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V 
 
 ELEMENTS 
 
 OF 
 
 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE: 
 
 OR, 
 
 COURSE OF INSTRUCTION 
 
 IN 
 
 STRATEGY, FORTIFICATION, TACTICS OF BATTLES, &c 
 
 EMBRACING 
 
 THE DUTIES OF STAFF, INFANTRY, CAVALRY, 
 ARTILLERY, AND ENGINEERS. 
 
 ADAPTED TO THE USE OF 
 
 VOLUNTEERS AND MILITIA. 
 
 WITH CRITICAL NOTES ON THE 3IEXICAN AND CEIMEAN "WAES, 
 
 BY 
 
 H. WAGER HALLECK,, A. M., 
 
 LATE CAfPTi c's psraiNzzE^, V. S. itM^. 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 
 D. APPLETON & COMPANY, 
 
 443 & 445 BEOADWAT. 
 
 LONDON: 16 LITTLE BRITAIK 
 
 1861. 
 
Entered, according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1846, 
 
 By D. APPLETON & COMPANY, 
 
 In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern 
 District of New York. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 Paqb 
 Prkfacx • 5 
 
 Chapter I. Introduction.— Dr. Wayland's Arguments on the Justifiable 
 
 ness of War briefly examined 7 
 
 II. Strategy. — General Divisions of the Art.— Rules for planning 
 a Campaign. — Analysis of the Military Operations ot Na- 
 poleon 35 
 
 III. Fortifications.- Their importance in the Defence of States 
 
 proved by numerous Historical Examples 61 
 
 IV. Logistics.— Subsistence. — Forage. — Marches.— Convoys.— Cas- 
 
 trametation 88 
 
 V. Tactics.— The Twelve Orders of Battle, vpith Examples of 
 each. — Different Formations of Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, 
 and Engineers on the Field of Battle, with the Modes of 
 bringing Troops into action 114 
 
 VI. Military Polity. — ^The Means of National Defence best suited 
 
 to the character and condition of a Country, with a brief Ac- 
 count of those adopted by the several European Powers... • 135 
 
 VII. Defence of o0r Sea-coast. — Brief Description of our Mari- 
 
 time Fortifications, with an Examination of the several Con- 
 tests that have taken place between Ships and Forts, inclu- 
 ding the Attack on San Juan d'UUoa, and on St. Jean 
 d'Acre 155 
 
 VIII. Our Northern Frontier Defences.— Brief Description of 
 the Fortifications on the Frontier, and an analysis of our 
 Northern Campaigns 210 
 
 IX. Army Organization.— Staff and Administrative Corps.— Their 
 
 History, Duties, Numbers, and Organization 235 
 
 X. Army Organization. — Infantry and Cavalry. — ^Their History, 
 
 Duties, Numbers, and Organization 256 
 
 XI. Army Organization.— Artillery.— Its History and Organiza- 
 tion, with a Brief Notice of the different kinds of Ordnance, 
 the Manufacture of Projectiles, &.c. 275 
 
 XII. Army Organization. — Engineers.— Their History, Duties, and 
 Organization, — with a Brief Discussion, showing their im- 
 portance as a part of a modem Army Organization 300 
 
 235153 
 
4 CONTENTS. 
 
 Paob 
 Chaf. XIII. PiRMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. Historical Notice of the progress 
 of this Art.— Description of the several parts of a Fortress, 
 and the various Methods of fortifying a Position 327 
 
 XIV. Field Engineering.— Field Fortifications. — Military Communi- 
 cations. — Military Bridges. — Sapping, Mining, and the Attack 
 and Defence of a Fortified Place 342 
 
 XV. Military Education.— Military Schools of France, Prussia, 
 Austria, Russia, England, &c. — Washington's Reasons for 
 establishing the West Point Academy.— Rules of Appoint- 
 ment and Promotion in Foreign Services. — Absurdity and In- 
 justice of our own System 378 
 
 Explanation of Platxs 4flft 
 
PREFACE 
 
 The following pages were hastily thrown together in 
 the form of lectures, and delivered, during the past winter, 
 before the Lowell Institute of Boston. They were writ- 
 ten without the slightest intention of ever publishing them ; 
 but several officers of militia, who heard them delivered, 
 or afterwards read them in manuscript, desire their publi- 
 cation, on the ground of their being useful to a class of 
 officers now likely to be called into military service. It 
 is with this view alone that they are placed in the hands 
 of the printer. No pretension is made to originality in 
 any part of the work ; the sole object having been to em 
 body, in a small compass, well established military princi- 
 ples, and to illustrate these by reference to the events 
 of past history, and the opinions and practice of the best 
 generals. 
 
 Small portions of two or three of the following chap- 
 ters have already appeared, in articles furnished by the 
 author to the New York and Democratic Reviews, and in 
 a " Report on the Means of National Defence," published 
 by order of Congress. 
 
 H. W. H. 
 
 May, 1846. 
 
ELEMENTS 
 
 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 / 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Our distance from the old world, and the favorable cir- 
 cumstances in which we have been placed with respect 
 to the other nations of the new world, have made it so 
 easy for our government to adhere to a pacific policy, that, 
 in the sixty-two years that have elapsed since the ac- 
 knowledgment of our national independence, we have en- 
 joyed more than fifty-eight of general peace ; our Indian 
 border wars have been too limited and local in their char- 
 acter to seriously affect the other parts of the country, or 
 to disturb the general conditions of peace. This fortunate 
 state of things has done much to diffuse knowledge, pro- 
 mote commerce, agriculture, and manufactures ; in fine, to 
 increase the greatness of the nation and the happiness of 
 the individual. Under these circumstances our people 
 have grown up with habits and dispositions essentially 
 pacific, and it is to be hoped that these feelings may not 
 soon be changed. But in all communities opinions some- 
 times run into extremes ; and there are not a few among 
 us who, dazzled by the beneficial results of a long peace, 
 have adopted the opinion that war in any case is not only 
 useless, but actually immoral ; nay, more, that to engage 
 in war is wicked in the highest degree, and even brutish. 
 
8 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 All modern ethical writers regard unjust war as not only 
 immoral, but as one of the greatest of crimes — murder on 
 a large scale. Such are all wars of mere ambition, en- 
 gaged in" for the purpose of extending regal power ol 
 national sovereignty; wars of plunder, carried on from 
 mercenary motives ; wars of propagandism, undertaken 
 for the unrighteous end of compelling men to adopt certain 
 religious or political opinions, whether from the alleged 
 motives of " introducing a more orthodox religion," or of 
 " extending the area of freedom." Such wars are held in 
 just abhorrence by all moral and religious people : and 
 this is believed to be the setthed conviction of the great 
 mass of our o^vn citizens. 
 
 But in addition to that respectable denomination of 
 Christians who deny our right to use arms under any cir- 
 cumstances, there are many religious enthusiasts in other 
 communions who, from causes already noticed, have 
 adopted the same theory, and hold all wars, even those in 
 self-defence, as unlawful and immoral. This opinion has 
 been, within the last few years, pressed on the public with 
 great zeal and eloquence, and many able pens have been 
 enlisted in its cause. One of the most popular, and by 
 some regarded one of the most able writers on moral 
 science, has adopted this view as the only one consonant 
 with the principles of Christian morality. 
 
 It has been deemed proper, in commencing a course of 
 lectures on war, to make a few introductory remarks re- 
 specting this question of its justifiableness. We know of no 
 better way of doing this than to give on the one side the ob- 
 jections to war as laid down in Dr. Wayland's Moral Phi- 
 losophy, and on the other side the arguments by which 
 other ethical writers have justified a resort to war. We do not 
 select Dr. Wayland's work for the purpose of criticizing so 
 distinguished an author ; but because he is almost the only 
 writer on ethics who advocates these views, and because 
 
INTRODUCTION. 9 
 
 the main arguments against war are here given in brief 
 space, and in more moderate and temperate language than 
 that used by most of his followers. I shall give his argu- 
 ments in his own language. 
 
 " I. All wars are contrary to the revealed will of God." 
 It is said in reply, that if the Christian religion con- 
 demns all wars, no matter how just the cause, or how ne- 
 cessary for self-defence, we must expect to find in the 
 Bible some direct prohibition of war, or at least a prohibi- 
 tion fairly implied in other direct commandments. But 
 the Bible nowhere prohibits war : in the Old Testament 
 we find war and even conquest positively commanded, and 
 although war was raging in the world in the time of Christ 
 and his apostles, still they said not a word of its unlawful- 
 ness and immorality. Moreover, the fathers of the church 
 amply acknowledge the right of war, and directly assert, 
 that when war is justly declared, the Christian may en- 
 gage in it either by stratagem or open force. If it be of 
 that highly wicked and immoral character which some 
 have recently attributed to it, most assuredly it would be 
 condemned in the Bible in terms the most positive and 
 unequivocal. 
 
 But it ^s been said that the use of the sword is either 
 directly or typically forbidden to the Christian, by such 
 passages as " Thou shalt not kill," (Deut. v. 17,) «' I say 
 unto you, that ye resist not evil : but whosoever shall 
 smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also," 
 (Matt. V. 39,) &LC. If these passages are to be taken as 
 literal commands, as fanatics and religious enthusiasts 
 would have us believe, not only is war unlawful, but also 
 all our penal statutes, the magistracy, and all the institu- 
 tions of the state for the defence of individual rights, the 
 protection of the innocent, and the punishment of the 
 guilty. But if taken in conjunction with the whole Bible, 
 we must infer that they are hyperbolical expressions, used 
 
10 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 to impress strongly on our minds the general principle of 
 love and forgiveness, and that, so far as possible, we over 
 come evil with good. Can any sober-minded man sup- 
 pose, for a moment, that we are commanded to encou- 
 rage the attacks of the wicked, by literally turning the 
 left cheek when assaulted on the right, and thus in- 
 duce the assailant to commit more wrong ? Shall we in- 
 vite the thief and the robber to persevere in his depreda- 
 tions, by literally giving him a cloak when he takes our 
 coat ; and the insolent and the oppressor to proceed in 
 his path of crime, by going two miles with him if he bid 
 us to go one ? 
 
 Again, if the command, " Thou shalt not kill," is to be 
 taken literally, it not only prohibits us from engaging in 
 just war, and forbids the taking of human life by the 
 state, as a punishment for crime ; it also forbids, says Dr. 
 Leiber, our taking the life of any animal, and even ex- 
 tends to the vegetable kingdom, — for undoubtedly plants 
 have life, and are liable to violent death — to be killed. 
 But Dr. Wayland concedes to individuals the right to 
 take vegetable and ai^mal life, and to society the right to 
 punish murder by death. This passage undoubtedly 
 means, thou shalt not unjustly kill, — thou shalt do no 
 murder; and so it is rendered in our prayer-books. It 
 cannot have reference to war, for on almost the next page 
 we find the Israelites commanded to go forth and smite 
 the heathen nations, — to cast them out of the land, — to 
 utterly destroy them, — to show them no mercy, &c. If 
 these passages of the Bible are to be taken literally, there 
 is no book which contains so many contradictions ; but if 
 taken in connection with the spirit of other passages, we 
 shall find that we are permitted to use force in preventing 
 or punishing crime, whether in nations or in individuals ; 
 but that we should combine love with justice, and free 
 our hearts from all evil motives. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 11 
 
 II. All wars are unjustifiable, because " God commands 
 us to love every man, alien or citizen, Samaritan or Jew, 
 as ourselves ; and the act neither of society nor of gov- 
 ernment can render it our duty to violate this command." 
 
 It is true that no act of society can make it our duty to 
 violate any command of God : but is the above command 
 to be taken literally, and as forbidding us to engage in 
 just war ? Is it not rather intended to impress upon us, 
 in a forcible manner, that mutual love is a great virtue ; 
 that we should hate no one, not even a stranger nor an 
 enemy, but should treat all with justice, mercy, and 
 loving-kindness ? If the meaning attempted to be given 
 to this command in the above quotation be the true one, it 
 is antagonistical not only to just war, but to civil justice, 
 to patriotism, and to the social and domestic affections. 
 
 But are we bound to love all human beings alike ; that 
 is, to the same degree ? Does the Bible, as a whole, in- 
 culcate such doctrine ? On the contrary, Christ himself 
 had his beloved disciple, — one whom he loved pre-emi- 
 nently, and above all the others ; though he loved the 
 others none the less on that account. We are bound to 
 love our parents, our brothers, our families first, and above 
 all other human beings ; but we do not, for this reason, 
 love others any the less. A man is not only permitted to 
 seek first the comfort and happiness of his own family, 
 but if he neglect to do so, he is worse than an infidel. 
 We are bound to protect our families against the attacks 
 of others ; and, if necessary for the defence of their 
 lives, we are permitted to take the life of the assailant ; 
 nay more, we are bound to do so. But it does not follow 
 that we hate hiin whom we thus destroy. On the con- 
 trary, we may feel compassion, and even love for him. 
 The magistrate sentences the murderer to suffer the pen- 
 alty of the law ; and the sheriff carries the sentence into 
 execution by taking, in due form, the life of the prisoner ; 
 
12 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 nevertheless, both the magistrate and the sheriff may have 
 the kindest feelings towards him whom they thus deprive 
 of life. 
 
 So it is in the external affairs of the state. Next to 
 my kindred and my neighbors do I love my countrymen. 
 I love them more than I do foreigners, because my in- 
 terests, my feelings, my happiness, my ties of friendship 
 and affection, bind me to them more intimately than to the 
 foreigner. I sympathize with the oppressed Greek, and 
 the enslaved African, and willingly contribute to their 
 relief, although their sufferings affect me very remotely ; 
 but if my own countrymen become oppressed and en- 
 slaved, nearer and dearer interests are affected, and pecu- 
 liar duties spring from the ties and affections which God 
 has formed. If my countrymen be oppressed, my neigh- 
 bors and kindred will be made unhappy and suffering ; 
 this I am bound to take all proper measures in my power 
 to prevent. If the assailant cannot be persuaded by ar- 
 gument to desist from his wicked intentions, I unite with 
 my fellow-citizens in forcibly resisting Jiis aggressions. 
 In doing this I am actuated by no feelings of hatred to- 
 wards the hostile forces ; I have in my heart no malice, 
 no spirit of revenge ; I have no desire to harm indi- 
 viduals, except so far as they are made the instruments 
 of oppression. But as instruments of evil, I am bound 
 to destroy their power to do harm. I do not shoot at my- 
 military enemy from hatred or revenge ; I fight against 
 him because the paramount interests of my country can- 
 not be secured without destroying the instrument by 
 which they are assailed. I am prohibited from exercising 
 any personal cruelty ; and after the battle, or as soon as 
 the enemy is rendered harmless, he is to be treated with 
 kindness, and to be taken care of equally with the wound • 
 ed friend. All conduct to the contrary is regarded by 
 civilized nations with disapprobation. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 13 
 
 That war does not properly beget personal malignity 
 but that, on the contrary, the effects of mutual kindness 
 and courtesy on the battle-field, frequently have a bene- 
 ficial influence in the political events of after years, may 
 be shown by innumerable examples in all history. Soult 
 and Wellington were opposing generals in numerous bat- 
 tles ; but when the former visited England in 1838, he 
 was received by Wellington and the whole British nation 
 with the highest marks of respect ; and the mutual warmth 
 of feeling between these two distingui«hed men has con- 
 tributed much to the continuance of friendly relations be 
 tween the two nations. And a few years ago, when we 
 seemed brought, by our civil authorities, almost to the 
 brink of war by the northeastern boundary difficulties, the 
 pacific arrangements concluded, through the intervention 
 of General Scott, between the Governors of Maine and 
 New Brunswick, were mainly due to ancient friendships 
 contracted by officers of the contending armies during our 
 last war with Great Britain. 
 
 III. " It is granted that it would be better for man in 
 general, if wars were abolished, and all means, both of 
 offence and defence, abandoned. Now, this seems to me 
 to admit, that this is the law under which God has created 
 man. But this being admitted, the question seems to be 
 at an end ; for God never places man imder circumstances 
 in which it is either wise, or necessary, or innocent, to 
 violate his laws. Is it for the advantage of him who lives 
 among a community of thieves, to steal ; or for one who 
 lives among a community of liars, to lie ?" 
 
 The fallacy of the above argument is so evident that it 
 is scarcely necessary to point out its logical defects. 
 
 My living among a community of thieves would not 
 justify me in stealing, and certainly it would be no reason 
 why I should neglect the security of my property. My 
 living among murderers would not iustify me in commit 
 
14 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE 
 
 ting murder, and on the other hand it would be no reason 
 why I should not fight in the defence of my family, if the 
 arm of the law were unable to protect them. That other 
 nations carry on unjust wars is no reason why we should 
 do likewise, nor is it of itself any reason why we should 
 neglect the means of self-defence. 
 
 It may seem, to us short-sighted mortals, better that we 
 were placed in a world where there were no wars, or 
 murders, or thefts ; but God has seen fit to order it other- 
 wise. Our duties rand our relations to our fellow-men are 
 made to suit the world as it is, and not such a world as 
 we would make for ourselves. 
 
 We live among thieves : we must therefore resort to 
 force to protect our property — that is, to locks, and bars, 
 and bolts ; we build walls thick and high between the 
 robber and our merchandise. And more : we enact laws 
 for his punishment, and employ civil officers to forcibly 
 seize the guilty and inflict that degree of punishment 
 necessary for the prevention of other thefts and robberies. 
 
 We live among murderers : if neither the law nor the 
 ordinary physical protections suffice for the defence of our 
 own lives and the lives of our innocent friends, we forci- 
 bly resist the murderer, even to his death, if need be. 
 Moreover, to deter others from like crimes, we inflict the 
 punishment of death upon him who has already taken 
 life. 
 
 These relations of individuals and of society are laid 
 down by all ethical writers as in accordance with the 
 strictest rules of Christian morality. Even Dr. Wayland 
 considers it not only the right, but the duty of individuals 
 and of society to resort to these means, and to enact these 
 laws for self-protection. Let us extend the same course 
 of reasoning to the relations of different societies. 
 
 We live among nations who frequently wage unjust 
 wars ; who, disregarding the rights of others, oppress 
 
INTRODUCTION. 15 
 
 and rob, and even murder their citizens, in order to reach 
 seme unrighteous end. As individuals, we build fences 
 and walls for the protection of our grounds and our mer- 
 chandise ; so, as a nation, we build ships and forts to 
 protect our commerce, our harbors, and our cities. But 
 the walls of our houses and stores are useless, unless 
 made so strong and high that the robber cannot break 
 through or scale them without great effort and personal 
 danger ; so our national ships and forts would be utterly 
 useless for protection, unless fully armed and equipped. 
 
 Further: as individuals and as societies we employ 
 civil officers for the protection of our property and lives, 
 and, when necessary, arm them with the physical means 
 of executing the laws, even though the employment of 
 these means should cost human life. The prevention and 
 punishment of crime causes much human suffering ; nev- 
 ertheless the good of community requires that crime 
 should be prevented and punished. So, as a nation, we 
 employ military officers to man our ships and forts, to pro- 
 tect our property and our persons, and to repel and punish 
 those who seek to rob us of our life, liberty, and pursuit 
 of happiness. National aggressions are far more terrible 
 in their results than individual crime ; so also the means 
 of prevention and punishment are far more stupendous, 
 and the employment of these means causes a far greater 
 amount of human suffering. This may be a good reason 
 for greater caution in resorting to such means, but assuredly 
 it is no argument against the moral right to use them. 
 IV. War is unjustifiable because unnecessary : 
 " 1st. The very fact that a nation relied solely upon the 
 justice of its measures, and the benevolence of its con- 
 duct, would do more than any thing else to prevent the 
 occurrence of injury. The moral sentiment of every com- 
 munity would rise in opposition to injury inflicted upon 
 the just the kind, and the merciful." 
 
16 MIUTARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 The moral duty of nations in this respect is the same 
 as that of individuals. Active benevolence and forbear- 
 ance should be employed, so far as may be proper ; but 
 there are points at which forbearance ceases to be a vir- 
 tue. If we entirely forbear to punish the thief, the rob- 
 ber, and the murderer, think you that crime will be dimin- 
 ished? Reason and experience prove the contrary. 
 Active benevolence and kindness should always attend 
 just punishment, but they were never designed to prohibit 
 it. The laws of God's universe are founded on justice as 
 well as love. " The moral sentiment of every community 
 rises in opposition to injury inflicted upon the just, the 
 kind, and the merciful ;" but this fact does not entirely 
 prevent wicked men from robbing and murdering innocent 
 persons, and therefore wise and just laws require that 
 criminals shall be punished, in order that those who are 
 dead to all moral restraints may be deterred from crime 
 through fear of punishment. 
 
 "2d. But suppose the [national] injury to be done. I 
 reply, The proper appeal for moral beings, upon moral 
 questions, is not to physical force, but to the consciences 
 of men. Let the wrong be set forth, but be set forth in 
 the spirit of love ; and in this manner, if in any, will the 
 consciences of men be aroused to justice." 
 
 Argument, and " appeals to the consciences of men" 
 should always be resorted to in preference to " physical 
 force ;" but when they fail to deter the wicked, force 
 must be employed. I may reason with the robber and 
 the murderer, to persuade him to desist from his attempt 
 to rob my house, and murder my family ; but if he refuse 
 to listen to moral appeals, I employ physical force, — I 
 call in the strong arm of the law to assist me ; and if no 
 other means can be found to save innocent life that is as- 
 sailed, the life of the assailant must be sacrificed. 
 
 " If," says PufFendorf, " some one treads the laws of 
 
INTRODUCTION. 17 
 
 peace under his feet, forming projects which tend to my 
 ruin, he could not, without the highest degree of impu- 
 dence, (impudentissime,) pretend that after this I should 
 consider him as a sacred person, who ought not to be 
 touched ; in other words, that I should betray myself, and 
 abandon the care of my own preservation, in order to 
 give way to the malice of a criminal, that he may act 
 with impimlty and with full liberty. On the contrary, 
 since he shows himself unsociable towards me, and since 
 he has placed himself in a position which does not per- 
 mit me safely to practice towards him the duties of peace, 
 I have only to think of preventing the danger which 
 menaces me ; so that if I cannot do this without hurting 
 him, he has to accuse himself only, since he has reduced 
 me to this necessity." De Jure Nat. et Gent., lib. ii., ch. 
 v., ^ 1 . This same course of reasoning is also applied 
 to the duties of a nation towards its enemy in respect to 
 war. 
 
 " 3d. But suppose this method fail. Why, then, let us 
 suffer the evil." 
 
 This principle, if applied to its full extent, would, we 
 believe, be subversive of all right, and soon place all 
 power in the hands of the most evil and wicked men in 
 the community. Reason with the nation that invades our 
 soil, and tramples under foot our rights and liberties, and 
 should it not desist, why, then, suffer the evil ! Reason 
 with the murderer, and if he do not desist, why, then, 
 suffer him to murder our wives and our children ! Reason 
 with the robber and the defaulter, and if they will not 
 listen, why, then, let them take our property ! We can- 
 not appeal to the courts, for if their decisions be not re- 
 spected, they employ ybrae to compel obedience to their 
 mandates. But Dr. Wayland considers the law of be- 
 nevolence to forbid the use of force between men. He 
 forgets this, it is true, in speaking of our duties towards 
 
18 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE 
 
 our fellow-men of the same society , and even allows us to 
 punish the murderer with death; but towards the for- 
 eigner he requires a greater forbearance and benevolence 
 than towards our neighbor ; for if another nation send its 
 armies to oppress, and rob, and murder us by the thou- 
 sand, we have no right to -employ physical force either to 
 prevent or to punish them, though we may do so to pre- 
 vent or punish a neighbor for an individual act of the 
 same character. The greater the scale of crime, then, 
 the less the necessity of resorting to physical force to 
 prevent it ! 
 
 " 4th. But it may be asked, what is to prevent repeated 
 and continued aggression ? ' I answer, first, not instru- 
 ments of destruction, but the moral principle which God 
 has placed in the bosom of every man. I think that obe- 
 dience to the law of God, on the part of the injured, is 
 the surest preventive against the repetition of injury. I 
 answer, secondly, suppose that acting in obedience to the 
 law of benevolence will not prevent the repetition of in- 
 jury, will acting on the principle of retaliation prevent 
 it?" Again; "I believe aggression from a foreign nation to 
 be the intimation from God that we are disobeying the 
 law of benevolence, and that this is his mode of teaching 
 nations their duty, in this respedt, to each other. So that 
 aggression seems to me in no manner to call for retalia- 
 tion and injury, but rather to call for special kindness and 
 good-will." 
 
 This argument, if such it can be called, is equally ap- 
 plicable to individual aggressions. We are bound to 
 regard them as intimations of our want of benevolence, 
 and to reward the aggressors for the intimations ! Is it 
 true, that in this world the wicked only are oppressed, 
 and that the good are always the prospered and happy ? 
 Even suppose this true, and that I, as a sinful man, de- 
 serve God's anger, is this any reason why I should not 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 19 
 
 resist the assassin, and seek to bring him to punish- 
 ment? The whole of this argmnent of Dr. Wayland 
 applies with much greater force to municipal courts than 
 to war. 
 
 V. '* Let us suppose a nation to abandon all means 
 both of offence and of defence, to lay aside all power of 
 mfiicting injury, and to rely for self-preservation solely 
 upon the justice of its own conduct, and the moral effect 
 which such a course of conduct would produce upon the 
 consciences of men. * * * * How would such a 
 nation be protected from external attack, and entire sub- 
 jugation 1 I answer, by adopting the law of benevolence, 
 a nation would render such an event in the highest de- 
 gree improbable. The causes of national war are, most 
 commonly, the love of plunder and the love of glory. 
 The first of these is rarely, if ever, sufficient to stimulate 
 men to the ferocity necessary to war, unless wh0n assisted 
 by the second. And by adopting as the rule of our con- 
 duct the law of benevolence, all motive arising from the 
 second cause is taken away. There is not a nation in 
 Europe that could be led on to war against a harmless, 
 just, forgiving, and defenceless people." 
 
 History teaches us that societies as well as individuals 
 have been attacked again and again notwithstanding that 
 they either would not or could not defend themselves. 
 Did Mr. White, of Salem, escape his murderers any the 
 more for being harmless and defenceless ? Did the Qua- 
 kers escape being attacked and hung by the ancient New 
 Englanders any the more because of their non-resisting 
 principles 1 Have the Jews escaped persecutions through- 
 out Christendom any the more because of their imbecility 
 and non-resistance for some centuries past ? Poland was 
 comparatively harmless and defenceless when the three 
 groat European powers combined to attack and destroy 
 the entire nation, dividing between themselves the Polish 
 
20 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 territory, and enslaving or driving into exile the Polish 
 people. 
 
 " Oh, bloodiest picture in the book of time, 
 Sarmatia fell, unwept, without a crime !" 
 
 We need not multiply examples under this head ; all history 
 is filled with them. 
 
 Let us to-morrow destroy our forts and ships of war, 
 disband our army and navy, and apply the lighted torch 
 to our military munitions and to our physical means of de- 
 fence of every description; let it be proclaimed to the 
 world that we will rely solely upon the consciences of 
 nations for justice, and that we have no longer either the 
 will or the ability to defend ourselves against aggression. 
 Think you that the African and Asiatic pirates would re- 
 frain, any the more, from plundering our vessels trading to 
 China, betiause we had adopted "the law of benevolence?" 
 Would England be any the more likely to compromise her 
 differences with us, or be any the more disposed to re- 
 frain from impressing our seamen and from searching our 
 merchant-ships ? Experience shows that an undefended 
 state, known to suffer every thing, soon becomes the prey 
 of all others, and history most abundantly proves the wis- 
 dom and justice of the words of Washington — " If we 
 
 DESIRE TO SECURE PEACE, IT MUST BE KNOWN THAT WE 
 ARE AT ALL TIMES READY FOR WAR." 
 
 But let US bring this case still nearer home. Let it be 
 known to-morrow that the people of Boston or New York 
 have adopted the strictly non-resisting principle, and thai 
 hereafter they will rely solely on the consciences of men 
 for justice ; let it be proclaimed throughout the whole ex- 
 tent of our Union, and throughout the world, that you have 
 destroyed your jails and houses of correction, abolished 
 your police and executive law officers, that courts may 
 decide justice but will be allowed no force to compel re- 
 
INTRODUCTION. 21 
 
 spect to their decisions, that you will no longer employ 
 walls, and bars, and locks, to secure your property and 
 the virtue and lives of your children ; but that you will 
 trust solely for protection to " the law of active benevo- 
 lence." Think you that the thieves, and robbers, and 
 murderers of Philadelphia, and Baltimore, and New Or- 
 leans, and the cities of the old world, will, on this ac- 
 count, refrain from molesting the peace of New York and 
 Boston, and that the wicked and abandoned men now in 
 these cities, will be the more likely to turn from the evil 
 of their ways 1 
 
 Assuredly, if this " law of active benevolence," as Dr. 
 Wayland denominates the rule of non-resistance, will 
 prevent nations from attacking the harmless and defence- 
 less, it will be still more likely to prevent individuals 
 from the like aggressions ; for the moral sense is less 
 active in communities than where the responsibility is 
 individual and direct. 
 
 Throughout this argument Dr. Wayland assumes that 
 all wars are wars of aggression, waged for " plunder" or 
 " glory," or through " hatred" or " revenge," whereas 
 such is far from being true. He indeed sometimes speaks 
 of war as being generally of this character ; at others he 
 speaks of it as being always undertaken either from a 
 spirit of aggression or retaliation. Take either form of 
 his argument, and the veriest schoolboy would pronounce 
 it unsound : viz., 
 
 All wars are undertaken either for aggression or retal- 
 iation ; 
 
 Aggression and retaliation are forbidden by God's laws ; 
 —therefore. 
 
 All wars are immoral and unjustifiable. 
 
 Or, 
 
 Wars are generally undertaken either for aggression or 
 retaliation ; 
 
22 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 Aggression and retaliation are forbidden by God's laws 
 — ^therefore, 
 
 All wars are immoral and unjustifiable. 
 
 YI. " Let any man reflect upon the amount of pecuniary 
 expenditure, and the awful waste of human life, which the 
 wars of the last hundred years have occasioned, and then 
 we will ask him whether it be not evident, that the one- 
 himdredth part of this expense and sufl"ering, if employed 
 in the honest effort to render mankind wiser and better, 
 would, long before this time, have banished wars from 
 the earth, and rendered the civilized world like the gar- 
 den of Eden ? If this be true, it will follow that the cul- 
 tivation of a military spirit is injurious to a community, 
 inasmuch as it aggravates the source of the evil, the cor- 
 rupt passions of the human breast, by the very manner in 
 which it attempts to correct the evil itself." 
 
 Much has been said to show that war begets immo- 
 rality, and that the cultivation of the military spirit has a 
 corrupting influence on community. And members of the 
 clergy and of the bar have not unfrequently so far for- 
 gotten, if not truth and fact, at least the common cour- 
 tesies and charities of life, as to attribute to the military 
 profession an unequal share of immorality and crime. 
 We are declared not only parasites on the body politic, 
 but professed violaters of God's laws — men so degraded, 
 though unconsciously, that " in the pursuit of justice we 
 renounce the human character and assume that of the 
 beasts ;" it is said that " murder, robbery, rape, arson, 
 theft, if only plaited with the soldier's garb, go un whipped 
 of justice."* It has never been the habit of the military 
 to retort these charges upon the other professions. We 
 prefer to leave them unanswered. If demagogues on the 
 " stump," or in the legislative halls, or in their Fourth <i{- 
 
 * Sumner's Oration. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 23 
 
 July addresses, can find no fitter subjects " to point a 
 moral or adorn a tale," we must be content to bear their 
 misrepresentations and abuse. 
 
 Unjust wars, as well as unjust litigation, are immoral 
 in their effects and also* in their cause. But just wars 
 and just litigation are not demoralizing. Suppose all 
 wars and all courts of justice to be abolished, and the 
 wicked nations as well as individuals to be suffered to 
 commit injuries without opposition and without punish- 
 ment ; would not immorality and unrighteousness increase 
 rather than diminish ? Few events rouse and elevate the 
 patriotism and public spirit of a nation so much as a just and 
 patriotic war. It raises the tone of public morality, and 
 destroys the sordid selfishness and degrading submissive- 
 ness which so often result from a long-protracted peace. 
 Such was the Dutch war of independence against the 
 Spaniards ; such the German war against the aggressions 
 of Louis XIV., and the French war against the coalition 
 of 1792. But without looking abroad for illustration, we 
 find ample proof in our own history. Can it be said that 
 the wars of the American Revolution and of 1812, were 
 demoralizing in their effects ? " Whence do Americans," 
 says Dr. Lieber, " habitually take their best and purest 
 examples of all that is connected with patriotism, public 
 spirit, devotedness to common good, purity of motive and 
 action, if not from the daring band of their patriots of the 
 Revolution ?" 
 
 The principal actors in the military events of the Revo- 
 lution and of 1812, held, while living, high political offi- 
 ces in the state, and the moral tone which they derived 
 from these wars may be judged of by the character 
 stamped on their administration of the government. These 
 men have passed away, and their places have, for some 
 time, been filled by men who take their moral tone from the 
 relations of peace To the true believer in the efficacy 
 
24 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 of non-resistance J and in the demoralizing influence of all 
 wars, how striking the contrast between these different 
 periods in our political history ! How infinitely inferior 
 to the rulers in later times were those, who, in the blind- 
 ness of their infatuation, appealed to physical force, rather 
 than surrender their life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness ! 
 Let us trace out this contrast : — 
 
 In the earlier ages of our republic, and under the rule 
 of those whose moral character had been corrupted by 
 war, party spirit ran higher and was less pure than at 
 later periods in our history. The object of the principal 
 leaders of the great political parties was then to render 
 the opinions of the opposite party odious : now, their only 
 object is to sustain their own opinions by argument. 
 Then, each party claimed to itself an exclusive love of 
 country, and stigmatized the other as aliens and the natu- 
 ral enemies of the state : now^ they both practise great 
 forbearance, love, and charity, towards political opponents. 
 Then, men obtained place through intrigue and corruption, 
 and a universal scramble for the loaves and fishes of of- 
 fice on the one side, and a universal political proscription 
 on the other, were regarded as the natural results of an 
 election : now, this disgusting strife for oflice has ceased ; 
 men no longer seek place, but wait, like Cincinnatus, to 
 be called from their ploughs ; and none are proscribed for 
 opinion's sake. Then, in electing men to office the most 
 important social and constitutional principles were forgot- 
 ten or violated : now, we have the august spectacle of a 
 nation choosing its rulers under the guidance of strict 
 moral principle. Then, the halls of congress were fre- 
 quently filled with demagogues, and tiplers, and the small 
 men of community : now, the ablest and best of the coun- 
 try are always sought for as representatives. Then, the 
 magnates of party were the mere timid, temporizing slaves 
 of expediency, looking, not to the justice and wisdom of 
 
INTR0DT3CTI0N. 25 
 
 their measures, but to their probable popularity with their 
 sneaking train of followers : now, they rely for respect 
 and support upon the judgment of the honest and enlight- 
 ened. Then, the rank and file of party were mere politi- 
 cal hirelings, who sold their manhood for place, who 
 reviled and glorified, and shouted huzzas and whispered 
 calumnies, just as they were bidden ; they could fawn 
 upon those who dispensed political patronage with a 
 cringing servility that would shame the courtiers of Louis 
 XIV., or the parasites and hirelings of Walpole : now, all 
 political partisans, deriving their moral tone from the piping 
 times of peace, are pure, disinterested patriots, who, like 
 the Roman farmer, take office with great reluctance, and 
 resign it again as soon as the state can spare their ser- 
 vices. Then, prize-fighters, and blacklegs, and gamblers, 
 having formed themselves into political club^ were court- 
 ed by men high in authority, and rewarded for their dirty 
 and corrupting partisan services by offices of trust and 
 responsibility : now, no man clothed with authority would 
 dare to insult the moral sense of community by receiving 
 such characters in the national councils, or by bestowing 
 public offices upon these corrupt and loathsome dregs of 
 society. 
 
 Such, the advocates of non-resistance would persuade 
 us, are the legitimate results in this country of war on the 
 one hand and of a long-protracted peace on the other. 
 But there are men of less vivid imaginations, and, per- 
 haps, of visions less distorted by fanatical zeal, who fail 
 to perceive these results, and who even think they see 
 the reverse of all this. These men cannot perceive any 
 thing in the lives of Washington, Hamilton, and Knox, to 
 show that they were the less virtuous because they had 
 borne arms in their country's service : they even fail to 
 perceive the injurious effects of the cultivation of a mili- 
 tary spirit on the military students of West Point, whose 
 
 3 
 
26 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE 
 
 graduates, they think, will compare favorably in mora 
 character with the graduates of Yale and Cambridge. 
 Nay, more, some even go so far as to say that our army, 
 as a body, is no less moral than the corresponding classes 
 in civil life ; that our common soldiers are as seldom 
 guilty of riots, thefts, robberies, and murders, as similarly 
 edlicated men engaged in other pursuits ; that our militar)' 
 oiFicers are not inferior in moral character to our civil 
 officers, and that, as a class, they will compare favorably 
 with any other class of professional men — with lawyers, 
 for example. In justification of these opinions — which 
 may, perhaps, be deemed singularly erroneous — they say, 
 that in the many millions of public money expended during 
 the last forty years, by military officers, for the army, for 
 military defences, and for internal improvements, but a 
 single graduate of West Point has proved a defaulter, even 
 to the smallest sum, and that it is exceedingly rare to see 
 an officer of the army brought into court for violating the 
 laws. 
 
 But even suppose it true that armies necessarily diffuse 
 immorality through community, is it not equally true that 
 habitual submission to the injustice, plunder, and insult 
 of foreign conquerors would tend still more to degrade 
 and demoralize any people ? 
 
 With regard to "pecuniary expenditures" required in 
 military defence, many absurd as well as false statements 
 have been put forth. With respect to our own comitry, 
 the entire amounts expended, under the head of war de- 
 partment, whether for Indian pensions, for the purchase 
 of Indian lands, the construction of government roads, the 
 improvement of rivers and harbors, the building of break- 
 waters and sea-walls, for the preservation of property, the 
 surveying of public lands, &c., &;c. ; in fine, every ex- 
 penditure made by officers of the army, under the war 
 department, is put down as " expenses for military de- 
 
INTRODUCTION 27 
 
 fence." Similar misstatements are made with respect to 
 foreign countries : for example, the new fortifications of 
 Paris are said to have already cost from fifty to seventy- 
 five millions of dollars, and as much more is said to be re- 
 quired to complete them. Indeed, we have seen the whole 
 estimated cost of those works stated at two hundred and 
 forty millions of dollars, or twelve hundred millions of 
 francs ! The facts are these : the works, when done, 
 will have cost about twenty-eight millions. We had the 
 pleasure of examining them not long since, in company 
 with several of the engineer officers employed on the 
 works. They were then three-fourths done, and had 
 cost about twenty millions. We were assured by these offi- 
 cers that the fortifications proper would be completed for 
 somewhat less than the original estimate of twenty-eight 
 millions. Had we time to enter into details, other examples 
 of exaggeration and misrepresentation could be given. 
 
 But it is not to be denied that wars and the means of 
 military defence have cost vast amounts of money. So 
 also have litigation and the means deemed requisite for 
 maintaining justice between individuals. It has been 
 estimated that we have in this country, at the present 
 time, thirty thousand lawyers, without including petti- 
 foggers. Allowing each of these to cost the country the 
 average sum of one thousand dollars, and we have the 
 annual cost to the country, for lawyers, thirty millions of 
 dollars. Add to this the cost of legislative halls and legis- 
 lators for making laws ; of court-houses, jails, police- 
 offices, judges of the different courts, marshals, sheriflfs, 
 justices of the peace, constables, clerks, witnesses, &c., 
 employed to apply and enforce the laws when made ; the 
 personal loss of time of the different plaintiff's and defend- 
 ants, the individual anxiety and suffering produced by 
 litigation ; add all these together, and I doubt not the re- 
 sult for a single year will somewhat astonish these modem 
 
28 * MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 economists. But if all the expenditures of this nature 
 that have been made for the last fifty years, in this indi- 
 vidual " war of hate," be added together, we have no doubt 
 a very fruitful text might be obtained for preaching a cru- 
 sade against law and lawyers ! But could any sane man 
 be found to say that, on account of the cost of maintaining 
 them, all laws and lawyers are useless and should be 
 abolished ? 
 
 If, therefore, these vast sums of money are deemed 
 necessary to secure justice between individuals of the 
 same nation, can we expect that the means of international 
 justice can be maintained without expenditures commen- 
 surate with the object in view ? If we cannot rely exclu- 
 sively upon the " law of active benevolence" for main- 
 taining justice between brothers of the same country, can 
 we hope that, in the present state of the world, strangers 
 and foreigners will be more ready to comply with its re- 
 quisitions 1 
 
 The length of the preceding remarks admonishes us 
 to greater brevity in the further discussion of this subject. 
 
 It is objected to war, that men being rational beings, 
 should contend with one another by argument, and not by 
 force, as do the brutes. 
 
 To this it is answered, that force properly begins only 
 where argument ends. If he who has wronged me can- 
 not be persuaded to make restitution, I apply to the court, 
 — ^that is, to legal force, — to compel him to do me justice. 
 So nations ought to resort to military force only when all 
 other means fail to prevent aggression and injury. 
 
 But war often fails to j>rocure redress of grievances, or 
 to prevent repeated and continued aggression. 
 
 So does a resort to civil force ; but such a resort is 
 none the less proper and just on that account. 
 
 But in war the innocent party is sometimes the sufferer, 
 while the guilty triumph. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 29 
 
 So it often is in civil life : God, for some wise purpose, 
 sometimes permits the wicked to triumph for a season. 
 
 But in all wars one party must be in the wrong, and 
 frequently the war is unjust on both sides. 
 
 So in suits at law, one party is necessarily wrong, and 
 frequently both resort to the civil tribunals in hopes of 
 attaining unrighteous ends. 
 
 But nations do not resort to tribunals, like individuals, 
 to settle their differences. 
 
 For the reason that it is believed a tribunal of this 
 character — a congress of nations, as it has been called, 
 — ^would be more productive of evil than of good. By 
 such an arrangement the old and powerful European 
 monarchies wOuld acquire the authority to interfere in 
 the domestic affairs of the weaker powers. We see the 
 effects of establishing such a tribunal in the so-called 
 Holy Alliance, whose influence is regarded by the friends 
 of liberty as little less dangerous than the Holy Inqui- 
 sition. Moreover, such a tribunal would not prevent war, 
 for military force would still be resorted to to enforce its 
 decisions. For these and other reasons, it is deemed 
 better and safer to rely on the present system of Inter- 
 national Law. Under this system, and in this country, a 
 resort to the arbitrament of war is not the result of im- 
 pulse and passion, — a yielding to the mere " bestial pro- 
 pensities" of our nature ; it is a deliberate and solemn 
 act of the legislative power, — of the representatives of 
 the national mind, convened as the high council of the 
 people. It is this power which must determine when all 
 just and honorable means have been resorted to to obtain 
 national justice, and when a resort to military force is 
 requisite and proper. If this decision be necessarily un- 
 christian and barbarous, such, also, should we expect 
 to be the character of other laws passed by the same 
 body, and under the same circumstances. A declaration 
 
30 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 of war, m this country, is a law of the land, made by a 
 deliberative body, under the high sanction of the consti- 
 tution. It is true that such a law may be unjust and 
 wrong, but we can scarcely agree that it will necessarily 
 be so. The distinction between war, as thus duly de- 
 clared, and " international Lynch-law" is too evident to 
 need comment. 
 
 But it is said that the benefits of war are more than 
 counterbalanced by the evils it entails, and that, " most 
 commonly, the very means by which we repel a des- 
 potism from abroad, only establishes over us a military 
 despotism at home." 
 
 Much has been said and written about military des- 
 potism ; but we think he who studies history thoroughly, 
 will not fail to prefer a military despotism to a des- 
 potism of mere politicians. The governments of Alex- 
 ander and Charlemagne were infinitely preferable to 
 those of the petty civil tyrants who preceded and fol- 
 lowed them ; and there is no one so blinded by prejudice 
 as to say that the reign of Napoleon was no better thaji 
 that of Robespierre, Danton, and the other "lawyers" 
 who preceded him, or of the Bourbons, for whom he was 
 dethroned. 
 
 " CoBsar," says a distinguished senator of our own 
 country, " was rightfully killed for conspiring against his 
 country ; but it was not he that destroyed the liberties of 
 Rome. That work was done by the profligate politicians 
 without him, and before his time ; and his death did not 
 restore the republic. There were no more elections : 
 rotten politicians had destroyed them; and the nephew 
 of Csesar, as heir to his uncle, succeeded to the empire 
 on the principle of hereditary succession. 
 
 " And here History appears in her grand and instruc- 
 tive character, as Philosophy teaching by example : and 
 let us not be senseless to her warning voice. Superficial 
 
INTRODUCTION. 31 
 
 readers believe it was the military men who destroyed 
 the Roman republic ! No such thing ! It was the poli- 
 ticians who did it! — factious, corrupt, intriguing politi- 
 cians — destroying public virtue in their mad pursuit after 
 office — destroying their rivals by crime — deceiving and 
 debauching the people for votes — and bringing elections 
 into contempt by the frauds and violence with which they 
 were conducted. From the time of the Gracchi there 
 were no elections that could bear the name. Confederate 
 and rotten politicians bought and sold the consulship. 
 Intrigue and the dagger disposed of rivals. Fraud, vio- 
 lence, bribes, terror, and the plunder of the public trea- 
 sury commanded votes. The people had no choice ; and 
 long before the time of Caesar, nothing remained of re- 
 publican government but the name and the abuse. Read 
 Plutarch. In the ' Life of Caesar,' and not three pages 
 before the crossing of the Rubicon, he paints the ruined 
 state of the elections, — shows that all elective government 
 was gone, — that the hereditary form had become a neces- 
 sary relief from the contests of the corrupt, — and that in 
 choosing between Pompey and Caesar, many preferred 
 Pompey,-»not because they thought him republican, but 
 because they thought he would make the milder king. 
 Even arms were but a small part of Caesar's reliance, 
 when he crossed the Rubicon. Gold, still more than the 
 sword, was his dependence ; and he sent forward the ac- 
 cumulated treasures of plundered Gaul, to be poured into 
 the laps of rotten politicians. There was no longer a 
 popular government ; and in taking all power himself, he 
 only took advantage of the state of things which profli- 
 gate politicians had produced. In this he was culpable, 
 and paid the forfeit with his life. But in contemplating 
 his fate, let us never forget that the politicians had under- 
 mined and destroyed the republic, before he came to 
 seize and to master it." 
 
32 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE 
 
 We could point to numerous instances, where the ben- 
 efits of war have more than compensated for the evils 
 which attended it ; benefits not only to the generations 
 who engaged in it, but also to their descendants for long 
 ages. Had Rome adopted the non-resistance principle 
 when Hannibal was at her gates, we should now be in 
 the night of African ignorance and barbarism, instead of 
 enjoying the benefits of Roman learning and Roman civ- 
 ilization. Had France adopted this principle when the 
 allied armies invaded her territories in 1792, her fate had 
 followed that of Poland. Had our ancestors adopted this 
 principle in 1776, what now had been, think you, the 
 character and condition of our country 1 
 
 Dr. Lieber's remarks on this point are peculiarly just 
 and apposite. " The continued efforts," says he, " requi- 
 site for a nation to protect themselves against the ever- 
 repeated attacks of a predatory foe, may be infinitely 
 greater than the evils entailed by a single and energetic 
 war, which forever secures peace from that side. Nor 
 will it be denied, I suppose, that Niebuhr is right when 
 he observes, that the advantage to Rome of having con- 
 quered Sicily, as to power and national vigor, was unde- 
 niable. But even if it were not so, are there no other 
 advantages to be secured ? No human mind is vast 
 enough to comprehend in one glance, nor is any human 
 life long enough to follow out consecutively, all the im- 
 measurable blessings and the unspeakable good which 
 have resolved to mankind from the ever-memorable vic- 
 tories of little Greece over the rolling masses of servile 
 Asia, which were nigh sweeping over Europe like the 
 high tides of a swollen sea, carrying its choking sand 
 over all the germs of civilization, liberty, and taste, and 
 nearly all that is good and noble. Think what we should 
 have been had Europe become an Asiatic province, and 
 the Eastern principles of power and stagnation should 
 
INTRODUCTION. 33 
 
 have become deeply infused into her population, so that 
 no process ever after could have thrown it out again! 
 Has no advantage resulted from the Hebrews declining 
 any longer to be ground in the dust, and ultimately anni- 
 hilated, at least mentally so, by stifling servitude, and the 
 wars which followed their resolution 1 The Netherlands 
 war of independence has had a penetrating and decided 
 effect upon modem history, and, in the eye of all who 
 value the most substantial parts and elementary ideas of 
 modem and civil liberty, a highly advantageous one, both 
 directly and through Great Britain. Wars have frequently 
 been, in the hands of Providence, the means of dissemi- 
 nating civilization, if carried on by a civilized people — as 
 in the case of Alexander, whose wars had a most decided 
 effect upon the intercourse of men and extension of civili- 
 zation — or of rousing and reuniting people who had fallen 
 into lethargy, if attacked by less civilized and numerous 
 hordes. Frequently we find in history that the ruder and 
 victorious tribe is made to recover as it were civilization, 
 already on the wane with a refined nation. Paradoxical 
 as it may seem at first glance, it is, nevertheless, aiftply 
 proved by history, that the closest contact and consequent 
 exchange of thought and produce and enlargement of 
 knowledge, between two otherwise severed nations, is 
 frequently produced by war. War is a struggle, a state 
 of suffering; but as such, at times, only that struggling 
 process without whidh — in proportion to the good to be 
 obtained, or, as would be a better expression for many 
 cases, to the good that is to be home — no great and essen- 
 tial good falls ever to the share of man. Suffering, merely 
 as suffering, is not an evil. Our religion, philosophy, 
 every day's experience, prove it. No maternal rejoicing 
 brightens up a mother's eve without the anxiety of la- 
 bor." 
 
 One word more, and we must leave this subject. It 
 
34 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 has been said by some that the duties of patriotism are 
 less binding upon us than upon our ancestors ; that, what- 
 ever may have been the practice in years that are past 
 the present generation can in no manner bear arms in 
 their country's cause, such a course being not only dis' 
 honorable, but in the eye of the Christian, wicked, and 
 even infamous! It is believed, however, that such are 
 not the general opinions and sentiments of the religious 
 people of this country. Our forefathers lighted the fires 
 of Religion and Patriotism at the same altar; it is be- 
 lieved that their descendants have not allowed either to 
 be extinguished, but that both still burn, and will continue 
 to burn, with a purer and brighter flame. Our forefathers 
 were not the less mindful of their duty to their God, be- 
 cause they also faithfully served their country. If we are 
 called upon to excel them in works of charity, of benev- 
 olence, and of Christian virtue, let it not be said of us 
 that we have forgotten the virtue of patriotism.* 
 
 * For further discussion of this subject the reader is referred to 
 Lieber's Pohtical Ethics, Part II., book vii. chap. 3 ; Paley's Moral and 
 Political Philosophy ; Legare's Report of June 13, 1838, in the House 
 of Representatives ; Mackintosh's History of the Revolution of 1688, 
 chap. X. ; Bynkershock ; Vatel ; Puffendorf ; Clausewitz ; and most 
 other writers on international law and the laws of war. 
 
 Dr. Wayland's view of the question is advocated with much zeal by 
 Dymond in his Inquiry into the Accordancy of War with the Princi- 
 ples of Christianity ; Jay's Peace and War ; Judd's Sermon on Peace 
 and War ; Peabody's Address, &c. ; Coue's Tract on What is the Use 
 of the Navy ? Sumner's True Grandeur of Nations. 
 
STRATEGY. 35 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 STRATEGY. 
 
 War has been defined, " A contest between nations and 
 states carried on by force." But this definition is by some 
 considered defective, inasmuch as it would exclude all 
 civil wars. 
 
 When war is commenced by attacking a nation in peace, 
 it is called offensive, and when undertaken to repel invasion, 
 or the attacks of an enemy, it is called defensive. A war 
 may be essentially defensive even where we begin it, if 
 intended to prevent an attack or invasion which is under 
 preparation. Besides this general division of war, mili- 
 tary writers have made numerous others, such as — 
 
 Wars of intervention^ in which one state interferes in 
 favor of another. This intervention may either have re- 
 spect to the internal or to the external affairs of a nation. 
 The interference of Russia in the affairs of Poland, of 
 England in the government of India, Austria and the 
 allied powers in the affairs of France during the Revolu- 
 tion and under the empire, are examples under the first 
 head. The intervention of the Elector Maurice of Sax- 
 ony against Charles V., of King William against Louis 
 XIV., in 1688, of Russia and France in the seven years' 
 war, of Russia again between France and Austria, in 
 1805, and between France and Prussia, in 1806, are ex- 
 amples under the second head Most liberal publicists 
 consider intervention in the internal affairs of nations as 
 indefensible ; but the principle is supported by the advo- 
 cates of the old monarchies of Europe. 
 
 Wars of insurrection to gain or to regain liberty ; as 
 
36 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 was the case with the Americans in 1776, and the modem 
 Greeks in 1821. 
 
 Wars of independence from foreign dictation and control 
 as the wars of Poland against Russia, of the Netherlands 
 against Spain, of France against the several coalitions of 
 the allied powers, of the Spanish Peninsula against France 
 and of China and India against England. The American 
 war of 1812 partook largely of this character, and some 
 judicious historians have denominated it the war of Inde- 
 pendence, as distinguished from the war of the Revolution. 
 
 Wars of opinion, like those which the Vendeans have 
 sustained in support of the Bourbons, and those France 
 has sustained against the allies, as also those of propa- 
 gandism, waged against the smaller European states by 
 the republican hordes of the French Revolution. To this 
 class also belong — 
 
 Religious wars, like those of Islamism, of the crusades, 
 and of the Reformation. 
 
 Wars of conquest, like those of the Romans in Gaul, of 
 the English in India, of the French in Egypt and Africa, 
 and of the Russians in Circassia. 
 
 National wars, in which the great body of the people 
 of a state engage, like those of the Swiss a^-ainst Austria 
 and the Duke of Burgundy, of the Catalans in 1712, of 
 the Americans against England, of the Dutch against 
 Phillip II., and of the Poles and Circassians against 
 Russia. 
 
 Civil wars, where one portion of the state fights against 
 the other, as the war of the Roses in England, of the 
 league in France, of the Guelphs and Ghibelines in Italy, 
 and of the factions in Mexico and South America. 
 
 It is not the present intention to enter into any discus- 
 sion of these different kinds of war, but rather to consider 
 the general subject, and to discuss such general principles 
 and rules as may be applicable to all wars. 
 
STRATEGY. 37 
 
 War in its most extensive sense may be regarded both 
 as a science and an art. It is a science so far as it inves- 
 tigates general principles and institutes an analysis of 
 military operations ; and an art when considered with re- 
 ference to the practical rules for conducting campaigns, 
 sieges, battles, &c. So is engineering a science so fal 
 as it investigates the general principles of fortification, 
 and also artillery, in analyzing the principles of gunnery ; 
 but both are arts when considered with reference to the 
 practical rules for the construction, attack, and defence 
 of forts, or for the use of cannon. 
 
 This distinction has not always been observed by wri- 
 ters on this subject, and some have asserted that strategy 
 is the science, and tactics the art of war. This is evi- 
 dently mistaking the general distinction between science, 
 which investigates principles, and art, which forms prac- 
 tical rules. 
 
 In popular language, however, it is usual to speak of 
 the military art when we refer to the general subject of 
 war, and of the military sciences when we wish to call 
 attention more particularly to the scientific principles upon 
 which the art is founded. We shall here consider the 
 military art in this general sense, as including the entire 
 subject of war. 
 
 As thus defined, the military art may be divided into 
 four distinct branches, viz.: 1st. Strategy; 2d. Fortifica- 
 tion, or Engineering; 3d. Logistics; 4th. Tactics. Sev- 
 eral general treatises on this art add another branch, 
 called The Policy of War, or the relations of war with 
 the affairs of state. 
 
 Strategy is defined to be the art of directing masses on 
 decisive points, or the hostile movements of armies be- 
 yond the range of each other's cannon. Engineering em- 
 braces all dispositions made to enable troops to resist a 
 superior force the longest time possible ; and also the 
 
38 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 means resorted to by the opposing army to overcome 
 these material obstacles. Logistics embraces the prac- 
 tical details of moving and supplying armies. Tactics is 
 the art of bringing troops into action, or of moving them 
 in the presence of an enemy, that is, within his view, and 
 within the reach of his artillery. All these are most in- 
 timately connected. A fault in tactics may occasion the 
 loss of strategic lines ; the best combined manoeuvres on 
 the field of battle may lead to no decisive results, when 
 the position, or the direction of the operation is not strat- 
 egic ; sometimes not only battles, but entire campaigns, 
 are lost through neglect of the engineer's art, or faults in 
 his dispositions ; again, armies would be of little use with- 
 out the requisite means of locomotion and of subsistence. 
 I. Strategy regards the theatre of war, rather than the 
 field of battle. It selects the important points in this 
 theatre, and the lines of communication by which they 
 may be reached ; it forms the plan and arranges the gen- 
 eral operations of a campaign ; but it leaves it to the 
 engineers to overcome material obstacles and to erect 
 new ones ; it leaves to logistics the means of supporting 
 armies and of moving them on the chosen lines ; and to 
 tactics, the particidar dispositions for battle, when the ar- 
 mies have reached the destined points. It is well to 
 keep in mind these distinctions, which may be rendered 
 still more obvious by a few illustrations. The point 
 where several lines of communications either intersect 
 or meet, and the centre of an arc which is occupied by 
 the enemy, are strategic points ; but tactics would reject 
 a position equally accessible on all sides, especially with 
 its flanks exposed to attack. Sempronius at Trebbia and 
 Varro at Cannae, so placed their armies that the Cartha- 
 genians attacked them, at the same time, in front, on the 
 flanks, and in rear ; the Roman consuls were defeated : 
 but the central strategic position of Napoleon at Rivoli 
 
STR iTEGY. 39 
 
 was eminently successful. At the battle of Ausierlitz th« 
 allies liad projected a strategic, movement to their left, in 
 order to cut off Napoleon's right from Vienna ; Weyrother 
 afterwards changed his plans, and executed a correspond- 
 ing tactical movement. By the former there had been 
 some chance of success, but the latter exposed him to 
 inevitable destruction. The little fort of Koenigsten, 
 from its advantageous position, was more useful to the 
 French, in 1813, than the vast works of Dresden. The 
 little fort of Bard, with its handful of men, was near de- 
 feating the operations of Napoleon in 1800, by holding in 
 check his entire army ; whereas, on the other hand, the 
 ill-advised lines of Ticino, in 1706, caused an army of 
 78,000 French to be defeated by only 40,000 men under 
 Prince Eugene of Savoy. 
 
 War, as has already been said, may be either offensive 
 or defensive. If the attacking army be directed against 
 an entire state, it becomes a war of invasion. If only a 
 province, or a military position, or an army, be attacked, 
 it is simply regarded as taking the initiative in offensive 
 movemtr ts. 
 
 Offensive war is ordinarily most advantageous in its 
 moral and political influence. It is waged on a foreign 
 soil, and therefore spares the country of the attacking 
 force ; it augments its own resources at the same time 
 that it diminishes those of the enemy ; it adds to the 
 moral courage of its own army, while it disheartens its 
 opponents. A war of invasion may, however, have also 
 its disadvantages. Its lines of operation may become too 
 deep, which is always hazardous in an enemy's country. 
 All the natural and artificial obstacles, such as monntains, 
 rivers, defiles, fortifications, &5^., are favorable for de- 
 fence, but difficidt to be overcome by the invader. The 
 local authorities and inhabitants oppose, instead of fa- 
 cilitating his operations ; and if patriotism animate the 
 
40 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 defensive army to fight for the independence of its threat 
 ened country, the war may 4)ecome long and bloody. Bui 
 if a political diversion be made in favor of the invading 
 force, and its operations be attended with success, it 
 strikes the enemy at the heart, paralyzes all his military 
 energies, and deprives him of his military resources, thus 
 promptly terminating the contest. Regarded simply as 
 the initiative of movements, the offensive is almost always 
 the preferable one, as it enables the general to choose his 
 lines for moving and concentrating his masses on the de- 
 cisive point. 
 
 The first and most important rule in offensive war is, to 
 keep your forces as much concentrated as possible. This 
 will not only prevent misfortune, but secure victory, — 
 since, by its necessary operation, you possess the power 
 of throwing your whole force upon any exposed point of 
 your enemy's position. 
 
 To this general rule some writers have laid down the 
 following exceptions : — 
 
 1st. When the food and forage of the neighborhood in 
 which you act have been exhausted and destroyed, and 
 your magazines are, from any cause, unable to supply the 
 deficiency, one of two things must be done ; either you 
 must go to places where these articles abound, or you 
 must draw from them your supplies by detachments. The 
 former is rarely compatible with your plan, and neces- 
 sarily retards its execution ; and hence the preference 
 which is generally given to the latter. 
 
 2d. When reinforcements are about to join you, and 
 this can only be effected by a march through a country 
 actually occupied by hostile corps, or liable to be so oc- 
 cupied, you must again \raive the general rule, and risk 
 one party for the security of the other ; or, (which may 
 be better,) make such movements with your main body as 
 «hall accomplish your object. 
 
STRATEGY. 41 
 
 3d. When you have complete evidence of the actual, 
 or probable insurrection in your favor, of a town or prov- 
 ince of your enemy, or of a division of his army, you 
 must support this inclination by strong detachments, or by 
 movements of your main body. Napoleon's operations 
 in Italy, in 1796-7, furnish examples of what is here 
 meant. 
 
 4th. When, by dispatching a detachment, you may be 
 able to intercept a convoy, or reinforcement, coming to 
 the aid of your enemy. 
 
 These are apparent rather than real exceptions to the 
 rule of concentration. This rule does not require that 
 all the army should occupy the same position. Far from it. 
 Concentration requires the main body to be in immediate 
 and supporting reach : small detachments, for temporary 
 and important objects, like those mentioned, are perfectly 
 legitimate, and in accordance with correct principles. 
 Napoleon's position in Spain will serve as an illustration 
 A hand, placed on the map of that country, will represent 
 the position of the invading forces. When opened, the 
 fingers will represent the several detachments, thrown 
 out on important strategic lines, and which could rea,dily 
 be drawn in, as in closing the hand, upon the principal 
 and central mass, preparatory to striking some important 
 blow. 
 
 " If, as we have seen, it be the first great rule for an 
 army acting on the offensive principle, to keep its forces 
 concentrated, it is, no doubt, the second, to keep them fully 
 employed. Is it your intention to seize a particular prov- 
 ince of your enemy ? to penetrate to his capital ? or to 
 cut him off from his supplies 1 Whatever measure be 
 necessary to open your route to these objects must be 
 promp^Zy taken ; and if you mean to subsist yourself at 
 his expense, your movements must be more rapid than 
 his. Give him time to breathe, — and above all, give him 
 
42 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 time to rest, and your project is blasted ; his forages will 
 be completed, and his magazines filled and secured. Tha 
 roads of approach will be obstructed, bridges destroyed^ 
 and strong points everywhere taken and defended. You 
 will, in fact, like Burgoyne, in 1777, reduce yourself to 
 the necessity of bleeding at every step, without equiva 
 lent or use. 
 
 " Such cannot be the fate of a commander who, know- 
 ing all the value of acting on the offensive, shakes, by 
 the vigor and address of his first movements, the moral 
 as'well as physical force of his enemy, — who, selecting 
 his own time, and place, and mode of attack^ confounds 
 his antagonist by enterprises equally hardy and unex- 
 pected, — and who at last leaves to him only the alterna- 
 tive of resistance without hope, or of flying without re- 
 sistance." 
 
 The British army, in the war of the American Revo- 
 lution, must have been most wretchedly ignorant of these 
 leading maxims for conducting offensive war. Instead of 
 concentrating their forces on some decisive point, and 
 then destroying the main body of our army by repeated 
 and well-directed blows, they scattered their forces over 
 an immense extent of country, and became too weak to 
 act with decision and effect on any one point. On the 
 other hand, this policy enabled us to call out and disci- 
 pline our scattered and ill-provided forces. 
 
 The main object in defensive war is, to protect the 
 menaced territory, to retard the enemy's progress, to mul- 
 tiply obstacles in his way, to guard the vital points of the 
 country, and — at the favorable moment, when the enemy 
 becomes enfeebled by detachments, losses, privations, 
 and fatigue — to assume the offensive, and drive him from 
 the country. This combination of the defensive and 
 offensive has many advantages. The enemy, being 
 forced to take the defensive in his turn, loses much of 
 
STRATEGY. 43 
 
 the moral superiority due to successful offensive opera- 
 tions. There are numerous instances of this kind of 
 war, " the defensive-offensive," as it is sometimes called, 
 to be found in history. The last four campaigns of Fred- 
 erick the Great of Prussia, are examples which may 
 serve as models. Wellins^on played a similar part in the 
 Spanish peninsula. 
 
 To merely remain in a defensive attitude, yielding grad- 
 ually to the advances of the enemy, without any effort to 
 regain such positions or provinces as may have fallen into 
 his power, or to inflict on him some fatal and decisive 
 blow on the first favorable opportunity ; such a system is 
 always within the reach of ignorance, stupidity, and cow- 
 ardice ; but such is far from being the true Fabian system 
 of defensive war. 
 
 " Instead of finding security only in flight ; instead of 
 habitually refusing to look the enemy in the face ; instead 
 of leaving his march undisturbed ; instead of abandoning, 
 without contest, points strong by nature or by art ; — instead 
 of all this, the true war of defence seeks every occasion 
 to meet the enemy, and loses none by which it can annoy 
 or defeat him ; it is always awake ; it is constantly in 
 motion, and never unprepared for either attack or defence. 
 When not employed in efforts of courage or address, it 
 incessantly yields itself to those of labor and science. In 
 its front it breaks up roads or breaks down bridges ; while 
 it erects or repairs those in its rear: it forms abbatis, 
 raises batteries, fortifies passes, or intrenches encamp- 
 ments ; and to the system of deprivation adds all the ac- 
 tivity, stratagem, and boldness of la petite guerre. Divi- 
 ding itself into detachments, it multiplies its own attacks 
 and the alarms of the enemy. Collecting itself at a single 
 pomt, it obstructs his progress for days, and sometimes 
 fo* weeks together. Does it even abandon the avenues 
 it is destined to defend? It is but for the purpose of 
 
44 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 shielding them more securely, by the attack of his hospi- 
 tals, magazines, convoys, or reinforcements. In a word, 
 by adopting the maxim, that the enemy must he made to pay 
 for whatever he gains^ it disputes with him every inch of 
 ground, and if at last it yields to him a victory, it is of 
 that kind which calls forth only his sighs." 
 
 In discussing the subject of strategy, certain technical 
 terms are employed, such as theatre of war ; theatre of 
 operations; base of operations, or the line from which 
 operations start ; objective points, or points to which the 
 operations are directed ; line of operations, or the line 
 along which an army moves ; key points, or points which 
 it is important for the defensive army to secure ; line of 
 defence, or the line which it is important to defend at all 
 hazards : and in general, strategic points, strategic lines, 
 strategic positions, 6fc. As these terms are very generally 
 used in military books, it may be well to make ourselves 
 thoroughly acquainted with their import. After defining 
 these tenns and explaining their meaning and application, 
 it is deemed best to illustrate their use by reference to 
 well-known and striking historical examples. 
 
 The theatre of a war embraces not only the territory of 
 the two belligerent* powers, but also that of their allies, 
 and of such secondary powers as, through fear or interest, 
 may be drawn into the contest. With maritime nations it 
 also embraces the seas, and sometimes crosses to another 
 continent. Some of the wars between France and Eng- 
 land embraced the two hemispheres. 
 
 The theatre of operations, however, is of a more limited 
 character, and should not be confounded with the theatre 
 of war. In general, it includes only the territory which 
 an army seeks, on the one hand, to defend, and on the 
 other, to invade. If two or more armies be directed to- 
 wards the same object, though by different lines, their 
 combined operations are included in the same theatre* 
 
STRATEGY. 45 
 
 but if each "acts independently of the others, and seeks 
 distinct and separate objects, each must have its own in- 
 dependent theatre of operations. 
 
 A war between France and Austria may embrace all 
 Italy and Germany, but the theatre of operations may be 
 limited to only a portion of these countries. Should the 
 Oregon question lead to hostilities between the United 
 States and England, the theatre of war would embrace 
 the greater part of North America and the two oceans, 
 but the theatre of operations would probably be limited to 
 Canada and our northern frontier, with naval descents 
 upon our maritime cities. 
 
 The first point to be attended to in a plan of military 
 operation is to select a good hase. Many circumstances 
 influence this selection, such as mountains, rivers, roads, 
 forests, cities, fortifications, military depGts, means of sub- 
 sistence, &c. If the frontier of a state contain strong 
 natural or artificial barriers, it may serve not only as a 
 good base for offensive operations, but also as an excellent- 
 line of defence against invasion. A single frontier line 
 may, however, be penetrated by the enemy, and in that 
 case a second or third base further in the interior becomes 
 indispensable for a good defence. 
 
 A French army carrying on military operations against 
 Germany would make the Rhine its first base ; but if driven 
 from this it would form a second base on the Meuse or 
 Moselle, a third on the Seine, and a fourth on the Loire ; 
 or, when driven from the first base, it would take others 
 perpendicular to the front of defence, either to the right," 
 on Befort and Besancon, or to the left, on Mezieres and 
 Sedan. If acting offensively against Prussia and Russia, 
 the Rhine and the Main would form the first base the 
 Elbe and the Oder the second, the Vistula the third, the 
 Nieman the fourth, and the Dwina and the Dnieper the 
 fifth. 
 
46 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 A French army operating against Spain would have the 
 Pyrenees for its first base ; the line of the Ebro for a 
 second, resting its wings on the gulf of Gascony and the 
 Mediterranean. If from this position it advance its left, 
 possessing itself of the kingdom of Valencia, the line of the 
 Sierra d'Estellas becomes its third base of operations 
 against the centre of Spain. 
 
 A base may be parallel, oblique, or perpendicular to 
 our line of operations, or to the enemy's line of defence. 
 Some prefer one plan and some another; the best authori- 
 ties, however, think the oblique or perpendicular more 
 advantageous than the parallel ; but we are not often at 
 liberty to choose between these, for other considerations 
 usually determine the selection. 
 
 In 1806, the French forces first moved perpendicular 
 to their base on the Main, but afterwards effected a change 
 of front, and moved on a line oblique or nearly parallel to 
 this base. They had pursued the same plan of operations 
 in the Seven Years' War. The Russians, in 1812, based 
 perpendicularly on the Oka and the Kalouga, and extended 
 their flank march on Wiozma and Krasnoi ; in 1813, the 
 allies, based perpendicularly on Bohemia, succeeded in 
 paralyzing Napoleon's army on the Elbe. 
 
 An American army moving by Lake Champlain, would 
 be based perpendicular on the great line of communica- 
 tion between Boston and Buffalo ; if moving from the New- 
 England states on Quebec and Montreal, the line of oper- 
 ations would be oblique ; and if moving from the Niagara 
 frontier by Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence, the line 
 would be nearly parallel both to our base and to the ene- 
 my's line of defence — an operation, under the circum- 
 stances, exceedingly objectionable. 
 
 Any point in the theatre of operations which gives to 
 the possessor an advantage over his opponent, is regarded 
 as strategic. Their geographical position and political 
 
STRATEGY. 47 
 
 and military character, give them a greater or less influ- 
 ence in directing thq campaign. These points are occu- 
 pied by the defensive army, and attacked by the offensive ; 
 if on or near the base, they become the key points for the 
 former, and the objective points for the latter.* There are 
 also between these two a greater or less number of strate- 
 gic points, which have an important though inferior influ- 
 ence upon the result of the war. 
 
 The first object of the French in attacking Belgium, is 
 to gain possession of the Meuse, as this position would 
 give them a decided advantage in any ulterior operations. 
 In attacking southern Germany, the course of the Danube 
 offers a series of points which exercise an important in- 
 fluence on the war. For northern Germany, Leipsic and 
 the country bordering on the Saale and the Elbe, are ob- 
 jects oft^n fiercely contested by the French and other bel- 
 ligerent powers. In a war between this country and 
 England, Montreal and the points on the St. Lawrence 
 between Montreal and Quebec, would become objects of 
 the highest importance, and their possession would prob- 
 ably determine the result of the war. 
 
 The capital of a state, from its political importance 
 as well as its military influence, is almost always a deci- 
 sive strategic point, and its capture is therefore frequently 
 the object of an entire campaign. The possession of 
 Genoa, Turin, Alexandria, Milan, &c., in 1796, both 
 from their political and military importance, had a decided 
 influence upon the results of the war in these several 
 states. In the same way Venice, Rome, and Naples, in 
 1797, Vienna, in the campaigns of 1805 and 1809, Berlin, 
 
 * It may be well to remark that a strategic point is not-neccssarily a 
 geometrical point ; an entire province, or a considerable portion of a 
 geographical frontier, is, in military language, sometimes denominated 
 a point. In the same way, strategic lines, instead of bemg mathemati- 
 cal lines, are frequently many miles in width. 
 
48 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 in 1806, Madrid, in 1808, and Paris, in 1814 and 1815. 
 If Hannibal had captured the capital immediately after the 
 battle of Cannae, he would thus have destroyed the Roman 
 power. The taking of Washington, in 1814, had little or 
 no influence on the war, for the place was then of no im- 
 portance in itself, and was a mere nominal capital. It, 
 however, greatly influenced our reputation abroad, and re- 
 quired many brilliant successes to wash the blot from our 
 national escutcheon. 
 
 Lines of defence in strategy are either permanent or 
 temporary. The great military frontiers of a state, espe- 
 cially when strengthened by natural and artificial obsta- 
 cles, such as chains of mountains, rivers, lines of for- 
 tresses, &c., are regarded as permanent lines of defence. 
 The Alpine range between France and Piedmont, with its 
 fortified passes ; the Rhine, the Oder, and the Elbe, with 
 their strongly-fortified places ; the Pyrenees, with Bay- 
 onne at one extremity and Perpignon at the other; the 
 triple range of fortresses on the Belgian frontier — are all 
 permanent lines of defence. The St. Lawrence river is 
 a permanent line of defence for Canada ; and the line of 
 lake Champlain, the upper St. Lawrence, and the lakes, 
 for the United States. 
 
 Temporary lines of defence are such as are taken up 
 merely for the campaign. Napoleon's position in Saxony, 
 in 1813 ; the line of the allies in Belgium, in 1815 ; the 
 line of the Mame, in 1814, are examples of temporary 
 lines of defence. 
 
 It will be seen from these remarks that lines of defence 
 are not necessarily bases of operation. 
 
 Strategic positions are such as are taken up during the 
 operations of a war, either by a corps cCarmee or grand de- 
 tachment, for the purpose of checking or observing an 
 opposing force ; they are named thus to distinguish them 
 from tactical positions or fields of battle. The positions 
 
STRATEGY. 49 
 
 of Napoleon at Rivoli, Verona, and Legnano, in 1796 and 
 1797, to watch the Adige ; his positions on the Passarge, 
 in 1807, and in Saxony and Silesia in front of his line of 
 defence, in 1813; and Massena's positions on the Albis, 
 along the Limmat and the Aar, in 1799, are examples 
 under this head. 
 
 Before proceeding further it may be well to illustrate 
 the strategic relations of lines and positions by the use of 
 diagrams. 
 
 (Fig. 1.) The army at A covers the whol« of the 
 ground in rear of the line DC perpendicular to the line 
 AB, the position of the enemy being at B. 
 
 (Fig. 2.) AJ being equal to BJ, A will still cover ev- 
 ery thing in rear of DC. 
 
 (Fig. 3.) If the army A is obliged to cover the point a, 
 the army B will cover all the space without the circle 
 .whose radius is aB ; and of course A continues to cover 
 the point a so long as it remains within this circle aB. 
 
 A line of operatAons embraces that portion of the theatre 
 of war which an army or corps d'armee passes over in at- 
 taining its object; X\iQ front of operations is the front form- 
 ed by the army as it advances on this line. 
 
 When an army acts as a single mass, without forming 
 independent corps, the line it follows is denominated a 
 simple line of operations. 
 
 If two or more fcorps act in an isolated manner, but 
 against the same opposing force, they are said to follow 
 double or multiple lines. 
 
 The lines by which Moreau and Jourdan entered Ger- 
 many in 1796, were double lines ; but Napoleon's advance 
 by Bamberg and Gera, in 1806, although moving in seven 
 distinct corps d^arm^e, formed but a single line of opera- 
 tions. 
 
 Interior lines of operations are those followed by an 
 army which operates between the enemy's lines in such 
 5 
 
I 
 
 60 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 a way as to be able to concentrate bis forces on one of 
 these lines before the other can be brought to its assist- 
 ance. For example, Napoleon's line of operations in 
 1814, between the Mame and the Seine, where he man- 
 oeuvred with so much skill and success against the im- 
 mensely superior forces of the allies. 
 
 Exterior lines present the opposite results ; they are 
 those which an army will form in moving on the extremi- 
 ties of the opposing masses. For example, the lines of the 
 Mame and the Seine, followed by the army of Silesia and 
 the grand Austro-Russian army, in the campaign of 1814. 
 Burgoyne's line of operations, in 1777, was double and 
 exterior. 
 
 Concentric lines are such as start from distant points, and 
 are directed towards the same object, either in the rear or 
 in advance of their base. 
 
 If a mass leaves a single point and separates into sev- , 
 eral distinct corps, taking divergent directions, it is said 
 to pursue eccentric lines. 
 
 Lines are said to be deep, when the end to be attained 
 is very distant from the base. 
 
 The lines followed by a secondary or auxiliary force 
 are denominated secondary lines. 
 
 The lines pursued by the army of the Sombre-et-Meuse 
 in 1796, and by Bagration in 1812, were secondary lines, 
 as the former were merely secondary to the army of the 
 Rhine, and the latter to that of Barclay. 
 
 Accidental lines are those which result from a change 
 in the primitive plan of campaign, which give a new direc- 
 tion to the operations. These are of rare occurrence, 
 but they sometimes lead to important results. 
 
 The direction given to a line of operations depends not 
 only on the geographical situation of the country, but also 
 on the positions occupied by the enemy. The general 
 plan of campaign is frequently determined on previous to 
 
STRATEGY. 61 
 
 beginning operations, but the choice of lines and positions 
 must ordinarily result from the ulterior events of the war, 
 and be made by the general as these events occur. 
 
 As a general rule, a line of operations should be directed 
 upon the centre, or one of the extremities of the enemy's line 
 of defence; unless our forces be infinitely superior in num- 
 ber, it would be absurd to act against the front and ex- 
 tremities at the same time. 
 
 If the configuration of the theatre of operations be fa- 
 vorable to a movement against the extremity of the ene- 
 my's line of defence, this direction may be best calculated 
 to lead to important results. (Fig. 4.) 
 
 In 1800 the army of the Rhine was directed against 
 the extreme left of the line of the Black Forest ; the army 
 of reserve was directed by the St. Bernard and Milan on 
 the extreme right and rear of Melas's line of defence : both 
 operations were most eminently successful. (Fig. 5.) 
 
 It may be well to remark that it is not enough merely 
 to gain the extremity and rear of the enemy, for in that 
 case it may be possible for him to throw himself on our 
 communications and place us in the very dilemma in 
 which we had hoped to involve him. To avoid this dan- 
 ger it is necessary to give such a direction to the line of 
 operations that our army shall preserve its communica- 
 tions and be able to reach its base. 
 
 Thus, if Napoleon, in 1800, after crossing the Alps, 
 had marched by Turin on Alexandria and received battle 
 at Marengo, without having first secured Lombardy and 
 the left of the Po, his own line of retreat would have 
 been completely cut off by Melas ; whereas, by the direc- 
 tion which he gave to his line of operations he had, in 
 case of reverse, every means for reaching either the Var 
 or the Valois. (Fig. 6.) Again, in 1806, if he had march- 
 ed directly from Gera to Leipsic, he would have been cut 
 ofl* from his base on the Rhine ; whereas, by turning from 
 
52 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 Gera towards Weimar, he not only cut off the Prussians 
 from the Elbe, but at the same time secured to himself 
 the roads of Saalfield, Schleitz, and Hoff, thus rendering 
 perfectly safe his communications in his rear. (Fig. 7.) 
 
 "We have said that the configuration of the ground and 
 the position of the hostile forces may sometimes render it 
 advisable to direct our line of operations against the ex- 
 tremity of the enemy's line of defence ; but, as a general 
 rule, a central direction will lead to more important re- 
 sults. This severs the enemy's means of resistance, and 
 enables the assailant to strike, with the mass of his force, 
 upon the dissevered and partially paralyzed members of 
 the hostile body. (Fig. 8.) 
 
 Such a plan of operations enabled Napoleon, in the 
 Italian campaigns of 1796 and 1797, to pierce and destroy, 
 with a small force, the large and successive armies which 
 Austria sent against him. In 1805 his operations were 
 both interior and central- in 1808 they were most em- 
 inently central : in 1809, by. the central operations in the 
 vicinity of Ratisbonne, he defeated the large and almost 
 victorious army of the Archduke Charles : in 1814, from 
 his central position between the Mame and Seine, with 
 only seventy thousand men against a force of more than 
 two hundred thousand, he gained numerous victories, and 
 barely failed of complete success. Again in 1815, with 
 an army of only one hundred and twenty thousand men 
 against an allied force of two hundred and twenty thou- 
 sand, by his central advance on Charleroi and Ligny, he 
 gained a most decided advantage over the enemy — an ad- 
 vantage lost by the eccentric movement of Grouchy : and 
 even in 1813, his central position at Dresden would have 
 secured him most decisive advantages, had not the faults 
 of his lieutenants lost these advantages in the disasters of 
 Kulm and the Katzbach. 
 
 For the same frontier it is objectionable to form more 
 
STRATEGY. 53 
 
 than one army ; grand detachments and corps of observa- 
 tion may frequently be used with advantage, but double or 
 multiple lines of operation are far less favorable than one 
 simple line. It may however sometimes occur that the 
 position of the enemy's forces will be such as to make 
 this operation the preferable one. In that case, interior 
 lines should always be adopted, unless we have a vast 
 superiority in number. Double exterior lines, with corps 
 several days' march asunder, must be fatal, if the enemy, 
 whether acting on single or double interior lines, take ad- 
 vantage of his position to concentrate his masses succes- 
 sively against our isolated forces. The Roman armies 
 under the consuls Flaminius and Servilius opposed Han- 
 nibal on exterior lines, the one by Florence and Arrezzio, 
 and the other by Modena and Ariminum. Hannibal turned 
 the position of Flaminius and attacked the Roman armies 
 separately, gaining a complete and decisive victory. Such 
 also was the character of the operations of the French in 
 1795, under Pichegru and Jourdan; they met with a 
 bloody and decisive defeat. Again in 1796, the French 
 armies under Jourdan and Moreau, pursued exterior lines ; 
 the Archduke Charles, from his interior position, succeed- 
 ed in defeating both the opposing generals, and forcing 
 them to retreat. If the two armies united had pursued a 
 single line, the republican flag had been carried in tri- 
 umph to Vienna. 
 
 Converging lines of operation are preferable, under 
 most circumstances, to diverging lines. Care should be 
 taken, however, that the point of meeting be such that it 
 may not be taken as a strategic position by the enemy, 
 and our own forces be destroyed in detail, before they 
 can effect a junction. In 1797 the main body of the 
 Austrians, under Alvinzi, advanced against Napoleon, on 
 three separate lines, intending to concentrate at Rivoli, 
 and then attack the French in mass ; but Napoleon took 
 
54 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 his Strategic position at Rivoli, and overthrew the en- 
 emy's corps as they successively appeared. In the same 
 way the Archduke Charles took an interior position, be- 
 tween Moreau and Jourdan, in 1796, and prevented them 
 from concentrating their forces on a single point. Wurm- 
 ser and Quasdanowich attempted to concentrate their 
 forces on the Mincio, by moving on the opposite shores 
 of Lake Garda ; but Napoleon took an interior position 
 and destroyed them. In 1815 Blucher and Wellington, 
 from their interior position, prevented the junction of 
 Napoleon and Grouchy. 
 
 Diverging lines may be employed with advantage 
 against an enemy immediately after a successful battle 
 or strategic manoeuvre ; for by this means we separate 
 the enemy's forces, and disperse them ; and if occasion 
 should require it, may again concentrate our forces by 
 converging lines. Such was the manoeuvre of Frederick 
 the Great, in 1757, which produced the battles of Ros- 
 bach and Leuthen ; such also was the manoeuvre of Na- 
 poleon at Donawert in 1805, at Jena in 1806, and at Rat- 
 isbon in 1809. 
 
 Interior lines of operations, when properly conducted, 
 have almost invariably led to success : indeed every in- 
 stancewof failure may be clearly traced to great unskilful- 
 ness in their execution, or to other extraneous circum- 
 stances of the campaign. There may, however, be cases 
 where it will be preferable to direct our forces on the 
 enemy's flank ; the geographical character of the theatre 
 of war, the position of other collateral forces, &c., ren- 
 dering such a direction necessary. But as a general 
 rule, interior and central lines, for an army of moderate 
 'brces, will lead to decisive results. 
 
 Napoleon's Italian campaigns in 1796 and 1797, the 
 campaign of the Archduke Charles in 1796, Napoleon's 
 campaigns of 1805 and 1809 against Austria, and of 
 
STRATEGY. 55 
 
 1806 and 1807 against Prussia and Russia, of 1808 in 
 Spain, his manoeuvres in 1814, between the battle of Bri- 
 enne and that of Paris, and his operations previous to the 
 battle of Ligny in 1815, are all brilliant examples under 
 this head. 
 
 To change the line of operations, in the middle of a 
 campaign, and follow accidental lines, is always a delicate 
 affair, and can only be resorted to by a general of great 
 skill, and with disciplined troops. In such a case it may 
 be attended with important results. It was one of Na- 
 poleon's maxims, that " a line of operations, when once 
 chosen, should never be abandoned." This maxim, how- 
 ever, must sometimes be disregarded by an army of un- 
 disciplined troops, in order to avoid entire destruction ; 
 but the total abandonment of a line of operations is al- 
 ways attended with great loss, and should be regarded as 
 a mere choice of evils. A regular army can always 
 avoid this result, by changing the direction of its line ; 
 thus frequently gaining superior advantages in the new 
 theatre of action. If the plan of this change be the re- 
 sult of a good coup d'mlj and it be skilfully executed, the 
 rear of the operating army will be secure from the en- 
 emy ; and moreover, he will be left in doubt respecting 
 its weak points. But such is the uncertainty of this 
 manoeuvre, that it is very rarely taken by the best troops, 
 unless actually forced upon them. If the army be of in- 
 ctngruous materials, generally a change of direction will 
 be less advantageous than to entirely abandon the line, 
 and save as many as possible of the troops for some new 
 plan of operations. (Maxim 20.) If, however, the undis- 
 ciplined army be sustained by fortifications, it can take 
 up the accidental line of operations in the same manner, 
 and with the same probability of success, as is done by a 
 regular force. 
 
 We have examples of accidental lines in the operations 
 
56 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 of the king of Prussia, after the battle of Hohenkirchen, 
 and of Washington, in New-Jersey, after the action of 
 Princeton. This is one of the finest in military liistory. 
 Napoleon had projected a change in his line of opera- 
 tions, in case he lost the battle of Austerlitz ; but victory 
 rendered its execution unnecessary. Again in 1814 he 
 had planned an entire change of operations ; but the 
 want of co-operation of the forces under Mortier and 
 Marmont forced him to abandon a plan which, if properly 
 executed, had probably defeated the allies. Jomini pro- 
 nounced it one of the most brilliant of his military career. 
 Having explained the principal terms used in strategy, 
 let us trace out the successive operations of war in their 
 usual strategic relations. 
 
 We will suppose war to be declared, and the army to be 
 just entering upon a campaign. The political and military 
 authorities of the state determine upon the nature of the 
 Nwar, and select the theatre of its enterprises. The chief 
 selects certain points, on or near the borders of the seat 
 of war, where his troops are to be assembled, and his 
 materiel collected. These points, together, form his base 
 of operations. He now selects some point, within the 
 theatre of the war, as the first object of his enterprises, 
 and chooses the line of operations most advantageous for 
 reaching this objective point. The temporary positions 
 taken on this line become strategic positions, and the line 
 in his rear, a line of defence. When he arrives in the 
 vicinity of his first object, and the enemy begins to oppose 
 his enterprises, he must force this enemy to retreat, either 
 by an attack or by manoeuvres. For this purpose he 
 temporarily adopts certain lines of mancEUvre, which may 
 deviate from his general line of operations. The ulterior 
 events of the campaign may possibly cause him to make 
 •hese new, or accidental lines, his lines of operations. 
 The approach of hostile forces may cause him to detach 
 
STRATEGY. 67 
 
 secondary corps on secondary lines ; or to divide his 
 army, and pursue double or multiple lines. The primi- 
 tive object may also be relinquished, and new ones pro- 
 posed, with new lines and new plans of operations. As 
 he advances far from his. primitive base, he forms ne^ 
 depots and lines of magazines. He may encounter nat- 
 ural and artificial obstacles. To cross large rivers in the 
 face of an enemy is a hazardous operation ; and he re- 
 quires all i^e art of the engineer in constructing bridges, 
 and securing a safe passage for his army. If a fortified 
 place is to be taken, he will detach a siege corps, and 
 either continue his march with the main army, or take a 
 strategic position to cover this siege. Thus Napoleon, 
 in 1796, with an army of only 50,000 combatants, could 
 not venture to penetrate into Austria, with Mantua and 
 its garrison of 25,000 men in his rear, and an Austrian 
 force of 40,000 before him. But in 1806 the great supe- 
 riority of his army enabled him to detach forces to be- 
 siege the principal fortresses of Silesia, and still to con- 
 tinue his operations with his principal forces. The chief 
 of the army may meet the enemy under circumstances 
 such as to induce or compel him to give battle. If he 
 should be victorious, the enemy must be pursued and 
 harassed to the uttermost. If he should be defeated, he 
 must form the best plan, and provide the best means of 
 retreat. If possible, he must take shelter in some line 
 of fortifications, and prepare to resume the offensive. 
 Lines of intrenchment and temporary works may some- 
 times serve him as a sufficient protection. Finally, when 
 the imfavorable season compels him to suspend his oper- 
 ations, he will go into winter cantonments, and prepare 
 for a new campaign. 
 
 Such are the ordinary operations of war : its relations 
 to strategy must be evident, even to the most superficial 
 reader. 
 
58 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 Not unfrequently the results of a campaign depend more 
 upon the strategic operations of an army, than upon its 
 victories gained in actual combat. Tactics, or movements 
 within the range of the enemy's cannon, is therefore sub- 
 <frdinate to the choice of positions : if the field of battle be 
 properly chosen, success will be decisive, and the loss 
 of the battle not disastrous ; whereas, if selected without 
 reference to the principles of the science, the victory, if 
 gained, might be barren, and defeat, if suffered, totally 
 fatal : thus demonstrating the truth of Napoleon's maxim, 
 that success is oftener due to the genius of the general, 
 and to the nature of the theatre of war, than to the number 
 and bravery of the soldiers. (Maxim 17, 18.) 
 
 We have a striking illustration of this in the French 
 army of the Danube, which, from the left wing of General 
 Kray, marched rapidly through Switzerland to the right 
 extremity of the Austrian line, " and by this movement 
 alone conquered all the country between the Rhine and 
 Danube without pulling a trigger." 
 
 Again, in 1805, the army of Mack was completely para- 
 lyzed, and the main body forced to surrender, at Ulm, 
 without a single important battle. In 1806, the Prussians 
 were essentially defeated even before the battle of Jena. 
 The operations about Heilesberg, in 1807, the advance 
 upon Madrid, in 1808, the manoeuvres about Ratisbon, in 
 1809, the operations of the French in 18M, and the first 
 part of the campaign of 1815, against vastly superior 
 numbers, are all familiar proofs of the truth of the maxim. 
 
 Strategy may therefore be regarded as the most impor- 
 tant, though least understood, of all the branches of the 
 military art.* 
 
 • Strategy may be learned from didactic works or from general mili- 
 tary histories. There are very few good elementary works on this 
 bnnch of the military art The general treatises of the Archduke 
 
STRATEGY. 59 
 
 Charles, and of General Wagner, in German, (the former has been 
 translated into French,) are considered as the best. The discussions 
 of Jomini on this subject in his great work on the military art, are ex- 
 ceedingly valuable ; also the writings of Rocquancourt, Jacquinot de 
 Presle, and Gay de Vernon. The last of these has been translated 
 into English, but the translation is exceedingly inaccurate. The 
 military histories of Lloyd, TemplehofF, Jomini, the Archduke Charles, 
 Griraoard, Gravert, Souchet, St. Cyr, Beauvais, Laverne, Stutter- 
 heim, Wagner, Kausler, Gourgaud and Montholon, Foy, Mathieu 
 Dumas, Segur, Pelet, Koch, Clausewitz, and Thiers, may be read 
 with great advantage. Napier's History of the Peninsular War is the 
 only English History that is of any value as a military work : it is a 
 most excellent book. Alison's great History of Europe is utterly 
 worthless to the military man ; the author is ignorant of the first prin- 
 ciples of the military art, and nearly every page is filled with the 
 grossest blunders. 
 
 We subjoin the titles of a few of the best works that treat of strategy, 
 either directly or in connection with military history. 
 
 Principes de la Strategic, ^c, par le Prince Charles, traduit de 
 I'Allemand, 3 vols, in 8vo. This is a work of great merit. The tech- 
 nical terms, however, are very loosely employed. 
 
 Precis de VArt de la Guerre, par le Baron Jomini. His chapter 
 on strategy embodies the principles of this branch of the art. 
 
 Cfrundsdtze der Strategie, Von Wagner. 
 
 Cours Elementaire d'Art et d'Histoire Militaire, par Rocquan- 
 court. This work contains much valuable information connected with 
 the history of the art of war ; but it is far too diffuse and ill-arranged 
 for an elementary book. 
 
 Cours d'Art et d'Histoire Militaire, par Jacquinot de Presle. This 
 work is especially designed for cavalry officers, and the other branches 
 of military service are but very briefly discussed. 
 
 De Vernon's Treatise on the Science of War and Fortification con- 
 tains much valuable information ; but, as an elementary book, it has 
 the same objections as that of Rocquancourt. 
 
 History of the Seven Years' War, by Lloyd and Templehoff. The 
 military writings of Lloyd and Templehoff are valuable as connected 
 with the history of strategy ; but many of the principles laid down by 
 these writers are now regarded as erroneous. 
 
 Memoires de Napoleon. The Memoirs of Napoleon, as dictated by 
 aimself to Gourgaud and Montholon, have been translated into Eng- 
 lish. It is hardly necessary to remark that they contain all the ge» 
 
60 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 eral principles of military art and science. No military man s: ould 
 fail to study them thoroughly. The matter is so condensed, and impor- 
 tant principles are embodied in so few words, that they are not easily 
 understood by the ordinary reader, and probably will never be popular 
 with the multitude. 
 
 Essai general de Tactique, par Guibert. A work very popular in 
 'ts day, but now far less valuable than the writings already mentioned. 
 
 Ausfuhrliche Beschreibung der Schlacht des Pirmasens, von 
 Gravert. Regarded by military men as a valuable historical fragment. 
 
 Memoires sur les Campagnes en Espagne. Souchet. 
 
 Memoires de Gouvion St. Cyr. 
 
 Statistique de la Guerre, par Reveroni St. Cyr. 
 
 Premiere Campagnes de la Revolution, par Grimoard. 
 
 Victoires et Conquetes. Beauvais. 
 
 Campagnes de Suwarrow. Laveme. 
 
 Histoire de la Guerre de la Peninsule. Foy. 
 
 Precis des Evenements Militaires. Mathieu Dumas. 
 
 Histoire de Napoleon et de la Grande Armee en 1812. S^gur 
 
 Memoires sur la Chterre de 1809. Pelet. 
 
 La Campagne de 1814. Koch. 
 
 Vom Kriege — Die Feldzugge, ^c. Clausewitz. 
 
 La Revolution, le Consulat et V Empire. Thiers. 
 
 Memoires sur la Guerre de 1812 — sur la Campagne du Vice rot 
 en Italic, en 1813 et 1814 ; Histoire de la Guerre en Allemagne en 
 1814; Histoire des Campagnes de 1814 c< IB15, en France. Vau- 
 don court. 
 
 Essai sur I' Art Militaire, ^c. Carion — ^Nisas. 
 
 Histoire de VExpedition en Russie en 1812. Chambray. 
 
 War in Spain, Portugal, and the South of France. John Jones. 
 
 Peninsular War. Napier. 
 
 Notices of the War of 1812. Armstrong 
 
 All the above are works of merit ; but none are more valuable to 
 the military man than the military histories of Jomini and K&dslort 
 with their splendid diagrams and maps. 
 
FORTIFICATIONS. 61 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 FORTIFICATIOlMS. 
 
 Fortifications i or engineering, may be considered with 
 reference to the defence of states and the grand operation 
 of armies ; or with reference to the details of the con- 
 struction, and attack, and defence of forts, and the influ- 
 ence of field-works on the tactical manoeuvres of armies. 
 It is proposed to speak here only of its general character, 
 as a branch of the military art, without entering into any 
 p#ofessional discussion of details. 
 
 The connection of fortification and strategy may be con- 
 sidered under two distinct heads : 1st, the choice of sites 
 for constructing fortresses for defence ; 2d, their influence 
 in offensive operations, and the determination of the ques- 
 tion whether they can be passed with safety, or whether 
 the attacking force will be under the necessity of be- 
 sieging them. 
 
 The centre and extremities of « base of operations should 
 always be secured either by natural or artificial obstacles. 
 This base is generally chosen so that fortifications will 
 be necessary for strengthening only a part of the line. 
 But if a frontier, like the side of France towards Belgium, 
 be destitute of natural obstacles, the artificial means of 
 defence must be proportionally increased. Great care 
 should be taken that permanent fortifications be made 
 only on such places as may favor military operations. If 
 otherwise, the troops detached from the active army for 
 garrisoning them, will only tend to weaken this force 
 without any corresponding advantages. In this way, for- 
 tifications may become actually injurious to defence. A 
 
62 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 number of the European fortresses which were built be- 
 fore the subject of strategy was properly understood, are 
 now regarded as utterly useless, from their ill-advised po- 
 sitions. 
 
 Whether a fortress may be safely passed with merely 
 blockading or observing it, depends very much upon the 
 nature of the war, and the numbers and position of the 
 defensive army. The allies, in 1814, invading France 
 with a million of soldiers, assisted by the political diver- 
 sion of factions and Bourbonists within the kingdom, and 
 treason in the frontier fortresses, and even in the ranks 
 of Napoleon's army, could conduct their military opera- 
 tions on a very different plan from that which would be 
 adopted by either Austria, Prussia, Russia, England, Spain, 
 Portugal, Holland, Italy, and the German powers, if singly 
 waging war with the French. Napoleon sometimes de- 
 tached a corps to observe a fortress which threatened his 
 line of operations or of manoeuvre ; at others, he delayed 
 his advance till the place could be reduced. 
 
 " An army," says Jomini, " may sometimes penetrate 
 between places on an open frontier, to attack the enemy's 
 forces in the field, taking care at the same time to observe 
 these places ; but no invading army can cross a great 
 river, like the Danube, the Rhine, or the Elbe, without 
 reducing at least one of the fortresses on that river, so as 
 to secure a line of retreat ; but being in possession of such 
 a place, it can continue the offensive, while its materiel de 
 si^ge successively reduces the other places." 
 
 In case the main army is obliged to remain and cover 
 the besieging corps, it should take some central position, 
 where it can command all the avenues of approach, and 
 fall with vigor on the enemy, should he attempt to raise 
 the siege. Napoleon's operations before Mantua, in 1796, 
 i>ffer the finest model for imitation. 
 
 The old system of intrenched camps and lines of coa- 
 
FORTIFICATIONS. 63 
 
 travallation is unsuited to the spirit of modern warfare. 
 In ancient times, and more particularly in the middle 
 ages, too much importance was attached to tactical posi- 
 tions, and not enough to strategic points and lines. This 
 gave to fortifications a character that never properly be- 
 longed to them. From the middle ages down to the pe- 
 riod of the French Revolution, wars were carried on 
 mainly by the system of positions — one party confining 
 their operations to the security of certain important places, 
 while the other directed their whole attention to the siege 
 and capture of these places. But Carnot and Napoleon 
 changed this system, at the same time with the system 
 of tactics, or rather, returned from it to the old and true 
 system of strategic operations. Some men, looking merely 
 at the fact that a change was made, but without examining 
 the character of that change, have rushed headlong to the 
 conclusion that fortified places are now utterly useless in 
 war, military success depending entirely upon a good sys- 
 tem of marches. 
 
 On this subject. General Jomini, the great military his- 
 torian of the wars of the French Revolution, remarks that 
 "we should depend entirely upon neither organized masses, 
 nor upon material obstacles, whether natural or artificial. 
 To follow exclusively either of these systems would be 
 equally absurd. The true science of war consists in 
 choosing a just medium between the two extremes. The 
 wars of Napoleon demonstrated the great truth, that dis- 
 tance can protect no country from invasion, but that a 
 state, to be secure, must have a good system of fortresses, 
 and a good system of military reserves and military insti- 
 tutions." 
 
 In all military operations time is of vast importance. 
 If a single division of an army can be retarded for a few 
 hours only, it not unfrequently decides the fate of the 
 campaign. Had the approach of Blucher been delayed 
 
64 MILITARY ART AND J5CIENCE. 
 
 for a few hours, Napoleon jnust have been victorious al 
 the battle of Waterloo. An equilibrium can seldom be 
 sustained for more than six or seven hours between 
 forces on the field of battle ; but in this instance, the 
 state of the ground rendered the movements so slow as 
 to prolong the battle for about twelve hours ; thus ena- 
 bling the allies to effect a concentration in time to save 
 Wellington. 
 
 Many of Napoleon's brilliant victories resulted from 
 merely bringing troops to bear suddenly upon some de- 
 cisive point. Rivoli in 1796-7, Marengo in 1800, Ulm 
 in 1805, Jena in 1806, Ratisbon in 1809, Brienne in 
 1814, and Ligny in 1815, are familiar examples. But this 
 concentration of forces, even with a regular army, cannot 
 be calculated on by the general with any degree of cer- 
 tainty, unless his communications are perfectly secure. 
 And this difficulty is very much increased where the 
 troops are new and undisciplined. When a country like 
 ours is invaded, large numbers of such troops must sud- 
 denly be called into the field. Not knowing the designs 
 of the invaders, much time will be lost in marches and 
 countermarches ; and if there be no safe places of resort 
 the operations must be indecisive and insecure. 
 
 To a defensive army fortifications are valuable as 
 points of repose, upon which the troops, if beaten, may 
 fall back, and shelter their sick and wounded, collect 
 their scattered forces, repair their materials, and draw 
 together a new supply of stores and provisions ; and as 
 rallying points, where new troops may be assembled with 
 safety, and the army, in a few days, be prepared to again 
 meet the enemy in the open field. Without these de- 
 fences, undisciplined and inexperienced armies, when 
 once routed, can seldom be rallied again, except with 
 great losses. But when supported by forts, they can se- 
 lect their opportunity for fighting, and offer or refus© 
 
FORTIFICATIONS. 65 
 
 battle according to the probability of success ; and, hav- 
 ing a safe place of retreat, they are far less influenced by 
 fear in the actual conflict. 
 
 The enemy; on the other hand, being compelled either 
 to besiege or observe these works, his army will be sep- 
 arated from its magazines, its strength and efficiency 
 diminished by detachments, and his whole force exposed 
 to the horrors of partisan warfare. It has therefore been 
 estimated by the best military writers, that an army sup- 
 ported by a judicious system of fortifications, can repel a 
 land force six times as large as itself. 
 
 Every government should prepare, in time of peace, its 
 most prominent and durable means of defence. By se- 
 curing in a permanent manner its important points, it will 
 enable a small force to retain possession of these places 
 against a greatly superior army, for a considerable length 
 of time. This serves the same purpose as a battle gain- 
 ed; for, in the .beginning of a war of invasion, the 
 economy of time is of the utmost importance to the de- 
 fensive party, enabling it to organize and prepare the 
 great military resources of the state. 
 
 In all mountainous frontiers, or sides of states border- 
 ing on large rivers, or chains of lakes, there will neces- 
 sarily be but few points by which an invader can pene- 
 trate into the interior of the country. Let us suppose 
 that, for a frontier of moderate extent, there are five 
 passes, or avenues through which the enemy may ap- 
 proach the interior. To efTectually defend these ap- 
 proaches against the invading army will require, for each, 
 an army of ten thousand men. Not being able to decide 
 positively on the plans of the enemy, all these communi- 
 cations must be defended at the same time. This re- 
 quires a defending army of fifty thousand men. Let us 
 now suppose each of these passes to be fortified in such 
 a way, that one thousand men will be able to hold the 
 
66 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 enemy in check, and force him* to resort to the operations 
 of a siege ; or, at least, to retard his advance till an 
 active army can be organized in the interior, and pre- 
 pared to meet him in the field. We here see that five 
 thousand men, by me«,ns of fortifications, can accomplish 
 the same defensive object as fifty thousand men without 
 these artificial means of security. 
 
 But let us enter a little more into the details of frontier 
 defences, and examine the qharacter of the several sys- 
 tems which have been successively proposed or adopted. 
 Frontiers are divided into four distinct classes, according 
 as the state may be open on one or more sides, or bound- 
 ed by mountains, large rivers and lakes, or by the sea. 
 
 An open frontier is the most difficult of defence ; and 
 while there exists a perfect uniformity among military 
 men upon the vast importance of fortifying such a fron- 
 tier, there is an equal diversity of opinion respecting the 
 best manner of arranging these works. _ We shall here 
 mention three general systems of arranging forts for the 
 defence of an open country, each of Which has been ad- 
 vocated at different times, and afterwards received vari- 
 ous modifications and additions. These three systems 
 comprise the main features of all others worthy of much 
 consideration. They are : — 
 
 1st. The system of continuous lines, proposed by Mont- 
 alembert. 
 
 2d. A system of three lines of detached works, strongly 
 recommended by D'Ar^on and others. 
 
 3d. A system proposed by Vauban, and advocated by 
 Rogniat, consisting of lines of very strong works, placed 
 at considerable distances from each other and covering 
 large intrenched camps. 
 
 The first of these systems was proposed in 1790, and 
 for a time attracted considerable notice in France, but 
 has long since been discarded, as being utterly incompat- 
 
FORTIFICATIONS. 67 
 
 ible with the principles of the military art. A writer, 
 however, of some pretensions in this country, recom- 
 mends its adoption for the defence of Baltimore and the 
 shores of the Chesapeake. The same author would dis- 
 pense entirely with our present system of fortifications 
 on the sea-coast, and substitute in their place wooden 
 Martello towers ! This would be very much like build- 
 ing 120 gun ships at Pittsburg and Memphis, for the de- 
 fence of the Ohio and the Mississippi rivers, and sending 
 out duck-boats to meet the enemy on the Atlantic ! 
 
 In the second system, the works on the extreme fron- 
 tier are to be placed about thirty or forty miles apart, and 
 those of the second and third lines respectively thirty or 
 forty miles in rear of the first and second lines, and op- 
 posite the intervals. 
 
 In the third system, first recommended by Vauban and 
 more recently by Rogniat, the works are to be arranged in 
 the same manner as in that of D'Arcon, but the distance be- 
 tween them is to be from seventy to one hundred miles, and 
 each fort arranged for covering a large intrenched camp. 
 
 Either of these last two systems is well suited to the 
 defence of an open frontier. The former is applied to 
 the side of France towards Belgium, and the latter, with 
 certain modifications, to the defence of Western Ger- 
 many. The first line of fortifications on the northern 
 frontier of France consists of Dunkirk, Lille, Valen- 
 ciennes, Conde, Quesnoy, Rocroi, Charlemont, Mezieres, 
 and Sedan ; the second line, of Calais, Andres, St. Omer, 
 Bethune, Arras, Douai, Chambrai, Landrecies, and Aves- 
 nes ; the third line, of Boulogne, Montreuil, Hesdin, Abbe- 
 ville, Amiens, Bapaume, Peronne, Ham, and Laon. 
 
 For mountainous frontiers it is deemed necessary to 
 secure all the important passes with small redoubts or 
 military works, and to defend with strong forts the grand 
 interior strategic points on which these communications 
 
68 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 are directed. For a frontier of moderate extent there 
 may be some six or eight gorges in the mountains by 
 which an army might penetrate ; but it will always be 
 found that these roads concentrate on two or three points 
 in the great valleys below. Take, for example, the fron- 
 tier of France towards Switzerland and Italy. The passes 
 of the mountains are secured by the little works of Fort 
 L'Ecluse, Fort Pierre-ehatel, Fort Barraux, Briancon, 
 Mont Dauphin, Colmars, Entrevaux, and Antibes ; while 
 Besancon, Grenoble, and Toulon, form a second line ; 
 and Lyons a grand central depot. 
 
 Where a great river or chain of lakes forms the boun- 
 dary of a state, the system of defence will be much the 
 same as that of an open land frontier, the works of the 
 first line being made to secure the great bridges or ferries 
 by which the enemy might effect a passage ; those of the 
 second line, to cover the passes of the highlands that 
 generally approach more or less near the great water- 
 course ; and those of the third line, far enough in rear to 
 protect the great internal communications of the country. 
 Let us take, for example, the side of France bordering on 
 the Rhine. Wissembourg and Lauterbourg, Fort Louis, 
 Haguenau, Strasbourg, Schelstadt, Neuf-Brisach, and Hu- 
 neguen, cover the several passages of the river ; while 
 Bitche,Phalsbourg, and Befort form a second line ; Thion- 
 ville, Metz, and Toul, a third line ; and Verdun a grand 
 central depot. 
 
 The following are the principal objects proposed to be 
 accomplished by fortifications on a sea-coast. 
 
 1st. To close all important harbors to an enemy, and 
 secure them to the navy of the country. 
 
 2d. To prevent the enemy from forming an establish- 
 ment on our shores, from which, by his naval superiority, 
 he might destroy our commerce and keep the whole fron- 
 tier in continual alarm. 
 
FORTIFICATIONS. 69 
 
 3d. To cover our great cities against a maritime attack 
 and bombardment. 
 
 4th. To cover our ship-yards and great naval depots. 
 
 5th. To prevent, as much as possible, the great ave- 
 nues of interior navigation from being blockaded by naval 
 means at their entrance into the ocean. 
 
 6th. To give to our navy facilities for protecting our 
 coast trade from the enemy's ships of war, and our inter- 
 nal communications, which lie near the coast, from mari- 
 time descents. 
 
 Let us notice how France has attempted to accomplish 
 this object. The Mediterranean frontier has Fort Quarre, 
 Fort St. Marguerite, St. Tropez, Brigancon, the forts of 
 Point Man, of I'Ertissac, and of Langoustier, Toulon, St. 
 Nicholas, Castle of If, Marseilles, Tour de Boue, Aigues- 
 Montes, Fort St. Louis, Fort Brescou, Narbonne, Cha- 
 teau de Salces, Perpignan, CoUioure, Fort St. Elme, and 
 Port Vendre. Toulon is the great naval depot for this 
 frontier, and Marseilles the great commercial port. Both 
 are well secured by strong fortifications. The Atlantic 
 frontier has Bayonne ; the forts of Royan, Grave, Medoc, 
 Pate, &c., on the Gironde ; Rochefort, with the forts of 
 Chapus, Lapin, Aix, Oleron, &;c., to cover the roadstead ; 
 La Rochelle, with the forts of the Isle of Re ; Sables, 
 with the forts of St. Nicholas, and Des Moulines, Isle 
 Dieu, Belle Isle, Fort du Pilier, Mindin, Ville Martin; 
 Quiberon, with Fort Penthievre ; L'Orient, with its harbor 
 defences ; Fort Cigogne ; Brest, with its harbor defences ; 
 St. Malo, with Forts Cezembre, La Canchee, L'Anse du 
 Verger, and Des Rimains ; Cherbourg, with its defensive 
 forts and batteries ; Havre, Dieppe, Boulogne, Calais, and 
 Dunkirk. Cherbourg, Brest, and Rochefort, are great 
 naval depots ; and Havre, Nantes, and Bordeaux, the 
 principal commercial ports. Many of the works above 
 enumerated are small in extent and antiquated in their 
 
70 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 construction, and some of them quite old and dilapidated , 
 nevertheless, they have heretofore been found sufficient 
 for the defence of the naval depots and commercial sea- 
 ports of France against the superior naval forces of her 
 neighbor. 
 
 Omitting for the present all discussion of seacoast de- 
 fences, let us examine more particularly the character 
 and influence of fortifications on land frontiers. 
 
 All military writers agree that fortifications have here- 
 tofore exerted a great, and frequently a decisive, influence 
 on the operations of a war. Those of France are fre- 
 quently referred to as proofs of this influence. But, while 
 all are disposed to allow that these works contributed 
 much in former times to the defence of states, yet some 
 have said that modern improvements in the mode of at- 
 tack have rendered forts far less valuable than formerly. 
 
 Such, however, is not the case. Improvements in the 
 mode of attack have not kept pace with the facilities of 
 locomotion ; and, although fortifications do not now usually 
 sustain a siege of as many days as in former times, still, 
 as compared with the relative lengths of campaigns in 
 ancient and modern wars, the proportional length of sieges 
 is now even greater than formerly. When the same is 
 accomplished in a campaign of seven weeks as was for- 
 merly done in a war of seven years, it is not necessary 
 that fortified places should hold out a very long time. A 
 place that can sustain a siege of a month is now deemed 
 sufficiently strong for ordinary campaigns ; for by the end 
 of that time the defensive army will either be destroyed, 
 or be able to come to its succor. In either case a longer 
 defence would not be required. 
 
 A reference to the most important sieges of the last 
 century or two will show that forts are, on an average, 
 capable of sustaining a siege for more than that length of 
 time. 
 
FORTIFICATIONS. 71 
 
 Lille, in 1708, held the allies in check for a whole 
 year; and again, in 1792, compelled the Austrians to 
 raise the siege after an unsuccessful attack of fifteen days. 
 
 Antwerp, in 1585, sustained a siege of fourteen months 
 against greatly superior forces ; in 1814 Carnot defended 
 the citadel of this place for four months, and imtil an ar- 
 mistice had been concluded between the contending par- 
 ties ; in 1832, it sustained, with a garrison of only 4,500 
 men and 145 pieces of ordnance, a siege of twenty-five 
 days, against a force of 55,000 men and 223 cannon. 
 
 Namur, near the end of the seventeenth century, sus- 
 tained a siege often weeks. 
 
 Ismail, in 1790, sustained a siege of more than two 
 months against the Russians. 
 
 Maestricht, in 1793, sustained a siege of nearly two 
 weeks; and again, in 1794, sustained a blockade and 
 siege of nearly two months. 
 
 Magdeburg, in the thirty years' war, resisted the army 
 of Wallenstein for seven months; and in 1813-14, al- 
 though garrisoned by only 4,000 men, it for a long time 
 resisted the overwhelming forces of the allies. 
 
 Dantzic, at the same time, sustained a siege against 
 superior forces for more than nine months. 
 
 Landau, in 1793, sustained a siege of nine months. 
 
 Valenciennes and Mayence, in 1793, each sustained a 
 siege of about three months. 
 
 Charleroi, Fort Vauban, and L'Ecluse, in 1794, each 
 sustained a siege of about thirty days. 
 
 Quesnoy, in 1794, sustained a siege of about three 
 weeks. 
 
 Rosas, in 1795, sustained a siege of some seventy days. 
 
 Mantua, in 1796-7, protected from invasion, for eight 
 months, the Tyrol and the heart of the Austrian mon- 
 archy. 
 
 Kehl and Huninguen, in 1796, sheltered Moreau for 
 
72 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 three months against all the efforts of the Archduke 
 Charles. 
 
 St. Jean d'Acre, iij 1799, sustained a siege of sixty- 
 days of open trench. 
 
 Ulm, in 1800, held Moreau in check for more than a 
 month. 
 
 Genoa, in 1800, sustained a blockade of sixty and a 
 siege of forty days. 
 
 Saragossa in 1808 sustained a close siege of near two 
 months ; and in 1809 it was again besieged for two 
 months. 
 
 Rosas in 1808 sustained a siege of thirty days. 
 
 Gerona in 1809 sustained a siege and blockade of 
 seven months, nearly four of them being of open trench. 
 
 Mequinenza (a very small work) in 1810 sustained a 
 siege of more than two weeks. 
 
 Astorga in 1810 sustained a siege of thirty days ; 
 twenty-four being of open trench. * 
 
 Lerida in 1810 sustained a siege of thirty days, two 
 weeks being of open trench. 
 
 Ciudad Rodrigo in 1810 sustained a siege of two 
 months. 
 
 Almeida in 1810 sustained a siege of more than a 
 month. 
 
 Tortosa in 1810 sustained a siege of six months. 
 
 Tarragona in 1811 sustained a siege of nearly two 
 'months. 
 
 Badajos in 1811 sustained a siege of more than forty 
 days open trench. 
 
 Lerida in 1811 sustained a siege of two weeks open 
 trench. 
 
 Sag-antum in 3 811 sustained a siege of a month. 
 
 Yakncij, in 1§11-12 sustained a siege of two months. 
 
 Ciudttti Kodrigo in 1812 sustained a blockade of seve- 
 ral months, and a close siege of two weeks. 
 
FORTIFICATIONS. 73 
 
 Badajos in 1812 sustained twenty-one days of open 
 trenches. 
 
 Burgos in 1812 sustained thirty-three days of open 
 trenches. 
 
 St. Sebastian in 1813 sustained a siege and blockade 
 of nearly three months, with fifty-nine days of open 
 trenches. 
 
 Pampeluna in 1813 sustained a siege of more than 
 four months. 
 
 Monzon in 1813-14 also sustained a siege of more 
 than four months. 
 
 This list might be increased with numerous other ex- 
 amples, to show that even poorly fortified towns are 
 capable of defending themselves, on an average, for more 
 than a month. These examples, be it remembered, are 
 nearly all taken from a period of history since any mate- 
 rial improvements have been made in the art of attack. 
 Since the time of Vauban the improvements in attack 
 have not kept pace with the increased means of defence. 
 Moreover, these examples are taken from the sieges of 
 towns defended mainly by old and antiquated works, and 
 entirely incapable of offering the same resistance as de- 
 tached fortifications, with all the modem improvements. 
 
 The value of fortifications, as land defences, is suf- 
 ficiently proved by showing their general capability of 
 resisting an invader, even for a limited period ; thus af- 
 fording us time and opportunity to provide other means 
 of security. But it must not be inferred that forts be- 
 sieged en rigle will necessarily fall after so many days. 
 Such is far from being the case. The besieged have 
 usually great advantages over the besiegers ; and unless 
 the latter are vastly superior in number, or the work is of 
 a very inferior character, or the garrison is destitute of 
 the requisite means aiMl energy to resist an attack, they 
 will not be taken. 
 
 7 
 
74 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 Mezieres was not taken in 1520 ; nor Marseilles in 
 1524 ; nor Peronne in 1536 ; nor Landrecies in 1543 ; 
 nor Metz in 1552 ; nor Montauban in 1621 ; nor Lerida 
 in 1647; nor Maestricht in 1676; nor Vienna in 1529, 
 and again in 1683 ; nor Turin in 1706 ; nor Conde in 
 1744 ; nor Lille in 1792 ; nor Landau in 1793 ; nor Ulm 
 in 1800; nor Saragossa in 1808; nor Burgos in 1812. 
 This list might be extended almost indefinitely with the 
 names of places that could be reduced neither by force 
 nor by starvation. 
 
 But, as has already been noticed, some have asserted 
 that fortifications have become of little comparative im- 
 portance, under the new system of warfare introduced 
 during the wars of the French Revolution. On this sub- 
 ject let us consult the opinions of the best military judges 
 of the present century. 
 
 Napoleon says of fortifications, " they are an excellent 
 means of retarding, fettering, enfeebling, and disquieting 
 a conquering foe." 
 
 "The possession of strategic points," says the Arch- 
 duke Charles, " is decisive in military operations ; and 
 the most efficacious means should, therefore, be employed 
 to defend points whose preservation is the country's safe- 
 guard. This object is accomplished by fortifications, in- 
 asmuch as they can resist, for a given time, with a small 
 number of troops, every efibrt of a much larger force ; 
 fortifications should, therefore, be regarded as the basis 
 of a good system of defence." " It should be a maxim 
 of state policy in every country, to fortify, in time of 
 peace, all such points, and to arrange them with great 
 care, so that they can be defended by a small number of 
 troops. For the enemy, knowing the difficulty of getting 
 possession of these works, will look twice before he in- 
 volves himself in a war." " Es4ablishments which can 
 secure strategic advantages are not the works of a mo- 
 
FORTIFICATIONS. 75 
 
 ment ; they require time and labor. He who has the 
 direction of the military forces of a state, should, in time 
 of peace, prepare for war." " The proper application or 
 neglect of these principles will decide the safety or the 
 ruin of the state." " Fortifications arrest the enemy in 
 the pursuit of his object, and direct his movements on 
 less important points ; — he must either force these for- 
 tified lines, or else hazard enterprises upon lines which 
 offer only disadvantages. In fine, a country secured by 
 a system of defences truly strategic, has no cause to fear 
 either the invasion or the yoke of the enemy ; for he can 
 advance to the interior of the country only through great 
 trouble and ruinous efforts. Of course, lines of fortifica- 
 tions thus arranged cannot shelter a state against all re- 
 verses ; but these reverses will not, in this case, be 
 attended by total ruin ; for they cannot take from the 
 state the means nor the time for collecting new forces ; 
 nor can they ever reduce it to the cruel alternative of 
 submission or destruction." 
 
 " Fortifications," says Jomini, " fulfil two objects of 
 capital importance, — 1st. The protection of the frontiers ; 
 and 2d. Assisting the operations of the army in the field." 
 " Every part of the frontiers of a state should be secured 
 by one or two great places of refuge, secondary places, 
 and even small posts for facilitating the active operations 
 of the armies. Cities girt with walls and slight ditches 
 may often be of great utility in the interior of a country, 
 as places of deposite, where stores, magazines, hospitals, 
 ifec, may be shelfered from the incursions of the enemy's 
 light troops. These works are more especially valuable 
 where such stores, in order not to weaken the regulai 
 army by detachments, are intrusted to the care of raw 
 and militia forces." It is not supposed that any system 
 of fortifications can hermetically close a frontier ; " but, 
 although they of themselves can rarely present an abso- 
 
76 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 lute obstacle to the advance of the hostile army, yet it is 
 indisputable that they straiten its movements, change the 
 direction of its marches, and force it into detachments ; 
 while, on the contrary, they afford all the opposite advan- 
 tages to the defensive army ; they protect its marches, 
 favor its debouches, cover its magazines, its flanks, and 
 its movements, and finally furnish it with a place of 
 refuge in time of need." 
 
 These opinions were uttered, be it remembered, long 
 since the period at which modern military quacks date the 
 downfall of fortifications as inland defences, by men, too, 
 who were not engineers, and consequently had no profes- 
 sional predilections in favor of fortifications. The Arch- 
 duke Charles, as a general, knew no rival but Napoleon, 
 and General Jomini is universally regarded as the first 
 military historian of the age. The truth of their remarks 
 on fortifications is most fully confirmed by the military 
 histories of Germany and France. 
 
 For a long period previous to the Thirty Years' War, its 
 strong castles and fortified cities secured the German em- 
 pire from attacks from abroad, except on its extensive 
 frontier, which was frequently assailed, but no enemy was 
 able to penetrate to the interior till a want of union among 
 its own princes opened its strongholds to the Swedish 
 conqueror ; nor then, did the cautious Gustavus Adolphus 
 venture far into its territories till he had obtained posses- 
 sion of all the military works that might endanger his re- 
 treat. 
 
 Again, in the Seven Years' War, when the French neg- 
 lected to secure their foothold in Germany, by placing in 
 a state of defence the fortifications that fell into their 
 power, the first defeat rendered their ground untenable, 
 and threw them from the Elbe back upon the Rhine and 
 the Mayne. They afterwards took the precaution to for- 
 tify their positionSj and to secure their magazines under 
 
FORTIFICATIONS. 77 
 
 shelter of strong places, and, consequently, were enabled 
 to maintain themselves in the hostile country till the end 
 of the war, notwithstanding the inefficiency of their gen- 
 erals, the great reverses they sustained in the field, the 
 skill and perseverance of the enemy they were contending 
 with, and the weak and vacillating character of the cabi- 
 net that directed them. 
 
 But this system of defence was not so carefully main- 
 tained in the latter part of the eighteenth century, for at 
 the beginning of the French Revolution, says Jomini, 
 " Germany had too few fortifications ; they were generally 
 of a poor character, and improperly located." France, on 
 the contrary, was well fortified : and although without 
 armies, and torn in pieces by domestic factions, (we here 
 use the language of the Archduke,) " she sustained her- 
 self against all Europe ; and this was because her govern- 
 ment ^ since the reign of Louis XIII. ^ had continually la- 
 bored to put her frontiers into a defensive condition agreeably 
 to the principles of strategy ; starting from such a system 
 for a basis, she subdued every country on the continent 
 that was not thus fortified ; and this reason* alone will ex- 
 plain how her generals sometimes succeeded in destroy- 
 ing an army, and even an entire state, merely by a strate- 
 gic success." 
 
 This may be illustrated by reference to particular cam- 
 paigns. In 1792, when the Duke of Brunswick invaded 
 France, she had no armies competent to her defence. 
 Their numbers upon paper were somewhat formidable, it 
 is true, but the license of the Revolution had so loosened 
 the bonds of discipline as to effect an almost complete 
 disorganization. " It seemed, at this period," says the 
 historian, " as if the operations of the French generals 
 were dependent upon the absence of their enemies ; the 
 moment they appeared, the operations were precipitately 
 abandoned." But France had on her eastern frontier a 
 
78 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 triple line of good fortresses, although her miserable sol 
 diery were incapable of properly defending them. The 
 several works of the first and second lines fell, one after 
 another, before the slow operations of a Prussian siege, 
 and the Duke of Brunswick was already advancing upon 
 the third, when Dumourier, with only twenty-five thousand 
 men, threw himself into this line, and by a well-conducted 
 war of positions, placing his raw and unsteady forces be- 
 hind unassailable intrenchments, succeeded in repelling a 
 disciplined army nearly four times as numerous as his 
 own. Had no other obstacle than the French troops been 
 interposed between Paris and the Prussians, all agree that 
 France must have fallen. 
 
 In the campaign of 1793, the French army in Flanders 
 were beaten in almost every engagement, and their forces 
 reduced to less than one half the number of the allies. 
 The French general turned traitor to his country, and the 
 National Guards deserted their colors and returned to 
 France. The only hope of the Republicans, at this crisis, 
 was Vauban's line of Flemish fortresses. These alone 
 saved France. The strongholds of Lille, Conde, Valen- 
 ciennes, Quesnoy, Landrecies, &c., held the Austrians in 
 check till the French could raise new forces and reorganize 
 their army. " The important breathing-time which the 
 sieges of these fortresses," says an English historian, 
 " afforded to the French, and the immense advantage 
 which they derived from the new levies which they re- 
 ceived, and fresh organization which they acquired during 
 that important period, is a signal proof of the vital impor- 
 tance of fortresses in contributing to national defence. 
 Napoleon has not hesitated to ascribe to the three months 
 thus gained the salvation of France. It is to be constantly 
 recollected that the Republican armies were then totally 
 unable to keep the field ; that behind the frontier fortresses 
 there was neither a defensive position, nor a corps to re- 
 
FORTIFICATIONS. 79 
 
 inforce them ; and that if driven from their vicinity, the 
 capital was taken and the war concluded." 
 
 In the following year, 1794, when France had com- 
 pleted her vast armaments, and, in her turn, had become 
 the invading power, the enemy had no fortified towns tg 
 check the progress of the Republican armies ; which, 
 based on strong works of defence, in a few weeks over- 
 ran Flanders, and drove the allies beyond the Rhine. 
 
 In the campaign of 1796, when the army of Moreau 
 had been forced into a precipitate retreat by the admira- 
 ble strategic operations of the Archduke Charles, the 
 French forces owed their safety to the fortifications on 
 the Rhine. These works arrested the enemy's pursuit 
 and obliged him to resort to the tedious operations of 
 sieges ; and the reduction of the French advanced posts 
 alone, Kehl and Huninguen, poorly as they were defended, 
 employed all the resources of the Austrian army, and the 
 skill of their engineers, from early in October till late in 
 February. Kehl was at first assaulted by a force four 
 times as numerous as the garrison ; if the enemy had 
 succeeded, he would have cut oflf Moreau's retreat, and 
 destroyed his army. Fortunately the place was strong 
 enough to resist all assaults ; and Moreau, basing himself 
 on the fortresses of Alsace, his right covered by Hunin- 
 guen, Neuf-Brisach, and Befort, and his left by the iron 
 barrier of the Netherlands, effectually checked the waves 
 of Austrian success. 
 
 , Let us now turn to the campaigns of Napoleon. In his 
 first campaign in Italy, 1796, the general was directed 
 " to seize the forts of Savona, compel the senate to furnish 
 him with pecuniary supplies, and to surrender the keys of 
 Gavi, a fortress perched on the rocky height commanding 
 the pass of the Bocchetta." Setting out from Savona, he 
 crossed the mountains at a weak point between the Alps 
 and the Apennines, and succeeded in piercing the enemy's 
 
80 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 line of defence. The king of Sardinia, jealous of Aus- 
 trian influence, had refused to permit the Austrian army 
 to garrison his line of fortifications. Napoleon, profiting 
 by his victorious attitude, the mutual jealousy of Austria 
 and Sardinia, and the intrigues of his diplomatists, soon 
 gained possession of these important works. " These 
 Sardinian fortresses^'' he wrote to the Directory, " at once 
 •put the Republicans in possession of the keys of the Penin- 
 sula" Basing himself on Coni, Mondovi, Ceva, Gavi, 
 and Alessandria, with Tortosa as his depot of magazines, 
 he advanced against Lombardy. Now basing himself on 
 the Adda and Po, with the fortress of Pizzighettone as the 
 depot of his magazines, he advanced upon the line of the 
 Adige. Pechiera became his next depot, and he now had 
 four fortresses in echelon between him and his first depot 
 of magazines ; and, after the fall of Mantua, basing him- 
 self on the Po, he advanced against the States of the 
 Church, making Ferrara and then Ancona, his places of 
 depot. 
 
 From the solid basis of the fortresses of Piedmont and 
 Lombardy, " he was enabled to turn his undivided atten- 
 tion to the destruction of the Austrians, and thus commence, 
 with some security, that great career of conquest which 
 he already meditated in the imperial dominions." In this 
 campaign of 1797, after securing his base, he fortified 
 Palma-Nuova, Osapo, &c., repaired the old fortifications 
 of Klagenfurth, and, as he advanced, established, to use 
 his own words, " a good point cfappui at every five or six^ 
 marches." 
 
 Afterwards, when the Austrians had nearly wrested 
 Italy from the weak grasp of Napoleon's successors, the 
 French saved their^army in the fortress of Genoa and be- 
 hind the line of the Var, which had been fortified with 
 care in 1794-5. Numerous attempts were made to force 
 this line, the advanced post of Fort Montauban being sev- 
 
FORTIFICATIONS. 81 
 
 eral times assaulted by numerous forces. But the Aus- 
 trian columns recoiled from its murderous fire of grape 
 and musketry, which swept off great numbers at every 
 discharge. Again the assault was renewed with a vast 
 superiority of numbers, and again " the brave men who 
 headed the column almost perished at the foot of the in- 
 trenchment ; and, after sustaining a heavy loss, they were 
 compelled to abandon the enterprise. 
 
 While the forces on the Var thus stayed the waves of 
 Austrian success, Massena, in the fortifications of Genoa, 
 sustained a blockade of sixty, and a siege of forty days, 
 against an army five times as large as his own; and 
 when forced to yield to the stern demands of famine, he 
 almost dictated to the enemy the terms of the treaty. 
 These two defences held in check the elite of the Aus- 
 trian forces, while the French reserve crossed the Alps, 
 seized the important points of the country, and cut ofi* 
 the Austrian line of retreat. "But even after the victory 
 of Marengo," says Napoleon, " I did not consider the 
 whole of Italy reconquered, until all the fortified places 
 between me and the Mincio should be occupied by my 
 troops. I gave Melas permission to return to Mantua, on 
 condition of his surrendering all these fortresses." 
 
 He now directed Chasseloup de Laubat and his en- 
 gineers to repair and remodel the fortifications of Verona, 
 Legnano, Pechiera, Mantua, the line of the Adda, Milan, 
 Alessandria,* Roco d'Aufo, Genoa, and several smaller 
 works ; thus forming a quadruple line of defence against 
 Austrian aggression in Italy. These works were of great 
 service to the French in 1805, enabling Massena with 
 fifty thousand men to hold in check the Archduke Charles 
 with more than ninety -thousand, while Napoleon's grand 
 
 * More than twenty millions of money were appropriated for this 
 place alone. 
 
82 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 army, starting from the solid base of the Rhine, traversed 
 Germany and seized upon the capital of Austria. 
 
 The neglect of the Prussians to place their country in 
 a state of military defence, previous to declaring war 
 against Napoleon in 1806, had a most disastrous influ- 
 ence upon the campaign. Napoleon, on the other hand, 
 occupied and secured all the important military positions 
 which he had captured in the preceding campaign. " The 
 Prussians," said he, " made no preparations for putting 
 into a state of defence the fortifications on their first line, 
 not even those within a few marches of our cantonments. 
 While I was piling up bastion upon bastion at Kehl, Cas- 
 sel, and Wesel, they did not plant a single palisade, at 
 Magdeburg, nor put in battery a single cannon at Span- 
 dau." The works on the three great lines of the Oder, 
 the Elbe, and the Weser, had they been properly re- 
 paired, garrisoned, and defended, were sufiicient to have 
 held in check the French, even after the great victory of 
 Jena, till the newly-organized forces, acting in concert 
 with the Russian army, could re-establish the Prussian 
 monarchy in its ancient greatness. Profiting by the 
 neglect of the Prussians, Napoleon seized upon the great 
 defensive works of the country, which, to his great joy, 
 were readily surrendered into his hands by the old and 
 inefficient generals who commanded them; and French 
 garrisons were almost immediately established in the for» 
 tresses of Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, Magdeburg, Spandau, 
 Hameln, Nieubourg, <fec. " Spandau," said he in the 
 19th Bulletin, "is an inestimable acquisition. In our 
 hands it could sustain two months of operations. But 
 such was the general confusion, that the Prussians had 
 not even armed its batteries." The possession of these 
 fortifications inclined the scale at Eylau. All the histo- 
 rians of the war notice their influence on the campaigns 
 •f Friedland and Tilsit. 
 
FORTIFICATIONS. 83 
 
 These Prussian fortresses were retained by Napoleon 
 at the treaty of Tilsit. The campaign of 1809 proved 
 the wisdom of this policy, as they effectually prevented 
 Prussia from joining Austria in rekindling the flames of 
 war. And again in 1813, these works might have pro- 
 duced a decided influence on the campaign, had not the 
 political perfidy of Austria, and the treason of the French 
 generals, prevented Napoleon from profiting by the ad- 
 vantages of his position. 
 
 The influence of the fortifications of Spain upon the 
 Peninsular campaigns has often been alluded to by his- 
 torians. Those works which had been given up to Na- 
 poleon previous to the opening of hostilities, contributed 
 very much to the success of his arms ; while those which 
 had been retained by Spain and her allies contributed in 
 an equal degree to fetter and embarrass his operations. 
 Some of these, like Saragossa, Tarragona, Gerona, Tor- 
 tosa, &c. &c., with their broken walls and defective ar- 
 maments, kept the enemy in check for months ; and, by 
 compelling the French to resort to the tedious operations 
 of sieges, did much to weaken the French power in the 
 Peninsula. 
 
 The influence of the fortifications of the French fron- 
 tiers in furnishing a secure basis for the successful oper- 
 ations of Napoleon into the enemy's territory, has al- 
 ready been noticed. If these fortresses of France, after 
 the disasters of 1812 and '13, failed to save the nation, 
 the cause must be sought for in the peculiar features of 
 the invasion itself, rather than any lack of military influ- 
 ence in the French defences. As has been already re- 
 marked, a million of disciplined men, under consummate 
 leaders, were here assailing a single state, impoverished 
 by the fatal war in Russia, — torn in pieces by political 
 factions, — deserted by its sworn allies,— its fortresses 
 basely betrayed into the enemy's hands, and its military 
 
84 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 power paralyzed by the treason of generals with theil 
 entire armies. Its only hope was in the fortresses which 
 had remained faithful ; and Napoleon said at St. Helena, 
 that if he had collected together the garrisons of these 
 few fortresses and retired to the Rhine, he could have 
 crushed the allies even after their entrance into Paris. 
 But political considerations prevented the operation. 
 
 Again in 1815, Napoleon, even after the defeat of Wa- 
 terloo, possessed lines of defence sufficiently strong to 
 resist all attempts at invasion. But again the want of 
 co-operation on the part of the government at Paris, and 
 the treason of his own generals, forced his second abdica- 
 tion. If he had retained the command of the army, and 
 the nation had seconded his efforts, the allies would never 
 have reached Paris. But the new government presented 
 the disgraceful spectacle of opening the way for the ene- 
 mies of their country. " France," said Napoleon, " will 
 eternally reproach the ministry with having forced her 
 whole people to pass under the Caudine-forks, by order- 
 ing the disbanding of an army that had for twenty-five 
 years been its country's glory, and hy giving up to our aS' 
 tonished enemies our still invincible fortresses." 
 
 History fully supports Napoleon's opinion of the great 
 danger of penetrating far into a hostile country to attack 
 the capital, even when that capital is without fortifications. 
 The fatal effects of such an advance, without properly se- 
 curing the means of retreat, is exemplified by his own 
 campaign of 1812, in Russia. If, after the fall of Smo- 
 lensk, he had fortified that place and Vitepsk, which by 
 their position closed the narrow passage comprised be- 
 tween the Dnieper and the Dwina, he might in all proba- 
 bility, on the following spring, have been able to seize 
 upon Moscow and St. Petersburg. But leaving the hos- 
 tile army of Tschkokoff" in his rear, he pushed on to Mos- 
 cow, and when the conflagration of that city cut ofi* his 
 
FORTIFICATIONS. 85 
 
 hopes of winter quarters-there, and the premature rigor 
 of the season destroyed the horses of his artillery and 
 provision-trains, retreat became impossible, and the awful 
 fate of his inmiense army was closed by scenes of horror 
 to which there is scarcely a parallel in history. This 
 point might be still further illustrated by the Russian cam- 
 paign of Charles XIL, in 1708-9, the fatal advance of the 
 French army on Lisbon, in the Peninsular war, and other 
 examples of the same character. 
 
 Even single works sometimes effect the object of lines 
 of fortifications, and frustrate the operations of an entire 
 army. Thus, Lille suspended for a whole year the oper- 
 ations of Prince Eugene and Marlborough ; the siege of 
 Landrecies gave Villars an opportunity of changing the 
 fortunes of the war; Pavia, in 1525, lost France her 
 monarch, the flower of her nobility, and her Italian con- 
 quests ; Metz, in 1552, arrested the entire power of 
 Charles V., and saved France from destruction ; Prague, 
 in 1757, brought the greatest warrior of his age to the 
 brink of ruin; St. Jean d'Acre, in 1799, stopped the suc- 
 cessful career of Napoleon; Burgos, in 1812, saved the 
 beaten army of Portugal, enabled them to collect their 
 scattered forces, and regain the ascendancy; Strasburg 
 has often been the bulwark of the French against Ger- 
 many, saving France from invasion, and perhaps subjuga- 
 tion. 
 
 In nearly the language of Napoleon, (Memoirs, vol. IX.,) 
 If Vienna had been fortified in 1805, the battle of Ulni 
 would not have decided the fate of the war. Again, in 
 1809, if this capital had been fortified, it would have en- 
 abled the Archduke Charles, after the disaster of Eckmuhl, 
 by a forced retreat on the left of the Danube, to form a 
 junction with the forces of General Hiller and the Arch- 
 duke John. 
 
 If Berlin had been fortified in 1806, the army routed at 
 
86 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 Jena would have rallied there and been joined by the 
 Russians. If Madrid had been strongly fortified in 1808, 
 the French army, after the victories of Espinosa, Tudela, 
 Burgos, and Sommo-Sierra, would not have marched to- 
 wards that capital, leaving in rear of Salamanca and Val- 
 ladolid, both the English army of General Moore and the 
 Spanish army of Romana. If Moscow had been fortified 
 in 1812, its conflagration would have been avoided, for, 
 with strong defensive works, and the army of Kutusoff 
 encamped on its ramparts, its capture would have been 
 impossible. 
 
 Had not Constantinople been well fortified, the empire 
 of Constantino must have terminated in the year 700, 
 whereas the standard of the Prophet was not planted 
 there until 1440. This capital was therefore indebted to 
 its walls for eight hundred years of existence. During 
 this period it was besieged fifty-three times, but only one 
 of these sieges was successful. The French and Vene- 
 tians took it, but not without a very severe contest. 
 
 Paris has often owed its safety to its walls. In 885 
 the Normans besieged it for two years without efl'ect. In 
 1358 the Dauphin besieged it in vain. In 1359 Edward, 
 king of England, encamped at Montrouge, devastated the 
 country to its walls, but recoiled from before it, and re- 
 tired to Chartres. In 1429 it repulsed the attack of 
 Charles VII. In 1464 the Count of Charlerois surrounded 
 the city, but was unsuccessful in his attacks. In 1472 it 
 repulsed the army of the Duke of Bourgone, who had al- 
 ready ravaged its precincts. In 1536, when attacked by 
 Charles V., it again owed its safety to its walls. In 1588 
 and 1589 it repulsed the armies of Henry HI. and Henry 
 IV. In 1636 and several succeeding years the inhabitants 
 of Paris owed their safety to its walls. If this capital 
 had been strongly fortified in 1814 and 1815, the allied 
 armies would not have dared to attempt its investment. 
 
FORTIFICATIONS. 87 
 
 But it is deemed unnecessary to further specify exam- 
 ples ; the whole history of modern warfare is one con- 
 tinued proof of the importance of fortifications as a 
 means of national defence, and as an auxiliary in offen- 
 sive military operations. Our illustrations have been 
 mostly drawn from European wars, but our own brief 
 history, as will be shown hereafter, is not without its 
 proofs. 
 
 The use and importance of field-fortifications, intrench- 
 ed camps, &c., as well as the class of military works 
 called coast-defences, will be discussed hereafter.* 
 
 * The use of fortifications in the defence of states is discussed by 
 Ternay, Vauban, Cormontaigne, Napoleon, the Archduke Charles, 
 Jomini, Fallot, and, incidentally, by most of the military historians of 
 the wars of the French Revolution. The names of such standard 
 works as give the detailed arrangements of fortifications will be men- 
 tioned hereafter 
 
88 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 LOGISTICS. 
 
 III. We have defined logistics to be that branch of the 
 military art which embraces all the practical details of 
 moving and supplying armies. The term is derived from 
 the title of a French general officer, (major-general des 
 logis,) who was formerly charged with directing the 
 marches, encampments, and lodging of the troops. It 
 has been still further extended by recent military writers, 
 and many of them now regard logistics as a distinct and 
 important branch of the art. 
 
 We shall here consider logistics as including the mili- 
 tary duties ordinarily attributed to the pay, subsistence, 
 clothing, medical, hospital, and transportation depart- 
 ments ; in fine, of all the civil and civico-military corps 
 of the army. We shall therefore discuss under this head, 
 the preparation of all the necessary materials for fitting 
 out troops for a campaign and for putting them in motion; 
 the regulating of marches, convoys, the means of trans- 
 port for provisions, hospitals, munitions, and supplies of 
 all kinds ; the preparation and protection of magazines ; 
 the laying out of camps and cantonments ; in fine, every 
 thing connected with preparing, moving, and guarding the 
 impedimenta of an army. 
 
 The officers connected with this branch of service 
 must consult with the engineers in every thing relating 
 to the defence of their depots, magazines, camps, canton- 
 ments, communications, and the passage of rivers, and in 
 all that relates to their connection with the attack and 
 defence of places ; but in all that relates to strategy and 
 
LOGISTICS. 89 
 
 tactics they must receive instructions directly from the 
 chief of the staff of the army, who will have the general 
 direction of every thing connected with logistics. Before 
 commencing the operations of the campaign, or beginning 
 the execution of the plans decided upon at head-quarters, 
 this officer should satisfy himself respecting the condition 
 of the various materials belonging to the different depart- 
 ments of the army ; — the horses and horse equipments, 
 carriages, caissons, ponton and artillery equipages, siege 
 equipages, moveable hospitals, engineer and artillery uten- 
 sils, clothing, and munitions of all kinds ; he must supply 
 whatever may be wanting, and provide means for the 
 transportation of every thing. 
 
 Subsistence. — The art of subsisting troops during active 
 operations in a hostile country, is one of the most diffi- 
 cult subjects connected with war; and it is a question 
 well worthy of study, both for the statesman and the war- 
 rior, how Darius and Xerxes, Philip and Alexander, in 
 ancient times — and the Greek emperors and the barba- 
 rians — and, later still, the crusaders of the middle ages, 
 contrived to support the immense masses of men which 
 they led to war. 
 
 Caesar has said that war should be made to support 
 war; and some modem generals have acted upon this 
 principle to the extreme of supporting their* armies en- 
 tirely at the expense of the country passed over. Others 
 have adopted either in part or entirely the principle of 
 regular magazines. 
 
 Louis XIV. and Frederick II. fought mostly on their 
 own frontiers, and followed the system of regular depots 
 and supplies. But the revolutionary armies of France 
 made war without magazines, subsisting, sometimes on 
 the inhabitants, sometimes by requisitions levied on the 
 country passed over, and at others by pillage and maraud- 
 ing. Napoleon found little difficulty in supporting an 
 
90 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 army of a hundred or a hundred and twenty thousand men 
 in Italy, Suabia, and on the rich borders of the Rhine and 
 the Danube ; but in Spain, Poland, and Russia, the sub- 
 ject of subsistence became one of extreme embarrass- 
 ment. 
 
 All depots of provisions and other supplies for an army 
 are denominated magazines ; these are divided into prin- 
 cipal, secondary, and provisional. The first are usually on 
 the base of operations ; the second, on the line of opera- 
 tions ; and the last in the immediate vicinity of the troops, 
 and contain supplies for a few days only. 
 
 The system of magazines is objected to by some, be- 
 cause it fetters the movements of an army, and makes its 
 military operations subordinate to the means of supply. 
 Moreover, as the movements of an army must be so ar- 
 ranged as to cover these magazines, their establishment 
 at given points reveals to the enemy our plan of cam- 
 paign. 
 
 On the other hand, the system of requisitions, either for 
 immediate supplies or for secondary magazines, gives far 
 greater velocity and impetuosity to an active army ; and 
 if it be so regulated as to repress pillage, and be levied 
 with uniformity and moderation, it may be relied on with 
 safety in well-cultivated countries; but in more barren 
 and less populous districts, an army without magazines, 
 especially in case of a prolonged stay or a forced retreat, 
 will be exposed to great suffering and loss, if not to total 
 destruction. 
 
 Before commencing a campaign the general should 
 make himself acquainted with all the resources of the 
 country to be passed over — determine the amount of sup- 
 plies which it may be necessary to take with him, and 
 the amount that can be obtained by requisitions; these 
 requisitions being levied in a uniform and legal manner, 
 and through the existing local authorities. 
 
LOGISTICS. 91 
 
 In great wars of invasion it is sometimes impracticable, 
 at least for a time, to provide for the immense forces 
 placed on foot, by any regular system of magazines or of 
 ordinary requisitions : in such cases their subsistence is 
 entirely intrusted to the troops themselves, who levy con- 
 tributions wherever they pass. The inevitable conse- 
 quences of this system are universal pillage and a total 
 relaxation of discipline ; the loss of private property and 
 the violation of individual rights, are followed by the 
 massacre of all straggling parties, and the ordinary peace- 
 ful and non-combatant inhabitants are converted into bit- 
 ter and implacable enemies. 
 
 In this connection the war in the Spanish peninsula is 
 well worthy of study. At the beginning of this war Na- 
 poleon had to choose between methodical operations, with 
 provisions carried in the train of his army, or purchased 
 of the inhabitants and regularly paid for ; and irregular 
 warfare, with forced requisitions — war being made to sup- 
 port war. The question was thoroughly discussed. 
 
 On the one hand, by sacrificing three or four millions 
 of francs from the French treasury, he would have been 
 able to support his troops without requisitions, would have 
 maintained good order and discipline in his armies, and 
 by the distribution of this money among a people poor 
 and interested, he would have made many partisans. He 
 could then have offered them, with a firm and just hand, 
 the olive or the sword. But then the drafts upon the 
 French treasury, had the war been a protracted one, 
 would have been enormous for the support of an army of 
 200,000 men in Spain. Moreover, the hostile and insur- 
 rectionary state of the local authorities rendered regular 
 and legal requisitions almost impossible ; and the want 
 of navigable rivers, good roads, and suitable transport, 
 rendered problematical the possibility of moving a sufli- 
 cient quantity of stores in an insurrectionary country. 
 
92 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 Besides, no great detachments could have been made to 
 regulate the administration of the provinces, or to pursue 
 the insurgent corps into the fastnesses of the mountains. 
 In fine, by this system, he would have effected a military 
 occupation of Spain without its subjugation. 
 
 On the other hand, by marching rapidly against all or- 
 ganized masses, living from day to day upon the local re- 
 sources of the country, as he had done in Italy, sparing 
 his reserves for the occupation and pacification of the 
 conquered provinces ; this mode promised more prompt 
 and decisive results than the other. Napoleon, therefore, 
 determined to adopt it for his active masses, employing 
 the system of magazines and regular requisitions so far as 
 practicable. In favorable parts of the country, Soult and 
 Souchet, with smaller armies, succeeded in obtaining in 
 this way regular supplies for a considerable length of 
 time, but the others lived mainly by forced requisitions 
 levied as necessity required. This sometimes gave place 
 to great excesses, but these were priAcipally the faults 
 of subordinate officers who tolerated them, rather than 
 of Napoleon, who punished such breaches of discipline, 
 when they were known to him, with great severity. He 
 afterwards declared that, "had he succeeded ho would 
 have indemnified the great mass of the Spanish people for 
 their losses, by the sale of the hoarded wealth of the 
 clergy, which would have rendered the church less pow- 
 erful, and caused a more just division of property ; thus 
 the evil of the war would have been forgotten in the 
 happy triumph of public and private interest over the in- 
 terest of an ambitious and exclusive clergy." 
 
 The following maxims on subsistence have the sanction 
 of the best military writers : 
 
 1st. Regular magazines should be formed, so far as 
 practicable, for the supplies of an army ; the levying of 
 requisitions being resorted to only where the nature of 
 
LOGISTICS. 93 
 
 the war, and the requisite rapidity of marches, render 
 these absolutely necessary to success. 
 
 2d. Depots should be formed in places strengthened by 
 nature or art, defended by small corps, or garrisons, and 
 situated in positions least liable to attack, 
 
 3d. All great depots should be placed on navigable 
 rivers, canals, railways, or practical roads, communicating 
 with the line of operations, so that they may be transported 
 with ease and rapidity, as the army advances on this line. 
 
 4th. An army should never be without a supply for ten 
 or fifteen days, otherwise the best chances of war may 
 be lost, and the army exposed to great inconveniences. 
 TemplehofT says that the great Frederick, in the cam- 
 paign of 1757, altvays carried in the Prussian provision- 
 train bread for six, and flour for nine days, and was there- 
 fore never at a loss for means to subsist his forces, in 
 undertaking any sudden and decisive operation. The 
 Roman soldier usually carried with him provisions for fif- 
 teen days. Napoleon says, " Experience has proved tha 
 an army ought to carry with it a month's provisions, ten 
 days' food being carried by the men and baggage-horses 
 and a supply for twenty days by the train of wagons ; so 
 that at least four hundred and eighty wagons would be 
 required for an army of forty thousand men ; two hundred 
 and forty being regularly organized, and two hundred and 
 forty being obtained by requisition. For this purpose 
 there would be a battalion of three companies for the mili- 
 tary stores of each division, each company having its estab- 
 lishment for forty wagons, twenty being furnished by the 
 commissariat, and twenty obtained by requisition. This 
 gives for each division one hundred and twenty wagons, 
 and for each army, four hundred and eighty. Each bat- 
 talion for a provision-train should have two hundred and 
 ten men." 
 
 5th. An army, while actually in motion, can find tem- 
 
94 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 porary resources, unless in a sterile country, or one al- 
 ready ravaged by war, or at the season of the year when 
 the old crops are nearly exhausted and the new ones not 
 ready for harvest ; but, even supposing the army may in 
 this way be partially or wholly supplied, while in motion, 
 it nevertheless frequently happens that it may remain for 
 some days in position, (as the French at Austerlitz and 
 Ulm;) a supply of hard bread for some ten days will 
 therefore be important to subsist the army till a regular 
 commissariat can be established. 
 
 6th. " Supplies of bread and biscuit," says Napoleon, 
 " are no more essential to modem armies than to the Ro- 
 mans ; flour, rice, and pulse, may be substituted in marches 
 without the troops suffering any harm. It is an error to 
 suppose that the generals of antiquity did not pay great 
 attention to their magazines ; it may be seen in Csesar's 
 Commentaries, how much he was occupied with this care 
 in his several campaigns. The ancients knew how to 
 avoid being slaves to any system of supplies, or to being 
 obliged to depend on the purveyors ; but all the great 
 captains well understood the art of subsistence." 
 
 Forage is a military term applied to food of any kind for 
 horses or cattle, — as grass, hay, corn, oats, &c.; and also 
 to the operation of collecting such food.. Forage is of two 
 kinds, green and dry ; the former being collected directly 
 from the meadows and harvest-fields, and the latter from 
 the bams and granaries of the farmers, or the storehouses 
 of the dealers. 
 
 The animals connected with an army may be subsisted by 
 regular magazines, by forced requisitions, or by authorized 
 foraging."^ As has already been remarked, it is not always 
 politic, or even possible, to provide regular magazines for the 
 entire supplies of an army during the active operations of a 
 
 * This term is sometimes, though improperly, applied to the open- 
 tkm of forcibly collecting food for the troops. 
 
LOGISTICS. 95 
 
 campaign. On account of the great expense and difficulty of 
 transporting forage, the general of an army is more fre- 
 quently imder the necessity of resorting to requisitions, or 
 forced contributions as they are called, and to foraging, 
 for the subsistence of his animals, than to provide food for 
 his men. Nor are requisitions and foragings for this eb- 
 ject so objectionable as in the other case, being far less 
 likely to produce general want and distress among the 
 non-combatant inhabitants. 
 
 The commanding officer of troops should always use his 
 best endeavors to obtain his forage by purchase of the in- 
 habitants, or by requisitions on the local authorities ; and 
 even where these means are impracticable, the foraging 
 parties should be strictly directed to make their levies 
 with uniformity and due moderation. Accurate accounts 
 should be kept of the kinds and quantities of all produce 
 and other property taken, so that it may be regularly dis- 
 tributed and accounted for. Under no circumstances 
 should individuals be permitted to appropriate to them- 
 selves more than their pro rata allowance . Foraging par- 
 ties may sometimes attain their object in a peaceful man- 
 ner, by representing to the inhabitants the nature of their 
 instructions and the necessity of obtaining immediate sup- 
 plies. Even where no recompense is proposed, it may 
 be well to offer certificates to the effect. that such arti- 
 cles have been taken for the use of the army. These 
 certificates, even when of no value in themselves, fre- 
 quently tend to appease excited passions and allay insur- 
 rections. In defensive war, carried on in one's own coun- 
 try, it is often necessary to seize upon private property and 
 appropriate it to the public service : i* all such cases the 
 certificates of the foraging officers become proofs of indi- 
 vidual claims against the government. 
 
 No foraging party should ever be sent out till after the 
 country has been properly reconnoitred. A good military 
 
96 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 escort and vanguard should always accompany and pre- 
 cede the foragers, for protection against the enemy's light 
 cavalry and an insurgent militia. Trustworthy troops must 
 be placed in the villages and hamlets of the country to be 
 foraged, in order to prevent the foragers from engaging in 
 irregular and unauthorized pillage. Officers of the staff 
 and administrative corps are sent with the party to see to 
 the proper execution of the orders, and to report any irreg- 
 ularities on the part of the troops. In case any corps en- 
 gage in unauthorized pillage, due restitution should be 
 made to the inhabitants, and the expense of such re^itu- 
 tion deducted from the pay and allowances of the corps 
 by whom such excess is committed. A few examples of 
 this kind of justice will soon restore discipline to the ar- 
 my, and pacify the inhabitants of the country occupied. 
 
 Experience is the best guide in estimating the amount 
 of hay or grain that may be taken from a given field : the 
 produce of an acre is, of course, very different for different 
 soils and climates. In distributing the burdens to the sev- 
 eral pack-horses and wagons employed in conveying the 
 forage to the army, it is important for the foraging officers 
 to know the relative weight and bulk of each article. 
 
 Ordinary pressed hay in this country will average 
 about 12 lbs. per cubic foot. 
 
 Wheat . * . . weighs 
 Rye .... " 
 Maize or Indian com " 
 Barley. ..." 
 Oats .... " 
 
 60 lbs. per bushel. 
 56 " " 
 
 56 " " 
 
 50 " " 
 
 35 " « 
 
 Meal, flour, and ground feed of all kinds, are purchased 
 by the pound. 
 
 As it would be exceedingly dangerous to send forward 
 the regular train of the army for the conveyance of forage 
 collected by these foraging parties, the country wagons 
 
logAtics. 97 
 
 and pack-horses are usually pressed into service for tliis 
 purpose. 
 
 Troops of horse are sometimes sent into the vicinity of 
 meadows and grain-fields for temporary subsistence : in 
 such cases the horses and cattle may be farmed in the 
 neighborhood, and the grass and grain issued in regular ra- 
 tions, immediately as taken from the field ; but in no case 
 should the animals be turned out to pasture. 
 
 In a country like ours, where large bodies of new and 
 irregular forces are to be suddenly called into the field in 
 case of war, it is important to establish very rigid rules in 
 relation to forage and subsistence ; otherwise the opera- 
 tions of such troops must be attended with great waste of 
 public and private property, the want of means of subsist- 
 ence, the consequent pillage of the inhabitants, and a 
 general relaxation of discipline. Regular troops are far 
 less liable to such excesses than inexperienced and un- 
 disciplined forces. 
 
 Marches. — Marches are of two kinds : 1 st. Route marches, 
 — 2d. Marches within reach of the enemy. The former be- 
 ong to the domain of strategy ; the latter to that of tactics ; 
 both, however, are connected with logistics in every thing 
 that concerns the means of their execution. 
 
 When an army is moving on a line of operations, it 
 should be in as many columns as the facility of subsist- 
 ence, celerity of movement, the nature of the roads, &c., 
 may require. Large columns cannot move with the same 
 rapidity as smaller ones, nor can they be so readily sub- 
 sisted. But when an army is within striking distance of 
 the enemy, concentration becomes more important than 
 celerity, and the forces must be kept in mass, or at least 
 within supporting distances of each other. We find only 
 two instances in the Seven Years' War, in which Frederick 
 attempted attacks by several columns at considerable dis- 
 tances from each other ; and in both these instances (at 
 
 9 
 
98 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 Torgau and at Namiest, against Laudon, during the siege 
 of Olmutz) he was unsuccessful. His usual mode was to 
 bring his columns near together as he approached the 
 enemy, and to form his troops into line at the moment of 
 attack. Such was his order of march at Prague, Kollin, 
 Rosbach, Leuthen, Zornsdorf, and Kunersdorf. The 
 following is one of Frederick's orders respecting marches, 
 (October 2d, 1760.) 
 
 " The army will, as usual, march in three columns by 
 lines. The first column will consist of the first line ; the 
 second, of the second line ; ancf the third, of the reserve. 
 The wagons, and hospital wagons, of regiments, will fol- 
 low their corps. The batteries of heavy calibre will fol- 
 low the infantry brigades to which they are assigned. On 
 passing woods, the regiments of cavalry will march be- 
 tween two infantry corps. 
 
 " Each column will have a vanguard of one light battal- 
 ion and ten squadrons of hussars or dragoons. They will 
 be preceded by three wagons carrying plank-bridges. 
 The rear-guard is charged with taking up these bridges 
 after the army has defiled over them. 
 
 " The parks will be divided among the columns, to 
 avoid the embarrassment resulting from a great many 
 wagons being together in a body. 
 
 " If any thing should happen to the second and third 
 columns* the king will be instantly apprized of it ; he will 
 be found at the head of the first column. Should any 
 thing occur to the rear-guard, the same will be instantly 
 communicated to Lieutenant-general Zeithen, who will be 
 with the rear-guard of the first column.. 
 
 '• The officers will take care that the soldiere march 
 with equal step, and that they do not stray to the right or 
 left, and thus uselessly fatigue themselves and J<.*se their 
 distances. 
 
 * When orders are given to form the line, th M^agons 
 
LOGISTICS. 99 
 
 will file out of the columns to the left, and will march to 
 be parked," &c. 
 
 The position of the baggage, when near the enemy, 
 will depend on the nature of the march. If the march be 
 to the front, it will be in rear of the column ; if the march 
 be by the flank, and the enemy be on the outer flank, the 
 baggage will be on the inner one, most remote from danger ; 
 if the march be in retreat, the baggage will be in advance 
 of the army. In either case it should be strongly guarded. 
 
 It was in direct violation of this rule that General Hull, 
 in the campaign of 1812, on reaching the Miami of the 
 Lake, (Maumee,) embarked his baggage, stores, sick, con- 
 valescent, and " even the instructions of his government 
 and the returns of his army," on board the Cuyahoga 
 packet, and dispatched them for Detroit, while the army, 
 with the same destination, resumed its march by land. 
 The result of thus sending his baggage, stores, official 
 papers, &c., without a guard, and on the Jlank nearest the 
 enemy, was just what might have been anticipated : — in 
 attempting to pass the British post of Maiden the whole 
 detachment was attacked and captured, " by a subaltern 
 and six men, in a small and open boat." 
 
 To prevent a surprise, detachments of light troops should 
 be always thrown out in front, on the flanks, and in rear 
 of the column, denominated from their position, Advanced- 
 Guard, Flankers, and Rear-Guard. These scan the coun- 
 try which is to be passed over by the column, watch the 
 enemy's motions, and give notice of his approach in time 
 to allow the main force to choose a suitable field of battle, 
 and to pass from the order of march to that of combat. 
 The strength and composition of these detachments de- 
 pend upon the nature of the ground, and the character 
 and position of the enemy. In case of an attack they 
 retire slowly, and on joining the main body, take iheir 
 assigned position in the line of battle. 
 
100 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 In an open country the order of march presents but 
 little difficulty ; but in a broken country, and especially in 
 the vicinity of the enemy, a march cannot be conducted 
 with too many precautions. Before engaging in a defile 
 it should be thoroughly examined, and sufficient detach- 
 ments sent out to cover the main body from attack while 
 effecting the passage. A neglect of these precautions has 
 sometimes led to the most terrible disasters. 
 
 In military operations very much depends upon the 
 rapidity of marches. The Roman infantry, in Scipio's 
 campaigns in Africa, frequently marched a distance of 
 twenty miles in five hours, each soldier carrying from fifty 
 tof eighty pounds of baggage. Septimius Severus, Gibbon 
 states, marched from Vienna to Rome, a distance of eight 
 hundred miles, in forty days. Caesar marched from Rome 
 to the Sierra-Morena, in Spain, a distance of four hundred 
 and fifty leagues, in twenty-three days ! 
 
 Napoleon excelled all modem generals in the celerity 
 of his movements. Others have made for a single day 
 as extraordinary marches as the French, but for general 
 activity during a campaign they have no rivals in modem 
 history. A few examples of the rapidity of their move- 
 ments may not be without interest. 
 
 In 1797 a part of Napoleon's army left Verona after 
 having fought the battle of St. Michaels, on the 13th of 
 January, then marched all night upon Rivoli, fought in 
 the mountains on the 14th, returned to Mantua on the 
 15th, and defeated the army of Provera on the morning of 
 the 16th, — thus, in less than four days, having marched 
 near fifty leagues, fought three battles, and captured more 
 than twenty thousand prisoners ! Well might he write to 
 the Directory that his soldiers had surpassed the much 
 vaunted rapidity of Caesar's legions. 
 
 In the campaign of 1800, Macdonald, wishing to pre- 
 vent the escape of Loudon, in a single day marched forty 
 
LOGISTICS. 101 
 
 miles, crossing rivers, and climbing mountains and gla- 
 ciers. 
 
 In 1805 the grand French army broke up their camp at 
 Boulogne, in the early part of September, and in two 
 weeks reached their allotted posts on the Rhine, averag- 
 ing daily from twenty-five to thirty miles. 
 
 During the same campaign the French infantry, pursu- 
 ing the Archduke Ferdinand in his retreat from Ulm, 
 marched thirty miles a day in dreadful weather, and over 
 roads almost impassable for artillery. 
 
 Again, in the campaign of 1806, the French infantry 
 pursued the Prussians at the rate of from twenty-five to 
 thirty miles per day. 
 
 In 1808 the advanced posts of Napoleon's army pursued 
 Sir John Moore's army at the rate of twenty-five miles a 
 day, in the midst of winter. Napoleon transported an 
 army of fifty thousand men from Madrid to Astorga with 
 nearly the same rapidity, marching through deep snows, 
 across high mountains, and rivers swollen by the winter 
 rains. The activity, perseverance, and endurance of his 
 troops, during these ten days' march, are scarcely equalled 
 in history. 
 
 In 1812, the activity of the French forces under Clau- 
 sel was truly extraordinary. After almost unheard-of 
 efforts at the battle of Salamanca, he retreated forty miles 
 in a little more than twelve hours ! 
 
 In 1814, Napoleon's army marched at the rate of ten 
 leagues a day, besides fighting a battle every twenty-four 
 hours. Wishing to form a junction with other troops, for 
 the succor of Paris, he marched his army the distance of 
 seventy-five miles in thirty-six hours ; the cavalry march- 
 ing night and day, and the infantry travelling en poste. 
 
 On his return from Elba, in 1815, his guards marched 
 fifty miles the first day after landing ; reached Grenoblo 
 through a rough and mountainous country, a distance of 
 
102 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 two hundred miles, in six days, and reached Paris, a dis- 
 tance of six hundred miles, in less than twenty days ! 
 
 The marches of the allied powers, during the wars of 
 the French Revolution, were much less rapid than those 
 of the armies of Napoleon. Nevertheless, for a single 
 day the English and Spaniards have made some of the 
 most extraordinary marches on record. 
 
 In 1 809, on the day of the battle of Talavera, General 
 Crawford, fearing that Wellington was hard pressed, made 
 a forced march with three thousand men the distance of 
 sixty-two miles in twenty-six hours ! 
 
 The Spanish regiment of Romana, in their march from 
 Jutland to Spain, marched the extraordinary distance of 
 fifty miles in twenty-one hours. 
 
 Cavalry, for a single day, will march a greater distance 
 than infantry ; but for a campaign of several months the 
 infantry will march over the most ground. In the Russian 
 campaign of Napoleon, his cavalry failed to keep pace 
 with the iftfantry in his forced march on Moskwa. But 
 in the short campaigns of 1805 and 1806, the cavalry of 
 Murat displayed the most wonderful activity, and effected 
 more extraordinary results than any mounted troops of 
 modem ages. 
 
 The English cavalry, however, have made one or two 
 short marches with a rapidity truly extraordinary. 
 
 In 1803 Wellington's cavalry in India marched the dis- 
 tance of sixty miles in thirty-two hours. 
 
 But the march of the English cavalry under Lord Lake, 
 before the battle of Furruckabad, is, if we can trust the 
 English accounts, still more extraordinary than any thing 
 recor.ded of the Romans or the French — it is said that he 
 marched seventy miles in twenty-four hours ! ! ! 
 
 As a general rule, troops marching for many days in 
 succession will move at the rate of from fifteen to twenty 
 miles per day. In forced marches, or in pursuit of a fly* 
 
LOGISTICS. 103 
 
 ing enemy, they will average from twenty to twenty-five 
 miles per day. And for only two or three days in succes- 
 sion, with favorable roads, thirty miles per day may be 
 calculated on. Marches beyond this are unusual, and, 
 when they do occur, are the result of extraordinary cir- 
 cumstances. 
 
 Convoy. — A convoy consists of provisions, military mu- 
 nitions, &c., sent from one point to another, under the 
 charge of a detachment of troops, called an escort. When 
 regular depots and magazines are established, with proper 
 relations to the line of operations, convoys requiring par- 
 ticular escorts are seldom necessary, because the position 
 of the army will cover the space over which the magazines 
 are to be moved. But in the immediate vicinity of the en- 
 emy, or in a country whose inhabitants are hostile or in- 
 surrectionary, precautions of this kind should always be 
 resorted to. 
 
 The size and composition of the escort must depend 
 upon the nature of the country and the imminence of the 
 ^ danger. The ground to be passed over should be previ- 
 ously reconnoitred, and the line of march be taken up only 
 after the most satisfactory reports When once put in mo- 
 tion, the convoy should be thoroughly henuned in by flank- 
 ers, to give warning to the escort of the approach of the 
 enemy. Small parties of cavalry are detached on all sides, 
 but particularly in advance. The main body of the escort 
 is concentrated on the most exposed point of the convoy, 
 while the other sides are guarded by subdivisions. In 
 case of an attack by a large party, the baggage wagons 
 may be formed into a kind of defensive field-work, which, 
 with one or two pieces of light artillery, can in this way 
 resist a pretty strong effort to destroy or carry away the 
 convoy. 
 
 As a general rule, it is better to supply the wants of an 
 army by small successive convoys than by periodical and 
 
104 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 large ones. Even should some of the former be captured, 
 their loss would not be materially felt ; but a large period- 
 ical convoy offers so great a temptation to the enterprise 
 of the enemy, and is so difficult to escort, that he will ven- 
 ture much to destroy it, and its loss may frustrate our plans 
 of a siege or of an important military operation. If the 
 Prussian army, when besieging Olmutz, had observed this 
 rule, the capture of a convoy would not have forced them 
 to raise the siege and to retreat. 
 
 Napoleon estimates that an army of 100,000 men in po- 
 sition will require the daily arrival of from four to five hun- 
 dred wagon loads of provisions. 
 
 The difficulty of moving provisions, baggage, &c., in a 
 retreat, is always very great, and the very best generals 
 have frequently failed on this point. Indeed, the best con- 
 certed measures will sometimes fail, amid the confusion 
 and disorder consequent upon a retreat with an able and 
 active enemy in pursuit. In such a case, the loss of the 
 provision-larains in a sterile or unfriendly country may lead 
 to the most terrible disasters. We will allude to two ex- 
 amples of this kind : the retreat of the English from Spain 
 in 1809, and that of the French from Russia in 1812. 
 
 When Sir John Moore saw that a retreat had become 
 necessary to save his army from entire destruction, he di- 
 rected all the baggage and stores to be taken to the rear, 
 and every possible arrangement to be made for their pres- 
 ervation and for the regular supplies of the army. But the 
 want of discipline in his troops, and more especially the 
 want of a proper engineer organization to prepare the re- 
 quisite means for facilitating his own marches, and impe- 
 ding the enemy's pursuit, prevented his plans from being 
 fully carried into execution. Much suffering and great 
 losses were consequently inflicted upon his troops ; a large 
 portion of his baggage and military stores was captured, 
 and even the treasure of his army, amounting to some 
 
LOGISTICS. 105 
 
 200,000 dollars, was abandoned through the ignorance and 
 carelessness of the escorting officer. 
 
 In Napoleon's march into Russia, his plans had been so 
 admirably combined, that from Mentzto Moscow not a sin- 
 gle estafette or convoy, it is said, was carried off in this 
 campaign ; nor was there a day passed without his re- 
 ceiving intelligence from France. When the retreat was 
 begun, (after the burning of Moscow,) he had six lines 
 of magazines in his rear ; the 1st, at Smolensk, ten days' 
 march from Moscow ; those of the 2d line at Minsk and 
 Wilna, eight marches from Smolensk ; those of the 3d line at 
 Kowno, Grodno, and Bialystok ; those of the 4th line at 
 Elbing, Marienwerder, Thorn, Plock, Modlin, and War- 
 saw ; those of the 5th line at Dantzic, Bamberg, and Po- 
 sen ; those of the 6th line at Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau. 
 When the army left Moscow it carried with it provisions 
 sufficient for twenty days, and an abundance of ammuni- 
 tion, each piece of artillery being supplied with three 
 hundred and fifty rounds ; but the premature cold weather 
 destroyed thirty thousand horses in less than three days, 
 thus leaving the trains without the means of transportation 
 or suitable escorts for their protection : the horrible suf- 
 ferings of the returning army now surpassed all descrip- 
 tion. 
 
 The officer selected to escort convoys should be a man 
 of great prudence, activity, and energy, for frequently very 
 much depends upon the safe and timely arrival of the pro- 
 visions and military stores which he may have in charge. 
 
 Castrametation. — Castrametation is, strictly speaking, 
 the art of laying out and disposing to advantage the sev- 
 eral parts of the camp of an army. The term is some- 
 times more extensively used to include all the means for 
 lodging and^ sheltering the soldiers during a campaign, and 
 all the arrangements for cooking, &;c., either in the field 
 or in winter quarters. A camp, whether composed of tents 
 
106 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 or barracks, or merely places assigned for bivouacking, 
 must be divided and arranged in such a way that the sev- 
 eral divisions shall be disposed as they are intended to be 
 drawn up in order of battle ; so that, on any sudden alarm, 
 the troops can pass from it promptly, and form their line 
 of battle without confusion. Suitable places must also be 
 assigned for cooking, for baggage, and for provisions, mil- 
 itary stores, and ammunitions. 
 
 The extent of the color front of a camp depends much 
 on the charaicter of the ground and the means of defence, 
 but as a general rule, it should never exceed the position 
 which the army would occupy in the line of battle. The 
 different arms should be encamped in the same order as 
 that of battle ; this order of course depending on the na- 
 ture of the battle-ground. A corps d'armce is composed 
 of battalions of infantry, squadrons of cavalry, batteries of 
 artillery, and companies of engineer troops, and the art of 
 encampments consists in arranging each of these ele- 
 ments so as to satisfy the prescribed conditions. 
 
 The choice of ground for a camp must be governed, 
 Istjxby the general rules respecting military positions, 
 and, 2d, by other rules peculiar to themselves, for they 
 may be variously arranged in a manner more or less suit- 
 able on the same position. 
 
 That the ground be suitable for defence, is the first and 
 highest consideration. 
 
 It should also be commodious and dry : moist ground in 
 the vicinity of swamps and stagnant waters, would endan- 
 ger the health of the army : for the same reason it should 
 not be subject to overflow or to become marshy by heavy 
 rains, and the melting of snow. 
 
 The proximity of good roads, canals, or navigable 
 streams, is important for furnishing the soldiers with all 
 the necessaries of life. 
 
 The proximity of woods is also desirable for furnishing 
 
LOGISTICS. 
 
 107 
 
 firewood, materials for huts, for repairs of military equip- 
 ments, for works of defence, &c. 
 
 Good water within a convenient distance, is also an es- 
 sential element in the choice of ground for a camp ; with- 
 out this the soldiers' health is soon undermined. The 
 proximity of rimning streams is also important for the pur- 
 poses of washing and bathing, and for carrying off the 
 filth of the camp. 
 
 The camp should not be so placed as to be enfiladed or 
 commanded by any point within long cannon range ; if 
 bordering on a river or smaller stream, there should be 
 space enough between them to form in order of battle ; 
 the communications in rear should offer the means of re- 
 treating in case of necessity, but should not afford facilities 
 to the enemy to make his attack on that side. 
 
 If the camp is to be occupied for a considerable length 
 of time, as for cantonments or winter-quarters , the greater 
 must be the care in selecting its position and in the ar- 
 rangement for the health and comfort of the soldiers. In 
 the latter case, (of winter-quarters,) the engineer's art 
 should always be called in play to form intrenchments, 
 lines of abattis, inundations, &;c., to render the position 
 as difficult of access to the enemy as possible. 
 
 A bivouac is the most simple kind of camp. It consists 
 merely of lines of fires, and huts for the officers and sol- 
 diers. These huts may be made of straw, of wood ob- 
 tained from the forest, or by dismantling houses and other 
 buildings in the vicinity of the camp, and stripping them 
 of their timbers, doors, floors, &c. Troops may be kept 
 in bivouac for a few days, when in the vicinity of the en- 
 emy, but the exposure of the soldier in ordinary bivouacs, 
 especially in the rainy seasons or in a rigorous climate, 
 is exceedingly destructive of human life, and moreover 
 .eads to much distress to the inhabitants of the country 
 occupied, in the destruction of their dwellings and the 
 
108 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 most common necessaries of life. If the position is to 
 be occupied for any length of time, the huts should be ar- 
 ranged like tents, according to a regular system, and made 
 comfortable for the troops. Such should always be the 
 system adopted in camps of practice or manoeuvre, in can- 
 tonments, winter-quarters, or in intrenched positions. 
 
 We have adopted in our service the system of encamp- 
 ing in tents. These may do very well under the ordinary 
 circumstances ; but in the active operations of a campaign 
 they are exceedingly objectionable, as greatly encumber- 
 ing the baggage-trains. It would seem preferable to re- 
 sort to bivouacs for the temporaiy camp of a single night, 
 and to construct a regular system of huts where a position 
 is to be occupied for any length of time. This may be 
 regarded as a general rule, but in certain countries and 
 climates, the tent becomes almost indispensable. 
 
 Napoleon's views on this subject are certainly interest- 
 ing, if not decisive of the question : " Tents," says he, 
 " are not wholesome. It is better for the soldier to bi- 
 vouac, because he can sleep with his feet towards the 
 fire ; he may shelter himself from the wind with a few 
 boards or a little straw. The ground upon which he lies 
 will be rapidly dried in the vicinity of the fire. Tents 
 are necessary for the superior officers, who have occasion 
 to read and consult maps, and who ought to be ordered 
 never to sleep in a house — a fatal abuse, which has given 
 rise to so many disasters. All the European nations have 
 so far followed the example of the French as to discard 
 their tents ; and if they be still used in camps of mere pa- 
 rade, it is because they are economical, sparing woods, 
 thatched roofs, and villages. The shade of a tree, against 
 the heat of the sun, and any sorry shelter whatever, against 
 the rain, are preferable to tents. The carriage of the 
 tents for each battalion would load five horses, who would 
 be much better employed in carrying provisions. Tents 
 
LOGISTICS. 109 
 
 are a subject of observation for the enemies' spies and 
 officers of the staff: they give them an insight into your 
 numbers, and the position that you occupy ; and this in- 
 convenience occurs every day, and every instant in the 
 day. An army ranged in two or three lines of bivouac is 
 only to be perceived at a distance by the smoke, which 
 the enemy may mistake for the vapor of the atmosphere. 
 It is impossible to count the number of fires ; it is easy, 
 however, to count the number of tents, and to trace out 
 the position that they occupy." 
 
 The guarding of camps^ is a very important matter, and 
 requires much attention. 
 
 The camp-guard consists of one or two rows of senti- 
 nels placed around the camp, and relieved at regular in- 
 tervals. The number of rows of sentinels, and the dis- 
 tance between each man, will depend upon the character 
 of the ground and the degree of danger apprehended. 
 
 Detachments of infantry and cavalry, denominated pic- 
 quets, are also thrown out in front and on the flanks, which, 
 in connection with the camp-guards, serve to keep good 
 order and discipline in and around the camp, to prevent 
 desertions, intercept reconnoitering parties, and to give 
 timely notice of the enemy's approach. 
 
 Still larger detachments, denominated ^ra;i<Z-^warJ5, are 
 posted in the surrounding villages, farm-houses, or small 
 field-works, which they occupy as outposts, and from which 
 they can watch the movements of the enemy, and prevent 
 any attempts to surprise the camp. They detach patrols, 
 videttes, and sentries, to furnish timely notice of danger. 
 They should never be so far from the camp as to be be- 
 yond succor in case of sudden attack. Outposts, when 
 too far advanced, are sometimes destroyed without being 
 able to give notice of the enemy's approach. 
 
 In encamping troops in winter-quarters, it is sometimes 
 necessary to scatter them over a considerable extent of 
 
110 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 ground, in order to facilitate their subsistence. In such 
 a case, the arrangement of guards requires the utmost 
 care. A chain of advanced posts should be placed several 
 miles' distance from the line of camp ; these posts should 
 be supported by other and larger detachments in their 
 rear, and concentrated on fewer points ; and the whole 
 country around should be continually reconnoitered by 
 patrols of cavalry. 
 
 The manner in which Napoleon quartered and wintered 
 his army on the Passarge, in 1806-7, furnishes a useful 
 lesson to military men, both in the matters of encampment 
 and subsistence. An immense army of men were here - 
 quartered and subsisted, in a most rigorous climate, with 
 a not over fertile soil, in the midst of hostile nations, and 
 in the very face of a most powerful enemy. 
 
 A Roman army invariably encamped in the same order, 
 its troops being always drawn up in the same battle array. 
 A Roman staff-officer who marked out an encampment, 
 performed nothing more than a mechanical operation ; he 
 had no occasion for much genius or experience. The 
 form of the camps was a square. In later times, they 
 sometimes, in imitation of the Greeks, made them circular, 
 or adapted them to the ground. The camp was always 
 surrounded with a ditch and rampart, and divided into two 
 parts by a broad street, and into subdivisions by cross- 
 streets and alleys. Each tent was calculated to hold ten 
 privates and a petty officer. 
 
 In the middle ages, the form of the camp did not differ 
 very essentially from that of the Romans, the variation 
 consisting principally in the interior arrangements, these 
 arrangements being made to correspond to the existing 
 mode of forming a line of battle. The details of this sys- 
 tem may be found in the military work of Machiavelli. 
 
 The art of fixing a camp in modem times is the same 
 as taking up a line of battle on the same position. Of 
 
LOGISTICS. Ill 
 
 course all the projectile machines must be in play and 
 favorably placed. The position must neither be com- 
 manded, out-fronted, nor surrounded ; but on the contrary 
 ought, as far as possible, to command and out-front the 
 enemy's position. But even in the same position there 
 are numerous modes of arranging an encampment, or of 
 forming a line of battle, and to select the best of these 
 modes requires great experience, coup d'ml, and genius. 
 In relation to this point Napoleon makes the following 
 remarks : — 
 
 *• Ought an army to be confined to one single encamp- 
 ment, or ought it to form as many as it has corps or di- 
 visions ? At what distance ought the vanguard and the 
 flankers to be encamped ? What frontage and what depth 
 ought to be given to the camp ? Where should the caval- 
 ry, the artillery, and the carriages be distributed ? Should 
 the army be ranged in battle array, in several lines ? and 
 if it should, what space should there be between those 
 lines ? Should the cavalry be in reserve behind the in- 
 fantry, or should it be placed upon the wings ? As every 
 piece has sufficient ammunition for keeping up its fire 
 twenty-four hours, should all the artillery be brought into 
 action at the beginning of the engagement, or should half 
 of it be kept in reserve ? 
 
 " The solution of these questions depends on the follow- 
 ing circumstances : — 1st. On the number of troops, and 
 the numbers of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, of which 
 the army is composed. 2d. On the relation subsisting 
 between the two armies. 3d. On the quality of the troops. 
 4th. On the end in view. 5th. On the nature of the field. 
 And 6th. On the position occupied by the enemy, and on 
 the character of the general who commands them. Noth- 
 ing absolute either can or ought to be prescribed on this 
 head. In modem warfare there is no natural order of 
 batUe. 
 
112 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 " The duty to be performed by the commander of an 
 army is more difficult in modem armies, than it was in 
 those of the ancients. It is also certain that his influence 
 is more efficacious in deciding battles. In the ancient 
 armies the general-in-chief, at a distance of eighty or a 
 hundred toises from the enemy, was in no danger ; and 
 yet he was conveniently placed, so as to have an oppor- 
 tunity of directing to advantage all the movements of his 
 forces. In modern armies, a general-in-chief, though re- 
 moved four or five hundred toises, finds himself in the 
 midst of the fire of the enemy's batteries, and is very 
 much exposed; and still he is so distant that several 
 movements of the enemy escape him. In every engage- 
 ment he is occasionally obliged to approach within reach 
 of small-arms. The effect of modern arms is much in- 
 fluenced by the situation in which they are placed. A 
 battery of guns, with a great range and a commanding 
 position that takes the enemy obliquely, may be decisive 
 of a victory. Modern fields of battle are much more ex- 
 tended than those of the ancients, whence it becomes 
 necessary to study operations on a large scale. A much 
 greater degree of experience and military genius is re- 
 quisite for the direction of a modem army than was ne- 
 cessary for an ancient one." 
 
 Figure 9 represents a camp (on favorable ground) of a 
 grand-division of an army, composed of two brigades or 
 twelve battalions of infantry, twelve squadrons of cavalry, 
 five batteries of artillery, and three companies of engi- 
 neers. 
 
 Figure 10 represents the details of a camp of a bat- 
 talion of infantry composed of eight companies. 
 
 Figure 11 is the camp of a squadron of cavalry. 
 
 Figure 12 is the camp of two batteries of foot artillery, 
 or two companies of foot engineers. 
 
 Figure 13 is the camp of two batteries of mounted ar- 
 
LOGISTICS. 113 
 
 tillery, or two companies of mounted sappers and pon- 
 toniers. 
 
 On undulating or broken ground the arrangement and 
 order of the general camp, as well as the details of the 
 encampment of each arm, would admit of much variation.* 
 
 * There are many valuable remarks on the various subjects com- 
 prised under the head of logistics, in the works of Jomini, Grimoard, 
 Thiebault, Boutourlin, Guibert, Laroche Amyon, Bousmard, Ternay, 
 Vauchelle, Odier, Audouin, Bardin, Chemevrieres, Daznan, Ballyet, 
 Dremaux, Dupre d'Aulnay, Morin, and in the published regulations 
 and orders of the English army. 
 
114 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 TACTICS. 
 
 IV. Tactics. — We have defined tactics to be the art* 
 of bringing troops into action, or of moving them in the 
 presence of the enemy ; — that is, within his view, and 
 within the reach of his artillery. This branch of the 
 military art has usually been divided into two parts : 1st. 
 Grand Tactics, or the tactics of battles ; and 2d. Elemen- 
 tary Tactics, or tactics of instruction.* 
 
 A battle is a general action between armies. If only a 
 small portion of the forces are engaged it is usually de- 
 nominated a combat J an affair, an action, a skirmish, &c., 
 according to the character of the conflict. The art of 
 combining and conducting battles of all descriptions has 
 been designated by tl;^e name of Grand Tactics. 
 
 Battles may be arranged into three classes; 1st. De- 
 
 * " It does not come within the view of this work to say any thing of 
 the merely mechanical part of the art ; because it must be taken for 
 granted, that every man who accepts the command of an army 
 knows at least the alphabet of his trade. If he does not, (unless his 
 enemy be as ignorant as himself,) defeat and infamy await him. 
 Without understanding perfectly what are called the evolutions, how 
 is it possible that a general can give to his own army that order of 
 battle which shall be most provident and skilful in each particular 
 case in which he may be placed ? How know which of these evolu- 
 tions the enemy employs against him ? and, of course, how decide on 
 a counter-movement which may be necessary to secure victory or 
 avoid defeat? The man who shall take the command of an army 
 without perfectly understanding this elementary branch, is no less 
 presumptuous than he who should pretend to leach. Greek without 
 knowing even his letters. If we have such generals, let them, for 
 their own sakes, if not for their country's, put themselves immediately 
 to school." 
 
TACTICS. 115 
 
 fensive battles, or those given in a chosen position by an 
 army waiting the attack of the enemy. 2d. Offensive 
 battles, or those made by an army which attacks the en- 
 emy in position. 3d. The mixed or unforeseen battles, 
 given by two armies meeting while on the march. 
 
 I. When an army awaits the attack, it takes its posi- 
 tion and forms its line of battle according to the nature of 
 the ground and the supposed character and strength of 
 the enemy's forces. Such is usually the case when an 
 army wishes to cover a siege, protect a capital, guard 
 deputs of provisions and military stores, or some import- 
 ant strategic point. The general relations of positions 
 with strategy and engineering have already been consid- 
 ered ; we will now discuss merely their relations to bat- 
 tles. 
 
 The first condition to be satisfied by a tactical position 
 is, that its debouches shall be more favorable for fallirtg 
 on the enemy when he has approached to the desired 
 point, than those which the enemy can have for attacking 
 our line of battle. 2d. The artillery should have its full 
 effect upon all the avenues of approach. 3d. We should 
 have good ground for manoeuvring our own troops un- 
 seen, if possible, by the enemy. 4th. We should have a 
 full view of the enemy's manoeuvres as he advances to 
 the attack. 5th. We should have the flanks of our line 
 well protected by natural or artificial obstacles. 6th. We 
 should have some means of effecting a retreat without 
 exposing our army to destruction. 
 
 It is very seldom that all these conditions can be satis- 
 fied at the same time ; and sometimes the very means of 
 satisfying one, may be in direct violation of another, A 
 river, a forest, or a mountain, which secures a flank of a 
 line of battle, may become an obstacle to a retreat, should 
 the defensive forces be thrown back upon that wing. 
 Again, the position may be difficult of attack in front or 
 
116 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 on the wings, and at the same time unfavorable for re- 
 treat. Such was Wellington's position at Waterloo. The 
 park of Hougomont, the hamlet of Haye Sainte, and the 
 marshy rivulet of Papelotte, were serious obstacles against 
 the attacking force ; but the marshy forest of Soignies in 
 rear, with but a single road, cut off all hope of retreat. 
 
 II. According to the strategic relations of the contend- 
 ing forces in a campaign, will it be determined whether 
 we are to await the enemy, or to seek him out and attack 
 him wherever he may be found. We may sometimes be 
 obliged to make the attack at all hazards, for the purpose 
 of preventing the junction of two corps, or to cut off 
 forces that may be separated from the main body by a 
 river, <fec. As a general rule the attacking force has a 
 moral superiority over the defensive, but this advantage 
 is frequently more than counterbalanced by other condi- 
 tions. 
 
 The main thing in an offensive battle is to seize upon 
 the decisive point of the field. This point is determined 
 by the configuration of the ground, the position of the 
 contending forces, the strategic object of the battle ; or, 
 by a combination of these. For example, when one wing 
 of the enemy rests on a height that commands the re- 
 mainder of his line, this would seem the decisive point to 
 be attacked, for its occupation would secure the greatest 
 advantages ; but this point may be so very difficult of ac- 
 cess, or be so related to the strategic object as to render 
 its attack out of the question. Thus it was at the battle 
 of Bautzen : the left of the allies rested on the mountains 
 of Bohemia, which were difficult of attack, but favorable 
 for defence ; moreover, their only line of retreat was on 
 the right, which thus became the point of attack for the 
 French, although the topographical and tactical key of the 
 field was on the left. 
 
 III. It frequently happens in modern warfare that bat- 
 
TACTICS. 117 
 
 ties result from the meeting of armies in motion, both 
 parties acting on the offensive. Indeed, an army that is 
 occupying a defensive position may, on the approach of 
 the enemy, advance to meet him while on the march. 
 Battles of this kind may partake of the mixed character 
 of offensive and defensive actions, or they may be of the 
 nature of a surprise to both armies. To this class belong 
 the battles of Rosbach, Eylau, Lutzen, Luzzara, Abens- 
 berg, &c. 
 
 Surprises were much more common in ancient than in 
 modern times, for the noise of musketry and the roar of 
 artillery, belonging to the posts or wings assailed, will 
 prevent any general surprise of an army. Moreover, the 
 division into separate masses, or corps d'armee^ will ne- 
 cessarily confine the surprise to a part, at most, of the 
 forces employed. Nevertheless, in the change given to 
 military terms, a surprise may now mean only an unex- 
 pected combination of manoeuvres for an attack, rather 
 than an actual falling upon troops unguarded or asleep. 
 In this sense Marengo, Lutzen, Eylau, &c. are numbered 
 with surprises. Benningsen's attack on Murat at Zaran- 
 tin in 1812 was a true surprise, resulting from the gross 
 negligence and carelessness of the king of Naples. 
 
 An order of battle is the particular disposition given to 
 the troops for a determined manoeuvre on the field of bat- 
 tle. A line of battle is the general name applied to troops 
 drawn up in their usual order of exercise, without any 
 determined manoeuvre ; it may apply to defensive posi- 
 tions, or to offensive operations, where no definitive object 
 has been decided on. Military writers lay down twelve 
 orders of battle, viz.: 1st. The simple parallel order; 
 2d. The parallel order with a crotchet ; 3d. The parallel 
 order reinforced on one or both wings ; 4th. The parallel 
 order reinforced on the centre ; 5th. The simple oblique 
 order ; 6th. The oblique order reinforced on the assailing 
 
118 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 wing ; 7th. The perpendicular order on one or both wings ; 
 8th. The concave order ; 9th. The convex order ; 10th. 
 The order by echelon on one or both wings ; 11th. The 
 order by echelon on the centre ; 12th. The combined or- 
 ders of attack on the centre and one wing at the same 
 time. 
 
 (Figure 14.)* The simple parallel order is the worst pos- 
 sible disposition for a battle, for the two parties here fight 
 with equal chances, and the combat must continue till ac- 
 cident, superior numbers, or mere physical strength de- 
 cides the day; skill can have little or no influence in 
 such a contest. 
 
 (Figure 15.) The parallel order with a crotchet on 
 the flank, is sometimes used in a defensive position, and 
 also in the oflfensive with the crotchet thrown forward. 
 Malplaquet, Nordlingen, Prague, and Kolin, are examples 
 of this order. Wellington, at Waterloo, formed the paral- 
 lel order with the retired crotchet on the right flank. 
 
 (Figure 16.) A line of battle parallel to the enemy's, 
 if strongly reinforced on one point, is according to cor- 
 rect principles, and may in certain cases secure the vic- 
 tory ; but it has many inconveniences. The weak part 
 of the line being too near the enemy, may, notwithstand- 
 ing its efforts to the contrary, become engaged, and run 
 the risk of a defeat, and thereby counterbalance the ad- 
 vantages gained by the strong point. Moreover, the rein- 
 forced part of the line will not be able to profit by its 
 success by taking the enemy's line in flank and rear, 
 without endangering its connection with the rest of the 
 line. 
 
 * In the plans, B is the army in position, and A the attacking force 
 Brranged according to the different orders of battle. To simplify the 
 drawings, a single line represents the position of an army, whereas, m 
 practice, troops are usually drawn up in three Imes. Each figure re- 
 Diesents a gr£ind division of twelve battalions. 
 
TACTICS. , 119 
 
 (Figure 17) represents the parallel order reinforced on 
 the centre. The same remarks are applicable to this as to 
 the preceding. 
 
 These two orders were frequently used by the ancients ; 
 as at the battle of Zama, for example ; and sometimes by 
 modern generals. Turenne employed one of them at Ens- 
 heim. 
 
 (Figure 18) is the simple oblique order. 
 
 (Figure 19) is the oblique order, with the attacking wing 
 reinforced. This last is better suited for an inferior army 
 in attacking a superior, for it enables it to carry the mass 
 of its force on a single point of the enemy's line, while the 
 weak wing is not only out of reach of immediate attack, 
 but also holds the remainder of the enemy's line in check 
 by acting as a reserve ready to be concentrated on the fa- 
 vorable point as occasion may require. 
 
 The most distinguished examples under this order are 
 the battles of Leuctra and Mantinea, under the celebrated 
 Epaminondas ; Leuthen, under Frederick ; the Pyramids, 
 Marengo, and Jena, under Napoleon. 
 
 (Figure 20.) An army may be perpendicular upon a flank 
 at the beginning of a battle, as was the army of Frederick 
 at Rosbach, and the Russian army at KunersdorfT; but 
 this order must soon change to the oblique. An attack 
 upon both wings can only be made when the attacking 
 force is vastly superior. At Eylau, Napoleon made a per- 
 pendicular attack on one wing at the same time that he 
 sought to pierce the enemy's centre. 
 
 (Figure 21.) The concave order may be used with ad 
 vantage in certain cases, and in particular localities. Han- 
 nibal employed it at the battle of Cannse, the English at 
 Crecy and Agincourt, and the, Austrian! at Essling, in 
 1809. 
 
 (Figure 22.) The convex order is sometimes fonned to 
 cover a defile, to attack a concave line, or to oppose an 
 
120 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 attack before or after the passage of a river. The Ro- 
 mans formed this order at the battle of Cosilinum ; the 
 French at Ramilies in 1706, at Fleurus in 1794, at Ess- 
 ling in 1809, and at the second and third days of Leipsic 
 in 1813, and at Brienne in 1814. 
 
 (Figure 23.) The order by echelon on one wing maybe 
 frequently employed with advantage ; but if the echelon be 
 made on both wings, there is the same objection to its use as 
 to the perpendicular order on both wings . At Dresden, Na- 
 poleon attacked both wings at the same time ; this is the 
 only instance in his whole history of a similar attack, and 
 this was owing to peculiar circumstances in the ground 
 and in the position of his troops. 
 
 (Figure 24.) The echelon order on the centre alone may 
 be employed with success against an army formed in a 
 thin or too extended line of battle, for it would be pretty 
 certain to penetrate and break the line. 
 
 The echelon order possesses in general very great ad- 
 vantages. The several corps composing the army may 
 manoeuvre separately, and consequently with greater ease. 
 Each echelon covers the flank of that which precedes it ; 
 and all may be combined towards a single object, and ex- 
 tended with the necessary ensemble. At the battle of the 
 Pyramids, Napoleon formed the oblique order in echelon 
 by squares. Portions of his forces were arranged in eche- 
 lon in some of his other battles. 
 
 (Figure 25.) The combined order in columns on the 
 centre and one extremity at the same time, is better suited 
 than either of the preceding for attacking a strong contig- 
 uous line. Napoleon employed this order at Wagram, 
 Ligny, Bautzen, Borodino, and Waterloo. 
 
 It is impossible to lay down, as a general rule, which 
 of these orders of battle should be employed, or that either 
 should be exclusively followed throughout the whole bat- 
 tle. The question must be decided by the general him 
 
TACTICS. 121 
 
 self on the ground, where all the circumstances may be 
 duly weighed. An order well suited to one position might 
 be the worst possible in another. Tactics is in this re- 
 spect the very reverse of strategy — the latter being subject 
 to more rigid and invariable rules. 
 
 But whatever the plan adopted by the attacking force, 
 it should seek to dislodge the enemy, either by piercing 
 or turning his line. If it can conceal its real intentions, 
 and deceive him respecting the true point of attack, suc- 
 cess will be more certain and decisive. A turning ma- 
 noeuvre may frequently be employed w4th advantage at the 
 same time with the main attack on the line. The opera- 
 tions of Davoust at Wagram, and Richepanse at Hohen- 
 linden, are good examples under this head. The ma- 
 noeuvre is, however, a difficult one, and unless executed 
 with skill, may lead to disasters like the turning manoeuvres 
 of the Austrians at Rivoli and Austerlitz, and of the French 
 under Jourdan at Stackach, and under Marmont at Sala- 
 manca. 
 
 We will now discuss the particular manner of arranging 
 he troops on the line of battle, or the manner of employ- 
 ing each arm, without entering, however, much into the 
 detailed tactics of formation and instruction. 
 
 We shall begin with infantry, as the most important arm 
 on the battle-field. 
 
 There are four different ways of forming infantry for 
 battle : 1st, as tirailleurs, or light troops ; 2d, in deployed 
 lines ; 3d, in lines of battalions, ployed on the central di- 
 vision of each battalion, or formed in squares ; 4th, in deep 
 masses. 
 
 These different modes of formation are reduced to four 
 separate systems : 1st, the thin formation of two deployed 
 lines ; 2d, a line of battalions in columns of attack on the 
 centre, or in squares by battalions ; 3d, a combination of 
 these two, or the first line deployed, and the second in 
 11 
 
122 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 columns of attack ; and 4th, the deep formation of heavy 
 columns of several battalions. The tirailleurs are merely 
 accessories to the main forces, and are employed to fill 
 up intervals, to protect the march of the columns, to an- 
 noy the enemy, and to manoeuvre on the flanks. 
 
 1st. Formerly the line of battle for infantry was very gen- 
 erally that of two deployed lines of troops, as shown in Fig. 
 26. But reason and experience have demonstrated that 
 infantry in this thin or light order can only move very 
 slowly ; that in attempting rapid movements it breaks and 
 exhibits great and dangerous undulations, and would be 
 easily pierced through by troops of a deeper order. Hence 
 it is that the light formation is only proper when the in- 
 fantry is to make use of its fire, and to remain almost sta- 
 tionary. 
 
 2d. If the formation of a line of battalions in columns 
 of attack be employed, the depth and mobility will depend 
 upon the organization or habitual formation of this arm. 
 
 In our service a battalion is supposed to be composed 
 of ten companies, each formed in three ranks. The two 
 flank companies are designed for tirailleurs. This would 
 give a column of four divisions, and consequently twelve 
 files deep ; and as only two of these files could employ 
 their fire, there would be much too large a portion of non- 
 combatants exposed to the enemy's artillery. In practice, 
 however, we employ the two-rank formation, which, if the 
 flank companies be detached, would give a column of at- 
 tack eight files in depth, which is not objectionable. If 
 however, the flank companies should be present in the 
 battalion, the depth of the column wouid still be ten files. 
 
 In the French service, each battalion is composed of 
 four divisions, formed in either two or three ranks. The 
 two-rank formation is the one habitually employed. If all 
 the companies ba present, and the formation in three ranks, 
 the depth of column will be twelve files ; if in two ranks 
 
TACTICS. 123 
 
 the depth will be eight files. If the flank companies be 
 detached, the depth of column will be, for three ranks nine 
 files, and for two ranks six files. (Figs. 27 and 28.) 
 
 In the Russian service each battalion has four divisions 
 of three ranks each. But the third rank is employed as 
 tirailleurs, which gives a depth of column of eight files. 
 The employment of the third rank for tirailleurs is deemed 
 objectionable on account of the difficulty of rallying them 
 on the column. For this reason, the best authorities pre- 
 fer detaching an entire division of two companies. 
 
 The formation of squares is exceedingly effective in an 
 open country, and against an enemy who is superior in 
 cavalry. Formerly very large squares were employed, 
 but they are now formed either by regiment or by battal- 
 ion. The former are deemed best for the defensive, and 
 the latter for offensive movements. The manner of ar- 
 ranging these is shown in Figure 29. 
 
 3d. The mixed system, or the combination of the two 
 preceding, has sometimes been employed with success. 
 Napoleon used this formation at Tagliamento, and the 
 Russians at Eylau. Each regiment was composed of 
 three battalions, the first Ijeing deployed in line, and the 
 other two formed in columns of attack by division in rear 
 of the two extremities, as shown in Fig. 30. It may in 
 some cases be better to place the second and third bat- 
 talions in line with the first, and on the two extremities of 
 this battalion, in order to prolong the line of fire. The 
 centre of the line of each regiment would be less strong, 
 however, than when the two battalions by column are 
 placed in rear of the other which is deployed. This 
 mixed system of formation has many advocates, and in 
 certain situations may be employed with great advantage. 
 
 4th. The deep order of heavy columns of several bat- 
 talions is objectionable as an habitual formation for battle, 
 inasmuch as it exposes large masses of men to the ravages 
 
124 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 of artillery, and diminishes the mobility and impulsion of 
 an attack without adding greatly to its force. Macdonald 
 led -a column of this kind at the battle of Wagram with 
 complete success, although he experienced enormous 
 losses. But Ney's heavy columns of attack at Waterloo 
 failed of success, and suffered terribly from the concentric 
 fire of the enemy's batteries. 
 
 Whenever deep columns are employed, Joraini recom- 
 mends that the grand- division of twelve battalions should 
 have one battalion on each flank, (Fig. 31,) marching by 
 files, in order to project its flanks from the enemy's at- 
 tacks. Without this defence a column of twelve bat- 
 talions deep becomes an inert mass, greatly exposed to be 
 thrown into disorder or broken, as was the column of Fon- 
 tenoy, and the Macedonian phalanx by Paulus Emillus. 
 A grand-division is sometimes arranged in two columns 
 by brigade, as is represented in Figure 32. These are less 
 heavy than a single column of grand-division by battalion, 
 but are subject to nearly the same objections. 
 
 All offensive operations on the field of battle require 
 mobility J solidity, and impulsion ; while, on the other hand, 
 all defensive operations should" combine solidity with the 
 greatest possible amount of fire. 
 
 Troops in motion can make but little use of their fire- 
 arms, whatever may be their formation. If in very large 
 masses, they move slower and are more exposed ; but the 
 moral efl"ect of these large moveable columns is such, that 
 they frequently carry positions without ever employing 
 their fire. The French columns usually succeeded against 
 the Austrian and Prussian infantry, but the English in- 
 fantry could not so easily be driven from their ground ; 
 hey also employed their fire to greater advantage, as was 
 flhown at Talavera, l^usaco, Fuente de Honore, Albuera, 
 and Waterloo. The smaller columns and the mixed for- 
 mation were always most successful against such troops. 
 
TACTICS. 125 
 
 From these remarks we must conclude — 1st, That the 
 \rery thin as well as the very deep formation is objec- 
 tionable under ordinary circumstances, and can seldom be 
 employed with safety. 
 
 2d. That the attack by battalions in columns by division 
 is the best for carrying a position ; the column should, 
 however, be diminished in depth as much as possible, in 
 order both to increase its own fire and to diminish its ex- 
 posure to the fire of the enemy ; moreover, it should be 
 well covered by tirailleurs and supported by cavalry. 
 
 3d. That the mixed formation of the first line deployed 
 and the second in columns of battalion by division- is the 
 best for defence. 
 
 4th. That either of the last two may be employed in 
 the offensive or defensive, according to the nature of the 
 ground, the character of the general, and the character 
 and .position of the troops. Squares are always good 
 against cavalry. 
 
 Troops should be habituated to all these formations, and 
 accustomed to pass rapidly from one to another in the 
 daytime or at night. None, however, but disciplined 
 troops can do this : hence the great superiority of regulars 
 on the field of battle, where skilful manoeuvres frequently 
 effect more than the most undaunted courage. 
 
 The arm next in importance on the battle-field is cav- 
 alry. The principal merit of this arm consists in its velo- 
 city and mobility. Cavalry has little solidity, and cannot 
 of itself defend any position against infantry ; but in con- 
 nection with the other arms, it is indispensable for begin- 
 ning a battle, for completing a victory, and for reaping 
 its full advantage by pursuing and destroying the beaten 
 foe. 
 
 There are four different modes of forming cavalry, the 
 same as for infantry : 1st, in deployed lines; 2d, a line of 
 regiments in column of attack on the centre ; 3d, the 
 
126 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 mixed formation ; and 4th, the deep formation of several 
 columns. 
 
 1st. The thin formation was deemed objectionable for 
 infantry, on account of its liability to be penetrated by 
 cavalry. The same objection does not hold so forcibly 
 with respect to this latter arm ; but full lines are deemed 
 less advantageous than lines deployed checker-wise or in 
 echelon. In either case the distance between the lines 
 should be sufficient to prevent the second line from com- 
 ing in contact with the first, in case the latter receives a 
 slight check. This distance need not be so great in lines 
 deployed checker-wise, as when they are full, or in ech- 
 elon. 
 
 2d. The second system of formation, that is, a line of 
 columns of attack on the central division for infantry, is 
 by battalion, but for cavalry, by regiment. If the regiment 
 is composed of eight squadrons, the column will contain 
 four lines, two squadrons forming a division ; but if com- 
 posed of only six squadrons, the column will contain only 
 three lines, and consequently will be six files in depth. 
 In either case the distance between the lines should be 
 that of a demi-squadron, when the troops are drawn up in 
 battle array ; but when charging, the divisions may close 
 to a less distance. 
 
 3d. In forming a grand division of two brigades, by the 
 third or mixed system, two regiments may be deployed 
 in the first line, and three formed in columns of attack in 
 rear of the flanks and centre, as is shown in Fig. 33, the 
 sixth being held in reserve. ^This formation is deemed a 
 good one. 
 
 4th. The fourth system, of deep columns of cavalry, is 
 entirely unsuited for the charge, and this formation can 
 only be employed for troops drawn up in reserve. 
 
 The flanks of lines 'or columns of cavalry are always 
 much exposed, and squadrons should therefore be formed 
 
TACTICS. 127 
 
 in echelon on the right and left, and a little in rear of the 
 main body, in order to protect the flanks from the attacks 
 of the enemy's horse. Irregular cavalry is usually em- 
 ployed for this purpose. 
 
 In the formation of a grand division in line of battle, 
 care should be taken not to give too great an extent to the 
 command of the generals of brigade. If the formation be 
 in two lines, neither brigade should form an entire line, 
 but each should form a wing of the division, two regiments 
 of the same brigade being placed in rear of each other. 
 This rule is an important one, and should never be ne- 
 glected. 
 
 It may also be laid down as a maxim, in the formation 
 of cavalry on the battle-field, that the first line after the 
 charge, even if most successful, may require reforming in 
 rear of the second line, and that this last should be pre- 
 pared to act in the front line after the first onset. The 
 success of the battle frequently depends upon the charge 
 of the final reserve of cavalry on the flanks of lines already 
 engaged. 
 
 It is on account of this frequent manoeuvring of the cav- 
 alry on the battle-field, its reforming for repeated charges, 
 that great bodies deployed in full lines are principally ob- 
 jected to. They cannot be handled with the facility and 
 rapidity of columns of regiments by divisions. The at- 
 tack of Nansouty's cavalry, formed in this way, on the 
 Prussian cavalry, deployed in advance of Chateau-Thierry, 
 in 1814, is a good proof of this. 
 
 Cavalry may be brought to a charge — 1st, in columns ; 
 2d, in line ; and 3d, in route, or at random, (d la dehan- 
 dade.) These may also be varied by charging either at a 
 trot or a gallop. ' All these modes have been employed 
 with success. In a regular charge in line the lance offers 
 great advantages ; in the melee the sabre is the best weap- 
 on ; hence some military writers have proposed arming 
 
128 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 the front rank with lances, and the second with sabres. 
 The pistol and the carabine are useless in the charge, but 
 may sometimes be employed with advantage against con- 
 voys, outposts, and light cavalry ; to fire the carabine with 
 any effect, the troop must be at a halt. In all charges in 
 line, especially against cavalry, the fast trot is deemed 
 preferable to the gallop, on account of the difficulty of 
 keeping up the alignment when the speed is increased. 
 Lances are utterly useless in a mMee, and in employing 
 troops armed in this way, it is of the greatest importance 
 to keep them in order and in line. In charging with the 
 sabre against artillery the gallop may sometimes be em- 
 ployed, for velocity here may be more important than force. 
 
 We will now consider the formation and use of artillery 
 on the field of battle. It may be laid down as a funda- 
 mental principle, that the fire of artillery should be di- 
 rected on that part of the enemy's line which we design 
 to pierce ; for this fire will not only weaken this point, 
 but will also aid the attack of the cavalry and infantry 
 when the principal effojts are directed towards the in- 
 tended point. 
 
 In the defence, the artillery is usually distributed through- 
 out the whole line, on ground favorable for its fire ; but 
 the reserve should be so placed that it can easily be 
 brought to bear on the point where the enemy will be 
 most likely to direct his principal attack. 
 
 Artillery placed on a plain, or with ground slightly in- 
 clined in front, and using the point-blank or ricochet fire, 
 is the most effective ; very high points are unfavorable. 
 If possible, the concentric fire should be employed against 
 the enemy's columns of attack. The position of the Eng- 
 lish artillery on the field of Waterloo, and the use of the 
 concentric fire, furnishes one of the best examples for the 
 iisposition of this arm to be found in raoderm military 
 history. 
 
TACTICS. 129 
 
 The proper use of artillery on the battle-field is against 
 the enemy's infantry and cavalry, consequently only a 
 small part of it should be employed to respond to the fire 
 of the enemy's batteries ; not more than one third at most 
 can be spared for this object. 
 
 If possible, batteries should be established so as to take 
 the enemy's line in flank, either by an oblique or enfdading 
 fire. A direct fire against columns of attack, with a few 
 light pieces thrown out to take it in flank at the same time, 
 will always be advantageous. A direct and flank fire was 
 employed with success by Kleist against the column of 
 Ney at the battle of Bautzen ; the French marshal was 
 forced to change his direction. 
 
 Batteries should always be well secured on the flanks, 
 and constantly sustained by infantry or cavalry. If at- 
 tacked by cavalry, the artillery should keep up its fire as 
 long as possible, first with ball, and then with grape when 
 the enemy arrives within a suitable distance. The same 
 rule will apply to attacks of infantry, except that the fire 
 of solid shot at a great distance is much less effective than 
 against mounted troops. 
 
 The engineer troops are employed on the field of battle 
 principally by detachments, acting as auxiliaries to the 
 other arms. Each regiment of infantry should have a de- 
 tachment of sappers armed with axes to act as pioneers, 
 for the removal of obstacles that may impede its advance. 
 These sappers are of the utmost importance, for without 
 them an entire column might be checked and thrown into 
 confusion by impediments which a few sappers with their 
 axes would remove in a very short time. Detachments of 
 engineer troops must also act in concert with the cavalry 
 and artillery for the same purpose as above. In establish- 
 ing the batteries of artillery, in opening roads for their ma- 
 ncEuvres, and in arranging material obstacles for their de- 
 fence, the axes, picks, and shovels of the sappers are of 
 
130 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 infinite value. Field-works, bridges, and bridge-defences, 
 frequently have a decisive influence upon the result of a 
 battle, but as these are usually arranged previous to the ac- 
 tion, they will be discussed in another place. In the at- 
 tack and defence of these field-works, the engineer troops 
 play a distinguished part. The consideration of this part 
 of the subject, though perhaps properly belonging to 
 the tactics of battles, will also be postponed to another 
 occasion. 
 
 We will now discuss the employment of the combined 
 arms on the field of battle. 
 
 Before the French Revolution, all the infantry, formed 
 by regiments and brigades, was united in a single body 
 and drawn up in two lines. The cavalry was placed on 
 the two flanks, and the artillery distributed along the en- 
 tire line. In moving by wings, they formed four columns, 
 two of cavalry and two of infantry : in moving by a flank, 
 they formed only two very long columns ; the cavalry, 
 however, sometimes formed a third and separate column 
 in flank movements, but this disposition was rarely made. 
 
 The French Revolution introduced the system of grand 
 divisions composed of the four arms combined ; each di- 
 vision moved separately and independently of the other. 
 In the wars of the Empire, Napoleon united two or more 
 of these divisions into a corps d^armee^ which formed a 
 wing, the centre, or reserve of his grand army. In addition 
 to these divisions and corps d'armee, he had large reserves 
 of cavalry and artillery, which were employed as distinct 
 and separate arms. 
 
 If the forces be sufficiently numerous to fight by corps 
 d^armee, each corps should have its own reserve, inde- 
 pendent of the general reserve of the army. Again, if the 
 forces be so small as to act by grand divisions only, each 
 division should then have its separate reserve. 
 
 An army, whether composed of separate corps or of 
 
TACTICS. 131 
 
 grand divisions, usually forms, on the field of battle, a cen- 
 tre, two wings, and a reserve. Each corps or division 
 acts by itself, with its infantry, cavalry, artillery, and en- 
 gineer troops. The reserve of cavalry may be formed in 
 rear of the centre or one of the wings. In small forces 
 of fifty or sixty thousand men, the cavalry may act with 
 advantage on the wings, in the manner of the ancients. 
 If the reserve of this arm be large enough to form three 
 separate bodies, it may itself very properly be formed into 
 a centre and wings. If it be formed into two columns 
 only, they may be placed in rear of the openings between 
 the centre and the wings of the main force. The reserve 
 of artillery is employed either to reinforce the centre or 
 a wing, and in the defensive is frequently distributed 
 throughout the whole line of battle. In offensive opera- 
 tions, it may be well to concentrate as much fire as possi- 
 ble on the intended point of attack. The mounted artil- 
 lery either acts in concert with the cavalry, or is used to 
 reinforce that arm ; the light-foot acts with the infantry, 
 and the batteries of heavy calibre are distributed along 
 the line, or concentrated on some important point where 
 their fire may be most effectual. They reach the enemy's 
 forces at a distance, and arrest the impulsion of his attack. 
 They may also be employed to draw the fire of his artil- 
 lery ; but their movements are too slow and difficult for a 
 reserve. 
 
 The order of succession in which the different arms 
 are engaged in a battle, depends upon the nature of the 
 ground and other accidental circumstances, and cannot be 
 determined by any fixed rules. The following, however, 
 is most frequently employed, and in ordinary cases may 
 be deemed good. 
 
 The attack is first opened by a cannonade ; light troops 
 are sent forward to annoy the enemy, and, if possible, to 
 pick off his artillerists. The main body then advances in 
 
132 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 two lines : the first displays itself in line as it arrives 
 nearly within the range of grape-shot ; the second line re- 
 mains in columns of attack formed of battalions by division, 
 at a distance from the first sufficient to be beyond the 
 reach of the enemy's musketry, but near enough to sup- 
 port the first line, or to cover it, if driven back. The 
 artillery, in the mean time, concentrates its fire on some 
 weak point to open a way for the reserve, which rushes 
 into the opening and takes the enemy in flank and rear. 
 The cavalry charges at the opportune moment on the 
 flank of the enemy's columns or penetrates an opening in 
 his line, and cutting to pieces his staggered troops, forces 
 them into retreat, and completes the victory. During this 
 time the whole line of the enemy should be kept occupied, 
 so as to prevent fresh troops from being concentrated on 
 the threatened point. 
 
 The following maxims on battles may be studied with 
 advantage : — 1st. General battles are not to be fought but 
 under the occurrence of one of the following circum- 
 stances : when you are, from any cause, decidedly supe- 
 rior to the enemy ; when he is on the point of receiving 
 reinforcements, which will materially effect your relative 
 strength ; when, if not beaten or checked, he will deprive 
 you of supplies or reinforcements, necessary to the con- 
 tinuance or success of your operations ; and, generally, 
 when the advantage of winning the battle will be greater 
 than the disadvantage of losing it. 
 
 2d. Whatever may be your reason for risking a general 
 battle, you ought to regard as indispensable preliminaries, 
 — a thorough knowledge of the ground on which you are to 
 act ; an ample supply of ammunition ; the most perfect 
 order in your fire-arms ; hospital depots regularly estab- 
 lished, with surgeons, nurses, dressings, &c., sufficient 
 for the accommodation of the wounded ; points of ren- 
 dezvous established and known to the commanders of 
 
TACTICS. 133 
 
 corps ; and an entire possession of the pctsses in your 
 own rear. 
 
 3d. The battle being fought and won, the victory must 
 be followed up with as much alacrity and vigor, as though 
 nothing had been gained, — a maxim very difficult of ob- 
 servance, (from the momentary disobedience which per- 
 vades all troops flushed with conquest,) but with which 
 an able general will never dispense. No one knew better 
 the use of this maxim than Napoleon, and no one was a 
 more strict and habitual observer of it. 
 
 4th. The battle being fought and lost, it is your first 
 duty to do away the moral effect of defeat, — the want of 
 that self-respect and self-confidence, which are its imme- 
 diate followers, and which, so long as they last, are the 
 most powerful auxiliaries of your enemy. It is scarcely 
 necessary to remark that, to effect this object, — to re- 
 inspire a beaten army with hope, and to reassure it of 
 victory, — we must not turn our backs on an enemy, without 
 sometimes presenting to him our front also ; — we must not 
 confide our safety to mere flight, but adopt such measures 
 as shall convince him that though wounded and overpow- 
 ered, we are neither disabled nor dismayed ; and that we 
 still possess enough both of strength and spirit to punish 
 his faults, should he commit any. Do you operate in a 
 covered or mountainous country? — avail yourself of its 
 ridges and woods ; for by doing so you will best evade 
 the pressure of his cavalry. Have you defiles or villages 
 to pass? — seize the heads of these, defend them obsti- 
 nately, and make a show of fighting another battle. In a 
 word, let no error of your enemy, nor any favorable inci- 
 dent of the ground, escape your notice or your use. It is 
 by these means that your enemy is checked, and your 
 troops inspirited ; and it was by these that Frederick 
 balanced his surprise at Hohenkirchen, and the defeat of 
 his plans before Olmutz. The movement of our own 
 
134 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 Washington, after losing the battle of Brandy wine, was 
 of this character. He hastily recrossed the Schuylkill 
 with the professed intention of seeking the enemy and 
 renewing the combat, which was apparently prevented 
 only by a heavy and incessant fall of rain. A rumor was 
 now raised that the enemy, while refusing his left wing, 
 was rapidly advancing upon his right, to intercept our* 
 passage of the river, and thus gain possession of Phil- 
 adelphia. This report justified a retreat, which drew 
 from the General repeated assurances, that in quitting his 
 present position and giving to his march a retrograde di- 
 rection, it was not his object to avoid, but to follow and 
 to fight the enemy. This movement, though no battle 
 ensued, had the effect of restoring the confidence as well 
 of the people as of the army.* 
 
 * There are innumerable works in almost every language on ele- 
 mentary tactics ; very few persons, however, care to read any thing 
 further than the manuals used in our own service. Our system of 
 infantry, cavalry, and artillery tactics is generally taken from the 
 French ; and also the course of engineer instruction, so far as matured, 
 for sappers, miners, and pontoniers, is based on the French manuals 
 for the varied duties of this arm. 
 
 On Grand Tactics, or Tactics of Battles, the military and historical 
 writings of General Jomini abound in most valuable instructions. Na- 
 poleon's memoirs, and the writings of Rocquancourt, Hoyer, Decker, 
 OkounefF, Rogniat, Jocquinot-de-Presle, Guibert, Duhesme, Gas- 
 sendi, Warnery, Baron Bohan, Lindneau, Maiseroy, Miller, and Ter- 
 nay, are considered as being among the best authorities. 
 
MILITARY POLITY 135 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 MILITARY POLITY AND THE MEANS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE. 
 
 Military Polity. — In deciding upon a resort to arms, 
 statesmen are guided by certain general rules which have 
 been tacitly adopted in the intercourse of nations : so also 
 both statesmen and generals are bound by rules similarly 
 adopted for the conduct of hostile forces while actually 
 engaged in military operations. 
 
 In all differences between nations, each state has a right 
 to decide for itself upon the nature of its means of redress 
 for injuries received. Previous to declaring open and 
 public war, it may resort to some other forcible means of 
 redress, short of actual war. These are : — 
 
 1st. Laying an embargo upon the property of the of- 
 fending nation. 
 
 2d. Taking forcible possession of the territory or prop- 
 erty in dispute. 
 
 3d. Resorting to some direct measure of retaliation. 
 
 4th. Making reprisals upon the persons and things of 
 the offending nation. 
 
 It is not the present purpose to discuss these several 
 means of redress, nor even to enter into any examinatior 
 of the rights and laws of public war, when actually de- 
 clared ; it is intended to consider here merely such mili- 
 tary combinations as are resorted to by the state in prep- 
 aration for defence, or in carrying on the actual operations 
 of a war. 
 
 In commencing hostilities against any other power, we 
 must evidently take into consideration all the political and 
 
13^ 
 
 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 physical circumstances of the people with whom we are 
 to contend : we must regard their general character for 
 courage and love of country ; their attachment to their 
 government and political institutions ; the character of their 
 rulers and their generals ; the numbers, organization, and 
 discipline of their armies ; and particularly the relations 
 between the civil and military authorities in the state, for 
 if the latter be made entirely subordinate, we may very 
 safely calculate on erroneous combinations. We must 
 also regard their passive means of resistance, such as 
 their system of fortifications, their military materials and 
 munitions, their statistics of agriculture, commerce, and 
 manufactures, and especially the geographical position and 
 physical features of their country. No government can 
 neglect, with impunity, these considerations in its prepar- 
 ations for war, or in its manner of conducting military 
 operations. 
 
 Napoleon's system of carrying on war against the weak, 
 effeminate, and disorganized Italians required many modi- 
 fications when directed against the great military power 
 of Russia. Moreover, the combinations of Eylau and 
 Friedland were inapplicable to the contest with the mad- 
 dened guerrillas of Minos, animated by the combined 
 passions of hatred, patriotism, and religious enthusiasm. 
 
 Military power may be regarded either as absolute or 
 relative : the absolute force of a state depending on the 
 number of its inhabitants and the extent of its revenues ; 
 the relative force, on its geographical and political posi- 
 tion, the character of its people, and the nature of its 
 government. Its military preparations should evidently 
 be in proportion to its resources. Wealth constitutes both 
 the apprehension and the incentive to invasion. Where 
 two or more states have equal means of war, with incen- 
 tives very unequal, an equilibrium cannot exist ; for dan- 
 ger and ternptation are no longer opposed to each other. 
 
MILITARY POLITY. 137 
 
 The preparation of states may, therefore, be equal with- 
 out being equivalent, and the smaller of the two may be 
 most liable to be drawn into a war without the means of 
 sustaining it. 
 
 The numerical relation between the entire population 
 of a state, and the armed forces which it can maintain, 
 must evidently vary with the wealth and pursuits of the 
 people. Adam Smith thinks that a country purely agri- 
 cultural may, at certain seasons, furnish for war one-fifth, 
 or even in case of necessity one-fourth, of its entire popu- 
 lation. A commercial or manufacturing country would be 
 unable to furnish any thing like so numerous a military 
 force. On this account small agricultural states are some- 
 times able to bring into the field much larger 'armies than 
 their more powerful neighbors. During the Seven Years* 
 War, Frederick supported an army equal to one-twentieth 
 of the entire Prussian population, and at the close of this 
 memorable contest one-sixth of the males capable ofbear- 
 ing arms had actually perished on the field of battle. 
 
 But the number of troops that may be brought into the 
 field in times of great emergency is, of- course, much 
 greater than can be supported during a long war, or as a 
 part of a permanent military establishment. Montesquieu 
 estimates that modem nations are capable of supporting, 
 without endangering their power, a permanent military 
 force of about one-hundredth part of their population. 
 This ratio difiers but little from that of the present mili- 
 tary establishments of the great European powers. 
 
 Great Britain, with a population of about twenty-five 
 millions, and a general budget of $250,000,000, supports 
 a military and naval force of about 150,000 effective and 
 100,000 non-effective men, 250,000 in all, at an annual 
 expense of from seventy to eighty millions of dollars. 
 
 Russia, with a population of about seventy millions, 
 supports an active array of 632,000 men, with an im- 
 
138 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 mense reserve, at an expense of about $65,000,000, out 
 of a general budget of $90,000,000 ; that is, the expense 
 of her military establishment is to her whole budget as 7 
 to 10. 
 
 Austria, with a population of thirty-five millions, has an 
 organized peace establishment of 370,000, (about 250,000 
 in active service,) and a reserve of 260,000, at an ex- 
 pense of $36,000,000, out of a general budget of 
 $100,000,000.. 
 
 Prussia, with a population of about fifteen millions, has 
 from 100,000 to 120,000 men in arms, with a reserve of 
 200,000, at an annual expense of more than $18,000,000, 
 out of a general budget of about $38,000,000. 
 
 France, \fiih. a population of near thirty-five millions, 
 supports a permanent establishment of about 350,000 
 men, at an expense of seventy or eighty millions of dol- 
 lars, out of a total budget of $280,000,000. France has 
 long supported a permanent military force of from one- 
 hundredth to one hundred-and-tenth of her population, at 
 an expense of from one-fourth to one-fifth of her whole 
 budget. The following table, copied from the " Specta- 
 teur Militaire," shows the state of the army at six difi"er- 
 ent periods between 1788 and 1842. It omits, of course, 
 the extraordinary levies of the wars of the Revolution 
 and of the Empire. 
 
MILITARY POLITY. 
 
 Table. 
 
 139 
 
 
 Population. 
 
 Budget. 
 
 Army. 
 
 Remarks. 
 
 Dates. 
 
 Of State. 
 
 Of the Ar- 
 my. 
 
 Peace 
 Estab. 
 
 War 
 
 Estab. 
 
 1788 
 1814 
 1823 
 
 1830 
 1840 
 
 1842 
 
 24,000,000 
 28,000,000 
 31,000,000 
 
 32,000,000 
 34,000,000 
 35,000,000 
 
 Livres. 
 500,000,000 
 
 Francs. 
 800,000,000 
 
 900,000,000 
 
 1,000,000,000 
 1,170,000,000 
 1,200,000,000 
 
 Livres. 
 100,000,000 
 
 Francs. 
 180,000,000 
 
 200,000,000 
 
 220,000,000 
 242,000,000 
 285,000,000 
 
 Men. 
 180,000 
 
 255,000 
 280,000 
 
 312,000 
 312,000 
 370,000 
 
 Men. 
 360,000 
 
 340,000 
 390,000 
 
 500,000 
 520,000 
 
 ( Ordinance 
 \ of 1814. 
 ( Renort of 
 
 < Minister 
 I of War. 
 
 C Report of 
 
 < Minister 
 I of War. 
 
 J Budget of 
 } 1840. 
 ( Estimated 
 
 < Expenses 
 ( of 1842. 
 
 From these data we see that the great European powers 
 at the present day maintain, in time of peace, military es- 
 tablishments equal to about one-hundredth part of their 
 entire population. 
 
 The geographical position of a country also greatly in- 
 fluences the degree and character of its military prepar- 
 ation. It may be bordered on one or more sides by 
 mountains and other obstacles calculated to diminish the 
 probability of invasion ; or the whole frontier may be wide 
 open to an attack : the interior may be of such a nature as 
 to furnish security to its own army, and yet be fatal to the 
 enemy should he occupy it ; or it may furnish him advan- 
 tages far superior to his own country. It may be an island 
 in the sea, and consequently exposed only to maritime de- 
 scents — events of rare occurrence in modern times. 
 
 Again, a nation may be placed between others who are 
 interested in its security, their mutual jealousy preventing 
 the molestation of the weaker neighbor. On the other 
 hand, its political institutions may be such as to compel 
 
140 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 the Others to unite in attacking it in order to secure them- 
 selves. The republics of Switzerland could remain un- 
 molested in the midst of powerful monarchies ; but revolu- 
 tionary France brought upon herself the armies of all 
 Europe. 
 
 Climate has also some influence upon military charac- 
 ter, but this influence is far less than that of education and 
 discipline. Northern nations are said to be naturally more 
 phlegmatic and sluggish than those of warmer climates ; 
 and yet the armies of Gustavus Adolphus, Charles XII., 
 and Suwarrow, have shown themselves sufficiently active 
 and impetuous, while the Greeks, Romans, and Spaniards, 
 in the times of their glory, were patient, disciplined, and 
 indef^itigable, notwithstanding the reputed fickleness of 
 ardent temperaments. 
 
 For any nation to postpone the making of military prep- 
 arations till such time as they are actually required in 
 defence, is to waste the public money, and endanger the 
 public safety. The closing of an avenue of approach, the 
 security of a single road or river, or even the strategic 
 movement of a small body of troops, often efiects, in the 
 beginning, w^hat afterwards cannot be accomplished by 
 large fortifications, and the most formidable armies. Had 
 a small army in 1812, with a well-fortified depot on Lake 
 Champlain, penetrated into Canada, and cut off" all rein- 
 forcements and supplies by way of Quebec, that country 
 would inevitably have fallen into our possession. In the 
 winter of 1806-7, Napoleon crossed the Vistula, and ad- 
 vanced even to the walls of Konigsberg, with the Aus- 
 trians in his rear, and the whole power of Russia before 
 him. If Austria had pushed forward one hundred thou- 
 sand men from Bohemia, on the Oder, she would, in ciU 
 probability, says the best of military judges, Jomini, have 
 struck a fatal blow to the operations of Napoleon, and his 
 army must have been exceedingly fortunate even to regain 
 
MILITARY POLITY. 141 
 
 the Rhine. But Austria preferred remaining neutral till 
 she could increase her army to four hundred thousand men. 
 She then took the offensive, and was beaten ; whereas, 
 with one hundred th6usand men brought into action at the 
 favorable moment, she might, most probably, have decided 
 the fate of Europe. 
 
 " Defensive war," says Napoleon, " does not preclude 
 attack, any more than offensive war is exclusive of de- 
 fence," for frequently the best way to counteract the ene- 
 my's operations, and prevent his conquests, is, at the very 
 outset of the war, to invade and cripple him. But this 
 can never be attempted with raw troops, ill supplied with 
 the munitions of war, and unsupported by fortifications. 
 Such invasions must necessarily fail. Experience in the 
 wars of the French revolution has demonstrated this ; and 
 even our own short history is not without its proof. In 
 1812, the conquest of Canada was determined on some 
 time before the declaration of war ; an undisciplined army, 
 without preparation or apparent plan, was actually put in 
 motion, eighteen days previous to this declaration, for the 
 Canadian peninsula. With a disciplined army of the same 
 numbers, with an efficient and skilful leader, directed 
 against the vital point of the British possessions at a time 
 when the whole military force of the provinces did not 
 exceed three thousand men, how different had been the 
 result ! 
 
 While, therefore, the permanent defences of -a nation 
 must be subordinate to its resources, position, and charac- 
 ter, they can in no case be dispensed with. No matter 
 how extensive or important the temporary means that 
 may be developed as necessity requires, there must be 
 some force kept in a constant state of efficiency, in order 
 to impart life and stability to the system. The one can 
 never properly replace the other; for while the former 
 constitutes the basis, the latter must form the main body 
 
142 MILITARY ART AND SCIBNCE. 
 
 of the military edifice, which, by its strength and durabili- 
 ty, will offer shelter and protection to the nation ; or. if 
 the architecture and materials be defective, crush and de- 
 stroy it in its fall. 
 
 The permanent means of military defence employed by 
 modern nations, are — 
 
 1st. An army; 2d. A navy; 3d. Fortifications. 
 
 The first two of these could hardly be called permanent, 
 if we were to regard their personnel; but looking upon 
 them as institutions or organizations, they present all the 
 characteristics of durability. They are sometimes sub- 
 jected to very great and radical changes ; by the hot-house 
 nursing of designing ambition or rash legislation, they 
 may become overgrown and dangerous, or the storms of 
 popular delusion may overthrow and apparently sweep 
 them away. But they will immediately spring up again 
 in some form or other, so deeply are they rooted in the 
 organization of political institutions. 
 
 Its army and navy should always be kept within the 
 limits of a nation's wants ; but pity for the country which 
 reduces them in number or support so as to degrade their 
 character or endanger their organization. " A govern- 
 ment," says one of the best historians of the age, " which 
 neglects its army, under whatever pretext, is a govern- 
 ment culpable in the eyes of posterity, for it is preparing 
 humiliations for its flag and its country, instead of laying 
 the foundation for its glory.'* 
 
 One of our own distinguished cabinet ministers remarks, 
 that the history of our relations with the Indian tribes from 
 the beginning to the present hour, is one continued proof 
 of the necessity of maintaining an eflicient military force 
 in time of peace, and that the treatment we received for a 
 long series of years from European powers, was a most 
 humiliating illustration of the folly of attempting to dis- 
 pense with these means of defence. 
 
MILITARY POLITY. 143 
 
 " Twice," says he, " we were compelled to maintain, 
 by open war, our quarrel with the principal aggressors. 
 After many years of forbearance and negotiation, our 
 claims in other cases were at Jength amicably settled ; 
 but in one of the most noted of these cases, it was not 
 without much delay and imminent hazard of war that the 
 execution of the treaty was finally enforced. No one ac- 
 quainted with these portions of our history, can hesitate 
 to ascribe much of the wantonness and duration of the 
 wrongs we endured, to a knowledge on the part of our 
 assailants of the scantiness and inefiiciency of our military 
 and naval force. 
 
 " If," said Mr. Calhoun, " disregarding the sound dic- 
 tates of reason and experience, we, in peace, neglect our 
 military establishment, we must, with a powerful and skil- 
 ful enemy, be exposed to the most distressing calamities." 
 
 These remarks were made in opposition to the reduc- 
 tion of our military establishment, in 1821, below the 
 standard of thirteen thousand. Nevertheless, the force 
 was reduced to about six or seven thousand ; and we were 
 soon made to feel the consequences. It is stated, in a re- 
 port of high authority, that if there had been two regi- 
 ments available near St. Louis, in 1832, the war with 
 Black Hawk would have been easily avoided ; and that it 
 cannot be doubted that the scenes of devastation and sav- 
 age warfare which overspread the Floridas for nearly 
 seven years would also have been avoided, and some 
 thirty millions have been saved the country, if two regi- 
 ments had been available at the beginning of that con- 
 flict.* 
 
 * We may now add to these remarks, that if our government had 
 occupied the country between the Nueces and the Rio Grande with a 
 well-organized army of twelve thousand men, war with Mexico might 
 have been avoided ; but to push forward upon Matamoras a small 
 force of only two thousand, in the very face of a large Mexican aiiny 
 
144 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 We must, in this country, if we heed either the dictates 
 of reason or experience, maintain in time of peace a skele- 
 ton military and naval force, capable of being greatly ex- 
 panded, in the event of danger, by the addition of new 
 troops. 
 
 Much energy and enterprise will always be imparted to 
 an army or navy by the addition of new forces. The 
 strength thus acquired is sometimes in even a far greater 
 ratio than the increase of numbers. But it must be re- 
 membered that these new elements are, of themselves, far 
 inferior to the old ones in discipline, steady courage, and 
 perseverance. No general can rely on the accuracy of 
 their movements in the operations of- a campaign, and 
 they are exceedingly apt to fail him at the critical moment 
 on the field of battle. The same holds true with respect 
 to sailors inexperienced in the discipline and duties of a 
 maii-of-war. There is this difference, however : an army 
 usually obtains its recruits from men totally unacquainted 
 with military life, while a navy, in case of sudden in- 
 crease, is mainly supplied from the merchant marine with 
 professional sailors, who, though unacquainted with the 
 use of artillery, &c., on ship-board, are familiar with all 
 the other duties of sea life, and not unused to discipline. 
 Moreover, raw seamen and marines, from being under the 
 immediate eye of their officers in time of action, and with- 
 out the possibility of escape, fight much better than troops 
 of the same character on land. If years are requisite to 
 make a good sailor, surely an equal length of time is 
 necessary to perfect the soldier ; and no less skill, prac- 
 tice, and professional study are required for the proper 
 direction of armies than for the management of fleets. 
 
 was holding out to them the strongest inducements to attack us. The 
 temporary economy of a few thousands in reducing our military estab- 
 lishment to a mere handful of men, again results in "a necessary ex- 
 penditure of many millions of dollars and a large sacrifice of human life. 
 
MILITARY POLITY. 145 
 
 But some have said that even these skeletons of mili- 
 tary and naval forces are entirely superfluous, and that a 
 brave and patriotic people will make as good a defence 
 against invasion as the most disciplined and experienced. 
 Such views are frequently urged in the halls of congress, 
 and some have even attempted to confirm them by histori- 
 cal examples. 
 
 There are instances, it is true, where disorganized and 
 frantic masses, animated by patriotic enthusiasm, have 
 gained the most brilliant victories. Here, however, ex- 
 traordinary circumstances supplied the place of order, and 
 produced an equilibrium between forces that otherwise 
 would have been very unequal ; but in almost every in- 
 stance of this kind, the loss of the undisciplined army has 
 been unnecessarily great, human life being substituted for 
 skill and order. But victory, even with such a drawback, 
 cannot often attend the banners of newly raised and disor- 
 derly forces. If the captam and crew of a steamship knew 
 nothing of navigation, and had never been at sea, and the 
 engineer was totally unacquainted with his profession, 
 could we expect the ship to cross the Atlantic in safety, 
 and reach her destined port ? Would we trust our lives 
 and the honor of our country to their care ? Would we 
 not say to them, " First make yourselves acquainted with 
 the principles of your profession, the use of the compass, 
 and the means of determining whether you direct your 
 course upon a ledge of rocks or into a safe harbor ?" War 
 is not, as some seem to suppose, a mere game of chance. 
 Its principles constitute one of the most intricate of mod- 
 em sciences ; and the general who understands the art of 
 rightly applying its rules, and possesses the means of car- 
 rying out its precepts, may be morally certain of success. 
 
 History furnishes abundant proofs of the impolicy of re- 
 lying upon undisciplined forces in the open field. Almost 
 every page of Napier's classic History of the Peninsular 
 
 13 
 
146 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 War contains striking examples of the useless waste of 
 human life and property by the Spanish militia ; while, 
 with one quarter as many regulars, at a small fractional 
 part of the actual expense, the French might have been 
 expelled at the outset, or have been driven, at any time 
 afterwards, from the Peninsula. 
 
 At the beginning of the French Revolution the regular 
 army was abolished, and the citizen-soldiery, who were 
 established on the 14th of July, 1789, relied on exclusively 
 for the national defence. " But these three millions of 
 national guards," says Jomini, "though good vsupporters of 
 the decrees of the assembly, were nevertheless useless for 
 reinforcing the army beyond the frontiers, and utterly in- 
 capable of defending their own firesides." Yet no one can 
 question their individual bravery and patriotism ; for, when 
 reorganized, disciplined, and properly directed, they put 
 to flight the best troops in Europe. At the first outbreak 
 of this revolution, the privileged classes of other countries, 
 upholding crumbling institutions and rotten dynasties, 
 rushed forth against the maddened hordes of French de- 
 mocracy. The popular power, springing upward by its 
 own elasticity when the weight of political oppression was 
 removed, soon became too wild and reckless to establish 
 itself on any sure basis, or even to provide for its own pro- 
 tection. If the attacks of the enervated enemies of France 
 were weak, so also were her own efforts feeble to resist 
 these attacks. The republican armies repelled the ill- 
 planned and ill-conducted invasion by the Duke of Bruns- 
 wick ; but it was by the substitution of human life for prep- 
 aration, system, and skill ; enthusiasm supplied the place 
 of discipline ; robbery produced military stores ; and the 
 dead bodies of her citizens formed epaulements against the 
 enemy. Yet this was but the strength of weakness ; the 
 aimless struggle of a broken and disjointed government ; 
 and the new revolutionary power was fast sinking away 
 
MILITARY POLITY. 147 
 
 before the combined opposition of Europe, when the great 
 genius of Napoleon, with a strong arm and iron rule, seiz- 
 ing upon the scattered fragments, and binding them to- 
 gether into one consolidated mass, made France victorious, 
 and seated himself on the throne of empire. 
 
 No people in the world ever exhibited a more general 
 and enthusiastic patriotism than the Americans during the 
 war of our own Revolution. And yet our army received, 
 even at that time, but little support from irregular and 
 militia forces in the open field. Washington's opinions 
 on this subject furnish so striking a contrast to the con- 
 gressional speeches of modern political demagogues, who, 
 with boastful swaggers, would fain persuade us that we 
 require no organization or discipline to meet the veteran 
 troops of Europe in the open field, and who would hurry 
 us, without preparation, into war with the strongest mili- 
 tary powers of the world — so striking is the contrast be- 
 tween the assertions of these men and the letters and re- 
 ports of Washington, that it may be well for the cool and 
 dispassionate lover of truth to occasionally refresh his 
 memory by reference to the writings of Washington. 
 The following brief extracts are from his letters to the 
 President of Congress, December, 1776 : 
 
 " The saving in the article of clothing, provisions, and 
 a thousand other things, by having nothing to do with the 
 militia, unless in cases of extraordinary exigency, and 
 such as could not be expected in the common course of 
 events, would amply support a large army, which, well 
 officered, would be daily improving, instead of continuing 
 a destructive, expensive, and disorderly mob. In my 
 opinion, if any dependence is placed on the militia another 
 year, Congress will be deceived. When danger is a little 
 removed from them they will not turn out at all. When 
 it comes home to them, the well-affected, instead of flying 
 to arms to defend themselves, are busily employed in re- 
 
148 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 moving their families and effects ; whiie the disaffected 
 are concerting measures to make their submission, and 
 spread terror and dismay all around, to induce others to 
 follow their example. Daily experience and abundant 
 proofs warrant this information. Short enlistments, and a 
 mistaken dependence upon our militia, have been the ori- 
 gin of all our misfortunes, and the great accumulation of 
 our debt. The militia come in, you cannot tell how ; go, 
 you cannot tell when ; and act, you cannot tell where ; 
 consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave 
 you at last, at a critical moment." 
 
 These remarks of Washington will not be found too se- 
 vere if we remember the conduct of our militia in the open 
 field at Princeton, Savannah River, Camden, Guilford 
 Court-House, &:c., in the \var of the Revolution ; the 
 great cost of the war of 1812 as compared with its milita- 
 ry results ; the refusal of the New England militia to 
 march beyond the lines of their own states, and of the 
 New- York militia to cross the Niagara and secure a vic- 
 tory already won ; or the disgraceful flight of the Southern 
 militia from the field of Bladensburg. 
 
 But there is another side to this picture. If our militia 
 have frequently failed to maintain their ground when drawn 
 up in the open field, we can point with pride to their brave and 
 successful defence of Charleston, Mobile, New Orleans, 
 Fort M'Henry, Stonington, Niagara, Plattsburg, in proof 
 of what may be accomplished by militia in connection with 
 fortifications. 
 
 These examples from our history must fully demonstrate 
 the great value of a militia when properly employed as a de- 
 fence against invasion, and ought to silence the sneers of 
 those who would abolish this arm of defence as utterly use- 
 ess. In the open field militia cannot in general be manoeu- 
 vred to advantage ; whereas, in the defence of fortified places 
 their superior intelligence and activity not unfrequently ren- 
 
MEANS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE. 149 
 
 der them even more valuable than regulars. And in reading 
 the severe strictures of Washington, Greene, Morgan, and 
 others, upon our militia, it must be remembered that they 
 were at that time entirely destitute of important works of 
 defence ; and the experience of all other nations, as well 
 as our own, has abundantly shown that a newly-raised 
 force cannot cope, in the open field, with one subordinate 
 and disciplined. Here science must determine the contest. 
 Habits of strict obedience, and of simultaneous and united 
 action, are indispensable to carry out what the higher 
 principles of the military profession require. New and 
 undisciplined forces are often confounded at the evolutions, 
 and strategic and tactical combinations of a regular army, 
 and lose all confidence in their leaders and in themselves. 
 But, when placed behind a breastwork, they even over- 
 rate their security. They can then coolly look upon the 
 approaching columns, and, unmoved by glittering armor 
 and bristling bayonets, will exert all their skill in the use 
 of their weapons. The superior accuracy of aim which 
 the American has obtained by practice from his early 
 youth, has enabled our militia to gain, under the protection 
 of military works, victories as brilliant as the most veteran 
 troops. The moral courage necessary to await an attack 
 behind a parapet, is at least equal to that exerted in the 
 open field, where movements generally determine the vic- 
 tory. To watch the approach of an enemy, to see him 
 move up and display his massive columns, his long array 
 of military equipments, his fascines and scaling-ladders, 
 his instruments of attack, and the professional skill with 
 which he wields them, to hear the thunder of his batteries, 
 spreading death all around, and to repel, hand to hand, 
 those tremendous assaults, which stand out in all their 
 horrible relief upon the canvass of modern warfare, re- 
 quires a heart at least as brave as the professional war 
 rior exhibits in the pitched battle. 
 
150 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 But we must not forget that to call this force into the 
 open field, — to take the mechanic from his shop, the mer- 
 chant from his counter, the farmer from his plough, — will 
 necessarily be attended with an immense sacrifice of 
 human life. The lives lost on the battle-field are not the 
 only ones ; militia, being unaccustomed to exposure, and 
 unable to supply their own wants with certainty and regu- 
 larity, contract diseases which occasion in every cam- 
 paign a most frightful mortality. 
 
 There is also a vast difference in the cost of support- 
 ing regulars and militia forces. The cost of a regular 
 army of twenty thousand men for a campaign of six 
 months, in this country, has been estimated, from data in 
 the War-ofiice, at a hundred and fifty dollars per man ; 
 while the cost of a militia force, under the same circum- 
 stances, making allowance for the difierence in the ex- 
 penses from sickness, waste of camp-furniture, equip- 
 ments, &c., will be two hundred and fifty dollars per 
 man. But in short campaigns, and in irregular warfare, 
 like the expedition against Black Hawk and his Indians 
 in the Northwest, and during the hostilities in Florida, 
 " the expenses of the militia,*' says Mr. Secretary Spen- 
 cer, in a report to congress in 1842, " invariably exceed 
 those of regulars by at least three hundred per centP It is 
 further stated that *^^ ffty-jive thousand militia were called 
 into service during the Black Hawk and Florida wars, 
 and that thirty millions of dollars have been expended in 
 these conflicts /" When it is remembered that during these 
 border wars our whole regular army did not exceed 
 twelve or thirteen thousand men, it will not be difiicult to 
 perceive why our military establishment was so enor- 
 mously expensive. Large sums were paid to sedentary 
 militia who never rendered the slightest service. Again, 
 during our late war with Great Britain, of less than three 
 years' duration, two hundred and eighty thousand muskets 
 
MEANS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE. 151 
 
 were lost, — the average cost of which is stated at twelve 
 dollars, — making an aggregate loss, in muskets alone, of 
 three millions and three hundred and sixty thousand dollars j 
 during a service of about two years and a half; — ^result- 
 ing mainly from that neglect and waste of public property 
 which almost invariably attends the movements of newly- 
 raised and inexperienced forces. Facts like these should 
 awaken us to the necessity of reorganizing and disci- 
 plining our militia. General Knox, when Secretary of 
 War, General Harrison while in the senate, and Mr. 
 Poinsett in 1841, each furnished plans for effecting this 
 purpose, but the whole subject has been passed by with 
 neglect. 
 
 Permanent fortifications differ in many of their features 
 from either of the two preceding elements of national 
 defence. They are passive in their nature, yet possess 
 all the conservative properties of an army or navy, and 
 through these two contribute largely to the active opera- 
 tions of a campaign. When once constructed they re- 
 quire but very little expenditure for their support. In time 
 of peace they withdraw no valuable citizens from the 
 useful occupations of life. Of themselves tliey can never 
 exert an influence corrupting to public morals, or danger- 
 ous to public liberty ; but as the means of preserving 
 peace, and as obstacles to an invader, their influence and 
 power are immense. While contributing to the economi- 
 cal support of a peace establishment, by furnishing drill- 
 grounds, parades, quarters, &c. ; and to its efficiency still 
 more, by affording facilities both to the regulars and mi- 
 litia for that species of artillery practice so necessary in 
 the defence of water frontiers ; they also serve as safe 
 depots of arms and the immense quantity of materials and 
 military munitions so indispensable in modern warfare. 
 These munitions usually require much time, skill, and 
 expense in their construction, and it is of vast import- 
 
152 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 ance that they should be preserved with the utmosi 
 care. 
 
 Maritime arsenals and depots of naval and military 
 stores on the sea-coast are more particularly exposed to 
 capture and destruction. Here an enemy can approach 
 by stealth, striking some sudden and fatal blow before 
 any effectual resistance can be organized. But in addi- 
 tion to the security afforded by harbor fortifications to 
 public property of the highest military value, they also 
 serve to protect the merchant shipping, and the vast 
 amount of private wealth which a commercial people al- 
 ways collect at these points. They furnish safe retreats, 
 and the means of repair for public vessels injured in bat- 
 tle, or by storms, and to merchantmen a refuge from the 
 dangers of sea, or the threats of hostile fleets. Moreover, 
 they greatly facilitate our naval attacks upon the enemy's 
 shipping ; and if he attempt a descent, their well-directed 
 fire will repel his squadrons from our harbors, and force 
 his troops to land at some distant and unfavorable position. 
 
 The three means of permanent defence which have 
 been mentioned, are, of course, intended to accomplish 
 the same general object ; but each has its distinct and 
 proper sphere of action, and neither can be regarded as 
 antagonistical to the others. Any undue increase of one, 
 at the expense of the other two, must necessarily be fol- 
 lowed by a corresponding diminution of national strength. 
 We must not infer, however, that all must be maintained 
 upon the same footing. The position of the country and 
 the character of the people must determine this. 
 
 England, from her insular position and the extent of 
 her commerce, must maintain a large navy ; a large army 
 is also necessary for the defence of her own coasts and 
 the protection of her colonial possessions. Her men-of- 
 war secure a safe passage for her merchant-vessels, and 
 transport her troops in safety through all seas, and thus 
 
MEANS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE. 153 
 
 contribute much to the acquisition and security of colonial 
 territory. The military forces of the British empire 
 amount to about one hundred and fifty thousand men, and 
 the naval forces to about seven hundred vessels of war,* 
 carrying in all some fifteen thousand guns and forty thou- 
 sand men. France has less commerce, and but few colo- 
 nial possessions.^ She has a great extent of seacoast, but 
 her fortifications secure it from maritime descents ; her 
 only accessible points are on the land frontiers. Her 
 army and navy, therefore, constitute her principal means 
 of defence. Her army numbers some three hundred and 
 fifty thousand men, and her navy about three hundred and 
 fifty vessels,* carrying about nine thousand guns and thirty 
 thousand men. Russia, Austria, Prussia, Sweden, and 
 other continental powers, have but little commerce to be 
 protected, while their extensive frontiers are greatly ex- 
 posed to land attacks : their fortifications and armies, 
 therefore, constitute their principal means of defence. 
 But for the protection of their own seas from the inroads 
 of their powerful maritime neighbor, Russia and Austria 
 support naval establishments of a limited extent. Russia 
 has, in all, some one hundred and eighty vessels of war, 
 and Austria not quite half that number.* 
 
 The United States possess no colonies ; but they have 
 a seacoast of more than three thousand miles, with numer- 
 ous bays, estuaries, and navigable rivers, which expose 
 our most populous cities to maritime attacks. The north- 
 em land frontier is two thousand miles in extent, and in 
 the west our territory borders upon the British and Mexi- 
 can possessions for many thousand miles more. Within 
 these limits there are numerous tribes of Indians, who re- 
 quire the watchful care of armed forces to keep them at 
 peace among themselves as well as with us. Our author- 
 
 * These numbers include all vessels of war, whether in commission, 
 buildingr, or in ordinary. 
 
154 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 ized military establishment amounts to 7,590 men, and 
 our naval establishment consists of seventy-seven vessels 
 of all classes, carrying 2,345 guns, and 8,724 men.* 
 This is certainly a very small military and naval force for 
 the defence of so extended and populous a country, espe- 
 cially one whose political institutions and rapidly-increas- 
 mg power expose it to the distrust and jealousy of most 
 Other nations. 
 
 The fortifications for the defence of our sea-coast and 
 land frontiers will be discussed hereafter.f 
 
 * Since these pages were put in the hands of the printer, the above 
 numhers have been nearly doubled, this increase having been made 
 with special reference to the present war with Mexico. 
 
 t Jomini's work on the Military Art contains many valuable re- 
 marks on this subject of Military Polity : also the writings of Clause- 
 witz, Dupin, Lloyd, Chambray, Tranchant de Laveme, and Rud- 
 torfer. Several of these questions are also discussed in Rocquancourt, 
 Carion-Nisas, De Vernon, and other writers on military history. The 
 several European Annuaires Miiitaires, or Army Registers, and the 
 French and German military periodicals, contain much valuable mat- 
 ter connected with military statistics. 
 
SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 165 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 
 
 The principal attacks which we have had to sustain, 
 either as colonies or states, from civilized foes, have come 
 from Canada. As colonies we were continually encoun- 
 tering difficulties and dangers from the French posses- 
 sions. In the war of the Revolution, it being one of na- 
 tional emancipation, the military operations were more 
 general throughout the several states ; but in the war of 
 1812 the attacks were confined to the northern frontier 
 and a few exposed points along the coast. In these two 
 contests with Great Britain, Boston, New York, Philadel- 
 phia, Baltimore, Washington, Charleston, Savannah, Mo- 
 bile, and New Orleans, being within reach of the British 
 naval power, and offering the dazzling attraction of rich 
 booty, have each been subjected to powerful assaults. 
 
 Similar attacks will undoubtedly be made in any future 
 war with England. An attempt at permanent lodgment 
 would be based either on Canada or a servile insurrection 
 in the southern states. The former project, in a military 
 point of view, offers the greatest advantages, but most 
 probably the latter would also be resorted to for effecting 
 a diversion, if nothing more. But for inflicting upon us a 
 sudden and severe injury by the destruction of large 
 amounts of public and private property, our seaport towns 
 offer inducements not likely to be disregarded. This 
 mode of warfare, barbarous though it be, will certainly at- 
 tend a conflict with any great maritime power. How 
 
156 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 can we best prepare in time of peace to repel these 
 attacks ? 
 
 Immediately after the war of 1812 a joint commission 
 of our most distinguished military and naval officers was 
 formed, to devise a system of defensive works, to be erect- 
 ed in time of peace for the security of the most important 
 and the most exposed points on our sea-coast. It may be 
 well here to point out, in very general terms, the positions 
 and character of these works, mentioning only such as 
 have been completed, or are now in course of construction, 
 and such as are intended to be built as soon as Congress 
 shall grant the requisite funds. There are other works 
 projected for some future period, but as they do not belong 
 to the class required for immediate use, they will not be 
 referred to. 
 
 MAINE. 
 
 Beginning at the northeastern extremity of our coast, 
 we have, for Eastport and Wiscasset, projected works 
 estimated to carry about fifty guns. Nothing has yet 
 been done to these works. 
 
 Next Portland, with works carrying about forty or fifty 
 guns, and Fort Penobscot and batteries, carrying about 
 one hundred and fifty guns. These are only partly built. 
 
 NEW HAMPSHIRE. 
 
 Defences of Portsmouth and the vicinity, about two 
 hundred guns. These works are also only partly built. 
 
 MASSACHUSETTS. 
 
 Projected works east of Boston, carrying about sixty 
 guns. These are not yet commenced. 
 
 Works for defence of Boston Harbor carry about five 
 hundred guns. These are nearly three-quarters completed. 
 Those of New Bedford harbor carry fifty guns : not yet begun. 
 
SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 157 
 
 RHODE ISLAND. 
 
 Newport harbor, — works carry about five hundred guns, 
 nearly completed. 
 
 CONNECTICUT. 
 
 New London harbor, New Haven, and the Connecticut 
 river. The first of these nearly completed ; the two latter 
 not yet begun. 
 
 NEW YORK. 
 
 The works projected for the defence of New York har- 
 bor are estimated to carry about one thousand guns. These 
 works are not yet one-half constructed. 
 
 PENNSYLVANIA. 
 
 The works projected for the defence of the Delaware 
 Bay and Philadelphia will carry about one hundred and 
 fifty guns. They are not one-quarter built. 
 
 MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA. 
 
 Baltimore and Annapolis — these works will carry some 
 two hundred and fifty guns. The works for the Chesa- 
 peake Bay will carry about six hundred guns ; and those 
 for the Potomac river about eighty guns. These are more 
 than one-half completed. 
 
 NORTH CAROLINA. 
 
 The works at Beaufort and Smithville carry about one 
 hundred and fifty guns. They are essentially completed. 
 
 SOUTH CAROLINA. 
 
 The works for the defence of Charleston carry some 
 two hundred guns. They are one-half constructed. 
 
168 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 GEORGIA. 
 
 The defences of Savannah carry about two hundred guns 
 and are nearly three-quarters finished. 
 
 FLORIDA. 
 
 The works projected for the defence of St. Augustine, 
 Key West, Tortugas, and Pensacola will carry some eight 
 or nine hundred guns. Those at St. Augustine and Pen- 
 sacola are essentially completed, but those at Key West 
 and Tortugas are barely begun. • 
 
 ALABAMA. 
 
 The works for the defence of Mobile will carry about one 
 hundred and sixty guns. These are nearly constructed. 
 
 LOUISIANA. 
 
 The works foT the defence of New Orleans will carry 
 some two hundred and fifty or three hundred guns ; they 
 are nearly completed. 
 
 The works north of the Chesapeake cost about three 
 thousand dollars per gun ; those south of that point about 
 six thousand^doUars per gun. This difference in cost is 
 due in part to the character of the soil on which the forti- 
 fications are built, and in part to the high prices paid in 
 the south for materials and workmanship. 
 
 Having pointed out the character and condition of our 
 system of sea-coast defences, let us briefly examine how 
 far these works may be relied on as a means of security 
 against a maritime descent. 
 
 To come to a proper conclusion on this subject, let us 
 first examine the three or four great maritime descents at- 
 tempted by the English during the wars of the French Rev^ 
 olution ; a period at which the great naval superiority of 
 
SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 159 
 
 England over other nations, gave her the title of mistress 
 of the seas. Let us notice what have been the results of 
 the several attempts made by this power at maritime inva- 
 sions, and the means by which such attacks have been 
 repelled. 
 
 In 1795, a maritime expedition was fitted out against 
 Quiberon, at an expense of eight millions of dollars. 
 This port of the French coast had then a naval defence 
 of near thirty sail, carrying about sixteen hundred guns. 
 Lord Bridport attacked it with fourteen sail of the line, 
 five frigates, and some smaller vessels, about fifteen hun- 
 dred guns in all, captured a portion of the fleet, and forced 
 the remainder to take shelter under the guns of the forti- 
 fications of L'Orient. The French naval defence being 
 destroyed, the British now entered Quiberon without op- 
 position. This bay is said by Brenton, in his British 
 Naval History, to be " the finest on the coast of France, 
 or perhaps in the world, for landing an army." Besides 
 these natural advantages in favor of the English, the in- 
 habitants of the surrounding country were in open insur- 
 rection, ready to receive the invaders with open arms. A 
 body of ten thousand troops were landed, and clothing, 
 arms, &c., furnished to as many more royalist troops ; but 
 the combined forces failed in their attack upon St. Barbe, 
 and General Hoche, from his intrenchments, with seven 
 thousand men, held in check a body of eighteen thousand, 
 penned up, without defences, in the narrow peninsida. 
 Reinforced by a new debarkation, the allies again at- 
 tempted to advance, but were soon defeated, and ultimate- 
 ly almost entirely destroyed. 
 
 In 1799, the English and Russians made a descent up- 
 on Holland with fourteen ships of the line and ten frig- 
 ates, carrying about eleven himdred guns and a great num- 
 ber of transports, with an army of thirty-six thousand men. 
 The Dutch naval defences consisted of eight ships of the 
 
160 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 line, three fifty-four gun ships, eight forty-eight gun ships 
 and eight smaller frigates, carrying in all about twelve hun- 
 dred guns ; but this force contributed little or nothing to 
 the defence, and was soon forced to hoist the hostile flag. 
 The defensive army was at first only twelve thousand, but 
 the Republicans afterwards increased it to twenty-two 
 thousand, and finally to twenty-eight thousand men. But 
 notwithstanding this immense naval and military superior- 
 ity, and the co-operation of the Orange party in assisting 
 the landing of their troops, the allies failed to get posses- 
 sion of a single strong place ; and after a loss of six thou- 
 sand men, were compelled to capitulate. " Such," says 
 Alison, " was the disastrous issue of the greatest expedi- 
 tion which had yet sailed from the British harbors during 
 the war." 
 
 In 1801, Nelson, with three ships of the line, two frig- 
 ates, and thirty-five smaller vessels, made a desperate at- 
 tack upon the harbor of Boulogne, but was repulsed with 
 severe loss. 
 
 Passing over some unimportant attacks, we come to the 
 descent upon the Scheldt, or as it is commonly called, the 
 Walcheren expedition, in 1809. This expedition, though 
 a failure, has often been referred to as proving the expe- 
 diency of maritime descents. The following is a brief 
 narrative of this expedition : — 
 
 Napoleon had projected vast fortifications, dock-yards, 
 and naval arsenals at Flushing and Antwerp for the pro- 
 tection of a maritime force in the Scheldt. But no sooner 
 was the execution of this project begun, than the English 
 fitted out an expedition to seize upon the defences of the 
 Scheldt, and capture or destroy the naval force. Flush- 
 ing, at the mouth of the river, was but ill-secured, and 
 Antwerp, some sixty or seventy miles further up the river, 
 was entirely defenceless ; the rampart was unarmed with 
 cannon, dilapidated, and tottering, and its garrison consisted 
 
SEACOAST DEFENCES. 161 
 
 of only about two hundred invalids and recruits. Napo- 
 leon's regular army was employed on the Danube and in 
 the Peninsula. The British attacking force consisted of 
 thirty-seven ships of the line, twenty-three frigates, thirty- 
 three sloops of war, twenty-eight gun, mortar, and bomb 
 vessels, thirty-six smaller vessels, eighty-two gim-boats, in- 
 numerable transports, with over forty thousand troops, and 
 an immense artillery train ; making in all, says the English 
 historian, " an hundred thousand combatants." A landing 
 was made upon the island of Walcheren, and siege laid to 
 Flushing, which place was not reduced till eighteen days 
 affer the landing ; the attack upon the water was made by 
 seven or eight ships of the line, and a large flotilla of bomb 
 vessels, but produced no eflfect. The channel at the mouth 
 of the river was too broad to be defended by the works of 
 Flushing, and the main portion of the fleet passed out of 
 reach of the guns, and ascended the Scheldt part way up 
 to Antwerp. But in the mean time, the fortifications of 
 that place had been repaired, and, after a fruitless opera- 
 tion of a whole month in the river, the English were 
 gradually forced to retreat to Walcheren, and finally to 
 evacuate their entire conquest. 
 
 The cost of the expedftion was immense, both in treas- 
 ure and in life. It was certainly very poorly managed. 
 But we cannot help noticing the superior value of fortifi- 
 cations as a defence against such descents. They did 
 much to retard the operations of the enemy till a defensive 
 army could be raised. The works of Flushing were never 
 intended to close up the Scheldt, and of course could not 
 intercept the passage of shipping ; but they were not re- 
 duced by the English naval force, as has sometimes been 
 alleged. Col. Mitchel, of the English service, says that 
 the fleet " kept up so tremendous a fire upon the batteries, 
 that the French officers who had been present at Auster- 
 litz and Jena, declared that the cannonade in these battles 
 
162 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 had been a mere jeu d'enfans in comparison. Yet what 
 was the effect produced on the defences of the place by 
 this tire, so formidable, to judge by the sound alone 1 
 The writer can answer the question with some accuracy, 
 for he went along the entire sea-line the very day after 
 the capitulation, and found no part of the parapet injured 
 so as to be of the slightest consequence, and only one sol- 
 itary gun dismounted, evidently by the bursting of a shell, 
 and which could not, of course, have been thrown from the 
 line of battle ships, but must have been thrown from the 
 land batteries."* 
 
 But it may be said that although great naval descents 
 on a hostile coast are almost always unsuccessful, never- 
 theless a direct naval attack upon a single fortified posi- 
 tion will be attended with more favorable results ; and 
 that our seaport towns, however fortified, will be exposed 
 to bombardment and destruction by the enemy's fleets. 
 In other words, that in a direct contest between ships and 
 forts the former will have at least an equal chance of 
 success. 
 
 Let us suppose a fair trial of this relative strength. 
 The fort is to be properly constructed and in good repair ; 
 its guns in a position to be used^vith effect; its garrison 
 skilful and efiicient; its commander capable and brave. 
 The ship is of the very best character, and in perfect 
 order ; the crew disciplined and courageous ; its com- 
 mander skilful and adroit ; the wind, and tide, and sea — 
 all as could be desired.f The numbers of the garrison 
 and crew are to be no more than requisite, with no unne- 
 cessary exposure of human life to swell the lists of the 
 slain. The issue of this contest, unless attended with 
 
 * The batteries constructed in the siege of this place were armed 
 with fifty-two heavy guns and mortars. 
 
 t These conditions for a battery are easily satisfied, but for the ship, 
 are partly dependent on the elements, and seldom to be wholly attained 
 
SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 163 
 
 extraordinary and easily distinguishable circumstances, 
 would be a fair test of their relative strength. 
 
 What result should we anticipate from the nature of the 
 contending forces ? The ship, under the circumstances 
 we have supposed, can choose her point of attack, select- 
 ing the one she may deem the most vulnerable ; but she 
 herself is everywhere vulnerable ; her men and guns are 
 much concentrated, and consequently much exposed. 
 But in the fort the guns and men are more distributed, a 
 fort with an interior area of several acres not having a 
 garrison as large as the crew of a seventy-four-gun ship. 
 All parts of the vessel are liable to injury ; while the fort 
 offers but a small mark, — the opening of the embrasures, 
 a small part of the carriage, and now and then a head or 
 arm raised above the parapet, — the ratio of exposed sur- 
 faces being not less than twenty to one. In the vessel the 
 guns are fired from an oscillating deck, and the balls go 
 at random ; in the fort the guns are fired from an immove- 
 able platform, and the balls reach their object with uner- 
 ring aim. There is always more or less motion in the 
 water, so that the ship's guns, though accurately pointed 
 at one moment, at the next will be thrown entirely away 
 from the object, even when the motion is too slight to be 
 otherwise noticed ; whereas in the battery the guns will 
 be fired just as they are pointed ; and the motion of the 
 vessel will merely vary to the extent of a few inches the 
 spot in which the shot is received. In the fort the men 
 and guns are behind impenetrable walls of stone and 
 earth ; in the vessel they are behind frail bulwarks, 
 whose splinters are equally destructive with the shot. 
 The fort is incombustible ; while the ship may readily 
 be set on fire by incendiary projectiles. The ship has 
 many points exposed that may be called vital points. By 
 losing her rudder, or portions of her rigging, or of her 
 spars, she may become unmanageable, and unable to use 
 
164 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 her strength ; she may receive shots under water, and be 
 liable to sink ; she may receive hot shot, and be set on 
 fire : these damages are in addition to those of having her 
 guns dismounted and her people killed by shots that pierce 
 her sides and scatter splinters from her timbers ; while 
 the risks of the battery are confined to those mentioned 
 above — namely, the risk that the gun, the carriage, or the 
 men may be struck. 
 
 The opinions of military writers, and the facts of his- 
 tory, fully accord with these deductions of theory. Some 
 few individuals mistaking, or misstating, the facts of a few 
 recent trials, assert that modern improvements in the naval 
 service have sq far outstripped the progress in the art of 
 land defence, that a floating force is now abundantly able 
 to cope, upon equal terms, with a land battery. Ignorant 
 and superficial persons, hearing merely that certain forts 
 had recently yielded to a naval force, and taking no trou- 
 ble to learn the real facts of the case, have paraded them 
 before the public as proofs positive of a new era in mili- 
 tary science. This conclusion, however groundless and 
 absurd, has received credit merely from its novelty. Let 
 us examine the several trials of strength which have taken 
 place between ships and forts within the last fifty years, 
 and see what have been the results. 
 
 In 1792 a considerable French squadron attacked Ca- 
 gliari, whose fortifications were at that time so dilapidated 
 and weak, as scarcely to deserve the name of defences. 
 Nevertheless, the French fleet, after a bombardment of 
 three days, was most signally defeated and obliged to 
 retire. 
 
 In 1794 two British ships, "the Fortitude of seventy- 
 four, and the Juno frigate of thirty-two guns," attacked a 
 small town in the bay of Martello, Corsica, which was 
 armed with one gun in barbette, and a garrison of thirty 
 men. After a bombardment of two and a half hours, these 
 
SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 165 
 
 ships were forced to haul off with considerable damage 
 and loss of life. The little tower had received no injury, 
 and its garrison were unharmed. Here were one hundred 
 and six guns afloat against one on shore ; and yet the latter 
 was successful. 
 
 In 1797 Nelson attacked the little inefficient batteries 
 of Santa Crux, in Teneriff'e, with eight vessels carrying 
 four hundred guns. But notwithstanding his great supe- 
 riority in numbers, skill, and bravery, he was repelled 
 with the loss of two hundred and fifty men, while the gar- 
 rison received little or no damage. A single ball from 
 the land battery, striking the side of one of his vessels, 
 instantly sunk her with near a hundred seamen and ma- 
 rines ! 
 
 In 1 798, a French flotilla of fifty-two brigs and gunboats, 
 manned with near seven thousand men, attacked a little 
 English redoubt on the island of Marcou, which was arm- 
 ed with two thirty-two-pounders, two six-pounders, four 
 four-pounders, and two carronades, and garrisoned with 
 two hundred and fifty men.- Notwithstanding this great 
 disparity of numbers, the little redoubt sunk seven of the 
 enemy's brigs and gunboats, captured another, and forced 
 the remainder to retreat with great loss ; while the garri- 
 son had but one man killed and three wounded. 
 
 In 1801, the French, with three frigates and six thou- 
 sand men, attacked the poorly-constructed works of Porto 
 Ferrairo, whose defensive force was a motley garrison of 
 fifteen hundred Corsicans, Tuscans, and English. Here 
 the attacking force W3,s four times as great as that of the 
 garrison ; nevertheless they were unsuccessful after several 
 bombardments and a siege of five months. 
 
 In July of the same year, 1801, Admiral Saumarez, 
 with an English fleet of six ships of the line and two 
 smaller vessels, carrying in all five hundred and two guns, 
 attacke i the Spanish and French defences of Algesiras. 
 
166 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 Supposing the floating forces of the contending parties io 
 be equal, gun for gun, (which is certainly a very fair es- 
 timate for the attacking force, considering the circum- 
 stances of the case,) we have a French land-battery of 
 only twelve guns opposed by an English floating force of 
 one hundred and ninety-six guns. Notwithstanding this 
 inequality of nearly seventeen to one, the little battery 
 compelled the superior naval force to retreat with great 
 loss. 
 
 Shortly after this, the French and Spanish fleets at- 
 tacked the same English squadron with a force of nearly 
 three to one, but met with a most signal defeat ; whereas 
 with a land-battery of only one to seventeen, the same 
 party had been victorious. What proof can be more de- 
 cisive of the superiority of guns on shore over those 
 afloat ! 
 
 In 1803 the English garrison of Diamond Rock, near 
 Port Royal Bay, with only one hundred men and some fif- 
 teen guns, repelled a French squadron of two seventy- 
 four-gun ships, a frigate, and a brig, assisted by a land 
 attack of two hundred troops. There was not a single 
 man killed or wounded in the redoubt, while the French 
 lost fifty men ! The place was afterwards reduced by 
 famine. 
 
 In 1806 a French battery on Cape Licosa, of only two 
 guns and a garrison of twenty-five men, resisted the at- 
 tacks of a British eighty-gun ship and two frigates. The 
 carriage of one of the land-guns failed on the second 
 shot, so that, in fact, only one of them was available dur- 
 ing the action. Here was a single piece of ordnance and 
 a garrison of twenty-Jive men, opposed to a naval force of 
 over one hundred and jifty guns and about thirteen hundred 
 men. And what effects were produced by this strange 
 combat ? The attacking force lost thirty-seven men killed 
 and wounded, the eighty-gun ship was much disabled, 
 
SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 167 
 
 while the fort and garrison escaped entirely unhan^d ! 
 What could not be effected by force was afterwards ob- 
 tained by negotiation. 
 
 In 1808 a French land-battery of only three guns, near 
 Fort Trinidad, drove off an English seventy-four-gun 
 ship, and a bomb-vessel. 
 
 In 1813 Leghorn, whose defences were of a very me- 
 diocre character, and whose garrison at that time was ex- 
 ceedingly weak, was attacked by an English squadron of 
 six ships, carrying over three hundred guns, and a land 
 force of one thousand troops. The whole attempt was a 
 perfect failure. 
 
 "In 1814, when the English advanced against Ant- 
 werp," says Colonel Mitchell, an English historian, " Fort 
 Frederick, a small work of only two guns, was establish- 
 ed in a bend of the Polder Dyke, at some distance below 
 ♦Lillo. The armament was a long eighteen-pounder and 
 a five and a half inch howitzer. From this post the 
 French determined to dislodge the English, and an eighty- 
 gun ship dropped down with the tide and anchored near 
 the Flanders shore, about six hundred yards from the 
 British battery. By her position she was secured from 
 the fire of the eighteen-pounder, and exposed to that of 
 the howitzer only. As soon as every thing was made 
 tight her broadside was opened ; and if noise and smoke 
 were alone sufficient to ensure success in war, as so 
 many of the moderns seem to think, the result of this 
 strange contest would not have been long doubtful, for the 
 thunder of the French artillery actually made the earth 
 to shake again ; but though the earth shook, the single 
 British howitzer was neither dismounted nor silenced ; 
 and though the artillerymen could not, perfectly exposed 
 as they were, stand to their gun while the iron hail was 
 striking thick and fast around, yet no sooner did the en- 
 emy's fire slacken for a moment than they sprang to their 
 
168 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 p(^, ready to return at least one shot for eighty. This 
 extraordinary combat lasted from seven o'clock in the 
 morning till near twelve at noon, when the French ship, 
 having had forty-one men killed and wounded, her com- 
 mander being in the list of the latter, and having besides 
 sustained serious damage in her hull and rigging, return- 
 ed to Antwerp without effecting any thing whatever. The 
 howitzer was not dismounted, the fort was not injured, — 
 there being in fact nothing to injure, — and the British had 
 only one man killed and two wounded." 
 
 It is unnecessary to further specify examples from the 
 wars of the French Revolution ; the whole history of 
 these wars is one continued proof of the superiority of 
 fortifications as a maritime frontier defence. The sea- 
 coast of France is almost within stone's throw* of the 
 principal British naval depots ; here were large towns and 
 harbors, filled with the rich commerce of the world, offer- 
 ing the dazzling attraction of rich booty. The French 
 navy was at this time utterly incompetent to their defence ; 
 while England supported a maritime force at an annual 
 expense of near ninety millions of dollars. Her largest 
 fleets were continually cruising within sight of these sea- 
 ports, and not unfrequently attempting to cut out their 
 shipping. " At this period," says one of her naval histori- 
 ans, " the naval force of Britain, so multiplied and so ex- 
 pert from long practice, had acquired an intimate know- 
 ledge of their (the French) harbors, their bays and creeks ; 
 her officers knew the depth of water, and the resistance 
 likely to be met with in every situfition." On the other 
 hand, these harbors and towns were frequently stripped of 
 their garrisons by the necessities of distant wars, being 
 left with no other defence than their fortifications and 
 militia. And yet, notwithstanding all this, they escaped 
 
 * Only eighteen and a half miles across the Channel at the narrow- 
 est place. 
 
SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 169 
 
 unharmed during the entire contest. They were frequent- 
 ly attacked, and in some instances the most desperate ef- 
 forts were made to effect a permanent lodgment ; but in 
 no case was the success at all commensurate with the ex- 
 pense of life and treasure sacrificed, and no permanent 
 hold was made on either the maritime frontiers of France 
 or her allies. This certainly was owing to no inferiority 
 of skill and bravery on the part of the British navy, as the 
 battles of Aboukir and Trafalgar, and the almost total an- 
 nihilation of the French marine, have but too plainly pro- 
 ven. Why then did these places escape ? We know of 
 no other reason, than that they were fortified ; and that the 
 French knew how to defend their fortifications. The 
 British maritime expeditions to Quiberon, Holland, Bou- 
 logne, the Scheldt, Constantinople, Buenos Ayres, &c., 
 sufiiciently prove the ill-success, and the waste of life and 
 treasure with which they must always be attended. But 
 when her naval power was applied to the destruction of 
 the enemy's marine, and in transporting her land forces to 
 solid bases of operations on the soil of her allies, in Por- 
 tugal and Belgium, the fall of Napoleon crowned the glory 
 of their achievements. 
 
 Let us now examine the several British naval attacks 
 on our own forts, in the wars of the Revolution and of 1812. 
 
 In 1776 Sir Peter Parker, with a British fleet of nine 
 vessels, carrying about two hundred and seventy* guns, 
 attacked Fort Moultrie, in Charleston harbor, which was 
 then armed with only twenty-six guns, and garrisoned by 
 only three hundred and seventy-five regulars and a few 
 militia. In this contest the British were entirely defeated, 
 and lost, in killed and wounded, two hundred and five men, 
 while their whole two hundred and seventy guns killed 
 and wounded only thirty-two men in the fort. Of this 
 
 * These vessels rated two hundred and fifty-four guns, but the num- 
 ber actually carried is stated to have been two hundred and seventy. 
 15 
 
170 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 trial of strength, which was certainly a fair one, Cooper^ 
 in his Naval History, says : — " It goes fully to prove the 
 important military position that ships cannot withstand 
 forts, when the latter are properly armed, constructed, and 
 garrisoned. General Moultrie says only thirty rounds 
 from the battery were fired, and was of opinion that the 
 want of powder alone prevented the Americans from de- 
 stroying the men-of-war." 
 
 In 1814 a British fleet of four vessels, carrying ninety- 
 two guns, attacked Fort Boyer, a small redoubt, located 
 on a point of land commanding the passage from the Gulf 
 into the bay of Mobile. This redoubt was garrisoned by 
 only one hundred and twenty combatants, officers in- 
 cluded ; and its armament was but twenty small pieces of 
 cannon, some of which were almost entirely useless, and 
 most of them poorly mounted " in batteries hastily thrown 
 up, and leaving the gunners uncovered from the knee up- 
 ward," while the enemy's land force, acting in concert 
 with the ships, consisted of twenty artillerists with a bat- 
 tery of two guns, and seveti hundred and thirty marines, 
 Indians, and negroes. His ships carried five hundred and 
 ninety men in all. This immense disparity of numbers 
 and strength did not allow to the British military and na- 
 val commanders the slightest apprehension " that four 
 British ships, carrying ninety-two gims, and a land force 
 somewhat exceeding seven hundred combatants, could 
 fail in reducing a small work mounting only twenty short 
 carronades, and defended by a little more thanra hundred 
 men, unprovided alike with furnaces for heating shot, or 
 casements to cover themselves from rockets and shells." 
 Nevertheless, the enemy was completely repulsed ; one of 
 his largest ships was entirely destroyed, and 85 men were 
 killed and wounded on board the other ; while our loss 
 was only eight or nine. Here a naval force oi Jive to one 
 was repelled by the land-battery. 
 
SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 171 
 
 Again, in 1814, a barbette battery of one four-pounder 
 and two eighteen-pounder guns at Stonington, repelled a 
 British fleet of one hundred and thirty-four guns. During 
 the engagement the Americans exhausted their ammuni- 
 tion, and spiked their eighteen-pounders, and only one of 
 them was afterwards tised. Two of the enemy's ships, 
 carrying one hundred and twelve guus, were engaged du- 
 ring the whole time of attack, and during much of this 
 time bombarded the town from a position beyond reach of 
 the land-battery. They were entirely too far off for the 
 four-pounder gun to be of any use. Supposing the two 
 eighteen-pounders to have been employed during the whole 
 action, and also all the guns of the fleet, one eighteen- 
 pounder on land must have been more than equivalent to 
 sixty-seven guns afloat, for the ships were so much injured 
 as to render it necessary for them to withdraw. The 
 British loss was twenty killed, and more than fifty wound- 
 ed. Ours was only two killed and six wounded.* 
 
 The fleet sent to the attack of Baltimore, in 1814, con- 
 sisted of forty sail, the largest of which were ships of the 
 line, carrying an army of over six thousand combatants. 
 The troops were landed at North Point, while sixteen of 
 the bomb-vessels and frigates approached within reach of 
 Fort McHenry, and commenced a bombardment which 
 lasted twenty-five hours. During this attack, the enemy 
 threw " fifteen hundred shells, four hundred of which ex- 
 ploded within the walls of the fort, but without making 
 any impression on either the strength of the work or the 
 garrison," and the British were compelled to retire with 
 much loss. 
 
 In 1815, a squadron of British ships, stationed off* the 
 mouths of the Mississippi, for the purpose of a blockade, 
 ascended the river as high as Fort St. Philip, which is a 
 
 • Perkins says two killed and six wounded. Holmes says six 
 wounded, but makes no mention of any killed. 
 
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 has be^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
 
 the facts the ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 
 
 our to re^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
 
 a case fail^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
 
 to overthrow^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^l 
 
 We allude to^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
 
 Washington by the ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^| 
 
 mac assi^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
 
 burning ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 
 
 the Fort ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
 
 i n c c^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
 
 on^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
 
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 fence was i^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
 
 ron c^^V^I^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^I 
 
 guns, under orders " to ascend the river as high as Fort 
 Washington, and try upon it the experiment of a bombard- 
 ment," approached that fort, and, upon firing a single shell, 
 which did no injury to either the fort or the garrison, the 
 latter deserted the works, and rapidly retreated. The 
 commanding officer was immediately dismissed for his 
 cowardice. An English naval officer, who was one of the 
 expedition, in-speaking of the retreat of the garrison, says : 
 '* We were at loss to account for such an extraordinary 
 
SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 173 
 
 Step. The position was good and the capture would have 
 cost us at least fifty men, and more, had it been properly- 
 defended ; besides, an unfavorable wind and many other 
 chances were in their favor," &:c. The fleet ascended 
 the river to Alexandria, but learning soon afterwards that 
 batteries were preparing at White House and Indian Head 
 to cut off its retreat, it retired, in much haste, but not 
 without injury. 
 
 Some have also pretended to find in modern European 
 history a few examples contradictory of the relative pow- 
 er which we have here assigned to ships and forts. 
 Overlooking the numerous and well-authenticated exam- 
 ples, where forts of small dimensions and of small arma- 
 ment have repelled large fleets, they would draw their 
 conclusions from the four or five instances where fleets 
 have gained (as was at first supposed) a somewhat doubt- 
 ful victory over forts. But a careful and critical examin- 
 ation of the facts in these cases, will show that even these 
 are no exceptions to the general rule of the superiority of 
 gims ashore over guns afloat. 
 
 The only instances where it has ever been pretended 
 by writers of any note, that ships have gained advan- 
 tage, are those of the attack on Copenhagen in 1801 ; the 
 passage of the Dardanelles, in 1807; the attack on Al- 
 giers, in 1816 ; the attack on San Juan d'UUoa, in 1838 ; 
 and the attack on St. Jean d'Acre, in 1840. 
 
 Let us examine these examples a little in detail : — 
 
 Copenhagen. — The British fleet sent to attack Copen- 
 hagen, in 1801, consisted of fifty-two sail, eighteen of 
 them being line-of-battle ships, four frigates, &c. They 
 sailed from Yarmouth roads on the 12th of March, passed 
 the Sound on the 30th, and attacked and defeated the 
 Danish line on the 2d of April. 
 
 The Soimd between Cronenberg and the Swedish coast 
 is about two and a half miles wide, (vide Fig. 34.) The 
 
174 MILITARy ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 batteries of Cronenberg and Elsinore were lined with one 
 hundred pieces of cannon and mortars ; but the Swedish 
 battery had been much neglected, and then mounted only 
 six guns. Nevertheless, the British admiral, to avoid the 
 damage his squadron would have to sustain in the passage 
 of this wide channel, defended by a force scarcely supe- 
 rior to a single one of his ships, preferred to attempt the 
 difficult passage of the Belt ; but after a few of his light 
 vessels, acting as scouts, had run on rocks, he returned to 
 the Sound. 
 
 He then tried to negotiate a peaceful passage, threaten- 
 ing, however, a declaration of war if his vessels should 
 be fired upon. It must be remembered that at this time 
 England was at peace with both Denmark and Sweden, 
 and that no just cause of war existed. Hence, the ad- 
 miral inferred that the commanders of these batteries 
 would be loath to involve their countries in a war with so 
 formidable a power as England, by commencing hostili- 
 ties, when only a free passage was asked. The Danish 
 commander replied, that he should not permit a fleet to 
 pass his post, whose object and destination were unknown 
 to him. He fired upon them, as he was bound to do by 
 long-existing commercial regulations, and not as an act of 
 hostility against the English. The Swedes, 'on the con- 
 trary, remained neutral, and allowed the British vessels to 
 lie near by for several days without firing upon them. 
 Seeing this friendly disposition of the Swedes, the fleet 
 neared their coast, and passed out of the reach of the 
 Danish batteries, which opened a fire of balls and shells ; 
 but all of them fell more than two hundred yards short 
 of the fleet, which escaped without the loss of a single 
 man. 
 
 The Swedes excused their treachery by the plea that 
 it would have been impossible to construct batteries at 
 that season, and that, even had it been possible, Denmark 
 
SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 175 
 
 would not have consented to tlieir doing so, for fear that 
 Sweden would renew her old claim to one half of the rich 
 duties levied by Denmark on all ships passing the strait. 
 There may have been some grounds for the last excuse ; 
 but the true reason for their conduct was the fear of get- 
 ting involved in a war with England. Napoleon says 
 that, even at that season, a few days would have been 
 sufficient for placing a hundred guns in battery, and that 
 Sweden had much more time than was requisite. And 
 with a hundred guns on each side of the channel, served 
 with skill and energy, the fleet must necessarily have sus- 
 tained so much damage as to render it unfit to attack 
 Copenhagen. 
 
 On this passage, we remark : — 
 
 1st. The whole number of guns and mortars in the forts 
 of the Sound amounted to only one hundred and six, while 
 the fleet carried over seventeen hundred guns ; and yet, 
 with this immense superiority of more than sixteen to one, 
 the British admiral preferred the dangerous passage of the 
 Belt to encountering the fire of these land-batteries. 
 
 2d. By negotiations, and threatening the vengeance of 
 England, he persuaded the small Swedish battery to re- 
 main silent and allow the fleet to pass near that shore, out 
 of reach of Cronenberg and Elsinore. 
 
 3d. It is the opinion of Napoleon and the best English 
 writers^ that if the Swedish battery had been put in order, 
 and acted in concert with the Danish works, they might 
 have so damaged the fleet as to render it incapable of any 
 serious attempt on Copenhagen. 
 
 We now proceed to consider the circumstances attend- 
 ing the attack and defence of Copenhagen itself. The 
 only side of the town exposed to the attack of heavy ship- 
 ping is the northern, where there lies a shoal extending 
 out a considerable distance, leaving only a very narrow 
 approach to the heart of the city, (Fig. 35 ) On the most 
 
176 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 advanced part of this shoal are the Crown-batteries, car 
 lying in all eighty-eight guns.* The entrance into the 
 Baltic between Copenhagen and Salthom, is divided into 
 two channels by a bank, called the Middle Ground, which 
 is situated directly opposite Copenhagen. To defend the 
 entrance on the left of the Crown-batteries, they placed 
 near the mouth of the channel four ships of the line, one 
 frigate, and two sloops, carrying in all three hundred and 
 fifty-eight guns. To secure the port and city from bom- 
 bardment from the King's Channel, (that between the 
 Middle Ground and town,) a line of floating defences were 
 moored near the edge of the shoal, and manned princi- 
 pally by volunteers. This line consisted of old hulls of 
 vessels, block-ships, prames, rafts, &;c., carrying in' all six 
 hundred and twenty-eight guns — a force strong enough to 
 prevent the approach of bomb-vessels and gunboats, (the 
 purpose for which it was intended,) but utterly incapable 
 of contending with first-rate ships of war ; but these the 
 Danes thought would be deterred from approaching by the 
 difiiculties of navigation. These difficulties were cer- 
 tainly very great ; and Nelson said, beforehand, that " the 
 wind which might carry him in would most probably not 
 bring out a crippled ship." Had the Danes supposed it 
 possible for Nelson to approach with his large vessels, 
 the line of floating defences would have been formed 
 nearer Copenhagen, the right supported by batteries raised 
 on the isle of Amack. " In that case," says Napoleon, 
 "it is probable that Nelson would have failed in his 
 attack ; for it would have been impossible for him to pass 
 between the line and shore thus lined with cannon." As 
 it was, the line was too extended for strength, and its right 
 too far advanced to receive assistance from the battery of 
 
 * Some writers say only sixty-eight or seventy ; but the English 
 writers generally say eighty-eight. A few, (apparently to mereaere 
 the brilliancy of the victory,) make this number still greater. 
 
SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 177 
 
 Amack. A part of the fleet i*emained as a reserve, under 
 Admiral Parker, while the others, under Nelson, advanced 
 to the King's Channel. This attacking force consisted 
 of eight ships of the line and thirty-six smaller vessels, 
 carrying in all eleven hundred guns, (without including 
 those in the six gun-brigs, whose armament is not given.) 
 One of the seventy-four-gun ships could not be brought 
 into action, and two others grounded ; but. Lord Nelson 
 says, "although not in. the situation assigned them, yet 
 they were so placed as to be of great service." This 
 force was concentrated upon a -part of the Danish line of 
 floating defences, the whole of which was not only infe- 
 rior to it by three hundred and eighty-two guns, but so 
 situated as to be beyond the reach of succor, and without 
 a chance of escape. The result was what might have 
 been expected. Every vessel of the right and centre of 
 this outer Danish line was taken or destroyed, except one 
 or. two small ones, which cut and run under protection of 
 the fortifications. The left of the line, being supported 
 by the Crown-battery, remained unbroken. A division 
 of frigates, in hopes of providing an adequate substitute 
 for the ships intended to attack the batteries, ventured to 
 gigage them, but " it suffered considerable loss, and, in 
 spite of all its efforts, was obliged to relinquish this enter- 
 prise, and sheer off*." 
 
 The Danish vessels lying in the entrance of the chan- 
 nel which leads to the city, were not attacked, and took 
 no material part in the contest. They are to be reckoned 
 in the defence on the same grounds that the British ships 
 of the reserve should be included in the attacking force. 
 Nor was any use made of the guns on shore, for the ene- 
 my did not advance far enough to be within their range. 
 
 The Crown-battery was hehind the Danish line, and 
 mainly masked by it. A part only of its guns could be 
 used in support of the left of this line, and in repelling the 
 
178 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 direct attacks of the frigates,' whicli it did most effectually 
 But we now come to a new feature in this battle. As 
 the Danish line of floating defences fell into the hands of 
 the English, the range of the Crown-battery enlarged, and 
 its power was felt. Nelson saw the danger to which his 
 fleet was exposed, and, being at last convinced of the 
 prudence of the admiral's signal for retreat, " made up his 
 mind to weigh anchor and retire from the engagement." 
 To retreat, however, from his present position, was ex- 
 ceedingly difficult and dangerous. He therefore deter- 
 mined to endeavor to effect an armistice, and dispatched 
 the following letter to the prince-regent : 
 
 " Lord Nelson has directions to spare Denmark when 
 no longer resisting ; but if the firing is continued on the 
 part of Denmark, Lord Nelson must be obliged to set on 
 fire all the floating batteries he has taken, without the 
 power to save the brave Danes who have defended them." 
 
 This produced an armistice, and hostilities had hardly 
 ceased, Avhen three of the English ships, including that 
 in which Nelson himself was, struck upon the bank. 
 " They were in the jaws of destruction, and would never 
 have escaped if the batteries had continued 'their fire. 
 They therefore owed their safety to this armistice." A 
 convention was soon signed, by which every thing was 
 left in statu quo, and the fleet of Admiral Parker allowed 
 to proceed into the Baltic. Edward Baines, the able 
 English historian of the wars of the French Revolution, 
 in speaking of Nelson's request for an armistice, says : 
 " This letter, which exhibited a happy union of policy and 
 courage, was written at a moment when Lord Nelson per- 
 ceived that, in consequence of the unfavorable state of the 
 wind, the admiral was not likely to get up to aid the enter- 
 prise ; that the principal batteries of the enemy, and the 
 ships at the mouth of the harbor, were yet untouched ; that 
 two of his own division had grounded, and others were 
 
SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 179 
 
 likely to share the same fate." Campbell says these bat- 
 teries and ships " were still unconquered. Two of his [Nel- 
 son's] own vessels were grounded and exposed to a heavy 
 fire ; others, if the battle continued, might be exposed to 
 a similar fate, while he found it would be scarcely prac- 
 ticable to bring off the prizes under the fire of the bat- 
 teries." 
 
 With respect to the fortifications of the town, a chroni- 
 cler of the times says they were of no service while the 
 action lasted. " They began to fire when the enemy took 
 possession of the abandoned ships, but it was at the same 
 time the parley appeared." The Danish commander, 
 speaking of the general contest between the two lines, 
 says : " The Crown-battery did not come at all into action." 
 An English writer says distinctly : " The works (fortifi- 
 cations) of Copenhagen were absolutely untouched at the 
 close of the action." Colonel Mitchel, the English his- 
 torian, says : " Lord Nelson never fired a shot at the town 
 or fortifications of Copenhagen ; he destroyed a line of 
 block-ships, prames, and floating batteries that defended 
 the sea approach to the town ; and the Crown Prince, 
 seeing his capital exposed, was willing to finish by armi- 
 stice a war, the object of which Avas neither very popular 
 nor well understood. What the result of the action be- 
 tween Copenhagen and the British fleet might ultimately 
 have been, is therefore altogether uncertain. The Bom- 
 bardment OF Copenhagen by Nelson, as it is generally 
 styled, is therefore, like most other oracular phrases of the 
 day, a mere combination of words, without the slightest 
 meaning." 
 
 The British lost in killed and wounded nine hundred 
 and forty-three men ; and the loss of the Danes, accord- 
 ing to their own account, which is confirmed by the French, 
 was but very little higher. The English, however, say it 
 amounted to sixteen or eighteen hundred ; but let the loss 
 
180 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 be what it may, it was almost exclusively confined to the 
 floating defences, and can in no way detennine the rela- 
 tive accuracy of aim of the guns ashore and guns afloat. 
 
 The facts and testimony we have adduced, prove incon- 
 te St ably — 
 
 1st. That -of the fleet of fifty-two sail and seventeen 
 hundred guns sent by the English to the attack upon Co- 
 penhagen, two ships carrying one hundred and forty-eight 
 guns were grounded or wrecked ; seven ships of the line, 
 and thirty-six smaller vessels, carrying over one thousand 
 guns, were actually brought into the action ; while the re- 
 mainder were held as a reserve to act upon the first fa- 
 vorable opportimity. 
 
 2d. That the Danish line of floating defences, con- 
 sisting mostly of hulls, sloops, rafts, &c., carried only six 
 hundred and twenty-eight guns of all descriptions ; that 
 the fixed batteries supporting this line did not carry over 
 eighty or ninety guns at most ; and that both these land 
 and floating batteries were mostly manned and the guns 
 served by volunteers. 
 
 3d. That the fixed batteries in the system of defence 
 were either so completely masked, or so far distant, as to 
 be useless during the contest between the fleet and float- 
 ing force. 
 
 4th. That the few guns of these batteries which were 
 rendered available by the position of the floating de- 
 fences, repelled, with little or no loss to themselves, and 
 some injury to the enemy, a vastly superior force of fri- 
 gates which attacked them. 
 
 5th. That the line of floating defences was conquered 
 and mostly destroyed, while the fixed batteries were unin- 
 jured. 
 
 6th. That the fortifications of the city and of Amack 
 ^land were not attacked, and had no part in the contest. 
 
 7th. That, as soon as the Crown-batteries were un- 
 
SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 181 
 
 masked and began to act, Nelson prepared to retreat, but, 
 on account of the difficulty of doing so, lie opened a par- 
 ley, threatening,- with a cruelty unworthy of the most bar- 
 barous ages, that, unless the batteries ceased their jire upon 
 his ships, he would hum all the floating defences with the 
 Danish prisoners in his possession ; and that this armistice 
 was concluded just in time to save his own ships from 
 destruction. 
 
 8th. That, consequently, the battle of Copenhagen can- 
 not be regarded as a contest between ships and forts, or a 
 triumph of ships over forts : that, so far as the guns on 
 shore were engaged, they showed a vast superiority over 
 those afloat — a superiority known and confessed by the 
 English themselves. 
 
 Constantinople. — The channel of the Dardanelles is 
 about twelve leagues long, three miles wide at its en- 
 trance, and about three-quarters of a mile at its narrowest 
 point. Its principal defences are the outer and inner cas- 
 tles of Europe and Asia, and the castles of Sestos and 
 Abydos. Constantinople stands about one hundred miles 
 from its entrance into the Sea of Marmora, and at nearly 
 the opposite extremity of this sea. The defences of the 
 channel had been allowed to go to decay ; but few guns 
 were mounted, and the forts were but partially garrisoned. 
 In Constantinople not a gun was mounted, and no prepar- 
 ations for defence were" made ; indeed, previous to the 
 approach of the fleet, the Turks had not determined 
 whether to side with the English or the French, and even 
 then the French ambassador had the greatest difficulty in 
 persuading them to resist the demands of Duckforth. 
 
 The British fleet consisted of six sail of the line, two 
 frigates, two sloops, and several bomb-vessels, carrying 
 eight hundred and eighteen guns, (besides those in the 
 bomb-ships.) Admiral Duckforth sailed through the Dar- 
 danelles on the 19th of February, 1807, with little or no 
 
182 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 opposition. This being a Turkish festival day, the sol 
 diers of the scanty garrison were enjoying the festivities 
 of the occasion, and none were left to serve the few guns 
 of the forts which had been prepared for defence. But 
 while the admiral was waiting on the Sea of Marmora for 
 the result of negotiations, or for a favorable wind to make 
 the attack upon Constantinople, the fortifications of this 
 city were put in order, and the Turks actively employed, 
 under French engineers and artillery officers, in repair- 
 ing the defences of the Straits. Campbell, in his Naval 
 History, says : — " Admiral Duckforth now fully perceived 
 the critical situation in which he was placed. He might, 
 indeed, succeed, should the weather become favorable, in 
 bombarding Constantinople ; hut unless the bombardment 
 should prove completely successful in forcing the Turks to 
 pacific terms, the injury he might do to the city would not 
 compensate for the damage which his fleet must necessarily 
 sustain. With this damaged and crippled fleet, he must re- 
 vass the Dardanelles, now rendered inflnitely stronger than 
 they were when he came through them^ 
 
 Under these circumstances the admiral determined to 
 retreat ; and on the 3d of April escaped through the Dar- 
 danelles, steering midway of the channel, with a favora- 
 ble and strong current. " This escape, however," says 
 Baines, " was only from destruction, but by no means 
 from serious loss and injury. * * * * Jn what in- 
 stance in the whole course .of our naval warfare, have 
 ships received equal damage in so short a time as in this 
 extraordinary enterprise ?" In detailing the extent of this 
 damage, we will take the ships in the order they descend- 
 ed. The first had her wheel carried away, and her hull 
 much damaged, but escaped with the loss of only three 
 men. A stone shot penetrated the second, between the 
 poop and quarter deck, badly injured the mizzen-mast, car- 
 ried away the wheel, and did other serious damage, killing 
 
SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 183 
 
 and wounding twenty men. Two shot struck the third, car- 
 rying away her shrouds and injuring her masts ; loss in 
 killed and wounded, thirty. The fourth had her mainmast 
 destroyed, with 9, loss of sixteen. The fifth had a large shot, 
 six feet eight inches in circumference, enter her lower 
 deck ; loss fifty-five. The sixth, not injured. The seventh, a 
 good deal damaged, with a loss of seventeen. The eighth 
 had no loss? The ninth was so much injured that, " had 
 there been a necessity for hauling the wind on the oppo- 
 site tack, she must have gone down :" her loss was eight. 
 The tenth lost twelve. The eleventh was much injured, 
 with a loss of eight — making a total loss in repassing the 
 Dardanelles, of one hundred and sixty-seven ; and in the 
 whole expedition twO hundred and eighty-one, exclusive 
 of two hundred and fifty men who perished in the burning 
 of the Ajax. 
 
 Such was the effect produced on the British fleet, sail- 
 ing with a favorable wind and strong current past the half- 
 armed and half-manned forts of the Dardanelles. Duck- 
 forth himself says, that "had he remained before Constan- 
 tinople much longer — till the forts had been completely put 
 in order — ^no return would have been open to him, and the 
 unavoidable sacrifice of the squadron must have been the 
 consequence." Scarcely had the fleet cleared the Straits, 
 before it (the fleet) was reinforced with eight sail of the 
 line ; but, even with this vast increase of strength, the 
 English did not venture to renew the contest. They had 
 effected a most fortunate escape. General Jomini says 
 that if the defence had been conducted by a more enter- 
 prising and experienced people, the expedition would 
 have cost the English their whole squadron. 
 
 Great as was the damage done to the fleet, the forts them 
 selves were uninjured. The English say their own fire did 
 no execution, the shot in all probability not even striking 
 heir objects — " the rapid change of position, occasioned 
 
184 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 by a fair wind and current, preventing the certainty of 
 aim." The state of the batteries when the fleet first pass- 
 ed, is thus described in James's Naval History : " Some 
 of them were dilapidated, and others but partially mount- 
 ed and poorly manned." And Alison says : " They had 
 been allowed to fall into disrepair. The castles of Europe 
 and Asia, indeed, stood in frowning majesty, to assert the 
 dominion of the Crescent at the narrowest part of the pas- 
 sage, but their ramparts were antiquated, their guns in 
 part dismounted, and such as remained, though of enor- 
 mous calibre, little calculated to answer the rapidity and 
 precision of an English broadside." 
 
 Much has been said because the fortifications of the Dar- 
 danelles did not hermetically seal that channel, (an object 
 they were never expected to accomplish, even had they 
 been well armed and well served ;) but it is forgotten, or 
 entirely overlooked, that twelve Turkish line-of -battle- 
 ships, two of tliem three-deckers, with nine frigates, were with 
 their sails bent and in apparent readiness, filled with troops, 
 and lying within the line of fortifications ; and yet this naval 
 force effected little or nothing against the invaders. It is 
 scarcely ever mentioned, being regarded of little conse- 
 quence as a means of defence ; and yet the number of its 
 guns and the expense of its construction and support, could 
 hardly have fallen short of the incomplete and half-armed 
 forts, some of which were as ancient as the reign of Amurath ! 
 
 Algiers. — The following narrative of the attack on Al- 
 giers, in 1816, is drawn from the reports of the English 
 and Dutch admirals, and other oflicial and authentic Eng- 
 lish papers. 
 
 The attack was made by the combined fleets, consist- 
 ing of five sail of the line, eighteen or twenty frigates and 
 smaller vessels, besides five bomb-vessels and several 
 rocket-boats, carrying in all about one thousand guns. 
 The armament of some of the smaller vessels is not given, 
 
SEACOAST DEFENCES. 185 
 
 but the guns of those whose armaments are known, amount 
 to over nine hundred. The harbor and defences of Al- 
 giers had been previously surveyed by Captain Warde, 
 royal navy, under Lord Exmouth's direction; and the 
 number of the combined fleet was arranged according to 
 the information given in this survey — just so many ships, 
 and no more, being taken, as could be employed to ad- 
 vantage against the city, without being needlessly ex- 
 posed. Moreover, the men and officers had been selected 
 and exercised with reference to this particular attack. 
 
 From the survey of Captain Warde, and the accompa- 
 nying map, it appears that the armament of all the fortifi- 
 cations of Algiers and the vicinity, counting the \weter 
 fronts and the parts that could flank the shore, was only 
 two hundred and eighty-four guns of various sizes and 
 descriptions, including mortars. But not near all of these 
 could act upon the fleet as it lay. Other English accounts 
 state the number of guns actually opposed to the fleet at 
 from two hundred and twenty to two hundred and thirty. 
 Some of these were in small and distant batteries, whereas 
 nearly all the fleet was concentrated on the mole-head 
 works. (Fig. 36.) Supposing only one broadside of the 
 ships to have been engaged, the ratio of the forces, as ex- 
 pressed by the number of guns, must have been about as 
 5 to 2. This is a favorable supposition for the ships ; for 
 we know that several of them, from their position and a 
 change of anchorage, brought both broadsides to bear; 
 moreover, at no one time could all the guns of the water 
 fronts of the batteries bear on the attacking ships. The 
 Algerine shipping in the harbor was considerable, includ- 
 ing several vessels of war, but no use. was made of them 
 in defence, and nearly all were burnt. The attacking 
 ships commanded some of the batteries, and almost imme- 
 diately dismounted their guns. The walls of the case- 
 mated works were so thin as to be very soon battered 
 
186 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 down. Most of the Algerine guns were badly mounted, 
 and many ot them were useless after the first fire. They 
 had no furnaces for heating shot, and, as "they loaded 
 their guns with loose powder, put in with a ladle," they 
 could not possibly have used hot shot, even had they con- 
 structed furnaces. The ships approached the forts, and 
 many of them anchored in their intended position, without 
 a shot being fired from the batteries. The action com- 
 menced at a quarter before three, and did not entirely 
 cease till half-past eleven. The ships then took advan- 
 tage of the land breeze, and, by warping and towing off, 
 were able to get under sail and come to anchor beyond 
 rea«h of the land-batteries. Negotiations were again 
 opened, and the Dey surrendered the Christian slaves and 
 yielded to the terms of the treaty. 
 
 During the contest, the fleet " fired nearly one hundred 
 and eighteen tons of powder, and fifty thousand shot, 
 (weighing more than five hundred tons of iron,) besides 
 nine hundred and sixty thirteen and ten-inch shells, 
 (thrown by the bomb-vessels,) and the shells and rockets 
 from the flotilla." The vessels were considerably crip- 
 pled, and their loss in killed and wounded amounted to 
 eight hundred and eighty-three. The land batteries were 
 much injured, and a large part of their gims dismounted. 
 Their loss is not known ; the English confess they could 
 obtain no account of it, but suppose it to have been very 
 great. This seems more than probable ; for, besides those 
 actually employed in the defence, large numbers of people 
 crowded into the forts to witness the contest. So great 
 was this curiosity, that, when the action commenced, the 
 parapets were covered with the multitude gazing at the 
 manoeuvres of the ships. To avoid so unnecessary and 
 indiscriminate a slaughter. Lord Exmouth (showing a 
 humanity that does him great credit) motioned with his 
 hand to the ignorant wretches to retire to some place of 
 
SEA-COAST DEFENCES 187 
 
 safety. This loss of life in the batteries, the burning of 
 the buildings within the town and about the mole, the en- 
 tire destruction of their fleet and merchant vessels an- 
 chored within the mole and in the harbor, had a depress- 
 ing effect upon the inhabitants, and probably did more than 
 the injuries received by the batteries in securing an honor- 
 able conclusion to the treaty. We know very well that 
 these batteries, though much injured, were not silenced 
 when Lord Exmouth took advantage of the land breeze 
 and sailed beyond their reach. The ships retired — 1st, 
 because they had become much injured, and their ammuni- 
 nition nearly exhausted ; 2d, in order to escape from a 
 position so hazardous in case of a storm ; and 3d, to get 
 beyond the reach of the Algerine batteries. Lord Ex- 
 mouth himself gives these as hif reasons for the retreat, 
 and says, " the land wind saved me many a gallant fellow." 
 And Vice-admiral Von de Capellan, in his report of the 
 battle, gives the same opinion : " in this retreat,''^ says he, 
 " which, from wantof wind and the damage suffered in the 
 rigging, was very slow, the ships had still to suffer mtich 
 from the new-opened and redoubled fire of the enemy's bat- 
 teries ; at last, the land breeze springing up," &c. An 
 English officer, who took part in this affair, says : " It 
 was well for us that the land wind came off, or we should 
 never have got out; and God knows what would have 
 been our fate, had we remained all night." 
 
 The motives of the retreat cannot, therefore, be doubt- 
 ed. Had the Arabs set themselves zealously at work, 
 during the night, to prepare for a new contest, by re- 
 mounting their guns, and placing others behind the ruins 
 of those batteries which had fallen, — in other words, had 
 the works now been placed in hands as skilful and expe- 
 rienced as the English, the contest would have been far 
 from ended. But (to use the words of the Board of De- 
 fence) Lord Exmouth relied on the effects produced on 
 
188 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 the people by his dreadful cannonade j and the result 
 proves that he was right. His anxiety to clear the ves- 
 sels from the contest shows that there was a power still 
 unconquered, which he thought it better to leave to be 
 restrained by the suffering population of the city, than to 
 keep in a state of exasperation and activity by his pres- 
 ence. What was this power but an unsubdued energy in 
 the batteries ? 
 
 The true solution of the question is, then, not so much 
 the amount of injury done on the one side or the other— 
 particularly as there was on one side a city to suffer as 
 well as the batteries — as the relative efficiency of the 
 parties when the battle closed. All political agitation and 
 popular clamor aside, what would have been the result 
 had the fight been continued, or even had Lord Exmouth 
 renewed it next morning 1 These are questions that can 
 be answered only on conjecture ; but the manner the bat- 
 tle ended certainly leaves room for many doubts whether, 
 had the subsequent demands of Lord Exmouth been re- 
 jected, he had it in his power to enforce them by his 
 ships ; whether, indeed, if he had renewed the fight, he 
 would not have been signally defeated. On the whole, 
 we do not think that this battle, although it stands pre- 
 eminent as an example of naval success over batteries, 
 presents an argument to shake the confidence which for- 
 tifications, well situated, well planned, and well fought, 
 deserve, as the defences of a seaboard. 
 
 We cannot help regarding these conclusions as just, 
 when we reflect upon all the circumstances of the case. 
 The high character, skill, and bravery of the attacking 
 force ; their immense superiority in number of guns, with 
 no surplus human life to be exposed ; the antiquated and 
 ill-managed works of defence, the entire want of skill of 
 the Algerine artillerists, and the neglect of the ordinary 
 means of preparation ; the severe execution which these 
 
SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 189 
 
 ill-jserved guns did upon the enemy's ships, — an execution 
 far more dreadful than that effected by the French or 
 Dutch fleets in their best-contested naval battles with the 
 ships of the same foe, — from these facts, we must think that 
 those who are so ready to draw from this case conclusions 
 unfavorable to the use of land-batteries as a means of de- 
 fence against shipping, know but little of the nature of 
 the contest. 
 
 An English historian of some note, in speaking of this 
 attack, says : — " It is but little to the purpose, unless to 
 prove what may be accomplished by fleets against towns 
 exactly so circumstanced, placed, and governed. Algiers 
 is situated on an amphitheatre of hills, sloping down to- 
 wards the sea, and presenting therefore the fairest mark 
 to the fire of hostile ships. But where is the capital ex- 
 actly so situated that we are ever likely to attack ? And 
 as to the destruction of a few second-rate towns, even 
 when practicable, it is a mean, unworthy species of war- 
 fare, by which nothing was ever gained. The severe loss 
 sustained before Algiers must also be taken into account, 
 because it was inflicted by mere Algerine artillery, and 
 was much inferior to what may be expected from a con- 
 test maintained against batteries manned with soldiers in- 
 structed by officers of skill and science, not only in work- 
 ing the guns, but in the endless duty of detail necessarj' 
 for keeping the whole of an artillery material in a proper 
 state of formidable efficiency." 
 
 San Juan (TUlloa. — The following facts, relative to the 
 attack on San Juan d'UUoa by the French, in 1838, are 
 drawn principally from the report of a French engineer 
 officer who was one of the expedition. 
 
 The French fleet consisted of four ships, carrying one 
 hundred and eighty-eight guns, two armed steamboats, 
 and two bomb-ketches with four large mortars. The 
 whole number of guns, of whatever description, found in 
 
190 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 the fort was one hundred and eighty-seven ; a large por- 
 tion of these, however, were for land defence. (Fig. 37.) 
 When the French vessels were towed into the position 
 selected for the attack, " it was lucky for us," says the 
 French officer in his report, " that the Mexicans did not dis- 
 turb this operation, which lasted nearly two hours, and that 
 they permitted us to commence the fire ." " We were exposed 
 to the fire of one twenty-four-pounder, five sixteen-pounders, 
 seven twelve-pounders, one eight-pounder, and five eigh- 
 teen-pounder carronades — in all nineteen pieces only" li 
 these be converted into equivalent twenty-four-pounders, in 
 proportion to the weight of the balls, the whole nineteen 
 guns will be less than twelve twenty-four pounders. This 
 estimate is much too great, for it allows three eight- 
 pounders to be equal to one twenty-four-pounder, and 
 each of the eighte en-pounder carronades to be three 
 quarters the power of a long twenty-four-pounder ; where- 
 as, at the distance at which the parties were engaged, these 
 small pieces were nearly harmless. Two of the powder 
 magazines, from not being bomb-proof, were blown up 
 during the engagement, by which three of the nineteen 
 guns on the water front of the castle were dismounted ; 
 thus reducing the land force to an equivalent of ten twenty- 
 four-pounders. The other sixteen guns were still effect- 
 ive when abandoned by the Mexicans. The cannonade 
 and bombardment continued about six hours, eight thou- 
 sand two hundred and fifty shot and shells being fired at 
 the fort by the French. The principal injury received by 
 the work was from the explosion of the powder maga- 
 zine. But very few guns were dismounted by the fire of 
 the French ships, and only three of these on the water 
 front. The details of the condition of the ships and fort 
 are given in the report of the French officer,* but it is 
 unnecessary to repeat them here. 
 * Vide also House Doc. No. 206, twenty-sixth Congress, first se^ion 
 
SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 191 
 
 In general terms, it appears from the above-mentioned 
 report, that the number of guns actuallybrought into action by 
 the floating force, (counting only one broadside of the ship,) 
 amounted to ninety-four guns, besides four heavy sea-mor' 
 tars ; that the whole number so employed in the fort was 
 only nineteen, including the smallest calibres ; that these guns 
 were generally so small and inefficient, that their balls 
 would not enter the sides of the ordinary attacking frigates ; 
 the principal injury sustained by the castle was produced 
 by the explosion of powder magazines injudiciously placed 
 and improperly secured ; that the castle, though built of 
 poor materials, was but slightly injured by the French fire ; 
 that the Mexicans proved themselves ignorant of the ordi- 
 nary means of defence, and abandoned their works when 
 only a few of their guns had been dismounted ; that not- 
 withstanding all the circumstances in favor of the French, 
 their killed and wounded, in proportion to the guns acting 
 against them, was upwards of four times as great as the 
 loss of the English at the battle of Trafalgar ! 
 
 St. Jean d'Acre. — The narratives of the day contained 
 most exaggerated accounts of the English attack on St. 
 Jean d'Acre ; now, however, the principal facts connected 
 with this attack are fully authenticated. For the amount 
 of the fleet we quote from the British official papers, and 
 for that of the fort, from the pamphlet of Lieutenant-col- 
 onel Matuszewiez. These statements are mainly con- 
 firmed by the narratives, more recently published, of sev- 
 eral English and French eye-witnesses. 
 
 The fortifications were built of poor materials, antiqua- 
 ted in their plans, and much decayed. Their entire arma- 
 ment amounted to only two hundred guns, some of which 
 were merely field-pieces. The water fronts were armed 
 with one hundred cannon and sixteen mortars, those of the 
 smaller calibre included. (Fig. 38.) When approached by 
 the British fleet, the works were undergoing repairs, and, 
 
192 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 says Commodore Napier, "were fast getting into a state 
 of preparation against attack." 
 
 The British fleet consisted of eight ships of the line, 
 carrying six hundred and forty-six guns ; six frigates, car- 
 rying two hundred and thirty-six guns ; four steamers, 
 carrying eighteen guns ; and two or three other vessels, 
 whose force is not given. " Only a few guns," says Na- 
 pier, " defended the approach from the northward," and 
 most of the ships came in from that direction. The west- 
 ern front was armed with about forty cannon ; but opposed 
 to this were six ships and two steamers, carrying about 
 five hundred guns. Their fire was tremendous during the 
 engagement, but no breach was made in the walls. The 
 south front was armed in part by heavy artillery and 
 in part by field-pieces. This front was attacked by six 
 ships and two steamers, carrying over two hundred guns. 
 The eastern front was armed only with light artillery ; 
 against this was concentrated the remainder of the fleet, 
 carrying about two hundred and forty guns. The guns of 
 the works were so poorly mounted, that but few could be 
 used at all ; and these, on account of the construction of 
 the fort, could not reach the ships, though anchored close 
 by the walls. " Only five of their guns," says Napier, 
 " placed in a flanking battery, were well served, and never 
 missed ; but they were pointed too high, and damaged our 
 spars and rigging only." The stone was of so poor a 
 quality, says the narrative of Colonel Matuszewiez, that 
 the walls fired upon presented on the exterior a shattered 
 appearance, but they were nowhere seriously injured. In 
 the words of Napier, " they were not breached, and a deter- 
 mined enemy might have remained secure under the breast- 
 works, or in the numerous casemates, without suffering much 
 toss" The accidental explosion of a magazine within the 
 fort, containing six thousand casks of powder, laid in ruins 
 a space of sixty thousand square yards, opened a large 
 
SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 193 
 
 oreach in the walls of the fortifications, partially destroyed 
 the prisons, and killed and wounded a thousand men of 
 the garrison. This frightful disaster, says the French ac- 
 count, hastened the triumph of the fleet. The prisoners 
 and malefactors, thus released from confinement, rushed 
 upon the garrison at the same time with the mountaineers, 
 who had besieged the place on the land side. The use- 
 lessness of the artillery, the breaches of the fort, the at- 
 tacks of the English, all combined to force the retreat of 
 the garrison, " in the midst of scenes of blood and atro- 
 cious murders." *^ 
 
 We will close this account with the following extract 
 of a speech of the Duke of Wellington, in the House of 
 Lords, Feb. 4, 1841 : "He had had," he said, "a little 
 experience in services of this nature ; and he thought it 
 his duty to warn their lordships, on this occasion, that they 
 must not always expect that ships, however well command- 
 ed, or however gallant their seamen might be, were capable 
 of commonly engaging successfully with stone walls. He 
 hud no recollection, in all his experience, except the recent 
 instance on the coast of Syria, of any fort being taken by 
 ships, excepting two or three years ago, when the fort of 
 San Juan d'Ulloa was captured by the French fleet. This 
 was, he thought, the single instance that he recollected, 
 though he believed that something of the sort had occur- 
 red at the siege of Havana, in 1763. The present 
 achievement he considered one of the greatest of modern 
 times. This was his opinion, and he gave the highest 
 credit to those who had performed such a service. It was, 
 altogether, a most skilful proceeding. He was greatly sur- 
 prised at the small number of men that was lost on board 
 the fleet; and, on inquiring how it happened, he discovered 
 that it was because the vessels were moored within one- 
 third of the ordinary distance. The guns of the fortress were 
 intended to strike objects at a greater distance ; and the con 
 
 17 
 
194 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 sequence was, that the shot went over the ships that were 
 anchored at one-third the usual distance. By that means, 
 they sustained not more than one-tenth of the loss which 
 they would otherwise have experienced. Not less than 
 five hundred pieces of ordnance were directed against the 
 walls, and the precision with which the fire was kept up, 
 the position of the vessels, and, lastly, the blowing up of 
 the large magazine — all aided in achieving this great vic- 
 tory in so short a time. He had thought it right to say 
 thus much, because he wished to warn the public against 
 supposing that such deeds as this could be efiected. every 
 day. He would repeat that this was a singular instance, 
 in the achievement of which undoubtedly great skill was 
 manifested, but which was also connected with peculiar 
 circumstances, which they could not hope always to oc- 
 cur. It must not therefore be expected, as a matter of 
 course, that all such attempts must necessarily succeed." 
 
 Having completed our examination of the ability of land 
 batteries to cope, gun for gun, with a naval force, let us 
 consider, for a few moments, the objection which is some- 
 times made to the use of fortifications for the defence of 
 the sea-coast, viz. : that our maritime cities and arsenals can 
 he better and more economically secured by a home squadron. 
 
 We have already alluded to the impossibility of substi- 
 tuting one means of defence for another. The efficiency 
 of the bayonet can in no way enable us to dispense with 
 artillery, nor the value of engineer troops in the passage 
 of rivers, and the attack and defence of forts, render cav- 
 alry the less necessary in other operations of a campaign. 
 To the navy alone must we look for the defence of our 
 shipping upon the high seas ; but it cannot replace fortifi- 
 cations in the protection of our harbors, bays, rivers, ar- 
 senals, and commercial towns. 
 
 Let us take a case in point. For the defence of New 
 York city, it is deemed highly important that the East 
 
SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 195 
 
 River should be closed to the approach of a hostile fleet at 
 least fifteen or twenty miles from the city, so that an army 
 landed there would have to cross the Westchester creek, 
 the Bronx, Harlem river, and the defiles of Harlem heights 
 — obstacles of great importance in a judicious defence. 
 Throg's Neck is the position selected for this purpose ; 
 cannon placed there not only command the channel, but, 
 from the windings of tjie river, sweep it for a great dis- 
 tance above and below. No other position, even in the 
 channel itself, possesses equal advantages. Hence, if we 
 had only naval means of defence, it would be best, were 
 such a thing possible, to place the floating defences them- 
 selves on this point. Leaving entirely out of considera- 
 tion the question of relative power, position alone would 
 give the superior efficiency to the fort. But there are 
 other considerations no less important than that of position. 
 Fort Schuyler can be garrisoned and defended in part by 
 the same militia force which will be employed to prevent 
 the march of the enemy's army on the city. On the other 
 hand, the crews of the floating defences must be seamen ; 
 they will consequently be of less value in the subsequent 
 land operations. Moreover, forts, situated as this is, can 
 be so planned as to bring to bear upon any part of the 
 channel a greater number of guns than can be presented 
 by any hostile squadron against the corresponding portion 
 of the fort. This result can be obtained with little diffi- 
 culty in narrow channels, as is done in most of the other 
 works for the defence of New York, the works for Boston, 
 Newport, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Charleston, Savannah, 
 New Orleans, &c., and an approximation to it is not in 
 compatible with the defence of the broader estuaries, liko 
 the Chesapeake. 
 
 But we will suppose that there are no such points of 
 land, in the inlets to our harbors, and that we rely for de 
 fence upon a naval force exclusively. Let us leave out oi 
 
196 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 consideration the security of all our other harbors and our 
 commerce on the high seas, and also the importance of 
 having at command the means of attacking the enemy's 
 coast, in the absence of his fleet. We take the single 
 case of the attack being made on New York harbor, and 
 that our whole fleet is assembled there. Now, if this 
 fleet be equal in number to the enemy, the chances of suc- 
 cess may be regarded as equal ; if inferior, the chances 
 are against us — for an attacking force would probably be 
 of picked men and of the best materials. But here the 
 consequences of victory are very unequal : the enemy can 
 lose his squadron only, while we put in peril both our 
 squadron and the olyects it is intended to defend. If we 
 suppose our own naval force superior to that of the enemy, 
 the defence of this harbor would in all respects be com- 
 plete, provided this force never left the harbor. But, then, 
 all the commerce of the country upon the ocean must be 
 left to its fate ; and no attempt can be made to react of- 
 fensively upon the foe, unless we can control the chances 
 of finding the enemy's fleets within his ports, and the still 
 more uncertain chance of keeping him there ; the escape 
 of a single vessel being sufiicient to cause the loss of our 
 harbor." 
 
 These remarks are based upon the supposition that we 
 have but the single harbor of New York ; whereas Port- 
 land, Portsmouth, Boston, Newport, the Delaware, the 
 Chesapeake, Charleston, Savannah, Pensacola, Mobile, 
 New Orleans, and numerous other places, are equally 
 open to attack, and therefore must be equally defended, 
 for we know not to which the enemy will direct his as- 
 saults. If he come to one of these in the absence of our 
 fleet, his object is attained without resistance ; or, if his 
 whole force be concentrated upon one but feebly defended, 
 we involve both fleet and harbor in inevitable ruin. Could 
 our fleet be so arranged as to meet these enterprises ? 
 
SEA-COAST DEFENCES 19V 
 
 " As it cannot be denied that the enemy can select the 
 point of attack out of the whole extent of coast, where is 
 the prescience that can indicate the spot ? And if it can- 
 not be foretold, how is that ubiquity to be imparted that 
 shall always place our fleet in the path of the advancing 
 foe ? Suppose we attempt to cover the coast by cruising 
 in front of it, shall we sweep its whole length — a distance 
 scarcely less than that which the enemy must traverse in 
 passing from his coast to ours ? Must the Gulf of Mexico 
 be swept, aS well as the Atlantic ; or shall we give up the 
 Gulf to the enemy ? Shall we cover the southern cities, 
 or give jthem up also ? We must unquestionably do one 
 of two things — either relinquish a great extent of coast, 
 confining our cruisers to a small portion only, or include 
 so much that the chances of intercepting an enemy would 
 seem to be out of the question." 
 
 " On the practicability of covering a small extent of 
 coast by cruising in front of it— or, in other words, the 
 possibility of anticipating an enemy's operations, discov- 
 ering the object of movements of which we get no glimpse 
 and hear no tidings, and seeing the impress of his foot- 
 steps on the surface of the ocean — it may be well to con- 
 sult experience." 
 
 The naval power of Spain under Philip II. was almost 
 unlimited. With the treasures of India and America at 
 his command, the fitting out of a fleet of one hundred and 
 fifty or two hundred sail, to invade another country, was 
 no very gigantic operation. Nevertheless, this naval force 
 was of but little avail as a coast defence. Its efficiency 
 for this purpose was well tested in 1596. England and 
 Holland attacked Cadiz with a combined fleet of one hun- 
 dred and seventy ships, which entered the Bay of Cadiz 
 without, on its approach to their coast, being once seen by 
 the Spanish navy. This same squadron, on its return to 
 England, passed along a great portion of the Spanish coast 
 
198 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 without ever meeting with the slightest opposition from 
 the innumerable Spanish floating defences. 
 
 In 1744, a. French fleet of twenty ships, and a land 
 force of twenty-two thousand men, sailed from Brest to 
 the English coast, without meeting with any opposition 
 from the superior British fleet which had been sent out, 
 under Sir John Norris, on purpose to intercept them. 
 The landing of the troops was prevented by a storm, which 
 drove the fleet back upon the coast of France to seek 
 shelter. 
 
 In 1755, a French fleet of twenty-five sail of the line, 
 and many smaller vessels, sailed from Brest for America. 
 Nine of these soon afterwards returned to France, and 
 the others proceeded to the gulf of St. Lawrence. An 
 English fleet of seventeen sail of the line and some frig- 
 ates had been sent out to intercept them; but the two 
 fleets passed each other in a thick fog, and all the French 
 vessels except two reached Quebec in safety. 
 
 In 1759, a French fleet, blockaded in the port of Dun- 
 kirk by a British force under Commodore Bogs, seizing 
 upon a favorable opportunity, escaped from the enemy, 
 attacked the coast of Scotland, made a descent upon Car- 
 rickfergus, and cruised about till February, 1760, without 
 meeting a single British vessel, although sixty-one ships 
 of the line were then stationed upon the coasts of Eng- 
 land and France, and several of these were actually in 
 pursuit. 
 
 In 1796, when the French attempted to throw the army 
 of Hoche into Ireland, the most strenuous eflbrts were 
 made by the British navy to intercept the French fleet in 
 its passage. The Channel fleet, of near thirty sail of the 
 line, under Lord Bridport, was stationed at Spithead j 
 Sir Roger Curtis, with a smaller force, was cruising to 
 the westward; Vice-admiral Colpoys was stationed off" 
 Brest, with thirteen sail of the line ; and Sir Edward 
 
SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 199 
 
 Pellew (afterwards Lord Exmouth) watched the harbor, 
 with a small squadron of frigates. Notwithstanding this 
 triple floating bulwark, as it was called — one fleet on the 
 enemy's coast, a second in the Downs, and a third close on 
 their own shores — ^the French fleet of forty-four vessels, 
 carrying a land force of twenty-five thousand men, reached 
 Bantry Bay in safety ! This fleet was eight days on the 
 passage, and three more in landing the troops ; and most 
 of the vessels might have returned to Brest in safety, had 
 it not been for disasters by storms, for only one of their 
 whole number was intercepted by the vast naval force 
 which England had assembled for that express object. 
 " The result of this expedition," says Alison, " was preg- 
 nant with important instructions to the rulers of both coun- 
 tries. To the French, as demonstrating the extraordinary 
 risks which attend a maritime expedition, in comparison 
 with a land campaign ; the small number of forces which 
 can be embarked on board even a great fleet ; and the 
 unforeseen disasters which frequently, on that element, 
 defeat the best concerted enterprises. To the English, 
 as showing that the empire of the seas does not always afford 
 security against invasion; that, in the face of superior 
 maritime forces, her possessions were for sixteen days at 
 the mercy of the enemy ; and that neither the skill of her 
 sailors nor the valor of her armies, but the fury of the 
 elements, saved them from danger in the most vulnerable 
 part of their dominions. While these considerations are 
 fitted to abate the confidence in invasion, they are calcu- 
 lated, at the same time, to weaken an overweening confi- 
 dence in naval superiority, and to demonstrate that the 
 only base upon which certain reliance can he placed, even by 
 an insular power, is a well-disciplined army and the patri- 
 otism of its own subjects y 
 
 Subsequent events still further demonstrated the truth 
 of these remarks. In the following year, a French squad- 
 
200 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 ron of two frigates and two sloops, passed the British 
 fleets with perfect impunity, destroyed the shipping in the 
 port of Ilfracombe, and safely landed their troops on the 
 coast of Wales. Again, in 1798, the immense British 
 naval force failed to prevent the landing of General Hum- 
 bert's army in the bay of Killala ; and, in the latter part 
 of the same year, a French squadron of nine vessels and 
 three thousand men escaped Sir J. B. Warren's squadron, 
 and safely reached the coast of Ireland. As a further 
 illustration, we quote from the report of the Board of Na- 
 tional Defence in 1839. 
 
 The Toulon fleet, in 1798, consisting of about twenty 
 sail of the line and twenty smaller vessels of war, and 
 numerous transports, making in all, three hundred sail 
 and forty thousand troops, slipped out of port and sailed 
 to Malta. " It was followed by Nelson, who, thinking 
 correctly that they were bound for Egypt, shaped his 
 course direct for Alexandria. The French, steering to- 
 wards Candia, took the more circuitous passage ; so that 
 Nelson arrived at Alexandria before them, and, not finding 
 them there, returned, by way of Caramania and Candia, 
 to Sicily, missing his adversary in both passages. Sail- 
 ing again for Alexandria, he found the French fleet at 
 anchor in Aboukir bay, and, attacking them there, achieved 
 the memorable victory of the Nile. When we consider 
 the narrowness of the sea ; the numerous vessels in the 
 French fleet; the actual crossing of the two fleets on a 
 certain night ; and that Nelson, notwithstanding, could 
 see nothing of the enemy himself, and hear nothing 
 of them from merchant vessels, we may judge of the 
 probability of waylaying our adversary on the broad 
 Atlantic. 
 
 " The escape of another Toulon fleet in 1805 ; the long 
 search for them in the Mediterranean by the same able 
 oflTicer ; the pursuit in the West Indies ; their evasion of 
 
SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 201 
 
 nim among the islands ; the return to Europe ; his vain 
 efforts subsequently, along the coast of Portugal, in the 
 bay of Biscay, and off the English channel; and the* 
 meeting at last at Trafalgar, brought about only because 
 the combined fleets, trusting to the superiority that the 
 accession of several reinforcements had given, were wil- 
 ling to try the issue of a battle — ^these are instances, of the 
 many that might be cited, to show how small is the proba- 
 bility of encountering upon the ocean an enemy who de- 
 sires to avoid a meeting, and how little the most unti- 
 ring zeal, the most restless activity, the most exalted pro- 
 fessional skill and judgment, can do to lessen the adverse 
 chances. For more than a year Nelson most closely 
 watched his enemy, who seems to have got out of port as 
 soon as he was prepared to do so, and without attracting 
 the notice of any of the blockading squadron. When out, 
 Nelson, perfectly in the dark as to the course Villeneuve 
 had taken, sought for him in vain on the coast of Egypt. 
 Scattered by tempests, the French fleet again took refuge 
 in Toulon ; whence it again put to sea, when refitted and 
 ready, joining the Spanish fleet at Cadiz. 
 
 " On the courage, skill, vigilance, and judgment, acceded 
 on all hands to belong in a pre-eminent degree to the na- 
 val profession in this country, this system of defence re- 
 lies to accomplish, against a string of chances, objects of 
 importance so great that not a doubt or misgiving as to the 
 result is admissible. It demands of the navy to do per- 
 fectly, and without fail, that which, to do at all, seems 
 impossible. The navy is required to know the secret 
 purposes of the enemy, in spite of distance, and the broken 
 intercourse of a state of war, even before these purposes 
 are known to the leader who is to execute them ; nay, 
 more, before the purpose itself is formed. On an element 
 where man is but the sport of storms, the navy is required 
 to lie in wait for the foe at the exact spot and moment, in 
 
202 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 spite of weather and seasons ; to see him in spite of fogs 
 and darkness. 
 
 • " Finally, after all the devices and reliances of the sys- 
 tem are satisfactorily accomplished, and all the difficulties 
 subdued, it submits to the issue of a single battle, on equal 
 terms, the fate of the war, having no hope or reserve beyond. 
 " The proper duty of our navy is, not coast or river de- 
 fence ; it has a more glorious sphere — that of the offensive. 
 In our last war, instead of lying in harbor, and contenting 
 themselves with keeping a few more of the enemy's ves- 
 sels in watch over them than their own number — instead 
 of leaving the enemy's commerce in undisturbed enjoy- 
 ment of the sea, and our commerce without countenance 
 or aid, they scattered themselves over the wide surface of 
 the ocean, penetrated to the most remote seas, everywhere 
 acting with the most brilliant success against the enemy's 
 navigation. And we believe, moreover, that in the amount 
 of the enemy's property thus destroyed, of American prop- 
 erty protected or recovered, and in the number of hostile 
 ships kept in pursuit of our scattered vessels, ships evaded 
 if superior, and beaten if equal — they rendered benefits a 
 thousand-fold greater, to say nothing of the glory they ac- 
 quired for the nation, and the character they imparted to it, 
 than any that would have resulted from a state of passive- 
 ness within the harbors. Confident that this is the true 
 policy as regards the employment of the navy proper, we 
 doubt not that it will in the future be acted on, as it has 
 been in the past ; and that the results, as regards both 
 honor and advantage, will be expanded commensurately 
 with its own enlargement. In order, however, that the 
 navy may always assume and maintain that active and en- 
 ergetic deportment, in offensive operations, which is at the 
 same time so consistent with its functions, and so conso- 
 nant with its spirit, we have shown that it must not bo oc- 
 cupied with mere coast defence." 
 
SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 203 
 
 A few remarks on the relative cost of ships and forts, 
 and the economy of their support, and we will close this 
 discussion. We do not regard this question, however, as 
 a matter of any great importance, for it can seldom be de- 
 cisive in the choice of these two means of defence. No 
 matter what their relative cost may be, the one cannot often 
 be substituted for the other. There are "some few cases, 
 however, where this might be taken into consideration, 
 and would be decisive. Let us endeavor to illustrate our 
 meaning. For the defence of New York city, the Nar- 
 rows and East River must be secured by forts ; ships can- 
 not, in this case, be substituted. But let us suppose that 
 the outer harbor of New York furnishes no favorable place 
 for the debarkation of troops, or that the place of debarka- 
 tion is so far distant that the troops cannot reach the city 
 before the defensive forces can be prepared to repel them. 
 This outer harbor would be of great importance to the en- 
 emy as a shelter from storms, and as a place of debarka- 
 tion or of rendezvous preparatory to a forcible passage of 
 the Narrows ; while to us its possession would not be ab- 
 solutely essential, though very important. Strong fortifi- 
 cations on Sandy Hook, and one of the shoals, might prob- 
 ably be so constructed as to furnish a pretty sure barrier 
 to the entrance of this outer harbor ; on the other hand, a 
 naval force stationed within the inner harbor, and acting^ 
 under the protection of forts at the Narrows, might also 
 furnish a good, though perhaps less certain protection for 
 this outer roadstead. Here, then, we might well consider 
 the question of relative cost and economy of support of the 
 proposed fortifications, and of a home squadron large 
 enough to effect the same object, and to be kept continu- 
 ally at home for that special purpose. If we were to allow 
 it to go to sea for the protection of our commerce, its char- 
 acter and efficiency as a harbor defence would be lost. 
 We can therefore regard it only as a local force — fixed 
 
204 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 within the limits of the defence of this particular place— 
 and our estimates must be made accordingly. 
 
 The average durability of ships of war in the British 
 navy, has been variously stated at seven and eight years 
 in time of war, and from ten to twelve and fourteen years 
 in time of peace. Mr. Perring, in his " Brief Inquiry," 
 published in 1812, estimates the average durability at 
 about eight years. His calculations seem based upon 
 authentic information. A distinguished English writer 
 has more recently arrived at the same result, from esti- 
 mates based upon the returns of the Board of Admiralty 
 during the period of the wars of the French Revolution. 
 The data in our own possession are less complete ; the 
 appropriations for building and repairing having been so 
 expended as to render it impossible to draw any accurate 
 line of distinction. But, in the returns now before us, 
 there are generally separate and distinct amounts of the 
 timbers used for these two purposes; and consequently, 
 so far as this (the main item of expense) is concerned, 
 we may form pretty accurate comparisons. 
 
 According to Edge, (pp. 20, 21,) the average cost of 
 timber, for hulls, masts, and yards, in building an English 
 74 gun ship, is £61,382. Let us now compare this cost of 
 timber for building, with that of the same item for repairs, 
 *for the following fifteen ships, between 18G0 and 1820. 
 The list would have been still further enlarged, but the 
 returns for other ships during some portion of the above 
 period are imperfect : 
 
SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 
 
 205 
 
 Name of Ship. 
 
 Vengeance, 
 
 Ildefonso, 
 
 Scipio, 
 
 Tremendous, 
 
 Elephant, 
 
 Spencer, 
 
 Komulus 
 
 Albion, 
 
 Donegal, 
 
 Implacable, 
 
 Illustrious, 
 
 Northumberland, . . . 
 
 Kent, 
 
 Sultan, 
 
 Sterling Castle, 
 
 No. of 
 
 When 
 
 Guns. 
 
 built. 
 
 74 
 
 _ 
 
 74 
 
 - 
 
 74 
 
 - 
 
 74 
 
 - 
 
 74 
 
 — 
 
 74 
 
 1800 
 
 74 
 
 
 74 
 
 1802 
 
 74 
 
 — 
 
 74 
 
 - 
 
 74 
 
 1803 
 
 74 
 
 - 
 
 74 
 
 - 
 
 74 
 
 1807 
 
 74 
 
 
 Repaired from 
 
 Cost. 
 
 1800 
 1807 
 1807 
 1807 
 1808 
 1809 
 1810 
 1810 
 1812 
 1813 
 1813 
 1814 
 1814 
 1816 
 1816 
 
 to 1807 
 to 1808 
 to 1809 
 to 1810 
 to 1811 
 to 1813 
 to 1812 
 to 1813 
 to 1815 
 to 1815 
 to 1816 
 to 1815 
 to 1818 
 to 1818 
 to 1818 
 
 je84,720 
 85,195 
 60,785 
 
 135,397 
 67,007 
 
 124,186 
 73,141 
 
 102,295 
 
 101,367 
 59,865 
 74,184 
 59,795 
 88,357 
 61,518 
 65,280 
 
 This table, although incomplete, gives for the above 
 fifteen ships, during a period of less than twenty years, 
 the cost of timber alone used in their repair, an average 
 of about $400,000 each. More timber than this was 
 used, in all probability, upon the same vessels, and paid 
 for out of the funds appropriated " for such as may be or- 
 dered in course of the year to be repaired." But the 
 amount specifically appropriated for timber for these fif- 
 teen ships, would, in every twelve or fifteen years, equal 
 the entire first cost of the same items. If we add to this 
 amount, the cost of labor required in the application of 
 timber to the operations of repair, and take into consider- 
 ation the expense of other materials and labor, and the 
 decayed condition of many of the ships at the end of this 
 period, we should not be surprised to find the whole sum 
 expended under these heads to equal the first cost, even 
 within the minimum estimate of seven years. The whole 
 cost of timber used for hulls, masts, and yards, in build- 
 ing between 1800 and 1820, was £18,727,551 ; in repairs 
 and " ordinary wear and tear," jei7,449,780 ; making an 
 annual average of $4,560,158 for building timber, and 
 $4,273,371 for that used in repairs. A large portion of 
 
206 
 
 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 the vessels huilt were intended to replace others which 
 had been lost, or were so decayed as to be broken up. 
 
 But it may be well to add here, the actual supplies 
 voted for the sea-service, and for wear and tear, and the 
 extraordinary expenses in building and repairing of ships 
 from 1800 to 1815. 
 
 
 Year. 
 
 For the wear 
 and tear of 
 
 Ext. Expenses 
 for building, 
 
 For entire sea- 
 
 
 
 
 Ships. 
 
 repairing, &c. 
 
 service. 
 
 
 
 1800 
 
 £4,350,000 
 
 jE772,140 
 
 JE13,619,079 
 
 
 
 1801 
 
 5,850,000 
 
 933,900 
 
 16,577,037 
 
 
 
 1802 
 
 3,684,000 
 
 773,500 
 
 11,833,571 
 
 
 
 1803 
 
 3,120,000 
 
 901,140 
 
 10,211,378 
 
 
 
 1804 
 
 3,900,000 
 
 948,520 
 
 12,350,606 
 
 
 
 1805 
 
 4,680,000 
 
 1,553,690 
 
 15,035,630 
 
 
 
 1806 
 
 4,680,000 
 
 1,980,830 
 
 18,864,341 
 
 
 
 1807 
 
 5,070,000 
 
 2,134,903 
 
 17,400,337 
 
 
 
 1808 
 
 5,070,000 
 
 2,351,188 
 
 18,087,544 
 
 
 
 1809 
 
 • 3,295,500 
 
 2,296,030 
 
 19,578,467 
 
 
 
 1810 
 
 3,295,500 
 
 1,841,107 
 
 18,975,120 
 
 
 
 1811 
 
 3,675,750 
 
 2,046,200 
 
 19,822,000 
 
 
 
 1812 
 
 3,675,750 
 
 1,696,621 
 
 19,305,759 
 
 
 
 1813 
 
 3,549,000 
 
 2,822,031 
 
 20,096,709 
 
 
 
 1814 
 
 3,268,000 
 
 2,086,274 
 
 19,312,070 
 
 
 
 1815 
 
 2,386,500 
 
 2,116,710 
 
 19,032,700 
 
 
 It appears from this table that the appropriations for the 
 service, during the first fifteen years of the present cen- 
 tury, amounted to a little less than ninety millions of dol- 
 lars per annum ; and for the wear and tear of ships, and 
 "the extraordinary expenses in building and repairing 
 ships, &c.," the annual appropriations amounted to near 
 thirty millions. 
 
 Our own naval returns are also so imperfect that it is 
 impossible to form any very accurate estimate of the rel- 
 ative cost of construction and repairs of our men-of-war. 
 The following table, compiled from a report of the Secre- 
 tary of the Navy, in 1841, (Senate Doc. No. 223, 26th 
 Congress,) will afford data for an approximate calcula^* 
 tion : — 
 
SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 
 
 207 
 
 1= 
 
 
 Total Cost of 
 
 
 Cost of Re- 
 
 
 Name of Ship. 
 
 No. of 
 Guns. 
 
 building, 
 exclusive of 
 
 When 
 com- 
 
 pairs, exclu- 
 sive of ord- 
 
 Repaired 
 between 
 
 
 
 armament, 
 
 pleted. 
 
 nance. 
 
 
 
 
 stores, &c. &c. 
 
 
 &c. &c. 
 
 
 Delaware, — 
 
 74 
 
 $543,368 00 
 
 1820 
 
 $354,132 56 
 
 1827 and 1838 
 
 N. Carolina, . . 
 
 74 
 
 431,852 00 
 
 1825 
 
 317,628 92 
 
 1824 and 1836 
 
 Constitution,.. 
 
 44 
 
 302,718 84 
 
 1797 
 
 266,878 34 
 
 1833 and 1839 
 
 United States,. 
 
 44 
 
 299,336 56 
 
 1797 
 
 571,972 77 
 
 1821 and 1841 
 
 Brandywine,.. 
 
 44 
 
 *299,218 12 
 
 1825 
 
 *377,665 95 
 
 1826 and 1838 
 
 Potomac, 
 
 44 
 
 *231,013 02 
 
 1822 
 
 *82,597 03 
 
 1829 and 1835 
 
 Concord, 
 
 Falmouth, 
 
 20 
 
 115,325 80 
 
 1828 
 
 72,796 22 
 
 1832 and 1840 
 
 20 
 
 94,093 27 
 
 1827 
 
 130,015 43 
 
 1828 and 1837 
 
 John Adams, . 
 
 20 
 
 110,670 69 
 
 1829 
 
 119,641 93 
 
 1834 and 1837 
 
 Boston, 
 
 20 
 
 91,973 19 
 
 1825 
 
 189,264 37 
 
 1826 and 1840 
 
 St. Louis, 
 
 20 
 
 102,461 95 
 
 1828 
 
 135,458 75 
 
 1834 and 1839 
 
 Vincennes, ... 
 
 20 
 
 111,512 79 
 
 1826 
 
 178,094 81 
 
 1830 and 1838 
 
 Vandalia, 
 
 20 
 
 90,977 88 
 
 1828 
 
 59,181 34 
 
 1832 and 1834 
 
 Lexington, 
 
 20? 
 
 114,622 35 
 
 1826 
 
 83,386 52 
 
 1827 and 1837 
 
 Warren 
 
 Fairfield 
 
 20? 
 
 99,410 01 
 
 1826 
 
 152,596 03 
 
 1830 and 1838 
 
 20 
 
 100,490 35 
 
 1826 
 
 65,918 26 
 
 1831 and 1837 
 
 Natches,t 
 
 20? 
 
 106,232 19 
 
 1827 
 
 129,969 80 
 
 1829 and 1836 
 
 Boxer, 
 
 10 
 
 30,697 88 
 
 1831 
 
 28,780 48 
 
 1834 and 1840 
 
 Enterprise, 
 
 10 
 
 27,938 63 
 
 1831 
 
 20,716 59 
 
 1834 and 1840 
 
 Grampus, 
 
 10 
 
 23,627 42 
 
 1821 
 
 96,086 36 
 
 1825 and 1840 
 
 Dolphm, 
 
 10 
 
 38,522 62 
 
 1836 
 
 15,013 35 
 
 1839 and 1840 
 
 Shark, 
 
 10 
 
 23,627 42 
 
 1821 
 
 93,395 84 
 
 1824 and 1839 
 
 It appears from the above table, that the cost of con- 
 structing ships of the line is about $6,600 per gun ; of 
 frigates, $6,500 per gun ; of smaller vessels of war, a 
 little less than $5,000 per gun : making an average cost 
 of vessels of wbli to be more than six thousand dollars per 
 gun. And the expense of repairs for these vessels is 
 more than seven per cent, per annum on their first cost. 
 
 We have as yet had but little experience in the use of 
 war-steamers. The Fulton, four guns, built in 1838-39, 
 cost three hundred and thirty-three thousand seven hun- 
 dred and seventy dollars and seventy-seven cents ; the 
 Mississippi and Missouri, ten guns each, built in 1841, 
 cost about six hundred thousand dollars a piece ; making 
 an average cost for war-steamers of over sixty thousand 
 dollars per gun. The cost of repairs of steam ships will 
 be mucli greater than those for vessels of war ; but we 
 
 * Returns incomplete. 
 
 t Broken up in ]840 
 
208 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 liave not yet had sufficient experience to determine the 
 exact amount. It has been estimated, however, by com- 
 petent judges, that when kept, the expense of repairs 
 will at least equal twelve per cent, of the first cost. The 
 expense of keeping them in commission is enormously 
 great. " Their engines," says the Secretary of the Navy, 
 in his annual report in 1 842, " consume so much fuel as 
 to add enormously to their expenses ; and the necessity 
 that they should return to port, after short intervals of 
 time, for fresh supplies, renders it impossible to send 
 them on any distant service. They cannot be relied on 
 as cruisers, and are altogether too expensive for service 
 in time of peace. I have therefore determined to take 
 them out of commission, and substitute for them other and 
 less expensive vessels." 
 
 The average cost of permanent fortifications is but 
 little more than three thousand dollars per gun. And it 
 must be obvious, from the nature of the materials of 
 which they are constructed, that the expense of their 
 support must be inconsiderable. It is true that for some 
 years past a large item of annual expenditure for fortifi- 
 cations has been under the head of " repairs ;" but much 
 of this sum is for alterations and enlargements of tempo- 
 rary and inefficient works, erected anterior to the war of 
 1812. Some of it, however, has been for actual repairs 
 of decayed or injured portions of the forts ; these injuries 
 resulting from the nature of the climate, the foundations, 
 the use of poor materials and poor workmanship, and 
 from neglect and abandonment. But if we include the 
 risk of abandonment at times, it is estimated, upon data 
 drawn from past experience, that one-third of one per cent, 
 per annum, of the first cost, will keep in perfect repair 
 any of our forts that have been constructed since the last 
 war. 
 
 But it is unnecessary to further discuss this question 
 
SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 209 
 
 We repeat what has already been said, no matter what 
 may be the relative cost of ships and forts, the one, as a 
 general thing, cannot be substituted for the other. Each 
 has its own sphere of action, and each will contribute, in 
 its own way, to the national defence ; and any undue in- 
 crease of one, at the expense of the other, will be at- 
 tended by a corresponding diminution of national power.* 
 
 * For further information concerning our system of sea- coast de- 
 fences, the reader is referred to House Doc. 206, twenty-sixth Con- 
 gress, second session ; Senate Doc. 85, twenty-eighth Congress, sec- 
 ond session ; and to the annual reports of the Chief Engineer. 
 
210 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES. 
 
 In discussing engineering as a branch of the military 
 art, we spoke of the use of fortifications on land frontiers, 
 and their influence on the strategic operations of a cam- 
 paign. A brief notice was also given of the different sys- 
 tems that have been proposed for arranging these defen- 
 sive works. Let us now apply this discussion to our 
 northern frontier. 
 
 The principle laid down by Napoleon and Jomini, 
 " that fortifications should always be constructed on im- 
 portant strategic points," is undoubtedly the correct one : 
 but how to determine these points is a question that will 
 often perplex the patience and try the skill of the engi- 
 neer ; yet determine them he must, or his fortifications 
 will be worse than useless ; for a fort improperly located, 
 like a cannon with its fire reversed on its own artillerists, 
 will be sure to effect the destruction of the very forces it 
 was designed to protect. 
 
 The selection of positions for fortifications on our 
 northern frontier must have reference to three distinct 
 classes of objects, viz. : the security, first, of the large 
 frontier towns, where much public and private property is 
 exposed to sudden dashing expeditions of the foe, made 
 either on land or by water ; second, of lake harbors, im- 
 portant as places of refuge and security to our own ships, 
 or to the enemy's fleets while engaged in landing troops 
 or furnishing supplies to an invading army ; third, of all 
 strategic points on the probable lines of offensive or de- 
 
OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES. 211 
 
 fensive operations. These objects are distinct in their 
 nature, and would seem to require separate and distinct 
 means for their accomplishment ; nevertheless, it will 
 generally be found that positions selected with reference 
 to one of these objects equally fulfil the others, so inti- 
 mately are they all connected. To determine the strategic 
 points of a probable line of military operations is there- 
 fore the main thing to be attended to in locating fortifica- 
 tions. That such points of maximum importance are ac- 
 tually marked out by the peaceful or hostile intercourse of 
 nations cannot be doubted. 
 
 The relative importance of cities and towns is less va- 
 ried by the fluctuations of commerce on a land frontier 
 than on the sea-coast. The ever-changing system of " in- 
 ternal improvements," by furnishing new highways and 
 thoroughfares for the transportation of the products of 
 manufacturers and agriculture, either continually varies 
 the relative standing of the seaports already opened, or 
 opens new ones for the exportation of these products, and 
 the importation of foreign articles received in exchange. 
 But these " internal improvements" are seldom carried so 
 far as to connect together two separate and distinct coun- 
 tries, and consequently the principal places on the di- 
 viding line usually retain their relative importance, no 
 matter how often they may have declined during times of 
 hostility, or again flourished with the increased commer- 
 cial intercourse which results from peace. The principal 
 European places of traffic near the frontiers have remained 
 the same for ages, and in all probability ages hence the 
 great frontier marts will be nearly the same as at present. 
 This stability of rank among border towns is not confined 
 to commercial influence ; the same holds true with re- 
 spect to that established by intercourse of a hostile char- 
 acter. Military history teaches us that lines of hostile 
 opera ions, and the fields upon which the principal battles 
 
212 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 between any two countries have been fought, are nearly 
 the same, no matter how remote the periods of comparison. 
 These points and lines, so important in commerce as well 
 as in war, result from the natural features of the ground, 
 and we ought therefore to expect that they would be as 
 little liable to sudden changes as the character of the 
 earth itself. 
 
 From these remarks it will readily be perceived that 
 there are three distinct methods of determining the strate- 
 gic points between this country and Canada: 1st, by an 
 examination of the topography of the two countries ; 2d, 
 by tracing out the main channels of commercial inter- 
 course ; 3d, by reviewing the lines of their military oper- 
 ations. The last method is the least liable to error, and 
 perhaps is the most easily understood, inasmuch as it is 
 sometimes difficult to point out the precise degree of con- 
 nection between prospective military lines and the chan- 
 nels of commerce, or to show why these two have a fixed 
 relation to the physical features of the country. In the 
 present instance, moreover, this method furnishes ample 
 data for the formation of our decision, inasmuch as the 
 campaigns between this country and Canada have been 
 neither few in number nor unimportant in their character 
 and results. 
 
 In tracing out the main features of the early wars upon 
 our northern frontier, it must be borne in mind that nearly 
 the same portion of country which is now possessed by 
 the English, was then occupied by the French, and that 
 the English possessions in North America included the 
 present Middle and Northern States. At the period of 
 the American revolution the French and English had com- 
 pletely changed ground, the armies of the former opera- 
 ting in the " States," while the English were in possession 
 of Canada. 
 
 The first expedition to be noticed against that portion of 
 
OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES. 213 
 
 the country, was conducted by Samuel Argall, who sailed 
 from Virginia in 1613, with a fleet of eleven vessels, at- 
 tacked the French on the Penobscot, and afterwards the 
 St. Croix. 
 
 In 1654, Sedgwick, at the head of a small New Eng- 
 land army, attacked the French on the Penobscot, and 
 overrun all Arcadia. 
 
 In 1666, during the contest between Charles II. and 
 Louis XIV., it was proposed to march the New England 
 troops across the country by the Kennebec or Penobscot, 
 and attack Quebec ; but the terrors and difficulties of cross- 
 ing " over rocky mountains and howling deserts" were such 
 as to deter them from undertaking the campaign. 
 
 In 1689, Count Frontenac, governor of Canada, made a 
 descent into New York to assist the French fleet in redu- 
 cing that province. His line of march was by the river 
 Sorrel and Lake Champlain. An attack upon Montreal 
 by the Iroquois soon forced him to return ; but in the fol- 
 lowing January a party of French and Indians left Mon- 
 treal in the depth of a Canadian winter, and after wading, 
 for two and twenty days, with provisions on their backs, 
 through snows and swamps and across a wide wilderness, 
 reached the unguarded village of Schenectady. Here a 
 midnight war-whoop was raised, and the inhabitants either 
 massacred or driven half-clad through the snow to seek 
 protection in the neighboring towns. 
 
 In 1690, a congress of the colonies, called to provide 
 means for the general defence, assembled at New York, 
 and resolved to carry war into Canada: an army was to 
 attack Montreal by way of Lake Champlain, and a fleet to 
 attempt Quebec by the St. Lawrence. The former ad- 
 vanced as far as the lake, when the quarrels of the com- 
 manding officers defeated the objects of the expedition. 
 The Massachusetts fleet of thirty-four vessels, (the largest 
 carrying forty-four guns each,) and two thousand men, 
 
214 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE 
 
 failed to reduce Quebec, though the defences of that place 
 were then of the slightest character, and armed with only 
 twenty-three guns. 
 
 In 1704, and again in 1707, Port Royal was attacked by 
 costly expeditions fitted out by the eastern colonies ; and 
 again, in 1709, a land force of fifteen hundred men ad- 
 vanced against Montreal by Lake Champlain;'but nothing 
 of importance was effected by either expedition. 
 
 In 1711, Lord Bolingbroke planned the conquest of Can- 
 ada. The land forces, numbering five thousand men in all, 
 were separated into two distinct armies, the one sent 
 against Detroit, and the other against Montreal by Lake 
 Champlain ; while a fleet of fifteen ships of war, forty 
 transports, and six store-ships, carrying a land force of 
 six thousand five hundred men, was to attack Quebec. 
 The maritime expedition failed to reach its destination, 
 and after losing a part of the fleet and more than a thou- 
 sand men in the St. Lawrence, this part of the project 
 was abandoned. Nor was any thing important accom- 
 plished by either division of the land forces. . 
 
 The same plan of campaign was followed in 1712. An 
 army of four thousand men marched against Montreal by 
 Lake Champlain, but on hearing of the failure of the naval 
 expedition and of the concentration of the French forces 
 on the river Sorel, they retired towards Albany. 
 
 The next expedition of any importance was the naval 
 one of 1745 against Louisburg. For the attack of this 
 place the colonies raised about four thousand men, and one 
 hundred small vessels and transports, carrying between 
 one hurfdred and sixty and two hundred gims. They 
 were afterwards joined by ten other vessels carrying near 
 five hundred guns. This attacking force now, according 
 to some of the English writers, consisted of six thousand 
 provincials, and eight hundred seamen, and a combined 
 naval force of near seven hundred guns. The troops 
 
OUU NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES. 215 
 
 landed, and laid siege to the town. The garrison of the 
 fortifications of Louisburg consisted of six hundred regu- 
 lars and one thousand Breton militia, or, according to 
 some writers, of only twelve hundred men in all. The 
 armament of these works was one hundred and one cannon, 
 seventy-six swivels, and six mortars. Auxiliary to the 
 main works were an island-battery of thirty twenty-two- 
 pounders, and a battery on the main land armed with 
 thirty large cannon. Frequent attempts were made to 
 storm the place, but the most persevering efforts were of 
 no avail, many of the New Englanders being killed and 
 wounded, and their boats destroyed, while the garrison 
 remained unharmed. At length, after a siege of forty- 
 nine days, want of provisions and the general dissatisfac- 
 tion of the inhabitants, caused the garrison to surrender. 
 When the New Englanders saw the strength of the works, 
 and the slight impression which their efforts had produced, 
 they were not only elated but greatly astonished at their 
 success. It should be noticed, that in the above attack 
 the number of guns in the fleet was almost three times as 
 great as that of all the forts combined ; and yet the naval 
 part of the attack was unsuccessful. The besieging army 
 was more than four times as great as all the garrisons 
 combined ; and yet the place held out forty-nine dfllj^s, and 
 at last was surrendered through the want of provisions 
 and the disaffection of the citizens. This place was soon 
 afterwards restored to the French. 
 
 We see that, thus far in these wars, the English were 
 vastly superior in strength and numbers, yet the result of 
 the several campaigns was decidedly in favor of the 
 French, who not only retained their possessions in the 
 North, but extended their jurisdiction to the mouth of the 
 Mississippi, and laid claim to the whole country west of 
 the Alleghany mountains. This success must be attribu- 
 ted, not to any superiority of the Canadians in bravery, 
 
216 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 but to the higher military character of their governors, 
 and more especially to their fortifications, which were con- 
 structed in situations most judiciously selected, to influ- 
 ence the Indians and facilitate incursions into the Eng- 
 lish colonies. The French pursued interior and central 
 lines, while the English followed exterior and divergent 
 lines. The disparity of numbers was always very great. 
 At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the whole 
 population of the colonies amounted to upwards of one 
 million of souls, while that of both Canada and Louisiana 
 did not exceed fifty-two thousand. But the French pos- 
 sessions, though situated at the extremities of a continent 
 and separated by an almost boundless wilderness, were 
 nevertheless connected by a line of military posts, strong 
 enough to resist the small arms that could then be brought 
 against them. This fort-building propensity of the French 
 became a matter of serious alarm to the colonies, and in 
 1710 the legislature of New York especially protested 
 against it in an address to the crown. While the militar}"- 
 art was stationary in England, France had produced her 
 four great engineers — Errard, Pagan, Vauban, and Cor- 
 montaigne ; and nowhere has the influence of their sys- 
 tem of military defence been more strikingly exhibited 
 than in the security it afforded to the Canadian colony, 
 when assailed by such vastly superior British forces. 
 Still further accessions were now made to these English 
 forces by large reinforcements from the mother country, 
 while the Canadians received little or no assistance from 
 France ; nevertheless they prolonged the war till 1760, 
 forcing the English to adopt at last the slow and expen- 
 sive process of reducing all their fortifications. This 
 will be shown in the following outline of the several cam- 
 paigns. 
 
 Very early in 1755, a considerable body of men was 
 sent from Great Britain to reinforce their troops in thitf 
 
OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES. 217 
 
 country. These troops were again separated into four 
 distinct armies. The first, consisting of near two thou- 
 sand men, marched to the attack of Fort Du Quesne, but 
 was met and totally defeated by one-half that number of 
 French and Indians. The second division, of fifteen hun- 
 dred, proceeded to attack Fort Niagara by way of Oswego, 
 but returned without success. The third, of three thou- 
 sand seven hundred men, met and defeated Dieskau's 
 army of twelve hundred regulars and six hundred Cana- 
 dians and Indians, in the open field, but did not attempt 
 to drive him from his works at Ticonderoga and Qrown 
 Point. The fourth, consisting of three thousand three 
 hundred men and forty-one vessels, laid waste a portion of 
 Nova Scotia ; thus ending the campaign without a single 
 important result. It was commenced under favorable aus- 
 pices, with a^pple preparations, and a vast superiority of 
 force ; hut this superiority was again more than counterbal- 
 anced hy the faulty plans of the English, and hy the fortifi- 
 cations which the French had erected, in such positions as to 
 give them a decided advantage in their military operations. 
 Washington early recommended the same system of de- 
 fence for the English on the Ohio ; and, after Braddock's 
 defeat, advised " the erection of small fortresses at con- 
 venient places to deposite provisions in, by which means 
 the country will be eased of an immense expense in the 
 carriage, and it will also be a means of securing a retreat 
 if we should be put to the rout again." 
 
 But this advice of Washington was unheeded, and the 
 campaign of 1756 was based upon the same erroneous 
 principles as the preceding one. The^r.?^ division, of three 
 thousand men, was to operate against Fort Du Quesne ; the 
 second, of six thousand men, against Niagara ; the third, of 
 ten thousand men, against Crown Point; and 21, fourth, of 
 two thousand men, was to ascend the Kennebec river, de- 
 fitioy the settlements on the Chaudiere, and, by alarming 
 19 
 
218 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 the country about Quebec, produce a diversion in favor ol 
 the third division, which was regarded as the main army, 
 and was directed along the principal line of operations. 
 The entire French forces at this time consisted of only 
 three thousand regulars and a body of Canadian militia. 
 Nevertheless, the English, with forces neaily six times as 
 numerous, closed the campaign without gaining a single 
 advantage. 
 
 We here see that the French, with very inferior forces, 
 still continued successful in every campaign, uniformly 
 gaining advantage over their enemy, and gaining ground 
 upon his colonies. By the possession of Forts William 
 Henry, Ticonderoga, and Crown Point, they completely 
 commanded Lake George and Lake Champlain, which af- 
 forded the shortest and easiest line of communication be- 
 tween the British colonies and Canada. By means of 
 their forts at Montreal, Frontenac, Detroit, &c., they had 
 entire dominion of the lakes connecting the St. Lawrence 
 with the Mississippi, and Canada with Louisiana ; more- 
 over, by means of Fort Du Quesne and a line of auxiliary 
 works, their ascendency over the Indians on the Ohio was 
 well secured. But experience had at length taught the 
 English wherein lay the great strength of their opponents, 
 and a powerful effort was now to be made to displace the 
 French from their fortresses, or at least to counterbalance 
 these works by a vast and overwhelming superiority of 
 troops. 
 
 In 1757, a British fleet of fifteen . ships of the line, 
 eighteen frigates, and many smaller vessels, and a land 
 force of twelve thousand effective men, were sent to at- 
 tempt the reduction of the fortifications of Louisburg ; but 
 they failed to effect their object. 
 
 In 1758 the forces sent against this place consisted of 
 twenty ships of the line and eighteen frigates, with an ar- 
 my of fourteen thousand men. The harbor was defended 
 
OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES. 219 
 
 by only five ships of the line, one fifty-gun sliip, and five 
 frigates, three of which were sunk across the mouth of the 
 basin. The fortifications of the town had been much neg- 
 lected, and in general had fallen into ruins. The garri- 
 son consisted of only two thousand five hundred regulars, 
 and six hundred militia. Notwithstanding that the number 
 of gims of the British fleet exceeded both the armaments 
 of the French ships and of all the forts, these British ships 
 did not risk an attack, but merely acted as transports and 
 as a blockading squadron. Even the French naval defence, 
 and the outer works commanding the harbor, were reduced 
 by the temporary land-batteries which Wolfe erected; and 
 the main work, although besieged by an inequality of forces 
 of nearly ^ue to one, held out for two months, and even 
 then surrendered through the fears and petitions of the 
 non-combatant inhabitants, and not because it had received 
 any material injury from the besiegers. The defence, 
 however, had been continued long enough to prevent, for 
 that campaign, any further operations against Canada. The 
 whole number of the English land forces in this campaign 
 was computed at fifty thousand men, of which more than 
 forty thousand were in the field. The^r^^ division, of 
 nine thousand men, was directed against Fort Du Quesne, 
 whose garrison did not exceed as many hundred. The 
 second division, of sixteen thousand eff'ective troops, pro- 
 ceeded against Ticonderoga and Crown Point ; while a 
 detachment of three thousand men captured Fort Fronte- 
 nac, then garrisoned by only one hundred and ten men. 
 The whole force of the French amounted to only five 
 thousand ; the English attempted to drive them from their 
 works by storm, but were repulsed with a loss of near two 
 thousand men, while their opponents were scarcely in- 
 jured. The third division acted, as has just been stated, 
 in concert with the naval force against Louisburg. 
 
 In 1759, the western division of the English army, con- 
 
220 MILITARV ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 sisting of a strong body of Indians, and five thousand 
 troops, wasted the whole season in reducing Fort Niagara, 
 which was garrisoned by only six hundred men. The 
 central column of thirteen thousand men was sufficiently 
 successful to enable it to winter at Crown Point. The 
 eastern division of eight thousand men under Wolfe as- 
 cended the St. Lawrence with a fleet of twenty-two ships 
 thirteen frigates, and fourteen sloops, and smaller vessels, 
 carrying one thousand nine hundred and ninety guns, and 
 five thousand five hundred and ninety seamen. The naval 
 defence of Quebec consisted of eight frigates, carrying two 
 hundred and ten guns ; the land forces numbered about 
 nine thousand, and the fortifications were armed with nine- 
 ty-four guns and five mortars, only a part of which could 
 be brought to bear upon the anchorage ground. Several 
 attempts were made by the combined forces to carry these 
 works, but they proved equally unsuccessful. Although 
 the English fleet carried twenty times as many guns as the 
 forts, their inability to reduce these works was acknowl- 
 edged. The siege had continued for two months, and still 
 the fortifications were uninjured. General Wolfe himself 
 distinctly stated, that, in any further attempt to carry the 
 place, the " guns of the shipping could not be of much 
 use ;" and the chief engineer of the expedition gave it as 
 his opinion, that " the ships would receive great damage 
 from the shot and bombs of the upper batteries, without 
 making the least impression upon them." Under these 
 circumstances it was finally determined to endeavor to de- 
 coy Montcalm from his works, and make him risk a battle 
 in the ppen field. In an evil hour, the French consented 
 to forego the advantages of their fortifications, and the 
 contest was finally decided on the plains of Abraham, with 
 forces nearly equal in number. Both Wolfe and Mont- 
 calm fell in this battle, but the former on the field of vic- 
 tory ; and five days afterwards the inhabitants of Quebec, 
 
OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES. 221 
 
 weakened and dispirited by their losses, surrendered the 
 town, although its fortifications were still unharmed. 
 
 The French, in this campaign, had relinquished all idea 
 of opposing the enemy in the open field, and confined their 
 efforts to retard the advance of the English till France 
 could send troops to their relief ; but no such relief came ; 
 and when the campaign of 1760 opened, the little French 
 army was concentrated at Montreal. As the English di- 
 visions advanced, one by Oswego, one by Lake Champlain, 
 and the third by Quebec, they afforded to the French a fine 
 opportunity for the strategic movement from a centre against 
 converging lines ; but the garrison was too weak to hope 
 for success in either direction, a^d therefore awaited the 
 enemy*within their works. Montreal, being but slightly 
 fortified, was soon reduced, and with it fell the French 
 empire erected in this country at infinite labor and ex- 
 pense. 
 
 At the first outbreak of the American Revolution, it was 
 so obviously important to get possession of the military 
 works commanding the line of Lake Champlain, that ex- 
 peditions for this purpose were simultaneously fitted out 
 by Massachusetts and Connecticut. The garrisons of 
 these works were taken by surprise. This conquest, says 
 Botta, the able and elegant historian of the Revolution, 
 " was no doubt of high importance, but it would have had 
 a much greater influence upon the course of the whole 
 war, if these fortresses, which are the bulwarks of the col- 
 onies, had been defended in times foUow^ing, with the 
 same prudence and valor with which they had been ac- 
 quired." 
 
 In the campaign of 1775, an army of two thousand 
 seven hundred and eighty-four effective men, with a re- 
 serve of one thousand at Albany, crossed the lake and 
 approached the fortress of St. John's about the 1st of 
 September! The work was garrisoned by only about five 
 
222 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 or six hundred regulars, and some two hundred militia. 
 This was the only obstacle to prevent the advance of our 
 army into the very heart of Canada ; to leave it unreduced 
 in rear would cut off all hope of retreat. Allen had al- 
 ready made the rash and foolish attempt, and his whole 
 army had been destroyed, and he himself made prisoner. 
 The reduction of this place was therefore deemed abso- 
 lutely necessary, but was not effected till the 3d of Novem- 
 ber, and after a long and tedious siege. This delay decided 
 the fate of the campaign ; for, although Montreal fell im- 
 mediately afterwards, the season was so far advanced that 
 a large portion of our troops, wearied with their sufferings 
 from cold and want of clothing, now demanded their dis- 
 charge. The eastern division, of one thousand iften un- 
 der Arnold, crossing the country by the Kennebeck and 
 Chaudiwe, through difficulties and suffering almost un- 
 paralleled, arrived opposite Quebec on the 9th of Novem- 
 ber. The place was at this time almost without defence, 
 and, had Arnold possessed a suitable ponton equipage, it 
 might easily have been taken by surprise. But by the 
 time that the means for effecting a passage could be 
 prepared, and a junction could be effected between the 
 two American armies, Quebec was prepared to sustain 
 their attack. The result of that attack is too well known 
 to require a repetition here. 
 
 Early the next season it was deemed necessary to 
 withdraw the American army from Canada. This retreat 
 of undisciplined troops, in the presence of vastly superior 
 numbers of the enemy, would have been extremely haz- 
 ardous had it not been effected on a line of forts which 
 were held by our own troops. As it was we sustained no 
 considerable loss. 
 
 Carleton pursued on rapidly, to co-operate with General 
 Howe, who was now lying at New York with over one 
 hundred ships and about thirty-five thousand troops ; but 
 
OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES. 223 
 
 he received a decided check from the guns of Ticonde- 
 roga, and retired again to Canada. 
 
 By the British plan of campaign in 1777, the entire 
 force of their northern army was to concentrate at Al- 
 bany. One division of fifteen hundred men, including 
 Indians, advanced by Oswego, Wood Creek, and the Mo- 
 hawk; but Fort Stanwix, with a garrison of only six 
 hundred men, arrested their progress and forced them to 
 return. Another, leaving New York, ascended the Hud- 
 son as far as Esopus ; but its progress was so much re- 
 tarded by the small forts and water-batteries along that 
 river, that it would have been too late to assist Burgoyne, 
 even if it could possibly have reached Albany. The 
 principal division of the enemy's army, numbering about 
 nine thousand men, advanced by the Champlain route. 
 Little or no preparations were made to arrest its progress. 
 The works of Ticonderoga were so out of repair as to be 
 indefensible on the flanks. Its garrison consisted of only 
 fifteen hundred continental troops, and about as many mi- 
 litia, over whom the general had no control. Their sup- 
 ply of provisions was exhausted, and only one man in ten 
 of the militia had bayonets to their guns. Under these 
 circumstances it was deemed best to withdraw the garri- 
 son six days after the investment. Burgoyne now ad- 
 vanced rapidly, but with so little precaution as to leave 
 his communications in rear entirely unprotected. Being 
 repulsed by the American forces collected at Saratoga, 
 his line of supplies cut off by our detached forts, his pro- 
 visions exhausted, his troops dispirited, and his Indian 
 allies having deserted him, retreat became impossible, 
 and his whole anny was forced to capitulate. This cam- 
 paign closed the military operations on our northern fron- 
 tier during the war of the Revolution. 
 
 We now come to the war of 1812. In the beginning dC 
 this war the number of British regulars in the Canadas did 
 
224 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 not exceed three thousand men, who were scattered along 
 a froiitier of more than nine hundred miles in extent. In 
 the whole of Upper Canada there were but seven hundred 
 and twenty men, and at Montreal, Three Rivers, and on 
 the whole line of the Sorel the whole defensive force 
 amounted to only thirteen hundred and thirty men, and the 
 garrison of Quebec was so small, that no detachment 
 could be made without great inconvenience and danger. 
 The fortifications of Isle aux Noix, then emphatically the 
 key of central Canada, was without a garrison during 
 nearly the whole of the first campaign. Under these cir- 
 cumstances an American force of fifteen hundred or two 
 thousand men marching rapidly from Albany, might readi- 
 ly have broken the enemy's line of defence, and cut off" all 
 Upper Canada from supplies and reinforcements from 
 England by way of Quebec. Let us see what course was 
 pursued. 
 
 On the 1st of June an army of two thousand men was 
 collected at Dayton, in Ohio, placed under the command 
 of an imbecile old officer of the Revolution, and directed 
 by Detroit against the Canadian Peninsula. The dilatory 
 march, absurd movements, and traitorous surrender of 
 Hull's army to a British force of three hundred regulars 
 and four hundred militia, are but too well known. An- 
 other American army of about ten thousand men was 
 afterwards raised in the west ; the main division of this 
 army under Harrison marched by three separate routes to 
 invade Canada by way of Maiden ; but they failed to reach 
 their destination, and wintered behind the river Portage. 
 The Eastern army was collected at Albany in the early 
 part of the summer and placed under the command of 
 General Dearborn, another old officer of the Revolution. 
 Instead of pushing this force rapidly forward upon the 
 strategic line of Lake Champlain, the general was directed 
 to divide it into three parts, and to send one division 
 
OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES. 225 
 
 against the Niagara frontier, a second against Kingston, 
 and a third against Montreal. These orders were dis- 
 patched from Washington the 26th of June, nearly a month 
 after Hull had begun his march from Dayton. Dearborn's 
 army, on the first of September, consisted of six thousand 
 five hundred regulars and seven thousand militia — ^thirteen 
 thousand five hundred in all : six thousand three hundred 
 for the Niagara frontier, two thousand two hundred at 
 Sacketts Harbor, and five thousand for Lake Champlain. 
 Even with this absurd plan of campaign and faulty division 
 of the forces, we might have succeeded if the general had 
 acted with energy, so exceedingly weak were the Cana- 
 dian means of defence ; but instead of taking advantage 
 of his superiority in numbers and the favorable circum- 
 stances of the time, he entered into an armistice with the 
 British general, and his whole army of thirteen thousand 
 five hundred men lay inactive till the 13th of October, 
 when the absurd project of crossing the Niagara at Lewis- 
 ton failed, because the New-York militia had constitu- 
 tional scruples against crossing a river so long as the ene- 
 my were on the other side. The Lake Champlain column, 
 consisting of three thousand regulars and two thousand 
 militia, a considerable portion of which had been collected 
 as early as the first of August, had in four months advanced 
 as far as La Cole river, a distance of about two hundred 
 miles from Albany. The unimportant action at this place 
 terminated the campaign, and the army of the North re- 
 turned to winter-quarters. 
 
 All the early part of the campaign of 1813, on the 
 lyjrthern frontier, was spent in a war of detachments, in 
 which our troops captured Fort George and York, and 
 repelled the predatory excursions of the enemy. In these 
 operations our troops exhibited much courage and energy, 
 and the young officers who led them, no little skill and 
 military talent. But nothing could have been more ab- 
 
226 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 surd than for a general, with superior forces in the vi- 
 cinity of an enemy, to act only by detachments at a time 
 when his opponents were daily increasing in number. 
 This useless war of outposts and detachments was con- 
 tinued till July, when General Dearborn was recalled, 
 and General Wilkinson, another old officer of the Revo- 
 lution, put in his place. It was now determined to make 
 a push for Montreal, with the combined forces of the 
 Northern army. Wilkinson, with 8,000 men, descended 
 the St. Lawrence, but did not reach Prescott till the 6th 
 of November, thus affording to the English plenty of leis- 
 ure to prepare for his reception. Hampton, another old 
 officer of the Revolution, ascended Lake Champlain with 
 another column of 4,000 men, but refused to form any co- 
 operation with Wilkinson, and after the unimportant com- 
 bat of Chrystler's Field, the whole army again retired to 
 winter-quarters . 
 
 In the mean time the army of the West, under Har- 
 rison, who was assisted by the military skill and science 
 of M'Crea and Wood, and the bravery of Croghan and 
 Johnson, held in check the British and Indians ; and the 
 battle of the Thames and the victory of Lake Erie form- 
 ed a brilliant termination to the campaign in that quarter. 
 Had such victories been gained on the Montreal or east- 
 em portion of the frontier, they would have led to the 
 most important results. 
 
 The plan of operations for the campaign of 1814 was 
 of the same diverse and discordant character as before. 
 But the command of the troops had now fallen into the 
 hands of young and energetic officers , and Brown, as- 
 sisted by such men as Wood, M'Crea, Scott, Ripley, 
 Miller, soon gained the victories of Fort Erie, Chippe- 
 wa, and Lundy's Lane ; while M'Comb and M'Donough 
 drove back the enemy from the line of Lake Champlain. 
 With these operations terminated the Northern campaign 
 
OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES. 22*7 
 
 of 1814, the last which has been conducted on that fron- 
 tier. 
 
 Let us now turn to the system of works projected for 
 the defence of this line. 
 
 The first works are at the Falls of St. Mary, on the 
 western extremity of the line. 
 
 The second works are at Mackinaw. 
 
 The third works are at the foot of Lake Huron. 
 
 The fourth works are near Detroit. 
 
 The fifth works are near Buffalo. 
 
 The sixth works are at the mouth of the Niagara river. 
 
 The seventh works are at Oswego. 
 
 The eighth works are at Sacketts Harbor. 
 
 The ninth works are below Ogdensburg. 
 
 The tenth works are at Rouse's Point. 
 
 The eleventh works are near the head-waters of the 
 Kennebec or the Penobscot. 
 
 The twelfth works are at Calais, on the St. Croix. 
 
 All these works are small, and simple in their charac- 
 ter, well calculated to assist the operations of arme(} 
 forces in the field, but incapable of resisting a protracted 
 siege. They are entirely different in their character from 
 those on the coast, the latter being intended principally 
 for the use of our citizen-soldiery, in the defence of our 
 seaport towns, while the former are intended merely as 
 auxiliaries to the operations of more disciplined troops. 
 
 This system of defence for our Northern frontier has 
 been much commented on by men professing some know- 
 ledge of the military art, and various opinions have been 
 advanced respecting its merits. Some have thought that 
 more and larger works should be placed on the western 
 extremity of this line ; others attach by far the greatest 
 importance to the central or Montreal portion of the fron- 
 tier; while others, again, attach a higher value to tho 
 eastern extremity of the line. 
 
228 MILITARY AUT AND SCIENCE. 
 
 These last would have us concentrate our main forcer 
 on the head-waters of the Kennebec and the Penobscot, 
 and then advance upon Quebec, a distance of some 250 
 miles, along the isolated carriage -road, through the valley 
 of the Chaudiere. Here is only a single road, but little 
 travelled, and penetrating a wide and almost uninhabited 
 wilderness. General Jomini says emphatically, that a 
 line of operations should always offer two or three roads for 
 the movement of an army in the sphere of its enterprises, — 
 an insuperable objection to the Kennebec route, except 
 as a diversion to the main attack. But there are still 
 stronger objections to this route, than its want of feasi- 
 bility for the transportation of the main army ; for even 
 should that army succeed in reaching Quebec in safety, 
 the expedition would be entirely without military results, 
 unless that fortress could be immediately reduced, — a 
 contingency which would be extremely doubtful under 
 the most favorable circumstances ; and even should we be 
 ever so fortunate in our operations, the siege of such a 
 place would occupy a considerable length of time. It 
 would be throwing our forces along the most difficult line 
 of operations, against the strongest point in the enemy's 
 line of defence, and making the success of the whole 
 plan depend upon the contingency of a reduction, in a 
 few days, of one of the strongest fortresses in the world. 
 What principle in military science would justify such a 
 plan of campaign ? We are fully aware of the great ad- 
 vantages to be derived from the reduction of Quebec ; 
 and we are also aware of the great difficulties to be en- 
 countered in any attempt to accomplish that object. It 
 may, and probably will ere long, be made to surrender to 
 our arms ; but it would be utter folly to base our military 
 operations on the contingency of a short and successful 
 siege. By advancing upon Montreal by the Lake Cham- 
 plain route, we could cut off the Canadian forces in the 
 
OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES. 229 
 
 West from all reinforcements ; and then, as circumstances 
 might direct, could besiege Quebec, or attack the enemy 
 in the field, or perhaps, manoeuvring as the French did at 
 the siege of Mantua, accomplish both objects at the same 
 time. 
 
 We have seen that it was one of Napoleon's maxims 
 that an army should choose the shortest and most direct line 
 of operations, which should either pierce the enemy's line of 
 defence, or cut off his communications with his base. It is 
 the opinion of men of the best military talent in our army 
 that the Lake Champlain line satisfies all these conditions 
 at the same time ; — that it is the most direct, most feasi- 
 ble, and most decisive line which can be pursued in case 
 of operations against Canada ; and that it is indispensable 
 to success in war that this line be well fortified in time 
 of peace. All agree that the St. Lawrence above Quebec 
 constitutes the key point of the enemy's defence, and the 
 objective point towards which all our operations should be 
 directed. To reach this point, all our Boards of Engi- 
 neers have deemed it best to collect our troops at Albany 
 and advance by Lake Champlain, a distance of only two 
 hundred miles. Besides the advantages of a good water 
 communication the whole distance for the transportation 
 of military stores, there are several roads on each side, 
 all concentrating on this line within our own territory. 
 It has already been shown by the brief sketch of our nor- 
 thern wars, that this line has been the field of strife and 
 blood for fifteen campaigns. Nature has marked it out as 
 our shortest and easiest line of intercourse with Canada, 
 both in peace and war. Military diversions will always 
 be made on the eastern and western extremities of this 
 frontier, and important secondary or auxiliary operations 
 be carried on by the eastern and western routes ; but until 
 we overthrow the whole system of military science aa 
 established by the Romans, revived by Frederick, ani 
 
230 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 practised and improved by Napoleon, the central and inte' 
 rior line, under all ordinary circumstances, will furnish the 
 greatest probabilities of success. 
 
 If the line of Lake Champlain is, as we have endeav- 
 ored to show, the most important line in the north, its 
 security by fortifications is a matter of the greatest inter- 
 est. The works recommended by the Board, consist of a 
 single fort, costing $600,000, at Rouse's Point, on the 
 extreme frontier, and unfortified depots at Plattsburg and 
 Albany. But is this sufficient to accomplish the object? 
 If the hostile army should pass the extreme frontier bar- 
 rier, what is to retard his advance, — ^what defensive works 
 are to protect the debouche of the Northern canal, or even 
 to save the great central depot ? We know of no foreign 
 engineer who has recommended less than three lines of 
 fortifications for the security of a land frontier ; and Na- 
 poleon, the Archduke Charles, and General Jomini, agree 
 in recommending at least this number of lines. There 
 may be circumstances that render it unnecessary to resort 
 to a three-fold defence throughout the whole extent of our 
 northern frontier ; but upon our main line of communica- 
 tion with Canada, — a line of maximum importance both to 
 us and to the enemy, we know of no reason for violating 
 the positive rules of the art, — rules which have been estab- 
 lished for ages, and sanctioned by the best engineers and 
 greatest generals of modem times. 
 
 Ticonderoga has more than once stayed the waves of 
 northern invasion ; and we know of no change in the art 
 of war, or in the condition of the country, that renders 
 less important than formerly the advantages of an inter- 
 mediate point of support between Albany and the Cana- 
 dian lines. Indeed it would seem that the connection of 
 the Hudson with the lake by the northern canal had even 
 increased the value of such a point. 
 
 It would seem, moreover, that the great value of a cen- 
 
OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES. 231 
 
 tral depot near Albany would warrant a resort to the best 
 means of security which can be afforded by defensive 
 works. Here we already have one of our largest arsenals 
 of construction ; here are to be located magazines for the 
 collection and deposite, in time of peace, of gunpowder ; 
 here, in time of war, is to be formed the grand military 
 depot for our whole northern armies ; and here is the 
 point of junction of the lines of communication of our 
 northern and eastern states, and the great central rallying- 
 point where troops are to be collected for the defence of 
 our northern frontier, or for offensive operations against 
 Canada. Such a place should never be exposed to the 
 coup-de-main of an enemy. The chance operations of a 
 defensive army are never sufficient for the security of 
 so important a position. We do not here pretend to say 
 what its defences should be. Perhaps strong tHes-de-pont 
 on the Mohawk and Hudson rivers, and detached works 
 on the several lines of communication, may accomplish the 
 desired object ; perhaps more central and compact works 
 may be found necessary. But we insist on the importance 
 of securing this position by some efficient means. The 
 remarks of Napoleon, (which have already been given,) 
 on the advantages to be derived from fortifying such a 
 central place, where the military wealth of a nation can 
 be secured, are strikingly applicable to this case. 
 
 But let us look for a moment at what is called the west' 
 em plan of defence for our northern frontier. 
 
 Certain writers and orators of the western states, in 
 their plans of military defence, would have the principal 
 fortifications of the northern frontier established on Lake 
 Erie, the Detroit river, the St. Clair, and Lake Kuron ; 
 and the money proposed for the other frontier and coast 
 works, expended in establishing military and naval depots 
 at Memphis and Pittsburg, and in the construction of a 
 ship-canal from the lower Illinois to Lake Michigan, — for 
 
232 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 the purpose of obtaining the naval control of the northern 
 lakes. 
 
 It is said that British military and steam naval forces 
 will ascend the St. Lawrence to Lake Ontario ; that to 
 counteract these operations we must build an opposition 
 steam-navy at Pittsburg and Memphis, and collect our 
 troops on the Ohio and Mississippi, ascend the Mississippi 
 and Illinois, Lake Michigan, Lake Huron, and the Geor- 
 gian Bay, cross over to the Ottawa by French river and 
 Lake Nipissing, or Moon river and the Muskago, then de- 
 scend the Ottawa river to Montreal. But as there might 
 be some difficulty in conveying their war-steamers over 
 some twelve or fifteen portages between the Georgian Bay 
 and the Ottawa, and as the upper waters of that river are 
 not navigable by such craft, it has, by some of the military 
 writers before alluded to, been deemed preferable to de- 
 scend Lake Huron, St. Clair river and lake, run the 
 gauntlet past the British forts on the Detroit, descend 
 Lake Erie and the Niagara* into Lake Ontario, so as to 
 meet the English as they come steaming up the St. Law- 
 rence ! 
 
 It is agreed upon all sides that the British must first 
 collect their forces at Quebec, and then pass along the 
 line of the St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario to reach the 
 Niagara and Detroit frontiers. Our boards of engineers 
 have deemed it best to collect troops on the Champlain 
 line, and, by penetrating between Montreal and Quebec, 
 separate the enemy's forces and cut off all the remainder 
 of Canada from supplies and reinforcements from England. 
 But it has been discovered by certain western men that 
 to cut the trunk of a tree is not the proper method of fell- 
 ing it ; we must climb to the top and pinch the buds, or, at 
 
 * How they are to pass the Falls was not determined either by 
 Harry Bluflf or the Memphis Convention. 
 
OUR NORTHERN MILITARY DEFENCES. 233 
 
 most, cut off a few of the smaller limbs. To blow up a 
 house, we should not place the mine under the foundation, 
 but attach it to one of the shingles of the roof! We have 
 already shown that troops collected at Albany may reach 
 the great strategic point on the St. Lawrence by an easy 
 and direct route of two hundred miles ; but forces collected 
 at Pittsburg and Memphis must pass over a difficult and 
 unfrequented route of two thousand miles. 
 
 Our merchant marine on the lakes secures to us a na- 
 val superiority in that quarter at the beginning of a war ; 
 and our facilities for ship-building are there equal if not 
 superior to any possessed by the enemy. The only way, 
 therefore, in which our ascendency on the lakes can be 
 lost, is by the introduction of steam craft from the Atlan- 
 tic. The canals and locks constructed for this object will 
 pass vessels of small dimensions and drawing not over 
 eight and a half feet water. 
 
 How are we to prevent the introduction of these Atlan- 
 tic steamers into our lakes 1 Shall we, at the first opening 
 of hostilities, march with armed forces upon the enemy's 
 line of artificial communication and blow up the locks of 
 their ship-canals, thus meeting the enemy's marine at the 
 very threshold of its introduction into the interior seas ; 
 or shall we build opposition steam-navies at Pittsburg and 
 Memphis, some two thousand miles distant, and then ex- 
 pend some forty or fifty millions* in opening an artificial 
 
 * The construction of the Illinois ship-canal, for vessels of eight and 
 a half feet draught, is estimated at fifteen millions ; to give the same 
 draught to the Mississippi and lower Illinois, would require at least ten 
 millions more ; a ship canal of the corresponding draught around Nia- 
 gara Falls, will cost, say, ten millions ; the navy yard at Memphis, with 
 docks, storehouses, &c., will cost about two millions, and steamers sent 
 thence to the lakes will cost about fifty thousand dollars per gun. On 
 the other hand, the military defences which it is deemed necessary to 
 erect in time of peace for the securitv of the Champlain frontier, will 
 
234 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 channel to enable them to reach Lake Ontario, after its 
 borders have been laid waste by the hostile forces ? Very 
 few disinterested judges would hesitate in forming their 
 opinion on this question.* 
 
 cost only about two thousand dollars per gun ; the whole expenditure 
 not exceeding, at most, two millions of dollars ! 
 
 It is not to be denied that a water communication between the Mis- 
 sissippi and the northern lakes will have great commercial advantages, 
 and that, in case of a protracted war, auxiliary troops and military 
 stores may be drawn from the valley of the Mississippi to assist the 
 North and East in preventing any great accessions to the British mili- 
 tary forces in the Canadas. We speak only of the policy of expending 
 vast sums of money on this military (?) project, to the neglect of mat- 
 ters of more immediate and pressing want. We have nothing to say 
 of its character as a commercial project, or of the ultimate military ad- 
 vantages that might accrue from such a work. We speak only of the 
 present condition and wants of the country, and not of what that con- 
 dition and those wants may be generations hence ! 
 
 * There are no books devoted exclusively to the subjects embraced 
 in this chapter ; but the reader will find many remarks on the northern 
 frontier defences in the histories of the war of 1812, in congressional 
 reports, (vide House Doc. 206, XXVIth Congress, 2d session ; and 
 Senate Poc, No. 85, XXVIIIth Congress, 2d session,) and in numerous 
 pamphlets and essays that have appeared from the press within the 
 last few years. 
 
STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE CJORPS. 235 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 ARMY ORGANIZATION STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS. 
 
 By the law of the 12th of December, 1790, on the or- 
 ganization of the public force of France, the Army was 
 defined, " A standing force drawn from the public force, 
 and designed to act against external enemies." [Une 
 force hahituelle extraite de la force puhlique, et destinee es- 
 sentiellement a agir contre les ennemis du dehors.^ 
 
 In time of peace, the whole organized military force of 
 the State is intended when we speak of the army ; but in 
 time of war this force is broken up into two or more frac- 
 tions, each of which is called an army. These armies are 
 usually named from the particular duty which may be as- 
 signed to them — as, army of invasion, army of occupation, 
 army of observation, army of reserve, 6fc. ; or from the 
 country or direction in which they operate — as, army of the 
 North, of the South, of Mexico, of Canada, of the Rhine, 6fc. ; 
 or from the general who commands it — as, the army of 
 Soult, army of Wellington, army of Blucher, <^c. 
 
 All modern armies are organized on the same basis. 
 They are made up of a Staff and Administrative depart- 
 ments, and four distinct arms — Infantry, Cavalry, Artil- 
 lery, and Engineers ; each having distinct duties, but all 
 combining to form one and the same military body. In 
 the actual operations of a campaign, these forces are form- 
 ed into corps d'armee, each corps d^armee being composed 
 of two or more grand-divisions ; each grand-division, of 
 two or more brigades ; and each brigade, of several com- 
 panies, squadrons, or batteries. 
 
236 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 In speaking of an army in the field, it is sometimes sup- 
 posed to be divided into two classes of men — ^the Staff 
 and the line. We here include in the first class — 
 
 All officers, of whatever arm, above the rank of colonel j 
 
 All officers of the staff* corps of whatever grade, and 
 
 All officers attached to the staff as aides, &;c. ; 
 
 All officers of the administrative departments ; 
 
 All officers of artillery and engineer staffs ; 
 
 The corps of geographical or topographical engineers, 
 and 
 
 The guards. 
 
 In the second class are included all troops, of what- 
 ever arm, which belong to the active army, in infantry, 
 cavalry, artillery, and engineers. All troops on detached 
 service, such as recruitmg, guarding posts and depots, es- 
 corting convoys, &c., as well as all sedentary corps, gar- 
 risons of fortified places, &c., are not regarded in this 
 classification as composing any part of the line of the 
 army. 
 
 Troops of the line is a term applied only to such troops 
 as form the principal line on the battle-field, viz : — The 
 heavy infantry and heavy cavalry. These are technically 
 called infantry of the line, and cavalry of the line. In this 
 sense of the term, light infantry, light cavalry or dragoons, 
 artillery, and engineers, are not classed as troops of the 
 line. But this distinction is now pretty much fallen into 
 disuse, and the division of an army into Staff and Admin- 
 istrative departments, and four arms of service — Infan- 
 try, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers — is now regarded 
 as the most convenient, from being precise and definite in 
 its meaning. 
 
 The general staff of an army includes all general offi- 
 cers of the army, and such officers of lower grades as are 
 attached to this general duty, instead of serving with 
 troops, or on special administrative duty. The general 
 
STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS. 237 
 
 officers are — 1st, the generalissimo, or commander-in-cliief ; 
 2A, generals, or marshals, as they are called in France, or 
 field-marshals and generals of infantry and cavalry, as 
 they are called in England and the northern states of Eu- 
 rope ; 3d, lieutenant-generals ; 4th, generals of division, 
 or major-generals, as they are called in England ; 5th, gen- 
 erals of brigade, or brigadier-generals, as they are sometimes 
 called ;— colonels, majors, captains, lieutenants, ensigns, 
 and cornets or cadets, are also either attached to the staff, 
 or form a part of the staff corps. The titles of " adjutant- 
 general," and of " inspector-general," are given to staff 
 officers selected for these special services, either in the 
 general staff or in the several corps d'armee. No special 
 rank is attached to these offices themselves, and the grade 
 of those who hold them is fixed by some special rule, or 
 by their general rank in the army. 
 
 In the war of the Revolution, Washington held the rank 
 of General, and in 1798 the rank of Lieutenant-general. 
 In the war of 1812, the highest grade held by any of our 
 officers was that of General of Division, or Major-general, 
 as it was called. The highest grade in our army at the 
 present time is called Major-general — a title that properly 
 belongs, not to the general of an army, but to the chief of 
 staff. Hamilton had this title when chief of Washington's 
 staff; Berthier and Soult when chief of Napoleon's staff, 
 the former till the close of the campaign of 1814, and the 
 latter in the Waterloo campaign. General Jomini first 
 greatly distinguished himself as chief of Ney's staff, and 
 afterwards on the staff of the Emperor of Russia. Other 
 generals have owed much of their success to the chiefs of 
 their staff: — Pichegru to Regnier, Moreau to Dessoles, 
 Kutusof to Toll, Barclay to Diebitsch, and Bliicher to 
 Sbarnharst and Gneisenau. 
 
 The generalissimo or commander-in-chief of an army is 
 the person designated by the law of the land to take charge 
 
238 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 of the organized military forces of the state. In this coun- 
 try the President, through his Secretary of War, exercises 
 this general command. In England, Wellington acts in 
 the capacity of commander-in-chief of all the British mili- 
 tary forces. In France, the Minister of War, under the 
 king, has this general direction. In other European ser- 
 vices, some prince of the blood, or distinguished general, 
 exercises the functions of generalissimo. 
 
 An active army in the field should be conunanded by a 
 general^ or, as is done in some European countries, by 
 a marshal. These may be regarded as of assimilated rank. 
 
 A corps d^armJee should be commanded by a Lieutenant' 
 general. This rule is almost universal in Europe. The 
 number of marshals in France under Napoleon was so 
 great, that officers of this grade were often assigned to 
 corps d'armee. 
 
 A grand division of an army should be commanded by a 
 General of Division. In England, the assimilated grade is 
 that of major-general, and in France at the present time, 
 the younger lieutenant-generals, or the marechaux-de-camp, 
 command divisions. 
 
 A brigade should be commanded by a Brigadier-general. 
 At the present time in the French service, marechaux-de- 
 camp act as commanders of brigades. 
 
 The several corps d^armee are designated by numbers, 
 1st, 2d, 3d, &c., and in the same way the several divisions 
 in each corps d^arrnee, and the se 'eral brigades in each di- 
 vision. 
 
 When the number of troops are placed on a war footing, 
 each corps d'armee ordinarily contains from twenty to thirty 
 thousand men. 
 
 The command of these several corps d'armee^ divi- 
 sions, and brigades, is taken by the officers of the corre- 
 sponding grades according to seniority of rank, and with- 
 out reference to arms, unless otherwise directed by the 
 
STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS. 239 
 
 generalissimo, who should always have the power to des- 
 ignate officers for special commands. 
 
 The chief of staff of an army is usually selected from 
 the grade next below that of the general commanding, and 
 receives, the title, for the time being, which is used to 
 designate this special rank. In some European armies, 
 and formerly in our own service, this officer was called 
 major-general. In France, if the generalissimo commands 
 in person, a marshal is made chief of staff with the tem- 
 poray title of major-general ; but if a marshal commands 
 the army, a lieutenant-general or marechal-de-camp be- 
 comes chief of staff with the title of aide-major-general. 
 The chiefs of staff of corps d^armee and of divisions, are se- 
 lected in precisely the same way. 
 
 The position assigned by the commanding general for the 
 residence of his staiff, is denominated the General Head- 
 Quarter of the army ; that of a corps d'armee staff, the Head- 
 Quarters q/" [1st or 2d, <fec.] corps d'armee; that of a divi- 
 sion, the Head-Quarters of [1st or 2d, &c.] division, [1st 
 or 2d, &c.] corps darmee. 
 
 The petty staffs of regiments, squadrons, &;c., consisting 
 of an adjutant, sergeant-major, &c., are especially organ- 
 ized by the commandants of the regiments, &c., and have 
 no connection whatever with the general staff of an army. 
 Of course, then, they are not embraced in the present 
 discussion. 
 
 The subordinate officers of the staff of an army, in time 
 of war, are charged with important and responsible duties 
 connected with the execution of the orders of their re- 
 spective chiefs. But in time of peace, they are too apt to 
 degenerate into fourth-rate clerks of the Adjutant-general's 
 department, and mere military dandies, employing their 
 time in discussing the most unimportant and really con- 
 temptible points of military etiquette, or criticising the 
 letters and dispatches of superior officers, to see whether 
 
240 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 the wording of the report or the folding of the letter exact- 
 ly corresponds to the particular regulation applicable to 
 the case. Such was the character given to the first staff of 
 Wellington, and a similar class of men composed the staff 
 of the army of Italy when it was abolished by Napoleon 
 and a new one formed in its place. There are also some 
 officers of this stamp in our own service, but they are re- 
 garded by the army with universal contempt. The staff 
 of our army requires a new and different organization, and 
 should be considerably enlarged. 
 
 The following is the composition of a regularly organ- 
 ized general staff in the French service for an army of 
 forty or fifty thousand men divided into two corps d^armee 
 and a reserve. 
 
 1st. The marshal (or general) commanding-in-chief; 
 and one colonel or lieutenant-colonel, one major, three 
 captains and three subalterns, as aides-de-camp. 
 
 2d. A lieutenant-general as chief-of-staff, with the title 
 of major-general, assisted by one colonel or lieutenant-co- 
 lonel, three majors, five captains, and one subaltern, as 
 aides-de-camp. 
 
 3d. Three lieutenant-generals, commanding the corps 
 d'armee and reserve. Each of these will be assisted by 
 aides in the same way as the major-general, and each will 
 also have his regularly-organized staff of corps d'armee, 
 with a general of division or general of brigade as chief. 
 
 4th. Six or nine generals commanding 4ivisions, each 
 having his own distinct and separately organized staff. In 
 the French army, the staff of an officer commanding a di- 
 vision is composed of one colonel, two majors, three cap- 
 tains, and six subalterns. 
 
 5th. Twelve or more generals of brigade, each having 
 one captain, and one subaltern for aides. 
 
 6th. There is also attached to the staff of the general- 
 in-chief of the army, the commandants of artillery and en- 
 
STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS, 241 
 
 gineers, with several subordinates, inspector-generals, and 
 the ranking officers of each of the administrative depart- 
 ments, with their assistants. 
 
 The generals select their aides and assistants from the 
 staff corps, or from either of the four arms of service. 
 
 The troops of these arms may be distributed as follows : 
 
 52 battalions of infantry, . . . 35,000 men. 
 
 42 squadrons of horse, . . . 6,500 " 
 
 13 batteries of artillery, (4 mounted and 9 foot,) . 2,500 « 
 
 5 companies of sappers, 2 of pontoniers,* and 1 of arti- 
 ficers, ..... 1,500 " 
 
 . 45,500 
 
 If we add to these the staff, and the several officers and 
 employes of the administrative departments, we have an 
 army of nearly fifty thousand men. 
 
 This, it will be remembered, is the organization of an 
 army in the field ; in the entire military organization of a 
 state, the number of staff officers will be still higher. 
 
 In 1788, France, with a military organization for about 
 three hundred and twenty thousand men, had eighteen mar- 
 shals, two hundred and twenty-five lieutenant-generals, 
 five hundred and thirty-eight marechaux-de-camp, and four 
 hundred and eighty-three brigadiers. A similar organiza- 
 tion of the general staff was maintained by Napoleon. At 
 present the general staff of the French army consists of 
 nine marshals, (twelve in time of war ;) eighty lieutenant- 
 generals in active service, fifty -two in reserve, and sixty- 
 two en retraite — one hundred and ninety-four in all ; one 
 hundred and sixty marechaux-de-camp in active service 
 eighty-six in reserve, and one hundred and ninety en re- 
 traite — four hundred and thirty-six in all. The oflScers of 
 the staff-corps are : thirty colonels, thirty lieutenant-colo- 
 
 * One bridge-equipage is required for each corps d'armit. 
 21 
 
242 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 nels, one hundred majors, three hundred captains, and one 
 hundred lieutenants. Those of other European armies are 
 organized on the same basis. 
 
 It will be seen from these remarks that the organization 
 of our own general staff is exceedingly defective, and en- 
 tirely unsuited to the object for which it is created. We 
 have two brigadier-generals for the command of two bri- 
 gades, and one general of division, with the title of major- 
 general, who acts in the fourfold capacity of general com- 
 manding the army, lieutenant-general, general of division, 
 and chief of staff of the army. But as it is impossible 
 with this number to maintain a proper organization, the 
 President (with the advice and consent of the Senate) 
 has, from time to time, increased this number to three ma- 
 jor-generals, and nine brigadier-generals, and numerous 
 officers of staff with lower grades. Nearly all these officers 
 are detached from their several regiments and corps, thus in- 
 juring the efficiency of regiments and companies ; and we 
 have in our service, by this absurd mode of supplying the 
 defects of our system of organization by brevet rank, the 
 anomaly of officers being generals, and at the same time not 
 generals ; of holding certain ranks and grades, and yet not 
 holding these ranks and grades ! Let Congress do away 
 this absurd and ridiculous system, and establish a proper 
 and efficient organization of the general staff, and restore 
 the grades of general and lieutenant-general. In the war 
 of 1812, instead of resorting to a proper organization when 
 an increase of the general staff was required, we merely 
 multiplied the number of major-generals and generals of bri- 
 gade by direct appointment, or by conferring brevet rank. 
 It is now conceded that there never was a more inefficient 
 general staff than that with which our army was cursed 
 during the war ; and the claims of brevet rank have ever 
 since been a source of endless turmoils and dissatisfaction, 
 driving from the army many of its noblest ornaments. 
 
STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS. 243 
 
 In the event of another war, it is to be hoped that Con- 
 gress will not again resort to the ruinous system of 1812. 
 Possibly it may by some be objected to the creation of 
 generals, lieutenant-generals, &;c., that it increases the 
 expense of the army and the number of its officers. This 
 need not be. The number, pay, &c., may remain the 
 same, or nearly the same, as at present. But by increas- 
 ing the grades you avoid in a considerable measure the 
 difficulties of seniority claims and brevet rank — the prin- 
 cipal curses of our present system. If we merely in- 
 crease the number of each existing grade, giving a part 
 of these rank above their name and office, wa merely 
 multiply evils. But we will leave this subject for the 
 present, and recur to the general discussion of staff du- 
 ties 
 
 The following remarks of Jomini on the importance of 
 the staff of an army are worthy of attention. " A good 
 staff," says he, " is, more than all, indispensable to the 
 constitution of an army ; for it must be regarded as the 
 nursery where the commanding general can raise his 
 principal supports — as a body of officers whose intelli- 
 gence can aid his own. When harmony is wanting be- 
 tween the genius that commands, and the talents of those 
 who apply his conceptions, success cannot be sure ; for the 
 most skilful combinations are destroyed by faults in exe- 
 cution. Moreover, a good staff has the advantage of being 
 more durable than the genius of any single man ; it not 
 only remedies many evils, but it may safely be affirmed 
 that it constitutes for the army the best of all safeguards. 
 The petty interests of coteries, narrow views, and mis- 
 placed egotism, oppose this last position : nevertheless, 
 every military man of reflection, and every enlightened 
 statesman, will regard its truth as beyond all dispute ; for 
 I. well-appointed staff is to an army what a skilful minis- 
 ter is to a monarchy — it seconds the views of the chief, 
 
244 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 even though it be in condition to direct all things of it- 
 self; it prevents the commission of faults, even though 
 the commanding general be wanting in experience, by 
 furnishing him good councils. How many mediocre men 
 of both ancient and modem times, have been rendered 
 illustrious by achievements which were mainly due to 
 their associates ! Reynier was the chief cause of the 
 victories pf Pichegru, in 1794; and Dessoles, in like 
 manner, contributed to the glory of Moreau. Is not Gen- 
 eral Toll associated with the successes of Kutusof ? Die- 
 bitsch with those of Barclay and Witgenstein ? Gneise- 
 nau and Muffling with those of Blucher? Numerous 
 other instances might be cited in support of these asser- 
 tions. 
 
 " A well-established staff does not always result from a 
 good system of education for the young aspirants ; for 
 a man may be a good mathematician and a fine scholar, 
 without being a good warrior. The staff should always 
 possess sufficient consideration and prerogative to be 
 sought for by the officers of the several arms, and to 
 draw together, in this way, men who are already known 
 by their aptitude for war. Engineer and artillery officers 
 will no longer oppose the staff, if they reflect that it will 
 open to them a more extensive field for immediate dis- 
 tinction, and that it will eventually be made up exclu- 
 sively of the officers of those two corps who may be 
 placed at the disposal of the commanding general, and 
 who are the most capable of directing the operations of 
 war." 
 
 " At the beginning of the wars of the Revolution," says 
 this able historian elsewhere, " in the French army the 
 general staff, which is essential for directing the opera- 
 tions of war, had neither instruction nor experience." 
 The several adjutant-generals attached to the army of 
 Italy were so utterly incompetent, that Napoleon became 
 
STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS. 245 
 
 prejudiced against the existing staff-corps, and virtually- 
 destroyed it, drawing his staff-officers from the other 
 corps of the army. In his earlier wars, a large portion 
 of staff duties were assigned to the engineers ; but in his 
 later campaigns the officers of this corps were particu- 
 larly required for the sieges carried on in Germany and 
 Spain, and considerable difficulty was encountered in 
 finding suitable officers for staff duty. Some of the de- 
 fects of the first French staff-corps were remedied in the 
 latter part of Napoleon's career, and in 1818 it was re- 
 organized by Marshal Saint-Cyr, and a special school es- 
 tablished for its instruction. 
 
 Some European nations have established regular staff- 
 corps, from which the vacancies in the general staff are 
 filled ;' others draw all their staff-officers from the corps 
 of the army. A combination of the two systems is pre- 
 ferred by the best judges. Jomini recommends a regular 
 staff-corps, with special schools for its instruction ; but 
 thinks that its officers should be drawn, at least in part, 
 from the other corps of the "army : the officers of engi- 
 neers and artillery he deems, from their instruction, to be 
 peculiarly qualified for staff duty. The policy of holding 
 double rank at the same time in the staff and in the corps 
 of the army, as is done in our service, is pronounced by 
 all competent judges as ruinous to an army, destroying 
 at the same time the character of the staff and injuring 
 the efficiency of the line. 
 
 The following remarks on the character and duties of 
 general-officers of an army, made at the beginning of the 
 war of 1812, are from the pen of one of the ablest mili- 
 tary writers this country has yet produced : — 
 
 " Generals have been divided into three classes, — 
 Theorists, who by study and reflection have made them- 
 selves acquainted with all the rules or maxims of the art 
 Ihey profess ; Martinets, who have confined their atten- 
 
246 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 tion merely to the mechanical part of the trade ; and 
 Practical men, who have no other or better guide than 
 their own experience, in either branch of it. This last 
 description is in all services, excepting our own, the 
 most numerous, but with us gives place to a fourth class, 
 viz., men destitute alike of theory and of experience. 
 
 " Self-respect is one thing, and presumption another. 
 Without the former, no man ever became a good officer ; 
 under the influence of the latter, generals have commit- 
 ted great faults. The former is the necessary result of 
 knowledge ; the latter of ignorance. A man acquainted 
 with his duty can rarely be placed in circumstances new, 
 surprising, or embarrassing ; a man ignorant of his duty 
 will always find himself constrained to guess, and not 
 knowing how to be right by system, wifl often be 'wrong 
 by chance. 
 
 " These remarks are neither made nor offered as ap- 
 plying exclusively to the science of war. They apply to 
 all other sciences ; but in these, errors are comparatively 
 harmless. A naturalist may amuse himself and the pub- 
 lic with false and fanciful theories of the earth ; and a 
 metaphysician may reason very badly on the relations 
 and forms of matter and spirit, without any ill eflfect but 
 to make themselves ridiculous. Their blunders but make 
 us merry ; they neither pick pockets, nor break legs, nor 
 destroy lives ; while those of a general bring after them 
 evils the most compounded and mischievous, — the slaugh- 
 ter of an army — ^the devastation of a state — the ruin of an 
 empire ! 
 
 " In proportion as ignorance may be calamitous, the 
 reasons for acquiring instruction are multiplied and 
 strengthened. Are you an honest man ? You will spare 
 neither labor nor sacrifice, to gain a competent knowledge 
 of your duty. Are you a man of honor ? You will be 
 careful to avoid self-reproach. Does your bosom glow 
 
STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS. 247 
 
 with the holy fervor of patriotism ? You will so accom- 
 plish yourself as to avoid bringing down upon your coun- 
 try either insult or injury. 
 
 " Nor are the more selfish impulses without a similar 
 tendency. Has hunger made you a soldier ? Will you 
 not take care of your bread ! Is vanity your principle of 
 action ? Will you not guard those mighty blessings, your 
 epaulets and feathers ! Are you impelled by a love of 
 glory or a love of power 1 And can you forget that these 
 coy mistresses are only to be won by intelligence and 
 good conduct ? 
 
 " But the means of instruction, say you, where are 
 they to be found ? Our standing army is bufa bad and 
 ill-organized militia, and our militia not better than a mob. 
 Nor have the defects in these been supplied by Lycees, 
 Prytanees, and Polytechnic schools. The morbid patri- 
 otism of some, and the false economy of others, have 
 nearly obliterated every thing like military knowledge 
 among us. 
 
 " This, reader, is but one motive the more for reinsta- 
 ting it. Thanks to the noble art of printing ! you still 
 have hooTis which, if studied, will teach the art of war. 
 
 " Books I And what are they but the dreams of pe- 
 dants ? They may make a Mack, but have they ever 
 made a Xenophon, a Caesar, a Saxe, a Frederick, or a 
 Bonaparte 1 Who would not laugh to hear the cobbler of 
 Athens lecturing Hannibal on the art of war ? 
 
 " True ; but as you are not Hannibal, listen to the 
 cobbler. Xenophon, Caesar, Saxe, Frederick, and Napo- 
 leon, have all thought well of books, and have even com- 
 posed them. Nor is this extraordinary, since they are 
 but the depositories of maxims which genius has sug- 
 gested, and experience confirmed ; since they both en- 
 lighten and shorten the road of the traveller, and render 
 ■he labor and genius of past ages tributary to our own. 
 
248 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 These teach most empliatically, that the secret of suc- 
 cessful war is not to be found in mere legs and arms, but 
 in the head that shall direct them. If this be either un- 
 gifted by nature, or uninstructed by study and reflection, 
 the best plans of manoeuvre and campaign avail nothing. 
 The two last centuries have presented many revolutions 
 in military character, all of which have turned on this 
 principle. It would be useless to enumerate these. We 
 shall quote only the greatest and the last — The troops of 
 Frederick ! How illustrious under him ! How contempt- 
 ible under his successors ! Yet his system was there ; 
 his double lines of march at full distance ; his oblique 
 order of battle ; his simple lines of manoeuvre in the 
 presence of an enemy ; his wise conformation of an etat- 
 major ; — all, in short, that distinguished his practice from 
 that of ordinary men, survived him; but the head that 
 truly comprehended and knew how to apply these, died 
 with Frederick. What an admonition does this fact pre- 
 sent for self-instruction, — for unwearied diligence, — fox 
 study and reflection ! Nor should the force of this be 
 lessened by the consideration' that, after all, unless nature 
 should have done her part of the work, — unless to a soul 
 not to be shaken by any changes of fortune — cool, col- 
 lected, and strenuous — she adds a head fertile in expedi- 
 ents, prompt in its decisions, and sound in its judgments, 
 no man can ever merit the title of a general.^'' 
 
 The celebrated Marshal Saxe has made the following 
 remarks on the necessary qualifications to form a good 
 general. The most indispensable one, according to his 
 idea, is valor, without which all the rest will prove nuga- 
 tory. The next is a sound understanding with some ge- 
 nius : for he must not only be courageous, but be extreme- 
 ly fertile in expedients. The third is health and a robust 
 constitution. 
 
 " His mind must be capable of prompt and vigorous re- 
 
STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS. 249 
 
 sources ; he must have an aptitude, and a talent at dis- 
 covering the designs of others, without betraying the 
 slightest trace of his own intentions ; he must be, seem- 
 ingly, communicative, in order to encourage others to un- 
 bosom, but remain tenaciously reserved in matters that 
 concern his own army ; he must, in a word, possess ac- 
 tivity with judgment, be able to make a proper choice of 
 his officers, .and never deviate from the strictest line of 
 military justice. Old soldiers must not be rendered 
 wretched and unhappy by unwarrantable promotions, nor 
 must extraordinary talents be kept back to the detriment 
 of the service on account of mere rules and regulations. 
 Great abilities will justify exceptions ; but ignorance and 
 inactivity will not make up for years spent in the profes- 
 sion. 
 
 " In his deportment he must be affable, and always su- 
 perior to peevishness or ill-humor ; he must not know, or 
 at least seem not to know, what a spirit of resentment is ; 
 and when he is under the necessity of inflicting military 
 chastisement, he must see the guilty punished without 
 compromise or foolish humanity ; and if the delinquent be 
 from among the number of his most intimate friends, he 
 must be doubly severe towards the unfortunate man. For 
 it is better, in instances of correction, that one individual 
 should be treated with rigor (by orders of the person over 
 whom he may be supposed to hold some influence) than 
 that an idea should go forth in the army of public justice 
 being sacrificed to private sentiments. 
 
 " A modern general should always have before him the 
 example of Manlius ; he must divest himself of personal 
 sensations, and not only be convinced himself, but con- 
 vince others, that he is the organ of military justice, and 
 that what he does is irrevocably'prescribed. With these 
 qualifications, and by this line of conduct, he will secure 
 the affections of his followers, instil into their minds all 
 
250 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 the impulses of deference and respect ; he will be feared, 
 and consequently obeyed. 
 
 " The resources of a general's mind are as various as 
 the occasions for the exercise of them are multiplied and 
 checkered: he must be perfectly master of the art of 
 knowing how to support an army in all circumstances and 
 situations ; how to apply its strength, or be sparing of its 
 energy and confidence ; how to post all its different com 
 ponent parts, so as not to be forced to give or receive bat- 
 tle in opposition to settled plans. When once engaged, he 
 must have presence of mind enough to grasp all the rela- 
 tive points of disposition and arrangement, to seize favor- 
 able moments for impression, and to be thoroughly con- 
 versant in the infinite vicissitudes that occur during the 
 heat of a battle ; on a ready possession of which its ulti- 
 mate success depends. These requisites are unquestion- 
 ably manifold, and grow out of the diversity of situations, 
 and the chance medley of events that produce their ne- 
 cessity. 
 
 " A general to be in perfect possession of them, must 
 on the day of battle be divested of every thought, and be 
 inaccessible to every feeling, but what immediately regards 
 the business of the day ; he must reconnoitre with the 
 promptitude of a skilful geographer, whose eye collects 
 instantaneously all the relative portions of locality, and 
 feels his ground as it were by instinct ; and in the dispo- 
 sition of his troops he must discover a perfect knowledge 
 of his profession, and make all his arrangements with ac- 
 curacy and dispatch. His order of battle must be simple 
 and unconfused, and the execution of his plan be as quick 
 as if it merely consisted in uttering some few words of 
 command ; as, the first line will attack ! the second will sup- 
 vort it ! or, such a battalion will advance and support the line, 
 
 ** The general officers who act under such a general 
 must be ignorant of their business indeed, if, upon the re- 
 
STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS. 251 
 
 ceipt of these orders, they should be deficient in the im- 
 mediate means of answering them, by a prompt and ready 
 co-operation. So that the general has only to issue out 
 directions according to the growth of circumstances, and 
 to rest satisfied that every division will act in conformity 
 to his intentions ; but if, on the contrary, he should so far 
 forget his situation as to become a drill-sergeant in the heat 
 of action, he must find himself in the case of the fly in 
 the fable, which perched upon a wheel, and foolishly im- 
 agined that the motion of the carriage was influenced by 
 its situation. A general, therefore, ought on the day of 
 battle' to be thoroughly master of himself, and to have both 
 his mind and his eye riveted to the immediate scene of 
 action. He will by these means be enabled to see every 
 thing ; his judgment will be unembarrassed, and he will 
 instantly discover all the vulnerable points of the enemy. 
 The instant a favorable opening offers, by which the con- 
 test may be decided, it becomes his duty to head the near- 
 est body of troops, and, without any regard to personal 
 safety, to advance against the enemy's line. [By a ready 
 conception of this sort, joined to a great courage. General 
 Dessaix determined the issue of the battle of Marengo.] 
 It is, however, impossible for any man to lay down rules, 
 or to specify with accuracy all the different ways by which 
 a victory may be obtained. Every thing depends upon a 
 variety of situations, casualties of events, and intermedi- 
 ate occurrences, which no human foresight can positively 
 ascertain, but which may be converted to good purposes 
 by a quick eye, a ready conception, and prompt execution. 
 
 " Prince Eugene was singularly gifted with these quali- 
 fications, particularly with that sublime possession of the 
 mind, which constitutes the essence of a military char- 
 acter." 
 
 " Many commanders-in-chief have been so limited in 
 the J ideas of warfare, that when events have brought the 
 
252 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 contest to issue, and two rival armies have been drawn 
 out for action, their whole attention has devolved upon a 
 straight alignment, an equality of step, or a regular dis- 
 tance in intervals of columns. They have considered it 
 sufficient to give answers to questions proposed by their 
 aides-de-camp, to send orders in various directions, and to 
 gallop themselves from one quarter to another, without 
 steadily adhering to the fluctuations of the day, or calmly 
 watching for an opportunity to strike a decisive blow. 
 They endeavor, in fact, to do every thing, and thereby do 
 nothing. They appear like men whose presence of mind 
 deserts them the instant they are taken out of the beaten 
 track, or reduced to supply unexpected calls by uncommon 
 exertions ; and from whence, continues the same sensible 
 writer, do these contradictions arise 1 from an ignorance 
 of those high qualifications without which the mere routine 
 of duty, methodical arrangement, and studied discipline 
 must fall to the ground, and defeat themselves. Many 
 officers spend their whole lives in putting a few regiments 
 through a regular set of manoeuvres ; and having done so, 
 they vainly imagine that all the science of a real military 
 man consists in that acquirement. When, in process of 
 time, the command of a large army falls to their lot, they 
 are manifestly lost in the magnitude of the undertaking, 
 and, from not knowing how to act as they ought, they 
 remain satisfied with doing what they have partially 
 learned." 
 
 " Military knowledge, as far as it regards a general or 
 commander-in-chief, may be divided into two parts, one 
 comprehending mere discipline and settled systems for 
 putting a certain number of rules into practice ; and the 
 other originating a sublimity of conception that method 
 may assist, but cannot give." 
 
 " If a man be bom with faculties that are naturally 
 adapted to the situation of a general, and if his talents do 
 
STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS. 253 
 
 not fit the extraordinary casualties of war, he will never 
 rise beyond mediocrity." 
 
 " It is, in fact, in war as it is in painting, or in music. 
 Perfection in either art grows out of innate talent, but it 
 never can be acquired without them. Study and perse- 
 verance may correct ideas, but no application, no assiduity 
 will give the life and energy of action ; these are the 
 works of nature." 
 
 " It has been my fate (observes the Marshal) to see sev- • 
 eral very excellent colonels become indifferent generals. 
 I have known others, who have distinguished themselves 
 at sieges, and in the different evolutions of an army, lose 
 their presence of mind and appear ignorant of their pro- 
 fession, the instant they were taken from that particular 
 line, and be incapable of commanding a few squadrons of 
 horse. Should a man of this cast be put at the head of an 
 army, he will confine himself to mere dispositions and 
 manoeuvres ; to them he will look for safety ; and if once 
 thwarted, his defeat will be inevitable, because his mind 
 is not capable of other resources." 
 
 " In order to obviate, in the best possible manner, the 
 innumerable disasters which must arise from the uncer- 
 tainty of war, and the greater uncertainty of the means 
 that are adopted to carry it on, some general rules ought 
 to be laid down, not only for the government of the troops, 
 but for the instruction of those who have the command of 
 them. The principles to be observed are : that when the 
 line or the columns advance, their distances should be 
 scrupulously observed ; that whenever a body of troops is 
 ordered to charge, every proportion of the line should rush 
 forward with intrepidity and vigor ; that if openings are 
 made in the first line, it becomes the duty of the second 
 instantly to fill up the chasms." 
 
 " These instructions issue from the dictates of plain na- 
 ure, and do not require the least elucidation in writing. 
 
254 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 They constitute the A, B, C of soldiers. Nothing can be 
 more simple, or more intelligible ; so much so, that it 
 would be ridiculous in a general to sacrifice essential ob- 
 jects in order to attend to such minutise. His functions in 
 the day of battle are confined to those occupations of the 
 mind, by which he is enabled to watch the countenance 
 of the enemy, to observe his movements, and to see with 
 an eagle's or a king of Prussia's eye, all the relative di- 
 rections that his opponents take. It must be his business 
 to create alarms and suspicions among the enemy's line in 
 one quarter, while his real intention is to act against 
 another ; to puzzle and disconcert him in his plans ; to 
 take advantage of the manifold openings which his feints 
 have produced, and when the contest is brought to issue, 
 to be capable of plunging with effect upon the weakest 
 part, and carrying the sword of death where its blow is 
 certain of being mortal. But to accomplish these impor- 
 tant and indispensable points, his judgment must be clear, 
 his mind collected, his heart firm, and his eyes incapable 
 of being diverted, even for a moment, by the trifling occur- 
 rences of the day." 
 
 The administrative service of an army is usually divided 
 into several distinct departments, as — 
 
 Pay department. 
 
 Subsistence " 
 
 Clothing 
 
 Medical 
 
 Hospital 
 
 Barrack " ^ These in our service are combined 
 
 Fuel " > in one, called the Quart^rmas- 
 
 Transportation " 3 ter's department. 
 
 Recruiting " 
 
 Military Justice, or Court Martial department. 
 
 It was intended to enter into the history, organization. 
 
 [ These in our service are united. 
 
STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS. 255 
 
 and use of each of these civico-military departments of an 
 army ; but our limits are such as to preclude any thing 
 like so detailed a discussion as would be necessary for a 
 proper understanding of the subject. We therefore pass 
 from the staff directly to the line, or rather the four princi- 
 pal arms of an army organization.* 
 
 * Of works that treat directly of staff organization and duties, those 
 of Grimoard, Thi^bault, Boutourlin, Labaurae, are esteemed among the 
 best. The writings of Jomini, Napoleon, Rocquancourt, Vauchelle, 
 Odier, Scharnhorst, also contain much valuable information on this sub- 
 ject. The following list of books may be referred to for further infor- 
 mation on the subjects alluded to in this chapter : 
 
 Aide-Memoire des officiers generaux et superieurs et des capitaines. 
 
 Precis de Vart de la guerre. Jomini. 
 
 Memoires de Napoleon. Montholon et Gourgaud. 
 
 Cours elementaire d'art et d'histoire militaires. Rocquancourt. 
 
 Cours elementaire d' administration militaire. Vauchelle. 
 
 Droite elementaire d'art militaire, &c. Gay de Vernon. 
 
 Annuaire militaire historique, &c. Sicard. 
 
 Cours abrege d' administration militaire. Bemier. 
 
 Cours d administration militaire, &c. Odier. 
 
 De V administration de Varmee dEspagne. Odier. 
 
 De Vorganization de la force armee en France. Carion-Nisas. 
 
 Siemens de Vart militaire, &c. Cugnot. 
 
 Memoires sur la guerre. Feuqui^res. 
 
 Cours d'art militaire et d'kistoire. Jacquinot de Presle. 
 
 Cours d'art militaire. Fallot. 
 
 Theorie de Vofficier superieur. L^orier. 
 
 Histoire de V administration de la guerre. Audouin. 
 
 Instructions diverses a Vusage de Vecole dapplication du corps 
 royal d'etat-major. 
 
 Handbuch fur offiziere, &c. Scharnhorst. 
 
 Having omitted all discussion of the several departments of the ad- 
 ministrative service of an army organization, it is not deemed necessary 
 to give the names of books of reference on the subjects of pay, courts- 
 martial, medicinal and hospital departments, ^c, &,c. 
 
256 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 -INFANTRY AND CAVALRY 
 
 Infantry. — Infantry constitutes, in active service, by far 
 the most numerous portion of an army ; in time of peace 
 its duties are simple, and, in most countries, of little com- 
 parative importance ; but in our country the continually re- 
 curring difficulties on the Indian frontiers, render this arm 
 peculiarly necessary and important, even in time of gen- 
 eral peace. From the nature of infantry service — no pe- 
 culiar technical knowledge (we speak of the privates and 
 officers of the lower grades) being so absolutely indispen- 
 sable as in the other arms — the soldier may in a short 
 time be trained and instructed in his duties. For this 
 reason the ratio of infantry in a peace establishment is 
 ordinarily much less than in active service, this arm being 
 always capable of great expansion when occasion re- 
 quires. 
 
 In the early periods of society, and in countries where 
 horses abounded, men have usually preferred fighting on 
 horseback ; but civilization and a more thorough acquaint- 
 
 * In discussing our own organization, it may be well to compare it 
 with the armies of some of the principal nations of Europe. Our limits 
 will not allow us to go very much into details, nor to make a com- 
 parison with more than a single European power. We shall select 
 France, inasmuch as her army organization has served as a model 
 for the rest of Europe, and is still, in some respects, superior to mos^ 
 •thers. 
 
ARMY ORGANIZATION. 257 
 
 ance with war has always increased the importance of 
 infantry. 
 
 The Hebrews, and also the Egyptians, employed this 
 arm almost exclusively. The Asiatics generally em- 
 ployed both infantry and cavalry, but with the Greeks the 
 infantry was the favorite arm. Even their kings and 
 generals usually fought on foot. The Romans conquered 
 the world mainly with their infantry. This arm was also 
 considered of the greatest importance by the ancient Ger- 
 mans and Gauls ; but the migration of the Huns and other 
 Mongolic tribes mounted on small and fleet horses, and 
 the acquaintance formed by the Franks of northern Spain 
 with the Moors, who were mounted on beautiful horses 
 from Arabia and the plateau of Asia, introduced a taste 
 for cavalry in western Europe. This taste was still fur- 
 ther cultivated under the feudal system, for the knights 
 preferred fighting on horseback to serving on foot. During 
 the crusades the infantry fell into disrepute. But the in- 
 vention of gunpowder changed the whole system of war- 
 fare, and restored to infantry its former importance. 
 
 " The Romans," says Napoleon in his Memoirs, " had . 
 two infantries ; the first, lightly armed, was provided with 
 a missile weapon ; the second, heavily armed, bore a short 
 sword. After ftie invention of powder two species of in- 
 fantry were still continued : the arquebusiers, who were 
 lightly armed, and intended to observe and harass the 
 enemy ; and the pikemen, who supplied the place of the 
 heavy-armed infantry. During the hundred and fifty years 
 which have elapsed since Vauban banished lances and 
 pikes from all the infantry of Europe, substituting for them 
 the firelock and bayonet, all the infantry has been lightly 
 
 armed There has been since that time, properly 
 
 speaking, only one kind of infantry : if there was a company 
 of chasseurs in every battalion, it was by way of coimter- 
 poise to the company of grenadiers ; the battalion being 
 
258 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 composed of nine companies, one picked company did not 
 appear sufficient. If the Emperor Napoleon created com- 
 panies of voltigeurs armed like dragoons, it was to substi- 
 tute them for those companies of chasseurs. He com- 
 posed them of men under five feet in height, in order to 
 bring into use that class of the conscription which measured 
 from four feet ten inches to five feet ; and having been un- 
 til that time exempt, made the burden of conscription fall 
 more heavily on the other classes. This arrangement 
 served to reward a great number of old soldiers, who, be- 
 ing under five feet in height, could not enter into the com- 
 panies of grenadiers, who on account of their bravery, de- 
 served to enter into a picked company : it was a powerful 
 incentive to emulation to bring the giants and pigmies into 
 competition. Had there been men of difi'erent colors in 
 the armies of the emperor, he would have composed com- 
 panies of blacks and companies' of whites : in a country 
 where there were cyclops or hunchbacks, a good use 
 might be made of companies of cyclops, and others of 
 hunchbacks. 
 
 "In 1789, the French army was composed of regiments 
 of the line and battalions of chasseurs ; the chasseurs of 
 the Cevennes, the Vivarais, the Alps, of Corsica, and the 
 Pyrenees, who at the Revolution formed half brigades of 
 light infantry ; but the object was not to have two differ- 
 ent sorts of infantry, for they were raised alike, instructed 
 alike, drilled alike ; only the battalions of chasseurs were 
 recruited by the men of the mountainous districts, or by the 
 sons of the garde-chasse ; whence they were more fit to 
 be employed on the frontiers of the Alps and Pyrenees ; 
 and when they were in the armies of the North, they were 
 always detached, in preference, for climbing heights or 
 scouring a forest : when these men were placed in line, in a 
 battle, they served very well as a battalion of the line, 
 oecause they had received the same instructions, and 
 
ARMY ORGANIZATION. 259 
 
 were armed and disciplined in the same manner. Every 
 power occasionally raises, in war-time, irregular corps, 
 under the title of free or legionary battalions, consisting 
 of foreign deserters, or formed of individuals of a particu- 
 lar party or faction ; but that does not cons'titute two sorts 
 of infantry. There is and can be but one. If the apes 
 of antiquity must needs imitate the Romans, it is not light- 
 armed troops that they ought to introduce, but heavy-armed 
 soldiers, or battalions armed with swords ; for all the in- 
 fantry of Europe serve at times as light troops." 
 
 Most European nations, for reasons probably similar to 
 those of Napoleon, keep up this nominal division of in- 
 fantry of the line and light infantry ; but both are usually 
 armed and equipped alike, and both receive the same or- 
 ganization and instruction. The light infantry are usual- 
 ly made up from the class of men, or district of country, 
 which furnishes the greatest number of riflemen and sharp- 
 shooters. In France, the light infantry is best supplied 
 by the hunters of the Ardennes, the Vosges, and the Jura 
 districts ; in Austria, by the Croates and Tyrolese ; in 
 Prussia, by the " forsters," or woodsmen ; and in Russia, 
 by the Cossacks. Our own western hunters, with pfoper 
 discipline, make the best tirailleurs in the world. 
 
 Light infantry is usually employed to protect the flanks 
 of the main army, to secure outposts, to reconnoitre the 
 ground, secure avenues of approach, deceive the enemy 
 by demonstrations, and secure the repose of the other 
 troops by patrolling parties. They usually begin a battle, 
 and afterwards take their places in the line, either on the 
 flanks, or in the intervals between the larger bodies. The 
 battle of Jena furnishes a good example of the use of 
 French light infantry ; and at the battle of Waterloo, the 
 Prussian tirailleurs were exceedingly eflfective in clearing 
 the ground for the advance of Bllicher's heavy columns. 
 The attack of Floh-hug by Augereau, of Vierzehn Heile- 
 
260 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 gen by Suchet, of Iserstaedt by Desjardins, are models 
 well worthy of study. 
 
 The infantry of the line acts in masses, and, on the 
 field of battle, constitutes the principal fighting force. Its 
 formations and the manner of engaging it have already 
 been discussed under the head of tactics. 
 
 The importance of infantry is due, in considerable part, 
 to the fact that it can be used everywhere — in mountains 
 or on plains, in woody or open countries, in cities or in 
 fields, on rivers or at sea, in the redoubt or in the attack 
 of the breach ; the infantry depends only on itself, where- 
 as the other arms must depend in a considerable degree 
 on the efiiciency of their materials and the will and 
 strength of brute force ; and when the snows of Russia or 
 the deserts of Egypt deprive their animals of the means of 
 sustenance, they become perfectly useless. 
 
 Foot-soldiers, in olden times, were armed with a spear 
 and sometimes with a sword, arrows, lance, and sling. 
 At present they are armed with a gun and bayonet, and 
 sometimes with a sword. In some European services a 
 few of the foot-soldiers are armed with a pike. Some of 
 the light troops used as sharp-shooters carry the rifle, but 
 this weapon is useless for the great body of infantry. The 
 short-sword is more useful as an instrument for cutting 
 branches, wood, &c., than for actual fighting. The in- 
 fantry have no defensive covering, or at least very little. 
 The helmet or cap serves to protect the head, and the 
 shoulders are somewhat defended by epaulets. It has 
 often been proposed in modern times to restore the ancient 
 defensive armor of the foot-soldier; but this would be 
 Avorse than useless against firearms, and moreover would 
 destroy the efiiciency of these troops by impeding their 
 movements. The strength of this arm depends greatly 
 upon its discipline ; for if calm and firm, a mass of infan- 
 try in column or in square is almost impenetrable. 
 
ARMY ORGANIZATION. 261 
 
 The bayonet was introduced by Vauban in the wars of 
 Louis XIV., and after the years 1703 and '4, the pike was 
 totally suppressed in the French army. This measure 
 was warmly opposed by Marshal Montesquieu, and the 
 question was discussed by him and Marshal Vauban with 
 an ability and learning worthy of these great men. The 
 arguments of Vauban were deemed most conclusive, and 
 his project was adopted by the king. 
 
 This question has been agitated by military writers in 
 more recent times, Puysegur advocating the musket, and 
 Folard and Lloyd contending in favor of restoring the pike. 
 Even in our own service, so late as the war of 1812, a dis- 
 tinguished general of the army strongly urged the use ot 
 the pike, and the fifteenth (and perhaps another regiment) 
 was armed and equipped in part as pikemen ; but expe- 
 rience soon proved the absurdity of the project. 
 
 Napoleon calls the infantry the arm of battles and the 
 sinews of the army. But if it be acknowledged, that, next 
 to the talent of the general-in-chief, the infantry is the first 
 instrument of victory, it must also be confessed that it finds 
 a powerful support in the cavalry, artillery, and engineers, 
 and that without these it would often be compromised, and 
 could gain but a half success. 
 
 The French infantry is divided into one hundred regi- 
 ments of three battalions each, a battalion being composed 
 of seven companies. There are also several other battal- 
 ions of chasseurs, zuaves, &c., being organized especially 
 for service in Africa, and composed in part of native 
 troops. 
 
 In our own army we have eight regiments of infantry, 
 each regiment forming a single battalion often companies. 
 The flank companies are intended for light infantry. 
 
 In all properly organized armies the infantry constitutes 
 from three-fourths to four-fifths of the entire active force in 
 the field, and from two-thirds to three-fourths, say about 
 
262 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 seven-tenths of the entire military establishment. In time 
 of peace this proportion may be slightly diminished. 
 
 Cavalry. — The use of cavalry is probably nearly as old 
 as war itself. The Egyptians had cavalry before the time 
 of Moses, and the Israelites often encountered cavalry in 
 their wars with their neighbors, though they made no use 
 of this arm themselves until the time of Solomon. 
 
 The Greeks borrowed their cavalry from the Asiatics, 
 and especially from the Persians, who, according to Xen- 
 ophon, held this arm in great consideration. After the 
 battle of Platea, it was agreed by assembled Greece that 
 each power should furnish one horseman to every ten foot- 
 soldiers. In Sparta the poorest were selected for this arm, 
 and the cavalry marched to combat without any previous 
 training. At Athens the cavalry service v^as more popular, 
 and they formed a well-organized corps of twelve hundred 
 horsemen. At Thebes also this arm had consideration in 
 the time of Epaminondas. But the cavalry of Thessaly 
 was the most renowned, and both Philip and Alexander 
 drew their mounted troops from that country. 
 
 The Romans had made but little progress in this arm 
 when they encountered the Thessalians, who fought in the 
 army of Pyrrhus. They then increased their cavalry, but 
 it was not numerous till after their wars with the Cartha- 
 ginians. Scipio organized and disciplined the Roman 
 cavalry like that of the Numidians. This arm was sup- 
 plied from the ranks of the richest citizens, and afterwards 
 formed an order intermediary between the Senate and the 
 people, under the name of knights. 
 
 At a later period, the cavalry of the Gauls was particu- 
 larly good. The Franks were without cavalry when they 
 made their first irruption into Gaul. Under the reign of 
 Childeric I. we see for the first time the " cavaliers francs*' 
 figure as a part of the national forces. At the battle of 
 Tours the cavalry and infantry were in the proportion of 
 
ARMY ORGANIZATION. 263 
 
 one to five, and under Pepin and Charlemagne their num- 
 bers were nearly equal. Under Charles the Bald armies 
 were composed entirely of cavalry, and during the middle 
 ages the knights disdained the foot service, and fought 
 only on horseback. 
 
 After the introduction of artillery, cavalry was still em- 
 ployed, though to little advantage. Gustavus Adolphus 
 was the first to perceive the real importance of this arm in 
 modern warfare, and he used it with great success. But 
 it was left for Seidlitz to perfect it under the direction of 
 Frederick the Great. 
 
 Marshal Saxe very justly remarked, that cavalry is the 
 " arme du ' moment" for in almost every battle there are 
 moments when a decisive charge of cavalry will gain the 
 victory, but if not made at the instant it may be too late , 
 The efficiency of cavalry depends upon the moral impres- 
 sion which it makes on the enemy, and is greater in pro- 
 portion to the size of the mass, and the rapidity of its mo- 
 tion. This last quality enables a commander to avail him- 
 self immediately of a decisive moment, when the enemy 
 exposes a weak point, or when disorder appears in his 
 ranks. But this requires a bold and active spirit, which 
 shrinks not from responsibility, and is able to avail itself 
 with quickness and decision of every opportunity. If it be 
 remembered that it is essential that this coup d^ceil, so rare 
 and so difficult to acquire, be accompanied by a courage 
 and vigor of execution which nothing can shake, we shall 
 not be astonished that history furnishes so few good cav- 
 alry generals, and that this arm so seldom does such exe- 
 cution as it did under Frederick and Napoleon, with Seid- 
 litz and Murat as commanders. 
 
 The soldier gains great velocity by the use of the horse 
 m war ; but in other respects he is the loser. The great 
 expense and care required of the cavalier to support his 
 horse ; the difficulty experienced in surmounting ordinary 
 
264 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 obstacles, and in using his fire-arms to advantage, are all 
 prejudicial to success. 
 
 The unequal size of the horse, and the great diversity 
 in his strength and breed, have rendered it necessary to 
 divide this arm into light and heavy cavalry, and a mixed 
 class called dragoons. The heavy cavalry is commonly 
 used in masses where force is mainly requisite ; the lighter 
 troops are used singly and in small detachments, where 
 rapidity of movement is most desired. 
 
 The heavy cavalry are divided into carabiniers, cuiras- 
 siers, and sometimes lancers. The two latter are fre- 
 quently united, the cuirassiers being armed with the lance. 
 These troops are seldom used for scouts, vanguards, and 
 convoys ; but are frequently employed to sustain the light 
 cavalry. Their main duty is ^Ho appear on the field of bat- 
 tle and make the decisive charges^^ 
 
 The light cavalry is composed of chasseurs, or troopers, 
 hussars, and lancers. The latter, when composed of large 
 men and mounted on heavy horses, are attached to the 
 heavy cavalry. 
 
 The dragoons were formerly a mixed body of horse and 
 foot, but it being found impossible to unite these two dis- 
 tinct arms in one, and the attempt having destroyed the 
 usefulness of the body to act in either capacity, the term 
 was applied to a mixed kind of cavalry between the heavy 
 and the light horse. In more recent wars they have also 
 been instructed as infantry and employed as foot-soldiers, 
 till horses could be foimd in the enemy's country with 
 which to mount them. But we believe there is no instance 
 in more modern wars in which they have been employed 
 at the same time in both capacities. 
 
 This term is, very improperly, applied to all our cavalry; 
 and some of the congressional wiseacres have recently 
 experimented on one of our so-called regiments of dra- 
 goons, by dismounting it one year, selling its horses at 
 
ARMY ORGANIZATION. 265 
 
 auction, and changing its arms and equipments, and again, 
 the next year, purchasing new horses, arms, and equip- 
 ments for remounting it ; and all this for economy ! 
 
 The Roman cavalry at first wore a round shield and 
 helmet, the rest of their body being nearly uncovered. 
 Their arms were a sword and long thin javelin, or lance, 
 with an iron head. They afterwards reduced the shield 
 lo a much smaller size, and made square, and their lance 
 was greatly increased in size and length, and armed at 
 both ends. In other respects they were armed in the 
 same way as infantry. The use of the lance and the 
 shield at the same time, of course rendered both nearly 
 worthless. The Roman cavalry was superior to that oftheir 
 enemies, except, perhaps, the light cavalry of the Parthians. 
 
 The heavy armor which was sometimes worn by the 
 ancients, like the gens (Tarmes of the middle ages, rendered 
 them greatly inferior to infantry in a close engagement. 
 Tigranes, king of Armenia, brought an army of one hun- 
 dred and fifty thousand horse into the field, against the 
 Roman general LucuUus, who had only about six thousand 
 horse and fifteen thousand foot. But the Armenian cav- 
 alry, called cataphratti, were so overburdened with armor, 
 that when they fell from their horses they could scarcely 
 move or make any use oftheir arms. They were routed 
 by a mere handful of Roman infantry. 
 
 The modem cavalry is much lighter, and, by dispensing 
 with armor, shields, &c., it can move with much greater 
 rapidity. A modem cavalry horse carries a weight of 
 from two hundred and fifty to three hundred pounds, viz. : 
 
 The rider, .... 
 
 Heavy 
 
 cavalrj'. 
 
 160 
 
 Light 
 cavalry. 
 
 140 lbs. 
 
 His arms and equipments, 
 
 55 
 
 40 
 
 His horse equipments, 
 
 60 
 
 45 
 
 Two days' rations of provisions and grain, 
 
 25 
 
 25 
 
 300 250 
 23 
 
266 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 The horse moves per minute — 
 
 At a walk, . . . from 110 yards to 120 
 
 At a trot, 220 240 
 
 At a gallop," ....'. 330 360 
 
 But on a march over the ordinary average of good and 
 bad roads, cavalry will walk about one hundred yards per 
 minute, and at an easy trot, two hundred. 
 
 An ordinary day's march for cavalry is about thirty 
 miles, but on a forced march this arm can march fifty miles 
 within the twenty-four hours. A single horseman, or a 
 small detachment, can easily exceed this distance. 
 
 " Light cavalry," says Napoleon, in his Memoirs, " ought 
 to reconnoitre and watch the motions of the enemy, con- 
 siderably in advance of the army ; it is not an appendage 
 to the infantry : it should be sustained and protected espe- 
 cially by the cavalry of the line. Rivalry and emulation 
 have always existed between the infantry and cavalry: 
 light cavalry is indispensable to the vanguard, the rear- 
 guard, and the wings of the army ; it, therefore, cannot 
 properly be attached to, and forced to follow the move- 
 ments of any particular corps of infantry. It would be 
 more natural to attach it to the cavalry of the line, than 
 to leave it in dependence upon the infantry, with which it 
 has no connection ; but it should be independent of both. 
 
 " If the light cavalry is to form vanguards, it must be 
 organized into squadrons, brigades, and divisions, for the 
 purpose of manoeuvring ; for that is all vanguards and rear- 
 guards do : they pursue or retreat by platoons, form them- 
 selves into several lines, or wheel into column, or change 
 their position with rapidity for the purpose of outfronting 
 a whole wing. By a combination of such evolutions, a 
 vanguard, of inferior numbers, avoids brisk actions and 
 general engagements, and yet delays the enemy long 
 enough to give time for the main army to come up, for the 
 
ARMY ORGANIZATION. 267 
 
 infantry to deploy, for the general-in-chief to make his 
 dispositions, and for the baggage and parks to file into 
 their stations. The art of a general of the vanguard, or 
 of the rear-guard, is, without hazarding a defeat, to hold 
 the enemy in check, to impede him, to compel him to 
 spend three or four hours in moving a single league : tac- 
 tics point out the methods of effecting these important 
 objects, and are more necessary for cavalry than for in- 
 fantry, and in the vanguard, or the rear-guard, than in any 
 other position. The Hungarian Insurgents, whom we 
 saw in 1797, 1805, and 1809, were pitiful troops. If the 
 light troops of Maria Theresa's times became formidable, 
 it was by their excellent organization, and, above every 
 thing, by their numbers. To imagine that such troops 
 could be superior to Wurmser's hussars, or to the dra- 
 goons of Latour, or to the Archduke John, would be en- 
 tertaining strange ideas of things ; but neither the Hun- 
 garian Insurgents, nor the Cossacks, ever formed the van- 
 guards of the Austrian and Russian armies ; because to 
 speak of a vanguard or a rear-guard, is to speak of troops 
 which manoeuvre. The Russians considered a regiment 
 of Cossacks who had been trained worth three regiments 
 untrained. Every thing about these troops is despicable, 
 except the Cossack himself, who is a man of fine person, 
 powerful, adroit, subtle, a good horseman, and indefatiga- 
 ble ; he is bom on horseback, and bred among civil 
 wars ; he is in the field, what the Bedouin is in the desert, 
 or the Barbet in the Alps ; he never enters a house, never 
 lies in a bed ; and he always changes his bivouac at sun- 
 set, that he may not pass a night in a place where the 
 enemy may possibly have observed him. 
 
 " Two Mamelukes kept three Frenchmen at bay, because 
 they were better armed, better mounted, and better exer- 
 cised ; they had two pairs of pistols, a tromblon, a carbine, 
 a helmet with a visor, a coat of mail, seveial horses, and 
 
268 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 several men on foot to attend them. But a hundred 
 French did not fear a hundred Mamelukes ; three hun- 
 dred were more than a match for an equal number ; and 
 one thousand would beat fifteen hundred : so powerful is 
 the influence of tactics, order, and evolutions ! Murat, 
 Leclerc, and Lasalle, cavalry generals, presented them- 
 selves to the Mamelukes in several lines : when the latter 
 were upon the point of outfronting the first line, the second 
 came to its assistance on the right and left ; the Mame- 
 lukes then stopped, and wheeled, to turn the wings of this 
 new line : this was the moment seized for charging them ; 
 they were always broken. 
 
 " The duty of a vanguard, or a rear-guard, does not con- 
 sist in advancing or retiring, but in manoeuvring. It 
 should be composed of a good light cavalry, supported by a 
 good reserve of cavalry of the line, by excellent battalions 
 of foot, and strong batteries of artillery : the troops must 
 be well trained ; and the generals, officers, and soldiers, 
 should all be equally well acquainted with their tactics, 
 each according to his station. An undisciplined troop 
 would only embarrass the advanced guard." 
 
 " It is admitted that for facility in manoeuvring, the 
 squadron should consist of one hundred men, and that every 
 three or four squadrons should have a superior officer." 
 
 " It is not advisable for all the cavalry of the line to 
 wear cuirasses : dragoons, mounted upon horses of four 
 feet nine inches in height, armed with straight sabres, and 
 without cuirasses, should form a part of the heavy caval- 
 ry ; they should be furnished with infantry-muskets, with 
 bayonets : should have the shakot of the infantry, panta- 
 loons covering the half-boot-buskin, cloaks with sleeves, 
 and portmanteaus small enough to be carried slung across 
 the back when the men are on foot. Cavalry of all de- 
 scriptions should be furnished with fire-arms, and should 
 know how to manoeuvre on foot. Three thousand light 
 
ARMY ORGANIZATION. 269 
 
 cavalry, or three thousand cuirassiers, should not suffer 
 themselves to be stopped by a thousand infantry posted hi 
 a wood, or on ground impracticable to cavalry ; and three 
 thousand dragoons ought not to hesitate to attack two 
 thousand infantry, should the latter, favored by their posi- 
 tion, attempt to stop them. 
 
 " Turenne, Prince Eugene of Savoy, and Vendome, 
 attached great importance to drago(^s, and used them 
 successfully. The dragoons gained great glory in Italy, 
 in 1796 and 1797. In Egypt and in Spain, during the 
 campaigns of 1806 and 1807, a degree of prejudice sprung 
 up against them. The divisions of dragoons had been 
 mustered at Compiegne and Amiens, to be embarked with- 
 out horses for the expedition of England, in order to serve 
 on foot until they should be mounted in that country. 
 General Baraguay d'Hilliers, their first inspector, com- 
 manded them ; he had them equipped with gaiters, and 
 incorporated with them a considerable number of recruits,, 
 whom he exercised in infantry manceuvres alone. These 
 .were no longer cavalry regiments : they served in the 
 campaign of 1806 on foot, until after the battle of Jena, 
 when they were mounted on horses taken from the Prus- 
 sian cavalry, three-fourths of which were unserviceable. 
 These combined circumstances injured the dragoons ; but 
 in 1813 and 1814 their divisions acquired honor in rival- 
 ling the cuirassiers. Dragoons are necessary for the sup- 
 port of light cavalry in the vanguard, the rear-guard, and 
 the wings of an army ; cuirassiers are little adapted for 
 van and rear-guards : they should never be employed in 
 this service but when it is requisite to keep them in prac- 
 tice and accustom them to war." 
 
 Napoleon further recommends that light cavalry be di- 
 vided into two kinds, chasseurs or troopers, and light 
 horse ; and the heavy to be composed of dragoons and 
 cuirassiers ; the troopers to be TPounted on horses of 4 ft 
 
270 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 6 in. ; light cavalry on horses of 4 ft. 7 or 8 in. ; dragoons 
 on horses of 4 ft. 9 in. ; and cuirassiers on horses of 4 ft. 
 10 or 11 in.; which employ horses of all kinds for 
 mounting the troops. 
 
 All cavalry must receive the same instruction ; and all 
 should be capable, in case of need, of performing any of 
 the duties of mounted troops. The shock is the principal 
 effect produced by this arm; therefore, the greater the 
 velocity the greater must be this effect, provided the 
 troops can be kept in mass. But it is found, by experi- 
 ence, that it is impossible to preserve them in line when put 
 to the height of their speed. The best authorities there- 
 fore prefer, as we have said elsewhere, the charge at the 
 trot, or at any rate the gallop should not be taken up till 
 within a very short distance of the enemy. The charge 
 of a compact mass at a trot is much greater than that of a 
 wavering one at a gallop. 
 
 On the field of battle the cavalry of the line is consider- 
 ed as the arm of the shock, to break through any corps 
 that may be in opposition ; but it is unable of itself to re- 
 sist a shock, and therefore should on no account wait to 
 receive the charge of another body of mounted troops. It 
 was on this account that Frederick directed his cavalrj' 
 officers, under the severest penalties, never to receive a 
 charge, but always to meet the attacking force half way. 
 This is the only mode of preventing defeat. 
 
 A good infantry can always sustain itself against the 
 charges of cavalry. At the battle of Auerstedt, in 1806, 
 Davoust ordered the divisions of Gudin to form squares to 
 resist the Prussian cavalry, which, by means of a fog, had 
 gained a most advantageous position. Bliicher led his 
 cavalry in repeated and impetuous charges, but all was in 
 vain ; the French infantry presented a front of iron. At 
 the combat of Krasnoi, in 1812, the cavalry of Grouchy, 
 Nansonty, and Bordesoult, attacked and overthrew the 
 
ARMY ORGANIZATION. 271 
 
 dragoons of Clarkof, but the Russian infantry under Neve- 
 roffskoi sustained itself against the repeated charges of 
 vastly superior numbers of these French horse. At the 
 battle of Molwitz, the grenadiers sustained the charges of 
 the enemy's cavalry, although the cavalry of the great 
 Frederick had already been completely overthrown. 
 
 But when the infantry is engaged with the infantry of 
 the enemy, the charges of cavalry are generally success- 
 ful, and sometimes decide the fate of the battle, as was 
 the case at Rosbach, Zomsdorf, Wurtsburg, Marengo, 
 Eylau, Borodino, &;c. 
 
 Cavalry may also be very efficacious against infantry 
 in wot weather, when the rain or snow renders it impos- 
 sible for the foot soldiers to use their fire-arms to advan- 
 tage, as was the case with the corps of Augereau, at 
 Eylau, and with the Austrian left, at the battle of Dresden. 
 Again, if the infantry be previously weakened, or thrown 
 into disorder by the fire of batteries. The charge of the 
 Russian cavalry at Hohenfriedberg, in 1745, is a remark- 
 able example of this kind. 
 
 Cavalry should always be immediately sustained iu its 
 efforts either by infantry or other bodies of horse ; for as 
 soon as the charge is made, the strength of this arm is 
 for a time exhausted, and, if immediately attacked, defeat 
 becomes inevitable. The charge of the cavalry of Ney 
 on Prince Hohenlohe at the battle of Jena, and of the 
 French horse on Gossa at Leipsic, are fine examples of 
 the successful charges of cavalry when properly sus- 
 tained. Kunnersdorf and Waterloo are examples of the 
 disastrous consequences of leaving such charges without 
 support. 
 
 The choice of the field of battle is sometimes such as 
 to render cavalry almost useless. Such was the case at 
 the battle of Cassano, between the Duke of Vendome and 
 the Prince Eugene. The field was so cut up by the 
 
272 MILITARY ART AiVD SCIENCE. 
 
 Adda and the canals of Rittorto and Pendina, that Princo 
 Eugene could make no use of his horse. If, when mas- 
 ter of the bridge of Rittorto, he had been able to charge 
 the French with a body of cavalry, there had been no 
 doubt of his complete success. 
 
 After a battle, and in the pursuit of a flying enemy, 
 cavalry is invaluable. If Napoleon had possessed a suit- 
 able number of mounted troops, with an able commander, 
 at the battles of Lutzen and Ligny, the results of these 
 victories had been decisive ; whereas they were really 
 without consequence. On the other hand, the Prussian 
 army in 1806, after the battle of Jena, and Napoleon's 
 army in 1815 at Waterloo, were completely cut to pieces 
 by the skilful use of cavalry in the pursuit of a defeated 
 and dispirited foe. 
 
 The want of good cavalry was severely felt in the war 
 of the American Revolution. Had Washington possessed 
 a few good squadrons of horse, his surprise and defeat in 
 the lines of Brooklyn, and the consequent loss of New 
 York, had never taken place. The efiicient employment 
 of a few good squadrons of cavalry might readily have 
 prevented the defeat at Bladensburg, and the loss of the 
 capitol, in 1814. 
 
 . In a well-organized army, the cavalry should be from 
 one-fourth to one-sixth of the infantry, according to the 
 nature of the war.* 
 
 * To gain a competent knowledge of the duties ctManected with the 
 two arms of service mentioned in this chapter, the officer should make 
 himself thoroughly acquainted with Scott's System of Infantry Tac- 
 tics, for the United States' Infantry, or at least with Major Cooper's 
 abridged edition of Infantry Tactics, and with the system of Cavalry 
 Tactics, adopted in our army ; also with the directions for the use of 
 these two arms in a campaign, and their employment on the battle- 
 field, given in the writings of Jomini, Decker, Okouneff, Rocquancouit, 
 and Jacquinot de Presle 
 
ARMY ORGANIZATION. 273 
 
 The following books may be referred to for further information re- 
 specting the history, organization, use, and instruction of infantry and 
 cavalry : — 
 
 Essai general de tactique. Guibert. 
 
 Considerations generates sur Vinfanterie frangaise, par un gdn^ral 
 en rdtraite. A work of merit 
 
 De Vinfanterie, par I'auteur de I'histoire de I'exp^dition de Riissie 
 
 Histoire de la guerre de la peninsule. Foy. This work contains 
 many interesting and valuable remarks on the French and English 
 systems of tactics, and particularly on the tactics of Infantry. 
 
 Cours d'art et d'histoire militaires. Jacquinot de Presle. 
 
 Art de la guerre. Rogniat. 
 
 Instruction destinee aux troupes legeres, &c., redigee sur xme in- 
 struction de Frederick II. S, ses officiers. 
 
 English Infantry Regulations. 
 
 Ordonnance (French) pour Vexercice et les manoeuvres de Vin- 
 fanterie, par le commission de manoeuvres. 
 
 Aide-memoires des officiers generaux et superieurs, et des capi' 
 taines. 
 
 Essai sur Vhistoire generale de Vart militaire. Carion-Nisas. 
 
 Histoire de la milice frangaise. Daniel. 
 
 Cours elementaire d'art et d'kistoire militaires. Rocquancourt 
 
 Traite elementaire d'art militaire, &c. Gay de Vernon. 
 
 Introduction a Vetude de Vart de la guerre. La Roche-Amyou. 
 
 Tactique des trois armes. Decker. 
 
 Examen raisonne des trois armes, &c. OkounelE 
 
 The last two are works of great merit. The writings of Okouneff, 
 however, are very diffuse. 
 
 Instruction pour le service de Vinfanterie legere. Guyard. 
 
 Instruction de Vinfanterie, &c. Schauenbourg. 
 
 Traite de tactique. Temay et Koch. 
 
 Mecanism des manoeuvres de guerre de Vinfanterie polonaise. 
 Vroniecki. 
 
 Traite sur Vinfanterie legere. Beurmann. 
 
 English Cavalry Regulations. 
 
 Ordonnance (French) sur Vexercice et les evolutions de la ca» 
 calerie. 
 
 Les troupes dcheval de France, &c. De Bourge. 
 
 Avant-postes de cavalerie legere. Brack. The author served with 
 distinction under Lassale, Colbert, Maison, Pujol, and Excelmans. 
 
 Reflexions sur Vemploi de la cavalerie. Sec. Caraman. 
 
274 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 Observations sur Vordonnance, ^c, de la cavalerie. Dejean. 
 
 Tactique de la cavalerie. Itier. 
 
 Elements de tactique pour la cavalerie, par Mottin de la Balme. 
 A work of rare merit. 
 
 De Vemploi de la cavalerie a la guerre. Schauenbourg. 
 
 Remarques sur la cavalerie. Warnery. This work has long en- 
 joyed a high reputation among the cavalry officers of the European 
 services. The Paris edition is enriched with notes by a French gen- 
 eral officer. 
 
 Nachrickten und Betrachtungen uber die Thaten und Schicksale 
 der Reiterei, &c. This work discusses the operations of cavalry in 
 the campaigns of Frederick the Great and of Napoleon, down to the 
 battle of Lutzen in 1813. 
 
 Examen du livret provisoire, &c. Marbot. 
 
 Le Spectateur Militaire, contains many essays by cavalry officers 
 on the various questions connected with the organization and use of 
 this arm. 
 
 Die Gefechtslehre der heiden verbundenen Waffen-Kavallerie und 
 reitenden Artillerie. Decker 
 
 Manuel de Vofficier. Ruble de Lilienstem. 
 
 Aide-memoire, a Vusage des officiers de cavalerie. 
 
 Journal de Vinfanterie et de la cavalerie. 
 
 Traiti de tactique pour les officiers d'infanterie et de cavalerie. 
 
 Histoire des exploits et des vicissitudes de la cavalerie pru$» 
 sienne. Coutz 
 
ARTILLERY. 275 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 ARMY ORGANIZATION. ARTILLERY. 
 
 Artillery. — Previous to the invention of gunpowder in 
 the thirteenth century, the machines of war were divided 
 between two classes of military men, the engineers {en- 
 orignours, as they were called in the middle ages) and the 
 artillery, (artilliers, as they were formerly called,) the lat- 
 ter being particularly charged with the management of the 
 lighter and more portable projectile machines, such as the 
 balistas and arco-balistas, which were used for throwing 
 different kinds of arrows — -filches, viretons, carreaux, ma- 
 tras, &c., while the former managed the battering-rams, 
 cranes, helipoles, &c. And, indeed, for a long time after 
 the discovery of gunpowder, this distinction was kept up, 
 and the artillery retained all the more ordinary projectile 
 machines, while the engineers constructed and managed 
 the more ponderous weapons of attack and defence. But 
 the new artillery was gradually introduced, without, how- 
 ever, immediately displacing the old, and there were for 
 a time, if we may be allowed the expression, two artille- 
 ries, the one employing the old projectile machines, and 
 the other those of the new invention. The latter were 
 called canoniers, to distinguish them from the former, who 
 still retained the name of artilliers. 
 
 The first cannon were invented in the early part of the 
 fourteenth century, or, perhaps, among the Arabs as early 
 as the middle of the thirteenth century, but they were not 
 much known in Europe till about 1350. Cannon are said 
 to have been employed by the Moors as early as 1249, and 
 by the French in 1338. The English used artillery at 
 
276 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 the battle of Crecy in 1346. Both cannon and the ancien 
 projectile machines were employed at the siege of Ai- 
 guillon in 1339, at Zara in 1345, at Rennes in 1357, and 
 at Naples in 1380. At this last siege the ancient balista 
 was employed to throw into the castle of Naples barrels 
 of infectious matter and mutilated limbs of prisoners of 
 war. We read of the same thing being done in Spain at 
 a later period. 
 
 Cannon in France were at first called bombards and 
 coideuverines, but were afterwards named from certain, 
 figures marked on them, such as serpentines, basilisks, scor- 
 vions, &c. In the infancy of the art they were made 
 small, weighing only from twenty to fifty pounds, and were 
 mounted on small moveable carriages. This species of 
 fire-arms became quite numerous about the beginning of 
 the fifteenth century. They were followed by heavier 
 pieces, used in the attack and defence of towns. This 
 siege artillery continued to be increased in dimensions, 
 till, towards the latter part of the fifteenth century, they 
 reached such an enormous size as to be almost useless as 
 a military machine. Louis XI. had an immense piece 
 constructed at Tours, in 1770, which, it was said, carried 
 a ball from the Bastille to Charenton, (about six miles !) 
 Its caliber was that of five hundred pounds. It was in- 
 tended for experiment, and burst on the second discharge. 
 The famous culverin of Bolduc was said to carry a ball 
 from that city to Bommel. The culverin of Nancy, made 
 in 1598, was more than twenty-three feet in length. 
 There is now an ancient cannon in the arsenal at Metz 
 of about this length, which carries a ball of one hundred 
 and forty pounds. Cannon balls were found at Paris as 
 late as 1712, weighing near two hundred pounds, and from 
 twelve to sixteen inches in diameter. At the siege of 
 Constantinople in 1453, there was a famous metallic bom- 
 bard which threw stone balls of an incredible size ; at the 
 
ARTILLERY. 277 
 
 siege of Bourges in 1412, a cannon was used which, it 
 was said, threw stone balls " of the size of mill-stones." 
 The Gantois, under Arteville, made a bombard fifty feet 
 in length, whose report was heard at a distance of ten 
 leagues ! 
 
 The first cannon were made of wood, and covered with 
 sheet-iron, or embraced by iron rings : longitudinal bars 
 of iron were afterwards substituted for the wooden form. 
 Towards the end of the fourteenth century, brass, tin, cop- 
 per, wrought and cast iron, were successively used for 
 this purpose. The bores of the pieces were first made in 
 a conical shape, and it was not until a much later period 
 that the cylindrical form was introduced. 
 
 In the wars between the Spaniards and Moors in the 
 latter part of the fifteenth century, very great use was made 
 of artillery in sieges and battles. Ferdinand the Catholic 
 had at this time, probably, a larger artillery train than any 
 other European power. The Spanish cannon, generally 
 very large, were composed of iron bars about two inches 
 in breadth, held together by bolts and rings of the same 
 •metal. The pieces were firmly attached to their car- 
 riages, and incapable of either horizontal or vertical move- 
 ment. The balls thrown by them were usually of marble, 
 though sometimes of iron. Many of the pieces used at 
 the siege of Baza, in 1486, are still to be seen in that city, 
 and also the cannon balls then in use. Some of the latter 
 are fourteen inches in diameter, and weigh one hundred 
 and seventy-five pounds. The length of the cannon was 
 about twelve feet. These dimensions are a proof of a 
 slight improvement in this branch of military science, 
 which was, nevertheless, still in its infancy. The awk- 
 wardness of artillery at this period may be judged of by its 
 slowness of fire. At the siege of Zeteuel, in 1407, five 
 " bombards," as the heavy pieces of ordnance were then 
 called, were able to discharge only forty shot in the course 
 
S78 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 of a day ; and it is noticed as a remarkable circumstance, 
 at the siege of Albahar, that two batteries discharged one 
 hundred and forty balls in the course of the twenty-four 
 hours ! 
 
 In the Italian wars between France and Spain, in the 
 beginning of the sixteenth century, the difficulty of moving 
 the heavy cannon then in use was so great that only a very 
 small number of pieces were brought upon the battle-field. 
 At the battle of Cerignola, in 1503, the number of cannon 
 in the French army was only thirteen. Indeed, during 
 the greater part of this century, four or five pieces were 
 considered sufficient for an ordinary army in the field, and 
 many agreed to the doctrine of Machiavelli, that the only 
 legitimate use of artillery was in the attack and defence 
 of places. But in the wars of Henry IV. of France, this 
 arm of service was again increased, and the troops which 
 this king destined against the house of Austria had an ar- 
 tillery train of fifty pieces. Great improvements were also 
 made about this period in the manufacture of powder, and 
 all kinds of fire-arms. Sully gave greater development 
 to this arm of service, improving its materials, and in- 
 creasing its efficiency. Then, as at most other periods, the 
 French were in advance of most other nations in artillery. 
 
 It was near the close of the sixteenth or the beginning 
 of the seventeenth century, that the heavy and ill-shaped 
 artillery began to give place to more wieldy and useful 
 pieces. A certain M. de Linar demonstrated, in the lat- 
 ter part of the sixteenth century, that cannon twelve feet 
 in length would give a greater range than those seventeen 
 feet in length, the calibre being the same ; but some years 
 elapsed before advantage was taken of this discovery. In 
 1624, Gustavus Adolphus caused experiments to be made 
 to veiify this point, and, on being convinced of its truth, 
 caused his batteries to be furnished with shorter and light- 
 er pieces. This great king introduced, about the aame 
 
ARTILLERY. 279 
 
 time, a new and lighter kind of artillery, made of sheet 
 iron and leather. Each piece had its chamber formed of 
 thin metal and embraced by strong iron rings ; over these 
 was placed a form of hardened leather, which was again 
 encircled with rings and held compactly together. These 
 pieces were mounted on light carriages, so that two men 
 could easily manoeuvre them. It was said that they would 
 fire from eight to ten rounds without requiring repairs. 
 Gustavus made use of them in all his military operations 
 from 1 628 to the time of his death. They did him excel- 
 lent service on numerous occasions ; being so very light 
 they could be easily transported, and, on the field of bat- 
 tle, their movements could be made to conform to the 
 movements of his troops. 
 
 As cannon and small arms were gradually introduced 
 into general use, various inventions and improvements 
 were proposed and introduced from time to time. Can- 
 non were constructed with two or more barrels ; some 
 were arranged for being loaded in the breech, and others 
 at the mouth of the piece ; two pieces were sometimes 
 connected by horizontal timbers, which revolved about 
 a vertical axis, so that the recoil of one piece would 
 bring the other into battery ; and various other arrange- 
 ments of this description, which have recently been re- 
 vived and some of them patented as new inventions. The 
 small arms employed at this period were much the same 
 as those used at the present day, except the match- 
 lock, which afterwards gave place to flint-locks. Arms 
 of this description were sometimes made to be load- 
 ed at the breach, and guns with two, three, and even as 
 many as eight barrels, were at one time in fashion. In 
 the Musee de VArtillerie at Paris may be found many arms 
 of this kind, which have been reproduced in this country 
 and England as new inventions. In this Museum are two 
 ancient pieces, invented near the end of the sixteenth or 
 
280 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 the beginning of the seventeenth century, which very 
 nearly correspond with CoWs patent, with the single ex- 
 ception of the lock !* 
 
 The materiel of artillery employed in modem warfare 
 is divided into two general classes : 1st. Siege Artillery, 
 or such as is employed in the attack and defence of 
 places. 2d. Field Artillery, or such as is used in battle, 
 or in the field-operations of an army. 
 
 1 . Siege Artillery is composed of mortars, large how- 
 itzers, PaixJian guns or Columbiads,\ and all cannon of a 
 large calibre. In our service this class of ordnance in- 
 cludes the twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, thirty-two, and 
 forty-two-pounder guns, the eight, ten, and thirteen-inch 
 mortars, the sixte en-inch stone mortar, the twenty-four- 
 pounder coehorn mortar, the twenty-four-pounder carron- 
 ade, and the eight, ten, and twelve-inch howitzers. 
 
 All these, except the smaller mortars, are made of cast 
 iron. This substance is less tenacious than wrought iron 
 or bronze, and the cannon made of it are, on this account, 
 
 * * It is not to be inferred that the modem improvements (as they 
 are called) are copied from the more ancient inventions. Two men 
 of diflferent ages, or even of the same age, sometimes fall upon the 
 same identical discovery, without either's borrowing from the other. 
 
 t These pieces were first invented by Colonel Bomford, of the U. S. 
 army, and used in the war of 1812. The dimensions of these guns 
 were first taken to Europe by a young French officer, and thus fell 
 into the hands of General Paixhan, who immediately introduced them 
 into the French service. They were by this means first made known 
 to the rest of Europe, and received the name of the person who in- 
 troduced them into the European services, rather than that of the 
 original inventor. All these facts are so fully susceptible of proof, 
 that Europeans now acknowledge themselves indebted to us for the 
 invention ; even General Paixhan gives up all claim to originality in 
 his gun, and limits himself to certain improvements which he intro- 
 duced. The original gun, which was invented by Colonel Bomford, 
 and whose dimensions were carried to General Paixhan in France, is 
 now lying at the ordnance d^pdt, in New York harbor. 
 
ARTILLERY. 281 
 
 much heavier than of the other materials ; but for the na- 
 val service, and the attack and defence of fortifications, 
 the weight required to secure the necessary strength is 
 not very objectionable. Wrought iron and bronze are 
 much more expensive and less durable. Moreover, the 
 difficulty of forging wrought iron in masses of sufficient 
 size has been such as to prevent its being brought into 
 general use for artillery. Numerous attempts have been 
 made, at different periods, to construct large guns of this 
 material, but none have yet been successful. Improve- 
 ments which are now making in the manufacture of 
 wrought iron, may render this the preferable material for 
 the smaller pieces of artillery ; but the best informed mil- 
 itary men deem it objectionable for the heavier cannon, 
 both on account of its cost and the imperfection of its 
 manufacture. Even should the latter objection be re- 
 moved, its cost must prevent its general application to the 
 construction of siege artillery. Charlatans in military sci- 
 ence, both in this country and in Europe, bring this sub- 
 ject up every fifteen or twenty years as a new invention^ 
 and flaming notices of the improvement, and predictions 
 of the revolution it is to effect in the art of war, are cir- 
 culated in the newspapers to "gull" a credulous public; 
 and after some fifty or one hundred thousand dollars have 
 been squander^ on some court-favorite, the whole matter 
 ends in the explosion of the " improvement,^^ and probably 
 the destruction of the " inventor" and perhaps also of his 
 spectators. Let us be distinctly understood on this sub- 
 ject. There may be inventions and improvements in the 
 manufacture of wrought iron, but there is nothing new in 
 Its application to the construction of cannon, for it has 
 been used for this purpose as long ago as the first inven- 
 tion of the art. 
 
 2. Field Artillery is composed of the smaller guns and 
 howitzers. In our service this class of cannon includes 
 
282 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 the six and twelve-pounder guns, and the twelve and 
 twenty-four-pounder howitzers. All these are now made 
 of bronze. This material is more expensive than cast- 
 iron, but its superior tenacity renders it more useful 
 where great weight is objectionable. Improvements in 
 the manufacture of cast iron may render it safe to employ 
 this metal in the construction of field-pieces. It is also 
 possible the wrought iron may be forged in masses large 
 enough, and the cost be so reduced as to bring it into use 
 for field-pieces. It is here important to combine strength 
 with lightness, and additional expense may very properly 
 be incurred to secure this important object. 
 
 The projectiles now in use are solid shot, shells, strap- 
 shot, case or canister-shot, grape-shot, light and fire-balls, 
 carcasses, grenades, and rockets. 
 
 Solid shot are now almost invariably made of cast iron,* 
 formed in moulds of sand or iron. This projectile is used 
 under almost every circumstance, whether in the battle- 
 field or in the attack and defence of places, and is the 
 only one that is effectual against the stone walls of forts. 
 Hot shot are used against shipping and wooden structures 
 of every description. Red-hot balls were first employed 
 by the king of Poland, in 1575, but, on account of the dif- 
 ficulty of heating them with rapidity, and the danger of 
 loading the piece with them, this kind ofc projectile was 
 not in general use till a much later period. It was at first 
 supposed that the expansion of the metal would be so 
 great, when heated to a red or white heat, as to prevent 
 the ball from entering the piece ; it is found, however, 
 that the windage is still sufficient for loading with facility. 
 These red-hot balls are principally used to fire wooden 
 buildings, ships, and other combustible matter. They are 
 therefore much used as a projectile for coast defence, and 
 
 * In Mexico, where iron is scarce, copper is used for shot and 
 ihells ; but it is a poor substitute. 
 
ARTILLERY. 283 
 
 all fortifications on the seaboard should be providv*d with 
 furnaces and grates, arranged so as to heat them with fa- 
 cility and rapidity. 
 
 There are several kinds of hoUow-shot and shells, called 
 bombs, howitzes, grenades, &c . They are made of cast iron, 
 and usually in a spherical shape, the cavity being concen- 
 tric with the exterior surface. The cavity was formerly 
 made eccentric with the exterior, under the belief that the 
 heavier side would always strike first. The rotary motion 
 of the ghell during its flight rendered this precaution of 
 no use. Fire is communicated to the combustible matter 
 within the shell by means of a fuse. Which is so regulated 
 that the explosion shall take place at the desired moment. 
 Hollow-shot are used with advantage to destroy ordinary 
 buildings, ships, earthwork, and thin walls of masonry ; 
 they, however, are of little avail in breaking the massive 
 walls of well-constructed forts. Howitzes and grenades 
 are particularly effective against cavalry and columns of 
 infantry, and are much employed on the battle-field ; they 
 are also much used in the attack and defence of places. 
 
 We find that as early as 1486 the Spaniards made use 
 of a projectile similar to the modern bomb. " They threw 
 from their engines large globular masses, composed of 
 certain inflammable ingredients mixed with gunpowder, 
 which, scattering long trains of light," says an eye-wit- 
 ness, " in their passage through the air, filled the behold- 
 ers with dismay, and descending on the roofs of edi- 
 fices, frequently occasioned extensive conflagration." In 
 the siege of Constantinople by Mahomet H., shells 
 were used, and also mortars of enormous size. In 1572 
 Valturus proposed to throw, with a kind of mortar, 
 " globes of copper filled with powder." In 1588, an arti- 
 ficer of Venloo burned Wachtendeck by throwing bombs 
 into the place. A similar attempt had just been made at 
 Berg-op-Zoom. The use of this projectile became quite 
 
284 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 common in France under Louis XIII. Howitzes were 
 not much used till the seventeenth century. They are of 
 German origin, and the howitzer first bore the name of 
 haufmitz. 
 
 The strap-shot consists of a round ball attached to a 
 sahot of the same calibre, by means of two strips of tin 
 passing over the shot at right angles; and fastened to a 
 third, which is soldered around the sabot. One end of 
 the sabot is arranged for attaching it to the cartridge, the 
 other being hollowed out to receive the shot. The sup- 
 posed advantages of this arrangement are, 1st, a diminu- 
 tion of the windage ; 2d, the gim may be loaded with 
 greater rapidity ; and, 3d, the cartridge is transported with 
 greater safety. 
 
 The case or canister-shot is prepared by filling a tin can- 
 ister with grape-shot or musket-balls, and attaching it to 
 the cartridge by means of a sabot. There being two sizes 
 of grape-shot, and one of musket-balls, we have three kinds 
 of canister-shot calculated to reach at different distances. 
 The three sizes of shot are frequently mixed in the same 
 canister. This projectile is particularly effective against 
 lines of infantry and cavalry, when the distance is short. 
 
 The grape-shot is composed of small balls arranged 
 round an upright pin attached to a plate of wood or iron. 
 The concave cast-iron plate is preferable, as it increases 
 the range of the shot. The balls are covered with can- 
 vass, and thoroughly confined by a quilting of strong twine. 
 This shot is used for the same purposes as the canister. 
 
 Light and Jire-balls are formed of an oval case of sacking, 
 filled with combustible matter,' and attached to a culot of 
 cast-iron. The whole is covered with a net of spun-yarn. 
 Light-balls are used to light up our own works, and are 
 not armed ; fire-balls being employed to light up the works 
 or approaches of an enemy, it is necessary to arm them 
 with pistol-barrels, in order to prevent any one from extin- 
 
ARTILLERY. 285 
 
 guishing them. When made of very combustible mate- 
 rials, and used for setting fire to wooden structures, they 
 are denominated incendiary balls. 
 
 Carcasses are employed for the same purpose as incen- 
 diary balls ; they are of two kinds : 1st, the shell-carcass ; 
 and, 2d, the ribbed-carcass. The first is composed of a 
 spherical shell, cast with five fuse-holes, one being at the 
 top, and the other four in a plane perpendicular to this and 
 at right angles with each other ; the shell is filled with 
 matter highly combustible. The second is formed of iron 
 ribs connected by iron straps, and attached at the ends to 
 culots of the same material, the whole being filled with 
 combustible composition. This is more expensive than 
 the shell carcass, and cannot be fired with as great accu- 
 racy ; it is now seldom used. Carcasses may be armed 
 in the same manner as fire-balls. 
 
 Smoke and suffocating balls are used to drive an enemy 
 from galleries and mines. They are thrown by hand. 
 
 The personnel of the French artillery was for a long 
 time retained, together with the engineers, under the gen- 
 eral direction of the " Grand Master of Cross-bows." 
 In 1420 the master-general of artillery was made inde- 
 pendent of the grand-master of cross-bows ; but previous 
 to the reign of Louis XIV., the artillery troops had no or- 
 ganization as a separate corps. In 1668 six companies 
 of canoniers were created, and soon after two companies 
 of bombardiers. In 1693 the first regiment of fusiliers 
 was changed into a royal regiment of artillery, and both 
 the canoniers and bombardiers were eventually incorpo- 
 rated with it. The staff of artillery, towards the close 
 of this reign, was composed of one grand-master, sixty 
 lieutenants, sixty commissaries, and eighty officiers-poin- 
 teurs. In 1721 the artillery was divided into five battal- 
 ions and stationed at Metz, Strasbourg, Grenoble, Per- 
 pignan, and La Fere, where they established schools of 
 
286 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 theory and practice. In 1756 the artillery was organized 
 into seven regiments, each regiment having its own sepa- 
 rate school. This organization continued without any 
 remarkable change till the Revolution. 
 
 During the earlier campaigns of the French Revolu- 
 tion it is impossible to trace out the changes that took 
 place in army organization, every thing was then so 
 irregular and confused, the troops of different arms being 
 frequently united together. In the campaign of 1792 
 there were some six or seven regiments of foot artillery, 
 and ten companies of horse. This arm was ' greatly in- 
 creased during the subsequent campaigns, and its organ- 
 ization was completely remodelled by Napoleon on his 
 elevation to the head of the government. The personnel 
 of the artillery was then composed of a general staff, 
 nine regiments of foot and six of horse. In 1815 it was 
 reduced to eight regiments of foot and four of horse. 
 
 The personnel of artillery in modern army organization 
 is divided into four classes : the staff, guards, artificers, 
 and troops. 
 
 I. The Staff, or Ordnance, as it is called in our service, 
 is charged with the construction of all the materials of 
 artillery, and the collection of powder and military stores. 
 As the lives of persons using these materials, and, in a 
 considerable degree, the success of war, depend upon the 
 nature and quality of the stores thus manufactured and 
 collected, it is obvious that the members of this branch 
 of the artillery service should possess high and peculiar 
 qualifications. In the French army the artillery staff is 
 composed of two hundred and eighty-three officers of dif- 
 ferent grades : also twenty-four officers of the general 
 staff are attached to this service. In our army the ord- 
 Tzanceis composed of twenty-eightofficers of different grades. 
 
 II. Artillery-guards. — These in our service are divided 
 into two classes : 1st. Military Store-keepers. 2d. Ord' 
 
ARTILLERY. 287 
 
 nance Sergeants. Both are alike charged with the care 
 and preservation of the artillery property and stores at 
 the several garrisons, arsenals, and magazines. In our 
 army we have fifty-eight of these guards, viz ; fifteen 
 commissioned military store-keepers, and forty-three ord- 
 nance sergeants. We seldom have more than this num- 
 ber of permanent posts ; each one can therefore be sup- 
 plied with an artillery guard for the care of the artillery 
 stores. In the French service there are three hundred 
 and fifteen of these artillery guards ; they are divided 
 into three classes. 
 
 III. Artificers. — This class of men are employed in 
 the construction and repairs of military nnaterials. In 
 most of our arsenals and armories it is thought to be 
 best to employ unenlisted workmen, by the piece or con- 
 tract. Nevertheless a limited number of enlisted men of 
 this description are found to be both useful and necessary. 
 We have three hundred and thirty of these in our army, 
 viz : two hundred and fifty enlisted " ordnance men," and 
 eighty " artificers" attached to the regiments. In the 
 French army they have for the service of the arsenals 
 and establishments, one hundred and forty-nine " ouv- 
 riers," and twelve " artificers ;" there are also three hun- 
 dred and sixty " ouvriers" and seventeen " armuriers" 
 attached to the corps of artillery, making in all five hun- 
 dred and thirty-eight. 
 
 IV. Artillery Troops. — Artillery, as an arm of service, 
 IS divided in the same manner as its materiel; the field- 
 artillery being intended for field service, and the garrison 
 or ^ze^e-artillery, for the attack and defence of places. 
 The troops of the artillery corps of a modern army usu- 
 ally do duty either in the field, or in sieges, or garrison, 
 as occasion may require. When employed in the service 
 of a campaign, artillery is usually divided into two class- 
 es : 1st. i^oo^ Artillery ; and 2d. i/or^e Artillery. 
 
288 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 In the early history of artillery, as has already been 
 shown, but few pieces were ever brought upon the battle- 
 field. Charles VIII . crossed the Alps with a pretty large 
 train ; but a part of these were hand-guns, and but very 
 few of the larger pieces were ever brought into battle ; 
 indeed, it was then thought that this arm would be of little 
 use except in sieges. At the battle of Gravelines the 
 army of Philip II. had only seventeen pieces of artillery ; 
 and at the battle of Ivry the French had only four pieces 
 of cannon, and two culverins : the army of the League 
 had also only four pieces. At the battle of Moncontour 
 the opposing armies had but eight pieces each. 
 
 Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden not only improved the 
 character of artillery, but also gave to it great develop- 
 ment as an arm of service. At the battle of Breetenfield 
 he had one hundred pieces of artillery, great and small, 
 and at the camp of Nuremberg he numbered about three 
 hundred. This king also made a more skilful use of his 
 cannon by uniting them more in mass than had been done 
 by his predecessors ; his system was nevertheless very 
 imperfect. In the disposition of this arm on the field of 
 battle, a vast improvement was made by Conde, Turenne, 
 and Prince Eugene of Savoy. Frederick the Great 
 also made great use of this arm, and was the first to 
 introduce horse artillery. This mode of using field- 
 pieces has peculiar properties which in many circum- 
 stances render it an invaluable arm. The promptness and 
 rapidity of its movements enable it to act with other troops 
 without embarrassing them. The French soon introduced 
 into their army the improvements made by the king of 
 Prussia, and in 1763 the celebrated Gribeauval appeared. 
 He improved the form of the cannon and greatly dimin- 
 ished the weight of field artillery, giving it an organ- 
 ization which has been but slightly changed since his 
 time. 
 
ARTILLERY. 289 
 
 The successive improvements in artillery have for a 
 long time constituted a prominent feature in war. The 
 power of this arm to throw projectiles to a great distance, 
 and to overturn and destroy opposing obstacles, renders it 
 a necessary arm on the battle-field, and a strong barrier 
 and safeguard of states. It is an essential element in all 
 army organization. 
 
 In our army we have four regiments of artillery, form- 
 ing the basis of forty batteries. In the French service 
 there are fourteen regiments, forming the basis of two 
 hundred and six field batteries. 
 
 The term lattery, when applied to artillery as an arm 
 of service, refers to a permanent organization of a certain 
 number of cannon, with the men and other accessaries re- 
 quired to serve them. This is the unit of force in this 
 arm. The regimental organization is a mere nominal ar- 
 rangement, for in actual sei-vice artillery acts by batteries, 
 and never by regiments. Its strength is therefore invaria- 
 bly estimated by the number of its batteries. 
 
 A battery is ordinarily composed of six pieces, two of 
 them being howitzers. The lighter batteries would, in 
 our service, be formed of six-pounder gims and twelve- 
 pounder howitzers ; and the heavier of twelve-pounder 
 guns and twenty-four-pounder howitzers. These heavy 
 batteries would usually form the reserve. Each piece be- 
 ing attended by its caisson, this formation would give 
 twelve carriages to each battery, six for the guns and six 
 for the caissons. The extra caissons form a part of the 
 reserve, and move with the train. In some foreign ser- 
 vices a battery is composed of eight pieces with their 
 caissons. 
 
 This arm admits of three formations — in column, in battle, 
 and in battery. In column it ordinarily moves by sections 
 of two pieces, each piece being followed or preceded by 
 its caisson. Columns of half-batteries are sometimes 
 
 25 
 
290 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 formed, and also columns of single pieces ; but the latter 
 ought never to be employed except in cases of necessity 
 in passing a narrow defile, and at a distance from the 
 enemy. 
 
 In order of battle, the pieces are drawn up in line, their 
 caissons forming a second line, at the distance of a few 
 paces. 
 
 When in order of battery, the pieces are formed in the 
 same way as for battle, except that the guns are directed 
 towards the enemy and prepared for firing. 
 
 The movements and manoeuvres of foot artillery corre- 
 spond with those of infantry, and of mounted artillery with 
 those of cavalry, a battery being regarded as a battalion or 
 squadron, of which the pieces form the platoons. Mounted 
 batteries can seldom move with greater rapidity than the 
 trot, except in cases of emergency, and even then the 
 gallop can be kept up only for a very short time ; but this 
 is of no great importance, as the batteries never accom- 
 pany cavalry in the charge. 
 
 The French and German writers discuss artillery as 
 employed in battle, under two distinct heads — 1st, as an 
 arm of preparation, and 2d, as an arm of siiccor. 
 
 I. As an arm of preparation it serves, 1st, to protect the 
 deploying of the other troops ; 2d, to disorganize the ene- 
 my's masses, and to facilitate the action of infantry and 
 cavalry, by weakening the intended points of attack ; 3d, 
 to force an enemy to evacuate a position by overthrowing 
 obstacles with which he has covered himself; 4th, to 
 keep up the action till the other troops can be prepared to 
 strike the decisive blow. 
 
 The force of this arm depends upon the rapidity and 
 accuracy of its fire ; rash valor is therefore far less desi- 
 rable in artillery than skill, patience, and cool courage. 
 Artillery always acts at a distance, and in mass ; single 
 pieces are seldom employed, except to cover reconnoitring 
 
ARTILLERY. 291 
 
 parties, or to sustain the light infantry in a skirmish. 
 Mounted batteries sometimes approach within two or 
 three hundred yards of the enemy's infantry ; but this is 
 only done with a strong support of other troops, and to 
 prepare the way for a charge of cavalry. The batteries 
 do not accompany the charge, but they should always 
 follow up and complete the success ; mounted batteries 
 are particularly useful in pursuit. If Murat, in 1812, had 
 accompanied his attacks upon Neveroffskoi's retreating 
 columns of sixty thousand infantry by two or three bat- 
 teries of mounted artillery, the whole column must have 
 been captured or destroyed. 
 
 Artillery, on the field of battle, is very liable to allow 
 its fire to be drawn, and its projectiles wasted, while the 
 enemy is at too great a distance to be reached. It is a 
 very common thing in a battle, to employ two or three 
 pieces of heavy calibre at the beginning of the fight, in 
 order to provoke the opposing batteries to open their fire 
 before the proper time. The waste of material is not the 
 only loss attending this error ; the troops are fatigued and 
 disheartened, while the courage and confidence of their 
 opponents are always revived by a weak and inaccurate 
 fire. To avoid such an error the commanding officer of a 
 battery of artillery should be perfectly familiar with the 
 effective ranges of his pieces, and accustomed to form a 
 correct estimate of distances. For this purpose the eye 
 should be frequently practised in time of peace in esti- 
 mating the ranges for different calibres. 
 The eflfective range of a 12-pounder field-piece 
 
 is about 1000 yds. 
 
 " " 6 « " 800 " 
 
 " " " 24 " howitzer, 600 « 
 
 " " " 12 " «* 500 « 
 
 " " " grape and case shot is 
 
 from ... . . 300 to 500 « 
 
292 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 Even at these distances the aim is usually so inaccurate 
 that a large portion of the projectiles are lost. In the at- 
 tack on Spires, a whole column of artillery expended its 
 fire while at a distance of 900 yards from the enemy, who, 
 of course, received little or no injury. In firing from for- 
 tifications, the aim is far more accurate, and the artillery 
 may therefore be employed to advantage as soon as the 
 enemy comes within the longest range. 
 
 II. As an arm of succor, the artillery serves, 1st, to give 
 impulsive force to the attacking columns ; 2d, to assist in 
 arresting, or at least in retarding, the offensive movements 
 of an enemy ; 3d, to protect the avenues of approach, and 
 to defend obstacles that cover a position ; and, 4th, to 
 cover a retrograde movement. 
 
 Mounted artillery is, like cavalry, much the most efi*ec- 
 tive in attack ; but batteries of foot are better calculated 
 for defence. The cannoniers are so armed as to be capa- 
 ble of defending their pieces to the last extremity ; they 
 therefore cannot be easily captured by opposing columns 
 of infantry. "As to pretending to rush upon the guns," 
 says Napoleon, " and carry them by the bayonet, or to 
 pick off the gunners by musketry, these are chimerical 
 ideas. Such things do sometimes happen ; but have we 
 not examples of still more extraordinary captures by a 
 coup de main ? As a general rule, there is no infantry, how- 
 ever intrepid it may be, that can, without artillery, march 
 with impunity the distance of five or six hundred toises, 
 against two well-placed batteries (16 pieces) of cannon, 
 served by good gunners ; before they could pass over two- 
 thirds of the way, the men would be killed, wounded, or 
 dispersed. * * * * A. good infantry forms, no doubt, the 
 sinews of an army ; but if it were required to fight for a 
 long time against a very superior artillery, its good quality 
 would be exhausted, and its efficiency destroyed. In the 
 6rst caiApaigns of the wars of the Revolution, what France 
 
ARTILLERY. 293 
 
 had in the greatest perfection was artillery ; we know not 
 a single instance in which twenty pieces of cannon, judi- 
 ciously placed, and in battery, were ever carried by the bay- 
 onet. In the affair at Valmy, at the battles of Jeramapes, 
 Nordlingen, and Fleurus, the Frenclj had an artillery su- 
 perior to that of the enemy, although they had often only 
 two guns to one thousand men ; but that was because their 
 armies were very numerous. It may happen that a gen- 
 eral, more skilful in manoeuvring, more expert than his ad- 
 versary, and commanding a better infantry, may obtain 
 successes during a part of a campaign, although his ar- 
 tillery may be far inferior to that of his opponent ; but on 
 the critical day of a general engagement, his inferiority in 
 point of metal will be severely felt." 
 
 History furnishes us numerous examples of the use of 
 artillery in protecting avenues of approach : — such as the 
 defile of Kbesen at the battle of Auerstedt; the avenues 
 between the redoubts of Pultowa, &c., &c. 
 
 When an army is forced to retreat, it covers its rear by 
 that portion of its cavalry and mounted artillery which has 
 suffered least during the battle. By placing the squadrons 
 of horse and the light batteries in echelon, the retiring 
 column may be well protected. The artillery, by using 
 the prolonge, may also continue its retreat while in bat- 
 tery and firing. It was in this way that at the battle of 
 Albuera, in 1811, the French artillery on the left wing 
 held in check the right and centre of the Anglo- Spaniards 
 till the army effected its retreat ; the artillery then retired 
 in echelons, by batteries and fractions of batteries, under 
 the protection of the cavalry. 
 
 We have already discussed, under the general head of 
 tactics, the position and use of artillery on the battle-field 
 a few additional remarks must suffice. 
 
 As a general rule, batteries should be placed in positions 
 from which they can employ their fire to advantage, and 
 
294 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 also be free to move in any direction that the progress of 
 the battle may require. Advantage should always be 
 taken of natural or artificial obstacles, such as hedges, 
 clumps of trees, logs, mounds of earth, &c., to cover and 
 conceal the guns till the moment they open their fire. El- 
 evated positions are, contrary to the common opinion, gen- 
 erally unfavorable, for artillery cannot fire to advantage at 
 any considerable angle of depression. The slopes in front 
 should be of considerable length, otherwise the balls would 
 do very little execution upon that portion of the column of 
 attack which occupied the valley. The ground should 
 also be smooth, for if rough the balls will either bury 
 themselves in the earth, or ricochet at a high angle of de- 
 flection, thus destroying a considerable part of the eff*ect 
 of the fire. The counterforts or spurs of hills are favora- 
 ble for artillery, as they enable it to see, with an enfilading 
 fire, the slopes of the principal range. Batteries should 
 seldom be placed so as to fire over other troops, for they 
 will not only be intimidated by this fire, but also exposed 
 to the opposing fire of the enemy's artillery. A large num- 
 ber of pieces should never be crowded into the same place, 
 but an interval should be left between the guns of forty or 
 fifty feet, according to the locality. The most favorable 
 position for this arm in ordinary ground, is in the intervals 
 between the regiments or brigades of the line, and far 
 enough in advance of this line not to draw upon the other 
 troops the fire of the enemy's artillery. The flanks of the 
 line are also favorable for the action of this arm. 
 
 Sometimes artillery has been employed to form a part 
 of the line of battle ; but such instances are exceptions, 
 and can never be comprised in general rules. Whenever 
 this disposition has been made, it has resulted from the 
 defective character of the other arms, or from some pecu- 
 liar circumstance in the battle which enabled a bold and 
 skilful commander to deviate from the ordinary rules of 
 
ARTILLERY. 295 
 
 tactics. Such was the case with Napoleon at Wagram. 
 In Saxony, in 1813, he was several times obliged to sub- 
 stitute his artillery to supply the want of other arms. 
 
 In the defence and attack of field-works, and in the 
 passage of rivers, artillery plays an important and indis- 
 pensable part ; but it here becomes an auxiliary to the dis- 
 positions of the engineers, or at least acts in concert with 
 that arm. 
 
 The troops of artillery, in all well-regulated army or- 
 ganizations, should equal about two-thirds of the cavalry, 
 or one-seventh of the infantry.* 
 
 * To qualify himself for the duties connected with his arm of ser- 
 vice, the artillery officer must make himself thoroughly acquainted 
 with — 
 
 The Instruction for United States Field Artillery, horse and foot ; 
 
 Capt. Anderson's Instruction for Garrison Artillery ;■, 
 
 Kinsley's Notes on Pyrotechny ; 
 
 Knowlton's Notes on Gunpowder, &LC.', and 
 
 The writings of Thiroux and Piobert on theoretical and practical 
 instruction, and the writings of Jomini, Decker, and Okouneff, on the 
 use of this arm on the field of battle. 
 
 The following list of books of reference may be of use to those who 
 wish to make themselves perfectly familiar with all the branches of 
 artillery. 
 
 Histoire general de Vartillerie. Brunet 
 
 Uartillerie a cheval dans les combats de cavalerie. Par un officier 
 de I'artillerje Prussienne. 
 
 Considerations et experiences sur le tir des ohus a balles, Bor- 
 mann. 
 
 Essai sur les ohusiers. Dusaert. 
 
 Essai sur Vorganisation de Vartillerie. Le Bourg. 
 
 Traite sur Vartillerie, (traduit de rAllemaud.) Rouvroy. 
 
 Bombardier Frangais. B^Iidor. 
 
 Memoires d' artillerie. St. R^my. 
 
 Essai sur Vusage de Vartillerie dans la guerre de campagno et 
 celle de siege. Dupuget. 
 
 Memoires sur les nouveaux systimes d'artillerie. St. Aubin. 
 
 Treatise on Artillery. Miiller. 
 
296 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 Artificial Fire-Works. Jones. 
 
 Table de tir les canons et obusiers. Lombard. ' 
 
 On Gunpowder. Antoni. 
 
 Recherches swr Vartillerie en general. Texier de Norbec. 
 
 Description de Vm-t defabriquer les canons. Monge. 
 
 Procedes de la fabrication des armes blanches. Vandermondck 
 
 Manuel de Vartilleur. Durtubie. 
 
 Traite du mouvement des projectiles. Lombard. 
 
 TVeatise on Artillery. Scheel. (Translated from the German.) 
 
 Traite pratique des feux d^ artifice. Morel. 
 
 Manuel du canonnier marin. Comibert. 
 
 New Principles of Gunnery. Robins. 
 
 Memoires sur la fabrication des armes portatives. Cotty. 
 
 Recherches sur la poudre. Cossigny. 
 
 Supplement. Cossigny. 
 
 Fabrication de la poudre. Renaud. 
 
 American Artillerist's Companion. Toussard. 
 
 Tables des portees des canons et canonades de la marine. Cor- 
 nibert. 
 
 Traite d'artifices de guerre. Bigot. 
 
 Tarite elementaire de la fabrication des bouches a feu. Dartein. 
 
 Traite de Vart defabriquer la poudre d canon. Bottde et Riffault. 
 
 L'art du salpetrier. Bottee et Riffault. 
 
 Dictionary of Artillery. Hoyer. (German.) 
 
 New Experiments on Gunnery. Hutton — (Hutton's Tracts.) 
 
 Des bois proves au service des Arsenaux. Herbin de Halles. 
 
 Instruction sur le service de Vartillerie. Hulot. 
 
 Manoeuvres deforce. Bigot. 
 
 Balistique. Obenheim. 
 
 Treatise on Artillery. German. Schamhorst. (Translated into 
 French, 1840.) 
 
 Essai sur Vart de pointer. Pomnet. 
 
 Reflexions sur la fabrication des bouches a feu. Lamartillidre. 
 
 Memoire sur la planchette du canonnier. Obenheim. 
 
 Aide-Memoire. Gassendi. 
 
 Observations on the use of Artillery at the sieges of Badajos, St 
 Sebastian, ^c. 
 
 Treatise on Artillery. Lallemand. 
 
 Elemens de pyrotechnic. Ruggieri. 
 
 Nouvelle force maritime. Paixhans. 
 
 Dictionnaire d'artillerie. Cotty. 
 
ARTILLERY 297 
 
 Recherches balistiques. Coste. 
 
 Poudres fulminantes. Vergnaud. 
 
 Manuel de la metallurgie du fer. Culmaa. 
 
 Pyrotechnic militaire, (traduit de I'Allemand, par R. de Peretsdorffi) 
 
 Journal des Sciences Militaires. 
 
 Pyrotechny. Cutbush. 
 
 Traite elementaire d'artillerie. Decker. 
 
 Fusees de guerre. Montgery. 
 
 Documens sur la matiere d canons. Hervd. 
 
 Observations sur le nouveau systeme d'artillerie. AUix. 
 
 Systeme d'artillerie de campagne. AUix. 
 
 Pocket Gunner. Adye. 
 
 On the Rocket System. Congreve 
 
 Essai sur Vart des fontes. Serres 
 
 Receuil de Mimoires sur la poudre a canon. Proust. 
 
 Memorial de Vartilleur marin. Michel. 
 
 Observations sur le nouveau systeme de Vartillerie. Pouraet 
 
 Memorial d'artillerie, 
 
 British Gunner. Spearman. 
 
 Regies de pointage a bord des vaisseaux. Montgery. 
 
 Manuel du maitre de forges. Landrin. 
 
 Naval Gunnery. Douglass. 
 
 Metallurgie du fer (traduit de rAllemand, par Culmau.) Kar- 
 sten. 
 
 Aide-Memoire a Vusage des officers d'artillerie. (Strasbourg.) 
 
 Traite de V organisation et de la tactique de rartillerie, (traduit de 
 I'Allemand par Peretsdorff.) Grewenitz. 
 
 Supplement au dictionnaire d'artillerie. Cotty. 
 
 Memoir on Gunpowder. Braddock. 
 
 Manuel de Varmurier. Paulin-Desormeaux. 
 
 Journal des armes speciales. 
 
 Cours sur le service des officiers dans les fonderies. Serres. 
 
 Experiences sur la fabrication et la duree des bouches a feu en 
 fer et bronze, (traduit de I'Allemand par Peretsdorff.) Meyer. 
 
 Applications du fer aux constructions de Vartillerie. Thierry. 
 
 Aide-Memoire d'art militaire. Lebas. 
 
 Memorial a Vusage de Varmee Beige. 
 
 Instructions and Regulations for the service and management of 
 heavy ordnance in the British service. 
 
 Experiences sur les principes du tir, faites k Metz, en 1834. 
 
 Traite d'artillerie theorique et pratique. Piobert 
 
298 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 Aide-Memoire a Vusage des officiers d'artillerie, (avec approbation 
 du comity d'artillerie.) 
 
 Manuel d'artillerie a Vusage des officiers de la Republique Hel- 
 vetique. Bonaparte, (Napoleon Louis.) 
 
 Experiences comparatives entre des bouches a feu en fonte de fer, 
 d'origine Frangaise, Anglaise et Suedoise, faites k Gavres, en 1836. 
 
 Experiences faites a Brest en 1831, sur les canons. Paixhans. 
 
 Essai sur Vorganisation de Vartillerie. Le Bourg. 
 
 Experiences sur des projectiles creux, faites en 1829, '30, '31. 
 
 Instruction pratique sur Vemploi des projectiles, (traduit de I'Alle- 
 mand par Peretsdorff) Decker. 
 
 Effects of heavy ordnance as applied to ships of war. Simmons. 
 
 Experiences sur lespoudres de guerre, faites k Esquerdes, en 1832, 
 '33, '34, and '35. Maguin. 
 
 Cours d'artillerie d Vusage des sous-officiers. De Crdpy. 
 
 Instruction theorique et pratique d'artillerie, k I'usage des dlfevea 
 de St. Cyr. Thiroux. 
 
 Cours sur le service des officiers d'artillerie dans les forges. 
 
 Manuel historique de la technologic des armes a feu, (traduit do 
 I'Allemand par M. Rieffel.) Meyer. 
 
 Formules relatives aux effets du tir sur affut. Poisson. 
 
 Manuel de Vartificer. Vergnaud. 
 • Etat actuel de Vartillerie de campagne de toutes les puissances 
 de VEurope, (traduit par Mazd ; Ire partie, Artillerie Anglaise.) Ja- 
 cobi. (Six other parts have been published in German, containing de- 
 scriptions of the French, Belgian, Hessian, Wirtemburg, Nassau, and 
 Swedish systems.) 
 
 Introduction a Vetude de Vartillerie. Madelaine. 
 Cours sur le service des officiers d'artillerie dans les fonderies. 
 
 Description de la fabrication des bouches d feu a la fonderie royale 
 de Liege. Huguenin. 
 
 Poudre a canon. Timmerhans. 
 
 Frocedes de fabrication dans les forges, (extrait du cours sur le ser- 
 vice des ofSciers dans les forges.) 
 
 Renseignements sur le materiel de Vartillerie havale de la Cfrande 
 Bretagne. Zeni et des Hays. 
 
 Theorie des affuts et des voitures de Vartillerie. Migout et Bergory 
 
 ArtillerisVs Manual. GriflSth. 
 
 Handbuchfur die K. K.Oesterreichische Artillerie OffizierCj (man> 
 nal for the Austrian artillery oflScers.) 
 
 Sammlung von Steindruckzeichnungen der Preussischen Artillerief 
 
ARTILLERY. 299 
 
 mit Erlduterungen, (collection of plates of the Prussian artillery, with 
 explanatory text.) 
 
 Histoire des fusees de guerre. 
 
 Ordnance Manual, for the use of the officers of the United States 
 Army. 
 
 Experiments on Gunpowder. Capt. Mordecai. ^ 
 
 Pyrotechny, for the use of the Cadets at the United States Military 
 Academy. Kinsley. 
 
 Notes on Gunpowdei, Percussion Powdery Cannon, and Projec- 
 tiles. Lt. Knowlton. 
 
300 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 CHAPTER XU, 
 
 ARMY ORGANIZATION ENGINEERS. 
 
 Engineers. — The term engineer is derived from the un- 
 classical Latin word ingenium, which was applied both to 
 a machine and the mind or skill of the person who devised 
 or constructed it. 
 
 It was Philip Augustus, say the French writers, who 
 first introduced engineers (engigneurs, or engignours, as 
 they were called) into France, and restored the art of 
 sieges. The engineers of that age were seldom charged 
 with the construction of works of military defence, but, 
 like Archimedes at Syracuse, and Longinus at Palmyra, 
 they directed their attention principally to devising imple- 
 ments of war and the most effective manner of using them. 
 Engines of war were at that time divilied between the en- 
 gigneurs and the artilliers] the former being charged with 
 the heavier machines, and the latter with the smaller wea- 
 pons used for throwing projectiles. After the invention 
 of gunpowder, the old battering-rams, cranes, helipoles, 
 &c., disappeared, and with them the engigneurs, or mas- 
 ters of engines. The new inventions were united with 
 the few old projectile machines that remained in the artil- 
 lery, and the engineers were for a time left almost with- 
 out employment. The revival of the art of fortification 
 was very slow, and the modern system scarcely began to 
 be developed till near the sixteenth century. 
 
 We must omit for the present giving even an outline of 
 
ENGINEERS. 301 
 
 the history of military engineering, and pass to the troops 
 of this arm, as constituting an essential element of an 
 army organization. The subject of fortification, and the 
 history of its various changes, will be examined in the 
 next chapter. 
 
 The engineers, in modem army organization, constitute 
 the fourth arm of service, as, compared with artillery, 
 their relative numbers are about as two to three. They 
 are divided in the same manner as the artillery, viz. : — 
 1st, the staff; 2d, guards, or fort-keepers ; 3d, artificers ; 
 and 4th, the troops. 
 
 I. The officers constituting the staff" of this corps are 
 charged in time of peace with planning, constructing, and 
 repairing all fortifications and other defensive works ; the 
 construction and preparation of all military materials, and 
 stores connected with this arm; and (in our service) 
 with the disbursements of money connected with these 
 operations : in time of war they are charged with the at- 
 tack and defence of military works, the laying out and 
 construction of field defences, redoubts, intrenchments, 
 roads, &c. ; in the attack they form a part of the van- 
 guard, to remove obstructions ; and in retreat they form a 
 part of the rear-guard, to erect obstacles, destroy roads, 
 bridges, &c., so as to retard an enemy's pursuit. 
 
 From the important character of these duties as con- 
 nected with the means essential to a national defence, and 
 the vast amount of money expended in these operations, 
 it is evident that a high order of acquirements should be 
 deemed necessary to qualify one to perform the duties of 
 a military engineer. This officer requires a knowledge 
 of chemistry, to guide his choice of materials for mortars, 
 cements, and mastics ; of mineralogy and geology, for 
 selecting stone ; of "botany, for timber and the means of 
 preventing its decay ; of mathematics, in laying out his 
 work and calculating the thickness and stability of his 
 
302 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 walls, embankments, &c. ; of mechanical philosophy, in 
 constructing his machinery ; of military engineering, in 
 his plans of fortifications ; and of all the higher branches 
 of military science, in selecting positions for these works, 
 such that they shall have the proper relations to the means 
 of national defence, and to the grand operations of armies 
 in the field. The avenues to appointment to this corps 
 are guarded, in most European armies, with special care, 
 to prevent the influence of money, politics, or family con- 
 nections ; and in our own army it is now specified by law 
 of Congress, that the vacancies shall be filled only from the 
 most distinguished graduates of the military academy. 
 Formerly our service suffered most severely from the em- 
 ployment of incompetent persons, introduced through 
 political influence from civil life, and foreign charlatans, 
 the refuse of European armies. Many of our earlier 
 military works (as will be mentioned hereafter) were 
 modelled upon systems for a long time discarded by the 
 profession in Europe, and even some of those which have 
 been constructed within the last thirty years are made of 
 such wretched materials and workmanship that they are 
 already crumbling into ruins. While the existing laws 
 and regulations seem well calculated to prevent the recur- 
 rence of similar abuses and errors, it nevertheless can be 
 shown that the organization of this arm of our service re- 
 quires modifications and extensions to give it the requisite 
 degree of efficiency, and to economize the public expen- 
 ditures. 
 
 The wars of Louis XIV. first led to a regular military or- 
 ganization, and a regular system of defence. In these wars 
 the engineers received great development, and have ever 
 since occupied a prominent position as parts of an army or- 
 ganization. We therefore find in all the great sieges and 
 battles of this era a large and continually increasing number 
 of engineers and engineer troops, this force being grad- 
 
ENGINEERS. 303 
 
 nally augmented as the true principles of war became 
 better imderstood, and as the wants of the service required. 
 Even in the earliest of these battles we find the engineers 
 taking a prominent and distinguished part. In the war 
 of 1688, twenty-four engineers were killed and wounded 
 at the siege of Philipsbourg, eighteen at Namur, eight at 
 Huy, ten at Charleroi, eight at Ath, thirty at Barcelona, 
 &c. Such losses were good proofs of the usefulness of 
 these officers, and before this war was closed, their num- 
 ber was increased to six hundred; and in 1706 the army 
 contained eight brigades of engineers and four companies 
 of miners. 
 
 The engineer corps being partially disbanded in the early 
 part of the French Revolution, great difficulty was experi- 
 enced in reorganizing it and in finding competent men to 
 supply the places of those who had been driven into exile or 
 sacrificed during the reign of terror. Energy and activity, 
 combined with republican zeal, could supply the place of 
 skill in the other arms, but the science of the engineer 
 could not be acquired in a day. 
 
 In 1799, the staff" of the engineer corps consisted of 
 four hundred and forty-nine officers, without including tho 
 general officers, commanding departments, or those con- 
 nected with the engineer troops. The same organization 
 was continued in 1804. The engineer staff* of the French 
 anny now numbers four hundred and thirty-two officers. 
 We have in our service forty-three engineer officers, for 
 staflf duty, who are now engaged in the construction and 
 repairs of some sixty or seventy fortifications, and other 
 works of a civil and military character. 
 
 II. Engineer Guards, or Fort-Keepers, are a class of 
 men charged with the general care of forts, and all public 
 property deposited in the several engineer depots and 
 garrisons, and in the public works during their construction. 
 
 There are five hundred and fifty of these "^arc?e^ rfa 
 
304 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 Genie** in the French army, who rank next the sub-lieuten« 
 ants of engineers, and are assimilated with the sub-lieu- 
 tenants of infantry in the hospitals, marches, &c. In our 
 service we have no engineer guards or fort-keepers. 
 
 This defect in our organization has been the cause of 
 serious inconvenience, and the consequent waste of public 
 property. The expense of hiring civil agents for this 
 purpose has more than trebled the cost of supporting a 
 suitable number of non-commissioned guards to maintain 
 the good order and efficiency of our forts, in the absence 
 of engineer officers, and to preserve and keep in repair 
 the military implements and stores connected with this 
 department of the army. It has already been shown that 
 we have fifty-eight of these guards for the artillery service, 
 and it really seems somewhat singular that the engineers, 
 with a much greater amount of public property in their 
 charge, are allowed no assistants of this kind. 
 
 III. Engineer artificers are a class of men employed in 
 the practical operations of constructing forts and other 
 military defences, and in making and repairing all the im- 
 plements used by the engineer troops in the operations of 
 sapping and mining, in crossing rivers, in constructing 
 field-defences, and in the attack and defence of field- 
 works. 
 
 As very few new fortifications are now required in 
 France, the services of engineer artificers are less neces- 
 sary and important than in our service, where large sums 
 of money are annually expended upon military defences. 
 There are, however, in the French army a corps of en- 
 gineer artificers, consisting of eight officers and a cadre of 
 fifty-four non-commissioned officers, with a variable num- 
 ber of privates, organized into two companies. But in 
 our army we have no regular engineer artificers ! In our 
 artillery service we have three hundred and thirty enlist- 
 ed artillery artificers. If these are useful and necessary 
 
ENGINEERS. 
 
 305 
 
 to the artillery service, which no one doubts, for still 
 stronger reasons would it be advantageous to the public 
 service to employ at least an equal number of enlisted en- 
 gineer artificers on our fortifications ; for the annual ex- 
 penditure of public money is here much greater than in 
 the corresponding branch of the artillery service. 
 
 IV. Engineer troops are divided into three classes — 
 1st, sappers and pioneers; 2d, miners; and 3d, ponioniers. 
 
 In the French army of 1799, there were four battalions of 
 sappers, consisting of 120 oflicers and 7,092 men. In 1804, 
 Napoleon organized five battalions of these troops, consist- 
 ing of 165 ofliicers and 8,865 men. Even this number was 
 found insufficient in his campaigns in Germany and Spain, 
 and he was obliged to organize an additional number of 
 sappers from the Italian and French auxiliaries. The 
 pioneers were then partly attached to other branches of 
 the service. There is, at present, in the French army a 
 considerable number of sappers or pioneers detached for 
 the service of the infantry regiments, three companies of 
 sapeurs-conducteurs, and forty-two companies of sapeurs. 
 In the French army of 1799, there were six companies 
 of miners, consisting of 24 officers and 576 men. In 1804, 
 Napoleon increased these troops to nine companies, con- 
 taining 36 officers and 864 men. The present French 
 peace establishment contains six companies of miners, 
 organized much the same as under Napeleon. In the 
 French army of 1799 there were two regiments of pon- 
 toniers, of 38 officers and 960 men. But this number was 
 found to© small in the remaining campaigns, and the de- 
 ficiency was temporarily supplied by organizing sailors 
 for these duties. In the present French army organiza- 
 tion, there are eleven companies of pontoniers, forming a 
 regiment of sixty-three officers. 
 
 We have in our service no sappers, miners, or pontoniers, 
 and, in case of war, would be found without the means of 
 
306 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 executing any military works, or performing any militar5 
 operation which would require engineer troops. 
 
 In the preliminary stages of army organization under 
 Louis XIV., infantry troops were detailed as sappers, and 
 instructed in these duties by the engineers. This irregu- 
 larity of service soon caused difficulties and losses, and 
 the evils springing from it were so great, that Vauban ur- 
 ged the propriety of a separate organization. In 1670 
 he officially recommended to the king to establish a regi- 
 ment of twelve hundred sappers and ouvriers, and in a sub- 
 sequent report on the value of these troops, used the fol- 
 lowing language : " They would be useful in peace as 
 well as in war, and would be the means of saving much in 
 all fortifications where they should be employed. In fact, 
 I have not the least doubt that they would save annually 
 to the king much more than their pay. I assert all I have 
 said on this subject with as much confidence as if I had 
 seen the result ; and I can, with the same certainty, add, 
 that this small troop will be the means of saving large 
 numbers of good engineers and brave officers and soldiers, 
 from the stem necessity to which we are reduced of ex- 
 posing, almost always, the laborers and those who support 
 them ; which necessity would not arise had we at com- 
 mand a sufficient number of this kind of workmen well in- 
 structed. To such a degree have I felt the necessity of 
 sappers, at every siege at which I have been present, that 
 I have always had reason to repent of not having more 
 urgently solicited the creation of this company." 
 
 Such are the views of he greatest of milita,ry engi- 
 neers, a man who fought one hundred and forty battles, 
 conducted fifty-eight sieges, and built or repaired three 
 hundred fortifications. His anticipations of the useful- 
 ness of engineer troops were fully realized, and they have 
 ever since received the most careful attention, and now 
 form, as has just been shown, one of the most important 
 
ENGINEERS. 
 
 307 
 
 and efficient anns in the French service. The fortifi- 
 cations constructed by the engineers, as organized by 
 Vauban, have ever since constituted one of the principal 
 elements of the French military power. 
 
 In the wars of Napoleon there are innumerable instan- 
 ces in illustration of the delays and disasters attending the 
 operations of armies not supplied with engineer troops ; 
 and, on the other hand, the advantages resulting from their 
 services when properly organized and instructed. We 
 have already pointed out the influence which the fortifica- 
 tions in the hands of the French exerted on the results of 
 these wars, and the fatal consequences to the Allies of 
 neglecting these works of national defence. Every stu 
 dent of military history will immediately call to mind the 
 influence of Savona, Coni, Mondovi, Ceva, Govi, Ales- 
 sandria, Tortona, Pizzighitone, Peschiera, Mantua, Palma- 
 Nuova, Osopo, Klagenfurth, &c., in the campaigns of 
 1796-7 ; of Genoa, Fort Bard, the fortifications of the 
 Var, Ulm, Ingoldstadt, &c., in 1800; of Milan, Turin, 
 Mantua, Roco d'Aufo, Genoa, Alessandria, &c., in 1805; 
 the importance of Kehl, Cassel, Wesel, &c., to the French 
 in 1806, and the fatal consequences to the Prussians in 
 that campaign, of their total and culpable neglect of their 
 own fortifications. 
 
 All military historians speak of the influence of fortifi- 
 cations in the Peninsular campaigns: those which had 
 been given up to Napoleon previous to the opening of 
 hostilities, contributed very much to the success of his 
 arms, while those which were retained by Spain and her 
 allies, contributed in an equal degree to hamper and em- 
 barrass his operations. Some of these, like Saragossa 
 and Tarragona, with their broken walls and defective ar- 
 maments, kept the enemy in check some sixty days each, 
 and did much to weaken the French power in the Penin- 
 lula. 
 
308 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 Temporary or field-fortifications also had an important 
 influence here. The lines of Torres-Vedias, the field- 
 works of Ronda, the intrenched camps of the Pyrenees, 
 Bayonne, Toulouse, &c., are examples under this head. 
 In fact, field-works played a most important part in all of 
 Napoleon's wars. We might mention the redoubt of Mon- 
 tenotte, the intrenchments at lyEilesimo, the batteries of 
 Lobau, the field-defences of Hougomont, La Haye-Sainte, 
 and Papelotte at Waterloo, and numerous other cases 
 equally striking. Just before the battle of Waterloo, Wel- 
 lington employed some eighteen thousand peasants and 
 two thousand horses, under the direction of British of- 
 ficers of engineers. In speaking of these defences. Colo- 
 nel Pasley says : " It may be easily conceived that to 
 have directed such a great body of workmen to proper ad- 
 vantage, by means of a few oflicers of engineers, would 
 have been impossible, but for the system adopted of sub- 
 dividing the various works among the non-commissioned 
 officers and privates of the engineer troops, each of whom 
 was made responsible for laying out the details of his own 
 portion, and for the direction of a party of from twenty to 
 one hundred men, or even more, according to circum- 
 stances." 
 
 But to return to the Peninsular war. These campaigns 
 exhibit in strong colors the advantages derived, on the one 
 side, from a well-organized engineer corps, and the losses, 
 delays, and defects suffered on the other, until the defects 
 of the organization were remedied. Napoleon entered 
 Spain with a well-appointed army, and soon, through 
 strategy and well-directed force, gained possession of the 
 important fortresses of the Peninsula; seizing in this 
 way the strategic routes and important geographical points, 
 he was enabled to retain possession of the country for 
 eight years, in spite of the numerous forces arrayed against 
 him, the absence of himself and his best generals in Ger- 
 
ENGINEERS. 309 
 
 many, and the great inefficiency of Joseph and of many of his 
 generals. These fortifications were old, and of strength 
 inferior to modern works of defence, but it required years 
 and the expenditure of millions in blood and treasure 
 to expel from the country those who had possession of 
 them. 
 
 For the first five years of this war the English strug- 
 gled with a most imperfect army organization.* When 
 " the first serious siege," says Napier, was undertaken by 
 "the British army, " to the discredit of the English gov- 
 ernment, no army was ever so ill provided with the means 
 of prosecuting such an enterprise. The engineer officers 
 were exceedingly zealous ; and many of them were well 
 versed in the theory of their business. But the ablest 
 trembled when reflecting on their utter destitution of all 
 that belonged to real service. Without a corps of sap- 
 pers and miners, without a single private who knew how 
 to carry on an approach under fire, they were compelled 
 to attack fortresses defended by the most warlike, prac- 
 tised, and scientific troops of the age. 
 
 " The best officers and finest soldiers were obliged to 
 sacrifice themselves in a lamentable manner, to compen- 
 sate for the negligence and incapacity of a government, 
 always ready to plunge the nation into war, without the 
 
 *In a letter dated February 11th, 1812, Wellington wrote to the 
 Secretary of State as follows : — " I would beg leave to suggest to 
 your lordship the expediency of adding to the engineer establishment 
 a corps of sappers and miners. It is inconceivable with what disad- 
 vantages we undertake any thing like a siege for want of assistance 
 of this description. There is no French corps d'armee which has not 
 a battalion of sappers and a company of miners ; but we are obliged 
 to depend for assistance of this description upon the regiments of the 
 line ; and although the men are brave and willing, they want the 
 knowledge and training which are necessary. Many casualties among 
 them consequently occur, and much valuable time is lost at the most 
 critical period of the siege." 
 
310 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 slightest care of what was necessary to obtain success. 
 The sieges carried on by the British in Spain were a 
 succession of butcheries ; because the commonest mate- 
 trials, and the means necessary to their art, were denied 
 the engineers." Colonel J. T. Jones writes in nearly 
 the same terms of the early sieges in the Peninsula, and 
 with respect to the siege of Badajos, adds in express 
 terms, that " a body of sappers and miners, and the ne- 
 cessary fascines and gabions, would have rendered the 
 reduction of the work certain."* Soon after this siege a 
 body of engineer troops arrived from England, but their 
 number was insufficient, and Wellington, having learned 
 by sad experience the importance of engineer troops, or- 
 dered a body of two hundred volunteers to be detached 
 from the line, " and daily instructed in the practice of 
 sapping, making and laying fascines and gabions, and the 
 construction of batteries, &c." The siege of Ciudad 
 Rodrigo, which immediately followed this organization, 
 was conducted with greater skill and success than any 
 other till nearly the close of the war ; and all military 
 writers have attributed this result to the greater efficiency 
 of the engineer force engaged in the siege. This arm 
 was now gradually increased, and the last year of the 
 war the engineer force with the English army in the field 
 consisted of seventy-seven officers, seven assistant-engi- 
 n ^ers and surveyors, four surgeons and assistants, one 
 thousand six hundred and forty-six sappers, miners, arti- 
 ficers, &c., one thousand three hundred and forty horses, 
 and one hundred and sixty carriages. 
 
 During all this time the French furnished their armies 
 
 * Colonel Pasley states that only one and a half yards of excava- 
 tion, per man, was executed in a whole night, by the untrained 
 troops in the Peninsular war; whereeis an instructed sapper can 
 easily accomplish this in twenty minutes, and that it has been done 
 by one of his most skilful sappers, at Chatham, in seven minutes I 
 
ENGINEERS. 311 
 
 in Spain with well-organized engineer forces. We have 
 endeavored to form a comparison of the number of French 
 engineers and artillerists employed on these peninsular 
 sieges. But from the loose manner in which these de- 
 tails are usually given by historians, it is almost im- 
 possible to distinguish between the two. Both are not 
 unfrequently given under the same head, and when a 
 distinction is apparently kept up, only the engineer staff 
 is mentioned under the head of engineers — the sappers, 
 miners, artificers, the train, &c., all being put down as 
 artillery. In the following table we have endeavored to 
 arrange them as is done in our own army. The trains of 
 both arms are left out, for frequently that of one arm per- 
 formed the duties of the other. Moreover, in our service 
 a portion of these duties of engineer and artillery trains is 
 performed by the quartermaster's department. For those 
 who wish to know the exact organization of the French 
 engineer train, we give it as it existed in 1811, viz.: — 
 seven troops, each troop consisting of three officers, one 
 hundred and forty-one non-commissioned officers and pri- 
 vates, two hundred and fifty horses, and fifty wagons, con- 
 veying five thousand two hundred and seventy intrenching 
 tools, one thousand seven hundred cutting tools, one thou- 
 sand eight hundred and two artificers' tools, two hundred 
 and fifty-three miners' tools, and eight thousand three hun- 
 dred and eighteen kilogrammes' weight of machinery and 
 stores, each article being made to a particular pattern. 
 The pioneers in Spain acted sometimes with one arm and 
 sometimes with the other, and we have assigned them ac- 
 cordingly in the table. The pontoniers, however, in our 
 service are included with the engineers ; we have there- 
 fore put them, in our table, in the same column with the 
 engineers. 
 
312 
 
 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 Name of Siege. 
 
 Engineer 
 
 staff, sappers, 
 
 miners, ponto- 
 
 niers, and 
 
 pioneers. 
 
 Offic. Men 
 
 Artillery staff, 
 horse and foot 
 
 artillery, 
 ouvriers, and 
 
 pioneers. 
 
 Offic. Men 
 
 Total 
 of 
 engineers, 
 sappers, 
 miners, 
 ponton- 
 iers, and 
 pioneers. 
 
 Total ol 
 artillery 
 staff, horse 
 and foot 
 artillery, 
 ouvriers, 
 
 and 
 pioneers. 
 
 Saragossa, 
 
 Rosas 
 
 Girona, 
 
 Astorga, 
 
 Lerida 
 
 Meguinenza, 
 
 1st Ciudacl Rodrigo 
 
 Almeida, 
 
 Tortosa, 
 
 Tarragona, 
 
 Olivensa, 
 
 1st Badajos, 
 
 Tarifa, 
 
 Peniscola, 
 
 2d Ciudad Rodrigo, 
 
 2d Badajos, 
 
 Burgos, 
 
 Castio Udiales, .... 
 St. Sebastian, 
 
 1189 
 211 
 G03 
 
 91 
 316 
 278 
 441 
 489 
 429 
 681 
 106 
 707 
 235 
 138 
 
 12 
 250 
 124 
 
 68 
 248 
 
 90 
 
 32 
 
 1276 
 
 1299 
 427 
 208 
 
 381 
 701 
 
 148 
 183 
 160 
 
 126 
 197 
 166 
 
 1275 
 232 
 657 
 
 98 
 331 
 312 
 475 
 523 
 472 
 731 
 116 
 732 
 247 
 151 
 
 15 
 265 
 128 
 
 73 
 261 
 
 1360 
 461 
 
 1361 
 444 
 219 
 136 
 
 1019 
 
 1019 
 413 
 747 
 186 
 740 
 165 
 192 
 168 
 268 
 129 
 205 
 173 
 
 From this table it appears that the ratio of the two arms 
 at these sieges, making the comparison on the basis of 
 our own organization, is about the same as for the present 
 French army in Algeria, or a little more than five of engi- 
 neers to six of artillery. 
 
 Thus far we have spoken of the field-operations of en- 
 gineer troops in connection with fortifications, alluding 
 only incidentally to the use of military bridges and the 
 passage of rivers. In the early wars of the French Revo- 
 lution the want of pontoniers was severely felt, and from 
 the deficiency of this branch of service, the operations of 
 the French generals were on several occasions very much 
 restricted. The evil was afterwards remedied in a great 
 degree by the introduction of several battalions of ponto- 
 niers in the regular army organization. On many occa- 
 sions, during his wars, did Napoleon feel and acknow- 
 ledge the importance of these troops ; but on none, per- 
 
ENGINEERS. 313 
 
 haps, was this importance more clearly shown than in the 
 passage of the Beresina during his retreat from Moscow 
 with the wreck of his army. The Russians had cut the 
 bridge of Borisow and taken position in great strength on 
 the right bank of the river, both at this point and below ; 
 the French, wearied with long and difficult marches, des- 
 titute of artillery, provisions, and military stores, with a 
 wide and deep river in front, and a powerful enemy on 
 their flank and rear, benumbed by the rigors of a merciless 
 climate, and dispirited by defeat — every thing seemed to 
 promise their total destruction. " General Eble," says an 
 English general officer, in his remarks on this retreat, 
 " who, from the beginning of the campaign, had made all 
 the arrangements for the equipment and construction of 
 military bridges, was specially charged with the important 
 duty of providing for the passage of this river ; and he 
 discharged that duty with a degree of forecast and ability 
 to which certainly Napoleon owed his escape and the 
 wreck of his army its safety. General Eble had begun to 
 prepare, at Smolensko, for the difficulties which he fore- 
 saw in this operation. He formed, with every care, a 
 train sufficient for the transport of all the tools and stores 
 that might be required ; and, further to provide against 
 casualties and accidents, ever^^ man belonging to the com- 
 panies of pontoniers was obliged to carry from Smolensko 
 a tool or implement of some kind, and a proportion of 
 nails : and fortunate was it for the army that he did so ; 
 for such was the difficulty in getting through the carriages 
 containing stores, that only two forge-wagons and six cais- 
 sons of tools and nails could be preserved. To these the 
 general added a quantity of iron-work taken from the 
 wheels of carriages that were abandoned on the march. 
 Much was sacrificed to bring off these valuable materials 
 for making clamps and fastenings, but, as Segur observes, 
 that exertion ' sauva Varmee.^ " 
 
 27 
 
314 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 But it is not always in the possession of a thing that 
 we are most likely to appreciate its utility ; the evils and 
 inconveniences resulting from the want of it not unfre- 
 quently impress us most powerfully with its importance 
 and the advantages to be derived from its possession. A 
 few examples of this nature, drawn from military history, 
 may be instructive. We need not go back to the disas- 
 trous passage of the Vistula by Charles XII., the failure 
 of Marlborough to pass the Dyle, and Eugene to cross the 
 Adda in 1705, nor of the three unsuccessful attempts of 
 Charles of Lorraine to cross the Rhine in 1743. The 
 wars following the French Revolution are sufficiently re- 
 plete with useful instruction on this subject.* 
 
 In 1794 so great was the disorder in the direction of 
 afiairs, that the boats of the bridges across the Wahal and 
 the Rhine were disposed of for commercial purposes ; and 
 in the beginning of 1 795, says Jomini, " the conquerors of 
 
 * Before recurring to these, it might be useful to give one example, 
 AS it is often referred to, in the campaign of 1702. It was deemed 
 important for the success of the campaign to attack the Prince of Ba- 
 den in his camp at Friedlingen. Accordingly, a bridge was thrown 
 across the Rhine at Huningen, the passage effected, and the victory 
 gained. But Villars was several times on the point of losing all for 
 want of a sufficient ponton equipage. Having but a single bridge, 
 the passage was necessarily slow ; the artillery and stores were fre- 
 quently interrupted by the infantry hurrying to the field of battle ; 
 disorder ensued, and the whole movement was retarded ; Villars could 
 bring only a small part of his artillery into action, and towards the 
 close of the battle the infantry were in want of ammunition : more- 
 over, the whole operation had nearly failed from the attempt of the 
 enemy to destroy this bridge, but the skill of the French pontoniers 
 saved it. We here remark, 1st, the passage secured to Villars an im- 
 portant victory ; 2d, from having an inefficient bridge-equipage his 
 whole army weis placed in great peril, and the operation had nearly 
 failed ; 3d, if the Prince of Baden had possessed a skilful corps to op- 
 pose that of Villars, this single bridge would have been destroyed, and 
 the army cut to pieces ; 4th, the skill of the little corps of French pon- 
 toniers saved the bridge, and of consequence, the army. 
 
ENGINEERS. 315 
 
 Belgium and Holland had not even a bridge equipage, at 
 a time too when the success of the campaign depended 
 solely on the means of crossing a river." A few boats 
 were procured from the Wahal and the Meuse, and others 
 manufactured in the forests of the Moselle ; but " these 
 operations consumed precious time, and four months thus 
 passed away in preparations." Even after other things 
 were all ready, the anriy was obliged to Avait thirty days 
 for the arrival of boats for ponton bridges ; during this 
 delay the Austrians strengthened their position, and with 
 very little exertion they might easily have prevented the 
 passage. 
 
 In 1796, profiting by the errors of the former campaigns, 
 the French collected more suitable bridge equipages, and 
 the two armies passed the Rhine at Neuweid and Kehl 
 without loss or delay. The latter of these passages has 
 often been referred to as a model for such operations, and 
 certainly does credit to the general who directed it. But 
 Moreau's bridge equipage having been destroyed during 
 this disastrous campaign, his operations the following year 
 were considerably delayed in preparing a new one, and 
 even then he was under the necessity of seizing all pri- 
 vate boats that could be found within reach ; but the diffi- 
 culty of collecting and using boats of all sizes and de- 
 scriptions was so great as entirely to defeat his plan of 
 surprising the enemy on the opposite bank of the river. 
 The necessity of co-operating with Hoche admitted of no 
 further delay, and he was now obliged to force his pas- 
 sage in the open day, and in face of the enemy. Under- 
 taken under such circumstances, " the enterprise was ex- 
 tremely sanguinary, and at one time very doubtful ;" and 
 had it failed, " Moreau's army would have been ruined for 
 the campaign." 
 
 Napoleon's celebrated passage of the Po, at Placentia, 
 shows plainly how important it is for a general to posseiai 
 
316 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 the means of crossing rivers. " I felt the importance of 
 hastening the enterprise in order not to allow the enemy 
 time to prevent it. But the Po, which is a river as wide 
 and deep as the Rhine, is a barrier difficult to be over- 
 come. We had no means of constructing a bridge, and 
 were obliged to content ourselves with the means of em- 
 barkation found at Placentia and its environs. Lannes, 
 chief of brigade, crossed in the first boats, with the ad- 
 vanced guard. The Austrians had only ten squadrons on 
 the other side, and these were easily overcome. The 
 passage was now continued without interruption, but very 
 slowly. If I had had a good ponton-equipage, the fate of 
 the enemy's army had been sealed ; hut the necessity of pass- 
 ing the river hy successive embarkations saved it." 
 
 In the campaign of 1799, the Archduke attempted to 
 pass the Aar, and attacked the French on the opposite 
 side, but for want of suitable equipage his operation was 
 delayed till the enemy had collected sufficient forces to 
 intercept the passage ; he was now obliged to enter into 
 a stipulation for a suspension of hostilities, and to with- 
 draw his bridges. 
 
 The operations of the French in the campaign of 1800, 
 led to the most glorious results, but their execution was 
 attended with the greatest difficulties. The passage of 
 the Alps was greatly facilitated by the ability of the chief 
 engineer, Marescot, and the skill of the troops under his 
 command ; and the facility of passing rivers afforded Na- 
 poleon by his pontoniers, had an important influence upon 
 the success of'the campaign. " The army of the reserve 
 had many companies of pontoniers and sappers ; the pon- 
 tons of course could not be taken across the St. Bernard, 
 but the pontoniers soon found materials on the Po and 
 Tesin for constructing bridge equipages." Moreau's army 
 in the same year profited well by his pontoniers, in the 
 passages of the Inn, the Salza, the Traun, the Alza, &c., 
 
ENGINEERS. ' 317 
 
 and in the pursuit of the Austrian army — a pursuit that 
 has but a single parallel example in modern history. 
 
 The facility with which Napoleon crossed rivers, made 
 forced marches, constructed redoubts, fortified depots, and 
 grasped the great strategic points of the enemy in the 
 campaign of 1805, resulted from the skilful organization 
 of his army, and the efficiency given to the forces em- 
 ployed in these important operations. The engineer staff 
 of the French army at this period, consisted of four hun- 
 dred and forty-nine officers, and there were four battalions 
 of sappers, of one hundred and twenty officers and seven 
 thousand and ninety-two men ; six companies of miners, 
 of twenty-four officers and five hundred and seventy-six 
 men ; and two regiments of pontoniers, of thirty-eight offi- 
 cers and nine hundred and sixty men. On the contrary, 
 the enemy's neglect of these things is one of the most 
 striking of the many faults of the war, and his ill-directed 
 efibrts to destroy the great wooden bridge across the 
 Danube, and the successful operations of the French sap- 
 pers in securing it, formed one of the principal turning 
 points in the campaign. 
 
 The same organization enabled the French to perform 
 their wonderfully rapid and decisive movements in the 
 Prussian campaign of 1806, and the northern operations 
 of 1807. 
 
 In 1809, Napoleon's army crossed, with the most won- 
 derful rapidity, the Inn, the Salza, the Traun, and other 
 rivers emptying into the Danube, and reached Vienna be- 
 fore the wonder-stricken Austrians could prepare for its 
 defence. It was then necessary for the French to effect 
 a passage of the Danube, which was much swollen by 
 recent rains and the melting snow of the mountains. 
 Considering the depth and width of the river, the positions 
 of the enemy, and his preparations to oppose a passage, 
 with the disastrous consequences that would result to the 
 
318 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 French from any failure in its execution ; taking all these 
 things into consideration, Jomini pronounced it " one of 
 the most hazardous and difficult of all the operations of 
 war." Here the fate of the army depended, apparently, 
 upon the skill and efficiency of the engineers and pon- 
 toniers, and nobly did they discharge the trust reposed in 
 them. When the pontons failed, tressel-bridges were 
 substituted, and even fifty-four enormous boats were put in 
 requisition. So skilfully were these operations conducted, 
 that Napoleon's immense army crossed over in safety, di- 
 rectly in the face of a superior enemy, and the same day 
 fought the memorable battle of Esling. Forced to retire 
 before numbers vastly superior to his own. Napoleon con- 
 centrated his forces on the island of Lobau, and intrenched 
 his position. Surrounded by the broad and deep channel 
 of the Danube, and watched by numerous and skilful ene- 
 mies, it required the most constant activity and the greatest 
 good fortune to effect a passage. Here the skill and 
 efficiency of the engineers shone conspicuously ; a num- 
 ber of bridges were thrown across the river in the face 
 of the Austrians, and against obstacles almost insurmount- 
 able ; the whole French army passed in safety, and soon 
 put the finishing stroke to that brilliant campaign. So 
 high an estimate did Napoleon attach to the construction 
 of these bridges, that, when the passage was completed, 
 he offered to place Bertrand, the constructing engineer, 
 though of comparatively low rank, at the head of the 
 French corps du genie. 
 
 On many occasions during the retreat in 1812-13, from 
 the Beresina to the left of the Rhine, across the Niemen, 
 the Vistula, the Oder, the Elbe, and the numerous other 
 rivers which divide that immense country, the French 
 derived vast advantages from the experience and skill of 
 their engineers and pontoniers, several times whole corps 
 escaping through their means from the grasp of their pur 
 
ENGINEERS. 319 
 
 suers. When, however, the disasters of this retreat had 
 absorbed most of the material of the army, and had sadly- 
 thinned the ranks of men of skill and experience, they 
 sustained many severe, and, in other circumstances, unne- 
 cessary losses. Of this character we may mention the 
 passage of the Elster by the bridge of Lindnau, where, 
 through the ignorance and carelessness of those charged 
 with the mines, and through the want of suitable bridge 
 arrangements, thousands of brave men were buried in the 
 muddy waters of this small river. So sensibly did Napo- 
 leon feel this want of bridge equipages, in the winter of 
 1813-14, that he addressed to his minister of war, on this 
 subject, the followmg remarkable words : " If I had had 
 pontons, I should have already annihilated the army of 
 Schwartzenberg, and closed the war; I should have taken 
 from him eight or ten thousand wagons, and his entire 
 army in detail ; but for want of the proper means I could 
 not pass the Seine." Again, on the 2d of March he wrote : 
 " If I had had a bridge equipage this morning, Bliicher's 
 army had been lost." Whoever will examine the cletails 
 of the operations of this campaign, will be convinced of 
 the full force of these remarks. 
 
 In Spain in 1808, Sir John Moore, in order to assist the 
 native forces, had penetrated so near the army of Napo- 
 leon, that retreat became exceedingly difficult, and he was 
 several times on the point of being lost. The English 
 army was at this time very deficient in engineer troops, 
 and Moore suffered much for want of miners to destroy 
 bridges, and pontoniers to construct new ones. In order 
 to cover his retreat and impede the advance of the French, 
 the commander-in-chief, says Napier, " directed several 
 bridges to be destroyed, but the engineers [for want of 
 miners and miner's tools] failed of success in every at- 
 tempt." 
 
 In Soult's retreat, in 1809, he crossed the Duero at 
 
320 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 Oporto, and destroyed the bridges so as to cut off the pur- 
 suit of Wellington. But while Soult, deceived by treach- 
 ery in his own corps, neglected to guard the river with 
 proper vigilance, Wellington collected- boats at differ- 
 ent points, crossed over his army, surprised the French, 
 and, had it not been for the singular delay and indecision 
 of General Murray, would most certainly have forcedthe en- 
 tire army to capitulate ; as it was, his operation produced a 
 decided influence on the campaign, and effected the safety 
 of Beresford's corps. Soult destroyed his artillery and 
 baggage, and hastily retreated through the mountain 
 passes ; but his army was again arrested at the river Ca- 
 vado, and placed on the very brink of destruction, when 
 the brave and skilful Dulong succeeded in effecting a pas- 
 sage at the Ponte Nova ; the same daring officer opened, 
 on the same day, a way for the further escape of the 
 French across the Misarella by the Saltador. 
 
 In the pursuit of Massena, in 1810, it was important to 
 the English to cross the Guadiana, and attack the French 
 before Badajos could be put in a state of defence. Be- 
 resford was directed by Wellington to pass this river at 
 Jerumina, where the Portuguese had promised to furnish 
 pontons ; but they neglected to fidfil their engagement, 
 and the army had to wait till Capt. Squire, an able and 
 efficient officer of engineers, could construct other means 
 for effecting a passage. Every thing was done that genius 
 could devise and industry execute ; nevertheless, the op- 
 erations of the army were greatly delayed — " a delay y^ 
 says the historian, " that may be considered as the principal 
 cause of those long and bloody operations which afterwards 
 detained Lord Wellington more than a year on the frontiers 
 of Portugal." 
 
 We might prolong these remarks by discussing the pas- 
 sages of the Ceira and Alva, and their influence on the 
 pursuit of Massena ; Wellington's passage of the Tagus, 
 
ENGINEERS. 321 
 
 and his retreat from Burgos in 1812 ; the passage of the 
 Adour and Garonne in 1814 ; and the failure of the mines 
 to blow up the bridges of Saltador, Alcantara, <fcc. ; but a 
 sufficient number of examples, it is believed, has already 
 been adduced to show the advantage of maintaining a prop- 
 erly organized and instructed body of sappers, miners, and 
 pontoniers, and the fatal results attending the want of such 
 troops, as a component part of an army organization. 
 
 It has already been remarked that the infantry of an 
 army must always form the basis of the apportionment ; 
 and by the general rule laid down by military writers, the 
 cavalry should be from one -fourth to one-sixth of the in- 
 fantry, according to the character of the war ; the artillery 
 about two-thirds of the cavalry, or one-seventh of the in- 
 fantry ; and the engineers from one-half to three-fourths 
 of the artillery, — say about two-thirds. The staff and ad- 
 ministrative corps must vary according to the nature of the 
 organization, and the character of the theatre of war. The 
 former ought to be from two to five in a thousand, and the 
 latter from twenty-five to seventy-five,* as a general rule. 
 These ratios would give for a good army organization : 
 
 Staff, about 5 
 
 Administrative service — pay, medical, commis- 
 sary, quarter-master, &c. . . 65 
 Infantry, .... . . 650 
 
 Cavalry, .... . . 130 
 
 Artillery, 90 
 
 Engineers, 60 
 
 Total, . . 1,000 
 
 In a broken country, and against savage and undis- 
 ciplined foes, like the Indians in this country, the natives 
 opposed to the English in India, to the French in Algeria, 
 
 * This supposes the teamsters, wagon-masters, hospital-servants, 
 &c., to be enlisted men, and not persons hired for the occasion! as m 
 done in our army. * 
 
322 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 or to the Russians in Circassia, the cavalry, artillery, and 
 engineers would be diminished, and the infantry and ad- 
 ministrative corps proportionably increased; the former 
 because light troops are always preferable against an un- 
 disciplined foe, and the latter because of the difficulty of 
 moving and procuring supplies in new and uncultivated 
 countries. The French forces in Algeria, in 1844, amount- 
 ed to about sixty thousand men, in the following propor- 
 tion : — 
 
 Staff, .4.7 
 
 Administrative, &.C., . . . . '. 112.3 
 Infantry, . .• . . . . . 687.3 
 
 Cavalry, 86.6 
 
 Artillery, . . . . . . . 61.2 
 
 Engineers, . .... 47.9 
 
 1000 men. 
 
 In small peace establishments the relative proportion of 
 infantry and cavalry should be much less than when pre- 
 pared for the field, because troops for these two anns can 
 be much more readily formed in case of emergency, than 
 for those which require more scientific information, and 
 technical skill and instruction. The staff and engineers 
 are evidently the most difficult to be formed in case of 
 war, and next to these the artillery and administrative corps. 
 
 In this country we can maintain, in time of peace, only 
 the frame-work of an army, looking to our citizen soldiery 
 to form, in case of need, the great mass of our military 
 force. This is the starting point in our military system, 
 and the basis of our army organization. Let us see 
 whether this principle is carried out in practice. 
 
 For every thousand men in our present organization* we 
 have, 
 
 * These numbers are the real rather than the nominal proportions, 
 wany of our oflScers being called staff, who properly belong to one of 
 <he other classes. 
 
ENGINEERS 323 
 
 For the staff, 2 
 
 Administrative, 20* 
 
 Infantry, . . . . . * . .513 
 Cavalry, . . . . . . .150 
 
 Artillery, 310 
 
 Engineers, ... . . 5 
 
 1000 
 
 We see from this table, that while our artillery is nearly 
 six times as numerous as in ordinary armies, our staff is 
 less by one-half, and our engineers not more than one-half 
 what ought to be their proportion in a war establishment. 
 To this excess of artillery over infcmtry and cavalry in our 
 army in time of peace there is no objection, inasmuch as 
 the latter could be more easily expanded in case of war 
 than the artillery. But for a still stronger reason our staff 
 and engineers should also be proportionally increased, in- 
 stead of being vastly diminished, as is actually the case. 
 
 Experience in the first campaigns of the American 
 Revolution strongly impressed on the mind of Washing- 
 ton the absolute necessity of forming a regular and sys- 
 tematic army organization. But so difficult was it to ob- 
 tain properly instructed engineers, that he was obliged to 
 seek his engineer officers in the ranks of foreign adven- 
 turers, and to make drafts from the other arms of service, 
 and have them regularly instructed in the duties of engi- 
 neer troops, and commanded by the officers of this corps. 
 An order, in his own handwriting, giving the details of 
 this temporary arrangement, is dated March 30th, 1779. 
 Until men are enlisted for the purpose, companies of sap- 
 pers and miners shall be formed by drafts from the line. 
 " The duties of the companies of sappers and miners," 
 
 * Much of the administrative duty in our army is done by unen- 
 listed men, or by soldiers detached from their companies. Where such 
 is the case, the ratio of this branch of the service ought to be no high- 
 •r than is represented above. 
 
324 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 he continues, " shall be under the direction of the engi- 
 neers, to construct field-works of every kind, and all 
 works necessary for the attack or defence of places, as 
 circumstances may require. On a march in the vicinity 
 of an enemy, a detachment of the companies of sappers 
 and miners shall be stationed at the head of the column, 
 directly after the vanguard, for the purpose of opening 
 and mending the roads, and removing obstructions," &c. 
 &c. 
 
 The great difficulties encountered by Washington in 
 instructing his inexperienced forces in the more difficult 
 branches of the art, mjade him the more earnest, in after 
 years, to impress on us how important it was for us In 
 peace to prepare for war. The preparation here meant is 
 not the keeping up, in time of peace, of a large standing 
 army, ever ready to take the field ; but rather the forma- 
 tion of a small body, educated and practised in all the 
 scientific and difficult parts of the profession ; a body 
 which shall serve as the cadre or framework of a large 
 army, capable of imparting to the new and inexperienced 
 soldiers of the republic that skill and efficiency which 
 has been acquired by practice. How far have we accom- 
 plished this object, and what will be the probable opera- 
 tions in case of another contest with a European power 1 
 New and inexperienced troops will be called into the 
 field to oppose a veteran and disciplined army. From 
 these troops we shall expect all the bravery and energy 
 resulting from ardent patriotism and an enthusiastic love 
 of liberty. But we cannot here expect much discipline, 
 military skill, or knowledge of the several branches of 
 the military art. The peaceful habits of our citizens 
 tend but little to the cultivation of the military character. 
 How, then, are we to oppose the hostile force 1 Must 
 human blood be substituted for skill and preparation, and 
 the dead bodies of our citizens serve as epaulements 
 
ENGINEERS. 325 
 
 against the inioads of the enemy 1 To some extent, we 
 fear it must be the case ; but not entirely so, for govern- 
 ment has not altogether neglected to make preparation for 
 such an event. Fortifications have been planned or 
 erected on the most important and exposed positions ; 
 military materials and munitions have been collected in 
 the public arsenals ; a military school has been organized 
 to instruct in the military sciences ; there are regularly 
 kept up small bodies of infantry and cavalry, weak in 
 numbers, but capable of soon making good soldiers of a 
 population so well versed as ours is in the use of the 
 musket and the horse ; an artillery force, proportionally 
 much larger, is also regularly maintained, with a suf- 
 ficient number of men and ofiicers to organize and make 
 good artillery-men of citizens already partially acquainted 
 with the use of the cannon. But an acquaintance with 
 infantry, cavalry, and artillery duties is not the only prac- 
 tical knowledge requisite in war. In the practical oper- 
 ations of an army in the field, rivers are to be crossed, 
 bridges suddenly erected and suddenly destroyed, field- 
 works constructed and defended, batteries captured and 
 destroyed ; fortifications are to be put in order and de- 
 fended, or to be besieged and recaptured ; trenches must 
 be opened, mines sprung, batteries established, breaches 
 made and stormed ; trous-de-loup, abattis, palisades, ga- 
 bions, fascines, and numerous other military implements 
 and machinery are to be constructed. Have our citizens 
 a knowledge of these things, or have we provided in our 
 military establishment for a body of men instructed and 
 practised in this branch of the military art, and capable 
 of imparting to an army the necessary efficiency for this 
 service ? Unfortunately this question must be answered 
 in the negative ; and it is greatly to be feared that the 
 future historian will have to say of us, as Napier has 
 said of the English : — " T/te best officers and soldiers were 
 
326 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 obliged to sacrifice themselves in a lamentable manner, to 
 compensate for the negligence and incapacity of a govern^ 
 ment always ready to plunge the nation into a war, without 
 the slightest care of what was necessary to obtain success. 
 Their sieges were a succession of butcheries ; because the 
 commonest materials, and the means necessary to their art, 
 were denied the engineers^* 
 
 * The subjects discussed in this chapter are also treated by most 
 authors on Military Organization and Military History, and by the 
 several writers on Military Engineering. AUent, Vauban, Cormon- 
 taigne, Rocquancourt, Pasley, Douglas, Jones, Belmas, Napier, Gay 
 de Vernon, may be referred to with advantage. Pasley, Douglas, 
 Jones, and Napier, speak in the strongest terms of the importance of 
 engineer troops in the active operations of a war, and of the absolute 
 necessity of organizing this force in time of peace. A list of books of 
 reference on Military Engineering will be given at the close of the fol- 
 lowing chapters. 
 
 While these pages are passing through the press. Congress has au- 
 thorized the President to raise one cornpany of engineer troops ! Thi« 
 number is altogether too small to be of any use in time of war. 
 
PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. 327 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. 
 
 Fortification is defined, — the art of disposing the ground 
 in such a manner as to enable a small number of troops 
 to resist a larger army the longest time possible. If 
 the work be placed in a position of much importance, 
 and its materials be of a durable character, it is called 
 permanent; if otherwise, it receives the appellation of j^cZc/, 
 or temporary. Field-works are properly confined to oper- 
 ations of a single campaign, and are used to strengthen 
 positions which are to be occupied only for a short period. 
 Generally these works are of earth, thrown up by the 
 troops in a single day. They are intimately connected 
 with a system of permanent fortifications, but from the fa- 
 cility of their construction, no provision need be made for 
 them before the actual breaking out of war. Indeed, 
 they could not well be built before hostilities commenced, 
 as their locality in each case must be determined by the 
 position of the hostile forces. 
 
 Having already described the general influence of per- 
 manent fortifications as a means of national defence, we 
 shall here speak merely of the principles of their con- 
 struction. It is not proposed to enter into any technical 
 discussion of matters that especially belong to the instruc- 
 tion of the engineer, but merely to give the nomenclature 
 tnd use of the more important parts of a military work ; 
 in a word, such general information as should belong to 
 officers of every grade and corps of an army. 
 
328 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 The tirst species of fortification among the ancients 
 was of course very simple, consisting merely of an earth- 
 en mound, or palisades. A wall was afterwards used, and 
 a ditch was then added to the wall. It was found that a 
 straight wall could be easily breached by the enemy's bat- 
 tering-rams ; to remedy this evil, towers were built at 
 short intervals from each other, forming a broken line of 
 salient and re-entering parts. These towers or salient 
 points gradually assumed a shape approximating to the 
 modem bastion. 
 
 After the invention of gunpowder and the application 
 of cannon to the attack and defence of places, it became 
 necessary to arrange earthen ramparts behind the thin 
 walls of the ancient works, for the reception of the new 
 artillery. Moreover these walls were soon found inad- 
 equate to resist the missiles of the besiegers, and it be- 
 came necessary to replace them by parapets of earth. In 
 order to cover the retaining walls of these parapets from 
 the besieging batteries, it was also found to be necessary 
 to lower these walls as much as possible, and to raise the 
 counterscarps. The traces or plans of the -works, how- 
 ever, received no material change till about the close of 
 the fifteenth century. 
 
 ' It is not known who first changed the ancient towers 
 into bastions. Some attribute it to an Italian, and with 
 considerable show of reason, for a bastion was built at 
 Turin as early as 1461. Achmet Pacha, it is said, forti- 
 fied Otranto in this way, in 1480, but whether the system 
 was previously known among the Turks cannot be deter- 
 mined. Others attribute the invention to Ziska, the cele 
 brated leader of the Hussites. It is most probable that 
 the transition from the tower to the bastion was a very 
 gradual one, and that the change was perfected in several 
 countries at about the same time. 
 
 Fortifications, like other arts and sciences, greatly 
 
PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. 329 
 
 flourished in Italy under the Medicis, and that country 
 furnished Europe with its most skilful engineers. Cath- 
 arine of Medicis introduced into France many of her 
 countrymen, distinguished in this profession ; among these 
 may be named Bellamat, Bephano, Costritio, Relogio, 
 Vorganno, the two Marini, Campi, and Hieronimo, who 
 built several important places and directed the sieges of 
 others. These able foreigners were rivalled by some 
 distinguished French engineers, who laid the foundation 
 of the " corps du Genie,^^ which has since become a school 
 of military instruction for the world. Among the early 
 French engineers may be distinguished Lafontaine De 
 Serre, Feuquieres, and St. Remy. Pedro Navarro had 
 been appointed a member of this corps, but his attention 
 was more specially directed to mining, and we do not 
 learn that he distinguished himself in the construction of 
 any fortification. 
 
 In Germany, in the beginning of the sixteenth century, 
 Albert Durer distinguished himself as a writer on fortifi- 
 cation ; his book is remarkable as containing the germs 
 of many of the improvements which were made by those 
 who followed him. This is the more to be wondered at 
 as he was not a professed engineer. After him followed 
 Spekel, a native of Strasburg, who died in 1589. His 
 writings are valuable as showing the state of the art at 
 that time, and the changes which he himself introduced. 
 He was an engineer of much practical knowledge and 
 experience, having assisted at the sieges of Malta, Gol- 
 letta, Vienna, Jula, Nicosia, Famagusta, &c. 
 
 The first French engineer who wrote on fortification was 
 Errard de Bar-le-Duc, who published near the close of 
 the sixteenth century. As an engineer, he was rivalled 
 by Chatillon, a man of distinguished merit. Errard for- 
 tified Amiens, built a part of the castle of Sedan, and a 
 portion of the defences of Calais. Under the reign of 
 
330 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 Louis XIII. , Desnoyers, Deville, Pagan, and Fabre were 
 greatly distinguished. Deville published in 1628. He 
 was a man of much learning and experience ; but he is 
 said to have adopted, both in his theory and practice, the 
 principles of the Italian school, with most of its errors. 
 Pagan began his military career while young, and became 
 marechal de champ at the age of 38, when, having the mis- 
 fortune to become blind, he was compelled to relinquish 
 his brilliant hopes. He was the ablest engineer of his 
 age, and was also greatly distinguished in other brandies 
 of science. In his plans he inclined to the Dutch rather 
 than the Italian school of fortification. He published in 
 1645. 
 
 At the close of the sixteenth century, the Dutch had 
 been forced to resort to military defences to protect 
 themselves against the aggressions of the Spaniards. As 
 the Dutch were inferior in other military means, fortifica- 
 tion became one of the vital resources of the country. 
 Their works, however, thrown up in much haste, were 
 in many respects defective, although well adapted to the 
 exigencies of the time. Freytag, their principal engineer, 
 wrote in 1630. Some of his improvements were intro- 
 duced into France by Pagan. He was preceded by Ma- 
 rolois, (a cotemporary of Pagan,) who published in 1613. 
 
 In Germany, Rimpler, a Saxon, wrote on fortification in 
 1671. He was a man of great experience, having served 
 at the sieges of Candia, Phillipsburg, Bonn, Riga, Bre- 
 men, Dansburg, Bommeln, &c. He fell at the siege of 
 Vienna in 1683. His writings are said to contain the 
 groundwork of Montalembert's system. 
 
 In Italy, after the time of Tartaglia, Marchi, Campi, 
 &c., we find no great improvement in this art. Several 
 Italians, however, distinguished themselves as engineers 
 under the Spaniards. The fortifications of Badajos are a 
 good example of the state of the art in Italy and Spain a 
 
PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. 331 
 
 that epocli. The citadel of Antwerp, built by two Italian 
 engineers, Pacciotti and Cerbelloni, in 1568, has become 
 celebrated for the siege it sustained in 1832. 
 
 The age of Louis XIV. effected a great revolution in 
 the art of fortification, and carried it to such a degree of 
 perfection, that it has since received but slight improve- 
 ment. The years 1633 and 1634 are interesting dates in 
 the history of this art, as having given birth respectively 
 to Yauban and Coehorn. The former was chief engineer 
 of France under Louis XIV., and the latter held a corre- 
 sponding position under the Dutch republic. Coehorn's 
 ideas upon fortification are conceived with an especial 
 view to the marshy soil of his own country, and, although 
 well suited to the object in view, are consequently of less, 
 general application than those of his more distinguished 
 cotemporary and rival. The best specimens of his mode 
 of construction that exist at the present day, are the 
 fortresses of Manheim, Bergen-op-Zoom, Nimiguen, and 
 Breda. . 
 
 Coehorn was followed in Holland by Landsberg, an able 
 and practical engineer, who to much reading added ex- 
 tensive experience, having himself served at sixteen 
 sieges. His system was in many respects peculiar, both 
 in trace and relief; it dispensed with the glacis, and all 
 revertments of masonry. His plans could be applied only 
 10 marshy soils. The first edition of his work was pub- 
 lished in 1685. 
 
 But the career of Vauban forms the most marked and 
 prominent era in the history of fortification ; it constitutes 
 the connecting link between the rude sketches of the ear- 
 lier engineers, and the well-established form which the 
 art has since assumed. In his earlier works we find many 
 of the errors of his predecessors ; but a gradual change 
 seems to have been wrought in his mind by reflection and 
 experience, and these faults were soon remedied and a 
 
332 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 new and distinct system developed. Vauban has left no 
 treatise upon his favorite art, and his ideas upon fortifica- 
 tion have been deduced from his constructions, and from 
 detached memoirs left among his papers. The nature of 
 his labors, and the extent of his activity and industry, 
 may be imagined from the fact that he fought one hundred 
 and forty battles, conducted fifty-eight sieges, and built or 
 repaired three hundred fortifications. His memoirs, found 
 among his manuscript papers, on various military and po- 
 litical subjects, are numerous, and highly praised even at 
 the present day. But his beautiful and numerous con- 
 structions, both of a civil and military character, are real 
 monuments to his genius. The best illustrations of his 
 principles of fortification occur at Lille, Strasbourg, Lan- 
 dau, Givet, and Neuf-Brisack. His writings on mines, 
 and the attack and defence of places, are, by the profes- 
 sion, regarded as classic. His improvements in the ex- 
 isting method of attack gave great superiority to the arms 
 of his countrymen, and even enabled him to besiege and 
 capture his rival Coehorn, in his own works. He died in 
 1707, and was soon succeeded by Cormontaigne. 
 
 The latter did not attempt the introduction of any new 
 system, but limited himself to improving and perfecting 
 the plans of his illustrious predecessors. His improve- 
 ments, however, were both extensive and judicious, and 
 are sufficient to entitle him to the place he holds as one 
 of the ablest military engineers the world has ever pro- 
 duced. His works on the subject of fortification, besides 
 being elegantly written, contain the most valuable infor- 
 mation of any works we have. His most admired con- 
 structions are to be found at Metz, Thionville, and Bitche. 
 The beautiful crown works of Billecroix, at Metz, are per- 
 fect models of their kind. Cormontaigne died in 1750. 
 
 Cotemporary with him were Sturin and Glasser. The 
 former deviated but slightly from the systems of his prede- 
 
PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. 333 
 
 cessors, but the latter invented several ingenious improve- 
 naents vrhich gave him great reputation. 
 
 Next follows Rosard, a Bavarian engineer ; and Fred- 
 erick Augustus, king of Poland, who devoted himself par- 
 ticularly to this art. The former casemated only the flanks 
 of his works, but the latter introduced casemate fire more 
 extensively than any one who had preceded him. 
 
 In France, Belidor and De Filey published about the 
 middle of the last century. They were both able engineers, 
 but their systems were inferior to that of Cormontaigne. 
 
 In 1767 De la Chiche introduced a system of fortifica- 
 tion in many respects original. He raised his covered- 
 ways so as to conceal all his masonry, and casemated a 
 great portion of his enceinte. For exterior defence, he 
 employed direct fire from his barbettes, and curvated fire 
 from his casemates ; the direct fire of the latter secured 
 his ditches. 
 
 Next to De la Chiche follows Montalembert, who pub- 
 lished in 1776. He was a man of much experience and 
 considerable originality, but of no great ability as an engi- 
 neer. Most of his ideas were derived from De la Chiche 
 and the German school of Rimpler. His plans have gen- 
 erally been rejected by his own countrymen, but they still 
 have advocates among the Germans. 
 
 General Virgin, a distinguished Swedish engineer, 
 wrote in 1781. His idea of strongly fortifying the smaller 
 towns to the comparative neglect of the larger cities, con- 
 stitutes one of the principal novelties in his system. 
 
 In 1794, Reveroni devised a system in which the case- 
 mates of Montalembert were employed, but his guns were 
 so arranged as to be employed in barbette while the be- 
 siegers were at a distance, and afterwards to be used for 
 casemated fire. The casemate gun-carriage, which form- 
 ed a part of his invention, was ingenious, but never much 
 employed in practice. 
 
334 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 Bousmard, a French emigrant, published in 1799. He 
 adopted the general trace of Vauban, but introduced modi- 
 fications in the details essentially different from those of 
 Cormontaigne. Some of these modifications are very val- 
 uable improvements, while others are of a more doubtful 
 character. Bousmard is, on the whole, a very able wri- 
 ter, and his works should be found in the library of every 
 military engineer. 
 
 Camot's celebrated treatise was published in 1810. He 
 was evidently a man of genius, and during his career at 
 the head of the War Department of France, numerous and 
 very important improvements were made in the several 
 branches of the military art, and especially in strategy. 
 His work on fortification exhibits much originality and 
 genius, but it is doubtful whether it has very much contrib- 
 uted to the improvement of this art. His ideas have been 
 very severely, and rather unfairly criticised by the Eng- 
 lish, and particularly by Sir Howard Douglas. 
 
 Chasseloup de Laubat early distinguished himself as an 
 engineer of much capacity and talent. He followed Na- 
 poleon in nearly all his campaigns, and conducted many 
 of his sieges. He remodelled the fortifications of North- 
 ern Italy and of the Lower Rhine. He published in 1811. 
 The improvements which he introduced are numerous 
 and valuable, and he probably contributed more to advance 
 his art, and to restore the equilibrium between attack and 
 defence, than any other engineer since Cormontaigne. 
 After the fall of Napoleon and the partition of his empire, 
 the allies mutilated or destroyed the constructions of Chas- 
 seloup, so that, it is believed, no perfect specimen of his 
 system remains. 
 
 The cotemporaries of Chasseloup were mostly engaged 
 in active field service and sieges, and few had either lei- 
 sure or opportunity to devote themselves to improvements 
 in permanent fortification. 
 
PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. 335 
 
 Choumara published in 1827. His system contains 
 much originality, and his writings give proof of talent and 
 genius. He has very evidently more originality than 
 judgment, and it is hardly probable that his system will 
 ever be generally adopted in practice. 
 
 The Metz system, as arranged by Noizet, as a theore- 
 tical study, is undoubtedly the very best that is now known. 
 It, however, requires great modifications to suit it to dif- 
 fer.ent localities. For a horizontal site, it is probably the 
 most perfect system ever devised. It is based on the 
 system of Vauban as improved by Cormontaigne, and con- 
 tains several of the modifications suggested by modem 
 engineers. It is applied in a modified form to the new 
 fortifications of Paris. 
 
 Baron Rohault de Fleury has introduced many modifi- 
 cations of the ordinary French system in his new defences 
 of Lyons. We have seen no written account of these 
 works, but from a hasty examination in 1844, they struck 
 us as being too complicated and expensive. 
 
 The new fortifications of Western Germany are modi- 
 fications of Rempler's system, as improved by De la 
 Chiche and Montalembert. It is said that General Aster, 
 the directing engineer, has also introduced some of the 
 leading principles of Chasseloup and Camot. 
 
 The English engineers have satisfied themselves with 
 following in the track of their continental neighbors, and 
 can offer no claims to originality. 
 
 Of the system of fortification now followed in our ser- 
 \ice we must decline expressing any opinion ; the time 
 has not yet arrived for subjecting it to a severe and judi- 
 cious criticism. But of the system pursued previous to 
 1820, we may say, without much fear of contradiction, 
 that a worse one could scarcely have been devised. In- 
 stead of men of talent and attainments in military science, 
 most of our engineers were then either foreigners, or 
 
336 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 civilians who owed their commissions to mere political 
 influence. The qualifications of the former were proba- 
 bly limited to their recollection of some casual visit to 
 two or three of the old European fortresses ; and the latter 
 probably derived all their military science from some old 
 military book, which, having become useless in Europe, 
 had found its way into this country, and which they had 
 read without understanding, and probably without even 
 looking at its date. The result was what might have been 
 anticipated — a total waste of the public money. We 
 might illustrate this by numerous examples. A single 
 one, however, must suffice. About the period of the last 
 war, eight new forts were constructed for the defence of 
 New York harbor, at an expense of some two millions of 
 dollars. Six of these were circular, and the other two were 
 star forts — systems which had been discarded in Europe 
 for nearly two thousand years ! Three of these works 
 are now entirely abandoned, two others are useless, and 
 large sums of money have recently been expended on the 
 other three in an attempt to remedy their faults, and ren- 
 der them susceptible of a good defence. Moreover, a 
 number of the works which were constructed by our en- 
 gineers before that corps was made to feel the influence 
 of the scientific education introduced through the medium 
 of the Military Academy — we say, a considerable number 
 of our fortifications, constructed by engineers who owed 
 their appointment to political influence, are not only wrong 
 in their plans, but have been made of such wretched mate- 
 rials and workmanship that they are already crumbling 
 into ruins. 
 
 A fortification, in its most simple form, consists of a 
 mound of earth, termed the rampart, which encloses the 
 space fortified ; a parapet, surmounting the rampart and 
 covering the men and guns from the enemy's projectiles ; 
 a scarp wall, which sustains the pressure of the earth of 
 
PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. 3^7 
 
 l^e rampart and parapet, and presents an insurmountable 
 obstacle to an assault by storm ; a wide and deep ditchy 
 which prevents the enemy from approaching near the body 
 of the place j a counterscarp wall, which sustains the earth 
 on the exterior of the ditch ; a covered way, which occu- 
 pies the space between the counterscarp and a mound of 
 earth called a glacis, thrown up a few yards in front of the 
 ditch for the purpose of covering the scarp of the main work. 
 
 The work by which the space fortified is immediately 
 enveloped, is called the enceinte, or body of the place. 
 Other works are usually added to the enceinte to strength- 
 en the weak points of the fortification, or to lengthen the 
 siege by forcing the enemy to gain possession of them be- 
 fore he can breach the body of the place : these are term- 
 ed outworks, when enveloped by the covered way, and 
 advanced works, when placed exterior to the covered way, 
 but in some way connected with the main work ; but if 
 entirely beyond the glacis, and not within supporting dis- 
 tance of the fortress, they are called detached works. 
 
 In a bastioned front the principal outwork is the demi- 
 lune, which is placed in front of the curtain ; it serves to 
 cover the main entrance to the work, and to place the 
 adjacent bastions in strong re-enterings. 
 
 The tenaille is a small low work placed in the ditch, to 
 cover the scarp wall of the curtain and flanks from the 
 fire of the besieger's batteries erected along the crest of 
 the glacis. 
 
 The places of arms, are points where troops are assem- 
 bled in order to act on the exterior of the work. The re- 
 entering places of arms, are small redans arranged at the 
 points of junction of the covered ways of the bastion and 
 demi-lune. The salient places of arms are the parts of the 
 covered way in front of the salients of the bastion and 
 demi-lune. 
 
 Small permanent works, termed redoubts, are placed 
 29 
 
338 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 within the demi-lune and re-entering places of arms fol 
 strengthening those works. Works of this character con- 
 structed within the bastion are termed interior retrench* 
 ments ; when sufficiently elevated to command the exte- 
 rior ground, they are called cavaliers. 
 
 Caponniers are works constructed to cover the passage 
 of the ditch from the tenaille to the gorge of the demi- 
 lune, and also from the demi-lune to the covered way, by 
 which communication may be maintained between the 
 enceinte and outworks. 
 
 Posterns are underground communications made through 
 the body of the place or some of the outworks. 
 
 Sortie-passages are narrow openings made through the 
 crest of the glacis, which usually rise in the form of a 
 ramp from the covered way, by means of which commu- 
 nication may be kept up with the exterior. These pas- 
 sages are so arranged that they cannot be swept by the 
 fire of the enemy. The other communications above 
 ground are called ramps, stairs, &c. 
 
 Traverses are small works erected on the covered way 
 to intercept the fire of the besieger's batteries. 
 
 Scarp and counterscarp galleries are sometimes con- 
 structed for the defence of the ditch. They are arranged 
 with loop-holes, through which the troops of the garrison 
 fire on the besiegers when they have entered the ditch, 
 without being themselves exposed to the batteries of the 
 enemy. 
 
 In sea-coast defences, and sometimes in a land front for 
 the defence of the ditch, embrasures are made in the scarp 
 wall for the fire of artillery ; the whole being protected 
 from shells by a bomb-proof covering over head : this ar- 
 rangement is termed a casemate. 
 
 Sometimes double ramparts and parapets are formed, so 
 that the interior one shall fire over the more advanced ; 
 the latter in this case is called afaussebraie. 
 
PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. 339 
 
 If the inner work be separated from the other it is called 
 a retrenchment* and if in addition it has a commanding 
 fire, it is termed, as was just remarked, a cavalier. 
 
 The capital of a bastion is a line bisecting its salient 
 angle. All the works comprehended between the capitals 
 of two adjacent bastions is termed d, front : it is taken as 
 the unit in permanent fortification. 
 
 Fig. 39 represents the ground plan of a modern bas- 
 tioned front, of a regular and simple form, on a horizontal 
 site. 
 i4, JL, A — Is the enceinte, or body M. — The redoubt of the re-entering 
 
 of the place. places of arms. 
 
 B — The bastions. iV — The ditches of the redoubts. 
 
 C— The main ditch. O— The tenaille. 
 
 J) — The covered ways. P — The double caponnier. 
 
 JS — The re-entering places of arms, a — The traverses. 
 F — The salient places of arms. h — The sortie-passages. 
 
 G — The demi-lune. c — Stairs. 
 
 H — The demi-lune ditch. d — Cut in the demi-lune to fiank 
 
 J — The demi-lune redoubt. the redoubt of the re-entering 
 
 L — The ditch of the demi-lune place of arms. 
 
 redoubt. 
 Fig. 40 represents a section through the line mn^ of the 
 preceding figure. 
 
 A — Is the rampart. F — The glacis. 
 
 B — The parapet G — The covered vp^ay. 
 
 C— The ditch. If— The terre-plein. 
 
 D — The scarp wall. J — The parade. 
 
 F — The counterscarp wall. 
 Sometimes half embrasures are cut in the earthen par- 
 apet of a fort, so as to sink the gun below the crest, and 
 thus more eff"ectually cover the men from the enemy's fire. 
 
 * The term retrenchment implies an interior work, which is con- 
 Btructed within or in rear of another, for the purpose of strengthening 
 it; the term in^renrAmenf, on the contrary, implies an independent 
 work, constructed m the open field, without reference to any other ad- 
 joinmg work. 
 
340 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 But guns m embrasure have a far less extended field of 
 fire than when mounted in barbette ; moreover, the embra* 
 sures present openings through which an enemy may pen- 
 etrate in an assault. Owing to these objections, they are 
 employed only for the protection of particular points ; that 
 is, where it is important to cover the artillerists from the 
 enemy's fire, or where the guns are to be used merely to 
 protect a ditch, or to enfilade a road, &c. The bottom of 
 the embrasure is called the sole, the sides are called 
 cheeks, and the mass of earth between two embrasures, the 
 merlon. Embrasures may be made either direct or oblique, 
 according as the fire is required to be perpendicular or 
 oblique to the parapet. 
 
 A coverport is a small outwork of any convenient form, 
 erected immediately in front of a gateway, to screen it 
 from the enemy's fire. 
 
 A counterguard is a more extensive work, constructed in 
 front of a part of the fortress itself, or of some other outwork 
 of greater importance, which it is intended to cover. These 
 are sometimes called coverfaces, from their situation and 
 object ; but the former term is most commonly used. 
 
 Sometimes outworks, called tenaillons, consisting of one 
 long and one short face, are placed on each side of the 
 demi-lune of a front of fortification, for the purpose of pro- 
 longing the siege. (Fig. 41.) 
 
 Small, or c?cmi-tenaillons, are frequently so arranged as 
 to cover only one-half of the demi-lune, and then a bonnet 
 constructed in front of the salient of the demi-lune. (Fig. 
 42.) In this case the bonnet is flanked by the short faces 
 of the demi-tenaillons ; these short faces are themselves 
 flanked by the demi-lune, while the bastions flank the long 
 faces. 
 
 A hornwork consists of a front of fortification, and two 
 wings resting on the faces of bastions of a front of the 
 
PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. 341 
 
 fortress. It sometimes has also a demi-lune or bomiet, as 
 in the case of demi-tenaillons. (Fig. 43.) 
 
 A crownwork consists of two fronts of fortification, and 
 two wings. (Fig. 44.) It is sometimes made double, and 
 even triple 
 
 These works are also employed as advanced works, 
 and placed entirely in front of the glacis. They have 
 generally been added to a fortress for the purpose of oc- 
 cupying some important piece of ground not included 
 within the limits of the main work. They may be con- 
 structed with covered ways, and sometimes it may be 
 found advantageous to secure them by retrenchments. 
 
 A detached work may be made in any form deemed best 
 suited to the site. Being but remotely connected with the 
 fortress, the latter will exercise but slight influence on the 
 character of its plan or construction. They are usually 
 of limited extent and slight relief, partaking much of the 
 nature of field-works.* 
 
 * The general principles of permanent fortification may be best 
 learned from the writings of Cormontaigne, St. Paul de Noizet, and 
 Laurillard-Fallot. A list of valuable books of reference on the seve- 
 ral branches of military engineering will be given at the close of tha 
 next chapter 
 
342 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 FIELD-ENGINEERING. 
 
 Field-Engineering includes the making of military re- 
 connaissances, temporary fortifications, and military roads ; 
 the planning and construction of military bridges ; the at- 
 tack and defence of military works ; — in fine, all the various 
 duties of engineer troops, either in the operations of a 
 campaign, or in the dispositions on the battle-field. 
 
 Military reconnaissance. — By this term is meant an ex- 
 amination of a portion of the theatre of war, to ascertain 
 its military character and resources. If the examination 
 be made of a large district of country, and for an entire 
 campaign, the reconnaissance is general; if made for col- 
 lecting detailed information respecting a proposed line of 
 march, the passage of a river, the position of an enemy, 
 &c., it is termed special. 
 
 In making a general reconnaissance, great care should 
 be taken to collect accurate information respecting the 
 general topography of the country ; the character of the 
 mountains, forests, and watercourses ; the nature of the 
 roads, canals, and railways ; the quality of the soil, and 
 the amount of provisions and forage it produces ; the pop 
 ulation and character of the cities, towns, and villages , 
 the commercial and manufacturing resources of every part 
 of the country, and the means of transportation to be found 
 in each district. The plan of military operations will be 
 based on the information thus obtained, and any serious 
 error in the reconnaissance may involve the results of the 
 campaign, and even the fate of the war. , 
 
 In a special reconnaissance, not only accurate but mi- 
 
PIELD-ENGINEERING. 343 
 
 nute information will be required : the character of the 
 roads must be given in detail ; the nature of the water- 
 courses, their depth and velocity ; the position and charac- 
 ter of bridges, and fords ; — in fine, a full description of 
 all obstacles to be encountered, and the means that can be 
 made available for overcoming these obstacles. 
 
 A reconnoitring officer may usually derive much valua- 
 ble information from the published maps and descriptions 
 of the country to be examined ; additional matters of de- 
 tail may be obtained from woodsmen, hunters, and fisher- 
 men ; and also from the innkeepers and local authorities 
 of the district. But the officer should always verify this 
 information, so far as practical, by personal examination. 
 In making a reconnaissance in the vicinity of an enemy, 
 he must be supported by a strong escort of mounted troops, 
 and in all his operations the greatest precaution will be re- 
 quisite to ensure success. 
 
 Some simple instrument, such as a pocket sextant, or 
 compass, will be sufficient to enable the reconnoitring offi- 
 cer to measure, with considerable accuracy, the height of 
 mountains, the width of streams, &c., and an ordinary scale 
 and dividers will enable him to make a suitable military 
 sketch. 
 
 Temporary Fortification. — It has been stated in the pre- 
 ceding chapter that temporary fortifications are properly 
 confined to the operations of a single campaign, and are 
 used to strengthen positions which are to be occupied only 
 for a short period ; and that they are usually made of 
 earth, thrown up by the troops in a single day. Tempo- 
 rary fortifications, as a part of field-engineering, may there- 
 fore be regarded rather as an arm than an art. The prin- 
 ciples of their construction are derived, of course, from the 
 theory of permanent fortification, but in applying these prin- 
 ciples to practice in the field, much greater latitude is allowed 
 than in the exact scientific arrangement of permanent works. 
 
344 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 The purpose of field-works (or intrenchments, as they 
 are commonly called) is to arrest, or at least to impede; 
 the march of the attacking foe ; to shelter the defensive 
 troops from the missive v^eapons of the assailants, and to 
 detain them in a position where they will be exposed to 
 the fire of the defensive force. The numerical and posi- 
 tive strength of the assailed may be much less than that 
 of the assailant, and yet an equilibrium exist ; the material 
 obstacles compensating for the difference in numbers. In- 
 trenchments, though inert masses, must therefore be re- 
 garded as most valuable and important accessaries in the 
 defence of a position. 
 
 Intrenchments consist either of lines of works made to 
 cover extended positions, or of detached works designed 
 simply to defend the ground they occupy. The former 
 generally present a front against the enemy in but one di- 
 rection, while the latter are usually closed on all their sides. 
 
 The following figures have been employed for the plan 
 of simple intrenchments, viz. : the polygon, redan, lunette, 
 raitre, star-fort, and bastion. 
 
 Square or polygonal redoubts are the most common forms 
 given to field-works, on account of the ease of their con- 
 struction. But they have many defects. There is a sec- 
 tor without fire in front of each salient, and the ditches are 
 without protection. The latter objection also holds good 
 against all circular works. 
 
 The redan (Fig. 45) is frequently used to cover a point 
 in rear, as a bridge, a ford, or a defile. When used alone, 
 its gorge should be closed by palisades. Its ditches are 
 unprotected. 
 
 The lunette (Fig. 46) has nearly the same defects as 
 the redan. 
 
 The mitre y or priest-cap^ (Fig. 47,) may be employed 
 with advantage when a cross-fire is required on the capi* 
 tal of the work. 
 
FIELD-ENGINEERING. 345 
 
 The star-fort has all the defects, without the merit of 
 simplicity, which belong to the polygonal redoubt. 
 
 The hastion-fort (Fig. 48) more fully satisfies the con- 
 ditions of a good defence than any other plan ; but it is 
 less simple and easy of execution. It is usually composed 
 of four or five fronts, but it may be applied to a polygon of 
 any number of sides. 
 
 For the details of the construction of these several 
 works, we must refer to the special treatises on field-forti- 
 fication. 
 
 Lines of intrenchments may be made either continuous 
 or with intervals. In adopting either plan, the engineer 
 should avail himself of all the natural obstacles presented 
 by the position, so as to diminish the labor of erecting 
 artificial means of defence. 
 
 The simplest arrangement for a continuous intrench- 
 ment is the cremailliire, or indented line. When applied 
 to an irregular site, or used to connect together distant 
 and detached works, the indented line may be regarded 
 as a good disposition. Mitres and redans, connected by 
 straight curtains, are sometimes employed, as also a com 
 bination of large and small redans, forming alternate sa ■ 
 lient and re-entering angles. A continuous line of bas- 
 tions is preferable to any other arrangement, when there 
 is plenty of time for their construction. 
 
 Lines with intervals are frequently formed of alternate 
 lunettes and square redoubts. Other detached works may 
 be employed in the same way. This manner of intrench- 
 ing a position has several advantages, with disciplined 
 troops. The first shock of the assailant is sustained by 
 the detached works, and when he attempts to penetrate in 
 the intervals, his flanks become exposed to a deadly cross 
 fire. These intervals also allow the assailed to act on the 
 offensive, by charging the enemy at the opportune moment. 
 But with raw and militia forces it will be safer to resoi* 
 
346 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 to continuous lines. If cavalry form any part of the de« 
 fensive force, it will be absolutely necessary to leave in- 
 tervals through which these troops may charge. 
 
 A vertical section of all intrenchments is of the same 
 general form ; the dimensions will, of course, vary with 
 the nature of the soil, and the time and means employed in 
 their construction. The minimum dimensions that can be 
 used with any considerable advantage are given in Fig. 49. 
 
 In laying out field-works advantage should be taken of 
 all available artificial obstacles, such as hedges, walls, 
 houses, outbuildings, &c. A thickset hedge may be ren- 
 dered defensible by throwing up against it a slight parapet 
 of earth. Stone fences may be employed in the same way. 
 Walls of masonry may be pierced with loopholes and ar- 
 ranged for one or two tiers of fire. The walls of houses 
 are pierced in the same manner, and a projecting wooden 
 structure, termed a machicoulis gallery, is sometimes made 
 from the floor of the second story, to enable the assailed 
 to fire down upon their opponents. This arrangement is 
 frequently employed to advantage in wooden blockhouses 
 against a savage foe ; but it is of little avail when exposed 
 to the fire of artillfery. Some have proposed galleries of 
 this description in permanent works of masonry, but the 
 project is too obviously absurd to merit discussion. 
 
 In addition to the parapet of an intrenchment, a good 
 engineer will always find time and means for constructing 
 other artificial obstacles, such as trous-de-loup, abattis, 
 palisades, stockades, fraises, chevaux-de-frise, crows'-feet, 
 mines. &c. 
 
 Trous-de-loup are pits dug in the earth in the form of 
 an inverted truncated cone, some six feet in diameter, and 
 about the same number of feet in depth. They are usu- 
 ally placed a few yards in front of the ditch, and concealed 
 by some slight covering. 
 
 Abattis are tops and large limbs of trees arranged along 
 
FIELD-ENGINEERING. 347 
 
 the glacis of a work ; the ends of the branches are lopped 
 off and sharpened. 
 
 Palisades are stakes some eight or ten feet long, with 
 one end fastened in the ground and the other made sharp. 
 They are placed in juxtaposition and connected together 
 by horizontal riband-pieces. This arrangement is fre- 
 quently placed at the foot of the counterscarp. When the 
 timbers are large and the work is intended as a part of a 
 primary defence, it is called a stockade ; when the stakes 
 are placed at the foot of the scarp, either horizontally or 
 tnclined, they receive the name of /raises. 
 
 A cheval-de-frise consists of a horizontal piece of timber 
 armed with wooden or iron lances, which project some 
 eight or ten feet. It is • much employed against cavalry, 
 and on rocky soils serves as a substitute for palisades. 
 
 Crows'-feet are small wooden or iron forms filled with 
 sharp spikes. They are thrown, with their points up- 
 ward, on ground which is to be passed over by cavalry. 
 
 Mines are sometimes used in connection with intrench- 
 ments, but more commonly in the attack and defence of 
 permanent works. They will be noticed further on. 
 
 Field-works which are to be occupied for a consider- 
 able length of time will usually have their steeper slopes 
 revetted, and be arranged with scarp and counterscarp, 
 galleries, traverses, blindages, &c. Such works hold an 
 intermediary rank between temporary and permanent for- 
 tification. 
 
 As examples of the importance of field fortifications 
 and of the manner of organizing them, the reader is re- 
 ferred to the celebrated battle of Fontenoy, in 1745, where 
 the carefully-arranged intrenchments of Marshal Saxe en- 
 abled the French to repel, with immense destruction, the 
 attacks of greatly superior numbers ; to the battle of Fleti- 
 rus, in 1690, where the Prince of Waldeck exposed him- 
 self to a most disastrous defeat " by neglecting the re- 
 
348 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 sources of fortification and other indispensable precau 
 tions ;" to tlie battle of Malplaquet, in 1709, where 
 Marshal Villars, by neglecting to occupy and intrench the 
 farm that closed the passage between the woods of Sara 
 and Laniere, exposed himself to a disastrous defeat ; to 
 the operations of 1792, where General Custine, by 
 neglecting to intrench the heights that covered Bingen, 
 as the engineers had recommended, exposed himself to 
 those terrible disasters which forced him to a precipi- 
 tate retreat ; to the works of Wervike, which, by a vig- 
 orous resistance on the 10th of September, 1793, saved 
 the Dutch army from total destruction ; to the intrenched 
 camp of Ulra, in 1800, which for six weeks held in check 
 the victorious army of Moreau ; to the intrenched lines of 
 Torres Vedras, in 1810, which saved from destruction the 
 English army of Wellington ; to the field-defences of 
 Hougomont, which contributed so much to the victory of 
 Waterloo, &c. 
 
 Military communications. — The movements of armies 
 are always much embarrassed by forests, marshes, and 
 water-courses, and nothing contributes more to the dis- 
 patch of military operations than the means of opening 
 practical and easy communication through these various 
 obstacles. 
 
 It is not necessai;y here to enter into any detailed dis- 
 cussion of the manner of constructing military communi- 
 cations through forests or marshes. In a new country 
 like ours, where almost every one has had some experi- 
 ence in road-making, no very great technical knowledge 
 is required for the construction of temporary works of 
 this character; butmuch professional skill and experience 
 will be requisite for the engineers who make the prelimi- 
 nary reconnaissances, and fix the location of these roads. 
 
 Water-courses may be crossed by means of fords, on 
 the ice, or by ferries and bridges. When temporary 
 
FIELD-ENGINEERING. 349 
 
 bridges or ferries are constructed by the aimy in the field, 
 they are classed under the general head of military bridges^ 
 or more properly, pontoniering. 
 
 Where the depth of the stream is not great, the current 
 slight, and the bottom smooth and hard, the passage may 
 be effected hj fording. If the bottom be of mud, or large 
 stones, the passage will be difficult and dangerous, even 
 where the depth and current are favorable. Under favor- 
 able circumstances infantry can ford a stream where the 
 depth is not greater than four feet ; cavalry to a depth of 
 four or five feet ; but artillery, and engineer trains, cannot 
 go to a depth of more than two and a half feet, without 
 greatly exposing their ammunition and military stores 
 The fords should be accurately staked out before the pas- 
 sage is attempted, and ropes ought to be stretched across' 
 the stream, or cavalry and small boats stationed below, to 
 prevent the loss of life. 
 
 Ice may be crossed by infantry, in small detachments. 
 Its strength may be increased by covering it with boards, 
 or straw, so as to distribute the weight over a greater sur- 
 face. By sprinkling water over the straw, and allowing 
 it to freeze, the mass may be made still more compact. 
 But large bodies of cavalry, and heavy artillery, cannot 
 venture on the ice unless it be of great thickness and 
 strength. An army can never trust, for any length of 
 time, to either fords or ice ; if it did a freshet or a thaw 
 would place it in a most critical state. Military bridges 
 will, therefore, become its only safe reliance for keeping 
 open its communications. 
 
 Military bridges are made with trestles, rafts, boats, and 
 other floating bodies. Rop§ bridges are also sometimes 
 resorted to by troops for passing rivers. 
 
 Trestle bridges are principally used for crossing small 
 streams not more than seven or eight feet in depth : they 
 also serve to connect floating bridges with the shore, in 
 
350 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 shallow water. The form of the trestle is much the same 
 as that of an ordinary carpenter's horse ^ i. e., a horizontal 
 beam supported by four inclined legs. These trestles are 
 placed in the stream, from twelve to twenty feet apart, and 
 connected by string-pieces, (or halks as they are termed 
 in technical language,) which are covered over with 
 plank. The action of the current against the bridge may 
 be counteracted by anchors and cables, or by means of 
 boxes or baskets attached to the legs of the trestles, and 
 filled with stones. A more substantial form may be given 
 to the bridge by substituting for the trestles, piles, or the 
 ordinary framed supports so much used in the newer 
 parts of our country. 
 
 For examples of the use of bridges of this description 
 we would refer to Caesar's celebrated bridge across the 
 Rhine ; the passage of the Scheldt in 1588 by the Span- 
 iards ; the passage of the Lech in 1631 by Gustavus 
 Adolphus ; the passage of the Danube in 1740 by Mar- 
 shal Saxe ; the gTeat bridge across the Var during Na- 
 poleon's Italian campaigns ; the passage of the Lech in 
 1800 by Lecourbe ; the bridges across the Piava, the 
 Isonso, (fee, in the subsequent operations of the army in 
 Italy ; the celebrated passage of the Danube at the island 
 of Lobau in 1809; the passage of the Agueda in 1811 
 by the English; the passages of the Dwina, the Mos- 
 cowa, the Dneiper, the Beresina, &;c., in the campaign 
 of 1812; the repairing of the bridge near Dresden,, and 
 the passage of the Elbe in 1813, &;c. 
 
 Rafts formed of timbers, casks, barrels, &c., are fre- 
 quently used as military bridges. They may be made to 
 bear almost any weight, and will answer for the passage 
 of rivers of any depth and width, provided the current be 
 not rapid. 
 
 Where the bridge is to be supported by rafts made of 
 solid timbers, these timbers should be first placed in the 
 
FIELD-ENGINEERING. 351 
 
 ■water, to ascertain their natural position of stability, and 
 then the larger ends cut away on the under side, so as to 
 present the least possible resistance to the action of the 
 current. They are afterwards lashed together by strong 
 rope or withe lashing, or fastened by cross-pieces let into 
 the timbers, and held firm by bolts, or wooden pins. 
 These rafts are kept in place by anchors and cables pla- 
 ced up and down stream. The roadway is formed in 
 nearly the same manner as for a bridge supported on 
 trestles. Empty casks, and other floating bodies, may be 
 substituted in place of logs in the construction of rafts. 
 
 For examples of the use of rafts in the construction of 
 military bridges, we would refer to the passage of the 
 Seine in 1465 by Count Charolais ; the passage of the 
 Mouse in 1579 by Alexander Famese ; the passage of 
 the Vistula in 1704, the Borysthenese in 1709, and the 
 Sound in J 71 8, by Charles XII. ; the passage of the 
 Adige in 1796 ; the passage of the Po in 1807; and the 
 subsequent military operations in the Spanish Peninsula. 
 
 Military bridges are frequently made of boats, and the 
 ordinary river-craft found in the vicinity of the intended 
 passage. Flat-bottomed boats are the most suitable for 
 this purpose, but if these cannot be obtained, keel boats 
 will serve as a substitute. When these water-craft are of 
 very unequal sizes, (as is frequently the case,) two smaller 
 ones may be lashed together to form a single support ; 
 they can be brought to the same level by means of stone 
 ballast. The gunwales must be suitably arranged for sup- 
 porting the balks, or else frameworks should be erected 
 for this purpose from the centre of the boat. The ar- 
 rangemenf of the roadway, anchors, &c., is the same as 
 before. 
 
 A bridge-equipage made to follow an army in its move- 
 ments in the field, is generally composed of light skiffs or 
 batteaux, and the necessary timbers, planks, anchors, <&;c., 
 
352 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 for forming the roadway, and keeping the bridge in Its pa« 
 sition. All these articles are constructed especially for 
 this purpose. All the wood-work should be of tough and 
 well-seasoned timber, so as to impose no unnecessary 
 weight on the wagon trains. The bateaux should also be 
 made of strong and light materials. For convenience in 
 transportation, these boats are sometimes made with hinges 
 so as to fold up. The ribs are usually of oak, and the 
 sides and bottom of pine. Instead of plank, a covering of 
 tin, copper, India-rubber, (fee, has sometimes been substi- 
 tuted. Floating supports of this character are often made 
 in compartments, so as to prevent their sinking whfen in- 
 jured by the enemy's projectiles. Indian-rubber pontons 
 may be folded up into a small space, and their slight weight 
 renders them convenient for transportation. 
 
 On navigable streams a part of the bridge resting on 
 one or two bateaux should be so arranged that it can be 
 shipped out of its place, forming a draw for the passage of 
 river-craft. Indeed, it would be well, even where the 
 river is not navigable, to form a draw for the passage of 
 trees, and other floating bodies, sent down by the enemy 
 against the bridge. 
 
 An ordinary bridge-equipage of bateaux, or light pontons, 
 for crossing a river of from three to four hundred yards in 
 width, and of moderate current, will require a train of from 
 sixty to eighty wagons.* Under favorable circumstances, 
 and with a well-instructed corps of pontoniers, the bridge 
 may be thrown across the river, and prepared for the pas- 
 sage of an army in a few hours at most.f After the troops 
 
 * The number of wagons in a ponton train will be greatly diminished 
 if it be found that Indian-rubber boats may be used as supports for the 
 bridge. The engineer department of our army are making experi- 
 ments to determine this point. 
 
 t In 1746, three bridges of bateaux were thrown across the Po, near 
 Placentia, each fifteen hundred feet in length, and entirely comple- 
 
FIELD-ENGINEERING. 353 
 
 have passed over, the bridge may be taken up, and re- 
 placed on the wagons in from a quarter to half an hour 
 
 The following examples will serve to illustrate the use 
 of different kinds of boat-bridges in military operations : — 
 the passage of the Rhine, in 1702, by Villars ; the pas- 
 sage of the Dnieper and the Bog, in 1739, by the Rus- 
 sians ; the passage of the Danube, in 1740, by Marshal 
 Saxe ; the passage of the Rhine, near Cologne, in 1758, 
 by the Prince of Clermont ; the passage of the Rhine, in 
 
 1795, by Jourdan ; the passage of the Rhine, at Kehl, in 
 
 1796, by Moreau ; and again the same year, at Weissen- 
 thum, and at Neuwied, by Jourdan ; the bridges across 
 the Rhine, at the sieges of Kehl and Huninguen, in 
 1797 ; the passage of the Limmat, in 1799, by Massena ; 
 the passages of the Mincio, the Adige, the Brenta, the Pi- 
 ava, <fcc., in 1800 ; the passages of these rivers again in 
 1805; the passages of the Narew, in 1807, by the Rus- 
 sians ; the several passages of the Danube, in 1809, by 
 the French and Austrian armies ; the passages of the Ta- 
 gus and Douro, in 1810, by the English ; the passages of 
 the Niemen, the Dwina, the Moskwa, and the Beresina, 
 in 1812, by the French; and of the great rivers of Ger- 
 many and France, in 1813 and 1814. 
 
 A floating body, propelled from one bank to the other by 
 the current of the stream, is termed ^ifying-bridge. The 
 usual mode of establishing a ferry of this kind, is to at- 
 
 ted in eight hours. In 1757, two bridges of bateaux were thrown 
 across the Rhine, at Wesel, in half an hour ; again, in the same 
 year, a third bridge was thrown across this river near Dusseldorf, in 
 six hours. In 1841, Col. Birago, of the Austrian army, arrived on the 
 bank of the Weisgerben arm of the Danube, with his bridge-equipage, 
 at a round trot, and immediately began the construction of his bridge, 
 without any previous preparation or examination. In less than three- 
 quarters of an hour the bridge was completed, and three loaded four- 
 horse wagons passed over on a trot, followed by a column of infantry. 
 
354 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 tach the head of the boat by means of a cable and anchor 
 to some point near the middle of the stream. By steering 
 obliquely to the current, the boat may be made to cross 
 and recross at the same point. A single passage may be 
 made in the same way, by the action of the current with- 
 out the cable and anchor, but the boat in this case will be 
 carried some distance down the stream. Rowboats are 
 employed for crossing over infantry by successive debar- 
 kations ; but this process is too slow for the passage of a 
 large force ; it may very well be resorted to as auxiliary 
 to other means. 
 
 Steam craft are so common at the present day on all 
 navigable streams, that an army in the field will frequent- 
 ly be able to avail itself of this means of passing the 
 larger rivers. But, in a hostile country, or in one already 
 passed over by the enemy, it will not be safe to rely with 
 confidence upon obtaining craft of this character. A well- 
 organized army will always carry in its train the means of 
 effecting a certain and speedy passage of all water-courses 
 that may intercept its line of march. 
 
 Flying-bridges or rowboats were employed in the pas- 
 sage of the Dwina, in 1701, by the Swedes ; the passage 
 of the Po, in 1701, by Prince Eugene ; the passage of the 
 Rhine, at Huninguen, in 1704 ; Jourdan's passage of the 
 Rhine in 1795 ; Moreau's passage in 1796 ; the sieges of 
 Kehl and Huninguen in 1797 ; Massena's passage of the 
 Limmat, and Soult's passage of the Linth, in 1799; the 
 passage of the Rhine, at Lucisteig, in 1800 ; the passage 
 of the Po, by the French, just before the battle of Maren- 
 go ; and others in Italy, Germany, and Spain, in the sub- 
 sequent campaigns of Napoleon. 
 
 Military bridges have sometimes been formed of ropes, 
 cables stretched across the stream, and firmly attached at 
 each end to trees, or posts let into the earth. If the shore 
 is of rock, rings with staples let into the stone form the 
 
FIELD-ENGINEERING. 355 
 
 best means for securing the ends of the main ropes. Plank 
 are laid on these cables to form the road-way. The ropes 
 forming the " side-rail" of the bridge are passed over tres- 
 tles at each shore, and then fastened as before. Short 
 vertical ropes attach the main supports to these side ropes, 
 in order that they may sustain a part of the weight passing 
 over the bridge. Constructions of this character are fully 
 described in Douglas's Essay on Military Bridges. For 
 example, see the passage of the Po, near Casal, in 1515, 
 by the Swiss ; the bridge thrown over the Clain by Admi- 
 ral Coligni, at the siege of Poitiefs, in 1569 ; the opera- 
 tions of the Prince of Orange against Ghent and Bruges, 
 in 1631 ; the passage of the Tagus, at Alcantara, in 1810, 
 by the English ; the bridge constructed across the Zezere, 
 by the French, in 1810 ; the bridge thrown across the 
 Scarpe, near Douai, in 1820; the experiments made at 
 F6re in 1823, &c. 
 
 The passage of a river in the presence of an enemy, 
 whether acting offensively or in retreat, is an operation of 
 great delicacy and danger. In either case the army is 
 called upon to show the coolest and most determined 
 courage, for its success will depend on its maintaining the 
 strictest discipline and ^ood order. 
 
 In the case of a retreat the bridge should be covered by 
 field intrenchments, called a t^te depont, and defended by 
 a strong guard. If the river be of moderate width, the 
 enemy may be kept at a distance by heavy battpries on 
 the opposite shore. As soon as the passage is effected 
 by the main body, the bridge, if permanent, will be blown 
 up, or otherwise destroyed by the miners, and if floating, 
 will be swung round to the other shore. The rear-guard 
 will pass over in rowboats, or the end pontons detached 
 for that purpose. An army retreating in the face of an 
 enemy should never rely upon one single bridge, no mat- 
 ter what may be its character ; for the slightest accident 
 
356 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 happening to it might expose the whole army to inevit* 
 ble destruction. 
 
 The passage of a river by main force, against an enter- 
 prising and active enemy on the opposite shore, is always 
 an operation of the greatest difficulty, and not unfrequent- 
 ly accompanied with the most bloody results. 
 
 The most effectual method of accomplishing this ob- 
 ject is by stratagem. Demonstrations are made at seve- 
 ral points at the same time : bodies of troops are thrown 
 across, after nightfall, in rowboats or by flying-bridges, to 
 get possession of the t)pposite bank. The vanguard of 
 light cavalry may cross by swimming. The pontoniers 
 should have their bridge equipage in readiness near the 
 intended point of passage, so that it can be thrown across 
 with the greatest possible rapidity, while the advanced 
 guards are still able to keep the enemy at a distance. 
 Under favorable circumstances the pontoniers will have the 
 bridge in readiness for the passage of the army before the 
 enemy can collect his troops upon the threatened point. 
 
 Cannon-balls and hollow shot are the most effectual 
 means for destroying an enemy's bridge when our batteries 
 can be planted within reach. When this cannot be done, 
 we must resort to fire-boats, floating rafts, &c., to accom- 
 plish our object. Operations of this kind carried on in 
 the night, are most likely to succeed. 
 
 To protect bridges from the action of these floating 
 bodies, stockades, or floating chevaux-de-frise are con- 
 structed across the stream at some distance above the 
 bridge ; strong cables, or chains stretched directly across 
 the river, or with an angle up stream, may be used in 
 place of stockades, or in conjunction with them. Guards 
 should be stationed above the bridge, with boats, ropes, 
 grapnels, &c., for the purpose of arresting all floating 
 bodies and drawing them ashore, or directing them safely 
 through the draw in the bridge arrangement. 
 
FIELD-ENGINEERING. 357 
 
 The troops especially charged with the construction 
 and management of the various kinds of military bridges, 
 are denominated pontoniers. The duties of these troops 
 are arduous and important, and, in a country like ours, 
 intersected by numerous water-courses, the success of a 
 campaign will often depend upon their skill and efficiency. 
 
 Sapping. — This is a general term applied to the opera- 
 tions of forming trenches, along which troops may ap- 
 proach a work without being exposed to the fire of the 
 besieged. 
 
 In addition to the ordinary sapping-tools, such as shov- 
 els, picks, gabion-forks, &c., used in constructing trenches, 
 there will also be require^ a considerable amount of sap- 
 ping materials, such as gabions, fascines, sap-fagots, sand- 
 bags, &c. 
 
 The gabion is a cylindrical basket of twigs, about two 
 feet in diameter, and some three feet in length, and with- 
 out a bottom. It is made by driving into the ground, in a 
 circular form, a number of small pickets about an inch in 
 diameter, and of the length required for the gabion. 
 Twigs are wattled between the pickets like ordinary bas- 
 ket-work, and fastened at the ends by withs or packthread. 
 Gabions are used in forming saps, batteries, blindages, 
 powder-magazines, and in revetting the steep slopes of 
 field-works. 
 
 The fascine is a bundle of twigs closely bound up, from 
 nine to twelve inches in diameter, and from ten to fifteen 
 or twenty feet in length. The largest are sometimes called 
 saucissons. In making a fascine, straight twigs about the 
 thickness of a man's finger are laid side by side, and 
 firmly compressed together by a strong rope or chain at- 
 tached to the extremities of two levers. While held in 
 this position the twigs are firmly bound together by withs 
 or cords. Fascines are used in constructing trenches, bat- 
 teries, &c., and for filling up wet ditches. 
 
358 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 The sap-fagot is a strong fascine about ten inches m 
 diameter and two feet in length, with a picket inserted 
 through the middle. It is used in the double sap in con- 
 nection with gabions. 
 
 Sand-hags are usually made of coarse canvass. When 
 filled with earth they are some six or eight inches in dia- 
 meter, and from eighteen inches to two feet in length. 
 From their perishable nature, they are used only when 
 other materials cannot be procured, and where it is im- 
 portant to place the troops speedily under cover from the 
 enemy's fire. 
 
 Bales of wool, cotton, hay, straw, &c., may be employed 
 in sapping for the same purposes as the above materials, 
 when they can be procured in sufficient quantity. Pork 
 and flour barrels, which are usually in abundance in a 
 camp, are frequently filled with sand and used for forming 
 magazines, blindages, &c., in field-works. 
 
 A trench constructed in ordinary soil beyond the range 
 of the enemy's grape, is called a simple sap, or ordinary 
 trench. The earth is thrown up on the side towards the 
 place besieged, so as to form a kind of parapet to cover 
 the men in the trench. The labor is here executed under 
 the supervision of engineer soldiers, by working parties 
 detached from the other arms. Fig. 50 represents a ver- 
 tical section of a simple sap. 
 
 When within range of the enemy's grape, the flying sap 
 is resorted to in order to place the workmen speedily under 
 cover. In this operation, gabions are placed in juxtapo- 
 sition on the side towards the besieged work, and filled 
 with all possible speed by the workmen. Three rows of 
 fascines are usually placed on the top of the gabions to in- 
 crease the height. The most difficult part of the flying 
 ■sap is executed by engineer troops, and the trench is com- 
 pleted by the ordinary working parties. Fig. 51 repre- 
 sents a section of this sap. 
 
FIELD-ENOINEERING. 359 
 
 The full-sap is employed when the works of the be- 
 siegers are within range of musketry, or when the grape 
 fire of the besieged is so deadly that the flying sap can 
 no longer be used. This is a difficult operation, and un- 
 less executed with great care and by well-instructed engi- 
 neer troops, the construction of the trench will be attend- 
 ed with an immense loss of life. The work must be ex- 
 ecuted under cover of a sap-roller, which is a cylindrical 
 mass of fascines, wool, or cotton, some two feet in diame- 
 ter. On very smooth ground a ball-proof shelter on wheels 
 might be used as a substitute. The sap-roller being 
 placed along the line of the trench so as to cover the sap- 
 per in front, who is armed with a musket-proof head- 
 piece and cuirass, this sapper commences the sap by 
 placing a gabion on the line of the proposed trench and 
 fills it with earth, working on his hands and knees. Hay- 
 ing filled the first gabion, he pushes forward the sap-roller 
 and places a second one next the first, stopping the open 
 joint between the two with a stop-fagot. The second 
 gabion being filled in the same manner as the first, others 
 are successively established. When the first sapper has 
 advanced a few feet, he is followed by a second, also in 
 defensive armor, who increases the excavation and em- 
 bankment ; this sapper is then followed in the same way 
 by a third and a fourth, after which the trench will be suf- 
 ficiently advanced to be turned over to the ordinary work- 
 men. The sap-fagots may be removed when the em- 
 bankment becomes thick enough to resist grape. Fig. 52 
 represents a plan and section of a full-sap. 
 
 When the direction of the trench is such that the men 
 are exposed on both sides, it will be necessary to throw 
 up an embankment both to the right and left. This oper- 
 ation is called the double sap, and is executed by two 
 parties of sappers, working side by side. In this sap it 
 will be necessary to frequently change the direction of 
 
360 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 the trench, or to throw up traverses, in order to cover the 
 men at a distance from the sap-roller. Wing-traverses, 
 on the side of the trench which is least exposed, some 
 times serve the same purpose as a double sap. 
 
 Mines. — By mining, as a military term, we understand 
 the operations resorted to for the demolition, with pow 
 der, of a military structure of any description. The term 
 mine is applied both to the excavation charged with pow- 
 der for the purpose of producing an explosion, and to the 
 communications which lead to this excavation. 
 
 The place in which the charge of powder is lodged is 
 called the chamber, the communication by which this 
 place is reached the gallery, and the excavation made by 
 the explosion is termed the crater. 
 
 The form of the crater caused by an explosion in or- 
 dinary soils is assumed to be a truncated cone, the diam- 
 eter, c d, (Fig. 53,) of the lower circle being one-half the 
 diameter, a b, of the upper circle. This form has never 
 been ascertained to be exactly /correct, but the theoretical 
 results deduced from a mathematical discussion of this 
 figure have been fully verified in practice. The radius, 
 p b, of the upper circle is termed the crater radius ; the 
 line p, drawn from the centre of the charge perpendicular 
 to the surface where the explosion takes place, is termed 
 the line of least resistance ; the line o b, drawn from the 
 centre of the powder to any point in the circumference of 
 the upper circle, is termed the radius of explosion. 
 
 When the crater radius is equal to the line of least re- 
 sistance, the mine is termed common ; when this radius is 
 greater than the line of least resistance, the mine is 
 termed overcharged; and when the radius is less, under- 
 charged. A mine of small dimensions, formed by sinking 
 a shaft in the ground, is termed a fougasse. The term 
 camouflet is applied to a mine used to suffocate the ene- 
 my's miner, without producing an explosion. Small mines 
 
FIELD-ENGINEERING. 361 
 
 made in rock or masonry, merely for the purpose of ex- 
 cavation, without any considerable external explosion, are 
 called blasts. 
 
 From experiments made on common mines, whose line 
 of least resistance did not exceed fifteen feet, it has been 
 ascertained that the tenacity of the earth is completely 
 destroyed around the crater to a distance equal to the 
 crater radius, and that empty galleries would be broken 
 in at once and a half that distance. It has also been 
 proved by experiment, that the crater radius in over- 
 charged mines may be increased to six times the line 
 of least resistance, but not much beyond this ; that within 
 this limit the diameter of the crater increases nearly in 
 the ratio of the square roots of the charge ; and that 
 empty galleries may be destroyed by overcharged mines 
 at the distance of four times the line of least resistance. 
 
 By means of the deductions of physico-mathematical 
 theory, and the results of experiments, rules have been 
 determined by which the miner can calculate, with much 
 accuracy, the charge necessary to produce a required 
 result in any given soil. 
 
 In the earlier stages of the history of this art, mines 
 were only used to open breaches and demolish masses of 
 masonry ; but in later times they have been employed as 
 important elements in the attack and defence of places. 
 
 An isolated wall, only two or three feet thick, may 
 readily be demolished by exploding one or two casks of 
 powder placed in contact with its base. If the wall be 
 five or six feet thick, the charges should be placed under 
 the foundation. For walls of still greater thickness it 
 will be best to open a gallery to the centre of the wall, a 
 foot or two above its base, and place the powder in cham- 
 bers thus excavated. Revetment walls may be over- 
 turned by placing the charges at the back of the wall, 
 about one-third or one-quarter of the way up from the 
 
 31 
 
362 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 base. If placed too near the base, a breach will be made 
 in the wall without overturning it. 
 
 To demolish a bridge of masonry the powder should be 
 lodged in chambers excavated in the centre of the piers. 
 When there is not time for excavating these chambers in 
 the piers, a trench may be cut over the key of the arch, 
 in which the powder is placed and exploded; or, the 
 casks of powder may be suspended immediately under 
 the arch, with the same results. Where a saving of pow- 
 der is of consequence, small chambers may be excavated 
 in the haunches of the arch, and the mine carefully 
 tamped before firing it. 
 
 Bridges of wood may be destroyed by suspending casks 
 of powder under the principal timbers, or attaching them 
 to the supports. 
 
 Palisading, gates, doors, &c., may be destroyed in the 
 same way, by suspending casks or bags of powder against 
 their sides ; or still more effectually, by burying the 
 charges just beneath their base. 
 
 To demolish a tower, magazine, or house, of masonry, 
 place charges of powder under the piers and principal 
 walls of the building. In wooden structures the powder 
 should be placed under, or attached to the principal sup- 
 ports. Where time is wanting to effect these arrange- 
 ments, a building may be blown down by placing a large 
 mass of powder in the interior. The powder may be 
 economized, in this case, by putting it in a strong case, 
 which should be connected with the walls of the building 
 on all sides by wooden props. * 
 
 Special treatises on military mining contain full in- 
 structions for regulating the size and position of the 
 charge for the various cases that may be met with in 
 the practical operations of field-engineering. 
 
 As applied to the attack and defence of a fortified place, 
 mines are divided into two general classes — offensive and 
 
FIELD-ENGINEERING. 363 
 
 defensive mines. The former are employed by the besie- 
 gers to overthrow the scarps and counterscarps of the 
 place, to demolish barriers, palisades, walls, and other 
 temporary means of defence, and to destroy the mines of 
 the besieged. The latter are employed by the opposite 
 party to blow up the besiegers' works of attack, and to de- 
 fend the passage of ditches against an assault. Small 
 mines called fougasses may be employed for the last 
 named object. The shell-fougasse is composed of a wooden 
 box filled with one or more tiers of shells, and buried just 
 below the surface of the earth. Sometimes a quantity of 
 powder is placed under the shells, so as to project them 
 into the air previous to their explosion. The stone fou- 
 gasse is formed by making a funnel-shaped excavation, 
 some five or six feet deep, and placing at the bottom a 
 charge of powder enclosed in a box, and covered with a 
 strong wooden shield; several cubic yards of pebbles, 
 broken stone, or brickbats, are placed against the shield, 
 and earth well rammed round, to prevent the explosion from 
 taking place in the wrong direction. These mines are 
 fired by means of powder hose, or by wires connected 
 with a galvanic battery. 
 
 The defensive mines employed to blow up the besie- 
 gers' works, are generally common mines with the lines of 
 least resistance seldom greater than fifteen feet. All the 
 main galleries and principal branches of mines for a per- 
 manent fortification are constructed at the same time with 
 the other portions of the work, leaving only the secondary 
 branches, chambers, &;c.,'to be made during the siege. 
 For the general arrangement of these galleries, and the 
 precautions necessary for their protection from the opera- 
 tions of the besiegers, reference must be made to trea- 
 tises specially devoted to the discussion of this subject. 
 
 ^Mines can seldom be employed with advantage in works 
 of slight relief, and liable to an assault. But if judiciously 
 
364 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 arranged in the plan of their construction, and well man- 
 aged during the operations of the siege, they contribute 
 very materially to the length of the defence. 
 
 Attack and defence. — This subject admits of two natural 
 divisions : 1st, of intrenchments, and 2d, of permanent 
 works. 
 
 I. Intrenchments maybe attacked either by surprise, or 
 by open force. In either case the operations should be 
 based on exact information of the strength of the works 
 and the number and character of the garrison — information 
 that can be obtained from spies, deserters, and prisoners, 
 and confirmed by examinations or reconnaissances made 
 by officers of engineers. By these means a pretty accu- 
 rate knowledge may be obtained of the natural features of 
 the ground exterior to the works ; their weak and strong 
 points ; and their interior arrangements for defence. ' 
 
 In an attack by surprise, the troops should consist of a 
 storming party and a reserve of picked men. The at- 
 tacking column is preceded by a company of sappers 
 armed with axes, shovels, picks, crowbars, &c. ; bags of 
 powder are also used for blowing down gates, palisades, 
 &c. All the operations must be carried on with the ut- 
 most dispatch. The time most favorable for a surprise is 
 an hour or two before day, as at this moment the sentinels 
 are generally less vigilant, and the garrison in a profoimd 
 sleep ; moreover, the subsequent operations, after the first 
 surprise, will be facilitated by the approach of day. Un- 
 der certain circumstances, it may be advisable to make 
 false attacks at the same time with the true one, in order 
 to distract the attention of the garrison from the true point 
 of danger. But false attacks have, in general, the objec- 
 tion of dividing the forces of the assailants as well as of 
 the assailed. In all attacks by surprise, secrecy is the 
 soul of the enterprise. 
 
 In an open assault, if artillery be employed,* the troops 
 
FIELD-ENGINEERING. 365 
 
 should be drawn up in a sheltered position, until the fire 
 of the works is silenced, and breaches effected in the par- 
 apet. But if the bayonet alone be resorted to, the troops 
 are immediately brought forward at the beginning of the 
 assault. The attack is begun by a storming party of picked 
 men : they are preceded, as before, by a body of sappers, 
 provided with necessary means for removing obstacles, 
 and followed by a second detachment of engineers, who 
 will widen the passages, and render them more accessi- 
 ble to the main body of troops who now advance to the 
 assistance of the storming party. If the assailants should 
 be arrested at the counterscarp by obstacles which must 
 be removed before any farther progress can be made, the 
 infantry troops of the detachment display and open a fire 
 upon the assailed, in order to divert their fire from the 
 sappers. A few pieces of light artillery, on the flanks of 
 the column, may sometimes be employed for this purpose 
 with great advantage. 
 
 The storming party should always be provided with sca- 
 ling-ladders, planks, fascines, &c., for crossing the ditch, 
 and mounting the scarp. If the counterscarp be revetted 
 with masonry, the troops must either descend by ladders, 
 or fill up the ditch with fascines, bales of straw, bundles of 
 wool, &c. : if not revetted, a passage for the troops into 
 the ditch will soon be formed by the shovels of the sap- 
 pers. When the ditch is gained, shelter is sought in a 
 dead angle till the means are prepared for mounting the 
 scarp, and storming the work. If the scarp be of earth 
 only, the sappers will soon prepare a passage for the es- 
 calade ; but if revetted with masonry, the walls must be 
 breached with hollow shot, or scaled by means of ladders. 
 
 In the defence, the strictest vigilance should be at all 
 times exerted to guard against a surprise : sentinels are 
 posted on uU the most commanding points of the work ; 
 all the avenues of approach are most thoroughly guarded ; 
 
366 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 and patroles are constantly scouring the ground in all di- 
 rections. At night all these precautions are redoubled. 
 Light and fire-balls are thrown out in front of the work to 
 light up the ground, and discover the movements and ap- 
 proach of the enemy. Each man should have his particu- 
 lar post assigned to him, and be thoroughly instructed in 
 the duties he will have to perform. All auxiliary arrange- 
 ments, such as palisades, abattis, &;c., should be defended 
 with the utmost obstinacy ; the longer the enemy is held 
 in check by these obstacles, the longer will he be exposed 
 to the grape and musketry of the main work. When he 
 assaults the parapet, he will be opposed by the bayonet in 
 front and a well-aimed fire in flank. While in the ditch, 
 or as he mounts the scarp, hollow projectiles, incendiary 
 preparations, stones, logs, &c., will be rolled down upon 
 his head. But when the assaulting column has gained 
 the top of the scarp, the bayonet forms the most eflfective 
 means of resistance. 
 
 The measures resorted to in the attack and defence of 
 the larger class of field-works, will necessarily partake 
 much of the nature of the operations employed in the at- 
 tack and defence of permanent fortifications. 
 
 II. The attack and defence of a fortress may be car- 
 ried on either by a regular siege, or by irregular opera- 
 tions and an assault. The latter plan has sometimes been 
 adopted when the works of the place were weak and im- 
 properly defended ; where the time and means were want- 
 ing for conducting a regular siege ; or where the assail- 
 ants were ignorant of the means proper to be resorted to 
 for the reduction of the fortress. Such operations, how- 
 ever, are usually attended by an immense sacrifice of hu- 
 man life, and the general who neglects to employ all the 
 resources of the engineer's art in carrying on a siege, is 
 justly chargeable with the lives of his men. In the sieg« 
 of Cambrai, Louis XIV., on the solicitation of Du Metz, 
 
FIELD-ENGINEERING. 367 
 
 but contrary to the advice of Vauban, ordered the demi 
 lune to be taken by assault, instead of waiting for the re- 
 sult of a regular siege. The assault was made, but it was 
 unsuccessful, and the French sustained great losses. The 
 king now directed Vauban to take the demi-lune by regu- 
 lar approaches, which was done in a very short time, and 
 with a loss of only jive men I Again, at the siege of Ypres, 
 the generals advised an assault before the breaches were 
 ready. " You will gain a day by the assault," said Vauban, 
 " but you will lose a thousand men." The king directed 
 the regular works to be continued, and the next day the 
 place was taken with but little loss to the besiegers. 
 
 But a work may be of such a character as to render it 
 unnecessary to resort to all the works of attack which 
 would be required for the reduction of a regular bastioned 
 fort, on a horizontal site. For example : the nature of the 
 ground may be such as to enable the troops to approach to 
 the foot of the glacis, without erecting any works what- 
 ever ; of course, all the works up to the third parallel may 
 in this case be dispensed with without any violation of the 
 rules of a siege. Again, the point of attack may be such 
 that the other parts of the place will not flank the works 
 of approach ; here a single line of boyaux and short par- 
 allels may be all-sufficient. 
 
 But for the purpose of discussion, we will here suppose 
 the place besieged to be a regular bastioned work on a 
 horizontal site, (Fig. 54.) 
 
 The operations of the siege may be divided into three 
 distinct periods. 
 
 1st. The preliminary operations of the attack and de- 
 fence previous to the opening of the trenches. 
 
 2d. The operations of the two parties from the opening 
 of the trenches to the establishment of the third parallel. 
 
 3d. From the completion of the third parallel to the re- 
 duction of the place. 
 
368 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 First period. The object of the investment of the place is 
 to cut off all communication between the work and the 
 exterior, thus preventing it from receiving succors, pro- 
 visions, and military munitions, and also to facilitate a 
 close reconnoissance of the place by the engineers, who 
 should always accompany the investing corps, and pursue 
 their labors under its protection. This corps should be 
 composed chiefly of light troops — cavalry, light infantry, 
 horse artillery, "brigades of engineers and" mounted sap- 
 pers," — ^who march in advance of the besieging army, and, 
 by a sudden movement, surround the work, seize upon all 
 the avenues of approach, and carry off every thing without 
 the work that can be of service either to the garrison or to 
 the besiegers. To effect this object, the enterprise must 
 be conducted with secrecy and dispatch. 
 
 The investing corps is now distributed around the work 
 in the most favorable positions for cutting off all access 
 to it, and also to prevent any communication with the ex- 
 terior by detachments from the garrison, and even single in- 
 dividuals are sent out to give intelligence to a succoring ar- 
 my or to reconnoitre the operations of the besieging corps. 
 These posts and sentinels, called the daily cordon, are 
 placed some mile or mile and a half from the work, and 
 beyond the reach of the guns. But in the night-time 
 these posts are insufficient to accomplish their object, and 
 consequently as soon as it is dark the troops move up as 
 close to the work as' possible without being exposed to the 
 fire of musketry. This arrangement constitutes the nightly 
 cordon. 
 
 By the time the main army arrives the reconnoissance 
 will be sufficiently complete to enable the chief engineer 
 to lay before the general the outline of his plan of attack, 
 so as to establish the position of his depots and camp. 
 These will be placed some two miles from the work, ac- 
 cording to the nature of the ground. As they occupy a 
 
FIELD-ENGINEERING. 369 
 
 considerable extent of ground around the work, it will gene- 
 rally be necessary to form intrenchments strong enough to 
 prevent succors of troops, provisions, &c., from being 
 thrown into the place, and also to restrain the excursions 
 of the garrison. The works thrown up between the 
 camp and besieged place are termed the line of countervail 
 lationj and those on the exterior side of the camp form the 
 line of circumvallation. These lines are generally about 
 six hundred yards apart. It is not unusual in modem 
 warfare to dispense with lines of circumvallation, (except 
 a few detached works for covering t^e parks of the engi- 
 neers and artillery,) and to hold the succoring army in 
 check by means of an opposing force, called the armi/ of 
 observation. 
 
 The measures of defence resorted to by the garrison 
 will, of course, be subordinate, in some degree, to those 
 of attack. As soon as any danger of an investment is ap- 
 prehended, the commanding general should collect into 
 the place all the necessary provisions, forage, military 
 munitions, &c., to be found in the surrounding country ; 
 all useless persons should be expelled from the garrison ; 
 a supply of timber for the works of the engineers and ar- 
 tillery, fascines, gabions, palisades, &c., prepared ; all 
 ground within cannon range around the work levelled ; 
 hedges and trees cut down ; holes filled up ; temporary 
 buildings demolished or burnt ; and all obstacles capable 
 of covering an enemy and interrupting the fire of the 
 work, removed. 
 
 During this period the engineer troops and working 
 parties detached from the other arms will be most actively 
 employed. As soon as the investing corps makes its ap- 
 pearance, bodies of light troops are thrown out to cut off 
 reconnoitring parties, and, if possible, to draw the enemy 
 into ambush. To facilitate these exterior operations, and 
 to prevent a surprise, several guns of long range are 
 
370 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE 
 
 placed on the salients of the bastions and demi-lunes, and 
 others, loaded with grape, in the embrasures of the flanks, 
 so as to sweep the ditches. About one-third of the gar- 
 rison may be employed in exterior operations, and the 
 other two-thirds in arranging the means of defence in the 
 interior. 
 
 Second period. — As soon as the engineers have com- 
 pleted their reconnaissances and determined on the front 
 of attack, and all the other preparations are made, the 
 general will direct the opening of the trenches. The 
 ground being previously marked out, battalions of light 
 troops, termed guards of the trenches, as soon as it is dark, 
 are placed about thirty yards in front of the first parallel, 
 (A. Fig. 54,) with smaller sections, and sentinels about 
 the same distance further in advance. These guards lie 
 down, or otherwise conceal themselves from the fire of 
 the work. The engineer troops and detachments of 'work- 
 men being first marched to the depots and supplied with 
 all the necessary tools for carrying on the work, now 
 commence their labors under the protection of these 
 guards. By daybreak the construction of the first parallel, 
 and the trenches connecting it with the depots, will be 
 sufliciently advanced to cover the men from the fire of 
 the place ; the guards will therefore be withdrawn, and 
 the workmen continue their labors during the day to give 
 the trenches the proper size and form. 
 
 The parallels are the long lines of trench which en- 
 velop the besieged work, and serve both as covered ways 
 for the circulation of the besiegers, and as means of de- 
 fence against sorties from the garrison ; they are therefore 
 arranged with banquettes for musketry fire. The boyaux 
 are trenches run in a zigzag direction along the capitals 
 of the front of attack, and are intended exclusively for the 
 circulation of the troops ; they have no banquettes. The 
 first parallel is about six hundred yards from the place, 
 
FIELD-ENGINEERING. 371 
 
 and consequently beyond the reach of grape. It is con- 
 structed by the simple sap. After the first night, the 
 guards, instead of advancing in front of the work, are 
 placed in the trenches. 
 
 The second parallel (B) is made some three hundred 
 or three hundred and fifty yards from the place, and being 
 much exposed to grape, the flying-sap is employed in its 
 construction. Batteries (H) are established between the 
 first and second parallels to silence the fire of the demi- 
 lunes of the collateral bastions, and others (I) near the 
 second parallel, to enfilade the faces of the front of at- 
 tack. These are armed in part with mortars and in part 
 with heavy siege-pieces. 
 
 The works are now gradually pushed forward to the 
 third parallel, (C,) which is constructed about sixty yards 
 from the salients of the place. As the operations of the 
 besiegers are here greatly exposed to musketry fire, the 
 trenches are constructed by the full-sap. The third paral- 
 lel, having to contain the guards of the trenches, and being 
 of less development than the two preceding, is made much 
 wider. The second parallel now contains the reserve, 
 and the first parallel becomes the depot of materials. 
 Demi-parallels (G) are frequently established between the 
 second and third, to be occupied by detachments of guards. 
 
 The operations of defence during this period are so 
 directed as to harass the workmen in the trenches and 
 retard the advance of the works of attack. Garrison 
 pieces of long range and large howitzers are brought for- 
 ward on the salients of the bastions and demi-lunes of at- 
 tack, so as to fire in ricochet along the capitals on which 
 the boyaux must be pushed : light and fire-balls are thrown 
 out as soon as it becomes dark, to light up the ground oc- 
 cupied by the besiegers, thus exposing them to the fire of 
 the work and to the attacks of the sortie parties. These 
 parties are composed of light troops who charge the guards 
 
372 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 and compel the workmen to abandon their sapping tools 
 and stand upon the defence. They are most efFective 
 when the besiegers commence the second parallel,^ as the 
 guards in the first parallel are not so immediately at hand 
 to protect the workmen. When the sortie detachment has 
 driven these workmen from the trenches, instead of pur- 
 suing them into the first parallel, it will display itself in 
 battle order to cover the engineer troops, (who should al- 
 ways accompany the detachment in this enterprise,) while 
 they fill up the trenches and destroy the implements of 
 the besiegers. When the guards of the trenches appear 
 in force, the detachment will retire in such a way, if pos- 
 sible, as to draw the enemy within range of the grape and 
 musketry of the collateral works. These sorties, if suc- 
 cessful, may be frequently repeated, for they tend very 
 much to prolong the siege. The best time for making 
 them is an hour or two before day, when the workmen and 
 guards are fatigued with the labors of the night. While 
 the besiegers are establishing their enfilading batteries, a 
 strong fire of solid shot and shells will be concentrated on 
 the points selected for their construction. The garrison 
 will also labor during this period to put the work into a 
 complete state of defence : constructing all necessary pa- 
 lisadings, traverses, blindages, barriers ; and strengthening, 
 if necessary, the covering of the magazines. 
 
 Third period. — After the completion of the third paral- 
 lel, the crowning of the covered way may be efl?*ected by 
 storm, by regular approaches, or (if the work is secured by 
 defensive mines) by a subterranean warfare. 
 
 In the first case stone mortar-batteries are established 
 in front of the third parallel, which, on a given signal, will 
 open their fire in concert with all the enfilading and mor- 
 tar batteries. When this fire has produced its effect in 
 clearing the outworks, picked troops will sally forth and 
 carry the covered way with the bayonet, sheltering them- 
 
FIELD-ENGINEERING. 373 
 
 selves behind the traverses until the sappers throw np a 
 trench some four or five yards from the crest of the glacis, 
 high e^iough to protect the troops from the fire of the be- 
 sieged. It may afterwards be connected with the third 
 parallel by boyaux. 
 
 When the covered way is to be crowned by regular ap- 
 proaches, a double sap is pushed forward from the third 
 parallel to within thirty yards of the salient of the covered 
 way ; the trench is then extended some fifteen or twenty 
 yards to the right or left, and the earth thrown up high 
 enough to enable the besiegers to obtain a plunging fire 
 into the covered way, and thus prevent the enemy from 
 occupying it. This mound of earth is termed a trench ca- 
 valier, (0.) Boyaux are now pushed forward to the crown-, 
 ing of the covered way and the establishing of breach bat- 
 teries, (J.) Descents are then constructed into the ditches, 
 and as soon as th6se batteries have made a breach into 
 the walls of the bastions and outworks, the boyaux are 
 pushed across the ditches and lodgments effected in the 
 breaches. The demi-lune is first carried ; next the demi- 
 lune redoubt and bastion ; and lastly, the interior retrench- 
 ments and citadel. In some cases the breaches are car- 
 ried by assault, but the same objection is applicable here 
 as in the storming of the covered way ; time is gained, hut 
 at an immense expense of human life. 
 
 If the place is defended by mines it will be necessary 
 for the besiegers to counteract the effects of these works 
 by resorting to the slow and tedious operations of a sub- 
 terranean warfare. In this case a fourth trench is formed 
 in front of the third parallel ; shafts are sunk in this, 
 about six yards apart, for establishing overcharged mines ; 
 as soon as the galleries of the besieged are destroyed by 
 the explosion of these mines, the covered way is attacked 
 by storm ; other mines are established on the terre-plain 
 of the covered way to. destroy the entrance to the gal- 
 
374 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 leries, and thus deprive the besieged of the use of theit 
 entire system of mines. 
 
 .The measures of defence during this period must em- 
 brace every thing calculated to retard the works of the be- 
 siegers. This may be most effectually accomplished by 
 maintaining a constant fire of grape and musketry on the 
 heads of the sap, and throwing grenades, shells, &;c., into 
 the trenches, to harass and destroy the workmen. As 
 the musketry fire of the besiegers now becomes very de- 
 structive to the artillerists at the guns, strong musket-proof 
 blinds are arranged to mask the mouths of the embrasures 
 when the guns are not in battery, and also sloping blind- 
 ages to cover the men when serving at the pieces. The 
 possession of the outworks should be disputed inch by 
 inch, and when the besiegers have reached the ditch of 
 the body of the place, sorties, and every species of pro- 
 jectile, should be employed to drive ofi* the sappers, and 
 to retard the construction of their works. In fine, all the 
 resources of the engineer's art should be put in requisition 
 for the defence of the breach, and the final assault should 
 be vigorously resisted by the bayonet, and by a well-sus- 
 tained fire from all the collateral works. 
 
 With respect to the relative strength of the opposing 
 forces it may be well to remark, that if the fortress is 
 properly constructed the garrison will be able to resist a 
 besieging army six times as numerous as itself. Such is 
 the estimate of the best engineers.* 
 
 * A good knowledge of the several subjects discussed in this chapter 
 may be derived from the writings of Vauban, Cormontaigne, and Noi- 
 zet de St. Paul, on the attack and defence of places and field fortifica- 
 tion ; the several manuels used in the French service on sapping, mi- 
 ning, and pontoniering ; Col. Pasley's experiments on the operations of 
 a siege, sapping, mining, &c. ; Douglas's work on military bridges; 
 Macauley's work on field fortification ; and Professor Mahan's Treatise 
 on Field Fortification. This last is undoubtedly the very best work 
 
FIELD-ENGINEERING. 375 
 
 Ihat has ever been written on field fortification, and every officer going 
 into the field should supply himself with a copy. 
 
 The following are recommended as books of reference on subjects 
 discussed in the three preceding chapters. 
 
 Memorial pour la fortification permanenie et passagere. Cormon- 
 taigne. 
 
 Defense des places. Cormontaigne. 
 
 Attaque des places. Cormontaigne. 
 
 Attaque des places. Vauban. 
 
 Traite des mines. Vauban. 
 
 Memorial pour la castrametation ct la fortification passagere. 
 Lafitte-Clavd. 
 
 Exercice sur les fortifications. Duvigneau. 
 
 Memorial de Vofficier du genie. A periodical of rare merit, con- 
 taining most valuable military and scientific matter. It is conducted 
 by officers of the French corps of engineers. It has already reached 
 its fourteenth number, each number forming a volume. 
 
 Traite complet de fortification. Noizet de St. Paul. 
 
 Traite d'art militairc et de la fortification. Gay de Vernon. 
 
 Art de la guerre. Rogniat. 
 
 Essai general de fortification, &c. Bousmard. 
 
 Aide-memoire portatif a Vusage des officiers du genie. Laistt^. 
 A very valuable and useful book. 
 
 Aide-memoire de Vingenieur militaire. Grivet. 
 
 Cours d'art militaire. Laurillard Fallot. 
 
 Cours de fortification, &c. Lavart. 
 
 Le litre de la guerre. Perrot 
 
 Journaux des sieges dans la peninsule. Bclmas. 
 
 Journal of Sieges in Spain. John Jones. 
 
 Both of the above are works of great value. 
 
 Cours d'art militaire et de fortification militaire. Fran9oia. 
 
 Architettura militare. Marchi. 
 
 Essai sur la fortification. Baltard. 
 
 La fortification. Bar-le-Duc. 
 
 Elemens de fortification. Bellairo. 
 
 La science des ingenieurs. Belidor. 
 
 Vart universel des fortifications. Bitainvieu, 
 
 Nouvelle maniere de fortifier les places, BlonddL 
 
 Les sept sieges de Lille. Brun Lavaine. 
 
 Defense des places fortes. CamoL 
 
 Memoire sur la fortification. Carnot 
 
376 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 Defense de Saragosse. Cavallero. 
 Memoires sur la fortification. Choumara. 
 Nouvelle fortification. Coehom. 
 Thiorie de la fortification. Cugnot 
 Des fortifications, &c. &c. Dargon. 
 Relation de la defense de Dantzik. D'Artois. 
 Les fortifications. Deville. 
 Peribologie. Dilich. 
 
 De la fortification permanente. Dufour. A work of merit. 
 Essai sur la defense des etats par les fortifications. Duvivier. 
 Attaque et defense des places du camp de St. Omer. 
 L'ecole de la fortification. Fallois. 
 Introduction a la fortification. De Fer. 
 Preci» de la defense de Valenciennes. Ferrand. 
 Traite theorique, &c. Foissac-Latour. 
 Examen detaille, &c. Foissac-Latour. 
 Les outrages militaires de Fosse. 
 Instruction sur la fortification, &c. Gaillard. 
 Memoires pour V attaque et defense d'une place. Goulon 
 Siege of Peschiera. Henin. 
 Journal du siege de Pkilisbourg. 
 Precis du siege de Dantzick. Kirgener. 
 Deuxieme defense de Badajos. Lamare. 
 Fortification, et Vattaque et defense des places. Leblo',id. 
 (Euvres de Lefebvre. 
 L' architecture des forteresses. Maudar. 
 Traite sur Vart des sieges. Mazeroy. 
 La mrete des etats par le moyen des forteresses. Maigret. 
 Defense d'Ancone. Mangourit. 
 Fortification. Marolois. 
 Siege de Turin. Mengin. 
 Recherches sur Vart defensif, &c. Michaloz. 
 La fortification de campagne, &c. Miller. 
 L'art defensif, &c. Montalembert 
 Journaux des sieges de Flandre. 
 
 Relations des sieges en Europe, &c. Musset-Pathay. A very 
 faluable and interesting work. 
 Relation du siege de Metz. 
 Relation du siege d'Anters. 
 Les sieges de Jaffa et de St. Jean d'Acre. 
 Les sieges de Saragosse et de Toriose. Rogniat. 
 
FIELD-ENGINEERING. 377 
 
 Siege de Dantzick. Sainte-Susanne. 
 
 Memoire sur la fortification permanente. S^a. 
 
 Le siege de Constantine. 
 
 Elemens de fortification. Trincano. 
 
 Des places fortes. Valaz^. 
 
 Essay on Military Bridges. Douglas. A valuable work. 
 
 Guide du pontonier. Drieu. 
 
 Memoire sur la guerre souterraine. Cout6le. 
 
 Traite des mines. Etieime. 
 
 Traite de Vart du mineur. Geuss. 
 
 Traite de fortification souteiraine. Gillot. 
 
 Traite pratique et theorique des mines. Lebrun 
 
 Nouveau traite des mines, &c. Prudliomme. 
 
 Manuel du sapeur. Used in the French service. 
 
 Manuel du mineur. " " " 
 
 Manuel du pontonier. " " " 
 
 Essay on Field Fortifications. Pleydell. 
 
 Elements of Field Fortifications. Lochee. 
 
 Relation du siege de Grave et Mayence. 
 
 Sieges de Genes. Thiebault. 
 
 Traite de fortification souterraine. Mouze. 
 
 Militairische Mittheilungen. Xilander. 
 
 Die Befestigung der Stdtten. Hauser. 
 
 Abhandlung uher die Befestigung »kunst, &c. Hauser 
 Versuch uher die Verschanzungskunst. Muller. 
 Course of Elementary Fortification. Pasley. This is a work ol 
 much detail — useful, no doubt, to an uneducated engineer soldier, but 
 to an oflScer at all acquainted with his profession, it must seem ridicu- 
 lously minute. 
 
 To the above list might be added a long list of books on that branch 
 of the engineer's art called constructions ; but as this part of thd pro- 
 fession is, in some degree, common both to the civil and military engi- 
 neer, it is not deemed necessary to include works of this character in a 
 list of books strictly military. 
 
37S MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 MILITARY EDUCATION APPOINTMENT AND PROMOTION. 
 
 With the Romans, six years' instruction was required 
 to make a soldier ; and so great importance did these an- 
 cient conquerors of the world attach to military education 
 and discipline, that the very name of their array was de- 
 rived from the verb to practise. 
 
 Modern nations, learning from experience that military 
 success depends more upon skill and discipline than upon 
 numbers, have generally adopted the same rule as the Ro- 
 mans; and nearly all of the European powers have estab- 
 lished military schools for the education of their officers 
 and the instruction of their soldiers. 
 
 France, which has long taken the lead in military sci- 
 ence, has six military schools for the instruction of officers, 
 containing in all more than one thousand pupils, and nu- 
 merous division and regimental schools for the sub-officers 
 and soldiers. 
 
 Prussia maintains some twelve general schools for mil- 
 itary education, which contain about three thousand pu- 
 pils, and also numerous division, brigade, garrison, and 
 company schools for practical instruction. 
 
 Austria has some fifty military schools, which contain 
 in all about four thousand pupils. 
 
 Russia has thirty-five engineer and artillery technical 
 schools, with about two thousand pupils ; twenty-five mili- 
 iary schools for the noblesse, containing eight thousand 
 seven hundred pupils ; corps d^armee schools, with several 
 thousand pupils ; regimental schools, with eleven thou* 
 
MILITARY EDUCATION. 379 
 
 sand pupils ; and brigade-schools, with upwards of one 
 hundred and fifty-six thousand scholars ; — making in all 
 about two hundred thousand pupils in her military schools ! 
 
 England has five military schools of instruction for offi- 
 cers, number of pupils not known ; a military orphan 
 school, with about twelve thousand pupils ; and numerous 
 depot and regimental schools of practice. 
 
 The smaller European powers — Belgium, Sardinia, Na- 
 ples, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, Wurtemberg, 
 Bavaria, Baden, have each several military schools, with 
 a large number of pupils. 
 
 It is seen from these statistics, that the European pow- 
 ers are not so negligent in educating their officers, and in 
 instructing and disciplining their soldiers, as some in this 
 country would have us believe. 
 
 Washington, Hamilton, Knox, Pickering, and others, 
 learning, by their own experience in the war of the Amer- 
 ican revolution, the great necessity of military education, 
 urged upon our government, as early as 1783, the impor- 
 tance of establishing a military academy in this country, 
 but the subject continued to be postponed from year to year 
 till 1802. In 1794, the subaltern grade of cadet was cre- 
 ated by an act of Congress, the officers of this grade being 
 attached to their regiments, and " furnished at the public 
 expense with the necessary books, instruments, and appa- 
 ratus" for their instruction. But this plan of educating 
 young officers at their posts was found impracticable, and 
 in his last annual message, Dec. 7th, 1796, Washington 
 urged again, in strong language, the establishment of a 
 military academy, where a regular course of military in- 
 struction could be given. " Whatever argument," said he, 
 " may be drawn from particular examples, superficially 
 viewed, a thorough examination of the subject will evince 
 that the art of war is both comprehensive and complicated ; 
 that it demands much previous study ; and that the pes- 
 
380 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 session of it in its most improved and perfect state is al- 
 ways of great moment to the security of a nation." 
 
 The subject was however postponed from time to time, 
 till March, 1802, when a bill was passed establishing the 
 Military Academy. It was at first on a small scale, and its 
 course of instruction meager and deficient. It gradually 
 became enlarged, but lingered along, with no great im- 
 provement, till 1817, when Capt. Patridge was dismissed 
 from the superintendency, and Col. Thayer put in charge. 
 From this period we date the commencement of the suc- 
 cess and reputation which the Military Academy has since 
 enjoyed. 
 
 This institution, as now organized, consists of one cadet 
 from each congressional district, and a few at large, making 
 an average of two hundred and thirty-seven. The course 
 of instruction is four years, after which time the cadet is 
 sent to his regiment or corps, with higlier rank if there are 
 vacancies, but if there are no vacancies, he goes as a cadet, 
 with the brevet rank of the next higher grade. 
 
 The examination for admission to the institution is a 
 very limited one, being confined to the elementary branches 
 of an English education. 
 
 The annual course at the academy is divided into two 
 distinct periods, the first extending from June till Septem- 
 ber, and the second from September to the following June. 
 During the first period, the cadets leave their barracks and 
 encamp in tents, and are made subject to the police and 
 discipline of an army in time of war. In addition to the 
 thorough and severe course of practical exercises and 
 drills in the diff'erent arms during these three summer 
 months of each ye^r, they are made to perform the same 
 tx)urs of guard-duty, night and day, as is required of the 
 common soldier in time of actual war. This continues till 
 the first of September of each year, when the cadets re- 
 turn to their barracks, and for the remaining nine months 
 
MILITARY EDUCATION. 381 
 
 devote themselves to the prescribed course of scientific and 
 military studies, intermixed with military exercises and 
 practical operations in the laboratory and on the field. 
 
 To test the progress of the cadets in their studies, 
 there are held semi-annual public examinations. These 
 examinations are strict and severe, and all who fail to 
 come up to the fixed standard are obliged to withdraw 
 from the institution, to allow some one else from the 
 same district to make the trial. 
 
 During their course of studies the cadets, as warrant- 
 offi-cers of the army, draw pay barely sufficient to defray 
 their necessary expenses. The allowance to each is 
 twenty-six dollars per month, but none of this is paid to 
 the cadet, but is applied to the purchase of books, fuel, 
 lights, clothing, board, &c. 
 
 This institution furnishes each year to the army about 
 forty subaltern officers, thoroughly instructed in all the 
 theoretical and practical duties of their profession. After 
 completing this course, the cadet is usually promoted 
 from the grade of warrant-officer to that of a commis- 
 sioned officer, and is immediately put on duty with his 
 regiment or corps. 
 
 This system of appointment to the army has produced 
 the most satisfactory results, and has received the com- 
 mendation of our best military men, and the approbation 
 of all our presidents and most able statesmen. Never- 
 theless, it has occasionally met with strong opposition ; 
 this opposition springing in part from a want of proper 
 information respecting the character and working of the 
 system, and in part from the combined efforts of those 
 who from negligence or incapacity have failed to pass 
 their examinations for promotion, and of those who, from 
 a conscious want of qualifications or merit, feel assured 
 that they cannot obtain commissions in the army so long 
 as this system of merit, as fixed by examination, shall 
 
382 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 exist. Hence the effort to destroy the Military Academy, 
 and to throw the army entirely open to political appoint- 
 ment. 
 
 Several legislative bodies, acting mider these combined 
 influences, have passed resolutions, giving various objec- 
 tions to the Military Academy, and recommending that it 
 be abolished. The objections made by the legislatures 
 of Tennessee, Ohio, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and 
 Maine, are mostly founded on false information, and may 
 be readily answered by reference to the official records 
 of the War-office. But it is not the present object to en- 
 ter into a general discussion of the charges against that 
 institution, except so far as they are connected with the 
 importance of military education, and the rules of military 
 appointment and promotion. 
 
 It has been alleged by many of the opponents of the 
 West Point Academy, that military instruction is of little 
 or no advantage to a general ; — that in the wars of Napo- 
 leon, and in the American Revolution, and the American 
 war of 1812, armies were generally led to victory by 
 men without a military education, and unacquainted with 
 military science ; — and that in the event of another war 
 in this country, we must seek our generals in the ranks 
 of civil life, rather than among the graduates of our Mil- 
 itary Academy. 
 
 The objection here made to military education will 
 hold with equal force against education in any other pro- 
 fession. We sometimes find men who have become emi- 
 nent in the pulpit and at the bar, or in medicine and the 
 sciences, without ever having enjoyed the advantages of 
 an education in academic or collegiate halls, and perhaps 
 even without that preliminary instruction usually deemed 
 necessary for professional pursuits. Shall we therefore 
 abolish all our colleges, theological seminaries, schools 
 of law and medicine, our academies and primary schools, 
 
MILITARY EDUCATION. 383 
 
 and seek for our professional men among the uneducated 
 and the ignorant ? If professional ignorance be a recom- 
 mendation in our generals, why not also in our lawyers 
 and our surgeons ? If we deem professional instruction 
 requisite for the care of our individual property and 
 health, shall we require less for guarding the honor and 
 safety of our country, the reputation of our arms, and the 
 lives of thousands of our citizens ? 
 
 But in reality, were not these men to whom we have 
 alluded eminent in their several professions in spite of, 
 rather than hy means of their want of a professional edu- 
 cation 1 And have not such men, feeling the disadvan- 
 tages under which they were forced to labor, been almost 
 without exception the advocates of education in others ? 
 
 But is it true that most of the generals of distinction 
 in the more recent wars were men destitute of military 
 education, — men who rose from the ranks to the pinnacle 
 of military glory, through the combined influence of ig- 
 norance of military science and contempt for military in- 
 struction 1 Let us glance at the lives of the most distin- 
 guished of the generals of the French Revolution, for 
 these are the men to whom reference is continually made 
 to prove that the Military Academy is an unnecessary 
 and useless institution, the best generals being invariably 
 found in the ranks of an army, and not in the ranks of 
 military schools. Facts may serve to convince, where 
 reasoning is of no avail. 
 
 Napoleon himself was a pupil of the military schools 
 of Brienne and Paris, and had all the advantages of the 
 best military and scientific instruction given in France. 
 
 Dessaix was a pupil of the military school of Effiat, 
 ^with all the advantages which wealth and nobility could 
 procure. Davoust was a pupil of the military school of 
 Auxerre, and a fellow-pupil with Napoleon in the military 
 school of Paris. Kleber was educated at the military 
 
384 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 school of Bavaria. Eugene Beauhamais was a pupil of 
 St. Germain-en-Loye, and had for his military instructor 
 the great captain of the age. His whole life was devoted 
 to the military art. Berthier and Marmont were both 
 sons of officers, and, being early intended for the army, 
 they received military educations. Lecourbe had also 
 the advantages of a military education before entering the 
 army. Pichegru and Duroc were pupils of the military 
 school of Brienne. Drouet was a pupil of the artillery 
 school. Foy was first educated in the college of Sois- 
 sons, and afterwards in the military schools of La Fere 
 and Chalons. Carnot, called the " Organizer of French 
 victory," received a good early education, and was also a 
 pupil of the engineer school of Mezieres. 
 
 Several of the distinguished French generals at first re- 
 ceived good scientific and literary educations in the col- 
 leges of France, and then acquired their military instruc- 
 tion in the subordinate grades of the army ; and by this 
 means, before their promotion to responsible offices, ac- 
 quired a thorough practical instruction, founded on a basis 
 of a thorough preliminary education. Such was Suchet, 
 a pupil of the college of Lisle-Barbe ; Lannes, a pupil of 
 the college of Lectoure ; and Mortier, who was most care- 
 fully educated at Cambrai ; Lefebvre and Murat were 
 both educated for the church, though the latter profited but 
 little by his instruction ; Moreau and Joubert were educa- 
 ted for the bar ; Massena was not a college graduate, but 
 he received a good preliminary education, and for several 
 years before he entered the army as an officer, he had en- 
 joyed all the advantages afforded by leisure and affluent 
 circumstances ; Ney, though poor, received a good prelim- 
 inary education, and entered a notary's office to study a 
 profession. Hoche was destitute of the advantages of 
 early education, but, anxious to supply this deficiency, he 
 early distinguished himself by his efforts to procure books, 
 
MILITARY EDUCATION. 385 
 
 and by hi» extraordinary devotion to military studies. By 
 several years devoted in this way to professional studies 
 and the practical duties of a subordinate grade in the army, 
 Hoche acquired a military knowledge which early distin- 
 guished him among the generals of the French Revolution. 
 Soult and Gouvion-Saint-Cyr, being of parents in limited 
 circumstances, had not the advantages of extensive educa- 
 tion, but close and diligent application, an ardent ambition, 
 and strong and powerful intellect, combined with long 
 years of service in the practical operations of the field, at 
 length enabled these men to overcome all obstacles, and 
 force their way to the higher walks of their professions. 
 But both knew from experience the advantages of military 
 instruction, and the importance of professional education 
 in the army, and they have consequently both been the 
 warmest friends and strongest advocates of the military 
 schools of France. 
 
 The Polytechnic School was established too late to fur- 
 nish officers for any of the earlier wars of Napoleon ; but 
 in his last campaigns he began to reap the advantages of 
 an institution which had been under his fostering care, and 
 Bertrand, Dode, Duponthon, Haxo, Rogniat, Fleury, Va- 
 laze, Gourgaud, Chamberry, and a host of other distin- 
 guished young generals, fully justified the praises which 
 the emperor lavished on his ^^ poulet aux (Bufs d'or,^^ — ^the 
 hen that laid him golden eggs ! 
 
 In our own revolutionary war, Generals Washington, 
 Hamilton, Gates, Schuyler, Knox, Alexander, (Lord Stir- 
 ling,) the two Clintons, the Lees, and others, were men of 
 fine education, and a part of them of high literary and 
 scientific attainments ; "Washington, Gates, Charles Lee, 
 the Clintons, and some others, had considerable military 
 experience even before the war : nevertheless, so desti- 
 tute was the army, generally, of military science, that the 
 government was under the necessity of seeking it in 
 r?3 
 
886 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 foreigners — in the La Fayettes, the Kosciuskos, the Steu« 
 bens, the De Kalbs, the Pulaskis, the Duportails — who 
 were immediately promoted to the highest ranks in our 
 army. In fact the officers of our scientific corps were 
 then nearly all foreigners. 
 
 But, say the opponents of the Academy, military know- 
 ledge and education are not the only requisites for military 
 success ; youthful enterprise and efficiency are far more 
 important than a mere acquaintance with military science 
 and the military art : long service in garrison, combined 
 with the indolent habits acquired by officers of a peace- 
 establishment, so deadens the enterprise of the older offi- 
 cers of the army, that it must inevitably result, in case of 
 war, that military energy and efficiency will be derived 
 from the ranks of civil life. 
 
 We are not disposed to question the importance of 
 youthful energy in the commander of an army, and we 
 readily admit that while seeking to secure to our service 
 a due degree of military knowledge, we should also be 
 very careful not to destroy its influence by loading it down 
 with the dead weights of eflfete seniority. But we do 
 question the wisdom of the means proposed for supplying 
 our army with this desired efficiency. Minds stored with 
 vast funds of professional knowledge, and the rich lore of 
 past history ; judgments ripened by long study and expe- 
 rience ; with passions extinguished, or at least softened 
 by the mellowing influence of age — these may be best 
 suited for judges and statesmen, for here there is time for 
 deliberation, for the slow and mature judgment of years. 
 But for a general in the field, other qualities are also re- 
 quired. Not only is military knowledge requisite for di- 
 recting the blow, but he must also have the military ener- 
 gy necessary for striking that blow, and the military ac- 
 tivity necessary for parrying the attacks of the enemy. A 
 rapid coup <Vml, prompt decision, active movements, are 
 
MILITARY EDUCATION. 387 
 
 as indispensable as sound judgment ; for the general must 
 seCy and decide, and act, all in the same instant. Accord- 
 ingly we find that most great generals of ancient and mod- 
 ern times have gained their laurels while still young. 
 
 Philip of Macedon ascended the throne at the age of 
 twenty-two, and soon distinguished himself in his wars 
 with the neighboring states. At the age of forty-five he 
 had conquered all Greece. He died at forty-seven. 
 
 Alexander the Great had defeated the celebrated The- 
 ban band at the battle of Cheronea, and gained a military 
 reputation at the age of eighteen. He ascended the throne 
 of his father Philip before twenty, and at twenty-five had 
 reached the zenith of his military glory, having already 
 conquered the world. He died before the age of thirty- 
 
 iWO. 
 
 Julius Csesar commanded the fleet sent to blockade 
 Alitylene, where he greatly distinguished himself before 
 :he age of twenty-two. He soon after held the important 
 offices of tribune, quaestor, and edile. He had completed 
 his first war in Spain, and was made consul at Rome be- 
 fore the age of forty. He twice crossed the Rhine, and 
 conquered all Gaul, and had twice passed over to Britain, 
 before the age of forty-five ; at fifty-two he had won the 
 field of Pharsalia, and attained the supreme power. He 
 died in the fifty-sixth year of his age, the victor of five 
 hundred battles, and the conqueror of a thousand cities. 
 
 Hannibal joined the Carthaginian army in Spain at 
 twenty-two, and was made commander-in-chief at twenty- 
 six. Victorious in Spain and France, he crossed the Alps 
 and won the battle of Cannae before the age of thirty-one. 
 
 Scipio Africanus, (the elder,) at the age of sixteen dis- 
 tinguished himself at the battle of Ticinus ; at twenty was 
 made edile, and soon after pro-consul in Spain ; at 
 twenty-nine he won the great battle of Zama, and closed 
 his military career. Scipio Africanus (the younger) also 
 
MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 distinguished himself in early life ; at the age of thirty- 
 six he had conquered the Carthaginian armies and com- 
 pleted the destruction of Carthage. 
 
 Gengis-Khan succeeded to the domain of his father at 
 the age of thirteen, and almost immediately raised an army 
 of thirty thousand men, Avith which he defeated a numer- 
 ous force of rebels, who had thought to take advantage of 
 his extreme youth to withdraw from his dominion. He 
 soon acquired a military reputation by numerous conquests, 
 and before the age of forty had made himself emperor of 
 Mogul. 
 
 Charlemagne was crowned king at twenty-six, con- 
 quered Aquitania at twenty-eight, made himself master of 
 France and the greater part of Germany at twenty-nine, 
 placed on his brows the iron crown of Italy at thirty-two, 
 and conquered Spain at thirty-six. 
 
 Gonsalvo de Cordova, the " great captain," entered the 
 army at fifteen, and before the age of seventeen had ac- 
 quired a brilliant military reputation, and was knighted by 
 the king himself on the field of battle ; at forty-one he 
 was promoted over the heads of older veterans and made 
 commander-in-chief of the army in Italy. 
 
 Henry IV. of France was placed at the head of the Hu- 
 guenot army at the age of sixteen, at nineteen he became 
 king of Navarre ; at forty he had overthrown all his ene- 
 mies, placed himself on the throne of France, and become 
 the founder of a new dynasty. 
 
 Montecuculi, at the age of thirty-one, with two thousand 
 horse, attacked ten thousand Swedes and captured all their 
 baggage and artillery ; at thirty-two he gained the victory 
 of Triebel, at forty-nine defeated the Swedes and saved 
 Denmark, and at fifty-three defeated the Turks at the great 
 battle of St. Gothard. In his campaigns against the 
 French at a later age, he made it his chief merit, "not that 
 ae conquered, but that he was not conquered." 
 
MILITARY EDUCATION. 389 
 
 Saxe entered tlie army at the early age of twelve, and 
 soon obtained the command of a regiment of horse ; at 
 twenty-four he became marechal-de-camp, at forty-four mar- 
 shal of France, and at forty-nine gained the celebrated 
 victory of Fontenoy. He died at the age of fifty-four. 
 
 Vauban entered the army of Conde as a cadet at the 
 age of seventeen, at twenty was made a lieutenant, at 
 twenty-four he commanded two companies, at forty-one 
 was a brigadier, at forty-three a marechal-de-camp, and at 
 forty-five commissaire-general of all the fortifications of 
 France. At the age of twenty-five he had himself con- 
 ducted several sieges, and had assisted at many others. 
 
 Turenne entered the army before the age of fourteen ; 
 he served one year as a volunteer, four years as a captain, 
 four years as a colonel, three years as a major-general, 
 five years as a lieutenant-general, and became a marshal 
 of France at thirty-two. He had won all his military re- 
 putation by the age of forty. 
 
 Prince Maurice commanded an army at the age of six- 
 teen, and acquired his military reputation in very early 
 life. He died at fifty-eight. 
 
 The great Conde immortalized his name at the battle 
 of Rocroi, in which, at the age of twenty-two, he defeated 
 the Spaniards. He had won all his great military fame 
 before the age of twenty-five. 
 
 Prince Eugene of Savoy was a colonel at twenty-one, 
 a lieutenant-field-marshal at twenty-four, and soon after, a 
 general-field-marshal. He gained the battle of Zenta at 
 thirty-four, and of Blenheim at forty-one. At the opening 
 of the war of 1733, he again appeared at the head of the 
 army at the advanced age of sixty-nine, but having lost 
 the vigor and fire of youth, he efiected nothing of im- 
 portance. 
 
 Peter the Great of Russia was proclaimed czar at ten 
 years of age ; at twenty he organized a large army and 
 
390 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 built several ships ; at twenty-four he fought the Turks 
 and captured Asoph ; at twenty-eight he made war with 
 Sweden ; at thirty he entered Moscow in triumph after 
 the victory of Embach, and the capture of Noteburg and 
 Marienburg ; at thirty-one he began the city of St. Pe- 
 tersburg ; at thirty-nine he was defeated by the Turks and 
 forced to ransom himself and army. His latter years were 
 mostly devoted to civil and maritime affairs. He died at 
 the age of fifty-five. 
 
 Charles the XH. of Sweden ascended the throne at 
 the age of fifteen, completed his first successful campaign 
 against Denmark at eighteen, overthrew eighty thousand 
 Russians at Narva before nineteen, conquered Poland and 
 Saxony at twenty-four, and died at thirty-six. 
 
 Frederick the Great of Prussia ascended the throne at 
 twenty-eight, and almost immediately entered on that ca- 
 reer of military glory which has immortalized his name. 
 He established his reputation in the first Silesian war, 
 which he terminated at the age of thirty. The second Si- 
 lesian war was terminated at thirty-three ; and at forty- 
 three, with a population of five millions, he successfully 
 opposed a league of more than one hundred millions of 
 people. 
 
 Prince Henry of Prussia served his first campaign as 
 colonel of a regiment at sixteen ; at the age of thirty-one 
 he decided the victory of Prague, and the same year was 
 promoted to the command of a separate army. The mili- 
 tary reputation he acquired in the Seven Years' War was 
 second only to that of Frederick. 
 
 Cortes had effected the conquest of Mexico, and com- 
 pleted his military career, at the age of thirty-six. 
 
 Sandoval, the most eminent bf his great captains, died 
 at the age of thirty-one. He had earned his great renown, 
 and closed his military achievements, before the age of 
 wenty-five. 
 
MILtTARY EDUCATION. 391 
 
 Pizarro completed the conquest of Peru at thirty-five, 
 and died about forty. 
 
 Lord Clive began his military career at twenty-two, and 
 had reached the zenith of his military fame at thirty-five ; 
 he was raised to the peerage at thirty-six, and died at fifty. 
 
 Hastings began his mihtary service at about twenty-five, 
 and became governor of Bengal at forty. 
 
 Napoleon was made a lieutenant at seventeen, a captain 
 at twenty, chef-de-hataillon at twenty-four, general of bri- 
 gade at twenty-five, and commander-in-chief of the army 
 of Italy at twenty-six. All his most distinguished gener- 
 als were, like him, young men, and they seconded him in 
 his several campaigns with all the energy and activity of 
 youthful valor and enthusiasm. 
 
 Dessaix entered the army at fifteen ; at the opening of 
 the war he quickly passed through the lower grades, and 
 became a general of brigade before the age of twenty-five, 
 and a general of division at twenty-six ; he died before the 
 age of thirty-two, with a reputation second only to that of 
 Napoleon. 
 
 Kleber did not enter the army till later in life, but he 
 quickly passed through the subordinate grades, and was 
 made a general of brigade at thirty-eight, a general of di- 
 vision at forty, and general-in-chief of an army at forty- 
 one : he died at forty-six. On his death, and in Napoleon's 
 absence, Menau, aged and inefiicient, succeeded by right 
 of seniority to the command of the army of Egypt. Its 
 utter ruin was the almost immediate consequence. 
 
 Massena first entered the army at seventeen, but soon 
 married a rich wife, and retired to civil life. He returned 
 to the army at the opening of the revolution, and in two 
 years, before the age of thirty-five, was promoted to the 
 rank of general of division. He immediately acquired that 
 high reputation which he sustained through a long career 
 of niilitary glory. 
 
392 Mil ITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 Soult became a sub-lieutenant at twenty-two, a cap- 
 tain at twenty-four ; the following year he passed through 
 the several grades of chef-de-hataillon, colonel, and gen- 
 eral of brigade, and became general of division at twenty- 
 nine. 
 
 Davoust was a sub-lieutenant at seventeen, a general of 
 brigade at twenty-three, and general of division at twenty- 
 five. 
 
 Eugene Beauharnais entered the army at a very early 
 age. He became chef-de-hataillon at nineteen, colonel at 
 twenty-one, general of brigade at twenty-three, and Vice- 
 roy of Italy at twenty-five. He soon proved himself one 
 of Napoleon's ablest generals. At twenty-eight he com- 
 manded the army of Italy, and at thirty-one gained great 
 glory in the Russian campaign, at the head of the fourth 
 corps d'armee. 
 
 Gouvion-Saint-Cyr entered the army at the beginning 
 of the Revolution, and passing rapidly through the lower 
 grades, became a general of brigade at twenty-nine, and a 
 general of division at thirty. 
 
 Suchet became a chef-de-bataillon at twenty, general of 
 brigade at twenty-five, major-general of Brune's army at 
 twenty-seven, and general of division and of a corps d'armee 
 at twenty-eight. 
 
 Oudinot became a captain at twenty-three, chef-de-ba- 
 taillon at twenty-four, general of brigade at twenty-five, 
 and general of division at twenty-eight. 
 
 Ney was a captain at twenty-three, adjutant-general at 
 twenty-six, general of brigade at twenty-sever , and gen- 
 eral of division at twenty-nine. 
 
 Lannes was a colonel at twenty-seven, general of bri- 
 gade at twenty-eight, and very soon after general of di- 
 vision. 
 
 Joubert became adjutant-general at twenty-five, general 
 of brigade at twenty-six, general of division at twenty* 
 
MILITARY EDUCATION. 393 
 
 eight, and general-in-chief of the army of Italy at twenty- 
 nine. He died at thirty. 
 
 Victor was a chef-de-bataillon at twenty-seven, general 
 of brigade at twenty-nine, and general of division at thirty- 
 two. 
 
 Murat was a lieutenant at twenty, and passing rapidly 
 through the lower grades, he became a general of brigade 
 at twenty-five, and a general of division at twenty-seven. 
 
 Mortier was a captain at twenty-three, adjutant-general 
 at twenty-five, general of brigade at thirty, and general of 
 division at thirty-one. 
 
 Macdonald was a colonel at twenty-seven, a general of 
 brigade at twenty-seven, and a general of division at thirty. 
 
 Marmont was a captain at twenty-one, chef-de-hataillon 
 at twenty-two, general of brigade at twenty-four, inspector 
 general at twenty-seven, and general-in-chief of an army 
 at thirty-two. 
 
 Bemadotte was a colonel at twenty-eight, general of 
 brigade at twenty-nine, and general of division at thirty. 
 
 Lefebvre was made a captain at the organization of the 
 army in 1793 ; he became a general of brigade at thirty- 
 eight, and general of division at thirty-nine. 
 
 Bessieres entered the army at twenty-six, became a 
 colonel at thirty, general of brigade at thirty-two, and gen- 
 eral of division at thirty-four. He died at forty-seven. 
 
 Duroc was a captain at twenty-three, chef-de-hataillon 
 at twenty-six, colonel and chef-de-hrigade at twenty-seven, 
 and general of division at thirty. He died at forty-one. 
 
 This list might be still further extended with the same 
 results, but names enough have been given to show that 
 the generals who assisted Napoleon in his immortal cam- 
 paigns were all, with scarcely an exception, young men, 
 still burning with the fires of youthful ardor and enthusi- 
 asm. The grade of marshal was not created till after Na- 
 poleon became emperor. On ascending the throne of the 
 
394 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 empire, he nominated to this rank eighteen of the mos* 
 distinguished generals of France. Some of these were 
 generals of the earlier wars of the Revolution, and had 
 never served under him. Others were younger men, sev- 
 eral being only thirty-four, thirty-five, and thirty-six years 
 of age. The mean age of all was forty-four. He after- 
 wards made seven more marshals, whose mean age was 
 forty-three. These appointments, however, were regard- 
 ed as rewards for^a^^ services, rather than as a grade from 
 which service was expected, for several of the older mar- 
 shals were never called into the field after their promo- 
 tion. 
 
 Having noticed the ages of the principal generals who 
 commanded in the armies of Napoleon, let us look for a 
 moment at those who opposed him. In the campaign of 
 1796 the enemy's forces were directed by Beaulieu, then 
 nearly eighty years of age ; Wurmser, also an octogena- 
 rian, and Alvinzi, then over seventy : these had all three 
 distinguished themselves in earlier life, but had now lost 
 that youthful energy and activity so essential for a mili- 
 tary commander. 
 
 In the campaign of 1800 the general-in-chief of the Aus- 
 trian forces was Melas, an old general, who had served 
 some fifty years in the army ; he had distinguished him- 
 self so long ago as the Seven Years' War, but he had 
 now become timid and inefficient, age having destroyed 
 his energy. 
 
 In the campaign of 1805 the French were opposed by 
 Kutusof, then sixty, and Mack, then fifty-three ; the plan 
 of operations was drawn \\p by still more aged generals 
 of the Aulic council. 
 
 In the campaign of 1806 the French were opposed by 
 the Duke of Brunswick, then seventy-one, Hohenlohe, 
 then sixty, and Mollendorf, Kleist, and Massenbach, old 
 generals, who had served imder the great Frederick,— 
 
MILITARY EDUCATION. 395 
 
 men, says Joinini, " exhumed from the Seven Years' War," 
 — " whose faculties were frozen by age," — " who had been 
 buried for the last ten years in a lethargic sleep." 
 
 In the campaign of 1807 the French were opposed by 
 Kamenski, then eighty years of age, Benningsen, then six- 
 ty, and Buxhowden, then fifty-six. The Allies now be- 
 gan to profit by their experience, and in 1809 the Austrian 
 army was led by the young, active, skilful, and energetic 
 Archduke Charles ; and this campaign, although the com- 
 mander-in-chief was somewhat fettered by the foolish 
 projects of the old generals of the Aulic council, and 
 thwarted by the disobedience of his brother, was never- 
 theless the most glorious in the Austrian annals of the 
 wars of the Revolution. 
 
 At the opening of the campaign of 1812 the Emperor 
 Alexander, young, (only thirty-five,) active, intelligent, and 
 ambitious, had remodelled his army, and infused into it his 
 own energy and enthusiastic love of glory. He was him- 
 self at its head, and directed its operations. Kutusof was 
 for a short time the nominal commander-in-chief, and ex- 
 hibited an activity unusual at his age, but he was sur- 
 rounded by younger generals — Barclay-de-T611ey, and 
 Miloradowich, then forty-nine, Wintzengerode, then forty- 
 three, Schouvalof, then thirty-five, and the Archduke Con- 
 stantino, then thirty-three, — generals who, at the heads of 
 their corps, and under the young emperor and his able 
 staff of young ofliicers, in the two succeeding campaigns, 
 rolled back the waves of French conquest, and finally 
 overthrew the French empire. Wellington, who led the 
 English in these campaigns, was of the same age as Na- 
 poleon, and had been educated at the same time with him 
 in the military schools of France. The Austrians were 
 led by Schwartzenburg, then only about thirty, and the 
 Prussians by Yorck, Bulow, and Bliicher. The last of 
 these was then well advanced in life, but all his movements 
 
396 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 being directed by younger men, — Scharahorst and Gneise* 
 nau, — his operations partook of the energy of his abla 
 chiefs of staff. 
 
 In the campaign of 1815, Napoleon was opposed by the 
 combinations of Wellington and Gneisenau, both younge? 
 men than most of his own generals, who, it is well known, 
 exhibited, in this campaign, less than in former ones, the 
 ardent energy and restless activity which had character- 
 ized their younger days. Never were Napoleon's plans 
 better conceived, never did his troops fight with greater 
 bravery ; but the dilatory movements of his generals en- 
 abled his active enemies to parry the blow intended for 
 their destruction. 
 
 In the American war of 1812, we pursued the same 
 course as Austria, Prussia, and Russia, in their earlier 
 contests with Napoleon, i. e., to supply our armies with 
 generals, we dug up the Beaulieus, the Wurmsers, the 
 Alvinzis, the Melases, the Macks, the Brunswicks, and the 
 Kamenskis of our revolutionary war ; but after we had 
 suffered sufficiently from the Hulls, the Armstrongs, the 
 Winchesters, the Dearborns, the Wilkinsons, the Hamp- 
 tons, and other veterans of the Revolution, we also changed 
 our policy, and permitted younger men — the Jacksons, the 
 Harrisons, the Browns, the McReas, the Scotts,* the 
 Ripleys, the Woods, the M' Combs, the Wools, and the 
 Millers — to lead our forces to victory and to glory. In 
 the event of another war, with any nation capable of op- 
 posing to us any thing like a powerful resistance, shal) 
 we again* exhume the veterans of former days, and again 
 place at the head of our armies respectable and aged in- 
 efficiency ; or shall we seek out youthful enterprise and 
 activity combined with military science and instiuction? 
 The results of the war, the honor of the country, the glorj 
 
 * Scott had acquired his military reputation, and attained the ranll 
 of major-general at twenty-eight. 
 
MILITARY EDUCATION. 397 
 
 of our arms, depend, in a great measure, upon the answer 
 that will be given to this question. 
 
 But it may be asked, how are we to secure this combi- 
 nation of military instruction and military energy ; how 
 are we to fill the higher grades of our army with young 
 and active men possessing due military instruction and 
 talent ? The question is not a difficult one, and our gov- 
 ernment can easily attain the desired object, if it will only 
 set at work honestly, disregarding all party prejudices 
 and the mercenary and selfish interests of its own mem- 
 bers and advisers. Other governments have pointed out- 
 to us the way. It is this : let merit be the main test for 
 all appointments and promotions in the army. Let one or 
 more of the subordinate grades be thrown open to the 
 youth of the whole country, without distinction as to 
 birth, or wealth, or politics ; let them be kept on proba- 
 tion in this subordinate grade, and be thoroughly instructed 
 in all that relates to the military profession ; after strict 
 examination let them be promoted to the vacancies in the 
 higher grades as rapidly as they shall show themselves 
 qualified for the duties of those grades, merit and services 
 being here as elsewhere the only tests. 
 
 The first part of this rule is already accomplished by 
 the Military Academy. One young man is selected from 
 each congressional district, on an average, once in about 
 two years, the selection being made by the representative 
 of the district ; these young men are made warrant officers 
 in the army, and sent to a military post for instruction ; 
 frequent and strict examinations are instituted to deter- 
 mine their capacity and fitness for military service ; after 
 a probation of a certain length of time, the hest are select- 
 ed for commission in the army, relative rank and appoint- 
 ments to corps being made strictly with reference to 
 merit j birth, wealth, influence of political friends — all ex- 
 traneous circumstances being excluded from considera 
 
398 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 tion. What can be more truly and thorouglily democratic 
 than this ? What scheme can be better devised to supply 
 our army with good officers, and to exclude from the mili- 
 tary establishment the corrupting influence of party poli- 
 tics, and to prevent commissions in the army from being 
 given to " the sons of wealthy and influential men, to the 
 almost total exclusion of the sons of the poor and less in- 
 fluential men, regardless alike of qualifications and of 
 merit ?" 
 
 Unfortunately for the army and for the country this sys- 
 tem ends here, and all further advancement is made by 
 mere seniority, or by executive favoritism, the claims of 
 merit having but little or no further influence. Indeed, 
 executive patronage is not unfrequently permitted to en- 
 croach even upon these salutary rules of appointment, and 
 to place relatives and political friends into the higher 
 ranks of commissioned officers directly from civil life, 
 " regardless alike of qualifications and of merit," while 
 numbers " of sons of the poor and less influential men," 
 who have served a probation of four or five years in military 
 studies and exercises, and have proved themselves, in some 
 thirty examinations made by competent boards of military 
 officers, to be most eminently qualified for commissions, 
 are passed by in utter neglect ! Our army is much more 
 open to this kind of favoritism and political partiality, than 
 that of almost any of the governments of Europe, which 
 we have been accustomed to regard as aristocratic and 
 wholly unfriendly to real merit. 
 
 In the Prussian service, in time of peace, the govern- 
 ment can appoint no one, even to the subordinate grade 
 of ensign, till he has followed the courses of instruction 
 of the division or brigade-school of his arm, and has 
 passed a satisfactory examination. And, " no ensign can 
 be promoted to a higher grade till after his promotion has 
 been agreed to by the superior board or commission of 
 
MILITARY EDUCATION. 399 
 
 examiners at Berlin, and his name has been placed on the 
 list of those whose knowledge and acquirements (connais- 
 sauces) render them qualified (aptes) for the responsible 
 duties of their profession. The nomination to the grade 
 of second-lieutenant is not, even after all these conditions 
 are fulfilled, left to the choice of the government. When 
 a vacancy occurs in this grade, the subaltern officers pre- 
 sent to the commandant of the regiment a list of three 
 ensigns who have completed their course of study ; the 
 commandant, after taking the advice of the superior offi- 
 cers of the regiment, nominates the most meritorious of 
 these three to the king, who makes the appointment." 
 The government can appoint to the engineers and artillery 
 only those who have been instructed as eleves in the 
 Berlin school of cadets and the school of artillery and en- 
 gineers, and these appointments must be made in the 
 order in which the pupils have passed their final exami- 
 nation. In these corps the lieutenants and second cap- 
 tains can be promoted to a higher grade only after they 
 have passed a satisfactory examination. No political in- 
 fluence, nor even royal partiality, can interfere with this 
 rule. 
 
 Even in the arbitrary monarchies of Austria and Rus- 
 sia it is deemed necessary to subject all military appoint- 
 ments and promotions, in the peace establishments, to 
 certain fixed rules. In the Austrian army all sub-lieuten- 
 ants must be taken from the miUtary schools, or the spe- 
 cially-instructed corps of cadets and imperial guards ; from 
 this grade to that of captain all promotions are made by 
 the commandants of regiments and corps on the advice of 
 the other superior officers. Above the grade of captain 
 all nominations for promotion are made to the emperor by 
 \he Aulic Council, in the order of seniority of rank, except 
 the claims of superior merit interfere. " In the Russian 
 army," says Haillot, " no one, not even a prince of the im- 
 
400 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 perial family, can reach the grade of officer till he has 
 satisfactorily passed his several examinations, or finished 
 the severe novitiate to which the cadets in the corps are 
 subjected." Promotion below the grade of colonel is made 
 partly by seniority, and partly by merit ; above that grade, 
 by selection alone. 
 
 In the British service, rank in the line of the army is 
 obtained by purchase, and the higher grades are in this 
 way filled with young men of energy and enterprise ; but 
 this efficiency is gained by injustice to the poor man, who 
 is without the means of purchasing rank. In some re- 
 spects it is preferable to our ruinous system of exclusive 
 seniority and executive favoritism, but far more objection- 
 able than that based on merit. Wellington has recently 
 said that the system of exclusive seniority would soon ut- 
 terly destroy the efficiency of the army, by preventing 
 young men from reaching the higher grades. " At first," 
 says an officer of some distinction in the British navy, in 
 speaking of promotions in that arm of service, " it certain- 
 ly looks very hard to see old stagers grumbling away their 
 existence in disappointed hopes ; yet there can be little 
 doubt that the navy, and, of course, the country at large, 
 are essentially better served by the present system of em- 
 ploying active, young, and cheerful-minded officers, than 
 they ever could be by any imaginable system by seniority. 
 It must not be forgotten, indeed, that at a certain stage of 
 (he profession, the arrangement by which officers are pro- 
 moted in turn is already made the rule, and has long been 
 so : but, by a wise regulation, it does not come into oper 
 ation before the rank of post-captain be attained. Ante 
 cedent to this point, there must occur ample opportunities 
 of weeding out those persons, who, if the rule of mere se- 
 niority were adopted, would exceedingly embarrass the 
 navy list." We fully agree with this writer respecting the 
 evils of a system of exclusive seniority, but not respecting 
 
MILITARY EDUCATION. 40 1 
 
 the best means of remedying these evils. In England, where 
 the wealthy and aristocratic classes govern the state, they 
 may very well prefer a system of military appointment 
 and promotion based exclusively on wealth and political 
 influence ; but in this country we are taught to consider 
 merit as a claim much higher than wealth, or rank, or 
 privilege. 
 
 The various changes in the rules of appointment and 
 promotion in the French service, and the various results 
 of these changes, both on the character of the army and 
 the welfare of the state, are so instructive that we regret 
 
 that our limits will not allow us to enter into a full dis- 
 
 * 
 
 cussion of them. We can give only a very brief outline. 
 Previous to the Revolution, military appointment and 
 promotion were wholly subject to the rules of nobility, 
 certain grades in the army belonging of right to certain 
 grades of the noblesse ; merit and service being excluded 
 from consideration. But the constituent assembly changed 
 this order of things, and established the rule that three- 
 fourths of the sub-lieutenants be appointed by selection, 
 after a concours, and the other quarter be appointed from 
 the sub-officers, alternately by seniority and selection, 
 without concours ; the captains and lieutenants by se- 
 niority ; the colonels and lieutenant-colonels two-thirds 
 by seniority and one-third by selection ; marechaux-de' 
 camp and lieutenant-generals one-half by seniority and 
 one-half by selection. In 1793 the grades were still fur- 
 ther opened to selection, and in the turbulent times that 
 followed, a part of them were even thrown open to elec- 
 tion by the soldiers. But in 1795 the combined system 
 of merit and seniority, with certain improvements, was 
 restored. In 1796 and the wars that followed, merit was 
 the only qualification required, and Bonaparte, Moreau, 
 and other young generals were actually placed in com- 
 mand of their seniors in rank. Military talent and mil- 
 
402 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 itary semces, not rank, were the' recognised claims foi 
 promotion, the baptism of bloody as it was called, having 
 equalized all grades. Bonaparte, in leaving Egypt, paid 
 no attention to seniority of rank, but gave the command 
 to Kleber, who was then only a general of brigade, while 
 Menou was a general of division. Everybody knows 
 that on the death of Kleber, General Menou succeeded 
 in the command ; and that Egypt, saved by the selection 
 of Kleber, was lost by the seniority of Menou. 
 
 Napoleon formed rules for promotion, both for peace 
 and war, based on merit. His peace regulations were 
 much the same as the system of 1795 ; his field regula- 
 tions, however, from the circumstances of the times, were 
 almost the only ones used. The following extract from 
 the Reglement de Campagne of 1809, (title XX.,) gives 
 the spirit of this system : — " The next day after an action 
 the generals of brigade will present to the generals of 
 division the names of all such as have distinguished 
 themselves in a particular manner ; the generals of di- 
 vision will immediately report these to the commander- 
 in-chief, and also the names of the generals and superior 
 officers whose conduct has contributed most to secure 
 success, so that the general-in-chief may immediately in- 
 form his majesty." 
 
 On the restoration of the Bourbons there were also re- 
 stored many of the ancient privileges and claims of rank 
 by the officers of the maison militaire du roi, and court fa- 
 voritism was substituted for merit and service. But the 
 revolution of 1830 produced a different order of things. 
 " The laws now regulate military promotion ; the king can 
 appoint or promote only in conformity to legal prescrip- 
 tions ;, and even in the exercise of this prerogative, he is 
 wise enough to restrain himself by certain fixed rules, 
 "Which protect him from intrigues, and from the obsessions 
 of persons of influence, and of party politicians." Would 
 
MILITARY EDUCATION. 403 
 
 that the same could always be said of the executive of this 
 country in making appointments and promotions in the 
 army. 
 
 The existing laws and regulations of the French service 
 differ slightly for different corps, but the general rule is 
 as follows : No one can be appointed to the grade of offi- 
 cer in the army who has not graduated at one of the mili- 
 tary schools, or has not served at least two years as a sub- 
 officer in a corps (Tarmee. . In time of peace, no one can be 
 promoted to the rank of lieutenant, captain, or major, {chef- 
 cfescadron and chef-de-hataillon^) till he has served two 
 years in the next lower grade ; no one can be made lieu- 
 tenant-colonel till he has served four years, nor be made 
 colonel till he has served three years, in the next lower 
 grade ; no one can be made marechal-de-camp, lieutenant- 
 general, or marshal of France, till he has served two years 
 in the next lower grade. These numbers are all dimin- 
 ished one half in time of war. For the grades of first- 
 lieutenant and captain, two-thirds of the promotions are 
 by seniority, and one-third by selection ; for the chef-de- 
 bataillon and chef-d'escadron, one-half by seniority and 
 one-half by selection ; for all the other grades by selection 
 only. In time of war, one-half of the promotions to the 
 grades of first-lieutenant and captain are filled by selec- 
 tion, and all the promotions to other grades in this way. 
 For promotion by selection, a list of the authorized candi- 
 dates for each grade is made out every year by inspectors, 
 and boards of examiners appointed ad hoc^ and the name, 
 qualifications, and particular claim are given of each offi- 
 cer admitted to the concours. The recommendations of 
 these inspectors and examiners are almost invariably fol- 
 lowed by the government in its selections. This com- 
 bined system of seniority and merit secures a gradual pro- 
 motion to all, and at the same time enables officers of great 
 talents and acquirements to attain the higher grades while 
 
404 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 Still young and efficient. Merit need not, therefore, al- 
 ways linger in the subaltern grades, and be held subordi- 
 nate to ignorance and stupidity, merely because they hap- 
 pen to be endowed with the privileges of seniority. More- 
 over, government is precluded from thrusting its own fa- 
 vorites into the higher grades, and placing them over the 
 heads of abler and better men. 
 
 If such a system of appointment were introduced into 
 our army, and fixed by legal enactments, and no one were 
 allowed to receive a commission till he had either distin- 
 guished himself in the field, or had passed an examination 
 before a board of competent officers, we are confident that 
 better selections would be made in the appointments from 
 civil life than have been within the last ten years by the 
 present system of political influence. It would scarcely 
 be possible to make worse selections.* And if the com- 
 
 * To show the woiting of this system of political appointments, we 
 would call attention to a single fact. On the formation of an additional 
 regiment of dragoons in 1836, thirty of its officers were appointed from 
 civil life, and only four from the graduates of the Military Academy. 
 Of those appointed to that regiment from civil life, twenty-two have 
 already been dismissed or resigned, (most of the latter to save them- 
 selves from being dismissed,) and only eight of the whole thirty political 
 appointments are now left, their places having been mainly supplied by 
 graduates of the Military Academy. 
 
 In case of another increase of our military establishment, what course 
 will our government pursue ? Will it again pass by the meritorious young 
 officers of our army, — graduates of the Military Academy, — who have 
 spent ten or twelve of the best years of their life in qualifying themselves 
 for the higher duties of their profession, and place over their heads ci- 
 vilians of less education and inferior character — men totally ignorant of 
 military duties, mere pothouse politicians, and the base hirelings of party, 
 — those who screech the loudest in favor of party measures, and de- 
 grade themselves the most m order to serve party ends ? — and by thus 
 devoting the army, like the custom-house and post-office, to political 
 purposes, will it seek to increase that vast patronage of the executive 
 which is already debasing individual morality, and destroying the na« 
 
MILITARY EDUCATION. 405 
 
 bined system of seniority and examination were pursued 
 in promoting the subalterns already in service, it certainly 
 would produce less injustice, and give greater efficiency 
 to the army, than the present one of exclusive seniority 
 and brevet rank, obtained through intrigue and political 
 influence, or high military appointments bestowed as a re- 
 ward for dirty and corrupt party services. As a military 
 maxim, secure ejfficiency, hy limiting the privileges of rank ; 
 exclude favoritism, hy giving the power of selection to boards 
 of competent officers, totally independent of party politics. 
 Such a system has been for some time pursued in the med- 
 ical department of our army ; it has produced the most 
 satisfactory results ; stupidity, ignorance, and aged ineffi- 
 ciency have been overslaughed, and will soon entirely dis- 
 appear from that corps ; they have been replaced by young 
 men of activity, talent, character, intelligence, and great 
 professional skill. Is it less important to have competent 
 military officers to command where the lives of thousands, 
 the honor of our flag, the safety of the country depend upon 
 their judgment and conduct, than it is to have competent 
 surgeons to attend the sick and the wounded 1 
 
 We wish to call particular attention to this subject. It 
 deserves attention at all times, but at the present moment 
 it more especially demands a close and candid considera- 
 tion. The higher grades of our peace establishment are 
 now filled with men so far advanced in life that, in case 
 of an increase of the army, many of them must undoubt- 
 edly be either passed over, or put on a retired list. Soon- 
 er or later some change of this kind will undoubtedly be 
 made. It is demanded by the good of service, even in 
 time of peace ; and in time of war, it will be absolutely 
 
 tional character? Should any administration of the goverumeut be so 
 unmindful of the interests and honor of the country as to again pursue 
 such a coiuse, it is to be hoped that the sword of political justice will 
 not long slumber in its scabbard. 
 
406 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 necessary to the success of our arms.* But the great 
 danger is that the change may be made for the worse— 
 that all the appointments and promotions to the higher 
 grades will be made through political influence, thus con- 
 verting the army and navy into political engines. Let 
 proper measures be taken to prevent so dangerous a re- 
 sult ; let executive patronage in the army be limited by 
 wholesome laws, like those in France and Prussia ; and 
 let military merit and services, as determined by boards 
 of competent military oflicers, be the only recognised 
 claims to appointment and promotion, thus giving to the 
 poor and meritorious at least an equal chance with the 
 man of wealth and the base hireling of party. In actual 
 service the system of exclusive seniority cannot exist ; it 
 would deaden and paralyze all our energies. Taking ad- 
 vantage of this, politicians will drive us to the opposite 
 extreme, unless the executive authority be limited by 
 wholesome laws, based on the just principles of merit and 
 service. 
 
 But the importance of maintaining in our military or- 
 ganization a suitable system of military instruction is not 
 confined to the exigencies of our actual condition. It 
 mainly rests upon the absolute necessity of having in the 
 country a body of men who shall devote themselves to 
 the cultivation of military science, so as to be able to com- 
 pete with the military science of the transatlantic powers. 
 It is not to be expected that our citizen soldiery, however 
 intelligent, patriotic, and brave they may be, can make 
 
 * Even at the present moment, in ordering troops to Texas, where 
 immediate and active service is anticipated, it is found necessary to 
 break up regiments and send only the young and efficient officers 
 into the field, leaving most of the higher officers behind with mere 
 nominal commands. Very many of the officers now in Texas are 
 acting in capacities far above their nominal grades, but without receiv- 
 ing the rank, pay, and emoluments due to their services. 
 
MILITARY EDUCATION. 407 
 
 any very great progress in military studies. They have 
 neither the time nor opportunities for such pursuits, and if 
 they can acquire a practical acquaintance with elementary 
 tactics — the mere alphabet of the military art — it is as 
 much as can reasonably be expected of them. As a gen- 
 eral rule, the militia are individually more capable and in- 
 telligent than the men who compose a regular army. But 
 they must of necessity be inferior in practical professional 
 knowledge. 
 
 Technical education is necessary in every pursuit of 
 life. It is possible that the lawyer may succeed in some 
 particular cases without a knowledge of law, but he will 
 probably have few clients if he remain ignorant of the 
 laws and precedents that govern the courts. The un- 
 learned chemist may succeed in performing some single 
 experiment, but his progress will be slow and uncertain if 
 he neglect to make himself familiar with the experiments 
 and discoveries of his predecessors. 
 
 Learning, when applied to agriculture, raises it from a 
 mere mechanical drudgery to the dignity of a science. By 
 analyzing the composition of the soil we cultivate. We learn 
 its capacity for improvement, and gain the power to stimu- 
 late the earth to the most bountiful production. How dif- 
 ferent the results attending the labors of the intelligent 
 agriculturist, guided by the lamp of learning, from those 
 of the ignorant drudge who follows the barren formula of 
 traditional precepts ! As applied to manufactures and the 
 mechanical arts, learning develops new powers of labor, 
 and new facilities for subsistence and enjoyment. Personal 
 comforts of every kind are greatly increased, and placed 
 within the reach of the humbler classes ; while at the same 
 time the " appliances of art are made to minister to the 
 demands of elegant taste, and a higher moral culture." 
 As applied to commerce, it not only greatly increases the 
 facilities for the more general diffusion of civilization and 
 
408 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 knowledge, but is also vastly influential in harmonizing 
 the conflicting interests of nations. 
 
 Nor is learning less humanizing and pacific in its in- 
 fluence when applied to the military art. " During the 
 dark ages which followed the wreck of the Roman power, 
 the military science by which that power had been reared, 
 was lost with other branches of learning. When learning 
 revived, the military art revived with it, and contributed 
 not a little to the restoration of the empire of mind over 
 that of brute force. Then, too, every great discovery in 
 the art of war has a life-saving and peace-promoting in- 
 fluence. The effects of the invention of gunpowder are 
 a familiar proof of this remark ; and the same principle 
 applies to the discoveries of modern times. By perfecting 
 ourselves in military science, paradoxical as it may seem, 
 we are therefore assisting in the diffusion of peace, and 
 hastening on the approach of that period when swords 
 shall be beaten into ploughshares and spears into pruning* 
 hooks." 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 Since the first edition of this work^ was published, two important 
 wars have been commenced and terminated — that between the United 
 States and the Republic of Mexico, and that between Russia and the 
 Western Powers of Europe — and another is now being waged between 
 France and Austria, upon the old battle fields of Northern Italy. In 
 issuing a new edition of these Elements of Military Art and Science, it 
 is deemed proper to refer to these wars, and to apply the principles 
 here discussed to the military operations carried on in Mexico and in 
 the Crimea, It is proposed to do this in the form of Notes to the sev- 
 eral Chapters. The war in Italy being still undetermined, and the de- 
 tails of the several battles which have already been fought being but 
 imperfectly known, it is obviously improper to attempt to criticize their 
 strategic character or tactical arrangement 
 
 H. W. H. 
 
 New York, Jul^, 1859. 
 
 NOTE TO CHAPTER XL— Strategy. 
 
 separate armies, moving on /our distinct lines of operation : 
 1st. The " Army of the West," under General Kearny, mov- 
 ing from St. Louis on New Mexico and California ; 2d. The 
 " Army of the Centre," under General Wool, moving from Sau 
 Antonio de Bexar on Chihuahua; 3d. The "Army of Occupa- 
 tion," on the Rio Grande, under General Taylor, moving from 
 Corpus Christi on Matamoras, Monterey, and Saltillo ; and 4th. 
 The " Main Army," under General Scott, moving from Vera 
 Cruz on the capital of Mexico. 
 
 The Army of the West, under General Kearny, moved 
 35 
 
410 NOTES. 
 
 upon a separate and distinct line of operations, having nc 
 strategic relations to the other three ; its objects were the con 
 quest and occupation of New Mexico and Upper California. 
 The first was readily accomplished ; but the general then de- 
 tached so large a force to operate on Chihuahua after the diver- 
 sion of Wool's column, that his expedition to California must 
 have utterly failed without the assistance of the naval forces in 
 the Pacific. 
 
 The lines of Taylor and Wool were evidently ill chosen, 
 being so distant as to afibrd the enemy an opportunity to take 
 a central position between them. Fortunately Wool proceeded 
 no further than Monclova, and then turned off to occupy Parras, 
 thus coming under the immediate command of General Taylor. 
 The latter fought the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la 
 Palma, and sustained the siege of Fort Brown ; then crossing 
 the Rio Grande at Matamoras, he captured Monterey, and, 
 forming a junction with Wool, defeated the army of Santa 
 Anna at Buena Vista. This battle ended the campaign, which, 
 however brilliantly conducted, was entirely without strategic 
 results. 
 
 Scott landed his army near the Island of Sacrificios without 
 opposition, and immediately invested Vera Cruz, which sur- 
 rendered after a short siege and bombardment. Having thus 
 secured his base, he immediately advanced to the city of Puebla, 
 meeting and defeating the army of Santa Anna at Cerro Gordo. 
 Remaining some time at Puebla to reinforce his army, he ad- 
 vanced into the valley of Mexico, and after the brilliant vic- 
 tories of Contreras, Churubusco, Molino del Rey, and Chapul- 
 tepec, captured the city and terminated the war. 
 
 With respect to the double line of operations of Taylor and 
 Scott, it may be suflBcient to remark, that Santa Anna, 'from 
 his central position, fought, with the same troops, the battles 
 of Buena Vista and Cerro Gordo. It should also be remarked, 
 that the line of operations of the army of the Rio Grande was 
 not approved by either Scott or Taylor, nor, it is believed, by 
 any other officer of our army. Scott's line of operations, how- 
 ever, was truly strategic, and in turning the Mexican flank by 
 
NOTES. 41 1 
 
 Lake Ohalco and the Pedregal, he exhibited the skill of a great 
 general. 
 
 The war in the Crimea, from the hmited extent of the 
 theatre of operations, afforded but little opportunity for the 
 display of strategic skill on either side. Nevertheless, the 
 movements of both parties, prior to the investment and siege 
 of Sebastopol, are fair subjects for military criticism with re- 
 spect to the plans of operation. 
 
 When the allies landed their troops at the Old Fort, three 
 plans were open for the consideration of the Russian general : 
 1st. To destroy or close the harbors of Balaklava, Kamiesch, 
 Kazatch and Strelitzka, and, garrisoning Sebastopol with a 
 strong force, to occupy with the rest of his army the strong 
 plateau south of the city, and thus force the allies to besiege 
 the strong works on the north. 2d. Having closed the harbors 
 on the south, and secured Sebastopol from being carried by the 
 assault of any detachment of the allies, to operate on their 
 left flank, annoying and harassing them with his Cossacks, 
 and thus delay them many days in the diflScult and precarious 
 position which they would have occupied. 3d. To advance 
 with his whole force and offer them battle at the Alma. The 
 last and least advantageous of these plans was adopted, and as 
 the garrison of Sebastopol, during the battle, consisted of only 
 four battalions and the sailors of the fleet, it might, considering 
 the weakness of its works, have been easily carried by a de- 
 tachment of the allied forces. 
 
 For the allies at the Alma two plans presented themselves : 
 1st. To turn the Russian left, cut him off from Sebastopol, and 
 occupy that city in force. 2d. To turn the Russian right, and, 
 throwing him back upon Sebastopol, cut him off from all exter- 
 nal succor. Neither plan was fully carried out. The column of 
 General Bosquet turned the Russian left and decided his re- 
 treat ; but no strategic advantage was taken of the victory. 
 The battle was fought on the 20th of September, and by noon 
 of the 26th the allies had only advanced to the Balbeck, a dis- 
 tance of a little more than ten miles in six days ! On the 27th 
 they regained their communication with tbe fleet at Balaklava, 
 
412 NOTES. 
 
 without attempting to occupy Sebastopol, and haTing exposed 
 themselves to destruction by an ill-conducted flank march. For- 
 tunately for the allies, the Russians failed to avail themselves 
 of the advantages which the enemy had thus gratuitously af- 
 forded. The fleet having entered the open harbor of Balaklava, 
 the allies now commenced the labor of landing and moving up 
 their siege material and of opening their trenches, while the 
 Russians prepared their fortifications on the south of Sebasto- 
 pol for resisting the operations of that gigantic siege which 
 stands without a parallel in history. 
 
 NOTE TO CHAPTER III.— Fortifications. 
 
 In the war between the United States and Mexico, the latter 
 had no fortifications on her land frontiers, and, with the single 
 exception of Vera Cruz, her harbors were entirely destitute of 
 defensive works. The Americans, therefore, had no obstacles 
 of this kind to overcome on three of their lines of operation ; 
 and, when Scott had reduced Vera Cruz, his line of march was 
 open to the capital. Moreover, nearly every seaport on the 
 Gulf and Pacific coast fell into our hands without a blow. 
 Had the landing of Scott been properly opposed, and Vera 
 Cruz been strongly fortified and well defended, it would have 
 been taken only after a long and difficult siege. Moreover, had 
 the invading army encountered strong and well-defended fortifi- 
 cations on the line of march to Mexico, the war would, neces- 
 sarily, have been prolonged, and possibly with a diflerent result. 
 
 The Russian fortifications in the Baltic prevented the allies 
 from attempting any serious operations in that quarter, and 
 those in the Black Sea confined the war to a single point of the 
 Heracleidan Chersonese. Had Russia relied exclusively upon 
 her fleet to prevent a maritime descent, and left Sebastopol 
 entirely undefended by fortifications, how different had been 
 the result of the Crimean war. 
 
 This subject will be alluded to again in the Notes on Sea- 
 soast Defences, and Permanent Fortifications. 
 
NOTES. 413 
 
 NOTE TO CHAPTER IV.— Logistics. 
 
 The war in Mexico exhibited, in a striking manner, our 
 superiority over the enemy in this branch of the military art. 
 No army was better supphed than ours in all matters of sub- 
 sistence, clothing, medical and hospital stores, and in means of 
 transportation. Two points, however, are worthy of remark in 
 this connection : 1st. The great waste of material, which resulted 
 from the employment of raw troops under short enlistments, 
 and commanded by officers appointed. from civil life, who were 
 without experience and destitute of military instruction ; and, 
 2d. The immense expense of transportation, which was due in 
 part to the above cause and in part to the employment, in the 
 administrative departments, of civilians who were utterly igno- 
 rant of the rules and routine of military service. This war 
 was conducted on the system of magazines and provisions 
 carried in the train of the army, or purchased of the inhabitants 
 and regularly paid for, forced requisitions being seldom resorted 
 to, and then in very moderate quantities. The wisdom of this 
 plan was proved by the general good order and discipline of 
 our troops, and the general good-will of the non-combatant 
 inhabitants of the country which was passed over or occupied 
 by the army. 
 
 The war in the Crimea proved most conclusively the vast 
 superiority of the French administrative system over that of 
 the English — of the military over a civil organization of the 
 administrative corps of an army. The French troops before 
 Sebastopol were regularly, cheaply, and abundantly supphed 
 with every requisite of provisions, clothing, munitions, medical 
 stores, military utensils, and hospital and cam^ equipages; 
 while the English army, notwithstanding an immense expendi- 
 ture of money, was often paralyzed in its operations by the 
 want of proper military material, and not unfrequently was 
 destitute of even the necessaries of life. 
 
 Instead of profiting by this lesson, the recent tendency of 
 our own government has been (especially in supplying the 
 
414 NOTES. 
 
 army in Utah) to imitate the sad example of the English, and 
 to convert the supplying of our armies into a system of political 
 patronage to be used for party purposes. If fully carried out, 
 it must necessarily result in the ruin of the army, the robbery 
 of the treasury, and the utter corruption of the government. 
 
 NOTE TO CHAPTER V.— Tactics. 
 
 The war in Mexico, from the small number of troops-engaged, 
 and the peculiar character of the ground in most cases, afforded 
 but few opportunities for the display of that skill in the tactics 
 of battle which has so often determined the victory upon the 
 great fields of Europe. Nevertheless, the history of that war 
 is not without useful lessons in the use which may be made of 
 the several arms in the attack and defence of positions. The 
 limit assigned to these Notes will admit of only a few brief 
 remarks upon these battles. 
 
 The affairs of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma properly 
 constitute only a single battle. In the first, which was virtually 
 a cannonade, the lines were nearly parallel, and Arista's change 
 of front to an oblique position during the engagement, was 
 followed by a corresponding movement on the part of General 
 Taylor. Being made sensible of the superiority of the Ameri- 
 can artillery, the ]Mexican general fell back upon the Ravine of 
 Resaca de la Palma, drawing up his troops in a concave fine to 
 suit the physical character of the ground. The Americans 
 attacked the whole line with skirmishers, and with dragoons 
 supported by light artillery, and the charge of a heavy column 
 of infantry decided the victory. General Taylor's operations 
 at Monterey* partook more of the nature of an attack upon an 
 intrenched position than of a regular battle upon the field. 
 No doubt Worth's movement to the right had an important 
 influence in deciding the congest, but the separation of his 
 column from the main body, by a distance of some five miles, 
 was, to say the least, a most hazardous operation. The Mex- 
 icans, however, took no advantage of the opening to operate 
 
NOTES. 
 
 415 
 
 between the separate masses into which the American army- 
 was divided. The loss which the Mexicans inflicted upon us 
 resulted more from the strength of their position than from 
 any skilful use of their defensive works. In the battle of 
 Buena Vista, the efforts of Santa Anna were principally directed 
 to turning the American left. If he had concentrate.d his masses 
 more upon the centre at the plateau, the success gained in 
 the early part of the contest would probably have been decisive. 
 The American right at La Angostura was made almostt inacces- 
 sible by the deep ravines in its front, and the skilful use made 
 of the artillery from this point enabled General Taylor to gaia 
 the victory, even after his left had been completely turned, and 
 a portion of the volunteers had actually fled from the field. 
 
 The manner in which Scott handled his troops in the various 
 battles on his line of march from Vera Cruz to the capital, 
 proved him to be one of the best generals of the age. At 
 Cerro Gordo he so completely turned Santa Anna's left as to 
 cut off his line of retreat, and nearly destroyed his army, the 
 general himself barely escaping capture. The turning of 
 Valencia's position by the village of San Geronimo, at the 
 battle of Cdntreras, and the charge by Riley's columns of 
 infantry, were movements well planned and admirably executed, 
 as were also the rapid pursuit of Santa Anna to Churubusco, 
 and the flank and rear attacks by the brigades of Pierce and 
 Shialds. The victory of Molino del Eey was mostly won with 
 the musket, without very material assistance from heavy artil- 
 lery, and was one of the most brilliant but dearly bought 
 achievements of the war. The assault upon Chapul tepee was 
 preceded by a long and heavy cannonade, which produced a 
 decided moral effect upon the enemy and greatly facilitated the 
 assault. 
 
 With respect to the battles of the Crimean war, only that 
 of the Alma is subject to the tactical criticism of ordinary bat- 
 tles ; those of Balaklava, Inkerman, and the Tchernaya, were 
 of the nature of sorties made to prevent an assault of the unfin- 
 ished works of defence, and to prolong the operations of the 
 siege. They must therefore be judged as such, and not accord- 
 
416 NOTES. 
 
 
 
 ing to the ordinary rules applicable to contests in the open field. 
 At the battle of the Alma the Russians were attacked in 
 position, the two lines of battle being nearly parallel. Accord- 
 ing to the original plan of attack, the Turks and Bosquet's 
 division was to turn the Russian left, while the main attack was 
 made upon the centre. But, on account of the division of com- 
 mand in the allied army, there was no concert of action. The 
 heavy column of Bosquet probably decided the victory, although 
 the battle^was general throughout the whole line. The English 
 army advanced in columns of brigades at deploying distances^ 
 its right connected with the French, and its left protected by a 
 line of skirmishers, of cavalry and horse artillery. "With 
 respect to the formation and use of troops in the other battles, 
 it may be remarked that the charge of the English light cavalry 
 at Balaklava was apparently without necessity or object, and 
 led to its inevitable destruction. In the battle of Inkerman 
 the Russians directed their main attack upon the English right 
 and centre, with false attacks upon the French left and towards 
 Balaklava. But these false attacks, as is usual in such cases, 
 were not conducted with sufficient energy and decision, and 
 Bosquet was thus enabled to perceive the real intentions of 
 the enemy upon the English portion of the line and move to 
 its assistance. Moreover, the main body of the Russians 
 moved in too heavy and unwieldy masses, which exposed 
 them to terrible losses, and rendered impossible a rapid and 
 effective deployment of their numerical force. The same 
 criticism is applicable to their formation at the battle of 
 the Tchernaya. 
 
 NOTE TO CHAPTER VI.— Means of National Defence. 
 
 On the invasion of Mexico by the United States, the former 
 republic had a large army of tolerably good troops, though badly 
 officered, still worse equipped, and almost destitute of proper 
 military stores j but she was entirely wanting in two important 
 elements of national defence — fortifications and a navy. Her 
 
NOTES. 417 
 
 weakness was shown by the rapid and easy conquest of almost 
 the entire country. 
 
 We have already remarked that the fortifications of Russia 
 confined the theatre of war to a single point of the Crimea, and 
 limited the military operations of the aUies to the prolonged 
 and only partially successful siege of Sebastopol. 
 
 NOTE TO CHAPTER VII.— Sea-Coast Defences. 
 
 Allusion has already been made to the weakness of Mexico, 
 resulting from her want of sea-coast defences, as shown by the 
 war between that republic and the United States. This 
 would have been still more manifest had she possessed any thing 
 like a commercial marine, exposed to capture by our naval 
 forces. As it was, the Mexican war afforded not a single con- 
 test between ships and forts, no opposition being made to the 
 occupation of Mexican ports by our naval force. The only 
 coast defence, the castle of San Juan d'UUoa, was not attacked, 
 but after the bombardment and capture of Vera Cruz, it sur- 
 rendered without a blow. 
 
 The Crimean war, on the contrary, exhibited in a most 
 marked degree the importance of a well-fortified sea-coast. 
 Notwithstanding the immense force of the combined fleets of 
 England and France, no naval attack was made upon either 
 Cronstadt or Sebastopol, and the large naval force of Russia 
 proved utterly useless as a defence against a maritime descent. 
 There was, indeed, a simulachre of a " naval cannonade " on the 
 latter place on the 17th of October, 1854, intended as a diver- 
 sion of the attention and strength of the garrison from the 
 land side, where the real struggle for predominance was going 
 on between the besieged and the besiegers. The inutility of 
 this attempt was so manifest that no serious naval attack was 
 undertaken, notwithstanding that the allies were ready to bring 
 to bear upon the antiquated and ill-armed Russian works the 
 most powerful naval armaments the world had ever seen. 
 
 The results of this " simulachre of a naval cannonade," as it 
 
418 NOTES. 
 
 has been called, is worthy of note. The details are taken from 
 Major Barnard's able pamphlet on '^ The Dangers and Defences 
 of New York," and Commander Dahlgren's interesting and 
 valuable work on "Shells and Shell Guns." 
 
 " The allied fleet consisted of 14 French, 10 British, and 2 Turkish 
 ships-of-the-line (some few of which had auxiliary steam power), and a 
 number of side-wheel steamers to tow these ; and carried in all about 
 2,500 guns. It was opposed by about 280 guns from the works. The 
 fleet kept itself (in general) at a respectable distance (from 1500 to 2000 
 yards) ; too far to inflict any material injury with its armament (82- 
 pounders, with a moderate proportion of 8-inch shell-guns) upon the 
 works ; — too far to receive much from the inefficient armament of the 
 Russian works. 
 
 " The only exception to this remark applies to the detached English 
 squadron under Sir Edmund Lyons, consisting of the Agamemnon^ 
 Sampareil, London, Arethusa, and Albion^ the first-named of which 
 vessels took a position at 750 or 800 yards from Fort Constantine, while 
 the others stretched along, at about the same distance from Fort Con- 
 stantine, the ' Wasp Tower,' and ' Telegraph Battery.' Dahlgren de- 
 scribes the result as follows : — 
 
 " * The Agamemnon was very seriously maltreated, though not to 
 such an extent as to impair her power of battery or engine. She was 
 on fire several times ; was struck by 240 shot or shells ; and, singular 
 to say, only lost 29, while her second, just by, lost 70 men. The Albion 
 sufiered still more, and in an hour was towed out crippled, and on fire 
 in more than one place, with a loss of 81 men. The crews of the Lon- 
 don and Arethusa fared rather better, but the ships nearly as ill ; and 
 they too remained in station but a little time after the Albion. The 
 Queen was driven off soon after she got into her new position, in great 
 danger ; and the Rodney had the bare satisfaction of getting aground 
 and afloat after experiencing some damage. 
 
 " ' The value of the small works on the cape and blufis, was clearly 
 defined in these results ; being above the dense cloud of smoke that 
 enveloped the ships and the lower forts, their aim was not embarrassed, 
 while the seamen labored under the difficulty of firing, with an incon- 
 venient elevation, at objects that they saw but seldom, and then but 
 dimly and briefly. As a consequence, three line-of-battle ships and a 
 frigate were driven off very shortly and in great peril, and a fourth 
 badly cut up ; while the Agamemnon lay opposed to one of the heaviest 
 sea-forts with two tiers of casemates, and at the end of five hours came 
 off with comparatively little loss.' 
 
 " Whatever superiority of effect the batteries on the heights may 
 have had (and we have so few details about these works that we can 
 
NOTES. 419 
 
 draw no sure conclusion from this mere naked statement of damages 
 received by the vessels), it evidently was not for want of being Mt often 
 enough (smoke or no smoke), that the Agamemnon escaped with so 
 little injury. She * was struck by 240 shot and shells ; ' and it is only 
 due to the inefficiency of the projectiles by which she was struck, that 
 she was not destroyed. 
 
 " With respect to the damages received by Fort Constantine, Dahl- 
 gren says : — 
 
 " * The distance of the Agamemnon and Sanspareil from Fort Con- 
 stantine (17th October, 1854), was assumed to be about 800 yards ; Lord 
 Raglan states it to have been rather less. These two ships could bring 
 to bear about 87 guns, and the firing from them probably lasted some 
 four hours. There can be no doubt that it inflicted much damage, for 
 the Russian Commander-in-chief admits it in his official report ; but not 
 sufficient to impair the strength of the masonry, and far short of effect- 
 ing a breach in it. 
 
 *'*At Bomarsund, the results were rather different : — Three 32- 
 pounders of 42 cwt. (guns of inferior weight), were landed from a ship's 
 spar deck, and placed in battery at 950 yards from the North Tower — 
 the masonry of good quality and Gi feet thick. In eight hours, the wall 
 between two embrasures was cut through from top to bottom, offering 
 a practicable breach, to effect which 487 shot and 45 shells were fired, 
 being at the rate of one round from the battery in rather less than a 
 minute ; or, from each gun, one iu 2f minutes. The Tower surren- 
 dered. 
 
 " ' It seems almost incredible that three pieces should be able to 
 accomplish fully that which eighty-seven pieces utterly failed to do, the 
 distances from the object being alike — particularly when it is considered 
 that many of the latter were of greater calibre, and most of them 
 employed much heavier charges where the calibres were similar. The 
 guns of the ship, if fired at the same rate as those of the battery, which 
 was not unusually rapid (one round in two and three-fourth minutes), 
 would have discharged some seven thousand seven hundred shot and 
 shells in the course of the four hours, supposing no interruption ; a 
 number which, if properly applied, would appear, from the results of 
 three guns, to have been sufficient to breach the wall of the fort in four- 
 teen places ; whereas they did not effect a single breach, which is abun- 
 dant proof of the lack of accuracy. They must either have been 
 dispersed over the surface of the fort, or else missed it altogether, and 
 thi^ could have been due only to a want of the precision which was 
 attained by the battery. The constantly preferred complaint of motion 
 in the ships was not to be urged, because on the day of cannonading 
 Sebastopol, there was scarcely a breath of wind, and the ships were too 
 large to be easily moved by the swell, unless very considerable. That 
 
420 NOTES. 
 
 the fort did no greater damage to the ships than it received from them, 
 proves no more than that its fire was quite as illy directed, and the 
 calibres too low. It is said that the Agamemnon was struck in the hull 
 bj two hundred and forty shot and shells, which must have been but a 
 small portion of what was fired, though sufficient to be decisive, if, as 
 already observed, the calibre had been heavier.' " 
 
 Here, then, a number of projectiles thrown from the ships, 
 which were sufficient, had they been -thrown from a land bat- 
 tery, according to the result at Bomarsund, to produce fourteen 
 practicable breaches, failed not only to produce a single breach, 
 but even '''to impair the strength of the masonry." 
 
 The reason of this is obvious. That degree of precision of 
 fire by which a breach is effected by a land battery is utterly 
 unattainable from a floating structure, for the motion of the 
 water, even in the calmest days, is quite sufficient to prevent 
 accuracy of aim at an object at a distance, as in this case, of 
 seven and eight hundred yards. 
 
 With respect to the action of the shot and shells upon the 
 Agamemnon^ it is to be remarked that we have as yet had no 
 fair trial of the power of the fire of modern shell-guns of large 
 calibre from land batteries against ships of war. The Russians 
 had some of them in their fleet, and at Sinope, with their shell- 
 guns, they blew up two Turkish frigates in fifteen minutes. 
 It does not appear that in the Crimean war they had yet pro- 
 vided their fortifications with the modern armaments, for where 
 shells were thrown from their sea-coast batteries, they were in 
 ever}-- instance of inferior calibre. 
 
 With respect to the naval attack upon Kinbum, which has 
 been referred to as showing the importance of floating batteries 
 as an auxiliary to ships in reducing harbor defences, we have 
 no official reports of the Russians from which to derive accurate 
 information of the strength of the works attacked. Dahlgren, 
 drawing his information from the official accounts of the " English 
 and French admii-als," describes the works and their location 
 its follows : — 
 
 " * The Boug and the Dnieper issue into a large basin, formed partly 
 by the projection of the main shore, partly by a long narrow strip of 
 Band-beach, which continues from it and takes a north-westerly direction 
 
NOTES. 421 
 
 until it passes the promoutory of Otchakov, where it terminates, and 
 from which it is separated by the channel, whereby the waters of the 
 estuary empty into the Black Sea. 
 
 " ' The distance between the spit or extremity of this tongue and the 
 Point of Oichakov, or the main shore opposite, is about two miles ; but 
 the water is too shoal to admit of the passage of large vessels of war, 
 except in the narrow channel that runs nearest to the spit and its north- 
 ern shore. Here, therefore, are placed the works designed to command 
 the entrance. They are thref in number. Near the extreme point of 
 the spit is a covered battery built of logs, which are filled in and over- 
 laid with sand, — pierced for eighteen guns, but mounting only ten. 
 
 " * Advancing further along the beach is a circular redoubt^ connected 
 with the spit battery by a covered way. This work, built of stone, 
 and riveted with turf, is open, and said to be the most substantial 
 of the three ; it has eleven cannon, and within is a furnace for heating 
 shot. 
 
 *' * Further on, and where the beach has widened considerably, is 
 Fort Kinburn, a square bastioned work, extending to the sea on the 
 south, and to the waters of the estuary on the north. It is casemated 
 in part, though but few of these embrasures were armed, — its chief force 
 being in the pieces en barbette, and some nine or ten mortars. The 
 masonry, though solid, is represented by an eye-witness not to be bomb- 
 proof, and so dilapidated by age that the mortar was falling out from 
 the interstices, leaving the stone to disintegrate. The interior space 
 was occupied by ranges of wooden buildings, slightly constructed and 
 plastered over. 
 
 " * This fort is said to be armed with sixty pieces. The English 
 admiral states, that all three of the works mounted eighty-one guns and 
 mortars. The calibres are not given officially, but stated in private 
 letters to be 18-pounders and 32-pounders.' " 
 
 " The above description will quite justify the further remark as to 
 these works : — 
 
 " * They were inferior in every respect, and manifestly incapable ot 
 withstanding any serious operation by sea or land. The main fort was 
 particularly weak in design, and dilapidated ; all of them were indiffer- 
 ently armed and garrisoned.' " 
 
 " So much for the works. As to the character of the armament 
 brought to the assault, the same authority says : — 
 
 " * The allied force was admirably adapted to the operation, em- 
 bracing every description of vessel, from the largest to the smallest, 
 and all propelled by steam. There were screw-liners, and like vessels 
 of inferior class, side-wheel steamers, screw gunboats, floating-batteries, 
 mortar-vessels, etc., each armed in what was considered the most ap- 
 proved manner.' And this truly formidable naval force carried besides 
 
422 NOTES. 
 
 'some thousand troops' on board, all designed to attack these *dilapi» 
 dated ' works of Kinburn. 
 
 " Without going into the particulars, we simply give Dahlgren's ac- 
 count of the alBTair : — 
 
 " * The French floating-batteries {Devastation, Lave, and Tonnante) 
 steamed in to make their first essay, anchoring some six or seven hun- 
 dred yards off" the S. E. bastion of Fort Kinburn, and at 9.20 opened 
 fire, supported by the mortar-vessels, of which six were English, by 
 the gun-boats, five French and six Englifh, and by the steamer Odin, 
 16. 
 
 '"The heavy metal of the floating-batteries (said to be twelve 50- 
 pounders ot the broadside of each) soon told on the walls of the fort ; 
 and the vertical fire was so good that the French admiral attributed to 
 it, in great part, the speedy surrender of the place. The gun-boats also 
 made good ricochet practice, which was noticed to be severe on the 
 barbette batteries. 
 
 " ' The Russian gunners, in nowise daunted by this varied fire, plied 
 their guns rapidly in return, directing their attention chiefly to the 
 floating-batteries, which were nearest. 
 
 " * Exactly at noon, the admirals steamed in with the Royal Albert 
 121, Algiers, 91, Agamemnon, 90, and Princess lioyal,^0, with the four 
 French liners in close order, taking position in line, ranging N. W. and 
 S. E., about one mile from the fort, in twenty-eight feet water. 
 
 " ' At the same time, a squadron of steam-frigates, under Rear- 
 Admirals Stewart and Pellion, dashed in through the passage to the 
 basin, opening fire on the spit and central batteries in passing, and an- 
 choring well inside of Fort Nicholaiev and Otchakov. The attack sea- 
 ward was completed by the Acre, 100, Curagoa, 30, Tribune, 30, and 
 Sphynx, 6, opening on the central battery; while the Hannibal, 91, 
 Dauntless, 24, and Terrible, 21, assailed that on the spit. To this storm 
 of shot and shells, the Russians could not reply long. In the spit bat- 
 tery, the sand falling through between the logs, displaced by shot and 
 shells, choked the embrasures, and blocked up the guns. In the fort, 
 the light wooden buildings were in flames at an early hour ; then the 
 walls began to crumble before the balls which came from every quarter, 
 front, flank, and rear ; and as the guns were disabled successively, the 
 return became feeble, until few were in condition to be fired, the central 
 redoubt alone discharging single guns at long intervals. The Russian 
 commander, however, made no sign of surrender ; but the admirals, 
 seeing that his fire had ceased, and further defence was unavailing, 
 hoisted the white flag at 1.35 p. m., upon which the works were given 
 up on honorable terms. 
 
 " * The garrison consisted of about fourteen hundred men ; their loss 
 
NOTES. _ 423 
 
 is differently stated, — the French admiral says eighty wounded,— 
 another, forty-three killed and one hundred and fourteen wounded. 
 
 " ' The English suffered the least, having but two men wounded; 
 besides two killed and two wounded in the Arrow, by the bursting of 
 her two 68-pounder Lancaster guns, 
 
 " ' The superiority of the allied vessels in number and calibre of 
 ordnance was very decided ; they must have had at least six hundred 
 and fifty pieces in play, chiefly 32-pounders, and 8-inch shell guns, with 
 a fair proportion of 68-pounders and mortars, besides the 50-pounders 
 of the French floating batteries. To which the Russians could only 
 reply with eighty-one cannon and mortars, and no guns of heavier 
 calibre than 32-pounders, while many were lower. The greai disparity 
 in offensive power was not compensated to the works by the advantage 
 of commanding position, the Russian fort and redoubt being upon 
 nearly the same level with the ships' batteries, and also very deficient 
 in proper strength. On the other hand, the depth of water did not 
 allow the liners to approach nearer than one mile ; and thus their fire 
 was by no means so intense as it would have been at shorter range. 
 
 " < This was the sole occasion in which the floating batteries had an 
 opportunity of proving their endurance ; which was the question of 
 most importance, as no one could doubt the effect of long 50-pounders, 
 or 68-pounders, when brought within a few hundred yards of masonry, 
 and able to retain the steadiness indispensable to a breaching fire. 
 
 " <No siege operation had ever embraced batteries of such power, 
 for though the English had employed long 68-pounders at Sebastopol, 
 yet the distance from the objects exceeded a thousand yards ; and the 
 concentration of fire, so far as any opinion can be formed from the 
 published statements, was far inferior to that of the thirty-six 50- 
 pounders, in the broadsides of the three batteries anchored in close 
 order. 
 
 *' * They were hulled repeatedly by shot ; one of them (the Devasta- 
 tion), it is said, sixty-seven times, without any other effect on the stout 
 iron plates than to dint them, at the most, one and a half inches, — still, 
 there were ten men killed and wounded in this battery by shot and shell 
 which entered the ports, — and the majority of damage to the French 
 personnel (twenty-seven men) occurred in the three floating-batteries.' " 
 
 Major Barnard, in commenting upon this affair, says that it " proves 
 nothing, unless it be, that dilapidated, and ill-designed, and ill-con- 
 structed works, armed with inferior calibres, cannot contend against 
 such an overwhelming array of force as was here displayed. * * * The 
 Fort of Kinburn surrendered, not because it was breached — not because 
 the defenders were so far diminished by their losses as to be un- 
 able to protract the contest, — but simply because the guns and 
 gunners, exposed in all possible ways, were put hors-du-combat, and 
 
424 . NOTES. 
 
 the calibres (of the guns in Kinburn) were incapable of doing anj 
 great damage to the vessels, at the distance they were stationed." 
 
 The guns in the low open batteries were exposed to a ri- 
 cochet and vertical fire, to which latter the French admiral 
 attributed, in good part, the surrender of the place. The 
 buildings behind the batteries, built of wood, " slightly con- 
 structed and plastered over," were set on fire, and the heat 
 and smoke must have rendered the service of the guns almost 
 impracticable. Nevertheless, out of a garrison of 1,400, only 
 157 were killed and wounded — a very small loss under all the 
 circumstances. If the works had been well- constructed case- 
 mates, covering the men from the ricochet and vertical fires 
 and the sharpshooters of the troops who invested the land 
 fronts, the loss of the garrison would have been still less j and 
 if they had been armed with heavier projectiles, much greater 
 damage would have been inflicted upon the attacking force. 
 
 With respect to the use of floating-batteries in this case, 
 Commander Dahlgren very judiciously remarks : — 
 
 " The nse that can be made of floating-batteries, as auxiliaries in 
 attacking shore-works, must depend on further confirmation of their 
 asserted invulnerability. It may be that the performance at Kinburn 
 answered the expectation of the French emperor as regards offensive 
 power, for that is a mere question of the battering capacity of the 
 heaviest calibres, which is undoubted ; but the main issue, which con- 
 cerns their endurance, cannot be settled by the impact of 32-pounder 
 shot, fired at 600 and 700 yards. Far heavier projectiles will in future 
 be found on all sea-board fortifications ; and the ingenuity of the artil- 
 lerist may also be exerted more successfully than at Kinburn. Still, it 
 is not to be doubted that the floating-battery is a formidable element in 
 assailing forts, even if its endurance falls short of absolute invulner- 
 ability; and the defence will do well to provide against its employ- 
 ment." 
 
 The works at Bomarsund were taken by means of land- 
 latteries^ which breached the exposed walls of the towers and 
 main works. An auxiliary fire was opened upon the water 
 fipont by the fleet, but it produced very little effect. But after 
 the work had been reduced, an experimental firing was made 
 Dy the Edinburgh^ armed with the largest and most powerful 
 guns in the British navy. 
 
NOTES. 425 
 
 In speaking of the effects of the siege batteries upon the 
 walls of Bomarsund, and the experimental fire of the Edin- 
 lurgJi^ Sir Howard Douglas remarks : — 
 
 " This successful operation (of the land batteries) is very generally, 
 but erroneously, stated to have been effected by the fire of the ships, 
 and it is even strongly held up as a proof of what ships can do, and 
 ought to attempt elsewhere. 
 
 "But the results of the experimental firing at the remnant of the 
 fort, which, unless the previous firing of the ships during the attack 
 was absolutely harmless, must have been somewhat damaged, and more- 
 over shaken by the blowing-up of the contiguous portions, do not war- 
 rant this conclusion, even should the attacking ships be permitted, like 
 the EdinlurgJi, to take up, quietly and coolly, positions within 500 
 yards, and then deliberately commence and continue their firing, with- 
 out being fired at ! The firing of the Edinburgh^ at 1,060 yards, was 
 unsatisfactory, 390 shot and shells were fired, from the largest and 
 most powerful guns in the British navy (viz., from the Lancaster gun 
 of 95 cwt., with an elongated shell of 100 lbs. ; — from 68-pounders of 95 
 cwt., and 32-pou.nder3 of 56 cwt., solid shot guns; — from 10-inch shell 
 guns of 84 cwt., with hollow shot of 84 lbs. ; — from 8-inch shell guns of 
 65 and 60 cwt., with hollow shot of 56 lbs.), and did but little injury to 
 the work. At 480 yards, 250 shot, shells, and hollow shot were fired. 
 A small breach was formed in the facing of the outer wall, of extremely 
 bad masonry, and considerable damage done to the embrasures and 
 other portions of the wall ; but no decisive result was obtained — no 
 practicable breach formed, by which the work might be assaulted, 
 taken, and effectually destroyed, although 640 shot and shells (40,000 
 lbs. of metal) were fired into the place, first at 1,060, and then at 480 
 yards." 
 
 Surely, this " naval attack," taken in connection with the 
 true facts of the capture of Kinburn, the abortive attempt of 
 the British fleet in the Pacific upon the Kussian works of 
 Petropauloski, is not calculated to affect the well established 
 opinion of the ability of forts to resist maritime attacks. 
 
 Few are now disposed to dispute the general superiority of 
 guns ashore over guns afloat ; but some think that works -of 
 masonry are incapable of resisting the heavy and continuous 
 fire which may now be brought against it by fleets and floating- 
 batteries, and would therefore extend the area of the works 
 and rely mainly upon earthen parapets, with guns in barbette. 
 
426 NOTES. 
 
 This conclusion they form from the results of the maritime 
 attack, on Kinburn, and of the land-batteries on Bomarsund. 
 
 Major Barnard, in his valuable work on " The Dangers and 
 Defences of New York," draws a very different conclusion 
 from these attacks, and contends that they abundantly prove 
 the capability of well-constructed stone masonry to resist the 
 fire of ships and floating-batteries, if the- latter are opposed by 
 proper ar^jaaments in the forts ; moreover, that they proved the 
 superiority of casemated forts over low open batteries, with 
 guns in barbette, in covering the garrison from the effects of a 
 vertical and ricochet fire. Unquestionably the masonry at 
 Bomarsund was poorly constructed ; nevertheless, the fire of 
 the shipping produced very little effect upon it. It is also 
 equally certain that Kinburn was taken, not by a breaching 
 fire, but mainly by the effects of vertical and ricochet fires. 
 
 With respect to our own system of sea-coast defences, it 
 may be remarked, that, since this chapter was written, the 
 works mentioned therein as having been commenced, have been 
 gradually advanced towards completion, and that the acquisi- 
 tion of Texas and California, and the settlement of Oregon and 
 Washington Territory, by greatly extending our line of mari- 
 time defence, have rendered necessary the fortification of other 
 points. It should also be noted that while the value and neces- 
 sity of these works are generally admitted, and while the gen- 
 eral outline of the system is almost universally approved, many 
 are of the opinion that the increased facilities for naval attacks, 
 and the immense power of modern maritime expeditions, like 
 that upon Sebastopol, render it necessary to more strongly- 
 fortify the great naval and commercial ports of New York and 
 San Francisco— one the Tcey point of the Atlantic, and the 
 other of the Pacific coast. Perhaps the system adopted by 
 our Boards of Engineers may be open to the objection that 
 they have adopted too many points of defence, without giving 
 gufficient prominence to our great seaports, which are neces- 
 sarily the strategic points of coast defence. However this may 
 have been at the time the system was adopted, there can be 
 uo question that the relative strength of the works designed 
 
NOTES. 427 
 
 for the different points of our coast does not correspond to the 
 present relative importance of the places to be defended, and 
 the relative temptations they offer to an enemy capable of or- 
 ganizing the means of maritime attack. On this subject we 
 quote from the work of Major Barnard : — 
 
 " While the means of maritime attack have of late years assumed 
 a magnitude and formidableness not dreamed of when our defensive 
 system was planned, and our country has so increased in population, 
 wealth and military resources, that no enemy can hope to make any 
 impression by an invasion of our territory, — our great maritime places 
 like New York, have, on the other hand, increased in even greater pro- 
 portion, in every thing that could make them objects of attack. 
 
 *' The works deemed adequate in former years for the defence of 
 New York could not, therefore, in the nature of things, be adequate at 
 the present day. 
 
 ** The recent war of England and France against Russia may illus- 
 trate my meaning ; for it has taught us what to expect were either of 
 these nations to wage war against the United States. 
 
 " No invasion of territory, no attempt at territorial conquest was 
 made, or thought of; for it was well foreseen that no decisive results 
 would flow from such means. The war consisted exclusively in attacks 
 upon maritime places — great seaports — seats of commercial and naval 
 power. Such places, by their vast importance to the well-being and 
 prosperity of a nation — by the large populations and immense amount 
 of wealth concentrated in them, and by their exposure to maritime at- 
 tack, offer themselves at once as points at which the most decisive re- 
 sults may be produced. Cronstadt, Sebastopol, Sweaborg, Kinburn, 
 Odessa, Kertch, Petropauloski, and other places of less note, were in 
 succession or simultaneously objects of attack ; while such as the first 
 named became, indeed, the true seats of war. 
 
 "Around Sebastopol assailed and assailant gathered their re« 
 sources, and on the result of the arduous struggle may be said to have 
 turned the issue of the war. Had it not been so decided tJiere, Cron- 
 stadt would have been the next field of combat, — for which, indeed, the 
 allies had made the most enormous preparations. 
 
 " Is it not certain that in future all war of maritime powers against 
 the United States, will take a similar course ? All territorial invasion 
 being out of the question, it is against our great seaports and strategic 
 points of coast defence— such as New York, New Orleans, and San 
 Francisco— pre-eminently New York,— that an enemy will concentrate 
 his efforts. Against these he will prepare such immense armaments, — 
 against these he will call into existence special agencies of attack,— 
 
428 NOTES. 
 
 which (unless met by an inexpugnable defensive system) stall znsuri 
 success. 
 
 " The mere defense of the city against ordinary fleets, is no longer 
 the question ; but through the defensive works to he here erected, the 7?-a- 
 tion is to measure its strength against the most lavish use of the resources 
 of a great maritime power, aided ly all that modern science and me- 
 chanical ingenuity in creating or inventing means of attach, can 'bring 
 against them ; in short, in fortifying New York, we are really preparing 
 the hattle field on which the issue of future momentous conteds is to ha 
 decided^* 
 
 A few, however, object to the system at present adopted, 
 on the ground that casemated works do not offer sufficient re- 
 sistance to ships and floating-batteries, and that earthen works, 
 covering a greater area, will accomplish that object much more 
 effectually, while their longer land fronts will be more difficult 
 of reduction by siege. 
 
 It cannot be doubted that earthen batteries, with guns in 
 barbette, can, as a general rule, be more easily taken by as- 
 sault, that they are more exposed to vertical and ricochet 
 firing, and more expose their gunners to be picked off by 
 sharpshooters. Moreover, they give but a very limited fire 
 upon the most desirable point, as the entrance to a harbor. 
 On the other hand, it has not been proved that masonry-case- 
 mated works, when properly constructed and properly armedj 
 will not effectually resist a naval cannonade, whether from 
 ships or floating-batteries. The results of recent wars, and of 
 the West Point experiments by General Totten, would seem 
 to prove them abundantly capable of doing this. Against such 
 proofs the mere ad captandum assertion of their incapacity can 
 have but little weight — certainly not enough to justify the 
 abandonment of a system approved by the best militar;^ 
 authorities of this country and Europe, and sanctioned bj 
 long experience. 
 
 Major Barnard, in speaking of the capacity of masonry 
 casemated forts to resist the fire of a hostile armament, and of 
 the propriety of abandoning them for earthen batteries in oui 
 system of Coast Defences, uses the following forcible lan- 
 guage : — 
 
NOTES, 429 
 
 "When we bear in mind that the hostile 'floating batteries,' of 
 whatever description, will themselves be exposed to the most formidable 
 projectiles that can be thrown from shore batteries, — that when they 
 choose to come to 'close quarters,' to attempt to breach, their 'em- 
 brasures' present openings through which deluges of grape, canister, 
 and musket balls can be poured upon the gunners ; and consider what 
 experience has so far shown, and reason has taught us, with regard to 
 the casemate, — we need not be under apprehension that our casemated 
 works will be battered down ; nor doubt that they will, as they did in 
 Russia, answer the important purposes for which they were designed. 
 
 " It only remains to show the necessity of such works. It, in general, 
 costs much less to place a gun behind an earthen parapet, than to build 
 a masonry structure covered with bomb-proof arches, in which to mount 
 it. All authorities agree that an open barbette battery (Grivel's very 
 forcible admission has been Quoted), on a low site, and to which vessels 
 can approach within 300 or 400 yards, is utterly inadmissible. It may 
 safely be said, that in nine cases out of ten, the sites which furnish the 
 efficient raking and cross fires upon the channels, are exactly of this 
 character ; and indeed it very often happens that there are no others. 
 
 " When such sites are found, it rarely happens that they afford room 
 for sufficient number of guns in open batteries. Hence the necessity 
 of putting them tier above tier, which involves, of course, the case- 
 mated structure. Such works, furnishing from their lower tier a low, 
 raking fire, and (if of several tiers) a plunging fire from their barbettes, 
 ofiFer as favorable emplacements for guns as can be contrived, and afford 
 to their gunners a degree of security quite as great as can be given to 
 men thus engaged. 
 
 " On subjects which have a mere speculative importance, there is no 
 danger in giving rein to speculation ; but on those of such real and in- 
 tense practical importance as the security against hostile aggression of 
 the great city and port of New York, it is not admissible to set aside 
 the experience of the past, or the opinions of the best minds who have 
 devoted themselves to such subjects. A means of defence, sanctioned 
 by its being confided in to protect the great ports of Europe — which has 
 protected the great ports of Russia against the most formidable naval 
 armament thai ever floated on the ocean, has a claim upon our confi- 
 dence which mere criticism cannot diminish ; and a claim to be adhered 
 to in place of all new * systems,' until time and trial shall have necessi' 
 toted (not merely justified) the change. 
 
 " If, then, we refer to the practice of other nations, to find what has 
 been judged necessary for the defence of important ports, — to expe- 
 rience, to find how such defensive systems have stood the test of actual 
 trial, — we may draw useful conclusions with regard to what is now re- 
 quired to defend New York. We shall find at Sebastopol — a narrow 
 
430 NOTES. 
 
 harbor, which owed its importance to its being the great naval depot 
 of Russia on the Black Sea — an array of 700 guns, about 500 of which 
 were placed in five ' masonry-casemated ' works (several of them of 
 great size), and the remainder in open batteries. These defensive 
 works fulfilled their object, and sustained the attack of the allied fleet, 
 on the 17th of October, 1854, without sensible damage. 
 
 " The facility with which seaports are attacked by fleets — the enor- 
 mous preparations required — the great risks encountered in landing a 
 besieging army on the coast of a formidable enemy (while, for protec- 
 tion against the former species of attack, costly works are necessary, 
 and against the latter, field works and men can, in emergency, aflbrd 
 protection), naturally caused the Russians to make these water defences 
 their/r«^ object. Yet, though almost unprotected on the land side, Se- 
 bastopol resisted, for a whole year, an attack on that quarter ; and illus- 
 trated how, with plenty of men and material, an energetic and effectual 
 land defence may be improvised, where the sea defence is provided for, 
 as thoroughly as it was at that place. 
 
 " Let Cronstadt be another example. Great as was the importance 
 of its defence to Russia, it was not greater, — ^it was by no means aw 
 great, as that of New York to our own country. This port, and military 
 and naval depot, was defended (in its main approach) by upwards of 
 600 guns, 500 of which were mounted in five * masonry-casemated * 
 works ; the remainder in an open barbette battery, which enfiladed the 
 main channel. This number is formidable in itself; yet the same num- 
 ber mounted in New York harbor would not aflford anything like such 
 a formidable defence as was found at Cronstadt, owing to its great area, 
 and long line of approach, compared with the latter. 
 
 " These works fulfilled their object. They protected the great port 
 and depot of Cronstadt and the capital Of the empire from invasion. 
 For two successive years did the mighty armaments of France and 
 England threaten ; but they were overawed by the frowning array of 
 * casemated castles ' which presented itself, and declined the contest. 
 
 " Let us turn our eyes now to the great naval depot of France. 
 After the almost incredible expenditure lavished here, in creating a 
 harbor facing the shores of her great rival, England, and an equally 
 profuse expenditure in providing all that constitutes a great naval 
 depot, we may suppose that the best means, without regard to cost, 
 which the science of man could devise, would be employed here to make 
 this great seat of naval power secure against the formidable means of 
 attack possessed by the great maritime power most likely to be the as- 
 sailant. The means there employed are (so far as regards mere harbor 
 defence) precisely the same (viz., casemated works in several tiers, com- 
 bined \Yith open batteries where the locations are favorable) ; and the 
 application of means is the same as we have found so successful in 
 
NOTES. 431 
 
 Russia,— the same which constitute the system of harbor defence of 
 New York." 
 
 Captain McClelland, in his official report to the War De- 
 partment, on the siege of Sebastopol, uses language equally- 
 strong and pertinent : — 
 
 "The permanent defences of Sebastopol against an attack by water, 
 although inferior in material and the details of construction to our own 
 most recent works, proved fully equal to the purpose for which they 
 were intended. Indeed, the occurrences on the Pacific, the Baltic, and 
 the Black Sea, all seem to establish beyond controversy, the soundness 
 of the view so long entertained by all intelligent military men, that well 
 constructed fortifications must always prove more than a match for the 
 strongest fleet. 
 
 "It is deemed that a calm consideration of the events so hastily and 
 imperfectly narrated in the preceding pages must lead all unprejudiced 
 persons among our countrymen to a firm conviction on two vital points : 
 
 " 1st. That our system of permanent (Upast defences is a wise and 
 proper one, which ought to be completed and armed with the least 
 possible delay. 
 
 " 2d. That mere individual courage cannot suffice to overcome the 
 forces that would be brought against us, were we involved in an Eu- 
 ropean war, but that it must be rendered manageable by discipline, and 
 directed by that consummate and mechanical skill which can only be 
 acquired by a course of education, instituted for the special purpose, 
 and by long habit. 
 
 " In the day of sailing-vessels the successful siege of Sebastopol 
 would have been impossible. It is evident that the Russians did not 
 appreciate the advantages afforded by steamers, and were unprepared 
 to sustain a siege. 
 
 " This same power of steam would enable European nations to dis- 
 embark upon our shores even a larger force than that which finally en- 
 camped around Sebastopol. To resist such an attack, should it ever be 
 made, our cities and harbors must be fortified, and those fortifications 
 must be provided with guns, ammunition, and instructed artillerists. 
 To repel the advance of such an army into the interior, it is not enough 
 to trust to the number of brave but undisciplined men that we can 
 bring to bear against it. An invading army of 15,000 or 20,000 men 
 could easily be crushed by the unremitting attacks of superior num- 
 bers ; but when it comes to the case of more than 100,000 disciplined 
 veterans, the very multitude brought to bear against them works its 
 own destruction; because, if without discipline and instruction, they 
 cannot be handled, and are in their own way. We cannot afford a Mos- 
 cow campaign. 
 
432 NOTES. 
 
 " Our regular army never can, and, perhaps, never ought to be, large 
 enough to provide for all the contingencies that may arise, but it should 
 be as large as its ordinary avocations in the defence of the frontier will 
 justify ; the number of officers and non-commissioned officers should 
 be unusually large, to provide for a sudden increase ; and the greatest 
 po§sible care should be bestowed upon the instruction of the special 
 arms of the artillery and engineer troops. The militia and volunteei 
 system should be placed upon some tangible and effective basis ; in- 
 structors furnished them from the regular army, and all possible means 
 taken to spread sound military information among them. In the vicinity 
 of our sea-coast fortifications, it would be well to provide a sufficient 
 number of volunteer companies with the means of instruction in heavy 
 artillery, detailing officers of the regular artillery for instructors." 
 
 On this subject of instructing our volunteers and militia in 
 the use of sea-coast batteries, we add the following quotation 
 from Major Barnard's pamphlet : — 
 
 " One of the main causes of inefficiency in coast batteries, which 
 has given color to the idea that they may be passed, or even attached 
 with impunity, I conceive to be the want of shill and care in the use of 
 the guns. The result is a prodigious smoke, and a prodigious throwing 
 away of balls, and very little damage done. This has been, however, 
 by no means a, peculiarity of coast defences. The same system of ran- 
 dom firing has hitherto prevailed, both in the use of small arms in land 
 and of heavy ordnance in sea battles ; nor has it occurred apparently to 
 even the greatest masters of the art of war, to ask why, for one man 
 wounded, or for one effective shot in a vessel's hull, so many thousands 
 of shot should be thrown uselessly into the air. 
 
 " But this question is now asked, both in the use of the soldier's 
 rifled musket, and in the management of ships' guns, as well as of ar- 
 tillery of all kinds. 
 
 " It is at last discovered that it is of more importance to teach the 
 soldier to direct his piece with accuracy of aim, than to perform certain 
 motions on parade with the precision of an automaton. The same idea 
 is now infused into all the departments of military and naval science, 
 and is a necessary result of the recent great improvements in the con- 
 struction of arms. In short, the truth has at last become apparent that 
 the old-fashioned system of random firing, though perhaps like the 
 < charge of the six hundred ' at Balaklava, * bien magnifique, n^est paa 
 la guerre.^ 
 
 " It is of the utmost importance that we should apply this principle 
 to the management of our sea-coast batteries, and give it a practical 
 effect. The volunteers of our cities will constitute mainly y in time of 
 
NOTES. 433 
 
 war, the gunners of our forts and manipulators of our sea-coast guns. 
 In time of war, they will probably be exercised in these duties. But it 
 is most desirable that we should have at all times a body of gunners, 
 practised in these exercises. The result would be, not only to give to 
 our citizens, as well as citizen-soldiers, confidence in the defences pro- 
 vided for their security, but it would disseminate military knowledge, 
 and an intelligent idea of the bearing and objects of the different de- 
 fensive works. To carry out this idea, it would be desirable that there 
 should be at each considerable seaport town, ji sufficient garrison of 
 urtillery troops to aid in the instruction of the volunteers. In the 
 present condition of the army tliis cannot be hoped ; but perhaps it 
 might, at least, be found practicable to detail an artillery officer or two 
 for the purpose." . 
 
 NOTE TO CHAPTER VIII.— Our Northern Frontier Defences. 
 
 The author has seen nothing since this chapter was written 
 to induce him to change the views therein expressed with re- 
 spect to the superior strategic importance of the line of Lake 
 Champlain, both as a line of military operations, and as a line 
 of defence. The mutual commercial interests of the United 
 States and the Oanadas render a war between the two countries 
 less probable than formerly ; nevertheless, such an event is by 
 no means impossible, and common prudence should induce us 
 to prepare in the best possible manner for such a contingency. 
 
 NOTE TO CHAPTERS IX., X., XI. and XIL— Army Orqaniza- 
 
 TION. 
 
 Since these chapters were written, several important changes 
 have been made in our army organization. The rank of Lieu- 
 tenant-General (at least, by brevet) has been revived, the staff, 
 administrative corps, infantry and cavalry have been in- 
 creased, and a company of engineer troops organized. But 
 this company is mainly employed at West Point for instruction 
 of the cadets in the several branches of military engineering, 
 87 
 
434 NOTES. 
 
 and thus serves to supply a deficiency long felt in the system 
 of education at the Military Academy. The want, however, 
 of troops of this arm for the construction, care, and preserva- 
 tion of our permanent fortifications, and for the general duties 
 of field engineering, still remains to be supplied. Of all the 
 arms of military organization, this one most requires instruc- 
 tion in time of peace j it cannot be supphed at the moment a 
 war is declared. 
 
 In speaking of our present army organization, as compared 
 with those of the different European powers which he was sent 
 to examine and report upon, Captain McClelland says : — 
 
 " Our force of artillery is large in proportion to the other arms of 
 service, while the number of our engineer .troops is ridiculously and 
 shamefully small ; it is, therefore, more than probable that in any 
 future siege it will be easy for the artillery to construct theiu own bat- 
 teries, while the engineers wilt be suflSciently burdened by the con- 
 struction of the other works of attack ; we have now, at last, the germ 
 of an artillery school of practice ; I would then suggest, for the consid- 
 eration of the Secretary, the propriety of causing the artillery to con- 
 struct their own batteries. The position and armament of siege bat- 
 teries should be determined by consultation between the engineers and 
 the artillery, the former having the preponderating voice, in order to 
 secure the necessary harmony and connection between all parts of the 
 works of attack. This change," he says, " will require to be intro- 
 duced into the artillery manual and course of instruction everything in 
 relation to the preparation of the fascines, gabions, platforms, and 
 magazines, the dimensions of batteries, manner of arranging, working 
 parties, etc." 
 
 With regard to the suggestion of Captain McClellan, it is 
 sufficient to remark, that it seeks to remedj'- one evil by intro- 
 ducing another equally as great and equally as objectionable. 
 The defect in our present army organization is that one of its 
 arms is too small for the duties which, from the very nature 
 of military service, naturally and properly belong to it ; and it 
 surely is no remedy for this defect to permanently transfer a 
 part of these duties to another arm. As well might it be said, 
 if our artillery force were "ridiculously and shamefully small " 
 in proportion to the infantry and cavalry, that the field bat- 
 teries should be permanently transferred to those arms, and 
 
NOTES. 435 
 
 that light artillery tactics should be comprised in our infantry 
 and cavalry manuals. 
 
 There are certain duties which the military experience of 
 ages has shown to properly and almost necessarily belong to 
 each particular arm of an army organization, and every at- 
 tempt to make one branch perform the appropriate duties of 
 another has invariably destroyed its efficiency for either ser- 
 vice. Suppose our medical corps were "ridiculously and 
 shamefully small " in proportion to our pay department, shall 
 our paymasters perform the duties of surgery, and be instructed 
 in the use of the scalpel and amputating instruments ! This 
 is, perhaps^ an extreme case, but it serves to illustrate the 
 principle. 
 
 The defect referred to by Captain McClelland, and which 
 has so often been pointed out by our best mihtary men, cannot 
 be obviated by any transfer or assignment, whether temporary 
 or permanent, of the appropriate duties of one corps to another. 
 Indeed, such a measure would only tend to make this defect 
 permanent, and to convert a temporary into a lasting evil. It 
 can readily be remedied by legislative action, but in no other 
 way. The executive action suggested would be deprecated by 
 all. Moreover, the evil is now so obvious and so generally ad- 
 mitted, that there can be little doubt that Congress will soon 
 perceive the importance of applying the only proper and 
 effective remedy. 
 
 NOTE TO CHAPTER XIII.— Permanent Fortifications. 
 
 Although the general principles of the plan and arrange- 
 ment of a permanent fortification, as established by the great 
 masters of this branch of militarj'- science, remain the same ; 
 nevertheless, the vast improvements which have, within the 
 last few years, been made in projectiles, require some changes 
 in the details of defensive works of this character. These 
 changes consist mainly in an increased thickness of stone and 
 earthen parapets and of the covering of magazines, in the 
 
436 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 arrangement of embrasures, and in protecting the garrison from 
 an enemy's sharpshooters. The introduction of heavier siege 
 guns, and of heavier ordnance on ships of war, and especially 
 on those propelled by steam, require much larger ordnance in 
 forts designed for the defence of harbors. In the Russian war, 
 Sweaborg was made to suffer from a distant bombardment 
 which left her fortifications intact. These modifications in the 
 arrangements and armaments of forts are absolutely necessary 
 in order to restore the relative power of defence against the 
 improvements made in the means of attack. They can very 
 easily be introduced without changing the form or general 
 character of the works, and they are really so very essential 
 that, without them, a fort constructed 25 or 30 years ago, and 
 well suited to the then existing state of the military art, will be 
 likely to offer no very considerable resistance to modern siege 
 batteries or well organized maritime attacks. 
 
 Some have gone much further in their estimate of the effect 
 produced by the increased size and force of military projectiles, 
 and boldly assert that masonry works of strong relief can no 
 longer be used, and that the increased range of small arms 
 requires an entire change of the bastioned front, with lines 
 more extended. 
 
 With respect to the effect of the increased range of small 
 arms, it is very natural that a superficial observer should adopt 
 the opinion that this improvement must be followed by an ex- 
 tension of the lines of a defensive military work; but a close 
 study of the subject will probably lead to a different conclusion. 
 Such at least is the opinion of the ablest military engineers 
 of Europe. The lines of the bastioned front now generally 
 in use, were really too long for a good defence with the 
 arms in use at the time it was adopted, and, in theory, the 
 " rampart gun " was to be relied upon for the defence of certain 
 exposed points. But this weapon, is no longer in use i its 
 place, however, is better supplied by the increased range of the 
 musket and rifle. The latter weapon is almost invaluable for 
 defending the approaches to a permanent work. ,,,. 
 
 With respect to the breaching of stone masonry by siege 
 
NOTES. 437 
 
 batteries, it has long been an established principle that all 
 masonry exposed to the fire of. land batteries should be masked 
 by earthen works. The neglect of this rule caused the fall of 
 Bomarsund. Those who so readily draw, from the results of 
 that siege, the inference that the present mode of fortifying 
 land fronts must be abandoned, exhibit their ignorance of mili- 
 tary engineering. The facts do not justify their conclusions. 
 
 With respect to sea fronts, which can be reached only by 
 guns afloat, the case is very different. They are usually case- 
 mates of masonry, not masked by earthen works. Whether 
 the increased eflBciency of projectiles thrown by ships and 
 floating batteries now require a resort to this mode of protect- 
 ing masonry on the water fronts of fortifications, is a question 
 well worthy of discussion. This subject has already been 
 alluded to in the Kote on Sea-coast Defences, and it is there 
 shown that no facts have yet been developed which require or 
 authorize any change in our present system. 
 
 NOTE TO CHAPTER XIY.— Field Engineering. 
 
 As Mexico had no permanent fortifications to be besieged, 
 the war in that country afforded very little practice in that 
 branch of engineering which is connected with the attack and 
 defence of permanent works, particularly sapping and mining. 
 The only operation resembling a siege was the investment and 
 bombardment of Vera Cruz, and it is worthy of remark that 
 if General Scott had stormed that place, weak as it was, he 
 must have lost a large number of his men, while from his 
 trenches and batteries he reduced it with scarcely the sacrifice 
 of a single life. 
 
 Nor did either party in this war make much use of field 
 works in the attack and defence of positions. Nevertheless, 
 no one can read the history of the war without appreciating 
 the important influence which Fort Brown had upon General 
 Taylor's defence of the left bank of the Rio Grande. Again 
 
438 NOTES. 
 
 if we compare our loss in other Mexican battles with that which 
 the Americans sustained in their attacks upon Monterey, Chu- 
 rubusco, Molino del Rey, and Chapultepec, — places partially 
 secured by field works — we shall be still more convinced of the 
 value of temporary fortifications for the defence of military 
 positions, although it was manifest that the ^Mexicans neither 
 knew how to construct nor how to defend them. 
 
 Nor was there much practice in this war in the use of mili- 
 tary bridges, for, with the exception of the Rio Grande, our 
 armies had no important rivers to cross. "We must not, how- 
 ever, omit to note the important fact that General Taylor was 
 unable to take advantage of the victories of Palo Alto and 
 Resacade la Palma to pursue and destroy the army of Arista, 
 hecause he had no pontoon equipage to enable him to follow 
 them across the Rio Grande. It should also be remarked that 
 even a very small bridge equipage would have been of very 
 great use in crossing other streams and ravines during the 
 operations of this war. One of our cavalry officers writes : — 
 
 " On our march from Matamoras to Victoria and Tampico, in 1846 
 and 1847, we had infinite difficulty in bridging boggy streams (there 
 being no suitable timber), and in crossing ravines with vertical banks ; 
 a few ways of the Birago trestles would have saved us many days and 
 a vast amount of labor. In the operations in the valley of Mexico, our 
 movements, checked as they so often were by impassable wet ditches 
 and sometimes by dry ravines, would have been rendered so much more 
 free and rapid by the use of the Birago trestles, that our successes 
 could have been gained at far less cost, and p^obably with more ra- 
 pidity than they were." 
 
 With regard to military reconnoissance, the splendid achieve- 
 ments of Lee and others connected with the operations of 
 General Scott, proved the value and importance of this parti- 
 cular branch of field engineering. 
 
 But field engineering, as a branch or arm of the military 
 service, received its greatest development and most brilliant 
 application in the Crimean war, particularly in the siege of 
 Sebastopol, and the measures resorted to by General Todtleben 
 to defend that place against the attack of superior forces. 
 
NOTES. 439 
 
 A brief sketch of these defensive works may he of interest 
 to the reader : — 
 
 When the allies reached Balaklava, Sebastopol was defended 
 on the south sidp only by a loop-holed wall about four feet and 
 a half thick, and from eighteen to twenty feet high, and a semi- 
 circular redoubt with two stories of loop-holes, and five guns 
 in barbette. These works would have afforded some protection 
 against a coup-de-main by infantry and cavalry, but could have 
 offered no very considerable obstacle to a combined attack of 
 these arms with artillery. 
 
 The Russian engineer commenced his operations for 
 strengthening this position by occupying the most important 
 points in his line of defence with detached field works of suffi- 
 cient relief to resist an assault, and generally closed at the 
 gorge. These works were afterwards connected by re-entering 
 lines of a weaker profile, which served to enfilade the ravines 
 and to flank the advanced works. The old wall was strength- 
 ened with earth, and rifle-pits for sharpshooters were con- 
 structed at a considerable distance in front. 
 
 The most important points of the main line of defence were : 
 1st. The Flagstaff Bastion. 2d. The Central Bastion. 3d. 
 The Malakoff. 4th. The Redan. 5th. The little Redan. The 
 command of the first was about fifteen feet, its ditch thirty 
 feet wide and from twelve to fifteen feet deep. A portion of 
 the scarp was provided with palisades some ten feet high. The 
 construction of the Central Bastion was similar to that of the 
 Flag-staff, but weaker in profile. The relief of the other 
 works was still less. The command of the Malakoff was about 
 fourteen feet, its ditch eighteen feet wide and twelve feet deep. 
 The thickness of parapet in these works was generally about 
 eighteen feet, and the bombproofs were covered with timber 
 eighteen inches thick and six feet of earth. The loop-holed 
 walls connecting these works were covered by a rampart and 
 parapet, or entirely replaced by a simple parapet. Many of 
 the embrasures were revetted with the common boiler iron 
 ships' water-tanks filled with earth. The same material was 
 sometimes used for traverses. Rope mantelets were used to 
 
440 NOTES. 
 
 protect the artillerists at the pieces from rifle balls and small 
 grape. Great attention was given to the construction of bomb- 
 proofs to cover the men from vertical firing. These were 
 sometimes under the rampart and the second line of defence 
 (where there was one), often under special traverses, or en- 
 tirely under ground, and occasionally excavated in the solid 
 rock. Some had fireplaces and chimneys, and were well venti- 
 lated. Interior slopes were revetted with gabions, crowned by 
 fascines and sand bags. Gabions were also employed to repair 
 the damage caused by the enemy's artillery. Abattis, military 
 pits, caltrops and spikes, stuck through planks, and explosive 
 machines were employed in front of different parts of the 
 defences. Mines were resorted to in front of the Flag-staff 
 Bastion to retard the French approaches. They were made in 
 rocky soil with craters from twelve to fifteen feet deep. The 
 Russian counter-approaches generally consisted of fleches, 
 united by a simple trench. 
 
 Captain McClelland, one of our officers sent to the Crimea, 
 from whose valuable Report most of the foregoing details arc 
 gathered, adds the following remarks upon these works of de- 
 fence : — 
 
 *' From the preceding hasty and imperfect account of the defences 
 of Sebastopol, it will appear how little foundation there was for the gen- 
 erally-received accounts of the stupendous dimensions of the works, 
 and of new systems of fortifications brought into play. The plain truth 
 is, that these defences were simple temporary fortifications of rather 
 greater dimensions than usual, and that not a single new principle of 
 engineering was developed. It is true, that there were several novel 
 minor details, such as the rope mantelets, the use of iron tanks, etc., 
 but the whole merit consisted in the admirable adaptation of well- 
 known principles to the peculiar locality and circumstances of the case. 
 Neither can it be asserted that the plans of the various works were 
 perfect. On the contrary, there is no impropriety in believing that if 
 Todtleben were called upon to do the same work over again, he would 
 probably introduce better close flanking arrangements. 
 
 " These remarks are not intended to, nor can they, detract from the 
 reputation of the Russian engineer. His labors and their results will 
 be handed down in history as the most triumphant and enduring monu- 
 ment of the value of fortifications, and his name must ever be placed 
 in the first rank of military engineers. But, in our admiration of the 
 
NOTES. 441 
 
 talent and energy of the engineer, it must not be forgotten that the 
 inert masses which he raised would have been useless without the skil- 
 ful artillery and heroic infantry who defended them. Much stronger 
 places than Sebastopol have often fallen under far Fess obstinate and 
 well-combined attacks than that to which it was subjected. There can 
 be no danger in expressing the conviction that the siege of Sebastopol 
 called forth the most magnificent defence of fortifications that has ever 
 yet occurred." 
 
 We will now pass to the works of attack. When the .allies 
 decided that the works of Sebastopol could not be carried by 
 a simple cannonade and assault, but must be reduced by a 
 regular siege, the first thing to be considered was to secure the 
 forces covering the siege works from lateral sorties and the 
 efforts of a relieving army. The field works planned for this 
 purpose were not of any great strength, and many of them 
 " were only undertaken when a narrow escape from some immi- 
 nent danger had demonstrated their necessity." The French 
 line of defence consisted of eight pentagonal redoubts, con- 
 nected by an infantry parapet. The English seemed to attach 
 but little importance to field works for the defence of their 
 position ; the terrible slaughter at Inkerman was the natural 
 consequence of this neglect. 
 
 In describing the engineering operations of the allies at this 
 siege, Captain McClelland says : — 
 
 *'In regard to the detailed execution of the French attacks, little -or 
 nothing novel is to be observed. Even when coolly examining the 
 direction of their trenches, after the close of the siege, it was very rare 
 that a faulty direction could be detected ; they always afforded excellent 
 cover, and were well defiladed ; in some cases the excavation of the 
 double direct sap was carried to the depth of six and a half feet in the 
 solid rock ! The execution of many of the saps and batteries was 
 worthy of a school of p-actice. In the parallels, bomb-proofs were 
 provided as temporary hospitals, ofiices for the generals on duty, etc- 
 They did not use the sapper armor. The use of the sap-roller was 
 often attempted, but it could be employed only during the latter part of 
 the attack upon the Malakoff, when the fire of the Russian artillery was 
 nearly extinguished by the mortars ; before that, as soon as a sap-roller 
 wf ^ placed in position — some thirty guns would be brought to bear 
 up in it, the result being its immediate destruction. It may justly be 
 aaLd of the French approaches, that they admirably carried into prac- 
 
442 NOTES. 
 
 tice their system of sapping. The technical skill and patient courage 
 evinced by their oflficers and men in pushing forward such excellent ap- 
 proaches, under a most deadly fire, is worthy of all commendation, and 
 is such as might have been expected from the antecedents of their corps 
 of engineers. 
 
 " With regard to the English, the case was different ; it seemed as 
 if they systematically abandoned the excellent system taught and per- 
 fected with so much care at Chatham. "Whenever the ground was diffi- 
 cult, their trenches generally ceased to afford shelter ; a shallow exca- 
 vation in the rock, and a few stones thrown up in front, appeared to be 
 all that was considered necessary in such cases. They were often faulty 
 in direction as well as in profile, being not unfrequently badly defiladed, 
 or not gaining ground enough and entirely too cramped; nor were 
 they pushed as close to the Redan as they ought to have been before 
 giving the assault. In too many cases the expression * tatonnement ' 
 of the French would seem to convey the best idea of their operations. 
 Their batteries, however, were very well constructed. The magazines, 
 platforms, etc., were usually similar to those adopted at Chatham, al- 
 though unnecessary deviations were sometimes complained of. They 
 employed neither armor nor the full sap, sometimes the half-full, but 
 generally the flying-sap were employed." 
 
 It may also be added, that, at the time of the assault, the 
 French approaches had been pushed to the distance of thirty- 
 two paces of the counterscarp of the Malakoff, while the 
 English had scarcely reached within two hundred and twenty- 
 five yards of the ditch of the Redan. 
 
 This description of the operations of the English at the 
 siege of Sebastopol carries the professi-onal reader directly 
 back to their sieges in the Spanish Peninsula. It certainly is 
 very strange that a great nation leading the van of civilization 
 should, after such experience, have neglected to provide its 
 army with a proper number of engineer officers and engineer 
 troops, well instructed in the peculiar and difficult duties 
 of that arm. What excuse can ever be offered for sub- 
 stituting human life for professional skill in the operations of 
 a siege, when that skill may so readily be acquired in time of 
 peace, and is always so necessary an element of a good military 
 organization ! 
 
 While every one admits that the siege of Sebastopol proved 
 the immense importance of fieidworks against land attacks, 
 
NOTES. 445 
 
 some would conclude from the operations of that siege that 
 good earthen works of a large development are better suited 
 for the defence of a large city than permanent fortifications 
 with masonry revetments, and which will necessarily have a 
 less extended line of fire and less capacity for men and military 
 stores. We quote the remarks of Captain McClelland on this 
 point, and also make a short extract from the recently pub- 
 lished Journal of the siege of Sebastopol by General Nicl. 
 Captain McClelland says : — 
 
 " This would seem to be the proper place to notice a popular fallacy, 
 which, for a time at least, gained extensive credence. It was, that the 
 siege of Sebastopol proved the superiority of temporary (earthen) forti- 
 fications over those of a permanent nature. It is easy to show that it 
 proved nothing of the kind ; but that it only proved that temporary 
 works in the hands of a brave and skillful garrison are susceptible of a 
 longer defence than was generally supposed.^ They were attacked as 
 field works never were before, and were defenaed as field works never 
 had been defended. The main difference between properly constructed 
 permanent fortifications (intended to resist a siege) and temporary 
 works, is that the latter seldom present an insuperable obstacle against 
 assault, while the former always do. In addition, permanent works 
 have a better command over the adjacent country, and are more care- 
 fully and perfectly planned. The masonry walls, which render an as- 
 sault impossible, cannot be seen from the distance, and can be de- 
 stroyed only by establishing batteries on the crest of the glacis, or the 
 edge of the ditch ; the eatthen parapet alone being visible beyond that 
 point, they may, until the besiegers arrive there, be regarded in the 
 same light as field works, with the difference that the garrison are not 
 harassed by the necessity of being constantly prepared to repel an 
 assault. 
 
 *'Now, in the siege of Sebastopol, the trenches of the besiegers 
 never reached the edge of the ditch ; so that, had the fortification been 
 a permanent one, the most difiicult, slow, and dangerous part of the 
 siege remained to be undertaken, viz., the crowning of the covered 
 way, the establishment of the breach batteries, the descent and passage 
 of the ditch, and the assault of the breach ; in other words, at the mo- 
 ment when the weakness of the temporary works became apparent and 
 fatal, the true strength of the permanent defences would have com- 
 menced coming into play. 
 
 "Assuming the progress of the attack to have been as rapid as it was 
 under existing circumstances, the besiegers, on the 8th of September, 
 
444 NOTES. 
 
 would not yet have been in a condition to crown the corered way, the 
 siege would certainly have extended into the winter ; and it may even 
 be doubted whether the place would eventually have fallen, until the 
 allies were in sufficient force to invest the north as well as the south 
 side/' 
 
 General Neil remarks : — 
 
 " Struck by the length of the siege of Sebastopol, certain foreign 
 officers have expressed the opinion that masonry-revetted Scarpa are not 
 of incontestable utility in fortified places. 
 
 " Sebastopol, a vast retrenched camp, defended by field fortifica- 
 tions of strong profile, derived its principal strength from an armament 
 such as could only exist in an extensive maritime arsenal, and from a 
 large army which always preserved its free communications with the 
 interior of Russia. 
 
 " If the enceinte had been provided with good revetted scarps ; 
 if it had been necessary to breach these, and subsequently have been 
 compelled to penetrate through difficult passages, in rear of which the 
 heads of our columns \^uld have met an army, Sebastopol would have 
 been an impregnable fortress. 
 
 " When we compare, in effect, the works of attack at Sebastopol 
 with those of an ordinary siege, we will see that on the 8th of Septem- 
 ber, 1855, the day of the last assault, we had only executed, after the 
 greatest eflFort, the besieging works which precede the crowning of the 
 covered way ; we had not then, as yet, entered upon that period of the 
 works of a siege which is the most difficult and the most murderous ; 
 and there was no occasion to engage ourselves in them, since the ditches 
 and parapets of the enceinte were not insuwaountable, as the sequel 
 has proved. 
 
 " The difficulty consisted in conquering the Russian army upon a 
 position prepared long beforehand for its defence, quite as much as in 
 surmounting the material obstacle of the fortification. 
 
 ** Our places of arms being established at thirty metres from the 
 besieged works, we were able to choose our own time for action, and to 
 throw ourselves unexpectedly upon the enemy when the fire of our ar- 
 tillery had forced him to shelter himself, up to the last minute, behind 
 his numerous blindages ; to have gone further would have been inviting 
 the initiative in the attack on the part of the Russian army. 
 
 " The absence of scarp walls, which would have &e(;ured the place 
 from escalade, did not exercise a less influence upon the defence; 
 for the besieged were compelled to keep permanently at the gorges 
 of the works, strong reserves, in readiness to repulse the assault, 
 which they saw themselves menaced with from the commencement ot 
 the siege. 
 
NOTES. 445 
 
 " Finally, it can be remarked, that these reserves, which were deci- 
 mated night and day by the concentric fire of our batteries, were able 
 to issue out from the enceinte through wide debouches, without having 
 to pass through the narrow defiles which are formed by the draw- 
 bridges of revetted places ; they were, then, a permanent threat for the 
 besiegers, who were exposed to seeing their trenches unexpectedly in- 
 vaded by the greater part of the Russian army. 
 
 "Neither side, consequently, was in a position analogous to that 
 which is presented in the siege of a fortified place, protected from insult 
 by good masonry scarps.' (Note to page 443.) 
 
 And again, page 423, the same authority remaiks : 
 " Now, it (the Russian army) is no longer able to escape from the 
 concentric fires of our batteries ; for, not being protecUd lyy masonry 
 scarps, it is obliged constantly to keep united strong reserves, in order 
 to repulse the assault with which it is at every instant menaced ' " 
 
 NOTE TO CHAPTER XV.— Military Education, &c. 
 
 With regard to the subjects discussed in this chapter it will, 
 perhaps, be suflBcient to remark that the Mexican war incon- 
 testably proved the value of the West Point Military Academy ; 
 for the superior efficiency of properly-educated officers over 
 those who had been appointed from civil life without any 
 knowledge of the profession they were called upon to practice, 
 fully satisfied the country of the importance of that institution, 
 and even silenced the clamors of the few who refused to be 
 convinced. 
 
 The recent abortive attempt to give efficiency to our navy 
 by means of a retired list, has, it is feared, destroyed for a 
 time all hopes of introducing this very necessary measure into 
 our military service ; although it is very certain that w ithout 
 this we can never have our system of promotion placed upon 
 an effective and satisfactory basis, which shall give efficiency to 
 the army by rewarding merit, while it prevents injustice by 
 closing the avenues of political favoritism. 
 
 The Mexican war also most abundantly proved that our 
 
446 NOTES. 
 
 objections to the system of military appointment were well 
 founded, and it is hoped that the more recent abuses of that 
 system will call public attention to the necessity of a change ; 
 for if military office continue to be conferred for partisan ser- 
 vices, it will soon destroy the integrity as well as the efficiency 
 of our army. 
 
EXPLANATION OP PLATES. 
 
 Figs. 1, 2, 3. — Used to illustrate the strategic relations of the 
 armies A and B. 
 
 Fig. 4. — Line of operations directed against the extremity of the 
 enemy's line of defence, as was done by Napoleon in the 
 Marengo campaigm 
 
 Fig. 5. — Napoleon's plan of campaign in 1800, for the army of the 
 Rhine, and the army of reserve. 
 
 Fig. 6 shows the plan adopted by Napoleon ia the campaign of 
 1800, to preserve his communications. 
 
 Fig. 7 illustrates the same thing in the campaign of 1806. 
 
 Fig. 8. — Interior and central line of operations. 
 
 Fig. 9 represents ^ camp of a grand division of an army. The 
 distance from the front row of tents to the line of camp- 
 guards should be from 350 to 400 feet ; thence to the line 
 of posts, from 150 to 200 feet ; thence to the line of sen- 
 tinels, from 100 to 200 feet. In many cases, the line of 
 posts between the camp-guards and sentinels may be dis- 
 pensed with. The distance between battalions will be 
 from 50 to 100 feet ; and the same between squadrons 
 and batteries. 
 
 Fig. 10. — Details of encampment for a battalion of Infantry. The 
 width of company streets will depend upon the strength 
 of a company, and will be so arranged that the front of 
 the camp shall not exceed the length of the battalion, 
 when drawn up in line of battle. This width will be from 
 50 to 100 feet. The distance between the tents of each 
 row will be 2 or 3 feet ; the distance between the tents of 
 one company and those of another, from 4 to 6 feet. 
 
 Fig. 11 is the camp of a squadron of cavalry. A single company 
 encamping alone, would be arranged in the same way as 
 an entire squadron. The horses are picketed in two lines 
 parallel to the tents, and at a distance from them of about 
 12 feet. The forage is placed between the tents. A squad- 
 ron of two companies will occupy a front of about 180 
 feet The fires, or company kitchens, should be 50 or 60 
 feet in rear of the non-commissioned officers' tents. 
 
448 MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 
 
 Fig 12 is the camp of two batteries of foot artillery, or two com- 
 panies of foot engineers. 
 
 [The plan of encampment for artillery, as given in the 
 " Instruction of U. S. Field Artillery, horse and foot," may 
 be employed where a single battery encamps by itself, or 
 where only the skeleton of companies is maintained ; but 
 it will be found exceedingly inconvenient, where a full 
 battery, with a large train, encamps on the same line with 
 other troops. The plan we have given is that which is era- 
 ployed in most European services.] 
 Fig. 13. — In this plan for mounted artillery and engineers, the fires 
 are so arranged as to expose the ammunition as httle as 
 possible to the sparks from the kitchens. 
 Fig. 14. — Simple parallel order of battle. 
 
 . 15. — Parallel order, with a crochet on the flank. 
 
 16. — Parallel order, reinforced on a wing. 
 
 17. — Parallel order, reinforced on the cei^re. 
 
 18. — Simple oblique order. 
 
 19. — Oblique order, reinforced on the assailinfr wing. 
 
 20. — Perpendicular order. 
 
 21. — Concave order. 
 
 22. — Convex order. 
 
 23. — Order by echelon on a wing. 
 
 24. — Order by echelon on the centre. 
 
 25.- — Combined order of attack. 
 
 26. — Formation of infantry by two deployed lines. 
 
 27, 28. — Arrangements corresponding to depth of column. 
 
 29. — Formation by squares. 
 
 30. — Mixed formation of three battalions. 
 
 31. — Deep formation of heavy columns. 
 
 32. — Formation in columns by brigade. 
 
 33. — Formation of two brigades of cavalry, by the mixed 
 system. 
 
 34. — Passage of the Sound by the British fleet, in 1807. 
 
 35. — Attack on Copenhagen. 
 
 36. — ^Attack on Algiers. 
 
 37. — Attack on San Juan d'Ulloa. 
 
 38.— Attack on St. Jean d'Acre. 
 
 39. — ^Plan of a regular bastioned front of a fortificatiwi. * 
 
 40.— Section of do. do. 
 
 41. — Tenaillons. 
 
EXPLANATION OF PLATES. 449 
 
 Fig. 42.~Demi-tenaillons, with a bonnet. 
 43.— A horn-work. 
 44. — A crown-work 
 45. — A redan. 
 46. — A lunette. 
 47. — ^A mitre oi priest-cap. 
 48. — A bastioned fort. 
 
 49. — Vertical section of a field intrenchmentl 
 50. — Simple sap. 
 51. — Flying sap. 
 52.— Full sap. 
 
 53. — Crater of a military mine. 
 54. — Flan of the attack of a regular bastioned work. 
 
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