UC-NRLF 
 
 B ^ DEM bfl3 
 
HBRAF 
 
 EDUC. 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
PRACTICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 "Truth remains true — the fault's in the prover " 
 
 — Browning. 
 
BY THE 
 
 Rev. I. Gregory 5mith, M.A. 
 
 Hon. LL.D. (Edin.) 
 
 WHAT IS TRUTH ? John Murray - 5s. 
 
 HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN MON- 
 
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 THOUGHTS ON EDUCATION. 
 
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Practical Psychology 
 
 By 
 I. GREGORY SMITH, 
 
 M.A., Hon. LL.D., Edin. 
 
 AUTHOR OF 
 ARISTOTELIANISM AND MODERN THOUGHT," 2ND ED. 
 " CHARACTERISTICS OF MORALITY," 2ND ED. 
 " WHAT IS TRUTH? " ETC. 
 
 "If the human race were too much afraid of 
 making mistakes it would learn nothing. 
 
 Prof. Grotb. 
 
 4 1 * 
 
 , , • \l • "J > . • 
 
 , , J > ' • ' ' 
 
 LONDON 
 BENNETT AND CO. 
 
 THE CENTURY PRESS 
 8, HENRIETTA STREET, W.C. 
 
 {_AU Rights Reserved} 
 
S <r 
 
 EDUC. 
 
 PSY'-f!. 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
 DEDICATED 
 TO 
 
 The Rev. WALTER LOCK, D.D., etc. 
 
 WARDEN OF KEBLE COLLEGE 
 OXFORD. 
 
PREFACE 
 
 This attempt to indicate, in what direction the 
 study of Psychology is flowing, is at best only 
 a skeleton map to be filled in. Perhaps, if 
 the outlines are in the main correct, this may 
 be done some day by physiologists more com- 
 petent, than I. At an age a long way beyond 
 fourscore I cannot hope myself to make this 
 book less incomplete. 
 
 I have not tried to specify how much I owe 
 to previous writers, except by reference now 
 and again to the master of all analysts of 
 human nature, deepest and yet clearest of 
 thinkers, and to our modern Aristotle, and to 
 some few others. What one owes to the past 
 is more than one can say, more even than one 
 is conscious of. 
 
 I have left out purposely, as far as possible, 
 references to Revelation. Though they may 
 arrive, each by legitimate reasoning, at the 
 
 5 
 
 284234 
 
PREFACE 
 
 same conclusion, the standpoints of Revelation 
 and Philosophy are not the same. 
 
 Very inadequate though the treatment may 
 be, the questions handled in this book appeal 
 to all. What are a man's faculties ? What is 
 he, the responsible owner of them? The 
 answer, if not yet, will surely be in the near 
 future. They belong, one and all, to the 
 material universe; he, the Self, the Will, is 
 Spirit. 
 
 I. G. S. 
 
 HoRSELL, Woking, 1910. 
 
 P.S. — Advancing — Horace would say, 
 " receding " — years hinder my giving final 
 corrections to this book. Such as it is, it must 
 go forth. My brother, ex-Registrar of the 
 Admiralty Court, has helped me in correcting 
 proofs and otherwise. 
 
 I. G. S. 
 
 February, 191 1. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 AP. 
 
 PREFACE . . . . 
 
 PAGE 
 7 
 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 9 
 
 I. 
 
 SENSATION 
 
 • 19 
 
 II. 
 
 INTELLECT 
 
 . 26 
 
 III. 
 
 EMOTIONS . . . . 
 
 • 39 
 
 IV. 
 
 CO-ORDINATION OF PARTS 
 
 . 46 
 
 V. 
 
 THE WILL 
 
 • S3 
 
 VI. 
 
 SUMMARY 
 
 . 63 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 I. GROTE'S EXPLORATIO PHILO- 
 
 SOPHICA II . . . .76 
 
 II. SORLEV'S EVOLUTIONARY 
 
 ETHICS . 83 
 
First publisJied in 1911 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 " Memoire pour servir a I'histoire : " so 
 Tillemont labelled his contribution to history. 
 " Material and stimulant for kindly criticism 
 and discriminating attention " : so Baron von 
 Hugel introduces his very thoughtful work on 
 " The Mystical Element in ReHgion." Thai 
 is all that this essay in Psychology can hope 
 to be ; " Memoire pour servir " — " material for 
 kjndly criticism." Even so, if the principles 
 are sound, on which it rests, it may not be 
 altogether fruitless. Only by going back to 
 first principles is progress sure. One must 
 begin at the beginning. The foliage, 
 obscuring what is really essential, has to be 
 stripped off. The truth is always simplest of 
 things, can one but grasp it. Evasive at 
 first, hke Proteus, for it has many sides, it 
 
 9 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 must be held fast in the vice of inductive 
 experiment and in its most elementary form 
 subjected to analysis. 
 
 Every student is apt to glorify his own 
 subject. " There is nothing so good as 
 leather," says the shoemaker in the old 
 German proverb. Yet, even after discount- 
 ing this partiality of the specialist, much may 
 fairly be conceded to psychology, " the science 
 of our life and being." ^ Hidden away 
 under the surface it supports the stately 
 structures of history,^ poetry, art, in fact, of 
 all humanistic studies. Of cosmic wonders 
 nothing, as the Attic drama has taught,^ is so 
 wonderful as man. And as psychology is 
 most deeply interesting of all kinds of know- 
 ledge, so it ought to be one of the surest ; for 
 the facts of psychology are within reach of 
 anyone's observation ; and, what is abnormal 
 and exceptional being put aside, these facts 
 
 ' Houghton. 
 
 ' The biographical element in History, as explaining 
 character, outweighs in importance the record of public 
 events even on the largest scale. Action has its springs 
 in character. 
 
 * TToXXa Ta Seipk kovBIv avSi^wTTov Savorepov iriXei, 
 
 10 
 
Introduction 
 
 are on the whole consentaneous. Human 
 nature is much the same radically in all times 
 and places. The " scorcher " on the road 
 nowadays, for instance, is lineal descendant of 
 the Elizabethan buccaneer and of the Front 
 de Boeuf of older days. 
 
 Technical phrases are, like a telegraph 
 code, a convenience to the initiated but to 
 other people hieroglyphic, hiding more than 
 they reveal. The questions, which psychology 
 has to do with — What are the things which 
 make a human being .-^ — What are the 
 attributes, the functions of human nature? — 
 questions like these have a bearing on life in 
 its every aspect: they concern everyone. 
 
 Psychology need not trouble itself with the 
 
 Cietaphysic, which tries to deal with questions 
 eyond the scope of actual experience. One 
 can know that a thing exists without knowing 
 what Existence is. Ontology, the science of 
 Being, is abstract, psychology, a science of 
 Becoming, is concrete; ontology aspires to 
 Truth absolute, psychology is content with 
 truth in relation to man here and now;^ 
 
 ^ aTrXwy, irpos 7)>as, the transcendental, the actual. 
 
 II 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 ontology soaring into the clouds deduces con- 
 clusions, which are at best clever guesswork, 
 psychology is pragmatical. Whether the 
 phenomena, by which man is surrounded, 
 have a substantial existence of their own 
 or exist only in his consciousness, matters 
 not practically. Anyhow man has to act 
 \on the assumption, that they are real, while 
 they last. Beyond this the question is as 
 academic as the long controversy about the 
 Platonic Ideas, or between the Realists and the 
 Nominalists. Phenomena are ^ what man has 
 to do with. Locke, Hume, Reid, are surer 
 guides than Berkeley, Hegel, Lotze. 
 
 Nor need psychology be cumbered with 
 questions about the genesis of life or the evolu- 
 tion of species. Psychology starts from man 
 as it finds him, without stopping to ask, whence 
 he came. The transmission by heredity of 
 habit and propensity from one personality to 
 another is, indeed, important to psychology ; 
 but there is no need to linger over minute 
 details in the theories of Weismann and 
 Lamarck. 
 
 ^ Cf. Grote " Exploratio Philosophica. " II. p. 2. 
 
 12 
 
Introduction 
 
 Above all it must be remembered, that 
 demonstration is impossible in psychology. 
 The most, that can be hoped for, as in all 
 sciences outside the pale of pure mathematic, 
 is a balance of probabilities. It must be 
 remembered also, that science has to do with 
 " How " rather than " Why," with phenomena, 
 as they present themselves, rather than with 
 any pre-supposed intentions. 
 
 Like other sciences psychology moves on. 
 
 Physical science in her triumphal march 
 
 annexes continually fresh territories ; and 
 
 human nature is discovered to be, within 
 
 certain limits, an automaton, obeying the 
 
 unswerving laws, which regulate the material 
 
 universe, even in functions, which have been 
 
 * called spiritual. The mists roll away ; and 
 
 the old distinctions between mind and matter, 
 
 between emotion and matter vanish. Much 
 
 that seemed vague and dim and impalpable 
 
 responds to the touch of the senses. That 
 
 thought and emotion are closely affected by 
 
 the health of the body is a truism. Anyone 
 
 can understand, for instance, how in syncope 
 
 thought and emotion are suspended, how they 
 
 13 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 can be stimulated by a tonic, by a change of 
 temperature or by the exhilarating re-action of 
 a cold bath, how the mental perception of 
 things can be jaundiced by ailments, how in 
 sickness or old age if the brain is weaker, so the 
 power of thinking becomes feebler, how in 
 " unconscious cerebration " what is called 
 ■• subconsciousness " works by itself. The 
 psychological laboratories now busily at work 
 in both hemispheres have great revela-v 
 tions in store for years to come on the 
 automatic processes of thought and 
 emotion.^ 
 
 But there is another side to the picture. As 
 the searchlight of science penetrates the fog, 
 one sees more clearly, not only that the 
 domain of man's corporal organism stretches 
 far beyond the supposed boundary of it, but 
 also that there is something else in man, 
 spiritual not material, supreme over all other 
 elements ; the Will, the Personality, the Self. 
 Digestion good or bad may help to shape the 
 
 ' Dr Augustus Farel, the well-known psychical 
 experimentalist rejects the theory of " parallelism " in 
 favour of automatic activity. "Senses of Insects." 
 Methuen. 
 
Introduction 
 
 sequence of thought, may quicken or dull the 
 force of emotion, but the will has to accept or 
 reject, what is presented to it. In trying to 
 trace the frontier line, which thus demarcates 
 the man's Self from the faculties, which he 
 uses, one must go back to the greatest of all 
 psychologists. In physical science Aristotle 
 was an infant in comparison with the scientist 
 of to-day. But where is his equal in the keen 
 analysis of character and in that actuality of 
 observation, which one fails to find in the 
 fascinating day-dreams of Plato ? The shrewd, 
 practical perspicacity of Aristotle ^ or Locke 
 is a greater help to the student tracking the 
 footprints of those who have trodden this path 
 jbefore, than the nebulosity of what Grote 
 called the " Noo-Psychology." ' In the 
 Aristotelian psychology " deliberate choice " 
 (TTpodipea-ii) corresponds to voHtion in the 
 final acceptance or rejection of what is 
 proffered by the emotions and intellect. 
 
 ' " II maestro di tutti chi sanno." — Dante. 
 
 ' There is more need of thinking than of reading. 
 " Had I read as much as others," Hobbes said, " I should 
 be as ignorant as they," 
 
 15 
 
Practical Pyschology 
 
 Too often, It must be owned, psychology is 
 handled loosely and unsystematically. By a 
 strange perversion intellect and emotion seem 
 to change sides. Pope talks of a " lettered 
 heart," and Scott of " the passions of the 
 mind." " The heart has its reasons " is a 
 loose way of saying that emotion can bias 
 judgment: to trust because one likes a person 
 is (rightly or wrongly) a legitimate syllogism. 
 Even in the present day one of the acutest of 
 thinkers speaks of " convictions, which lie so 
 " deep in our human nature, that words cannot 
 '' express them, ratiocination cannot formulate 
 " them, as the ultimate foundation of our 
 " religion ; " ^ a chaotic foundation for a build- 
 ing to rest upon. 
 
 The word " soul " ^ is equivocal, being used 
 sometimes for the emotions, sometimes for the 
 spiritual element in man, which controls every- 
 thing else in him. Richard Jeffries, the 
 naturalist, for instance, longed for more " soul- 
 life," more " soul-learning," as if to identify 
 
 ' Canon Wilson in " Lectures on Pastoral Theology." 
 Macmillan. 
 
 - ^vxv , TTvev/jLa, 
 
 i6 
 
Introduction 
 
 himself more intimately with the inner life of 
 bud, insect, etc. There is no need to invent 
 a new faculty. In him, as in Wordsworth and 
 in all lovers of Nature, it was a more than 
 ordinary tenderness of sympathy, a more than 
 ordinary closeness of observation, which made 
 him, more truly than others, one with the 
 landscape and its belongings. 
 
 Anthropology and the Natural History of 
 Animals are converging lines towards a true 
 psychology. For instance, the writer, who 
 calls himself " Jack London," ^ seems, like 
 Kipling in his " Jungle Book," by the magic 
 of sympathy, to know what the wild things are 
 thinking- and desirincr. He delineates with 
 fnarvellous skill the growth mentally and 
 emotionally of a wolf-cub from the very 
 beginning and the gradual development into a 
 domesticated dog. He sees in the creatures 
 inferior to man an embryo of man's Reason, 
 Affections, Conscience, Will." The compara- 
 
 1 i( 
 
 3 
 
 White Fang." Jack London. Nelson & Sons. 
 Nihil per saltum facit natura. " Arbitrary lines 
 of demarcation, " our puney boundaries " as Wordsworth 
 calls them, for instance between the canine and the 
 human, day and night, etc., etc., are for man's conven- 
 
 17 B 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 tive study of savage races also throws a strong 
 side-light on the growth and development of 
 each human individual. One of the greatest 
 of helps to psychology will be, when the 
 physiologist shall give a sound explanation of 
 what goes on in dreams. The Will seems for 
 the time to abdicate its suzerainty. The 
 correction, which in waking moments, sensa- 
 tion supplies to thought by contact with things 
 external is wanting. Will not the scientific 
 study of telepathy be helpful ? 
 
 Psychology has to delimitate the frontiers, 
 which separate the faculties from one another 
 and all from the spirit, which dwells among 
 them and yet above them in a tenement of 
 clay with its five outlooks on the outer world. 
 
 ience, not in the nature of things. Anyone (e.g.) who 
 understands dogs can see that their contrition for a fault 
 is something better than mere fear of the whip. 
 
 (8 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 SENSATION 
 
 Apparently the only idea, which can rightly 
 call itself " innate," which admits no exception 
 and beyond which analysis cannot further go, 
 is, that a thing cannot at the same moment be 
 and not be what it is/ With this very scanty 
 equipment the mind starts on its never-ending 
 \5t)yage of discovery. It cannot think " yes " 
 and " no " simultaneously ^ about anything. 
 It cannot, in technical phraseology, predicate 
 what is self-contradictory, about anything. 
 For instance it cannot conceive anything at 
 
 * " Nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius in sensu, 
 praeter intellectum ipsum." — Leibnitz. 
 
 * Thought moves so swiftly, and one thought takes the 
 place of another in the brain-chamber so instantaneously, 
 that thoughts really successive seem to be simultaneous. 
 
 " Thoughts ten times faster glide than the sun's 
 beams. " — Shakespeare. 
 
 19 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 once quite black and quite white. ^ But 
 even this very small amount of knowing has 
 to be reahsed slowly and gradually by 
 experience. 
 
 In the inarticulate infant the first step is to 
 disentangle itself from surrounding objects — 
 - the " circum-ego " ^ and to distinguish one of 
 these objects from another. These elemen- 
 tary lessons are traced, Locke has truly said, 
 as on a blank sheet of paper. The first 
 perceptiveness of the infant is, as in the 
 moment, when one awakes from a swoon, a 
 dim consciousness of existence.' Apprehen- 
 sion precedes comprehension. It is by 
 contact with external things, that the mind 
 learns by degrees, that they are outside itself. 
 In this glimmering of dawn they begin to 
 assume form and substance. Experience 
 gropes its way through impressions made on 
 the senses from outside : place and distance 
 
 ' Adjectives are comparative. But, " black and white " 
 may serve for a working illustration. 
 -^ ' Cf. Explor. Phil. II., p. 35. 
 
 ' To say, as, I think, Dr Moberley said, that the sense 
 of belonging to the Universal, comes before the sense of 
 a particular existence is to invert the natural order of 
 things. 
 
 20 
 
Sensation 
 
 begin to be realised. The tiny fingers try in 
 vain to clutch the flame of the lamp, or the 
 moon shining through the window, or the bit 
 of red in the nurse's ribbon, till, trained by 
 experience, intelligence expands itself and 
 ripens, like the opening petals of a bud. 
 
 As time and growth move on, this almost 
 imperceptible spark of intelligence is fanned 
 into a flame by the same agencies, to which it 
 owes its origin. By reiterated impact of outer 
 things on the senses, either immediately by 
 actual contact or by the medium of recollec- 
 tion, the brain is supplied with imagery, which 
 it is for ever sorting ' by the law of like to like, 
 the corollary of the primary law of '* yes " or 
 '' no." Perception grows into conception, the 
 senses continually setting up fresh imagery for 
 the brain to classify. At last, not without 
 co-operation of emotion and Will — for even 
 at a very early date likings and dislikings, as 
 yet almost involuntary, come into play as well 
 as the necessity of choosing — are evolved the 
 
 * In this mental sorting the child learns to beware of 
 homonyms or false resemblances. For instance there are 
 more persons than one called " William." 
 
 21 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 stately conceptions of a Hamlet or a Faust. 
 The labours of previous thinkers are harvested 
 into the common stock accordine to the 
 mechanical laws, which regulate the storage of 
 thmgs material. At last, after this lengthy 
 incubation Pallas leaps in her panoply from 
 the head of Zeus. 
 
 But how can what is so impalpable as 
 thought be educed from what is palpably 
 material? How can thoughts be engendercvd 
 out of the molecular action of infinitely minute 
 particles of matter .-^ 
 
 An analogous difficulty has to be ex- 
 plained ' in the most rudimentary stage of 
 perception. " Ce n'est que le premier pas 
 qui coute." 
 
 How is it ^ that the touch of the finger can 
 communicate to the Ego the sensation of some- 
 thing external, or that the eye can transmit the 
 
 * It is interesting to compare different explanations, 
 how thought is developed out of sense, given by Locke 
 and Mill (Grote '* Exploratio Philosophica " II., p. 45. 
 C/ p- 13). The question is for physiologists. 
 
 * Aristotle is cited against the homogeneity of thought 
 and matter. But though supreme in the analysis of 
 character, he was ignorant in physical science. 
 
 22 
 
N 
 
 Sensation 
 
 impression made on the retina, or the wounded 
 limb the pain of the wound? There is, it 
 must be owned, a chasm to be bridged over? ' 
 Before allowing, that the mental faculties are 
 really part of the organism of the body, one 
 clings to the old distinction between " mind 
 and matter." But it must be kept in view, 
 that in sensation the percipient brain is as 
 truly material as the object, which dints it 
 through the senses. The scalpel of the 
 anatomist, the crucible of the chemist may help 
 in time to solve the problem, how the perfume 
 of the rose can call up the idea of sweetness, 
 or the arrowy spire of Salisbury Cathedral the 
 , idea of Heaven. Perhaps the electric spark 
 may help to span the gulf, which yawns 
 between thought and matter. Meantime the 
 solid fact, explicable or not, confronts us, that, 
 when the finger meets the flame, one knows, 
 that one is burnt ; although the manner of the 
 process, by which one becomes conscious of 
 
 ' Object and subject meet in sensation, in varying pro- 
 portion. It is hard to reconcile Theodor Lipp's theory of 
 " Infeeling " with the fact, that the Old Hundredth tune 
 becomes a jig if played quickly. 
 
 23 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 something imparted from without to the 
 internal organism may for a time longer baffle 
 attempts at explanation. The law of associa- 
 tion or assimilation seems at work. A similar 
 transition is going on in ^every direction. 
 Thought is translated into speech, experience 
 into formula, fact into principle, principle into 
 practice, etc. Kingsley's words about " drink- 
 
 ~- ing beer and thinking beer," or Carlyle's " that 
 digestion rules all things," or Thoreau's " I 
 owed a mental perception to the gross action 
 of taste — some berries, which I had eaten on 
 the hillside fed my genius," may sound like a 
 fantastic exaggeration. But they point to the 
 fact, that the abstract reasonings of the 
 philosopher, the many tinted fancies of the 
 poet, all the marvellous combinations of which 
 science and art are capable, derive their 
 fertilising stream from this lowly source ; just 
 as the arches and columns of Cologne have 
 
 \ their birth in the rude quarry, a fugue of Bach 
 in seven notes of sound, the endless configura- 
 tions of the universe in primeval atoms. Only 
 it must never be forgotten, that the component 
 
 parts of man's nature are not arranged " in 
 
 24 
 
Sensation 
 
 separate water-tight compartments." ^ The 
 V intellect works not alone, ^ but incited by the 
 emotions and directed by the Will. 
 
 ' The phrase is von Hugel's : v.s. 
 ■•^ H 5Lav6ix ivSev KH'ii. Arist. Ethic. 
 
 25 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 INTELLECT 
 
 Without memory there would be no 
 continuity of existence. The impressions 
 made on the senses would vanish and be lost,'^ 
 like the vibrations of the harp strings when, 
 the hand is no longer there, or as the whitej 
 heat of the iron cools down, away from the fire! 
 of the smithy.^ The impression may lie 
 dormant, may seem effaced ; but once made, it 
 becomes an integral part of the personal equipTj 
 ment, just as all things perish only to reappeai| 
 in new forms and under new conditions.^ 
 When the occasion calls it forth again, the 
 outer world touching again the chords, which 
 responded in the first instance, the old sensa- 
 tion starts up into life with its concomitants. 
 
 * Cf. Hobbes " decaying sense " (sensation). 
 
 26 
 
Intellect 
 
 A clarifying, classitying process is for ever 
 going on, if the brain is in a normal state each 
 new sensation as it comes, group.ng .self 
 automatically w.th similar sensations for future 
 
 use 
 
 Of all mental operations = memory is m 
 
 itself most obviously mechanical. Ihe 
 sequence of past sensations as they recal one 
 another, is necessary and inevitabk, like the 
 tickings of a clock or the reverberation o 
 echoes among the hills; unless the Will 
 swayed by the emotions, chooses to derange 
 this routine. Memory varies m individuals, 
 ;"e retentiveness of the " Calculating 
 Boy " or of the late Mr Brandram, who could 
 repeat seven of Shakespeare's Plays straight 
 off without faltering, to the faint, senile 
 memory, which can scarcely recall the doings 
 of yesteiday; but always, feeble or vigorous 
 
 it bears witness to its origin from sensation by 
 
 practical intellect, l.ke Kant s <> f ™»°" |^„3„, (or 
 reason and the understanding, .s hardly 
 practical purposes. rnanners of the 
 
 e:err7\nSe"ncr ^^~^ - separate facu. 
 .. T-_._i v)U\\ IT o. lol. 
 
 ties." Explor. Phil. H- P- i6i 
 
 27 
 
Practical Psychology- 
 its dependence on material things. Scott 
 tells how a schoolfellow broke down in repeat- 
 ing his lesson, because someone had cut off 
 the button which he used to finger during the 
 repetition. Orators know how memory is 
 helped or marred by external objects or inter- 
 nally by the bodily health. In trymg to recall 
 words of a poem the last line of the preceding 
 stanza suggests the first Kne of the next. In 
 trying to recall something forgotten one must 
 trace back the sequence of thoughts, step by 
 step, link by link. Recollection is a kind of 
 rumination. An artificial scheme, like 
 ■■ Memoria technica " for linking one idea with 
 another, more laborious and less effective than 
 the natural sequence of ideas, testifies to the 
 fact that memory works like a machine. 
 Indeed, so mechanical is memory, that it can 
 \ almost seem to defy the controlling authority 
 of the Will. 
 
 If the memory were all, if brain-work ended 
 there, the result would be an inert heap of 
 notions duly labelled and faggotted together 
 like a bundle of sticks for the fire. But a new 
 
 factor comes to take part in what is going on 
 
 28 
 
Intellect 
 
 — imagination or fancy ^ the combination of 
 intellect and emotion. Even while memory 
 is storing her treasures, the emotions, guided 
 by the Will, are quickening or retarding the 
 work with their importunate likings and 
 aversions ; they have their word to say in 
 what might otherwise be dry and savourless 
 as an old almanack ; they bid the brain retain 
 especially, whatever their tendrils clasp. 
 
 " No profit grows, where no delight is taken. 
 In brief, sir, study what you most affect." 
 
 — Shakespeare. 
 
 Pleasure is the oil which lubricates the wheels 
 of the machinery. As Whately said years 
 ago, the standpoint of each thinker determines 
 \ for him, what qualities in each object are to 
 be noted specially. The same plant may be 
 a noxious weed to the farmer, a valuable 
 specimen to the botanist, a medicinal 
 ingredient to the chemist. The brain, urged 
 
 * Imagination is more emotional than fancy. In fancy 
 the ingenuity of the brain is predominant. See, for in- 
 instance, the difference between Shakespeare's description 
 of Queen Mab's Fairy Chariot and of Lady Macbeth 
 walking in her sleep. The distinction between wit and 
 humour is much the same as this. 
 
 29 
 
< Practical Psychology 
 
 by the emotions, catches at a glance the 
 resemblances and the contrasts, which draw 
 together thoughts remote from one another 
 superficially. The plough, for instance — it is 
 Grote's illustration — speaks not only of the 
 wood and iron of which it consists, but also 
 of the purpose, for which it is made and of the 
 labour, which it facilitates. Sensation evokes 
 the idea;^ and, however slender may be the 
 connecting link, the likeness, or, it may be, 
 the contrast of unHkeness, leads automatically 
 from sensation to idea. Thus new combina- 
 tions shaped by the restless brain, transfused 
 by the glow of the affections are perpetually 
 re-arranging themselves, like the mosaics 
 evolved by a twist of the kaleidoscope. In 
 this secondary meaning imagination is 
 creative, ^ re-arranging its materials, as by the 
 waving of an enchanter's wand. Originali 
 in art or literature cannot really go beyon 
 this. Butler, suspicious of any interference 
 
 ' Imagination is but old impressions. Grote v.s. p. 56; 
 "the sum of particular experiences "; "the penumbra 
 of sensation." Ibid. p. 207. 
 
 - Cf. TTotijTTjy. Imagination is the hall-mark of true 
 poetry. 
 
 30 
 
Intellect 
 
 with his relentless logic, has called imagina- 
 tion " a forward and delusive faculty." ^ It 
 might be nearer the truth to say, that imagina- 
 tion, like fire, is a good servant, a bad master. 
 Whether a " vision " is hallucination or 
 reality, is best tested by the ethical consistency 
 of it (See chapter 6, page i.) for though 
 illustration is not argument, nor can analogy 
 by itself pretend to be conclusive, they can 
 drive the argument home. The dry bones of 
 archaeology wake up into life at the touch of 
 the noveHst; history becomes a real, a living 
 thing. The idea enshrined in the incident is 
 more precious than the fact itself. The 
 precise day and hour, when the gates of Delhi 
 were forced in the Indian Mutiny is worth far 
 less than the heroic self-devotion of the deed. 
 The idea is what the fact means. 
 
 When, as in dreams, the brain is at work 
 without the corrective and verifying aid of the 
 senses, it substitutes its own medley of 
 reminiscences for actual experience. Even 
 in waking moments imagination can mislead 
 
 ' A test of truth in imagination is if the key fits many 
 different wards. 
 
 31 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 memory in details. Five or six eye-witnesses 
 of the storming of Secunderabad in the Mutiny 
 ascribed the honour of being first to enter, 
 each to a different person. Imagination can 
 even distort what is actually taking place at 
 any moment. The court-jester, led away to 
 a mock execution after a mock trial, died of 
 fright, when the cold water was splashed on his 
 bare neck. If unrestrained by what is 
 actual, imagination pursues a reckless, lawless 
 course, as in the nightmare incoherences of 
 Wirtz's pictures ; and yet, unless the Will, 
 asserting its sovereignty, compels thought 
 otherwise, imagination moves in a groove, as 
 water runs in the rut, where it meets the least 
 resistence ; ^ if left to itself, it obeys mechani- 
 cally the laws of like to like. Here, as always, 
 the final decision rests with the Will ; unless 
 the Will allows itself to drift, abdicating its 
 rightful throne, succumbing to the vehemence 
 
 ' The common meaning of " sensible " (wise) testifies 
 not only to the origin of knowledge in sensation, but, also, 
 that ideas ought to be in congruity with what the senses 
 tell us. In the sanne way " sentiment," used to express 
 what is impalpable, leads back to sensation. " Senti- 
 mentality " is the ideal without the practical. 
 
 32 
 
Intellect 
 
 of the emotions. Even with a normal brain- 
 gear the imagination needs restraint, lest it be 
 led astray by emotion. The haunting antici- 
 pation of a coming trouble is often worse than 
 the trouble itself. 
 
 " Cowards die many times before their death; 
 The valiant never taste of death but once." 
 
 — Shakespeare. 
 
 Like memory, imagination varies in 
 intensity, in one person sluggish and feeble, in 
 another lively and vigorous. Sometimes the 
 wheels revolve so fast, that incongruous images 
 jostle one another ^ confusedly. Sometimes 
 the wheels move heavily. 
 
 Like memory, imagination depends largely 
 on the merely vegetative functions of the 
 body. When digestion is regular and the 
 blood circulates nimbly, the imagination is 
 naturally clearer and more alert. When the 
 limbs are fagged and weary, so is the brain- 
 energy. Change of temperature, affecting 
 digestion, etc., may affect the imagination. A 
 
 * Is not this the explanation of the paradoxical witti- 
 cisms which go by the name of *' Irish Bulls?" 
 
 33 C 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 morbid imagination may result from an 
 unhealthy body. But the Will, the Self, can 
 either admit the images presented to it or slam 
 the door against them. 
 
 Imagination is the combined action of the 
 senses, thought, desire. The crude sensation 
 is the starting point ; the mind works up the 
 picture from its stores ; emotion supplies 
 warmth, colour, life. 
 
 Knowledge (in itself) is purely intellectual ; 
 wisdom is practically the combination with 
 knowledge of emotions, disciplined by the 
 Will. But, in the philosophy of Aristotle, 
 abstraction from phenomena into the con- 
 templation of essential realities is the climax 
 (<ro0/a) to which practical wisdom (^povrja-i^) 
 is the ladder. 
 
 The process of reasoning is essentially 
 mechanical. Logic, like mathematic, is built 
 on axioms, acquired by the experience of the 
 senses ; for example, that the greater includes 
 the less, or that two parallel hues will never 
 meet. It is by experience that the brain 
 accumulates facts ; it is by induction tabulating 
 experience, that the adjective, which denotes 
 
 34 
 
Intellect 
 
 the quality of a thing, has its value, all 
 adjectives being really comparative, not 
 absolute. Every step in the process of apply- 
 ing first principles to the problems of life has 
 its counterpart in the laboratory of the chemist, 
 or in the honey-bred factory of bees in the 
 spring of the year. Analysis distinguishes the 
 ingredients of a thought, to be re-arranged by 
 synthesis; induction gathers together all in- 
 stances bearing on a thought, deduction^ traces 
 the consequences, which flow from it by the 
 laws of logic. The syllogism, positive or 
 negative, constructive or destructive, which 
 for ever, consciously or not, is shaping itself 
 in the brain, is simply an automatic arrange- 
 ment of idealised sensations, according to the 
 fundamental law of " This is that " or " This 
 is not that." The whole process of 
 brain-work, whether done well or ill, is the 
 clockwork of a machine obeying the funda- 
 mental law of " like to like," under the master- 
 hand of the Will. If the verdict of physical 
 science to-day is, that mind and brain are 
 
 ^ The scholastic philosophy erred by relying on de- 
 duction without induction. 
 
 35 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 parallel and analogous, probably the verdict 
 to-morrow * will be that they are identical. 
 
 It has been said ^ that superstitions come 
 from believing " before evidence." More 
 exactly, they come from incomplete evidence, 
 from hasty and partial induction. In sifting 
 and sorting the data presented to it from with- 
 out by sense or by memory from within, 
 the brain takes up one working hypothesis 
 after another, as one tries keys in a lock. The 
 truth or falsity of each hypothesis is tested by 
 the key fitting (or not) the wards of the lock. 
 The savage, for instance, believes his dream to 
 be as actual as what he sees in the dayt-ime, 
 till experience teaches him the difference. 
 
 There is no need to invent a new faculty in 
 man, a " chimera running in a vacuum," a 
 vague something, which acts independently 
 of his everyday apparatus for thinking and 
 wishing. Intuition ^ is only a name for a 
 movement of thought so swift, so flash-like, so 
 
 ^ See note, Introduction p. £ on Dr Farel's " Senses of 
 Insects." 
 
 ' Edinburgh Review. CCCCDXXIX pp. 
 
 ' " A man knows nothing, really, intuitively, but goes 
 Uirough a course of experience." J. S. Mill. 
 
 36 
 
Intellect 
 
 instantaneous as to seem to reach the goal in 
 one bound, instead of the step-by-step routine. 
 The soHtary dreamer of the East, the Plotinist 
 in his half-way house between East and West, 
 the cloistered mystic of mediaeval Europe, the 
 Quietist of the seventeenth century, all may 
 fancy themselves able to dispense with dull 
 rules of logic and ethic. But, after all, with 
 them as with others, it is the ordinary 
 machinery working at an extraordinary pace. 
 Like Mohere's " Monsieur Jourdain," people 
 syllogise unconsciously. What is called 
 " Weighing up," ^ (a rough and ready way of 
 arguing) is as truly logic as the most elaborate 
 syllogism ; it is faulty unless the premisses, 
 major and minor, are right. 
 
 " Consciousness," a reflex action, as in a 
 mirror, when the attention of the mind is 
 concentrated on the Self, is the natural 
 development ^ of that earHest of the infant's 
 
 ' "The Betterworth Book." George Bourne. Lum- 
 ley. " Memoirs of a Surrey Labourer." Duckworth. 
 
 ^ " Self-knowledge, so to speak, or rather self- 
 " presence, self-companionship; carrying ourself with our 
 " thought, etc. etc.," Explor. Phil. II. p. 41. Cf. pp. 80-1. 
 It is knowing that we know. 
 
 " As I walked by myself, I said to myself, 
 And myself said again to me." 
 
 37 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 apprehensions, when the senses send to the 
 " Ego " their first message, that the " Ego " 
 is distinct from the outer world; a develop- 
 ment also, ethically, of the sympathetic 
 substitution, by which the infant learns to 
 place Self in the position of others and to place 
 them in his own. Consciousness includes 
 self-consciousness. That operation of the 
 mind, which is called " Conscience," must be 
 considered subsequently; for though, as the 
 name indicates, a kind of knowledge, it deals 
 especially with the ethical problem of the 
 government of the emotions by the Will. 
 
 38 
 
\ 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 THE EMOTIONS 
 
 If, as Aristotle taught, the passions' give the 
 impulse, which sets in motion the whirring 
 machinery of the brain, they are an important 
 element, for good or evil, of Hfe and character. 
 Many and various as they are, they may be 
 reduced essentially into two great divisions, 
 positive or negative, attraction or repulsion ; 
 for instance, hope of something desired, fear of 
 something to be avoided. These cravings, 
 clamouring to be satisfied, are in themselves 
 neither to be praised nor blamed ; for they are, 
 in the first instance, as involuntary as the 
 thirst of a flower in a dry soil for rain or dew." 
 
 * The term " feelings " is sometimes used loosely for 
 emotions, passions, affections ; strictly speaking, it should 
 be kept for sensations. 
 
 ' They are the tendrils, the tentacles, clasping or thrust- 
 ing away what touches them in the outer world. 
 
 39 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 They have a mechanical sequence of their 
 own, a law of " Hke to like," which they must 
 obey, unless the Will, takmg counsel of the 
 intellect, intervenes. " This I Hke, this I 
 dislike " is their equivalent for the law of 
 assirriilation, which regulates thought. The 
 inarticulate cry of the babe for food, warmth, 
 light, is the rudiment either of the insatiable 
 greed of a Napoleon or of a generous sacrifice 
 of what to Self is most precious for the sake of 
 others. 
 
 These cravings, ethically neutraP (per se) 
 have to be watched and trained, that they may 
 be developed into the self-sacrifice of a hero 
 and not into the self-love, which esteems others 
 only as pawns on a chess-board to be pushed 
 about for the convenience of Self. The wants, 
 few and simple, of the child or of the savage 
 expand themselves on every side, as the 
 horizon widens, and as life becomes more 
 complex. Chaos and anarchy would ensue, 
 passion warring against passion, each crying 
 
 ^ In the language of Aristotle an unformed " poten- 
 tiality "(ij\v) the unchiselled block of marble, out of which 
 the statue is to emerge. 
 
 40 
 
The Emotions 
 
 out to be gratified, were not the Will at hand to 
 still the storm by the word of wisdom. 
 
 The infant is unblameably selfish. Aware, 
 at first, of no existence but his own, he 
 unlearns by degrees das grosses Ich, he 
 learns that there are other persons m the world 
 beside himself, and learns, by the association 
 of ideas, to rank them with himself, transfer- 
 ring to them a partnership in his own wants 
 and wishes.^ It is a foretaste of a sympathy 
 larger, more conscious, more deliberate. 
 
 Thus in the very outset of the journey 
 comes the parting of the ways. All the 
 differences between right and wrong have their 
 germ in the choice between Self and Unself. 
 All duties, even the highest, have their birth 
 here, for this is the essence of them all. 
 When once it is realised, that there are other 
 beings in the world beside Self to be con- 
 sidered, the crucial decision begins to be 
 made, which has to be made again and again, 
 as time goes on. Am I to seek first my own 
 
 ' " Crede mihi, vulnus. quod feci, non dolet, inquit, 
 Sed quod tu fades, id mihi, care, dolet." 
 
 — Martial. 
 
 41 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 gain and pleasure or am I to put others in my 
 
 place and to do for them as the cravings within 
 
 me urge me to do for myself ? To Francis of 
 
 Assisi even inanimate things seem to be 
 
 instinct with a living personality ; to those like 
 
 Scrooge, in Dickens's story, who live only for 
 
 themselves, and to whom a famine in India 
 
 means much less than a scratch on one's own 
 
 finger, even the persons, who should be 
 
 dearest, are only things. 
 
 This is the fundamental flaw which vitiates 
 
 the noble self-mastery of the Stoic and his 
 
 power of self-detachment from external things ; 
 
 it is all self-centred ; the ideal of it all is only a 
 
 glorified Self. This is what drags down to 
 
 earth the aspirations of Epicurus, even in their 
 
 loftiest flight. The pleasure which he proposes 
 
 as the end to be attained may be far above low, 
 
 sensual pleasure ; but it is only a selfish 
 
 pleasure after all. The motive is what stamps 
 
 its character on the philosophy. The purer 
 
 teaching of the founder of the school 
 
 gravitates downward by its very nature into 
 
 the teaching of Aristippus and the Cyrenaics. 
 
 There seem to be three varieties of selfish 
 
 42 
 
The Emotions 
 
 cupidity considered in the training of the 
 emotions. The lowest desires spring directly 
 from the bodily appetites. To regulate these 
 is the first step in character-building. To be 
 able for others' sake to say No to the entice- 
 ments of the senses, and to steel the heart 
 against the shrinking from pain, is the opening 
 of the campaign, or rather the preliminary 
 drill, not to eliminate desires but to train them 
 to obey an enlightened Will. 
 
 This craving of the lower appetites repeats 
 itself on a larger scale, as time develops it. 
 Self desires wealth, power, aggrandisement, 
 as facilities for selfish enjoyment. Altruism 
 urges that others have similar wants, that their 
 claims are as valid as the claims of Self. Are 
 those claims to be trampled under foot in the 
 selfish struggle for pre-eminence? Carlyle 
 in his monumental life of Frederick " the 
 Great " of Prussia, allows himself to be 
 dazzled by the perseverence, which could not 
 be daunted even by overwhelming disasters. 
 But, after all, the devastation of Europe, year 
 after year, by the horrors of war for one's own 
 
 aggrandisement is a miserably sordid thing. 
 
 43 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 There is a more subtle form of self-worship. 
 The solitary student, like Spinoza, or the 
 ascetic in his cell may easily be proof against 
 the allurements of the senses or of ambition. 
 Such things for them have no attraction. But 
 this very isolation has its own peril. They 
 may look down from the heights, which they 
 seem to have scaled, with contempt on those 
 below. Self-love, indifferent to lower wants, 
 entrenches itself in its citadel. This 
 apotheosis of Self is the subtlest, deadhest 
 form of selfishness ; more deliberate, less able 
 to plead, that it is overpowered by momentary 
 gusts of passion ; it is the " corruption of what 
 is best " in man, the betrayal of the fortress, 
 the antithesis of the divinest of all attributes, 
 iove.^ The scornfulness of pride is more 
 anti-social, more inhuman than the silliness 
 of vanity. This leans for support on others' 
 sympathy, that begins and ends in Self. 
 Sometimes courage is misinterpreted as self- 
 reliance. The courage, which inspired 
 
 * The word " Love " is strangely travestied sometimes. 
 The longing for the gratification of Self is the very 
 opposite of Love. 
 
 44 
 
The Emotions 
 
 Gordon at Khartoum, was not reliance on him- 
 self/ The self-renunciation, which can abase 
 itself for the sake of others, was inconceivable, 
 as Aristotle's portraiture of the Perfect man 
 shows, till men had seen the self-abasement 
 for others' sake of the Highest One. 
 
 Pride, howe'er disguised 
 In its own majesty, is littleness. 
 
 The man who feels contempt 
 For any living thing has faculties 
 Which he has never used; and thought with him 
 Is in its infancy. — Wordsworth. 
 
 ' " Mark, what a generosity and courage a dog will 
 put on, when he finds himself maintained by a man, who 
 is to him instead of a God. So man, etc." — Bacon. 
 
 45 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 CO-ORDINATION OF PARTS 
 
 In the microcosm of man's nature the several 
 
 functions of sensation, brain, heart, though 
 
 distinct from, are not independent of one 
 
 another. They must all co-operate even for 
 
 the most trivial action. One cannot lift hand 
 
 to mouth, nor put foot to the ground, without 
 
 due adjustment of all this intricate machinery. 
 
 The senses must pass on to headquarters 
 
 their crude report of what they touch in the 
 
 outer world. The brain must put into shape 
 
 these broken notifications, as a clever editor 
 
 pieces together the scraps of a telegram. 
 
 The emotions must say what they want. 
 
 Then the thing is done, or at least attempted, 
 
 if the Will gives the word of command. This 
 
 complex, delicate, and intricate machinery 
 
 cannot eventuate into the action which desire 
 
 46 
 
Co-ordination of Parts 
 
 and intellect point to, without the Fiat of the 
 Will. 
 
 Just as each organ of the senses/ eye, ear, 
 etc., corrects and completes the impression of 
 size, shape, distance, etc., received from with- 
 out by other senses, so sensation, intellect, and 
 emotion are largely influenced, each by its 
 fellows. For instance, fear or hope can 
 modify the evidence of the senses. The 
 bush by the roadside becomes to a timid 
 traveller an assailant in the act to spring ; the 
 sough of the wind in the trees is the shout of 
 an advancing crowd. This obstrusiveness of 
 the emotions, as it can distort the message, 
 which the senses bring, so it can intensify 
 their grasp of what they touch. For 
 instance, in persons hard of hearing the 
 tympanum of the ear catches most quickly 
 what they are wishing, or it may be, dreading 
 to hear. In like manner, the senses are 
 influenced by the mind. If he knows before- 
 hand what is being talked about, even a poor 
 linguist can catch more easily the words of a 
 
 * Strictly all are one — touch — in various ways. To the 
 blind, who know colours only by hearsay, red seems 
 like the blast of a trumpet. 
 
 47 
 
\ 
 
 Practical Psychology 
 
 foreigner. If the mechanical sequence of 
 ideas prepares the way, even those who are 
 hard of hearing, are more able to hear what is 
 said. A disordered brain can contradict the 
 plain evidence of the palate. The pauper 
 lunatic who thought, that his daily fare was a 
 king's banquet, complained that " every dish 
 tasted of gruel " ; sensation was muttering its 
 ineffectual protest against the vagaries of the 
 imagination. Even when the brain ^cts 
 normally, it can bias the palate^- Shakes- 
 peare's " Nothing is good or bad, but thinking 
 makes it so " is true of the palate as of things 
 more important. Perhaps the most telHng 
 instance of the power, which thought and 
 emotion can exercise over even the most 
 ordinary and most mechanical of bodily 
 functions is the derangement of digestion^ 
 etc. etc., by prepossessions of any kind. 
 
 The senses are often appealed to, as a final 
 Court, from which there is no further appeal. 
 To handle a thing is, as the saying goes, to 
 know it. But the senses, though the primary 
 source of all intelligence and emotion, are 
 
 very much at the mercy of their coadjutors. 
 
 48 
 
Co-ordination of Parts 
 
 Eye does not see, ear cannot hear without the 
 co-operation of brain and heart. Sensation 
 can deceive because it can be deceived. 
 The common saying " Seeing is beHeving " 
 must sometimes be read backwards. The 
 whole machinery must be in order, must work 
 harmoniously ; and the Will, the unmechanical 
 factor in the sum, must be in order too. 
 
 There is a similar and even greater inter- 
 action in regard to the higher faculties. A 
 few instances are enough. That intelligence 
 and emotion depend largely on the lower 
 functions of the body is obvious to anyone 
 and that they depend also largely on each 
 other. " The wish is father to the 
 thought " ; * and in return, the imagery 
 projected by the brain, as the wheels go round 
 can add fuel to the flame by suggesting what 
 attracts or repels. Prejudice begins when 
 likings or dislikings are allowed by the Will, 
 to set aside the unimpassioned verdict of the 
 brain. On the other hand the dry, formal 
 
 ' This obtrusive pleading of the emotions, when the 
 Reason is giving its verdict and the Will about to pass 
 sentence, is well illustrated in a recent essay on *' Popular 
 Tallacies." Edinburgh Review, CCCCDXXIX 
 
 49 D 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 logic of the intellect may paralyse action by 
 chilling the emotional glow, which incites 
 men to be strenuous. External circum- 
 stances also play their part. They must be 
 taken into account, as lessening or enhancing 
 the personal responsibility of the Will. 
 
 " How oft the sight of means to do ill deeds 
 Makes ill deeds done! " — Shakespeare. 
 
 Controversies would often be less bitter if 
 disputants would discriminate the parts 
 played severally by intellect, emotions, Will. 
 Only when Self is allowed to intrude into the 
 passionless arena, what may be a purely 
 intellectual mistake becomes wrong ethically. 
 The arrogance of pride, for instance, or the 
 wish to justify one's own faults, not the mere 
 misunderstanding, these, if they creep in, are 
 the real evil of heresy. 
 
 The emotions contend with one another, 
 like persons pushing their way in a crowd. 
 For instance, the craving for money and 
 power or the wish to escape disgrace may 
 cancel the craving for illicit pleasure, one 
 kind of selfishness extruding another. 
 
 In this threefold co-partnership, sensation 
 
 50 
 
Co-ordination of Parts 
 
 pouring grain and husk together into the mill, 
 the mind shaping and arranging what is thus 
 supplied to it, the heart suffusing everything 
 with warmth and colour, the result is an all- 
 round completeness, if there is due balance 
 and proportion of the parts. Sometimes, as 
 in the artist, the sensuous element predomin- 
 ates ; sometimes, as in students like Newton 
 or Pascal, the brain — often in women, the 
 eager impulsiveness of emotion outstrips slow- 
 footed deliberation. Where the emotional 
 element dwarfs the other elements in 
 character-building, the result is unreasonable- 
 ness ; where intellect preponderates unduly, a 
 want of sympathy; where the Will is out of 
 proportion with the reason and the emotions, 
 arbitrariness. The tree must not grow lop- 
 sided. It is remarkable that in some 
 temperaments, notably in the late Cardinal 
 Newman, an exceptional keenness of the 
 mental apparatus is not incompatible with a 
 tinge of superstition. 
 
 The thing done is the outcome of the long 
 process beginning in sensation. The 
 emotions in their rainbow tints, their " coat of 
 
 51 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 many colours," are quick to seize what the 
 senses present to them directly or indirectly. 
 The imagery supplied to the brain, immedi- 
 ately or through recollection, supplies 
 what the craving calls for. Books, for 
 instance, or pictures can either encourage a 
 longing for the nobler life or drag the Self to 
 the edge of the abyss. Desire succeeds 
 desire, at the suggestion of external things or 
 through the trend of habit. But all the time 
 the Will sits on her throne, to decide, not only 
 what shall be the final embodiment of thought 
 and desire, but also what shall be each several 
 step which leads to the climax and consum- 
 mation. In one sense, action is not the end. 
 Not to do virtuous things, but to be virtuous 
 is the end. Habit makes character.^ But 
 the habit cannot, normally, be made, without 
 consent of the Will. 
 
 * ido^, ^dos. In this sense Aristotle attaches more im- 
 portance to the doing than to the thing done {ivepyiia — 
 (pyov. ) 
 
 52 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 THE WILL 
 
 The machinery may be perfect in every 
 part, sensation duly communicating its 
 impressions, thought duly registering and 
 arranging these, desire duly giving the touch, 
 which puts the whole thing in motion, but the 
 result is anarchy, unless there is a controlling 
 and directing Force. Without this, man 
 would be a cleverly compacted motor-car 
 making its way along a crowded thoroughfare, 
 with no guiding hand on the wheel ; he would 
 be a boat amid cross-currents with none at the 
 helm. For the passions contend with the 
 reason ; one passion contends with another ; 
 one thought, swift as the flash of lightning, 
 replaces another; and conflicting circum- 
 stances make the confusion worse. The jar- 
 ring elements must be coerced into harmony, 
 
 53 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 if they are to do their work. The " many 
 members are one body " ; and this bodily 
 organisation belongs to the spirit, which 
 dwells therein. 
 
 The oneness^ of this indwelling person- 
 ality needs no proving practically. " Solvitur 
 ambulando," Johnson's brusque " Kick it, 
 Sir," when Boswell was quoting Berkeley's 
 idealism about material things, was enough ; 
 for both the stone and the sensation were 
 equally real, equally unreal. It is merely a 
 way of speaking, to say that everyone has two 
 selves, or more than two. In the clever 
 novelette the same person can be Mr Hyde 
 one day and Dr Jekyll another. The glaring 
 inconsistencies of conduct which occur in 
 daily life provoke and almost seem to justify 
 the exaggeration. But the inner conscious- 
 ness gives the lie to it. Anyone who stops to 
 think, knows that these aberrations are his, 
 and that, when all is said and done, he is still 
 himself, made better or made worse by the 
 
 ' " A variety of consciousness (or, in other words, a 
 succession of various feelings) bound all together by the 
 ' I ' hood or feeling of personality." Grote. Explor. 
 Phil. II. p. II. 
 
 54 
 
The Will 
 
 exercise in each case of his prerogative of 
 deciding. The faculties of thinking and 
 wishing, the use of which is intrusted to him, 
 are his equipment, his paraphernaHa, a 
 garment, which can be laid aside. Though 
 they contribute to the due development of his 
 personality, he can exist with one or another 
 of them truncated, imperfect. In the 
 language of the Schoolmen, they are at most 
 merely a " property," not the " essence " of 
 him.^ 
 
 In considering the operations of the Will- 
 power the student of psychology passes out of 
 the region, where what he seeks to know is 
 comparatively certain. The workings of 
 emotion and intellect are palpable as the 
 workings of bees in a glass hive, or of bacilli 
 under the microscope. Even when the 
 succession of thoughts or emotions may seem 
 incoherent, an orderly sequence underlies it. 
 But the Will is inscrutable in its movements 
 as the air that we breathe, capricious and 
 uncertain as the wind. Like all things else in 
 the Universe, the Will, doubtless, obeys its 
 
 55 
 
/ 
 
 Practical Psychology 
 
 own laws: but these laws are undecipherable 
 by man ; they transcend knowledge.^ Spirit 
 is imponderable. But, as the path of the air- 
 current is marked by the swaying of the trees, 
 so the presence, the action, the sovereignty of 
 the Will is indicated by results, which would 
 otherwise be inexplicable.^ The Will, like a 
 gate-keeper, can admit or slam the door 
 against the intruding thought or emotion. It 
 can put a Veto on thought or desire, as 
 Ulysses stopped with wax the ears of his 
 sailors, lest they should be allured by the 
 songs of the Sirens. It can command 
 another thought to be substituted, another 
 desire in place of those which the mechanism 
 proffers. In the syllogism, which, with the 
 instantaneousness of an electric flash is for 
 ever going on sub-consciously, the Will can 
 insist on a change in the major if not in the 
 
 ^ " Dark fluxions, all unfixable by thought, 
 
 A phantom dim, of past and future wrought." 
 
 — 5. T. Coleridge. 
 
 ' I have tried to say something more in detail on this 
 vital question, the Freedom of the Will in " What is 
 Truth?" (Murray). " Aristotelianism and Modern 
 Thought," S.P.C.K. and in my " Bampton Lectures," 
 1873 (Parker). 
 
 56 
 
The Will 
 
 minor premiss, by shifting the standpoint. 
 In the tumult of conflicting wishes the Will 
 can select one or another out of the crowd to 
 be allowed to have audience. Not that this 
 supremacy is unaffected by the other elements 
 of man's being and even by environment. 
 Like Czar, Sultan, Pope, the Will, though 
 supreme, is swayed hither or thither by the 
 camarilla which surrounds it. The 
 " Exequator " of the Will, like the Fiat of any 
 autocrat, may be accepted grudgingly with 
 the sullen acquiescence of rebels, who submit 
 because they must. The autocrat is respon- 
 sible not only for the final decision, but 
 for every step which leads to it, in allowing 
 himself to be shackled by this or that sugges- 
 tion. So far, the Determinist is right. The 
 Will, the Self, the Character of each person, 
 is modified for better and for worse by every 
 permission, which it accords to emotional 
 impulses, good or evil. Bad desires, bad 
 thoughts harboured even for a while leave a 
 stain on the crystal. But the permission is 
 voluntary, except so far as circumstances, 
 
 outward or inward, which are really beyond 
 
 57 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 control of the Will, constrain the permission 
 to be given. To measure rightly how far the 
 result is voluntary or involuntary, to say, m 
 each particular case, where responsibility 
 begins and ends, to apportion rightly, praise or 
 blame, is only possible to Omniscience/ 
 
 If, however, the Determinist asserts that 
 man is merely the creature of his own organ- 
 ism within " and of the influences, which help 
 to mould him from without, the actual experi- 
 ences of hfe contradict him daily. Were his 
 assertion true, it would be possible, in 
 ordinary cases at least, to anticipate, whaW 
 any given person will do in any given case, 
 where his antecedents of character as well a^ 
 the circumstances are known. But this is 
 hopelessly incalculable. The secret of suc- 
 cess in a campaign, or on the chess-board of* 
 life, lies in foreseeing and forestalling, what 
 
 ' Nothing in Aristotle's Moral Philosophy is more note- 
 worthy, than the stress, which he lays on the power of 
 habit, ^dos persisted in, becomes ijdos. 
 
 The chains of Habit it has been said, are seldom heavy 
 enough to be felt, till they are almost too strong to be 
 broken. They are silken, till they become iron. 
 
 * As Kingsley said, " character makes the body as 
 really as tlie body makes character." 
 
 58 
 
The Will 
 
 the opponent will do. But not the most con- 
 summate of commanders or of statesmen can 
 be sure of this. Given a certain conjuncture 
 of circumstances, given the capacity and the 
 temper of the adversary, ascertained from 
 past experience, none can say for certain, 
 even approximately, what his adversary's 
 course of action will be, when the time comes. 
 Were conduct merely the mechanical result of 
 temperament, capacity and environment, the 
 sum to be worked out, though difficult, might 
 not be impossible. The seeming lawlessness 
 of VoHtion, baffles calculation and bears 
 witness to its own spontaneity.^ Besides, if 
 decision is merely the result of whatever 
 desire may chance to be uppermost at the 
 moment, it would follow, when contending 
 motives are balanced equally, that there could 
 be no decision one way or the other. The 
 old fable would repeat itself of the ass dying 
 of hunger midway between two equally 
 attractive heaps of provender. When two 
 billiard balls come into collision with equal 
 force from opposite quarters, both are still. 
 
 ' See " What is Truth? "; Chapter I. 
 
 59 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 Even the senses and the most obviously 
 mechanical parts of man's structure can, 
 within limits, be controlled by a strong 
 Volition. The Will can, at anyrate, bar 
 them from acting effectively. " None are so 
 deaf as those who will not hear." Even the 
 merely vegetative processes (of digestion, 
 etc. etc.,) can be put out of gear, not only by 
 a spasm of emotion or a pre-occupying 
 thought, but by a strong Volition. Drowsi- 
 ness, even when it seems irresistible, can be 
 shaken off thus. Doctors know how potent a 
 factor is the Will in sickness ; how a resolute 
 intention on the part of the patient can assist 
 the recovery or hasten the end.^ If 
 the Will has this power over the lower 
 functions of the human mechanism, a fortiori 
 (unless it is led captive by the emotions), it 
 can dominate those parts of the mechanism, 
 which are more akin to itself. 
 
 As the digger if not the spade which he 
 handles, the rider not the horse which he 
 bestrides, so the thinker is not his thought, 
 
 * What is called " Faith Healing " is a question for 
 physiologists, especially for the medical profession. 
 
 60 
 
The Will 
 
 nor he, who desires anything, his desire. 
 The Self has hunger, has thirst, has pain ; but 
 Self is not the hunger, the thirst, the pain. 
 For these things come and go; yet Self 
 remains ; just as if hand or foot is cut off, Self 
 remains, though ill-equipped and maimed. 
 As the Will, normally, can control the 
 mechanical movement of the limbs, so the 
 Will, normally, can control the operations of 
 thought and desire, although thought and 
 desire, like the limbs, obey their own 
 mechanical laws of association and sequence. 
 The thoughts and the wishes, which a man 
 allows, help to make his personality what it is, 
 but they are adjuncts and appHances, not the 
 Self, the Will.^ Each thought, each 
 emotion, allowed to stay, becomes an integral 
 part of the Self, for better or worse. Whether 
 each individual Will starts in life with the 
 same calibre, as other Wills, becoming 
 stronger or weaker through training, or is 
 born with a propensity in one direction or 
 
 * It would be almost as reasonable to say " Ambulo 
 •' ergo sum " as to say with Descartes " Cogito ergo 
 / "sum." •* Volo ergo sum " is more intelligible." 
 
 6i 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 another, does not concern the psychologist 
 practically. Responsibility is proportionate. 
 The practical question in every case is whether 
 the Will is striving to govern rightly, 
 sensation, impulse, reason, in the little 
 commonwealth, over which it presides. 
 
 62 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 SUMMARY 
 
 In a world of cross-lights and flitting shadows 
 absolute certainty is attainable only where it 
 has least bearing, if any, on conduct and 
 character. Outside pure mathematic proba- 
 bility is all that can be looked for. Strictly 
 speaking, mathematic is the only " science " ^ 
 if the term impHes certainty. But all other 
 kinds of knowledge (aesthetical, ethical, etc.) 
 have their canons for discovering the True, or 
 the Beautiful, or the Right, The nearest 
 approach practically to anything like certainty 
 is in the general acknowledgment, that there 
 is an essential rightness and an essential 
 wrongness in character, as manifested by 
 conduct. To quote, against this, the anoma- 
 
 63 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 lous eccentricities of a particular time or 
 place, to allege, for instance, that one savage 
 tribe counts lying and another parricide a 
 virtue, is only to cite a proof of the (apparent) 
 lawlessness of the human Will. " Exceptio 
 probat regulam." The appe^ tS a consensus 
 of those nations and tho^^Kdividuals most 
 qualified to judge is as reasonable now, as 
 when Aristotle used it.^ To suggest that moral 
 laws are only a device of the weak against 
 brute force, or of priest and prophet to exalt 
 themselves, is to suggest a cause altogether 
 disproportionate with the fact, which has to be 
 explained. That there is really such a thing 
 as Duty is the bed-rock, amid the ouicksands 
 of doubt, on which the light-to™: stands 
 secure, though the surface of th^aeep is 
 ruffled by many a storm of controversy. 
 
 If there is any truth in what these pages 
 have attempted to say, it is not difficult to 
 trace the genesis and the growth of morality 
 in its main principle. The essence of morality is 
 the victory over Self, over the insatiable greedi- 
 ness of Self, over the propensity, irresistible 
 
 * Si (Tirovdiaoi — irevaiSevfjiJvoi, 
 64 
 
Summary 
 
 at first, ^ to set Self on a pedestal to be wor- 
 shipped. This un-self, in Browning's phrase, 
 is " Stuff o' the very stuff, life of the " life." 
 
 " Fate, time, occasion, chance and change — To 
 these 
 All things am s|ibject but eternal Love." 
 
 — Shelley. 
 
 s|ibje 
 )t^ 
 
 The precepts^' On the Mount," which 
 
 expanded the old Hebrew Decalogue into the 
 
 purest morality which the world has ever seen, 
 
 all resolve themselves, if analysed, into this. 
 
 The aspirations of Pagan philosophy at its 
 
 best, in Greece, in the East all point towards 
 
 this. In the affairs of life, all the world over, 
 
 unalloyed unselfishness, or, in the language 
 
 of to-day, Altruism, is the most potent of 
 
 factors. 4l|fc.ove, as mankind has been told, 
 
 comprehends in itself all virtues and is the 
 
 abhorrence of every kind of vice. From the 
 
 outset to the close of life the lesson to be 
 
 learnt, till "practice makes perfect," is how to 
 
 keep down what Xavier de Maistre called " la 
 
 Bete " struggling for mastery over man. 
 
 Just as in the infant the first thing known is its 
 
 own personal existence, so the first of 
 
 ' See Chapter III. 
 
 65 E 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 emotional impulses is to seek to gratify itself. 
 By the law of " like to like " the child finds 
 out that there are other beings like itself 
 within reach. By the same law it can transfer 
 to them the wishes, which it has for Self. The 
 spirit, which dwells in man, the Self, the Will, 
 is drawn in opposite directions — to prefer Self, 
 to give precedence to the claims of others. 
 Incessant training and a spiritual Influence, 
 closer than the influence of the closest of 
 friends, must aid the Will to triumph over 
 itself. There must be radiation from centre 
 to circumference. 
 
 First comes the wish, the brain advising 
 how the wish can be satisfied ; then, if the 
 Will assents, ensues the attempt to embody 
 this decision in overt action.^ At each 
 successive step the Will can intervene, more 
 easily at first, before the habit gaining 
 momentum ^ is matured. The last step is the 
 most important ; for it not only sets the seal of 
 
 ' In animals less rational than man the wish, the 
 thought, the will, the deed (as when they spring upon a 
 foe) seem co-instantaneous. 
 
 * The word in this context is Dr Illingworth's. 
 "Vires acquirit eundo. " 
 
 66 
 
Summary 
 
 completeness and irrevocability on what was 
 till then fluid and merely potential, but 
 becomes the firmest link in the chain of habit, 
 which even the strongest of Wills finds it hard 
 to break. By doing, the wish and the plan are 
 stiffened into a concrete actuahty. Regarded 
 from another point of view action is of 
 secondary importance ; for the moral quality 
 of it depends on the intention, the motives 
 (hardly anything is done from one single 
 motive) whence it springs.^ The deed may 
 be laudable, and yet not the doer of it, if it is 
 done for the sake of some advantage to him- 
 self. " Honesty is the best poHcy, but he is 
 " a rogue who is honest on this principle." 
 The distinction which Aristotle drew, between 
 doing the just thing and being just, holds good 
 for ever. So, again, his masterly delineation, 
 how the character can ascend gradually, by 
 habituation, through a brave struggle with 
 temptation to the serenity of the man, who has 
 learnt to govern himself,^ and how, through 
 
 ' " Nam, scelus intra se taciturn qui cogitat altum, 
 
 Facti crimen habit." — Juvenal. 
 * iyKparris, <T(Ii<pptoi>. Cf. " Responsare cupidinibus." 
 
 — Horat. 
 
 67 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 irresolution, one may fall into the abyss of 
 utter recklessness, where further correction 
 seems of no avail. ^ 
 
 Everything which is really beyond a 
 person's control takes away from personal 
 responsibility. Hereditary ^ tendencies, early 
 influences, environment, etc., etc., all these 
 things, so far as they go, lessen, if they 
 cannot cancel, merit or demerit. " The 
 " brave man " (for example) " is not he who 
 " feels no fear, for that were stupid and 
 " irrational." It is he, who by a stern effort of 
 volition conquers his fears, like the young 
 subaltern in Mr Mason's " The Four 
 Feathers," penetrating into Omdurman dis- 
 guised, to rescue his comrades from their 
 desperate captivity. He who overcomes his 
 selfish propensities, in whatever form they^ 
 beset him, is more truly unselfish than he, t© 
 whom this costs no effort. The efficiency of 
 the cerebral apparatus and the intensity of the 
 emotions vary greatly in different persons. 
 
 '' dKpaTT]s, dKoXacrros. 
 
 * Heredity shows itself most in little traits and in lower 
 organisms; e.g. in the pointer pup, who points before 
 Deing taught how to do it. 
 
 68 
 
Summary 
 
 Also some start in the race handicapped by a 
 taint in the blood, predisposing to what is 
 ignoble ; some with a predisposition to a noble 
 life. External circumstances play their part, 
 and must be taken into account as lessening or 
 increasing personal responsibility. The task 
 of the lion-tamer may be more arduous in one 
 case than in another ; but in every case it has 
 to be done. 
 
 To distinguish clearly the several functions 
 of Mind, Heart, Will, is essential to a sound 
 system of morality and in all cases of 
 casuistry. Wishing is not Willing; knowing 
 is not doing ; willing and doing are one, if no 
 impediment occurs.^ Inexcusable ignor- 
 ance,^ that is, ignorance such as could have 
 been avoided, is no excuse for a fault. If 
 the ignorance of what is right comes from the 
 Will having allowed the wells of thought and 
 emotion to be poisoned, the excuse only 
 makes the fault worse. Granting that, from 
 one point of view, vice is a disease, still the 
 
 * Aristotle expresses the distinction between emotions, 
 viOT] intellect, Siavoia. ; will, irpa-dipeffis. 
 
 * C/. d7»'ouJ;' and 5t d7vota»'. 
 
 69 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 questions must be answered, Has the patient 
 contracted the disease through his own fault? 
 Is he really trying to be cured ? 
 
 Conscience is the inspection of Self by 
 Self. The reason, acting as assessor, turns 
 from the outer world, and sets itself to learn 
 what transcends all other knowledge, to a 
 study more intimate, more urgent, according 
 to the oracular precept, old as time, " Know 
 " thyself." The emotions must be shut out of 
 court. " Send away Helen! " said the judges 
 in the old legend of Troy. " While she 
 " stands there, how can we judge fairly ? " 
 Sometimes conscience is troubled, because a 
 temptation, once foiled, recurs again and 
 again. This may not be a fault. Perhaps 
 the suggestion comes back automatically, by 
 mere sequence or provoked by something 
 outside. Fault begins only when the Will 
 invites or entertains the evil thought, the evil 
 desire. To be assailed again and again even 
 by the same temptation, which has been 
 repelled, is incidental to a life of probation. 
 
 If the mind and the emotions act mechani- 
 cally, and are only a something, which 
 
 70 
 
Summary 
 
 belongs to the personality, not the person 
 himself, a future existence becomes more 
 intelligible. It is, of course, preposterous to 
 think, that anyone takes with him, beyond the 
 present Hfe, his possessions of any kind: 
 although it was said jestingly of some million- 
 aire, " What a nice sum to begin the next 
 world with ! " But, if clever people take with 
 them their cleverness, and people naturally 
 amiable their quickness of sensibility, the 
 same inequality is perpetuated, as if dying 
 people could take their money or their rank 
 with them. It is the Self, that lives on., 
 divested of all its paraphernalia, though made, 
 what it comes out finally, by what it has 
 absorbed from them. Step-by-step reason- 
 ings cannot be needed, when they are super- 
 seded by intuition. Fitful vicissitudes of 
 emotion can have no place 
 "In worlds whose course is equable and pure."^ 
 It is objected that, if the vital principle ^ of 
 
 ' Wordsworth. The poet imports Christian ideas into 
 " Laodamia. " 
 
 * Is not this the answer to Herbert Spencer's *' Where 
 can we find a philosophical basis for morality? " a raison 
 d'etre? 
 
 71 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 virtue is to subordinate self to the welfare of 
 others, this is simply suicidal ; and that, if a 
 principle so " Quixotic " prevailed generally, 
 the result would be a holocaust of human 
 happiness. To argue thus is to forget that 
 self-preservation becomes a duty more 
 imperative than ever for the very purpose of 
 helping one's fellows. In order to promote 
 their happiness each one must develop him- 
 self fully, must cultivate his capacities to the 
 utmost, must perfect himself in the art of 
 giving himself to others in the wisest way and 
 with the best results to them. Paradoxical 
 as it may sound, self-preservation is indis- 
 pensable for self-sacrifice ; else there can be 
 nothing to sacrifice. Perfect wisdom is to 
 adjust rightly the due regard for Self to the 
 altruistic end. The moral philosophy of 
 England in the eighteenth century was a 
 wisely regulated selfishness instead of being a 
 wisely regulated unselfishness.* Wise sub- 
 ordination of selfish motives to the welfare of 
 others is a diffusion all round of the real 
 
 ' Hence the dread of enthusiasm in any shape. 
 
 72 
 
Summary 
 
 happiness/ which only falls to those who do 
 not seek it for themselves. 
 
 Another objection is, that Altruism is not 
 unselfish, because the altruist likes to be 
 unselfish and therefore is just as selfish as 
 other people. The confusion arises from the 
 word " Hkes." In one sense, whatever the 
 Will decides to do, rightly or wrongly, it likes 
 " ipso facto." The difference is in the motive 
 for the decision. To like what one ought to 
 do is as wise and right, as to do what one likes 
 is foolish and wrong. This is the secret of 
 misery; that of happiness. 
 
 Religion is founded on morality.^ The 
 best credentials that a Creed can bring are the 
 purity of its practical precepts. The vital 
 principles of religion may be traced in the evo- 
 lution of the vital principles of morality. 
 There are, as always, parhelia in the firma- 
 ment, mock suns, a parody of the light that is. 
 
 ' Goethe's definition of Happiness, as the harmonious 
 accord of Self with its surroundings, is capable of an un- 
 selfish interpretation. 
 
 ^ Reciprocally morality is elevated by religion, and 
 under the sanction of religion can assert itself in the 
 world more effectively. 
 
 73 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 There are low, slavish cults, which spring from 
 selfish fear and cupidity. But if by religion is 
 meant what is normal, not what is abnormal, 
 not Fetich worship, but the grateful surrender 
 of Self to a higher Beneficence, religion evolves 
 itself out of altruism as naturally as the full 
 blown rose out of the bud. Discrimination is 
 almost coasval in a child with the sensation of 
 there being other persons than itself in its 
 little world. Some of these personalities 
 make an impression on the waxen tablets of 
 the mind, as being more worthy to be trusted. 
 Even when parents are out of sight the 
 thought of their protective love is ever 
 present; and as the growing intelligence 
 becomes more and more aware of its own 
 limitations, it realises more and more an 
 unseen Power never absent. What is called 
 " Natural Religion " is only guess work ; but 
 the germ, at anyrate, of Godward duty and 
 affection shows itself in the evolution of the 
 ideas of right and wrong in a child. Religion 
 is the transference of altruistic faith and love 
 to their Highest Object. Detachment from 
 Self must precede attachment to that which is 
 
 74 
 
Summary 
 
 higher than Self. Self-devotion ascends 
 through the seen to the unseen, through the 
 imperfect to the Absolute, through human 
 personalities to a Divine. The spiritual 
 element in man, " divinse particula aurae," the 
 Will, the Self, yields itself, without losing its 
 essential freedom, to the guidance from 
 Above/ 
 
 ^"Spirit with Spirit Combines.** — Tennyson. 
 
 ' Cf. The *' Daim»n " «i Socrates. 
 
 75 
 
APPENDIX I 
 
 A FEW COMMENTS ON PROFESSOR GROTE's 
 
 " EXPLORATIO PHILOSOPHICA " ' 
 
 "Though deep yet clear, though gentle yet not 
 dull, 
 Strong without rage, without o'erflowing full." 
 — Denham. On the Thames. 
 
 As in Aristotle's great treatise so in what 
 Grote modestly called his " Exploratio 
 Philosophica " we seem to have only an out- 
 line. But even so, the substance is 
 
 * By John Grote, B.D., Senior Fellow of Trin. Coll. 
 (Cambridge). Professor of Moral Philosophy in the 
 University of Cambridge. Edited for the Syndics of the 
 Press by Joseph Bickersteth Mayor, Hon. Fellow of 
 St. John's College, Cambridge; Hon. Litt. D. of Dublin 
 University. At the University Press, 1900. 
 
 Psychologists have great cause to be thankful to Prof. 
 J. B. Mayor for his excellent editorship of the Exploratio. 
 
 76 
 
" Exploratio Philosophica " 
 
 singularly coherent. There is something 
 characteristic in this absence of the graces of 
 composition: both philosophers cared far 
 more for the truth itself than for the manner of 
 expressing it. Even the Professor's fondness 
 for condensing what he has to say into a 
 technical phrase may help the student by 
 compelling him to take pains to untie the 
 knot. 
 
 But there is a deeper resemblance than 
 merely in style and manner. Clearness of 
 thought, closeness in reasoning, rigid exacti- 
 tude, a dispassionateness, a fairness, by no 
 means too common, to opponents, and, above 
 all, actuality ; these things draw the 
 Cambridge Professor and his prototype of 
 Stagira very near to one another. 
 
 This actuahty is an especial charm of 
 Grote's book. He has at command the 
 learned treatises of past and present 
 theorists ; he can avail himself, when neces- 
 sary, of the technical phraseology of the 
 schools ; but he knows, that words are not 
 things, that the final appeal must be to facts. 
 Thus after discussing the theories of the 
 
 77 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 Scottish psychologist on the question, how 
 sensation becomes perception, he reminds the 
 disputants that " the object which makes 
 '' impressions, is the same as the object, the 
 " existence and quaHties of which are per- 
 " ceived ; for the simple reason, that its 
 " producing impressions followed by a sensa- 
 " tion is the same thing, if we look in one 
 '' direction, as our perceiving its existence and 
 '' qualities, if we look in the other." (pp. 15, et 
 seq.) 
 
 Grote avoids hairsplitting and tilting 
 at shadows. In the analysis of per- 
 ception he says, " Our thought and the 
 thought cf a state of things in relation to us 
 seem to me indistinguishable." Not that he 
 is incompetent to handle abstruse questions 
 of Ontology. Space and time are well 
 defined (Chap. VI) as the relation of objects 
 to one another. But " How is it better," he 
 asks, " to speak of the universe as consisting 
 " of two things so disparate as * myself ' and 
 " ' perceivableness ' than to speak of it as con- 
 " sisting of things or real existences, of which I 
 " am one? " (p. 70). In short, the Cambridge 
 
 78 
 
" Exploratio Philosophica " 
 
 Professor, though testifying, as was to be 
 expected, again and again in his philosophy 
 to the influence of Plato, writes as one to 
 whom the severer psychology of the Sister 
 University was very congenial. The actual 
 tears asunder the gossamer cobwebs of 
 ideahty. The seed must be in contact with 
 the soil, if it is to live and grow. 
 
 On the other hand Grote dissents 
 altogether from the materialism, which leaves 
 no room in the nature of things for anything 
 but itself. At the time, when these lectures 
 were written, this sort of materialism was 
 more rampant than it is now among thinkers, 
 and there was more need of strong protest 
 against it. Like Aristotle, Grote in his 
 " Exploratio " assumes the freedom of the Will 
 as self-evident. He takes it for granted. 
 But his aversion to materialism sometimes 
 carries him too far. Psychology is the portico 
 to the study of Ethic ; and in rejecting a merely 
 material explanation of the moral sentiment 
 Grote seems to overlook the fact, that a vegeta- 
 tive or mechanical explanation (per se) of 
 mental or emotional action is quite consistent 
 
 79 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 with the free action of the Will. He criticises 
 Hume's " bad psychology " in " putting 
 " hearing and seeing by the side of loving and 
 "hating" (pp. 51-53); and yet loving and 
 hating have, like all emotions, their origin in 
 sensation. He condemns Kant's confusion 
 of experience and sensation ; and yet he 
 admits that all knowledge comes experiment- 
 ally, and, in the first instance, through the 
 senses. He objects to Locke saying that an 
 idea is right, if it agrees with the thing, as 
 tautological, and as equivalent to saying, that 
 our idea of anything ought to agree with our 
 idea of it. But this is surely to confound the 
 phenomenal with the absolutely real (p. 90, 
 but cf. p. 36). 
 
 Had the " Exploratio " been written half a 
 century later, the author of it would surely 
 have hailed gladly the light, which physiology 
 throws, at her every step, on the dark places 
 of psychology. Much that has been obscure 
 as to the operation of thought and emotion in 
 the busy workshops of brain and heart, 
 becomes now less unintelligible. Continu- 
 ally Grote writes as one half-unconsciously 
 
 80 
 
" Exploratio Philosophica ■' 
 
 anticipating the solution, which was to come of 
 problems then and there insoluble, as one 
 feeling his way through a dimly lighted 
 tunnel. Within certain limits he welcomes 
 the investigatk)ns of physiology " following 
 " inwards the anatomy of our nerves and 
 "brain" (p. 17.) 
 
 So far as it goes, he is willing to accept 
 Hartley's theory of " vibrations in delicate 
 " nervous strings all over the body, brain and 
 '* all " (p. 236). He insists more than onc« 
 that " sensation is the basis of all knowledgCi*^ 
 that " immediateness has all the life of knawr 
 " ledge, though as yet but embryonic " (p. 1 56).. 
 " Whatever is true," he says (p. 156), " exists., 
 " germinally at least, in immediateness." 
 " Imagination," he says (p. 56), is " a mass of 
 '' remembered and digested impressions.'^ 
 " Thought is glorified sensation." He traces 
 back the operation of liking and disliking to 
 sensation, and while maintaining that " there 
 " is no pleasure or (sic) pain,^ till we are more 
 " or less distinctly conscious " [qu. in a new 
 
 ' So in Chapter IX he says, " Sensation i« extern^ 
 till we are conscious of it. " 
 
 81 e 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 born babe ?] " yet there is, independently of 
 " the consciousness, the occasion of it " 
 (p. 187). Language, the precarious short- 
 hand of thought, he connects (p. 114) 
 immediately with sensation rather than 
 mediately with intellect. For those who 
 think that reason and emotion, though sub- 
 servient to the Will, move mechanically. 
 Professor Grote holds in his hand a clue, to 
 guide them through the maze. 
 
 8^ 
 
APPENDIX II 
 
 PROFESSOR SORLEY ON EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS 
 
 Professor Sorley in his masterly essay in 
 the Quarterly Review April, 1909, con- 
 tends, that a merely " mechanical " explana- 
 tion of the moral sentiment is inadequate ; 
 that a merely " mechanical " causation of the 
 ideas of right and wrong cannot explain them ; 
 that there must be another factor at work in 
 their " origin and development." 
 
 Perhaps that part of man's organism, which 
 is here termed " mechanical " might more ex- 
 actly be termed " vegetative "^ or " chemical." 
 But this is a minor point. The thing intended 
 is, I assume, matter acting mechanically with- 
 out the aid of anything spiritual. 
 
 The point, which I venture to ask the 
 Professor to reconsider, is, as I understand 
 
 ' Vegetative in growth, mechanical in operation. 
 
 83 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 him, the denial of a material origin of that, 
 which is the germ or embryo of ethical 
 principles. This question of " origin " does 
 not touch the force of the Professor's argu- 
 ment against morality being a merely material 
 product, so long as the " process," by which 
 ethic is evolved is not merely material. 
 
 I will try to do without the technical phrases 
 which, except to the few, are a repellent 
 jargon. They are the shorthand of experts, 
 saving them trouble, but giving trouble to the 
 uninitiated. The larger, the more real the 
 truth, the simpler is the expression of it. And 
 I will follow the Professor's example in not 
 taking up space by quotations from previous 
 thinkers, ancient or modern. 
 
 The Professor rejects " We must interpret 
 
 the more developed by the less developed " ; 
 
 and so far as Spencer meant a disregard of 
 
 the bearing of results on principles, Spencer 
 
 is wrong ; for the tree shows the acorn more 
 
 even than the acorn shows the tree. And yet 
 
 the quickest, surest way of testing a principle 
 
 is by reducing the problem to its simplest 
 
 terms. The law, which sways the Universe, 
 
 84 
 
Evolutionary Ethics 
 
 was detected by the fall of an apple from a 
 tree ; the steam engine with all its potencies 
 by the kettle lid bobbing on the hearth. 
 
 Something, and more as time goes on, is 
 learnt by noting how the impressions made, as 
 on wax, on the infant's sensorium, gradually 
 sort themselves through the mechanical law 
 of association, something by anthropology 
 tracking the growth mental and moral of the 
 savage into a civilised being, something by 
 observing, how in the animal world the 
 difference from human intelligence and con- 
 science seems often a difference in degree 
 rather than in kind. When a dog buries a 
 bone against his return from a walk, the " ideal 
 " factor " which, as the Professor says, " is 
 " more prominent in man," is there, though not 
 a high one. When a dog asks to be forgiven, 
 it is a rudimentary conscience, not merely 
 fear of punishment. Those, who like Kipling 
 and " Jack London " know by sympathy, what 
 is going on in the thoughts and desires of 
 animals, can help the psychologist not a little. 
 The germ of intelligence is, confessedly, 
 
 the sensation of identity ; in other words the 
 
 85 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 sensation, " this is that " or " this is not that ; "^ 
 first as marking off Self from the world around, 
 next as distinguishing one external object from 
 another. From this follows gradually the 
 sensation of likeness and unlikeness ; in other 
 words, the sensation that some things seem to 
 be the same as other things but are not. 
 From this small commencement spring (by the 
 law of association) all the intellectual achieve- 
 ments, which the world has seen. 
 
 Similar is the development of the emotional 
 side of our organism. From hking and dis- 
 liking, (the cosmic law of attraction and 
 repulsion at work in man's microcosm) is 
 evolved the many tinted network of passions 
 giving warmth and movement to life in its 
 chameleon aspect. 
 
 These, the intellectual and emotive parts of 
 man's nature, acting and reacting on each 
 other in a thousand ways, have their origin in 
 matter through sensation. A Pallas leaping 
 full-armed from the head of Zeus, with 
 no previous preparation, has no counter- 
 part in real life. " Intuition," if the 
 
 * Conjunctive, disjunctive. 
 86 
 
Evolutionary Ethics 
 
 word means something innate, has a very 
 limited meaning, if any.^ 
 
 Where in all this is the germ of morality? 
 An infant is in the beginning selfish ; it is all 
 cupidity. Whatever catches its attention, 
 the infant wants for itself. On this unpromis- 
 ing soil whence spring the fragrant flowers of 
 benevolence and justice? In the first 
 instance, if one goes back far enough, they 
 originate through the material sensation from 
 which everything in the organism starts, of 
 identity or likeness. The child sees a being 
 like itself suffering, and identifies itself, 
 partially at least, with its fellow, not, as 
 Shaftesbury's selfish theory would have it, 
 thinking, 
 
 " This pain, this grief hurt 77ie, and therefore I 
 
 must relieve them." 
 but 
 
 " Someone, like myself, is suffering what I should 
 shrink from." 
 
 In this lies the difference between real 
 charity and its parhelion. 
 
 ' " A bad, confusing word," Explor. Phil. II., p. 203. 
 Grote uses it in the sense of conscious sensation, 
 (p. 161 etc.) 
 
 87 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 With time comes the influence of training, 
 example, custom, to foster this tender plant of 
 unselfishness. But the original alloy of Self 
 i^ never got rid of altogether, even in the 
 purest self-devotion for others. The states- 
 man like Sylla, ambitious not for himself but 
 for his party, the soldier leading a forlorn 
 hope for love of fatherland, husband or wife 
 dying for the other, even the mother counting 
 herself nothing if only she may save her child 
 all have a sense, however slight, of ownership, 
 of Self, mixed up with their self-devotion. 
 
 And yet, though the sense of right and 
 
 wrong may thus be traced back to a material 
 
 origin, something else is needed to account 
 
 for the process of development. " Man does 
 
 " choose " the Professor says, (p. 368) " one 
 
 " course rather than another." The brain may 
 
 act liiechanically evolving one imagery after 
 
 another, like the pictures in a gallery. 
 
 The heart, with its eager pulsations, may utter 
 
 automatically its wishes, desires, hopes and 
 
 fears, but the Will, the Self, the Personality 
 
 chooses, which of the thoughts prompted by 
 
 the brain is to stay, which of the heart's long- 
 
 88 
 
Evolutionary Ethics 
 
 ings is to be fulfilled or to be chased away. 
 A spiritual element in man controls the clock- 
 work regularity of his mechanical equipment, 
 as the rider steers his bicycle in Cheapside. 
 Just as the most absolute of Sultans 
 may be swayed the right way or the 
 wrong, by his Viziers, so the Will may 
 be drawn hither or thither by the interference 
 of the emotions but, after all, the responsi- 
 bility of choosing, rests with the Will. 
 Thoughts and desires, in coming and going 
 obey a fixed law of association, but all the time 
 it is the Will, that has to decide whether the 
 door shall be shut or opened to the knocking 
 for admission. 
 
 It is objected that it is a very long way 
 from the protoplasm to the " myriad minded- 
 ness " of Shakespeare or Goethe. But 
 greatest and most complex things are evolved 
 from small commencements ; a fugue of Bach 
 from seven slightly different sounds, the empire 
 from the family, the ramifications of language 
 fiom a few rude, inarticulate grunts. Kant's 
 was no vain boast " Give me matter, and I will 
 
 " make a world of it." Where, it is asked, is 
 
 89 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 the bridge over the chasm, which yawns 
 between the inert and the active, the ponder- 
 able and that which cannot be defined by 
 weight and measure? But there is the same 
 need of a bridge to explain the very 
 beginning of sensation, how Self can be 
 aware of the response of the finger to the 
 object, which it comes into contact with. 
 Physical science shows already, that there is a 
 correspondence between brain and heart on 
 the one hand and on the other thought and 
 emotion, that they move on parallel lines. 
 Perhaps some now living will learn that 
 thought and emotion are both, in themselves, 
 mechanical. But no " Determinism " can 
 explain away Volition. 
 
 Physical science, as it marches on, even 
 while demoHshing the old distinction between 
 ** mind and matter," even while showing more 
 and more clearly the mechanical way in which 
 brain and heart do their work, points, through 
 " unconscious cerebration," " subconscious- 
 ness," etc., to the fact that there is a something 
 m man apart from the clockwork. The old 
 
 saying " Know thyself " impHes it, for the dis- 
 
 90 
 
Evolutionary Ethics 
 
 tinctness of the Self from its faculties explains 
 the fact of self-consciousness, as nothing else 
 can. 
 
 Thought and emotion, as each thought, 
 each wish is allowed or forbidden by the Will, 
 make the Will, the Self, what it becomes 
 finally, but it is the Will, after all, which must 
 decide, of what sort it shall be. 
 
 The thought which one thinks, the hking or 
 the aversion which one has, is not one's Self 
 any more than is the eye, the ear, the hand ; 
 but, if allowed, it shapes and colours the Self. 
 
 Self or non-Self — is not this the elementary 
 principle of right and wrong, the law of 
 morality, which Herbert Spencer sought for.'* 
 In other words, duty is the recognition of what 
 one owes to other personalities. Nor is the 
 instinct of self-preservation, which begins 
 with the infant's blind cry for food, contradic- 
 tory to this duty ; it is, indeed, indispensable 
 for it. If one would help others, so much the 
 more must one take care of Self, for their sake. 
 The difficulty is, as always, the balancing of 
 things seemingly antagonistic. Imagine a 
 human being born and bred and living apart 
 
 91 
 
Practical Psychology 
 
 from all other human beings on a far-off 
 island. The relation of Self to other Selves 
 would find its scope among the wild creatures. 
 For the " validity " of duty, for the enforce- 
 ment which lies behind the Set of Greek 
 philosophy, behind Kant's " Categorical 
 Imperative " we must look, as Professor 
 Sorley bids us — so far as philosophy by itself 
 is concerned — to the results of conduct. A 
 true Eudaemonism, the real Happiness, if not 
 of all, at least " of the greater number," is a 
 test. MoraUty, even apart from Revelation, 
 can justify itself by its fruits. 
 
 92 
 

 INDEX 
 
 Altruism, 43, 65, tz 
 Anthropology, 17 
 Aristotle, 5, 15, 32, 25, 27, 
 
 34, 39, 40, 45, 52, 58, 64, 
 
 67, 69, 76, 79 
 
 Bacon, 45 
 
 Berkeley, 12, $4 
 Bourne : George, yj 
 Browning : Robert, 65 
 Butler : Bp., 30 
 
 Carlyle Thomas, 24, 43 
 Certainty and probability, 
 
 63 
 
 Coleridge : S. T., 56 
 
 Conscience, 70 
 
 Consciousness, and self-con- 
 sciousness, 37-8 
 
 Cupidity : Three varieties 
 of, 42 
 
 Dantk, 15 
 Denham, 76 
 Descartes, 61 
 Determinism, 57 
 Dickens' " Scrooge ", 42 
 Dreams, 18 
 Duty, 64, 92 
 
 Edinburgh Review, 36, 
 
 49 
 Epicurus, 42 
 Exploratio Philosophica, 12, 
 
 20, 22, 27, zi, 54, 76-82, 
 
 87 
 
 Farel; Augustus, Dr^ 14, 
 
 36. 
 Francis of Assisi, 42 
 Freedom of the Will, 56, 79 
 Future existence, 71 
 
 Genesis of Life, la 
 German proverb, 10 
 Goethe, Ti, §9 
 Grote : Professor, 3, 15, 30, 
 {see "Exploratio Phil.") 
 
 Happiness, 73, q2 
 
 Hartley's Theory of Vibra- 
 tions, 81 
 
 Heredity, 68 
 
 History : The Biographical 
 Element ito, lo 
 
 Hobbes, 15, 26 
 
 Horace, 67 
 
 Houghton: Lord, 10 
 
 Hugel : Baron von, 9, Z5 
 
 Hume, 12, 80 
 
 Illingworth: Dr, 66 
 Imagination and Fancy, 29- 
 
 34 
 Innate Ideas, 19 
 Intuition, 36 
 " Irish Bulls ", 33 
 
 "Jack London", 17, 85 
 Jeffries: Richard, 16 
 Johnson : Dr, 54 
 Juvenal, 67 
 
 93 
 
Index 
 
 Kant, 27, 80/ %, ga Revelation, 5 
 
 Kinfjsloy : Charles, 24, 58 
 
 Kiphing, 17,85 Schoolmen: The, 55 
 
 Knowledge and Wisdom, 34 Scott, 16, 28 
 
 Self: The, 66, 71, 88, gi-2 
 
 Leibnitz, ig 
 Lipp : Theodore, 23 
 Locke, 12, 15, 20, 22, 80 
 Love, 44, 65 
 
 Martial, 41 
 
 Mason's " The Four Fea- 
 thers ", 68 
 Mayor : J. B. 76 
 Memory, 27 
 Mill, 22, 36 
 
 Self-preservation, 72 
 Self-subordination, 72 
 Self and Unself, 41 
 Selfishness in Infants, 41 
 Shaftesbury : Lord, 87 
 Shakespeare, 19, 29, 33, 48, 
 
 50, 89 
 Shelley, 65 
 
 Socrates' " Daimon ", 75 
 Sorley : Prof., "Evolution- 
 ary Ethics ", 83-92 
 Mind and Matter, 13, 14, Spencer: Herbert, 71, 84, 
 
 23, 80 
 Moberly : Dr, 20 
 Molifere, 37 
 Morality, 64, 69, 87, 92 
 
 Natural History, 17 
 Natural Religion, 74 
 Newman: Cardinal, 51 
 
 Ontology, ii, 12, 78 
 Originality, 30 
 
 Physical Science, 90 
 Plato, 15, 79 
 Pope, 16 
 Prejudice, 49 
 
 Reasoning, 34 
 
 Religion and Morality, 73 
 
 91 
 Stoic : The, 42 
 Stevenson's " Dr. Jekvll and 
 
 Mr Hyde ", 54 
 Subconsciousness, 14 
 
 Technical Phrases, ii 
 
 Telepathy, 16 
 
 Tennyson, 75 
 
 Thoreau, 24 
 
 Thought developed out cf 
 
 Sensation, 21, 22 
 Tillemont, 9 
 
 Whately, 29 
 Wilson : Canon, 16 
 Wordsworth, 17, 45, 71 
 
 Xavier de Maistre, 65 
 
 I thank the Rev. J. W. Wardle, Byfleet, Woking, for 
 the Index. 
 
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