States, in the two and one-half years from June, 1899, to November, 1901, made most elaborate investiga- tions of the whole canal problem, covering the first Darien route from the Gulf of San Bias to the Gulf of Panama; the second Darien route from Caledonia Bay to San Miguel Bay, an arm of the Gulf of Panama; the Panama route from Limon Bay to Panama Bay; and the Nicaragua route from Greytown via the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua to Brito on the Pacific, and other less important routes. An immense amount of literature, reports and surveys turned out 22 THe Panama Canal by previous boards was accessible, including the most excellent and complete data in the hands of the New French Company. Besides all this, much additional surveying and investigation was a necessity. The commission evaluated the French property as follows: Useful Canal Excavation $21,020,386 Chagres Diversion 178,186 Gatun Diversion 1,396,456 Railroad Diversion 300,000 Contingencies 4,579,005 Panama Railroad Stock 6,850,000 Maps, Drawings and Records 2,000,000 Total $36,324,033 Add about 10 per cent to cover omissions 3,675,967 Grand total $40,000,000 The French company submitted an estimated valua- tion for purpose of discussion with a view to sale to the United States, of $109,141,500. The commission estimated the cost of completing the Panama Canal to be $144,233,358, to which must be added the commission's evaluation of the French property, or a total of $184,233,358, or adding the company's offer to the cost of completion, a total of $253,374,858. The commission estimated the cost of building the Nicaragua Canal to be $189,864,062. A lock type was found to be obligatory on the Nicaragua route, and either a sea-level or lock canal was found possible on the Panama route, but the com- mission strongly recommended the lock canal and Historical 23 reported on the relative advantages of the two schemes as follows: The estimated annual cost of maintaining and operating the Nicaragua Canal is $1,300,000 greater than the corresponding charges for the Panama Canal. The Panama route would be 134.57 miles shorter from sea to sea than the Nicaragua route. It would have less summit eleva- tion, fewer locks, 1568 degrees and 26.44 miles less curvature. The estimated time for a deep-draft vessel to pass through is about 12 hours for Panama and 33 hours for Nicaragua. These periods are practically the measure of the relative advantages of the two canals as waterways connecting the two oceans, but not entirely, because the risks to vessels and the dangers of delay are greater in a canal than in the open sea. Except for the items of risks and delays, the time required to pass through the canals need to be taken into account only as an element in the time required by vessels to make their voyages between terminal ports. Compared on this basis, the Nicaragua route is the more advantageous for all trans-isthmian commerce except that originating or ending on the west coast of South America. For the commerce in which the United States is most interested, that between our Pacific ports and Atlantic ports, European and American, the Nicaragua route is shorter by about one day. The same advantage exists between our Atlantic ports and the Orient. For our Gulf ports the advantage of the Nicaragua route is nearly two days. For commerce between North Atlantic ports and the west coast of South America the Panama route is shorter by about two days. Between Gulf ports and the west coast of South America the saving is about one day. The commission's recommendation was that: After considering all the facts developed by the investigations made by the commission and the actual situation as it now stands, and having in view the terms offered by the New Panama Canal Company, this Commission is of the opinion that "the most practicable and feasible route' * for an Isthmian Canal, to be " under the control, management, and ownership of the United States," is that known as the Nicaragua route. 24 THe Panama Canal When this information reached Paris the French company were at our mercy and capitulated with a cabled offer to sell to the United States for $40,000,000. The Isthmian Commission then made a supplementary report, dated January 18, 1902, as follows: The unreasonable sum asked for the property and rights of the New Panama Canal Company when the Commission reached its former conclusion overbalanced that route, and now that the estimates by the two routes have been nearly equalized the Com- mission can form its judgment by weighing the advantages of each and determining which is the more practicable and feasible. .. . . After considering the changed conditions that now exist, the Commission is of opinion that "the most practicable and feasible route" for an Isthmian Canal, to be "under the control, management, and ownership of the United States," is that known ■as the Panama route. The report and plans of the commission of 1899-1901 are most comprehensive, covering the subject from the earliest times and forming a veritable mine of in- formation. The American desire for a trans-isthmian canal had now become a determination. The demands of com- merce were intensified, and the trip of the U. S. S. Oregon around South America had made clear the im- mense potential value of the canal to the navy. During the succeeding moves the American side of the case was handled with great skill and acumen, for which the able report of the Isthmian Commission had paved the way. The Spooner law became effective on June 28, 1902, and authorized: (a) The purchase of the rights and property of the New Panama Canal Company at $40,000,000, includ- ing the stock of the Panama Railroad. Historical 25 (b) Acquiring from the Republic of Colombia per- petual control of a strip of land, together with all water rights, and the right to build and perpetually maintain a canal, together with the right to exercise sanitary control over the strip of land and the cities at either end. (c) The actual building of the canal on the Panama route. (d) The making of all arrangements for the complete building of a canal on the Nicaragua route, should the negotiations with Colombia or with the New Panama Canal Company prove unsuccessful. (e) The creation of an Isthmian Canal Commission of seven members, four of whom were to be skilled engineers, and of the four, one to be an officer of the Engineer Corps of the United States Army, and one an officer of the United States Navy. (f) The act appropriated $10,000,000, to be im- mediately available, and authorized a further sum of $135,000,000 (besides the $40,000,000 for purchase of the canal company's property) in case of adoption of the Panama route, or of $185,000,000 in case of adoption of the Nicaragua route. During the negotiations with Colombia the hopes of the stockholders in the French company were alter- nately raised and dashed as the trend of affairs indi- cated the adoption of the Panama or the Nicaragua route. The Colombian government, which had the sovereign rights over the Isthmus, failed to ratify the treaty, and soon thereafter the Department of Panama led a successful revolt. The new Panama government, 26 TKe Panama Canal after being recognized by the United States, concluded a treaty which was very satisfactory and which was proclaimed February 26, 1904. The purchase from the French Canal Company was soon consummated, and on May 4, 1904, the United States took possession of the site and property. The occasion was a momentous one. The men who had accomplished so much in clearing the way for the building of the canal looked forward with confidence to its speedy and successful construction. There were many others who looked with fear and trepidation upon the undertaking. There was a general feeling that after almost four centuries of reports, investigations, surveys and failures, it was time for the dirt to fly immediately. Fortunately those placed in charge of the work were trained in the scientific planning of large undertakings, and while certain excavation work was done to appease the pop- ular demand, and also to secure experimental data for excavating and planning, the great problems of the moment were recognized as three in number: first, to decide on the type, form and exact location of the canal; second, to outline the method of attack and to purchase and assemble the vast amount of equipment and material; third, to perfect an organization of the administrative and working forces. THE PANAMA CANAL Part II THE ROUTE THE DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION BY REUBEN E. BAKENHUS, S. B. CIVIL ENGINEER U. S. NAVY THE ROUTE THE DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CANAL ROUTE While the size and character of the canal were open questions, the general location was determined. The line of cut adopted by the French had been selected by some of the early exploiters; the Panama Railroad had been located in the same valleys and depressions; and the French had actually begun to build along this line. At this point it is well to consider briefly the character and topography of the canal route and adja- cent territory as it was before any work was done, but bearing the future canal in mind. The Isthmus of Panama, if it joined the two conti- nents by the shortest line, would extend northwest toward North America and southeast toward South America; but it does not follow the shortest line, and on the map looks as if South America had been pushed northwestward and the narrow part of the Isthmus on the end toward South America had been bent out of shape with a bulge to the north and the concave side to the south, almost forming a semicircle enclosing the Gulf of Panama. (See plan No. 1.) Near the head of this gulf is an indentation known as the Bay of Panama. This bay touches that part of the rough semicircle where the Isthmus sweeps to the northeast toward the top of the semicircle, and where a line at right angles 29 30 The Panama Canal to the Isthmus is about northwest. This northwest line from the Bay of Panama ends in the Limon Bay, on the Atlantic side, and happens to pass through the region where the Continental Divide is much lower than anywhere else and where the Isthmus is less than 36 miles wide, only 5 miles wider than at the very narrowest point. The line if slightly distorted may be made to pass for three-fourths of its length along the valley of the Rio Grande River on the Pacific side, and the valley of the lower Chagres on the Atlantic side, except that the Chagres before reaching Limon Bay turns off to the left to its mouth, seven miles west of the bay, while the line continues straight to Limon Bay. This is in general terms the course of the canal. Limon Bay faces almost directly north, and has an opening^ three miles wide into the Caribbean Sea, and extends five miles inland of the full width. The depth of the water varies from 5 feet to 36 feet. (See plan No. 2.) The Atlantic end of the French canal was cut through the swamps along the east shore of Limon Bay and extended into the bay, so as to make use of Colon as a protection from northerly seas. Limon Bay, on the westerly and inland sides, is sur- rounded by much higher land, except that the lowlands of the small Mindi River valley extend inland from the above-named swamps almost through the ridge, which is here very low. The narrow strip of lowland continues inland beyond the Mindi River valley and dips into the Chagres valley near Gatun. One would almost have expected the Chagres River to seek outlet straight ahead in Limon Bay, only three miles distant; Rovite, Design and Construction 31 but the little ridge between the Chagres and the head- waters of the Mindi River prevented this, and so the Chagres follows the lowlands behind the ridges sur- rounding Limon Bay and discharges into the Caribbean Sea about seven miles west of the bay. At Gatun, where the line of the canal first meets the Chagres, the valley is about a mile and a half wide, but as we follow upstream it becomes very much wider. The stream is sluggish and winds in and out amongst the swamp lands. Just above Gatun the Chagres on its right bank receives an important tributary, the Gatun River. It was of some importance in the plans for any canal of which the sea-level portion extended inland beyond Gatun, for the canal had either to cross the river, to take its flow, or otherwise the river must be turned off before reaching the canal by a new channel or diver- sion to the sea parallel to the canal. The French actu- ally built a very wide diversion to the sea, 8 miles long. The Trinidad River enters the Chagres from the other side, about three miles above Gatun. Throughout this portion of the Chagres the water- surface is but little above sea level, and it so con- tinues inland as far as Bohio, 16 miles by the canal line from Colon. At Bohio the valley contracts, and this was the site selected for the locks and dams in the French canal, and in one of the early American plans. The land surface from Bohio upstream becomes grad- ually more undulating and the slopes of the valleys become steeper. At Bas Obispo, 13 miles inland from Bohio by canal line, or 29 miles from Colon, the low 32 XKe Panama Canal water level of the river rises to 45 feet above the sea. Up to this point the Chagres valley leads in a fairly direct line toward the Pacific Ocean, and fortunately approaches the low point of the Continental Divide. Now the canal line must leave the Chagres, for the river makes an abrupt turn, and to follow it to its sources would carry us into the mountains to the northeast, that is, into the apex of the roughly semi- circular part of the Isthmus. The canal builder can- not dismiss the river from his mind at the point where the line of the canal leaves the valley, for some of the most important problems of the canal are dependent upon the character of the stream above Obispo. At Bas Obispo the Chagres River is joined by its tributary, the Obispo River, the valley of which offers the best opportunity for continuing the canal for the next 4 miles. The continental ridge begins at Bas Obispo, and with it the hills become higher. The stream is tortuous, and the canal line cannot follow it, but must be cut on more direct lines to avoid objec- tionable curvature. The elevation of the ground is constantly increasing, reaching a low summit at Empire, and the highest summit at Culebra, where the future canal passes between Gold Hill and Contractors Hill. The highest elevation of the ground on the center line is 312 feet above sea level, but the highest part of the sloping sides will be 554 feet above sea level. Culebra is about 6 miles from Obispo, and about 35 miles from Colon. The country falls much more rapidly on the Pacific side, and 3 miles beyond Culebra, close to Photo by L. E. G. Fig. 5. — A slide, showing shovel at work, February, 1913. Photo by L. E. G. Fig. 6. — A slide — near view, February, 1913. Route, Design and Construction 33 Pedro Miguel, the level is lower than at Obispo, 8 miles back. The Continental Divide covers a distance of 9 miles from Bas Obispo through Empire and Culebra to Pedro Miguel, and of this the deepest part is 6 miles in length, from Las Cascades to a point near Pedro Miguel, and forms the heaviest part of the so-called Culebra Cut. From Pedro Miguel to Miraflores, a distance of 1J miles, the land continues to fall, and the canal fortu- nately finds the low valley of the Rio Grande as an available path to the Pacific. This valley from Mira- flores to the sea is very little above the sea level, and beyond the lowlands is lined on both sides with much higher ground and hills, of which Sosa Hill and Ancon Hill are the best-known. The distance from Colon to Miraflores is about 39 J miles, and from Miraflores to the Pacific is 5| miles, or a total of about 45 miles from Colon to the shores of the Pacific. The waters of Panama Bay vary in depth from 7 to 32 feet, and the bottom slopes off into the deeper waters of the Gulf of Panama and the Pacific Ocean. (See plan No. 3.) About 2\ miles off shore from the mouth of the Rio Grande is a group of islands with both lowlands and mounds. The question as to whether the canal should pass to the east or to the west of them was decided one way by the French and the opposite way by the Americans, the reasons for which will develop later. Having thus observed the principal natural features of the canal route, we may note to what extent the to- pography was affected by the French operations, pay- 34 THe Panama Oanal ing but little attention to the period from 1889 to 1904, for the New Panama Canal Company, aside from its comprehensive preparatory technical work, wisely did only enough excavation to hold the charter. As already noted, the French canal was excavated from Colon through the lowlands on the easterly shore of Limon Bay, and as far as Gatun it was later used by the Americans for carrying materials to the locks. It was partly excavated as far as Bohio, a total dis- tance of about 17 miles. The bottom width of the canal was not over 72 feet, and the depth of water averaged about 20 feet for half the length, and over the part toward Bohio, where the ground was higher, did not go below sea level. The canal crossed the Chagres River at several points, and the river water flowed freely into the canal. At Gatun, where the canal on its way to Colon leaves the river bed, about one-third of the flow continued through the canal. The large bend in the river where it sweeps toward Gatun is "short-circuited" by a cut-off known as the Chagres diversion. Deadening this bend elim- inated two river crossings and shortened the distance to the mouth of the river. A part of this diversion is utilized in the spillway channel of the completed canal. There were also a number of other such diversions. At Bohio considerable rock excavation was done after the sea-level canal was given up in favor of a lock canal. From Bohio to Bas Obispo the canal excavation cut the course of the Chagres a great many times. Across the Continental Divide the French cut a comparatively narrow trench, which at its deepest point was 165 feet Roiate, Design, and Construction 35 below the original surface, and left about 190 feet more of cut to accomplish a sea-level canal, and over 100 feet for the French lock canal. On the Pacific end a partial channel was dredged, and also the neces- sary diversions on each side, which captured the water from the river branches and discharged it into the bay before it could reach the canal. A total amount of 80,000,000 cubic yards of excavation was done all along the canal. Some of it was deposited on the line of the much wider canal finally adopted by the Americans, and required re-excavating; some of the channels were partially filled by silting. Besides exca- vation, the French left behind them some 2000 buildings and a vast amount of equipment. Much of it was overgrown with a dense jungle during the 15 years of inactivity, and was lost until years after. THE CHOICE OF TYPE With this brief excursion across the Isthmus, ob- serving the various natural and artificial features of importance, and which an examination of the maps will aid in fixing in the mind, we are in a better posi- tion to consider the problems that confronted the United States when it was necessary to decide on the type of canal. The choice lay between a sea-level and a lock canal. The United States was determined to have the best canal, regardless of cost or trouble. The French ideal was a sea-level canal which they epito- mized as the "Straits of Panama." But their resources would not allow them to attain their ideal, so they adopted a lock canal as a makeshift and temporary 36 THe Panama Canal expedient. Knowing this, the American tendency was to regard the sea-level canal as something more diffi- cult to attain and, therefore, as something more valu- able and more desirable. Furthermore, the average citizen or average official is unfamiliar with locks, and these devices convey to him an idea of something vague and hazardous. These feelings had first to be overcome before the nation was ready to consider the question on its true merits. In view of this, and of the vital necessity to the success of the enterprise of deciding the question of the type of canal correctly, the President appointed an International Board of Consulting Engineers to advise in the decision as to type and probable cost. The board was presided over by a retired major-general of the United States Army, and included in the membership seven American and five foreign engineers, all most eminent in their profes- sion and experienced in the problems involved in the construction of the canal. The divided report of the board was unexpected and in a way disappointing. Five of the American engineers favored the lock type, but they were in the minority, as the chairman, the two remaining American engineers and all the five foreign engineers voted for the sea-level canal. Five members of the Isthmian Canal Commis- sion and the chief engineer approved and recommended the lock canal, while the other member favored the sea-level type. On a poll of individuals of both bodies, nine were for the sea-level and eleven for the lock canal. It remained for the Secretary of War and the President to consider, with the various reports of facts and state- c3 si o 03 rH 03 o o a o o 03 02 03 bfi 73 03 rH 73 bC Pi • rH O r<3 73 (3 03 Si H-= 02 03 o rH r<3 rH o (3 bC S3 'Si o o 03 f-i Si 03 o 03 -t-3 o c3 f-t Si 03 r-H 1> d 02 r2 be el 03 rH o rd o 02 o si 02 •S S3 -1 03 CD r*3 03 bfi £ O 03 o S3 o 03 .2 » 03 PL, 03 bC >s 03 r_ rP 03 ° p * 03 a ^ 03 02 pe 02 • rH rP H a .2 02 o CQ S o 03 02 03 73 «H-H O 02 a r QQ 02 O 03 rH ing 73 S3 H-5 S3 «*H 03 o "02 o I— H bO rQ • rH 03 03 02 rH O 73 02 O 03 Dr dip e cle 03 O Si 73 03 rP GQ rH 03 • r- ( Route, Design and Construction 37 merits of relative advantages and disadvantages before them, which type was to be adopted. The essential facts regarding the two types of canal can be most clearly set forth in a table such as the following, to which is added a third column showing the characteristics of the canal as actually built: COMPARATIVE DATA Sea-level canal and lock canal as proposed by the Board of Consulting Engineers and canal as built. Item Sea-level canal Lock-canal 85-foot summit Lock canal as built 85-foot summit $247,000,000 $140,000,000 $375,000,000* Depth 40 feet 40 to 45 feet 40 to 45 feet 1000 feet, none 1000 feet, 19 miles 1000 feet, 16 miles 800 feet, none 800 feet, 4 miles 800 feet, 4 miles 500 feet, 5 miles 500 feet, 12 miles 500 feet, 22 miles 300 feet, 4 miles 300 feet, 7 miles 300 feet, 8 miles 200 feet, 19 miles 200 feet, 7 miles 200 feet, none 150 feet, 21 miles 150 feet, none 150 feet, none Total volume of water within limits of canal in cubic yards. . . 100,664,000 303,600,000 Number of pairs of locks 1 6 6 Dimensions of locks in feet 1000X100 900X95 1000X110 Highest current, miles per hour. . . 2.6 Inappreciable Inappreciable Time to complete 12 to 20 years 9 years 9 years Gamboa in upper Gatun, Pedro Gatun, Pedro Chagres valley Miguel, Balboa Miguel, Mira- flores * Includes sanitation, civil government, land damages and purchase price from French, not included in first two columns. Not only was the sea-level canal of inferior dimen- sions and greater cost, but its winding channel would not be conducive to easy or safe navigation, and the time which a vessel in the high-level canal would lose in the locks would be lost in the sea-level canal in slowing down for passing other vessels on account of the very narrow channels; in fact, two vessels of any size could not pass in the 21 miles of 150-foot width unless one of them tied up in specially provided turn- 38 The Panama Canal outs, similar to the custom in the Suez Canal. The sea-level canal was not considered superior from the standpoint of safety; the sinking of a single ship could block the canal indefinitely; the many stream diversions along the banks of the canal and the great dam at Gamboa were potential sources of danger in time of flood to a canal which was in the lowest part of the valley, and would form the receptacle for flood debris. It is illuminating to read the following extract from the comment of Secretary of War Taft, on the report of the Board of Consulting Engineers: The majority of the Board makes objection that locks are un- safe for the passage of the great seagoing vessels contemplated by the act, due to the disastrous consequences that might result if the gates are injured by vessels entering; that the lifts pro- posed are beyond the limit of prudent design for safe operation and administrative efficiency; that locks delay transit. Lock navigation is not an experiment. All the locks are du- plicated, thereby minimizing such dangers, and experience shows that with proper appliances and regulations the dangers are more imaginary than real. The locks proposed have lifts of about 30 feet, or less than those heretofore advocated by en- gineers of such high standing that the objection is believed to be not well founded. The delays due to lockages are more than offset by the greater speed at which vessels can safely navigate the lakes formed by the dams than is possible in the sea-level canal, and the argument on this point in the minority report seems to me to be the more weighty. J The advocates of the sea-level canal express doubt as to the stability of the dams at Gatun and at La Boca, if founded on the natural soil, and advance the opinion that "no such vast and doubtful experiment should be indulged in." It appears, however, that the dams proposed are to be founded on impervious materials, thereby conforming to the views of the Route, Design and Construction 39 majority, and are to have such ample dimensions as to insure the compression of the mud and clay rather than its displacement. Furthermore, the estimates include an allowance for additional safeguards against seepage if subsequent detailed investigations show the necessity for extra precautions. The construction of earth dams to retain water 85 feet deep is not experimental, and as the dams proposed have greater mass and stability than sim- ilarly constructed dams of greater heights, it appears that the apprehensions as to the safety of the dams are unnecessary. When I visited the Isthmus a year and a half ago and went over the site and talked with the then chief engineer, I received a strong impression that the work of construction upon which the United States was about to enter was of such world-wide im- portance and so likely to continue in active use for centuries to come, that it was wise for the government not to be impatient of the time to be taken or of the treasure to be spent. It seemed to me that the sea-level canal was necessarily so much more certain to satisfy the demands of the world's commerce than a lock canal that both time and money might well be sacrificed to achieve the best form, and this feeling was emphasized by reading the very able report of the majority. But the report of the mi- nority, in showing the actual result of the use of the locks in ship canals, in pointing out the dangers of so narrow and contracted a canal prism as that which the majority proposes, and in making clear the great additional cost in time and money of a sea-level canal, has led me to a different conclusion. We may well concede that if we could have a sea-level canal with a prism from 300 to 400 feet wide, with the curves that must now exist reduced, it would be preferable to the plan of the minority, but the time and the cost of constructing such a canal are in effect prohibitory. I ought not to close without inviting attention to the satis- factory character of the discussion of the two types of canal by the greatest canal engineers of the world, which insures to you and to the Congress an opportunity to consider all the arguments, pro and con, in reaching a proper conclusion. The following is the essential part of the decision by President Roosevelt, dated February 19, 1908, which 40 XKe Panama Canal with the reports of the board he transmitted to Congress: It will be noticed that the American engineers on the Consult- ing Board and on the Commission by a more than two to one majority favor the lock canal, whereas the foreign engineers are a unit against it. I think this is partly to be explained by the fact that the great traffic canal of the Old World is the Suez Canal, a sea-level canal, whereas the great traffic canal of the New World is the Sault Ste. Marie Canal, a lock canal. Al- though the latter, the Soo, is closed to navigation during the winter months, it carries annually three times the traffic of the Suez Canal. In my judgment the very able argument of the majority of the Board of Consulting Engineers is vitiated by their failure to pay proper heed to the lessons taught by the construc- tion and operation of the Soo Canal. It must be borne in mind, as the Commission points out, that there is no question of building what has been picturesquely termed "the Straits of Panama that is, a waterway through which the largest vessels could go with safety at uninterrupted high speed. Both the sea-level canal and the proposed lock canal would be too narrow and shallow to be called with any truthful- ness a strait, or to have any of the properties of a wide, deep water strip. Both of them would be canals, pure and simple. Each type has certain disadvantages and certain advantages. But, in my judgment, the disadvantages are fewer and the ad- vantages very much greater in the case of a lock canal substan- tially as proposed in the papers forwarded herewith. . . . A careful study of the reports seems to establish a strong probability that the following are the facts: The sea-level canal would be slightly less exposed to damage in the event of war, the running expenses, apart from the heavy cost of interest on the amount employed to build it, would be less, and for small ships the time of transit would probably be less. On the other hand, the lock canal at a level of 80 feet or thereabouts would not cost much more than half as much to build and could be built in about half the time, while there would be very much less risk connected with building it, and for large ships the transit would be quicker; while, taking into account the interest on the amount +3 d d "S 03 O d o ,d — < fcdD d CD cd o += 03 o3 "53 o © "53 S e "53 © © d O O f-i o3 GO ^ 3 CD d O ^ 03 f-i c3 £js CD £ O ?f -d 03 »i— ( £ *g CD £ o3 a o p o3 CD .d f-t CD > O a o CD a; go a O CO M o o 3 f-i CD d 03 a 00 "53 s © «H -2 ^ CD -g "S © lZ CD CD . A CD d 03 ^ « 1? id © ^ ?3 a d ,d o3 d © . CD o3 £ a °D y CD o ,2 (U © -V rd 03 "»* CD f-i 02 O ten o3 rv CD S o3 8 S IVovite, Design and Construction 41 saved in building, the actual cost of maintenance would be less. After being built, it would be easier to enlarge the lock canal than the sea-level canal. Moreover, what has been actually dem- onstrated in making and operating the great lock canal, the Soo, a more important artery of traffic than the great sea-level canal, the Suez, goes to support the opinion of the minority of the Con- sulting Board of Engineers and of the majority of the Isthmian Canal Commission as to the superior safety, feasibility, and desira- bility of building a lock canal at Panama. The law now on our statute books seems to contemplate a lock canal. In my judgment a lock canal, as herein recommended, is advisable. On June 27, 1906, Congress passed a joint resolution which approved the lock canal proposed by the minor- ity, and finally closed the case. This was more than one year after the appointment of the Board of Con- sulting Engineers. Many details, as well as many problems of importance, were not finally determined by the board and required consideration by the Isth- mian Canal Commission. It will not be necessary to describe the detailed processes and the steps by means of which these matters were finally determined, except incidentally when studying some of the important ele- ments of the canal. A general account of the canal as it is actually being built will now be given, to be followed by descriptions of its important parts. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE CANAL The sea-level approach channel from the Caribbean Sea lies within Limon Bay for 4| miles. (See plan No. 2.) It is 500 feet wide on the bottom, with side slopes of one vertical to three horizontal, and having a depth of 41 feet below mean sea level. (See plans Nos. 42 THe Panama Canal 4 and 5.) The range of the tide is about 2 feet. The alignment is straight for 5| miles from the entrance as far as the Mindi Hills, at which point the American canal intersects the comparatively insignificant old French canal. There is a slight bend of long radius at Mindi Hills, and then a straight run of 1| miles to Gatun Locks. We have passed from the valley of the Mindi River into the valley of the Chagres, and are face to face with one of the great problems of the canal construction, namely, the handling of the torrential Chagres River. After weighing several other schemes, that finally adopted consists of the formation of a lake measuring about 24 miles on the canal axis from Gatun to Bas Obispo. The length of the lake in the other direction will be over 30 miles. The lake is formed by the construction of an earth dam of unusual dimensions extending across the valley at Gatun. The dam does not seem artificial to the eye, but appears as one of the major features of the landscape. After the lake is filled, the flow of the Chagres into it will be discharged by the carefully designed concrete spillway, which cuts through the middle of the great earth dam at a point where a rocky eminence afforded a safe location. The normal water surface of Gatun Lake will be 85 feet above mean sea level, but provisions are made so that the water surface can be carried at any elevation between 80 feet and 87 feet. Ships will be passed into Gatun Lake by means of a series of three locks at Gatun, each of which in turn will raise the vessel an average of 28J feet. The locks are close together and the ships will pass directly from Route, Design and Construction 43 one lock into the next. The three locks are in dupli- cate; that is, a vessel may go up either one flight or the other of the duplicate locks, or one flight may be used for ascending vessels and the other for descending vessels. The corresponding locks adjoin and there is only a dividing wall between them. After the ship has passed into the lower lock, and while it is being raised, the following ship, if close behind, may be tied up at the approach wall 1200 feet long, formed by an exten- sion of the dividing wall. Each lock has a net or usable length of 1000 feet, and a net or usable width of 110 feet, but the dimensions of the ship must be somewhat less than this to provide for fenders and clearances. The formation of the lake with the water 85 feet above the sea level obviated all digging for 17 miles, except the top of an occasional mound. (See plan No. 5.) The alignment of the channel in the lake was determined by the position of hills, changed into islands by the rising water. At the locks, the canal axis makes a slight bend to the left and the channel of 1000 feet width and 75 feet depth extends in a straight line for 3| miles to the first bend in the lake. This bend is followed by a straight channel of the same width but reduced depth for a distance of miles, almost to Bohio, where a further turn to the left is made. The course does not run straight to Bohio from the locks, because Tiger Hill and Lion Hill are in the way. After a two-mile run from Bohio to Buena Vista, 1000 feet wide, there is a turn to the right, the course continuing straight for a distance of 2§ miles to a point opposite Frijoles. 44 THe Panama Canal Here there is a further turn to the right, with a straight course of miles, still 1000 feet wide, to a point near Tabernilla; then a turn to the left, with a reduction in width to 800 feet, and a straight reach of 3 miles to a point near San Pablo. The lake has now become a narrow arm, occupying the region where the valley of the Chagres had much steeper banks. At San Pablo there is a turn to the left with a short run 800 feet wide of 1 mile; then a turn to the right, another short run of 1 mile, with a further turn to the right; then a longer reach of 3 miles, with width reduced to 500 feet, passing the submerged town of Gorgona; then a right turn and a 1-mile run to a point near Gamboa. From Gatun to Gamboa there are 23 crossings of the former course of the Chagres, showing that the canal has practically followed the course of the river, but with the aid of steam shovels has selected a much straighter course than the one carved by the river along the lines of least resistance. At Bas Obispo, which is close to Gamboa, we enter the great Culebra Cut. The minimum width of the canal up to this point has been 500 feet, but through the following 8.1 miles the bottom width is reduced to 300 feet to save excavation. A width of only 200 feet was originally contemplated but was wisely increased to 300 feet. The banks of the canal become higher and higher as we pass on, until at Gold Hill, the ele- vation of the highest land on one side is 554 feet above sea level, and the other side, 410 feet, while the land over the center of the canal was formerly 312 feet above sea level, or 227 feet above the bottom of the IVomte, Design and Construction 45 canal. The minimum depth of the canal on the entire upper section is 45 feet at normal lake level, or 40 feet at low lake level, but throughout Gatun Lake the depth is in excess of these. The Culebra Cut and the 85-foot elevation of the water both end at the Pedro Miguel Lock. In passing through the cut, from Bas Obispo to Pedro Miguel, there are eight straight reaches connected by easy curves, three to the right and four to the left. It is most remarkable that so large a portion of this run is on straight lines, and that the total degree of curvature has been kept so low. At Pedro Miguel there is one lock in duplicate which lowers the vessel to the 55-foot elevation of Miraflores Lake. The Pedro Miguel Lock has approach walls formed by 1200-foot extensions in both directions of the dividing-wall between the locks. Miraflores Lake is comparatively small, and a run of 1| miles, in a 500-foot channel 45 feet deep, takes the ship to Mira- flores. At this point there are two locks in duplicate, with approach walls at the upper and lower levels, the same as at Pedro Miguel and Gatun. The two locks at Miraflores lower the vessel to tidewater, a drop of 45 feet at high tide, or 65 feet at low tide. (See plan No. 3.) The 20-foot tides on the Pacific coast have made the problem more difficult than on the Atlantic coast, where the tide is only 2 feet. One-half mile beyond Miraflores Locks, the canal makes a turn to the right and extends for a distance of 2| miles to Balboa, where it makes a turn to the left and extends for 4J miles to deep water in the Bay of Panama. The Pacific sea-level section is all of 500 feet width, TKe Panama Canal and the depth of the water is 55 feet at high tide and 35 feet at low tide, and is usually stated to be 45 feet deep, referring to mean tide. The total length of the canal, measured along its axis, is 50.4 miles. The portion within the shore lines is only 41.5 miles, and the remainder consists of dredged channels in Limon Bay and Panama Bay. Of the total length, 14| miles are at sea level, over 23 J miles in Gatun Lake, nearly 3 miles in the locks or alongside approach walls, 1| miles in Miraflores Lake and 8 miles in the Culebra Cut. In the total length there are 22 bends, with a total curvature of 600 de- grees and 51 minutes. The average length of the straight reach is a little over 2 miles. At each bend the canal is widened by cutting away on the inside of the bend, the shape and amount of cutting having been determined after observations of vessels actually rounding turns. The time required for a vessel to pass through was estimated to be from 10 to 12 hours, of which 3 hours are required for passing the locks, and these estimates have been verified by experience. Through the Culebra Cut the vessel must reduce speed, but for most of the remaining distance may approach full speed. GATUN LAKE Less attention, it is believed, has been paid to Gatun Lake by those describing the canal than the subject really deserves. (See plan No. 1.) It forms the pre- ponderant element in the American project. The great dam at Gatun, the spillway, and the locks are Route, Design and Construction 47 incidental to the lake, and by virtue of it, the amount of excavation and the attendant difficulties in the Culebra Cut are greatly reduced. The lake provides 23 J miles of canal channel, or nearly half the total length, and gives a width of 1000 feet for 16 miles, 800 feet for 4 miles, and 500 feet for the remaining 4 miles; the average width is nearly 900 feet, while the rest of the canal averages less than 450 feet. Not only in width, but also in depth the lake channel offers an advantage, for while the rest of the channel is limited to an ample depth of 45 feet, the lake offers a maximum depth of about 75 feet, and is nowhere less than 45 feet along the navigable channel. These generous dimensions will facilitate navigation and will allow vessels to approach their ocean speed. Besides being such a valuable asset to navigation, Gatun Lake solves one of the most difficult and most vital of all the problems involved in the canal con- struction. We are familiar with the characteristics of the Chagres River. This wild and variable stream is immediately tamed and calmed on entering Gatun Lake. Its waters, which form and replenish the lake, may be likened to a beast of burden quietly carrying the ships to and fro, supplying the lifting force that passes them through the locks, and the power to drive the generators which light the canal, operate the machinery, and which may, later, operate the railroad. While great ideas and great accomplishments may be briefly abstracted in picturesque terms, the knowl- edge so given is superficial if unaccompanied by a more intimate consideration of the principles involved, 48 XKe Panama Canal and of the studies and investigations which attended them. Nothing may be left to surmise or conjecture, no assumptions may be made, unsupported by masses of the best evidence available. Where the problems are new and no direct evidence can be obtained, the best engineering judgment, based on experience, must be brought into play. An investigation had first to be made as to the suf- ficiency of the water supply. The lake, once it is formed, will suffer losses from at least five different sources: 1st, evaporation; 2d, seepage, or groundflow; 3d, leakage through the lock gates and spillway gates; 4th, water required to pass ships through the locks, and 5th, water to develop power, if a sufficient amount remains available. Evaporation depends on the wind and the hygro- metric state of the air, and also on the area of the lake. At the normal elevation of 85 feet above sea level, the area of the lake is 163 square miles. For certain rea- sons that will be discussed later, the elevation of the lake may, when actually placed in service, vary from 80 to 90 feet above sea level, and the area of the lake will vary correspondingly from 153 to 173 square miles. Evaporation continues from day to day, and, unfortunately, is the greatest when rainfall is the least. The length of the dry season is, therefore, of importance. To provide for the driest future year, the weather records as far back as available are studied, and the driest year taken as a standard, with an allowance for even more unfavorable conditions. Fortunately, the French under the New Company, differing from the Route, Design and Construction 49 de Lesseps Company, made continuous and careful observations of all meteorological and hydrological features of value. The Americans have continued these observations with great care and completeness. Evaporation pans have also been exposed to secure direct evidence which would bear some relation to the rate of evaporation from the lake. From the best evi- dence available at the time, the probable rate of evap- oration was found to be about one-fourth of an inch per 24 hours. This has been computed to equal a loss of 930 cubic feet per second, continuing during the dry season. Later observations indicate one-sixth of an inch daily during the dry season, thus reducing the computed probable loss. The loss by seepage is dependent on the character of the soil forming the bottom of the lake, and upon the head or pressure of water at any particular point. To clearly understand its character, we may note that an ordinary river in reality includes more than the flowing water which is visible between its banks, in that the ground along the river contains water which to the eye seems quiescent, but which actually has a flow, extremely slow, but always moving toward the river and down the valley with the river. Its rate of flow depends on the character of the material, the frictional resistance, and the distance to be traveled; it is comparatively rapid in sand or gravel, and is re- duced to a minimum in clays and rocks. The seepage from Gatun Lake will be of an allied nature, and it remains to estimate the amount. The engineers made careful studies of thfc bottom of the lake by borings, 50 XHe Panama Canal test pits, and geological surveys. Specially careful ex- aminations were made at those points where the ridges between the lake and the adjoining valleys are narrow and low. It was perfectly possible that gravel strata or porous coral deposits might exist which, communi- cating with the sea, might discharge the waters of the lake as through a sieve. The engineers satisfied them- selves that no ; such condition existed, and their judgment was confirmed by a Board of Consulting Engineers appointed in 1908 by President Roosevelt. The probable seepage was estimated to be 85 cubic feet per second, or less than one-tenth the rate of evapora- tion during the dry season. The loss of water through leaks and imperfect seat- ings in the many valves and miter-gates of the locks, and the 14 gates of the spillway, depends on the accu- racy with which the devices are made and the care used in the maintenance. The commission followed correct principles in using the utmost care in designing and constructing them, and yet assuming a rather heavy loss of water from incomplete closure or accident. The amount lost is estimated to be 275 cubic feet per second, the equivalent of 500 ordinary city fire streams. The amount of water found necessary for developing electric current for lighting the canal, and operating all the machinery is estimated at 275 cubic feet per second, based on the required amount of current and the effi- ciency of the apparatus. The amount of water required for lockages is de- pendent on the design of the locks, the amount of traffic, and the size of the vessels, for the locks are so Route, Design and Construction 51 divided that small vessels may use short sections, or several small vessels pass through the whole lock to- gether. Assuming the traffic equal to the maximum capacity of the locks, and utilizing records of experi- ence with the Sault Ste. Marie Canal, the Board of Consulting Engineers estimated the traffic at 80,000,000 register tons per year, as against 30,000,000 tons for the "Soo" Canal, and an actual maximum at that time of 15,500,000 tons for the Suez.* The amount of water required for lockage was found by the designing engi- neers to be about 2618 cubic feet per second, which means about one lockage in each direction per hour, but the assumed maximum traffic will not be reached for many years. Adding the total losses from all causes gives a total of 4183 cubic feet per second, applicable during the dry months, when evaporation is the greatest. The question now arises: Where is this rather enormous quantity of water coming from? The input into Gatun Lake comes from rainfall directly on the lake, which is absent in the dry season, however, and from the flow of Chagres River and of minor streams. The data desired for this purpose pertains to the driest period that may be reasonably expected, and the best way to predict it is from records of the flow of the Chagres in past years. The records of the New French Panama Canal Company furnish much reliable infor- mation, while that obtained from the old company is fragmentary and incomplete. * The Suez Canal passed 5373 vessels in 1912, about 12 per day, with a total tonnage of 28,008,945 the largest year of record. The tonnage in 1913 was less. 52 XKe Panama Canal The driest consecutive four months in the available records of 19 years showed a flow, on an average, of 1190 cubic feet per second into the lake. Unfortunately, a 19-year period is hardly sufficient to determine the future probable minimum, and the average of 1190 cubic feet which occurred in 1908, the year the com- putations were made, was followed in 1912 by an aver- age flow for four months of less than 900 cubic feet per second, or about 25 per cent less. This will not affect the problem adversely, because of the liberal allowances made in determining losses and the possi- bility of using an oil-fired steam plant in place of water power. It is apparent that the 900 cubic feet per second supplied to Gatun Lake will not provide the 4183 cubic feet per second to be consumed. The balance, or 3283 cubic feet per second, will be obtained by filling Gatun Lake to a level of 87 feet above the sea (the gates and copings are 92 feet) before the end of the rainy season, and then, during the succeeding dry season, drawing the lake down gradually to a level of 80 feet above sea level, if need be. The storage capac- ity of the lake between these two levels, at an average area of about 159 square miles, will supply this amount of water with a slight margin. The problem is iden- tical, in many respects, with that involved in the great impounding reservoirs of modern city water works, such as those of Boston and New York, where storage tides over the dry season. It may be noted that this drawing off of the upper 5 feet of the lake explains one reason why the depth of Route, Design, and Construction 53 channel through the Culebra Cut was made 45 feet at normal lake level. The water level in the cut is the same as in the lake, and when the lake falls to 80 feet, the channel in the cut will have 40 feet depth of water. At this point it becomes clear that one of the great- est responsibilities of the canal operating force will be the conservation of the water. The operator must be thoroughly versed in problems of rainfall and hydrol- ogy, and should begin the dry season with a full lake, and he must be careful not to be caught by an unex- pectedly early or unusually dry season; he must each year be prepared for the worst. No apprehension need be felt that the water supply will give out, however, if reasonable care is taken. Should increased storage capacity for water be required to meet new conditions of the distant future, it may be obtained by building a reservoir on the upper Chagres, with a dam at Alha- juela, where some of the flood waters of the Chagres, which now waste over the spillway, may be stored until needed in the dry season. It was here that the French proposed building a reservoir for supplying the highest level of their canal through a tunnel. It is seen that Gatun Lake can be kept full, but the designing engineer was required to determine that it could be filled initially. An examination of the records of flow of the Chagres for all available years left no doubt that the water in the rainy season in excess of all losses was more than sufficient to fill the lake in two successive years. The driest rainy season of record, 1911-1912, afforded an average flow of 6556 cubic feet per second, which would have filled Gatun Lake in 54 THe Panama Canal about 400 days, or two rainy seasons, making deduc- tions for reduced losses on account of there being no lockages, no hydraulic power plant in operation, and less leakage, evaporation, and seepage, due to reduced lake area and head of water. Two rainy seasons were actually taken to fill the lake, although in fact the rate of filling depended more on the contingencies of construction work than on the amount of water available. THE GATUN DAM The Gatun Dam, which made Gatun Lake possible, is the key to the American Panama Canal scheme. (See plan No. 2.) The lock-level canal might have been built with a dam at a different location, 9 miles upstream at Bohio adopted by the French in their final scheme and selected by the first Isthmian Commission on the lock canal alternative; but the area of the lake would have been very much less, with a consequent loss of opportunity to navigate in wide, unrestricted channels, and a great loss in storage capacity. The dam at Bohio could have been built of masonry on a rock foundation, for which the French made consider- able excavation. A masonry dam on rock foundation was not possible at Gatun, because the rock is too far below the surface. It was only after advice had been obtained of some of the ablest engineering talent in the world, familiar with similar problems elsewhere, that an earth dam at Gatun was decided on. This decision was probably the most momentous one in connection with the canal construction. Elaborate investigations were made of the character of the under- Route, Design and Construction 55 lying material through test pits and innumerable bor- ings. It was found that the top layer consisted of fine sand intermixed with a large proportion of clay, which extended to a maximum depth, at one point, of practi- cally 80 feet. Below this, for a distance of 100 feet or more, is a thick deposit of impervious blue clay, con- taining a little sand with a quantity of shells inter- spersed. Below the clay, and directly overlying the bed rock, is a miscellaneous layer of variable thickness up to 20 feet, consisting of boulders and gravel consoli- dated with finely divided clays and silts. Several important factors enter into the design of this dam and the determination of its dimensions. The dam itself must be impervious to water, or, on finer analysis, it would be more accurate to say the seepage must be a minimum. If a well, extending below the ordinary level of the ground water, and without tapping subterranean water channels, is pumped, the ground water in the surrounding territory will flow towards the well and its level will gradually fall and assume a curve joining the surface of the water in the well with the normal ground-water level some distance away. The slope of this curve depends upon the character of the material and the amount of fric- tion which it exerts against the flow. Deeper pumping will lower the curve and extend it farther back. To maintain a fixed level of water in the well will require a fixed rate of pumping, equal to the seepage through the ground, so long as no rain falls on the area affected by the well. The conditions at the Gatun Dam are similar, with the ground-water level in the valley below 56 THe Panama Canal the dam corresponding to the water in the well and the water in the lake corresponding to the normal ground- water level, and the slope curve passing through the dam. To prevent loss of water, the materials of which the dam is built must be selected from the available local deposits and placed in such a way as to retard, to the greatest possible extent, the flow of water. In very fine silts, the rate of flow is so minute that they are generally classed as impervious. Capillary attraction is a force which must be considered. It is this which keeps the surface of ordinary ground moist. The evapora- tion from the surface removes the moisture, but it is promptly replaced by capillary attraction from the ground-water reservoir below. With no rain, the ground water is thus gradually lowered until the capillary forces are no longer sufficient to raise the water from the increased depth to the surface which then becomes dry. This force must also be considered, although to a minor extent, in the design of the dam. Unfortunately, the ordinary materials which are classed as impervious have a faculty for absorbing water, which softens them and reduces their capacity for self-support. With the height of water furnished by Gatun Lake, there is ample opportunity for the contents of the dam to become saturated, and mate- rials subject to disintegration, or with a tendency to absorb, would settle and not maintain the side slopes. Clay or fine silt is particularly treacherous in its nature; yet it is upon these materials that the imperviousness of Gatun Dam must depend. The solution of this problem is to build the center of the dam of impervious Route, Design and Construction 57 material and the outer portion on both sides of a ma- terial capable of maintaining the predetermined slopes wet or dry, but necessarily allowing water to pass. On the lake side, it must be faced with a lining to resist wave action. Yet this is not all. The weight of the dam might produce so great a pressure on the original surface of the earth that it would sink and cause the earth to rise just beyond the toe of the dam. This actually hap- pened only a short distance away with embankments for the Panama Railroad. The remedy was to counter- weight the rising area of soft material at the toe of the embankment with fill material and thus prevent any further rise. With a structure like the Gatun Dam, settlement of this character would have dislodged the parts of the dam already built, would have created possible fissures and avenues for future flow, and would have aroused the greatest doubt in the minds of the public as to its strength and safety; therefore, the question must be investigated and settled in ad- vance. The rising of the material is prevented by first removing any soft material, and further by making the dam very wide, with a thin extended toe, thus making the counterweight a part of the dam itself. Even with the greatest precautions, a slip in the rock fill due to the giving way of soft material near the old French canal occurred and caused great popular alarm, and led the President to order a board of emi- nent engineers to Panama. Their report was most re- assuring and confirmed, in the main, the judgment of the commission. 58 THe Panama Canal Not only the dam itself must be impervious, but also the material upon which it is built must prevent the water from flowing underneath it. To increase imperviousness, the commission drove a line of sheet piling twenty feet into the earth; but on the advice of the special board of engineers this was omitted and, instead, a trench was dug along the middle, which was filled by the core of the dam. The generous dimensions of the dam, however, prin- cipally contribute the imperviousness and stability. As finally built, the crest is 100 feet wide and 20 feet above normal water level; the thickness of the dam at the water surface is 400 feet, and it increases to a thickness of nearly one-half mile at its deepest part. The dam, after clearing the 573 acres of site, was constructed by first building long mounds at the outer lines of the dam with the proper exterior slope. The material was spoil from the Culebra Cut, the locks and the spillway, and was dumped from trestles. When the mounds were carried to sufficient height, the interior space was filled with silty material from nearby deposits by the hydraulic dredging process. Where the course of the Chagres crosses the dam, two lines of sheet piling were driven, and the material between them, which was not of a suitable character, was excavated and replaced. The design of the Gatun Dam was not decided on until elaborate tests had been made of the actual seep- age through the material to be used in the construc- tion. These seepage tests were made by drilling holes into the deposits that were later to form the core of Fig. 10. — Gatun Spillway Dam, under construction, showing three perma- nent crest gates in position, January, 1913. The water is issuing from tempo- rary culverts, which were permanently closed at a later date. R.o\ite, Design and Construction 59 the dam, and pumping a measured amount of water into them, and noting the loss and rate of flow under fixed pressures. The natural flow of the ground water through the soil was also studied. Several model dams were built and experiments made to determine the slope of the water through the material of the dam, caused by the miniature lake on one side. Test pits were dug in the deposits, and the flow into the test pits was pumped out and measured, while at the same time, observations on the level of the ground water were taken in the neighborhood. The dimensions of the cross-section of the dam were twice changed. The height of 135 feet above sea level, as originally proposed, was at first reduced to 115 feet, and finally to the adopted height of 105 feet. The surface slopes and width at the bottom were also changed. GATUN SPILLWAY During the rainy season the influx of water into Gatun Lake is much greater than the amount con- sumed, and the spillway through the Gatun Dam pro- vides the outlet. It might have been placed anywhere on the rim of the lake and a channel to the sea con- structed, but a favorable site on rock foundation was found on the line of the dam, which allowed the use of the bed of the Chagres for carrying the water to the sea. (See plan No. 2.) The spillway consists of a concrete dam with means for overflow, and a concrete channel to lead the water away. It is a most important adjunct to Gatun Lake, for it not only will safely relieve the lake of dangerous 60 » The Panama Canal flood waters, but also will control the level of the water surface, thus accomplishing the storage of a part of the flood waters for use in the dry season. Its dis- charge capacity must be made equal to that of the greatest possible flood. To determine the amount of water, we must again seek information in the records of the New French Company and the succeeding records by the Americans. It is to be deplored that the old company obtained no record of the Chagres flood of 1879, known to be larger than any covered by subsequent records. The engineers' report states that, "The maximum momentary discharge of the Chagres River at Gatun is calculated from the measured Bohio discharge to be 182,000 cubic feet per second." This is over 200 times the minimum dry-weather flow. An overflow type of spillway to carry off this amount of water would be over 2,000 feet long, and even so, its discharge capacity at the highest floods would not be sufficient, and the lake might rise five feet. For these reasons, the commission adopted a spillway with a crest that is semi-circular in plan and has fourteen openings cut through the upper part, closed by gates. The elevation of the bottom of the openings is at 69 feet above sea level, or 16 feet below the normal level of the lake. Each opening is about 45 feet wide. They are so wide, in fact, that the top of the spillway is really composed of a series of piers, with the open- ings containing the valves between them. When the gate is shut, its top is at elevation 88 feet above sea level, making the gate 19 feet in its vertical dimension. The gate may be raised 22J feet, or clear of a 90-foot Route, Design and Construction 61 depth of water in the lake. This device for discharg- ing water from the lake is far superior to the plain crest without gates, because the amount of water pass- ing through may be very nicely controlled; further- more, any increase in the depth of the water in the lake from sudden floods would tend to increase the capacity of each opening of the spillway, because the amount of water discharged through a weir is dependent upon the head or elevation of water which is acting on the weir. When the lake is at elevation 87 a single gate will discharge 11,000 cubic feet per second, or 154,000 cubic feet per second for the lot. The maximum known flow of the Chagres is less than this amount; in fact, is only 137,500 cubic feet for any prolonged period, such as 33 hours. The momentary discharge may be much greater than this and has been determined as high as 186,000 cubic feet per second, but, in designing a spill- way, the momentary maximum is not what is wanted. Should any flood occur which will exceed the capacity of 154,000 cubic feet per second, then, of course, the lake will begin to rise; but as it rises, the capacity of the spillway is increased until, with the lake at the improbable elevation of 92 feet, above which the water would flow over the miter gates and into the locks, the rate of discharge of the crest will be 222,000 cubic feet per second. In addition to this, water can be passed through the lock culverts both at Gatun and Pedro Miguel. The length of the period over which records of flow of the Chagres are available is insufficient to predict with any degree of certainty the probable max- imum flood at some future time, and the commission 62 THe Panama Canal has again shown its wisdom in designing for a capacity which is quite far in advance of that required by recorded floods. The gates themselves are constructed of heavy and massive steel work. They are of the so-called Stoney gate-valve type. The sliding frictional resistance of ordinary valves of this size would be very great. The Stoney pattern of valve overcomes this by using roller trains upon which the valve travels. Passing length- wise along the dam and underneath the gates is a tun- nel in which all the machinery for operating the gate valves is placed. A chain is fastened to each side of the gate and passes over a sprocket wheel on the ad- joining pier, and then down through a vertical well to the machinery tunnel. A large screw is fastened to the end of the chain and passes through a worm. A heavy counterweight hangs on the lower end of this screw rod, leaving only frictional resistance to be over- come. The motor for operating the worms is located midway between the screw rods, thus applying equal lifting force to each end of the gate. After passing over the crest the water slides over the face of the spillway, which is so designed as to fit the normal curve of the water. At the bottom the con- crete work is curved so as to give the stream a hori- zontal direction. About 21 baffle piers are built within this area to retard the rapid flow. At the same time, the channel becomes contracted from a width of 414 feet, which is the length of the inside of the crest, to a width of 285 feet. The water is carried in a long sluiceway, lined with heavy concrete walls and paved Route, Design and Construction 63 with a concrete floor, and is discharged at a safe dis- tance from the dam into the old French Chagres di- version and then into the bed of the Chagres River, whence it continues to the sea. During the dry season of four months very little water will pass through the spillway, but in the rainy season varying amounts will pass. The average flow will be about 10,000 cubic feet per second, increased momentarily to almost 15 times that amount during periods of high flood. Over the tops of the piers which separate the gate openings, a bridge and roadway have been built, so that traffic may be carried the full length of the Gatun Dam. So important to the success of the canal is this spill- way that the commission's engineers constructed a model of the same for experimental purposes, one thirty-second of the size of the original. It was tested under various conditions and the facts thus gained were of value in making the final designs. EXCAVATION OF CULEBRA CUT The Culebra Cut is very generally and very justly considered the most important part of the canal con- struction work. (See plan No. 5.) The date of com- pletion of the cut practically determined that of the whole canal. It was in charge of the Central Divison of the canal organization, which covered also the small amount of dredging and excavation within the limits of Gatun Lake. Total expenditures are a good measure of the magnitude and relative importance of the various items and, as given in the table elsewhere, show that about half the amount applied to construction work 64 XKe Panama Canal direct, was for the Culebra Cut. There might be added to the total for the Culebra Cut $20,000,000 of the payment for the French property, which applied to ex- cavation, thus indicating that the cut comprised over one-half of the construction work of the canal proper. A typical American tool developed largely on rail- road work, namely, the steam shovel, solved one of the vital parts of the excavation problem. Its function was to pick up the soft material or blasted hard mate- rial and place it aboard the cars. It performed its function so well that the rate of progress was dependent on keeping the shovels supplied with cars and disposing of the material on the dumps. Again allowing the cost of the various items into which excavation may be analyzed to indicate their relative importance, the fol- lowing table, taken from the records for the fiscal year 1912, is given with the items arranged in the order of cost: ANALYSIS OF COST OF EXCAVATING CULEBRA CUT, TAKEN FROM RECORDS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1912 Cost per Cubio Yard., 1. Transportation $0.1331 2. Drilling and blasting 0. 1157 3. Tracks 0.0885 4. Loading by steam shovels 0.0681 5. General expense and supervision 0.0503 6. Dumps 0.0479 7. Plant, arbitrary 0.0395 8. Drainage, structures and clearing . 0045 Total unit cost $0.5496 The clearing of the site in preparation for excavation work was of minor importance. After the loose mate- Rx>\ite, Design and Construction 65 rial had been cut away by the shovels, the drilling and blasting followed. Of the total of 93,000,000 cubic yards of material removed from the cut prior to July 1, 1912, about 66,500,000 cubic yards, or 71 § per cent, required drilling and blasting. The power for drilling was supplied by a large compressed-air main, which was tapped at convenient points and the lines laid to the drills. The work was most carefully studied and planned. Systematic records were kept of the amount drilled by each crew daily. Familiarity with the ma- terial and trial of various methods indicated exactly the setting of the holes and the depths to which they should be drilled to obtain the greatest economy. All loading of holes and firing was placed in the charge of a special crew of trained men, and the firing was done by current from the electric station at Empire. There was a serious accident during the early stages of the work, due to a premature discharge of a vast quantity of dynamite that had been placed in the holes and left there for firing at a convenient time. From some ob- scure cause, such as the overheating of the dynamite, it exploded and killed a large number of men. There- after, the dynamite was fired within a few hours after being placed, with the result that in three years only eight men were killed by dynamite, although a total of 19,000,000 pounds of explosives was used in the Central Division during that time. A knowledge of the handling of explosives, as in the case of many other important public works, formed an asset of great importance. Various kinds of explosives were used, including saltpeter dynamite with 60 per cent nitro- 66 THe Panama Canal glycerin, saltpeter dynamite with 40 per cent nitro- glycerin and Trojan powder. The total amount of explosives used on the entire canal work to June 30, 1913, reached the enormous total of 56,000,000 pounds. When the blasting did not break up the material small enough for handling by steam shovel, it was further broken up by so-called "dobe" shots, which consisted in laying a small stick of dynamite on the top of the rock and detonating it with a safety fuse. The shovels worked on short pieces of track, which were extended as the work progressed, while the cars for receiving the material were handled on parallel tracks next to the shovel. So rapidly did the shovels load cars that the handling of dirt trains into and out of the cut was a problem in railroad transportation of the very first order. Within the limits of the cut there were nine parallel tracks to carry the traffic, having a total length of over one hundred miles. Where two or more shovels were working on one line, the empties came in on one end of the track, so that each shovel had a train of cars. As soon as any shovel filled its train, all were immediately shoved ahead so as to get the full train out of the way. By adhering to this sys- tem the first train was always the one to be loaded first. All trains were handled by a train dispatcher and his assistants, who were located in a tower in a commanding position and provided with telephones, flags, and other forms of signalling apparatus. A great deal depended on the manner in which the train dis- patcher handled his work. There were empties to get into the cut over a complicated system of tracks 03 3 I 2 ^ m M S o l> o o3 S 03 a .d 03 . o3 .9 d ^ o3 o oa •s a Jr ^ 03 i-H CO W d 1-3 o o d r— i ,„ < O | 5h O o O 03 d 3 d J h3 O 05 ■+3 1-1 0) o _ a 3 ft 8 t> 03 CO 03 o3 ~ rH O o> 03 n^J 13 g o> 02 •d PQ 0) • fe o3 O •? M rd • i— I M CD •3 2 Route, Design and Construction 67 to the proper shovel; there were loaded trains to be moved on, and loaded trains to be passed out of the cut; there were workmen's trains, accident cases, spe- cial locomotives, and other traffic to handle. There was scarcely a moment when some definite action, affecting the economy of the entire operation, was not expected of the train dispatcher. The trains were passed on to the construction tracks and thence to the main line of the Panama Railroad. The dirt trains invariably had the right-of-way. To observe the work of these train dispatchers, and to see the constant pro- cession of dirt trains and empties rolling along the main line of the Panama Railroad, was most impres- sive. The traffic was probably equal to that on the main lines of the important trunk lines of the United States. The amount of traffic is indicated by consid- ering the average number of locomotives and cars in use during a typical year, namely 1912, as shown by the following table: Average Daily LOCOMOTIVES AND CARS Number in Use, 1912 Locomotives handling spreaders 6 Locomotives handling unloaders 10 Locomotives handling track shifters 3 Locomotives handling dirt and miscellaneous trains. . . 117 Lidgerwood flat cars, average per day 2403 Large steel dump cars 320 Small steel dump cars 973 The largest number of cars handled in one day during the year 1912 was 4896. In other years the total was even larger. The number of shovels in use during this year was 46, of which nearly half were 68 THe Panama Canal 95-ton shovels with a dipper capacity of 5 cubic yards. The highest daily yardage for one shovel was 4465 cubic yards. The highest annual record was 543,481 cubic yards. The average amount of material handled per shovel per hour increased from 121 cubic yards in 1908 to 165 cubic yards in 1912. In the meantime the average cost per cubic yard of excavation dropped from $0,725 in 1908 to $0.55 in 1912. The disposal of the excavated material required most careful thought and involved considerable en- gineering ability. The rate of progress on the Culebra Cut, and, therefore, the rate of progress on the whole canal, at various times depended upon the speed at which the trains could dispose of their loads of dirt. Where the material could possibly be of any use, trestles were built and the material was deposited without rehandling directly where it was needed, as in the Gatun Dam, the back fill behind the lock walls, the embankments of the new Panama Railroad, and in raising the level of swamp lands, making land, and building a breakwater at the Pacific entrance of the canal. The vast bulk of the material was wasted. The principal dumps were at Tabernilla, Gatun, Mira- flores, Balboa and the Panama Railroad relocation. Each of these dumps took from 5,000,000 to 18,000,000 cubic yards. Trestles were first built to dump material off the cars; and as the level of this fill rose, the track was removed from the trestle and shifted always toward the edge of the bank. It was the constant shifting of track and extension of trestles which caused the delays in disposal of material. The ingenious Route, Design and Construction 69 methods that had been developed on railroad work and elsewhere were utilized on the dumps. A small amount of the material was handled in steel side- dump cars which landed the material alongside the track. Air pressure from a locomotive was used in dumping these cars. Another and a more ingenious method for unloading them was by means of a large plow. The cars were flat and had a bulkhead on one side only; to balance this the other side overhung slightly more. When a train arrived at the dump an enormous plow of the full width of the car was set on one end of the train, and a cable led to the other end. The winding of the cable drew the plow the full length of the train and discharged all the material on the ground next to the track. A further operation was necessary, because the track could not then be laid directly on the brink of the dump. The material which was piled up by the dumping of the cars was shoved off the edge of the embankment by means of an enormous plow, sus- pended over the area alongside the track from a special car, and pushed along by powerful locomotives. When the dump had been widened to a point where the plow or spreader could no longer slide the material out of the way, it was necessary to shift the track. Here again railroad experience was brought into play, and the work of hundreds of men was done by a small crew with a track shifter. This machine had two booms; the first lifted the track off the ground, the second was slewed, and a line passing over it was made fast to the track and drew the track into its new 70 TTHe Panama Canal location. The length of the booms was sufficient so that the weight of the shifter itself, which ran on the track, did not affect the work. Special problems were encountered in some of the dumps, of which one of the most interesting was the disposition of silt and clays taken from the Chagres section of the Central Division. It became very soft when exposed during the rainy season, and the slope was found in some cases to be as flat as 1 vertical to 22 horizontal. It was impossible to maintain tracks on such material. Accordingly, a track was laid along the banks of the Chagres on hard ground, and when the material was dumped, it was thoroughly wetted by means of a 4-inch water pipe, whereupon the saturated material slid slowly but firmly into the Chagres River. The current was sufficient to carry it along and deposit it at points where it could do no harm. In September 1913 steam shovel work in the Culebra Cut was completed, the decision having been reached to flood the cut and do the remaining digging by means of dredges. Controlling factors in this decision were: first, it was hoped that the weight of the water in the cut would have a deterrent effect on some of the slides and breaks; second, the remaining material required no drilling and blasting and could, therefore, be more economically handled by dredges; and third, the canal could be used for traffic while excavation was still in progress which would be impossible with shovels at work. The step forms a connecting link between canal construction and canal maintenance, since dredges will be continually at work to maintain the various channels. Rovite, Design and Construction 71 The French began excavating the Culebra Cut on Janu- ary 20, 1882 and with the exception of the six years from 1889 to 1895 it has been in continuous progress cover- ing a period of over 32 years. GEOLOGY AND THE SLIDES The material through which the Culebra Cut passes is very variable. The region of the Isthmus was once geologically very active, and each period of activity is marked by material typical of the conditions under which it was formed. Fortunately, as in so many other parts of the world that were once the scene of geologic or volcanic activity, the Isthmus is now in a quiescent period and the great geologic forces are in a condition of comparatively stable equilibrium. When the canal project was being agitated there was great apprehension on the part of those not familiar with conditions as to possible volcanic eruptions or earth- quakes. In allaying this feeling, the photographer of the flat arch in the ruins of the old Santo Domingo con- vent in Panama played a very important part. The fact that the arch has stood for so many years, while the roof and windows have disappeared and the ma- sonry has deteriorated, adds to the impressiveness. Equally important, as proving the absence of seismic disturbances, is an almost exactly similar arch in a nearby church which still carries its superimposed floor load. Being in a different plane adds to the force of the evidence. The comparatively infinitesimal forces controlled by the hand of man in a few localities produced minor 72 THe Panama Canal conditions of instability that have resulted in so-called " slides" or " breaks." Fortunately, man controls the means to restore equilibrium. This phase of the canal work will be more fully described later on. From the reports of the commission's geologists it is learned that the oldest rocks are exposed along the canal in the Atlantic end of the Culebra Cut in the region about Bas Obispo. There is also a smaller out- crop of these rocks near Miraflores at the Pacific end of the Culebra Cut and the evidence is that the two are joined by deep-lying rocks of the same character. These are of a type known as volcanic breccia, with local deposits of meta-conglomerates, and originally composed of fragments from volcanic craters but which, in the course of ages, have been compacted and ce- mented into a fairly hard rock. The whole in past ages has been under heavy stresses, which have caused faults and shears; that is, the rocks have cracked and the parts have slid by one another vertically, and this has resulted in very much broken masses. From Empire to Paraiso, at the head of Miraflores Lake, and thus including the greater part of the Cu- lebra Cut, there existed in a former age a great basin or sag. This basin no longer forms a valley, for during succeeding geologic periods it was filled with new forma- tions. These are not of a regular character and the variations in the rocks and in their disposition are greater than in many other parts of the world. A com- plete and detailed description would interest only the geologist or the engineer in advance of his constructive operations. The basin rocks are overlaid by the next iVo\ite, Design and Construction 73 younger formation, composed of light gray limy sand- stones and sandy limestones in beds or lenses, and separated from each other by thin beds of friable shale with occasional masses of carbonaceous matter. These formations contain fossils of marine fauna which also occur at other points entirely across the Isthmus, and as these are formed only in the shallow estuaries of the sea, it is proved that the materials in which the fossils are now lodged were deposited under water; and their disposition across the Isthmus is considered by geologists as proof that the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans were joined at that time. The latest marine- deposited rock is composed of coral and shell limestones and is of non-continuous occurrence. During succeed- ing ages, these formations slowly rose, as they are now above the level of the sea. There was then aerially deposited a thick bed of greenish fine-grained volcanic clay rock, which fills the depressions in the marine- deposited rocks — the remains, probably, of former es- tuaries and channels. This deposit is also not uniform, but contains beds of gravel, sandstone and lava flow. The whole is weak and crumbly. The most recent geologic formations consist of masses of volcanic rock; molten lava from below forced its way through the softer rocks along the lines of least resistance, sometimes spreading between the layers of softer rock and sometimes breaking through in great rifts, forming dikes. Great volcanic masses have also risen, due to the pressure exerted from below, and, forcing their way upward in a cold condition through several hundred feet of softer overlying rocks, are said 74 THe Panama Canal to have formed such elevations as Gold Hill and Contractors Hill. The geologically recent volcanic eruptive rocks are generally hard, and they fortunately serve to greatly strengthen the banks of the canal. The various rocks are in irregular formation, and have in some cases been dislodged from their former relative position by faults or vertical sliding of unstable masses, and by the breaking and cracking into blocks of masses of contiguous rocks. With this brief description of the local geology, the problem ahead of the engineer in planning and making the Culebra Cut becomes a little clearer. It is to be remembered that most of the information now avail- able was unknown before the excavation exposed ma- terials hundreds of feet below the surface. Where the canal passes through a deep cut, the exact slopes to be given to the sides are of the greatest importance. If they are too steep the material will slide or fall into the canal, and if the slope is flattened, even a little, unnecessary excavation and greater cost will be in- curred, increasing rapidly with the depth of the cut. The side slopes must be determined in advance of excavation, as far as possible, because the shovels in the beginning cover the full width and gradually work to the lower and narrower levels. The cutting of any additional material from the side to flatten the slope will be hazardous and costly. As the cut progressed, the bulk of the side slopes proved stable. But as already mentioned, certain areas of instability devel- oped into breaks and slides. Fig. 12. — Miraflores upper locks, general view, looking north from lower locks. Steam-shovel excavation for lower locks in foreground. November 8, 1911. The two cranes on extreme left and on extreme right are the "berme" cranes containing concrete mixers. The two center cranes are chamber cranes and handle materials to center part of the locks. Fig. 13. — Concrete handling cranes at Miraflores. The booms on the right carry the buckets which pick up the sand and stone from the storage piles and dump in bins over the mixers in center of crane. The booms on the left carry the concrete for dumping in the lock walls. The whole crane travels on a track. The booms on the left move through a small angle horizontally. Route, Design and Construction 75 The slides as a feature of the canal operations have received, perhaps, more than their share of attention, and have been made use of by alarmist press agents. Whereas the amount of American excavation for the whole canal is 232,353,000 cubic yards, the total addi- tional amount of material to be removed, due to the slides, is estimated to be approximately 29,431,000 cubic yards, or about 12J per cent of the total excava- tion, or a little over 22 per cent of the dry excavation, or about 30 per cent of the excavation in the Culebra Cut. This is, relatively, the same condition that would be encountered on a difficult sewer or water-pipe trench. Recent activity of the slides will increase the amounts. The slides are not to be minimized, however, as the amount of material involved is equivalent to the exca- vation for 60 of the largest dry docks and they have served to considerably prolong the time of completing the Culebra Cut. Careful attention has been given them by the commission, and the geologist employed by them has made a thorough examination and report on the subject. Slides have developed at those points where the side slopes of the canal excavation were left too steep; that is, where not enough material was taken out to provide a stable bank, having in view the soft or weak- ened character of the material. By removing addi- tional material, stability of the banks results and the slides are thus resolved into a problem of the ultimate amount of excavation. Very large areas are involved. The West Culebra slide, for instance, covers 68 acres 76 THe Panama Canal and involves the excavation of over 11,000,000 cubic yards. The Cucaracha slide covered over 50 acres and involved over 5,300,000 cubic yards. The East Culebra slide covers an area of 55 acres and will mean a total excavation of about 8,000,000 cubic yards. The slides are uncertain. It was thought that the Cucaracha slide would come to rest because of some strengthening dikes of hard rock, but the pressure of the material above was sufficient to break or shear the rocks, allowing the material to move, which it did very rapidly, filling the almost completed canal. The slides are of four different characters, each due to different conditions. The first is produced where a bed of clayey materials, with or without superimposed formations, rests on a bed of harder material which pitches toward the canal. If the surface is sufficiently lubricated by the ground waters, the superincumbent mass slowly moves into the canal. The second class re- sults where faults or great geologic cracks in the rocks occur, and where the fault is at such an angle that the material in the canal prism held the rocks from sliding and, upon excavation of this material, there is nothing to prevent a sliding into the canal. The third and most subtle and difficult form of slide, which is locally known as a break or structural break, begins by a verti- cal settling of the banks. Cracks form in the surface of the ground and the material between cracks settles a little more on the side toward the canal, causing the cracks to open and a series of steps to form ; at the same time the bottom of the canal rises. The rocks in which this phenomenon occurs are some of the weakest in IVo\xte, Design and Construction 77 the canal and are composed of loosely cemented rounded particles. Very little stress will break the cementitious material, and the rounded particles then flow freely on one another; there is nothing to prevent their sliding, as would be the case if they interlocked like pieces of broken stone. The masses do not slide directly into the canal, but the high part of the bank drops vertically, slides some, and forces the bottom of the excavation to rise. It reaches a state of equilib- rium by a different method than the normal sliding mass. The fourth form of slide is that due to erosion and weathering induced both by physical and by chem- ical forces. Just as every cliff has as its foot a talus of broken bits of weathered rock, so the banks of the canal will weather, and limited amounts of material will wash into the canal. Vegetation will retard this. The rest will have to be dug or later dredged from the canal. The serious problems of the slides will have been solved when the canal is entirely finished. No one can predict with certainty, however, that they will have been altogether eliminated by that time.* New slides may develop or old ones extend. But the slides are usually slow to develop, and the material can be rapidly excavated should any occur. The commission will no doubt leave for the maintenance force a fleet of dredges and other excavating apparatus, with which the prob- lems could be met should they arise. It may be added that it is most fortunate that we did not adopt the sea-level canal, for with 85 feet greater depth the slides in the cut might easily have * A slide in October, 1914, temporarily closed the canal to traffic, after vessels had been regularly passing through for several weeks. 78 THe Panama Canal been fourfold the present extent, and they might, in- deed, have been a problem of the first magnitude. MIRAFLORES LAKE Miraflores Lake is a very much smaller body of water than Gatun Lake, and lies between the locks at Pedro Miguel and those at Miraflores. (See plan No. 1.) It is a little over miles long and about 1| miles wide at its widest part. It was at first intended to have the lower locks built close to Balboa instead of at Miraflores. If this had been done, the lake would have had an area of 7 square miles instead of, as built, only one square mile, and would have afforded a very good navigable channel of 5 miles, instead of onlyl^ miles, as at the present time. This was the scheme proposed by the Board of Consulting Engineers in their report of 1906. The change from the board's plan to the one finally adopted involved an increased cost of about $10,000,000, and was apparently disad- vantageous, so far as the physical characteristics of the canal are concerned. The reasons for the change were that close to Balboa the locks would be subject to hostile gun-fire from the Bay of Panama, and that the preliminary work on the dam at Balboa connecting with Sosa Hill showed that a suitable foundation did not exist. The water level of Miraflores Lake will be carried at an elevation 55 feet above mean tide. Miraflores Lake occupies a portion of the valley of the Rio Grande River, and at its lower end the Miraflores locks have been constructed in the line of this valley. Dams R,o\ite, Design and Construction 79 extend from the lock walls to neighboring hills, which are close by, so as to enclose the lake. The dam on the west side of the locks makes an apparently un- necessary sweep to the south, but the object is to cap- ture the flow of the Cocoli River for use in the lake and to prevent the water from giving trouble in the valley below the locks. The flow from the Rio Grande and Pedro Miguel Rivers, and from one or two other smaller streams, also enters the lake. The water from Gatun Lake which is used in the single lock at Pedro Miguel will flow into Miraflores Lake. The water consump- tion from Miraflores Lake is that due to evaporation and lockages through the two sets of locks at Mira- flores, and the amount used will be in excess of the supply from the rivers during the dry season. The difference will be made up from water allowed to flow into Miraflores Lake from Gatun Lake. During the rainy season there may be an excess of water, and this will be discharged through a spillway having gates exactly like those for the Gatun Dam spillway. The capacity of the gates was not, however, designed from the estimated flow thus obtained, but was based on the larger flow which would enter Miraflores Lake in case all the gates in one of the Pedro Miguel locks should be wrecked, and the full head of water from Gatun Lake should flow uninterruptedly through one of the Pedro Miguel locks. The discharge from the spillway is into the old channel of the Rio Grande River, over which the spillway is built. After following the old channel for about one mile, the water will be carried through the Rio Grande diversion for about If miles, when it 80 THe Panama Canal will again enter a part of the old river channel and find its way to the sea close to the mouth of the canal. THE CANAL LOCKS The passage of a vessel through locks wherein it remains continually water-borne is simple, as com- pared with the usual process of placing vessels in dry dock, involving the removal of water from the dock and support of the ship on blocking. The percent- age of accidents in both cases is found to be exceed- ingly small. About 90 per cent of the accidents in locking vessels are due to failure of signals from the bridge to the engine room, and these will be eliminated at Panama through the adoption of a part of the process in common use in docking; namely, the vessel will not move into the lock under its own steam, but will come to a full stop at the approach wall, and the movement of the ship will then be controlled by the lock opera- tives. Two lines to the bow and two to the stern will be used, the strains being obtained from four electric locomotives with winches on board, running on rack railroads on the edge of the lock walls, two on each side of the lock. For large ships more lines and more locomotives may be found necessary. The process is not dissimilar to towing canal boats, but with amplifi- cations. With experience there will no doubt be de- veloped the proper order of seamanship to handle all vessels expeditiously under these novel conditions. (See plan No. 6.) The canal has in all twelve lock chambers, two flights of three each at Gatun, two flights of one each d * 03 Q. ^ id 03 CD O y CD -4-3 So * CD O CD ■73 73 o3 — ' faD d M o o 73 o 'H— I o o 73 03 CO 03 CD co 3 CD CD CO 73 O >> CD "a3 CO CO CD > co =1 03 is o o -t-= -d bJO CO CD -d o O CD d Sz; CD -d CD d 03 d - a 1 ° -a ^ s So d ^, O o3 .9 03 O 2 &j CO 05 p, O 03 Route, Design and Construction 81 at Pedro Miguel, and two flights of two each at Mira- flores. The twelve locks are alike in their principal features, but variations occur from differences in ar- rangements of gates and protective devices. The lock chamber must have at least one gate at each end, to separate it from the adjoining chamber or from the adjoining body of water. The minimum number of gates that would fulfil this condition for the arrange- ment of locks adopted is 18. The actual number used is, for various reasons to be explained later, increased to 46. Each lock has a chamber 110 feet wide and 1000 feet long, but as about 95 per cent of all ocean-going vessels are under 600 feet long, the locks are divided by a second set of gates into two parts, one 400 feet long and the other 600 feet long. There is no saving of time in filling a small chamber rather than the full 1000-foot lock, since all filling is done at the rate of 2 feet per minute; but advantage in the use of divided locks arises from the great saving in water, which is an element of importance, as we have seen in consid- ering Gatun Lake. This feature adds ten pairs of lock gates to the installation. One duplicate lock, namely, the lower one at Miraflores, is not provided with the dividing gates. This is because the designing engineers found that the cost of the gates and additional length of concrete structure in this particular lock, due to tidal conditions, outweighed the saving in water. Should a vessel approaching the first lock of any flight not come to a stop through some misunderstand- ing, a collision with the lock gate will be prevented by 82 THe Panama Canal a chain of 3-inch iron stretched from one side of the lock to the other. The impact will be taken up by hydraulic cylinders in the lock walls to which the ends of the chain will be attached. The resistance is suffi- cient to stop a 10,000-ton vessel moving at 4 knots per hour in a length of 73 feet. When not in use the chain will rest in a groove in the floor and side walls. If the chain should give way, or not be in position, the impact would be received by a pair of guard or safety gates, which it is expected would check the vessel and prevent it from injuring the next set of gates. Should the inconceivable accident happen of a vessel passing both the guard chain and safety gate and wrecking the next one while all the other gates in the lock were open, due to a vessel having just passed through, then Gatun Lake would begin to flow out to the full ca- pacity of the channel now formed by the lock, and similarly for Lake Miraflores. Four guard gates are required to protect the entrances to the four lock chambers adjoining Gatun Lake at Gatun and Pedro Miguel, and four more to protect the exits from the same locks, as an accident at the exits would have the same consequences as at the entrances. Similarly, two gates each are required at the entrances and exits of the upper Miraflores lock chambers, or a total of twelve guard gates. A guard gate is also constructed at the lower en- trance of each flight of locks, and the leaves of this gate point away from the lock. Each of these gates is a guard for vessels approaching from below and also may be used in unwatering the lock. Route, Design and Construction 83 Even the well-nigh impossible combination of cir- cumstances described above would not wreck the canal. The mitering lock gates could, of course, not be closed against the flowing stream, therefore, to stop the flow the emergency dam would be brought into play. The emergency dam is in the form of a bridge resting on a turntable on the side wall of the lock. It may be turned so as to span the lock and then be firmly bed- ded on each side. A series of steel girders with the upper ends fastened to the bridge would be lowered by cables into position, having the lower ends on a concrete sill provided for the purpose. Then steel plates would be forced down one by one, supported by the girders, and the opening would thus be gradually closed by a steel wall and the flow practically stopped. A floating caisson such as is used with dry docks would then be placed at the lake end of the lock on a seat provided for the purpose. The caisson carries a pumping plant for unwatering the lock, and repairs may thus be made. In the meantime traffic would use the other series of locks in both directions. The locks are some of the most massive concrete work in the world. The dividing wall between the flights of three locks at Gatun, with the approach walls which are in extension of the dividing wall, forms a mass of concrete 60 feet thick, about 81 feet high, and over If miles long. The approach walls are of cellular construction. The dividing wall is built with the faces vertical and is solid for over half the height. Above the solid portion the center of the wall is filled with earth, except three superimposed 84 THe Panama Canal tunnels. The lowest tunnel is used for drainage of the upper ones, the center tunnel for electric light and power cables, and the upper one as a passageway for employees to reach the various chambers containing machinery for operating the miter gates and the many valves. The exterior walls of the locks are of equal height with the central wall, and are from 45 feet to 50 feet thick at the floor-level; they diminish by steps on the back to a thickness of 8 feet at the top. The thickness of the floor is variable but is approximately 13 feet. The emptying and filling of the locks is done through circular openings in the floor, each 3 feet 10 J inches in diameter and having an area of 12 square feet. There are five of them in each line across the lock, and the lines are spaced 32 feet to 36 feet apart. In one 1000- foot lock there are in all 105 openings, with a total area of 1260 square feet. Each row of five openings com- municates with a cross-tunnel under the floor. Eleven of these cross-tunnels in each lock lead to the outside wall and there open into a culvert 18 feet in diameter, without the interposition of valves. The remaining ten tunnels, alternating with the others, lead to the center wall where a cylindrical valve allows each tunnel to communicate with the culvert in the center wall, which is also 18 feet in diameter. The center-wall culvert receives the tunnels from both locks. It ex- tends the full length of the three locks at Gatun, and at the upper end it opens into Gatun Lake, while the lower end discharges into the sea-level canal. There are control valves at each end and also in the line of Rxmte, Design and Construction 85 the culvert at intermediate points corresponding to the locks. It is evident that, with a proper adjustment of the culvert valves, the water in any two lock chambers may be equalized by opening the cylindrical valves that allow the floor tunnels to communicate with the center culvert. This allows a very considerable saving of water in operation. With all culvert valves open, the center culvert may be used to discharge water from Gatun Lake into the sea. The side-wall culverts also extend the full length of the locks, and have con- trol valves at the ends and at points corresponding to the ends of the locks, and at the subdivision points. They may be used in equalizing the water in any two locks that adjoin endwise, or in passing water into and out of the end locks. (See plan No. 6.) LOCK-OPERATING MACHINERY All machinery connected with the locks is operated by electricity and has been specially designed for the canal work, based largely on previous experience with locks. There are 114 rising stem gate valves, 120 cy- lindrical valves, and 92 machines for operating the in- dividual leaves of the large miter gates. The apparatus is equipped with remote control and position indicators, which show at the control switchboard the positions of the gates and valves during operation. Indicators also show the various water levels. All regular operating machinery will be controlled by means of interlocking switches, with one central switchboard for each of the three groups of locks at Gatun, Pedro Miguel and Miraflores. There is also local control and hand oper- 86 TKe Panama Canal ation where feasible. The whole installation is a good example of electric operation. Realizing that a great deal of the machinery was of new type and that the operating conditions in a trop- ical climate would be unusually severe, the greatest care was exercised before finally deciding on the type and character of the apparatus. In most cases a sample piece was first made and actually tried out under the severest working conditions, and changed if necessary before the order for the whole lot was given. The cylindrical gate valves controlling the tunnels from the center-wall culvert consist essentially of a vertical cylinder placed in a chamber adjoining the culvert. The cylinder is seated at the bottom, and directly beneath it is a well to the floor culvert. A short lift gives a large waterway under the edges of the cylinder. The great advantage of the cylindrical type is that it is very quick opening, and that the water pressures are balanced and do not tend to prevent either open- ing or closing. On the canal a special form is used which does not involve carrying the full diameter of the cylinder above the water surface. The larger openings to the main culverts are con- trolled by rising stem gate valves of the Stoney pat- tern, similar to those used in the crest of the Gatun spillway dam. The gate is made of heavy structural steel, and the water pressure is taken by a train of rollers at the back of the valve upon which the gate moves. Leakage is prevented by means of a metal Route, Design and Construction 87 water-seal extending around the face of the valve. This seal is fastened to the valve and slides on the wall of the opening and forms the only sliding friction of the whole valve. Each mitering lock gate consists of two leaves hinged to the walls at opposite sides of the lock, and each leaf is 65 feet long; that is, longer than half the width of the lock, so that when the two leaves are closed, they form an angle pointing against the water pressure. The 92 leaves weigh in the aggregate 60,000 tons, a weight in excess of that of two modern dreadnoughts. If all the gates were laid flat in a pile, it would be 644 feet high. The joints at the hinges are made water-tight by means of Babbitt metal. Embedded on the sill of the lock is a heavy block of wood, against which a similar block along the lower end of the gate fits. The water- tight joint, however, is made by means of a seal on the under side of the block on the gate in the form of a rubber flap \ inch thick, which is forced against the seat by the water pressure itself. The weight of the gates is decreased by water-tight compartments near the bottom, which give flotation. A trunk extends from the deck to these compartments. Some of the upper water-tight chambers may be filled so as to control the buoyancy of the gates for different levels of water. When in motion the gates hang simply on their hinges, and there are no rollers on the floor of the lock, the weight being carried principally by the buoyancy of the chambers. 88 THe Panama Canal CONSTRUCTING THE LOCKS In deciding on the site for the locks, extensive and elaborate borings were made, indicating the exact character of the material. In every case a rock foun- dation was selected. The Gatun locks were constructed somewhat ear- lier than those at Pedro Miguel and Miraflores, and the method of building them also differed from that used for the others. The conditions were not so favor- able for economical work. The three Gatun locks and the approach walls contain over 2,000,000 cubic yards of concrete. For purpose of comparison it may be stated that a large modern dry dock^ contains less than one-tenth this amount. The broken stone was obtained from quarries at Porto Bello, which were opened particularly for the lock work. The material was quarried and crushed at Porto Bello, and was transported on barges in tow of commission tugs and carried through the old French canal, which happened to pass very close to the site selected for the locks. On account of the silting in of the old canal and the long haul, the cost of transpor- tation was quite materially increased. The cost of the stone delivered at Gatun, including cost of plant and overhead charges, averaged $2.40 per cubic yard. The sand was dredged at Nombre de Dios and similarly transported on barges, at a total cost of about $2.10 per cubic yard. Cement was shipped from the United States to Colon, transferred by train and placed in storehouses at Gatun. The mixing of the concrete F^ovite, Design and Construction 89 was done at a stationary mixing plant. The stone, sand and cement were transferred by gravity, in proper proportions for each batch, to cars which dumped the materials into the mixers. After thorough mixing, the concrete was discharged into buckets on electric cars which ran on an automatically operated electric rail- road. The cars were carried to tracks parallel to the locks and were stopped at the proper point. To transfer the concrete to the desired location in the lock, a number of aerial cableways were used, extend- ing from one side to the other of the locks. The cable at one end was fastened to the top of a movable tower which contained hoisting apparatus, and at the other end the cable was fastened to a tower that was also movable but contained no machinery. The concrete was lifted from the cars, and by a trolley operating on the cableway was carried over the point of deposit, lowered and dumped. The forms for the interior face of the side walls con- sisted of a heavy steel frame with steel face plates which were moved into position. The full height of the wall for the length of the form was then con- structed, whereupon the form was moved to the next section. The cost of concrete on the Gatun locks was $6.64 per cubic yard in 1911 and $7.76 in 1912. For the Miraflores locks broken stone was brought from a very large quarry opened high up on the side of Ancon Hill, where a satisfactory quality of stone was found. About 5,000 cubic yards of stone were turned out daily. Heavy blasts were set off above the berm, and steam shovels then loaded the material into 90 THe Panama Canal railroad dump cars, which were switched farther down the hill by locomotives to the top of a crusher, and then dumped directly into it. "Dobe" shots were fired off in the cars to split the stones which were too large. The crusher could take stones equal in size to that of an ordinary chair. The crushed material was screened, and that of proper size was carried by a rub- ber belt to a sorting-screen and passed into the storage bins underneath for the various sizes. The material from the large crusher which was rejected by the screen passed into four small gyratory crushers, and from these on to the same belt for transfer to the sorting-screen. With this efficient and well-arranged plant the cost of stone delivered at the site of the locks was about $0.82 per cubic yard. The capacity of the Panama Railroad was insufficient to supply this mate- rial to the works at Gatun on the other side of the Isthmus. Sand for the Miraflores locks was obtained by dredg- ing at Chame, transferred by barges to Balboa, where it was unloaded by means of grab buckets and placed in overhead storage bins for transfer by rail to the lock site. The total cost in storage at the locks was about $0.76 per cubic yard. To handle the stone and sand in building the Mira- flores locks, an elevated trestle was built parallel to the locks and about 200 feet away. The cars dumped the stone on the side toward the locks, and the sand on the side away from them. On the bank between the locks and the storage pile a large cantilever crane operated on a track. The tower contained bins and 0** a .a 8 * .2 3 So. 9 "3 s » -° "8 02 hjr 03 02 GO CD P3 a a o3 C3 02 h "' 1—1 o3 o _ h « ffl o> 43 O > . c3 -£ CO <^ P« O CD J • i— i M •!-( o3 M + 3 £ <1 .3 Rcvute, Design and Construction 91 hoppers and two large concrete-mixers. One canti- lever arm overhung the storage piles, and a grab bucket kept the bins full. The other cantilever arm overhung the nearest lock wall and transferred the concrete from the mixers to the lock wall. The cement was taken directly from the cars to the tower without first going into storage. In the lock chamber was another canti- lever crane, which transported concrete to those parts of the lock beyond the reach of the mixing-crane. The entire plant was probably one of the most perfect ever devised for handling concrete. The cost of the concrete in place was $4.68 per cubic yard in 1911 and $4.77 in 1912. LOCKS AS THE LIMITING FEATURE The locks fix the maximum size ship that may use the canal. They will pass the largest now built or building, but will not, for instance, pass the floating dry dock Dewey, which passed through the Suez Canal on the way to the Philippine Islands. The size of the locks was determined from the provisions of the Act of Congress approved June 28, 1902, which state: "Such canal shall be of sufficient capacity and depth as shall afford convenient passage for vessels of the largest tonnage and greatest draft now in use, and such as may be reasonably anticipated. ..." In considering the limiting dimensions of the locks, and thus of the canal, it must be borne in mind that there has been a steady increase in the size of ships, upon which great emphasis has been laid. If curves are plotted to show the growth in length, width, depth and tonnage, especially if the maximum ship of each 92 XKe Panama Canal period is taken, and if these curves are extended to show future developments, the predictions are alarm- ing. However, when the curves are produced beyond a certain point other factors not hitherto considered, and having no influence on the curves as plotted, are likely to enter. Shipbuilding has undergone an almost untrammelled development; building facilities, capital and cost have, seemingly, not retarded growth. Har- bors have been deepened, channels have been widened, wharves, docks, locks and wet basins have been in- creased in size, to make way for the leviathans. The impetus toward larger vessels has undoubtedly been from economic reasons. Shipowners have found that with the larger and better equipped ships, having in view passenger traffic and advertising effects as well as freight, their ratio of income has increased and there has been nothing to curb their efforts. Communities and governments have, in their striving for all-im- portant commercial growths, paid the bills for harbor development. As economic conditions have brought about the steep rise in the ship-growth curve, so eco- nomic conditions, but in another field, will tend to flatten the curve. There must be a limit beyond which harbor development cannot economically go, and be- yond which the sum of the cost of shipping and build- ing and the cost of construction and maintenance of port works will increase rather than decrease. It will be difficult to determine when this point is reached, especially because the same interests do not provide capital for both enterprises. There are already occa- sional indications that this factor is entering. The Route, Design and Construction 93 difficulty in providing for the largest ships in New York harbor, while from one standpoint a physical one, is in the last analysis economic. There is now no commercial necessity why the Pan- ama Canal should accommodate the largest ships; the largest ships may be regarded as ocean ferries with fixed ports. The total estimated traffic capacity of 80,000,000 tons can be handled in ships under 600 feet long, which comprise 95 per cent of the world's ton- nage, but within the next generation the canal may become one of the elements which exercise a retardant influence on the maximum size of ships, depending on developments in the commerce of the world. More important is the effect of the canal on the size of naval vessels. Battleships of the United States have increased in beam from 76 feet in 1900 (date of authorization) to 80 feet in 1905, 88 feet in 1908, and about 98 feet in 1912; and if this ratio of increase is maintained, the limiting beam would be reached in ships authorized in about 1915. It is worthy of note that the locks of the enlarged Kaiser Wilhelm Canal from the Baltic to the North Sea are 1082 feet long and 147 feet wide, but the lift is very much less than at Panama. Before leaving the subject of the locks as the limit- ing features, it is important to note that no physical obstacle will prevent the engineer of the coming gen- eration from building an additional series of locks, should experience show wider or longer locks to be a real necessity. The cost will be great but not prohib- itive and will be but a small fraction of the original 94 XKe Panama Canal cost of the canal. So far as commercial needs are con- cerned the present provisions are extremely liberal. So far as naval needs are concerned no one can foretell what results the rapid and radical developments of the present decade may disclose. THE SEA-LEVEL SECTIONS AND THE TERMINALS Limon Bay, through which the Atlantic sea-level section passes, faces directly north and is open to the northerly storms and seas, which are quite severe at certain times. Protection was necessary in order: first, that ships might enter the canal in quiet water; second, to provide a quiet anchorage; third, to make traffic in small boats feasible and safe between the shore and ships at anchor; fourth, to prevent the movement of silts and sands by the seas and the attendant dredging expenditure. (See plan No. 2.) To give this protection, Toro Point breakwater has been constructed, extending from Toro Point in a northeasterly direction for a distance of about 2 miles. The outer end does not quite cover the entrance to the canal. The breakwater protects the greater part of Limon Bay from the northerly storms, but the easterly portion is still exposed, especially to waves and trade winds from a northeasterly direction. The construc- tion of a breakwater to close this part of the bay was postponed to await the results of actual experience with the one at Toro Point. It seemed probable at the time that this breakwater would ultimately be built, as the protection was not sufficient, especially for boating, and as the effects of wave action cause Route, Design and Construction 95 silting of the channel. It was actually found as a result of the experience of the navy that it would be dangerous and at times impossible for small boats and coal barges to lie alongside ships. Furthermore, an estimate showed that 2,200,000 cubic yards of material, costing several hundred thousand dollars to remove, had been deposited in the finished channel during twelve months' action of the waves. The construction of the east breakwater was accordingly decided upon. The Toro Point breakwater was constructed from a trestle supported on creosoted piles 85 feet long and having two tracks. The piles were driven by a railroad pile-driver with very heavy hammer, which could reach all of the piles from either track. Stone from a Toro Point quarry was carried in cars on the trestle and dumped overboard, and forms the core of the break- water. Porto Bello stone, which is harder and much more durable, was transported a distance of about 28 miles on barges and carefully deposited on the exte- rior by means of derricks. The breakwater is 20 feet in width on top, and is built in water from 35 to 50 feet in depth. The height of the top above the surface of the water is about 16 feet. The total quantity of material placed to December 31, 1912, when the breakwater was nearly completed, was 954,500 cubic yards, at an average cost of $2.20 per cubic yard. In addition, 620,000 cubic yards of rock dredged from the canal were deposited in the vicinity of the break- water. During the fiscal year 1912 the Toro Point rock cost $1.38 per cubic yard, and the Porto Bello rock, $4.31. 96 XKe Panama Canal A large anchorage basin is provided between Cris- tobal and the canal channel. The wharfage space at Cristobal is being increased. New piers are built on steel cylinders which were excavated inside by hand and gradually forced down. The cylinders, upon reaching the proper depth, were filled with concrete, and a superstructure of reinforced concrete was built upon them. To complete the Atlantic sea-level section, from the outer end to its terminus at the Gatun Locks, required the excavation of over 32,000,000 cubic yards by dredging, costing over $7,600,000, or about 24 cents per cubic yard; and over 2,000,000 cubic yards by steam shovel, costing over $1,450,000, or about 67 cents per cubic yard. The Pacific sea-level section from the Miraflores Locks to Panama Bay cuts the winding channel of the Rio Grande River and then continues through the bay. The land is all very low. This channel up to Decem- ber 31, 1912, when the work was well in hand, had required the excavation of over 34,500,000 cubic yards by dredging, at a total cost of over $8,500,000, or about 25 cents per cubic yard; over 2,500,000 cubic yards by steam shovel, at a cost of over $2,000,000, or about 80 cents per cubic yard, and in addition over 1,500,000 cubic yards by hydraulic excavation, at a total cost of over $1,100,000, or about 72 cents per cubic yard. The hydraulic excavation consisted in dislodging the earth by means of powerful streams of water and carrying the material, water-borne, to suc- tion pumps which discharged it on the neighboring CD Sh ,jcJ bfi r3 ^ tJD ^ ^ § . & 6 * bC^ , ^ ° a CD 03 Pd o o o 3 H g< <3 Ph O fn — CD +3 i— i 02 o3 CD O bJD O ■73 ca CD c3 bC H CD H CD CD o CD 02 CD y Bay is the place above all others on our Pacific conti- nental coast that is suited for a naval base by reason of its strategic situation geographically and the advan- tages attending the proximity of a large city. But the Mare Island Navy Yard is impossibly situated for this 142 XHe Panama Canal purpose. It has neither the depth of water in its approaches needed for modern capital ships nor a suf- ficient area of water of suitable depth opposite the yard for the safe anchorage and maneuvering of such ships, while its distance from San Francisco and lack of a rail- way connection are handicaps in the supply of labor and in the economical handling of freight and building supplies. At the present time * the available depth is 22 feet at mean lower low water, and the channels con- stantly and rapidly silt up. It is even difficult to keep the entrance to the new dry dock deep enough for the safe docking of ships that can enter it. The adopted departmental policy is to^ have 40 feet depth from the sea to our navy yards, and that depth of channel is be- ing urged at our important commercial ports in the in- terests of commerce. To all except those who will not see it has been increasingly evident during the last ten years that the Mare Island Navy Yard is doomed for the service of modern capital ships, and it is equally evident that a new location, somewhere in San Fran- cisco Bay, on deep water near the city, must eventually be provided for their docking and repair. If the people of California desire and expect to see any considerable part of our modern fleet habitually visiting in their waters after the canal is finished, they cannot too soon bestir themselves to provide in the deep water of San Francisco Bay the naval facilities that are required for the supply, upkeep and repair of modern capital ships. Mare Island does not afford them for the simple reason that recent capital ships cannot safely go there, if for * Written in the spring of 1913. Some dredging has since been done. THe Navy and tKe Panama Canal 143 no other. Men cannot drive rivets on a ship 20 to 30 miles away. The completion of the canal should help to force this conclusion home if the people of Cali- fornia are not prepared to accept it now. Of Pearl Harbor and Bremerton there is less occa- sion to speak in this connection. Congress is treating Pearl Harbor in a liberal spirit, and the facilities at Bremerton are gradually increasing. The development of both should go on to provide for the increased naval shipping that may naturally be expected to follow the completion of the canal; but, above all, to provide for the greatly increased demand upon them in the event of war in the Pacific. In the present uncrystallized state of opinion con- cerning the ultimate status to be conferred upon the Philippines, it is open to question whether it is worth while to add materially to our naval facilities in those waters just now. But whether the Philippines remain a dependency, become a territory, or be made inde- pendent, each of which things is a possibility and has its advocates, the United States will have a direct responsibility for them. The responsibility is visible as long as our flag flies over the Philippines. It will be moral in any event, and probably contractual if inde- pendence be granted; for it is inconceivable that the United States will abandon the new and weak nation to which it may give birth, and leave it a prey to the ambitions of strong nations, able to subdue it, and even now suspected of casting covetous eyes in its di- rection. Should aggression come the United States must resist it with the fleet; and if occasion arise for 144 THe Panama Canal the fleet to go to the Philippines for belligerent purposes the way must be open for it to make safe passage, and, more than that, to arrive ready for action. Honolulu (Pearl Harbor) is more than 4750 miles from Manila by the shortest route, — an impracticable distance over which to conduct operations without an intermediate point of support. Guam, under our own flag, offers such a point; but Guam unfortified would be a broken reed in time of war. The value of Guam to the United States is as a place of rest and supply on the long voyage to the Far East for the fighting fleet, and for the ships that keep up the continual stream of per- sonnel and supplies necessary to maintain its efficiency, and as a base for the naval ships required to safeguard the long line of communications. Guam in the hands of an enemy would be a most serious obstacle to any hope of success for the United States in a campaign in the Philippines. Both to make it a secure point of support for our own Navy and to deny it to an enemy Guam should be fortified, and fortified and garrisoned so effectively that it cannot be captured by an enemy before our fleet can arrive for its relief. The value of the canal in connection with Guam lies in the reduc- tion by two months, made possible by it, of the time that Guam must be able to hold out under its own re- sources before a relieving fleet from the Atlantic can arrive on the scene. The consideration that, perhaps, comes most naturally to mind in connection with the canal is the immense shortening of distances effected by it in most cases THe Navy and tKe Panama Canal 145 between points in the Atlantic and Pacific. This con- sideration was, of course, the reason for building it. What may be termed the commercial routes from New York to Hong Kong, those that take in ports of call, are practically the same length via Panama and Suez, the difference between them being less than 20 miles in favor of Suez; but the Panama route is the shorter from New York to Shanghai and the ports of Japan. From New York to Manila the Panama route is shorter than that by Suez unless the former go by way of Honolulu and Yokohama. The further east the point in the Pacific, the greater the gain in distance to New York by the Panama route. Valparaiso is 3750 miles nearer New York via Panama than via Magellan. Speaking generally, the distance is shortened via the canal from New York to any point in the Pacific north of a line drawn from Magellan Strait, through Australia and the Philippines, to Hong Kong. As affecting naval movements this means more than time and fuel saved, though both economies are of prime importance. It means the possibility of sending ships from the Atlantic to almost any place where they will be needed in the Pacific by a route that has fuel stations under our flag along the entire distance, no two of which are further apart than the fuel en- durance of our capital ships. This is an enormous advantage, for the problem of fueling our naval ships in time of war on a passage from the Pacific to the Atlantic, or vice versa, would be a staggering one by either the Suez or Magellan route, and the attitude of neutrals might make it almost an unsolvable one. 146 TTKe Panama Canal The canal will eliminate the question of neutrality altogether, and for that reason alone it is of incalculable benefit to the Navy. The question of economy is, however, one not to be ignored. Between New York and San Francisco, in either direction, Panama and Guantanamo would probably be ports of call for a fleet. A study of the saving of time, fuel and money effected by sending a fleet between Panama and Guantanamo through the canal instead of through Magellan gives some aston- ishing results. Such a study has been made, based on the movement of 25 capital ships with attendant cruisers, destroyers and auxiliaries. It is too long to give more than the results, but they are sufficiently interesting. The time saved under the assumptions is about 60 days. This could be considerably shortened by in- creasing the assumed sea speed, but this would involve a considerable increase in the amount of fuel burned to cover the same distance, with the attendant in- creased cost and necessity of fueling oftener. The route via Magellan that the fleet would follow between Guantanamo and Panama requires nearly 900 actual steaming hours at 12 knots, or 37 days. This makes no allowance for necessary time to refuel and repair, so that 60 days is not an unreasonable gain in time to allow in favor of the canal, in view of the fact that refueling on the Magellan route would have to be carried on at places outside the territorial limits of neutrals, and often under disadvantageous circum- stances. This might be time enough to enable the XKe Navy and tKe Panama Canal 147 enemy to finish the campaign in his favor. At the best, the long sea voyage via Magellan would be wearing upon personnel and material, and the prob- lem of supply would be very difficult. The saving in coal is about 290,000 tons, and in fuel oil about 54,000 tons. At the present * market values of these fuels taken for the conditions, this means a money saving of nearly $3,000,000. Not to overestimate this saving, and assuming that an over- supply of 20 per cent has been allowed, the saving in coal would still be 240,000 tons, in oil 45,000 tons, and in money $2,500,000. The gain in time is the all-important economy, but the saving in money is itself important. In view of our lack of a merchant marine, however, the simplifi- cation in the supply of fuel via the canal is of vastly greater moment than the money saving. The United States can furnish whatever money the circumstances of war may demand, but it cannot build over-night a merchant marine for the service of the fleet. This subject could be greatly elaborated, but enough has been said to show what a valuable military asset the canal is in its bearing on fleet logistics. Simply for the ordinary service of the fleet in time of peace the canal will effect very large savings to the naval appropriations. A fair average price for eastern coal of a kind fit for naval use is $8.45 per ton at San Francisco, Puget Sound and Honolulu. While no exact prediction can be made, competent authorities believe that, when the canal is in operation, the price * Spring of 1913. 148 THe Panama Canal at which eastern coals can be laid down at these places will be not more than $6.20 per ton. Taking as a basis the amount of coal on naval account sent to the Pacific in the last fiscal year, 160,000 tons, the saving amounts to $360,000. Nor does the advantage end there; a collier can take a cargo via the canal to the Pacific coast, discharge and be back at Norfolk in the time she would take to make the voyage out via Magel- lan. This roughly divides by two the tonnage neces- sary for any given supply of coal at those ports. In time of war in the Pacific, this will be of inestimable advantage, considering our woful lack of a merchant marine. With respect to other bulky naval supplies, like provisions, the same thing does not hold true, for they can be delivered equally well and at little differ- ence in cost on either coast from their points of origin. Even ammunition and guns, which are practically all manufactured in the east, would very probably be sent by rail to the Pacific in order to save time, although the expense would be greater. But with oil fuel, again, the advantage to the Navy is apparent, and this time the gain is in movement toward the Atlantic. In the last few months the price of oil has markedly increased. California produces more oil than any other state and its price is lower than eastern oils. This fact, in addition to the important fact that a large oil-producing area has been set aside for naval purposes in California,* points to the possibility that the Navy may soon be using California oil in the * A decision rendered early in June, 1914, by Judge Dooling of the Federal District Court, San Francisco, will invalidate the Government's title to the naval reservation of oil lands unless it is reversed by the higher court. THe Navy and tKe Panama Canal 149 Atlantic, which would hardly be possible without the canal. The demand for oil increases every day and many of the older wells are falling off in production; the Navy may not improbably have great occasion in the years to come to congratulate itself that the canal will make the Pacific coast fields available. Modifications of trade routes that will follow the completion of the canal are sure eventually to cause a reduction in freight rates, and so act as a stimulus to trade. The increased trade will, in turn, demand a greater tonnage, although this demand will be partially met at first by the ability of the same amount of shipping to provide for a greater trade because of the shortened distances via the canal. Still it can hardly be doubted that the opening of the canal will create a demand in time for an amount of shipping consider- ably greater than exists now in order to provide for the increased trade. The opinion has been advanced that the United States merchant marine will be greatly stimulated by the operation of these causes. The Navy earnestly hopes that this may be true, for a large merchant marine is a necessity for a strong navy only in a less degree than the auxiliary ships especially designed for its service; and anything what- ever that can properly be done to increase the mer- chant marine should have the active support of the Navy. In so far as the coasting trade is concerned there seems to be good reason to expect an increase of United States shipping, for that trade is certain to grow rapidly upon the opening of the canal, and for- 150 The Panama Canal eigners cannot take any part in it. Already some ships have been built for this trade in anticipation of the completion of the canal, and others are being built. But the writer has been unable to convince himself that the opening of the canal will alone serve to draw American capital into a form of investment from which it has persistently kept aloof, and under present conditions and laws* he anticipates little or no resultant increase in that part of the merchant marine of the United States engaged in foreign trade. With- out any close examination of the reason why, it seems to be a fact that Americans either cannot or else do not care to compete with other maritime nations in the sea carriage of foreign trade, and it is not apparent that the opening of the canal will by itself change that condition. That we should have a flourishing merchant marine is a matter of such vital interest to the Navy that it will anticipate with satisfaction the increase of shipping engaged in coastwise trade due to the opening of the canal; and, as remarked above, the Navy should exert its influence in favor of every proper measure tending to put American ships on the ocean in the foreign trade. However interesting and profitable it may be to dwell upon the military advantages to the United States attending the opening of the canal, that feature is not the most vital one to the Navy. The canal puts an added and very great responsibility upon the Navy, and this fact is one that the Navy and its friends must always keep in mind. * Written before the outbreak of war in Europe. THe Navy and tHe Panama Canal 151 The canal is being built, and it will be operated and controlled, solely by the United States government, and its protection falls solely upon the United States. In the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901, the neutraliza- tion rules are embodied in Article 3, in which the lan- guage is: "The United States adopts, as the basis of the neutralization of such ship canal, the following rules. . . We are, therefore, the sole guarantors of the neutralization of the canal. Again Article 1 of the treaty of November 18, 1903, with Panama reads: "The United States guarantees and will maintain the independence of the Republic of Panama." Finally, the United States trade passing through the canal will be very great. Here are new and great responsi- bilities, all flowing from the canal, and all dependent upon the Navy for their realization. The Navy is the outer line of defense of the canal as it is of the country. The inner line of defense of the canal resides in the fortifications and garrison at the canal itself. If our Navy is driven from the sea and made negligible, an enemy with a great army can undertake with impunity the transportation of the troops necessary to overcome the inner line of defense and complete the victory begun on the ocean. The task may not be easy for him, but its possibility must be conceded if the sea is closed to us and open to the enemy. The only possible and final assurance of safety for the canal is in a Navy strong enough to meet the enemy, beat him, and pre- vent him from ever getting near it. The following words, quoted from Admiral Mahan, indicate the alter- native: "Permanent [naval] inferiority means inevit- 152 TTie Panama Canal ably ultimate defeat, which fortifications can only delay. " And a few lines later he uses these words: "If the United States desires peace with security, it must have a Navy second to none but that of Great Britain; to rival which is inexpedient, because for many reasons unnecessary.' 1 The United States is not a military nation. There is little consideration and less understanding among the people at large of military matters. The govern- ment has no defined military policy, using " military " in its wide sense, and it has no defined naval policy. By this is meant that there is no soberly thought-out relation between our military strength and our situa- tion in the world — between our declared external political policies and the only means yet found effica- cious to uphold them — that manifests itself as a guiding principle in Congress, or even in the recom- mendations of departmental heads to Congress. There should be such a military policy, and it should carry on from administration to administration, from Con- gress to Congress, and be considered a part of our for- eign affairs policy, as little open to attack from within our own household as the external policies on which it is founded. Our form of government, the immensity of our country, and our isolated position, almost in- sular as far as other first-class nations having great military strength are concerned, all doubtless conspire to cause the general lack of interest of our people in foreign affairs, which is the ultimate cause why there is so little appreciation of the underlying need for a strong Navy. The Navy is popular just now, and to TKe Navy and tHe Panama Canal 153 that degree it is fortunate; but the roots of its exist- ence should lie in deeper ground than popularity. It is to be hoped that the completion of the canal may serve to broaden the national outlook, and that we may be able to look back to it in coming years as the period in which a reasoned national policy, founded on national aims, shall have had its birth in the country at large. There would be no excuse for a failure of the Navy itself to have a " reason for the faith that is in us"; nor can that reproach be laid at the door of the Navy, which has for years had a definite, consistent policy as expressed by the responsible naval advisers of the Navy Department. Moreover, the effect of the canal upon that policy has been carefully kept in mind since the day the canal was started. THE PANAMA CANAL Part V THE PANAMA CANAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW BY HARRY S. KNAPP CAPTAIN U. S. NAVY THE PANAMA CANAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW The Hay-Pauncefote treaty,* negotiated in 1901 between the United States and Great Britain, is the basis of the international status of the Panama Canal. It superseded the Clayton-Bulwer treaty f of 1850 be- tween the same nations. In another place $ the writer has made a study of the two treaties, and a summary of the conclusions reached will be given here, for it is important to have a knowledge of the antecedent his- tory to appreciate the full bearings of the present treaty obligations of the United States with respect to the canal. Long before 1850 the desirability and eventual ne- cessity of a canal joining the Atlantic and the Pacific had been recognized, but no sentiment had developed in the United States for exclusive control by this nation. On the contrary, the utterances of represent- ative men were quite in the opposite sense; i.e., toward a guarantee by all the great commercial na- tions that the canal should be free and open to all. Shortly before 1850 Great Britain, already having a foothold in Central America at Belize, assumed a pro- * Compilation of Treaties in Force, 1904, p. 609. f Ibid., p. 380. % The Real Status of the Panama Canal as Regards Neutralization. U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 36, No. 1; Whole No. 133, March, 1910. 157 158 XKe Panama Canal tectorate over the Mosquito Indian country, claiming as far south as the San Juan River. This greatly irri- tated the people of the United States; for, in addition to being an infringement upon the Monroe Doctrine, it would, if allowed, put Great Britain in control of the eastern end of what was then considered to be the most practicable route for a canal. The attitude of the two nations was one of mutual jealousy, each fearing that the other would attempt to get for itself some advantage not possessed by the other, with respect to a canal, although neither actually sought a monopoly of political control. In other words, it was not a question of what either nation did want to get for itself alone, but of what each suspected that the other nation might be trying to get for itself alone. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850 settled that point, the first sentence of Article I reading: "The Governments of the United States and Great Britain hereby declare that neither the one nor the other will ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over the said ship-canal." Other stipulations were that neither would erect or maintain fortifications commanding, or in the vicinity of the canal; nor occupy, fortify, colonize, assume or exercise any do- minion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Central America, nor to that end make use of any intimacy or alliance; the powers jointly engaged to protect the finished canal from in- terruption, seizure or unjust confiscation, and to guar- antee that the canal should be ever open and free; they engaged to invite other powers to join them in Panama Canal in International Law 159 similar stipulations; and they established a " general rule" by agreeing to extend their protection, not alone to a canal at Nicaragua (the then favored site), but to any other practicable communication, whether by canal or railway, across the Isthmus. In a memorandum* of the Secretary of State, Mr. Olney, written in 1896, it is pointed out that the United States desired, in negotiating the Clayton- Bulwer treaty, to overcome two difficulties: one, the rights asserted by Great Britain on the Mosquito Coast; the other, the inability to get in this country the capital necessary to prosecute the work of canal construction by the American company in whose favor the United States had obtained concessions from Nicaragua by treaty in 1849, or to get capital abroad as long as the canal enterprise was conducted under purely American auspices. After stating that the treaty secured the two objects desired, he goes on to say: "In short, the true operation and effect of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty is that, as respects Central America generally, Great Britain has expressly bound herself to the Monroe Doctrine, while, as respects all water and land interoceanic communications across the Isthmus, the United States has expressly bound itself to so far waive the Monroe Doctrine as to admit Great Britain to a joint protectorate." The waiver of the Monroe Doctrine was even greater than Mr. Olney states, for Article VI opens with the words: "The contracting parties in this convention engage to invite every state, with which both or either have friendly * Moore's International Law Digest, Vol. Ill, Sec. 364. 160 XKe Panama Canal intercourse, to enter into stipulations with them sim- ilar to those which they have entered into with each other." If it was a waiver of the Monroe Doctrine in any degree to enter into a joint protectorate of the canal with Great Britain, it was certainly a waiver to a greater degree to engage to invite every other state to do likewise. For a decade after 1850 there was friction between the United States and Great Britain over the inter- pretation of some features of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which were not directly connected, however, with canal matters. In 1860 these sources of friction were satisfactorily adjusted, and then the Civil War engaged this country's attention to the exclusion of everything not of immediate importance. After the Civil War there were signs of a change of sentiment in the United States regarding the control of the canal. It began to be appreciated that our interests demanded our exclusive control of the canal, instead of sharing that control with foreign nations, or with one such nation, as Great Britain. Such a complete reversal of sentiment took time to develop. In 1877, in President Grant's administration, a draft treaty looking to neutralization was prepared "to which it was proposed to obtain the accession of the principal maritime powers." * In his message of March 8, 1880, President Hayes enunciated the new and contrary policy in these plain words: "The policy of this coun- try is a canal under American control. The United States cannot consent to the surrender of this control * Moore's International Law Digest, Vol. Ill, p. 187. Panama Canal in International Law 161 to any European power, or to any combination of European powers"; * and further on he used the words so often quoted since: "It (the canal) will be . . . virtually a part of the coast line of the United States." This policy directly contravened our engagements with Great Britain in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and it be- came our object to get rid of those engagements in order to have the free hand we desired. For twenty years the matter was agitated until, in the Hay- Pauncefote treaty, our wishes were met by Great Britain, and very fully met as will be seen by a perusal of the treaty which is quoted at the end of this chapter. I This treaty, as stated at the outset, is the basis of the international status of the canal. With a knowl- edge of the conditions before the treaty was negotiated it is difficult to see in what manner the United States has been worsted in its provisions, as has recently been claimed. Almost invariably treaties are compromises, and almost invariably for favors granted there is, ex- pressed or implied, a quid pro quo which carries obliga- tions complementary to the favors. In the Hay mem- orandum,! sent to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations while the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was under consideration, it is said: " These rules (those of Article III) are adopted in the treaty with Great Britain as a consideration for getting rid of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty." In the Hay-Pauncefote treaty Great Britain definitely renounced her legal right, existent under the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, of sharing with the United * Moore's International Law Digest, Vol. Ill, p. 188. f Senate Document No. 746, 61st Congress, 3d Session. 162 THe Panama Canal States in the control and protection of the canal. In consenting to the supersession of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty she gave up the only treaty right with the United States known to the writer by which a non- American nation had a voice in, and consequent possi- bility of interference with, matters in this hemisphere external to those covered by direct treaties between the several non-American and American nations. And more than this, — Great Britain gave up the right, the duty even, of inviting other nations to join with her and the United States in stipulations similar to those of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. It is plain that the United States not only gained the free hand she wanted in canal matters when the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was concluded, but also that the Monroe Doc- trine was immensely strengthened, not to say rehabil- itated. The impairment of the Monroe Doctrine by the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, whether due to force of circumstances at the time or done without a realiza- tion of its import, has now been remedied, and the United States can maintain it with no embarrassing exception to explain. With the obstacle presented by the Clayton-Bulwer treaty cleared away, everything bade fair for the at- tainment of the wish of this country to build and control the canal. After much discussion the Panama route was decided upon, which was doubtless good engineering, although with that we are not concerned here; it was certainly good statesmanship to dispose of any possible rival, both in a business sense and with a view to obviating any possible future diplomatic dis- Panama Canal in International Law 163 agreements. No great difficulty was anticipated in reaching an agreement with Colombia, which was bound to be greatly benefited by the canal and was too weak financially to dream of undertaking it alone. But negotiations dragged, for Colombia insisted on terms that were considered unreasonable in this coun- try. Then one morning Panama was born, and the United States hastened to make with the infant re- public a canal treaty that was concluded November 18, 1903, two years to a day after the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was concluded. This treaty with Panama, quoted at the end of this chapter, is the second one upon which the international status of the canal rests. It is the only treaty with an American nation, as the Hay-Pauncefote treaty is the only one with a non- American nation, that directly enters into stipulations concerning the Panama Canal. It is true that the 35th Article of the treaty of 1846 with New Grenada, now Colombia, bore upon the transit across the Isth- mus of Panama; but the successful revolution of Panama carried with it the assumption by Panama of all the rights and obligations of that article to the exclusion of Colombia, on the principle that treaties run with the land. The treaty of 1903, moreover, covers these points more fully than did the treaty of 1846. There is one other treaty and two protocols that are concerned with transit over the Isthmus. The Gads- den treaty of 1853 with Mexico contains in Article VIII stipulations concerning transit over "a plank and rail road across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec." This 164 THe Panama Canal has no bearing on the Panama Canal. The two proto- cols were identical, concluded December 1, 1900, with Costa Rica and Nicaragua, and looked to more definite later engagements concerning a canal by the Nicaragua route. They were anticipatory only and have no bear- ing on the Panama Canal, as the canal to which they referred has not been built. , It thus appears that with two nations only have we direct treaty engagements concerning the Panama Canal — Great Britain and Panama. We are not legally answerable by reason of contractual obligations to any other nation for our control and operation of the canal. The only possible exception to this state- ment that occurs to the writer is that "most favored nation" treatment might possibly be held to apply to canal matters, although it is difficult to see how. The wording of Article III (1) of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, confirmed by that of Article XVIII of the treaty with Panama, does, however, undoubtedly place upon us a moral obligation toward all the nations of the earth until those treaties are denounced or super- seded. What has been said heretofore has been inspired by no desire to lessen that obligation, but simply to point out its different character, which is moral toward the world at large in so far as matters are concerned about which we have made declarations affecting all nations in our treaties with Great Britain and Panama; legally we are under obligations to those two countries only. Of the two the Hay-Pauncefote treaty is the one the more likely to give rise to international and diplomatic Panama Canal in International Law 165 questions, for the treaty with Panama followed after and was based upon it. Of the four essential articles of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, Article I concerns Great Britain and the United States only. Article IV enun- ciates the mutual agreement providing that no change of sovereignty or of the international relations of the country traversed by the canal shall affect the general principle of neutralization or the obligation of the high contracting parties. It is not inconceivable that this article may at some time give rise to international questions of gravity; but it is so improbable that it needs no further mention than to point out that the opening words of the article, "It is agreed," point to a joint responsibility of the two nations that they shall work to the same end in the settlement of such a question, should it arise. The canal is being built by the United States, "directly at its own cost," pur- suant to Article II, which also provides that "subject to the provisions of the present treaty" the United States "shall have and enjoy all the rights incident to such construction, as well as the exclusive right of providing for the regulation and management of the canal." The vital provisions that limit the powers of the United States are found in Article III, and it is this article that is most apt to give rise to diplomatic questions, as it has already given rise to the question of tolls. With this mere mention of tolls the subject will be dismissed, for it would be manifestly improper for the writer to discuss it at the present time and in these pages.* * Written in the last days of the Taft administration. 166 XKe Panama Canal Article III enunciates certain rules to govern the conduct of the canal, and it is worth while to observe very carefully the reading of the opening sentence preceding the rules themselves. In the first place, the rules are adopted "as the basis of the neutralization of such ship canal/ ' and for no other stated pur- pose whatever; i.e., the rules are in pursuance of the " 'general principle' of neutralization" cited in the preamble of the treaty. In the second place, the open- ing words of the article are "The United States adopts," not "the High Contracting Parties adopt," or "it is agreed," or any such words implying dual responsi- bility. By virtue of this language in the treaty the United States adopts alone, with the assent of Great Britain, the rules governing that status of the canal termed neutralization, and in consequence the United States is alone responsible for maintaining that status itself. In the third place, the wording regarding the rules is "the following Rules, substantially as embodied in the Convention of Constantinople." The rules of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty are not said to be substan- tially those embodied in the Convention of Constan- tinople, but substantially as. In other words, the rules of the Constantinople Convention are not all (that might apply) adopted, but those that are adopted are substantially as they appear in that instrument. This is a very real distinction that has not always been kept clearly in mind by writers on canal matters. Thus the right of the United States to fortify the canal has been challenged at home and abroad, although never by any government, and the prohibition of fortifica- Panama Canal in International Law 167 tions in the Constantinople Convention has been urged as a reason why fortifications at Panama would violate the spirit of the rules of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. That question has been settled and the work on the Panama Canal fortifications is now in progress. Again there are those who hold that the United States in war would have to permit the ships of her enemy to pass freely through the canal because of the wording of Rule I of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, taken in con- nection with the reference to the rules of the Con- stantinople Convention in the opening sentence of Article III. In Article IV of the Constantinople Con- vention occur the words "The Maritime Canal re- maining open in time of war as a free passage, even to the ships of war of belligerents . . . the high contract- ing parties agree that no right of war, no act of hos- tility, nor any act having for its object to obstruct the free navigation of the canal, shall be committed in the canal and its ports of access, as well as within a radius of three marine miles from those ports, even though the Ottoman Empire should be one of the belligerent powers. 71 * No such words as those italicized appear in the Hay- Pauncefote treaty rules; and, if the remarks recently made at a public banquet by a gentleman high in the councils of state are any indication of governmental policy, no such suicidal thing is apt to occur as per- mitting a free passage through the canal of our own enemy's ships of war, on an errand inimical to us. Considered as a question of language the writer does not believe that the word "neutralization" is * Italics the writer's. 168 XKe Panama Canal applicable to the present status of the Panama Canal. " Neutralized" and "neutralization" imply a status maintained by mutual agreement of so many powerful nations that there can be no hope of a successful vio- lation of that status by any one, or by any combina- tion. At Panama the United States stands alone. But whatever the word used the thing aimed at is perfectly plain, and the word "neutralization" may be accepted for want of a better. The United States is sole sponsor for the neutralization of the canal. Considering now the rules themselves it will be noted that all but the first have reference to a state of war. This is to be expected because the idea of neu- tralization is correlative to that of a state of war; neutralization is imposed to meet the conditions arising in actual war or in anticipation of those that may arise in a future war. A first reading of Rule 1 leads to the impression that it is out of place in rules pro- viding for neutralization; but closer consideration shows that it belongs properly enough where it is. By the very omission of reference to time of war the intention is evident that the rule is intended to cover all times, including time of war. A very important exception to this last statement must be made, how- ever: the rule does apply to times of war in which the United States herself is not a belligerent, but does not apply to her enemy' 's war vessels when she is a belligerent. This limitation is not expressly stated but it is borne out by the history of the rule, which had its prototype in Article I of the Constantinople Convention.* That * Printed at the end of this chapter. Panama Canal in International Law 169 article reads in part: "The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag. Consequently the High Contract- ing Parties agree not in any way to interfere with the free use of the Canal in time of war as in time of peace. The words "always" and "in time of war as in time of peace" of this article are absent from Rule 1 of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. It will be remembered that the original draft of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was made in 1900 and contained rules for the neutraliza- tion of the canal. Rule 1 of the original draft, in general tenor similar to Rule 1 of the accepted treaty, did contain the words "in time of war as in time of peace." That draft was materially amended in the Senate, and, as amended, it was unacceptable to Great Britain. One of the Senate amendments provided "that none of the immediate foregoing conditions and stipulations . . . shall apply to measures which the United States may find it necessary to take for securing by its own forces the defense of the United States and the maintenance of public order." The original draft also provided, in Rule 7, that "no fortifications shall be erected commanding the Canal or the waters adja- cent." Great Britain held that the amendment re- ferred to above, called the Davis amendment, and Rule 7 were incompatible. In the Hay memorandum, previously cited, which went to the Senate Committee in explanation of the later and accepted draft of the treaty, Mr. Hay said: 170 THe Panama Canal His Majesty's Government . . . thought that ... it would be impossible to determine what might be the effect if one clause permitting defensive measures and another clause (which has now been omitted) prohibiting fortification of the canal were allowed to stand side by side in the same convention. This amendment was strenuously objected to by Great Britain as involving a distinct departure from the principle of neutral- ity .. . No longer insisting upon the language of the Davis amend- ment — which had in terms reserved to the United States express permission to disregard the rules of neutrality prescribed, when necessary to secure its own defense, which the Senate had appar- ently deemed necessary because of the provision in Rule 1, that the canal should be free and open "in time of war as in time of peace" to the vessels of all nations — it was considered that the omission of the words "in time of war as in time of peace" would dispense with the necessity of the amendment referred to, and that war between the contracting parties, or between the United States and any other power, would have the ordinary effect of war upon treaties when not specially otherwise provided, and would remit both parties to their original and natural right of self-defense and give to the United States the clear right to close the canal against the other belligerent, and to protect it and defend itself by whatever means might be necessary* The statement just quoted was made by one nego- tiator of the treaty and was presented to the Senate Committee having the treaty in charge, and there can be no reasonable doubt that the Senate ratified the treaty with a clear understanding of this matter. It is thus seen that the exception noted above to the general interpretation of Rule 1 is fully justified. If it be objected that this represents the views of only one party to the treaty, the words of Lord Lansdowne in his memorandum of August 3, 1901, may carry the * Italics the writer's. Panama Canal in International Law 171 conviction that this interpretation was understood by Great Britain also. In that memorandum* he says: I understand that by the omission of all reference to the matter of defense the United States Government desires to reserve the power of taking measures to protect the Canal, at any time when the United States may be at war, from destruction or damage at the hands of an enemy or enemies. On the other hand, I conclude that, with the above exception, there is no intention to derogate from the principles of neutrality laid down by the rules. As to the first of these propositions I am not prepared to deny that contingencies may arise when, not only from a national point of view, but on behalf of the commercial interests of the whole world, it might be of supreme importance to the United States that they should be free to adopt measures for the defense of the Canal at a moment when they were themselves engaged in hostilities. It may be added that Lord Pauncefote, the British plenipotentiary in the negotiation of the treaty, was one of the British representatives in the negotiation of the Constantinople Convention, and must be assumed therefore to have been especially qualified to note the effect of the deviation in the Hay-Pauncefote treaty rules from those of the rules governing the Suez Canal. Taken collectively the Hay-Pauncefote treaty rules define the attitude of the United States in the man- agement of the canal to be built. Rule 1 opens the canal on terms of equality to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations " observing these rules." If any nation, or its citizens or subjects, declines or fails to observe the rules it may not use the canal. The rule is silent as to specific times when it is applicable, * Supplement, American Journal of International Law, Vol. V, No. 3, July, 1911. 172 THe Panama Canal times of war or times of peace; the manifest inference is that free passage in time of war is permissible, to which the exception already noted must be added. The rule may be stated to mean, in effect, that the canal shall be free and open to the vessels of com- merce and of war of all nations observing these rules, on terms of entire equality, provided the voyage of the vessel be innocent in character as toward the United States, so that, etc. By inference the interpretation above leaves in the category of vessels entitled to free passage through the canal those private vessels of enemies of the United States in war that are engaged in voyages of an inno- cent character. For instance, supposing a war be- tween France and the United States, a French vessel loaded with guano, on a voyage from Peru to Canada, would be freely entitled to passage through the canal. The writer believes this interpretation to be correct. In the present development of international law the question is rather academic, for the French master would scarcely run the risk of capture by United States ships outside the three mile limit at the canal ends. But if the principle of the inviolability of private property at sea becomes established in international law the question will at once be a practical one. It is not entirely academic now, as will be seen from a perusal of Article XII of the treaty of 1871 between the United States and Italy which reads : The High Contracting Parties agree that in the unfortunate event of a war between them the private property of their re- spective citizens and subjects, with the exception of contraband Panama Canal in International Law 173 of war, shall be exempt from capture or seizure on the high seas or elsewhere by the armed vessels or by the military forces of either party, it being understood that this exemption shall not extend to vessels and their cargoes which may attempt to enter a port blockaded by the naval forces of either party. (Treaties in Force, 1904, p. 453.) The remaining five rules are essentially prohibitions of a nature similar to those the United States would enforce in her own territorial waters for the preserva- tion of national neutrality in a war between other nations. The effect of them all is that the United States will not permit the canal to be used as a base by either belligerent in a war between foreign powers. When the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was negotiated the canal routes lay through foreign territory in which the exercise of sovereignty could only legally apper- tain to the nation, or nations, through whose territory the canal would pass. This condition was entirely changed by the treaty with Panama, made two years later. The changed condition cannot, in equity, be regarded as making any change in the attitude of the United States toward Great Britain in the interpreta- tion of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty; for the treaty with Panama came after it, was made possible by it, and in Article XVIII expressly states that the canal shall be opened in conformity with all the stipulations of it. But toward every other nation the treaty with Panama very materially changed the rights of the United States in her control and management of the canal, as will be seen by an examination of its provisions. In Article II* Panama " grants to the United States * See text following this chapter. 174 THe Panama Canal in perpetuity the use, occupation and control" of cer- tain lands, land under water and waters for canal pur- poses. In Article IV Panama grants in perpetuity a monopoly for any system of interoceanic communica- tion by canal or railroad across its territory. In Article III The Republic of Panama grants to the United States all the rights, power and authority within the zone mentioned and de- scribed in Article II of this agreement and within the limits of all auxiliary lands and waters mentioned and described in said Article II which the United States would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign of the territory within which said lands and waters are located to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power or authority. The title to the lands and waters, the use of which is ceded, still vests in Panama, and the compensation, including an annual rental, is provided for in Article XIV; but the abstract right of title does not affect the concrete right of the United States to exercise sovereignty in the Canal Zone to the exclusion of Panama. The Canal Zone is thus virtually and legally as much a part of the United States as is the Missis- sippi Valley, and the United States has the same inter- est and right, and indeed the same obligation, to take measures against the violation of the neutrality of the Canal Zone, and against hostile acts toward her prop- erty there, by belligerents, that she has for ensuring the same objects in the Mississippi Valley or any other part of her territorial possessions. Great Britain can legally hold us to the duty of maintaining neutrality In the Canal Zone by virtue of the terms of the Hay- Panama Canal in International Law 175 Pauncefote treaty; on the other hand, as far as the rest of the world is concerned, we have that right and duty naturally in consequence of the treaty with Panama, whether the Hay-Pauncefote treaty be in existence or not. The cities of Colon and Panama with their adjacent harbors are not included in, but are expressly excluded from, the grant of the Canal Zone. Even in them, however, Panama has yielded some attributes of sov- ereignty to the United States, as will be seen from a reading of Articles VII and X. The treaty with Panama is largely occupied with matters that are of interest only to the two countries concerned in making it. There are, however, several things of international interest that have not yet been touched upon. The most important of these is the subject of Article I, which reads: "The United States guarantees and will maintain the independence of the Republic of Panama." This imposes a serious duty upon the United States that was not without some bearing on the question of fortifications and a permanent gar- rison in the Canal Zone, now happily settled. The guarantee is of great importance to Panama; and it is also of great importance to the United States, for it ensures for the future that no embarrassing questions will arise from the possibility of an attack upon Panama by a more powerful neighbor; the announcement of the guarantee will probably suffice to attain the object, but the means will be at hand to enforce the guarantee if necessary. It would be intolerable to have a war of aggression going on in the vicinity of the canal, and 176 XKe Panama Canal the guarantee is worth the assumption of the respon- sibility involved. The language of Article I is unqualified, and the announcement that the United States "will maintain" the independence of Panama, read by itself, is capable of the interpretation that the United States will main- tain that independence even against the wishes of Panama to the contrary; and very good reasons are apparent why such an interpretation would be to the interest of the United States. But the language of the second paragraph of Article XXIV shows that the guarantee of independence is not intended to prohibit Panama from merging her independence in another state if she so wishes; for it expressly provides that, in such a contingency, the rights of the United States under this treaty shall remain unimpaired. As the treaty must be interpreted as a whole, the plain mean- ing of Article I is that the independence of Panama is guaranteed and will be maintained against the assaults of any enemy of that state. The first paragraph of Article XXIV provides that no change in the treaties of Panama shall, " without the consent of the United States, affect any right of the United States under the present convention, or under any treaty stipulation between the two coun- tries that now exists or may hereafter exist touching the subject matter of this convention." This is an evident matter of international interest, looking to the future. In a similar way, looking to the past, Article XX provides for annulment or modification of any treaty in relation to the territory of the Isthmus of Panama Canal in International Law 177 Panama, the obligations of which have descended to or been assumed by the Republic of Panama, whereby any privilege or concession is granted relative to means of interoceanic communication that is incompatible with the terms of the treaty under discussion. The writer does not know of any formal announcement that the provisions of Article XX have been complied with. If they have not there is a possibility of interesting diplomatic questions arising out of that article. Article IX provides on the part of the United States that the ports at the canal entrances, and on the part of Panama that the towns of Colon and Panama, shall be free ports for vessels using or passing through the canal, with exceptions covering canal tolls, articles destined for other parts of the Republic of Panama, and vessels touching at Colon and Panama without passing through the canal. Articles XXIII and XXV may be considered to- gether, as both bear upon the protection of the canal. Article XXIII explicitly permits the United States to use her police and her land and naval forces, and to establish fortifications to ensure the safety and protec- tion of the canal and its auxiliaries. This bears upon the right of the United States to fortify the canal, if that right needs further argument; for it is plain that the negotiators of this treaty with Panama would never have put in the authorization to establish fortifica- tions if they had believed fortifications were forbidden, by implication or otherwise, by the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. In Article XXV Panama agrees to sell or lease lands for naval and coaling stations "to the end of 178 t The Panama Canal the efficient protection of the Canal and the preser- vation of its neutrality." The use of the word "sell" in this article is noteworthy; it carries with it the pos- sibility of the actual transfer of title, and with the title sovereignty in a transaction of this kind between one government and another. The title to the Canal Zone did not pass under the provisions of Article III. Both Article XXIII and Article XXV point to a belief of the two governments that something more than a mere dictum of the United States is necessary to en- able her to ensure the safety and protection of the canal, and to maintain its neutrality. Summing up, the international status of the canal appears to the writer to be as follows: (a) The canal is free (for passage but not in respect of tolls) and open to all private vessels of nations ob- serving the rules of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. (b) The canal is similarly free and open to men-of- war, even to those of belligerents when the United States is not a party to the war. (c) To these permissive conditions the exception may be anticipated that the United States, when her- self engaged in war, will not allow the war vessels of her enemies to use the canal, nor her enemies' private vessels, unless the character of the voyage be innocent as regards the United States. (d) The other conditions are prohibitive, and of the nature that the United States would enforce in her own ports for the preservation of neutrality and the protec- tion of her own property. They are so explicitly stated that nothing more than a reference to them, Rules 2 to 6 inclusive, Article III, is necessary here. Panama Canal in International Law 179 (e) The United States stands alone as the guarantor that the canal shall be kept free and open in accordance with the Hay-Pauncefote rules. (f) The canal will be protected by permanent forti- fications and a military garrison. The Suez Canal afforded the only precedent for es- tablishing the status of the Panama Canal. The two are alike in the fact that each is an artificial waterway connecting two great oceans, whereby trade routes may be shortened thousands of miles. The two are very unlike in several other particulars. The Panama Canal is being constructed by the United States as a government enterprise; the Suez Canal was built and is now owned by a private company of which the British Government later became a large stockholder, but is not now sole proprietor. . The Suez Canal is comparatively near to several strong European States having diverse interests, while the Panama Canal is separated by the width of a great ocean from any first- class power. The Suez Canal is on the common short- est route of several European powers to their important colonies; this is not the case with the Panama Canal as regards European countries, but the United States has a vital interest in it because it makes a short route between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. The Suez Canal is in Egypt, which is a suzerainty of Turkey, whose territorial rights are expressly reserved in Article XXII of the Constantinople Convention; the Panama Canal passes through territory in which the United States exercises sovereignty to the exclusion of such exercise by Panama. Enough has been said to show 180 THe Panama Canal the wide differences in important particulars of the two great artificial waterways. Such differences in physical status are quite sufficient to account for differences in international status. The text of the Constantinople Convention govern- ing "the free navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal" is printed at the end of this chapter, and the reader can compare for himself its provisions with those of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. A few of the more noticeable divergencies may be pointed out, however. In the first place the Suez Canal is really neutralized by a concert of nine European powers, although the words "neutralization" and "neutrality" are carefully omit- ted, and the language is "free and open," "open . . . as a free passage," or "free use"; Turkey, the sov- ereign power, is one of the nine signatories. On the other hand, the Panama Canal is not neutralized by a concert of powers, although the word "neutraliza- tion" is used in the Hay-Pauncefote treaty; the United States is the sole guarantor of the condition so charac- terized. Again, Turkey expressly gives up, in Article IV, the right to exercise any war right or commit any act of hostility in the .canal situated in her own sov- ereign territory; the United States is not so restricted by the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. Permanent fortifications are forbidden by the Constantinople Convention, Article VIII and Article XI ; they are not forbidden by the Hay- Pauncefote treaty. Comment has already been made upon the omission in the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of the words "in time of war as in time of peace" found in Article I of the Constantinople Convention. Panama Canal in International Law 181 The natural cause of these divergencies may be found in the entirely different relation borne to the Panama Canal by the United States from that borne to the Suez Canal by any one European state. The Panama Canal is of paramount importance to us for commercial and military reasons, and the latter were very freely advanced before construction began, al- though they are now somewhat forgotten in the discus- sion of commercial matters. The Suez Canal was begun purely as a commercial enterprise in which the inter- ests of many nations ran parallel, and military ad- vantage was incidental. Put in another way, the Panama Canal was a necessity for us; the Suez Canal was a great convenience to Europe. For these reasons, and also because of the Monroe Doctrine, it was worth while to undertake single-handed the guarantee at Panama that the European nations collectively under- took at Suez. It very naturally follows that guns and soldiers are necessary to enable a single nation to maintain what the pronouncement of a concert of nations will effect by moral suasion. And it equally follows by every rule of common sense and self-preser- vation that the United States in undertaking such a responsibility will not be quixotic enough to maintain a canal for the use of her own enemies in war. Notwithstanding divergencies the great fact stands out that the management of both canals is on a basis of equal treatment to all with special advantage to none. Unless the United States be herself at war the inter- national status of the two canals is practically the same. The President's Neutrality Proclamation concerning the Panama Canal is given in the Appendix. CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, GERMANY, AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, SPAIN, FRANCE, ITALY, THE NETHERLANDS, RUSSIA, AND TURKEY, RESPECT- ING THE FREE NAVIGATION OF THE SUEZ MARI- TIME CANAL* Signed at Constantinople, October 29, 1888. {Ratifications deposited at Constantinople, December 22, 1888.) HER Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India; His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, King of Prussia; His Majesty the Emperor of Aus- tria, King of Bohemia, &c., and Apostolic King of Hungary; His Majesty the King of Spain, and in his name the Queen Regent of the Kingdom; the President of the French Republic; His Maj- esty the King of Italy; His Majesty the King of the Nether- lands, Grand Duke of Luxembourg, &c. ; His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias; and His Majesty the Emperor of the Otto- mans; wishing to establish, by a Conventional Act, a definite system destined to guarantee at all times, and for all the Powers, the free use of the Suez Maritime Canal, and thus to complete the system under which the navigation of this Canal has been placed by the Firman of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, dated the 22nd February, 1866 (2 Zilkade, 1282), and sanctioning the Concessions of His Highness the Khedive, have named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say: ( Here follow the names of the several Plenipotentiaries.) Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the fol- lowing Articles: * Parliamentary State Papers, Commercial, No. 2 (Suez Canal), 1889. [C.-5623.] 182 Panama Canal in International Law 183 Article I The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag. Consequently, the High Contracting Parties agree not in any way to interfere with the free use of the Canal, in time of war as in time of peace. The Canal shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right of blockade. Article II The High Contracting Parties, recognizing that the Fresh- Water Canal is indispensable to the Maritime Canal, take note of the engagements of His Highness the Khedive towards the Universal Suez Canal Company as regards the Fresh-Water Canal; which engagements are stipulated in a Convention bear- ing date the 18th March, 1863, containing an expose and four Articles. They undertake not to interfere in any way with the security of that Canal and its branches, the working of which shall not be exposed to any attempt at obstruction. Article III The High Contracting Parties likewise undertake to respect the plant, establishments, buildings, and works of the Maritime Canal and of the Fresh- Water Canal. Article IV The Maritime Canal remaining open in time of war as a free passage, even to the ships of war of belligerents, according to the terms of Article I of the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties agree that no right of war, no act of hostility, nor any act having for its object to obstruct the free navigation of the Canal, shall be committed in the Canal and its ports of access, as well as within a radius of 3 marine miles from those ports, even though the Ottoman Empire should be one of the belligerent Powers. Vessels of war of belligerents shall not revictual or take in 184 TKe Panama Canal stores in the Canal and its ports of access, except in so far as may- be strictly necessary. The transit of the aforesaid vessels through the Canal shall be effected with the least possible delay, in ac- cordance with the Regulations in force, and without any other in- termission than that resulting from the necessities of the service. Their stay at Port Said and in the roadstead of Suez shall not exceed twenty-four hours, except in case of distress. In such case they shall be bound to leave as soon as possible. An interval of twenty-four hours shall always elapse between the sailing of a belligerent ship from one of the ports of access and the departure of a ship belonging to the hostile Power. Article V In time of war belligerent Powers shall not disembark nor embark within the Canal and its ports of access either troops, munitions, or materials of war. But in case of an accidental hindrance in the Canal, men may be embarked or disembarked at the ports of access by detachments not exceeding 1000 men, with a corresponding amount of war material. Article VI Prizes shall be subjected, in all respects, to the same rules as the vessels of war of belligerents. Article VII The Powers shall not keep any vessel of war in the waters of the Canal (including Lake Timsah and the Bitter Lakes). Nevertheless, they may station vessels of war in the ports of access of Port Said and Suez, the number of which shall not exceed two for each Power. This right shall not be exercised by belligerents. Article VIII The Agents in Egypt of the Signatory Powers of the present Treaty shall be charged to watch over its execution. In case of any event threatening the security or the free passage of the Canal, they shall meet on the summons of three of their number Panama Canal in International Law 185 under the presidency of their Doyen, in order to proceed to the necessary verifications. They shall inform the Khedivial Govern- ment of the danger which they may have perceived, in order that that Government may take proper steps to insure the protection and the free use of the Canal. Under any circumstances, they shall meet once a year to take note of the due execution of the Treaty. The last-mentioned meetings shall take place under the presi- dency of a Special Commissioner nominated for that purpose by the Imperial Ottoman Government. A Commissioner of the Khedive may also take part in the meeting, and may preside over it in case of the absence of the Ottoman Commissioner. They shall especially demand the suppression of any work or the dispersion of any assemblage on either bank of the Canal, the object or effect of which might be to interfere with the liberty and the entire security of the navigation. Article IX The Egyptian Government shall, within the limits of its powers resulting from the Firmans, and under the conditions provided for in the present Treaty, take the necessary measures for insuring the execution of the said Treaty. In case the Egyptian Government should not have sufficient means at its disposal, it shall call upon the Imperial Ottoman Government, which shall take the necessary measures to respond to such appeal; shall give notice thereof to the Signatory Powers of the Declaration of London of the 17th March, 1885; and shall, if necessary, concert with them on the subject. The provisions of Articles IV, V, VII, and VIII shall not inter- fere with the measures which shall be taken in virtue of the present Article. Article X Similarly, the provisions of Articles IV, V, VII, and VIII shall not interfere with the measures which His Majesty the Sultan and His Highness the Khedive, in the name of His Imperial Majesty, and within the limits of the Firmans granted, might find it necessary to take for securing by their own forces the defence of Egypt and the maintenance of public order. 186 THe Panama Canal In case His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, or His Highness the Khedive, should find it necessary to avail themselves of the excep- tions for which this Article provides, the Signatory Powers of the Declaration of London shall be notified thereof by the Imperial Ottoman Government. It is likewise understood that the provisions of the four Articles aforesaid shall in no case occasion any obstacle to the measures which the Imperial Ottoman Government may think it necessary to take in order to insure by its own forces the defence of its other possessions situated on the eastern coast of the Red Sea. Article XI The measures which shall be taken in the cases provided for by Articles IX and X of the present Treaty shall not interfere with the free use of the Canal. In the same cases, the erection of permanent fortifications contrary to the provisions of Article VIII is prohibited. Article XII The High Contracting Parties, by application of the principle of equality as regards the free use of the Canal, a principle which forms one of the bases of the present Treaty, agree that none of them shall endeavor to obtain with respect to the Canal territo- rial or commercial advantages or privileges in any international arrangements which may be concluded. Moreover, the rights of Turkey as the territorial Power are reserved. Article XIII With the exception of the obligations expressly provided by the clauses of the present Treaty, the sovereign rights of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, and the rights and immunities of His Highness the Khedive, resulting from the Firmans, are in no way affected. Article XIV The High Contracting Parties agree that the engagements re- sulting from the present Treaty shall not be limited by the dura- tion of the Acts of Concession of the Universal Suez Canal Company. Panama Canal in International Law 187 Article XV The stipulations of the present Treaty shall not interfere with the sanitary measures in force in Egypt. The High Contracting Parties undertake to bring the present Treaty to the knowledge of the States which have not signed it, inviting them to accede to it. The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Constantinople within the space of one month, or sooner if possible. In faith of which the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty, and have affixed to it the seal of their arms. Done at Constantinople, the 29th day of the month of October, in the year 1888. TREATY TO FACILITATE THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SHIP CANAL Concluded November 18, 1901; ratification advised by Senate De- cember 16 } 1901; ratified by President December 26, 1901; ratifications exchanged February 21, 1902; proclaimed February 22,1902. Article XVI Article XVII [L. S. [L. S. [L. S. [L. S. [L. S. [L. S. [L. S. [L. S. [L. S. W. A. White. Radowitz. Calice. Miguel Florez Y Garcia. G. DE MONTEBELLO. A. Blanc. Gus. Keun. Nelidow. M. Said. 188 THe Panama Canal Articles I. Convention of April 19, 1850. IV. Change of sovereignty. II. Construction of canal. V. Ratification. III. Rules of neutralization. The United States of America and His Majesty Edward the Seventh, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, King, and Emperor of India, being desirous to facilitate the construction of a ship canal to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, by whatever route may be considered expedient, and to that end to remove any objection which may arise out of the Convention of the 19th April, 1850, commonly called the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, to the construction of such canal under the auspices of the Government of the United States, without impairing the "general principle" of neutralization established in Article VIII of that Convention, have for that purpose appointed as their Plenipotentiaries: The President of the United States, John Hay, Secretary of State of the United States of America: And His Majesty Edward the Seventh, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, King, and Emperor of India, the Right Honourable Lord Pauncefote, G. C. B., G. C. M. G., His Majesty's Ambas- sador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States; Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have agreed upon the following Articles: Article I The High Contracting Parties agree that the present Treaty shall supersede the afore-mentioned Convention of the 19th April, 1850. Article II It is agreed that the canal may be constructed under the aus- pices of the Government of the United States, either directly at its own cost, or by gift or loan of money to individuals or Corpora- Panama Canal in International Law 189 tions, or through subscription to or purchase of stock or shares, and that, subject to the provisions of the present Treaty, the said Government shall have and enjoy all the rights incident to such construction, as well as the exclusive right of providing for the regulation and management of the canal. Article III The United States adopts, as the basis of the neutralization of such ship canal, the following Rules, substantially as embodied in the Convention of Constantinople, signed the 28th October, 1888, for the free navigation of the Suez Canal, that is to say: 1. The canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations observing these Rules, on terms of entire equality, so that there shall be no discrimination against any such nation, or its citizens or subjects, in respect of the conditions or charges of traffic, or otherwise. Such conditions and charges of traffic shall be just and equitable. 2. The canal shall never be blockaded, nor shall any right of war be exercised nor any act of hostility be committed within it. The United States, however, shall be at liberty to maintain such military police along the canal as may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness and disorder. 3. Vessels of war of a belligerent shall not revictual nor take any stores in the canal except so far as may be strictly necessary; and the transit of such vessels through the canal shall be effected with the least possible delay in accordance with the Regulations in force, and with only such intermission as may result from the necessities of the service. Prizes shall be in all respects subject to the same Rules as vessels of war of the belligerents. 4. No belligerent shall embark or disembark troops, munitions of war, or warlike materials in the canal, except in case of acci- dental hindrance of the transit, and in such case the transit shall be resumed with all possible dispatch. 5. The provisions of this Article shall apply to waters adjacent to the canal, within 3 marine miles of either end. Vessels of war of a belligerent shall not remain in such waters longer than twenty- four hours at any one time, except in case of distress, and in such case, shall depart as soon as possible; but a vessel of war of one 190 THe Panama Canal belligerent shall not depart within twenty-four hours from the departure of a vessel of war of the other belligerent. 6. The plant, establishments, buildings, and all work neces- sary to the construction, maintenance, and operation of the canal shall be deemed to be part thereof, for the purposes of this Treaty, and in time of war, as in time of peace, shall enjoy complete im- munity from attack or injury by belligerents, and from acts calculated to impair their usefulness as part of the canal. Article IV It is agreed that no change of territorial sovereignty or of the international relations of the country or countries traversed by the before-mentioned canal shall affect the general principle of neutralization or the obligation of the High Contracting Parties under the present Treaty. Article V The present Treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by His Britannic Majesty; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington or at London at the earliest possible time within six months from the date hereof. In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty and thereunto affixed their seals. Done in duplicate at Washington, the 18th day of November, in the year of Our Lord one thousand nine hundred and one. John Hay. [seal] Pauncefote. [seal] CONVENTION FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SHIP CANAL Concluded November 18, 1903; ratification advised by the Senate February 23, 1904; ratified by President February 25, 1904; ratifications exchanged February 26, 1904; proclaimed February 26,1904. Panama Canal in International Law 191 Articles I. Independence of Panama. XVI. Extradition. II. Canal zone. XVII. Ports of Panama. III. Authority in canal zone. XVIII. Neutrality rules. IV. Subsidiary rights. XIX. Free transport. V. Monopoly for construction, XX. Cancellation of exist- etc. ing treaties. VI. Private property. XXI. Anterior [debts, conces- VII. Panama; Colon; harbors. sions, etc. VIII. Panama Canal Company XXII. Renunciation of rights and railroad. under concessionary IX. Ports at entrance of canal. contracts. X. Taxes, etc. XXIII. Protection of canal. XI. Official dispatches. XXIV. Change in government, XII. Access of employees. laws, etc. XIII. Importation into zone. XXV. Coaling stations. XIV. Compensation. XXVI. Ratification. XV. Joint commission. The United States of America and the Republic of Panama being desirous to insure the construction of a ship canal across the Isthmus of Panama to connect the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and the Congress of the United States of America having passed an act approved June 28, 1902, in furtherance of that object, by which the President of the United States is authorized to acquire within a reasonable time the control of the necessary territory of the Republic of Colombia, and the sovereignty of such terri- tory being actually vested in the Republic of Panama, the high contracting parties have resolved for that purpose to conclude a convention and have accordingly appointed as their plenipoten- tiaries, — The President of the United States of America, John Hay, Secretary of State, and The Government of the Republic of Panama, Philippe Bunau- Varilla, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Panama, thereunto specially empowered by said gov- ernment, who after communicating with each other their respec- tive full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the following articles : 192 XKe Panama Canal Article I The United States guarantees and will maintain the inde- pendence of the Republic of Panama. Article II The Republic of Panama grants to the United States in per- petuity the use, occupation and control of a zone of land and land under water for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of said Canal of the width of ten miles extending to the distance of five miles on each side of the center line of the route of the Canal to be constructed; the said zone beginning in the Caribbean Sea three marine miles from mean low water mark and extending to and across the Isthmus of Panama into the Pacific ocean to a distance of three marine miles from mean low water mark with the proviso that the cities of Panama and Colon and the harbors adjacent to said cities, which are included within the boundaries of the zone above de- scribed, shall not be included within this grant. The Republic of Panama further grants to the United States in perpetuity the use, occupation and control of any other lands and waters out- side of the zone above described which may be necessary and convenient for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanita- tion and protection of the said Canal or of any auxiliary canals or other works necessary and convenient for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of the said enterprise. The Republic of Panama further grants in like manner to the United States in perpetuity all islands within the limits of the zone above described and in addition thereto the group of small islands in the Bay of Panama, named Perico, Naos, Culebra and Flamenco. Article III The Republic of Panama grants to the United States all the rights, power and authority within the zone mentioned and de- scribed in Article II of this agreement and within the limits of all auxiliary lands and waters mentioned and described in said Panama Canal in International Law 193 Article II which the United States would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign of the territory within which said lands and waters are located to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power or authority. Article IV As rights subsidiary to the above grants the Republic of Panama grants in perpetuity to the United States the right to use the rivers, streams, lakes and other bodies of water within its limits for navigation, the supply of water or water-power or other pur- poses, so far as the use of said rivers, streams, lakes and bodies of water and the waters thereof may be necessary and convenient for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of the said Canal. Article V The Republic of Panama grants to the United States in per- petuity a monopoly for the construction, maintenance and opera- tion of any system of communication by means of canal Or railroad across its territory between the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific ocean. Article VI The grants herein contained shall in no manner invalidate the titles or rights of private land holders or owners of private prop- erty in the said zone or in or to any of the lands or waters granted to the United States by the provisions of any Article of this treaty, nor shall they interfere with the rights of way over the public roads passing through the said zone or over any of the said lands or waters unless said rights of way or private rights shall conflict with rights herein granted to the United States in which case the rights of the United States shall be superior. All damages caused to the owners of private lands or private property of any kind by reason of the grants contained in this treaty or by reason of the operations of the United States, its agents or employees, or by reason of the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of the said Canal or of the works of sanitation and 194 THe Panama Canal protection herein provided for, shall be appraised and settled by a joint Commission appointed by the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Panama, whose decisions as to such damages shall be final and whose awards as to such damages shall be paid solely by the United States. No part of the work on said Canal or the Panama railroad or on any auxiliary works relating thereto and authorized by the terms of this treaty shall be prevented, delayed or impeded by or pending such proceed- ings to ascertain such damages. The appraisal of said private lands and private property and the assessment of damages to them shall be based upon their value before the date of this convention. Article VII The Republic of Panama grants to the United States within the limits of the cities of Panama and Colon and their adjacent harbors and within the territory adjacent thereto the right to acquire by purchase or by the exercise of the right of eminent domain, any lands, buildings, water rights or other properties necessary and convenient for the construction, maintenance, operation and protection of the Canal and of any works of sani- tation, such as the collection and disposition of sewage and the distribution of water in the said cities of Panama and Colon, which, in the discretion of the United States may be necessary and convenient for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of the said Canal and railroad. All such works of sanitation, collection and disposition of sewage and distribution of water in the cities of Panama and Colon shall be made at the expense of the United States, and the gov- ernment of the United States, its agents or nominees shall be authorized to impose and collect water rates and sewerage rates which shall be sufficient to provide for the payment of interest and the amortization of the principal of the cost of said works within a period of fifty years and upon the expiration of said term of fifty years the system of sewers and water works shall revert to and become the properties of the cities of Panama and Colon respectively, and the use of the water shall be free to the inhabitants of Panama and Colon, except to the extent that Panama Canal in International Law 195 water rates may be necessary for the operation and maintenance of said system of sewers and water. The Republic of Panama agrees that the cities of Panama and Colon shall comply in perpetuity with the sanitary ordinances whether of a preventive or curative character prescribed by the United States and in case the Government of Panama is unable or fails in its duty to enforce this compliance by the cities of Panama and Colon with the sanitary ordinances of the United States the Republic of Panama grants to the United States the right and authority to enforce the same. The same right and authority are granted to the United States for the maintenance of public order in the cities of Panama and Colon and the territories and harbors adjacent thereto in case the Republic of Panama should not be, in the judgment of the United States, able to maintain such order. Aeticle VIII The Republic of Panama grants to the United States all rights which it now has or hereafter may acquire to the property of the New Panama Canal Company and the Panama Railroad Company as a result of the transfer of sovereignty from the Republic of Colombia to the Republic of Panama over the Isthmus of Panama and authorizes the New Panama Canal Company to sell and transfer to the United States its rights, privileges, properties and concessions as well as the Panama Railroad and all the shares or part of the shares of that company; but the public lands situated outside of the zone described in Article II of this treaty now included in the concessions to both said enterprises and not required in the construction or operation of the Canal shall revert to the Republic of Panama except any property now owned by or in the possession of said companies within Panama or Colon or the ports or terminals thereof. Article IX The United States agrees that the ports at either entrance of the Canal and the waters thereof, and the Republic of Panama agrees that the towns of Panama and Colon shall be free for all time so that there shall not be imposed or collected custom house 196 THe Panama Canal tolls, tonnage, anchorage, lighthouse, wharf, pilot, or quarantine dues or any other charges or taxes of any kind upon any vessel using or passing through the Canal or belonging to or employed by the United States, directly or indirectly, in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protec- tion of the main Canal, or auxiliary works, or upon the cargo, officers, crew, or passengers of any such vessels, except such tolls and charges as may be imposed by the United States for the use of the Canal and other works, and except tolls and charges im- posed by the Republic of Panama upon merchandise destined to be introduced for the consumption of the rest of the Republic of Panama, and upon vessels touching at the ports of Colon and Panama and which do not cross the Canal. The Government of the Republic of Panama shall have the right to establish in such ports and in the towns of Panama and Colon such houses and guards as it may deem necessary to col- lect duties on importations destined to other portions of Panama and to prevent contraband trade. The United States shall have the right to make use of the towns and harbors of Panama and Colon as places of anchorage, and for making repairs, for loading unloading, depositing, or transshipping cargoes either in transit or destined for the service of the Canal and for other works pertaining to the Canal. Article X The Republic of Panama agrees that there shall not be im- posed any taxes, national, municipal, departmental, or of any other class, upon the Canal, the railways and auxiliary works, tugs and other vessels employed in the service of the Canal, store houses, work shops, offices, quarters for laborers, factories of all kinds, warehouses, wharves, machinery and other works, property, and effects appertaining to the Canal or railroad and auxiliary works, or their officers or employees, situated within the cities of Panama and Colon, and that there shall not be imposed contributions or charges of a personal character of any kind upon officers, employees, laborers, and other individuals in the service of the Canal and railroad and auxiliary works. Panama Canal in International Law 197 Article XI The United States agrees that the official dispatches of the Government of the Republic of Panama shall be transmitted over any telegraph and telephone lines established for canal pur- poses and used for public and private business at rates not higher than those required from officials in the service of the United States. Article XII The Government of the Republic of Panama shall permit the immigration and free access to the lands and workshops of the Canal and its auxiliary works of all employees and workmen of whatever nationality under contract to work upon or seeking employment upon or in any wise connected with the said Canal and its auxiliary works, with their respective families, and all such persons shall be free and exempt from the military service of the Republic of Panama. Article XIII The United States may import at any time into the said zone and auxiliary lands, free of custom duties, imposts, taxes, or other charges, and without any restrictions, any and all vessels, dredges, engines, cars, machinery, tools, explosives, materials, supplies, and other articles necessary and convenient in the con- struction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of the Canal and auxiliary works, and all provisions, medicines, clothing, supplies and other things necessary and convenient for the officers, employees, workmen and laborers in the service and employ of the United States and for their families. If any such articles are disposed of for use outside of the zone and auxiliary lands granted to the United States and within the territory of the Republic, they shall be subject to the same import or other duties as like articles imported under the laws of the Republic of Panama. Article XIV As the price or compensation for the rights, powers and privi- leges granted in this convention by the Republic of Panama to the United States, the Government of the United States agrees 198 TKe Panama Canal to pay to the Republic of Panama the sum of ten million dollars, ($10,000,000) in gold coin of the United States on the exchange of the ratification of this convention and also an annual payment during the life of this convention of two hundred and fifty thou- sand dollars ($250,000) in like gold coin, beginning nine years after the date aforesaid. The provisions of this Article shall be in addition to all other benefits assured to the Republic of Panama under this convention. But no delay or difference of opinion under this Article or any other provisions of this treaty shall affect or interrupt the full operation and effect of this convention in all other respects. Article XV The joint commission referred to in Article VI shall be estab- lished as follows: The President of the United States shall nominate two persons and the President of the Republic of Panama shall nominate two persons and they shall proceed to a decision; but in case of dis- agreement of the Commission (by reason of their being equally divided in conclusion) an umpire shall be appointed by the two Governments who shall render the decision. In the event of the death, absence, or incapacity of a Commissioner or Umpire, or of his omitting, declining or ceasing to act, his place shall be filled by the appointment of another person in the manner above indicated. All decisions by a majority of the Commission or by the umpire shall be final. Article XVI The two Governments shall make adequate provision by future agreement for the pursuit, capture, imprisonment, detention and delivery within said zone and auxiliary lands to the authorities of the Republic of Panama of persons charged with the commitment of crimes, felonies or misdemeanors without said zone and for the pursuit, capture, imprisonment, detention and delivery without said zone to the authorities of the United States of persons charged with the commitment of crimes, felonies and misdemeanors within said zone and auxiliary lands. Panama Canal in International Law 199 Article XVII The Republic of Panama grants to the United States the use of all the ports of the Republic open to commerce as places of refuge for any vessels employed in the Canal enterprise, and for all vessels passing or bound to pass through the Canal which may be in distress and be driven to seek refuge in said ports. Such vessels shall be exempt from anchorage and tonnage dues on the part of the Republic of Panama. Article XVIII The Canal, when constructed, and the entrances thereto shall be neutral in perpetuity, and shall be opened upon the terms pro- vided for by Section 1 of Article three of, and in conformity with all the stipulations of, the treaty entered into by the Governments of the United States and Great Britain on November 18, 1901. Article XIX The Government of the Republic of Panama shall have the right to transport over the Canal its vessels and its troops and munitions of war in such vessels at all times without paying charges of any kind. The exemption is to be extended to the auxiliary railway for the transportation of persons in the service of the Republic of Panama, or of the police force charged with the preservation of public order outside of said zone, as well as to their baggage, munitions of war and supplies. Article XX If by virtue of any existing treaty in relation to the territory of the Isthmus of Panama, whereof the obligations shall descend or be assumed by the Republic of Panama, there may be any privilege or concession in favor of the Government or the citizens and subjects of a third power relative to an interoceanic means of communication which in any of its terms may be incompatible with the terms of the present convention, the Republic of Panama agrees to cancel or modify such treaty in due form, for which purpose it shall give to the said third power the requisite notifi- cation within the term of four months from the date of the present 200 THe Panama Canal convention, and in case the existing treaty contains no clause permitting its modifications or annulment, the Republic of Panama agrees to procure its modification or annulment in such form that there shall not exist any conflict with the stipulations of the present convention. Article XXI The rights and privileges granted by the Republic of Panama to the United States in the preceding Articles are understood to be free of all anterior debts, liens, trusts, or liabilities, or concessions or privileges to other Governments, corporations, syndicates or individuals, and consequently, if there should arise any claims on account of the present concessions and privileges or other- wise, the claimants shall resort to the Government of the Repub- lic of Panama and not to the United States for any indemnity or compromise which may be required. Article XXII The Republic of Panama renounces and grants to the United States the participation to which it might be entitled in the future earnings of the Canal under Article XV of the conces- sionary contract with Lucien N. B. Wyse now owned by the New Panama Canal Company and any and all other rights or claims of a pecuniary nature arising under or relating to said concession, or arising under or relating to the concessions to the Panama Railroad Company or any extension or modification thereof; and it likewise renounces, confirms and grants to the United States, now and hereafter, all the rights and property reserved in the said concessions which otherwise would belong to Panama at or before the expiration of the terms of ninety-nine years of the concessions granted to or held by the above men- tioned party and companies, and all right, title and interest which it now has or may hereafter have, in and to the lands, canal, works, property and rights held by the said companies under said concessions or otherwise, and acquired or to be acquired by the United States from or through the New Panama Canal Company, including any property and rights which might or may in the future either by lapse of time, forfeiture or otherwise, Panama Canal in International Law 201 revert to the Republic of Panama under any contracts or con- cessions, with said Wyse, the Universal Panama Canal Company, the Panama Railroad Company and the New Panama Canal Company. The aforesaid rights and property shall be and are free and released from any present or reversionary interest in or claims of Panama and the title of the United States thereto upon con- summation of the contemplated purchase by the United States from the New Panama Canal Company, shall be absolute, so far as concerns the Republic of Panama, excepting always the rights of the Republic specifically secured under this treaty. Article XXIII If it should become necessary at any time to employ armed forces for the safety or protection of the Canal, or of the ships that make use of the same, or the railways and auxiliary works, the United States shall have the right, at all times and in its discretion, to use its police and its land and naval forces or to establish fortifications for these purposes. Article XXIV No change either in the Government or in the laws and trea- ties of the Republic of Panama shall, without the consent of the United States, affect any right of the United States under the pres- ent convention, or under any treaty stipulation between the two countries that now exists or may hereafter exist touching the subject matter of this convention. If the Republic of Panama shall hereafter enter as a constitu- ent into any other Government or into any union or confedera- tion of states, so as to merge her sovereignty or independence in such Government, union or confederation, the rights of the United States under this convention shall not be in any respect lessened or impaired. Article XXV For the better performance of the engagements of this conven- tion and to the end of the efficient protection of the Canal and the preservation of its neutrality, the Government of the Repub- 202 XKe Panama Canal lie of Panama will sell or lease to the United States lands ade- quate and necessary for naval or coaling stations on the Pacific coast and on the western Caribbean coast of the Republic at certain points to be agreed upon with the President of the United States. Article XXVI This convention when signed by the Plenipotentiaries of the Contracting Parties shall be ratified by the respective Govern- ments and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington at the earliest date possible. In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present convention in duplicate and have hereunto affixed their respective seals. Done at the City of Washington the 18th day of November in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and three. John Hay. [seal] P. Bunau Varilla. [seal] THE PANAMA CANAL Part VI COMMERCIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE PANAMA CANAL BY EMORY R. JOHNSON, Ph.D., Sc. D. COMMERCIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE PANAMA CANAL Each individual's interest in the Panama Canal, and his estimate of the importance of the canal, is necessarily determined by the point of view. The diplomat and statesman concerned with the promo- tion of the peaceful development of Latin American countries, politically and economically, and desirous of seeing the United States become increasingly help- ful to the countries south of the Rio Grande, will study the canal with regard to the effect it may have upon the international relations of American countries; the military expert will seek to understand how the water- way across the Isthmus will or may augment the offensive and defensive strength of the American Navy, what forts need to be constructed, what naval bases and coaling stations need to be established, what increases need to be made in the Army and the Navy to enable the Panama Canal to enhance the military power and naval prestige of the United States; while the producers and traders, although not without interest in the political and military changes that the canal may effect, are especially desirous of knowing how the shortened ocean route between the north Atlantic and the Pacific will assist the world's trade, will enable American industries to produce for wider domestic and foreign markets, and will reduce 205 206 TKe Panama Canal freight rates by rail within the country and by water beyond and between the seaboards. The commercial importance of the canal, or the assistance it will render the industry and trade of the people of the United States and other countries, can be indicated: (1) by showing what effects the new route will have upon the length and time of ocean voyages; (2) by stating conservatively the volume of shipping, foreign and American, international and coastwise, that may be expected to use the canal; (3) by estimating the influence which the Panama Canal will have upon the freight rates by rail between the two seaboards of the United States and by ocean carriers engaged in American intercoastal and foreign commerce; (4) by showing how much the ocean car- riers will save in fuel costs by using the Panama route and by pointing out how the cheaper fuel costs by way of the Isthmus will assist the Panama Canal in com- peting with alternative routes via the Straits of Ma- gellan, the Cape of Good Hope, and the Suez Canal; (5) by studying the relation of tolls to the traffic and revenues of the canal; and (6) by considering what policy the Government should adhere to in the manage- ment of the canal in order that the canal may best serve the welfare of the entire country. I. - Distances and Time Saved by Panama Canal The Panama Canal is being constructed to shorten the length and time of ocean voyages between the countries of the north Atlantic and those of the north and south Pacific. To recite textually and in detail Commercial Importance of Canal 207 the distances from the several Atlantic ports, American and foreign, to the leading ports of each of the principal countries bordering the Pacific would be wearisome to writer and reader; but by resorting to a few short tables, which the reader may skip or may study in accordance with the degree of his interest, it will be possible to present with satisfactory completeness the changes which the canal will make in distances and in sailing time.* The maximum effect of the Panama Canal upon ocean distances will be the reduction in the length and time of voyages between the Atlantic-Gulf seaboard of the United States and the Pacific coast of the United States and South America. Table I gives the saving for trips from New York and New Orleans to San Francisco and to four selected ports having central and southern locations upon the west coast of South America. The saving in time is given both for freight steamers, most of which are run at an average speed of 9 to 12 knots, and for steamers that carry both freight and passengers, which usually average 14 to 16 knots. Except upon the north Atlantic, passenger steamers seldom average above 16 knots. In calculating the saving in time of voyages, as stated in the table, a half day is deducted to allow for the detention due to passing through the canal. * The tables are taken from Chapter XI of the Report upon Panama Canal Traffic and Tolls. Chapters I and XI discuss fully the effect of the Panama Canal upon ocean distances. 208 THe Panama Canal TABLE I. — DISTANCES AND TIME SAVED VIA THE PANAMA CANAL AS COM- PARED WITH THE STRAITS OF MAGELLAN BETWEEN THE ATLANTIC- GULF PORTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE WEST COAST OF NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA From New York. To- San Francisco Callao Iquique Valparaiso. . . , Coronel Distance saved. Miles. 7,873 6,250 5,139 3,747 3,296 9 knots. 35.9 28.4 23.3 16.8 14.7 Days saved for vessels of • 10 knots. 32.3 25.2 20.9 15.1 13.2 12 knots. 26.8 21.2 17.3 12.5 10.9 14 knots. 22.9 18.1 14.8 10.6 9.3 16 knots. 20.0 15.7 12.9 9.2 8.1 To — San Francisco Callao Iquique Valparaiso. . . , Coronel Distance saved. Miles. 8,868 7,245 6,134 4,742 4,291 From New Orleans. Days saved for vessels of ■ 9 10 12 14 16 knots. knots. knots. knots. knots. 40.5 36.4 30.2 25.8 22.5 33.0 29.7 24.7 21.1 18.4 27.9 25.0 20.8 17.7 15.4 21.4 19.2 16.0 13.6 11.8 19.4 17.4 14.4 12.3 10.7 On a trip between San Francisco and New York a 10-knot freight steamer will be able to save 32 days by- using the Panama Canal instead of going around by the Straits of Magellan. A 16-knot passenger steamer will be able to make the voyage in 20 days less. The saving in time and distance will be greater for New Orleans than for New York; because Gulf ports are nearer to the canal than are the Atlantic ports. From New York to the great nitrate port of Iquique 9- and 10-knot freight steamers will save from 23 to 21 days by using the Panama Canal instead of going by way of the Straits of Magellan; and even for Valparaiso, the Commercial Importance of Canal 209 principal port of the agricultural section of Chile, the 10-knot steamer from New York will save 15 days by using the Panama Canal. The reduction in time and distance between the Atlantic-Gulf seaboard of the United States and the west coast of North and South America will be so great that the traffic between these two sections will, without question, use the Panama Canal. TABLE II. — DISTANCES AND TIME SAVED VIA THE PANAMA CANAL AS COM- PARED WITH THE STRAITS OF MAGELLAN BETWEEN EUROPEAN PORTS AND THE WEST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA To- From Liverpool. Distance saved. Days saved for vessels of — 9 knots. 10 knots. 12 knots. 14 knots. 16 knots. Callao Miles. 4,043 2,932 1,540 ' 1,089 18.2 13.1 6.6 4.5 16.3 11.7 5.9 4.0 13.5 9.7 4.8 3.3 11.5 8.2 4.1 2.7 10.0 7.1 3.5 2.3 To — From Antwerp. Distance saved. Days saved for vessels of — 9 knots. 10 knots. 12 knots. 14 knots. 16 knots. Miles. Callao 3,905 17.6 15.8 13.1 11.5 9.7 2,794 12.4 11.1 9.2 7.8 6.8 1,402 6.0 5.3 4.3 3.5 3.1 951 3.9 3.4 2.8 2.3 1.9 To- From Gibraltar. Distance saved. Days saved for vessels of — 9 knots. 10 knots. 12 knots. 14 knots. 16 knots. Miles. Callao 3,327 14.9 13.3 11.0 9.4 8.1 Iquique 2,216 9.7 8.7 7.2 6.1 5.2 Valparaiso 824 3.3 2.9 2.3 1.9 1.6 Coronel 373 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.5 210 THe Panama Canal Table II illustrates the effect which the canal will have upon the length and time of voyages between European ports and those of the west coast of South America. From Liverpool and from Antwerp, repre- sentative ports of north Europe, a 10-knot freight steamer can save between 11 and 12 days by using the Panama Canal to the nitrate ports. For trips to Val- paraiso, the saving in time will be only about half as great as the saving in time for trips to the nitrate ports; and, if saving in distance and time were the only factor affecting the choice of routes, it is probable that the tolls that have been established for the use of the Panama Canal would divert the traffic between Europe and Chile to the Magellan route; but the cheaper cost of fuel by the Panama route, and the greater possibility of trading at intermediate ports by taking the Panama route instead of going through the Straits of Magellan, make it practically certain that but a small part of the traffic between Europe and the west coast of South America will continue to use the Magellan route after the opening of the Panama Canal. Tables III and IV show how the Panama Canal will affect the length of routes and the time of voyages to Australia and New Zealand from New York and New Orleans and from a representative European port, Liverpool. Commercial Importance of Canal 211 m 4 5 « go M fl S « H w W H & O Ph w H >— i Q w Eh CQ < ft H 55 O CQ <3 55 Q H < w H Eh Q 55 CQ w o 55 £ & fl u fl o3 fl 03 co © >»fl > © © ©CQ 1 ^ © . • cb.-SCQ 6 J? cs o3 o 03 fl© 03 03 "> u o C3&H 2 ^ fi © o -° fl a a> 03 a fl C3 ©_i 03 ^T-^ Ph fl fl CD 03 V2 CD -~i 2 C3^ ill 2 03 O CD H o fl O £ ... « o ... 03 OXJ fl fl CD jo S 03 J, G CD o3§ 03 •r- 1 03 CQ 03 CD tn ACQ 8 2 fl'> +3 03 ©la g 03 ©~ S« . 1 16 knots. o OO 10.7 13.7 CO od Days saved for vessels of 14 knots. CN 12.2 15.7 C3i ai Drleana. 12 knots. 10.8 14.3 18.4 11.6 m New < 10 knots. 13.1 17.3 22.2 14.0 g 00 +s Oi O fl 14.6 19.3 24.6 15.6 i m fl tance saved. Miles. 3,258 4,282 5,444 3,488 1 16 knots. © fr- ee* ci o CO Days saved for vessels of- 14 knots. CO ■«*' fr- 11.2 Cs CO rom New York. 12 knots. CO »o T-H ai 13.1 CO 10 knots. co 11.0 15.8 Oi Oi oa ^> Oi o fl iO 12.3 17.7 11.0 Dis- tance saved. Miles. 1,746 2,770 3,932 2,493 To— Adelaide Melbourne .... >> © a >> CQ Wellington 212 TKe Panama Canal H W H a ?> Q i-5 «1 !Z5 <; 3 S P5 H « O w CO H H P O P3 w i> Hi H tSJ G fc Hi CO CO >H P P o co P w » o 55 «! Eh co CO a a) o O GO c3 ■> 03 02 02 >» 03 P , ©T3 CD m 02 g CD o3-£-S 02 M ©T5 1° co g "■3*2 03 9 - o i° 03 13 P4' © CO ^ a o T3 © >>o 13 Pi SB Eh O > o osn 03 PI 0313 c5 c3 o a o "© 73 03 © 73 *© 73 o CO © bD u O © © . a o3 o 13 S 03 o oSO 03^ 03 03 » »4S 02 1, © 02 t> Pol 03 00 a PI 03 73 o3 05 o3 • i-l • iH 16 knots. • -OS • T-4 • -co ■ lO • co -co • o • co 14 knots. •Ci -C35 -Tti • CM •CO -CO • O -Tt* 12 knots. • • -CNJ • • t-i -CO • iO -O • od -o 10 knots. • • • CM • • I>. . Ttl -CO -O • o »>o • O -CO 02 -P 05 O PI '. '. '.as '• •00 'i-H • CO • t~- •O -CO • O -CO • 1—1 00 C-4 (M CM NiH CD PI p) 03 coPh Commercial Importance of Canal 213 The traffic between the Atlantic-Gulf coast of the United States and Australia is now carried by way of the Cape of Good Hope. The short route from New York to Wellington is by way of the Straits of Magel- lan. It is certain that practically all, if not all, ship- ping engaged in the trade of the eastern seaboard of the United States with Australia will use the Panama route. If vessels went out from New York to Adelaide and from there directly back to New York without going on to Melbourne or Sydney, it is probable that the present route by way of the Cape of Good Hope might continue to be used; but, as a matter of fact, the great port of Australia is Sydney and most vessels outbound to Australia make the port of Sydney, which not only has the largest tonnage of traffic but which, also, being situated near Newcastle, has cheap coal. Moreover, as will be pointed out later, the fuel expenses of steamers will be less via Panama than via the Cape of Good Hope. The trade between the At- lantic coast of the United States and New Zealand will use the Panama route, both because of the shorter distance and the lower fuel costs. Australia, as is shown by Table IV, is nearer Europe by way of Suez than via Panama; but it will be ob- served that Sydney, the principal port of Australia, is less than a day's run for an ordinary steamer farther from Liverpool via Panama than via Suez, with calls at the intermediate ports at which vessels usually find it advantageous to stop for coal or traffic. New Zea- land is 6 days nearer to Liverpool for a 10-knot freight steamer via Panama than by way of Suez; but the 214 The Panama Canal distance from Wellington to Liverpool by way of the Straits of Magellan is only 550 miles greater than by way of Panama. Thus, the Panama route will have to compete for the European-New Zealand traffic not only with the Suez Canal but with the Straits of Ma- gellan route. The high cost of coal by way of the Straits of Magellan will probably prevent that route from being used to much extent for this traffic. The division of the traffic between the Suez and Panama routes will depend largely upon the extent to which the New Zealand commerce is handled by vessels en- gaged only in that trade or by vessels which are en- gaged in both Australian and New Zealand commerce. Under present conditions the eastern part of the United States, where most of the exported goods are manufactured, competes with Europe for the trade of Japan and China at a great disadvantage. The Suez route is used for the Oriental trade both by Europe and by the producers and traders located in the eastern part of the United States. The opening of the Panama Canal, as is shown by Table V, will remove the present handicap which America has in trading with the Orient. A 10-knot freight steamer can make the voyage to Yokohama from New York in 15 days less than it now takes to make the run by way of Suez. For New Orleans the Panama Canal will save 23 days. The distance from New York to Shanghai is much less by way of Panama than by Suez. Hongkong and Manila, however, are equally distant from New York via Panama and Suez. The choice of routes taken by Commercial Importance of Canal 215 p < O CQ < m w p O i o l-H 53 ■< i-l H < H W H Q 53 <5 53 W H 9 CQ 53 o3 DO CQ >> 03 P ^ d ^1 a J . as O d s3 > adg 03^ O "So 03 H d-d.O 03 O o . CQpMrj © ° o > > d 03 o o "3 d 8 S S - s a d-d o 03>H 53 CQ ^ d M rt d CO co oi 2 o ^ d CO CM OS O d «5 CQ CD 03 CQ CQ >J 03 P 2 o a co ^ d ^4 o NO ^ d CP 2 o rt d OS O d ^4 OS CD i ©T5 •2 d £ +» CQ 00 OO <» CO 03 > 00 o CN1 "5 CO l-H oo co o CO CO CO oo CM CM CO U3 00 o T— I CO CO 00 oo o 00 y-l 03 03 03 a a a 03 tq* 03 H 03 d CO d CD d 03 53 03 d 03 Ph CQ Ph CQ Ph OS d o CM US us CD 00 00 OS 00 TJ1 CD d CQ 03 a 03 d 03 Ph CD d CQ H t-H PQ o Eh 03 a 03 A o 5h 03 ja If 03 ■£) CQ bfl d o M d° o w 1 o a 03 bfl d CQ 216 THe Panama Canal vessels outbound from New York to Hongkong or Manila will depend partly upon whether vessels wish to trade at intermediate ports and partly upon the relative costs of coal via Panama and Suez. ! The Panama Canal will evidently not be used to much extent by the commerce of Europe with the Orient. Table VI shows that the entire Orient, in- cluding Japan, is nearer Europe by way of Suez than via Panama. If relative distances alone determined the choice of routes, none of Europe's trade with the Orient, not even any of that with Japan, would use the Panama Canal; but it is a well-known fact that distance is only one of the forces that determine the routes taken by vessels engaged in trade between widely . separated parts of the world. Even under pre-canal conditions, an appreciable tonnage of shipping moved from the Far East by way of America to Europe. After the opening of the Panama Canal, the shipping making the trip from the Orient to Europe by way of America will increase; and, as will be shown in a later connec- tion, the lower fuel costs by way of Panama, as well as the possibilities of engaging en route in the commerce between the United States and Europe, may be ex- pected to cause a considerable tonnage of shipping to move both eastward and westward via the Panama Canal between the Orient and Europe. II. Panama Traffic, American and Foreign The most concrete measure of the commercial im- portance of the Panama Canal will be the volume of Commercial Importance of Canal 217 11 td o l-H h 55 H PQ H P O 00 03 a © PS 73 © > o3 Cfi in >> o3 Q "* o ^4 S o 2 o ^ el J* OS o S > 03 2 03 ■ « ffl-^.2 03-3 J 03 © "'-.SJ 03 w 02 ^" o H e3 a c3 rd o o d o3 O o 02 o a o3 Is to jo >o ft) 53 o a> o Sh S3 0) 3 c3 a o3 ,d O O d S-H o c3 a c3 d c3 o3 o3 _ bfl ° d .23 CO ^ o3 O §1 tO jD o3 "O >o 0) o3 O 0) d o f-i d c3 a c3 d c3 o3 a o3 rd O o i* 6 T3 O d Oh c3 o3 .2oa §1 j_i 03 o If to JO o3 "o •po O o3 d o Jh S3 0) d bO 03 o a^ 03 bfi ^ 9 o o 03 o o o3 bfi d o3 a d c3 13 d c3 O • l-H o d o3 tO Jh P=H O §a m ° o3 "o >o (1) o3 d > O . CO CO CO T— I CO OS OS 00 CO CO CO OS CO" O o3 d to d o3 T— 4 bfi d o bD d o w CO 03 rd bfi d o3 to o3 bfi d 03 ^d to d o3 bfl d o M bfl d o w o u :& ! o3 bfl d o O § a tojo o3 O o h d o Ph c3 a o3 d o3 pL|CO PntO P-(tO PntO PMtO CO tH OS OS t-H OS CO 03 a o3 rd O O 218 THe Panama Canal traffic or tonnage of shipping making use of the water- way. In the latter part of 1911 and in the early months of 1912, a detailed investigation was made of entrance and clearance statistics kept by the United States and other countries for the purpose of ascertaining how much shipping would have passed through a Panama Canal had one been in existence during the year 1909- 1910, the latest year for which complete information was obtainable. The following table summarizes the results of an elaborate statistical investigation: TABLE VII.— NET REGISTER TONNAGE OF VESSELS THAT MIGHT HAVE ADVANTAGEOUSLY USED A PANAMA CANAL IN 1909-1910 Europe with — Western South America Western Central America and Pacific Mexico Pacific United States, British Columbia and Hawaii Pacific United States via Suez Canal .... Oriental countries east of Singapore, and Oceania Eastern United States Coast with — Western South America, Pacific Mexico and Hawaii , Pacific Coast of United States (via Cape Horn) 2 Pacific Coast of United States and Hawaii (via American-Hawaiian S. S. Co.). . . . Oriental countries east of Singapore, and Oceania Panama traffic Eastern Canada with Alaska, Chile and Australia Total 1 Figures furnished by the Suez Canal Co. It is not possible to divide the total into entrances and clearances. 2 Not including Hawaii. Total entrances. Total clearances. Total entrances and clearances. 1,553,887 1,594,513 3,148,400 80,788 118,714 199,502 419,865 269,853 689,718 158,000! 1,174,585 618,704 555,881 300,909 166,686 467,595 117,311 55,344 172,655 181,713 181,713 363,426 600,000 158,558 900,000 259,932 1,500,000 418,490 13,410 22,248 35,658 4,045,145 4,124,884 8,328,029 Commercial Importance of Canal 219 The figures presented in Table VII show that about 10| per cent of the total tonnage of shipping that would have used a Panama Canal in 1909-1910 would have consisted of vessels serving the trade between the two seaboards of the United States, i.e., vessels which carried traffic via Cape Horn, via the Straits of Ma- gellan, or to and from the Isthmuses of Panama and Tehuantepec. The vessels employed in the trade of the United States with foreign countries contributed about 33 per cent of the total Panama tonnage for the year 1910. Over 56 per cent of the shipping that would have used the canal during the year in question was employed in handling commerce that did not touch the shores of the United States. The importance of the west coast South American trade and the large place occupied by Europe in that trade are indicated by the fact that 38 per cent of the total shipping that would have used a Panama Canal in 1909-1910 con- sisted of vessels serving the trade of Europe with the west coast of South America.* To estimate the probable traffic of the Panama Canal during the early years of its operation and at the end of 5- and 10-year periods, it is necessary to apply to the tonnage that would have used the canal in 1910 such a rate of increase as is justified by the growth of the world's commerce. * Since this was written the great European war has temporarily stopped most of the maritime foreign trade of Continental Europe and has interfered with the commerce of Great Britain. The trade of Europe with the Pacific coast of North and South America forms such a large share of the commerce that will use the Panama Canal that the war in Europe must necessarily reduce the tonnage of Panama Canal traffic for one or two years at least. 220 TKe Panama Canal An investigation made by the Isthmian Canal Com- mission from 1899 to 1901 showed that the available Panama Canal traffic in 1899 was about 5,000,000 tons. Records kept for a period of years by the Suez Canal Company showed practically the same available tonnage. Thus, the increase in available Panama Canal traffic during the eleven years ending in 1910 amounted to 66| per cent and was at the rate of 59 per cent per decade. The trade of the United States with non-European countries increased 67 J per cent in value during the decade 1900-1910. The commerce of the Atlantic-Gulf ports of the United States with Pacific countries rose in value 63.1 per cent, while the ton- nage of the Suez Canal advanced 70.26 per cent during the decade ending with 1910 and 78.4 during the 10 years closing with 1912. These and other facts that might be adduced indicate that an increase of 60 per cent per decade in the traffic of the Panama Canal may conservatively be assumed. If that rate of growth shall prevail down to 1915, the tonnage of shipping available for the use of the canal will then be 10,500,000 net tons per annum. It is important to know what part of this total ton- nage will probably be made up of shipping engaged in the intercoastal trade of the United States, and how much of the remaining tonnage will consist of Amer- ican and foreign shipping. Table VIII contains an estimate of the probable tonnage of the Panama Canal in 1915, 1920 and 1925, so classified as to show what part of the total will consist of shipping in the Amer- ican coastwise trade and what portions of the total Commercial Importance of Canal 221 will consist of American ships and foreign ships engaged in American and foreign trade. TABLE VIII .—CLASSIFICATION OF ESTIMATED NET TONNAGE OF SHIPPING USING THE PANAMA CANAL IN 1915, 1920 AND 1925 Average per annum during 1915 and 1916. 1920. 1925. Coast-to-coast American shipping. . American shipping carrying for- eign commerce of the United States 1,000,000 720,000 8,780,000 1,414,000 910,000 11,020,000 2,000,000 1,150,000 13,850,000 Foreign shipping carrying com- merce of the United States and foreign countries Total 10,500,000 13,344,000 17,000,000 The figures given in the above table for American coast-to-coast shipping are obtained by assuming that the shipping employed in carrying the water-borne commerce that moved between the two seaboards of the United States in 1910 will have somewhat more than doubled by 1915. Should the rate of increase that has prevailed during 1911 and 1912 continue to 1915, the intercoastal traffic will have more than dou- bled during the 5-year period. In constructing Table VIII, it was also thought conservative to assume that the traffic between the two seaboards by way of the Panama Canal would double during the first decade and, thus, reach 2,000,000 tons in 1925. This again is believed to be an estimate well on the safe side of what will happen. In estimating the growth in the total Panama Canal traffic during the first 10 years of the canal's operation an increase of only 60 per cent has been assumed. Should only this rate of growth be 222 TTHe Panama Canal realized, which is much less than the actual rate of increase of the traffic of the Suez Canal after that waterway has been in operation for more than four decades and its tonnage has become large, the traffic of the Panama Canal, in 1925, will amount to 17,000,000 net tons of shipping, of which not less than 2,000,000 tons will consist of vessels operated in the coast-to- coast trade. There will be about 1,150,000 tons of American ships employed in the foreign commerce of the United States, and probably 13,850,000 tons of vessels under foreign flags engaged in carrying the commerce of other countries and the foreign trade of the United States. III. Effect of Panama Canal upon Transconti- nental Rates by Railroads and Carriers by Water The Panama Canal will be of benefit to American producers and traders by providing new and cheaper transportation facilities. It is also expected that, at least, some of the transcontinental shipments by rail will move at cheaper rates than would be charged if there were no Panama Canal. The commercial value of the canal may, thus, be measured by its effect upon services and rates by water and by rail. Whatever may be the effect of the canal upon the rates actually charged by the coastwise carriers, it is certain that the costs of transportation by water between the two seaboards will be largely reduced. The rates between New York and San Francisco by way of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec are said to average Commercial Importance of Canal 223 about $11.50 per ton of 2,000 pounds. The agreement between the American-Hawaiian Steamship Company and the Mexican National Railroad provides that one-third of the through rate shall be paid to the rail- road across the Isthmus of Tehauntepec for transfer- ring the cargo from the steamer in one ocean to the steamer in the other ocean. Thus, the cost of transfer at the Isthmus, while varying for different kinds of cargo, probably averages about $3.50 per ton of 2000 pounds. Through traffic by way of the Isthmus of Panama is handled on through rates, the Panama Railroad Com- pany taking a proportional of the through tariff. The average cost of transferring cargo from one steamer to another at the Isthmus of Panama probably is about $3.00 per ton. Thus, the absence of a canal across the Isthmus increases the transportation cost between the two seaboards of the United States from $3.00 to $3.50 per cargo ton. As vessels carry on an average nearly two tons of cargo for each net vessel ton, the transfer costs across the Isthmus are equivalent to six or seven dollars per net vessel ton. The double handling of traffic at the Isthmus often damages goods; articles may be lost; and, in time of congested traffic, delays may occur that are annoying and expensive to ship- pers and consignees. The tolls fixed for the use of the Panama Canal are $1.20 per net vessel ton, which is probably less than one-fourth of the saving which the canal will effect in the cost of transportation between the two seaboards of the United States. The reduction in freight rates coastwise between the two seaboards will not necessarily be equal to the de- 224 XKe Panama Canal crease which the canal will effect in the cost of the service. If the competition between the steamship lines were keen and unrestrained, the rates would be based upon the cost of the service; but the competi- tion of the steamship lines will be carefully regulated in their " conferences." The rates between the two seaboards will be the same by the several lines. For a part of their traffic, the regular steamship lines will have to meet the competition of individual vessels owned or chartered by producers and shippers whose business is large enough to enable them to ship goods in full cargo lots. This competition, however, will be limited, and only a minor part of the rates of the reg- ular lines will be regulated by the cost of transporting goods in vessels owned or chartered by the large shippers. There will be competition between the transconti- nental railroads and the coastwise steamship lines, but it remains to be seen how active that competition will be. Will it be the policy of the railroads to reduce their rates generally from coast to coast in order to hold traffic against the active competition of the steam- ship lines, or will the railroads maintain their through rates practically at the present level, knowing that they will thereby lose such traffic between the two sea- board sections as can secure satisfactory service and lower rates from the carriers by water? If the rail- roads elect to maintain their present rate schedules, will the steamship lines, acting through their confer- ences, maintain their common rates at such differen- tials under the stable schedules of railroad tariffs as Commercial Importance of Canal 225 will cause the rates by water to attract to the coast- wise lines the volume of traffic needed to fill the ships in service? In other words, will the coastwise lines operated via the canal so compete with each other and with the railroads as to bring rates as low as the cost of service will allow, or will the coastwise lines restrict their competition with each other and fix and maintain their rates, not with reference to the cost of the service, but with regard to what the traffic will bear — with regard to what shippers can pay, and what they will pay, for transportation by water rather than by rail? These questions are not easy to answer in advance of experience; but the history of rate making by rail- roads and by steamship lines does not presage keen competition either between the through transconti- nental rail lines, or between the coastwise steamship companies, or between the railroads and the steam- ship lines. It is probable that the railroads will main- tain most of their through rates between the two seaboard sections. Only a comparatively small percentage of the traffic of the transcontinental railroads originates in the sea- board sections of the country. Of the westbound traffic carried through to the Pacific, only 20 to 22 per cent originates east of the Buffalo-Pittsburgh ter- ritory, and only 35 per cent originates in the eastern section and in the Buffalo-Pittsburgh territory. More than two-thirds of the through westbound traffic of the transcontinental lines is shipped from the central West. Similarly, only a small portion of the traffic originating on the Pacific coast is carried through to the section 226 XKe Panama Canal east of Pittsburgh and Buffalo. Most of the shipments from the far West are to the middle West. Another reason for anticipating that the railroads will not seriously disturb their present rates for the purpose of meeting the competition of coastwise lines through the canal is that for most commodities the same rates are charged to the Pacific coast and Moun- tain States from the entire section of the United States east of the Missouri River. In order to put the indus- tries and railroads of the middle West on an equal foot- ing with the industries and railroads of the Eastern States, railroad rates to the far West have been blan- keted over the eastern half of the United States. Thus, if the rail rates from the Atlantic section to the West are cut to meet canal competition, like reductions will have to be made from the middle West, or the rail- roads will have to do what they probably will not do — abolish the present blanketing of rates. A third reason for thinking that the railroads will probably not make large reductions in their rates to meet the competition of the coastwise lines is that the eastern trunk line railroads will not be in favor of join- ing with their western connections in low, through, transcontinental rates. It will be to the advantage of the eastern railroads to haul traffic from points within 500 miles of the Atlantic to the seaboard for shipment thence by water, rather than to divide with their western connections low, through, all-rail rates from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Otherwise stated, it will be to the interest of the eastern railroads to join with the coastwise lines in through services at profitable rates, Commercial Importance of Canal 227 instead of fighting the steamship lines by uniting with the western railroads in through rail services at low rates. It was suggested above that the steamship lines will probably not base their charges upon the cost of serv- ice, but that they will make the rates what the traffic will bear. If the railroads maintain their rates and do not seriously attempt to prevent traffic from moving by water, it can hardly be doubted that much, if not most, of the general commodity traffic handled by the coastwise lines will be at rates that are less than the railroad charges only by such a differential as experience shows to be necessary. The rates via the Tehuan- tepec route have been, as a matter of fact, adjusted with reference to the railroad tariffs, and there is little reason to suppose that this policy of the coastwise carriers will be abandoned after the canal is opened. It is not, however, to be inferred from this analysis that the rates between the two seaboards will not be lower after the canal is opened than they are at the present time. The lower cost of the service, the in- creased volume of traffic, and the larger number of steamship lines, will affect the policy of the steamship companies in making rates. Although the companies will, unless prevented by the effective enforcement of anti-trust legislation, regulate their competition in rates and services by means of conferences, the com- petition to be regulated after the canal is opened will be stronger than it is at the present time; and the force of public sentiment will undoubtedly have its effect — at least, some effect — upon the policy of the 228 THe Panama Canal coastwise carriers. The most that can be expected, however, is that competition will somewhat limit monopoly in the coastwise rates. If the public is to secure as low freight rates as the coastwise carriers can profitably afford to give — rates as low as the public is entitled to receive — it will be necessary to regulate the services and charges of the coastwise steamship companies much the same as the railroad services and charges are now regulated. It may safely be predicted that within a few years there will be a strong public demand for the effective regulation of the coastwise carriers. IV. Effect of Fuel Costs upon Usefulness of the Panama Canal The usefulness of the Panama Canal will depend upon the economies that shipping can effect by taking the Panama Canal instead of some alternative route. Economies can result from shortening the distance and time of ocean voyages, from enabling vessels to trade en route at intermediate ports more advantageously, and, fortunately, in the case of the Panama Canal, from a reduction in fuel costs — the largest expense incurred in the operation of steamships. Fuel costs by the way of the Straits of Magellan are especially high, there being practically no native coal on the east coast of South America; and only inferior coal can be ob- tained on the west coast. The cost of coal at the Suez Canal will certainly be higher than at the Isthmus of Panama. The coal sold at Suez and at Mediterranean stations is Welsh and English coal, which costs more Commercial Importance of Canal 229 than does American coal at home ports, and which has to pay higher freight rates to the Mediterranean and the Isthmus of Suez than will have to be paid upon American coal from the Atlantic-Gulf seaboard to the Isthmus of Panama. The best way to measure the advantages of the Panama route in the matter of fuel costs is to compare the outlay which a freight steamer would have to make for coal via the Panama and the alternative or competitive route. As there will be no question as to the use of the Panama Canal for all traffic between the two seaboards of North America and for practically all traffic between the Atlantic-Gulf seaboard of the United States and the west coast of South America, it is not necessary to compare fuel expenses via Panama and the alternative Straits of Magellan route. For the trade between Europe and the west coast of South America, however, particularly for the Chilean commerce, the use of the canal is certain to depend, in part, upon relative fuel costs via that route and the Straits of Magellan. In the first part of this chapter, it was pointed out that freight vessels will save only five or six days by taking the Panama route instead of going through the Straits of Magellan on voyages between Liverpool and Valpa- raiso. The saving due to reduction of time would not be sufficient to justify the payment of $1.20 per net ton for the use of the Panama Canal; but the fuel expenses by Panama would be so much less than via Magellan as to make certain the use of the Panama route by practically all ships en route between Europe and Chile. 230 THe Panama Canal A 10-knot freight steamer ; whose daily coal con- sumption averages 30 tons, would, in 1912, have saved $9,300 in fuel expenses by using a Panama Canal for a round trip between Liverpool and Valparaiso. The saving in fuel expenses would nearly equal the amount of tolls which this vessel would have to pay for passing through the canal on its outbound and return voyages. Although Natal coal can be obtained cheaply by vessels making the run from New York to Australia by way of the Cape of Good Hope, fuel expenses will be less between New York and Australia via Panama than by way of the Cape of Good Hope. With the coal prices that prevailed in 1912, a 10|-knot freight steamer having an average daily coal consumption of 38 tons while at sea, could save about $3,500 in coal expenses by taking a Panama route instead of one around the Cape of Good Hope for a round-trip voyage between New York and Adelaide. This would have nearly paid this ship's tolls one way. Adelaide is taken for this illustration, because it is that one of the three large Australian ports that will derive least ad- vantage from the Panama Canal. Melbourne, and especially Sydney, which is the largest of the Aus- tralian ports, are brought so much nearer to the Atlantic-Gulf coast of the United States by the Panama Canal than they are by the Cape of Good Hope route that the use of the canal by their commerce is certain. The location of the Islands of New Zealand is such that the trade of the Atlantic-Gulf seaboard of the United States with those islands is certain to be car- ried on by way of Panama; but the usefulness of the Commercial Importance of Canal 231 Panama Canal to the trade of New Zealand with Europe will depend largely upon the relative fuel expenses via Panama and alternative routes. As was pointed out above, the distance from Liverpool to Wellington is only 550 miles more by way of the Straits of Magellan than via Panama; but the fuel expenses are so much higher via the Straits of Magellan that a 10-knot steamer using 30 tons of coal a day while at sea would, on a basis of 1912 prices, save $8,470 in fuel expenses by making the round trip be- tween Liverpool and Wellington via the Panama Canal. The saving in coal bills would nearly equal the tolls which this ship would have to pay for two passages through the Panama Canal. Manila and Hongkong being equally distant from New York via Panama and via Suez, it is certain that the choice of routes will be largely influenced by the relative fuel costs. Fortunately for the Panama Canal, the cost of coal via the Panama route will be much less. On a basis of 1912 prices, the lOJ-knot freight steamer mentioned above would save $4,041 in fuel expenses for a round trip between New York and Manila by using the Panama instead of the Suez route. This would be half the tolls payable for the round trip. It is shown by Table VI that the Panama Canal will not reduce the distance between Europe and Japan and China. The Suez route will be shorter than the one via Panama. Fuel expenses by the two routes, moreover, will average about the same. For voyages between Europe and China, fuel expenses via Suez will be somewhat lower, while for voyages from British 232 TKe Panama Canal and other North-European ports to Japan the coal costs will be somewhat less via Panama. This fact will influence freight vessels leaving Yokohama with full cargoes for Europe to select the Panama route, provided, as is probable, the tolls at Panama are no higher than those charged at Suez. V. Panama Tolls and Revenue The proclamation issued by the President of the United States, November 13, 1912, established the following schedule of tolls: "1. On merchant vessels carrying passengers or cargo one dollar and twenty cents ($1.20) per net vessel ton — each one hundred (100) cubic feet — of actual earning capacity. "2. On vessels in ballast without passengers or cargo forty (40) per cent less than the rate of tolls for vessels with passengers or cargo. "3. Upon naval vessels, other than transports, col- liers, hospital ships and supply ships, fifty (50) cents per displacement ton. "4. Upon Army and Navy transports, colliers, hos- pital ships and supply ships one dollar and twenty ($1.20) per net ton, the vessels to be measured by the same rules as are employed in determining the net tonnage of merchant vessels." In fixing the charges payable by merchant vessels for the use of the Panama Canal, the tolls were ad- justed with reference to the fulfillment of three condi- tions: That the tolls should be low enough to enable the canal to compete successfully with alternative Commercial Importance of Canal 233 routes; that the charges should not be high enough to burden commerce unduly or seriously to restrict the usefulness of the canal; and that the rates should be high enough to yield revenues that will, within a rea- sonable period of time, make the canal commercially self-supporting. The facts presented above regarding the effect which the canal will have upon the length and time of ocean voyages, and the facts concerning the relative costs of coal via the Panama Canal and the alterna- tive routes that may be taken by traffic most sensitive to tolls, are, possibly, sufficient to show that the rates of toll, as fixed by the President, will not prevent the canal from competing with alternative routes, and will not unduly burden traffic or restrict the use of the canal. Whether the revenues derivable from the esti- mated volume of shipping served by the canal will enable the waterway to carry itself financially can be indicated by comparing the probable yearly revenues with the annual capital and current expenses. The estimated revenues that might be secured from the Panama Canal, if all ships paid tolls, during 1915, 1920 and 1925 are classified in the following table with reference to the nationality of shipping employed in American and foreign commerce: 234 TKe Panama Canal TABLE IX. — CLASSIFICATION OF ESTIMATED REVENUE OF THE PANAMA CANAL AT A TOLL OF $1.20 PER NET TON Average per annum during 1915 and 1916. 1920. 1925. Coast-to-coast American shipping. . American shipping carrying for- eign commerce of the United States $ 1,200,000 864,000 10,536,000 $ 1,696,800 1,092,000 13,224,000 $ 2,400,000 1,380,000 16,620,000 Foreign shipping carrying com- merce of the United States and foreign countries Total $12,600,000 $16,012,800 $20,400,000 It is estimated that $20,750,000 will be required an- nually to make the canal commercially self-sustaining. This total is made up of $4,000,000 for operating and maintenance expenses, $1,500,000 for sanitation and Zone government, $250,000 for the annuity payable to Panama under the treaty of 1903, $11,250,000 to pay 3 per cent on the $375,000,000 invested in the canal, and $3,750,000 for an amortization fund of 1 per cent per annum upon the cost of the canal. During the first year or two of the canal's operation the annual net tonnage of the shipping passing through the canal will presumably amount to about 10,500,000 tons.* Of this amount about 1,000,000 net tons will consist of shipping engaged in the coastwise trade of the United States. By the end of the first decade, that is, in 1925, the total net tonnage of shipping passing through the canal annually will be about 17,000,000 tons, of which at least 2,000,000 tons will be contributed by the coastwise shipping. * As stated in the footnote on page 219, the European war will inevitably make the initial tonnage of canal traffic less than it otherwise would have been. Commercial Importance of Canal 235 It is thus possible that about $12,600,000 per annum will be secured from tolls during the first two or three years of the canal's operation, if all vessels, American and foreign, are required to pay the tolls fixed by the President in his Proclamation of November 13, 1912. If the Panama Canal Act of August 24, 1912, had not been amended by the act of June 15, 1914, and the coastwise shipping had been exempted from tolls, the initial receipts from the canal would have amounted to less than $10,500,000 per annum. In all probability the rate of tolls will, by 1925, have been reduced to $1.00 per net ton upon merchant vessels. It will not be wise to charge higher tolls at Panama than are levied at Suez. The tolls at Suez are now $1.20 (6.25 francs) per net ton and they have been reduced four times since 1902. It is probable that the prophecy of de Lesseps will be realized and that the Suez tolls will, eventually, be brought down to 5 francs, about $1.00 per net ton. There will thus be a probable revenue of $17,000,000 per annum in 1925, obtainable from canal tolls, if all ships are required to pay the dues. The exemption of the coastwise ship- ping would have reduced the revenue in 1925 to about $15,000,000 a year, or to less than the estimated annual outlay for operation, Zone sanitation and government, the Panama annuity and the interest on the amount in- vested in the canal. The revenues would have yielded no surplus for betterment and nothing for the amorti- zation of the $375,000,000 or more which the people of the United States will have paid for the canal. These calculations indicate clearly that the United 236 THe Panama Canal States will need to collect tolls from the owners of the ships engaged in the American coastwise trade in order to secure revenues, within a reasonable time after the opening of the canal, large enough to meet the canal's current expenses and its capital charges. VI. The Exemption of the Owners of Coast- wise Ships from Tolls Would Have Been an Unnecessary and Unwise Subsidy The provision which exempted the owners of ships engaged in the American coastwise trade from the payment of Panama tolls was included in the Canal Administration Act of August 24, 1912, presumably, because it was thought that such a provision was needed in order to enable the canal to be of satisfactory service to the industries and trade of the United States, and because it was the desire of Congress to aid the Amer- ican merchant marine. Would the rates paid by pro- ducers and shippers of most articles of commerce have been less because of exempting the coastwise steam- ship companies from Panama tolls; and did or do those companies need the subsidy that it was proposed to give them? The exceptionally large producers and traders who ship goods in vessels which they own or charter would probably enjoy lower transportation charges beween the two seaboards of the United States, if the Govern- ment relieved them from the payment of Panama tolls; and in so far as the railroads compete with char- tered vessels for lumber, coal, ore and similar traffic the canal tolls would be of advantage to the railroads. Commercial Importance of Canal 237 This advantage, however, would be more theoretical than real, for it is not probable that the railroads can compete with the carriers by water for bulk cargoes of lumber, coal, ore and similar products. The rail- roads will be obliged to allow that traffic to go by water and the charter rates on such shipments will not be affected by rail competition. The effect which canal tolls upon coastwise shipping will have upon rail and water rates, and the adjustment of the charges of coastwise carriers and the railroads engaged in handling traffic between the two seaboards of the United States may be summarized as follows: The rates on traffic handled by regular steamship lines between the two seaboards will be but slightly affected by canal tolls. Only such producers and traders as use vessels which they own or charter for the shipment of full cargoes would profit by the ex- emption of the coastwise shipping from tolls. Prob- ably 99 out of every 100 shippers would pay the same rates whether there are tolls or not. Most of the inter- coastal traffic will consist of general commodities and package freight handled by the established steamship lines. Bulk cargoes of lumber, coal, ore and heavy steel products will comprise a relatively small share of the total traffic. The rates charged by the several steamship lines will be the same. The charges will be regulated by agreements among the competing com- panies and will be fixed primarily with reference to the cost of the service to the carriers. The several steamship lines will maintain relatively stable sched- ules of charges which will ordinarily be adjusted with 238 XKe Panama Canal reference to the even more stable schedule of com- modity and class rates maintained by the transconti- nental railroads and their eastern rail connections. If the regular steamship lines are required to pay Panama tolls, their payments to the Government will be a part of their operating expenses, which will thus be increased by the amount of the tolls. If the steamship compa- nies were exempted from the payment of tolls they would thereby receive a subsidy equal to the amount of the tolls not collected by the Government. The policy of toll exemption for the owners of the coastwise ships was urged upon Congress by appeals to patriotism. It was held to be a duty to aid the merchant marine under the American flag; and a sub- sidy in the form of toll exemption was granted to the owners of coastwise ships. No assistance was to be given vessels serving the foreign trade of the United States. The carriers that were to have been given this subsidy have a monopoly of the coastwise traffic, no foreign-owned ships being allowed to enter the domestic trade. Was the subsidy necessary or was it justifiable? Senator Root, in the eloquent and forceful speech which he delivered in the Senate January 21, 1913, characterized the coastwise shipping business as "the most highly and absolutely protected special industry in the United States/ ' This industry, moreover, is prosperous, not languishing. There are over 3,500,000 tons of ships enrolled for the domestic trade, on the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards, and the opening of the Panama Canal will cause a large addition to be made to the coastwise fleet. It would seem that our navi- Commercial Importance of Canal 239 gation laws now give the shipping owned by the coast- wise carriers sufficient aid and protection. At least, the burden of proof is upon the coastwise steamship companies to show need of further assistance. It is important that business principles should be adhered to in the management of the Panama Canal. Indeed, it ought to be accepted as axiomatic that the United States Government should operate the canal in a business-like way; that the tolls charged by the Government should, if possible, be such as will stimu- late traffic and at the same time safeguard the owners of the waterway against an annual deficit. If it were a private enterprise, it would be well to insist upon its being managed, if possible, so as to yield its owners a profit; but the canal being a government undertaking, it will be best for the United States to collect such revenues as are needed to meet operating and main- tenance expenses and interest charges, and to provide a sinking fund that will eventually return to the treasury the sum invested in the canal. In advocating the policy of adhering to business principles in the management of the Panama Canal, it is not recommended that the rate of tolls should be high. Indeed, the schedule of charges fixed by the President establishes relatively low rates — rates that will not unduly restrict the use of the canal. The owners of the vessels that serve the coastwise trade will derive greater benefit from the canal than will the owners of any other vessels. Rates double those es- tablished by the President might be imposed without preventing the canal from being used by the coastwise 240 THe Panama Canal carriers. In view of these facts, it seems just that those who derive immediate benefit from the use of the canal should pay reasonable tolls. Congress acted wisely when, by the act of June 15, 1914, it repealed the provision of the law of August 24, 1912, which had exempted the shipping engaged in the coastwise trade of the United States from the payment of Panama Canal tolls. APPENDIX NEUTRALITY OF PANAMA CANAL ZONE] Since this book went to press the President of the United States has issued a proclamation prescribing "|Rules and Regulations Governing the Use of the Panama [Canal by Vessels of Belligerents and the Maintenance of Neutrality by the United States in the Canal Zone." It is noteworthy that a proclamation of this kind has been necessary so soon after the actual opening of the Canal to traffic. The proclamation is of general interest in connection with the subject matter of this book, and it is of especial interest just at the present time. The text of the proclamation follows: BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA A PROCLAMATION WHEREAS, the United States is neutral in the present war and Whereas the United States exercises sovereignty in the land and waters of the Canal Zone and is authorized by its treaty with Panama of February twenty-six, nineteen hundred and four, to maintain neutrality in the cities of Panama and Colon, and the harbors adjacent to the said cities: Now, Therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, do hereby declare and proclaim the following Rules and Regulations Governing the Use of the Panama Canal by Vessels of Belligerents and the Maintenance of Neutrality by the United States in the Canal Zone, which are in addition to the general "Rules and Regulations for the Operation and Navi- gation of the Panama Canal and Approaches Thereto, including 241 242 THe Panama Canal all Waters under its jurisdiction" put into force by Executive Order of July 9, 1914, and I do bring to the attention of all con- cerned the Protocol of an Agreement between the United States and the Republic of Panama, signed at Washington, October 10, 1914, which protocol is hereunto annexed. Rule 1. A vessel of war, for the purposes of these rules, is de- fined as follows : a public armed vessel, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government, whose name appears on the list of officers of the military fleet, and the crew of which are under regular naval discipline, which vessel is qualified by its armament and the character of its personnel to take offensive action against the public or private ships of the enemy. Rule 2. In order to maintain both the neutrality of the Canal and that of the United States owning and operating it as a govern- ment enterprise, the same treatment, except as hereinafter noted, as that given to vessels of war of the belligerents shall be given to every vessel, belligerent or neutral, whether armed or not, that does not fall under the definition of Rule 1, which vessel is em- ployed by a belligerent Power as a transport or fleet auxiliary or in any other way for the direct purpose of prosecuting or aiding hostilities, whether by land or sea; but such treatment shall not be given to a vessel fitted up and used exclusively as a hospital ship. Rule 3. A vessel of war of a belligerent, or a vessel falling under Rule 2 which is commanded by an officer of the military fleet, shall only be permitted to pass through the Canal after her com- manding officer has given written assurance to the Authorities of the Panama Canal that the Rules and Regulations will be faith- fully observed. The authorities of the Panama Canal shall take such steps as may be requisite to insure the observance of the Rules and Regu- lations by vessels falling under Rule 2 which are not commanded by an officer of the military fleet. Rule 4- Vessels of war of a belligerent and vessels falling under Rule 2 shall not revictual nor take any stores in the Canal except so far as may be strictly necessary; and the transit of such vessels through the Canal shall be effected with the least possible delay in accordance with the Canal Regulations in force, and with only such intermission as may result from the necessities of the service. Appendix 243 Prizes shall be in all respects subject to the same Rules as vessels of war of the belligerents. Rule 5. No vessel of war of a belligerent or vessel falling under Rule 2 shall receive fuel or lubricants while within the territorial waters of the Canal Zone, except on the written authorization of the Canal Authorities, specifying the amount of fuel and lubricants which may be received. Rule 6. Before issuing any authorization for the receipt of fuel and lubricants by any vessel of war of a belligerent or vessel falling under Rule 2, the Canal Authorities shall obtain a written declara- tion, duly signed by the officer commanding such vessel, stating the amount of fuel and lubricants already on board. Rule 7. Supplies will not be furnished by the Government of the United States, either directly, or indirectly through the in- tervention of a corporation, or otherwise, to vessels of war of a belligerent or vessels falling under Rule 2. If furnished by private contractors, or if taken from vessels under the control of a belli- gerent, fuel and lubricants may be taken on board vessels of war of a belligerent or vessels falling under Rule 2 only upon permission of the Canal Authorities, and then only in such amounts as will enable them, with the fuel and lubricants already on board, to reach the nearest accessible port, not an enemy port, at which they can obtain supplies necessary for the continuation of the voyage. The amounts of fuel and lubricants so received will be deducted from the amounts otherwise allowed in the ports under the juris- diction of the United States during any time within a period of three months thereafter. Provisions furnished by contractors may be supplied only upon permission of the Canal Authorities, and then only in amount sufficient to bring up their supplies to the peace standard. Rule 8. No belligerent shall embark or disembark troops, munitions of war, or warlike materials in the Canal, except in case of necessity due to accidental hindrance of the transit. In such cases the Canal Authorities shall be the judge of the necessity, and the transit shall be resumed with all possible dispatch. Rule 9. Vessels of war of a belligerent and vessels falling under Rule 2 shall not remain in the territorial waters of the Canal Zone under the jurisdiction of the United States longer than twenty- four hours at any one time, except in case of distress; and in such 244 Trie Panama Canal case, shall depart as soon as possible; but a vessel of war of one belligerent shall not depart within twenty-four hours from the departure of a vessel of an opposing belligerent. The twenty-four hours of this rule shall be construed to be twenty-four hours in addition to the time necessarily occupied in passing through the Canal. Rule 10. In the exercise of the exclusive right of the United States to provide for the regulation and management of the Canal, and in order to ensure that the Canal shall be kept free and open •on terms of entire equality to vessels of commerce and of war, there shall not be, except by special arrangement, at any one time «t greater number of vessels of war of any one nation, including those of the allies of a belligerent nation, than three in either termi- nal port and its adjacent terminal waters, or than three in transit through the Canal; nor shall the total number of such vessels, at nny one time, exceed six in all the territorial waters of the Canal Zone under the jurisdiction of the United States. Rule 11. When vessels of war or vessels falling under Rule 2, belonging to or employed by opposing belligerents, are present simultaneously in the waters of the Canal Zone, a period of not less than twenty-four hours must elapse between the departure of the vessel belonging to or employed by one belligerent and the departure of the vessel belonging to or employed by his adversary. The order of departure is determined by order of arrival, unless the vessel which arrived first is so circumstanced that an extension of her stay is permissible. A vessel of war of a belligerent or vessel falling under Rule 2 may not leave the waters of the Canal Zone until twenty-four hours after the departure of a private vessel flying the flag of the adver- sary. Rule 12. A vessel of war of a belligerent or vessel falling under Rule 2 which has left the waters of the Canal Zone, whether she has passed through the Canal or not, shall, if she returns within a period of one week after her departure, lose all privileges of pre- cedence in departure from the Canal Zone, or in passage through the Canal, over vessels flying the flag of her adversaries which may enter those waters after her return and before the expiration of one week subsequent to her previous departure. In any such case the time of departure of a vessel which has so returned shall be fixed Appendix 245 by the Canal Authorities, who may in so doing consider the wishes of the commander of a public vessel or of the master of a private vessel of the adversary of the returned vessel, which adversary's vessel is then present within the waters of the Canal Zone. Rule 13. The repair facilities and docks belonging to the United States and administered by the Canal Authorities shall not be used by a vessel of war of a belligerent, or vessels falling under Rule 2, except when necessary in case of actual distress, and then only upon the order of the Canal Authorities, and only to the degree necessary to render the vessel sea-worthy. Any work authorized shall be done with the least possible delay. Rule H. The radio installation of any vessel of a belligerent Power, public or private, or of any vessel falling under Rule 2, shall be used only in connection with Canal business to the exclu- sion of all other business while within the waters of the Canal Zone, including the waters of Colon and Panama Harbors. Rule 15. Air craft of a belligerent Power, public or private, are forbidden to descend or arise within the jurisdiction of the United States at the Canal Zone, or to pass through the air spaces above the lands and waters within said jurisdiction. Rule 16. For the purpose of these rules the Canal Zone includes the cities of Panama and Colon and the harbors adjacent to the said cities. In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. Done at the city of Washington this thirteenth day of November in the year of our Lord one thousand [Seal.] nine hundred and fourteen and of the independence of the United States the one hundred and thirty- ninth. WOODROW WILSON By the President: W. J. Bryan Secretary of State Protocol of an agreement concluded between Honorable Robert Lansing, Acting Secretary of State of the United States, and Don Eusebio A. Morales, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Pleni- potentiary of the Republic of Panama, signed the tenth day of October, 1914. 246 THe Panama Canal The undersigned, the Acting Secretary of State of the United States of America and the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Panama, in view of the close association of the interests of their respective Governments on the Isthmus of Panama, and to the end that these interests may be conserved and that, when a state of war exists, the neutral obliga- tions of both Governments as neutrals may be maintained, after having conferred on the subject and being duly empowered by their respective Governments, have agreed: That hospitality extended in the waters of the Republic of Panama to a belligerent vessel of war or a vessel belligerent or neutral, whether armed or not, which is employed by a belligerent power as a transport or fleet auxiliary or in any other way for the direct purpose of prosecuting or aiding hostilities, whether by land or sea, shall serve to deprive such vessel of like hospitality in the Panama Canal Zone for a period of three months, and vice versa. In testimony whereof, the undersigned have signed and sealed the present Protocol in the city of Washington, this tenth day of October, 1914. Robert Lansing [l. s.] Eusebio A. Morales [l. s.] INDEX Accidents in locks, 80. Adelaide, distances and time saved via Panama or Suez Canals to, 211, 212. Aids to navigation, 104. American, Atlantic, and Pacific Ship Canal Co., 13. Anterior debts, concessions, etc., waived by Panama treaty, 200. Antwerp, distances and time saved via Panama Canal from, 209. Approach walls for locks, 83. Appropriations for Navy, affected by canal, 126. Appropriations, original, for canal, 25. Asiatic exclusion, 127. Atlantic sea-level section, 96. Australia, time and distances saved by various routes, 211, 212. Authority of U. S. in Canal Zone, 192. Avila, Gil Gonzales de, 7. Balboa, 6, 7. Battleships, increase in beam, 93. Belligerents and the Panama Canal, 189. Blockade of Panama Canal forbidden, by treaty, 189. Bohio site for locks and dams, 31. Breaks in canal banks, character of, 76. Breakwater, Toro Point, 94, 95. East, 95. Naos Island, 97. Bremerton, naval base, 141, 143. Bryce, Ambassador, 3. Bunau-Varilla, P., signatory of Pan- ama treaty, 191, 202. Buoys in Panama Canal channel, 104. Caisson for locks, floating, 83. California, influence on canal idea, 12. as source of oil fuel, 148. Callao, distances and time saved via canal to, 208, 209. Camacho River diversion, 101. Canal, effect of, on size of Navy, 132, 133. Canal forms the military coast line of the U. S., 161. Canal idea, history of, 4. Canal location, 30, 42. Canal projects, modern, 11. Canal route, 29. Canal tolls, and revenues, 232. determination of, influenced by competitive routes, 233. Canal Zone sovereignty, 174, 192. established by treaty, 192. Cancellation of previous treaties by Panama, 199. Cathay, route to, 4, 5. Cement as used at Gatun, 88. as used at Miraflores, 91. Central Division in charge of Culebra Cut excavation, 63. Chagres, town of, 8. Chagres River, a great problem in canal construction, 42. dammed af Culebra Cut, 102. description of, 31. diversions, 31, 34. dry weather flow, 52. early traffic on, 60. outlet, 30. threatens Gatun Dam during con- struction, 42. Chain fender in locks, 82. 247 248 Index Change in government, laws, etc., does not affect U. S treaty rights, 201. Charles V of Spain urges discovery of strait, 7. China, distances and time saved via Panama or Suez canals to, 215, 217. Choice of type of canal, 35. Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 127, 157, 158, 162. Coal, price of, affected by Canal, 147. Coal, see also Fuel. Coaling plants, Cristobal, 100. land for, 177, 201. Pacific end, 99. Coastwise shipping, exemption of, from canal tolls, 236. Colombia fails to ratify treaty with U. S., 25, 163. grants canal concession, 17. grants extension of time, 20. Colon, a free port, 177, 195. Columbus, 5. Comite technique of engineers, 20. Commerce across isthmus, early, 8. of U. S. with non-European coun- tries, increase in, 220. Commercial importance of Panama Canal, 205, 206. Commercial routes via Panama Canal, 145. Compensation for Canal Zone, etc., paid by U. S. to Panama, 197. Competition between transcon- tinental railroads and Panama Canal steamship lines, 224, 226. Composition of fleet as affected by canal, 136. Concentration of fleet, canal a mili- tary advantage in, 137. Concession from Colombia for canal, 17. Concessionary rights under old canal contracts renounced by Panama, 177, 200. Conclusion, 120. Concrete costs, Gatun locks, 89, 113. Gatun spillway, 113. Miraflores locks, 91. Congress and naval policy, 152. Congress of Geographical Science, 1875, 15. Congress, requirement by, as to size of canal, 91. Constantinople Convention, as to Suez Canal, 166. copy of, 182. neutralizes Suez Canal, 168. provisions of, as to Suez Canal, 167. Consulting Engineers, International Board of, comment by President Roosevelt on report of, 40. comment by Secretary of War Taft on report of, 38. comparative data by, on sea-level versus lock canals, 37. report of, on type of canal, 36. Continental Divide, 32, 33. Contract for canal construction by French company, 18. Control of canal by U. S., 157. Control of water during construction, 100. Coronel, distances and time saved via canal to, 208, 209. Cost keeping records, 112. Cost of canal, comparative estimates of, 114 Costs of operating Panama Canal, estimated, 234. Costs, actual, of breakwater stone, 95. broken stone, 88, 90. concrete, 91, 113. dredging, 96, 113. excavating Culebra Cut, 64, 113. hydraulic excavation, 96, 113. Naos Island breakwater, 98. sand, 90. sanitation, 112. work, 112. Index 249 Costs of work, actual, by divisions, classified, 116. Couvreux & Hersent contract for French Canal, 18. Cuba, 129. Culebra the canal summit, 32. Culebra Cut, analysis of excavation costs, 64. disposal of excavated material, 68, 97. excavation of, 63. general description, 44. proportion of blasted material, 65. Culebra Cut and geology of the Isth- mus, 74. Cylindrical valves for locks, 86. Dam between Culebra Cut and Chagres River, 102. Dam, Gatun, see Gatun Dam. Defense of canal by Navy, 151. de Lesseps, Ferdinand, announces speedy completion of canal, 19. capitulates to lock idea, 19. committee formed by, in 1876, 17. dominates committees, 16. enters on scene, 15. predicts tolls of $1.00 per ton for Suez, 235. tried and convicted by courts, 19. visits Isthmus, 17, 19. Depth of canal channel in Culebra Cut, 52. Dingier, M., engineer, 18. Discovery of America, 5. Disposition of fleet as affected by canal, 137. Distance, not only factor in choice of route, 216. Distance tables, 208, 209, 211, 212, 215, 217. Distances and time saved, by Pana- ma Canal, 125, 206. Distances and time saved via Pana- ma and Suez Canals compared, 211, 212, 215, 217. Distances between ports, as affecting the Navy, 131, 132, 139. shortened, 125, 145. Distances, maximum effect of Pana- ma Canal on, 207. Distances via Magellan Straits and Panama Canal, 125, 145, 208. Diversion of rivers see Chagres River, Rio Grande River, Obispo River. Drake, Sir Francis, 9. Dredging, Atlantic sea-level section, 96. Pacific sea-level section, 96. Dredging in Culebra Cut, 70. Dry docks at Pacific end of canal, 98. Dumps for excavated material, methods of handling dirt at, 69, 70. Dynamite, premature discharge, 65. firing, 65. amount used, 65, 66. history of canal, 4. Earthquakes, absence of, 71. Economic conditions, influence of, on ships and harbors, 92. Economies in fuel via Panama Canal route, 228. Economy in fuel for Navy due to canal, 146. Effect of canal on naval building policy, 134. on Navy, 132, 133. Effect of fuel cost upon usefulness of Panama Canal, 228. Egyptian government and Suez Canal, 184, 185. Elements of success, 117. Elevation of ground at Culebra, 32. Emergency dam, 83. Empire, low summit of canal at, 32. Enemy's ships passing through canal, 167. Early 250 Index England, treaties of 1850 and 1901 with, 127. Entrance and clearance statistics, possible traffic through canal based on, 218. Estimated probable tonnage of Pana- ma Canal, 219, 220, 221, 234. Estimated revenues of Panama Canal, 234. Estimates of cost of Nicaragua Canal, 22. Estimates of cost of Panama Canal by Consulting Engineers' Board, 114. by de Lesseps, 18. by International Survey Commis- sion, 18. by Isthmian Canal Commission, 22, 114. comparative, 114. Estimates by French Company of value of French work, 22. by Isthmian Canal Commission of value of French work, 22. European-New Zealand traffic not much affected by canal, 214. Excavation by the French, 35. Exemption of coastwise shipping from Panama Canal tolls, an un- wise subsidy, 236. reduction in canal revenue, due to, 235. Expenditures to June 30, 1913, 116. Extradition, provisions of Panama treaty, 198. Fleet, composition of, as affected by canal, 136. Floating caisson for locks, 83. Floating cranes — 250 tons, 99. Floating dry dock Dewey, 91. Foreign trade and foreign relations, 128. Formula for strength of Navy, 129. Fortifications forbidden by Clayton- Bulwer treaty, 158. Fortifying canal, effect of Hay- Pauncefote treaty on, 166. Hay memorandum, 169. Lord Lansdowne memorandum, 170. permitted by Panama treaty, 177, 201. to maintain independence of Pana- ma, 175. Fortifying Suez Canal forbidden, 180. Freight rates via Panama Canal, how probably fixed, 224. French Canal Company, 17. French Canal, evaluation of, 22. location of Atlantic end, 30. proposed lock-level plan, 21. used to construct locks, 88. French concession, canal and roads, 1838, 12. French contribution to canal, 15. errors, 119. operations, 33, 34. Frontier, military, 140. Fuel costs, effect of, on usefulness of Panama Canal, 228. high via Straits of Magellan, 214. influence traffic, 216. less via Panama than via Cape of Good Hope or Straits of Magel- lan, 213, 230. via Panama Canal and Straits of Magellan, affecting traffic, 229. via Panama less than via Suez, 228, 231. Fuel problem for Navy, 145. Fuel stations for Navy, 131, 145. Fueling naval vessels, 145. Gadsden treaty with Mexico, 163. Garella, Napoleon, recommends canal, 12. Gates for locks, 81, 82, 87. Index 251 Gatun Dam, characteristics of, 58. comment by Secretary of War Taft, 38. description, 54. forms Gatun Lake, 42. tests of models and soils, 58, 59. threatened by river during con- struction, 102. Gatun Lake as a storage reservoir, 52. description of, 46. evaporation, 48. formation of, and level of water, 42. loss of water by leaks, 50. seepage loss, 49. sufficiency of water supply, 48, 53. water required by lockages, 50. Gatun Locks, construction of, 88, 103. general description, 42. Gatun Spillway, channel in Chagres diversion, 34. construction of, 103. description of, 59. discharge capacity, 61. General description of Panama Canal, 41. Geology, description of formations, 71. Gibraltar, distances and time saved via canal, 209. Government of Panama, free passage through canal and over railroad, 199. Grant, President, official recognition of canal by, in 1869, 14. Great Britain and the Monroe Doc- trine, 159. Guam, 130, 141, 144. Guantanamo, 132, 140, 146. Guard gates for locks, 82. Harbors at canal terminals, 94. Hay memorandum as to defense of canal, 170. Hay-Pauncefote treaty, based on canal being in foreign territory, 173. copy of, 188. supersedes Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 161. see also 127, 151, 157, 164. Hayes, President, policy as to canal, 160. Historical, 3. Hong Kong, distances and time saved via Panama Canal to, 215. distances and time saved via Suez Canal to, 217. Hydraulic excavation, 96. Illumination of canal and locks, 104, 105. Immigration into Canal Zone, 197. Importations into Canal Zone by U. S. free by treaty, 197. Income from Panama Canal tolls, probable, 235. Increase in size of ships, 91. Independence of Panama guaranteed by U. S., 175, 176, 192. International law and the canal, 157, 178. International status of Panama and Suez Canals compared, 179, 180, 181. International status of Panama Canal, 157, 178. Interoceanic Canal Commission rec- ommends Nicaragua route, 14. Interoceanic passage, desire for, 6. Iquique, distances and time saved via canal to, 208, 209. Isthmian Canal Commission, author- ized by Spooner law, 25. first appointed, 1899, 15. investigations, 1899-1901, 21. vote on type of canal, 36. Isthmus of Panama, increase in im- portance of, 12. description of, 29. 252 Index J apan, distances and time saved via Panama Canal to, 215, 217. Joint commission for valuation of private lands in Canal Zone, 198. Kaiser Wilhelm Canal locks, 93. Kiel Canal locks, 93. Iiand damages in Canal Zone, 194. Lands for naval and coaling stations, Panama agrees to sell, 177, 201. Lansdowne, Lord, on right to fortify canal, 170. Larvicide used, 111. Length of canal, 33, 46. Lighting canal, 104. Limiting dimensions of locks, 91. Limon Bay, description of, 30, 94. Liverpool, distances and time saved, via Panama Canal to, 209, 212. via Suez Canal to, 217. Lobnitz rock-breakers used, 97. Lock operating machinery, 85. Lock type of canal, adopted by de Lesseps, 19. comparative data with sea-level type, 37. obligatory at Nicaragua, 22. recommended by commission for Panama, 22. versus sea-level type, 37. Locking vessels, accidents in, 80. method used in Panama Canal, 80. Locks, additional in the future, 93. as the limiting feature, 91. construction of, 88. emptying and filling, 84. general description of, 80. illumination of, 105. unwatering, 82, 83. Locomotives for towing vessels, 80. Long voyages by navy in fleet, 138. lllachinery for operating locks, 85. Magellan, 6. Magellan Straits, naval route via, 145, 146. Mahan, Admiral, 151. Malaria and yellow fever, 110. Management of canal enterprise, 117. Manila, distances and time saved via Panama Canal to, 215. via Suez Canal to, 217. Mare Island — naval base, 141, 142. Maritime Canal Company of Nicara- gua, 14. Melbourne, distances and time saved via Canal to, 211, 212. Merchant marine and the canal, 149. and the navy, 150. Merchantmen, status of, in war, 172. Meyer, Secretary, 127. Military frontier of U. S., 140. Military policy of U. S., 152. Miraflores Lake, area and elevation of, 78. detailed description of, 78. general description of, 45. Miraflores Locks, construction of, 88, 89, 90. general description of, 45. Modern canal projects, 11, 13. Monopoly of U. S. for construction of canals or railroads in Panama, 193. Monroe Doctrine infringed by Great Britain, 158. upheld by Hay-Pauncefote treaty, 162. waiver of, 159. see also 127, 129, 140, 181. Moral obligations of U. S. as to canal, 164. Morgan, Henry, 10. Mosquito, the yellow fever, 110. Naos Island, 97. Naos Island breakwater, 97, 98. / Index 253 Naval auxiliaries, effect of canal on, 136. Naval bases in West Indies and Pacific, 139, 141. Naval policy of U. S., 152. Naval strength of U. S., desirable, 134. Navigation, aids to, in canal, 104. of sea-level canal, 37. Navy and the Panama Canal, the, 125, 150. Navy, duty to protect canal, 150. on Pacific Coast, 138. New French Company, formed by receiver, 20. gathers data, 21. sells canal to U. S., 26. New Granada, treaty with, 163. New Orleans, distances and time saved via canal to, 208, 211, 215. naval station, 140. New York, distances and time saved from, via canal, 208, 211, 215. New Zealand, time and distances saved to, by various routes, 211, 212. Neutrality, as affecting fueling navy, 146. of Canal Zone, duty of maintaining, 174. of Canal Zone, Panama treaty, 199. of Canal Zone, proclamation by President, 202, 241. Neutralization of canal, U. S. sole sponsor, 168. Neutralization policy by President Hayes, 160. Neutralization rules for canal, 151, 168. Neutralization rules in Hay-Paunce- fote treaty, 166. Nicaragua Canal Board appointed 1895, 14. Nicaragua Canal Commission ap- pointed 1897, 15. Nicaragua canal route, examined in 1779, 11. locks obligatory, 22. Nicaragua canal route, recommended in 1876, 14. recommended in 1901, 23. surveys in 1885, 14. Nicaragua Canal versus Panama Canal, 23. Nicaragua Lake discovered, 7. Nombre de Dios founded, 8. Obispo River, 32, 101. Obispo River diversion, 101. Oil fuel for navy via canal, 148. Olney, Secretary of State, 159. Open door in Far East policy, 127. Operating costs of Panama Canal, 234. Pacific Coast and the Navy, 138. Pacific sea-level section, 96. Panama, copy of treaty with, 190. grants of Canal Zone lands, 178. independence of, guaranteed by U. S., 175, 192. revolts from Colombia, 25, 163. treaty with U. S., 26, 163, 173. U. S. protection, 129. Panama Bay, description of, 33. Panama Canal in international law, 157. in war, 168. route recommended by commission in 1902, 24. status compared with Suez Canal, 179, 180, 181. versus Nicaragua Canal, 23. Panama city, a free port, 177, 195. Panama, old city of, early metropo- lis, 9. founded, 8. ransacked, 10. Panama Railroad, 29, 90, 115. amount of traffic on, 67. established, 13. rights over, ceded by Panama, 195. 254 Index Panama tolls and revenue, 232. Panama traffic, American and For- eign, 216. Pauncefote, Lord, 171. Pearl Harbor naval base, 141, 143. Pedro Miguel, 33. Pedro Miguel lock, construction of, 89. general description of, 45. Pensacola naval station, 140. Philip II, canal idea abandoned by, 9. Philippine Islands, 130, 141, 143. Philippine Islands, distances and time saved via Panama and Suez Ca- nals to, 215, 217. Physical characteristics of canal route, 29. Piratical attacks on Isthmus, 9. Pizarro, conquest of Peru, 8. Policies of the United States, 127. Porto Bello, quarry, 88. . stone, 95. town of, 5, 8, 9, 10. Porto Rico, 129. Ports at canal entrances declared free by treaty, 195. Preponderance of naval strength in Atlantic, 139. Private land holders in Canal Zone, 193. Private property, at sea, 172. inviolability of, at sea if at war with Italy, 172. Prize vessels, Hay-Pauncefote treaty, 189. Probable tonnage of Panama Canal, 219, 220, 221. Probable traffic through Panama Canal, 219. Proclamation by President Wilson on Canal Zone neutrality, 202. copy of, 241. Protection of canal by U. S., per- mitted, 177. See also Fortifying canal. Protectorate by Great Britain in Central America, 157. Purchase by U. S. of Canal Zone from Panama, 197. Purchase of canal from French Com- pany, 26. Quarantine to control yellow fever, 110. Quarry at Ancon, 89. at Porto Bello, 88. at Toro Point, 95. Railroad rates via transcontinental lines, effect of Panama Canal on, 222, 226. Range lights, 104. Rates for freight via Panama Canal, how probably fixed by steamship lines, 224. Rates via Isthmus of Tehuantepec, 222. via Panama Railroad, 223. Regulation and management of canal vests in U. S., 165. Regulation of Panama Canal freight rates probable, 228. Revenue and tolls, Panama Canal 232. Revolution by Panama, 25, 163. Rio Grande River, diversion, 79, 101. path of canal to Pacific, 33, 96. takes Miraflores spillway flow, 79. Road across Isthmus, 8, 10. Roosevelt, President, discussion of type of canal by, 39. Route, design and construction of canal, 29. San Francisco, distances and time saved via canal to, 208. San Francisco Bay, suitable for naval base, 141. Sand, Chame", 90. cost of, 90. Sanitation, 109. cost of, 112. Index 255 Sanitation of Panama and Colon placed under U. S. by treaty, 194. Santo Domingo convent, arch in, shows absence of earthquakes, 71. Sault Ste. Marie Canal, 40. Saving in fuel by Navy using canal, 147. Saving in time and distance by Panama Canal, 206. Saving in time, one-half day deducted for canal passage, 207. Screening dwellings, etc., 111. Sea-level canal, advocated by de Les- seps, 16. attacks on feasibility of, 19. comparative data with lock type, 37. French ideal, 35. versus lock canal, 37. Sea-level sections, Atlantic end, gen- eral description of, 41, 96. Pacific end, general description of, 45,96. Sentiment in canal organization, national, 118. Seward, Wm. H., speech of, in senate, 120. Sewerage and water supply for Pan- ama and Colon provided by U. S., 194. Shanghai, distances and time saved via Panama Canal to, 215. distances and time saved via Suez Canal to, 217. Ship repair plant, 98, 99. Shortening of sea routes, 125. Singapore, distances and time saved via Suez Canal to, 215, 217. Slides, amount of material in, 75. at Cucaracha, 76. at West Culebra, 75. causes and description, 74. of varying character, 76. Sovereignty, change of, in Panama, no effect on canal, 190. over Canal Zone, 174. Speed of passenger and freight steam- ers, 207. Spooner law, provisions of, 24, 25. Standard Atlantic fleet, 130. Standard Pacific fleet, 130. Status of Suez and Panama canals compared, 179, 180, 181. Steam shovels, in Culebra Cut, 66. work in cut completed, 70. Stone, broken, cost of, 88. from Ancon, 89. from Porto Bello, 88. Stone crushing plant at Ancon, 89. Stoney gate valves, 62, 86. Straits of Magellan, 145, 146. distances via, 208. Straits of Panama, 35, 40. Strength of the Navy, affected by canal, 125, 131, 133. affected by various conditions, 130. Submarine rock excavation, 97. Success, elements of, 117. Suez Canal, 16, 38, 91, 145. distances and time saved via, 211, 212, 215, 217. international status fixed by Con- stantinople Convention, 182. naval route via, 145. neutralization rules, 167. neutralized by concert of nine European powers, 180. open in war and peace, 183. status compared with Panama Canal, 179. tolls, 235. Superior Advisory Commission, 18. Sydney, distances and time saved via canal to, 211, 212. Taft, Secretary of War, discussion by, of type of canal, 38. Taxes by Panama on Canal Zone property forbidden by treaty, 196. 256 Index Terminals, 94. Tide, range of, in Atlantic, 42. range of, in Pacific, 45. Time and distances, saved by Panama Canal, 206. Time of vessel passing through canal, as compared with Nicaragua Canal, 23. estimated, 46. Tolls and revenue, Panama Canal, 232. Tolls for Panama Canal fixed at $1.20 per ton, 223, 232. Tonnage, estimated amount of, pass- ing through Panama Canal, 234. of vessels 1909-1910 that might have advantageously used Panama Canal, 218. Topography of canal route, 29. Toro Point breakwater, 94. Trade of Panama, 8, 10. with Orient, early European, 4. see also Traffic. Traffic, American and foreign via Panama, 216. amount of, Sault Ste. Marie Canal, 51. amount of, Suez Canal, 51. between Atlantic and Gulf coasts and Australia, 213. between Europe and Australia, 213. between Europe and China, fuel costs via Suez less than via Pan- ama, 231. between Europe and New Zealand via Panama Canal, influence of fuel costs on, 231. between Europe and Orient, 216. between Europe and west coast of South America likely to use canal, 210; influence of fuel costs on, 229. estimate for Panama Canal, 51, 93. of transcontinental railroads, small amount of, originates on sea- board, 225. Traffic through Panama Canal, effect of European war (footnote), 219. through Panama Canal, probable, 219, 220, 221. through Panama Canal, probable amount of in 1909-1910 if canal had been open, 218. Train dispatchers in Culebra Cut, 66. Transcontinental railroad rates, effect of Panama Canal on, 222. Transcontinental railroad traffic, small amount originates on sea- board, 225. Treaty engagements as to canal, with Great Britain and Panama only, 164. Treaty to facilitate construction of a ship canal (Hay-Pauncefote), 187. Treaty with Panama, 151, 173. copy of, 190. excepts Colon and Panama from Canal Zone, 175. grants Canal Zone to U. S., 174. Tutuila, 130. Two-ocean standard fleet, 130, 134. Type of canal, choice of, 35. United States in isolated position, 152. United States trade with Orient, dis- advantage removed by canal, 214. Universal Interoceanic Canal Co., 17. Unwatering locks, 82, 83. Valp araiso, distances and time saved via canal to, 208, 209. Valves for locks, 85, 86. for spillway, 62. Vessels, private, status of, in war, 17. Wars, possible, 126, 128, 129. Water, control of, during construction, 100. Index 257 Water, amount of, required by lock- ages, 50. Water systems and sewerage for Panama and Colon provided by U. S., 194. Wellington, distances and time saved via canal to, 211, 212. West Indian naval bases, 139. Wilson, President, proclamation by, on Canal Zone neutrality, 202, 241. Work done by French, 22, 34. Wyse, Lieut. L. N. B., secures con- cession, 17. secures extension, 20. Yellow fever, 110. Yokohama, time and distances, via Panama Canal to, 215. via Suez Canal to, 217. A K Naranjitos utonilk Fort Lorani PtDiigo "•H,!, agar to Area of Gatun Lake at f/ex ~8Srt ,163.38 S2f. .PANAMA ZONE Laatampanai anida >CaeaLarga Grahfle V _ nboadrn/ge ^\ froGrande"^ 0080 ffletle Etfrpire ' \mo f/f After a \ iPfOffO ftj&OCL LOC Yjofe '■■w-arior.es. IHill'j^ taiVcW J? umnos CoetrtiZ Arr« ISTHMIAN CANAL COMMISSION — MAP SHOWING ISTHMUS WITH COMPLETED CANAL. LPAN SCALE Miles so' ,jCh«Tera Kilometres • LQnuiTdQi wfir\r/ro* *A-e£(!^£L t PaloSeco j/Cul.bXtf jn,„ , nco | tf v SVenado I. \Cocovl L £ \ fortola PtV»c»monte A r Tabogal.^ 4 U>' ^'"'ti-'T^ s * nt ^" J Old Penam^^^' Pla.be N V — 95 -H I Beam ; Water Surface Meat? Sea Level' Mindi River to Gatun Locks Mile4.S to7.i5 Miraf lores to Pavama Bay Mile 41 4-7 to 45.5 Color? Harbor Mile o to 4.5 Ar»gle Nortb of San Pablo to Ar79le Nortb of Juar> Grande- Mile 23.66 to 27.5 Gatur> Locks to Angle Mortb of San Pablo Mll©7.74 to 2366 Cro»» Section of Culebra Cut Sowing Largest Effect of Slide (1912) Angle Nortb of Joan Grande to Angle at Bas Obispo Mile 27.5 to 31.5 PANAMA CANAL CROSS SECTIONS 300' • — <\ Typical Cross Section of Culebra CVit Bas obispo,Mile3l.s to Pedro Migoel. Mile 39.6 PLa.te Y PANAMA CANAL-PROFILE VERTICAL SCALE IOO TIMES HORIZONTAL SCALE Mai E!ev rfl7' Plate Vf Mean Sea Lev. LtevtQ Side Wall Elevation GATUN LOCKS GENERAL PLAN, PROFILES & SECTIONS REC'O HE hi University of California Library Los Angeles This book is DUE on the last date stamped below. Hon wals 10/82&-9188 4 WK APR 13 200C REC'D YRL MAR 17 DO , is JUN 1 2 RECTI :00AM 0* ?nof Form L9 TC 774, R17P