.-^y^' 
 
 / 
 
 ^k^ 
 
.^■ 
 
 /^ 
 
 
 X 
 
NOTE. 
 
 I HAVE been informed that an American publisher has printed 
 the first edition of this translation of M. Antoninus. I do 
 not grudge him his profit, if he has made any. There may 
 be many men and women in the United States who will be 
 glad to read the thoughts of the Eoman emperor. If the 
 American politicians, as they are called, would read them 
 also, I should be much pleased, but I do not think the 
 emperor's morality would suit their taste. 
 
 I have also been informed that the American publisher 
 has dedicated this translation to an American. I have no 
 objection to the book being dedicated to an American ; but 
 in doing this without my consent the publisher has trans- 
 gressed the bouuds of decency. 1 have never dedicated a 
 book to any man, and if I dedicated this, I should choose the 
 man whose name seemed to me most worthy to be joined to 
 that of the Koman soldier and philosopher. I might dedicate 
 the book to the successful general who is now the President 
 of the United States, with the hope that his. integrity and 
 justice will restore peace and happiness, so far as he can, to 
 those unhappy States which have suffered so much from war 
 and the unrelenting hostility of wicked men. 
 
 But, as the Koman poet said, 
 
 Victrix causa Deis placuit, sed victa Catoni ; 
 
 and if I dedicated this little book to any man, I would 
 dedicate it to him who led the Confederate armies against 
 the powerful invader, and retired from an unequal contest 
 defeated, but not dishonoured ; to the noble Virginian soldier, 
 whose talents and virtues place him by the side of the best 
 and wisest man who sat on the throne of the Imperial Caesars. 
 
 George Long. 
 
Ill 
 THE THOUGHTS 
 
 OF THE 
 
 EMPEROR M. AURELIUS 
 ANTONINUS. 
 
 TRANSLATED BY GEORGE LONG. 
 
 SECOND EDITION. 
 
 SdH*^ 
 
 REVISED AND CORRECl'ED. 
 
 LONDON : GEORGE BELL & SONS, YORK STREET, 
 
 COVENT GARDEN. 
 
 1880. 
 
335 S^ 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS^ 
 
 SXAJWOBD 6TBEET AND CHAEING CKOSS. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 I HAVE carefully revised the Life and Philosophy of 
 Antoninns, in which I have made a few corrections, and 
 added a few notes. 
 
 I have also made a few alterations in the translation 
 where I thought that I conld approach nearer to tho 
 author's meaning ; and I have added a few notes and 
 references. 
 
 There still remain difficulties which I cannot remove, 
 because the text is sometimes too corrupt to be under- 
 stood, and no attempt to restore tlie true readings could 
 be successful. 
 
 Gkobge Long. 
 
 103148 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 M. AuBELius Antoninus 1 
 
 The Philosophy of ANTONnrcs 28 
 
 M. AnTONiNrs 6*8 
 
 Ikdex . . . , 207 
 
M. AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 
 
 M ANTONINUS was born at Eome a.d. 121, on the 2Gth 
 • of April. His father Annius Yerns died while he 
 was praetor. His mother was Domitia Calvilla also named 
 Lucilla. The Emperor T. Antoninus Pius married Annia 
 Galeria Faustina, the sister of Annius Verus, and was con- 
 sequently the uncle of M. Antoninus. When Hadrian adopted 
 Antoninus Pius and declared him his successor in the empire, 
 Antoninus Pius adopted both L. Ceionius Commodus, the 
 son of Aelius Caesar, and M. Antoninus, whose original name 
 was M. Annius Verus. Antoninus then took the name of 
 M. Aelius Aurelius Verus to which was added the title of 
 Caesar in a.d. 139 : the name Aelius belonged to Hadrian's 
 family, and Aurelius was the name of Antoninus Pius. When 
 M. Antoninus became Augustus, he dropped the name of Verus 
 and took the name of Antoninus. Accordingly he is generally 
 named M. Aurelius Antoninus or simply M. Antoninus. 
 
 The youth was most carefully brought up. He thanks 
 the gods (i. 17) that he had good grandfathers, good parents, 
 a good sister, good teachers, good associates, good kinsmen 
 and friends, nearly everything good. He had the happy 
 fortune to witness the example of his uncle and adoptive 
 father Antoninus Pius, and he has recorded in Lis work 
 
 •'J 
 
2 M. Aurelius Antoninus. 
 
 (i. 16 ; VI. 30) the virtues of this excellent man and prudent 
 ruler. Like many young Romans he tried his hand at 
 poetry and studied rhetoric. Herodes Atticus and M. Cor- 
 nelius Pronto were his teachers in eloquence. There are 
 extant letters between Fronto and Marcus/ which show the 
 great affection of the pupil for the master, and the master's 
 great hopes of his industrious pupil. M. Antoninus mentions 
 Fronto (i. 11) among those to whom he was indebted for his 
 education. 
 
 When he was eleven years old, he assumed the dress of 
 philosophers, something plain and coarse, became a hard 
 student, and lived a most laborious abstemious life, e^en so 
 far as to injure his health. Finally, he abandoned poetry 
 and rhetoric for philosophy, and he attached himself to the 
 sect of the Stoics. But he did not neglect the study of law, 
 which was a useful preparation for the high place which he 
 was designed to fill. His teacher was L. Volusianus 
 Maecianus a distinguished jurist. We must suppose that he 
 learned the Eoman discipline of arms, which was a necessary 
 part of the education of a man who afterwards led his troops 
 to battle against a warlike race. 
 
 Antoninus has recorded in his first book the names of his 
 teachers and the obligations which he owed to each of them. 
 The way in which he speaks of what he learned from them 
 might seem to savour of vanity or self-praise, if we look 
 carelessly at the way in which he has expressed himself ; but 
 if any one draws this conclusion, ho will be mistaken. Anto- 
 ninus means to commemorate the merits of his several teachers, 
 what they taught and what a pupil might learn from them, 
 
 1 M. Cornelii Frontonis Reliquiae, Berlin, 181G. There are a few 
 letters between Fronto and Antouiuus Pius. 
 
M. AureUus Antoninus. 3 
 
 Besides, this book like the eleven other books was for his own 
 use, and if we may trust the note at the end of the fii-st book, 
 it was written duiing one of M. Antoninus' campaigns against 
 the Quadi, at a time when the commemoration of the virtues 
 of his illustrious teachers might remind him of their lessons 
 and the j)ractical uses which he might derive from them.* 
 
 Among his teachers of philosophy was Sextus of Chacroneia 
 a grandson of Plutarch. What he learned from this excellent 
 man is told by himself (i. 9). His favourite teacher was 
 Q. Junius Eusticus (i. 7), a philosopher aud also a man of 
 practical good sense in public affairs. Eusticus was the 
 adviser of Autoninus after he became emperor. Young men 
 who are destined for high places are not often fortunate in 
 those who are about them, their companions and teachers ; 
 and I do not know any example of a young prince having 
 had an education which can be compared with that of M. An- 
 toninus. Such a body of teachers distinguished by their ac- 
 quirements and their character will hardly be collected again ; 
 and as to the pupil, we have not had one like him since. 
 
 Hadrian died in July a.d. 138, and was succeeded by 
 Antoninus Pius. M. Antoninus married Faustina, his cousin, 
 the daughter of Pius, probably about a.d. 146, for he had a 
 daughter born in 147. He received fi*om his adoptive father 
 the title of Caesar and was associated with him in ^he adminis- 
 tration of the state. The father and the adopted son lived to- 
 gether in perfect friendship and confidence. Antoninus was a 
 dutiful son, and the emperor Pius loved and esteemed him. 
 
 Antoninus Pius died in March a.d. 161. The Senate, it 
 is said, urged M. Antoninus to take the sole administration 
 of the empire, but he associated with himself the other adopted 
 son of Pius, L. Ceionius Commodus, who is generally called 
 
4 M. Aurelius Antoninus. 
 
 L. Verus. Thus Eome for the first time liad two emperors. 
 Verus was an indolent man of pleasure and unworthy of his 
 station. Antoninus however bore with him, and it is said 
 that Verus had sense enough to pay to his colleague the 
 respect due to his character. A virtuous emperor and a 
 loose partner lived together in peace, and their alliance was 
 strengthened by Antoninus giving to Verus for wife his 
 daughter Lucilla. 
 
 The reign of Antoninus was first troubled by a Parthian 
 war, in which Verus was sent to command, but he did nothing, 
 and the success that was obtained by the Romans in Armenia 
 and on the Euphrates and Tigris was due to his generals. 
 This Parthian war ended in a.d. 165. Aurelius and Verus 
 had a triumph (a.d. 166) for the victories in the east. A 
 pestilence followed which carried off great numbers in Eome 
 and Italy, and spread to the west of Europe. 
 
 The north of Italy was also threatened by the rude people 
 beyond the Alps from the borders of Gallia to the eastern side 
 of the Hadi'iatic. These barbarians attempted to break into 
 Italy, as the Germanic nations had attempted near three 
 hundred years before ; and the rest of the life of Antoninus 
 with some intervals was employed in driving back the in- 
 vaders. In 169 Verus suddenly died, and Antoninus ad- 
 ministered ihe state alone. 
 
 During the German wars Antoninus resided for three years 
 on the Danube at Carnuntum. The Marcomanni were driven 
 out of Pannonia and almost destroyed in their retreat across 
 the Danube; and in a.d. 174 the emperor gained a great 
 victory over the Quadi. 
 
 In A.D. 175 Avidius Cassius a brave and skilful Eoman 
 commander who was at the head of the troops in Asia revolted 
 
M. Aurelius Antoninus. 5 
 
 and declared himself Augustus. But Cassius was assassinated 
 by some of his officers, and so the rebellion came to an end. 
 Antoninus showed his humanity by his treatment of the 
 family and the partizans of Cassius, and his letter to the 
 senate in which he recommends mercy is extant. (Vulcatius, 
 Avidius Cassius, c. 12.) 
 
 Antoninus set out for the east on hearing of Cassius' revolt. 
 Though he appears to have retiu-ned to Eome in a.d. 174, he 
 went back to prosecute the war against the Germans, and 
 it is probable that he marched direct to the east from the 
 German war. His wife Faustina who accompanied him 
 into Asia died suddenly at the foot of the Taurus to the 
 great grief of her husband. Capitolinus, who has written 
 the life of Antoninus, and also Dion Cassius accuse the 
 empress of scandalous infidelity to her husband and of 
 abominable lewdness. But Capitolinus says that Antoninus 
 either knew it not or pretended not to know it. Nothing 
 is so common as such malicious reports in all ages, and the 
 history of imperial Kome is full of them. Antoninus loved 
 his wife and he says that she was " obedient, affectionate and 
 simple." The same scandal had been spread about Faustina's 
 mother, the wife of Antoninus Pius, and yet he too was 
 perfectly satisfied with his wife. Antoninus Pius says after 
 her death in a letter to Fronto that he would rather have 
 lived in exile with his wife than in his palace at Eome 
 without her. There are not many men who would give their 
 wives a better character than these two emperors. Capi- 
 tolinus wrote in the time of Diocletian. He may have 
 intended to tell the truth, but he is a poor feeble biographer. 
 Dion Cassius, the most malignant of historians, always reports 
 and perhaps he believed any scandal against anybody. 
 
6 M. Aurelius Antoninus. 
 
 Antoninus continued his journey to Syria and Egypt, and 
 on his return to Italy through Athens he was initiated into 
 the Eleusinian mysteries. It was the practice of the emperor 
 to conform to the established rites of the age and to perform 
 religious ceremonies with due solemnity. We cannot con- 
 clude from this that he was a superstitious man, though we 
 might perhaps do so, if his book did not show that he was 
 not. But this is only one among many instances that a 
 ruler's public acts do not always prove his real opinions. A 
 prudent governor will not roughly oppose even the super- 
 stitions of his people, and though he may wish that they were 
 wiser, he will know that he cannot make them so by offending 
 their prejudices. 
 
 Antoninus and his son Commodus entered Rome in triumph, 
 perhaps for some German victories, on the 23rd of December 
 A.D. 176. In the following year Commodus was associated 
 with his father in the empire and took the name of Augustus. 
 This year a.d. 177 is memorable in ecclesiastical history. 
 Attains and others were put to death at Lyon for their ad- 
 herence to the Christian religion. The evidence of this per- 
 secution is a letter preserved by Eusebius (E. H. v. 1 ; printed 
 in Eouth's Reliquiae Sacrae, vol. i. with notes). The letter is 
 from the Christians of Vienna and Lugdunum in Gallia 
 (Vienne and Lyon) to their Christian brethren in Asia and 
 Phrygia ; and it is preserved perhaps nearly entire. It con- 
 tains a very particular description of the tortui-es inflicted on 
 the Christians in Gallia, and it states that while the persecu- 
 tion was going on, Attalus a Christian and a Roman citizen 
 was loudly demanded by the populace and brought into the 
 amphitheatre, but the governor ordered him to be reserved 
 nrith the rest who were in prison, until he had received in- 
 
M. Aurelius Antoninus. 7 
 
 structious from tlie emperor. Many had been tortured before 
 the governor tbouglit of applying to Antoninus. The im- 
 perial rescript, says the letter, was that the Christians should 
 be punished, but if they would deny their faith, they must be 
 released. On this the work began again. The Christians 
 who were Roman citizens were beheaded : the rest were 
 exposed to the wild beasts in the amphitheatre. Some modern 
 writers on ecclesiastical history, when they use this letter, 
 say nothing of the wonderful stories of the martyrs' sufferings. 
 Sanctus, as the letter says, was burnt with plates of hot -iron 
 till his body was one sore and had lost all human form, but 
 on being put to the rack he recovered his former appearance 
 under the torture, which was thus a cure instead of a punish- 
 ment. He was afterwards torn by beasts, and placed on an 
 iron chair and roasted. He died at last. 
 
 The letter is one piece of evidence. The writer, whoever 
 he was that wrote in the name of the Gallic Christians, is our 
 evidence both for the ordinary and the extraordinary circum- 
 stances of the story, and we cannot accept his evidence for 
 one part and reject the other. We often receive small evi- 
 dence as a proof of-a thing which we believe to be within the 
 limits of probability or possibility, and we reject exactly the 
 same evidence, when the thing to which it refers, appears 
 very improbable or impossible. But this is a false method 
 of inquiry, though it is followed by some modern writers, 
 who select what they like from a story and reject the rest of 
 the evidence ; or if they do not reject it, they dishonestly 
 suppress it. A man can only act consistently by accepting 
 all this letter or rejecting it all, and we cannot blame him 
 for either. But he who rejects it may still admit that such 
 a letter may be founded on real facts ; and he would make 
 
8 M, Aurelius Antoninus. 
 
 this admission as the most probable way of accounting for 
 the existence of the letter : but if, as he would suppose, the 
 writer has stated some things falsely, he cannot tell what 
 part of his story is worthy of credit. 
 
 The war on the northern frontier appears to have been 
 uninterrupted during the visit of Antoninus to the East, and 
 on his return the emperor again left Eome to oppose the 
 barbarians. The Germanic people were defeated in a great 
 battle A.D. 179. During this campaign the emperor was 
 seized with some contagious malady, of which he died in the 
 camp at Sirmium (Mitrovitz) on the Save in Lower Pannonia, 
 but at Vindebona (Vienna) according to other authorities, on 
 the 17th of March a.d. 180, in the fifty-ninth year of his 
 age. His son Commodus was with him. The body or the 
 ashes probably of the emperor were carried to Eome, and he 
 received the honour of deification. Those who could afford 
 it had his statue or bust, and when Capitolinus wrote, many 
 people still had statues of Antoninus among the Dei Penates 
 or household deities. He was in a manner made a saint. 
 Commodus erected to the memory of his father the Antonine 
 column which is now in the Piazza Colonna at Eome. The 
 bassi rilievi which are placed in a spiral line round the shaft 
 commemorate the victories of Antoninus over the Marco- 
 manni and the Quadi, and the miraculous shower of rain 
 which refreshed the Eoman soldiers and discomfited their 
 enemies. The statue of Antoninus was placed on the capital 
 of the column, but it was removed at some time unknown, 
 and a bronze statue of St. Paul was put in the place by Pope 
 Sixfcus the fifth. 
 
 The historical evidence for the times of Antoninus is very 
 defective, and some of that which remains is not credible, 
 
M. Aurelius Antoninus. 9 
 
 The most curious is the story about the miracle which 
 happened in a.d. 174 dui-ing the war with the Quadi. The 
 Roman army was in danger of perishing by thirst, but a 
 sudden storm drenched them with rain, while it discharged 
 fire and hail on their enemies, and the Eomans gained a great 
 victory. All the authorities which speak of the battle speak 
 also of the miracle. The Gentile writers assign it to their 
 gods, and the Christians to the intercession of the Christian 
 legion in the emperor's army. To confii-m the Christian 
 statement it is added that the emperor gave the title of 
 Thundering to this legion ; but Dacier and others who 
 maintain the Christian report of the miracle, admit that this 
 title of Thundering or Lightning was not given to this legion 
 because the Quadi were struck with lightning, but because 
 there was a figure of lightning on their shields, and that this 
 title of the legion existed in the time of Augustus. 
 
 Scaliger also had observed that the legion was called 
 Thundering (KepawofSokos, or Kepavvo<fi6po<;) before the reign of 
 Antoninus. We learn this from Dion Cassius (Lib. 55, c. 23, 
 and the note of Keimarus) who enumerates all the legions 
 of Augustus' time. The name Thundering or Lightning also 
 occurs on an inscription of the reign of Trajan, which was 
 found at Trieste. Eusebius (v. 5) when he relates the 
 miracle, quotes Apolinarius, bishop of Hierapolis, as authority 
 for this name being given to the legion Melitene by the 
 emperor in consequence of the success which he obtained 
 through their prayers; from which we may estimate the 
 value of Apolinarius' testimony. Eusebius does not say in 
 what book of Apolinarius the statement occurs. Dion says 
 that the Thundering legion was stationed in Cappadocia in 
 the time of Augustus. Valesius also observes that in the 
 
10 M. Aurelius Antoninus. 
 
 Notitia of the Imperium Romanum there is mentioned under 
 the commander of Armenia the Praefectura of the twelfth 
 legion named " Thundering Melitene ;" and this position in 
 Armenia will agree with what Dion says of its position in 
 Cappadocia. Accordingly Valesius concludes that Melitene 
 was not the name of the legion, but of the town in which it 
 was stationed. Melitene was also the name of the district in 
 which this town was situated. The legions did not, he says, 
 take their name from the place where they were on duty, but 
 from the country in which they were raised, and therefore, 
 what Eusebius says about the Melitene does not seem 
 probable to him. Yet Valesius on the authority of Apolina- 
 rius and Tertullian believed that the miracle was worked 
 through the prayers of the Christian soldiers in the emperor's 
 army. Eufinus does not give the name of Melitene to this 
 legion, says Valesius, and probably he purposely omitted it, 
 because he knew that Melitene was the name of a town in 
 Armenia Minor, where the legion was stationed in his time. 
 
 The emperor, it is said, made a report of his victory to the 
 Senate, which we may believe, for such was the practice ; but 
 we do not know what he said in his letter, for it is not 
 extant. Dacier assumes that the emperor's letter was pur- 
 posely destroyed by the Senate or the enemies of Christianity, 
 that so honourable a testimony to the Christians and their 
 religion might not be perpetuated. The critic has however 
 not seen that he contradicts himself when he tells us the 
 purport of the letter, for he says that it was destroyed, and 
 even Eusebius could not find it. But thert does exist a letter 
 in Greek addressed by Antoninus to the Koman people and 
 the sacred Senate after this memorable victory. It is some- 
 times printed after Justin's first Apology, but it is totally 
 
Al. Awrelius Antoninus. H 
 
 unconnected witli the apologies. This letter is one of tho 
 most stupid forgeries of the many which exist, and it cannot 
 be possibly founded even on the genuine report of Antoninus 
 to the Senate. If it were genuine, it would free the emperor 
 from the charge of persecuting men because they were 
 Christians, for he says in this false letter that if a man 
 accuse another only of being a Christian and the accused 
 confess and there is nothing else against him, he must be set 
 free ; with this monstrous addition, made by a man incon- 
 ceivably ignorant, that the informer must be bui-nt alive.' 
 
 During the time of Antoninus Pius and Marcus Antoninus 
 there appeared the first Apology of Justinus, and under 
 M. Antoninus the Oration of Tatian against the Greeks, 
 which was a fierce attack on the established religions ; the 
 addi'ess of Athenagoras to M. Antoninus on behalf of the 
 Chi"istians, and the Apology of Melito, bishop of Sardes, also 
 addressed to the emperor, and that of Apolinarius. The first 
 Apology of Justinus is addressed to T. Antoninus Pius and 
 his two adopted sons M. Antoninus and L. Yerus ; but we do 
 not know whether they read it.^ The second Apology of 
 Justinus is intitled " to the Roman Senate ;" but this super- 
 
 2 Eusebius (v. 5) quotes Tertullian's Apology to the Roman Senate in 
 C5onfinnation of the story. TertuUian, he says, writes that letters of the 
 emperor were extant, in which he declares tliat his army was saved by 
 the prayers of the Christians ; and that he " threatened to punish with 
 death those who ventured to accuse us." It is possible that the forged 
 letter which is now extant may be one of those which Tertulhan had 
 seen, for he uses the plural number '• letters." A great deal has been 
 written about this miracle of the Thundering Legion, and more than is 
 worth reading. There is a dissertation on this supposed miracle in 
 Moyle's "Works, London, 1726. 
 
 3 Orosius, vn. l-i, says that Justinus the philosopher presented to 
 Antoninus Pius his work in defence of tlie Christian religion, and made 
 him mercifiil to the Christians. 
 
12 M. Aurelius Antoninas. 
 
 scription is from some copyist. In the first chapter Justinus 
 addresses the Eomans. In the second chapter he speaks of 
 an affair that had recently happened in the time of M. Anto- 
 ninus and L. Yerus, as it seems ; and he also directly 
 addresses the emperor, saying of a certain woman, " she 
 addressed a petition to thee the emperor, and thou didst 
 grant the petition." In other passages the writer addresses 
 the two emperors, from which we must conclude that the 
 Apology was directed to them. Eusebius (E. H. iv. 18) 
 states that the second Apology was addressed to the successor 
 of Antoninus Pius, and he names him Antoninus Yerus, 
 meaning M Antoninus. In one passage of this second 
 Apology (c. 8.), Justinus, or the writer, whoever he may be, 
 says that even men who followed the Stoic doctrines, when 
 they ordered their lives according to ethical reason, were 
 hated and murdered, such as Heraclitus, Musonius in his own 
 times and others ; for all those who in any way laboured to 
 live according to reason and avoided wickedness were always 
 hated ; and this was the effect of the work of daemons. 
 
 Justinus himself is said to have been put to death at Rome, 
 because he refused to sacrifice to the gods. It cannot have 
 been in the reign of Hadrian, as one authority states ; nor in 
 the time of Antoninus Pius, if the second Apology was 
 written in the time of M. Antoninus ; and there is evidence 
 that this event took place under M. Antoninus and L. Yerus, 
 when Rusticus was praefect of the city.* 
 
 4 See the Martyriura Sanctorum Justini, &c., in the works of Justinus, 
 ed. Otto, vol. II. 559. " Junius Kusticus Praefectus Urbi erat sub inipe- 
 ratoribus M. Aureiio et L. Vero, id quod liquet ex Themistii Orat. xxxiv. 
 Diudorf. p. 451, et ex quodam illorum rescripto, Dig. 49. 1.1, §2.' 
 (Otto.) The rescript contains the words " Juuiuni Uusiicuni amicum 
 nostrum Piaefectum Urbi." The Martyri-Tuu of Justinus and others is 
 
M. Aurtlius Antoninus. 13 
 
 Tlic persecution iu whick Polycarp sufifered at Sinyrua 
 belongs to the time of M. Antoninus. The evidence for it is 
 the letter of the church of Smyrna to the churches of 
 Philomelium and the other Christian churches, and it is 
 preserved by Eusebius (E. H. iv. 15). But the critics do 
 not agree about the time of Polycarp's death, differing in the 
 two extremes to the amount of twelve years. The circum- 
 stances of Polycarp's martyrdom were accompanied by 
 mii'acles, one of which Eusebius (iv. 15) has omitted, but it 
 appears in the oldest Latin version of the letter, which Usher 
 published, and it is suj^posed that this versicm was made not 
 long after the time of Eusebius. The notice at the end of 
 the letter states tliat it was transcribed by Caius from the 
 copy of Irenaeus, the disciple of Polycarp, then transcribed 
 by Socrates at Corinth ; " after which I Pionius again wrote 
 it out from the copy above mentioned, having searched it out 
 by the revelation of Polycarp, who directed me to it, &c." 
 
 written in Greek. It begins, " In the time of the wicked defendtrs of 
 idolatry impious edicts were published against the pious Cliristians both 
 in cities and couutry places, for the purpose of compelling them to make 
 offerings to vain idols. Accordingly the holy men (Juatinus, Chariton, 
 a woman Charito, Paeon, Liberianus, and others) were brought before 
 Eutoticus, the praefect of liome." 
 
 The Martyrium gives the examination of the accused by Rusticus. 
 All of them professed to be Christians. Justinus was asked if he 
 expected to ascend into heaven and to receive a reward for his suffer- 
 ings, if he was condemned to death. He answered that he did not ex- 
 pect : he was certain of it. Finally, the test of obedience was proposed 
 to the prisoners : they were required to sacrifice to the gods. AH 
 refused, and Rusticus pronounced the sentence, which was that those, 
 who refused to sacrifice to the gods and obey the emperor's order, 
 should be whipped and beheaded according to the law. The martyrs 
 were then led to the usixal place of execution and beheaded. Some 
 of the faithful secretly carried off the bodies and deposited then) 
 in a fit place. 
 
14 M. Aurelius Antoninus. 
 
 The story of Polycarp's martyrdom is embellished with 
 miraculous circumstances which some modern writers on 
 ecclesiastical history take the liberty of omitting.^ 
 
 In order to form a proper notion of the condition of the 
 Christians under M. Antoninus we must go back to Trajan's 
 time. When the younger Pliny was governor of Bithynia, 
 the Christians were numerous in those parts, and the 
 worshippers of the old religion were falling off. The temples 
 were deserted, the festivals neglected, and there were no 
 purchasers of victims for sacrifice. Those who were interested 
 in the maintenance of the old religion thus found -that their 
 profits were in danger. Christians of both sexes and of all 
 ages were brought before the governor, who did not know 
 what to do with them. He could come to no other conclusion 
 than this, that those who confessed to be Christians and 
 persevered in their religion ought to be punished ; if for 
 nothing else, for their invincible obstinacy. He found no 
 crimes proved against the Christians, and he could only 
 characterize their religion as a depraved and extravagant 
 superstition, which might be stopped, if the people were 
 allowed the opportunity of recanting. Pliny wrote this in a 
 letter to Trajan (Plinius, Ep. x. 97). He asked for the 
 emperor's directions, because he did not know what to do : 
 He remarks that he had never been engaged in judicial 
 
 5 Conyers Middleton, An luquiry into the Miraculous Fowers, &c. 
 p. 126. Middleton says that Eusebius omitted to mention the dove, which 
 flew out of Polycarp's body, and Dodwell and Archbishop Wake have 
 done the same. Wake says " I am so little a friend to such miracles 
 that I thought it better with Eusebius to omit that circumstance than to 
 mention it from Bp. Usher's Manuscript," which manuscript however, 
 Bays Middleton, he afterwards declares to be so well attested that we 
 need not any fm-ther assurance of the truth of it 
 
M. Aurelhis Antoninus. 15 
 
 inquiries about the Christians, and that accordingly he did 
 not know what to inquire about or how far to inquire and 
 punish. This proves that it was not a new thing to examine 
 into a man's profession of Christianity and to punish him for 
 it.^ Trajan's Kescript is extant. He approved of the 
 governor's judgment in the matter ; but he said that no 
 search must be made after the Christians ; if a man was 
 charged with the new religion and convicted, he must not be 
 punished, if he affirmed that he vras not a Christian and con- 
 firmed his denial by showing his reverence to the heathen 
 gods. He added that no notice must be taken of anonymous 
 informations, for such things were of bad example. Trajan 
 was a mild and sensible man, and both motives of mercy and 
 policy probably also induced him to take as little notice of 
 the Christians as he could ; to let them live in quiet, if it 
 were possible. Trajan's rescript is the first legislative act of 
 the head of the Roman state with reference to Christianity, 
 which is known to us. It does not appear that the Christians 
 were fiu-ther disturbed under his reign. The martyrdom of 
 Ignatius by the order of Trajan himself is not universally 
 admitted to be an historical fact.'' 
 
 In the time of Hadrian it was no longer possible for the 
 Roman government to overlook the great increase of the 
 Christians and the hostility of the common sort to them. If 
 the governors in the provinces were willing to let them alone, 
 
 ^ Orcisius (vn. 12) speaks of Trajan's persecution of the Christians, 
 and of Pliny's application to him having led the emperor to mitigate his 
 severity. The punishment by the Mosaic law for those who attempted 
 to seduce the Jews to follow new gods, was death. If a man was 
 secretly enticed to such new worship, he must kill the seducer, even if 
 the seducer were brother, son, daughter, wife, or friend, (Deut. xiii.) 
 
 ' The Martyrium Ignatii, first pu])li&hed in Latin by ArehbisJiop 
 Usher, is the chief evideuce for the circumstances of Ignatius' death. 
 
16 M. Aurelius Antoninus. 
 
 they could not resist the fanaticism of the heathen community, 
 who looked on the Christians as atheists. The Jews too who 
 were settled all over the Roman Empire were as hostile to 
 the Christians as the Gentiles were.^ With the time of 
 Hadrian begin the Christian Apologies, which show plainly 
 what the popular feeling towards the Christians then was. 
 A rescript of Hadrian to Minucius Fundanus the Proconsul 
 of Asia, which stands at the end of Justin's first Apology," in- 
 structs the governor that innocent people must not be 
 troubled and false accusers must not be allowed to extort 
 money from them ; the charges against the Christians must 
 be made in due form and no attention must be paid to 
 popular clamours ; when Christians were regularly prosecuted 
 and convicted of illegal acts, they must be punished according 
 to their deserts ; and false accusers also must be punished. 
 Antoninus Pius is said to have published Rescripts to the 
 same effect. The terms of Hadrian's Rescript seem very 
 favourable to the Christians ; but if we understand it in this 
 sense, that they were only to be punished like other people 
 for illegal acts, it would have had no meaning, for that could 
 
 ^ We have the evidence of Justinus (ad Diognetum, c. 5) to this effect : 
 " the Christians are attacked by the Jews as if they were men of a 
 different race and are persecnted by the Greeks ; and those who hate 
 them cannot give the reason of their enmity." 
 
 9 And in Eusebius, E, H. iv. 8, 9. Orosius (vn, 13) says that Hadrian 
 sent this rescript to Minucius Fundanus proconsul of Asia after being 
 instructed in books written on the Christian rehgion by Quadratus a 
 disciple of the Apostles and Aristides an Athenian, an honest and wise 
 man, and Serenus Granius. In the Greek text of Hadrian's rescript 
 there is mentioned Serenius Granianus, the predecessor of Minucius 
 Fundanus in the government of Asia. 
 
 This rescript of Hadrian has clearly been added to the Apology by 
 some editor. The Ajiology ends with the words: % (piXov r^i 6^^, rovro 
 yev4adu. 
 
M. Aurelius Anfoninus. 17 
 
 liavo been done without asking tlic emperor's advice. The 
 real purpose of the Ecscrijjt is that Christians must bo 
 punished if they persisted in their belief, and would not 
 prove their renunciation of it by acknowledging the heathen 
 religion. This was Trajan's rule, and we have no reason for 
 supposing that Hadrian granted more to the Christians than 
 Trajan did. There is also printed at the end of Justin's 
 first Apology a Rescript of Antoninus Pius to the Com- 
 mune of Asia {to kolvov Trj<s 'Ao-tas), and it is also in 
 Eusebius (E. H. iv. 13). The date of the Rescript is the 
 third consulship of Antoninus Pius.^" The Rescript declares 
 that the Christians, for they are meant, though the name 
 Christians does not occm* in the Rescript, were not to be 
 distui'bed, unless they were attempting something against the 
 Roman rule, and no man was to be punished simply for being 
 a Christian. But this Rescript is spui'ious. Any man 
 
 10 Eusebius (E, H. iv. 12) after giving the beginning of Justiuus' First 
 Apology, which contains the address to T, Antoninus and bis two 
 adopted sons, adds " the same emperor being addressed by other 
 brethren in Asia lionoured tlie Commune of Asia with the following 
 Eescript." .This Eescript, which is in the next chapter of Eusebius 
 (E. H. IV. 13), is in the sole name of Caesar Marcus Aurelius Antoninus 
 Augustus Armenius, thougb Eusebius bad just before said that he was 
 going to give us a Rescript of Antoninus Pius, There are some material 
 variations between the two copies of the Eescript besides the difference 
 in the title, wliich ditierence makes it impossible to sny whether the 
 forger intended to assign this Eescript to Pius or to M. Antoninus. 
 
 The author of the Alexandrine Chronicura says that Marcus being 
 moved by the entreaties of Melito and other heads of the church wrote 
 an Epistle to the Commune of Asia in which he forbade the Christians 
 to be troubled on account of their religion. Valesius supposes this to 
 be the letter or rescript which is contained in EiirsL-bius (iv. 13), and to 
 be the answer to the apology of Mtlito of which I shall soon give the sub- 
 stance. But Marcus certainly did not write tliia letter which is in 
 Eusebius, and we know not what answer he made to Melito. 
 
 O 
 
18 M. Aurelius Antoninus. 
 
 moderately acquainted with Eoman history will see by the 
 style and tenor that it is a clumsy forgery. 
 
 In the time of M. Antoninus the opposition between the 
 old and the new belief was still stronger, and the adherents 
 of the heathen religion urged those in authority to a more 
 regular resistance to the invasions of the Christian faith. 
 Melito in his apology to M. Antoninus represents the 
 Christians of Asia as persecuted under new imperial orders. 
 Shameless informers, he says, men who were greedy after the 
 property of others, used these orders as a means of robbing 
 those who were doing no harm. He doubts if a just emperor 
 could have ordered anything so unjust ; and if the last order 
 was really not from the emperor, the Christians entreat him 
 not to give them up to their enemies." We conclude from 
 
 ^1 Eusebius, iv. 26 ; and Routh's Eeliquiae Saerae, vol. i. and the 
 notes. The interpretation of this Fragment is not easy. Mosheim mis- 
 understood one passage so far as to affirm that Marcus promised rewards 
 to tiiose wlio denounced the Christians ; un interpretation which is 
 entirely false. Melito calls the Christian religion "our philosophy," 
 which began among barbarians (the Jews), and flourished among the 
 Eoman subjects in the time of Augustus, to the great advantage of the 
 empire, for from that time the power of the Eomans grew great and 
 glorious. He says that the emperor ha s and will have as the successor 
 to Augustus' power the good wishes of men, if he will protect that 
 philosophy which grew up) with the empire and began with Augustus, 
 which philosophy the predecessors of Antoninus honoured in addition 
 to the other religions. He further says that the Christian religion had 
 suffered no harm since the time of Augustus, but on the contrary had 
 enjoyed all honour and respect tliat any man could desire. Nero and 
 Domitian, he says, ^were alone persuaded by some malicious men to 
 calumniate the Christian religion, and this was the origin of the false 
 charges against the Christians. But this was corrected by the emperors 
 who immediately preceded Antoninus, who often by their Eescripta 
 reproved those who attempted to trouble the Ciiristians. Hadrian, 
 Antoninus' grandfather, wrote to many and among them to Fuudanus 
 the governor of Asia. Antoninus Pius when Mureus was aasociateU 
 
M. Aurelius Antoninus. 19 
 
 this that there were at least imperial Rescripts or C(mstitu- 
 tions of M. Antoninus, which were made the foundation of 
 these persecutions. The fact of being a Christian was now 
 a crime and punished, unless the accused denied their 
 religion. Then come the persecutions at Smyrna, which 
 some modern critics place in a.d. 167, ten years before the 
 persecution of Lyon. The governors of the provinces under 
 M. Antoninus might have found enough even in Trajan's 
 Rescript to warrant them in punishing Christians, and the 
 fanaticism of the people would drive them to persecution, 
 even if they were unwilling. But besides the fact of the 
 Christians rejecting all the heathen ceremonies, we must not 
 forget that they plainly maintained that all the heathen 
 religions were false. The Chi-istians thus declared war 
 against the heathen rites, and it is hardly necessary to 
 observe that this was a declaration of hostility against the 
 Roman government, which tolerated all the various forms of 
 superstition that existed in the empire, and could not con- 
 sistently tolerate another religion, which declared that all 
 
 with liim in the empire wrote to the cities, that they must not trouLle 
 tlie Cliristians ; among others to the people of Larissa, Tiie^salonica, tlie 
 Athenians and all the Greeks. Melito concluded thus : "We are per- 
 suaded that thou who hast about these things the same mind that they 
 had, nay rather one much more humane and philosophical, wilt do all 
 that we ask thee. — This apology was written after a.d. 169, the year in 
 which Verus died, for it speaks of Marcus only and his son Commodus. 
 According to Melitos testimony, Christians had only been punished 
 for their religion in the time of Nero and Domitian, and the persecu- 
 tions began again in the time of M. Antoninus and were founded on his 
 orders, which were abused as he seems to mean. He distinctly affirms 
 " that the race of the godly is now persecuted and harassed by fresli 
 imperial orders in Asia, a thing which had never happened before." 
 But we know that all this is not true, and that Christians had boen 
 punished in Trajan's time. 
 
20 M. Aurelius Antoninus. 
 
 the rest were false ahd all tlie splendid ceremonies of the 
 empire only a worship of devils. 
 
 If we had a true ecclesiastical history, we should know 
 how the Eoman emperors attempted to check the new religion, 
 how they enforced their principle of finally punishing 
 Christians, simply as Christians, which Justin in his 
 Apology nffivms that they did, and I have no doubt that he 
 tells the truth ; how far popular clamour and riots went in 
 this matter, and how far many fanatical and ignorant 
 Christians, for there were many such, contributed to excite 
 the fanaticism on the other side and to embitter the quarrel 
 between the Eoman government and the new religion. Our 
 extant ecclesiastical histories are manifestly falsified, and 
 what truth they contain is grossly exaggerated ; but the fact 
 is certain that in the time of M. Antoninus the heathen 
 populations were in open hostility to the Christians, and that 
 under Antoninus' rule men were put to death because they 
 were Christians. Eusebius in the preface to his fifth book 
 remarks that in the seventeenth year of Antoninus' reign, in 
 some parts of the world the persecution of the Christians 
 became more violent and that it proceeded from the populace 
 in the cities ; and he adds in his usual style of exaggeration, 
 that we may infer from what took place in a single nation 
 that myriads of martyrs were made in the habitable earth. 
 The nation which he alludes to is Gallia ; and he then pro- 
 ceeds to give the letter of the churches of Vienna and Lug- 
 dunum. It is probable that he has assigned the true cause 
 of the persecutions, the fanaticism of the populace, and that 
 both governors and emperor had a great deal of trouble with 
 these distm'bances. How far Marcus was cognizant .of these 
 cruel proceedings we do not know, for the historical records 
 
M. Aurclius Antoninus. 21 
 
 of his reign are very defective. lie did not make the rulo 
 against the Christians, for Trajan did that ; and if we admit 
 that he would have been willing to let the Christians alone, 
 we cannot affirm that it was in his power, for it would be a 
 great mistake to suppose that Antoninus had the unlimited 
 authority, which some modern sovereigL^s have had. His 
 power was limited by certain constitutional forms, by the 
 senate, and by the precedents of his predecessors. We can- 
 not admit that such a man was an active persecutor, for there 
 is no evidence that he was,^^ though it is certain that he had 
 no good opinion of the Christians, as appears from his own 
 words.^^ But he knew nothing of them except their hostility 
 
 ^2 Except that of Orosius(YTi. 15), who says that during the Parthiau 
 war there were grievous persecutions of the Christians in Asia and 
 Gallia under the orders of Marcus (praecepto ejus), and "many were 
 crowned with the martyrdom of saints." 
 
 ^2 See XI. 3. The emperor probably speaks of such fanntics as Cle- 
 mens (quoted by Gataker on this passage) mentions. The rational 
 Christians admitted no fellowship with them. " Some of these heretics,"' 
 says Clemens, " show their impiety and cowardice by loving their lives, 
 saying that the knowledge of the really existing God is true testimony 
 (martyrdom), but that a man is a self-murderer who bears witness by \nM 
 death. We also blame those who nash to deatli, for there are some, not 
 of us, but only bearing the same name w ho give themselves up. We say 
 of them that they die without being martyrs, even if they are publicly 
 punished ; and they give themselves up to a death which avails nothing, 
 as the Indian Gymnosophists give themselves up foolishlj- Lo fire." 
 Cave in his Primitive Christianity (n. c. 7) says of the Christians : 
 '■ They did flock to the place of torment faster than droves of beasts that 
 are driven to the shambles. They even longed to be in the arms of 
 suffering. Ignatius, though then in his journey to Kome in order to his 
 execution, yet by the way as he went could not but vent his passionate 
 desire of it : that I might come to those wild beasts, that are prepared 
 for me ; I heartily wish that I may presently meet with them ; I would 
 invite and encourage them speedily to devoiu- me, and not be afraid tc 
 set upon me as they have been to others ; nay should thi y refuse it, 1 
 would even force them to it;" and more to the same purpose from 
 
22 M. Aiirelius Anioninus. 
 
 to the Roman religion, and he probably thought that they 
 were dangerous to the state, notwithstanding the professions 
 false or true of some of the Apologists. So much I have 
 said, because it would be unfair not to state all that can be 
 urged against a man whom his contemporaries and subsequent 
 ages venerated as a model of virtue and benevolence. If I 
 admitted the genuineness of some documents, he would be 
 altogether clear from the charge of even allowing any perse- 
 cutions ; but as I seek the truth and am sure that they are 
 false, I leave him to bear whatever blame is his due.^* I add 
 that it is quite certain that Antoninus did not derive any of his 
 Ethical principles from a religion of which he knew nothing.^^ 
 There is no doubt that the Emperor's Reflections or his 
 Meditations, as they are generally named, is a genuine work. 
 In the first book he speaks of himself, his family, and his 
 teachers ; and in other books he mentions himself. Suidaa 
 (v. MapKos) notices a work of Antoninus in twelve books, 
 which he names the " conduct of his own life ;" and he cites 
 the book under several words in his Dictionary, giving the 
 emperor's name, but not the title of the work. There are 
 also passages cited by Suidas from Antoninus without 
 
 Eusebius. Cave, an honest and good man, says all this in praise of the 
 Christians ; but I tliink that he mistook the matter. We admire a man 
 who holds to his principles even to death ; but these fanatical Christiana 
 are the Gymnosophists whom Clemens treats with disdain. 
 
 ^* Dr. F. C. Baur in his work entitled Das Christenthum und die 
 Christliche Kirche der drei ersten Jahrhunderte, &c., has examined this 
 question with great good sense and fairness, and I believe he has stated 
 the tmth as near as our authorities enable us to reach it. 
 
 ^' In the Digest, 48, 19, 30, there is the following excerpt from Modes- 
 tinus: " Si quis aliquid fecerit, quo leves hominum animi superstitiono 
 numinis terrerentur, divus Marcus hujusmodi homines in insulaiu 
 relegari rescripsit." 
 
M. Aurelius Antoninus. 23 
 
 mention of the emperor's name. The true title of the work 
 is unknown. Xylandcr who published the first edition of 
 this book (Ziiricli, 1558, 8vo. with a Latin version) used a 
 manuscript, which contained the twelve books, but it is not 
 known where the manuscript is now. The only other 
 complete mauuscript which is known to exist is in the 
 Vatican library, but it has no title and no inscriptions of the 
 several books : the eleventh only has the inscription MdpKov 
 avTOKpaTopo<i marked with an asterisk. The other Vatican 
 manuscripts and the three Florentine contain only excerpts 
 from the emperor's book. All the titles of the excerpts 
 nearly agree with that which Xy lander prefixed to his edition, 
 MapKOu 'Arrwj/iVov At»roKpa-opos roiv ets iavrov ^ifiXia l^. This 
 title has been used by all subsequent editors. We cannot 
 tell whether Antoninus divided his work into books or some- 
 body else did it. If the inscriptions at the end of the first 
 and second books are genuine, he may have made the division 
 himself. 
 
 It is plain that the emperor wrote down his thoughts or 
 reflections as the occasions arose; and since they were 
 intended for his own use, it is no improbable conjecture that 
 he left a complete copy behind him written with his own 
 hand ; for it is not likely that so diligent a man would use 
 the labour of a transcriber for such a pui-pose, and expose 
 his most secret thoughts to any other eye. He may have 
 also intended the book for his son Commodus, who however 
 had no taste for his father's philosophy. Some careful hand 
 preserved the precious volume ; and a work by Antoninus is 
 mentioned by other late writers besides Suidas. 
 
 Many critics have laboured on the text of Antoninus. The 
 most complete edition is that by Thomas Gataker, 1652, 4to, 
 
24 31. Aurelius Antoninus. 
 
 The second edition of Gataker was superintended by George 
 Stanhope, 1697, dto. There is also an edition of 1704. 
 Gataker made and suggested many good corrections, and he 
 also made a new Latin version, which is not a very good 
 specimen of Latin, but it generally expresses the sense of 
 the original and often better than some of the more recent 
 translations. He added in the margin opposite to each 
 paragraph references to the other parallel passages ; and he 
 wrote a commentary, one of the most complete that has been 
 written on any ancient author. This commentary contains 
 the editor's exposition of the more difficult passages, and 
 quotations from all the Greek and Eoman writers for the 
 illustration of the text. It is a wonderful monument of 
 learning and labour, and certainly no Englishman has yet 
 done anything like it. At the end of his preface the editor 
 says that he wrote it at Eotherhithe near London in a severe 
 wdnter, when he was in the seventy-eighth year of his age, 
 1651, a time when Milton, Selden and other great men of the 
 Common v/ealth time were living ; and the great French 
 scholar Saumaise (Salmasius), with whom Gataker corre- 
 sponded and received help from him for his edition of 
 Antoninus. The Greek text has also been edited by J. M. 
 Schultz, Leipzig, 1802, 8vo. ; and by the learned Greek 
 Adamantinus Corais, Paris, 1816, 8vo. The text of Schultz 
 vi^as republished by Tauchnitz, 1821. 
 
 There are English, German, French, Italian, and Spanish 
 translations of M. Antoninus, and there may be others. 
 I have not seen all the English translations. There 
 is one by Jeremy Collier, 1702, 8vo., a most coarse and 
 vulgar copy of the original. The latest French translation 
 by Alexis Pierron in the collection of Charpentier is better 
 
M. AureUus Antoninus. 25 
 
 than DaciGi-'s, which has been honoured with an Italian 
 version (Udiue, 1772). There is an Italian version (1G75) 
 which I have not seen. It is by a cardinal. " A man 
 illustrious in the church, the Cardinal Francis Barberini the 
 elder, nephew of Pope Urban VIII., occupied the last years 
 of his life in translating into his native language the 
 thoughts of the Eoman emperor, in order to diffuse among 
 the faithful the fertilizing and vivifying seeds. He dedicated 
 this translation to his soul, to make it, as he says in his 
 energetic style, redder than his purple at the sight of the 
 vii'tues of this Gentile " (Pierron, Preface). 
 
 I have made this translation at intervals after having used 
 the book for many years. It is made from the Greek, but I 
 have not always followed one text ; and I have occasionally 
 compared other versions with my own. I made this trans- 
 lation for my own use, because I found that it was worth the 
 labour ; but it may be useful to others also and therefore I 
 determined to print it. As the original is sometimes very 
 difficult to understand and still more difficult to translate, it 
 is not possible that I have always avoided error. But I 
 believe that 1 have not often missed the meaning, and those 
 who will take the trouble to compare the translation with 
 the original should not hastily conclude that I am wrong, if 
 they do not agree with me. Some passages do give the 
 meaning, though at fii-st sight they may not appear to do so ; 
 and when I differ from the translators, I think that in some 
 places they are wrong, and in other places I am sure that 
 they are. I have placed in some passages a f, which 
 indicates corruption in the text or great uncertainty in the 
 meaning. I could have made the language more easy and 
 flowing, but I have preferred a ruder style as being better 
 
26 M. Aurelius Antoninus. 
 
 suited to express tlie cliaracter of tlic original ; and some- 
 times the obscurity which may appear in the version is a 
 fair copy of the obscurity of the Greek. If I should ever 
 revise this version, I would gladly make use of any correc- 
 tions which may be suggested. I have added an index of 
 some of the Greek terms with the corresponding English. 
 If I have not given the best words for the Greek, I have 
 done the best that I could ; and in the text I have always 
 given the same translation of the same word. 
 
 The last reflection of the Stoic philosophy that I have 
 observed is in Simplicius' Commentary on the Enchiridion 
 of Epictetus. Simplicius was not a Christian, and such a 
 man was not likely to be converted at a time when 
 Christianity was grossly corrupted. But he was a really 
 religious man, and he concludes his commentary with a 
 prayer to the Deity which no Christian could improve. 
 From the time of Zeno to Simplicius, a period of about nine 
 hundred years, the Stoic philosophy formed the characters of 
 some of the best and greatest men. Finally it became 
 extinct, and we hear no more of it till the revival of letters 
 in Italy. Angelo Poliziano met wdth two very inaccurate 
 and incomplete manuscripts of Epictetus' Enchiridion, which 
 he translated into Latin and dedicated to his great patron 
 Lorenzo de' Medici in whose collection he had found the 
 book, Poliziano's version was printed in the first Bale 
 edition of the Enchiridion, a.d. 1531 (apud And. Cratandrum). 
 Poliziano recommends the Enchiridion to Lorenzo as a work 
 well suited to his temper, and useful in the difficulties by 
 which he was surrounded. 
 
 Epictetus and Antoninus have had readers ever since they 
 were first printed. The little book of Antoninus has been 
 
M, Aurelius Antoninus. 27 
 
 the companlou of some great men. Macliiavelli's Art of 
 War and Marcus Antoninus were the two books which were 
 used when he was a young man by Captain John Smith, and 
 he could not have found two writers better fitted to form the 
 character of a soldier and a man. Smith is almost unknown 
 and forgotten in England his native country, but not in 
 America where he saved the young colony of Virginia. He 
 was great in his heroic mind and his deeds in arms, but 
 greater still in the nobleness of his character. For a man's 
 greatness lies not in wealth and station, as the vulgar believe, 
 nor yet in his intellectual capacity, which is often associated 
 with the meanest moral character, the most abject servility 
 to those in high places and arrogance to the poor and lowly ; 
 but a man's true greatness lies in the consciousness of an 
 honest purpose in life, founded on a just estimate of himself 
 and everything else, on frequent self-examination, and a 
 steady obedience to the rule which he knows to be right, 
 without troubling himself, as the emperor says he should not, 
 about what others may think or say, or whether they do or 
 do not do that which he thinks and savs and does. 
 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANTONINUS. 
 
 IT has been said that the Stoic philosophy first showed its 
 real value when it passed from Greece to Roma The 
 doctrines of Zeno and his successors were well suited to the 
 gravity and practical good sense of the Eomans ; and even in 
 the Eepublican period we have an example of a man, M. Cato 
 Uticensis, who lived the life of a Stoic and died consistently 
 with the opinions which he professed. He was a man, says 
 Cicero, who embraced the Stoic philosophy from conviction ; 
 not for the purpose of vain discussion, as most did, but in 
 order to make his life conformable to the Stoic precepts. In 
 the wretched times from the death of Augustus to the murder 
 of Domitian, there was nothing but the Stoic philosophy 
 which could console and support the foUo^i^f the old 
 religion under imperial tyranny and amidst ^HK^l corrup- 
 tion. There were even then noble minds that could dare 
 and endure, sustained by a good conscience and an elevated 
 idea of the purposes of man's existence. Such were Paetus 
 Thrasea, Helvidius Prisons, Cornutus, C. Musonius Rufus,^ 
 and the poets Persius and Juvenal, whose energetic language 
 
 1 I have omitted Seneca, Nero's, preceptor. He was in a sense a 
 Stoic and he has said many good things in a very fine way. There is 
 a judgment of Gellius (xii, 2) on Seneca, or rather a statement of what 
 some people thought of his philosophy, and it is not favourable. His 
 writings and his life must be taken together, and I have nothing more 
 to say of him here. The reader will find a notice of Seneca and his 
 philosophy in " Seekers after God," by the Rev. F. W. Farrar, Ma> 
 millan and Co. 
 
The Philosophy of Antoninus. 29 
 
 and manly thoughts may be as instructive to us now as they 
 might have been to theii- contemporaries. Persius died under 
 Nero's bloody reign, but Juvenal had the good fortune to 
 survive the tyrant Domitian and to see the better times of 
 Nerva, Trajan and Hadrian.^ His best precepts are derived 
 from the Stoic school, and they are enforced in his finest 
 verses by the unrivalled vigour of the Latin language. 
 
 The two best expounders of the later Stoical philosophy 
 were a Greek slave and a Eoman emperor. Epictetus, a 
 Phrygian Greek, was brought to Eomo, we know not how, but 
 he was there the slave and afterwards the freedman of an 
 unworthy master, Epajihroditus by name, himself a freedman 
 and a favourite of Nero. Epictetus may have been a hearer of 
 C Musonius Eufus, while he was still a' slave, but he could 
 hardly have been a teacher before he was made free. He was 
 one of the philosophers whom Domitian's order banished 
 from Rome. He retired to Nicopolis in Epirus, and he may 
 have died there. Like other great teachers he wrote nothing, 
 and we are indebted to his gTateful pupil Arrian for what we 
 have of E]^h|^|s' discourses. Arrian wrote eight books of 
 the discourPIWl Epictetus, of which only four remain and 
 some fragments. \\e have also from Arrian's hand the small 
 Enchiridion or Manual of the chief precepts of Epictetus. 
 There is a valuable commentary on the Enchiridion by Sim- 
 plicius, who lived in the time of the emperor Justinian.^ 
 
 2 Eibbeck has laboured to prove that those Satires, which contain 
 philosophical precepts, are not the work of the real, but of a false 
 Juvenal, a Declainator. • Still the verses exist, and were written by 
 somebody wiio was acquainted with the Stoic doctrines. 
 
 ^ There is a complete edition of Arrian's Epictetus with the com- 
 mentary of Simplicius by J. Schweighaeuser, 6 vols. Svo. 1 799, 1800 
 There is also an English tronslatiou of Epictetus by Mrs. (Jaiter. 
 
30 The Philosojphy of Antoninus. 
 
 Antoninus in liis first book (i. 7), in which he gratefully 
 commemorates his obligations to his teachers, says that he 
 was made acquainted by Junius Eusticus with the discourses 
 of Epictetus, whom he mentions also in other passages (iv. 
 41 ; XI. 34. 36). Indeed the doctrines of Epictetus and 
 Antoninus are the same, and Epictetus is the best authority 
 for the explanation of the philosophical language of Antoninus 
 and the exposition of his opinionsT^ But the method of the 
 two philosophers is entirely different. Epictetus addressed 
 himself to his hearers in a continuous discourse and in a 
 familiar and simple manner. Antoninus wrote dowj his 
 reflections for his Own use only, in short unconnected 
 paragraphs, which are often obscure. 
 
 The Stoics made three divisions of philosophy, Pliysic 
 ((jiva-LKov), Ethic (jjOiKov), and Logic (Xoyi/cov) (viii. 13). This 
 division, we are told by Diogenes, was made by Zeno of 
 Citium, the founder of the Stoic sect and by Chrysippus ; 
 but these philosophers placed the three divisions in the 
 following order, Logic, Physic, Ethic. It appears however 
 that this division was made before Zeno's time and acknow- 
 ledged by Plato, as Cicero remarks (Acad. Post. i. 5). Logic 
 is not synonymous with our term Logic in the narrower sense 
 of that word. 
 
 Cleanthes, a Stoic, subdivided the three divisions, and made 
 six : Dialectic and PJietoric, comprised in Logic ; Ethic and 
 Politic; Physic and Theology. This division was merely 
 , for practical use, for all Philosophy is one. Even among the 
 earliest Stoics Logic or Dialectic does not occupy the same 
 place as in Plato : it is considered only as an instrument 
 which is to be used for the other divisions of Philosophy. 
 An exposition of the earlier Stoic doctrines and of their 
 
The PhilosojjJuj of Antoninus. 31 
 
 modifications would require a volume. My object is to 
 explain only the opinions of Antoninus, so far as tbcy can be 
 collected from bis book. 
 
 According to tbe subdivision of Cleantbes Pbysic and 
 Tbeology go togetber, or tbe study of tbe nature of Tbings, 
 and tbe study of tbe nature of tbe Deity, so far as man can 
 understand tbe Deity, and of bis government of tbe universe. 
 Tbis division or subdivision is not formally adopted by 
 Antoninus, for as already observed, tbere is no metboti in bis 
 booJs ; but it is virtually contained in it. 
 
 Cleantbes also connects Etbic and Politic, or tbe study of 
 tbe principles of morals and tbe study of tbe constitution of 
 civil society; and undoubtedly be did well in subdividing 
 Etbic into two parts, Etbic ili^be narrower sense and Politic, 
 for tbougb tbe two are intimately connected, tbey are also 
 very distinct, and many questions can only be properly 
 discussed by carefully observing tbe distinction. Antoninus 
 does not treat of Politic. His subject is Etbic, and Etbic in 
 its practical application to bis own conduct in life as a man^ 
 and as a governor. His Etbic is founded on bis doctrines 
 about man's naturCj tbe Universal Nature, and tbe relation of 
 every man to everytbLng. elsQ^ It is tberefore intimately and 
 inseparably connected witb Pbysic or tbe nature of Tbings 
 and witb Tbeology or tbe Natui-e of tbe Deity. He advises 
 us t o^exa mine well all tbe impressions on our minds (<^avracrrat) 
 and to form a rigbt judgment of tbem, to make just conclu- 
 sions, and to inquire into tb.e meanings of words, and so far 
 to apply Dialectic, but be bas no attempt at any exposition of 
 Dialectic, and bis pbilosopby is in substance purel y mora l ^^ 
 and practical. He says (viii. 13), "Constantly and, if it 
 be possible, on tbe occasion of every impression on the 
 
32 The Philosophy of Anto7iinus. 
 
 soul,* apj)ly to it the principles of Physic, of Ethic and of 
 Dialectic :" which is only another way of telling ns to examine 
 the impression in every possible way. In another passage 
 (hi. 11) he says, " To the aids which have been mentioned 
 let this one still be added : make for thyself a definition or 
 description of the object (to cfiavrao-rov) which is presented to 
 thee, so as to see distinctly what kind of a thing it is in its 
 substance, in its nudity, in its complete entirety, and tell 
 thyself its proper name, and the names of the things of which 
 it has been compounded, and into which it will be resol-tted." 
 Such an examination implies a use of Dialectic, which 
 Antoninus accordingly employed as a means towards estab- 
 lishing his Physical, Theological and Ethical principles. 
 
 There are several expositions of the Physical, Theological, 
 and Ethical princij)les, which are contained in the work of 
 Antoninus ; and more expositions than I have read. Eitter 
 (Geschichte der Philosophic, iv. 241) after explaining the 
 doctrines of Epictetus, treats very briefly and insufficiently 
 those of Antoninus, But he refers to a short essay, in which 
 the work is done better.* There is also an essay on the 
 Philosophical Principles of M. Aurelius Antoninus by J. M. 
 Schultz, placed at the end of his German translation of 
 
 * The original is iirl irda-ris (pavracrias. We have no word which 
 expresses (pavraaia, for it is not only the sensuous appearance wliich 
 comes from an external object, which object is called t^ (pavTaardv, but 
 it is also the thought or feeling or opinion which is produced even when 
 there is no corresponding external object before us. Accordingly 
 everything which moves the soul is (pavraarSu and i)roduces a (pavTuaia. 
 
 In this extract Antoninus says (pv(Tio\oyf7u,TTa9okoye7v, SiaXfKriKsvia-dai. 
 I have translated TraOoXoyelu by using the word Moral (Ethic), and that 
 is the meaning here. 
 
 ^ De Marco Aurelio Antonino ... ex ipsius Commeutariis. Scriptio 
 I'hilologica. Instituit Nicolaus Bachius, Lipsiae, 1826. 
 
The Philosophy of Antoninus. 33 
 
 Antoninus (Sclileswig, 1799). With tlie assistance of tlicso 
 two useful essays and his own diligent study a man may form 
 a sufl&cicnt notion of the principles of Antoninus ; but he will 
 find it more difficult to expound them to others. Besides the 
 want of arrangement in the original and of connection among 
 the numerous paragraphs, the corruption of the text, tlie 
 obscurity of the language and the style, and sometimes 
 perha2)s the confusion in the writer's own ideas, — besides all 
 this there is occasionally an apparent contradiction in the 
 emperor's thoughts, as if his principles were sometimes 
 unsettled, as if doubt sometimes clouded his mind. A man 
 who leads a life of tranquillity and reflection, who is not 
 disturbed at home and meddles not with the aff'airs of the 
 world, may keep his mind at ease and his thoughts in one 
 even course. But such a man has not been tried. All his 
 Ethical philosophy and his passive virtue might turn out to 
 be idle words, if he were once exposed to the rude realities of 
 human existence. Fine thoughts and moral dissertations 
 from men who have networked and suffered may be read, but 
 they will be forgotten. No religion, no Ethical philosophy 
 is worth anything, if the teacher has not lived the " life of an 
 apostle," and been ready to die " the death of a martyr." 
 " Not in passivity (the passive affects) but in activity lie tuv 
 evil and the good of the rational social animal, just as his 
 virtue and his vice lie not in passivity, but in activity " 
 (ix. 16). Th e em peror Antoninus was a practical mor alis t. 
 From his youth he followed a laborious discipline, and 
 though his high station placed him above all want or the 
 fear of it, he lived as frugally and temperately as the poorest 
 philosopher. Ej^ictetus wanted li ttle, and it seems th at he 
 always had the little that he wanted and he was content 
 
34 The Philosophj of Antoninus. 
 
 with it, as lie had been with his servile station. But 
 Antoninus after his accession to the empire sat on an uneasy 
 seat. He had the administration of an empire which 
 extended from the Euphrates to the Atlantic, from the cold 
 mountains of Scotland to the hot sands of Africa ; and we 
 may imagine, though we cannot know it by experience, what 
 must be the trials, the troubles, the anxiety and the sorrows 
 of him who has the world's business on his hands with the 
 wish to do the best that he can, and the certain knowledge 
 that he can do very little of the good which he wishes^ 
 
 In the midst of war, pestilence, conspiracy, general corrup- 
 tion and with the weight of so unwieldy an empire upon him, 
 we may easily comprehend that Antoninus often had need of 
 all his fortitude to support him. The best and the bravest 
 men have moments of doubt and of weakness, but if they are 
 the best and the bravest, they rise again from their depression 
 by recurring to first principles, as Antonmus ,does. The 
 emperor says that life is smoke, a vapour, and St. James in 
 his Epistle is of the same mind ; that the world is full of 
 envious, jealous, malignant people, and a man might be well 
 content to get out of it. He has doubts perhaps sometimes 
 even about that to which he holds most firmly. There are 
 only a few passages of th's kind, but they are evidence of the 
 struggles which even the noblest of the sons of men had to 
 maintain against the hard realities of his daily life. 7 A poor 
 remark it is which I have seen somewhere, an'a made in 
 a disparaging way, that the emperor's reflections show that he 
 had need of consolation and comfort in life, and even to 
 prepare him to meet his death. True that he did need 
 comfort and suj)port, and we sec how he found it. He con- 
 stantly recurs to his fundamental principle that the universe 
 
The Philosophy of Antoninus, 35 
 
 IB wisely ordered, that every man is a part of it and must 
 conform to that order which he cannot change, that whatever 
 the Deity has done is good, that all mankind are a man's 
 brethren, that he must love and cherish them and try to make 
 them better, even those who would do him harm. This is 
 his conclusion (ii. 17) : " What then is that which is able to 
 conduct a man ? One thing and only one, Philosophy. But 
 this consists in keeping the divinity within a man free from 
 violence and unharmed, superior to pains and pleasures, doing 
 nothing without a purpose nor yej; falsely and with hypocrisy, 
 not feeling the need of another man's doing or not doing any- 
 thing ; and besides, acce^^ting all that happens and all that is 
 allotted, as coming from thonce, wherever it is, from whence 
 he himself came ; and finally waiting for death with a 
 cheerful mind as being nothing else than a dissolution of the 
 'elements, of which every living being is compounded. But 
 if there is no harm to the elements themselves in each con- 
 tinually changing into another, why should a man have any 
 apprehension about the change and dissolution of all the 
 elements [himself] '? for it is according to nature ; and 
 
 nothing is evil that is according to natui-e." ' 
 
 The Physic of Antoninus is the knowledge of the Nature 
 of the Universe, of its government, and of the relation of 
 man's nature to both. He names the universe (17 tojv oXwv 
 ova-ca, VI. 1),'' " the universal substance," and he adds that 
 
 ^ As to the word ovaia, the reader may see the Index. I add here a 
 few examples of tlie use of the word ; Antoninus has (v. 24), ^ crv/j-iraaa 
 ohaia, " the universal substance." He says ^xii. 30), " there is one com- 
 mon substance " (ovcria), distributed among countless bodies ; and 
 (IV. 40). In Stobaeus (torn. i. lib. 1, tit. 34) tliere is this definition, 
 ovcriav Se (paaiv twv ovrcav airdvTcov ttju irpwrrju v\y)v. (In vin. 11}, 
 Antoninus speaks of t^ ouo-iwSes koX v\ik6v, " the substantial and 
 
36 27/e PhiIosoj)hy of Antoninus. 
 
 "reason" (Aoyo?) governs the universe. He also (vi. 9) 
 uses the terms " universal nature " or " nature of the uni- 
 verse." He (vi. 25) calls the universe "the one and all, 
 which we name Cosmus or Order" (K6aiJio<;). If he ever 
 seems to use these general terms as significant of the All, 
 of all that man ean in any way conceive to exist, he still on 
 other occasions plainly distinguishes between Matter, Ma- 
 terial things {vXrj, vkiKov), and Cause, Origin, Eeason (aiTia^ 
 atTtwSes, Xoyos)/ This is conformable to Zeno's doctrine 
 
 the material ;" and (vii. 10) lie says that " everything material " 
 (JivvXov) disappears in the substance of the whole (t?? twv '6\av ovaii,). 
 The ovaia is the generic name of that existence, which we assume as the 
 highest or ultimate, because we conceive no existence which can be co- 
 ordinated with it and none above it. It is the philosopher's " sub- 
 stance :" it is the ultimate expression for that which w'e conceive or 
 suppose to be the basis, the being of a thing. " From tlie Divine, 
 which is substance in itself, or the only and sole substance, all and 
 every thing that is created exists." (Swedenborg, Angelic Wisdom, 198.) 
 '' I remark, in order to anticipate any misapprehension, that all these 
 general terms involve a contradiction. The "one and all," and the like, 
 and " the whole," imply limitation. " One " is limited ; '' all " is 
 limited; the "whole" is limited. We cannot help it. We cannot find 
 words to express that which we cannot fully conceive. The addition of 
 *' absolute" or any other such word does not mend the matter. Even 
 the word God is used by most people, often unconsciously, in such a 
 way that limitation is impMtd, and yet at the same time words are 
 added which are intended to deny limitation. A Christian maityr, 
 when he was asked what God was, is said to have answered that God 
 nas no name like a man; and Justin says the same (Apol. ii. G), ''the 
 names Father, God, Creator, Lord and Master are not names, but 
 appellations derived from benefactions and acts." (Compare Seneca, 
 De Benef. iv. 8.) We can conceive the existence of a thing, or rather 
 we may have the idea of an existence, witliout an adequate notion of it, 
 " adequate " meaning coextensive and coequal with the tiling. We have 
 a notion of limited space derived from the dimensions of what we call a 
 material thing, though of space absolute, if I may use the term, we have 
 no notion at all ; and of infinite space the notion is the same, no notion 
 
lite Philosophy of Antoninus. 37 
 
 ihn,t there arc two original principles (apX^O ^^^ ^^^ things, 
 that whicli acts (to ttolovv) and that which is acted upon 
 [to Traaxov)-. That which is acted on is the formless 
 matter ({'Avy) : that which acts is the reason (Aoyos), 
 God, who is eternal and operates through all matter, and 
 produces all things. So Antoninus (v. 32) speaks of the 
 reason (Xoyos) which pervades all stibstance (ovata), and 
 through all time bj fixed periods (revolutions) administers 
 the universe (to ttuv). God is eternal, and Matter is 
 eternal. It is God who gives form to matter, but he is not 
 said to liave created matter. According to this view, which 
 is as old as Auaxagoras, God and matter exist independently, 
 but God governs matter. This doctrine is simply the 
 expression of the fact of the existence both of matter and of 
 God. The Stoics did not perplex themselves with the 
 insoluble question of the origin and :|^ature of matter.^ 
 
 at all ; and yet we conceive it in a sense, though I know not how, and 
 we believe that space is infinite, and we cannot conceive it to be finite, 
 s The notions of matter and of space are inseparable. "We derive the 
 notion of space from matter and form. But we have no adequate con- 
 ception either of matter or of space. Matter in its ultimate resolution 
 is as unintelligible as what men call mind, spirit, or by whatever otliei 
 name they may express the power which makes itself known by acts. 
 Anaxagoras laid down the distinction between intelligence (uovs) and 
 matter, and he said that intelligence impressed motion on matter, and so 
 separated the elements of matter and gave them order ; but he probably 
 only assumed a beginning, as Simplicius says, as a foundation of his 
 philosophical teaching. Empedocles said •' The universe always existed." 
 He had no idea of what is called creation. Ocellus Lucanus (1, § 2) 
 maintained that the Universe (rt) irai^) was imperishable and uncreated. 
 Consequently it is eternal. He admitted the existence of God; but his 
 Theology would require some discussion. On the contrary, the Brach- 
 mauB, according to Strabo ^p. 713, ed. Cas.), taught that the universe was 
 created and perishable ; and the creator and administrator of it pervades 
 the whole. The author of the book of Solomon's Wisdom says ;xi. 17) : 
 
38 The Philosophy of Antoninus. 
 
 Autonimis also assumes a beginning of tilings, as we now 
 know them ; but bis language is sometimes very obscure. 
 I have endeavoured to explain the meaning of one difficult 
 passage, (vii. 75, and tbe note.) 
 
 Matter consists of elemental parts ((rroLxua) of wbicb all 
 material objects are made. But nothing is permanent in 
 form. The nature of the universe, according to Antoninus' 
 expression (iv. 36), "loves nothing so much as to change 
 the things which are, and to make new Jhings like them_._ 
 For everything that exists is in a manner the seed of that 
 which will be. But thou art thinking only of seeds which 
 are cast into the earth or into a womb : but this is a very 
 vulgar notion." All things then are in a constant flux and 
 change : some things are dissolved into the elements, others 
 come in their places ; and so the " whole universe continues 
 ever young and perfect." (xii. 23.) 
 
 Antoninus has some obscure expressions about what he 
 calls " seminal principles " (a-jrepixaTtKot Xoyot). He opposes 
 them to the Epicurean atoms (vi. 24), and consequently his 
 "seminal principles" are not material atoms which wander 
 about at hazard, and combine nobody knows how. In one 
 passage (iv. 21) he speaks of_liying principleSj souls^(;//vxat) 
 after the dissolution of their bodies being received into the 
 "seminal principle of the universe." Schultz thinks that 
 by " seminal principles Antoninus means the relations of 
 the various elemental principles, which relations are de- 
 termined by the deity and by which alone the production of 
 
 " Thy Almighty hand made the world of matter without form," which 
 may mean that matter existed already. 
 
 The common Greek word which we translate " matter " is v\t]. It is 
 the stuff that things are made of. 
 
The Philosophy of Antoninus. 39 
 
 organized beings is possible." This may be the meaning, 
 but if it is, nothing of any value can be derived from it." 
 Antoninus often uses the word " Nature " (^v'o-ts), and wo 
 must attempt to fix its meaning. The simple etymological 
 sense of ^I'crts is " production," the birth of what wc call 
 Things. The Eomans used Natura, which also means 
 " birth " originally. But neither the Greeks nor the Romans 
 stuck to this simple meaning, nor do we. Antoninus says 
 (x. 6) : " Whether the universe is [a concourse of] atoms or 
 Nature [is a system], let this first be established that I am 
 a part of the whole which is governed by nature." Here it 
 might seem as if nature were personified and viewed as an 
 active, efficient power, as something which, if not inde- 
 pendent of the Deity, acts by a power which is given to it 
 by the Deity. Such, if I understand the expression right, 
 is the way in which the word Nature is often used now, 
 though it is plain that many writers use the word without 
 fixing any exact meaning to it. It is the same with the 
 expression Laws of Nature, which some writers may use in 
 an intelligible sense, but others as clearly use in no definite 
 sense at all. There is no meaning in this word Nature, 
 except that which Bishop Butler assigns to it, when he says, 
 " The only distinct meaning of that word Natural is Stated, 
 Fixed or Settled; since what is natural as much requires 
 and presupposes an intelligent agent to render it so, i. e. to 
 
 9 Justin (Apol. n. 8) has the words Kara aTrepfxariKOv Xoyov ix4pos, 
 where he is speaking of the Stoics ; but he uses this expression in a 
 peculiar sense (note, 11). The early Christian writers were familiar with 
 the Stoic terms, and their writings show that thfe contest was begun be- 
 tween the Christian expositors and the Greek philosophy. Even in the 
 second Epistle of St. Peter (ir. 1, v. 4) we find a Stoic expression, Ti'a 
 hia TovTuy yevrjcrdt deias koivwvoI (pvcrfws. 
 
40 The Philosophif of Antoninus, 
 
 effect it continually or at stated times, as wliat is super- 
 natural or miraculous does to effect it at once." This is 
 Plato's meaning (De Leg. iv.715), when he says, that God holds 
 the beginning and end and middle of all that exists, and 
 proceeds straight on his course, making his circuit according 
 to nature (that is, by a fixed order) ; and he is continually 
 accompanied by justice who punishes those who deviate 
 from the divine law, that is, from the order or course which 
 God observes. 
 
 When we look at the motions of the planets, the action of 
 what we call gravitation, the elemental combination of 
 unorganized bodies and their resolution, the production of 
 plants and of living bodies, their generation, growth, and 
 their dissolution, which we call their death, we observe a 
 regular sequence of phaenomena, which within the limits 
 of experience present and past, so far as we know the past, 
 is fixed and invariable. But if this is not so, if the order 
 and sequence of phaenomena, as known to us, are subject to 
 change in the course of an infinite progression, — and such 
 change is conceivable, — w^e have not discovered, nor shall 
 we ever discover, the whole of the order and sequence of 
 phaenomena, in which sequence there may be involved 
 according to its very nature, that is, according to its fixed 
 order, some variation of what we now call the Order or 
 Nature of Things. It is also conceivable that such changes 
 have taken place, changes in the order of things, as we are 
 comj)elled by the imperfection of language to call them, but 
 which are no changes; and further it is certain, that our 
 knowledge of the true sequence of all actual phaenomena, 
 as for instance, the phaenomena of generation, growth, and 
 dissolution, is and ever must be imperfect. 
 
The Philosophy of Antoninus. 41 
 
 Wc do not fare much bettor when we spcalc of Causes and 
 Effects than when wo speak of Nature. For the practical 
 purposes of lifie we may use the terms cause and effect 
 conveniently, and we may fix a distinct meaning to them, 
 distinct enough at least to prevent all misunderstanding. 
 But the case is different when we speak of causes and effects 
 as of Things. All that we know is phaenomena, as the 
 Greeks called them, or appearances which follow one another 
 in a regular order, as we conceive it, so that if some one 
 phaenomenon should fail in the series, we conceive that 
 there must either be an interruption of the series, or that 
 something else will appear after the phaenomenon which 
 has failed to appear, and will occupy the vacant place ; and 
 so the series in its progression may be modified or totally 
 changed. Cause and effect then mean nothing in the 
 seq^uence of natural phaenomena beyond what I have said ; 
 and the real cause, or the transcendent cause, as some would 
 call it, of each successive phaenomenon is in that which is 
 the cause of all things which are, which have been, and 
 which will be for ever. Thus the word Creation may have 
 a real sense if we consider it as the first, if we can conceive 
 a first, in the present order of natural phaenomena ; but in the 
 vulgar sense a creation of all things at a certain time, followed 
 by a quiescence of the first cause and an abandonment of all 
 sequences of Phaenomena to the laws of Nature, or to j 
 other words that people may use, is absolutely absurd.^" 
 
 1" Time and space are the conditions of our thought ; but time infinite 
 and space infinite cannot be objects of thought, except in a very im- 
 perfect way. Time and space must not in any way be thought of, when 
 we think of the Deity. Swedenborg says, '• The natural man may 
 believe that he would have no thought, if the ideas of time, of space, 
 and of things material were taken away ; for upon those is founded all 
 
42 The Fhilosoijhy of Antoninus. 
 
 Now, thougli tliere is great difficulty in understanding all 
 the passages of Antoninus, in which he s]3eaks of Nature, of 
 the changes of things and of the economy of the universe, I 
 am convinced that his sense of Nature and Natural is the 
 same as that which I have stated ; and as he was a man who 
 knew how to use w^ords in a clear way and with strict con- 
 sistency, we ought to assume, even if his meaning in some 
 passages is doubtful, that his viejy of Nature was in har mony 
 with his fixed belief in t he all-p ervading, ever present, and 
 ever^ active energy of God._(ii. 4 ; iv. 40 ; x. 1 ; vi. 40 ; and 
 other passages. Compare Seneca, De Benef. iv. 7. Sweden- 
 borg, Angelic Wisdom, 349-357.) 
 
 There is much in Antoninus that is hard to understand, 
 and it might be said that he did not fully comprehend all 
 that he wrote ; which would however be in no way remark- 
 able, for it happens now that a man may write what neither 
 he nor anybody can understand. Antoninus tells us (xii. 10) 
 to look at things and see what they are, resolving them into 
 the material (vXt]), the causal (atVtov), and the relation 
 (ava<f>opd), or the purpose, by which he seems to mean 
 something in the nature of what we call effect, or end. 
 The word Cause (airta) is the difficulty. There is the 
 same word in the Sanscrit (hetu) ; and the subtle philosophers 
 of India and of Greece, and the less subtle philosophers of 
 modern times have all used this word, or an equivalent 
 word, in a vague way. Yet the confusion sometimes may be 
 
 the thought that man has. But let him know that the thoughts are 
 limited and confined in proportion as they partake of time, of space, and 
 of what is material ; and that they are not limited and are extended, in 
 proportion as they do not partake of those things ; since the mind is so 
 far elevated above the things corporeal and worldly." (Concerning 
 Heaven and Hell, 169.) 
 
The FhlJusojjltu of Antoninus. 43 
 
 in the inevitable ambiguity of language rather tlian in tho 
 mind of the writer, for I cannot think that some of the 
 wisest of men did not know what they intended to say. 
 AYhen Antoninus says (iv. 36), " that everything that exists 
 is in a manner the seed of that which will be," he might be 
 supposed to say w^hat some of the Indian philosophers have 
 said, and thus a profound truth might be converted into a 
 gross absurdity. But he says, " in a manner," and in a 
 manner he said true ; and in another manner, if you mistake 
 his meaning, he said false. When Plato said, "Nothing 
 ever is, but is ahvays becoming " (del ytyverat). he delivered 
 a text, out of which we may derive something ; for he 
 destroys by it not all practical, but all specidative notions 
 of cause and effect. The whole series of things, as they 
 appear to us, must be contemplated in time, that is in suc- 
 cession, and we conceive or suppose intervals between one 
 state of things and another state of things, so that there is 
 priority and sequence, and interval, and Being, and a ceasing 
 to Be, and beginning and ending. But there is nothing of 
 the kind in the Nature of Things. It is an everlasting con- 
 tinuity, (iv. 45; VII. 75.) When Antoninus speaks of 
 generation (x. 26), he speaks of one cause (atria) acting, 
 and then another cause taking up the work, which the 
 former left in a certain state and so on; and we might 
 perhaps conceive that he had some notion like what has been 
 called " the sel f-evolving power of nature ;'^ a fine phrase 
 indeed, the full import of which I believe that the writer 
 of it did not see, and thus he laid himself open to the impu- 
 tation of being a follower of one of the Hindu sects, which 
 makes all things come by evolution out of nature or matter, 
 cr out of something which takes the place of deity, but is 
 
44 The Philoso])hy of Antoninus. 
 
 not deity. I would have all men think as they please, or as 
 they can, and I only claim the same freedom which I give. 
 When a man writes anything, we may fairly try to find out 
 all that his words must mean, even if the result is that they 
 mean what he did not mean ; and if we find this contra- 
 diction, it is not our fault, but his misfortune. Now An- 
 toninus is perhaps somewhat in this condition in what he 
 says (x. 26), though he speaks at the end of the paragraph 
 of the power which acts, unseen by the eyes, but still no 
 less clearly. But whether in this passage (x. 26) he means 
 that the power is conceived to be in the different successive 
 causes (atrtat), or in something else, nobody can tell. From 
 other passages however I do collect that his notion of the 
 phaenomena of the universe is what I have stated. The 
 deity works unseen, if we may use such language, and perhaps 
 I may, as Job did, or he who wrote the book of Job. " In 
 him we live and move and are," said St. Paul to the Athe- 
 nians, and to show his hearers that this was no new doctrine, 
 he quoted the Greek poets. One of these poets was the Stoic 
 Cleanthes, whose noble hymn to Zeus or God is an elevated 
 expression of devotion and philosophy. It deprives Nature 
 of her power and puts her under the immediate government 
 of the deity. 
 
 " Thee all this heaven, which whirls around the eartli, 
 Obeys and willing fo Hows where thou leadest. — 
 Without tliee, God, nothing is done on earth, 
 Nor in the aethereal realms, nor in the sea, 
 Save what the wicked througli their folly do." 
 
 Antoninus' con viction of the existence of a divine power 
 and government w as fou nd ed on his per ception of t he order 
 ofJ;he universe. Like Socrates (Xen. Mem. iv. 3, 13, kc), 
 
The Fhilosophy of Antunlmis. 45 
 
 he says that though we caDnot see the forms of divine 
 powers, we know that they^xist because we see t heir works. 
 
 " To those who ask, Where hast thou seen the gods, or 
 how dost thou comprehcud that they exist and so worshipest 
 them ? I answer, in the fii'st place, that they may be seen 
 even with the eyes ; in the second place, neitlier have I seen 
 my owTi soul and yet I honour it. Thus then with respect 
 to the gods, from what I constantly experience of their 
 power, from this I comprehend that they exist and I venerate 
 them." (xii. 28, and the note. Comp. Aristotle de Mundo, c. 6 ; 
 Xen. :\lem. i. 4, 9 ; Cicero, Tuscul. i. 28, 29 ; St. Paul's 
 Epistle to the Romans, i. 19, 20 ; and Montaigne's Apology 
 for Eaimond de Sebonde, ii. c. 12.) This is a very old 
 argument which has always had great weight with most 
 people and has appeared sufficient. It does not acquire the 
 least additional strength by being developed in a learned 
 treatise. It is as intelligible in its simple enunciation as it 
 can be made. If it is rejected, there is no arguing with him 
 who rejects it : and if it is worked out into innumerable par- 
 ticulars, the value of the evidence runs the risk of being 
 bui'ied under a mass of words.^ 
 
 Man being conscious thatrie is a spiritual power or an 
 intellectual power, or that he has such a power, in whatever 
 way he conceives that he has it— for I wish simply to state a 
 fact — from this power which he has in himself, he is led, as 
 Antoninus says, to believe that there is a greater power, 
 which as the old Stoics tell us, pervades the whole universe 
 as the intellect '^ (lovs) pervades man. (Compare Epictetus' 
 
 1* I have always translated tlie word vovs, " intelligence "or * ' in- 
 tellect." It appears to be the word used by the oldest Greek philosophers 
 to express the notion of " intelligence " as opposed to the notion of 
 
46 The Fhilosophy of Antoninus. 
 
 Discourses, i. 14; and Voltaire a Mad". Necker, vol. lxvii. 
 p. 278, ed. Lequien.) 
 
 " matter." I have always translated the word Xoyos by " reason," and 
 \oyiK6s by the word " rational," or j)erhaps sometimes " reasonable," as 
 I have translated vospos by the word " intellectual." Every man who 
 has thought and has read any philosophical writings knows the difficulty 
 of finding words to express certain notions, how imperfectly words 
 express these notions, and how carelessly the words are often used. 
 The various senses of the word Xoyos are enough to perplex any man. 
 Our translators of the New Testament (St. Jolin, c. i.) have simply 
 translated 6 x6yos by " the word," as the Germans translated it by "das 
 Wort;" but in their theological writings they sometimes retain the 
 original term Logos. The Germans have a term Vernunft, which 
 seems to come nearest to our word Reason, or the necessary and absolute 
 truths, which we cannot conceive as being other than what they are. 
 Such are what some people have called the laws of thought, the con- 
 ceptions of space and of time, and axioms or first principles, which need 
 no proof and cannot be proved or denied. Accordingly the Germans 
 can say '■ Gott i&t die hochste Vernunft," the Supreme Reason. The 
 Germans have also a word Verstand, which seems to represent our 
 word " understanding," " intelligence," " intellect," not as a thing 
 absolute whicli exists by itself, but as a thing connected with an 
 individual being, as a man. Accordingly it is the capacity of receiving 
 impressions (Vorstellungen, (pauTaa-iaL), and forming from them distinct 
 ideas (Begrifie), and perceiving differences. I do not think that these 
 remarks will help the reader to the understanding of Antoninus, or his 
 use of the words vovs and Xoyos. The Emperor's meaning must be got 
 from his own words, and if it does not agree altogether with modern 
 notions, it is not our business to force it into agreement, but simply to 
 find out what his meaning is, if we can, 
 
 Justinus (ad Diognetum, c. vii.) says that the omnipotent, all-creating, 
 and invisible God has fixed trutli and the holy, incomprehensible Logos 
 in men's hearts; and this Logos is the architect and creator of the 
 Universe. In the first Apology (c. xxxii.) he says that the seed (a-TT^p/xa] 
 from God is the Logos, which dwells in those who believe in God. So 
 it appears that according to Justinus the Logos is only in such believers. 
 In the second Apology (c. viii.) he sj^eaksof the seed of the Logos being 
 imiDlanted in all mankind ; but those who order their lives according to 
 Logos, such as the Stoics, have only a portion of the Logos («aTa 
 OTTsp/xariKov x6yov /xe'pos), and have not the knowledge and contempla 
 
tion of the entire Logos, -which is Christ. Swedeiiborg's remarks 
 (Angelic Wisdom, 240) are worth comparing with Justinus. The modern 
 philosopher in substance agrees with the ancient ; but he is more precise. 
 
 ^- Comp. Ep. to the Corinthians, i. 3. 17, and James iv. 8, " Draw 
 nigh to God and he will draw nigh to you." 
 
 ^ This is also Swedenborg's doctrine of the soul. "As to wliat 
 concerns the soul, of which it is said that it shall live after death, it is 
 nothing else but the man himself, who lives in the body, that is, the 
 interior man, who by the body acts in the world and from whom the 
 body itself lives" (quoted by Clissold, p. 45C of "The Practical Nature 
 of the Theological "Writings of Emanuel Swedenborg, in a Letter to the 
 Archbishop of Dublin (Whately ;," second edition, 1859 ; a book which 
 theologians might read with profit ,. Tiiis is an old doctrine of the 
 soul, which has been often proclaimed, but n«ver better expressed than 
 by the " Auctor de INIundo," c. 6, quoted by Gatakei iu his" Antoninus," 
 p. 43G. '• The soul by which we live and have cities and houses ia 
 invisible, but it is seen by its works ; for the whole method of life has 
 been devised by it and ordered, and by it is held together. Li like 
 
 Tlte PJiilosoijhy of Antoninus. 47 
 
 God exists theu, but what do we know of his Nature ? 
 A ntouiuu s^ says th at the soul xtf mau is an efflux from the 
 divinity. We have bodies like animak, but we have reason,^^^*^ 
 intelligence as the gods. Animals have life {^vxq), and 
 what we call instincts or natura]^ j)rinciples of action : but 
 the rational animal man alone has a rational, intelligent soul 
 (i/a;^^/ AoyiKr;, voepo), Antoninus insists on this continu- 
 ally : God is in man,'- and so we must constantly attend to 
 the divinity within us, for it is only in this way that we can 
 have any knowledge of the nature of God. The human soul 
 is in a sense a portion of the^ divinity, and the soul alone has 
 any communication with the deity, for_as he says (xii. 2) : 
 " With his intellectual part alone God touches the intelligence 
 only which has flowed and been derived from himself into 
 these bodies." In fact he says that which is hidden within a 
 mau is life, that is the man himself. All the rest is vesture, \K 
 covering, organs, instrument, which the living man, the real''* 
 
48 Tlie Pliihsopinj of Antoninus. 
 
 man, uses for tlie puriDose of his present existence. The air 
 is universally diffused for him who is able to respire, 8iid so 
 for him who is willing to partake of it the intelligent power, 
 which holds within it all things, is diffused as wide and free 
 as the air. (viii. 54.) It is by living a divine life that man 
 approaches to a knowledge of the divinity." It^s by following 
 the divinity within, Sat/xcaj/ or ^eo's as Antoninus calls it, 
 that man comes nearest to jthe^eity, the supreme good, for 
 man can never attain to perfect agreement with his internal 
 guide {to rjycixovLKov). " Live with the gods. And he does 
 live with the gods who constantly shows to them that his own 
 soul is satisfied with that which is assigned to him, and that 
 it does all the daemon (Sat/xcoj/) wishes, which Zeus hath 
 
 manner we must think also about the deity, who in power is most 
 mighty, in beauty most comely, in life immortal, and in virtue supreme : 
 wherefore though he is invisible to human nature, he is seen by his very 
 works." Other passages to the same purpose are quoted by Gataker 
 (p. 382) Bishop Butler has the same as to the soul : " Upon the whole 
 then our organs of sense and our limbs are certainly instruments, which 
 the living persons, ourselves, make use of to perceive and move with." 
 If this is not plain enough, he also says : " It follows that our organized 
 bodies are no more ourselves, or part of ourselves than any other matter 
 around us." (Compare Anton, x. 38.) 
 
 !■* The reader may consult Discourse V. " Of the existence and nature 
 of God," in Jolm Smith's " Select Discourses." He has prefixed as a 
 text to this Discourse, the striking passage of Agapetus, Paraenes. § 3 : 
 *■ He who knows himself will know God; and he who knows God will 
 be made like to God ; and he will be made like to God, who has become 
 worthy of God ; and be becomes worthy of God, who does nothing 
 unworthy of God, but thinks the things tliat are his, and speaks what 
 he thinks, and does what he speaks " I suppose that the old saying, 
 "Know thyself," wliich is attributed to Socrates and others, had a 
 larger meaning than the narrow sense which is generally given to it. 
 (Agapetus, ed. Stephan. Bchoning, Franeker, 1608. This volume coii« 
 tains also the Paraeneses of Nilus ) 
 
The Philosophy of Antoninus. 49 
 
 given to every man for liis guardian and guide, a portion of 
 himself. And this daemon is every man's understanding and 
 reason." (v. 27.) 
 
 There is in man, that is in the reason, the intelligence, a 
 superior faculty which if it is exercised rules all the rest. 
 This is the ruling faculty (to qyejxovLKov), which Cicero 
 (De Natiu-a Deorum, ii. 11) renders by the Latin word Prin- 
 cipatus, " to which nothing can or ought to be superior." 
 Antoninus often uses this term, and others which arc equiva- 
 lent. He names it (vii. 64) " the governing intelligence." 
 The governing faculty is the master of the soul, (v. 26.) A 
 man must reverence only his ruling faculty and the divinity 
 within him. As we must reverence that which is supreme 
 in the universe, so we must reverence that which is supreme 
 in ourselves, and this is that which is of like kind with that 
 which is supreme in the universe, (v. 21.) So, as Plotinus 
 says, the soul of man can only know the divine, so far as it 
 knows itself. In one passage (xi. 19) Antoninus speaks of a 
 man's condemnation of himself, when the diviner part wdthin 
 him has been overpowered and yields to the less honourable 
 and to the perishable part, the body, and its gross pleasures. 
 In a word, the views of Antoninus on this matter, however 
 his expressions may vary, are exactly what Bishop Butler 
 expresses, when he speaks of " the natural supremacy of re- 
 flection or conscience," of the faculty " which sui-veys, ap- 
 proves or disapproves the several affections of o ur mind and 
 actions of our lives." 
 
 Much matter might be collected from Antoninus on the 
 notion of the Universe being one animated Being. But all 
 that he says amounts to no more, as Schultz remarks, than 
 this : the soul of man is most intima^tely^united to his body 
 
50 The PhiIosoj)hy of Antoninus. 
 
 and together the y make one animal, which we call man ; so 
 the Deity is most intimately united to the world or the 
 material universe, and together they form one whole. But 
 A.ntoninus did not view God and the material universe as the 
 same, any more than he viewed the body and soul of man as 
 one. Antoninus has no sp ecu lations on the absolute nature 
 of the deity. It was not his fashion to waste his time on 
 what man cannot understand.^* He was sati sfied that God 
 exists, that he governs all things, that ma,n can only 
 have an imperfect know ledge o f his nature, and he must 
 attain this imperfect knowledge by reveren cing the ^diyinity 
 which is within Jiinvandjifigping it j3ure. 
 
 From all that has been said it follows that the universe is 
 administered by the Providence of God ( TrpovoLa), and 
 that all things are wisely ordered. There are passages in 
 which Antoninus expresses doubts, or states different pos- 
 sible theories of the constitution and government of the 
 Universe, but he always recurs to his fundamental principle, 
 that if we admit the existence of a deity, we must also 
 admit that he orders all things wisely and well. (iv. 27 ; 
 Yi. 1 ; IX. 28 ; xii. 5, and many other passages.) Epictetus 
 says (i. 6) th at ^ve can discern the providence wh ich rule s 
 the world, if j^^,43QSsess two things, th e powe^_of_seeing_all 
 that baj2p^PTia wjjJTj^Rgpft to panh thing, and q. grateful dis- 
 position^ 
 
 But if all things are wisely ordered, how is the world so 
 full of what we call evil, j)hysical and moral ? If instead of 
 saying that there is evil in the world, we use the expression 
 v/hich I have used, " what we call evil," we have partly anti- 
 
 ^■' " God wlio is infinitely beyond tlic reacli of our narrow capacities." 
 LockCi Essay concerning the Human Understanding, ii. ebap. 17. 
 
The Fhilosoi)hif of Antoninus. 51 
 
 cipated the Emperor's answer. Wc sec and feel and know 
 imperfectly very few things in the few years that we live, and 
 all the knowledge and all the experience of all the human 
 race is positive ignorance of the whole, which is infinite. 
 Now as our reason teaches us that everything is in some way 
 related to and connected with every other thing, all notion 
 of evil as being in the universe of things is a contradiction, 
 for if the whole comes from and is governed by an intelligent 
 being, it is impossible to conceive anything in it which tends 
 to the evil or destruction of the whole, (viii. 55; x. 6.) 
 Everything is in constant mutation, and yet the whole sub- 
 sists. We might imagine the solar system resolved into its 
 elemental parts, and yet the whole would still subsist " ever 
 young and perfect." 
 
 All things ^_all forms, are_dissolyedja,nd new forms appear. 
 All IJTin^ things undero;o th e change whic h we call death. 
 If we call death an evil, then all change is an evil. Living 
 beings also suffer pain, and man suffers most of all, for he 
 suffers both in and by his body and by his intelligent part. 
 Men suffer also from one another, and perhaps the largest 
 part of human suffering comes to man from those whom ho 
 calls his brothers. Antoninus says (viii. 55), " Generally, 
 wickedness does no harm at all to the universe ; and par- 
 ticularly, the wickedness [of one man] does no harm to 
 another. It is only harmful to him who has it in his power 
 to be released from it as soon as he shall choose." The first 
 part of this is perfectly consistent with the doctrine that the 
 whole can sustain no evil or harm. The second part must 
 be explained by the Stoic principle that there is no evil in 
 anything which is not in our power. What wrong we sufier 
 from another is his evil, not ours. But this.is ^n admission 
 
r 
 
 52 The Fhilosopliij of Antoninus. 
 
 that there is evil in a sort, for he who does wrong does evil, 
 and if others can endure the wrong, still there is evil in the 
 wrong doer. Antoninus (xi. 18) gives many excellent pre- 
 cepts with respect to wrongs and injimes, and his precepts 
 are practical. He teaches us to bear what we cannot avoid, 
 and his lessons may be just as useful to him who denies the 
 being jiftd the^ gover nment of G od a s to him who believes in 
 both^^.-/rhere is no direct answer in Antoninus to the ob- 
 jections which may be made to the existence and providence 
 of God because of the moral disorder and suffering which are 
 in the world, except this answer which he makes in reply to 
 the supposition that even the best men may be extinguished 
 by death. He says i f it is so, we ma y be sure th at, if it. ought 
 toJiaveJbefin_piherwise, the gods, wxaild have ordered it othe r - 
 wiae--(xii. 5.) His conviction of the wisdom which we may 
 observe in the government of the world is too strong to be dis- 
 turbed by any apparent irregularities in the order of things. 
 That these disorders exist is a fact, and those who would 
 conclude from them against the being and government of God 
 conclude too hastily. We all admit that there is an order in 
 the material world, a Nature, in the sense in which that 
 word has been explained, a constitution (Karao-Keury), what we 
 call a system, a relation of parts to one another and a fitness 
 of the whole for something. So in the constitution of plants 
 and of animals there is an order, a fitness for some end. 
 Sometimes the order, as v/e conceive it, is interrupted and 
 the end, as we conceive it, is not attained. The seed, the 
 plant or the animal sometimes perishes before it has passed 
 through all its changes and done all its uses. It is according 
 to Nature, that is a fixed order, for some to perish early and 
 for others to do all their uses and leave successors to take 
 
 N 
 
The Philosojihif of Antoninus. .03 
 
 their place. So mau has a corporeal and intellectual and 
 moral constitution fit fur certain uses, and on the whole man 
 performs these uses, dies and leaves otlier men in his place. 
 So society exists, and a social- ata l e is mauifebll)' the N atural 
 S tate of man, t he state for which his Nature tits him ; and 
 society amidst innumerable irregularities and disorders still 
 subsists ; and pcrliajis we may say that the history of the past 
 and oiu* present knowledge give us a reasonable hope that its 
 disorders will diminish, and that order, its governing prin- 
 ciple, may be more firmly established. As order then, a 
 fixed order, we may say, subject to deviations real or ajjpa- 
 rent, must be admitted to exist in the whole Nature of things, 
 that which we call disorder or evil as it seems to us, does not 
 in any way alter the fact of the general constitution of things 
 having a Nature or fixed order. Nobody will conclude from 
 the existence of disorder that order is not the rule, for the 
 existence of order both physical and moral is proved by daily \ 
 experience and all past experience. We cannot conceive 
 how the order of the universe is maintained : we cannot eveu 
 conceive how our own life from day to day is continued, nor 
 how we perform the simplest movements of the body, nor 
 how we grow and think and act, though we know many of 
 the conditions which are necessary for all these functions. 
 Knowing nothing then of the imseen power which acts in 
 ourseives^xcept._by what is done, we know nothing of the 
 . power which acts through what we call all time and all 
 ^pace ; but seeing that there is a Nature or fixed order in all 
 things known to us, it is conformable to the nature of our 
 minds to believe that this universal Nature has a cause which 
 operates continually, and that we are totally ui4ible to specu- 
 late on the reason of any of those disorders or evils which 
 
54 The Philosojjhj/ of Antoninus. 
 
 we perceive. Tliis I believe is the ai^^er whicli may be 
 collected from all tbat Antoninus has said.^®\ 
 
 The origin of evil is an old questiofiT: ■'- Achilles tells 
 Priam (Iliad, 24, 527) that Zeus has two casks, one filled 
 with good things, and the other wdth bad, and that he gives 
 to men out of each according to his pleasure ; and so we 
 must be content, for we cannot alter the will of Zeus. One of 
 the Greek commentators asks how must we reconcile this 
 doctrine with what we find in the first book of the Odyssey, 
 where the king of the gods says, Men say that evil comes to 
 them from us, but they bring it on themselves through their 
 own folly. The answer is plain enough even to the Greek 
 commentator. The poets make both Achilles and Zeus 
 speak appropriately to their several characters. Indeed Zeus 
 says plainly that men do attribute their sufferings to the 
 gods, but they do it falsely, for they are the cause of their 
 own sorrows, 
 
 Epictetus in his Enchiridion (c. 27) makes short work of 
 the question of evil. He says, " As a mark is not set up for 
 the purpose of missing it, so neither does the nature of evil 
 exist in the Universe." This will appear obscure enough to 
 those who are not acquainted with Epictetus, but he always 
 knows what he is talking about. We do not set up a mark 
 in order to miss it, though we may miss it. God, whose 
 existence Epictetus assumes, has not ordered all things so 
 that his purpose shall fail. Whatever there may be of what 
 
 ^s Cleanthes says in his Hymn : 
 
 " For all things good and bad to One thou formest, 
 So that One everlasting reason governs all." 
 
 See Bishop Butler's Sermons. Sermon XV. " Upon the Ignorance uS 
 Man." 
 
The Philosojjhy of Anioninus. 55 
 
 we call ev^il, the Xature of evil, as he expresses it, does not 
 exist ; that is, evil is not a jxart of the constitution or nature 
 of Things. If there were a principle of evil (apx'^z) ^^ ^^^^ 
 constitution of things, evil would no longer be evil, as 
 Simplicius argues, but evil would be good. Simplicius 
 (c. 34, [27J) has a long and curious discourse on this 
 text of Epictctus, and it is amusing and instructive. 
 
 One passage more will conclude this matter. It contains 
 all that the emperor could say (ii. 11) : " To go from among 
 men, if there are gods, is not a thing to be afraid of, iov the 
 gods will not involve thee in evil ; but if indeed they do not 
 exist, or if they have no concern about human affairs, what is 
 it to me to live in a universe devoid of gods or devoid of pro- 
 vidence ? \ But in truth they do exist, and they do care for 
 human things, and they have put all the means in man's 
 power to enable him not to foil into real evils. And as to 
 the rest, if there was anything evil, they would have provided 
 for this also, that it should be altogether in a man's power 
 not to fall into it. But that which does not make a man 
 worse, how can it make a man's life worse ? But neither 
 through ignorance, nor having the knowledge, but not the 
 power to guard against or correct these things, is it possible 
 that the nature of the Universe has overlooked them ; nor is 
 it possible that it has made so great a mistake, either through 
 want of power or want of skill, that good and evil should 
 happen indiscriminately to the good and the bad. But death 
 certainly and life, honour and dishonour, pain and pleasure, 
 all these things equally happen to good and bad men, being 
 things which make us neither better nor worse. Therefore 
 they are neither good nor evil." 
 
 The Ethical part of Antoninus' Philosophy follows from 
 
 y 
 
56 The Philosophy of Antoninus 
 
 his geueral principles. The en d of all his philosophy is to 
 ^ci^ live con formabl y to N ature, both a man's o w n nat ur e and the 
 nature of the U niverse. Bishop Butler has explained what 
 the Greek philosophers meant when they;^ j^ ke of l ivings 
 accordiiigJo_Nature, and he says that when it is explained, 
 as he has explained it and as they understood it, it is " a 
 manner of speaking not loose and unjletermmatej_bui clear 
 and dist inct, strictly just and true." To live according to 
 Nature is to live according to a man's whol e nat ure, not 
 according to a part of it, and to reverence the divinity 
 within him as the governor of all his actions. '* To the 
 rational_ani mal the same act is a ccordingto nature and 
 according to reason."'^ (vii. 11.) That which is done 
 contrary to reason is also an act contrary to nature, to the 
 whole nature, though it is certainly conformable to some 
 part of man's nature, or it could not be done. Man is made 
 for action, not for idleness or pleasure, As plants and 
 Scc((f animals do the uses of their_ natuie, so man must do 
 
 his7~(v. !•) 
 
 Man must also live conformably to the universal nature, 
 conformably to the nature of all things of which he is one ; 
 and as a citizen of a political community he must direct his 
 life and actions with reference to those among whom, and for 
 whom, among other purposes, he lives.^® A man must not 
 retire into solitude and cut himself off from his fellow men. 
 
 lie must be ever active to_do his part in the great whole. 
 All men are his kin, not only in blood, but still more by 
 participating in the same intelligence and by being a portion 
 
 1^ This is what Juvenal means when he says (xiv. 321) — 
 
 Nunquam aliud Natura aliucl Sapicntia elicit. 
 »3 See vni. 52 : and Persius iii. 66. 
 
The PhiIoso2)hfj of Antoninus. 
 
 I 
 of the same divinity. A man cannot really bo injured by uio 
 brethren, for no act of theii's can make him bad, and he 
 must not be angry with them nor hate them : " For we are 
 made for co-operation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like 
 the rows of the upper and lower teeth. To act against one 
 another then is contrary to nature ; and it is acting^ against 
 one another to be vexed and to turn away." (ii. 1 .) 
 
 Further he says : " Take pleasure in one thing and rest in 
 it, in passing from one social act to another social act, 
 thinking of God." (vi. 7.) Again : " Love mankind. Follow 
 God." (vii. 31.) It is the characteristic of the rational soul 
 for a man to love his neighbour, (xi. 1.) Antoninus teaches 
 in various passages the forgiveness of injui'ies, and we know 
 that he also practised what he taught. Bishop Butler 
 remarks that " this divine precept to forgive injimes and to 
 love our enemies, though to be met ^^th in Gentile moralists, 
 yet is in a peculiar sense a precept of Christianity, as our 
 Saviour has insisted more upon it than on any other single 
 virtue." The practice of this precept is the most difficult of 
 all virtues. Antoiiinus often enforces it and gives us aid 
 towards following it. When we are injured, we feel anger 
 and resentment, and the feeling is natural, just and useful for 
 the conservation of society. It is useful that wrong doers 
 should feel the natural consequences of their actions, among 
 which is the disapprobation of society and the resentment of 
 him who is vrronged. But revenge, in the proper sense of 
 that word, must not be practised. " The b est way of 
 avenging thyself," s ay s the emperor, "is not to become like 
 the wrong doer." It is plain by this that he does not mean 
 that we should in any case practise revenge ; but he says to 
 those who talk of revenging wrongs, Be not like him who 
 
68 The Fhilosoi:>liy of Antoninus. 
 
 has done tlie wrong. Socrates in the Crito (c. 10) says the 
 same in other ^yords, and St. Paul (Ep. to the Eomans, xii. 
 17). " When a man has done thee any wrong, innnediately 
 consider -with. what opinion about good or evil he has done 
 wrong. For when thou^JbLast seen this, thou wilt pity him 
 and wilt neither wonder nor be angry." (vii. 26.) Antoninus 
 would not deny that wrong naturally produces the feeling of 
 anger and resentment, for this is implied in the recommenda- 
 tion to reflec t on the nature of the man's mind who has done 
 the wrong, and then you will have pity instead of resent- 
 ment : and so it comes to the same as St. Paul's advice to be 
 angry and sin not ; which, as Butler well explains it, is not a 
 recommendation to be angry, which nobody needs, for anger 
 is a natural passion, but it is a warning against allowing 
 anger to lead us into sin. In short the emperor's doctrine 
 about wrongful acts is this : wrong doers do not know what 
 good and bad are : they offend out of ignorance, and in the 
 sense of the Stoics this is true. Though this kind of 
 ignorance will never be admitted as a legal excuse, and ought 
 not to be admitted as a full excuse in any way by society, 
 there may be grievous injuries, such as it is in a man's power 
 to forgive without harm to society; and if he forgives 
 because he sees that his enemies know not what they do, he 
 is acting in the spirit of the sublime prayer, " Father, forgive 
 them, for they know not what they do." 
 
 The emperor's moral philosophy was not a feeble, narrow 
 system, which teaches a man to look directly to his own 
 happiness, though a man's happiness or tranquillity is 
 indirectly promoted by living as he ought to do. A man 
 must live conformably to the universal nature, which means, 
 as the emperor explains it in many passages, that a man's 
 
The Philosopliy of Antoninus. 59 
 
 BctioriS must be conformable to bis true rcLitions to all otlicr 
 bumau beings, botli as a citizen of a political community and 
 as a member of tbo wbole buman family. Tbis implies, and 
 be often expresses it in tbe most forcible language, tbat a 
 man's words and_actionSj^ s o far as tbcy affect otjiers^ must be 
 measu red by a fixed rule, wbicb is tbeir^consistency witb the 
 conservation and tbe interests of^ tbe jpru^tijjiilar society of 
 wbicb be is a member, and of tbe wbole buman race. To 
 live conformably to siicb a rule, a man must use bis rational 
 faculjies iu^^m;;dCT to discern cjcaQy jtbe consec ^cnces and 
 full eff ect of all bis actions an d of tbe actions of otbers : be 
 must not live a life of contemplation aid reflection only, 
 tbougb bo must often retire within himself to calm and 
 purify bis soul by thought,^® but be must mingle in the work 
 of man and be a fellow labourer for tbe general good. 
 
 A man should have an object or purpose in life^-ibat he 
 mayjire ct a l l bi s energies_tj3_it ; of coui'se a good object. 
 (n. 7.) He who has not one object or purpose of life, cannot 
 be one and the same all through his life. (xi. 21.) Bacon 
 has a remark to the same effect, on the best means of 
 " reducing of tbe mind unto virtue and good estate ; which is, 
 the electing and propoimding unto a man's self good and 
 virtuous ends of his life, such as may be in a reasonable sort 
 within his compass to attain." He is a happy man who has 
 been wise enough to do this when he was young and has bad 
 tbe opportunities ; but the emperor seeing well that a man 
 cannot always be so wise in his youth, encourages himself to 
 do it when be can, and not to let life slip away before be has 
 begun. He who can propose to himself good and virtuous 
 ends of life, and be true to them, cannot fail to live con- 
 ^^ Ut nemo in sese tentat descendere, nemo, — Persiits, iv. 21. 
 
60 The Fhilo8ophy of Antoninus. 
 
 formably to his own interest and the universal interest, for 
 in the nature of things they are one. Tf a thing is not good 
 for the hive, it is not good for the bee. (vi. 54.) 
 
 One passage may end this matter. "If the gods have 
 determined about me and about the things which must 
 happen to me, they have determined well, for it is not easy 
 even to imagine a deity without forethought ; and as to doing 
 me harm, why should they have any desire towards that? 
 For what advantage would result to them from this or to the 
 whole, which is the special object of their providence ? But 
 if they have not determined about me individually, they have 
 certainly determined about the whole at least; and the 
 things which happen by way of sequence in this general 
 arrangement I ought to accept with pleasure and to be 
 content with them. But if they determine about nothing — 
 which it is wicked to believe, or if we do believe it, let us 
 neither sacrifice nor pray nor swear by them nor do anything^ 
 else which we do as if the gods were present and lived with 
 us — but if however the gods determine about none of the 
 things which concern us, I am able to determine about 
 myself, and I can inquire about that which is useful ; and 
 that is useful to every man which is conformable to his own 
 constitution (^KaraaK^vy']) and nature, f But my nature is 
 rational and social ; and my city and country, so far as I am 
 Antoninus, is Eome ; but so far as I aiii a man, it is the 
 world. The things then whj^h are useful to tKese cities are 
 alone useful to me." (vi. 44.) \ 
 
 It would be tedious, and ir is not necessary to state the 
 emperor's opinions on all the ways in ^vhich a man may 
 profitably use his understanding towards perfecting himself 
 in practical virtue. The passages to this pm'pose are in all 
 
Tlie Philosojjh?/ of Antoninus. 61 
 
 parts of his book, but as they arc in no order or connection, 
 a man must use the book a long time before he will find out all 
 that is in it. A few words may be added here. If we ansvlyso 
 all other tilings, wo find how insufficient they are for human 
 life, and how truly worthless many of them arc. Virtue 
 alone is indivisible, one, and perfectly satisfying. The notion 
 of Virtue cannot be considered vague or unsettled, because a 
 man ma}' find it difficult to explain the notion fully to him- 
 self or to expound it to others in such a way as to prevent 
 cavilling. V irtue is a whole , and no more consists of parts 
 than man's intelligence does, and yet we speak of various 
 intellectual faculties as a convenient way of expressing the 
 vai'ious powers which man's intellect shows by his wc-ili.-^ 
 In the same way we may speak of various virtues or parts of 
 virtue, in a practical sense, for the purpose of showing what 
 particular virtues we ought to practise in order to the exercise 
 of the whole of virtue, that is, as much as man's nature is 
 capable of. 
 
 The prime principle in man's cons titution is social. _ The 
 next in order is not to yield, to the persuasions of the body, 
 when they are not conformable to the rational principle, 
 which must govern. The third is freedom from error and 
 from deception. " Let then the ruling principle holding 
 fast to these things go straight on and it has what is its own." 
 (vii. 55.) The emperor selects justjce as the virtue which is 
 the basisj>f_iillJ;iia_rest^. 11). and this had been said long 
 before his time. 
 
 It is true that all people have some notion of what is 
 meant by justice as a disposition of the mind, and some 
 notion about acting in conformity to this disposition ; but 
 experience shows that men's notions about justice are as con- 
 
62 The PhilGSo^hy of Antoninus. 
 
 fused as tlieir actions are inconsistent with the true notion of 
 justice. The emperor's notion of justice is clear enough, but 
 not practical enough for all mankind. " Let there be freedom 
 from perturbations with respect to the things which come 
 from the external cause; and let there be justice in the 
 things done by vii'tue of the. internal cause, that is, let there 
 be movement and action terminating in this, in social acts, 
 for this is according to thy nature." (ix. 31.) In another 
 place (ix. 1) he says that " he who acts unjustly acts im- 
 piously," which follows of course from all that he says in 
 various places. He insists ^n the practice of truth_as a 
 virtue and as a means to virtue, which no doubt it is : for 
 lyi ng ev en injndiffer ent thi ngs__weakens the understanding; 
 andjjing malicio usly is as great a moral offe nce 'as j jman 
 can be guilty of, viewed both as showing an habitual dis- 
 position, and viewed with respect to consequences. He 
 couples the notion of justice with action. A man must not 
 pride himself on having some fine notion of justice in his 
 head, but he must exhibit his justice in act, like St. James's 
 notion of faith. But this is enough. 
 
 ^ The Stoics and Antoninus among them call some things 
 beautiful (Kaka) and some ugly (ala-^a), and as they are 
 beautiful so they are good, and as they are ugly so they arc 
 evil or bad. (ii. 1.) All these things good and evil are in 
 our power, absolutely some of the stricter Stoics would say ; 
 in a manner only, as those who would not depa\-t altogether 
 from common sense would say ; practically i;hoy are to a 
 great degree in the power of some persons and in some cir- 
 cmnstances, but in a small degree only in other persons "and 
 in other circumstances. The Stoics maintain man's free will 
 as to the things which are in his power ; for as to the things 
 
The Philosophj of Antoninus. 
 
 which are out of his power, free will terminating in 
 of course excluded by the very terms of the expressioi.. 
 hardly know if we can discover exactly Antoninus' notion of 
 the free will of man, nor is the question worth the inquiry. 
 What he does mean and does say is intelligible. Alt the 
 things which are not in our power (ttTrpoaipera) are indifferent >- 
 they are neither good nor bad, morally^Such are life, health, 
 wealth, power, disease, poverty and death. Life and death 
 are all men's portion. Health, wealth, power, disease and 
 poverty happen to men indifferently to the good and to tho 
 bad ; to those who live according to nature and to those who 
 do not.^" "Life," says the emperor, "is a warfare and a 
 stranger's sojourn, and after fame is oblivion." (n. 17.) 
 After speaking of those men who have disturbed the world 
 and then died, and of the death of philosophers such as 
 Heraclitus and Democritus who was destroyed by lice, and of 
 Socrates whom other lice (his enemies) destroyed, he says : 
 * What means all this ? Thou hast embarked, thou , hast 
 made the voyage, thou art come to shore ; get out. If indeed 
 to another life, there is no want of gods, not even there. But 
 if to a state v/ithout sensation, thou wilt cease to be held by 
 pains and pleasures, and to be a slave to the vessel W'hich is 
 as much inferior as that which serves it is superior : for the 
 one is intelligence and deity ; the other is earth and corrup- 
 
 ^^ " All events come alike to all : there is one event to the righteous 
 and to the wicked : to the good and to the clean and to the unclean," 
 &c. Ecclesiastes, ix. v. 2 ; and v. 3 : " This is an evil among all things 
 that are done under the sun, that there is one event unto all," In what 
 sense " evil " is meant here seem s rather doubtful. There is no doubt 
 about the Emperor's meaning. Compare Epictetus, Enchiridion, c. i., 
 &c. ; and the doctrine of the Brachmans (Strabo. p. 713, ed. Cas.); 
 ayaBhv Se v) KUKhu ixyidiy eJuat. tuu (rvfj.PaLv6vTwv avSpairois. 
 
64 The Philosoj'jhij of Antoninus. 
 
 tion.^' (ill. 3.) It is not death that a man should fear, but 
 he should fear never beginuing^to live according to nature, 
 (xii. 1.) Every man should live in such a way as to discharge 
 his duty, and to trouble himself about nothing else. He 
 should live such a life that he shall always be ready for death, 
 and shall depart content when the summons comes. For 
 what Js death j " A_cessation of the impressions through the 
 senses^ and of the pulling of the strings which move the 
 appetites and of the discursive movements of the thoughts, 
 and of the service to the flesh." (vi. 28.) Death is such as 
 generation is, a mystery of nature, (iv. 5.) In another 
 passage, the exact meaning of which is perhaps doubtful 
 (ix. 3), he speaks of the child which leaves the womb, and so 
 he says the soul at death leaves its envelope. As the child 
 is born or comes into life by leaving the womb, so the soul 
 may on leaving the body pass into anotlier existence which 
 is perfect. I am not sure if this is the emperor's mean- 
 ing. Eutler compares it with a passage in Strabo (p. 713) 
 about the Brachmans' notion of death being the birth into 
 real life and a happy life to those who have philoso- 
 phized ; and he thinks that Antoninus may allude to this 
 opinion.'^ 
 
 Antoninus' oijinion of a future life is nowhere clearly 
 expressed. His doctrine of the nature of the soul of necessity 
 
 -^ Seneca (Ep. 102) has the same, whether an expression of his own 
 opinion, or merely a fine saying of othei-s employed to embellish his 
 writings, I know not. After speaking of the child being prepared in 
 the womb to live this life, he adds, " Sic per boo spatium, quod ab 
 infantia patct in senectutera, in alium naturae sumimur partura. Alia 
 origo nos ex pec tat, alius rerum status." See Ecclesiastes, xii. 7; ard 
 Lucan, i. 457 : 
 
 " Lcngae, cauitis si cognita, vitae 
 Mors melia est." 
 
The Philosophy of Antoninus. Cj 
 
 implies that it does not perisli absolutely, for a portion of the 
 divinity cannot perish. The opinion is at least as old as the 
 time of Epichai-mus and Euripides ; what comes from eartlk:!^^^,^^ 
 goes back to earth^and what comes from heaven, the divinity, 
 returns to him who gave it. But I find nothing clear in 
 Antoninus as to the notion of the man existing after death so 
 as to be conscious of his sameness with that soul which 
 occupied his vessel of clay. He seems to be perplexed on 
 this matter, and finally to have rested in this, that God or 
 the gods will do whatever is best and consistent with the 
 university of things. 
 
 Nor I think does he speak conclusively on another Stoic 
 doctrine, which some Stoics practised, the anticipating the 
 regular course of nature by a man's own act. The reader 
 will find some passages in which this is touched on, and he 
 may make of them what he can. But there are passages in 
 which the emperor encom'ages himself to wait for the end 
 patiently and with tranquillity ; and certainly it is consistent 
 with all his best teaching that a man should bear all that 
 falls to his lot and do useful acts as long as he lives. He 
 ghould not therefore abridge the time of his usefulness by his 
 own act. "Whether^he jcontemplates any possible cases in 
 which a man should die by his own hand, I cannot tell, and q. • ^ 
 the matter is not^ worth a curiqus_inquiry, for I believe it y"^^^^ 
 would not lead to any certain result as to his opinion on this 
 point. I do not think that Antoninus, who never mentions 
 Seneca, though he must have kno-^Ti all about him, would ^ 
 have a greed w ith Seneca when he gi ves as a reas on for suicide, 
 that the eternal laWj^ whatever he means, has made nothing 
 better forjis than this, that it has given us only one way of 
 entering into life a nd m any ways of going out of it. The 
 
 jt 
 
66 The Philosoj)h7j of Antoninus. 
 
 ways of going out indeed are many, and that is a good reason 
 for a man taking care of liimself.^^ 
 
 Happiness was not the direct object of a Stoic's life. There 
 is no rule of life contained in the precept that a man should 
 pursue his own hajppiness. Many men think that they are 
 seeking happiness when they are only seeking the gratification 
 of some j)articular passion, the strongest that they have. 
 The end of a man is, as already explained^t o live c onformably 
 to nature, and he will JJyi^ j)btain hajDpines^^ tranc[uillity of 
 mind and contentment, (iii. 12; viii. 1, and other places.) 
 As a means of living conformably to nature he must study 
 the four chief virtues, each of which has its proper sphere : 
 wdsdom, or the knowledge of good and evil ; justice, or the 
 giving to every man his due ; fortitude, or the enduring of 
 labour and pain ; and temperance^ which is moderation in all 
 things. By thus living conformably to nature the Stoic 
 obtained all that he wished or expected. Hisj.'eward was in 
 his virtuous life, and he was satisfied with that. Some Greek 
 poet long ago wrote : 
 
 For virtue only of all Imman things 
 
 Takes her reward not from the hands of others. 
 
 Virtue herself re vards the toils of virtue. 
 
 Some of the Stoics indeed expressed themselves in very 
 arrogant, absurd terms, about the wise man's self sufficiency ; 
 they elevated him to the rank of a deity.^'* But these were 
 only talkers and lecturers, such as those in all ages who utter 
 
 22 See Plinius, H. N. ii. c. 7 ; Seneca, De Provid. c. 6. ; and Ep. 70: 
 '• Nihil melius aeterna lex," &c. • 
 
 '3 J. Smith in his Select Discourses on "the Excellency and Noble- 
 ness of True lleligion" (c. vi.'i has remarked on this Stoical arrogance. 
 He finds it in Seneca and others. In Seneca certainly, and peihaps 
 Bomethiug of it in Epietetus ; but it is not in Antoninus. 
 
Tile Phihsopluj of Antoninus. 07 
 
 fme words, know little of human aflfairs, and care only for 
 notoriety. Epictetus and Antoninus both by precejit and 
 •jxample laboured to improve themselves and others ; and if 
 we discover imi^erfections in their teaching, we miLst still 
 honour these great men w^ho attempted to show that there is 
 in man's nature and in the constitution of things sufficient 
 reason for living a virtuous life. It is difficult enough to 
 live as we ought to live, difficult even for any man to live in 
 such a way as to satisfy himseK, if he exercises only in a 
 moderate degree the power of reflecting upon and reviewing 
 his own conduct ; and if all men cannot be brought to the 
 same opinions in morals and religion, it is at least worth 
 while to give them good reasons for as much as thoy can be 
 persuaded to accept. 
 
68 M, Antoninus, L 
 
 M. ANTONINUS. 
 
 I. 
 
 FROM my grandfather Verus^ [I learned] good morals and 
 the government of my temper. 
 
 2. From the reputation and remembrance of my father,^ 
 modesty and a manly character. 
 
 3. From my mother,^ piety and beneficence, and abstinence, 
 not only from evil deeds, but even from evil thoughts ; and 
 further, simplicity in my way of living, far removed from the 
 habits of the rich. 
 
 4. r'rom my great-grandfather,^ not to have frequented 
 public schools, and to have had good teachers at home, and 
 to know that on such things a man should spend liberally. 
 
 5. From my governor, to be neither of the green nor of 
 the blue party at the games in the Circus, nor a partizan 
 either of the Parmularius or the Scutarius at the gladiators' 
 fights ; from him too I learned endurance of labour, and to 
 want little, and to work with my own hands, and not to 
 
 1 Annius Verus was his grandfathers name. Tliere is no verb in 
 this section connected with the word " from," nor in the foUowing sections 
 of this book ; and it is not quite certain what verb should be supplied. 
 What I have added may express the meaning here, though there are 
 sections which it will not fit. If he does not mean to say that ho learned 
 all these good things from the several persons whom he mentions, he 
 means that he observed certain good qualities in them, or received 
 certain benefits from them, and it is implied that he was the better for 
 it, or at least might have been ; for it would be a mistake to understand 
 Marcus as saying that he possessed all the virtues which he observed in 
 his kinsmen and teachers. 
 
 - His father's name was Annius Verus. 
 His mother was Domitia Culvillii, named also Lucilla. 
 Perhaps his mother's grandfather, Catilius Severus. 
 
M. Antoninus. I. 69 
 
 meddle with other people's afiairs, and not to 1)0 ready to 
 listen to slander. 
 
 6. From Diognctus,* not to busy myseli about trifling 
 things, and not to give credit to vrhat was said by miracle- 
 workers and jugglers about incantations and the driving away 
 of daemons and such things ; and not to breed quails [for 
 fighting], nor to give myself up passionately to such things ; 
 and to endure freedom of speech ; and to have become intimate 
 with philosophy ; and to have been a hearer, first of Bacchius, 
 then of Tandasis and Marcianus ; and to have written dia- 
 logues in my youth ; and to have desired a plank bed and 
 skin, and whatever else of the kind belongs to the Grecian 
 discipline. 
 
 7. From Eusticus^ I received tho impression that my cha- 
 racter required improvement and discipline ; and from him I 
 learned not to be led astray to sophistic emulation, nor to 
 wi'iting on speculative matters, nor to delivering little hor- 
 tatory orations, nor to showing myself off as a man who 
 practises much discipline, or does benevolent acts in order to 
 make a disi)lay ; and to abstain from rhetoric, and poetry, 
 and fine writing ; and not to walk about in the house in my 
 outdoor dress, nor to do other things of the kind ; and to 
 
 ^ In the works of Justinus there is printed a letter to one Diognetus, 
 •whom the writer names " most excellent." He was a Gentile, but he 
 wished very much to know what the religion of the Christians was, what 
 God they worshipped, and how this worship made them despise the world 
 and death, and neither believe in the gods of the Greeks nor observe 
 the superstition of the Jews ; and what was this love to one anotlier 
 which they had, and wliy this new kind of religirix was introduced now 
 and not before. My friend Mr, Jenkius, rector of Lyminge in Kent, 
 has suggested to me that this Diognetus may have been the tutor of 
 M. Antoninus. 
 
 ^ Q. Jimius Eusticus was a Stoic philosopher, whom Antoninus valued 
 highly, and often took his advice. (Capitol. M. Antonin. rn.) 
 
 Antoninus says, toTs 'ETriKTTjrei'ois v-KOfjivv.^aaiv^ which raiist not le 
 translated, "the writings of Epictetus," fur Epictetus wrote nothing. 
 His pupil Arrian, who has preserved for us all that we know of Epictetus, 
 eavs, ravTa iireipadriv v.ouvrjixaTa ijxavrcf dia(pv\d^ai TrjS iKUVOV diavoias. 
 {Eg. ad GeU.) 
 
70 M. Antoninus. L 
 
 write my letters with simplicity, like the letter which Eiisticus 
 wrote from Sinuessa to my mother ; and with respect to those 
 who have offended me by words, or done me wrong, to be 
 easily disposed to be pacified and reconciled, as soon as they 
 have shown a readiness to be reconciled ; and to read care- 
 fully, and not to be satisfied with a superficial understanding 
 of a book ; nor hastily to give my assent to those who talk 
 overmuch ; and I am indebted to him for being acquainted 
 with the discourses of Epictetus, which he communicated to 
 me out of his own collection. 
 
 8. From Apollonius^ I learned freedom of will and un- 
 deviating steadiness of purpose ; and to look to nothing else, 
 not even for a moment, except to reason ; and to be always 
 the same, in sharp pains, on the occasion of the loss of a 
 child, and in long illness ; and to see clearly in a living 
 example that the same man can be both most resolute and 
 yielding, and not peevish in giving his instruction ; and to 
 have had before my eyes a man who clearly considered his 
 experience and his skill in expounding philosophical prin- 
 ciples as the smallest of his merits ; and from him I learned 
 how to receive from friends what are esteemed favours, with- 
 out being either humbled by them or letting them pass un- 
 noticed. 
 
 9. From Sextus,^ a benevolent disposition, and the example 
 of a family governed in a fatherly manner, and the idea of 
 living conformably to nature ; and gravity without affectation, 
 and to look carefully after the interests of friends, and to 
 tolerate ignorant persons, and those who form opinions with- 
 out consideration! : he had the power of readily accom- 
 modating himself to all, so that intercoiu'se with him was 
 more agreeable than any flattery ; and at the same time he 
 was most highly venerated by those who associated with him : 
 and he had the faculty both of discovering and ordering, in 
 
 7 Apollonius of Clialcis came to Rome in the time of Pius to bo 
 Marcus' preceptor. He was a rigid Stoic. 
 
 ° Sextus of CliOironea, a grandson of Plutarch, or nephew, as some 
 say ; but more probably a grandson. 
 
M. Antoninus. I. 71 
 
 an iutelligent and mctlioclical way, the principles necessary 
 for life; and lie never showed anger or any other passion, 
 but was entirely free from passion, and also most aftectionato ; 
 and he could express approbation without noisy display, and 
 he possessed much knowledge without ostentation. 
 
 10. From Alexander'' the grammarian, to refrain from 
 fault-linding, and not in a reproachful way to chide those 
 who uttered any barbarous or solecistic or strange-sounding 
 exj)ression ; but dexterously to introduce the very expression 
 which ought to have been used, and in the way of answer or 
 giviug confirmation, or joining in an inquiry about the thing 
 itself, not about the word, or by some other fit suggestion. 
 
 11. From Fronto'" I learned to obsei've what envy, and 
 duplicity, and hypocrisy are in a tyrant, and that generally 
 those among us who are called Patricians are rather deficient 
 in paternal affection. 
 
 12. From Alexander the Platonic, not frequently nor 
 without necessity to say to any one, or to write in a letter, 
 that 1 have no leisure ; nor continually to excuse the neglect 
 of duties required by our relation to those with whom we 
 live, by alleging urgent occupations. 
 
 13. From Catulus," not to be indifferent when a friend 
 finds fault, even if he should find fault without reason, but to 
 try to restore him to his usual disposition ; and to be ready 
 to speak well of teachers, as it is reported of Domitius and 
 Athenodotus ; and to love my children truly. 
 
 14. From my br other ^^ Severus, to love my kin, and to love 
 truth, and to love justice ; and through him I learned to know 
 
 ^ Alexander was a Graniraaticus, a native of Plirygia. He wrote a 
 commentary on Homer ; and tb.c rhetorician A riptides wrote a panegyric 
 on Alexander in a funeral oration. 
 
 '° M. Cornelius Fronto was a rhetorician, and in great favour with 
 Marcus. There are extant various letters between Marcus and Fronto. 
 
 ^^ Cinna Catulus, a Stoic philosopher. 
 
 '^ The word brother may not be genuine. Antoninus had no biotLer. 
 It has been supposed that he may mean some cousin. Schultz in iiis 
 translation omits "brother,"' and says tLat this Severus is probably 
 Claudius Severus. a peripatetic. 
 
72 M. Antoninus. 1. 
 
 Thrasea, Helvidius, Cato, Dion, Brutus ;^^ and from him I 
 received tlae idea of a polity in v/liicli there is the same law 
 for all, a polity administered with regard to equal rights and 
 equal freedom of speech, and the idea of a kingly government 
 which respects most of all the freedom of the governed ; I 
 learned from him alsof consistency and undeviating steadiness 
 in my regard for philosoj)hy ; and a disposition to do good, 
 and to give to others readily, ''and to cherish good hopes, and 
 to believe that I am loved by my friends ; and in him I ob- 
 served no concealment of his opinions with respect to those 
 whom he qondemned, and that his friends had no need to 
 conjecture what he wished or did not wish, but it was quite 
 plain. 
 
 15. From Maximus^* I learned self-government, and not to 
 be led aside by anything; and cheerfulness in all circum- 
 stances, as well as in illness ; and a just admixture in the 
 moral chai:acter of swe^ness and dignity, and to do what was 
 set before me without comjplaining. I observed that every- 
 body beliisved that he thought as he spoke, and that in all 
 that he did he never had any bad intention ; and he never 
 showed amazement and surprise, and was never in a hurry, 
 and never put off doing a thing, nor was perplexed nor de- 
 jected, nor did he ever laugh to disguise his vexation, nor, on 
 the other hand, was he ever passionate or suspicious. He was 
 accustomed to do acts of beneficence, and was ready to forgive, 
 and was free from all falsehood ; and he presented the appear- 
 ance of a man who could not be diverted from right rather 
 than of a man who had been improved. I observed, too, 
 that no man could ever think that he was dcsj)ised by 
 Maximus, or ever venture to think himself a better man. 
 He had also the art of being humorous in an agreeable way.| 
 
 '3 We know, from Tacitus {Annal. xiii., xvi. 21 ; and other passages), 
 who Thrasea and Helvidius were. Plutarch has written the lives of the 
 two Catos, and of Dion and Brutus. Atitouinvis probably alludes to 
 Cato of Utica, who was a Stoic. 
 
 14 Claudius Maximits was a Stoic ]>hilosopher, who was highly 
 esteemed also by Antoninus Pius, Marcus' predecessor. Tiie characto? 
 of Maximus is that of a perfect man. ''See vni. 25.) 
 
M. Antoninus. I. 73 
 
 16. In my father^* I observed mildness of temper, and 
 nncliangcable resolution in the things which he had deter- 
 mined after due deliberation ; and no vainglory in those 
 things which men call honours ; and a love of labour and 
 perseverance ; and a readiness to listen to those who had any- 
 thing to propose for the common weal ; and undeviating 
 fii'mness in giving to every man according to his deserts ; and 
 a knowledge derived from experience of the occasions for 
 vigorous action and for remission. And I observed that he 
 had overcome all passion for boys ; and he considered him- 
 self no more than any other citizen ;'® and he released his 
 friends from all obligation to sup with him or to attend him 
 of necessity when he went abroad, and those who had failed 
 to accompany him, by reason of any urgent circumstances, 
 always found him the same. I observed too his habit of 
 careful inquiry in all matters of deliberation, and his persis- 
 tency, and that he never stopped his investigation through 
 being satisfied with appearances which first present them- 
 selves ; and that his disposition was to keep his friends, and 
 not to be soon tired of them, nor yet to be extravagant in his 
 affection ; and to be satisfied on all occasions, and cheerful ; 
 and to foresee things a long way off, and to provide for the 
 smallest without display ; and to check immediately popular 
 applause and all flattery ; and to be ever watchful over the 
 things which were necessary for the administration of the 
 empire, and to be a good manager of the expenditure, and 
 patiently to endure the blame which he got for such conduct ; 
 and he was neither superstitious with respect to the gods, nor 
 did he court men by gifts or by trying to please them, or by 
 flattering the populace ; but he showed sobriety in all things 
 and firmness, and never any mean thoughts or action, nor 
 love of novelty. And the things which conduce in any way 
 to the commodity of life, and of which fortune gives an 
 abundant supply, he used without arrogance and without 
 
 '5 He means his adoptive father, his predecessor, the Emperor An* 
 touinus Pius. Compare ti. 30. 
 
 '^ He uses the word icoivouonuoavvn- See Gataker's uoto. 
 
74 ^ M. Antoninus. I. 
 
 excusing himself; so tliat wlien he had them, he enjoyed 
 them without affectation, and when he had them not, he did 
 not want them. No one could ever say of him that he was 
 either a sophist or a [home-bred] flippant slave or a pedant ; 
 but every one acknowledged him to be a man ripe, perfect, 
 above flattery, able to manage his own and other men's affairs. 
 Besides this, he honoured those who were true philosoj^hers, 
 and he did not reproach those who pretended to be philo- 
 sophers, nor yet was he easily led by them. He was also 
 easy in conversation, and he made himself agreeable without 
 any offensive affectation. He took a reasonable care of his 
 body's health, not as one who was greatly attached to life, nor 
 out of regard to personal appearance, nor yet in a careless 
 way, but so that, through his own attention, he very seldom 
 stood in need of the physician's art or of medicine or external 
 ai)plications. He was most ready to give way without envy 
 to those who possessed any particular faculty, such as that of 
 eloquence or knowledge of the law or of morals, or of any- 
 thing else ; and he gave them his help, that each might enjoy 
 reputation according to his deserts ; and he always acted 
 conformably to the institutions of his country, without show- 
 ing any affectation of doing so. Further, he was not fond of 
 change nor unstead}^, but he loved to stay in the same places, 
 and to employ himself about the same things ; and after his 
 paroxysms of headache he came immediately fresh and 
 vigorous to his usual occupations. His secrets were not 
 many, but very few and very rare, and these only about public 
 matters; and he showed prudence and economy in the 
 exhibition of the public spectacles and the construction of 
 public buildings, his donations to the people, and in such 
 things, for he was a man who looked to what ought to bo 
 done, not to the reputation which is got by a man's acts. 
 He did not take the bath at unseasonable hours : he was not 
 fond of building houses, nor curious about what he ate, nor 
 about the texture and colour of his clothes, nor about the 
 beauty of his slaves.^'^ His dress came from Lorium, his villa 
 '"' This passage is corrupt, and the exact meaning is uncertain. 
 
M. Antoninus. I. 75 
 
 on the coast, and from Lanuvium generally.'^ We know liow 
 Le behaved to the toll-collector at Tusculum who asked his 
 pardon ; and such was all his behaviour. There was in him 
 nothing harsh, nor implac^ible, nor violent, nor, as one may 
 say, anything carried to the sweating point ; but he examined 
 all things severally, as if he had abundance of time, and with- 
 out confusion, in an orderly way, vigorously and consistently. 
 And that might be applied to him which is recorded of ^ 
 Socrates,^^ that he was able both to abstain from, and to 
 enjoy, those things which many are too weak to abstain from^ 
 and cannot enjoy without excess. But to be strong enough 
 both to bear the one and to be sober in the other is the mark 
 of a man who has a perfect and invincible soul, such as he 
 showed in the illness of Maximus. 
 
 17. To the gods I am indebted for having good grand- 
 fiithers, good parents, a good sister, good teachers, good 
 associates, good kinsmen and friends, nearly everything good. 
 Further, I owe it to the gods that I was not hurried into any 
 oflence against any of them, though I had a disposition which, 
 if opportunity had offered, might have led me to do something . 
 of this kind ; but, through theii* favour, there never was such 
 a concmTcnce of circumstances as put me to the trial. 
 Further, I am thankful to the gods that I was not longer 
 brought up with my grandfather's concubine, and that I 
 preserved the flower of my youth, and that I did not make 
 proof of my virility before the proper season, but even 
 deferred the time ; that I was subjected to a ruler and a father 
 who was able to take away all pride from me, and to bring me 
 to the knowledge that it is possible for a man to live in a 
 palace without wanting either guards or embroidered di-esses, 
 or torches and statues, and such-like show ; but that it is in 
 such a man's power to bring himself very near to the fashion 
 of a private person, without being for this reason either 
 meaner in thought, or more remiss in action, with respect to 
 
 ^8 Lorium was a villa on the coast north of Eome, and there Aa 
 toninus was brought np, and he died there. This also is corrupt. 
 19 Xenophon, Memorab. i. 3. 15. 
 
76 M. Antoninus. I. 
 
 the things which must be done for the public interest in a 
 manner that befits a ruler. I thank the gods for giving me 
 such a brother,^ who was able by his moral character to rouse 
 me to vigilance over myself, and who, at the same time, 
 pleased me by his respect and aifection ; that my children 
 have not been stupid nor deformed in body ; that I did not 
 make more proficiency in rhetoric, poetry, and the other 
 studies, in which I should perhaps have been completely 
 engaged, if I had seen that I was making progress in them ; 
 that I. made haste to place those who brought me up in the 
 station of honour, which they seemed to desire, without 
 putting them off with hope of my doing it some time after, 
 because they were then still young ; that I knew ApoUonius, 
 Eusticus, Maximus ; that I received clear and frequent 
 impressions about living according to nature, and what kind 
 of a life that is, so that, so far as depended on the gods, and 
 their gifts, and help, and inspirations, nothing hindered me 
 from forthwith living according to nature, though I still fall 
 short of it through my own fault, and through not observing 
 the admonitions of the gods, and, I may almost say, their 
 direct instructions ; that my body has held out so long in such 
 a kind of life; that I never touched either Benedicta or 
 Theodotus, and that, after having fallen into amatory passions, 
 I was cured ; and, though I was often out of humour with 
 Eusticus, I never did anything of which I had occasion to 
 repent ; that, though it was my mother's fate to die young, 
 she spent the last years of her life with me ; that, whenever I 
 wished to help any man in his need, or on any other occasion, 
 I was never told that I had not the means of doing it ; and 
 that to myself the same necessity never happened, to receive 
 anything from another ; that I have such a wife,^^ so obedient, 
 and so affectionate, and so simple ; that I had abundance of 
 good masters for my children ; and that remedies have been 
 shown to me by dreams, both others, and against bloodspitting 
 
 -° The emperor had no brother, except L. Verus, his brother hy 
 
 adoption. 
 
 ^' See the Life of Antoninus. 
 
M. Antoninus. 1. 77 
 
 and giddiness 22 ****** • and that, when I had aii in- 
 clination to ijhilosophy, I did not fall into the hands of any 
 sophist, and that I did not waste my time on writers [of 
 histories], or in the resolution of syllogisms, or occupy 
 myself about the investigation of appearances in the heavens ; 
 for all these things require the help of the gods and fortune. 
 Among the Quadi at the Granua."^^ 
 
 ^ This is corrupt. 
 
 '^ The Quadi hved in the southern part of Bohemia and Moravia ; 
 and Antoninus made a campaitrn against them. (See the Life.) Granua 
 is probably the river Graan, which flows into the Danube. 
 
 If these words are genuine, Antoninus may liave written thl3 first 
 book during the war with the Quadi. In the first etiition of Antoninusj, 
 and in the older editions, the first three sections of the second book 
 make the conclusion of the first book. Gataker placed theni at the 
 betjinning of tlie second book. . 
 
78 M. Antoninus. IL 
 
 II. 
 
 BEGIN tlie morning by saying to thyself, I sball meet 
 with the busybody, the ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, 
 envious, unsocial. All these things happen to them by reason 
 of their ignorance of what is good and evil. But I who have 
 seen the nature of the good that it is beautiful, and of the 
 bad that it is ugly, and the nature of him who does wrong, 
 that it is akin to me, not [only] of the same blood or seed, 
 but that it participates in |]the same] intelligence and [the 
 same] portion of the divinity, I can neither be injured by any 
 of them, for no one can fix on me what is ugly, nor can I be 
 angry with my kinsman, nor hate him. For we are made for 
 CQioperation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like the rows 
 of the upper and lower teeth.' To act against one another 
 then is contrary to nature; and it is acting against one 
 another to be vexed and to turn away. 
 
 2. Whatever this is that I am, it is a little flesh and breath, 
 and the ruling part. Throw away thy books; no longer 
 
 , distract thyself : it is not allowed ; but as if thou wast now 
 j dying, despise the flesh ; it is blood and bones and a net- 
 work, a contexture of nerves, veins, and arteries. See the 
 breath also, what kind of a thing it is, air, and not always 
 the same, but every moment sent out and again sucked in. 
 The third then is the ruling part : consider thus : Thou art 
 an old man ; no longer let this be a slave, no longer be 
 pulled by the strings like a puppet to unsocial movements, no 
 longer be either dissatisfied with thy present lot, or shrink 
 from the future. 
 
 3. All that is from the gods is full of providence. That 
 which is from fortune is not separated from nature or without 
 
 ' Xenophon, Mem. ii. 3. l-S. 
 
M. Antoninus. II. 79 
 
 an interweaving and involution with the things which aro 
 ordered by providence. From thence all things flow ; and 
 there is besides necessity, and that which is for the advantage 
 of the whole universe, of which thou art a part. But that is 
 good for every part of nature which the nature of the whole 
 brings, and what serves to maintain this nature. Now the 
 universe is preserved, as by the changes of the elements so 
 by the changes of things compounded of the elements. Let 
 these j^rinciples be enough for thee, let them always be fixed 
 opinions. But cast away the thirst after books, that thou 
 mayest not die murmuring, but cheerfully, truly, and from 
 thy heart thankful to the gods. 
 
 4. Eemember how long thou hast been putting off these 
 things, and how often thou hast received an opportunity from 
 the gods, and yet dost not use it. Thou must now at last 
 perceive of what universe thou art a part, and of what ad- 
 mimstratorLiiJLi±ie-un i verse JLtiyLexigtence'ls'an efflux, and that 
 a limitjc>fJLi ^ is faed for thee, which if thou dost not use 
 forclearmg away The clouds from thy mind, it will go and 
 thou wilt go, and it will i^ever return . 
 
 5. Every moment think steadily as a Koman and a man to 
 do what thou hast in hand with perfect and simple dignity, 
 and feeling of affection, and freecTbm, and justice ; and 'to 
 give thyself relief from all other thoughts. And thou wilt 
 give thyself relief, if thou doest every act of thy life as if it 
 were the last, laying aside all carelessness and passionate 
 aversion from the commands of reason, and all hypocrisy, 
 and self-love, and discontent with the portion which has been 
 given to thee. (Thou seest how few the things are, the which 
 if a man lays hold of, he is able to live a life which flows in 
 quiet, and is like the existence of the gods ; for the gods on 
 their part will requii'e nothing more from him who observes 
 these things.^ 
 
 6. Do wrong^ to thyself, do wrong to thyself, rQ yisouL;_but 
 thou wilt no longe r have t he opportuni ty of ho no uring thy self. 
 
 - Perhaps it should be " thou art doing violence to thyself,' vfipiCuSt 
 not vBoiCe. • 
 
/ 
 
 80 M. Antoninus. 11. 
 
 Every man's life is sufiicient.f But thine is nearly finishedj 
 tliough thy soul reverences not itself, but places thy felicity 
 in the souls of others. 
 
 7. Do the things external which fall upon thee distract 
 thee? Give t hyself t i me to lear n somethin g new an d good, 
 and cease to be whirled around. But then thou must also 
 avoid being carried about the other way. For those tco are 
 triflers who have wearied themselves m life by their activity, 
 and j'et have no object to which- to direct every movement, 
 and, in a word, all their thoughjis. 
 
 8. Through not observing what is in the mind of another 
 a man has seldom been seen to be unhappy ; but those who 
 do not observe the movements of their own minds must of 
 necessity be unhappy. 
 
 9. This thou must always bear in mind, what is the nature 
 of the whole, and what is my nature, and how this is related 
 to that, and what kind of a part it is of what kind of a whole ; 
 and that there is no one who hinders thee from always doing 
 and saying the things which are according to the nature of 
 which thou art a part. 
 
 10. Theophrastus, in his comparison of bad acts — such a 
 comparison as one "^vould make in accordance with the com- 
 mon notions of mankind — says, like a true philosojjher, that 
 t he oifences whi ch are committed through _desiro are more 
 blameable than those whicJi are~c ommitted through a nger . 
 H'or he who is excited by anger^seems to turn away from 
 
 reason with a certain pain and unconscious_ f^nntrnrtion j but 
 he who offp.uds f>b rough desire, being overpowered by^pleasure, 
 seems to be in a manner more intemperate aiocT 
 
 in his offences. EightlytheST'and in a way \\^orthy of 
 philosophy, Ee said that the offence which is committed 
 with pleasui'e is more blameable than that which is com- 
 mitted with pain ; and on the whole the one is more like a 
 person who has been first wronged and through pain is 
 comp oiled to be angry ; but the other is moved by hi s own 
 impulse to do wro ng, being carried towards ^oing something 
 bv desire. ' ^^^T " I 
 
M. Antoninus. II. 81 
 
 j 11. Since it is possible^ that thou rnayest depart from life 
 I thLs very moment, regulate every act and thought accordingly.^ 
 But to go away from among men, if there are gods, is not a 
 thing to be afraid of, fur the gods will not involve thee in 
 evil ; but if indeed they do not exist, or if they have no con- 
 cern aboiit human atfairs, what is it to me to live in a universe 
 devoid of gods or devoid of providence ? But in truth they 
 do exist, and they do care for human things, and they have 
 put all the means in man^s power to enable him not to fall 
 into real evils. And as to the rest, if there was anything 
 evil, they would have provided for this also, that it should be 
 altogether in a man's power not to fall into it. Now that 
 which does not make a man worse, how can it make a man_[^s 
 life worse ? But neither through ignorance, nor having the 
 knowledge, but not the power to guard against or correct 
 these things, is it possible that the nature of the universe has 
 overlooked them; nor is it possible that it has made so great 
 a mistake, either through want of power or want of skill, that 
 good and evil should happen indiscriminately to the good 
 and the bad. But death certainly, and life, honour and dis- 
 honour, pain and pleasure, all these things equally happen to 
 good men and bad, being things which make us neither better 
 ( nor worse. Therefore they are neither good nor evil, f 
 
 12. How quickly all things disappear, in the universe the 
 bodies themselves, but in time the remembrance of them ; 
 what is the n ature of all sensible thing s, and particularly 
 those which attract with the bait of pleasure or terrify by 
 pain, or are noised abroad by vapoury fame ; how worthless, 
 and contemptible, an^ sordid, and perishable, and dead they 
 are — all this it is the part of the intellectual faculty to 
 observe. To observe too who these are whose opinions and 
 voices give reputation : what death is, and the fact that, if a 
 man looks at it in itself, and by the abstractive power of 
 reflection resolves into their parts all the things which pre- 
 
 3 Or it may mean " since it iii in thy power to depart ;" which gives 
 a meaning somewhat different. 
 ■* See Cicero, Tuscul. i. 49. 
 
 6 
 
82 M. Antoninus. 11. 
 
 sent themselves to the imagination in it, lie will then consider 
 it to be nothing else than an operation of nature ; and if any- 
 one is afraid of an operation of nature, he is a child. This, 
 however, is not only an operation of nature, but it is also a 
 thing which conduces to the purposes of nature. To observe 
 too how man comes near to the deity, and by what part of 
 him, and when this part of man is so disposed.f (vi. 28.) 
 
 13. Nothing is more wretched than a man who traverses 
 everything in a round, and pries into the things beneatli the 
 earth, as the poef^ says, and seeks by conjecture what is in 
 the minds of his neighbours, without perceiving that it is 
 sufficient to attend to the daemon within him, and to reverence 
 it sincerely. And reverence of the daemon consists in keeping 
 it pure from passion and thoughtlessness, and dissatisfaction 
 with what comes' from gods and men. ^ov the thin gs from 
 the gods merit veneration for their excellence ; and the^things 
 from^^en should be~~dear to us by" reason of kinship ; and 
 sometimes even, in a manne r, they move our p it y by reas on 
 of men's ignorance of good and b ad ; this defect being not 
 less than that which deprives us of the power of distinguishing 
 things that are white and ]>lack. 
 
 14. Though thou shouldest bo going to live three thousand 
 years, and as many times ten thousand years, still remember 
 that no ma n loses any other life than this which he no w lives. ' 
 nor lives_anyother than thiji,j.Jaieh.-h e now JLoseg., The 
 longest and shortest are thus brought to the same. For the 
 present is the same to all, though that which perishes is not 
 the same ;t ^ and so that which is lost appears to be a niere 
 moment. For a mancannot lose either tj^^paist '"' th^_ 
 f uture : for what a man has not, how can any one take this 
 from him ? These two things then thou must bear in mind ; 
 the on e^that all things from eternity are of like forms and 
 come round in a circle, and that it makes no difference 
 whether a man shall see the same things during a hundred 
 years or two hundred, or an infinite time ; and the second, 
 
 * Pindar iu tlie Theuetetus of Plato. Soe xi. 1. 
 ^ {See Gataker's note. 
 
M. Antoninus. II. 83 
 
 that the longest liver and he who will die soonest lose just 
 tlic same. For the present is t he only thing of which a man 
 can b e deprive d, if it is true that this is the only thing which 
 hcTias, and that a man cannot lose a thing if lie has it not. 
 
 15. Ecmember^ that _all is o])inio n. For wliat was said by 
 the Cynic Monimus is manifest : and manifest too is the use 
 of what was said, if a man receives what may be got out of it 
 as far as it is true. 
 
 16: The soul of ma n^^e s vio lence to itself, fii-st of all, 
 when it becomes an abscess and, as it were, a tumour on the, 
 ^uniierse, so~IaFaslt can. For to be vexed at anything which ^ 
 hajipens is a separation of ourselves from nature, in some * 
 part of which the natures of all other things are contained. 
 ^ In the next place, the soul does violence to itself when it 
 turns away from any man, or even moves towards him with i 
 the intention of iujui-ing, such as are the souls of those who 1 
 are angry.5 In the third place, the soul does violence to j 
 itself when it is overpowered by pleasure or by pain. 
 ^ Foui'thly, when it plays a part, and does or says anything in- i 
 sincerely and untruly. n» "fifthly, when it allows any act of its i 
 own and any movement to be without an aim, and docs any- 
 thing thoughtlessly and without considering what it is, it 
 being right that even the smallest things be done with j 
 reference to an end ; and the end of rational animals is to 1 
 follow the reason and the law of the most ancient city and \ 
 polity. 
 
 17. Of human life the time is a point, and the substance 
 is in a flux, and the perception dull, and the composition of 
 the whole body subject to putrefaction, and the soul a whirl, 
 and fortune hard to divine, and fame a thing devoid of judg- 
 ment. And, to say all in a word, everything which belongs 
 to the body is a stream, and what belongs to the soul is a 
 dream and vajDour, and life is a w^arfare and a stra: iter's so- 
 journ, and after-fame is oblivion. What then is that which 
 is able to conduct a man? One thing and only one, phi- 
 losophy. But this consists in keeping the daemon with jn a 
 man fve^ from violence and unharmed, superior to pains and 
 
84 M. Antoninus. 11. 
 
 pleasures, doing nothing without a purpose, nor yet falsely 
 and with hypocrisy, not feeling the need of another man's 
 doing or not doing anything ; and besides, acceptuig all that 
 happens, and all that is allotted, as coming from thence, 
 wherever it is, from whence he himself came ; and, finally, 
 waiting for death with a cheerful mind, as being nothing else 
 than a dissolution of the elements of which every living being 
 is compounded. But if there is no harm to the elements 
 themselves in each continually changing into another, why 
 should a man have any apprehension about the change and 
 dissolution of all the elements? For it is according to 
 nature, and nothing is evil which is according to nature. 
 This in Carnuntum7 
 
 7 Carnuntum was a town of Pannonia, on the south side of the Danube, 
 about thiity miles east of Yiudobona (Vienna). Orosius (vn. 15) and 
 Eutropius (vni. 13) say that Antoninus remained three years at Cai:- 
 nuntum during his war with the Marcomanni. 
 
 A 
 
M. Antoninus. 111. 85 
 
 III. 
 
 WE onglit to consider not only tliat our life is daily 
 wasting away and a smaller part of it is left, but 
 another thing also must be taken into the account, that if a 
 man should live longer, it is quit e uncerta in whether the 
 understanding will still continue sufficient for the compre- 
 hension of things, and retain the power of contemplation 
 which strives to acquii-e the knowledge of the divine and the 
 human. For if he shall begin to fall into dotage, perspiration 
 and nutrition and imagination and appetite, and whatever 
 else there is of the kind, T\ill not fail; but the power of 
 making use of oui'selves, and filling up the measure of our 
 duty, and clearly separating all appearances, and considering 
 whether a man should now depart from life, and whatever 
 else of the kind absolutely requires a disciplined reason, all 
 this is already extinguished. We must make haste then, not 
 only because we are daily nearer to death, but also because 
 the conception of things and the undei'standing of them cease 
 first. • 
 
 2. We ought to observe also that even the things which 
 follow after the things which are produced according to 
 nature contain soigething pleasing and attractive. For in- 
 stance, when breadTis^baked^some parts are split at the 
 surface, and these parts which thus open, and have a certain 
 fashion contrary to the purpose of the baker's art, are beau- 
 tiful in a manner, and in a peculiar way excite a desire for 
 eating. And again, figs, when they are quite ripe, gape open ; 
 and in the ripe olives the very circumstance of their being 
 near to rottenness adds a peculiar beauty to the fruit. And 
 the ears of corn bending down, and the lion's eyebrows, and 
 the foam which flows from the mouth of wild boars, and many 
 
86 ill. Antoninus. III. 
 
 other tilings — though they are far from being beautiful, if a 
 man should examine them severally, — still, because they are 
 consequent upon the things which are formed by nature, help 
 to adorn them , and they please the mind ; so that if a man 
 should have a feeling and deeper insight with resj)ect to the 
 things which are produced in the universe, there is hardly 
 one of those which follow by way of consequence which will 
 not seem to him to be in a manner disposed so as to give 
 pleasure. And so he will see even the real gaping jaws of 
 wild beasts with no less pleasure than those which painters 
 and sculptors show by imitation ; and in an old woman and 
 an old man he will be able to see a certain maturity and 
 comeliness ; and the attractive loveliness of young persons 
 he will be able to look on with chaste eyes ; and many such 
 things will j)resent themselves, not pleasing to every man, 
 but to him only who has become truly familiar with nature 
 and her works. 
 
 3. Hippocrates after curing many diseases himself fell 
 sick and died. The Chaldaei foretold the deaths of many, 
 and then fate caught them too. Alexander, and Pompeius, 
 and Caius Caesar, after so often completely destroying whole 
 cities, and in battle cutting to pieces many ten thousands of 
 cavalry and infantry, themselves too at last departed from 
 life. Heraclitus, after so many speculations on the conflagra- 
 tion of the universe, was filled with water internally and 
 died smeared all over with mud. And lice destroyed De- 
 mocritus; and other lice killed Socrates. What means all 
 this '? Thou hast embarked, thou hast made the voyage, thou 
 art come to shore ; get out. If indeed to another life, there 
 is no want of gods, not even there. But if to a state without 
 sensation, thou wilt cease to be held by pains and pleasures, 
 and to be a slave to the vessel, which is as much inferior as 
 that which serves it is superior :f for the one is intelligence 
 and deity ; the other is earth and corruption. 
 
 4. Do not waste the remainder of thy life in thoughts about 
 others, when thou dost not refer thy thoughts to some object 
 of common utility. For thou losest the opportunity of doing 
 
M. Antoninus. III. 87 
 
 something else ^vhen tlioii hast such thoughts as these, "What 
 is such a person doing, and why, and ^hat is he saying, and 
 what is he thinking of, and what is ho contriving, and what- 
 ever else of the kind makes us wander away from the ob- 
 servation of our own ruling power. We ought then to check ^^ 
 in the series of our thouglits every tiling that is witliout a | 
 purpose and useless, but most of all the overcurious feeling ; 
 and the malignant; and a man should use himself to think; 
 of those things only about which if one should suddenly ask, 
 What hast thou now in thy thoughts ? with perfect ojienness / 
 thou mightest immediately answer, This or That ; so that 
 from thy words it should be plain that everytliing in^thee is 
 simple and benevolent, and such as befits a social animal, and 
 one that cares not for thoughts about pleasure or sensual 
 enjoyments at all, nor has any rivalry or envy and suspicion, , 
 or anvthinf? else for which thou wouldst blush if thou shouldst 1 
 say that thou hadst it in thy mind. For the man who is such 
 and no longer delays being among the number of the best, is ' 
 like a priest and minister of the gods, using too the [deity j 
 which is planted within him, which makes the man uncon- 
 taminated by pleasure, unharmed by an}^ pain, untouched by 
 any insult, feeling no wrong, a fighter in the noblest fight, 
 one who cannot be overpowered by any passion, dyed deep 
 with justice, accepting with all his soul everything which 
 happens and is assigned to him as his j^ortion ; and not often, 
 nor yet without great necessity and for the general interest, 
 imagining what another says, or does, or thinks. For it is 
 only what belongs to himself that he makes the matter for ^ 
 his activity ; and he constantly thinks of that which is 
 allotted to himself out of the sum total of things, and he 
 makes his own acts fair, and he is persuaded that his ov»n 
 portion is good. For the lot which is assigned to each man 
 is carried along with him and carries him along with it.j 
 
 And he remembers also that every rational .animal is his v. 
 
 kinsman, and that to care for all men is according to man's ^ 
 nature ; and a man should hold on to the opinion not of all, J 
 
 but of those only who confessedly live according to natui'o. 
 
88 M. Antoninus. IIL 
 
 But as to those who live not so, he always bears in mind 
 what kind of men they are both at home and from home, both 
 by night and by day, and what they are, and with what men 
 they live an imjDure life. Accordingly, he does not value at 
 all the praise which comes from such men, since they are not 
 even satisfied with themselves. 
 
 5. Labour not unwilKngly, nor without regard to the com- 
 mon interest, nor without due consideration, nor with dis- 
 traction ; nor let studied ornament set off thy thoughts, 
 and be not either a man of many words, or busy about too 
 many things. And further, let the deity which is in thee be 
 the guardian of a living being, manly and of ripe age, and 
 engaged in matter political, and a Roman, and a ruler, who 
 has taken his post like a man waiting for the signal which 
 summons him from life, and ready to go, having need 
 neither of oath nor of any man's testimony. Be cheerful 
 also, and seek not external help nor the tranquillity which 
 others give. A man then must stand erect, not be kept erect 
 by others. 
 
 6. If thou findest in human life anything better than justice, 
 truth, temperance, fortitude, and, in a word, anything better 
 than thy own mind's self-satisfaction in the things which it 
 enables thee to do according to right reason, and in the con- 
 dition that is assigned to thee without thy own choice ; if, I 
 say, thou seest anything better than this, turn to it with all 
 thy soul, and enjoy that which thou hast found to be the best. 
 
 /But if nothing appears to be better than the deity which is 
 planted in thee, which has subjected to itself all thy appetites, 
 and carefully examines all the impressions, and, as Socrates 
 said, has detached itself from the persuasions of sense, and 
 
 V^ has submitted itself to the gods, and cares for mankind ; if 
 thou findest everything else smaller and of less value than 
 this, give place to nothing else, for if thou dost once diverge 
 and incline to it, thou wilt no longer without distraction be 
 able to give the j^reference to that good thing which is thy 
 proper possession and thy own; for it is notl-ight that any- 
 thing of any other kind, such as praise from the many, or 
 
M. Antoninus. III. 89 
 
 power, or enjoyment of pleasure, should come into competition 
 with that which is rationally and politically [or, practically] 
 good. All these things, even though they may seem to adapt ~ 
 themselves [to the better things] in a small degree, obtain 
 tliu superiority all at once, and carry us away. But do thou, 
 I say, simply and freely choose the better^ and hold to it. — ^ 
 But that which iilnsp,fu1_is_ the bett9r. — Well then, if it is \ 
 useful to theeois a rational being, keep to it ; but if it is only 
 useful to thee as an animal, say so, and maintain thy judgment 
 witliout arrogance : only take care that thou makest the in- 
 quiry by a sure method. ^ 
 
 7. Never value anything as profitable to thyself which 
 shall compel thee to break thy promise, to lose thy self- 
 respect, to hate any m.an, to suspect, to curse, to act the 
 hypocrite, to .desire anything which needs walls and cm-tains : 
 for he who has preferred to everything else his own intelli- 
 gence and daemon and the worship of its excellence, acts no 
 ti-agic part, does not groan, will not need either solitude or 
 much company ; and, what is chief of all, he will live with- 
 out either pm-suing or flying from [death] ;^ but whether for 
 a longer or a shorter time he shall have the soul inclosed in 
 the body, he cares not at all : for even if he must depart 
 immediately, he will go as readily as if he were going to do 
 anything else which can be done with decency and order; 
 taking care of this only all through life, that his thoughts 
 turn not away from anything vrhich belongs to an intelligent / 
 animal and a member of a civil community. y' 
 
 8. In the mind of one who is chastened and purified thou 
 wilt find no corrupt matter, nor impurity, nor any sore skinned 
 over. Nor is his Kfe incomplete when fate overtakes him, as 
 one may say of an actor who leaves the stage before ending /T'^ 
 and finishing the play. Besides, there is in him nothing 
 servile, nor aftected, nor too closely bound [to other things], 
 nor yet detached'^ [from other things], nothing worthy of 
 blame, nothing which seeks a hiding-place. 
 
 9. Pieverence the faculty which produces opinion. On 
 
 Comp. IX. 3. 2 yiij_ 34^ 
 
 =1 
 
90 M. Antoninus. III. 
 
 this faculty it entirely deiDends whether there shall exist in 
 thy ruling part any opinion inconsistent with nature and the 
 constitution of the rational animal. And this faculty promises 
 freedom from hasty judgment, and friendship towards men, 
 and obedience to the gods. 
 
 10. Throwing away then all things, hold to these only 
 which are few ; and besides bear in mind that every man lives 
 only this present time, which is an indivisible point, and that 
 all the rest of his life is either past or it is uncertain. Short 
 then is the time which every man lives, and small the nook of 
 the earth where he lives ; and short too the longest posthumous 
 fame, and even this only continued by a succession of poor 
 human beings, who will very soon die, and who know not 
 even themselves, much less him who died long ago. 
 
 11. To the aids which have been mentioned let this one 
 still be added : — Make for thyself a definition or description 
 of the thing which is presented to thee, so as to see distinctly 
 what kind of a thing it is in its substance, in its nudity, in its 
 complete entirety, and tell thyself its proper name, and the 
 names of the things of which it has been compounded, and 
 into which it will be resolved. For nothing is so productive 
 of elevation of mind as to be able to examine methodically and 
 truly every object which is j)resented to tliee in life, and 
 always to look at things so as to see at the same time what 
 kind of universe this is, and what kind of use everything 
 performs in it, and what value everything has with reference 
 to the whole, and what with reference to man, who is a citizen 
 of the highest city, of which all other cities are like families ; 
 v/hat each thing is, and of what it is composed, and how long 
 it is the nature of this thing to endure which now makes an 
 impression on me, and what virtue I have need of with respect 
 to it, such as gentleness, manliness, truth, fidelity, simplicity, 
 contentment, and the rest. Wherefore, on every occasion a 
 man should say : this comes from god ; and this is according 
 to the apportionment! and spinning of the thread of destiny, 
 and such-like coincidence and chance ; and this is from one 
 of the same stock, and a kinsman and partner, one who knows 
 
M. Antoninus. III. [)1 
 
 not however what is according to his nature. But I know ; 
 for this reason I behave towards him according to the natural 
 hiw of fellowship with benevolence and justice. At tlie same 
 time however in things indifferent^ I attempt to ascertain the 
 value of each. 
 
 12. Jf thou workest at that which is before thee, following 
 righjL-Xfiason seriously, vigorously, calmly, without allowing 
 "anything else to distract thee, but keeping thy divine part 
 
 pure, as if thou shouldst be bound to give it back im- 
 mediately ; if thou boldest to this, expecting nothing, fearing 
 nothing, but satisfied with thy present activity according to 
 trature, and with heroic truth in every word and sound which 
 thou utterestj thou wilt live happy. And there is no man 
 wlro is able to prevent this. 
 
 13. As physicians have always their instruments and knives 
 ready for cases which suddenly requii'e their skill, so do thou 
 have principles ready for the understanding of things divine 
 and human, and for doing everything, even the smallest, with 
 a recollection of the bond which unites the divine and human 
 to one another. For neither wilt thou do anything well 
 which pertains to man without at the same time having a 
 reference to things divine ; nor the contrary. 
 
 14. No longer wander at hazard; for neither wilt thou 
 read thy own memoirs,* nor the acts of the ancient Romans 
 and Hellenes, and the selections from books which thou wast 
 reserving for thy old age,^ Hasten then to the end which 
 thou hast before thee, and, throwing away idle hopes, come 
 to thy own aid, if thou carest at all for thyself, while it is in 
 thy power. 
 
 15. They know not how many things are signified by the 
 words stealing, so^^ing, buying, keeping quiet, seeing what 
 
 3 " Est et horum quae media appellamus grande discrimen." — Seneca, 
 Ep. 82. 
 
 * vTTQixv^^^ara ; or memoranda, notes and the like. See i. 17. 
 
 ^ Compare Fronto, n. 9 ; a letter of Marcus to Fronto, who was then 
 consul : " Feci tamen mihi per hos dies excerpta ex libris sexaginta m 
 quinque tomis." But he says some of them were small books. 
 
92 M. Antoninus. III. 
 
 ougM to be done ; for this is not effected by tlie eyes, but by 
 another kind of vision. 
 
 16. Body, soul, intelligence : to the body belong sensations, 
 to the soul appetites, to the intelligence principles. To 
 receive the impressions of forms by means of appearances 
 belongs even to animals ; to be pulled by the strings^ of 
 desire belongs both to wild beasts and to men who have made 
 themselves into women, and to a Phalai'is and a Nero : and to 
 have the intelligence that guides to the things which appear 
 suitable belongs also to those who do not believe in the gods, 
 and who botray their country, and do their impure deeds 
 when they have shut the doors. If then everything else is 
 common to all that I have mentioned, there remains that 
 which is peculiar to the good man, to be pleased and content 
 with what happens, and with the thread which is spun for 
 him ; and not to defile the divinity which is planted in his 
 breast, nor disturb it by a crow^l of images, but to preserve it 
 tranquil, following it obediently as a god, neither saying any- 
 thing contrary to the truth, nor doing anything contrary to 
 justice. And if all men refuse to believe that he lives a 
 simple, modest, and contented life, he is neither angry with 
 any of them, nor does he deviate from the way which leads 
 to the end of life, to which a man ought to come pure, 
 tranquil, ready to depart, and without any compulsion perfectly 
 reconciled to his lot. 
 
 6 Compare Plato. De Lcgibus, i. p. 644, or. ravra zb. viBv, etc. : ',\Jiii 
 Autoniims, ii. 2; vn, 3; xu, 19. 
 
 ^ 
 
 I 
 
ill. Antoniims. IV. 93 
 
 IV. 
 
 THAT which rules within, when it is accoriliiig to nature, 
 is so affected with respect to the events which hapj)en, 
 that it always easily adapts itself to that which is possible and 
 is presented to it. For it requires no definite inaterial, but it 
 moves towards its purpose,^ under certain conditions however ; 
 and it makes a material for itself out of that which opposes 
 it, as fire lays hold of what falls into it, by which a small 
 light would have been extinguished : but when the fii-e is 
 strong, it soon appropriates to itself the matter which is heaped 
 on it, and consumes it, and rises higher by means of this 
 very material. 
 
 2. Let no act be done without a purpose, nor otherwise 
 than according to the perfect principles of art. 
 
 3. Men seek retreats for themselves, houses in the country, 
 sea-shores, and mountains ; and thou too art w^ont to desire 
 such things very much. But this is altogether a mark of the 
 most common sort of men, for it is in thy power whenever 
 thou shalt choose to retire into thyself. For nowhere either 
 with more quiet or more freedom from trouble does a man 
 retii'e than into his own soul, particularly w^hen he has 
 within him such thoughts that by looking into them be is 
 immediately in perfect tranquillity ; and I afSrm that tran- 
 quillity is nothing else than the good ordering of the mind. 
 Constantly then give to thyself this retreat, and renew 
 thyself; and let thy principles be brief and fundamental, 
 which, an soon as thou shalt recur to them, will be sufficient 
 to cleanse the soul completely, and to send thee back free from 
 all discontent with the things to which thou returnest. For 
 
 't( 
 translation is doubtful. Seti Gataker's note. 
 
94 ^ M. Antoninm. IT. .^ 
 
 witli what art tliou discontented ? Witli tlie badness of men ? 
 Eecall to tliy mind tliis conclusion, that rational animals 
 exist for one another, and that to endure is a part of justice, 
 and that men do wrong involuntarily ; and consider how 
 many already, after mutual enmity, susjDicion, hatred, and 
 fighting, have been stretched dead, reduced to ashes ; and be 
 quiet at last. — But perhaps thou art dissatisfied with that 
 which is assigned to thee out of the universe. — Recall to thy 
 recollection this alternative ; either there is providence or 
 atoms [fortuitous concurrence of things] ; or remember the 
 arguments by which it has been proved that the world is a 
 kind of political community [and be quiet at last]. — But 
 perhaps corporeal things will still fasten upon thee. — Con- 
 sider then further that the mind mingles not with the breath, 
 whether moving gently or violently, when it has once drawn 
 itself apart and discovered its own power, and think also of 
 all that thou hast heard and assented to about pain and 
 pleasure [and be quiet at last]. — But perhaps the desire of 
 the thing called fame will torment thee — See how soon 
 
 I everything is forgotten, and look at the chaos of infinite time 
 
 on each side of [the present], and tho emptiness of applause, 
 and the changeablenesa and want of judgment in those who 
 pretend to give praise, and the narrowness of the space v/ithin 
 which it is circumscribed [and be quiet at last]. For the 
 whole earth is a point, and how small a nook in it is this thy 
 dwelling, and how few arc there in it, and what kind of 
 people are they who will praise thee. ^ 
 
 This then remains : Eumember to retire into this little 
 territory of thy own,^ and above all do not distract or strain 
 thyself, but be free, and look at things as a man, as a human 
 being, as a citizen, as a mortal. But among the things 
 readiest to thy hand to wdiicli thou slialt turn, let there be 
 these, which are two. One is that things do not touch the 
 soul, for they are external and remain immovable ; but our 
 
 S^r pei:tii£batiaDS come only from the opinion which is w'ithin. 
 The other is that all these things, which thou seest, change 
 2 Tecum habita, noris qiwm sit tibi curta supellex. — Persiue, iv. 52. 
 
M. Antoninus. IV. 95 
 
 immediately and will no longer be ; and constantly bear in 
 mind how many of these changes thou hast already witnessed. 
 The universe is^trausformation : life is opinion. 
 
 4. If our intellectual part is common, the reason also, in 
 respect of which we are rational beings, is common : if this 
 is so, common also is the reason which commands us what to 
 do, and what not to do ; if this is so, there is a common law 
 also ; if this is so, we are fellow-citizens ; if this is so, we 
 are members of some political community ; if this is so, the 
 world is in a manner a state.^ For of what other common 
 political community will any one say that the whole human 
 race are members ? And from thence, from this common 
 political community comes also our very intellectual faculty 
 and reasoning faculty and our capacity for law ; j or whence 
 do they come ? For as my earthly part is a portion given to 
 me from certain earth, and that which is watery from another 
 element, and that which is hot and fiery from some peculiar 
 source (for nothing comes out of that which is nothing, as 
 nothing also returns to non-existence), so also the intellectu'^J 
 part comes from some source. 
 
 5. Death is such as generation is, a mystery of nature ; \ 
 composition out of the same elements, and a decomposition 
 into the same ; and altogether not a thing of which any man 
 should be ashamed, for it is not contrary to [the nature of] 
 a reasonable animal, and not contrary to the reason of our 
 constitution. 
 
 6. It is natural that these things should be done by such 
 persons, it is a matter of necessity ; and if a man w^ill not 
 have it so, he will not allow the fig-tree to have juice. But 
 by all means bear this in mind, that within a very short 
 time both thou and he will be dead ; and soon not even your 
 names will be left behind. 
 
 7. Take away thy opinion, and then there is taken away 
 tlie complaint, " I have been harmed." Take away the 
 complaint, " I have been harmed," and the harm is taken 
 away. 
 
 ^ Compare Cicero De Legibus, i. 7. 
 
96 ^ M. Antoyiinus, IV. 
 
 8. That whicli does not make a man worse than ne was, 
 also does not make his life worse, nor does it haim him either 
 from without or from within. 
 
 9. The nature of that which is [universally] useful has 
 been compelled to do this. 
 
 10. Consider that everything which happens, haj^pens 
 justly, and if thou observest carefully, thou wilt find it to be 
 so. I do not say only with respect to the continuity of the 
 series of things, but with respect to what is just, and as if it 
 were done by one who assigns to each thing its value. 
 Observe then as thou hast begun ; and whatever- thou doest, 
 do it in conjunction with this, the being good, and in the 
 sense in which a man is properly understood to be good. 
 Keep to this in every action. 
 
 11. Do not have such an opinion of things as he has who 
 does thee wrong, or such as he wishes thee to have, but look 
 at them as they are in truth. 
 
 12. A man should always have these two rules in readi- 
 ness ; the one, to do only whatever the reason of the ruling 
 and legislating faculty may suggest for the use of men ; the 
 other, to change thy opinion, if there is any one at hand who 
 sets thee right and moves thee from any opinion. But this 
 change of opinion must proceed only from a certain per- 
 suasion, as of what is just or of common advantage, and the 
 like, not because it appears pleasant or brings reputation. 
 
 13. Hast thou reason ? I have. — Why then dost not thou 
 use it ? For if this does its own work, what else do£.t thou 
 wish ? 
 
 14. Thou hast existed as a part. Thou shalt disappear in 
 that which produced thee ; but rather thou shalt be received 
 back into its seminal princii^le by transmutation. 
 
 15. Many grains of frankincense on the same altar : one 
 falls before, another falls after ; but it makes no difference. 
 
 16. Within ten days thou wilt seem a god to those to 
 whom Ihou art now a beast and an ajje, if thou wilt return 
 to thy principles and the worship of reason. 
 
 17. ])o not act as if thou wert going to live ten thousand 
 
M. Antoninus. IV. 97 
 
 years. Deaili bangs over tlice. While tliou livest, while it 
 is in thy power, bo good. 
 
 18. How mueb trouble he avoids who does not look to sec 
 what his neighbour says or does or thinks, but only to wliat 
 he does himself, that it may be just and pure ; or as Agathon | 
 says, look not round at the depraved morals of others, but 
 run straight along the line without deviating from it. 
 
 19. He who has a vehement desire for posthumous fi^me 
 does not consider that every one of those who remember him 
 will himself also die very soon ; then again also they who 
 have succeeded them, until the whole remembrance shall have 
 been extinguished as it is transmitted through men who 
 foolishly admire and perish. But suj)pose that those who 
 will remember are even immortal, and that the remembrance 
 will be immortal, what then is this to thee ? And I say not 
 what is it to the dead, but what is it to t\e living. What is 
 praise, exceptf indeed so far as it hasf a certain utility? 
 For thou now rejectest unseasonably the gift of nature, 
 clinging to something else * * * -j-. 
 
 20. Everything which is in any way beautiful is beautiful 
 in itself, and terminates in itself, not having praise as part of 
 itself. Neither worse then nor better is a thing made by 
 being praised. I affirm this also of the things which are 
 called beautiful by the vulgar, for example, material things 
 and works of art. That which is really beautiful has no 
 need of anything ; not more than law, not more than truth, 
 not more than benevolence or modesty. Which of these 
 things is beautiful because it is praised, or spoiled by being 
 blamed ? Is such a thing as an emerald made worse than it 
 was, if it is not praised ? or gold, ivory, purple, a lyre, a little 
 knife, a flower, a shrub ? 
 
 21. If souls continue to exist, how does the air contain 
 them from eternity ? — But how does the earth contain the 
 bodies of those who have been buried from time so remote '? 
 For as here the mutation of these bodies after a certain con- 
 tinuance, whatever it may be, and their dissolution make 
 room for other dead bodies ; so the souls which are removed 
 
 II 
 
-U4^ 
 
 98 If. Antoninus. IV. 
 
 into the air after subsisting for some time are transmuted 
 and diffused, and assume a fiery nature by being received 
 into the seminal intelligence of the universe, and in this way 
 make room for the fresh souls which come to dwell there. 
 And this is the answer which a man might give on the 
 hypothesis of souls continuing to exist. But we must not 
 only think of the number of bodies which are thus buried, 
 but also of the number of animals which are daily eaten by 
 us and the other animals. For what a number is consumed, 
 and thus in a manner buried in the bodies of those who feed 
 on them? And nevertheless this earth receives them by 
 reason of the changes [of these bodies] into blood, and the 
 transformations into the aerial or the fiery element. 
 
 What is the investigation into the truth in this matter ? 
 The division into that which is material and that which is 
 the cause of form [the formal], (vii. 29.) 
 
 22. Do not be whirled about, but in every movement have 
 respect to justice, and on the occasion of every impression 
 maintain the faculty of comprehension [or understanding]. 
 
 23. Everything harmonizes with me, which is harmonious 
 to thee, Universe. Nothing for me is too early nor too 
 late, which is in due time for thee. Everything is fruit to 
 me which thy seasons bring, Nature : from thee are all 
 things, in thee are all things, to thee all things return. The 
 poet says, Dear city of Cecrops ; and wilt not thou say, Dear 
 city of Zeus ? 
 
 24. Occupy thyself with few things, says the philosopher, 
 if thou would st be tranquil. — But consider if it would not be 
 better to say, Do what is necessary, and whatever the reason 
 of the animal which is naturally s;)cial requires, and as it 
 requires. For this brings not only the tranquillity which 
 comes from doing well, but also that which comes from doing 
 few things. For the greatest part of what we say and do 
 being unnecessary, if a man takes this away, he will have 
 more leisure and less uneasiness. Accordingly on every 
 eccasion a man should ask hi?uself, Is this one of the un- 
 necessary things ? Now a man should take away not only 
 
M. Antoninus. IV. 91) 
 
 unnecessary acts, but also unnecessary tlioughts, for tlius 
 superfluous acts will not follow after. 
 
 25. Try Low the life of the good man suits thee, the life of 
 him who is satisfied with his portion out of the whole, and 
 satisfied with his own just acts and benevolent disposition. 
 
 26. Hast thou seen those things ? Look also at these. 
 Do not disturb thyself. Make thyself all simplicity. Does 
 any one do wrong ? It is to himself that he does the wrong. 
 Has anything happened to thee ? Well ; out of the universe 
 from the beginning everything which happens has been ap- 
 portioned and spun out to thee. In a word, thy life is short. 
 Thou must turn to profit the present by the aid of reason 
 and justice. Be sober in thy relaxation. 
 
 27. Either it is a well arranged universe^ or a chaos 
 huddled together, but still a universe. But can a certain 
 order subsist in thee, and disorder in the All ? And this too 
 when all things are so separated and diifused and sym- 
 pathetic. 
 
 28. A black character, a wcimcmioh character, a stubborn 
 character, bestial, childish, animal, stupid, counterfeit, scur- 
 rilous, fraudulent, tyrannical. 
 
 29. If he is a stranger to the universe who does not know 
 what is in it, no less is he a stranger who does not know what 
 is going on in it. He is a runaway, who flies from social 
 reason ; he is blind, who shuts the eyes of the understanding ; 
 he is poor, who has need of another, and has not from himself 
 all things which are useful for life. He is an abscess on the 
 universe w^ho withdraws and separates himself from the 
 reason of our common nature through being disj)leased with 
 the things which hapj)en, for the same nature produces this, 
 and has produced thee too : he is a piece rent asunder from 
 the state, who tears his own soul from that of reasonable 
 animals, which is one. 
 
 30. Tlie one is a philosopher without a tunic, and the 
 other without a book : here is another half naked : Bread 7 
 
 * Antoninus here uses the word Koa/xos both in the sense of the 
 Universe and of Ordi r ; and it is difficult to express his meaning. 
 
 V 
 
100 M. Antoninus. IV. 
 
 have not, he says, and I abide by reason — And I do not get 
 the means of living out of my learning,! and I abide [by my 
 reason]. 
 
 31. Love the art, poor as it may be, which thou hast 
 learned, and be content with it ; and pass through the rest 
 of life like one who has intrusted to the gods with his whole 
 soul all that he has, making thyself neither the tyrant nor 
 the slave of any man. 
 
 32. Consider, for example, the times of Vespasian. Thou 
 wilt see all these things, people marrying, bringing up child- 
 ren, sick, dying, warring, feasting, trafficking, cultivating the 
 ground, flattering, obstinately arrogant, sii.pecting, plotting, 
 wishing for some to die, grumbling about the present, loving, 
 heaping up treasure, desiring consulship, kingly power. Well 
 then, that life of these people no longer exists at all. Again, 
 remove to the times of Trajan. Again, all is the same. 
 Their life too is gone. In like manner view also the other 
 epochs of time and of whole nations, and see how many after 
 gi-eat efforts soon fell and were resolved into the elements. 
 But chiefly thou shouldst think of those whom thou hast 
 thyself known distracting themselves about idle things, 
 neglecting to do what was in accordance with theii* proper con- 
 stitution, and to hold firmly to this and to be content with it. 
 And herein it is necessary to remember that the attention 
 given to everything has its proper vplue and proportion. For 
 thus thou wilt not be dissatisfied, if thou appliest thyself to 
 smaller matters no further than is fit. 
 
 33. The words which were formerly familiar are now 
 antiquated : so also the names of those who were famed of 
 old, are now in a manner antiquated, Camillus, Caeso, Yolcsus, 
 Leonnatus, and a little after also Scipio and Cato. then Au- 
 gustus, then also Hadrianus and Antoninus. For all things 
 soon pass away and become a mere tale, and complete 
 oblivion soon buries them. And I say this of those who 
 have shone in a wondrous way. For the rest, as soon as 
 they have breathed out their breath, they are gone, and no 
 man speaks of them. And, to conclude the matter, what is 
 
M. Antoninub IV. ]r>l 
 
 even an eternal rcracmbvance ? A mere nothing. What 
 then is tliat about which we ought to employ our serious 
 pains ? This one thing, thoughts just, and acts social, and 
 words which never lie, and a disposition which gladly accepts 
 all that happens, as necessary, as usual, as flowing from a 
 principle and source of the same kind. 
 
 34. AVillingly give thyself up to Clotho [one of the fates], 
 allowing her to spin thy thread | into whatever things she 
 pleases. 
 
 35. Everything is only for a day, both that which remem- 
 bers and that which is remembered. 
 
 36. Observe constantly that all things take place by change, 
 and accustom thyself to consider that the nature of the 
 Universe loves nothing so much as to change the things 
 which are and to make new things like them. For every- 
 thing that exists is in a manner the seed of that which will 
 be. But thou art thinking only of seeds which are cast 
 into the earth or into a womb : but this is a very vulgar 
 notion. 
 
 37. Thou wilt soon die, and thou art not yet simple, nor 
 free from perturbations, nor without suspicion of being hurt 
 by external things, nor kindly disposed towards all ; nor dost 
 thou yet place wisdom only in acting justly. 
 
 38. Examine men's ruling principles, even those of the 
 wise, what kind of things they avoid, and what kind they 
 pursue. 
 
 39. What is evil to thee does not subsist in the ruling 
 principle of another ; nor yet in any turning and mutation 
 of thy corporeal covering. Where is it then ? It is in that 
 part of thee in which subsists the pow-er of forming opinions 
 about evils. Let this power then not form [such] opinions, 
 and all is well. And if that which is nearest to it, the poor 
 body, is cut, burnt, filled with matter and rottenness, never- 
 theless let the part which forms opinions about these things 
 be quiet, that is, let it judge that nothing is either bad or 
 good which can happen equally to the bad man and the good. 
 For that which happens equally to him who lives contrary 
 
l'(J2 -M. Antoninus. IV. 
 
 to nature and to liim who lives according to nature, is neither 
 according to nature nor contrary to nature. 
 
 40. Constantly regard the universe as one living being, 
 having one substance and one soul; and observe how all 
 things have reference to one perception, the perception of 
 this one living being ; and how all things act with one move- 
 ment ; and how all things are the co-operating causes of all 
 things which exist ; observe too the continuous spinning of 
 the thread and the contexture of the web. 
 
 41. Thou art a little soul bearing about a corpse, as Epic- 
 tetus used to say (i. c. 19). 
 
 42. It is no evil for things to undergo change, and no good 
 for things to subsist in consequence of change. 
 
 43. Time is like a river made up of the events which 
 happen, and a violent stream; for as soon as a thing has 
 been seen, it is carried away, and another comes in its place, 
 and this will be carried away too. 
 
 44. Everything which happens is as familiar and well 
 known as the rose in spring and the fruit in summer ; for 
 such is disease, and death, and calumny, and treachery, and 
 whatever else delights fools or vexes them. 
 
 45. In the series of things those which follow are always 
 aptly fitted to those which have gone before ; for this series 
 is not like a mere enumeration of disjointed things, which 
 has only a necessary sequence, but it is a rational connection : 
 and as all existing things are arranged together harmoniously, 
 so the things which come into existence exhibit no mere suc- 
 cession, but a certain wonderful relationship, (vi. 38 ; vii. 9 ; 
 VII. 75, note.) 
 
 46. xilways remember the saying of Heraclitus, tliat the 
 death of earth is to become water, and the death of water is 
 to become air, and the death of air is to become fire, and 
 reversely. And think too of him who forgets whither the 
 way leads, and that men qua-rrel with that with which they 
 are most constantly in communion, the reason which governa 
 the universe ; and the things which they daily meet with 
 seern to them strange : and consider that we ought r.ot to act 
 
M. Antoninus. I]'. lO.*! 
 
 aod speak as if wc were asleep, for even in sleep wo seem tn 
 act and speak ; and thatj we ouglit not, like children who 
 learn from their i)arents, simply to act and speak as we have 
 been taught. | 
 
 47. If any god told thee that thou slialt die to-morrow, or 
 certainly on the day after to-morrow, thou wouldst not care 
 much whether it was on the third day or on the morrow, 
 unless thou wast in the highest degree mean-spirited, — for 
 how small is the difference ? — so think it no great thing to 
 die after as many years as thou canst name rather than to- 
 morrow. 
 
 48. Think continually how many physicians are dead after 
 often contracting their eyebrows over the sick ; and how 
 many astrologers after predicting with great pretensions the 
 deaths of others ; and how many philosophers after endless 
 discourses on death or immortality ; how many heroes after 
 killing thousands ; and how many tyrants who have used 
 theii- power over men's lives with terrible insolence as if they 
 were immortal ; and how many cities are entirely dead, so to 
 speak, Helice' and Pompeii and Herclanum, and others 
 innumerable. Add to the reckoning all whom thou hast 
 known, one after another. One man after burying another 
 has been laid out dead, and another buries him ; and all this 
 in a short time. To conclude, always observe how ephemeral 
 and worthless human things are, and what was yesterday a 
 little mucus, to-morrow will be a mummy or ashes. Pass 
 then through this little space of time conformably to nature, 
 and end thy journey in content, just as an olive falls off when 
 it is ripe, blessing nature who produced it, and thanking th<- 
 tree on which it grew. 
 
 49. Be like the promontory against which the waves con- 
 tinually break, but it stands firm and tames the fury of the 
 water around it. 
 
 Unhappy am I, because this has happened to me — Not so, 
 
 » Ovid, Met. xv. 293 : 
 
 Si qiiaeras Hehcen et Burin Aohaidas lubes, 
 luvenies sub aquis. 
 
]04 M. Antoninus, IV. 
 
 but Hapj)y am I, thougli this has happened to me, because I 
 continue free from pain, neither crushed by the present nor 
 fearing the future. For such a thing as this might have 
 happened to every man ; but every man would not have con- 
 tinued free from pain on such an occasion. Why then is 
 that rather a misfortune than this a good fortune ? And dost 
 thou in all cases call that a man's misfortune, which is not a 
 deviation from man's nature? And does a thing seem to 
 thee to be a deviation from man's nature, when it is not 
 contrary to the will of man's nature ? Well, thou knowest 
 the will of nature. Will then this which has happened 
 prevent thee from being just, magnanimous, temperate, pru- 
 dent, secure against inconsiderate opinions and falsehood; 
 will it prevent thee from having modesty, freedom, and every- 
 thing else, by the presence of which man's nature obtains all 
 that is its own ? Eemember too on every occasion which 
 leads thee to vexation to apply this principle : not that this 
 is a misfortune, but that to bear it nobly is good fortune. 
 
 50. It is a vulgar, but still a useful helj) towards contempt 
 of death, to pass in review those who have tenaciously stuck 
 to life. What more then have they gained than those who 
 have died early ? Certainly they lie in their tombs some- 
 where at last, Cadicianus, Fabius, Julianus, Lepidus, or any 
 one else like them, who have carried out many to be buried, 
 and then were carried out themselves. Altogether the in- 
 terval is small [between birth and death] ; and consider with 
 how much trouble, and in company with what sort of people 
 and in what a feeble body this interval is laboriously passed. 
 Do not then consider life a thing of any value. f For look 
 to the immensity of time behind thee, and to the time which 
 is before thee, another boundless sjDace. In this infinity then 
 what is the difference between him who lives three days and 
 him who lives three generations?^ 
 
 * Au allusion to Homer's Nestor who was living at the war of Troy 
 among the third generation, like old Parr with his hundred and fifty- 
 two years, and some others in modern times who have beaten Pair by 
 twenty or thirty years, if it is true; and yet they died at last. Tha 
 
M. Antoninus. IV. 105 
 
 51. Always run to the short way ; and the short way is 
 the natural : accordingly say and do everything in conformity 
 with the soundest reason. For such a purpose frees a man 
 from trouble,! and warfare, and all artifice and ostentatious 
 display. 
 
 word is Tpiyep-qviov in Antoninus. Nestor is named rpiy^puv by some 
 writers ; but here perhaps there is an allusion to Homer's Tep-ijvio^ iviroTo 
 
106 M. Antoninus. V. 
 
 I 
 
 V. 
 
 N the morning wlien thou risest unwillingly, let this 
 
 thought be present — I am risi ng to Jh e work of a human 
 
 X beings Whj_ then am I dissatisfied if I am going to do the 
 
 things for which I exist and for which I was brought into the 
 
 world? Or have I been made for this, to lie in the bed- 
 
 ' olothes and keep myself warm ? — But this is more pleasant — 
 Dost thou exist then to take thy pleasure, and not at all for 
 action or exertion ? Dost thou not see the little plants, the 
 little birds, the ants, the spiders, the bees working together 
 to put in order their several parts of the universe ? And art 
 thou unwilling to do the work of a human being, and dost 
 thou not make haste to do that which is according to thy 
 nature ? — But it is necessary to take rest also — It is neces- 
 sary : however na turejias fixed bounds_ta_thia,jLOO : she has 
 fixed bounds both to eating and drinking, and yet thou goest 
 beyond these~boimds71>oyoncl^ wha t is suffi cient ; yet in thy 
 acts it is not so, but thou stoppest short of what thou canst 
 do. ^Sothou lovest not thysejf, for if thou didst, thou 
 wouldst love thy nature and her will. But those whoTove 
 their several arts exhaust themselves in working at them 
 im washed and without food ; but thou vainest thy own nature 
 less than the turner values the turning art, or the dancer the 
 dancing art, or the lover of money values his money, or the 
 vainglorious man his little glory. And s uch men, w hen 
 they have a violent affection to a thing;, choose n either to 
 "eKt noFto sleep rather than to perfect the things which they 
 care for. But are the acts which concern society more vile in 
 thy' eyes and less worthy of thy labour H, 
 
 /^ 2. How easy it is to repel and to wipe away every impres- 
 
 ( sion which is troublesome or unsuitable, and immediately to 
 
 V bo in all tranquillity. 
 
M. Antoninus. V. 107 
 
 3. Judge every word aud deed which are according to 
 nature to^be fit for tliec ; and be not diverted hy the blamo 
 which follows from any people nor by their words, but if a 
 thing is good to be done or said, do not consider it imworthy 
 of thee. For those persons have their peculiar leading 
 principle and foEow their peculiar movement ; which things 
 do not thou regard, but go straight on, following thy own 
 nature and the common nature ; and the way of both is one. 
 
 4. I go through the things which happen according tc 
 natui-e until I shall full and rest, breathing out my breath 
 into that element out of which I daily draw it in, and falling 
 upon that earth out of which my father collected the seed, 
 and my mother the blood, and my nurse the milk ; out of 
 which dui-ing so many years I have been supplied Ti'ith food 
 and drink ; which bears me when I tread on it and abuse it 
 for so many pui'poses. 
 
 5. Thou sayest, Men cannot admire the sharpness of thy 
 wits — Be it so : but there are many other thin-gs of which 
 thou canst not say, I am not formed for them by nature. 
 Show those qualities then which are altogether in thy power, 
 sincerity, gravity, endurance of labour, aversion to pleasure, 
 contentment with thy portion and with few things, benevo- 
 lence, frankness, no love of superfluity, freedom from trifling, 
 magnanimity. Dost thou not see how many qualities thou 
 art immediately able to exhibit, in which there is no excuse of 
 natui'al incapacity aud unfitness, and yet thou still remainest 
 voluntarily below the mark ? or art thou compelled through 
 being defectively furnished by nature to miu'mur, and to be 
 stingy, and to flatter, and to find fault with thy poor body, and 
 to try to please men, and to make great display, and to be so 
 restless in thy mind ? No by the gods : but thou mightest 
 have been delivered from these things long ago. Only if in 
 truth thou canst be charged with being rather slow and dull 
 of comprehension, thou must exert thyself about this also, not 
 neglecting it nor yet taking pleasure in thy dulness. 
 
 6. One man, when he has done a service to another, i& 
 ready to set it down to his account as a favour conferred. 
 
108 M. Antoninus. V. 
 
 Another is not ready to do this, but still in his own mind he 
 thinks of the man as his debtor, and he knows what he has 
 done. A third in a manner does not even know what he has 
 done, but he is like a vine which has produced grapes, and 
 seeks for nothing more after it has once produced its proper 
 fruit. As a horse when he has run, a dog when he has 
 tracked the game, a bee when it has made the honey, so a man 
 when he has done a good act, does not call out for others to 
 
 '^ come and see, but he goes on to another act, as a vine goes on 
 to produce again the grapes in season — Must a man then be 
 one of these, who in a manner act thus without observing it ? 
 — Yes — But this very thing is necessary, the observation of 
 what a man is doing : for, it may be said, it is characteristic 
 
 yf of the social animal to perceive that he is working in a social 
 manner, and indeed to wish that his social partner also should 
 perceive it — It is true what thou sayest, but thou dost not 
 rightly understand what is now said : and for this reason thou 
 wilt become one of those of whom I spoke before, for even 
 they are misled by a certain show of reason. But if thou 
 wilt choose to understand the meaning of what is said, do not 
 fear that for this reason thou wilt omit any social act. 
 
 7. A prayer of the Athenians: Rain, rain, O dear Zeus, 
 down on the ploughed fields of the Athenians and on the 
 plains. — In truth we ought not to pray at all, or we ought to 
 pray in this simple and noble fashion. 
 
 8. Just as we must understand when it is said, That 
 Aesculapius jDrescribed to this man horse-exercise, or bathing 
 in cold water or going without shoes ; so we must understand 
 it when it is said. That the nature of the universe prescribed 
 to this man disease or mutilation or loss or anything else of 
 the kind. For in the first case Prescribed means something 
 like this : he prescribed this for this man as a thing adapted 
 to procure health; and in the second case it means. That 
 which happens' to [or, suits] every man is fixed in a manner 
 for him suitably to his destiny. For this is what we mean 
 
 ' In tbis section there is a play on the meaning of avfifiaiveiv. 
 
M. Antoninus. V. 103 
 
 when we say that tilings aro suitable to us, as the workmen 
 say of squared stones in walls or the pyramids, that they are 
 suitable, when they fit them to one another in some kind of 
 connection. For there is altogether one fitness [harmony]. 
 And as the universe is made up out of aUHBodies to be such a 
 body as it is, so out of all existing causes necessity I'^destiny] 
 is made up to be such a cause as it is. And even those who 
 are completely ignorant understand what I mean, for-4lioy 
 say, It [necess ity, destiny] brought this to such a person . — 
 This tEen'was brought and this was prescribed to him. Let 
 us then receive these things, as well as those which Aescu- 
 lapius prescribes. Many as a matter of course even among 
 his prescriptions are disagreeable, but we accept them in the 
 hope of health. Let the perfecting and accomplishment of 
 the things, which the common nature judges to be good, be 
 judged by thee to be of the same kind as thy health. And so 
 accept everything which happens, even if it seem disagree- 
 able, because it leads to this, to the health of the universe and 
 to the prosperity and felicity of Zeus [the universe]. For he 
 would not have brought on any man what he has brought, if 
 it were not useful for the whole. Xeither-does the nature of 
 anything, whatever it may be, cause anything which is not 
 suitable to that which is dii-ected by it. For two rea.sons 
 then it is r ight to be content with that which happens ^to 
 thee ; the one, because it was done for thee and prescribed for 
 thee, and in a manner had reference to thee, originally from 
 )^^ most ancient causes spun with thy destiny ; and the other, 
 because even that which comes severally to every man is to 
 the power which administers the universe a cause of felicity 
 and perfection, nay even of its very continuance. For the 
 integrity of the whole is mutilated, if thou cuttest off any- 
 thing whatever from the conjunction and the continuity either 
 of the parts or of the causes. And thou dost cut off, as far as 
 it is in thy power, when thou art dissatisfied, and in a manner 
 triest to put anything out oi the way. 
 
 9. Be not disgusted, nor discouraged, nor dissatisfied, if 
 thou dost not succeed in doing everything according to right 
 
ilO M. Antoninus. V. 
 
 principles ; but when thou hast failed, return back again, and 
 be content if the greater part of what thou doest is consistent 
 with man's nature, and love this to which thou returnest; 
 and do not return to philosophy as if she were a master, but 
 act like those who have sore eyes and apply a bit of sponge 
 and egg, or as another applies a plaster, or drenching with 
 water. For thus thou wilt not fail tof obey reason, and thou 
 wilt repose in it. And remember that philosophy requires 
 only the things which thy nature requires ; but thou wouldst 
 have something else which is not according to nature — It may 
 be objected, Why what is more agreeable than this [which I 
 am doing] ? — But is not this the very reason why pleasure 
 deceives us? And consider if magnanimity, freedom, sim- 
 plicity, equanimity, piety, are not more agreeable. For 
 what is more agreeable than wisdom itself, when thou 
 thinkest of the security and the happy course of all things 
 which depend on the faculty of understanding and know- 
 ledge ? 
 
 10. Things are in such a kind of envelo2:)ement that they 
 have seemed to philosophers, not a few nor those common 
 philosophers, altogether unintelligible ; nay even to the 
 Stoics themselves they seem difficult to understand. And all 
 our 9,ssent is changeable ; for where is the man who never 
 changes? Carry thy thoughts then to the objects themselves, 
 and consider how short-lived they are and worthless, and that 
 they may be in the possession of a filthy wretch or a whore 
 or a robber. Then turn to the morals of those who live with 
 thee, and it is hardly possible to endure even the most 
 agreeable of them, to say nothing of a man being hardly 
 able to endure himself. In such darkness then and dirt and 
 in so constant a flux both of substance and of time, and of 
 motion and of things moved, what there is worth being 
 highly prized or even an object of serious pursuit, I cannot 
 imagine. But on the contrary it is a man's duty to comfort 
 himself, and to wait for the natural dissolution and not to be 
 vexed at the delay, but to rest in these jmnciples only : the 
 one, that nothing will happen to me which is not conformable 
 
M. Antoninus. V. Ill 
 
 to the nature of the uuiverse ; and tlic other, that it is in my 
 power never to act contrary to my god and daemon : for there 
 is no man who will compel me to this. 
 
 11. About what am I now employing my own soul? On 
 every occasion I must ask myself this question, and inquire, 
 what have I now in this part of me which they call the ruling 
 jmuciple ? and whose soul have I now ? that of a child, or of 
 a young man, or of a feeble woman, or of a tyrant, or of a 
 domestic animal, or of a wild beast ? 
 
 12. What kind of things those are which appear good to 
 the many, w^e may learn even from this. For if any man 
 should conceive certain things as being really good, such as 
 prudence, temperance, justice, fortitude, he would not after 
 having fii'st conceived these endui'e to listen to anything*)" 
 which should not be in harmony wdth what is really good.j 
 But if a mail has fii'st conceived as good the things which appear 
 to the many to be good, he will listen and readily receive as 
 very applicable that which was said by the comic writer. 
 fThus even the many perceive the difference. f For were it 
 not so, this saving would not offend and would not be rejected 
 [in the first case], while we receive it when it is said of 
 wealth, and of the means which further luxury and fame, as 
 said fitly and wdttily. Go on then and ask if we should value 
 and think those things to be good, to which after their first 
 conception in the mind the words of the comic writer might 
 be aptly applied — that he who has them, through pure 
 abundance has not a place to ease himself in. 
 
 13. I am composed of the formal and the material; and 
 neither of them will perish into non-existence, as neither of 
 them came into existence out of non-existence. Every part 
 of me then will be reduced by change into some part of the 
 universe, and that again will change into another part of the 
 universe, and so on for ever. And by consequence of such a 
 change I too exist, and those who begot me, and so on for 
 ever in the other direction. For nothing hinders us from 
 saying so, even if the universe is administered according to 
 definite periods [of revolution]. 
 
112 M. Antoninus. V. 
 
 14. Eeason and the reasoning art [philosophy] are powers 
 ivhich are sufficient for themselves and for their own works. 
 They move then from a first principle which is their own, 
 and they make their way to the end which is proposed to 
 them; and this is the reason why such acts are named 
 Catorthoseis or right acts, which word signifies that they 
 proceed by the right rop.d. 
 
 15. None of these things ought to be called a man's, which 
 do not belong to a man, as man. They are not required of a 
 man, nor does man's nature promise them, nor are tliey the 
 means of man's nature attaining its end. Neither then does 
 the end of man lie in these things, nor yet that which aids 
 to the accomplishment of this end, and that which aids towards 
 this end is that which is good. Besides, if any of these things 
 did belong to man, it would not be right for a man to despise 
 them and to set himself against them ; nor would a man be 
 worthy of praise who showed that he did not want these 
 things, nor would he who stinted himself in any of them be 
 good, if indeed these things were good. But now the more 
 of these things a man deprives himself of, or of other things 
 like them, or even when he is deprived of any of them, the 
 more patiently he endures the loss, just in the same degree 
 he is a better man. 
 
 ■ 16. Such as are thy habitual thoughts, such also will be 
 the character of thy mind; for the soul is dyed by the 
 thoughts. Dye it then with a continuous series of such 
 thoughts as these : for instance, that where a man can live, 
 there he can also live well. But he must live in a palace ; — 
 well then, he can also live well in a palace. And again, con- 
 sider that for whatever purpose each thing has been con- 
 stituted, for this it has been constituted, and towards this it 
 is carried ; and its end is in that towards which it is carried ; 
 and where the end is, there also is the advantage and the 
 good of each thing. Now the good for the reasonable animal 
 is society ; for that we are made for society has been shown 
 above.*^ Is it not plain that the inferior exist for the sake of 
 
 2 II. 1. 
 
M. Antoninus. V. 113 
 
 the superior ? but the things which have life are superior to 
 those which have not life, and of those which have life the 
 sujicrior are those which have reason. 
 
 17. To seek what is impossible is madness: audit is im- 
 possible that the bad should not do something of this kind. 
 
 18. Nothing happens to any man which he is not formed 
 by nature to bear. The same things happen to another, and 
 either because he does not see that they have hapj^ened or 
 because he would show a great spirit he is firm and remains 
 unharmed. It is a shame then that ignorance and conceit 
 should be stronger than wisdom. 
 
 19. Things themselves touch not the soul, not in the least 
 degree ; nor have they admission to the soul, nor can they 
 turn or move the soul : but the soul turns and moves itself 
 alone, and whatever judgments it may think proper to make, 
 such it makes for itself the things which present themselves 
 to it. 
 
 20. In one respect man is the nearest thing to me, so far 
 as I must do good to men and endure them. But so far as 
 some men make themselves obstacles to my proper acts, man 
 becomes to me one of the things which are indifferent, no 
 less than the sun or wind or a wild beast. Now it is true 
 that these may impede my action, but they are no impediments 
 to my affects and disposition, which have the power of acting 
 conditionally and changing : for the mind converts and 
 changes every hindrance to its activity into an aid ; and so 
 that which is a hindrance is made a furtherance to an act ; 
 and that which is an obstacle on the road helps us on this 
 road. 
 
 .21. Eeverence that which is best in the universe ; and this^ 
 is that which makes use of all things and directs all things. 
 And in like manner also reverence that which is best in 
 thyself; and this is of the same kind as that. For in thyself 
 also, that which makes use of everything else, is this, and thy 
 life is directed by this. 
 
 22. That which does no harm to the state, does no harm to 
 the citizen. In the case of every appearance of harm apply 
 
 z 
 
114 M. Antoninus. V. 
 
 tliis rule : if tlie state is not harmed by this, neither am I 
 harmed. But if the state is harmed, thou must not be angry 
 with him who does harm to the state. Show him where his 
 error is. 
 
 23. Often think of the rapidity with which things pass by 
 and disappear, both the things which are and the things 
 which are produced. For substance is like a river in a con- 
 tinual flow, and the activities of things are in constant change, 
 and the causes work in infinite varieties ; and there is hardly 
 anything which stands still. And consider this which is 
 near to thee, this boundless abyss of the past and of the future 
 in which all things disappear. How then is he not a fool 
 who is puffed up with such things or plagued about them and 
 makes himself miserable ? for they vex him only for a time, 
 and a short time. 
 
 24. Think of the universal substance, of which thou hast a 
 very small portion ; and of universal time, of which a short 
 and indivisible interval has been assigned to thee ; and of 
 that which is fixed by destiny, and how small a part of it 
 thou art. 
 
 25. Does another do me wrong ? Let him look to it. He 
 has his own disposition, his own activity. I now have what 
 the universal nature wills me to have ; and I do what my 
 nature now wills me to do. 
 
 26. Let the part of thy soul which leads and governs be 
 undistm-bed by the movements in the flesh, whether of 
 pleasure or of pain ; and let it not unite with them, but let 
 it circumscribe itself and limit those affects to their parts. 
 But when these affects rise up to the mind by virtue of that 
 other sympathy that naturally exists in a body which is all 
 one, then thou must not strive to resist the sensation, for it 
 is natural : but let not the ruling part of itself add to the 
 sensation the opinion that it is either good or bad. 
 
 27. Live with the gods. And he does live with the gods 
 who constantly shows to them that his own soul is satisfied 
 with that which is assigned to him, and that it docs all that 
 the daemon wishes, which Zeus hath given to every man for 
 
 i 
 
M. Antomnus. V. 115 
 
 Ill's guardian and guide, a portion of liimself. And tliis is 
 every man's understanding and reason. 
 
 28. Art tliou angry with liim whose arm-joits stink ? art 
 thou angry with him whose mouth smells foul '? What good 
 will this anger do thee ? He has such a mouth, he has such 
 arm-pits : it is necessary that such an emanation must come 
 from such things — but the man has reason, it will be said, 
 and he is able, if he takes pains, to discover wherein ho 
 offends — I wishsihee well of thy disco very. Well then, and 
 thou hast reason : by thy rational faculty stir up his rational 
 faculty ; show him his error, admonish him. For if he listens, 
 thou wilt cure him, and there is no need of anger. [fNeither 
 tragic actor nor whore.lj^ 
 
 29. As thou intendest to live when thou art gone out, * * 
 so it is in thy power to live here. But if men do not permit 
 thee, then get away out of life, yet so as if thou wert suffering 
 no harm. The house is smoky, and I quit it.* Why dost 
 thou think that this is any trouble ? But so long as nothing 
 of the kind drives me out, I remain, am free, and no man 
 shall hinder me from doing what I choose ; and I choose to 
 do what is according to the nature of the rational and social 
 animal. 
 
 30. The intelligence of the universe is social. Accordingly 
 it has made the inferior things for the sake of the superior, 
 and it has fitted the superior to one another. Thou seest 
 how it has subordinated, co-ordinated and assigned to every 
 thing its proper portion, and has brought together into concord 
 with one another the things which are the best. 
 
 31. How hast thou behaved hitherto to the gods, thy 
 parents, brethren, children, teachers, to those who looked 
 after thy infancy, to thy friends, kinsfolk, to thy slaves? 
 
 3 This is imperfect or corrupt, or both. There is also something 
 wrong or incomplete in the beginning of S. 29, where he says w? i^eXdwu 
 Qu Siavorj, which Gataker translates " as if thou wast about to quit 
 life ;" but we cannot translate e^e\9wv in that way. Other translations 
 are not much more satisfactory. I have translated it literally and left 
 it imperfect. 
 
 * Epictetus, I. 25. 18. 
 
116 M. Antoninus. V. 
 
 Consider if thou hast hitherto behaved to all in such a way 
 that this may be said of thee : 
 
 Never has wronged a man in deed or word. 
 
 And call to recollection both how many things thou hast 
 passed through, and how many things thou hast been able to 
 endure : and that the history of thy life is now complete and 
 thy service is ended : and how many beautiful things thou 
 hast seen : and how many pleasures and pains thou hast 
 despised ; and how many things called honourable thou hast 
 spurned ; and to how many ill-minded folks thou hast shown 
 a kind disposition. 
 
 32. Why do unskilled and ignorant souls disturb him who 
 has skill and knowledge ? What soul then has skill and 
 knowledge? That which knows beginning and end, and 
 knows the reason which pervades all substance and thi'ough 
 all time by fixed periods [revolutions] administers the 
 universe. 
 
 33. Soon, very soon, thou wilt be ashes, or a skeleton, and 
 either a name or not even a name ; but name is sound and 
 echo. And the things which are much valued in life are 
 empty and rotten and trifling, and [like] little dogs biting 
 one another, and little children quarrelling, laughing, and 
 then straightway weeping. But fidelity and modesty and 
 justice and truth are fled 
 
 Up to Olympus from the wide-spread earth. 
 
 JSesiod, Worls, etc. v. 197. 
 
 What then is there which still detains thee here ? if the 
 objects of sense are easily changed and never stand still, and 
 the organs of percej^tion are dull and easily receive false 
 impressions ; and the poor soul itself is an exhalation from 
 blood. But to have good repute amidst such a world as this 
 is an empty thing. Why then dost thou not wait in tran- 
 quillity for thy end, whether it is extinction or removal to 
 another state ? And until that time comes, what is sufiicicnt ? 
 Why, what else than to venerate the gods and bless them, 
 and to do good to men, and to practise tolerance and self- 
 
M. Anioninus. V. 11 V 
 
 rcstraiut ;* but as to cverytliiug ^vllicll is beyond tlio limits 
 of the poor flesh and breath, to remember that this is neither 
 thine nor in thy power. 
 
 34. Thou canst pass thy life in an equable flow of hap- 
 piness, if thou canst go by the right way, and think and act 
 in the right way. These two things are common both to thci 
 soul of god and to the soul of man, and to the soul of every 
 rational being, not to be hindered by another ; and to hold 
 good to consist in the disposition to justice and the practice 
 of it, and in this to let thy desire find its termination. 
 
 35. If this is neither my own badness, nor an effect of my 
 own badness, and the common weal is not injured, why am I 
 troubled about it? and what is the harm to the common 
 weal ? 
 
 36. Do not be carried along inconsiderately by the appear- 
 ance of things, but give help [to all] according to thy ability 
 and their fitness ; and if they should have sustained loss in 
 matters which are indifferent, do not imagine this to be a 
 damage. For it is a bad habit. But as the old man, when 
 he went aw^ay, asked back his foster-child's top, remembering 
 that it was a top, so do thou in this case also. 
 
 When thou art calling out on the Eostra, hast thou for- 
 gotten, man, what these things are ? — Yes ; but they are 
 objects of great concern to these people — wilt thou too then 
 be made a fool for these things? — I was once a fortunate 
 man, but I lost it, I know not how. — But fortunate means 
 that a man has assigned to himself a good fortune : and a 
 good fortune is good disposition of the soul, good emotions, 
 good actions.^ 
 
 5 This is the Stoic precept aj/e'xou koI airexov. The first part teaches 
 us to be content with men and things as they are. The second part 
 teaclies us the virtue of self-restraint, or the government of our passions. 
 
 ^ This section is unintelligible. Many of the ^vords may be corrupt, 
 and the general purport of the section cannot be discovered. Perhaps 
 several things have been improperly joined in one section. I have 
 translated it nearly literally. Different translators give the section a 
 different turn, and the critics have tried to mend what they cannot 
 understand. 
 
il8 ill Antoninus. VL 
 
 VI. 
 
 I^HE substance of tlie universe is obedient and compliant ; 
 and tbe reasoiT wliicli goveFns i t has in itself no cause 
 for doin^ evil, for it bas no malice, iior~does~ir~do evil 'to 
 anything, nor is anything harmed by it. But all things are 
 made and perfected according to this reason. 
 
 2. Let it make no difference to thee whether thou art cold 
 or warm, if thou art doing thy^duty ; and whether thou art 
 drowsy or satisfied with sleep ; and whether ill-spoken of or 
 praised ; and whetherdying or doing something else. For 
 it is one of the acts^ofn^T^Esact by which we die : it is 
 sufficient then in this act also to do well what we have in 
 hand. (vi. 22, 28.) 
 
 3. Look within. Let neither the peculiar quality of any- 
 thing nor its value escape thee. 
 
 4. All existing things soon change, and they will either 
 be reduced to vapour, if indeed all substance is one, or they 
 will be dispersed. 
 
 5. Th e reason which governs knows what its own disposi- 
 tion is, and what it does, and on what material it works. 
 
 6. The best way of avenging thyself is not to become like 
 [the wrong doer]. 
 
 7. Take pleasure in one thing and rest in it, in passing 
 from one social act to another social act, thinking of God. 
 
 8. The ruling principle is that which rouses and turns 
 itself, and while it makes itself such as it is and such as it 
 wills to be, it also makes everything which happens appear to 
 itself to be such as it wills. 
 
 9. In conformity to the nature of the universe every single 
 thing is accomplished, for certainly it is not in conformity 
 to any other nature that each thing is accomplished, either a 
 
M. Antoninus. VI. 119 
 
 natui-e which externally comprehends this, oi- a nature which 
 is comprehended within this nature, or a nature external and 
 indei^endcut of this. (xi. 1, vi. 40, viii. 50.) 
 / 10. The universe is either a confusion, and a mutual in- 
 ^ volution ofthings, and a^dispersion ; or it is unity and order 
 and j)rovidence. If then it is the former, why do I desire to 
 tarry in a fortuitous combination of things and such a dis- 
 order ? and why do I care about anything else than how I 
 shall at last become earth ? and why am I disturbed^ for the 
 dispersion of my elements will happen whatever I do. But 
 if the other supposition is true, I venerate, and I am firm, 
 and I trust in him who governs, (iv. 27.) 
 
 11. When thou hast been compelled by circumstances to 
 be disturbed in a manner, quickly return to ih "33lf and do 
 not continue out of tune longer than the compulsion lasts ; 
 for thou wilt hate more mastery over the harmony by con- 
 tinually recui'ring to it ~ ^ " 
 
 12. If thou hadst a step-mother and a mother at the same 
 time, thou wouldst be dutiful to thy step-mother, but still thou 
 wouldst constantly return to thy mother. Let the court and 
 philosophy now be to thee step-mother and mother : return 
 to philosophy frequently and repose in her, through whom 
 what thou meetest with in the court ajDpears to thee tolerable, 
 and thou appearest tolerable in the court. 
 
 13. When we have meat before us and such eatables, we 
 receive the impression, that this is the dead body of a fish, 
 and this is the dead body of a bii'd or of a pig; and 
 again, that this Falernian is only a little grape juice, 
 and this pui'ple robe some sheep's wool dyed with the 
 blood of a shell-fish : such then are these impressions, 
 and they reach the things themselves and penetrate them, 
 and so we see what kind of things they are. Just in 
 the same way ought we to act all through life, and where 
 there are things which appear most worthy of our approba- 
 tion, we ought to lay them bare and look at their worthless- 
 
 ' ness and strip them of all the words by which they are 
 exalted. For outward show is a wonderful pervcrter of tho 
 
120 If. Antoninus. VI. 
 
 reason^ and when tliou art most sure that then art employed 
 
 "alooiit things worth thy pains, it is then that it cheats theo 
 
 most. Consider then what Crates says of Xenocratcs himself. 
 
 14. Most of the things which the multitude admire are 
 referred to objects of the most general kind, those which are 
 held together by cohesion or natural organization, such as 
 stones, wood, fig-trees, vines, olives. But those which are 
 admired by men, who are a little more reasonable, are re- 
 ferred to the things which are held together by a li ving^ 
 principle, as flocks, herds. Those which are admired by 
 men w^ho are still more instructed are the_yiingsjv\'hich are 
 held togothoi Ua j?: a rational^ soul, not however a universal soul, 
 but rational so far as it is asoul s ki]le(Lin_somejirt, or expert 
 i n some other way, or simply rational so far as it possesses a 
 number of slaves. But he who values a rational so.ul, a soul 
 universal and fitted for political life, regards nothing else 
 except this ; and above all things lie keeps his soul in a con- 
 dition and in an activity co nformab le. to_reasorL_iLnd social^ 
 life, and he co-operates to this end with those who are of the 
 same kind as himself. 
 
 15. Some things are hurrying into existence, and others 
 are hurrying out of it ; and of that which is coming into 
 existence part is already extinguished. Motions and changes 
 are contin ually renewing j he jworld, just as the uninterrupted 
 course' of time is always renewing the infinite duration of 
 ages. In this flowing stream then, on which there is no 
 abiding, what is there of the things which hurry by on which 
 a man. would set a high price ? It would be just as if a man 
 should fall in love with one of the sparrows which fly by, 
 but it has already past out of sight. Something of this kind 
 is the very life of every man, like the exhalation of the blood 
 and the respiration of the air. For such as it is to have 
 once drawn in the air and to have given it back, which we do 
 every moment, just the same is it with the whole respiratory 
 power, which thou didst receive at thy birth yesterday and 
 the day before, to give it back to the element from which 
 thou didst first draw it. 
 
M. Antoninus. VI. 121 
 
 16. Neither is transpiration, as in plants, a thin^ to be 
 valued, nor respiration, as in domesticated animals and wild 
 
 Ijeasts, nor the receiving of imin-essions by the apjjearancos 
 of things, nor being moved by desires as puppets by strings, 
 nor assembling in herds, nor being noui'ished by food ; for 
 this is just like the act of separating and parting with the 
 useless part of our food. What then is worth being valued ? 
 To be received with clapping of hands ? No. Neither must 
 we value the clapping of tongues, for the praise which comes 
 from the many is a clapping of tongues. Suppose then that 
 thou hast given up this worthless thing called fame, what 
 remains that is worth valuing ? This in my opinion, to 
 move thyself and to restrain tlivself in conformity to thy 
 prop er constitution , to which end both all emp loyments an3^ 
 arts lead. For every art aims at this, that the thing which 
 has been made should be adapted to the work for which it 
 has been made ; and both the vine-planter who looks after 
 the vine, and the horse-breaker, and he who trains the docj, 
 seek this end. But the education and the teaching of youth 
 ai m at something. In this tlien is the value^of the educa- 
 tion and the teaching. And if thisls~well, thou^wilt not 
 seek anything else. Wilt thou not cease to value many 
 other things too? Then thou wilt be neither free, nor 
 sufficient for thy own haj^piness, nor without passion. For 
 of necessity thou must be envious, jealous, and suspicious of 
 those who can take away those things, and plot against those 
 who have that which is valued by thee. Of necessity a man 
 must be altogether in a state of perturbation who wants any 
 of these things ; and besides, he must often find fault with the 
 gods. But to reverence and honour thy own mind will make 
 thee content with thyself, and in harmony with society, and 
 in agreement with the gods, that is, praising all that they 
 give and have ordered. 
 
 17. Above, below, all around are the movements of the 
 elements. But the motion of virtu e is in none of these : it 
 is something more divmCj^andT advancing by a way hardly 
 observed it goes happily on its road. 
 
122 M. Antoninus. VI. 
 
 18. How strangely men act. They will not praise those 
 who are living at the same time and living with themselves ; 
 but to be themselves praised by posterity, by those whom 
 they have never seen or ever will see, this they set much 
 value on. But this is very much the same as if thou shouldst 
 be grieved because those who have lived before thee did not 
 praise thee. 
 
 19. If a thing is difficult to be accomplished by thyself, do 
 not think that it is impossible for man : but if anything is 
 possible for man and conformable to his nature, think that 
 this can be attained by thyself too. 
 
 20. In the gymnastic exercises suppose that a man has torn 
 thee with his nails, and by dashing against thy head has 
 inflicted a wound. Well, we neither show any signs of 
 vexation, nor are we offended, nor do we suspect him after- 
 wards as a treacherou's fellow ; and yet we are on our guard 
 against him, not however as an enemy, nor yet wdth sus- 
 picion, but we quietly get out of his way. Something like 
 this let thy behaviour be in all the other parts of life ; let us 
 overlook many things in those who are like antagonists in 
 the gymnasium. For it is in our po wer, as I sa id, to get 
 out of the way, and to have no s uspicion_nor hatre^r~ 
 
 ""^Llf any man is able to convince me and show me that I 
 do not think or act right, I will gladly change ; for I seek 
 the truth by which no man was ever injured. But he is 
 injured who abides in his error and ignorance. 
 
 22. I do my duty : other things trouble me not ; for they 
 are either things without life, or things without reason, or 
 things that have rambled and know not the way. 
 
 23. As to the animals which have no reason and generally 
 all things and objects, do thou, since thou hast reason and 
 they have none, make usQ- of them with a ge nero us an d 
 liberalspirrL But towards human beings, as they have 
 reason, behave in a social spirit. And on all occasions call 
 on the gods, and do not perplex thyself about the length of 
 time in which thou shalt do this ; for even three houi'S so 
 6nent are sufficient. 
 
M. Antoninus. VI. 123 
 
 24. Alexander the Macedonian and his groom by death 
 were brought to the same state ; for either tliey were received 
 among the same seminal principles of the universe, or they 
 were alike dispersed among the atoms. 
 
 25. Consider how many things in the same indivisible 
 time take place in each of us, things which concern the body 
 and things which concern the soul : and so thou wilt not 
 wonder if many more things, or rather all things which 
 come into existence in that which^jg^t he one and all^ which 
 W'e call Cosmos, exist in it at the same time. 
 
 26. If any man should propose to thee the question, how 
 the name Antoninus is written, wouldst thou with a straining 
 of the voice utter each letter? "What then if they grow 
 angry, wilt thou be angry too? Wilt thou not go on with 
 composure and number every letter ? Just so then in this 
 life also remember tha t every duty is made up of c ertain 
 garts. These it is thy duty to observe and without being 
 disturbed or showing anger towards those who are angry 
 with thee to go on thy way and finish that which is set be- 
 fore thee. 
 
 27. How cruel it is not to allow men to strive after the 
 things which appear to them to be suitable to their nature 
 and profitable ! And yet in a manner thou dost not allow 
 them to do this, when thou art vexed because they do wrong. 
 For they are certainly moved towards things because they 
 suppose them to be suitable to their nature and profitable 
 to them — But it is not so — Teach them then, and show them 
 without being angry. 
 
 28. Death is a cessation of the impressions through the 
 senses, and of the pulling of the strings which move the 
 appetites, and of the discursive movements of the thoughts, 
 and of the service to the flesh, (ii. 12.) 
 
 29. It is a shame for the soul to be first to give way in this 
 life, when thy body does not give way. 
 
 30. Take care that thou art not made into a Caesar, that 
 thou art not dyed wdth this dye ; for such things happen. /^ 
 Keep thyself then simple, good, pure, serious, free from 
 
124 M. Antoninus. VI. 
 
 affectation, a friend of justice, a worshipper of the gods, kind, 
 affectionate, strenuous in all proper acts. Strive to continue 
 to be such as philosophy wished to make thee. Eeverence 
 the gods, and help men. Short is life. There is only one 
 fruit of this terrene life, a pious disposition and social acts. 
 Do everything as a disciple of Antoninus. Eemember his 
 constancy in every act which was conformable to reason, and 
 his evenness in all things, and his piety, and the serenity of 
 his countenance, and his sweetness, and his disregard of 
 empty fame, and his efforts to understand things ; and how 
 he would never let anything pass without having first most 
 carefully examined it and clearly understood it ; and how he 
 bore with those who blamed him unjustly without blaming 
 them in return ; how he did nothing in a hurry ; and how he 
 listened not to calumnies, and how exact an examiner of 
 manners and actions he was ; and not given to reproach 
 people, nor timid, nor suspicious, nor a sophist ; and with 
 how little he was satisfied, such as lodging, bed, dress, food, 
 servants ; and how laborious and patient ; and how he was 
 able on account of his sparing diet to hold out to the evening, 
 not even requiring to relieve himself by any evacuations 
 except at the usual hour ; and his firmness and uniformity in 
 his friendships ; and how he tolerated freedom of sj)eech in 
 those who opposed his opinions ; and the pleasure that he 
 had when any man showed him anything better ; and how 
 religious he was without superstition. Imitate all this that 
 thou mayest have as good a conscience, when thy last hour 
 comes, as he had. (i. 16.) 
 
 31. Eeturn to thy sober senses and call thyself back ; and 
 when thou hast roused thyself from sleep and hast iDerceived 
 that they were only dreams which troubled thee, now in thy 
 waking hours look at these [the things about thee] as thou 
 didst look at those [the dreams]. 
 
 32. I consist of a little body and a soul. Now to this 
 little body all things are indifferent, for it is not able to 
 perceive differences. But to the understanding those things 
 only are indifferent, which are not the works of its own 
 
M. Antoninus. VI. 125 
 
 activity. But wLatevcr things are the works of its own 
 activity, all these are in its power. And of those however 
 only those which are done with reference to the present ; for 
 as to the future and the past activities of the mind, even 
 these are for the present indifferent. 
 
 33. Neither the labour which the hand does nor that of 
 the foot is contrary to nature, so long as the foot does the i- 
 foot's work and the hand the hand's. So then neither to a 
 man as a man is his labou r contrary to natu re, so long as it 
 does the things of a man. But if the labour is not contrary 
 to his nature, neither is it an evil to him. 
 
 31. How many pleasures have been enjoyed by robbers, 
 patricides, tyrants. 
 
 35. Dost thou not see how the handicraftsmen accom- 
 modate themselves up to a certain point to those who are not 
 skilled in their craft, — nevertheless they cling to the reason 
 [the principles] of their art and do not endure to depart from 
 it? Is it not strange if the architect and the physician 
 shall have more respect to the reason [the principles] of their 
 own arts than man to his own reason, which is common to 
 him and the gods ? 
 i 36. Asia, Europe are corners of the universe : all the sea 
 I a drop in the universe ; Athos a little clod of the universe : 
 I all the present tim e is a point in e ternity. All thing s are l- 
 I little, changeable, perishable. All things come from thence, 
 I from that universal rulmg power either directly proceeding 
 I or by way of sequence. And accordingly the lion's gaping 
 I jaws, and that which is poisonous, and every harmful thing, 
 as a thorn, as mud, are after-products of the grand and 
 I beautiful. Do not then imagine that they are of another 
 ! kind from that which thou dost venerate, but form a just 
 opinion of the ^om-ce of a ll, (vii. 75.) ^ 
 
 37. He who has seen present things has seen all, both vc^^ 
 everything which has taken place from all eternity and ^ 
 everything which will be for time without end ; for all thinga-^-^^^^^^ 
 are_of ong ^in and of o ne form. — 
 
 88. Frequently consider the connection of all things in 
 
126 M. Antoninus, VI. 
 
 the universe and tkeir relation to one another. For in a 
 manner all things are implicated wi th one an other, and all 
 in this way are friendly to one another ; for one^hing comes 
 in order idier another, and this is hy virtue o f the j active 
 movement and mutual conspiration and the unity of th e 
 s ubsta nce, (ix. 1.) ~~— 
 
 397^clapt thyself to the things with which thy lot has 
 been cast : and the men among whom thou hast received thy 
 portion, love them, but do it truly [sincerely]. 
 
 40. Every instrument, tool, vessel, if it does that for 
 which it has been made, is well, and yet he who made it is 
 not tliere. But in the things which are held together by 
 nature there is within and there abides in them the power 
 which made them ; wherefore the more is it fit to reverence 
 this power, and to think, that, if thou dost live and act 
 according to its will, everything in thee ^ is in conf ormity to, 
 intelligence. And thus also in the universe th e things 
 which belong to it are in conformity to intelligence. ^ 
 
 41. Whatever of the things which are not~within thy 
 power thou shalt suppose to be good for thee or evil, it must 
 of necessity be that, if such a bad thing befall thee or the 
 loss of such a good thing, thou wilt blame the gods, and hate 
 men too, those who are the cause of the misfortune or the 
 loss, or those who are suspected of being likely to be the 
 cause ; and indeed we do much injustice, because we make 
 a difference between these things [because we do not regard 
 these things as indifferentj].^ But if we judge only those 
 things which are in our power to be good' or badT^ESsi'o 
 remains no reason either for finding fault with god or stand- 
 ing in a hostile attitude to man.* 
 
 42. We are all working together to one end, some with 
 knowledge and design, and others without knowing what 
 
 ^ Gataker translates this, "because we strive to get these things," 
 comparing the use of SLa<p4pe(r6ai in v. 1, and x. 27, and ix. 38, 
 where it appears that his reference should be xi. 10. He may be right 
 in his interpretation, but I doubt 
 
 • Cicero, De Natura Deorum, in, 32. 
 
ill. Antoniiuis. VI. 127 
 
 tlicy do ; as men also when tbcy arc asleep, of whom it is 
 lleraclitus, I think, who says that they are labonrers and co- 
 operators in the things which take place in the universe. 
 But men co-operate after different fash ions : and even those 
 co-operate abundantly, who find fault with what happens and 
 those who try to oppose it and to hinder it ; for the universe 
 had need even of sucTTTiieh as these. It remains then for 
 thee to understand among what kind of workmen thou 
 placest thyself; for he who rules all things wdll certainly 
 make a right use of thee, and he will receive thee among 
 some part of the co-op erato rs and of those whose labours 
 conduce to one end. But be not thou such a part as the mean 
 and ridiculous verse in the play, which Chrysippus speaks of.' 
 43. Does the sun undertake to do the w^ork of the rain, or 
 AesculajDius the work of the Fruit -bearer [the earth] ? And 
 how is it with respect to each of the stars, are they not 
 different and yet they w^ork together to the same end ? 
 . 44. If the gods have determined about me and about the 
 things which must happen to me, they have determined well, 
 for it is not easy even to imagine a deity without forethought ; 
 and as to doing me harm, why should they have any desire 
 towards that ? for what advantage would result to them from 
 this or to the whole, which is the special object of their pro- 
 vidence? But if they have not determined ^out me 
 individually, they have certainly determined about ^the 
 whole at least, and the things which happen by way of 
 sequence in this general arrangement J^ oug ht to accep t with 
 pleasure and to be content with them. But if they determine 
 about nothing — which it is wicked to believe, or if we do 
 believe it, let us neither sacrifice nor pray nor swear by them 
 nor do anything else which we do as if the gods were present 
 and lived with us — but if however the gods determine about 
 none of the things which concern us, I am able to determine 
 abo ut myse lf, and I can inquire about that which is useful ; 
 andthat is useful to every man which is conformable to his 
 own constitution and nature. But my nature is rational and 
 3 Plutarch, adversus Stoicos, c. 14. 
 
128 M. Antoninus. VL 
 
 social ; and my city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is 
 Eome, but so far as I am a man, it is tlie world. Tlie things 
 then which are useful to these cities are alone useful to me. 
 
 45. Whatever happens to every man, this is for the 
 interest of the imiversal : this might be sufficient. But further 
 thou wilt observe this also as a general truth, if thou dost 
 observe, that whatever is profitable to any man is profitable 
 also to other men. But let the word profitable be taken here 
 in the common sense as said of things of the middle kind 
 [neither good nor bad]. 
 
 46. As it happens to thee in the amphitheatre and such 
 places, that the continual sight of the same things and the 
 uniformity make the spectacle wearisome, so it is in the 
 whole of life ; for all things above, below, are the same and 
 from the same. How long then ? 
 
 47. Think continually that all kinds of men and of all 
 kinds of pursuits and of all nations are dead, so that thy 
 thoughts come down even to Philistiou and Phoebus and 
 Origanion. Now turn thy thoughts to the other kinds [of 
 men]. To that place then we must remove, where there are 
 so many great orators, and so many noble philosophers, 
 Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Socrates ; so many heroes of former 
 days, and so many generals after them, and tyrants ; besides 
 these, Eudoxus, Hipparchus, Archimedes, and other men of 
 acute natural talents, great minds, lovers of labour, versatile, 
 confident, mockers even of the perishable and ephemeral life 
 of man, as Menippus and such as are like him. As to all 
 these consider that they have long been in the dust. What 
 harm then is this to them ; and what to those whose names 
 are altogether unknown? One thing here is worth a great 
 deal, to pass thy life in truth and justice, with a benevolent 
 disposition even to liars and unjust men. 
 
 48. When thou wishest to delight thyself, think of the 
 virtues of those who live with thee ; for instance, the activity 
 of one, and the modesty of another, and the liberality of a 
 third, and some other good quality of a fourth. For nothing 
 delights so much as the examples of the virtues, when they 
 
M. Anfontnus. VI. 121) 
 
 are exhibited in the morals of those wlio live with lis and 
 present themselves in abundance, as far as is possible. 
 Wherefore we must keep them before us. 
 
 49. Thou art not dissatisfied, I suppose, because thou 
 weighest only so many litraeand not three hundred. Be not 
 dissatisfied then that thou must live only so many years and 
 not more ; for as thou art satisfied with the amount of sub- 
 stance which has been assigned to thee, so be content with the 
 time. 
 
 60. Let us try to persuade them [men]. But act even 
 against their will, when the principles of justice lead that 
 way. If however any man by using.force stands in thy way, 
 betake thyself to contentment and tranquillity, and at the 
 same time employ the hindrance towards the exercise of some 
 other virtue ; and remember that thy attempt was with a 
 reservation [conditionally], that thou didst not desire to do 
 impossibilities. What then didst thou desire ? — Some such 
 effort as this — But thou attainest thy object, if the things to 
 which thou wast moved are [not] accomplished.! 
 
 51. He who loves fame considers another man's activity to 
 be his own good ; and he who loves pleasure, his own sensa- 
 tions ; but he who has understanding, considers his own acts 
 to be his own good. 
 
 52. It is in our power to have no opinion about a thing, and 
 not to be disturbed in our soul ; for things themselves have 
 no natural power to form our judgments. 
 
 53. Accustom thyself to attend carefully to what is said by 
 another, and as much as it is j)ossible, be in the speaker's 
 mind. 
 
 54. That which is not good for the swarm, neither is it 
 good for the bee. 
 
 55- If sailors abused the helmsman or the sick the doctor, 
 would they listen to anybody else ; or how could the helms- 
 man secure the safety of those in the ship or the doctor the 
 health of those whom he attends ? 
 
 56. How many together with whom I came into the world 
 are already gone out of it. 
 
 c 
 
 \ 
 
130 M. Antoninus. VI. 
 
 57. To the jaundiced honey tastes bitter, and to those bitten 
 by mad dogs water causes fear ; and to little children the ball 
 is a fine thing. Why then am I angry ? Dost thou tliink 
 that a false opinion has less power than the bile in the 
 jaundiced or the poison in him who is bitten by a mad dog ? 
 
 58. No man will hinder thee from living according to the 
 reason of thy own nature : nothing will happen to thee con- 
 trary to the reason of the universal nature. 
 
 59. What kind of people are those whom men wish to 
 please, and for what objects, and by what kind of acts ? How 
 soon will time cover all things, and how many it has covern:^ 
 already. 
 
M. Antoninus. VII. 131 
 
 w 
 
 YJI. 
 
 HAT is badness? It is that which thou hast often 
 seen. And on the occasion of everything which 
 happens keep this in mind, that it is that which thou hast 
 often seen. Everywhere up and down thou wilt find the same 
 things, with which the old histories are filled, those of the 
 middle ages and those of oui* own day ; with which cities and 
 houses are filled now. There is nothing new : all things are 
 both familiar and short-lived. 
 
 2. How can our principles become dead, unless the im- 
 pressions [thoughts] whicli correspond to them are extin- 
 guished ? But it is in thy power continuously to fan these 
 thoughts into a flame. I can have that opinion about 
 anything, which I ought to have. K I can, why am I 
 disturbed ? The things which are external to my mind have 
 no relation at all to my mind. — Let this be the state of thy 
 afiects, and thou standest erect. To recover thy life is in thy 
 power. Look at things again as thou didst use to look at 
 them ; for in this consists the recovery of thy life, 
 
 3. The idle business of show, plays on the stage, flocks of 
 I sheep, herds, exercises wdth spears, a bone cast to little dogs, 
 I a bit of bread into fish-ponds, laboimugs of ants and burden- 
 I carrying, runnings about of frightened little mice, pui)pets 
 
 pulled by strings — [all alike]. It is thy duty then in the 
 midst of such things to show good humour and not a proud 
 air ; to understand however that every man is worth just so 
 much as the things are w^orth about which he busies himself. 
 
 4. In discourse thou must attend to what is said, and in 
 every movement thou must observe what is doing. And in the 
 one thou shouldst see immedia|;ely to what end it refers, 
 but in the other watch carefully what is the thing siguifitd. 
 
132 M. Antoninus. VIL 
 
 5. Is my understanding sufficient for this or not ? If it is 
 sufficient, I use it for the work as an instrument given by the 
 universal nature. But if it is not sufficient, then either I 
 retire from the work and give way to him who is able to do 
 it better, unless there be some reason why I ought not to do 
 iso ; or I do it as well as I can, taking to help me the man 
 who with the aid of my ruling j)rinciple can do what is now 
 fit and useful for the general good. For whatsoever either 
 by myself or with another I can do, ought to be directed to 
 this only, to that which is useful and well suited to society. 
 
 6. How many after being celebrated by fame have been 
 given up to oblivion ; and how many who have celebrated the 
 fame of others have long been dead. 
 
 7. Be not ashamed to be helped ; for it is thy business to 
 do thy duty like a soldier in the assault on a town. How 
 then, if being lame thou canst not mount up on the battle- 
 ments alone, but with the help of another it is possible ? 
 
 8. Let not future things disturb thee, for thou wilt come 
 to them, if it shall be necessary, having with thee the same 
 reason which now thou usest for present things. 
 
 9. All things are implicated with one another, and the 
 bond is holy ; and there is hardly anything unconnected with 
 any other thing. For things have been co-ordinated, and 
 they combine to form the same universe [order]. For there is 
 one universe made up of all things, and one god who pervades 
 all things, and one substance,^ and one law, [one] common 
 reason in all intelligent animals, and one truth ; if indeed 
 there is also one perfection for all animals which are of the 
 same stock and participate in the same reason. 
 
 10. Everything material soon disappears in the substance 
 of the whole ; and everything formal [causal] is very soon 
 taken back into the universal reason ; and the memory of 
 everything is very soon overwhelmed in time. 
 
 11. To the rational animal the same act is according to 
 nature and according to reason. 
 
 12. Be thou erect, or be iitiade erect, (iir. 6.) 
 
 * " One substance," p. '66, note 6. 
 
M. Antoninus. VII. 133 
 
 13. Just as it is witli tlie members in those bodies wLicli 
 are united in one, so it is with rational beings which exist 
 BCi)arate, for they have been constituted for one co-operation. 
 And the jjercejjtion of this will be more apparent to thee, ii* 
 thou often sayest to thyself that I am a member [/^eAos] of 
 the system of rational beings. But if [using the letter r] 
 thou sayest that tliou art a part [/xepos], thou dost not yet lovo 
 men from thy heart ; beneficence does not yet delight thee for 
 its own sake f thou still doest it barely as a thing of propriety, 
 and not yet as doing good to thyself. 
 
 14. Let there fall externally what will on the parts which can 
 feel the effects of this fall. For those parts which have felt 
 will complain, if they choose. But 1, unless I think that 
 what has happened is an evil, am not injured. And it is in 
 my power not to think so. 
 
 15. Whatever any one does or sa^-s, I must be good, just 
 as if the gold, or the emerald, or the purple were always 
 saying this, Whatever any one does or says, I must be emerald 
 and keep my colour. 
 
 16. The ruling faculty does not distui'b itself; I mean, does 
 not frighten itself or cause itself pain.j But if any one else 
 can frighten or pain it, let him do so. For the faculty itself 
 will not by its own opinion turn itself into such ways. Let 
 the body itself take care, if it can, that it suffer nothing, and 
 let it speak, if it suffers. But the soul itself, that which is 
 subject to fear, to pain, which has completely the power 
 of forming an opinion about these things, will suffer no- 
 thing, for it will never deviatef into such a judgment. The 
 leading principle in itself wants nothing, unless it makes 
 a want for itself ; and therefore it is both free from per- 
 turbation and unimpeded, if it does not disturb and impede 
 itself. 
 
 17. Eudaemonia [happiness] is a good daemon, or a good 
 thing. What then art thou doing here, imagination ? go 
 away, I inti*eat thee by the gods, as thou didst come, for I 
 
 "I have used Gataker'3 conjecture Kara\7]KTiKU3s instead of tbo 
 oommon reading KaraX-niTTiKwi ; compare iv. 20 ; ix. 42. 
 
134 M. Antoninus. VIL 
 
 want tliee not. But thou art come according to tliy old 
 fashion. I am not angry with thee : only go away. 
 
 18. Is any man afraid of change? Why what can take 
 place without change ? What then is more pleasing or more 
 suitable to the universal nature ? And canst thou take a 
 bath unless the wood undergoes a change ? and canst thou 
 be nourished, unless the food undergoes a change? And 
 can anything else that is useful be accomplished without 
 change? Dost thou not see then that for thyself also to 
 change is just the same, and equally necessary for the uni- 
 versal nature ? 
 
 19. Through the universal substance as through a furious 
 torrent all bodies are carried, being by their nature united 
 with and co-operating with the whole, as the parts of our 
 body with one another. How many a Chrysippus, how many 
 a Socrates, how many an Epictetus has time already swal- 
 lowed up ? And let the same thought occur to thee with 
 reference to every man and thing, (v. 23 ; vi. 15.) 
 
 20. One thing only troubles me, lest I should do some- 
 thing which the constitution of man does not allow, or in the 
 way which it does not allow, or what it does not allow now. 
 
 21. Near is thy forgetfulness of all things ; and near the 
 forgetfulness of thee by all. 
 
 22. It is peculiar to man to love even those who do wrong. 
 And this hapi)ens, if when they do wrong it occurs to thee 
 that they are kinsmen, and that they do wrong through 
 ignorance and unintentionally, and that soon both of you will 
 die ; and above all, that the wrong-doer has done thee no 
 harm, for he has not made thy ruling faculty worse than it 
 was before. 
 
 23. The universal nature out of the universal substance, as 
 if it were wax, now moulds a horse, and when it has broken 
 this up, it uses the material for a tree, then for a man, then 
 for something else ; and each of these things subsists for a 
 very short time. But it is no hardship for the vessel to bo 
 broken up, just as there was none in its being fastened to- 
 gether, (viii. 50.) 
 
M. Antoninus. VII. 135 
 
 24. A scowling look is altogctlicr unnatural ; wlicn it is 
 often assumed,^ the result is that all comeliness dies away, 
 and at last is so completely extinguished that it cannot bo 
 again lighted up at all. Try to conclude from this very fact 
 that it is contrary to reason. For if even the perception of 
 doing wrong shall depart, what reason is there for living any 
 longer '? 
 
 25. Nature which governs the wdiole will soon change all 
 things which thou seest, and out of their substance will make 
 other things, and again other things from the substance of 
 them, in order tliat the world may be ever new. (xii. 23.) 
 
 26. When a man has done thee any wrong, immediately 
 consider with what opinion about good or evil he has done 
 wrong. For w^hen thou hast seen this, thou wilt pity him, 
 and wilt neither wonder nor be angry. For either thou thy- 
 self thinkest the same thing to be good that he does or 
 another thing of the same kind. It is thy duty then to pardon 
 him. But if thou dost not think such things to be good or 
 evil, thou wilt more readily be well disposed to him who is 
 in error. 
 
 27. Think not so much of what thou hast not as of what 
 thou hast : but of the things which thou hast select the best, 
 and then reflect how eagerly they would have been sought, if 
 thou hadst them not. At the same time however take care 
 that thou dost not through being so pleased wdth them ac* 
 custom thyself to overvalue them, so as to be disturbed if ever 
 thou shouldst not have them. 
 
 / 28. Eetire into thyself. The rational principle which 
 rules has this nature, that it is content with itself when it 
 
 ■ — does what is just, and so secui.'es tranquillity. 
 
 29. Wipe out the imagination. Stop the pulling of the 
 striags. Confine thyself to the present. Understand well 
 what happens either to thee or to another. Divide and dis- 
 tribute every object into the causal [formal] and the material. 
 Think of thy last hour. Let the wrong which is done by a 
 man stay there where the wrong was done. (viii. 29.) 
 * This is corrupt. 
 
136 M. Antoninus. VIL 
 
 30. Direct tliy attention to what is said. Let tliy under- 
 standing enter into the things that are doing and the things 
 which do them. (vii. 4.) 
 
 31. Adorn thyself with simplicity and modesty and with 
 indifference towards the things which lie between virtue and 
 vice. Love mankind. Follow God. The poet says that 
 Law rules all — j And it is enough to remember that law 
 rules all.f'* — 
 
 32. About death : whether it is a dispersion, or a resolution 
 into atoms, or annihilation, it is either extinction or change. 
 
 33. About pain : the pain which is intolerable carries us 
 off; but that which lasts a long time is tolerable; and the 
 mind maintains its own tranquillity by retiring into itself, f 
 and the ruling faculty is not made worse. But the parts 
 which are harmed by pain, let them, if they can, give their 
 opinion about it. 
 
 34. About fame: look at the minds [of those who seek 
 fame], observe what they are, and what kind of things they 
 avoid, and what kind of things they pursue. And consider 
 that as the heaps of sand piled on one another hide the 
 former sands, so in life the events which go before are soon 
 covered by those which come after. 
 
 35. From Plato :^ the man who has an elevated mind and 
 takes a view of all time and of all substance, dost thou sup- 
 pose it possible for him to think that human life is anything 
 great ? it is not possible, he said. — Such a man then will 
 think that death also is no evil — Certainly not. 
 
 36. From Antisthenes : It is royal to do good and to be 
 abilsed. 
 
 37. It is a base thing for the countenance to be obedient 
 and to regulate and compose itself as the mind commands, 
 and for the mind not to be regulated and composed by itself 
 
 38. It is not right to vex ourselves at things, 
 For they care nought about it.^ 
 
 ^ The end of this section is unintelligible. 
 
 « Plato, Pol. VI. 486. 
 
 ^ From the Bellerophon of Euripides. 
 
M. Antoninus. VII. 137 
 
 39. To tlie immortal gods and us give joy. 
 
 do. Life must be reaped like the ripe cars of corn : 
 
 Que man is born ; another dies.' i 
 
 41. If gods care not for me and for my children, 
 There is a reason for it. 
 
 42. For the good is with me, and the just.^ 
 
 43. No joining others in their wailing, no violent emotion. 
 
 44. From Plato :^ But I would make this man a sufficient 
 answer, which is this : Thou sayest not well, if thou thinkest 
 that a man who is good for anything at all ought to compute 
 the hazard of life or death, and should not rather look to this 
 only in all that he does, whether he is doing what is just or 
 unjust, and the works of a good or a bad man. 
 
 45. ^ For thus it is, men of Athens, in tiiith : wherever a 
 man has placed himself thinking it the best place for him, or 
 has been placed by a commander, there in my opinion he 
 ought to stay and to abide the hazard, taking nothing into 
 the reckoning, either death or anything else, before the base- 
 ness [of deserting his -post], 
 
 46. But, my good friend, reflect whether that which is noble 
 and good is not something difierent fi'om saving and being 
 saved ; forf as to a man living such or such a time, at least 
 one who is really a man, consider if this is not a thing to be 
 dismissed from the thoughts :| and there must bo no love of 
 life : but as to these matters a man must intrust them to the 
 deity and believe what the women say, that no man can 
 escape his destiny, the next inquiry being how he may best \ 
 live the time that he has to live.^° ' 
 
 " From the Hypsipyle of Euripides. Cicero (Tuscul. m. 25.) has 
 ti-anslated six lines from Euripides, and among them are these two 
 lines, — 
 
 Eeddenda terrae est terra : tum vita omnibus 
 Metenda ut fruges : Sic jubet necessitas. 
 
 ' See Aristophanes, Acharnenses, v. G61. 
 
 ^ From the Apologia, c. 16. 
 
 10 Plato, Gorgias, c. QS (512). In this passage the text of Antoninus 
 has iareov, which is perhaps right; but there is a difficulty in the 
 words f-O] yap tovto /xey, rh ^riv oTcoaovS^ XP^^^^ rovye ws a.Ky]dus &vZpa 
 
138 M. Ayitoninus. ViL 
 
 47. Look round at the courses of the stars, as if thou wert 
 going along with them ; and constantly consider the changes 
 of the elements into one another ; for such thoughts purge 
 away the filth of the terrene life. 
 
 48. This is a fine saying of Plato •}^ That he who is dis- 
 coursing about men should look also at earthly things as if 
 he viewed them from some higher place ; should look at them 
 in their assemblies, armies, agricultm-al labours, marriages, 
 treaties, births, deaths, noise of the courts of justice, desert 
 places, various nations of barbarians, feasts, lamentations, 
 markets, a mixture of all things and an orderly combination 
 of contraries. 
 
 49. Consider the j)ast; such great changes of political 
 supremacies. Thou may est foresee also the things which 
 will be. For they will certainly be of like form, and it is 
 not possible that they should deviate from the order of the 
 things which take place now : accordingly to have contem- 
 plated human life for forty years is the same as to have contem- 
 plated it for ten thousand years. For what more wilt thou see ? 
 
 50. That which has grown from the earth to the earth, 
 But that which has sprung from heavenly seed, 
 Back to the heavenly realms returns.^* 
 
 This is either a dissolution of the mutual involution of the 
 atoms, or a similar dispersion of the unsentient elements. 
 
 51. With food and di-inks and cunning magic arts 
 Turning the channel's course to 'scape from death.^^ 
 
 The breeze which heaven has sent 
 We must endure, and toil without complaining. 
 
 52. Another may be more expert in casting his opponent ; 
 but he is not more social, nor more modest, nor better dis- 
 ciplined to meet all that happens, nor more considerate with 
 respect to the faults of his neighbours. 
 
 eareoj/ eVri, Koi ov, &c. The conjecture €vkt4ov for eareoj/ does not 
 mend the matter. 
 
 " It is said that this is not in the extant Nvri tings of Plato. 
 
 '2 From the Chrysippus of Euripides. 
 
 ^3 The tirst two lines are from the Suppliccs of Euripides, v. 1 1 10. 
 
M. Antoninus. VII. 139 
 
 53. Where any work can be done conformably to tlio 
 reason which is common to gods and men, there we have 
 nothing to fear : for where we are able to get profit by 
 means of the activity which is successful and proceeds ac- 
 cording to our constitution, there no harm is to be suspected. 
 
 54. Everywhere and at all times it is in thy power piously 
 to acquiesce in thy present condition, and to behave justly to 
 those who arc about thee, and to exert thy skill upon thy 
 present thoughts, that nothing shall steal into them without 
 being well examined. 
 
 55. Do not look around thee to discover other men's ruling 
 principles, but look straight to this, to what nature leads 
 thee, both the universal natui-e through the things which 
 happen to thee, and thy own nature through the acts which 
 must be done by thee. But every being ought to do that 
 which is according to its constitution ; and all other things 
 have been constituted for the sake of rational beings, just as 
 among irrational things the inferior for the sake of the 
 superior, but the rational for the sake of one another. 
 
 The j)i'ii^e principle then in man's constitution is the 
 social. And the second is not to yield to the persuasions of 
 the body, for it is the peculiar office of the rational and in- 
 teltlgent motion to circumscribe itself, and never to be over- 
 powered either by the motion of the senses or of the appe- 
 tites, for both are animal ; but the intelligent motion claims 
 superiority and does not permit itself to be overpowered 
 by the others. And with good reason, for it is formed by 
 nature to use all of them. The third thing in the rational 
 constitution is freedom from error and from deception. Let 
 then the ruling principle holding ftist to these things go 
 straight on, and it has what is its own. 
 
 56. Consider thyself to be dead, and to have completed thy 
 life up to the present time ; and live according to nature the 
 remainder which is allowed thee. 
 
 57. Love that only which happens to thee and is spun 
 with the thread of thy destiny. For what is more suitable ? 
 
 68. In everything which happens keep before thy eyes 
 
140 M. Antoninus. VIL 
 
 those to wliom the same things happened, and how they wero 
 vexed, and treated them as strange things, and found fault 
 with them : and now where are they ? Nowhere. Why 
 then dost thou too choose to act in the same way ? and why 
 dost thou not leave these agitations which are foreign to 
 nature, to those who cause them and those who are moved 
 by them ? and why art thou not altogether intent upon the 
 right way of making use of the things which happen to thee ? 
 for then thou wilt use tliem well, and they will be a mate- 
 rial for thee [to work on]. Only attend to thyself, and 
 resolve to be a good man in every act which thou doest : and 
 remember * * * « ^-u 
 
 59. Look within. Within is the fountain of good, and it 
 will ever bubble up, if thou wilt ever dig. 
 
 60. The body ought to be compact, and to shov/no irregu- 
 larity either in motion or attitude. For what the mind shows 
 in the face by maintaining in it the expression of intelligence 
 and propriety, that ought to be required also in the whole 
 body. But all these things should be observed without 
 affectation. 
 
 61. The art of life is more like the wrestler's art than the 
 dancer's, in respect of this, that it should stand ready and 
 firm to meet onsets which are sudden and unexpected. 
 
 62. Constantly observe who those are whose approbation 
 thou wishest to have, and what ruling principles they possess. 
 For then thou wilt neither blame those who offend involun- 
 tarily, nor wilt thou want theu' approbation, if thou lookest 
 to the sources of their opinions and appetites. 
 
 63. Every soul, the philosopher says, is involuntarily 
 deprived of truth ; consequently in the same way it is 
 deprived of justice and temperance and benevolence and 
 everything of the kind. It is most necessary to boar this 
 constantly in mind, for thus thou wilt be more gentle to- 
 wards all. 
 
 1* This section is obscure, and the conclusion is so corrupt that it is 
 impossible to give any probable meaning to it. It is better to leave ii 
 as it is than to patch it up, as some critics and translators have done. 
 
M. Antoninus. VIl. Ill 
 
 64. Ill every pain let this tliouglit be present, tluit tlicro 
 is no dishonour in it, nor does it make the governing intel- 
 ligence worse, for it does not damage the intelligence either 
 so far as the intelligence is rational ^^ or so far as it is social. 
 Indeed in the case of most pains let this remark of Epicurus 
 aid thee, that pain is neither intolerable nor everlasting, if 
 tliou bearest in mind that it has its limits, and if thou addest 
 nothing to it in imagination : and remember this too, that 
 we do not perceive that many things which are disagreeable 
 to us are the same as pain, such as excessive drowsiness, and 
 the being scorched by heat, and the having no appetite. 
 When then thou art discontented about any of these things, 
 say to thyself, that thou art yielding to pain. 
 
 65. Take care not to feel towards the inhuman, as they 
 feel towai'ds men.^^ 
 
 66. How do we know if Telauges was not superior in 
 character to Socrates ? for it is not enough that Socrates died 
 a more noble death, and disputed more skilfully wdth the 
 sophists, and passed the night in the cold with more en- 
 durance, and that when he was bid to arrest Leon ^' of 
 Salamis, he considered it more noble to refuse, and that he 
 walked in a swaggering way in the streets ^^ — though as to 
 this fact one may have great doubts if it was true. But we 
 ought to inquire, what kind of a soul it was that Socrates 
 possessed, and if he was able to be content with being just 
 towards men and pious towards the gods, neither idly vexed 
 on account of men's villany, nor yet making himself a slave 
 to any man's ignorance, nor receiving as strange anything 
 
 '5 The text has vXiK-fj, which it has been proposed to alter to KoyiKi], 
 and this change is necessary. We shall then have in this section 
 XoyiKT] and K0LVWVLK7} assoclated, as we Lave in s. G8 \oyiK-r] and 
 TToXiriK-r], and in s. 72. 
 
 ^^ -I have followed Gataker's conjecture ol hrdvdpcoiroi instead of the 
 MSS. reading ol oLudpwiroi. 
 
 ^^ Leon of Salamis. See Plato, Epist. 7 ; Apolog. c. 20 : Epictems, 
 IV. i; 160 ; TV. 7, 30. 
 
 1^ Aristophan. Nub. 3G2. on ^pivBv^i t eV Tolaiv bluls ko). tu 
 
142 M. Antonmus. VIL 
 
 that fell to liis stare out of tlie universal, nor enduring it as 
 intolerable, nor allowing liis understanding to sympathize 
 with the affects of the miserable flesh. 
 
 67. Nature has not so mingledf [the intelligence] with the 
 composition of the body, as not to have allowed thee the 
 power of circumscribing thyself and of bringing under sub- 
 jection to thyself all that is thy own ; for it is very possible 
 to be a divine man and to be recognised as such by no one. 
 Always bear this in mind ; and another thing too, that very 
 little indeed is necessary for living a happy life. And 
 because thou hast despaired of becoming a dialectician and 
 skilled in the knowledge of nature, do not for this reason 
 renounce the hope of being both free and modest and social 
 and obedient to God. 
 
 68._It is in thy power to live free from. all .compulsion in 
 the greatest tranquillity of mind, even if all the world cry 
 out against thee as much as they choose, and even if wild 
 beasts tear in pieces the members of this kneaded matter 
 which has grown aromid thee. For what hinders the mind 
 in the midst of all this from maintaining itself in tranquil- 
 lity and in a just judgment of all surrounding things and in 
 a ready use of the objects which are presented to it, so that 
 the judgment may say to the thing which falls under its 
 observation : This thou art in substance [reality], though in 
 men's opinion thou may est appear to be of a different 
 kind ; and the use shall say to that which falls under the 
 hand : Thou art the thing that I was seeking ; for to me that 
 which presents itself is always a material for virtue both 
 rational and political, and in a word, for the exercise of art, 
 which belongs to man or God. For everything which 
 happens has a relationship either to God or man, and is 
 neither new nor difficult to handle, but usual and apt matter 
 to work on. 
 
 69. The perfection of moral character consists in this, in 
 passing every day as the last, and in being neither violently 
 excited nor torpid nor playing the hypocrite. 
 
 70. The gods who are immortal are not vexed because 
 
M. Antoninus. VII. 143 
 
 during so long a time tlicy must tolerate continually men 
 sucli as tliey are and so many of tliem bad ; and besides this, 
 they also take care of them in all ways. But tliou, who art 
 destined to end so soon, art thou wearied of enduring the 
 bad, and this too when thou art one of them ? 
 
 71. It is a ridiculous thing for a man not to fly from his 
 own badness, which is indeed possible, but to fly from other 
 men's badness, which is imj)ossible. 
 
 72. Whatever the rational and j^olitical [social] faculty 
 finds to be neither intelligent nor social, it properly judges 
 to be inferior to itself. 
 
 73. When thou hast done a good act and another has 
 received it, why dost thou still look for a third thing besides 
 these, as fools do, either to have the reputation of having 
 done a good act or to obtain a return ? 
 
 74. No man is tired of receiving what is useful. But it is 
 useful to act according to nature. Do not then be tii*ed of 
 receiving what is useful by doing it to others. 
 
 75. The natui-e of the All moved to make the universe. 
 But now either everything that takes place comes by way of 
 consequence or [continuity] ; or even the chief things towards 
 which the ruling power of the universe directs its own move- 
 ment are governed by no rational principle. If this is re- 
 membered it will make thee more tranquil in many things. 
 (VI. 44 ; IX. 28.)^^ 
 
 ^9 It is not easy to understand this section. It has been suggested 
 that there is some error in t) aXoyiara, &c. Some of the translators 
 have made nothing of the passage, and they have somewhat perverted 
 the words. The first proposition is, that tlie universe was made by 
 some sufficient power. A beginning of the universe is assumed, and a 
 power which framed an order. The next question is, How are things 
 produced now ; or, in other words, by what power do forms appear in 
 continuous succession ? The answer, according to Antoninus, may be 
 this: It is by virtue of the original constitution of things that all 
 change and succession have been effected and are efiected. And this 
 is intelligible m a sense, if we admit that the universe is always one 
 and the same, a continuity of identity ; as much one and the same as 
 man is one and the same, which he believes himself to be, though he 
 also believes and cannot help believing that both in his body and in hi? 
 
144 M. Antoninus. VIl. 
 
 thoughts there is change and succession. There is no real discontinuity 
 then in the universe; and if we say that there was an order framed in 
 the beginning and that the things which are now produced are a 
 consequence of a previous arrangement, we speak of things as we are 
 compelled to view them, as forming a series or succession ; just as we 
 speak of the changes in our own bodies and the sequence of our own 
 thoughts. But as there are no intervals, not even intervals infinitely 
 small, between any two supposed states of any one thing, so there are 
 no intervals, not even infinitely small, between what we call one thing 
 and any other tiling which we speak of as immediately preceding or 
 following it. What we call time is an idea derived from our notion of 
 a succession of things or events, an idea which is a part of our constitu- 
 tion, but not an idea whicli we can suppose to belong to an infinite 
 intelligence and power. The conclusion tlicn is certain that the present 
 and the past, the production of present tilings and the supposed original 
 order, out of which we say that present things now come, are one : and 
 the present productive power and the so-called past arrangement are 
 only different names for one thing. I suppose then that Antoninus 
 wrote here as people sometimes talk now, and that his real meaning is 
 not exactly expressed by his words. There are certainly otlier passages 
 from wliich, I think, that we may collect that he had notions of pro- 
 duction something like what I have expressed. 
 
 We now come to the alternative : " or even the chief things 
 
 principle." I do not exactly know what he means by to. Kvpiwrara, 
 " the chief," or, " the most excellent," or whatever it is. But as he 
 speaks elsewhere of inferior and superior things, and of the inferior 
 being for the use of the superior, and of rational beings being the 
 highest, he may here mean rational beings. He also in this alternative 
 assumes a governing power of the universe, and tliat it acts by directing 
 its power towards these chief objects, or making its special, proper, 
 motion towards them. And here he uses the noun (6/j/.n5 j " movement," 
 which contains the same notion as the verb (wp/x-na-e) " moved," which 
 he used at the beginning of the paragraph when he was speaking of 
 the making of the universe. If we do not accept the first hypothesis, 
 he says, we must take the conclusion of the second, that the " chief 
 things towards which the ruling power of the universe directs its own 
 movement are governed by no rational principle." The meaning then 
 is, if there is a meaning in it, that though there is a governing power, 
 which stiives to give eliect to its efforts, we must conclude that there is no 
 rational direction of anything, if the power which first made the universe 
 does not in some way govern it still. Besides, if we assume that any- 
 thing is now produced or now exists without the action of the supreme 
 intelligence, and yet that this intelligence makes an effort to act, we 
 obtain a oonchisiou which cannot be reconciled with the nature of a 
 
M. Antoninus. VII. 145 
 
 guprcme power, whose existence Antoninus always assumes. Tlie 
 tranqtiillity that a man may gain from these reflections must result from 
 his rt-jecting the second Jjypothesis, and accepting the first; whatever 
 may be the exact sense in which the emperor undei-stood the first. Or. 
 as he says elsewhere, if there is no providence which governs the world, 
 man has at least the power of (governing himself according to the 
 constitution of his nature ; and so he may be tranquil, if he does the 
 best that he can. 
 
 If there is no error in the passage, it is worth the labour to discover 
 the writer's exact meaning ; for I think that he had a meaning, though 
 people may not agree wliat it was. (Compare ix. 28.) If I have 
 rightly explained the emperor's meaning in this and other passages, he 
 has touched the solution of a great question. 
 
146 M. Antoninus. VIIL 
 
 VIII. 
 
 THIS reflection also tends to tlie removal of the desire of 
 empty fame, that it is no longer in thy power to have 
 lived the whole of thy life, or at least thy life from thy 
 youth upwards, like a philosopher ; but both to many others 
 and to thyself it is plain that thou art far from philosophy. 
 Thou hast fallen into disorder then, so that it is no longer 
 easy for thee to get the reputation of a philosopher ; and thy 
 plan of life also opposes it. If then thou hast truly seen 
 where the matter lies, throw away the thought, How thou 
 shalt seem [to others], and be content if thou shalt live the 
 rest of thy life in such wise as thy nature wills. Observe 
 then what it wills, and let nothing else distract thee ; for 
 thou hast had experience of many wanderings without having 
 found happiness anywhere, not in syllogisms, nor in wealth, 
 nor in reputation, nor in enjoyment, nor anywhere. Where 
 is it then? In doing what man's nature requires. How 
 then shall a man do this ? If he has principles from which 
 come his affects and his acts. What principles ? Those 
 which relate to good and bad : the belief that there is no- 
 thing good for man, which does not make him just, temperate, 
 manly, free ; and that there is nothing bad, which does not 
 do the contrary to what has been mentioned. 
 
 2. On the occasion of every act ask thyself, How is this 
 with respect to me ? Shall I repent of it ? A little time 
 and I am dead, and all is gone. What more d'^ I seek, if 
 what I am now doing is the work of an intelligent living being, 
 and a social being, and one who is under the same law with God? 
 
 3. Alexander and Caius ^ and Pompeius, what are they in 
 comparison with Diogenes and Heraclitus and Socrates? 
 For they were acquainted with things, and their causes 
 
 1 Caius is C. Julius Caesar, the dictator; and Pompeius is Ca. 
 Pompeius, named Magnus. 
 
M. Antoninus. VIII. 147 
 
 [forms], and their matter, and tlie ruling princijiles of these 
 men were the same [or conformable to their jjursuitsj. But 
 as to the others, how many things had they to care for, and 
 to how many things were they slaves. 
 
 4. [Consider] that men will do the same things neverthe- 
 less, even though thou shouldst burst. 
 
 5. This is the chief thing: Be not i3erturbed, for all things 
 are according to the nature of the universal ; and in a little 
 time thou wilt be nobody and nowhere, like Iladrianus and 
 Augustus. In the next place having fixed thy eyes steadily 
 on thy business look at it, and at the same time remembering 
 that it is thy duty to be a good man, and what man's nature 
 demands, do that without turning aside ; and speak as it seems 
 to thee most just, only let it be with a good disposition and 
 with modesty and without hypocrisy. 
 
 6. The nature of the universal has this work to do, to 
 remove to that place the things which are in this, to change 
 them, to take them away hence, and to carry them there. All 
 things are change, yet we need not fear anything new. All 
 things are familiar [to us] ; but the distribution of them still 
 remains the same. 
 
 7. Every nature is contented with itself when it goes on 
 its way well ; and a rational nature goes on its way well, 
 when in its thoughts it assents to nothing false or uncertain, 
 and when it dii-ects its movements to social acts only, and 
 when it confines its desires and aversions to the things which 
 are in its power, and when it is satisfied with everything that 
 is assigned to it by the common natiu-e. For of this common 
 nature every particular nature is a part, as the natui-e of the 
 leaf is a part of the nature of the plant ; except that in the 
 plant the nature of the leaf is part of a nature which has not 
 perception or reason, and is subject to be impeded ; but the 
 natui-e of man is part of a nature which is not subject to im- 
 pediments, and is intelligent and just, since it gives to every- 
 thing in equal portions and according to its worth, times, 
 substance, cause [form], activity, and incident. But examine, 
 not to discover that any one thing compared with any other 
 
148 M. Ayitoninus, VIII. 
 
 single thing is equal in all respects, but by taking all the 
 parts together of one thing and comparing them with all the 
 parts together of another. 
 
 8. Thou hast not leisure [or ability] to read. But thou 
 hast leisure [or ability] to check arrogance : thou hast leisure 
 to be superior to pleasure and pain : thou hast leisure to be 
 superior to love of fame, and not to be vexed at stupid and 
 ungrateful people, nay even to care for them. 
 
 9. Let no man any longer hear thee finding fault with the 
 court life or with thy own. (v. 16.) 
 
 10. Eepentance is a kind of self-reproof for having neg- 
 lected something useful ; but that which is good must be 
 something useful, and the perfect good man should look after 
 it. But no such man would ever repent of having refused any 
 sensual pleasure. Pleasure then is neither good nor useful. 
 
 11. This thing, what is it in itself, in its own constitu- 
 tion ? What is its substance and material ? And what its 
 causal nature [or form] ? And what is it doing in the 
 world ? And how long does it subsist ? 
 
 12. When thou risest from sleep with reluctance, remem- 
 ber that it is according to thy constitution and according to 
 human nature to perform social acts, but sleeping is common 
 also to irrational animals. But that which is according to each 
 individual's nature is also more peculiarly its own, and more 
 suitable to its nature, and indeed also more agreeable, (v. 1.) 
 
 13. Constantly and, if it be possible, on the occasion of 
 every impression on the soul, apply to it the princijDles of 
 Physic, of Ethic, and of Dialectic. 
 
 14. Whatever man thou meetest with, immediately say to 
 thyself : W hat opinions has this man about good and bad ? For 
 if with respect to pleasure and pain and the causes of each, 
 and with respect to fame and ignominy, death and life he has 
 such and such opinions, it will seem nothing wonderful or 
 strange to me, if he does such and such things ; and I shall 
 bear in mind that he is compell(3d to do so.^ 
 
 2 Antoninus V. 16. Thucydides, iii. 10 ; eV yap red SiaWdaaovri rrjs 
 yv(Jof.ir)s Kol at Siacpopal twv epywv KaQiinavTai. 
 
M. Antoninus. VIII. 149 
 
 14. Remember that as it is a shame to be surprised if the 
 fig-tree produces figs, so it is to be surprised if the world 
 produces such and such things of which it is productive ; and 
 for the physician and the helmsman it is a shame to be 
 surj^rised, if a man has a fever, or if the wind is unfavourable. 
 
 16. Eemember that to change thy opinion and to follow 
 him who corrects thy error is as consistent with freedom as 
 it is to persist in thy error. For it is thy own, the activity 
 which is exerted according to thy own movement and judg- 
 ment, and indeed according to thy own understanding too. 
 
 17. If a thing is in thy own power, why dost thou do it ? 
 but if it is in the power of another, whom dost thou blame ? 
 the atoms [chance] or the gods ? Both are foolish. Thou 
 must blame nobody. For if thou canst, correct [that which 
 is the cause] ; but if thou canst not do this, correct at least the 
 thing itself ; but if thou canst not do even this, of what use is 
 it to thee to find fault ? for nothing should be done without a 
 purpose. 
 
 18. That which has died falls not out of the universe. If 
 it stays here, it also changes here, and is dissolved into its 
 proper parts, which are elements of the universe and of thy- 
 self. And these too change, and they murmur not. 
 
 19. Everything exists for some end, a horse, a vine. Why 
 dost thou wonder ? Even the sun will say, I am for some 
 purpose, and the rest of the gods will say the same. For 
 what purpose then art thou? to enjoy pleasure? See if 
 common sense allows this. 
 
 20. Nature has had regard in everything no less to the end 
 than to the beginning and the continuance, just like the man 
 who throws up a ball. What good is it then for the ball to 
 be thrown up, or harm for it to come down, or even to have 
 fallen? and what good is it to the bubble while it holds 
 together, or what harm when it is burst ? The same may be 
 said of a light also. 
 
 21. Turn it [the body] inside out, and see what kind of 
 thing it is ; and when it has grown old, what kind of thing it 
 becomes, and when it is diseased. 
 
150 M. Antoninus. VIII. 
 
 Short lived are both the praiser and the praised, and the 
 rememberer and the remembered : and all this in a nook of 
 this part of the world ; and not even here do all agree, no, 
 not any one with himself : and the whole earth too is a point. 
 
 22. Attend to the matter which is before thee, whether it is 
 an opinion or an act or a word. 
 
 Thou sufferest this justly : for thou choosest rather to 
 become good to-morrow than to be good to-day. 
 
 23. Am I doing anything ? I do it with reference to the 
 good of mankind. Does anything happen to me ? I receive 
 it and refer it to the gods, and the source of all things, from 
 which all that happens is derived. 
 
 24. Such as bathing appears to thee — oil, sweat, dirt, filthy 
 water, all things disgusting — so is every part of life and 
 everything. 
 
 25. Lucilla saw Verus die, and then Lucilla died. Secunda 
 saw Maximus die, and then Secunda died. Epitynchanus saw 
 Diotimus die, and then Epitynchanus died. Antoninus 
 saw Faustina die, and then Antoninus died. Such is every- 
 thing. Celer saw Hadrianus die, and then Celer died. And 
 those sharp-witted men, either seers or men inflated with 
 pride, where are they? for instance the sharp-witted men, 
 Charax and Demetrius the Platonist and Eudaemon, and any 
 one else like them. All ephemeral, dead long ago. Some 
 indeed have not been remembered even for a short time, 
 and others have become the heroes of fables, and again others 
 have disappeared even from fables. Remember this then, 
 that this little compound, thyself, must either be dissolved, or 
 thy poor breath must be extinguished, or be removed and 
 placed elsewhere. 
 
 26. It is satisfaction to a man to do the proper works of a 
 man. Now it is a proper work of a man to be benevolent to 
 his own kind, to despise the movements of the senses, to form 
 a just judgment of plausible appearances, and to take a 
 survey of the nature of the universe and of the things which 
 happen in it. 
 
 27. There are three relations fbotween thee and other 
 
M. Antoninus. VI 1 1. lol 
 
 things] : the one to the body^ which surrounds thee ; the 
 second to the divine cause from which all things come to all • 
 and the third to those who live with thee. 
 
 28. Pain is either an evil to the body — then let the body 
 say what it thinks of it — or to the soul ; but it is in the 
 power of the soul to maintain its own serenity and tran- 
 quillity, and not to think that pain is an evil. For everv 
 judgment and movement and desire and aversion is within, 
 and no evil ascends so high. 
 
 29. Wipe out thy imaginations by often saying to thyself : 
 now it is in my power to let no badness be in this soul, nor 
 desire nor any perturbation at all ; but looking at all things 
 I see what is their nature, and I use each according to its 
 value. — Eemember this power which thou hast from nature. 
 
 30. Speak both in the senate and to every man, whoever 
 he may be, appropriately, not with any affectation : use j^lain 
 discourse. 
 
 31. Augustus' court, wife, daughter, descendants, ancestors, 
 sister, Agrippa, kinsmen, intimates, friends, Areius,* Maecenas, 
 physicians and sacrificing priests — the whole court is dead. 
 Then turn to the rest, not considering the death of a single 
 man, [but of a whole race], as of the Pomj)eii ; and that 
 which is inscribed on the tombs — The last of his race. 
 Then consider what trouble those before them have had that 
 they might leave a successor ; and then, that of necessity 
 some one must be the last. Again here consider the death of 
 a whole race. 
 
 32. It is thy duty to order thy life well in every single 
 act ; and if every act does its duty, as far as is possible, be 
 content ; and no one is able to hinder thee so that each act 
 shall not do its duty— But something external will stand in 
 
 ^ The text has a'tnuv -which in Antoninus means '* form," " formal." 
 Accordingly Schultz recommends either Valkenaer's emendation ayyflov, 
 " body," or Corais' o-cc/jloltlov. Compare xii. 13, x. 38. 
 
 * Areius {Jipeios) was a philosopher, who was intimate with Augustus: 
 Sneton, Augustus, c. 89 ; Plutarch, Antoninus, 80 ; Dion Cassius, 51, 
 c. 16. ^ 
 
152 M. Antoninus. VIII. 
 
 the way — Nothing will stand in the way of thy acting justly 
 and soberly and considerately — But perhaps some other 
 active power will be hindered — Well, but by acquiescing in 
 the hindrance and by being content to transfer thy efforts to 
 that which is allowed, another opportunity of action is 
 immediately put before thee in place of that which was 
 hindered, and one which will adapt itself to this ordering of 
 which we are speaking. 
 
 33. Eeceive [wealth or prosperity] without arrogance ; and 
 be ready to let it go. 
 
 34. If thou didst ever see a hand cut off, or a foot, or a 
 head, lying anywhere apart from the rest of the body, such 
 does a man make himself, as far as he can, who is not content 
 with what happens, and separates himself from others, or 
 does anything unsocial. Suppose that thou hast detached 
 thyself from the natural unity — for thou wast made by 
 natm-e a part, but now thou hast cut thyself off — yet here 
 there is this beautiful provision, that it is in thy power again 
 to unite thyself. God has allowed this to no other part, after 
 it has been separated and cut asunder, to come together 
 again. But consider the kindness by which he has dis- 
 tinguished man, for he has put it in his power not to be 
 separated at all from the universal ; and when he has been 
 separated, he has allowed him to return and to be united and 
 to resume his place as a part. 
 
 35. As the nature of the universal has given to every 
 rational being all the other powers that it has,f so we have 
 received from it this power also. For as the universal 
 nature converts and fixes in its predestined place everything 
 which stands in the way and opposes it, and makes such 
 things a part of itself, so also the rational animal is able to 
 make every hindrance its own material, and to use it for such 
 purposes as it may have designed.^ 
 
 * The text is corrupt at the beginning of the paragraph, but the 
 meaning will appear if the second XoyiKoiu is changed into (iXcav : thougli 
 this change alone will not establish the grammatical completeness ol 
 the text. 
 
M. Antonimis. VIII. ];j3 
 
 36. Do not disturb thyself by thinking of the whole of thy 
 life. Let not thy thoughts at once embrace all the various 
 troubles wliich thou mayest expect to befall tlice : but on 
 every occasion ask thyself, What is there in this which is 
 intolerable and past bearing ? for thou wilt be ashamed to 
 confess. In the next place remember that neither the future 
 nor the past pains thee, but only the present. But this is 
 reduced to a very little, if thou only circumscribest it, and 
 chidest thy mind, if it is unable to hold out against even 
 this. 
 
 37. Does Panthea or Pergamus now sit by the tomb of 
 Verus?® Does Chaurias or Diotimus sit by the tomb of 
 Hadrianus? That would be ridiculous. Well, suppose they 
 did sit there, would the dead be conscious of it ? and if the 
 dead were conscious, would they be pleased ? and if they 
 were pleased, would that make them immortal ? Was it not in 
 the order of destiny that these persons too should first become 
 old women and old men and then die ? What then would 
 those do after these were dead ? All this is foul smell and 
 blood in a bag. 
 
 38. If thou canst see sharp, look and judge wisely,| says 
 the philosopher. 
 
 39. In the constitution of the rational animal I see no 
 virtue which is opposed to justice ; but I see a virtue which 
 is opposed to love of pleasure, and that is temperance. 
 
 40. If thou takest away thy opinion about that which 
 appears to give thee pain, thou thyself standest in perfect 
 security — Who is this self? — The reason — But I am not 
 reason — Be it so. Let then the reason itself not trouble 
 itself. But if any other part of thee suffers, let it have its 
 own opinion about itself (vii. 16.) 
 
 41. Hindi-ance to the perceptions of sense is an evil to the 
 animal nature. Hindrance to the movements [desires] is 
 equally an evil to the animal nature. And something else 
 also is equally an impediment and an evil to the constitution 
 of plants. So then that which is a hindrance to the in- 
 
 ^ '* Verus ■' is a conjecture of Sauinaise, and perhaps the true readmg. 
 
154 M. Antoninus. VIIL 
 
 telligence is an evil to the intelligent nature. Apply all 
 these things then to thyself. Does pain or sensuous pleasure 
 affect thee ? The senses will look to that. — Has any obstacle 
 opposed thee in thy efforts towards an object ? if indeed thou 
 wast making this effort absolutely [unconditionally, or 
 without any reservation], certainly this obstacle is an evil to 
 thee considered as a rational animal. But if thou takest [into 
 consideration] the usual course of things, thou hast not yet 
 been injured nor even impeded. The things however which 
 are proper to the understanding no other man is used to 
 impede, for neither fire, nor iron, nor tyrant, nor abuse, 
 touches it in any way. When it has been made a sphere, it 
 continues a sphere, (xi. 12.) 
 
 42. It is not fit that I should give myself pain, for I have 
 never intentionally given pain even to another. 
 
 43. Different things delight different people. But it is 
 my delight to keep the ruling faculty sound without turning 
 away either from any man or from any of the things which 
 happen to men, but looking at and receiving all with welcome 
 eyes and using everything according to its value. 
 
 44. See that thou secure this present time to thyself : for 
 those who rather pursue posthumous fame do not consider 
 that the men of after time will be exactly such as these 
 whom they cannot bear now ; and both are mortal. And 
 what is it in any way to thee if these men of after time 
 utter this or that sound, or have this or that opinion about 
 thee? 
 
 45. Take me and cast me where thou wilt ; for there I 
 shall keep my divine part tranquil, that is, content, if it can 
 feel and act conformably to its proper constitution. Is this 
 [change of place] sufficient reason why my soul should be 
 unhappy and worse than it was, depresse ?, expanded, 
 shrinking, affrighted? and what wilt thou find which is 
 sufficient reason for this ?^ 
 
 7 b^eyoix4vn in this passage seems to liave a passive sense. It is 
 difficult to find an apt expression for it and some of the other worda A 
 comparison with xi. 12, will help to explain the meaning. 
 
M. Antoninus. VJII. 155 
 
 46. Nothing can liapixn to any man wliicli is nut a Luman 
 accident, nor to an ox which is not according to the nature 
 of an ox, nor to a vine which is not according to the nature 
 of a vine, nor to a stone which is not pro2)er to a stone. If 
 then there happens to each thing both what is usual and 
 natural, why shouldst thou complain ? For the common 
 nature brings nothing which may not be borne by thee. 
 
 47. Jf thou art pained by any external thing, it is not this 
 thing that disturbs thee, but thy own judgment about it. 
 And it is in thy power to wipe out this judgment now. But 
 if anything in thy own disposition gives thee pain, who 
 hinders thee from correcting thy opinion ? And even if thou 
 art pained because thou art not doing some particular thing 
 which seems to thee to be right, why dost thou not rather 
 act than complain ? — But some insuperable obstacle is in the 
 way ? — Do not be gi'ieved then, for the cause of its not being 
 done depends not on thee — But it is not worth while to live, 
 if this cannot be done — Take thy departure then from life 
 contentedly, just as he dies who is in full activity, and well 
 pleased too with the things which are obstacles. 
 
 48. Remember that the ruling faculty is invincible, when 
 self-collected it is satisfied with itself, if it does nothing which 
 it does not choose to do, even if it resist from mere obstinacy. 
 What then will it be when it forms a judgment about 
 anything aided by reason and deliberately ? Therefore the 
 mind which is free from passions is a citadel, for man has 
 nothing more secure to which he can fly for refuge and for the 
 future be inexpugnable. He then who has not seen this is an 
 ignorant man ; but he who has seen it and does not fly to this 
 refuge is unhappy. 
 
 49. Say nothing more to thyself than what the first 
 appearances report. Suppose that it has been reported to 
 thee that a certain person speaks ill of thee. This has been 
 reported ; but that thou hast been injured, that has not been 
 reported. I see that my child is sick. I do see ; but that he 
 is in danger, I do not see. Thus then always abide by the 
 fii-st appearances, and add nothing thyself from within, and 
 
156 M. Antoninus. VIII. 
 
 then nothing happens to thee. Or rather add something, 
 like a man who knows everything that happens in the 
 world. 
 
 50. A cucumber is bitter— Throw it away. — There arc 
 briars in the road — Turn aside from them. — This is enough. 
 Do not add, And why were such things made in the world ? 
 For thou wilt be ridiculed by a man who is acquainted with 
 nature, as thou wouldst be ridiculed by a carpenter and shoe- 
 maker if thou didst find fault because thou seest in their 
 workshop shavings and cuttings from the things which they 
 make. And yet they have places into which they can throw 
 these shavings and cuttings, and the universal natui-e has no 
 external space; but the wondrous part of her art is that 
 though she has circumscribed herself, everything within her 
 which appears to decay and to grow old and to be useless she 
 changes into herself, and again makes other new things from 
 these very same, so that she requires neither substance from 
 without nor wants a place into which she may cast that which 
 decays. She is content then with her own space, and her own 
 matter and her own art. 
 
 51. Neither in thy actions be sluggish nor in thy con- 
 versation without method, nor wandering in thy thoughts, 
 nor let there be in thy soul inward contention nor external 
 effusion, nor in life be so busy as to have no leisure. 
 
 Suppose that men kill thee, cut thee in pieces, curse thee. 
 What then can these things do to prevent thy mind from 
 remaining pure, wise, sober, just ? For instance, if a man 
 should stand by a limpid pure spring, and curse it, the spring 
 never ceases sending up potable water ; and if he should cast 
 clay into it or filth, it will speedily disperse them and wash 
 them out, and will not be at all polluted. How then shalt 
 thou possess a perpetual fountain [and not a mere well] ? By 
 forming | thyself hourly to freedom conjoined with content- 
 ment, simplicity and modesty. 
 
 52. He who does not know what the world is, does not 
 know where he is. And he who does not know for what 
 purpose the world exists, does not know who he is, nor what 
 
M. Antoninus, VIII. 157 
 
 the world is. But he wlio has failed in any one of these 
 things could not even say for what purpose he exists himself. 
 What then dost thou think of him who [avoids or] seeks the 
 praise of those who applaud, of men who know not either 
 where they are or who they are ? 
 
 53. Dost thou wish to be praised by a man who curses him- 
 self thrice every hour ? w^ouldst thou wish to please a man 
 who does not please himself ? Does a man please himself who 
 repents of nearly everything that he does ? 
 
 54. No longer let thy breathing only act in concert with 
 the air which surrounds thee, but let thy intelligence also 
 now be in harmony with the intelligence which embraces all 
 things. For the intelligent power is no less diffused in all 
 parts and pervades all things for him who is willing to 
 draw it to him than the aerial power for him who is able to 
 respire it. 
 
 55. Generally, wickedness does no harm at all to the 
 universe ; and particularly, the wickedness [of one man] 
 does no harm to another. It is only harmful to him who has 
 it in his power to be released from it, as soon as he shall 
 choose. 
 
 56. To my own free will the free will of my neighbour is 
 just as indifferent as his jjoor breath and flesh. For though 
 we are made especially for the sake of one another, still the 
 ruling power of each of us has its own office, for otherwise 
 my neighbour's wickedness would be my harm, which God has 
 not willed in order that my unhappiness may not depend on 
 another. 
 
 57. The sun appears to be poured down, and in all 
 directions indeed it is diffused, yet it is not effused. For 
 this diffiision is extension : Accordingly its rays are called 
 Extensions [aKxtves] because they are extended [ciTro tov iKT^iv- 
 €o-^at].* But one may judge what kind of a thing a ray is, if 
 he looks at the sun's light passing through a narrow opening 
 into a darkened room, for it is extended in a right line, and 
 as it were is divided when it meets with any solid body which 
 
 ^ A piece of bad etymology. 
 
 / 
 
158 M. Antoninus, VIIL 
 
 stands in the way and intercepts the air beyond ; but there 
 the light remains fixed and does not glide or fall off. Such 
 then ought to be the out-pouring and diffusion of the under- 
 standing, and it should in no way be an effusion, but an 
 extension, and it should make no violent or impetuous 
 collision with the obstacles which are in its way ; nor yet fall 
 down, but be fixed and enlighten that which receives it. For 
 a body will deprive itself of the illumination, if it does not 
 admit it. 
 
 58. He who fears death either fears the loss of sensation 
 or a different kind of sensation. But if thou shalt have no 
 sensation, neither wilt thou feel any harm ; and if thou shalt 
 acquire another kind of sensation, thou wilt be a different 
 kind of living being and thou wilt not cease to live. 
 
 59. Men exist for the sake of one another. Teach them 
 then or bear with them. 
 
 60. lu one way an arrow moves, in another way the mind. 
 The mind indeed both when it exercises caution and when it 
 is employed about inquiry, moves straight onward not the 
 less, and to its object. 
 
 61. Enter into every man's ruling faculty; and also let 
 every other man enter into thine.^ 
 
 ^ (JuDipare Epictetus, iii. ^, VI, 
 
 ^ 
 
M. Antoninus. IX, 15.9 
 
 IX. 
 
 HE who acts unjustly acts impiously. For since tlie 
 universal natui-e has made rational animals for the sake 
 of one another to help one another according to their deserts, 
 but in no way to injure one another, he who ti'ansgresses her 
 will, is clearly guilty of impiety towards the highest divinity. 
 And he too who lies is guilty of impiety to the same divinity ; 
 for the imiversal natui-e is the nature of things that are ; and 
 things that are have a relation to all things that come into 
 existence.^ And further, this universal nature is named 
 truth, and is the prime cause of all things that are true. He 
 then who lies intentionally is guilty of impiety inasmuch as 
 he acts unjustly by deceiving ; and he also who lies uninten- 
 tionally, inasmuch as he is at variance with the universal 
 nature, and inasmuch as he disturbs the order by fighting 
 against the nature of the world : for he fights against it, who 
 is moved of himself to that which is contrary to truth, for he 
 had received powers from nature through the neglect of 
 which he is not able now to distinguish falsehood from truth. 
 
 ^ " As tliere is not any action or natural event, which we are ac- 
 quainted with, so single and unconnected as not to Lave a respect to some 
 other actions and events, so, possibly each of them, when it has not an 
 immediate, may yet have a remote, natural relation to other actions 
 and events, much beyond the compass of this present world." Again : 
 " Things seemingly the most insignificant imoginable, are perpetually 
 observed to be necessary conditions to other things of the greatest 
 importance ; so that any one thing whatever, may, for aught we know 
 to the coutraiy, be a necessary condition to • any other. ' — Butler's 
 Analogy, Chap. 7. See all the chapter. Some critics take to 
 inrdpxovra in this passage of Antoninus to be the same as ra ovra: but 
 if that were so, he might have said irphs &\\r]\a instead of irphs to 
 virdpxovra. Perhaps the meaning of ivphs to. v-Kapxovra may be ' to aU 
 prior things.' It so, the translation is still correct. See vi.' oS. 
 
160 M. Antoninus. IX. 
 
 And indeed he wlio pursues pleasure as good, and avoids pain 
 as evil, is guilty of impiety. For of necessity such a man 
 must often find fault with the universal nature, alleging that 
 it assigns things to the bad and the good contrary to their 
 deserts, because frequently the bad are in the enjoyment of 
 pleasure and possess the things which procure pleasure, but 
 the good have pain for their share and the things which cause 
 pain. And further, he who is afraid of pain will sometimes 
 also be afraid of some of the things which will happen in the 
 world, and even this is impiety. And he who pursues 
 pleasure will not abstain from injustice, and this is plainly 
 impiety. Now with respect to the things towards which the 
 universal nature is equally affected — for it would not have 
 made both, unless it was equally affected towards both — 
 towards these they who wish to follow nature should be of 
 the same mind with it, and equally affected. With respect to 
 pain, then, and pleasure, or death and life, or honour and 
 dishonour, which the universal nature employs equally, who- 
 ever is not equally affected is manifestly acting impiously. 
 And I say that the universal nature employs them equally, 
 instead of saying that they happen alike to those who are 
 produced in continuous series and to those who come after 
 them by virtue of a certain original movement of Providence, 
 according to which it moved from a certain beginning to this 
 ordering of things, having conceived certain principles of the 
 things which were to be, and having determined powers 
 productive of beings and of changes and of such like succes- 
 sions, (vii. 75). 
 
 2. It would be a man's happiest lot to depart from mankind 
 without having had any taste of lying and hypocrisy and 
 luxui'y and pride. However to breathe out one's life when 
 a man has had enough of these things is the next best voyage, 
 as the saying is. Hast thou determined to abide with vice, 
 and has not experience yet induced thee to fly from this 
 pestilence ? For tlie destruction of the understanding is a 
 pestilence, much more indeed than any such corruption and 
 change of this atmosphere wliich surrounds us. For this 
 
M. Antoninus. IX. 161 
 
 corruption is a pestilence of animals so far as they ara 
 animals ; but the other is a pestilence of men so far as they 
 ai'C men. 
 
 ■ 3. Do not despise death, but be well content with it, since 
 this too is one of those things w^hich nature wills. For such 
 as it is to be young and to grow old, and to increase and to 
 reach maturity, and to have tefith and beard and gray hairs, 
 and to beget, and to be pregnant and to bring forth, and all 
 the other natural operations which the seasons of thy life 
 bring, such also is dissolution. This, then, is consistent with 
 the character of a reflecting man, to be neither careless nor 
 impatient nor contemptuous with respect to death, but to 
 wait for it as one of the oj^crations of nature. As thou now 
 waitest for the time when the child shall come out of thy 
 wife's womb, so be ready for the time when thy soul shall 
 fall out of this envelope.^ But if thou requirest also a vulgar 
 kind of comfort which shall reach thy heart, thou wilt be 
 made best reconciled to death by observing the objects from 
 which thou art going to be removed, and the morals of those 
 with whom thy soul will no longer be mingled. For it is 
 no way right to be offended with men, but it is thy duty to 
 care for them and to bear with them gently ; and yet to 
 remember that thy departure will be not from men who have 
 the same principles as thyself. For this is the only thing, 
 if there be any, which could draw us the contrary way and 
 attach us to life, to be permitted to live with those who have 
 the same principles as ourselves. But now thou seest how 
 great is the trouble arising from the discordance of those 
 who live together, so that thou mayst say, Come quick, 
 death, lest perchance I, too, should forget myself. 
 
 4. He who does wrong does wrong against himself. He 
 who acts unjustly acts unjustly to himself, because he makes 
 himself bad. 
 
 5. He often acts unjustly who does not do a certain thing ; 
 not only he who does a certain thing. 
 
 6. Thy present opinion founded on understanding, and 
 
 3 Note 21 of the Philosophy, p. 64. 
 
162 M. Antoninus. IX. 
 
 thy present conduct directed to social good, and thy present 
 disposition of contentment with everything which happens | — 
 that is enough. 
 
 7. Wipe out imagination : check desire : extinguish appe- 
 tite : keep the ruling faculty in its own power. 
 
 8. Among the animals which have not reason one life is 
 distributed ; but among reasonable animals one intelligent 
 soul is distributed : just as there is one earth of all things 
 which are of an earthy nature, and we see by one light, and 
 breathe one air, all of us that have the faculty of vision and 
 all that have life. 
 
 9. All things which participate in anything which is 
 common to them all move towards that which is of the same 
 kind with themselves. Everything which is earthy turns 
 towards the earth, everything which is liquid flows together, 
 and everything which is of an aerial kind does the same, so 
 that they require something to keep them asunder, and the 
 ap2)lication of force. Fire indeed moves upwards on account 
 of the elemental fire, but it is so ready to be kindled together 
 with all the fire which is here, that even every substance 
 which is somewhat dry, is easily ignited, because there is less 
 mingled with it of that which is a hindrance to ignition. 
 Accordingly then everything also which participates in the 
 common intelligent nature moves in like manner towards 
 that which is of the same kind with itself, or moves even 
 more. For so much as it is superior in comparison with all 
 other things, in the same degree also is it more ready to 
 mingle with and to be fused with that which is akin to it. 
 Accordingly among animals devoid of reason we find swarms 
 of bees, and herds of cattle, and the nurture of young birds, 
 and in a manner, loves ; for even in animals there are souls, 
 and that power which brings them together is seen to exert 
 itself in the superior degree, and in such a way as never has 
 been observed in plants nor in stones nor in trees. But in 
 rational animals there are political communities and friend- 
 ships, and families and meetings of people ; and in wars, 
 treaties and armistices. But in the things which are still 
 
M. Antoninus. IX. 163 
 
 superior, even though tlicy are separated from one another, 
 unity in a manner exists, as in the stars. Thus the ascent to 
 the higher degree is able to produce a sympathy even in 
 things which are separated. See, then, what now takes i)lace. 
 For only intelligent animals have now forgotten this mutual 
 desire and inclination, and in them alone the property of 
 flowing together is not seen. But still though men strive to 
 avoid [this unionj, they are caught and held by it, for their 
 natui'e is too strong for them ; and thou wilt see what I say, 
 if thou only observest. Sooner, then, will one find anything 
 earthy which comes in contact with no earthy thing than a 
 man altogether separated from other men. 
 
 10. Both man and God and the universe produce fruit ; at 
 the proper seasons each produces it. But if usage has 
 especially fixed these terms to the vine and like things, this 
 is nothing. Keason produces fruit both for all and for itself, 
 and there are produced from it other things of the same kind 
 as reason itself. 
 
 11. If thou art able, correct by teaching those who do 
 wrong ; but if thou canst not, remember that indulgence is 
 given to thee for this pui^pose. And the gods, too, are 
 indulgent to such persons ; and for some purposes they even 
 help them to get health, wealth, reputation ; so kind they 
 are. And it is in thy power also ; or say, who hinders thee ? 
 
 12. Labom' not as one who is wretched, nor yet as one who 
 would be pitied or admired : but direct thy will to one thing 
 only, to put thyself in motion and to check thyself, as the 
 social reason requires. 
 
 13. To-day I have got out of all trouble, or rather 1 have 
 cast out all trouble, for it was not outside, but within and in 
 my opinions. 
 
 14. All things are the same, familiar in experience, and 
 ephemeral in time, and worthless in the matter. Everything 
 now is just as it was in the time of those whom we have 
 bui'ied. 
 
 15. Things stand outside of us, themselves by themselves, 
 neither knowing aught of themselves, nor expressing anj 
 
164 M. Antoninus. IX, 
 
 judgment. "What is it, then, which does judge about them ? 
 The ruling faculty. 
 
 16. Not in passivity, but in activity, lie the evil and the 
 good of the rational social animal, just as his virtue and his 
 vice lie not in passivity, but in activity.^ 
 
 17. For the stone which has been thrown up it is no evil 
 to come down, nor indeed any good to have been carried up. 
 (^viii. 20.) 
 
 18. Penetrate inwards into men's leading principles, and 
 thou wilt see what judges thou art afraid of, and what kind 
 of judges they are of themselves. 
 
 19. All things are changing : and thou thyself art in con- 
 tinuous mutation and in a manner in continuous destruction, 
 and the whole universe too. 
 
 20. It is thy duty to leave another man's wrongful act 
 there where it is. (vii. 29, ix. 38.) 
 
 21. Termination of activity, cessation from movement and 
 opinion, and in a sense their death, is no evil. Turn thy 
 thoughts now to the consideration of thy life, thy life as a 
 child, as a youth, thy manhood, thy old age, for in these also 
 every change was a death. Is this anything to fear ? Turn 
 thy thoughts now to thy life under thy grandfather, then to 
 thy life imder thy mother, then to thy life under thy father ; 
 and as thou findest many other differences and changes and 
 terminations, ask thyself. Is this anything to fear ? In like 
 manner, then, neither are the termination and cessation and 
 change of thy whole life a thing to be afraid of. 
 
 22. Hasten [to examine] thy own ruling faculty and that 
 of the universe and that of thy neighbour : thy own that 
 thou mayst make it just : and that of the universe, that thou 
 mayst remember of what thou art a part ; and that of thy 
 neighbour, that thou mayst know whether he has acted 
 iguorantly or with knowledge, and that thou mayst also con- 
 eider that his ruling faculty is akin to thine. 
 
 23. As thou thyself art a component part of a social system, 
 so let every act of thine be a component part of social Ufa 
 
 ' a «' Virtutis omnia laus in actione consistit." — Cicero, De Off. i. 6, 
 
M. Antoninus, IX. 1G5 
 
 Whatever act of thine then has no reference either immediately 
 or remotely to a social end, this tears asunder thy life, and 
 does not allow it to be one, and it is of the nature of a mutiny, 
 just as when in a popular assembly a man acting by himself 
 stands aj^art from the general agreement. 
 
 24. Quarrels of little children and their sports, and poor 
 spirits carrying about dead bodies [such is everythingj ; and 
 so what is exhibited in the representation of the mansions of 
 the dead* strikes our eyes more clearly. 
 
 25. Examine into the qualty of the form of an object, and 
 detach it altogether from its material part, and then contem- 
 plate it ; then determine the time, the longest which a thing 
 of this peculiar form is naturally made to endure. 
 
 26. Thou hast endured infinite troubles through not being 
 contented with thy ruling faculty, when it does the things 
 which it is constituted by nature to do. But enoughj [of this]. 
 
 27. When another blames thee or hates thee, or when men 
 say about thee anything injurious, approach their poor souls, 
 penetrate within, and see what kind of men they are. Thou 
 wilt discover that there is no reason to take any trouble that 
 these men may have this or that opinion about thee. How- 
 ever thou must be well disposed towards them, for by nature 
 they ai'o friends. And the gods too aid them in all ways, by 
 dreamy, by signs, towards the attainment of those things on 
 which they set a value .f 
 
 28. The periodic movements of the universe are the same, 
 up and dow^n from age to age. And either the universal in- 
 telligence puts itself in motion for every separate eifect, and 
 if this is so, be thou content with that which is the result of 
 its activity ; or it puts itself in motion once, and everything 
 else comes by way of sequence^ in a manner ; or indivisible 
 elements are the origin of all things. — In a word, if there is 
 
 * rh TTJs Ne/cin'as may be, as Gataker coojectures, a dramatic repre- 
 seutation of the state of the dead. Scliultz supposes that it may be also 
 a reference to the Ne'/c i;«o of the Odyssey (lib. xi.) 
 
 » The words which immediately follow kut iTraKoXovd-n<riu are corrupt 
 But the meaning is hardly doubtful. (Compare vn. 15.) 
 
166 M. Antoninus. IX. 
 
 a god, all is well ; and if chance rules, do not thou also be 
 governed by it (vi. 44, vii. 75). 
 
 Soon will the earth cover us all : then the earth, too, will 
 change, and the things also which result from change will 
 continue to change for ever, and these again for ever. For 
 if a man reflects on the changes and transformations which 
 follow one another like wave after wave and their rapidity, 
 he will despise everything which is perishable, (xn. 21.) 
 
 29. The universal cause is like a winter torrent : it carries 
 everything along with it. But how worthless are all these 
 poor people who are engaged in matters political, and, as 
 they suppose, are playing the philosopher ! All drivellers. 
 Well then, man : do what nature now requires. Set thyself 
 in motion, if it is in thy power, and do not look about thee 
 to see if any one will observe it ; nor yet expect Plato's 
 Eepublic :^ but be content if the smallest thing goes on well, 
 and consider such an event to be no small matter. For who 
 can change men's opinions ? and without a change of opinions 
 what else is there than the slavery of men who groan while 
 they pretend to obey ? Come now and tell me of Alexander 
 and Philippus and Demetrius of Phalerum. They themselves 
 shall judge whether they discovered what the common nature 
 required, and trained themselves accordingly. But if they 
 acted like tragedy heroes, no one has condemned me to imitate 
 them. Simple and modest is the work of philosophy. Draw 
 me not aside to insolence and pride. 
 
 30. Look down from above on the countless herds of men 
 and their countless solemnities, and the infinitely varied 
 voyagings in storms and calms, and the difi'erences among 
 those who are born, who live together, and die. And consider, 
 too, the life lived by others in olden time, and the life of 
 those who will live after thee, and the life now lived among 
 barbarous nations, and how many know not even thy name, 
 and how many will soon forget it, and how they who perhaps 
 now are praising thee will very soon blame thee, and that 
 
 8 Those who wish to know what Plato's Eepublic is, may now study 
 it in the accurate translation of Davics and Vanerhan. 
 
M. Antoninus. IX. 167 
 
 neither a postliumous name is of any value, nor reputation, 
 nor anything else. 
 
 31. Let there be freedom from perturbations with respect 
 to the things which come from the external cause ; and let 
 there be justice in the things done by virtue of the internal 
 cause, that is, let there be movement and action terminating 
 in this, in social acts, for this is according to thy nature. 
 
 32. Thou canst remove out of the way many useless things 
 among those which disturb thee, for they lie entirely in thy 
 opinion ; and thou vnlt then gain for thyself ample space by 
 comprehending the whole universe in thy mind, and by con- 
 templating the eternity of time, and observing the rapid 
 change of every several thing, how short is the time from 
 bii'th to dissolution , and the illimitable time before birth as 
 well as the equally boundless time after dissolution. 
 
 33. All that thou seest will quickly perish, and those who 
 have been spectators of its dissolution will very soon perish 
 too. And he who dies at the extrcmest old age will be 
 brought into the same condition with him who died pre- 
 maturely. 
 
 34. What are these men's leading principles, and about 
 what kind of things are they busy, and for what kind of 
 reasons do they love and honour ? Imagine that thou seest 
 their poor souls laid bare. When they think that they do 
 harm by their blame or good by their praise, what an idea ! 
 
 35. Loss is nothing else than change. But the universal 
 nature delights in change, and in obedience to her all things 
 are now done well, and from eternity have been done in like 
 form, and will be such to time without end. What, then, dost 
 thou say ? That all things have been and all things always 
 will be bad, and that no power has ever been found in so 
 many gods to rectify these things, but the world has been con- 
 demned to be bound in never ceasing evil? (iv. 45, vii. 18.) 
 
 36. The rottenness of the matter which is the foundation 
 of everything ! water, dust, bones, filth : or again, marble 
 rocks, the callosities of the earth ; and gold and silver, the 
 Bediments ; and garments, only bits of hair ; and purple dye^ 
 
168 M. Antoninus. IX. 
 
 blood ; and everything else is of the same kind. And that 
 which is of the nature of breath is also another thing of the 
 same kind, changing from this to that. 
 
 37. Enough of this wretched life and murmuring and apish 
 tricks. Why art thou disturbed? What is there new in 
 this ? What unsettles thee ? Is it the form of the thing ? 
 Look at it. Or is it the matter ? Look at it. But besides 
 these there is nothing. Towards the gods, then, now become 
 at last more simple and better. It is the same whether we 
 examine these things for a hundred years or three. 
 
 38. If any man has done wrong, the harm is his own. But 
 perhaps he has not done wrong. 
 
 39. Either all things proceed from one intelligent source 
 and come together as in one body, and the part ought not to 
 find fault with what is done for the benefit of the whole ; or 
 there are only atoms, and nothing else than mixture and dis- 
 persion. Why, then, art thou disturbed ? Say to the ruling 
 faculty, Art thou dead, art thou corrupted, art thou playing 
 the hypocrite, art thou become a beast, dost thou herd and 
 feed with the rest ?^ 
 
 40. Either the gods have no power or they have power. 
 If, then, they have no power, why dost thou pray to them ? 
 But if they have power, why dost thou not pray for them to 
 give thee the faculty of not fearing any of the things which 
 thou fearest, or of not desiring any of the things which thou 
 desirest, or not being pained at anything, rather than pray 
 that any of these things should not hapjjen or happen '? for 
 certainly if they can co-operate with men, they can co-operate 
 for these purposes. But perhaps thou wilt say, the gods 
 have placed them in thy power. Well, then, is it not better 
 to use what is in thy power like a free man than to desire in 
 a slavish and abject way what is not in thy power ? And 
 who has told thee that the gods do not aid us even in the 
 
 7 There is some corruption at the end of this section : but I think 
 that the translation expresses the emperor's meaning. Whether intelli- 
 gence rules all things or chance rules, a man must not be disturbed. 
 He must use the power that he has, and be tranquil. 
 
M. Antoninus. IX. 109 
 
 things which are in our power ? Begin, then, to pray for 
 such things, and thou wilt see. One man prays thus : How 
 shall I be able to lie with that woman ? Do thou pray thus : 
 How shall I not desire to lie with her ? Another prays thus : 
 How shall I be released from this ? Another prays : How 
 shall I not desire to be released ? Another thus : How shall 
 I not lose my little son ? Thou thus : How shall I not be 
 afraid to lose him? In fine, turn thy prayers this way, and 
 see what comes. 
 
 41. Epicurus says, In my sickness my conversation was 
 not about my bodily sujBferings, nor, says he, did I talk on 
 such subjects to those who visited me ; but I continued to 
 discourse on the nature of things as before, keeping to this 
 main point, how the mind, while participating in such move- 
 ments as go on in the poor flesh, shall be free from perturba- 
 tions and maintain its proper good. Nor did I, he says, 
 give the physicians an opportunity of putting on solemn 
 looks, as if they were doing something great, but my life 
 went on well and happily. Do, then, the same that he did 
 both in sickness, if thou art sick, and in any other circum- 
 stances ; for never to desert philosophy in any events that 
 may befall us, nor to hold trifling talk either with an ignorant 
 man or with one unacquainted with nature, is a princij)le of 
 all schools of philosophy ; but to be intent only on that 
 which thou art now doing and on the instrument by which 
 thou doest it. 
 
 42. When thou art offended with any man's shameless 
 conduct, immediately ask thyself, Is it possible, then, that 
 shameless men should not be in the world ? It is not possible. 
 Do not, then, require what is impossible. For this man also 
 is one of those shameless men who must of necessity be in 
 the world. Let the same considerations be present to thy 
 mind in the case of the knave, and the faithless man, and of 
 every man who does wrong in any way. For at the same 
 time that thou dost remind thyself that it is impossible that 
 such kind of men should not exist, thou wilt become more 
 kindly disposed towards every one individually. It is useful 
 
170 M. Antoninus. IX. 
 
 to perceive this, too, immediately when the occasion arises, 
 what virtue nature has given to man to oppose to every 
 wrongful act. For she has given to man, as an antidote 
 against the stupid man, mildness, and against another kind of 
 man some other power. And in all cases it is possible for 
 thee to correct by teaching the man who is gone astray ; for 
 every man who errs misses his object and is gone astray. 
 Besides wherein hast thou been injured ? For thou wilt find 
 that no one among those against whom thou art irritated has 
 done anything by which thy mind could be made worse ; but 
 that which is evil to thee and harmful has its foundation only 
 in the mind. And what harm is done or what is there 
 strange, if the man who has not been instructed does the 
 acts of an uninstructed man ? Consider whether thou shouldst 
 not rather blame thyself, because thou didst not expect such 
 a man to err in such a way. For thou hadst means given 
 thee by thy reason to suppose that it was likely that he would 
 commit this error, and yet thou hast forgotten and art amazed 
 that he has erred. But most of all when thou blamest a man 
 as faithless or ungrateful, turn to thyself. For the fault is 
 manifestly thy own, whether thou didst trust that a man 
 who had such a disposition would keep his promise, or when 
 conferring thy kindness thou didst not confer it absolutely, 
 nor yet in such way as to have received from thy very act all 
 the profit. For what more dost thou want when thou hast 
 done a man a service ? art thou not content that thou hast 
 done something conformable to thy nature, and dost thou 
 seek to be paid for it ? just as if the eye demanded a re- 
 compense for seeing, or the feet for walking. For as these 
 members are formed for a particular purpose, and by working 
 according to their several constitutions obtain what is their 
 own f so also as man is formed by nature to acts of bene- 
 volence, when he has done anything benevolent or in any 
 other way conducive to the common interest, he has acted 
 conformably to his constitution, and he gets what is his own. 
 
 ^ ATre'xei rh tdiov. This sense of oTrexeiv occurs in XI. 1, and iv, 40,- 
 ftlso in St. Matthew, vi. 2, airexovai rhv ixiaOSy, and in Epictetus. 
 
M. Antoninus. X 171 
 
 . % 
 
 TT /'ILT thou, then, my soul, never be good and simple and 
 VV one and naked, more manifest than the body which 
 surrounds thee ? Wilt thou never enjoy an afifectionate and 
 contented disposition ? Wilt thou never be full and without 
 a want of any kind, longing for nothing more, nor desiring 
 anything, either animate or inanimate, for the enjoyment of 
 pleasures? nor yet desiring time wherein thou shalt have 
 longer enjoyment, or place, or pleasant climate, or society of 
 men with whom thou mayst live in harmony ? but wilt thou 
 be satisfied with thy present condition, and pleased with all 
 that is about thee, and wilt thou convince thyself that thou 
 hast everything and that it comes from the gods, that every- 
 thing is well for thee, and will be well whatever shall please 
 them, and whatever they shall give for the conservation of 
 the perfect living being,^ the good and just and beautiful, 
 which generates and holds together all things, and contains 
 and embraces all things which are dissolved for the pro- 
 duction of other like things ? Wilt thou never be such that 
 thou shalt so dwell in community with gods and men as 
 neither to find fault with them at all, nor to be condemned by 
 them ? 
 
 2. Observe what thy nature requires, so far as thou art 
 governed by nature only : then do it and accept it, if thy 
 nature, so far as thou art a living being, shall not be made 
 worse by it. And next thou must observe what thy nature 
 requires so far as thou art a living being. And all this thou 
 mayst allow thyself, if thy nature, so far as thou art a 
 rational animal, shall not be made worse by it. But the 
 
 1 That is, God (iv. 40), as he is defined by Zeno. But the confusion 
 between gods and God is strange. 
 
]72 M. Antoniyius. X 
 
 rational animal is consequently also a political [social] 
 animal. Use these rules, then, and trouble thyself about 
 nothing else. 
 
 3. Everything which happens either happens in such wise 
 as thou art formed by nature to bear it, or as thou art not 
 formed by nature to bear it. If, then, it happens to thee in 
 such way as thou art formed by nature to bear it, do not 
 complain, but bear it as thou art formed by nature to bear it. 
 But if it happens in such wise as thou art not formed by 
 nature to bear it, do not complain, for it will perish after it 
 has consumed thee. Eemember, however, that thou art formed 
 by nature to bear everything, with respect to which it depends 
 on thy own opinion to make it endurable and tolerable, by 
 thinking that it is either thy interest or thy duty to do this. 
 
 4. If a man is mistaken, instruct him kindly and show 
 him his error. But if thou art not able, blame thyself, or 
 blame not even thyself. 
 
 • 5. Whatever may happen to thee, it was prepared for thee 
 from all eternity ; and the implication of causes was from 
 eternity spinning the thread of thy being, and of that which 
 is incident to it. (iii. 11 ; rv. 26.) 
 
 6. Whether the universe is [a concourse of] atoms, or 
 nature [is a system], let this first be established, that I am a 
 part of the whole which is governed by nature ; next, I am 
 in a manner intimately related to the parts which are of the 
 same kind with myself. For remembering this, inasmuch as 
 I am a part, I shall be discontented with none of the things 
 which are assigned to me out of the whole ; for nothing; i s 
 injurious to the part, jfjt is jo r the adv antagfLof JJiajghole^ 
 For the whole contains nothing which is not for its advantage ; 
 and all natures indeed have this common principle, but the 
 nature of the universe has this principle besides, that it 
 cannot be compelled even by any external cause to generate 
 anything harmful to itself. By remembering, then, that I am 
 a part of such a whole, I shall be content with everything 
 that happens. And inasmuch as I am in a manner intimately 
 related to the parts which are of the same kind with myself, 
 
M. Antoninus. X, 173 
 
 I shall do nothing unsocial, but I shall rather direct myself 
 to the things which arc of the same kind with myself, and I 
 shall turn all my efforts to the common interest, and divert 
 them from the contrary. Now, if these things are done so, life 
 must flow on happily, just as thou mayst obsei"ve that the life 
 of a citizen is happy, who continues a course of action which 
 is advantageous to his fellow-citizens, and is content with 
 whatever the state may assign to him. 
 
 7. The parts of the whole, everything, I mean, which is 
 natiu'ally comprehended in the universe, must of necessity 
 perish ; but let this be understood in this sense, that they 
 must undergo change. But if this is naturally both an evil 
 and a necessity for the parts, the whole would not continue 
 to exist in a good condition, the parts being subject to change 
 and constituted so as to perish in various ways. For whether 
 did nature herself design to do evil to the things which are 
 parts of herself, and to make them subject to evil and of 
 necessity fall into evil, or have such results happened without 
 her kno\^dng it ? Both these suppositions, indeed, are in- 
 credible. But if a man should even drop the term Nature 
 [as an efficient power], and should speak of these things as 
 natural, even then it would be ridiculous to affirm at the 
 same time that the parts of the w^hole are in their nature 
 subject to change, and at the same time to be sui'prised or 
 vexed as if something were happening contrary to nature, 
 particularly as the dissolution of things is into those things 
 of which each thing is composed. For there is either a dis- 
 persion of the elements out of which everything has been 
 compounded, or a change from the solid to the earthy and 
 from the airy to the aerial, so that these parts are taken back 
 into the universal reason, whether this at certain periods is 
 consumed by fii'C or renewed by eternal changes. And do 
 not imagine that the solid and the airy part belong to thee 
 from the time of generation. For all this received its accre- 
 tion only yesterday and the day before, as one may say, from 
 the food and the air which is inspired. This, then, which 
 has received [the accretion], changes, not that which thy 
 
174 M. Antoninus. X. 
 
 motlier brouglit forth. But suppose that this [which thy 
 mother brought forth] implicates thee very much with that 
 other part, which has the peculiar quality [of change], this 
 is nothing in fact in the way of objection to what is said.'^ 
 
 8. When thou hast assumed these names, good, modest, 
 true, rational, a man of equanimity, and magnanimous, take 
 care that thou dost not change these names; and if thou 
 shouldst lose them, quickly return to them. And remember 
 that the term Eational was intended to signify a discrimi- 
 nating attention to every several thing and freedom from 
 negligence ; and that Equanimity is the voluntary acceptance 
 of the things which are assigned to thee by the common 
 nature ; and that Magnanimity is the elevation of the in- 
 telligent part above the pleasurable or painful sensations of 
 the flesh, and above that poor thing called fame, and death, 
 and all such things. If, then, thou maintainest thyself in the 
 possession of these names, without desiring to be called by 
 these names by others, thou wilt be another person and wilt 
 enter on another life. For to continue to be such as thou 
 hast hitherto been, and to be torn in pieces and defiled in 
 such a life, is the character of a very stupid man and one 
 overfond of his life, and like those half-devoured fighters with 
 wild beasts, who though covered with wounds and gore, still 
 intreat to be kept to the following day, though they will be 
 exposed in the same state to the same claws and bites.^ 
 Therefore fix thyself in the possession of these few names : 
 and if thou art able to abide in them, abide as if thou wast 
 
 " The end of this section is perhaps corrupt. The meaning is very 
 obscure. I have given that meaning which appears to be consistent 
 with the whole argument. The emperor liere maintains that the 
 essential part of man is unchangeable, and that the other parts, if they 
 change or perish, do not aft'ect that which really constitutes the man. 
 See the Philosophy of Antoninus, p. 47, note 13. Schultz supposed " thy 
 mother" to mean nature, r) (pvais. But I doubt about that. 
 
 3 See Seneca, Epp. 70, on these exhibitions which amused the people 
 of those days. These fighters were the Bestiarii, some of whom may 
 have been criminals, but even if they were, the exhibition was equally 
 characteristic of the depraved habits of the spectators. 
 
M. Antoninus. X. 175 
 
 removed to certain islands of the Happy/ But if thou shalt 
 perceive that thou fallest out of them and dost not maintain 
 thy hold, go courageously into some nook where thou shalt 
 maintain them, or even depart at once from life, not in passion, 
 but with simplicity and freedom and modesty, after doing 
 this one [laudable] thing at least in thy life, to have gone out 
 of it thus. In order, however, to the remembrance of these 
 names, it will greatly help thee, if thou rememberest the gods, 
 and that they wish not to be flattered, but wish all reasonable 
 beings to be made like themselves ; and if thou rememberest 
 that what does the work of a fig-tree is a fig-tree, and that 
 what does the work of a dog is a dog, and that what does the 
 work of a bee is a bee, and that what does the work of a man 
 is a man. 
 
 9. Mimi,^ war, astonishment, torpor, slavery, will daily 
 wipe out those holy principles of thine. "fHow many things 
 without studying nature dost thou imagine, and how many 
 dost thou neglect ?* But it is thy duty so to look on and so 
 to do everything, that at the same time the power of dealing 
 
 "* The islands of the Happy or the Fortunatse Insula are spoken of 
 by the Greek and Roman writers. They were the abode of Heroes, like 
 Achilles and Diomedes, as we see in the Scolion of Hai-modius and 
 Aristogiton. Sertorius heard of the islands at Cadiz from some sailors 
 who had been there, and he had a wish to go and live in them and rest 
 from his troubles. (Plutarch, Sertorius, c. 8.) In the Odyssey, Proteus 
 told Menelaus that he should not die in Argos, but be removed to 
 a place at the boundary of the earth where Khadamanthus dwelt : 
 (Odyssey, iv. 565.) 
 
 For there in sooth man's life is easiest : 
 Nor snow nor raging storm nor rain is there, 
 But ever gently breathing gales of Zephyr 
 Oceanus sends up to gladden man. 
 
 It is certain that the writer of the Odyssey only follows some old 
 legend without having any knowledge of any place which corresponda 
 tj his description. The two islands which Sertorius heard of may be 
 Madeira and the adjacent island. Compare Pindar, 01. ii. 129. 
 
 * Corais conjectured /iTo-os "hatred' in place of Mimi, Roman plnyi 
 in which action and gesticulation were all or nearly all. 
 
 ^ This is corrupt. See the edition of Schultz. 
 
176 M. Antoninus. X, 
 
 with circumstances is perfected, and the contemplative faculty 
 is exercised, and the confidence which comes from the know- 
 ledge of each several thing is maintained without showing it, 
 but yet not concealed. For when wilt thou enjoy simplicity 
 when gravity, and when the knowledge of every several thing, 
 both what it is in substance, and what place it has in the 
 universe, and how long it is formed to exist and of what 
 things it is compounded, and to whom it can belong, and who 
 are able both to give it and take it away ? 
 
 10. A spider is proud when it has caught a fly, and another 
 when he has caught a poor hare, and another when he has 
 taken a little fish in a net, and another when he has taken 
 wild boars, and another when he has taken bears, and another 
 when he has taken Sarmatians. Are not these robbers, if 
 thou examinest their opinions ?^ 
 
 1 1. Acquire the contemplative way of seeing how all things 
 change into one another, and constantly attend to it, and 
 exercise thyself about this part [of philosophy]. For nothing 
 is so much adapted to produce magnanimity. Such a man 
 has put off the body, and as he sees that he must, no one 
 knows how soon, go away from among men and leave every- 
 thing here, he gives himself up entirely to just doing in all 
 his actions, and in everything else that happens he resigns 
 himself to the universal nature. But as to what any man 
 shall say or think about him or do against him, he never 
 even thinks of it, being himself contented with these two 
 things, with acting justly in what he now does, and being 
 satisfied with what is now assigned to him ; and he lays aside 
 all distracting and busy pursuits, and desii-es nothing else 
 than to accomplish the straight course through the law,' and 
 by accomplishing the straight course to follow God. 
 
 12. What need is there of suspicious fear, since it is in 
 thy power to inquire what ought to be done ? And if thou 
 
 ' Marcus means to say that conquerors are robbers. He himself 
 warred against Sarmatians, and was a robber, as he says, like the rest. 
 But compare the life of Avidius Cassius, c. 4, by Vulcatius. 
 
 * By the law, he means the divine law, obedience to the will of God. 
 
 OF THE 
 
M. Antoninus. X. 177 
 
 Rocst clear, go by this Avay content, without turning back : 
 but if thou dost not see clear, stop and take the best advisers. 
 But if any other things 0])i)ose thee, go on according to thy 
 powers with due consideration, keeping to that which appears 
 to be just. For it is best to reach this object, and if thou 
 dost fail, let thy failure be in attempting this. He who 
 follows reason in all things is both tranquil and active at the 
 same time, and also cheerful and collected. 
 
 13. Inquire of thyself as soon as thou wakest from sleep 
 whether it will make any diiference to thee, if another does 
 what is just and right. It will make no difference, (vi. 32 ; 
 VIII. 55.) 
 
 Thou hast not forgotten, I suppose, that those who assume 
 arrogant airs in bestowing their praise or blame on others, 
 are such as they are at bed and at board, and thou hast not 
 forgotten what they do, and what they avoid and what they 
 jiursue, and how they steal and how they rob, not with hands 
 and feet, but with their most valuable part, by means of which 
 there is produced, when a man chooses, fidelity, modesty, 
 truth, law, a good daemon [happiness] ? (vii. 17.) 
 
 14. To her who gives and takes back all, to nature, the 
 man who is instructed and modest says, Give what thou wilt ; 
 take back what thou wilt. And he says this not proudly, but 
 obediently and well pleased with her. 
 
 15. Short is the little which remains to thee of life. Live 
 as on a mountain. For it makes no difference whether a man 
 lives there or here, if he lives everywhere in the world as in 
 a state [political community]. Let men see, let them know 
 a real man who lives according to nature. If they cannot 
 endure him, let them kill him. For that is better than to 
 live thus [as men do]. 
 
 16. No longer talk at all about the kind of man that a good 
 man ought to be, but be such. 
 
 17. Constantly contemplate the whole of time and the 
 whole of substance, and consider that all individual things as 
 to substance are a grain of a fig, and as to time, tho turning 
 of a gimlet. 
 
178 M. Antoninus. A. 
 
 18. Look at everything that exists, and observe that it is 
 already in dissolution and in change, and as it were putrefac- 
 tion or dispersion, or that everything is so constituted by 
 nature as to die. 
 
 19. Consider what men are when they are eating, sleeping, 
 generating, easing themselves and so forth. Then w^hat kind 
 of men they are when they are imperiousf and arrogant, or 
 angry and scolding from their elevated place. But a short 
 time ago to how many they were slaves and for what things ; 
 and after a little time consider in what a condition they wuU 
 be. 
 
 20. That is for the good of each thing, which the universal 
 nature brings to each. And it is for its good at the time 
 when nature brings it. 
 
 21. '• The earth loves the shower ;" and " the solemn aether 
 loves :" and the universe loves to make whatever is about to 
 be. I say then to the universe, that I love as thou lovest. 
 And is not this too said, that " this or that loves [is wont] to 
 be produced ?" ^ 
 
 22. Either thou livest here and hast already accustomed 
 thyself to it, or thou art going away, and this was thy own 
 will ; or thou art dying and hast discharged thy duty. But 
 besides these things there is nothing. Be of good cheer, 
 then. 
 
 23. Let this always be plain to thee, that this piece of 
 land is like any other ; and that all things here are the same 
 with things on the top of a mountain, or on the sea-shore, or 
 wherever thou choosest to be. For thou wilt find just what 
 
 9 These words are from Emipides. They arc cited by Aristotle, Ethic. 
 Nicom. VIII. 1. Athengeus (xiii. 296.) aud Stobieus quote seven 
 complete lines begiuuiug ipS, fxhv o/m^pov yala. There id a similar 
 fragment of Aeschylus, Danaides, also quoted by Athenseus. 
 
 It was the fashion of the Stoics to work on the meanings of words. 
 So Antoninus here takes the verb (piKe'i, " loves/' which has also the 
 sense of " is wont," " uses," and the like. He finds in the common 
 language of mankind a philosophical truth, and most great truths are 
 expressed in the common language of life ; some understand them, but 
 most people utter them without knowing how much thay meao. 
 
M. Antoninus. X. ITD 
 
 Plato says, Dwelling within the walls of a city as in a 
 shepherd's fold on a mountain. [The three last words are 
 omitted in the translation.]'" 
 
 24. T\Tiat is my ruling faculty now to me? and of wliat 
 nature am I now making it ? and for what purpose am i now 
 using it ? is it void of understanding ? is it loosed and rent 
 asunder from social life ? is it melted into and mixed with 
 the poor flesh so as to move together with it ? 
 
 25. He who flies from his master is a runaway ; but the 
 law is master, and he who breaks the law is a runaway. 
 And he also who is grieved or angry or afraid,f is dissatisfied 
 because something has been or is or shall be of the things 
 which are appointed by him who rules all things, and he is 
 Law, and assigns to every man what is fit. He then svho 
 fears or is grieved or is angry is a runaway.^^ 
 
 26. A man deposits seed in a womb and goes away, and 
 then another cause takes it, and labours on it and makes a 
 child. What a thing from such a material ! Again, the 
 child passes food dowTi through the throat, and then another 
 cause takes it and makes perception and motion, and in fine 
 life and strength and other things ; how many and how 
 strange ! Observe then the tilings which are produced in 
 such a bidden way, and see the power just as we see the 
 power which carries things downwards and upwards, not with 
 the eyes, but still no less plainly, (vii. 75.J 
 
 27. Constantly consider how all things such as they now 
 are, in time past also were ; and consider that they will be 
 the same again. And place before thy eyes entire dramas 
 and stages of the same form, whatever thou hast learned from 
 thy experience or from older history ; for example, the whole 
 court of Hadi'ianus, and the whole coiu't of Antoninus, and 
 the whole coui't of Philippus, Alexander, Croesus ; for all those 
 were sucb dramas as we see now, only with different actors. 
 
 '0 Plato, Theffit. 174 D. E. But compare the original with the use 
 that Antoninus has made of it, 
 
 11 Antoninus is here playing on the etymology of v6(i.os, law, assign- 
 ment, that which assigns (y^nei) to every man his portion. 
 
180 M. Antoninus. X 
 
 28. Imagine every man who is grieved at anything or dis- 
 contented to be like a pig which is sacrificed and kicks and 
 screams. 
 
 Like this pig also is he who on his bed in silence laments 
 the bonds in which we are held. And consider that only to 
 the rational animal is it given to follow voluntarily w^hat 
 happens ; but simply to follow is a necessity imposed on all. 
 
 29. Severally on the occasion of everything that thou doest, 
 pause and ask thyself, if death is a dreadful thing because it 
 deprives thee of this. 
 
 30. "When thou art offended at any man's fault, forthwith 
 turn to thyself and reflect in what like manner thou dost err 
 thyself: for example, in thinking that money is a good 
 thing, or pleasure, or a bit of reputation, and the like. For 
 by attending to this thou wilt quickly forget thy anger, if 
 this consideration also is added, that the man is compelled : 
 for what else could he do ? or, if thou art able, take away 
 from him the compulsion. 
 
 31. When thou hast seen Satyron ^^ the Socratic,']' think of 
 either Eutyches or Hymen, and when thou hast seen Eu- 
 phrates, think of Eutychion or Silvanus, and when thou 
 hast seen Alciphron think of Tropaeoi^horus, and when thou 
 hast seen Xenophon think of Crito ^^ or Severus, and when 
 thou hast looked on thyself, think of any other Caesar, and 
 in the case of every one do in like manner. Then let this 
 thought be in thy mind, Where then are those men ? No- 
 where, or nobody knows where. For thus continuously thou 
 wilt look at human things as smoke and nothing at all ; 
 esi)ecially if thou reflectest at the same time that what has' 
 once changed will never exist again in the infinite dui-ation 
 
 ^2 Nothing is known of Satyron or Satyrion; nor, I believe, of 
 Eutyches or Hymen. Euphrates is honourably mentioned by Epictetus 
 (ill. 15, 8; IV. 8, 17). Pliny (Epp. i. 10), speaks very highly of him. 
 He obtained the permission of the Emperor Hadrian to drink poison, 
 because he was old and in had health (Dion Cassius, G9, c. 8). 
 
 ^•* Crito is the friend of Socrates ; and he was, it appears, also a friend 
 of Xenophon. When the emperor says " seen " {iSioy), he does not 
 ooan with the eves. 
 
M. Anfoninus. X. 181 
 
 ©f time. But tliou, in what a brief space of time is tliy 
 existence ? And why art thou not content to pass through 
 this shoi-t time in an orderly way ? What matter and oppor- 
 tunity [for thy activity] art thou avoiding ? For what else- 
 are all these things, except exercises for the reason, when it 
 has viewed carefully and by examination into their nature 
 the things which hapjien in life ? Persevere then until thou 
 shalt have made these things thy own, as the stomach w^hich is 
 strengthened makes all things its own, as the blazing fire 
 makes flame and brightness out of everything that is throT^-n 
 into it. 
 
 32. Let it not be in any man's power to say truly of thee 
 that thou art not simple or that thou art not good ; but let 
 him be a liar whoever shall think anything of this kind about 
 thee ; and this is altogether in thy power. For who is he 
 that shall hinder thee from being good and simple ? Do 
 thou only determine to live no longer, unless thou shalt be 
 such. For neither does reason allow [thee to live], if thou 
 art not such.^* 
 
 33. What is that which as to this material [our life] can 
 be done or said in the way most conformable to reason. For 
 whatever this may be, it is in thy power to do it or to say 
 it, and do not make excuses that thou art hindered. Thou 
 wilt not cease to lament till thy mind is in such a condition 
 that, what luxury is to those who enjoy pleasure, such shall 
 be to thee, in the matter which is subjected and pre- 
 sented to thee, the doing of the things which are conformable 
 to man's constitution; for a man ought to consider as an 
 enjoyment everything which it is in his power to do ac- 
 cording to his own nature. And it is in his power every- 
 where. Now, it is not given to a cylinder to move every- 
 where by its own motion, nor yet to water nor to fire, nor to 
 anything else which is governed by nature or an irrational 
 soul, for the things which check them and stand in the way 
 are many. But intelligence and reason are able to go 
 through everything that opposes them, and in such macner 
 
 " Compare Epictetus, i. 29, 28. 
 
182 M. Antoninus. X. 
 
 as tliey are formed \)j nature and as they clioose. Place 
 before tliy eyes this facility with which the reason will be 
 carried through all things, as fire upwards, as a stone down- 
 wards, as a cylinder down an inclined surface, and seek for 
 nothing further. For all other obstacles either affect the 
 body only which is a dead thing ; or, except through opinion 
 and the yielding of the reason itself, they do not crush nor do 
 any harm of any kind ; for if they did, he who felt it would 
 immediately become bad. Now, in the case of all things 
 which have a certain constitution, whatever harm may 
 happen to any of them, that which is so affected becomes 
 consequently worse ; but in the like case, a man becomes 
 both better, if one may say so, and more worthy of praise by 
 making a right use of these accidents. And finally remem- 
 ber that nothing harms him who is really a citizen, which 
 does not harm the state ; nor yet does anything harm the 
 state, which does not harm law [order] ; and of these things 
 which are called misfortunes not one harms law. What then 
 does not harm law does not harm either state or citizen. 
 
 34. To him who is penetrated by true principles even 
 the briefest precept is sufficient, and any common precept, to 
 remind him that he should be free from grief and fear. For 
 example — 
 
 Leaves, some the wind scatters on the ground — 
 So is the race of men.^^ 
 
 Leaves, also, are thy children ; and leaves, too, are they who 
 cry out as if they were worthy of credit and bestow their 
 praise, or on the contrary curse, or secretly blame and sneer ; 
 and leaves, in like manner, are those who shall receive and 
 transmit a man's fame to after-times. For all such things 
 as these " are produced in the season of spring," as the poet 
 says ; then the wind casts them down; then the forest pro- 
 duces other leaves in their places. But a brief existence is 
 common to all things, and yet thou avoidest and pursuest all 
 things as if they would be eternal. A little time, and thou 
 
 « Homer, II. vi 146. 
 
M. Antoninus. X. 1S3 
 
 Bhalt close thy eyes ; and liim wlio lias attcndetl thee to tliy 
 grave another soon will lament. 
 
 35. The healthy eye ouglit to see all visible things and 
 not to say, I wish for green things ; for this is the condition 
 of a diseased eye. And the healthy hearing and smelling 
 ought to be ready to perceive all that can be heard and 
 smelled. And the healthy stomach ought to be with resjiect 
 to all food just as the mill with respect to all things which 
 it is formed to grind. And accordingly the healthy under- 
 standing ought to be prepared for everything which happens ; 
 but that which says, Let my dear children live, and let all 
 men praise whatever I may do, is an eye which seeks for 
 green things, or teeth which seek for soft things. 
 
 36. There is no man so fortunate that there shall not be 
 by him when he is dying some who are pleased with what is 
 going to happen.^® Suppose that he was a good and wise 
 man, will there not be at last some one to say to himself, 
 Let us at last breathe freely being relieved from this school- 
 master ? It is true that he was harsh to none of us, but I 
 perceived that he tacitly condemns us. — This is what is said 
 of a good man. .But in our own case how many other things 
 are there for which there are many who wish to get rid of 
 us. Thou wdlt consider this then when thou art dying, and 
 thou wilt depart more contentedly by reflecting thus : I am 
 going away from such a life, in which even my associates in 
 behalf of whom I have striven so much, prayed, and cared, 
 themselves wish me to depart, hoping perchance to get some 
 little advantage by it. "Why then should a man cling to a 
 longer stay here ? Do not however for this reason go away 
 less kindly disposed to them, but preserving thy own 
 character, and friendly and benevolent and mild, and on the 
 other hand not as if thou wast torn away ; but as when a man 
 dies a quiet death, the poor soul is easily separated from the 
 body, such also ought thy departure from men to be, for 
 
 '^ He says kukov, but as he affirms iu other places that death is no 
 evil, he must mean what others m^y call an evil, and he means only 
 •• what is going to happen." 
 
184 M. Antoninus. X. 
 
 nature united thee to them and associated thee. But does 
 she now dissolve the union ? Well, I am separated as from 
 kinsmen, not however dragged resisting, but without com- 
 pulsion; for this too is one of the things according to 
 nature. 
 
 37. Accustom thyself as much as possible on the occasion 
 of anything being done by any person to inquire with thy- 
 self, For what object is this man doing this ? but begin with 
 thyself, and examine thyself first. 
 
 38. Eemember that this which pulls the strings is the 
 thing which is hidden within : this is the power of persua- 
 sion, this is life, this, if one may so say, is man. In con- 
 templating thyself never include the vessel which surrounds 
 thee and these instruments which are attached about it. For 
 they are like to an axe, differing only in this that they grow 
 to the body. For indeed there is no more use in these parts 
 without the cause which moves and checks them than in the 
 weaver's shuttle, and the writer's pen and the driver's 
 whip.^' 
 
 27 Seo *' The Philosophy of Autonirsiis," n, 18, 
 
M. Antoninus. XI. 185 
 
 XI. 
 
 THESE are the properties of the rational soul : it sees 
 itself, analyses itself, and makes itself such as it 
 chooses ; the fruit wliich it bears itself enjoys — for the fruits 
 of plants and that in animals which corresponds to fruits 
 others enjoy — it obtains its own end, wherever the limit of 
 life may be fixed. Not as in a dance and in a play and in 
 such like things, where the whole action is incomplete, if 
 anything cuts it short ; but in every part and wherever it 
 may be stopped, it makes what has been set before it full and 
 complete, so that it can say, I have what is my own. And 
 further it traverses the whole universe, and the sm'rounding 
 vacuum, and surveys its form, and it extends itself into the 
 infinity of time, and embraces and comprehends the ^ peri- 
 odical renovation of all things, and it comprehends that those 
 who come after us will see nothing new, nor have those 
 before us seen anything more, but in a manner he who is 
 forty years old, if he has any understanding at all, has seen 
 by virtue of the uniformity that prevails all things which 
 have been and all that will be. This too is a property of 
 the rational soul, love of one's neighbour, and truth and 
 modesty, and to value nothing more than itself, which is also 
 the property of Law.^ Thus then right reason diifers not at 
 all from the reason of justice. 
 
 2. Thou wilt set little value on pleasing song and dancing 
 and the pancratium, if thou wilt distribute the melody of the 
 voice into its several sounds, and ask thyself as to each, if 
 thou art mastered by this ; for thou wilt be prevented by 
 shame from confessing it : and in the matter of dancing, if 
 
 ^ TV ireoioSLK^v iraXiyyevecriav. See V. 13, 32 ; X. 7. 
 ' Law is the order by which all things are goverucd. 
 
186 M. Antoninus. XL 
 
 at each movement and attitude tliou v/ilt do tlie same; and 
 the like also in the matter of the pancratium. In all things, 
 then, except virtue and the acts of virtue, remember to apply 
 thyself to their several parts, and by this division to come to 
 value them little : and apply this rule also to thy whole 
 life. 
 
 3. What a soul that is which is ready, if at any moment it 
 must be separated from the body, and ready either to be 
 extinguished or dispersed or continue to exist ; but so that 
 this readiness comes from a man's own judgment, not from 
 mere obstinacy, as with the Christians,^ but considerately 
 and with dignity and in a way to persuade another, without 
 tragic show. 
 
 4. Have I done something for the general interest ? Well 
 then I have had my reward. Let this always be present to 
 thy mind, and never stop [doing such good]. 
 
 5. What is thy art ? to be good. And how is this accom- 
 plished well except by general principles, some about the 
 nature of the imiverse, and others about the proper constitu- 
 tion of man ? 
 
 6. At fii'st tragedies were brought on the stage as means of 
 reminding men of the things which happen to them, and that 
 it is according to nature for things to happen so, and that, if 
 you are delighted with what is shown on the stage, you should 
 not be troubled with that which takes place on the larger 
 stage. For you see that these things must be accomplished 
 thus, and that even they bear them who cry ouf* "O 
 Cithaeron." And, indeed, some things are said well by 
 the dramatic writers, of which kind is the following 
 especially : — 
 
 Me and my children if the gods neglect, 
 This has its reason too.^ 
 
 ^ See the Life of Antoninus. This is the only passage in which 
 the emperor speaks of the Christians. Epictetus (iv. 7, 6) m mes them 
 Galilaei. 
 
 ■• Sopliocles, Oedipus Kex. 
 
 5 See VII. 41, 38, 40. 
 
M. Antoninus. XL 187 
 
 And agaiu — 
 
 Wc must not chafe and fret at that whicli happens. 
 Aud— 
 
 Life's harvest reap hke the wheat's fruitful ear. 
 
 And other things of the same kind. 
 
 After tragedy the old comedy was introduced, which had a 
 magisterial freedom of speech, and by its very plainness of 
 speaking was useful in reminding men to beware of 
 insolence; and for this purpose too Diogenes used to take 
 from these ^\Titers. 
 
 But as to the middle comedy which came next, observe 
 what it was, and again, for what object the new comedy was 
 introduced, which gradually sunk down into a mere mimic 
 artifice. That some good things are said even by these 
 writers, everybody knows : but the whole plan of such 
 poetry and di-amaturgy, to what end does it look ! 
 
 7. How plain does it appear that there is not another 
 condition of life so well suited for philosophizing as this in 
 which thou now hapi)enest to be. 
 
 8. A branch cut off from the adjacent branch must of 
 necessity be cut off from the whole tree also. So too a man 
 when he is separated from another man has fallen off from 
 the whole social community. Now as to a branch, another 
 cuts it off, but a man by his own act separates himself from 
 his neighboui' when he hates him and turns away from him, 
 and he does not know that he has at the same time cut 
 himself off from the whole social system. Yet he has this 
 privilege certainly from Zeus who framed society, for it is in 
 our power to grow again to that which is near to us, and 
 again to become a part which helps to make up the whole. 
 However, if it often happens, this kind of separation, it makes 
 it difficult for that which detaches itself to be brought to 
 unity and to be restored to its former condition. Finally, 
 the branch, which from the first grew together with the tree, 
 and has continued to have one life with it, is not like that 
 which after being cut off is then ingrafted, for this is some- 
 
188 M. Antoninus. XL 
 
 thing like wliat the gardeners mean when they say that it 
 grows with the rest of the tree, butf that it has not the same 
 mind with it. 
 
 9. As those who try to stand in thy way w^hen thou art 
 proceeding according to right reason, will not be able to 
 turn thee aside from thy proj)er action, so neither let them 
 drive thee from thy benevolent feelings towards them, but be 
 on thy guard equally in both matters, not only in the matter 
 of steady judgment and action, but also in the matter of 
 gentleness towards those who try to hinder or otherwise 
 trouble thee. For this also is a w^eakness, to be vexed at 
 them, as well as to be diverted from thy course of action and 
 to give way through fear; for both are equally deserters 
 from their post, the man who does it through fear, and the 
 man who is alienated from him who is by nature a kinsman 
 and a friend. 
 
 10. There is no nature which is inferior to art, for the 
 arts imitate the natures of things. But if this is so, that 
 nature which is the most perfect and the most comprehensive 
 of all natures, cannot fall short of the skill of art. Now all 
 arts do the inferior things for the sake of the superior ; there- 
 fore the universal nature does so too. And, indeed, hence is 
 the origin of justice, and in justice the other virtues have 
 their foundation : for justice will not be observed, if we 
 either care for middle things [things indifferent], or are easily 
 deceived and careless and changeable, (v. 16. 80 ; vii. 55.) 
 
 11. If the things do not come to thee, the pursuits and 
 avoidances of which disturb thee, still in a manner thou 
 goest to them. Let then thy judgment about them be at rest, 
 and they will remain quiet, and thou wilt not be seen either 
 pursuing or avoiding. 
 
 12. The spherical form of the soul maintains its figure, 
 when it is neither extended towards any object, nor contracted 
 inwards, nor dispersed nor sinks down, but is illuminated by 
 light, by which it sees the truth, the truth of all things and 
 the truth that is in itself, (viii. 41. 45, xii. 3.) 
 
 13. Suppose any man shall despise me. Let him look to 
 
M. Antoninus. XL 189 
 
 tliat himself. But I will look to tliis, tliat I bo not 
 discovered doing or saying anytliing deserving of contempt. 
 Shall any man hate me ? Let him look to it. But I will bo 
 mild and benevolent towards every man, and ready to show 
 even him his mistake, not reproachfully, nor yet as making a 
 display of my endurance, but nobly and honestly, like tho 
 great Phocion, unless indeed he only assumed it. For the 
 interior [parts] ought to be such, and a man ouglit to be seen 
 by the gods neither dissatisfied with anything nor complaining. 
 For what evil is it to thee, if thou art now doing what is 
 agreeable to thy own nature, and art satisfied with that which 
 at this moment is suitable to the nature of the universe, since 
 thou art a human being placed at thy post in order that what 
 is for the common advantage may be done in some way ? 
 
 14. Men despise one another and flatter one another ; and 
 men wish to raise themselves above one another, and crouch 
 before one another. 
 
 15. How unsound and insincere is he who says, I have 
 determined to deal with thee in a fair way. — What art thou 
 doing, man ? There is no occasion to give this notice. It 
 will soon show itself by acts. The voice ought to be plainly 
 written on the forehead. Such as a man's character is,f he 
 immediately shows it in his eyes, just as he who is beloved 
 forthwith reads everything in the eyes of lovers. The man 
 who is honest and good ought to be exactly like a man who 
 smells strong, so that the bystander as soon as he comes near 
 him must smell whether he choose or not. But the afiecta- 
 tion of simplicity is like a crooked stick.^ Nothing is more 
 disgraceful than a wolfish friendshij) [false friendship]. 
 Avoid this most of all. The good and simple and benevolent 
 show all these things in the eyes, and there is no 
 mistaking. 
 
 « Instead of (XKa.\^-q Saumaise reads (XKafx^r]. There is a Greek 
 proverb, ana-^^hv ^vKov ovSeiroT opdov : ' You cannot make a crooked 
 BLick straight." 
 
 The wolfish friendship is an allusion tc the fable of the sheep and 
 tlie wolves. 
 
190 AL Antoninus: XL 
 
 16. As to living in the best way, this power is in the soul, 
 if it be indifferent to things which are indifferent. And it 
 will be indifferent, if it looks on each of these things 
 separately and all together, and if it remembers that not one 
 of them produces in us an opinion about itself, nor comes to 
 us; but these things remain immoveable, and it is we 
 ourselves who produce the judgments about them, and, as we 
 may say, write them in ourselves, it being in our power not 
 to write them, and it being in our power, if perchance these 
 judgments have imperceptibly got admission to our minds, to 
 wipe them out ; and if we remember also that such attention 
 will only be for a short time, and then life will be at an end. 
 Besides, what trouble is there at all in doing this ? For if 
 these things are according to nature, rejoice in them, and 
 they will be easy to thee: but if contrary to nature, seek 
 what is conformable to thy own nature, and strive towards 
 this, even if it bring no reputation ; for every man is allowed 
 to seek his own good. 
 
 17. Consider whence each thing is come, and of what it 
 consists,! and into what it changes, and what kind of a thing 
 it will be when it has changed, and that it will sustain 
 no harm. 
 
 18. [If any have offended against thee, consider first]: 
 What is my relation to men, and that we are made for one 
 another ; and in another respect, I was made to be set over 
 them, as a ram over the flock or a bull over the herd. But 
 examine the matter from first principles, from this : If all 
 things are not mere atoms, it is nature which orders all 
 things : if this is so, the inferior things exist for the sake of 
 the superior, and these for the sake of one another, (n. 1 ; 
 IX. 39 ; V. 16 ; III. 4.) 
 
 Second, consider what kind of men they are at table, in bed, 
 and so forth: and particularly, under what compulsions in 
 respect of opinions they are ; and as to theii' acts, consider 
 with what pride they do what they do. (viii. 14; ix. 34.) 
 
 Third, that if men do rightly what they do, we ought not 
 to be displeased; but if they do not right, it is plain that 
 
ill. Antonimis. XL VM 
 
 they io so involuntarily and in ignorance. For as every 
 Boul is unwillingly deprived of the truth, so also is it unwill- 
 ingly deprived of the power of behaving to each man acccjrd- 
 ing to his deserts. Accordingly men are pained when they Are 
 called unjust, ungrateful, and greedy, and in a word wrong- 
 doers to their neighbours. (vii. 62, 63; ii. 1; vu. 26; 
 VIII. 29.) 
 
 Fourth, consider that thou also doest many things wrong, 
 and that thou art a man like others ; and even if thou dost 
 abstain from certain faults, still thou hast the disposition to 
 commit them, though either through cowardice, or concern 
 about rej^utation or some such mean motive, thou dost abstain 
 from such faults, (i. 17.) 
 
 Fifth, consider that thou dost not even understand whether 
 men are doing wrong or not, for many things are done with a 
 certain reference to circumstances. And in short, a man must 
 learn a great deal to enable him to pass a correct judgment 
 on another man's acts."(ix. 38 ; iv. 51.) 
 
 Sixth, consider when thou art much vexed or grieved, that 
 man's life is only a moment, and after a short time we are all 
 laid out dead. (vii. 58 ; iv. 48.) 
 
 Seventh, that it is not men's acts which distiu'b us, for those 
 acts have their foundation in men's ruling principles, but it is 
 our own opinions which disturb us. Take away these opinions 
 then, and resolve to dismiss thy judgment about an act as if 
 it were something grievous, and thy anger is gone. How 
 then shall I take away these opinions ? By reflecting that no 
 wrongful act of another brings shame on thee : for imless that 
 which is shameful is alone bad, thou also must of necessity do 
 many things wrong, and become a robber and everything else. 
 (v. 25; Yii. 16.) 
 
 Eighth, consider how much more pain is brought on us by 
 the anger and vexation caused by such acts than by the acts 
 themselves, at which we are angry and vexed, (tv. 39. 49 ; 
 VII. 24) 
 
 Ninth, consider that a good disposition is invincible, if it 
 be genuine, and not an affected smile and acting a part. For 
 
192 M. Antoninus. XL 
 
 what will the most violent man do to thee, if thou continuest 
 to be of a kind disposition towards him, and if, as opportunity 
 offers, thou gently admonishest him and calmly correctest his 
 errors at the very time when he is trying to do thee harm, 
 saying. Not so, my child : we are constituted by nature for 
 something else : I shall certainly not be injured, but thou art 
 injuring thyself, my child. — And show him with gentle tact 
 and by general principles that this is so, and that even bees 
 do not do as he does, nor any animals which are formed by 
 nature to be gregarious. And thou must do this neither with 
 any double meaning nor in the way of reproach, but affection- 
 ately and without any rancour in thy soul ; and not as if thou 
 wert lecturing him, nor yet that any bystander may admire, 
 but either when he is alone, and if others are present * *J 
 
 Kemember these nine rules, as if thou hadst received them 
 as a gift from the Muses, and begin at last to be a man while 
 thou livest. But thou must equally avoid flattering men and 
 being vexed at them, for both are unsocial and lead to harm. 
 And let this truth be present to thee in the excitemeiit of 
 anger, that to be moved by passion is not manly, but that 
 mildness and gentleness, as they are more agreeable to 
 human nature, so also are they more manly; and he who 
 possesses these qualities possesses strength, nerves and 
 courage, and not the man who is subject to fits of passion and 
 discontent. For in the same degree in which a man's mind is 
 nearer to freedom from all passion, in the same degree also is 
 it nearer to strength : and as the sense of pain is a charac- 
 teristic of weakness, so also is anger. For he who yields to 
 pain and he who yields to anger, both are wounded and both 
 submit. 
 
 But if thou wilt, receive also a tenth present from the leader 
 of the [Muses Apollo], and it is this — that to expect bad men 
 not to do wrong is madness, for he who expects this desires 
 an impossibility. But to allow men to behave so to others, 
 and to expect them not to do thee any wrong, is irrational 
 and tyrannical. 
 
 ' It appears that there is a defect m the text here. 
 
M. Antoninus. XI. 193 
 
 19. There are four princijial aberrations of the snperioi 
 faculty against which thou shouklst be constantly on thy guard, 
 and when thou hast detected them, thou sliouldst wipe them 
 out and say on each occasion thus : this thought is not neces- 
 sary : this tends to destroy social union : this which thou art 
 going to say comes not from the real thoughts ; for thou 
 shouldst consider it among the most absurd of things for a 
 man not to speak from his real thoughts. But the fourth is 
 when thou shalt reproach thyself for anything, for this is an 
 evidence of the diviner part within thee being overpowered 
 and yielding to the less honourable and to the perishable part, 
 the body, and to its gross pleasures, (iv. 24; ii. 16.) 
 
 20. Thy aerial part and all the fiery parts which are 
 mingled in thee, though by nature they have an upward ten- 
 dency, still in obedience to the disposition of the universe 
 they are overpowered here in the compound mass [the body]. 
 And also the whole of the earthy part in thee and the watery, 
 though their tendency is downward, still are raised up and 
 occupy a position which is not their natural one. In this 
 manner then the elemental j^^i'^s obey the universal, for 
 when they have been fixed in any place perforce they remain 
 there until again the universal shall sound the signal for dis- 
 solution. Is it not then strange that thy intelligent part only 
 should be disobedient and discontented with its own place '? 
 And yet no force is imposed on it, but only those things which 
 are conformable to its nature : still it does not submit, but is 
 carried in the opposite direction. For the movement towards 
 injustice and intemperance and to anger and grief and fear is 
 nothing else than the act of one who deviates from nature. 
 And also when the ruling faculty is discontented with any- 
 thing that happens, then too it deserts its post : for it is con- 
 stituted for piety and reverence towards the gods no less than 
 for justice. For these qualities also are comprehended under 
 the generic term of contentment with the constitution of 
 things, and indeed they are prior^ to acts of justice. 
 
 * The word izpecr^vrepa, N\liich is here translated " prior," mny alsc 
 mean •' superior:" but Antoninus seems to say that piety and reverence 
 
 O 
 
194 M. Antoninus. XI. 
 
 21. He who lias not one and always the same object in life, 
 cannot be one and the same all through his life. But what 
 1 have said is not enough, unless this also is added, what this 
 object ought to be. For as there is not the same opinion 
 about all the things which in some way or other are con- 
 sidered by the majority to be good, but only about some cer- 
 tain things, that is, things which concern the common 
 interest ; so also ought we to propose to ourselves an object 
 which shall be of a common kind [social] and political. For 
 he who directs all his own efforts to this object, will make all 
 his acts alike, and thus will always be the same. 
 
 22. Think of the country mouse and of the town mouse, 
 and of the alarm and trepidation of the town mouse.^ 
 
 23. Socrates used to call the opinions of the many by the 
 name of Lamiae, bugbears to frighten children. 
 
 24. The Lacedaemonians at their public spectacles used to 
 set seats in the shade for strangers, but themselves sat down 
 anywhere. 
 
 25. Socrates excused himself to Perdiccas^" for not going 
 
 of the gods precede all virtues, and that other virtues are derived from 
 them, even justice, which in another passage (xi. 10) he makes the 
 foundation of all virtues. The ancient notion of justice is that of giving 
 to every one his due. It is not a legal definition, as some have supposed, 
 but a moral rule which law cannot in all cases enforce. Besides law 
 has its own rules, which are sometimes moral and sometimes imrcoral ; 
 but it enforces them all simply because they are general rules, and if 
 it did not or could not enforce them, so far Law would not be Law. 
 Justice, or the doing what is just, implies a universal rule and obedience 
 to it ; and as we all live under universal Law, which commands both 
 our body and our intelligence, and is the law of our nature, that is the 
 law of the whole constitution of man, we miist endeavour to discover 
 what this supreme Law is. It is the will of the power that rules all. 
 By acting in obedience to this will, we do justice, and by consequence 
 everything else that we ought to do. 
 
 9 The story is told by Horace in his Satires (ii. 6), and by others 
 since, but not better. 
 
 10 Perhaps the emperor made a mistake here, for other vsrriters say 
 that it was Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, who invited Socrates to 
 Macedonia. 
 
M. Antoninus. XI. 195 
 
 to him, saying, It is because I would not perish by the worst 
 of all ends, that is, I would not receive a favour and tlicii bo 
 unable to retui-n it. 
 
 26. In the writings of the [Ephesians]" there was this pre- 
 cept, constantly to think of some one of the men of f(jrmer 
 times who practised virtue. 
 
 27. The Pythagoreans bid us in the morning look to tlic 
 heavens that we may be reminded of those bodies which con- 
 tinually do the same things and in the same manner perform 
 theii* work, and also be reminded of their pui'ity and nudity 
 For there is no veil over a star. 
 
 28. Consider what a man Socrates was when he dressed 
 himself in a skin, after Xanthippe had taken his cloak and 
 gone out, and what Socrates said to his friends who were 
 ashamed of him and drew back from him when they saw him 
 dressed thus. 
 
 29. Neither in writing nor in reading wilt thou be able to 
 lay down rules for others before thou shalt have first learned 
 to obey rules thyself. Much more is this so in life. 
 
 30. A slave thou art : free spech is not for thee. 
 
 31. And my heart laughed within. (Od. ix. 413.) 
 
 32. And virtue they will curse speaking harsh words. 
 
 (Hesiod, Works and Days, 184.) 
 
 33. To look for the fig in w:inter is a madman's act : such 
 is he who looks for his child when it is no longer allowed. 
 (Epictetus, III. 24, 87.) 
 
 34. When a man kisses his child, said Epictetus, he should 
 whisj)er to himself, " To-morrow perchance thou wilt die " — 
 But those are words of bad omen — " No word is a word of 
 bad omen," said Epictetus, " which expresses any work of 
 nature ; or if it is so, it is also a word of bad omen to speak 
 of the ears of corn being reaped." (Epictetus, iii. 24, 88.) 
 
 35. The unripe grape, the ripe bunch, the dried grape, 
 all are changes, not into nothing, but into sometLi;- ,>hich 
 exists not yet. (Epictetus, iii. 24.) 
 
 " Gataker suggested 'ETnKovpeiwj/ for 'E<p€(rlwv^ 
 
196 M. Antoninus. XL 
 
 36. No man can rob us of our free will. (Epictetus, 
 HI. 22, 105.) 
 
 37. Epictetus also said, a man must discover an art [or 
 rules] with respect to giving his assent ; and in respect to 
 his movements he must be careful that they be made with 
 regard to circumstances, that they be consistent with social 
 interests, that they have regard to the value of the object ; 
 and as to sensual desii-e, he should altogether keep away 
 from it ; and as to avoidance [aversion] he should not show it 
 with respect to any of the things which are not in our 
 power. 
 
 38. The dispute then, he said, is not about any common 
 matter, but about being mad or not. 
 
 39. Socrates used to say, What do you want ? Souls of 
 rational men or irrational ? — Souls of rational men — Of what 
 rational men ? , Sound or unsound ? — Sound — Why then do 
 you not seek for them ? — Because we have them — Why then 
 do you fight and quarrel ? 
 
M. Antoninus. Xll. 3 97 
 
 XII. 
 
 ALL those things at which thou wishest to arrive by a 
 circuitous road, thou canst have now, if thou dost nol 
 refuse them to thyself. And this means, if thou wilt take no 
 notice of all the past, and trust the future to providence, and 
 direct the present only conformably to piety and justice. 
 Conformably to piety, that thou mayst be content with the 
 lot which is assigned to thee, for nature designed it for thee 
 and thee for it. Conformably to justice, that thou mayst 
 always speak the truth freely and without disguise, and do 
 the things which are agreeable to law and according to the 
 worth of each. And let neither anotlier man's wickedness 
 hinder thee, nor opinion nor voice, nor yet the sensations of 
 the poor flesh which has grown about thee ; for the passive 
 part will look to this. If then, w^hatever the time may be 
 when thou shalt be near to thy dejDarture, neglecting every- 
 thing else thou shalt respect only thy ruling faculty and the 
 divinity within thee, and if thou shalt be afraid not because 
 thou must some time cease to live, but if thou shalt fear 
 never to have begun to live according to nature — then thou 
 wilt be a man worthy of the universe which has produced 
 thee, and thou wilt cease to be a stranger in thy native land, 
 and to wonder at things which happen daily as if they 
 were something unexpected, and to be dependent on this 
 or that. 
 
 2. God sees the minds (ruling principles) of all men bared 
 of the material vesture and rind and impurities. For with his 
 intellectual part alone he touches the intelligence only which 
 has flowed and been derived from himself into these bodies. 
 And if thou also usest thyself to do this, thou wilt rid thyself 
 of thy much trouble. For he who regards not the peor fie&h 
 
193 31. Antoninus. XII. 
 
 which envelopes him, surely will not trouble himself by 
 looking after raiment and dwelling and fame and such like 
 externals and show. 
 
 3. The things are three of which thou art composed, a 
 little body, a little breath [life], intelligence. Of these the 
 first two are thine, so far as it is thy duty to take care of 
 them ; but the third alone is properly thine. Therefore if 
 thou shalt separate from thyself, that is, from thy under- 
 standing, whatever others do or say, and whatever thou hast 
 done or said thyself, and whatever future things trouble thee 
 because they may happen, and whatever in the body which 
 envelopes thee or in the breath [life], which is by nature 
 associated with the body, is attached to thee independent of 
 thy will, and whatever the external circumfluent vortex 
 whirls round, so that the intellectual power exempt from the 
 things of fate can live pure and free by itself, doing what is 
 just and accepting what happens and saying the truth : if 
 thou wilt separate, I say, from this ruling faculty the things 
 which are attached to it by the impressions of sense, and the 
 things of time to come and of time that is past, and wilt 
 make thyself like Empedocles' sphere, — 
 
 All round, and in its joyous rest reposing •} 
 
 and if thou shalt strive to live only what is really thy life, 
 that is, the present — then thou wilt be able to pass that 
 portion of life which remains for thee up to the time of thy 
 death, free from perturbations, nobly, and obedient to thy 
 own daemon [to the god that is within thee], (ii. 13. 17 ; 
 III. 5, 6 ; XI. 12.) 
 
 4. I have often wondered how it is that every man loves 
 himself more than all the rest of men, but yet sets less value 
 on his own opinion of himself than on the oj)inion of others. 
 If then a god or a wise teacher should present himself to a 
 
 1 The verse of Empedocles is corrupt in Antoninus. It has beea 
 restorc-d by Peyron from a Turin MS. thus : 
 
 ^ipa/.pos KVK\oT€p-{}s ixovh] TrepiyvBu yaiocv. 
 
M. Antoninus. XI L 109 
 
 man and bid liim to think of nothing and to design nothing 
 which he would not exprt^ss as soon as he conceived it, ho 
 could not endure it even for a single day.^ So much more 
 respect have we to what our neighbours shall think of uh 
 than to what we shall think of ourselves. 
 
 5. How can it bo that the gods after having ari-anged all 
 things well and benevolently for mankind, have overlooked 
 this alone, that some men and very good men, and men who, 
 as we may say, have had most communion with the divinity, 
 and through pious acts and religious observances have been 
 most intimate with the divinity, when they have once died 
 should never exist again, but should be completely extin- 
 guished ? 
 
 But if this is so, be assured that if it ought to have been 
 other\vise, the gods would have done it. For if it were just, 
 it would also be possible ; and if it were according to nature, 
 natui-e would have had it so. But because it is not so, if in 
 fact it is not so, be thou convinced that it ought not to have 
 been so : — for thou seest even of thyself that in this inquiry 
 thou art disputing with the deity ; and we should not thus 
 dispute with the gods, unless they were most excellent and 
 most just ; — but if this is so, they would not have allowed 
 anything in the ordering of the universe to be neglected 
 unjustly and ii-rationally. 
 
 6. Practise thyself even in the things which thou despairest 
 of accomplishing. For even the left hand, which is ineffectual 
 for all other things for want of practice, holds the bridle 
 more vigorously than the right hand ; for it has been practised 
 in this. 
 
 7. Consider in what condition both in body and soul a 
 man should be when he is overtaken by death ; and consider 
 the shortness of life, the boundless abyss of time past and 
 future, the feebleness of all matter. 
 
 8. Contemplate the formative principles [forms] of things 
 bare of their coverings ; the piu-poses of actions ; consider 
 what pain is, what pleasure is, and death, and fame ; who is 
 
 2 m. 4. 
 
200 M. Antoninus. XIL 
 
 to himself the cause of his uneasiness; how no man is 
 hindered by another ; that everything is opinion. 
 
 9. In the application of thy principles thou must be like 
 the pancratiast, not like the gladiator ; for the gladiator lets 
 fall the sword which he uses and is killed ; but the other 
 always has his hand, and needs to do nothing else than 
 use it. 
 
 10. See what things are in themselves, dividing them into 
 matter, form and purpose. 
 
 11. What a power man has to do nothing except what 
 god will approve, and to accept all that god may give him. 
 
 12. With respect to that which happens confonnably to 
 nature, we ought to blame neither gods, for they do nothing 
 -svrong either voluntarily or involuntarily, nor men, for they 
 do nothing wrong except involuntarily. Consequently we 
 should blame nobody, (ii. 11, 12, 13 ; vii. 62 ; viii. 17.) 
 
 13. How ridiculous and what a stranger he is who is sur- 
 prised at anything which happens in life. 
 
 14. Either there is a fatal necessity and invincible order, 
 or a kind providence, or a confusion without a purpose and 
 without a director (iv. 27). If then there is an invincible 
 necessity, why dost thou resist ? But if there is a providence 
 which allows itself to be propitiated, make thyself worthy of 
 the help of the divinity. But if there is a confusion without 
 a governor, be content that in such a tempest thou hast in 
 thyself a certain ruling intelligence. And even if the tempest 
 carry thee away, let it carry away the poor flesh, the poor 
 breath, everything else ; for the intelligence at least it will 
 not carry away. 
 
 15. Does the light of the lamp shine without losing its 
 splendour until it is extinguished ; and shall the truth which 
 is in thee and justice and temperance be extinguished [before 
 thy death] ? 
 
 16. When a man has presented the appearance of having 
 done wrong, [say,] How then do I know if this is a wrongful 
 act ? And even if he has done wrong, how do I know that 
 he has not condemned himself? and so this is like teai-inj? 
 
M. Antoninus. XII. 201 
 
 his own face. Consider tliat lie, wlio would not havo tlia 
 bad man do wrong, is like the man who would not have tho 
 figtree to bear juice in the tigs and infants to cry and the 
 horse to neigh, and whatever else must of necessity be. Foi* 
 what must a man do who has such a character ? If then then 
 art irritable,! cure this man's disposition.^ 
 
 17. If it is not right, do not do it: if it is not true, do 
 not say it. [For let thy efforts be. — ]* 
 
 18. In everything always observe what the thing is which 
 produces for thee an appearance, and resolve it by dividing it 
 into the formal, the material, the purpose, and the time 
 within which it must end. 
 
 19. Perceive at last that thou hast in thee something 
 better and more divine than the things which cause the 
 various affects, and as it were pull thee by the strings. What 
 is there now in my mind ? is it fear, or suspicion, or desire, 
 or anything of the kind? (v. 11.) 
 
 20. First, do nothing inconsiderately, nor without a pur- 
 pose. Second, make thy acts refer to nothing else than to a 
 social end. 
 
 21. Consider that before long thou wilt be nobody and 
 nowhere, nor will any of the things exist which thou now seest, 
 nor any of those who are now living. For all things are formed 
 by nature to change and be turned and to perish in order that 
 other things in continuous succession may exist, (ix. 28.) 
 
 22. Consider that everything is opinion, and opinion is in 
 thy power. Take away then, when thou choosest, thy 
 opinion, and like a mariner, who has doubled the promontory, 
 thou wilt find calm, everything stable, and a waveless bay. 
 
 23. Any one activity whatever it may be, when it has 
 ceased at its proper time, suffers no evil because it has 
 ceased ; nor he who has done this act, does he suffer any evil 
 for this reason that the act has ceased. In like manner theil 
 
 3 The interpreters translate yopySs by the words " acer, validusque," 
 and " skilful." But in Epictetus (ii. 16, 20 ; m. 12, 10) yopyos means 
 *' vehement," " prone to anger," " irritable." 
 
 ■* There is something wrong here, or incomplete. 
 
202 M. Antoninus. XIL 
 
 the whole whicli consists of all the acts, which is our life, if 
 it cease at its proper time, suffers no evil for this reason that 
 it has ceased ; nor he who has terminated this series at the 
 proper time, has he been ill dealt with. But the proper time 
 and the limit nature fixes, sometimes as in old age the 
 peculiar nature of man, but always the universal nature, by 
 the change of whose parts the whole universe continues ever 
 young and perfect.^ And everything which is useful to the 
 universal is always good and in season. Therefore the ter- 
 mination of life for every man is no evil, because neither is it 
 shameful, since it is both independent of the will and not 
 opposed to the general interest, but it is good, since it is 
 seasonable and profitable to and congruent with the universal. 
 For thus too he is moved by the deity who is moved in the 
 same manner with the deity and moved towards the same 
 things in his mind. 
 
 24. These three principles thou must have in readiness. 
 In the things which thou doest do nothing either incon- 
 siderately or otherwise than as justice herself would act ; but 
 with respect to what may happen to thee from without, con- 
 sider that it happens either by chance or according to provi- 
 dence, and thou must neither blame chance nor accuse 
 providence. Second, consider what every being is from the 
 seed to the time of its receiving a soul, and from the reception 
 of a soul to the giving back of the same, and of what things 
 every being is compounded and into what things it is resolved. 
 Third, if thou shouldst suddenly be raised up above the earth, 
 and shouldst look down on human things, and observe the 
 variety of them how great it is, and at the same time also 
 shouldst see at a glance how great is the number of beings 
 who dwell all around in the air and the aether, consider 
 that as often as thou shouldst be raised up, thou wouldst see 
 the same things, sameness of form and shortness of duration. 
 Are these things to be proud of ? 
 
 25. Cast away opinion : thou art saved. Who then hinders 
 thee from casting it away ? 
 
 fi vn. 25. 
 
M. Antoninus. XIl. 203 
 
 26. When thou art troubled about anything, thou hast 
 forgotten this, that all things happen according to tlio 
 universal nature ; and forgotten this, that a man's wrongful 
 act is nothing to thee ; and further thou hast forgotten this, 
 that everything which huppens, always happened so and will 
 happen so, and now happens so everywhere ; forgotten this 
 too, how close is the kinship between a man and the whole 
 human race, for it is a community, not of a little blood or 
 seed,J)ut of intelligence. And thou hast forgotten this too, 
 that every man's intelligence is a god, and is an efflux of the 
 deity f and forgotten this, that nothing is k man's own, but 
 that his child and his body and his very soul came from 
 the deity; forgotten this, that everything is opinion; and 
 lastly thou hast forgotten that every man lives the present 
 time only, and loses only this. 
 
 27. Constantly bring to thy recollection those who have 
 compJained greatly about anything, those who have been most 
 conspicuous by the greatest fame or misfortunes or enmities 
 or fortunes of any kind : then think where are they all now ? 
 Smoke and ash and a. tale, or not even a tale. And let there 
 be present to thy mind also everything of this sort, how 
 Fabius Catullinus lived in the country, and Lucius Lupus in 
 his gardens, and Stertinius at Baiae, and Tiberius at Capreae 
 and Yelius Eufus [or Eufus at Yelia] ; and in fine think of 
 the eager pursuit of anything conjoined with pride f and how 
 worthless everything is after which men violently strain ; 
 and how much more philosophical it is for a man in the 
 opportunities presented to him to show himself just, tem- 
 perate, obedient to the gods, and to do this with all simplicity : 
 for the pride which is proud of its want of pride is the most 
 intolerable of all. 
 
 28. To those who ask. Where hast thou seen the gods or 
 how dost thou comprehend that they exist and so worshipest 
 them, I answer, in the first place, they may be seen even with 
 
 ^ See Epictctus, ii. S, 9, etc. 
 
 ' /x€t' 04^(rews. OiTjcris koi riJcpos, Epict. I. 8, 6. 
 
20i 31. Antoninus. XII. 
 
 the eyes f in the second place neither have I seen even my 
 own soul and yet I honour it. Thus then with respect to the 
 gods, from what I constantly experience of their power, from 
 this I comprehend that they exist and I venerate them. 
 
 29. The safety of life is this, to examine everything all 
 through, what it is itself, what is its material, what the 
 formal part ; with all thy soul to do justice and to say the 
 truth. What remains except to enjoy life by joining one 
 good thing to another so as not to leave even the smallest 
 intervals between ? 
 
 30. There is one light of the sun, though it is interrupted 
 by walls, mountains, and other things infinite. There is one 
 common substance,^ though it is distributed among countless 
 bodies which have their several qualities. There is one soul, 
 though it is distributed among infinite natures and individual 
 circumscriptions [or individuals]. There is one intelligent 
 soul, though it seems to be divided. Now in the things 
 which have been mentioned all the other parts, such as those 
 which are air and matter, are without sensation and have no 
 
 ^ " Seen even with the eyes." It is supposed that this may be 
 explained by the Stoic doctrine, that the universe is a god or living 
 being (iv. 40), and that the celestial bodies are gods (viii. 19). But the 
 emperor may mean that we know that the gods exist, as he afterwards 
 states it, because we see what they do ; as we know that man has in- 
 tellectual powers, because we see what he does, and in no other way 
 do we know it. This passage then will agree with the passage in the 
 Epistle to the Komans (i. v. 20), and with the Epistle to tlie Colossians 
 (i. V. 15), in which Jesus Christ is named " the image of the invisible 
 god;" and with the passage in the Gospel of St. John (xiv, v. 9). 
 
 Gataker, whose notes are a wonderful collection of learning, and all 
 of it sound and good, quotes a passage of Calvin which is founded on 
 St. Paul's language (Kom. i. v. 20) : " God by creating the universe [or 
 world, mundum], being himself invisible, has presented himself to 
 our eyes conspicuously in a certain visible form." He also quotes 
 Seneca (De Benef. iv. c. 8) : " Quocunque te flexeris, ibi ilium videbis 
 occurrentem tibi : nihil ab illo vacat, opus suum ipse implet." Com- 
 pare also Cicero, Do Senectute (c. 22), Xcnophon's Cyropaedia (vin. 7), 
 and Mem. iv. 3 ; also Epictetus, i. 6, de Providentia. I think that my 
 interpretation of Antoninus is right. 
 
 » IV. 40. 
 
M. Antoninus. XII. 205 
 
 fellowship : and yet even these parts the intelligent principle 
 holds together and the gravitation towards the same. But 
 intellect in a peculiar manner tends to that which is of the 
 same kin, and combines with it, and the feeling for com- 
 munion is not interrupted. 
 
 31. What dost thou wish? to continue to exist? Well, 
 dost thou wish to have sensation ? movement ? growth ? and 
 then again to cease to grow ? to use thy speech ? to think ? 
 What is there of all these things which seems to thee worth 
 desiring ? But if it is easy to set little value on all these 
 things, turn to that which remains, which is to follow reason 
 and god. But it is inconsistent with honouring reason and 
 god to be troubled because by death a man will be deprived 
 of the other things. 
 
 32. How small a part of the boundless and unfathomable 
 time is assigned to every man ? for it is very soon swallowed 
 up in the eternal. And how small a part of the whole sub- 
 stance ? and how small a part of the universal soul ? and on 
 what a small clod of the whole earth thou creepest ? Reflect- 
 ing on all this consider nothing to be great, except to act as 
 thy nature leads thee, and to endure that which the common 
 nature brings. 
 
 33. How does the ruling faculty make use of itself? for all 
 lies in this. But everything else, whether it is in the power 
 of thy will or not, is only lifeless ashes and smoke. 
 
 34. This reflection is most adapted to move us to contempt 
 of death, that even those who think pleasure to be a good and 
 pain an evil still have desi^ised it. 
 
 35. The man to whom that only is good which comes in 
 due season, and to whom it is the same thing whether he has 
 done more or fewer acts conformable to right reason, and to 
 whom it makes no difference whether he contemplates the 
 world for a longer or a shorter time — for this man neither is 
 death a terrible thing, (m. 7 , vi. 23 ; x. 20 ; xii. 23.) 
 
 36. Man, thou hast been a citizen in this great state [the 
 world] •}'' what difference does it make to thee whether for 
 
 ^0 n. IG; ni. 11; r^. 29. 
 
206 31. Antoninus. XIL 
 
 five years [or tliree] ? for that which is conformable to the 
 laws is just for all. Where is the hardship then, if no tyrant 
 nor yet an unjust judge sends thee away from the state, but 
 nature who brought thee into it ? the same as if a praetor who 
 has employed an actor dismisses him from the stage'^ — " But 
 I have not finished the five acts, but only three of them " — 
 Thou sayest well, but in life the three acts are the whole 
 drama ; for what shall be a complete drama is determined by 
 him who was once the cause of its composition, and now of its 
 dissolution : but thou art the cause of neither. Depart then 
 satisfied, for he also who releases thee is satisfied. 
 
 9K^ 
 ofTrtt 
 
 UNWE^S^'^'' 
 
207 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 ASict^opa (indiffereutia, Cicero, Seneca. Epp. 82) ; things indiffefent, 
 
 neither good nor bad; tlie Siiine as fxeaa. 
 alaxpos, (turpis, Cic.% ugly; morally ugly. . 
 otV/o, cause. 
 otTiwSes, oiTiou, TO, the formal or formative principle, the cause. 
 
 CLKOlUiOVTJTOS, UUSOClal. 
 
 avacpopd, reference, relation to a purpose. 
 
 avvire^aiperus, unconditionally. 
 
 airoppoia, efflux. 
 
 aTrpoaipera, rd, the things which are not in our will or power. 
 
 apx-h, a first principle. 
 
 &Top.oi, (corpora individua, Cic.\ atoms. 
 
 avrapKeia, est quae parvo conteuta omne id respuit quod abundat 
 
 (Cicero) ; contentment. 
 avTdpK7}s, sufficient in itself; contented. 
 acpopfxai, means, principles. The word has also other sig-nificatious in 
 
 Epictetus. Index ed. Schweig. 
 yt-yvofxeva, rd, tilings which are produced, come into existence. 
 Saifxcou, god, god in man, man's intelligent principle. 
 BidOecris, disposition, affection of the mind. 
 Siaipea-is, di\'ision of things into their parts, dissection, resolution, 
 
 analysis. 
 SiaX^KTiKT]. ars bene disserendi et vera ac falsa dijudicandi (Cic). 
 5id\v(rLs, dissolution, the opposite of avyKpicris. 
 Biduoia, understanding; sometimes, the mind generally, the whole 
 
 intellectual power. 
 ^Syfjiara, (decreta, Cic), principles. 
 dvuafjLLs voepd, iatellectual faculty. 
 iyKpdma, temperance, self-restraint. 
 fISos, in divisione formae tuut, quas Graeci d^T] vocaut ; noetri, si qiL' 
 
208 Index. 
 
 haec forte tractant, species appellant (Clc.). But ilBos is used by 
 
 Epictetus and Antoninus less exactly and as a general term, like 
 
 genus. Index Epict. ed. Schweigh. — 'hy Se ye al irpooTai ovaiai irpbs 
 
 TO. 6,Wa exovcTLU, ovtw kul rh elSos irpbs rh yhos exet* vTTOKiirai yap 
 
 rh elSos Tw yevei. (Al'istot. Cat. C. 5.) 
 dfiapfiei/ri, (fatalis necessitas, fatum, Cic), destiny, necessity. 
 e/c/cAiVeis, aversions, avoidance, the turning away from things; the 
 
 opposite of 6p4^€Ls. 
 ifirpvxa, rd, things which have life. 
 ivepyeia, action, activity. 
 fvvoia, evvoiai, notio, notiones (Cic.), or "notitiae rerum;" notions ol 
 
 things. (Notiouem appello quam Graeci turn evvoiav, turn irpokrirpiv, 
 
 Cic). 
 evoocris, 7}, the unity. 
 4TTi(TTpo<pT), attention to an object. 
 evQvfxia, animi tranquillitas (Cic). 
 evfxeves, rh, evfxeveia, benevolence; evij.eyf]s sometimes means, well 
 
 contented. hD 
 
 eijvoia, benevolence. 
 i^ovffia, power, faculty. 
 eTraKoXovOrjaiv, Kara, by way of sequence. 
 
 7]yefxoviK6u, TO, the ruling faculty or part ; principatus (Cicero). 
 eewpri/xara, percepta (Cic), things perceived, general principles. 
 Kadr]K€iv, TO, duty, " olficium." 
 Ka\6s, beautiful. 
 
 KaTd\r]\l/Ls, comprehension; cognitio, perceptio, comprehensio (Cicero). 
 KaracTKevr], constitution. 
 Karopdwaeis, KaropQoofxaTa; recta, recte facta (Cicero^ ; right acts, those 
 
 acts to which we proceed by the right or straight road. 
 Koa/jLos, order, world, universe. 
 
 Koa-fios, o o\os, the universe, that which is the One and the All vi. 25). 
 Kpiixa, a judgment. 
 Kvpievou, Tt) epoov, that which rules within (iv. 1 , the same as rh 
 
 TjyefxoviKov. Diogenes Laerlius, vn., Zeno. 'qycfxoviKov 8e eJyai rh 
 
 KvpidoraTOU ttjs xj/uxv^- 
 KoyiKo., rd, the things which have reason. 
 XoyiKds, rational. 
 K6yos, reason. 
 
 \6yos o-irepuaTtfcJs, seminal principle. 
 /xeVa, TO, thii'gs indifierent, viewed with respect to virtue, 
 i/oepo'?, intellectual. 
 v6iJ.os, law. 
 
 vovs, intelligence, understanding. 
 OvTjcTiS, arrogfinoo, pride. It sometimes means in Antoninus the eami 
 
 as Ti/^os; but it also moans " opinion." 
 
Index. 209 
 
 o.Kovofiia (dispositio, ordo, Cic), lias sometimes the peculiar sense of 
 artifice, or doing something with an apparent purpodo different from 
 the real purpose. 
 
 i\ov, t6, the universe, the whole : f) twu '6\u)v cpixns. 
 
 ovra, TO., things which exist ; existence, being. 
 
 ope^is, desire of a thing, which is opposed to ^kkAktis, aversion. 
 
 dp/xri, movement towards an object, appetite ; appetitio, naturahs appe- 
 titus, appetitus animi (Cicero). 
 
 ovcrla, substance (vi, 49). Modern writers sometimes incorrectly trans- 
 late it " (.'ssentia.' It is often used by Epictetus in the same sense 
 as uAtj. Aristotle (Cat. c. 5) defines ovaia, and it is properly trans- 
 lated "substantia" (ed. Jul. Pacius). Porphyrins (Isag. c. 2): 
 7] oi/aia dj/wTarw ov<ra Tcp /xtjScj/ elvai Trph avTrjs y4vos ^y t6 y^viKU)- 
 rarov. 
 
 irapaKoXovQ-qTiKT] Siva/^us, 7], the power which enables us to observe and 
 understand. 
 
 ireTo-ts, passivity, opposed to ivipyeia : also, affect. 
 
 Tre/jio-rao-ety, circumstances, the things which surround us; troubles, 
 difficulties. 
 
 imrpwixivT], 7], destiny. 
 
 TTpoa'ip^cris, purpose, free will (Aristot. Khet. i. 13). 
 
 ■trpoaip^Tci, rd, things which are within our will or power. 
 
 TTpoaipeTLKou, r6, free will. 
 
 ■Kp6d€(ns, a purpose, proposition. 
 
 Trp6voia (provideutia, Cic), providence, 
 
 (TKOTTos, object, purpose. 
 
 crroix^'^ov, element. 
 
 crvyKaTaQ^cns (assensio, approbatio, Cic), assent ; (TvyKaraBiaiis (pro- 
 bationes, Gellius, xix. 1). 
 
 (TvyKpi/xaTa, things compounded (n. 3). 
 
 (TvyKpLffis, the act of combining elements out of which a body is pro- 
 duced, combination. 
 
 (TvuOea-is, ordering, arrangement (compositio). 
 
 <rv(TTriixa, system, a thing compounded of parts which have a certain 
 relation to one another. 
 
 v\7], matter, material. 
 
 vKiKov, TO, the material principle. 
 
 vK€^aipe(Tis, exception, reservation ; fied' vire^aipea-eus, conditionally. 
 
 vir60€(ns, material to work on; thing to employ the reason on; pro- 
 position, thing assumed as matter for argrunent and to lead to 
 conclusions. (Quaestionum duo sunt genera; alterum infinitum, 
 definitum alterum. Definitum est, quod virSdeaiv Graeci, nos causam : 
 infinitum, quod d4(nv illi appellant, nos propositum possumus nominare. 
 Cic. See Aristot. Anal. Post. i. c 2). 
 
 vTroKeififva, to., things present or existing, vi. 4 ; or things which are a 
 basis or foundation. 
 
210 Index. 
 
 vir6\r]\pLs, opinion. 
 
 viroa-raais, basis, substance, being, foundation (x. 5). Epictetus haa ri 
 
 rh virocTTaTiKhy koL oixriwdes. (Justinus ad Diogn. C. 2.) 
 {/(piaraadai, to subsist, to be. 
 <pavTa(xiai (visus, Cic.) ; appearances, thoughts, impressions (visa animi, 
 
 Grellius, XIX. 1) : (pavraaia itrri rvTvuicns eV ^vxv- 
 (f>dvTa(rixa, seems to be used by Antoninus in the same sense as <payraffla, 
 
 Epictetus uses only (l>avTa(rla. 
 <pavra(rT6v, that which produces a (pavraa-ia: (pavTaarhv rh ireiroiriKhs 
 
 r7)v (pavraciav alaBr^TSu. 
 <pv(ris, nature. 
 
 <pv<TLs, 7] rS}v '6\wv, the nature of the universe. 
 \\/vx'h, soul, life, living principle. 
 i^ivx^ A.07JK7J, yofpd, a rational soul, an intelligent souL 
 
 vasvov : printed bt wiixiam clowks and sons, otamfobd otbibi 
 
 AND CBAaiNQ OKOc^* 
 
\ 
 
^Y OF calipornt:. 
 THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE 
 STAMPED BELOW 
 
 
 AN INITIAL FINE OF 25 CENTS 
 
 WILL BE ASSESSED FOR FAILURE TO RETURN 
 THIS BOOK. ON THE PATE DUE. THE PENALTY 
 WILL H><dREASE-TO SO" CENTS ON THE FOURTH 
 DAY AND TO $1.00 ON THE SEVENTH DAY 
 OVERDUE. 
 
 W 
 
 rfliu L> LD 
 
 „, ^^ qkcieBSi 
 
 JUL 27 193B 
 
 25Feb'63A£ 
 
 >ii^ STACKS 
 AUG 10 1933 / 
 
 JI/tT^^^H ^FEB 111963 
 
 **" ^ EC'D LD 
 APR! 10 1934 MAR 14 19G. 
 
 I 
 
 'l6t)ec'55GB |||AR 2 1975 5^ 
 
 DEC 15 1955 1« 
 
 
 MAY 15 1988 
 mm /\pR 3 0J9I 
 
 LD 21-50m-l, 
 
 w 
 
 I 
 
U.C. BERKELEY LIBRARIES 
 
 w 
 
 
 M 
 
 / i/ 
 
 ^>T<r 
 
 t 
 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY