UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 DEPARTMENT OF UNIVERSITY EXTENSION 
 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 DEPARTMENT OF UNIVERSITY EXTENSION 
 
 37 
 
TRADE UNION LAW AND CASES. 
 
CHICAGO: CALLAGHAN & CO. 
 
 SYDNEY: C. F. MAXWELL (HAYES BROS.), LTD. 
 MELBOURNE: C. F. MAXWELL (G. PARTRIDGE & CO.) 
 TORONTO: THE CARSWELL CO., LTD. 
 
TRADE UNION LAW AND CASES 
 
 A TEXT BOOK 
 
 RELATING TO 
 
 TEADE UNIONS AND TO LABOUE. 
 
 BY 
 
 HERMAN COHEN 
 
 OK THE 1NNEK TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW 
 AND 
 
 GEORGE HOWELL, F.S.S. 
 
 AUTHOR OF "THE CONFLICTS OF CAPITAL AND LABOUR: 
 "TRADE UNIONISM, NEW AND OLD;" "HANDY- 
 BOOK OF THE LABOUR LAWS," ETC. 
 
 LONDON : 
 SWEET & MAXWELL, LIMITED, 3, CHANCERY LANE 
 
 MANCHESTER: MEREDITH RAY & LITTLER 
 1901 
 
BRADBURY, AGNEW, & CO. LD., PRINTERS, 
 LONDON AND TONBRIDGE. 
 
 3/ 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 IN the first and second editions of my Handy- 
 Book of the Labour Laws, I said : " This is not 
 intended as a text-book for lawyers, but as a guide- 
 book for workmen." In the third edition, 1895, 
 I said : "It was never designed as a text-book for 
 the legal profession, it would have been presump- 
 tuous in me to aim at such distinction." That 
 work, however, has been received and treated with 
 generous forbearance by the profession of all grades, 
 and by Justices of the Peace, by Stipendiary Magis- 
 trates, and even by Her Majesty's Judges. I cannot 
 but feel grateful for such recognition and kindly 
 treatment, for, after all, it was only the work of a 
 layman, designed for the use of laymen. 
 
 During the twenty-five years which the Handy- 
 Book of the Labour Laws has been before the public 
 (it was first issued in 1876), I have hoped to see 
 some work from the hands of a trained lawyer, 
 which should be of such a character as to be regarded 
 as a text-book to be quoted in the Courts. To have 
 
 293313 
 
vi PEEFACE. 
 
 been asked to co-operate in such a work was a great 
 compliment to me, and I was encouraged to comply 
 not only by the cordial invitation of my coadjutor, 
 but also by mutual friends to whom the project 
 was communicated. 
 
 As to the necessity for such a work, it will be 
 obvious to those who take an interest in the subject. 
 No work has been published thereon since the year 
 1876, when Mr. Davis published his work. Three 
 years prior to that date Mr. W. Guthrie published 
 a work in Scotland, but that only dealt with the 
 Trade Union Act, 1871. These works, however 
 valuable at the time, are now out of date. All cases 
 of significance have been decided since their publi- 
 cation. New points have arisen of grave importance 
 during the last ten or twelve years, such as were 
 scarcely contemplated at an earlier period ; but no 
 work has appeared dealing with the subject in its 
 changed circumstances. The only book which filled 
 the gap was the third edition of the Handy-Book 
 of the Labour Laws, which appeared in 1895, and 
 which probably would not have been published had 
 some legal text-book been issued meanwhile. 
 
 Before the passing of the Trade Union Act in 
 1871, and of the " Labour Laws " in 1875, work- 
 men were subject to criminal prosecution, and 
 
PKEFACE. vii 
 
 various Acts, or remnants of old laws or decisions 
 in the Courts, and of the provisions of the Master 
 and Servant Acts. Now they are mostly proceeded 
 against by civil action in the civil Courts, a change 
 for the better, which was the result of long years of 
 agitation by the labour leaders, to whose efforts the 
 change was due. But the cause of labour is not 
 wholly free from danger of a serious kind. By 
 means of injunctions, the men affected, and the 
 unions to which they belong, run the double risk 
 of being thwarted in a dispute while it is pending, 
 and of ruinous litigation to contest the validity of 
 any such injunction. Eecent examples will be found 
 in the notes and cases in support of this view. 
 
 Workmen generally, and especially the officers 
 of trade unions and those denominated as labour 
 leaders, should, as a matter of duty, strive to under- 
 stand the law as applicable to labour, especially 
 collective labour as represented by jirade unions 
 or other labour organisations. Ignorance of the 
 law is not regarded as a valid excuse for any 
 breach of the law, nor will it materially mitigate 
 the penalties which such breach or offence entails. 
 If the law* be wrong, or unjust in its operation, 
 workmen must endeavour to repeal or modify it. 
 To ignore or break it only ends in disaster to all 
 
viii PREFACE. 
 
 concerned. Actions at law, whether criminal or 
 civil, always intensify the antagonisms of labour 
 disputes. A rightful understanding of legal obli- 
 gations will help to secure industrial peace. To 
 all I would say : Labour has its rights as well 
 as its duties, and capital has its duties as well as 
 
 its rights. 
 
 G. H. 
 
 January, 1901. 
 
 MY share in this little work sprang out of an 
 attempt to collect all the cases on the subject, and 
 I hope that they are all at least mentioned. This 
 origin has sometimes affected the form of the book, 
 for cases not turning on the construction of a par- 
 ticular section in a statute do not readily fall into 
 their places in a commentary on an Act, and may 
 have the appearance of being dragged in. It is 
 hoped that the Index will be a sure guide to 
 such cases. 
 
 As far as possible the reports are allowed to 
 speak for themselves, at the risk, perhaps, of too 
 liberal quotation. 
 
 The notation adopted for citing statutes is shorter 
 than that in general use, and has been found 
 
 convenient elsewhere. 
 
 H. C. 
 
 January, 1901. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 PREFACE v 
 
 TABLE OF CASES xi 
 
 INTRODUCTION 1 
 
 The Trade Union Act, 1871 . . . 48 
 
 The Trade Union Act, 1876 .... 101 
 
 The Larceny Act, 1868 115 
 
 The Trades Unions Funds Protection Act, 1869 . 119 
 
 The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1871 . . 120 
 
 The Falsification of Accounts Act, 1875 . . 121 
 
 The Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 
 
 1875 123 
 
 The Employers and Workmen Act, 1875 . . 172 
 
 The Trade Union (Provident Funds) Act, 1893 . 186 
 
 The Conciliation Act, 1896 188 
 
 The Friendly Societies Act, 1896 . . . . .67 
 
 The Collecting Societies Act, 1896 . 69 
 
 APPENDIX A. Employers and Workmen Act . 193 
 
 B. Trade Union Acts . . .199 
 
 C. Forms . . 206 
 INDEX 233 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 ADAMS'S Trust, In re . 77 
 
 Aitken v. Associated Car- 
 penters and Joiners . 61 
 
 Aliens Flood. . 53, 54,55, 
 
 56, 143, 1456, 154, 155 
 
 158, 163 
 
 Amalgamated Society of 
 Railway Servants for 
 Scotland v. Mothenvcll 
 Branch . . .59 
 
 Amos, In re, Carrier v. 
 Price . 71 
 
 Bamford v. Turnley . 144 
 
 Barker, In re . . . 77 
 Bedford, Duke of, v. Ellis 79 
 Bignold, In re. . . 77 
 Bound v. Lawrence . .181 
 Bowen v. Hall . 161, 162 
 Bowie v. Marquis of Ailsa 78 
 Broiler v. Saillard . .144 
 Buchanan v. Hamilton . 77 
 
 Game v. Long . . 73 
 Carrier v. Price . . 71 
 Chamberlain's Wharf, Ltd., 
 
 v. Smith ... 62 
 
 Charnoek v. Court . 85,146, 
 
 147,148 
 
 Clark's Trusts, In re . 73 
 Clemson u Hubbard . 176 
 
 Collins v. Locke 
 Crocker v. Knight . 
 Crump v. Lambert . 
 Curran v. Treleaven 
 
 PAOE 
 
 64 
 107 
 144 
 134 
 
 Dixon v. Holden . . 80 
 Duke v. Littleboy . 59, 61 
 Durham Miners' Case 19, 100 
 
 Farrer v. Close 5, 51, 64, 119u. 
 Flood v. Jackson 54, 140, 155 
 
 Gas Stokers' Case . . . 120 
 Gibson v. Lawsou 120, 124, 131 
 Gordon v. Pyper . . 78 
 
 Harrison, In re . . 77 
 
 Hilton v. Eckersley 50, 64, 
 
 114, 132 
 
 Hindley v. Haslam . . . 175 
 
 Hornby v. Close . . 5, 48, 
 
 51n., 64, 119ii. 
 
 Huttleyv. Simmons 56, 1623 
 
 Ilkeston Case .. 
 Ironmoulders' Case . 
 
 9 
 
 18 
 
 Judge v. Bennett . .136 
 
 Kearney r. Lloyd . .163 
 
 Kennedy v. CoAvie . .164 
 
 Knight v. Whitmore . 88 
 
xii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Lemaim, In re . .77 
 
 Lumley v. Gye . 55, 161 
 
 Lyons & Sons r. Wilkins 128, 
 
 133n., 139, 146, 162 
 
 Mersey Dock Trustees v. 
 
 Gibbs .... 84 
 Millard v. Eyre . .76 
 Mineral Water, &c., Society 
 
 v. Booth . . 51, 66, 112 
 Mitchel v. Reynolds . 49 
 M 'Kernan v. United Ope- 
 rative Masons' Associa- 
 tion . . .58, 60n. 
 Mogul Steamship Co. v. 
 Macgregor, &c. . 50n., 51, 
 52n., 53, 54, 81, 162 
 Monson v. Tussauds . 81 
 Moravian Society, In re . 77 
 
 Nordenfeldt v. Maxim 
 Nordenfeldt . . 49 
 
 Old v. Robson ... 65 
 Operative Carpenters and 
 Joiners v. O'Doimell and 
 Todd .... 62 
 
 Padstow, &c., lure. . 58 
 Palairet v. Carew . 767 
 Phelps, In re . . .77 
 Plymouth Case . . 32 
 Price -y. Green . . 64 
 Prudential Assurance Co. 
 v. Knott ... 79 
 
 Railway Servants for Scot- 
 land, &c. Sec Amalga- 
 mated Society. 
 
 Railway Servants, Taff 
 Yale r. . . 34, 82 
 
 R. v. Bauld . . .138 
 R. v. Blackburn 8, 115n., 116 
 R. v. Bunn . . 120, 133 
 R. v. Druitt . . 132, 133 
 R. v. Edmondes . .131 
 R. v. Justices of Louth . 181 
 R. v. Lynch and Jones . 164 
 R. v. McKeevit . .136 
 R. v. McKenzie . 130, 144 
 R. v. Phillips . . .164 
 R. v. Registrar of Friendly 
 
 Societies . . .71 
 
 R. v. Robson . . .118 
 
 R. v. Stainer . 64, 65, 116, 
 
 117, 118 
 
 R. v. Tankard. . 65,117 
 R. v. Wall . . .164 
 R. r. Warburton . . 163 
 Rigby 0. Connol . 48, 53, 59, 
 61, 62 
 Ruck v. Williams . . 84 
 
 Shanks v. United Opera- 
 tive Masons' Associa- 
 tion . . 59 
 Smith r. Thomasson . 138 
 Springhead Spinning Co. 
 
 v. Riley ... 79 
 Strick v. Swansea Tin 
 
 Plate Co. ... 57 
 
 Stroud v. Lawson . .147 
 
 Swaine v. Wilson . 62, 63, 
 
 65, 117 
 
 Taff Vale Case . 34, 82 
 
 Tailors' Case . . . 1 32 
 
 Tallis v. Tallis . . 65 
 
 Temperton v. Russell . 55, 
 
 56, 78, 79n., 85, 1545, 
 
 158162 
 
 Tenant v. Elliott 119n. 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Xlll 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Trollope, &c. v. London 
 Building Trades Federa- 
 tion, &c. . . 80, 155 
 
 Urmston v. Whitelegg 51, 58 
 
 Walker v. Selfe 
 
 144 
 
 Walters v. Green 
 Watson v. Cann 
 Whitehouse v. Fellovves . 
 Wilkins, Ex parte . 
 Winder v. Governors, &c., 
 of Kingston-upon-Hull 
 Wolf v. Mathews 
 
 PAGE 
 
 147 
 
 100 
 
 84 
 
 130 
 
 62 
 61 
 
 Walsby v. Anley . . 132 Wood v. McCarthy . 78, 79 
 
THE TKADE UNION ACTS, 
 1871 AND 1876. 
 
 INTBODUCTION. 
 
 Civil Rights of Workmen. The present work is 
 restricted to certain Acts which relate to Trade 
 Unions as organised bodies, to Trade Unionists 
 who are members of such bodies, and to other 
 workmen, especially when they co-operate with 
 Unionists in labour disputes, though at the time 
 they happen to be Non-unionists. It is essential 
 to bear this in mind, for, in cases arising out of 
 labour disputes, workmen are too often treated 
 in courts of law as though they had, in some way, 
 forfeited their rights as citizens of the State, and 
 who must be dealt with specially as persons in 
 combination. This is frequently the case before 
 justices of the peace, often by the stipendiary 
 magistrates, sometimes by recorders, and some- 
 times, though less frequently of late, by Judges 
 of the High Court. This treatment is in violation 
 of the principles of the Common Law, and there is 
 no justification for it under the Statute Law. Let 
 
 T.U.A. 1 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACTS. 
 
 it be clearly understood that workmen, whether 
 Unionists or Non-unionists, have equal civil 
 rights with all other citizens, unless the contrary 
 is expressed by and in the Statute Law. 
 
 Workmen no longer under Combination Laws. 
 The reason why this obvious fact is often over- 
 looked is, that workmen in combination were, up 
 to 1824 25, under the ban of the law. Com- 
 binations were illegal, and all those in combination 
 were liable to penalties under the Statute Law. 
 But the Combination Laws are now repealed. 
 Combinations are legal by express statutory enact- 
 ment. Another reason is that formerly all asso- 
 ciations of workmen for the purpose of regulating 
 the hours of labour, wages, and conditions of 
 employment, were deemed to be in restraint of trade. 
 
 Restraint of Trade. The doctrine of " restraint 
 of trade " was, it appears, not unknown to the 
 Common Law. Nevertheless, it is a curious his- 
 torical fact that its violation was general, constant, 
 and continuous, under and by the Statute Law. 
 But, of course, when the violation of a Common 
 Law doctrine is sanctioned by statute, it is no 
 longer an offence punishable by the Courts. 
 "Restraint of trade" by Ordinance and by Regu- 
 lation was the essence of the old Guild system. 
 For centuries, such regulation by the Guilds had 
 the force of Law, their ordinances being everywhere 
 enforced. 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACTS. 
 
 Under Edward III. was passed the Statute 
 of Labourers, and thenceforward Statute Law 
 attempted to do all that had been done under 
 Guild ordinances, and often more. The 5 Eliz. 
 c. 4, was little more than a consolidation of existing 
 Acts, and the blending of them with still existing 
 Guild ordinances, under one and the same statute. 
 Trade and labour were restrained by ordinance and 
 statute for centuries, but when workmen combined 
 to mitigate their severity, the " doctrine of restraint 
 of trade " was used to prevent them, and as a means 
 of punishment. Even when the specific laws against 
 combination were repealed, the doctrine survived, 
 and is even now used in the workmen's charter 
 the Trade Union Act, 1871. The above facts 
 deserve to be considered where the doctrine of 
 " restraint of trade " is hurled at Trade Unionists, 
 as though they were and had been the guilty 
 parties in reference thereto. 
 
 Scope of the present Work. The Acts herein 
 specifically dealt with are five in number, viz. : 
 (1) Larceny and Embezzlement, commonly called 
 the Eecorder's Act, 1868; (2) the Trade Union 
 Act, 1871 ; (3) the Trade Union Act, 1876 ; 
 
 (4) the Employers and Workmen Act, 1875 ; 
 
 (5) the Conspiracy and Protection of Property 
 Act, 1875; and (6) the Conciliation Act, 1896. 
 Two subsidiary Acts are also included, viz., the 
 Falsification of Accounts Act, 1875, and the Trade 
 
 12 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACTS. 
 
 Union (Provident Funds) Act, 1893. All the cases 
 bearing upon each and all of these Acts are cited 
 and explained in connection with the various 
 sections of each Act. 
 
 The Combination Laws, Repeal of. With respect 
 to the Trade Union Acts, it is necessary to explain 
 that the right of combination was conceded by the 
 repeal of the Combination Laws, first in 1824 
 by 5 Geo. IV. c. 95, and then, in a slightly modified 
 form, by 6 Geo. IV. c. 129, in 1825, the former 
 being repealed, and the latter substituted therefor. 
 But though combinations of workmen were no 
 longer illegal, singularly enough the right to com- 
 bine thus conceded did not carry with it the citizen's 
 right of protection, as regards funds and property. 
 
 Unprotected Funds of Trade Unions. Trade 
 Unions, called by the earlier statutes combinations, 
 were not accorded the ordinary safeguards enjoyed 
 by all other associations not unlawful in their 
 character, and hence were under the ban of the 
 law, being practically without their pale. When, 
 in 1854, Mr. Sotheron Estcourt obtained the 
 appointment of a Select Committee, to consider a 
 Bill which he had prepared, on the law relating to 
 Friendly Societies, some representatives of Trade 
 Unions and others had interviews with him, with 
 the view of securing some protection to the funds 
 of Trade Societies. As a result of those con- 
 ferences the 44th clause in the Bill was introduced 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACTS. 
 
 and carried, in the Act of 1855. This fancied 
 security was obtained by the deposit of the Kules 
 of Trade Unions with the registrar and justices 
 of the peace. For ten years partial protection 
 was obtained, but in 1866 the delusion of security 
 was rudely dispelled by the decision of Lord Chief 
 Justice Cockburn, in the case of Hornby v. Close 
 (see p. 48 n.), a like decision being given in the 
 case of Farrer v. Close. (See p. 51.) Those 
 decisions left the Unions without protection, their 
 funds being at the mercy of any dishonest official. 
 
 Protection of Funds Act, 1869. Those decisions 
 led to an organised agitation, on the part of the 
 Labour leaders and Trade Union officials, during 
 1866 69, for an Act which should give security to 
 the funds and property of Trade Unions. Eventually 
 this was obtained by a temporary Act, passed in 
 1869, repealed by the Trade Union Act, 1871. 
 
 The preceding brief historical outline indicates 
 the nature of the grievances of Trade Unions as 
 organised bodies, and also the demands urged in 
 their behalf for legal recognition and protection. 
 
 Grievances of Trade Unionists. In addition, 
 however, to the grievances of Trade Unions, as 
 associated bodies of workmen, the members of those 
 bodies Trade Unionists had specific grievances 
 as individuals, namely, the curtailment of personal 
 rights by reason of the fact that they acted in 
 combination in matters relating to labour. The 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACTS. 
 
 old doctrine of " restraint of trade " was applied to 
 them. This expression is used in sect. 2 of the Trade 
 Union Act, 1871, but it is there introduced to 
 enact that the purposes of a Trade Union shall not 
 be deemed to be unlawful by reason of the fact 
 that they are " in restraint of trade," by which 
 provision acts done by the members thereof are 
 no longer criminal or unlawful in that respect. 
 
 Acts specially relating to Conduct of Workmen. 
 The Acts relating to the conduct of workmen are, 
 some provisions in the Trade Union Act, 1871, 
 the Employers and Workmen Act, 1875, and the 
 Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875. 
 The provisions in these statutes are in addition to 
 those in general Acts, such as the Malicious Injuries 
 to Property Act (24-5 V. 97), and to the common 
 law. The cases which are cited in the following 
 pages are those mainly which have occurred under 
 the three Acts above named ; but where other 
 statutes are relied upon, or are quoted in support 
 of the prosecution, and also where the Common 
 Law is applied, the cases bearing thereon are 
 cited. The object sought is to set forth the law 
 in each case, showing at once what are the 
 recognised rights of workmen, individually and in 
 combination, and what are deemed to be offences, 
 together with the penalties or punishments for 
 any breach of the law, whether civil or criminal. 
 There is a necessity for this, inasmuch as the 
 
THE RECORDER'S ACT. 
 
 decisions vary considerably, especially as regards 
 infractions of the law by workmen. Severity in 
 sentences is not now so common as it was. The 
 worst instance of its kind was that on the gas 
 stokers, in 1872. (See p. 120.) 
 
 I. THE KECORDER'S ACT, 1868. 
 
 Object of the Act. This Act, passed in 1868, is 
 " An Act to amend the Law relating to Larceny 
 and Embezzlement." The primary object of the 
 Bill, as brought in by Mr. Kussell Gurney, was to 
 protect the partners in a joint or co-partnership 
 concern. The original purpose of the measure 
 doubtless was to provide better security of the 
 property of co-partnerships in the commercial and 
 trading world, many instances having occurred of 
 ruin to a firm through the dishonesty of a single 
 member, the others suffering by reason of defalca- 
 tions, yet innocent of any complicity in the crime. 
 
 Application of Act to Trade Unions. When the 
 measure was before the House of Commons the 
 attention of the Labour leaders was called to the 
 provisions of the Bill, with the result that inter- 
 views took place between Mr. Eussell Gurney and 
 some of the workmen's representatives, respecting 
 the measure. It was pointed out to him that the 
 funds of Trade Unions were unprotected, and it 
 was suggested that they were to all intents and 
 purposes " joint beneficial owners " in the property. 
 
THE KECOBDEK'S ACT. 
 
 He was asked whether, in his opinion, the pro- 
 visions of the Bill would apply to officers of Trade 
 Unions in cases of embezzlement, they being joint 
 owners of the property. He declared that the 
 provisions would apply, such bodies coming within 
 the expression " other joint beneficial owners," in 
 the preamble to the Bill. They were advised, 
 however, that, inasmuch as Trade Unions were 
 then under a cloud, by reason of the then recent 
 disclosures before the Royal Commission, 1867 9, 
 not to take any public action which might affect 
 the measure, and perhaps delay its enactment. 
 
 First Case under the Act. The Bill was passed, and 
 immediately a case was tried under the Act, Regina v. 
 Blackburn, the prisoner being sentenced to imprison- 
 ment under it. (See p. 116.) Offences under the Act 
 are of a criminal character, the punishment being 
 imprisonment, unless express power is otherwise 
 given in some other statute. Officers and members 
 of Trade Unions may be tried under this Act, 
 whether the Union is registered or not, the offence 
 being an indictable one. But the money or property 
 is not recoverable under this Act, nor can it be 
 recovered if the offender is prosecuted under this 
 Act. Registered Trade Unions, as a rule, prefer 
 to proceed under the Trade Union Acts, by which 
 they may recover the money, or the offender may 
 be fined, or he may be imprisoned. 
 
 Recent Case under the Act. It is important that 
 
THE RECORDER'S ACT. 
 
 this Act should be well known, because many Unions 
 are still unregistered, and it is doubtful whether 
 some of the " Labour Unions," Trades Councils, 
 and other bodies can be registered under the Trade 
 Union Acts. The Ilkstone and District Hosiery 
 Union prosecuted a treasurer at Ilkstone Petty 
 Sessions, on January 26th, 1894, for embezzlement 
 under the Trade Union Acts, but failed to obtain a 
 committal, because that body was not registered as 
 a Trade Union, though the component bodies of it 
 were registered. He was then prosecuted under the 
 Recorder's Act, and was convicted and imprisoned. 
 
 Important cases under this Act are given in 
 connection with the text of the statute. The Act does 
 not apply to Scotland. Proceedings must be taken 
 in the district in which the offence is committed. 
 
 (See the Eecorder's Act, pp. 115 9.) 
 
 II. FALSIFICATION OF ACCOUNTS ACT, 1875. 
 
 Nature and Seventy of the Act. The Falsification 
 of Accounts Act, 1875, is a general Act, but it will 
 apply to unregistered Trade Unions in cases where 
 the official is a paid servant of the Union, as in most 
 instances they are. In nearly all defalcations and 
 embezzlements, falsification of the accounts is one of 
 the methods employed. The provisions of this Act 
 ought therefore to be known in connection with the 
 Eecorder's Act, especially as the penalties are of a 
 criminal character, and are very severe. Such 
 
10 THE TKADE UNION ACTS. 
 
 knowledge might have a deterrent effect where the 
 official or officials are dishonestly inclined. They 
 ought to understand what risks they run, and what 
 punishments may be inflicted for offences of this 
 kind. The offence of, "wilfully and with intent to 
 defraud," destroying, altering, mutilating or falsi- 
 fying " any book, paper, writing, valuable security, 
 or account which belongs to or is in the possession 
 of " an employer, &c., is by this Act a mis- 
 demeanour, and the person so offending is liable to 
 penal servitude for seven years, or to imprisonment 
 for any term not exceeding two years. Thus the 
 offence is regarded as a serious one, and the penalty 
 is severe. 
 
 III. THE TRADE UNION ACTS, 1871 AND 1876. 
 
 1. Purposes of the Trade Union Acts. The Trade 
 Union Act, 1871, was intended to remove the ban 
 or legal disability which deprived such associations 
 of the protection of the law, such protection being 
 enjoyed as a right by all other associative bodies 
 whose existence was not specifically prohibited 
 by statutory enactment. Section 23 of the Act 
 provided for the registration of such bodies " as 
 would have been, if this Act had not been passed, 
 an unlawful combination by reason of one or more 
 of its purposes being in restraint of trade." Under 
 the amending Act of 1876, that most unwise restric- 
 tion was removed by sect. 16, which declared that a 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACTS. 11 
 
 society can be registered as a Trade Union " whether 
 such combination would or would not, if the principal 
 Act had not been passed, have been deemed to have 
 been an unlawful combination by reason of some 
 one or more of its purposes being in restraint of 
 trade." There is still, however, a restriction. A 
 society to be registered under the Acts must in its 
 rules provide " either for regulating trade relations, 
 or for imposing restrictive conditions on the conduct 
 of trade." Hence societies which merely provide 
 relief for members out of employment, or other 
 similar benefits, cannot apparently be so registered. 
 They may, however, be registered as " specially 
 authorised societies" under the Friendly Societies 
 Acts, by virtue of an authority granted on 
 March 20th, 1877, forms as to which are provided 
 by the Eegistrar of Friendly Societies and of Trade 
 Unions. 
 
 Modification of Doctrine of Restraint of Trade. 
 By sects. 2 and 3 it is declared that the purposes of 
 a Trade Union shall not be deemed unlawful by 
 reason merely that they are " in restraint of trade," 
 so as to render any member liable to criminal 
 prosecution for conspiracy or otherwise ; nor so as 
 to render void or voidable any agreement or trust. 
 Criminal prosecution is provided against by sect. 2, 
 and civil rights are secured by sect. 3. In this con- 
 nection, sect. 3 of the Conspiracy and Protection of 
 Property Act, 1875, affords further protection, for 
 
12 THE TRADE UNION ACTS. 
 
 it legalises all acts done in furtherance of a com- 
 bination or dispute, if the acts so done are not in 
 themselves " crimes " if done by one person. This 
 provision practically concedes to workmen co-equal 
 rights with other persons. 
 
 Mischievous Effects of the Doctrine. The doc- 
 trine of the "restraint of trade " is, it would seem, 
 finally and wholly disposed of in connection with 
 Trade Unions and labour disputes. But the taint 
 of it is left in the Law Courts, from the magis- 
 trates' bench to the High Court of Justice, even to 
 the last court of appeal the House of Lords. 
 The importation of that doctrine into disputes 
 between employers and workpeople has done infinite 
 harm. It has caused more trouble than perhaps 
 any other expression delivered in a court of law. 
 The nearest approach to it, in its mischievous 
 effects, is the doctrine of "common employment," 
 by which workmen were deprived of legal remedy 
 in cases of injury while following their employ- 
 ment. If the impression created by the doctrine 
 of "restraint of trade" could be erased from the 
 minds of those who administer the law, much 
 of the heart-burning caused by prosecutions of 
 workmen would be removed. Questions as to the 
 legal rights of Trade Unions, in the processes of 
 Civil Law, would also be simplified, although care 
 is taken in the Trade Union Acts to define such in 
 most instances. 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACTS. 13 
 
 2. Investment of Funds. The Trade Union Act, 
 1876, amended the principal Act (1871) in several 
 important particulars, not the least of which was 
 the improved definition of a Trade Union, and its 
 extension to bodies as to which there was previously 
 some doubt. Another important amendment was 
 as to property and funds. By sect. 3 of the Act 
 of 1871 it is provided that " the real or personal 
 estate of any branch of a Trade Union shall be 
 vested in the trustees of such branch." In sect. 16 
 of the Act of 1876 it is enacted " or of the trustees 
 of the Trade Union, if the rules of the Trade Union 
 so provide." Thus amalgamated Unions, like those 
 of the Engineers, Carpenters, and other great 
 organisations, have power to invest the general 
 funds for the benefit of all concerned. This pro- 
 vision has enabled Trade Unions to create large 
 " reserve funds," so as to ensure the payment of 
 such benefits as superannuation in old age, in 
 sickness, or cases of accident, which otherwise they 
 would not be able to create. The Act further provides 
 for the appointment and removal of trustees ; the 
 registry of Unions in more than one country ; 
 jurisdiction in cases of offences ; membership of 
 Unions ; nominations, change of name, dissolution, 
 &c., &c. 
 
 Olyections to Registration considered. With 
 respect to the general provisions in the two Trade 
 Union Acts, 1871 and 1876, little need be said 
 
14 THE TRADE UNION ACTS. 
 
 in this introduction. They are clearly expressed 
 in the Acts, and by this time are fairly well under- 
 stood by the officials of all registered Trade Unions. 
 It is a fortunate circumstance that the several 
 registrars appointed to administer the Acts have 
 interpreted them, and applied them, in such a 
 manner as to avert any serious friction. The 
 regulations and forms have been prepared with 
 so much care that very little difficulty has beerr 
 experienced. This is attested by the fact that no 
 serious complaints have been heard, and there has 
 been no demand for changes in the law. More- 
 over, most of the Unions which, in the earlier 
 period of the existence of those Acts, were somewhat 
 averse to registration, have since been registered. 
 At first some objected, but it was mainly on the 
 ground that the " Criminal Law Amendment Act, 
 1871," formed part of the original Bill ; and even 
 when the third clause was separated from it, and was 
 presented as a new Bill, it was passed as though it 
 was its natural sequel or complement. That Act was, 
 however, repealed in 1875, by the " Labour Laws." 
 General Character of the Provisions. The Trade 
 Union Acts, 1871 and 1876, together with the 
 regulations and forms, and the notes of cases 
 herein given, in connection with the several sec- 
 tions in the Acts which have occasioned an appeal 
 to the Higher Courts, mostly under the Summary 
 Jurisdiction Acts, are sufficiently clear without any 
 
THE TEADE UNION ACTS. 15 
 
 further elaborate explanation. The several sec- 
 tions explain the relationship of members to the 
 Unions, and vice versa ; and declare also the rela- 
 tive position of Trade Unions to other societies, 
 registered by the same official under other Acts. 
 They define the position of Trade Unions as to 
 holding land, as regards vesting their property 
 in trustees, and the duties and responsibilities of 
 such ' trustees, their actions at law, liability, &c. ; 
 provide for the audit of accounts, for summary 
 proceedings in case of fraud, registration of Union, 
 &c. ; and a schedule is given as to matters to be 
 provided for by and in the rules of Trade Unions, 
 registered under the Acts. Appeals are also pro- 
 vided for to Quarter Sessions, to the Superior 
 Courts, and from the Sheriff's Court in Scotland. 
 
 Registration of Trade Unions. The Kegistrar 
 of Friendly Societies is also the Registrar of Trade 
 Unions, and of other bodies constituted under 
 certain Acts. The registrar has to see that the 
 rules of the Union fulfil the conditions set forth 
 in the Trade Union Acts, 1871 and 1876, and now 
 also the provisions of the Trade Union (Provident 
 Funds) Act, 1893, wherein is given a definition 
 of " provident purposes," &c., to enable the Unions 
 to claim exemption from the income tax. 
 
 Validity of Registration. It does not appear to 
 be the duty of the registrar to examine the rules, 
 and to certify that they are, one and all, in 
 
16 THE TRADE UNION ACTS. 
 
 accordance with the general law of the land ; but 
 he must certify that the rules agree with the Acts 
 under which registration is made, and with the 
 schedule of the Act of 1871. If any unlawful 
 purpose was expressed in the rules, doubtless he 
 would refuse registration. But apparently refusal 
 to register is rare. (See p. 70.) 
 
 Regulations and Forms. Certain regulations 
 are in force, made by the Home Secretary, and 
 forms are provided, in accordance with the regu- 
 lations, for the use of Trade Unions registered 
 under the Acts. Those in force, with a few modi- 
 fications in some of the forms, were issued in 
 1876, by the then Home Secretary, " Eich. Assheton 
 Cross," now Lord Cross. All the requisite forms 
 are supplied to the officers of Trade Unions by the 
 registrar. It might be added that all the regulations 
 and forms are given, in extenso, in Ho well's " Handy- 
 book of the Labour Laws," Third Edition, 1895,* 
 and we have decided to reproduce them for reference. 
 (See Appendix C, p. 206). 
 
 Privileges conferred by Registration. Registration 
 does not in any way curtail the rights of Trade 
 Unions, .but it confers certain privileges. This 
 is especially the case as regards property and 
 funds, and proceedings for the recovery of the 
 same, or for the punishment of those who embezzle, 
 or misappropriate, or withhold such property and 
 
 * Macmillan & Co., London and New York, price 3*. 6<f. net. 
 
THE TEADE UNION ACTS. 17 
 
 funds. But registered Unions have to send an 
 annual account of income and expenditure in 
 accordance with the form supplied for that pur- 
 pose. They have also to notify changes in the 
 rules, which changes have to be certified, and also 
 changes in the registered address of the Union, 
 and other details as required. 
 
 Legal Position of Trade Unions. Trade Unions 
 are no longer secret societies. There is no necessity 
 for secrecy. For all lawful purposes, they are as 
 legal, in constitution and aims, as any other 
 society or association permitted by law to exist 
 in any part of the United Kingdom. 
 
 Importance of Trade Union Rules. The most 
 important matter in connection with the formation, 
 establishment, and conduct of a Trade Union, is 
 the framing of the constitution and rules. Provi- 
 sion is made in this respect in the Act of 1871, by 
 sect. 14, sub-sects. 1 and 2, the matters specially to 
 be provided for being set out in Schedule I., under 
 six heads. The section and schedule only apply 
 to registered Unions, but non-registered Unions 
 ought also to comply with the whole of the pro- 
 visions. There is no need to hide any of the 
 objects, as all such are now legal. Trade Unions 
 may do all that any other associated body of 
 persons may lawfully do, provided that the objects, 
 purposes, and means are clearly set forth and 
 defined. If these are not fully set forth, a vote, to 
 
 T.U.A. 2 
 
18 THE TRADE UNION ACTS. 
 
 do something not thus provided for, even a nearly 
 unanimous vote of the members of the Union who 
 recorded their votes, will not render the act legal, 
 if any member calls it in question. This fact was 
 clearly brought home to the council and members 
 of the Associated Iron-moulders of Scotland, during 
 the recent strike and lock-out in the engineering 
 trades ; the incident deserves to be noted. 
 
 Grants of Money an "Interdict." The council 
 of the Iron-moulders' Society issued voting papers 
 for a grant of ^1,500 towards the support of the 
 men locked out. The members voted in its favour 
 by a large majority. But there was some dis- 
 satisfaction among the members as to the dispute, 
 and they, or some of them, wrote to the registrar 
 requesting his opinion as to the legality of the 
 grant, even though sanctioned by a majority of 
 the members. Being thus appealed to, he replied 
 that no provision for such grant was made in the 
 rules. The matter was then brought before the 
 Sheriff Court of Lanarkshire, Glasgow, in October, 
 1897, and the sheriff issued an "interdict" (the same 
 as an " injunction " in an English Court) restraining 
 the Union from paying over the sum granted, and 
 the amount was thereupon withheld. The grant 
 would have been perfectly lawful if the rules had 
 so provided. It is indeed one of the purposes of 
 a Trade Union to help another Union when in 
 trouble, or the men who are out on strike, or are 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACTS. 19 
 
 locked out in connection with a labour dispute. 
 Sometimes they lend sums to each other ; all such 
 things can be lawfully done if the rules so provide. 
 The Right of withholding Strike Pay. A case of 
 some importance was heard in the Appeal Court 
 on November 13th, 1900, as to the right of a Trade 
 Union to refuse strike pay to its members. The 
 case arose out of a dispute in August, 1897, when 
 the coal-hewers at a certain pit left their work 
 without having first obtained the consent of the 
 council or committee of the association, as pro- 
 vided for in the rules. The ground of refusal by 
 the executive to grant strike pay was that by so 
 doing they would render themselves, and the trus- 
 tees of the Union, liable for such payment, seeing 
 that it was contrary to the rules. The men then 
 made an appeal to the council, and, in sympathy 
 with the men on strike, the council carried a resolu- 
 tion to grant an amount equal to lock-out pay of 
 10s. per week, in spite of the fact that the chairman 
 of, the meeting ruled the motion out of order. The 
 trustees applied to the Court, and Mr. Justice Cozens- 
 Hardy held that the resolution of the council vf&Bultra 
 vires, and therefore the treasurer could not properly 
 pay the amount in question. The men, being dissatis- 
 fied, appealed against that decision. Their Lordships 
 in the Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, thus up- 
 holding the right of the Union to refuse strike pay in 
 cases where specific rules were violated. (See p. 100.) 
 
 22 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACTS. 
 
 Rules as to Property and Funds. Provision must 
 be made for the investment of funds, and also as 
 to the appointment of trustees, and other officers, 
 and committee (sub-sects. 4 and 5). Now that the 
 accumulated funds of some Trade Unions are very 
 large, and the Post Office Savings Bank impose a 
 restriction upon the amount to be deposited, the 
 Unions are seeking other investments, and pro- 
 vision must be made in the rules to enable the 
 trustees so to invest. There is really no restric- 
 tion in this respect, except as regards land, which 
 is limited to one acre. But as every branch is 
 " considered a distinct Union " for the purposes of 
 this section (sect. 7), there is a wide latitude even 
 as regards the acquisition of land. 
 
 Rules as to Benefits, Fines, dee. The rules must 
 also provide as to benefits, fines, and forfeitures 
 (sub-sect. 2) ; as to amendment, &c., of rules (sub- 
 sect. 3), and inspection of books by members (sub- 
 sect. 6). If the constitution and rules are properly 
 and fully set forth, the Union runs no risk of legal 
 disablement. The better class of Unions, such as 
 those of the Engineers, Carpenters and Joiners, 
 Boilermakers and Iron Shipbuilders, Ironfounders, 
 Steam Engine Makers, &c., have codes of rules, 
 which may well be taken as models by other Unions. 
 
 (See Trade Union Acts, 1871 and 1876, pp. 48, 
 101.) 
 
THE TEADE UNION ACTS 21 
 
 IV. TRADE UNION (PROVIDENT FUNDS) ACT, 1893. 
 
 Exemption of Funds from Income Tax. The State, 
 in order to encourage thrift, exempted certain societies, 
 such as friendly societies, industrial and provident 
 societies, charitable institutions, loan societies, and 
 even building societies, from income tax, under the 
 Inland Eevenue Acts. Most of the Trade Unions, 
 especially since 1850, have also provided " provident 
 benefits," but the exemption did not extend to 
 them. Indeed it could not very well do so, seeing 
 that Trade Unions had no legal protection up to 
 1869, and were only legally recognized as lawful 
 associations in 1871. Since that date, and even 
 before it, from the year 1851, in fact, when the 
 Amalgamated Society of Engineers was established, 
 it was felt that the funds appropriated to provident 
 benefits should have the same exemption from 
 income tax as all the other societies named. 
 In 1893 I was fortunate enough to be able to carry 
 a Bill through the House of Commons conceding 
 the same privilege. It was passed by Parliament 
 in that session 52 Viet. c. 2. (See p. 186.) 
 
 Restriction of the Exemption. The exemption is 
 limited to Trade Unions registered under the Trade 
 Union Acts, 1871 & 1876. It is also restricted to 
 the invested funds of the Union, because the yearly 
 income of the Union from subscriptions is not 
 subject to income tax. But that is also the case 
 
22 THE TRADE UNION ACTS. 
 
 as regards all other societies enjoying the privilege 
 of exemption. 
 
 Definition of Provident Benefits. In this Act 
 the term " provident benefits " is for the first time 
 defined (sect. 3). It " includes any payment made 
 to a member during sickness or incapacity from 
 personal injury, or while out of work, or to an 
 aged member by way of superannuation ; or to a 
 member who has met with an accident, or has lost 
 his tools by fire or theft ; or the payment of funeral 
 expenses, or for provision for children of a deceased 
 member." As many of the largest Trade Unions 
 provide all those benefits, and most of them pro- 
 vide one or more of such benefits, the concession 
 was a reasonable one. It has encouraged the 
 Unions to create reserve funds, especially to insure 
 the payment of superannuation to aged members 
 and other provident benefits provided for in the 
 rules. 
 
 (See the Act, pp. 186.) 
 
 V. THE EMPLOYERS AND WORKMEN ACT, 1875. 
 
 General Summary of Preceding Acts. The pre- 
 ceding Acts deal with Trade Unions, as associated 
 bodies of workmen, in their relationship to the 
 State, as lawful organizations ; and with the relation- 
 ship of the members of such bodies to such societies. 
 They define such relationships, the relative duties 
 and responsibilities ; provide for actions at law 
 
EMPLOYEES AND WORKMEN ACT. 23 
 
 and prosecution of offenders, and also punishments 
 in case of an infraction of the law. The modes 
 of procedure are also laid down, and the requisite 
 machinery is provided for acting in conformity to 
 the Acts. 
 
 Nature of the Employers and Workmen Act. The 
 Employers and Workmen Act, 1875, is of a different 
 character. It deals with the relationships sub- 
 sisting between employers and workmen, the hirer 
 and the hired. It takes the place of the old 
 Master and Servant Acts, and some other Acts, 
 which for centuries governed the hired workmen 
 of this country. Under those Acts a breach of 
 contract by a workman was a criminal offence, 
 criminally punishable. There was no option on 
 the part of justices of the peace, magistrates, or 
 Judges, but to inflict a sentence of imprisonment, 
 except dismissal of the case, which latter seldom 
 took place. 
 
 The old Master and Servant Acts. In the 
 memorandum prepared in 1866, to lay before the 
 Select Committee on the operation of the Master 
 and Servant Acts, it was stated that, on the average, 
 there were 11,000 convictions annually, under those 
 Acts. The result of the inquiry was the Master 
 and Servant Act, 1867, which in some particulars 
 modified the provisions of the Acts at that date in 
 force. The amending Act continued in force until 
 1875, when it was repealed by the Conspiracy and 
 
24 EMPLOYEES AND WOEKMEN ACT. 
 
 Protection of Property Act, as were also numerous 
 other enactments. 
 
 Changes effected by the New Act. The changes 
 effected by the Employers and Workmen Act were 
 great and far-reaching. The very title denotes an 
 important change. It is no longer " Masters and 
 Servants," but " Employers and Workmen." As 
 regards contracts of service there was to be equality. 
 A breach of contract was to be a civil offence in all 
 cases of labour, as well as in all other cases. The 
 then Home Secretary, Sir Eichard Cross, now Lord 
 Cross, expressed the change thus : " For the future, 
 contracts of hiring and of service shall be as free 
 and independent, both for master and servant, as 
 any other contracts between persons." 
 
 Breaches of Labour Contracts Civil Offences. 
 Breaches of labour contract are no longer criminal 
 offences, except in particular cases mentioned in 
 the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, as 
 specified further on. They are now the subject of 
 civil action, in a civil court, by civil procedure. 
 The tribunals for hearing and determining disputes 
 between employers and workmen are; (1) the 
 County Court in England, the Sheriff Court in 
 Scotland, and the Civil Bill Court in Ireland ; and 
 (2) Courts of Summary Jurisdiction. The latter 
 Courts are deemed to be civil courts of summary 
 jurisdiction when adjudicating upon all cases of 
 labour contracts, except those specified in the 
 
EMPLOYERS AND WORKMEN ACT. 25 
 
 Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act. The 
 constitution and jurisdiction of all such Courts are 
 clearly set forth in the several sections of the Act. 
 Courts of summary jurisdiction include those con- 
 stituted by justices of the peace in places where the 
 other Courts specified in the Act do not exist. The 
 rules as to procedure under the Summary Juris- 
 diction Acts are those framed by Lord Herschell, in 
 1886, when Lord Chancellor. (See Eules, p. 193.) 
 
 County Courts Procedure. Procedure in County 
 Courts is regulated by the rules and forms framed 
 under the County Courts Acts Consolidation Act, 
 1888, and approved by the Lord Chancellor. In 
 these rules and forms every detail of procedure is 
 fully set forth. They may be varied from time 
 to time, as new features arise in cases before the 
 Courts, or as new powers may be given by Acts not 
 passed when the rules were framed ; but, in general, 
 the principles and character remain unchanged.* 
 
 Powers of the Courts under the Act. The power 
 conferred on the Courts constituted under the 
 Employers and Workmen Act, 1875, is necessarily 
 great. The Court may adjust and set off one 
 against the other all claims for wages, damages, or 
 otherwise. It may rescind contracts, or order the 
 performance of existing contracts, and require 
 security for such performance ; or award damages 
 
 * A brief synopsis of the County Court Rules, &c.. is given in 
 the " Handy-Book of the Labour Laws." 
 
26 EMPLOYERS AND WORKMEN ACT. 
 
 for non-fulfilment of contract. Instances sometimes 
 occur when batches of workmen are summoned for 
 breach of contract; the conditions being, in such 
 cases, the same or similar, the fines or damages 
 may be, and often are, of the same amount. 
 
 Limitation of Jurisdiction. In one respect the 
 power of the Courts is limited, that is, as regards 
 the amount of claim. The ordinary jurisdiction of 
 the County Court is limited to 50, but actions for 
 a larger amount may be tried with the consent of 
 both parties. In Courts of summary jurisdiction 
 the amount is limited to 10, and no order can be 
 made for the payment of more than 10, exclusive of 
 costs, nor can security be exacted exceeding that sum. 
 
 Labour Contracts. Contracts may be express, 
 or may be implied, oral, or in writing. Labour 
 contracts are in the great majority of cases 
 implied. They cover all recognised trade customs, 
 rules, and the regulations in the locality where the 
 work or service is performed ; and also the special 
 rules or regulations of an employer or firm, if the 
 workmen have, by working under them, given a tacit 
 assent to them, unless the workman has made an 
 express stipulation to the contrary. Individual 
 labour contracts are now comparatively rare; 
 collective bargaining is the rule. In some places 
 working rules, agreed to by employers and work- 
 men in a branch of trade, regulate the conditions 
 of labour. In such cases the contract is express and 
 
EMPLOYERS AND WORKMEN ACT. 27 
 
 definite. In other cases one party or the other may 
 plead trade customs or usages ; these, if established, 
 are regarded as binding, unless it can be shown 
 that they do not apply in the particular case. 
 
 Validity of Contracts. The question as to the 
 validity of a contract often arises in courts of law. 
 In all such cases the Court decides the point. But 
 there are some general principles of law which 
 apply. For example, contracts to be valid must be 
 in accordance with the general law. Again, some 
 consideration, that is, value received, or to be given, 
 is essential to the validity of a contract, not under 
 seal. The Courts sometimes refuse to enforce un- 
 equal contracts, and by the Employers and Workmen 
 Act they may be rescinded. Mutuality is implied, 
 and, in this connection, the equity of the contract 
 is considered. For example, if an employer claims 
 the right to dismiss a workman without notice, 
 there is an implied right on the part of a workman 
 to leave work without notice, the conditions being 
 in all respects equal. But if the workman had been 
 guilty of some wrong or misconduct, justifying his 
 discharge, the claim of equal right is forfeited. 
 
 (See Employers and Workmen Act, p. 172.) 
 
 VI. CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION OF PROPERTY ACT. 
 
 Conspiracy abolished as regards Labour. 
 Although this Act is entitled the Conspiracy and 
 Protection of Property Act, 1875, conspiracy is by 
 
28 CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION OF PROPERTY ACT- 
 
 this Act, and by sect. 2 of the Trade Union Act, 1871, 
 wholly abolished as regards labour disputes, except 
 conspiracies to commit what would be an offence, 
 criminal or civil, if done by one person. The 
 respective sections in the two Acts relating to con- 
 spiracy must be read and construed together, both 
 being operative. 
 
 Unlawful Pui-poses. The Trade Union Act, 1871, 
 which legalises combinations of workmen, declares, 
 sect. 2 : " The purposes of any Trade Union shall 
 not, by reason merely that they are in restraint of 
 trade, be deemed to be unlawful, so as to render 
 any member of such Trade Union liable to criminal 
 prosecution for conspiracy or otherwise." Thus 
 every combination of workmen which before that 
 Act was passed would have been unlawful, merely 
 on the ground of its purposes being in restraint of 
 trade, is expressly legalised, whether such combina- 
 tion was temporary or permanent in its character. 
 That section did not, however, avert prosecutions. 
 
 The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1871. When 
 the Trade Union Bill was first introduced it con- 
 tained a clause which was afterwards separated 
 from it and embodied in another Bill : it was 
 carried pari passu with the Trade Union Bill, and 
 became the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1871. 
 Unhappily the two Acts were often construed 
 together as if one Act, in so far as the specific 
 sections relating to labour disputes were concerned. 
 
CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION OF PROPERTY ACT. 29 
 
 The legal decisions given in some cases so inter- 
 preted the provisions in the two Acts as to imply 
 that while the object of a labour dispute was lawful, 
 the means adopted by workmen to achieve that 
 object were illegal. The Criminal Law Amend- 
 ment Act, 1871, worked so mischievously that it 
 was repealed by the Conspiracy and Protection of 
 Property Act, 1875, sect. 3 of the latter Act being 
 substituted for the former Act. The words of the 
 section are : 
 
 " An agreement or combination by two or more 
 persons to do, or procure to be done, any act in 
 contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute 
 between employers and workmen, shall not be 
 indictable as a conspiracy if such act committed 
 by one person would not be punishable as a 
 crime." 
 
 Criminal Conspiracies. It would seem, therefore, 
 that to be indicted for conspiracy, in matters 
 relating to labour disputes, the combination must 
 be for the purpose of committing a crime, whether 
 that crime be the object of the combination or the 
 means employed to effect the object. The common 
 law of conspiracy is consequently abolished as 
 affecting labour disputes between employers and 
 workmen. 
 
 Sub-sect. 4 of sect. 3 defines " crime," as used in 
 sect. 3, to mean "an offence punishable on indict- 
 ment, or an offence which is punishable on summary 
 
30 CONSPIBACY AND PROTECTION OF PROPERTY ACT. 
 
 conviction, and for the commission of which the 
 offender is liable, under the statute making the offence 
 punishable, to be imprisoned either absolutely, or at 
 the discretion of the Court as an alternative for some 
 other punishment." Sub-sect. 5 of sect. 3 limits the 
 penalty to three months, except where the statute 
 for the punishment of the offence prescribes a longer 
 term when the act is committed by one person. 
 
 Application of Act to Gas and Water Works. So 
 far the Act deals with offences by workmen in con- 
 nection with, or arising out of labour disputes 
 generally. Then follows sect. 4, a specific provision 
 relating breaches of contract by "persons employed 
 in the public supply of gas or water," thus : 
 
 " Persons employed in the public supply of gas 
 or water wilfully and maliciously breaking their con- 
 tract of service, knowing, or having reasonable cause 
 to believe, that the probable consequence of their so 
 doing, either alone or in combination with others, 
 will be to deprive a town or place of gas or water, 
 is liable on conviction to pay a penalty not exceeding 
 j20, or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding 
 three months, with or without hard labour." 
 
 A printed copy of this section is to be posted up 
 at the gas or water works in a conspicuous place. 
 The penalty for not doing so is a fine of 5 for every 
 day so long as the default continues. Defacing 
 such notice is punishable by a fine not exceeding 
 40s. It will be seen that sect. 4 is safeguarded by the 
 
CONSPIEACY AND PEOTECTION OF PEOPEETY ACT. 31 
 
 words wilfully and maliciously, but these have a 
 technical meaning. 
 
 Breach of Contract endangering Life, &c. 
 Sect. 5 is of general application, and it is of 
 importance that all cases under it should be care- 
 fully watched, for it is so drafted and worded that 
 an act which, if unconnected with labour, would 
 be dealt with as an ordinary breach of contract, 
 might under its provisions become, in the case of 
 workmen, a criminal offence. The section is so 
 worded as to necessitate careful consideration 
 on the part of the Court as to the nature of the 
 offence, and, impliedly, of the motive which led to it. 
 A wrongful act, done intentionally, without just 
 cause or excuse, might be construed as " wilfully 
 and maliciously " breaking a contract of service or 
 of hiring, the person so offending " knowing, or 
 having reasonable cause to believe, that the pro- 
 bable consequences of his so doing will be to 
 endanger human life, or cause serious bodily injury, 
 or to expose valuable property, whether real or 
 personal, to destruction, or serious injury." And 
 yet none of these things may have entered into 
 the offender's head. The word maliciously, as 
 here used, according to the Malicious Injuries to 
 Property Act (24 & 25 Viet. c. 97), s. 58, means, 
 " whether the offence was from malice or not." 
 
 Penalty for Certain Breaches of Contract. All 
 the cases decided under this section require careful 
 
32 CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION OF PROPERTY ACT. 
 
 consideration, because the penalty is a fine not 
 exceeding 20, or imprisonment, with or without 
 hard labour, for a term not exceeding three months. 
 The words " valuable property " are not defined in 
 the Act ; any definition by the Courts will therefore 
 be quoted as a precedent in any new case that 
 may arise. It is possible to overstrain the words 
 of this section unintentionally, by reason of the 
 fact that the section applies only to contracts of 
 service. 
 
 Neglect by Master. Sect. 6 imposes a penalty 
 for neglect by a master to provide necessary food, 
 clothing, medical aid, or lodging, wilfully and 
 without lawful excuse, for his servant or apprentice, 
 whereby the health of either is or is likely to be 
 seriously or permanently injured the penalty is 
 a sum not exceeding 20, or imprisonment, with 
 or without hard labour, for a term not exceeding 
 six months. By s. 11 the respective parties to 
 the contract of service, their husbands or wives, 
 were empowered to give evidence in all cases 
 under sects. 4, 5 and 6 of this Act. The prisoner 
 was in this case, as under the Employers and 
 Workmen Act, also empowered to give evidence 
 on oath. 
 
 Picketing, Watching, and Besetting. The majority 
 of prosecutions under this Act are instituted under 
 sect. 7. It is commonly known as the "picket- 
 ing clause." The Plymouth case was under this 
 
CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION OF PROPERTY ACT. 33 
 
 section (sub-sect. 1), the recorder sentenced the men 
 to a fine of 20, with the alternative of six weeks 
 imprisonment ; but the conviction was quashed on 
 appeal. Curran v. Treleaven. (See p. 134.) The 
 section sets forth certain acts which are unlawful, 
 and the penalty if they are committed. In brief, the 
 acts are as follows : Uses violence to or intimidates 
 a person, his wife or children, or injures such person's 
 property ; persistently follows such person about from 
 place to place ; hides tools, clothes, or other property, 
 or deprives such person of, or hinders him in the use 
 thereof ; watches or besets the house or place where 
 such person resides, works, carries on business, or 
 happens to be, or the approach to such house or place; 
 or follows, with two or more, such person in a disor- 
 derly manner. Those are the prohibited acts, quali- 
 fied by this object-^-" with a view to compel any other 
 person to abstain from doing or to do any act which 
 such other person has a legal right to do or abstain 
 from doing, wrongfully, and without legal authority." 
 Lawful Picketing Defined. There is a further 
 qualification in what is termed the saving clause, 
 thus: "Attending at or near the place where a 
 person resides, or works, or carries on business, or 
 happens to be, or the approach to such house or 
 place, in order merely to obtain or communicate 
 information, shall not be deemed a watching or 
 besetting within the meaning of this section." 
 The whole section is general in its character and 
 T.U.A. 3 
 
34 CONSPIKACY AND PROTECTION OF PROPERTY ACT. 
 
 application, and the mere fact that the prohibited 
 act or acts were done in connection with a labour 
 dispute ought not to aggravate the offence. It is 
 important to remember that the word " compel " is 
 used instead of " coerce," as in the repealed Act, 
 and that the word " molest " is expunged. The 
 Court may impose a fine in lieu of imprisonment ; 
 the extreme penalty is a fine of 20, or three months 
 imprisonment with or without hard labour, but 
 either may be less. In brief, the things really 
 prohibited are violence, intimidation, or compul- 
 sion force in some form, or threats of force, 
 and depriving a man of the use of his tools or 
 other property. Peaceful picketing is lawful within 
 the limits prescribed by the Act. 
 
 Taff Vale Case One of Picketing. The case of 
 the Taff Vale Raihvay Company v. Amalgamated 
 Society of Railway Servants arose out of a dispute 
 between the former and the latter, eventuating in 
 a strike. In connection with that strike, the Great 
 "Western Kailway Station at Cardiff, the works, and 
 other places were picketed. The Railway Company 
 thereupon applied for an injunction to restrain two 
 officials of the Union, Messrs. Bell and Holmes, 
 from watching and besetting the places referred to. 
 The injunction was contested, but it was granted. 
 The Union did not in this case instruct counsel 
 to appeal, as it was personal to the men named 
 in the summons. Then an injunction was applied 
 
CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION OF PROPERTY ACT. 35 
 
 for against the Union. The summons taken out by 
 the plaintiffs, in the Queen's Bench Division, and 
 adjourned into Court, was heard before Mr. Justice 
 Farwell, in the High Court of Justice, Chancery 
 Division, sitting as Vacation Judge, on September 
 5th, 1900. " By the summons an injunction was 
 asked for to restrain the defendants, the Amalga- 
 mated Society of Railway Servants, Richard Bell 
 and James Holmes, from watching or besetting, 
 or causing to be watched or beset, the Great Wes- 
 tern Railway Station at Cardiff or the works of the 
 plaintiffs, or any of them, or the approaches thereto, 
 or the place of residence, or any place where they 
 may happen to be, of any workman employed by or 
 proposing to work for the plaintiffs, for the purpose 
 of persuading or otherwise preventing persons from 
 working for the plaintiffs, or for any purpose except 
 merely to obtain or communicate information, and 
 from procuring any persons who may have or may 
 enter into contracts with the plaintiffs to commit a 
 breach of such contracts." 
 
 The terms of the summons are not important from 
 a legal standpoint, as any terms pertinent to the 
 case can be put in by the solicitor in whose hands 
 it is. But the terms are nevertheless important 
 as showing the object and intention of the plain- 
 tiffs, it being, in this instance, the prevention of 
 picketing. In order to cover all possibilities the 
 words " for the purpose of persuading or otherwise 
 
 32 
 
36 CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION OF PROPERTY ACT. 
 
 preventing persons from working for the plaintiffs," 
 were inserted in the summons. Naturally, this led to 
 the conclusion that a blow was aimed at "peaceful 
 picketing," and the Trade and Labour Unions were 
 consequently up in arms when the injunction asked 
 for was granted. 
 
 Union responsible for Acts of Members. Though 
 the summons set forth picketing as the offence 
 against which the injunction was asked for, in reality 
 the judgment of Mr. Justice Farwell did not deal 
 with it except inferentially . The offence was assumed 
 that picketing was in some way an infraction of 
 the law else how could an injunction be granted ? 
 Under some of the terms in the summons, as, for 
 example, -preventing persons doing what they had a 
 right to do, or procuring persons to break contracts, 
 such acts, if committed, and were proven, would be 
 an infraction of the law. But persuading a person 
 to do a thing, or not to do a thing, would not be 
 unlawful, unless the act itself was specifically un- 
 lawful. Unlawfulness was implied in the summons, 
 and assumed apparently by the learned Judge. The 
 judgment was wider. It was a decision that a Trade 
 Union was in this particular instance responsible 
 for the acts of the members, and that the acts in 
 question were in themselves contrary to law. This 
 was the essence of the judgment, and it was against 
 that dictum that the defendants in the action 
 appealed. It is essential that the two matters be 
 
CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION OF PROPERTY ACT. 37 
 
 separated the act of picketing, and the responsi- 
 bility of a Trade Union. 
 
 The defendant society pleaded that the name of 
 the society should be struck out, on the ground that 
 it was neither a corporation nor an individual, and 
 cannot be sued in a quasi corporate or any other 
 capacity. Mr. Justice Farwell on this point is 
 reported to have said : " It is undoubtedly true that 
 a Trade Union is neither a corporation nor an indi- 
 vidual, nor a partnership between a number of 
 individuals." He went on to say that "this does 
 not by any means conclude the case." He then 
 quoted reported cases relating to Improvement 
 Commissioners, Turnpike Trusts, Eailways, Benefit 
 Building Societies, &c., all of which are corporate 
 bodies, in support of the view that Trade Unions, 
 though not corporate bodies, can be sued, and, con- 
 sequently, that they can, as such, sue. This decision 
 was regarded with alarm by Trade Union officials, 
 and by Labour leaders, and therefore it was appealed 
 against ; the Trade Unions of the country supported 
 the Amalgamated Society of Eailway Servants in 
 that appeal, because it was felt that the decision 
 opened the door to litigation -of a serious kind, and 
 endangered the position of Trade Unions. 
 
 Appeal Case A Trade Union not suable. The 
 appeal of the Amalgamated Society of Eailway 
 Servants was heard before the Master of the Eolls 
 and Lords Justices Collins and Stirling, in the Court 
 
38 CONSPIKACY AND PROTECTION OF PROPERTY ACT. 
 
 of Appeal, on November 12th, and on November 21st 
 the Master of the Eolls gave judgment. In reality the 
 question of picketing as such did not arise, except 
 incidentally. (See p. 82.) The sole point raised was 
 whether the action was maintainable against a Trade 
 Union as such, consisting not only of the defendants 
 named (Messrs. Bell and Holmes, and others), but of 
 a great number of other persons. In general terms, 
 the judgment of the Master of the Kolls, in which 
 Lords Justices Collins and Stirling concurred, was : 
 At Common Law the defendants could not be sued in 
 the name in which they were sued in this action, any 
 more than a tradesman could sue a defendant in the 
 name of a West End club for goods supplied to the 
 club. His Lordship went on to say that for the action 
 to be maintained against the defendants, in the name 
 of " The Amalgamated Society of Eailway Servants," 
 there must be some statute enabling this to t>e 
 done, either by creating the society a corporation 
 or enacting that it might be sued in its registered 
 name. In the Trade Union Acts of 1871 and 1876 
 there was no section empowering a Trade Union 
 to sue or to be sued in its registered name, nor 
 was there any provision constituting the society a 
 corporation so that it might be sued as such. If a 
 Trade Union can be sued in the manner proposed, the 
 funds of the Union would be liable to be taken on 
 execution under a judgment against the Union in the 
 society's name. 
 
CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION OF PROPERTY ACT. 39 
 
 His Lordship went on to consider whether the 
 Legislature intended that a Trade Union was to 
 be sued in its registered name. If it had been so 
 intended the Legislature knew well how, in plain 
 terms, to bring about such a result. Keference 
 was then made to sect. 6 of the Companies Act, a 
 part of which section was re-enacted in the Trade 
 Union Act of 1871, but the last part, about 
 incorporation, was left out " pointedly omitted " 
 seem to have been the words used by the Master 
 of the Rolls. Registration did not render the 
 society an entity capable of being sued in its 
 registered name. A Trade Union was not made 
 a corporation, as was constantly the case with 
 other societies. The case relied on by Mr. Justice 
 Far well did not affect the question for decision. 
 As there was no statute empowering the action to 
 be brought against the Union in its registered 
 name, it was not maintainable against the Amal- 
 gamated Society of Railway Servants, and these 
 defendants must therefore be struck out, and the 
 injunction against them dissolved. 
 
 Intention of the Legislature. The appeal of the 
 Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants was there- 
 fore successful in the Court of Appeal, the injunction 
 against the Union being dissolved, defendants being 
 allowed costs. Leave was given to appeal to a 
 higher Court, but whether it will be further contested 
 remains to be seen. (January, 1901). The question 
 
40 CONSPIKACY AND PEOTECTION OF PROPERTY ACT. 
 
 of picketing was not raised or referred to ; the 
 judgment dealt with the liability and responsibility 
 of the Union, as such, in an action at law involving 
 damages suing and being sued as a registered 
 body. As to the intention of the Legislature in this 
 respect I can speak with some authority, as I had 
 more to do with the negotiations respecting the 
 enactment of the Trade Union Acts, 1871 and 1876, 
 during their passage through both Houses of 
 Parliament, than any other living man. The 
 Members of Parliament who were more or less the 
 exponents of the views of Trade Unionists at that 
 period were Mr. Thomas Hughes the late Judge 
 Hughes ; the late Mr. A. J. Mundella ; the late Sir 
 James Stansfeld, and Mr. William Eathbone, who 
 is, I am glad to say, still living. Lord James of 
 Hereford and Sir William Harcourt had more 
 to do personally with the Labour Laws, and the 
 Trade Union Act, 1876, together with the repeal 
 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1871 ; but 
 incidentally they were cognisant of the trend of 
 workmen's opinion in respect of all of the above. 
 
 In my interviews with the then Home Secretary, 
 Sir Henry Austin Bruce, afterwards Lord Aberdare, 
 and they were many, some of which were private, 
 at the residences of Sir James Stansfeld and Mr. 
 William Eathbone, others by public deputation at 
 the Home Office, or interviews at the House of 
 Commons, the question of empowering Trade 
 
CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION OF PROPERTY ACT. 41 
 
 Unions to sue and to be sued was often and often 
 discussed. Some few were in favour of embodying 
 such power in the Trade Union Bill, but the vast 
 preponderating opinion was averse to it. Any pro- 
 vision of that nature was intentionally left out ; the 
 Home Secretary being quite as strong on that point 
 as Messrs. Hughes, Mundella, J. Hinde Palmer, 
 Serjeant Simon, and, so far as my memory serves 
 me, the late Lord Coleridge. The representatives 
 of labour and officials of Trade Unions, whose 
 mouthpiece I then was, were strongly averse to any 
 clause being in the Bill which would open the door 
 to litigation. In this the Government concurred. 
 The absence, therefore, of any express power 
 enabling a Union to sue or to be sued, was intentional 
 on the part of the authors of the measure, and that 
 intention was indorsed in the passage of the Bill 
 through Parliament. Of course, the above remarks 
 only relate to intention. From a legal point of view 
 the Courts decide upon the facts of the case and 
 the language of the statute, rather than upon the 
 intention. 
 
 Reduction of Penalties, Tribunals, Procedure, dec. 
 By sect. 8 power is given to any Court or 
 Justices having jurisdiction to reduce the penalties 
 under any other Act relating to employers and 
 workmen to not less than one-fourth of the maxi- 
 mum penalty. The constitution of the tribunal, 
 and modes of procedure in dealing with cases, are 
 
42 CONSPIKACY AND PROTECTION OF PROPERTY ACT- 
 
 given in sects. 9 to 11. (See sections of the Act, 
 pp. 1489.) Appeals are provided for in sect. 12. 
 The remaining sections contain definitions, the 
 saving clause, repeals of former Acts, not the least 
 important enactment in this Act, and the appli- 
 cation of the Act to Scotland and Ireland. 
 
 Conclusion. These notes need not be further 
 extended, as the provisions of the Act are given 
 in full, and the cases relating to them will be 
 found in that connection. It only remains to add 
 that most of the difficulties that have arisen, under 
 the several Acts here referred to; have been rather 
 in the administration of the law than from defects 
 in the statutes. The Acts in force have been 
 evolved out of conditions of the past, when labour 
 was restrained by law. Equality and freedom 
 have been substituted, and under their influence 
 severity must disappear. (See Conspiracy and 
 Protection of Property Act, pp. 123 71.) 
 
 VII. THE CONCILIATION ACT, 1896. 
 
 Origin of Labour Arbitrations. As previously 
 remarked, most of the legislation in this country 
 relating to labour, during nearly five hundred 
 years, dealt with its aggressive or militant side, 
 the object being to restrain the liberty of workmen 
 in certain cases, and to regulate their action in 
 others. The specific Acts of this character com- 
 menced with the Statute of Labourers, in 1349 
 
THE CONCILIATION ACT. 43 
 
 the 23 Edw. III. and continued all through the 
 centuries down to the repeal of the Combination 
 Laws, in 1824 25. One Act, the Statute of Appren- 
 tices (5 Eliz. c. 4), sought to restore certain rights 
 which had been taken away by statute, and some, 
 towards the close of the eighteenth century, such 
 as the Spitalfields Acts, gave to workmen an easy 
 right of appeal before the justices of the peace in 
 matters affecting the silk industry in the district 
 of Spitalfields. But even the provisions in those 
 Acts were illusory for the most part, and generally 
 they were badly administered. It was not until 
 the beginning of this century that the idea of 
 protecting labour was entertained by Parliament, 
 and then only in the case of young children, in 
 the first Factory Act, in 1802, which Act was 
 mainly intended to protect parish apprentices; 
 but its influence extended farther, and was the 
 starting point of the Factory and Workshops Acts. 
 Arbitration by Justices of the Peace. The statute 
 of Elizabeth was indeed one of regulation a kind 
 of general embodiment of the yet remaining ordi- 
 nances of the old Guilds, and of the least injurious 
 provisions in previous statutes. It was the same 
 in the Spitalfields Acts, but the latter contained 
 provisions for arbitration before the justices in 
 specified cases. All such provisions, however, were 
 in the nature of regulations, and therefore they 
 were more or less mischievous and disastrous. 
 
44 THE CONCILIATION ACT. 
 
 Right of Association Conceded. The repeal of 
 the Combination Laws was the first great step 
 towards the emancipation of labour from State 
 control. In a way, it gave the right of associa- 
 tion, and partially, to a limited extent, legalised 
 the combinations then in existence. Before this, 
 however, encouragement was given to associative 
 effort by the Friendly Societies Acts, carried ere 
 the close of the eighteenth century, though the 
 objects were strictly confined within certain limits, 
 the purposes of Trade Unions being excluded 
 therefrom. 
 
 Arbitration in the Silk Trades, &c. As above 
 stated, the Spitalfields Acts provided for a kind 
 of arbitration, and were often appealed to in dis- 
 putes between the silk manufacturers and their 
 weavers. There were indeed many other Acts in 
 which the principle of arbitration was recognised, 
 commencing with the 1 Anne, st. II. c. 22, down 
 to the 55 Geo. III. c. 184. Those Acts were as 
 a rule specific as to .certain industries. 
 
 Arbitration for all Trades. The Act of 1824, 
 the 5 Geo. IV. c. 96, was the first general Act 
 relating to arbitration in labour disputes. It 
 repealed all previous Acts, and consolidated and 
 amended their provisions, so as to make them 
 apply to the changed conditions of labour. But 
 the Act was rendered absolutely nugatory by one 
 provision, namely, that the decision or award should 
 
THE CONCILIATION ACT. 45 
 
 not affect the future rates of wages, hours of work, 
 and conditions of labour. This was absurd. All 
 such decisions must affect the future of labour ; 
 it cannot, except in very rare instances, affect the 
 'past, or even the present. Herein labour disputes 
 differ from disputes in trade and commerce, for 
 in these, as a rule, the matters in dispute pertain 
 to what has been done, or omitted to be 'done, 
 as the case may be. The only future in all such 
 cases relates to damage or compensation, or to the 
 fulfilment of a contract which has been broken 
 at the date of the action, or submission to the 
 Court. Hence the Act of 1824 was never put in 
 force in a single instance. It was the same with 
 the Conciliation Act of Lord St. Leonards, in 
 1867. It had the same limitation, and conse- 
 quently that too was a dead letter. The Arbitration 
 Act, 1872, had in it the elements of a better fate, 
 but that also was a dead letter, because of the 
 unrepealed Act of 1824, which was referred to as 
 the principal Act. 
 
 A New Departure. The Conciliation Act, 1896, 
 has saved itself from a like fate, by repealing all 
 the Acts named, It is permissive in character, 
 and voluntary in its operation. The Board of 
 Trade has certain powers conferred upon it, to take 
 initial steps to bring the parties together ; but in 
 general the preference is that the two parties shall 
 in some way intimate their willingness to submit 
 
46 THE CONCILIATION ACT. 
 
 the matters in dispute to a Board of Conciliation, 
 either one in existence, or one to be called into 
 existence, for the express purpose of considering 
 and adjusting the differences that may exist in a par- 
 ticular case. There is also a power to act upon the 
 submission of one of the parties ; but it is a power 
 which has not been used, and it is fraught with 
 difficulties. An award, in such a case, could only 
 be enforced by legal process, and the Act contains 
 no specific means whereby it could be enforced. 
 There is this legal difficulty in the way : the award 
 must have reference to something to be done in 
 the future, as to which there is no agreement and 
 one of the parties refuses to enter into such agree- 
 ment. How, therefore, can specific performance 
 be ordered, except by consent, or, if ordered, how 
 can the order be enforced ? This is the real 
 difficulty in all labour disputes. 
 
 Nature of the Conciliation Act. The Conciliation 
 Act, 1896 (59 & 60 Viet. c. 30), is simple in con- 
 struction and is understandable of the people. 
 No cases have arisen under the Act, nor are any 
 likely to arise as at present administered, for the 
 Board of Trade is cautious and careful. The Act 
 provides (sect. 1) for the registration of boards 
 intended to be more or less permanent in character, 
 and for the supply, by such boards, of information, 
 reports, and returns to the Board of Trade, for 
 guidance, &c. 
 
THE CONCILIATION ACT. 47 
 
 Sect. 2. Power is given to the Board of Trade 
 to institute inquiries into the causes of labour 
 disputes, and to take steps for the purpose of 
 bringing the parties together; or it may, on the 
 application of either party, appoint a person or 
 persons to act as conciliator ; and, on the applica- 
 tion of both parties, may appoint an arbitrator. 
 Provision is made for inquiry, and for the prepara- 
 tion of terms of settlement, copy to be sent to the 
 Board of Trade. 
 
 Sect. 3. The Arbitration Act, 1869, is expressly 
 excluded, which Act provides for the enforcement 
 of awards. 
 
 Sect. 4 gives power to the Board of Trade to 
 aid in establishing Boards of Conciliation ; sect. 5 
 provides for Eeports to be presented to Parlia- 
 ment, and sect. 6 as to costs and expenses ; sect. 7 
 repeals former Acts, and sect. 8 gives the short 
 title of the Act. 
 
 G. H. 
 
THE TEADE UNION ACTS, 1871 AND 1876. 
 
 " The Act of 1871," said Jessel, M. R., in 1880, " no doubt 
 was passed primarily with a view to preventing the treasurers 
 and secretaries and officers of these societies from robbing 
 them ; that was the chief object." [This ignores Kussell 
 Gurney's Act, passed in 1868. See p. 115.] " It was 
 discovered that some of these men, abusing the confidence 
 reposed in them, took advantage of the law, which made 
 these societies illegal, by appropriating their funds and property 
 to their own use.* That, no doubt, was one of the principal 
 objects, and therefore the Act was passed to get at these 
 men. Another object was this : there was a great difficulty in 
 suing and getting their property from third persons, and one 
 object of the Act was to enable these societies to sue in respect 
 of their property, and also to enable them to hold property* 
 such as a house or office." (Rigby v. Connol, 14 Ch. D. 489). 
 
 34 & 35 VICT. c. 31. 
 
 An Act to amend the Law relating to Trades 
 Unions. [29th June, 1871. 
 
 The Act of 1876 (see p. 101) is entitled " An Act to amend 
 the Trade Union Act, 1871." Trade Union seems to be the 
 correct term. 
 
 * A notorious instance was Hornby v. Close, in 1867 (L. R. 
 2 Q. B. 153). The Court of Queen's Bench (Cockburn. C. J., 
 Blackburn, Mellor, and Lush, JJ.) unanimously held that Justices 
 were right in dismissing a complaint against a defaulting member 
 of " a society of which one of the objects was the relief of sick, 
 disabled and aged members, and the burial of dead members, but 
 of which one of the main objects was that of a trades union, and 
 the support of members when on strike," on the ground that this 
 last purpose was " illegal." (See p. 51.) 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACT, 1871. 49 
 
 Preliminary. Ss *> 2 - 3 - 
 
 1. This Act may be cited as " The Trade Union short title. 
 Act, 1871." 
 
 The two Acts are to be known as the " Trade Union Acts, 
 1871 and 1876 " and are to be construed together (39 & 40 
 Viet. 22, s. 1). For instance, see p. 102 and p. 111. 
 
 Criminal Provisions. 
 
 2. The purposes of any trade union shall not, by Trade 
 
 * union not 
 
 reason merely that they are in restraint of trade, criminal. 
 be deemed to be unlawful, so as to render any 
 member of such trade union liable to criminal 
 prosecution for conspiracy or otherwise. 
 
 3. The purposes of any trade union shall not, by 
 reason merely that they are in restraint of trade, 
 be unlawful so as to render void or voidable any 
 agreement or trust. 
 
 These sections summarise the results of many years' 
 struggle to obtain legal recognition for certain combinations 
 of working men and "the rights of labour," and legal 
 protection for their property. (See pp. 2 4.) 
 
 The legal theory of "restraint of trade" cannot be fully 
 dealt with here. "It was decided so early as the reign of 
 Henry V. that a contract imposing a general restraint on 
 trade was void" (Notes to Mitcliel v. Reynolds, 1 Smith, 
 L. C.). The question was thoroughly discussed in the House 
 of Lords expressly from a modern standpoint in Nordenfelt 
 v. Maxim Nordenfelt, <6c. (1894, A. C. 535), and it may now 
 be taken as settled that whether the extent of the restraint 
 of trade (in time and area) is reasonable and therefore legal, 
 or not, must depend on the circumstances of each case, and 
 the convenience of the public, i.e., on considerations of ' ' public 
 
 T.U.A. 4 
 
50 THE TRADE UNION ACTS, 1871 & 1876. 
 
 8. 3. policy." * Till the Act of jjTj^JheJaw hel6Lthat_-trade- 
 unions necessarily impeded ~trade, and so far were illpga.1 
 institutions^ TEey~mipede3 trade by promoting joint and 
 organTsed action among their members in their own interests, 
 and this the law frequently held to amount to the crime of 
 conspiracy. Perhaps the leading case is Hilton v. Eckersley 
 in 1855 (6 El. & Bl. 47), which decided that an association 
 of masters (which was practically a trade union) had not 
 validity at common law. " If agreements like the present 
 [between the members]" said Crompton, J., "were enforce- 
 able at law, I see no reason why . . . they should not be 
 enforceable hi equity ; and our courts of equity might be 
 called upon to enjoin masters against opening their mills, 
 or workmen from going to work or discontinuing a strike 
 whilst our county courts would have to make decrees for the 
 contributions to strikers or to enforce penalties from work- 
 men who have felt it their duty to resume employment." 
 In the same case, in delivering the judgment of the Exchequer 
 Chamber, Alderson, B., said : " We see no way of avoiding the 
 conclusion that, if a bond of this sort between masters is 
 capable of being enforced at law, an agreement to the same 
 effect amongst workmen must be equally legal and enforce- 
 able, and so we shall be giving a legal effect to combinations 
 of workmen for the purpose of raising wages, and make their 
 strikes capable of being enforced at law." 
 
 Of this case Lord Watson said in 1891 : "The agreement 
 of which the appellants complain left the contracting parties 
 free to recede from it at their pleasure, and is not obnoxious 
 to the rule of public policy which was recognised in Hilton 
 v. Eckersley. The decision in that case, which was the 
 result of judicial opinions not altogether reconcilable, appears 
 to me to carry the rule no farther than this that an agree- 
 ment by traders to combine for a lawful purpose and for a 
 specified time, is not binding upon any of the parties to it 
 if he chooses to withdraw, and consequently cannot be 
 
 * For " public policy," see some remarks of Lord Brainwell, in 
 the Mogul case (181)2, A. C. at p. 45). 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACT, 1871. 51 
 
 enforced in invitum" (Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, S. 3. 
 Gow &Co., 1892, A. C. at 42). 
 
 In other words, observance of agreements of this sort is 
 voluntary in the sense that the law will not help to enforce 
 them. (Cf., for instance, Urmston v. Wliitelegg, p. 58, and 
 Mineral, dc. v. Booth, p. 112.) On this point there are some 
 very clear remarks of Halsbury, L. C., in the Mogul case 
 (1892, A. C. at p. 39). 
 
 It is clear that the sense in which it has been occasionally 
 attempted to explain the phrase " restraint of trade," viz., 
 with reference to the trade of others than those agreeing 
 to act in concert, is quite untenable. Thus in the Mogul 
 case, Lord Coleridge, C. J., said : " One word in passing only 
 on the contention that this combination of the defendants 
 was unlawful because it was in restraint of trade. It seems 
 to me it was no more in restraint of trade, as that phrase is 
 used for the purpose of avoiding contracts, than if two tailors 
 in a village agreed to give their customers five per cent, 
 off their bills at Christmas on condition of their customers 
 dealing with them and with them only. Restraint of trade, 
 with deference, has in its legal sense nothing to do with 
 this question " (21 Q. B. D. 553). 
 
 In the same case " No action at common law," said 
 Bowen, L. J., " will lie or ever has lain against any individual 
 or individuals for entering into a contract merely because it 
 is in restraint of trade " (23 Q. B. D. 619). See also the remarks 
 of Lord James of Hereford, cited p. 162. The words of Lord 
 Halsbury mentioned above confirm this conclusion. 
 
 The state of the law before the Act of 1871 is well 
 illustrated by Farrer v. Close in 1869 (L. R. 4 Q. B. 602). 
 Two Judges of the Queen's Bench (Cockburn, C. J. and 
 Mellor, J.) held* that the purposes of a society which 
 included the support of strikes and were therefore illegal 
 as being in restraint of trade, were those of a trade union 
 and not of a friendly society (within 18-9 V. 63, 44, 
 repealed by 38-9 V. 60), and that the justices were, therefore, 
 
 * Following Hornby v. Close, to which they were parties. 
 
 42 
 
52 THE TRADE UNION ACTS, 1871 & 1876. 
 
 S. 3. right in dismissing a certain charge ; while two others 
 ~ (Hannen and Hayes, JJ.) laid it down that strikes are not 
 necessarily illegal, that there was no evidence that the funds 
 of this society had been applied to support illegal strikes, 
 that its rules did not operate in restraint of trade, that there 
 was nothing to show that the purpose of its establishment 
 was illegal and that the justices were wrong. (The Court 
 being equally divided, the appeal was dismissed.) 
 
 In 1869, Sir William Erie, formerly Chief Justice of the 
 Common Pleas, wrote : " A union operates by way of agree- 
 ment. If all its purposes should be free from unlawfulness, 
 it would be like to a partnership agreement, for breach 
 whereof the remedy is mostly in chancery; if any of its 
 purposes should be unlawful, whether criminal or not, it 
 would be so far void for illegality ; if any of its purposes 
 should be criminal, the concert would be a crime. With 
 respect to rights to property, they are not directly affected 
 by the purposes of the owner of the property ; but as unions 
 operate by way of agreement, and as the validity of agree- 
 ments depends on (among other things) the lawfulness of 
 the purposes comprised in such agreement, the purposes 
 of the unions may thus indirectly affect the rights of 
 the members thereof to the joint property of the union. 
 Accordingly members of lawful unions have rights to the 
 property of the union the same as other subjects to other 
 joint property. Members of unions for unlawful purposes 
 have no right to assistance from any court for the fulfilment 
 of the unlawful purposes ; but for all other purposes, except 
 the unlawful (if they can be distinctly severed), they are, 
 I believe, in the same position as unions for lawful pur- 
 poses " (The Law relating to Trade Unions,* Macniillan & 
 Co., pp. 23. See p. 64 and pp. 116, 117). 
 
 "It appears to me," said Jessel, M. R., speaking of a 
 trade union, " that without the Act it is clearly an unlawful 
 
 * " A book more full of careful and accurate law than is to be 
 found in many judgments." Per Esher, M. R., in Mogul, $c. v. 
 JTacgregor, 23 Q. B. D. at 606. 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACT, 1871. 58 
 
 association ; it is an association by which men are not only S. 3. 
 restrained in trade, but they are bound to do certain acts 
 under a penalty " (Bigby v. Connol, 14 Ch. D. 491 * ; 42 
 L. T. 139 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 328 ; 28 W. R. 650). 
 
 "Or otherwise." Grammatically these words may mean 
 (1) " or otherwise criminally liable ; " (2) " or otherwise 
 unlawful," i.e., in any way whatsoever; or (3) "or other- 
 wise liable," i.e., civilly. Probably (1) is the meaning 
 intended,! and this is the view of the annotator in the 
 margin of the statutes; and (3) is included in (2). But as 
 it seems that no civil liability can flow from purposes merely 
 in restraint of trade, it matters little practically which 
 interpretation is correct. 
 
 The (civil) action for conspiracy, however, is a very 
 different matter. 
 
 It is convenient to deal here with the Mogul case, 1885 91 
 (15Q.B.D.476;21Q.B.D.544;23Q.B.D.598;1892,A.C.25). 
 In the words of Lord Herschell (in Allen v. Flood, 1898, 
 A. C. at 140) : " Certain owners of ships formed an associa- 
 tion with the object of securing to themselves exclusively a 
 particular carrying trade. They allowed a rebate on the 
 freights to all shippers who shipped only with members 
 of the association. They also sent ships to ports where the 
 plaintiffs were endeavouring to obtain cargoes, to carry at 
 unremunerative rates in order to secure the trade to them- 
 selves. A circular was sent by an agent of the defendants 
 reminding shippers at a particular port that shipments for 
 London by any of the plaintiffs' steamers at any of the ports 
 in China would exclude the firm making the shipment from 
 
 * At p. 490 the learned Judge is reported to have said : "The Act 
 recognises the principle that men may enter into any contract 
 they think fit ; there is an exception in the case of a contract for 
 borrowing in this country. I hope that exception will always 
 remain in whatever form that contract may be expressed." The 
 writer cannot find any authority for this exception ; the two last 
 reports cited do not contain these words. 
 
 t But it does not appear what other criminal proceedings could 
 be taken. 
 
54 THE TRADE UNION ACTS, 1871 & 1876. 
 
 S. 3. participation in the returns of freight during the whole six- 
 ~~ monthly period in which they had been made, even though 
 the firm elsewhere might have given exclusive support to 
 the steamers of the combination. It was held by this House 
 that the plaintiffs had no cause of action. This, too, be it 
 observed, though the action was in respect of a conspiracy, 
 what was done being in pursuance of a common course of 
 action concerted by several ship-owners. 
 
 " In that case the very object of the defendants was to 
 induce shippers to contract with them and not to contract 
 with the plaintiffs, and thus to benefit themselves at the 
 expense of the plaintiffs and to injure them by preventing 
 them from getting a share of the carrying trade. Its express 
 object was to molest and interfere with the plaintiffs in 
 the exercise of their trade. It was said that this was held 
 lawful because the law sanctions acts which are done in 
 furtherance of trade competition. I do not think the 
 decision rests on so narrow a basis, but rather on this, 
 that the acts by which the competition was pursued were 
 all lawful acts ; that they were acts not in themselves 
 wrongful, but a mere exercise of the right to contract with 
 whom, and when, and under what circumstances, and upon 
 what conditions they pleased. I am aware of no ground 
 for saying that competition is regarded with special favour 
 by the law at all events. I see no reason why it should be 
 so regarded." 
 
 See also the remarks of Lord James of Hereford in this 
 case, cited p. 162. It must be remembered that the 
 defendants undoubtedly came within the definition of a 
 trade union, p. 111. 
 
 But it is submitted that the importance of this action for 
 conspiracy is much diminished since Allen v. Flood (see 
 p. 155), if it has not disappeared altogether. 
 
 Three actions of the kind have been brought since 1871, 
 the date of this Act, viz., the Mogul case (p. 53), which 
 failed, Flood v. Jackson (the original of Allen v. Flood), 
 where the Judge held that there was no evidence of 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACT, 1871. 55 
 
 conspiracy to interfere with another's trade (1895, 2 Q. B. S. & 
 22, note], and Temperton v. Russell (see p. 154), which 
 succeeded. 
 
 But that case was, f not overruled (see p. 158), vigorously 
 disapproved in Allen v. Flood (1898, A. C. 1). Seethe 
 judgments of Lord Watson (at 94 and 108), of Lord 
 Herschell (at 121 and 143), of Lord Macnaghten (at 154), 
 of Lord Shand (at 168 and 169), and of Lord James of 
 Hereford (at 179). Some of these passages are set out 
 below, pp. 15962. 
 
 As to the present state of the law on the civil remedy for 
 conspiracy, 
 
 "The only findings," says Lord Watson (at p. 108), 
 "of the jury which the Court [C. A.] had to consider 
 were : (1) that the defendants had maliciously induced 
 certain persons to break their contracts with the plaintiffs, 
 and (2) that the defendants had maliciously conspired to 
 nduce, and had thereby induced, certain persons not to 
 make contracts with the plaintiffs. There having been 
 undisputed breaches of contract by the persons found to 
 have been induced, the first of these findings raised the 
 same question which had been disposed of in Lumley v. 
 Gye (2 E. & B. 216). According to the second finding, 
 the persons induced merely refused to make contracts, 
 which was not a legal wrong on their part ; but the 
 defendants who induced were found to have accomplished 
 their object, to the injury of the plaintiffs, by means of 
 unlawful conspiracy a clear ground of liability according to 
 Lumley v. Gye, if, as the Court held, there was evidence 
 to prove it." That was a successful action for inducing 
 an opera- singer to break her engagement with a manager, 
 and the noble and learned lord seems to be referring to the 
 following words in the judgment of Crompton, J. (at p. 230) : 
 " Where two or more parties were concerned in inflicting 
 such injury, an indictment, or a writ of conspiracy at com- 
 mon law, might perhaps have been maintainable, and, where 
 a writ of conspiracy would lie for an injury inflicted by two, 
 
56 THE TRADE UNION ACTS, 1871 & 1876. 
 
 an action on the case in the nature of conspiracy will generally 
 lie ; and in such action on the case the plaintiff is entitled to 
 recover against one defendant without proof of any con- 
 spiracy, the malicious injury and not the conspiracy being 
 the gist of the action." (See also Huitley v. Simmons, p. 162.) 
 
 Theoretically, then, the common law action of conspiracy 
 still exists, but practically, at any rate, as an obstacle to the 
 operations of trade unions, it has gone, for, while before 
 Allen v. Flood evidence of conspiracy was or was supposed 
 to be evidence of bad motive, since that case, the only ques- 
 tion is : Is the act complained of legal or illegal (whatever 
 the motive was) ? and if it is illegal, an action lies, whether 
 there was conspiracy or not. Thus in Temperton v. Russell, 
 if it was rightly decided, the defendants were liable for the 
 injury caused to the plaintiff by their inducing people not to 
 enter into contracts with him, whether they conspired to do 
 so or not. 
 
 There is nothing in sects. 2 and 3 to take unregistered. 
 unions out of them. See on sect. 6, p. 70. 
 
 " Agreement or trust." These words are best understood 
 in connection with sect. 4. 
 
 4. Nothing in this Act shall enable any court to 
 
 entertain any legal proceeding instituted with the 
 
 Trade union object of directly enforcing or recovering damages 
 
 when not for the breach of any of the following agreements, 
 
 enforceable. 
 
 namely, 
 
 1. Any agreement between members of a trade 
 union as such, concerning the conditions on 
 which any members for the time being of 
 such trade union shall or shall not sell their 
 goods, transact business, employ, or be 
 employed : 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACT, 1871. 57 
 
 2. Any agreement for the payment by any person s. 4. 
 of any subscription or penalty to a trade union : 
 
 3. Any agreement for the application of the 
 funds of a trade union, 
 
 (a.) To provide benefits to members : or, 
 (b.) To furnish contributions to any employer 
 or workman not a member of such 
 trade union, in consideration of such 
 employer or workman acting in con- 
 formity with the rules or resolutions of 
 such trade union ; or 
 
 (c.) To discharge any fine imposed upon 
 any person by sentence of a court of 
 justice ; or, 
 
 4. Any agreement made between one trade union 
 and another ; or, 
 
 5. Any bond to secure the performance of any 
 of the above-mentioned agreements. 
 
 But nothing in this section shall be deemed to 
 constitute any of the above-mentioned agreements 
 unlawful. 
 
 " Agreement," in sect. 3, includes the rules of the union to 
 which members have subscribed, called the " agreement of 
 association," in StricJc^v. Swansea Tin Plate Company, 
 (36 Ch. D. 558, in 1887). This follows from that case where 
 one such rule was : " That any person being a member 
 of the said association who shall not act upon and keep 
 all the rules of the said association shall thereupon cease to 
 be a member thereof, and shall forfeit all moneys paid into 
 the said association, and shall under no circumstances or con- 
 ditions be entitled to any repayment or to any compensation 
 
58 THE TKADE UNION ACTS, 1871 & 1876. 
 
 S. 4. or allowance in respect of his being a member of the said 
 ~ association, or in respect of any claim which he may then 
 have against the funds of the said association." Under 
 this rule, for the breach of certain rules, admitted to be 
 in restraint of trade, some members were expelled, but, 
 on the winding up of the union, claimed to be entitled 
 to share in the trust funds. It was held that they were 
 properly excluded. North, J., pointed out that no illegality 
 was shown in the rules beyond their being hi restraint of trade. 
 
 The agreement in question came within sect. 4 (ibid., 
 p. 561), and the learned Judge seems to have thought that 
 if the objection, that the court could not entertain the pro- 
 ceedings, had been taken at the proper time, in this case it 
 might have been successful. The proper time would seem 
 to have been on the hearing of the summons which directed 
 an enquiry by the chief clerk who were entitled to the funds. 
 (Cf. In re Padstow, rfc., 20 Ch. D. 137.) 
 
 " Penalty." In Urmston v. Wliitclegg, in 1890 (55 J. P. 
 453 ; 63 L. T. N. S. 455), the members of an associa- 
 tion agreed not to sell mineral waters at less than a 
 particular price for ten years, and to pay a penalty of 
 ten pounds for each breach of this agreement ; there was 
 no restriction as to area. The treasurer sued an offending 
 member for the penalty, but a Divisional Court (Day and 
 Lawrance, JJ.) and the Court of Appeal (Esher, M. K., 
 Bowen and Fry, L. JJ.) held that the agreement was in 
 restraint of trade as being unreasonable both as to time 
 and area. 
 
 This section does not seem to have been mentioned to 
 either court, nor indeed does this Act at all. Yet the 
 association is well within the definition (see p. Ill), and the 
 words here seem conclusive. 
 
 "Any agreement for the application of the funds of 
 a trade union 
 
 (a.) " To provide benefits to members." 
 
 In two Scotch cases in 1874 (M'Kernan v. United 
 Operative Masons' Association, 1 K., 4th series, 453, and 
 
THE TEADE UNION ACT, 1871. 59 
 
 Shanks v. the Same, Ibid., p. 823), the Court of Session was S. 4. 
 unanimous that these words prevented the court entertaining 
 an action against a trade union for compensation for an 
 accident to an eye. 
 
 In another Scotch case, Amalgamated Society of Railway 
 Servants for Scotland v. The Motherwell Branch of the 
 Society, in 1880 (7 R. 869), the Court of Session (Lords 
 Ormidale, Gifford, and Young) held that there was nothing 
 in this section to prevent an interdict (or injunction) at the 
 instance of the general trustees against the trustees of 
 a branch applying funds for purposes alleged to be other 
 than those specified in the rules, and they granted one 
 accordingly, " until the rights of the parties should be 
 ascertained." All their lordships said that their object was 
 merely to preserve the status quo. "The terms of the 
 interdict," said Lord Gifford, " must be carefully limited, 
 otherwise the funds might be locked up indefinitely or 
 permanently." 
 
 But, shortly afterwards, in a very similar case (Duke v. 
 Littleboy (49 L. J. Ch. 802), Denman, J., came to a contrary 
 conclusion. 
 
 There the plaintiffs, the executive of a central trade union, 
 sought an injunction against the officers and trustees of a 
 branch " to restrain them from dividing funds belonging to 
 the central society and under their control among the 
 members of the branch, or dealing with them contrary to 
 the rules of the society without the consent of the execu- 
 tive," &c. They also asked for payment to the executive of 
 so much of the funds of the branch as were not required for 
 current expenses. The learned Judge refused all relief, 
 holding that the case was within Higby v. Connol (see p. 53). 
 The suggestion that it was not a legal proceeding instituted 
 with the object of directly enforcing an agreement, but was 
 for an injunction, intended to stop, there at present, to 
 prevent trustees doing what they pleased with or returning 
 to members money in their hands, appeared to him " too 
 great a refinement when you look at the true object and at 
 
60 THE TRADE UNION ACTS, 1871 & 1876. 
 
 S. 4. the words of the Act, ' legal proceedings,' which are very 
 elastic. Is not this a proceeding instituted with the object 
 of directly enforcing an agreement for the application of the 
 funds of a trade union to provide benefits for members ? 
 What other object has it ? It is undoubtedly intended to be 
 followed with something further ; it would be useless if it 
 were limited merely to keeping the funds locked up " which 
 is exactly what the Scotch Judges did for a time. The learned 
 Judge added, " This is to prevent funds from being dealt 
 with in any other manner except according to the rules, and 
 I think it would be frittering away the meaning of this clause 
 if I were to put any other construction upon it than that this 
 is a proceeding to directly enforce an agreement, &c." 
 
 It is submitted that the order of the Scotch court was the 
 right one. There is nothing in the statute to prevent the 
 Court preserving the status quo, to use their phrase, though 
 it may well be that the "something further" to which 
 Denman, J., alluded, could only take the shape of a legal 
 process prohibited by this section. The Scotch court certainly 
 did not think that an interim injunction, locking up the 
 funds, would be useless, and they perhaps knew that practi- 
 cally such an interdict would settle the dispute. (Lord Young 
 expressly says, "For my own part I would like to advise 
 these parties to agree to divide the money between them so 
 long as there is any left to divide.") And their decree, merely 
 until the rights of the parties should be determined, seems to 
 imply that there was a fit procedure for such determination. 
 And even if there is not, possibly, the policy* of the legis- 
 lature in denying certain ordinary legal remedies to trade 
 unionists in certain cases, and so forcing members inter se to 
 amicable settlement of their disputes, is exemplified here. 
 
 It is respectfully submitted that the learned Judge did not 
 give sufficient weight to the word "directly" above. This 
 seems to be borne out by some words in the judgment of 
 
 * As to which, Lord Benholme. a Scotch Judge, said he could not 
 see it (in M'Kcrnan v. Un'iti'd ()/>er/tfh^ J///.VH//A-' J.v.xor/W /<>//, in 
 1 11., 4th ser., p. 4.~>3, where the judgments contain some criticisms 
 on this section generally). 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACT, 1871. 61 
 
 Fry, J., in Wolfv. Mathews, in 1882 (21 Ch. D. 194), as the S. 4. 
 contention here made is by that case : " An order that the ~ 
 defendants should pay money to the plaintiff's would be a 
 direct enforcement of an agreement for the application of 
 the funds, but all that is sought here is to prevent the pay- 
 ment of the moneys to somebody else. Either that is no 
 enforcement of an agreement at all, or it is an indirect 
 enforcement." Here the plaintiffs, members of a trade 
 union, sought to prevent other members paying away the 
 funds to a body with which it was alleged that the union had 
 duly amalgamated (under sect. 12 of the Act of 1876), against 
 the wishes of the plaintiff's. Fry, J., overruled the objection 
 that this section prevented the plaintiffs bringing the action, 
 holding that Rigby v. Cormol did not apply. But he added, 
 " it will remain to be seen whether the terms of the Act will 
 eventually permit any relief to be given by the court to the 
 plaintiffs," a very different matter. And it seems that they 
 will not. Neither Duke v. Littleboy nor the Scotch case 
 was mentioned to the Court. 
 
 But this section does prevent a declaration that a plaintiff 
 is entitled to participate in the property of a union, where 
 the rules contain an agreement to provide benefits for 
 members, for such a declaration would be a direct enforce- 
 ment of such an agreement (Rigby v. Connol, 14 Ch. D. 482, 
 in 1880). In this case the plaintiff had been expelled from 
 a union on the ground that he had put his son in a " foul 
 shop," and had refused to remove him or pay a fine under a 
 rule of the union. Jessel, M. B., refused to restrain the 
 committee and trustees from expelling him, or to make the 
 declaration prayed for. 
 
 In a somewhat similar case in Scotland, in 1885, Aiiken v. 
 Associated Carpenters and Joiners (12 R., 4th ser., 1206), a 
 similar conclusion was unanimously arrived at by the Court 
 of Session, which held that the two (Scotch) cases cited above 
 (p. 58) governed this. Here the member had been expelled for 
 not apologising to the society. The Lord President said: "In 
 regard to the claim for damages I think that that also falls 
 
62 THE TRADE UNION ACTS, 1871 & 1876. 
 
 S. 4. within the operation of" this section. "The pursuer has 
 ~~ been deprived of his chance of participating in the funds 
 of the society, and he proposes to enforce his right to do 
 so by means of a claim of damages." 
 
 Rigby v. Connol was followed by the Court of Appeal 
 (Alverstone, M. R., Rigby and Collins, L. JJ.) in Chamber- 
 lain's Wharf, Limited v. Smith (1900, 2 Ch. 605 ; 69 L. J. Ch. 
 783), where the defendants were members of the committee 
 of an association called the Tea Clearing House (which, by 
 its rules, imposed restrictive conditions on the conduct of 
 the trade of its members). The court, on a consideration of 
 its rules, held that it was a trade union within the Acts, and, 
 therefore, there was no jurisdiction to restrain the committee 
 from expelling a member, as to do. so would be to " directly 
 enforce" an agreement (within sect. 4 of the Act of 1871). 
 " Swaine v. Wilson" (see p. 63) . said Lord Alverstone, 
 " certainly does not purport to decide anything contrary to 
 Rigby v. Connol." 
 
 In an Irish case, in 1877, a member of a union obtained a 
 magistrate's order on summons for the payment to him of 
 a sum as benefit money under the rules. The trustees 
 obtained a conditional order for a certiorari to remove the 
 magistrate's order into the Queen's Bench to have it quashed 
 on the grounds that such an order was within this sub-section, 
 and that the member had not complied with an essential rule, 
 and it was quashed (The Operative Carpenters and Joiners 
 v. O'Donnell, R. M., and Todd, 11 Irish Law Times, 282). 
 
 An order obtained by guardians of the poor against a 
 union for the payment of a sum for the maintenance of a 
 pauper, a member of the union who, at his death, had been 
 for some time entitled to an allowance from its funds, was 
 held to be an attempt to directly enforce such an agree- 
 ment, and was quashed (Winder v. Governors, dc., of the 
 Kingston-upon-Hull Corporation, 20 Q. B. D. 412, in 1888). 
 " Practically," said Mathew, J., " the guardians were suing in 
 the name of the pauper. If this were possible, it would 
 follow that the statute could always be defeated by the 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACT, 1871. 63 
 
 assignment of a claim against a trade union ;" and A. L. S. 4. 
 Smith, J., agreed with him. 
 
 " To provide benefits to members." As this object of 
 providing benefits is common to many trade unions and 
 friendly societies, it is sometimes doubtful whether a given 
 body is one or the other, or both. In this connection 
 Sivaine v. Wilson (24 Q. B. D. 252), in 1889, is a very 
 important case. The defendants were the officials of an 
 organisation calling itself a friendly society, but not registered 
 as such. The plaintiff claimed a sum of money under the 
 rules, as being disabled by blindness, " and the only defence 
 set up was that the plaintiffs claim could not be maintained 
 because the society was an illegal society, on the ground 
 that its objects, as set forth in certain of the rules, were in 
 restraint of trade." Dennian, J., overruled this defence and 
 found for the plaintiff, and the Court of Appeal (Esher, M. R., 
 Lindley and Lopes, L. JJ.) upheld this judgment. " The first 
 point," said Lindley, L. J., " is as to the bearing of the Trade 
 Union Acts on societies of this kind. The result of the 
 provisions of these Acts is by no means obvious at first 
 sight. . . . The practical results of these enactments when 
 applied to this particular society are as follows : 1. The 
 society is a trade union within the definition clause [see 
 p. Ill] . It is legal by virtue of sect. 3." But the Lord 
 Justice held that this action came wifchin sect. 4, and " there- 
 fore cannot be maintained unless it can be maintained 
 independently of that section; but," he went on, " although 
 the plaintiff cannot avail himself of sect. 3 of the Act of 1871, 
 he will be entitled to relief if the society is a legal society 
 apart from that section. Is, then, the society a legal 
 society? Illegality is not to be presumed; it must be 
 established by those who rely upon it. The defendants rely 
 on certain rules of this society, and contend (1) that they are 
 illegal, being in restraint of trade ; and (2) that, being illegal, 
 the society itself is an illegal society, and cannot therefore be 
 sued by one of its own members for money payable to him 
 under its rules. Before dealing with this argument it is to 
 
64 THE TKADE UNION ACTS, 1871 & 1876. 
 
 S. 4. be observed that the particular rule sought to be enforced is 
 ~~ not even alleged to be illegal, and that the illegality relied 
 upon is the illegality of other rules and of the objects of the 
 society. . . . Before examining" the rules alleged by the 
 defence to be illegal " in detail, it is desirable to ascertain 
 the principles which render rules illegal simply by reason of 
 their being in restraint of trade. The general proposition 
 that every society which has rules in restraint of trade is 
 unlawful, i.e. criminal, and that its members are punishable 
 at common law, was denied by the Court in Reg. v. Stainer 
 (L. E. 1 C. C. B. 230), and cannot be supported. See also 
 Hilton v. Eckersley (6 Q. 13. 47, p. 58) ; Hornby v. Close 
 (L. E. 2 Q. B. 153) ; per Patteson, J., in Price v. Green (16 
 M. & W. 346, at p. 353). Such societies are not necessarily 
 indictable as nuisances or as conspiracies, and their rules, 
 although in restraint of trade, are not necessarily unlawful in 
 any criminal sense. Whether such rules can be enforced by 
 civil legal proceedings is quite another matter, and depends 
 mainly on the reasonableness of the rules. But even if some 
 rules of a society cannot be enforced it by no means follows 
 that other rules of the same society cannot. Collins v 
 Locke (4 App. Cas. 674) is a clear authority to this effect, if 
 authority be wanted for so reasonable a proposition. 
 
 No doubt if the real object of this society were unduly to 
 fetter trade its rules might all be tainted by the vice of the 
 object, and none of the rules might be enforceable. See 
 Hornby v. Close and Farrer v. Close (L. E. 4 Q. B. 602). 
 . . . If the objects of the society are themselves legal, the 
 introduction of some objectionable rules will at most have 
 the effect of rendering those particular rules invalid. The 
 other rules will not be affected by them (Collins v. Locke)." 
 
 Thus that peculiar antipathy to trade unions, which was 
 a tradition of the law, has dwindled to the well-regulated 
 sentiment expressed in italics. 
 
 It may be added that the learned Judge went seriatim 
 through the rules alleged to be illegal, and held that they 
 were valid. " There is no evidence here," he said, " that the 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACT, 1871. 65 
 
 rules are in fact used for the purpose of supporting strikes or S. 4. 
 for any illegal purpose. . . . The test of validity in a case like ~~ '~~ 
 
 this is reasonableness with reference to the real and legitimate 
 objects of this society : Collins v. Locke. One of the main 
 objects of this society is to provide a fund for the payment 
 of members when out of work. Rules made for the bond fide 
 purpose of protecting the funds of the society from claims 
 which can be avoided by reasonable care and management 
 will not be invalid on the ground that they are in restraint 
 of trade, provided the rules are not unduly oppressive or 
 obviously detrimental to the public. To render rules for the 
 above purposes invalid it must be clearly shown that they go 
 beyond what is necessary for those purposes : see Tallis v. 
 Tallis " (1 E. & B. 391). Cf. the judgments in Reg. v. Stain&r 
 and-R^. v. Tankard, pp. 116, 117. 
 
 It is extraordinary that the case of Swaine v. Wilson was 
 not cited to the Divisional Court hi Old v. Robson (59 L. J. 
 M. C. 41 ; 54 J. P. 597), in 1890; and it is submitted that this 
 omission seriously impairs the value of the judgment therein. 
 The question in effect was whether an amalgamated society 
 of carpenters and joiners was a trade union or a friendly 
 society. It was registered under the Trade Union Act of 
 1871, and a member summoned the secretary under sect. 22 
 of the Friendly Societies Act, 1875, for non-payment of " sick 
 pay." The magistrates made an order, but the court 
 (Pollock, B., and Wills, J.) were clear that this was wrong. 
 " Here," said the former, " we have a society the objects of 
 which, before the Act of 1871, would have been clearly illegal, 
 as being in restraint of trade. ... A person joining the 
 society may be expelled if he refuses to work according to 
 the rules laid down, although he merely joined the society as 
 a benefit member. At common law these rules would be 
 illegal, and clearly could not be enforced in any of the 
 courts of this country. ... In the present case, this society 
 would be altogether illegal were it not for the Act of 1871. 
 ... I am, therefore, of opinion that none of the rules of 
 this society can be enforced." " In the first instance," said 
 
 T.U.A, 5 
 
66 
 
 THE TRADE UNION ACTS, 1871 & 1876. 
 
 Provisions 
 of 18-9 V. 03, 
 80-1 V. 117, 
 25-6 V. 89, 
 &c., not to 
 apply to 
 trade 
 unions. 
 
 Ss. 4, 5. Wills, J., " I had certainly some difficulty in finding out what 
 ~ it was the appellant relied x>n, for many of ,the rules were 
 clearly for the benefit of members ; but it ultimately appeared 
 equally clearly that many other of the rules were in restraint 
 of trade, and that the society was in fact for the purposes 
 of restraint of trade. . . . Now, in the case of the society 
 before us, it is extremely improbable that a member could 
 get any benefit from it under the rules which are directed 
 towards the benefit of members, unless he at the same time 
 complied with the regulations relating to trade unions and in 
 restraint of trade." 
 
 For the effect of sect. 10 of the Act of 1876 on this section, 
 see p. 107. 
 
 5. The following Acts, that is to say, 
 
 (1.) The Friendly Societies Acts, 1855 and 1858, 
 and the Acts amending the same ; 
 
 (2.) The Industrial and Provident Societies Act, 
 1867, and any Act amending the same ; and 
 
 (3.) The Companies Acts, 1862 and 1867, 
 shall not apply to any trade union, and the regis- 
 tration of any trade union under any of the said 
 Acts shall be void, and the deposit of the rules 
 of any trade union made under the Friendly 
 Societies Acts, 1855 and 1858, andjhe Acts amend- 
 ing the same, before the passing of this Act, shall 
 cease to be of any effect. 
 
 In Mineral Water, <&c., Protection Society v. Booth, it 
 was pleaded as a defence that the registration of the plaintiff 
 society under the Companies Acts was void, but the point 
 does not seem to have been followed up. See p. 112. 
 
 Sect. 2 of the Act of 1876 runs: " Notwithstanding anything 
 in sect. 5 of the principal Act contained, a trade union, whether 
 registered or unregistered, which insures or pays money on 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACT, 1871. 67 
 
 the death of a child under ten years of age shall be deemed S, 5, 
 to be within the provisions of sect. 28 of the Friendly ~ 
 Societies Act, 1875." See p. 102. That Act (38-9 V. 60) was 
 partly repealed by 59-60 V. 25, 107, and the rest by 59-60 V. 26, 
 18, so that it has been totally repealed ; repealed sect. 28 was 
 reproduced (to some extent verbatim, but with some modifica- 
 tions) in the Friendly Societies Act, 1896 (59-60 V. 25, 6267 
 and 84 (f), (g)), and the Collecting Societies and Industrial 
 Assurance Companies Act, 1896 (59-60 V. 26, 13) ; hence, by 
 virtue of the Interpretation Act of 1889, we must read for 
 sect. 28 (above) these sections of the Acts of 1896, viz. : 
 
 FRIENDLY SOCIETIES ACT, 1896. 
 Payments on Death of Children. 
 G2. A society or branch, whether registered or unregis- Limitation 
 
 ,,,,.. , , , ,, , ., , of amount 
 
 tered, shall not insure or pay on the death of a child payable. 
 under five years of age any sum of money which, added 
 to any amount payable on the death of that child by any 
 other society or branch, exceeds six pounds, or on the 
 death of a child under ten years of age any sum of money 
 which, added to any amount payable on the death of that 
 child by any other society or branch, exceeds ten pounds. 
 
 63. A society or branch, whether registered or unregis- Person to 
 tered, shall not pay any sum on the death of a child meiTinay" 
 under ten years of age except to the parent of the child, 
 or to the personal representative of the parent, and upon 
 the production by the parent or his personal representative 
 of a certificate of death issued by the registrar of deaths, 
 or other person having the care of the register of deaths, 
 containing the particulars mentioned in this Act. 
 
 64. (1.) Where application is made for a certificate Particulars 
 of the death of a child for the purpose of obtaining a ncates!" 
 sum of money from a society or branch, the name of the 
 society or branch, and the sum sought to be obtained 
 therefrom shall be stated to the registrar of deaths. 
 
 52 
 
68 THE TRADE UNION ACTS, 1871 & 1876. 
 
 s. 5. (2.) The registrar of deaths shall write on or at the 
 
 ~ foot of the certificate the words " to be produced to the 
 
 society or branch (naming the same) 
 
 said to be liable for payment of the sum of 7. 
 
 (stating the same)." 
 
 (3.) All certificates of the same death shall be numbered 
 in consecutive order. 
 
 whTcVcerti ^* ^') ^ re S^ strar f deaths shall not give any one 
 licatesmay or more certificates of death for the payment in the 
 
 be given. , . 
 
 whole of any sum of money exceeding six pounds on the 
 death of a child under five years, or for the payment in 
 the whole of a sum exceeding ten pounds on the death of 
 a child under ten years. 
 
 (2.) A registrar of deaths shall not grant any such 
 certificate unless the cause of death has been previously 
 entered in the register of deaths on the certificate of 
 a coroner, or of a registered medical practitioner who 
 attended the deceased child during its last illness, or 
 except upon the production of a certificate of the probable 
 cause of death under the hand of a registered medical 
 practitioner, or of other satisfactory evidence thereof. 
 inquiries by 66. A society or branch, whether registered or unregis- 
 tered, to which is produced a certificate of the death of a 
 child which does not purport to be the first shall, before 
 paying any money thereon, inquire whether any and 
 what sums of money have been paid on the same death by 
 any other society or branch. 
 
 saving as to 67. Nothing in this Act respecting payments on the 
 interests, death of children shall apply to insurances on the lives 
 of children of any age, where the person insuring has an 
 interest in the life of the person insured. 
 
 84. It shall be an offence under this Act if (f.) a 
 
THE TEADE UNION ACT, 1871. 69 
 
 society or branch whether registered or unregistered pays s. 5. 
 
 money on the death of a child under ten years of age . 
 
 otherwise than is provided by this Act : or 
 
 (g.) a parent or personal representative of a parent 
 claiming money on the death of a child produces a 
 certificate of the death other than is in this Act 
 provided to the society or branch from which the 
 money is claimed, or produces a false certificate, or 
 one fraudulently obtained, or in any way attempts 
 to defeat the provisions of this Act with respect to 
 payments upon the death of children. 
 
 COLLECTING SOCIETIES ACT, 1896. 
 
 13. (1.) The provisions of sections sixty-two to 
 sixty-seven and section eighty-four of the Friendly lives by 
 
 & J ,11 industrial 
 
 Societies Act, 1896, relating to payments on the death assurance 
 of children, shall extend to industrial assurance com- 
 panies, as if the word society where used in those 
 sections included all industrial companies assuring the 
 payment of money on the death of children under the 
 age of ten years. 
 
 (2.) An assurance made, or to be made by an indus- 
 trial assurance company, of a sum of money payable on 
 the death of a child under the age of ten years, which 
 would be valid if effected with a registered society, shall 
 not be invalidated by reason of any provision contained 
 in the Life Assurance Act, 1774. 
 
 (3.) The provisions of this section shall extend to 
 industrial assurance companies which do not receive 
 premiums by means of collectors at a greater distance 
 than ten miles from their principal place of business, 
 and to assurances with any such company the premiums 
 
70 THE TRADE UNION ACTS, 1871 & 1876. 
 
 Ss. 5, 6. in respect of which are receivable at greater periodical 
 ~ intervals than two months. 
 
 (On these sects, see Baden Fuller on F riendly Societies, 
 2nd ed., pp. 8486, 120, and 154.) 
 
 Registered Trade Unions. 
 Registry of 6. Any seven or more members of a trade union 
 
 trade 
 
 unions. ma y by subscribing their names to the rules of the 
 union, and otherwise complying with the provisions 
 of this Act with respect to registry, register such 
 trade union under this Act, provided that if any 
 one of the purposes of such trade union be unlawful 
 such registration shall be void. 
 
 " Rules." See the Schedules, p. 100. 
 
 " Such registration shall be void." 
 
 Does this mean the Kegistrar shall refuse to register any 
 such union ? Probably it does. It is true that the Registrar 
 is thus made the judge of what purposes are unlawful, but, 
 however sect. 2 is construed, the chief part of the judicial 
 burden is taken off his shoulders, for the purposes most likely 
 to be (and which formerly were most frequently) unlawful 
 are those in restraint of trade, and these, by virtue of that 
 section, have ceased to be criminally, and perhaps civilly, 
 illegal ; in any case, we have seen (p. 56) that civil liability on 
 this head need not be practically considered. 
 
 As to other purposes, unless they were manifestly and 
 patently unlawful, a Registrar would be ill advised who refused 
 his assistance, for instance, if he thought that some of the 
 objects of the union exposed members to an action for con- 
 spiracy. See p. 56. The doubt as to the Registrar's power 
 seems to be removed by sect. 8 of the Act of 1876 (which is 
 to be read with this Act, p. 101), as the right to withdraw or 
 cancel the certificate of registration seems to imply that of 
 refusal. 
 
 The refusal of a Registrar to register could be challenged 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACT, 1871. 7 
 
 by a rule nisi for a mandamus, and the question of lawfulness Ss. 6, 7, 
 would thus be tried by a court. 
 
 N.B. Eegistration of trade unions is not compulsory. 
 Who is to register ? See s. 17. 
 
 Where two trade unions, originally one, applied to be 
 registered by the name of the union of which, before a seces- 
 sion, the members of both had all been members, the 
 Kegistrar, after hearing evidence from both parties, refused 
 to register either in that name. The Court (Blackburn, 
 Mellor, and Lush, JJ.) held that he was right, and that apart 
 from the Secretary of State's regulations (see sect. 13 (6)), and 
 refused a mandamus to compel him to register either body. 
 (The Queen v. The Registrar of Friendly Societies, L. R. 
 7 Q. B. 741 in 1872.) It is clear from 39-40 V. 22, 8, that 
 registration, at first good, may become void. See p. 105. 
 
 7. It shall be lawful for any trade union regis- Buildings 
 
 for trade 
 
 tered under this Act to purchase or take upon * 
 lease in the names of the trustees for the time 
 being of such union any land not exceeding one 
 acre, and to sell, exchange, mortgage, or let the 
 same, and no purchaser, assignee, mortgagee, or 
 tenant shall be bound to inquire whether the 
 trustees have authority for any sale, exchange, 
 mortgage, or letting, and the receipt of the trustees 
 shall be a discharge for the money arising therefrom ; 
 and for the purpose of this section every branch of 
 a trade union shall bo considered a distinct union. 
 
 " Purchase " here = " buy for money" in the popular 
 sense ; it is not used in the legal sense of the word. (In re Amos, 
 Carrier v. Price, (1891) 3 Ch.159 ; 65 L. T.69 ; 39 W. E. 550.) 
 
 This case is a warning to persons who desire to leave land 
 or money to trade unions. The facts appear sufficiently 
 from the judgment of North, J., from which the following are 
 xtracts : 
 
72 THE TBADE UNION ACTS, 1871 & 1876. 
 
 8. 7. " By his will the testator appointed two persons to be his 
 
 ~~ executors. . . . Then conies this gift: 'I give, devise, and 
 bequeath unto Thomas Price the property known as 27, Bath 
 Terrace, the conditions to be as follows : that the property 
 be left to him for his life and for the life of his heir, after 
 which it becomes the property of the Boiler Makers' and 
 Iron Shipbuilders' Society.' Then two other houses are 
 given to two other persons in substantially identical words. 
 . . . The conditions in each case are exactly the same as 
 those which I have read. . . . The will goes on, 'And 
 that the further sum of 3 6s. Sd. each per annum be paid by 
 them to be disposed of as follows : viz., 5 per annum to the 
 Boiler Makers' Benevolent Fund, and 5 per annum to the 
 executors. Should either of the parties refuse or fail to com- 
 ply with the foregoing conditions they shall forfeit all rights 
 to the property, and the executors shall cause the same to be 
 handed over to the Boiler Makers' Society forthwith.' So 
 that the limitation of each house is complete in itself, to the 
 devisee, for the lives of himself and his heir, after which the 
 house becomes the property of the society. The society, 
 therefore, take in remainder after the estate given by the 
 previous words. The effect of the final clause is that the 
 interim estate having come to an end, the remainder to the 
 Boiler Makers' Society is accelerated. . . . There are two 
 bodies mentioned, the Boiler Makers' Society, and the 
 Boiler Makers' Benevolent Fund. I think it is clear from the 
 rules of the society that the Boiler Makers' Benevolent Fund 
 merely means a fund administered by the Boiler Makers' 
 Society, under Rule 89. Under the rules a certain sum is 
 appropriated as a benevolent fund, and it is to be applied 
 under the control of the executive council, and the meaning 
 of this bequest, as I read it, is to add 5 per annum to that 
 fund, so that there will be so much more at the disposal of 
 the persons who administer it. In my opinion, it is a gift to 
 the Boiler Makers' Society, for the purposes of the benevolent 
 fund which they have to administer. 
 
 " Then, construing the ultimate gift first, what is meant 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACT, 1871. 73 
 
 by the property being ' handed over to the Boiler Makers' S. 7. 
 Society ' ? That society is a trade union registered under ~ 
 the Act of 1871, but it is not a corporation.* It is a body 
 which exists for certain purposes contemplated by the Act, 
 but for no others. In my opinion the devise and bequest in 
 remainder to the Boiler Makers' Society cannot have any 
 effect at all. In the first place, and independently of the Act, 
 what is the meaning of it? It is, beyond question, in my 
 opinion a perpetuity or a gift tending to a perpetuity. It is 
 not intended for the benefit of the particular individuals con- 
 stituting the society at the time. It was suggested in argu- 
 ment that the gift might have the effect of vesting the 
 property in all the existing members as joint tenants or 
 tenants in common. But, in my opinion, that is not the 
 effect of the gift. Such a construction would be entirely 
 contrary to the testator's intention, because, instead of the 
 property being administered by the executive body of the 
 Boiler Makers' Society for the purposes of the society, it 
 would belong to a number of individuals as their common 
 property, so that any one of them might at any moment 
 commence an action for partition or sale, thus taking the 
 control away from the society altogether, and simply 
 dividing the property among themselves for their own 
 benefit. That was not the intention of the testator. The 
 only alternative construction is, that it is a gift to the society 
 for the purposes of the society. Beyond all question that is 
 a perpetuity. Came v. Long (2 D. F. & J. 75), and the 
 observations of Vice-Chancellor Hall in In re Clark's Trusts 
 (1 Ch. D. 497), are conclusive on the point. 
 
 " There is this further difficulty. I do not see how this 
 body are capable of taking land at all, whether in perpetuity 
 or otherwise. It is said that, assuming this to be so but for 
 the Act of 1871, that Act authorizes the society to acquire 
 land and to hold it. The latter part of sect. 7 which autho- 
 rizes the dealing with such land, applies to land which has 
 been properly acquired, but it does not throw any light on 
 * Cf. pp. 824. 
 
74 THE TBADE UNION ACTS, 1871 & 1876. 
 
 S. 7. the earlier part of the section. It is argued that the society 
 ~ can take these three houses in remainder under the will 
 because it is lawful for them ' to purchase ' land, and it is 
 said that ' purchase ' means ' acquire otherwise than by descent 
 or escheat " ; and, therefore, a devise or bequest of property 
 confers on the person to whom it is made an interest by 
 purchase. In my opinion, that is not the meaning of the 
 word " purchase " as used in this section. No doubt the 
 word is sometimes used by lawyers in that sense, but that is 
 not its natural ordinary meaning. So to construe the word 
 in this section would strain the language very much. It is 
 to be lawful for the society ' to purchase or take upon lease.' 
 If ' purchase ' meant ' acquire otherwise than by descent 
 or escheat,' taking on lease would be a * purchase.' The 
 words ' take upon lease ' would be tautologous ; they 
 would suggest as an alternative that which is really com- 
 prised in the previous word. ' Purchase ' and * take on 
 lease ' are put in contrast with one another, ' purchase ' 
 referring (I do not say necessarily) to a purchase out and out 
 on payment of a sum of money down, as distinguished from 
 a tenancy at a yearly rent. I do not say that * purchase ' 
 means nothing else ; I think it would be satisfied by their 
 buying up an existing lease. But, in my opinion, by * pur- 
 chase or take on lease ' is meant the acquiring by the payment 
 of money of property which they may acquire either by 
 purchase out and out, or, if they please, by taking lease of it. 
 " The subsequent words of the section are not immaterial. 
 That which is contemplated is a purchase in the names of 
 the trustees for the time being. How a devise to the society 
 could be a purchase in the names of the trustees for the time 
 being I fail to understand. Then the section goes on to 
 limit the quantity of land to be taken ' purchase any land 
 not exceeding an acre in quantity.' That points to the 
 acquisition of land for purposes connected with the adminis- 
 tration of the business of the society, probably for an office. 
 I do not say it is confined to that; there might be other 
 purposes for which it would be desirable to acquire land ; 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACT, 1871. 75 
 
 but that is the kind of thing for which it is considered that Ss. 7, 8. 
 the acquisition of land may be desirable. In my opinion, the 
 section has nothing to do with the acquisition of land as forming 
 part of the substratum of the society itself, and it does not 
 authorise this society to take land by devise under the terms 
 of this will. Consequently, the devise to the society is void. 
 
 " As to the bequest of .5 a year to the Boiler Makers' 
 Benevolent Fund, I cannot distinguish it from the gift in 
 remainder to the Boiler Makers' Society. The bequest of 
 5 a year was, in my opinion, a gift to the society for the 
 purposes of their Benevolent Fund by way of anticipation of 
 that which they would get when the life interests came to 
 an end, and, in my opinion, it is a gift connected with the 
 land. It is made payable by the person who has the land, 
 and, in my opinion, it is open to objection on many grounds, 
 one of which is that it is contrary to the Statute of Mortmain." 
 
 The annual payment to the Benevolent Fund was held void. 
 
 Thus, the devises to the society of the leasehold and free- 
 hold properties were void as tending to perpetuities ; and the 
 gift to the fund was void as being a charge connected with 
 land, and, the nature of the fund being charitable, it offended 
 against the Statutes of Mortmain. Further, it was held that 
 a trade union is incapable of taking land at all. 
 
 But note that the bequest to the fund would now be 
 good by virtue of 54-5 V. 73, 3 (The Mortmain and 
 Charitable Uses Act, 1891). 
 
 8. All real and personal estate whatsoever belong- Property of 
 ing to any trade union registered under this Act nins 
 
 vested in 
 
 shall be vested in the trustees for the time being of trustees. 
 a trade union appointed as provided by this Act 
 for the use and benefit of such trade union and the 
 members thereof, and the real or personal estate of 
 any branch of a trade union shall be vested in the 
 trustees of such branch, and be under the control 
 
76 THE TRADE UNION ACTS, 1871 & 1876. 
 
 St 8t of such trustees, their respective executors or ad- 
 ministrators, according to their respective claims 
 and interests, and upon the death or removal of any 
 such trustees the same shall vest in the succeeding 
 trustees for the same estate and interest as the 
 former trustees had therein, and subject to the same 
 trusts, without any conveyance or assignment what- 
 soever, save and except in the case of stocks and 
 securities in the public funds of Great Britain and 
 Ireland, which shall be transferred into the names 
 of such new trustees ; and in all actions or suits, or 
 indictments, or summary proceedings before any 
 court of summary jurisdiction, touching or concern- 
 ing any such property, the same shall be stated to 
 be the property of the person or persons for the time 
 being holding the said office of trustee, in their 
 proper names, as trustees of such trade union, 
 without any further description. 
 
 After the words " trustees of such branch," add : " or of 
 the trustees of the trade union, if the rules of the trade union 
 so provide." 39-40 V. 22, 3. See p. 102. 
 
 With this section compare sect. 4 of the Act of 1876. Sec 
 p. 102. 
 
 " Removal of any such trustees." " A trustee," says 
 Mr. Underbill (On Trusts, 4th edition, p. 475), "may be 
 removed from his office: 
 
 o. Under an express power. 
 
 . Under the statutory power contained in the Trustee 
 Act, 1893. 
 
 7. By the Court (under sect. 25 of the Trustee Act, 
 1893) at the instance of any of the beneficiaries, where he 
 has behaved improperly (Millard v. Eyre, 2 V. 94, Palairet 
 
In Linaker v. Pilcher and Others (17 T. L. E. 256) three 
 of the defendants, against whom a jury had awarded damages 
 for libel, were the trustees of the Amalgamated Society of 
 Eailway Servants and proprietors of the Railway Review in 
 which the libel appeared. The newspaper was the property 
 of the union, and the three trustees were its registered 
 proprietors. It was argued on behalf of the defendants that 
 'fproperty" hi sect. 9 of the Act of 1871 f meant specific 
 property e.g., goods or. land," but Mathew J. declined to 
 adopt this 'f extremely narrow construction of the section. 
 " There seemed to be no reason why this disability should be 
 " imposed on the trustees in respect of any but specific pro- 
 " perty," and he was satisfied that there could be no such 
 intention on the part of the Legislature, and he gave judg- 
 ment, with costs, against the defendants, and held that the 
 trustees were entitled to be indemnified out of the funds 
 of the society. The Taff Vale Case (see p. 82), he said, 
 did not affect this. He also decided that it was not ultra 
 vires of this society "to start a newspaper," as its rules 
 and objects included the improvement of the conditions and 
 the protection of the interests of members (see p. 101). 
 Sect. 23 of the Act of 1871 (see p. Ill) and sect. 16 of that 
 of 1876 (see p. 98) did not deprive the society of this right. 
 
 February, 1901. 
 
 T.U.A. \Tofacep.ll. 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACT, 1871. 77 
 
 v. Carew, 32 B. 567), or is incapable of acting properly Ss. 8, 9, 
 (Buchanan v. Hamilton, 5 V. 722 ; and Be Lemann, 22 C. D. ~~ 
 633 ; and Ee Phelps, 31 C. D. 351, where trustees were 
 incapable from old age and infirmity), or is a felon or 
 dishonest misdemeanant, or a recent bankrupt (Ee Adams's 
 Trust, 12 C. D. 634 ; Ee Barker, 1 C. D. 43), or is residing 
 permanently, or for a long or indefinite period, abroad 
 (Buchanan v. Hamilton, supra ; Ee Bignold 7 Ch. App. 
 223 ; and Ee The Moravian Society, 26 B. 101), or cannot 
 be heard of (Ee Harrison, 22 L. J. Ch. 69)." 
 
 9. The trustees of any trade union registered ^^J 8 ^^ 
 under this Act, or any other officer of such trade trustees - 
 union who may be authorised so to do by the rules 
 thereof, are hereby empowered to bring or defend, 
 or cause to be brought or defended, any action^suit, 
 prosecution or complaint_in_any court of law or 
 e*quity touching or concernin^the_j)roperty } right, or 
 claim to ,]oroperty.xijfjhe trade junion ; and shall and 
 may, in all cases concerning the real or personal 
 property of such trade union, sue and be sued, plead 
 and be impleaded, in any court of law or equity, in 
 their proper names, without other description than 
 the title of their office ; and no such action, suit, 
 prosecution, or complaint shall be discontinued or 
 shall abate by the death or removal from office of 
 such persons or any of them, but the same shall 
 and may be proceeded in by their successor or 
 successors as if such death, resignation, or removal 
 had not taken place ; and such successors shall pay 
 or receive the like costs as if the action, suit, pro- 
 secution, or complaint had been commenced in their 
 
78 THE TRADE UNION ACTS, 1871 & 1876. 
 
 s - 9 - names for the benefit of or to be reimbursed from 
 the funds of such trade union, and the summons to 
 be issued to such trustee or other officer may be 
 served by leaving the same at the registered office 
 of the trade union. 
 
 This section says nothing about legal proceedings by or 
 against individual members, as such, of unions, but it maybe 
 mentioned here that it never has been suggested that a union, 
 in furthering the interests of a member (provided, of course, 
 they coincide with the legitimate objects of the society), 
 would render itself liable to an action for " maintenance." 
 For instance, there was no hint of such a possibility in the 
 Scotch case, Gordon v. Pyper, in 1892 (20 R. (H. L.) 28), 
 where the Appeal Committee (Lords Watson, Macnaghten, 
 Field, Morris, and Hannen) granted the appellant's petition 
 to appeal in forma pauperis, although the respondent objected 
 that the appellant was supported in the litigation by the 
 Firemen and Sailors' Union. They distinguished Bowie v. 
 Marquis of Ailsa (L.E. 13 App. Cas. 371). 
 
 "Trustees." The trustees seem to be the only persons who 
 can be sued as representatives of a trade union, unless a judge 
 / orders certain members to defend on behalf of the rest, as 
 was done in Wood v. McCarthy (1893, 1 Q. B. 775) where 
 apparently there were no trustees under Order 16, r. 9 (see 
 below) ; a Divisional @ourt (Wills and Lawrance, JJ.) upheld 
 Bruce, J. 
 
 " Officer." In Temperton v. Eussell (1893, 1 Q. B. 435 ; 9 
 T. L. R. 298, and 304) a very important point of procedure was 
 determined. The writ sued the various officials of the unions 
 " as well on their own behalf as on behalf of and representing 
 all the members of each of the said societies and joint com- 
 mittee to which they respectively belong." It was alleged that 
 such a form was good within the meaning of Order 16, r. 9,which 
 runs (as it did then) : " Where there are numerous persons 
 having the same interest in one cause or matter, one or more 
 
THE TEADE UNION ACT, 1871. 79 
 
 of such persons may sue or be sued, or may be authorised by S. 9. 
 the Court or a Judge to defend in such cause or matter, on 
 behalf or for the benefit of all persons so interested." A 
 Master and a Judge refused to strike the words out, but a 
 Divisional Court (Coleridge, L. C. J., and Hawkins, J.) and the 
 Court of Appeal (Esher, M. E., Lindley and Bowen, L. JJ.) 
 reversed their decision, and held that the writ must be 
 amended by striking out the words indicating that the defen- 
 dants were sued in a representative capacity. " The expres- 
 sion, ' having the same interest in one cause or matter,' only 
 extends, we think," said Lindley, L. J., " to persons who 
 have or claim some beneficial proprietary right which they 
 are asserting or defending in the cause or matter.* . . . 
 The truth is that this is an attempt to stretch the rule to 
 cases to which it is wholly inapplicable, and the attempt is 
 only plausible by reason of the ambiguity of the expression 
 ' same interest.' The case of Springhead Spinning Co. v. 
 Riley (L. E. 6 Eq. 551), relied on by the plaintiff's counsel, 
 is no authority for them. In the first place, the case was 
 overruled by the Court of Appeal in Prudential Assurance 
 Co. v. Knott (L. E. 10 Ch. App. 142), &c." In Springhead 
 Spinning Co., &c. v. Riley, in 1868, the defendants were officers 
 of a trade union, and had given notice to workmen, by means 
 of placards and advertisements, that they were not to hire 
 themselves to the plaintiffs, pending a dispute between the 
 latter and their union. The placard read, " Wanted, all well- 
 wishers to the Operative Cotton Spinners, &c., Association 
 not to trouble or cause any annoyance to the Springhead 
 Spinning Company, Leeds, by knocking at the door of their 
 office until the dispute between them and the self-actor 
 minders is finally, terminated. By special order." The 
 
 * For comment on this judgment see Wood v. McCarthy, (1893) 
 1 Q. B. at 778. For criticism of it see The Duke of Bedford v. 
 Mlis and Others, in the House of Lords (17 T. L. K. at 140 in 
 1900), where inter alia Lord Macnaghten says : " It is rather a 
 pity when a case like Temperton v. Russell finds its way into the 
 reports. The attempt made there to invest the defendants with 
 a representative character was absurd on the face of it." 
 
80 THE TEADE UNION ACTS, 1871 & 1876. 
 
 S. 9. plaintiffs asked for an injunction restraining the issue of the 
 ~ placards, &c., alleging that by means thereof the defendants 
 had, in fact, intimidated and prevented workmen from seeking 
 employment with them, that they were prevented from 
 continuing their business, and that the value of their property 
 was thereby diminished. Vice-Chancellor Malins held that the 
 acts alleged amounted to crime, and that they also tended to 
 destroy or deteriorate property, and, therefore, it was a proper 
 case for the Court to interfere by injunction. The case was 
 overruled in 1875, when Lord Cairns pointed out that the 
 learned Judge who decided it "must be taken to have expressed 
 the same opinion as he expressed in the case of Dixon v. 
 Eolden (L. R. 7 Eq. 488)," as to which case James, L. J., 
 added that he held without doubt that the statement of the 
 law was not correct, remarking that the Vice-Chancellor 
 " was, by his desire to do what was right, led to exaggerate 
 the jurisdiction of this Court in a manner for which there 
 was no authority in any reported case, and no foundation in 
 principle." 
 
 It is surprising that this case was not mentioned to the 
 Court by either side in the case of Trollope and Others v. 
 The London Building Trades Federation and Others in 
 1895 (72 L. T. Rep. 342; 12 T. L. R. 373). According to 
 one headnote, " In consequence of a dispute with reference 
 to an alleged preferential employment of non-union men by 
 a building firm, a trade union published a poster, headed 
 ' Trollope's Black List,' containing the names of non-union 
 men employed by the firm." The employees had been 
 called out by the Federation, but a large number remained. 
 The poster was a large yellow one with a black border, and 
 gave the names and addresses not only of the non-union 
 men but of those who had not come out on strike, and was 
 distributed in the resorts of the workmen. Messrs. Trollope 
 and some of the workmen whose names had been published 
 brought an action against the Federation and certain others, 
 and, before the hearing, moved for an interim injunction to 
 restrain the publication of the black list. A member of the 
 
THE T&ADE tNION ACT, 1871. 81 
 
 firm made an affidavit that that publication injured the S. 9. 
 business of the firm, and did other harm to their interests, 
 and the plaintiff workmen swore in the same way that it . 
 would bring them into odium and contempt with their 
 fellow-workmen, prevent them from obtaining employment, 
 and that its object was to ruin them in their business. 
 Kekewich, J., following the judgments in The Mogul Steam- 
 ship Company v. MacGregor ( 66 L. T. Eep. 8 ; (1892) A. C. 
 51), and Monson v. Tussauds, Limited (70 L. T. Rep. 335 ; 
 (1894) 1 Q. B. 671), granted an interlocutory injunction 
 against the defendants, their officers, agents, and servants, 
 " and the other defendants by name only," and his decision 
 was upheld by the Court of Appeal (Halsbury, L. C., and 
 Lindley, and A. L. Smith, L. JJ.), which practically declined 
 to go into the merits of the case before the trial. 
 
 The trial came on before Hawkins, J., and a special jury in 
 1896, when the plaintiffs claimed damages and an injunction. 
 The defendant Federation did not appear, and the other 
 defendants admitted the publication of the black list, but 
 pleaded that its publication was justified by the law, that 
 every statement in it was true in fact, that it was published 
 without malice, and in the legitimate and bond fide inter- 
 ests of the defendant Federation, of which they were 
 officials. 
 
 The facts were not substantially in dispute, and the jury 
 found that the black list "was not published bond fide for the 
 purpose of protecting the interests of the association, but 
 maliciously to compel Messrs. Trollope to dismiss Eves and 
 Iliff, or others who were under contracts to serve them, 
 that it was published vindictively, that it was calculated to 
 injure, and did injure, Messrs. Trollope and their workmen, 
 that it injured Messrs Trollope financially, but not the 
 workmen " ; and (apparently) they ultimately fixed the 
 damages at ^500. Judgment was given for that amount, 
 and the injunction was made perpetual. 
 
 It will be observed that neither Mr. Justice Kekewich nor 
 Mr. Justice Hawkins felt any difficulty in granting an 
 T.U.A. 6 
 
82 THE TBADE UNION ACTS, 1871 & 1876. 
 
 S. 9. injunction against a trade union as such (as well as against 
 members or officials of one). 
 
 The point seems never to have been discussed till the 
 case of the Taff Vale Eailwdy Company v. Amalgamated 
 Society of Railway Servants and Bell and Holmes (reported 
 in Law Times, September 8th, 1900), when Mr. Justice 
 Farwell went thoroughly into the question in a written judg- 
 ment. The defendant union had taken out a summons to 
 strike out their name as defendants (on a motion for an 
 interim injunction to restrain picketing, &c.), on the ground 
 " that they could not be sued, being neither a corporation 
 nor an individual, and could not be made parties either 
 in that capacity or in any other." The learned Judge dis- 
 missed the summons, and granted an injunction against the 
 union, but the Court of Appeal (A. L. Smith, M. R., Collins 
 and Stirling, L.JJ.) held that the union as such could not 
 be sued, and dissolved the injunction. 
 
 The Master of the Rolls, in delivering the judgment of 
 the Court, said : " The point is important, for if a trade 
 union can be sued in the manner proposed in this case, the 
 funds of the union will be liable to be taken in execution 
 under a judgment obtained against the union in the society's 
 name. . . . The learned Judge, in the early part of his 
 judgment, says that which is undoubtedly the truth, namely, 
 that ' a trade union is neither a corporation nor an individual, 
 nor a partnership between a number of individuals,' and in 
 this we entirely agree. There can, in our judgment, be no 
 doubt that at common law the defendants could not be sued 
 yi the name in which they are sued in this action, any more 
 than a tradesman could sue a defendant in the name of a 
 West End club for goods supplied by him to that club, for the 
 simple reason that the name of a club is not the name of a 
 corporation nor of an individual, nor of a partnership, which 
 apart from statute are the only entities known to the law as 
 being capable of being sued." . . . Speaking of the Trade 
 Union Acts, the Master of the Rolls said : " Now, in con- 
 sidering these Acts, it is in the first place to be pointed out 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACT, 1871. 83 
 
 that there is no section empowering a trade union to sue or S. 9. 
 to be sued in its registered name, nor is there any provision ~ 
 as to constituting the society a corporation, so that it may 
 be sued as such. And this is the more remarkable if, as the 
 learned Judge holds, it was the intention of the legislature 
 that a trade union was to be sued in its registered name, 
 seeing that when it was desired that a society should sue or 
 be sued in its registered name the legislature knew well 
 how in plain terms to bring about such a result. For 
 instance, in the Companies Act, 1862 (25-6 V. 89), by 
 sect. 6 it is enacted that seven or more persons may be 
 registered, and the section goes on to enact that after regis- 
 tration they shall form an incorporated company, with or 
 without limited liability. The first part of the section is 
 re-enacted in the Trade Union Act* of 1871, but the last part 
 about incorporation is pointedly omitted. ... It is true 
 that the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants is the 
 registered name of the trade union sued, but how does this 
 fact of itself, , without more, render the society an entity 
 capable of being sued in that name ? The mere registration 
 has no such effect. Mr. Justice Farwell does nob suggest in 
 his judgment that in the Trade Union Acts he can find any 
 sections in terms authorising an action against a trade union 
 in its registered name, or that by the Acts trade unions are 
 incorporated. But the learned Judge says the legislature 
 has legalised it i.e., the trade union and it must be dealt 
 with by the Courts according to the intention of the legis- 
 lature. The learned Judge says : ' Although a corporation 
 and an individual or individuals may be the only entities 
 known to the common law who can sue or be sued, it is 
 competent to the legislature to give to an association of 
 individuals, which is neither a corporation nor a partnership 
 nor an individual, a capacity for owning property and acting 
 by agents ; and sudh capacity, in the absence of express enact- 
 ment to the contrary, involves the necessary correlative of 
 liability, to the extent of such property, for the acts and defaults 
 of such agents, in other words, the liability of being sued in its 
 
 * In sect. 6. 
 
 62 
 
84 THE TEADE UNION ACTS, 1871 & 1876. 
 
 S. 9. registered name. It is with regard to this last paragraph, 
 ~~ which is the basis of the judgment, that, with all submission, 
 we cannot agree. When once one gets an entity not known 
 to the law, and therefore incapable of being sued, in our 
 judgment, to enable such an entity to be sued, an enactment 
 must be found, either express or implied, enabling this to be 
 done ; and it is not correct to say that such an entity can be 
 sued unless there be found an express enactment to the 
 contrary. Where, in the Trade Union Acts, is to be found 
 any enactment, express or implied, that a trade union is to 
 be sued in its registered name ? Express there is none, and 
 it is clear that a trade union is not made a corporation. . . . 
 In our judgment this has not been omitted in error. . . . 
 Moreover, by sect. 9 of the Act of 1871 it is expressly 
 enacted that the trustees of a trade union registered under 
 the Act, or any other officer of the union who may be 
 authorised to do so by the rules, may bring or defend any 
 action in any court of law touching the property of the trade 
 union a most remarkable section if, as is argued for the 
 plaintiffs and held by the learned Judge, the purview of the 
 Act is that a trade union can be sued in its registered name. 
 If this were so, what is the good of this section expressly 
 enabling the trustees or other officer of the union to sue or 
 be sued in respect of property ? We can find nothing in the 
 Acts wherefrom the inference is to be drawn that the legis- 
 lature has enacted that a trade union can be sued in its 
 registered name, but, by reason of the language of the Acts, 
 and what is omitted therefrom, if necessary, we should find 
 the exact contrary. In our judgment", for the reasons above, 
 a trade union cannot be sued as is now attempted. 
 
 " Sects. 15 and 16 only show, as regards penalties, that the 
 funds of the union may be got at. The cases [viz., Mersey 
 Dock Trustees v. Gibbs (L. R 1, H. L. 93) ; Buck v. 
 Williams (3 H. & N. 308); Whitehouse v. Fellowes (10 
 C. B. N. S. 765)] which are relied on by the learned Judge do 
 not affect the question which now arises for decision. The 
 case of Temperton v. Eussell [see p. 78] referred to during 
 
THE TBADE UNION ACT, 1871. 85 
 
 the argument in this court, seems to have been argued and Ss. 9, 10, 
 decided upon the assumption that an action such as the _ llt 
 present was not maintainable " (17 T. L. E. 68 ; 49 W. R. 101 ; 
 (1901) 1 Q. B. 170). 
 
 In Cliarnock v. Court, in 1899 (80 L. T. N. S. 564, see 
 p. 146), all the members of a union were added as plaintiffs, 
 because, the union being (apparently) unregistered, there was 
 no one who could sue on behalf of other members. The 
 point is not expressly mentioned, but it would seem that the 
 learned Judge followed Temperton v. Russell (see p. 78) in 
 his construction of Order 16, r. 9, as it was at his suggestion 
 that the writ was amended as stated. 
 
 10. A trustee of any trade union registered under Limitation 
 this Act, shall not be liable to make good any wiity of 
 
 17 trustees. 
 
 deficiency which may arise or happen in the funds 
 of such trade union, but shall be liable only for the 
 moneys which shall be actually received by him on 
 account of such trade union. 
 
 .11. Every treasurer or other officer of a trade Treasurers, 
 union registered under this_Act, at such times as by account. 
 the rules qfjmch trade union he should render such 
 account as hexeinafterjiie^tioiied, or. upon_bein 
 
 trustees of the 
 
 trade union, or to the members of such trade union, 
 at a meeting of the trade union, a just and true 
 Account of all moneys received and paid by him" 
 sincejie laat rejade^ejJhenSke 
 
 tjajance then remainjngjn^jiis _ 
 
 bonds or securities of^such__trade union, which 
 
 shall cause to be audited 
 
 by some fit and proper person or persons by them 
 
86 THE TRADE UNION ACTS, 1871 & 1876. 
 
 8s. 11, 12. to be appointed : and such treasurer, if thereunto 
 required, upon the said account being audited, shall 
 forthwith hand over to the said trustees the balance 
 which on such audit appears to be due from him, 
 and shall also, if required, hand over to such trus- 
 tees all securities and effects, books, papers, and 
 property of the said trade union in his hands or 
 custody; and if he fail to do so the trustees of 
 the said trade union may sue such treasurer in 
 any competent court for the balance appearing to 
 have been due from him upon the account last 
 rendered by him, and for all the moneys since 
 received by him on account of the .said trade 
 union, and for the securities and effects, books, 
 papers, and property in his hands or custody, 
 leaving him to set off in such action the sums, 
 if any, which he may have since paid on account of 
 the said trade union ; and in such action the said 
 trustees shall be entitled to recover their full costs 
 of suit, to be taxed as between attorney and client. 
 
 Punishment 12. If any officer, member, or other person being 
 
 for with- ' v - im^LT 
 
 holding or representing himself to be a member of a trade 
 
 money, &c. 
 
 union registered under this Act, or the nominee, 
 executor, administrator, or assignee of a member 
 thereof, or any person whatsoever, by false repre- 
 sentation or imposition obtain possession of any 
 moneys, securities, books, papers, or other effects 
 of such trade union, or, having the same in his pos- 
 session, wilfully withhold or fraudulently misapply 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACT, 1871. 87 
 
 the same, or wilfully apply any part of the same s - 12 - 
 to purposes other than those expressed or 
 directed in the rules of such trade union, or 
 any part thereof, the court of summary jurisdic- 
 tion for the place in which the registered office 
 of the trade union is situate upon a complaint 
 made by any person on behalf of such trade union, 
 or by the registrar, or in Scotland at the instance 
 of the procurator fiscal of the court, to which 
 such complaint is competently made, or of the 
 trade union, with his concurrence, may, by sum- 
 mary order, order such officer, member, or other 
 person to deliver up all such moneys, securities, 
 books, papers, or other effects to the trade union, or 
 to repay the amount of money applied, improperly; 
 and to pay, if the court think fit, a further sum of 
 money not exceeding twenty pounds, together with 
 costs not exceeding twenty shillings ; and, in default 
 of such delivery of effects, or repayment of such 
 amount of money, or payment of such penalty 
 and costs aforesaid, the said court may order the 
 said person so convicted to be imprisoned, with 
 or without hard labour, for any time not exceed- 
 ing three months : Provided, that nothing herein 
 contained shall prevent the said trade union, or 
 in Scotland Her Majesty's Advocate, from pro- 
 ceeding by indictment against the said party ; 
 provided also, that no person shall be proceeded 
 against by indictment if a conviction shall have. 
 
88 THE TRADE UNION ACTS, 1871 & 1876. 
 
 Ss. 12, 13. been previously obtained for the same offence under 
 the provisions of this Act. 
 
 With this section must be read sect. 5 of the Act of 1876. 
 See p. 103. 
 
 In a case which occurred in 1885, a (former) treasurer had 
 been convicted under this section, and had been ordered to 
 refund a sum which he had fraudulently misapplied, and to 
 pay a fine and costs ; in default, he had been imprisoned for 
 two months with hard labour. The secretary, then, on 
 behalf of the union, brought an action in the county court to 
 recover the money misappropriated, but he was nonsuited. 
 The Court (Field and Manisty, JJ.) refused to set aside the 
 nonsuit, remarking, " The society has no further remedy ; 
 to allow the defendant to be sued after he has suffered the 
 imprisonment would be most oppressive " (Knight v. 
 WMtmore, 33 W. E. 907). 
 
 Registry of Trade Union. 
 
 13 ' With res P ect to tne re g istr J> under tnis Act > 
 of a trade union, and of the rules thereof, the 
 following provisions shall have effect : 
 
 (1.) An application to register the trade union and 
 printed copies of the rules, together with a 
 list of the titles and names of the officers, 
 shall be sent to the registrar under this Act : 
 
 (2.) The registrar, upon being satisfied that the 
 trade union has complied with the regula- 
 tions respecting registry in force under 
 this Act, shall register such trade union 
 and such rules : 
 
 (3.) No trade union shall be registered under 
 a name identical with that by which 
 
THE TKADE UNION ACT, 1871. 89 
 
 any other existing trade union has been s - 13 - 
 registered, or so nearly resembling such 
 name as to be likely to deceive the members 
 or the public : 
 
 (4.) Where a trade union applying to be regis- 
 tered has been in operation for more than 
 a year before the date of such application, 
 there shall be delivered to the registrar 
 before the registry thereof a general state- 
 ment of the receipts, funds, effects, and ex- 
 penditure of such trade union in the same 
 form, and showing the same particulars, 
 as if it were the annual general statement 
 required as herein-after mentioned to be 
 transmitted annually to the registrar : 
 
 (5,) The registrar upon registering such trade 
 union shall issue a certificate of registry, 
 which certificate, unless proved to have 
 been withdrawn or cancelled, shall be 
 conclusive evidence that the regulations 
 of this Act with respect to registry have 
 been complied with : 
 
 (6.) One of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of 
 State may from time to time make regula- 
 tions respecting registry under this Act, 
 and respecting the seal (if any) to be used 
 for the purpose of such registry, and the 
 forms to be used for such registry, and 
 the inspection of documents kept by the 
 
90 THE TRADE UNION ACTS, 1871 & 1876. 
 
 ss. 13, 14. registrar under this Act, and respecting 
 
 the fees, if any, to be paid on registry, 
 
 not exceeding the fees specified in the 
 second schedule to this Act, and generally 
 for carrying this Act into effect. 
 " The registrar under this Act." See sect. 17. 
 " Withdrawn or cancelled." There is nothing in this 
 Act to authorise withdrawal or cancellation; but see sect. 8 of 
 the Act of 1876, p. 105. 
 
 " Regulations." See Appendix B., p. 199. 
 
 Rules of 14. With respect to the rules of a trade union 
 
 registered 
 
 registered under this Act, the following provisions 
 shall have effect: 
 
 (1.) The rules of every such trade union shall 
 contain provisions in respect of the several 
 matters mentioned in the first schedule to 
 this Act : 
 
 (2.) A copy of the rules shall be delivered by the 
 trade union to every person on demand on 
 payment of a sum not exceeding one shilling. 
 15> Every trade union registered under this Act 
 shall have a registered office to which all com- 
 munications and notices may be addressed ; if any 
 trade union under this Act is in operation for seven 
 days without having such an office, such trade union 
 and every officer thereof shall each incur a penalty 
 not exceeding five pounds for every day during 
 which it is so in operation. 
 
 Notice of the situation of such registered office, 
 and of any change therein, shall be given to the 
 
THE TEADE UNION ACT, 1871. 91 
 
 registrar and recorded by him ; until such notice is Ss. 15, 16. 
 given the trade union shall not be deemed to have 
 complied with the provisions of this Act. 
 
 16. A general statement of the receipts, funds, Annual 
 
 returns to 
 
 effects, and expenditure of every trade union 
 registered under this Act shall be transmitted to ma y * irect - 
 the registrar before the first day of June in every 
 year, and shall show fully the assets and liabilities 
 at the date, and the receipts and expenditure during 
 the year preceding the date to which it is made out, 
 of the trade union ; and shall show separately the 
 expenditure in respect of the several objects of the 
 trade union, and shall be prepared and made out 
 up to such date, in such form, and shall comprise 
 such particulars, as the registrar may from time 
 to time require ; and every member of, and depositor 
 in, any such trad&union shall be entitled to receive, 
 on application to the treasurer or secretary of that 
 trade union, a copy of such general statement, 
 without making any payment for the same. 
 
 Together with such general statement there shall 
 be sent to the registrar a copy of all alterations of 
 rules and new rules and changes of officers made 
 by the trade union during the year preceding the 
 date up to which the general statement is made out, 
 and a copy of the rules of the trade union as they 
 exist at that date. 
 
 Every trade union which fails to comply with 
 or acts in contravention of this section, and also 
 
92 THE TEADE UNION ACTS, 1871 & 1876. 
 
 ss. 16, 17, every officer of the trade union so failing, shall 
 
 ' each be liable to a penalty not exceeding five pounds 
 
 for each offence. 
 
 Every person who wilfully makes or orders to 
 be made any false entry in or any omission 
 from any such general statement, or in or from 
 the return of such copies of rules or alterations 
 of rules, shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding 
 fifty pounds for each offence. 
 
 Registrars. 17. The registrars of the friendly societies in 
 England, Scotland, and Ireland shall be the 
 registrars under this Act. 
 
 The registrar shall lay before Parliament annual 
 reports with respect to the matters transacted by 
 such registrars in pursuance of this Act. 
 
 These offices were instituted in 1846 (by 9-10 V. 27) ; 
 the office from which they sprang seems to date from 1829 
 (10 Geo. IV. 56). See 59-60 V. 25, 1. 
 
 circulating 18. If any person with intent to mislead or 
 
 false copies 
 
 of rules, &c. defraud gives to any member of a trade union 
 
 a misde- 
 meanor, registered under this Act, or to any person intend- 
 ing or applying to become a member of such trade 
 union, a copy of any rules or of any alterations 
 or amendments of the same other than those 
 respectively which exist for the time being on 
 the pretence that the same are the existing rules 
 of such trade union, or that there are no other 
 rules of such trade union, or if any person with 
 the intent aforesaid gives a copy of any rules to 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACT, 1871. 93 
 
 any person on the pretence that such rules are the Ss - 18 > 19 - 
 rules of a trade union registered under this Act 
 which is not so registered, every person so offending 
 shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. 
 
 " Of a misdemeanor." See sect. 23, p. 98. Punishment 
 might be by fine or imprisonment without hard labour, or 
 both, or by being put under recognizances. See Stephen, 
 Digest of Criminal Law, Art. 23. 
 
 Legal Proceedings. 
 
 19. In England and Ireland all offences and summary 
 penalties under this Act may be prosecuted and 
 
 17 A 
 
 penalties, 
 
 recovered in manner directed by the Summary &c. 
 Jurisdiction Acts. 
 
 In England and Ireland summary orders under 
 this Act may be made and enforced on complaint 
 before a court of summary jurisdiction in manner 
 provided by the Summary Jurisdiction Acts. 
 
 Provided as follows : 
 
 1. The "Court of Summary Jurisdiction," when 
 hearing and determining an information or com- 
 plaint, shall be constituted in some one of the 
 following manners ; that is to say, 
 (A.) In England, 
 
 (1.) In any place within the jurisdiction of a 
 metropolitan police magistrate or other 
 stipendiary magistrate, of such magistrate 
 or his substitute : 
 
94 THE TKADE UNION ACTS, 1871 & 1876. 
 
 s. 19. (2.) In the city of London, of the Lord Mayor 
 
 or any alderman of the said city : 
 (3.) In any other place, of two or more jus- 
 tices of the peace sitting in petty sessions. 
 (B.) In Ireland, 
 
 (1.) In the police district of Dublin metropolis, 
 
 of a divisional justice : 
 
 (2.) In any other place, of a resident magis- 
 trate. 
 
 In Scotland all offences and penalties under this 
 Act shall be prosecuted and recovered by the pro- 
 curator fiscal of the county in the Sheriff Court 
 under the provisions of the Summary Procedure 
 Act, 1864. 
 
 In Scotland summary orders under this Act may 
 be made and enforced on complaint in the Sheriff 
 Court. 
 
 All the jurisdictions, powers, and authorities 
 necessary for giving effect to these provisions 
 relating to Scotland are hereby conferred on the 
 sheriffs and their substitutes. 
 
 Provided that in England, Scotland, and Ireland 
 
 2. The description of any offence under this Act 
 hi the words of such Act shall be sufficient in law. 
 
 3. Any exception, exemption, proviso, excuse, 
 or qualification, whether it does or not accompany 
 the description of the offence in this Act, may be 
 proved by the defendant, but need not be specified 
 or negatived in the information, and if so specified 
 
THE TKADE UNION ACT, 1871. 96 
 
 or negatived, no proof in relation to the matters so Ss. 19, 20. 
 specified or negatived shall be required on the part 
 of the informant or prosecutor. 
 
 " The Summary Jurisdiction Acts." Defined, 52-3 
 V. 63. 13, (7), (8), (9), and including any Act, past or future, 
 amending the principal Acts. 
 
 20. In England or Ireland if any party feels Appeal to 
 aggrieved by any order or conviction made by a 
 court of summary jurisdiction on determining any 
 complaint or information under this Act, the party 
 so aggrieved may appeal therefrom, subject to the 
 conditions and regulations following : 
 
 (1.) The appeal shall be made to some court 
 of general or quarter sessions for the 
 county or place in which the cause of 
 appeal has arisen, holden not less than 
 fifteen days and not more than four 
 months after the decision of the court 
 from which the appeal is made : 
 (2.) The appellant shall, within seven days after 
 the cause of appeal has arisen, give notice 
 to the other party and to the court of 
 summary jurisdiction of his intention to 
 appeal, and of the ground thereof : 
 (3.) The appellant shall immediately after such 
 notice enter into a recognizance before 
 a justice of the peace in the sum of ten 
 pounds, with two sufficient sureties in the 
 sum of ten pounds, conditioned personally 
 
96 THE TRADE UNION ACTS, 1871 & 1876. 
 
 s. 20, 21. to try such appeal, and to abide the judg- 
 
 ment of the court thereon, and to pay such 
 costs as may be awarded by the court : 
 
 (4.) Where the appellant is in custody the justice 
 may, if he think fit, on the appellant 
 entering into such recognizance as afore- 
 said, release him from custody : 
 
 (5.) The court of appeal may adjourn the appeal, 
 and upon the hearing thereof they may 
 confirm, reverse, or modify the decision 
 of the court of summary jurisdiction, or 
 remit the matter to the court of summary 
 jurisdiction with the opinion of the court 
 of appeal thereon, or make such other 
 order in the matter as the court thinks 
 just, and if the matter be remitted to 
 the court of summary jurisdiction the 
 said last-mentioned court shall thereupon 
 re-hear and decide the information or 
 complaint in accordance with the opinion 
 of the said court of appeal. The court 
 of appeal may also make such order as 
 to costs to be paid by either party as the 
 court thinks just. 
 
 " Quarter sessions." The remainder of the section, after 
 these words, is repealed, as regards England only, by 478 
 V. 43, 4 (the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1884). 
 
 Appeal in 
 
 preSed 3 21. In Scotland it shall be competent to any 
 c y 4a Geo< 2> person to appeal against any order or conviction 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACT, 1871. 97 
 
 under this Act to the next Circuit Court of Justiciary, Ss 21 > 22 
 or where there are no Circuit Courts to the High 
 Court of Justiciary at Edinburgh, in the manner 
 prescribed by and under the rules, limitations, con- 
 ditions, and restrictions contained in the Act passed 
 in the twentieth year of the reign of His Majesty 
 King George the Second, chapter forty-three, in 
 regard to appeals to Circuit Courts in matters 
 criminal, as the same may be altered or amended 
 by any Acts of Parliament for the time being in 
 force. 
 
 All penalties imposed under the provisions of 
 this Act in Scotland may be enforced in default of 
 payment by imprisonment for a term to be specified 
 in the summons or complaint, but not exceeding 
 three calendar months. 
 
 All penalties imposed and recovered under 
 the provisions of this Act in Scotland shall be 
 paid to the sheriff clerk, and shall be accounted 
 for and paid by him to the Queen's and Lord 
 Treasurer's Eemembrancer on behalf of the 
 Crown. 
 
 22. A person who is a master, or father, son, or interested 
 
 person not 
 
 brother of a master, in the particular manufacture, to act as a 
 
 member of 
 
 trade, or business in or in connexion with which a cou ^ of 
 any offence under this Act is charged to have been 
 committed shall not act as or as a member of a 
 court of summary jurisdiction or appeal for the 
 purposes of this Act. 
 
 T.U.A. 7 
 
98 THE TRADE UNION ACTS, 1871 & 1876. 
 
 S. 23. 
 
 Definitions. 
 
 Definitions. 23. In thlS Act 
 
 rm'<sum- The term Summary Jurisdiction Acts means as 
 !Sn liris - follows: 
 
 Acts '* * 
 
 As to England, the Act of the session of the 
 eleventh and twelfth years of the reign of Her 
 present Majesty, chapter forty-three, intituled 
 \"An Act to facilitate the performance of the 
 duties of justices of the peace out of sessions 
 within England and Wales with respect to 
 summary convictions and orders," and any 
 Acts amending the same : 
 
 As to Ireland, within the police district of Dublin 
 metropolis, the Acts regulating the powers 
 and duties of justices of the peace for such 
 district, or of the police of such district, and 
 elsewhere in Ireland, " The Petty Sessions 
 (Ireland) Act, 1851," and any Act amending 
 the same. 
 
 In Scotland the term "misdemeanor" means a 
 crime and offence. 
 
 As to The term "trade union" means such combination, 
 
 union " whether temporary or permanent, for regulating the 
 
 relations between workmen and masters, or between 
 workmen and workmen, or between masters and 
 masters, or for imposing restrictive conditions on the 
 conduct of any trade or business, as would, if this Act 
 had not passed, have been deemed to have been an 
 unlawful combination by reason of some one or more 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACT, 1871. 99 
 
 of its purposes being in restraint of trade ; Provided Ss. 23, 24. 
 that this Act shall not affect 
 
 1. Any agreement between partners as to 
 
 their own business ; 
 
 2. Any agreement between an employer and 
 
 those employed by him as to such 
 employment ; 
 
 3. Any agreement in consideration of the 
 
 sale of the goodwill of a business or of 
 instruction in any profession, trade, or 
 handicraft. 
 
 Part of this section is repealed by the Act of 1876, s. 16. 
 See p. 111. 
 
 Repeal. 
 24. The Trades Unions Funds Protection Act, Repeal of 
 
 Trades 
 
 1869, is hereby repealed. H 1 "^ 
 
 J r Funds Pro- 
 
 Provided that this repeal shall not affect 
 
 (1.) Anything duly done or suffered under the 
 said Act: 
 
 (2.) Any right or privilege acquired or any liability 
 incurred under the said Act : 
 
 (3.) Any penalty, forfeiture, or other punishment 
 incurred in respect of any offence against 
 the said Act : 
 
 (4.) The institution of any investigation or legal 
 proceeding or any other remedy for ascer- 
 taining, enforcing, recovering, or imposing 
 
 12 
 
100 THE TRADE UNION ACTS, 1871 & 1876. 
 
 8 42 - any such liability, penalty, forfeiture, or 
 
 punishment as aforesaid. 
 
 Repealed by 46-7 V. 39, 1 (the Statute Law Revision 
 Act, 1883). The proviso in sect. 1 prevents the Act (32-3 
 V. 61) repealed by this section (24), reviving. 
 
 That Act was by sect. 2 to expire on August 31st, 1870 ; it 
 was continued in force by 33-4 V. 10, 3, till at least 
 August 31st, 1871, by which time this Act had repealed it. 
 
 SCHEDULES. 
 FIRST SCHEDULE. 
 
 Of Matters to be provided for by the Rules of Trade Unions 
 Registered under this Act. 
 
 See is & 19 i. The name of the trade union and place of meeting for the 
 
 Viet. c. 63, business of the trade union. 
 
 '2. The whole of the objects for which the trade union is to be 
 established, the purposes for which the funds thereof shall be 
 applicable, and the conditions under which any member may 
 become entitled to any benefit assured thereby, and the fines and 
 forfeitures to be imposed on any member of such trade union. 
 
 3. The manner of making, altering, amending, and rescinding 
 rules. 
 
 4. A provision for the appointment and removal of a general 
 committee of management, of a trustee or trustees, treasurer, and 
 other officers. 
 
 5. A provision for the investment of the funds, and for an 
 annual or periodical audit of accounts. 
 
 6. The inspection of the books and names of members of the 
 trade union by every person having an interest in the funds of the 
 trade union. 
 
 " Rules." In case of doubt as to the meaning of rules, 
 application may be made to the Court to determine the 
 construction. 
 
 This was the case In re Durham Miners' Association ; 
 Watson v. Cann (17 T. L. R. 39) in 1900. " The rules of 
 a trade union, the management of which was vested in a 
 council, under whom an executive committee acted, provided 
 that no lodge was to give notice of a strike until its case 
 had been laid before a council or committee meeting for 
 their approval ; and that any lodge, or number of men in a 
 
THE TEADE UNION ACT, 1871. 101 
 
 lodge, ceasing work without the approval of either the S. 1. 
 committee or council should forfeit all claims on the union. 
 A number of men in a lodge ceased work on account of a 
 dispute with their employer without having laid their case 
 before the council or the committee for their approval. The 
 executive committee refused to grant strike pay, but the 
 council on appeal allowed it." Upon a summons taken out 
 by the trustees, Cozens-Hardy, J. held that the resolution of 
 the council was ultra vires (and, therefore, the treasurer 
 could not properly pay the sums in question), and the Court 
 of Appeal (Bigby, Vaughan Williams, and Homer, L. JJ.) 
 confirmed this view. See Introduction, p. 19. 
 
 SECOND SCHEDULE. 
 
 Maximum Fecx. 
 
 & . d. 
 
 For registering trade union 100 
 
 For registering alterations in rules . . . . 10 
 For inspection of documents 026 
 
 TRADE UNION ACT (1871) AMENDMENT 
 ACT, 1876. 
 
 39 & 40 VICT. c. 22. 
 
 An Act to amend the Trade Union Act, 1871. 
 
 [30th June, 1876. 
 1. This Act and the Trade Union Act, 1871, construe- 
 
 tion and 
 
 herein-after termed the principal Act, shall be short title - 
 construed as one Act, and may be cited together 
 as the " Trade Union Acts, 1871 and 1876," and 
 this Act may be cited separately as the " Trade 
 Union Act Amendment Act, 1876." 
 See p. 48. 
 
102 TRADE UNION ACT (1871) AMENDMENT ACT, 1876. 
 
 Ss - 2 > 3,4. 2. Notwithstanding anything in section five of 
 unions to be * ne principal Act contained, a trade union, whether 
 of Friendly 8 registered or unregistered, which insures or pays 
 
 SfMMPtlPS 
 
 Act, 1875. money on the death of a child under ten years of 
 age shall be deemed to be within the provisions of sec- 
 tion twenty-eight of the Friendly Societies Act, 1875. 
 See p. 66. 
 
 Amendment 3. Whereas by section eight of the principal Act 
 
 principal it is enacted that "the real or personal estate of 
 any branch of a trade union shall be vested in 
 the trustees of such branch " : The said section 
 shall be read and construed as if immediately after 
 the herein-before recited words there were inserted 
 the words "or of the trustees of the trade union, 
 if the rules of the trade union so provide." 
 See p. 75. 
 
 Provision in 4. When any person, being or having been a 
 
 cases of ab- 
 sence, &c. of trustee of a trade union or of any branch of a trade 
 trustee. 
 
 union, and whether appointed before or after the 
 legal establishment thereof, in whose name any 
 stock belonging to such union or branch transfer- 
 able at the Bank of England or Bank of Ireland is 
 standing, either jointly with another or others, or 
 solely, is absent from Great Britain or Ireland 
 respectively, or becomes bankrupt, or files any 
 petition, or executes any deed for liquidation of 
 his affairs by assignment or arrangement, or for 
 composition with his creditors, or becomes a lunatic, 
 or is dead, or has been removed from his office of 
 
TRADE UNION ACT (1871) AMENDMENT ACT, 1876. 103 
 
 trustee, or if it be unknown whether such person Ss. 4, 5. 
 is living or dead, the registrar, on application in 
 writing from the secretary and three members of 
 the union or branch, and on proof satisfactory to 
 him, may direct the transfer of the stock into the 
 names of any other persons as trustees for the 
 union or branch ; and such transfer shall be made 
 by the surviving or continuing trustees, and if there 
 be no such trustee, or if such trustees refuse or be 
 unable to make such transfer, and the registrar so 
 direct, then by the Accountant-General or Deputy or 
 Assistant Accountant-General of the Bank of 
 England or Bank of Ireland, as the case may be ; 
 and the Governors and Companies of the Bank of 
 England and Bank of Ireland respectively are 
 hereby indemnified for anything done by them or 
 any of their officers in pursuance of this provision 
 against any claim or demand of any person 
 injuriously affected thereby. 
 
 " The legal establishment thereof > = the registration 
 thereof, according to law. See p. 70. 
 
 5. The jurisdiction conferred in the case of Jurisdiction 
 
 m offences. 
 
 certain offences by section twelve of the principal 
 Act upon the court of summary jurisdiction for the 
 place in which the registered office of a trade union 
 is situate may be exercised either by that court or 
 by the court of summary jurisdiction for the place 
 where the offence has been committed. 
 See p. 86. 
 
104 TRADE UNION ACT (1871) AMENDMENT ACT, 1876. 
 
 Ss. 6, 7. 6. Trade unions carrying or intending to carry 
 Registry of on business in more than one country shall be 
 
 unionsdoing .,-,.,, .,.,,. . , 
 
 mre Sum" re g is ^ erec ^ in ^ ne country in which their registered 
 one country. fQ ce j s situate; but copies of the rules of such 
 unions, and of all amendments of the same, shall, 
 when registered, be sent to the registrar of each of 
 the other countries, to be recorded by him, and 
 until such rules be so recorded the union shall not 
 be entitled to any of the privileges of this Act or 
 the principal Act, in the country in which such 
 rules have not been recorded, and until such 
 amendments of rules be recorded the same shall 
 not take effect in such country. 
 
 In this section ''country" means England, 
 Scotland, or Ireland. 
 
 Life Assur- 7. Whereas by the " Life Assurance Companies 
 panics Acts Act, 1870," it is provided that the said Act shall 
 
 not to apply 
 
 !u,i'ms stered not a Pply to societies registered under the Acts 
 relating to Friendly Societies: The said Act (or 
 the amending Acts) shall not apply nor be deemed 
 to have applied to trade unions registered or to be 
 registered under the principal Act. 
 
 The Act of 1870 (33-4 V. 61) applies to unregistered trade 
 unions which come within the meaning of " company " as 
 there denned (sect. 2), viz., " any person or persons, corporate 
 or unincorporate, not being registered under the Acts relating 
 to friendly societies, who issue or are liable under policies of 
 assurance upon human life within the United Kingdom, or 
 who grant annuities upon human life within the United 
 Kingdom." 
 
or cancelling 
 of cei 
 cate. 
 
 TRADE UNION ACT (1871) AMENDMENT ACT, 1876. 105 
 
 8. No certificate of registration of a trade union s - 8 - 
 shall be withdrawn or cancelled otherwise than by the 
 
 v 
 
 chief registrar of Friendly Societies, or in the case of of certif1 
 trade unions registered and doing business exclu- 
 sively in Scotland or Ireland, by the assistant registrar 
 for Scotland or Ireland, and in the following cases : 
 (1.) At the request of the trade union to be 
 evidenced in such manner as such chief or 
 assistant registrar shall from time to time 
 direct : 
 
 (2.) On proof to his satisfaction that a certificate 
 of registration has been obtained by fraud 
 or mistake, or that the registration of the 
 trade union has become void under section 
 six of the Trade Union Act, 1871, or that 
 such trade union has wilfully and after 
 notice from a registrar whom it may con- 
 cern, violated any of the provisions of the 
 Trade Union Acts, or has ceased to exist. 
 Not less than two months previous notice in 
 writing, specifying briefly the ground of any 
 proposal withdrawal or cancelling of certificate 
 (unless where the same is shown to have become 
 void as aforesaid, in which case it shall be the duty 
 of the chief or assistant registrar to cancel the 
 same forthwith) shall be given by the chief or 
 assistant registrar to a trade union before the 
 certificate of registration of the same can be 
 withdrawn or cancelled (except at its request). 
 
106 TEADE UNION ACT (1871) AMENDMENT ACT, 1876. 
 
 Ss-8,9,10. A trade union whose certificate of registration 
 has been withdrawn or cancelled shall, from the 
 time of such withdrawal or cancelling, absolutely 
 cease to enjoy as such the privileges of a registered 
 trade union, but without prejudice to any liability 
 actually incurred by such trade union, which may 
 be enforced against the same as if such withdrawal 
 or cancelling had not taken place. 
 
 See p. 89. 
 
 "And in the following cases," an ungrammatical 
 phrase for " and except in the following cases." 
 
 Membership 9. A person under the age of twenty-one, but 
 
 of minors. 
 
 above the age of sixteen, may be a member of a 
 trade union, unless provision be made in the rules 
 thereof to the contrary, and may, subject to the 
 rules of the trade union, enjoy all the rights of a 
 member except as herein provided, and execute all 
 instruments and give all acquittances necessary to 
 be executed or given under the rules, but shall not 
 be a member of the committee of management, 
 * trustee, or treasurer of the trade union. 
 Nomination. 10. A member of a trade union not being under 
 the age of sixteen years may, by writing under his 
 hand, delivered at, or sent to, the registered office 
 of the trade union, nominate any person not being 
 an officer or servant of the trade union (unless such 
 officer or servant is the husband, wife, father, 
 mother, child, brother, sister, nephew, or niece of 
 
TRADE UNION ACT (1871) AMENDMENT ACT, 1876. 107 
 
 the nominator), to whom any moneys payable on s - 10. 
 the death of such member not exceeding fifty 
 pounds shall be paid at his decease, and may from 
 time to time revoke or vary such nomination b}' a 
 writing under his hand similarly delivered or sent ; 
 and on receiving satisfactory proof of the death 
 of a nominator, the trade union shall pay to the 
 nominee the amount due to the deceased member 
 not exceeding the sum aforesaid. 
 
 " Fifty pounds." " One hundred pounds " must be read, 
 by 46-7 V. 47, 3. 
 
 This section will not be enforced by a court of law owing 
 to sect. 4 of the Act of 1871 (Crocker v. Knight, (1892) 
 1 Q. B. 702). See p. 56. In that case the plaintiff was the 
 executrix of the deceased member who had nominated her to 
 receive the funeral money, due under the rules of the society 
 to his nominee. The branch disputed her claim, and she 
 brought an action in the County Court against the union by 
 its secretary. It was there admitted that the deceased had 
 been a member, and that J612 was the amount due, if any- 
 thing. The County Court Judge overruled the objection 
 that sect. 4, 3 (a) of the Act of 1871 prevented the Court 
 having jurisdiction to entertain the action. Charles, J., 
 refused the defendant a writ of prohibition to restrain all pro- 
 ceedings, but a Divisional Court (Lawrance and Wright, JJ.) 
 set aside that order, and granted the writ prayed' for. The 
 plaintiff appealed, but the Court of Appeal (Lindley and 
 Kay, L. JJ.) upheld the Divisional Court. " The question 
 is," said Lindley, L. J., " whether the words 'the trade union 
 shall pay ' constitute an obligation which can be enforced by 
 action. Now, I think the object of this section was not to 
 depart from the policy of the earlier Act, but was entirely 
 different, namely, to enable persons of sixteen years of age 
 and upwards, without the necessity of making a will and 
 incurring the expense of probate, to give away any small 
 
108 TEADE UNION ACT (1871) AMENDMENT ACT, 1876. 
 
 Ss. 10,11. sums of money that may be due to them from the trade 
 ~ union. ... I do not think, looking at the first and other 
 sections of that Act, thab we can find any sufficient indication 
 of an intention to depart from the terms of sect. 4 of the 
 first Act so as to alter the policy of the legislature, which 
 was to prevent the introduction of legal proceedings into the 
 affairs of trade unions, and to save trade unions from being 
 subjected to the expense of litigation. 
 
 The question really turns on the construction of the two 
 Acts. We are asked to read sect. 10 of the second Act 
 as overruling sect. 4 of the first, and to hold that there is, 
 therefore, a distinct statutory obligation on the part of the 
 trade union to pay ; but when we are told by the legislature 
 to read the two Acts as one, we must read them in such a way 
 as to make them consistent. In my opinion, the trade 
 union is subject to no more obligation to pay than it was 
 before the Act of 1871 was passed. Sect. 4 is clear; no 
 action shall be brought for any such sum of money as is 
 sought to be recovered here." Kay, L. J., in concurring, said : 
 " The money is a debt which could not be recovered by the 
 executor or administrator of the deceased member if he had 
 one ... it would be an extraordinary construction of this 
 section to say that although the member cannot sue, or his 
 executor or administrator cannot sue, yet the nominee of the 
 member, that is, a person brought into the matter by the 
 legislature, evidently to avoid the expense of probate, shall 
 have power to put the trade union to the expense of an 
 action . . . the section is intended like the corresponding 
 provisions of the Friendly Societies Act, to prevent a trade 
 union, so far as it is a benefit society, from being subjected 
 to the expense and trouble of litigation by its members. . . . 
 I think sect. 4 is intended to prohibit the very kind of 
 litigation we have in this case." 
 
 change oi 11. A. trade union may, with the approval in 
 writing of the chief registrar of Friendly Societies, 
 or in the case of trade unions registered and doing 
 
 name 
 
TKADE UNION ACT (1871) AMENDMENT ACT, 1876. 109 
 
 business exclusively in Scotland or Ireland, of the SB. 11, 12, 
 assistant registrar for Scotland or Ireland respec- - '. 
 tively, change its name by the consent of not less 
 than two thirds of the total number of members. 
 
 No change of name shall affect any right or 
 obligation of the trade union or of any member 
 thereof, and any pending legal proceedings may be 
 continued by or against the trustees of the trade 
 union or any other officer who may sue or be sued 
 on behalf of such trade union notwithstanding its 
 new name. 
 
 12. Any two or more trade unions may, by the 
 
 consent of not less than two thirds of the members 
 of each or every such trade union, become amal- 
 gamated together as one trade union, with or 
 without any dissolution or division of the funds of 
 such trade unions, or either or any of them ; but 
 no amalgamation shall prejudice any right of a 
 creditor of either or any union party thereto. 
 
 "Dissolution," i.e., with or without any dissolution of 
 such trade unions or of either or of any of them or with or 
 without any division of the funds of such trade unions or of 
 either or of any of them. 
 
 13. Notice in writing of every change of name or Registration 
 
 i i- T ^ i of changes 
 
 amalgamation signed, in the case of a change of 
 
 name, by seven members, and countersigned by the mations - 
 secretary of the trade union changing its name, 
 and accompanied by a statutory declaration by 
 such secretary that the provisions of this Act in 
 respect of changes of name have been complied 
 
110 TRADE UNION ACT (1871) AMENDMENT ACT, 1876. 
 
 SB. 13, 14, with, and in the case of an amalgamation signed 
 
 by seven members, and countersigned by the 
 secretary of each or every union party thereto, and 
 accompanied by a statutory declaration by each or 
 every such secretary that the provisions of this Act 
 in respect of amalgamations have been complied 
 with, shall be sent to the central office established 
 by the Friendly Societies Act, 1875, and registered 
 there, and until such change of name or amalga- 
 mation is so registered the same shall not take effect. 
 Dissolution. 14. The rules of every trade union shall provide 
 for the manner of dissolving the same, and notice 
 of every dissolution of a trade union under the 
 hand of the secretary and seven members of the 
 same, shall be sent within fourteen days thereafter 
 to the central office herein -before mentioned, or, 
 in the case of trade unions registered and doing 
 business exclusively in Scotland or Ireland, to the 
 assistant registrar for Scotland or Ireland respec- 
 tively, and shall be registered by them : Provided 
 that the rules of any trade union registered before 
 the passing of this Act shall not be invalidated by 
 the absence of a provision for dissolution. 
 penalty for 15. A trade union which fails to give any notice 
 give notice, or send any document which it is required by this 
 Act to give or send, and every officer or other 
 person bound by the rules thereof to give or send 
 the same, or if there be no such officer, then every 
 member of the committee of management of the 
 
TRADE UNION ACT (1871) AMENDMENT ACT, 1876. Ill 
 
 union, unless proved to have been ignorant of, or SB. 15, 16. 
 to have attempted to prevent the omission to give or 
 send the same, is liable to a penalty of not less than 
 one pound and not more than five pounds, recover- 
 able at the suit of the chief or any assistant registrar 
 of Friendly Societies, or of any person aggrieved, 
 and to an additional penalty of the like amount for 
 each week during which the omission continues. 
 
 16. So much of section twenty-three of the prin- Definition 
 cipal Act as defines the term trade union, except the union" 
 
 altered. 
 
 proviso qualifying such definition, is hereby re- 
 pealed, and in lieu thereof be it enacted as follows: 
 The term "trade union" means any combination, 
 whether temporary or permanent, for regulating the 
 relations between workmen and masters, or between 
 workmen and workmen, or between masters and 
 masters, or for imposing restrictive conditions on the 
 conduct of any trade or business, whether such com- 
 bination would or would not, if the principal Act 
 had not been passed, have been deemed to have been 
 an unlawful combination by reason of some one or 
 more of its purposes being in restraint of trade. 
 
 " The principal Act " is that of 1871. See p. 101. 
 
 It follows, therefore, that societies proposing actually to 
 carry on trade cannot be registered as trade unions, and 
 registration has actually been refused in such cases. * The 
 subject is a branch of Company Law, but it may be added 
 that for such societies in connection with trade unions a 
 
 * Information kindly supplied by the Registrar of Friendly 
 Societies for England. 
 
112 TRADE UNION ACT (1871) AMENDMENT ACT, 1876. 
 
 S. 16. convenient machinery is provided by the Industrial and Provi- 
 ~ dent Societies Acts, 1893 and 1894 (56-7 V. 39, and 57-8 V. 8). 
 
 In Mineral Water Bottle Exchange and Trade Protection 
 Society v. Booth (36 Ch. D. 465 ; 57 L. T. 573 ; 36 W. R. 
 274, in 1887) the facts were as follows : A co-plaintiff (Cox) 
 and the defendants were both mineral water manufacturers, 
 and were both members of the society, the other co-plaintiff, 
 incorporated under the Companies Act, 1862, for the purpose 
 of protecting the property and promoting the interests of the 
 members. A carman who had been in Cox's employment for 
 about four years left him, and on the same day applied for 
 employment to the defendants, who wrote to the plaintiff 
 inquiring his character. The latter alleged nothing against 
 his character, but protested against his being employed by 
 the defendants in consequence of the 44th of the articles of 
 association viz., " No member of the society shall employ 
 any traveller, carman or out-door employe who has left the 
 service of another member without the consent in writing 
 of his late employer, until after the expiration of two years 
 from his leaving such service." The defendants, however, 
 engaged the carman, and the plaintiffs sought to restrain 
 them from employing him. 
 
 The defendants pleaded that the society was a trade union 
 under the Trade Union Acts, and that the registration under 
 the Companies Act was void. See p. 70. They also pleaded 
 that the article 44 was unreasonable, and void as being in 
 restraint of trade. 
 
 Chitty, J., in refusing the injunction, said : " It appears to 
 me with reference at least to this 44th article (and I have 
 not to go beyond that on this motion) this is a trade union. 
 ... It appears to me that this 44th article is, in any view of 
 the case, an unreasonable restraint of trade. It is contained 
 in the articles of association of this company, and it is not an 
 agreement between the employer and the employed, but it is 
 an agreement between employers of labour, who may amount 
 ... to the large number of 500, and the agreement relates 
 to carmen amongst others. . . . According to the evidence 
 
TRADE UNION ACT (1871) AMENDMENT ACT, 1876. 113 
 
 on one side a man can almost at once discharge the duties of S. 16. 
 a carman, as little skill is required beyond competency to ~~ 
 drive horses, and some honesty. According to the other 
 side a somewhat high degree of skill is required, but it is 
 not a high degree. It is, for instance, in this part of the 
 kingdom, a knowledge of the streets of London and of the 
 locality about London. The article is in no sense framed 
 with reference to soliciting orders or the like, but it is a 
 harshly conceived absolute agreement that no member 
 that is to say, no one of those 179 members at the present 
 moment shall employ any carman who has left the service 
 of another member without the consent in writing of his 
 late employer, without any limitation of space except that 
 limitation which . . . exists by reason of the nature of the 
 association. As the members may be in any part of the 
 world, so the area to which this agreement would apply 
 would be co-extensive, the only limitation being a limitation 
 of two years in point of time. There may be the most 
 honest and respectable carman that can be conceived. If he 
 has the misfortune to discharge himself lawfully, he falls 
 within this rule, not as being himself bound, but, according 
 to the contention put forward, the members of the associa- 
 tion, these 179 persons at the present moment, must all 
 close their doors to him and refuse to employ him. I think 
 this is an unreasonable restraint of trade, and there is no 
 business here of a society to be protected. The business 
 that is intended to be protected, as I understand the argu- 
 ment of the plaintiffs, is the business of each individual 
 member, but the agreement is not the agreement of Mr. A. and 
 Mr. B., mere members of the society, it is the agreement of all 
 the members with the society itself. I think that this is an 
 unreasonable restraint. It is quite enough for me to dispose 
 of this motion on that ground, and I think it is an agreement 
 which I ought not to enforce as between the society and any 
 member, or as between any members of the society itself." 
 
 The Court of Appeal (Cotton, Bowen, and Fry, L. JJ. 
 affirmed the judgment of Chitty, J. " We have not," said 
 
 T.U.A. 8 
 
114 TEADE UNION ACT (1871) AMENDMENT ACT, 1876. 
 
 S.16. the former, " to deal with the question here as to whether 
 the members of this body might have enforced a covenant 
 exclusively pointed to preventing the members from injuring 
 one another in a particular way by improperly acquiring 
 information which had been gained by the servants of one 
 another. The 44th article ... is perfectly general. ... So 
 that generally if any out-door employe were in the service of 
 any member of this society, even for a week, and then left, 
 he could not be employed, if this covenant is a good one, by 
 any other member of the association. That, of itself, might 
 be used most oppressively, and although in the present case 
 ... it might be proper, if the covenant were aptly framed, 
 to restrain the defendants from employing a particular 
 individual so as to prejudice his late employer by using 
 knowledge he had got confidentially, yet there is no restric- 
 tion or limitation in this' covenant at all. It is very like the 
 case which Lord Justice Bo wen referred to of Hilton v. 
 EcTfersley, [see p. 50] in which there was an attempt to regulate 
 the way in which certain members of the association were to 
 carry on their trade. That is a difficulty here. But in my 
 opinion the great objection to this covenant is that it might 
 be used most oppressively by preventing a man who had 
 never been in any confidential position, and never desired 
 improperly to use the information he had then acquired, 
 from getting employment from another master in the trade 
 which he knew most about and which he could best carry 
 on." "It appears to me," added Fry, L. J., "that a 
 covenant might have been framed which possibly might have 
 been good, that is to say, that the masters might have con- 
 tracted not to use in competition with one another knowledge 
 confidentially obtained. It is said the object of this clause is 
 to give effect to that intention. But it has gone far beyond 
 it. ... I think . . . the restraint of trade and of the liberty 
 of her Majesty's subjects in gaining eniploj^ment is far in 
 excess of any legitimate purpose of the contracting parties." 
 Part of the headnote to this is : " Whether the society was 
 to any and what extent within the Trade Union Acts, 1871 
 & 1876, queere." 
 
THE LAKCENY ACT, 1868. B.I. 
 
 31-2 V. 116. 
 
 An Act to amend the Law relating to Larceny and 
 Embezzlement. [31st July, 1868. 
 
 The name of this statute is fixed by 59-60 V. 14, The 
 Short Titles Act, 1896. 
 
 1. If any person, being a member of any Member of 
 
 co-pavtner- 
 
 co-partnership, or being one of two or more 
 beneficial owners of any money, goods, or effects, 
 bills, notes, securities, or other property, shall 
 steal or embezzle any such money, goods, or effects, Se'to be 
 
 ., tried as if 
 
 bills, notes, securities, or other property of or not such 
 
 * . member. 
 
 belonging to any such copartnership or to such 
 joint beneficial owners, every such person shall 
 be liable to be dealt with, tried, convicted, and 
 punished for the same as if such person had not 
 been or was not a member of such co-partnership 
 or one of such beneficial owners. 
 
 " At common law a co-owner could not steal property from 
 his other co-owners. This was altered in 1868* by 31-2 
 V. 116, commonly called Mr. Russell Gurney's Act. It 
 was passed in consequence of cases occurring in which trade 
 
 * " 1867 " is a misprint. The Act was sometimes called " The 
 Recorder's " (e.g., Reg. v. Blackburn, 11 Cox, p. 161), as Mr. 
 Russell Gurney, at whose instance it was passed, was Recorder of 
 London. 
 
 82 
 
116 THE LARCENY ACT, 1868. 
 
 S. 1. unions had been robbed with impunity by persons in their 
 """ employment, who were also members of the body, and so 
 co-owners of its funds " (3 Stephen, History of the Criminal 
 Law, p. 159). Such* being its origin, it is the more remarkable 
 that the prisoner in Reg. v. Stainer, in 1870 (L. R. 1 C. C. R. 
 230 ; 11 Cox, 483 ; 39 L. J. M. C. 54), was indicted, not under 
 this Act, which was not even mentioned, but, apparently, 
 under 32-3 V. 61. See p. 119. 
 
 The offence was substantially the same as that alleged hi 
 Reg. v. Blackburn in 1868 (11 Cox, 157), which counsel said 
 was the first prosecution under Russell Gurney's Act.' 
 
 As the Act of 1869 (32-3 V. 61) is no longer in force (see p. 119), 
 Reg. v. Stainer is dealt with here. The prisoner was a local 
 secretary and member of the " Power Loom Carpet Weavers' 
 Mutual Defence and Provident Association of Kidderminster 
 and Stourport " ; neither the original nor the revised rules 
 of the society were enrolled or certified under the Friendly 
 Societies Acts. It was in respect of money received by the 
 prisoner as local secretary that he was charged at Quarter 
 Sessions with embezzlement. For the defence it was con- 
 tended that the society was established, in part at least, for 
 an illegal object, and for this purpose certain rules were 
 relied upon, and it was urged that an acquittal should be 
 directed. This objection was overruled and the prisoner 
 was found guilty. In stating a case, the chairman referred 
 seriatim to the rules impugned, and added that the society 
 had occasionally contributed to the support of men on strike, 
 otherwise there was no evidence that the funds were used 
 for any illegal purpose. The Court for Crown Cases Reserved 
 (Cockburn, C. J., Byles and Keating, JJ.,Pigott andCleasby, 
 BB.) was unanimously of opinion that the conviction was right. 
 Cockburn, C. J., said : " In this society there is nothing criminal 
 either in its purposes or its operation. Its primary objects 
 are laudable. There are, however, one or two rules with 
 reference to the seeking of employment and other matters 
 which would come within the purposes of a trades union." 
 * But see Introduction, p. 7. 
 
THE LAECENY ACT, 1868. 117 
 
 Keferring to 82-3 V. 61 (see p. 119), his Lordship added, S. 1. 
 " This statute is, however, at all events an indication of the 
 intention of the Legislature that trades unions shall have rights 
 of property which are to be protected by the criminal law. 
 I think, therefore, that it is clear that societies such as this 
 are not criminal, because the Legislature could never have 
 intended that a criminal society should have the benefit of 
 the Friendly Societies Act. It is absurd to suppose that it 
 was intended that these societies should be able to prosecute 
 before justices those who had embezzled their money, and 
 yet should not be able to indict a criminal at the Assizes. 
 The recent statute is equivalent to a declaration by the Legis- 
 lature that societies having rules in restraint of trade have no 
 defect on that account in their title to property in proceed- 
 ings in criminal law." Byles, J., said : " Some of the objects 
 of this society may be unlawful, as being in restraint of trade 
 and so void, but the objects are not criminal." Keating, J., 
 said : " The only illegality suggested in this case is the object 
 of one or two rules which are in restraint of trade. It may 
 be impossible to enforce these rules as being illegal, in the 
 sense of being void, but are they within the criminal law ? 
 Is the illegality such as to ^deprive the funds of the society 
 of the protection given by the criminal law ? I think not." 
 Cleasby, B., said : " The foundation of the argument against 
 the conviction is, that this society could have no servants. 
 I think this is not the law." 
 
 Cf . Lindley , L. J.'s judgment in Swaine v. Wilson. See p. 63. 
 Reg. v. Stainer was approved in Reg. v. Tankard in 1893 
 (1894, 1 Q. B. 548 ; 63 L. J. M. C. 61 ; 17 Cox, 719), where the 
 indictment was drawn under this Act (1868). " The prisoner 
 was the treasurer and a member of a trading club which was 
 an unregistered association of more than twenty persons, 
 such as is prohibited from being formed by sect. 4 of the 
 Companies Act, 1862," and was convicted of embezzle- 
 meut. The Court for Crown Cases Eeserved (Coleridge, 
 L. C. J., Mathew, Granthani, Lawrance and Collins, JJ.) 
 unanimously confirmed the conviction. " There are," said 
 
118 THE LARCENY ACT, 1868. 
 
 Ss. 1, 2. Coleridge, L. C. J., " a number of persons who join them- 
 ~ selves together, not for any criminal purpose, but their 
 joining together is not legalised. It is true that they have no 
 .legal existence as a company, association, or co-partnership, 
 but they are none the less beneficial owners of property. In 
 the indictment, the property was properly laid in the prisoner, 
 W. Jackson, and others, as beneficial owners. It does not 
 follow that because the club had no legal existence as a com- 
 pany, association or co-partnership, the members had no 
 legal existence as beneficial owners of property. It is untrue 
 to say that they are not beneficial owners in fact. It has 
 been decided in Reg. v. Stainer, before trade unions were 
 legalised, that where the property was laid in an association 
 in the nature of a trade union, it did not follow that a person 
 could not be convicted of stealing or embezzling their pro- 
 perty because the association did not in all respects conform 
 to the law, and the grounds of that decision apply here. It 
 seems to me that the case for the prisoner is gone the 
 moment his counsel is obliged to admit that if his conten- 
 tion be good, the property belonged to nobody and could, so 
 to speak, be scrambled for. It would be a very strong thing 
 to hold that an association not expressly sanctioned by law, 
 yet not criminal, is incapable of holding any property at all." 
 "Co-part- In Reg. v. Robson, in 1885 (15 Cox, 772), the meaning of 
 " co-partnership " in this section was discussed. The Court 
 for Crown Cases Reserved (Coleridge, L.C.J.,Denman, Field, 
 Hawkins and Wills, JJ.) was unanimously of opinion that the 
 term, hi modern usage, is confined to societies formed for gain, 
 and the conviction of the prisoner, a member of a Young Men's 
 Christian Association, for embezzling their money , on an indict- 
 ment under this section as " a member of a co-partnership," 
 was quashed. It seems that if he had been indicted as one 
 of several joint beneficial owners, it could have been sustained. 
 
 clerks or 
 servants. 
 
 provisions of the Act passed in the 
 ed to session of Parliament held in the eighteenth and 
 nineteenth years of Her present Majesty's reign, 
 
THE LAECENY ACT, 1868. 119 
 
 intituled An Act for diminishing Expense and Delay Ss. 2, 3. 
 in the administration of Criminal Justice in certain 
 Cases, shall extend and be applicable to the offence 
 of -embezzlement by clerks or servants, or persons 
 employed for the purpose or in the capacity of 
 clerks or servants, and the said Act shall hence- 
 forth be read as if the said offence of embezzlement 
 had been included therein. 
 
 Most of this Act is repealed, in so far as it relates to 
 England, by 42-3 V. 49. It still applies to Ireland. 
 
 3. This Act shall not extend to Scotland. Extent of 
 
 Act. 
 
 THE TKADES UNIONS FUNDS PKOTECTION 
 ACT, 1869. 
 
 32-3 V. 61. 
 
 This Act* expired in 1871 ; it is therefore not worth while 
 to set it out. For the circumstances in which it was passed, 
 see the Annual Kegister for 1869, p. 176.] 
 
 * " It is presumed that even before this statute a trades union 
 might have maintained an action against an officer who had mis- 
 appropriated their funds, for money had and received to their use 
 (cf . Tenant v. Elliott, 1 B. & P. 3)." Jolly, Contracts in Kestraint 
 of Trade, p. 50. This is an interesting speculation. Criminal 
 proceedings had failed in Hornljy v. Close and Farrer v. Close. 
 See p. 48 and p. 51. 
 
THE CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT ACT, 1871. 
 34-5 V. 32. 
 
 As to the origin of this statute, cf. p. 28. 
 
 This Act " was repealed by 38 & 39 Viet. c. 86, s. 17 
 (see p. 164), in consequence of the decision in R. v. Bunn, 
 (12 Cox, 316) in 1872, that improper combination to control 
 a master was still a common law offence " (Archbold's 
 Criminal Pleadings, 22nd ed., p. 1102). Part of the headnote 
 to that case runs : " An indictment for conspiracy at common 
 law will lie against two or more persons for conspiring to 
 commit an offence for which special provision is made by 
 statute. The defendants, servants of a gas company under 
 contract of service, being offended by the dismissal of a 
 fellow- servant, agreed together to quit the service of their 
 employers without notice and in breach of their contracts of 
 service, by reason of which the company were seriously 
 impeded in the conduct of their business. . . . Held, that the 
 provisions of the statute [34-5 V. 32] had not affected the 
 common law of conspiracy, for which an indictment would lie." 
 
 The prisoners were found guilty of conspiracy " to do a 
 lawful act by unlawful means." They were acquitted of 
 conspiracy to do an unlawful act. 
 
 Reg. v. Bunn was overruled by Gibson v. Lawson. See 
 p. 131. According to Sir J. F. Stephen (3 History of the 
 Criminal Law, c. 30), the decision in the Gas Stokers' case* 
 " caused a real dissatisfaction amongst those who were 
 principally affected by it," and led not only to the repeal of 
 this statute but to the enactment of 38-9 V. 86. See p. 123 
 
 * According to the same writer this was the last occasion on 
 which the course was taken of asserting a power " inherent in the 
 Judges" of declaring acts to be offences at common law which 
 were never so declared before, i.e., by " the treatment of con- 
 spiracies in restraint of trade as a common law misdemeanour." 
 The history of this matter " is by no means favourable to the 
 declaration by the bench of new offences " (Ibid. c. 34). 
 
THE FALSIFICATION OF ACCOUNTS s. 1. 
 
 ACT, 1875.* 
 
 38-9 V. 24. 
 
 An Act to amend the Law with reference to the 
 Falsification of Accounts. [29 June, 1875. 
 
 1. If any clerk, officer, or servant, or any per- Punishment 
 
 J J * for falsiftca- 
 
 son employed or acting in the capacity of a 
 clerk, officer, or servant, shall wilfully and with 
 intent to defraud destroy, alter, mutilate, or falsify 
 any book, paper, writing, valuable security, or 
 account which belongs to or is in the possession of 
 his employer, or has been received by him for or 
 on behalf of his employer, or shall wilfully and 
 with intent to defraud make or concur in making 
 any false entry in, or omit or alter, or concur in 
 omitting or altering, any material particular from 
 or in any such book, or any document or account, 
 then in every such case the person so offending 
 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and be liable to 
 be kept in penal servitude for a term not exceeding 
 seven years, or to be imprisoned with or without hard 
 labour for any term not exceeding two years. 
 
 4 ' Or to be imprisoned . . . 2 years." 
 Repealed 56-7 V. 54 (S. L. R. (No. 2) Act, 1893). 
 
 * See Introduction, p. 9. The Act is inserted here because it 
 might protect unregistered Trade Unions. 
 
122 THE FALSIFICATION OF ACCOUNTS ACT, 1875. 
 
 Ss. 2, 3, 4. 2. It shall be sufficient in any indictment under 
 intention to this Act to allege a general intent to defraud, 
 
 defraud 
 
 iudictnient w i tnout naming any particular person intended to 
 
 be defrauded. 
 
 Act to i>e 3. This Act shall be read as one with the Act of 
 24 & 25 vict. the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth of Her Majesty, 
 
 c. 90. 
 
 chapter ninety-six. 
 
 I.e., The Larceny Act, 1861. 
 
 short title. 4. This Act may be cited as the Falsification of 
 Accounts Act, 1875. 
 
THE CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION OF Ss. 1,2, 3. 
 PROPERTY ACT, 1875. 
 
 38-9 V. 86. 
 
 An Act for amending the Law relating to Con- 
 spiracy, and to the Protection of Property, and for 
 other purposes. [13th August, 1875. 
 
 1. This Act may be cited as the Conspiracy and short title 
 Protection of Property Act, 1875. 
 
 2. This Act shall come into operation on the first commence- 
 
 * < mentofAct. 
 
 day of September one thousand eight hundred and 
 seventy-five. 
 
 Repealed by 56-7 V. 54, a Statute Law Revision Act. 
 
 Conspiracy, and Protection of Property: 
 
 3. An agreement or combination by two or more Amendment 
 
 of law as to 
 
 persons to do or procure to be done any act in gfgj^J * 
 contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute dis P utes - 
 between employers and workmen shall not be 
 indictable as a conspiracy if such act committed 
 by one person would not be punishable as a crime. 
 Nothing in this section shall exempt from 
 punishment any persons guilty of a conspiracy for 
 which a punishment is awarded by any Act of 
 Parliament. 
 
124 CONSPIRACY AND PEOTECTION, Ac., ACT, 1875. 
 
 SB. 3, 4. Nothing in this section shall affect the law 
 relating to riot, unlawful assembly, breach of the 
 peace, or sedition, or any offence against the State 
 or the Sovereign. 
 
 A crime for the purposes of this section means 
 an offence punishable on indictment, or an offence 
 which is punishable on summary conviction, and 
 for the commission of which the offender is liable 
 under the statute making the offence punishable to 
 be imprisoned either absolutely or at the discretion 
 of the Court as an alternative for some other 
 punishment. 
 
 Where a person is convicted of any such agree- 
 ment or combination as aforesaid to do or procure 
 to be done an act which . is punishable only on 
 summary conviction, and is sentenced to imprison- 
 ment, the imprisonment shall not exceed three 
 months, or such longer time, if any, as may have 
 been prescribed by the statute for the punishment 
 of the said act when committed by one person. 
 
 " The 3rd section of [this] Act distinctly legalises strikes 
 in the broadest terms, subject to the exceptions enumerated 
 in the 4th and 5th sections, which immediately follow, and 
 are almost in the nature of provisoes upon the 3rd " (per 
 Coleridge, L. C. J., Gibson v. Lawson (1891, 2 Q. B. at 558). 
 See p. 132. 
 
 Breach of 4. Where a person employed by a municipal 
 
 contract by 
 
 persons^ authority or by any company or contractor upon 
 
 gaor y water wnom ' l<& imposed by Act of Parliament the duty, or 
 
 who have otherwise assumed the duty of supplying 
 
CONSPIEACY AND PKOTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 125 
 
 any city, borough, town, or place, or any part s - 4 - 
 thereof, with gas or water, wilfully and maliciously 
 breaks a contract of service with that authority 
 or company or contractor, knowing or having 
 reasonable cause to believe that the probable con- 
 sequences of his so doing, either alone or in 
 combination with others, will be to deprive the 
 inhabitants of that city, borough, town, place, or 
 part, wholly or to a great extent of their supply of 
 gas or water, he shall on conviction thereof by a 
 court of summary jurisdiction or on indictment as 
 herein-after mentioned, be liable .either to pay a 
 penalty not exceeding twenty pounds or to be 
 imprisoned for a term not exceeding three months, 
 with or without hard labour. 
 
 Every such municipal authority, company, or 
 contractor as is mentioned in this section shall 
 cause to be posted up, at the gasworks or water- 
 works, as the case may be, belonging to such 
 authority or company or contractor, a printed 
 copy of this section in some conspicuous place 
 where the same may be conveniently read by 
 the persons employed, and as often as such 
 copy becomes defaced, obliterated, or destroyed, 
 shall cause it to be renewed with all reasonable 
 despatch. 
 
 If any municipal authority or company or con- 
 tractor make default in complying with the provi- 
 sions of this section in relation to such notice as 
 
126 CONSPIEACY AND PEOTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 
 
 Ss. 4, 5, 6. aforesaid, they or he shall incur on summary 
 conviction a penalty not exceeding five pounds for 
 every day during which such default continues, and 
 every person who unlawfully injures, defaces, or 
 covers up any notice so posted up as aforesaid in 
 pursuance of this Act, shall be liable on sum- 
 mary conviction to a penalty not exceeding forty 
 shillings. 
 
 5. Where any person wilfully and maliciously 
 
 Breach of - 
 
 fnvoiJin breaks a contract of service or of hiring, knowing 
 pmwniar or having reasonable cause to believe (hat the 
 property, pro^g^e consequences of his so doing, either alone 
 or in combination with others, will be to endanger 
 human life, or cause serious bodily injury, or to 
 expose valuable property whether real or personal 
 to destruction or serious injury, he shall 011 convic- 
 tion thereof by a court of summary jurisdiction, or 
 on indictment as herein-after mentioned, be liable 
 either to pay a penalty not exceeding twenty pounds, 
 or to be imprisoned for a term not exceeding three 
 months, with or without hard labour. 
 
 Miscellaneous. 
 
 Penalty for 6. "Where a master, being legally liable to 
 muter 5 provide for his servant or apprentice necessary 
 clothing, &c! food, clothing, medical aid, or lodging, wilfully 
 
 for servant 
 
 OT appren- an( j without lawful excuse refuses or neglects to 
 provide the same, whereby the health of the 
 
CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 127 
 
 servant or apprentice is or is likely to be seriously Ss> 6 7 - 
 or permanently injured, he shall on summary 
 conviction be liable either to pay a penalty not 
 exceeding twenty pounds, or to be imprisoned for 
 a term not exceeding six months, with or without 
 hard labour. 
 
 7. Every person who, with a view to compel any Penalty for 
 other person to abstain from doing or to do any 
 act which such other person has a legal right to 
 do or abstain from doing, wrongfully and without 
 legal authority, 
 
 1. Uses violence to or intimidates such other 
 person or his wife or children, or injures his 
 property; or, 
 
 2. Persistently follows such other person about 
 from place to place ; or, 
 
 3. Hides any tools, clothes, or other property 
 owned or used by such other person, or 
 deprives him of or hinders him in the use 
 thereof; or, 
 
 4. Watches or besets the house or other place 
 where such other person resides, or works, 
 or carries on business, or happens to be, or 
 the approach to such house or place ; or, 
 
 5. Follows such other person with two or more 
 other persons in a disorderly manner in or 
 through any street or road, 
 
 shall, on conviction thereof by a court of sum- 
 mary jurisdiction, or on indictment as herein-after 
 
128 CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 
 
 8 - 7 - mentioned, be liable either to pay a penalty not 
 exceeding twenty pounds, or to be imprisoned for a 
 term not exceeding three months, with or without 
 hard labour. 
 
 Attending at or near the house or place where 
 a person resides, or works, or carries on business, 
 or happens to be, or the approach to such house or 
 place, in order merely to obtain or communicate 
 information, shall not be deemed a watching or 
 besetting within the meaning of this section. 
 
 "With a View." "'View' does not import motive. 
 It imports purpose" (per Chitty, L. J., in Lyons and Sons 
 v. Wilkins). See p. 189. 
 
 " Any act." In 1892 the justices of Sunderland, on the 
 information of a district superintendent of the Shipping 
 Federation, Limited, convicted an officer of the National 
 Amalgamated Seamen's and Firemen's Union, which was 
 at variance with the former body. He was summoned for 
 that he " unlawfully, with a view to compel the informant 
 to abstain from doing or to do acts which the informant 
 had a legal right to do or abstain from doing, wrongfully 
 and without legal authority persistently followed the infor- 
 mant about from place to place, and followed the informant 
 with two or more other persons, in a disorderly manner, 
 in or through High Street," &c. The defendant elected to 
 be dealt with summarily, and the conviction stated that he, 
 " with a view to compel one L. to abstain from doing acts 
 which he the said L. had a legal right to do," unlawfully 
 followed, &c. A rule nisi was obtained calling on the Justices 
 to show cause why a writ of certiorari should not issue to 
 bring up and quash the conviction ; one ground was that the 
 summons and conviction ought to have specified the acts 
 therein referred to. 
 
 The justices stated in their affidavit that they found that 
 
CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 129 
 
 the defendant's object was "to compel him to abstain from S. 7. 
 following his occupation as the agent of the Shipping Federa- "~ 
 tion, an act which he had a legal right to do." The Queen's 
 Bench Division quashed the conviction on the ground 
 mentioned. 
 
 " The conviction," said Collins, J., " does not altogether 
 follow the wording of the summons. . . . When the section 
 constituting the offence is looked at, it is obvious that the 
 defect is one of substance and not one merely of form. . . . 
 The Legislature might, had it chosen to do so, have consti- 
 tuted the mere following a person in a disorderly manner an 
 offence. It has not so chosen, and it is clear that the gist 
 and pith of the offence here is not the following in a dis- 
 orderly manner, but the doing so with a view to compel the 
 informant to abstain from doing some act which he had a 
 legal right to do. If the defendant could have shown that 
 he had had no such view, or that the informant had had no 
 legal right to do the act which the defendant had desired to 
 compel him to abstain from doing, that would have been a 
 good answer to the charge. The conviction, therefore, does 
 not address itself to the real pith of the offence, and it does 
 not seem to me to comply with either the terms or substance 
 of the statute. 
 
 " But then it is said that it might nevertheless be cured by 
 amendment. I think that that might be so if it was clearly 
 shown to us that the offence constituted by the Act w r as in 
 fact proved before the magistrates. It is a good test to 
 see what the magistrates had actually before them. As it 
 seems to me, the laxity which is expressed in the conviction 
 is also apparent in the mode in which they dealt with the 
 offence charged. The affidavit of the justices says that it 
 was proved that the defendant had followed the informant 
 in a disorderly manner and with two or more persons * with 
 a view to compel him to abstain from following his occupa- 
 tion as the agent of the Shipping Federation, an act which 
 he had a legal right to do.' They appear to have treated 
 that as one act. Obviously, the following of an occupation 
 
 T.U.A. 9 
 
130 CONSPIEACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 
 
 S. 7. must consist of a large number of acts, and I think, unless 
 ~~ the prosecution could specify some particular act which the 
 defendant desired to compel the informant to abstain from 
 doing, it is impossible to say that he was properly convicted 
 of an offence under the section. It seems, therefore, to me, 
 that any amendment of the conviction is out of the question 
 here, as the facts proved at the hearing do not point to any 
 such specific act " (Reg. v. McKenzie, 1892, 2 Q. B. 519). 
 
 Bruce, J., in concurring, said : " It was formerly necessary 
 in order to render a conviction good to set out in it all the 
 facts constituting the offence in order that the offence itself 
 might appear in the conviction. But by sect. 39 (1) of the 
 Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, it is provided that the 
 description of any offence in the words of the Act creating 
 the offence shall be sufficient in law. I am inclined to think, 
 therefore, that, if this conviction had followed the words of 
 the Act, even although it did not specify the particular act 
 which the informant was intended to be prevented from 
 doing, it would be sufficient. But the conviction here speaks 
 of acts and not of ' an act,' and therefore it does not follow 
 the words of the section. That seems to be a sufficient 
 variance and a variance in substance, and it is plain that the 
 magistrates had not any particular act present to their minds." 
 But "a commitment under this section for 'following in 
 a disorderly manner with a view to compel one A. B. to 
 abstain from working as a shoe-finisher in the employment 
 of one C. D., a shoe manufacturer, carrying on business in 
 the parish of E.,' is a good one, inasmuch as it contains a 
 sufficient description of a specified act from which the 
 complainant was compelled to abstain" (per Cave and 
 Lawrance, JJ., Ex parte Wilkins, 64 L. J. M. C. 221 ; 18 
 Cox, 161, in 1895). "In the case of Beg. v. McKenzie" 
 said the former, " I share the doubt expressed by Mr. Justice 
 Bruce whether, if the commitment there had followed the 
 words of the statute, it would not have been good without 
 further specification of any particular act. The point of 
 that case, and the only point, was that the commitment did 
 
CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 131 
 
 not fully follow the form of the statute. . . . But here the S. 7. 
 conviction is a perfectly good one in form and substance. ..." 
 The object of the following, as alleged, was to prevent the 
 complainant from working at his employment as specified. 
 That is the very offence pointed at in the section." 
 
 As to the form of indictment under this s., see Beg. v. 
 Edmondes (59 J. P. 776), in 1895. 
 
 (1) "Intimidates." The meaning of this word was 
 considered, in 1891, in two cases ordered to be argued, on 
 appeal, before a specially constituted court, which consisted 
 of Coleridge, L. C. J., Mathew, Cave, A. L. Smith, and 
 Charles, JJ. 
 
 In Gibson v. Lawson (1891, 2 Q. B. 547) the Lord Chief 
 Justice delivered the judgment of the Court, whence the facts 
 sufficiently appear : " The magistrates having dismissed the 
 charge, the appeal is against the dismissal of the summons 
 a course, no doubt, open to the appellant under 42-3 V. 49, 33. 
 This summons was under 38-9 .V. 86, 7, and charged in 
 substance that the respondent unlawfully intimidated the 
 appellant. 
 
 " The respondent was employed as a fitter in the j^ard of an 
 iron shipbuilding company ; the appellant was employed in 
 the same capacity in the same yard. The respondent was a 
 member of a society called the Amalgamated Society, and 
 the appellant was a member of a society called the National 
 Society. On December 3rd, 1890, a meeting of the Amalga- 
 mated Society was held, at which it was resolved that the 
 members of that society would strike unless the appellant 
 left his society and joined theirs. The respondent communi- 
 cated this resolution to the foreman of the shipbuilding 
 company, who communicated it to the appellant. There- 
 upon the appellant had an interview with the respondent. 
 In the result the respondent informed the appellant that the 
 Amalgamated Society were determined to carry their resolu- 
 tion into effect, but gave him till the morning of Saturday, 
 December 6th, to make up his mind. The appellant adhered 
 to his own society, and the shipbuilding company, in order 
 
 92 
 
132 CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 
 
 S. 7. to avoid a strike, dismissed him from their yard. It is 
 ~~ expressly found in the case that no violence or threats of 
 violence to person or property were used to the appellant ; 
 but he swore that he 'was afraid, because of what the 
 respondent had said, that he would lose his work, and would 
 not get employment anywhere where the Amalgamated 
 Society predominated numerically over his own society.' 
 These are the whole of the material facts, and on these facts the 
 magistrates dismissed the summons and, we think, rightly. 
 
 "The 3rd sect, of [this] Act distinctly legalises strikes in 
 the broadest terms, subject to the exceptions enumerated in 
 the 4th and 5th sects., which immediately follow, and are 
 almost in the nature of provisoes upon the third. . . . The 
 Act 34-5 V. 32 was passed in 1871, after, therefore, the 
 charge to the jury by the present Lord Bramwell in Reg- 
 v. Druitt * (10 Cox, C. C. 592), which was in 1867. Whether 
 the Act was produced by the charge, it is profitless to 
 inquire. The last proviso of the 1st section is plainly incon- 
 sistent with the charge and still more inconsistent with the 
 language of Crompton and Hill, JJ., who, in Hilton v. 
 Eclcerslcy (6 E. & B. 47 ; 24 L. J. Q. B. 353), and Walsly v. 
 Ariley (30 L. J. M. C. 121), had, the one declared, and the other 
 suggested that strikes were per se criminal at common 
 law. . . . The statute 34-5 V. 32 is not, indeed, conceived 
 in any weak spirit of tenderness to workmen, but the 
 2nd sub-s. of sect. 1 limits ' intimidation ' in that sub- 
 section to such intimidation as would justify a magistrate in 
 
 * According to the headnote of that case : " The defendants were 
 members of a -trade union of the tailors. The workmen having, at 
 the instigation of the union, struck for wages, and the masters 
 having employed workpeople, men and women, not being members 
 of the union, the defendants, who were members of the managing 
 committee of the union, caused ' pickets ' to be statione'd about 
 the doors of such employers to note workpeople who went in and 
 out, for the purpose of deterring them from continuing in such 
 employ, and inducing them to join the union. Proof was given 
 of the use of insulting expressions and gestures used by ' the 
 pickets ' to the non-union workpeople. Held, to be ' intimida- 
 tion.' 'molestation,' and 'obstruction' within the meaning of 
 6 G. IV. 120, 3, and 22 V. 84, 1." 
 
GONSPIEACY AND PBOTECTION, Ac., ACT, 1875. 133 
 
 binding over the intimidator to keep the peace towards the S. 7. 
 person intimidated, in other words, to such intimidation as 
 implies a threat of personal violence. * Of such intimidation 
 there is in this case no evidence whatever ; but it is truly 
 said that this statute is repealed, and is of importance only 
 so far as its object and language may throw light upon the 
 existing statute. . . . It seems clear, however, that, looking 
 at the course of legislation, and keeping in mind the changing 
 temper of the times on this subject, the word ' intimidate ' 
 in the 7th sect, of the later Act cannot reasonably be con- 
 strued in a wider and severer sense than the same word in 
 the 2nd sub-s. of sect. 1 of the earlier Act. ' Intimidate 
 is not, as has been often said by judges of authority, a term 
 of art it is a word of common speech and every- day use ; 
 and it must receive, therefore, a reasonable and sensible 
 interpretation according to the circumstances of the cases 
 as they arise from time to time. We do not propose to 
 attempt an exhaustive definition of the word, nor a com- 
 plete enumeration of the cases to which it may be properly, 
 nor of those to which it may be improperly, applied. It is 
 enough for us to say that in this case it appears to us that 
 there was nothing which, under any reasonable construction 
 of the word ' intimidate,' could be brought within it. 
 Whether the action of the Amalgamated Society was 
 morally right or not is a matter on which we express no 
 opinion, because it is not the question. before us. It seems 
 to us that it was not illegal within the words of the Act of 
 Parliament under which the summons was issued. 
 
 " This, however, does not entirely dispose of the question, 
 for we were very properly reminded of the cases of Reg. v. 
 Druitt and Beg. v. Bunn [see p. 120] , in which Lord Brarn- 
 well and Lord Esher . . . are both said to have held that the 
 statutes on the subject have in no way interfered with or 
 altered the common law, and that strikes and combinations 
 
 * " Whether that was rather a narrow view to take of the clause 
 or not I do not -pause to inquire." Lindley, L. J., in Lyons v. 
 Scop. 109. 
 
134 CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 
 
 S. 7. expressly legalised by statute may yet be treated as indict- 
 ~~ able conspiracies at common law, and may be punished by 
 imprisonment with hard labour. Neither of these cases is 
 very satisfactorily reported ; in neither was there any motive 
 for questioning the dicta of the Judges. In the one tried by 
 Lord Esher there was 110 opportunity, in consequence of the 
 prisoner having been acquitted on all the counts to which the 
 alleged ruling applied. [See p. 120.] 
 
 " We are well aware of the great authority of the judges by 
 whom the above cases were decided, but we are unable to 
 concur hi these dicta, and, speaking with all deference, we 
 think they are not law. It seems to us that to hold that the 
 very same acts which are expressly legalised by statute 
 remain nevertheless crimes punishable by the common law 
 is contrary to good sense and elementary principle, and that 
 the reports, therefore, cannot be correct. If the dicta are 
 law, they render the statutes passed on these subjects 
 practically inoperative, and these statutes might as well not 
 have been passed. The dicta are criticised in detail and with 
 great ability in Mr. Justice Wright's excellent work [1873] on 
 the Law of Criminal Conspiracies and Agreements, pp. 50-59. 
 It is difficult to withhold assent from the statements and 
 reasonings contained in those pages, and it seems to us that 
 the law concerning combinations in reference to trade 
 disputes is contained in 38-9 V. 86, and in the statutes 
 referred to in it, and that acts which are not indictable under 
 that statute are not now, if indeed they ever were, indictable 
 at common law." 
 
 In the other case, Curranv. Treleaven (Ibid.), the facts 
 also sufficiently appear from the following excerpts from the 
 judgment of Coleridge, L. C. J. : " In order to prevent the 
 employment by Mr. Treleaven of non-union men, the three 
 secretaries told him that if he did not cease to employ non- 
 union men they, the secretaries, would call off from their 
 employment by him all the members of their respective 
 unions. Mr. Treleaven refused compliance with their de- 
 mands, and thereupon the secretaries called off their 
 
CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 135 
 
 respective union men, who, in obedience to the call, struck S. 7, 
 work. The facts are stated to us as follows by the learned 
 Recorder : . . . ' On October 14th, there was a meeting of the 
 unions, at which it was resolved to adopt the course which 
 the defendants had stated at their interview would be adopted, 
 and accordingly, on the 15th, the defendants, in the presence 
 of Mr. Treleaven, whom they had asked to attend, made the 
 following statement to Mr. Treleaven's workmen and others 
 who were assembled at the wharf : " Inasmuch as Mr. 
 Treleaven still insists on employing non-union men, we, 
 your officials, call upon all union men to leave their work. 
 Use no violence, use no immoderate language, but quietly 
 cease to work and go home." The orders thus given were 
 obeyed, and the union men who were unloading Mr. 
 Treleaven's ships immediately ceased unloading them, 
 although they had not completed the work that they were 
 under contract to perform." He has also found, ... or 
 rather he has expressed his opinion upon the two following 
 facts or points in these words . . . with reference to the 
 particular question of intimidation : ' That the defendants 
 did not desire or intend that any violence should be used or 
 injury done to Mr. Treleaven or his property ; that it was 
 not proved that their words or acts were calculated directly 
 to cause any such violence or injury, although I am of 
 opinion that Mr. Treleaven was not unreasonably afraid that 
 such violence or injury might occur from the action of the 
 members of the unions, in consequence of the strike, but 
 against the wishes and intentions of the defendants ; that 
 the defendants had no illwill against Mr. Treleaven 
 personally, but acted with the object of obliging all the 
 labourers to join the union as a means of getting employ- 
 ment, and of obtaining for the members of the unions a 
 monopoly of the labour of the port.' He held . . . that the 
 facts above stated constituted intimidation within the words 
 of the section, and that the appellants were properly con- 
 victed by the magistrates of intimidating. We are unable 
 to agree with him. . . . We say that, to tell an employer 
 
136 CONSPIEACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 
 
 s - 1' that if he employs workmen of a certain sort, the workmen 
 of another sort in his employ will be told to leave him, and 
 to tell the men, when the employer will not give way, * to 
 leave their work, use no violence,' &c., is certainly not 
 intimidation within any reasonable construction of the statute. 
 " Two further observations are necessary in order to make 
 our judgment complete and effective. We do not think 
 that the legislature intended by the change of words in 
 the 1st sub-s. of sect. 7 of 88-9 V. 86, to send the Courts 
 back to 6 G. IV. 129 for an interpretation of the word 
 'intimidate,' although the later statute did repeal 34-5 V. 
 32, which limited intimidation to cases which would justify 
 a magistrate in binding over the party to keep the peace. 
 There is, indeed, much to be said for the view entertained by 
 my learned brother Cave and acted upon by him ... in a case 
 tried before him at Liverpool (Reg. v. McKeevit, Liverpool 
 Assizes, December 16th, 1890, unreported), namely, that 
 intimidation in 38-9 V. 86, must still be limited to 
 threats of personal violence, as enacted by 34-5 V. 32. It 
 may become necessary to decide this point in time to 
 come; it is not now; and we confine ourselves to the 
 negative statement that 6 G. IV. 129, is not now on this 
 subject the governing statute." 
 
 6 G. IV. 129 was repealed in 1871 by 34-5 V. 32, 7. For 
 this latter Act see p. 120. 
 
 A threat to do any of the acts prohibited by sub-ss. (2), (3), 
 (4) or (5) (see p. 137) maybe " intimidation "under sub-s. (1). 
 
 In Judge v. Bennett in 1887 (52 J. P. 247 ; 36 W. B. 103), 
 the facts found were as follows ; There had been a strike 
 among the riveters in Mrs. Bennett's employ, whereupon 
 Judge, the secretary of a riveters' union, wrote to her : " I 
 have to inform you that the riveters in your employ have 
 determined not to again start work unless you are willing 
 to start the whole of them. Should you refuse to start them 
 all, the finishers will also be stopped, and your shop picketed 
 until such time that you comply with the conditions above 
 stated. ... If you are agreeable to take back all your 
 
CONSPIRACY AND PBOTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 137 
 
 hands the matter is settled. If not, then we shall fight it S. 7. 
 out to the end." She " refused to take back the men ; the 
 shop was ordered by the union to be picketed. Two men 
 paraded in turns before the front of the shop for three days. 
 It was admitted that the picketers behaved in an orderly 
 manner, and did not personally interfere with the work- 
 people going in and out of the respondent's shop, but a crowd 
 of four to five hundred people assembled in the roadway out- 
 side the shop, and the police were called upon by the respon- 
 dent to protect her shop from, as she alleged, a well-grounded 
 fear on her part of personal violence." A magistrate con- 
 victed Judge and a Divisional Court (Stephen and A. L. 
 Smith, JJ.) upheld the conviction. " Intimidation," said 
 the former, "is to use violence so as to make a person 
 afraid. It is not brought about by actual threats of violence 
 to a person or his property, but by attempting by any 
 means to make that person afraid, in this particular instance, 
 of doing or not doing that which such person has a legal 
 right to do or to refuse to do. If a man expresses his intention 
 to picket in such terms as to make the person addressed 
 afraid, that is sufficient to bring his action within the meaning 
 of intimidation.* I can imagine that such intention to picket 
 might be conveyed in such terms as to show that there was 
 no intention to do anything within the terms of this Act. 
 Here this determination was conveyed in such a way as to 
 cause fear." " Intimidation," said A. L. Smith, J., " is 
 not merely to use violence or to threaten to use violence. 
 Sub-s. 1 of sect. 7 shows this. What is the meaning of 
 * intimidates ' ? Why, the using of language which causes 
 another man to fear." 
 
 This case, said Mathew, J. (during the argument in Gibson 
 v. Lawsori), "would seem merely to have decided that a 
 threat to do something specifically prohibited by the statute, 
 if it in fact intimidates, is intimidation." 
 
 * " I am of opinion that the word intimidation may mean any 
 kind of threat, provided it made the person against whom it was 
 used reasonably afraid." (52 J. P. 2i8.) 
 
138 CONSPIKACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 
 
 S. 7. Thus, comparing the last two cases, it would seem that 
 
 ~ Mrs. Bennett had reasonable ground for fear, and Mr. Tre- 
 leaven had not. Note that in Judge's case the threat was 
 that someone else and not lie would picket. 
 
 (2) " Persistently follows." 
 
 In Smith v. Thomasson in 1890 (54 J. P. 596), the head- 
 note is : " S. being one of the workmen on strike, acted 
 as picket, and watched those who were employed as they 
 came out of the works. On T., a workman, coming out, the 
 crowd shouted names and threw refuse, and S. followed T. 
 close behind through several streets, but never spoke to T." 
 Justices convicted S. under this sub-s., and a Divisional 
 Court (Pollock, B. and Hawkins, J.) held that they were 
 right. " The legislature did not, in describing that offence 
 [persistently following] mean that there must be a number 
 of persons joining in the act of following. AVhat was 
 intended was to prevent the act of following persistently, 
 whatever the intention may have been. It must be for the 
 justices to say in any given case whether the conduct of the 
 defendant was in the nature of intimidation. If in this case 
 the appellant had been alone, even his silence in following 
 might have been something against him, but when it is shown 
 that a crowd of three hundred persons followed the respon- 
 dent, &c. . . . surely this is some evidence that he was 
 doing something of the same kind. He may have had 
 opportunities of speaking to the respondent, and did not 
 avail himself of the opportunity ; but as far as intention can 
 be inferred, we may look at what the people were doing at 
 the same time. All the circumstances tend to show the 
 general object." Per Pollock, B. " It is no doubt," said 
 Hawkins, J., " difficult to define what the statute meant 
 by persistent following. ... It is true the appellant did 
 not speak to the respondent, but still his conduct, taken 
 along with the conduct of the crowd, supplied abundant 
 evidence that he was persisently following from place to 
 place contrary to the statute." 
 
 (4) " Watches or Besets." In Reg. v. Bauld (13 Cox, 
 
CONSPIEACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 139 
 
 282), in 1876, where the defendants were indicted for having S. 7. 
 conspired, by means of watching and besetting, to compel 
 certain workmen to quit their employment, their counsel 
 argued that if the watching and besetting "were merely 
 done for the purpose of persuading the men to quit their 
 employment it would not be illegal," but Huddleston, B., 
 would not assent to that view of the law. " The statute," 
 he said, " allows watching or attending near a place for 
 the purpose of obtaining or communicating information, 
 but this is the only exception." 
 
 In J. Lyons and Sons v. WilUns (65 L. J. Ch. 601 ; (1896) 
 1 Ch. 811 ; 74 L. T. 358 ; 45 W. R. 19 ; 60 J. P. 325), Kay, L. J., 
 said, " The question involved is one of the highest possible 
 importance, because by this case the long struggle which 
 has been going on between trade unions and employers and 
 workmen is brought exactly to a point." 
 
 There the facts were the executive committee of a trade 
 union desired the plaintiffs to raise the wages of their work- 
 people and to alter their system from part piece-work and 
 part time-work to one wholly one or the other. In the end 
 a strike was ordered. Several of the workpeople gave notice 
 to end their engagements, and ceased work, and the plaintiffs' 
 works were picketed by persons employed by the executive 
 committee. Each picket had a card, headed with the union's 
 name, and running : " Dear Sir. You are hereby requested 
 to abstain from taking work from [plaintiffs] pending a 
 dispute. Members are also requested to use their influence 
 to keep non-society men, stitchers and machinists, &c., from 
 applying for work until the dispute is settled." " The 
 pickets accosted persons entering and leaving the plaintiffs' 
 premises, tried to persuade them not to work for the 
 plaintiffs, and gave them some of the cards. On one occa- 
 sion they opened a bag carried by an errand-boy who was 
 taking goods to the plaintiffs, and on one or two occasions 
 followed persons into the plaintiffs' works. . . . The execu- 
 tive committee endeavoured to get one Schoenthal, who was 
 a sub-manufacturer for the plaintiffs, to cease to do work for 
 
140 CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 
 
 S. 7. the plaintiffs, and on failing to do so they ordered a strike 
 ~ of, and picketed his works." 
 
 North, J., granted an interlocutory injunction against the 
 defendants, members of the executive committee. He held 
 that there was " strong evidence of malice," though he 
 thought it would be too strong to say that there was 
 "intimidation or terrorism. But the pickets do seem to 
 have carried it rather far." He refused that relief in respect 
 of the inducing the breaking of contracts and the libel alleged. 
 On a point of procedure, the learned Judge said : "I was 
 told that it was inconvenient to, try the question of malice 
 on an interlocutory motion, or afterwards on a motion to 
 commit, and Mr. Jenkins referred to the observation of Lord 
 Esher in Flood v. Jackson (1895, 2 Q. B. 38), where he said 
 the only recognised tribunal that could decide whether an 
 act is or is not malicious is a jury. I do not understand 
 that to mean that in no case of malice can an interlocutory 
 injunction be granted. It would have been quite unnecessary 
 to make any such statement in a case of that sort ; and I take 
 it that it may at times be right to interfere by interlocutory 
 injunction, although the question of malice is involved. It 
 is far better that a question of that sort should be tried 
 where it can be by a jury, and not otherwise ; but if the 
 question is whether an act admittedly malicious is to be 
 dealt with on interlocutory application or tried at the hearing, 
 it cannot possibly be for the benefit of the public that an 
 admitted wrong should be continued without being stopped. . . . 
 There is this to be borne in mind also^ that in most of these 
 cases ... in which trade unions are concerned the persons 
 who are defendants are such that a decision that there can 
 be no remedy but damages would be equivalent to a decision 
 that there cannot be any remedy at all." 
 
 Upon appeal, the Court (Lindley, Kay, and A. L. Smith, 
 L. JJ.) unanimously affirmed the decision of Mr. Justice 
 North. 
 
 On the question of procedure, the former spoke of " the 
 second point, which is that we ought to leave these people 
 
CONSPIKACY AND PKOTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. . 141 
 
 to the summary jurisdiction of a magistrate. I do not think S. 7. 
 so. This is obviously a case in which a man's property, his 
 trade, his livelihood, and the goodwill of his business will be 
 absolutely ruined if what is complained of is not peremptorily 
 stopped; and according to the well-known principles by 
 which the Court of Chancery has been guided, it is a case in 
 which a person's property and trade are so interfered with 
 that he may come to the Court for the protection which an 
 injunction affords him." 
 
 In the course of the same judgment Lindley, L. J., said : 
 " One cannot say as an abstract proposition that all picketing 
 is unlawful, because if all that is done is attending at or near 
 a house in order merely to obtain or communicate information, 
 that is lawful. But it is easy to see how under colour of so 
 attending, a great deal maybe done which is absolutely illegal. 
 . . . It is because this proviso is often abused and used for an 
 illegal purpose that such disputes as these very often arise." 
 
 All the judgments are to the same effect. Some of Lord 
 Justice Kay's remarks are, perhaps, the most emphatic. 
 " Since the Judicature Act, at any rate, there can be no doubt 
 whatever of the jurisdiction of the Court to grant an inter- 
 locutory injunction like this which has been granted by 
 North, J. . . . Now, the defendants are the officers of a 
 trade union, and it seems to me to be very unlikely that any 
 possible damage can result to them from the granting of this 
 injunction ; whereas, ori the other hand, if it is not granted 
 very grave damage indeed may result to the plaintiffs. A 
 primd facie case of illegality is made out, and upon the 
 balance of convenience and inconvenience an interim 
 injunction ought to be granted. . . . 
 
 Also, I take it that under the terms of section 3, it is not 
 illegal for a trade union to promote [a] strike. But further 
 than that the law has not gone. 
 
 I hold distinctly that it is illegal to picket the works or 
 place of business of a man by persons who are distributed 
 and placed there for the purpose of trying by persuasion to 
 induce the workmen of that man not to work for him any 
 
142 CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 
 
 S. 7. longer, or to induce people who want to work for him to 
 abstain from entering into an agreement with him to do so. 
 
 Mr. Jenkins argued very ingeniously that the expression 
 * with a view to compel any other person ' only means to 
 compel any other workmen. I entirely disagree with him. 
 I think that it means to compel either the employer or the 
 workmen. To compel the employer by inducing the men not 
 to work for him seems to me to be precisely within 
 the language of this section. ... If that [watching or 
 besetting] is done by means of persuasion of the workmen, 
 then, although no compulsion is put on the workmen them- 
 selves, but the compulsion is by that means put upon the 
 employer, that, nevertheless, seems to me to be distinctly 
 within this section of the Act ; and this is, I think, more 
 clearly shown by the proviso at the end of this section. . . . 
 Now, let me take Schoenthal's case. In that case they are 
 not merely persuading Schoenthal not to work, but they are 
 trying to prevent his working. They have no right to prevent 
 anybody working ; they have no right to prevent one of his 
 workmen working for him. If they use means to prevent 
 his working, that is not encouraging a strike, but it is doing 
 something far more. If by any means they prevent 
 Schoenthal working for Messrs. Lyons, that is an illegal act. 
 They have conspired together and combined to take means 
 to prevent somebody from working for Messrs. Lyons, who 
 otherwise would do so. No Act of Parliament justifies that. 
 It would have been illegal before this Act. There is nothing 
 in this Act which justifies it, and it is illegal still." * 
 
 * The learned Lord Justice suggested the form of the injunction 
 adopted by the Court and likely to become common in cases of 
 picketing viz., " an injunction to restrain the defendants, their 
 servants or agents, from watching or besetting the plaintiffs' works 
 for the purpose of persuading or otherwise preventing persons from 
 working for or for any purpose except merely to obtain or communi- 
 cate information." Note that the C. A.. j>ro}-io tnotu, extended its 
 protection to Schoenthal (not a party to the suit) for North, J., does 
 not seem to have dealt with the point by adding to the words of 
 the injunction just cited, the following : " and also from preventing 
 Schoenthal or other persons from working for the plaintiffs, by with- 
 drawing his or their workmen from their employment respectively." 
 
CONSPIEACY AND PEOTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 143 
 
 " If," said A. L. Smith, L. J., " there had been a trade S. 7. 
 dispute between Mr. Schoenthal's workmen and himself, I 
 apprehend that the trade union might have done as regards 
 Mr. Schoenthal exactly that which they did as regards 
 Messrs. Lyons, and they might have called his men out. . . . 
 There was no dispute between Mr. Schoenthal and his men. 
 What the union did was not done in furtherance of a trade 
 dispute between him and his men. . . . That strike of the 
 trade union against Schoenthal was . . . illegal." 
 
 The action came on for trial in November, 1897 (1899, 
 1 Ch. 255), some time after the strike had come to an end. 
 The trustees of the union had meanwhile been added as 
 defendants. Byrne, J., having postponed his judgment 
 until the decision of Allen v. Flood (seep. 155), early in 1898 
 made the injunction referring to the plaintiffs' works 
 perpetual, and gave damages in respect of the libels. He 
 also granted a perpetual injunction against " watching or 
 besetting the premises of Adolph Schoenthal for the purpose 
 of persuading or otherwise preventing him from working for 
 the plaintiffs, or for any purpose except merely to obtain or 
 communicate information," remarking as to this, " I think 
 it probable that the C. A. would have framed the second 
 part of the injunction granted in a different manner had the 
 case of Allen v. Flood then been decided by the House of 
 Lords. [See p. 158.] At any rate, the point has not been 
 specifically argued whether or not, apart from the question 
 of malice, it was unlawful to call out the workmen of 
 Schoenthal in order to prevent him from working for the 
 plaintiffs." 
 
 At the same time the learned Judge refused an injunction 
 against maliciously inducing or conspiring to induce persons 
 not to enter into contracts with the plaintiffs, holding that 
 he was precluded by Allen v. Flood, saying, " It was conceded 
 by the plaintiffs that they could not succeed unless they 
 could show malice, and it is the law, as finally determined 
 by the House of Lords, that the existence of a malicious 
 motive cannot in such a case as this render unlawful an 
 
144 CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 
 
 S. 7. act or acts otherwise lawful." He also refused an injunction 
 ~ asked for against the trustees applying the funds in further- 
 ance of the wrongful acts, being of opinion " that there is no 
 legal ground to justify such an injunction," and disallowed 
 the plaintiffs' costs in this respect. The defendants were 
 allowed the costs of their motion to strike out the name 
 of the Society as defendants. On this point, see p. 82. 
 The defendants appealed, but the C. A. (Lindley, M. R., 
 Chitty, and Vaughan Williams, L. JJ.), after considering its 
 judgment, dismissed the appeal. The Master o the Rolls 
 remarked that the construction put upon 38-9 V. 86, 3, 7, 
 by that Court (see p. 140) was, in his opinion, correct, and 
 he confined himself to " one or two important questions " 
 now raised for the first time. In dealing with an argument 
 (not necessary to reproduce here) on the words " wrongfully 
 and without legal authority," he remarked, " It* is not neces- 
 sary to show the illegality of the overt acts complained of 
 by other evidence than that which proves the acts them- 
 selves, if no justification or excuse for them is reasonably 
 consistent with the facts proved. ... If the overt acts 
 mentioned in sub-head 1, for example, i.e., using violence or 
 intimidation, are proved, and it is proved that they were 
 done with a view to compel, &c., and there is no reasonable 
 ground for justifying them, it is unnecessary to give further 
 evidence to prove that they were committed ' wrongfully 
 and without legal authority.' See Reg. v. McKenzie [p. 128] . 
 ** The truth is that to watch or beset a man's house with a 
 view to compel him to do or not to do what is lawful for him 
 not to do or to do is wrongful, and without lawful authority, 
 unless some reasonable justification for it is consistent with 
 the evidence. Such conduct seriously interferes with the 
 ordinary comfort of human existence and ordinary enjoy- 
 ment of the house beset, and such conduct would support 
 an action on the case for a nuisance at common law. See 
 Bamford v. Turnley (3 B. & S. 62), Broder v. Saillard 
 (2 Ch. D. 692, 701), per Jessel, M. R., Walker v. Selfe 
 (4 De G. & Sm. 315), and Crump v. Lambert (L. R. 3 Eq. 
 
CONSPIEACY AND PBOTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 145 
 
 409). Proof that the nuisance was 'peaceably to persuade S. 7. 
 other people ' would afford no defence to such an action. 
 Persons may be peaceably persuaded provided the method 
 employed to persuade is not a nuisance to other people." 
 Cf. the judgment of Chitty, L. J., at p. 271. 
 
 Vaughan Williams, L. J., dissented to some extent from 
 the rest of the Court as to the meaning of these words, though 
 he held that he was bound by the previous judgment of that 
 Court in the case. See p. 140. Apparently he thought that 
 the construction put by his colleagues on these words "would 
 shift the onus from the prosecution to the defence," and 
 he remarked, " At the common law watching and besetting, 
 apart from the law of conspiracy, might or might not be so 
 conducted as to amount to a nuisance." Another important 
 difference of opinion is contained in the words : " I think 
 that the fact that the communication invites the men to 
 discontinue working for the master as soon as they lawfully 
 may, does not thereby cause the communication to cease to 
 be a communication within the meaning of the proviso" 
 (i.e., the last paragraph of this section). On the other hand, 
 the same learned judge points out " the persuading " must 
 not take any other shape than that of a communication, 
 even though in itself it was not a nuisance at common law. 
 And even when it did take that form, yet " it may be made 
 in such a manner " as to be a common law nuisance. In 
 the present case, he thought, the persuasion did not amount 
 to a common law nuisance. 
 
 " Such other person " in sub-s. 4. 
 
 " It is said," the Master of the Kolls went on (IbicL), 
 " that to beset one person's house with a view to compel 
 some one else is not within the section. Such a construc- 
 tion would render the Act nugatory in a great number of cases 
 clearly within the mischief intended to be remedied. . , . 
 ' Such other ' means ' any other.' " 
 
 The Court was unanimous that this case was not affected 
 by Allen v. Flood. 
 
 " Nor is Allen v. Flood of any real use in construing the 
 
 T.U.A. 10 
 
146 CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 
 
 S. 7. statute with which we have to deal." Per Lindley, M. E. 
 "In my opinion . . . the appellants have failed to show 
 that the decision of the Court on the motion [see p. 140] 
 is in any way overruled by Allen v. Flood or by any principle 
 laid down in that case." Per Chitty, L. J. " I agree 
 that the case of Allen v. Flood in the House of Lords 
 has no application to the case before us." Per Vaughan 
 Williams, L. J. 
 
 In Ckarnock v. Court (1899, 2 Ch. 35 ; 80 L. J. N. S. 564), 
 the facts were: "During the pendency of a strike, two 
 agents of a trade union attended at a landing-stage to await 
 the arrival of a steamer containing workmen imported by 
 the masters from Ireland to replace the men on strike, and 
 on the arrival of the steamer they informed the Irish work- 
 men of the strike, and offered to pay their expenses if 
 they would go elsewhere to work." Stirling, J., following 
 Lyons v. WilJcins (sec p. 139), held that " the attendance 
 at the landing-stage was with a view to compel the 
 masters to conduct their business in accordance with the 
 requirements of the men, and was not in order merely 
 to communicate information." " The next question is," 
 he went on, " whether the case is within sub-sect. 4. 
 ... It was known or suspected that the workmen would 
 arrive at Fleetwood by steamer on February 22nd." The two 
 agents "go there and await the .arrival of the steamer, and 
 then enter into communication with the men who land. It 
 seems to me that that is watching a place where the work- 
 men happened to be. There is nothing in the statute which 
 defines the duration of the watching. It may be, it seems 
 to me, for a short time. . . . The word * attending ' does 
 not necessarily imply any lengthened attendance upon the 
 spot, nor is there anything in the statute to limit its opera- 
 tion to a place habitually frequented by the workman, such 
 as the house where he resides or the place where he 
 works. On the contrary, the words ' place where he happens 
 to be ' seem to me to embrace any place where the workman 
 is found, however casually." 
 
CONSPIRACY AND PEOTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 147 
 
 It may be noted that the writ in this action was amended S. 7. 
 so as to make all the members of the masters' union, which ~ 
 brought it, plaintiffs, apparently because the union was not 
 registered. See p. 77. The defendants were officials and a 
 member of the executive committee of a workmen's trade 
 union. The learned Judge decided that the defendants were 
 liable for the acts of the two agents, and granted an interlocu- 
 tory injunction against the former, restraining them " or their 
 agents or persons authorised by them from watching or 
 besetting the landing- stage at Fleet wood or any other place 
 to which any person or persons employed or about to be 
 employed by the plaintiffs or any of them may be brought." 
 Ultimately the defendants submitted to a perpetual injunction 
 (Ibid. p. 703, note). 
 
 In Walters v. Green (1899, 2 Ch. 696), the facts were 
 similar to those in Charnock v. Court, but a very important 
 point of law was argued. The plaintiffs were master builders 
 and members of the Master Builders' Association ; the 
 defendants were officials of various trade unions at Hull, and 
 also of a federation, " a union of the unions." Upon the 
 statement of claim (one paragraph of which gave particulars 
 of alleged overt acts by particular defendants against (1) par- 
 ticular plaintiffs, (2) against all the plaintiffs, and by the defen- 
 dants generally against particular plaintiffs) a preliminary 
 objection was taken that the action was not properly con- 
 stituted, on the ground that "there are here several plaintiffs 
 and several defendants, and the acts alleged against the defen- 
 dants are different in character. Each one is a distinct tort, and 
 a separate cause of action by each of the plaintiffs against each 
 defendant. There is no joint cause of action against all the 
 defendants. The case does not fall within the provisions of 
 Order XVI. [r. 1] ." Stirling, J., held that the statement of 
 claim alleged "that the defendants jointly committed a 
 series of illegal acts, causing damage to the plaintiffs. There- 
 fore, what is alleged is a joint cause of action." He also held 
 that the plaintiffs could combine in bringing the action, citing 
 the view of Order XVI. r. 1, taken in Stroud v. Lawson (1898, 
 
 102 
 
148 CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 
 
 Ss. 7, 8, 9. 2 Q. B. 44,52); the right to the relief as alleged arose out of the 
 
 same series of transactions, and there was a common question 
 
 of fact as well as of law, viz. : whether all these acts were 
 done in pursuance of a combination so as to make the defen- 
 dants jointly responsible. An injunction was granted against 
 two (only) of the defendants, similar to that in Charnock v. 
 Court, the learned Judge observing: " Trade unions are legal 
 bodies and pritna facie their officers cannot be presumed to 
 have authority to do or sanction anything " unlawful. 
 
 ^* Where i n an y Act re l a ting to employers or 
 workmen a pecuniary penalty is imposed in respect 
 of any offence under such Act, and no power is 
 given to reduce such penalty, the justices or court 
 having jurisdiction in respect of such offence may, 
 if they think it just so to do, impose by way of 
 penalty in respect of such offence any sum not less 
 than one fourth of the penalty imposed by such Act. 
 
 Legal Proceedings. 
 Power for 9. Where a person is accused before a court of 
 
 offender . 
 
 under this summary jurisdiction of any offence made punish - 
 dkftmeut iu " a kl Q ky this Act, and for which a penalty amounting 
 court of by to twenty pounds, or imprisonment, is imposed the 
 . accused may, on appearing before the court of 
 summary jurisdiction, declare that he objects to 
 being tried for such offence by a court of summary 
 jurisdiction, and thereupon the court of summary 
 jurisdiction may deal with the case in all respects 
 as if the accused were charged with an indictable 
 offence and not an offence punishable on summary 
 
CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 149 
 
 conviction, and the offence may be prosecuted on Ss - 9 > !0, 
 indictment accordingly. ! 1_ 
 
 10. Every offence under this Act which is made 
 punishable on conviction by a court of summary JurismcK. 
 jurisdiction or on summary conviction, and every 
 penalty under this Act recoverable on summary 
 conviction, may be prosecuted and recovered in 
 manner provided by the Summary Jurisdiction Act. 
 
 11. Provided, that upon the hearing and determin- Regulations 
 ing of any indictment or information under sections evidence. 
 four, five, and six of this Act, the respective parties to 
 
 the contract of service, their husbands or wives, shall 
 be deemed and considered as competent witnesses. 
 
 This subject is now regulated generally by the Criminal 
 Evidence Act, 1898 (61-2 V. 36, 1 (c) and 4). Under this Act, 
 a wife may be called as a witness for her husband but could 
 not be a witness against him, and in this respect the Act of 
 1898 makes no difference. 
 
 12. In England or Ireland, if any party feels ^PJJJJ.* 
 aggrieved by any conviction made by a court of sessions - 
 summary jurisdiction on determining any informa- 
 tion under this Act, the party so aggrieved may 
 appeal therefrom, subject to the conditions and 
 regulations following : 
 
 (1.) The appeal shall be made to some court of 
 
 general or quarter sessions 
 
 The rest of the section is repealed as to England by 
 47-8 V. 43, 4 (Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1884). 
 
 for the county or place in which the cause of 
 appeal has arisen, holden not less than fifteen 
 
150 CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 
 
 s - 12 - days and not more than four months after 
 
 the decision of the court from which the appeal 
 is made : 
 
 (2.) The appellant shall within seven days after the 
 cause of appeal has arisen, give notice to the 
 other party and to the court of summary juris- 
 diction of his intention to appeal, and of the 
 ground thereof : 
 
 (3.) The appellant shall immediately after such notice 
 enter into a recognizance before a justice of 
 the peace, with or without sureties, conditioned 
 personally to try such appeal and to abide the 
 judgment of the court thereon, and to pay such 
 costs as may be awarded by the court : 
 
 (4.) Where the appellant is in custody the justice may, 
 if he think fit, on the appellant entering into 
 such recognizance as aforesaid, release him from 
 custody : 
 
 (5.) The court of appeal may adjourn the appeal, and 
 upon the hearing thereof they may confirm, 
 reverse, or modify the decision of the court of 
 summary jurisdiction, or remit the matter to the 
 court of summary jurisdiction with the opinion 
 of the court of appeal thereon, or make such 
 other order in the matter as the court thinks 
 just, and if the matter be remitted to the court 
 of summary jurisdiction the said last-mentioned 
 court shall thereupon re-hear and decide the 
 information in accordance with the opinion of 
 the said court of appeal. The court of appeal 
 may also make such order as to costs to be paid 
 by either party as the court thinks just. 
 
CONSPIEACY AND PEOTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 151 
 
 Definitions. s - 13 - 
 
 13. In this Act, 
 
 The expression " the Summary Jurisdiction General 
 
 definitions : 
 
 Act" means the Act of the session of the eleventh "The 
 
 Summary 
 
 and twelfth years of the reign of Her present Jurisdiction 
 
 Act. 
 
 Majesty, chapter forty-three, intituled " An Act to 
 facilitate the performance of the duties of justices of 
 the peace out of sessions within England and Wales 
 with respect to summary convictions and orders," 
 inclusive of any Acts amending the same ; and 
 
 The expression " court of summary jurisdiction " sum 
 
 nirisdic 
 
 means tion." 
 
 (1.) As respects the city of London, the Lord 
 Mayor or any alderman of the said city 
 sitting at the Mansion House or Guildhall 
 justice room ; and 
 
 (2.) As respects any police court division in the 
 metropolitan police district, any metro- 
 politan police magistrate sitting at the 
 police court for that division ; and 
 
 (3.) As respects any city, town, liberty, borough, 
 place, or district for which a stipendiary 
 magistrate is for the time being acting, such 
 stipendiary magistrate sitting at a police court 
 or other place appointed in that behalf; and 
 
 (4.) Elsewhere, any justice or justices of the 
 peace to whom jurisdiction is given by the 
 Summary Jurisdiction Act : Provided that, 
 
152 CONSPIEACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 
 
 Ss - 13 > 14 - as respects any case within the cognizance 
 
 of such justice or justices as last aforesaid, 
 an information under this Act shall be 
 heard and determined by two or more 
 justices of the peace in petty sessions 
 sitting at some place appointed for holding 
 petty sessions. 
 
 Nothing in this section contained shall restrict 
 the jurisdiction of the Lord Mayor or any alder- 
 man of the city of London, or of any metropolitan 
 police or stipendiary magistrate, in respect of any 
 act or jurisdiction which may now be done or 
 exercised by him out of court. 
 
 Definitions 14. The expression "municipal authority" in 
 rity" a -mi 10 " ^ s ^ c ^ means an y f the following authorities, 
 that is to sa .Y> the Metropolitan Board of Works, 
 the Common Council of the city of London, the 
 Commissioners of Sewers of the city of London, the 
 town council of any borough for the time being 
 subject to the Act of the session of the fifth and 
 sixth years of the reign of King William the 
 Fourth, chapter seventy-six, intituled " An Act to 
 provide for the Regulation of Municipal Corpora- 
 tions in England and Wales," and any Act 
 amending the same, any commissioners, trustees, 
 or other persons invested by any local Act of 
 Parliament with powers of improving, cleansing, 
 lighting, or paving any town, and any local 
 board, 
 
CONSPIRACY AND PBOTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 153 
 
 Any municipal authority or company or con- Ss - 14 15 - 
 tractor who has obtained authority by or in pur- 
 suance of any general or local Act of Parliament 
 to supply the streets of any city, borough, town, 
 or place, or of any part thereof, with gas, or which 
 is required by or in pursuance of any general or 
 local Act of Parliament to supply water on demand 
 to the inhabitants of any city, borough, town, or 
 place, or any part thereof, shall for the purposes 
 of this Act be deemed to be a municipal authority 
 or company or contractor upon whom is imposed 
 by Act of Parliament the duty of supplying such 
 city, borough, town, or place, or part thereof, 
 with gas or water. 
 
 " The Municipal Corporations Act, 1835." For this 
 we must read " The Municipal Corporations Act, 1882," by 
 sect. 242 (3) of that Act (45-6 V. 50). 
 
 15. The word " maliciously " used in reference "Maiici- 
 
 ously" in 
 
 to any offence under this Act shall be construed 
 in the same manner as it is required by the fifty- 
 eighth section of the Act relating to malicious Act per< 
 injuries to property, that is to say, the Act of the 
 session of the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth years 
 of the reign of Her present Majesty, chapter 
 ninety-seven, to be construed in reference to any 
 offence committed under such last-mentioned Act. 
 
 The word occurs in sects. 4, 5, 9. 
 
 Section 58 of 24-5 V. 97 (Malicious Injuries to Property 
 Act) runs : Every punishment and forfeiture by this Act 
 
154 CONSPIKACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 
 
 S. 15. imposed on any person maliciously committing any offence, 
 ~ whether the same be punishable upon indictment or upon 
 summary conviction shall equally apply and be enforced, 
 whether the offence shall be committed from malice 
 conceived against the owner of the property in respect of 
 which it shall be committed, or otherwise. 
 
 In this section " malice " is only considered from the point 
 of view of criminal law. But it is convenient to deal here 
 with the subject in its connection with civil actions, especially 
 as the leading case in recent times (Allen v. Flood, 1898, 
 App. C. 1) in which it was exhaustively discussed, arose out 
 of the ordinary proceedings of a trade union. Only a brief 
 account can here be given of the general legal aspects of the 
 case, except in so far as they bear on the special law affecting 
 trade unions, and the same remark applies to Temperton 
 v. Russell and Others (1893, 1 Q. B. 715 ; 9 T. L. K. 393), 
 which must be mentioned first. 
 
 The headnote to this case states : " The defendants were 
 members and officers of certain trade unions connected with 
 the building trade, and of a joint committee thereof. These 
 unions adopted certain rules in relation to building opera- 
 tions. A firm of builders having refused to observe these 
 rules, the unions, in order to compel them to do so 
 endeavoured to prevent other persons from supplying them 
 with materials. The plaintiff, who supplied materials to 
 that firm, refused to comply with the request of the unions 
 to cease doing so. The defendants, in order to compel the 
 plaintiff to comply with that request by injuring him in his 
 business, induced certain persons, who, as the defendants 
 knew, had made contracts with the plaintiff, not to perform 
 those contracts, and also induced those persons and others 
 not to deal in the future with the plaintiff, by threatening 
 to withdraw the union workmen who were employed by 
 them. The plaintiff thereby suffered damage." The plain- 
 tiff brought an action for damages before Collins, J., and a 
 special jury at Leeds. The learned Judge laid it down that 
 " to induce a person who has made a contract with another 
 
CONSPIKACY AND PKOTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 155 
 
 to break that contract in order to injure the person with S. 15. 
 whom it has been made, to hamper him in his trade or to ~ 
 put undue pressure upon him, or to procure some indirect 
 advantage for the person himself, to induce another to break 
 a contract for any of these motives, is in point of law to do it 
 maliciously." The jury were also directed "that a malicious 
 conspiracy to prevent persons from entering into contracts 
 with another was actionable if it caused damage." The jury 
 found that the defendants maliciously induced certain persons 
 to break their contracts with the plaintiff and maliciously 
 conspired to induce those persons and others not to enter 
 into contracts with the plaintiff, whereby those persons were 
 induced not to make such contracts, and awarded damages. 
 Collins, J., granted an injunction restraining the defendants 
 from inducing persons to refuse to take goods from the 
 plaintiff or from endeavouring to induce persons to break 
 their contracts with the plaintiff. The defendants appealed 
 upon the ground of misdirection and that there was no 
 evidence of any actionable wronjf. The Court of Appeal 
 (Esher, M. B., Lopes and A. L. Smith, L. JJ.), held that 
 there was no misdirection, and that there, was an actionable 
 wrong, the latter remarking : " It was argued that if the 
 defendants were to be held liable in damages in this case, 
 no trade union could hereafter call out their men, for 
 might be held that by so doing they were inducing the breach 
 of a contract to the injury of one of the contracting parties, 
 if there happened to be one. I do not agree that a strike is 
 analogous to the present case. . . . The present is a very 
 different case to that suggested, viz. : the merely calling out 
 men on strike ; though it does appear to me that, if a strike 
 were used for the purpose and with the intent above 
 mentioned, an action would lie." 
 
 The importance of Temperton v. Eussell (p. 154) and 
 Trollops' 8 case (p. 80) is much diminished since the final 
 judgment in the leading case of Allen v. Flood and Taylor 
 (1898, App. Cases, 1), which was an appeal from Flood 
 and Another v. Jackson, Allen, dc. (1895, 2 Q. B. 21). " The 
 
156 CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 
 
 S. 15. facts material to this appeal (omitting matters not now 
 ~ in question) were as follows: In April, 1894, about forty 
 boiler-makers or * iron-men ' were employed by the Glengall 
 Iron Company in repairing a ship at the company's Regent 
 Dock in Millwall. They were members of the Boiler -makers' 
 Society, a trade union, which objected to the employment 
 of shipwrights on ironwork. On April 12th the respondents 
 Flood and Taylor, who were shipwrights, were engaged by 
 the company in repairing the woodwork of the same ship, 
 but were not doing ironwork. The boiler-makers, on dis- 
 covering that the respondents had shortly before been 
 employed by another firm (Mills and Knight) on the Thames 
 in doing ironwork on a ship, became much excited and began 
 to talk of leaving their employment. One of them, Elliott, 
 telegraphed for the appellant Allen, the London delegate of 
 the Boiler-makers' Society. Allen came upon the 13th, and 
 being told by Elliott that the iron-men or some of them 
 would leave at dinner-time, replied that if they took the law 
 into their own hands he would use his influence with the 
 council of the society that they should be deprived of all 
 benefit from the society and be fined, and that they must 
 wait and see how things settled. Allen then had an inter- 
 view with Halkett, the Glengall's Company's manager, and 
 Edmonds, the foreman, and the result was that the respon- 
 dents were discharged at the end of the day by Halkett. 
 An action was then brought by the respondents against Allen 
 for maliciously and wrongfully, and with intent to injure the 
 plaintiffs, procuring and inducing the Glengall Company to 
 break their contract with the plaintiffs and not to enter into 
 new contracts with them, and also maliciously, &c., intimi- 
 dating and coercing the plaintiffs to break, &c., and also 
 unlawfully and maliciously conspiring with others to do the 
 above acts. 
 
 At the trial before Kennedy, J., and a common jury, 
 Halkett and Edmonds were called for the plaintiffs, and gave 
 their account of the interview with Allen. In substance it 
 was this : Allen told them that he had been sent for because 
 
CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 157 
 
 Flood and Taylor were known to have done ironwork in S. 15. 
 Mills and Knight's yard, and that unless Flood and Taylor ~ 
 were discharged, all the members of the Boiler-makers' 
 Society would be 'called out' or 'knock off' work that 
 day they could not be sure which expression was used ; 
 that Halkett had no option ; that the iron-men were doing 
 their best to put an end to the practice of shipwrights doing 
 ironwork, and wherever these men were employed, or other 
 shipwrights who had done ironwork, the boiler-makers would 
 cease work in every yard on the Thames. Halkett said that 
 if the boiler-makers (about 100 in all were employed) had 
 been called out it would have stopped the company's 
 business, and that in fear of the threat being carried out he 
 told Edmonds to discharge Flood and Taylor that day, and 
 that if he knew of any shipwrights having worked on iron- 
 work elsewhere, when he was engaging men, for the sake of 
 peace and quietness for themselves he was not to employ 
 them. Allen was called for the defence. His account 
 of the interview is discussed in the judgment of Lord 
 Halsbury, L. C. 
 
 Kennedy, J., ruled that there was no evidence of conspiracy 
 (see p. 54), or of intimidation or coercion, or of breach of 
 contract, Flood and Taylor having been engaged on the 
 terms that they might be discharged at any time. In the 
 ordinary course their employment would have continued till 
 the repairs were finished or the work slackened. 
 
 In reply to questions put by Kennedy, J., the jury found 
 that Allen maliciously induced the Glengall Company (1) to 
 discharge Flood and Taylor from their employment ; (2) not 
 to engage them ; that each plaintiff had suffered 20 
 damages, and that the settlement of the dispute was a matter 
 within Allen's discretion. After consideration Kennedy, J. 
 entered judgment for the plaintiffs for .40." 
 
 This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (Esher, 
 M. R., Lopes and Rigby, L. JJ.) 
 
 The defendant Allen appealed to the House of Lords 
 (Halsbury, L. C., Lords Watson, Herschell, Macnaghten, 
 
158 CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 
 
 S. 15. Morris, Shand, and Davey). Their Lordships decided that 
 the case should be re-argued, and that the opinion of the 
 Judges should be taken. Accordingly, the case was again 
 argued before their Lordships, Lord Ashbourne and Lord 
 James of Hereford, some of the Judges being present on the 
 second occasion. 
 
 The following question was put to the Judges : Assuming 
 the evidence given by the plaintiffs' witnesses to be correct, 
 was there any evidence of a cause of action fit to be left 
 to the jury ? 
 
 Hawkins, Cave, North, Wills, Grantham and Lawrance, JJ., 
 gave their opinion in the affirmative. Mathew and Wright, J J. , 
 gave theirs in the negative. The House of Lords (Halsbury, 
 L. C., and Lords Ashbourne and Morris dissenting), reversed 
 the decision of the Court of Appeal, and held that Allen "had 
 violated no legal right of the respondents, done no unlawful 
 act, and used no unlawful means, in procuring the respon- 
 dents' dismissal ; that his conduct was therefore not 
 actionable, however malicious or bad his motive might be, 
 and that, notwithstanding the verdict, the appellant was 
 entitled to judgment." 
 
 According to the same headnote : " An act lawful hi itself 
 is not converted by a malicious or bad motive into an 
 unlawful act so as to make the doer of the act liable to a 
 civil action." 
 
 This case is also reported 77 L. T. 717 ; 46 W. R, 258, 
 14 T. L. R, 125, and 67 L. J. Q. B. 119. 
 
 According to the report cited above (viz. : 1895, 2 Q. B. 
 see p. 155), Tempertonv. Russell was " commented on " in 
 Allen v. Flood ; according to W. R. it was " considered ; " 
 but L. T. says it was " overruled," and L. J. " disapproved," 
 the latter adding : " Dicta of Lord Esher, M. R., and 
 Lopes, L. J., in Temperton v. Russell, that it is actionable 
 maliciously to induce a person not to enter into a contract, 
 disapproved." 
 
 It may be convenient to set out the chief references to that 
 case in the various judgments. 
 
CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 159 
 
 " It does not appear to me to admit of doubt that the jury S. 15. 
 in finding the action of the company to have been maliciously 
 induced by the appellant, simply meant to affirm that the 
 appellant was influenced by a bad motive, namely, an inten- 
 tion to injure the respondents in their trade or calling of 
 shipwrights. At the trial, the case for the plaintiff was con- 
 ducted, and was submitted to the jury by the learned Judge 
 who presided, upon the lines laid down by the Master of the 
 Rolls and Lopes, L. J., in Temperton v. Russell. 
 
 When the present case was before the Appeal Court, the 
 same doctrine was repeated by the Master of the Rolls and 
 Lopes, L. J., and was expounded at great length by Lord 
 Esher. Rigby,L. J., deferred to, but did not express his con- 
 currence in, the authority of Temperton v. Russell, which he 
 accepted as binding upon him. . . . 
 
 According to my opinion, coercion, whatever be its nature, 
 must, in order to infer the legal liability of the person who 
 employs it, be intrinsically and irrespectively of its motive 
 a wrongful act. According to the doctrine ventilated in 
 Temperton v. Russell and the present case it need not 
 amount to a wrong, but will become wrongful if it was 
 prompted by a bad motive. 
 
 The doctrine laid down by the Court of Appeal in this 
 case and in Temperton v. Russell, with regard to the efficacy 
 of evil motives in making to use the words of Lord Esher 
 * that unlawful which would otherwise be lawful,' is 
 stated in wide and comprehensive terms ; but the majority 
 of the consulted Judges who approve of the doctrine have 
 only dealt with it as applying to cases of interference with 
 a man's trade or employment. Even in that more limited 
 application it would lead in some cases to singular results. 
 One who committed an act not in itself illegal, but attended 
 with consequences detrimental to several other persons, 
 would incur liability to those of them whom it was proved that 
 he intended to injure, and the rest of them would have no 
 remedy. A master who dismissed a servant engaged from 
 day to day, or whose contract of service had expired, and 
 
160 CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 
 
 S. 15. declined to give him further employment because he dis- 
 liked the man, and desired to punish him, would be liable in 
 an action for tort. And ex pari ratione a servant would be 
 liable in damages to a master whom he disliked if he left 
 his situation at the expiry of his engagement and declined to 
 be re-engaged, in the knowledge and with the intent that the 
 master would be put to considerable inconvenience, expense 
 and loss before he could provide a substitute. If that be the 
 state of the law, it is somewhat remarkable that there is no 
 case to be found in the books of any such action having 
 been sustained. 
 
 It is to my mind very doubtful whether in that case 
 there was any question before the Court with regard to the 
 effect of the animus of the actor in making that unlawful which 
 would otherwise have been lawful" (per Lord Watson). 
 
 " The judgment is grounded almost wholly upon the 
 presence of this element that the purpose of the inducement 
 is to injure the plaintiff, or to benefit the defendant at his 
 expense. The fact that the act which is induced by the 
 persuasion is the breach of a contract with the plaintiff' is 
 treated as a subordinate matter, which without this element 
 would not be a wrong act, or an act wrongful and therefore 
 actionable. The motive of the person who did the act com- 
 plained of was thus treated as the gist of the action. In 
 Temperton v. Russell, the further step was taken by the 
 majority of the Court, A. L. Smith, L. J., reserving his 
 opinion on the point, of asserting that it was immaterial 
 that the act induced was not the breach of a contract, but 
 only the not entering into a contract, provided that the 
 motive of desiring to injure the plaintiff, or to benefit the 
 defendant at the expense of the plaintiff, was present. It 
 seems to have been regarded as only a small step from the 
 one decision to the other, and it was said that there seemed 
 to be no good reason why, if an action lay for maliciously 
 inducing a breach of contract, it should not equally lie for 
 maliciously inducing a person not to enter into a contract. 
 So far from thinking it a small step from the one decision to 
 
CONSPIEACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 161 
 
 the other, I think there is a chasm between them. The S. 15. 
 reason for a distinction between the two cases appears to 
 me to be this : that in the one case the act procured was 
 the violation of a legal right, for which the person doing 
 the act which injured the plaintiff could be sued as well as 
 the person who procured it ; whilst in the other case no 
 legal right was violated by the person who did the act from 
 which the plaintiff suffered : he would not be liable to be sued 
 in respect of the act done, whilst the person who induced 
 him to do the act would be liable to an action. I think this 
 was an entirely new departure " (per Lord Herschell). 
 
 " The judgment under appeal does not depend on Lumley 
 v. Gye (2 E. & B. 216) [see p. 55] , or on any decision before or 
 after that case. It rests only on certain dicta to be found 
 first in Bowen v. Hall (6 Q. B. D. 333), and afterwards 
 repeated in Temperton v. Eussell. Those dicta are of great 
 weight, owing to the eminence of the Judge by whom they 
 were pronounced, but they certainly were not necessary for 
 the decision in either case" (per Lord Macnaghten). 
 
 *' It was urged by the counsel for the respondent that a 
 disapproval of the law laid down in Temperton v. Russell, 
 and repeated in this case, will be attended with dangerous 
 consequences, as extending the power of trades (sic) unions 
 or combinations beyond limits which these cases laid down, 
 and I am not insensible to the truth of the observation that 
 a certain amount of restraint which these cases introduced 
 will be removed. But if that measure of restraint was not 
 founded, as I believe it was not, on sound legal principle, it 
 is only right that by legal decision in this Court of last 
 resort it should be removed. And if the force of combina- 
 tion should be harshly or oppressively used, if it should be 
 used in circumstances in which right-minded men would 
 deplore its use, it must be observed that those against 
 whom combination is so employed have precisely the same 
 liberty of action for resisting oppressive measures and for 
 causing those who use them to desist from that course of 
 action" (per Lord Shand). 
 
 T.U.A. 11 
 
162 CONSPIEACY AND PBOTECTION, &c. f ACT, 1875. 
 
 S. 15. " If the principles laid down in the judgment of Lord Esher 
 ~" in the case of Bowen v. Hall and in the case of Temperton \. 
 Enssell were applied to the ordinary affairs of life, great 
 inconvenience as well as injustice would ensue. Every com- 
 petitor for a contract who alleged that he was the best person 
 to fulfil it, would be liable to an action. ... Of course the 
 conduct of the boiler-makers in the case before your Lordships 
 amounted to an interference with the plaintiffs' business ; and 
 yet, as has been pointed out, it is not said that an action lies 
 against them. Every organiser of a strike in order to obtain 
 higher wages, 'interferes with' the employer carrying on 
 his business ; also every member of an employers' federation 
 who persuades his co-employer to lock out his workmen 
 must ' interfere with ' those workmen. Yet I do not think it 
 will be argued that an action can be maintained in either 
 case on account of such interference. But whatever meaning 
 may be attached to the words ' interfere with,' I see no 
 ground for saying that any different rule should be applied 
 to cases of interference with a man when carrying on his 
 trade or business, or when he is engaged in any other pursuit. 
 In the Mogul Steamship Co. case [see p. 53] there was an 
 extreme case of interference with the plaintiffs' business by 
 methods which directly injured the plaintiffs in their trade 
 for the express purpose of benefiting the defendants. The 
 admitted interference was carried on by several defendants 
 in a combination which in one sense amounted to a con- 
 spiracy, yet it was held by this House that no action could be 
 maintained, for the acts done were not unlawful, and the 
 combination was not a criminal conspiracy " (per Lord 
 James of Hereford). 
 
 Thus it is clear that, hi view of the decision in Allen v. 
 Flood, it would not be safe to rely on the doctrine of 
 Temperton v. Russell. 
 
 Allen v. Flood was, to a certain extent, considered in 
 Lyons and Sons v. WilJdns (see p. 143), and in Huttley v. 
 Simmons and Others (1898, 1 Q. B. 181 ; 67 L. J. Q. B. 213). 
 In this case the jury found that the defendant Simmons (who 
 
CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 163 
 
 was the president of a strike committee of a trade union, of Ss. 15, 16, 
 which all the other defendants were members) induced a cab "" 
 proprietor not to engage the plaintiff to drive a cab for him 
 or to let him one on hire; that he did this " maliciously," in 
 order to injure the plaintiff and to procure some indirect 
 advantage for those for whom he was acting (but not for 
 himself) ; and that he conspired with other members of the 
 Cab Drivers' Union to induce the proprietor not to let him 
 have a cab ; and they assessed damages. 
 
 Darling, J., thought iha,t Allen v. Flood governed this case 
 except on the finding of conspiracy. " Upon the question 
 thus raised," he said, " the judgment in Allen v. Flood is, 
 I humbly conceive, of no absolute authority. ... I take it 
 to have been established * by that judgment ' that (con- 
 spiracy apart) nothing proved to have been done by the 
 defendant in this case amounted to an actionable wrong. 
 Does, then, his having conspired with others to do those 
 things render such, otherwise innocent, acts illegal and 
 wrongful so as to give plaintiff a right of action against him? 
 I think I am bound by authority to come to a contrary 
 conclusion," and the learned Judge cited the judgment of 
 Cockburn, C. J., in Eeg. v. Wen-burton (in 1870, L. R. 1 C. C. 
 274, at p. 276), and that of Palles, C. B., in Kearney v. Lloyd 
 (26 L. R. Ir. 268), the latter to- the effect "that conspiracy 
 to do certain acts gives a right of action only where the acts 
 agreed to be done, and in fact done, would, had they been 
 without preconcert, have involved a civil injury to the plain- 
 tiff;" and he entered judgment for the defendant. (See p. 56.) 
 
 Saving Clause. 
 16. Nothing in this Act shall apply to seamen saving as to 
 
 . . ., . sea service. 
 
 or to apprentices to the sea service. 
 
 " Apply to Seamen." "I am clearly of opinion," said 
 Day, J., " that all which is meant by this saving clause is 
 that nothing in the Act shall make persons who are seamen 
 responsible for the offences there dealt with. That is to say, 
 
 112 
 
164 CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION, &c,, ACT, 1875. 
 
 Ss. 16, 17. the penalties and punishments provided by the Act are not 
 to fall upon seamen. It is not meant that any one may 
 commit those offences upon seamen " (Kennedy v. Coivie, 
 1891, 1 Q. B. 771). Cf. R. v. Wall (112 Sessions Paper, 
 C. C. C. 880) in 1890, and P. v. Phillips (ibid., vol. 113, 
 p. 622) in 1891. 
 
 Seamen are subject to a special code, viz. : the Merchant 
 Shipping Act, 1894 (57-8 V. c. 60). 
 
 It is not always clear who is a "seaman" under the Act. 
 In Peg. v. Lynch and Jones (1898, 1 Q. B. 61), "there was 
 evidence that the prisoners followed the sea as a calling, 
 each of them having been engaged as firemen on board steam- 
 ships, but on the day in question they were not engaged or 
 employed as firemen or seamen on boarcl ship. It was not 
 shown when either of them had been -last so employed or 
 engaged, but they followed the sea as an occupation." 
 
 " It would be strange," said Russell, L. C. J.,in delivering 
 the judgment of the Court for Crown Cases Reserved, " if 
 the Legislature intended to exclude such persons [as the 
 prisoners] from the legislation of 1875, as well as from that 
 of the Merchant Shipping Acts," and the Court came to the 
 conclusion that seamen were excluded from the Act of 1875 
 because they were subject to the Merchant Shipping Act of 
 1854 (partly re-enacted by the Act of 1894), which had defined 
 the term, and "that no ground of reason or common sense 
 can be found for excluding from the operation of the Act 
 [of 1875] the whole class of seafaring men, not actually 
 engaged in sea service." It held, accordingly, that these 
 prisoners were rightly convicted under sect. 7 of this Act 
 notwithstanding sect. 16. 
 
 HepcaL 
 
 -^ On and after the commencement of this Act, 
 there shall be repealed : 
 
 I. The Act of the session of the thirty-fourth and 
 thirty-fifth years of the reign of Her present Majesty, 
 
CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 165 
 
 chapter thirty-two, intituled "An Act to amend s - 17- 
 the Criminal Law relating to violence, threats, and 
 molestation ; " and 
 
 II. "The Master and Servant Act, 1867," and the 
 enactments specified in the First Schedule to that 
 Act, with the exceptions following as to the enact- 
 ments in such Schedule ; (that is to say), 
 (1.) Except so much of sections one and two of 
 the Act passed in the thirty-third year of the 
 reign of King George the Third, chapter fifty- 
 five, intituled " An Act to authorise justices of 
 the peace to impose fines upon constables, over- 
 seers and other peace or parish officers for 
 neglect of duty, and on masters of apprentices 
 for ill-usages of such their apprentice ; and also 
 to make provision for the execution of warrants 
 of distress granted by magistrates," as relates 
 to constables, overseers, and other peace or 
 parish officers ; and 
 
 (2.) Except so much of sections five and six of an 
 Act passed in the fifty-ninth year of the reign 
 of King George the Third, chapter ninety-two, 
 intituled " An Act to enable justices of the peace in 
 Ireland to act as such, in certain cases, out of the 
 limits of the counties in which they actually are ; 
 to make provision for the execution of warrants 
 of distress granted by them ; and to authorise 
 them to impose fines upon constables and other 
 officers for neglect of duty, and on masters for 
 ill-usage of their apprentices," as relates to con- 
 stables and other peace or parish officers ; and 
 (3.) Except the Act of the session of the fifth and 
 sixth years of the reign of Her present Majesty, 
 
166 CONSPIEACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 
 
 s. 17. chapter seven, intituled " An Act to explain 
 
 the Acts for the better regulation of certain 
 apprentices," and 
 
 (4.) Except sub-sections one, two, three, and five 
 of section sixteen of " The Summary Jurisdic- 
 tion (Ireland) Act, 1851." relating to certain 
 disputes between employers and the persons 
 employed by them ; and 
 
 III. Also there shall be repealed the following enact- 
 ments making breaches of contract criminal, and 
 relating to the recovery of wages by summary pro- 
 cedure ; (that is to say,) 
 
 (a.) An Act passed in the fifth year of the reign 
 of Queen Elizabeth, chapter four, and intituled 
 " An Act touching dyvers orders for artificers, 
 labourers, servantes of husbandrye, and appren- 
 tices ; " and 
 
 (b.) So much of section two of an Act passed in 
 the twelfth year of King George the First, 
 chapter thirty-four, and intituled "An Act to 
 prevent unlawful combination of workmen em- 
 ployed in the woollen manufactures, and for 
 better payment of their wages," as relates to 
 departing from service and quitting or return- 
 ing work before it is finished ; and 
 (c.) Section twenty of an Act passed in the fifth 
 year of King George the Third, chapter fifty- 
 one, the title of which begins with the words 
 " An Act for repealing several Laws relating to 
 the manufacture of woollen cloth in the county 
 of York," and ends with the words " for pre- 
 serving the credit of the said manufacture at 
 the foreign market ; " and 
 
CONSPIEACY AND PKOTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 167 
 
 (d.) An Act passed in the nineteenth year of King S- 17. 
 George the Third, chapter forty-nine, and ~ 
 intituled "An Act to prevent abuses in the 
 payment of wages to persons employed in the 
 bone and thread lace manufactory ; " and 
 
 (e.) Sections eighteen and twenty-three of an Act 
 passed in the session of the third and fourth 
 years of Her present Majesty, chapter ninety- 
 one, intituled "An Act for the more effectual 
 prevention of frauds and abuses committed by 
 weavers, sewers, and other persons employed in 
 the linen, hempen, union, cotton, silk, and woollen 
 manufactures in Ireland, and for the better pay- 
 ment of their wages, for one year, and from thence 
 to the end of the next session of Parliament ; " 
 and 
 
 (/) Section seventeen of an Act passed in the session 
 of the sixth and seventh years of Her present 
 Majesty, chapter forty, the title of which begins 
 with the words " An Act to amend the Laws," 
 and ends with the words "workmen engaged 
 therein ; " and 
 
 (g.} Section seven of an Act passed in the session 
 of the eighth and ninth years of Her present 
 Majesty, chapter one hundred and twenty-eight, 
 and intituled " An Act to make further regula- 
 tions respecting the tickets of work to be delivered 
 to silk weavers in certain cases." 
 
 Provided that, 
 
 (1.) Any order for wages or further sum of com- 
 pensation in addition to wages made in 
 pursuance of section sixteen of " The 
 
168 CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 
 
 SB- 1? is. Summary Jurisdiction (Ireland) Act, 1851," 
 may be enforced in like manner as if it were 
 an order made by a court of summary juris- 
 diction in pursuance of the Employers and 
 Workmen Act, 1875, and not otherwise ; 
 and 
 (2.) The repeal enacted by this section shall not 
 
 affect 
 
 (a.) Anything duly done or suffered, or any right or 
 liability acquired or incurred under any enact- 
 ment hereby repealed ; or 
 
 (b.) Any penalty, forfeiture, or punishment incurred 
 in respect of any offence committed against any 
 enactment hereby repealed ; or 
 (c.) Any investigation, legal proceeding, or remedy 
 in respect of any such right, liability, penalty, 
 forfeiture, or punishment as aforesaid ; and any 
 such investigation, legal proceeding, and remedy 
 may be carried on as if this Act had not passed. 
 
 Sect. 17 now runs : " Any order for wages . . . not 
 otherwise" ; the rest of this section being repealed by 46-7 
 V. 39 (S. L. R. Act, 1883). 
 For the Employers and Workmen Act, 1875, see p. 
 
 N.B. In the following ss. of this Act, the words in smaller 
 type are repealed by 56-7 V. 54 (S. L. R. Act (No. 2), 1893). 
 
 Application of Act to Scotland. 
 Application 18. This Act shall extend to Scotland, with the 
 
 to Scotland. 
 
 modifications following ; that is to say, 
 Definitions. (1.) The expression " municipal authority " 
 means the town council of any royal or parlia- 
 
CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 169 
 
 mentary burgh, or the commissioners of police Ss - 18 19 - 
 of any burgh, town, or populous place under 
 the provisions of the General Police and 
 Improvement (Scotland) Act, 1862, or. any 
 local authority under the provisions of the 
 Public Health (Scotland) Act, 1867 : 
 
 (2.) The expression "The Summary Jurisdiction 
 Act" means the Summary Procedure Act, 1864, 
 and any Acts amending the same : 
 
 (3.) The expression " the court of summary 
 jurisdiction " means the sheriff of the county 
 or any one of his substitutes. 
 
 19. In Scotland the following provisions shall Recovery of 
 have effect in regard to the prosecution of offences, ' 
 
 recovery of penalties, and making of orders under 
 this Act : 
 
 (1.) Every offence under this Act shall be 
 prosecuted, every penalty recovered, and every 
 order made at the instance of the Lord 
 Advocate, or of the Procurator Fiscal of the 
 sheriff court : 
 
 (2.) The proceedings may be on indictment in 
 the Court of Justiciary in Edinburgh or on 
 circuit or in a sheriff court, or may be 
 taken summarily in the sheriff court under 
 the provisions of the Summary Procedure 
 Act, 1864: 
 
 (3.) Every person found liable on conviction to 
 pay any penalty under this Act shall be liable, 
 
170 CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 
 
 SB. 19,20, in default of payment within a time to be 
 fixed in the conviction, to be imprisoned for 
 a term, to be also fixed therein, not exceeding 
 two months, or until such penalty shall be 
 sooner paid, and the conviction and warrant 
 may be in the form of Xo. 3 of Schedule K. 
 of the Summary Procedure Act, 1864 : 
 (4.) In Scotland all penalties imposed in pur- 
 suance of this Act shall be paid to the clerk 
 of the court imposing them, and shall by 
 him be accounted for and paid to the Queen's 
 and Lord Treasurer's Remembrancer, and be 
 carried to the Consolidated Fund. 
 20 - In Scotland it shall be competent to any 
 person to appeal against any order or conviction 
 under this Act to the next circuit Court of Justiciary, 
 or where there are no circuit courts to the High Court 
 of Justiciary at Edinburgh, in the manner prescribed 
 by and under the rules, limitations, conditions, 
 and restrictions contained in the Act passed in the 
 twentieth year of the reign of His Majesty King 
 George the Second, chapter forty-three, in regard 
 to appeals to circuit courts in matters criminal, 
 as the same may be altered or amended by any 
 Acts of Parliament for the time being in force. 
 
 Application of Act to Ireland. 
 Application 21. This Act shall extend to Ireland, with the 
 
 to Ireland. 
 
 modifications following ; that is to say, 
 
CONSPIEACY AND PROTECTION, &c., ACT, 1875. 171 
 
 The expression " the Summary Jurisdiction Act " shall S. 21. 
 be construed to mean, as regards the police district 
 of Dublin metropolis, the Acts regulating the powers 
 and duties of justices of the peace for such district ; 
 and elsewhere in Ireland, the Petty Sessions (Ire- 
 land) Act, 1851, and any Acts amending the same : 
 
 The expression " court of summary jurisdiction " shall 
 be construed to mean any justice or justices of the 
 peace, or other magistrate to whom jurisdiction is 
 given by the Summary Jurisdiction Act : 
 
 The court of summary jurisdiction, when hearing 
 and determining complaints under this Act, 
 shall in the police district of Dublin metropolis 
 be constituted of one or more of the divisional 
 justices of the said district, and elsewhere in 
 Ireland of two or more justices of the peace 
 in petty sessions sitting at a place appointed 
 for holding petty sessions : 
 
 The expression " municipal authority " shall be 
 construed to mean the town council of any 
 borough for the time being, subject to the Act 
 of the session of the third and fourth years 
 of the reign of Her present Majesty, chapter 
 one hundred and eight, entitled " An Act for 
 the Eegulation of Municipal Corporations in 
 Ireland," and any commissioners invested by 
 any general or local Act of Parliament, with 
 power of improvement, cleansing, lighting, or 
 paving any town or township. 
 
ss.^1,2,3. THE EMPLOYEES AND WORKMEN 
 
 ACT, 1875. 
 
 38-9 V. 90. 
 
 An Act to enlarge the powers of County Courts 
 in respect of disputes between Employers and 
 Workmen, and to give other Courts a limited civil 
 jurisdiction in respect of such disputes. 
 
 [13th August, 1875. 
 
 Preliminary. 
 
 short utie. l Thig Act may be cited ag the Employers and 
 Workmen Act, 1875. 
 
 2. This Act, except so far as it authorises any rules to 
 be made or other thing to be done at any time after the 
 passing of this Act, shall come into operation on the 
 first day of September one thousand eight hundred and 
 seventy-five. 
 
 Kepealed by 56-7 V. 54 (S. L. K. Act (No. 2), 1893). 
 
 PART I. 
 
 
 court as to 
 
 Power of 
 
 county Jurisdiction Jurisdiction of County Court. 
 
 3. In any proceeding before a county court in 
 relation to any dispute between an employer and 
 of contract a workman arising out of or incidental to their 
 
 and taking 
 security. 
 
THE EMPLOYEES AND WORKMEN ACT, 1875. 173 
 
 relation as such (which dispute is herein-after s - 3. 
 referred to as a dispute under this Act) the court 
 may, in addition to any jurisdiction it might have 
 exercised if this Act had not passed, exercise all or 
 any of the following powers ; that is to say, 
 
 (1.) It may adjust and set off the one against 
 the other all such claims on the part either of 
 the employer or of the workman, arising out . 
 of or incidental to the relation between them, 
 as the court may find to be subsisting, whether 
 such claims are liquidated or unliquidated, 
 and are for wages, damages, or otherwise; 
 and, 
 
 (2.) If, having regard to all the circumstances of 
 the case, it thinks it just to do so, it may 
 rescind any contract between the employer 
 and the workman upon such terms as to the 
 apportionment of wages or other sums due 
 thereunder, and as to the payment of wages 
 or damages, or other sums due, as it thinks 
 just; and, 
 
 (3.) Where the court might otherwise award 
 damages for any breach of contract it may, 
 if the defendant be willing to give security to 
 the satisfaction of the court for the perform- 
 ance by him of so much of his contract as 
 remains unperformed, with the consent of the 
 plaintiff, accept such security, and order per- 
 formance of the contract according!}', in place 
 
174 THE EMPLOYEES AND WORKMEN ACT, 1875. 
 
 Ss. 3, 4. either of the whole of the damages which 
 
 would otherwise have been awarded, or some 
 part of such damages. 
 
 The security shall be an undertaking by the 
 defendant and one or more surety or sureties 
 that the defendant will perform his contract, 
 subject on non-performance to the payment 
 of a sum to be specified in the undertaking. 
 
 Any sum paid by a surety on behalf of a defendant 
 in respect of a security under this Act, together 
 with all costs incurred by such surety in respect 
 of such security, shall be deemed to be a debt 
 due to him from the defendant ; and where 
 such security has been given in or under the 
 direction of a court of 'summary jurisdiction, 
 that court may order payment to the surety of 
 the sum which has so become due to him from 
 the defendant. 
 
 Court of Summary Jurisdiction. 
 jurisdiction 4. A dispute under this Act between an employer 
 
 of justices 
 
 h an( * a wor ^ man ma J be heard and determined by 
 workmen!" 1 a court of summary jurisdiction, and such court, 
 for the purposes of this Act, shall be deemed to be 
 a court of civil jurisdiction, and in a proceeding in 
 relation to any such dispute the court may order 
 payment of any sum which it may find to be due 
 as w r ages, or damages, or otherwise, and may 
 exercise all or any of the powers by this Act 
 
THE EMPLOYEES AND WOEKMEN ACT, 1875. 175 
 
 conferred on a county court : Provided that in any s ' 4 - 
 proceeding in relation to any such dispute the 
 court of summary jurisdiction 
 
 (1.) Shall not exercise any jurisdiction where the 
 
 amount claimed exceeds ten pounds ; and 
 (2.) Shall not make an order for the payment of 
 any sum exceeding ten pounds, exclusive of 
 the costs incurred in the case, and 
 (3.) Shall not require security to an amount 
 exceeding ten pounds from any defendant or 
 his surety or sureties. 
 
 In Hindley v. Ha slam and Others (3 Q. B. D. 481, in 
 1878), the appellant was a spinner who had been discharged 
 from the respondent's employment for neglect of work. He 
 was paid the wages he had actually earned, but nothing in 
 lieu of notice. He sued his late employers in the county 
 court and recovered 3 10s. in lieu of notice. Thereupon 
 the respondents claimed ^8 8s. damages for the materials 
 which they alleged the appellant had spoiled by his inatten- 
 tion and neglect of work, and recovered that sum and costs 
 before the justices. No counterclaim was made or set-off 
 alleged in the county court, and the appellant objected to 
 the jurisdiction of the justices, one ground being that these 
 sections ousted it. On a case stated, the Court (Cockburn, 
 C. J., Mellor and Lush, JJ.), unanimously upheld the 
 justices' order, Mellor, J., saying : "I am bound to say 
 that I think it most inconvenient that a controversy involv- 
 ing so small a sum should be divided and go before two 
 different tribunals, but I think the Justices had jurisdiction 
 to make this order." " I cannot see," said Lush, J., " that 
 the respondents \vere bound to bring this matter before the 
 county court Judge by way of counterclaim." 
 
 " Dispute." It maybe mentioned though the matter 
 
176 THE EMPLOYERS AND WORKMEN ACT, 1875. 
 
 SB. 4, 5, 6. does not affect trade unions, as such that under this section 
 the justices have jurisdiction, where a workman absents 
 himself without notice, "though no subsequent explanation 
 has passed between the parties," i.e., there has been no 
 " dispute " in the popular sense, because one party has at 
 once taken legal proceedings, without saying more to the 
 other side (Clemson v. Hubbard, 49 J. P. 725, in 1876). 
 
 jurisdiction 5. Any dispute between an apprentice to whom 
 
 of justices ,1 . A T T i 
 
 in disputes this Act applies and his master, arising out of or 
 
 between 
 
 masters and incidental to their relation as such, (which dispute 
 
 apprentices. 
 
 is hereinafter referred to as a dispute under this 
 Act,) may be heard and determined by a court of 
 summary jurisdiction. 
 
 iiSsui 6. In a proceeding before a court of summary 
 apprentice* jurisdiction in relation to a dispute under this Act 
 between a master and an apprentice, the court 
 shall have the same powers as if the dispute were 
 between an employer and a workman, and the 
 master were the employer and the apprentice the 
 workman, and the instrument of apprenticeship a 
 contract between an employer and a workman, and 
 shall also have the following powers : 
 
 (1.) It may make an order directing the ap- 
 prentice to perform his duties under the 
 apprenticeship; and 
 
 (2.) If it rescinds the instrument of apprentice- 
 ship it may, if it thinks it just so to do, 
 order the whole or any part of the premium 
 paid on the binding of the apprentice to be 
 repaid. 
 
THE EMPLOYERS AND WORKMEN ACT, 1875. 177 
 
 Where an order is made directing an apprentice SB. 6, 7. 
 to perform his duties under the apprenticeship, the 
 court may, from time to time, if satisfied after the 
 expiration of not less than one month from the 
 date of the order that the apprentice has failed to 
 comply therewith, order him to be imprisoned for 
 a period not exceeding fourteen days. 
 
 7. In a proceeding before a court of summary order 
 jurisdiction in relation to a dispute under this Act surety of 
 between a master and an apprentice, if there is any 
 
 person liable, under the instrument of apprentice 
 ship, for the good conduct of the apprentice, that securit y- 
 person may, if the court so direct, be summoned 
 in like manner as if he were the defendant in such 
 proceeding to attend on the hearing of the pro- 
 ceeding, and the court may, in addition to or in 
 substitution for any order which the court is autho- 
 rised to make against the apprentice, order the 
 person so summoned to pay damages for any breach 
 of the contract of apprenticeship to an amount not 
 exceeding the limit (if any) to which he is liable 
 under the instrument of apprenticeship. 
 
 The court may, if the person so summoned, or 
 any other person, is willing to give security to the 
 satisfaction of the court for the performance by 
 the apprentice of his contract of apprenticeship, 
 accept such security instead of or in mitigation 
 of any punishment which it is authorised to inflict 
 upon the apprentice. 
 
 T.U.A. 12 
 
178 THE EMPLOYERS AND WORKMEN ACT, 1875. 
 
 3s. 8, 9. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 Procedure. 
 
 Mode of 8. A person may give security under this Act in a 
 security, county court or court of summary jurisdiction by an 
 oral or written acknowledgment in or under the direc- 
 tion of the court of the undertaking or condition by 
 which and the sum for which he is bound, in such 
 manner and form as may be prescribed by any rule 
 for the time being in force, and in any case where 
 security is so given, the court in or under the 
 direction of which it is given may order payment 
 of any sum which may become due in pursuance 
 of such security. 
 
 The Lord Chancellor may at any time after the 
 passing of this Act, and from time to time make, 
 and when made, rescind, alter, and add to, rules 
 with respect to giving security under this Act. 
 
 The rules now in force under this and next sections were 
 made by Lord Chancellor Herschell in 1886. See Appendix A., 
 p. 198, and Howell's Handy Book of the Labour Laws, c. iii. 
 
 summary 9. Any dispute or matter in respect of which 
 
 proceedings. * . 
 
 jurisdiction is given by this Act to a court of 
 summary jurisdiction shall be deemed to be a 
 matter on which that court has authority by law 
 to make an order on complaint in pursuance of the 
 Summary Jurisdiction Act, but shall not be deemed 
 to be a criminal proceeding ; and all powers by this 
 Act conferred on a court of summary jurisdiction 
 
THE EMPLOYERS AND WORKMEN ACT, 1875. 179 
 
 shall be deemed to be in addition to and not in s - 9 - 
 derogation of any powers conferred on it by the 
 Summary Jurisdiction Act, except that a warrant 
 shall not be issued under that Act for apprehending 
 any person other than an apprentice for failing to 
 appear to answer a complaint in any proceeding 
 under this Act, and that an order made by a court 
 of summary jurisdiction under this Act for the 
 payment of any money shall not be enforced by 
 imprisonment except in the manner and under the 
 conditions by this Act provided ; and no goods or 
 chattels shall be taken under a distress ordered by 
 a court of summary jurisdiction which might not be 
 taken under an execution issued by a county court. 
 
 A court of summary jurisdiction may direct any 
 sum of money, for the payment of which it makes an 
 order under this Act, to be paid by instalments, and 
 may from time to time rescind or vary such order. 
 
 Any sum payable by any person under the order 
 of a court of summary jurisdiction in pursuance of 
 this Act, shall be deemed to be a debt due from 
 him in pursuance of a judgment of a competent 
 court within the meaning of the fifth section of the ' 
 Debtors Act, 1869, and may be enforced accordingly ; 
 and as regards any such debt a court of summary 
 jurisdiction shall be deemed to be a court within 
 the meaning of the said section. 
 
 The Lord Chancellor may at any time after the 
 passing of this Act, and from time to time make, 
 
 122 
 
180 THE EMPLOYEES AND WORKMEN ACT, 1875. 
 
 Ss 9 10 - and when made, rescind, alter, and add to, rules 
 for carrying into eftect the jurisdiction by this Act 
 given to a court of summary jurisdiction, and in 
 particular for the purpose of regulating the costs of 
 any proceedings in a court of summary jurisdiction, 
 with power to provide that the same shall not 
 exceed the costs which would in a similar case be 
 incurred in a county court, and any rules so made 
 in so far as they relate to the exercise of jurisdiction 
 under the said fifth section of the Debtors Act, 1869, 
 shall be deemed to be prescribed rules within the 
 meaning of the said section. 
 
 Execution issued by a County Court. The bailiff may 
 not take the wearing apparel and bedding of the execution 
 debtor or his family, and the debtor's tools and implements 
 are protected from seizure to the value of 5. Perhaps 
 money on the person of the debtor may be taken. " The 
 bailiff cannot seize fixtures as furnaces, ovens, doors, 
 windows, hearths, chimneypieces, &c." (1 Annual County 
 Courts Practice, 1901, p. 345). There are also some special 
 exemptions in the case of agricultural tenants. 
 
 PART III. 
 
 Definitions : 10. In this Act 
 
 " Work- 
 
 The expression " workman " does not include a 
 domestic or menial servant, but save as aforesaid, 
 means any person who, being a labourer, servant 
 in husbandry, journeyman, artificer, handicrafts- 
 man, miner, or otherwise engaged in manual 
 labour, whether under the age of twenty-one years 
 or above that age, has entered into or works 'under 
 
THE EMPLOYEES AND WORKMEN ACT, 1875. 181 
 
 a contract with an employer, whether the contract S B. 10, 11, 
 be made before or after the passing of this Act, - 
 be express or implied, oral or in writing, and be 
 a contract of service or a contract personally to 
 execute any work or labour. 
 
 The question who is a " workman " under this Act cannot 
 be discussed here. See Bound v. Lawrence (61 L. J. M. C. 
 21 ; (1892) 1 Q. B. 226 ; 65 L. T. 844; 40 W. E. 1 ; 56 J. P. 
 118), where the Court of Appeal held that " the test of 
 whether an employee is engaged in manual labour " within 
 this section " is whether such labour is his real and sub- 
 stantial employment or whether it is incidental and accessory 
 to such employment") or Beg. v. Justices of Louth (1900, 
 2 Irish Eep. 714). 
 
 11. In the case of a child, young person, or set-off in 
 
 case of 
 
 woman subject to the provisions of the Factory fact r y 
 
 workers. 
 
 Acts, 1833 to 1874, any forfeiture on the ground of 
 absence or leaving work shall not be deducted from 
 or set off against a claim for wages or other sum 
 due for work done before such absence or leaving 
 work, except to the amount of the damage (if any) 
 which the employer may have sustained by reason 
 of such absence or leaving work. 
 
 Factory Acts, 1833 to 1874. See now 41-2 V. 16, 
 102 (The Factory and Workshop Act, 1878). 
 
 Application to Apprentices, 
 
 Act in so far as it relates to 
 
 only to an apprentice to t' 
 
 of a workman as denned by this Act upon whose 
 
 12. This Act in so far as it relates to apprentices Application 
 
 to appren- 
 
 shall apply only to an apprentice to the business tices - 
 
182 THE EMPLOYERS AND WORKMEN ACT, 1875. 
 
 8s. 12, 13, binding either no premium is paid, or the premium 
 - (if any) paid does not exceed twenty-five pounds, 
 and to an apprentice bound under the provisions 
 of the Acts relating to the relief of the poor. 
 
 Acts relating to the Belief of the Poor. The 
 
 principal Act is 7-8 V. 101 (1844). See, on the whole 
 subject, Austin on Apprentices, c. vi. 
 
 Saving Clause. 
 savins of 13. Nothing in this Act shall take away or 
 
 special jnrta- 
 
 alul Bridge an y l ca l 01> special jurisdiction touching 
 
 apprentices. 
 
 This Act shall not apply to seamen or to 
 apprentices to the sea service. 
 
 By 43-4 V. 16, 11 (The Merchant Seamen (Payment of 
 Wages,' &c.) Act, 1880) it is provided: The 13th section of 
 the Employers and Workmen Act, 1875, shall be repealed 
 in so far as it operates to exclude seamen and apprentices 
 to the sea service from the said Act, and the said Act 
 shall apply to seamen and apprentices to the sea service 
 accordingly ; but such repeal shall not, in the absence of 
 any enactment to the contrary, extend to or affect any pro- 
 vision contained in any other Act of Parliament passed, or 
 to be passed, whereby workman is defined by reference to 
 the persons to whom the Employers and Workmen Act, 
 1875, applies. 
 
 PART IV. 
 
 Application of Act to Scotland. 
 Application 14. This Act shall extend to Scotland, with the 
 
 to Scotland. 
 
 modifications following ; that is to say, 
 
THE EMPLOYEES AND WORKMEN ACT, 1875. 188 
 
 In this Act with respect to Scotland s. 14. 
 
 The expression "county court" means the Definitions. 
 ordinary sheriff court of the county : 
 
 The expression " the court of summary juris- 
 diction " means the small debt court of 
 the sheriff of the county : 
 
 The expression " sheriff" includes sheriff 
 substitute : 
 
 The expression "instrument of apprentice- 
 ship " means indenture : 
 
 The expression "plaintiff" or " complainant" 
 means pursuer or complainer : 
 
 The expression "defendant "includes defender 
 or respondent : 
 
 The expression " the Summary Jurisdiction 
 Act " means the Act of the seventh year of 
 the reign of His Majesty King William the 
 Fourth and the first year of the reign of 
 Her present Majesty, chapter forty-one, 
 intituled " An Act for the more effectual 
 recovery of small debts in the Sheriff Courts, 
 and for regulating the establishment of 
 circuit courts for the trial of small debt 
 causes by the sheriffs in Scotland," and 
 the Acts amending the same : 
 
 The expression " surety " means cautioner : 
 This Act shall be read and construed, as if 
 for the expression " The Lord Chancellor," 
 wherever it occurs therein, the expression "the 
 
184 THE EMPLOYERS AND WORKMEN ACT, 1875. 
 
 SB. 14, 15. Court of Session by act of sederunt " were 
 substituted. 
 
 All jurisdictions, powers, and authorities necessary 
 for the purposes of this Act are hereby conferred on 
 sheriffs in their ordinary or small debt courts, as 
 the case may be, who shall have full power to make 
 any order on any summons, petition, complaint, or 
 other proceeding under this Act, that any county 
 court or court of summary jurisdiction is empowered 
 to make on any complaint or other proceeding 
 under this Act. 
 
 Any decree or order pronounced or made by a 
 sheriff under this Act shall be enforced in the same 
 manner and under the same conditions in and 
 under which a decree or order pronounced or made 
 by him in his ordinary or small debt court, as the 
 case may be, is enforced. 
 
 PART V. 
 
 Application of Act to Ireland. 
 Application 15. This Act shall extend to Ireland, with the 
 
 to Ireland. 
 
 modifications following ; that is to sa}% 
 
 The expression " county court " shall be con- 
 strued to mean civil bill court : 
 The expression "Lord Chancellor" shall be 
 construed to mean the Lord Chancellor of 
 Ireland : 
 
 The expression " The Summary Jurisdiction 
 Act" shall be construed to moan, as regards 
 
THE EMPLOYERS AND WORKMEN ACT, 1875. 185 
 
 the police district of Dublin metropolis, the s< 15 ^ 
 Acts regulating the powers and duties of 
 justices of the peace for such district, and else- 
 where in Ireland, the Petty Sessions (Ireland) 
 Act, 1851, and any Acts amending the same : 
 
 The expression " court of summary juris- 
 diction" shall be construed to mean any 
 justice or justices of the peace or other 
 magistrate to whom jurisdiction is given 
 by the Summary Jurisdiction Act : 
 
 The court of summary jurisdiction, when 
 hearing and determining complaints under 
 this Act, shall in the police district of 
 Dublin metropolis be constituted of one or 
 more of the divisional justices of the said 
 district, and elsewhere in Ireland of two 
 or more justices of the peace in petty 
 sessions sitting at a place appointed for 
 holding petty sessions : 
 
 The expression "fifth section of the Debtors Act, 
 1869," shall be construed to mean " sixth 
 section of Debtors Act (Ireland), 1872." 
 
SB. i, 2. THE TEADE UNION (PROVIDENT FUNDS) 
 
 ACT, 1893. 
 
 56-7 V. 2. 
 
 Ail Act to exempt from Income Tax the Invested 
 Funds of Trade Unions applied in payment of 
 Provident Benefits. [28th March, 1893. 
 
 provident 1. A trade union duly registered under the 
 
 trmdetmioM Trade Union Acts, 1871 and 1876, shall be 
 
 f?om income entitled to exemption from income tax chargeable 
 
 34 & 35 vict. under Schedules A., C., and D. of any Acts for 
 
 39 &*4o vict. granting duties of income tax in respect of the 
 
 interest and dividends of the trade union applicable 
 
 and applied solely for the purpose of provident 
 
 benefits. 
 
 Provided alwaj^s that the exemption shall not 
 extend to any trade union by the rules of which 
 the amount assured to any member, or person 
 nominated by or claiming under him, shall exceed 
 the total sum of two hundred pounds, or the 
 amount of any annuity granted to any member, or 
 person nominated by him, shall exceed the sum 
 of thirty pounds per annum. 
 Mode of 2. The exemption shall be claimed and allowed 
 
 claiming 
 
 exemption, in the same manner as is prescribed by law in the 
 
THE TRADE UNION (PROVIDENT FUNDS) ACT, 1893. 187 
 
 case of income applicable and applied to charitable Ss - 2 ? 3 > 4 - 
 purposes. See on this subject Chilcott in the 
 " Administration of Charities " (1898). 
 
 3. In this Act the expression "provident benefits " Definition of 
 
 "provident 
 
 means and includes any payment made to a benefits. 
 member during sickness or incapacity from personal 
 injury, or while out of work ; or to an aged 
 member by way of superannuation, or to a 
 member who has met with an accident- or has lost 
 his tools by fire or theft, or a payment in discharge 
 or aid of funeral expenses on the death of a member 
 or the wife of a member, or as provision for the 
 children of the deceased member, where the pay- 
 ment in respect whereof exemption is claimed is 
 a payment expressly authorised by the registered 
 rules of the trade union claiming the exemption, snort title. 
 
 4. This Act may be cited as the Trade Union 
 (Provident Funds) Act, 1893. 
 
s. i. THE CONCILIATION ACT, 1896. 
 
 59-60 V. 30. 
 
 An Act to make better Provision for the Prevention 
 and Settlement of Trade Disputes. 
 
 [7th August, 1896. 
 nitration i. (i.) Any board established either before or 
 
 jincl powers 
 
 tioniards a ^er the passing of this Act, which is constituted 
 for the purpose of settling disputes between 
 employers and workmen by conciliation or arbitra- 
 tion, or any association or body authorised by an 
 agreement in writing made between employers and 
 workmen to deal with such disputes (in this Act 
 referred to as a conciliation board), may apply to 
 the Board of Trade for registration under this Act. 
 
 (2.) The application must be accompanied by 
 copies of the constitution, byelaws, and regulations 
 of the conciliation board, with such other informa- 
 tion as the Board of Trade may reasonably require. 
 
 (3.) The Board of Trade shall keep a register of 
 conciliation boards, and enter therein with respect 
 to each registered board its name and principal 
 office, and such other particulars as the Board of 
 Trade may think expedient, and any registered 
 conciliation board shall be entitled to have its name 
 
THE CONCILIATION ACT, 1896. 189 
 
 removed from the register on sending to the Board Ss - *> 2 - 
 of Trade a written application to that effect. 
 
 (4.) Every registered conciliation board shall 
 furnish such returns, reports of its proceedings, 
 and other documents as the Board of Trade may 
 reasonably require. 
 
 (5.) The Board of Trade may, on being satisfied 
 that a registered conciliation board has ceased to 
 exist or to act, remove its name from the register. 
 
 (6.) Subject to any agreement to the contrary, 
 proceedings for conciliation before a registered con- 
 ciliation board shall be conducted in accordance 
 with the regulations of the board in that behalf. 
 
 2. (1.) Where a difference exists or is apprehended 
 between an employer, or any class of employers, 
 and workmen, or between different classes of dls i )Utes - 
 workmen, the Board of Trade may, if they think fit, 
 exercise all or any of the following powers, namely, 
 
 (a) inquire into the causes and circumstances of 
 the difference ; 
 
 (b) take such steps as to the Board may seem 
 expedient for the purpose of enabling the 
 parties to the difference to meet together, by 
 themselves or their representatives, under the 
 presidency of a chairman mutually agreed 
 upon or nominated by the Board of Trade or 
 by some other person or body, with a view to 
 the amicable settlement of the difference ; 
 
 (c) on the application of employers or workmen 
 
190 THE CONCILIATION ACT, 1896. 
 
 8s. 2, 3. interested, and after taking into consideration 
 
 the existence and adequacy of means avail- 
 able for conciliation in the district or trade 
 and the circumstances of the case, appoint a 
 person or persons to act as conciliator or as 
 a board of conciliation ; 
 (d) on the application of both parties to the 
 
 difference, appoint an arbitrator. 
 (2.) If any person is so appointed to act as con- 
 ciliator, he shall inquire into the causes and cir- 
 cumstances of the difference by communication with 
 the parties, and otherwise shall endeavour to bring 
 about a settlement of the difference, and shall report 
 his proceedings to the Board of Trade. 
 
 (3.) If a settlement of the difference is effected 
 either by conciliation or by arbitration, a memo- 
 randum of the terms thereof shall be drawn up 
 and signed by the parties or their representatives, 
 and a copy thereof shall be delivered to and kept 
 by the Board of Trade. 
 
 Exclusion of 3. The Arbitration Act, 1889, shall not apply to 
 t^i". the settlement by arbitration of any difference or 
 dispute to which this Act applies, but any such 
 arbitration proceedings shall be conducted in accord- 
 ance with such of the provisions of the said Act, 
 or such of the regulations of any conciliation board, 
 or under such other rules or regulations, as may 
 be mutually agreed upon by the parties to the 
 difference or dispute. 
 
THE CONCILIATION ACT, 1896. 191 
 
 4. If it appears to the Board of Trade that in Ss. 4, 5, 6, 
 any district or trade adequate means do not exist - 
 
 for having disputes submitted to a conciliation Hoard of 
 board for the district or trade, they may appoint 
 any person or persons to inquire into the conditions 
 of the district or trade, and to confer with employers 
 and employed, and, if the Board of Trade think 
 fit, with any local authority or body, as to the 
 expediency of establishing a conciliation board for 
 the district or trade. 
 
 5. The Board of Trade shall from time to time Report to 
 present to Parliament a report of their proceedings 
 under this Act. 
 
 6. The expenses incurred by the Board of Trade Expenses. 
 in the execution of this Act shall be defrayed out 
 
 of moneys provided by Parliament. 
 
 7. The Masters and Workmen Arbitration Act, Repeal 
 1824, and the Councils of Conciliation Act, 1867, o.e, 
 
 30 & 31 Viet. 
 
 and the Arbitration (Masters and Workmen) Act, p : ips, 
 
 3o & 3b\iet. 
 
 1872, are hereby repealed. 
 
 8. This Act may be cited as the Conciliation short title. 
 Act, 1896. 
 
APPENDICES. 
 
 NOTE. The Bules, Regulations, and, Forms that follow 
 are those in force on January 1st, 1901. 
 
 A. EMPLOYERS AND WORKMEN ACT, 1875. 
 SUMMARY JURISDICTION ACTS EULES. 
 
 1. These Kules may be cited as the Employers and Work- Short title 
 men Bules, 1886. They came into operation on the first mencement. 
 day of January, 1887. 
 
 2. The proceedings in relation to any dispute between an Procedure, 
 employer and a workman may be commenced under the 
 Employers and Workmen Act, 1875, in a Court of Summary 
 Jurisdiction for the district in which the defendant or one 
 
 of the defendants dwelt or carried on business, or was 
 employed at the time the cause of action arose, or in which 
 he or one of them happens to be at the time of the entry 
 of the action, and thereupon the same proceedings shall be 
 had, and the same forms may be used as upon a claim for 
 a civil debt under the Summary Jurisdiction Acts : Provided 
 that the summons shall be served four clear days at least 
 before the hearing in manner directed by the said Summary 
 Jurisdiction Acts, or by leaving it with an adult person at 
 the office or place of business or employment of the defendant 
 or one of the defendants: Provided also that no order of 
 commitment shall be made against an apprentice until he 
 shall have been personally served with a judgment summons. 
 
 3. A defendant shall not, except by leave of the Court Set-off or 
 of Summary Jurisdiction, on such terms as the Court may 
 
 think fit, be permitted to set up against the claims of the 
 T.U.A. 13 
 
194 
 
 APPENDIX A. 
 
 Names of 
 plaintiff's 
 claiming 
 upon 
 common 
 circum- 
 stances to 
 be inserted 
 in one 
 summons. 
 
 Defendant 
 may object 
 that a 
 plaintiff's 
 claim shall 
 be heard 
 separately. 
 
 Determina- 
 tion of 
 first-named 
 plaintiffs 
 claim to 
 determine 
 the others 
 
 Where 
 
 summons 
 
 dismissed. 
 
 plaintiff any set-off or counter-claim, unless he shall have 
 served, or cause to be served, by registered post letter or 
 otherwise, two clear days at least before the return-day, a 
 notice thereof directed to the plaintiff at his address as 
 mentioned in the summons, setting forth the particulars of 
 such set-off or counter-claim. Service of any notice by post 
 shall, unless the contrary be proved, be deemed to have 
 been made on the day upon which the letter would have 
 been delivered in the ordinary course of post. 
 
 4. Where disputes between an employer and his workmen 
 are of such a character that the liability of the employer to 
 divers of his workmen depends upon circumstances common 
 to a whole class of their claims, the names of all the workmen 
 whose claims are grounded upon common circumstances 
 may be inserted as plaintiffs in one summons. Where the 
 number of such plaintiff's is large, the name of one plaintiff 
 only may be inserted in the body of the summons, and in 
 such case the names of the other plaintiffs, together with 
 their descriptions and addresses and the amounts of their 
 respective claims, may be endorsed on the summons or 
 added in a schedule thereto annexed. 
 
 5. The employer may, at the hearing of any such summons, 
 object that the claim of any plaintiff included in the summons 
 ought to be separately heard and determined, either on the 
 ground that the amount claimed is disputed, as well as the 
 liability, or as depending on special circumstances. The 
 name of any plaintiff, whose claim is so objected to, shall 
 be struck out by order of the Court of Summary Jurisdiction. 
 
 6. When the summons comes on for hearing, the case of 
 the plaintiff first named in the summons shall (unless the 
 Court otherwise directs) be heard and determined, and the 
 claims of all the other plaintiffs whose names shall have 
 been included in the summons, and not struck out as in 
 Rule 5 provided, shall abide the result of the case so 
 determined. 
 
 7. If the Court of Summary Jurisdiction dismisses the 
 summons, no claim shall afterwards be admitted at the 
 
EMPLOYERS AND WORKMEN ACT, 1875 RULES. 195 
 
 instance of any workman whose name was included in the 
 summons (and was not struck out as in Rule 5 provided) 
 in respect of the claim made thereby, unless he shows to 
 the satisfaction of the Court that his name was included in 
 the summons without his consent. 
 
 8. If the Court of Summary Jurisdiction finds in favour where 
 of the plaintiff whose case is tried, it shall make an order 
 
 on all the claims of the plaintiffs included in the summons 
 (not struck out as in Rule 5 provided), and such order shall 
 operate and take effect as if the claim of each workman, 
 whose name may have been so included as a plaintiff in the 
 summons and not struck out, had been separately heard 
 and determined by the Court, and an order had been made 
 on each such claim. 
 
 9. The Court of Summary Jurisdiction by whom any New trial, 
 action has been determined ex parte may, at the same or 
 
 any subsequent Court, set aside any judgment so given, and 
 any process thereon, and may grant a new trial on such 
 terms as the Court may think fit. 
 
 10. The fees to be paid by a person seeking the assistance Fees. 
 of the Court of Summary Jurisdiction shall be those contained 
 
 in the Schedule annexed hereto. 
 
 11. The Court of Summary Jurisdiction may, in its discre-. Costs, 
 tion, allow any party, in respect of any expense he may 
 have incurred in the employment of a solicitor, any sum 
 
 not exceeding ten shillings where the sum claimed exceeds 
 forty shillings, and not exceeding fifteen shillings where it 
 exceeds five pounds. 
 
 12. The forms in ' force under the Summary Jurisdiction Forms. 
 Rules, 1886, so far as the same are applicable, together with 
 
 the forms in the Schedule hereto, and forms to the like 
 effect, with such variations as circumstances may require, 
 may be used in proceedings under this Act. 
 
 13. The Rules and forms under the Employers and Annulment. 
 Workmen Act, 1875, heretofore in use are hereby annulled. 
 
 (Signed) HERSCHELL, C. 
 The 16th July, 1886. 
 
 132 
 
196 APPENDIX A. 
 
 SCHEDULE. 
 
 1. 
 
 ORDER RESCINDING CONTRACT. 
 In the [cowfity of . Petty Sessional Division 
 
 of ] 
 
 Between A.B., Plaintiff, 
 
 and 
 
 C.ZX, Defendant. 
 Before the Court of Summary Jurisdiction sitting at 
 
 It is adjudged that the [or this] contract [or instrument 
 of apprenticeship] made between the plaintiff and defendant 
 [on the day of 190 ] be rescinded, 
 
 and that the plaintiff [or defendant] do pay to 
 the sum of pounds, being the whole [or a part] 
 
 for wages [or damages, or in respect of the premium paid 
 on such instrument of apprenticeship] . 
 
 Darted the day of one thousand 
 
 nine hundred and 
 
 J.P., 
 
 Justice of the Peace for the [county] aforesaid. ( Seal - 
 
 2. 
 
 ORDER FOR PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT. 
 In the \ county of . Petty Sessional Division 
 
 of ] 
 
 Between A.B., Plaintiff, 
 
 and 
 
 C.D. [andjBLF.] Defendant. 
 Before the Court of Summary Jurisdiction at 
 It is ordered that the defendant [C.D.] do perform his 
 contract [of apprenticeship] with the plaintiff, that is to say 
 [setting out the 'particulars if necessary] . 
 
 [And that he [or the defendant E.F.] do pay to the 
 plaintiff the sum of for damages.] 
 
EMPLOYERS AND WORKMEN ACT, 1875 FORMS. 197 
 
 And the defendant, the said E.F. [or C. D.] , being willing 
 to give security for the performance of such contract, the 
 Court hereb}^ accepts his security in pounds, with 
 
 suret in pounds [each] for the performance of such 
 
 contract as aforesaid [in place of the payment of [ 
 part of] such damages] . 
 
 Dated the day of one thousand nine 
 
 hundred and 
 
 J.P., 
 
 Justice of the Peace for the [county] aforesaid. 
 
 3. 
 
 UNDERTAKING BY DEFENDANT TO PERFORM CONTRACT. 
 In the [county of . Petty Sessional Division 
 
 of ] 
 
 Between A.B., Plaintiff, 
 
 and 
 C.D., Defendant. 
 
 Whereas it having been found by the Court of Summary 
 Jurisdiction, sitting at on the day of , 
 
 that the defendant had broken the contract for the breach 
 of which he was summoned, it is ordered that he should 
 give security for the performance of his contract : 
 
 Now, therefore, I the defendant, and we [or I] his 
 suret , do undertake that the said defendant will perform 
 the said contract, that is to say [setting out the particulars 
 if necessary] : 
 
 And we do hereby severally acknowledge ourselves bound 
 to forfeit to the plaintiff the sum of pounds and 
 
 shillings, in case the said defendant fails to 
 perform what he has hereby undertaken to perform. 
 
 (Signed ivliere not tciken orally) C.D., Defendant. 
 
 Taken before me this day of 
 
 J.P. ( Seal. 
 
 Justice of the Peace for the [county] aforesaid. 
 
198 APPENDIX A. 
 
 FEES. 
 
 s. d. 
 For entry of every plaint, including summons 
 
 thereon ... ... ... ... ... 1 
 
 For order in writing on a plaint ... ... 2 
 
 For every undertaking given by way of 
 
 security 2 
 
 For judgment-summons, including hearing... 1 
 For warrant of distress or order of commit- 
 ment 2 
 
 For summons to witness 1 
 
 N.B. Where the sum claimed exceeds It. O.s. Of?., or the 
 sum in respect of the non-payment of which the summons 
 for an order of commitment or warrant of distress issues 
 exceeds II. O.s. (k?., an additional fee of one shilling on each 
 fee shall be taken. 
 
 For mileage in serving or executing \ Such reasonable 
 process, and for cost of conveying I cost as may be 
 
 to prison [ allowed by the 
 
 For affidavit and postage ) Court. 
 
APPENDIX B. 
 
 REGULATIONS UNDER THE TRADE UNION ACTS, 
 1871 AND 1876. 
 
 IN pursuance of the powers vested in the Home Secretary 
 by the above-mentioned statutes, the Right Honourable 
 Richard Assheton Cross, one of Her Majesty's Principal 
 Secretaries of State, revoked the Regulations made by 
 the Right Honourable H. A. Bruce on the 8th December, 
 1871, and the Right Honourable R. Lowe on the 18th 
 August, 1873, and made the following Regulations in lieu 
 thereof. 
 
 (1.) In the following Regulations and Forms the terms 
 " Chief Registrar" and "Assistant Registrar" mean respec- 
 tively the chief registrar and assistant registrar of friendly 
 societies, and the term "Central Office" means the central 
 office established under the Friendly Societies Act, 1875. 
 
 (2.) The registrar shall not register a trade union under 
 a name identical with that of any other existing trade union 
 known to him, whether registered or not registered, or so 
 nearly resembling such name as to be likely to deceive the 
 members or the public. 
 
 (3.) Upon an application for the registration of a trade 
 union which is already in operation, the registrar, if he has 
 reason to believe that the applicants have not been duly 
 authorised by such trade union to make the same, may, 
 for the 1 purpose of ascertaining the fact, require from the 
 applicants such evidence as may seem to him necessary. 
 
 (4.) Application for registry of a trade union shall be 
 made in Form A.* subjoined to these Regulations, and shall 
 
 * See p. 206. - 
 
200 APPENDIX B. 
 
 be accompanied by two printed copies of the rules marked 
 and signed, as mentioned in the said Form. 
 
 (5.) The certificate of registry of a trade union shall be 
 in Form B.* subjoined to these Eegulations. 
 
 (6.) An alteration of the rules of a trade union may be 
 either 
 
 (a.) A partial alteration, consisting of the addition of a 
 new rule or part of a rule or rules to the existing 
 rules, or of the substitution of a new rule or part of 
 a rule or rules for any of the existing rules, or of a 
 rescission of any of the existing rules or any part 
 thereof without any substitution, or of more than one 
 or all of these modes ; or, 
 
 (b.) A complete alteration consisting of the substitu- 
 tion of an entire set of rules for the existing set of 
 rules. 
 
 (7.) An application for the registration of a partial altera- 
 tion of rules must be made by seven members of the trade 
 union, and must be made in the Form C.f annexed hereto, 
 and must be accompanied by a statutory declaration in 
 Form D.J hereto annexed, and by a printed copy of the 
 existing rules, and by the following documents : 
 
 (a.) If the partial alteration consists of the addition or 
 substitution of a new rule or part of a rule or rules, 
 two copies of such rule or part of a rule or rules, each 
 copy being marked O. and signed by each of the 
 applicants. 
 
 (6.) If the partial alteration consists of the rescission of 
 
 any of the rules without any substitution, two copies 
 
 of the resolution for such rescission, each copy being 
 
 marked O. and signed by each of the applicants. 
 
 The registrar, before registering the partial alteration of 
 
 rules, shall ascertain that the rules of the trade union, if 
 
 altered in accordance with the proposed partial alteration, 
 
 will provide for all the matters required by the above- 
 
 * See p. 208. f See p. 208. } See p. 209. 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACTS, 1871 AND 1876 RULES, 201 
 
 mentioned Acts to be provided for by the rules of a 
 registered trade union. 
 
 (8.) The certificate of registry of a partial alteration shall 
 be in Form E.* annexed hereto, and shall be delivered to 
 the applicants, attached to one of the copies of the new rule 
 or rules, or, when the alteration consists of rescission merely, 
 attached to the old set of rules. 
 
 (9.) An application for the registration of a complete 
 alteration of rules shall be made by seven members of the 
 trade union, and shall be in Form F.f annexed hereto, and 
 must be accompanied by a statutory declaration in Form 
 D.J annexed hereto, and by a printed copy of the existing 
 rules and by two printed copies of the new rules, each copy 
 being marked P. and signed by each of the applicants ; and 
 the registrar, before registering the new set of rules, shall 
 ascertain that it provides for all matters which, by the above- 
 mentioned Acts, are to be provided for by the rules of a 
 registered trade union. 
 
 (10.) The certificate of registry of a complete alteration of 
 rules shall be in Form G. annexed hereto, and shall be 
 delivered to the applicants attached to one of the copies of 
 the new set of rules. 
 
 Recording of Rules already Registered. 
 
 (11.) An application to record in one country rules or 
 amendments of rules registered in another shall be made by 
 the secretary or other officer of the trade union in Form H.'j 
 or I.1F hereto annexed, and shall be accompanied by a copy 
 of such rules or amendments duly authenticated. 
 
 Withdrawal or Cancelling of Certificate of Registration. 
 
 (12.) Every request by a trade union for withdrawal or 
 cancelling of its certificate of registration shall be sent to 
 the chief registrar or assistant registrar for Scotland or for 
 Ireland, as the case may require, in Form J.** annexed hereto. 
 
 * See p. 2 10. f See p. 211. J See p. 209. See p. 21 3. 
 || See p. 213. IT See p. 214. ** See p. 214. 
 
202 APPENDIX B. 
 
 (18.) Notice before withdrawal or cancelling of certificate, 
 where required, shall be in Form K.* annexed hereto. 
 
 (14.) The withdrawal or cancelling of certificate shall be 
 in Form L.f annexed hereto. 
 
 Registered Office. 
 
 (15.) Notice of the situation of the registered office of a 
 trade union, and of any change therein, shall be given to the 
 registrar in Form M. annexed hereto. 
 
 (15a.) The removal of the registered office of a trade union 
 from one country, within the meaning of 6 of the Trade 
 Union Act Amendment Act, 1876, to another shall not render 
 it necessary to re-register the trade union in the country in 
 which its new registered office is situate. 
 
 (156.) All matters requiring registry shall be registered 
 in, and returns and notices sent to the registrar of the 
 country in which the registered office of a trade union is for 
 the time being situate, copies of matters requiring registry 
 being forwarded for recording to the registrars of each of the 
 other countries in which it is carrying, or intends to carry on 
 business. 
 
 Change of Name. 
 
 (16.) The application for approval, and notice of change 
 of name of a trade union, shall be in Form N.|| annexed 
 hereto, and shall be sent in duplicate, accompanied by a 
 statutory declaration in Form O.^I annexed hereto, to the 
 chief registrar, or in the case of trade unions registered and 
 doing business exclusively in Scotland or Ireland, to the 
 assistant registrar for Scotland or Ireland, as the case may 
 require. The chief or assistant registrar, before approving 
 the change of name, shall ascertain that the new name is 
 
 * See p. 215. f See p. 216. + See p. 216. 
 
 These two Rtiles wore made by the Home Secretary and the 
 Secretary of State for Scotland under the Trade Union Acts, 1871 
 and 187<5. and the Secretary for Scotland Act. 1887. and dated 
 29th April, 1890. 
 
 || See p. 217. U See p. 218. 
 
THE TKADE UNION ACTS, 1871 AND 1876 RULES. 203 
 
 not identical with that of any existing trade union known to 
 him, or so nearly resembling the same as to be calculated to 
 deceive ; and if the change of name be approved, the word 
 " approved " shall be written at the foot or end of each copy 
 of the application, and the same shall be signed by the chief 
 registrar or by such assistant registrar, as the case may 
 require, and shall be transmitted by him to the central office 
 for registry. 
 
 Transfer of Stock. 
 
 (17.) Every application to the registrar to direct a transfer 
 of stock shall follow, as near, as may be, Form P.* annexed 
 hereto, and shall be accompanied by a statutory declaration 
 in Form Q.t annexed hereto, or as near thereto as the facts 
 admit, and by the certificate of the stock in respect of which 
 the application is made. 
 
 (18.) Before making the application, the trade union shall 
 submit to the registrar for examination a draft copy on 
 foolscap paper, written on one side only, of the proposed 
 application and declaration. 
 
 (19.) The registrar, before directing the transfer, may 
 require further proof of any statement in the application. 
 
 (20.) The registrar shall give a direction in Form R.J 
 annexed hereto, so framed in each case as to suit the par- 
 ticular circumstances, and shall register the same and 
 deliver the same to the applicants endorsed with the word 
 " Registered," and duly authenticated. 
 
 Dissolution. 
 
 (21.) When a trade union is dissolved, notice of the dis- 
 solution shall be given to the central office, or in the case of 
 trade unions registered and doing business exclusively in 
 Scotland or Ireland, to the assistant registrar for Scotland 
 or Ireland, as the case may require, in duplicate in Form S. 
 annexed hereto, and the central office or assistant registrar 
 shall return one copy to the trade union, endorsed with the 
 word " Registered," and duly authenticated. 
 
 * See p. 219. f See p. 221. J See p. 222. See p. 223. 
 
204 APPENDIX B. 
 
 Amalgamation. 
 
 (22.) Where two or more trade unions become amalgamated 
 together, notice shall be given to the central office in duplicate 
 in Form T.* annexed hereto, accompanied by statutory 
 declarations from each such trade union in Form I'.t annexed 
 hereto, and the central office shall return to the amalgamated 
 trade union one copy of the notice, endorsed with the word 
 " Registered," and duly authenticated. 
 
 inations. 
 
 (28.) Every registered trade union shall keep a record or 
 
 register of all nominations made by the members, and of all 
 revocations and variations of the same, and for the recording 
 or registering of every such nomination, revocation, or varia- 
 tion the rules of the trade union may require the member 
 nominating to pay a sum not exceeding threepence. 
 
 Fees. 
 
 (24.) The following fees shall be payable under the Acts: 
 
 a. ,1. 
 For the certificate of registry of a trade 
 
 union 100 
 
 For the certificate of registry of an altera- 
 tion of rules 10 
 
 For the certificate of registry of a change 
 
 of name 10 
 
 For a direction to transfer stock ... ... 1 
 
 For registry of notice of a dissolution ... 2 6 
 
 For registry of amalgamation 010 
 
 For every document required to be authen- 
 ticated by the registrar, not chargeable 
 
 with any other fee 026 
 
 For every inspection on the same day of 
 documents (whether one or more), in 
 
 * Seep. 224. f See p. 22:>. 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACTS, 1871 AND 1876 RULES. 205 
 
 8. d. 
 
 the custody of the registrar, relating to 
 
 one and the same trade onion 010 
 
 For every copy or extract of any document 
 in the custody of the registrar, not ex- 
 ceeding 216 words Is., and if exceeding 
 that number 4d. per folio of 72 words, 
 in addition to the fee for authentication. 
 No fee is payable for the recording of rules or documents 
 already registered in another country, or for the registry 
 or recording of 
 
 The cancelling or withdrawal of certificate of registry. 
 Any notice of change of office. 
 Any document or copy of document supplied to a f public 
 
 department. 
 
 Any document in respect of which a fee is already 
 chargeable, under or by virtue of the Act and of any 
 other statute. 
 
 The chief registrar may also dispense with the fee for 
 inspection of documents in cases where he may consider it 
 for the public interest to do so. 
 
 Authentication of Documents by Registrar. 
 
 ry document under the Trade Union Acts, 1871 
 and 1876, bearing the seal of the central office, or the signature 
 of the chief registrar or the assistant registrar for Scotland or 
 Ireland, as the case may require, shall be deemed to be duly 
 authenticated for the purposes of the said Acts and the 
 Regulations made thereunder. 
 
 Whitehall, RICH. ASSHKTON CROSS. 
 
 1st November, 1876. 
 
 For societies registered in Scotland the address " 43, New 
 Register House, Edinburgh/' and in Ireland " 16, Dame 
 Street, Dublin," will be substituted in the following Forms 
 for "28, Abingdon Street, Westminster." 
 
APPENDIX C. 
 
 OFFICAL FORMS TO BE USED UNDER THE TRADE 
 UNION ACTS, 1871 AND 1876, THE 34 & 35 VICT. 
 c. 31, AND 39 & 40 VICT. c. 22. 
 
 FORM A. Reg. 4. 
 
 Application for Eegistry of Trade Union. (Fee payable jl .) 
 
 1. This application is made by the seven persons whose 
 names are subscribed at the foot hereof. 
 
 2. The name under which it is proposed that the Trade 
 Union, on behalf of which this application is made, shall be 
 
 * Name of registered is* , as set forth in Rule No.f 
 
 To the best of our belief there is no other existing Trade 
 Union, whether registered or not registered, the name of 
 which is identical with the proposed name, or so nearly 
 resembles the same as to cause confusion. 
 
 * Name of 3. The place of meeting for the business of the* 
 
 / and the office to which all communications and notices 
 
 may be addressed, is at , as set forth in 
 Rule No. 
 
 * Name of 4. The* was established on the 
 
 trade union. 
 
 day of 
 
 * Name of 5. The whole of the objects for which the* 
 
 is established, and the purposes for which the funds thereof 
 are applicable, are set forth in Rule No. 
 
 6. The conditions under which members may become 
 entitled to benefits assured, are set forth in Rule No. 
 
 7. The fines and forfeitures to be imposed on members 
 are set forth in Rule No. 
 
 8. The manner of making, altering, amending, and rescind- 
 ing rules is set forth in Rule No. 
 
 N.B. The Rules referred to in these Forms are the Rules of 
 the Trade Union to be registered. 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACTS, 1871 AND 1876 FORMS. "207 
 
 9. The provision for the appointment and removal of a 
 general committee of management, of trustee or trustees, 
 treasurer, and other officers, is set forth in Rule No. 
 
 10. The provision for the investment of funds, and for 
 the periodical audit of accounts, is set forth in Rule No. 
 
 11. The provision for the inspection of the books and 
 names of the members, by every person having an interest 
 in the funds, is set forth in Rule No. 
 
 12. The provision for the manner of dissolving the Trade 
 Union is set forth in Rule No. 
 
 13. Accompanying this application are sent 
 
 1. Two printed copies, each marked A., of the Rules. 
 
 2. A list, marked B., of the titles and names of the 
 officers. 
 
 3. A general statement, marked C.* showing * This will 
 
 (a.) The assets and liabilities of the cessary 6 to 
 
 e 
 
 at the date up to which the statement is ti ie 
 
 made out. union s 
 
 been in 
 
 (6.) The receipts and expenditure off operation 
 
 during the year preceding the date| up to L^year prc" 
 which the statement is made out, such ex- iSS 8 ^ SH 
 
 U.'t U* OI tllG 
 
 penditure being set forth under separate application, 
 heads corresponding to the several objects trade union, 
 of the Trade Union. t s fa d ^ 
 
 14. We have been duly authorised by the Trade Union by the Be- 
 to make this application on its behalf, such authorisation gl t ^j s %vill 
 
 consisting of o n 1 y b e 
 
 necessary 
 
 (Signed) 1. where the 
 
 trade union 
 
 2. has been in 
 
 o operation 
 
 before the 
 
 4 date of the 
 
 application 
 5. 
 
 6. 
 
 7. 
 
 day of 190 . 
 
 In paragraph 14 must be stated whether the authority 
 to make this application was given by a "resolution of a 
 
 irnnvrV fit 
 
208 APPENDIX C. 
 
 general meeting of the Trade Union," or, if not, in what 
 other way it was given. 
 
 The two copies of rules must be signed by the seven 
 members signing this application. 
 
 The application should be dated, and forwarded to " The 
 Registrar of Friendly Societies, 28, Abingdon Street, West- 
 minster, S.W." [or, for Scotland, to "The Registrar of 
 Friendly Societies, 43, New Register House, Edinburgh"; 
 or, for Ireland, to "The Registrar of Friendly Societies, 
 16, Dame Street, Dublin "] . 
 
 To accompany 
 
 Form A. LIST B. 
 
 Name of Trade Union 
 
 State the titles and names of the Officers. 
 
 Names 
 
 Addresses 
 
 Office held in the 
 Trade Union 
 
 FORM B. Reg. 5. 
 
 Certificate of Registry of Trade Union. 
 No. 
 
 * Name of It is hereby certified that the* has 
 
 trade union. been reg i st ered under the Trade Unions Acts, 1871 and 
 1876, this day of , 190 . 
 
 [Seal of Central Office, or signature of Assistant 
 Registrar for Scotland or Ireland.] 
 
 FORM C. Reg. 7. 
 
 Application for Registry of partial Alteration of Rules. 
 * Name of * Trade Union. Register No. 
 
 l J 1. This application for the registry of a partial alteration 
 trade union, of the rules of the* Trade Union, is made 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACTS, 1871 AND 1876 FOEMS. 
 
 209 
 
 by the seven persons whose names are subscribed at the 
 foot hereof. 
 
 With this application are sent 
 
 (a.) A printed copy of the registered rules marked to 
 
 show where, and in what way, they are altered : 
 (6.) Two printed [or written] copies of the alteration, 
 each marked 0., signed by each of the applicants : 
 (c.) A statutory declaration of an officer of this Trade 
 Union, that in making the alteration of rules 
 now submitted for registry the rules of the 
 * Trade Union were duly complied 
 
 with. 
 
 2. We have been duly authorised by the* 
 Trade Union to make this application on its behalf, such 
 authorisation consisting of a resolution passed at a general 
 
 * Name of 
 trade union. 
 
 meeting on thef 
 (Signed) 
 
 day of 
 
 1. 
 2. 
 3. 
 
 4. 
 5. 
 6. 
 
 7. 
 
 J day of 
 
 To the Registrar of Friendly Societies, 
 
 28, Abingdon Street, Westminster, S.W. 
 
 190 
 
 t Here in- 
 sert the date, 
 or, if there 
 was no such 
 resolution, 
 state in what 
 other way 
 the authori- 
 sation was 
 given. 
 
 t Here in- 
 sert the date. 
 
 FORM D. Reg. 7, 9 
 
 Declaration accompanying Alteration of Rules. 
 
 Trade Union. Register No. . * Name of 
 
 I, , of , an officer of the above- tmde union ' 
 
 named Trade Union, do solemnly and sincerely declare that 
 T.U.A. 14 
 
210 APPENDIX C. 
 
 in making the alteration of the rules of the Trade Union, 
 the application for the registry of which is appended to 
 this declaration, the rules of the said Trade Union have 
 been duly complied with. 
 
 And I make this solemn declaration, conscientiously 
 believing the same to be true, and by virtue of the pro- 
 visions of an Act made and passed in the fifth and sixth 
 years of the reign of His late Majesty King William the 
 Fourth, intituled *' An Act to repeal an Act of the present 
 Session of Parliament, intituled 'An Act for the more 
 effectual Abolition of Oaths and Affirmations taken and 
 made in various Departments of the State, and to substitute 
 Declarations in lieu thereof, and for the more entire 
 Suppression of voluntary and extra-judicial Oaths and 
 Affidavits, and to make other Provisions for the Abolition 
 of unnecessary Oaths.' " 
 
 Taken and received be- 
 fore me, one of Her 
 Majesty's justices of 
 the peace for the county 
 of 
 
 at , in 
 
 the said county, this 
 day of , 
 
 190 
 
 FORM E. Reg. 8. 
 
 Certificate of Registry of partial Alteration of Rules. 
 
 * Name of * Trade Union. Register No. 
 
 trade union. It ig liere b y certified that the foregoing partial altera- 
 tion has been registered under the above-mentioned Acts 
 this day of , 190 . 
 
 [Seal of Central Office, or signature of Assistant 
 Registrar for Scotland or Ireland.] 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACTS, 1871 AND 1876 FORMS. 211 
 
 FORM F. Reg. 9. 
 
 Form of Application for Registry of complete Alteration of 
 Rules. 
 
 * Trade Union. Register No. . ^ Na l m 1 J f 
 
 1. This application for the registry of a complete altera- 
 tion of the registered rules of the* Trade 
 Union is made by the seven persons whose names are sub- 
 scribed at the foot hereof. 
 
 2. The complete alteration submitted for registry is the 
 substitution of the set of rules, two printed copies of which 
 (each copy marked P., and signed by the applicants) 
 accompany this application, for the set of rules already 
 registered. 
 
 8. The name under which it is proposed that the Trade 
 Union on behalf of which this application is made shall be 
 registered is* as set forth in Rule * Name of 
 
 XT trade iinion. 
 
 AO. . 
 
 To the best of our belief there is no other existing Trade 
 Union, whether registered or not registered, the name of 
 which is identical with the proposed name or so nearly 
 resembles the same as to cause confusion. 
 
 4. The place of meeting for the business of the 
 
 * , and the office to which all communica- * Name of 
 
 tions and notices may be addressed, is at , 
 
 as set forth in Rule No. . 
 
 5. The* was established on the * Name of 
 day of . trade union - 
 
 6. The whole of the objects for which the* * Name of 
 is established, and the purposes for which the funds thereof ri 
 
 are applicable, are set forth in Rule No. 
 
 7. The conditions under which members may become 
 entitled to benefits assured are set forth in Rule No. 
 
 8. The fines and forfeitures to be imposed on members 
 are set forth in Rule No. 
 
 142 
 
212 APPENDIX C. 
 
 9. The manner of making, altering, amending, and 
 rescinding rules is set forth in Rule No. 
 
 10. The provision for the appointment and removal 
 of a general committee of management, of trustee or 
 trustees, treasurer, and other officers, is set forth in Eule 
 No. 
 
 11. The provision for the investment of funds and for the 
 periodical audit of accounts is set forth in Eule No. 
 
 12. The provision for the inspection of the books and 
 names of the members by every person having an interest in 
 the funds is set forth in Rule No. 
 
 13. The provision for the manner of dissolving the Trade 
 Union is set forth in Rule No. 
 
 14. This application is accompanied by a statutory 
 declaration of , 
 an officer of the said Trade Union, to the effect that, 
 in making the alteration of rules now submitted for 
 registry, the rules of the Trade Union were duly complied 
 with. 
 
 * Name of 15. We have been duly authorised by the* 
 
 ' Trade Union to make this application on its behalf, such 
 authorisation consisting of a resolution passed at a general 
 t Here in- meeting held on thef day of 
 
 sert the date, 
 
 resolution, 2. 
 state in what 
 
 other way o. 
 
 authorisa- * 
 
 tiou was * 
 
 given. 5 
 
 6. 
 7. 
 
 day of , 190 
 
 The Registrar of Friendly Societies, 
 28, Abingdon Street, 
 
 Westminster, S.W. 
 
 [or 43, New Register House, Edinburgh ; 
 or 16, Dame Street, Dublin.] 
 
THE TKADE UNION ACTS, 1871 AND 1876 FORMS. 213 
 
 FORM G. Be. 10. 
 
 Certificate of Registry of complete Alteration of {Rules. 
 
 Trade Union, Register No. . 
 
 It is hereby certified that the set of rules, copy whereof 
 is appended hereto, has been registered under the above- 
 mentioned Acts in substitution for the set of rules already 
 registered for the* Trade Union this 
 
 day of , 190 . 
 
 [Seal of Centml Office, or signature of Assistant 
 Registrar for Scotland or Ireland.] 
 
 FORM H. Reg. 11. 
 
 Application to record Rules registered in another 
 Country. 
 
 Trade Union. * Name of 
 
 Register No. . [Add England, Scotland, or Ireland, 
 
 as tJie case may be.] 
 
 To the Registrar of Friendly Societies. 
 Application to record the rules of the Trade 
 
 Union is made by the secretary of the same. 
 
 1. The Trade Union carries [or intends to carry] on 
 business in [Scotland, Ireland, or England, as the case may 
 be] as well as in England, Scotland, or Ireland where the 
 same is registered. 
 
 2. With this application are sent two printed [or 
 written] copies of the rules of the Trade Union, one of 
 such copies being under the seal of the Central Office [or 
 under the signature of the Assistant Registrar for Scotland 
 or Ireland] . 
 
 (Signed) 
 
 Registered Office Secretary. 
 
 Date day of 
 
214 APPENDIX C. 
 
 FORM I. Eeg. 11. 
 
 Application to record Amendments of Rules already recorded. 
 
 * Name of * Trade Union. 
 
 ITU do u 11 ion, 
 
 Register No. . [Add England, Scotland, or Ireland, 
 
 as the case may be.] 
 
 Recorded in [Scotland, Ireland, or England, as the 
 
 case may be] No. 
 
 To the Registrar of Friendly Societies. 
 
 Application to record an amendment of the rules of 
 the Trade Union is made by the secretary of 
 
 the same. 
 
 1. The Trade Union carries on business in [Scotland, 
 Ireland, or England, as the case may be] as well as in 
 [England, Scotland, or Ireland] where the same is registered. 
 
 2. The rules of the Trade Union have been already 
 recorded in [Scotland, Ireland, or England, as the case 
 may be] . 
 
 3. With this application are sent two printed [or written] 
 copies of an amendment of such rules lately registered, one 
 of such copies being under the seal of the Central Office [or 
 under the signature of the Assistant Registrar for Scotland 
 or Ireland] . 
 
 (Signed) 
 
 Registered Office Secretary. 
 
 Date day of 
 
 FORM J. Reg. 12. 
 
 Bequest to withdraw or cancel Certificate of Registry. 
 
 * Name of * Trade Union, 
 
 trade union. Regigter No> . [jyr ihe Tmde Un i on i s registered 
 
 in Scotland or Ireland, add Scotland or Ireland, as the case 
 may be.] 
 
 To the Chief Registrar [or in the case of a Trade Union 
 registered and doing business in Scotland or Ireland 
 
THE TKADE UNION ACTS, 1871 AND 1876 FOKMS. 215 
 
 exclusively, to the Assistant Registrar for Scotland or 
 Ireland, as the case may be] . 
 
 1. The above-mentioned Trade Union desires that its 
 certificate of registry under the Trade Union Acts may be 
 withdrawn [or cancelled] on the following ground, viz., [state 
 reason for desiring 'withdrawal or cancelling of certificate 
 
 of registry] and at a general meeting* duly held on the * If no t 
 
 day of 190 , it was resolved as follows : ^ fefin 
 
 " That the trustees be authorised to request the Chief (or state in what 
 Assistant) Registrar to withdraw [or cancel] the certificate request has 
 of registry of this Trade Union." " 
 
 2. This request is made by the trustees accordingly. 
 
 [Trustees. 
 
 Registered Office 
 
 Date 190 . 
 
 To be addressed to the Chief or other Registrar, as the case 
 may be. 
 
 FORM K. Reg. 13. 
 
 Notice before Withdrawal or Cancelling of Certificate of 
 Registry. 
 
 Trade Union. 
 
 Register No. . [If the Trade Union is registered 
 
 in Scotland or Ireland, add Scotland or Ireland, as the case 
 may be.] 
 
 Notice is hereby given to the above-mentioned Trade 
 Union that it is the intention of the Chief Registrar [or 
 Assistant Registrar for Scotland or Ireland, as the case may 
 be] to proceed on the* day of 190 , to * Tin's will 
 
 cancel [or to withdraw] the registry of the Trade Union, than* tiro 
 
 unless cause be shown to the contrary in the meantime. 
 
 The ground of such proposed cancelling [or withdrawal] the notice. 
 is that the certificate of registry has been obtained by 
 fraud [or mistake, or that the registry of the Trade Union 
 
216 APPENDIX C. 
 
 has become void under s. 6 of the Trade Union Act, 1871, 
 or that the Trade Union has wilfully and after notice 
 from me violated the provisions of the above-mentioned 
 Acts or has ceased to exist]. [The facts should be briefly 
 specified where practicable.'] 
 (Signature) 
 
 Chief Registrar [or Assistant Registrar 
 
 for Scotland or Ireland] . 
 Date 190 . 
 
 FORM L. Reg. 14. 
 
 Withdrawal or Cancelling of Certificate of Registry. 
 
 Trade Union. 
 
 Register No. . [If the Trade Union is registered in 
 
 Scotland or Ireland, add Scotland or Ireland, as the case 
 may be.] 
 
 The certificate of registry of the above-mentioned Trade 
 Union is hereby withdrawn or cancelled at its request [or as 
 the case may be. The Registrar may, if he thinks fit, 
 add a statement as in Form K. of the ground of the 
 cancelling] . 
 
 (Signature) 
 
 Chief Registrar [or Assistant Registrar 
 Date . for Scotland or Ireland] . 
 
 FORM M. Reg. 15. 
 
 Notice of Change of Registered Office. 
 
 Name of * Trade Um'on. Register No. . [If the 
 
 Trade Union is registered in Scot- 
 land or Ireland, add Scotland or 
 Ireland, as the case may be.] 
 To the Registrar of Friendly Societies. 
 
THE TEADE UNION ACTS, 1871 AND 1876 FORMS. 
 
 217 
 
 Notice is hereby given that the Registered Office of the 
 above-mentioned Trade Union is removed from 
 
 in the Parish of 
 
 in the Parish of 
 
 Dated this 
 
 , and is now situated at 
 , in the county of 
 day of , 190 . 
 
 - Trustees. 
 
 To be addressed to the Chief Registrar or ) 
 other Registrar, as the case may be. ) 
 
 NOTE. Until this notice has been given, the Trade 
 Union will not have complied with the provisions 
 of the Act. 
 
 Received this day of notice of removal 
 
 of the Registered Office of the , Register 
 
 No. , to in the county of . 
 
 [Seal of Central Office, or signature of a Registrar.] 
 
 This part 
 by 
 
 the notice is 
 registered, 
 and returned 
 to the trade 
 union. 
 
 FORM N. Reg. 16. 
 
 Application for Approval, and Notice of Change of 
 Name. 
 
 Name already registered* 
 
 Register No. . [If the Trade Union is registered 
 
 in Scotland or Ireland, add Scotland or Ireland, as the case 
 may be.] 
 
 To the Chief Registrar [or Assistant Registrar for Ireland 
 or Scotland, as the case may be] and Central Office. 
 
 Application for approval of a change of name of the above- 
 mentioned Trade Union is made by the persons whose names 
 are subscribed at the foot hereof. 
 
 * Name 
 trade union ' 
 
218 APPENDIX C. 
 
 The following is a copy of a resolution passed by the con- 
 sent of two-thirds of the total number of members of the 
 Trade Union: 
 
 [The resolution to be copied at length.] 
 And notice of the said change is hereby given to the 
 Central Office for registry there. 
 
 1. 
 
 Secretary. 2. 
 3. 
 
 Members. 
 
 Registered Office . 5. 
 
 Date , 190 . 6. 
 
 7. 
 
 To be directed to the Chief or other Registrar, as the case 
 may be. 
 
 FORM 0. Reg. 16. 
 
 Declaration to accompany Application for Approval of 
 Change of Name. 
 
 County of 
 
 Name of Trade Union 
 
 Register No. . [If the Trade Union is registered 
 
 in Scotland or Ireland, add Scotland or Ireland, as the case 
 may be.] 
 
 I, of , the secretary of 
 
 the above-named Trade Union, do solemnly and sincerely 
 declare that in making the change of name, notice of which 
 is appended to this declaration, the provisions of the 
 89 & 40 Viet. c. 22, in respect of change of name, have been 
 complied with. 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACTS, 1871 AND 1876 FORMS. 219 
 
 And I make this solemn declaration, conscientiously 
 believing the same to be true, and by virtue of the pro- 
 visions of an Act made and passed in the fifth and sixth 
 years of the reign of His late Majesty King William the 
 Fourth, intituled " An Act to repeal an Act of the present 
 Session of Parliament, intituled * An Act for the more 
 effectual Abolition of Oaths and Affirmations taken and 
 made in various Departments of the State, and to substitute 
 Declarations in lieu thereof, and for the more entire 
 Suppression of voluntary and extra-judicial Oaths and 
 Affidavits, and to make other Provisions for the Abolition 
 of unnecessary Oaths.' " 
 Taken and received before 
 
 me, one of Her Majesty's 
 
 justices of the peace for 
 
 the said county of , 
 
 at , in the said ! 
 
 county, this day 1 
 
 of , 190 . / 
 
 FORM P. Reg. 17. 
 
 [N.B. A draft copy of this application, on foolscap paper, 
 written on one side only, is to be submitted to the 
 Registrar for examination.] 
 
 Application for Direction to transfer Stock. 
 
 Trade Union. Reg. No. . * Name of 
 
 Application for a direction to transfer stock is made by ^i^form 
 the four persons whose names are subscribed at the foot appiies(with 
 thereof, being the secretary and three members of the sary mod in- 
 above-mentioned Trade Union. branch of' a 
 1. The Trade Union on the day of , duly tra<le union - 
 appointed , of in the county of 
 
220 APPENDIX C. 
 
 [here name and describe all the trustees then appointed] to 
 be trustees. 
 
 2. On the day of the sum of was 
 
 invested in the purchase of stock transferable 
 
 at the Bank of England [or Ireland] in the names of 
 the said trustees, and the same is still standing in their 
 names, as follows [state exactly in what names the Stock 
 stands] : 
 
 [This clause 3. The said is absent from Great Britain 
 
 iiecesaary \ r Ireland] [or became bankrupt on the day of , 
 
 r^Hcafion or ftled a P etition ( r executed a deed) for liquidation of his 
 is in conse- affairs by assignment or arrangement or for composition 
 the C mere re- with his creditors, on the day of , or has 
 
 1 * become a lunatic, or died on the day of , or has 
 
 not been heard of for years, and it is not known 
 
 whether he is living or dead] . 
 
 4. On the day of the Trade Union duly 
 removed the said from his office of trustee, and 
 appointed [give full name and description] in 
 his place. 
 
 5. Since such removal application has been made in 
 writing to the said [removed trustee] to join in the transfer 
 of the said Stock into the names of the said [here give the 
 names of the other trustees, and of the new trustee appointed 
 in the place of the one removed^ as trustees for the said 
 Trade Union, but he has refused to comply [or has not 
 complied] with such application. [This paragraph may be 
 omitted, or varied, as the facts require.] 
 
 6. This application to the Registrar is made pursuant to 
 39 & 40 Viet. c. 22, s. 4, that he may direct the said Stock to 
 be transferred into the names of the said 
 
 as trustees for the Trade Union by 
 
 [This blank should be filled by the names of the surviving or 
 continuing trustees (if any], and if they be willing and able 
 to make the transfer; but if there be no such trustee, or if 
 any such trustee refuse or be unable to make the transfer, 
 thai by the words "the Accountant General, or Deputy, or 
 
THE TBADE UNION ACTS, 1871 AND 1876 FORMS. 221 
 
 Assistant Accountant General of the said Bank " ; and a full 
 statement of the facts and of the grounds of such refusal or 
 inability should be made.] 
 
 Secretary. 
 
 Member. 
 
 Member. 
 
 Member. 
 Registered Office 
 
 Date day of , 190 . 
 
 To the Chief Registrar, or other Registrar, as the case may be. 
 
 FORM Q. Reg. 17. 
 
 Declaration verifying Statements in an Application for This form 
 Direction to transfer Stock. H 
 
 sary modifi- 
 County of to wit. cations) to a 
 
 Trade Union. Register No. . trade union. 
 
 I. O f * Name of 
 
 ' trade union. 
 in the county of , do solemnly and sincerely 
 
 declare that I am the secretary of the above-mentioned 
 Trade Union. 
 
 That and 
 
 whose names are subscribed at the foot of the application 
 hereto annexed, are members of the said Trade Union. 
 
 That on the day of , 190 , 
 
 and therein mentioned, were 
 
 appointed trustees of the said Trade Union. 
 
 That on the day of , 190 , the sum 
 
 of was invested in the purchase of 
 
 Stock, transferable at the Bank of England [or Ireland] 
 in the names of the said trustees, and the declarant believes 
 that it is still standing in their names, as follows [state as in 
 Form P.] : 
 
 That the said is absent from Great 
 
 Britain [or Ireland] [or became bankrupt, etc., as in 
 Form P.] 
 
222 APPENDIX C. 
 
 That on the day of , 190 , the said 
 
 was removed from his office of trustee, 
 and was appointed in his place. 
 
 That since such removal application has been made in 
 writing to the said to join in the 
 
 transfer of the said Stock into the names of the said 
 
 as trustees for the said Trade Union, but he 
 has refused to comply [or has not complied] with such 
 application. [This paragraph may be omitted, or varied, as 
 the facts require.] 
 
 And I make this solemn declaration, conscientiously 
 believing the same to be true, and by virtue of the pro- 
 visions of an Act made and passed in the fifth and sixth 
 years of the reign of His late Majesty King William the 
 Fourth, intituled " An Act to repeal an Act of the present 
 Session of Parliament, intituled 'An Act for the more 
 effectual Abolition of Oaths and Affirmations taken and 
 made in various Departments of the State, and to substitute 
 Declarations in lieu thereof, and for the more entire 
 Suppression of voluntary arid extra-judicial Oaths and 
 Affidavits, and to make other Provisions for the Abolition 
 of unnecessary oaths.' " 
 
 Taken and received before me, one> 
 of Her Majesty's justices of the 
 peace for the said county of , 
 at , in the said county, 
 
 this day of ,190 .> 
 
 FORM B. Reg. 20. 
 
 Direction by the Registrar to transfer Stock. 
 
 This form Whereas it has been made to appear to the Registrar 
 that Stock, transferable at the Bank of England 
 
THE TEADE UNION ACTS, 1871 AND 1876 FOEMS. 223 
 
 For Ireland! is now standing in the names of sa.ry modifi- 
 
 cations) to a 
 and , as trustees branch of a 
 
 of Trade Union registered under the above- trade uuion ' 
 
 mentioned Acts. 
 
 And that the said is absent from 
 
 Great Britain [or Ireland, or became bankrupt, etc., as in 
 Form P.] 
 
 And that has been appointed trustee 
 
 of the said Trade Union in place of the said 
 
 *(a.) The Eegistrar under the said Acts hereby directs, * T h e 
 pursuant to section 4 of the 39 & 40 Viet. c. 22, that the 
 
 said sum of so standing in the books of the or (&) wil1 
 
 Governor and Company of the Bank of England [or the case re- 
 Ireland] in the names of the said be quires ' 
 
 transferred in the said books by the said 
 into the names of the said 
 
 (6.) And that there is no surviving or continuing trustee 
 of the said Trade Union, or that the surviving or continuing 
 trustee or trustees refuse or are unable to transfer the said 
 Stock. 
 
 The Eegistrar under the said Acts hereby directs, pur- 
 suant to section 4 of the 39 & 40 Viet. c. 22, that the said 
 sum of so standing in the books of the Governor 
 
 and Company of the Bank of England [or Ireland] be 
 transferred in the said books by the Accountant General, 
 or Deputy or Assistant Accountant General, of the said 
 Bank into the names of the said 
 
 Address 
 
 Date , 190 . 
 
 [Seal of Central Office, and 
 signature of Chief Eegis- 
 trar for England, or signa- 
 ture of Assistant Eegistrar 
 for Scotland or Ireland.] 
 
224 APPENDIX C. 
 
 FORM S. Beg. 21. 
 
 Notice of Dissolution. 
 
 * Name of Trade Union. Register No. 
 
 trade union. TQ the Central O ffi ce , 28, Abingdon Street, 
 
 Westminster [or 
 
 To the Assistant Registrar for Scotland or 
 for Ireland, as the case may require] . 
 Notice is hereby given that the above-mentioned Trade 
 Union was dissolved in pursuance of the rules thereof on 
 the day of 
 
 1. Secretary. 
 
 2. Member. 
 
 3. Member. 
 
 4. Member. 
 
 5. Member. 
 
 6. Member. 
 
 7. Member. 
 
 8. Member. 
 Name and address to) 
 
 which registered copy j- 
 is to be returned. ) 
 Date , 190 . 
 
 FORM T. Reg. 22. 
 
 Notice of Amalgamation of Trade Unions. 
 
 * Name of (-^0* Trade Union. Register No. 
 
 (.)* Trade Union. Register No. 
 
 [and so on if more than two] . 
 To the Central Office, 28, Abingdon Street, 
 
 Westminster. 
 
 Notice is hereby given, that by the consent of two-thirds 
 of the whole number of members of each or every of the 
 
THE TEADE UNION ACTS, 1871 AND 1876 POEMS. 225 
 
 above-mentioned Trade Unions they have resolved to become 
 amalgamated together as one Trade Union. 
 
 And the following are the terms of the said amalgamation 
 [state the terms] : 
 
 And that it is intended that the Trade Union shall hence- 
 forth be called the* . * Name of 
 Accompanying this notice is a copy of the Bules in- triule union 
 tended to be henceforth adopted by the amalgamated Trade 
 Union [which are the Bules of the* Trade 
 Union] . 
 
 [To be signed by seven 
 Members and the Secre- 
 tary of each Trade Union.] 
 Name and address to^ 
 which registered copy L 
 is to be sent. ) 
 
 Date , 190 . 
 
 FORM U. Beg. 22. 
 
 Declaration in supx>ort of Amalgamation, to le made by the 
 Secretary of each Trade Union amalgamating. 
 
 * Trade Union. Begister No. . * Name of 
 
 , trade union. 
 
 I, , Of 
 
 the secretary of the above-mentioned Trade Union, do 
 solemnly and sincerely declare that in the amalgamation 
 of the said Trade Union with the , 
 
 notice of which is appended to this declaration, the provi- 
 sions of the Trade Union Act Amendment Act, 1876, 
 in respect of amalgamations, have been duly complied 
 with. 
 
 And I make this solemn declaration, conscientiously 
 T.U.A. 15 
 
226 APPENDIX C. 
 
 believing the same to be true, and by virtue of the provisions 
 of the Statutory Declarations Act, 1835. 
 Taken and received before\ 
 
 me, one of Her Majesty's I 
 
 justices of the peace for 
 
 the said county of , [ Signature of Declarant. 
 
 at , in the | 
 
 said county, this day I 
 
 of , 190 . 
 
 NOTE. All the preceding Forms are kept in stock, except 
 H., I., K., L., and R. ; those five are written out as required 
 to suit the circumstances in each case. 
 
 FORM A.R. 15. 
 
 TRADE UNION ACTS, 1871 AND 1876. T. U. No. 1. 
 Annual Return as prescribed by the Registrar. 
 
 Eegister No. . County 
 
 EETURN REQUIRED FROM A REGISTERED TRADE UNION, 
 Year ending 31st December, 1901. 
 
 [The Trade Union's Balance Sheet cannot be accepted as a 
 substitute for this Return.] 
 
 This Return is to be sent to the Registrar before the 
 
 following 1st of June. 
 
 A Copy of the Auditors' Report, if any, should also be 
 sent, together with a Copy of the Printed Statement of 
 Accounts. 
 
 Name of Trade Union 
 
 Date of commencement of Trade Union , 190 . 
 
 When first Registered . , 190 . 
 
 Date of Registration of last Alteration of Rules , 190 . 
 
 Names of the present Trustees 
 
THE TRADE UNION ACTS, 1871 AND 1876 RETURN. 227 
 
 Name and Address of the Treasurer, \ 
 
 and of any other Officer in receipt L 
 
 or charge of money 
 
 Amount of Security given by him or them, 
 The Audit for the Year has been conducted by 
 
 who were appointed Auditors by 
 
 under the authority of Rule No. 
 
 Registered Office of the Trade Union* * state full 
 
 postal ad- 
 in the County of . dress. 
 
 Date , 190 . 
 
 In filling up the Form of Annual Return, particular 
 attention should be given to the following observations : 
 1. RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURE. It must be carefully 
 remembered that this is not a mere Cash Account, 
 giving particulars of cash received and cash 
 expended. Accordingly such items as 
 
 (a) Cash withdrawn from Bank, or cash paid into Bank ; 
 
 (b) Cash expended in purchase of investments, or 
 
 cash received on sale of investments, or on 
 discharge of mortgages, etc. etc., 
 must not appear, beyond entering as a profit or 
 loss, as the case may be, the difference between 
 the amount received and the amount at which 
 the assets previously stood in the Trade Union's 
 balance-sheets. 
 
 2. Interest on the funds which has become due and 
 payable in the course of the year should appear 
 as a receipt ; and if not actually paid at end of 
 year, will appear in the assets of the balance-sheet 
 as interest due and unpaid. 
 
 3. Where, under the rules, separate funds are required 
 to be kept for the various benefits, the amounts 
 of these various funds should always be stated 
 separately in the balance-sheet. 
 
 4. The Return of a Trade Union having Branches is 
 to include all the receipts and expenditure, funds 
 and effects of all the Branches. 
 
 152 
 
'228 APPENDIX C. 
 
 5. The amount brought forward at beginning of year 
 must agree with the amount shown in the Return 
 for the previous year. 
 
 6. Whatever the rules may provide as to date of 
 Annual Meetings and Annual Accounts, the 
 Annual Return required, under the Act, to be 
 made out and sent to the Registrar must always 
 be made up for the year ending 31st December. 
 
 7. The Annual Return should be signed by the Auditors 
 appointed under the rules. 
 
 8. The Trade Union should in all its Returns and com- 
 munications to the Registrar state its registered 
 name and number. 
 
 9. The Signatures of all officers required to sign the 
 Return must be in their own handwriting. 
 
 10. If the Registered Office has been changed since 
 the last Return, and the change not notified to 
 the Registrar, the Secretary should apply for 
 Form M. forthwith. On the dissolution of a 
 Trade Union, Form S. is required to be filled up 
 in duplicate. 
 
 N.B. With this Annual Return must be sent to the 
 Registrar : 
 
 (1) A Copy of the rules of the Trade Union as they 
 
 exist at date to which this Return is made out. 
 
 (2) A Copy of all alterations of rules and new rules 
 
 made by the Trade Union during the year pre- 
 ceding the date up to which this Return is made 
 out. 
 
 The address to which Rules, Returns, and other docu- 
 ments should be sent is as follows : 
 
 ENGLAND AND WALES: Registry of Friendly 
 Societies, Central Office, 28, Abingdon Street, Westminster, 
 London, S.W. 
 
THE TRADE UNION AGTS, 1871 AND 1876 RETURN. 229 
 
 SCOTLAND : Registry of Friendly Societies, SA, Howe 
 Street, Edinburgh. 
 
 IRELAND : Registry of Friendly Societies, 16, Dame 
 Street, Dublin. 
 
 [For particulars as to changes of officers see fourth page of 
 this Return.] (See p. 232, T. U. No. 2.) 
 
230 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 01 
 
 ' 
 
 QJ O^ 'S G 
 _ C >S c3 
 
 1 If 
 
 
 
 BECEIPTS 
 
 Members 
 
 5| 
 
 III 
 I- 1 
 
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THE TRADE UNION ACTS, 1871 AND 1876 RETURN. 
 
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 APPENDIX C. 
 
 T. U. No. 2. 
 
 Reg. No. 
 
 Name of Trade Union 
 
 TRADE UNION ACTS, 1871 AND 1876. 
 
 Annual Return of Change of Officers during the year ending 
 31st December, 1901. 
 
 Date of 
 Change. 
 
 Title of 
 Officer. 
 
 Name of Officer 
 
 retiring. 
 
 Cause of 
 retirement. 
 
 Name of Officer 
 appointed. 
 
 A<Mn-ss. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 Signatures 
 of 
 Trustees. 
 
 Date, December 31st, 190 . 
 
INDEX. 
 
 ABSENCE FROM WORK, 181 
 ACCIDENT TO MEMBER, 187 
 
 ACCOUNTS 
 
 of officers, 85, 86 
 
 of unions, 91, 100, 121 
 
 ACTION AT LAW 
 
 for conspiracy, 53 56, 158 
 
 " ACTS " 
 
 must be specified in summons, 128 130 
 overt, 144 
 
 ACTS 
 
 not applying to unions, 66, 104 
 
 ACTS OF PARLIAMENT to be construed together, 49, 101, 
 108 
 
 ACTS OF PARLIAMENT, 
 Apprentices, Statute of, 3 
 Arbitration (1824), 45 
 (1872), 45 
 Conciliation, Courts of (1867), 3, 45 
 
 (1896), 45, 188191 
 nature of, 46, 47 
 
 Conspiracy and Protection of Property (1875), 3, 6, 27, 123 
 Criminal Law Amendment (1871), 28, 120, 164, 165 
 Employers and Workmen (1875), 3, 6, 22, 23, 24, 168, 172 
 Falsification of Accounts (1875), 3, 9, 121 
 Larceny and Embezzlement (1868), 3, 115 
 
234 INDEX. 
 
 ACTS OF PAKLIAMENT continued. 
 
 Master and Servant, 23, 165 
 
 Protection of Funds, 5, 99, 119 
 
 Recorder's Act (1868), 3, 7, 8, 9, 48, 115 
 
 Relating to relief of poor, 181 
 
 Spitalfields Acts, 43 
 
 Trade Union (1871), 3, 10, 48 
 
 (1871) Amendment (1876), 3, 10, 101 
 (Provident Funds) (1893), 4, 186, 187 
 
 Trades Unions Funds Protection, repealed, 99100, 119 
 
 AGREEMENTS 
 
 between unions, 57 
 not affected by Act of 1871, 99 
 of unions, 49, 5663, 107, 123 
 voluntary, 51 
 
 ALL MEMBERS, plaintiffs, 147 
 AMALGAMATION, 109 
 
 ANNUAL REPORTS, 92 
 
 statement, 89, 91 
 
 APPEAL 
 
 cases, 37 
 
 from summary jurisdiction, 957, 14950, 170 
 in Scotland, 967 
 judgment, 38, 39 
 
 APPENDICES, 193232 
 
 Appendix A. Employers and Workmen Act, 1875j193 
 
 B. Trade Union Acts, 1871 and 1876, 199 
 
 C. Trade Union Acts, 1871 and 1876, Forms, 
 
 206 
 
 Fees, Employers and Workmen Act, 198 
 Forms, Employers and Workmen Act, 196 
 Regulations, Trade Union Acts, 1871 and 1876, 199 
 Rules, Summary Jurisdiction Acts, 193 
 Schedule, as to contents, 196 
 
 APPRENTICES, 1267, 163, 1767, 179, 181 
 surety of, 177 
 
INDEX. 235 
 
 ARBITRATION 
 Act, 190 
 
 all trades, 44, 188, 190 
 by justices, 43 
 in silk trades, 44 
 origin of, 42 
 
 ASSETS OP UNIONS, 91 
 
 ASSOCIATION, 
 
 right of conceded, 44 
 
 " ATTENDING AT OB NEAR," 128, 146 
 AUDITS, 85 G, 100 
 
 BENEFICIAL OWNER, 115, 118 
 
 BENEFIT MONEY, 
 
 order to pay, an " agreement," 62, 107 8 
 
 BENEFITS TO MEMBERS, 57, 5860, 66, 100 
 BEQUESTS TO UNIONS, 715 
 BESETTING, 32, 127, 13848 
 " BLACK LIST," 801 
 
 BOARD OF CONCILIATION OR ARBITRATION, 18890 
 of Trade, 18891 
 
 BONDS, to secure agreements, 57 
 
 BOOKS, 
 
 inspection of, 101 
 falsification of, &c., 121 
 withholding of, &c., 867 
 
 BRANCH UNIONS, 5960, 71, 75, 102 
 
 BREACHES OF LABOUR CONTRACTS, 24, 120 
 endangering life, 31 
 penalties, 31 
 
 CANCELLATION OF CERTIFICATE, 105 
 
236 INDEX. 
 
 CENTRAL OFFICE, 110 
 CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRAR, 9, 105 
 
 CHANCERY, 
 
 Court of, when it will interfere, 140 1 
 
 CHANGE OF NAME, 10910 
 " CHARITY," 75, 187 
 
 CHILD, 
 
 under Factory Acts, 181 
 
 CHILDREN, 
 
 insurance of, 6770, 102 
 of deceased member, 187 
 
 CIVIL COURT, 24 
 inquiry, 163 
 offences, 24 
 
 remedy or criminal ? 88 
 rights of workmen, 1 
 
 CLERK, 121 
 
 CLOTHES, 
 
 hiding, &c., 127 
 
 CLOTHING OF SERVANT, 1267 
 COERCION. See COMPULSION. 
 COLLECTING SOCIETIES ACT, 6970 
 COMBINATION, 49, 120, 123, 126, 1334, 142, 148, 161, 162 
 COMBINATION LAWS, 2 
 
 COMMITMENT 
 
 must follow form of statute, 130 1 
 
 COMMITTEE OF MANAGEMENT, 100, 106, 110 
 
 COMMON LAW, 
 
 offences at, 120, 1334 
 
 COMMUNICATING INFORMATION, 128, 145, 146 
 
INDEX. 237 
 
 COMPANIES ACTS, 
 
 registration under, 112 
 prohibition under, 117 
 
 COMPANY, 1245, 153 
 
 unregistered union may be, 104, 111 
 
 COMPENSATION 
 
 for accident, a benefit, 59 
 order for, 167, 1G8 
 
 COMPETITION IN TRADE, 54 
 
 COMPULSION OF OTHERS, 127, 12836, 1423, 159 
 CONCILIATION ACT (1896), 42, 46, 18891 
 CONDITIONS of doing business or of employment, 56 
 
 CONFORMITY to rules or resolutions, 17, 57, 59, 878, 100, 
 1101 
 
 CONSPIRACY, 49, 536, 64, 120, 123, 142, 143, 155, 156, 162, 163 
 
 CONSPIRACY AND PROTECTION OF PROPERTY ACT 
 
 (1875), 3, 6, 27 
 application of, to gas and water, 30 
 
 CONTRACTS, 
 
 breaches of, 125, 126, 173, 177 
 civil offences, 26 
 express or implied, 26 
 
 inducing to break, 54, 55, 1545, 156, 1601 
 may be rescinded, 173, 176 
 validity of, 27 
 
 CONTRIBUTIONS TO NON-MEMBERS, 57 
 CO-PARTNERSHIP, 115, 118 
 COPY OF A SECTION, 125 
 COSTS, 77, 86, 96, 174, 180 
 
 COUNTY COURTS, 
 
 jurisdiction of, limited, 26 
 powers of, 25, 1724 
 procedure in, 25, 172 4 
 
238 INDEX. 
 
 COVENANT NOT TO EMPLOY, 1124 
 CREDITORS, 109 
 CRIME, defined, 124 
 
 CRIMINAL CONSPIRACIES, 29, 49, 123, 134 
 proceedings, 149, 19, 123, 178 
 remedy excludes civil, 88 
 
 CRIMINAL LAW, and unions, 1168 
 
 Amendment Act (1871), 28, 120 
 
 DAMAGES 
 
 for breaches of agreement, 5G, 61, 173 4, 177 
 
 DECEASED MEMBER'S NOMINEE, 1067 
 DEFENDANTS, JOINT, 148 
 DEFRAUD, intent to, 122 
 DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY, 126 
 DEVISES TO UNIONS, 715 
 "DIRECTLY ENFORCING," 56, 601 
 
 DISPUTES 
 
 of members, 60, 143 
 
 meaning of, 175 6 
 
 Trade, 123, 134, 1724, 176, 1889 
 
 DISQUALIFICATION 
 to hear union cases, 97 
 
 DISSOLUTION, 10910 
 DISTRESS, 179 
 
 DOCUMENTS, 
 
 inspection of, 89 
 
 EMBEZZLEMENT, 115, 117 
 
 EMPLOYEES 
 
 (gas or water), 124 6 
 
INDEX. 239 
 
 EMPLOYER 
 
 may be " compelled," 142 
 
 and workmen. See DISPUTES, Trade. 
 
 EMPLOYERS AND WORKMEN ACT (1875), 3, 6, 22, 23, 24, 
 
 17285 
 
 changes effected by, 24 
 nature of, 23 
 summary of, 22 
 
 EVIDENCE OF ILLEGAL ACTS, 12930, 144 
 EXECUTION, 180 
 
 EXEMPTION FROM INCOME TAX, 186 
 EXPULSION OF MEMBERS, 58, 61, 62 
 
 FACTORY ACTS, 181 
 
 FALSIFICATION OF ACCOUNTS ACT (1875), 3, 9, 121 
 FEES ON REGISTRATION, &c., 90, 101, 198 
 FINES, 20, 57, 100 
 
 FOLLOWING, 
 
 disorderly, 127, 12931 
 persistently, 127, 138 
 
 FOOD OF SERVANTS, &c., 1267 
 FORFEITURES, 100 
 FORMS, 16, 89, 196, 206 
 FRAUD. See DEFRAUD. 
 
 FRIENDLY SOCIETIES ACT (1875), 102, 108, 117 
 
 (1896), 679 
 
 FRIENDLY SOCIETY OR TRADE UNION ? 51, 63, 65 
 
 FUNDS OF TRADE UNIONS, 
 application of, 57 
 declaration as to title to, 61 
 division of, 109 
 
 exemption from income tax, 21 
 injunction against applying, 59, 60 
 
240 INDEX. 
 
 FUNDS OF TRADE UNIONS continued. 
 investment of, 13, 101 
 restrictions as to, 21, 101 
 unprotected by law, 4, 48 
 not unprotected by law, 115, 11G 7 
 
 FUNERAL MONEY, 107 
 
 GAS, 
 
 supply of, 1246, 153 
 
 GAS STOKERS' CASE, 120 
 GENERAL STATEMENT, 89 
 
 GOODWILL, 
 injury to, 141 
 
 GRANTS OF MONEY, 
 
 interdict as to, 18 
 
 GRIEVANCES OF TRADE UNIONISTS, 5 
 GURNEY'S ACT, RUSSELL. See RECORDER'S ACT. 
 
 HEALTH OF SERVANT, &c., 1267 
 HIDING PROPERTY, 127 
 
 HUMAN LIFE, 
 danger to, 126 
 
 HUSBAND, 
 
 as witness, 149 
 
 ILLEGAL acts, evidence of, 144 
 agreements 57 
 Societies, 48, 50, 512, 63, 65, 70, 116 
 
 INCOME TAX, 186 
 
 INDICTMENT, 
 form of, 131 
 
 INDUCING NOT TO CONTRACT, 54, 55, 56, 1412, 143, 
 
 1545, 156, 1601 
 Breach of Contract, 55, 140, 1546, 1601 
 
INDEX. 241 
 
 INDUSTBIAL AND PROVIDENT SOCIETIES ACTS, 1112 
 
 INFORMATION, 
 
 obtaining or communicating, 128, 139 
 
 " INHERENT " POWER OF JUDGES, 120 
 
 INJUNCTION 
 
 against applying funds, 59 60, 144 
 
 Union as such, 81 5 
 form of, 142n., 143 
 in case of malice, 140, 143 
 
 INJURY, 
 
 bodily, 126 
 
 civil, 163 
 
 to property, 126, 127 
 
 to trade. See TRADE, INTERFERENCE WITH. 
 
 INSPECTION 
 of books, 100 
 of documents, 89 
 
 INSURANCE OF CHILDREN, 6770, 102 
 
 INTERDICT, 
 
 case of, 5960 
 
 INTERFERENCE WITH TRADE, 54, 15960, 162 
 INTIMIDATION, 127, 1318 
 INVESTMENT OF FUNDS, 13 
 IRISH PROCEDURE, 934, 1815 
 
 JOINT 
 
 Beneficial Owners, 115, 118 
 cause of action, 147 
 defendants, 148 
 plaintiffs, 147 8 
 
 JUDGES AND NEW OFFENCES, 120 
 
 JURISDICTION, 
 
 limitation of, 26 
 T.U.A. 10 
 
242 INDEX. 
 
 LABOUR CONTRACTS, 181 
 
 breaches of, 24. And sec CONTRACTS. 
 
 LAND, 
 
 what rnay be acquired, 71, 74 5 
 
 LANGUAGE, INTIMIDATING, 137 
 
 LARCENY AND EMBEZZLEMENT ACT, 3, 115 
 
 LEAVING WORK, 181 
 
 LEGAL PROCEEDINGS, 49, 56, 64, 75, 77, 98-7, 109, 
 14850 
 
 LIABILITIES OF UNIONS, 91, 106 
 
 LIFE. See HUMAN LIFE. 
 
 LIFE ASSURANCE, 1045. And see CHILDKEN. 
 
 LOCK OUT, 162 
 
 LODGING OF SERVANT, &c., 1267 
 
 LORD CHANCELLOR, power of to make rules, 178, 17980 
 
 " MAINTENANCE " BY UNION, 78 
 MALICE, 140, 143, 153, 15463 
 MALICIOUS INJURY, 56 
 
 MALICIOUS INJURIES TO PROPERTY ACT (1861), 6, 
 1534 
 
 " MALICIOUSLY," 153, 154-63 
 MANDAMUS TO REGISTRAR, 70, 71 
 "MANUAL LABOUR," 181 
 MASTER AND SERVANT ACTS, 23 
 
 MASTERS, 
 
 attempt to control, 120 
 disqualified in union cases, 97 
 liability of, 1267 
 
INDEX. 248 
 
 MEDICAL AID TO SERVANT, 1267 
 
 MEETING, 
 
 place of, 100 
 
 of employers and employed, 189 
 
 MEMBERS, 
 
 names of, 101 
 
 MINORS, 
 
 members, 106 
 
 MISDEMEANOUR, 
 punishment of, 93 
 
 MONEY 
 
 due to deceased member, 107 
 
 " had and received," action for, 119 
 
 MORTMAIN, 75 
 
 MOTIVE IN CONSPIRACY, 56, 1434, 1589 
 
 MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY, 1523, 168 9, 171 
 employees of, 124 6 
 
 NAME OF UNION, 71, 889, 100, 10910 
 
 NAMES OF MEMBERS, 100 
 
 NEGLECT BY MASTER, 32 
 
 NEW OFFENCES, 120 
 
 NOMINATION TO RECEIVE MONEY, 1067, 186 
 
 NON-MEMBERS 
 
 contributions to, 57 
 
 NOTICE, 105 
 
 pay in lieu of, 175 
 not given, 110, 125 
 
 NUISANCE, 
 
 watching and besetting, a, 144 5 
 
 OBJECTION TO SUMMARY JURISDICTION, 1489 
 OBJECTS OF UNIONS, 65, 70, 91, 101, 148 
 
244 INDEX. 
 
 OFFENCES AGAINST UNIONS, 868 
 OFFICE OF UNION, 901 
 
 OFFICERS OF UNIONS, 7888, 91, 100, 107, 109, 110, 119, 121 
 
 names of, 88 
 
 OMISSION TO COMPLY WITH ACT, 1101 
 
 ORDER 16, 
 
 Rule 1, 1478 
 Rule 9, 789, 85 
 
 ORDERS 
 
 against unions to pay allowances, &c., an " agreement," 
 
 62, 65 
 
 for wages or compensation, 167 8, 174 5 
 to apprentice, 1767 
 to surety, 178 
 under Employers and Workmen Act, 176 9 
 
 OUT OF WORK, 
 
 pay to member, 187 
 
 PAPERS, &c., of unions, 867, 121 
 
 PARLIAMENT, 
 reports to, 92 
 
 PARTNERSHIP, 115 
 
 PAY DUE TO DECEASED MEMBER, 1067 
 
 PEACE, breach of, 124 
 
 PENALTIES, 41, 57, 58, 84, 87, 90, 92, 110, 126, 127, 123, 148 
 reduction of, 41, 148 
 
 PERPETUITIES, 735 
 
 PERSISTENTLY FOLLOWING, 33, 12738 
 
 PERSUASION, 139, 1413, 145 
 
INDEX. 246 
 
 PICKETING, 
 peaceful, 33 
 
 intention of Legislature, 39, 40 
 lawful, denned, 33 
 Taff Vale Case, 34 
 unlawful, 32, 33, 132, 1368, 13941, 142n., 3 
 
 PLACABDS, 
 
 injunction against, 79 81 
 
 PLAINTIFFS, 
 joint, 1478 
 
 POLICY OF LEGISLATURE, 60, 108 
 PREMIUM, 176, 1812 
 
 PROCEDURE, 41 
 
 point of. See ORDER 16. 
 
 PROCURATOR FISCAL, 
 powers of, 94 
 
 PROPERTY, 
 
 injury to, 126, 127 
 power to hold, 48, 49, 75 
 protection of, 141 
 
 union's, 1156, 118 
 rights to, 52, 118 
 
 PROPERTY AND FUNDS, Rules as to, 20 
 PROTECTION OF FUNDS ACT (1869), 5, 99, 119 
 
 PROVIDENT BENEFITS, 186-7 
 definition of, 22 
 
 PROVIDENT SOCIETIES. See INDUSTRIAL, &c. 
 Funds, exemption from income tax, 21, 186 7 
 restriction as to exemption, 21, 186 7 
 
 PUBLIC POLICY, 49, 50n. 
 
 PURPOSES OF A UNION, 100, 116 
 legal or illegal, 4953, 70, 116 
 
 QUARTER SESSIONS, 
 jurisdiction of, 95 6 
 
246 INDEX. 
 
 REASONABLENESS OF RULES, 645 
 RECORDER'S ACT (1868), 3, 7, 8, 115 
 
 REGISTRARS, 
 
 powers of, 70, 87, 103, 105, 109, 110 
 who are, 92 
 
 REGISTRATION 
 
 of Unions, 13, 15, 701, 8890, 104, 187 
 objections to, 13 
 privileges conferred by, 16 
 under Companies Acts, 66, 112 
 validity of, 15 
 void, 70, 105, 112 
 
 REGULATIONS, 16, 8890, 199 
 
 REMEDY, 
 
 civil or criminal, 88 
 
 REPRESENTATIVES 
 
 of a union, who are ? 78 85 
 
 RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS, 173, 176 
 
 RESTRAINT OF TRADE, 2, 3,11, 12,4953, 58,635, 70 99, 
 111, 11214, 117, 120 
 
 RESTRICTIVE CONDITIONS, 98, 111 
 RIOT, 124 
 
 RULES, 
 
 an "agreement," 57 
 
 as to benefits and fines, 20 
 
 as to property and funds, 20, 59, 87 8 
 
 changes in, 91, 101, 104 
 
 construction of, 100 
 
 falsification of, 92 3 
 
 illegal? 48n., 512, 58, 635, 116 
 
 nature of, 90, 1001 
 
 provisions of, 100, 106, 110 
 
 registration of, 88, 104, 187 
 
 whether or not a trade union, dependent on, 62, 112 4 
 
INDEX. 247 
 
 " SAME INTEREST," 
 meaning of, 78 9 
 
 SCOTCH PROCEDURE, 94, 16870, 1824 
 
 SEAL, 89 
 
 SEAMEN, 1634, 182 
 
 SECRETARY, 10910 
 
 SECURITY TO PERFORM CONTRACT, 1735, 1778 
 
 SEDITION, 124 
 
 SERVANT, 
 
 rights of, 1267 
 
 of union, 107, 117, 121 
 
 SERVICE, Contract of, 125 126, 181 
 
 SHERIFF COURT, 
 jurisdiction of, 94 
 
 SCCK PAY, 65, 187 
 
 SOVEREIGN, 
 
 offences against, 124 
 
 STATE, 
 
 offences against, 124 
 
 STATUTE OF LABOURERS, 3 
 STATUTORY DECLARATION, 10910 
 
 STRIKE PAY, 
 
 withholding of, 19, 101 
 
 STRIKES, 48 n., 50, 512, 116, 124, 132, 1337, 139, 141, 143, 
 146, 155, 162, 163 
 
 SUBSCRIPTION TO A UNION, 57 
 
 SUE, BIGHT TO, 37 
 
 intention of Legislature as to, 39 
 
 SUMMARY JURISDICTION, 935, 1034, 1489, 1512, 
 168, 169, 174-5, 176, 178, 193 
 
248 INDEX. 
 
 SUMMONS, 
 
 against officer, &c., 78 
 
 must specify " acts," 128 30 
 
 SUPERANNUATION PAY, 187 
 
 TAILORS' CASE, 132 
 THREATS, 1368 
 
 TOOLS, 
 
 hiding, &c., 127 
 loss of, 187 
 
 TRADE, 
 
 Board of, 18891 
 
 disputes, 123, 134. 143 
 
 interference with, 54, 99, 111, 141, 15960, 162 
 
 not to be carried on by union, 111 
 
 TRADE OR TRADES UNION? 48 
 
 TRADE UNION ACT (1871), 3, 10, 48 
 
 (1876),3, 10 
 
 Provident Funds (1893), 21, 186, 187 
 nature of provisions of, 14 
 provisions of, general character of, 14 
 
 TRADE UNION OR FRIENDLY SOCIETY ? 51, 63, 65 
 
 TRADE UNIONS 
 
 and criminal law, 116 8 
 
 benefit societies, 108. See BENEFITS. 
 
 cannot carry on trade, 111 
 
 cannot sue or be sued, 37, 82 3, 144 
 
 corporations ? 73, 824 
 
 definition of, 111 
 
 dissolution, 10910 
 
 intention of Legislature, 39, 40 
 
 legal position of, 17, 1167, 144, 148 
 
 may promote strike, 141 
 
 power of, 161 
 
 registration of, 13, 15, 701, 8890, 104, 187 
 
 responsibility for acts of members, 36 
 
 right of withholding strike pay, 19 
 
 rules, importance of, 17 
 
INDEX. 249 
 
 TRADING CLUB, 1178 
 
 TREASURER OF UNION, 856, 100, 106 
 
 TRIAL 
 
 may be demanded on indictment, 1489 
 
 TRIBUNALS, 41 
 
 TRUSTEES, 71, 758, 856, 101, 1023, 106, 109, 143, 144 
 
 TRUSTS FOR UNIONS, 49 
 
 ULTRA VIRES, 
 
 instance of, 19, 101 
 
 UNION responsible for acts of members, 36, 37 
 
 UNLAWFUL assembly, 124 
 means, 120 
 purposes, 28 
 
 UNREGISTERED UNIONS, 56, 85, 104, 121n., 147 
 
 VALIDITY OF CONTRACTS, 27 
 
 VIOLENCE, 127 
 threat of, 136 
 
 VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS, 51 
 
 WAGES, 
 
 claims, &c., for, 1734, 181 
 order for, 1678, 174 
 
 WARRANT NOT TO BE ISSUED, 179 
 WATCHING OR BESETTING, 32, 127, 13848 
 
 WATER, 
 
 supply of, 124 6, 153 
 
 WIFE, 
 
 as witness, 149 
 
 WINDING-UP OF UNION, 58 
 
 T.U.A. 17 
 
250 INDEX. 
 
 WITHDRAWAL OF CERTIFICATE, 105 
 
 WOMAN, 
 
 under Factory Acts, 181 
 
 WORKMEN 
 
 and employers, disputes between. See DISPUTES, TRADE. 
 who are ? 1801 
 
 YOUNG PERSON, 
 
 under Factory Acts, 181 
 
 THE END. 
 
 BKADBUBY, AGNtW, & CO. L.D., PBlNTEBb, LONDON AND TONBBIDGE. 
 
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