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I 
 
The New Tactics 
 
 : : : OF : : : 
 
 INFANTRY, 
 
 ( Studies in. ) 
 
 BY MAJOR W. VON SCHERFF, 
 
 TRANSLATED BY 
 
 COLONEL LUMLEY GRAHAM, 
 
 LATE 18TH (ROYAL IRISH) REGIMENT. 
 
 tJFIVBESXTT 
 
 GEORGE A. SPOONER, 
 
 IvKA-VKN WORTH, 
 I SL 
 
55" 
 
 C. J. SMITH & Co., PRINTERS, 
 LEAVENWORTH, KAN. 
 
TABLE or CONTENTS, 
 
 PART I. 
 WAR TIME. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 INTRODUCTION . 9 
 
 CHAPTER I. THE OFFENSIVE AND THE DEFENSIVE . 14 
 
 CHAPTER II. THE OFFENSIVE 20 
 
 1. THE PREPARATORY STAGE 29 
 
 2. THE STAGE OF EXECUTION . . . . 51 
 
 3. THIRD STAGE OF THE ATTACK .... 70 
 
 4. CONCLUDING REMARKS UPON DRILL . . 79 
 CHAPTER III. THE DEFENSIVE-OFFENSIVE ... 83 
 
 1. THE STAGE OF RESISTANCE .... 89 
 
 2. THE STAGE OF COUNTER-ATTACK . . . 108 
 
 3. SOME REMARKS ON DRILL . . . . 115 
 CHAPTER IV. THE TEMPORISING COMBAT . . . 119 
 
 (THE DEMONSTRATIVE.) 
 
 PART II. 
 THE PEACE SCHOOL. 
 
 INTRODUCTION 131 
 
 CHAPTER I. THE TRAINING OF SOLDIERS INDIVID- 
 UALLY AND COLLECTIVELY . . 138 
 
 CHAPTER II. THE HIGHER INSTRUCTION OF OFFI- 
 CERS 154 
 
 CHAPTER III. THE GREAT MANOEUVRES . . . 165 
 
SOME REMARKS BY THE TRANSLATOR. 
 
 AMONGST the many important subjects now under discus- 
 sion in the military world, none is more important than, in- 
 deed, I believe I may safely say, none is so important as, 
 the subject of the following studies. 
 
 By this time soldiers of all nations are agreed, almost 
 without exception, that with the new arms new tactics are 
 required. Some have long held this opinion and have been 
 striving to spread it ever since the rifled musket came into 
 general use. The introduction of rifled cannon and of 
 breechloaders made the necessity for change more impera- 
 tive and more obvious, so that at length almost everyone 
 who reflects at all upon such matters has become a convert. 
 The few who hold to the saying ''new arms old tactics," are 
 not likely to exercise much influence upon future war, and 
 may safely be ignored. 
 
 But though we may all, in England as elsewhere, be con- 
 vinced of the necessity for new tactics, there is plenty of 
 
6 Some Remarks by the Translator. 
 
 reason for difference of opinion as to the nature of this in- 
 novation which it is desirable to introduce. And here it is 
 that much study is required, and that the opinions of prac- 
 tical men like Major von Scherff who write under the fresh 
 impression of the best possible experience in such matters, 
 that of the battle-field, are extremely valuable, particularly 
 to men who, like most Englishmen of the present day, are 
 from the force of circumstances compelled to be more theo- 
 retical than practical in such matters. 
 
 Now we all know that many things which appear very 
 good in theory turn out very badly in practice, but why so? 
 Simply because the theory had not a practical foundation. 
 The Prussian soldiers who first used the needle-gun were, it 
 may be said, mere theorists, but the theories were based 
 upon practical considerations and careful study, so that they 
 developed themselves into most successful execution. Still 
 actual practice showed the Prussians that their theories 
 were at fault in many points, and they have ever since been 
 busy in profiting by the lessons from which they feel that 
 they have still much to learn. 
 
 We English have now as fine an opportunity as can fall 
 to the lot of theorists, having had the advantage of watch- 
 ing some gigantic tactical experiments carried out in a 
 most exhaustive manner at the cost of our neighbors, and 
 
Some Remarks by the Translator. 7 
 
 receiving afterwards the benefit of their opinions upon the 
 result. 
 
 Let us only study these opinions carefully upon their 
 own merits, and neither adopt them with blind enthusiasm 
 because they are "Prussian," or reject them with stolid 
 prejudice because they are "Un-English," and "not suited 
 to our national characteristics." 
 
 By the way, I have more than once heard it gravely as- 
 serted that fighting in skirmishing order is not "suited to 
 our national characteristics." If I thought so, I should say 
 the sooner we get a new suit of "characteristics" the better, 
 but I don't think so, having read of our famous old "light 
 division," and having seen what our men could do in the 
 Kafir bush under Eyre. The reader will, I hope, pardon 
 me for drawing his attention to one remarkable point of 
 difference between "Studies on Tactics," written by soldiers 
 who knew battle by practice like Major von Scherff, and 
 those written by men who, like many of our later English 
 essayists, only know it by theory, I mean the great stress 
 which the former class lays upon the moral effect of a tacti- 
 cal formation, whilst the attention of the latter class is 
 almost entirely confined to the material and mechanical side 
 of the question. This is quite natural, for I believe those 
 who have seen most of war attach the greatest importance 
 
8 Some Remarks by the Translator. 
 
 to moral as distinguished from mere material considera- 
 tions. 
 
 I cannot conclude these few introductory remarks more 
 fitly than with the concluding sentence of Major von 
 Scherff's studies: 
 
 " May we be able to find time and opportunity for these 
 lessons, lest war should have to teach us what we ought 
 already to have learnt in peace, what like is battle ? " 
 
 L. G. 
 
 March, 1873. 
 
STUDIES 
 
 ON THE 
 
 NEW TACTICS OF INFANTRY 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 THE general adoption of the rifled musket, soon followed 
 by that of the rifled cannon, has impressed a very different 
 character upon the tactical literature of all European arm- 
 ies, if we compare that of the last fifteen years or so (that 
 is to say, from the time of the Crimean war), with that of 
 the previous period; and the great wars which have been 
 waged during these later years have contributed powerfully 
 to the same result; for whilst the tactical writings of the 
 period antecedent to the date above mentioned were almost 
 without exception mere text-books, calculated to set before 
 the reader and to make him practically acquainted with the 
 
io Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 great principles of modern tactics as then determined (which 
 was often done in a masterly manner); on the other hand, 
 the more recent works have been, and are to the present 
 day, mostly of a controversial nature, written, with more or 
 less ability, but not always quite to the point, to discuss the 
 changes in tactics apparently rendered necessary by the 
 new firearms. Speaking generally, the debate has been 
 narrowed to two questions : 
 
 What general influence do the new arms exert upon the 
 commander with reference to tactical operations ; upon his 
 selection of the offensive or defensive? 
 
 How do they affect his manner of conducting either? (a 
 question of elementary tactics, drill). 
 
 Now, although upon the former of these two questions 
 opinions are pretty well reconciled, and nearly unanimous, 
 the latter has not been settled definitively even by the last 
 war between France and Germany, and we still see military 
 men everywhere occupied with theoretical argument and 
 practical experiment upon elementary tactics, especially 
 with reference to infantry, seeking after a solution of the 
 problem. 
 
 The necessity of finding such has been brought home to 
 all more closely by the war of 1870 71, and has been ac- 
 cepted more readily than perhaps was the case before. 
 
 In that campaign the Prussian company-column triumph- 
 antly asserted its position as satisfying in the most com- 
 plete manner hitherto discovered the altered requirements 
 

 Introduction^ 1 1 
 
 of tactics. Still it is just in the Prussian-German army itself 
 that the conviction has gained ground most thoroughly; 
 
 1. That what has hitherto been accomplished in this way 
 is by no means absolutely exhaustive; that 
 
 2. We owe the successful result of this formation mainly 
 to our long familiarity with it in peace time: hence that 
 
 3. Our present peaceful leisure who knows how long it 
 may last? must be taken advantage of to provide our in- 
 fantry tactics with a firm foundation based upon the expe- 
 rience gained in war; to establish a system more adapted to 
 our present requirements than has been hitherto the case; 
 so as to be able without prejudice to act on the field of 
 battle as we have been accustomed to do on the drill- 
 ground, and to be less dependent than we have hitherto 
 been upon the personal inspiration of subordinate officers, 
 however well justified this dependence may have been up 
 to this time. 
 
 It is the school of peace no one will now deny it which 
 provides an army with the cement necessary for enabling it 
 to withstand the enormous friction of the battle-field. It is 
 the established system to which the men have been long 
 accustomed which gives to a standing army its immense 
 superiority over the dilettantism of the mere levy. 
 
 Whatever system of battle-formations we adopt, the 
 simpler, clearer, more unchangeable it is, so much the bet- 
 ter for our requirements in every way; it will never check 
 self-reliance or the exercise of individual skill, unless it is 
 
12 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 based on false principles, whilst where these qualities are at 
 a low ebb a case which may possibly arise it will be a 
 powerful aid in critical moments. 
 
 The present time seems to be in some measure favorable 
 to the discovery of such a system, for the following reasons. 
 As the possession of rifled guns and breechloaders will soon 
 be common to all armies, the era of progress in the manu- 
 facture of firearms may, speaking generally, be considered 
 closed for the immediate future. Although improvements 
 may still be made constantly, we may yet consider ourselves 
 for the present safe from such sudden surprises, from such 
 startling and revolutionary novelties as were rifled guns and 
 breechloaders when they first appeared. 
 
 Even repeating rifles and shrapnel shell contain at least 
 no unexpected elements. On the other hand the practical 
 experience of a great war, rich to excess in examples of 
 battle, and in which both parties had the advantage of the 
 most improved armament, gives to theory the so much 
 needed aid. The following study is intended to contribute 
 towards a work which is admitted to be both necessary and 
 possible. 
 
 It does not pretend of itself to accomplish this work. 
 
 Based upon theoretical materials which may be considered 
 as in every way exhaustive, and upon the practical exam- 
 ples of the last great wars, it will place the questions re- 
 quiring decision impartially before the reader, not refraining 
 
Introduction. 1 3 
 
 at the same time from the expression of the writer's indi- 
 vidual opinion or from criticism. 
 
 It will deal in turn, and as far as at present appears nec- 
 essary, with the two main questions above alluded to. 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE OFFENSIVE AND THE DEFENSIVE. 
 
 EVERY improvement in firearms produces a powerful im- 
 pression that the Defensive has thereby gained an accession 
 of strength. This feeling is all the more natural because a 
 purely defensive attitude in the open field was first rendered 
 possible by the invention of firearms and of gunpowder. In 
 earlier days battles took the form of encounters in which 
 both sides took the offensive, or else the defender was 
 driven to make use of fortification to an extent far surpass- 
 ing the practice of the present day. 
 
 Firearms and the Defensive are as much allied in our 
 minds as are "1'arme blanche" and the Offensive; in neither 
 case can we well imagine the allies separated. "The better 
 the firearm, the stronger the defence" is, therefore, a maxim 
 the justice of which has always exerted its influence upon 
 military operations since firearms have become general, and 
 which has not yet quite lost its power. 
 
 So it was after the Crimean war, when the rifled musket, 
 and so after the Bohemian campaign, when the breechloader, 
 respectively made their dtbut in the field. In each case 
 theory raised its voice very loudly in favor of the principle 
 of the Defence, and if the book-tacticians of those days had 
 been worthy of credit, the war of 1870 71 should have 
 bloomed into one of the finest specimens of a war of posi- 
 tions, in which, as is well known, the art of beating gives 
 place to that of not being beaten. 
 
 This theory was deduced in a curious manner from our 
 latest war-experience, each time in an indirect way, that is 
 
The Offensive and the Defensive. 15 
 
 to say, the new arm was in both campaigns victorious in 
 Offence ; nevertheless we are told that it should properly 
 give more power to the Defence. The fact that in 1859 the 
 Austrian rifle did not hold its own against the smoothbore 
 with which the French were still mostly armed, was ac- 
 counted for by the action of the French rifled cannon. But, 
 as was still maintained, "rifled guns and muskets must in- 
 fallibly make the Defensive invincible." 
 
 It is a remarkable and interesting fact that at a time when 
 these defensive theories had obtained pretty general ap- 
 proval, both in literature and even in other ways, the Aus- 
 trians in 1866 would have nothing to say to them, and set- 
 ting at naught the dictates of nature and tradition, rushed 
 almost fanatically into the Offensive to be everywhere 
 beaten ; and that when the tables were turned and many 
 voices were raised against that one-sided theory to reject it, 
 the French in 1870 went upon the opposite tack, and, like 
 the Austrians, acting contrary to their nature and traditions, 
 servilely followed a Defensive system to be in like manner 
 everywhere beaten ! 
 
 These striking contradictions show plainly enough that 
 the formula of the "certain shot" is not infallible, when we 
 have to decide upon the absolute merit of this or that tacti- 
 cal formation. 
 
 It must be confessed that the critics recovered themselves 
 pretty soon from the first panic, so to say, which was created 
 by the general introduction of rifled arms, and resting upon 
 the experiences of 1859, they met the theory of the absolute 
 Defensive with the argument that it was not so much the 
 accuracy of the new arms as their low trajectory which ren- 
 dered them such valuable allies to the Defence. With re- 
 gard to breechloaders, it was asserted even before 1866 that 
 their rapidity of fire would serve the assailant at least as 
 well as it would the defender. In fact the more portable, 
 moveable, handy, and quick-firing a gun is, so much the 
 more suited is it to the attacking party, which is compelled 
 
1 6 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry, 
 
 to be constantly in movement, a condition unfavorable to 
 the use of firearms. The development of artillery from the 
 gun of position to its present degree of perfection was a 
 consequence of this conviction, just as the rapid-firing in- 
 fantry of Frederick the Great, acting as it did on the offen- 
 sive, was an example of its justice. 
 
 Thus a very decided opposition to the defensive hobby 
 grew out of purely technical considerations. Is it necessary 
 to enlarge upon the decisive question of morale? 
 
 We think not, after 1870, after 1866, after the whole of 
 Prussia's history. Indeed it may appear superfluous to 
 moot the question at all at the present day, and in our 
 country ! The theory of the superiority of the Offensive is 
 for the time being so firmly rooted that a reaction is not 
 much to be feared. 
 
 And yet even with us the time of the doubters has not 
 long passed away; a single instance of failure on the part of 
 the Offensive always a possible event would again wake 
 up these theorists, who, in accordance with their critical 
 German nature, would once more produce their coldly rea- 
 soned "demonstrations founded upon the nature of the arm." 
 
 After all we might remain indifferent to this if the ques- 
 tion raised in tactical literature, "Defensive or Offensive ? " 
 had not led to another tactical inquiry, which in its bearing 
 on the principles of the training of our infantry is, perhaps, 
 no less important than the former one. 
 
 The well-known school-definitions describe "victory" as 
 the end aimed at in every "conflict;" moreover, the pro- 
 nounce the "Offensive" to be almost without exception the 
 only "road to victory;" whilst they proclaim the "Defensive" 
 to be a "negation of victory," which to become decisively 
 victorious must needs "change its nature" and become 
 Offensive. We thus come to the following conclusion : 
 
 "That to obtain a decisive victory we must adopt the 
 Offensive from the first, or else take to it after a Defence suc- 
 cessfully conducted." 
 

 The Offensive and the Defensive. 17 
 
 Though these maxims are only of primary and absolute 
 importance to the strategical side of the discussion, yet 
 they doubtless have the value of a principle also from the 
 tactical point of view. A victory gained simply by acting 
 tactically on the defensive, without any offensive return or 
 pursuit, and merely compelling the enemy to retreat, will 
 never decide a campaign, but will, at the most, prepare the 
 way for this result. 
 
 But in every battle it should be our aim at once to attain 
 the decisive result, which consists in the tactical annihila- 
 tion of the enemy. 
 
 When, therefore, we come to treat of tactical formations, 
 we shall necessarily resume the discussion as to the funda- 
 mental conditions, and as to the chances of these two only 
 possible methods of attaining victory. 
 
 But we find in war, besides the decisive battles alluded 
 to, a great number of engagements, that is to say, of oppor- 
 tunities for fighting, in which certainly one side, and per- 
 haps the other also, does not attempt to attain to any deci- 
 sive result ; in other words, to gain a victory in the sense of 
 a definitive overthrow of the enemy ; where the possession of 
 a certain point or portion of a position, or the gain of a 
 certain amount of time, is of more importance to you than 
 is the actual loss of men at the same time caused to the 
 enemy. 
 
 Such engagements must always naturally assume an 
 offensive or defensive character, but never represent the 
 Offensive or Defensive in the sense of seeking to obtain vic- 
 tory by the adoption of either principle. Hence it ensues 
 that the way in which troops are handled will differ accord- 
 ing to which of the two objects you have in view, and thus, 
 that the formations which suit the one case will not be en- 
 tirely adapted to the other. 
 
 In order then to promote a clear system of instruction in 
 time of peace, the end we are now aiming at, it appears 
 necessary, both in theory and practice, to establish the dis- 
 
1 8 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 tinction between the fighting which aims at a decisive result, 
 and that which aims at no decisive result ( to which we ivill apply 
 the term "Temporising combat"), more clearly than has been 
 done heretofore. 
 
 Then in treating of fighting which aims at a decisive result, 
 the further question crops up of Offensive or Defensive ? and 
 we shall have occasion again to inculcate, both theoretically 
 and practically, that there should be no such thing as a De- 
 fensive without a development of the Offensive from it. 
 
 This study, then, would give the foundation upon which 
 the details of a sound modern system of infantry tactics 
 may be based, a foundation which, assuming the form of a 
 " Battle-guide," would establish principles somewhat such 
 as follow : 
 
 1. Every officer with an independent command finding 
 himself in front of the enemy has at once to make up his 
 mind as to the following points : whether he can or should, 
 cannot or should not, aim at a decisive result ; this will de- 
 pend upon whether he is strong enough, upon the general 
 situation, whether other troops are engaged before him, 
 what there is behind him, and so forth ; or whether his sit- 
 uation is likely to be improved by a temporising combat or 
 not. This would be undertaken to give time for reinforce- 
 ments to arrive, for the purpose of misleading the enemy, 
 or for gaining better information ; 
 
 2. Should he feel bound to answer both questions in the 
 negative, he should do his utmost to avoid or break off all 
 engagements ; 
 
 3. If he thinks himself justified in entering into a decisive 
 action, he should adopt the principle of the Offensive; should 
 he, without being momentarily strong enough for such a 
 course, be able to reckon upon receiving sufficient rein- 
 forcements, he should carry on a temporising combat in such 
 a manner that, as far as possible, the enemy may be de- 
 prived of the initiative in assuming the Offensive, whilst 
 
The Offensive and the Defensive. 19 
 
 threatened with it at the same time by him (see the chapter 
 on the temporising combat). 
 
 4. Only under very peculiar and exceptional circum- 
 stances, or when the nature of the ground peremptorily de- 
 mands it, should he accept battle from the first in a defen- 
 sive position. 
 
 We will now proceed to consider the three chief forms of 
 tactical action, which result from the foregoing considera- 
 tions: the Offensive, the Defensive-Offensive, and the Tempo- 
 rising Combat. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE OFFENSIVE. 
 
 THE outward evidence of victory, hence the object we 
 strive for, is the forcible expulsion of the enemy from that 
 spot on which he wishes to maintain himself. All action of 
 troops in battle consists in the employment of the power 
 either of dealing blows or of withstanding them. Both 
 taken together constitute the fighting capacity of a body of 
 troops, that quality without which the troops as a body 
 cannot exist, and the loss of which entails their destruction 
 as such. This power, then, of giving blows and of with- 
 standing them in other words, the attacking power and 
 the resisting power, encounter one another in every action, 
 with a view to mutual destruction ; victory inclines to the 
 side gifted with the greatest fighting capacity. In order to 
 be victorious, it is therefore necessary to be stronger than 
 your adversary at a given time and place. 
 
 This greater degree of strength is obtained either by the 
 physical and numerical, or by the moral superiority of one 
 force over the other ; if possible, by all combined. 
 
 The sum total of these advantages represents the attack- 
 ing power of the force on the offensive, and, in like manner, 
 the resisting power of that on the defensive. Now, in order 
 that a force on the offensive may be able to develop with 
 effect its maximum of attacking power, and make use of it 
 to the utmost, it should adopt a formation favorable, as far 
 as possible, to the following requirements : 
 
 To the very greatest mobility ; for the possibility of a sue- 
 
The Offensive. 21 
 
 cessful Offensive is, above all, dependent on forward move- 
 ment ; further, 
 
 To the greatest possible security from the effects of the enemy's 
 fire ; that most dangerous foe to the Offensive, because it 
 damages most intensely the assailant's attacking power, 
 both physical and moral, and may cause him to hesitate, 
 retire, give way before reaching the decisive point : 
 
 Lastly, to the greatest possible development of its own 
 fire, at any rate, at the moment of actual collision, and, if 
 possible, at an earlier stage of the combat also ; for the 
 superiority of the assailant in this respect is absolutely 
 necessary to give his attack the amount of power requisite 
 to ensure a real victory. 
 
 The old system of tactics met these requirements by pro- 
 viding formations in mass; either in line or column. 
 
 The revolutionary wars introduced the extended order the 
 swarm of skirmishers. 
 
 The massive formations as developed by the Napoleonic 
 wars, and as maintained down to the latest war-era, fulfilled 
 more or less well all the above-mentioned general require- 
 ments for every offensive formation, or fulfilled, some 
 more, others less well, as measured by the armament of those 
 days. 
 
 Formation in extended order, in other words the action 
 of individuals, seems at that period to have been a mere 
 accessory, rendered necessary, to speak generally, rather by 
 the altered method of conducting military operations (tak- 
 ing advantage of ground), than by the nature of the arms. 
 
 The attempts made from time to time to raise this ex- 
 tended order to the first rank failed during the revolutionary 
 period, owing to the inefficiency of those who undertook 
 the enterprise ; and these attempts were not renewed, be- 
 cause they were as yet not necessary ; nevertheless, the 
 combat of Saalfeld may be cited as an example of an action 
 
 
22 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 in which victory was gained entirely by the use of entended 
 order offensively. 
 
 Since the first steps were taken in the manufacture of the 
 new arms, this formation has forced its way more and more 
 into the foreground; in 1859, the rifle placed it upon an 
 equality with the old formation; in 1870-71, the breech- 
 loader established its superiority over it. 
 
 The following fact is finally established in opposition to 
 all previous theories, that in the war of 1870-71, the enemy's 
 position (whether in the open field or on the borders of 
 woods and villages), was invariably carried by swarms of 
 skirmishers, followed only at greater or less distance by lines 
 and columns in close order. 
 
 We may therefore affirm, that individual order has actually 
 become the only battle-formation for infantry. 
 
 We place the expression individual order in contrast to 
 order in mass, and understand by the latter term, a formation 
 in which each individual soldier has his assigned place, 
 which he must not leave; by the former, a formation in 
 which each soldier has likewise a place assigned to him, but 
 in a general way, and with the power of changing it at 
 pleasure within certain fixed limits. 
 
 We substitute the expressions "order in mass" and "indi- 
 vidual order" for those in general use, namely, "close order" 
 and "extended" or "dissolved" (aufgelost) order, first, 
 because the formation of skirmishers, which is implied by 
 both the latter terms, may often take very close order ; and, 
 secondly, because the actual dissolution of order is never 
 recognised.* 
 
 These are but words : of little consequence in argument, 
 when the disputants understand one another's meaning, but 
 in practice not altogether void of meaning and valueless. 
 
 * Henceforth in the translation, I shall take the liberty of making use of the ex- 
 pressions " close order" and " extended order," because more convenient and more 
 familiar to English ears than the literal translation of "massenordnung" and 
 " einzelordnung." (Tr.) 
 
The Offensive. 23 
 
 We hardly require any further arguments to prove that ex- 
 tended order is more adapted to the three above-named 
 main requirements for offensive action than any formation 
 in close order. 
 
 Moreover, we may safely allege, that no considerations of 
 that kind weighed against the general and much earlier 
 adoption of extended order for infantry attack. The actual 
 objection lay rather in the instinctive, though it might be 
 unexpressed, conviction, that with the means of training 
 troops then available, it would be impossible with skirmish- 
 ers to obtain the amount of attac king-power indispensable to 
 offensive action. 
 
 In the first place, it was thought seriously that it would 
 not be possible to provide a sufficient number of skirmish- 
 ers ; and, secondly, no great reliance was placed on the moral 
 force of extended order. This arose from the traditions of 
 the period, and tradition hinders men oftener than we think 
 from finding Columbus' egg. 
 
 The promotion of extended order to the rank of a tactical 
 formation only became possible when value began to be 
 attached to the development of the soldier's faculties by in- 
 struction, and on the other hand, this only took place when 
 the improvement of firearms began to make the extended 
 order more and more necessary. 
 
 Thus, as is generally the case in this world, supply met 
 demand, one having produced the other, until we reached 
 the present stage, when we have to perfect the means which 
 have supplied the demand. 
 
 The controversial literature of later years, and war-expe- 
 rience, have supplied such inexhaustible materials for show- 
 ing how this may be accomplished that it would be difficult 
 to say anything new upon the subject ; we only require 
 these materials to be arranged methodically. This arrange- 
 ment must evidently be in keeping with those general prin- 
 ciples applicable to the Offensive, which have held good in 
 all ages. 
 
24 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 We must now, before proceeding further, revert briefly to 
 these principles, although, in doing so, we shall go over 
 long-familiar ground. 
 
 Every attack has to go through three stages : 
 The period of preparation, 
 
 The moment of accomplishment, and of the greatest 
 strain on the faculties, and 
 
 The period of reaction and of recovery. 
 
 It is sufficient to indicate these stages ; we are not here 
 called upon to prove their "raison d'etre." 
 
 Let us only premise, in order to avoid misunderstanding, 
 that by the expression "preparation of the attack,"* we by 
 no means understand the same thing as the "opening of the 
 fight."f 
 
 The "opening of the fight" implies the several acts of 
 reconnoitring the enemy and the ground, of gaining time 
 for deployment, of coming to a determination upon the 
 object to be fought for, and upon the means to be em- 
 ployed; that is to say, of making your dispositions and 
 giving out your orders ; all of which belongs, according to 
 our previous classification, to the domain of the "Temporis- 
 ing combat." 
 
 In the observations which follow, we will look upon this 
 period as passed by, and will treat of the "preparation" 
 simply as the first step of an attack, the direction of which, 
 and the means to be employed in making which, have al- 
 ready been quite settled. 
 
 If in any matter connected with war we may consider 
 thorough energy of will as the most necessary condition of 
 success, this will apply most certainly to the attack, in which 
 our warlike energy is most completely drawn upon. 
 
 This being then admitted, we must actually take into con- 
 
 * Vorbereitung des Angriffs. 
 t EInleitung des Qefechts. 
 
The Offensive. 25 
 
 sideration whatever relates to the theory of the attack, and 
 to its practical execution. 
 
 This will be the place to treat more particularly of those 
 elements which produce energy of action. 
 
 First of all comes clearness of judgment clearness in two 
 ways both with regard to the end to be attained and to the 
 means to be employed. 
 
 This might appear to some so self-evident as not to de- 
 serve particular mention, and yet whoever studies military 
 history with care will find how much powder has been 
 wasted, how much human blood has been uselessly spilt, 
 from want of this clearness. 
 
 The critic cannot fail to observe that a large proportion 
 of the actions in every war, both ancient and modern, have 
 been commenced without consideration, carried on without 
 energy, and brought to a close without advantage, by one 
 or both parties. 
 
 We are now speaking of temporising combats, or of those 
 undertaken for reconnoitring purposes ; these have an actual 
 object, and a real use ; we refer to that scuffling sort of fight 
 in which some commanders think themselves bound to en- 
 gage every time that they see an enemy, and which is often 
 commenced by a go-a-head advance-guard before its leader 
 has calculated what he wishes to gain, or can gain by it ; 
 before he has asked himself the question, whether it may 
 not, on the whole, be prejudicial to the general operations. 
 Once commenced, the fight must be carried on by the 
 troops which successively come up, because in military 
 affairs most especially the saying comes true, that he who 
 says A must also say B. It is only lucky when a "skrim- 
 mage," of this kind, at least, ends without any decided re- 
 sult, or when he who commenced it without knowing why, 
 finds as the affair goes on, means and energy enough to 
 bring it to a decisive conclusion. 
 
 But still, this sort of thing does no good. Therefore in 
 
26 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 the chapter on the Offensive and Defensive, it is recommended 
 that a commander should avoid all fights which do not offer 
 any positive and attainable objective. Therefore, again, we 
 consider it of primary importance that whoever determines 
 upon the Offensive should undertake it with his whole energy, 
 and should make full use of all the means at his disposal. 
 
 This also may seem self-evident ; and yet how many 
 attacks one sees made with half or a quarter of the force 
 available, under the influence of that barrack-square theory, 
 false as it is, of the possibility of renewing the attack with 
 the second line, and of that equally false school-theory of 
 the necessity of holding back the reserves. 
 
 This is the moment to devote a few words to the import- 
 ance of the introductory (as distinguished from the prepara- 
 tory} period of the attack, of the form and conduct of which 
 we shall treat in the chapter on the temporising combat. 
 
 The enormous effect of artillery and infantry fire more 
 than ever impels masses of troops which come under it to 
 bring things to as rapid a conclusion as possible : more than 
 ever, therefore, is the habit of quick decision necessary to 
 the leader, and more than ever should the masses be kept 
 back until the plan of action is determined, for which the 
 introductory period is alone available, the possibility of a 
 subsequent change of plan being, moreover, much more 
 restricted than formerly. 
 
 As soon as'the leader has determined upon his mode of 
 action, he has, so to say, cast the dice, and victory depends 
 upon the throw. 
 
 From that moment, no hesitation, no half measures, are 
 allowable. The commander's judgment as to "where" and 
 "when" will unalterably and irrevocably determine the re- 
 sult of the operation. 
 
 This is the work of the introductory stage, and this it is 
 which makes that stage decisive to the leader of an attack. 
 The determination has been taken. Now to the conditions 
 of execution. 
 
The Offensive. 27 
 
 >We have already shown that to have a numerical and 
 moral superiority over the enemy at a specified time and 
 place is a main condition of success: to this must be added, 
 as elements of victory, mobility, certainty, and a formation 
 calculated to get full value from the arms. 
 
 Your attack vmist have its fixed objective ; it must be conducted 
 as directly as possible, and without a check; it must be executed 
 with the whole of the force at your disposal. 
 
 These three principles, as universal experience shows us 
 are the necessary foundation of all attack. 
 
 With all disposable force! You can never be too strong 
 when making an attack, for you never can be perfectly sure 
 of what forces you may encounter, or at what moment the 
 defender may make a counter attack, which will only be 
 omitted by an apathetic foe. But the repulse of every at- 
 tack exercises a demoralising influence on the assailant, and 
 the possibility of renewing the assault with fresh troops, 
 which can alone justify the non-employment in the first 
 instance of your whole available force, will always be dimin- 
 ished by a first unsuccessful attempt. Whether the attack 
 prove successful or not, it is better that all your forces 
 should be concentrated, as both the physical effect upon 
 the enemy and the moral stimulus upon yourself will be 
 thereby augmented, and danger will be diminished, both 
 directly and indirectly, if the masses are held together under 
 the influence of one chief. 
 
 Infantry being able to maintain a standing fight is not, 
 like cavalry, put "hors combat" by a repulse, and the 
 stronger the force the more true this is. Hence the reserve 
 which infantry proceeding to the attack leaves behind it 
 should be reduced to a minimum, being- only intended to 
 cover its rear in case of need, perhaps to hold a defile which 
 may happen to be in dangerous proximity ; it will be best if 
 this reserve for the infantry is furnished by the other arms. 
 
 An attack made with only a part of your force at once 
 awakens the idea of the possibility of non-success. 
 
28 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 Now a commander should weigh in his own mind all the 
 chances of defeat, and seek beforehand to provide against 
 them ; but if once soldiers engaged in an assault have the 
 idea of retreat in their heads they are already half beaten. 
 
 It is possible for the attack to fail, but it is impossible for 
 us to go back. The sword cuts or flies to pieces, the army 
 conquers, or there will only be its fragments to collect. 
 
 To make an attack in such a spirit as this, you require 
 your whole available strength ; otherwise it ceases to be an 
 attack, and becomes merely a tentative advance with a retreat 
 quickly impending. 
 
 As directly as possible, and without a check! It naturally 
 must deaden the energy of your attack and diminish your 
 chance of success if you take a round-about way to reach 
 your object. Quickness of execution is one of the chief 
 elements of success, and is most seriously impaired by any 
 deviation from the straight direction of the onset. However 
 great the advantage of directing your attack upon the flank 
 of an enemy, it is nevertheless imperative that the measures 
 for doing this should be taken when they can be carried out 
 unseen and unmolested by fire ; as, for instance, during the 
 introductory period ; and such a manoeuvre will never be 
 favorable to success if attempted by an oblique movement 
 under fire, or by a change of front (which takes up a long 
 time, and is therefore prejudicial), after you are already en- 
 gaged. The destructive effect of the enemy's projectiles 
 will produce confusion as the inevitable consequence of such 
 a complicated attempt ; this will be followed by hesitation 
 and a full stop ; the attentive foe will take advantage of 
 such a dangerous movement for making a doubly damaging 
 counter stroke. 
 
 Straight to the front forward is the word of command 
 suited to the attack, and the only command which is sure 
 of its moral impulse upon the soldier. 
 
 The fixed objective! Only the first point to be reached 
 should be given as the object of attack. Nothing can be 
 
The Preparatory Stage. 29 
 
 more prejudicial than to make a determination as to a 
 second objective before the first is attained. The previous 
 indication of what is to happen z/the first point is carried is 
 as premature as the simultaneous direction of the attacking 
 force on objects which are not in the same line. 
 
 No attack should have more than one objective at a time ; 
 whatever follows will require further orders. 
 
 It is the duty of the supreme command to confine opera- 
 tions to the end in view, and it is the duty of the operating 
 force to keep strictly within the limits assigned. An offen- 
 sive action to be carried out with calculated energy (to which 
 mere "Man" is in strong contrast), should advance by spurts 
 from one mark aimed at to another. We must make allow- 
 ance for the moment of reaction, the natural consequence 
 of every attack, and of the extreme tension of the nerves, 
 which is its inevitable accompaniment. Before this moment 
 of weakness has passed away, a leader with clear and sure 
 views will not proceed to the solution of further problems. 
 
 On the other hand, a force which ignores these natural 
 pauses in the conflict, and which oversteps those lines of 
 demarcation between its stages in a fragmentary way will 
 not be as reliable for manoeuvre as much in hand as could 
 be wished. That blind forward rush beyond a position 
 which has been carried, that reckless charge upon the 
 enemy, without a thought of your neighbors, has gathered 
 many a laurel, but has also compromised many a success, 
 and has led to many a repulse : it has only cost the perpe- 
 trators their lives, but it has cost the army victory. 
 
 Therefore, only one object at a time! So much for the gen- 
 eral subject. Let us now turn to the special formations for 
 the three stages of the attack. 
 
 I. THE PREPARATORY STAGE. 
 
 The necessity of preparing the way for an attack by the 
 fire of artillery and skirmishers has already been inculcated 
 in former lessons on warfare. We shall therefore have less 
 
3O Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 to deal with the general question than with the strength of 
 troops intended for this purpose, and with the mode of 
 handling them. The old principle of extending only as few 
 skirmishers as possible, of letting "out of hand" only as 
 many as are absolutely necessary for the end in view, how- 
 ever well suited to the epoch such a maxim may have been, 
 has suffered considerable modification from the improve- 
 ment in firearms. 
 
 There is no doubt that the accession of strength which 
 has accrued to the Defence from improved firearms has pro- 
 duced its first result in the increased necessity for preparatory 
 action, and, consequent upon this, in the augmentation of the 
 force employed for this purpose. 
 
 The rule which formerly was considered so important, of 
 only reinforcing a line of skirmishers little by little, soon 
 proved itself in practice to be more dangerous and more 
 productive of loss that the extension of a sufficient number 
 from the very first, that is to say, from the time of coming 
 within the zone of rifle fire. After substituting the latter 
 rule for the old one, we must next determine what is a suf- 
 ficient number. 
 
 In view of the increased powers of resistance of the De- 
 fence, the answer must certainly be, as many rifles as from the 
 nature of the ground can be brought effectively into play. 
 
 If the preparation of an attack is really to be effectual, in 
 other words, if it is to shake the defender physically and 
 morally, it is of primary importance that the same should 
 be continued without interruption from the very commence- 
 ment to the moment of actual impact. If the last rush only 
 takes place some time after the preparatory fire has been 
 interrupted, although this may possibly have materially 
 weakened the defenders, there will be no question of seri- 
 ously shaking their morale, always supposing them to be 
 good troops. On the contrary, the fact of the artillery fire 
 having been really or apparently silenced, will have exalted 
 their courage. 
 
The Preparatory Stage. 31 
 
 Now, as the fire of every skirmisher armed with a breech- 
 loader may be looked upon as uninterrupted, and as each 
 individual requires for the full use of his arm, when in 
 movement, about one-and-a-half paces in width, we may 
 reckon the greatest possible strength desirable for troops 
 engaged in the preparatory operation at one man to every one- 
 and-a-half paces of the front of attack. This calculation will, 
 then, without considering the question of loss which we shall 
 deal with hereafter, represent the maximum strength of 
 skirmishers told off for the preparation. As at this moment 
 we have only to consider the amount of fire to be developed, 
 we must look upon every man placed in the line of skir- 
 mishers who cannot contribute to this, owing to want of 
 space, as hurtful to the general effect, inasmuch as he is un- 
 necessarily increasing the materials for loss. 
 
 Given, therefore, a body of troops of a specified strength, 
 it will be at once necessary to determine how broad can, 
 should, or must be its front of attack. 
 
 In order to do this, we must examine another phase of the 
 requirements to be demanded from the fire which prepares 
 the way for attack. 
 
 We have already noticed the necessity for an uninter- 
 rupted fire from the very commencement of the action up 
 to the moment of actual collision. And to be more precise, 
 it is necessary to remark, that we time this commencement 
 from the moment at which the advanced troops, whose mis- 
 sion consists in preparing the way for the attack by attempt- 
 ing to shake the enemy's powers of resistance, have reached 
 (we will explain later how) the point from which their fire 
 will be most effective. It is not at present necessary for us 
 to explain our reasons for choosing this moment. In the 
 present condition of firearms this point would be between 
 400 and 200 paces from the spot at which we propose to 
 force the enemy's position. 
 
 Now it is not in human nature for even the best troops 
 in the world to hold out for more than a few minutes whilst 
 
32 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 they and their opponents are keeping up a rapid independ- 
 ent fire, such as it would be, upon one another at so close 
 and effective a range (for we presume both parties to be 
 equally well armed). Not to mention the actual loss, which 
 is often not at all in proportion to the expenditure of am- 
 munition, the moral effect of such a fire upon the nerves is 
 such that the crisis will be hurried on very quickly by the 
 excitement thus produced. 
 
 We must not imagine the defender with the advantage, 
 which he has, of the more favorable position, to be in other 
 respects inferior to the assailant ; we must not suppose him 
 to bolt; therefore, after a very short time, the attacking 
 force will either be seized with the impulse to rush forward 
 to close quarters, or to turn tail. Hence, it is advisable, in 
 order to meet either the one case or the other, for the main 
 body destined to give the actual shock to be up in line with 
 the advanced skirmishers (who are not of themselves strong 
 enough to do the work) by this time, or better still, a little 
 sooner. 
 
 On the other hand, it is naturally the interest of the main 
 body not to come up with the advanced skirmishers, that is 
 to say, into the zone of serious loss, before their fire has 
 been doing its work for some time ; if possible indeed, not 
 until the probable moment of the crisis. 
 
 Until then, it should endeavor to keep as far as practica- 
 ble out of the effectual range of the enemy's fire, and by 
 reconciling as far as possible these contradictory require- 
 ments, nay, necessities, we obtain the distance which should 
 intervene between the main body and the advanced line 
 which is preparing the way for it. 
 
 Assuming, from the lessons of the late war, that a rapid, 
 independent fire from both sides, such as above supposed, 
 cannot well last above five minutes without bringing things 
 to a crisis, we may fix the distance of the main body from 
 the advanced troops, when this critical period commences, 
 at not exceeding 500 paces. 
 
The Preparatory Stage. 33 
 
 On perfectly open ground, the main body will not be able 
 to get nearer until the decisive moment when the com- 
 mencement of the rapid fire in front will force it to push 
 on. But even if it should follow the first line of skirmishers 
 at no more than about 300 paces distance, it will still be 
 necessary to interpose an intermediate body between the 
 two, keeping in mind that the said skirmishers are in single 
 rank with intervals of from one to one-and-a-half paces. 
 
 The advance of this line to within effective range will 
 naturally be attended with loss, and probably very serious 
 loss, the materials for repairing which immediately it is 
 necessary to have close at hand, if you wish the preparation 
 for the attack to be uninterrupted. 
 
 This support must be stronger, or may be weaker, accord- 
 ing to the degree of cover afforded by the ground as you 
 approach the enemy. It may be considered as a maxim 
 approved by practice, and generally received in theory, 
 that the support should be at least half as strong as the line 
 of skirmishers, and range between that strength and one 
 equal to theirs. 
 
 But in order to give the necessary impetus to the attack, 
 it will be undoubtedly advisable that our main body should 
 at least equal in strength the total of the two front lines, 
 both of which are actually only intended to prepare the 
 way. 
 
 This question of what is requisite for each separate stage 
 of the attack has led us back by a roundabout way to our 
 starting-point, namely, what should be the extent of front 
 for an attacking force of specified strength ? 
 
 This normal extent of front may be estimated from the fol- 
 lowing premises: that an attacking force will devote from 
 one-half to two-thirds of its total strength to the main body, 
 from one-half to one-third of that strength to the advance, 
 and that from one-half to two-thirds of the latter force will 
 be extended at intervals of from one to one-and-a-half 
 paces. In other words, and with due consideration for at- 
 
34 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 tendant circumstances: the normal front of attack of a battalion 
 on open ground should not exceed 300 paces* 
 
 It remains now to be mentioned, that in making this cal- 
 culation, we have as yet entirely left out of count the third 
 stage of the attack. We must return to it presently. 
 
 Further, it appears from what has come out on our way 
 to this result, that the normal front of attack of a specified 
 force increases in proportion to the amount of cover afforded 
 by the ground which it has to traverse. In other words, the 
 more cover there is, the closer can the main body keep to 
 the advance, whilst the losses of the latter will be at the 
 same time smaller; the more both these conditions are 
 realised, the more superfluous will be, or at least the less 
 strong need be, the intervening supports ; what we spare in 
 this way we can employ eventually for strengthening the 
 advance which should in principle be as strong as possible ; 
 but as every rifle in the advance should be in action, this 
 accession of strength will produce an extension of front. 
 
 This brings us, then, to the influence of the ground on the 
 attack, and at the same time, to another branch of the in- 
 quiry, bearing, as above remarked, upon the preparatory 
 stage ; we mean, the form in which the troops should be led on. 
 
 This consideration will also naturally lead us to determine 
 the extreme limit of the offensive front of an attacking 
 force. If, in discussing this subject, we assume the most 
 trying conditions to be in force, namely, that the ground is 
 open, the question of how to handle a line of skirmishers 
 (and of this only we have here to treat) will be also solved 
 for the more favorable conditions of more or less broken 
 ground. Let us fix the point to be attained, namely, that 
 from which rapid independent fire should be opened, at 300 
 paces from the enemy's main position. 
 
 Three different methods have been proposed in theory, 
 
 * 200 rifles for the advanced line of skirmishers, 200 for the support, 400 for the 
 main body; officers, supernumeraries, and casuals will make up the rest of the effec- 
 tive strength. 
 
The Preparatory Stage. 35 
 
 and tried in practice, of bringing up a line of skirmishers to 
 this point under heavy fire. 
 
 1. The advance of the whole line in one body with or with- 
 out firing; 
 
 2. The advance of the whole line by a succession of rushes, 
 between which the men lie down and fire by word of com- 
 mand ; 
 
 3. The advance of the line by fractions, those on the move 
 being covered by the fire of those halted. 
 
 All three methods demand, as an absolute necessity, the 
 greatest possible expedition ; thus, as far as applicable, the 
 use of running; also, the practice of lying down at every 
 forced or voluntary halt. Being universally recognised, 
 these points require here no further discussion. The rapid 
 advance without a halt and without firing, must, undoubt- 
 edly, be acknowledged to be the most effective course, as 
 long as it seems possible. But it can only be followed to a 
 certain extent, rather owing to reasons founded upon the 
 inner nature of man than, perhaps, upon the force of out- 
 ward circumstances ; and let us not be misled by some ex- 
 ceptions under peculiarly favorable conditions. After hav- 
 ing attained to that distance from the enemy where a line 
 of skirmishers begins to experience loss, particularly from 
 infantry fire, which cannot be put down simply to chance 
 shots, from that moment advance in the mode referred to 
 becomes difficult, slackens, finally comes to a standstill. 
 
 One mode of overcoming the first stage of this difficulty 
 will be to open fire yourself. It will in all probability, have 
 no effect worth mentioning upon your adversary, still it will 
 to a certain extent animate your own people, as it will con- 
 vey to them the impression that they are no longer, as it 
 were, opposed unarmed to the enemy. The danger of this 
 course consists in the probability of the fire, commenced at 
 first sparingly by individuals, becoming general, and there- 
 by slackening the advance, which is to be avoided, as 
 progress is apt to become slower and slower, till at last 
 
36 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 you come to a halt, the attitude best suited to the use of 
 firearms. 
 
 To act in a really practical manner we are here more than 
 ever called upon to study human nature. A theory which 
 is only based upon "that can, that should, that must not 
 be," runs the risk of much too bitter checks, when put in 
 practice, for us to prefer laying too little rather than too 
 much stress upon the moral side of the question (the effect 
 on the spirit of the soldier), in our peace-habits. This 
 reflection should induce us, in our peace exercises, to do 
 what is perhaps the best in principle, in all cases to make 
 allowance for human weakness as far as would actually be 
 necessary. 
 
 For this reason we should be inclined to make it a fixed 
 rule that the advance be made entirely without firing under 
 artillery fire, and till within the outer space of infantry fire. 
 In other words, the body of troops which is intended to 
 prepare the way should extend on reaching the zone of 
 artillery fire directed upon it (whether at once entirely or 
 only by degrees is immaterial, but at all events the part 
 destined to act as support should extend before it becomes 
 a target even for artillery fire); the skirmishers should then 
 advance as rapidly as possible without firing until they come 
 under the infantry fire directly against them. 
 
 The advanced body should get over the ground from its first 
 entry into action up to within 1000 or 800 paces, if possible witl 
 in 600 paces of the enemy, in one line. We have here purposely 
 made no mention of firing. It will be better to do without 
 it, if possible, but if not, no harm will be done, as long as il 
 is well regulated by command, and does not become t< 
 wild. 
 
 From this point onwards where the losses from th< 
 enemy's infantry cease to be accidental, and where we cai 
 make out our opponents clearly, or at any rate their posi- 
 tion, being at the same time plainly visible to them, it will 
 in most cases be advisable to adopt one or other form ol 
 
The Preparatory Stage. 37 
 
 gradual advance. Each of the two above indicated methods 
 offers undeniable advantages ; that of successive rushes in one 
 body gives greater promise of maintaining order ; whilst the 
 fractional plan gives greater security. If, on our own part, 
 we speak out decisively in favor of the latter method, we 
 do not found our opinion so much upon the more or less 
 cogent reasons which theorists have up to this time adduced 
 (for instance, the advance being covered by fire), as upon 
 the following considerations: 
 
 We have hitherto been supposing the case of an attack, 
 conducted by a comparatively small body, but if we now 
 imagine instead a similar operation, but executed by a force 
 of several battalions side by side, and all having the same 
 objective, it is evident that the long line of skirmishers 
 necessary to prepare the way for such an attack cannot 
 possibly be directed by one leader either by voice or bugle 
 amidst the tumult and the din of battle. But in addition to 
 this evident difficulty, there are other causes which, in the 
 case of long lines, lead to a fractional advance. The resist- 
 ance will not always be equally vigorous along the whole 
 front ; the fire brought to bear by the defender against the 
 assailant during the different stages of his advance will be 
 weakened perhaps, sometimes at one place, sometimes at 
 another, often only for a few moments ; a lucky shell, or the 
 fortunate exposure of a part of the enemy's line of defence, 
 if quickly taken advantage of, may favor the onset at par- 
 ticular points ; whilst at the same moment the difficulties of 
 the attack are doubled on other parts of the front ; even a 
 plain, to all appearance as open as possible, will offer here 
 and there little accidents of ground favorable to the assail- 
 ant, which he will take advantage of, if intelligent; and so 
 forth. Thus, in the case of a long line, a fractional advance 
 becomes the most natural course, and is adopted at once 
 instinctively, and because the impulse to action felt at one 
 point cannot be very quickly communicated along the whole 
 line. But what must inevitably and without doubt occur in 
 the case supposed will very often be found the best course, 
 
38 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 and even necessary, with shorter lines. Even with a front 
 of a few hundred paces, when a whole line is advancing in 
 one body, alternately rushing on and lying down by word 
 of command, it will sometimes happen that, even in the 
 most apparently open ground, some group or other of skir- 
 mishers will find its fire most unexpectedly masked by an 
 undulation which had not been before remarked. The course 
 then which must imperatively be followed whenever the 
 front is very extensive had better be adopted as the general 
 rule under all circumstances. 
 
 There are, however, two arguments which may be adduced 
 in favor of the system of successive rushes in one body as 
 against that of the fractional advance. In the first place, it 
 is urged that the moral impulse to go forward will be more 
 easily maintained if all jump up and run on together; that 
 the difficulty, which is well recognised, of inducing skir- 
 mishers to leave cover, however slight, will be more easily 
 overcome if the officers of the whole line set the example, 
 enforcing at the same time with voice and signal (whistle). 
 Again, a fractional advance, particularly if the fractions are 
 small, will very likely lead to sections getting in front of 
 one another, the fire of those behind, on which, however, 
 one has to count, thus being masked by those in front, and 
 the whole line being thus easily thrown into disorder. 
 
 These arguments are not without force, but they do not 
 appear sufficiently conclusive to warrant the adoption of the 
 system which they support as one of universal application 
 (one fixed by regulation), because in practice the exceptions 
 will be numerous. It would appear to be more advisable to 
 strive to remedy the disadvantages of the fractional system 
 by advancing only in entire divisions (zuge*) (thus gain- 
 ing the moral influence of the officers) and not more than 
 from fifty to eighty paces at a time beyond the adjacent 
 fraction which is halted ; moreover, by practising this ma- 
 noeuvre so constantly at drill as to make it into a second 
 nature. 
 
 * Three of which form a company when drawn up, as for action, two deep. (Tr.) 
 
The Preparatory Stage. 39 
 
 However much one may be tempted for the sake of 
 order to make strict regulations as to the succession, for 
 instance, in which the separate divisions are to move for- 
 ward, it will be well to guard against this temptation, as it 
 will lead to artificial refinements impossible of execution 
 under fire. It will be found advisable in peace to allow the 
 leader of the line of skirmishers and his subordinates that 
 liberty of action which would in war result from their ap- 
 preciation of their own fire and of that of the enemy. The 
 utmost we should do in this way is to fix a limit of time, at 
 drill, for each section to remain halted (it might be whilst 
 two or three rounds are fired). On service this matter would 
 settle itself. 
 
 This brings us to another question affecting the mode in 
 which a preparatory force should be handled namely, that 
 of command. 
 
 It is a military principle, which we are hardly required to 
 defend in this place, that a movement directed on one object 
 should be under one head. 
 
 In order to act up to the spirit of this principle, it is nec- 
 essary that wherever a body of troops is employed to gain 
 some one object, which body is not a separate unit, but is 
 composed of different sections independent of one another, 
 it is necessary, we say, to assign to each section-commander 
 a share of the work to be done as his special object. 
 
 In spite of all theorising upon the idea of the tactical unit, 
 the most fanatical admirer of the company-column must 
 confess that the company is too small a body to carry out 
 an attack through all its three stages, always supposing the 
 operation to be on a large scale. 
 
 Tivelve company-columns will not be able to carry out, 
 each independently for itself, the preparation and execution 
 of an attack, not to mention its third stage ; whilst three bat- 
 talions are quite competent to do it.* 
 
 * It may be as well to remind the reader that a German battalion equals four com- 
 panies. (Tr.) 
 
40 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 What is generally true of the companies is also applica- 
 ble, only in a modified form, to separate battalions. 
 
 Three battalions, each acting independently, will be able 
 to get well through the first two stages of an attack, but it 
 will be hardly equal to the third stage. 
 
 We shall return to this subject in dealing with the further 
 stages of the battle ; we only touched upon it in this place 
 in order to arrive at the conclusion (a certain one, we 
 think), that when it appears necessary, as above pointed 
 out, to subdivide the object of attack into separate objec- 
 tives, it will be well not to assign one of these to a smaller 
 body than a battalion. 
 
 But, as we have already pointed out, the front of attack 
 suited to a battalion may be estimated at about 300 paces, 
 from which it appears evident that it would hardly do to 
 assign to several battalions formed side by side the same 
 special object of attack, such as a house, the entrance to a 
 village, the corner of a wood, or such like. 
 
 We shall return to this subject likewise when we treat of 
 the execution of the attack ; for the present it will suffice that 
 it should be generally allowed that in practice each battalion 
 on the front of attack should and will have its own special 
 point to carry. 
 
 This being allowed, we must next inquire whether it is 
 better for the battalion to have the two lines recognized as 
 necessary for the preparatory stage, namely, skirmishers and 
 supports, under one command as respects front or depth. 
 
 To be in accordance with the principle of one head for 
 one task, we will at once dismiss the case, as not seriously 
 debateable, of the possibility of all the companies of a bat- 
 talion sharing about equally in the formation of the advance 
 and of the main body: we have only, then, to consider 
 whether two companies ranged side by side should from the 
 first form both skirmishers and supports, or whether these 
 companies should be drawn up, one behind the other, one 
 acting as skirmishers, the other as support. 
 
The Preparatory Stage. 41 
 
 To solve this question, it will be necessary to- examine a 
 little more closely the task which each line has to perform, 
 and how their action is combined. The first, or skirmishing 
 line has, in the supposed case of a battalion with an assigned 
 object of attack, most undoubtedly a task complete in itself, 
 and with one object in view. This task consists in endeav- 
 oring to overwhelm with its fire from a front, not originally 
 exceeding 300 paces, some always smaller portion of the 
 enemy's position which has been pointed out, and thus to 
 shake the defenders before the onslaught of the main body. 
 
 The point which the latter is to force should be first quite 
 clearly made out, the most f^/orable spot being chosen, 
 after you have approached pretty close to the enemy's 
 position. Upon this point the fire will then be concentrated 
 as much as possible, which, with a front of only 300 paces, 
 may, with our present arms, proceed from the whole line, 
 even if the selected point chance to be opposite one flank. 
 
 It is evident that all this may be attained most success- 
 fully by unity of command, and that, on the other hand, 
 considerations of space by no means render this unity im- 
 possible. The advantages of this unity of command have, 
 indeed, misled French tacticians into wishing to break up a 
 whole battalion into skirmishers, when the attacking force 
 consists of several battalions. This is carrying it too far, 
 and the arrangement must break down, because no one sep- 
 arate objective can be assigned to such a line. Let us now 
 compare the case of a skirmishing line composed of one 
 company with that of one made up of two halves of differ- 
 ent companies (of course we suppose the number of skir- 
 mishers in both cases to be equal). In the latter case, we 
 see the line led by two independent commanders of equal 
 powers, in close proximity to one another. This must, of 
 necessity, produce greater difficulties in the way of com- 
 mand than when, as in the former case, the skirmishers are 
 all under one leader. When it comes to advancing by suc- 
 cessive fractions, the full value will not be got out of the 
 two half companies as it will out of the one company accus- 
 
42 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 tomed to the signs and signals of its officers. Moreover, 
 the opinions of the two commanders as to the moment at 
 which it is advisable to extend the full number of skir- 
 mishers, or as to when it is necessary to ask for further rein- 
 forcements from the supports, will agree no better than will 
 their views as to the time when the line should, according 
 to the existing state of affairs, commence the rapid inde- 
 pendent fire, which must be continued to the very moment 
 of the final rush. 
 
 As we must understand the effective range for this fire to 
 extend from 200 to nearly 400 paces, it is evident that the 
 line of skirmishers runs the risk of partial checks from the 
 different appreciation of the proper distance from which to 
 commence rapid firing, which may be formed by the two 
 officers, each of whom will only direct his attention to the 
 other, so far as to avoid being left behind by him. Now 
 these partial checks are the worst things that can happen 
 in the preparatory stage. 
 
 Besides, it by no means follows that the two leaders will 
 agree as to the best point for forcing the enemy's line ; 
 hence, there will not be the concentration of fire which is so 
 requisite for the success of the whole enteprise, for we 
 should prefer the less well-chosen point of attack which has 
 been well fired upon to one better selected but less well 
 fired upon. 
 
 Again; whilst a skirmishing line composed of one entire 
 company gravitates naturally to its center, because the one 
 chief will, and must, have influence enough over his lieu- 
 tenants to control their perhaps conflicting aims, it is not a 
 mere matter of fancy to affirm that two separate companies 
 moving side by side will have a decidedly centrifugal ten- 
 dency, and (for we must always make allowance for human 
 nature) will be sure to act accordingly in reality, in spite of 
 all theory. 
 
 It will not be a sufficient answer to reply that the battalion 
 commander will be on the spot to remedy all these draw- 
 

 The Preparatory Stage. 43 
 
 backs arising from the subdivision of units. It is the busi- 
 ness of this officer to conduct the entire attack ; the most 
 important part of his duty is to point out the proper direc- 
 tion for the main body to follow, as on this the success of 
 his battalion will depend. If he undertakes in person the 
 guidance of his advanced companies, those of his main body 
 will be very likely to take a wrong direction, even to get 
 quite out of hand (and this is no idle supposition, but an 
 event of which there have been numerous examples in war). 
 He must, therefore, confine himself to assigning a general 
 direction to the advanced line, whilst he certainly will do 
 well to leave the execution of details to one subordinate 
 rather than to two. Then, again, the other available remedy, 
 namely, that of giving the senior of the two captains in the 
 front line the command of both companies seems insufficient, 
 on account of the uncertain nature of such an ill-defined 
 office an office inconsistent with the custom of the service, 
 which, indeed, admits of an officer taking over the com- 
 mand of those of like rank in rear, whilst the chief recon- 
 noitres in front, but is very much opposed to the same 
 being done under the actual pressure of danger and emer- 
 gency. 
 
 Lastly, in order still further to strengthen our argument, 
 we must allude to the possibility which always exists of the 
 attack not encountering as stubborn a resistance as is ex- 
 pected, in which case the skirmishers do not require any 
 strong support. In this case, also, it is doubtless more ad- 
 vantageous to have at first only broken up one company, 
 instead of two side by side, into skirmishers. 
 
 There could be, neither in theory nor in practice, any fair 
 argument to oppose to the formation of the skirmishing line 
 under one sole leader, were it not for the second phase of 
 the question, that of reinforcements. 
 
 Now, considering the line of supports merely as such, that 
 is with reference to their special task, it appears to us just 
 as important for them as for the skirmishers to be under 
 one chief. If with regard to the latter, the thing has a more 
 
44 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 positive significancy ; with regard to the former, the same 
 is more of a negative kind. In practice, we so constantly 
 meet with two conditions easily arising, which both combine 
 to produce the same undesirable consequence, that it would 
 appear, to say the least, expedient to discover something to 
 counteract them. We mean that the skirmishers in front 
 always wish to have the supports as near as possible, or even 
 up with them, and are disposed to assert that they might 
 have done wonders "if only the supports had been closer;" 
 on the other hand, the supports in rear are always anxious 
 to give up their thankless post of "bullet-catchers," and of 
 their own accord to join the skirmishers, whilst the mutual 
 tendency of the two lines to unite is, no doubt, the stronger, 
 the nearer the relation between them. 
 
 This tendency, which with a view to an attack executed 
 with calculated energy, and not with mere Man, should be in 
 every way opposed, because it will all too readily lead either 
 to, what we have already alluded to, the overcrowding of 
 the skirmishers, or to an immoderate extent of front, this 
 tendency will be at least weakened if the connection between 
 skirmishers and supports is made less intimate. In other 
 words, if in place of the captain who has rushed away to 
 his front division into the thick of the battle, we have 
 another captain to influence the support which is independ- 
 ent, and to be used only when he is convinced of the neces- 
 sity, the evils which we have pointed out will be more easily 
 avoided than with the other method. The independent 
 leader of the supporting line being of course kept informed 
 of the progress of the fight in his front, whilst, on the other 
 hand, from his position in rear, better able to overlook the 
 situation of the skirmishers than one who is in the midst of 
 them, can judge more calmly and justly of the time and 
 place at which he should give reinforcement, and of the 
 number of men to be employed, and as they are his own 
 people, he will take care that his subalterns do not expose 
 them prematurely to loss. 
 
 The one leader of the skirmishers takes the initiative ; the 
 

 The Preparatory Stage. 45 
 
 leader of the second line has only to follow in the same 
 direction ; far from him be the temptation to take a line of 
 his own. He must consider himself the second drop upon the 
 same spot in the stone which the third drop will penetrate . 
 
 Perhaps it may be said, "So far so good; but now comes 
 the moment when this support must actually be given, when 
 gaps have been torn in the skirmishing line either by the 
 enemy's fire or by an undue extension involuntarily pro- 
 duced by accidents of ground. These gaps must be filled 
 up. What, then, must infallibly happen ? Why, that one 
 company will be doubled up with the other. Then what a 
 medley; what disorder! And this will upset all your theo- 
 ries." 
 
 Before replying to this new objection we must go back 
 and cast a glance upon the influence which some of our 
 later considerations have upon the subject of the maximum 
 front of attack permissible to a body of troops a subject to 
 which, it will be remembered, we promised to return. 
 
 We shall once more take the case of a battalion without 
 supposing it to be fighting by itself. When an attacking 
 line is composed of several battalions, those on the flanks 
 have from the first no neighbors to keep them within limits; 
 but in the case of the center battalions also it may happen 
 that the restriction to their lateral extension may either 
 not exist from the first, or may cease in the course of the 
 action. 
 
 Up to what point may, ought, or must a battalion thus 
 placed make use of its freedom to extend ? 
 
 We leave out, as not here to be discussed, all mention of 
 the tendency to turning and surrounding movements ; as 
 presupposed, we have only here to do with a force whose 
 objective is in front 
 
 With regard to this we have already above stated, per- 
 haps thus forestalling subsequent speculations, that a force 
 of this nature should at least devote half its strength to the 
 
46 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 main body. We have also admitted the justice of the prin- 
 ciple that the advanced line should be as strong and dense 
 as possible, at the same time laying great stress upon the 
 importance of being able to concentrate its fire upon the 
 point where the enemy's line is to be broken. Lastly, we 
 have noticed how necessary it is for each commander to 
 have sole direction of the attack which he has to make. 
 
 From these three factors we may deduce the maximum 
 front which a leader may allow his attacking line to take 
 up, consistently with vigorous action. He may at the out- 
 side extend half of his force as an advanced (preparatory) 
 line. This half may, in order to render the preparatory fire 
 effective, and supposing it to meet with only moderate 
 losses, increase its original front by perhaps two-thirds the 
 space it occupies when extended, i.e., for a battalion, from 
 300 to 500 paces. 
 
 The indispensable condition remains that the line should 
 be able to concentrate its fire, which will always be practi- 
 cable, that the ground should permit the main body to ap- 
 proach so near to the skirmishers as to be able to reinforce 
 them at once, which, may be doubtful; and lastly, most im- 
 portant of all, that the commander should be able to make 
 his influence felt unmistakably from one extremity of the 
 line to the other, which will always be difficult, particularly 
 as he must dismount. But as soon as any one of the above 
 conditions is riot complied with, the operation ceases to be 
 calculated and directed on a fixed object ; it becomes a 
 mere chance affair. Thus we fix the limits for the extent of 
 front. 
 
 Now let us return to the question of mixing up one tactical 
 unit with another (Eindoublirung). 
 
 The expression is objectionable, and it stands for a prac- 
 tice which is still more so, yet a practice which is now-a- 
 days unavoidable. 
 
 If you had said to a tactician of the time of Frederick the 
 Great: "It must come to this; every single foot soldier will 
 
The Preparatory Stage. 47 
 
 shoot whenever he chooses and has the chance ; and the 
 battalion, company, or platoon volley will be a thing of the 
 past" he would only shrug his shoulders with contempt 
 for such "an awful state of disorder." 
 
 Nevertheless, the time has come when the army, without 
 disowning its old traditions, has got on very well in this 
 very state of disorder. 
 
 May not the same thing occur in the matter of mixing up 
 tactical units ? It is an undoubted fact that the practice of 
 doubling in files out of their proper order (a greater innova- 
 tion when made than any we have now to attempt) has 
 ilready been adopted as a matter of regulation in the army, 
 
 ias been employed by generals with war-experience, and 
 carried out by our recruits twenty, thirty, forty years ago. 
 
 Cannot our present recruits also do as much ? To this it 
 will be answered that the practice was abolished because 
 impracticable ; and no one will deny that this was at the 
 time a wise measure, because in their then existing state 
 of development elementary tactics did not require the 
 formation. 
 
 But now the state of things is very different. The prac- 
 tice of mixing up men out of their proper order is no longer 
 to be avoided. 
 
 It is no longer possible for skirmishers within effective 
 range of the enemy, and in face of the breechloader, to take 
 ground to a flank, or to diminish their intervals, without 
 suffering fearful loss, hence nothing is left for a reinforce- 
 ment coming up from the rear but to double itself up with 
 the skirmishers. 
 
 We shall return to this theme once more when we describe 
 the actual execution of the attack in which the bodies re- 
 ferred to will attain greater dimensions than in the case 
 with which we are now dealing. But if it be once estab- 
 lished that we cannot avoid the practice either on a large or 
 on a small scale it would appear well to accept it frankly. 
 
 on 3 
 
48 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 As the proverb has it, a danger once recognised ceases to 
 be a danger. Well, then, on the same principle, regulated 
 disorder ceases to be disorder. In the question now before 
 us we do not then escape this conclusion we must break 
 up tactical formations either by mixing up the divisions of 
 the same company together or by mixing one company up 
 with another. We maintain that the latter measure is only 
 in appearance worse than the former. If once the original 
 distribution of troops in line of battle is disturbed, it does 
 not much matter, during the heat of action (and we are only 
 treating of that period) by whom the disturbance is occa- 
 sioned. When such mixing up of men occurs in action, in 
 those moments of danger and of excitement strained to the 
 highest pitch, personal influence on its own merits will 
 affect the soldier more than the influence of his immediate 
 superior merely as such. He will follow the lead of the 
 brave man, the hero, whether belonging to his own company 
 or not. 
 
 It is in such moments that a superior officer, often entirely 
 unknown to the men about him, will carry them away with 
 him, and that lieutenants have gained their spurs with th( 
 aid of men whom they never came across before or since. 
 In such moments, we assert, it does not matter whether the 
 original order is disturbed by men of the same or of another 
 body. But when the fight is o'er, when it is advisable to 
 restore the original order of things after the momentary dis- 
 order, this will be more quickly accomplished if only two 
 units are in question instead of the fractions of one unit, for 
 every soldier knows his own company ; thus officers and 
 non-commissioned officers quickly find out the men of their 
 company in the crowd. But many a man may forget t< 
 which division (zug) he happens to be attached on the par- 
 ticular day, and the officer who knows the whole company 
 by sight cannot be expected to remember whether Johi 
 Smith forms part of his division on this occasion. 
 
 We do not deny that many and weighty arguments may 
 be brought against the aforesaid. Nevertheless, after weigh- 
 
The Preparatory Stage. 49 
 
 ing one argument against the other, we are still inclined to 
 propose the following principles for the preparation of the 
 attack : 
 
 1. In order to prepare the way effectively it is necessary 
 to bring up your skirmishing line to between 200 and 400 
 paces of the enemy's position, and to overwhelm with a con- 
 centrated and uninterrupted fire the particular part of it on 
 which you intend to direct your assault. * 
 
 2. In order to do this, the attacking force should be di- 
 vided into an advance and a main body. 
 
 3. These two bodies should be in such proportion to one 
 another that from one-fourth to one-half of the total strength 
 should be allotted to the advance. 
 
 4. The advance is again divided into skirmishers and sup- 
 ports ; the former bringing as many rifles into play as the 
 nature of the ground will allow, the latter being intended to 
 
 Rmake good the losses of the former, must, on open ground, 
 be of equal strength to them, but under favorable circum- 
 stances need only be half as strong. 
 
 5. The better the cover afforded by the ground the greater 
 may be the extension of the skirmishers during their ad- 
 vance. The limits to be assigned to this extension depend 
 on the necessity which exists of ensuring unity of command 
 throughout the attack, and of being able to concentrate the 
 skirmishers' fire upon one point. The front for a battalion 
 of 1000 men will range between 300 and 500 paces. 
 
 6. For the sake of unity of command it will be advisable 
 for every battalion taking part in the attack to form its line 
 of skirmishers with one company, and its supports with 
 another. 
 
 7. The skirmishers should advance from the extreme 
 range of the artillery fire bearing upon them as far as the 
 extreme effective range of the enemy's infantry in one body. 
 The company which furnishes them should always be ex- 
 tended in one line before it becomes a target for the enemy's 
 
 
50 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 fire, even if at first it had formed some supports. This ad- 
 vance from 1 200 to 800, if possible, to 600 paces of the 
 enemy, takes place as long as may be without opening fire, 
 individual firing by word of command being only allowed 
 when you can no longer dispense with its animating effect, 
 or when special reasons for it arise (such as the necessity 
 of driving in advanced parties of the enemy, &c.). 
 
 As soon as the line of skirmishers reaches the zone of loss 
 from aimed infantry fire it changes its mode of progression to 
 that of the alternate rushing forward and lying down of sepa- 
 rate fractions. 
 
 As far as it is possible (the nature of the ground and the 
 advantage taken of particularly favorable moments forming 
 exceptions), these rushes are made by whole divisions, and 
 not over more than from fifty to eighty paces at a time ; 
 whether in succession from a flank or chequerwise is imma- 
 terial. Each time, the divisions which are halted and lying 
 down cover by a steady, well-directed fire the advance of 
 the others. Only when the skirmishers have advanced to 
 within the most effective range of the enemy say from 400 
 to 200 paces will an unmistakable command or signal be 
 given, upon which a rapid independent fire, as much concen- 
 trated as possible upon a point previously indicated, will be 
 opened and will be maintained until the moment of the 
 actual assault. 
 
 8. The distance of the supports from the skirmishers and 
 their mode of advance, will be regulated as provided for the 
 portion of the attacking force, which remains in close order 
 (see, further on, the execution of the attack}. 
 
 9. The skirmishers will be reinforced by the supports, as 
 far as practicable, by doubling in separate sections (such as 
 "divisions" or "groups") between separate sections of the 
 front line ; but the details of execution will always be subor- 
 dinate to producing the best possible effect upon the enemy. 
 
The Stage of Execution. 5 1 
 
 II. THE STAGE OF EXECUTION. 
 
 I Whilst it was the task of the preparation to pave the way 
 for the attack, the work of breaking the enemy's power of 
 resistance by employing the greatest possible amount of 
 k striking power, devolves upon the execution. 
 In spite of all the preliminary work the assailant cannot 
 dispense with this extreme measure, because, as we shall 
 see, the defenders have considerable means at their disposal 
 to support their power of resistance, both directly and indi- 
 rectly, to such an extent that the preparatory force will only 
 succeed in exceptional cases in rendering them incapable of 
 further efforts. 
 
 Although we must needs return to this question, and treat 
 it more at length, when we deal with the Defensive, we still 
 cannot avoid reference to the indirect means at the disposal 
 of the defender. 
 
 These means are ; fire intended to shatter and break up 
 the striking power of the assailant before he is able to come 
 to close quarters. 
 
 In the effect of this fire, delivered as it is by the defender 
 from the halt on the assailant who is on the move, lies the 
 great risk for the latter of seeing his numerical and moral 
 superiority (whether original or acquired) demolished and 
 annihilated. We must study the nature of this fire if we 
 wish to discover an antidote against it for the attack, and 
 the inquiry will lead us at first beyond the domain of in- 
 fantry tactics into that of artillery. 
 
 Without wishing here to enlarge upon the employment of 
 the latter arm in attack and defence, we must, however, go 
 so far as to point out that the attacking force is not seri- 
 ously endangered by the artillery of the defender at the ex- 
 treme ranges of which the latter is capable, but only when 
 it gets so near that the gunner, who ought not to waste his 
 ammunition on chance shots, can see the object he is aim- 
 
52 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 ing at clearly, and can mark the effects of his fire. If the 
 defender's artillery act otherwise, all the better for the 
 assailant. 
 
 We need, therefore, only trouble ourselves with the de- 
 fender's artillery from the point at which (taking into con- 
 sideration the power of its present materiel), it is able to 
 have a fair prospect of hitting a mark of such size as an 
 attacking force is likely to present in the first moment of 
 deployment, supposing it to be handled according to our 
 present ideas of war. 
 
 Not to waste our time in sophisms by taking into con- 
 sideration conditions of ground and attacking masses, such 
 as would not actually be met with once In a hundred times, 
 we may content ourselves with making the following de- 
 ductions from what has gone before : that an attacking 
 force composed of several battalions and batteries (more 
 than three or four), in line of columns (Rendezvous Forma- 
 tion), will, without supposing conditions of ground unusu- 
 ally favorable to the defender's artillery, come within the 
 zone of aimed fire at about 3000 paces from the enemy. 
 
 Conditions of ground favorable to the attack, and other 
 circumstances, such as dull weather, the smoke occasioned 
 by a fight which is already raging, &c., may shorten this 
 distance very much, just as, on the other hand, circum- 
 stances may arise to lengthen it. But as we are here deal- 
 ing with average chances for both sides, we hold that, at a 
 distance of 3000 paces from the enemy an attacking force 
 should form line of battle, and should in most cases, reason- 
 ing from what has already been adduced, go straight to the 
 point. 
 
 The advanced troops begin the action supported to the 
 utmost by artillery, if possible superior to that of the de- 
 fenders. Though we have here only to do with infantry 
 tactics, we must needs take notice of a moment when sup- 
 port from the sister-arm is so necessary and important- 
 even, it may be said, decisive. 
 

 The Stage of Execution. 53 
 
 From this moment up to that of actual collision the as- 
 sailant is exposed to two kinds of fire-effect that is to say, 
 to that of aimed and chance shots, a distinction which has 
 perhaps hitherto not been as much noticed by enquirers 
 theoretical and practical as is required for the solution of 
 the question of formation. The artillery of the defence, and 
 soon also its infantry, become the objects of the assailant's 
 fire. Thus the chief attention and chief efforts of the de- 
 fenders are in great measure distracted from that portion of 
 the assailant's force upon which the actual execution of the 
 attack will devolve. The more the advanced troops of the 
 assailant succeed in doing this the better for his prospects ; 
 and, on the other hand, the defender will do well to resist 
 the temptation. Nevertheless, his fire will be of some use, 
 if directed, not on the front line of skirmishers, but on the 
 supporting line and batteries. Its effect upon the main 
 body will be at all events secondary and accidental. Thus 
 we see that if the fire of the defenders does not prevent the 
 strong advanced line of the assailants from approaching 
 their position, it runs the risk of being silenced by the latter, 
 and that if this fire is, on the other hand, concentrated on 
 the advanced line, the progress of the main body will be 
 thereby indirectly facilitated. 
 
 The possibility of success for the Offensive is founded 
 upon these contradictions so difficult for the Defensive to 
 reconcile, and in order to take full advantage thereof the 
 advanced line of the assailant should be a strong one, for 
 the main body will thus be exposed to smaller risks. In 
 speaking of the preparatory stage, we have already given our 
 reasons for requiring that the advanced line should repre- 
 sent from one-third to one-half the total force. It should 
 have in addition the whole disposable artillery. 
 
 Thus we come to the following result: that the advanced 
 troops of the assailant will, and can alone, taken as a whole, 
 be the objects of the defender's fire ; and that, up to the 
 moment when it dissolves itself into one mass with the ad- 
 vanced line, a moment which must come sooner or later, as 
 
 
54 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 we shall see further on, the main body will only suffer loss 
 more or less accidental from the enemy's fire ; a rule which 
 will only be altered either by unskilful massing of the main 
 body, or by want of energy on the part of the advanced 
 troops and of the accompanying artillery. The nearer a 
 second line follows a first one on which the enemy's fire is 
 directed, the greater share of its losses must the former 
 suffer. It is therefore advisable to keep as much distance 
 between the lines as may be possible consistently with the 
 time required to bring those in rear into action at the right 
 moment. Now, in treating of the preparatory stage, we have 
 already found that from the moment when the advanced 
 line begins its rapid independent firing, the main body should 
 not be more than 500 paces in rear, if it wishes to arrive in 
 time. And the distance between the lines cannot be allowed 
 to be much greater even during the period of advance which 
 precedes the rapid independent firing. The arguments in 
 favor of maintaining unity of command of troops making an 
 attack on one object, in respect of depth, that is of the ad- 
 vanced and main body being under the same leader, have 
 been partly given already ; and as we have established that 
 it is a condition indispensable to this unity of command that 
 the front should not exceed 500 paces, we must now like- 
 wise assign the same limits to the depth, limits to be, as a 
 general rule, not materially exceeded without exposing the 
 commander to the risk of losing control over one or other 
 half of his force. 
 
 It must therefore be a fixed rule that the main body of 
 a battalion should in the first moments of the attack not 
 keep more than 600 paces in rear of its first line of skir- 
 mishers. 
 
 As, on principle, there can be no check in the attack from 
 the moment of its first commencement up to that of actual 
 collision, without seriously compromising its chances of 
 success ; as however the advance in rushes and by fractions 
 to which the front line is forced when under the enemy's 
 effective musketry fire must needs delay its progress, whilst 
 
The Stage of Execution. 5 5 
 
 the main body, on the contrary, keeps moving steadily on, 
 the latter will by the time the rapid independent firing begins 
 have reduced its distance from the former to a maximum of 
 from 400 to 300 paces. 
 
 If it now keeps moving on, as it must do, the time allowed 
 for the rapid independent firing from the halt will not exceed 
 from two to three minutes, but as there is still a space to 
 traverse beyond the skirmishers of from 200 to 400 paces 
 which cannot be crossed without the aid of the most intense 
 fire, the preparatory force will have time enough for its task. 
 
 It remains to inquire, given the above-named distances 
 between lines, how soon will the main body begin to suffer 
 from the fire directed on the advanced troops ? 
 
 The answer will be different according to the nature of 
 the fire intended that of infantry, or that of artillery. Who- 
 ever has taken part in an attack will testify that real danger 
 for the second line begins with the rifle bullets, to which in- 
 deed mitrailleuse shot and an exceptional stray shrapnel 
 may be added. 
 
 The modern infantry musket propels its bullets to the 
 distance of from 1200 to 1800 paces. The individual infantry 
 soldier on opening fire is not able to judge his distance ac- 
 curately ; his misses are, and must therefore be, very numer- 
 ous indeed ; and they will be all the more numerous the 
 greater the distance at which he commences firing; but all 
 these ill-aimed shots render the ground lying behind the 
 objects aimed at extremely dangerous to traverse, but dan- 
 gerous to an extent utterly incalculable. Modern artillery, 
 on the other hand, possesses much more effective means of 
 controlling its aim, also of correcting it and of estimating 
 the distance. But the peculiarity of its projectiles renders 
 its misses only dangerous to the extent of the error in 
 estimating distance, which experience shows us to be (and 
 this is advantageous to the assailant) more often too low 
 than too high. 
 
 That is to say, a body of troops following in second line 
 
56 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 will not suffer from artillery fire directed on the first line 
 unless it come within about 300 paces of it ; but if the first 
 line is the object of infantry fire, the second line will prob- 
 ably share its losses from the moment it gets within extreme 
 rifle range. 
 
 It follows from these various considerations that in calcu- 
 lating how far the formation of an attacking force can con- 
 tribute to guard its striking power, physical and moral, from 
 being impaired, we have to divide the action of the main 
 body into three stages: first, from the commencement of 
 the movement to attack up to within from 1200 to 1800 paces 
 of the enemy's position ; secondly, from thence until close 
 up to the advanced line, i.e., to within 500 paces of the de- 
 fenders; lastly, during the remainder of the distance. In 
 the first stage we must aim at not affording so good a mark 
 to the enemy's artillery as to give him a prospect of reaping 
 great and undoubted advantage from aiming at it, thereby 
 diverting his attention from our advanced troops, and 
 especially from the artillery accompanying them. This 
 same artillery, and the advanced troops moving on with its 
 support, are at this moment much too threatening a danger 
 to the defence for them to be ignored without very cogent 
 reasons. If then the advanced line is strong enough, and if 
 the main body follows it at not less than from 500 to 600 
 paces, it would appear certainly advisable to form the latter 
 in columns of moderate size, with a front not exceeding 
 from 50 to 80 paces, and a depth of from 25 to 30 paces 
 (from 6 to 12 files), with intervals, if thought expedient, of 
 about 100 paces. The marks thus afforded would hardly be 
 attractive to the enemy's guns. 
 
 We come now to the second zone that of unaimed rifle 
 fire. In attaining this the main body will pass beyond its 
 own guns, which have in all probability advanced so far to 
 prepare the way. To the chance hits of the defender's 
 infantry are now added those of his artillery, whether the 
 shots are aimed at the assailant's guns and fall short, or at 
 his advanced line with too much elevation. If their atten- 
 
The Stage of Execution. 57 
 
 ;ion is not fully occupied by the advanced line, the enemy's 
 runners will from this moment onwards take as their mark 
 :he main body which is gradually approaching. At this 
 
 >riod, the fire, both aimed and unaimed, will be so intense 
 ipon the whole space, but at the same time (unless led to 
 roncentrate itself by the assailant's adoption of particularly 
 inskilful formations in mass) so equally spread and in a 
 
 tanner so impossible to calculate, that in whatever forma- 
 :ion the assailant advances along the whole front, as long as 
 ic avoids too dense bodies, his losses will remain much the 
 
 ime. 
 
 We decidedly assert that it is neither necessary nor will 
 t be of any use to try and invent tactical formations calcu- 
 ated to diminish loss at this stage of the proceedings ; 
 ther is it possible and expedient to search for formations 
 tending to weaken the moral effect which the inevitable 
 losses are sure to produce, and thus indirectly to contribute 
 to the striking power of the attack that assistance which 
 these formations cannot give directly. 
 
 Great losses bring the attacking force to a standstill, be- 
 cause even those who remain unwounded are disheartened 
 by the sights which meet their eyes, and are likely to lose 
 all hope of success. 
 
 When troops engaged in making an attack are brought to 
 a standstill, in a very short time they begin to retire, that is 
 to say, the attack fails. 
 
 But to overcome this fit of faint-heartedness is really the 
 task which one formation more than another may favor. 
 
 Allowing that officers, non-commissioned officers, and 
 individual soldiers, endowed with remarkable physical or 
 moral courage, are those who will influence the masses and 
 carry them away with them in such moments of weakness, 
 one might be inclined to say that the more densely the mass 
 is packed together, the more will the consciousness of 
 strength be developed in it, the more plentiful will be those 
 strong elements within it, and the more easily can the con- 
 
 
58 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 duct of those setting a good example be witnessed by all, 
 thus imparting the desired impulse to the mass. 
 
 One cannot deny that there is much truth in these argu- 
 ments, and thus in other days the column formation was 
 adopted specifically as that of attack. On the other hand, 
 however, it is objected that serious losses suffered at the 
 same time and place have a more depressing effect upon 
 the imagination than the same amount of loss would have if 
 spread over more time and space ; so that it may be said 
 that the less densely a given number of men are massed, 
 the less will they require the example to carry them on. 
 Let us make a comparison. Take a column of 400 men a 
 front of twenty file, a depth of twenty ranks, with intervals 
 of about a pace between them. A shell falls well into the 
 mass, and knocks over perhaps eight or ten men. Well, the 
 moral effect of this upon the whole body will be much more 
 serious than if these same 400 men had been drawn up two 
 deep, with intervals of two paces between the files. Three 
 or four shells may fall amongst them at the same time, but 
 in different places ; one man may be knocked over here, two 
 there, three in another place : perhaps on the whole as many 
 as in the column ; nay, even more. Still the effect upon the 
 survivors will be much slighter. 
 
 The example will be all the more forcible in the case of 
 shrapnel, on account of the small lateral dispersion of the 
 bullets ; yet no one will deny that in both formations the 
 losses will be, as above represented, about equal, howevei 
 highly the practical result may be estimated. 
 
 So the question of formation reduces itself to this whei 
 to draw the line between dense masses and open lines. 
 
 But, besides the actual and moral effect of the enemy's 
 fire, we have to consider another agent having influence on 
 the solution of the problem thus set before us. The desired 
 formation will not be one suited to standing still, but to 
 movement, and to the greatest possible development of fire 
 at the end of that movement. 
 
? 
 
 The Stage of Execution. 59 
 
 And there are other requirements to be satisfied besides 
 the purely negative one of not interfering with the' action of 
 firearms. The formation should be as favorable as possible 
 to forward movement, and it should not require to be 
 changed when you come to close quarters. 
 
 The forward movement will be favored both directly and 
 indirectly by the broader front and lesser depth, as nothing is 
 more fatiguing or trying to men than to march in a dense 
 mass one behind the other ; and nothing is more damaging 
 to the moral influence of the leader, who must, as things go, 
 always at the head of his troops, than to have to diffuse 
 it from front to rear instead of to the right and left. He 
 has not the same power of superintendence, and his exam- 
 ple has less effect. 
 
 In like manner a broad front and small depth are favora- 
 ble to the use of firearms. 
 
 Thus both requirements act in the same direction as the 
 tendency to the more extended order ; and though this may 
 perhaps be obtained just as well with a deep as with a broad 
 formation, yet we must still remember that its most impor- 
 tant quality that of concealing the inevitable general loss 
 as much as possible from the observation of the attacking 
 troops is only feasible with a broad front, in the case of 
 troops who, as we are assuming, are constantly moving 
 onward and leaving their dead and wounded behind. 
 
 The only things which tend to moderate this decided 
 tendency to spread out are the arguments already adduced 
 in favor of close order, and in addition the general desire, 
 natural to the party on the offensive, to possess the numeri- 
 cal superiority that is to say, masses at the decisive point ; 
 also the circumstance that extension of front cannot be car- 
 ried beyond certain limits without dangerous results to the 
 forward movement ; all which considerations are in favor of 
 a certain depth of formation. 
 
 Thus the question once more takes the following turn : 
 
6o Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 What extent of front should be allowed, and what depth can 
 be allowed to the main body at this stage of the attack ? 
 
 Our answer is : the extent of front should be such as 
 admits of the personal influence of the commander being 
 fully exerted (remember that he is now on foot); the depth 
 can be such as, without hindering movement, is yet sufficient 
 to give the soldier the confidence and solidity to be derived 
 from the feeling of companionship and from the idea of 
 numbers perhaps a front of thirty or forty paces, with a 
 depth of six or eight files. Between these little columns 
 may be intervals equal to or double the front of each. 
 
 We have thus brought the main body of the attacking 
 force through the first zone in half-battalion columns, 
 through the second zone in company columns, and we must 
 suppose them close up to the advanced line. It remains 
 now to revert to the supporting line of the advanced troops 
 (the company), and to study its operations during this 
 period ; for, when treating of the preparatory stage of the 
 attack, we dealt with the general task which devolves upon 
 it, not with the way in which that task is performed. 
 
 We have already mentioned that the advanced body of 
 the attacking force will, and must be from the commence- 
 ment, the object of the defender's fire, being at that time 
 the greatest source of danger to the defence. As long, in- 
 deed, as the advanced line is unable to open fire, the enemy's 
 artillery will prefer to play upon the main body, which offers 
 a better mark, and which, at that period of the attack, is 
 solely bent upon reducing the risk to itself by the covering 
 fire of its own artillery, and by increasing its distance from 
 the advanced line. 
 
 The latter, meanwhile, must, from the moment it comes 
 within range, take care to adopt such a formation as will 
 weaken the effect of the defender's fire, both actual and 
 moral ; for it cannot reckon upon any of the assistance which 
 by its presence and action it, in this respect, is able to afford 
 to the main body. 
 
I The Stage of Execution. 61 
 
 The^considerations which, in consequence of this, weighed 
 with the main body in its mode of traversing the second 
 zone will have governed the advanced line already in its 
 passage through the first zone. 
 
 These considerations, which were founded upon the feel- 
 ing that it is desirable to advance in as broad and open a 
 formation as possible, were all the more easily acted upon 
 by the advanced body ; because the objections to which in 
 the case of the main body some force must be allowed, in 
 consequence of the necessity of preserving the striking 
 power, had not here the same weight. 
 
 The action demanded of the advanced line is simply that 
 of its firearms, the effect of which can well be concentrated, 
 even if the front is broad, whilst its composition, as above 
 recommended, of independent parties placed behind one 
 another, is more calculated to overcome the moral difficul- 
 ties of the situation than is that of the main body. 
 
 The formation of the line of skirmishers is all that can be 
 desired or expected ; they have, besides, the advantage that 
 their own busy action occupies their thoughts, and makes 
 them treat difficulties more lightly (such is human nature). 
 
 But the supporting line requires more external aid, be- 
 cause it has not the benefit of the last-named indirect assist- 
 ance. 
 
 Thus its formation must be such as not to offer a good 
 mark for the enemy's artillery, which, we may assume, will 
 at first have no better occupation than to fire upon it. It 
 must, therefore, give up the column formation very early in 
 the day. 
 
 Whether it will be best to deploy into line or to break 
 into smaller columns, such as of divisions with a front of 
 sections, may be left to each commander's discretion. 
 Either formation will, with our present establishment, per- 
 mit of unity of command as well as of free movement. 
 
 A second way of attaining the end is to regulate the dis- 
 
 
62 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 tance of the supports from the skirmishers, which under 
 artillery fire may no doubt be increased to 300 paces and 
 even more, 
 
 In this manner the supports may traverse the first zone, 
 and a good part of the second, without hesitation. 
 
 But the moment approaches when, the skirmishers having 
 reached the most effective range of the enemy's musketry, 
 the services of the supports will be in request. 
 
 The first condition for fulfilling their duties in this respect, 
 namely, the nearer approach of the supports to the skir- 
 mishers, will be obtained of itself by the delay caused to 
 the latter by their advance in successive rushes, a course 
 which, if possible, the supports must avoid. But in order to 
 be in a position to give the assistance required immediately, 
 and in the most direct manner, the supports must adopt 
 the formation most suitable to a gradual but continuous ad- 
 vance. 
 
 The leader of the support should during this forward 
 movement ascertain, as far as possible, where his assistance 
 is most likely to be needed, and where it will be most effec- 
 tive, also the distribution of the enemy's batteries and other 
 forces : the point chosen at which to force the position may 
 be made out with some certainty at a distance of from 800 
 to 600 paces. The commander will then, as far as possible; 
 assign to each of his parties such a task as he may consider 
 the ascertained circumstances to demand. As a general 
 rule, to be modified at need, these fractions of his command 
 will be distributed along the rear of the whole line of skir- 
 mishers ; and whatever their formation may have been up 
 to this time, they will now assume that of an open line. 
 
 We make use of this expression advisedly, to represent a 
 formation which really is only that assumed at the word of 
 command to skirmish. But as the expressions "to skirmish," 
 and a "line of skirmishers," are very nearly allied with the 
 idea of "fire-action" on their part, and as such is by no 
 means intended on the part of our "open line," it would ap- 
 
The Stage of Execution. 63 
 
 ar both expedient and necessary to make the distinction. 
 
 e may indicate the external difference between the two 
 ormations more precisely by pointing out that the files of 
 
 open line do not "uncover," and that rifles are carried at 
 he slope. 
 
 The different fractions of the supporting line follow the 
 kirmishers in the formation indicated, from this point, that 
 , on arriving within from 800 to 600 paces of the enemy, 
 nd when the skirmishers begin the decisive "rapid inde- 
 endent firing," establish themselves, as far as they have 
 ot already been obliged to double up with them, as close 
 hind them as possible without intermixture. It follows 
 a matter of course, that just as the commander of the 
 pports has regulated their distribution along the front at 
 is own discretion, so he has also the power, and must ex- 
 rcise it, to distribute them as to depth for instance, to 
 keep back some of his parties so as to employ them at need 
 in another direction. But in whatever manner the whole of 
 this period of the attack may have been carried out, the 
 rule holds good that when the main body approaches to 
 within about 100 paces of what still remains of the line of 
 supports, the latter throw themselves at once into the line 
 of skirmishers, so as to give them the impulse necessary to 
 carry them through the last and most dangerous stage, that 
 of the storm. 
 
 We have already accompanied the main body close up to 
 the advanced line. We have seen how the attacking force, 
 starting from a compact mass, was at once forced to give 
 way to a tendency to a more and more increasing extension 
 and separation of fractions, and we have now reached the 
 period when this tendency must again yield to that of con- 
 centration. 
 
 Before going further, however, we must most completely 
 admit an aim which we have above purposely avoided 
 acknowledging as a principle. We must do justice to the 
 oft-repeated and defended demand that the main body also 
 should move in open line. 
 
 
64 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 It cannot, indeed, be denied that there are certain advan- 
 tages in such a formation, which we also recognised in our 
 examples of the dense and open order, but we cannot yet 
 persuade ourselves that the great losses which we have all 
 along declared to be as irresistible as incalculable, are there- 
 by to be really prevented. 
 
 We do not, however, esteem the morally tranquillising 
 effect of this formation so little as to wish to forbid its being 
 used on the Commander's own responsibility, though we con- 
 sider it specially applicable to the supports which are in- 
 tended afterwards to skirmish, but not suited to the main 
 body, whose massive force alone will tell. In peace exer- 
 cises, at least, we should not willingly recommend it for use 
 by the latter. 
 
 During the whole preparatory stage of the attack, of which 
 we have as yet been speaking, the companies of the main 
 body, whether ranged in column or in line, having moved 
 forward uninterruptedly, have arrived close up to the first 
 line of skirmishers. The supports which now, at the very 
 latest, are joining the latter, take part as well as they can in 
 the rapid independent firing, which has now reached its 
 utmost intensity, perhaps pouring in their volleys over the 
 heads of the skirmishers who are lying down. The com- 
 mander gives the signal for the attack, which is thenceforth 
 repeated and continued uninterruptedly along the line by 
 bugle call, and the whole line rushes forward as rapidly as 
 possible against the foe. The little masses of the main 
 body follow, converging on any point where the advanced 
 troops have gained an advantage, and have forced their 
 way, pushing in like a wedge twenty or thirty paces behind 
 them. 
 
 There used to be a theory, not indeed yet quite exploded, 
 according to which a storming party should attack without 
 firing a shot. 
 
 We have accepted the distance of 400 paces as sufficiently 
 close to the enemy for the advanced line of skirmishers to 
 
The Stage of Execution. 65 
 
 perform its task, considering the capabilities of the breech- 
 loader of the present day; only under peculiarly favorable 
 circumstances will it be feasible to reduce this distance to 
 200 paces. Taking then 300 paces as a mean between the 
 two distances, we are to expect a mass, no matter how 
 formed, to rush upon an enemy armed with the breech- 
 loader for two minutes without firing a shot ! But it will be 
 objected, this is not intended ; the skirmishers who remain 
 lying down, and over whom the stormers pass without firing, 
 have to keep up their fire with all their vigor, so as to sup- 
 port the column of attack. We reply, this is simply impos- 
 sible unless quite exceptionally there chance to be flanking 
 positions favorable to the attack, but which we must not 
 here take into consideration in this study of a front assault. 
 
 Skirmishers who remain lying down, and who have to fire 
 round the flanks and between the intervals of two or three 
 little columns which are advancing beyond them, must 
 cease firing when these columns have gone fifty paces to the 
 front. The smoke will prevent their fire from being con- 
 tinued any longer without endangering the rear of the col- 
 umns. Whoever has been in a position to hear bullets 
 whistling past him from behind, even considerably on one 
 side of him, though there could be no doubt of their being 
 friendly bullets, will confess that such music is even less 
 conducive to forward movement than is the rain of hostile 
 shot coming from the front. But independently of these 
 purely external reasons, which it must be confessed may not 
 apply to some parts of a line of skirmishers when engaged 
 in a front attack, the principle of leaving skirmishers behind 
 you lying down is antagonistic to that main principle of the 
 Offensive, that we should use all our available force in mak- 
 ing an attack, and, moreover, it would do no good. 
 
 We have just established the fact that a line thus left be- 
 hind can no longer use its fire with advantage, and the idea 
 that it may perhaps serve to cover the shattered fragments 
 of columns which have been crushed would be expecting 
 too much after the previous exertions of the skirmishers. 
 
 
66 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 "Forward" is the word for them : to remain behind lyini 
 down is only a matter of theory ; at the best it will be use- 
 less, generally even prejudicial. 
 
 All this, it may be said, never really happens ; on th< 
 contrary, judging from war experience, we might maintain 
 that the onslaught of the skirmishers would of itself suffice. 
 
 But here we are speaking of a seriously conducted and 
 well-situated defence, so that, in theorising, we must keep 
 in view all means which by any possibility may be useful, 
 and in difficult moments must needs be and have been use- 
 ful. 
 
 It is to be desired that the approach of the main body 
 should impart a fresh impulse to the advanced line, tending 
 to stimulate the forward movement which will culminate in 
 the decisive assault. This last forward movement must be 
 covered by as vigorous a fire as possible, which can, how- 
 ever, only proceed from the advancing troops themselves. 
 Though it is doubtless true that this fire will not do much 
 harm to the enemy, yet it must not cease. 
 
 The defenders, who are now threatened with the approach- 
 ing assault, having been for some minutes the mark for the 
 most intense fire, that which follows, accidental though its 
 effect may be, as we readily admit, will not be without its 
 influence on the morale of the defenders. (We have attrib- 
 uted a similar result from unaimed fire on the assailants.) 
 At this moment, also, the artillery of the latter must be as 
 active as possible to make up for the deficiency of infantry 
 fire. What we have to do is to overwhelm the point of 
 attack with as tremendous a fire as possible : we must not 
 at this moment think of something to aim at ; on the con- 
 trary, the last stage of the preparatory fire will be most effec- 
 tive, if it prevents the defenders from daring to poke their 
 noses out of cover. 
 
 The decisive assault having been thus prepared, executed, 
 and supported up to the last moment, when we get to with- 
 in twenty or thirty paces of the enemy, we rush on with 
 
The Stage of Execution. 67 
 
 hurrahs and beat of drum, and may be pretty sure of the 
 result. 
 
 You require uncommonly good troops (we shall have 
 more to say about this in treating of the Defensive) to meet 
 an attack in force, such as we have described, at this mo- 
 ment of its near approach, as it should be with the bayonet. 
 We shall also see, that at this period of the engagement the 
 success of the defenders will depend rather on efforts ex- 
 terior to their own, that is to say, on counter-attacks made 
 by other troops, than on their own stubbornness and tenac- 
 ity a circumstance of which we must say more when treat- 
 ing of the third stage of the attack. But having here only 
 considered the attack of a given body of troops against 
 purely defensive action, and having thought out the opera- 
 tion under those conditions, we have only to mention as a 
 final requirement necessary to success, that the last decisive 
 onslaught with shot and bayonet should be continued until 
 the assailants actually reach the further limit of the object of 
 attack (the further border of wood or village, the crest of a 
 hill, &c.). On the other hand, they must on no account go be- 
 yond those limits. 
 
 The conditions, then, for successfully carrying out an 
 attack, as far as they depend on the commander's disposi- 
 tions, may be summed up as follows: 
 
 1. Every independent body of troops intended to take 
 part in an attack should have a distinct objective assigned 
 to it by superior authority, and should direct its efforts 
 against this point, without cessation, with its whole strength 
 and in the most direct way. 
 
 2. The troops must be deployed for the attack as soon as 
 they come within reach of the enemy's artillery. They 
 should be divided into a main and advanded body (compare 
 chapter on the preparatory stage, page 49), the former keep- 
 ing within 500 paces of the advanced skirmishers ; in open 
 ground, and under favorable circumstances, nearer to them. 
 
 3. The support of the advanced skirmishers should, as 
 
 
68 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 soon as it becomes a mark for the enemy's guns, assume by 
 degrees a more and more extended formation behind the 
 skirmishers, first deploying from column into line, then 
 spreading out so as to leave intervals between the divisions, 
 and finally making each division expand into an open line. 
 
 The captain of the support will use his own discretion as 
 to the reinforcement of the skirmishers, both with regard 
 to time, place, and amount, establishing himself as close as 
 possible behind them with whatever parts of his company 
 remain in hand, and finally throwing himself with these 
 remnants into the line of skirmishers to take part in the 
 heavy firing, when the main body has approached within 80 
 or ioo paces. 
 
 4. The main body may get over the ground from first 
 coming into action until reaching the zone of unaimed in- 
 fantry fire, that is, until within 1500 or 1200 paces of the 
 enemy, in little columns (either half-battalion or company), 
 if the attention of the defender's artillery is so much occu- 
 pied by that of the assailant, or by his advanced skirmishers, 
 that it cannot direct its fire on the main body. 
 
 5. From this point onwards, when either the mass attracts 
 the fire of the enemy's guns or begins to catch his rifle- 
 balls, it should resolve itself into company columns, with 
 intervals of from 40 to 80 paces, in which formation as near 
 an approach as possible should be made to the advanced 
 skirmishers, say to within from 600 to 400 paces of them. 
 During this advance each company may, at the discretion 
 of its captain, either deploy or else form open line from di- 
 vision columns. 
 
 Other formations, such as, for instance, the deployment 
 of whole or of half-battalions, the open line from a deployed 
 company, the advance by sections or by files from a flank 
 of divisions, do not seem advisable, because they all more 
 or less hamper the forward movement, and interfere with 
 the influence of the officers, without sensibly diminishing 
 the losses. 
 
I The Stage of Execution. 69 
 
 6. As soon as the main body has arrived within about 50 
 paces of the line of skirmishers, now reinforced by the 
 whole of the supports, the commanding officer gives the 
 signal for the assault, which will be made by both advanced 
 
 and main body together in double time (from 120 to 150 
 paces in the minute), whilst the drums beat the "storm 
 march" and the bugles constantly repeat the call, as lively a 
 fire as possible being at the same time kept up by the ad- 
 vanced troops during the movement, which continues thus 
 to within about 20 or 30 paces of the enemy, then terminates 
 in a rush at full speed with a cheer, and the position is car- 
 ried. The advanced troops will generally make it their 
 business to envelop the point of entry whilst the main body 
 converges upon it and breaks in. 
 
 7. The troops which force the position must aim at gain- 
 ing the further border of it, so as to be able from thence to 
 pursue the retreating enemy with their fire, and every por- 
 tion of the attacking force will try to do this without regard 
 to their original subdivision into advanced and main body. 
 It will not signify if at this stage portions of the main-body 
 companies pass beyond or mingle with fractions of the ad- 
 vanced companies, which may yet be engaged with the 
 enemy within the limits of the post which has been forced. 
 
 An immediate rush forward beyond the border of the 
 position is altogether inadmissible. The assailant will do 
 much better if he at once prepares the point which he has 
 captured for defence. 
 
 However much every subordinate officer should en- 
 deavor to keep his people together, all should yet be pre- 
 pared, and the men should be ready and habituated to per- 
 form any task which the necessities of the attack may bring 
 forth at a moment's notice, with whatever force may be at 
 hand. 
 
 8. As soon as the success of the attack may be considered 
 complete, every officer must do his utmost to restore order 
 as quickly as possible in his immediate neighborhood, and 
 
 ! 
 
70 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 by degrees throughout the whole mass, in spite of the over 
 excitement or reaction which will probably prevail. 
 
 III. THE THIRD STAGE OF THE ATTACK. 
 
 We hardly require theoretical argument or graphic 
 description to prove that troops which have made an at- 
 tack, as it necessarily must be made, in the manner above 
 described, will have expended almost all their power for a 
 certain time, and require a period of repose which should, 
 at least, last until the disorder which, as we have already 
 asserted and still confidently maintain, is inseparable from 
 such operations has been to some extent remedied. This 
 third stage has at all times been an extremely dangerous 
 period for the assailant, a period in which the laurels which 
 have just been won at the price of blood, have often been 
 again torn from the victor by a counter attack of the enemy. 
 Hence it has always been the aim and the task of the com- 
 mander when making his general dispositions for the attack 
 to provide for this moment of depression, and in examining 
 this part of the question we come to this difficult point, the 
 subdivision of the force into separate lines of battle* 
 
 From what we have already said the rule must be ac- 
 cepted as permanent that the aforesaid subdivision should 
 only be made with a view to that moment of weakness ii 
 the attacking force, and not with any idea of being able t< 
 renew an attack of the first line of battle made unsucces< 
 fully, by that of a second line. 
 
 The first fundamental condition always holds good that 
 the attack should be conducted so as to be successful ; ii 
 consequence we are bound to bring up as great a force 
 we can to the assault, and to keep only as small a portioi 
 of it back as may appear necessary to overcome the tempc 
 
 * " Treffen," the original meaning of which is to "strike," applied here technicall 
 to the tool used to give the blow. It is difficult to render the term in English. " Line ' 
 does not express it, for a "Treffen" may be broken up into several lines. "Line 
 battle" does it better, and is perhaps sufficiently clear to render the meaning int 
 ligible, but the expression is cumbrous. (Tn.) 
 
The Third Stage of the Attack. 71 
 
 rary difficulties referred to. In order to take the measure 
 of our need properly, we must first consider more closely 
 the task which the force thus held in reserve will have to 
 execute. 
 
 If the assailant only had to deal with the defender's mere 
 power of resistance, there would be no exception to the rule 
 of bringing as many troops into first line as the space would 
 admit of being employed effectively. But the Defence will 
 and must, at least unless ill-conducted, make use not only 
 of its power of resistance, but likewise of that power of strik- 
 ing which is also inherent in it, and this action on its part 
 will cause the greater danger to the Attack, the more nearly 
 it coincides with the last extreme efforts of the assailant. In 
 treating of the Defensive, we shall see that its counter-strokes 
 will best be dealt at the actual moment of the assailant's 
 last rush, or, at least, immediately after this, because the 
 attacking force will then be in a condition most easily 
 affected by the offensive return. 
 
 We have thus in this place to occupy ourselves with the 
 means at the disposal of the assailants to meet this danger. 
 We have already pointed out that even beaten infantry is 
 never entirely defenceless ; it will therefore here be sufficient 
 if we bring even a comparatively small force of fresh troops 
 to the support of men who, although, as far as the outward 
 circumstances of the moment go, not favorably situated for 
 resistance, are yet under the stimulating effects which every 
 attack, particularly one which has just succeeded, produces. 
 
 Unless we have to deal with a numerical inequality be- 
 tween the two parties which sets all theory at defiance, a 
 reinforcement consisting of one-half or one-third of the 
 forces engaged in first line may be considered sufficient at 
 this moment ; that is to say, the assailant need not keep 
 more than from one-third to one-fourth of his total force in 
 reserve for this third stage. 
 
 This conclusion certainly seems rather arbitrary, and ex- 
 amples may be produced from military history of cases in 
 
72 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 which forces even equal to those engaged in front did not 
 suffice, and again of others where a very small fraction was 
 enough. But as we must fix upon some proportion as to 
 numbers in determining a normal order of attack, we shall 
 do well to abide by the rule above given, sanctioned as it is 
 by our general experience. 
 
 Of course the commanding officer remains at liberty to 
 alter details according to the actual circumstances of the 
 moment ; only let this general principle be adopted always 
 to put our main strength into the first line. Moreover, the 
 absolute strength of an attacking force will, as well as its 
 distribution, affect this question. A single battalion which 
 has to make a decisive attack will hardly be able to keep 
 anything back, whilst a division composed of four regi- 
 ments, each of three battalions, can barely afford four bat- 
 talions as reserve, and, on the other hand, an army corps 
 will often only employ one of its divisions in first line, &c., 
 &c. 
 
 We have hitherto spoken of the danger incurred by the 
 Attack in its last stage, and of the remedy, but we must now 
 look back to another danger which, under certain circum- 
 stances, may be encountered even earlier. 
 
 The more an attack is made up of independent portions 
 side by side in other words, the more extensive its front, 
 the more easy would it seem for the defender, who is per- 
 haps only making an appearance of maintaining the defen- 
 sive, to concentrate his strength against some point of the 
 advancing line, to break through it, and to put an end to 
 the attack by this very counter stroke. This danger natur- 
 ally increases as the line gets longer, because the difficulty 
 of a contemporaneous advance of all parts of it augments in 
 proportion to its length, and, at the same time, the v risk 
 arises of involuntary gaps being caused, which would tempt 
 the enemy to make these offensive returns. 
 
 When circumstances appear to produce this danger, we 
 must strive to provide against it by our order of attack, and 
 
The Third Stage of the Attack. 
 
 we come thus to the result that a second and third line of 
 battle must follow the first, the former being only condition- 
 ally, but the latter always necessary. 
 
 A second line of battle in this sense (taking for granted the 
 existence of a third line) will only be necessary if the front 
 of the attacking force is so extended that its fire will not 
 range effectively from one flank to the other, and concentric 
 action against the enemy's counter attacks from both flanks 
 to center, or from the whole line to either flank, is thus not 
 feasible. 
 
 It is a strong point in the breechloader that troops armed 
 with it can hardly be attacked successfully in front without 
 proper preparation, and, as we saw just now how the Defence 
 was aided by its inherent power of striking, so in this case 
 we see the Attack assisted by its inherent power of resist- 
 ance, in consequence of which the disadvantages arising 
 from comparatively thin lines are more easily overcome than 
 they could be in former days. 
 
 If, then, at this moment of danger to the attacking force 
 (the risk of being broken through), there is a good prospect 
 of support from a flank, assistance from the rear may all the 
 more readily be dispensed with, as at the worst we assume 
 the existence of a third line of battle prepared to throw its 
 weight into the scales. 
 
 We may thus say that when the attack is made by com- 
 paratively small bodies, whose front when deployed does 
 not exceed from 800 to 1200 paces, no second line of battle 
 (in the old sense) is required if a body of troops follows in 
 reserve to perform the part above indicated as devolving 
 upon a third line of battle. In other words, an attacking 
 force not exceeding the strength of a brigade will be best 
 formed in a first line of battle, with a reserve following at a 
 considerable distance, in the spirit of a third line of battle. 
 This will be preferable to forming two lines of equal strength, 
 with but a small distance between them. 
 
 
 But even where, in consequence of a greater front, the 
 
74 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 support of a second line of battle cannot entirely be dis- 
 pensed with, a comparatively small body will answer the 
 purpose. It is merely a question of filling up accidental 
 gaps by doubling in with the first line, and thus taking part 
 in the attack, or of opposing purely defensive action against 
 the enemy's counter-strokes (a course much favored by the 
 breechloader), until whatever reinforcements are needed 
 come into play from right, left, and rear. 
 
 It will therefore be sufficient in most instances, that when 
 a second line of battle is required, it should be looked upon 
 (unless circumstances, to be noticed hereafter, should render 
 this course unadvisable) as a detachment pushed forward 
 by the third line, which should furnish it of a strength suited 
 to circumstances: better this than to weaken the first line 
 by making a detachment for the same purpose. 
 
 We will proceed to consider the specific task required of 
 the body, which we call the third line of battle, so as to bring 
 this question to issue. 
 
 Be it understood that we purposely chose the expression 
 "third line of battle," in place of that which is, perhaps, 
 more generally popular, namely, "reserve," because the 
 latter term is easily convertible with the idea of standing still, 
 a part which we do not in the least intend the body kept 
 back as last line of the attacking force to act. 
 
 The most dangerous counter-attacks which the defender 
 can make on the assailant are those attempted during the 
 last stage of the attack, because the latter will be at that 
 period most thoroughly exposed to the effects of the 
 enemy's fire, hence making the nearest approach to that 
 shaky state which his advanced troops have been trying to 
 produce in the ranks of the defenders. 
 
 But these counter-attacks must necessarily be directed 
 against the flanks of the attacking force, if the troops mak- 
 ing them are still to derive any advantage from the fire of 
 their comrades, which by making a front attack they would 
 mask. Only when a flank attack is impossible will the de- 
 
The Third Stage of the Attack. 75 
 
 fender deliver his counter-stroke straight to the front 
 lirectly after the enemy has broken into the position. 
 
 In either instance, the assailant will depend upon his third 
 ] ine of battle, which must, in order to meet the first case, be 
 irong enough and near enough to encounter the enemy's 
 lank movements by a similar manoeuvre ; whilst, in the sec- 
 >nd case, it will only act the part of an "outer"* reserve (a 
 part which will be described more at length in our chapter 
 on the Defensive} to the main body reduced for the time to 
 a defensive attitude. 
 
 In both cases the third line of battle will find its best field 
 of action on one or both flanks of the attack, and the same 
 rule will hold good with regard to its third and most difficult 
 task, that of renewing an attack which has failed. The 
 theory of allowing the remnants of a beaten force to pass 
 through your ranks, and of being afterwards able to oppose 
 a successful resistance to the enemy, in other times led to 
 the formation of two equally strong lines of battle, one. in 
 rear of the other, but it is certainly, now-a-days, a theory, 
 and nothing more. 
 
 It is now only possible to cover the retreat of a beaten 
 force from a position on its flank, a direction therefore 
 which, as it has been shown, the main body of a third line 
 of battle is bound to take whatever the nature of the de- 
 mands upon it. 
 
 Another question still requires discussion. What should 
 be the distance between the first, second, and third lines of 
 battle ? 
 
 Our answer may well be founded upon what has been 
 already said about this matter of distances: a second line 
 should be kept so far in rear as not to come in for a share 
 of the losses of the first line, i.e., about 300 paces, and a 
 
 
 By outer ("aiissere") reserve the author means a body which keeps itself sepa- 
 rate from that which it is required to assist, i.e., does not intermingle with it, as do 
 for instance the supports with the skirmishers whom they reinforce. (TR.) 
 
76 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 third line should follow close enough to come into action at 
 once when required, i.e., about 500 paces in rear of the hind- 
 most troops of the actual attack, that is to say, of the sec- 
 ond line of battle, if there be one. 
 
 The lines of battle, as we have hitherto viewed them, may 
 be looked upon as the defensive supplement to the Attack, 
 an element which cannot altogether be dispensed with as 
 long as the Defence contains within itself any offensive prop- 
 erties. 
 
 Although these lines may appear to be so far lost as re- 
 gards the special task of an attacking force, there yet re- 
 mains to them, under certain circumstances, a not unimpor- 
 tant place in purely offensive action, though certainly in a 
 rather different form, and therefore in different proportions, 
 to what was required of them in former days, when the sec- 
 ond line was supposed to ''pass through the first," or the 
 latter was expected to "renew" the attack. After the first 
 line of battle (the main force) has made a successful attack, 
 it will be the duty of the second line to clear the interior of 
 the captured post of the straggling remnants of the defend- 
 ing force, thereby allowing the first line to devote all its 
 strength to gaining the further border of the position, a 
 measure which on principle should be adopted. The duty 
 of pursuing the enemy will be assigned to the third line of 
 battle, the first line being, as we have already said, not only 
 dissuaded from doing so, but also positively forbidden to 
 join in pursuit, further than by firing after the fugitives. 
 
 It appears, therefore, that depth rather than breadth is 
 required in an attacking force to enable it to perform the 
 tasks demanded of it, and thus the question arises of how 
 the different fractions composing this force are best kept 
 under command. 
 
 Which is preferable, that there should be unity in com- 
 mand in the lines of battle with regard to front or to depth ? 
 
 We should say, taking into consideration the different 
 duties which we have shown above to devolve upon the two 
 
The Third Stage of the Attack. 
 
 lines, that as a general rule the second line requires unity of 
 :ommand more in the direction of depth, and the third line 
 lore in that of width. 
 
 This principle will not, however, be so invariably applica- 
 >le as to be considered an unalterable rule. The tasks which 
 the different lines have to execute will differ so much ac- 
 :ording to the view taken each time of the actual situation 
 of the moment, that it will be best to leave the command- 
 ing officer's hands free. 
 
 However much we may have dwelt in the introduction to 
 this study upon the necessity and expediency of establishing 
 a more regular system of drill for the operations thus treated 
 of, we have now come to the point where greater latitude 
 should be allowed than has hitherto been done. 
 
 Let us have a fixed system of drill to suit the tactical unity 
 of the battalion ; fixed rules to govern the united actions of 
 several battalions ; fixed principles to guide the commanders 
 of several independent bodies of troops taking part in one 
 battle. 
 
 Thus we define the limits between drill and manoeuvre: 
 now when it comes to five, six or more battalions, these 
 may be said to manoeuvre, even if they are acting together 
 in the most open plain with the most complete unity of 
 purpose. 
 
 As soon as a body of troops on the offensive is large 
 enough to be divided into separate lines of battle, it will 
 be well not to bind it any longer by any fixed drill regula- 
 tions. 
 
 These regulations include the question of command which 
 requires to be left the more open, that is, to be decided more 
 according to circumstances, the larger the forces with which 
 we have to deal. In the present state of tactics, drill regu- 
 lations cannot be allowed to rule any larger body than a 
 regiment. Whether the brigade should be formed with its 
 regiments side by side, or one behind the other, is the briga- 
 
 gu 
 
7 8 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 dier's business, whose decision is thus the first called for in 
 a matter affecting the question of lines of battle, which we 
 are now discussing. In proportion as the body of troops 
 increases in size, and as at the same time more regard has 
 to be paid to the combined action of the other arms, the 
 latitude allowed to the commander will also necessarily in- 
 crease, which, however, does not do away with the need of 
 fixed regulations respecting the original formation of these 
 masses ("Rendez-vous formation"). 
 
 The following principles will be sufficient to regulate their 
 general employment in the attack, with reference to its third 
 stage now discussed. 
 
 1. An attacking force of more than two or three battal- 
 ions must needs be formed in more than one line of battle, 
 so as to be able to meet a counter attack of the enemy, the 
 possibility of which must always be kept in view. 
 
 2. A second line of battle becomes necessary when the 
 front of attack is so wide that a charge made against it can- 
 not be met directly by the wings of the assailing force, 
 namely, if the front exceeds the range of a rifle-ball, say 
 from 800 to 1200 paces. A third line of battle is requisite 
 to help the advanced troops to tide over the weak moment 
 of reaction through which soldiers who have met with a 
 stubborn resistance will naturally always pass, and of which 
 the defender is likely to take advantage for making a coun- 
 ter attack either on the flank of the stormers as they ad- 
 vance, or on the position which they have just carried. 
 
 Therefore, whilst a second line of battle is only necessary 
 under certain conditions, a third line can never well be dis- 
 pensed with ; that is to say, we shall always find it advisable 
 to keep back a certain portion of the first line to follow after 
 the fashion of a third line. 
 
 3. From a quarter to one-third of the total force will 
 usually be sufficient for a third line, and the second may be 
 much weaker. The former will meet the enemy's counter- 
 strokes by acting on his flanks, and, according to circum- 
 
Some concluding Remarks upon Drill. 79 
 
 stances, will serve as an "outer" reserve after the position 
 has been carried, or will undertake the pursuit; the latter 
 will fill up accidental gaps in the front line, oppose a purely 
 defensive action to the enemy's attempts to break through, 
 r clear out his stragglers after the position is won. 
 
 4. The usual distance of the second line of battle from the 
 ain body of the first line will be 300 paces, so that it may 
 
 ot share the losses of the latter, whilst the third line will 
 How at the distance of from 800 to 500 paces, so regulated 
 at it may be at hand when its support is required. 
 
 Whilst the corps composing the second line of battle will, 
 accordance with the duties required of them, be disposed 
 as to cover the intervals of the first line, those of the 
 ird line will be most advantageously posted on the flanks 
 with a view to the part assigned to them, which, however, 
 oes not prevent them from being at first kept together in 
 e center so as to be available for use on either side. But 
 anyhow they must be drawn to a flank in the extreme case 
 f having to cover the retreat of the first line after its repulse. 
 
 5. The combined action of the second and third lines of 
 battle with the first will depend too much upon circum- 
 stances to become the subject of regulation. 
 
 It will generally be convenient to place the corps in sec- 
 ond line, under the same command as those in front of them 
 in first line, whilst the third line had better form an inde- 
 pendent command ; but the commander of the whole force 
 must have full discretion in the matter. 
 
 If this arrangement is made we cannot avoid, in a second 
 line at least, breaking up the tactical unity of the battalion 
 into two independent half battalions. 
 
 i 
 
 It appears evident from all that has been said upon the 
 attack, and the formations suitable to it, that the drill-book 
 rovides all that is required in this respect. We do not re- 
 
 j 
 
 a 
 
 I 
 
 IV. SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS UPON DRILL. 
 
 provii 
 
8o Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 quire to invent anything new in drill to suit our new tactics, 
 only to apply existing forms somewhat differently. 
 
 If, however, as we stated in the introduction, we are to 
 regulate our drill by the requirements of the battle-field, it 
 s most important and necessary that certain of the forma- 
 tions already sanctioned by regulation which have hitherto 
 been kept in the back-ground should be brought to the front, 
 and vice versa. 
 
 The decisive command has already gone forth from a de- 
 cisive quarter; for the new regulations say, "the normal 
 battle formation of a battalion in the open is that of com- 
 pany columns ; the battalion column should be avoided ; 
 even second and third lines of battle should adopt the 
 former formation under certain circumstances." 
 
 The company column is recognised by the regulations 
 themselves as the basis of skirmishing, and experience 
 teaches us that we shall not be going too far if we add to 
 the above precept the following one: "Skirmishing order 
 is the normal fighting formation for infantry," whether in 
 the plain or in broken ground. 
 
 If these truths have become the foundation of our drill practice, 
 ive may certainly be able to dispense with a number of close-order 
 formations which are still much used, and which waste a great 
 deal of time. 
 
 Still, the all-important intention of our drill-practice in 
 what close-order movements we yet retain will gain still 
 greater force. 
 
 No one will deny that the more extended (individual) 
 order becomes our battle formation, the more important 
 will practice in close order movements become, as a means 
 of training, for the individual soldier. Just as the one order 
 becomes more necessary to us, so the other, at the same 
 time, gains consequence. The value of the solidity of the 
 battalion column, of readiness in passing from one forma- 
 tion to another, of individual dexterity increases in like pro- 
 
 
Some concluding Remarks upon Drill. 
 
 portion to the necessity for change from the one to the 
 other form of battle under difficulties. The so-called 
 "steady drill," that is to say, the habit of most complete 
 order and subordination at any given moment, will there- 
 fore gain importance from the new requirements of tactics, 
 and whatever can contribute to this, by making our peace 
 practice fit us for war, should not be thrown overboard far 
 from it. 
 
 Nevertheless it is quite true that simplicity is more than 
 ever desirable in our formations. Their value as a means of 
 disciplining and preparing the soldier for what is to follow 
 does not arise from complication, but from sureness of exe- 
 cution. It would appear therefore desirable not to multiply 
 formations, or to render those we have more difficult, but 
 rather to strive after the greatest possible simplicity, which 
 is sure to bear good fruit. 
 
 This brings us to the well-ventilated question of which is 
 preferable, the two or three deep formation ? It would really 
 be desirable that this question were settled once for all by 
 regulation. We cannot undertake in these pages to give the 
 pros and cons in this matter, but it appears to us certain that 
 the arguments in favor of introducing the two-deep forma- 
 tion, which were of weight in their day (when volley firing 
 was the regular mode of fighting of infantry), have now lost 
 their value ; the line of skirmishers is just as quickly formed 
 from three ranks as from two (for we need hardly quarrel 
 about the five or ten extra paces which the men have to go 
 over,*) and the three-deep formation is just as serviceable as 
 the two-deep in close order, if ever that should happen to 
 be used in battle. On the other hand, whatever arguments 
 have been in former days, and are yet brought forward in 
 favor of the three-deep formation still retain their full force. 
 If formation in three ranks were made the universal rule, the 
 complicated formation of skirmishers would be simplified, 
 and the perhaps preferable subdivision of the company into 
 
 * In consequence of the greater depth of column ; the rear division being as usual 
 sent out first to skirmish. (TB.) 
 
82 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 four parts instead of three (four half divisions) would ensue, 
 and all this without making any innovation. 
 
 Having just supported our plea of simplicity by the fore- 
 going proposal, it may seem inconsistent on our part to 
 speak up for greater latitude being allowed by regulation in 
 the instructions for brigade drills. 
 
 As we have already stated, nothing requires to be altered 
 in respect of the rendezvous formation, nor of any movements 
 beyond the range of fire ; the prescribed formation, one regi- 
 ment behind the other, suits best the probable order of the 
 column of route and the question of space. 
 
 Only from the moment that the brigade comes into action, 
 the commander should be no longer bound to adhere to the 
 forms of the drill-book. After a brigade has taken its fight- 
 ing formation it cannot be, now-a-days, when under fire, 
 directed by words of command as per regulation ; therefore 
 it requires such forms no more. 
 
 It is in fact impossible, under existing circumstances, to 
 fix upon a normal fighting formation for the brigade. 
 
 Every possible combination has been made use of suc- 
 cessfully in latter times, from that of both regiments side 
 by side, with their battalions in three lines, to that of the 
 deployment of all the battalions in one line. It would ap- 
 pear therefore judicious to allow the Brigadier even when at 
 drill, to settle the how ? we know how decisive are his where 
 and when, and the offensive does not demand more in this 
 respect than do the other phases of battle. 
 

 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE DEFENSIVE-OFFENSIVE. 
 
 ALL defensive action which aims at a decisive result is 
 composed of two elements ; resistance and counter-attack. 
 
 Where the latter element is wanting, the Defensive is, ac- 
 cording to Clausewitz, the stronger form with only a negative 
 object ; here, however, we have to do simply with \hz positive 
 object of victory. 
 
 The Defensive- Offensive aims at the same end as does the 
 Offensive, but in a different manner. 
 
 Whilst the latter begins by shattering the enemy's powers 
 of resistance so as next to destroy his capacity for righting, 
 the former attempts to obtain the same result by previously 
 breaking the enemy's powers of attack. 
 
 The Defensive holds it to be easier to break the power of 
 attack than that of resistance, and therefore begins by only 
 warding off the enemy's blows ; but if it desires to smash its 
 adversary, it is obliged at length to make use of its own 
 powers of offence, in place of those of defence which have 
 hitherto been called into play. 
 
 The Offensive attempts to perform both tasks by means 
 of the same form of action. 
 
 The main difficulty of the Defensive-Offensive lies in this 
 change from one form of fighting to the other, and it was 
 this very difficulty which caused us from the first to reject 
 the general adoption of the principle of the Defensive.- 
 
84 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 Offensive notwithstanding its advantages as they appear in 
 theory. 
 
 This transposition is, with the result at which it aims, 
 namely victory, dependent upon the fulfillment of two con- 
 ditions ; first, that the assailant against whom the decisive 
 counter-attack is to be directed must have previously been 
 shaken both as to his power of attack and of resistance by 
 the defence; the latter result being by no means necessarily 
 identical with the former. Even if the attacking powers of 
 the assailant are so broken that he has to retire, it by no 
 means follows that his powers of resistance are so much 
 impaired as to make the success of a counter-attack certain ; 
 for, as above remarked, a repulse does not necessarily put 
 the attacking infantry "hors combat," and they will not 
 always be reduced to the fragments of which we before 
 spoke. On the other hand, if the powers of resistance of a 
 body of troops are broken, their powers of attack are at 
 the same time destroyed. The converse is not always ap- 
 plicable. 
 
 Should, however, the first condition be fulfilled, still the 
 second remains equally indispensable : the counter-attack 
 must catch the assailants at the right moment, that is, just 
 after they have been thrown into disorder a state to which, 
 in any case, they must previously have been reduced. 
 
 We may safely assert that to do this at the right moment 
 is one of the most difficult tasks which falls to the lot either 
 of commander or of troops. We shall return to this subject 
 later, when treating of the. second stage of the Defensive- 
 Offensive. 
 
 Let us first glance at the other condition, which is, accord- 
 ing to theory, arrived at more easily by the first stage of the 
 Defensive, namely, resistance, than by the attack. This con- 
 dition is, your enemy's demoralisation. 
 
 Now, the arguments adduced in support of this theory are 
 founded on two advantages which the Defensive is said to 
 have over the Offensive with regard to the action of firearms 
 
The Defensive-Offensive. 
 
 
 
 (and this it is which can alone demoralise the enemy) : first, 
 that the defender stands still to fire upon his opponent, 
 who is in motion, and thus can make more of his arms, being 
 able to choose his time, to fire more shots, and to take bet- 
 ter aim ; secondly, that being halted, he can more easily take 
 advantage of the ground which, now-a-days, is a matter of 
 vast importance. 
 
 The above-named advantages next demand our atten- 
 tion. 
 
 It is not to be denied that the use of firearms in battle 
 appears toVequire the combatant to stand still, because 
 movement destroys all certainty of aim, and after all, the 
 effect of fire consists only in the hits made by the shooter. 
 
 We have already pointed out in our first chapter what 
 technical deductions have been drawn over and over again 
 from this specialty of the Defensive. 
 
 This is our time to reply, that even with the best firearms, 
 certainty of aim will only produce a sure and absolute re- 
 sult when both shooter and object aimed at are at rest, hence 
 that, cceteris paribus, the attacking skirmisher gets the advan- 
 tage of a standing mark to aim at, which, at least, in some 
 degree, counterbalances the disadvantage of being himself 
 on the move. 
 
 The superiority enjoyed by the Defensive in this respect 
 is therefore founded less on the fact of being at rest taken 
 by itself than on the favorable conditions under which fire 
 can be brought to bear on the assailant. 
 
 Firearms only give the defender a decisive advantage 
 when he can really make full use of them from beginning 
 to end of the action, where peculiar circumstances, such as 
 ranges previously marked out, ensure his aim, or where the 
 favorable nature of the ground, such as being placed behind 
 a defile, or being able to bring his firearms into play, tier 
 above tier, enables him to take full advantage of his numer- 
 ical superiority. 
 
86 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 Wherever these conditions do not exist, the assailant's 
 firearm, now-a-days, by reason of its great mobility, quite 
 equals that of the defender in efficiency. 
 
 All these conditions of fundamental importance depend 
 upon the ground. We no longer now-a-days reckon upon the 
 arm of itself making up for any deficiency in this respect, as 
 we might, for instance, if the breech-loader were opposed to 
 the crossbow. 
 
 The former, then, of the two above-named advantages of 
 the Defence is simply supplemented by the second ; the 
 superiority of position over that of the assailant assumed as 
 at first existing, and which is, or ought to be, doubled, in 
 consequence of subsequent measures. In fact, it is the 
 position which alone can give to the Defence the superiority 
 contended for, the position so far as it favors fire-action 
 directly and supports it indirectly by giving cover to the sol- 
 dier. 
 
 The old teachers also recognised this truth, and the right 
 choice of a position was the chief subject of their discourses 
 on the Defensive, discourses which we need only so far re- 
 capitulate as will be requisite for the purpose of inquiring 
 whether any, and, if so, what modifications therein have 
 been called forth by the new arms ? 
 
 A clear field for fire in front ; good appui for the flank: 
 strong defensive points within, space for free movement 
 both in the interior and in rear, an obstacle in front ; the* 
 are in general terms the qualities of a good position insisted 
 upon in all books of instruction on Tactics. 
 
 It cannot be denied that as far as a passive resistance i< 
 concerned, the conditions remain still the same, even witl 
 the best arms. 
 
 But we aim at something beyond this for the Defensivt 
 Offensive, and then two elements of superiority are admitted 
 by which the rapid, grazing and certain fire of the new arms 
 combines with local advantages to favor the counter-attacl 
 
The Defensive- Offensive. 87 
 
 which was indeed contemplated in the olden time, but was 
 a work of greater difficulty. 
 
 The assailant must now, just as formerly, pass over a cer- 
 tain intervening space, and get up to the position if he 
 means to carry it. Whilst doing so, he is now, on account 
 of the greater range of firearms, much longer exposed to 
 their effect than he was formerly, and at the same time the 
 intensity of the fire is much augmented by its rapidity ; if 
 even his own improved armament to some extent counter- 
 balances this drawback, there still remains a certain surplus 
 of gain to the Defence, which has profited, if not to an over- 
 powering extent as some would make us believe, at least 
 considerably, by this addition to its strength. But this im- 
 plies nothing more than that the Defensive can now arrive at 
 the same result as that always aimed at with a smaller ex- 
 penditure of force ; it can in fact economise strength. 
 
 If in the present day a skirmisher can fire three times as 
 far, as fast, and as correctly as he could formerly, it is clear 
 that he can produce at least as much effect with his rifle as 
 three men could formerly with their muskets ; now, what- 
 ever number of men can in consequence be spared in occu- 
 pying the position (of course not losing sight of the inten- 
 tion of retaining it if possible), is so much in favor of the 
 defender's counter-stroke, and the latter, like an attack 
 which it virtually becomes, never can be too strong. 
 
 To this direct advantage which, as we have shown in treat- 
 ing of the attack, is really not illusory, although it may not, 
 as theorists maintain, increase in like proportion with the 
 improvements in firearms, because these improvements also 
 benefit in some measure the Offensive, an indirect, and per- 
 haps, still more important, advantage is added. 
 
 We have already mentioned that according to our old 
 theories, in the time of the old arm, the indirect aid of an 
 obstacle in front of a position was indispensable. The delay 
 thus caused to the assailant, and the power thus afforded of 
 concentrating fire upon a few narrow passages, replaced to 
 some extent those qualities of range, accuracy, and rapidity 
 
 0_lli\_ V^ 
 
88 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 of fire which were wanting in the firearms of the past. But 
 this very obstacle became a hindrance to the Defender him- 
 self when, in seeking a decisive result, he attempted a coun- 
 ter-attack ; and this truth has been recognised by the old 
 authorities. 
 
 The power of the modern breech-loader has freed the De- 
 fensive-Offensive from this incumbrance, and the theory of 
 obstacles in front of a position may now be looked upon as 
 exploded. 
 
 We arrive then at the following conclusion to this general 
 inquiry; the Defensive- Offensive is dependent on the nature 
 of the ground. 
 
 The breech-loader has produced some favorable modifica- 
 tions in the conditions to be sought after in choosing a po- 
 sition, enabling, as it does, the defender both to occupy it 
 with a smaller force, and to dispense with an obstacle in 
 front, thus both directly and indirectly facilitating the nec- 
 essary counter-attack. 
 
 But the necessity of really having such a position, an ad- 
 vantage not always to be gained, still remains the first and 
 foremost condition for the employment of this form of action. 
 
 The one principle derivable from the foregoing, whereon 
 to found instructions for battle, will only supplement those 
 already given in the first chapter, and is as follows : the De- 
 fensive-Offensive is only justified when a commander finds a 
 position so favorable to a passive defence that he may safely 
 calculate upon shattering the enemy's power both of deal- 
 ing blows and of withstanding them, although occupying 
 the ground with a comparatively small force;* and at the 
 
 * We shall only speak throughout this chapter of the relative proportions of tl 
 troops destined for the passive defence, (as few as possible) and of those intended 
 make the counter-attack, (as many as possible). Definite numbers can only be given 
 if we have particular ground in view. It is, however, as well here to remark that a 
 position requiring more than at the outside the larger half of the disposable force for 
 the passive defence is, in our opinion, a bad one, and that to be called advantageous 
 it should be of such a nature that a commander occupying it with Defensive-Offensive 
 views should be able to devote about one third of his force to purposes of resistance, 
 and about two -thirds to those of counter-attack. 
 
The Stage of Resistance. 89 
 
 same time one which enables him to make his offensive re- 
 turns at the right moment, to make full use of his forces for 
 the purpose, and to have the power of pushing the move- 
 ment beyond his own lines. 
 
 We will now proceed to examine more closely both stages 
 of the Defensive- Offensive. As we assumed in treating of the 
 Offensive that the decisive point of attack was rightly 
 chosen, so we now shall take it for granted that a good 
 position for defence has been selected ; we have only to do 
 with the modern conditions upon which a successful result 
 depends. 
 
 
 I. THE STAGE OF RESISTANCE. 
 
 
 he stage of passive resistance is, in the first place, to the 
 Defensive- Offensive, what the Preparatory stage is to the Offen- 
 sive ; it serves to shake the enemy's morale. But, in the 
 next place, it must be continued for a certain time, long 
 enough, indeed, to prepare the change from one form of 
 action to another, i.e., to make the counter-attack possible, 
 so that meanwhile the defender must at least be able to 
 hold in check the enemy's power of attack by his own power 
 of resistance. 
 
 The task of Defence thus divides itself like that of attack, 
 into a preparatory and a principal period of action. 
 
 If the defender has to perform this double task along the 
 whole front of the position chosen, it is very evident that 
 such a display of force would be required as to exceed what 
 will be presumably available, all the more because that on 
 principle a minimum only can be employed for defensive 
 purposes without compromising the success of the offensive 
 return. We are not called upon to consider here the case 
 of a Defensive, persevered in in spite of the defenders being 
 actually numerically superior to the assailants. 
 
 The stage of resistance would in this case be so short, un- 
 certain, and purposely designed to deceive (unless all tacti- 
 
go Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 cal principles were set at defiance), that we need here lay 
 down no rules for such a course. 
 
 We have only to deal with cases in which numbers are 
 about eqally balanced, or where, if there is a difference, the 
 scale is inclined to the disadvantage of the defender.. 
 
 Under such conditions in respect of numbers, it is evident 
 that the defender cannot think of distributing his forces 
 which are presumed to be scanty equally along the whole 
 front, so as to be prepared everywhere for any possible 
 emergency. He must, therefore, seek out other means of 
 gaining his object, which means will really only be afforded 
 by the position, if wisely chosen as it must always be with 
 due regard to the force, though the choice must, to a cer- 
 tain extent, be independent of this consideration. The mode 
 of occupying the position, which it will be for the defender 
 to settle, will always exert a certain influence upon the 
 means referred to. 
 
 It is a well-known advantage of the offensive which indeed 
 contributes to making it the stronger form of action, that 
 the initiative both of time and place falls to its lot, giving it 
 the power of surprising the enemy. To compensate for this 
 special advantage, the Defender possessed, and still possesses 
 a certain general initiative, by means of which (if only his 
 position be strategically good, of which we have nothing 
 here to say), he can, from the nature of the position taken 
 up, attract his opponent, and force him to advance in one or 
 more directions determined by and known to him before- 
 hand. 
 
 Passive defence must then be restricted to these principal 
 lines of attack, which are entirely dependent on the more 
 or less fortunate choice of position, and the defender must, 
 at those points, endeavor to perform his double task thor- 
 oughly, whilst at other parts of the position he only main- 
 tains an attitude of observation. 
 
 Wherever these main lines of attack may be, the strong 
 points of the defence, i.e., of the position, must be, and be- 
 
! 
 
 The Stage of Resistance. 91 
 
 ing strongly occupied, they must and will infallibly attract 
 the assailant to them. 
 
 If even there should be neither local circumstances nor 
 troops arrayed for defence to prevent the enemy from pene- 
 rating between the separate strong points of a position, 
 hese, if well chosen, will exercise an irresistible power of 
 attraction upon him, both because they threaten him directly 
 by their fire, and also indirectly by the attacks aimed from 
 them at his flank and rear, from which he is not safe till he 
 has mastered them. 
 
 The first necessity of the Defence then, if it means to per- 
 form its task with its relatively weak forces, is concentration 
 on decisive points. 
 
 To put the matter in a negative form, we may say that 
 the Defence should never accumulate forces where it will not 
 presumably be exposed to decisive or would-be decisive 
 attack, where in fact the assailant will probably only make 
 demonstrations. 
 
 It being now established that the general principle of 
 occupation of ground for passive defence is to concentrate 
 on decisive points, and only to remain in observation else- 
 where, we now come to the arrangement of details at these 
 centers of concentration. 
 
 The nature of the case demands that every such center 
 should form an independent whole under one command, 
 whose entire task amounts to this: to maintain himself with 
 the force under his orders at the point assigned to him. 
 Just as we said before, an attack to be successful and decisive 
 should be conducted under the persuasion that "the sword 
 severs or snaps asunder," so we may here require the de- 
 fence to be maintained with the conviction that the "shield 
 wards off the blow or splits." It has been remarked of the 
 assailant that he never can tell what force he may chance 
 upon, so now we may assert of the defender that he never 
 knows but what he may yet be relieved. 
 
 The most determined and stubborn tenacity is alone 
 
 in 
 
92 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 capable of enabling the Defence to encounter the resolute 
 energy of an attack, pushed to the utmost. The possibility 
 of evacuating the post confided to him must be as far from 
 the defender's mind as the idea of retreat from that of the 
 assailant. 
 
 This appears to be a fit place to warn the student against 
 conduct on the part of the defender corresponding to those 
 premature and useless engagements which we denounced in 
 treating of the attack ; we mean the practice, for which the 
 higher authorities are sometimes accountable, of maintain- 
 ing and battling for points in advance of the actual posi- 
 tion, which practice leads to repeated and long-protracted 
 affairs of outposts (advanced and rear guard skirmishes, 
 and such like). Here, as with the attack, we must insist 
 upon complete clearness of judgment and will ; the com- 
 mander who wishes to fight a defensive battle, and has the 
 opportunity of doing so in an advantageous position, must 
 not, under any pretence whatsoever, expose a weak detach- 
 ment in front of his position to the risk of being overpow- 
 ered separately by a superior enemy, by this means lower- 
 ing the morale of his army. 
 
 In the chapter on the "Temporising Combat," we shall 
 speak of what must be done in this way as an introduction 
 to the reconnaissance. 
 
 All this is a digression. Let us return to the one leade 
 who has to hold one of the keys of the position. 
 
 The theory of our forefathers, which is after all the parent 
 of our present wisdom, was in favor of the line formation 
 for defensive purposes, just as it favored columns for the 
 attacking force. Modern views confirm these impressions. 
 The whole power of resistance lies in the complete devel- 
 opment of the effect of firearms, and substantially in this 
 alone. But this maxim implies the necessity of bringing as 
 many rifles as possible into front line, i.e., the principle 
 of the line formation. The defender must strive to ensure 
 to his firearms by all possible means the superiority over 
 any fire which the enemy may be able to bring against him. 
 
 
The Stage of Resistance. 93 
 
 We have already touched upon the manner in which a 
 numerical superiority can be ensured in a confined position 
 (such as by concentration behind defiles, by several tiers of 
 fire, &c.), and it may be dismissed for the present as be- 
 longing to the general question of the choice of a position. 
 
 The other measure, that of ensuring superior accuracy of 
 fire by marking the ranges beforehand, is mentioned here to 
 be strongly recommended, although it can only be carried 
 out if there is plenty of time. 
 
 The third means at the disposal of the defender for pre- 
 serving his advantage, depends on time and place ; we speak 
 of cover, that is to say, reduction of loss to the utmost, by 
 taking advantage of the ground. Up to a certain point, 
 however, this advantage will always be on the side of the 
 Defence, because all ground affords more or less cover to a 
 man standing still or lying down. The defender should 
 never neglect to add to this cover as much as he can by 
 artificial means, and with this view the rifle-pit is to him 
 almost a necessary of life. 
 
 All these things, however, though of the greatest import- 
 ance, depend upon the conditions of the moment, as they 
 may chance to be, upon the locality, the time and means 
 available. We have here more to do with the general prin 
 ciples which govern the employment of troops under all 
 conditions. 
 
 In the defence of an assigned position, as in attack, this 
 task divides itself into two branches, that of preparation, 
 and that of execution. Hence, the same as with the attack, 
 as strong a force as the ground will allow must be devoted 
 to the first task (being concentrated at the different strong 
 points), at the same time, no larger force than can be em- 
 ployed with advantage ; that is to say, at a given part of the 
 position, the first line should be from the very commence- 
 ment as thickly occupied with skirmishers as there is room 
 for, and, above all, as there is the power of bringing into 
 effective action. As these skirmishers are not required to 
 
 
94 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 move about, and as, further, they will as usual be posted 
 under cover, they may be more closely packed than in the 
 attack, without taking off from their efficiency, or exposing 
 them to extraordinary loss ; and the following principle may 
 be accepted, that troops employed in a passive defence will 
 do well, whenever it can be done, to assign one skirmisher 
 in first line to every pace of front. The fire of this line 
 should, as with the attack, be as much as possible uninter- 
 rupted, and here also we require a supporting line to make 
 good losses. 
 
 Taking into consideration the more favorable conditions 
 with regard to cover, it will be sufficient if the supports be 
 equal to half the strength of the skirmishers (first line). It 
 is hardly necessary to remark that they should not actually 
 join it till the attack has been clearly developed. The third 
 part of the task committed to the passive Defence remains 
 to be mentioned, and that is, to oppose its own powers of 
 resistance to the whole striking power of the attack, at least 
 until its own counter-stroke can be made effectually. We 
 must describe the moment when this action will be re- 
 quired from the course pursued by the. assailant as we have 
 traced it. 
 
 The advanced troops of the attack have, thanks to supe- 
 rior numbers and greater extent of front, spread round the 
 flanks and brought a concentric fire to bear upon this first 
 line of the Defence, reducing it to silence ; they then break 
 in with their masses in one place or other, all their rearward 
 troops being directed to converge upon it. 
 
 With comparatively narrow front, but hence more consid- 
 erable depth, the stream of warriors pours into the breach. 
 
 To stem this torrent, the passive Defence requires a reserve 
 or main body. We use the expression as we used it for the 
 attack, but without reference to numerical strength. 
 
 Whenever it can be done, the reserve will use for its pur- 
 pose independent reduits in this position, i.e., strong points 
 not yet affected by the preparatory operations of the attack- 
 
The Stage of Resistance. 95 
 
 ing force, and to carry which further preparation and another 
 assault will be required. The possibility of doing this will, 
 however, be reduced to a minimum by the range, precision, 
 and destructiveness of modern artillery. Even in village- 
 fights the inner reduit, unless exceptionally sheltered, will 
 not be less cannonaded than the border, even before the 
 tual assault. 
 
 Much less often than formerly will it now be possible to 
 ollow up the first period of passive defence by a second 
 interior" period. The fate of inner reserves will more than 
 ever be bound up with that of the foremost line. 
 
 Much more frequently, therefore, than heretofore, will the 
 reserve of the passive defence be forced to exchange its passive 
 part of resistance for the active part of making partial use 
 of its power of attack ; that is to say, far more than in former 
 days will even the passive Defence depend for success on 
 assistance from the offensive element, which, in truth, was 
 never strange to it. 
 
 We have already seen that an Attack well met by a passive 
 Defence is not in the best condition to make its own power 
 of resistance operative, and that even slight counter-attacks 
 made at this moment, particularly if directed on a flank, 
 will check the assailant, and will in any case prevent him 
 from attaining his decisive objective, the "further border" 
 of the position. 
 
 The passive Defence does not require an absolute prepon- 
 derance of force to gain this end, because the assailant can- 
 not at once develop his numerical superiority, nor immedi- 
 ately bring it into play. 
 
 The defender's best chances lie in surprising the enemy, 
 in acting on the flanks, in displaying all his energy. 
 
 Be it as it will, however, whether the Defence remain en- 
 tirely passive or whether it pass into the active stage, the 
 stru ggle for localities, that real prototype of the defensive 
 battle, will be decided in these days much more quickly 
 
g6 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 than heretofore ; the obstinate stubbornness of former con- 
 flicts of this kind will, with few exceptions, hardly be re- 
 peated in the same degree in face of the all-devouring 
 breech-loader. 
 
 Hence it follows, that the passive Defence also depends 
 less for the performance of the second part of its allotted 
 task upon the numerical strength of its forces than upon 
 their sudden action calculated to take the enemy by sur- 
 prise, and therefore, in spite of the expression, "main body!' 
 being applied to the troops in second line the defender 
 must always put his main numerical strength, as far as prac- 
 ticable, into the first line for holding the border of the posi- 
 tion. 
 
 The relative strength of the advanced troops (skirmishers 
 and supports), and of the main body (reserve), of the De- 
 fence will vary materially according to the position occu- 
 pied. 
 
 In any case, however, the strength of the reserve during 
 the stage of passive Defence should never more than equal 
 that of the advanced body. 
 
 If, then, the defence be concentrated, as it should be, on 
 decisive points, according to our reckoning three men per 
 pace of the given front will be sufficient. This total again 
 will be divided, according to circumstances, between first 
 line and reserve, up to the extreme limit of 3 : I. 
 
 We must further inquire what distance should be kept be- 
 tween the different subdivisions of the force which we have 
 up to this time recognised as necessary. 
 
 As all movement under effective fire is undesirable, and 
 as the moment when the defensive line of skirmishers will 
 in all probability most need the aid of its supports, coincides 
 with the period of most intense fire from the enemy (that 
 of the rapid independent fire of his advanced troops), the 
 general rule will hold good, that the support should be 
 placed as near the skirmishers as possible, so as to be at 
 hand when required. The disadvantage of such an arrange- 
 
tage of Resistance. 
 
 97 
 
 ment is that it is apt to expose the supports to the same fire 
 from which the skirmishers are suffering, particularly if op- 
 posed to the enemy's artillery (a disadvantage not always to 
 be remedied by natural cover). The best way of meeting 
 this difficulty will be, perhaps, by dividing the supports 
 from the very first into small parties. The objection to this 
 course, which was necessarily entertained when it was pro- 
 posed for the offensive, that it leads to a too early inter- 
 mixture of the lines, does not here apply, in consequence 
 of the fact that both skirmishers and supports are lying 
 still. 
 
 On the other hand, the first consideration for the Reserve 
 is to keep as much as possible sheltered from the enemy's 
 fire during the preparatory stage. A distance of from 300 
 to 400 paces from the skirmishers, varying, indeed, accord- 
 ing to the nature of the ground, will generally suffice to 
 save the reserve from being exposed to the risk of sharing 
 the effects of the artillery fire directed on the first line. 
 Again, as this body, even if acting straight to its front, 
 should only come into play shortly before or contempora- 
 neously with the enemy's assault, so that it may take the 
 assailant all the more by surprise, the distance named does 
 not appear too great ; as an extreme limit the rule may be 
 that the reserve should stand a little nearer to its skirmish- 
 ers than they are to those of the enemy. 
 
 Naturally, however, these conditions depend entirely on 
 the locality, and must needs be often considerably modified ; 
 for instance, in the defence of villages. The general princi- 
 ples which govern the distribution, strength, and distances 
 between the several parts of a defensive force being fixed, 
 we come now to the question of command. 
 
 It has already been established as a principle in our chap- 
 ter on the Offensive, that unity of command is in direct pro- 
 portion to the unity of the end to be attained, and to the 
 possibility of the leader exercising personal influence over 
 his troops. 
 
 r " 
 
98 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 Looking at the matter from this point of view, it would 
 appear necessary that in a defensive force unity of com- 
 mand should reign in the direction of depth, as the arrange- 
 ment most completely answering the requirements of a 
 stubborn resistance ; and we shall, therefore, here bespeak 
 this unity of command unconditionally for skirmishers and 
 supports, and for the main force in rear (reserve) also, if it 
 can be posted within such a distance of the first line as to 
 be visible to the commander of the latter (which, indeed, 
 will not always depend entirely on the distance). 
 
 As, further, it is in the nature of the Defence, which can- 
 not take the initiative at any special point, that it may be- 
 come the object of the enemy's attack at any part of the 
 position which he may choose to select, we should recom- 
 mend dividing the reserve laterally into detachments inde- 
 pendent of one another, and distributed in our general line 
 at no great intervals. The company column would appear 
 to be a peculiarly suitable formation for this purpose, and 
 should, therefore, be the tactical unit of the Defence. 
 
 All this depends, as with everything connected with the 
 Defence, very much on local conditions, which in the direc- 
 tion of width may easily be so similar throughout, that unity 
 of command may be desirable, and, at least in the case of a 
 battalion, may exist. 
 
 Without any intention of fixing upon a normal fighting 
 formation for a battalion on the defensive, which would be 
 unpractical, in consequence of the great variety of possible 
 situations, but rather to illustrate the ideas which we have 
 just expressed, we shall, therefore, say, that a battalion, of 
 course supposed to be in connection with others, and in- 
 tended to fight defensively in open ground, occupying, let 
 us suppose, the ridge of a hill, should spread out its four 
 companies with intervals of from 80 to 100 paces ; each com- 
 pany (200 rifles) will extend one division as skirmishers 
 with a front of 80 paces, posting about 50 or 100 paces be- 
 hind these a half-division (eventually broken up into sec- 
 tions) as supports, and establishing the remaining one-and- 
 
Stage of Resistance. 99 
 
 a-half divisions, either deployed or in half-division column, 
 in open line from 300 to 400 paces in rear of the skirmishers : 
 or else, a battalion to which the defence of the border of a 
 wood, village, or such like is entrusted, and which need only 
 provide for the enemy's reception at certain fixed points of 
 entry, will, according to the estimated number of such 
 points, place its companies across them (an arrangement 
 always far preferable for the defence of a barricade to that 
 of occupying sections of the front from street to street), 
 and will keep back one or two of them (according to cir- 
 cumstances) as reserve in close order, whilst the two or 
 three companies fighting in first line are extended as skir- 
 mishers and supports. 
 
 The circumstance that the force of resistance, for entirely 
 mechanical reasons, increases in the ratio of the depth of 
 formation opposed by the defender to the attack directed 
 against him (a circumstance which influenced us when we 
 advocated unity of command in the direction of depth), 
 brings us by an entirely different route from that pursued 
 when discussing the attack to the question of lines of battle ; 
 and notwithstanding this difference, the ruling idea remains 
 the same here as there, that of the lines of battle assisting 
 the combatant to tide over the moment when we may pre- 
 sume that his powers of resistance will be put to the test. 
 
 In our foregoing treatise on passive Defence we have de- 
 signedly, and on principle, made use of the expressions 
 "first line" and "reserve," instead of "advanced" and 
 "main" "body," which we employed in treating of the 
 attack, in spite of the many points of resemblance indicated. 
 In fact, when the passive Defence has reached the point of 
 bringing into action that part of its force designated the 
 "reserve," it has done its utmost, it has acted its part, that 
 of holding its ground with all its might to the end. This 
 element of endurance appeared to us to be best rendered 
 by the expression "reserve," and just because this term im- 
 plies an extreme degree of passive tenacity, we avoided it 
 when dealing with the Attack. The well-known phraseology 
 
ioo Stittlies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 of all our text-books agrees with this our method, as they 
 all have long ago applied the term "inner reserve" to the 
 portion of the defending force of which we are speaking, at 
 any rate, -when they treat of local defence. 
 
 Inversely, we shall again, for the same reason, when 
 speaking of the body of troops which delivers the counter- 
 stroke of the Defensive-Offensive, not call it a "reserve."* 
 
 But now it is evident that if, as may happen in spite of 
 original economy of strength, the numerical proportions of 
 the troops employed in this passive Defence have assumed 
 greater dimensions at the different points of concentration 
 than we have presupposed in our general remarks, the sub- 
 division hitherto imagined into skirmishers, supports, and 
 reserves will be insufficient. 
 
 When, as has frequently happened, and as will often 
 happen, in decisive battles between the great masses of the 
 present day, the part of passive Defence devolves upon whole 
 brigades, divisions, even corps, until other forces undertake 
 the counter-attack, the question of distribution into lines of 
 battle must needs crop up even from the point of view of 
 space, when dealing with such large bodies. 
 
 In contrast to what was said in the chapter on the Offen- 
 sive, the expediency and necessity of forming a second line 
 of battle will have much greater weight in the case of the 
 Defence. In the former case, we saw it intended only as a 
 stop-gap to be used in the improbable event of the first line 
 being broken through by the enemy, or in the accidental 
 event of a gap otherwise arising. But with troops engaged 
 in a passive Defence this condition presents itself differently 
 to the view. 
 
 Accidental gaps will certainly rarely arise, as every one 
 is standing fast ; but, on the other hand, the enemy right 
 
 * It may, perhaps, strike the reader that too much importance has often been 
 assigned in this study to particular forms of expression which may be in fact 
 synonymous. We are not of this opinion, as we have before mentioned, but think 
 that the want of clearness in forms very frequently engenders a vagueness of ideas. 
 
The Stage of Resistance. 
 
 101 
 
 
 1U 
 
 earnestly intends, and strives with all his might, to make 
 breaches in the line, bringing all the weight of his powers 
 of offence to bear upon the points assailed. The event 
 which on the side of the Attack we have seen was an im- 
 probable exception, only to be provoked by the assailant's 
 own faults, will, on the side of the Defence be the rule, and 
 the object contended for by the enemy with all his means. 
 
 This circumstance at once renders a second line of battle 
 uncommonly important to the Defence, even when the front 
 is comparatively short, and in proportion as the line be- 
 comes longer, and, as thanks to the enemy having the 
 initiative, the uncertainty as to his intended point of assault 
 increases in like measure, so the value of a second line of 
 battle is largely augmented. 
 
 The more total the defeat which would be entailed upon 
 the defender by the loss of his position, the more speedily 
 must reinforcements be brought up at need. It does not 
 much matter to the assailant when met by a counter-attack 
 of the enemy, at what particular point the same is made, as 
 his resistance does not depend on the position in which he 
 happens to be at the moment. Very different is the case of 
 the Defence, whose position is the base of its strength. 
 
 If the second line of battle on the Defensive-Offensive side 
 is called upon to cover the retreat of the first, we may look 
 upon the game, taken as a whole, as lost, and probably 
 definitively so. 
 
 Such are the principal reasons for the necessity of a sec- 
 ond line of battle in a defensive position of some extent. 
 
 Like everything else on the side of the defender, the 
 questions of strength, distance, and command of such a 
 second line, depend entirely on the nature of the ground. 
 The more this is favorable to the first line of battle, the 
 weaker naturally may the second be ; we may, however, 
 assume, that even in a position occupied by only one regi- 
 ment, a second line of battle will be requisite, whether fight- 
 ing on open ground or in woods or villages. 
 
io2 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 This second line of battle may, according to circumstances, 
 be fused with the main body of the first line into one "inner 
 reserve," or by relieving it make it free to act in front, or 
 else itself operate independently as an "outer reserve." 
 
 It will not be necessary, after what we have already said 
 in our chapter on the Attack, about lines of battle, and after 
 what has elsewhere been remarked about the employment 
 of reserves, to enter specially into the mode of action of the 
 second line of battle, or to describe its conduct, according to 
 circumstances, offensive or defensive. 
 
 What more remains to be noted under this head will be 
 referred to when we come to the second stage of the Defen- 
 sive-Offensive. 
 
 True to the principle, that even the most passive resist- 
 ance must not remain without some infusion of the offensive 
 element, the greater the force employed in the passive De- 
 fence, the more must the action of its second, eventually of 
 its third line of battle (even if merely local, and therefore in- 
 decisive) be that of a force executing a decisive counter- 
 attack ; in fact, to do this should be its aim. 
 
 Having thus thrown some light on the question of the 
 distribution of strength during the stage of passive Defence, 
 it only remains to notice briefly the course which the strug- 
 gle of the contending forces must take with the formations 
 adopted by Attack and Defence. 
 
 We must at this stage of our inquiry first of all speak of 
 the defensive artillery, which has not been hitherto men- 
 tioned, for without its assistance we cannot hope now-a-days 
 to maintain a defensive fight on a large scale. 
 
 We shall start by assuming that the defensive batteries 
 are placed in the most favorable positions possible, that 
 they are, as far as can be, behind natural cover, and so forth ; 
 and that they are in the general line of the reserve, i.e., 
 about 400 paces in rear of the foremost line of skirmishers. 
 
 As certainly as it is inconvenient for the attacking force to 
 
Stage of Resistance. 
 
 103 
 
 be compelled to deploy at a long distance from the enemy, 
 so it is clearly incumbent on the defender to force the as- 
 sailant to this deployment, but it remains a question whether 
 this task should, as a rule, be allotted to the defensive bat- 
 teries. It is, after all, more important that they should 
 catch the assailant at a really effective range, to ensure 
 which they should not unmask themselves too soon. It 
 would appear preferable to hand over this duty to an ad- 
 vanced party* of the Defensive- Offensive force supported by 
 cavalry and some light batteries ; in like manner, on the 
 other side, the advanced guard of the assailant will endeavor 
 to save the troops coming up from the rear from being 
 forced into an unnecessarily early or inconvenient deploy- 
 ment. 
 
 The batteries in position should only open fire when the 
 enemy is within easy range and there is promise of good 
 effect (the assailant's want of skill may, of course, expose 
 him to serious loss at an unusual distance), and should 
 aim, as a general rule, at the attacking infantry, although 
 they cannot be expected to resist taking advantage of the 
 favorable moment for firing at the enemy's guns as they 
 come into action. 
 
 But from the instant when the attacking infantry itself 
 opens fire up to the very last moment, the defender's guns 
 should never leave it alone. 
 
 The assailant's artillery will, in consequence of this pro- 
 ceeding, be obliged to come nearer, and the defender's in- 
 fantry must be left to encounter it, and to keep it at as great 
 a distance as possible. 
 
 We have already mentioned as one of the qualities of a 
 good position, that it should offer a clear field for fire up to 
 the furthest effective range. We do not mean, however, 
 that this should be taken advantage of from the first by the 
 mass of the defender's forces. 
 
 Einleitungstruppe," literally introductory force. 
 
IO4 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 Nevertheless, just as in speaking of the attack we dwelt 
 upon the expediency and utility of even unaimed fire at the 
 last moment, we feel ourselves obliged here to advocate 
 chance shots on the part of the defence. The advantage of 
 a range exceeding the length of vision of most skirmishers 
 which the new arms possess ought no longer to be neglected 
 for the purposes of passive Defence, in spite of all the value 
 which we most decidedly attach to the fire of the masses at 
 the most effective ranges, and only at such. 
 
 The moral effect produced upon the assailant by the 
 whistling of hostile bullets, coming from positions of which 
 he can as yet see nothing, is not to be undervalued (we have 
 already referred to it when speaking of the attack), and 
 every, even the smallest deduction from the moral force of 
 the assailant contributed to by the defender, is of great value 
 to the latter. 
 
 But certainly the remedy would become dangerous, and 
 would produce the reverse of what is intended if adminis- 
 tered in too large doses. Such unaimed fire can only, of 
 course, produce mere chance hits, which must be out of all 
 proportion to the number of cartridges expended. Now if 
 the men of the attacking force remark that out of the crowd 
 of whistling bullets not only some, but by far the greater 
 number hit no one, this sort of fire will encourage more than 
 it will depress. All the same, experience has led us to take 
 count of these chance shots in considering the formation for 
 attack, hence we shall do well not to neglect this means of 
 annoyance. If some quite small detachments are pushed 
 forward from the flanks of a position or in front of it, and 
 keep up a steady continuous fire, well-regulated by the 
 officers at ranges of from 1800 to 1500 paces, for in- 
 stance, in the ascertained direction of the enemy's general 
 advance, it must at least somewhat influence the formations 
 of the attacking force. And as we have before remarked, 
 the passive Defence cannot afford to neglect even the small- 
 est means of offence. The way in which afterwards the real 
 fire of the masses, and lastly their rapid independent fire is 
 
The Stage of Resistance. 
 
 105 
 
 regulated, stands out in sharp contrast to the foregoing pro- 
 ceedings. Fire should only be opened by the defender's 
 actual line of skirmishers at the range most effective accord- 
 ing to the mark aimed at, and should be maintained with a 
 certain degree of spirit without at first taking the form of 
 rapid independent firing, which should, however, be practised 
 when the object is to keep the enemj^'s advanced line as far 
 as possible from the position, when preparing to open its 
 own rapid independent fire. Success on the part of the De- 
 fence at this moment causes most frequently the failure of 
 the attack, as is well known. 
 
 But the defender develops the full force of his fire, bring- 
 ing it to its highest pitch by employing supports, often also 
 reserves, even his second line of battle at the moment when, 
 as above described, the enemy advances to storm the posi- 
 tion ; for the Defence truly the most trying time, but also 
 the moment when all the commander's resources (arising 
 both from previous training and momentary impulse) must 
 be called into play, to awaken the firm conviction in his 
 troops that to retreat now would be certain ruin, and that, as 
 a last resource, they must take to the bayonet. 
 
 We may then resume what we said upon passive Defence as 
 follows: 
 
 1. The passive Defence must, in order to reserve as much 
 force as possible for the decisive offensive return, endeavor 
 to perform with a minimum of strength the double task of 
 shattering the enemy and of holding the position. 
 
 2. Whilst the choice of position has much to do with the 
 successful performance of this task, the mode of occupying 
 it will also materially affect the result. 
 
 The troops employed in the passive Defence should be con- 
 centrated at points previously recognised and indicated as 
 keys of the position, unity of command being preserved at 
 each of these points, whilst the intervening space should 
 only be observed. 
 
io6 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 3. The principle of the line-formation will govern the dis- 
 position of the troops at each point occupied, i.e., as many 
 rifles as possible will be brought into action in first line. 
 
 One man to a pace in this line of skirmishers will best 
 meet this demand, and a line of supports half as strong as 
 the first line, and approaching as close as practicable to it 
 will be sufficient, as it is assumed that both lines are well 
 under cover. 
 
 Upon these two bodies, forming together the first line of 
 the Defence, and which should also invariably be under one 
 commander, devolves the task of shattering the assailants' 
 power of attack. 
 
 4. So as under all circumstances to be able to hold a po- 
 sition once occupied, this first line needs a reserve (main- 
 body), varying in strength according to circumstances, from 
 equal to down to one-third or one-fourth of its own num- 
 bers ; this reserve serving passively to garrison a reduit or to 
 furnish active support, under one and the same, or under 
 separate command, according to which part it plays, but 
 never more than from 300 to 400 paces in rear. 
 
 5. Unity of command in the direction of depth is desira- 
 ble as long as the reserve is visible from the position of the 
 first line, whilst in the direction of width its extent depends 
 upon the unity of the work in hand, which again chiefly de- 
 pends upon the nature of the ground. 
 
 It is always better to occupy the approaches to a position 
 by independent bodies, and not to make such approaches 
 boundaries between sections of the position. 
 
 The best formation for a battalion on the defensive, is 
 generally that of separate company columns, whether, as a 
 whole, it be formed in one or more lines. 
 
 6. The value and necessity of a second line of battle are 
 much more evident for a defensive than for an attacking 
 force ; but its strength, and the manner in which it is drawn 
 up and handled, depend entirely on the nature of the ground, 
 
ie Stage of Resistance. 
 
 107 
 
 according to which it will come into action either as an 
 "inner" or "outer" reserve, for the latter of which offices a 
 third line of battle will often become necessary when the 
 numbers are large ; and its operations will be conducted al- 
 most entirely on the principles of the offensive return (the 
 more so, the larger the dimensions of the forces engaged), 
 even when it does not of itself attempt to produce a decisive 
 result. 
 
 Above all, an infusion of the offensive element should 
 never be wanting to the passive Defence even in the smallest 
 particulars. 
 
 7. It should be a principle of the passive Defence to open 
 fire upon the enemy only when he comes within the most 
 effective range. 
 
 All the same it will be necessary to take advantage of the 
 extreme range of the arm by detaching small parties to fire, 
 under the control of their officers, on the enemy's general 
 line of approach, as far as it is known. 
 
 The first line will by a lively fire, and eventually by rapid 
 independent firing, keep the enemy's skirmishers at as great 
 a distance as possible when they are taking up their ground 
 previous to the assault, for the defence will be best served 
 by their being hindered from establishing themselves firmly 
 at this moment. Every fire-arm should be brought into play 
 to the fullest extent against the actual assault at from 400 
 to 300 paces. 
 
 The defenders must be convinced that it may be neces- 
 sary, after all, to have recourse to the bayonet, and that this 
 would be less dangerous to them than to give way. 
 
 8. From the very nature of the work, a defensive action 
 can only be carried through in extended order, to adopt which, 
 from the very first, both supports and reserve may easily be 
 forced. 
 
 Still, even with troops thus extended, the power of con- 
 centrating fire must be preserved, although it will rarely now 
 be able to take the form of a volley. 
 
 
io8 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 The intermixture of skirmishers with supports will, for 
 the Defence as for the Attack, be generally the only form of 
 reinforcement possible, although exceptions to this rule may 
 occur in the earlier stages of the fight, exceptions always to 
 be made use of. 
 
 II. THE STAGE OF COUNTER-ATTACK. 
 
 The counter-attack of the Defensive-Offensive is its deci- 
 sive act of offence. Hence it is not necessary here to speak 
 of numbers, formations, or principles of execution, all which 
 matters have been settled when treating of the Offensive. It 
 remains to us only in this place to clear up one point, but 
 certainly the most material one for the counter-attack, 
 namely, at what moment it should be made. 
 
 We have already pointed out as a fundamental condition 
 of success in attack that the shock of the masses should fol- 
 low immediately upon the preparatory operations. The 
 same condition holds good in the case of the counter-attack 
 of the Defensive- Offensive force, if the defensive stage is 
 really to be a preparation for it. 
 
 Success, on the whole, depends upon choosing the right 
 moment for action. This moment is self-evident in the case 
 of the attack, which adheres simply to the same mode of 
 fighting throughout, but for the Defensive-Offensive force 
 which will deal its blow with other troops hitherto far away 
 from the front, and therefore more fresh, the question of 
 when? and where? so decisive for the attack, must be solved, 
 and the answer acted upon as speedily as possible and under 
 the most trying conditions. 
 
 The first thing, then, to be done is to fix upon the most 
 favorable moment, and thereupon to settle upon the best 
 position for the troops destined to make the movement. 
 
 The worst time for the assailant to exert his power of re- 
 sistance is, doubtless, that at which he puts all his strength 
 into offensive action. 
 
kThe Stage of Counter- Attack. 109 
 
 nee it follows, as a matter of course, that the most 
 able moment for the counter-attack is that in which 
 the assailant is advancing to the assault. If the Defence has 
 done its duty, the attacking force is just then, whilst ad- 
 vancing without shelter and in a mass, as much shaken in 
 respect of its power of resistance as it could ever expect the 
 opposing force to be. Doubtless, its offensive power is, at 
 such a moment, raised to its highest pitch, and this is more 
 
 I" e consequence of human nature than of tactical rules ; but 
 is force and energy are only of avail in one direction, and 
 at is forwards. 
 A counter-attack make at this moment on the flank has 
 eat, very great chance of success. All that has been re- 
 arkcd about the attack and its formation in lines of battle 
 in its favor. 
 
 To fall upon the flank of the assailant at the very moment 
 that he makes his assault, must be the special aim of the 
 
 I Defender, as in this manner the counter-attack of the Defen- 
 sive-Offensive is likely to be most telling. But when we con- 
 sider the questions of time and space, and that, as we have 
 seen, the assailant is to some extent prepared for the at- 
 tempt, no one will deny that it is not quite an easy matter. 
 
 Before we proceed to inquire into the ways and means by 
 which the Defensive-Offensive can arrive at this end, it will 
 be advisable to determine whether there are not other mo- 
 ments favorable for the counter-stroke. 
 
 Let us examine, in the first place, the preceding stages of 
 he combat. 
 
 
 
 ? 
 
 in 
 
 A well-led attacking force advancing in a close, compact 
 line, followed at a suitable distance by second and third 
 lines of battle, will seldom or ever give the Defender the 
 chance of making a successful counter-attack until the fire 
 f the troops in position at the most telling range has shaken 
 The only circumstances which will justify the Defender 
 assuming the offensive before he has made the most of 
 his fire to give the enemy a warm reception, are faults in 
 
. 
 
 HO Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 the dispositions made by the latter, or a gap in the advanc- 
 ing line occasioned by want of instruction on the part of his 
 troops ; in short, mere accidents. Even if in the course of 
 the action it should appear likely that the effect produced 
 by the fire would not be as great as was perhaps expected 
 beforehand, as the defender promised to himself from his 
 position (which in such a case must have been ill-chosen), 
 it still remains more than doubtful whether a change of pur- 
 pose, a relinquishment of the defensive for the offensive, 
 would offer a better prospect than a consistent execution of 
 the original plan, even if that were not absolutely the best 
 which might have been adopted. It generally answers bet- 
 ter in war to go through steadily with what you have deter- 
 mined on doing, than to fly off suddenly to some other 
 scheme, even if you think that the latter might have 
 answered better from the beginning. If, then, we have once 
 accepted battle on the Defensive-Offensive, let us carry it out, 
 until a counter-attack has, at least comparatively, the best 
 chance of success. 
 
 But the case is different when it is a question of taking 
 advantage of manifest errors on the part of the assailant. 
 An active Defender should not neglect such opportunities, 
 but the counter stroke will then assume the character of a 
 sortie, not that of a real change to decisively offensive 
 action. Unless disorder, want of energy, and other faults 
 have shown themselves unmistakably on the part of the 
 attacking force, it will never be advisable for the Defensive- 
 Offensive force to sally forth directly from its position with 
 the troops which had been told off for passive Defence. 
 
 And even for the partial sorties it will be advisable not to 
 employ the troops actually holding the position, but only 
 their "outer" reserves, particularly cavalry, and to recall 
 them as soon as the short sally has had its effect. 
 
 The counter-attack, if made immediately after the assail- 
 ant's final rush, does not at least suffer from not having 
 waited for the effects of effective preparatory defensive-fire, 
 as do premature sallies, such as above alluded to. 
 
I The Stage of Counter- Attack. 1 1 1 
 
 We pointed out in the previous chapter that an attacking 
 >rce, even if successful, is not in a very favorable condition 
 for withstanding an attack, which consideration leads to 
 making dispositions calculated to help the assailant through 
 his period of weakness, but as in any case there is some 
 ifficulty in bringing the reinforcements (the third line of 
 attle) into action at the right time, this moment will always 
 decidedly the most favorable for the defender's counter- 
 roke. 
 
 Whenever then it is not possible to fall with fresh troops 
 pon the flank of the enemy just as he is advancing to the 
 auit, this second opportunity will be used for the pur- 
 se. 
 
 According to old tactical rules, the flank attack was of 
 universal application, because obstacles in front of the posi- 
 ion generally hindered any movement in that direction. 
 
 From measures of this description arise those long-pro- 
 tracted struggles for localities which distinguished the Na- 
 poleonic wars, and which now, partly indeed for other 
 reasons beside that above given, have become so much less 
 frequent. The rule that the defender should charge the 
 assailant when he gets within 30 paces on open ground is 
 also based upon the same theory. 
 
 It cannot be denied that the front attack offers less 
 chance of decisive success than the flank attack, because 
 the latter has the unmistakable advantages first, of being 
 executed on troops which have been more cut up before- 
 hand ; secondly, as the passive Defence co-operates to the 
 last moment, of being able to bring larger forces into play; 
 and lastly, of drawing at once the assailant's supporting 
 troops, themselves the object of attack, into a partnership 
 of loss with their advanced line, thus depriving the com- 
 mander of the attack of the advantage of having his reserves 
 at his disposal. 
 
 Having thus indicated the opportunities, or the opportu- 
 nity for action, it now remains to make the best of them. 
 
 ; 
 
H2 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 This problem, which to us appears the most difficult in 
 the difficult art of command, resolves itself into the follow- 
 ing question; In what part of the position should the troops 
 intended to make the counter-attack be drawn up ? 
 
 Unfortunately, the answer which we find so commonly 
 given in manuals and essays as a complete solution, although 
 it be undoubtedly accurate, is by no means exhaustive ; this 
 answer being that you should place the troops referred to 
 under cover, where they will, as far as can be foreseen, be 
 required, and near enough to come to the scratch at the 
 right moment. 
 
 There are, doubtless, in all military operations, great and 
 small, a vast number of questions which must be left to the 
 judgment, acuteness, and genius of the commander to de- 
 cide ; but it is difficult to name a point upon which theory 
 can give so little guidance as upon this particular one. We 
 do not claim the merit of supplying this want. What we 
 have above said about the most favorable moment for the 
 counter-attack will show that we consider the most desira- 
 ble post for the troops which are to make it, to be in rear of 
 a flank of the position, thus at the same time any turning 
 movement or flank attack being best provided against. But 
 under certain conditions the counter-stroke may also be 
 dealt upon the enemy's flank from a position between two 
 of the main points of occupation, and this is the object 
 which we must try our utmost to attain. But having said 
 this, almost everything is exhausted which we can contribute 
 to the subject, and we conclude with no other answer but 
 that it depends upon circumstances whether we place the 
 troops in question behind one or both wings, whether we 
 place them in the center eventually or at first, how near to 
 the front line, &c., &c.* 
 
 But because this was so, and is so, and because it must 
 surely be granted that the officer who, acting "according to 
 
 * These "circumstances" themselves usually depend upon the choice of a position, 
 and upon its offensive capabilities, subjects which do not now concern us. 
 
The Stage of Counter- Attack. 113 
 
 circumstances," hits upon the very best course, is a some- 
 what rare creature, therefore we said above : the change ..of 
 form of action necessary for the counter-stroke, makes the 
 Defensive- Offensive so remarkably difficult, and everj/thing 
 connected with it is so dependent on "circumstances," that 
 we must reject it as a form of action to be recommended on 
 principle. We will not deny or fail to recognise that in 
 theory the attractions of the Defensive- Offensive as a tactical 
 principle in many ways surpass those of the pure Offensive ; 
 but when you come to practice, so many "it's" and "but's" 
 into play, that but little of the fascination remains. 
 
 K 
 It is not too much to say that only a general with the most 
 rfect eye, and troops the most thoroughly capable of 
 manoeuvering appear fit to undergo this ordeal. 
 
 Only once did even a Napoleon carry out this change of 
 form in the middle of a battle, and that was at Austerlitz ; 
 the number of instances, however, in which even a so-called 
 
 Bctorious Defensive army has been stopped by the difficul- 
 :s of the second part of its task, so that the battle in con- 
 quence remained undecided, almost equals the number of 
 the defensive battles themselves.* 
 
 All that we have said remains unaltered by the fact that 
 our battles and combats of the present day fought with arms 
 and masses of men unheard of since the invention of gun- 
 powder, will lead more often than formerly to a compara- 
 tively indecisive measuring of strength, more seldom than 
 formerly to a victory which really annihilates the enemy, 
 because both daylight and strength must fail before the way 
 can be properly prepared for the decisive onslaught, and 
 because both sides remain too much exhausted to begin 
 again next day. And the cases which will be of more fre- 
 quent occurrence now than formerly, of masses being com- 
 pelled to fight entirely on the Defensive, without any hope 
 
 * Some of Wellington's battles may be quoted as successful instances of the Defen- 
 sive-Offensive; notably Salamanca, where the "second part of the task" was well per- 
 formed. (Tr.) 
 
114 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 of gaining a real victory, but simply with the intention of 
 maintaining themselves in the position which they have 
 taken up, will make no alteration in these principles. 
 
 (Such combats may be called covering actions, for instance 
 against sorties or attempts at relief.) 
 
 We must, however, always strive for a decisive result, and 
 the only unalterable task of theory is to point out the way 
 to arrive at such. 
 
 But if, as a deduction from this, it should be asserted that 
 in future all combats will assume the form of action in which 
 both parties take the Offensive, this must to a certain extent 
 be allowed.* Battles in which both sides take the Offensive 
 ( Rencontreschlacht ), and the attack and defence of fortresses 
 and entrenched camps were the only forms of warfare be- 
 fore powder came as an agent so completely in favor of the 
 Defence, which character it no longer continues to retain. 
 
 But if, speaking generally, victory should be the object of 
 every battle, it is evident how extremely important it must 
 be to deprive the enemy of his initiative for attack. 
 
 Thus, the study of the Defensive-Offensive brings us back 
 at last to the purest Offensive. 
 
 The principles which present themselves to us as a conse- 
 quence of this study of the second stage of the Defensive- 
 Offensive are pretty much as follows: 
 
 1. The Defensive- Offensive must carefully separate the 
 troops intended for the two purposes of Defence and Coun- 
 ter-attack ; allotting to the former as far as possible a mini- 
 mum of force, if the position be favorable. 
 
 2. The. strong main-body is intended to deal the coiwiter- 
 stroke best of all on the enemy's flank just as he is advanc- 
 ing to storm the position ; otherwise, at least as soon as pos- 
 sible after the assailant has actually forced his way in ; only 
 
 * Reasons for assuming the Defensive are given above, and what has been said of 
 Its consequences is not without a weakening tendency. 
 
Some Remarks on Drill. 115 
 
 as an exceptional case, when the assailant makes gross mis- 
 takes or shows timidity, should the counter-attack be made 
 before the fire of the Defence has had its full effect. 
 
 3. The counter-attack as an act of offence is governed en- 
 tirely, both as to form and execution, by the same princi- 
 ples which regulate the attack, that is to say, it should be 
 
 [uick, concentrated, and energetic. 
 
 4. The position chosen for the body of troops intended to 
 ake the counter-attack, is one of the most difficult as well 
 
 s one of the most important problems which a commander 
 as to solve. Being entirely dependent on circumstances 
 or time and place, the offensive return can only produce a 
 ecisive result if made at the right moment. This consid- 
 ration must guide the commander in selecting a position, 
 nd also in deciding upon the further dispositions and orders 
 hich are certain to be required. The only principle which 
 an be laid down is to keep the troops concealed under 
 over, if possible behind a flank. 
 
 5. The combination of defence and counter-attack, and 
 he necessary transition from one to the other are of such 
 irect and decisive consequence to the Defensive- Offensive, 
 hat this form of action is only to be recommended if the 
 
 commander be thoroughly competent and the troops ex- 
 tremely fit to manoeuvre. 
 
 III. SOME REMARKS ON DRILL. 
 
 All that we have since said on the Defence has not in the 
 least affected the assertion made in our chapter on the 
 Offensive, that extended order had become practically the 
 only fighting formation for infantry. We find the line of 
 skirmishers, the swarm of skirmishers as much in the Defence 
 as in the Attack, nay, even more generally and imperatively 
 required in the former than in the latter; and in the former 
 also more than in the latter, the company column comes 
 into the foreground as the actual foundation of skirmishing 
 
 into 
 
n6 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 order. It must be admitted that in the Defence the company 
 is, almost without exception, to be regarded as the tactical 
 unit, whilst in the Attack this cannot everywhere be allowed. 
 All the deductions, then, in respect of drill formations which 
 were drawn from these premises at the conclusion of the 
 second chapter would here have simply to be repeated ; but 
 we may mention that the requirements of the Defence furnish 
 further arguments in favor of the three-deep formation, and 
 of the subdivision of the company into four parts resulting 
 from it. 
 
 It would be hardly necessary to revert again to the drill 
 regulations, were we not bound to say a few words upon a 
 subject so intimately connected with the Defence which is 
 based upon the action of firearms, as the volley, a form of 
 fire which has been warmly recommended for defensive pur- 
 poses. 
 
 The extraordinary effect, particularly on the morale 
 which the sudden discharge of a great shower of bullets at 
 the same moment is apt to produce upon an enemy under 
 certain conditions, is assuredly not undervalued by us, lay- 
 ing stress, as we often have done, upon the effects of even 
 unaimed fire. 
 
 On the contrary, and just because we so much value this 
 powerful agent, we desire for the troops which have to make 
 use of it, the adoption of a formation which will expose 
 them less than that of compact close order, the only one 
 hitherto imagined for this purpose, to the especially severe 
 losses which may be expected at those particular moments. 
 It will, in future, be almost impossible to bring up to the 
 front, or to direct lines in close order at such moments as 
 demand the volley, and indeed this has already been proved, 
 except in the case of quite small detachments under pecu- 
 liarly favorable conditions. As a means of training we may, 
 and indeed we should continue to practice this old-estab- 
 lished form, but we can only employ the volley in action, 
 when feasible, from extended order by signal. A shrill 
 
Some Remarks on Drill. 117 
 
 whistle of the leader of the line or swarm of skirmishers, of 
 the clump or group, gives, as far as it can be heard, the signal 
 to make "ready," or, as the case may be, to "cease firing," 
 even when rapid independent firing is going on ; the whistle 
 repeated after that for the "ready" is the signal to "com- 
 mence firing," which every soldier must at once obey, at 
 least every one who can fire without hurting his neighbor. 
 This requires drill. 
 
 There is nothing new in this at bottom, but it is well that 
 it should become matter of regulation. 
 
 Lastly, the question of the square belongs also to the do- 
 main of Defence. From all we have been saying about the 
 fighting formation for infantry, it cannot be doubted that we 
 consider the square an impossibility as long as the enemy's 
 guns and rifles are within effective range. The smaller de- 
 tachments will sometimes have to form "clumps," but the 
 battalion square can only now be used when hostile cavalry 
 masses come on without the support of the other arms ; cer- 
 tainly a rare, if not an impossible case. 
 
 One more remark may be here permitted, although it does 
 not actually concern infantry field-exercise. In treating 
 both of Offensive and of Defensive-Offensive, we have dwelt 
 much less than was thought formerly necessary, particularly 
 in the early days of the breech-loader, upon the importance 
 of avoiding the so-called "waste of ammunition." 
 
 In fact, it is one of the most important advantages of the 
 breech-loader, that it can fire away a great quantity of am- 
 munition, and war experience has taught us that, far differ- 
 ently to what was in other days the case, we must now take 
 count of chance hits and unaimed shots. 
 
 The arm is equal to the task, the frequently momentous 
 results of its fire are well-established ; it remains to supply 
 the ammunition. 
 
 Constant and plentiful relays of ammunition are a neces- 
 sity of life for infantry now-a-days, which necessity must be 
 
H8 
 
 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 supplied. We must not omit all notice of this point in these 
 remarks on drill, although it does not strictly belong to our 
 subject. Besides the circumstance that the relation between 
 gun and ammunition wagon is a subject of artillery-regula- 
 tion, may also serve to show that the above observation is 
 not out of place. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE TEMPORISING COMBAT (THE DEMONSTRATIVE). 
 
 IN the first chapter of this study, we pointed out the dif- 
 ference between fighting which aims at a decisive result and 
 that which does not do so, whilst in the two succeeding 
 chapters we gave a sufficient illustration of the decisive 
 forms of action, as far as general principles are concerned, 
 so that we think we may here dispense with further argu- 
 ment. 
 
 It is indeed difficult to imagine a more striking contrast 
 than exists between those endeavors to annihilate the enemy 
 based upon the most extreme energy in offence, or upon 
 the most stubborn tenacity in defence, and the objects 
 aimed at in the action with which we now have to deal, 
 namely, to gain time, or to occupy, perhaps to hold a cer- 
 tain point, if possible without fighting. 
 
 In our chapters on the Offensive and on the Defensive- 
 Offensive, we alluded to the necessity of an "introductory" 
 phase of action, as enabling the commander to come to a 
 right decision as to the course to be pursued ; in the period 
 preceding this "introductory" stage, reconnoissances will 
 be required which will usually bring those making them 
 into collision with the enemy's outposts. The commander 
 who wishes to avoid a decisive operation, or to escape if 
 possible the consequences of one which has turned out 
 badly, can only do so by means of a rear-guard ; and so on. 
 
 All detachments intended for these "introductory," "re- 
 connoitring," "outpost," or "rear-guard," purposes, in fact, 
 
120 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 all troops meant to carry on "la petite guerre," act so far in 
 the same manner that they neither desire to, can, or ought 
 to bring things to the crisis of destroying or being destroyed 
 (at any rate this may always be said of one side). 
 
 Nevertheless, as in war, the fact of our opponent not 
 wishing a thing to happen is sufficient reason for the other 
 to desire it, these tasks will very rarely be performed except 
 by force of arms. And after all, a decisive result lies at the 
 root of all military action. 
 
 To escape from this dilemma, requires, it must be con- 
 fessed, a different mode of handling troops than does the 
 clear and precise aiming at an actual result. If we search 
 for the characteristics common to all action of this kind, 
 for the means by which according to both practice and 
 theory, this difficult task of avoiding battle, at least by one 
 side, is to be accomplished, we shall find that all bodies of 
 troops thus employed will always make a show of adopting 
 either the Offensive or the Defensive form of action, so as, by 
 threatening the enemy with it, to deceive, mislead, and in- 
 duce him to take false steps. 
 
 The advanced-guard of an attacking force, which is lead- 
 ing the way with the view of making out the details of the 
 hostile position, will be compelled, in order to settle upon 
 the principal line of attack, to make at once a show of 
 being really the attacking force, for the purpose of mislead- 
 ing the enemy, and of tempting him to unmask his strength 
 early. 
 
 So also the outposts, or the rear-guard of the Defensive 
 force, in retiring upon the main position must here and 
 there make a show of intending to offer decided resistance, 
 so as to induce the assailant, if possible, to make a prema- 
 ture deployment, and to draw him after them in the desired 
 direction. Reconnoissances will often by false attacks, dis- 
 tract the enemy's attention from the point which is really 
 of importance. Rear-guards are very difficult to handle, 
 because they cannot always maintain the imposing attitude 
 

 The Temporising Combat (The Demonstrative). 121 
 
 required of them for the purpose of forcing the enemy to 
 make turning movements, or of delaying him in some other 
 way. 
 
 We may describe, in a few words, this sort of fight to be 
 something which appears different to what it is, and which 
 tries to be thought something different. 
 
 Feint, deceit, allurement, demonstration, are the life-ele- 
 icnts of this style of conflict, for which perhaps the Demon- 
 Dative, will be a more suitable comprehensive expression, 
 in the temporising Combat. 
 
 But as now the power of Striking and that of Resisting 
 e the only two strings of the instrument (the armed force), 
 id as the Offensive and Defensive are the only two notes of 
 :s music (Tactics) which are produced by these strings, 
 >thing remains to the Demonstrative but to use these notes 
 happy alternation. 
 
 Having seen that the Offensive cannot exist without an 
 [fusion of the Defensive, nor the Defensive without some in- 
 irmixture of the Offensive, it will now be recognised as the 
 
 >k of the Demonstrative to act sometimes offensively, at 
 thers defensively, so as to make the most of both the pri- 
 lary forms of action by the most judicious combination 
 
 >ssible ; in other words, to manoeuvre skilfully. 
 
 In order to be equal to this task, the fighting formation 
 lust needs be of a very flexible, mobile character, a for- 
 lation which will accommodate itself easily, and without 
 iction to all circumstances, taking advantage of these if 
 ivorable, and if not so evading the danger. 
 
 The Feint, with pliability soft as wax, requires very dif- 
 ferent combinations to the struggle for life and death, with 
 ethod hard and unyielding as iron. 
 
 On the part of the soldier mobility, on the part of the 
 officer, from highest to lowest, readiness to act on his own 
 responsibility and decision, are qualities indispensable to 
 uccess in these operations. Although we only wish here 
 
 success ir 
 
122 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 to speak particularly of Infantry, and the other arms do not 
 concern us, this seems the place to mention that all these 
 tasks are specially suited to well-armed Cavalry and Horse 
 Artillery, which have again, in the last wars, played so 
 prominent a part as advanced- and rear-guard. May they 
 then no longer stick at the word; the thing itself is of the 
 very greatest importance, and its performance affords the 
 most brilliant opportunities to genius, aptitude for war, and 
 fitness for command.* 
 
 But let us return to the Infantry. The two fundamental 
 requirements noticed as affecting the question of formation, 
 leave no room for doubt that Infantry can only meet them 
 by using the company column. 
 
 This formation is the basis of skirmishing, and only the 
 action of skirmishers carried to its fullest extent can per- 
 form for Infantry what the Demonstrative requires. Any 
 order more or less close, of itself leads to decisive action, 
 which extended order alone gives the power to avoid, and 
 at the same time to threaten. 
 
 We here contrast close and extended order with reference 
 to the employment of individual portions of the battle 
 array, not as above, when in contrasting mass and individual 
 formations we referred to the employment of the individual 
 man. 
 
 In this sense, we say, extended order alone can be employed 
 successfully in the Demonstrative, viewing it as the exact 
 opposite to close order as required, speaking generally, in the 
 Offensive and Defensive-Offensive; extended order alone 
 enables us to evacuate a defensive position without incur- 
 ring a defeat ; it alone admits of an attacking movement 
 without being exposed to the evils of a repulse. 
 
 This first main requirement of the Demonstrative will have 
 the further consequence, that in all such combats troops 
 must be spread out over a broader front than with the two 
 
 * In this Infantry -study there can be no question of the employment of Cavalry in 
 battle. 
 
The Temporising Combat {The Demonstrative). 123 
 
 main forms of action, each of which in its way, sets so high 
 a value upon concentration. 
 
 The object of all these engagements is, according to cir- 
 cumstances, to gain a sight of the enemy or to hinder him 
 from seeing you. Both objects, however, always require a 
 certain extension of front, but may almost and entirely dis- 
 pense with depth of formation, because the Demonstrative 
 force nowhere wishes to be a prime agent, and at the same 
 time the main body, the great mass of the host of which it 
 is only a fraction, is coming up behind it. 
 
 Still, the greater the numbers the less will it be able to 
 dispense entirely with some sort of reserve. But when 
 compared with the decisive forms of action, the Demonstrative 
 will only present the mere image of a first line, and of a 
 reserve held back to meet a case of extremity. 
 
 The more this tendency to extension of front makes itself 
 felt, the more difficult unity of command will of course be- 
 come, the more capable of independent action must be the 
 fractions which stand side by side. The Commanding 
 Officer's task can therefore only be specified in a very gen- 
 eral manner ; it cannot, as in the'cases of Attack and Defence, 
 be distinctly determined by having a special point assigned 
 to take or to hold ; again, subordinate officers will not have, 
 as in those cases, their allotted parts to play, but only gen- 
 eral directions, and this rule will probably hold good down 
 to the lowest grades, each individual perhaps getting the 
 chance of solving the whole problem by himself. 
 
 A patrol which reaches the favorable point from whence 
 the hostile position can be surveyed, a picket which hinders 
 a mischievous reconnoissance, a weak detachment in ad- 
 vance of a defensive position, or in a rear-guard action 
 which compels the opponent's force to deploy, has done all 
 that could be expected of it, and it will be able to do this 
 under certain circumstances, for the object to be attained is 
 not so much to win the fight itself, as to gain time or some 
 local advantage. 
 
1 24 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 Even if the one detachment which accomplishes this be 
 destroyed, all the other troops at hand merely demonstra- 
 ting, the task will yet have been executed. 
 
 Would this be possible except by using totally different 
 formations and dispositions to those applicable to the great 
 decisive battles of the masses ? 
 
 Having established as the most judicious form of action 
 that of a line of independent company columns with greater 
 or smaller intervals, each company furthering the common 
 object to the best of its ability, the indirect manner in which 
 they will co-operate will explain itself. These small bodies 
 righting side by side will each be too weak either of itself to 
 make directly a real attack or a serious resistance, but they 
 will play into one another's hands by mutual action on the 
 flanks. Each will send forth its skirmishers, opening a very 
 heavy fire wherever the enemy shows himself in force, but 
 quickly avoiding his attack, to try the same game anew at 
 another place if he assumes the offensive, or tries to hold 
 his opponent fast by an obstinate resistance. 
 
 These partial engagements take the place of that unity of 
 action which is only found in carrying out the general plan 
 of operations ; hence, however, the risk of partial defeats. 
 
 However damaging such a check may be to the particular 
 enterprise in hand, it is but of secondary importance in 
 itself, and only becomes dangerous when the commander in 
 rear gives way to the temptation of trying to extricate a 
 detachment thus compromised, and in this manner is very 
 likely to become involved in a serious engagement against 
 his own will, and contrary to the general object of his opera- 
 tions, which should always be kept clearly in view.* 
 
 It may seem a hard thing to say, but still it should be 
 
 * At Spicheren, Worth, and Borny, the German commanders became involved in 
 serious engagements against their own will, in consequence of the initiative taken 
 by the leaders of their advanced guards. In each case they supported the detach- 
 ment compromised, and the result was most satisfactory, because the action of the 
 advanced guards, though in two cases, at least, premature, was on the whole con- 
 sistent with the general object of the operations. (TR.) 
 
The Temporising Combat (The Demonstrative.} 125 
 
 established as a principle, that the captains to whom be- 
 longs the honor of these fights, must undertake them at 
 their own risk and on their own responsibility. 
 
 They will get support from the neighboring companies 
 in line with them, but must not reckon upon any from the 
 rear. 
 
 It stands to reason that we do not mean to imply that it 
 should be an absolute and imperative rule that on no ac- 
 count is one company to be kept back behind another, that 
 all must be scattered into one long line of skirmishers, and 
 so forth. We have only meant to treat the question in the 
 abstract, and all that should be deduced from what we have 
 said amounts simply to this : the Demonstrative neither 
 knows nor ought to know either the recklessness of the 
 Attack a outrance, which is ready to venture all, or the 
 tenacity of the obstinate Defence which is prepared to sacri- 
 fice all. 
 
 The Demonstrative will have to vary and modify its action 
 in a hundred different ways according to its special task, to 
 its absolute and relative strength, to the nature of the 
 ground, and to the enemy's measures, for which reason we 
 name a flexible formation as that best suited to it. And so 
 we sum up as follows: 
 
 1. Every body of troops engaged in decisive operations 
 requires to have a number of secondary tasks executed be- 
 yond their scope, and both before and after them. Such 
 tasks are rarely to be performed except by force of arms, 
 yet have but little to do with the final object of every real 
 battle, namely, decisive victory. 
 
 All these reconnoitring, outpost, advanced, and rear-guard 
 actions may be comprehended in the term Demonstrative 
 combats. 
 
 2. It is to the interest of every force intended for decisive 
 action to employ only as few troops as possible, and only 
 the infantry absolutely necessary to gain the object in view. 
 
. 1 26 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 3. These troops will sometimes act offensively, at other 
 times defensively, but as they never aim at a decisive result, 
 and as their task is always rather to gain time and room, 
 they never make a real attack or a real defence. 
 
 4. To perform the work required of them their formation 
 should be very flexible, and with more front than depth, 
 only consisting of one line, with maybe a reserve held back. 
 The line of company columns with skirmishers will be the 
 best formation for the purpose. 
 
 5. With this looseness of formation the chief Commander 
 can only give general directions to the different independent 
 fractions, and eventually come up to their support. The 
 result will depend more than in any other situation upon 
 the subordinate officers ; indeed, at times, it may be brought 
 about by any one of them. 
 
 6. The operation will always, on the whole, be only an 
 indirect one, for all direct action involves the danger, against 
 which there is and can be no remedy of leading to the un- 
 desired crisis. Success will depend solely on the skill with 
 which detachments acting side by side play into each other's 
 hands. 
 
 So much for principles; one word more to conclude: 
 
 When we first in this study explained the difference be- 
 tween combats aiming at a decisive result and those not 
 doing so, we pointed out the great importance of drawing 
 the same distinction in the general principles of instruction 
 for our infantry, and we think that a nearer consideration 
 of the various formations has served to prove the correct- 
 ness of our views. 
 
 The Demonstrative requires nothing in the way of drill in 
 addition to what was noted for the two main forms of action, 
 it simply ratifies their wants in this respect. But if we only 
 picture to ourselves superficially (and our treatment of the 
 subject in this place can only be superficial, as we cannot 
 here enlarge upon the training of our troops), the demands 
 
The Temporising Combat (The Demonstrative). 127 
 
 which each of these modes of fighting makes upon our in- 
 fantry, we must confess that they necessarily vary accord- 
 ing to the object in view. 
 
 But we are inclined to think that the smaller objects are 
 more attended to in our peace-instruction than are the 
 greater. 
 
 Must that not, or at least may that not easily lead to seek- 
 ing great results where only small ones are to be found ? 
 
 In other words, may not our Field-exercise spoil our Fight- 
 ing? 
 
 The bold and vigorous features of the Offensive and De- 
 fensive-Offensive present a strong contrast to the delicately 
 shaded outline of the Demonstrative. 
 
 From the private to the captain, careful instruction in 
 details is the chief thing for all ranks ; that is to say, they 
 should be made good shots, be educated to a thorough 
 knowledge of how to take advantage of the ground, and to 
 a complete mastery of every tactical formation, also to quick 
 perception ; this training will culminate in the battalion- 
 commander's capacity for handling his companies, and all 
 this preliminary instruction will have its good effect further 
 on ; after this comes the training of masses from the battalion 
 up to the division. 
 
 Now, in our army, there is no want of guidance, zeal, or 
 in general of intelligence in carrying out the first part of 
 this course, and far be it from us to detract in any way from 
 the merit of our soldiers ; but for the last part of the course, 
 what we urgently want above all is more time. 
 
 The battalions of a regiment are assembled yearly for a 
 few days on the drill-ground, which may do, and the regi- 
 ments of a brigade are scrambled together somehow (yet 
 they, too, should learn how to manoeuvre). 
 
 But the division, the battle-unit, is assembled barely once 
 or twice a year. The manoeuvres as a rule represent only 
 
 or t 
 
128 
 
 Studies on the New Tactics of Infantry. 
 
 fighting in extended order, not the action of the masses at 
 the critical moment. 
 
 And yet is it not wonderfully difficult to know how to 
 bring the masses into play at the right time : to deploy 
 masses here and there when needed ; to combine the move- 
 ments of the masses ; in one word, to direct the masses ? 
 
 May we be able to find time and opportunity for these 
 lessons, lest war should have to teach us what we ought al- 
 ready to have learnt in peace, what like is Battle ! ! ! 
 
PART II. 
 
 THE PEACE SCHOOL 
 
(PREPARATION FOR WAR 
 IN PEACE). 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 WHEN we endeavored in the first part of these studies to 
 nd an answer to the question, what alterations in the Tac- 
 tics of Infantry have been forced upon us by the introduc- 
 tion of the improved arms now in use, our attention was 
 repeatedly drawn to the degree of tactical success which 
 may be attained in war by having previously, during peace, 
 made ourselves familiar with the necessary formations. 
 
 "The school of peace (war-training in time of peace) can 
 alone enable us to overcome the enormous friction of the 
 battle-field;" this is what we then at once recognised as a 
 fact; hence the following question would only appear to 
 be the natural sequel to the enquiry then commenced, 
 what effect will its results, with reference to formations 
 suitable to war, be calculated to produce in matter and 
 manner, upon the training of our infantry during peace ? It 
 must at once be admitted that the new order of things has 
 raised to no inconsiderable extent the demands which must 
 be made as well upon the soldier individually as upon a 
 body of troops collectively and upon its leaders up to the 
 very highest grade. 
 
132 Preparation for War in Peace. 
 
 Extended order, which is acknowledged to be now the 
 only possible fighting formation, requires higher qualities 
 than were ever before expected in the private soldier ; the 
 extension of the sphere of danger renders it necessary for a 
 body of troops to be more capable of manoeuvring than 
 ever; the increased complication of command in battle, 
 together with the more than heretofore irrevocable nature 
 of its results, require on the part of the leaders a well- 
 trained tactical judgment, all the more that they have both 
 to deal much oftener with elements strange to them, and 
 always to operate with much greater masses, than in other 
 days. 
 
 Now although there is nothing positively new either in 
 the formations alluded to or in the educational require- 
 ments based upon them, nevertheless the influence, the 
 value, the importance of such training compared to what 
 was given in former days, are as much raised on the whole 
 as they are modified in matters of detail. And doubtless, 
 if our army wishes to maintain the pre-eminence now at- 
 tained in face of future foes, it must necessarily devote its 
 constant attention to this continual process of change, for 
 which reason a more complete enquiry into the question is 
 justified. 
 
 The most complete self-reliance on the part of the indi- 
 vidual soldier, the greatest power of manoeuvring on that of 
 the troops, combined with a good military eye on the part 
 of subordinate officers, and with thorough capacity for 
 directing the masses on the part of those in higher com- 
 mand ; these are the qualities which in the main form the 
 groundwork for that successful unity of action which leads 
 to victory. 
 
 To prepare beforehand all these elements of success is 
 the task, and by no means a light one, of our peace-training, 
 a task, however difficult, which must be accomplished if an 
 army is to be fitted to its work. Now the instruction of the 
 individual soldier in detail has been already for many years 
 a fundamental principle of our method of training during 
 
Introduction. 133 
 
 peace ; the practical field-manceuvres of our army enjoy an 
 European renown ; the theoretical preparatory teaching of 
 our officers is avowedly of a high standard ; upon all which 
 the results of three campaigns have impressed the stamp of 
 actual proof. 
 
 With such facts before us we may be justified in main- 
 taining that the fundamental principles of our peace-training 
 should continue stedfast and immovable, whilst only such 
 modifications should be made as experience has shown to 
 be necessary. Above all let us be careful not to meddle 
 with any part of what our peace school has so pre-eminently 
 contributed towards the creation of discipline, of patriotism, 
 of the love of honor, in short to the moral phase of military 
 education. 
 
 We, who have here only to do with tactical training, are 
 simply called upon to enquire how far what has hitherto 
 been aimed at, and accomplished, in this way during peace, 
 has approved itself in war, and consequently what improve- 
 ments may be made therein. For, however great may be 
 the pleasure with which we look back to the success ob- 
 tained, a careful examination of our tactics will reveal much 
 to the impartial eye of the critic which might well have 
 been different. And we cannot be surprised that such was 
 and is the case when we consider that the collossal technical 
 alterations which the present age has brought forth were 
 tried for the first time practically against one another in the 
 war of 1870-71, and that it would have been more than rash 
 to throw over a well-tried system of peace-training on ac- 
 count of mere theoretical speculations. 
 
 Now, however, we are in a position to estimate by means 
 of the scale of experience the length and breadth of the 
 edifice which it is necessary to erect. But measuring by 
 this scale what has been already accomplished and what re- 
 mains to be done, we cannot but admit that, however com- 
 plete and sufficient the training of our soldiers, non-com- 
 missioned officers, and subalterns has proved itself to be, as 
 
 
134 
 
 Preparation for War in Peace. 
 
 far as the sphere of operations of each individual extends, 
 they have often, very often been wanting in a clear and 
 comprehensive intelligence of how to co-operate for a com- 
 mon end ; moreover, however well acquainted our captains, 
 field officers, and generals have shown themselves with the 
 requirements of war generally and with the conduct of 
 troops in action particularly, they have met with great, often 
 insurmountable difficulties in making their respective com- 
 mands fit into the great battle-frame as parts of one and the 
 same picture. 
 
 Making therefore all due acknowledgment of what was 
 accomplished in detail, we cannot avoid confessing that the 
 tactical errors of our infantry were numerous, very numer- 
 ous, and more especially so where things were on a larger 
 scale, which errors may entirely be laid to the charge of a 
 system of instruction in peace which fails to meet the re- 
 quirements of modern battle, requirements which, to be sure, 
 have only quite lately made themselves felt. 
 
 To what other cause but to insufficient familiarity with 
 and practice in such matters, for theories have never been 
 wanting, can the following effects be attributed ; that we so 
 often saw our Infantry rush headlong to the charge without 
 giving our Artillery sufficient time or opportunity to pre- 
 pare the way ; that great bodies of troops trickled away into 
 action before completing their march into line of battle; 
 that detachments standing or fighting side by side made 
 their attacks independently of one another instead of in 
 combination; that comparatively weak bodies (advanced 
 guards, for instance) assumed an extension of front far more 
 than commensurate with their strength, and that separate 
 battalions, companies, even at last divisions, breaking away 
 here and there from their "stem," and seeking each its own 
 way, doubled in, attacked, made turning movements, pur- 
 sued, each "on its own hook," until utterly breathless, and 
 with ammunition expended, they found themselves at the 
 opposite end of the battle-field. And how many more such 
 examples might be given ! 
 

 Introduction. 135 
 
 We must freely admit that faults of this sort became less 
 frequent as the war went on, that our Infantry acquired on 
 the battle-fields the routine in which it had been at first in 
 this respect deficient ; but it appears to us that this very 
 fact should all the more induce us to regulate our work in 
 peace in such a manner that such-like improvements should 
 no longer remain to be made in war, and that the "peace- 
 school" of the future may steer clear of error as it may do, 
 if it takes for its guide the well-considered lessons of the 
 late war, fruitful as they are of instruction, and conclusive, 
 at any rate, for the immediate future. 
 
 But let us not flatter ourselves with the hope that the war- 
 experience just gained will alone be sufficient to fulfill this 
 object. Even if it were kept longer in view than is avow- 
 edly the case during the "piping times of peace," the value 
 of its lessons is often very problematical unless sifted and 
 regulated by criticism. 
 
 Final deductions from "personal experiences" often take 
 a wonderfully false twist. For instance, we saw how after 
 1866 a man, with an otherwise clear and observing mind, 
 and one which extracted much that was true, went so far in 
 his "Retrospect" as to assert, with many believers, that the 
 right course for infantry to follow was to fight in future 
 " like a horde of savages ! " 
 
 If just now at least, when recent events are still fresh in 
 our memory, such a doctrine will no longer find many dis- 
 ciples, and the elimination, on principle, of all superior 
 direction will hardly at this moment be a maxim of even 
 the most fanatical theorist, it is advisable nevertheless to 
 oppose to it a firmer barrier than that of mere "individual 
 war-experience." There is only one sure way of preserving 
 ourselves in future from a relapse into such erroneous doc- 
 trine, the facile offspring of "personal experiences," and 
 that way is to have fixed precepts founded upon the wants of 
 war. 
 
 Let us then sum up the objects we are aiming at : 
 
136 Preparation for War in Peace. 
 
 The foundation of our peace-school has approved itself 
 throughout, but the building which we have at once to erect 
 upon this base must be calculated to render the same ser- 
 vice to the altered tactics of the present day as was ren- 
 dered by the old edifice to those of an earlier period. 
 
 In other words, battle as it is now must again be the prin- 
 cipal object of our peace-training, just as battle, as it was 
 then, used to be the principal object of our training in former 
 days. Again, to be in keeping with the phraseology of the 
 first part of these studies, we will say : 
 
 Our peace-instruction should make a more radical distinc- 
 tion than has been done hitherto between the Decisive and 
 the Demonstrative* forms of action. 
 
 We do not conceal from ourselves that great, but we think 
 not insurmountable, difficulties stand in the way of this 
 modern "labor of peace." If we shall always find much 
 which bears upon such work to be totally unrepresentable 
 in peace; if first and foremost the necessity of more costly 
 and more frequent gatherings of great masses of troops 
 must be accepted, there will yet be much, very much to be 
 done in the way of preparation in the earlier and even in 
 the earliest stages of our instruction in addition to those 
 "great reviews" of the great Frederick which seem to have 
 been revived. 
 
 And to that army which gained such great successes on 
 the bettle-fields of the late war by its invincible spirit, and 
 by pouring forth its best heart's blood, the faculty will hardly 
 be denied of raising in peace-time its new tactics to the 
 level of its well-proved strategy, and of assigning to the art 
 of fighting battles the place which it ought to hold amongst 
 the other qualities which that army so eminently possesses. 
 If we keep the object aimed at in view, to make progress 
 with the training of the soldier both individually and col- 
 
 * The skirmishing-tactics which originated in 1870-71 differ as much from the col- 
 umn tactics of Napoleon, as these differed from the line-tactics of Frederick ; it remains 
 for us to develop the new system as far as the strength of man will admit. 
 
Introduction. 137 
 
 lectively, and then with the higher instruction of the officers, 
 we shall perhaps succeed, by making desirable modifications 
 and improvements in these respects, in working up before- 
 hand for the great field-manoeuvres a material by means of 
 which these representations of war will make as near an ap- 
 proach to reality as can possibly be attained in peace. 
 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 / 
 
 THE TRAINING OF SOLDIERS INDIVIDUALLY AND 
 COLLECTIVELY. 
 
 IN face of modern requirements it is no longer allowable 
 to follow the old custom of fixing upon a certain proportion 
 of matter the infusion of which would convert a man into a 
 perfect soldier. 
 
 Mechanical proficiency in externals, formerly of such 
 primary importance, has lost its value in the same propor- 
 tion as the soldier has ceased to be merely a wheel in the 
 great military machine, and even where, as for instance in 
 the use of the rifle, greater mechanical proficiency than ever 
 is required of him, yet after all it is the independent and 
 judicious use of the art of shooting by each individual which 
 is the pith of the whole thing. The amount of actual matter 
 which is drilled into a soldier no longer forms the only, 
 hardly indeed even the main criterion of efficiency, which 
 has come to depend much more upon his moral and intel- 
 lectual qualities. 
 
 It will be hard to find anyone now who will be inclined to 
 assign positive limits to the amount of what a soldier should 
 know and be able to do, after which his military education 
 may be considered complete, for the flexibility of modern 
 tactics makes such an estimate of proficiency simply im- 
 possible. Hence it is evident, and was indeed evident be- 
 fore our last experiences, that with a system of short ser- 
 vice during peace, and viewing the question of training sim 
 ply from the point of view of a soldier, we are dealing, and 
 
The Training of Soldiers. 1 39 
 
 can only deal with a relative minimum of instruction with 
 which we must needs be satisfied ; on the other hand, also, 
 that with the existing terms of service the instructor must 
 endeavor to attain as far as possible at each moment of pro- 
 gressive development a certain relatively serviceable degree 
 of efficiency which would render his men at any time imme- 
 diately fit for use. 
 
 In order to gain a clearer view of this point without at 
 present going into the question of the means to be em- 
 ployed in military training its substance and the final result 
 let us place before ourselves an ideal to be attained by it 
 in working up a certain specified material. 
 
 To bring the man as individual combatant, and the indi- 
 viduals as joint combatants, to the highest possible pitch of 
 warlike efficiency (fighting-capacity), to make soldiers of 
 them, and of these soldiers to form organized bodies, such 
 are the material objects of military training; to raise both 
 the individual and the body of men at the same time to the 
 moral level of their task, is the aim of military education an 
 aim to be pursued from the very first, and to be regarded as 
 on a par with the objects above mentioned. 
 
 So much for our aim ; now as regards the material out of 
 which so much that is great and difficult has to be fashioned. 
 This presents itself to us, as seen and judged from the tech- 
 nical standpoint, in the shape of a raw, i.e., totally unpre- 
 pared mass. 
 
 Without its being here necessary for us to enter into his- 
 torical dissertation and argument, it will doubtless be ad- 
 mitted that modern armies have, and must have, for their 
 foundation the "mass-levy" of the nation, of which the 
 great majority have up to the time of enrollment been en- 
 tirely strange to the use of arms. Whilst in former days 
 one was required only to form a limited number of profes- 
 sional soldiers, we are now called upon, under present con- 
 ditions, both directly and indirectly more difficult, to train 
 
140 Preparation for War in Peace. 
 
 the mass of the people during a short period of service, to 
 a higher standard of efficiency for war. 
 
 In face of such circumstances, the above-mentioned 
 necessity of being "satisfied with a minimum" has already 
 been long forced upon us ; but it becomes still more im- 
 perative when we compare actual circumstances with those 
 of the time just passed. The demands upon us, as we have 
 already pointed out in our introduction, have once more 
 been increased ; the time allotted for meeting them remains 
 the same. In deciding upon our future system of peace- 
 training, we cannot help recognising the greatest possible 
 reduction in the quantity of things taught, if we do not wish 
 to expose ourselves to a reduction of quality still more 
 prejudicial. It is therefore necessary to enquire how far 
 such reduction in amount of matter in favor of the mainte- 
 nance and, wherever possible, of the elevation of the stan- 
 dard of quality, may and ought to go ; also whether, and if 
 so, how this end may be promoted by the system of train- 
 ing. The further consideration of this important question 
 will lead us soon to a distinction hitherto perhaps not fully 
 appreciated between the warlike efficiency of soldiers as in- 
 dividuals and as a body. 
 
 For instance, it is not necessary, and, as one may sup- 
 pose, has never been necessary, because never obtainable, 
 that, for a body of troops to possess a general fitness for 
 war, each member should be equally prepared to perform 
 each one of the warlike tasks which that body may be 
 called upon to accomplish. 
 
 If even it must be admitted in theory that a force com- 
 posed only of perfectly-trained soldiers will produce the 
 most perfect results, yet this commonplace is entirely 
 worthless in practice, because based upon a mere Utopia of 
 the present day. With things as they actually are, the 
 question presents itself to us substantially in this wise ; 
 which body of troops is most fit for war, one composed of 
 soldiers who have undergone a certain equal average degree 
 
The Training of Soldiers. 141 
 
 of preparatory training for all the possible requirements of 
 war, or one the majority of whose members are prepared to 
 perform with sufficient sureness the principal and constantly- 
 recurring tasks which devolve upon soldiers in the field, 
 whilst only a smaller number are initiated in the more diffi- 
 cult and rarer operations of an indecisive character required 
 on actual service ? 
 
 That nowadays we have only these two alternatives before 
 us, that it is practically impossible in the two or three years 
 at our disposal for training our men to impart to every in- 
 fantry soldier a sufficient degree of efficiency in every pos- 
 sible situation of war, will, we think, be admitted without 
 further proof. 
 
 That man who only knows the outward forms and manip- 
 ulations of which he is to make use "under certain circum- 
 
 ances," is not a proficient in his calling or handicraft, but 
 only he who thoroughly understands their employment, and 
 therefore knows for certain and without doubt what he has 
 to do in each individual case. 
 
 But if a "peace-school," limited as to time, endeavors on 
 principle to train every soldier in every way as far as time 
 and circumstances allow, it is evident that such a course 
 must interfere with the higher instruction of those who are 
 gifted with more aptitude or taste for the business than the 
 less favorably endowed majority, and that in consequence 
 thereof only a certain average efficiency can naturally be 
 obtained as the general result. If then, as is always the 
 case, certain individuals stand above the common level, they 
 will hardly surpass by their achievements the many who 
 remain below the level, so far that on the whole there should 
 be a balance of gain. But the state of things will be very 
 different, and certainly more favorable, if, taking count of 
 individual aptitude in our peace training, we aim at attain- 
 ing for the body of troops collectively only what is abso- 
 lutely necessary in war, and proceed to the more difficult 
 tasks exclusively with those who have manifested real mili- 
 
142 Preparation for War in Peace. 
 
 tary aptitude, and these latter who shall have the power of 
 educating to a much higher standard than heretofore, or 
 without this classification ; whilst we shall gain time and 
 opportunity to prepare the remainder, constituting the great 
 majority, all the more thoroughly for their necessary labors. 
 If then at any time any unusual task devolves upon a corps, 
 the influence and example of the men who have been more 
 thoroughly instructed with' a view to the particular emer- 
 gency, will act upon the rest ; so that the general efficiency 
 aimed at will rather be increased than diminished. Our 
 argument, then, may be summed up as follows: Whilst 
 hitherto the edifice of our "peace-school" has been based 
 upon the idea of aiming at imparting to each infantry sol- 
 dier complete instruction, or at any rate instruction as 
 varied as possible, so that the general standard should be 
 raised by the sum of individual acquirements, we must now 
 endeavor to erect a system of classification upon the undis- 
 turbed foundation of our old traditions. 
 
 And to do this nothing fundamentally new is required ; 
 this system of voluntary restriction to a certain field of in- 
 struction has long been embodied with the best results in 
 our well-proved course of musketry instruction ; the evident 
 practical utility of forming an "upper class"* has already 
 long since accustomed the masses to this distinction in all 
 the different branches ; but nevertheless it will neither be 
 unadvisable or of little importance to proclaim this doctrine 
 clearly as the leading principle of our method of instruction, 
 so that there should be perfect certainty as to our object. 
 Only by doing this will it be possible to knock the too 
 idealistic principle of universal perfection on the head, a 
 principle which endangers our success by its experimental 
 tours de force. There can be no doubt that the course we 
 have pursued hitherto has been governed by a longing for 
 this "all-sidedness," as every possible formation imaginable, 
 every phase of combat has been shown to the young soldier 
 on the drill ground and at field exercise from his very first 
 
 * "Ausbildend," i.e., improving, receiving cultivation. (TK.) 
 
The Training of Soldiers. 143 
 
 year of service, the practice of the following years being 
 devoted to perfecting him in these lessons by repetition. 
 But if, in face of the constantly increasing claims upon us, 
 we must once for all give up the hope of attaining this end 
 with all our men, an intentional and well-considered system 
 of restriction must incontestably be preferred to trying how 
 far we can possibly get. That such an endeavor, if it does, 
 not really reach the acme, must rather operate prejudicially 
 than otherwise, manifests itself perhaps most clearly by the 
 example of the course of development given to our peace- 
 practice in fighting in extended order. 
 
 All our instructions, directions, and rules for guidance in 
 this branch of our duties date from a time when the first 
 commencement of a better armament, especially for our 
 own troops, imparted an increased importance to the action 
 of skirmishers in battle, although it still remained very far 
 indeed from being estimated on a par with the action of the 
 masses in close order. The situations of combat to which 
 we have applied the common term "demonstrative," were 
 naturally the only ones which could then be kept in view as 
 objects of all our instruction in skirmishing. The highest 
 possible development of the sharpshooter in this way passed 
 as over and above sufficient for the secondary part which he 
 had to play in the decisive engagements of columns. The 
 drill-ground, with its double columns on the center and skir- 
 mishers in the intervals, was our preparatory school for the 
 conflict of masses, in other words for battle : our field-exer- 
 cise* served to train light infantry for their secondary tasks. 
 
 The short campaign of 1866 against the muzzle-loader had 
 only immaterially disturbed these customary conditions of 
 peace when the next war came with totally different de- 
 mands on the army. 
 
 It cannot create surprise that, when the destructive effects 
 of the latest inventions placed before the eyes of every in- 
 
 * "Felddienstiibung," literally " Fieldservice-practice," which means a great deal 
 more in Germany than what we in England understand by "Field-exercise," and for 
 which we have hitherto had no fair equivalent either in word or deed. (Tn.) 
 
144 Preparation for War in Peace. 
 
 dividual the imperative necessity of breaking with all our 
 old battle-traditions, our leaders of high and low degree, 
 realising with quick determination the only possible change, 
 substituted "field-exercise" for the evolutions of the drill- 
 ground. 
 
 But battle in its present form is by no means field-exercise 
 magnified. 
 
 The use of masses in extended order for decisive action 
 has nothing in common with the employment of skirmishers 
 in extended order for demonstrative purposes. 
 
 All the above-mentioned tactical errors of our Infantry 
 are to be attributed to the fact of this distinction not hav- 
 ing been sufficiently recognised in the press and hurry of 
 the first moment, a distinction which has still been treated 
 as of little consequence in the peace-training subsequent to 
 the war, and which has now unexpectedly assumed decisive 
 importance. This complete distinction however lies, in our 
 opinion, in the radical difference* between demonstrative and 
 decisive action in battle with reference to the use of ground. 
 
 Whilst for instance in demonstrative combats a force is not 
 only justified in suiting and subordinating its action to the 
 ground, but also bound to do so, in a decisive battle it can 
 only seek to avail itself of the ground as far as possible and 
 to make the best use of it in the one decisive direction. 
 
 Our Infantry only acquired the former art at "field-exer- 
 cise"; whilst in the "field-manoeuvres" which generally rep- 
 resented only small affairs, we were usually of necessity 
 forced to recognise the ground as the ruling element, on 
 account of the weakness of the forces engaged, and in spite 
 of the "decisive ideas" which were, in truth, rather kept in 
 the background. Moreover the training preparatory to 
 battle continued to be restricted to the drill-ground, or, at 
 any rate, in the few days allotted to "division-exercises'* 
 there had not been sufficient opportunity or motive to get 
 out of the old rut. 
 
The Training of Soldiers. 145 
 
 Thus at the decisive moment the really needful was want- 
 ing in spite of all individual perfection. Hence arose the 
 practice on the part of our troops of splitting up for the 
 purpose of seeking more favorable ground, hence the exag- 
 gerated extension of front, the confused interminglement ; 
 all intimately connected with an idea to which our field- 
 exercise gave birth, that to take advantage of the ground is 
 synonymous with plenty of space, freedom, and independ- 
 ence of higher direction. 
 
 So it came to this that the distinction made on principle 
 between field-exercise and drill elevated to the utmost, so as 
 to give the best possible returns in both domains, ended by 
 producing difficulties in the battle-field which were only 
 successfully overcome by the high intelligence of our lead- 
 ers and the noble-self-sacrifice of our men. 
 
 All honor to the energy and skill with which these battles 
 were fought out, but we must not cite them as examples of 
 correct tactics, and we may depend upon it that our proba- 
 ble adversaries of the future have already reflected upon 
 this. A remedy is required, as we have already experienced, 
 and which we have sought after in war ; but now is specially 
 the time to find it during the leisure of peace, and the whole 
 army is anxiously searching for it. 
 
 Let us return to the question whether, by the tendency 
 hitherto in force towards "all-sidedness" (making our men 
 all equally good at everything), we shall attain our object. 
 We think not not at least until a length of time for train- 
 ing our men, which we can never indeed hope to command, 
 is placed at our disposal. 
 
 A method of instruction which, with short service, aims 
 at giving each recruit perfect, or at least sufficient, training 
 in every branch, which is calculated to seek for results only 
 in the sum of individual efforts instead of relying upon an 
 organised division of labor, must and will very soon sink so 
 far below the level of the requirements of war, which have 
 in the present day so prodigiously risen, that it will produce 
 
146 Preparation for War in Peace. 
 
 no longer any satisfactory result whatever. It therefore be- 
 hooves us to say, with concise decision, we require for the 
 new tactics more practice in manoeuvring than we have 
 hitherto had ; and we must contrive to spare the time for it, 
 as we can no longer expect the mass of individual soldiers 
 to be equal to all the emergencies of war. 
 
 The value of individual instruction on its own account 
 has increased, but it is no longer possible to arrive at this 
 intrinsic accession of value by cramming the individual sol- 
 dier with more material details ; we must, on the contrary, 
 rather do less in this way, so that, on the other hand, we 
 may be able to get more out of the body collectively. The 
 well-tested principles of training remain unaltered, only its 
 material tasks and aims require to be changed. A satis- 
 factory proficiency for all in the necessary, the greatest pos- 
 sible attainments for the more gifted ones in the desirable, 
 branches of a soldier's trade ; such must be the watch-word 
 for a system of short service. 
 
 What things should come under the head of the necessary 
 will hardly be a matter of doubt for anyone who has ac- 
 companied us through the first part of these studies. 
 
 The only possible decisive forms of combat, and of these 
 two, of course most specially the Offensive will be of con- 
 stant and unfailing occurrence, will come in the way of 
 every soldier-as long as war remains what it is ; in contrast 
 to these forms are the indecisive, proficiency in which is only 
 desirable, although you will perhaps meet in them greater 
 technical difficulties. 
 
 When now we go further into detail as to the knowledge 
 and acquirements requisite for these forms of various de- 
 grees of importance, we must always distinguish between 
 what is required of the individual and what of the body of 
 which he is a member. 
 
 These questions, however, lead us to that of what should 
 be the practice of our future "peace-school," whence it will 
 appear that, as regards the daily routine of the service, it 
 
The Training of Soldiers. 147 
 
 will not differ as much as, after all that has been said, one 
 might suppose and fear, from our practice hitherto. Let us 
 first inquire what is necessary ; and in doing so we shall treat 
 of the individual combatant. 
 
 The first thing we must demand of the soldier in every 
 decisive combat is discipline, born of high personal energy. 
 Although this as a moral quality belongs to the domain of 
 military education a domain with which, as before remarked, 
 we who treat only of the formal side of the question have 
 nothing to do, still this fundamental condition of all great 
 results must not here be passed over in silence, because we 
 must allude to the outward means of developing it afforded 
 by a rationally-conducted course of gymnastics, which, 
 whilst giving a man complete control over his own limbs, 
 accustoms him to the strictest regularity and steadiness in 
 the ranks, to intelligent subordination. 
 
 A perfect familiarity with the use of arms is the second 
 requirement for decisive combat. The certain shot makes 
 the good foot-soldier ; but the distances at which this sure 
 aim comes into play in decisive action do not now-a-days, as 
 a rule, exceed 400 paces. In engagements where they are 
 really in earnest, the real zone of activity for firearms lies in 
 by far the greatest majority of cases between 450 and 150 
 paces. The ranges, therefore, from 200 up to 400 paces 
 constitute the field in which the most thorough training in 
 the use of the rifle is necessary. It is of the greatest conse- 
 quence that we should make our men as good shots as pos- 
 sible at these distances, and at the same time to take count 
 of rapidity of fire, which plays so great a part in decisive 
 combats, as also of the various nature of the marks to be 
 aimed at (those under cover or those moving on the skir- 
 misher). But the bullet is not yet the final argument. The 
 soldier should be accustomed from the very first to the use 
 of the bayonet, and this should be promoted by a sensible 
 ind really serviceable system of bayonet exercise, progress- 
 ig by degrees to fencing, if for nothing else, for its moral 
 Affect. 
 
148 Preparation for War in Peace. 
 
 Skill in taking advantage of the ground is the third quality 
 which we should seek to develop for decisive action by 
 means of individual training. The power of making use of 
 or preparing for defence at pleasure every accident of 
 ground, whether for cover, however momentary, or to facili- 
 tate the action of our firearms, is, both for decisively offen- 
 sive situations as well as during the stage of resistance of 
 the Defensive-Offensive, an important resource, and therefore 
 one to be generally understood. But in training our people 
 to make use of it we should be careful not to allow local 
 considerations to interfere arbitrarily with the assigned 
 direction of personal action in battle. To take advantage of 
 accidents of ground which happen to occur in the given 
 direction of attack, to know how to make the most of means 
 of defence which may chance to exist in the defensive posi- 
 tion assigned to occupy, this and this alone should be 
 taught and learnt. Just in this consists the material differ- 
 ence between our field training of the present day and that 
 of former times. Extended order applied to the masses 
 can and should no longer allow that liberty of action which, 
 admitted* as it was in our "field-exercise," was so calculated 
 to promote dispersion. 
 
 We now turn to the formal requirements of decisive action 
 on a body of troops. The power of moving surely and with 
 cohesion in close order stands first and foremost as point of 
 departure, and also as keystone of all action in battle. The 
 ability to pass quickly from one form of close order to another 
 (to perform evolutions) and again to change from close to 
 extended order and vice versa (to extend, to close) come 
 next. 
 
 Individual action having become the rule of battle, and 
 tempting, as it does, to carelessness and disorder, by way of 
 counteraction, the greatest steadiness, the most perfect 
 order and precision amongst the masses must be all the 
 more insisted upon and enjoined. 
 
 But as the disciplining value of these exercises does not 
 consist in the quantity and complication of the evolutions, 
 

 The Training of Soldiers. 149 
 
 but in the manner in which each is performed, the forma- 
 tions actually necessary in war will be amply sufficient for 
 our purpose, a subject to which we must return further on. 
 
 Mobility, attention to orders, "fire-discipline" constitute (last not 
 least*) the third requirement to be considered in training 
 troops for decisive action. The one and only actual method 
 of fighting, with its requirements, many of which still so 
 new or at least unfamiliar to us, even those of a purely 
 formal character (different movements, modes of firing, 
 etc.) must be made a second nature to our Infantry. Who 
 will fail to comprehend that here is the field in which we 
 can and must spend a great part of the time which may be 
 spared from other work, and this can be done with advan- 
 tage even on the drill-ground, but especially on ground of 
 the most varied character. 
 
 Lastly, a general acquaintance with the forms and requirements 
 of outpost duty, imparted by practical instruction limited to 
 what is absolutely necessary and simplified to the utmost, 
 will make our Infantry equal to every emergency of the 
 greater operations of war.f All requirements which go be- 
 yond those just specially mentioned as necessary, however 
 desirable they may otherwise be considered, cannot in our 
 opinion be now-a-days any longer met by the mass of 
 the Infantry, and they maybe relinquished for them without 
 prejudice to the general result, if on the other hand we make 
 up for it by giving all the more thorough training to the 
 chosen few. 
 
 We will now turn to what is required in this direction. If, 
 adhering with set purpose to the principle of classification, 
 we select those young soldiers, and only those, who after 
 their first year's service, i.e., when the autumn manoeuvres 
 have given them an idea of the daily life of war, have hith- 
 
 * Sic, in the original. (Tn.) 
 
 t "Des grossen krieges," "la grande guerre," for which we have no equivalent ex- 
 pression. Of course every military reader understands the distinction made by 
 French and Germans between "great" and "little" war. (TK.) 
 
i 50 Preparation for War in Peace. 
 
 erto distinguished themselves from the mass, by greater 
 power of comprehension, natural gifts, a lively interest in 
 their profession, etc., and having thus selected them, push 
 them on a step in advance of their comrades, such a course, 
 as we before remarked, can only be advantageous. The 
 range of study for the body of picked men to be formed 
 thus to a certain extent in every company would comprise 
 all that we have hitherto understood by the term "Field 
 service" in its more limited sense. Above all, these men 
 should be trained to taking advantage of the ground with 
 greater nicety, if the expression is permissible, thus gaining 
 an insight into the art of adapting their own action to the 
 nature of the country, and learning at the same time to dis- 
 tinguish the comparatively rare cases in which this may be 
 allowable. Patrol duties, as far as they can be performed 
 by Infantry, the minor operations of war, also practice in 
 executing works and tasks which under certain circum- 
 stancs are required of Infantry, as for instance those of an 
 engineering character, all these things should be taught them 
 both theoretically and practically ; also, as far as it is feasi- 
 ble to do so, they should receive at least theoretical instruc- 
 tion as to their conduct in various situations of warfare, 
 such as, for instance, investments, sieges, attack and de- 
 fence of works, subjects which, notwithstanding their im- 
 portance, have hitherto been almost entirely neglected dur- 
 ing peace. 
 
 It cannot be the aim or intention of these pages to. enter 
 into the details of carrying out our proposals. The "how" 
 in these matters, in accordance with orders emanating from 
 the highest source, is the special province of those from 
 whom the "what" is required; and our task here only 
 amounts to specifying in what that "what" consists. But 
 we hope to have given all necessary proof in this disserta- 
 tion that the demands which we are making upon our In- 
 fantry will ensure all desirable proficiency, even though on 
 principle we relinquish any attempt to arrive at universal 
 perfection (allseitige Ausbildung). 
 
The Training of Soldiers. 1 5 1 
 
 We already show the results of a soldier's musketry in- 
 struction in his discharge documents ; we might surely also 
 find place for such an expression as " qualified as leader of 
 skirmishers," thus showing once for all the standard of in- 
 struction which we desire to attain. 
 
 Let us then resume our argument: considering how the 
 demands upon our Infantry have increased, we must con- 
 tent ourselves under a system of short service with training 
 our masses to the highest possible standard of efficiency in 
 the tactical forms requisite for decisive action, and we must 
 only aim at imparting universal proficiency to the more 
 gifted members of a corps by giving them all the more 
 careful instruction even in the indecisive operations of war. 
 But even if this principle be adopted everywhere practically 
 as the guiding one with reference to the course of training, 
 we shall still be compelled, in order to ensure real general 
 efficiency, to limit the quantity of matter taught to what is 
 actually serviceable in war. It remains now, with reference 
 to the tactics of the present day, to cast a glance upon this 
 side of the question, so as to determine how narrow it may 
 be allowable to make these limits. 
 
 As far as concerns what we must necessarily require of 
 the individual soldier, it will be difficult to reduce the quan- 
 tity of matter. At the same time it must be confessed that by 
 omitting the motion of "advance-arms," a motion which 
 can well be spared, much time would be economised in in- 
 dividual instruction.* 
 
 The reduction to be effected in the formal training of sol- 
 diers as a body will be of more consequence. 
 
 First it seems altogether allowable to abolish all battalion 
 evolutions hitherto executed at the commanding officer's 
 word of command, as the battalion is no longer a battle- 
 unit, though it will still continue to be one, for the march 
 for manoeuvre. It may be considered sufficient for the 
 
 * Some of the motions of our own "Manual" might, I think, be omitted with 
 advantage. (TB.) 
 
152 Preparation for War in Peace. 
 
 warfare of the present day, if the battalion concentrated in 
 column can go through its facings, interior movements, 
 manual and platoon, at the word of one officer. But evolu- 
 tions, i.e., changes from one formation in close order to 
 another, also the extension and re-assembling of the battal- 
 ion, may without prejudice be executed at the word of com- 
 mand of the captains (now no longer required to lead divis 
 ions), commanding officers only giving the "cautions."* 
 
 If this were carried out, company drill in close-order 
 movements would gain additional importance, and would 
 require more time to be expended upon it, which will be all 
 to the advantage of this important battle-unit (we purposely 
 avoid the expression tactical unit}. 
 
 All that we require of the battalions over and above this 
 first groundwork belongs to the domain of "battle-exer- 
 cise" of which we shall speak more at large when we treat 
 of the instruction of officers. 
 
 We have further already pointed out in the first part of 
 these studies that, with a view to simplifying our course to 
 the utmost with regard to forms, we think that the reten- 
 tion of only one system of formation in rank and file is 
 strongly to be recommended. It appears really quite unim- 
 portant at present whether in doing so our choice falls on 
 the two or three deep formation. 
 
 Taking into consideration the fact that both methods 
 have advantages and disadvantages which about balance 
 one another, also the so much increased tendency to dis- 
 persion in the fighting of the present day, which reduces 
 itself practically to only single rank, we should ourselves 
 prefer the more compact three-deep formation more com- 
 pact by a third. 
 
 But this is only by the way. We enter into details of 
 regulation no further than our "study" positively requires; 
 
 * This, amongst other changes, was recommended by me in a little book with a 
 rather ambitious title, "A New System of Tactics for Infantry," published in 
 1867. (Tn.) 
 
The Training of Soldiers. 
 
 153 
 
 only, in opposition to some all too zealous innovators in this 
 matter, we must define precisely our standpoint with regard 
 to this subject, which it is not our province to discuss, by 
 stating that we hardly want any part of the old drill regu- 
 lations altered, first on account of the hundreds of thousands 
 of reserve men, and again because we really do not think 
 alteration required, but do wish to see a good deal cut out. 
 
 But we believe that a "peace-school," which aims at rais- 
 ing the standard of results whilst limiting the amount of 
 things taught to what is necessary in war, will not fail to 
 supply our leaders again, as in the past, with the solid and 
 substantial materials suitable for "crowning the edifice" of 
 future victories. 
 
 So much for the training of the soldier individually and 
 )llectively. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE HIGHER INSTRUCTION OF OFFICERS. 
 
 THE more we are convinced, as expressed in the previous 
 chapter, that modern tactical requirements force us to con- 
 fine the formal training of the mass of our infantry to a 
 minimum of quantity, so as to obtain to that extent at least 
 the amount of desirable proficiency, all the more evident 
 becomes the importance of the instruction of our officers. 
 Their influence, which under the present conditions of in- 
 creased difficulty has become all the more needful, can only 
 make itself felt in a satisfactory manner if each one of them, 
 according to his position, has the absolute faculty of judg- 
 ing every tactical situation, in which he may chance to find 
 himself, with quick, just and clear intelligence. To come 
 to a right decision, always according to his position in the 
 military hierarchy, as to the object of each engagement 
 commenced, and thereupon to base his plans with judg- 
 ment; this it is which is required in the present day more 
 than ever of every officer down to the lowest grade, and 
 which can alone enable him to maintain his proper influence 
 with his subordinates. The troops have only to fight when 
 and where they receive the order ; but the officer in chief 
 command, who from his post issues this order, bears the 
 full and entire responsibility thereof. He must make up 
 his mind as to what object he can and wishes to attain, for 
 then, and only then, will he be in a position to make the 
 best use of the means at his disposal. 
 
 Except the fear of responsibility, an officer of high or low 
 
The Higher Instruction of Officers. 155 
 
 degree can have no greater fault than to forget his responsi- 
 bility. 
 
 Here we come to a dilemma which is in truth not easy to 
 overcome. The sharpness, impetuosity, and energy which 
 always are found united with quick, even hasty determina- 
 tion, must be restrained ; this sharp thirst for battle must 
 give way to mature consideration, to the power of biding 
 your time and of bearing delay ; patience must be practiced 
 when the raging desire to get at the enemy has perhaps 
 been raised to boiling heat by the aggravating hail of hos- 
 tile bullets. And yet at the same time "the native hue of 
 resolution" must not be "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of 
 thought" on the contrary, the extreme of energy is re- 
 quired. 
 
 Is this not more than can be expected of man ? Will not 
 the attempt to obtain it lead to a lamentable fiasco to want 
 of decision and timidity, or at least to half-heartedness and 
 lukewarmness ? 
 
 And yet we believe that the venture must be made, as 
 long as our officers are and continue to be what they now 
 are. We must therefore bring them and the younger gen- 
 eration up to that spirit of self-sacrifice which shrinks from 
 nothing, to that heroic daring which from the earliest days 
 has added such wondrous leaves to the national laurels ; but 
 at the same time we wish to train them to somewhat calmer 
 judgment. And further, whilst we may excuse men for 
 going ahead themselves, and for allowing others to go 
 ahead in war and the more readily the lower their position 
 at the same time let us repress it when displayed at small 
 cost at peace manoeuvres. We have, by the way, no great 
 fear that our "pluck will go to the devil" with such educa- 
 tional maxims. 
 
 One of the latest war-experiences also is that blind "elan" 
 will not do much if we do not allow it to impose upon us. 
 Calculated energy, the result of sound instruction, will 
 amply replace qualities founded perhaps on the fool-hardi- 
 ness generated by too hot blood. 
 
1 56 Preparation for War in Peace. 
 
 Now the main requirement for such a method of instruc- 
 tion by which a commanding officer (we choose purposely 
 this comprehensive expression) may develop his own judg- 
 ment, is an entire breach with that system of pre-arranged 
 drill-ground combats, where even the second senior officer 
 learns for the first time when receiving from his chief the 
 order to attack, where he is to suppose the enemy to be ; 
 again the definite abolition of the distinction between 
 manoeuvring "across country" and on the "drill-ground," 
 whenever we have to do with any phase of actual fighting. 
 
 As far as concern's practice in the mere formations of 
 combat for instance, the extension, movements, and firings 
 of a line of skirmishers, the barrack-square and the drill- 
 shed will be enough for the squad of recruits for whom 
 alone this sort of thing can be wanted ; when we come to 
 the company, however, we should no longer allow attacks 
 to be made against "empty air." But the instruction of 
 officers commences at once with "battle-practice," outside 
 the barrack-gate and beyond the flat level of our present 
 drill-grounds, always excepting the very beginners, who are 
 hardly bona fide officers, and whom the captain has to in- 
 struct in the art of leading a division in close order, and 
 such like. 
 
 This is the time to put in a word about the places which 
 we from the force of habit are accustomed to search out for 
 our military exercises, and the constantly increasing diffi- 
 culty of discovering which in the neighborhood of our gar- 
 risons appears to many calamitous, because the spectre of 
 hut encampments "a la Thiers appears in the background. 
 But now really, considering the present tactical require- 
 ments of Infantry, so far from any advantage arising to us 
 from having as open a plain as possible for this object, such 
 ground would rather be unfavorable for training purposes. 
 In the olden time, when the tactician sought out a plain for 
 his battle-field, there was good sense and complete justifica- 
 tion in selecting similar ground for battle-practice also ; but 
 now-a-days, when the strategist chooses his field of battle 
 
The Higher Instruction of Officers. 157 
 
 without in the least troubling himself about the configura- 
 tion of the ground, whilst the tactician even gladly avoids 
 a perfect flat, the choice of places for practicing battle-move- 
 ments may surely be less restricted. We have already in 
 our first chapter pointed out how mere drill i.e., the prac- 
 tice of formations has made or should be confined to much 
 smaller limits than heretofore, in consequence of the later 
 conditions of the altered nature of battle. Really, the com- 
 pany alone now requires a drill-ground ; the space necessary 
 for the drill of a battalion i.e., for its only remaining col- 
 umn-movementsmay be very much smaller than in former 
 days. 
 
 It will be amply sufficient for its purpose if the length of 
 the space slightly exceeds the front of the battalion in line, 
 and if its breadth is a little more than three times the front 
 of the battalion in column. These measurements are, how- 
 ever, far below those to which we now pretend, and they are 
 such as the yard of every one of our newer barracks would 
 afford for a battalion on its peace-footing. 
 
 Everything connected with battalion-exercises which goes 
 beyond this point can no longer be counted as drill, but is 
 rather included under the head of "battle-practice," for 
 which we no longer require perfectly level ground. But as 
 soon as we give up this requirement, we shall still find 
 undulating ground (only let it be dry) in the immediate 
 neighborhood of our large garrisons i.e., towns, which will 
 serve as fields for the "battle-practice" of our infantry- 
 such ground being, moreover, as a rule not such as is sought 
 after by co-operative agricultural associations. 
 
 With such undulating country (and no matter if here and 
 there in cultivation or intersected by smaller and greater 
 obstacles) for our "exercise-grounds," that distinction of 
 which we complained in our first chapter between field-ser- 
 vice and field-exercise will melt away with the greatest ease 
 in face of an increased unity of idea; and the more varied 
 the ground the more will it tend to develop the tactical 
 
158 Preparation for War in Peace. 
 
 judgment and the understanding both of the young officer 
 and of the older commander. 
 
 But if we wish our "battle-exercises" to meet this end, 
 they must be made subordinate to a clear and definite idea 
 from the very first moment of entering upon this field of 
 instruction, a condition with which we cannot dispense even 
 on the most platform-like drill-ground, if the battalion be 
 broken up or thrown into skirmishing order as for "battle." 
 
 By this we do not mean that the commander should 
 plague himself with extensive general and special ideas, but 
 we do mean that when a body of troops is to engage an 
 imaginary enemy, his supposed position should be pointed 
 out to it, if an attack is intended ; the supposed direction of 
 his movements should be indicated, if it is proposed to re- 
 main on the defensive ; the point which he is assumed 
 to have reached should be shown, if a counter-attack is 
 planned ; and, finally, his whereabouts should be made 
 known, if a mere demonstration is purposed ; and all this 
 should be done clearly and definitely. 
 
 If the ground does not furnish us with clearly suitable 
 points of vantage, we may content ourselves with marking 
 the spots in the simplest possible manner by using adjutants 
 and non-commissioned officers to make the limits of the 
 enemy's position, the point of attack, or the line of the 
 enemy's advance clear to the eye. 
 
 If only the "exercise ground" is not absolutely flat, the 
 battle-pictures may in this manner be much varied in 
 kaleidoscope fashion, and the greatest possible variety in 
 detail is desirable together with complete simplicity in the 
 main features, particularly if the younger officers are to 
 learn anything. It is only by seeing this from every possi- 
 ble point of view and by doing it in every possible manner 
 that our sight is so sharpened as to recognise quickly the 
 right course of action, and this is just what we have to aim 
 at for actual warfare. 
 
 There are very few men who judge things more clearly 
 
The Higher Instruction of Officers. 159 
 
 when under fire, and those are exceptional persons whose 
 understanding, which, before seemed to slumber, gathers 
 strength amidst the enemy's bullets. Habit is the best 
 security for keeping the mind clear even in press of dan- 
 ger. 
 
 Just as with the private soldier the habit of discipline 
 makes obedience into a second nature, even in the most 
 trying moments, so with the officer the habit of observing 
 ground must make a correct judgment as to making the 
 most of it, become to him a second nature. 
 
 This end, however, can only be obtained if a great num- 
 ber of as varied fights as possible are worked out on the 
 practice-ground and discussed concisely and instructively. 
 
 As certain as in actual warfare a pause of rest for re- 
 establishing order must follow every attack successfully 
 made or repulsed, so on the practice-ground, after one 
 attack has been made, one position quickly occupied, the 
 troops under inspection may surely without prejudice be 
 led on to perform a second, a third, and even more opera- 
 tions of quite a different character, without its being neces- 
 sary for these various practices, though executed in one 
 day, to have any connection with one another. It must only 
 be made clear to both officers and men that "now something 
 else is coming." 
 
 In this manner, for instance, a battalion will easily be able 
 to represent in a course of eight or ten exercises some thirty 
 battle-pictures with ever-varying shades, and this even on 
 ground affording comparatively little change. Every time 
 the direction of attack is somewhat altered, the mode of 
 advance of the line of skirmishers, the manner of occupying 
 the ground and so forth are modified, and the most varied 
 changes in detail are developed on a foundation of sound 
 principles. 
 
 By these means both field officers and captains will be 
 educated to the correct way of taking advantage of ground 
 in each specified direction, thus gaining that quickness of 
 
160 Preparation for War in Peace. 
 
 eye which will afterwards prevent all wavering in the actual 
 emergency, and which will result in making them do the 
 right thing instinctively. 
 
 Moreover, just as in this manner we may train our people 
 to the exigencies of decisive battle, so may we train them 
 after the same fashion to the temporising combat. 
 
 The same place of exercise may be used, without extend- 
 ing our "ideas" much further, for practising the battalion 
 in advanced and rear-guard actions or in reconnoissance ; 
 lastly, it may serve to represent the "intermediate stage be- 
 tween two decisive situations," again helping to form a cor- 
 rect judgment. 
 
 We will now say of the "what" just what we before said 
 of the "how."* By such a course of training in the battal- 
 ion, the regiment, even in the brigade ; and we maintain 
 only and solely by such a course shall we arrive at forming 
 the judgment of every officer according to his station, so as 
 to enable him to come to the important decision which will 
 be constantly required of him in war, as to whether he 
 should keep his troops back or commit them to action, and 
 at once to choose the right course. 
 
 By such numerous and varied "battle-exercises," we shall 
 teach the young officer to be kept in hand and the elder 
 officer to keep in hand. Each will learn to form a right 
 estimate of the value of the detachment under his command 
 with reference to the whole force, and to subordinate him- 
 self to the higher object in view. By this means also we 
 shall recover that tactical precision once the pride and 
 strength of our army, but which has, we cannot deny, aban- 
 doned us in these latter years and during the late cam- 
 paigns. 
 
 That long-proved "fire-discipline," dating from the time 
 of the great Frederick, which has worked such wonders for 
 us, is still just as necessary for us as it was then and at all 
 
 * See p. 150. (TB.) 
 
The Higher Instruction of Officers. 161 
 
 times ; only it no longer depends on our men but on our 
 lieutenants. The independence of the individual soldier in 
 action has since those old times wonderfully augmented, 
 hence the difficulty of controlling him has extraordinarily 
 increased ; but the necessity of control remains the same 
 now as ever. And as in this way with the task of the lieu- 
 tenant with reference to his division, so on account of the 
 altered character of command in action the task of the cap- 
 tain with reference to his subalterns, of the battalion-com- 
 mander with reference to his captains (who have gained 
 greater independence), and so upwards, has each individual's 
 task become very much more onerous, whilst the value, im- 
 portance, and necessity of each have not thereby been in 
 the least diminished. 
 
 Even so far back as that, the great king was obliged to 
 oppose with energetic reprimands a habit of dispersion 
 "which leads to this, that the common soldier decides the 
 battle ; and this is an every-day affair (journalier)." Now 
 we shall not be misunderstood if we say : it is also "journ- 
 alier" for the lieutenant or captain to decide the battle; 
 such being the favorite theme of our innovators of the pres- 
 ent day, whose passionate ardor would lead them to give no 
 chance in this way to the battalion commander, not to men- 
 tion higher authorities. 
 
 We learn from the experience of war that if peace-habits 
 have not prepared us to meet this difficulty, incorporating, as 
 it were, in our flesh and blood the conviction of the necessity of 
 maintaining the influence of the higher and highest authority, the 
 force of momentary circumstances will be stronger than all 
 theory and all good will. 
 
 There is truly something great in that universal strife to 
 go forward which has animated even the smallest detach- 
 ment, and it is hardly necessary to clear ourselves of the 
 suspicion that we wish to suppress this feeling, but if this 
 noble sentiment is to conduce to the general result instead 
 of uselessly evaporating, as it often does, in isolated deeds 
 
1 62 Preparation for War in Peace. 
 
 of heroism, the conviction must be carefully fostered be- 
 forehand in peace, that intelligent obedience stands even 
 before dash, and that in battle the commander-in-chief will 
 give an opportunity at the right moment for every man to 
 satisfy his thirst for action. 
 
 Thus officers in high command will no longer have to fear 
 that if they hold back even in critical moments, their con- 
 duct will be misjudged by their subordinates, and those in 
 a lower position will learn that by having a little patience 
 they will reap all the larger crop of laurels. 
 
 So we repeat that the system of training for our officers 
 centers itself in "battle-exercises" of a practical nature, 
 answering to the requirements of modern tactics, and no 
 longer recognising any difference between " field-exercise " 
 and "field-practice." We know well that this is not all that 
 can be said upon the matter, and that there are claims upon 
 officers both of high and low degree which they must meet 
 in order to be fully competent for their respective duties. 
 But the first thing to be thought of for them, as for the rank 
 and file, is to prepare them for the universal, the inevitable, 
 the constantly recurring exigencies of warfare; afterwards 
 attempting to give them as officers thorough efficiency in 
 all the other phases of military action. 
 
 So these "battle-exercises" are the kernel round which 
 group themselves on one side the greater manoeuvres to 
 which we shall devote a special chapter, on the other side 
 the smaller manoeuvres for training in the minor tasks of war 
 (des grossen Krieges). 
 
 These latter furnish a special field for work to our younger 
 officers, who, whilst making their first appearance as instruc- 
 tors upon it, have the opportunity of themselves learning so 
 much. 
 
 In these little operations the judgment develops itself, 
 the spirit of self-reliance is engendered, which spirit they 
 have again to school themselves to sacrificing elsewhere of 
 their own free will and from conviction to the claims of a 
 larger unit. 
 
The Higher Instruction of Officers. 163 
 
 Here the opportunity for acting on his own responsibility 
 offers itself to the young officer, here the fruits of his own 
 work manifest themselves, to gather which fruit is the 
 natural desire of every mortal. The small proportions of 
 the work which he is here called upon to direct will make 
 him comprehend all the more fully and unmistakably the 
 necessity for subordination and unity of command in work 
 of larger proportions. 
 
 Here, too, he will learn on a small scale, whilst distin- 
 guishing between more and less favorable ground, and whilst 
 teaching his select men to do so, how every sort of ground 
 may on a larger scale be utilized, and at the same time he 
 will acquire the capacity of coming on every occasion to 
 the right determination. 
 
 If, as we go on, we accustom the learner to hostile action 
 by practising one party against another, these little manoeu- 
 vres, more or less useful even for superior officers, accord- 
 ing to the strength of the forces engaged, form quite fairly 
 part of a system of education for officers. As far as gar- 
 rison arrangements will permit, we must also endeavor to 
 carry on these exercises, particularly such as have reference 
 to field and outpost duties, with mixed detachments of cav- 
 alry and infantry, before the corps proceed to take part in 
 the great manoeuvres which will give the finishing touch to 
 its training. 
 
 We do not propose to ourselves here, any more than when 
 treating of the soldier individually and collectively, to enter 
 into details. Here, as there, we are only called upon to 
 specify clearly and broadly the point of view from which 
 the object aimed at should be regarded, and the ways and 
 means for attaining it ; the work itself is the province of the 
 workman. 
 
 We only wish to add one thing more. The "education of 
 the officer" cannot be considered complete so long as it is 
 confined to the narrow limits of a number of "exercises," 
 however practically conducted. Theoretical study must, of 
 
164 Preparation for War in Peace. 
 
 course, keep pace with them. We are all the more anxious 
 not to omit mention of this personal work of every officer as 
 a pedestal to the edifice of our performances of quite equal 
 value to the other, because otherwise a misunderstanding 
 might easily arise, and we might be supposed not to assign 
 their full value to theoretical studies, thus undermining the 
 theoretical study which we have devoted to the very study 
 now before us. The "method of application," to which we 
 owe such great progress, will furnish rich and ample mate- 
 rials for this study, even to our youngest comrades. May 
 they continue to use them as fairly as ever; then for them 
 will the good fruit of practice ripen upon the tree of sound 
 theory. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE GREAT MANOEUVRES. 
 
 IT remains now to cast a last glance on that part of our 
 system of peace-instruction where officers and men, having 
 undergone the preparatory course advocated, are brought 
 up in company to the highest stage of their efficiency, and 
 as the season draws to a close, are to prove in the field of 
 \\iegreat mancenvres to the chiefs in high and in highest 
 command, lastly to the Imperial Commander himself, that 
 the army is equal to its task. 
 
 There are three objects which we strive to attain by these 
 great manoeuvres: Mutual acquaintance between the different 
 corps and arms, and the power of giving mutual support, 
 are to be promoted and encouraged; officers of all ranks 
 have to learn how to make use of what they have already 
 practiced in face of an adversary who on his side is not idle. 
 Both the soldier and the corps must get acquainted with 
 and accustomed to the daily routine of life in the field. 
 
 In order to meet this triple demand, our "divisional 
 autumnal manoeuvres" have already been divided into 
 "field" and "outpost" practice, "field manoeuvres with tw^o 
 forces opposed to one another," and "manoeuvres of the 
 entire division." We must examine this tripartition some- 
 what more closely from the standpoint of war as at present 
 carried on. 
 
 It must be recognised as a rule hitherto usually followed 
 that the troops assembled for these annual exercises do not 
 exceed the strength of a division. Royal reviews, at which 
 
1 66 Preparation for War in Peace. 
 
 the two divisions of an army-corps, or great autumnal 
 manoeuvres, at which at the outside two army-corps were 
 concentrated, are, as we know, of rare occurrence, occurring 
 exceptionally, often after an interval of some years, of 
 which the Guard corps has alone not to complain, in conse- 
 quence of the convenient arrangement of its quarters. The 
 division of all arms forming now the battle-unit, at any rate 
 by assembling it annually, as is done on principle, the basis 
 at least of a system of instruction calculated to meet even 
 the highest demands is provided. 
 
 Nevertheless, we cannot fail to remark that here also our 
 old habits are affected by the requirements of modern tac- 
 tics, which seem to make a modification in the division of 
 time allowed to the different exercises urgently necessary. 
 According to present regulations the division, as such, has 
 only three (even sometimes two) days for the so-called 
 "divisional-exercises" ( manoeuvres of the entire division). 
 Of these one is taken up with the divisional parade, so that 
 the division is only assembled under command of its gen- 
 eral for Tinited battle-practice twice, or may be once a year. 
 Considering, however, the great tasks which devolve upon 
 an infantry division in modern battle this scanty allowance 
 of time would appear much too small. 
 
 Twelve battalions and twenty-four guns, without reckon- 
 ing the cavalry regiment, represent, even in the battles of 
 masses which take place in the present epoch, such an im- 
 posing force that the fact of its being employed, success- 
 fully or otherwise, may well exert a decisive effect upon 
 the course of the whole action. The attack even of a single 
 division properly led by the commander, and well executed 
 by the troops, may incline the scales in our favor amidst 
 the conflict of hundreds of thousands which has raged 
 doubtfully for hours; the overthrow of one single division 
 in a defensive position may tear a gap in our line which can 
 never again be closed. That the division, being the smallest 
 independent unit on which a commander can reckon for the 
 decisive stroke which he meditates, should be in thoroughly 
 
The Great Manoeuvres. 167 
 
 efficient working order, is a necessary condition, not only 
 for the great tactical, but also for the strategical result. 
 The "division" represents to the commander-in-chief a con- 
 stant mathematical expression of offensive and defensive 
 force upon which he may base his higher and final calcula- 
 tions with incontestable security. 
 
 This was the case formerly, and so it must continue to be ; 
 but it has become more difficult to carry out ; yes, very 
 much more difficult, on account of the loosening effect of 
 the battle of the present day. 
 
 Much steady practice is required, unless we wish to see 
 what may easily happen in the heat of such battles as we 
 have now, whole divisions melt away, like snow under a 
 March sun, useless because not under control of the one comman- 
 der. 
 
 We have already often pointed out in general terms the 
 dangers of dispersion to which the tactics of the present 
 age may so easily lead ; the division welded together into 
 unity by habits acquired during peace is the rock upon which 
 that dreaded wave must break. 
 
 If in the old times of column-tactics, the battalion mass 
 was the symbol of united force and concentrated energy, 
 constantly reforming, as it did, its dense array, so in these 
 times, when the nature of battle occasions a greater disper- 
 sion the smaller the body, this necessary conviction of strength 
 is only inherent in the larger bodies ; in none more thor- 
 oughly than in the division. It is the smallest "fighting- 
 assemblage" which under modern conditions of war can of 
 itself produce a decisive result. 
 
 The battalion, the regiment, the brigade, these are all im- 
 portant intermediate bodies, each of which will, as far as it 
 can, endeavor to keep itself together, but each of which will 
 possibly find itself compelled to fight without depth; the 
 division with its framework of artillery is the first to pre- 
 sent the cohesion of an organic body. It appeared to us 
 necessary to enter rather at length into this pre-eminent 
 
1 68 Preparation for War in Peace. 
 
 consequence of the infantry-division in modern battle, so as 
 to deduce from thence all the more decisively the import- 
 ance of its training during peace. 
 
 Once allow the full extent of its value, and you cannot 
 deny that to attain to it more than two days' work per 
 annum are required. 
 
 Here, again, perhaps what we before said about the rela- 
 tion which the soldier bears to the corps to which he be- 
 longs applies, only one step higher; the efficiency of the 
 division is not entirely based upon the sum of efficiency of 
 all its separate battalions. Twelve battalions, four regi- 
 ments, two brigades, may all have been thoroughly trained 
 beforehand in "battle-practice;" yet when united into a 
 division they may do little good as such, they may even 
 get it and thereby also themselves into a scrape, if they are 
 not accustomed to subordinate themselves completely to 
 the undivided command of their divisional general. The 
 reason is this, that with the present conditions of strength 
 even a brigade can only exceptionally find itself in a posi- 
 tion to represent by itself more than one situation in a com- 
 bat (an attack, a defence, &c.), and that a division is the 
 smallest body which has the power of going through the 
 whole fight, including "introduction" and "victory." But 
 the division itself, being only the first and smallest battle 
 unit, must therefore also learn to take its share in action in 
 a manner suited to the circumstances as the part of a whole ; 
 and for this reason it also requires the kind of "battle-prac- 
 tice" in which, being employed as a unit for a limited pur- 
 pose actually assigned or supposed by the commander-in- 
 chief, it has to a certain extent to represent only one definite 
 situation of battle. With demands of, as it appears to us, 
 such unquestionably two-fold character as regards our train- 
 ing, we must declare that we consider it extremely desirable 
 that the annual period of three days now allowed for the 
 exercises of the united division should be extended to at 
 least six, and, if larger assemblages of troops take place, 
 wherever possible to nine real working days. Of these it is 
 
The Great Manoeuvres. 169 
 
 certainly desirable that one should be set apart expressly for 
 a parade of the whole division, if such cannot conveniently 
 be tacked on to a "battle-practice." Such military displays 
 on a large scale impart both to the corps and to the indi- 
 vidual, to a greater extent than is generally supposed, the 
 feeling of "all belonging together-ness," the consciousness 
 of strength, the certainty that "there are a great lot of us." 
 They also tell well upon the great public, which rarely but 
 on such occasions has an opportunity of raising its spirits 
 by a contemplation of the nation's power. At these parades, 
 and often only by means of these parades, do the different 
 arms make each other's acquaintance, outwardly at least, 
 and come to know of one another, what is the size of a cav- 
 alry regiment, of an infantry battalion, and so forth; the 
 private soldier often never seeing these bodies together ex- 
 cept on such occasions. The other five or eight days we 
 should like to see equally divided between the kind of 
 "battle-exercise" in which the division comes into play as 
 an united whole to carry out a definite portion of a supposed 
 action, and that in which it goes through the fight inde- 
 pendently and isolated. 
 
 For the first object the ground itself will usually supply 
 the necessary points to mark the position or movements of 
 the supposed enemy, or such points may easily be indicated, 
 as we before remarked when treating of "battle-exercises;" 
 for the latter purpose the regulations upon an "indicated 
 enemy" in the "imperial orders" come into force. Here, 
 likewise, again we have only to speak of "what" is desirable, 
 leaving confidently the "how" to the decision of those in 
 command. We only wish to draw attention to the import- 
 ance of combining with the above-mentioned exercises, as 
 can easily be done, the most varied practice possible in 
 bringing the division into line of battle from one or from 
 more columns of route at the same time. 
 
 It will be objected to the wish here expressed for multi 
 plying the exercises of the united division, that this can 
 only be accomplished at the cost of the two other above- 
 
I/O 
 
 Preparation for War in Peace. 
 
 mentioned exercises, both also doubtless very important 
 branches of instruction, without an increased expenditure 
 of time and particularly of money. 
 
 Perhaps, however, we may succeed in meeting this objec- 
 tion by the following arguments. The three days' "field" 
 and "out-post" exercises have for their object, as denoted 
 by their designation, actually merely the incidents of out- 
 post duty,* and of the minor operations of war which, with 
 a few isolated exceptions, are developed from it alone, as 
 we have all experienced in the last great wars. At our 
 "peace-exercises," however, it has hitherto been the cus- 
 tom, in order to furnish a motive for the intended out-post 
 position, to conceive "ideas" in the three days, often of the 
 most wonderful description, derived from times long past 
 (for instance, forced f foraging expeditions, convoy-escorts, 
 and such like), which culminated at length in scuffles be- 
 tween small detachments, which it is only to be hoped that 
 our army will now-a-days avoid. 
 
 On this account it appears to us that we may, without 
 prejudice, give up these days as an independent cycle of 
 exercises, and that it will be a more practical course to unite 
 the out-post exercises as far as they cannot be practiced be- 
 forehand in "mixed" garrisons, with the great manoeuvres 
 of the division. If, for instance, at the end of each "battle- 
 exercise" of the entire division, which of itself would not 
 take up more than, at the outside, two or three hours' time, 
 a small portion of the division were told off as rear-guard 
 of the enemy supposed to be repulsed, or as his advanced 
 guard, supposing him victorious, and were ordered to take 
 up a line of out-posts consistent with the "idea," whilst 
 another fraction of the division were directed to ensure its 
 
 * " Sicherheitsdienst," literally "safety-service," i.e., the duty of ensuring an army 
 against surprise. There is no expression in our language actually equivalent. That 
 used in the text is the nearest approach. (Tn.) 
 
 t The expression is, I am aware, not good English, but perhaps it may be pardoned 
 for want of a better and as preferable to a long paraphrase. Besides, a "forced 
 reconnoissance" is an accepted military term. Why not then speak of "forced 
 foraging" ' (TR.) 
 
The Great Manoeuvres. 171 
 
 security in accordance with the supposed situation, doubt- 
 less nothing but advantage could accrue from such a course. 
 
 The out-post duty itself will appear more like reality, be- 
 cause founded on conditions more nearly akin to war ; there 
 will be the more ample time for all its incidents after the 
 short day's work, because its main difficulties arise at night ; 
 as for the division itself, the bivouac, which has become in- 
 dispensable, will, if only the general-staff officer shows a 
 little dexterity, on this occasion, take the place of a long 
 march, instead of a short march to cantonments or in the 
 morning from cantonments which it would have formerly 
 had. When the division assembles the next morning, the 
 "idea" which has previously directed the conduct of the 
 troops which may happen to occupy the out-post position 
 of course ceases to be in force, having from the first not 
 affected those which took no part in the practice. Whilst 
 thus the "out-post exercises" are suppressed, as an inde- 
 pendent feature in the autumn manoeuvres, the time remains 
 intact for the detachment-exercises which accustom officers, 
 at first on a small scale, to the counter-action of the enemy; 
 but we should not hesitate to shorten this period in favor of 
 the exercises of the entire division, if the pretext for doing 
 so is afforded by determining upon subsequent greater 
 manoeuvres for which the division must thus be all the more 
 carefully prepared. 
 
 We shall come now by a roundabout way which takes us 
 momentarily beyond the limits of infantry-tactics to the 
 necessity for having these greater manoeuvres or concentra- 
 tions as frequently as possible. We have hitherto spoken 
 of the exercises of an Infantry-division, without taking into 
 consideration the fact that, according to our custom hith- 
 erto, a number of batteries and a force of cavalry have been 
 attached during the period of exercise to the two divisions 
 of an army corps on the peace footing far in excess of the 
 proportion for war. It has been hitherto allowable for us 
 to take no notice of this circumstance, because it had no 
 material effect upon the method and design of exercise of 
 
172 
 
 Preparation for War in Peace. 
 
 the division on a peace footing which still remained in sub- 
 stance an Infantry -division. The number of guns did not 
 differ greatly from that actually at the disposal of a division 
 in war,* and the general result is not much affected by 
 whether the available surplus is looked upon as performing 
 the part of division or of corps-artillery. The superfluous 
 cavalry brigade also was, at all events, not calculated to 
 affect the suitable training of the divisional infantry, whether 
 it were appropriated by the divisional commander to serve 
 his own purposes, or whether he considered it as by chance 
 in his neighborhood during the action. 
 
 But viewing this matter from a cavalry stand-point it 
 bears a different aspect. The following experience of the 
 late most instructive war, more perhaps than any other, 
 strikes the tactical inquirer: the rush (if we may so say) 
 made of late by this arm to resume once more its position 
 on equal terms with the sister arms even in actual battle 
 a field in theory closed against it, and from which it was 
 considered to be quite shut out. The part which it played 
 on the German side with so much distinction - that of veil 
 appears to it now in peace no longer sufficient, and it again 
 aims at doing in addition to this its old work as wedge. . It 
 appears to promise itself, thereby digging its own grave, the 
 recovery of that influence of which it has been robbed by 
 the rapidity and accuracy of rifle fire, through the looseness 
 of infantry formation which that very fire has promoted. 
 To be able to break in among the enemy's "footmen," scat- 
 tered as they will be in thin lines, with masses of rapidly- 
 moving horsemen following one another, squadron upon 
 squadron, this is the dream which our cavalry have brought 
 back by way of war-experience to the peace-garrisons, and to 
 realize which they now ask for mass-training during peace. 
 
 It is not our part to inquire in this "study" into the pros 
 and cons for these aspirations, which only interest us here, 
 
 * A Prussian field battery only turns out four guns and thirty seven horses in peace 
 time. (TB.) 
 
The Great Manoeuvres. 173 
 
 as perhaps it is more likely that in consequence thereof a 
 modification of the autumn arrangements may result. But 
 if the annual concentration of a cavalry division within the 
 army-corps for independent exercise is to be the invariable 
 rule, the annual concentration of the army-corps itself, even 
 if only for a few days' general exercise, must in consequence 
 soon appear absolutely necessary, so as to give this body, 
 which will then alone have the power of practising the em- 
 ployment of the three arms in battle, the opportunity for 
 instruction indispensably necessary. 
 
 But also quite independent of this influence upon our 
 peace-training, which is perhaps more a matter of chance, 
 and the necessity for which will not be absolutely admitted 
 everywhere, it will be impossible much longer to avoid 
 recognising that, with the actual conditions of warfare, a 
 more frequent assemblage of the larger masses of troops is 
 indispensable to the thorough and complete preparation for 
 every emergency of our own and of every other army, and 
 that this measure cannot be delayed any longer without mis- 
 chief. 
 
 Do what you will, these exercises will be very far indeed 
 behind what is wanted to represent the realities of war, but 
 the performances of peace and the requirements of war must 
 at least approximate, if any profit is to be obtained, and if 
 there is not to be a pure waste of strength. 
 
 Again and again we consider it necessary to give our 
 warning against the tendency to view the performances of 
 large bodies as simply the sum of the performances of 
 their smaller composite parts ; on the contrary, we should 
 be inclined to maintain that the former are with regard to 
 difficulty as the square of the latter. 
 
 Considering the migration of peoples which our modern 
 wars represent, we cannot consider it an exorbitant demand 
 that at least as many battalion, squadron and battery-^dra, 
 without attempting even to raise them to a war strength, 
 may temporarily be assembled for our peace manoeuvres as 
 
1 74 Preparation for War in Peace. 
 
 must be assumed to be engaged against one another in the 
 smallest battles of the present day. If also financial con- 
 siderations should not admit of such comparatively consid- 
 erable concentrations to take place yearly, as in the time of 
 Frederick the Great, when, in the four "inspections" (dis- 
 tricts) a fourth always of the whole peace-army was assem- 
 bled, an army much stronger than the present one in pro- 
 portion to the size of state at that time ; it is yet excessively 
 desirable that the rule should be that every other year there 
 should either be a concentration of the whole of the troops 
 of an "inspection" or of the army-corps. 
 
 These great manoeuvres need indeed never last very long, 
 their object being, in substance, only to give the troops an 
 idea of how they are handled in masses, and to form officers 
 for high command, who, if only these reviews became of 
 regular occurrence, would, in the course of their service, 
 have repeated opportunities for accustoming themselves to 
 what is required of them in this respect. 
 
 Even the Potsdam reviews, which all Europe used to at- 
 tend, lasted only three days each time, and although always, 
 taking place on almost precisely the same ground with the 
 same number of thirty-eight battalions and fifty squadrons, 
 they show so much variety, a thing more difficult to attain 
 then even than now, that not one of the twenty-four battle- 
 exercises in the fourteen successive annual courses which 
 have come down to us is like another. If so it must be then, 
 this example may at least set our minds at rest so far as to 
 convince us that such exercises need not be made monoto- 
 nous, even if we were compelled to conduct them for a long 
 series of years from a standing camp on one and the same 
 ground. 
 
 But the following "idea" comes out pretty often in the 
 reports of these field-days just alluded to one to be recom- 
 mended as useful by way of change, " the next day his 
 Majesty showed how such an attack (or something of the 
 sort) might have been better managed." 
 
The Great Manoeuvres. 
 
 175 
 
 Considerations of expense may (and of this we have no 
 means of judging) induce our rulers to confine such manoeu- 
 vres to certain localities, and may render the formation of 
 camps necessary. But even if such should be the case, this 
 measure would not be subject to those objections which one 
 often hears urged against it, always supposing the camps to 
 be used only for a short time, and by one and the same 
 body of troops. But we hope, in the interests of a healthy, 
 soldier-like life, that our army may be spared the trial of 
 having its greater manoeuvres, especially those of the divis- 
 ion, tied down on principle to such camps. We should be 
 sorry to exchange our old privilege of the shifting canton- 
 ment, of free intercourse with nature, as we might almost 
 say, for an arrangement which, if continued permanently, 
 would infallibly be fatal to the healthy circulation, and 
 would poison the fresh and cheery spirit of our army. 
 
 Once more ; if it must be so, and if by no other means the 
 great concentrations of troops, which are so urgently neces- 
 sary, can.be managed, at least, let the measure only be ap- 
 plied to these, and in every case only for a short time. 
 
 We return to our starting point in these studies. 
 
 To take early account of the requirements of the new tac- 
 tics in our "peace-school" must, we thought, be recognised 
 as a necessity not to be deferred ; changes merely of a formal 
 nature could not be considered sufficient for this purpose. 
 They would burden the short period for peace-training with 
 an additional quantity of work which could not be done jus- 
 tice to in face of the extraordinary rise of the standard of 
 quality. We were compelled, on the contrary, to admit that 
 the absolute amount of training in externals must be re- 
 duced to a minimum, both for the individual and the corps, 
 so that, what is of much more importance now-a-days, the 
 thorough proficiency of each man in what he is actually 
 taught, might be attained. 
 
 The principle of classification, with regard to the higher 
 training of the mass of our Infantry, thus showed itself to 
 
1 7 6 
 
 Preparation for War in Peace. 
 
 be the necessary consequence, and one which would answer 
 all demands a principle which would not make the efficiency 
 of a corps depend solely upon the efficiency of each of its 
 members. But, in order to be equal even to the highest 
 exigencies, it was, we thought, incumbent upon us to accus- 
 tom the officers of all ranks to their war duties, by giving 
 them the most varied "battle-exercises" in the field, and 
 thereby training them to rapid and just tactical judgment 
 respecting the "what" as well as the "how." 
 
 Finally, remembering, as we did, that the true fruit of 
 even the most brilliant bloom of peace-instruction will only 
 be seen to ripen on the battle-field, we thought it advisable 
 to recommend manoeuvres in great masses, with, at least, a 
 resemblance to war, from which alone we dare to hope that 
 we may in peace get the best possible idea of Battle. 
 
 THE END. 
 
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 umes of over 200 pages. Subscription price, $4.00 a year, 
 or $1.00 a number, post paid. 
 
 The first number, containing Boguslawski's "Tactical 
 Deductions from the War of 1870-71" complete, appeared 
 March 1st, 1891. The second number, Von Scherff's famous 
 work, "Studies in the New Tactics of Infantry," appeared 
 June 1st, 1891. The third number, Maude's "Tactics and 
 Organization," will appear September 1st, 1891. 
 
 Among the works to appear are the following, though 
 not necessarily in the order here given : 
 
 Von der Goltz's "THE NATION IN ARMS." 
 Chesney's "WATERLOO LECTURES." 
 Hoffbauer's "GERMAM ARTILLERY." 
 Anderson's "VICTORIES AND DEFEATS." 
 GALL'S "MODERN TACTICS." 
 Clery's " MINOR TACTICS." 
 Trench's "CAVALRY IN MODERN WAR." 
 Von Schmidt's "CAVALRY INSTRUCTION." 
 Denison's "HISTORY OF CAVALRY." 
 ETC., ETC., ETC. 
 
 The size of some of these works will necessitate their 
 publication in two parts. 
 
 BINDING. Those wishing them bound, by returning 
 their copies to the publisher can have them bound in 
 appropriate cover designed for the same, as follows : 
 
 Cloth, 75c. Half Calf, or Russia, with marble 
 edges or gilt top, $2.OO. 
 

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 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY 
 
 THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE 
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 MAR 8 1961 
 
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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY