UC-NRLF 
 
 "ii'Triiiii' iriii 
 
 iiiii iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii I iiiiiiii III iiiiiiiiii 
 
 FA3I1L,Y I^Il^RARY. 
 
 iN. XXXVil, 
 
 INQUIRIES 
 
 1 N T E L L E CI' U A L P \V E 11 S 
 
 Asx> ins 
 INVESTIGATION nV ^I'^^i'l R, 
 
 J E R C R u -li 
 
 K. 3. 
 
 C O M P i«i: T F, IN ONI 
 
 Jich)«PbtU:# 
 
 HARPER & BnoTHERf 
 
 1839. 
 
 3T, 
 
Harper's Stereotype Edition, 
 
 I N d U I R I E S 
 
 CONCKRNINO THE 
 
 INTELLECTUAL POWERSs 
 
 AND THB 
 
 INVESTIGATION OF TRUTH. 
 
 BY JOHN ABERCROMBIE, M.D. F.R.S., 
 
 FWlow of Uie Royal CoUege of Physiciani in Ed-nburgh, ire., and First RtTvidsn 
 to His Majesty iw Sco; nd. 
 
 FROM THE SECOND EDINBURGH EDITION. 
 
 NEW. YORK: 
 
 PUBLISHED BY HARPER & BROTHERS, 
 82 cLirr-STRECT. 
 
 1839. 
 
:bk/// 
 
 L_JC. 
 
 PSYCH. 
 LiBRAKT 
 
 nr^j^i-'^-- 
 
 Entered, acooralng to Act of Congress, in the year 1834. 
 
 By Harper & Brothers, 
 
 In the Clerk's Office of the Southern District of New-York. 
 

 ADVERTISEMENT 
 
 BY THE AMERICAN PUBLISHERS. 
 
 The Publishers of the Family Library, in issuing 
 a new and improved edition of the Inquiries con- 
 cerning the Intellectual Powers, are happy in being 
 able to say that its past success, compared with that 
 of the other volumes of the series, has exceeded their 
 most sanguine expectations. Though not entered 
 upon the race till two years after the work was com- 
 menced, it has already outstripped all its competitors, 
 and promises still to maintain its distance. 
 
 In addition to a very wide circulation among the 
 general mass of readers, the Publishers are gratified 
 to learn that it is finding its way to the seats of 
 science, and that in several of the higher literary insti- 
 tutions of our country, it has already been adopted as 
 a text-book for the classes in Intellectual Philosophy. 
 
 Cheered by this encouragement, they feel disposed 
 to spare neither effort nor expense to render the 
 work permanently worthy the high favour thus far 
 bestowed upon it. They have accordingly procured 
 the services of a gentleman every way qualified for 
 (he task, in furnishing, especially with a view to 
 
4 ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 purposes of instruction, a complete set of Questions 
 adapted to the contents of the whole volume, wuh 
 the single exception of the Part upon the appli- 
 cation of certain rules of investigation to medical 
 science. As this part of the treatise would naturally 
 be omitted in a course of study in seminaries purely 
 iiterary, it was deemed expedient to pass it by in 
 reference to the present object. Upon the remain- 
 ing portions the questions will be found to have 
 been constructed with great care, and with a par- 
 ticular aim to avoid the evils of engendering a habit 
 of mere mechanical recitation. While the con- 
 venience of the teacher has been consulted, such a 
 form has been given to the questions as will render 
 something more necessary on the part of the pupil 
 than the mere exercise of memory : otherwise such 
 an apparatus had better be dispensed with altogether. 
 As the Questions for Examination are thrown to- 
 gether at the end of the volume, they in nowise in- 
 terfere with the continuous perusal of the work, and 
 the ordinary reader can act his pleasure as to using 
 them. 
 
 Should the author's other work, " The Philosophy 
 of the Moral Feelings," meet, as the publishers have 
 reason to believe it may, with a patronage at all 
 equal to the present, and be found to answer the 
 purposes of a class-book in another department, 
 they will lose no time in furnishing that also with a 
 similar appendage. 
 
 New-York, Oct. 1833 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Introduction 15 
 
 Preliminary Observations on the General Objects 
 OF Science. 
 
 Uniformity of the Relations of Bodies . . .19 
 Origin of onr IJea of Causation . . . .20 
 
 Our Iiic-a of the Relation of Cause and Effect in refer- 
 ence to any two events, entirely distinct from our 
 .intuitive impression of Causation . . 21 
 
 Of Physical, Efficient, and Final Causes . . 23 
 
 The Object of Science is to trace the Uniform Rela- 
 tions of things . . . . • , 24 
 The Object of Art is to apply our Knowledge of these 
 
 Relations for producing particular Results . 24 
 
 Distinction of Sciences and Arts, according to the par- 
 ticular Substances or Relations which are their im- 
 mediate objects . . . . . ,25 
 Division of Sciences into certain and uncertain . . 27 
 Grounds of Uncertainly in a Science . . . 23 
 Illustrations of the Uncertain Sciences from Medicine 
 
 and Political Economy . . . . . 30 
 
 Imperfection of all Science, from the limited nature of 
 the human faculties . . . , .31 
 
 PART I. 
 
 OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF OUR 
 KxNOWLi.DGE OF MIND. 
 
 Our Knowledge of Mind limited entirely to Facts . 33 
 Weal i:heory of the Old Philosophy . . . .34 
 
6 CONTENTS. 
 
 '^ 
 
 Of Materialism 37 
 
 Grounds for considering Materialism as not only un- 
 founded, but as in its nature opposed to the First 
 Principles of Philosophical Inquiry . . .37 
 
 Grounds for believing that the Thinking Principle is 
 in its Essence independent of the Body, and will 
 survive it ........ 33 
 
 This Belief is entirely independent of our Speculations 
 respecting the ImmateriaUty of the Thinking Prin- 
 ciple, and rests on a species of evidence altogether 
 djferent. ....... 4] 
 
 PART IL 
 
 OF THE ORIGIN OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF 
 FACTS RELATING BOTH TO MATTER 
 AND MIND. 
 
 SECTION L 
 
 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
 
 Of the Primary and Secondary Properties of Matter 48 
 Knowledge of the Properties of Matter by the Senses 49 
 Of our Knowledge of Distance and Magnitude . . 51 
 Apparent improvement of some Senses after loss of 
 others . . . . .... 53 
 
 Of our Knowledge of the Nature of Perception . . 57 
 Remarkable Influence of Attention . . .68 
 Habits of Attention and Inattention . . .59 
 Of False Perceptions 63 
 
 SECTION IL 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS AND REFLECTION. 
 
 Of the Knowledge which we derive from Conscious- 
 ness and Reflection 
 
CONTENTS. 7 
 
 1. The Knowledge of our Mental Processes . . 67 
 
 2. Compound Notions, — as Time, Cause, Motion . 67 
 3 First Truths, or Intuitive Articles of Belief . 68 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 TESTIMONY. 
 
 Rules by which we estimate the Credibility of Testi- 
 mony 69 
 
 Confidence in Testimony in regard to statements at va- 
 riance with our Personal Observation or Experience 72 
 
 Objections which have been made to the Reception of 
 such Statements on the Eviaence of Testimony 73 
 
 Fallacy of these Objections, and Crounds of our Con 
 fidence in Testimony 74 
 
 Distinction between Events which ^re marvellous and 
 those which are miraculous . . . .77 
 
 Mora! Probability of Miracles .... 79 
 
 Miracles not a violation of the established order of Na- 
 ture, but referable to an agency altogether new and 
 peculiar ........ 81 
 
 Grounds on which we estimate the Credibility of Tes- 
 timony in regard to unusual or miraculous events 83 
 
 PART m. 
 
 OF THE INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 MEMORY. 
 
 Attention . 91 
 
 Association . . . . • , . 93 
 
 1. Natural or Philosophical Association . • 97 
 
 2. Local or Incidental Association • • • 101 
 
8 CONTENTS. 
 
 3. Arbitrary or Fictitious Association , .106 
 
 Artilicial Memory .... . 107 
 
 Important Application of the Principle of Arbi- 
 trary Association in Commemorative Rites 108 
 Conception, or the Memory of Perceptions . .110 
 
 Of the Culture and Improvement of Attention, Reflec- 
 tion, and Memory . . . . . .113 
 
 Of the Influence of Disease upon Attention and Memory IP 
 Of Extensive Cerebral Disease, without Sensible De- 
 rangement of the Mental Functions . . . 132 
 Influence of the F'acts connected with this sub- 
 ject in showing the Independent Exis\ence 
 of the Thinking Principle .... 133 
 
 SECTION 11. 
 
 ABSTRACTION. 
 
 Nature and Applications of Abstraction . . . 134 
 Disputes of the Nominalists and Realists . . 135 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 IMAGINATION. 
 
 Nature and Applications of Imagination , . .138 
 Various Kinds of Artificial Combination to which it is 
 
 applicable .... . . 139 
 
 Importance of a Proper Application of it in the I orma- 
 
 tion of Character . . . . . 140 
 
 Eff*ects of Fictitious Narrative .... 141 
 
 Etifects of an Ill-regulated Imagination . . .143 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 REASON OR JUDGMENT. 
 
 Analysis of the Mental Process of which Reason con- 
 Bista . . . ... 144 
 
CONTENTS. 9 
 
 Applications of Reason in the Investigations of Sci 
 ence, the Affairs of Common Life, and the Forma- 
 tion of Opinions ..... 
 
 Man's Responsibility for his BeHef 
 
 Farther Division of the Subject. — Brief Outline of the 
 System of Dr. Brown .... 
 
 148 
 .153 
 
 154 
 
 § I. — OF THE USE OF REASON IN THE INVESTIGATION 
 OF TRUTH. 
 
 Of First Truths, or Intuitive Articles of Belief, as the 
 Foundation of all Reasoning .... 156 
 
 1. A Belief in our own Existence, and of Mind as 
 somethincr distinct from the Body . . . 157 
 
 2. A Confidence in the Information furnished by 
 our Senses ...... 158 
 
 3. A Confidence in our Mental Operations . .158 
 
 4. A Belief of our Personal Identity . . . 158 
 
 5. A Conviction that every Event must have a 
 Cause 159 
 
 6 A Confidence in the Uniformity of Nature . 159 
 Uniformity of Physical Relations . . 160 
 
 Uniformity of Moral Relations . . 163 
 
 Application to the Question of Liberty 
 and Necessity .... 165 
 Of the Nature and Importance of First Truths, and 
 Sophisms connected with attempts to reason against 
 
 them 173 
 
 Laws of Investigation in any Department of Knove- 
 ledge 177 
 
 1. Of collecting Facts 180 
 
 2. Of tracing the Relation of Cause and Effect 180 
 
 3. Of deducing General Principles . . 181 
 Of Fallacies in Investigation .... 182 
 
 Fallacies in regard to Facts .... 182 
 False Induction . ..... 182 
 
 False Reasoning 183 
 
 Of the Nature of Reasoning » . . 183 
 
 Of the Syllogism and its Uses .... 184 
 
10 CONTENTS. 
 
 , Pag* 
 
 Of the Cautions in examining a Process of Reasoning 
 or Investigation ...... 187 
 
 Distinction between a Process of Reasoning and a Pro- 
 cess of Investigation . • . . ,190 
 Of Fallacies in Reasoning . . . . 19S 
 
 Of Mathematical Reasoning 202 
 
 Difference between the Sound Exercise of Judgment 
 
 and the Art of Disputation .... 205 
 
 Of the Culture and Regulation of the Judgment . 207 
 
 Intiuence of Attention 207 
 
 Influence of Prejudice 208 
 
 Influence of Passion, or State of Moral Feelings 208 
 Importance of a well-regulated Judgment , . 209 
 
 ^ II. OF THE USE OP REASON IN CORRECTING THE 
 
 IMPRESSIONS OF THE MIND IN REGARD TO EXTER- 
 NAL THINGS. 
 
 Nature and Effects of this Exercise of Reason . .211 
 Peculiar Conditions connected with the Suspension of it 212 
 
 I. Dreaming ...... 214 
 
 Peculiar Condition of the Mind in Dreaming 214 
 Origin of the various Classes of Dreams 
 
 1. Recent Events .... 215 
 
 2. Old Associations excited by Bodily 
 Sensations ..... 216 
 
 3. Old Associations recalled by a Process 
 
 of the Mind itself . . .220 
 
 4. Mental Emotions imbodied into 
 Dreams ..... 225 
 
 Dreams consist chiefly of Real Objects of 
 Conception ..... 231 
 
 Operations of an Intellectual Character in 
 Dreams 233 
 
 II. Somnambulism .... . . 237 
 
 Various Degrees of this Affection 
 Remarkable Condition, commonly called Dou- 
 ble Consciousness .... 241 
 
CONTENTS. 11 
 
 III. Insaniti . ...... 245 
 
 Peculiar Condition of the Mind constituting In- 
 sanity 246 
 
 Various Modifications of it, from Eccentricity to 
 
 Mania 243 
 
 Great Activity of the Mental Powers in many 
 
 Cases 249 
 
 Remarkable Loss of Recent Impressions, and sud- 
 den Revival of them on Recovery . . . 250 
 
 Hallucination confined to a single Point . . 253 
 
 Probable Origin of the peculiar Hallucinations 
 
 in dififerent cases of Insanity , . . 254 
 
 1. Propensities of Character . . . 254 
 
 2. Old Associations 255 
 
 3. Old Fictions of the Imagination . . 255 
 
 4. Bodily Feelings 256 
 
 6. Undefined Impression of the new and pe- 
 
 c'jliar Condition of the Mental Powers . 256 
 
 Melancholia — Propensity to Suicide . . 257 
 
 Origin and (causes of Insanity . . • . 259 
 
 Cautions in deciding on slight or suspected Cases 263 
 
 Liability of the Insane to Punishment , , 265 
 
 Moral Treatment of Insanity .... 268 
 
 Of Idiocy — Difterence between it and Insanity . 272 
 
 Cretinism 274 
 
 rV. Spectral Illusions. 
 
 Various Forms and Sources of them . . . 279 
 
 PART IV. 
 
 APPLICATION OF THE RULES OF PHILOSO- 
 PHICAL INVESTIGATION TO MEDICAL SCI 
 ENCE. 
 
 Uncertainty of Medicine 293 
 
 Sources of this Uncertainty . ... 294 
 
 I. Difficulty of tracing Eflfects to their true Causes 297 
 
12 CONTENTS. 
 
 I^ 
 
 2. Intervention of new Causes, which elude our Ob- 
 servation . . . .... 298 
 
 3. Difficulty in extending our Knowledge to new 
 Cases ; as we must generally art on Analogy, not 
 
 on Experience . . .... 299 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 ACQUISITION AND RECEPTION OF FACTS. 
 
 Rules to be observed, and Sources of Error to be 
 avoided, in the Reception of Facts . . . 800 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 ARKANGINO, COMBINING, AND SEPARATING FACTS. 
 
 Rules to be observed in this Process . . . 806 
 Evils arising from unsound Comhinations . . 307 
 Of the Effects produced on Medical Science by a Zeal 
 for Nosology 308 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 TRACING THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. 
 
 Importajice and Difficulty of this Process , . . 309 
 Sources of Fallacy in conducting it . . . .311 
 Of the Division of Causes into Predisposing, Exciting, 
 and Proximate ••••••• 317 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 DEDUCING GENERAL FACTS OR GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 
 
 Nature of Generalizing 319 
 
 Difference between Generalizing and Classification . 319 
 Rules of Generalizing, or of the Induction of General 
 Principles 323 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 1. That the Principle be a Fact . 
 
 2. That it be true of all the Individuals 
 Legitimate Use of Hypothesis . 
 
 IS 
 
 . 323 
 . 324 
 . 326 
 
 Roles to be observed by those who would con- 
 tribute TO THE Improvement of Mrdical Science 329 
 
 PART V. 
 
 VTEW OF THE QUALITIES AND ACQUIRE- 
 MENTS WHICH CONSTITUTE A WELL- 
 REGULATED MIND. 
 
 1. Habit of Attention .... 
 
 2. Re^^ulation of the Succession of Thoughts 
 
 3. Activity of Mind 
 
 4. Habits of Association and Reflection . 
 
 5. Proper Selection of Objects of Pursuit . 
 
 6. Government of the Imagination . 
 
 7. Culture and Regulation of the Judgment 
 
 Observing and Inventive Genius 
 
 8. Right Condition of the Moral Feelings . 
 
 B 
 
 834 
 335 
 337 
 337 
 337 
 338 
 339 
 341 
 345 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 In entering upon the following Essay, I find it ne- 
 cessary to offer some explanation of the views which 
 induce me to attempt a subject so foreign to those 
 inquiries by which 1 am in some measure known to 
 the public, and in which thry have been pleased 
 to receive ray researches in the most favourable 
 manner. 
 
 The study of the phenomena of mind presents a 
 subject of intense interest, not to the moral philoso- 
 pher only, but to every one who has in view the cul- 
 tivation of his own mental powers, or the proper 
 application of them to the investigation of truth in 
 any department of knowledge. During the preva- 
 lence of that system which has been called the Meta- 
 physics of the Schools, this important inquiry was 
 obscured by speculations of the most frivolous nature. 
 It is in modern times only that it has assumed a real 
 value and a practical importance, under the researches 
 of those eminent men who have cultivated the phi- 
 losophy of mind on the principles which are acted 
 upon in physical science, namely, a careful observa- 
 tion of facts, and conclusions drawn from these by 
 the most cautious induction. The chief hinderance 
 to the cultivation of the science on these principles 
 arises from the difficulty of procuring the facts : for 
 the only field in which the mental philosopher can 
 pursue his researches with perfect confidence is his 
 own mind. In his observations on the minds of other 
 
16 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 men he is obliged to judge of the internal operations 
 by external phenomena ; and in this manner a degree 
 of uncertainty attends his investigations, which does 
 not occur in physical science. From this source 
 also has probably arisen much of that difference of 
 opinion which we meet with in regard to the mental 
 powers : for, each inquirer having drawn his obser- 
 vations chiefly from one mind, namely, his own, it 
 was scarcely to be expected that there should not be 
 some diversity, or that facts derived in this manner 
 should possess the character of being universal. 
 
 The means by which this difficulty can be removed 
 must consist in an extensive collection of facts, illus- 
 trating the phenomena of mind in various individuals, 
 and under a variety of circumstances ; and there are 
 several points of view in which the subject is pecu- 
 liarly adapted to the medical observer. Mental mani- 
 festations are greatly modified by the condition of 
 those bodily organs by which the mind holds inter- 
 course with external things, especially the brain. It 
 becomes therefore a matter of the greatest interest 
 to ascertain the manner in which the manifestations 
 of mind are affected by diseases of these organs, as 
 well as to observe their condition in that remarkable 
 class of affections commonly called diseases of the 
 mind. Besides, in the affections which are referable 
 to both these classes, we often meet with manifesta- 
 tions of the most interesting kind, and such as are 
 calculated to illustrate, in a very striking manner, 
 important points in the philosophy of the mental 
 powers. It is thus in the power of the observing 
 physician to contribute valuable facts to the science 
 of mind; and it is almost unnecessary to add, that 
 the study may be turned to purposes of immediate 
 importance to his own inquiries. He does not need 
 to be reminded how much the mind acts upon the 
 body — that mental emotions often prove sources of 
 iUsease, or causes by which his remedies are modi- 
 fied or counteracted — and that, on the other hand, a 
 
INTRODrCTION. 17 
 
 remedy may often be introduced by the mind, capa- 
 ble of composing tumults of the corporeal functions, 
 whichi cannot be tranquillized by phjsical aid. 
 
 From the deep interest which the philoso]jhy of 
 mind thus presents to the medical inquirer, 1 have 
 been induced to attempt a slight outline of this im- 
 portant subject. In doing so, I do not profess to offer 
 any thing new or original. My object is to present 
 to the younger part of the profession some leading 
 ficts, which may serve to direct their further inquiries 
 on a subject of great and general interest. 
 
 This slight outline of the functions of mind will 
 be followed by an attempt to trace the rules which 
 ought to guide us in applying these powers to the 
 investigation of truth in any department of know- 
 ledge. The practical application of the subject will 
 lead to a general view of the laws or principles of 
 philosophical inquiry and inductive science, and will 
 then be directed in a more particular manner to the 
 purposes of medical investigation. This is attempted 
 in the hope that the principles which it is meant to 
 convey may be of use in giving precision to medical 
 investigations, by illustrating those rules of sound 
 induction which are acted upon in other departments 
 of science. 
 
 B2 
 
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
 
 ON THE 
 
 GENERAL NATURE AND OBJECTS 
 OF SCIENCE. 
 
 By the will of the Almighty Creator, all things m 
 nature have been placed in certain relations to each 
 other, which are fixed and uniform. In other words, 
 they have been endowed with capacities of acting 
 and capabilities of being acted upon, according to 
 certain uniform laws ; so that their actions take place 
 in the same manner in every instance in which the 
 same bodies are brought together under similar cir- 
 cumstances. We have a conviction, which appear? 
 to be original and instinctive, of the general uniform 
 ity of these relations ; and in this consists our con- 
 fidence in the regularity of all the operations of na- 
 ture. But the powers or principles on which the 
 relations depend are entirely hidden from us in our 
 present state of being. The province of human 
 knowledge is merely to observe the facts, and to 
 trace what their relations or sequences are. This is 
 to be accomplished only by a careful and extensive 
 observation of the facts as they pass before us, and 
 by carefully distinguishing their true or uniform rela- 
 tions from connexions which are only incidental and 
 temporary* 
 
20 GENERAL OBJECTS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 In our first observation of any particular series of 
 facts or events, we find a certain number of them 
 placed together in a state of conti.^uity or apparent 
 connexion. But we are not entitled from this to 
 assume the connexion to be any thing more than 
 incidental juxtaposition. Wlien, in the further pro- 
 gress of observation, we find the same events occur- 
 ring a certain number of times, in the same relations 
 or sequences to each other, we suspect that their 
 connexion is not merely that of incidental contiguity. 
 We begin to believe that there exists among them 
 such a relation as leads us, when w«j meet with some 
 of these events, to expect that certain others are to 
 ifoUow. Hence is excited our idea of power in refer- 
 ence to these events, or of the relation of cause and 
 effect. This relation, however, according to the ut- 
 most extent of our knowledge of it in any individual 
 instance, is founded entirely upon the fact of certain 
 events uniformly following one another. But when 
 we have found, by sufficient observation, the partic- 
 ular events which do thus follow one another, we 
 conclude that there is a connexion, whatever may be 
 the nature of it, in consequence of which the sequence 
 which we have observed will continue to recur in 
 the same fixed and uniform manner. In other words, 
 we conclude with confidence, that when we observe 
 the first of two such events, the second will follow ; 
 and that when we observe the second, the first has 
 preceded it. The first we call cause, the second 
 effect. Thus our general confidence in the uniform- 
 ity of the true relations or sequences of events is an 
 original or instinctive principle, and not the result 
 of experience ; but it is by experience that we ascer- 
 tain what the individual sequences are which ob- 
 serve this uniformity ; or, in other words, learn to 
 distinguish connexions which consist of incidental 
 contiguity from those which constitute true and uni- 
 form relations. 
 
 The natural tendency of the mind appears indeed 
 
ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF CAUSATION. 21 
 
 to be, to infer causation from every succession of 
 phenomena, and to expect uniformity in every se- 
 quence. It is from experience we learii that this 
 impression is not to be rehed on in regard to indi- 
 vidual sequences, but requires to be corrected by 
 observation. The result of our further experience 
 then is, to ascertain what those sequences or con- 
 nexions are which are uniform, and which, conse- 
 quently, we may consider as connected in the manner 
 of causation. We are thus first taught by experience 
 the caution which is necessary in considering events 
 as connected in the manner of cause and effect, and 
 learn not to assume this relation till, by further ex- 
 perience, we have ascertained that the sequence is 
 uniform. This caution, however, has no reference 
 to our instinctive impression Oi" causation, or our 
 absolute conviction that every event must have an 
 adequate cause ; it only relates to our fixing the ar- 
 rangement of individual antecedents, or, in other 
 words, to our determining what individual events we 
 are warranted in considering as the true antecedents 
 or causes of certain other events. This, accordingly, 
 can in many cases be accomphshed only by long and 
 extensive observation; while, in others, a single in- 
 stance may be sufficient to produce an absolute con- 
 viction of what is the true antecedent. A child who 
 has been only once burnt may dread the fire as cer- 
 tainly as if the accident had happened a hundred 
 times ; and there are many other instances in which 
 the conviction may be produced in the same rapid 
 manner. The natural tendency of the mind, in fact, 
 is not only to infer the connexion, but in many cases 
 to carry it further than the truth. If, for instance, 
 we suppose a man who, for the first time in his life, 
 has seen gunpowder explode upon a match being ap- 
 plied to it, he would probably have an immediate 
 conviction that a similar explosion would take place 
 again in similar circumstances. But he would per- 
 haps go further than this : he would probably expect 
 
23 GENERAL OBJECTS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 a similar explosion when he applied a match to other 
 black powders, with the nature of which he was un 
 acquainted, such as powdered charcoal. It is by 
 experience that this erroneous expectation would be 
 corrected, and that he would learn the precise in 
 stances in which the particular result takes place. 
 But it is also by experience that he learns the former 
 thoug-h the conviction was produced more immedi- 
 ately; for there is nothing in the characters of gun 
 powder and charcoal from which any man could 
 pronounce, by reasoning a priori, that the one would 
 explode with violence when a match was applied to 
 it, and the other remain entirely unchanged. 
 
 Thus, our general impression of causation is not 
 the result of experience, but an original and intuitive 
 principle of belief; that is, our absolute conviction 
 that every event must have an adequate cause. This 
 is, in fact, that great and fundamental truth by which, 
 from the properties of a known effect, we infer the 
 powers and qualities of an unknown cause. It is in 
 this manner, for example, that from the works of 
 nature we infer the existence and the attributes of 
 the Almighty Creator. But in judging of the con- 
 nexion between any two individual events in that 
 order of things which he has established, our idea 
 of causation is derived from experience alone. For, 
 in regard to any two such events, our idea of caus- 
 ation or of power amounts to nothing more than 
 our knowledge of the fact, that the one is mva- 
 riably the antecedent of the other Of the myste- 
 rious agency on which the conne siot. depends, we 
 know nothing, and never can know any thing in our 
 present state of being. We know that the apphcation 
 of a match always sets fire to gunpowder, and we say 
 that it has the power of doing so, or that it is the cause 
 of the explosion ; but we have not the least concep- 
 tion why the application of fire produces combustion 
 in an inflammable substance; — these expressions, 
 therefore, amount to nothing more than a statement 
 of the fact* thai the result is universal. 
 
PHYSICAL, EFFICIENT, AND FINAL CAUSES. 23 
 
 When we speak, therefore, of physical causes, in 
 rrgard to any of the phenomena of nature, we mean 
 lothing more than the fact of a certain uniform con- 
 nexion whicii has been observed between events. 
 Of efficient causes, or the manner in which the result 
 takes place, we know nothing. In this sense, indeed, 
 we may be said not to know the cause of any thing, 
 even of events which at first sight appear the most 
 simple and obvious. Thus, the communication of 
 motion from one body to another by impulse appears 
 a very simple phenomenon, — but how little idea have 
 we of the cause of it ! We say the bodies touch each 
 other, and so the motion is communicated. But, in 
 the first place, we cannot say why a body in motion, 
 coming in contact with one at rest, should put the 
 latter in motion ; and further, we know that they do 
 not come in contact. We may consider it, indeed, 
 as ascertained that there is no such thing as the ac- 
 tual contact of bodies under these circumstances; 
 and therefore the fact which appears so simple conies 
 to be as unaccountable as any phenomenon in nature. 
 What, again, appears more intelligible than an unsup- 
 ported body falling to the ground ? Yet what is more 
 inexplicable than that one mass of matter should thus 
 act upon another, at any distance, and even though 
 a vacuum be interposed between them 1 The same 
 observation will be seen to apply to all the facts 
 which are most familiar to us. Why, for example, 
 one medicine acts upon the stomach, another on the 
 bowels, a third on the kidneys, a fourth on the skin, 
 we have not the smallest conception ; we know only 
 the uniformity of the facts. 
 
 It is of importance to keep in mind the distinction 
 now referred to between physical and efficient causes, 
 as the former only are the proper objects of philo 
 sophical inquiry. The term final cause, again, has 
 been applied to a subject entirely diflTerent ; namely, 
 to the appearances of unity of design in the phenom- 
 ena of nature, and the manner in which means ar« 
 
24 GENERAL OBJECTS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 adapted to particular ends. The subject is one of 
 great and extensive importance, but it appears desi- 
 rable that the name were altered, though it is sanc- 
 tioned by high authority ; for, when viewed in con- 
 nexion with the sense in which the word cause is 
 employed in modern science, it expresses a meaning 
 remarkably different. The investigation to which 
 it refers is also of a distinct nature, though one of the 
 highest interest. It leads us chiefly to the inductions 
 of natural religion respecting a great and intelligent 
 First Cause ; but it may also be directed to the discov- 
 ery of truth in regard to the phenomena of nature. 
 One of the most remarkable examples of this last 
 application of it is to be found in the manner in which 
 Harvey was led to the discovery of the circulation 
 of the blood, by observing the valves in the veins, and 
 contemplating the uses to which that pecuUar struc- 
 ture might be adapted. 
 
 The object of all science is to ascertain these estab- 
 lished relations of things, or the tendency of certain 
 events to be uniformly followed by certain other 
 events; in other words, the aptitude of cert^-' oodles 
 to produce or to be followed by certair. cha-iges in 
 other bodies in particular circumstances. The object 
 of art is to avail ourselves of the knowledge thus 
 acquired, by bringing bodies into such circumstances 
 as are calculated to lead to those actions upon each 
 other of which we have ascertained them to be capa- 
 ble. Art, therefore, or the production of certain 
 results by the action of bodies upon each other, must 
 be founded upon science, or a knowledge of their 
 fixed and uniform relations and tendencies. This 
 principle applies to all sciences, and to the arts or 
 practical rules which are founded upon them ; and 
 the various sciences differ only in the particular 
 substances or events which are their more imme- 
 diate objects. 
 
 In the physical sciences, we investigate the rela- 
 
UNIFORMITY OF RELATIONS. 25 
 
 ♦ions of material substances, and their actions upon 
 each other, either of a mechanical or ohymical nature. 
 On the relations thus ascertained are founded the 
 mechanical and chymical arts, in which we produce 
 certain results by bringing bodies into such circum- 
 stances as are calculated to give rise to their peculiar 
 actions. But mental phenomena have also their re- 
 lations, which are hkewise fixed and uniform ; though 
 it may be more difficult to ascertain the truth in re- 
 gard to them, than in the relations of material things 
 The relations or sequences of mental phenomena 
 are to be considered in two points of view ; namely, 
 relations to each other, and relations to external 
 things. In regard to both, it seems necessary to 
 divide the phenomena themselves into three classes. 
 
 1. Simple intellect, or those powers by which we 
 perceive, remember, and combine facts or events, 
 and compare them with each other : such as percep 
 tion, memory, imagination, and judgment. 
 
 2. Passive emotions, or those by which the mind 
 is affected by certain pleasurable or painful feelings, 
 which are, or maj*^ be, confined entirely to the indi 
 vidual who is the subject of them. 
 
 3. Active emotions, or those which tend directly 
 to influence the conduct of men, either as moral and 
 responsible beings, or as members of society. 
 
 In all these classes, mental phenomena have cer- 
 tain relations to each other and to external things 
 the investigation of which is the object nf particu- 
 lar branches of science ; and these lead . u certain 
 arts or practical rules whch are founded upon them. 
 
 Intellectual science investigates the laws and re- 
 lations of the processes of simple intellect, as per- 
 ception, memory, imagination, and judgment; and 
 the proper cultivation and regidation of these is the 
 object of the practical art of intellectual education. 
 
 The passive emotions may be influenced or ex- 
 cited in two ways; namely, through our relations 
 M other sentient and intelligent bemgs, and by ma- 
 C 
 
26 GENERAL OBJECTS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 terial or inanimate things. To the former head are 
 referable many of the tenderest and most interest- 
 ing feelings of oar nature, as love, hope, joy, and 
 sorrow. To the latter belong those emotions which 
 come under the subject of taste, or the tendencies 
 of certain combinations of material things to ex- 
 cite emotions of a pleasurable or painful kind, — as our 
 impressions of the sublime, the beautiful, the terrible 
 or the ludicrous. The practical rules or processes, 
 connected with the science of the passive emotions, 
 arrange themselves into two classes, corresponding 
 to the two divisions now mentioned. To the for- 
 mer belong the regulation of the emotions, and all 
 those rules of conduct not exactly referable to the 
 higher subject of morals, which bear an extensive 
 influence on the ties of friendship — and the relations 
 of social and domestic intercourse. To the latter 
 belong chiefly those processes which come under 
 the head of the fine arts ; namely, the arts of the 
 painter, the sculptor, the architect, the musician, — 
 perhaps we may add, the poet and the dramatist. 
 
 The active emotions, or those which influence hu- 
 man conduct, are referable to two classes ; namely, 
 those which aflfect men individually as moral and re- 
 sponsible agents, and those which affect them as 
 united in large bodies constituting civil society. 
 The cultivation of the emotions of the former class, 
 and the investigation of the motives and principles 
 by which ^hey are influenced, belong to the high 
 subjects o morals and religion. The investigation 
 and control of emotions of the latter class come un- 
 der the science of politics ; and the practical art, 
 founded upon it, relates to those measures by which 
 the statesman attempts to control and regulate the 
 conduct of masses of mankind united as members 
 of a great civil community. 
 
 In medical science, the objects of our researches 
 are chiefly the relations between external things 
 and the living powers of animal bodies, — and the re- 
 
CERTAIN AND UNCERTAIN SCIENCES. 27 
 
 lations of these powers to each other ; — more par- 
 ticularly in regard to the tendencies of external 
 things to produce certain changes upon living bodies, 
 either a-s causes Oi' d'sease or as remedies. The 
 practical art founded upon this science leads to the 
 consideration of the means hv which we may avail 
 ourselves of this knowledge, by producing, in the 
 one case, actions upon the body which ve wish to 
 produce, and in the other, by counteracting or avoid- 
 ing actions which we wish to prevent. 
 
 In all these sciences, and the practical arts which 
 are founded upon them, the general principles are 
 the same ; namely, a careful observation of the na- 
 tural and uniform relations or tendencies of bodies 
 towards each other; and a bringing of those ten- 
 dencies into operation for the production of results. 
 All art, therefore, must be founded upon science, or 
 a correct knowledge of these relations; and all 
 science must consist of such a careful observation 
 of facts in regard to the relations, as shall enable 
 us confidently to pronounce upon those which are 
 fixed and uniform. He who follows certain arts or 
 practical rules, without a knowledge of the science 
 on which they are founded, is the mere artisan or 
 the empiric ; he cannot advance beyond the precise 
 rules which are given him, or provide for new oc- 
 currences and unforeseen difl^culties. In regard to 
 science, again, when the relations are assumed 
 hastily, or without a sufficiently extensive observa- 
 tion of facts, the process constitutes false science, 
 or false induction; and when practical rules are 
 founded upon such conclusions, they lead to error 
 and disappointment in the result which is expected. 
 
 The views which have now been referred to lead 
 us to principles by which the sciences are distin- 
 guished into those which are certain and those which 
 are, in a greater or less degree, uncertain. The 
 certainty of a science depends upon the facility and 
 
28 GENERAL OBJECTS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 correctness with which we ascertain the true rela- 
 tions of things, or trace effects to their true causes, 
 and causes to their true effects, — and calculate upon 
 the actions which arise out of these relations taking- 
 place with perfect uniformity. Tliis certainty we 
 easily attain in the purely physical sciences, or those 
 in wnich we have to deal only with inanimate mat- 
 ter. For in our investigation of the relations of ma- 
 terial bodies, whether mechanical or chymical, we 
 contrive experiments, in which by placing the bodies 
 in a variety of circumstances towards each other, 
 and excluding all extraneous influence, we come to 
 determine their tendencies with perfect certainty. 
 Having done so, we rely with confidence on these 
 tendencies continuing to be uniform ; and should we 
 in any instance be disappointed of the result which 
 we wish to produce, we are able, at once, to detect 
 the nature of some incidental cause by which the 
 result has been prevented, and to obviate the effect 
 of its interference. The consequence of this ac- 
 curate knowledge of their relations is, that we ac- 
 quire a power over material things ; but this power 
 is entirely limited to a certain control and direction 
 of their natural relations ; and we cannot change 
 these relations in the smallest particular. Our power 
 is of course also limited to those objects which are 
 within the reach of our immediate influence ; but 
 with respect to those which are beyond this influ- 
 ence, as the heavenly bodies, the result of our 
 knowledge appears in a manner not less striking, in 
 the minute accuracy with which we are enabled to 
 foretel their movements, even at very distant periods. 
 1 need only mention the correctness with which the 
 astronomer calculates eclipses and the appearance 
 of comets. 
 
 With these characters of certainty in the purely 
 physical sciences, two sources of uncertainty are 
 contrasted in those branches of science in which we 
 have to deal with mental operations, or with the 
 
CERTAIN AND UNCERTAIN SCIENCES. 29 
 
 powers of living bodies. The first of these depends 
 upon the circumstance, that, in investigating the re- 
 lations and tendencies in these cases, we are gene- 
 rally obhged to trust to observation alone, as the 
 phenomena happen to be presented to us, and can- 
 not confirm or correct these observations by direct 
 experiment. And as the actual connexions in which 
 the phenomena occur to us are often very different 
 from iheir true relations, it is in many cases ex- 
 tremely difficult to ascertain the true relations , that 
 is, to refer effects to their true causes, and to trace 
 causes to their true effects. Hence just conclusions 
 are arrived at slowly, and after a long course of 
 occasional observations ; and we may be obliged to 
 go on for a long time without acquiring any conclu- 
 sions which we feel to be worthy of confidence. In 
 these sciences, therefore, there is great temptation 
 to grasp at prematura inductions; and when such 
 have been brought forward with confidence, there is 
 often difficulty in exposing their fallacy ; for in such 
 a case it may happen, that as long a course of ob- 
 servation is required for exposing the false conclu- 
 sion, as for ascertaining the true. In physical 
 science, on the other hand, a single experiment may 
 often overturn liie most plausible hypothesis, or may 
 estabhsh one which was proposed in conjecture. 
 
 The second source of uncertainty in this class of 
 sciences consists in the fact, that, even after we 
 have ascertained the true relations of things, we 
 may be disappointed of the results which we wish 
 to produce, when we bring their tendencies into ope- 
 ration. This arises from the interposition of other 
 causes, by which the true tendencies are modified or 
 counteracted, and the operation of which we are not 
 able either to calculate upon or to control. The 
 new causes, which operate in this manner, are chiefly 
 certain powers in living animal bodies, and the wills, 
 feelings, and propensities of masses of human be- 
 ings, which we have not the means of reducing to 
 C2 
 
30 GENERAL OBJECTS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 any fixed or uniform laws. As examples of the un- 
 certain sciences, therefore, we may mention medi- 
 cine and political economy ; and their uncertainty 
 is referable to the same sources, namely, the diffi- 
 culty of ascertaining the true relations of things, or 
 of tracing effects to their true causes, and causes to 
 their true effects; — and the intervention of new 
 causes which elude our observation, while they in- 
 terfere with the natural tendencies of things, and 
 defeat our attempts to produce certain results by 
 bringing these into action. The scientific physician 
 well knows the difficulty of ascertaining the true re- 
 lations of those things which are the proper objects 
 of his attention, and the uncertainty which attends 
 all his efforts to produce particular results. A per- 
 son, for example, affected with a disease, recovers 
 under the use of a particular remedy. A second is 
 affected with the same disease, and uses this remedy 
 without any benefit ; while a third recovers under a 
 very different remedy, or without any treatment at 
 all.' And even in those cases in which he has dis- 
 tinctly ascertained true relations, new causes inter- 
 vene and disappoint his endeavours to produce re- 
 sults by means of these relations. He knows, for 
 example, a disease which would certainly be relieved 
 by the full operation of diuretics ; — and he knows 
 various substances which have unquestionably diu- 
 retic virtues. But in a particular instance he may 
 fail entirely in relieving the disease by the most as- 
 siduous use of these remedies ; — for the real and 
 true tendencies of these bodies are interrupted by 
 certain other causes in the constitution iiself, which 
 entirely elude his observation, and are in no degree 
 under his control. 
 
 It is unnecessary to point out the similarity of 
 these facts to the uncertainty experienced by the 
 statesman in his attempts to influence the interests, 
 the propensities, and the actions of masses of man- 
 kind ; or to show how often measures which have 
 
LIMITED NATURE Of OUR FACULTIES. 31 
 
 been planned with every effort of human wisdom 
 fail of the results which they were intended to pro- 
 duce, or are followed by consequences remarkably 
 different. Nothing indeed can show in a more strik- 
 ing- manner the uncertainty which attaches to this 
 science, than the different aspects in which the same 
 measure is often viewed by different men distin- 
 guished for political wisdom and talent. I abstain 
 from alluding to particular examples, but those ac- 
 customed to attend to public affairs will find little 
 difficulty in fixing upon remarkable instances in 
 which measures have been recommended by wise 
 and able men, as calculated to lead to important 
 benefits, while others of no inferior name for talent 
 and wisdom have, with equal confidence, predicted 
 from them consequences altogether different. Such 
 are the difficulties of tracing effects to their true 
 causes, and causes to their true effects, when we have 
 to deal, not with material substances simply, but with 
 the powers of living bodies, or with the wills, the in- 
 terests, and propensities of human bemgs. 
 
 One other reflection arises out of the view which 
 has been given of this important subject. The object 
 of all science, whether it refer to matter or to mind, 
 is simply to ascertain facts, and to trace their rela- 
 tions to each other. The powers which regulate 
 these relations are entirely hidden from us in our 
 present imperfect state of being ; and by grasping at 
 principles which are beyond our reach, we leave that 
 path of inquiry which alone is adapted to our limited 
 faculties, and involve ourselves in error, perplexity, 
 and darkness. It is humbling to the pride of human 
 reason, but it is not the less true, that the highest 
 acquirement ever made by the most exalted genius 
 of man has been only to trace a part, and a very 
 small part, of that order which the Deity has estab- 
 t'^hed in his works. When we endeavour to pry into 
 the causes of this order, we perceive the operation 
 
82 GENERAL OBJECTS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 of powers which lie far beyond the reach of our 
 limited faculties. They who have made the highes 
 advances in true science will be the first to confess 
 how Imiited these faculties are, and how small a part 
 we can comprehend of the ways of the Almighty 
 Creator. They will be the first to acknowledge, that 
 the highest acquirement of human wisdom is to ad- 
 vance to that line which is its legitimate boundary, 
 and there contemplating the wondrous field which 
 lies beyond it, to bend in humble adoration before a 
 wisdom which it cannot fathom, and a power which 
 cannot comprehend 
 
INQUIRIES 
 
 CONCERNING THE 
 
 INTELLECTUAL POWERS, d&c 
 
 PART I. 
 
 OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF OUE 
 KNOWLEDGE OF MIND. 
 
 The mind is that part of our being which thinks 
 and wills, — remembers and reasons : we know no- 
 thing of it except from these functions. By means of 
 the corporeal senses it holds intercourse with the 
 things of the external world, and receives impres- 
 sions from them. But of this connexion also we 
 know nothing but the facts ; when we attempt to 
 speculate upon its nature and cause, we wander at 
 once from the path of philosophical inquiry into con- 
 jectures which are as far beyond the proper sphere 
 as they are beyond the reach of the human faculties. 
 The object of true science on such a subject, there- 
 fore, is simply to investigate the facts, or the relations 
 of phenomena, respecting the operations of mind 
 itself, and the intercourse which it carries on with 
 the things of the external world. 
 
 This important rule in the philosophy of mind has 
 been fully recognised in very modern times only, so 
 
34 EXTENT OF OUR KNOWLEDHF OF MIND; 
 
 that the science, as a faithful interpretation of nature, 
 may be considered as of recent origin. Before the 
 period now referred to the investigation was encum- 
 bered by the most fruitless speculations respecting 
 the essence of mind, and other discussions which led 
 to no discovery of truth. It was contended, for ex- 
 ample, that the mind cannot act where it is not pres- 
 ent, and that consequently it cannot be said to per- 
 ceive external objects themselves, but only their 
 images, forms, or sensible species, which were said 
 to be conveyed through the senses, and represented 
 to the mind in the same manner in which images are 
 formed in a camera obscura. By the int'^rnal func- 
 tions of mind these sensible species were then sup- 
 posed to be refined into phantasms, the objects of 
 memory and imagination ; and these, after undergo- 
 ing a further process, became intelligible species, the 
 objects of pure intellect. By a very natural applica- 
 tion of this doctrine, it was maintained by Bishop 
 Berkeley and the philosophers of his school, that as 
 the mind can perceive nothing but its own impres- 
 sions or images, we can derive no evidence from our 
 senses of the existence of the external world ; and 
 Mr. Hume carried the argument a little further, by 
 maintaining that we have as little proof of the exist- 
 ence of mind, and that nothing exists in the universe 
 except impressions and ideas. Of another sect of 
 philosophers who arose out of the same system, each 
 individual professed to believe his own existence, 
 but would not admit the existence of any other being ; 
 hence they received the appropriate name of Egoists. 
 The various eminent individuals by whom the fal- 
 lacy of these speculations was exposed, combated 
 them upon the principle that the doctrine of ideas is 
 entirely a fiction of philosophers ; and that a confi- 
 dence in the information conveyed to us by our senses 
 must be considered as a first truth, or a fundamental 
 law of our nature, susceptible of no explanation, and 
 admitting of no other evidence than that which is 
 
SPECULATIONS OF THE SCHOOL^. 39 
 
 derived from the universal conviction of mankind. 
 Nor does it, to common minds, appear a slight indi- 
 cation of the validity of this mode of reasoning, that 
 the philosophers who supported this theory do not 
 appear to have acted upon their own system ; but 
 in every thing which concerned their personal ac- 
 commodation or personal safety, showed the same 
 confidence in the evidence of their senses as other 
 men. 
 
 The deductions made from the ideal theory by 
 Berkeley and Hume seem to have been applications 
 of it which its former advocates had not contem- 
 plated. But it is a singular fact, as stated by Dr. 
 Reid, that nearly all philosophers, from Plato to Mr. 
 Hume, agree in maintaining that the mind does not 
 perceive external things themselves, but only their 
 ideas, images, or species. This doctrine was founded 
 upon the maxim that mind cannot act where it is not 
 present ; and we find one writer only who, admitting 
 the maxim, called in quesiion the application of it 
 so far as to maintain that the mind, in perceiving 
 external things, leaves the body, and comes into con- 
 tact with the objects of its perception. 
 
 Such speculations ought to be entirely banished 
 from the science of mind, as not only useless and 
 unprofitable, but as referring to things entirely be- 
 yond the reach of the human faculties, and therefore 
 contrary to the first principles of philosophical inves- 
 tigation. To the same class we are to refer all 
 speculations in regard to the essence of mind, the 
 manner in which thought is produced, and the means 
 by which t^ie intercourse is carried on between the 
 mind and external objects. These remarkable func- 
 tions were at one time explained by an imagmary 
 essence called the animal spirits, which were sup- 
 posed to be in constant motion, performing the office 
 of messengers between the brain and the organs of 
 sense. By another class of philosophers, of no very 
 ancient date, thinking was ascribed to vibrations in 
 
36 EXTENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF MIND. 
 
 the particles of the brain. The communication of 
 perceptions from the senses to the mind has been 
 accounted for in the same manner by the motions 
 of the nervous fluid, by vibrations of the nerves, or 
 by a subtile essence, resembling electricity or gal- 
 vanism. The mind, again, has been compared to a 
 camera obscura, to a mirror, and to a storehouse. 
 In opposition, hov/ever, to all such hypotheses, which 
 are equally incapable either of proof or of refutation, 
 our duty is to keep steadily in view, that the objects 
 of true science are facts alone, and the relations of 
 these facts to each other. The mind can be com- 
 pared to nothing in nature ; it has been endowed by 
 its Creator with a power of perceiving external 
 things ; but the manner in which it does so is entirely 
 bej^ond our comprehension. All attempts, therefore, 
 to explain or illustrate its operations by a reference 
 to any thing else can be considered only as vain and 
 futile. They are endeavours to establish a resem- 
 blance where there is not the vestige of an analogy ; 
 and consequently they can lead to no useful result. 
 It is only by a rigid adherence to this course of inves- 
 tigation that we can expect to make any progress in 
 true knowledge, or to impart to our inquiries in any 
 department of science the characters either of truth 
 or utility. 
 
 The ideal theory, with all the doctrines founded 
 upon it, may now'be considered as gone by. But 
 certain speculations are still occasionally brought 
 out by writers of a particular order, which are refer- 
 able to the same class, namely, hypotheses which 
 are to be treated, not merely as unsound, but as being, 
 by their very nature, directly opposed to the first prin- 
 ciples of philosophical inquiry. Among these, the 
 most prominent is the doctrine of materialism, of 
 which it may be advisable to take a shght view in 
 the commencement of this essay. On the principles 
 which have been referred to, the following considera- 
 tions may be submitted as bearing upon this subject. 
 
MATERIALISM. 37 
 
 The term Matter is a name which we apply to a 
 certain combination of properties, or to certain sub- 
 stances which are solid, extended, and divisible, and 
 which are known to us only by these properties. 
 The term Mind, in the same manner, is a name which 
 we apply to a certain combination of functions, or 
 to a certain power which we feel within, which 
 thinks, and \\dlls, and reasons; and is known to us 
 only by these functions. The former we know only 
 by our senses, the latter only by our consciousness. 
 In regard to their essence or occult qualities, we 
 know quite as httle about matter as we do about 
 mind ; and in as far as our utmost conception of them 
 extends, we have no ground for believing that they 
 have any thing in common. The true object of phi- 
 losophy is simply to investigate the facts in regard 
 to both ; and materiaUsm is not to be Viewed only 
 as unsound reasoning, but as a logical absurdity, and 
 a total misconception of the first principles of philo- 
 sophical inquiry. Does the materialist tell us that 
 the principle which thinks is material, or the result 
 of organization, we have only to ask him what light 
 he expects to throw upon the subject by such an as- 
 sertion ] For the principle which thinks is know^i 
 to us only by thinking ; and the substances which 
 are solid and extended are known to us only by their 
 solidity and extension. When we say of the former 
 that it'is immaterial, we simply express the fact that 
 it is known to us by properties altogether distinct 
 from the properties to which we have given the name 
 of matter, and, as far as we know, has nothing in com- 
 mon with them. Beyond these properties, we know 
 as little about matter as we do about mind, so that 
 materialism is scarcely less extravagant than would 
 be the attempt to explain any phenomenon by refer- 
 ring it to some other altogether distinct and dissimi- 
 lar ; to say, for example, that colour is a modification 
 of sound, or gravity a species of fermentation. The 
 assertion, indeed, would be fully as plausible, anO 
 D 
 
38 EXTENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF MIND. 
 
 calculated to throw as much light upon the subject, 
 were a person anxious to explain the nature of mat- 
 ter, to tell us that it is the result of a particular mani 
 Testation of mind. Something analogous to this, in 
 fact, seems to be the foundation of the theory of Bos- 
 covich, who conceives all bodies to consist of unex- 
 tended atoms or mathematical points endowed with 
 a certain power of repulsion, and consequently makes 
 the essence of matter to consist merely in the prop- 
 erty of resistance. We have, in truth, the same kind 
 of evidence for the existence of mind that we have 
 for the existence of matter, namely, from its prop- 
 erties ; and of the two, the former appears to be the 
 least liable to deception. " Of all the truths we 
 know," says Mr. Stewart, " the existence of mind is 
 the most certain. Even the system of Berkeley con- 
 cerning the non-existence of matter is far more con- 
 ceivable than that nothing but matter exists in the 
 universe." 
 
 A similar mode of reasoning may be applied to the 
 modification of materialism more JDrevalent in mod- 
 ern times, by which mind is considered as a result 
 of organization, or, in other words, a function of the 
 brain ; and upon which has been founded the conclu- 
 sion, that, like our bodily senses, it will cease to be 
 when the bodily frame is dissolved. The brain, it is 
 true, is the centre of that influence on which depend 
 sensation and motion. There is a remarkable con- 
 nexion between this organ and the manifestations 
 of mind ; and by various diseases of the brain these 
 manifestations are often modified, impaired, or sus- 
 pended. We shall afterward see that these results 
 are very far from being uniform ; but even if they 
 were uniform, the facts would warrant no such con- 
 clusion respecting the nature of mind ; for they ac- 
 cord equally with the supposition that the brain is 
 the organ of communication between the mind and 
 the external world. When the materialist advances 
 a single step beyond this, he plunges at once into 
 
MATERIALISM. 39 
 
 conclusions which are entirely gratuitous and un- 
 warranted. We rest nothing more upon this argu- 
 ment than that these conclusions are unwarranted ^ 
 but we might go further than this, and contend that 
 the presumption is clearly on the other side, when 
 we consider the broad and obvious distinction which 
 exists between the peculiar phenomena of mind and 
 those functions which are exercised through the 
 means of bodily organization. They do not admit 
 of being brought into comparison, and have nothing 
 in. common. The most exquisite of our bodily senses 
 are entirely dependent for their exercise upon im- 
 pressions from externa] things. We see not without 
 the presence both of light and a body reflecting it. 
 and if we could suppose light to be anniliilated, 
 though the eye were to retain its perfect condition, 
 sight would be extinguished. But mind owns no 
 such dependence on external things, except in the 
 origin of its knowledge in regard to them. When 
 this knowledge has once been acquired it is retained 
 and recalled at pleasure ; and mind exercises its va- 
 rious functions without any dependence upon im- 
 pressions from the external world. That which has 
 long ceased to exist is still distinctly before it, or is 
 recalled after having been long forgotten, in a man- 
 gier even still more wonderful; and scenes, deeds, or 
 ifeings, which never existed, are called up in long and 
 harmonious succession, invested with all the char- 
 acters of truth, and all the vividness of present exist- 
 ence. The mind remembers, conceives, combines, 
 and reasons ; it loves, and fears, and hopes, in the 
 *otal absence of any impression from without that 
 can influence in the smallest degree these emotions : 
 and we have the fullest conviction that it would con- 
 tinue to exercise the same functions in undiminished 
 activity, though all material things were at once an- 
 nihilated. 
 
 This argument, indeed, may be considered as only 
 negative, but this is all that tho subject admits oi 
 
40 EXTENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF MIND. 
 
 For when we endeavour to speculate directly on the 
 essence of mind, we are immediately lost in per- 
 plexity, in consequence of our total ignorance of the 
 subject, and the use of terms borrowed from anal- 
 ogies with material things. Hence the unsatisfac- 
 tory nature of every physiological or metaphysical 
 argument respecting the essence of mind, arising 
 entirely from the attempt to reason the subject in a 
 manner of which it is not susceptible. It admits 
 not of any ordinaiy process of logic, for the facts 
 on which it rests are the objects of consciousness 
 only ; and the argument must consist in an appeal 
 to the consciousness of every man, that he feels a 
 ^wer within totally distinct from any function of 
 tie body. AVhat other conception than this can he 
 form of that power by which he recalls the past, 
 and provides for the future ; by which he ranges un- 
 controlled from world to world, and from system to 
 system ; surveys the works of all-creating power, 
 and rises to the contemplation of the eternal Cause ] 
 To what function of matter shall he liken that prin- 
 ciple by which he loves and fears, and joys and sor- 
 rows ; by which he is elevated with hope, excited 
 by enthusiasm, or sunk in the horrors of despair 1 
 These changes also he feels, in many instances, to 
 be equally independent of impressions from without, 
 and of the condition of his bodily frame. In the 
 most peaceful state of every corporeal function, pas- 
 sion, remorse, or anguish may rage within; and 
 while the body is racked by the most frightful dis- 
 eases the mind may repose in tranquillity and hope. 
 He is taught by physiology that every part of his 
 body is in d constant state of change, and that within 
 a certain period every particle of it is renewed. 
 But, amid these changes, he feels that the being 
 whom he calls himself remains essentially the same. 
 Jn particular, his remembrance of the occurrences 
 of his early days, he feels to be totally inconsistent 
 
{MATERIALISM. 4 1 
 
 with the idea of an impression made upon a matRrial 
 org'an, unless he has recourse to the absurdity of 
 supposing that one series of particles, as they de- 
 parted, transferred the picture to those which came 
 to occupy their room. 
 
 If the being, then, which we call mind or soul be, 
 to the utmost extent of our knowledge, thus dis- 
 similar to and distinct from anything that we know 
 to be a result of bodily organization, what reason 
 have we to believe that it should be affected by any 
 change in the arrangement of material organs, ex- 
 cept in so far as relates to its intercourse with this 
 external world? The effects of that change which 
 we call the death of an animal body are nothing 
 more than a change in the arrangement of its con- 
 stituent elements; for it can be demonstrated, on 
 the strictest principles of chymistry, that not one 
 particle of these elements ceases to exist. We 
 have, in fact, no conception of annihilation ; and our 
 whole experience is opposed to the belief that one 
 atom which ever existed has ceased to exist. There 
 is, therefore, as Dr. Brown has well remarked, in 
 the very decay of the body, an analogy which w^ould 
 seem to indicate the continued existence of the 
 thinking principle, since that which we term decay 
 is itself only another name for continued existence. 
 To conceive, then, that any thing mental ceases to 
 exist after death, when we know that every thing 
 corporeal continues to exist, is a gratuitous assump- 
 tion, contrary to every rule of philosophical inquiry, 
 and in direct opposition, not only to all the facts re- 
 lating to mind itself, but even to the analogy which 
 is furnished by the dissolution of the bodily frame. 
 
 To this mode of reasoning it has been objected, 
 that it would go to establish an immaterial principle 
 in the lower animals, which in them exhibits many 
 of the phenomena of mind. 1 have only to answer 
 be it so. There are in the lower animals many 
 D2 
 
42 EXTENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF MIND. 
 
 of the phenomena of mind; and, with regard to 
 these, we also contend, that they are entirely dis- 
 tinct from any thing we know as the properties of 
 matter, — which is all that we mean, or can mean, 
 by being immaterial. There are other principles 
 superadded to material things, of the nature of which 
 we are equally ignorant ; such, for example, as the 
 principle of vegetable life, and that of animal life. 
 To say that these are properties of matter is merely 
 arguing about a term ; for what we mean by matter 
 is something which is sohd, extended, and divisible. 
 That these properties are, in certain individuals, com- 
 bined with simple or vegetable life, — in others, with 
 animal life, that is, life and the powers of sensation 
 and motion, — and in others with animal hfe, and 
 certain of those properties which we call mind, — are 
 all facts equally beyond our comprehension. For 
 any thing we know, they may all be immortal prin- 
 ciples ; and for any thing we know, matter itself 
 may be immortal. The simple truth is, that we 
 know nothing on the subject ; and while, on the one 
 hand, we have no title to assume an essence to be 
 mortal because it possesses only the properties of 
 matter ; neither, on the other hand, have we any 
 right to infer an essence to be immortal, because it 
 possesses properties different from those of matter. 
 We talk, indeed, about matter, and we talk about 
 mind ; we speculate concerning materiality and imma- 
 terialit)'^, until we argue ourselves into a kind of 
 belief that we really understand something of the 
 subject. The truth is that we understand nothing. 
 Matter and mind are known to us by certain prop- 
 erties ; these properties are quite distinct from 
 each other ; but in regard to both, it is entirely out 
 of the reach of oui faculties to advance a single 
 step beyond the facts which are before us. "Whether 
 in their substratum or ultimate essence, they are the 
 same, or whether they are different, we know not. 
 
MATERIALISM. 43 
 
 and never can know in our present state of being. 
 Let us, then, be satisfied with the facts, when our 
 utmost faculties can carry us no farther; let us 
 cease to push our feeble speculations, when our duty 
 s only to wonder and adore. 
 
 These considerations, while they are directly op- 
 posed to the crude conclusions of the materialist, 
 also serve to show us how much the subject is re- 
 moved beyond our limited faculties ; and it is not on 
 such speculations, therefore, that we rest the evi- 
 dence for a future state of being. We know no- 
 thing of the nature or the essence of mind ; but what- 
 ever may be its essence, and whatever may be the 
 nature and extent of that mysterious connexion 
 whicli the Deity has established between it and our 
 bodily organization, these points have no reference 
 whatever to the great question of its future exist 
 ence. This is a principle which seems to have been 
 too much lost sight of in the discussion of this sub- 
 ject, namely, that our speculations respecting the 
 immateriality of the rational human soul have no in- 
 fluence on our belief of its immortahty. This mo- 
 mentous truth rests on a species of evidence alto- 
 gether different, which addresses itself to the moral 
 constitution of man. It is found in those principles 
 of his nature by which he feels upon his spirit the 
 awe of a God, and looks forward to the future with 
 anxiety or with hope ; — by which he knows to dis- 
 tinguish truth from falsehood and evil from good, 
 and has forced upon him the conviction that he is 
 a moral and responsible being. This is the power 
 of conscience, that monitor within which raises its 
 voice in the breast of every man, a witness for his 
 Creator. He who resigns himself to its guidance, 
 and he who repels its warnings, are both compelled 
 to acknowledge its power ; and, whether the good 
 man rejoices in the prospect of immortality, or the 
 victim of remorse withers beneath an influence un- 
 
4i EXTENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OP MIND. 
 
 seen by human eye, and shrinks from the anticipa- 
 tion of a reckoning to come, each has forced upon 
 him a conviction, such as argument never gave, that 
 the being which is essentially himself is distinct from 
 any function of the body, and will survive in undi- 
 minished vigour when the body shall have fallen into 
 decay. 
 
 When, indeed, we take into the inquiry the high 
 principles of moral obligation, and the moral govern- 
 ment of the Deity, this important truth is entirely 
 independent of all our feeble speculations on the 
 essence of mind. For though we were to suppose, 
 with the materialist, that the rational soul of man 
 IS a mere chymical combination, which, by the dis- 
 solution of its elements, is dissipated to the four 
 winds of heaven, where is the improbability that 
 the Power which framed the wondrous compound 
 may cohect these elements again, and combine them 
 aneV, for the great purposes of his moral adminis- 
 tration. In our speculations on such a momentous 
 subject we are too apt to be influenced by our con- 
 ceptions of the powers and properties of physical 
 things ; but there is a point where this principle must 
 be abandoned, and where the soundest philosophy- 
 requires that we take along with us a full recogni- 
 sance of the power of God. 
 
 There is thus, in the consciousness of every man, 
 a deep impression of continued existence. The 
 casuist may reason against it till he bewilder him- 
 self in his own sophistries; but a voice within gives 
 the lie to his vain speculations, and pleads vrith au- 
 thority for a life which is to come. The sincere and 
 humble inquirer cherishes the impression, while he 
 seeks for farther light on a subject so momentous ; 
 and he thus receives, with absolute conviction, the 
 truth which beams upon him from the revelation of 
 God, — that the mysterious part of his being, which 
 thinks, and wills, and reasons, shall indeed survive 
 the wreck of its mortal tenement, and is destined 
 for immortality. 
 
PART n. 
 
 OF THE ORIGIN OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF 
 FACTS RELATING BOTH TO MIND AND 
 MATTER. 
 
 Among writers on the science of mind, there was 
 formerly much controversy in regard to the origin 
 of our ideas. Some maintained that they are 
 derived entirely from perception, that is, through 
 the external senses; others considered them as 
 arising partly from perception and partly from con- 
 sciousness, or reflection; and some added a third 
 class, which they called innate ideas, and which 
 were supposed to exist in the mind itself, inde- 
 pendently of and prior to the exercise either of per- 
 ception or reflection. This phraseology had its 
 origin in the ancient theory of ideas, according to 
 which something was supposed to exist distinct 
 both from the mind and the external object of its 
 perception. This, as we have formerly seen, was 
 what philosophers meant by an idea. It was be- 
 lieved to be the immediate object of the mind's per- 
 ception, but to be only a kind of image or repre- 
 sentative of the object perceived. This hypothesis, 
 which kept its place in the science of mind till a 
 very recent period, is now generally admitted to 
 have been a fiction of philosophers ; and the phrase- 
 ology respecting ideas is abandoned by the best 
 practical writers ; because, though the ancient doc- 
 trine be exploded, and the term may be used only in 
 a figurative sense, it still seems to imply something 
 existing in the mind distinct from the mind itself. 
 The impressions derived from external things aro 
 therefore to be considered as the occasions on which 
 
46 ORIGIN OF OUR KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 the various powers of the mmd are brought int"» 
 action. These powers themselves then become the 
 objects of consciousness or reflection, and by theL 
 further exercise we acquire certain notions which 
 arise out of the mental operations. This doctrine 
 gives no encouragement to the scheme of i.iaterial- 
 ism, for it is clear that we cannot remember till we 
 are furnished with some fact to be remembered ; but 
 this can never be supposed to affect our belief in the 
 existence of the power of memory before the fact 
 w^as so furnished. If we could suppose the case of 
 a man who had lived all his hfe in the dark, he cer- 
 tainly could not see, but we should not say that the 
 admission of light imparted to him the power of 
 vision ; it only furnished the circumstances which 
 gave occasion to the exercise of sight. It has 
 accordingly been shown by Mr. Stewart, that though 
 we may not be conscious of our mental powers till 
 they are called into action, yet this may arise from 
 the most simple sensation, — such as affords no evi- 
 dence of the properties, or even of the existence 
 of the material world. 
 
 Through the senses, then, we acquire a knowledge 
 of the facts relating to external things. The mental 
 processes thus brought into action then become the 
 subjects of consciousness, and we acquire a know- 
 ledge of the facts relating to them. By a further 
 exercise of these powers on various facts referring 
 to both matter and mind, we acquire certain notions 
 arising out of our reflection upon the relations of 
 these facts, such as our notions of time, motion, 
 number, cause and effect, and personal identity ; and 
 we acquire, further, the impression of certain funda- 
 mental laws of belief, which are not referable to 
 any process of reasoning, but are to be considered 
 as a part of our constitution, or a spontaneous and 
 instinctive exercise of reason in every sound mind. 
 
 The origin of our knowledge then is referable. 
 In a philosophical point of view, to perception and 
 
SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 47 
 
 leflection. But, in point of fact, the knowledge 
 which is acquired by an individual through his own 
 perception and reflection is but a small part of what 
 le possesses; much of the knowledge possessed by 
 every one is acquired through the perceptions of 
 other men. In an essay, therefore, which is in- 
 tended to be entirely practical, I shall include this 
 last department under the head of Testimony. The 
 division of this part of the subject will therefore be, 
 
 1. Sensation and Perception. 
 
 2. Consciousness and Reflection. 
 
 3. Testimony. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 OP SENSATION AND PEBCEPTiqK. 
 
 We know notliitig ul perception except me fact 
 that certain impressions made upon the organs of 
 sense convey to the mind a knowledge of the 
 properties of external things. Some of the older 
 speculations on this subject have already been 
 referred to. In these the mind was compared to a 
 camera obscura, and the transmission of the forms 
 or images of things to it from the organs of sense 
 was explained by the motion of the animal spirits, 
 or the nervous fluid, or by vibrations in the sub- 
 stance of the nerves. All such speculations are now 
 aismissed from the investigation, being considered 
 as attempts to penetrate into mysteries which are 
 beyond the reach of the human faculties, and conse- 
 quently not the legitimate objects of philosophical 
 inquiry. 
 
 Our first knowledge of the existence and proper- 
 ties of the material world is evidently of a complex 
 
48 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
 
 nature. It seems to arise from the combined action 
 of several senses, convejing to us the general 
 notion of certain essences which are soHd and ex- 
 tended, or possessed of those properties which 
 characterize material things. Without this general 
 knowledge previously acquired, our various senses 
 acting individually could convey to us no definite 
 notion of the properties of external things. A 
 smell, that is, a mere odour, for example, might be 
 perceived by us, but would convey nothing more 
 than the ^sensation simply. It could not communi- 
 cate the impression of this being a property of an 
 external body, until we had previously acquired a 
 knowledge of the existence of that body, and had 
 come by observation to associate the sensation with 
 the body from which it proceeds. The same holds 
 true of the other senses, and we are thus led at the 
 very first step of our inquiry to a complicated pro- 
 cess of mind without which our mere sensations 
 could convey to us no definite knowledge. 
 
 Having thus acquired a knowledge of the exist- 
 ence and general properties of material things, we 
 next derive from our various senses a knowledge 
 of their more minute characters. These are gene- 
 rally divided into primary and secondary. The 
 primary qualities of material things are such as 
 are essential, and must at all times belong to matter ; 
 such as solidity and extension. These properties 
 necessarily convey to us a conviction of something 
 existing out of the mind, and distinct from its own 
 sensations. The secondary qualities, again, are 
 colour, temperature, smell, taste, &c. These are 
 not essential properties of matter, but qualities pro- 
 ducing sensations in a sentient being ; they may or 
 they may not belong to any particular body, or they 
 may be attached to it at one time and not at another. 
 Hence they convey to us primarily no definite 
 notion in regard to the existence or properties of 
 external things, except, as Mr. Stewart expresses it, 
 
SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 49 
 
 "as the unknown cause of a known sensation." 
 One of the quibbles or paradoxes of the scholastic 
 philosophy was, denying' the real existence of these 
 secondary qualities"^ of matter. Every one is 
 familiar with the humorous account given in the 
 " Guardian" of the attainments of a youth from col- 
 lege, and his display of them when on a visit to 
 Lady Lizard, his mother. " When the girls were 
 sorting a set of knots he would demonstrate to them 
 that all the ribands were of the same colour, oi 
 rather of no colour at all. My Lady Lizard herself, 
 though she was not a little pleased with her son's 
 improvement, was one day almost angry with him ; 
 for, having accidentally burnt her fingers as she was 
 lighting the lamp for her teapot, in the midst of her 
 anguish Jack laid hold of the opportunity to instruct 
 her that there is no such thing as heat in the fire." 
 Such speculations, which were at one time common 
 in the schools of philosophy, had their origin en- 
 tirely in an abuse of terms. The term heat, for ex- 
 ample, has two meanings, which are quite distinct 
 from each other. It means a sensation produced in 
 a sentient being, and in this sense it may be said 
 with truth that there is no heat in the fire ; but it 
 means also a quality in material substances capable 
 of producing this sensation, and it is in this sense 
 that we speak of heat as a property of matter. 
 
 The process by which we acquire a knowledge 
 of external things is usually divided into two stages, 
 namely, sensation and perception; the former im- 
 plying the corporeal, the latter the mental part of it. 
 Others apply the term perception to both ; and, ac- 
 cording to Dr. Brown, sensation is the simple im- 
 pression made upon the organs of sense ; perception 
 is an association formed between this impression 
 and an external substance which we have ascer- 
 tained to be concerned in producing it. Our senses, 
 by which this knowledge is acquired, are generally 
 E 
 
50 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
 
 reckoned five, — namely, sight, hearing, taste, smell; 
 and touch. Dr. Brown proposes to add our mus- 
 cular frame, and apparently with good reason ; for 
 there seems ground for beheving that it is by resist- 
 ance to muscular action that we acquire the notion 
 of solidity, and that this could not be acquired by 
 touch alone. 
 
 Our first impression of the existence and solidity 
 of material objects, then, seems to be derived from 
 touch combined with muscular resistance ; and at 
 the same time we acquire the knowledge of temper- 
 ature, roughness or smoothness, &c. There has 
 been some difference of opinion in regard to the 
 maimer in which we acquire the notion of extension, 
 including figure and magnitude. It is evident that it 
 cannot be acquired from touch alone ; but it may be 
 acquired from touch combined with muscular motion, 
 as when we move the hand over the surface of a 
 body. This, however, includes also the idea of 
 time, — for our notion of the extent of a surface 
 when the hand moves over it is very much ni- 
 fluenced by the velocit}'' with which the motion is 
 made. Hence time has been supposed by some to 
 be one of our very earliest impressions, and antece^ 
 dent even to the notion of extension or space. It 
 is probable, however, that the notion of extension 
 ma}'- also be acquired in a more simple manner from 
 the combined operation of touch and vision. If this 
 opinion be correct, it will follow that our first know- 
 ledge of the existence and essential properties of 
 material things is derived from the combined opera- 
 tion of sight, touch, and muscular action. 
 
 With regard to all our senses, however, the truth 
 seems to be, that the first notions conveyed by them 
 are of a very hmited and imperfect kind ; and that 
 our real knowledge is acquired only after consider- 
 able observation and experience, in the course of 
 which the impressions of one sense are corrected 
 and assisted by those of others, and by a process of 
 
SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 51 
 
 mind acting upon the whole. The primary objects 
 of vision, for example, seetn to be simply light or 
 colour, and expansion. But the judgments which 
 we are in the daily habit of forming upon vision are 
 of a much more extensive kind, embracing also dis- 
 tance, magnitude, and what has been called tangible 
 figure, such as the figure of a cube or a sphere. 
 This last, it is evident, cannot be considered as a 
 primary object of vision, but as entirely the result 
 of experience derived from the sense of touch ; for 
 we never could havie formed any conception of the 
 figure of a cube or a sphere by vision alone. Dis- 
 tance and magnitude, also, are evidently not the 
 primary objects of vision; for persons who have 
 been suddenly cured of congenital bUndness, by the 
 operation for cataract, have no conception of the 
 distance or magnitude of objects ; they perceive only 
 simple expansion of surface with colour. Our judg 
 ment of distance and magnitude by vision, therefore, 
 is an acquired habit, founded upon the knowledge 
 which we have received by other means of the 
 properties of the objects. Accordingly, it is famihai 
 to every one, that we have no idea of the distance 
 of an object, except we have some notion of its mag- 
 nitude ; nor, on the other hand, of its magnitude, ex 
 cept we have some knowledge of its distance. The 
 apphcation of this principle is also familiar in per 
 spective drawing, in which the diminished size of 
 known objects is made to convey the notion of is 
 tance. On the same principle, known objects seen 
 through a telescope do not appear to be magnified, 
 but to be brought nearer. In the same manner with 
 regard to sounds ; we have no idea of their intensity 
 except we have some notion of their distance, and 
 vice versd. A given degree of sound, for example^ 
 if we believed it to have been produced in the next 
 room, we might conclude to proceed from the fall 
 of some trifling body ; but if we supposed it to be at 
 the distance of several miles, we should immediately 
 
52 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
 
 conclude that it proceeded from a tremendous ex 
 plosion. 
 
 In reg-ard to certain small distances, however, 
 there is a power of judging by sight alone ; and it 
 appears to arise out of the degiee of inclination 
 which is given to the axis of vision in directing the 
 two eyes to the object. Thus, in snuffing a candle, 
 or carrying the finger to a small object within arm's 
 length, it will be found that we are very apt to miss 
 it, if we look with one eye only, but can touch it 
 with unerring certainty when both eyes are directed 
 to it. It appears to be on the same principle that 
 we enjoy in a greater degree the deception produced 
 by a painting, when we look at it with one eye 
 especially if we also look through a tube. By the 
 former we cut off the means of correcting the illu- 
 sion by the direction of the axis of vision ; and by 
 the latter we remove the influence of all neighbour- 
 ing objects. It is impossible to determine the pre 
 cise distance to which we can extend this power of 
 judging of distance by the inclination of the axis of 
 vision, but it does not appear to be great ; and in re- 
 gard to all greater distances the judgment by vision 
 is evidently an acquired habit, arising out of such a 
 mental exercise as has now been referred to. 
 
 There are some other circumstances, also the re- 
 sult of experience, by which we are greatly influ- 
 enced in all such cases, particularly the degree of 
 illumination of the objects, and the degree of dis- 
 tinctness of their outline and minute parts. Thus, 
 in a picture, distant objects are represented as faintly 
 illuminated, and with indistinctness of outline and 
 minute parts , and vice versd. On this principle, ob 
 jects seen through a fog, or in obscure light, are apt 
 to appear much larger than they really are ; because, 
 in the mental process which takes place in regard to 
 them, we first assume them to be distant, from their 
 imperfect outline and faint illumination, and then, 
 judging from this assumed distance, we conclude 
 
SENSATION AND PERCE 53 
 
 them to be of great size. On the other hand, ob- 
 jects seen in an unusually clear state of the atmo- 
 sphere appear nearer than they really are, from the 
 greater distinctness of their outline. In our judg- 
 ment of distance by sight, we are also greatly influ- 
 enced by the eye resting on intermediate objects ; 
 and hence the difficulty of judging of distances at 
 sea. A striking illustration of the same principle is 
 furnished by Captain Parry, in regard to objects seen 
 across a uniform surface of snow. " We had fre- 
 quent occasion, in our walks on shore, to remark 
 the deception which takes place in estimating the 
 distance and magnitude of objects, when viewed 
 over an unvaried surface of snow. It was not un- 
 common for us to direct our steps towards what we 
 took to be a large mass of stone, at the distance of 
 half a mile from us, but which we were able to take 
 up in our hands after one minute's walk. This was 
 more particularly the case when ascending the 
 brow of a hill." Captain Parry adds, that this de- 
 ception did not become less on account of the fre- 
 quency with which its eff'ects were experienced ; and 
 a late writer has used this as an objection to the 
 doctrine lately referred to, respecting the influence 
 of experience on our judgment of distance by vision. 
 But this is evidently founded on a misconception of 
 the eff'ect of experience in such cases. Captain 
 Parry could mean only, that he did not acquire the 
 power of judging of the distance or magnitude of un- 
 known, objects. Had he been approaching an object 
 by which he had once been deceived, knowing it to 
 be the same, he would not have been deceived a 
 second time ; but, judging from its known magni- 
 tude, would have inferred its distance. Thus the 
 result of experience is to enable us to judge of the 
 distance of an object of known magnitude, or of the 
 magnitude of an object at a known distance ; but, in 
 fegard to objects of which both the distance and 
 E2 
 
54 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
 
 magnitude are unknown, it teaches us only not to 
 trust the indications of vision. 
 
 In our judgment by vision of the magnitude of ob- 
 jects, again, we are much influenced by comparison 
 with other objects, the magnitude of which is sup- 
 posed to be known. I remember once having occa 
 sion to pass along Ludgate Hill, when the great dooi 
 of St. Paul's was open, and several persons were 
 standing in it. They appeared to be very little chil^ 
 dren ; but, on coming up to them, were found to be 
 full-grown persons. In the mental process which 
 here took place, the door had been assumed as a 
 known magnitude, and the other objects judged of 
 by it. Had I attended to the door being much larger 
 than any door that one is in the habit of seeing, the 
 mind would have made allowance for the apparent 
 size of the persons ; and, on the other hand, had 
 these been known to be full-grown persons, a judg- 
 ment would have been formed of the size of the 
 door. On the same principle, travellers visiting the 
 Pyramids of Egypt have repeatedly remarked, how 
 greatly the notion of their magnitude is increased 
 by a number of large animals, as camels, being as- 
 sembled at their base. 
 
 There is something exceedingly remarkable in the 
 manner in which loss or diminution of one sense is 
 followed by increase of the intensity of others, or 
 rather, perhaps, by an increased attention to the in- 
 dications of other senses. Blind persons acquire a 
 wonderful dehcacy of touch ; in some cases, it is 
 said, to the extent of distinguishing colours. Mr. 
 Saunderson, the blind mathematician, could distin- 
 guish by his hand, in a series of Roman medals, the 
 true from the counterfeit, with a more unerring dis- 
 crimination than the eye of a professed virtuoso ; 
 and, when he was present at the astronomical ob- 
 servations in the garden of his college, he was ac- 
 customed to perceive every cloud which passed over 
 the sun. This remarkable power, which has some- 
 
SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 55 
 
 times been referred to an increased intensity of par- 
 ticular senses, in many cases evidently resolves 
 itself into an increased habit of attention to the indi- 
 cations of all those senses which the individual re- 
 tains. Two instances have been related to me of 
 blind men who were much esteemed as judges of 
 horses. One of these, in giving his opinion of a 
 horse, declared him to be blind, though this had 
 escaped the observation of several persons who had 
 the use of their eyes, and who were with some dif- 
 ficulty convinced of it. Being asked to give an ac- 
 count of the principle on which he had decided, he 
 said it was by the sound of the horse's step in walk, 
 ing, which implied a peculiar and unusual caution in 
 his manner of putting down his feet. The other 
 individual, in similar circumstances, pronounced a 
 horse to be bhnd of one eye, though this had also 
 escaped the observation of those concerned. "When 
 he was asked to explain the facts on which he 
 formed his judgment, he said he felt the one eye to 
 be colder than the other. It is related of the late 
 Dr. Moyse, the well-known blind philosopher, that 
 he could distinguish a black dress on his friends by its 
 smell; and there seems to be good evidence that 
 blind persons have acquired the power of distin- 
 guishing colours by the touch. In a case of this 
 kind, mentioned by Mr. Boyle, the individual stated 
 that black imparted to his sense of touch the greatest 
 degree of asperity, and blue the least. Dr. Rush re- 
 lates of two bhnd young men, brothers, of the city 
 of Philadelphia, that they knew when they ap- 
 proached a post in walking across a street, by a pecu- 
 liar sound which the ground under their feet emitted 
 in the neighbourhood of the post ; and that they 
 could tell the names of a number of tame pigeons, 
 with which they amused themselves in a little gar- 
 den, by only hearing them fly over their heads. I 
 have known several instances of persons affected 
 with that extreme degree of deafness, which occurs 
 
56 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
 
 in the deaf and dumb, who had a peculiar suscepti- 
 biUty to particular kinds of sounds, depending appa- 
 rently upon an impression communicated to their 
 organs of touch or simple sensation. They could 
 tell, for instance, the approach of a carriage in the 
 street without seeing it, before it was taken notice 
 of by persons who had the use of all their senses. 
 An analogous fact is observed in the habit acquired 
 by the deaf and dumb, of understanding what is said 
 to them by watching the motion of the lips of the 
 speaker. Examples still more wonderful are on re- 
 cord, but certainly require confirmation. A story, 
 for instance, has lately been mentioned, in some of 
 the medical journals, of a gentleman in France who 
 lost every sense, except the feeling of one side of his 
 face ; yet it is said that his family acquired a method 
 of holding communication with him, by tracing char- 
 acters upon the part which retained its sensation. 
 
 Much ingenuity has been bestowed upon attempts 
 to explain how, with two eyes, we see only one ob- 
 ject; and why that object is seen erect, when we 
 know that the image on the retina is inverted. All 
 that need be said upon the subject, and all that can 
 properly be said, appears to be, that such is the con- 
 stitution of our nervous system. It is on the same 
 principle, that by the sense of touch, in which may 
 be concerned a thousand or ten thousand distinct 
 points of contact, we receive the impression of only 
 one body; or, what perhaps may appear a more 
 strictly a'nalogous case, we receive the impression 
 of but one body, though we grasp the substance with 
 two hands, or with ten distinct fingers. For the 
 healthy perception in both these cases, however, a 
 certain arrangement is required, which we may call 
 the natural harmony of the nervous system ; and 
 when this harmony is disturbed, the result is re- 
 markably altered. Thus, squinting produces the 
 vision of a double image, because the images fall 
 upon what we may call unhajmonizing poiiits of the 
 
SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 57 
 
 retina; and the same principle may be illustrated 
 in a very curious manner by a simple experiment 
 with the sense of touch. If a small round body, 
 such as a pea, be laid upon the palm of the one hand, 
 and rolled about between the first and second fingers 
 of the other, in their natural position, one pea only 
 IS felt ; but, if the fingers are crossed, so that the 
 pea is rolled between the opposite surfaces of the 
 two fingers, a most distinct impression of two peas 
 is conveyed. 
 
 Of the whole of the remarkable process of sensa- 
 tion and perception we know nothing but the facts, 
 that certain impressions made upon the organs of 
 sense are followed by certain perceptions in the 
 mind ; and that this takes place, in some way through 
 the medium of the brain and nervous system. We 
 are in the habit of saying, that the impressions are 
 conveyed to the brain ; but, even in this, we proba- 
 bly advance a step beyond what is warranted. We 
 know that the nerves derive their influence from 
 their connexion with the brain, or as forming along 
 with it one great medium of sensation; but we do 
 not know whether impressions made upon the ner- 
 vous fabric connected with the organs of sense are 
 conveyed to the brain ; or whether the mind per- 
 ceives them directly, as they are made upon the or- 
 gans of sense. The whole subject is one of those 
 mysteries which are placed above our reach, and in 
 which we cannot advance a single step beyond the 
 knowledge of the facts. Any attempt to speculate 
 upon it is therefore to be considered as contrary to 
 the first principles of philosophical inquiry. We 
 must simply receive the facts as of that class which 
 we cannot account for in the smallest degree ; ani 
 the evidence which we derive from our senses, of th 
 existence and properties of the things of the mate- 
 rial world, is to be recognised as one of those fun- 
 damental laws of belief which admit of no other 
 proof than that which is found in the universal con- 
 viction of mankind. 
 
68 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
 
 Before concluding- the subject of perception, it re« 
 mains to be noticed t]\at a certain voluntary effort 
 is required for the full exercise of it ; or, at least, 
 for that degree of perception which leaves an im- 
 pression capable of being retained. It is familiar to 
 every one, that when the mind is closely occupied, 
 numerous objects may pass before our eyes, and cir- 
 cumstances be talked of in our hearing, of which 
 we do not retain the slightest recollection ; and this 
 is often in such a degree as imphes, not a want of 
 memoiy only, but an actual want of the perception 
 of the objects. We cannot doubt, however, that 
 there was the sensation of them ; that is, the usual 
 impression made upon the eye in the one- case, and 
 the ear in the other. "What is wanting is a certain 
 effort of the mind itself, without which sensation i? 
 not necessarily followed by perception ; — this is what 
 we call Attention. It is a state or act of the mind 
 which is exercised by different individuals in very 
 different degrees. It is much influenced by habit ; 
 and though it may not often be wanting in such a 
 degree as to prevent the perception of objects, it is 
 often deficient in a manner which prevents the re- 
 collection of them, and consequently has an exten 
 sive influence upon the intellectual character. 
 
 The effect of attention is illustrated by various 
 mental phenomena of daily occurrence. If we are 
 placed in such a situation that the eye commands 
 an extensive landscape, presenting a great variety 
 of objects, or the wall of an apartment covered with 
 pictures, we have the power of fixing the mmd upon 
 one object in such a manner that ail the rest become 
 to us nearly as if they did not exist. Yet we know 
 that they are actually seen as far as the mere sense 
 of vision is concerned ; that is, images of all of 
 them are formed upon the retina ; but they are not 
 objects of attention, or of that pecuUar voluntary 
 effort of mind which is necessary for the full per- 
 ception of them. In the same manner, a practised 
 
INFLUENCE OF ATTENTION. 59 
 
 musician can in the midst of a musical perfonnance 
 direct his attention to one part, such as the bass, — 
 can continue this for such a time as he pleases, and 
 then again enjoy the general harmony of the whole. 
 On the same principle, the mind may be so intensely 
 fixed upon something \v ithin itself, as an object of 
 conception or memory, or a process of reasoning, 
 as to have no full perception of present external im- 
 pressions. We shall afterward have occasion to 
 refer to a state of mind in which this exists in such 
 a degree, that objects of conception or memory are 
 believed to have a real and present existence ; and 
 in which this erroneous impression is not corrected 
 by impressions from external things : — this occurs 
 in insanity. 
 
 Attention is very much influenced by habit, and 
 connected with this subject there are some facts of 
 great interest. There is a remarkable law of the 
 system, by which actions at first requiring much at- 
 tention are after frequent repetition performed with 
 a much less degree of it, or without the mind being 
 conscious of any effort. This is exemplified in vari- 
 ous processes of daily occurrence, as reading and 
 writing, but most remarkably in music. Musical 
 performance at first requires the closest attention, 
 but the effort becomes constantly less, until it is 
 often not perceived at all ; and a lady may be seen 
 running over a piece of music on the piano, and 
 at the same time talking on another subject. A 
 young lady, mentioned by Dr. Darwin, executed a 
 long and very difficult piece of music with the ut- 
 most precision, under the eye of her master ; but 
 seemed agitated during the execution of it, and when 
 she had concluded, burst into tears. It turned out 
 that her attention had, during the whole time, been 
 intensely occupied with the agonies of a favourite 
 canary bird, which at last dropped dead in its cage. 
 We see the same principle exemplified in the rapidity 
 with which an expert arithmetician can run up a 
 
60 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
 
 long column of figrures, without being conscious of 
 the individual combinations. It is illustrated in 
 another manner by the feats of jugglers, the decep- 
 tion produced by which depends upon their perform- 
 ing a certain number of motions with such rapidity 
 that the attention of the spectators does not follow 
 all the combinations. 
 
 In teaching such arts as music or arithmetic, this 
 principle is also illustrated ; for the most expert 
 arithmetician or musical performer is not necessarily, 
 and perhaps not generally, the best teacher of the 
 art ; but he who, with a competent knowledge of it, 
 directs his attention to the individual mmute com- 
 binations through which it is necessary for the 
 learner to advance. 
 
 In processes more purely intellectual, we find the 
 influence of habit brought under our view in a similar 
 manner, particularly in following the steps of a pro- 
 cess of reasoning. A person little accustomed to 
 such a process advances step by step, with minute 
 attention to each as he proceeds ; while another 
 perceives at once the result, with little conscious- 
 ness of the steps by which he arrived at it. For 
 this reason, also, it frequently happens that in cer- 
 tain departments of science the profound philosopher 
 makes a bad teacher. He proceeds too rapidly for 
 his audience, and without sufficient attention to the 
 intermediate steps by which it is necessary for them 
 to advance ; and they may derive much more in- 
 struction from an inferior man, whose mental pro- 
 cess on the subject approaches more nearly to that 
 which, in the first instance, must be theirs. We re- 
 mark the same difference in public speaking and in 
 writing ; and we talk of a speaker or a writer who 
 is easily followed, and another who is followed with 
 difficulty. The former retards the series of his 
 thoughts, so as to bring distinctly before his hearers 
 or his readers every step in the mental process. 
 The latter advances without sufficient attention to 
 
INFLUENCE OF ATTENTION. 61 
 
 this, and consequently can be followed by those only 
 who are sufficiently acquainted with the subject to 
 fill up the intermediate staps, or not to require them. 
 
 There is a class of intellectual habits directly the 
 reverse of those now referred to ; namely, habits 
 of inattention, by which the mind, long unaccus- 
 tomed to have the attention steadily directed to any 
 nnportant object, becomes frivolous and absent, or 
 lost amid its own waking dreams. A mind in this 
 condition becomes incapable of following a train of 
 reasoning, and even of observing facts with accuracy 
 and tracing their relations. Hence nothing is more 
 opposed to the cultivation of intellectual character ; 
 and when such a person attempts to reason, or to 
 follow out a course of investigation, he falls into 
 slight and partial views, unsound deductions, and 
 frivolous arguments. This state of mind, therefore, 
 ought to be carefully guarded against in the young; 
 as, when it is once established, it can be removed 
 only by a long and laborious effort, and after a cer- 
 tain period of hfe is probably irremediable. 
 
 In rude and savage life remarkable examples occur 
 of the effect of habits of minute attention to those 
 circumstances to which the mind is intensely directed 
 by their relation to the safety or advantage of the 
 observer. The American hunter finds his way in 
 the trackless forests by attention to minute appear- 
 ances in the trees, which indicate to him the points 
 of the compass. He traces the progress of his ene- 
 mies or his friends by the marks of their footsteps; 
 and judges of their numbers, their haltinofs, their 
 employments by circumstances which would en- 
 tirely escape the observation of persons unaccus- 
 tomed to a mode of life requiring such exercises of 
 attention. Numerous examples of this kind are 
 mentioned by travellers, particularly among the origt 
 nal natives of America. 
 F 
 
62 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION- 
 
 OF FALSE PERCEPTIONS. 
 
 Before leavings this subject, it is necessary to refer 
 to some remarkable facts respecting perceptions 
 taking place, without the presence of any external 
 body corresponding with them. These are called 
 false perceptions, and they are usually referred to 
 two classes ; namely, those arising in the organs of 
 sense, in which the mind does not participate ; and 
 tho§e which are connected with hallucination of 
 mind, or a belief of the real existence of the object. 
 The former only belong to this part of the subject. 
 The latter will be referred to in another part of our 
 inquiry, as they do not consist of false impressions 
 on the senses, but depend upon the mind mistaking its 
 own conceptions for real and present existences. 
 
 Of false perceptions, properly so called, the most 
 familiar are the viusccb volitantes floating before the 
 eyes, and sounds in the ears resembling the ringnig 
 of bells, or the noise of a waterfall. Changes are 
 also met with in the organs of sense giving rise to 
 remarkable varieties of perception. Dr. Falconer 
 mentions a gentleman who had such a morbid state 
 of sensation that cold bodies felt to him as if they 
 w^ere intensely hot. A gentleman mentioned by Dr. 
 Conolly, when recovering from measles, saw objects 
 diminished to the smallest imaginable size; and a 
 patient mentioned by Baron I/arry, on recovering 
 from amaurosis, saw men as giants, and all objects 
 magnified in a most remarkable manner; it is not 
 mentioned how long these peculiarities continued. 
 This last peculiarity of percept'on occurred also to 
 a particular friend of mine in recovering from typhus 
 fever. His own body appeared to him to be about 
 ten feet high. His bed seemed to be seven or eight 
 feet from the floor, so that he felt the greatest dread 
 
FALSE PERCEPTIONS. 63 
 
 in attempting to get out of it ; and the opening of the 
 chimney of his apartment appeared as larg'e as the 
 arch of a bridge. A singular peculiarity of this case 
 however was, that the persons about him with whom 
 he was famihar did not appear above their natural 
 size. But the most interesting phenomena connected 
 with affections of this kind are furnished by the va- 
 rious modifications of spectral illusions. These are 
 referable to three classes. 
 
 I. Impressions of visible objects remaining for 
 some time after the eye is shut, or has been with- 
 drawn from them ; generally accompanied by some 
 remarkable change in the colour of the objects. 
 Various interesting experiments of this kind are re- 
 lated by Dr. Darwin ; one of the most striking is the 
 following: — "I covered a paper about four inches 
 square with yellow, and with a pen filled with a blue 
 colour wrote upon the middle of it the w'ord BANKS 
 in capitals ; and sitting with my back to the sun, 
 fixed my eyes for a minute exactly on the centre of 
 the letter N in the word. After shutting my eyes, 
 and shading them somewhat with my hand, the word 
 was distinctly seen in the spectrum, in yellow colours 
 on a blue ground; and then on opening my eyes on 
 a yellowish wall at twenty feet distance, the magni- 
 fied name of BANKS appeared on the wall written 
 in golden characters." — A friend of mine had been 
 one day looking intensely at a small print of the 
 Virgin and C^.ild, and had sat bending over it for some 
 time. On raising his head he was startled by per- 
 ceiving at the farther end of thf. .partment a female 
 figure, the size of life, with a child in her arms. The 
 first feeling of surprise having subsided, he instantly 
 traced the source of the illusion, and remarked that 
 the figure corresponded exactly with that which he 
 had contemplated in the print, being what painters 
 call a kit-cat figure, in which the lower parts of the 
 body are not represented. The illusion continued 
 distinct for about two minutes. Similar illusions of 
 
64 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
 
 hearing are met with, though less frequently than 
 those of vision. A gentleman recently recovered 
 from an affection of the head, in which he had been 
 much reduced by bleeding, had occasion to go into 
 a large town a few miles from his residence. His 
 attention was there attracted by the bugle of a regi- 
 ment of horse, sounding a particular measure which 
 is used at changing guard in the evening. He as- 
 sured me that this sound was from that time never 
 out of his ears for about nine months. During all 
 this period he continued in a veiy precarious stale 
 of health ; and it was only as his health became more 
 confirmed that the sound of the bugle gradually left 
 him. In regard to ocular spectra, another fact of a 
 very singular nature appears to have been first ob- 
 served by Sir Isaac Newton, — namely, that when he 
 produced a spectrum of the sun by looking at it with 
 the right eye, the left being covered, upon uncover- 
 ing the left, and looking upon a white ground, a spec- 
 trum of the sun was seen with it also. He likewise 
 acquired the power of recalling the spectra, after 
 they had ceased, when he went into the dark, and 
 directed his mind intensely, " as when a man looks 
 earnestly to see a thing which is difficult to be seen." 
 By repeating these experiments frequently, such an 
 effect was produced upon his eyes, " that for some 
 months after," he says, " the spectrum of the sun 
 began to return as often as I began to meditate upon 
 the phenomena, even though I lay in bed at midnight 
 with my curtains drawn." 
 
 II. Impressions of objects recently seen returning 
 after a considerable interval. Various interesting 
 examples of this kind are on record. Dr. Ferriar 
 mentions of himself that when about the age of four- 
 teen, if he had been viewing any interesting object 
 in the course of the day, as a romantic ruin, a fine 
 seat, or a review of troops, so soon as evening came, 
 if he had occasion to go into a dark room, the whole 
 fcicene was brought before him with a brilliancy equal 
 
FALSE PERCEPTIONS. WJ 
 
 to what it possessed in daylight, and remained visible 
 for some minutes. 
 
 III. False perceptions arising in the course of 
 some bodily disorder, generally fever. A lady whom 
 I attended some years ago, in a shght feverish dis- 
 order, saw distinctly a party of ladies and gentlemen 
 sitting round her bedchamber, and a servant handing 
 something to them on a tray. The scene continued 
 in a greater or less degree for several days, and was 
 varied by spectacles of castles and churches of a 
 very brilliant appearance, as if they had been built 
 of finely cut crystal. The whole was in this case 
 entirely a visual phantasm, for there was no hallu- 
 cination of mind. On the contrary, the patient had 
 from the first a full impression that it was a morbid 
 affection of vision, connected with the fever, and 
 amused herself and her attendants by watching and 
 describing the changes in the scenery. A gentleman 
 who was also a patient of mine, of an irritable habit, 
 and liable to a variety of uneasy sensations in his 
 head, was sitting alone in his dining-room in the twi- 
 light, the door of the room being a Uttle open. He 
 saw distinctli^ a female figure enter, wrapped in a 
 mantle, and the face concealed by a large black bon- 
 net. She seemed to advance a few steps towards 
 him and then stop. He had a full conviction that 
 the figure was an illusion of vision, and anmsed him- 
 self for some time by watching it ; at the same time 
 observing that he could see through the figure, so as 
 to perceive the lock of the door and other objects 
 behind it. At length, when he moved his body a 
 little forward, it disappeared. The appearances m 
 these two cases were entirely visual illusions, and 
 probably consisted of the renewal of real scenes or 
 figures, in a manner somewhat analogous to those 
 in Dr. Ferriar's case, thougrh the renewal took place 
 after a longer interval. When there is any degree 
 of hallucination of mind, so that the phantasm is be 
 F2 
 
66 CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 lieved to have a real existence, ("he affection is en- 
 tirely of a different nature, as will be more particu- 
 larly mentioned under another part of our subject. 
 
 False perceptions maybe corrected by one of three 
 methods ; — by the exercise of other senses — by a 
 comparison with the perceptions of other persons — 
 and by an exercise of judgment. If I suspect that 
 my eye deceives me, I apply the hand, with the per- 
 fect conviction of tlie improbability that the two 
 senses should be deceived at once. If this cannot 
 be done, I appeal to the impressions of some other 
 persons, with an equally strong conviction that the 
 same sense will not b-. deceived in the same man- 
 ner in several persons at once. Or I may do it 
 in another way, by a reference to some known and 
 fixed object. Suppose, for example, I see two ob- 
 jects where I imagine there should be but one, and 
 suspect a visual deception ; I turn my eyes to some 
 object which I know to be single — such as the sun. 
 If I see the sua double I know that there is a delu- 
 sion of vision ; if I see the sun single, I conclude the 
 original perception to be correct. These processes 
 imply a certain exercise of judgment; and there 
 are other cases in which the same conviction may 
 arise from an exercise of judgment, without any 
 process of this kind. In one of the cases now re- 
 ferred to, for example, the correction took place 
 instantly, from observing that the lock of the door 
 was seen as if through the figure. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND REFLECTION. 
 
 Consciousness appears to mean, simply, the act 
 of attending to what is passing in the mind at the 
 time. That more extensive operation to which we 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS. 67 
 
 ought to give the name of reflection, as distIno;uished 
 from simple consciousness, seems to be connected 
 with a power of remembering past perceptions and 
 past mental processes, — of comparing them with 
 present feelings, so as to trace between them a rela- 
 tion, as belonging to the same sentient being, — and, 
 further, of tracing the laws by which the mental pro- 
 cesses themselves are regulated. It is employed 
 also in tracing the relations and sequences of exter- 
 nal things, and thus proves the source of certain 
 notions expressive of these relations. It is therefore 
 a compound operation of mind, including various 
 mental processes, especially "^ consciousness, memory, 
 and the act of comparison o r judgment. The know- 
 ledge which we derive from this source, whether we 
 call it consciousness or reflection, is referable to 
 three heads. 
 
 I. A knowledge of the mental processes, and the 
 laws and relations by which they are regulated ; a 
 knowledge, for example, of the laws and facts relat- 
 ing to memory, conception, imagination, and judg- 
 ment. These will be more particularly referred fo 
 in a subsequent part of our inquiry. In the same 
 manner we acquire our knowledge of those which 
 have been called the active and moral powers, as 
 love, hope, fear, joy, gratitude, &c. 
 
 II. Certain notions arising out of the exercise of 
 the mental processes, in reference to the succession 
 and relations of things; our notion, for exr^mple, o 
 time, arising out of memory and consciousness, — 
 our notion of cause — of motion — number — duration 
 — extension or space. From simple perception we 
 seem to acquire a knowledge of external things as 
 existing only at the moment ; and from simple con- 
 sciousness a knowledge of a mental impression as 
 existing only at the moment. Our notions of the 
 succession of thing? as implying time and motion. 
 
68 CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 require the exercise of consciousness and memory; 
 and our notions of cause, and the various other rela- 
 tions of things to each other, require both memory 
 and comparison. To the same head, in reference to 
 another department of these faculties, belong our 
 notions of truth and falsehood — right and wrong. 
 These result from a certain exercise of mind, aided 
 by that remarkable principle in our constitution which 
 commonly receives the name of conscience. 
 
 III. With this exercise of the mental functions 
 there spring up in the mind certain convictions, or 
 intuitive and instinctive principles of belief. They 
 are the immediate result of a certain exercise of the 
 understanding, but are not referable to any process 
 of induction or chain of reasoning, and can be con- 
 sidered only as an original and fundamental part oi 
 our constitution. This is a subject of great and ex- 
 tensive importance, and the articles of belief which 
 are referable to it are chiefly the following : — 
 
 (1.) A conviction of our own existence as sentient 
 and thinking beings, and of mind as something dis- 
 tinct from the functions of the body. 
 
 (2.) A confidence in the evidence of our senses in 
 regard to the existence and properties of external 
 things , or a conviction that they have a real exist- 
 ence independent of our sensations. 
 
 (3.) A confidence in our own mental processes — 
 that facts, for example, which are suggested to us by 
 our memory, really occurred. 
 
 (4.) A behef in our personal identity, derived from 
 the combined operation of consciousness and mem- 
 ory ; or a remembrance of past mental feelings and 
 a comparison of them with present mental feelings, 
 as belonging to the same sentient being. 
 
 (5.) A conviction that every event must have a 
 cause, and a cause adequate to the eflfect. 
 
 (6.) A confidence in the uniformity of the opera 
 tions of nature ; or that tiie same cause, acting in th«» 
 
TESTIMONY. 69 
 
 same circumstances, will always be followed by the 
 same effect. 
 
 These first or instinctive principles of belief will 
 be referred to in a more particular manner when we 
 come to speak of the use of reason in the investiga- 
 tion of tiruth. They are usually called First Truths, 
 and will be seen to occupy a most important place 
 as the foundation of aU reasoning. Many ingenious 
 but fallacious arguments were at one time wasted in 
 attempts to establish them by processes of reasoning. 
 These again were assailed by sophistical and skep- 
 tical writers, who easily succeeded in showing the 
 fallacy of these arguments, and thus assumed the 
 credit of undermining the authority of the truths 
 themselves. All this species of sophistical warfare 
 is now gone by; and the most important era in the 
 modern science of reasoning was, when it was dis- 
 tinctly shown that these first truths admit of no 
 other evidence than the conviction which forces 
 itself upon the understanding of all classes of men. 
 Since that period it has been generally allowed that 
 *hey admit of no proof by processes of reasoning ; 
 \nd, on the other hand, that they are entirely unaf- 
 fected by the arguments by which all such reasoning 
 A^as shown to be fallacious. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 OF TESTIMONY. 
 
 A VERY small portion of our knowledge of external 
 things is obtained through our own senses ; by far 
 the greater part is procured through other men, and 
 this is received by us on the evidence of testimony. 
 But, in receiving facts in this manner, we usually 
 
70 TESTIMONV. 
 
 proceed with more caution than when they come to 
 us by our personal observation. We are much in- 
 fluenced, in the first place, by our confidence in the 
 veracity of the narrator, and our knowledge of the 
 opportunities which he has had of ascertaining the 
 facts he professes to relate. Thus, if he be a person 
 on whose testimony we have formerly received im- 
 portant statements, which have turned out to be cor- 
 rect, we are the more ready to receive his testimony 
 again ; if he be a stranger to us, we receive it with 
 greater caution ; if he has formerly misled us, we 
 view it with suspicion, or reject it altogether. 
 
 But there is another principle of very extensive 
 application in such cases, and which is independent 
 in a great measure of the character of the narrator. 
 In receiving facts upon testimony, we are much in- 
 fluenced by their accordance with facts with which 
 we are already acquainted. This is what, in com- 
 mon language, we call their probability; and state- 
 ments which are probable, that is, in accordance 
 with facts which we already know, are received 
 upon a lower degree of evidence than those which 
 are not in such accordance, or which, in other 
 words, appear tons in the present state of our know- 
 ledge to be improbable. Now this is a sound and 
 salutary caution, but w^e should beware of allowing 
 it to influence us beyond its proper sphere. It 
 should lead us to examine carefully the evidence 
 upon which we receive facts, not in accordance with 
 those which we have already acquired; but we 
 should beware of allowing it to engender skepticism. 
 For, while an unbounded creduhty is the part of a 
 weak mind, which never thinks or reasons at all, an 
 unlimited skepticism is the part of a contracted 
 mind, which reasons upon imperfect data, or makes 
 its own knowledge and extent of observation the 
 standard and test of probability. An ignorant pea- 
 sant may reject the testimony of a philosopher in 
 regard to the size of the naoon, because he thinks he 
 
TESTIMONY. 71 
 
 has the evidence of his senses that it is only a foot 
 in diameter; and a person, holding a respectable 
 Tank in society, is said to have received with con- 
 tempt the doctrine of the revohition of the earth on 
 its axis, because he was perfectly satisfied that his 
 house was never known to turn with its front to the 
 north. When the King of Siam was told by a Dutch 
 traveller that in Holland, at certain seasons of the 
 year, water becomes so solid that an elephant might 
 walk over it, he repUed, " I have beheved many ex- 
 traordinary things which you have told me, because 
 I took you for a man of truth and veracity, but now 
 I am convinced that you lie." This confidence in 
 one's own experience, as the test of probability 
 characterizes a mind which is confined in its views 
 and limited in its acquirements ; and the tendency of 
 it would be the rejection of all knowledge, for which 
 we have not the evidence of our senses. Had the 
 King of Siam once seen water in a frozen state, he 
 would not only have been put right in regard to this 
 fact, but his confidence would have been shaken in 
 his own experience as the test of probability in other 
 things ; and he would have been more disposed foi 
 the further reception of truth upon the evidence oi 
 testimony. 
 
 Thus, progress in knowledge is not confined in its 
 results to the mere facts which we acquire, but has 
 also an extensive influence in enlarging the rnind for 
 the further reception of truth, and setting it free 
 from many of those prejudices which influence men 
 who are limited by a narrow field of observation. 
 There may even be cases in which, without any re- 
 gard to the veracity of the narrator, a cultivated 
 mind perceives the elements of truth in a statement 
 which is rejected by inferior minds as altogether in- 
 credible. An ingenious writer supposes a traveller 
 of rather doubtful veracity bringing into the country 
 of Archimedes an account of the steam-engine. His 
 statement is rejected by his countrymen as alto 
 
1 2 TESTIMONY. 
 
 gether incredible. It is entirely at variance with 
 their experience, and they think it much more prob- 
 able that the traveller should lie, than that such a 
 thing should be. But when he describes to Archi- 
 medes the arrangement of the machine, the philoso- 
 pher perceives the result, and, without any consider- 
 ation of the veracity of the narrator, decides, upon 
 the evidence derived from the relation of the facts 
 themselves, and their accordance with principles 
 which are known to him, that the statement is un- 
 questionably true. 
 
 This illustration leads to a principle of the utmost 
 practical importance. In judging of the credibility 
 of a statement, we are not to be influenced simply 
 by our actual experience of similar events ; for tliis 
 w^ould limit our reception of new facts to their ac- 
 cordance with those which we already know. We 
 must extend our views much farther than this, and 
 proceed upon the knowledge which we have derived 
 from other sources, of the powers and properties of 
 the agent to which the event is ascribed. It is on this 
 principle that the account of the steam-engine would 
 have appeared probable to Archimedes, while it was 
 rejected by his countrymen as absolutely incredible ; 
 oecause he would have judged, not according to his 
 experience of similar machinery, but according to his 
 knowledge of the powers and properties of steam. 
 In the same manner, when the King of Siam rejected, 
 as an incredible falsehood, the account of the freez- 
 ing of water, if there had been at his court a phi- 
 losopher who had attended to the properties of heat, 
 he would have judged in a different manner, though 
 the actual fact of the freezing of water might have 
 been as new to him as it was to the king. He would 
 have, recollected that he had seen various solid 
 bodies rendered fluid by the application of heat ; and 
 that, on the abstraction of the additional heat, they 
 again became soUd. Me would thus have argued 
 the possibility, that, by i further abstraction of heat. 
 
TESTIMONY. 73 
 
 bodies might become solid which are fluid in the or- 
 dinary temperature of the atmosphere. In this 
 manner, the fact, which was rejected by the king, 
 judging from his own experience, might have been 
 received by the philosopher, judging from his know- 
 ledge of the powers and properties of heat — though 
 he had acquired this knowledge from events appa- 
 rently far removed from that to which he now ap- 
 plied it. 
 
 The principle here referred to is independent alto- 
 gether of the direct reliance which we have on tes- 
 timony, in regard to things which are at variance 
 with our experience, when we are satisfied that the 
 testimony has the characters of credibility; but, 
 even on these grounds, we may perceive the fallacy 
 of that application of the doctrine of probability 
 which has been employed by some writers, in oppo- 
 sition to the truths of revealed religion and to the 
 means by whicn they were promulgated — particu- 
 /arly the miracles of the sacred writings. Miracles, 
 Srhey contend, are deviations from the established 
 course of nature, and are, consequently, contrary to 
 our uniform experience. It accords with our expe- 
 rience that men should lie, and even that several 
 men might concur in propagating the same lie ; and, 
 therefore, it is more probable that the narrators lied, 
 than that the statement respecting miracles is true. 
 Mr. Hume even went so far as to maintain, that a 
 miracle is so contrary to what is founded upon firm 
 and unalterable experience, that it caimot be estab- 
 iished by any human testimony. 
 
 The fallacy of this argument may probably be 
 maintained from the principles which have been 
 stated. It is, in fact, the same mode of reasoning 
 which induced the King of Siam to reject the state- 
 ment of water becoming sohd. This was entirely 
 contradicted by his " firm and unalterable experi- 
 ence," and, therefore, could not be received, ever 
 upon tlie evidence of a man whom he had already 
 G 
 
74 TESTIMONY. 
 
 recognised as a witness of unquestionable veracltj', 
 and upon whose single testimony he had received 
 as truth " many extraordinary things." He thought 
 it much more probable that even this man lied, than 
 that such a statement could be true. Strictly speak- 
 'ng, indeed, the objection of Mr. Hume may be con- 
 sidered as little better than a play upon words. Foi 
 what renders an occurrence miraculous is precisely 
 the fact of its being opposed to uniform experience 
 To say therefore that miracles are incredible because 
 they are contrary to experience is merely to say 
 that they are incredible because they are miracles. 
 
 They who are imposed upon by such a sophism 
 as this do not, in the first place, attend to the fact 
 that the term experience, if so much is to be foimded 
 upon it, must be limited to the personal observation 
 of every individual ; that is, it can apply, in each 
 particular case, only to the last fifty or sixty years 
 at most, and to events which have happened during 
 that period, at the spot where the individual was 
 present. Whatever he knows of events which took 
 place beyond this spot, or before that period, he 
 knows, not from experience, but entirely from testi- 
 mony : and a great part of our knowledge, of what 
 we call the established course of nature, has been 
 acquired in this manner. In the reception of new 
 knowledge, then, an individual must either receive 
 facts upon testimony, or believe nothing but that for 
 which he has the evidence of his senses. It is un- 
 necessary to state how much the latter supposition 
 is at variance with the daily practice of every man ; 
 and how much information we are in the constant 
 habit of i-eceiving upon testimony, even in regard to 
 things which are very much at variance with our 
 personal observation. How many facts do we re- 
 ceive in this manner, with unsuspecting confidence, 
 on the testimony of the historian, in regard to the 
 occurrences of ancient times ; and on the testimony 
 of the naturalist and the traveller, respecting the 
 
TESTIMONY, 76 
 
 natural and civil history of forei^ countries. How- 
 few persons have verified, by their personal observa- 
 lion, the wonders which we receive on the testimony 
 of the astronomer; and, even of the great phe- 
 nomena of nature on the surface of our globe, how 
 much do we receive upon testimony in regard to 
 things which are widely at variance with our own 
 experience. I need only mention the boiling springs 
 of Iceland, and the phenomena of earthquakes and 
 volcanoes. But, on the principles of Mr. Hume, 
 these could not be believed. On the contrary, if 
 one of our intelhgent Highlanders were hearing de- 
 scribed to him the devastations of a volcano, he 
 would point to his heath-covered mountain, as the 
 basis of his " firm and unalterable experience," and 
 declare it to be more probable that travellers should 
 lie than that such a statement could be true. 
 
 The reception of facts upon the evidence of testi- 
 mony must therefore be considered as a fundamental 
 principle of our nature, to be acted upon whenever 
 we are satisfied that the testimony possesses certain 
 characters of credibility. These are chiefly refer- 
 able to three heads : that the individual has had suf- 
 ficient opportunity of ascertaining the facts ; that 
 we have confidence in his power of judging of their 
 accuracy; and that we have no suspicion of his 
 being influenced by passion or prejudice in his tes- 
 timony, — or, in other words, that w^e believe him to 
 be an honest witness. Our confidence is further 
 strengthened by several witnesses concurring in the 
 same testimony, each of whom has had the same 
 opportunities of ascertaining the facts, and presents 
 the same characters of truth and honesty. On such 
 testimony we are in the constant habit of receiving 
 statements which are much beyond the sphere of 
 our personal observation, and widely at variance 
 with our experience. These are the statements 
 which, for the sake of a name, we may call marvel- 
 lous. In regard to such, the foundation of incredu 
 
76 TESTIMONY. 
 
 lity, as we have seen, is generally ignorance ; and it 
 is interesting to trace the principles by which a man 
 of cultivated mind is influenced in receiving upon 
 testimony statements which are rejected by the 
 vulgar as totally incredible. 
 
 1. He is influenced by the recollection that many 
 things at one time appeared to him marvellous which 
 he now knows to be true : and he thence concludes 
 that there may still be in nature many phenomena 
 and many principles with which he is entirely un- 
 acquainted. In other words, he has learned from 
 experience not to make his own knowledge his test 
 of probability. 
 
 2. He is greatly influenced by perceiving in the 
 statement some element of probability, or any kind 
 of sequence or relation by which the alleged fact 
 may be connected with principles which are known 
 to him. It is in this manner that the freezing of 
 water, which was rejected by the King of Siam as 
 an incredible falsehood, might have appeared credible 
 to a philosopher who had attended to the properties 
 of heat, because he would have perceived in the 
 statement a chain of relations connecting it with 
 facts which he knew to be true. 
 
 3. He is much guided by his power of discrimi- 
 nating the credibility of testimony, or of distin- 
 guishing that species and that amount of it which 
 he feels to be unworthy of absolute credit from that 
 on which he relies with as implicit confidence as on 
 the uniformity of the course of nature. The vulgar 
 «nind is often unable to make the necessary dis 
 crimination in this respect, and therefore is apt tc 
 fall into one of the extremes of credulity and skeptt 
 cism. Mr. Hume, indeed, himself admits that ther 
 is a certain amount of testimony on which he would 
 receive a statement widely at variance with his own 
 uniform experience, as in the hypothetical case 
 which he proposes, — the account of a total darkness 
 over the whole earth continuing for eight days two 
 
TESTIMONr. 77 
 
 h«n<Ired years ago. The evidence which he re- 
 quires for it is simply the concurrence of testimonies, 
 —namely, that all authors in all languages describe 
 the event ; and that travellers bring accounts from 
 all quarters of traditions of the occurrence being 
 still strong and lively among the people. On such 
 evidence he admits that philosophers ought to re- 
 ceive it as certain. 
 
 These principles may be considered as the ele- 
 ments of our belief in regard to statements which 
 are new to us ; and it is interesting to remark how 
 they balance and compensate each other. Thus, a 
 statement which appears probable, or can be readily 
 referred to known relations, is received upon a lower 
 degree of testimony, as in the illustration respecting 
 Archimedes and the steam-engine. Others, which 
 we find greater difficulty in referring to any known 
 principle, we may receive upon a certain amount of 
 testimony which we feel to be worthy of absolute 
 confidence. But there may be others of so very 
 extraordinary a kind, and so far removed from or 
 even opposed to every known principle, that we may 
 hesitate in receiving them upon any kind of testi- 
 mony, unless we can discover in relation to them 
 something on which the mind can fix as an elemen 
 of nwral probability. 
 
 This leads us to a very obvious distinction of ex- 
 traordinary events, — into those which are only mar- 
 vellous, and those which are to be considered mirac- 
 ulous. A marvellous event is one which differs in 
 all its elements from any thing that we previously 
 knew, without being opposed to any known princi- 
 ple. But a miraculous event implies much more 
 than this, being directly opposed to what every man 
 knows to be the estabhshed and uniform course of 
 nature. It is further required that such an event 
 shall be of so obvious and palpable a kind that every 
 nan is qualified to judge of its miraculous character 
 G2 
 
78 TESTIMONY. 
 
 or is convinced it could not happen from the opera- 
 tion of any ordinary natural cause. 
 
 In receiving a statement respecting such an event 
 we require the highest species of testimony, or that 
 on which we rely with the same confidence as on 
 the uniformity of the course of nature itself. But 
 even with this amount of testimony a doubt may 
 still remain. For we have two amounts of proba- 
 bility which are equally balanced against each other ; 
 namely, the probability that such testimony should 
 not deceive us, and the probability that there should 
 be no deviation from the course of nature. The 
 concurring evidence of numerous credible witnesses, 
 indeed, gives a decided preponderance to the testi- 
 mony ; and upon a certain amount of testimony we 
 might receive any statement however improbable — 
 as in the case admitted by Mr. Hume of a universal 
 darkness. But, though in such a case we might re- 
 ceive the statement as a fact which we could not 
 dispute, the mind would be left in a state of absolute 
 suspense and uncertainty in regard to any judgment 
 which we could form respecting it. Something 
 more appears to be necessary for fixing the distinct 
 belief of a miraculous interposition ; and this is an 
 impression of moral probability. This consists of 
 two parts. (1.) A distinct reference of the event to 
 a power which we feel to be capable of producing 
 it ; namely, a direct interposition of the Deity. (2.) 
 The perception of an adequate object, or a convic- 
 tion of high moral probability that an interposition 
 of Divine power might be exerted in such circum- 
 stances, or for the accomplishment of such an object. 
 Such are the miracles of the sacred writings. As 
 events opposed to the common course of nature, 
 they are, by the supposition, physically improbable 
 in the highest degree. Were they not so, were they 
 in the lowest degree probable according to our con- 
 ceptions of the course of nature, they could not be 
 
TESTIMONY. 79 
 
 miracles, and consequently could not answer the 
 purpose for which they are intended. But notwith- 
 standing this species of improbability, they carry 
 with them all the elements of absolute credibility ; 
 namely, the highest species of testimony, supported 
 by a moral probability which bears directly upon 
 every element of the statement. This may be 
 briefly referred to the following heads : — 
 
 1. The human mind had wandered far from truth 
 respecting God; and on the great question of his 
 character and will, a future state, and the mode of 
 acceptance in his sight, the light furnished by reason 
 among the wisest of men was faint and feeble. On 
 points of such importance there was the highest 
 moral probability that the Deity would not leave 
 mankind in this state of darkness, but would com- 
 municate to them some distinct knowledge. 
 
 2. It is further probable, that if such a communi- 
 cation were made to man, it would be accompanied 
 by prodigies or miraculous events, calculated to 
 show beyond a doubt the immediate agency of God, 
 and thus to estabUsh the divine authority of the 
 record. 
 
 3. There is no improbability that the power of the 
 Deity should produce deviations from the usual 
 course of nature capable of answering such a pur- 
 pose. For what we call the course of nature is 
 nothing more than an order of events which he has 
 established; and there is no improbability that for 
 an adequate end he might produce a deviation from 
 this order. 
 
 4. An miportant branch of the moral probability 
 of the whole statement of the sacred writings arises 
 from the characters of the truths themselves, chai 
 lenging the assent and approbation of every uncon- 
 taminated mind. This part of the subject resolves 
 itself into three parts ; namely, the truths relating 
 to the character and perfections of the Deity ; the 
 high and refined morality of the goscel; and the 
 
80 TESTIMONY. 
 
 adaptation of the whole provisions of Christianity to 
 the actual condition of man as a moral being. The 
 former carry a conviction of their truth to the mind 
 of every candid inquirer ; the tvi^o latter fix them- 
 selves upon the conscience or moral feelings of all 
 classes of men with an impression which is irre- 
 sistible. 
 
 This mode of reasoning is not chargeable with 
 that kind of fallacy which has sometimes been 
 ascribed to it, — that it professes first to prove the 
 doctrine by the miracle, and then to try the miracle 
 by the doctrine. The tendency of it is only to 
 deduce from the various elements which really enter 
 into the argument a kind of compound evidence, the 
 strongest certainly which on such a subject the 
 human mind is capable of receiving. It is composed 
 of the character of the truths — the moral probability 
 of a revelation of clear knowledge on subjects of 
 such infinite importance — and the highest species of 
 testimony for the miraculous evidence by which the 
 revelation was accompanied. There are principles 
 in our nature calculated to perceive the manner in 
 which the different parts of such an argument har- 
 monize with each other ; and, upon every principle 
 of the human mind, it is impossible to conceive any 
 thing more highly calculated to challenge the serious 
 attention and absolute conviction of every sound 
 understanding. 
 
 This imperfect view of a deeply interesting sub- 
 ject will be sufficient to show the fallacy of the ob- 
 jection which has been urged against the credibility 
 of miracles, — that they are contrary to our unalter- 
 able experience of the established course of nature. 
 There might have been some degree of plausibility 
 in the argument if these events had been alleged to 
 have taken place in ordinary circumstances ; but the 
 case is essentially altered, and this kind of improb- 
 ability is altogether removed, when in the alleged 
 deviation a new agent is introduced entirely capable 
 
TESTIMONY. 81 
 
 of producing- it. Such, as we have seen, are the 
 miracles of the sacred writings ; and the question in 
 regard to their probability is, not whether they are 
 probable according to the usual course of nature, 
 but whether they are probable in the circumstances 
 in which they are alleged to have taken place; 
 namely, in the case of a direct interposition of the 
 Deity for certain great and adequate purposes. In 
 such a case, our estimate of probability must be 
 founded, according to the principles already stated, 
 not upon our experience of similar events, but on 
 the knowledge which we derive from other sources 
 of the power of the agent to whom the event is 
 ascribed. Now the agent to whom miracles are 
 ascribed is the Supreme Being, the creator of all 
 things, the stupendous monuments of whose omnipo 
 tent power are before us, and within us, and around 
 us. What we call the established course of nature 
 is merely an order of events which he has appointed ; 
 and the question of probability is, whether it is 
 probable that for certain adequate purposes he should 
 produce a deviation from this order. For such a 
 statement, indeed, we require strong, numerous, 
 credible, and concurring testimonies ; but it comes 
 to be simply a question of evidence ; and there is no 
 real improbability that in these circumstances such 
 events should take place. 
 
 In this manner, then, there is entirely removed from 
 iie statement the improbability which is founded 
 upon the unifocmity of the ordinary course of na- 
 ture ; because it is not in the ordinary course of na- 
 ture that the events are alleged to have taken place, 
 but in circumstances altogether new and peculiar. 
 The subsequent inquiry becomes, therefore, simply 
 a question of evidence ; this evidence is derived from 
 testimony; and we are thus led to take a shght view 
 of the grounds on which we estimate the credibihty 
 of testimony. 
 
 Testimony, we are told, is fallacious, and is liable 
 
83 TESTIMONY. 
 
 to deceive us. But so are our senses ; — tliey also 
 may deceive, and perhaps have deceived us, as in 
 the case of ocular spectra ; but we do not, on that 
 account discredit the evidence of our eyes ; we only 
 take means, in certain cases, for correcting- their in- 
 dications by other senses, as by touching the object, 
 or by a comparison with the visual impressions of 
 other men ; and, whatever probability there is that 
 the eyes of one man maybe deceived in any one in- 
 stance, the probability is as nothing that both his 
 sight and touch should be deceived at once ; or that 
 the senses of ten men should be deceived in the 
 same manner at the same time. It is the same with 
 regard to testimony. It may have deceived us in 
 particular instances ; but this applies to one species 
 of testimony only ; there is another species which 
 never deceived us. We learn by experience to sepa- 
 rate distinctly the one from the other, and fix upon 
 a species of testimony on which we rely with the 
 same confidence as on the uniformity of the course 
 of nature. Thus, if we find a man who in other re- 
 spects shows every indication of a sound mind, re- 
 lating an event which happened under his own in- 
 spection, and in such circumstances that he could 
 not possibly be deceived ; if his statement be such 
 as contributes in no respect to his credit or advan- 
 tage, but, on the contrary, exposes him to ridicule, 
 contempt, and persecution ; if, notwithstanding, he 
 steadily perseveres in it, under every species of per- 
 secution, and even to the suffering of death; to sup- 
 pose such a testimony intended to deceive would be 
 to assume a deviation from the established course of 
 human character, as remarkable as any event which 
 it could possibly convey to us. This might be main 
 tained in regard to one such testimony ; but if we 
 find numerous witnesses agreeing in the same testi- 
 mony, all equally informed of the facts, all showing 
 the same characters of credibility, and without 
 the possibility of concert or coimivance, the evi- 
 
TESTIMONY. 83 
 
 dence becomes, not convincing only, but incontro- 
 vertible. 
 
 The grounds on which we receive with confidence 
 the evidence of testimony, may, therefore, be briefly 
 stated in the following manner: — 
 
 1. That the statement refers to a matter of fact, 
 — that the fact was such as could be easily ascer- 
 tained by the person who relates it, — and that he 
 had sufficient opportunity of ascertaining it. When 
 the statement includes a point of opinion, the case 
 comes under another principle ; and we require, in 
 the first instance, to separate what is opinion from 
 what is fact. 
 
 2. That we have no reason to suspect the witness 
 to be influenced by interest or passion in his evi- 
 dence ; or that he has any purpose to answer by it 
 calculated to promote his own advantage. 
 
 3. That various individuals, without suspicion of 
 connivance, have concurred in the same statement. 
 This is a point of the utmost importance ; and in 
 cases in which we are satisfied that there could be 
 no connivance, a degree of evidence is derived from 
 the concurrence of testimonies which may be often 
 independent even of the credibility of the individual 
 witnesses. For, though it were probable that each 
 of them singly might lie, the chances that they 
 should al. happen to agree m the same lie may be 
 found to amount to an impossibility. On this subject 
 there is also a further principle of the greatest in- 
 terest, which has been well illustrated by Laplace, 
 namely, that the more improbable a statement is in 
 which such witnesses agree, the greater is the proba- 
 bility of its truth. Thus we may have two men 
 whom we know to be so addicted to lying that we 
 would not attach the smallest credit to their single 
 
 estimony on any subject. If we find these concur- 
 
 mg in a statement respecting an event which was 
 
 bi hlv probable or very likely to have occurred at 
 
84 TESTIMONY. 
 
 the time which they mention, we may still hare a 
 suspicion that they are lying, and that they may have 
 happened to concur in the same lie, even though there 
 should be no supposition of connivance. But if the 
 statement was in the highest degree improbable, such 
 as that of a man rising from the dead, we may feel 
 it to be impossible that they could accidentally have 
 agreed in such a statement; and, if we are satisfied 
 that there could be no connivance, we may receive 
 a conviction from its very improbabihty that it must 
 be true. In cases of concurring testimonies, we ex- 
 pect that the witnesses shall agree in all essential 
 and important particulars ; and, on the other hand, 
 evidence of the authenticity of testimony is some- 
 times derived from the various witnesses differing 
 in trifling circumstances in such a manner as, with- 
 out weakening the main statement, tends to remove 
 the suspicion of collusion or connivance. 
 
 4. In all matters of testimony, we are greatly in- 
 fluenced by our confidence in a certain uniformity of 
 human character. We attach much importance, for 
 example, to our previous knowledge of the narrator's 
 character for veracity ; and a man may have ac- 
 quired such a character in this respect that we con 
 fide in his veracity in every instance in which his 
 testimony is concerned, with a confidence equal to 
 that with which we rely on the uniformity of the 
 course of nature. In such a case, indeed, we pro- 
 ceed upon a uniformity which applies only to a par- 
 ticular order, namely, those whom we consider as 
 men of veracity. But there is also a principle of 
 uniformity which applies to the whole species ; and 
 in which we confide as regulating every man of sane 
 mind. Thus, if the statement of a narrator contain 
 circumstances calculated to promote his own ad- 
 vantage, we calculate on the probability of fabrica- 
 tion, and reject his evidence, except we had pre- 
 viously acquired absolute confidence in his veracity. 
 But if, on the contrary, his statement operates 
 
TESTIMONY. 85 
 
 against himself, conveying an imputation against his 
 own character, or exposing him to contempt, ridicule, 
 or personal injury; without any previous knowledge 
 of his veracity, we are satisfied that nothing could 
 make him adhere to such a testimony but an honest 
 conviction of its truth. 
 
 5. A very important circumstance is the absence 
 of any contradictory or conflicting testimony. This 
 applies, in a striking manner, to the miraculous state- 
 ments of the sacred writings ; for, even on the part 
 of those who were most interested in opposing them, 
 there is no testimony Avhich professes to show, that 
 at the time when the miracles are said to have taken 
 place they did not take place. It is, indeed, a re- 
 markable circumstance, that the earliest writers 
 against Christianity ascribe the miraculous events to 
 the power of sorcery or magic, but never attempt 
 to call them in question as matters of fact. 
 
 6. Much corroboration of testimony may often be 
 obtained from our knowledge of facts of such a na- 
 ture as, without directly bearing upon the statements 
 to which the testimony refers, cannot be accounted 
 for on any other supposition than the conviction of 
 these statements being true. This principle applies, 
 m a remarkable manner, to the miraculous histories 
 of the sacred writings. We knov;, as an historical 
 fact, the rapid manner in which the Christian faith 
 was propagated in the early ages, against the mo€t 
 formidable opposition, and by means of the feeblest 
 human instruments. We are told, that this was 
 owing to the conviction produced by miraculous dis- 
 plays of Divine power ; we feel "that the known 
 effect corresponds with the alleged cause ; and that 
 jt cannot be accounted for on any other principle. 
 
 It does not belong to our present inquiry' to allude 
 more particularly to the direct evidence by which 
 the miracles of the sacred writings are supported ; 
 we merely refer, in this general manner, to the prin- 
 ciples on which the evidence is to be estimated. A 
 H 
 
86 INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS, 
 
 very interesting' branch of the subject will come un- 
 der our view when we speak of memory and arbi- 
 trary association. We shall then see the irresistible 
 importance of the commemorative rites of Chris- 
 tianity, by which the memory of these events has been 
 transmitted from age to age, or rather from year to 
 year ; and by which our minds are carried backward, 
 in one unbroken series, to the time when the events 
 occurred, and to the individuals who witnessed them. 
 In this manner, also, is entirely removed any feeling 
 of uncertainty which may attach to testimony, as 
 we recede from the period at which the events took 
 place, and as the individuals are multiplied. Upon 
 the whole, therefore, the evidence becomes so clear 
 and conclusive, that we may say of those who reject 
 it what the great Author of Christianity said on 
 another occasion, — " If they liear not these, neither 
 will they be persuaded though one rose from the 
 dead." 
 
 PART III. 
 
 OF THE INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS. 
 
 Through the various sources referred to in the 
 pieceding observations, we acquire the knowledge 
 of a certain number of facts, relating either to the 
 mind itself or to thmgs external to it. The next 
 part of our inquiry refers to the operations (to use 
 a figurative expression) which the mmd performs 
 upon the facts thus acquired. The term functions, 
 or powers of mind, has often been applied to these 
 operations ; but, as Ave are not entitled to assume 
 
INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS. 87 
 
 that they are not in fact separate functions in the 
 usual acceptation of that expression, it is perhaps 
 more correct, and accords better with our hmited 
 knowledge of mind, to speak simply of the opera- 
 tions which it is capable of performing upon a given 
 series of facts. These seem to be chiefly referablo 
 to the following heads. 
 
 I. We remember the facts; and we can also 
 recall them into the mind at pleasure. Tlie former 
 is Memory; the latter is that modification of it 
 which we call Recollection. But, besides this 
 simple recollection of facts, we can recall a percep- 
 tion; that is, the impression of an actual scene 
 which has been witnessed, or a person who has 
 been seen, so as to place them, as it were, before 
 the mind, with all the vividness of the original per- 
 ception. This process is called Conception. It is 
 often described as a distinct power, or a distinct 
 operation of the mind ; but it seems to be so nearly 
 allied to memory that it may be considered as a 
 modification of it. It is the memory of a perception. 
 
 II. We separate facts from the relation in which 
 they were originally presented to us, and contem- 
 plate some of them apart from the rest ; — consider- 
 ing, for example, certain properties of bodies apart 
 from their other properties. Among a variety of 
 objects, we thus fix upon qualities which are com- 
 mon to a certain number of them, and so arrange 
 them into genera and species. This process is 
 usually called Abstraction. 
 
 III. We separate scenes or classes of facts into 
 Iheir <'onstituent elements, and form these elements 
 int.A new combinations, so as to represent to our- 
 seWos scenes, or combinations of events, which 
 anve no real existence. This is Imagination. 
 
88 INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS. 
 
 IV. We compare facts with each other, — observe 
 their relations and connexions, — and trace the re- 
 sults which follow particular combinations of them. 
 We also observe their general characters, so as to 
 deduce from the whole general facts or general prin- 
 ciples. This is Reason or Judgment. 
 
 In this arrangement. It will be observed, I confine 
 myself entirely to facts. I do not say that the mind 
 possesses distinct faculties, which we call memory, 
 abstraction, imagination, and judgment, — for this 
 at once leads into hypothesis; but simply, that, 
 in point of fact, the mind remembers, abstracts, im- 
 agines, and judges. These processes appear to con- 
 stitute distinct mental acts, which every one is con 
 scious of who attends to the phenomena of his own 
 mind. But beyond the simple facts we know nothing, 
 and no human ingenuity can lead us one step farther. 
 Some of the followers of Dr. Reid appear to have 
 erred in this respect, by ascribing to the mind dis- 
 tinct faculties or functions, somewhat in the mannei 
 in which we ascribe to the body distinct senses. 
 Dr. Brown, on the other hand, has shown much 
 ingenuity in his attempts to simplify the arrange- 
 ment of the mental processes, by referring them all 
 to his two principles of simple and relative sugges- 
 tion. But, without inquiring what has been gained 
 to the science by this new phraseology, and avoid- 
 ing entirely any system which seems to suppose 
 distinct functions of mind, I confine myself to facts 
 respecting the actual mental operations ; and it ap- 
 pears to answer best the purpose of practical utility 
 to speak of these operations in the arrangement, 
 and by the names, which are commonly used by the 
 generality of mankind. 
 
MEMORY. 89 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 MEMORF. 
 
 By Memory we retain the impression of facts or 
 events ; and by Rkcollection we recall them into 
 the mind by a Voluntary effort. By Conception we 
 recaK perceptions, or the impression of actual scenes, 
 persons, or transactions : thus a skilful painter 
 can delineate from conception a landscape a con- 
 siderable time after he has seen it, or the counte- 
 nance of a friend who is dead or absent. These 
 appear to be the leading phenomena which are re- 
 ferable to the head of memor)\ 
 
 There seem to be oria^inal differences in the power 
 of memory, some individuals being remarkable for 
 retentive memory, though not otherwise distin- 
 guished by their intellectual endowments. Thus, 
 persons have been known to repeat a long discourse 
 after once hearing it. or even a series of things 
 without connexion, as a long column of figures, or a 
 number of words w^ilhout meaning. There is on 
 record the account of a man who could repeat the 
 whole contents of a newspaper; and of another who 
 could retain words that were dictated to him, with- 
 out any connexion, to the amount of six thousand. 
 A man mentioned by Seneca, after hearing a poet 
 read a new poem, claimed it as his own ; and, in 
 proof of his claim, repeated the poem from begin- 
 ning to end, which the author could not do. A simi- 
 lar anecdote is told of an Englishman, whom the 
 King of Prussia placed behind a screen when Vol- 
 taire came to read to him a new poem of consider- 
 able length. It has been alleged, that this kind of 
 memory i? generally connected with inferiority of 
 H2 
 
90 MEMORY. 
 
 the other intellectual powers ; but there appears to 
 be no foundation for this. For, though the mere 
 memory of words may be met with in a high degree in 
 persons of defective understanding, it is also true 
 that men of high endowments have been remarkable 
 for memory. It is said that Themistocles could 
 name all the citizens of Athens, amounting to 
 twenty thousand ; and that Cyrus knew the name of 
 every soldier in his army. 
 
 Tiie late Dr. Leyden was remarkable for his 
 memory. I am informed, through a gentleman who 
 was intimately acquainted with him, that he could 
 repeat correctly a long act of parliament, or any 
 similar document, after having once read it. When 
 he was, on one occasion, congratulated by a friend 
 on his remarkable power in this respect, he replied, 
 that instead of an advantage it was often a source 
 of great inconvenience. This he explained by say- 
 ing, that when he wished to recollect a particular 
 ponit in any thing which he had read, he could do 
 it only by repeating to himself the whole from the 
 commencement till he reached the point which he 
 wished to recall. 
 
 We may find a mere local memory combined 
 with very little Judgment; that is, the power of 
 remembering facts in the order in which they oc- 
 curred, or words in the order in which they were 
 addressed to the individual ; but that kind of memory 
 which is founded, not u{>on local or incidental rela- 
 tions, but on real analogies, must be considered as 
 an important feature of a cultivated mind, and as 
 holding an important place in the formation of in- 
 tellectual character. The former kind of memory, 
 however, is often the more ready, and is that which 
 generally makes the greater show, both on account 
 of its readiness, and hkevvise because the kind of 
 facts with which it is chiefly conversant are usually 
 those most in request in common conve.'satioiL 
 
 The facts now referred to are matters of curiosity 
 
ATTENTION. 91 
 
 only. The points of real interest and practical im- 
 portance, in regard to memory, respect the manner 
 in which it is influenced by the intellectual habits 
 of individuals, and the principles on which it n>ay 
 be improved. These are referable chiefly to two 
 heads, namely, Attention and Association. 
 
 Memory is very much influenced by Attention, 
 or a full and distinct perception of the fact or object 
 with a view to its being remembered ; and by the 
 perception being- kept before the mind, in this dis- 
 tinct manner, for a certain time. The distinct re- 
 collection of the fact, in such cases, is generally in 
 proportion to the intensity with wliich it has been 
 contemplated ; and this is also very much strength- 
 ened by its being repeatedly brought before the mind. 
 Most people, accordingly, have experienced that a 
 statement is more strongly impressed upon the 
 memory by being several times repeated to others. 
 It is on the same principle, that memory is greatly 
 assisted by writing down the object of our know- 
 ledge, especially if this be done in a distinct and 
 systematic manner. A subject also is more dis- 
 tinctly conceived, and more correctly remembered, 
 after we have instructed another person in it. Such 
 exercises are not strictly to be considered as helps 
 to the memory, but as excitements to attention i 
 and as thus leading to that clear and full compre- 
 hension of the subject which is required for the dis- 
 tinct remembrance of it. 
 
 It is famihar to every one that there are great 
 diffierences in memory, both in respect to the facil- 
 ity of acquirement and the power of retention. In 
 the former there appear to be original differences, but 
 a great deal also depends upon habit. In the power 
 of retention much depends, as we shall afterward 
 see, upon the habit of correct association ; but, be- 
 sides this, there are facts which seem to show a 
 singular connexion with the manner in which the 
 acquisition was made. The following fact was 
 
03 MEMORY. 
 
 commimicated to nie by an able and intelligent 
 friend, who beard it from the individual to whom it 
 relates. A distinguished theatrical performer, in 
 consequence of the sudden dlness of another actor, 
 had occasion to prepare himself, on very short no- 
 tice, for a part which was entirely new to him ; and 
 the part was long and rather difficult. He acquired 
 it in a very short time, and went through it with 
 perfect accuracy, but innnediately after the perform- 
 ance forgot eveiy word of it. Characters which 
 he had acquired in a more deliberate manner he 
 never forgets, but can perform them at any time 
 without a moment's preparation ; but in regnrd to 
 the character now mentioned, there was the farther 
 and very singular fact, tliat though he has repeatedly 
 performed it since that time, he has been obliged 
 each time to prepare it anew, and has never acquired 
 in regard to it that facility which is familiar to him 
 in other instances. Wl.en questioned respecting 
 the mental process which he employed the first time 
 he performed this part, he says, that he lost sight 
 entirely of the audience, and seemed to have nothing 
 before him but the pages of tlie book from which 
 he had learned it ; and that if any thing had occurred 
 to interrupt this illusion, he should have stopped 
 instantly. 
 
 That degree of attention which is required for the 
 full remembrance of a subject is to be considered as 
 a voluntary act on the part of the individual ; but 
 the actual exercise of it is influenced in a great 
 measure by his previous intellectual habits. Of four 
 individuals, for example, who are giving an account 
 of a journey througli the same t 'istrict, one may de- 
 scribe chiefly its agricultural produce ; another, its 
 mineralogical characters; a third, its picturesque 
 beauties; while the fourth may not be able to give 
 <in account of any thing except the state of the roads 
 and the facilities for travelling. The same facts or 
 objects must have oassed before the senses of all the 
 
ASSOCIATION. 9b 
 
 four; but their remembrance of them depends upon 
 the points to which their attention was directed. 
 Besides the manner here alluded to, in which the 
 attention is influenced by previous habits or pursuits, 
 some persons have an active inquiring state of mind, 
 w-hich keeps the attention fully engaged upon what- 
 ever is passing before them ; while others give way 
 to a listless inactive condition, which requires to be 
 strongly excited before the attention is roused to the 
 degree required for remembrance. The former, ac- 
 cordingly, remember a great deal of all that passes 
 before them, either in reading or observation. The 
 latter are apt to say that they are deficient in memory ; 
 their deficiency, however, is not in memory, but in 
 attention ; and this appears from the fact that they 
 do not forget any thing which deeply engages theii 
 feelings or concerns their interest. 
 
 The habit of listless inactivity of mind should be 
 carefully guarded against in the young; and the 
 utmost care should be taken to cultivate the opposite, 
 namely, the habit of directing the mind intensely to 
 whatever conies before it, either in reading or obser- 
 vation. This may be considered as forming the 
 foundation of sound intellectual character. 
 
 Next to the effect of attention is the remarkable 
 influence produced upon memory by Association. 
 This principle holds so important a place in relation 
 to the mental operations, that some philosophers 
 have been disposed to refer to it nearly all the phe- 
 nomena of mind; but without ascribing to it this 
 universal influence, its effects are certainly very ex- 
 tensive, and the facts connected with it present a 
 subject of peculiar interest. 
 
 The principle of association is founded upon a re- 
 markable tendency, by which two or more facts or 
 conceptions, which have been contemplated together, 
 or in immediate succession, become so connected in 
 ti»« mind that one of them at a future time recalls 
 
94 MEMORY 
 
 the others, or introduces a train of thoughts which 
 without any mental effort, follow each other in the 
 order in which they were oridnally associated. 
 This is called the association of ideas, and various 
 phenomena of a very interesting kind are connected 
 with it. 
 
 But besides this tendency, by which thoughts for- 
 merly associated are brought into the mind in a par- 
 ticular order, there is another species of association 
 into which the mind passes spontaneously, by a sug- 
 gestion from any subject which happens to be pres- 
 ent to it. The thought or fact which is thus present 
 suggests another which has some kind of affinity to 
 it f this suggests a third, and so on, to the formation 
 of a train or series which may be continued to a 
 great length. A remarkable circumstance likewise 
 is, that such a train may go on with very httle con- 
 sciousness of or attention to it; so that "the particu- 
 lars of the series are scarcely remembered, or are 
 traced only by an effort. This singular fact every 
 one must "have experienced in that state of mind 
 which is called a revery. It goes on for some time 
 without effort and with little attention; at length 
 the attention is roused, and directed to a particular 
 thought which is in the mind, without the person 
 being able at first to recollect what led him to think 
 of that subject. He then, by a voluntary effort, 
 traces the chain of thoughts backwards, perhaps 
 through a long series, till he arrives at a subject of 
 which he has a distinct remembrance as having 
 given rise to it. 
 
 It is impossible distinctly to trace the pnnciples 
 which lead to the particular chain of thoughts which 
 arise in a case of this kind. It is probably much 
 influenced by the previous intellectual habits of the 
 individual; and perhaps in many instances is guided 
 by associations previously formed. There are also 
 among the facts or thoughts themselves certain 
 principles of analogy, by which one suggests another 
 
ASSOCIATION. 95 
 
 Without that kind of connexion which is estabhslied 
 by pi-evious proximity. These ha%e usual-ly been 
 caJled principles of associalion, or, according to the 
 phraseoloofy of Dr. Brown, principles of simple sug- 
 gestion. They have been generally referred to four 
 heads, — namely, resemblance, contiguity in time and 
 place, cause and effect, and contrast: and others 
 have reduced them to three, considering contiguity 
 and cause and effect as referable to the same head. 
 On these principles, then, one thought may suggest 
 another which has some relation to it, either in the 
 way of resemblance, contiguity, cause, effect, or con- 
 trast. But still the question recurs. What gives rise 
 to the occurrence of one of these relations in prefer- 
 ence to the others'? This may depend, in some in- 
 stances, on previous habits of thought and pecuhari- 
 ties of mental temperament ; and in other cases 
 associations may be more apt to occur, according 
 as some analogous association may have been more 
 recently formed, more lively, or more frequently 
 repeated. AVhen the common topic of the weatli^r, 
 for example, is introduced in conversation, or pre- 
 sented to the mind, the agriculturist will naturally 
 refer to its influence on vegetation ; the physician to 
 its effect on the health of the community; the man 
 of pleasure may think only of its reference to the 
 sports of the field ; the philosopher may endeavour 
 to seek for its cause in some preceding atmospheric 
 phenomena; and another person of certain habits 
 of observation may compare or contrast it with the 
 weather of the same period in a preceding year. 
 Thus, in five individuals, the same topic may give 
 rise to five trains of thought, perfectly distinct from 
 each other, yet each depending upon a very natural 
 ana obvious principle of suggestion. In other in- 
 stances it is impossible to trace the cause which 
 leads the mind off into peculiar and unusual associa- 
 lions. The following example from Hobbes has 
 }:)eeu. frequently referred to : — " In a company in 
 
96 MEMORY. 
 
 which the conversation turned on the civil war, what 
 could be conceived more impertinent than for a per- 
 son to ask abruptly what was the value of a Roman 
 denarius'? On a little reflection, however, I was 
 easily able to trace the train of thought which sug- 
 gested the question ; for the original subject of dis- 
 course naturally introduced the history of the king, 
 and of the treachery of those who surrendered his 
 person to his enemies ; this again introduced the 
 treachery of Judas Iscariot, and the sum of money 
 which he received for his reward. And ail this train 
 of ideas passed through the mind of the speaker in a 
 twinkling in consequence of the velocity of thought." 
 Mr. Stewart adds, in relation to this anecdote, " It is 
 by no means improbable, that if the speaker had 
 been interrogated about the connexion of ideas which 
 led him aside from the original topic of discourse, he 
 would have found himself, at first, at a loss for an 
 answer." 
 
 In the mental process now referred to it is evident 
 that the term suggestion is much more correct than 
 association, which has often been applied to it. For 
 in the cases which belong to this class the facts or 
 thoughts suggest each other, not according to any 
 connexion or association which the mind had pre- 
 viously formed between them, but according to some 
 mental impression or emotion, which by a law of our 
 constitution proves a principle of analogy or sugges- 
 tion. We readily perceive how this takes place in 
 regard to circumstances which are allied to each 
 other by resemblance, contiguity, cause, or effect ; 
 and the suggestion of contrast must also occur to 
 every one as by no means unnatural. Thus, the 
 sight of a remarkably fat man may recall to us the 
 thought of another man we had lately seen, who was 
 equally remarkable for his leanness : the playfulness 
 and mirth of childhood may suggest the cares and 
 anxieties of after hfe ; and an instance of conduct 
 which we greatly disapprove may lead us to recollect 
 
PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION. 97 
 
 how very differently another individual conducted 
 himself in similar circumstances. 
 
 In a practical view the subject of association leads 
 lis chiefly to a consideration of the manner in v.hich 
 facts are so associated in the mind as to be recalled 
 by means of the connexion ; in other words, the in- 
 fluence of association upon memory. In this view, 
 associations are distinctly referable to three classes : 
 
 I. Natural or philosophical association. 
 
 II. Local or incidental association. 
 
 III. Arbitrary or fictitious association. 
 
 A variety of mental phenomena of the most inter- 
 esting kind' will be found connected with the subjects 
 referred to under these classes. The principle on 
 which they all depend is simply the circumstance of 
 two or more facts, thoughts, or events being contem- 
 plated together by the mind, though many of them 
 may have'no relation to each other except this con- 
 junction. The strength of the association is gene- 
 rally in proportion to the intensity of the mental 
 emotion; and is likewise in a great measure regu- 
 lated by the length of time, or the number of times, 
 in which the facts have been contemplated in this 
 connexion. Astonishing examples may be often met 
 with of facts or occurrences which have long ceased 
 to be objects of simple memory, being brought up in 
 this manner by association, though they had not 
 passed through the mind for a very long time. 
 
 I. Natural or PmLosopmcAL Association takes 
 place when a fact or statement on which the atten- 
 tion is fixed is, by a mental process, associated with 
 some fact previously known to which it has a rela- 
 tion, or with some subject which it is calculated to 
 illustrate. The fact so acquired is thus, to use a 
 figurative expression, put by in its proper place in 
 the mind, and can afterward be recalled by means 
 of the association, 
 
 i 
 
98 MEMORY. 
 
 The formation of associations, in this manner, is 
 of course influenced in a very ^eat degi'ee by pre- 
 vious mental habits, pursuits, or subjects of reflec- 
 tion ; and, according to the nature and the variety 
 of these pursuits or subjects of thought, facts which 
 by some are passed by and instantly forgotten may 
 be fixed upon by others with eager attention, and 
 referred to some principle which they are calculated 
 to illustrate. Examples of this kind must be famihar 
 to every one ; I may mention the following : — In a 
 party of gentlemen, the conversation turned on the 
 warlike character of the Mahrattas, as compared 
 with the natives of Lower India, and the explanation 
 given of it by an author who refers it to their use of 
 animal food, from which the Hindoos are said to be 
 prohibited by their religion. A doubt was .started 
 respecting the extent to which Hindoos are prohib- 
 ited from the use of animal food: some were of one 
 opinion and some of another, and the point was left 
 undecided. Reading soon after the Journal of Bishop 
 Heber, I found it stated, that on one occasion during 
 his journey, when a large supply of meat was brought 
 to him, he ordered three lambs to be sent to his Hin- 
 doo attendants, and that the gift was received with 
 every expression of gratitude. On another occasion 
 such a fact might have been passed by without pro- 
 ducing any impression; or it might have been slightly 
 associated with the good bishop's attention to the 
 comfort of all around him, but not remembered be- 
 yond the passing moment. In connexion with the 
 discussion now mentioned it became a fact of great 
 interest, and never to be forgotten ; and led to inquiry 
 after more precise information on the subject to which 
 it related. 
 
 This trifling example may serve to illustrate the 
 principle, that the remembrance of insulated facts 
 does not depend merely upon the degree of attention 
 directed to them, but also o? the existence in the 
 «imd of subjects of thought with which the new 
 
PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION. 99 
 
 fact may be associated. Other facts, as they occur, 
 will afterward be added from tjme to time, giving 
 rise to a progressive increase of knowledge in a 
 mind in which this mental process is regularly car- 
 ried on. T/iis habit of attention and association 
 ought therefore to be carefully cultivated, as it must 
 have a great influence on our progress in knowledge, 
 and likewise on the formation of intellectual char- 
 acter, provided the associations be made upon sound 
 principles, or according to the true and important 
 relations of things. It is also closely connected with 
 that activity of mind which is ever on the alert for 
 knowledge, from every source that comes within 
 its reach ; and that habit of reflection which always 
 connects with such facts the conclusions to which 
 they lead, and the views which they tend to illus- 
 trate. On this principle also, every new fact which 
 is acquired, or every new subject of thought which 
 is brought before the mind, is not only valuable in 
 i/self, but also becomes the basis or nucleus of 
 further improvement. Minds which are thus fur- 
 nished with the requisite foundation of knowledge, 
 and act uniformly upon these principles of enlarg- 
 ing it, will find interesting matter to be associated 
 and remembered, where others find only amusement 
 for a vacant hour, which passes away and is for- 
 gotten. There is also another respect in which the 
 habit of correct and philosophical association assists 
 the memory, and contributes to progress in know- 
 ledge. For by means of it, when applied to a great 
 mass of facts relating to the same subject, we arrive 
 at certain general facts, which represent a numerous 
 body of the individuals, and the remembrance of 
 which is equivalent to the remembrance of the whole. 
 The associations referred to under this first head 
 arise out of the real relations of facts to each other, 
 or to subjects of thought previously existing in the 
 mind. The particular train of association, therefore, 
 which is formed from the same facts by different in- 
 
100 laEMORY. 
 
 dividuals may vary exceedindy. Thus, the same 
 facts may often admit of various apphcations, or, in 
 other words, of being associated in various ways, 
 by different persons, according- to their intellectual 
 habits, or by the same person at different times, ac- 
 cording to the subject of thought which happens to 
 be more immediately present. 
 
 When a variety of facts have been associated in 
 the mind in the manner now referred to, they form 
 a series which hang together and recall each other 
 in a very remarkable manner. There are two ways 
 in which this takes place, which may be called 
 voluntary and spontaneous. (1.) We call up facts 
 by a voluntary effort, by directing the mind into 
 particular trains of thought calculated to lead to 
 those which we are in search of. This is what we 
 call recollecting ourselves on a particular subject. 
 We have an impression, perhaps, that the mind is 
 in possession of information which bears upon 
 the subject, but do not at the moment remember 
 it ; or we remember some circumstances, and wish 
 to recall a more full and complete remembrance. 
 We therefore commence a mental process which 
 consists in putting in motion, to speak figuratively, 
 a train of thoughts, or a series of associated facts, 
 which we think calculated to lead us to the facts we 
 wish to recall. (2.) Associations recur spontane- 
 ously, either when particular topics naturally lead- 
 ing to them are brought before the mind, in reading 
 or conversation, or in that state in which the mind is 
 left to follow, without any effort, the current of 
 thoughts as they succeed each other. In the 
 healthy state of the mind, we can give way to this 
 spontaneous succession of thoughts ; or we can check 
 it at our pleasure, and direct the mind into some 
 new train connected with the same subject, or 
 arising out of it; or we can dismiss it altogether. 
 While we allow it to go on, it does so, not only with- 
 out effort, but often without consciousness ; so that 
 
LOCAL ASSOCIATION. 101 
 
 when the attention is, after some time, arrested by 
 a subject of thought which is in the mind, we do 
 not at first remembf^r what led us to think of it, and 
 bea:in to recollect ourselves by tracing the series 
 backwards. In this state of mind, it is most inter- 
 esting to observe the manner in which old associa 
 tions are revived, and old recollections renewed 
 which seemed to have been lost and forgotten ; and 
 how facts and occurrences come into the mind which 
 had not been thought of for many years. They are 
 recalled, we scarcely know how, by some train of 
 association which we can hardly trace, and which 
 had long ceased to be the subject of any voluntary 
 effort of attention. We shall again allude to thia 
 most interesting subject, in relation to the manner 
 in which associations, long forgotten, are sometimes 
 brought into the mind in dreaming, and in certain 
 states of delirium. 
 
 The voluntaiy power over the succession of 
 thoughts and associations which has now been al- 
 luded to is a subject of extreme interest. We shall 
 have occasion to refer to it again when we come to 
 speak of a remarkable condition in which it is lost ; 
 and in which the mind is left entirely under the in- 
 fluence of the series of thoughts as they happen to 
 succeed each other, according probably to old asso- 
 ciations, without the power of arresting or varying 
 it. This occurs in two very interesting mental con- 
 ditions to be afterward more particularly mentioned; 
 namely, dreaming and insanity. 
 
 IL Local or Incidental Association. — In the men- 
 tal process referred to under the preceding head, 
 facts or thoughts are associated according to certain 
 real relations ; though these, we have seen, may be 
 various, and the particular relation which is fixed 
 upon, in particular cases, depends upon the intellec- 
 tual habits of the individual. In the class now to 
 be mentioned, the associations are formed according 
 12 
 
102 MEMORY. 
 
 to no other relations than such as are entirely local 
 or casual. Thus, a fact, a thought, or a mental im- 
 pression is associated with thf person by whom it 
 was comnuuiicated, or the pl-^ce where the commu- 
 nication was made ; and is recalled to the mind 
 when the place or person is seen, mentioned, or 
 thought of. Some persons seem to form almost no 
 other associations than those of this description. 
 When a place which they had visited, for example, 
 is spoken of, they immediately relate, in connexion 
 witli it, the persons whom they met there, incidents 
 which occurred in their company, and opinions or 
 statements which were mentioned in conversation 
 with them ; and from this, perhaps, they may branch 
 off to other circumstances relating to these indi- 
 viduals, their families, or connexions. 
 
 These mere local associations, however, often 
 make a very deep impression upon the mind ; more 
 vivid, certainly, than simple memory of the facts or 
 transactions connected with them. Thus, we avoid 
 a place which is associated with some painful recol- 
 lection; yet the very fact of avoiding it shows that 
 we have a full remembrance of the circumstances, 
 and, at the same time, a conviction that the sight 
 of the spot would make the impression more vivid 
 and more painful. After the death of a beloved 
 child or a much valued friend, we may retain a lively 
 remembrance of them, and even anxiously cherish 
 the impression of their endearing qualities; yet, 
 after time has in some measure blunted the acute- 
 ness of feeling, the accidental discovery of some 
 trifling memorial strongly associated with the la- 
 mented object of our affection produces a freshness 
 and intensity of emotion, known only to those who 
 have experienced it. This feeling is peculiarly 
 strong if the memorial has been long lost sight of, 
 and discovered by accident ; because, as has been 
 well remarked by Dr. Brown, it in this case presents 
 the unmixed image of the friend with whom it is as- 
 
LOCAL ASSOCIATION. 103 
 
 sociated ; whereas, a memorial which has become 
 familiar to us is associated with other feelings not 
 relating exclusively to him. Philosophers have en- 
 deavoured to explain the mental phenomenon here 
 referred to by supposing, that in such cases the 
 mingling of mental emotion with actual perception 
 gives a feeling of reality to the emotion, and for the 
 time a kind of belief of the existence of the object 
 of it. This is sufficiently plausible, but, after all, 
 amounts to little more than expressing the fact in 
 other words, without conveying any real explanation. 
 Similar impressions, whether of a pleasurable or 
 painful character, according to the original feeling 
 which is thus recalled, are excited by the sight of a 
 spot which we have visited while under the influence 
 of strong emotion ; by a tune, a piece of poetry, 
 an article of dress, or the most trifling object with 
 which, from incir'ental circumstances, the associa- 
 tion was made. The efi'ect of a particular tune on 
 the Swiss regiments in foreign service is famihar 
 to every one ; and a similar effect has been remarked, 
 from a similar cause, among the Highland regiments 
 of our own country^. The feelings thus produced 
 may be so vivid as even to overpower present emo- 
 tions; to excite pleasure amid circumstances of 
 pain or depression ; and to produce depressing and 
 painful emotions, when all present circumstances 
 are calculated to give satisfaction. Hence, it is prob- 
 able that the principle might often be employed 
 with much advantage, as a moral remedy, in various 
 circumstances of diepressing disease, as in the low 
 state of fever, and certain conditions of insanity. 
 A pleasing anecdote of this kind is mentioned by Dr. 
 Rush. " During the time that I passed at a country 
 school in Cecil County in Maryland, I often went 
 on a holyday, with my schoolmates, to see an eagle's 
 nest upon the summit of a dead tree, in the neigh- 
 bourhood of the school, during the time of the in- 
 cubation of the bird. The daughter of the farrne* 
 
104 MEMORY. 
 
 in whose field the tree stood, and with whom I be- 
 came acquainted, married, ajid settled in this city 
 about forty years ago. In our occasional interviews, 
 we now and then spoke of the innocent haunts and 
 rural pleasures of our youth, and among others, of 
 the eagle's nest in her father's field. A few years 
 ago I was called to visit this woman when she was 
 in the lowest stage of typhus fever. Upon entering 
 the room, I caught her eye, and with a cheerful tone 
 of voice said only. The eagle's nest. She seized my 
 hand, without being able to speak, and discovered 
 strong emotions of pleasure in her countenance, 
 probably from a sudden association of all her early 
 domestic connexions and enjoyments with the words 
 which I uttered. From that time she began to re- 
 cover. She is now living, and seldom fails, when 
 we meet, to salute me with the echo of — ' The eagle's 
 nest.' " 
 
 There is even something in these mere local asso- 
 ciations which fixes an impression upon the mind, 
 almost independent of memory, and upon a principle 
 with which we are little acquainted. The follow- 
 ing anecdote is, I believe, authentic, though I cannot 
 at present refer to the work in which it is related. 
 It is certainly one of the most extraordinary of its 
 kind, and yet we see enough of the principle, in va- 
 rious instances, to give it a high degree of proba- 
 bility. — A lady, in the last stage of a chronic disease, 
 was carried from London to a lodging in the country : 
 there her infant daughter was taken to visit her, 
 and, after a short interview, carried back to town. 
 The lady died a few days after, and the daughter 
 grew up without any recollection of her mother, 
 till she was of mature age. At this time, she hap- 
 pened to be taken into the room in which her mother 
 died, without knowing it to have been so ; she 
 started on entering it, and when a friend who was 
 along, with her asked the cause of her agitation, 
 eplied, " I have a distinct impression of having been 
 
LOCAL ASSOCIATION 105 
 
 lit this room before, and that a lady, who lay in that 
 comer, and seemed very ill, leaned over me and 
 wept." 
 
 The singular influence of local association is often 
 fUustrated by the most trivial occurrences. Walking 
 in the street lately, I met a lady whose face was 
 familiar to me, but whom I could not nam.e. I had, 
 at the same time, an impression that I ought to have 
 spoken to her, and to have inquired for some rela- 
 tive who had lately been my patient ; but, notwith- 
 standing repeated efforts, I could not recognise her, 
 and passed on. Some time after, in passing along 
 the road a few miles from town, my eye caught a 
 cottage, to which I had b*^en taken about six months 
 before, to see a gentleman who had been carried 
 into it in a state of insensibility, in consequence of 
 being thrown from a gig. The sight of the cottage 
 instantly recalled the accident, and the gentleman 
 who was the subject of it; and, at the same instant, 
 the impression that the lady whom I had passed in 
 the manner now mentioned was his wife. In this 
 case no recollection was excited by the sight of the 
 lady, even after repeated and anxious attempts ; and 
 I believe I should not have recognised the patient 
 himself, had he been along with her ; whereas the 
 whole was recalled in an instant by the sight of the 
 cottage. Similar illustrations must have occurred 
 to every one. We meet a person in the street, who 
 stops and speaks to us ; but we cannot recognise 
 him. We are unwilling to tell him so, and walk 
 along with him conversing on various topics ; at 
 length, he makes an allusion to some person or some 
 circumstance, by means of which we instantly re- 
 collect who he is, and where we met with him. On 
 the same principle, when we are endeavouring to 
 remind a person of a transaction which he has for- 
 gotten, and which we are anxious to call to his re- 
 collection, we mention various circumstances con- 
 nected with it. until at length we mention one which, 
 
1 06 MEMORY. 
 
 by association, instantly brings the whole distinctly 
 before him. There are even facts which seem to 
 show that the impression recalled by local associa- 
 tion may affect the bodily organs. Van Swieten re- 
 lates of himself, that he was passing a spot where 
 the dead body of a dog burst and produced such a 
 stench as made him vomit ; and that, happening to 
 pass the same spot 5ome years after, he was affected 
 by sickness and vomiting from the recollection. 
 
 Finally, to the influence of local association we 
 are to refer the impressions produced by the monu- 
 ments of the illustrious dead ; the trophies of other 
 times ; the remains of Greece and Rome ; or by the 
 visitation of spots distinguished by iUustrious deeds, 
 as Thermopylae, Bannockburn, or Waterloo. " Far 
 from me," says Dr. Johnson, " and from my friends, be 
 such frigid philosophy, as may conduct us, indifferent 
 and unmoved, over any ground which has been dig- 
 nified by wisdom, bravery, or virtue. That man is 
 little to be envied whose patriotism would not gain 
 force upon the plains of Marathon, or whose piety 
 would not grow warmer among the ruins of lona." 
 
 III. Arbitrary or Fictitious Association. — This 
 association is generally produced by a voluntary ef- 
 fort of the mind; and the facts associated are not 
 connected by any relation except what arises out 
 of this effort. The process is exemplified in the 
 connexion we establish between something which 
 we wish to remember and something which we are 
 in no danger of forgetting ; as in the common ex- 
 pedients of tying a thread about the finger, or mak- 
 ing a knot on the pocket-handkerchief. A Roman, 
 for the same purpose, turned the stone of his ring 
 inwards towards the palm of his hand. There is an 
 analogous expedient which most people probably 
 have employed for enabling them to remember the 
 names of persons. It consists in forming an asso- 
 ciation between the name to be remembered and 
 
ARBITRARY ASSOCIATION. 10? 
 
 t^at of some intimate friend or public character of 
 the same name, which is famiUar to us. The re- 
 markable circumstance in these cases is, that what- 
 ever difficulty a person may have in simply remem- 
 bering a name, he never forgets who the individual 
 was with whose name he formed the association. 
 
 On this principle have been founded various 
 schemes of artificial memory. One of the most an- 
 cient consisted in associating the divisions of a dis- 
 course to be delivered with the various apartments 
 of a building, and the leading sentiments with articles 
 of furniture. This is said to have been much prac- 
 tised by the ancient orators, and to have given rise 
 to the phraseology by which we speak of the divi- 
 sions of a discourse, as the first place^ the second 
 place^ &c. I have repeatedly made experiments on 
 this method in remembermg the discourses of public 
 speakers, and the effect is certainly astonishing; for 
 though it is many years since the experiments were 
 made, I still find articles of furniture associated in 
 the clearest manner with sentiments delivered by 
 some of the speakers. Other systems of artificial 
 memory are founded upon the same general princi- 
 ple, though the particular applications of it may vary; 
 and some of them are extremely absurd. One of 
 the last which attracted notice in this country was 
 that of a German of the name of Feinagle, who de- 
 livered lectures on memory to crowded and fashion- 
 able audiences, about the year 1809 or 1810. A 
 leading part of his system was the memory of dates, 
 and it consisted in changing the figures in the date 
 into the letters of the alphabet corresponding to them 
 in number. These letters were then formed into a 
 word to be in some way associated with the date to 
 be remembered. One example, which I happen to 
 recollect, will be sufficient to illustrate the pecuharity 
 of the system, and at the same time its efficiency for 
 ts purpose. Henry IV. King of England was born 
 n the year 1366. 'This date, changed into letters, 
 
108 MEMORY. 
 
 gives mff, which are very easily formed into the word 
 muff. The method is not so obvious of estabhshing 
 with this a relation to Henry IV. " Henry IV.," 
 says M. Feinagle, " is four hens, and we put them 
 into the muff, one in each corner." No one, certainly, 
 after hearing this, is in any danger of forgetting the 
 date of the birth of Henry IV. ; but whether the re. 
 niembrance is worth such a process is a separate 
 question. 
 
 It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the subject of 
 arbitrary association, as the observation of every one 
 will furnish numerous examples of it. There is one 
 application of the principle, however, which deserves 
 to be referred to in a more particular manner. I 
 allude to the practice of commemorative rites, or 
 periodical observances, for transmitting the remem- 
 brance of remarkable events. These are in their 
 nature, in general, entirely arbitrary ; or, if they have 
 any analogy to the events, the relation is only figu- 
 rative. But the influence of such celebrations is of 
 the most extensive and most important kma. If the 
 events, particularly, are of a very uncommon char- 
 acter, these rites remove any feeling of uncertainty 
 which attaches to traditional testimony, when it has 
 been transmitted through a long period of time, and 
 consequently through a great number of individuals. 
 They carry us back, in one unbroken series, to the 
 period of the events themselves, and to the individ- 
 uals who were witnesses of them. 
 
 The most important apphcation of the principle 
 in the manner now referred to is in the observances 
 of religion which are intended to commemorate those 
 events which are connected with the revelation of 
 the Christian faith. The importance of this mode 
 of transmission has not been sufficiently attended to 
 by those who have urged the insufficiency of human 
 testimony to establish the truth of events which are 
 at variance with the common course of nature. We 
 have formerly alluded to one part of this sophism, 
 
ARBITRARY ASSOCIATION. lOS 
 
 and have stated the grounds on which we contend 
 that no objection to the credibility of these events 
 can be founded upon our observation of what we call 
 the course of nature. We have admitted that a much 
 higher species of evidence is required for them than 
 would be required for events which correspond with 
 our previous observation ; and this high and pecuhar 
 evidence is confirmed in a striking manner by the 
 periodical rites now referred to. By means of these 
 we are freed entirely from every impression of the 
 /ialhbility of testimony, and the possibility of the 
 statements having been fabricated; as we are con- 
 ducted in one uninterrupted series to the period when 
 the events took place, and to the individuals who wit- 
 nessed them. This will appear if we state in a few 
 words a hypothetical case. Let us conceive a person 
 attempting to impose upon the world by an account 
 of some wonderful or miraculous event, which he 
 alleges occurred five hundred years ago. He, of 
 course, exerts every possible ingenuity in fabricating 
 documents, and framing the appearance of a chain 
 of testimony in support of his statement. It is quite 
 possible that he might thus deceive a considerable 
 number of credidous persons ; and that others, who 
 did not believe his statement, might yet find difficulty 
 in proving its fallacy. But if the report were further 
 to bear, that ever since the occurrence of the alleged • 
 event it had been regularly and specially celebrated 
 by a certain periodical observance, it is clear that this 
 would bring the statement to the test of a fact open 
 to examination, and that the fallacy of tlie whole 
 would be instantly detected. 
 
 On these principles it must appear that the state- 
 ments of the sacred writings, respecting miraculous 
 events which are said to have occurred upwards of 
 1800 years ago, could not have been fabricated at any 
 intermediate era during that period. It is unneces- 
 sary to state how much more improbable it is that 
 they could have been fabricated at the very time and 
 K 
 
110 MEMORY. 
 
 place in which tliey are said to have occurred, and 
 in the midst of thousands who are said to have wit- 
 nessed them, many of whom were deeply interested 
 in detecting their fallacy. This part of the question 
 is not connected with our present inquiry, hut it is 
 impossible to dismiss the subject without one reflec- 
 tion : — that if we are to proceed upon the principle 
 of probabilities, we must balance fairly the proba- 
 bilities of fabrication. If we do so, we hesitate not 
 to assert, that the probability of the world being" im- 
 posed upon, under all the circumstances now alluded 
 to, is more at variance with our firm and unalterable 
 experience than all that we are called upon to believe. 
 
 It does not appear necessary to say much of that 
 modification of memory which is called Conception. 
 It is the recalhng of a perception. If, for example, we 
 have passed a person in the street whose face we 
 think we have seen, but without being able to recognise 
 him, we can recall the impression of his countenance, 
 and endeavour to recollect who he is. By a higher 
 exercise of this faculty a painter can draw from con- 
 ception a landscape or a building long after he has 
 visited them, and even the portrait of a friend who is 
 dead or absent, and whom he has not seen for aeon- 
 s-iderable time. By another modification of this 
 •power we can imbody into a conception a scene, a 
 figure, or a transaction which has been described to 
 us by another. The vividness of our conception, in 
 such cases, does not depend upon the accuracy or 
 even the truth of the description, but upon the degree 
 of liveliness with which it is given, or the intensity 
 with which our attention is directed to it. Thus, it 
 has been remarked that we have a more clear cvm- 
 ception of Don Quixote or Sancho than of any char- 
 acters in real history, unless they have been made 
 familiar to us by paintings. The business of the 
 novehst being to create his hero, he gives a more 
 full and graphic delineation of him than the authentic 
 
CONCEPTION. Ill 
 
 historian finds it necessary to do ; hence, the former 
 begins his narrative by an impression made upon our 
 conception ; the latter disregards this, and proceeds 
 at once to the facts which he has to address to our 
 attention and memory. 
 
 Conception, properly so called, or the recalling- of 
 a perception, does not appear to be necessarily con- 
 nected with the impression of past time, but rather 
 to be at first accompanied by a feehng of the present 
 existence of the object. Connecting the impression 
 with past time seems to be a distinct act of the mind ; 
 and the conception may be so strong as, for the mo- 
 ment, almost to exclude all idea of the past. That 
 degr&e of conception by which a painter can take the 
 likeness of a friend who has been long dead, or de- 
 lineate a scene visited at -a remote period, must 
 amount to something of this nature. In the active 
 and healthy state of the other faculties of the mind 
 this impression is but momentary, being almost in- 
 stantly corrected by impressions received from the 
 external world. We shall afterward have occasion 
 to refer to a remarkable state of mind in which it is 
 not thus corrected, but in which objects which exist 
 only in conception are believed to have a real and 
 present existence. On this condition depend many 
 of the peculiarities of dreaming, insanity, and spec- 
 tral illusions. 
 
 Different individuals possess the faculty of concep- 
 tion in different degrees ; and, connected with the 
 degree of it, there is generally a corresponding talent 
 for lively description. The faculty itself, or the 
 formation of the conception, probably follows nearly 
 the same laws with memory, and depends m a great 
 measure upon the degree of attention which was 
 originally directed to the objects. This, again, is 
 iniluenced, as in the case of memory, partly by the 
 general activit}"- of mind of the individual, and partly 
 by his particular habits and pursuits. _ Thus, as for- 
 
112 MEMORY. 
 
 merly remarked, in describing the features of a coun- 
 try which they have passed over, one person will 
 give a clear and lively description of its general char- 
 acters, so as to place it, as it were, before you ; a 
 second will describe chiefly its pastures and produce ; 
 a third may include both ; while a fourth may not be 
 able to give an intelligible account of any one feature 
 of the scene. 
 
 There are particular situations in which concep- 
 tion is apt to be most intensely brought into exercise, 
 especially those of seclusion and the absence of all 
 external impressions. A beautiful example of this 
 occurs in the Life of Niebuhr, the celebrated Danish 
 traveller. When old, blind, and so infirm that he was 
 able only to be carried from his bed to his chair, he 
 used to describe to his friends the scenes which he 
 liad visited in his early days with wonderful minute- 
 ness and vivacity. When they expressed their as- 
 tonishment, he told them, " that as he lay in bed, all 
 visible objects shut out, the pictures of what he had 
 seen in the East continually floated before his mind's 
 eye, so that it was no wonder he could speak of 
 them as if he had seen them yesterday. With like 
 vividness the deep intense sky of Asia, with its bril- 
 liant and twinkling host of stars, which he had so 
 often gazed at by night, or its lofty vault of blue by 
 day, was reflected, in the hours of stillness and dark- 
 ness, on his inmost soul." This may perhaps be con- 
 sidered as an example of what we may call the high- 
 est degree of healthy conception. Something a little 
 beyond this leads to that state on which depends the 
 theory of apparitions or spectral illusions. 
 
 In concluding this brief allusion to the subject of 
 conception, I shall only add the following example 
 of another application of this mental process. In 
 the church of St. Peter at Cologne the altar-piece 
 is a large and valuable picture by Rubens, represent- 
 ing the martyrdom of the apostle. This picture 
 having been Cxirried away by the French in 1805, t<» 
 
ITS CULTURE AND IMPROVEMENT. 113 
 
 the great regret of the inhabitants, a painter of that 
 city undertook to make a copy of it from recollection ; 
 and succeeded in doing so in such a manner, that the 
 most delicate tints of the original are preserved with 
 the most minute accuracy. The original painting 
 has now been restored, but the copy is preserved 
 along with it ; and even when they are rigidly com- 
 pared, it is scarcely possible to distinguish the one 
 from the other. I am not aware that this remarka- 
 ble anecdote has been recorded by any traveller ; I 
 am indebted for it to my friend Dr. Duncan, of the 
 miiversity of Edinburgh, who heard it on the spot in a 
 late visit to the Continent, and saw both the pictures 
 
 OF THE CULTURE AND IMPROVEMENT OF ATTENTION AND 
 
 MEMORY. 
 
 The facts which have been briefly referred to, m 
 regard to the phenomena of memory, lead to some 
 remarks of a practical nature. These relate to the 
 improvement of attention and memory in persons of 
 adult years, and tiie cultivation of these powers in 
 the education of the young. 
 
 The rules from which benefit is to be derived for 
 the improvement of memory, in persons of adult 
 years, may be chiefly referred to the following heads. 
 
 I. The cultivation of habits of attention, or of in- 
 tense application of the mind to whatever is at the 
 time its more immediate object of pursuit. 
 
 II. Habits of correct association. These consist 
 in the constant practice of tracing the relation be- 
 tween new facts and others with which we are pre- 
 viously acquainted ; and of referring facts to prin- 
 ciples which they are calculated to illustrate, or to 
 
 K2 
 
114 MEMORY. 
 
 opinions which they tend to confirm, modify, or over 
 turn. This is the operation of what we call a reflect 
 ing miad ; and that information which is thus fully 
 contemplated and associated is not likely to be for 
 gotten. 
 
 III. Intimately connected with both the former 
 rules is the cultivation of that active, inquiring state 
 of mind which is always on the watch for knowledge 
 from every source that comes within its reach, either 
 in reading, conversation, or observation. Such a 
 mind is ever ready to refer newly-acquired knowledge 
 to its proper place. It is thus easily retained, and 
 made to yield those conclusions which are legiti- 
 mately deduced from it. 
 
 IV. Method ; that is, the pursuit of particular sub 
 jects, upon a regular and connected plan. 
 
 A.11 these principles are opposed to that listless, 
 inactive state of mind which is occupied with trifles, 
 or with its own waking dreams ; or which seeks 
 only amusement in desultory pursuits which pass 
 away and are forgotten. They are hkewise opposed 
 to habits of irregular and desultory application, which 
 even intellectual persons are apt to fall into, by means 
 of which the mind loses the train of investigation, or 
 of argument, in which it had made some progress, 
 and may not be able to recover it in a satisfactory 
 manner. Nothing, indeed, appears to contribute 
 more to progress in any intellectual pursuit than the 
 practice of keeping the subject habitually before the 
 mind, and of daily contributing something towards 
 the prosecution of it. 
 
 V. Attention and memory are greatly promoted 
 by writing on a subject, especially if it be done in a 
 distinct and systematic manner; also, by conversing 
 on the subject, ajid by instructing others in it These 
 
ITS CULTURE AND IMPROVEMENT. 115 
 
 exercises, indeed, may perhaps be considered rather 
 as aids to attention, or a clear comprehension of the 
 subject, than to memory. For in regard to memorj^, 
 it is remarkable how much its power is increased in 
 many instances by that kind of exercise by which it 
 is alone trusted to, without any aid from writing. I 
 have known medical men, for example, who had to 
 recollect numerous appointments, do so with perfect 
 accuracy by trusting to memory, to which they had 
 habituated themselves, but blunder continually when 
 they kept a written memorandum. The mental 
 power which is in some cases acquired by constant 
 and intense exercise is indeed astonishing. Bloom- 
 field the poet relates of himself, that nearly one-half 
 of his poem, the Farmer's Boy, was composed, re- 
 vised, and corrected, without writing a word of it, 
 while he was at work with other shoemakers in a 
 garret. i 
 
 Similar rules apply to the cultivation of these 
 powers in young persons. They may be chiefly 
 referred to the following heads : — 
 
 L Exciting constant attention and constant in 
 terest- For this purpose it is of essential import- 
 ance that whatever reading is presented to children 
 shall be of a kind which they understand, and in 
 which they can feel interest and pleasure. This 
 will be greatly promoted by directing their attention 
 to the meaning of words, and explaining them by 
 famiUar illustrations. The practice of setting tasks 
 as punishments cannot be alluded to in terms ade- 
 quate to its extreme absurdity. On this ground also 
 it must be considered as a great error in education 
 to make children attempt too much; that is, more 
 than they can do with close attention. When a 
 sense of weariness or mental languor takes place, 
 what follows is not merely loss of time, but an im- 
 portant injury done to the mental constitution ; and 
 
1 1 6 MEMORY. 
 
 it appears to be of the utmost consequence that the 
 time of children should be as much as possible 
 divided between intense attention and active recre- 
 ation. By a shorter time occupied in this manner 
 not only is more progress made than by a longer 
 with listless and imperfect application, but an im- 
 portant part of mental discipline is secured, which 
 by the other method is entirely neglected. Similar 
 observations, indeed, apply to persons at every 
 period of life, and we are fully persuaded that 
 progress in any intellectual pursuit does not depend 
 so much upon protracted laborious study as on the 
 practice of keeping the subject habitually before the 
 mind, and on the intensity of mental application. 
 
 II. Cultivating habits of association, by pointing 
 out to children the relation of facts to each other, 
 the manner in which they illustrate one another, or 
 lead to some general conclusion. By directing them 
 in this manner from any particular fact to recollect 
 similar or analogous facts which had formerly 
 passed before them, they will be trained at once to 
 attention, memory, and reflection. 
 
 III. Cultivating that general activity of mind 
 which seeks for information on every subject that 
 comes in its way. The most common and trivial 
 occurrences may thus be made the source of mental 
 improvement : the habits of animals ; the natural 
 history of the articles that are constantly before us, 
 in clothes, food, furniture ; articles of manufacture 
 from a watch to a pin ; the action of the mechanic 
 powers, as illustrated by various contrivances in 
 constant use ; the structure of a leaf, a flower, a 
 tree. To those farther advanced a constant source 
 of interest may be found in history, geography, and 
 memoirs of eminent individuals ; and in the leading 
 principles of natural history, natural philosophy, and 
 chymistry. Every new subject of thought which is 
 
ITS CULTURE AND IMPROVEMENT. 117 
 
 thus presented to the mind is both valuable in itself 
 by the powers which it calls into action, and by 
 proving a nucleus to which new facts may be after- 
 ward associated. 
 
 IV. Memory and attention are greatly promoted 
 in young persons by writing; provided it be done, 
 not merely in the form of extracts from books, but 
 in their own words : in history, for example, in the 
 form of chronological tables ; and on other subjects 
 in clear and distinct abstracts, neatly and method- 
 ically written. 
 
 V. These exercises of mind are greatly promoted 
 in the young by verbal communication. Hence the 
 importance of frequent examination. The teacher 
 is thereby enabled, not only to ascertain their pro- 
 gress, but to explain what they do not understand; 
 to impress upon them important points to which 
 they may not have sufficiently attended ; to excite 
 attention, inquiry, and interest ; and so to cultivate 
 the habits of association and reflection. These, in 
 fact, ought to be the objects to be kept in view in 
 all such exercises as of much greater moment than 
 the mere putting of questions. On the same prin- 
 ciple, a most useful exercise for young persons is 
 instructing others still younger on subjects which 
 they have themselves recently acquired. 
 
 VI. In the cultivation of the mental powers in the 
 young, a point of essential importance is the selec- 
 tion of proper and worthy objects of acquirement. 
 In the general conduct of education in this respect 
 the chief error appears in general to have been, de- 
 voting too much time and attention in females to 
 superficial accomplishments, and in males to mere 
 acquirement in languages and mathematics : and the 
 great object to be kept in view from the very 
 earhest period is the paramount importance of the 
 
118 MEMORY. 
 
 actual knowledge of things on subjects of real utility 
 the actual cultivation of habits of observation, in- 
 quiry, association, and induction ; and, as the foun- 
 dation of the whole, the habit of steady and con- 
 tinued attention. The cultivation of these mental 
 habits is of greater value by far than any one 
 acquirement whatever ; for they are the basis' of all 
 future improvement, and are calculated to give a 
 tone to the whole character. 
 
 In this brief outline I have said nothing on the 
 subject of religious instruction ; for the same rules 
 apply to it as to branches of inferior importance, ni 
 as far as it is to be considered as engaging the in- 
 tellectual powers. The chief error here appears 
 to be, the practice of trusting too much to the mere 
 repetition of tasks or catechisms, without that kind 
 of direct personal instruction which is calculated to 
 interest the attention, to fix the truths upon the un- 
 derstanding, and to cultivate the habits of association 
 and reflection. A leading branch of this subject, 
 the culture of the moral feelings, does not belong to 
 our present inquiry ; but it is impossible to mention 
 it without alluding to its intense interest even in a 
 philosophical point of view. One of the most 
 striking phenomena, certainly, in the science of the 
 human mind, is the high degree of culture of which 
 the moral powers are susceptible, even in the infant 
 mind, long before the powers of intellect are de- 
 veloped for the investigation of truth. 
 
 In reference to the whole science of education 
 nothing is of greater importance than the principle 
 of association, which, we have formerly seen, exerts 
 a most extensive influence, not in the remembrance 
 of facts alone, but in perpetuating and recalling 
 mental emotions- We take a very limited view, 
 indeed, of this great subject, if we confine education 
 entirely or chiefly to the acquisition of knowledge, 
 or even to the culture of the intellectual powers. 
 
INFLUENCE OF DISEASE. 119 
 
 That system is deficient in its most essential part 
 which does not carry on along with tliese a careful 
 and habitual culture and regulation of the passions 
 and emotions of the young: their attachments and 
 antipathies, their hopes and fears, their joys and 
 sorrows ; the cultivation of the social and benevolent 
 affections ; the habit of repressing selfishness, and 
 bearing inconveniences and disappointments with- 
 out murmuring; a disposition to candour and in- 
 genuousness, and a sacred regard to truth. Their 
 future character as social and moral beings will be 
 greatly influenced by the manner in which they are 
 taught from an early period to regulate their emo- 
 tions, by directing them to c^^equate and worthy ob- 
 jects, and controlling them by the great principles 
 of wisdom and virtue. In tliis important process 
 the principle of association exerts a most extensive 
 influence. The stern lessons of morality, and even 
 the sublime truths of religion, may be rigidly im- 
 pressed upon the minds of the young, and may, in 
 after-life, recur from time to time as a mere matter 
 of remembrance ; but many must have experienced 
 how different is the impression when they recur in 
 close association with a father's affection and a 
 mother's tenderness, — with the lively recollection 
 of a home, where the kindest sympathies of the 
 human heart shed around the domestic circle all that 
 is lovely in life, while a mild and consistent piety 
 habitually pointed the way to a life which is to come 
 
 OF THE INFLUENCE OF DISEASE UPON ATTENTION 
 AND MEMORY. 
 
 The preceding imperfect outline of the subject of 
 memory naturally leads us briefly to investigate Ihe 
 manner in which this function is impaired in con- 
 
120 MEMORY. 
 
 nexion with bodily disease. This takes place chiefly 
 from injuries of the head, affections of the brain, 
 fever, and diseases of extreme debility. Similar 
 effects arise from intemperance and other habits of 
 dissipation. Our present purpose, however, is, no< 
 to investigate the peculiar effects of these various 
 causes, but to endeavour to trace the manner in 
 which attention and memory — and we may include 
 perception — are affected by any or all of them. 
 
 The first mental function which is impaired by 
 bodily disease is usually the power of attention; 
 this we see illustrated in all febrile affections. The 
 patient, in the early or milder stages, is incapable 
 of fixing his mind upon any thing that requires much 
 attention, of following out an argument, or of trans- 
 acting business which calls for much thought or 
 consideration. He is acute and intelhgent as to all 
 common occurrences, and shows no want of recol- 
 lection or of the power of reasoning when his atten- 
 tion is excited; but he feels it an exertion that is 
 painful to him. In a higher degree of this condition, 
 he is still intelligent as to what is said or done at 
 the time, or in recognising persons ; but in a short 
 time forgets every thing in regard to the person or 
 the occurrence. He is incapable of that degree of 
 attention which is necessary for memory, though 
 the powers of perception are entire. In the next 
 stage he becomes incapable of receiving the full 
 impression from external things; and, in conse- 
 quence of this, he mistakes the objects of his own 
 thoughts for realities. This is delirium, and there 
 are various degrees of it. In some cases the atten- 
 tion of the patient can be K)used for a time, and 
 directed to the true relations of external things, 
 though he relapses into his delirious impressions 
 when he is left undisturbed : in others, the false im- 
 pression is constant, and cannot be corrected by any 
 effort which is made to direct the attention ; and in 
 a third modification of this remarkable condition, he 
 
INFLUENCE OF DISEASE. 121 
 
 mixes up his hallucinations with external impres 
 sions in a most singular manner. He is still capable^ 
 however, of describing his impressions, — that is. of 
 talking so as to be understood, though what he 
 speaks of relates only to his erroneous conceptions, 
 or mere bodily feelings. In the next stage he either 
 does not attempt to express himself at all, or is en- 
 tirely unintelligible. He is now cut off from com- 
 munication with external things, and with other sen- 
 tient beings ; and the highest degree of this is what we 
 call coma, or stupor, which resembles profound sleep. 
 This description refers chiefly to the gradations in 
 the state of the mental functions which we observe 
 in continued fever. It is particularly interesting to 
 trace them in this disease, because we see the va- 
 rious grades passing into one another, and thus 
 showing in a connected series the leading peculiari- 
 ties which, in other affections, we have to contem- 
 plate separately. These peculiarities may be chiefly 
 referred to the following heads: — 
 
 I. A state in which the attention cannot be steadily 
 directed to a long and connected train of thought, or 
 to any thing requiring a continued effort of mind. 
 This takes place, as already stated, in the earlier 
 stages of all febrile diseases. It likewise occurs in 
 connexion with the debility which succeeds acute 
 diseases, in persons broken down by intemperance, 
 and in the first approaches of old age. It is also 
 often observed in a remarkable degree in connexion 
 with a disordered state of the stomach. 
 
 II. A state in which the impression made by ex- 
 ternal things is not sufficient to produce remem- 
 brance, though there appears to be, at the time, a 
 perfect perception. A person so affected under- 
 stands what is said to him, and answers correctly 
 but very soon forgeis what has passed ; he knows a 
 friend, and is happy to see him, but in a short time 
 
 L 
 
122 MEMORY. 
 
 forgets the occurrence. This is met with in a more 
 advanced state of febrile diseases, in the higher de- 
 grees of the condition which results from habitual 
 intemperance, and in the more advanced periods of 
 age. It also occurs in diseases of the brain, and in 
 cases of injuries of the head. A lady whom I at- 
 tended some time ago, on account of an injury pro- 
 duced by a fall from a horse, lay, for the first week, 
 in a state of perfect stupor; she then gradually re- 
 vived, so as to be sensible to external impressions, 
 and after some time to recognise her friends. But 
 afterward, when she was entirely recovered, she had 
 no recollection of this period of her convalescence, 
 or of having seen various friends who then visited 
 her, though, at the time, she recognised them, con- 
 versed with them sensibly, and was very happy to 
 see them. 
 
 III. The third condition is that in which external 
 impressions are either not perceived at all, or are 
 perceived in a manner which cannot convey any dis- 
 tinct notion of their relations to the mind. On this 
 account the conceptions or trains of ideas existing 
 in the mind itself are beheved to be realities. This 
 remarkable condition belongs properly to another 
 part of our subject. It occurs in various forms of 
 delirium, and constitutes the peculiar characters of 
 insanity and dreaming. The ideas or conceptions 
 which occupy the mind in this condition are various. 
 They may be trains of thought excited by some 
 passing event or some bodily sensation ; and fre- 
 quently the patient repeats something which is said 
 in his hearing, and then branches off into some other 
 train to which that has given rise. In other cases 
 the impression is one which has been brought up by 
 some old associations, even relating to things which 
 the person when in health had not recollected. Of 
 this kind there are various remarkable examples on 
 Tecord, especially in regai'd to the memory of laa- 
 
INFLUENCE OF DISEASE. 123 
 
 gfuages A man, mentioned by Mr. Abernelhy, had 
 been born in France, but had spent the greater part 
 of his Ufe in England, and for many years had en- 
 tirely lost the habit of speaking French. But when 
 under the care of Mr. Abernethy, on account of the 
 effects of an injury of the head, he always spoke 
 French. A similar case occurred in St. Thomas's 
 Hospital, of a man who was in a state of stupor in 
 consequence of an injury of the head. On his par- 
 tial recovery, he spoke j language which nobody in 
 the hospital understood, but which was soon ascer- 
 tained to be Welsh. It was then discovered that he 
 had been thirty years absent from Wales, and, before 
 the accident, had entirely forgotten his native lan- 
 guage. On his perfect recovery, he completely for- 
 got his Welsh again, and recovered the Enghsh lan- 
 guage. A lady, mentioned by Dr. Prichard, when in 
 a state of delirium spoke a language which nobody 
 about her understood; but which also was discovered 
 to be Welsh. None of her friends could form any 
 conception of the manner in which she had become 
 acquainted with that language ; but after much in- 
 quiry it was discovered, that in her childhood she 
 had a nurse, a native of a district on the coast of 
 Brittany, the dialect of which is closely analogous 
 to the Welsh. The lady had at that time learned a 
 good deal of this dialect, but had entirely forgotten 
 it for many years before this attack of fever. The 
 case has also been communicated to me of a lady 
 who was a native of Germany, but married to an 
 English gentleman, and for a considerable time ac- 
 customed to speak the English language. During 
 an illness, of the nature of which I am wOt informed, 
 she always spoke German, and could not make her- 
 self understood by her English attendants, except 
 when her husband acted as interpreter. A woman 
 who was a native of the Highlands, but accustomed to 
 speak EngUsh, was under the care of Dr. Macintosh 
 of Edinburgh, on account of an attack of apoplexy 
 
124 MEMORY. 
 
 She was so far recovered as to look around her with 
 an appearance of intelligence, but the doctor could 
 not make her comprehend any thing he said to her, 
 or. answer the most simple question. He then de- 
 sired one of her friends to address her in Gaelic, 
 when she immediately answered with readiness and 
 fluency. An Italian gentleman, mentioned by Dr. 
 Rush, who died of the yellow fever in New- York, in 
 the beginning of his illness spoke English, in the 
 middle of it French, but on the day of his death he 
 spoke only Italian. A Lutheran clergyman of Phil- 
 adelphia informed Dr. Rush that Germans and 
 Swedes, of whom he had a considerable number in 
 his congregation, when near death always prayed in 
 their native languages, though some of them he was 
 confident had not spoken these languages for fifty 
 or sixty years. 
 
 A case has been related to me of a boy, who at 
 the age of four received a fracture of the scull, for 
 M'hich he underwent the operation of trepan. He 
 was at the time in a state of perfect stupor, and 
 after his recovery retained no recollection either of 
 the accident or the operation. At the age of fifteen, 
 during the delirium of a fever, he gave his mother a 
 correct description of the operation and the persons 
 who were present at it, with their dress and other 
 minute particulars. He had never been observed to 
 allude to it before, and no means were known by 
 which he could have acquired the circumstances 
 which he mentioned. An eminent medical friend 
 informs me, that during fever, without any dehrium^ 
 he on one occasion repeated long passages from 
 Homer, which he could not do when in health ; and 
 another friend has mentioned to me, that in a simi- 
 lar situation there were represented to his mind, in 
 a most vivid manner, the circumstances of a journey 
 in the Highlands, which he had performed long be- 
 fore, including many minute particulars which he 
 had entirely forgotten. 
 
INFLUENCE OF DISEASE. 125 
 
 In regard to the memory of languages as influ. 
 enced by these affections of the brain, a condition 
 occurs the reverse of that now mentioned, and pre- 
 senting some singular phenomena: the cause of the 
 difference is entirely beyond our researches. The 
 late Dr. Gregory was accustomed to mention in his 
 lectures the case of a clergyman, who, while labour- 
 ing under a disease of the brain, spoke nothing but 
 Hebrew, which was ascertained to be the last lan- 
 guage that he had acquired. An English lady, men- 
 tioned by Dr. Prichard, in recovering from an apo- 
 plectic attack, always spoke to her attendants in 
 French, and had actually lost the knowledge of the 
 English language : this continued about a month. 
 
 IV. The fourth condition is the state of stupor, or 
 coma, in which the mind is entirely cut off from in- 
 tercourse with the external world. This occurs in 
 the worst states of fever, in various diseases of the 
 brain and injuries of the head ; and the same condi- 
 tion takes place, from a very different cause, in the 
 state of fainting. In such cases there is seldom any 
 recollection of mental impressions ; yet there are 
 facts which tend to show, that the patient is not in 
 such a state of total insensibility to external things 
 as his appearance would indicate. A gentleman 
 whom I attended in a state of perfect apoplexy, 
 from which he did not recover, was frequently ob- 
 served to adjust his nightcap with the utmost care, 
 when it got into an uncomfortable state; first pull- 
 ing it down over his eyes, and then turning up the 
 front of it in the most exact manner. Another, 
 whom I saw lately in a state of profound apoplexy, 
 but from which he recovered, had a perfect recollec- 
 tion of what took place during the attack, and men 
 lioned many things which had been said in his hear- 
 ing, when he was supposed to be in a state of per- 
 fect unconsciousness. A lady, on recovering from 
 a similar state, said she had been asleep and dream- 
 L3 
 
128 MEMORY. 
 
 ing, and mentioned what she had 'dreamed about. 
 Facts are wanting on this curious subject ; but there 
 can be little doubt, that many of the stories related 
 of things seen by persons in a state of trance are 
 referable to this head, and that their visions con- 
 sisted of the conceptions of the mind itself, believed 
 for the time to be real, in a manner analogous to 
 dreaming. That such impressions should not be 
 more frequently remembered in the ordinary cases 
 of stupor, probably arises from the higher degree 
 and greater permanency of the affection than that 
 which occurs in sleep. For we have reason to be- 
 lieve that dreams which are remembered occur only 
 in imperfect sleep, and that in very profound sleep 
 we do not remember any mental impressions, though 
 we have satisfactory proof that they exist. Thus, a 
 person will talk in his dleep so as to be distinctly 
 understood by another, but without having the least 
 recollection of the mental impression which led to 
 what he said. i 
 
 In the preceding observations we have referred 
 chiefly to the temporary influence of disease, in im- 
 pairing or suspending the powers of attention and 
 memory. But there is a part of the subject quite 
 distinct from this, namely, the effect of certain dis- 
 eases in obliterating impressions formerly received 
 and long retained. The higher degrees of this con- 
 dition amount to that state which we call idiotism, 
 and this we find supervening both upon affections ^of 
 the brain and protracted febrile diseases. The con- 
 dition so produced is sometimes permanent, but fre- 
 quently is recovered from ; and recovery takes place 
 in some cases gradually, in others very suddenly. 
 A. man, mentioned by Willis, on recovering from a 
 putrid fever, was found to have so entirely lost his 
 mental faculties, that he knew nobody, remembered 
 nothing, and understood nothing : " vix supra brutum 
 ^d^pereW" He continued in this state for two months, 
 
INFLUENCE OF DISEASE. 127 
 
 and then gradually recovered. Some years ago I 
 attended a young man, who, on recovering from a 
 tedious fever, was found to be in a state bordering 
 upon idiotism ; and this continued even after liis 
 bodily health was entirely restored. In this state 
 he was taken to the country, where he gradually re- 
 covered after several months. A gentleman, men- 
 tioned by Wepfer, on coming out of an apoplectic 
 attack, was found to know nobody, and remember 
 nothing. After several weeks he began to know his 
 friends, to remember words, to repeat the Lord's 
 Prayer, and to read a few words of Latin, rather 
 than German, which was his own language. When 
 urged to read more than a few words at a time, he 
 said that he formerly understood these things, but 
 now did not. After some time he began to pay 
 more attention to what was passing around him; 
 but, while thus making slight and gradual progress, 
 he was, after a few months, suddenly cut off by an 
 attack of apoplexy. 
 
 The sudden recoveries from this condition of the 
 mental powers are still more remarkable. Dr. 
 Prichard, on the authority of the late Dr. Rush of 
 Philadelphia, mentions an American student, a per- 
 son of considerable attainments, who, on recovering 
 from a fever, was found to have lost all his acquired 
 knowledge. When his health was restored, he be- 
 gan lo apply to the Latin grammar, had passed 
 through the elementary parts and was beginning to 
 construe, when, one day, in making a strong effort 
 to recollect a part of his lesson, the whole of his lost 
 impressions suddenly returned to his mind, and he 
 found himself at once in possession of all his former 
 acquirements. 
 
 In slighter injuries of the head, accompanied by 
 loss of recollection, we observe the circumstances 
 gradually recalled in a very singular manner. Soma 
 years ago I saw a boy who had fallen from a wall, 
 and struck his head against a stone which lay at the 
 foot of it. He was carried home in a state of in- 
 
12S MEMORY. 
 
 sensibility, from which he soon recovered, but with- 
 out any recollection of the accident. He felt that 
 his head was hurt, but he had no idea how he had 
 received the injury. After a short time he recol- 
 lected that he had struck his head against a stone, 
 but had no recollection how he had come to do so. 
 After another interval, he recollected that he had 
 been on the top of a wall, and had fallen from it and 
 struck against the stone, but could not remember 
 where the wall was. After some time longer, he re- 
 covered the recollection of all the circumstances. 
 Dr. Prichard mentions a gentleman who suffered a 
 severe injury by a fall from his horse, and who, on 
 his recovery, had no recollection of any thing re- 
 lating to the accident, or for some time before it. 
 A considerable time elapsed before his recollection 
 of it began to return, and it was only as he repeat- 
 edly rode over the country where the accident had 
 happened, that the sight of the various objects 
 ^adually recalled the circumstances of the journey 
 in which it occurred, and of the accident itself. 
 
 A still more remarkable phenomenon connected 
 with cases of this kind occurs in some instances in 
 which there is perfect inteihgence in regard to re- 
 cent circumstances, but an obliteration of former 
 impressions. Of this I have received the following 
 striking example from an eminent medical friend. 
 A respectable surgeon was thrown from his horse 
 while riding in the countjy, and was carried into an 
 adjoining house in a state of insensibility. From 
 this he very soon recovered, described the accident 
 distinctly, and gave minute directions in regard to 
 his own treatment. In particular, he requested that 
 he might be immediately bled ; the bleeding was 
 repeated, at his own desire, after two hours ; and 
 he conversed correctly regarding his feelings and 
 the state of his pulse with the medical man who 
 visited him. In the evening he was so much re- 
 covered as to be able to be removed to his own 
 
INFLUENCE OF DISEASE. 129 
 
 house, and a medical friend accompanied him in the 
 carriage. As they drew near home, the latter made 
 some observation respecting precautions calculated 
 to prevent unnecessary alarm to the wife and family 
 of the patient, when, to his astonishment, he dis- 
 covered that his friend had lost all idea of having 
 either a wife or children. This condition continued 
 durmg the following day, and it was only on the 
 third day, and after further bleeding, that the cir- 
 cumstances of his past life began to recur to his 
 mind. On the other hand, remarkable instances 
 occur of the permanency of impressions made upon 
 the mind previously to such injuries, though the 
 mental faculties are entirely obscured as to all sub- 
 sequent impressions. An affecting example is men- 
 tioned by Dr. Conolly : — a young clergyman, when 
 on the point of being married, suffered an injury of 
 the head by which his understanding was entirely 
 and permanently deranged. He lived in this con- 
 dition till the age of eighty ; and to the last talked 
 of nothing but his approaching wedding, and ex- 
 pressed impatience for the arrival of the happy day. 
 It is chiefly in connexion with attacks of an apo- 
 plectic nature that we meet with singular examples 
 of loss of memory on particular topics, or extending 
 only to a particular period. One of the most com- 
 mon is loss of the memory of words, or of names, 
 while the patient retains a correct idea of things 
 and persons. The late Dr. Gregory used to men- 
 tion a lady who, after an apoplectic attack, re- 
 covered correctly her ideas of things, but could not 
 name them. In giving directions respecting family 
 matters, she was quite distinct as to what she wished 
 to be done, but could make herself understood only 
 by going through the house, and pointing to the va- 
 rious articles. A gentleman whom I attended some 
 years ago, after recovering from an apoplectic at- 
 tack, knew his friends perfectly, but could not name 
 them. Wsdking one day in the street, he met a 
 
130 MEMORY. 
 
 gentleman to whom he was very anxious to com 
 municate something respecting a mutual friend. 
 After various ineffectual attempts to make him un- 
 derstand whom he meant, he at last seized him by 
 the arm and dragged him through several streets to 
 the house of the gentleman of whom he was speak- 
 ing, and pointed to the name-plate on the door. 
 
 A singular modification of this condition has been 
 related to me. The gentleman to whom it referred 
 could not be made to understand the name of an 
 object if it was spoken to him, but understood it 
 perfectly when it was written. His mental facul- 
 ties were so entire, that he was engaged in most 
 extensive, agricultural concerns, and he managed 
 them with perfect correctness, by means of a remark- 
 able contrivance. He kept before him, in the room 
 where he transacted business, a list of the words 
 which were most apt to occur in his intercourse 
 with his workmen. When one of these wished to 
 communicate with him on any subject, he first heard 
 what the workman had to say, but without under- 
 standing him further than to simply catch the words. 
 He then turned to the words in his written list, and 
 whenever they met his eye he understood them 
 perfectly. These particulars I had from his son, a 
 gentleman of high intelligence. Another frequent 
 modification consists in putting one name for another, 
 but always using the words in the same sense. An 
 example of this also occurred in the gentleman last 
 mentioned. He uniformly called his snuflT-box a 
 hogshead, and the association which led to this ap- 
 peared to be obvious. In the early part of his life 
 he had been in Virginia, and connected with the 
 trade in tobacco ; so that the transition from snuff 
 to tobacco, and from tobacco to a hogshead, seemed 
 to be natural. Another gentleman affected in this 
 manner, when he wanted coals put upon his fire al- 
 ways called for paper, and when he wanted paper 
 called for coals ; and these words he always used 
 
INFLUENCE OF DISEASE. 131 
 
 in the same manner. In other cases, the patient 
 seems to invent names, using words which to a 
 stranger are quite unintelhgible ; but he always uses 
 them in the same sense, and his immediate attend- 
 ants come to understand what he means by them. 
 
 Another remarkable modification of this condition 
 of the mental powers is found in those cases in 
 which there is loss of the recollection of a particular 
 period. A clergyman, mentioned by Dr. Beattie, on 
 recovering from an apoplectic attack, was found to 
 have lost the recollection of exactly four years 
 every thing that occurred before that period he re- 
 membered perfectly. He gradually recovered, partly 
 by a spontaneous revival of his memory, and partly 
 by acquiring a kno'/iedge of the leading events of 
 the period. A young lady who was present at a 
 late catastrophe in Scotland, in which many people 
 lost their lives by the fall cf the gallery of a church, 
 escaped without any injury, but with the complete loss 
 of the recollection of any of the circumstances ; and 
 this extended, not only to the accident, but to every 
 thing that had occurred to her for a certain time before 
 going to church. A lady whom I attended some 
 years ago in a protracted illness, in which her mem- 
 ory became much impaired, lost the recollection of 
 a period of about ten or twelve years, but spoke 
 with perfect consistency of things as they stood be- 
 fore that time. 
 
 As far as I have been able to trace it, the prin- 
 ciple in such cases seems to be, that when the 
 memory is impaired to a certain degree, the loss of 
 it extends backwards to some event or some period 
 by which a particularly deep impression had been 
 made upon the mind. In the lady last mentioned, 
 for instance, the period of which she lost the recol- 
 lection was that during which she had resided in 
 Edinburgh, and it extended back to her remove 
 from another city in which she had lived for many 
 years. During her residence in the latter, she had 
 
132 MEMORY. 
 
 become the mother of a large family, and other 
 events had occurred likely to make a deep impres- 
 sion on her mind. The period of her residence in 
 Edinburgh had been uniform and tranquil, and with- 
 out any occurrence calculated to excite much atten- 
 tion in a person of rather slender mental endow- 
 m'ents. I do not know whether we can give a similar 
 explanation of cases in which the loss of memory 
 has extended only to particular subjects ; namely, 
 by supposing that these subjects had been more 
 slightly impressed upon the mind than those which 
 were retained. A gentleman is mentioned by Dr, 
 Beattie, who, after a blow on the head, lost hi& 
 knowledge of Greek, and did not appear to have lost 
 any thing else. 
 
 While we thus review the manner in which the 
 manifestations of mind are affected, in certain cases, 
 by diseases and injuries of the brain, it is necessary 
 that we should refer briefly to the remarkable in- 
 stances in which the brain has been extensively 
 diseased without the phenomena of mind being im 
 paired in any sensible degree. This holds true both 
 in regard to the destruction of each individual part 
 of the brain, and likewise to the extent to which the 
 cerebral mass may be diseased or destroyed. In 
 another work I have mentioned various cases which 
 illustrate this fact in a very striking manner; par- 
 ticularly the case of a lady in whom one-half of the 
 brain was reduced to a mass of disease ; but who 
 retained all her faculties to the last, except that 
 there was an imperfection of vision, — and had been 
 enjoying herself at a convivial party in the house of 
 a friend a few hours before her death. A man, 
 mentioned by Dr. Ferriar, who died of an affection 
 of the brain, retained all his faculties entire till the 
 very moment of death, which was sudden : on ex 
 amining his head, the whole right hemisphere, — that 
 is,one-half of his brain, — was found destroyed by sup 
 
INFLUENCE OF DISEASE. 133 
 
 puration. In a similar case recorded by Diemer- 
 broek, half a pound of matter was found in the 
 brain ; and in one by Dr. Heberden, there was half 
 a pound of water. A man, mentioned by Mr. O'Hal- 
 loran, suffered such an injury of the head that a 
 large portion of the bone was removed on the right 
 side ; and extensive suppuration having taken place, 
 there was discharged at each dressing, through the 
 opening, an immense quantity of matter mixed with 
 large masses of the substance of the brain. This 
 went on for seventeen days, and it appears that 
 nearly one-half of the brain was thrown out mixed 
 with the matter ; yet the man retained all his intel- 
 lectual faculties to the very moment of dissolution ; 
 and through the whole course of the disease, his 
 mind maintained uniform tranquillity. These re- 
 markable histories might be greatly multiplied if it 
 were required, but at present it seems only neces- 
 sary to add the very interesting case related by Mr. 
 Marshall. It is that of a man who died with a pound 
 of water in his brain, after having been long in a 
 state of idiocy, but who, a very short time before 
 death, became perfectly rational. 
 
 The facts which have been thus briefly referred 
 to present a series of phenomena of the most rer 
 markable kind, but on which we cannot speculate 
 in the smallest degree without advancing beyond 
 the sphere of our limited faculties ; one thing, how- 
 ever, is certain, that they give no countenance to 
 the doctrine of materialism, which some have pre- 
 sumptuously deduced from a very partial view of 
 the influence of cerebral disease upon the manifes- 
 tations of mind. They show us, indeed, in a very 
 striking manner, the mind holding intercourse with 
 the external world through the medium of the brain 
 and nervous system ; and, by certain diseases of these 
 organs, they show this intercourse impaired or sus- 
 pended ; but they show nothing more. In particular, 
 M 
 
134 ABSTRACTION. 
 
 they warrant nothing in any de^ee analogous to 
 those partial deductions which form the basis of 
 inateriahsm. On the contrary, they show us the 
 brain injured and diseased to an extraordinary ex- 
 tent without the mental functions being- affected in 
 any sensible degree. They show us, further, the 
 manifestations of mind obscured for a time, and 
 yet reviving in all their original vigour, almost in 
 the very moment of dissolution. Finally, they ex- 
 hibit to us the mind, cut off from all intercourse 
 with the external world, recalling its old impressions, 
 even of things long forgotten ; and exercising its 
 powers on those which had long ceased to exist, in 
 a manner totally irreconcilable with any idea we can 
 form of a material function. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 ABSTRACTION. 
 
 Bv Abstraction we separate various facts from each 
 other, and examine them individually. We sepa:- 
 rate, for example, the qualities of a substance, and 
 contemplate one of them apart from the rest. This 
 act of the mind is employed in two processes of the 
 utmost importance. By the one, we examine a va- 
 riety of objects, select the properties in which cer- 
 tain numbers of them agree, and thus anange them 
 into classes, genera, and species. By the other, we 
 take a more comprehensive view of an extensive 
 collection of facts, and select one which is common 
 to the whole. This we call generalizing, or deduc- 
 ing a general fact or general principle ; and the pro- 
 cess is of extensive application in all philosophical 
 inquiries. The particular points to be attended to 
 
ABSTRACTION. 1 35 
 
 in conducting it will come under view in another 
 part of our subject. The most important is, that the 
 fact assumed as general really belongs to all the in- 
 dividual instances, and has not been deduced from 
 the examination of only a part of them. 
 
 There have been disputes among writers on the 
 science of mind, whether abstraction is to be con- 
 sidered as a distinct mental operation, or is referable 
 to judgment. But I have already stated that my ob- 
 ject in this outline is to avoid all such discussions, 
 and to allude simply to the actual processes of the 
 mind in a practical view. One thing at least is clear, 
 namely, that our abstractions must be corrected by 
 reason, the province of which is to judge whether 
 the process is performed correctly, and on sound 
 principles. This, however, is distinct from the pri- 
 mary act of the mind to which I now apply the 
 term abstraction, which is simply the power of con- 
 templating one property of a substance apart from 
 its other properties. It thus disjoins things which 
 by nature are intimately united, and which cannot 
 be separated in any other manner. Reason does not 
 appear to be immediately concerned in this, though 
 it is most closely connected with the purposes to 
 which the process is afterward applied; namely, 
 classifying substances according to a certain agree- 
 ment of properties, and fixing upon those which are 
 common to all the individuals of a numerous series, 
 in the act of generalizing, or deducing a general fact 
 or general principle. 
 
 I have formerly alluded to a period in the science 
 of mind, when our ideas of external things were 
 supposed to be certain actual essences, separated 
 from the substances and conveyed to the thinking 
 principle. In connexion with this theory there arose 
 a controversy, whether, when we perform the mental 
 act of generahzing, there exists in nature any es- 
 sence corresponding to a general idea ; or whether 
 in generalizing, we merely make use of an abstract 
 terra *, whether, for examjple, in using the word man 
 
136 ABSTRACTION. 
 
 we only employ a term, or whether we have th« 
 power of forming an idea of man in the abstract 
 without thinking of any individual man ; and, in the 
 same manner, whether we can reason respecting a 
 class of substances, without thinking of any of the 
 individuals composing it. Hence arose two sects, 
 whose disputes make a most remarkable figure in 
 the history of intellectual science, namely, the 
 Nominalists and Realists. 
 
 The controversies of these sects we now consider 
 as little more than a matter of historical curiosity ; 
 but, for several centuries, they divided the learned 
 of Europe, and were often carried on with an asperity 
 amounting to actual persecution. " The Nominal- 
 ists," says Mosheim, " procured the death of John 
 Huss, who was a Realist; and in their letter to 
 Lewis King of France do not pretend to deny that 
 he fell a victim to the resentment of their sect. The 
 Realists, on the other hand, obtained, in the year 
 1479, the condemnation of John de Wesaha, who was 
 attached to the party of the Nominalists. These 
 contending sects carried their fury so far as to charge 
 each other with the sin against the Holy Ghost." — 
 ** The dispute," says Mr. Stewart, " was carried on 
 with great warmth in the universities of France, 
 Germany, and England, more particularly in the two 
 former countries, where the sovereigns were led by 
 some political views to interest themselves deeply 
 in the contest, and even to employ the civil power 
 in support of their favourite opinions. The emperor 
 Lewis of Bavaria, in return for the assistance which 
 in his disputes with the pope,Occam had given him by 
 his writings, sided with the Nominalists ; Lewis the 
 Eleventh of France, ou the other hand, attached 
 himself to the Realists, and made their antagonists 
 the objects of a cniel persecution." 
 
 We find some difficulty in believing, in the present 
 day, that the controversy which thus embroiled the 
 continent of Europe in all the rancour of actual per- 
 secution related to the question, whether, in em 
 
ABSTll noN. 137 
 
 plojrin^ general terms, we use words or names only, 
 or whether there is in nature any thing correspond- 
 ing to what we mean by a general idea. It is well 
 designed by Mr. Stewart as " one of the most curi- 
 ous events which occur in the history of the human 
 mind." 
 
 The question is one of no practical importance, 
 and when it is cleared from its connexion with the 
 ancient doctrine of ideas, appears to be one of no 
 difficulty. Without supposing that there is in natiu-e 
 any actual essence corresponding to a general idea, 
 the truth seems to be, that we do form a certain no- 
 tion or conception of a quality in which several sub- 
 stances agree, distinct from any one substance to 
 which the quality belongs. Hence some have pro- 
 posed the term Notionahst, or Conceptualist, as de- 
 signating opinions distinct from those both of the 
 Nominalists and Realists. But, according to the 
 principles of modern science, we cannot consider 
 the discussion as any thing more than an ingenious 
 arguing on points of no real importance. The pro- 
 cess which the mind really can-ies on in that mental 
 operation to which these remarks have referred, con- 
 sists simply in tracing relations or points of resem- 
 blance in which certain individual things agree, 
 though they may in others be remarkably different. 
 We then give a name to this common quality, and 
 thus form the individuals into a class of which this 
 quality is the distinguishing character. Thus we 
 may take a number of animals differing remarkably 
 from each other, and say they are all quadrupeds. 
 We may take a number of substances very dissimi- 
 lar in their external and mechanical properties, and 
 say they are all acids. Some of these substances 
 are solid, some fluid, and some gaseous; but the 
 property of acidity is common to them all, and this 
 accordingly becomes the name and the distinguishing 
 character of the class into which we now arrange 
 them. 
 
 MS 
 
138 XMAGINATION. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 IMAGINATION. 
 
 In the exercise of Imagination, we take the com- 
 ponent elements o»r real scenes, events, or characters, 
 and combine them anew by a process of the mind 
 itself, so as to form compounds which have no ex- 
 istence in nature. A painter, by this process, de- 
 picts a landscape combining the beauties of various 
 real landscapes, and excluding their defects. A poet 
 or a novelist, in the same manner, calls into being a 
 fictitious character, endowed with those qualities 
 with which it suits his purpose to invest him, places 
 him in contact with other beings equally imaginary, 
 and arranges, according to his will, the scenes in 
 which he shall bear a part, and the line of conduct 
 which he shall follow. The compound in these 
 cases is entirely fictitious and arbitrary ; but it is 
 expected that the individual elements shall be such 
 SLS actually occur in nature, and that the combination 
 shall not differ remarkably from what might really 
 happen. When this is not attended to, as in a pic- 
 ture or a novel, we speak of the work being extrava- 
 gant, or out of nature. But, avoiding combinations 
 which are grossly at variance with reality, the framer 
 of such a compound may make it superior to any 
 thing that actually occurs. A painter may draw a 
 combination of beauties in a landscape superior to 
 any thing that is actually known to exist ; and a 
 novelist may delineate a more perfect character than 
 is met with in real life. It is remarked by Mr. 
 Stewart, that Milton in his Garden of Eden has 
 '* created a landscape more perfect, probably, in all 
 its parts, than has ever been realized in nature, and 
 
IMAGINATION. 139 
 
 certainly very different from any thing that this 
 country exhibited at the time when he wrote." " It 
 is a curious remark of Mr. Walpole," he adds, " that 
 Milton's Eden is free from the defects of the Old 
 English Garden, and is imagined on the same prin- 
 ciples which it was reserved for the present age to 
 carry into execution." 
 
 The mode of artificial combination which results 
 from the exercise of imagination is applicable chiefly 
 to four kinds of composition. 
 
 1. Fictitious narrative, in which the author deline- 
 ates imaginary scenes or transactions; and paints 
 imaginary characters, endowing them with such 
 qualities as may suit the purpose which he has in 
 view. 
 
 2. Composition or verbal address, directed to the 
 passions, and intended to excite particular mental 
 emotions. To this head are referable many of the 
 combinations of the poet, and addresses calculated 
 to operate upon the feelings of a popular assembly ; 
 also, those which derive their character from the 
 language of trope and metaphor. The genius of 
 the orator, and the inventive powers of the poet, are 
 exhibited in the variety and the novelty of the analo- 
 gies, resemblances, illustrations, and figures, which 
 he thus brings to bear upon his subject. 
 
 3. Those unexpected and peculiar associations 
 which form the basis of wit and humour. 
 
 4. Combinations of objects of sense, calculated to 
 produce mental emotions of a pleasurable or pamful 
 kind, as our impressions of the sublime, the beauti- 
 ful, the terrible, or the ludicrous. The combinations 
 of this class are chiefly referable to the head of ob- 
 jects of taste, or the fine arts ; and are exemplified 
 in the inventions of the painter and the statuary, iu 
 decorative architecture and artificial gardening, — we 
 may add, theatrical exhibitions and music. 
 
 The facility of rapidly forming in these several 
 
140 IMAGINATION. 
 
 departments combinations calculated to produce the 
 eifect which is intended, constitutes what we call in- 
 ventive genius. Similar powers of invention, founded 
 on an exercise of imagination, may also be applied 
 to the investigations of science. It may be employed, 
 for example, in the contrivance of experiments cal- 
 culated to aid an investigation or to illustrate a doc- 
 trme; and in the construction of those legitimate 
 hypotheses which have often led to the most im- 
 portant discoveries. 
 
 The union of elements, in all such productions of 
 the imagination, is regulated by the knowledge, the 
 taste, and the intellectual habits of the author ; and, 
 we must add, by his moral principles. According to 
 the views, the habits, and the principles of him who 
 frames them, therefore, they may either contribute 
 to moral and intellectual improvement, or they may 
 tend to mislead the judgment, vitiate the taste, and 
 corrupt the moral feelings. 
 
 Similar observations apply to the conduct of the 
 imagination in individuals, and its influence in the 
 cultivation of moral and intellectual character. There 
 is certainly no power of the mind that requires more 
 cautious management and stern control ; and the 
 proper regulation of it cannot be too strongly im- 
 pressed upon the young. The sound and proper 
 exercise of it may be made to contribute to the cul- 
 tivation of all that is virtuous and estimable in human 
 character. It leads us, in particular, to place our- 
 selves in the situation of others, to enter into their feel- 
 ings and wants, and to participate in their distresses. 
 It thus tends to the cultivation of sympathy and the 
 benevolent affections ; and promotes all those feel- 
 ings which exert so extensive an influence in the 
 duties of friendship and the harmonies of civil and 
 social intercourse. We may even say that we exer- 
 cise imagination when we endeavour to act upon that 
 high standard of morals which requires us " to do to 
 
IMAGINATION. 141 
 
 Others as we would that they should do unto us :" 
 for in this mental act we must imagine ourselves in 
 the situation of other men, and, in their character, 
 judge of our own conduct towards them. Thus a 
 man deficient in imagination, though he maybe free 
 from any thing unjust or dishonourable, is apt to be 
 cold, contracted, and selfish, — regardless of the feel- 
 :*ngs and indiflferent to the distresses of others. 
 Further, we may be said to exercise imagination 
 when we carry our views beyond present and sensi- 
 ble objects, and endeavour to feel the power of 
 " things which are not seen," and the reality of scenes 
 and times which are yet to come. On the other 
 hand, imagination may be employed for calling into 
 being evils which have no existence, or for exagger- 
 ating those which are real ; for fostering malevolent 
 feelings, and for imputing to those with whom we 
 are connected motives and intentions which have no 
 foundation in truth. Finally, an ill-regulated ima- 
 gination may be employed in occupying the mind 
 with waking dreams and vain delusions, to the ex- 
 clusion of all those high pursuits which ought to 
 employ the faculties of a rational being. 
 
 There has been considerable difference of opinion 
 in regard to the effects produced upon the mind by 
 fictitious narrative. Without entering minutely upon 
 the merits of this controversy, I think it may be con- 
 tended, that two evils are likely to arise from much 
 indulgence in works of fiction. The one is a tend- 
 ency to give way to the wild play of the imagination ; 
 a practice most deleterious, both to the intellectual 
 and moral habits. The other is a disruption of the 
 harmony which ought to exist between the moral 
 emotions and the conduct, — a principle of extensive 
 and important influence. In the healthy state of the 
 moral feelings, for example, the emotion of sympa- 
 thy excited by a tale of sorrow ought to be followed 
 Dy some efforts for the relief of the sufferer. When 
 such relations in real life are listened t^ ^om time 
 
142 IMAGINi-TION. 
 
 to time without any such efforts, the emotion grad- 
 ually becomes weakened, and that moral condition 
 is produced which we call selfishness, or hardness 
 of heart. Fictitious tales of sorrow appear to have 
 a similar tendency ; — the emotion is produced with- 
 out the corresponding conduct ; and when this habit 
 has been much indulged the result seems to be, that 
 a cold and barren sentimentalism is produced, instead 
 of the habit of active benevolence. If fictitious nar- 
 ratives be employed for depicting scenes of vice, an- 
 other evil of the greatest magnitude is likely to result 
 from them, even though the conduct exhibited should 
 be shown to end in remorse and misery : for by the 
 mere familiarity with vice, an injury is done to the 
 youthful mind, which is in no degree compensated 
 by the moral at the close. 
 
 Imagination, therefore, is a mental power of ex- 
 tensive influence, and capable of bemg turned to 
 important purposes in the cultivation of individual 
 character. But to be so, it must be kept under the 
 strict control both of reason and of virtue. If it be 
 allowed to wander at discretion, through scenes of 
 imagined wealth, ambition, frivolity, or pleasure, it 
 tends to withdraw the mind from the important pur- 
 suits of life, to weaken the habit of attention, and to 
 impair the judgment. It tends, in a most material 
 manner, to prevent the due exercise of those nobler 
 powers which are directed to the cultivation both ol 
 science and virtue. The state of a mind which has 
 yielded itself to the influence of this delusive habit 
 cannot be more forcibly represented than in the words 
 of an eloquent writer : — " The influence of this habit 
 of dwelling on the beautiful fallacious forms of ima- 
 gination will accompany the mind into the most se- 
 rious speculations, or rather musings, on the real 
 world, and what is to be done in it, and expected; 
 as the image which the eye acquires from looking at 
 any dazzling object still appears before it wherever 
 it turns. The vulgar materials that constitute the 
 
IMAGINATION. 143 
 
 actual economy of the world will rise up to its sight 
 in fictitious forms, which it cannot disenchant into 
 plain reahty, nor will even suspect to be deceptive. 
 It cannot g-o about with sober, rational inspection, 
 and ascertain the nature and value of all things around 
 it. Indeed, such a mind is not disposed to examine 
 with any careful minuteness the real condition of 
 things. It is content with ignorance, because en- 
 vironed with something more delicious than such 
 knowledge in the paradise which imagination creates. 
 In that paradise it walks delighted, till some impe- 
 rious circumstance of real life call it thence, and 
 gladly escapes thither again when the avocation is 
 past. There every thing is beautiful and noble as 
 could be desired to form the residence of an angel. 
 If a tenth part of the felicities that have been enjoyed, 
 the great actions that have been performed, the bene- 
 ficent institutions that have been established, and 
 the beautiful objects that have been seen in that 
 happy region, could have been imported into this 
 terrestrial place,— what a delightful thing it would 
 have been to awake each morning to see such a world 
 once more."* 
 
 To the same purpose are the words of another 
 writer of the highest authority: — "To indulge the 
 power of fiction, and send imagination out upon the 
 wing, is often the sport of those who delight too 
 much in silent speculation. He who has nothing 
 external that can divert him must find pleasure in his 
 own thoughts, and must conceive himself what he is 
 not, — for who is pleased with what he is 1 He then 
 expatiates in boundless futurity, and culls from all 
 imaginable conditions that which for the present 
 moment he should most desire ; amuses his desires 
 with impossible enjoyments, and confers upon his 
 pride unattainable dominion. The mind dances from 
 sceii^ to scene, unites all pleasures in all combina- 
 
 * Foster's Essays. 
 
144 REASON. 
 
 tions, and riots in delights which nature and fortune, 
 with all their bounty, cannot bestow. In time, some 
 particular train of ideas fixes the attention ; all other 
 intellectual gratifications are rejected ; the mind, in 
 weariness or leisure, recurs constantly to the favour- 
 ite conception, and feasts on the luscious falsehood 
 whenever she is offended with the bitterness of truth. 
 By degrees the reign of fancy is confirmed; she 
 grows first imperious, and in time despotic. Thea 
 fictions begin to operate as realities, false opinions 
 fasten upon the mind, and life passes in diveams of 
 rapture or of anguish."* 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 OF REASON OR JUDGMENT. 
 
 The most simple view which we can take of ren- 
 son probably is, that it is the exercise of mind by 
 which we compare facts with each other, and mental 
 impressions with external things. The applications 
 of this mental process may be referred to the follow- 
 ing heads : — 
 
 I. We compare facts with each other, so as to 
 trace their relations, connexions, and tendencies; and 
 to distinguish the connexions which aie incidental 
 from those which are fixed and uniform. 
 
 What we call the relations of things, whether re- 
 ferring to external events or mental processes, com- 
 prehend all those facts which form the great objects 
 of human knowledge, with respect either to the indi- 
 riduals, or their tendencies towards each other. 
 
 * Jobnson's Rasselas. 
 
REASON. 145 
 
 They may be briefly enumerated in the following 
 manner: — 
 
 1. Relations of character, — or those marks, char- 
 acters, or properties by which a substance may be 
 recognised, and may be distingnished from all others; 
 for example, the botanical characters of a plant — the 
 chymical properties of a mineral — the symptoms of 
 a disease — sensible properties of colour, taste, smell, 
 &c. — the mental endowments and moral qualities of 
 individual men. 
 
 2. Relations of resemblance and analogy, arising 
 out of a comparison of the qualities of various indi- 
 vidual substances or events. These admit of various 
 degrees. When there is a close agreement between 
 two events or classes of events, it constitutes resem- 
 blance : when there are points of difference, it is 
 analogy. In the latter case, we then trace the de- 
 grees of analogy, depending upon the number of 
 points in which the resemblance holds and the number 
 of points in which there is a difference. On the rela- 
 tions of resemblance also depend the arts of arrange- 
 ment and classification ; and the use of those general 
 terms by which we learn to express a great number 
 of individual objects by a single term, derived from 
 \.ertain characters in which they agree, such as solids, 
 fluids, quadrupeds, &c. We find a certain number 
 of substances which agree so much in their proper- 
 Ues, that we class them together as one species. 
 W^e then find other substances, which agree with 
 these in a certain number of their properties, but 
 differ m others. We dismiss the latter, and retain 
 those only in which they all agree, and so form the 
 whole into a genus. The individuals forming the 
 genus are still found to agree in some of their prop- 
 erties with various other substances, and, by leaving 
 out of view those in which they differ, we again form 
 this still larger number into a class or order. 
 
 3. Nearly connected with the former, but still 
 more extensive, is that important process Jby which, 
 
 N 
 
146 REASON. 
 
 among a great series of facts, we trace an accord- 
 ancey and thus deduce from the whole a general fact 
 or general principle. 
 
 4. Relaiions of composition ; comprehending the 
 resolution of a substance into its elements or con- 
 stituent parts, — the connexion of the parts as consti- 
 tuting a whole — of the whole to the parts, and of the 
 parts to each other. 
 
 5. Relations of causation, or the tendencies of 
 bodies to produce or be followed by certain actions 
 upon each other in certain circumstances. These 
 refer chiefly to that uniform sequence of events from 
 which we derive our idea of the one being the cause 
 of the other. But the class likewise includes other 
 relations arising out of the same subject ; such as the 
 relation of two events as the joint causes of a common 
 effect, or the joint effects of a common cause ; or as 
 forming hi^s in a chain of sequences in which we 
 have still to look for other events as the true ante- 
 cedents or final results. It includes also that most 
 important mental process by which, from the prop- 
 erties of a known effect, we infer the powers and 
 properties of an unknown cause. 
 
 6. Relations of degree and proportion, as in those 
 truths and relations which are the subjects of mathe- 
 matics. 
 
 7. The important question of moral relations, 
 which does not properly belong to the present part 
 of our inquiry, — including the relation of certain ac- 
 tions to the great standard of moral recti-tude, and 
 to those principles which bind men together in the 
 harmonies of social and domestic intercourse. 
 
 These appear to include the principal relations of 
 things which the mind requires to investigate in an 
 intellectual point of view. The facts respecting them 
 are acquired by attention and memory ; but it is the 
 province of reason to separate from the mass so ac- 
 
 ?[uired those which are incidental and temporary 
 rom those which are uniform, — to ascertain, for ex- 
 ample, those characters by which a substance may 
 
REASON. 147 
 
 t)Te certainly reco^ised, — the symptoms by which a 
 disease may be distinguished from other diseases 
 which resemble it, — and the actions which a sub- 
 stance may be confidently expected to produce upon 
 other substances in particular circumstances. When 
 the mental process required for doing so is performed 
 in a legitimate manner, the deduction constitutes 
 truths in regard to the particular point which is the 
 immediate subject of it; when the contrary, it leads 
 to fallacy or falsehood. Hence reason has sometimes 
 been defined that exercise of mind by which we dis- 
 tinguish truth from falsehood. 
 
 II. Having by the preceding processes ascertained 
 the uniform tendencies of bodies to be followed by 
 certain actions upon each other, we bring these ten- 
 dencies into operation for the production of certain 
 results. Hence reason has been considered also to 
 be that power by which we combine means for ac- 
 complishing an end ; but this, perhaps, may be re- 
 garded rather as the practical application of the 
 knowledge to which reason leads us, than as a pri- 
 mary part of the province of reason itself, 
 
 IH. We compare mental impressions with external 
 things, so as to correct the impressions of the mind 
 in regard to the external world. Mental processes 
 of the most important kind are connected with this 
 application of reason. 
 
 Reason or judgment, when duly exercised, con- 
 ducts us through these various mental operations, 
 and guides us towards the discovery of truth. It 
 does so by enabling us to compare facts with facts, 
 and events with events; to weigh their relations, 
 bearings, and tendencies ; and to assign to each cir- 
 cumstance its proper weight and influence m the 
 conclusions which we are to deduce from them. 
 The person who does so we call a man of sound 
 
148 REASON. 
 
 jud^ient, whose opinions and conclusions we r©» 
 ceive with confidence. On the contrary, we receive 
 with distrust and suspicion the conclusions of a man 
 of an opposite character, who forms his opinions and 
 deductions hastily, — that is, from a limited number 
 of facts, or a hasty and imperfect examination of 
 their relations. 
 
 A distinction has sometimes been made between 
 the term reason, as used in the language of science, 
 and as employed in the common affairs of life ; but 
 there seems to be no real ground for the distinction. 
 
 Reason, in the language of intellectual science, 
 appears to be that process by which we judge cor- 
 rectly of the true and uniform relations of facts, or 
 events, and give to each circumstance its due influ- 
 ence in the deductions. It is chiefly opposed to im- 
 agination, in which the mind is allowed to ramble 
 through chains of events which are connected by 
 loose and casual associations, leading to no true re- 
 sults. It is also distinguished from simple memory, 
 in which facts or events are connected in the mind 
 by certain principles of association, without a full 
 view of their relations. Thus, when we find a per- 
 son remembering an extensive collection of facts, 
 and forming certain combinations among them, or 
 deductions from them, without attending to points 
 of difference which tend to other deductions, we say, 
 his memory is better than his judgment. 
 
 Reasoning, again, appears to be the continued ex- 
 ercise of reason, when applied to the investigation 
 of a particular subject, or a certain series of facts or 
 events, so as to trace their relations or to establish 
 a particular conclusion as deduced from such a se- 
 ries. This process, however, which is commonly 
 called the discursive faculty, is to be distinguished 
 from the simple exercise of reason. It ought to be 
 guided by reason ; that is, by a full view of the real 
 relations of the facts about which it is exercised; 
 but it is often allowed to fix on a slight and partial 
 
REASON. 149 
 
 view of them ; or is applied ingeniously to discover 
 relations of a particular kind only. Thus, we speak 
 of a man who reasons closely, or with a correct at- 
 tention to the real relations of things, and the true 
 weight of every fact in the investigation ; of another 
 who reasons loosely, or who is led away by casual 
 relations and partial views, affording no true deduc- 
 tions ; and of a third, who reasons ingeniously and 
 plausibly, but not soundly, — that is, who argues on 
 one side of a question, and contemplates facts in 
 particular relations only, or as supporting particula. 
 opinions, neglecting those views of them which tend 
 to a different conclusion. This art of ingenious rea- 
 soning or disputation, accordingly, we shall after- 
 ward have occasion to show, is not only to be distin- 
 gnished from the sound exercise of reason or judg- 
 ment, but is often fomid directly opposed to it. 
 
 In the language of theology, reason is distin- 
 guished from revelation ; and means that exercise 
 of the mind by which we deduce a certain know- 
 ledge of the Deity from the power and wisdom dis- 
 played in the works of creation, apart from any di- 
 rect revelation of his character and will. 
 
 In the language of common life, the mental pro- 
 cess which we term reason or judgment appears to 
 be the same, though the facts on which it is exer- 
 cised may be different. A reasonable man is one 
 who, both in the formation of his opinions and the 
 regulation of his conduct, gives the due weight and 
 influence to all the facts ajid considerations which 
 ought to influence his decision. A man of the op- 
 posite character is one who takes up his opinions 
 upon slight, partial, and inadequate grounds; and 
 then cannot, or will not, admit the impression of 
 facts or arguments which are calculated to correct 
 these unsound deduclions ; or who, in the regulation 
 of his conduct, is led away by hasty impressions, or 
 feeble and inadequate motives, without giving due 
 consiiieration to tiiose which are calculated to lead 
 N3 
 
150 REASON. 
 
 him into a different course. The former we call a 
 
 reasonable, considerate, thinking man ; the latter 
 we say is an unreasonable, inconsiderate man, who 
 cannot or will not think. It also very often happens 
 that the latter, having formed his conclusions, is 
 obstinately tenacious of them ; while the former is 
 still open to the true and full impression of any new 
 fact or argument that is proposed to him. Solomon 
 has expressed in a very striking manner the leading 
 features of two such characters, namely, of the man 
 who takes up opinions with little examination, and 
 then adheres to them with inaccessible pertinacity ; 
 and him who forms them only after full and candid 
 examination, and with a clear conception of the 
 giounds on which they are formed :— " The sluggard 
 is wiser in his own conceit than seven men that can 
 render a reason." 
 
 The process of mind which we call reason or 
 judgment, therefore, seems to be essentially the 
 same, whether it be applied to the investigation of 
 truth or the affairs of common life. In both cases, 
 it consists in comparing and weighing facts, con- 
 siderations, and motives, and deducing from them 
 conclusions, both as principles of belief and rules of 
 conduct. In doing so, a man of sound judgment 
 proceeds with caution, and with a due consideration 
 of all the facts which he ought to take into the in- 
 quiry. Having formed his conclusions, he is still 
 open to the influence of new facts, by which they 
 may be corrected or modified ; but he is not to be 
 shaken in his confidence by trivial statements or 
 frivolous objections. Opposed to this there are two 
 modifications of character which present an inter- 
 esting subject for observation. Both form their con- 
 clusions hastily, and without due examination of the 
 facts and considerations which ought to influence 
 them ; but their subsequent conduct is widely dif- 
 ferent. The one is shaken in his conclusions by 
 every new fact th^t is presented to him, and every 
 
REASON. 151 
 
 slight objection that is brought against his induc- 
 tions ; and the consequence is, that his opinions and 
 his principles of conduct are constantly changing. 
 The other, having framed his opinions, though on 
 grounds the most inadequate, adheres to them with 
 inaccessible firmness ; and seems totally proof 
 against the force of any facts or arguments that can 
 be brought against them. Tne former is the more 
 hopeful character of the two, his error consisting 
 in a want of attention, rather than of judgment ; or 
 in a habit of framing his conclusions too hastily. 
 By education or attention on his own part, his habit 
 may be corrected in a greater or less degree ; but 
 the latte-r appears to labour under a radical defect 
 of judgment, which makes him insensible to the due 
 force of the considerations and arguments which 
 influence other men. In the affairs of hfe, the for- 
 mer, after perhaps committing various indiscretions, 
 acquires wisdom from experience ; that is, by hav- 
 ing the fallacy of his conclusions in many instances 
 forced upon him. The latter remains unchanged; 
 retaining the same confidence in his own conclu- 
 sions, and the same contempt for every thing that 
 can be opposed to them. This unfortunate con- 
 dition of mind, though it may have had its origin in 
 pecuHarity of mental constitution or deficient edu- 
 cation, is fostered and increased by indulgence, and 
 by a neglect of cultivating the important habit of 
 calm and candid investigation. The man seems at 
 last to become totally insensible to the motives and 
 evidences which influence other men ; and the more 
 striking and convincing these are to others, the more 
 remarkable appears the condition of that mind which 
 does not feel or estimate their importance. This 
 state of mind is emphatically ascribed, in the sacred 
 writings, to the man who denies the existence of a 
 great First Cause : — " The fool hath said in his heart 
 there is no God." By some process of mind, known 
 to himself, he has arrived at this conclusion ; and 
 
162 KEASON. 
 
 he is totally insensible to the manifold evidence, 
 which meets him wherever he turns his eye, of ita 
 futility and folly. And surely, if there be in human 
 things an affecting representation of a mind lost to 
 every function of a healthy understanding, incapable 
 of rising from effects to causes, or of tracing the re- 
 lations of things, — a mind deserted by its rightful 
 guardian, and left the unprotected victim of every 
 wild delusion that flutters by, — it is to be found in 
 him who, possessed of the senses of a hving man, 
 can stand before the fair face of creation, and say in 
 his heart, " There is no God." 
 
 In every exercise of judgment, it is of essential 
 importance that the mind shall be entirely unbiassed 
 by any personal feeling or emotion which might re- 
 strain or influence its decisions. Hence the diffi- 
 culty we feel in deciding on a subject in which we 
 are deeply interested, especially if our inchnations 
 ajid the facts and motives presented by the case be 
 in any degree opposed to each other. Thus, we 
 speak of a man who allows his feelings to influence 
 his judgment; and of another, of a cool head, who 
 allows no feeling to interfere with his decisions. 
 Any particular emotion, which has been deeply in- 
 dulged and fostered, comes in this manner to influ- 
 ence the judgment in a most extraordinary degree. 
 It is thus that a vitiated and depraved state of the 
 moral -feelings at last misleads the judgment, in re- 
 gard to the great principles of moral rectitude ; and 
 terminates in a state of mind emphatically described 
 in the sacred writings, in which a man puts evil for 
 good and good for evil, and is left to the influence 
 of strong delusion, so that he " beheves a he." This 
 remarkable condition of the power of reasoning and 
 judging we cannot refer to any principle with which 
 we are acquainted ; but we must receive it as a fact 
 in the history of our moral constitution which is 
 not to be questioned A poet has sung, that vice, 
 
REASON. 153 
 
 which at first is hated as an odious monster, is, 
 when seen too oft, endured, then pitied, then em- 
 braced : and he has only added his evidence to a fact 
 which has been received upon the testimony of the 
 philosopher and the moralist in eveiy age, and is 
 acted upon as a fixed and uniform principle of our 
 nature by all classes of men. 
 
 Upon the grounds which have been briefly referred 
 to in the above observations, it will appear, that the 
 principles on which a man should form his opinions 
 are essentially the same with those by which he 
 ought to regulate his conduct. If this conclusion 
 be admitted, it will enable us to perceive the fallacy 
 of a dogma which has often been brought forward 
 with much confidence, — that a man is not responsible 
 for his behef. When taken abstractly, this is true ? 
 but in the practical application of it there is a great 
 and dangerous fallacy. In the opinions which a man 
 "forms on any particular subject, he is indeed in- 
 fluenced, not "by his own will, but by the facts or evi- 
 dence by which the doctrines are supported ; and, 
 in this sense, a man may justly be said not to be re- 
 sponsible for his belief. But when we apply the 
 principle to practical purposes, and especially to 
 those truths of religious belief to which the dogma 
 has been pointed, it may easily be seen to be as fal- 
 lacious as it is dangerous. A man is undoubtedly 
 responsible for the care with which he has informed 
 himself of the facts and evidences by which his be- 
 lief on these subjects ought to be influenced ; and for 
 the care and anxiety with which he gives to each of 
 these facts and evidences its due weight in the mo- 
 mentous inquiry. He is further responsible for any 
 degree of that vitiated and corrupted state of the 
 moral feelings by which his judgment may have 
 been biassed, so as to prevent him from approaching 
 the subject with the sincere desire for truth of a 
 pure and uncontaminated mind. If, in this sense, 
 we say that a man is not responsible for his beHef, 
 
54 REASON. 
 
 we may quite as reasonably allege that he is not re 
 sponsible for his conduct, because he chooses on 
 some slight and partial grounds to frame for him- 
 self principles of action, without taking into con- 
 sideration those fundamental rules of moral rectitude 
 by which mankmd in general are expected to be in- 
 fluenced. We may as well contend that the man is 
 not responsible for his conduct who, by long fa- 
 miliarity with vice, has lost sight of its malignity, 
 and has come to approve and love that which he 
 once contemplated with abhorrence. 
 
 It appears, then, that the exercise of reason is 
 precisely the same, and is guided by the same laws, 
 whether it be applied to the investigation of truth 
 or to the regulation of conduct. The former is 
 more particularly connected with the further prose- 
 cution of our inquiry; but the leading principles 
 apply equally to the great questions of morals, and. 
 the important subject of reUgious belief. In prose-* 
 cutingthe subject as a branch of intellectual science, 
 it seems to resolve itself into two parts : — 
 
 I. The use of reason in the investigation of truth. 
 
 IL The use of reason in correcting the impres- 
 sions of the mind in regard to external things. 
 
 Before proceeding to these branches of the sub- 
 ject, however, this may perhaps be the proper place 
 for again stating in a few words, that in the preced- 
 ing observations my object has been to confine my- 
 self to facts, respecting the processes which the 
 mind actually performs, without entering on the 
 question how it performs them. On this subject we 
 find great differences among philosophers, which I 
 have alluded to only in an incidental manner. Some 
 appear to have spoken in too unqualified terras re 
 epecting various and distinct faculties of the mind 
 aadhave enumerated a variety of these, correspond 
 
REASON. 155 
 
 ing to the various mental operations. Dr. Brown, 
 on the other hand, has followed a very different 
 course, by referring all our mental processes to the 
 two principles of simple and relative sugg-estion. 
 According to this eloquent and ingenious writer, we 
 have no direct voluntary power over the succession 
 of our thoughts ; but these follow each other in con- 
 sequence of- certain principles of suggestion, by 
 which conceptions, in certain circumstances, call 
 up or suggest other conceptions, which are in some 
 manner related to them. We have the power only 
 of fixing the mind more intensely upon some images 
 of this series, when they arise, in consequence of 
 approving of them, as referring to some subject of 
 thought which is before us, while we disapprove 
 of others of the series as less allied to it. The 
 former become more fixed and vivid in consequence 
 of this approbation, while the latter are allowed to 
 sink back into oblivion. What systematic writers 
 have called the faculty of conception is, according 
 to this system, the simple presence in the mind of 
 one of these suggested or recalled images. Memory 
 is this simple suggestion combined with the impres- 
 sion of past time. In imagination, again, which has 
 been considered as a voluntary power of forming 
 conceptions or images into new combinations by a 
 peculiar mental process. Dr. Brown believes that we 
 have only the power of perceiving images as they 
 are brought up by established principles of sugges- 
 tion, — approving of some which thus become fixed, 
 and disapproving of others which thus pass away. 
 In thus approving or disapproving of the suggested 
 images, we are guided by a perception of their rela- 
 tion to any particular subject which is before us, 
 and which we may desire to cultivate or illustrate. 
 According to this writer, therefore, what is usually 
 called conception is simple suggestion ; memory is 
 simple suggestion with a feeling of past time ; ima- 
 gination is simple suggestion combined with desire 
 
156 REASON. 
 
 and with a perception of relation. The relatix'e 
 suggestion of Dr. Brown, again, is that perception 
 of relations arising out of the comparison of different 
 facts or objects which we have treated of under the 
 more familiar name of judgment ; and the mental 
 process usually called abstraction he resolves sim- 
 ply into a perception of resemblances. Various ob- 
 jections might be urged against this system ; and 
 we may, perhaps, be allowed to doubt whether by 
 means of it any thing has been gained to the science 
 of mind. But the plan which I proposed to myself 
 in this outline does not lead me into any considera- 
 tion of it, or of those systems to which it is opposed. 
 My object has been simply to inquire what the mind 
 does, without entering on the question hoiu it does 
 so. On this ground, the division which has been 
 adopted of distinct mental operations, not distinct 
 faculties, appears to be that best calculated for prac- 
 tical utility. 
 
 Olf THE USE OF REASON IN THE INVESTIGATION 
 OF TRUTH. 
 
 In applying our reason to the investigation of 
 truth in any department of knowledge, w^e are, in the 
 first place, to keep in mind that there are certain 
 intuitive articles of belief which lie at the foundation 
 of all reasoning. For, in every process of reasoning, 
 we proceed by founding one step upon another 
 which has gone before it; and when we trace such 
 a process backwards, we must arrive at certain 
 truths which are recognised as fundamental, re- 
 quiring no proof and admitting of none. These are 
 
FIRST TRUTHS. 157 
 
 usually called First Truths. They are not the 
 result of any process of reasoning-, but force them- 
 selves with a conviction of infallible certainty upon 
 every sound understanding, without regard to its 
 logical habits or powers of induction. The force 
 of them is accordingly felt in an equal degree by all 
 classes of men; and they are acted upon with 
 absolute confidence in the daily transactions of hfe. 
 This is a subject of great and extensive importance. 
 The truths or articles of belief which are referable 
 to it were briefly mentioned in a former part of our 
 inquiry: they are chiefly the following: — 
 
 I. A conviction of our own existence, as sentient 
 and thinking beings; and of mind, as something dis- 
 tinct from the functions of the body. From the first 
 exercise of perception we acquire a knowledge of 
 two things ; namely, the thing perceived, and the 
 sentient being who perceives it. In the same man- 
 ner, from the exercise of any mental operation, such 
 as memory, we acquire an impression of the thing 
 remembered, of an essence or principle which re- 
 members it, and of this essence as something en- 
 tirely distinct from any function of the body. This 
 last conviction must be considered as a first truth, 
 or intuitive article of belief, standing on the same 
 ground with the other truths which are referable to 
 this class. It does not, as was formerly stated, rest 
 upon any metaphysical or physiological argument, 
 but upon an appeal made to the conviction of every 
 man who attends to what is passing within. It re- 
 solves itself into a consciousness of the various 
 mental processes, impressions, and emotions, as re- 
 ferable to one permanent and unchanging essence, 
 while the body is known to be in a constant state 
 of change ; and of these processes as being exer- 
 cised without any necessary dependence upon pres- 
 ent impressions from external things. Like other 
 truths of this class* it is, consequently, unaffected by 
 O 
 
158 REASON. 
 
 sophisms which are brought against it; and tlie? 
 answer to these does not properly consist in any 
 process of reasoning, but in this appeal to every 
 man's absolute conviction. If brought into com- 
 parison, indeed, the evidence which we have for the 
 existence of mind is perhaps less liable to decep- 
 tion than that which we have for the existence of 
 matter. 
 
 II. A confidence in the evidence of our senses in 
 regard to the existence and the properties of ex- 
 ternal things ; or a conviction that they have a real 
 existence independently of our sensations. We 
 have formerly referred to a celebrated doctrine, by 
 which it was maintained that the mind perceives 
 only its own ideas or impressions; and that, conse- 
 quently, we derive from our senses no evidence of 
 the existence of external things. The only answer 
 to such a sophism is, that a confidence in the evi- 
 dence of our senses is a first truth, or intuitive prin- 
 ciple of belief, admitting of no other proof than that 
 which is derived from the universal conviction of 
 mankind. 
 
 III. A confidence in our own mental processes : 
 that facts, for example, which are suggested to us 
 by our memory really occurred. 
 
 IV. A belief in our personal identity. This is 
 derived from the combined operation of conscious- 
 ness and memory ; and it consists in a remembrance 
 of past mental feelings, and a comparison of them 
 with present feelings as belonging to the same sen- 
 tient being. There were formerly many disputes 
 on this subject; some maintaining that the notion 
 of personal identity is inconsistent with the diflferent 
 states in which the mind exists at different times, 
 as love and hatred, joy and sorrow, — and also with 
 the remarkable changes of character which often 
 
FIRST TRUTHS. 159 
 
 take place at different periods of life. This was one 
 of the sophisms of the schools, founded upon an ob- 
 scure analogy with changes which take place in 
 material things, and is not at all applicable to mind. 
 The only answer to the paradox is, that every man, 
 under every variety of mental emotion, and every 
 possible change of character, retains an absolute 
 conviction that the sentient being whom he calls 
 himself remains invariably the same ; and that in all 
 the affairs of life, whether referring to the past or 
 the future, every man acts upon this conviction. 
 
 V. A conviction that every event must have a 
 cause, and a cause adequate to the effect ; and that 
 appearances, showing a correct adaptation of means 
 to an end, indicate design and intelligence in the 
 cause. These, as fundamental truths, are quite dis- 
 tinct from the question relating to the connexion 
 of any two specified events as cause and effect. 
 The latter belongs to another part of our inquiry. 
 
 VI. A confidence in the uniformity of nature ; or, 
 that the same substance will always exhibit the 
 «anie characters ; and that the same cause under the 
 same circumstances will always be followed by the 
 same effect. This, as a first truth, is a fundamental 
 and instinctive conviction. The province of experi- 
 ence, we have already seen, is to ascertain the par- 
 ticular events which are so connected as to be in- 
 cluded under the law. 
 
 Our confidence in the uniformity of nature is the 
 foundation of all the calculations which we make for 
 the future in regard to our protection or comfort, or 
 even for the continuance of our existence ; and 
 without it the whole system of human things would 
 be thrcAvn into inextricable confusion. It is refer- 
 able to the two heads now stated ; namely, uni- 
 formity of characters, and uniformity of sequences 
 or operations. 
 
160 REASON. 
 
 By uniformity of characters, in any substance, we 
 mean that the substance will always continue to ex- 
 hibit the same combination of characters ; so that, 
 when we have ascertained its presence by some 
 of them, we conclude that it also possesses the 
 others. These characters may be numerous, and 
 referable to various classes ; such as the botanical 
 characters of a plant, the chymical properties of a 
 mineral, sensible qualities of smell, taste, and colour, 
 and capabilities of action upon other bodies. Such 
 is our confidence in the undeviating uniformity of 
 nature, that whatever number of these qualities we 
 have ascertained to belong to a substance, we ex- 
 pect to find in every specimen of it in all time 
 coming. For example, I find a substance which, by 
 its smell and colour, I know to be opium. Without 
 any further information, I decide with confidence on 
 its taste, its composition, its chymical affinity, its 
 action on the human body, and the characters of the 
 plant from which it was derived ; and 1 never calcu- 
 late upon the possibility of being deceived in any 
 of these particulars. 
 
 Our confidence in the uniformity of the sequences 
 or operations of nature resolves itself into a convic- 
 tion of the continuance of that order which experi- 
 ence has shown us to exist in a uniform manner in 
 the succession of phenomena. The conviction 
 itself is an original or instinctive principle, felt and 
 acted upon by all classes of men in the daily trans- 
 actions of life. It is from experience that we learn 
 the particular cases to which we are warranted in 
 applying it • or, in other words, the successions of 
 phenomena which, there is sufficient ground for be- 
 lieving, have occurred in a certain order in time past. 
 These we expect with perfect confidence to con- 
 tinue to be equally uniform, or to occur in the same 
 order in time to come. The error to be guarded 
 against in such investigations is, assuming the past 
 uniformity of phenomena on insufficient grounds; 
 
FIRST TRUTHS. 161 
 
 or, in other words, concluding that events have 
 always occurred in a certain order because we have 
 eeen thf^m occur in that order in a few instances. A 
 princ'iMrt assumed in this manner may of course dis- 
 appujnt us if apphed to future phenomena ; but in 
 this case there is no deviation from the uniformity 
 of nature : the error consisted in assuming such a 
 uniformity where none existed. 
 
 The uniformity of the sequences of phenomena is 
 the foundation of our idea of causation in regard to 
 these phenomena ; that is to say, when we have ob- 
 served one event uniformly follow another event, 
 we consider the first as cause, and the second as 
 effect; and, when this relation has been ascertained 
 to be uniform, we conclude that it will continue to 
 be uniform ; or that the same cause in the same cir- 
 cumstances will always be followed by the same 
 effect. This expectation will of course disappoint 
 us if we have assumed the relation on inadequate 
 grounds; or have considered two events as cause 
 and effect which have been only accidentally com- 
 bined in a few instances. To entitle us to assume 
 that the relation will be uniform in time to come, we 
 must have full and adequate grounds for believing 
 that it has been uniform in time past. 
 
 In the great operations of nature a very extensive 
 observation often enables us to trace a remarkable 
 uniformity even in regard to events which at first 
 sight appear to be most irregular and uncertain. 
 Tims', tlie most uncertain of all things is human life, 
 as far as respects individuals ; but Uie doctrine of 
 the continuance of life in regard to a large body of 
 men is, by extensive observation, reduced almost to 
 a certainty. Nothing is more uncertain than the 
 proportion of males and females that shall be born 
 in one family ; but in great communities this also 
 is uniform. There is much uncertainty in the char- 
 acter of different seasons, but there are facts which 
 give probabihty to the conjecture that in a long 
 02 
 
162 REASON. 
 
 series of years there may also be discovered a re- 
 markable uniformity. An Mnpression of this kind 
 was carried so far by the ancients as to lead to the 
 doctrine of the Annes Magnus, or Platonic year, in 
 which it was believed that the whole series of 
 human events would be acted over again. 
 
 The uniform successions of phenomena are, with 
 reasonable care, easily ascertained in regard to ma- 
 terial things; and when they are ascertained, we 
 rely upon their uniform continuance ; or, if we find 
 a deviation in any instance, we easily ascertain the 
 incidental cause by which the sequence is inter- 
 rupted, and can provide against the interference of 
 the same or any similar cause in future instances. 
 There is greater uncertainty when our researches 
 refer to the phenomena of mind, or the actions 
 of living bodies. The causes of this uncertainty 
 were formerly mentioned. It arises partly from 
 the greater difficulty of ascertaining the true rela- 
 tions, — that is, of tracing causes to their true effects, 
 and effects to their true causes ; and partly from the 
 tendency to these being interrupted in future in- 
 stances by some new cause, in regard to which we 
 cannot calculate either the existence or the precise 
 effects. Hence, for example, the micertainty of 
 human laws ; one of the contingencies by which 
 they are interrupted being the chances of evading 
 them. If we could conceive a case in which every 
 crime was with certainty detected, and every criminal 
 brought to punishment, it is probable that the effect 
 of human laws would be nearly as certain as the 
 operation of material causes. But the criminal, in 
 the first instance, calculates on the chance of 
 evading detection, and, even in the event of detec- 
 tion, of escaping punishment ; and thus the tendency 
 of the wisest laws is constantly interrupted in a 
 itianner which no human wisdom can calculate upon 
 or prevent. There is often a similar uncertainty in 
 human character in other situations : for example. 
 
FIRST TRUTHS. 163 
 
 in judging how an individual will act in particular 
 circumstances, or be influenced by particular mo- 
 tives ; for a motive which we have found to induce 
 a particular hne of conduct in one individual may 
 fail in producing the same result in another, being 
 prevented by circumstances in his moral condition 
 which entirely elude our observation. 
 
 Yet there is a uniformity in moral phenomena 
 which, though it may be ascertained with greater 
 difficulty than the order of natural phenomena, we 
 calculate upon with similar confidence when it has 
 been ascertained. Thus, a man may have acquired 
 such a character for integrity, that we rely upon his 
 integrity in any situation in which he may be placed, 
 with the same confidence with which we rely on the 
 uniformity of nature ; and there is a man distin- 
 guished by veracity and fidelity to his promise, of 
 whom we say, in common language, that his word 
 is as good as his bond. In such examples as these, 
 indeed, our confidence is founded, not upon any laws 
 which have been observed in regard to the whole 
 species, but on a uniformity which has been ob- 
 served in regard to the individuals, or rather a class 
 to which the individuals belong. There are also, 
 however, laws which apply to mankind in general, 
 and on which we rely as far as they go, — namely, 
 principles of conduct in which we confide, as regu- 
 lating every man of a sane mind, whatever may be 
 our knowledge of his previous habits of judging or 
 acting. It is in this manner, for example, as for- 
 merly stated, that we regulate our confidence in tes- 
 timony. If a man who is either a stranger to us or 
 bears a character of doubtful veracit}^ relates cir- 
 cumstances which tend gi*eatly to promote his own 
 purposes, we calculate on the probability of fabrica- 
 tion, and reject his testimony ; and if we even sus- 
 pect that he has a purpose to serve, a similar im- 
 pression is produced. If, on the contrary, we are 
 satisfied that the circumstances are indifferent to 
 
164 REASON. 
 
 him, and that he has no purpose to answer, we g-ive 
 greater credit to his testimony. If, further than 
 this, we perceive that the statement operates against 
 himself, conveying- an imputation against his own 
 conduct, or exposing him to contempt, ridicule, or 
 personal injury, we are satisfied that nothing could 
 make him adhere to such a testimony but an honest 
 conviction of its truth. Under the former circum- 
 stances, we believe only a man whom we consider 
 as a person of known and established veracity ; un- 
 der the latter, we believe any man whom we con- 
 sider to be of a sane mind. Thus, in both instances, 
 we proceed upon a certain uniformity of moral phe- 
 nomena ; only that we refer them to two classes, — 
 namely, one which is ascertained to be uniform in 
 regard to the whole species, and another which is 
 uniform only in regard to a certain order, that is, 
 all men of integrity and veracity. In the one case, 
 we rely upon the uniformity in every instance ; in 
 the other, we do not rely upon it until we are satis- 
 fied that the individual example belongs to that or- 
 der in which the other kind of moral uniformity has 
 been ascertained. 
 
 There are other inquiries closely connected with 
 the uniformity of moral relations ; but at present 
 we must allude to them very briefly. "VVe have every 
 reason to believe that there are moral causes, that 
 is, truths and motives, which have a tendency to in- 
 fluence human volition and human conduct with a 
 uniformity similar to that with which physical agents 
 produce their actions upon each other. These moral 
 causes, indeed, do not operate in every instance, or 
 in all circumstances ; but neither do physical causes. 
 Substances in chymistry, for example, have certain 
 tendencies to act upon each other, which are uni- 
 form and necessary ; but no action takes place un- 
 less the substances are brought into certain c'rcum- 
 s*,ances which are required for brmging these ten- 
 dencies into operation. Thev must, in the first place 
 
FIRST TRUTHS. 165 
 
 be bi ought into contact ; and, besides this, many of 
 them require other collateral circumstances, as a 
 particular temperature, or a particular state of con- 
 centration or dilution. It is the same with moral 
 causes : their tendencies are uniform, and there are 
 principles in the mind of man which these are 
 adapted for acting upon. But they require certain 
 circumstances in the man on whom they are expected 
 to act, without which they produce no influence upon 
 mm. It is necessary, for example, that he be fully in- 
 jbrmed in regard to them as truths; and that his atten- 
 tion be directed to them with such a degree of in- 
 tensity as shall bring him fully under their influence 
 as statements addressed to his understanding; also, 
 that there be a certain healthy state of his moral 
 feelings, — for this has a most extensive influence on 
 the due operation of moral causes. Without these 
 the most powerful moral causes may produce no ef- 
 fect upon a man ; as the most active chymical agents 
 may fail entirely of their actions, if the substances 
 are not placed in the requisite circumstances of tem- 
 perature, dilution, or concentration. 
 
 These considerations seem to bear an important 
 reference to a question which has been nnich argued, 
 namely, that respecting liberty, necessity, and the 
 freedom of the will. On a subject on which some 
 of the wisest and the best of men have been found 
 on opposite sides, I would express myself with be- 
 coming caution and diffidence ; but perhaps some of 
 the obscurity in which the question has been involved 
 arises from the want of a clear definition of the terms 
 in which it has been argued ; and by not fully distin- 
 guishing between will or simple volition^ and desire or 
 inclination. Will, or simple volition, is the state of 
 mind which immediately precedes action; and the 
 action following upon this is not only free, but it is 
 absolutely impossible to suppose it should be other- 
 wise. A man is not only free to do what he wills, 
 but we cannot conceive a case in whioh he could 
 
166 REASON. 
 
 exert a power of not doing what he wills, or of doing 
 what he wills not. Impulse or restraint from with- 
 out, acting upon his bodily organs, could alone inter- 
 fere with his following, in this sense, the tendency 
 of his will, or simple volition. The only idea, indeed, 
 that we can form of free agency, or freedom of the 
 will, is, that it consists in a man being able to do 
 what he wills, or to abstain from doing what he wills 
 not. Necessary agency, on the other hand, would 
 consist in the man being compelled, by a force from 
 without, to do what he wills not, or prevented from 
 doing what he wills. 
 
 The real bearing of the inquiry does not lie in this 
 comiexion between the volition and the act, but in 
 the origin or cause of the volition, or in the connex- 
 ion between the volition and the desire ; and this will 
 be seen to be entirely distinct. A man, for example, 
 may desire, or have an inclination to, that which he 
 has not the power to will ; because he maybe under 
 the influence of motives and principles which prevent 
 the inclination from being followed by volition, with 
 as absolute a necessity as we observe in the se- 
 quences of natural phenomena. Thus, also, we may 
 say to a man of strict integrity and virtue that he has 
 not the power to commit murder or robbery, or any 
 act of gross injustice or oppression. He may reply 
 that he has the power to do it if he willed ; and this 
 is granted, for this is free agency ; but it is not the 
 question in dispute. We do not say that he has not 
 the power to do any or all of these acts if he willed, 
 but that he has not the power to will such deeds. 
 He is under the influence of motives and principles 
 which make it as much' a matter of necessity for 
 him not to will such acts, as it is for a stone not to 
 rise from the earth's surface contrary to its gravity. 
 Such a necessity as this, if we must retain the term, 
 so far from being unfavourable to the interests of 
 virtue and morals, or opposed to the practice of ex 
 horting men to virtue, seems, on the contrary, to 
 
FIRST TRUTHS. IQ7 
 
 hold out the strongest encouragement in doing so; 
 and to be, in fact, the only scheme on which we can 
 expect an argument or motive to have any influence 
 upon human conduct. For it represents mtm as pos- 
 sessed of certain uniform principles in his nature 
 which are capable of being acted upon by certain 
 moral causes, truths, laws, or motives, wiCh a uni- 
 formity similar to that which we observe in physical 
 phenomena, provided he can be brought under their 
 influence, and into those circumstances which are 
 required for their due operation. These circum- 
 stances are, — that the moral causes, laws, motives, 
 or truths, shall be brought before his understanding; 
 that he shall direct his attention to them with suita- 
 ble intensity ; and that he is free from that degree 
 of corruption of his moral feelings, or any of those 
 distorted moral habits which we know to produce a 
 most extensive influence on the operation of moral 
 causes. To suppose a kind of moral liberty opposed 
 to such a necessity as this, would be to represent 
 man as a being possessed of no fixed or uniform 
 principles, — not to be calculated upon as to his con- 
 duct in any instance, — and not capable of being acted 
 upon by any motive or principle except the blind 
 caprice of the moment. To endeavour to act upon 
 such a being, by persuading him to virtue or dis- 
 suading him from vice, would be like expecting fixed 
 results in chymistry, by bringing substances to act 
 upon each other, the actions of which we had pre- 
 viously found to be without any kind of uniformity. 
 This is, in fact, precisely the situation of the maniac, 
 whom, accordingly, we never expect to guide or in- 
 fluence by motives or arguments, but by external 
 restraint. He may act harmlessly, or he may act 
 mischievously; but we never can calculate upon his 
 actions in any one instance ; we therefore shut him 
 up, so as to prevent him from being dangerous to the 
 community. 
 Necessity, then, as applied to the operation of 
 
168 REASOX. 
 
 moral causes, appears simply to correspond with th^ 
 uniformity which we observe in the operation of 
 physical caus-es. We calculate that a man of a cer* 
 tain character will act in a particular manner in par* 
 ticular circumstances, or that he will be acted upon 
 in a certain manner by particular truths and motives, 
 when they are presented to him, — by a principle of 
 uniformity similar to that with which we expect an 
 acid to act in a particular manner upon an alkali. 
 The action of the acid we know to be uniform, but 
 we know also, that no action will take place till the 
 substances are brought fully into contact, and in cer- 
 tain circumstances which are required for their ac- 
 tion ; — and the action of moral causes is uniform, 
 but they exert no influence on a man till he is fully 
 acquainted with them, — directs his attention to them 
 with suitable care, — and is besides in a certain heal- 
 thy state of moral feeling. It is thus that we cal- 
 culate on the full and uniform operation of moral 
 causes on some individuals, and not on others; 
 namely, by having previously ascertained that the for- 
 mer are in those intellectual and moral circumstances 
 which are required for their action. When, in ano- 
 ther individual, we find these causes fail in their na- 
 tural actions, we endeavour, as far as may be in our 
 power, to supply those collateral circumstances, — 
 by instructing him in the facts, truths, or motives;— 
 by rousing his attention to their importance ; — by 
 impressing them upon him in their strongest char- 
 acters, and by all such arguments and representations 
 as we think calculated to fix the impression. Ail 
 this we do under a conviction, that these causes 
 have a certain, fixed, uniform, or necessary action, 
 in regard to human volition and human conduct ; 
 and it is this conviction which encourages us to per- 
 severe in our attempts to bring the individual under 
 their influence. If we had not this conviction, we 
 should abandon the attempt as altogether hopeless 
 because we could have no ground on which to foriw 
 
FIRST TRUTHS. 169 
 
 any calculation, and no rules to guide us in our meas- 
 ures. Precisely in the same manner, when we find 
 a chymical agent fail of the effect which we expect 
 from it, we add it in larger quantity, or in an in- 
 creased state of concentration, or at a higher tem- 
 perature, — or with some other change of circum- 
 stances calculated to favour its action ; and v/e per- 
 severe in these measures, under a conviction that its 
 action is perfectly uniform or necessary, and will 
 take place whenever these circumstances have been 
 provided for. On the same principle, we see how 
 blame may attach to the intelligent agent in both 
 cases, though the actions of the causes are uniform 
 and necessary. Such is the action of chymical 
 agents, — but blame may attach to the chymist who 
 has not provided them in the necessary circumstances 
 as to quantity, concentration, and temperature. Such 
 is the action of moral causes, — but deep guilt may 
 attach to the moral agent, who has been proof against 
 their influence. There is guilt in ignorance, when 
 knowledge was within his reach ; — there is guilt in 
 heedless inattention, when truths and motives of the 
 highest interest claimed his serious consideration ; 
 — there is guilt in that corruption of his moral feel- 
 ings which impedes the action of moral causes, be- 
 cause this has originated, in a great measure, in a 
 course of vicious desires, and vicious conduct, by 
 which the mind, familiarized with vice, has gradu- 
 ally lost sight of its malignity. During the whole 
 of this course, also, the man felt that he was a free 
 agent; — that he had power to pursue the course 
 which he followed, — and that he had power to re- 
 frain from it. When a particular desire was first 
 present to his mind, he had the power immediately 
 to act with a view to its accomplishment; or he had 
 the power to abstain from acting, and to direct his 
 attention more fully to the various considerations 
 and motives which were calculated to guide his de- 
 termination. In acting as he did, he not only with- 
 
1 70 REASON 
 
 held his attention from those truths which were thus 
 calculated to operate upon him as a moral being ; 
 but he did still more direct violence to an impulse 
 within, which warned him that he was wandering 
 from the path of rectitude. The state of moral 
 feeling- which gradually results from this habitual 
 violation of the indications of conscience, and this 
 habitual neglect of the serious consideration of 
 moral causes, every individual must feel to be at- 
 tended with moral guilt. The effect of it is not only 
 to prevent the due operation of moral causes on his 
 future volitions, but even to vitiate and distort the 
 judgment itself, respecting the great principles of 
 moral rectitude. Without attempting any explana- 
 tion of this remarkable condition of the mental func- 
 tions, its actual existence must be received as a fact 
 in the constitution of human nature, which cannot 
 be called in question ; and it offers one of the most 
 remarkable phenomena that can be presented to him 
 who turns his attention to the moral economy of 
 man. 
 
 Before concluding this incidental allusion to a much 
 controverted subject, I may be allowed to remark, 
 that the term necessity, as applied to moral pheno- 
 mena, is not fortunate, and perhaps not philosophi- 
 cal; and something would perhaps be gained in con 
 ducting the inquiry, if, for necessity, we were to sub- 
 stitute uniformity. In strict propriety, indeed, the 
 terms necessity and necessary ought to be applied 
 only to mathematical truth. Of physical relations, 
 all that we know is the fact of their uniformity ; and 
 it would appear equally philosophical to apply the 
 same term to mental phenomena. On this principle, 
 therefore, we should say, — that the tendenc)'- of 
 moral causes or motives is not necessary, but uni- 
 form ; and that on this depends all our confidence in 
 the uniformity of human character, and in the power 
 of truths, motives, or arguments, to produce par- 
 ticular results on human conduct. To suppose the 
 
FIRST TTIUTHS. 171 
 
 mind possessed of a power of determining, apart 
 from all the influence of moral causes or motives, 
 would be to overthrow this confidence, and to re- 
 duce our whole calculations on human character to 
 conjecture an^ uncertainty. When, indeed, we talk 
 of a self-determining power of the will, we seem to 
 use a combination of words without any definite 
 meaning. For the will is not distinct from the being 
 who wills; and to speak of an individual deter- 
 mining his will, is only saying, in other words, that 
 he wills. He wills some act for some reason, which 
 is known to himself: if communicated to another, 
 the reason might not appear a satisfactory one, — 
 but still it is to him the reason which induced him 
 to will the act, and this appears to be all that we can 
 make of the subject. A power of determining, 
 without any reason, appears to be not only unphilo- 
 sophical, but, in point of fact, inapplicable to any 
 conceivable case. Ignorance, inattention, or gross 
 perversion of the moral feelings may make the 
 worse reason appear the better ; but we cannot con- 
 ceive a case, in which an individual could exert a 
 power of determining without any reason, or ac- 
 cording to what appears to him at the time to be a 
 weaker reason, in opposition to one which appears 
 a stronger. It will also, I think, be found that the 
 warmest advocates for philosophical liberty, and a 
 self-determining power, in actual practice recognise 
 as much as others the principle of the uniformity 
 of moral causes. Thus, if we find a person acting 
 in a manner widely different from that which we ex- 
 pected from him, all men concur in saying, " what 
 motive could induce him to act in that manner ]" 
 and if we cannot reconcile his conduct to any con- 
 ceivable motive, we say, " it really looks like insan- 
 ty." Another may remark, " his conduct indicates 
 a singular want of consideration ;" — thus clearly re- 
 cognising the existence of certain motives or moral 
 causes, which would have led the man into a differ- 
 
172 REASON. 
 
 ent line of conduct, had he allowed his attention to 
 fix upon them. The doctrine of a self-determining 
 power should remove every difficulty in such a case, 
 to those who believe in it ; but I am not aware that 
 it ever was made use of for such a purpose. It will 
 also be found to agree with the universal conviction 
 of mankind, that the circumstance which gives to 
 an action the character of merit or demerit is en- 
 tirely the motive from which it was done ; and that 
 if we could conceive such a thing as an action per- 
 formed by the impulse of a free self-determining 
 power apart from any influence of motives or moral 
 causes, no man of sane mind would for a moment 
 allow to such an act the character of virtue. On the 
 contrary, it is familiar to every one, that we often find 
 in a man's motive an excuse for conduct in which 
 we think he has acted wrong. We say, he erred in 
 judgment, but his motive was good ; and this mode 
 of reasoning meets with the cordial concurrence of 
 the whole mass of manliind. 
 
 The First Truths, or intuitive principles of beliel, 
 which have been the subject of the preceding ob- 
 servations, are of the utmost practical importance, 
 as they furnish the true and only answer to many 
 of the sophisms of the scholastic philosophy, and to 
 many skeptical arguments of more modern times. 
 They admit of no other evidence than an appeal to 
 the consciousness of every man, that he does and 
 must believe them. " We believe them," says Dr. 
 Brown, " because it is impossible not to believe 
 them." — "In all these cases," says Mr. Stewart, 
 "the only account that can be given of our belief is, 
 that it forms a necessary part of our constitution, 
 against which metaphysicians may argue, so as to 
 
FIRST TRUTHS. 173 
 
 perplex the judgment, but of which it is impossible 
 to divest ourselves for a moment, when we are called 
 to employ our reason, either in the business of hfe or 
 in the pursuits of science." 
 
 It is likewise to be kept in mind, as was formerly 
 stated, that our idea of reasoning necessarily sup- 
 poses the existence of a certain number of truths, 
 which require and admit of no evidence. Tlie maxim 
 indeed, is as old as the days of Aristotle, and has 
 never been called in question, " that, except some 
 first principles be taken for granted, there can be 
 neither reason nor reasoning; that it is impossible 
 that every truth should admit of proof, otherwise 
 proof would extend in infinitum, which is incompati- 
 ble with its nature ; and tliat, if ever men attempt 
 to prove a first principle, it is because they are ig- 
 norant of the nature of proof."* As these truths, 
 tlierefore, do not admit of being called in question 
 by any sound understanding, neither do they admit 
 of being supported by any process of reasoning; 
 and, when paradoxes or sophisms in opposition to 
 them are proposed, any attempt to argue with such, 
 upon logical principles, only leads to discussions as 
 absurd as themselves. Of attempts of both kinds, 
 many examples areto be met with among the writers 
 of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as Des 
 Cartes and Hobbes ; and even some eminent persons, 
 of more modern times, are not entirely free from 
 them. Thus, Des Cartes, Malebranche, and others, 
 thought it necessary to prove that external objects, 
 and the sentient beings with whom we are connected, 
 have a real existence, whether we think of them or 
 not, and are not merely ideas in our own minds. 
 Berkeley showed the weakness of this argument, 
 aivi on this founded the well-known doctrine by 
 which he denied the real existence of material things. 
 
 Many of the dogmas of modern sophistical writers 
 
 * Aristotle's Metaphysios, book iv 
 P2 
 
174 REASON. 
 
 such as Mr. Hume, have consisted of attempts to 
 overturn, by processes of argument, these funda- 
 mental or first truths. On the other hand, the \m 
 satisfactory nature of some of the rephes to these 
 sophisms, depends upon the attempts to combat them 
 having been made by reasonings, of which the sub- 
 ject is not susceptible. For these principles admit 
 of no proof by processes of reasoning, and conse- 
 quently, are in no degree affected by demonstrations 
 of the fallacy of attempts to establish them by such 
 processes. An interesting illustration of this has 
 been reserved by Mr. Stewart, in a correspondence 
 between Mr. Hume and Sir Gilbert Elliot.* " From 
 the reply to this letter," says Mr. Stewart, " by Mr. 
 Hume's very ingenious and accomplished corres- 
 pondent, we learn that he had drawn from Mr, 
 Hume's metaphysical discussions, the only sound 
 and philosophical inference : — that the lameness of 
 the proofs offered by Des Cartes and his successors^ 
 of some fundamental truths, universally acknow 
 ledged by mankind, proceeded, not from any defect 
 in the evidence, but on the contrary, from their 
 being self-evident, and consequently unsusceptible of 
 demonstration." The same view of Mr. Hume's 
 skeptical reasonings was taken by other eminent 
 persons, by whom his system was attacked, — particu- 
 larly Reid, Beattie, and Oswald ; and on the conti- 
 nent, the nature and importance of these first truths 
 had been at an earher period illustrated in a full and 
 able manner by Father Buffier. 
 
 Various characters have been proposed, by which 
 these primary and fundamental truths may be dis- 
 tinguished. One of those given by Father BufRer 
 appears to be the best, and to be alone sufficient to 
 identify them. It is, that their practical influence 
 extends even to persons who affect to dispute their 
 authority ; in other words, that in all the affairs of 
 
 • Introductory Essay to the Appendix of the Encyclopsdia Britannlca. 
 
FIRST TRUTHS. 176 
 
 life, the most skeptical philosopher acts, as much as 
 the mass of mankind, upon the absolute belief of 
 these truths. Let a person of this description, for 
 example, be contending '-ery keenly, in regard to 
 something which deeply concerns his interest or his 
 comfort, — he would scarcely be satisfied by being 
 told, that the thing about which he contends has no 
 real existence, and that he who contends about it so 
 eagerly is himself a nonentity, or, at best, nothing 
 more than an idea. Let him be taking cognizance 
 of an offence committed against him ten years ago, 
 — he never doubts that he is still the person against 
 whom the offence was committed. Let him lay 
 plans for future advantage or comfort, — it is done 
 under a full conviction that he is still lo continue the 
 individual who may enjoy them. Has a building 
 started up on his premises, which he did not expect 
 to see, — he immediately asks, who ordered the ma 
 sons, and would be very ill satisfied by being told, 
 that the thing had appeared without any known 
 cause, by a fortuitous combination of atoms. How- 
 ever much he may reason to the contrary, he shows 
 no doubt, in, his own practice, that every event must 
 have an adequate cause. The same mode of rea- 
 soning will be seen to apply to the other truths which 
 belong to- the class under consideration, — namely, 
 that those who argue against them act in all cases 
 on a behef of their truth. 
 
 The distinction between a process of reasoning, 
 and the act of the mind, in arriving at these funda- 
 mental and instmctive truths, is a principle of the 
 utmost practical importance. For a chain of correct 
 reasoning requires logical habits, and a certain cul- 
 tivation of the mental powers ; and consequently, 
 it is confined to a comparatively small number of 
 mankind. But the process here referred to is the 
 spontaneous and immediate induction of the im- 
 tutored mind, and a correct exercise of it requires 
 only, that the mind shall not be debased by depravity, 
 
176 REASON. 
 
 nor bewildered by the refinements of a false philo*' 
 sophy. The truths which we derive from it accord 
 ingly, do not concern the philosopher alone, but are 
 of daily and essential importance to the whole mass 
 of mankind. Let us take for example, the princi 
 pie referred to under the fifth head, namely, our in- 
 tuitive conviction that every change or event must 
 have an adequate cause. This is a principle of daily 
 application, and one which is acted upon with ab- 
 solute confidence in the ordinary affairs of life by 
 all classes of men. By the immediate and un- 
 conscious exercise of it, we infer the skill of one 
 workman from works indicating skill, and the vigour 
 of another, from works indicating strength. We 
 infer from every work, not only a cause, but a cause 
 which, both in degree and kind, is exactly propor- 
 tioned to the effect produced. From a chronometer, 
 which varies only a second in a year, we infer ex- 
 quisite skill in the artist ; and from the construction 
 of the Pyramids of Eg;^'pt, the united strength of a 
 multitude of men. We never suppose for a moment 
 that the minute skill of the artist raised the. pyramid, 
 or that the united force of the multitude constructed 
 the chronometer ; still less, that these monuments 
 of art started into their present condition without a 
 cause. We infer with absolute certainty in both 
 cases an adequate cause ; that is a cause distin- 
 guished in the one case by design and mechanical 
 power, — in the other, by design, adaptation, and ex- 
 quisite skill. 
 
 The principle which is thus acted upon, in the or- 
 dinary affairs of life, with a conviction of infallible 
 certainty, is precisely the same by which, from the 
 stupendous works of creation, we infer by the most 
 simple step of reasoning the existence of a great First 
 Cause. This cause also we conclude to be a de- 
 signing and intelligent mind, infinite in wisdom and 
 boundless in power ; and by a very slight and natural 
 extension of the same principle we arrive with equal 
 
LAWS 0? INVESTIGATION. 177 
 
 certainty at the conviction of this cause beinj^ the 
 first, — not arising out of any thing preceding it, con- 
 sequently self-existent and eternal. All this is not 
 such a process of reasoning as requires logical habits, 
 and admits of debate, deliberation, or doubt; — the 
 metaphysician may bewilder himself in its very sim- 
 plicity ; but the uncontaminated mind finds its way 
 to the conclusion with unerring certainty, and with 
 a conviction which is felt to be not only satisfactory, 
 but irresistible. 
 
 When we proceed from these first or intuitive ar 
 tides of belief to the further investigation of truth in 
 any department of knowledge, various mental pro- 
 cesses are brought into operation ; but in regard to 
 all of them reason is our ultimate guide in judging 
 whether they are performed in a legitimate manner, 
 and upon principles calculated to lead to the discov- 
 ery of truth. These processes may be chiefly re- 
 ferred to the following heads : — 
 
 I. To make a careful collection of facts relating to 
 the subject, and to abstain from deducing any conclu- 
 sions till we have before us such a series as seems 
 calculated to warrant them. The first operation of 
 reason therefore is, to judge when we have a suffi- 
 cient number of facts for this purpose. 
 
 II. To separate from the mass those facts which 
 are connected with it incidentally, and to retain those 
 only which we have reason to consider as uniform 
 and essential. In some sciences this is accomplished 
 by repeated and varied experiments ; and in those 
 departments which do not admit of this, it is done 
 by cautious and extensive observation. Our object 
 in both cases is to ascertain how many of the cir- 
 cumstances observed, and what particular combina- 
 tions of them uniformly accompany each other, or 
 
178 REASON. 
 
 are really connected with the effects which are pro- 
 duced. In this careful clearing of our statement 
 from all incidental combinations consists that faith- 
 ful observation of nature which forms the first step 
 in every scientific investigation. It is opposed to 
 two errors, both equally to be avoided, namely, leav- 
 ing out of view, or not assigning an adequate value 
 to, important and essential facts ; and giving a place 
 and an importance to those which are incidental and 
 trivial. In every scientific investigation this is a 
 process of the utmost importance ; and there is an- 
 other nearly connected with it, namely, to judge of 
 the authenticity of the facts. This also is a mental 
 process of the utmost delicacy. In conducting it, 
 there are two extremes from which the exercise of 
 sound judgment ought equally to guard us, namely, 
 receiving facts upon imperfect evidence, and reject- 
 ing those which have a sufficient title to credit ; in 
 other words, credulity and skepticism. Both these 
 extremes are equally unworthy of a mind which is 
 guided by sound reason. 
 
 III. To compare facte with each other, so as to 
 trace their resemblances or to ascertain those char- 
 acters or properties in which a certain number of 
 facts or substances agree. We thus arrange them 
 into classes, genera, and species. 
 
 IV. To compare facts or events with each other, 
 80 as to trace their relations and sequences ; espe- 
 cially that relation of uniform sequence on which is 
 founded our notion of cause and effect. This deli- 
 cate and most important process consists entirely in 
 a patient observation of facts, and of their relation 
 to each other. When, in a certain number of in- 
 stances, we find two events following one another 
 without any exception, we come to consider the se- 
 quence as uniform, and call the one cause and the 
 other effect ; and when, in other instances we i 
 
LAWS OF INVESTIGATION. 179 
 
 disappointed in finding such a succession, this con- 
 fidence is shaken, unless we can discover a cause by 
 which the sequence was interrupted. Reason, acting 
 upon extensive observation, must here guide us ; on 
 the one hand to judge of the uniformity of the se- 
 quences, and, on the other, to account for apparent 
 deviations. 
 
 V. To review an extensive collection of facts, so 
 as to discover some general fact common to the 
 whole. This is the process which we call general- 
 izing, or the induction of a general principle. The 
 result of it is the last and greatest object of human 
 science, and that to which all the other steps are 
 preliminary and subservient. An ordmary mind is 
 satisfied with the observation of facts as they pass 
 before it, and those obvious relations which obtrude 
 themselves upon its notice ; but the philosopher ana- 
 lyzes the phenomena, and thus discovers tlieir more 
 minute relations. His genius is distinguished above 
 tlie industry of the mere observer of facts, when he 
 thus traces principles of accordance among factfj 
 which, to the vulgar eye, appear remote and dis- 
 similar. A remarkable example of this is famihar to 
 every one. Between the fall of an a[)ple from a tree 
 and the motions of the heavenly bodies a common 
 mind would have been long ere it discovered any 
 kind of relation; but on such a relation Newton 
 founded those grand principles by which he brought 
 to light the order and harmony of the universe. For 
 it was this simple fact that first suggested to him the 
 great principle of physical science, that matter at- 
 tracts matter in the reciprocal ratio of their masses. 
 
 In a practical view, these processes may be referred 
 to three heads, — namely, collecting authentic facts, 
 —tracing causation, — and deducing general princi- 
 ples. Here various mental operations are brought 
 into action, especially attention, memorj^, concep* 
 
t80 REASON. 
 
 tion, and abstraction ; but it is the province of reason 
 to judge whether these are conducted in a legitimate 
 manner, or, in other words, to distinguish truth from 
 falsehood. It may therefore be important to keep 
 in mind what those circumstances are in which con- 
 sist truth and falsehood, in reference to any depart- 
 ment of knowledge. 
 
 I. In collecting facts, it is required in the first 
 place that they shall be authentic ; secondly, that the 
 statement shall include a full and fair view of all the 
 circumstances which ought to be taken into our in- 
 vestigation of ihe case ; and thirdly, that it shall not 
 include any facts which are not connected with the 
 subject, or whose connexion is only incidental. 
 When wo have thus formed a collection of facts, 
 authentic, full, and essential, the statement, in as far 
 as relates to the facts, constitutes truth. When any 
 of the facts are not authentic ; when important facts 
 are left out of the statement, or misrepresented ; or 
 when facts are taken into it, which, though true, have 
 no real relation to the subject ; this constitutes fal- 
 lacy or falsehood. 
 
 II. In considering two events as connected in the 
 manner of cause and effect ; when this relation is 
 deduced from a full and extensive observation of the 
 sequence being uniform, — this is truth. When it is 
 assumed upon inadequate grounds, that is, from the 
 observation of a connexion which is only incidental 
 or hmited, — this is either falsehood or h)q30thesis; 
 for the relation may be assumed upon grounds which, 
 though not actually false, are yet not sufficient to 
 establish it as true — namely, on observation which 
 is too limited in extent. This is conjecture or hy- 
 pothesis ; and it is in some cases a legitimate process, 
 provided it be used only as a guide for further ob- 
 servation, and be not received as true, until such 
 observation shall have been sufficient to confirm it. 
 
LAWS OF INVESTIGATION. 181 
 
 in. In deducing from a large collection of facts 
 a general fact or general principle ; when this induc- 
 tion is made from a full examination of all the indi- 
 vidual cases to which the general fact is meant to 
 apply, and actually does apply to them all, — this is 
 truth. When it is deduced from a small number of 
 observations, and extended to others to which it 
 does not apply, — this is falsehood. As in the former 
 case, however, a general prmciple may be produced 
 hypothetically or by conjecture ; that is, it may be 
 assumed as general so far as we at present know. 
 This process is often legitimate and useful as a guide 
 in further inquiry, if it be employed for this purpose 
 only, and the result be not received as truth until it 
 be established by sufficient observation. A great 
 and not unfrequent error is, that when such hypo- 
 thetical principles are proposed in a confident man- 
 ner, they are very often received as true ; and the 
 consequence is, that a degree of observation is re- 
 quired for exposing their fallacy, perhaps as extensive 
 as, if properly employed, might have been sufficient 
 to discover the truth. Those who are acquainted 
 with the history of medical doctrines will be best 
 able to judge of the accuracy of this observation, 
 and to estimate the extensive influence which this 
 error has had in retarding the progress of medical 
 science. 
 
 The proper rules to be observed, in deducing a 
 general principle, are therefore opposed, in the first 
 place to the error of hasty generalizing, or deducing 
 such a principle from a limited number of facts. 
 They are further opposed to another error, prevalent 
 in the hypothetical systems of the old philosophy, by 
 which phenomena were referred to principles alto- 
 gether fictitious and imaginary, or, m other words, 
 which could not be shown to be facts. In opposi- 
 tion to both these errors the great rule of induction 
 in modern science is, that the principle which is as- 
 sumed as general shall be itself a fact, and that the 
 Q 
 
182 REASON. 
 
 fact shall be universal. Thus, what we call the law 
 of gravitation is primarily nothing more than the 
 fact that bodies fall to the earth ; and that this is true 
 of all bodies, without a single exception. Of the 
 cause of this fact, or the hidden principle on which 
 it depends, we know nothing ; and all the investiga- 
 tions of Newton were carried on independently even 
 of the attempt to discover it. " When Newton," 
 says Mr. Stewart, "showed that the same law of 
 gravity extends to the celestial spaces, and that the 
 power by which the moon and planets are retained 
 in their orbits is precisely similar in its effects to that 
 which is manifested in the fall of a stone ; he left 
 the efficient cause of gravity as much in the dark as 
 ever, and only generalized still further the conclu- 
 sions of his predecessors." 
 
 False investigation may be briefly referred to three 
 heads, — fallacies in facts, — false inductions, — and 
 false reasoning. 
 
 I. Fallacies in Facts. A statement of facts is 
 fallacious when any of the alleged facts are not true, 
 — when it includes facts not relating to the subject, 
 — and when important facts are omitted. This last 
 error is most frequently examplified in those cases in 
 which facts are collected on one side of a question, 
 or in support of a particular doctrine. To the same 
 class we may likewise add those instances in which 
 statements are received as facts, which are not facts 
 but opinions. 
 
 II. False Induction includes false causation and 
 false generalization. False causation is, when two 
 events are considered as cause and effect without 
 sufficient reason, and which are, in fact, only inci- 
 dentally combined : — when events are considered as 
 cause and effect which are only joint effects of a com- 
 mon cause ; and when, of two events really con- 
 
FALLACIES IN INTESTIOATION. 183 
 
 liected as cause and effect, we mistake the order of 
 the sequence, considering- that as the cause which is 
 really the effect, and that as the effect which is really 
 the cause. The error of false causation is most apt 
 to occur in those sciences in which there is peculiar 
 difficulty in tracing effects to their true causes, and 
 causes to their true effects. These, as formerly 
 mentioned, are exemplified by medicine and political 
 economy, A physician, for example, ascribes the 
 cure of a patient to a remedy which he has taken, 
 though it perhaps had no influence on his recovery; 
 and a political declaimer refers some circumstance 
 of national distress or commercial embarrassment 
 to certain public measures which happened to corres- 
 pond in time, but were in fact entirely unconnected. 
 False generalization, again, as was lately stated, in- 
 cludes general principles which are deduced from a 
 limited number of facts ; and hypotheses which can- 
 not be shown to be facts, but are entirely fictitious 
 and imaginary. 
 
 III. Fai^e Reasoning. This consists either, — in 
 applying to the explanation of facts, principles 
 which are unsound, — in applying sound principles 
 to facts which have no relation to them, — or in de- 
 ducing conclusions which do not follow from these 
 facts and principles. 
 
 Reasoning is usually divided into two parts which 
 have been called the intuitive and the discursive. 
 Intuitive reasoning, or intuitive judgment, is when 
 the truth of a proposition is perceived whenever it 
 is announced. This applies to axioms or self-evi- 
 dent truths, — and to first truths or fundamental ar- 
 ticles of belief, formerly referred to, which rest upon 
 the absolute conviction of the whole mass of man- 
 kind. In discursive reasoning, again, some of these 
 axioms or first truths are applied to particular facts, 
 60 as to deduce from the comiexion new conclu- 
 
184 REASON. 
 
 sions. Thus, when we say that " every event must 
 have an adequate cause," we state a principle of in- 
 tuitive judgment. When we then collect from the 
 phenomena of nature various examples of adaptation 
 and design, and, applying that intuitive principle to 
 these facts, arrive at the conclusion that the uni- 
 verse is the work of an intelligent and designing First 
 Cause, — this is discursive reasoning. The new prin- 
 ciple or conclusion thus deduced may be applied in 
 a similar manner to the deduction of farther con- 
 clusions, and so on through what we call a chain of 
 reasoning. Any particular piece of reasoning, then, 
 may generally be resolved into the following ele > 
 ments : — 
 
 1. Certain principles or propositions which are 
 stated either as axioms, as first truths, or as deduc- 
 tions from some former process of reasoning. 
 
 2. Certain facts or relations of facts, derived either 
 from observation or testimony, which are stated as 
 true, and to which the principles are to be in some 
 manner applied. 
 
 3. Certain new conclusions deduced from the ap- 
 plication of the principles to the facts. 
 
 In examining the validity of such a process, we 
 have not only to attend to the correctness of the 
 principles and the authenticity of the alleged facts, 
 but likewise to inquire whether the facts are of that 
 class to which the principles are legitimately appli- 
 cable ; for the principles may be true, and the facts 
 authentic, and yet the reasoning may be unsound, 
 from the principles being applied to the facts to 
 which they have no relation. 
 
 This method of examining, separately, the ele- 
 ments of an argument, appears to correspond with 
 the ancient syllogism ; and this, accordingly, when 
 divested of its systematic shape, is the mental piocess 
 which we perform, whenever we either state, or ex- 
 amine any piece of reasoning. If I say, for example, 
 "the greatest kings are mortal, for they are but 
 
FALLACIES IN INVESTIGATION. 185 
 
 men ;•' I appear to state a very simple proposition ; 
 but it is in fact a pioeess of reasoning which involves 
 all the elements of the syllogism ; namely, — 
 
 1. The general fact or proposition, that all men 
 are mortal. 
 
 2. The fact referable to the class of facts which 
 are included under this proposition, — that kings are 
 men. 
 
 3. The deduction from this connexion, that kings 
 are mortal. 
 
 For the validity and efficacy of such a process, two 
 things are necessary, namely, — 
 
 1. That the general proposition which forms the 
 first part of the statement, or, in logical language, 
 the major proposition, be absolutely and universally 
 true, or true without exception in regard to facts of 
 a certain class, — and be admitted as such by those 
 to whom the reasoning is addressed. 
 
 2. That the fact referred to it, or the minor propo- 
 sition, be admitted or proved to be one of that class 
 of facts which are included under the general propo- 
 sition. 
 
 The conclusion then follows by a very simple 
 process. If either of the two former propositions 
 be deficient or untrue, the argument is false. Thus, 
 if I had varied the statement as follows, — "Angels, 
 like other human beings, are mortal ;" — there is a 
 fallacy which, when put into the syllogistic form, is 
 immediately apparent ; thus, — 
 
 All human beings are mortal, 
 Arijrels are humau beings ; 
 Therefore, angels are mortal. 
 
 The general or major proposition here is true ; but 
 the minor is not one of the class of facts which 
 are included under it ; therefore the conclusion is 
 false. If I had said again, " Angels, hke other cre- 
 ated beings, are mortal ;" the fallacy is equally ap« 
 parent, though from a different source ; thus, 
 
 a2 
 
186 REASON. 
 
 All created beings are morta'.. 
 Angels are created beings : 
 Tnerefore, angels are mortal. 
 
 Here the minor proposition is true, or is a fact in- 
 cluded imder the first ; but the first, or major, is not 
 true, for we have no ground to believe that all cre- 
 ated beings are mortal. On the other hand, when 
 a general fact is assumed as true of a certain class 
 of cases, we must not assume the converse as true 
 of those which are not included in the class ; thus, 
 from the proposition, that all human beings are mor- 
 tal, we are not entitled to infer that angels, who are 
 not human beings, are immortal. Whether this 
 conclusion be true or not, the argument is false ; 
 because the conclusion does 'not arise out of the 
 premises ; — for, from the admitted general fact, that 
 human beings are mortal, it does not follow, that all 
 who are not human beings are not mortal. Yet this 
 will be found a mode of fallacious reasoning of very 
 frequent occurrence. The rule to be kept in mind for 
 avoiding such fallacies is, — that a general truth, 
 which applies invariably to a certain class, may be 
 applied to any individual which can be shown to be 
 included in that class : — but that we are not entitled 
 to extend it to any which cannot be shown to be- 
 long to the class ; — and that we are not to assume 
 the reverse to be true of those which do not belong 
 to it. On the other hand, we are not to assume a 
 propert}' as belonging to a class, because we have 
 ascertained it to belong to a certain number of indi- 
 viduals. ThiS error comes under another part of 
 our subject, and has been already alluded to under 
 the head of false generalization. . The syllogism, 
 therefore, cannot properly be considered an engine 
 for the discovery of truth, but rather for enabling 
 us to judge of the application of, and deductions 
 from, truths previously ascertained. For, before 
 we can construct such a process as constitutes the 
 syllogism, we require to have premised that raosi 
 
FALLACIES IN INVESTIGATION 187 
 
 important process of investigation, by which a fact 
 is ascertained to be general in regard to all the in- 
 dividuals of a class, — and likewise, that certain indi- 
 viduals specified in the argument belong to this 
 class. Thus, the syllogism was nothing more than 
 that process of mind which we exercise evf^ry time 
 when we examine the validity of an argument, 
 though we may not always put it into this syste- 
 matic form. i\nd yet there may often be advantage 
 in doing so, as it enables us to examine the elements 
 of the arguments more distinctly apart. It is re- 
 lated of an eminent English barrister, afterward a 
 distinguished judge, that, on one occasion, he was 
 completely puzzled by an argument adduced by his 
 opponent in an important case, and that he did not 
 detect the fallacy, till he went home and put it into 
 the form of a syllogism. Though a syllogism, there- 
 fore, may not lead to any discovery of truth, it may 
 be an important instrument in the detection of so- 
 phistry, by directing the attention distinctly and 
 separately, to the various elements which compose 
 a stateme-nt or an argument, and enabling us to de- 
 tect the part in which the sophistry is involved. 
 
 In every process of reasoning there are two dis- 
 tinct objects of attention, or circumstances to be ex- 
 amined, before we admit the validity of the argument. 
 These are, — the premises or data which the reasoner 
 assumes, and which he expects us to admit as true ; 
 — and the conclusions which he proposes to found 
 upon these premises. The premises again consist 
 of three parts, which we require to examine separ- 
 ately and rigidly. These are, — 
 
 1. Certain statements which he brings forward as 
 facts, and which he expects to be admitted as suclu 
 
 2. Certain principles or propositions which he as- 
 sumes as first truths, or articles of belief universally 
 admitted. 
 
 3. Certain other propositions which he refers to, 
 
188 KEASON. 
 
 as deductions from former processes of investigation, 
 or processes of reasoning. 
 
 If the statements referable to these three heads 
 are admitted as true, the argument proceeds, and 
 we have only to judge of validity or correctness of 
 his farther deductions. If they are not at once ad- 
 mitted, the argument cannot proceed till we are 
 satisfied on these prehminary points. If we do not 
 admit his facts, we require him to go back to the 
 evidence on which they rest. If we do not admit 
 the general propositions which he assumes, we re- 
 quire the processes of reasoning or investigation on 
 which these are founded. When we are at last 
 agreed upon these premises, we proceed to judge of 
 the conclusions which he proposes to deduce from 
 them. 
 
 The circumstances now referred to may be con- 
 sidered as the essential parts of a process of rea- 
 soning, in a logical view; but there is another point 
 which we require to keep carefully in mind in ex- 
 amining such a process, and that is, the use of terms. 
 Much of the confusion and perplexity in reasoning 
 consists in the ambiguity of the terms ; this is re- 
 ferable to three heads, naiiiely : 1. Terms of a vague 
 and indefinite character, the precise import of which 
 has not been defined. 2. Terms employed in a sense 
 in some respect different from their common and 
 recognised acceptation. 3. Varying the import of 
 a term, so as to use it in different meanings in dif- 
 ferent parts of the same argument ; or employing it 
 at different times in different degrees of comprehen- 
 sion and extension. 
 
 In examining the validity of a process of reason- 
 ing, then, the mental operation which we ought to 
 perform may be guided by the following considera- 
 tions : — 
 
 1. What statements does the author propose as 
 Qiatters of fact ;— are these authentic ; are they all 
 
A PROCESS OF REASONING. 189 
 
 really bearing upon, or connected with, the subject 
 do they comptise a full and fair view of all the facts 
 which ought to be brought forward in reference to 
 the inquiry ; or have we reason to suspect that any 
 of them have been disguised or modified, — that im- 
 portant facts have been omitted or kept out of view, 
 — that the author has not had sufficient opportunities 
 of acquiring the facts which he ought to have been 
 possessed of, — or that he has been collecting facts 
 on one side of a question, or in support of a particu- 
 lar opinion ? 
 
 2. What propositions are assumed, either as first 
 or intuitive truths, or as deductions arising out of 
 former processes of investigation ; and are we satis • 
 fied that these are all legitimate and correct 1 In par- 
 ticular, does he make any statement in regard to two 
 or more events being connected as cause and effect ; 
 and is this connexion assumed on sufficient grounds : 
 — does he assume any general principle as applicable 
 to a certain class of facts ; is this principle in itself 
 a fact, and does it really apply to all the cases which 
 he means to inchide under it ; have we any reason to 
 believe that it has been deduced from an insufficient 
 number of facts, — or is it a mere fictitious hypothesis, 
 founded upon a principle which cannot be proved to 
 have a real existence ? 
 
 3. Do these assumed principles and facts really 
 belong to the same subject,--or, in other words, do 
 the facts belong to that class to which the principles 
 apply 1 
 
 4. Are the leading terms which he employs fully 
 and distinctly defined as to their meaning; does he 
 employ them in their common and recognised ac- 
 ceptation ; and does he uniformly use them in the 
 same sense ; or does he seem to attach deferent 
 meanings to the same term in different parts of his 
 argument ? 
 
 6. What are the new conclusions which he deduces 
 from the whole view of the subject ; are these cor- 
 
190 REASON. 
 
 rect and valid; and do they really follow from the 
 premises laid down in the previous parts of his ar^- 
 ment ] For on this head it is always to be kept in 
 mind that a conclusion may be tiue, while it does 
 not follow from the argument which has been brought 
 to prove it : in such a case the argument is false. 
 
 Much of the confusion, fallacy, and sophistry of 
 reasoning arises from these points not being suffi- 
 ciently attended to, and distinctly and rigidly investi- 
 gated- An argument may appear fair and consecu 
 live, but when we rigidly examine it we may find 
 that the reasoner has, in his premises, contrived to 
 iutroduce some statement which is not true in point 
 of fact, or some bold general position which is not 
 correct, or not proved ; or that he has left out some 
 fact, or some principle, which ought to have been 
 brought forward in a prominent manner, as closely 
 connected with the inquiry. Hence the necessity 
 for keeping constantly in view the various sources 
 of fallacy to which every process of reasoning is 
 liable, and for examining the elements rigidly and 
 separately before we admit the conclusion. 
 
 A process of reasoning is to be distinguished from 
 a process of investigation; and both maybe illus- 
 trated in the following manner: — All reasoning must 
 be founded upon facts, and the ascertained relations 
 of these facts to each other. The nature of these 
 relations has already been mentioned, as referable to 
 the various heads of resemblance, cause, effect, &c. 
 The statement of an ascertained relation of two facts 
 to each other is called a proposition, such as, — that 
 A is equal to B ; that C has a close resemblance to 
 D ; that E is the cause of F, Sic. These statements, 
 propositions, or ascertained relations are discovered 
 by processes of investigation. In a process of rea- 
 soning, again, we take a certain number of such 
 propositions or ascertained relations, and deduce 
 from them certain other truths or relations, arising 
 
A PROCESS OF REASONING. 19\ 
 
 out of the mutual connexion of some of these propo* 
 sitions to each other. Thus, if I state as proposi- 
 tions, ascertained by processes of investigation, thai 
 A is equal to B, and that B is equal to C, 1 imme- 
 diately decide by a single step of reasoning that A 
 is equal to C, in consequence of the mutual relation 
 M'hich both A and C have to B. Such a process may 
 be rendered more complicated in two ways. 
 
 1. By the number of such ascertained relations, 
 which we require to bear in mind and compare with 
 each other before we arrive at the conclusion. Thus 
 the relation that A is equal to E might rest on such 
 a series of relations as the following : — A is equal to 
 B ; B is the double of C ; C is the half of D ; D is 
 equal to E : therefore A is equal to E. 
 
 2. By propositions which are the conclusions of 
 one or more steps in a process becoming the prem- 
 ises in a subsequent step. Thus, — I may take as one 
 process A is equal to B, and B is equal to C ; there- 
 fore A is equal to C ; — and, as a distinct process, C 
 is equal to D, and D is equal to E ; therefore C is 
 equal to E. The conclusions from these two pro- 
 cesses I then take as tne premises in a thiid process 
 — thus : it has been proved that A is equal to C, and 
 that C is equal to E ; therefore A is equal to E. 
 
 In examining the vahdity of such processes, there 
 are two circumstances or objects of inquiry which 
 we ought to keep constantly in view. (1.) Have we 
 confidence in the accuracy of the alleged facts, and 
 ascertained relations which form the premises 1 — Can 
 wc rely on the process of investigation by which it 
 is said to have been ascertained that A is equal to B, 
 and that B is equal to C, &c. 1 (2.) Are the various 
 propositions in the series so related as to bring out 
 a new truth or new relation ? For it is to be kept in 
 mind that a series of propositions may all be true, 
 and yet lead to nothing ; s-uch propositions, for ex- 
 ample, as that A is equal to B, C is equal to D, E is 
 equal to F. There is here no mutual relation, and 
 
192 REASON. 
 
 no new truth arises out of the series. But when 1 
 say A is equal to B, and B is equal to C, a new truth 
 is immediately disclosed in consequence of the rela- 
 tion which both A and C have to B ; namely, that A 
 is equal to C. 
 
 Inventive genius, in regard to processes of reason- 
 ing, consists in finding out relations or propositions 
 which are thus capable of disclosing new truths or 
 new relations; and in placing them in that order 
 which is calculated to show how these new relations 
 aj-Jse out of them. This is the exercise of a reflect- 
 ing mind ; and there may be much acquired know- 
 ledge, that is, many facts accumulated by memory 
 alone, without any degree of this exercise or habit 
 of reflection. But both are required for forming a 
 well-cultivated mind ; the memory must be stored 
 with information, that is, ascertained facts and ascer- 
 tained relations ; and the power of reflection must 
 be habituated to discover new truths or new rela- 
 tions by a comparison of these facts and ascertained 
 relations with each other. For the discovery of new 
 truths may consist either of new facts or of new 
 relations among facts previously known. Thus, it 
 might happen that we had long been familiar with 
 two facts, without being aware that they had any 
 particular connexion. If we were then to ascertain 
 that the one of these was the cause of the other, il 
 would be a real and important discovery of a new 
 truth, though it would consist only of a new relation 
 between facts which had long been known to us. 
 
 A process of reasoning, as we have seen, consists 
 of two parts, namely, the premises and the conclusion 
 deduced from them. If the premises be admitted as 
 true, the remaining part of the process becomes com- 
 paratively simple. But it often happens that a rea- 
 soner must begin by establishing his premises. This 
 is most remarkably exemplified in what we call a 
 chain of reasoning, consisting of numerous distinct 
 
FALLACIES IN REASONING. 103 
 
 arguments or steps, so arranged that the conclusic 
 from one step becomes an essential part of the prem- 
 ises in the next ; and this may be continued through 
 a long series. The process then becomes much 
 more complicated, and in judging of the accuracy of 
 the reasoning we require to examine carefully every 
 part of it as we proceed, to guard against the intro- 
 duction of fallacy. Without this attention it may 
 often happen that the more advanced parts of an 
 argument may appear fair and consecutive, while a 
 fallacy has been allowed to creep into some part of 
 it, which, in fact, vitiates the whole. In the pre- 
 ceding observations we have endeavoured to point 
 out some of the leading cautions to be observed in 
 this respect, especially in regard to the admission 
 of facts, the assumption of causation, and the deduc- 
 tion of general principles ; and also the sources of 
 fallacy to be kept in view in conducting these pro- 
 cesses. But there is another class of fallacies which, 
 though less immediately connected with our inquiries, 
 it may be right briefly to point out in relation to this 
 subject. These are what may be called logical fal- 
 lacies, or perversions of reasoning. In regard to 
 them, as well as to those formerly mentioned, it is 
 to be kept in mind, that however obvious they may 
 appear when simply stated, this is by no means the 
 case when they are skilfully involved in a long pro- 
 cess of reasoning. The fallacies of this class may 
 be chiefly referred to the following heads : — 
 
 I. When a principle is assumed which, in fact, 
 amounts to the thing to be proved ; slightly disguised, 
 perhaps, by some variation in the terms. This is 
 commonly called petilio principii, or begging the 
 question. When simply stated, it appears a fallacy 
 not likely to be admitted ; but will be found one of 
 very frequent occurrence. It is indeed remarkable 
 to observe the facility with which a dogma, when it 
 has been boldly and confidently stated, is often ad» 
 R 
 
194 RfiASOiV. 
 
 mitted by numerous readers, without a single inquiry 
 into the evidence on which it is founded. 
 
 II. When a principle is assumed without proof; 
 when this is employed to prove something else ; and 
 this is again appUe'd in some way in support of the 
 first assumed principle. This is called reasoning in 
 a circle ; and the difficulty of detecting it is often in 
 proportion to the extent of the circle, or the number 
 of principles which are thus made to hang upon one 
 another. 
 
 III. A frequent source of fallacy is when a rea- 
 soner assumes a principle, and then launches out 
 into various illustrations and analogies, which are 
 artfully made to bear the appearance of proofs. The 
 cautions to be kept in mind in such a case are, that 
 the illustrations may be useful and the analogies 
 may be of importance, provided the principle has 
 been proved ; but that if it has not been proved, the 
 illustrations must go for nothing, and even analogies 
 seldom have any weight which can be considered as 
 of the nature of evidence. Fallacies of this class 
 are most apt to occur in the declamations of public 
 speakers ; and when they are set off with "^^ the 
 powers of eloquence, it is often difficult to detect 
 them. The questions which the hearer should pro- 
 pose to himself in such cases are, Does this really 
 contain any proof bearing upon the subject, or is it 
 mere illustration and analogy, in itself proving rro- 
 thing? — if so, has the reasoner previously estabhshed 
 his principle ; or has he assumed it, and trusted to 
 these analogies as his proofs 1 
 
 IV. A fallacy somewhat analogous to the preceding 
 consists in arguing for or against a doctrine on the 
 ground of its supposed tendency, leaving out of view 
 the primary question of its truth. Thus, a specu- 
 lator in theology will contend in regaid to a doctrine 
 
FALLACIES IN REASONING. 195 
 
 •which he opposes, that it is derogatory to the char- 
 acter of the Deity; and, respecting- another which 
 he brings forward, that it represents the Deity in an 
 aspect more accordant with the benignity of his char- 
 acter. The previous question in all such cases is, 
 not what is most accordant with our notions respect- 
 ing the Divine character, but what is truth. 
 
 V. When a principle which is true of one case, or 
 one class of cases, is extended by analogy to others 
 which differ in some important particulars. The 
 caution to be observed here is, to inquire strictly 
 whether the cases are analogous, or whether there 
 exists any difference which makes the principle not 
 applicable. We have formerly alluded to a remark- 
 able example of this fallacy in notions relating to the 
 properties of matter being applied to mind, without 
 attention to the fact that the cases are so distinct as 
 to have nothing in common. An example somewhat 
 analogous is found in Mr. Hume's objection to mira- 
 cles, that they are violations of the established order 
 of nature. The cases, we have seen, are not analo- 
 gous; for miracles do not refer to the common 
 course of nature, but to the operation of an agency 
 altogether new and peculiar. Arguments founded 
 upon analogy, therefore, require to be used with the 
 utmost caution, when they are employed directly for 
 the discovery or the establishment of truth. But 
 there is another purpose to which they may be ap- 
 plied with much greater freedom, namely, for repel- 
 ling objections. Thus, if we find a person bringing 
 objections against a particular doctrine, it is a sound 
 and valid mode of reasoning to contend that he re- 
 ceives doctrines which rest upon the same kind of 
 evidence ; or that similar objections might be urged 
 with equal force against truths which it fs impossible 
 to call in question. It is in this manner that the ar- 
 gument from analogy is employed in the valuable 
 w^ork of Bishop Butler. He does not derive from the 
 
196 REASON. 
 
 analogy of nature any direct argument in support of 
 natural or revealed religion ; but shows that many of 
 the objections which are urged against the truths of 
 religion might be brought against circumstances in 
 the economy and course of nature which are known 
 and undoubted facts. 
 
 VI. A fallacy the reverse of the former is used by 
 sophistical writers ; namely, when two cases are 
 strictly analagous they endeavour to prove that they 
 are not so by pointing out trivial differences not cal- 
 culated in any degree to weaken the force of the 
 analogy. 
 
 VIL ^^^^en a true general principle is made to 
 apply exclusively to one fact, or one class of facts, 
 while it is equally true of various others. This is 
 called, in logical language, the non-distribution of 
 the middle term. In an example given by logical 
 writers, one is supposed to maintain that corn is 
 necessary for life, because food is necessary for life, 
 and corn is food. It is true that food is necessary 
 for life, but this does not apply to any one particular 
 kind of food; it means only, that food of some kind 
 or other is so. When simply stated, the fallacy of 
 such a position is at once obvious, but it may be in- 
 troduced into an argument in such a manner as not 
 to be so immediately detected. 
 
 VIII. When an acknowledged proposition is in- 
 verted, and the converse assumed to be equally true. 
 We may say, for example, that a badly governed 
 country must be distressed ; but we are not entitled 
 to assume that every distressed country is badly 
 governed; for there may be many other sources 
 of national distress. I may say, " all wise men live 
 temperately," but it does not follow that every man 
 who lives temperately is a wise man. This fallacy 
 was formerly referred to under the svllogism. It 
 
FALLACIES IN REASONING. 197 
 
 is, at the same time, to be kept in mind that some 
 propositions do admit of being inverted, and still 
 remain equally true. This holds most remarkably 
 of propositions which are universally negative, as 
 in an example given by writers on logic. "No 
 ruminating animal is a beast of prey." It follows, 
 as equally true, that no beast of prey ruminates. 
 But if I were to vary the proposition by saying, " all 
 animals which do not ruminate are beasts of prey," 
 this would be obviously false ; for it does not arise 
 out of the former statement. 
 
 TX. A frequent source of fallacy among sophis- 
 tical writers consists in boldly applying a character 
 to a class of facts, in regard to which it carries a 
 general aspect of truth without attention to import- 
 ant distinctions by which the statement requires to 
 be modified. Thus, it has been objected to our be- 
 lief of the miracles of the sacred writings, that they 
 rest upon the evidence of testimony, and that testi- 
 mony is fallacious. Now, when we speak of testi- 
 mony in general, we may say with an appearance 
 of truth that it is fallacious ; but, in point of fact, 
 testimony is to be referred to various species ; and, 
 though a large proportion of these may be fallacious, 
 there is a species of testimony on which we rely 
 with absolute confidence ; — that is, we feel it to be 
 as improbable that this kind of testimony should de- 
 ceive us, as that we should be disappointed in our 
 expectation of the uniformity of nature. The kind 
 of sophism now referred to seems to correspond 
 with that which logical writers have named the fal- 
 lacy o* division. It consists in applying to facts in 
 their separate state what only belongs to them col- 
 lectively. The converse of it is the fallacy of com- 
 position. It consists in applying to the facts col- 
 lectively what belongs only to them, or to some 
 of them, in their separate state ; — as if one were to 
 show that a certain kmd of testimony is absolutely 
 R2 
 
1 98 REASON. 
 
 to be relied on, and thence were to contend that 
 testimony in general is worthy of absolute confi- 
 dence. 
 
 X. A frequent fallacy consists in first overturning 
 an unsound argument, and thence reasoning against 
 the doctrine which this argument was meant to sup- 
 port. This is the part of a mere casuist, not of a 
 sincere inquirer after truth ; for it by no means fol- 
 lows that a doctrine is false because unsound argu- 
 ments have been adduced in support of it. We 
 have formerly alluded to some remarkable examples 
 of this fallacy, especially in regard to those im- 
 portant principles commonly called first truths; 
 which, we have seen, admit of no processes of 
 reasoning, and consequently are in no degree af- 
 fected by arguments exposing the fallacy of such 
 processes. We learn from this, on the other hand, 
 the importance of avoiding all weak and incon- 
 clusive arguments, or doubtful statements ; for, in- 
 dependently of the opening which they give for 
 sophistical objections, it is obvious that on other 
 grounds the reasoning is only encumbered by them. 
 It is the part of the casuist to rest the weight of his 
 objections on such weak points, leaving out of view 
 those which he cannot contend with. It may even 
 happen that a conclusion is true, though the whole 
 reasoning may have been weak, unsound, and ir- 
 relevant. The casuist, of course, in such a case 
 attacks the reasoning, and not the conclusion. On 
 the other hand, there may be much in an argument 
 which is true, or which may be conceded ; while the 
 most important part of it is untrue, and the conclusion 
 false. An inexperienced reasoner, in such a case, 
 thinks it necessary to combat every point, and thus 
 exposes himself to sound replies from his adversary 
 on subjects which are of no importance. A skilful 
 reasoner concedes or passes over all such positions, 
 and rests his attack on those in which the fallacy 
 
FALLACIES IN REASONING. 199 
 
 is really involved. An example illustrative of this 
 subject is familiar to those who are acquainted with 
 the controversy respecting our idea of cause and 
 effect. Mr. Hume stated in a clear manner the doc- 
 trine that this idea is derived entirely from our ex- 
 perience of a uniform sequence of two events ; and 
 founded upon this an argument against our belief in 
 a great First Cause. This led to a controversy 
 respecting the original doctrine itself; and it is not 
 many years since it was contended by respectable 
 individuals that it is nothing less than the essence 
 of atheism to maintain that our notion of cause and 
 effect originates in the ob.servation of a uniform se- 
 quence. It is now, perhaps, universally admitted 
 that this doctrine is correct, and that the sophism 
 of Mr. Hume consisted in deducing from it conclu- 
 sions which it in no degree warranted. This im- 
 portant distinction we formerly alluded to ; namely, 
 that our idea of cause and effect in regard to any 
 two individual events is totally distinct from our in- 
 tuitive impression of causation, or our absolute con 
 viction that every event must have an adequate 
 cause. 
 
 XI. A sophism somewhat connected with the 
 former consists in disproving a doctrine, and on that 
 account assuming the opposite doctrine to be true. 
 It may be true, but its truth does not depend upon 
 the falsehood of that which is opposed to it; yet 
 this will be found a principle of not unfrequent 
 occurrence in unsound reasonings. 
 
 XII. Fallacies are often introduced in what may 
 be termed an oblique manner; or, as if upon a gene- 
 rally admitted authority. The effect of this is to 
 take off the appearance of the statement being made 
 directly by the author, and resting upon his own 
 authority, by which we might be led to examine its 
 truth. Slot this purpose it is put, perhaps, in the 
 
200 REASON. 
 
 form of a question ; or is introduced by such ex- 
 pressions as the following: — "it is a remarkable 
 fact," — " it is somewhat singular," — " it has been 
 argued with much justice," — " it will be generally 
 admitted," &c. 
 
 XIII. Fallacy may arise from leaving the main 
 subject of discussion, and arguing upon points which 
 have but a secondary relation to it. This is one 
 of the resources of {he casuist when he finds him- 
 self in the worst of the argimient. Nearly allied to 
 this, is the art of skilfully dropping part of a state- 
 ment, when the reasoner finds he cannot support it, 
 and going on boldly with the remainder as if he still 
 maintained the whole. 
 
 XIV. Much of the fallacy and ambiguity of pro- 
 cesses of reasoning depends entirely, as formerly 
 stated, on the use of terms. This may consist in 
 two contending parties using the same word in dif- 
 ferent meanings without defining what their mean- 
 ings are ; in one or both using terms in a sense dif- 
 ferent from their commonly recognised acceptation, 
 or in using them in one sense in one part of the 
 argument, and in another in a diff'erent part of it. 
 Such disputes, accordingly, are often interminable; 
 and this mode of disputation is one of the great re- 
 sources of the casuist, or of him who argues for 
 victory, not for truth. The remedy is, that every 
 reasoner shall be required clearly to define the terms 
 which be employs ; and that in every controversy 
 certain premises or preliminaries shall be fixed in 
 which the parties are agreed. The ambiguity of 
 terms is in fact so extensive a source of fallacy that 
 scarcely any sophistical argument will be found free 
 from it ; as in almost every language the same term 
 is used with great diversity of meanings. Let us 
 take, fcr example, the term faith. It means a mere 
 system of opinions, confidence in testimony rehance 
 
FALLACIES IN REASONING. 201 
 
 on the integrity, fidelity, and stability of character 
 of other beings, an act of the understanding in 
 regard to abstract truth presented to it, and a 
 menta) condition by which truths of another descrip- 
 tion exert a uniform influence over the moral feel- 
 ings, the will, and the whole character. In the con- 
 troversies which have arisen out of this word, it will 
 probably be found that these various meanings have 
 not been sufficiently distinguished from each otlier. 
 A celebrated passage in the "■ Spirit of Laws" has 
 been justly referred to as a remarlcable example of 
 the same kind of sophism. " The Deity," says 
 Montesquieu, " has his laws ; the material world, its 
 laws ; intelHgences superior to man, their laws ; 
 the brutes, their laws; man, his laws." In this 
 short passage the term laws is employed, probably, 
 in four senses, remarkably different. 
 
 XV. There are various other sources of fallacy, 
 consisting chiefly in the use of arguments which 
 cannot be admitted as relevant in regard to the pro- 
 cess of reasoning, though they may carry a certain 
 weight in reference to the individuals concerned 
 Among these may be reckoned appeals to high 
 authorities, to popular prejudices, or to the passions 
 of the multitude ; and what is called the argumentum 
 ad hominem. If a person, for example, be arguing in 
 support of a particular rule of conduct, we may 
 retort upon him that his own conduct in certain in- 
 stances was in direct opposition to it. This may be 
 very true in regard to the individual, but can have 
 no influence in the discussion of the question. 
 
 Xyi. One of the most common sources of fallacy 
 consists of distorted views and partial statements ; 
 — such as facts disguised, modified, or collected 
 on one side of a question ; — or arguments and au- 
 thorities adduced in support of particular opinions, 
 leaving out of view those which tend to different 
 
202 REASON. 
 
 conclusions. Mis-statement, in one form or another, 
 may indeed be considered as a most fruitful source 
 of controversy ; and, amid the contests of rival dis- 
 putants, the chief difficulty which meets the candid 
 inquirer after truth, is to have the subject presented 
 to his mind without distortion. Hence the import- 
 ance, in every inquiry, of suspending our judgment, 
 and of patiently devoting ourselves to clear the 
 subject from all imperfect views and partial state- 
 ments. Without the most anxious attention to this 
 rule, a statement may appear satisfactory, and a de- 
 duction legitimate, which are in fact leading us 
 widely astray from the truth. 
 
 After every possible care in any process of rea- 
 soning, we may still find, in many cases, a degree 
 of doubt, and even certain varieties of opinion in re- 
 gard to the import and bearing of the argument. 
 This arises partly from actual differences in the 
 power of judging, or what we call, in common lan- 
 guage, vigour of mind ; and partly from diiferences 
 in attention, or in the habit of applying the judgment 
 closely to the elements of an inquiry. Hence the 
 varieties of opinion that may be held by different 
 individuals on the same subject, and with the same 
 facts before them ; and the degree of uncertainty 
 which attends various processes of reasoning. — 
 There is one species of reasoning which is free 
 from all this kind of uncertainty, namely, the mathe- 
 matical ; and the superiority of it depends upon the 
 following circumstances : — 
 
 1. Nothing is taken for granted, or depends upon 
 mere authority; and, consequently, there is no room 
 for fallacy or doubt in regard to the premises on 
 which the reasoning is founded. No examination 
 of facts is required in any degree analogous to that 
 which is necessary in physical science. The mathe* 
 matician, indeed, proceeds upon assumptions of 
 euch a kind that it is in his own power to clear 
 
MATHEMATICAL REASONING. 2Q3 
 
 (hem from all ambiguity, and from every thing not 
 connected with the subject. 
 
 2. In the farther progress of a mathematical argu- 
 ment, if we have any doubt of a proposition which is 
 assumed as the result of a former process, we have only 
 to turn to the demonstration of it, and be immediately 
 satisfied. Thus, if any step of a process be founded 
 upon the principle that all the angles of a triangle 
 are equal to two right-angles, or that the square of 
 the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares 
 of the two sides, should we have any doubt of the 
 truth of these conclusions, the demonstration of 
 them is before us. But if an argument be founded 
 on the principle that the heavenly bodies attract one 
 another with a force which is directly as their 
 quantity of matter, and inversely as the square of 
 their distance ; this great principle must be received 
 on the authority of the eminent men by whom it 
 was ascertained, — the mass of mankind having nei- 
 ther the power nor the means of verifying it. 
 
 3. All the terms are fully and distinctly defined, 
 and there is no room for obscurity or ambiguity in 
 regard to them. 
 
 4. The various steps in a process of mathematical 
 reasoning follow each other so closely and consecu- 
 tively, as to carry a constant conviction of absolute 
 certainty; and, provided we are in possession of 
 the necessary premises, each single step is short, 
 and the result obvious. 
 
 5. The proper objects of mathematical reasoning 
 are quantity and its relations ; and these are capable 
 of being defined and measured with a precision of 
 which the objects of other kinds of reasoning are 
 entirely unsusceptible. It is, indeed, always to be 
 kept in mind, that mathematical reasoning is only 
 applicable to subjects which can be defined and 
 measured in this manner, and that all attempts to 
 extend it to subiects of other kinds have led to tH 
 
 xeatps* b«? 
 
204 REASON. 
 
 Notwithstanding the high degree of precision 
 which thus distinguishes mathematical reasoning, 
 the study of mathematics does not, as is commonly' 
 supposed, necessarily lead to precision in other 
 species of reasoning, and still less to correct inves* 
 ligation in physical science. The explanation that 
 is given of the fact seems to be satisfactory. The 
 mathematician argues certain conclusions from cer- 
 tain assumptions, rather than from actual ascertained 
 facts ; and the facts to which he may have occasion 
 to refer are so simple, and so free from all extraneous 
 matter, that their truth is obvious, or is ascertained 
 without difficulty. By being conversant with truths 
 of this nature, he does not learn that kind of caution 
 and severe examination which is required in physi- 
 cal science, — for enabling us to judge whether the 
 statements on which we proceed are true, and 
 whether they include the whole truth which ought 
 to enter into the investigation. He thus acquires a 
 habit of too great facility in the admission of data 
 or premises, v/hich is the part of every investigation 
 which the physical inquirer scrutinizes with the most 
 anxious care, — and too great confidence in the mere 
 force of reasoning, without adequate attention to 
 the previous processes of investigation on which all 
 reasoning must be founded. It has been, accord- 
 ingly, remarked by Mr. Stewart, and other accurate 
 observers of intellectual character, that mathemati- 
 cians are apt to be exceedingly credulous, in regard 
 both to opinions and to matters of testimony ; while, 
 on the other hand, persons who are chiefly conver- 
 sant with the uncertain sciences, acquire a kind of 
 skepticism in regard to statements, which is apt to 
 lead them into the opposite error. These observa- 
 tions, of course, apply only to what we may call a 
 mere mathematician, — a character which is now 
 probably rare, since the close connexion was estab- 
 lished between the mathematical and physical sci 
 ences in the philosophy of Newton. 
 
REASONING. 205 
 
 In the various steps constituting a process of rea- 
 soning, or a process of investigation, in any depart- 
 ment of knowledge, our guide is reason or judgment. 
 Its peculiar province is to give to each fact or each 
 principle, a proper place and due influence in the 
 inquiry, and to trace the real and true tendency of 
 it in the conclusion. It is, of course, assisted by 
 other mental operations, as memory, conception, 
 -and abstraction, but especially by attention, — or a 
 deliberate and careful application of the mind to 
 each fact and each consideration which ought to 
 have a place in the inquiry. This is entirely a vol- 
 untary exercise of the mind, strengthened and made 
 easy by habit, or frequent exercise, and weakened 
 or impaired by disuse or misapphcation ; and there 
 is, perhaps, nothing which has a greater influence 
 in the formation of character, or in determining the 
 place which a man is to assume among his fellow- 
 men. 
 
 This sound exercise of judgment is widely dis- 
 tinct from the art of ingenious disputation. The 
 object of the former is to weigh, fully and candidly, 
 all the relations of things, and to give to each fact 
 its proper weight in the inquiry: the aim of the 
 latter is to seize with rapidity particular relations, 
 and to find facts bearing upon a particular view of a 
 subject. This habit when much exercised tends 
 rather to withdraw the attention from the cultiva- 
 tion of the former. Thus, it has not unfrequently 
 happened, that an ingenious pleader has made a bad 
 judge ; and that acute and powerful disputants have 
 perplexed themselves by theirownsubtleties,till they 
 have ended by doubting of every thing. The same 
 observation apphes to controversial writing; and 
 hence the hesitation with which we receive the ar- 
 guments and statements of a keen controvertist, and 
 the necessity for hearing both sides. In making 
 use of this caution, we may not accuse the reasonei 
 
206 REASON. 
 
 of any unsound arguments or false statements. 
 We only charge him with acting the part of an in- 
 genious pleader, who brings forward the statements 
 and arguments calculated to favour one side of a 
 question, and leaves those of the opposite side out 
 of view. The candid inquirer, hke the just judge, 
 considers both sides, and endeavours, according to 
 the best of his judgment, to decide between them 
 To the same principle we trace the suspicion with 
 which we receive the statements of an author, who 
 first brings forward his doctrine, and then proceeds to 
 collect facts in support of it. To a similar process 
 we may ascribe the paradoxical opinions in which 
 sophistical writers have landed themselves, often 
 on subjects of the highest importance, and which 
 they have continued to advocate, with much appear- 
 ance of an honest conviction of their truth. It 
 would be unjust to suppose that these writers have 
 always intended to impose upon others; they have 
 very often imposed upon themselves ; but they have 
 done so by their own voluntary act, in a misappli- 
 cation of their reasoning powers. They have di- 
 rected their attention, exclusively or chiefly, to one 
 view of a subject, and have neglected to direct it, 
 with the same care, to the facts and considerations 
 which tend to support the opposite conclusions. 
 
 In regard to the sound exercise of judgment, it is 
 farther to be remarked, that it may exist without 
 the habit of observing the various steps in the men- 
 tal process which is connected with it. Thus we 
 find men of that character to Avhich we give the 
 name of strong sound sense, who form just and 
 comprehensive conclusions on a subject, without 
 being able to explain to others the chain of thought 
 by which they arrived at them; and who, when 
 they attempt to do so, are apt to bewilder them- 
 selves, and fall into absurdities. Such persons, ac- 
 cordingly, are adapted for situations requiring both 
 
 I 
 
ITS CULTURE AND REGULATION. ^O") 
 
 soundness of judgment and promptitude in action ^ 
 but they make a bad fig-ure in public spenking or 
 reasoning-. They are, indeed, possessed of a faculty 
 more valuable than any thing that metaphysics or 
 logic can furnish ; but a due attention to these 
 sciences might increase their usefulness, by enabling 
 them to communicate to others the mental process 
 which led to their decisions. A person of this de- 
 scription, according to a well-known anecdote, when 
 appointed to a judicial situation in one of the colo- 
 nies, received from an eminent judge the advice to 
 trust to his own good sense in forming his opinions, 
 but never to attempt to state the gi'ounds of them. 
 " The judgment," said he, " will probably be right, 
 the argument will infallibly be wrong." When 
 this strong sound judgment, and correct logical 
 habits, are united in the same individual, they form 
 the character of one who arrives at true conclusions 
 on any subject to which his attention is directed, 
 and, at the same time, carries others along with 
 him to a full conviction of their truth. 
 
 We have, then, every reason to believe that, 
 though there may be original differences in the 
 power of judgment, the chief source of the actual 
 varieties in this important function is rather to b© 
 found in its culture and regulation. On this subject 
 there are various considerations of the highest in- 
 terest, claiming the attention of those who wish to 
 have the understanding trained to the investigation 
 of truth. These are chiefly referable to two heads ; 
 namely, the manner in which the judgment suffers 
 from deficient culture ; and the manner in which it 
 is distorted by want of due regulation. 
 
 I. The judgment is impaired by deficient culture. 
 This is exemphfied in that listless and indifferent 
 habit of the mind in which there is no exercise of 
 correct thinking, or of a close and continued api li- 
 
208 REASON. 
 
 cation of the attention to subjects of real importance. 
 The mind is engrossed by frivoUties and trifles, or 
 bewildered by the wild play of the imagination ; and, 
 in regard to opinions on the most important sub- 
 jects, it either feels a total indifference, or receives 
 them from others without the exertion of thinking or 
 examining for itself. The individuals who are thus 
 affected either become the dupes of sophistical 
 opinions imposed upon them by other men, or spend 
 their l-'^es in frivolous and unworthy pursuits, with 
 a total incapacity for all important inquiries. A 
 slight degree removed from this condition of mind 
 is another, in which opinions are formed on slight 
 and partial examination, perhaps from viewing one 
 side of a question, or, at least, without a full and 
 candid direction of the attention to all the facts 
 which ought to be taken into the inquiry. Both 
 these conditions of mind may perhaps originate partly 
 in constitutional pecuharities or erroneous educa- 
 tion ; but they are fixed and increased by habit and 
 indulgence, until, after a certain time, they probably 
 become irremediable. They can be corrected only 
 by a diligent cultivation of the important habit 
 which, in common language, we call sound and cor- 
 rect thinking ; and which is of equal value, whether 
 it be applied to the formation of opinions, or to the 
 regulation of conduct. 
 
 II. The judgment is vitiated by want of due regu- 
 lation; and this may be ascribed chiefly to two 
 sources, — prejudice and passion. Prejudice consists 
 in the formation of opinions before the subject has 
 been really examined. By means of this, the atten* 
 tion is misdirected, and the judgment biassed, in a 
 manner of which the individual is often in a great 
 measure unconscious. The highest degree of it is 
 exemplifled in that condition of the mind in which a 
 man first forms an opinion which interest or incli- 
 nation may have suggested ; then proceeds to col- 
 
ITS CirtTURE AND REGULATION. 209 
 
 'ect arguments in support of it; and concludes by 
 reasoning himself into the belief of what he wishes 
 to be true. It is thus that the judgment is apt to be 
 m'sled, in a greater or less degree, by party spirit 
 and personal attachments or antipathies ; and it is 
 clear that all such influence is directly opposed to 
 its sound and healthy exercise. The same observa- 
 tions apply to passion, or the influence exerted by 
 the moral feelings. The most striking example of 
 this is presented by that depraved condition of the 
 mind, which distorts the judgment in regard to the 
 great principles of moral rectitude. " A man's un- 
 derstanding," says Mr. Locke, " seldom fails him in 
 this part, unless his will would have it so ; if he 
 takes a wTong course, it is most commonly because 
 he goes wilfully out of the way, or at least chooses 
 to be bewildered ; and there are few, if any, who 
 dreadfully mistake, that are willing to be right." 
 
 These facts are worthy of much consideration, 
 and they appear to be equally interesting to all 
 classes of men, w^iatever may be the degree of their 
 mental cultivation, and whatever the subjects are to 
 which their attention is more particularly directed. 
 There is one class of truths to which they apply with 
 peculiar force, — namely, those which relate to the 
 moral government of God, and the condition of n.an 
 as a responsible being. These great truths and the 
 evidence on which they are founded are addressed 
 to our judgment as rational beings ; they are pressed 
 upon our attention as creatures destined for another 
 state of existence ; and the sacred duty from which 
 no individual can be absolved is a voluntary exercise 
 of his thinking and reasoning powers, — it is solemnly, 
 seriously, and deliberately to consider. On these 
 subjects a man may frame any system for himself, 
 and may rest in that system as truth ; but the solemn 
 inquiry is, not what opinions he has formed, but in 
 what manner he has formed them. Has he ap- 
 proached the great inquiry with a sincere desire to 
 S2 
 
210 REASON 
 
 discover the truth ; and has he brought to it a mind, 
 neither misled by prejudice, nor distorted by the 
 condition of its moral feelings ; — has he directed his 
 attention to all the facts and evidences with an in- 
 tensity suited to their momentous importance ; and 
 has he conducted the whole investigation with a deep 
 and serious feehng that it carries with it an interest 
 which reaches into eternity 1 Truth is immutable 
 and eternal, but it may elude the frivolous or pre- 
 judiced inquirer ; and, even when he thinks his con- 
 clusions are the result of much examination, he 
 may be resting his highest concerns in delusion and 
 falsehood. 
 
 The human mind, indeed, even in its highest state 
 of culture, has been found inadequate to the attain- 
 ment of the true knowledge of the Deity ; but light 
 from heaven has shone upon the scene of doubt and 
 of darkness, which will conduct the humble inquirer 
 through every difficulty, until he arrive at the full 
 perception and commanding influence of the truth ; 
 — of truth such as human intellect never could have 
 reached, and which, to every one who receives it, 
 brings its own evidence that it comes from God. 
 
 Finally, the sound exercise of judgment has a re- 
 markable influence in producing and maintaining that 
 tranquillity of mind which results from a due appli- 
 cation of its powers, and a correct estimate of the 
 relations of things. The want of this exercise leads 
 a man to be unduly engrossed with the frivohties of 
 life, unreasonably elated by its joys, and unreason- 
 ably depressed by its sorrows. A sound and well- 
 regulated judgment tends to preserve from all such 
 disproportioned pursuits and emotions. It does so, 
 by leading us to view all present things in their true 
 relations, to estimate aright their relative value, and 
 to fix the degree of attention of which they are 
 worthy ; — it does so, in a more especial manner, by 
 
 I 
 
REASON. 211 
 
 leading us to compare the present life, which is so 
 rapidly passing over us, with the paramount im- 
 portance andoverwhehning interest of the hfe which 
 IS to come. 
 
 MI- 
 
 OK THE USE OF REASON — IN CORRECTING THE IMPRESSIONS 
 OF THE ftUND IN REGARD TO EXTERNAL THINGS. 
 
 This subject leads to an investigation of great and 
 extensive interest, of which I cannot liope to give 
 more than a slight and imperfect outhne. My 
 anxiety is, that what is attempted may be confined 
 to authentic facts, and the most cautious conclu- 
 sions ; and that it may be of some use in leading to 
 farther inquiry. 
 
 We have seen the power which tlie mind possesses 
 of recalling the vivid impressions of scenes or 
 events long gone by, in that mental process wliich 
 we call conception. We have seen also its power 
 of taking the elements of actual scenes, and forming 
 them into new combinations, so as to represent to 
 itself scenes and events whicli have no real exist- 
 ence. We have likewise observed the remarkable 
 manner in which persons, events, or scenes, long 
 past, perhaps forgotten, are recalled into the mind 
 by means of association; — trains of thought taking 
 possession of the mind in a manner which we often 
 cannot account for, and bringing back facts or occur- 
 rences which had long ceased to be objects of at- 
 tention. These ren.arkable processes are most apt 
 to take place when the mind is in lliat passive state 
 which we call a revery ; and they are more rarely ob- 
 served when the attention is actively exerted upon 
 wiy distinct and contmued subject of thought. 
 
212 REASON. 
 
 During the presence in the mind of such a repre- 
 sentation, whether recalled by conception or asso- 
 ciation, or fabricated by imagination, there is proba- 
 bly, for the time, a kind of belief of its real and 
 present existence. But, on the least return of the 
 attention to the affairs of life, the vision is instantly 
 dissipated ; and this is done by reason comparing 
 the vision with the actual state of things in the ex- 
 ternal world. The poet or the novelist, it is probable, 
 feels himself, for the time, actually imbodied in the 
 person of his hero, and in that character judges, 
 talks, and acts in the scene which he is depicting. 
 This we call imagination; but were the vision not 
 to be dissipated on his return to the ordinary rela- 
 tions of life, — were he then to act in a single in- 
 stance in the character of the being of his imagina- 
 tion, — this would constitute insanity. 
 
 The condition of mind here referred to does actu- 
 ally take place; nameljs a state m which the visions 
 or impressions of the mind itself are believed to have 
 a real and present existence in the external world, 
 and in whicfc reason fails to correct this belief by the 
 actual relations of external things. There are two 
 conditions in which this occurs in a striking man- 
 ner ; namely, insanity and dreaming. Considered as 
 mental phenomena, they have a remarkable affinity 
 to each other. The great difference between them 
 is, that in insanity the erroneous impression being 
 permanent affects the conduct ; whereas in dream- 
 ing, no influence on the conduct is produced, because 
 the vision is dissipated upon awaking. The differ- 
 ence, again, between the mind under the influence 
 of imagination, and in the state now under con- 
 sideration is, that in the former the vision is built 
 up by a voluntary effort, and is varied or dismissed 
 at pleasure ; while in dreaming and insanity this 
 power is suspended, and the mind is left entirely 
 under the influence of the chain of thoughts which 
 happens to be present, without beJ'*^ nble eith^'f to 
 
REASON. 213 
 
 ^ry or dismiss it. The particular chain or series 
 eeenis, in general, perhaps always, to depend upon 
 associations previously formed; the various ele- 
 ments of which bring up one another in a variety 
 of singular combinations, and in a manner which we 
 often cannot trace, or in any degree account for. 
 The facts connected with this branch of the subject 
 form one of the most interesting parts of this in- 
 vestigation. 
 
 There are some other affections which come un- 
 der the same class ; but insanity and dreaming are 
 the two extreme examples. In dreaming, the bodily 
 senses are in a great measure shut up from external 
 impressions; and the influence of the will upon 
 bodily motions is also suspended, so that no actions 
 in general follow. We shall afterward see that 
 there are exceptions to this ; but it is the common 
 state in dreaming. In insanity, on the other hand, 
 the bodily senses are awake to impressions from 
 without, and bodily motion is under the influence of 
 the will; hence the maniac acts, under his erroneous 
 impressions, in a manner which often makes him 
 dangerous to the community. There is an affection 
 which holds an intermediate place between these 
 two extremes, and presents a variety of interesting 
 phenomena. This is somnambulism. It differs from 
 dreaming in the senses being, to a certain degree, 
 awake to external things: though that power is sus- 
 pended by which the mental impressions are cor- 
 rected by the influence of the external world. Thus, 
 the somnambulist often understands what is said to 
 him, and can converse with another person in a 
 tolerably connected manner, though always with 
 some reference to his erroneous mental impressions. 
 He acts, also, under the influence of these ; but the 
 remarkable difference between him and the maniac 
 is, that the somnambulist can be roused from his 
 vision, and then the whole is dissipated. There are 
 cases, indeed, in which the hallucination is more 
 
214 REASON. 
 
 permanent, and cannot be at once interrupted in 
 this manner: — these of course come to border on 
 insanity. 
 
 There is still a fourth condition connected with 
 this curious subject ; namely, that in which a person 
 awake, and in other respects in possession of his 
 rational powers, perceives spectral illusions. This, 
 we shall see, is allied in a singular manner to the 
 affections now referred to. 
 
 The subject therefore, divides itself into four parts, 
 which will form the separate topics of the following 
 observations : — 
 
 1. Dreaming. 
 
 2. Somnambulism. 
 
 3. Insanity. 
 
 4. Spectral Illusions.' 
 
 The causes of these remarkable conditions of the 
 mental functions are entirely beyond the reach of our 
 inquiries ; but the phenomena connected with thera 
 present a subject of most interesting investigation. 
 
 I.— DREAMING. 
 
 The peculiar condition of the mind in dreaming 
 appears to be referable to two heads : — 
 
 1. The impressions which arise in the mind are 
 oelieved to have a real and present existence ; and 
 this belief is not corrected, as in the waking state, 
 by comparing the conception with the things of the 
 external world. 
 
 2. The ideas or images in the mind follow one an- 
 other according to associations over which we have 
 no control ; we cannot, as in the waking state, vary 
 the series, or stop it at our will. 
 
 One of the most curious objects of investigation 
 is *o trace the manner in which the particular visions 
 
DREAMING. 215 
 
 Or series of images arise. When considered in this 
 view, a great variety may be observed in dreams. 
 Some of those which we are able to trace most dis- 
 tinctly appear to be the following :— 
 
 1. Recent events, and recent mental emotions, 
 mingled up into one continuous series with each 
 other, or with old events, by means of some feel- 
 ing which had been in a greater or less degree alhed 
 to each of them, though in other respects they were 
 entirely unconnected. We hear, perhaps, of a dis- 
 tressing accident ; we have received some unpleas- 
 ant news of an absent friend ; and we have been 
 concerned in some business which gave rise to anx- 
 iety : a dream takes place, in which all these are 
 combined together ; we are ourselves connected 
 with the accident ; the absent friend is in our com 
 pany ; and the person with whom the business was 
 transacted also appears in the scene. The only bond 
 of union among these occurrences wa"s, that each of 
 them gave rise to a similar kind of emotion ; and the 
 train was probably excited by some bodily feeling of 
 uneasiness, perhaps an oppression at the stomach, at 
 the time when the dream occurred. Without this, 
 the particular series might not have taken place at 
 all ; or some of the elements of it might have oc- 
 curred in a totally different association. The absent 
 friend might have appeared in connexion with old 
 and pleasing recollections, combined perhaps with 
 persons and events associated with these, and with- 
 out any reference to the painful intelhgence by 
 which the attention had been directed to him. We 
 meet a person whom we have not seen for many 
 years, and are led to inquire after old friends, and to 
 allude to events long past. Dreams follow, in which 
 these persons appear, and other persons and occur- 
 rences connected with them ; but the individual, 
 whose conversation gave rise to the series, does not 
 appear in it, because he was not connected v' h the 
 
216 ' REASON. 
 
 particular chain of events which was thus recalled 
 into the mind. 
 
 A woman who was a patient in the Clinical Ward 
 of the infirmary of Edinburgh, under the care of Dr. 
 Duncan, talked a great deal in her sleep, and made 
 numerous and very distinct allusions to the cases 
 of other sick persons. These allusions did not ap- 
 ply to any patients who were in the ward at that 
 time ; but, after some observation, they were found 
 to refer correctly to the cases of individuals who 
 were there when this woman was a patient in the 
 ward two years before. 
 
 II. Trains of images brought up by association 
 with bodily sensations. Examples of this kind are 
 of frequent occurrence. By the kind attention of 
 my friend Dr. James Gregory, I have received a most 
 interesting manuscript by his late eminent father, 
 which contains a variety of curious matter on this 
 subject. In this paper, Dr. Gregory mentions of 
 himself that, having on one occasion gone to bed 
 with a vessel of hot water at his feet, he dreamed 
 of walking up the crater of Mount Etna, and of 
 feeling the ground warm under him. He had at an 
 early period of his h*'e visited Mount Vesuvius, and 
 actually felt a strong sensation of warmth in his 
 feet when walking up the side of the crater; but it 
 was remarkable that the dream was not of Vesuvius, 
 but of Etna, of which he had only read Brydone's de- 
 scription. This was probably from the latter im- 
 pression having been the more recent. On another 
 occasion, he dreamed of spending a winter at Hud- 
 son's Bay, and of suffering much distress from the 
 intense fiost. He found that he had thrown off the 
 bedclothes in his sleep; and, a few days before, he 
 had been reading a very particular account of the 
 state of the colonies in that country during winter 
 Again, when suffering from toothache, he dreamed 
 of undergoing the operation of tooth-drawing, with 
 
DREAMING. 2l7 
 
 the additional circumstance that the operator drew 
 a sound tooth, leaving the aching one in its place. 
 But the most striking anecdote in this interesting 
 document is one in which similar dreams were pro- 
 duced in a gentleman and his wife, at the same time, 
 and by the same cause. It happened at the period 
 when there was an alarm of French invasion, and 
 almost every man in Edinburgh was a soldier. All 
 things had been arranged in expectation of the land- 
 ing of an enemy ; the first notice of which was to 
 be given by a gun from the castle, and this was to 
 be followed by a chain of signals calculated to alarm 
 fhe country in all directions. Further, there had 
 been recently in Edinburgh a splendid military spec- 
 tacle, in which five thousand men had been drawn 
 up in Prince's Street, fronting the castle. The gen- 
 tleman to whom the dream occurred, and who had 
 been a most zealous volunteer, was in bed between 
 two and three o'clock in the morning, when he 
 dreamed of hearing the signal gun. He was imme- 
 diately at the castle, witnessed the proceedings for 
 displaying the signals, and saw and heard a great 
 bustle over the town from troops and artillery assem- 
 bling, especially in Prince's Street. At this time he 
 was roused by his wife, who awoke in a fright in 
 consequence of a similar dream, connected with 
 much noise and the landing of an enemy, and con- 
 cluding with the death of a particular friend of her 
 husband's, who had served with him as a volunteer 
 during the late war. The origin of this remarkable 
 concurrence was ascertained, in the mofning, to be 
 the noise produced in the room above by the fall of 
 a pair of tongs which had been left in some very 
 awkward position in support of a clothes-screen. 
 Dr. Reid relates of himself, that the dressing ap- 
 plied after a bUster on his head having become 
 ruffled so as to produce considerable uneasiness, he 
 dreamed of falling into the hands of savages and be» 
 ing scalped by thfem. 
 
 T 
 
218 REASON. 
 
 To this part of the subject are to be referred some 
 remarkable cases in which, in particular individuals, 
 dreams can be produced by whispering into their 
 ears when they are asleep. One of the most cu- 
 rious as well as authentic examples of this kind has 
 been referred to by several writers : I find the par- 
 ticulars in the paper of Dr. Gregory, and they were 
 related to him by a gentleman who witnessed them. 
 The subject of it was an officer in the expedition to 
 Louisburg in 1758, who had this peculiarity in so 
 remarkable a degree, that his companions in the 
 transport were in the constant habit of amusing 
 themselves at his expense. They could produce in 
 him any kind of dream by whispering into his ear, 
 especially if this was done by a friend with whose 
 voice he was familiar. At one time they conducted 
 him through the whole progress of a quarrel, which 
 ended in a duel ; and, when the parties were sup- 
 posed to be met, a pistol was put into his hand, 
 which he fired, and was awakened by the report. 
 On another occasion they found him asleep on the 
 top of a locker or bunker in the cabin, when they 
 made him believe he had fallen overboard, and ex- 
 horted him to save himself by swimming. He im- 
 mediately imitated all the motions of swimming. 
 They then told him that a shark was pursuing him, 
 and entreated him to dive for his life. He instantly 
 did so with such force as to throw himself entirely 
 from the locker upon the cabin floor, by which he 
 was much bruised, and awakened of course. After 
 the landing of the army at Louisburg, his friends 
 found him one day asleep in his tent, and evidently 
 much annoyed by the cannonading. They then 
 made him believe that he was engaged, when he ex- 
 pressed great fear, and showed an evident disposition 
 to run away. Against this they remonstrated, but 
 at the same time increased his fears by imitating 
 the groans of the wounded and the dying ; and when 
 he asked, as he often did, who was down, they 
 
PREA3I1NG. 219 
 
 named his particular friends. At last they told him 
 that the man next himself in the hne had fallen, 
 f when he instantly sprung from his bed, rushed out 
 of the tent, and was roused from his danger and his 
 dream together by faUing over the tent-ropes. A 
 remarkable circumstance in this case was, that after 
 these experiments he had no distinct recollection 
 of his dreams, but only a confused feeling of oppres- 
 sion or fatigue ; and used to tell iiis friends that he 
 was sure they had been playing some trick upon 
 him. A case entirely similar is related in Smelhe's 
 Natural History, the subject of which was a medical 
 student at the university of Edmburgh. 
 
 A singular fact has oft«in been observed in dreams 
 which are excited by a noise; namely, that the 
 same sound awakes the person, and produces a 
 dream which appears to him to occupy a consider- 
 able time. The following example of this has been 
 related to me : — A gentleman dreamed that he had 
 enlisted as a soldier, joined his regiment, deserted, 
 was apprehended, carried back, tried, condemned to 
 be shot, and at last led out for execution. After all 
 tne usual preparations a gun was fired ; he awoke 
 with the report, and found that a noise in an adjoin- 
 ing room had both produced the dream and awaked 
 him. The same want of the notion of time is ob- 
 Berved in dreams from other causes. Dr. Gregory 
 mentions a gentleman who, after sleeping in a damp 
 place, was for a long time liable to a feeling of suf- 
 focation whenever he slept irt* a lying posture ; and 
 this was always accompanied by a dream of a skel- 
 eton which grasped him violently by the throat. 
 He could sleep in a sitting posture without any un- 
 easy feeling ; and after trying various expedients he 
 at last had a sentinel placed beside him, with orders 
 to awake him whenever he sunk down. On one oc- 
 casion he was attacked by the skeleton, and a severe 
 and long struggle ensued before he awoke. On 
 finding fault with his attendant for allowing him to 
 
220 REASON. 
 
 lie so long in such a stale of suffering, he was as- 
 sured that he had not lain an instant, but had been 
 awakened the moment he began to sink. The gen-^ 
 tleman after a considerable time recovered from the 
 affection. A friend of mine dreamed that he crossed 
 the Atlantic, and spent a fortnight in America. In 
 embarking on his return, he fell into the sea; and, 
 having awoke with Ihe fright, discovered that he had 
 not been asleep above ten minutes. 
 
 III. Dreams consisting of the revival of old asso- 
 ciations respecting things which had entirely passed 
 out of the mind, and which seemed to have been 
 forgotten. It is often impossible to trace the man- 
 ner in which these dreams arise ; and some of the 
 facts connected with them scarcely appear referable 
 to any principle with which we are at present ac- 
 quainted. The following example occurred to a par- 
 ticular friend of mine, and may be relied upon in its 
 most minute particulars : — 
 
 The gentleman was at the time connected with 
 one of the principal banks in Glasgow, and was at 
 his place at the teller's table, where money is paid, 
 when a person entered demanding payment of a 
 sum of six pounds. There were several people wait- 
 ing, who were, in turn, entitled to be attended be- 
 fore him ; but he was extremely impatient, and rather 
 noisy; and, being besides a remarkable stammerer, 
 he became so annoying, that another gentleman re- 
 quested my friend to "^ay him his money and get rid 
 of him. He did so, accordingly, but with an expres- 
 sion of impatience at being obliged to attend to him 
 before his turn, and thought no more of the transac- 
 tion. At the end of the year, which was eight or 
 nine months after, the books of the bank could 
 not be made to balance, the deficiency being exactly 
 six pounds. Several days and nights had been 
 spent in endeavouring to discover the error, but with- 
 out success ; when, at last, my friend returned home 
 
BREAMING. 221 
 
 ntucTi fatigued, and went to bed. He dreamed of be- 
 ing at his place in the bank, — and the whole trans- 
 action with th? stammerer, as now detailed, passed 
 before him in all its particulars. He awoke under 
 a full impression that the dream was to lead him to 
 a discovery of what he was so anxiously in search 
 of; and, on examination, soon discovered that the 
 sum paid to this person in the manner now men- 
 tioned had been neglected to be inserted in the book 
 of interests, and that it exactly accounted for the 
 error in the balance. 
 
 This case, upon a little consideration, will appear 
 to be exceedingly remarkable, because the impres- 
 sion recalled in this singular manner was one of 
 which there was no consciousness at the time when 
 it occurred ; and, consequently, we cannot suppose 
 that any association took place which could have 
 assisted in recalling it. For the fact upon which 
 the importance of the case rested was, not his having 
 paid the money, but having neglected to insert the 
 payment. Now of this there was no impression 
 made upon the mind at the time, and we can scarcely 
 conceive on what principle it could be recalled. The 
 deficiency being six pounds, we may, indeed, suppose 
 the gentleman endeavouring to recollect whether 
 there could have been a payment of this sum made 
 in any irregular manner which could have led to an 
 omission, or an error ; but, in the transactions of an 
 extensive bank, in a great commercial city, a pay- 
 ment of six pounds, at the distance of eight or nine 
 months, could have made but a very faint impres- 
 sion ; and, upon the whole, the case presents, per- 
 haps, one of the most remarkable mental phenomena 
 connected with this curious subject. The following 
 is of the same nature, though much less extraordi- 
 nary, from the shortness of the interval ; and it may 
 perhaps be considered as a simple act of memory, 
 though, for the same reason as in the former case, 
 we cannot trace any association which could have 
 T2 
 
223 REASON. 
 
 recalled the circumstance : — A gentleman who was 
 appointed to an office in one of the principal banks 
 in Edinburgh found, on balancing his first day's 
 transactions, that the money under his charge was 
 deficient by ten pounds. After many fruitless at- 
 tempts to discover the cause of the error, he went 
 home, not a little annoyed by the result of his first 
 experiment in banking. In the night, he dreamed 
 that he was at his place in the bank, and that a gen- 
 tleman who was personally known to him pre- 
 sented a draught for ten pounds. On awaking, he 
 recollected the dream, and also recollected that the 
 gentleman who appeared in it had actually received 
 ten pounds. On going to the bank, he found that 
 he had neglected to enter the payment, and that the 
 gentleman's order had by accident fallen among 
 some pieces of paper, which had been thrown on 
 the floor to be swept away. 
 
 I have formerly referred to some remarkable cases 
 in which languages long forgotten were recovered 
 during a state of delirium. Something very analo- 
 gous seems to occur in dreaming, of which I have 
 received the following example from an able and 
 intelligent friend. In his youth he was very fond 
 of the Greek language, and made considerable pro- 
 gress in it ; but afterward, being actively engaged 
 in other pursuits, he so entirely forgot it that he can- 
 not even read the words. But he has often dreamed 
 of reading Greek works which he had been accus- 
 tomed to use at college, and with a most vivid im- 
 pression of fully understanding them. 
 
 A further and most interesting illustration of the 
 class 01 dreams referred to under this head, is found 
 in an anecdote lately published by the distinguished 
 author of the Waverley novels, and considered by 
 him as authentic:—" Mr. R. of Bowland, a gentle- 
 man of landed property in the vale of Gala, was 
 prosecuted for a very considerable sum, the accu- 
 mulated arrears of teind (or tithe), for which he 
 
DREAMING. 223 
 
 was said to be indebted to a noble family, the titulars 
 (lay impropriators of the tithes). Mr. R. was 
 strongly impressed with the belief that his father 
 had, by a form of process peculiar to the law of 
 Scotland, purchased these lands from the titular, and 
 therefore that the present prosecution was ground- 
 less. But, after an industrious search among his 
 father's papers, an investigation of the public re- 
 cords, and a careful inquiry among all pei-sons who 
 had transacted law-business for his father, no evi- 
 dence could be recovered to support his defence. 
 The period was now near at hand when he con- 
 ceived the loss of his lawsuit to be inevitable, and 
 he had formed his determination to ride to Edin- 
 burgh next day, and make the best bargain he could 
 in the way of compromise. He went to bed with 
 this resolution, and with all the circumstances of the 
 case floating upon his mind, had a dream to the fol- 
 lowing purpose : — His father, who had boen many 
 years dead, appeared to him, he thought, nnd asked 
 him why he was disturbed in his mind. In dreams 
 men are not surprised at such apparitions. Mr. R. 
 thought that he informed his father of the /^ause of 
 his distress, adding that the payment of a consider- 
 able sum of money was the more unpleasant to him, 
 because he had a strong consciousness that it was 
 not due, though he was unable to recover any evi- 
 dence in support of his belief. ' You are right, my 
 son,' repUed the paternal shade ; * I did acquire right 
 to these teinds, for payment of which you are now 
 prosecuted. The papers relating to the transaction 
 
 are in the hands of Mr. , a writer (or attorney), 
 
 who is now retired from professional business, and 
 resides at Inveresk, near Edinburgh. He was a 
 person whom I employed on that occasion for a 
 particular reason, but who never, on any other occa- 
 sion, transacted business on my account. It is very 
 
 possible,' pursued the vision, ' that Mr. may have 
 
 forgotten a matter which is now of a very old date ; 
 
224 REASON, 
 
 but you may call it to his recollection by this token, 
 that when I came to pay his account, there was 
 difficulty in getting change for a Portugal piece of 
 gold, and that we were forced to drink out the bal- 
 ance, at a tavern.' 
 
 "Mr. R. awaked in the morning, with all the 
 words of his vision imprinted on his mind, and 
 thought it worth while to ride across the country 
 to Inveresk, instead of going straight to Edinburgh. 
 When he came there he waited on the gentleman 
 mentioned in the dream, a very old man ; without 
 saying any thing of the vision, he inquired whether 
 he remembered having conducted such a matter for 
 his deceased father. The old gentleman could not 
 at first bring the circumstance to his recollection; 
 but, on mention of the Portugal piece of gold, the 
 whole returned upon his memory; he made an im- 
 mediate search for the papers, and recovered them, 
 — so that Mr. R. carried to Edinbugh the document& 
 necessary to gain the cause which he was on the 
 verge of losing."* 
 
 There is every reason to believe that this very 
 interesting case is referable to the principle lately 
 mentioned; that the gentleman had heard the cir- 
 cumstances from his father, but had entirely for- 
 gotten them, until the frequent and intense applica- 
 tion of his mind to the subject with which they were 
 connected at length gave rise to a train of associa- 
 tion which recalled them in the dream. To the same 
 principle are referable the two following anecdotes, 
 which I have received as entirely authentic. A 
 gentleman of the law in Edinburgh had mislaid an 
 important paper, relating to some affairs on which 
 a public meeting was soon to be held. He had been 
 making most anxious search for it for many days ; 
 but the evening of the day preceding that on which 
 the meeting was to be held had arrived, without his 
 
 * Notes to tbe new edition of the Waverley Novels, vd. v. 
 
DREAMING. 225 
 
 being able to discover it. He went to bed under 
 great anxiety and disappointment, and dreamed that 
 the paper was in a box appropriated to the papers of 
 a particular family, with which it was in no way con- 
 nected: — it was accordingly found there in the morn- 
 ing. — Another individual, connected with a public 
 office, had mislaid a paper of such importance, that 
 he was threatened with the loss of his situation if 
 he did not produce it. After a long but unsuccess- 
 ful search, under intense anxiety, he also d/eamed 
 of discovering the paper in a particular place, and 
 found it there accordingly. 
 
 IV. A class of dreams which presents an interest- 
 ing subject of observation includes those in which 
 a strong propensity of character, or a strong mental 
 emotion is imbodied into a dream, and by some 
 natural coincidence, is fulfilled. A murderer men- 
 tioned by Mr. Combe had dreamed of committing 
 murder some years before the event took place. 
 But more remarkable still are those instance?, many 
 of them authentic, in which a dream has given no- 
 tice of an event which was occurring at the time, 
 or occurred soon after. The following story has 
 been long mentioned in Edinburgh, and there seems 
 no reason to doubt its authenticity : — A clergyman 
 had come to this city from a short distance in the 
 country, and was sleeping at an inn, when he 
 dreamed of seeing a fire, and one of his children in 
 the midst of it. He awoke with the impression, and 
 instantly left town on his return home. When he 
 arrived within sight of his house, he found it on fire, 
 and got there in time to assist in saving one of his 
 thildren who, in the alarm and confusion, had been 
 eft in a situation of danger. Without calling in 
 question the possibility of supernatural communica- 
 tion in such cases, this striking occurrence, of which 
 
 believe there is little reason to doubt the truth, 
 may perhaps be accounted for on simple and natural 
 
226 REASON. 
 
 principles. Let us suppose, that the gentleman had 
 a servant who had shown great carelessness in re- 
 gard to fire, and had often given rise to his mind to 
 a strong apprehension that he might set fire to the 
 house. His anxiety might be increased by being 
 from home, and the same circumstance might make 
 the servant still more careless. Let us further sup- 
 pose that the gentleman, before going to bed, had, 
 in addition to this anxiety, suddenly recollected 
 that there was on that day, in the neighbourhood 
 of his house, some fair or periodical merry-maiving, 
 from which the servant was very likely to return 
 home in a state of intoxication. It was most natural 
 that these impressions should be imbodied into a 
 dream of his house being on fire, and that the same 
 circumstances might lead to the dream being fulfilled. 
 A gentleman in Edinburgh was affected with aneu- 
 rism of the pophteal artery, for which he was under 
 the care of two eminent surgeons, and the day was 
 fixed for the operation. About two days before the 
 time appointed for it, the wife of the patient dreamed 
 that a change had taken place in the disease, in con- 
 sequence of which the operation would not be re- 
 quired. On examining the tumour in the morning, 
 the gentleman was astonished to find that the pulsa- 
 tion had entirely ceased ; and, in short, this turned 
 out to be a spontaneous cure. To persons not pro- 
 fessional it may be right to mention that the cure 
 of popliteal aneurism without an operation is a very 
 uncommon occurrence, not happening in one out of 
 numerous instances, and never to be looked upon as 
 probable in any individual case. It is likely, how- 
 ever, that the lady had heard of the possibility of 
 such a termination, and that her anxiety had very 
 naturally imbodied this into a dream ; the fulfilment 
 of it at the very time when the event took place is 
 certainly a very remarkable coincidence. The fol- 
 lowing anecdotes also I am enabled to give as en- 
 tirely authentic. A lady dreamed that an aged female 
 
DREAMING. 227 
 
 relative had been murdered by a olack servant, 
 and the dream occurred more than once. She was 
 then so impressed by it that she went to the house 
 of the lady to whom it related, and prevailed upon a 
 gentleman to watch in an adjoining room during the 
 following night. Abdut three o'clock in the morn- 
 ing, the gentleman, hearing footsteps on the stair, 
 left his place of concealment, and met the servant 
 carry i ng u p a quantity of coals. Being questioned as 
 to where he was going, he replied, in a confused and 
 hurried manner, that he was going to mend his mis- 
 tress' fire, — which, at three o'clock in the morning, 
 in the middle of summer, was evidently impossible; 
 and, on further investigation, a strong knife was found 
 concealed beneath the coals. Another lady dreamed 
 that a boy, her nephew, had been drowned along 
 with some young companions with whom he had en- 
 gaged to go on a sailing excursion in the Frith of 
 Forth. She sent for him in the morning, and, with 
 much difficulty, prevailed upon him to give up his 
 engagement ;— his companions went and were all 
 drowned. A gentleman dreamed that the devil car- 
 ried him down to the bottom of a coal-pit, where 
 he threatened to burn him, unless he would agree 
 to give himself up to his service. This he refused 
 to do, and a warm altercation followed. He was 
 at last allowed to depart, upon condition of sending 
 down an individual whom the devil named, a worth- 
 less character well known in t\\e neighbourhood. 
 A few days after, this person was found drowned, 
 and under circumstances which gave every reason 
 to believe that his death had been vokmtary. A 
 lady in Edinburgh had sent her watch to be repaired : 
 u long time elapsed without her being able to re- 
 cover it, and, after many excuses, she began to sus- 
 pect that something was wrong. She now dreamed 
 that the watchmaker's boy, by whom the watch 
 was sent, had dropped it in the street, and injured 
 it in such a manner that it could not be repaired. 
 
228 nEAsox. 
 
 She then went to the master, and, without any allu- 
 sion to her dream, put the question to him directly; 
 when he confessed that it was true. 
 
 Such coincidences derive their wonderful char- 
 acter from standing alone and apart from those 
 numerous instances in which such dreams take place 
 without any fulfilment. An instance of a very sin- 
 gular kind is mentioned by Mr. .Joseph Taylor, and 
 is given by him as an undoubted fact. A young 
 man who was at an academy a hundred miles from 
 home dreamed that he went to his father's house in 
 the night, tried the front-door, but found it locked ; 
 got in by a back-door, and finding nobody out of bed, 
 went directly to the bedroom of his parents. He 
 then said to his mother, whom he found awake, 
 *' Mother, I am going a long journey, and am come 
 to bid you good-by." On this she answered under 
 much agitation, " Oh, dear son, thou art dead !" He 
 mstantly awoke and thought no more of his dream, 
 until, a few days after he received a letter from his 
 father inquiring very anxiously after his health, in 
 consequence of a frightful dream his mother had on 
 the same night in which the dream now mentioned 
 occurred to him. She dreamed that she heard some 
 one attempt to open the front-door, then go to the 
 back-door, and at last come into her bedroom. She 
 then saw it was her son, who came to the side of 
 litr bed, and said, " Mother, I am going a long jour- 
 ney, and am come to bid you good-by ;" on which 
 she exclaimed, " Oh, dear son, thou art dead !" But 
 nothing unusual happened to any of the parties ; — 
 the singular dream must have originated in some 
 strong mental impression which had been made on 
 both the individuals about the same time; and to 
 have traced the source of it would have been a mat- 
 ter of great interest. 
 
 On a similar principle, we are to account for some 
 of the stories of second sight : — A gentleman sitting 
 by the fire on a stormy night, and anxious about 
 
DREAMING. 229 
 
 Bome of his domestics who are at sea in a boat, 
 drops asleep for a few seconds, dreams very natu- 
 rally of drowning men, and starts up with an ex- 
 clamation that his boat is lost. If the boat returns 
 in safety, the vision is no more thought of. If it is 
 lost, as is very likely to happen, the story passes 
 for second sight ; and it is, in fact, one of the anec- 
 dotes that are given as the most authentic instances 
 of it. 
 
 It is unnecessary to multiply examples of the fulfil- 
 ment of dreams on the priHciples which have now 
 been mentioned ; but I am induced to add the fol- 
 lowing, as it is certainly of a very interesting kind, 
 and as I am enabled to give it as entirely authentic 
 in all its particulars. A most respectable clergyman 
 in a country parish of Scotland, made a collection 
 at his church for an object of pubhc benevolence, in 
 which he felt deeply interested. The amount of 
 the collection, which was received in ladles carried 
 through the church, fell greatly short of his expec- 
 tation ; and, during the evening of the day, he fre- 
 quently alluded to this with expressions of much disap- 
 pointment. In the following night he dreamed that 
 three one-pound notes had been left in one of the ladles, 
 having been so compressed that they had stuck in 
 the comer when the ladle was emptied. He was 
 so impressed by the vision, that at an early hour 
 in the morning he went to the church, found the 
 ladle which he had seen in his dream, and drew 
 from one of the corners of it three one-pound notes 
 This interesting case is perhaps capable of explana 
 t^on upon simple principles. It appears, that on 
 the evening preceding the day of the collection, 
 the clergyman had been amusing himself by calculat- 
 ing what sum his congregation would probably con- 
 tribute, and that in doing so, he had calculated on a 
 certain number of families, who would not give him 
 less than a pound each. Let us then suppose that 
 a particular ladle, which he knew to have been pre- 
 U 
 
230 REASOIC. 
 
 sented to three of these families, had been emptied 
 in his presence, and found to contain no pound notes-. 
 His first feehng would be that of disappointment ; 
 but, in afterward thinking of the subject, and con- 
 necting it with his former calculation, the possibility 
 of the ladle not having been fully emptied might 
 dart across his mind. This impression, which per- 
 haps he did not himself recollect, might then be im- 
 bodied into the dream, which, by a natural coinci- 
 dence, was fulfilled. 
 
 The four classes which have now been mentioned 
 appear to include the principal varieties of dreams ; 
 and it is often a matter of great interest to trace 
 the manner in which the particular associations 
 arise. Cases of dreams are indeed on record, which 
 are not referable to any of the principles which 
 have been mentioned, and which do not admit of 
 explanation on any principles which we are able to 
 trace. Many of these histories, there is every rea- 
 son to believe, derive their marvellous character 
 from embelhshment and exaggeration ; and in some 
 instances which have been related to me in the most 
 confident manner, I have found this to be the case 
 after a little investigation. Others, however, do 
 not admit of this explanation, and we are compelled 
 to receive them as facts which we can in no degree 
 account for. Of this kind I shall only add the fol- 
 lowing example; and 1 shall do so without any at- 
 tempt at explanation, and without any other com- 
 ment than that its accuracy may be relied on in all 
 its particulars. Two ladies, sisters, had been for 
 several days in attendance upon their brother, who 
 was ill of a common sore throat, severe and pro- 
 tracted, but not considered as attended with danger. 
 At the same time, one of them had borrowed a 
 watch from a female friend, in consequence of hei 
 own being under repair ; — this watch was one to 
 which particular value was attached on account of 
 
DREAMING. 23 1 
 
 some family associations, and some anxiety was ex- 
 pressed that it might not meet with any injury. The 
 sisters were sleeping together in a room communi- 
 cating with that of their brother, when the elder of 
 them awoke in a state of great agitation, and having 
 roused the other, told her that she had had a fright- 
 ful dream. "1 dreamed," she said, "that Mary's 
 watch stopped ; and that, when I told you of the 
 circumstance, you rephed, much worse than that 
 
 has happened, for 's breath has stopped also," — 
 
 naming their brother, who was ill. To quiet her 
 agitation, the younger sister immediately got up, 
 and found the brother sleeping quietly, and the 
 watch, which had been carefully put by in a drawer, 
 going correctly. The following night the very same 
 dream occurred, followed by similar agitation, which 
 was again composed in the same manner,-— the 
 brother being again found in a quiet sleep, and the 
 watch going well. On the following morning, soon 
 after the family had breakfasted, one of the sisters 
 was sitting by her brother, while the other was 
 writing a note in the adjoining room. When hejr 
 note was ready for being sealed, she was proceeding 
 to take out, for this purpose, the watch alluded to, 
 which had been put by in her writing-desk ; — she 
 was astonished to find it had stopped. At the same 
 instant she heard a scream of intense distress from 
 her sister in the other room, — their brother, who 
 had still been considered as going on favourably, had 
 been seized with a sudden fit of suffocation, and 
 had just breathed his last. 
 
 There are various other circumstances relating 
 to the philosophy of dreams, which may be mentioned 
 very briefly. It has been alleged that we never 
 dream of objects which we have not seen. On this 
 I cannot decide; but we certainly dream of things 
 in combinations in which they never occurred to us. 
 Our dreams appear to be very much influenced bv 
 
232 REASON. 
 
 the intensity of our conceptions, and, in this respect, 
 there is great variety in regard to the objeols of the 
 different senses. Our most vivid conceptions are 
 certainly of objects of sight ; and they appear to be 
 much less distinct in regard to tastes, smells, and 
 even sounds. Accordingly, I think dreams are 
 chiefly occupied with objects of sight ; and 1 am not 
 sure that we dream of tastes, or smells, or even of 
 sounds, except when a sound actually takes place 
 as in several instances which have been mentioned. 
 This, indeed, only applies to simple sounds, for we 
 certainly dream of persons speaking to us, and of 
 understanding what they say, — but I am not sure 
 that this is necessarily accompanied with a concep- 
 tion of sound. I am informed by a friend, who is a 
 keen sportsman, that he often dreams of being on 
 shooting excursions ; — that he starts his game, and 
 points his gun, but never succeeds in firing it. It 
 sometimes seems to miss fire, but in general there 
 appears to be something wrong with the lock, so 
 that it cannot be moved. A gentleman, mentioned 
 by Dr. Darwin, had been for thirty years so deaf 
 that he could be conversed with only in writing, or 
 by forming letters with the fingers. He assured 
 Dr. Darwin, that he nev<;r dreamed of persons con 
 versing with him except by the fingers or in writing 
 and that he never liad the impression of hearing 
 them speak. Two persons who had long been blind 
 also informed him, that they never dreamed of visible 
 objects since the loss of their sight. Mr. Bew, 
 however, in the Manchester Memoirs, mentions a 
 blind gentleman who dreamed of the figure, though 
 he could not distinguish the varieties, of the human 
 countenance ; and Smelhe mentions of Dr. Black- 
 lock, who lost his sight at the age of a few months, 
 that in his dreams he had a distinct impression of 
 a sense which he did not possess when awake. He 
 described his impression by saying that when 
 iwake there were three ways by which he could 
 
BREAMING. 233 
 
 distinguish persons, namely, — ^by hearing them 
 speak, by feeling the head and shoulders, and by 
 attending to the sound and manner of llieir breath- 
 ing. In his dreams, however, he had a vivid im- 
 pression of objects in a manner distinct from any 
 of these modes. He imagined that he was united 
 to them, by a kind of distant contact, which was 
 effected by threads or strings passing from their 
 bodies to his own. 
 
 On a similar principle, probably, we may explain 
 the fact that dreams refer chiefly to persons or 
 events which we have actually seen, though they 
 are put into new combinations ; and that we more 
 rarely dream of objects of simple memory unless 
 they have been strongly associated with some object 
 of conception. Thus we seldom dream of events or 
 characters in ancient history. Dr. Beattie, indeed, 
 mentions having dreamed of crossing the Alps with 
 Hannibal; but such dreams, I think, are very rare. 
 It would be curious to observe their occurrence, and 
 to trace the train that leads to them. 
 
 It appears, then, that the mental operations which 
 take place in dreaming consist chiefly of old concep- 
 tions and old associations, following one anothei 
 according to some principle of succession ovei 
 which we have no control. But there are facts on 
 record which show mental operations in dreams of a 
 much more intellectual character. Many people 
 have been conscious of something like composition 
 in dreams. Dr. Gregory mentions that thoughts 
 which sometimes occurred to him in dreams, and 
 even the particular expressions in which they were 
 conveyed, appeared to him afterward when awake 
 so just in point of reasoning and illustration, and so 
 good in point of language, that he has used them in 
 his college lectures, and in his written lucubrations. 
 Condorcet related of himself, that when engaged in 
 some profound and obscure calculations, he was 
 often obliged to leave them in an incomplete state, 
 U 2 
 
234 REASON. 
 
 and retire to rest ; and that the remaining steps, and 
 the conclusion of his calculations, had more than 
 once presented themselves in his dreams. Dr. 
 Franklin also informed Cabanis that the bearings 
 and issue of political events, which had puzzled him 
 when awake, were not unfrequeutly unfolded to him 
 in his dreams. A gentleman of Edinburgh, whose 
 name is deeply associated with the literature of his 
 country, had been one day much amused by reading 
 a very witty epigram by Piron on the French 
 Academy. In a dream the following night he com- 
 posed a parody or imitation of it, much at the ex- 
 pense of a learned society in Edinburgh, and some 
 individuals of this city. A gentleman had been 
 reading an account of cruelties practised upon some 
 Christians in Turkey by the mutilation of their 
 noses and ears. In a dream the following night he 
 witnessed the execution of a punishment of this 
 kind, and heard a Turk who was standing by address 
 the sufferer in some doggerel rhymes, which he dis- 
 tinctly recollected and repeated in the morning. 
 Another gentleman invented a French verb in a 
 dream. He thought he was in a veiy close sort of 
 penthouse with such a number of persons that they 
 were threatened with suffocation, as there appeared 
 no way of letting in air. In this state he called out, 
 " ilfaut detoiter.^'' There is no such word, but it was 
 evidently formed from toit, the roof of a building. 
 
 The following anecdote has been preserved in a 
 family of rank in Scotland, the descendants of a dis- 
 tinguished lawyer of the last age: — This eminent 
 person had been consulted respecting a case of great 
 importance and much difficulty; and he had been 
 studying it with intense anxiety and attention. 
 After several days had been occupied in this 
 manner, he was observed by his wife to rise from 
 his bed in the night and go to a writing-desk 
 which stood in the bedroom. He then sat down 
 and wrote a long paper, which he put carefully by 
 
DREAMING. 235 
 
 in the desk and returned to bed. Tlie following 
 morning he told his wife that he had a most interest- 
 ing dream; — that he had dreamed of delivering a 
 clear and luminous opinion respecting a case which 
 had exceedingly perplexed him ; and that he would 
 give any thing to recover the train of thought which 
 had passed before him in his dream. She then di- 
 rected him to the writing-desk, where he found the 
 opinion clearly and fully written out, and which was 
 afterward found to be perfectly correct. 
 
 There can be no doubt that many dreams take 
 place which are not remembered, as appears from 
 the fact of a person talking in his sleep so as to be 
 distinctly understood without remembering any 
 thing of the impression that gave rise to it. It is 
 probable, also, that the dreams which are most dis- 
 tinctly remembered are those which occur during 
 imperfect sleep, or when the sleep begins to be 
 broken by an approach towards waking. Another 
 very peculiar state has perhaps occurred to most 
 people, in which there is a distressing dream, and at 
 the same time an impression that it probably is 
 only a dream. This appears to take place in a still 
 more imperfect state of sleep, in which there is the 
 immediate approach to waking, and to the exercise 
 of the reasoning powers. But there are some very 
 singular facts on record of this kind of reasoning 
 being applied to dreams for the purpose of dissi- 
 pating them. Dr. Beattie mentions of himself, that 
 in a '^ream he once found himself standing in a very 
 peculiar situation on the parapet of a bridge. Re- 
 collecting, he says, that he never was given to pranks 
 of this nature, he began to fancy that it might be a 
 dream, and determined to throw himself headlong, in 
 the belief that this would restore his senses, which 
 accordingly took place. In the same manner Dr. 
 Reid cured himself of a tendency to fiightful dreams, 
 with which he had been annoyed from his early 
 years. He endeavoured to fix strongly on his mind 
 
236 REASON. 
 
 the impression that all such dangers in dream? are tjnl 
 imaginary ; and determined, whenever in a dream he 
 found himself on the brink of a precipice, to throw 
 himself over, and so dissipate the vision. By per- 
 severing in this method he so removed the propen- 
 sity that for forty years he was never sensible of 
 dreaming, though he was v«ry attentive in his ob- 
 servation on the subject. 
 
 Some persons are never conscious of dreaming; 
 and a gentleman, mentioned by Locke, was not sen- 
 sible of dreaming till he had a fever at the age of 
 twenty-six or twenty-seven. 
 
 A leading peculiarity in the phenomena of dream- 
 ing is the loss of power over the succession of our 
 thoughts. We have seen that there are some ex- 
 ceptions to this, but the fact applies to by far the 
 greater number of dreams, and some curious phe- 
 nomena appear to be referable to it. Of this kind 
 are probably some of those singular instances of 
 imaginary difficulties occurring in dreams on subjects 
 on which none could be felt in the waking state. It 
 is not uncommon for a clergyman to dream that he 
 is going to preach, and cannot find his text ; or for 
 a clergyman of the Church of England, that he can- 
 not find the place in the prayer-book. This, I think, 
 can only be explained by supposing that in the 
 chain of ideas passing through the mind the church 
 and prayer-book had come up, but had then led off 
 into some other train, and not into that of actually 
 going on with the service ; while, at the same time, 
 there arose in the mind a kind of impression that, 
 under these circumstances, it ought to have been 
 gone on with. 
 
 The remarkable analogy between dreaming and 
 insanity has already been referred to ; and 1 shall 
 only add the followincr illustration: — Dr. Gregory 
 mentions a maniac wno had been for some time 
 under his care, and entu-ely recovered. For a week 
 after his recovery hewas harassed during his dreams 
 
SOMNAMBULISM. 237 
 
 by the same rapid and tumultuous thoughts, and the 
 same violent passions by which he had been agi 
 tated during his insanity. 
 
 The slight outline which has now been given of 
 dreaming, may serve to show that the subject is not 
 only curious but important. It appears to be 
 worthy of careful investigation, and there is much 
 reason to believe that an extensive collection of 
 authentic facts, carefully analyzed, would unfold 
 principles of very great interest in reference to the 
 philosophy of the mental powers. 
 
 II.— SOMNAMBULl SM. 
 
 Somnambulism appears to differ from dreaming 
 chiefly in the degree in which the bodily functions 
 are affected. The mind is fixed in the same manner 
 as in dreaming upon its own impressions as pos- 
 sessing a real and present existence in external 
 things ; but the bodily organs are more under the 
 control of the will, so that the individual acts under 
 the influence of his erroneous conceptions, and 
 holds conversation in regard to them. He is also, 
 to a certain degree, susceptible of impressions from 
 without through his organs of sense ; not, however, 
 so as to correct his erroneous impressions, but 
 rather to be mixed up with them. A variety of re- 
 markable phenomena arise out of these peculiarities, 
 which will be illustrated by a slight outline of this 
 singular affection. 
 
 The first degree of somnambulism generally shows 
 itself by a propensity to talk during sleep ; the per- 
 son giving a full and connected account of what 
 passes before him in dreams, and often revealing his 
 own secrets or those of his friends. Walking 
 during sleep is the next decree, and that from 
 which the affection derives its name. The phe- 
 
238 REASON. 
 
 nomena connected with this form are familiar to 
 everyone. The individual gets out of bed ; dresses 
 .liraself; if not prevented, goes out of doors; walks 
 frequently over dangerous places in safety ; some- 
 limes escapes by a window, and gets to the roof of 
 a house ; after a considerable interval, returns and 
 goes to bed ; and all that has passed conveys to his 
 mind merely the impression of a dream. A young 
 nobleman, mentioned by Horstius, living in the- 
 citadel of Breslau, was observed by his brother, 
 who occupied the same room, to rise in his sleep, 
 wrap himself in a cloak, and escape by a window to 
 the roof of the building. He there tore in pieces a 
 magpie's nest, wrapped the young birds in his cloak, 
 returned to his apartment, and went to bed. In the 
 morning he mentioned the circumstances as having 
 occurred in a dream, and could not be persuaded 
 that there had been any thing more than a dream, 
 till he was shown the magpies in his cloak. Dr. 
 Prichard mentions a man who rose in nis sleep, 
 dressed himself, saddled his horse, and rode to the 
 place of a market which he was in the habit of at- 
 tending once every week : and Martinet mentions a 
 man who was accustomed to rise in his sleep and 
 pursue his business as a saddler. There are many 
 instances on record of persons composing during 
 the state of somnambulism ; as of boys rising in 
 their sleep and finishing their tasks which they had 
 left incomplete. A gentleman at one of the Eng- 
 lish universities had been very intent during the 
 day in the composition of some verses which he 
 had not been able to complete : during the following 
 night he rose in his sleep and finished his composi- 
 tion ; then expressed great exultation, and returned 
 to bed. 
 
 In these common cases the affection occurs 
 Quring ordinary sleep ; but a condition very analo- 
 gous is met with, coming on in the daytime in 
 paioxysrns, during which the person is affected m 
 
SOMNAMBULISM. 239 
 
 the same manner as in the state of somnambulism, 
 particulaily with an insensibiHty to external impres- 
 sions : this presents some singular phenomena. 
 These attacks in some cases come on without any 
 warning; in others, they are preceded by a noise or 
 a sense of confusion in the head. The individuals 
 then become more or less abstracted, and are either 
 unconscious of any external impression, or very 
 confused in their notions of external things. They 
 are frequently able to talk in an intelligible and con- 
 sistent manner, but always in reference to the im- 
 pression which is present in their own minds. 
 They in some cases repeat long pieces of poetry, 
 often more correctly than they can do in then 
 waking state, and not unfrequently things which 
 they could not repeat in their state of health, or of 
 which they were supposed to be entirely ignorant. 
 In other cases, they hold conversation with ima- 
 ginary beings, or relate circumstances or conversa- 
 tions which occurred at remote periods, and which 
 they were supposed to have forgotten. Some have 
 been known to sing in a style far superior to any 
 thing they could do in their waking state ; and there 
 are some well-authenticated instances of persons in 
 this condition expressing themselves correctly in 
 languages with which they were imperfectly ac- 
 quainted. I had lately under my care a young lady 
 who is liable to an affection of this kind, which 
 comes on repeatedly during the day, and continues 
 from ten minutes to an hour at a time. Without 
 any warning, her body becomes motionless, her eyes 
 open, fixed, and entirely insensible ; and she be- 
 comes totally unconscious of any external impres- 
 sion. She has be^^n frequently seized while playing 
 on the piano, and has continued to play over and 
 over a part of a tune with perfect correctness, but 
 without advancing beyond a certain point. On one 
 occasion, she was seized after she had begun to 
 play from the book a piece of music which w^as new 
 
240 REASON. 
 
 to her. During the paroxysm, she continued the 
 part which she had played, and repeated it five or 
 six times with perfect correctness ; but, on coming 
 out of the attack, she could not play it without the 
 book. 
 
 During the paroxysms the individuals are, in some 
 instances, totally insensible to any thing that is said 
 to them ; but in others, they are capable of holding 
 conversation with another person with a tolerable 
 degree of consistency, though they are influenced to 
 a certain degree by their mental visions, and are 
 very confused in their notions of external things. 
 In many cases, again, they are capable of going on 
 with the manual occupations in which they had 
 been engaged before the attack. This occurred re- 
 markably in a watchmaker's apprentice mentioned 
 by Martinet. The paroxysms hi him appeared once 
 in fourteen days, and commenced with a feehng of 
 heat extending from the epigastrium to the head. 
 This was followed by confusion of thought, and this 
 by complete insensibility ; his eyes were open, but 
 fixed and vacant, and he was totally insensible to 
 any thing that was said to him, or to any external 
 impression. But he continued his usual employ- 
 ment, and was always much astonished, on his re- 
 covery, to find the change that had taken place in 
 his work since the commencement of the paroxysm. 
 This case afterwai;d passed into epilepsy. 
 
 Some remarkable phenomena are presented by 
 this singular affection, especially in regard to exer- 
 cises of memory, and the manner in which old asso- 
 ciations are recalled into the mind ; also in the dis- 
 tinct manner in which the indi^iduals sometimes 
 express themselves on subjects Avitn which they 
 had formerly shown but an imperfect acquaintance. 
 In some of the French cases of epidemic " extase,'* 
 this has been magnified into speaking unknown 
 anguages, predicting future events, and describiiy; 
 
SOMNAMBULISM. 241 
 
 occurrences of which the persons could not have 
 possessed any knowledge. These stories seem in 
 some cases to resolve themselves merely into em- 
 bellishment of what really occurred, but in others 
 there can be no doubt of connivance and imposture. 
 Some facts however appear to be authentic, and are 
 sufficiently remarkable. Two females, mentioned 
 by Bertrand, expressed themselves during the par- 
 oxysm very distinctly m Latin. They afterward 
 admitted that they had some acquaintance with the 
 language, though it was imperfect. An ignorant 
 servant-girl, mentioned by Dr. Dewar, during par- 
 oxysms of this kind, showed an astonishing know- 
 ledge of geography and astronomy ; and expressed 
 herself in her own language in a manner which, 
 though often ludicrous, showed an understanding 
 of the subject. The alternations of the seasons, for 
 example, she explained by saymg that the earth was 
 set a-gee. It was afterward discovered that her no- 
 tions on these subjects had been derived from over- 
 hearing a tutor giving instructions to the young 
 people of the family. A woman who was some 
 time ago in the Infirmary of Edinburgh, on account 
 of an aflfection of this kind, during the paroxysms 
 mimicked the manner of the physicians, and re- 
 peated correctly some of their prescriptions in the 
 Latin language. 
 
 Another very singular phenomenon, presented by 
 some instances of this affection, is what has been 
 called, rather incorrectly, a state of double con- 
 sciousness. It consists in the individual recollect- 
 ing, during a paroxysm, circumstances which oc- 
 curred in a former attack, though there was no 
 remembrance of them during the interval. This, as 
 well as various other phenomena connected with 
 the affection, is strikingly illustrated in a case de- 
 scribed by Dr. Dyce of Aberdeen, in the Edinburgh 
 Philosophical Transactions. The patient was a ser- 
 vant-girl, and the affection began with fits of som 
 
242 REASOX. 
 
 nolency, which came upon her suddenly during the 
 day, and from which she could, at first, be roused 
 by shaking, or by being taken out into the open air. 
 She soon began to talk a great deal during the at- 
 tacks, regarding things which seemed to be passing 
 before her as a dream ; and she was not at this time 
 sensible of any thing that was said to her. On one 
 occasion she repeated distinctly the baptismal ser- 
 vice of the Church of England, and concluded with 
 an extemporary prayer. In her subsequent par- 
 oxysms she began to understand what was said to 
 her, and to answer with a considerable degree of 
 consistency, though the answers were generally to 
 a certain degree influenced by her hallucinations. 
 She also became capable of following her usual em- 
 ployments during the paroxysm ; at one time she 
 laid out the table correctly for breakfast, and re- 
 peatedly dressed herself and the children of the 
 family, her eyes remaining shut the whole time. 
 The remarkable circumstance was now discovered 
 that during the paroxysm she had a distinct recol- 
 lection of what took place in former paroxysms, 
 though she had no remembrance of it during the in- 
 tervals. At one time she was taken to church while 
 under the attack, and there behaved with propriety, 
 evidently attending to the preacher ; and she was at 
 one time so much affected as to shed tears. In the 
 interval she had no recollection of having been at 
 church ; but in the next paroxysm she gave a most 
 distinct account of the sermon, and mentioned par- 
 ticularly the part of it by which she had been so 
 aauch affected. 
 
 This woman described the paroxysm as commg 
 on with a cloudiness before her eyes and a noise in 
 the head. During the attack her eyelids were gene- 
 rally half-shut ; her eyes sometimes resembled those 
 of a person affected with amaurosis, that is, with a 
 dilated and insensible state of the pupil, but some- 
 times they were quite natural. She had a dull va- 
 
SOMNAMBULISM. 243 
 
 cant look ; but, when excited, knew what was said 
 to her, though she often mistook the person who 
 was speaking ; and it was observed, that she seemed 
 to discern objects best which were faintly illumi- 
 nated. The paroxysms generally continued about 
 an hour, but she could often be roused out of them; 
 she then yawned and stretched herself, hke a per- 
 son awaking out of sleep, and instantly knew those 
 about her. At one time, during the attack, she read 
 distinctly a portion of a book which was presented 
 to her; and she often sung, both sacred and common 
 pieces, incomparably better. Dr. Dyce affirms, than 
 she could do in the waking state. The affection 
 continued to recur for about six months, and ceased 
 when a particular change took place in her con- 
 stitution. 
 
 Another very remarkable modification of this af- 
 fection is referred to by Mr. Combe, as described by 
 Major Ellio,t, professor of mathematics in the United 
 States' Military Academy at West Point. The pa- 
 tient was a young lady of cultivated mind, and the 
 dffection began with an attack of somnolency, which 
 was protracted several hours beyond the usual time. 
 When she came out of it, she was found to have lost 
 every kind of acquired knowledge. She immediately 
 began to apply herself to the first elements of edu- 
 cation, and was making considerable progress, when, 
 after several months, she was seized with a second 
 fit of somnolency. She was now at once restored 
 to all the knowledge which she possessed before the 
 first attack, but without the least recollection of any 
 thhig that had taken place during the interval. After 
 another interval she had a third attack of som- 
 nolency, which left her in the same state as after the 
 first, [n this manner she suffered these alternate 
 conditions for a period of four years, with the very 
 remarkable circumstance that during the one state 
 she retained all her original knowledge ; but during 
 the other, that only which she had acquired since 
 
244 REASON. 
 
 the first attack. During the healthy interval, for ex 
 ample, she was remarkable for the beauty of het 
 penmanship, but during the paroxysm wrote a poor 
 awkward hand. Persons introduced to her during 
 the paroxysm she recognised only in a subsequent 
 paroxysm but not in the interval ; and persons whom 
 she had seen for the first time during the healthy 
 interval she did not recognise during the attack. 
 
 In reference to this very curious subject, the 
 author is induced to add a fact which has been re- 
 cently communicated to him. A young woman of 
 the lower rank, aged nineteen, became insane about 
 two years ago ; but was gentle, and applied herself 
 eagerly to various occupations. Before her insanity 
 she had been only learning to read, and to form 
 few letters ; but during her insanity she taught her 
 self to write perfectly, though all attempts of othei'g 
 to teach her failed, as she could not attend to any 
 person who tried to do so. She has intervals of 
 reason, which have frequently continued three weeks, 
 sometimes longer. During these she can neither 
 read nor write; but immediately on the return of 
 her insanity she recovers her power of writing, and 
 can read perfectly. 
 
 Of the rem.^rkable condition of the mental facul- 
 ties, exemplified in these cases, it is impossible to 
 give any explanation. Something very analogous 
 to it occurs in other affections, though in a smaller 
 degree. Dr. Prichard mentions a lady who was liable 
 to sudden attacks of dehrium, which, after continuing 
 for various periods, went off as suddenly, leaving 
 her at once perfectly rational. The attack was often 
 so sudden that it commenced while she was engaged 
 in interesting conversation ; and on such occasions 
 it happened, that on her recovery from the state oi 
 delirium she instantly recurred to the conversatioa 
 she had been engaged in at the time of the attack, 
 though she had never referred to it during the con 
 tinuance of the aflfection. To such a degree was 
 
INSANITY. 245 
 
 this C3rried, that she would even complete an un- 
 finished sentence. During the subsequent paroxysm, 
 again, she would pursue the train of ideas which 
 had occupied her mind in the former. Mr. Combe 
 also mentions a porter, who in a state of intoxica- 
 tion left a parcel at a wrong house, and when sober 
 could not recollect what he had done with it. But 
 the next time he got drunk, he recollected where he 
 had left it, and went and recovered it. 
 
 III.— INSANITY. 
 
 Reason we have considered to be that exercise 
 of mind by which we compare facts with each other, 
 and mental impressions with external things. By 
 means of it we are enabled to judge of the relations 
 of facts, and of the agreement between our impres- 
 sions and the actual state of things in the external 
 world. We have seen also that pecuhar power 
 which is possessed by the mind in a healthy state, — 
 of arresting or changing the train of its thoughts at 
 pleasure, — of fixing the attention upon one, or trans- 
 ferring it to another, — of changing the train into 
 something which is analogous to it, or of dismiss- 
 hig it altogether. This power is, to a greater or less 
 degree, lost in insanity ; and the result is one of 
 t^vo conditions. Either the mind is entirely under 
 the influence of a single impression, without the 
 power of varying or dismissing it, and comparing it 
 with other impressions ; or it is left at the mercy of 
 a chain of impressions which have been set in mo- 
 tion, and which succeed one another according to 
 some principle of connexion over which the indi- 
 vidual has no control. In both cases the mental 
 impression is beheved to have a real and present 
 existence in the external world ; and this false be- 
 lief is not corrected by the actual state of things as 
 they present themselves to the senses, or by any 
 X2 
 
246 REASON. 
 
 facts or considerations which can be communicated 
 by other sentient beings. Of the cause of this re- 
 markable deviation from the healthy state of the 
 mental functions we know nothing. We may trace 
 its connexion with concomitant circumstances in the 
 bodily functions, and we may investigate certain 
 effects which result from it ; but the nature of the 
 change and the manner in which it is produced are 
 among those points in the arrangements of the Al- 
 mighty Creator which entirely elude our researches. 
 It appears, then, that there is a remarkable analogy 
 between the mental phenomena in insanity and in 
 dreaming; and that the leading peculiarities of both 
 these conditions are referable to two heads : — 
 
 1. The impressions which arise in the mind are 
 believed to be real and present existences, and this 
 belief is not corrected by comparing the conception 
 with the actual state of things in the external world. 
 
 2. The chain of ideas or images which arise fol- 
 low one another according to certain associations 
 over which the individual has no control ; he cannot, 
 as in a healthy state, vary the series or stop it at 
 his will. 
 
 In the numerous forms of insanity, we shall see 
 these characters exhibited in various degrees ; but 
 we shall be able to trace their influence in one degree 
 or another through all the modifications ; and, in the 
 higher states, or what we call perfect mania, we see 
 them exemplified in the same complete manner as in 
 dreaming. The maniac fancies himself a king pos- 
 sessed of boundless power, and surrounded by every 
 form of earthly splendour; and, with all his bodily 
 senses in their perfect exercise, this hallucination is 
 in no degree corrected by the sight of his bed of straw 
 and all the horrors of his cell. 
 
 From this state of perfect mama the malady is 
 traced through numerous gradations to forms wliich 
 exhibit slight deviations from the state of a sound 
 mind. But they all show, in one degree or another. 
 
 i 
 
INSANITY. 247 
 
 the same leading characters, namely, that some im- 
 pression has taken possession of the mind, and influ- 
 ences the conduct in a manner in which it would not 
 affect a sound understanding; and that this is not 
 corrected by facts and considerations which are cal- 
 culated immediately to relieve the erroneous impres- 
 sion. The lower degrees of this condition we call 
 eccentricity; and, in common language, we often talk 
 of a man being crazed upon a particular subject. 
 This consists in giving to an impression or a fancy 
 undue and extravagant importance, without taking 
 into account other facts and considerations which 
 ought to be viewed in connexion with it. The man 
 of this character acts with promptitude upon a single 
 idea, and seems to perceive nothing that interferes 
 with it; he forms plans, and sees only important 
 advantages which would arise from the accomplish- 
 ment of them, without perceiving difficulties or objec- 
 tions. The impression itself may be correct, but an 
 importance is attached to it disproportioned to its 
 true tendency ; or consequences are deduced from, 
 and actions founded upon it, which would not be 
 warranted in the estimate of a sound understanding. 
 It is often difficult to draw the line between certain 
 degrees of this condition and insanity ; and, in fact, 
 they very often pass into each other. This will be 
 illustrated by the folio sving example : — 
 
 A clergyman in Scotland, after showing various 
 extravagances of conduct, was brought before a jury 
 to be cognosced ; that is, by a form of Scotch law to 
 be declared incapable of managing his own affairs, 
 and placed under the care of trustees. Among the 
 acts of extravagance alleged against him was, that 
 he had burnt his library. When he was asked by 
 the jury what account he could give of this part of 
 his conduct, he replied in the following terms : — " In 
 the early part of ray hfe I had imbibed a liking for a 
 most unprofitable study, namely, controversial divin- 
 ity. On reviewing my library, I found a great part 
 
248 REASON. 
 
 of it to consist of books of this description, and 1 
 . was so anxious that my family should not be led to 
 follow the same pursuit, that I determined to burn 
 the whole." He gave answers equally plausible to 
 questions which were put to him respecting other 
 parts of his conduct ; and the result was, that the jury 
 found no sufficient ground for cognoscing him ; but 
 in the course of a fortnight from that time he was in 
 a state of decided mania. 
 
 It is, therefore, incorrect to say of insanity, as has 
 been said, that the maniac reasons correctly upon 
 unsound data. His data .may be unsound, that is, 
 the}'' may consist of a mental image which is purely 
 visionary, as in the state of perfect mania lately re- 
 ferred to ; but this is by no means necessary to con- 
 stitute the disease ; for his premises may be sound, 
 though he distorts them in the results which he de- 
 duces from them. This was remarkably the case in 
 the clergyman now mentioned. His premises were 
 sound and consistent, namely, his opinion of the un- 
 profitable nature of the study of controversial divin- 
 ity, and his anxiety that his family should not prose- 
 cute it. His insanity consisted in the rapid and 
 partial view which he took of the means for accom- 
 plishing his purpose, — burning his whole libraiy. 
 Had he sold his library, or that part of it which con- 
 sisted of controversial divinity, the measure would 
 have been in correct relation to the object which he 
 had in view; and if we suppose that, in going over 
 his library, he had met with some books of an im- 
 moral tendency, to have burnt these to prevent them 
 from falling into the hands of any individual would 
 have been the act both of a wise and a virtuous man. 
 But to burn his whole library to prevent his family 
 from studying controversial divinity, was the sug- 
 gestion of insanity, — distorting entirely the true rela- 
 tion of things, and carrying an impression, in itself 
 correct, into consequences which it in no degree 
 warranted. 
 
INSANITY. 249 
 
 A. remarkable peculiarity in many cases of insanity 
 is, a great activity of mind, and rapidity of concep- 
 tion, — a tendency to seize rapidly upon incidental or 
 partial relations of things, — and often a fertility of 
 imagination which changes the character of the mind, 
 sometimes without remarkably distorting it. The 
 memory, in such cases, is entire, and even appears 
 more ready than hi health ; and old associations are 
 called up with a rapidity quite unknown to the indi- 
 vidual in his sound state of mind. A gentleman, 
 mentioned by Dr. Willis, who was liable to periodi- 
 cal attacks of insanity, said that he expected the 
 paroxysms with impatience, because he enjoyed dur- 
 ing them a high degree of pleasure. " Every thing 
 appeared easy to me. No obstacles presented them- 
 selves, either in theory or practice. My memory 
 acquired, all of a sudden, a singular degree of per- 
 fection. Long passages of Latin authors occurred 
 to my mind. In general I have great difficulty in 
 finding rhythmical terminations, but then I could 
 write verses with as great facility as prose." "I 
 have often," says Pinel, " stopped at the chamber- 
 door of a literary gentleman who, during his parox- 
 ysms, appears to soar above the mediocrity of intel- 
 lect that was familiar to him, solely to admire his 
 newly-acquired powers of eloquence. He declaimed 
 upon the subject of the revolution with all the force, 
 the dignity, and the purity of language that this very 
 interesting subject could admit of. At other times 
 he was a man of very ordinary abilities." 
 
 It is this activity of thought and readiness of asso- 
 ciation that gives to maniacs of a particular class an 
 appearance of great ingenuity and acuteness. Hence 
 they have been said to reason acutely upon false 
 premises; and one author has even alleged that a 
 maniac of a particular kind would make an excellent 
 logician. But to say that a maniac reasons either 
 soundly or acutely is an abuse of terms. He reasons 
 plausibly and ingeniously ; that is, he catches rapidly 
 
250 REASON. 
 
 incidental and partial relations ; and trom the rapidity 
 with which they are seized upon, it may sometinies 
 be difficult at first to detect their fallacy. He might 
 have made a skilful logician of the schools, whose 
 ingenuity consisted in verbal disputes and frivolous 
 distinctions ; but he never can be considered as exer- 
 cising that sound logic, the aim of which is to trace 
 the real- relations of things, and the object of which 
 is truth. 
 
 The peculiar character of insanity, in all its modi- 
 fications, appears to be, that a certain impression 
 has fixed itself upon the mind in such a manner as 
 to exclude all others ; or to exclude them from that 
 influence which they ought to have on the mind in 
 :rts estimate of the relations of things. This impres- 
 sion may be entirely visionary and unfounded ; or it 
 may be in itself true, but distorted in the applications 
 which the unsound mind makes of it, and the conse- 
 quences which are deduced from it. Thus, a man 
 of wealth fancies himself a beggar, and in danger of 
 dying of hunger. Another takes up the same im- 
 pression who has, in fact, sustained some consider- 
 able loss. In the one, the impression is entirely 
 visionary, like that which might occur in a dream; 
 in the other, it is a real and true impression, carried 
 to consequences which it does not warrant. 
 
 There is great variety in the degree to which the 
 mind is influenced by the erroneous impression. In 
 some cases it is such as entirely excludes all others, 
 even those immediately arising from the evidence 
 of the senses, as in the state of perfect mama for- 
 merly referred to. In many others, though in a less 
 degree than this, it is such as to change the whole 
 character. The particular manner in which this 
 more immediately appears will depend, of course, 
 upon the nature of the erroneous impression. A 
 person formerly most correct in his conduct and 
 habits may become obscene and blasphemous j ac* 
 
INSANITY. 25 1 
 
 customed occupations become odious to him ; the 
 nearest and most beloved friends become objects of 
 his aversion and abhorrence. Much interesting mat- 
 ter of observation often arises out of these pecuUari- 
 ties ; and it is no less interesting to observe during 
 convalescence the gradual return to former habits 
 and attachments. A young lady, mentioned by Dr. 
 Rush, who had been for some time confined in a 
 lunatic asylum, had shown for several weeks every 
 mark of a sound mind except one, — she hated her 
 father. At length, she one day acknowledged with 
 pleasure the return of her filial attachment, and was 
 soon after discharged, entirely recovered. Even 
 when the erroneous impression is confined to a single 
 subject, it is remarkable how it absorbs the attention, 
 to the exclusion of other feelings of a most intense 
 and powerful kind. I knew a person of wealth who 
 had fallen into a temporary state of melancholic hal- 
 lucination, in connexion with a transaction in busi- 
 ness which he regretted having made, but of which 
 the real effect was of a trifling nature. While in this 
 situation, the most severe distress occurred in his 
 family, by the death of one of them under painful 
 circumstances, without his being aflected by it in the 
 slightest degree. 
 
 The uniformit}?- of the impressions of maniacs is 
 indeed so remarkable that it has been proposed by 
 Pinel as a test for distinguishing real from feigned 
 insanity. He has seen melancholies confined in the 
 Bicetre for twelve, fifteen, twenty, and even thirty 
 years ; and through the whole of that period their 
 hallucination has been hmited to one subject. Others, 
 after a course of years, have changed from one hal- 
 lucination to another. A man, mentioned by him, 
 was for eight years constantly haunted with the idea 
 of being poisoned : he then changed his hallucination 
 became sovereign of the world and extremely happy, 
 and thus continued for four years. 
 
 The sudden revival of old impressions, after hav- 
 
252 REASON. 
 
 ing been long entirely suspended by mental hallucina- 
 tions, presents some of the most singular phenomena 
 connected with this subject. Dr. Frichard mentions 
 an interesting case of this kjnd from the American 
 Journal of Science. A man had been employed for 
 a day with a beetle and wedges in splitting pieces of 
 wood for erecting a fence. At night, before going 
 home, he put the beetle and wedges into the hollow 
 of an old tree, and directed his sons, who had been 
 at work in an adjoining field, to accompany him next 
 morning to assist in making the fence. In the night 
 he became maniacal, and continued in a state of in- 
 sanity for several years, during which time his mind 
 was not occupied with any of the subjects with which 
 he had been conversant when in health. After seve- 
 ral years his reason returned suddenly, and the first 
 question he asked was whether his sons had brought 
 home the beetle and wedges. They, being afraid of 
 entering upon any explanation, only said that they 
 could not find them ; on which he arose from his bed, 
 went to the field where he had been at work so many 
 years before, and found, where he had left them, the 
 wedges and the iron rings of the beetle, the wooden 
 part being entirely mouldered away. — A lady, men- 
 tioned in the same journal, had been intensely en- 
 gaged for some time in a piece of needlework. 
 Before she had completed it, she became insane, and 
 continued hi that state for seven years, after which 
 her reason returned suddenly. One of the first ques- 
 tions she asked related to her needlework, though 
 she had never alluded to it, so far as was recollected, 
 during her illness. I have formerly alluded to the 
 remarkable case of a lady who was liable to periodi- 
 cal parox.ysms of delirium, which often attacked her 
 so suddenly, that in conversation she would stop in 
 the middle of a story, or even of a sentence, and 
 branch off into the subject of her hallucination. On 
 he return of her reason, she would resume the con- 
 ersation in which she was engaged at the time of 
 
INSANITY. 253 
 
 the attack, beginning exactly where she had left off, 
 though she had never alluded to it during the deli- 
 rium ; and on the next attack of delirium she would 
 resume the subject of hallucination with which she 
 had been occupied at the conclusion of the former 
 paroxysm. In some cases there is a total loss of the 
 impression of time respecting the period occupied by 
 the attack, which on the partial recovery of the pa- 
 tient shows itself by singular fancies. A man, men- 
 tioned by Haslam, maintained that he had seen the 
 seed sown in a particular field, and on passing it again 
 three or four days after saw the reapers at work 
 cutting down the corn. The interval, of which he 
 had thus lost entirely the impression, had been spent 
 in a state of furious insanity; from this he had in 
 so far recovered as, by a mere act of observation 
 and memory, to form this notion, but not so far as, 
 by an act of comparison or judgment, to perceive its 
 absurdity. 
 
 Among the most singular phenomena connected 
 with insanity we must reckon those cases in which 
 the hallucination is confined to a single point, while 
 on every other subject the patient speaks and acts 
 like a rational man ; and he often shows the most 
 astonishing power of avoiding the subject of his dis- 
 ordered impression, when circumstances make it 
 advisable for him to do so. A man, mentioned by 
 Pinel, who had been for some time confined in the 
 JBicetre, was, on the visitation of a commissary, or- 
 dered to be discharged as perfectly sane, after a long 
 conversation in which he had conducted himself with 
 the greatest propriety. The officer prepared the 
 proces verbal for his discharge, and gave it him to put 
 his name to it, when he subscribed himself Jesus 
 Chritt, and then indulged in all the reveries con- 
 nected with that delusion, l-ord Erskine gives a 
 very remarkable history of a man who indicted Dr. 
 Munro for confining him without cause in a mad- 
 house. He underwent the most rigid examination 
 Y 
 
2,')4 REAsojr. 
 
 by the counsel of the defendant without discovering 
 any appearance of insanity, until a gentleman came 
 into court who desired a question to be put to him 
 respecting a princess with whom he had corres- 
 ponded in cherry-juice. He immediately talked about 
 the princess in the most insane manner, and the cause 
 was at an end. But this having taken place in West- 
 minster, he commenced another action in the city of 
 London, and on this occasion no effort could induce 
 him to expose his insanity ; so that the cause was 
 dismissed only by bringing against him the evidence 
 taken at Westminster. On another occasion Lord 
 Erskine examined a gentleman who had indicted his 
 brother for confining him as a maniac, and the ex- 
 amination had gone on for great part of a day with- 
 out discovering any trace of insanity. Dr. Sims 
 then came into court, and informed the counsel that 
 the gentleman considered himself as the Saviour of 
 the world. A single observation addressed to him 
 in this character showed his insanity, and put an end 
 to the cause. Many similar cases are on record. 
 Several years ago a gentleman in Edinburgh who 
 was brought before a jury to be cognosced, defeated 
 every attempt of the opposite counsel to discover 
 any trace of insanity, until a gentleman came into 
 court who ought to have been present at the begin- 
 ning of the case, but had been accidentally detained. 
 He immediately addressed the patient by asking him 
 what were his latest accounts from the planet Saturn, 
 and speedily elicited ample proofs of insanity. 
 
 Of the nature and cause of that remarkable con 
 dition of the mental faculties which gives rise to the 
 phenomena of insanity, we know nothing. We can 
 only observe the facts, and endeavour to trace among 
 them some general principle of connexion: and 
 even in this there is great difficulty, chiefly from 
 the want of observations particularly directed to 
 this object. There would be much interesting sub- 
 
iNSAiaTv. 256 
 
 ject of inquiry In tracing the origin of the particular 
 chain of ideas which arise in individual cases of in- 
 sanity; and likewise the manner in which similar 
 impressions are modified in different cases, either by 
 circumstances in the natural disposition of the indi- 
 vidual, or by the state of his bodily functions at the 
 time. From what has been observed, it seems prob- 
 able that in both these respects there is preserved 
 a remarkable analogy to dreaming. The particular 
 hallucinations may be chiefly referred to the follow 
 ing heads • — 
 
 I. Propensities of character, which had been kept un- 
 der restraint by reason or by external circumstances 
 or old habits which had been subdued or restrained, 
 developing themselves without control, and leading 
 the mind into trains of fancies arising out of them. 
 Thus, a man of an aspiring ambitious character may 
 imagine himself a king or great personage ; while 
 in a man of a timid, suspicious disposition, the mind 
 may fix upon some supposed injury, or loss either 
 of property or reputation. 
 
 IT. Old associations recalled into the mind, an^ 
 mixed up perhaps with more recent occurrences, ir 
 the same manner as we often see in dreaming. A 
 lady, mentioned b}'^ Dr. Gooch, who became insane 
 in consequence of an alarm from a house on fire in 
 her neighbourhood, imagined that she was the Vir- 
 gin Mary, and had a luminous halo round her head, 
 
 III. Visions of the imagination which have for- 
 merly been indulged in, of that kind which we call 
 waking dreams, or castle-building, recurring to the 
 mmd in this condition, and now believed to have a 
 real existence. I have been able to trace this source 
 of the hallucination. In one case, for example, it 
 turned upon an office to w^hich the individual ima- 
 gined he had been anj^ointed ; and it was impossible 
 
258 REASON. 
 
 to persuade him to the contrary, or even that the 
 ofRce was not vacant. He afterward acknowledged 
 that his fancy had at various times been fixed upon 
 that appointment, though there were no circum- 
 stances that warranted him in entertaining any ex- 
 pectation of it. In a man, mentioned by Dr. Mori- 
 son, the hallucination turned upon circumstances 
 which had been mentioned when his fortune was 
 told by a gipsy. 
 
 IV. Bodily feelings giving rise to trains of asso* 
 ciations, in the same extravagant manner as in 
 dreaming. A man, mentioned by Dr. Rush, ima- 
 gined that he had a Cafi're in his stomach, who had 
 got into it at the Cape of Good Hope, and had oc- 
 casioned him a constant uneasiness ever since. In 
 such a case, it is probable, that there had been some 
 iixed or frequent uneasy feeling at the stomach, and 
 that about the commencement of his complaint, he 
 had been strongly impressed by some transaction in 
 which a Caffre was concerned. 
 
 v. There seems reason to believe that the haBn- 
 cinations of the insane are often influenced by a cer- 
 tain sense of the new and singular state in which 
 their mental povrers really are, and a certain feeling, 
 though confused and ill-defined, of the loss of that 
 power over their mental processes which they pos- 
 sessed when in health. To a feeling of this kind, 1 
 am disposed to refer the impression so common 
 among the insane of being under the influence of 
 some supernatural power. They so»uotimes repre- 
 sent it as the working of an evil spirit, and some- 
 times as witchcraft. Very often they describe it as 
 a mysterious and undue influence which some indi- 
 vidual has obtained over them : and this influence 
 they often represent as being carried on by means 
 of electricity, galvanism, or magnetism. This im- 
 pression being once established of a mysterious 
 
CfSANlTY. 267 
 
 agency, or a mysterious change in the state and feel 
 ings of the individual, various other incidental asso 
 ciations may be brought into connexion with it, ac 
 cording as particular circumstances have made a 
 deep impression on the mind. A man, mentioned 
 by Pinel, who had become insan^ during the French 
 revolution, imagined that he had been guillotined ; 
 that the judges had changed their mind after the 
 sentence was executed, and had ordered his head to 
 be put on again; and that the persons intrusted 
 with this duty had made a mistake, and put a wrong 
 head upon him. Another individual, mentioned by 
 Dr. Conoliy, imagined that he had been hanged, and 
 brought to life by means of galvanism ; and that the 
 whole of his life had not been restored to him. 
 
 Out of the same undefined feeling of mental pro- 
 cesses very different from those of their healthy 
 state probably arises another common impression, 
 namely, of intercourse with spiritual beings, visions, 
 and revelations. The particular character of these, 
 perhaps, arises out of some previous processes of 
 the mind, or strong propensity of the character ; 
 and the notion of a supernatural revelation may 
 proceed from a certain feeling of the new and pecu- 
 liar manner in which the impression is fixed upon 
 the mind. A priest, mentioned by Pinel, imagined 
 that he had a commission from the Virgin Mary to 
 murder a certain individual, who was accused of in- 
 fidelity. It is probable that the patient in this case 
 had been naturally of a violent and irascible dispo- 
 sition ; that he had come in contact with this per- 
 son, and had been annoyed and irritated by infidel 
 sentiments uttered by him ; and that a strong feel- 
 ing in regard to him had thus been excited in his 
 mind, which, in his insane state, was formed into 
 this vision. 
 
 When the mental impression is of a depressing 
 character, that modification of the disease is pro- 
 V^2 
 
258 REASON. 
 
 duced which is called melancholia. It seems to dif- 
 fer from mania merely in the subject of hallucina* 
 tion, and accordingly we find the two modifications 
 pass into each other, — the same patient being at one 
 time in a state of melancholic depression, and at 
 another of maniapal excitement. It is, however, 
 more common for the melancholic to continue in 
 the state of depression, and generally in reference 
 to one subject; and the difference between him and 
 the exalted maniac does not appear to depend upon 
 the occasional cause. For we sometimes find per- 
 sons who have become deranged in connexion with 
 overwhelming calamities, show no depression, nor 
 even a recollection of their distresses, but the high- 
 est state of exalted mani^. The difference appears 
 to depend chiefly upon constitutional pecuUaritiea 
 of character. 
 
 The most striking peculiarity of melancholia is 
 the prevaiUng propensity to suicide ; and there are 
 facts connected with this subject which remarkably 
 illustrate what may be called the philosophy of in- 
 sanity. When the melancholic hallucination has 
 fully taken possession of the mind, it becomes the 
 sole object of attention, without the power of vaiy- 
 ing the impression, or of directing the thoughts to 
 any facts or considerations calculated to remove or 
 palUate it. The evil seems overwhelming and irre- 
 mediable, admitting neither of palliation, consola- 
 tion, nor hope. For the process of mind calculated 
 to diminish such an impression, or even to produce 
 the hope of a palliation of the evil, is precisely that 
 exercise of mind which, in this singular condition, 
 is lost or suspended ; namely, a power of changing 
 the subject of thought, of transferring the attention 
 to other facts and considerations, and of comparing 
 the mental impression with these, and with the ac- 
 tual state of external things. Under such a convic- 
 tion of overwhelming and hopeless misery, the feel- 
 ing naturally arises of life being a burden, and this 
 
INSANITY. 259 
 
 is succeeded by a determination to quit it. When 
 such an association has once been formed, it also 
 fixes itself upon the mind, and fails to be corrected 
 by those considerations which ought to remove it. 
 That it is in this manner the impression arises, and 
 not from any process analogous to the determination 
 of a sound mind, appears, among other circum- 
 stances, from the singular manner in which it is 
 often dissipated; namely, by the accidental produc- 
 tion of some new impression, not calculated in any 
 degree to influence the subject of thought, but 
 simply to give a momentary direction of the m'/id 
 to some other feeling. Thus a man, mentionea by 
 Pinel, had left his house in the night with the d*-.ier- 
 mined resolution of drowning himself, when he <vas 
 attacked by robbers. He did his best to escape irom 
 them, and, having done so, returned home, the leso- 
 lution of suicide being entirely dissipated. A 
 woman, mentioned, I believe, by Dr. Burrows, had 
 her resolution changed in the same manner, by 
 something falling on her head after she had gone 
 out for a similar purpose. 
 
 A very singular modification occurs in some of 
 these cases. With the earnest desire of death, 
 there is combined an impression of the criminality 
 of suicide ; but this, instead of correcting the hallu- 
 cination, only leads to another and most extraordi- 
 nary mode of eff*ecting the purpose ; namely, by 
 committing murder, and so dying by the hand of 
 justice. Several instances are on record in which 
 .this remarkable mental process was distinctly traced 
 "and avowed ; and in which there was no mixture of 
 nnalice against the individuals who were murdered. 
 On the contrary, they were generally children ; and 
 in one of the cases, the maniac distinctl)'^ avowed 
 his resolution to commit murder, with a view of 
 dying by a sentence of law, and at the same time^ 
 his determination that his victim should be a child, 
 as he should thus avoid the additional g^uilt of send' 
 
260 ^ REASON. 
 
 ing a person out of the world in a state of unrepentetl 
 sin. The mental process in such a case presents 
 most interesting subject of reflection. It appears to 
 be purely a process of association, without the 
 power of reasoning-. I should suppose that there 
 had been at a former period, durinja: a comparatively 
 healthy state of the mental faculties, a repeated 
 contemplation of suicide, which had been always 
 checked by an immediate conviction of its dreadful 
 criminaUty. In this manner, a strong connexion 
 had been formed, which, when the idea of suicide 
 afterward came into the mind during the state of 
 insanity, led to the impression of its heinousness, 
 not by a process of reasoning, but by simple asso- 
 ciation. The subsequent steps are the distorted 
 reasonings of insanity, mixed with some previous 
 impression of the safe condition of children dying 
 in infancy. This explanation, I think, is strongly 
 countenanced by the consideration, that had the 
 idea of the criminality of suicide been in any de- 
 gree a process of reasoning, a corresponding con- 
 viction of the guilt of murder must have followed it. 
 I find, however, one case which is at variance with 
 this hypothesis. The reasoning of that unfortunate 
 individual was, that if he committed murder and 
 died by the hand of justice, there would be time for 
 making his peace with the Almighty between the 
 crime and his execution, which would not be the 
 case if he should die by suicide. This was a spe- 
 cies of reasoning, — but it was purely the reasoning 
 of insanity. 
 
 Attempts have been made to refer insanity to dis- 
 ease of bodily organs, but hitherto without much 
 success. In some instances we are able to trace a 
 connexion of this kind ; but in a large proportion 
 we can trace no bodily disease. On this subject, as 
 Well as various other points connected with the phe- 
 nomena of insanity, extensive and careful observa- 
 
INSANITY. 261 
 
 tion will be required before we are entitled to ad- 
 vance to any conclusions. In regard to what have 
 been called the moral causes of insanity, also, I sus- 
 pect there has been a good deal of fallacy, arising 
 from considering as a moral cause what was really 
 a part of the disease. Thus we find so many cases 
 of insanity referred to erroneous views of religion, 
 so many to love, so many to ambition, &c. But 
 perhaps it may be doubted whether that which was 
 m these cases considered as the cause, was not 
 rather, in many instances, a pai t of the hallucination. 
 This, I think, applies in a peculiar manner to the 
 important subject of religion, which, by a common 
 but very loose mode of speaking, is often mentioned 
 as a frequent cause of insanity. When there is a 
 constitutional tendency to insanity, or to melancholy, 
 one of its leading modifications, every subject is dis- 
 torted to which the mijid can be directed, and none 
 more frequently or more remarkably than the great 
 questions of religious belief. But this is the effect, 
 not the cause ; and the frequency of this kind of 
 hallucination, and the various forms which it as- 
 sumes, may be ascribed to the subject being one to 
 which the minds of all men are so naturally directed 
 in one degree or another, and of which no man living 
 can entirely divest himself. Even when the mind 
 does give way uiider a great moral cause, such as 
 overwhelming misfortunes, we often find that the 
 hallucmation does not refer to them, but to some- 
 thing entirely distinct : — striking examples of this 
 are mentioned by Pinel. 
 
 Insanity is, in a large proportion of cases, to be 
 traced to hereditary predisposition ; and this is often 
 so strong that no prominent moral cause is neces- 
 sary for the production of the disease, and probably 
 no moral treatment would have any effect m pre- 
 venting it. We must, however suppose, that where 
 a tendency to insanity exists, there may be, in many 
 cases, tiiicumstajices in mental habits or menta- 
 
262 REAso^r. 
 
 discipline, calculated either to favour or to counter- 
 act tlie tendency. Insanity frequently commences 
 with a state in which particular impressions fix 
 themselves upon the mind in a manner entirely dis- 
 proportioned to their true relations ; and in which 
 these false impressions fail to be corrected by the 
 judgment comparing them with other impressions, 
 or with external things. In so far as mental habits 
 may be supposed to favour or promote such a condi- 
 tion, this may be likely to result from allowing the 
 mind to wander away from the proper duties of life, 
 or to luxuriate amid scenes of the imagination; and 
 permitting mental emotions, of whatever kind, to be 
 excited in a manner disproportioned to the true rela- 
 tions of the objects which give rise to them; in 
 short, from allowing the mind to ramble among ima- 
 ginary events, or to be led away by shght and casual 
 relations, instead of steadily exercising the judg- 
 ment in the investigation of truth. We might refer 
 to the same head, habits of distorting events, and of 
 founding upon them conclusions which they do not 
 warrant. These, and other propensities and habits 
 of a similar kind, constitute what is called an ill- 
 regulated mind. Opposed to it is that habit of cool 
 and sound exercise of the understanding by which 
 events are contemplated in their true relations and 
 consequences, and mental emotions arise out of them 
 such as they are really calculated to produce. Every 
 one must be familiar with the difference which ex- 
 ists among different individuals in this respect ; and 
 even in the same individual at different times. We 
 trace the influence of the principle in the impression 
 which is made by events coming upon us suddenly 
 and unexpectedly ; and the manner in which the emo- 
 tion is gradually brought to its proper bearings, as 
 the mind accommodates itself to the event, by con- 
 templating it in its true relations. In such a mental 
 process as this, we observe the most remarkable 
 diversities among various individuals. In some, the 
 
INSANITY 263 
 
 mind rspidly contemplates the event in all its rela- 
 tions, and speedily arrives at the precise impression 
 or emotion which it is in truth fitted to produce. In 
 others, this is done more slowly, perhaps more im- 
 perfectly, and probably not without the aid of sug-- 
 gestions from other minds ; while, in some, the first 
 impression is so strong and so permanent, ajid re- 
 sists in such a manner those considerations which 
 might remove or moderate it, that we find difficulty 
 in drawing the line between it and that kind of false 
 impression which constitutes the lower degree of 
 insanity. Habits of mental application must also 
 exert a great influence ; and we certainly remark a 
 striking difference between those who are accus- 
 tomed merely to works of imagination and taste, 
 and those whose minds have been rigidly exercised 
 to habits of calm and severe inquiry. A fact is men- 
 tioned by Dr. Conolly which, if it shall be confirmed 
 by farther observation, would lead to some most im- 
 portant reflections. He states that it appears from 
 the registers of the Bicetre, that maniacs of the more 
 educated classes consist almost entirely of priests, 
 artists, painters, sculptors, poets, and musicians ; 
 while no instance, it is said, occurs of the disease m 
 naturahsts, physicians, geometricians, or chymists. 
 
 The higher degrees of insanity are in general so 
 distinctly defined in their characters as to leave no 
 room for doubt in deciding upon the nature of the 
 affection. But it is otherwise in regard to many of 
 the lower modifications , and great discretion is often 
 required in judging whether the conduct of an indi- 
 vidual, in particular instances, is to be considered as 
 indicative of insanity. This arises from the princi- 
 ple, which must never be lost sight of, that in such 
 cases we are not to decide simply from the facts them- 
 selves, but by their relation to other circumstances, 
 and to the previous habits and character of the 
 mdividual. There are many peculiarities and eccen- 
 
264 REASON. 
 
 tricities of character which do not constitute in- 
 sanity ; and the same pecuUarities may afford reason 
 for suspecting insanity in one person and not in an- 
 other; namely, when in the former they have ap- 
 peared suddenly, and are much opposed to his pre- 
 vious uniform character : while, to the latter, they 
 have been long known to be habitual and natural. 
 Thus, acts of thoughtless prodigality and extrava- 
 gance may, in one person, be considered entirely in 
 accordance with his uniform character; while the 
 same acts, committed by a person formerly distin- 
 guished by sedate and prudent conduct, may give 
 good ground for suspecting insanity, — and in fact 
 constitute a form in which the affection very often 
 appears. In ordinary cases of insanity, a man's con- 
 duct is to be tried by a comparison with the average 
 conduct of other men; but, in many of the cases 
 now referred to, he must be compared with his for- 
 mer self. 
 
 Another caution is to be kept in mind, respecting 
 the mental impr«?ssions of the individual in these 
 slight or suspected cases of insanity; that an im- 
 pression which sfives reason for suspecting insanity 
 in one case, because we know it to be entirely un- 
 founded and imaginary, may allow of no such conclu- 
 sion in another, in which it has some reasonable or 
 plausible foundation. Insane persons indeed often 
 relate stories which hang together so plausibly and 
 consistently, that we cannot say whether we are to 
 consider them as indicative of insanity, until we 
 have ascertained whether they have any foundation, 
 or are entirely imaginary. In one instance, which 
 was referred to in the discussions respecting a late 
 remarkable case, the principal fact alleged against 
 the individual was, his having taken up a suspicion 
 of the fidelity of his wife. But it turned out to be 
 a very general opinion among his neighbours that 
 the impression was well-founded. The same prin- 
 ciple applies to the antipathies against intimate 
 
INSANITY PUNISHMENT OF THE INSANE. 265 
 
 friends which are often so remarkahle in the insane. 
 They may be of such a nature as decidedly to marlf 
 the hallucination of insanity, — as when a person ex. 
 presses a dislike to a child, formerly beloved, on the 
 ground that he is not really his child, but an evij 
 spirit which has assumed his form. This is clearly 
 insanity; but if the antipathy be against a friend or 
 relative, without any such reason assigned for it, we 
 require to keep in view the inquiry, whether the im- 
 pression be the result of hallucination, or whether 
 the relative has really given any ground for it. In all 
 slight or doubtful cases, much discretion should be 
 used in putting an individual under restraint, and 
 Etiil more in immediately subjecting him to confine- 
 ment in an asylum for lunatics. But there is one 
 modification in which all such delicacy must be dis- 
 pensed with, namely, in those melancholic cases 
 which have shown any tendency to suicide. When- 
 ever this propensity has appeared, no time is to be 
 lost in taking the most effectual precautions ; and 
 the most painful consequences have very often re- 
 sulted in cases of this description, from misplaced 
 delicacy and delay. 
 
 The subject of hallucination in insanity we have 
 seen may be either entirely imaginary and ground- 
 less, or may be a real event viewed in false relations, 
 and carried to false consequences. This view of the 
 subject bears upon an important practical point 
 which has been much agitated, namely, the liability 
 of maniacs to punishment ; and which has been ably 
 and ingeniously argued by Lord Erskine in his de- 
 fence of Hatfield, who fired at his majesty King 
 George III. The principle contended for by this 
 eminent person is, that when a maniac commits a 
 crime under the influence of an impression which is 
 entirely visionary, and purely the hallucination of 
 insanity, he is not the object of punishment ; but 
 that, though he may have shown insanity in other 
 Z 
 
266 REASON. 
 
 things, he is liable to punishment if the impression 
 under which he acted was true, and the human pas- 
 sion arising out of it was directed to its proper ob- 
 ject. He illustrates this principle by contrasting the 
 case of Hatfield with that of Lord Ferrers. Hatfield 
 had taken a fancy that tlie end of the world was at 
 hand, and that the death of his majesty was in some 
 way connected with important events which were 
 about to take place. Lord Ferrers, after shownig 
 various indications of insanity, murdered a man 
 against whom he was known to harbour deep-rooted 
 resentment, on account of real transactions in which 
 that individual had rendered himself obnoxious to 
 him. The former, therefore, is considered as an 
 example of the pure hallucination of insanity ; the 
 latter as one of human passion founded on real 
 events and directed to its proper object. Hatfield, 
 accordingly, was acquitted ; but Lord Ferrers was 
 convicted of murder, and executed. The contrast 
 between the two cases is sufficiently striking ; but 
 it may be questioned whether it will bear all that 
 Lord Erskine has founded upon it. There can be 
 no doubt of the first of his propositions, that a per- 
 son acting under the pure hallucination of insanity, 
 in regard to impressions which are entirely un- 
 founded, is not the object of punishment. But the 
 converse does not seem to follow ; namely, that the 
 man becomes an object of punishment merely be- 
 cause the impression was founded in fact, and be- 
 cause there was a human passion directed to its 
 «)roper object. For it is among the characters of 
 insanity not only to call up impressions which are 
 entirely visionary, but also to distort and exaggerate 
 those which are true, and to carry them to conse- 
 quences which they do not warrant in the estimation 
 of a sound mind. A. person, for instance, who has 
 suffered a loss in business which does not affect h:% 
 circumstances in any important degree may imagine, 
 under the influence of hallucination, that he is a 
 
INSANITY PUNISHMENT OF THE INSANE. 267 
 
 ruined man, and that his family is reduced to beg- 
 gary. Now, were a wealthy man under the influ- 
 ence of such hallucination to commit an outrajre on 
 a person who had defrauded him of a trifling sum, 
 the case would afford the character mentioned by 
 Lord Erskine, namely, human passion founded upon 
 real events, and directed to its proper object : but 
 no one, probably, would doubt for a moment that 
 the process was as much the result of insanity as 
 if the impression had been entirely visionary. In 
 this hypothetical case, indeed, the injury, though 
 real, is slight ; but it does not appear that the prin- 
 ciple is necessarily afl'ected by the injury being great, 
 or more in relation to the result which it leads to 
 according to the usual course of human passion. It 
 would appear probable, therefore, that in deciding a 
 doubtful case, a jury ought to be guided, not merely 
 by the circumstances of the case itself, but by the 
 evidence of insanity in other things. This, accord- 
 ingly, appears to have been the rule on which a jury 
 acted in another important case mentioned by Lord 
 Erskine, in which an unfortunate female, under the 
 influence o*f insanity, murdered a man who had se- 
 duced and deserted "her. Here was a real injuiy of 
 the highest description, and human passion founded 
 upon it and directed to its proper object ; but the 
 jury, on proof of derangement in other things, ac- 
 quitted the prisoner, who, accordingly, soon passed 
 into a state of " undoubted and deplorable insanity.'' 
 In the case of Lord Ferrers, also, it would appear 
 that the decision proceeded, not so much upon the 
 principle of human passion directed to its proper 
 object, as upon an impression that his lordship's pre- 
 vious conduct had been indicative of uncontrolled 
 violence of temper, rather than actual insanity. 
 
 Some of the points which have been briefly alluded 
 to seem to bear on the practical* part of this im- 
 portant subject, — the moral treatment of insanity. 
 
268 REASON. 
 
 "Without entering on any lengthened discussion 
 some leading principles may be referred to the fol- 
 lowing heads ; — 
 
 I. It will be generally admitted that every attempt 
 to reason with a maniac is not only fruitless, but 
 rather tends to fix more deeply his erroneous impres- 
 sion. An important rule in the moral management 
 of the insane will therefore probably be, to avoid 
 every allusion to the subject of their hallucination, 
 to remove from them every thing calculated by as- 
 sociation to lead to it, and to remove them from 
 scenes and persons likely to recall or keep up the 
 erroneous impression. Hence, probably, in a great 
 measure arises the remarkable benefit of removing 
 the insane from their usual residence, friends, and 
 attenaanis, and placing them in new scenes, and en- 
 tirely under the care of strangers. The actual effect 
 of this measure is familiar to every one who is in any 
 degree conversant w ith the management of the insane. 
 That the measure may have its full effect, it appears 
 to be of importance that the patient should not, for 
 a considerable time, be visited by any friend or ac- 
 quaintance ; but should be separated from every 
 thing connected with his late erroneous associa- 
 tions. The danger also is well known which attends 
 premature return to home and common associates ; 
 — immediate relapse having often followed this, in 
 cases which had been going on for some time in the 
 most favourable manner. 
 
 II. Occupation. This is referable to two kinds, 
 namely, bodily and mental. The higher states of 
 mania in general admit of no occupation ; but, on 
 Jhe contrary, often require coercion. A degree be- 
 '}ow this may admit of bodily occupation; and when 
 this can be accomplished in such a manner as fully 
 to occupy the attention and produce fatigue, there is 
 
INSANITY MORAL TREATMENT. 269 
 
 reason to believe that much benefit may result from 
 it. Dr. Gregory used to mention a farmer in the 
 north of Scotland who had acquired uncommon 
 celebrity in the treatment of the insane; and his 
 method consisted chiefly in having them constantly 
 employed in the most severe bodily labour. As 
 soon, also, as the situation of the patient will admit 
 of it, mental occupation must be considered as of th" 
 utmost importance : it should not consist merely of 
 desultory employment or amusement, but should 
 probably be regulated by two principles : — 1. Occu- 
 pations calculated to lead the mind gradually into 
 connected series of thought. When the nienta 
 condition of the patient is such as to make it prac 
 ticable, nothing answers so well as a course of his- 
 tory, the leading events being distinctly written ou' 
 in the form of a table, with the dates. Thus the at- 
 tention is fixed in an easy and connected manner 
 and in cases which admit of such occupation being 
 continued the etfeU is often astonishing. 2. En- 
 deavouring to discover the patient's former hiibits 
 and favourite pursuits, at a period previous to the 
 hallucination, and unconnected with it ; and using 
 means for leading his attention to these. I have 
 already alluded to the complete suspension of all 
 former pursuits and attachments which often takes 
 place in insanity, and to a return of them as being 
 frequently the most marked and satisfactory symp' 
 tom of convalescence. This is, in such cases, to be 
 considered as a sign, not a cause of the improve- 
 ment; but there seems every reason to believe tha 
 the principle might be acted upon with advantage in 
 the moral treatment of certain forms of insanity 
 On a similar principle, it is probable that in many 
 cases much benefit might result from moral manage- 
 ment calcuhted to revive associations of a pleasing 
 kmd, in regard to circumstances anterior to the oc- 
 currence of the malady. 
 
 Z2 
 
270 RB^dON. 
 
 III. Careful classification of the insane, so thafc 
 the mild and peaceful melancholic may not be har- 
 assed by the ravings of the maniac. The import- 
 ance of this is obvious ; but of still greater im- 
 portance it will probably be, to w^atch the first 
 cawnings of reason, and instantly to remove the pa- 
 tient from all associates by whom his mind might 
 be again bewildered. The following case, mentioned 
 by Pinel, is certainly an extreme one, but much im- 
 portant reflection arises out of it in reference both 
 to this and the preceding topic : — A musician con- 
 fined in the Bicetre, as one of the first symptoms 
 of returning reason, made some slight allusions to 
 his favourite instrument. It was immediately pro- 
 cured for him; he occupied himself with music for 
 several hours every day, and his convalescence 
 seemed to be advancing rapidly. But he was then 
 unfortunately allowed to come frequently into con- 
 tact with a furious maniac, by meeting him in the 
 gardens. The musician's mind was unhinged ; his 
 violin was destroyed; and he fell back into a state 
 of insanity which was considered as confirmed and 
 hopeless. 
 
 Cases of decided insanity in general admit of little 
 moral treatment, until the force of the disease has 
 been broken in some considerable degree. But 
 among the numerous modifications which come un- 
 der the view of the physician, there are various 
 forms in which, by judicious moral management, a 
 great deal is to be accomphshed. Some of these 
 affections are of a temporary nature, and have so 
 little influence on a man's general conduct in life, 
 2hat they are perhaps not known beyond his own 
 family, or confidential friends. In some of these 
 fases the individual is sensible of the singular change 
 «vhich has taken place in the state of his mental 
 ■powers, and laments the distortion of his feelings 
 and affections. He complains, perhaps, that he has 
 lost his asual interest in his family, and his usual 
 
INSANITY MORAL TREATMENT. 271 
 
 affection for them ; and that he seems to be deprived 
 of every feeling of which he was formerly suscepti- 
 ble. The truth is, that the mind has become so oc- 
 cupied by the erroneous impression as to be inac- 
 cessible to any other, and incapable of applying to 
 any pursuit, or following out a train of thought. 
 
 A most interesting affection of this class often 
 comes under the observation of the physician, con- 
 sisting of deep but erroneous views of religion, 
 generally accompanied with disturbed sleep and con 
 siderable derangement of the system, and producing 
 a state of mind closely bordering upon insanity. It 
 occurs most commonly in young persons of acute 
 and susceptible feelings, and requires the most deli- 
 cate and cautious management. Two modes of 
 treatment are frequently adopted in regard to it, 
 both equally erroneous. The one consists in hur- 
 rying the individual into the distraction of company, 
 or a rapid journey ; the other, in urging religious dis- 
 cussions, and books of profound divinity. Both are 
 equally injudicious, especially the latter; for every 
 attempt to discuss the important subject to which 
 the distorted impression refers only serves to fix 
 the hallucination more deeply. The mode of treat- 
 ment which I have always found most beneficial 
 consists of regular exercise, with attention to the 
 general health; and in enforcing a course of read- 
 ing of a nature likely to fix the mind, and carry it 
 forward in a connected train. Light reading or 
 mere amusement will not answer the purpose. A 
 regular course of history, as formerly mentioned, 
 appears to succeed best, and fixing the attention by 
 writing out the dates and leading events in the form 
 of a table. When the mind has been thus gradually 
 exercised for some time in a connected train of 
 thought, it is often astonishing to observe how it 
 will return to the subject which had entirely over- 
 powered it, with a complete dissipation of former 
 erroneous impressions. A frequent complaint at 
 
272 REASON. 
 
 the rommencement of such an exercise is, that the 
 person finds it impossible to fix the attention, or to 
 recollect the subject of even a few sentences: this 
 is part of the disease, and by perseverance gradually 
 disappears. This experiment I have had occasion 
 to make many times, and it has always appeared to 
 me one of extreme interest. I do not say that it 
 has uniformly succeeded, for the affection frequently 
 passes into confirmed insanity ; but it has succeeded 
 in a sufficient number of instances to give every en,- 
 courage ment for a careful repetition of it. The same 
 observations and the same mode of treatment apply 
 to the other forms of partial hallucination. The 
 plan is, of course, to be assisted by regular exercise, 
 and attention to the general health, which is usually 
 nnuch impaired. The affections are particularly 
 connected in a very intimate manner with a disor- 
 dered state of the stomach and bowels, and with 
 derangements in the female constitution. Means 
 adapted to these become, therefore, an essential part 
 of the management. 
 
 There has been considerable discussion respecting 
 the distinction between insanity and idiocy. It has 
 been said, that the insane reason justly on false prem- 
 ises ; and that idiots reason falsely on sound premises. 
 This does not seem to be well founded. It would 
 appear that a maniac may reason either upon false 
 or true premises ; but that, in either case, his reason- 
 ing is influenced by distorted views of the relations 
 of things. The idiot, on the other hand, does not 
 eason at all ; that is, though he may remember the 
 facts, he does not trace their relations. Idiocy ap- 
 pears to consist, in a greater or less degree, in a 
 simply impaired or weakened state of the mental 
 powers ; but this is not insanity. On the contrary, 
 we have seen that, in the insane, certain mental 
 powers may be in the highest state of activity, — the 
 memory recalling things long gone by,— the iraagi 
 
INSANITT— IDIOCY. 273 
 
 nation forminff brilliant associations, — every faculty 
 in the highest activity except the power of tracing 
 correct relations. I have already referred to a gen- 
 tleman mentioned by Pinel, who possessed during the 
 paroxysm a brilliancy of conception and readiness 
 of memory which were not natural to him. Another, 
 mentioned by the same writer, who was infatuated 
 with the chimera of perpetual motion, constructed 
 pieces of mechanism which were the result of the 
 most profound combinations, at the time when he 
 was so mad that he believed his head to have been 
 changed. A female, mentioned, I believe, by Rush, 
 sang with great beauty and sweetness, wliich she 
 could not do when she was sane ; and a musician 
 played, when insane, much better than when he was 
 well. 
 
 In that remarkable obliteration of the mental facul- 
 ties, on the other hand, which we call idiocy, fatuity, 
 or dimentia, there is none of the distortion of in- 
 sanity. It is a simple torpor of the faculties, in the 
 higher degrees amounting to total insensibility to 
 every impression ; and some remarkable facts are 
 connected with the manner in which it arises with- 
 out bodily disease. A man, mentioned by Dr. Rush, 
 was so violently affected by some losses in trade 
 that he was deprived almost instantly of all his 
 mental faculties. He did not take notice of any 
 thing, not even expressing a desire for food, but 
 merely taking it when it was put into his mouth. A 
 servant dressed him in the morning, and conducted 
 him to a seat in his parlour, where he remained the 
 whole day, with his body bent forward, and his eyes 
 fixed on the floor. In this state he continued nearly 
 five years, and then recovered completely and rather 
 suddenly. The account which he afterward gave 
 of his condition during this period was, that his mind 
 was entirely lost ; and that it was only about two 
 months before his final recovery that he began to 
 baye sensations and thoughts of any kind. These 
 
274 REASON. 
 
 at first served only to convey fears and apprehen- 
 sions, especially in the nig-ht-time. Of perfect 
 idiocy produced in the same manner by a moral 
 cause an affecting example is given by Pinel : — Two 
 young men, brothers, were carried off by the con- 
 scription, and, in the first action in which they were 
 engaged, one of them was shot dead by the side of 
 the other. The survivor was instantly struck with 
 perfect idiocy. He was taken home to his father's 
 house, where another brother was so affected by the 
 sight of him, that he was seized in the same man- 
 ner ; and in this state of perfect idiocy, they were 
 both received into the Bicetre. I have formerly re- 
 ferred to various examples of this condition super- 
 vening on bodily disease. In some of them the 
 aff'ection was permanent ; in others it was entirely 
 recovered from. 
 
 The most striking illustration of the various shades 
 of idiocy is derived from the modifications of intel- 
 lectual condition observed in the cretins of the Val- 
 lais. These singular beings are usually divided into 
 three classes, which receive the name of cretins, 
 semi-cretins, and cretins of the third degree. The 
 first of these classes, or perfect cretins, are in point 
 of intellect, scarcely removed above mere animal 
 life. Many of them cannot speak, and are only so 
 far sensible of the common calls of nature, as to go, 
 when excited by hunger, to places where they have 
 been accustomed to receive their food. The rest ot 
 their time is spent, either in basking in the sun, or 
 sitting by the fire without any trace of intelligence. 
 The next class, or semi-cretins, show a higher de- 
 gree of intelligence ; they remember common events, 
 understand what is said to them, and express them- 
 selves in an intelligent manner on the most common 
 subjects. They are taught to repeat prayers, but 
 scarcely appear to annex any meaning to the words 
 which they employ ; and they cannot be taught to 
 read or write, or even to number their fingers. The 
 
INSANITY — IDIOCY CRETINISM. 275 
 
 cretins of the third degree" learn to read and write, 
 though with very little understanding of what they 
 read, except on the most common topics. But they 
 are acutely alive to their own interest, and extremely 
 litigious. They are without prudence or discretion 
 in the direction of their affairs, and the regulation 
 of their conduct ; yet obstinate, and unwilling to be 
 advised. Their memory is good as to what they 
 have seen or heard, and they learn to imitate wha't 
 they have observed in various arts, as machinery, 
 painting, sculpture, and architecture ; but it is mere 
 imitation without invention. Some of them learn 
 music in the same manner; and others attempt poetry 
 of the lowest kind, distinguished by mere rhyme. It 
 is said that none of them can be taught arithmetic, 
 but 1 do not know whether this has been ascertained 
 to be invariably true ; — there is no doubt that it is 
 a very general peculiarity. 
 
 The imbecile in other situations show characters 
 very analogous to these. Their memory is often 
 remarkably retentive; but it appears to be merely a 
 power of retaining facts or words in the order and 
 connexion in which they have been presented to 
 them, without the capacity of tracing relations, and 
 forming new associations. In this manner, they 
 sometimes acquire languages, and even procure a 
 name for a kind of scholarship; and they learn to 
 imitate in various arts, but without invention. Their 
 deficiency appears to be in the powers of abstracting, 
 recombining, and tracing relations ; consequently they 
 are deficient in judgment, for which these processes 
 are necessary. The maniac, on the other hand, 
 seizes relations acutely, rapidly, and often ingeni- 
 ously, — but not soundly. They are only incidental 
 relations, to which he is led by some train of asso- 
 ciation existing in his own mind ; but they occupy 
 his attention in such a manner that he does not ad- 
 mit the consideration of other relations, or compare 
 
276 REASON. 
 
 them with those which have fixed themselves upon 
 his mind. 
 
 The states of idiocy and insanity, therefore, are 
 clearly distinguished in the more complete examples 
 of both; but many instances occur in which they 
 pass into each other, and where it is difficult to say 
 to which of the aifections the case is to be referred, 
 I believe they may also be, to a certain extent, com- 
 bined ; or that there may be a certain diminution of 
 the mental powers existing along with that distortion 
 which constitutes insanity. They likewise alternate 
 with one another, — maniacal paroxysms often leav- 
 ing the patient, in the intervals, in a state of idiocy. 
 A very interesting modification of another kind is 
 mentioned by Pinel : — Five young men were received 
 into the Bicetre, whose intellectual faculties ap- 
 peared to be really obliterated ; and they continued 
 in this state for periods of from three to upwards of 
 twelve months.. They were then seized with par- 
 oxysms of considerable violence, which continued 
 from fifteen to twenty-five days, after which they 
 all entirely recovered. 
 
 Idiocy can seldom be the subject either of medical 
 or moral treatment ; but the peculiar characters of 
 it often become the object of attention in courts of 
 law, in relation to the competency of imbecile per- 
 sons to manage their own affairs ; and much diffi- 
 culty often occurs in tracing the line between com- 
 petency and incompetency. Several years ago a 
 case occurred in Edinburgh, which excited much 
 discussion, and shows, in a striking manner, some of 
 the peculiarities of this condition of the mental facul- 
 ties : — A gentleman of considerable property hav- 
 ing died intestate, his heir-at-law was a younger 
 brother, who had always been reckoned very de- 
 ficient in intellect ; and consequently, his relatives 
 now brought an action into the Court of Session, 
 for the purpose of finding him incompetent, and ob- 
 taining the authority of the court for putting him 
 
INSANITY — IDIOCY. 277 
 
 under trustees. In the investigation of this case, 
 various respectable persons deponed that they had 
 long known the individual, ajid considered him as de- 
 cidedly imbecile in his understanding, and incapable 
 of managing his affairs. On the other hand, most 
 respectable evidence was produced, that he had been, 
 when at school, an excellent scholar in the languages, 
 and had repeatedly acted as a private tutor to boys; 
 that he was remarkably attentive to his own interest, 
 and very strict in making a bargain ; that he had 
 been proposed as a candidate for holy orders, and, 
 on his first examination in the languages, had ac- 
 quitted himself well; but that, in the subsequent 
 trials, in which the candidate is required to deliver 
 a discourse, he had been found incompetent. The 
 Court of Session, after long pleadings, decided that 
 this individual was incapable of managing his affairs. 
 The case was then appealed to the House of Lords, 
 where after farther protracted proceedings, this de- 
 cision was affirmed. I was well acquainted with 
 this person, and was decidedly of opinion that he 
 was imbecile in his intellects. At my suggestion 
 the following experiment was made in the course 
 of the investigation. A small sum of money was 
 given him, with directions to spend it, and present 
 an account of his disbursement, with the addition 
 of the various articles. He soon got rid of the mo- 
 ney, but was found totally incapable of this very 
 simple process of arithmetic, though the sum did 
 not exceed a few shillings. This individual, then, it 
 would appear, possessed the simple state of mem- 
 ory, which enabled him to acquire languages ; but 
 was deficient in the capacity of combining, reflecting, 
 or comparing. His total inability to perform the 
 most simple process of arithmetic was a prominent 
 character in the case, analogous to what I have al- 
 ready stated in regard to the cretins. In doubtful 
 cases of the kind, I think this might be employed as 
 a negative test with advantage ; for it probably will 
 A a 
 
278 REASON. 
 
 not be doubted that a person who is incapable of 
 such a process is incompetent to manage his affairs. 
 
 It is a singular fact that the imbecile are, in gene- 
 ral, extremely attentive to their own interest, and 
 perhaps most commonly cautious in their proceed- 
 ings. Ruinous extravagance, absurd schemes, and 
 quixotic ideas of liberahty and magnificence are more 
 allied to insanity ; the former may become the dupes 
 of others, but it is the latter who are most likely to 
 involve and ruin themselves. 
 
 Before leaving the subject of Insanity, there is a 
 point of great interest which may be briefly referfed 
 to. It bears, in a very striking manner, upon what 
 may be called the pathology of the mental powers ; 
 but I presume not to touch upon it, except in the 
 slightest manner. In the language of common life, 
 we sometimes speak of a moral insanity, in which a 
 man rushes headlong through a course of vice and 
 crime, regardless of every moral restraint, of every 
 social tie, and of all consequences, whether more 
 immediate or future. Yet, if we take the most 
 melancholy instance of this kind that can be fur- 
 nished by the history of human depravity, the indi- 
 vidual may still be recognised, in regard to all phys- 
 ical relations, as a man of a sound mind ; and he may 
 be as well qualified as other men for the details of 
 business, or even the investigations of science. He 
 is correct in his judgment of all the physical relations 
 of things; but, in regard to their moral relations, 
 every correct feeling appears to be obliterated. If 
 a man, then, may thus be correct in his judgment of 
 all physical relations while he is lost to every moral 
 relation, we have strong ground for believing that 
 there is in his constitution a power distinct from rea- 
 son, but which holds the same sway over his moral 
 powers that reason does among his intellectual ; and 
 that the influence of this power may be weakened or 
 lost, while reason remains unimpaired. This is the 
 moral principle, or the power of conscience. It has 
 
SPECTRAL ILLTISIONS. 279 
 
 been supposed by some to be a modification of rea- 
 son, but the considerations now referred to appear 
 to favour the opinion of their being- distinct. That 
 this power should so completely lose its sway while 
 reason remains unimpaired is a point in the moral 
 constitution of man which it does not belong to the 
 physician to investigate. The fact is unquestion- 
 able ; the solution is to be sought for in the records 
 of eternal truth. 
 
 TV.— SPECTRA.L ILLUSIONS. 
 
 The tbeory of spectral illusions is closely con- 
 nected with that of the affections treated of in the 
 preceding parts of this section ; and I shall conclude 
 this subject with a very brief notice of some of the 
 most authentic facts relating to them, under the fol 
 lowing heads : — 
 
 I. False perceptions, or impressions made upon 
 the senses only, in which the mind does not partici- 
 pate. Of this class there are several modifications, 
 which have been referred to under the subject of 
 Perception. I add in this place the following addi- 
 tional examples: — A gentleman of high mental en- 
 dowments, now upwards of eighty years of age, of 
 a spare habit, and enjoying uninterrupted health, has 
 been for eleven years liable to almost daily visita- 
 tions from spectral figures. They in general present 
 human countenances ; the head and upper parts of 
 the body are distinctly defined ; the lower parts are, 
 for the most part, lost in a kind of cloud. The fig- 
 ures are various, but he recognises the same coun- 
 tenances repeated from time to time, particularly of 
 ]ate years that of an elderly woman, with a pecu- 
 liarly arch and playful expression, and a dazzling 
 brilliancy of eye, who seems just ready to speak to 
 him They appear also in various dresses, such as 
 
280 REASON. 
 
 that of the age of Louis XIV. ; the costume of an- 
 cient Rome ; that of the modern Turks and Greeks ; 
 but more frequently of late, as in the case of the fe- 
 male now mentioned, in an old-fashioned Scottish 
 plaid of Tartan, drawn up and brought forward over 
 the head, and then crossed below the chin, as the 
 plaid was worn by aged women in his younger days. 
 He can seldom recognise among the spectres any 
 figure or countenance which he remembers to have 
 seen ; but his own face has occasionally been pre- 
 sented to him, gradually undergoing the change from 
 youth to manhood, and from manhood to old age. 
 The figures appear at various times of the day, both 
 night and morning; they continue before him for 
 some time, and he sees them almost equally well 
 with his eyes open or shut, in full daylight or in 
 darkness. They are almost always of a pleasant 
 character, and he seems to court their presence as a 
 source of amusement to him. He finds that he can 
 banish them by drawing his hand across his eyes, or 
 by shutting and opening his eyelids once or twice 
 for a second or two ; but on these occasions they 
 often appear again soon after. The figures are some- 
 times of the size of life, and sometimes in miniature ; 
 but they are always defined and finished with the 
 clearness and minuteness of the finest painting. 
 They sometimes appear as if at a considerable dis- 
 tance, and gradually approach until they seem almost 
 to touch his face ; at other times they float from side 
 to side, or disappear in ascending or descending. In 
 general, the countenance of the spectre is presented 
 to him ; but on some occasions he sees the back of 
 the head, both of males and females, exhibiting va- 
 rious fashions of wigs and headdresses, particularly 
 the flowing full-bottomed wig of a former age. At 
 the time when these visions began to appear to him, 
 he was in the habit of taking little or no wine, and 
 this has been his common practice ever since ; but 
 he finds that any addition to his usual quantity of 
 
SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 281 
 
 wme increases the number and vivacity of the visions. 
 Of the effect of bodily illness he can give no account, 
 except that once, when he had a cold and took a few 
 drops of laudanum, the room appeared entirely filled 
 with peculiarly brilliant objects, gold and silver or- 
 naments, and precious gems; but the spectral visions 
 were either not seen or less distinct. Another gen- 
 tleman, who died some time ago at the age of eighty, 
 for several years before his death never sat down to 
 table at his meals without the impression of sitting 
 down with a large party dressed in the fashion of 
 fifty years back. This gentleman was Mind of one 
 eye, and the sight of ■ .le other was very imperfect ; 
 on this account he wore over it a green shade, and 
 he had often before him the image of his own coun- 
 tenance, as if it were reflected from the inner sur- 
 face of the shade. A very remarkable modification 
 of this class of illusions has been communicated to 
 me by Dr. Dewar of Stirling. It occurred in a lady 
 v/ho was quite blind, her eyes being also disorganized 
 and sunk. She never walked out without seeing a 
 little old woman with a red cloak and a crutch, who 
 seemed to walk before her. She had no illusions 
 when within doors. 
 
 II. Real dreams, though the person was not at the 
 time sensible of having slept, nor, consequently, of 
 having dreamed. A person, under the influence of 
 some strong mental impression, drops asleep for a 
 few seconds, perhaps without being sensible of it; 
 some scene or person connected with the impression 
 appears in a dream, and he starts up under the con- 
 viction that it was a spectral appearance. I have 
 formerly proposed a conjecture by which some of 
 the most authentic stories of second sight may be 
 referreo to this principle ; others seem to be refer 
 able to the principle to be mentioned under the next 
 head. Several cases mentioned by Dr. Hibbert are 
 also clearly of the nature of dreams. The analogy 
 A a Q 
 
282 REASON. 
 
 between dreaming and spectral illusions is also beau- 
 tifully illustrated by an anecdote which I received 
 latfely from the gentleman to whom it occurred, an 
 eminent medical friend. Having sat up late one 
 evening, under considerable anxiety about one of his 
 children, who was ill, he fell asleep in his chair, and 
 had a frightful dream, in which the prominent figure 
 was an immense baboon. He awoke with the fright, 
 got up instantly, and walked to a table which was in 
 he middle of the room. He was then quite awake 
 and quite conscious of the articles around him ; but 
 close by the wall, in the end of the apartment, he 
 distinctly saw the baboon making the same horrible 
 grimaces which he had seen in his dream ; and the 
 spectre continued visible for about half a minute. 
 
 in. Intense mental conceptions so strongly im- 
 pressed upon the mind as for the moment to be be- 
 lieved to have a real existence. This takes place 
 when, along with the mental emotion, the individual 
 is placed in circumstances in which external impres 
 sions are very slight; as solitude, faint light, and 
 quiescence of body. It is a state closely bordering 
 upon dreaming, though the vision occurs while the 
 person is in the waking state. The following ex- 
 ample is mentioned by Dr. Hibbert : — A gentleman 
 was told of the sudden death of an old and intimate 
 friend, and was deeply affected by it. The impres- 
 sion, though partially banished by the business of the 
 day, was renewed from time to time by conversing 
 on the subject with his family and other friends. 
 After supper, he went by himself to walk in a small 
 court behind his house, which was bounded by ex- 
 tensive gardens. The sky was clear, and the night 
 serene ; and no light was falling upon the court from 
 any of the windows. As he walked down stairs, he 
 was not thinking of any thing connected with his 
 deceased friend; but when he had proceeded at a 
 slow pace about half-way across the court, the figure 
 
SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 283 
 
 of his friend started up before him in a most distinct 
 manner at the opposite angle of the court. "He 
 was not in his usual dress, but in a coat of a differ- 
 ent colour, which he had for some months left off 
 wearing. I could even remark a figured vest which 
 he had also worn about the same time ; also a col- 
 oured silk handkerchief around his neck, in whidi I. 
 had used to see him in a morning ; and my powers 
 of vision seemed to become more keen as 1 gazed 
 on the phantom before me." The narrator then 
 mentions the indescribable feeling which shot 
 through his frame ; but he soon recovered himself, 
 and walked briskly up to the spot, keeping his eyes 
 intently fixed upon the spectre. As he approached 
 the spot it vanished, not by sinking into the earth, 
 but seeming to melt insensibly into air.* 
 
 A similar example is related by a most intelligent 
 writer in the Christian Observer for October, 1829: — 
 "An intimate friend of my early years, and most 
 happy in his domestic arrangements, lost his wife 
 under the most painful circumstances, suddenly, just 
 after she had apparently escaped from the dangers 
 of an untoward confinement with her first child. A 
 few weeks after this melancholy event, while trav- 
 elling during the night on horseback, and in all prob- 
 abihty thinking over his sorrows, and contrasting 
 his present cheerless prospects with the joys which 
 so lately gilded the hours of his happy home, the 
 form of his lost relative appeared to be presented to 
 him at a little distance in advance. He stopped his 
 horse, and contemplated the vision with great trepi- 
 dation, till in a few seconds it vanished away. 
 Within a few days of this appearance, while he was 
 sitting in his solitary parlour late at night, reading 
 by the hght of a shaded taper, the door, he thought, 
 opened, and the form of his deceased partner en- 
 tered, assured him of her complete happiness, and 
 
 Hibbert on Apparitions, p. 47a Second edition. 
 
284 REASON. 
 
 ^■/ijoined him to follow her footsteps." This second 
 appearance was probably a dream ; the first is dis- 
 tinctly referable to the principles stated in the pre- 
 ceding observations. 
 
 An interesting case referable to this head is de- 
 scribed by Sir Walter Scott, in his late work on 
 Demonology and Witchcraft : — " Not long after the 
 death of a late illnstrious poet, who had filled, while 
 iving, a great station in tlie eye of the public, a lite- 
 rary friend, to whom the deceased had been well 
 known, was engaged during the darkening twilight 
 of an autumn evening in perusing one of the publica- 
 cations which professed to detail the habits aiid 
 opinions of the distinguished individual who was 
 now no more. As the reader had enjoyed the inti- 
 macy of the deceased to a considerable degree, he 
 was deeply interested in the publication, which con- 
 tained some particulars relating to himself and other 
 friends. A visiter was sitting in the apartment, who 
 was also engaged in reading-. Their sitting-room 
 opened into an entrance-hall rather fantastically 
 fitted up with articles of armour, skins of wild ani 
 mals, and the like. It wa3 when laying down his 
 book, and passing into this hall, through which the 
 moon was beginning to shine, that the individual of 
 whom I speak saw right before him, and in a stand- 
 ing posture, the exact representation of his departed 
 friend, whose recollection had been so strongly 
 brought to his imagination. He stopped for a single 
 moment, so as to notice the wonderful accuracy 
 wiih which fancy had impressed upon the bodily eye 
 the peculiarities of dress and posture of the illus- 
 trious poet. Sensible, however, of the delusion, he 
 felt no sentiment save that of wonder at the extra- 
 ordinary accuracy of the resemblance, and stepped 
 onwards towards the figure, which resolved itself as 
 he approached into the various materials of which 
 it was composed. These were merely a screen oc- 
 cupied by great- coats, shawls plaids, and such other 
 
 1 
 
SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 285 
 
 articles as usually are found in a country entrance- 
 hall." 
 
 On this part of the subject I shall only add the 
 following example, which I have received from Dr. 
 Andrew Combe : — A gentleman, a friend of his, has 
 in his house a number of phrenological casts, among 
 which is particularly conspicuous a.bust of Curran. 
 A servant-girl belonging to the family, after under- 
 going great fatigue, awoke early one morning, and 
 beheld at the foot of her bed the apparition of Cur- 
 ran. He had the same pale and cadaverous aspect 
 as in the bust, but he was now dressed in a sailor's 
 jacket, and his face was decorated with an immense 
 pair of whiskers. In a state of extreme terror she 
 awoke her fellow-servant, and asked whether she 
 did not see the spectre. She, however, saw nothing, 
 and endeavoured to rally her out of her alarm ; — but 
 the other persisted in the reality of the apparition, 
 which continued visible for several minutes. The 
 gentleman, it appears, keeps a pleasure yacht, the 
 seamen belonging to which are frequently in the 
 house. This, perhaps, was the origin of the sailor's 
 dress in which the spectre appeared; and the im- 
 mense whiskers had also probably been borrowed 
 from one of these occasional visiters. 
 
 To the same principle we are probably to refer 
 the stories of the apparitions of murdered persons 
 haunting the murderer, until he was driven to give 
 himself up to justice : many examples of this kind 
 are on record. Similar effects have resulted in other 
 situations from intense mental excitement. A gen- 
 tleman, mentioned by Dr. Conolly, when in great 
 danger of being wrecked in a boat on the Eddystone 
 rocks, said he actually saw his family at the moment. 
 In similar circumstances of extreme and immediate 
 danger, others have described the history of their 
 past lives being represented to them in such a vivid 
 manner, that at a single glance the whole was before 
 them, without the power of banishing the impres- 
 
286 REASON*. 
 
 sion. To this head we are also to refer some of the 
 stories of second sight, — namely, by supposing that 
 they consisted of spectral ijlusions arising out of 
 strong mental impression, and by some natural 
 coincidence fulfilled in the same manner as we have 
 seen in regard to dreams. Many of these anecdotes 
 are evidently en-kbellished and exaggerated ; but the 
 following I have received from a most respectable 
 clergyman, as being to his personal knowledge 
 strictly true : In one of the Western Isles of Scot- 
 land, a congregation w^as assembled on a Sunday 
 morning, and in immediate expectation of the appear- 
 ance of the clergyman, when a man started up, ut- 
 tered a scream, and stood looking to the pulpit with 
 a countenance expressive of terror. As soon as 
 he could be prevailed on to speak, he exclaimed, 
 " Do you not see the minister in the pulpit dressed 
 in a shroud !" — A few minutes after this occurrence 
 the clergyman appeared in his place, and conducted 
 the service, apparently in his usual liealih ; but in a 
 day or two after was taken ill and died before the 
 following Sunday. 
 
 The effect of opium is well known in giving aji 
 impression of reality to the visions of conception 
 Oi imagination : several striking examples of this 
 will be found in the Confessionsof an Opium-Eater. 
 These are in general ahied, or actually amount to 
 the delusions of delirium, but they are sometimes 
 entirely of a different nature. My respected friend, 
 the late Dr. Gregory, was accustomed to relate a 
 remarkable instance which occurred to himself. lie 
 had gone to the north country by sea to visit a lady, 
 a near relation, in whom he felt deeply interested, 
 and who was in an advanced state of consumption. 
 In returning from the visit, he had taken a moderate 
 dose of laudanunj, with the view of preventing sea- 
 sickness, and wat? lyir:g on a couch in the cabin, vhen 
 the figure of the lad}' appeared before him in so dis- 
 tinct a manner that her actual presence *' mid not 
 
SPECTRAl. ILLUSIONS. 287 
 
 have been more vivid. He was quite awake, and 
 fully sensible that it was a phantasm produced by 
 the opiate, along with his intense mental feeling, but 
 he was unable by any effort to banish the vision. 
 
 Some time ago I attended a gentleman affected 
 with a painful local disease, requiring the use of 
 large opiates, but which often failed in producing 
 sleep. In one watchful night there passed before 
 him a long and regular exhibition of characters and 
 transactions, connected with certain occurrences 
 which had been the subject of much conversation in 
 Edinburgh some time before. The characters suc- 
 ceeded each other with all the regularity and vivid- 
 ness of a theatrical exhibition : he heard their con- 
 versation and long speeches that were occasionally 
 made, some of which were in rhyme ; and he dis- 
 tinctly remembered, and repeated next day, long 
 passages from these poetical effusions. He was 
 quite awake, and quite sensible that the whole was 
 a phantasm ; and he remarked that when he opened 
 his eyes the vision vanished, but instantly reappeared 
 whenever he closed them. 
 
 IV. Erroneous impressions connected with bodily 
 disease, generally disease in the brain. The illu- 
 sions, in these cases, arise in a manner strictly an- 
 alogous to dreaming, and consist of some former cir- 
 cumstances recalled into the mind, and believed for 
 the time to have a real and present existence. The 
 diseases in connexion with which they arise are 
 generally of an apoplectic or inflammatory charac- 
 ter, — sometimes epileptic ; and they are very fre- 
 quent in the affection called delirium tremens, which 
 is produced by a continued use of intox'jating 
 liquors. Dr. Gregory used to mention m his lectures 
 a gentleman liable to epileptic fits, in whom the 
 paroxysm was generally preceded by the appearance 
 of an old woman in a red cloak, who seemed to come 
 up to him, and strike him on the head with her 
 
288 REASON. 
 
 crutch ; at that instant he fell down in the fit. It is 
 probable that there was in this case a sudden attack 
 of headache connected with the accession of the 
 paroxysm, and that this led to the vision in the same 
 manner as bodily feelings give rise to dreams. One 
 of the most siisgular cases on record of spectral 
 illusions referable to this class, is that of Nicolai, a 
 bookseller in Berlin, as described by himself, and 
 quoted by Dr. Ferriar : — By strong mental emotions 
 he seems to have been thrown into a state border- 
 ing upon mania ; and, while in this condition, was 
 haunted constantly, while awake, for several months, 
 by figures of men, women, animals, and birds. A 
 similar case is mentioned by Dr. Alderston :* — A 
 man who kept a dram-shop saw a soldier endeavour- 
 ing to force himself into his house in a menacing 
 manner ; and, in rushing forward to prevent him, 
 he was astonished to find it a phantom. He had af- 
 terward a succession of visions of persons long dead, 
 and others who were living. This man was cured 
 by bleeding and purgatives : and the source of his 
 first vision was traced to a quarrel which he had 
 some time before with a drunken soldier. A gentle- 
 man from America, who is also mentioned by Dr. 
 Alderston, was seized with severe headache, and 
 complained of troublesome dreams ; and, at the same 
 time, had distinct visions of his wife and family, 
 whom he had left in America. In the state of deli- 
 rium tremens such visions are common, and assume 
 a variety of forms. I have known a patient de- 
 scribe distinctly a dance of fairies going on in the 
 floor of the apartment, and give a most minute ac- 
 count of their figures and dresses. 
 
 Similar phantasms occur in various forms, in feb- 
 rile diseases. A lady whom I attended some years 
 ago on account of an inflammatory affection of the 
 chest, awoke her husband one night, at the com- 
 
 * Edinburgh Medical Journal, vol. vl. 
 
 i 
 
SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 289 
 
 mencement of her disorder, and beg-ged him to get 
 up instantly. She said she had distinctly seen a 
 man enter the apartment, pass the foot of her bed, and 
 go into a closet which entered from the opposite side 
 of the room. She was quite awake, and fully con- 
 vinced of the reahty of the appearance ; and, even 
 after the closet was examined, it was found almost 
 impossible to convince her that it was a delusion. 
 There are numerous examples of this kind on record. 
 The writer in the Cliristian Observer, lately referred 
 to, mentions a lady who, during a severe illness, re- 
 peatedly saw her father, who resided at the distance 
 of many hundred miles, come to her bedside, and, 
 withdrawing the curtain, address her in his usual 
 voice and manner. A farmer, mentioned by the 
 same writer, in returning from a market, was deeply 
 affected by a most extraordinary briUiant light, 
 which he thought he saw upon the road, and by an 
 appearance in the hght, which he supposed to be our 
 Saviour. He was greatly alarmed, and spurring his 
 horse, galloped home ; remained agitated during the 
 evening; was seized with typhus fever, then pre- 
 vailing in the neighbourhood, and died in about ten 
 days. It was afterward ascertained that on the 
 morning of the day of the supposed vision, before 
 he Isft home, he had complained of headache and 
 languor ; and there can be no doubt that the spectral 
 appearance was connected with the commencement 
 of the fever. Entirely analogous to this, but still 
 more striking in its circumstances, is a case which 
 I have received from an eminent medical friend; 
 and the subject of it was a near relation of his own, 
 a lady about fifty. On returning one evening from 
 a party, she went into a dark room to lay aside 
 some part of her dress, when she saw distinctly be- 
 fore her the figure of death, as a skeleton, with his 
 arm uplifted, and a dart in hand. He instantly 
 aimed a blow at her with the dart, which seemed to 
 strike her on the left side. The same night she was 
 Bb 
 
290 REASON. 
 
 seized with fever, accompanied by symptoms ofm- 
 flammation in the left side ; but recovered after a 
 severe illness. So strongly was the vision impressed 
 upon her mind, that even for some time after her re- 
 covery she could not pass the door of the room 
 in which it occurred, without discovering agitation, 
 — declaring that it was there she met with her 
 illness. 
 
 A highly intelligent friend, whom I attended 
 several yuars ago, in a mild but very protracted 
 fever, witnout delirium, had frequent interviews 
 with a spectral visiter, who presented the appear- 
 ance of an old gray-headed man, of a most benig- 
 nant aspect. His visits were always conducted 
 exactly in the same manner : he entered the room 
 by a door which was on the left-hand side of the 
 bed, passed the end of the bed, and seated himself 
 on a chair on the right-hand side : he then fixed 
 his eyes upon the patient with an expression of in- 
 tense interest and pity, but never spoke ; continued 
 distinctly visible for some seconds, and then seemed 
 to vanish into air. His visits were sometimes re- 
 peated daily for several days, but sometimes he 
 missed a day ; — and the appearance continued for 
 several weeks. The same gentleman on another 
 occasion, when in perfect health, sitting in his par- 
 lour in the evening, saw distinctly in the corner of 
 the room a female figure in a kneeling posture, who 
 continued visible for several seconds. 
 
 In a lady, whose case is mentioned in the Edin- 
 burgh Journal of Science for April, 1830, there was 
 an illusion aflfecting both sight and hearing. She 
 repeatedly heard her husband's voice calling to her 
 by name, as if from an adjoining room ; and on one 
 occasion, saw his figure most distinctly, standing 
 before the fire in the drawing-room, when he had 
 left the house half an hour before. She went and 
 sat down within two feet of the figure, supposing it 
 to be her husband, and was greatly astonished that 
 
SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS.' 291 
 
 he did not answer when she spoke to him. The 
 flgure continued visible for several minutes, then 
 moved towards a window at the farther end of the 
 room, and there disappeared. A few days after this 
 appearance, she saw the figure of a cat lying on tlie 
 hearth-rug; and, on another occasion, while adjust- 
 ing her hair before a mirror, late at night, she saw 
 the countenance of a friend, dressed in a shroud, 
 reflected from the mirror, as if looking over her 
 shoulder. This lady had been for some time in 
 bad health, being affected with pectoral complaints, 
 and much nervous debility. A remarkable feature 
 of this case was the illusion of hearing; and of this 
 I have received another example from a medical 
 friend in England. A clergyman, aged fifty-six, 
 accustomed to full living, was suddenly seized with 
 vomiting, vertigo, and ringing in his ears, and con- 
 tinued in rather an alarming condition for several 
 days. During this time, he had the sound in his 
 ears of tunes most distinctly played, and in accurate 
 succession. This patient "had, at the same time, a 
 very remarkable condition of vision, such as I have 
 not heard of in any other case. All objects appeared 
 to him inverted. This peculiarity continued three 
 days, and then ceased gradually ; — the objects by 
 degrees changing their position, first to the hori- 
 zontal, and then to the erect. 
 
 V. To these sources of spectral illusions, we ar3 
 to add, though not connected with our present sub- 
 ject, those which originate in pure misconception; 
 the imagination working up into a spectral illusion 
 something which is really a very trivial occurrence. 
 Of this class is an anecdote, mentioned by Dr. Hib- 
 bert, of a whole ship's company being thrown into 
 the utmost state of consternation by the apparition 
 of a cook who had died a few days before. He was 
 distinctly seen walking ahead of the ship, with a 
 peculiar gait, by which he was distinguished when 
 
292 REASON. 
 
 alive, from having one of his legs shorter than the 
 other. On steering the ship towards the object, it 
 was found to be a piece of floati'ng wreck. A story- 
 referable to the same principle is related by Dr. 
 Ferriar : — A gentleman travelhng in the Highlands 
 of Scotland was conducted to a bedroom which 
 was reported to be haunted by the spirit of a man 
 who had there committed suicide. In the night he 
 awoke under the influence of a frightful dream, and 
 found himself sitting up in bed with a pistol grasped 
 in his right-hand. On looking round the room he 
 now discovered, by the moonlight, a corpse dressed 
 in a shroud reared against the wall, close by the 
 window; the features of the body, and every part 
 of the funeral apparel being perceived distinctly. 
 On recovering from the first impulse of terror, so 
 far as to investigate the source of the phantom, it 
 was found to be produced by the moonbeams form- 
 ing a long bright image through the broken window. 
 Two esteemed friends of mine, while travelling in 
 the Highlands, had occasion to sleep in separate 
 beds in one apartment. One of them, having awoke 
 in the night, saw by the moonlight a skeleton hang- 
 ing from the head of his friend's bed,— every part 
 of it being perceived in the most distinct manner. 
 He instantly got up to investigate the source of the 
 illusion, and found it to be produced by the moon- 
 beams falling upon the drapery of the bed, Mhich 
 had been thrown back, in some unusuar manner, on 
 account of the heat of the weather. He returned 
 to bed and soon fell asleep. But having awoke 
 again some time after, the skeleton w^as still so dis- 
 tinctly before him, that he could not sleep without 
 again getting up to trace the origin of the phantom. 
 Determined not to be disturbed a third time, he now 
 brought down the curtain into its usual state, and 
 the skeleton appeared no more. 
 
UNCERTilNTV OF MEDICINE. 293 
 
 PART IV. 
 
 APPLICATION OF THE RULES OF PHILO- 
 SOPHICAL INVESTIGATION TO MEDICAL 
 SCIENCE. 
 
 There has been much difference of opinion among 
 philosophers in regard to the place which medicine 
 is entitled to hold among the physical sciences ; for 
 while one has maintained that it " rests upon an 
 eternal basis, and has within it the power of rising 
 to perfection," it has been distinctly asserted by 
 another, that " almost the only resource of medicine 
 is the art of conjecturing." " The following apo- 
 logue," says D'Alembert, " made by a physician, a 
 man of wit and of philosophy, lepresents very well 
 the slate of that science. Nature," says he, " is 
 fighting with disease ; a blind man armed with a 
 club, that is, the physician, comes to settle the differ- 
 ence. He first tries to make peace ; when he can- 
 not accomplish this, he hfts his club and strikes at 
 random ; if he strikes the disease, he kills the dis- 
 ease ; if he strikes nature, he kills nature." " An 
 eminent physician," says the same writer, " renounc- 
 ing a practice which he had exercised for thirty 
 years, said, ' I am wearied of guessing.' " 
 
 The uncertainty of medicine, which is thus a 
 theme both for the philosopher and the humourist, is 
 deeply felt by the practical physician in the daily 
 exercise of his art. It becomes, therefore, an in- 
 quiry of the utmost importance, — what the sources 
 of this uncertainty are, — where that point is in our 
 researches at which its influence begins, — and, when 
 Bb2 
 
!i94 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 we arrive at this point, what the means are by wliiej 
 it may be diminished. 
 
 The perfect uniformity of all the phemonena of 
 nature we have seen to be the foundation of the 
 certainty of results in physical science. For when 
 the order and relations of these phenomena have 
 once been ascertained, we calculate with confidence 
 that they will continue to observe the same orde^^. 
 Proceeding upon this confidence, in relations which 
 have been observed regarding the heavenly bodies, 
 the astronomer foretels their positions even at very 
 distant periods. In the same manner, the chymist, 
 having ascertained the actions which take place 
 when certain substances are brought into contact, 
 and the new combinations which follow, decides 
 with confidence that, in every instance in which 
 these agents are brought together, the same actions 
 will take place, and will be followed by the same 
 combinations. This confidence, which lies at the 
 foundation of all science, we have seen to be an 
 original or instinctive principle, and not the result 
 of experience ; but it is the province of experience 
 to ascertain the particular sequences to which it 
 may be applied ; in other words, to distinguish casual 
 relations and sequences from those which we are 
 entitled to consider as uniform. 
 
 The uncertainty of medicine resolves itself chiefly 
 into an apparent want of that uniformity of phe- 
 nomena, which is so remarkable in other branches 
 of physical science. There are, in particular, two 
 departments of our inquiries, in which we feel con- 
 tinually the effect of this want of uniformity, — the 
 characters and the progress of disease, and the 
 action of external agents upon the body. 
 
 Since medicine was first cultivated as a science, 
 a leading object of attention has ever been to as- 
 certain the characters or symptoms by which par 
 ticular internal diseases are indicated, and by which 
 
 X 
 
UNCERTAINTY OF MEDICINE. 295 
 
 they are distinguished from other diseases which 
 resemble them. But, with the accumulated experi- 
 ence of ages bearing upon this important subject, 
 our extended observation has only served to con- 
 vince us how deficient we are in this department, 
 and how often, even in the first step in our progress, 
 we are left to conjecture A writer of high eminence 
 has even hazarded the assertion that those persons 
 are most confident in regard to the characters of 
 disease whose knowledge is most limited, and that 
 more extended observation generally leads to doubt. 
 After showing the uncertainty of the symptoms 
 which are usually supposed to indicate effusion in 
 the thorax, Morgagni adds the remarkable assertion 
 to which I here allude : " qui enim plura corpora 
 inspexerunt, hi saltem, cum illi nil dubitant, epsi 
 dubitare didicerunt." If such uncertainty hangs 
 over our knowledge of the characters of disease, it 
 will not be denied that at least an equal degree of un- 
 certainty attends its progress. We have learned, for 
 example, the various modes by which internal in- 
 flammation terminates, — as resolution, suppuration, 
 gangrene, adhesion, and effusion ; but, in regard to 
 a particular case of inflammation which is before us, 
 how little notion can we form of what will be its 
 progress, or how it will terminate. 
 
 An equal or even a more remarkable uncertainty 
 attends all our researches on the second head to 
 which I have referred, namely, the action of exter- 
 nal agents upon the body. These engage our atten- 
 tion in two respects, — as causes of disease, and as 
 remedies ; and in both these views the action of 
 them is fraught with the highest degree of uncer- 
 tainty. In regard to the action of external agents 
 as causes of disease, we may take a single example 
 in the effects of cold. Of six individuals who have 
 been exposed to cold in the same degree, and, so 
 far as we can judge, under the same circumstances, 
 one may be seized with inflammation of the lungs. 
 
S96 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 One with diarrhosa, and one with rheumatism, while 
 three may escape without any injury. Not less 
 remarkable is the uncertainty in regard to the action 
 of remedies. One case appears to yield with readi- 
 ness to the remedies that are employed ; on another, 
 which we have every reason to believe to be of the 
 same nature, no effect is produced in arresting its 
 fatal progress; while a third, which threatened to 
 be equally formidable, appears to cease without the 
 operation of any remedy at all. 
 
 With these comphcated sources of uncertainty, 
 which meet us at every step in our medical inquiries, 
 it is almost unnecessary to contrast the perfect uni- 
 formity of phenomena, on a confidence in which we 
 proceed in other departments of science. When 
 we mix together pieces of zinc, sulphuric acid, and 
 water, we pronounce with perfect confidence that 
 the water will be decomposed, hydrogen evolved, 
 the metal oxidated, the oxyd dissolved, and sulphate 
 of zinc produced ; we pronounce with equal confi- 
 dence on all the properties, mechanical and chymi- 
 cal. of the new compound which is thus to be 
 formed; and m no case have we the smallest doubt 
 of the exact occurrence of every step in this com- 
 plicated process. With what different feelings we 
 contemplate, in its commencement, a case of dan- 
 jgerous internal disease, — its probable progress and 
 termination, and the effect which oiii remedies are 
 likely to produce in arresting it, — those best can 
 tell who have most experienced them. 
 
 The certainty of a science, as was formerly stated, 
 depends upon two circumstances; namely, the fa- 
 cility with which we ascertain the true relations 
 and tendencies of things, or trace effects to their 
 true causes, and causes to their true effects ; and 
 the confidence with which we rely on the actions, 
 dependent on these relations, continuing to occur 
 in all cases with J^erfect uniformity. This confi- 
 
TTNCERTAINTY OF MEDICINE. 297 
 
 dence we easily attain in those sciences in which 
 we have to deal only with inanimate matter. We 
 do so by means of experiments, in which, by placing 
 the substances in various circumstances towards 
 each other, we come to ascertain their true tenden- 
 cies with perfect certainty, and to separate them 
 from the influence of all associations which are 
 only casual and incidental. Having thus discovered 
 their tendencies or actions, we rely with confidence 
 on these continuing to be uniform ; and should we 
 in any instance be disappointed in the action which 
 we wish to produce, we are able to trace the cause 
 by which the expected result has been prevented, 
 and to obviate the effect of its interference. 
 
 In both these respects we find in medicine a de- 
 gree of uncertainty which marks a striking distinc 
 tion between it and the purely physical sciences. 
 
 I. There is great difficulty in medicine in tracing 
 effects to their true causes, and causes to their trub 
 effects. This difficulty has already been illustrated 
 by the same cause appearing to produce in different 
 instances different diseases, or no disease at all ; and 
 by a disease seeming to subside under the use of a 
 remedy which, in a similar case, fails to produce the 
 smallest benefit. When we find our researches thus 
 encumbered with uncertainty, we cannot, as in other 
 sciences, clear them from the influence of casual re- 
 lations by means of direct experiment ; but are 
 obliged to trust chiefly to the slow course of obser- 
 vation, as the relations happen to be presented to us. 
 Hence just conclusions are arrived at slowly, and 
 we may be obliged to go on through a long course 
 of observations, before we arrive at any results 
 which we feel to be worthy of confidence. Hence 
 also arises the great temptation to grasp at partial 
 and premature conclusions, from which medical 
 science has suffered so much injury. For when 
 such conclusions are brought forward with confidence. 
 
298 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 as lonjf a course of observation may be required foi 
 exposing their fallacy as might have been sufficient 
 for ascertaining the truth. In this respect we see 
 the remarkable difference between medicine and the 
 purely physical sciences ; as, in tlie latter, a single 
 experiment may often be sufficient to overturn the 
 most plausible hypothesis, or to establish one which 
 has been proposed only in conjecture. 
 
 II. Even after we have ascertained the true rela- 
 tions and tendencies of things, we are constantly 
 liable to disappointment in medicine, when we en- 
 deavour to produce certain results by bringing these 
 tendencies into action. This arises from the silent 
 operation of a new order of causes, by which the 
 phenomena of disease are varied and modified ; and 
 b3' which the action of external agents is aided, 
 modified, or counteracted in a manner which alto- 
 gether eludes our researches. The causes which 
 thus operate are certain powers in the living body 
 itself, the action of which is entirely beyond our 
 control ; and others arising out of the peculiarities 
 of age, sex, temperament of body and mind, and 
 mental emotions; constituting a class of agents of a 
 most powerful kind, of which it is impossible to es- 
 timate the combined operation. It is farther to be 
 kept in view, that these various agents may be act- 
 ing together, or in opposition to each other, or under 
 a variety of combinations; and that, in reference to 
 our attempts to act upon the body by remedies, they 
 may be operating in concert with, or in opposition 
 to these attempts. Hence arises a most extensive 
 source of uncertainty in all our investigations, of 
 which it is impossible to calculate the effect, or the 
 extent. Hence also arises that apparent want of 
 uniformity in the phenomena of disease, by which 
 we are so much impeded in our researches; and 
 that want of uniformity in the action of remedies, 
 by which our efforts in medicine are so often dis- 
 appointed. 
 
tJNCERTAINTY OF MEDICmE. 299 
 
 HI. Another source of uncertainty in the practi- 
 cal art of medicine is the difficulty which we find 
 in applying to new cases the knowledge which we 
 have acquired from observation. This application 
 is made upon the principle either of experience or 
 analogy. We are said to proceed upon experience 
 when the circumstances in the new case are the 
 same as in those cases from u'hich our knowledge 
 vas derived. When the circumstances are not the 
 same, but similar, we proceed upon analogy ; and 
 our confidence in the result is weaker than when 
 we proceed upon experience. The more numerous 
 the points of resemblance are, the greater is our 
 confidence, because it approaches the more nearly 
 to that which we derive from experience ; and the 
 fewer the points of resemblance, our confidence is 
 more and more diminished. When, in the practice 
 of medicine, we apply to new cases the knowledge 
 acquired from others which we believe to have beeu 
 of the same nature, the difficulties are so great, that 
 it is doubtful whether in any case we can properly 
 be said to act upon experience, as we do in other 
 departments of science. For we have not the means 
 of determining with certainty, that the condition of 
 the disease, the habit of the patient, and all the cir- 
 cumstances which enter into the character of the 
 affection, are in any two cases precisely the same : 
 and if they differ in any one particular, we cannot 
 be said to act from experience, but only from analogy 
 The difficulties and sources of uncertainty whicU 
 meet us at every stage of such investigations are, 
 in fact, so great and numerous, that those who have 
 had the most extensive opportunities of observation 
 will be the first to acknowledge that our pretended 
 experience must, in general, sink into analogy, and 
 even our analogy too often into conjecture. 
 
 In a science encumbered with so many difficulties, 
 and encompassed by so many sources of error, it is 
 obvious what cause we have for proceeding with the 
 utmost caution and for advancing from step to step 
 
300 MEDICAL SCIENCE^ 
 
 with the greatest circumspection. In attempting a 
 slight outline of a subject so extensive and so im- 
 portant, I shall confine myself to a few leading rules 
 of a strictly practical nature. 
 
 The objects to be kept in view in all our investi- 
 gations appear to be the following : — 
 
 I. To acquire an extensive collection of well-au- 
 thenticated facts. 
 
 II. To arrange, classify, combine, or separate 
 these facts. 
 
 III. To trace among the facts, sequences, or rela- 
 tions, particularly the relation of cause and effect. 
 
 IV. From an extensive collection of facts to de- 
 duce general facts or general principles. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 OF THE ACQUISITION AND RECEPTION QV FACTS. 
 
 The foundation of all knowledge must be a care- 
 ful and extensive acquisition of facts ; and the first 
 duty of an inquirer in any department of science is 
 to bind himself down to such a patient accumula- 
 tion, bewaring of all premature attempts to combine 
 or generalize them. 
 
 In the acquisition of facts, we depend partly on 
 our own observation, and partly on the testimony 
 of others. The former source is necessarily limited 
 in extent, but it is that in which we have the greater 
 confidence ; for, in receiving facts on the testimony 
 of others, we require to be satisfied, not only of the 
 veracity of the narrators, but also of their habits as 
 
RECEPTION OF FACTS. 30 
 
 philosophical observers, and of the opportunities 
 which they have had of ascertaining the facts. In 
 the degree of evidence which we require for new 
 facts, we are also influenced, as was formerly stated, 
 by their probability, or their accordance with facts 
 previously known to us ; and for facts which appear 
 to us improbable, we require a higher amount of 
 testimony than for those in accordance with our 
 previous knowledge. This necessary caution, how- 
 ever, while it preserves us from credulity, should 
 not, on the other hand, be allowed to engender skep- 
 ticism ; for both these extremes are equally unworthy 
 of a mind which devotes itself with candour to the 
 discovery of truth. 
 
 In forming a collection of facts, therefore, in 
 reference to any invesUgation, we may state the 
 cautions to be observed, and the errors to be guarded 
 against, as chiefly referable to the following points 
 
 I. Receiving facts on the testimony of person* 
 of doubtful veracity, or whom we suspect of having 
 purposes to answer by disguising, colouring, or 
 modifying them. 
 
 II. Receiving facts on the testimony of persons 
 of whom we have doubts of their opportunities of 
 acquiring correct information, or of their powers 
 and habits of accurate observation : receiving, for 
 example, important statements on the authority of 
 hasty and superficial observers, or of incompetent 
 persons, not professional. 
 
 III. Partial statements of facts bearing upon one 
 view of a subject, or one side of a question, or col- 
 lected in support of a particular doctrine. This, 
 when simply stated, will be universally admitted to 
 be an error of the first magnitude in every scientific 
 investigation ; and yet, I imagine, it would not be 
 dAlicult, even in very recent times, to find some 
 
 Cc 
 
302 MEDICAL SClEJfCE. 
 
 remarKable examples of it. There is, indeed, 
 scarcely any doctrine which may not in the hands 
 of an ingenious person be wrought up in this man- 
 ner into a fair system, amply supported by facts; 
 and it is obvious that nothing can be more contrary 
 to the rules of sound inquiry. On this ground, we 
 may even make it a mle to receive with suspicion 
 the statements of a writer, when we find him first 
 proposing his doctrine, and then proceeding to collect 
 from all quarters facts in support of it. Such a 
 mode of investigation must be considered as con- 
 trary to the principles of fair induction ; for these 
 lead us first to take a full view of the facts, and then 
 to trace the principles or doctrines which arise out 
 of them. 
 
 IV. Receiving as facts on which important con- 
 clusions are to be founded circumstances which are 
 trivial, incidental, or foreign to the subject. For 
 example, in the investigation of affections of the 
 spinal cord, appearances have been often considered 
 as indicative of disease, which we have good reason 
 to believe have arisen merely from the position of 
 the body after death. In the same manner, in the 
 investigation of a certain class of diseases, an im- 
 portant place has been assigned to slight appearances 
 in the gastro-intestinal membrane, which, we have 
 reason to believe, are entirely incidental, and worthy 
 of no confidence in a pathological inquiry 
 
 V. Receiving as facts statements which falsely 
 obtain that name. The sources of fallacy to be kept 
 in view under this head are chiefly the folio wmg; — 
 
 (1.) Receiving as facts statements which are not 
 facts but opinions. — A person dies after being affected 
 with a certain set of symptoms, and we find, on ex- 
 amination after death, the usual appearances of hy 
 drocephalus. Another is seized with similar symp- 
 toms, and leeovers. He is therefore said to hav 
 
RECEPTION OF FACTS. 303 
 
 recovered from hydrocephalus, and such a statement 
 is often given as a medical fact. The man's recov- 
 ery from certain symptoms is a fact; that he recov- 
 ered from hydrocephalus is not a fact, but an opinion. 
 
 (2.) Receiving as a fact a statement which only 
 assumes the relation of facts. — A person recovers 
 from a particular disease, while he was using a par- 
 ticular remedy. His recovery is ascribed to the 
 effect of the remedy ; and the cure of the disease by 
 this remedy is often given as a medical fact. The 
 man's recovery is a fact ; and that he used the remedy 
 is another fact; but the connexion of the remedy 
 with his recovery we are not entitled to assume as 
 a fact : — It is tracing between the facts the relation 
 of cause and effect, — a process of the utmost delicacy, 
 and not to be admitted on any occasion without the 
 greatest caution. 
 
 (3.) Receiving as facts general statements, or the 
 generalization of facts. One of the most common 
 examples of this error occurs, when a statement is 
 given of a symptom or set of symptoms as certainly- 
 diagnostic of any particular disease, or of a par- 
 ticular morbid condition of an internal organ. Such 
 a statement we hold to be of no value, unless we 
 have absolute confidence in the narrator, both in 
 regard to his habits as a philosophical observer, and 
 to the extent of the observations on which his state- 
 ment is founded. But, with every possible advan- 
 tage in these respects, we are to exercise the utmost 
 caution before we receive the relation thus stated 
 as a fact ; for it is to be kept in mind, that it is not 
 properly a fact, but a generalization of facts. Some 
 writers, for instance, have maintained with much 
 confidence that a particular state of rigidity of some 
 of the hmbs is distinctly characteristic of ramoUisse- 
 nient of the brain. iBut farther observation has 
 shown that the disease may exist without this symp- 
 tom, and that this condition of the limbs may appear 
 in connexion with othe-r diseases. Their observation 
 
304 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 of facts was in so far correct, that this state ot 
 iimbs does very often accompany ramollissement of 
 the brain; the error consisted in giving it as a gene- 
 ral fact, or a fact applicable to all cases of ramol- 
 lissement— which is without foundation. Yet such 
 statements, when brought forward with confidence, 
 are often received as facts, and rested upon as estab- 
 lished principles ; and then the facts by which their 
 fallacy might be detected are apt to be overlooked 
 or forgotten. 
 
 This may perhaps be considered as one of the 
 most prevailing errors in the modern science of 
 medicine ; and it is indeed astonishing to observe the 
 confidence with which such statements are brought 
 forward, and the facility with which they are received 
 as equivalent to facts, without attention to the mani- 
 fold sources of fallacy with which they are encum- 
 bered. Does a writer, for example, tell us he has 
 ascertained that the spinal cord is diseased in all 
 cases of tetanus. If we knew that such a state- 
 ment had been founded on the careful observation 
 of a hundred cases, it would be of value ; if it was 
 deduced from a few, its value is greatly diminished. 
 But even if it had been deduced from the larger 
 number, certain doubts would still arise in con- 
 sidering the relation thus stated as a fact. We 
 should naturally ask ourselves, — was the narrator 
 qualified to judge of the facts and their relations, — 
 were the cases referred to all really cases of tetanus, 
 — were the appearances in the cord such as could 
 properly be considered as indicating disease, or might 
 any of them have been mere changes of colour, or 
 other incidental appearances, which might have takien 
 place after death, or might have been the efl'ect of the 
 convulsion rather than its cause, — or were they such 
 changes as may be found in other cases without any 
 symptoms of tetanus 1 Other sources of fallacy will 
 come into view, if the statement be, that the nar- 
 rator has uniformly found a certain remedy of great 
 
RECEPTION OF FACTS. 305 
 
 efficacy in a particular disease. Here, in the first 
 place, similar questions occur as in the former 
 instance ;— on how many cases did he found his 
 statement, — how did he ascertain the disease, — and 
 was he qualified to decide that it really was a case 
 of the disease which he alleges 1 But, supposing ak 
 these questions to be answered in a satisfactory man- 
 ner, others still arise, namely, — had the alleged treat- 
 ment really any influence on the recovery of the 
 patients, — did they get well in consequence of the 
 treatment, or in spile of it, or altogether indepen 
 dently of it, — have not similar cases recovered spon- 
 taneously, or under modes of treatment entirely 
 different] Such is the uncertainty of causation and 
 generalization in medicine ; and such is the danger 
 of receiving general statements as equivalent to facts. 
 
 VI. In forming a collection of facts on which we 
 are to found any conclusions, it is always to be kept 
 in mind that fallacy may arise from the absence of 
 important facts, as well as from ihe reception of 
 statements which are untrue. Hence the erroneous 
 conclusions that may be deduced from statements 
 which are strictly true; and hence the fallacious 
 systems that are built up with every appearance of 
 plausibility and truth, when facts are collected on 
 one siae of a question, or in support of a particular 
 doctrine. 
 
 In forming a collection of facts, therefore, as the 
 prehminary step in any inquiry, the following rules 
 ought to be kept strictly and constantly in view before 
 we advance to any conclusions : — 
 
 1. That all the facts be fully ascertained, — tha 
 those collected by ourselves be derived from suffi 
 cient observation, — and that those which we receiv 
 from others be received only on the testimony o 
 pcisons fully qualified to judge of their accuracy 
 
 Cca 
 
306 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 and who have had sufficient opDOrtunities of ac- 
 quiring them. 
 
 II. That the statement include a full and fail view 
 of all the facts which ought to be taken into the in- 
 vestigation ; that none of them be disguised, or modi- 
 fied so as to be made to bear upon a particulai doc- 
 trine ; and that no essential facts be wanting. 
 
 III. That the statement do not include facts which 
 are trivial, incidental, or foreign to the subject. 
 
 IV. That we do not receive as facts statements 
 which are not facts, but opinions or general as- 
 sumptions. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 or ARRANGING, COMBINING, AND SEPARATING FACTS. 
 
 The precautions now suggested appear to be those 
 which it is necessary to keep in view in making a 
 collection of facts respecting any subject under in- 
 vestigation. Our next step is to aiFange the facts 
 according to the characters in which they agree ; to 
 separate from the mass those which appear to be 
 only fortuitous or occasional concomitants ; and to 
 place by themselves those which we have reason to 
 consider as a uniform and legitimate series or se- 
 quence. This is the first step towards tracing the 
 relations of the facts; and in every investigation it 
 is a process of the utmost consequence. In the other 
 departments of physical science this object is accom- 
 plished by means of experiments. These are so con- 
 trived as to bear distinctly upon particular points ; 
 and by the result of them we are enabled to separate 
 
COMBINING AND SEPARATING FACTS. 307 
 
 associations which are incidental from those which 
 are uniform ; or, in other words, to ascertain what 
 number of the circumstances which we find asso- 
 ciated in a particular series are really connected with 
 the result which follows. In medicine this is a pro- 
 cesG of greater difficulty, because we are obliged to 
 trust to the slower course of mmute and long-con- 
 tinued observation. 
 
 The rules to be observed under this head are essen- 
 tial to every department of medical inquiry; but, 
 perhaps, they are pecuharly important in our obser- 
 vations respecting the phenomena of disease. By 
 this, we mean such an acquaintance with the symp- 
 toms which characterise particular diseases, and the 
 morbid appearances in the cases which are fatal, as 
 shall enable us to trace the relation between the 
 symptoms and the nature and seat of the disease 
 A full collection of uniform and essential facts on 
 these subjects, cleared as far as we are able from 
 all incidental combinations, is the only true founda- 
 tion of medical science ; and every system, however 
 ingenious, which rests upon any other, can be nothing 
 better than hypothesis and conjecture. It is an es- 
 sential but difficult part of medical investigation, 
 and one which we must conduct with much patience, 
 without allowing ourselves to be seduced by theory 
 or system from the path of rigid observation. In 
 prosecuting it we must be cautious in considering 
 our conclusions as perfect, but make it our constant 
 study by further observation to clear them more and 
 more from every source of error. 
 
 Whatever leads the mind from the importance and 
 the difficulty of this investigation is injurious to medi- 
 cal science. The error to be chiefly avoided is a 
 fondness for system ; and I must confess my suspi- 
 cion that, in this respect, a zeal for nosology has 
 been unfavourable to the progress of medicine. The 
 nosologist proceeds upon the principle that the char- 
 acters of disease are, to a certain extent, fixed and 
 
308 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 determined, like the botanical characters of a planl^ 
 or the chymical properties of a mineral. Hence it 
 too frequently happens that individual cases are com 
 pared with the system, instead of the system being 
 corrected by further observation. In this manner 
 young- practitioners are in danger of attempting to 
 ascertain a disease by its agreement with the noso- 
 logical characters, and are drawn away from that 
 minute attention to the phenomena which alone can 
 lead to correct diagnosis. Thus, a medical man 
 might argue with regard to a case indicating disease 
 in the brain, that there can be no effusion, because 
 the pulse has never been below the natural standard, 
 or because the pupils are not dilated ; or, with regard 
 to an affection of the abdomen, that there is no in- 
 flammation, because the pulse is strong and the 
 bowels open. Nosology, it is true, teaches him that 
 in hydrocephalus, at a certain period, the pulse be- 
 comes slow, and the pupils dilated ; and that, in intes- 
 tinal inflammation, the pulse is small and the bowels 
 obstructed ; but no great extent of observation is re- 
 quired to show that the symptoms now mentioned 
 are not uniform or essential to these diseases. Such 
 a confidence in system must be equally injurious to 
 the improvement of the individual, and to the pro- 
 gress of medical science; and the examples now- 
 given will be sufficient to illustrate the importance 
 df the rule which these obsei vations are intended to 
 convey, — separating facts which are occasional oi 
 incidental from those which are uniform and essential. 
 On this subject I shall only add the following anec- 
 dote, which I lately received from a medical man of 
 very high inteUigence. At an early period of hia 
 career as a naval surgeon he was left in charge of a 
 ship on the West India station, when several sailors 
 presented themselves with an affection of the legs 
 the nature of which was entirely new to him. Hav- 
 ing expressed his difficulty to one of the officers, no 
 wedical, he was promptly told that the disease was 
 
TRACING CAUSATION'. 3(fQ 
 
 scurvy, and that if he examined the gums of his pa» 
 tients he would find sufficient evidence. To this he 
 rephed that the thing was impossible, because in the 
 nosology of Dr. Cullen it was expressly specified 
 that scurvy occurs " in regione frigida." He was, 
 however, soon convinced that the disease was really 
 scurvy, though it occurred in the West Indies ; and, 
 as he added, received a most important lesson,— ^o 
 observe for himself, instead of trusting to systems. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 OF TRACING AMONG FACTS THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND 
 EFFECT. 
 
 Our knowledge of cause and effect, in reference to 
 any two particular events, is founded entirely upon 
 the observation of a uniform sequence of the events 
 or of the one following the other in a uniform man- 
 ner in a great number of instances. The greater 
 the number of instances is in which the sequence 
 has taken place, with the greater confidence, as for- 
 merly remarked, do we expect it to take place again 
 under similar circumstances ; and every single in- 
 stance in which it does not occur weakens this con- 
 fidence, unless we can discover some adequate cause 
 by which the sequence was interrupted. The result 
 of this confidence is, that when we observe the first 
 of two such events, we expect the second to follow 
 it ; and that when we observe the second, we con- 
 clude the first has preceded it : the first we call cause, 
 the second effect. 
 
 In every department of science it is a step of the 
 utmost delicacy to assign to two events this relation ; 
 and manifold errors arise from assigning it on inade- 
 
8f0 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 quale grounds, — that is, on an insufficient number o . 
 observations. In medical science we have further 
 to contend with pecuhar difficulties and sources of 
 error. These have been already mentioned as re- 
 ferable to two classes, — namely, the difficulty of 
 tracing effects to their true causes, and causes to 
 their true effects ; and the manner in which the real 
 tendencies of antecedents or causes are modified or 
 counteracted by a new series of causes which elude 
 our observation. From these peculiarities it often 
 happens that the true antecedents of important events 
 are of an obscure and bidden nature ; while the ap- 
 parent relations would lead us to associate them with 
 antecedents more immediately under our view, but 
 whose connexion with the results is entirely inci- 
 dental. Other obstacles arise from difficulty in ascer- 
 taining the facts themselves, and in tracing the order 
 of the sequences; as, in doing so, we are often 
 obliged to trust to obscure mdications of actions 
 which are going on in internal parts, and which are 
 themselves liable to much uncertainty. Thus, a com- 
 plicated source of difficulty pervades the whole sub- 
 ject of medical causation, and makes it one of the 
 most delicate topics that can engage the attention of 
 the philosophical inquirer. 
 
 There are three particular views in which, in medi- 
 cal investigations, we have occasion to trace among 
 successive events the relation of uniform sequence, 
 — namely, the effects of external agents as causes 
 of disease, — the effects of external agents as reme- 
 dies, — and the connexion of certain morbid ccndi- 
 tions of internal organs with certain symptoms by 
 which these become known to us. In regard to all 
 these objects of research, it is of importance to keep 
 in mind the sources of fallacy to which we are liable, 
 in assigning to a succession of events the relation of 
 uniform sequence, or, in other words, in considering 
 Hob one as the cause of the other. 
 
TRACliVa CAUSATION. 311 
 
 I. The connexion which we observe may be en- 
 tirely accidental. That causation should be assigned 
 on grounds so slight as to admit of this explanation 
 may appear improbable ; but no person acquainted 
 with the history of medicine will find difficulty jn 
 pointing out examples of it, especially in the effects 
 which are often ascribed to remedies on the slightest 
 possible grounds. In this manner, by some bold and 
 confident assertion, founded probably on ver^- limited 
 observation, a remedy is frequently brought into re- 
 pute as nearly infallible in a certain class of diseases, 
 which we find in a very short time consigned to 
 oblivion. 
 
 II. The events may be closely connected, but not 
 as cause and effect. They may be effects of a third 
 event, which is the cause of both ; or they may be 
 parts in a sequence in which we have still to discover 
 the true antecedent. Thus, in the examination of 
 the bodies of those who have died of hydrocephalus, 
 the hver has frequently been found in a state of dis- 
 ease ; and, upon this ground, diseased liver has been 
 stated as one of the causes of hydrocephalus. This 
 must be considered as an example of false causation, 
 for, in its reference to hydrocephalus, diseased liver 
 cannot be considered in any other light than as an- 
 other effect of a common cause, — namely, as a result 
 of that unhealthy state of the constitution in which 
 hydrocephalus is mot:t apt to occur. When the na- 
 ture of croup was first investigated, the formation 
 of a new membrane was observed in the larynx, and 
 this was considered as the cause of croup. Further 
 investigation, however, showed that this was but 
 one of a chain of sequences, the real antecedent of 
 which is inflammation of the membrane lining the 
 laryn;c. 
 
 III. The events may be really connected as cause 
 and efl'eci, while there is difficulty in assigning to 
 
312 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 them their places in the sequence ; that is, in deter* 
 mining- which is cause and which is effect. This 
 occurs when, in ascertaining the facts themselves 
 and the order of their sequence, we are obUged to 
 trust to external indications of actions which are 
 going on in internal parts. It is a difficulty of fre- 
 quent occurrence ; and want of due attention to it 
 appears to have been the source of much fallacious 
 reasoning. In the investigations, for example, re- 
 specting the nature of continued fever, various mor^ 
 bid appearances have been observed in the internal 
 parts ; and each of these has in its turn been confi- 
 dently assigned as the cause of fever. Thus, one 
 has placed the seat and cause of fever in the brain ; 
 another in the spinal cord; a third in the gastro- 
 intestinal membrane ; and, according to one of the 
 latest doctrines, inflammation of the mucous folhcles 
 of Peyer and Brunner has been confidently stated as 
 the cause of every modification of fever. It does not 
 belong to this part of our inquiry to examine minutely 
 the comparative merit of these systems. In all of 
 them there is a correct observation of facts, and 
 probably a real relation of cause and effect ; the error 
 consists in fixing the order of the sequence ; for a 
 very slight view of the subject is sufficient to show 
 that the morbid appearances on which they rest must 
 be considered as effects, or incidental concomitants 
 of fever, — not as its cause. This kind of false causa- 
 tion may also occur in other subjects. In certain 
 states of the weather, for example, many people are 
 in the habit of saying that a shower brings a change 
 of the wind. There is every reason to believe that 
 there is between the two events a real connexion of 
 causation, but the meteorologist rather tells us tha* 
 the change of the wind produces the shower. 
 
 [V. When we observe a particular change in the 
 living body, and trace an apparent relation between 
 it and some external agent which seems to be thft 
 
TRACING CAUSATION. 313 
 
 immediate antecedent, it may very often happen that 
 other agents are concerned which elude our ohser- 
 vation; though they have been the real antecedents 
 or agents in the change which has taken place, or 
 have contributed to it in a very great degree. This 
 is a principle of most extensive application in medical 
 causation, and is one of the chief sources of its diffi- 
 culty and uncertainty. The agents referred to are 
 chiefly certain powers in the living body itself. These 
 in all cases exert a greater or less influence in the 
 changes which are the objects of our inquiries, and 
 in many cases are the sole agents in producing re- 
 sults which we falsely and ignorantly ascribe to our 
 remedies. When a disease has terminated favour- 
 ably our treatment may have been proper, and may 
 have co-operated with these powers ; it may have 
 been totally inefficient and harmless, and have had 
 no influence whatever in producing the result ; or it 
 may have been improper and hurtful, and yet these 
 powers may both have thrown off" the disease, and 
 have counteracted the eff'ects of our blind inter- 
 ference. It is unnecessary to allude, also, to the ex 
 tensive influence which, in certain classes of diseases, 
 is produced by passions and aff'ections of the mind, 
 often of so delicate a nature that even the person 
 who is the subject of them shall not be aware of 
 their influence. 
 
 The sources of false causation in regard to the 
 action of remedies, therefore, may be chiefly referred 
 to the following heads : — 
 
 1. The disease being throwm off" by the powers 
 of the constitution itself, or removed by some cir- 
 cumstances either external or mental, which are not 
 taken into account, or perhaps not known ; while 
 the recovery of the patient is ascribed to some 
 remedy which he was using at the time, but which 
 had no influence whatever in producing it. From 
 this source have arisen the many instances of inert 
 or trivial remedies acquiring a temporary reputation. 
 U d 
 
314 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 which have been afterward entirely neglected, oi 
 even expunged from the pharmacopoeia. The only 
 means of avoiding this error is by using the utmost 
 caution in assigning effects to particular remedies, 
 and doing so only after extensive and careful obser- 
 vation. On the other hand, we are not entitled to 
 decide a priori that any particular substance to 
 which certain effects are ascribed is inert or un- 
 worthy of attention. Candid and careful observa- 
 tion of facts must be our guide in this case as well 
 as in the former. 
 
 This source of false causation is particularly to 
 be kept in view in regard to those diseases which 
 are greatly influenced by adventitious causes ; such 
 as mental emotions, or the patient's external cir- 
 cumstances. A gentleman, immersed in the busi- 
 ness or the pleasures of a great city, becomes dis- 
 ordered in his health, dyspeptic and hypochondriacal. 
 He receives much good advice from his medical 
 friend, which he professes to follow with implicit 
 confidence, and proceeds to do so amid the anxieties 
 of business, bad air, late hours, luxurious dinners, 
 and nearly the total want of bodily exercise. De- 
 riving no benefit from all that is done for him, he 
 hears of some celebrated water, which has acquired 
 great reputation in the cure ol stomach complaints, 
 and at length makes up his mind to resort thither, 
 though with little hope of deriving benefit Irom any 
 thing. He now lays aside all business, lives by rule, 
 keeps early hours, and is all day long in the open 
 air. He soon recovers excellent health, and cor- 
 dially concurs in spreading the fame of the water 
 by which a cure so wonderful has been accom- 
 plished. An anecdote has been related of a physi- 
 cian in London having advised a dyspeptic patient, 
 who had baffled all his remedies, to go down and 
 consult a celebrated physician in Inverness, whose 
 name he gave him. On arriving there, he soon dis- 
 covered thai there was no such person to be found. 
 
TRACING CAtTSATION. 313 
 
 ^e then returned to London, somewhat nettled at 
 the trick which had been practised upon him, 
 thoug-h he was obhged to acknowledge that he was 
 cured of his disorder. 
 
 On this subject we are especially to keep in mind 
 the extensive class of diseases which are acted upon 
 in a most powerful manner by causes entirely men- 
 tal. These are the numerous and ever-varying mal- 
 adies which are included under the terms dyspeptic, 
 hypochondriacal, and nervous Many of them have 
 their origin in mental emotions which elude observa- 
 tion ; and a very large proportion are entirely refer- 
 able to indolence and inaction, — to that vacuity of 
 mind attending the unfortunate condition in which 
 there is no object in life but to find anmsement for 
 the passing hour. When, on patients of this de- 
 scription, the dexterous empiric produces results 
 which the scientific physician had failed to accom- 
 plish, we are too apt to accuse him, in sweepmg 
 terms, of practising upon their creduhty. He in 
 fact employs a class of remedies of the most power- 
 ful kind, to which the other perhaps attaches too 
 little importance ; namely, mental excitement and 
 mental occupation, — the stimulus of having some 
 thing to hope and somethmg to do. Examples of 
 this kind must have occurred to every practical 
 physician. 1 have known a young lady, who had 
 been confined to bed for months, and had derived no 
 benefit from the most careful medical treatment, 
 restored to health by the excitement of a marriage 
 taking place in the family. Changes of circum- 
 stances, also, or misfortunes which called for new 
 and unusual exertion, have often been known to 
 produce similar results ; and it is a matter of old and 
 frequent observation that diseases of the nervous 
 class disappear during periods of public alarm and 
 political convulsion. Nor is it only on diseases of 
 this nature that remarkable effects are produced by 
 mental causes ; for mental excitement is known to 
 
316 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 operate in a powerful manner on diseases of a much 
 more tangible character. Dr. Gregory was accus- 
 tomed to relate the case of a naval officer, who had 
 been for some time laid up in his cabin, and entirely- 
 unable to move, from a violent attack of gout, when 
 notice was brought to him that the vessel was on 
 fire : in a few minutes he was on deck, and the 
 most active man in the ship. Cases of a still more 
 astonishing kind are on record. A woman, men- 
 tioned by Diemerbroeck, who had been many years 
 paralytic, recovered the use of her limbs when she 
 was much terrified during a thunder-storm, and was 
 making violent efforts to escape from a chamber in 
 which she had been left alone. A man, affected in 
 the same manner, recovered as suddenly, when his 
 house was on fire ; and another, who had been ill for 
 six years, was restored to the use of his paralytic 
 limbs during a violent paroxysm of anger. 
 
 2. Referring symptoms to a cause which is alto- 
 gether hypothetical, and then assigning to particular 
 remedies the power of removing this cause. To 
 this head we may refer the remedies which were at 
 one time supposed to expel morbific matter in fever, 
 — those which are believed to purify the blood, to 
 remove congestions at the origin of the nerves, to 
 equalize the circulation, &c. 
 
 3. Mistaking the nature of a disease, and repre- 
 senting a remedy as having cured an affection which 
 did not exist. There is ground for believing that 
 this error has frequently occurred in medical sci- 
 ence, and has been the source of many statements, 
 in which remarkable effects have been ascribed to 
 particular modes of treatment in various formidable 
 diseases. There seems little reason to doubt, that 
 in this manner hysterical affections have sometimes 
 been mistaken for epilepsy or tetanus, — abdominal 
 distention for peritonitis, — chronic bronchial affec- 
 tions for consumption, — febrile oppression in chil- 
 dren for hydrocephalus, — irritable urethra or bladder 
 
 1 
 
TRACING CAUSATION. Sl7 
 
 for stricture or calculus, — and affectiong of the 
 bowels for diseases of the liver. Many similar ex- 
 amples will occur to those who are conversant with 
 the history of medicine. The error may occur to 
 the respectable practitioner from misapprehension, 
 arising out of the uncertainty of the art ; but it also 
 appears to be one of the great resources of the em- 
 piric. When we hear, therefore, of marvellous 
 cures of formidable diseases, our first inquiry ought 
 to be, not merely whether the patient recovered, but 
 what evidence there is that the alleged disease ever 
 existed. 
 
 Such are the difficulties and uncertainties of 
 medical causation; and such is the ground for cau- 
 tion in considering two events as connected in the 
 manner of cause and effect. Among the sources of 
 this difficulty, there are several circumstances which 
 are entirely beyond our reach, and the influence of 
 which upon our researches we cannot hope entirely 
 to overcome ; but, by keeping steadily in view the 
 sources of error by which we are surrounded, we 
 may avoid any very fallacious conclusions, and may 
 make some progress towards the truth. In regard 
 to the effects of medicines, in particular, there are 
 two opposite errors to be equally avoided ; namely, 
 an imphcit confidence In the power of particular 
 remedies, and a total skepticism in regard to the re- 
 sources of medicine. Both these extremes are 
 equally unworthy of persons of calm philosophical 
 observation; and they who advance carefully in the 
 middle course, not misled by the temptation to hasty 
 conclusions, and cautioned but not discouraged by 
 the dangers of concluding falsely, are most likely to 
 contribute something towards diminishing the un- 
 certainty of medicine. 
 
 Before leaving the subject of causation, I would 
 briefly allude to a confusion which has been intro- 
 duced into the language of medicine by the division 
 Dd3 
 
318 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 of the causes of disease into predisposing, ex- 
 citing, and proximate. It is well known that a 
 cause which appears to produce a disease in one in- 
 stance will, in another, be followed by no result, or 
 by a disease of a different kind. Attempts have 
 accordingly been made to investigate the circum- 
 stances which produce a tendency to be aifected by 
 particular diseases at certain times, — and these have 
 received the name of predisposing causes, or some 
 times of occasional causes. The effluvia of marshes, 
 for example, are considered as the exciting cause 
 of intermittent fever; but the disease is not pro- 
 duced in all who are exposed to this effluvia. Vari- 
 ous circumstances, such as fatigue and intemper- 
 ance, are said to act as the predisposing or occa- 
 sional causes. But, in other situations, fatigue and 
 intemperance were never known to produce inter- 
 mittent fever ; and thej^ cannot, therefore, in correct 
 language, be said to be connected with the disease 
 in the manner of cause. The term proximate cause, 
 again, has been applied to minute changes which 
 take place in certain functions of the body so as to 
 constitute particular diseases. Such speculations 
 are, in general, in a great measure hypothetical; 
 but, even if they were ascertained to be true, they 
 must be considered as constituting the nature an(f 
 essence of the disease, and could not be regarded in 
 the light of a cause. If these observalions shall be 
 considered as entitled to any weight, it will follow 
 that the term cause ought to be restricted to that 
 which has commonly 6een called the exciting cause. 
 
DEDUCING GF.NERAL PRINCIPLES. 319 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 OP DEDUCING GENERAL FACTS OR GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 
 
 Having, with the cautions which have been re- 
 ferred to, collected a body of authentic facts, and 
 having traced among- these facts the relation of uni- 
 form sequence, or uniform conjunction, the next 
 step in our investigation is to bring together a num- 
 ber of these facts, or classes of facts, and to en- 
 deavour to deduce from them general principles. 
 
 By the process of mind which we call abstraction, 
 we separate one property of a substance from its 
 other properties, or one fact from a chain of facts, 
 and contemplate it apart. When we thus view a 
 number of substances, or a number of classes of 
 facts, and separate an individual property or indi- 
 vidual fact which is common to them all, we may 
 then contemplate this fact or property as character- 
 istic of the whole class : and the process constitutes 
 generalizing, or deducing a general fact, or general 
 principle. 
 
 Generahzing is to be distinguished from classifica- 
 tion, though the mental process concerned is in both 
 essentially the same. We class together a certain 
 number of substances by a property in which they 
 agree ; and, in doing so, we specify and enumerate 
 the individual substances included in the class. 
 Thus, we may take a number of substances differing 
 widely in their external and mechanical properties, 
 some being soUd, some fluid, and some gaseous, and 
 say they are all acids. The class being thus formed, 
 and consisting of a defined number of substances 
 which agree in the property of acidity, we may next 
 investigate some other property which is common 
 
320 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 to all the individuals of the class, and belong-s to no 
 other, and say, for example, that all acids redden 
 veg-etable-blues. The former of these operations is 
 properly classification; the latter is generalizing in 
 reference to the class. In the former, we take or 
 exclude individual substances, according as they 
 possess or not the property on which the classifica- 
 tion rests; in performing the latter, the property 
 which is assumed must belong to all the individuals 
 without a single exception, or, if it does not, it must 
 be abandoned as a general fact or general principle 
 in reference to the class. In classifying, we may 
 use every freedom regarding individuals in takiiigor 
 excluding them. In generalizing, we must not ex- 
 clude a single individual ; for the principle which 
 does not include every one of them, — that is, the 
 proposed fact which is not true of all the individ- 
 uals is not a general fact, and consequently cannot 
 be admitted as a general principle. For in physical 
 science, to talk of exceptions to a general rule is 
 only to say, in other words, that the rule is not gene- 
 ral, and, consequently, is unworthy of confidence 
 If one acid were discovered which does not redden 
 vegetable-blues, it would belong to a history of these 
 substances to state that a certain number of them 
 have this property ; but the property of reddening 
 vegetable-blues would require to be abandoned as a 
 general fact or general principle apphcable to the 
 class of acids. 
 
 A general law, or general principle, then, is no- 
 thing more than a general fact, or a fact which is 
 invariably true of all the individual cases to which 
 it professes to apply. Deducing such facts is the 
 great object of modern science ; and it is by this pe- 
 culiar character that it is distinguisjjad from the an- 
 cient science of the schools, the constant aim of 
 which was to discover causes. The general law of 
 gravitation, for example, is nothing more than the 
 general fact, or fact invariably true, that all bodies 
 
DEDUCING GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 321 
 
 when left unsupported, fall to the ground. There 
 were at one time certain apparent exceptions to the 
 universality of this law, namely, in some very light 
 bodies, which were not observed to fall. But a little 
 farther observation showed that these are prevented 
 from falling by being lighter than the atmosphere, 
 and that in vacuo they observe the same law as the 
 heaviest bodies. The apparent exceptions being 
 thus brought under the law, it became general, 
 namely, the fact universally true, that all unsup- 
 ported bodies fall to the ground. Now, of the cause 
 of this phenomenon we know nothing ; and what we 
 call the general law, or general principle of gravita- 
 tion, is nothing more than a universal fact, or a fact 
 that is true without a single exception. But having 
 ascertained the fact to be invariably and universally 
 true, we assume it as a part of the established order 
 of nature, and proceed upon it with as much confi- 
 dence as if we knew the mysterious agency on 
 which the phenomenon depends. The establishment 
 of the fact as universal brings us to that point in the 
 inquiry which is the limit of our powers and capaci- 
 ties, and it is sufficient to the purposes of science. On 
 the same principle, it is familiar to every one that 
 extensive discoveries have been made in regard to 
 the properties and laws of heat ; but we do not know 
 what heat is, whether a distinct essence, or, as has 
 been supposed by some philosophers, a peculiar mo- 
 tion of the minute atoms of bodies. 
 
 In the same manner, the person who first observed 
 iron attracted by the magnet observed a fact which 
 was to him new and unaccountable. But the same 
 phenomenon having been observed a certain number 
 of times, a belief would arise that there existed be- 
 tween it and the substances concerned a connexion 
 of cause and effect. The result of this behef would 
 be, that when the substances were brought together 
 the attraction would be expected to take place. Ob- 
 servations would then probably be made with other 
 
822 MEDICAL S(MENCE. 
 
 substances, and farther observations with the same 
 substances; and it being found that the attraction 
 took place between iron and the magnet only, and 
 that between these it took place in every instance, 
 the general principle would be deduced, or the fact 
 universally true in all instances, that the magnet at- 
 tracts iron. The same observation applies to the 
 other remarkable property derived from the magnet, 
 namely, pointing to the north. The phenomenon 
 received the name of magnetism, and the laws were 
 then investigated by which it was regulated ; but 
 what we call magnetism is still nothing more than a 
 mode of expressing the universal fact, that the mag- 
 net attracts iron, and points to the north. ' On what 
 hidden influence these remarkable phenomena de- 
 pend we are still as ignorant as the man who first 
 observed them ; and, however interesting it would 
 be to know it, the knowledge is not necessary to the 
 investigation of the laws of magnetism. 
 
 These may, perhaps, be considered as fair exam- 
 ples of the inductive philosophy, as distinguished 
 from the hypothetical systems of the era which pre- 
 ceded it. According to these, the constant aim of 
 the inquirer was the explanation of phenomena ; and 
 in the case before us a theory would have been con- 
 structed calculated to account for the attraction by 
 the fluxes and refluxes of some invisible fluid or 
 ether, which would have been described with as 
 much minuteness as if there had been real ground 
 for believing it to exist. Strikingly opposed to all 
 such speculations is the leading principle of the in- 
 ductive philosophy, that the last object of science is 
 to " ascertain the universality of a fact." 
 
 "The study of nature," says an eminent writer, 
 " is the study of facts, not of causes." In conformity 
 with this truth, the objects of science may perhaps 
 be defined to be, to observe facts ; to trace their re- 
 lations and sequences; and to ascertain the facts 
 which are universal. It consists in simply tracing 
 
DEDUCING GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 323 
 
 the order which is observed by the phenomena of 
 nature; the efficient causes of these phenomena 
 beiiio- considered as beyond the reach of the human 
 faculties, and, cousequently, not the leiritimate ob- 
 jects of scientific inquiry. It is thus strikingly op- 
 posed to the old philosophy, the constant aim of 
 which was the explanation of phenomena, and which 
 has therefore received the name of " the philosophy 
 of causes." 
 
 Tiiis important distinction between induction and 
 hypothetical speculation, which is now so firmly 
 established in other departments of science, it is to 
 be feared has not been so fully recognised in medical 
 investigations. On the contrary, every one who is 
 acquainted with the history of medical doctrines 
 will probably admit that medicine is still deeply 
 tinged v/ith the philosophy of causes ; in other words, 
 that there is a remarkable tendency to refer phe- 
 nomena to certain obscure principles, which cannot 
 be shown to be facts, and, consequently, cannot be 
 considered as the objects of If^gitimate inquiry. It 
 is unnecessary in this place to refer more particu- 
 larly to fictitious and hypothetical principles of this 
 description, which, one after anotlier, have held a 
 prominent place in medical science. If the rules of 
 the inductive philosophy are to be applied to medi- 
 cine, the immediate effect of them must be to banish 
 all such speculations as contrary to the first rules of 
 sound investigation. They are entirely fictitious 
 principles, framed to correspond with the phenomena 
 instead of being deduced from them. It is also in 
 general beyond the reach of observdtion either to 
 establish or overturn them ; and the only mode of 
 detecting their character is to bring them to the test 
 of the inquiry, — Are they facts ] and are the facta 
 universal ] 
 
 The rules to be observed in deducing general prin- 
 ciples appear, therefore, to be the following : — 
 1 That the principle assumed be itself a fact 
 
324 MEDICAL SCIENCE 
 
 2. That it be true, without a single exception, ol 
 ail the individual cases ; or, in other words, that the 
 fact be universal. 
 
 I. The first of these rules is opposed to a practice 
 lately referred to, which must be admitted to have 
 been very prevalent in medical science, namely, 
 that of referring- phenomena to fictitious principles 
 which cannot be shown to be facts. Of the princi- 
 ples of this class, which at various periods have held 
 a prominent place in medical doctrine, some have 
 had their day, and are now forgotten ; but it may be 
 doubted whether they were inferior in value to those 
 which have succeeded them. We do not now hear 
 of viscidity of the blood, lentor of the fluids, or 
 rigidity of the solids ; of morbific matter in the blood, 
 of hot or cold humours, of obstruction of the animal 
 spirits, and other doctrines, by which various phe- 
 nomena were explained by the inquirers of former 
 times ; but, perhaps, those of more recent date can 
 scarcely be considered as more satisfactory. It may 
 certainly, at least, be a question whether we can 
 concede the character of facts to irregular excite- 
 ment of the nervous system, hepatic derangement, 
 as that term is very commonly employed, and the 
 numerous modifications under which we meet with 
 the doctrines of determination, irritation, congestion, 
 sympathy, and spasm. 
 
 II. The second rule is opposed to the error ol 
 hasty generalizing, or of deducing a general state- 
 ment from a limited number of facts. We can avoid 
 this error only by keeping steadily in view that 
 general principles derive their whole value from 
 being universal facts, or facts that are true without 
 a single exception, in regard to all the individual 
 cases to which the principle is meant to apply. 
 When they are deduced prematurely, that is, from a 
 limited number of facts, or a partial view of their 
 
DEDUCING GENERAL PRINCIPLES 325 
 
 minute characters, they fail entirely of the purposes 
 which they are meant to serve, and, when trusted, 
 lead us into error. I have formerly alluded to seve- 
 ral examples of hasty generalizing in medical sci- 
 ence. Some writers have maintained that a certain 
 ^tate of rigidity of the hmbs is distinctly character- 
 \stic of ramollissement of the brain ; and others con- 
 sider every modification of fever as depending upon 
 mfiammation of the gastro-intestinal membrane 
 This rigidity of the limbs is a frequent occurrence 
 in ramollissement of the brain, and in many cases 
 of fever there is disease of the gastro-intestinal 
 membrane. As a part of the history of the affec- 
 tions, therefore, these are important facts ; but they 
 are not true of all the cases of ramollissement and 
 of fever, and, consequently, cannot be admitted as 
 general principles in reference to these affections ; 
 for though they are facts, the facts are not uni- 
 versal. 
 
 In a science such as medicine, indeed, requiring an 
 accumulation of facts which must often be the re- 
 sult of the labour of ages, partial generalizing may 
 sometimes be admitted merely as a help to the 
 memory ; provided we keep constantly in view the 
 imperfect nature of such deductions, and be con- 
 stantly attentive to correct them by farther obser- 
 vations. But when imperfect results of this kind 
 are received as established principles, they retard 
 our progress in search of truth, or even lead us far- 
 ther and farthei away from it. The confidence is 
 truly remarkable with which such premature deduc- 
 tions in medicines are brought forward, and the fa- 
 cihty with which they are often received, without 
 examination, as established principles ; much labo- 
 rious investigation indeed is often devoted to no 
 other purpose than showing them to be fallacious. 
 The zeal for hypothetical systems is considerably 
 gone by ; but this tendency to unsound generahzing 
 
 ust be viewed as one of the chief errors which at 
 E 6 
 
326 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 present retard the progress of medical science ; and 
 it may, perhaps, be contended, that medicine will 
 never attain a place among the inductive sciences 
 till inquirers agree to act steadily upon the rule — 
 that every medical doctrine shall be a fact, and that 
 the fact shall be universal. 
 
 There are two respects in which a fondness for 
 generaUzing, in medicine, may be abused, and may 
 lead to errors of a practical nature. The one con- 
 sists in assuming a fact as general which is not 
 really true of all the individual cases ; — various ex- 
 amples of this have been already referred to. The 
 other arises from extending a fact or principle which 
 is true of one class of cases to others with which 
 it is not connected. Thus, a medical man, who de- 
 cides upon general principles without attending to 
 individual facts, may pronounce a patient to labour 
 under consumption, when he perceives expec- 
 toration of a purulent character. Admitting that 
 purulent expectoration may occur in all cases of 
 consumption, the sound observer knows, that it is 
 Dot confined to this disease, but also occurs in others 
 of a much less dangerous character. 
 
 For a legitimate theory, then, it is required that 
 the principle which is assumed be true, and that 
 it be common to all the cases. But there are cer- 
 tain instances, in which a principle ascertained to 
 be true in regard to one set of cases may be ex- 
 tended by conjecture to others, in regard to which 
 its existence is only hypothetical. This may be 
 called legitimate hypothesis, or anticipation of prin- 
 ciples ; and it differs in this respect from the ficti- 
 tious theories already referred to, that it is liable 
 to be either estabhshed or overturned by the progress 
 of observation. In this manner, the theory of gravi- 
 tation was hypothetic ally extended to the motions 
 of the heavenly bodies long before the observations 
 Gf Newton had actuallv*established the truth of the 
 
LEGITIMATE USE OF HYPOTHESIS. 827 
 
 doctrine ; and the same principle is of le^tirnate 
 use in medical investigations. Thus there has been 
 some difference of opinion in regard to the origin 
 of the aifection which is called ramollissement of the 
 brain ; a conjecture has been offered, that it is a re- 
 sult of inflammation in that particular structure. 
 Now this, at first, was mere hypothesis or conjecture ; 
 but it was hypothesis only in regard to the relation 
 of facts, or the application of a known principle. 
 For the pnnciple which is assumed, namely, inflam- 
 mation, is a real and true principle ; its relation to 
 this particular affection is the hypothesis. It is such 
 an hypothesis, or anticipation of a principle, as 
 serves to guide us in observation, and which, by 
 such observation, is likely to be soon either estab- 
 lished or overturned. Hypothesis of this kind is 
 to be considered as a legitimate guide to inquiry, and 
 may be of extensive use in medicine when kept un 
 der proper regulation. But it is to be regrett<»^3 that 
 such conjectures, if brought forward with conhdence, 
 are too often received without further investigation 
 as established principles. In this manner, the pro- 
 per use of them is entirely lost, and they rather lead 
 to error and fallacy. 
 
 The laws in regard to such hypotheses,'therefore, 
 are, that they shall be considered as nothing more 
 than conjecture until such observations or experi- 
 ments have been made as are sufficient to ascertain 
 their^ truth ; and that, if they aje not thus verified, 
 they shall be instantly abandoned. To the process 
 now mentioned, some writers have proposed to ap- 
 ply the term theory, as distinct from hypothesis ; 
 and to restrict the latter term to the fictitious prin- 
 ciples formerly mentioned, namely, those which 
 cannot be proved to have any real existence. 
 Others apply the term hypothesis to both kinds of 
 principles, whether fictitious or legitimate, and call 
 the latter a theory only after its truth has been 
 established. But the fact seems to be, that the two 
 
328 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 terms are used in philosophical writings in an unde- 
 fined and indiscriminate manner. 
 
 In every scientific investigation, it is to be kept in 
 mind, that efficient causes are beyond our reach. 
 The object of our research are physical causes only, 
 by which we mean nothing more than the uniform 
 sequences of events as ascertained by extensive ob- 
 servation. What we call the explanation of phe- 
 nomena consists in being able to trace distinctly all 
 the links of such a chain of sequences, so as to per- 
 ceive their uniform relation to each other. Thus, 
 there may be many instances in which we are ac- 
 quainted with facts forming part of such a chain, 
 and are satisfied that they are so connected, while 
 we cannot explain their connexion. This is occa- 
 sioned by the want of some fact which forms an in- 
 termediate part of the chain, and the discovery of 
 which would enable us to see the relation of the 
 whole sequence, or, in common language, to explain 
 the phenomena. Such a chain of facts was, at one 
 time, presented by the rise of water in a vacuum to 
 the height of thirty-two feet. The circumstances 
 were well known, as well as their uniform relation ; 
 that is to say, the fact of a vacuum, the fact of the 
 water rising, and the fact of this uniformly taking 
 place. But the phenomenon could not be explained ; 
 for an intermediate fact was required to show the 
 manner in which these known facts were connected. 
 The doctrine of nature abhorring a vacuum afforded 
 no explanation, for it furnished no fact ; but the fact 
 required was supplied by the discoveries of Torri- 
 celli on atmospheric pressure. The chain of events 
 was then filled up, or, in common language, the phe- 
 nomenon was accounted for. 
 
 There are, indeed, many cases in which the inves- 
 tigation of intermediate events in the chain of se- 
 quences is beycmd our reach. In these, we must be 
 satisfied with a knowledge of the facts, and their ac- 
 tual connexion as we observe them, without being 
 
SUGGESTIONS FOR MEDICAL INVESTIGATION. 329 
 
 able to trace the events on which the connexion de- 
 pends. This happens in some of the ^eat pheno- 
 mena of nature, such as cavitation and mag-netism. 
 We know the facts, but we cannot account for them ; 
 that is, we are ignorant of certain intermediate 
 facts by which those we do know are connected to- 
 gether. If, in such cases, we amuse ourselves with 
 visionary hypothesis or conjecture instead of facts, 
 we wander from the path of philosophical inquiry. 
 Of this nature were the vortices of Des Cartes, and 
 the doctrine of an invisible ether, which was at one 
 time proposed to explain the phenomena of gravita- 
 tion. Other examples of the same kind are to be 
 met with in the old philosophy ; and those who are 
 acquainted with the history of medicine need not be 
 told that such speculations have also been frequent 
 in medical science. 
 
 If we would contribute something towards di- 
 minishing the uncertainty of medical researches, 
 and introducing a greater degree of precision into 
 medical reasonings, there are certain rules which 
 we ought to keep steadily in view, both in conduct- 
 ing our own inquiries, and examining the investiga- 
 tions of others. These may be briefly recapitulated 
 in the following manner as arising out of the pre- 
 ceding observations : — 
 
 1. We should endeavour to have all our terms fully 
 and distinctly defined. If we speak, for example, 
 of a person being bilious, or labouring under biliary 
 derangement, or derangement of the chylopoietic 
 viscera, let it be explained what particular condition 
 of the biliary or digestive organs we mean to ex- 
 press by these terms; or, if this cannot be done, let 
 Ee2 
 
330 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 it at least be clearly understood what particular 
 s5^mptoms we include under them. The same ob- 
 servation applies to various other terms of an 
 equally indefinite character, which have been for- 
 merly mentioned. If they were defined in tliis 
 manner, they would be merely names, and no harm 
 could result from the use of them ; but, as they are 
 frequently employed, they seem to have no explicit 
 signification. 
 
 II. In making a statement of facts, or examining 
 a statement made by another person, we should be 
 satisfied that the facts are authentic, — that they are 
 fully and fairly stated, — and that no important facts 
 are left out of view, disguised, or modified. It is 
 also necessary that no facts be taken into the state- 
 ment wliich are not really connected with the sub- 
 ject. I formerly alluded to examples of this last 
 error, — appearances being considered as indicating 
 diseases of internal organs, which are incidental or 
 trivial, perhaps taking place after death, or under cir- 
 cumstances not connected with diseased action. 
 
 III. When we find two events placed in a state of 
 contiguity to each other, we should use the utmost 
 caution in considering them as connected in the man- 
 ner of cause and effect. Nothing warrants us in 
 assuming this relation but such an extent of obser- 
 vation as shows the connexion to be constant and 
 uniform ; and we should keep in view the various 
 sources of fallacy, formerly referred to, which en- 
 compass the whole subject of medical causation. 
 
 IV. In deducing general conclusions, or general 
 doctrines, we must beware, on the one hand, of as- 
 suming imaginary principles which cannot be proved 
 really to exist ; and, on the other, of deducing prin* 
 ciples or doctrines from a limited number of facts. 
 We must remember that such deductions are of n« 
 
SUGGESTIONS FOR MEDICAL INVESTIGATION. 331 
 
 value, unless they are invariably true in regard to all 
 the cases to which they are meant to refer. 
 
 V. In examining- a statement made by any writer, 
 there is cause for exercising similar caution. The 
 credibility of a narrator of medical statements does 
 not rest upon his veracity only, or the total absence 
 of any intention to deceive. With perfect sincerity 
 and conviction of the truth of what he delivers, he 
 may present fallacious statements. This may hap- 
 pen from a partial narration of facts, — from unsound 
 causation, — and from delivering as equivalent to a 
 fact what is really a general statement. In regard 
 to these, we require to be satisfied, not only of his 
 veracity, but of his habits as an observer, and the 
 extent of the observations on which his statement 
 is founded. In all cases of this kind, therefore, we 
 ought to exercise such a mental process as the fol- 
 lowing : — 
 
 1. Are the terms which the author employs fully 
 and distinctly defined ; and are they employed in the 
 usual and recognised meaning ] 
 
 2. Are the facts authentic; are they fully and 
 fairly stated ; do they all relate to the subject ; have 
 we reason to suspect that any important facts have 
 been omitted, disguised, or modified, or that facts 
 have been collected on one side only of a question , 
 does the statement include any points which, though 
 called facts, are merely assumptions requiring to be 
 proved ? 
 
 3. What events does the author consider as con- 
 nected in the manner of cause and effect ; have we 
 reason to believe that this relation has been assumed 
 upon an extent of observation which proved it to be 
 constant and uniform ; what does he propose as 
 general principles or doctrines ; are these facts ; and 
 are they true in regard to all the cases to which he 
 applies them 1 
 
 4. What are the new conclusions which he pro- 
 
332 MEDICAL SCIENCE 
 
 poses to deduce from his whole view of the subject* 
 and are these legitimate deductions from such of 
 his premises as we admit to be authentic ? 
 
 The rules thus shortly proposed, I submit as those 
 which ought to guide us in all our inquiries. With- 
 out constant attention to them, numerous facts may- 
 pass before us from which we can derive no real 
 knowledge ; and many ingenious and plausible doc- 
 trines may be presented which tend only to lead us 
 into error. In the same manner, the benefit which 
 a phj'sician derives from his own opportunities of 
 observation, in common language called his expe- 
 rience, is not in proportion to the period of time 
 over which it has extended, or the number of facts 
 which have passed under his view. It must depend 
 on the attention with which he has observed these 
 facts, and traced their relations to each other ; on 
 the anxiety with which he has separated incidental 
 relations from those which are uniform; and the 
 caution with which he has ventured on assuming the 
 relation of cause and effect, or has advanced to 
 general principles. It must depend, further, on the 
 jealousy and suspicion with which he has received 
 even his own conclusions, and the care with which 
 he has corrected them from time to time by further 
 observations. Finally, it must depend on the judg- 
 ment with which he applies the knowledge thus ac- 
 quired to the investigation and treatment of new 
 cases ; by tracing promptly the points of affinity be- 
 tween the case under his view and those cases on 
 which his knowledge was founded ; by discovering 
 real points of resemblance where there is an ap 
 parent difference, and real points of difference where 
 there is an apparent resemblance. The farther a 
 physician advances in this course of rigid inquiry, he 
 becomes more sensible of the difficulties with which 
 his science is encumbered, more suspicious of all 
 general conclusions, and more ai^xious to bring them 
 
STOGESTIONS FOR MEDICAL INrESTIQATION. 333 
 
 to the test of minute and extensive observation ; in 
 particular, he learns to exercise more and more cau- 
 tion in considering any one event in medicine as ihe 
 cause of another. In real acquisition, consequently, 
 his progress is slow; for much of his improvement 
 consists in detecting the fallacy of systems which 
 he once considered as established, and the instability 
 of principles in which he once confided as infallible 
 But these discoveries prepare the way for his actua. 
 progress, and the conclusions at which he does ar 
 rive then fall upon his mind with aU the authority 
 of truth. 
 
t34 CHARACTERS OF 
 
 PART V. 
 
 VIEW OF THE QUALITIES AND ACQUIRE- 
 MENTS WHICH CONSTITUTE A WELL- 
 REGULATED MIND. 
 
 In concluding this outline of facts regarding the 
 intellectual powers and the investigation of truth, 
 we may take a slight review of what those qualities 
 are which constitute a well-regulated mmd, and 
 which ought to be aimed at by those who desire 
 either their own mental culture, or that of others 
 who are under their care. The more important con- 
 siderations may be briefly recapitulated in the fol- 
 lowing manner : — 
 
 I. The cultivation of a habit of steady and con- 
 tinuous attention ; or of properly directing the mind 
 to any subject which is before it, so as fully to con- 
 template its elements and relations. This is neces- 
 sary for the due exercise of every other mental pro- 
 cess, and is the foundation of all improvement of 
 character, both intellectual and moral. We shall 
 afterward have occasion to remark, how often so- 
 phistical opinions and various distortions of character 
 may be traced to errors in this first act of the mind, 
 or to a misdirection and want of due regulation of 
 the attention. There is, indeed, every reason to be- 
 lieve that the diversities in the power of judging, in 
 different individuals, are much less than we are apt 
 to imagine ; and that the remarkable differences ob- 
 served in the act of judging are rather to be ascribed 
 to the manner in which the mind is previously di- 
 rected to the facts on which the judgment is after- 
 
A WELL-REGULATED MIND. 335 
 
 ward to be exercised. It is related of Sir Isaac 
 Newton that when he w^as questioned respecting- the 
 mental qualities which formed the peculiarity of his 
 character, he referred it entirely to the power which 
 he had acquired of continuous attention. 
 
 II. Nearly connected with the former, and of 
 equal importance, is a careful regulation and control 
 of the succession of our thoughts. This remarkable 
 faculty is very much under the influence of cultiva- 
 tion, and on the power so acquired depends the im- 
 portant habit of regular and connected thinking. It 
 is primarily a voluntary act ; and in the exercise of 
 it in different individuals there are the most remark- 
 able differences. In some the thoughts are allowed 
 to wander at large without any reflation, or are 
 devoted only to frivolous and transient objects; 
 while others habitually exercise over them a stern 
 control, directing them to subjects of real import- 
 ance, and prosecuting these in a regular and con- 
 nected manner. This important habit gains strength 
 6y exercise, and nothing, certainly, has a greater in- 
 fluence in giving tone and consistency to the whole 
 character. It may not, indeed, be going too far to 
 assert that our condition, in the scale both of moral 
 and intellectual beings, is in a great measure deter- 
 mined by the control which we have acquired over 
 the succession of our thoughts, and by the subjects 
 on which they are habitually exercised. 
 
 The regulation of the thoughts is, therefore, a 
 high concern ; in the man who devotes his attention 
 to it as a study of supreme importance, the first 
 great source of astonishment will be the manner in 
 which his thoughts have been occupied in many an 
 hour and many a day that has passed over him. 
 The leading objects to which the thoughts may be 
 directed are referable to three classes. (1.) The or- 
 dinary engagements of life, or matters of business, 
 with which every man is occupied in one degree or 
 
336 CHARACTERS OF 
 
 another; including concerns of domestic arrange- 
 ment, personal comfort, and necessary recreation 
 Each of these deserves a certain degree of attention, 
 but this requires to be strictly guided by its real and 
 relative importance ; and it is entirely unworthy of 
 a sound and regulated mind to have the attention 
 Bolely or chiefly occupied with matters of personal 
 comfort, or of trivial importance, calculated merely 
 to afford amusement for the passing hour. (2.) Vi- 
 sions of the imagination built up by the mind itself 
 when it has nothing better to occupy it. The mind 
 cannot be idle, and when it is not occupied by sub- 
 jects of a useful kind, it will find a resource in those 
 which are frivolous or hurtful, — in mere visions, 
 waking dreams, or fictions, in which the mind wan- 
 ders from scene to scene, unrestrained by reason, 
 probability, or truth. No habit can be more opposed 
 to a healthy condition of the mental powers ; and 
 none ought to be more carefully guarded against by 
 every one who would cultivate the high acquire- 
 ment of a well-regulated mind. (3.) Entirely op- 
 posed to the latter of these modes, and distinct also 
 in a great measure from the former, is the habit of 
 following out a connected chain of thoughts on sub- 
 jects of importance and of truth, whenever the mind 
 is disengaged I'rom the proper and necessary atten- 
 tion to the ordinary transactions of life. The par- 
 ticular subjects to which the thoughts are directed 
 in cultivating this habit will vary in different indi- 
 viduals ; but the consideration of the relative value 
 of them does not belong to our present subject. 
 The purpose of these observations is simply to im- 
 
 Sress the value of that regulation of the thoughts 
 y which they can always find an occupation of in- 
 terest and importance distinct from the ordinary 
 transactions of Hfe, or the mere pursuit of frivolous 
 engagements ; and also totally distinct from that de- 
 structive habit by which the mind is allowed to run 
 to waste amid visions and fictions unworthy of 9 
 waking man. 
 
\ A WELL-REGULATED MIND. 337 
 
 III. The cultivation of an active inquiring state 
 of mind which seeks for information from every 
 source that comes within its reach, whether in read- 
 ing, conversation, or personal obseivation. With 
 this state of mental activity ought to be closely con- 
 *£cted attention to the authenticity of facts so re- 
 ceived ; avoiding the two extremes of credulity and 
 skepticism. 
 
 IV. The habit of con act association; that is, 
 connecting facts in the mind according to their true 
 relations, aiid to the manner in which they tend to 
 illustrate each other. This, as we have formerly 
 seen, is one of the principal means of improving the 
 memory ; particularly of the kind of memory which 
 is an essential quality of a cultivated mind ; namely, 
 that which is founded not upon incidental con- 
 nexions, but on true and important relations. Nearly 
 allied to this is the habit of reflection, or of tracing 
 carefully the relations of facts, and the conclusions 
 and principles which arise out of them. It is in 
 this manner, as was formerly mentioned, that the 
 philosophical mind often traces remarkable relations, 
 and deduces important conclusions ; while to the 
 common understanding the facts appear to be very 
 remote or entirely unconnected. 
 
 V. A careful selection of the subjects to which the 
 mind ought to be directed. These are, in some 
 respects, different in different persons, according to 
 their situations in hfe ; but there are certain objects 
 of attention which are peculiarly adapted to each 
 individual, and there are some which are equally in- 
 teresting to all. In regard to the latter, an appro- 
 priate degree of attention is the part of every wise 
 man; in regard to the former, a proper selection is 
 the foundation of excellence. One individual may 
 waste his powers in that desultory application of 
 them which leads to an imperfect acquaintance with 
 
 Ff 
 
338 CHARACTERS OF 
 
 a variety of subjects ; while another allows his life 
 to steal over him in listless inactivity, or application 
 to trifling pursuits. It is equally melancholy to see 
 high powers devoted to unworthy objects ; such as 
 the contests of party on matters involving no import- 
 ant principle, or the subtleties of sophistical con- 
 troversy. For rising to eminence in any intellectual 
 pursuit, the^-e is not a rule of more essential im- 
 portance than that of doing one thing at a time ; 
 avoiding distracting and desultory occupations ; and 
 keeping a leading object hsbitually before the mind, 
 as one in which it can at all times find an interesting 
 resource when necessary avocations allow the 
 thoughts to recm to it. A subject which is culti- 
 vated in this manner, not by regular periods of study 
 merely, but as an habitual object of thought, rises 
 up and expands before the mind in a manner which 
 is altogether astonishing. If along with this habit 
 there be cultivated the practice of constantly writing 
 such views as arise, we perhaps describe that state 
 of mental disciphne by which talents of a very 
 moderate order may be applied in a conspicuous and 
 useful manner to any subject to which they are de- 
 voted. Such writing need not be made at first with 
 any great attention to method, but merely put aside 
 for future consideration; and in this manner the dif- 
 ferent departments of a subject will develop and 
 arrange themselves as they advance in a manner 
 equally pleasing and wonderful. 
 
 VI. A due regulation and proper control of the 
 imagination ; that is, restrictmg its range to objects 
 which harmonize with truth, and are adapted to the 
 real state of things with which the individual is or 
 may be connected. We have seen how much the 
 character is influenced by this exercise of the mind ; 
 that it may be turned to purposes of the greatest 
 moment, both in the pursuits of science and in the 
 cultivation of benevolence and virtue ; but that, on 
 
A WELL-REGULATED MIND. 339 
 
 the other hand, it may be so employed as to debase 
 both the moral and intellectual character. 
 
 VII. The cultivation of calm and correct judg- 
 ment — applicable alike to the formation of opinions, 
 and the regulation of conduct. This is founded, as 
 we have seen, upon the habit of directing the atten- 
 tion distinctly and steadily to all the facts and con- 
 siderations bearing upon a subject ; and it consists 
 ni contemplating them in their true relations, and 
 assigning to each the degree of importance of which 
 it is worthy. This mental habit tends to guard us 
 against forming conclusions, either with listless in- 
 attention to the views by which we ought to be influ- 
 enced, — or with attention directed to some of these, 
 while we neglect others of equal or greater import- 
 ance. It is, therefore, opposed to the influence of 
 prejudice and passion, — to the formation of sophis- 
 tical opinions, — to party spirit, — and to every pro- 
 pensity which leads to the adoptjon of principles on 
 any other ground than calm and candid examination, 
 guided by sincere desire to discover the truth. In 
 the purely physical sciences, distorted opinions are 
 seldom met with, or make little impression, be- 
 cause they are brought to the test of experiment, 
 and thus their fallacy is exposed. But it is other- 
 wise in those departments which do not admit of 
 this remedy. Sophisms and partial inductions are, 
 accordingly, met with in medicine, political econo- 
 my, and metaphysics ; and too often in the still 
 higher subjects of morals and religion. In the 
 economy of the human mind, it is indeed impossible 
 to observe a more remarkable phenomenon than the 
 manner in which a man who, in the ordinary affairs 
 of life, shows the general characters of a sound un- 
 derstanding, can thus resign himself to the influence 
 of an opinion founded upon partial examination 
 He brings ingeniously to the support of his dogma 
 every fact and argument that can possibly be turned 
 
340 CHARACTERS OF 
 
 to its defence; and explains away or overlooks 
 every thing that tends to a different conclusion; 
 while "he appears anxious to convince others, and 
 really seems to have persuaded himself, that he is 
 engaged in an honest investigation of truth. This 
 propensity gains strength by indulgence, and the 
 mind, which has yielded to its influence, advances 
 from one pretended discovery to another, — mistaking 
 its own fancies for the sound conclusions of the un- 
 derstanding, until it either settles down into some 
 monstrous sophism, or perhaps concludes by doubt- 
 ing of every thing. 
 
 The manner in which the most extravagant opin- 
 ions are maintained by persons who give way to this 
 abuse of their powers of reasoning, is scarcely more 
 remarkable than the facility with which they often 
 find zealous proselytes. It is, indeed, difficult to 
 trace the principles by which various individuals are 
 influenced in thus surrendering their assent, with 
 little examination, often on subjects of the highest 
 importance. In some it would appear to arise from 
 the mere pleasure of mental excitement ; in others, 
 from the love of singularity, and the desire of ap- 
 pearing wiser than their neighbours ; while, in not a 
 few, the will evidently takes the lead in the mental 
 process, and opinions are seized upon with avidity, 
 and embraced as truth, which recommend them- 
 selves to previously existing inchnations of the 
 heart. But whatever may be the exphanation, the 
 iixfluence of the principle is most extensive; and 
 sentiments of the most opposite kinds may often be 
 traced to the facihty with which the human mind re- 
 ceives opinions which have been presented to it by 
 some extrinsic influence. This influence may be of 
 various kinds. It may be the power of party, oi 
 the persuasion of a plausible and persevering indi- 
 vidual : it may be the supposed infallibility of a par 
 ticular system ; it may be the mere empire of 
 fashion, or the pretensions of a false philosophy. 
 
A. WELL-REGULATED MIND. 341 
 
 The particular result, also, n^ay differ, according as 
 one or other of these causes may be in operation. 
 But the intellectual condition is the same ; and the 
 distortion of character which arises out of it, 
 whether bigotry, superstition, or skepticism, may be 
 traced to a similar process ; namely, to an influ- 
 ence which directs the mind upon some other prin- 
 ciple than a candid investigation of truth. In a simi- 
 lar manner we may perhaps account for the facts, 
 that the lowest superstition and the most daring 
 skepticism frequently pass into each other ; and that 
 the most remarkable examples of both are often met 
 with in the same situations, namely, those in which 
 the human mind is restrained from free and candid 
 inquiry. On the other hand, it would appear that 
 the universal toleration, and full liberty of conscience, 
 which characterize a free and enlightened country, 
 are calculated to preserve from the two extremes of 
 superstition and skepticism. In other situations, it 
 is striking to remark how often those who revolt 
 from the errors of a false faith take refuge in in- 
 fidelity. 
 
 The mental quahties which have been referred to 
 in the preceding observations, constituting an active, 
 attentive, and reflecting mind, should be carefully 
 cultivated by all who desire their own mental im- 
 provement. The man who has cultivated them with 
 adequate care habitually exercises a process of 
 mind which is equally a source of improvement 
 and of refined enjoyment. Does a subject occur 
 to him, either in conversation or reflection, in 
 which he feels that his knowledge is deficient, he 
 commences, without delay, an eager pursuit of 
 the necessary information. In prosecuting any m- 
 quiry, whether by reading or observation, his at- 
 tention is acutely alive to the authenticity of facts, 
 — the validity of arguments, — the accuracy of pro- 
 cesses of investigation, — principles which are illus- 
 Ff2 
 
342 CHARACTERS OF 
 
 trated by the facts and conclusions deduced from 
 them, — the character of observers, — the style of 
 writers; and thus, all the circumstances which 
 come before him are made acutely and individually 
 the objects of attention and reflection. Such a man 
 acquires a confidence in his own powers and re- 
 sources to which those are strangers who have not 
 cultivated this kind of mental discipline. The in- 
 tellectual condition arising- out of it is applicable 
 alike to every situation in which a man can be 
 placed, — whether the affairs of ordinary life, the 
 pursuits of science, — or those higher inquiries and re- 
 lations which concern him as a moral being. 
 
 In the affairs of ordinary life, this mental habit 
 constitutes what we (;all an intelligent thinking man, 
 whose attention is alive to all that is passing before 
 him, — who thinks acutely and eagerly on his own 
 conduct and that of others, — and is constantly de- 
 riving useful information and subjects of reflection 
 from occurrences which, by the listless mind, are 
 passed by and forgotten. This habit is not neces- 
 sarily connected with acquired knowledge, or with 
 what is commonly called intellectual cultivation : 
 but is often met with, in a high degree, in persons 
 whose direct attainments are of a very limited kind. 
 It is the foundation of caution and prudence in the 
 affairs of life, and may perhaps be considered as the 
 basis of that quality, of more value to its possessor 
 than any of the sciences, which is commonly called 
 sound good sense. It is the origin also, of what we 
 call presence of mind, — or a readiness in adapting 
 resources to circumstances. A man of this charac- 
 ter, in whatever emergency he happens to be placed, 
 forms a prompt, clear, and defined judgment of what- 
 ever conduct or expedient the situation requires, and 
 acts with promptitude upon his decision. In both 
 these respect he differs equally from the listless in- 
 activity of one description of men, and the rash, 
 hasty, and inconsiderate conduct of another. He 
 differs not less from characters of a third class, who. 
 
\ WELL-REGULATED MIND. 343 
 
 though they may be correct in their judgrment of 
 what ougiit to be done, arrive at their decision, or 
 act upon it too slowly for the circumstances, and 
 consequently are said, according- to a common prov- 
 erb, to he wise behind time. The listless and tor- 
 pid character, indeed, may occasionally be excited 
 by emergencies to a degree of mental activity 
 which is not natural to him ; and this is, in many in- 
 stances, the source of a readiness of conception, 
 and a promptitude in action which the individual 
 does not exhibit in ordinary circumstances. 
 
 In the pursuits of science these mental qualities 
 constitute observing and inventive genius, — two con- 
 ditions of mind which lie at the foundation of all 
 philosophical eminence. By ohsen.nng genius 1 
 mean that habit of mind by which the philosopher 
 not only acquires truths relating to any subject, but 
 arranges and generalizes them in such a manner as 
 to show how they yield conclusions which escape 
 the mere collector of facts. He likewise analyzes 
 phenomena, and thus traces important relations 
 among facts which, to the common mind, appear very 
 remote and dissimilar. I have formerly illustrated 
 this by the manner in which Newton traced a relation 
 between the fnll of an apple from a tree, and those 
 great principles which regulate the movements of 
 the heavenly bodies. By inventive :^cnius, again, I 
 mean that active, inquiring state of mind, which not 
 only deduces, in this manner, principles from facts 
 when they are before it, but which grasps after prin- 
 ciples by eager anticipation, and then makes its own 
 conjectures the guides to observation or experiment 
 This habit o.^ mind is peculiarly adapted to the ex- 
 perimental sciences; and in these, indeed, it maybe 
 considered as the source of the most important dis- 
 coveries. It leads a man not only to observe and 
 connect the facts, but to go in search of them, and 
 to draw them, as it were, out of that concealment 
 in which they escape the ordmaiy observer, la 
 
344 CHARACTERS OF 
 
 doing so, he takes for his guides certain conjectures 
 or assumptions which have arisen out of his own in- 
 tense contemplation of the subject. These may be 
 as often false as true ; but if found false, they are 
 instantly abandoned ; and by such a course of active 
 inquiry he at length arrives at the development of 
 truth. From him are to be expected discoveries 
 which elude the observation, not of the vulgar alone, 
 but even of the philosopher who, without cultivating 
 this habit of invention, is satisfied with tracing the 
 relation of facts as they happen to be brought before 
 nim by the slower course of testimony or occasional 
 observation. The man who only amuses himself 
 with conjectures, and rests satisfied in them without 
 proof, is the mere visionary or speculatist, who in- 
 jures every subject to which his speculations are 
 directed. 
 
 In the concerns which relate to man as a moral 
 being, this active, inquiring, and reflecting habit of 
 mind is not less applicable than in matters of minor 
 interest. The man who cultivates it directs his 
 attention intensely and eagerly to the great truths 
 which belong to hie moral condition, — seeks to esti- 
 mate distinctly his relation to them, and to feel then 
 influence upon his moral principles. This constitutes 
 the distinction between the individual who merely 
 professes a particular creed, and him who examines 
 it till he makes it a matter of understanding and con- 
 riction, and then takes its principles as the rule of 
 his emotions and the guide of his conduct. Such a 
 man also contemplates in the same manner his rela- 
 tions to other men ; questions himself rigidly re- 
 garding the duties which belong to his situation, and 
 his own observance of them. He contemplates 
 others with a kind of personal interest, enters into 
 their wants and feelings, and participates in their 
 distresses. In all his relations, whether of justice, 
 benevolence, or friendship, he acts not from mere 
 incidental impulse, but upon clear and steady princi^ 
 
A WELL-REGULAT2D MIND. 345 
 
 pies. In this course of action many may go alonj 
 with him when the requirements of the individual 
 case are pointed out and impressed upon them ; but 
 that in which the mass of mankind are wanting is 
 the state of mental activity which eagerly contem- 
 plates its various duties and relations, and thus finds 
 its way to the line of conduct appropriate to the 
 importance of each of them. 
 
 VIII. For a well-regulated understanding, and 
 particularly for the application of it to inquiries of 
 the highest import, there is indispensably necessary 
 a sound condition of the moral feelings. This im- 
 portant subject belongs properly to another depart- 
 ment of mental science ; but we have seen its ex- 
 tensive influence on the due exercise of the intel- 
 lectual powers ; — and it is impossible to lose sight 
 of the place which it holds in the general harmony 
 of the mental functions required for constituting 
 that condition, of greater value than any earthly 
 good, which is strictly to be called a well-regulated 
 mind. This high attainment consists not in any 
 cultivation, however great, of the intellectual powers; 
 but requires also a corresponding and harmonious 
 culture of the benevolent affections and moral feel- 
 ings; a due regulation of the passions, emotions, 
 and desires; and a full recognisance of the supreme 
 authority of conscience over the whole intellectual 
 and moral system. Cold and contracted, indeed, is 
 that view of man which regards his understanding 
 alone ; and barren is that system, however wide its 
 range, which rests in the mere attainment of truth. 
 The highest state of man consists in his purity as a 
 moral being; and in the habitual culture and full 
 operation of those principles by which he looks 
 forth to other scenes and other times. Among these 
 are desires and longings which nought in earthly 
 :science can satisfy ; which soar beyond the sphere 
 of sensible things, and find no object worthy of theif 
 
346 CHARACTERS OF 
 
 capacities until, in humble adoration, they rest in 
 the contemplation of God. Tniths then burst upon 
 \he mind which seem to rise before it in a progres- 
 sive series, each presenting characters of new and 
 mightier import. The most aspiring understanding, 
 awed by the view, feels the inadequacy of its utmost 
 powers ; yet the mind of the humble inquirer gains 
 strength as it advances. There is now felt, in a 
 peculiar manner, the influence of that healthy con- 
 dition of the moral feelings which leads a man not 
 to be afraid of the truth. For, on this subject, we 
 are never to lose sight of the remarkable principle 
 of our nature formerly referred to, by which a man 
 comes to reason himself into the behef of what he 
 wishes to be true ; and shuts his mind against, oi 
 even arrives at an actual disbehef of, truths which 
 he fears to encounter. It is striking, also, to re- 
 mark how closely the philosophy of human naturt 
 harmonizes with the declarations of the sacred 
 writings ; where this condition of mind is traced t€ 
 its true source, in the corruption of the moral feel 
 ings, and is hkewise shown to involve a high degree 
 of guilt, in that rejection of truth which is its naturai 
 consequence : " This is the condemnation, thai 
 light is come into the world, and men loved dark 
 ness rather than light, because their deeds were 
 evil. For every one that doeth evil hateth the light, 
 neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be 
 reproved. But he that doeth truth, cometh to the 
 hght, that his deeds maybe made manifest, that they 
 are wrought in God." 
 
 This condition of mind presents a subject of in- 
 iJense interest to every one who would study his own 
 mental condition, either as an intellectual or a moral 
 being. In each individual instance, it may be traced 
 to a particular course of thought and of conduct, by 
 which the mind went gradually more and more astray 
 from truth and from virtue. In this progress, each 
 single step was felt to be a voluntary act ; but the 
 
A WELL-REGULATED MIND. 3^7 
 
 influence of the whole, after a certain period, is to 
 distort the judgment, and deaden the moral feehngs 
 on the great questions of truth and rectitude. Of 
 this remarkable phenomenon in the economy of 
 man, the explanation is beyond the reach of our 
 faculties ; but the facts are unquestionable, and the 
 practical lesson to be derived from them is of deep 
 and serious import. The first volition by which the 
 mind consciously wanders from truth, or the moral 
 feelings go astray from virtue, may impart a morbid 
 influence which shall perpetuate itself and gain 
 strength in future volitions, until the result shall be 
 to poison the whole intellectual and moral system. 
 Thus, in the wondrous scheme of sequences which 
 has been established in the economy of the human 
 heart, one volition may impart a character to the 
 future man, — the first downward step may be fatal. 
 Every candid observer of human nature must feel 
 this statement to be consistent with truth ; and, by 
 a simple and legitimate step of reasoning, a princi- 
 ple of the greatest interest seems to arise out of it. 
 When this loss of harmony among the mental facul- 
 ties has attained a certain degree, we do not per- 
 ceive any power in the mind itself capable of cor- 
 recting the disorder which has been introduced into 
 the moral system. Either, therefore, the evil is 
 irremediable and hopeless, or we must look for an 
 influence from without the mind, which may afford 
 an adequate remedy. We are thus led to discover 
 the adaptation and the probability of the provisions 
 of the Christian revelation, where an influence is 
 indeed disclosed to us, capable of restoring the har- 
 raorv which has been destroyed, and of raising man 
 anew to the sound and healthy condition of a moral 
 being. We cannot perceive any improbability, that 
 the Being who originally framed the wondrous fab- 
 ric may thus hold intercourse with it and provide a 
 remedy for its moral disorders ; and thus a state- 
 ment, such as human reason never could have anti 
 
348 CHARACTERS OF 
 
 cipated, comes to us invested with every element 
 of credibility and of truth. 
 
 The sound exercise of the understanding, there- 
 fore, IS closely connected with the important habit 
 of looking- within ; or of rigidly investigating oui 
 jitellectual and moral condition. This leads us to 
 inquire what opinions we have formed, and upon 
 what grounds we have formed them ; — what have 
 been our leading pursuits, — whether these have been 
 guided by a sound consideration of their real value, 
 — or whether important objects of attention have 
 been lightly passed over, or entirely neglected. It 
 leads us further to contemplate our mora] condition, 
 — our desires, attachments, and antipathies ; the 
 government of the imagination, and the regimen of 
 the heart; what is the habitual current of our 
 thoughts ; and whether we exercise over them that 
 control which indicates alike intellectual vigour and 
 moral purity. It leads us to review our conduct, 
 with its principles and motives, and to compare the 
 whole with the great standards of truth and recti- 
 tude. This investigation is the part of every wise 
 man. Without it, an individual may make the great- 
 est attainments in science, may learn to measure the 
 earth, and to trace the course of the stars, while he 
 is entirely wanting in that higher department, — the 
 knowledge of himself. 
 
 On these important subjects, I would more par- 
 ticularly address myself to that interesting class for 
 whom this work is chiefly intended, the younger 
 members of the medical profession. The considera- 
 tions which have been submitted to them, while they 
 appear to carry the authority of truth, are cpphcable 
 at once to their scientific investigations, and to those 
 great inquiries, equally interesting to men of every 
 degree, which relate to the principles of moral and 
 religious belief. On these subjects, a sound condi- 
 tion of mind will lead them to think and judge for 
 ^emselves with a care and seriousness adapted to 
 
A WELL-REGULATED MIND. 349 
 
 the solemn import of the inquiry, and without being 
 infuenoed by the dogmas of those who, with httle 
 examination, presume to decide with confidence on 
 matters of eternal moment. Of the modifications 
 of that distortion of character which has commonly 
 received the name of cant, the cant of h>-pocrisy 
 has been said to be the worst; but there is another 
 whicli may fairly be placed by its side, and that is 
 the cant of infidelity, — tlie affectation of scoffino; at 
 sacred things by men who have never examined the 
 subject, or never with an attention in any degree 
 adequate to its momentous importance. A Avell- 
 regulated mind must at once perceive that this is 
 alike unworthy ol sound sense and sound philosophy. 
 If we require the authority of names, we need only 
 to be reminded, that truths whicli received the cor- 
 dial assent of Boyle and Newton, of Haller and 
 Boerhaavc, are at least deserving of grave and de- 
 liberate examination. But we may dismiss such an 
 appeal as tliis ; for nothing more is wanted to chal- 
 lenge the utmost seriousness of every camhd in- 
 quirer than the solenui nature of tlie inquiry itself. 
 The medical observer, in an especial manner, has 
 facts at all times before him which are in the highest 
 degree calculated to fix his deep and serious atten- 
 tion. In the structure and economy of the human 
 body he has proofs, such as no other branch of 
 natural science can furnish, of the power luid wis- 
 don» of the Viternal One. Let him resign his mind 
 to the influence oi' these proofs, and It-arn to rise in 
 humble adoration to the Almighty Being of whom 
 they witness; and, familiar as he is with human 
 suffering and death, let him learn to estimate the 
 value of those trutlis which have power to heal the 
 broken heart, and to cheer the bed of death witii the 
 prospect of immortality. 
 
 THE EM). 
 
 Gg 
 
k 
 
aUESTIONS 
 
 FOR THE 
 
 EXAMINATION OF STUDENTS. 
 
 PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
 Page 19-33. 
 
 How have all things in nature been placed by the will of the 
 Creator, and what connexion is founded upon this fact ? — What 
 is there in regard to these relations which is at present hidden 
 from us ? — What is the province of human knowledge ? — How 
 is this to be accomplished ? 
 
 Wliat do we first observe in relation to any particular series 
 of facts or events, and what are we entitled to assume from 
 this? — Whence is excited our idea of power in reference to 
 these events ? — Upon what is the relation of cause and effect 
 founded ? — To what conclusion do we come upon further ob- 
 servation ? — Of what is this general confidence the result ? — 
 What do we learn by experience ? 
 
 What is the natural tendency of the mind, and how is it cor- 
 rected ?— What further do we learn from experience ? — What 
 caution do we find to be necessary in this matter ? — To what, 
 however, does this caution relate ? — How is this to be accom- 
 phshed? — WTiat instance is given? — What other tendency of 
 the mind is mentioned, and how is it illustrated ? 
 
 How do we infer the existence and attributes of an Almighty 
 Creator ? — To what does our knowledge of causation amount ? 
 In the application of fire to gunpowder, what do we know, and 
 what do we not know ? 
 
 in speaking of physical causes, what do we mean ? — Of what 
 are we ignorant in regard to the communication of motion, the 
 support of falling bodies, and the action of certam medicmes ? 
 
 What distinction is it important to keep in mind, and why ? — 
 To what has the term Jinal cause been applied ? — What is one 
 of the most remarkable examples of its apphcation? 
 
 What is the object of science, and what of art ? — Upon what is 
 art founded? — What is the subject ol investigation in the ptiys 
 ical sciences, and what is founded upon the results ? — Do the 
 same remarks apply to mental phenomena ' 
 
352 QUESTIONS. 
 
 In how many points of view are the relations or s fiences of 
 mental phenomena to be considered, and what are they? — How 
 are these phenomena to be classed ?- -What are to be referred 
 to these three lieads respectively? — What is the object of re- 
 search in medical science ? 
 
 Upon what does the certainty of a science depend ? — In what 
 sciences is this certainty most easily attainable, and why ? — 
 What are the two grand sources of uncertainty in respect to 
 sciences, involving mental operations? — What two examples 
 are given, and from what arises the uncertainty in each ? 
 
 What is the true object of all science, and when is that object 
 forsaken ? 
 
 PART I. 
 
 Page 33-45. 
 
 Wliat is the mind ? — How does it hold intercourse with the 
 external Avorld? — Of this connexion what do we know ? — What 
 is the object of true science ? — In what sense is the science 
 recent ? — What was the nature of former speculations ? — What 
 was ihe supposed process by which we become acquainted with 
 external objects? — What were the theories of Berkeley and 
 Hume respectively? — What the system of the Egoists ? 
 
 On what principle were these speculations combated and ex- 
 posed ? — What circumstance went to strengthen this mode of 
 reasoning ? — What singular fact is stated by Dr. Reid ? — Upon 
 what was this doctrine founded ? — What ought to be the fate 
 of such speculations, and why ? — What other speculations are 
 to be referred to the same class ? — By what different theories 
 are these functions attempted to be explained ? — What is our 
 duty in opposition to all such hypotheses, and what is the proper 
 view of the nature of the mind ? 
 
 What prominent erroneous doctrine is still occasionally 
 broached, notwithstanding the ideal theory has been aban- 
 doned ? — What is the proper application of the terms matter 
 and mind ? — How do we come to a knowledge of these subjects 
 respectively, and of what, m regard to each, are we necessarily 
 ignorant ? — What is the true object of philosophy, and how is 
 materialism to be viewed ? — In what respects does it fail to 
 afford satisfaction to the mind? — What was the theory of Bosco 
 vich ? — What is the nature of the evidence of the existence both 
 of matter and mind ? — What is the remark of Stewart ? 
 
 What is the modern system of materialism ? — What is ad 
 mitted on this head, and what denied ?— How do the operations 
 of the bodily senses differ from those of the mind ? 
 
 From what arises the unsatisfactory nature of any meta 
 
QUESTIONS. 353 
 
 physical argument respecting the essence of mind ? — What are 
 some of the reasons which compel us to regard mind as differ- 
 ent from all the functions of matter ? 
 
 Is there reason to think that death has any effect upon the 
 soul, and why ? — What is Dr. Brown's remark ? — What objec- 
 tion has been made to this mode of reasoning ? — How an- 
 swered? — What is admitted with regard to the lower animals? 
 — What is said of other principles superadded to material 
 things ' —To what is our knowledge limited ? 
 
 On what does the evidence of a future state of being rest? — 
 What is the name given to that power within which bears wit- 
 ness to immortahty ? — Does materialism, if admitted, disprove 
 the doctrine of a future existence ? — What is the spirit of the 
 humble inquirer on this subject ? 
 
 PART II. 
 
 Page 45-47. 
 
 What were some of the different opinions formerly enter 
 tained in regard to the origin of our ideas? — WTiat was the an- 
 cient theory of <ideas ? — What is the opinion at present enter 
 tained of this theory ? — Why is the old phraseology on this sub- 
 ject abandoned ? — What is the modern view ^ — Why does not 
 this doctrine encourage the scheme of materialism ? — How is 
 this illustrated ? 
 
 How is a knowledge of external things acquired, and what 
 knowledge do we gain in connexion ? — What additional notions 
 do we acquire by reflection ? — To what sources, then, is our 
 knowledge referable ? — What farther source ? — ^What division 
 of this part of the subject is adopted ? 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Page 47-66. 
 
 What do we know of perception ? — To what was the mind 
 ftjrmerly compared, and what is now thought of such specula- 
 tions ? — How is our first knowledge of the material world ob- 
 tained ? — How does it appear that some general knowledge, 
 previously acquired, is necessary ? 
 
 Wliat is the next step in the process ? — WTiat is the distinc 
 tion between primary and secondary.' qualities ? — What was one 
 of the quibbles of the scholastic philosophy ?— How illustrated. 
 — What are the two meanings of heat ? 
 
 How IS the process by which we acquire a knowledge of ex- 
 ternal things usually divided ? — What is impUed in each ? — How 
 Gg2 
 
354 QUESTIONS. 
 
 do Others apply the term perception, and what is Dr. Brown's 
 distinction ? — "V^liat is the number and uaines of the senses ?— 
 What does Dr. Brown propose to add to the?e ? 
 
 Whence are our first impressions of the existence and soUdity 
 of external objects derived ? — What has been supposed in regard 
 to our acquiring the notion of time ? 
 
 What is the character of the first notions acquired by all the 
 senses ? — What are the primary objects of vision ' — How are 
 our ideas of distance and magnitude obtained ?— How is it with 
 regard to sounds / — From wliat arises the power of judging by 
 sight of small distances? — How is it that we enjoy in a greater 
 degree the deception produced by a painting, when looked at 
 with one eye, and through a tube ? — What other circumstances 
 influence our perception? — How is this principle illustrated by 
 a fact mentioned by Capt. Parry? — What does Capt. P. add? — 
 What objection has been founded upon tliis, and how is it an- 
 swered ? 
 
 By what else is our judgment by vision -of the magnitude of 
 objects affected ?— How is this illustrated ? 
 
 What is the effect of the loss or diminution of one sense upon 
 others'' — What examples may be mentioned? — How is this to 
 be accounted for? — What other instances are adduced? 
 
 How is the difficulty solved in regard to an object's appearing 
 single and direct, though seen by two eyes?-— \\'hat analogous 
 cases may be mentioned? 
 
 What is the extent of our knowledge of sensation ? — What 
 are we in the habit of saying? — What do we 7iot know upon the 
 sub}ect ? 
 
 How does it appear that voluntary effort is in some degree 
 necessary to the full exercise of perception? — What is such an 
 effect of 'the mind called?— How may the effect of attention be 
 illustrated, in respect both to the sense of sight and of hearing? 
 
 How does it appear that attention is very much influenced by 
 habit ? — What is the anecdote mentioned by Dr. Darwin ? — From 
 what other sources is this principle illustrated? — What is 
 requisite to constitute the best teacher in arithmetic or music? 
 
 What is said of ihe inflaence of habit in facilitating intellectual 
 processes? — What is its effect upon profound philosophers and 
 public speakers ? — What is the effect of habits of inattention ? — ■ 
 vVhy should the young be guarded against this state of mind? — 
 What examples occur in savage life of the effect of habits of 
 close attention ? 
 
 What are meant by false impressions, and how are they usu- 
 ally classed ? — What are the most familiar of these false im- 
 pressions ? — What remarkable cases are specified ? 
 
 What are the most interesting phenomena connected with 
 
QUESTIONS. 356 
 
 affections of this kind ? — How are these divided '' — 'VMial is the 
 first class? — What is the experiment related by Dr. Darwin?— 
 What was the illusion produced by looking at a print? — What 
 case of an illusion of hearing is mentioned ? — What were New 
 ton's experunents in regard to ocular spectra? 
 
 What the second class ? — Wliat was the case of Dr. Ferriar? 
 
 W'hat the third class ? — What remarkable case of a lady is 
 mentioned ? — How is this case explained '. — What was the case 
 of the irritable gentleman ? — Is the etfect of hallucination of 
 mind the same ? — How may such false impressions be corrected ? 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Page 66-69. 
 
 What is meant by consciousness ? — ^Vhat is the distinction 
 between consciousness and reflection? — How is reflection e~.- 
 ployed? — How manv kinds of knowledge are derived from it ? — 
 What is the first ?— What the second ?— What tiie third ?— What 
 are the piincipal of the convictions here alluded to? — By what 
 general name are these instinctive principles of belief usually 
 called? — What is the proper v'ow to be taken of the controver- 
 sies which formerly prevailed respecting these first truths ? 
 
 SECTION HI. 
 
 Page 69-8G. 
 
 Why is the evidence of testimony necessary? — By what con 
 siderations is our confidence in testimony influenced ? — What 
 other principle is there of extensive application in such cases? 
 — What effect has probability in producing belief? — What cau 
 tions are necessary in regard to its influence ? — By what exam- 
 ples are these remarks illustrated? — What is the tendency of this 
 confidence in one's own experience, as the test of probability ? 
 
 What is the influence of general knowledge upon the belief 
 of testimony ? — What example is supposed in regard to Ar 
 chimedes? — What is the ground of Archimedes' belief? 
 
 To what principle of great practical importance does this 
 illustration lead? — How is this illustrated by the preceding 
 anecdotes ? 
 
 What objection has been sometimes urged by skeptics against 
 miracles ? — Wliat was Hume's position on this subject ? 
 
 How may the fallacy of this argument be shown ? — With what 
 is Hume's reasoning compared ? — How does it appear that his 
 objection is little better than a play upon words? 
 
 What fact, in regard to experience, is overlooked by those 
 who are imposed upon by such a sophism as this? — Upon what 
 does the reception of new knowledge necessarily depend ?•-< 
 
356 QUESTIONS. 
 
 What proportion of tlie facts of our knowledge do we receive 
 upon testimony ? — What examples are given ? — What are the 
 supposed reasonings of Highlanders on Hume's principle? 
 
 What is the proper view therefore to be taken of confidence in 
 testimony? — On what three conditions? — By what other cir- 
 cumstance is our confidence strengthened ? — On what testimony 
 do we believe the marvellous? — On what grounds are such 
 accounts usually rejected? — What is the first consideration 
 which influences a cultivated mind on receiving testimony ? — 
 What the second ?— What the example ?— What the third?— 
 W^hat admission is made by Hume ? 
 
 How do these principles balance and compensate each other ? 
 
 How may extraordinary events be distinguished ? — How are 
 they defined respectively? 
 
 What degree of testimony is necessary to establish a miracu 
 lous event ? — What necessary besides ? — On what grounds may 
 a doubt still remain ? — What are the grounds of moral probability, 
 or of how many parts does it consist, and what are they ? — To 
 what subject are these remarks apphed ? — How are the proba- 
 bilities in regard to this point classified? — What are the four 
 heads suggested ? 
 
 What charge of fallacy is sometimes brought against this 
 reasoning, and how is it answered ? 
 
 What is the real question in regard to the probabiUty of 
 miracles? — Upon what must our estimate of probabihty in such 
 a case be founded ? 
 
 What form does the question assume when the presumption 
 against the fact is removed ? 
 
 With what is the evidence of testimony compared, and what 
 the conclusion drawn? — By what example illustrated? 
 
 What are the grounds of confidence in testimony ? — What is 
 Laplace's illustration of a very important principle? — What is 
 expected in cases of concurring testimony ? 
 
 What etfect has character in influencing our belief in testi- 
 mony ? — How do supposed views of interest, on the contrary, 
 aftectit? 
 
 Wliat is the fifth point of importance to be considered in this 
 matter ? — To what does this apply in a striking ftianner ? 
 
 What other corroborating circumstance may be mentioned ? — 
 How does tliis apply to the history of Christianity ? — What are 
 he rcioarks upon the direct evidence of Christianity ? 
 
QUESTIONS. 357 
 
 PART III. 
 
 Page 86-89. 
 
 What knowledge is acquired through the various sources 
 referred to in the preceding observations ? — To what does the 
 next part of the inquiry refer? — What term has often been 
 applied to these operations ; why is it exceptionable, and what is 
 adopted instead of it ? — To what four heads are they referred ? — 
 What is the nature and office of each? 
 
 To what does the author propose to confine himself, and why ? 
 —How have some of Dr. Reid's followers erred in this respect * 
 — What did Dr. Brown attempt? — How does the author propose 
 
 10 view thesui)jfcct 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Page 89-119. 
 
 Wha"". is the office of memon,', recollection, and conception 
 respect, vely ? — What original differences are there in the power 
 of mem )ry 1 — What examples cited ? — What has been generally 
 alleged in regard to this fact?— Is there evidence that this 
 opinion is well founded? — What is said of Dr. Leyden's 
 memory? 
 
 What is meant by a mere local memory ? — What kind of 
 memory is there which is still more valuable ? — Which kind 
 is the more ready, and generally makes the greatest show, and 
 why ? 
 
 What are the points of real interest and importance in regard 
 to memory ? — To what two heads are these referable? 
 
 What is said of the influence of attention upon memorj' ?— 
 How are attention and memory assisted ? 
 
 In what respect is it obvious that there are great differences in 
 memory ? — Upon what does the power of attention depend ? — 
 What is the story of the actor in this connexion ? 
 
 Though attention as conducing to memory is voluntarj', yet 
 how is its actual exercise influenced ? — How is this illustrated ? 
 • -In what other way is attention influenced ? — How is this 
 character contrasted with that of others ? 
 
 What especial direction on this subject should be given to the 
 young? — For what reason is this important? 
 
 What next to attention exerts a remarkable influence upon 
 memory?— Upon what is this principle founded? — What ac- 
 count is given of the formation of a train of thought ' — What 
 
358 QUESTIONS. 
 
 remarkable circumstance is there about such a train'' — Hovr 
 instanced ? 
 
 Can the principles of association in a particular train of 
 thought always be traced ? — By what is it influenced ? — What 
 was the phraseology used by Dr. Brown? — Under what heads 
 have they been classed ? — Why does one of these relations occur 
 in preference to others ? — How illustrated from the common topic 
 of the weather? — What is the example given from Hobbes?— 
 What Mr. Stewart's remark upon it ? 
 
 W^hat improvement in terms does the author propose, and for 
 what reason? — How are the suggestions of contrast illustrated ? 
 
 How may associations be classified ?— What is the principle 
 on which they all depend? — Upon what does the strength of the 
 association deperxl ? 
 
 When does natural or philosophical association take place? — ■ 
 How is the fonnation of such associations influenced ? — What 
 example is given? — WTiat principle is illustrated by this ex- 
 ample? — What the natural result of this? — Why should habits 
 of attention and association be cultivated ? 
 
 Do the same facts suggest the same train of association to 
 diflerent individuals, and why ? 
 
 How many ways is a series of facts recalled ? — Has the mind 
 in a healthy state power to control its train of thought ? — Is 
 the power over the succession of thoughts ever lost ? — In what 
 cases ? 
 
 W'hat is meant by local associations ? — Mention examples. — 
 WTiat kind of impressions do these association? often make ? — 
 Examples. — When are they pecuharly strong ? — What the pro- 
 nosed explanation of this ? — What is the amount of it ? 
 
 Under what other circumstances are similar impressions 
 excited ? — Whatjnilitary examples mentioned ? — How viAnd may 
 such feelings be? — How might the principle be employed? — 
 What is the stor>' of the eagle's nest related by Dr. Rush ? 
 
 "WTiat anecdote is mentioned to illustrate the permanence of 
 these associations ? 
 
 WTiat anecdote illustrates the effect of trivial occurrences in 
 awakening local associations ? — WTiat common examples may 
 be cited ? — What is related by Van Swieten? — On what principle 
 does the interest of monuments depend ? 
 
 How is arbitrary or fictitious association produced ? — How is 
 this process exempUfied ? — What analogous expedient do most 
 people employ ? 
 
 What use has been made of this principle of association ?— • 
 Wliat was the practice of the ancients ? — What the author's own 
 experience ? — What the system of Feinagle ? — How exempUfied ? 
 
 What application of this principle deserves especial remark? 
 —What is their influence ? 
 
 What still more important instance may be adduced ? — What 
 
QUESTIONS. 359 
 
 case may be stated for illustration ? — How may thio be made to 
 bear upon the truth of the sacred writings ? 
 
 What is conception? — Examples. — What important mod'6 
 cation of this power may be mentioned? — Upon what does the 
 vividness of our conceptions depend ? — Wliat is said of the con- 
 ception of persons of vivid imagination ? — Why are they more 
 distinct than others ? 
 
 What is said of the connexion of conception with the idea 
 of time ? — In whom is conception sometimes exceedingly vi%nd ? 
 — Are such conceptions usually lasting ? 
 
 What is said of this faculty as possessed by different individ 
 uals ? — With what is a high degree of it generally connected ? — 
 Upon what does it depend ? — What else has influence upon it ? — 
 How exemphfied? 
 
 In what situations is this faculty brought most intensely into 
 exercise ? — What is the anecdote of Niebuhr ? — Wliat illus- 
 trated by this ? — What additional example is given of another 
 application of this mental process ? 
 
 What is the first rule for the improvement of memory m 
 adults ? — What the second ? — In what do these habits consist ? — 
 What the third?— What the fourth ? 
 
 What are the habits of mind to which these rules are opposed ^ 
 ^What is the fifth rule ? — What is its mode of operation ? — 
 What exception to it? — What is" related of Bloumfield the 
 poet? 
 
 What is the first rule for cultivating these powers in the young . 
 — What method should be taken with children ? — What errori 
 in education are pointed out? — Upon what does progress in 
 intellectual pursuits materially depend ? 
 
 What is the second rule ? — What the third ? — What may bo 
 made the means of awakening this mental activity ? 
 
 What the fourth rule ? — On what condition wiU written exer- 
 cises be peculiarly valuable ? 
 
 What the fifth rule ? — How is this advantage secured ? — What 
 are its good effects ? — What other useful exercise is mentioned ? 
 
 What is the sixth rule ? — WTiat errors have been prevalent on 
 this subject ? — What is really of paramount importance ? 
 
 Why has nothing been said of rehgious instruction ? — What 
 is the chief error here ? — V\Tiat is one of the most striking phe- 
 nomena in the science of the human mind ? 
 
 In what case is education deficient? — Upon what does futuie 
 character depend ? — Wliat principle is most effectual in securing 
 •hese advantages? — Exanu)!** 
 
360 QUESTIONS. 
 
 Page 119. 
 
 What bodily affections influence the memory? — What the 
 author's present purpose ? 
 
 What function first mipaired ? — What is the effect of fever in 
 Its first stage? — What in the second? — What in the third? 
 
 What is a more full description of the peculiarities of the 
 first stage, and in whom does it occur ? — What of the second, and 
 in what case is it met with ? — What case of a lady is deocribe-l? 
 
 What is the third condition, and when does it o-jcur? — l)e- 
 ficribe its effects. What case described by Mr. Abc-iethy '!— 
 What similar case mentioned? — What the cise oi the lady 
 mentioned by Dr. Prichard ? — What the explanation of it? — 
 What the case of the German lady ? 
 
 Wliat that of Dr. Macintosh's patient ? — Wliat other examples 
 are cited ? 
 
 What the case of the boy whose scull was fractured? — What 
 peculiar phenomena are mentioned connected with the memory 
 of languages? 
 
 What is the fourth condition, and when does it occur ? — What 
 phenomena does it exhibit ? — What facts are cited in proof? — 
 How are trances probably in some cases to be accounted for?— 
 Why are these impressions not always remembered? 
 
 To what do the above observations refer ? — What other striking 
 effect of disease i.- mentioned, and what, in its higher stages, 
 is it called ? — What pertinent cases are mentioned ? 
 
 What instances still more remarkable are mentioned? — What 
 the case of the American student ? 
 
 In wh?t slight injuries are the circumstances gradually recalled 
 in a Tf narkable manner? — By what case strikingly illustrated ? 
 
 W'lat still more remarkable phenomenon connected with cases 
 of this kind occurs ? — What the case related of the surgeon ? — 
 What that of the clergyman? 
 
 What disease occasions most numerous examples ? — What 
 effect upon the memory the most conmion ? — What the case of 
 tlie lady mentioned by Dr. Gregory? — What that of a gentleman 
 recovered from apoplexy ? 
 
 What singular modification of this condition is related, and 
 what the particulars of the case ? — What other modification 
 sometimes occurs, and what examples given? 
 
 What other remarkable modification of this condition is some 
 times found, and what is the example given by Dr. Beattie ?— 
 What two other similar cases are mentioned ? 
 
 What is the general principle in regard to such cases ? — Hon 
 is this remark applied to one of the preceding cases? 
 
 Is disease of the brain always attended by disorder of thi 
 mind ? — What the case of the lady ? — What the case mentioned 
 by Dr. Ferriar ? — Recite some other striking ca»ee. 
 
QTTESTTONS 361 
 
 What is said of the danger of speculsrting on these facts?— 
 What certain inference, however, may be drawn? — What do the 
 facts show us? 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Page 134-138. 
 
 What is the office of abstraction, and qow instanced ? — In 
 what two important processes is this act of the mind employed ? 
 — What is the name and office of the first ? — What is the most 
 important point to be attended lo in the process of generali- 
 zation .' 
 
 What disputes have existed among writers on mental science 
 on this subject? — What the author's object? — What one tiling 
 is clear? — What is the distinction between reason and abstrac- 
 tion? 
 
 What controversy formerly arose in regard to the process of 
 generalization ? — What example given ? — What two sects sprang 
 from this dispute ? 
 
 How are these controversies now considered ? — H Dw formerly 
 carried on ? — What the results in regard to each ? — To what 
 extent did they accuse each other? — In what countries did it 
 chiefly prevail ? — How was it connected with politics ? 
 
 What was the real point at issue ? — How designated by Mr. 
 Stewart ? 
 
 What the character of the question ? — What is the real pro- 
 cess in such a case ? — What examples may be mentioned I 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 Page 138-144, 
 
 What is the nature of the imagination ? — Examples. — How 
 much m these cases lictitious, and how much true ? — What is 
 often the character of such creations compared with realities T 
 — Examples. — What is Stewart's remark in regard to Milton? 
 
 With how many kinds of composition does imagination have 
 to do ? — What the first ? — What the second ? — How different 
 from the first ?— What the third ?— What the fourth ? 
 
 What constitutes inventive genius ? — To what else are similar 
 powers of invention applicable ? 
 
 How is the exercise of imagination regulated? — ^Miat are 
 its effects ? 
 
 What is said of the importance of regulating it? — What are 
 its useful effects ? — What are the moral effects of a deficiency 
 of imagination ? — What is a perverted imagination, and what it« 
 effects ? 
 
 Hh 
 
362 QUESTIONS. 
 
 What two evils may be said to result from indulgence m 
 works of fiction? — Example. — What evils arise from fictitious 
 tales of sorrow ? — What from fictitious tales of vice ? 
 
 Under what conditions may imagination be turned to important 
 purj)Oses? — What the evils of allowing it to wander at discre- 
 tion ? — What are the principal stated by Foster to flow from 
 the mind's surrendering itself to this delusive habit ? — What is 
 Johnson's description ? 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 Page 144-156. 
 
 What is the most simple view to be taken of reason ? — How 
 many general apphcations of this mental process ? — What the 
 first? 
 
 What is embraced under the phrase relations of things ? — What 
 is the first class ? — Examples. — What the second ? — What the 
 distinction between resemblance and analogy ? — What are the 
 arts depending upon these relations ? — What is the process of 
 classification ? 
 
 What is the third class ?— Wha* the fourth ?—W^hat the fifth ? 
 —What the sixth ? — What the seventh ? 
 
 How is the province of reason distinguished from that of 
 attention and m.emory ? — "WTien do the results of such a mental 
 process constitute truth, and when falsehood? 
 
 What is the second general apphcation of reason ? — What 
 the third ? 
 
 How does reason or judgment guide us towards the discovery 
 of truth ? — In whom do we repose confidence, and in whom not ? 
 — What distinction sometimes made in regard to the term rea- 
 son? — Is it well grounded? 
 
 How may reason be defined in the language of intellectual 
 science ? — To what is it chiefly opposed ? — From what else dis- 
 tinguished ? — When do we say a man's memory is better than 
 his judgment? 
 
 From what is reasoning sometimes contradistinguished ? 
 
 What are the characteristics of the reasoning of different 
 persons ? 
 
 From what is reason distinguished in theology, and what does 
 it mean ? 
 
 What is the character of a reasonable man ? — What the oppo- 
 site character ? — What is said of the tenacity with which the 
 two characters hold their opinions? — How has Solomon ex- 
 pressed the leading features of two such characters ? 
 
 What appears then in reference to the mental process called 
 reason or judgment ? — Of what does it ccaisist in both cases ?— 
 In, so doing, how does a man of sound judgment proceed ?— 
 
 1 
 
QUESTIONS. 363 
 
 What characters are opposed to this ? — Which the most hopeful 
 character ? — Why ? — What the results of the latter character ?— 
 How is this condition of mind increased ? — How is this state 
 of mind emphatically described in the Bible ? — What the most 
 affecting representation of a mind lost to sound reason ? 
 
 What circumstance essential in every exercise of judgment? 
 What are the sources of bias ? — Results? — How alluded to in 
 the Scriptures ? 
 
 What appears from the grounds above referred to ? — Of what 
 dogma shall we thus be aisle to perceive the fallacy ? — In what 
 sense is this true ?— In what sense not true ?— For what is a 
 man really responsible ? — What serious consequences result 
 from any other view ? 
 
 What is said of reason as appUed to opinions and to conduct ? 
 — What are the grand divisions of this subject? — What prelim- 
 inary remark previous to entering upon these branches? — What 
 are the differences stated among philosophers? — What Dr. 
 Brown's view? — What his view of conception? — Of memory? 
 — Of imagination? — What the author's remarks upon this 
 system ? 
 
 ^ I.— Page 15&-172. 
 
 Wliat lies at the foundation of all reasoning? — ^What the 
 name given to these truths ? — What is said of their universal 
 authority ? — Into how many heads are they classed ? 
 
 What the first ? — What is the nature and foundation of our 
 belief of our own existence ? — What is the proper answer to the 
 sophisms brought against it ? — What is the second conviction ? 
 — What the answer to the sophisms against it? — What is the 
 third conviction ? — What the fourth ? — From what is this de- 
 rived ? — What disputes were formerly held on this subject ? — 
 What the true answer to the apparent paradox ? — What is the 
 fifth conviction ? — What the sixth ? — What is founded upon our 
 belief in the uniformity of nature ? — To how many heads is it 
 referable ? — What is meant by the first, uniformity of charac- 
 ters ? — Examples. 
 
 Into what does the other kind of confidence resolve itself?— 
 What error is to be guarded against in such investigations ? 
 
 Of what is this uniformity of sequences the foundation?— 
 When will this expectation disappoint us? 
 
 What remarkable uniformity may be traced innature by care- 
 ful observation? — Exarr.ple. — What other instances may be 
 mentioned? — What was the peculiar notion of the ancients? 
 
 What uniform successions of phenomena are easily ascer- 
 tamed? — In what department is there greater uncertainty?— 
 Ttie causes of this? — Whence arises the uncertainty of human 
 
364 QUESTIONS. 
 
 ^ws? — What are the calculations of the criminal in violating 
 them? — What similar uncertainty in other cases? 
 
 Is there a uniformity in moral phenomena which can be relied 
 on in any case '—Example. — Upon what laws, applicable to 
 mankmd in general, do we rely as far as they go? — How does 
 ihis apply to confidence in testimony? — What is the influence 
 of the circumstances of the case in the credibility of witnesses ? 
 
 With what is the influence of moral causes compared, and in 
 what respects does the analogy hold ? — What is the influence of 
 circumstances in both cases? — What are the circumstances 
 essential to the full operation of moral causes ? 
 
 What important question is connected with this subject? — 
 From what has the obscurity of the question arisen ? — Wliat the 
 terms employed, and how distinguished ? — What is the will?— 
 What is the proper idea of free agency ?— What is necessary 
 agency ? 
 
 Where does the real bearing of the question lie ? — How does 
 it appear that there is a just distinction between desire and the 
 will ? — Has a man of strict integrity and virtue power to commit 
 muz-der or robbery, and why? — By what influence is he controlled 
 in such cases ? — Is this necessity ? — How does this necessity bear 
 upon the interests of morals and virtue ? — How does this view 
 represent man ? — What are the circumstances essential to their 
 due operation? — How would it represent man to suppose a kind 
 of moral liberty opposed to such a necessity as this? — By what 
 comparison is this illustrated ? 
 
 With what does this kind of necessity correspond ? — How do 
 we calculate that a man will act in given circumstances? — 
 With what physical operation is this compared ? — Why do we 
 calculate in the full and uniform operation of moral causes on 
 some individuals and not upon others ? — Under what conviction 
 do we act in such cases ? — How does this apply to physical pro- 
 cesses? — What constitutes guilt? — How does the man feel 
 through the whole of this course ? — In what sense is he free ?— 
 What is said of the habitual violation of conscience ? 
 
 What remark is made upon the term necessity ? — "V^Tiat is the 
 proposed substitute? — To what ought the terms necessity and 
 necessary strictly to be applied ? — What reasons are given for the 
 change of terms '^ — What would be the effect of supposing the 
 mind to be possessed of a power of determining apart from mo- 
 tives? — What is the objection to the phrase self-determiniTig 
 power of the will 1 — How does it appear that the uniformity of 
 moral causes is admitted in practice? — What would be the 
 Saoral character of an action without motive 1 
 
QUESTIONS. 365 
 
 Page 172-177. 
 
 Why are the above-mentioned First Truths peculiarly im- 
 portant? — What is the only evidence of which they admit? — 
 What is Dr. Brown's remark ''. — What Mr. Stewart's '. 
 
 What other suggestion is likewise to be kept in mind ?— What 
 maxim as old as the days of Aristotle? — Can these truths either 
 be proved or called in question? — By whom have attempts been 
 made to prove, and by whom to disprove them? — Can the 
 sophisms of Hume be refuted by reasoning ? — What was the 
 effect of Hume's reasoning upon the mind of EUiot ? — By what 
 other persons was the same view taken ? 
 
 What was Buffier's distinctive character of these primary 
 truths? — How exemplified? — What other practical admissions 
 of them may be stated ? 
 
 Wliat distinction of great practical importance is here adverted 
 to? — What is essential to correct reasoning, and what to in- 
 tuitive belief?— What is said of the universal influence of these 
 truths? — Wliat principle may be taken for an example? — To 
 what cases is this prmciple applied ? — What instances in com- 
 mon life may be cited ? — What instance in regard to the workjj 
 of creation ? 
 
 Page 177-211. 
 
 Into how many heads may the mental processes necessary for 
 the investigation of truth be classed? — What is the first head? 
 —What the first operation of reason? — Wliat the second head? 
 —How is this done ? — What is our object in both cases ? — What 
 two errors are to be avoided? — What other process is of the 
 greatest importance? — What two extremes are here to be 
 guarded against ?— What the third head?— WTiat the fourth?— 
 WTaat is the nature of this process? — What the fifth head? — 
 What is the difference in the operation on an ordinary and on 
 a philosophical mind in regard to this ? — How is this exemplified 
 in regard to Newton ? 
 
 How may these processes be classed in a practical point of 
 view ? — What are the three principles necessary in respect to the 
 collecting of facts? — Wliat, in this matter, constitutes truth, 
 and what falsehood ? 
 
 What principles to be observed in determining the relation of 
 cause and effect? — What the principles to be observed in 
 deducing general laws ?— \Miat process is often legitimate ia. 
 our inquiries after truth, prwided it be not abused ? — "WTiat is f 
 great and common error?— In what department has it beer?, 
 peculiarly prevalent ? 
 
 Hh2 
 
|J66 QUESTIONS. 
 
 What is the great rule of indi>ction ? — How exemplified ?•— 
 What is Mr. Stewart's remark respecting Newton ? 
 
 To how many heads maj^ false investigation be referred f— 
 What is the first ? — When is a statement of facts fallacious ?— 
 What the second? — What is false causation? — Where is the 
 error of false causation most apt to occur ? — "WTiat examples ? 
 — What the third head ? — In what does false reasoning consist? 
 
 Into how many parts is reasoning divided, and what are they! 
 — Give an example of both kinds of reasoning. 
 
 Into what three elements may any particular piece of reason 
 ing be divided? — What are the points to be attended to in 
 examining the validity of such a process ? 
 
 With what does this method correspond? — Wliat is the 
 nature of the ancient syllogism ? — WTiat example given, and what 
 does it involve ? — What is necessary for the validity and efficacy 
 of such a process ? — In what case is the argimient false ? — How 
 illustrated ? — What are the names of the propositions ? 
 
 What is the general rule for avoiding fallacies ? — What is the 
 real nature of the syllogism ? — What advantage arises from 
 vising it? — Wliat the anecdote of the English lawyer? — In what 
 respect is it an important instrument ? 
 
 How many distinct objects of attention in reasoning, and what 
 are they i — Of how many parts do the premises consist, and what 
 are they ? — What is necessary before we proceed to judge of 
 conclusions ? 
 
 What other point necessary to be kept in mind in examining 
 such a process ? — How many, and what, are the sources of am 
 Dignity in the use of terms? 
 
 What is the first consideration by which w-e should be guided 
 in examining the validity of reasoning? — What the second?^ 
 What the third ?— What the fourth ?— What the fifth ?— How is 
 the necessity of attendmg to these sources of fallacy evmced ? 
 
 From what is a process of reasoning to be distinguished, and 
 how is the distinction illustrated ? — What is a proposition? — 
 Example. — How are these ascertained relations discovered? — 
 What is the province of reasoning ? — Example. — In what ways 
 may such a process be rendered more complicated? — Example 
 of the first way ? — The second way, with an example ? — What 
 are the proper objects of inquiry in examining the validity of sucb 
 processes ? 
 
 In what does inventive genius in reasoning consist? — ^Wh^ 
 is required for forming a well-cultivated mind ? — For what pur 
 pose is the power of reliection needed in addition to the know 
 ledge of facts ? 
 
 Of how many and what parts does a process of reasoning con 
 sist ? — Jn what case is the final part of the process comparativeij 
 simple ?— What often happens? — How is this exemplified'? 
 
QUESTIONS. 367 
 
 "Why is canfion peculiarly necessary in this case ? — ^What other 
 class of fallacies require to be pointed out ? 
 
 What is the first Itind of fallacy specified under this head ?— 
 What is reasoning in a circle ? 
 
 What kind of fallacy is most apt to occur in the declamations 
 of public speaiiers? — What are the tests to be applied in such 
 cases ? 
 
 To what fallacies are speculations in theology peculiarly 
 liable ? — What is the previous question in all such cases ? 
 
 What is the fallacy in regard to analogy ? — What is the cau- 
 tion to be observed here? — What examples formerly alluded to? 
 — What Mr. Hume's argument? — In what does its fallacy con- 
 sist? — What is the proper use of analogy ? — How exemphfied? 
 —What is Butler's use of it? 
 
 What fallacy, the reverse of the former, is used by sophistical 
 writers ? 
 
 What is the non-distribution of the middle term? — Example. 
 
 Give an example of the fallacy which consiots in the inversion 
 of a proposition? — Are there any propositions that admit of 
 being inverted ? — Example. 
 
 What fallacy sometimes arises from characterizing facts?— 
 Example. — What the proper reply to this ? — What are the falla- 
 cies of division and composition ? 
 
 When is there a fallacy connected with overturning an unsound 
 argument? — Why is there a fallacy in this? — What practical 
 inference do we gather from this? — What course is to be taken 
 in regard to weak points ? — What is the course of a skilful 
 reasoner ? — What example in point ? — What was Mr. Hume's 
 doctrine, and his inference from it? — What was the former 
 opinion concerning his doctrine? — WTiat the present opinion 
 of the doctrine and the inference ? 
 
 In what does a sophism somewhat connected with the former 
 consist ? 
 
 How are fallacies sometimes introduced, and with what eifect ? 
 Examples. 
 
 To what other fallacy does a casuist sometimes resort, when 
 worsted in argument ? 
 
 Upon what does a great part of the fallacy and ambiguity ol 
 processes of reasoning depend ? — In what may this consist ? — 
 What are the consequences of it ? — What is the remedy ? — What 
 apposite example ? — What example from the " Spirit of Laws ?" 
 
 What is the nature of the argumentum ad hominem ? — Example 
 
 In what does one of the most common sources of fallacy con 
 aist? — What therefore is important in any inquiry? 
 
 What may we still find, notwithstanding all our care ? — From 
 ■what does this arise ? — What exception is there to this ? And 
 what is the first ground of its superiority I'— What the second ? — 
 
368 QUESTIONS. 
 
 What illustrations given of this ?— What the third?— What th«r 
 fourth ?— What the fifth ? 
 
 Does the study of mathem5"tlcs, however, always lead to pre- 
 cision in other species of ;easoning ? — What is the explanation 
 of this? — What is Mr. Stewart's remark? — To what class doe« 
 this remark apply ? 
 
 What is our guide in reasoning ?— What its peculiar province! 
 —By what other powers is it assisted? — What is said of ttiia 
 exercise of the mind ? 
 
 What is the distinction between sound judgment and ingenious 
 disputation ? — What is the influence of the habit of disputation t 
 —How illustrated? — What the difference between a keen dia- 
 puter and a candid inquirer ? — To what is it ov^'ing that men 
 sometimes impose upon themselves ? 
 
 What else is to be remarked in regard to the sound exercise 
 of judgment ? — Example. — For what situations are such persons 
 adapted ? — How might their usefulness be increased? — By what 
 anecdote is this illustrated ? 
 
 What then the chief source of the actual varieties of judg 
 ment ? — How may the subject be divided ? 
 
 How is the first head exempUfied ? — How are the minds of 
 such persons engrossed, and to what are they liable '. — What 
 other condition of mind is produced ? — What the remedy ? 
 
 In what two ways is the judgment vitiated by want of regu- 
 lation ? — WTiat is prejudice, and how is the highest degree of it 
 exemplified? — What is the most striking example of the bad 
 effect of passion ? — What is Locke's remark ? 
 
 To what class of truths do these facts apply with peculiar 
 force ? — What is our duty m regard to these great truths ? — 
 WTiat is the real question m regard to our opinions ? — How has 
 man's weakness in regard to the attainment of truth been 
 remedied ? 
 
 What effect has the sound exercise of judgment upon the feel 
 ings of the mind ? — How does it produce this efi'ect ? 
 
 § II.— Page 211 -214. 
 
 What is the author's anxiety in respect to the ensuing dis 
 cussion ? — What prominent mental operations are here adverted 
 to ? — In what state of mind are these processes most apt to 
 take place ? 
 
 What behef probably accompanies the presence of such a 
 representation in the mind? — How is this dispelled? — How 
 illustrated ? — Suppose the vision were not to be dissipated ? 
 
 Does this condition of the mind actually take place ? In wjial 
 
QUESTIONS. 369 
 
 two cases especially ? — ^What is the condition of the mind in 
 each of these two cases respectively? — What is the state of 
 the bodily senses in dreaming ? — What in insanity ? — What affec- 
 tion holds an intermediate place between these two extremes ? 
 — How does it differ from dreaming? — Describe its nature ? — 
 What difference between the somnambulist and the maniac ? 
 
 What is the fourth condition? — Recapitulate the whole.— 
 Can the causes of these phenomena be ascertained ? 
 
 Page 214-237. 
 
 fu how many heads may the condition of the mind in dream 
 ir-g be referred, and what are they ? — What is one of the moa*. 
 curious objects of investigation in this matter ? 
 
 What is the first -mentioned source of the images which arise 
 in dreaming ? — Examples. — What the only bond of union among 
 these occurrences? — How was the train probably excited ? — 
 Without this, what might have been the result ? — What the 
 Btory of Dr. Duncan's patient ? 
 
 Mliat is the second source? — What related of Dr. Gregory? — 
 What the anecdote of the Edinburgh gentleman and his wife ? 
 —What that of Dr. Reid ? 
 
 What remariiable cases of producing dreams by an artificial 
 method may be referred to this head? — What curious case 
 related of an officer ? — What remarkable circumstance in this 
 case? 
 
 What singular fact observed in dreams excited by a noise ? — 
 Example.— Dr. Gregory's instance ? — What other instance illus- 
 trating mistakes as to time in sleep ? 
 
 What the third class of dreams ? — What cannot be accounted 
 for in regard to them ? — What the striking case of the teller ui 
 a bank ? — What remarkable circumstances were there in this 
 case ? — What other similar example mentioned ? 
 
 What example cited of a knowledge of languages revived in 
 dreams ? — What the anecdote related by Walter Scott ? — What 
 the principle illustrated by this case ? — W^hat the explanation 
 of It ? — What the case of the Edinburgh lawyer ? — What that 
 of the public officer ? 
 
 What interesting subject of observation presented by a fourth 
 class of dreams ? — What the case mentioned by Mr. Combe ?— 
 What that of the clergyman? — How accounted for withoiC 
 having recourse to supernatural communication ? 
 
 What related of the Edinburgh patient ?— How explained ? — 
 What the anecdote of the black servant? — What the dream of 
 the lady respecting her nephew ? What that of the gentle- 
 
870 QUESTIONS. 
 
 man respecting himself? — What the story of the lady and he? 
 watch ? 
 
 From what do such coincidences derive their wonderful char 
 acter ? — What singular instance mentioned by Mr. Taylor ?— - 
 What the explanation? 
 
 What else to be accounted for on a similar principle ? — How 
 explamed ? 
 
 What remarkable case of the clergyman and the charitable 
 collection? — How explained? 
 
 What included in the four classes of dreams now mentioned ? 
 ^Are there other cases on record, and what is said of them ? — 
 Are there others wholly unaccountable 1 — Relate the case of 
 the two sisters and the watch ? 
 
 What other principles may be mentioned relating to the phi- 
 losophy of dreams? — With what objects principally are our 
 dreams occupied ? — Why ? — What the case of the sportsman ? — 
 What the point illustrated by it ? — WTiat the deaf gentleman's 
 dreams mentioned by Dr. Darwin? — What the blind man's 
 dreams ? — What exceptions mentioned ? 
 
 To what persons and things do our dreams principally refer? 
 — W'hat the dream of Dr. Beattie given as an exception ? 
 
 What IS the inference from these cases ? — What fact in regard 
 lo dreams is e^'inced by those of Dr. Gregory ? — What did Con- 
 dorcet relate of himself? — What Dr. Franklin ? — What the gen 
 tleman of Edinburgh? — What other cases ? 
 
 What the anecdote of the Scotch lawyer? 
 • How does it appear that many dreams take place which are 
 forgotten ? — What dreams probably most distinctly remembered ? 
 — What other peculiar state of mind sometimes occurs in dis- 
 tressing dreams? — Wliat Dr. Beattie's case? — How did D'. 
 Reid cure himself of a tendency to frightful dreams ? 
 
 Are there persons who are never conscious of dreaming C— 
 Example. 
 
 What leading pecuharity is there in the phenomena of dream- 
 ing ? — What kind of dreams to be referred to this class ? — Hov? 
 explained ^ — How is the anabgy between dreaming and insanity 
 illustrated T 
 
 Page 237-245. 
 
 What is the difference between somnambulism and dream- 
 ing? — Wliat the state of the senses ? 
 
 How does the first degree of somnambulism show itself?- 
 \^Tiat the next ? — Wliat the usual phenomena of this form ?— 
 What the case of the young nobleman ? — What other cases d 
 the same kind ? 
 
QUESTIONS. 371 
 
 Does this affection occur except during ordinary sleep at 
 Right ? — What are the various effects produced by this kind of 
 attacks ? — What case came under the author's notice ? — In what 
 different states are individuals during the paroxysm? — What 
 the case of the watchmaker's apprentice ? — What is the point 
 illustrated by this case ? 
 
 In regard to what are other remarkable phenomena presented 
 by this singular affection ? — What was exhibited in certain French 
 cases ? — Into what do these stories probably resolve themselves ? 
 —What the case of the two females ? — What that of the ser^ 
 vant-girl ? — (How are these cases to be explained ?) 
 
 What other singular phenomenon is sometimes presented ? — • 
 Jn what does it consist ! — By what sti iking case is this and other 
 phenomena illustrated ? — What were the symptoms preceaing 
 and attending the case ? — What its final result I 
 
 What was the case at West Point .' — What the case of tho 
 insane girl ? — What is said of the explanation of these cases? — 
 What analogous case is mentioned by Dr. Prichard ?— What by 
 Mr. Combe ? 
 
 Page 245-279. 
 
 What has reason been defined to be ? — What are we enabled 
 to do by means of it >. — Wliat power of the mind is in a greater 
 or less degree lost in insanity ? — What is the result ? — What is 
 believed in both cases ? — What is the cause of this deviation 
 from the healthy state of the mental functions ? 
 
 Between what mental phenomena is there a remarkable anal- 
 c^ ? — To what two heads are the leading peculiarities of both 
 these conditions referable ? 
 
 When are these characters most completely exemplified?— 
 What does the maniac fancy ? 
 
 What leading characters do all stages of mania show?— 
 What do we call the lower stages of this condition ? — In what 
 does this consist ? — How does the eccentric man act ? — With 
 what is eccentricity nearly allied? — How is this illustrated by 
 the case of a clergyman ? — What was the result in this case ? 
 
 What erroneous theory of insanity has been maintained ? — 
 How illustrated by the preceding case ? — How does the author 
 examine lus reasoning ? 
 
 What remarkable effects of insanity are noted in some cases ? 
 «— What is the case mentioned by Dr. Willis ? — What that by 
 Pinel ? 
 
 What the results of this in many cases ? — What the character 
 of a maniac's reasoning ? 
 
 What is the pecuhar character of insanity in all its modifica- 
 tions ?— Examples. — What is said of the degree to which the mind 
 
373 QUESTIONS. 
 
 IS inflnenced by erroneous impression? — Upon what w>*i nv.cli 
 effects depend ? — Example. — What is related of a female .--df ipnt 
 of Dr. Rush ? — What instance does the author adduce tw ihow 
 the absorbing nature of the maniac's impression ? 
 
 What test lias been proposed by Pinel for distinguishing nal 
 from feigned insanity ? — What his experience in the Bicelre ? 
 
 What is another singular phenomenon connected with this 
 subject ? — What the interesting case mentioned by Dr. Prichard^ 
 — Wliat that of the lady engaged in a piece of needlework f— 
 What other case of a lady? — What the case mentioned by 
 Haslam ? 
 
 To what is the hallucination sometimes confined ? — ^What the 
 case of the prisoner in the Bicetre ? — What the story related 
 by Lord Erskine? — What two other similar cases are men- 
 tioned ? 
 
 AMiat is known of the cause of insanity ? — To what is our 
 knowledge on the subject conlined ? — What is the first class to 
 which hallucinations are referable ? — Example. — What the 
 second ?— Case.— What the third ?— Case.— What the fourth? 
 — Case mentioned by Dr. Rush. — How explained ? — What the 
 fifth 1 — W^hat impression to be referred to this feeling ? — How 
 do they often represent it ? — Wliat the case mentioned by Pinel ? 
 
 What other common impression arises out of the same unde- 
 fined feeling ? — What the story related of the priest ? — How 
 explained ? 
 
 What is the disease called when the mental impression is 
 gloomy ? — How does melancholy differ from mania ? 
 
 What is the most striking peculiarity of melancholy? — What 
 is the nature of the melanchohc affection? — Why cannot these 
 overwhelming feelings be removed ? — What feeling naturally 
 arises under the conviction of hopeless miser>'? — How does it 
 appear that the impression arises in this manner ? — WTiat the 
 case mentioned by Pinel ? — What by Dr. Burrows? 
 i What singular modification of the disease occurs in some 
 cases ? — What instances on record, and how were they charac- 
 terized? — What remarkable in one of them? — ^What the char 
 acter of the mental process in such instances? — Wliat the 
 author's explanation? — What case at variance with this? 
 
 WTiat unsuccessful attempts have been made in the way of 
 accounting for insanity ? — Can any connexion be traced ? — What 
 previously necessary to advancing conclusions ? — What com- 
 mon fallacy on the subject ? — Examples. — "VVTiat doubtful in such 
 cases ? — To what does this peculiarly apply ? — How does the 
 author reason on this point ? 
 
 To wliat is insanity in a large proportion of cases to be traced? 
 — By what is this tendency promoted ? — How does insanity 
 frequently commence ? — From what does this result? — What 
 othei habits may be referred to the same head ?— What habits 
 
QUESTIONS. 373 
 
 tend to avert it ? — ^What remarkable diversities are there in dif 
 ferent individuals ? — What is said of habits ol mental applica- 
 tion ? — What the testimony of Dr. Conolly ? 
 
 WTiat is said of the higher degree of insanity ? — What of the 
 lower ? — What caution is necessary ? — How are we to decide? 
 —To what mistakes are we liable ? 
 
 What other caution is to be kept in mind? — What is said of 
 the stories often related by the insane^ — Example. — How can 
 hallucination be determined from the feeUngs of the insane 
 towards friends? — In what cases is antipathy an uncertain test? 
 —In what case must delicacy be dispensed with? 
 
 What division is made of the subjects of hallucination? — What 
 important practical pomt is involved in this vjew of the subject ? 
 —By whom and in what case has this matter been argued ?— 
 For what principle did he contend ? — How does he illustrato 
 this principle? — What the case of Lord Feirers? — What the 
 result in the two cases ? — What the author's view of the subject? 
 — Wliat his illustration of it? — How would Lord Erskine's prin 
 ciple bear upon this case ? — How correctly ? — By what consid 
 orations ought a jury to be guided ? — What other case mentioned 
 by Lord Erskine ? — How reasoned upon by the author? 
 
 What is the first head of the practical part of the subject? — 
 WTiat important rule in the moral management of the insane f 
 What step expedient as to their residence ? — What suggested 
 as to the \isits of friends or acquaintances? — What the danger 
 of a premature return home? 
 
 What is the second head ?— Occupation, of how many kinds ? 
 Can it always be adopted? — What case mentioned by Dr. Gre 
 gory ? — What said of mental occupation ? — On what principles 
 should such occupations be regulated? 
 
 What is the third head ? — WTiat additional rule to be observed? 
 — What the case of the musician related by Pinei ? 
 
 When do decided cases of insanity admit of moral treatment ? 
 — What is the character of the cases in which much may still 
 be accomplished by the judicious physician ? 
 
 What interesting form of this disease is not unfrequently met 
 with ? — How accompanied ? — In whom does it most frequently 
 occur? — WTiat are the common modes of treatment? — Wliat 
 their character? — "WTiat the treatment found most beneficial by 
 the author ? — What frequent complaint in such cases, and how 
 remedied ? — To what other points should attention be paid, and 
 why? 
 
 What the distinction between insanity and idiocy ? — What 
 the state of the faculties in insanity ? — What remarkable 
 instances ? 
 
 What the state of the faculties in idiocy ? — What the case 
 mentioned by Dr. Rush ? — What his own account of his oon 
 dition ? — What case o# idiocy produced by a luwiv^ cause? 
 
374 QUESTIONS 
 
 From what class of beings is a striking illustration of Vm 
 rarious shades of idiocy derived ? — What classes are there of 
 them ? — The first, and their condition ? — The second, and their 
 condition ? — Describe the third class. 
 
 What the character of the imbecile ? — In what are they defi 
 cient ? — How is the maniac compared with them ? 
 
 When are the states of idiocy and insanity most clearly dis 
 tinguished from each other? — Are they sometimes connected? 
 —What modification mentioned by Pinel ? 
 
 What is said of the treatment of idiocy? — ^What difficult 
 question in regard to cases of this kind? — "WTiatthe case which 
 occurred in Edinburgh? — What the final decision? — What ex 
 periment was tried with him ? — "VVTiat the general character ol 
 the imbecile ? 
 
 What is the character of moral insanity ? — What inference 
 do we draw from this consideration ? — What is this power inde 
 pendent of reason ? 
 
 Page 279-292. 
 
 With what is the theory of spectral illusions closely con 
 nected ? — "WTiat are the facts noticed under the first head ?- 
 What the case of the aged gentleman ? — Relate all the circum 
 stances. — What the case of the other gentleman of eighty .' - 
 What that of the blind lady ? 
 
 What the second class? — How exemplified? — How is the 
 analogy between dreaming and spectral illusions illustrated ? 
 
 What the third class ? — When does this take place ? — What 
 example mentioned by Dr. Hibbert? — What similar example 
 related in the Christian Obsei-ver ? — ^What the explanation of 
 the two?— What the case described by Sir Walter Scott?— 
 "WTiat that related by Dr. Combe ? — Explanation. 
 
 How are we to explain the stories of the apparitions of 
 murdered persons ? — From what other cause have similar 
 effects been produced? — How are we to account for stories 
 of second sight? — What the case of the clergjTnan in the 
 Western Isles ? 
 
 What the eftect of opium ? — Case of Dr. Gregory ? — What the 
 case observed by the author ? 
 
 What is the fourth class ? — How do the illusions in this case 
 arise, and of what do they consist ? — What the common char- 
 acter of the diseases ? — Example. — Explanation. — What singulai 
 case of Kicolai ? — What that mentioned by Dr. Alderston ? — 
 What the case of the American ? — In what state are such visions 
 peculiarly common ? 
 
 ^Vhat is the case in febrile diseases ?-»What related of thp 
 
QUESTIONS. 375 
 
 anthOi's patient? — ^What the case described in the Christian 
 Observer? — What that of the farmer? — Explanation.— ^\^lat 
 analogous case mentioned ? — What the effect upon her nund 
 subsequently ? 
 
 What other case which fell under the observation of the 
 author? 
 
 Describe the case of illusion affecting both sight and hear- 
 ing. — What the case of the clergyman I — How was his vision 
 affected ? 
 
 What the fifth head ?— Anecdote related by Dr. Hibbert ?— 
 That given by Dr. Ferriar ? — The case of the two friends of the 
 author? 
 
 PART V. 
 
 Page 334-349. 
 
 What is the subject of the concluding part of the volume? 
 — What the first quahty mentioned ? — For what is it neces- 
 sary? — What are some of the evils resulting from a wan? 
 of it? — To what cause may differences in the act of judging 
 be ascribed? — What Sir Isaac Newton's remark respecting 
 himself? 
 
 What the second quahty? — What its primary character? — 
 How do individuals differ in respect to it ? — What the effect ol 
 exercise ? 
 
 Wliat will be a source of astonishment to one who endeavours 
 seriously to regulate his thoughts ? — What is the first of the 
 three leading objects to which the thoughts may be directed ? — 
 How far is each of these important ? — What the second ? — 
 What is the influence of this habit ? — What the third class ? — 
 Wliat the grand piirpose of these observations ? 
 
 What third quality suggested? — What the fourth? — Of whal 
 is this one of the principal means ? — W"hat kind of memorr 
 essential to a cultivated mind ? — What habit nearly allied to this'? 
 
 What the fifth quahty? — What though these may differ in 
 different individuals? — How exemplified in difterent cases ?—i 
 What equally melancholy? — What essential principle stated?— 
 WTiat the effects of following this course? — Wliat habit advau 
 tageously connected with it? 
 
 What the sixth quahty ? — How is imagination to be regulated ? 
 
 What the seventh quality? — Upon what is this founded, and 
 in what does it consist ? — From what does it guard us ? — To 
 what is it opposed? — In what sciences is most caution required? 
 — What is a remarkable phenomenon in the economy of the 
 human mind? — How are liis mental oj)€rations characterized? 
 •~What are the consequences? 
 
376 QUESTIONS. 
 
 By what causes are men influenced in yielding their assert 
 hastily on subjects of the highest importance ? — What the various 
 ill effects of this ? — What are two opposite errors to which it 
 leads ? — What is the remedy ? 
 
 What the etfect of cultivating the mental habits above referred 
 to? — How does such a course bear on the individual's owii 
 character? — What is the character formed by these habits in 
 ordinary life ? — Is the habit necessarily connected with acquired 
 knowledge ? — What are the results of it in the affairs of life ? — 
 Of what else is it the origin ? — How does such a man act in 
 emergencies ? — From what three classes of men does he differ in 
 this respect ? 
 
 What is the character formed by these habits in scientific 
 pursuits ? — What the characteristics of observing genius I—Etl- 
 ample. — Wliat of inventive genius ? — To what sciences is this 
 habit peculiarly adapted ? — How does it operate ? — What to be 
 expected from such a one ? 
 
 In what other department is this reflecting habit of mind im- 
 portant? — What important distinction is thus constituted? — 
 What are such a man's views as to his moral duties ? — How 
 does he differ from the mass of mankind? 
 
 What is the eighth quality enumerated? — In what does it 
 consist, and what is required by it ? — In what consists the high- 
 est state of man ? — What are among the higher principles of 
 his nature ? — W^hat is the effect of lofty moral aims ? — Of what 
 remarkable principle are we not to lose sight ? — Wliat striking 
 correspondence is also to be observed ? — What is the passage 
 quoted ? 
 
 To what may such a condition of mind be traced in every 
 instance ? — What its final influence upon moral sensibility ?— 
 What the explanation of this phenomenon ? — What the conse- 
 quences of a first step ? — WTiat the issue? 
 
 What principle of great interest rises out of this view? — 
 What therefore is the alternative ? — From what quarter is aid 
 to be sought ? — Upon what is a presumption in favour of the gos- 
 pel founded 1 
 
 With what therefore is the sound exercise of the understand- 
 ing connected? — What does this lead us to inquire ? — What to 
 contemplate ?— W^hy is this self-scrutiny necessary ? 
 
 To whom would the author more particularly address himr 
 self on this subject? — To what are the above considerations 
 applicable? — What will be the benefits to them of a sound 
 condition of mind ? — What is worse than the cant of hypocrisy 
 — What authority of great names can be brought in suppoif 
 of Christianity ?—Wlaat higher evidence have we which is 
 pecuharly open to the medical student ?— What the author'* 
 concluding remarks ? 
 
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