\\\wmM ^a3AlNfl3^ ^.nM-LIBRARYO^ ^^H1BRARY6?/^ '%0JnY3J0>' %0J1W3J0>^ ,OFCALfFO% ^OFCALiFO% o pc: ^^AOTeiii^ ^^6>AHvaan-#: ^\\\E UNivERiy^ ^mmiiis.^ n\imm ^^AHvnan-i^ \WE UNIVERVa ' :':^. ^li jy iv^'n MO^aq pdduiKjs ajBp jsbj aip uo aflQ si 5iooq siqx sapSay soi AUVHan viNHoinvD lo AJLiffaaAiMn HISTORY OF THE PRINCIPAL REPUBLICS IN THE WORLD, VOL. t. lOHTS^ ADAMvS.LX.D, C/'C^- '^I't/Z'/c/h t/ I'e/''!'i^ija4. fy lo/ut Si:c./cif THE Al/tHOR. g {ions of the people had time to fubfide. The trial at length commenced, and lalled feveral days, during which he dilplayed the moft extenfive knowledge of the laws of his country, and of humanity ; and at the con- clufion he had the fatisfa^lion of proving ta Great Britain herfelf, that the citizens of MafTaChufetts would be juft and humane to their enemies amidfl the grofleft infults and provocations. Capt. Prefton was acquitted* In this moft delicate and important trial, Mr* Adams manifefted that firmnefs of mind, difinterefled and enlightened patriotifm, and that love of juftice and humanity, which have uniformly marked his conduft in all thofe great departments which he has fincc filled with fo miicii ability and dignity. He was a member of the firfl: Cons^refs in o 1774; and was one of the principal pro- moters of the famous refolution of the 4th of July, 1776, which declared the Amxrican colonies Free, Sovereign, and Indepen- dent States. Having been f^r a confiderable length of time one of the commiffioners of the war dc- partmenr,andanrincipalluggeftoroftheterms to be cfFered to France, for forming a treaty of 6 A SHORT ACCOUN'r of alliance and comnnerce, he was fenC to the court of Verfailles, as one of the minifters plenipotentiary of the United States, to con- fummate that important bufiliefs. On his return from France he was called upon by MalTachufetts to affift in forming a plan of government ; and to him this State is chiefly indebted for their prefent excellent conftitution.* After this important bufinefs was accom- plilhed, he returned to Europe, vefted with full powers from Congrefs to affift at any conference which might be opened for the eftablilhment of peace ; and he foon after received other powers to negociate a loan of money for the ufe of the United States ; and to reprefcnt them as their minifler plenipo* tentiary to their High MightinelTes the States General of the United Provinces. Such im- portant trufts (hew in what high eflimation he was held by his country, and the able and fatisfadory manner in which he executed them, proved that their confidence was well placed. * See the American Conftitutions, publiilied by order of Coiigrcls, printed for J. Stockdale, While OF THE AUTHOR. ^- *j While in Europe, Mr. Adams publifhcd the following learned and celebrated work, in which he advocates, /as the fundamental principles of a free government- equal re- prefentation, of which numbers, or property, or both fhould be the rule a total feparation of the executive from the legiflative power, and of the judicial from both and a balance in the legiflature, by three independent, equal branches. *' If there is one certain truth," iays he, '' to be coUeded from the hiftory of all ages, it is this : That the people's rights and liberties, and the democratical mixture in a conftitution, can never be preferved without a ftrong executive ; or in other words, without feparating the executive power from the legiflative.'* __y A charafter who rendered fuch eminent fervices to his country, both at home and abroad, in leafbns of the greateft gloominefs and danger, and who poflefled fuch an ex^ tenfive knowledge of politics and govern- ment, did not remain unnoticed by his grate^ ful countrymen. He was called, in 1789, by the choice of his country, to the Vice- Prefidency of the United Sates, which office be ftill retain 5; -^^ Thejr S A SHORT ACCOUNT, &C. '* They who have had an opportunity of knowing his Excellency, Mr. Adams," lays an European writer, " trace in his features the moft unequivocal marks of probity and candour. He unites to that gravity which is fuitable to the dignity of his flation, an affability which prejudices you in his favour. Although of a filent turn, as is common to men who engage in important affairs, yet he has a natural eloquence for the difcufiion of important fubjed:s, and for the recommend- ing and enforcing the meafures and iy ftems ivhich are dictated by found policy. He has neither the corrupted nor corrupting prin- ciples of Lxxrd Cheflerfield, but the plain and virtuous demeanour of Sir William Temple. Like him alfo he is fimple in uegociation^ where he finds candour in thofe who treat with him j othcrwife he has the feverity of a true Republican, his idea of virtue giving him a rigidnefs, which makes it difficult for him to accommodate himfelf to thofe in- trigues which European politics have intro* ^uced into negociatiori^" PREFACE* iP R E F A C E. THE arts and fciences in general, during the three or four lafh centuries, have had a regular courfe of progreffive improvement. The inventions in mechanic arts, the difco- veries in natural philofophy, navigation, and commerce, and the advancement of civi- lization and humanity, have occafioned changes in the condition of the world, and the human charad;er, which would have aftonifhed the moft refined nations of anti- quity. A continuation of fimilar exertions is every day rendering Europe more and more like one community, or Single family. Even in the tlieory and practice of govern- ment, in all the limple monarchies, conlider- able improvements have been made. The checks and balances of republican govern- ments have been in fome degree adopted by the courts of princes. By the ered:ion of va- rious tribunals to regifter the laws and exer- cife the judicial power by indulging the petitions and remonftrances of fubjects, un- til by habit they are regarded as rights a controul has been eftablilhed over muiifters h 2, of ii Preface, offlateand the royal councils, which ap- proaches, in Ibme degree, to the fpirit of repubhcs. Property is generally feciire, and perfonal liberty leldom invaded. The prels has great intiuence, even where it is not ex- prefsly tolerated ; and the public opinion mull be refpecfted by a miniller, or his place becomes iniccure. Commerce begins to thrive ; and if religious toleration were efta- blilhed, and perfonal liberty a little more proted:ed, by giving an abiolute right to de- mand a public trial in a certain reafonable time and the ftates invefted wath a few more privileges, or rather reftored to fome that have been taken aw^ay thefe govern- ments would be brought to as great a de- gree of perfection, they would approach as near to the character of governments of laws and not of men, as their nature will proba- bly admit of. In fo general a refinement, Qr more properly reformation of manners and improvement in knowledge, is it not unaccountable that the knowledge of the principles and conilruftion of free govern- ments, in which the happinefs of life, and even the further progrels of improvement in education and fociety, in knowledge and virtue, are fo deeply interefled, fhould have remained at a full ftand for two or three thoufand years ? According to a ftory in Herodotus, the nature of monarchy, ariffo- cracy, and democracy, and the advantages and Preface, iii and inconveniencles of each, were as well imderftoQcl at the time of the neighing of the horfe of Darius as they are at this hour. A variety of mixtures oi thefe limple fpecies were conceived and attempted, with differ- ent fuccefs, by the Greeks and Romans. Reprefentations, inftead of collections, of the people a total feparation of the execu- tive from the legiflative power, and of the ju- dicial from both and a balance in the legif- lature by three independent equal branches are perhaps the three only dilcoveries in the conllitution of a free government, iince the inftitution of Lycurgus. Even thefe have been fo unfortunate, that they have never fpread : the firll has been given up by all the nations, excepting one, who had once adopted it ; and the other two, reduced to practice, if not invented, by the Englifh nation, have never been imitated by any other except their own defcendants in Ame- rica. Whde it would be ralh to fay, that nothing further can be done to bring a free government, in all its parts, ftill nearer to perfection the repreientations of the people are moil obvioully iufceptible of improve- ment. The end to be aimed at, in the for- mation of a reprefentative aflembly, feems to be the fenfe of the people, the public voice : the perfection of the portrait conlifts in its likenefs. Numbers, or property, or both, ihould be the rule ; and the proportions of A 3 electors iv Preface. eledlors and members an affair of calculation. The duration fhould not be {o loner that the deputy fliould have time to forget the opi- nions of his conftitucnts . Corruption in elec- tions is the great enemy of freedom. Among the provifions to prevent it, m.ore frequent elecftions, and a more general privilege of vo- ting, are not all that might be deviled. Di- viding the diilridts, diminilhing the dillance ot travel, and confining the choice to reii- dents, would be great advances towards the annihilation of corruption. The modern arif- tocracies of Holland, Venice, Berne, Sec. have tempered themfelves with innumerable multitudes of checks, by which they have given a great degree of ftability to that form of government : and though liberty and life can never be there enjoyed fo Vv^ell as in a free republic, none is perhaps more capable of profound fagacity. We Ihall learn to prize the checks and balances of a free government, and even thofe of the modern arilfocracies, if we recollect the miferies of Greece, which arofe from their ignorance of them. The only balance attempted againil the ancient kings was a body ot nobles \ and the confequences were perpetual altercations of rebeihon and tyranny, and butcheries of thoufands upon every revolution, from one tothe other. When the kings were aboUliied, the anllocracies tyrann ized j and then no balance w as attempt- ed but between anitocracy and democracy. This, Preface, v This, in the nature of things, could be no balance at all, and therefore the penduluin was for ever on the iwing. It is impoflible to read in Thucidydes, lib. iii. his account of the faftions and confulioiVs throughout all Greece, which were introduced by this want of an equilibrium, without horror. During the few days th^ Eurymedon, with his troops, continued at Corcyra, the people of that city extended their maflacre to all whom they judged their enemies . The crime alledged was, an attempt to overturn the de- mocracy. Some periihed merely through private enmity j forae for the money they had lent, by the hands of the borrower. Every kind of death, every dreadful act, was perpetrated. Fathers flew thei|- children ; Ibme w^ere dragged from altars, fome were butchered at them j numbers, immerfed in temples, were ftarved. The contagion fpread through the whole extent of Greece : factions raged in every city j the licentious many con- tending for the Athenians, and the alpiring few for the Lacedsemonians. The confe- quence was, feditions in cities, with all their numerous and tragical incidents. Such thmgs ever will be, fays Thucidydes, fo long as human nature continues the fam^. But ii this nervous hiftorian had known a balance of three powers,he would not have pronounced the dilfemper fo incurable, but would have a.dded yi long as parties m cities remain iin- A 4 balanced. vi Preface. balanced. He adds Words loft their fig- nification: brutal raflinefs was fortitude; prudence, cowardice ; modefty, effeminacy; and being wife in every thing, to be good for nothing : the hot temper was manly va- lour ; calm deliberation, plaufible knavery ; he who boiled with indignation was trull- worthy ; and he who prefumcd to contradi(fl was ever fufped;ed. Connediion of blood was lels regarded than tran (lent acquaintance ; aflbciations were not formed for mutual ad- vantage, confiftent with law, but for rapine againlt all law ; truft was only communica- tion of guilt ; revenge was more valued than never to have fuffered an injury ; perjuries were mafter- pieces of cunning ; the dupes only blulhed, the villains moil: impudently triumphed. The fource of all thefe evils is -a thirft of power, from rapacious or ambi- tious paffions. The men of large influence, fome contending for the juft equality of the democratical, and others for the fair deco- rum of ariftocratical government, by artful founds, embarrafled thofe communities for their own private lucre, by the keeneft fpi- rit, the moll daring projedis, and mofl dread- ful machinations. Revenge, not limited by juftioe or the public welfare, was meafured only by fuch retaliation as was judged the fweeteil by capital condemnations, by ini- quitous fentences, and by glutting the pre- fent rancour of their hearts with their own hands. Preface, vii hands. The pious and upright condudl was on both fides difregarded : the moderate ci- tizens fell victims to both. Seditions intro- duced every ipecies of outrageous wicked- nefs into the Grecian manners. Sincerity was laughed out of countenance : the whole or- der of human life was coniminded : the hu- man temper, too apt to tranfgrefs in fpite of laws, now having" :r.i. red the afcendant over law, feemed to glory th.a': it was too itrong for juitice, and an enemy to all fuperiority. Mr. Hurne has coiledted, from Diodorus Siculus alone, a few maflacres which hap- pened in only fixtv of the moll: ^poliilled years of Greece: From Sybaris 500 nobles banifhed ; of Chians, 600 citizens j at Ephe- fus, 340 killed, 1000 banifhed; of Cyre- nians, 500 nobles killed, all the re ll: banifh- ed j the Corinthians killed 1 20, baniflied 500 j Pha:bidas baniihed 300 Boeotians. Upon. the fall of the Lacedaemonians, demo- cracies were reftOred in many cities, and fe- vere vengeance taken of the nobles j the ba- niflied nobles returning, butchered their ad- verfaries at Phiala^, in Corinth, in Megara, in Phliafia, where they killed 300 of the people; but thefe again revolting, killed above 600 of the nobles, and banifhjed the reft. In Arcadia, 1400 banithed, befides many killed : the baniihed retired to Sparta and Pallantium-j the latter were delivered up to their countrymen, and all killed. Of the banifhed mil Preface. ' baniilied from Argos and Thebes, there were 509 in the Spartan army. The people, be- fore the ufurpation of Agathocles, had ba- nifhed 600 nobles ; afterwards that tyrant, in concurrence with the people, killed 4000 nobles, and baniihed 6000, and killed 4000 people at Gela: his brother baniihed 8000 from Syracufe. The inhabitants of yligefla, to the number of 40,000, were killed, man, woman, and child, for the fake of their mo- ney : all the relations of the Libyan army, fathers, brothers, children, killed; 700a exiles killed after capitulation. Thefe num- bers, compared with the population of thofe cities, are prodigious; yet Agathocles was a man of charafter, and not to be fufpected oi cruelty, contrary to the maxims of his age : fuch were the faihionablc outrages of unba- lanced parties. In the name of humian and divine benevo- lence, is fuch a fyftem as this to be recom- mended to Americans in this age of the world ? Human natiu'c is as incapable now of going through revolutions with temper and fobriety, with patience and prudence, or without furv and madnefs, as it was amion": the Greeks lo lono- a<2o. The latcll rcvolu- tion that we read or was condudted, at leaft on one iide, m the Grecian Ifyle, with la- conic energy, and with a little Attic fait ; at leaft, without too much patience, foreiight, dnd prudence, on the other. V'ithout three orders. Preface, ix orders, and an effedtiial balance between them, in every American conititution, it rnufc be deltined to frequent unavoidable re- volutions : if they are delayed a few years , they muil come m time. The United States are large and populous nations in comparifon of the Grecian commonwealths, or even the Swifs cantons, and are growing every day more dilproportionate, and therefore lefs ca- pable of being held together by fimple go- vernments. Countries that increafe in popu- lation fo rapidly as the States of America did, even during fuch an impoverifliing and deftrucflive war as the laft w^as, are not to be bound long with lilken threads : lions, young or old, will not be bound by cobwebs. It would be better for America, it is neverthe- lefs agreed, to ring all the changes with the whole fet of bells, and go through all the revolutions of the Grecian flates, rather than elfabliili an ab folate monarchy among them, notwithftandins: all the o:reat and real im- provements made in that kind of government. The objc(ftion to thefe governments is not becaufe they are fupported by nobles and a fubordination of ranks j for all governments, even the mofl democratical, are fupported by a fubordniation of offices, and of ranks too. None ever exilied without it but in a ftate of anarchy and outrage, in a contempt of law and jultice, no better than no govern- ment. But the nobles in the European mo- narchies X preface. narchies fupport them more by oppofing th.m promoting their ordinary views. The kings are lapported by their armies : the no- bles fupport tiie cro\\n, as it is in full pof- feliion of the gift of all employments ; but they fupport it lliU more by checking its minifters, and preventing them from running into abufes of power and wanton defpotifm, otherwife the people would be puihed to ex- tremities and infurredfions. It is thus that the nobles reconcile the monarchical autho- rity to the obedience of the fubjccls j but take away the ftanding armies, and leave the nobles to themfclv^es, and they w^ould overturn every monarchy in Europe in a ie\y years, and erect ariilocracies. It is become a kind of fafliion among writers to admit, as a maxim, that if you could be always fure of a wife, acfive, and virtuous prince, monarchy would be the beft of governments. But this is fo far from be- ing admiifible, that it w^ill for ever remain true, that a free government has a great ad- vantage over a iimple monarchy. The bell and wifeft prince, by means of a freer com- . rnunication with his people, and the greater opportunities to collect the bell advice from the beft of his fubjctts, would have an im- menfe advantage in a free fiiate more than iji a monarchy. A fcnate confiiling of all that is moft noble, wealthy, and able in the na- tion, with a right to counfcl the crown at ail Preface, %i ^11 times, is a check to minillers, and a fe- curity againft abufes, that a body of nobles who never meet, and have no fuch right, can never accomphili. Another aflembly, compofed of reprefentatives chofen by the people in all parts, gives the whole nation free accefs, and communicates all the wants, knowledge, projedls, and wifhes of the na- tion to government ; excites an emxulation among ail claffes, removes complaints, re- dreffes grievances, affords opportunities of exertion to genius though in obfcurity, and gives full fcope to all the faculties of man *, opens a paiTage for every fpeculation to the legiflature, to adminiftration, and to the public : it gives a univerfal energy to the human charader, in every part of the ftate, which never can be obtained in a mo- narchy. There is a third particular which deferves attention both from governments and people. The mmifters of ftate in a fimple monarchy can never know their friends from their ene- mies : cabals in fecret undermine their in- fluence and blaft their reputations. Thisoc- cafions a jealoufy ever anxious and irritated, which never thinks the government fafe without an encouragement of informers and o fpies throughout every part of the ftate, w^ho interrupt the tranquillity of private lite, de- llroy the confidence of families in their ow^n domeftics and one another, and poifon free- dom in its fwectefl retirements. In a free govern- Inn Preface, government, on the contrary, the miniflefs can have no enemies of confcquence but among the members of the great or Httle council, where every man is obliged to take his iide, and declare his opinion upon every queffion. This circumftance alone, to every manly mind, would be luflicient to decide the preference in favour of a free govern- ment. Even fecrecy, where the executive is entire in one hand, is as eafily and furely preferved in a free government, as in a iim- ple monarchy; and as to difpatch, all the iimple monarchies of the whole univerfe may be defied to produce greater or more examples of it than are to be found in Engliih hiilory. An Alexander or a Frederic, poffeffed of the prerogatives only of a king of England, and leading his own armies, would never find himfelf embarrailed or delayed in any honeft enterprize. He might be reilrained, indeedj^from running mad, and from making con quells to the ruin of his nation merely for his own glory ; but this is no argument againft a free government, There can be no free government without a democratical branch in the conftitution. Monarchies and ariilocracies are in pofTeilion of the voice and influence of every univerlity and aca- demy in^ Europe. Democracy, iimple de- mocracy, never had a patron among men of letters. Democratical mixtures in go- vernment have loll almoil all the advocates they ever had out of England and America. Men Men of letters miift have a great deal of jpraife, and fome of the neceffaries, convei- niencies, and ornaments of hfe. Monarchies and ariftocracies pay well and applaud libe- rally. The people have almoft always ex- pected to be ferved gratis, and to be paid for the honour of ferving them ; and their ap- plaiifes and adorations are beftow^ed too of- ten on artifices and tricks, on hypocrify and fuperflition, on flattery, bribes, andlargeffes. it is no wonder then that democracies and democratical mixtiires are annihilated ail over Europe, except on a barren rock, a paltry fen, an inacceflible mountain, or an impeiK^trable foreft. The people of Eng- land, to their immortal honour, are hitherto an exception ; but, to the humiliation of human nature, they fliew very often that tliey are like other men. The people in America have now the heft opportunity, and thegreateft truft, in their hands, that Pro- vidence ever committed to fo fmall a num- ber fince the tranfgrefhon of the firfl: pair : if they betray their truft, their guilt will merit even greater punifliment than other nations have fuffered, and the indignation of iieaven. If there is one certain truth to be colled:ed from the hiflory of all ages, it is this : that the people's rights and liberties, and the democratical mixture in a conffitu- tion, can never be pre ferved without a llrong executive, or, in other words, without ie- 3 paiating Hdv Preface, parating the executive power from the legif"- lative. If the executive power, or any con- fiderable part of it, is left in the hands ei- ther of an ariilocratical or a democratical af- fembly, it will corrupt thelegillature, as ne- ceifanly as ruil corrupts iron, or as arfenic poifons the human body ; and when the le- giflature is corrupted the people are undone. The rich, the well-born, and the able, ac- quire an influence among the people that will loon be too much for fimple honelly and plain fenfe in a houfe of reprefentati ves . The moft illuftrious of them mufi: therefore be feparated from the mafs, and placed by them- felves in a fenate : this is, to all honelf and iifeful intents, an oftracifm. A member of a fenate of immenfe wealth,' the moft refpec- ted birth and tranfcendeut abilities, has no in- fluence in the nation in comparifon of what he would have in a lingle reprefentative af- fembly . When a fenate exifts , the moft pow- erful man in the ftate may be fafely admit- ted into the houfe of reprefentati ves, becaufe the people have it in their power to remove him into the fenate as foon as his influence becomes dangerous. The fenate becomes the great obje^f of ambition ; and the richeft and the moft fagacious wifti to merit an ad- vancement to it by fer vices to the public in the houfe. When he has obtained the ob- jed: of his wiflies, you may ftill hope for the benefits of his exertions, without dread- ing Preface, xv ing his paflions ; for the executive power be- ing in other hands, he has loft much of his influence with the people, and can govern very few votes more than his own among the fenators. It was the general opinion of ancient na- tions, that the Divinity alone was adequate to the important office of giving law^s to men. The Greeks entertained this prejudice throughout all their difperfions j the Romans cultivated the fame popular delufion ; and modem nations in the confecration of kings, and in feveral fuperftitious chimeras of di- vine rights in prmces and nobles, are nearly unanimous in preferving remnants of it : even the venerable magiftrates of Amersfort de- voutly believe themfelves God's vicegerents. Is it that obedience to the laws can be ob- tained from mankind in no other manner ? Is the jealoufy of power, and the envy of fuperiority, fo ftrong in all men, that no confiderations of public or private utility are fufficient to engage their fubmiffion to rules for their own happinefs ? Or is the difpofi- tion to impofture fo prevalent in men of ex- perience that their private views of ambition and avarice can be accomplilhed only by ar- tifice ? It was a tradition in antiquity that the laws of Crete were dK^lated to Minos by the infpiration of Jupiter. This legiflator and his brother Rtiadamanthus were both his fons : once in nine years they went to Vol. I. B converfe xvi Preface, converfe with their father, to propofe qiief^ tions concerning the wants ot the' people, and his anfvvers were recorded as laws for their government. The laws of Laceda^mon were communicated by Apollo to -Lycurgus ; and, leil the meaning of the deit) ihould not have been perfettiy comprejuudcd, or corredUy exprefled, were afterwards coiitirm- ed by his oracle at Delphos. Among the Romans, Numa was indebted for thofe laws which procured the profperity of his coun- try to his converfations with Egeria. The Greeks imported thefe myfterie^ from Egypt and the Eair, whofe defpotifrns, from the remoteft antiquity to this day, have been founded in the lame folemn empiricilm ; their emperors and nobles being all defcend- ed from their gods. Woden and Thor were divinities too y and their pofterity ruled a thoufand years in the north by the ftrength of a like credulity. Manco Capac was the child of the fun, the vifible deity of the Pe- ruvians, and tranfmitted his divinity, as well as his earthly dignity and authority, through a line of incas . And the rudclrtribes of favages in North America have certain families under the immediate protection of, the god of war, from which their leaders are always chofen. There is nothing in which mankind have been more unanimous ; yet nothing can be inferred from it more than this, that the multitude have always been. credulous, Preface, xvii credulous, and the few artful. The United States of America have exhibited, perhaps, the firft example of governments erefted on the fimple principles of nature j and if men are now fufficiently enlightened to diiabufe themfelves of artince, impolture, hypocrify, and fuperltition, they will conlider this event as an eera in their hiilory. Although the detail of the formation of the American governments is at prefent little known or re- garded either in Europe or America, it may hereafter become an objed: of curioiity. It will never be pretended that any perfons em- ployed in that fervice had any interviews with the gods, or were in any degree under the infpiration of heaven, any more than thofe at work upon ihips or houfes, or la- bouring in merchandize or agriculture : it will for ever be acknowledged that thefe go- vernments were contrived merely by the ufe of reafon and the fenfes. As Copley painted Chatham; Weft, Wolf; and Trumbull, War- ren and Montgomery; as Dwight, Barlow, Trumbull, and Humphries compofed their verfe, and Belknap and Ramfay hiftory ; as Godfrey invented his quadrant, and Ritten- houfe his planetarium ; as Boylfton prad:iled inoculation, and Franklin eleclricity j as Paine expofed the miftakes of Raynal, and Jefferfon thofe of Buffon, fo unphilofophi- cally borrowed from th& Recherches Philo- ibphiques fur les Americains, thofe defpica- B a blc xviii Preface, ble dreams of De Paw neither the people, nor their conventions, committees, or lub- committees, conlidered legiilation in any other hght than ordinary arts and fciences, only as of more importance. Called without expectation, and compelled without previ- ous inclination, though undoubtedly at the beft period of time both for England and America, to erecfl fuddenly new fyftems of laws for their future government, they adopt- ed the method of a wife archited:, in erect- ing a new palace for the refidence of his fo- vereign. Tlicy determined to confult Vi- truvius, Palladio, and all other writers of reputation in the art ; to examine the moffc celebrated buildings, whether they remain entire or in ruins ; compare thele with the principles of writers, and inquire how far both the theories and models were founded in nature, or created by fancy ; and when this fhould be done, as far as their circum- flances would allow, to adopt the advan- tages, and rejed: the inconveniencies, of all. Unembarrafied by attachments to noble fa- milies, hereditary lines and fucceffions, or any confiderations of royal blood, even the pious myflery of holy oil had no more in- fluence than that other of holy water : the people univerfally were too enlightened to be impofed on by artifice, and their leaders, or more properly followers, were men of too much honour to attempt it. Thirteen go- vernments Preface^ xix vernrntnts thus founded on the natural authority of the people alone, without a pretence of miracle or myllery, which are deftined to fpread over the northern part of that whole quarter of the globe, are a great point gained in favour of the rights of man- kind. The experiment is made, and has completely fucceeded : it can no longer be called in queftion, whether authority in magiftrates, and obedience of citizens, can be grounded on reafon, morality, and the Chriftian religion, without the monkery of priefts, or the knavery of politicians. As the writer was perfonally acquainted with moft of the gentlemen in each of the ftates, who had the principal fliare in the firft draughts, the following letters were really written to lay before the gentleman to whom they are addrefled, a fpecimen of that kind of reading and reafoning which produced the American conftitutions. It is not a little furpriiing that all this kind of learning fhould have been unknown to any illuftrious philofopher and ftatefman, cfpecially one who really was, what he has been often called, ** a well of fcience.*' But if he could be unacquainted with it, or it could have efcaped his memory, we may fuppofe millions in America have occafion to be reminded of it. The writer has long feen with anxiety the facility with which philofophers of greatell name have under- B 3 taken XX Preface, taken to write of American affairs without knowing any thing of them, and have echoed and re-echoed each other*s vifions. Hav- ing neither talents, leifure, nor inchnation, to meet fuch champions in the field of lite- rary controverfy, he little thought of ven- turing to propofe to them any queftions : circumftances, however, have lately occur- red, which feemed to require that Ibme no- tice Ihould be taken of one of them. It the publication of thefe papers Ihould con- tribute anv thino: to turn the attention of the younger gentlemen of letters in America to this kind of inquiry, it will produce an effed: of fome importance to their country. The fubjecl is the mofl: intereftmg that can engage the underllanding or the heart ; for whether the end of man, in this ftage of his exiftence, be enjoyment or improvement, or both, it can never be attained lo well in a bad government as a good one* I'he practicability or the duration of a republic, in which there is a governor, a fenate, and a houfe of reprefentatives, is doubted by Tacitus, though he admits the theory to be laudable " Cundlas nationes " et urbes, populus, aut priores, aut finguli, *' regunt. Delec^la ex his et conftituta *' reipublicaj forma, laudari facilius quam '' inveniri ; vel, ii evenit, baud diuturna *' effe potefl:.'* Ann. lib. iv. Cicero af- ferts '* Statuo elle optime conftitutam *' rem- Preface. xxi ** rempublicam, qua? ex tribus generibus " illis, regali, Optimo, et popiilari, modice *' confufa.'* Frag. in fuch peremptory terms the fuperionty of fuch a government to all other forms, that the lofs of his book upon republics is much to be regretted. From a it.\v paffages that have been pre- ferved, it i^ very probable he entered more largely into an examination of the compofi- tion of monarchical republics than any other ancient writer. He was fo far from appre- hending ** difputes'* from a variety of orders, that he affirms it to be the firmeft bond of juitice, and the flrongefl: anchor of fafety to the community. As the treble, the tenor, and the bafs exift in nature, they will be heard in the concert : if they are arranged by Handel, in a Ikilful compofition, they produce rapture the moft exquifite that har- mony can excite ; but if they are confufed together without order, tiiey will *' Rend with tremendous found your ears *' afunder." ** Ut in fidibus ac tibiis, atque cantu ipfo, *' a vocibus concentus eft: quidam tenendus ** ex dilfincStis fonis, quern immutatum ac ** difcrepantem aures eruditae ferre non pof- * funt ; ifque concentus , ex dijjim'ill'unarum *' vocum moderatione, cone or s tamen effic:tur " ei congruens: lie ex /um?nis et injimis et " mediis i?iierje^is ordinibus, ut fonis, mo- B 4 * derata xxii Preface, ** derata rationc, civitas confenfu diflimilli- ** morum concinit ; et quae harmonia a ** muficis dicitur in cantu, ea eft in civitate ** Concordia, ardliftimum atque optimum ** omniin republica vinculum incolumitatis; ** quae fine juftitia nullo pad:o elTe poteft,'* Cicero, Frag, de Repub. As all the ages of the world have not produced a greater ftatefman and philofopner united in the fame charad:er, his authority fhould have great weight. His decided opinion in favour of three branches is founded on a reafon that is unchangeable j the laws, which are the only pollible rule, meafure, and fe- curity of juftice, can be fure of protedtion, for any courfe of time, in no other form of government : and the very name of a re- public ixnplies, that the property of the people fhould be reprefented in the legifla- ture, and decide the rule of juftice. -'* Ref- *' publica eft res populi. Populus autem *' non omnis coetus multitudinis, fed coetus *' juris confenfu, et utilitatis communione *' fociatus." Frag, de Rep. * Refpublica res eft populi, cum bene ac ** jufte geritur, five ab uno rege, five a ** paucis optimatibus, five ab univerfo ** populo. Cum vero injuftus eft rex, ** quem tyrannum voco; aut injufti opti- ** mates, quorum confenfus fadtio eft; aut ** injuftus ipfe populus, cuinomen ufitatum ** nullum reperio, nifi ut etiam ipfum tyran- ** num Preface, xxiii ** num appellem; non jam vitiofa, fed *' omnino nulla refpublica eft; quoniam ** non eft res populi, cum tyrannus eam ** fadiiove capeflat j nee ipfe populus eft li ** fttinjuftus, quoniam non eft multitudinis ** juris confenfu, et utilitatis unionefociata.** Frag, de Repub. ** Ubi vero juftitia non eft, nee jus poteft **efle; quod enim jure fit, profedlo jufte ** fit ; quod autem fit injufte, nee jure fieri ** poteft. Non enim jura dicenda ftmt, vel ** putanda, iniqua hominum conftituta, cum ** illud etiam ipfi jus efle dicant quod de ** juftitiae fonte manaverit; falfiimque fit, ** quod a quibufdam non red:e fentientibus ** dici folet, id jus efle, quod ei, qui plus ** poteft, utile eft." According to this, a fimple monarchy, if it could in reality be what it pretends to be, a govemment of laws, might be juftly denominated a re- public. A limited monarchy, therefore, efpecially when limited by two independent branches, an ariftocratical and a democrati- cal power in the conftitution, may with ftridt propriety be called by that name. If Cicero and Tacitus could revifit the earth, and learn that the Englifti nation had reduced the great idea to pradiice, and brought it nearly to perfediion, by giving each divifion a power to defend itfelf by a negative ; had found it the moft folid and durable government, as well as the moft free; XxiV Preface. free; had obtained, by means of it, a prof- perity among civilized nations, in an en- lightened age, hke that of the Romans among barbarians ; and that the Americans, after liaving enjoyed the benefits of fuch a conftitution a century and a half, were ad- vifed by (ome of the greateil philofophers and politicians of the age to renounce it, and let up the governments of ancient Goths and modern Indians what would they fay ? That the Americans would be more reprehenlible than the Cappadocians, if they fhould liften to fuch advice. It would have been much to the purpofe to have inierted a more accurate inveftigation of the form of government of the ancient Germans and modern Indians ; in both, the exiilcnce of the three divilions of power is marked with a preciiion that excludes all controverfy. The democratical branch, efpecially, is fo determined, that the real fovereignty refided in the body of the people, and was exer- cifed in the alTembly of king, nobles, and commons together. Thefe inftitutions really collected all authority into one center of kings, nobles, and people. But fmall as their numbers, and narrow as their territo- ries were, the confequence was confufion ; each part believed it governed the whole : the chiefs thought they were fovereign ; the nobles believed the power to be in their bands J and the people flattered themfelves thit Preface, xxV that all depended upon them. Their pur- pofes were well enough anfwered, without coming to an explanation, while they were few in numbers, and had no property ; but when fpread over large provinces of the Roman empire, now the great kingdoms of Europe, and grown populous and rich, they found the inconvenience of not knowing each its place. Kings, nobles, and people claimed the government in turn : and after all the turbulence, wars, and revolutions, which compofe the hiftory of Europe for fo many ages, we find limple monarchies eftablifhed every where. Whether the fy ftem will now become flationary, and laft for ever, by means of a tew further improve- ments in monarchical governments, wc know not ; or whether ftiU further revolu- tions are to come. The moil probable, or rather the only probable change is, the in- trodud:ion of democratical branches into thofe governments. If the people fhould ever aim at more, they will defeat them- felves j and indeed if they aim at this, by any other than gentle means, and by gradual advances; by improvements in general edu- cation, and informing the public mind. The fyitems of legiilators are experiments made on human life and manners, ibciety and government. Zoroafter, Confucius, Mithras, Odin, Thor, Mahomet, Lycurgus, Solon, xxvi Preface, Solon, Romulus, and a thourand others^ may be compared to philofophcrs making experiments on the elements. Unhappily a political experiment cannot be made in a laboratory, nor determined in a few hours. The operation once begun, runs over whole quarters of the globe, and is not finilhed in many thoufands of years. The experiment of Lycurgus lafted leven hundred years, but never fpread beyond the limits of Laconia. The procefs of Solon blowed out in one century j that of Romulus lafted but two centuries and a half ; but the Teutonic in- ftitutions, defcribed by Casfar and Tacitus, are the moft memorable experiment, merely political, ever yet made in human affairs. They have I'pread all over Europe, and have lafted eighteen hundred years. They aftord the ftrongeft argument that can be imagined in fupport of the point aimed at in thefc letters . Nothing ought to have more weight with America, to determine her judgement againft mixing the authority of the one, the lew, and the many, confufedly in one aftem- bly, than the wide-fpread miferies and final llavery of almoft all mankind, in confe- quence of flich an ignorant policy in the ancient Germans. What is the ingredient which in England has preferved the demo- cratical authority ? The balance, and that only. The Englifh have, in reality, blend- ed Preface, xxvii cd together the feudal inftitutions with thofe pf the Greeks and Romans j and out of all have made that noble compofition, which avoids the inconveniencies, and retains the advantages pf both. The inltitutions now made in America will never wear wholly put for thoufands of years : it is of the lall importance, then, that they fliould begin right J if they fet out wrong, they will never be able to return, unlefs it be by ac- cident, to the right path. After having known the hiftory of Europe, and of England in particular, it would be the height of folly to go back to the inftitutions pf Woden and of Thor, as they are advifed Xo do ; if they had been counfelled to adopt a limple monarchy at once, it would have been lefs myfterious. Robertfon, Hume, and Gibbon, have given fuch admirable ac- counts of the feudal inftitutions, and their confequences, that it would have been more difcreet to have referred to them, perhaps, without faying any thing more upon the fubjedl. To collect together the legiflation pf the Indians would take up much room, but would be well /orth the pains. The fovercignty is m the nation, it is true, but the three pov/ers are ftrong in e\ery tribe; and their royal and ariitocratical dignities are nuich more generally hereditary, fiom the popular partiality to particular families, 3 and xxviii Preface, and the fuperititious opinion tliat fiich arc favourites of the god of war, than the late writers upon this fiibjedl hi:}.ve allowed. Grofuerwr Square^ January i, i 787, CONTENTS. CONTENTS. LETTER Page I. JpRelimtnary Obfervations 3 II. - 5 DEMOCRATICAL REPUBLICS. III. St. Marino . 8 IV. Btfcay - i6 The Grlfons - 21 The United Provinces of the Lozv Countries - 22 V. Szvitzerland. - ib. Appenzel - 23 VI. Underzvald - 26 VII. Claris - 28 VIII. Zug - 31 IX. Uri - 32 X. *yz;//z - 34 ARISTOCRATICAL REPUBLICS. XI. Berne 35 XI I. Fribourg ^ m 39 XIII. Soleure XXX CONTENTS. J.ETTEB Page "XIIK SoJeure 42 XIV. Lucerne AS XV. Zurich 47 XVI. Schaffhaufe 49 Mulkoufe Bienne 50 XVII. St. Gall 51 Geneva 52 XVIII. Lucca Genoa 56 XIX. Venice 58 The United Provinces of ths Low Countries % MONARCHICAL REPUBLICS. XX. 'England 70 XXI. Poland 72 XXII. Poland 74 XXIII. Recapitulation 91 ANCIENT REPUBLICS, AND OPINIONS OF PHILOSOPHERS. XXIV. Dr. Swift - - - 97 XXV. Dr. Franklin - - 105 XXVI. Dr. Price - ' - - 121 MIXED GOVERNMENTS. XXVIL Machiavel - - 141 Sidney - - - 148 XXVIII. Montefquieu - ' ^53 ANCIENT CONTENTS. XXXI XETTER Page ANCIENT REPUBLICS, AND OPINIONS OF PHILOSOPHERS* XXIX. Harrington - - - 158 XXX. Polybius - - - 169 XXXI. Polybius - - - 177 XXXII. Dionyjius Halicarnajfenjis Va- lerius - - 184 XXXIII. Plato - - 188 XXXIV. Sir "Thomas Smith - 207 ANCIENT DEMOCRATICAL REPUBLICS. XXXV. Carthagg - - 210 ANCIENT ARISTQCRATICAL REPUBLICS, XXXVI. Rome - - 215 ANCIENT MONARCHICAL REPUBLICS. XXXVII. Tacitus ; - 22^ XXXVIII. Homer-'Phaacia - - 232 XXXIX. Homer Ithaca - - 237 Homer - 242 ANCIENT ARISTQCRATICAL REPUBLICS. XL. Lacediemoit - - 249 Vol. I. C ANCIENT xxxll CONTENTS. LETTER Page ANCIENT DEMOCRATICAL REPUBLICS. XLI. Athens - - 260 XLII. Ant aid das - - 286 XLIII. Achaia - - 295 XUV. Crete - - ^05 XLV. Corinth - - 308 XLVI. Argos - - 311 XLVII. Iphitus " - 31^ XLVIII. T'Z^^^d'j - - - 318 ANCIENT ARISTOCRATICAL REPUBLICS. XLIX. Crotona Pythagoras - 322 ANCIENT DEMOCRATICAL REPUBLICS. L. Syharis- Charondas 327 LI. Locris'Zaleucus ^ 331 LII. Rome CONCLUSION. 334 LIII. Congrefs 362 LIV. Locke, Milton, and Hume 365 LV. Conclujiofi - 37^ Vojifcript 383 LETTER LETTER I. GrofuenorSquare, Ocf. 4, 1786, MV DEAR SIR, THREE writers in Europe, of great abili- ties, reputation, and learning, M. Turgot, the Abbe De Mably, and Dr. Price, have turned their attention to the conftitutions of government in the United States of America, and have writ- ten and publifhed their criticifms and advice. They had all the moll amiable charaders, and unqueftionably the pureft intentions. They had all experience in public affairs, and ample in- formation in the nature of man, the neceffity of fociety, and the fcience of government. There are in the productions of all of them, among many excellent things, fome fentiments, however, that it will be difficult to reconcile to reafon, experience, the conftitution of human na- ture, or to the uniform teftimony of the greateil ftatefmen, legiilators, and philosophers of all en- lightened nations, ancient and modern. M. Turgot, in his letter to Dr. Price, con- feffes, " that he is not fatisfied with the confti- " tutions which have hitherto been formed for " the different dates of America." Ke obferves ** that by moft of them the cuftoms of England " are imitated, without any particular motive, " InQead of coUedting all authority into one cen- " tcr, that of the nation, they have eftabliflied C 2 " different 4 Preliminary Obfervations. " different bodies, a body of reprefentatives, a " council, and a governor, becaufe there is in " England, a houfe of commons, a houfe of " lords, and a king. They endeavour to ba- " lance thefe different powers, as if this equili- " brium, which in England may be a neceffary " check to the enormous influence of royalty, *^ could be of any ufe in republics founded " upon the equality of all the citizens, and as if " etiabhfhing different orders of men was not a " fource of divifions and difputes." There has been, from the beginning of the re- volution in America, a party in every flate, who have entertained fentiments fimilar to thefe of M. Turgot. Two or three of them have eftabliflied governments upon his pHnciple : and, by ad- vices from Bofton, certain committees of coun- ties have been held, and other conventions pro- pofed in the Maffachufetts, with the cxprefs pur- pofe of depofing the governor and fenate, as ufe- lefs and expenfive branches of the conftitution ; and as it is probable that the publication of M. Turgot's opinion has contributed to excite fuch difcontents among the people, it becomes necef- fary to examine it, and, if it can be fliown to be an error, whatever veneration the Americans very juftly entertain for his memory, it is to be hoped they will not be mifled by his authority. LETTER Prelimlndry Ohfervatwns, LETTER II. MY DEAR SIR, M TURCOT is offended, becaufe the cufloms of England are imitated in moft of the new conflitutions in America, without any parti- cular motive. But, if we fuppofe that Englifh cuftoms were neither good nor evil in themfelves, and merely indifferent j and the people, by their birth, education, and habits, were familiarly at- tached to them i was not this a motive particular enough for their prefervation, rather than endan- ger the public tranquillity, or unanimity, by re- nouncing them ? l^ thofe cuftoms were wife, juft, and good, and calculated to fecure the li- berty, property, and fafety of the people, as well or better than any other inftitutions ancient or modern, would M. Turgot have advifed the na- tion to reject them, merely becaufe it was at that timejuftly incenfed againft the Englifh govern- ment ?~What Englilh cuftoms have they retained which may with any propriety be called evil ? M. Turgot has inftanced only in one, viz. " that " a body of reprefentatives, a council, and a go- " vernor, has been eftablilbcd, becaufe there is " in England, a houfe of commons, a houfe of " lords, and a king." It was not fo much be- caufe the legiflature in England confifted of three branches, that fuch a divifion of power was adopted by the ftates, as becaufe their own af- femblies had ever been fo conftituted. It was not fo much from attachment by habit to fuch a plan of power, as from convicflion that it was founded in nature and reafon, that it was continued. C 3 M. Tur- 6 Trelimlnary Obfervat'ions. M. Turgot fecms to be of a different opinion^ and is for " colledling all authority into one cen- " ter, the nation." It is eafily underftood how all authority may be co!lclcd " into one center" in a defpot or nnonarch ; but how it can be done, when the center is to be the nation, is more diffi- cult to comprehend. Before we attempt to dif- cufs the notions of an author, we iliould be care- ful to afcertain his meaning. It will not be eaiy, after the moft anxious refearch, to difcover tlie true fenfe of this extraordinary palTage. If, after the pains of *' collecting all authority into one " center," that center is to be the nation, we fhall remain exaftly where we began, and no coi- leftion of authority at all will be made. The na- tion will be the authority, and the authority the nation. The center will be the circle, and the circle the center. When a number of men^ wo- men, and children, are fnnpiy congregated toge- ther, there is no political authoricy among them j nor any natural authority, but that of parents over their children. To leave the women and children out of the queftion for the prefent, the men will all be equal, free, and independent of each other. Not one will have any authority over any other. The firfl " colleftion" of authority muft be an unanim.ous aojreement to form themfelves into a fiallon, people, community, or body politic, and to be governed by the majority of fuffrages or voices. But even in this cafe, although the au- thority is coiledled into one center, that center is no longer the nation, but the majority of the nation. Did M. Turgot mean, that the people of Virginia, for example, half a million of fouls fcattcred over a territory of two hundred leagues fquarcj Ihould flop here, and have no other au^ thority JPreliminary Obfervations, 7 thority by which to make or execute a law, or judge a caufe, but by a vote of the whole peo- ple, and the decifion of a maioricy ? Where is the plain large enough to hoid them j and what are the means, and how long would be the time, neceiTary to afTemble them loge'^iher ? A fimple and perfeft democracy never yet ex- ifted among m^en. If a village of half a mile (quare, and one hundred familieb, is capable of cxercifing all the legjflative, executive, and judi- cial powers, in public afiemblies of the whole, by unanimous votes, or by majorities, it is more than has ever yet been proved in theory or expe- rience. In fuch a democracy, the moderator would be king, the town-clerk legiflator and judge, and the conftable fherifF, for the moft part ; and upon more important occafions, com- mittees would be only the counfellors of both the former, and commandants of the latter. Shall we fuppofe then, that M. Turgot in- tended, that an alTembly of reprefentatives fhould be chofen by the nation, and veiled with all the powers of government ^ and that this affembly fliall be the center in which all the authority fhall be colledled, and fhall be virtually deemed the nation ? After long reflection, I have not been able to difcover any other fenfe in his words, and this was probably his real meaning. To examine this fyflem in detail may be thought as trifling an occupation, as the laboured reafonings of Sidney and Locke, to fhew the abfurdity of Filmar's fu peril: itio us notions, appeared to Mr. Hume in his enlightened days. Yet the mifl:akes of great; men, and even the abfurdities of fools, when they countenance the prejudices of numbers of people, efpccially in a young country, and under liew governments, cannot be too fully confuted. C 4 Yuo 8 Democratical Republics, You will not then efteem nriy time or your owrj, mif-fpent, in placing this idea of M. Turgot in all its lights ^ in confidering the confequences of it J and in coUeding a variety of authorities againft it. LETTER III. ST. MARINO. MY DEAR SIR, A SOCIETY of gods would govern them- " felves democratically," fays the eloquent philofopher of Geneva ; who, however, would have agreed, that his '^ gods" muft not have been the claffical deities : fince he knew from the higheft authority, the poets, who had their infor- mation from thofe divinities, the Mufes, that all the terrors of the nod, the arm, and the thun- derbolts of Jupiter, with all the energy of his undifputed monarchy, were infufficient to hold them in order. As it is impoflible to know what would have been his definition of the gods, we may quietly purfue our inquiry, whether it is practicable to goven men in this way. It would be very furprifi'ng, if, among all the nations that have exilled, not one has difcovered a fecret of fo much importance. It is not necefTary for us to prove that no fuch government has exifted ; it is incumbent on him who fhall embrace the opinion of M. Turgot, to name the age, the country, and the people, in which fuch an ex- periment has been tried. It might be eafier to deternaine the queftion concerning the practicabi- lity St. Marino, 9 lityor impracticability, the utility or inutility, of a fimple democracy, if we could find a number of examples of it. From the frightful pictures of a democratical city, drawn by the mafterly pencils of ancient philofophers and hiftorians, it mav be conjeilured that luch governments exilled in Greece and Italy, at leall for Ihort fpaces of time : but no particular hiftory of any one of them is come down to us ; nor are we able to procure any more fatisfaflion to our curiofity from modern hiftory. If fuch a phenomenon is at this time . to be leen in the world, it is pro- bably in fome of thofe flates which have the name of democracies, or at lead in fuch as have preierved fome Ihare in the government to the people. Let us travel to fome of thofe countries, and examine their laws. The republic of St. Marino, in Italy, is fome- times quoted as an inflance ; and therefore it is of fome importance to examine, i. Whether, in faft, this is a fimple democracy j and, 2. Whe- ther, if it were fuch, it is not owing to parcicu- Jar circumftances, which do not belong to any other people, and prove it to be improper for any other, efpeclally the United States of America, to attempt to imitate it. The republic of St. Marino, as Mr. Addifori informs us, Hands on the top of a very high and craggy mountain, generally hid among r.he clouds, and fometimes under fnow, even v-hen the weather is clear and warm in ail the country about it. This mountain, and a few hillocks thcit Yic fcattered about the bottom of it, is the whole circuit of the dominion. They have, what they call, three callles^ three convents, and five 3 ciiurchcSj JO . Democratlcal Republics. churches, and reckon about five thoufand fouls In their community. Sc. Marino was its founder, a Dalmatian by birthj and by trade a mafon. He was employed, about thirteen hundred years ago, in the repara- tion of Rimini, and after he had finiflied his work, retired to this folitary mountain as very proper for the life of a hermit, v/hich he led in the greateft aufterities of religion. He had not beea long here, before he wrought a reputed miracle, which, joined with his extraordinary fanftity, ganicd him fo great an efteem, that the princefs of the country made him a prefent of the moun- tain, to difpofe of it at his difcretion. His repu- tation quickly peopled ir, and gave rife to the republic which calls itlelf after his name. The belt of their churches is dedicated to the faint, and holds his afhes. l-Iis Itatuc Hands over the high altar, with the figure oi a mouniain in his hands, crovviied with three cr.files, which is like- wife the arms of the commonvvealrh. They at- tribute to his proteftion the long duration of the fcate, and looiv on him the greutcft faint next the hleflfed Viigin. In their {lutute-book is a law againft fuch as fpeak difrefpeftfully oi him, who arc to be puniflied in the fame manner as thofe wiio are convinced of blafphemy. This petty republic has laded thirteen hundred years, while all the orher itates of Italy have feveral times changed their maficrs and forms of govern menr. Theii v/hole hillory confills in two purchafes of a neighbojring prince, and two wars, in which ihey afTifled the pope againft a lord of Rimini. They would piobably fell their liberty as dear as they could to any that attacked them ^ for there is but one road by v/hich to climb up to them. Si. Marino. 1 1 them. All that are capable of bearing arms, are exercifed, and ready at a moment's call. The fovereign power of the republic was lodged, originally, in what they call the arengs, a great council, in which every houfe had its re- prefentative J but, becaufe they found too m.uch confufion In fuch a multitude of fbatefmen, they devolved their whole authority into the hands of the council of fixty. The arengo, however, is ftill called together in cafes of extraordinary im- portance ; and if, after due fummons, any mem- ber abfents himfelf, he is to be fined. In the ordinary courfe of government, the council of fixty, which, notwithftanding the name, confifts but of forty perfons, has in its hands the admi- niftration of affairs, and is made up of half out of the noble families, and half out of the ple- beian. They decide all by ballotting, are not admitted until five-and-twenty years old, and choofe the ofBcers of the commonwealth. No fentence can ftand that is not confirmed by two thirds of this council ; no fon can be admitted into it during the life of his father, nor two be in it of the fame family, nor any enter but by election. The chief officers of the commonwealth are the two capitaneoSj v/ho have fuch a power as the old Roman confuls had, but are chofen every fix months. Some have been capitaneos fix or 'itvtn times, though the office is never to be continued to the fame perfons twice fuccefTively. The tliird officer is the commifTary, who judges in all civil and cri- minal p.iatters : but becaufe the many alliances, friendffiips, and intermiarriages, as woll as the per- Ibnal feuds and animofiticj that happen amon:j (o fmall a people, might obftrucl the coui-fi of juf- tice, if one of their own number had the diffribu- tion of it, they have always a foreigner for tliis employ. X 2 Democraticcil RepuhUcs. employ, whom they choofe for three years, and maintain o'jt of the public (lock. He muft be a do6lor of law, and a man of known integrity. He is joined in commifiion with the capitancos^ and afts fomethins: like the recorder of London under the lord mayor. The fourth man in the (late is the phylician : another perfon, who makes no ordinary figure in the republic, is the fchoolmai- ter. Few in the place hut have fom.e tindture of learning. The people are edeemed very honefi:> and rigo- rous in the execution of jufticej and feem to live more happy and contented among their rocks and fnows, than others of the Italians do in the pleafantelt vallies in the world. Nothing indeed can be a greater inltance of the natural love mankind has for liberty, and of their averfion to arbitrary government, than fuch a &vage mountain covered with people, and the Campa- nia of Rome, which lies in the fame country,^ almoil deftitute of inhabitants. This is the account of St. Marino. Yet, if all authority is here coliedled in one center, that center is not the nation. Although the original reprefeatation in the arengo was of houles, that is to fay, of property, rather than of the perfons of the citizens, and confequently not very equal, as it excluded all perfonal property, as well as all who had no property ; yet even fuch an agra- rian, it feemsj was not a fuflicient check to li centioufnefs, and they found it neccfTary to in- ilitute a fenate of forty men. Here, at leaft, commenced as complete an arifcocracy as that of ancient Rome ; or, to exprefs it more exactly, as complete a feparation of the ariftocratical from the democratical part of the commuiiity : and there are two renparkable circamftances in confir- mation St. Marino, ij mation of this ; one is, that there are not only- noble families in this illujiriljimd repuhllcd Sancii Marini, but the conftitution has limited the choice of the eleftors (o far as to oblige tiiem to choofe one half the fenate out of thefe nobles; the other is, that the names of the agents for the common- wealth, of the notary, and the witnefles to two inftruments of purchafes made at feventy years diftance from one another, one in i ico, the other in 1 1 70, are the fame. It is not credible that they were the fame perfbns : they were probably (bns or grand fons which is a ftrong proof of the attachment to ariilocratical families in this little ftate;> and of their defire to continue the fame blood and the fame names in public em- ployments, like the Oranges, Fagels, De Lin- dens, &c. in Holland, and like innumerable other examples in all nations. Another remarkable circumftance is, the reluc- tance of the citizens to attend the aflembly of the arengOy which obliged them to make a law, oblig- ing themfelves to attend, upon a penalty. This is a defect, and a misfortune natural to every de- mocratical conftitution, and to che popular part of every mixed government. A general or too common difinclination to attend, leaves room for perfons and parties more a6live to carry points by faftion and intrigue, which the majority, if all were prefent, would not approve. It is curious to fee how many checks and li- mitations are contrived for this legiflative aflem- bly. Half nobles, half plebeians all upwards of five-and-tvventy years old two thirds muft agree no fon can fit with his father ; never two of the fame family. The capitamos have the executive, like the Ro- man confuls, and the commiflary has the judi- cial. 14 Democraticat RepuhUcs. cial. Here again are remarkable limitations i he muft be a foreigner, and he is for three years. This is to give forrie degree of ftabiliiy to the ju- dicial pow^r, and to make it a real and powerful check both to the executive and legiflative. We are not, indeed, told whether the council of forty are elected annually or for life. Mr. Addi- fon may, from his well-known chara6ler, be fup- pofed to have been more attentive to the grand and beautiful monuments of ancient arts of every kind which furrounded him in Italy, than to this rough hillock, although the form of government might have excited his curiofity, and the fimpli- city of manners his elteem ; he has accordingly given a very imperfedt Iketch of its conftitution and hiftory. Yet enough appears to fiiev^' incon- teliably, that St. Marino is by no means a per- fe6t democracy. It is a mixture of monarchy, ariftocracy, and democracy, as really as Sparta or Rome were, and as the Maflachufetts, New- York, and Maryland now are, in Vv'hich the pow- ers of the governor, fenate, and affembly, are more cxaftly afcertained and nicely balanced, but they are not more diftinct than thofe of the capitaneos, council of forty, and the arengo are in St. Ma- rino. Should it be argued, that a government like this, where the fovereignty refides in the whole body of the people, is a democracy, it may be anfwered, that the right of fovereignty in all na- tions is unalienable and indivifible, and does and can refide no where elfe -, but not to recur to a principle fo general, the exercife, as well as right of fovereignty, in Rome, refided in the people, but the government was not a democracy. In Ame- rica^ the right of fovereignty refides indifputably in the body of the people, and they have the whole Si. Marino. 1 5 ivhole property of land. There are no nobles or patricians all are equal by law and by birth. The governors and fenates, as well as reprefenta- tive alTemblies, to whom the exercife of fove- reignty is committed, are annually chofen. Go- vernments more democratical never exifted ; thef are vaftly more fo than St. Marino. Yet the an- nual adminiftration is divided into executive, le- gjllative, and judicial powers ; and the Itgiflature itfelf is divided into monarchical, ariftocratical, and democratical branches; and an equilibrium has been anxioufly fought for in all their deli berations and aftions, with infinitely more art, judgement, and fkilJ, than appears in this little Italian commonwealth. The liberty and the honefty of thefe people is not at all furprifing. In fo fmall a flate, where every man perfonally knows every other, let the form of government be what it will, it is fcarcely poffible that any thing like tyranny or cruelty can take place. A king, or a decemvirate intruded with the government, would feci the cenfures of the people, and be conflantly confcious of the facility of affemblingthe whole, and apprehenfivC of an exertion of their ftrensth. The poverty of this people appears, by the fine of one penny impofed upon abfence from the arengo ', and by the lav/, that an ambaffadoi^ fhould have a fhilling a day. This, however, is a falary in proportion to the numbers of the people, as thirty guineas a day would be to an ambaf- fador from the United States. It appears alio, from the phyfician's being obliged to keep a horfe, probably there is not a carriage, nor ano- ther faddle-horfe, in the commonweal h. An handful of poor people, living in the fim- pleft manner, by hard labour, upon the produce of i6 Democratical Republics, of a few cows, llieep, goats, fwine, poultry, and pigeons, on a piece of rocky, fnowy ground, pro- te(^ed from every enemy by their fitiiation, their fuperftition, and even by their poverty, having no commerce nor luxury, can be no example for the commonwealth of Fennfilvania, Georgiaj or Vermont, in one of which there are poffibly half a million of people, and in each of the other at leaft thirty thoufand, fcattered over a large ter- ritory. Upon the whole, a flronger proof cannot be adduced of the necelTity of different orders, and of an equilibrium between them, than this com- monwealth of St. Marino, where there are fuch ftrong fymptoms of both in a locicty, where the leaft occafion for them appears that can be ima- gined to take place in any conceiveable fituatioHi LETTER IV, BISCAY. MY DEAR SIR, IN a refearch like this, after thofe people in Europe who have had the fkill, courage, and fortune, to preferve a voice in the government, Bifcay, in Spain, ought by no means to be omit- ted. While their neighbours have long fince re- figned all their prctenfions into the hands of kings and priefts, this extraordinary people have prelerved their ancient language, genius, laws, government, and manners, without innovation^, longer f^an any other nation of Europe. Of Celtic adion, they once inhabited fomc of the the fineft parts of the ancient Boeticaj but their love of liberty, and unconquerable averfion to a foreign fervitude, nnade them retire, when inva- ded and overpowered in their ancient feats, into thefe mountainous countiies, called by the ancients Cantabria. They were governed by counts, fent them by the kings of Oviedo and Leon, until 859, when finding themfelves without a chief, becaufe Zeno, who commanded them, was made prifoner, they rfoe and took arms to refill Or- dogne. Ton of Alfonfus the Third, whofe domi- nation was too fevere for them, and chofe for their chief an ilTue of the bJood-royal of Scodand by the mother's fide, and fon-in-law of Zeno their governor, who having overcome Ordogne, in 870, they chofe him for their lord, and his pofterity, who bore afterwards the name of Haro, fucceed- ed him, from father to fon, until the king, Don Pedro the Cruel, having put to death thofe who were in pofTeflion of the lordfhip, reduced them to a treaty, by which they united their country, under the title of a lordfhip, with Caftile, by which convention the king of Spain is now lord of Bifcay. It is a republic j and one of the pri- vileges they have mod infilled on, is not to have a king: another was, that every new lord, at his acceffion, fhould come into the country inperfon, with one of his legs bare, and take an oath to preferve the privileges of the lordfhip. The pre- fent king of Spain is the firfl who has been com- plimented with their confent, that the oath fhould be adminiftered at Madrid, though the Other hu- miliating and indecent ceremony has been long laid afide. Their folicicude for defence has furrounded with walls all the towns in the diftrid, , They ^ Vol. I, D < ; are r iS Democratkal Republics. are onc-and-twenty in number j the principal of which are, Orduna, Laredo, Portugalete, Duran- go, Bilbao, and St. Andcro. Bifcay is divided into nine merindades, a fort of jurifdiftion like a bailiwick, befides the four cities on the coaft. The capital is Bilbao. The whole is a collefllon of very high and very deep mountains^ rugged and rocky to fuch a degree, that a company of men polled on one of them might defend itfelfas long as it could fubfift by rolling rocks on their enemy. This natural formation of the coun- try, which has rendered the march of armies im- pradlicable, and the daring fpirit of the inhabi- tants, have preferved their liberty. A(5tivc, vigilant, generous, brave, hardy, in- clined to war and navigation, they have enjoyed, for two thoufand years, the reputation of the belt ibldiers and faiiors in Spain, and even of the belt courtiers, many of them having, by their wit and manners, raifed themfelves into offices of con- fequence under the court of Madrid. Their va- luable qualities have recommended them to the efteem of the kings of Spain, who have hitherto left them in poflcffion of thofe great immunities of which they are fo jealous* In 1632, indeed, the court laid a duty upon fait: the inhabitants of Bilbao rofe, and maflacred all the officers ap- pointed to colleft it, and all the officers of the grand admiral. Three thoufand troops werefent to punifh them for rebellion : thefe they fought, and totally defeated, driving moft of them into the lea, which difcouraged the court from pur- suing their plan of taxation j and fince that time the king has had no officer of any kind in the lordlhip, except his corregidor. MaKf,^ writers aicribe their fiourilhing com- - ^-'*' mevce merce to their fituation ; but, as this is no better than that of Ferrol, or Corunna, that advantage is more probably due to their liberty. In riding through this little territory, you would fancy yourfelf in Connecticut ; inftead of miferable huts, built of mud, and covered with draw, you fee the country full of large and commodious houfes and barns of the farmer ; the lands well cultivated ; and a wealthy, happy yeomanry. The roads, fo dangerous and impalTable in mod other parts of Spain, are here very good, having been made at a vaft expence of labour. Although the government is called a demo- cracy, we cannot here find all authority collected into one center ; there are, on the contrary, as many diftinft governments as there are cities and merindades. The general government has two orders at lead ; the lord or governor, and the bi- ennial parliament. Each of the thirteen fubor- dinate divifions has its organized government, with its chief magiftrate at the head of it. We may judge of the form of all of them by that of the metropolis,' which calls itfelf, in all its laws^ the noble and illuftrious republic of Bilbao. This city has its alcalde, who is both governor and chief juftice, its twelve regidores or counfel- iors, attorney-general, &c. and by all thefe, af- fembled in the confiftorial palace under the titles of concejo, Jujiicia, y regimiento, the laws are made in the naniie of the lord of Bifcay, and confirmed by him, Thefe officers, it is true, are elefled by the ci- tizens, but they muft by law be elefted, as well as the deputies to the biennial parliament or jun- ta general, out of a few noble families, unftained, borh by the fide of father and mother, by any mixture with Moors, Jews, new conveits, peni- D 2 tentiarics 20 Democratical Republics. tentiaries of the inquifition, &c. They muft be natives and refidents, worth a thoufand ducats, and muft have no concern in commerce, manu- fadures, or trades , and, by a fundamental agree- ment among all the merindades, all their depu- ties to the junta general, and all their regidores, findics, fecretaries, and treafurers, muft be no- bles, at leaft knights, and fuch as never exer- cifed any mechanical trades themfelves or their fathers. Thus we fee the people themfelves have eftabliilied by law a concradled ariftocracy, under the appearance of a liberal democracy. Ameri- cans, beware ! Although we fee here in the general govern- ment, and in that of every city and merindad, the three branches of power, of the one, the few, and the many ; yet, if it were as democra- tical as it has been thought by fome, we could by no means infer, from this inftance of a little flock upon a few imprafticable mountains, in a round form of ten leagues diameter, the utility or prafticability of fuch a government in any other country. The difpofition to divifion, fo apparent in all de- mocratical governments, however tempered with ariftocratical and monarchical powers, has iliewn itfelf, in breaking oif from it Guipufcoa and Al- laba ; and the only prefer vative of it from other divifions has been the fear of their neighbours. They always knew, that as foon as they ftiould fall into faftions, or attempt innovations, the court of Spain would interpofe, and prefcribe ihem a government not fo much to their tafte. THE The Grifons, i THE GRISON8, In the republic of the Three Leagues of the Grifons, the fovereign is ail the people of a great part of the ancient Rhetia. This is called a de- mocratical republic of three leagues, i. The League of the Grifons. i. The League Caddee. 3. The League of Ten Jurifdidions. Thefe three are united by. the perpetual confederation of 1472, which has been feveral times renewed. The government refides fovereignly in the com- rnonsj where every thing is decided by the plu- rality of voices. The commons eleft and inftru6l their deputies for the general diet, which is held once a year. Each league eleds alfo its chief or prefident, who prefides at the diets, each one in his league. The general diet aflembles one year at Ilanz, in the league of the Grifons j one year at Coirej in the league Caddee ^ and one year at pavons, in the league of Ten Jurifdidlions. There is another ordinary affembly, com.pofed of chiefs and of three deputies from each league, which is held at Coire, in the month of January. Befides thefe regular aflemblies, they hold congrefTes whcH.ever the neceffities of the flate require them ; fometimes of the chiefs alone, fometimes of cer- tain deputies from each league, according to the importance of the cafe : thefe affemblies are held at Coire. The three leagues form but one body in general affairs j g,nd, although one league has more deputies than another, they count the voices without diftinftion of leagues. They condudt feparately their particular affairs. Their country is thirty- five leagues in length, and thirty in breadth, D 3 Even 24 Democrat ical RepuUics. Even in this happy country, where there is more equaliy than in alnnoft any other, there are noble families, who, although they live like their neighbours by the cultivation of the earth, and think it no difgrace, are very proud of the im- menfe antiquity of their defcent, and boaft of it, and value themfelves upon it, as much as Julius Csefar did, who was defcended from a goddefs. THE UNITED PROVINCES OF THE LOW COUNTRIES. There are in Friefland and Overyffell, and perhaps in the city of Dort, certain remnants of democratical powers, the fragments of an ancient edi&ce, which may poffibly be re-ere6led j but as there is nothing which favours M. Turgot's idea, I ihall pafs over this country for the prefent. LETTER V. SWITZERLAND. MY DEAR SIR, IT is commonly faid, that Tome of the cantons of Switzerland are democratical, and others ariftocratical : and if thefe epithets are underftood only to mean, that one of thefe powers prevails in fome of thofe republics, and the other in the reft, they are juft enough j but there is neither a limpie democracy, nor a fimple ariftocracy, among them. The governments of thefe confederated ftatesj Switzerland. t% ftates, like thofe of the United Provinces of the Netherlands, are very complicated, and there- fore very difficult to be fully explained j yet the moft fuperficial inquirer will find the moft evi- dent traces of a compofition of all the three powers in all of them. To begin with the cantons commonly reputed democratical. DEMOCRATICAL CANTONS, APPENZEL. The canton of Appenzel confifts of a feries of vailies, fcattered among inacceffible rocks and mountains, in all about eighteen miles fquare. The people are laborious and frugal, and have no commerce but in cattle, hides, butter, cheefe, and a little linen made of their own flax. It has no walled towns, and only two or three open boroughs, and a few fmall villages : it is, like New England, almoft a continued village, covered with excellent houfes of the yeomanry, built of wood, each of which has its territory of paflure grounds, commonly ornamented with trees j neat- pefs and convenience are ftudied without, and a remarkable cleanlinefs within. The principal part of the inhabitants haye preferved the fimpli- city of the paftoral life. As there are not, at moft, above fifty thoqfand fouls, there cannot be more than ten thoqfand men capable of bearing arms. It is not at all furprifing, among fo much freedom, though among rocks and herbs, to hear of lite- rature, and men of letters who are an ornament to their country. P 4 Never- $4 Democratical Cantons. Neverthelefs, this fimple people, fo fmall \n number, in fo narrow a territory, could not agree. After a violent contefl, in Vv-hich they were in danger of a civil war, by the mediation of the other cantons, at the time of the Reformation, they agreed to divide the canton into two por- tions, the Outer and the Inner Appenzel, or Rhodes Exterior, and Rhodes Interior. Each dif- trid: has now its refpeftive chief magiitrate, court of juftice, police, bandaret, and deputy to the general diet, although the canton has but one vote, and confequently lofes its voice if the two deputies are of different opinions. The canton is divided into no lefs than twelve communities; fix of them called the Inner Appenzel, lying to the eaft; and fix the Outer, to the weft. They have one general fovereign council, which is compofed of one hundred and forty-four perfons, twelve taken from each community. The fovereignty refidcs in the general aflfembly, which, in the interior Rhodes, meets every year at Appenzel, the laft Sunday in April; but, in the exterior Rhodes, it affembles alternately at Trogen and at Hundwyl. In the interior Rhodes are the chiefs and ofiicers, the land amm.an, the tything-man, the governor, the treafurer, the cap- tain of the country, the director of the buildings, the direftor of the churches, and the enfign. The exterior Rhodes have ten officers, viz. two land ammans, two governors, two treafurers, two cap- tains, and two enfigns. The interior Rhodes is fubdivided into fix leffer ones, each of which has Sixteen counfellors, among whom are always two chiefs. The grand council in the interior Rhodes, as alfo the criminal jurifdiftion, is compofed of one hundred and twenty-eight perfons, who af- femble dppen%eL a 5 femble twice a year, eight days after the general afTembly, and at as many other times as occafions require. Moreover, they have alfo the little council, called the weekly council, becaufc it meets every week in the year. The exterior Rhodes are now divided into nineteen communi- ties ; and the fovereignty of them confifts in the double grand council of the country, called the old and new council, which afiembles once a year, eight days after the aflembly of the country, at Trogen, or at Herifaw, and is compofed of ninety and odd perlons. Then follows the grand coun- cil, in which, befides the ten officers, the reign- ing chiefs of ail the comimunities have feats, the diredors of the buildings, the chancellor, and the fautier, which make thirry-ftve perfonsj the reign^ ing land amman preiides. After this comes the little council from before the fittern, which is held every fiifl Tuefday of each month at Tro- gen J the reigning land amman is the prefident, to whom always affifts, alternately, an officer, with a member of council from all the thirteen communities, the chancellor of the country, and the fautier, and confifts of twenty and odd perfons. The little council from behind the fittern is held under the prefidency of the reigning land am- man, whenever occafion requires 3 it is held at Herifaw, Hundwyl, or Urnaefchen : at it aflift the chancellor of the country, and the fautier, with the counfellors of the fix communities be- hind the fittern, appointed for this fervice. Let me afk, if here are not different orders of men, and balances in abundance ? Such an handful of people, living by agriculture, in pri- mitive fimpiicity, one would think might live very quietly, almoft without any government at all i yet, inftead of being capable of coiiefting all i5 Ikmocratkal Cantons, all authority into one aflemblyj they feem to have been forcibly 'gitatcd by a mutual power of repulfion, which has divided them into two commonwealths, each of which has its monarchi- cal power in a chief magiftrate; its ariftocraticat power in two councils, one for legislation, and the other for execution j befides the two more popular afTemblieF. This is furely no fimple de- mocracy. Indeed a fimple democracy by repre- sentation is a contradidtion in terms. LETTER VL UNDERWALD* MY DEAR SIR, THE canton of Underwald confifts only of villages and boroughs, although it is twen- ty-five miles in length, and feventeen in breadth, Thefc dimenfionsj it feems, were too extenfive to be governed by a legiflation fo imperfedlly com- bined, and nature has taught and compelled them, to feparate into two divifions, the one abovcj and the other below, a certain large foreft of oaks, which runs nearly in the middle of the country, from north to fouth. The inferior valley, below the foreft, contains four communities; and the fuperior, above it, fix. The principal or capital is Sarnen. The fovereign is the whole country, the fovereignty refiding in the general afiembly^ where all the males of fifteen have entry and fuf- frage ; but each valley apart has, with refped: to its interior concerns, its land amman, its officers of adminiftration, and its public aflfembly, com- pofed VnderwaU. 27 pofed of fifty-eight fenators, taken from the com- munities. As to affairs without, there is a ge- neral council, formed of all the officers of admi- niflration, and of fifty-eight fenators chofen in the faid councils of the two valleys. Befides this, there are, for juftice and police, the chamber of feven, and the chamber of fifteen, for the upper valley, and the chamber of eleven for the lower. Here again are arrangements more complica- ted, and ariftocratical preferences more decided, in order to counterpoife the democratical affem- bly, than any to be found in America ; and the land amman is as great a man in proportion as an American governor. Is this a fimple democracy ? Has this little clan of graziers been able to col- left all authority into one center ? Are there not three afTemblies here to moderate and balance each other ? and are not the executive and judi- cial powers feparated from the legiflative ? Is it not a mixed government, as much as any in America ? although its conftitution is not by any means fo well digefted as ten at leaft of thofe of the United States j and although it would never be found capable of holding together a great nation. LETTER 2% Democrat leal Cantons, LETTER VII, CLARIS. MV DEAR SIR, THE canton of Claris is a mountainous country, of eight miles long anyi four widcj, according to their own authors, perhaps intend- ing German miles ; but twenty-five miles in length and eighteen in bre4dth, according to fome Engliih accounts. Thp commt^rce of it is in cheefe, butter, c&ttle, linen, and thread, Teq thoufand catde, and four thoufand fheep, paftured in fummer upon the moL'^^uins, conuitute their wealth. The inhabitants live together in a geiieral equa- lity, and moft perfedt harmony ; evef> thofe of the different perfuafions of Catholics and Frosef- tants, who fometimes perform divine fervice in the fame church, one after the other : and all the offices of ftate are indifferendy adminiftered by both parties, though the Proteftants are more ia number, and luperior both in induftry and com- m.erce. All the houfes are bulk of Vv'ood, large and folid, thofe of the richeit inhabitants differ- ing only from thole of the poorer, as they arc larger. The police is well regulated here, as it is throughout Switzerland. Liberty does not dege- nerate into licentioufnefs. Liberty, independence^ and an exem.ption from taxes, amply compenfate for a want of the refinements of luxury. There are none fo rich as to gain an afcendency by lar- gefies. \( they err in their councils, it is an error of the judgement, and not of the heart. As ,-. .. ^ . ... there Claris. 29 there is no fear of invafion, and they have no con- quefts to make, their policy confifts in maintain- ing their independence^ and preferving the pub- lic tranquillity, y-^sthe end of government is the greateft happinefs of the greateft number, faving at the fame time the ftipulated rights of all, go- vernments like thefe, where a large fhare of power is preferved by the people, deferve to be admired and imiuated. It is in fuch governments that human nature appears in its dignity, honeft, brave, and generous. Some writers are of opinion, that Switzerland was originally peopled by a colony of Greeks. The fame greatnefs of foul, the fame fpirit of in- dependence, the fame love of their country, has animated both the ancients and the moderns, to that determined heroifm which prefers death to ilavery. Their hiftory is fuli of examples of vic- tories obtained by fmall num.bers of men over large armies. In 1388 the Auilrians made an irruption into their territory, with an army of fif- teen thoufand men; but, inftead of conqueiing the country as they expelled, in attacking about four hundred men pofted on the mountains at Nsefel, they were broken by the ftones rolled upon them from the fummit : the Swifs, at this critical moment, rufhed down upon them with fuch fury, as forced them to retire with an im- menfe lofs. Such will ever be the charadler of a people who preferve fo large a fliare to chemfelves in their legiflature, while they temper their con- Ititution, at the fame time, with an executive power in a chief magiftrate, and an arillocraticai power in a wife fenate. The government here is by no means entirely democratical. It is true, that the fovereign is the whole country, and the fovereignty refides in the 30 Democrat'tcal Cantons. the general aflembly, where each male of fifteen^, with his fword at his lide, has his feat and vote It is true, that this aflembly, which is annually held in an open plain, ratifies the laws, lays taxes, enters into alliances, declares war, and makes peace* But it has a firfl; magifirate in a land amman, who is the chief of the republic, and is chofen alternately from among the Proteftants and from among the Catholics. The Proteftant remains three years in office ; the Catholic two. The manner of his appointment is a mixture of elec- tion and lot. The people choofe five candi- dates, who draw lots for the office. The other great officers of Hate are appointed in the fame manner. There is >. council called a fenate, compofed of the land amman, a ftadthalder, and fixty-two fenators, forty-eight proteftants and fourteen Ca- tholics, all taken from fifteen tagwen or corvees, into which the three principal quarters or parti- tions of the country are fubdivided for its more convenient government. In this fenate, called the council of regency, the executive power re- lides. Each tagv>'en or corvee furniflies four fe- nators J belides the borough of Glaris, which fur- nifhes fix. Inftead of a fimple democracy, it is a mixed government, in which the monarchical power in the land amman, ftadthalder or pro-conful, the ariftocratical order in the fenate, and the demo- cratical in the general aflembly, are diftindlly marked. It is, however, but imperfedlly ba- lanced ; fo much of the executive power in an ariftocratical afTembly would be dangerous in the higheft degree in a large ftate, and among a rich people. If this canton could extend its do- minion. Zug. si minion, or greatly nnultiply its numbers, it would foon find the neceffity of giving the executive power to the land amman, in ord< r to defend the people againft the fenate ; for the fenate, although it is always the refervoir of wifdoai, is eternally that Lucerne. 4^ that if any dlflenfions fhould arife between the cantons, his majffty fhould, at the requeft of one of the parties, interpofe his mediation by all gen- tle nieans to bring about a reconciliation : but if thefe fhould fail, he fhould compel the aggreflbr to fulfil the treaties between the cantons and their allies. As this article was manifeftly incompa- tible with that independence which republicans ought to value above all things, it has been wifely omitted in the nev/ treaty ; and it would have become the dignity of the Swifs charafter to have renounced equally thole penfions, which are called Argents de Paix et d'Alliance, as in- confiftent not only with a republican fpirit, but with that equality which ought to be the founda* tion of an alliance. LETTER XIV. LUCERNE. MY DEAR SIR, THE canton of Lucerne comprehends a country of fixteen leagues long and eight wide, containing fifteen bailiwicks, befides feveral cities, abbays, monafleries, feigniories, bic. The inhabitants are almoft wholly engaged in agricul- ture, and the exportation of their produce. Tiieir commerce mi'ght be greatly augmented, as the river Reufs ilTues from the lake^ pafTes through the town, and falls into the Rhine. The city contains lefs than three thoufand fouls, has no manufadures, little trade, and no encouragement for learning : yet the fovereign is this fingle city, and the fovercignty refides in the little 46 Arijloeratkal Cantons, little and great council, having for chiefs twd avoyers, who are alternately regents. There are five hundred citizens in the town, from whom a council of one hundred are chofen, who are no- minally the fovereigntyi out of this body are formed the two divifions, the little council,- fenate, or council of (late, confifting of thirty- fix members, divided into two equal parts of eighteen each, one of which makes choice of the other every half year. The whole power is ac- tually exercifed by this body, the two divifions of which adminilter the government by turns. They are fubjed to no coutroul, are neither con- firmed by the fovereign council, nor by the citi- zens 5 the divifion which retires confirming that which comes in. As the vacancies in the fenate are filled up by themfelves, all power is in pofleffion of a few Patrician families. The fon fucceeds the father, and the brother his brother. The grand council confifts of fixty-four per- fons, taken from the citizens, who are faid to have their privileges i but it is hard to guefs what they are, as the elections are made by the little and great council conjointly. The adminiltration, t!:ie police, the finances, and the whole executive power, is in the fenate, which is conilantly fitting. The grand council is afiembled only upon particular occafions, for the purpofe of legiflation. The fenate has cognizance of criminal caufes, but in capital cafes the grand couiKil is convoked to pronounce fentence : in civil caufes an appeal lies from the fenate to the grand council j but thefe appeals can be but mere forms, the fame fenators being in both courts. As the fenate conftitutes above a third of the grand colincil, choofe their own members, confer all Zurich, 47 all employments, have the nomination to ecclefi- aftical benefices, two thirds of the revenues of the canton belonging to the clergy, their influence muft be uncontroulable. The two avoyers are chofen from the fenite by the council of one hundred, and are confirmed annuallyi The relations of the candidates arc excluded from voting : but all fuch checks againft influence and family connexions in an oligarchy are futile, as all laws are cyphers* There are aifo certain chambers of juftice and police. In fome few infl:ances, fuch as declaring war and making peace, forming alliances or impofing taxes, the citizens mufl: be afl^embled and give their confent, which is one check, upon the power of the nobles. LETTER XV. ZURICH. MY DEAR SIR, THE canton of Zurich contains one hun- dred and fifty thoufand fouls,. upon an area of forty miles by thirty, abounds in corn, wine and all the ordinary produdions of excellent paf- tures. Literature has been encouraged, and has conft:antly flouriflied in this country, from the time of Zuinglius to that of Gefner and Lavater. The inhabitants are induftrious, their manufac- tures confiderable, and their commerce extenfive. In the city is a public granary, an admirable refource againft fcarcity, and a magnificent arfe- nal well filled with cannon, arms, and ammu- nition, particularly mufquets for thirty thoufand meni 4% jirlftocratkal Cantons. men ; the armour of the old Swifs warriors, and the bow and arrow with which William Tell fhoe the apple on the head of his fon Who with the generous rufiics fate. On Uri's rock, in clofe divan. And wing'd that arrow, fure as fate. Which fix'd the facred rights of man. The fovereign is the city of Zurich. Th^ fovereignty refides in the two burgomafters, in the little council compofed of forty-eight mem- bers, and the grand council compofed of one hundred and fixty-two members j all taken from thirteen tribrs, one of which is of the nobles, and the other twelve of citizens. Although there are twelve thoufand fouls in the capital, and one hundred and fifty in the can- ton, there are not more than two thoufand citizens. In early times, when the city had no territory round it, or a fmail one, the citizens were in poffeflion of the government ; when they afterwards made additions by conqueft or purchafe, they ftill ob- ftinately held this power, and excluded all their new fubjedls. It is an hundred and fifty years? lince a new citizen has been admitted : befides eleding all the magiftrates and holding all offices, they have >aintained a monopoly of commerce, and enclud^d all ftrangers, and even fubjeds of the canton, from conducing any in the town. Such are com.mons, as well as nobles and princes, whenever they have power unchecked in their hands ! There is even in this commercial republic a tribe of nobles, who confider trade as a humilia- tion. The Schaffhaufe. 49. The legiflative authority is vefted iii the grand council of two hundred and twelve, including the fenate. The fenate confifts of twenty- four tribunes, a4id four counfellors chofen by the nobles, to thefe are added twenty, eledled by the fovereign council j making in all, with the two burgonnaf- ters, fifty : half of thena adminifter fix nmonths, and are then fucceeded by the reft. The burgonnafters are chofen annually by the fovereign council, and one of them is prefident of each divifion of the lenate, which has the judicial power, in criminal matters, without appeal, and in civil, with an appeal, to the grand council. The members of the fenate are liable to be changed, and there is an annual revifion of them, which is a great reftraint. The ftate is not only out of debt, but faves money every year againft any emergency. By this fund they fupported a war in 1712, without any additional taxes. There- is not a carriage in the town, except it be of a ftranger. Zurich has great influence in the general diet, which Ihe derives more from her reputation for integrity, and original Swifs independence of fpi- rit, than from her power. LETTER XVL SCHAFFHAUSE. MY DEAR SIR, THE fovereign is the city of Schaffhaufe. The citizens, about fixteen hundred, are divided into twelve tribes, one of which confifts of nobles, and eleven are ordinary citizens. Vol. I. F The 5^ Artjlocratkal Republics. The fovcreignty rcfides in the little and grand councils. The fenate, or little council of twenty-five, has the executive power. The great council, comprifing the fenate, has the legiflative, and finally decides appeals. The burgomaflers are the chiefs of the repub- lic, and alternately prefide in both councils. Befides thefe, there are the fecret council, of {even of the higheft officers; the chamber of juftice, of twenty-five, including the prefident; the praetorian chamber, of thirteen, including the prefident ; the confiftory, of nine ; and the chamber of accounts, of nine. The city has ten bailiwicks fubjedt to it. THE CITY OF MULHOUSE. The fovereign is the city : the fbvereignty re- fides in the little and the grand council. The lefier council is compofed of twenty -four perfons j viz. three burgomafters, who prefide by turns, each one fix months, nine counfcllors, and twelve tribunes, who fucceed by eledion, and are taken from the grand council. The grand council is compofed of feventy- eight, viz. the twenty-four of the lefiTer council, thirty-fix members of the tribes, fix from each, and eighteen taken from the body of the citizens, and elected three by each one of the fix tribes. THE CITY OF BIENNE* The republic of Bienne contains lefs than fi3 thoufand fouls. The The Kepublk of St. Gall $x The regency is compofed of the great council, in which thelegiilative authority refides, confid- ing of forty members ; and of the little council, compofed of twenty-four, who have the execu- tive. Each of thefe councils eled: their own mem- bers, from the fix confraternities of the city. The burgomafter is chofen by the two coun- cils, prefides at their meetings, and is the chief of the regency ; he continues in office for life, although he goes through the form of an annual confirmation by the two councils, when the other magiftrates fubmit to the fame ceremony. The burgomafler keeps the feal, and, with the ban- neret, the treafurersj and the fecretary, forms the ceconomical chamber, and the chamber of or- phans. This town fends deputies to the general diets, ordinary and extraordinary. LETTER XVIL THE REPUBLIC OF ST. GALL, MY DEAR SIR, THE republic of St. Gall is a league and a half in circumference, and contains nine thoufand fouls. The inhabitants are very induf- trious in manufaftures of linen, muOin, and em- broidery j have an exccnfive commerce; and arts, fciences, and literature, arc elleemed and culti- F a vated 5* Arijlocratical Republics. vated among them. They have a remarkable public library, in which are thirteen volumes of original manufcript letters of the firft reformers. To fee the different effefts of different forms of government on the human character, and the hap- pinefs and profperity of nations, it would be worth while to compare this city with Conflance, in its neighbourhood. This happy and profperous, though diminutive republic, has its grand council of ninety perfons, its litde council of twenty-four^ and three burgo- maflers. The little council confifts of the three burgomaflers, nine fenators, and twelve tribunes. The grand council confifts of all the little coun- cil, and eleven perfons from each tribe ; for the city is divided into the fociety of the nobles, and fix tribes of the artifans, of whom the weavers are the principal. Befides thefe there are, the chamber ofjuftice, the chamber of five, and fome others. GENEVA. In the republic of Geneva, the fovereignty re- fides in the general council, lawfully convened, which comprehends all the orders of the ftate, and is compofed of four findics, chiefs of the republic, prefidents of all the councils; of the lefTer council of twenty-five ; of the grand coun- cil of two hundred, though it confifts of two hundred and fifty when it is complete j and of all the citizens of twenty-five years of age. The rights and attributes of all thefe orders of the ftate are fixed by the laws. The hiftory of this city deferves to be ftudied with anxious attention bjr Geneva, 53 by every American citizen. The principles of government, the neceflity of various orders, and the fatal effects of an imperfecSt balance, appear no where in a ftronger light. The fatal flumbers of the people, their invincible attachment to a few families, and the cool deliberate rageof thofe families, if fuch an expreflion may be allowed, to grafp all authority into their own hands, when they are not controuled or over-awed by a power above them in a firft magiftrate, are written ia every page. I need only refer you to Dr. d'lver- nois's Hiltorical and Political View of the Con- ftitution and Revolutions of Geneva in the eigh- teenth Century, which you received from the au- thor, to convince you of this. Let me add here, that the fads relating to the Swifs cantons, and their environs, mentioned in thefe letters, are taken from the ^,arante Tabid Folittques de la Sutjfe, par C. E. Faber, JBernois, Pajleur, a Bi/Jj-viller^ in 1746; with fome addi- tional obfervations from the beautiful Sketches of Mr. Coxe, which I fend you v/ith this letter, and which you will find as inftruflive as they are entertaining. The petty council is indifferently called the council of twenty-five^ iliQ petit council^ or they^- jiate. The council of fixty is a body clefted by the fenate, and meets only for the difcuffion of fo- reign affairs. The grand council, and council of two hun- dred, are one and the fame body ; it is ftill called the council of two hundred, though it now con- fifts of two and hundred fifty members. The general council, called indifcriminarely the fove reign council , the general affembly, tht fove- F 3 * reign 54 Arljlocratical RepuMics. reign affemhiy, the ajfembly of the people, or the council generaly is compofed of all the citizens or freemen of twenty-five years of age. At the time of the Reformation, every affair, important or trifling, \vd.s laid before the general aflembly j it was both a deliberating and acting body, that always left the cognizance of details to four findics : this was neceflary, in that time of danger, to attach the affedlions of the citizens to the fupport of the commonwealth by every en- dearing tie. The city was governed by two fin- dics of its own annual election. The multipli- city of affairs had engaged each findic to nomi- nate fome of the principal citizens to ferve as af- fefibrs during his adminiftration i thefe affellors, called counfellors, formed a council of twenty- five perfons. In 1457 the general council de- creed, that the council of twenty-five fliould be augmented to fixty. This body, in 1 526, was augmented to two hundred. Thus far the ariftocratical gentlemen proceeded upon democratical principles, and all is done by the general alTembly. At this inflant commences the firft overt ad: of ariftocratical ambition. Warm in their feats, they were loth to leave them, or hold them any longer at the will of the peo- ple. With all the fubtlety, and all the fagacity and addrefs which is chara6teriftic of this order of men in every age and nation, they prevailed on the people to relinquilli for the future the right of elecbing counfellors in the general aflTenibly j and the people, with their charafteriftic of fimpli- ciry, and unbounded confidence in their rulers when they love them, became the dupes, and pafled a law, that the two councils fhould for the future cled, or at leaft approve and affirm, each other^ Geneva, j thefe countries would confirm the general principle we contend for : the laft efpecially. But who can think of writing upon this fubjedl after De Lolnie, whofe book is the heft defence of the political balance of three powers that ever was written ? If the people are not equitably reprefented in the houfe of comnnons, this is a departure in praftice from the theory. If the lords return members of the houfe of commons, this is an additional difturbance of the balance : whether the crown and the people in fuch a cafe will not fee the neceffity of uniting in a remedy, are queftions beyond my pretenfions : 1 only contend that the Englilh conftitution is, in theory, the moft flupendous fabric of human invention, both for the adjuftment of the balance, and the prevention of its vibrations j and that the Americans ought to be applauded inftead of cenfured, for im.itating it as far as they have. Not the formation of lan-r guages, not the whole art of navigation and Ihi.p- building, does more honour to the human undeN ftanding than this fyftem of government. The Americans have not indeed imitated it in giving a negative, upon their legiflature, to the executive power i in this refpedl their balances are incom- plete, very much, I confefs, to my mortification : in other refpedsj they have fome of them fallen Ihore England. 7 1 fhort of perfeclion, by giving the choice of fome militia officers, &c. to the people thefe are how- ever fmall matters at prefent. They have not made their firfl magiflrates hereditary, nor their lenators : here they differ from the Englifli confli- tution, and with great propriety. The Agrarian in America is divided into the hands of the common people in every fcate, in fuch a manner, that nineteen twentieths of the property would be in the hands of the commons, let them appoint whom they could for chief magiftrate and fenators : the fovereignty then, in faft, as well as morality, mufl: refide in the whole body of the people ; and an hereditary king and nobility, who Hiould not govern according to the public opinion, would infallibly be tumbled inftantly from their places : it is not only rnoft prudent then, but ab- folutely neceflary, to avoid continual violence, to give the people a legal, conftitutional, and peace- able mode of changing thefe rulers, whenever they difcover improper principles or difpofitions in them. In the prefent ftate of fociety, and with the prefent manners, this may be done, not only without inconvenience, but greatly for the happi- nefs and profperity of the country. In future ages, if the prefent flates become great nations, rich, powerful, and luxurious, as well as numerous, their own feelings and good fenfe will diftate to them what to do : they may make tranfitions to a nearer refemblance of the Britifh conftitution, by a frelh convention, without the fmalleft inter- ruption to liberty. But this will never become neceflary, until great quantities of property fhall get into few hands. The truth is, that the people have ever go- verned in America : all the weight of the royal governors and councils, even backed vvith fleets G 4 and 72 Monarchical Republics . and armies, have never been able to get the ad^ vantage of them, who have always ftood by their hoiifes of reprefentatives in every inftance, and carried all their points ; and no governor ever flood his ground againfl: a reprefcntative afTembly : as long as he governed by their advice he was happy ; as foon as he differed from them he wa^ Wretched, and foon obliged to retire. LETTER. XXI. P O L A N p. MY DEAR SIR, THE king of Poland is the firft magiflrate in the republic, and derives all his authority from the nation. He has not the power to make laws, raife taxes, contract alliances, or declare war, nor to coin money, nor marry, without the ratification of the diet. The fenate is compofed of the clergy and nobi- lity j the third eftate, or people, is not fo much as known. The grand marfhal, the marfnal of the court, the chancellor, vice chancellor, and the treafurer, are the firft fenators. The nobility, or gentry, poffefs the dignities and employments, in Vv'hich they never permit ftrangers, or the commonalty^ to have any partici- pation ; they ele(5t their king, and would never faffer the fenate to make themfelves mailers of this eleftion. The peafints are flavcs to the gentry; having no property, all their acquifitions are made for their maders, and are expofed to all their paf- fions, and are oppreffed with impunity. The Poland, 73 The general diets, which are ufually held ae Warfaw or Grodno, are preceded by particular afTcmblies of palatinates, in which the deputies are chofen for the general aflennbly, and inllruftedj the deputies aflembled in general diet proceed to the eleclion of a marfhal, who has a very extraor- dinary power, that of impofing filence on whom he pleafes i he is the chief or Ipeaker of the af- fcmbly. At the death, abdication, or depofition of a king, the primate calls the aflembly of, the elec- tors to an open field near Warfaw. Here the eltftors take an oath not to feparate until they lliall have unanimoufly elected a king, nor to render him, when ele6led, any obedience, until he has fworn to obferve the pacfa convenia, and the laws. The candidates mufl: let their gold glitter, and give fplendid entertainments, which muft be car- . ried into debguch : the nobility are caprivated with the attractions of magnificence and Hunga- rian wine, and infallibly declare in favour of the candidate who cai-ifes it to Bow in the greateil profufion. The ambafiadors enter upon intrigues, even in public : the nobility receive their prelirnts^ fell their fuffrages with impunity, and render the throne venal, but often behave with little fidelity to the candidate in whofe intereft they pretend to be engaged, and, forgetting the prefents they have received, efpoule the caufe of a more wealthy competitor v/ithout hefieation. When the candi- date has gained all the fuifrages, he is declared king, and fworn to obferve the^^^^ conventa, and the laws, and then crowned. The Poles are polite and friendly, but magnificence is the foible of the nobility, and they facrifice all things to luxury : as they feidom fee any perfon fuperior to them 74 Monarchical RepuhUcs. them in their own country, and treat their infe- riors with an air of abfolute authority, they live in all the fplendor of princes. This is the account of the Abbe des Fontaines in the year 1736 ; it is to be hoped things are fince changed for the better ; but if this account was then true, who can wonder at what has happened fince ! Here again is no balance; a king, and an af- fembly of nobles, and nothing more: the nobles here difcover their unalterable difpofrtion, when- ever they have the power, to limit the king^s au- thority ; and there being no mediating power of the people, coUedliveiy or reprefentatively, between them, the confequence has been, what it always will be in fuch a cafe, confufion and calamity. LETTER XXIL POLAND, MY DEAR SIR, SINCE the letter concerning Poland was fent you, Mr. Coxe's travels into that kingdom, &c. have fallen into my hands ; and they contain fo many facfls material to our argument, that it is very proper to fend you the fubltance of this account; indeed there is fcarcely a book in the world, in any manner relative to the hiflory of government, or to thofe branches of philofophy on which it depends, which is not much to our purpofe. In the moft ancient times, which records or hiftory elucidate, the monarchy of Poland, like all Poland. 7 J all others denominated feudal, was in theory and precenfion abfolute. The barons too, in t'lis country as in all others, were very often innpa- tient under fuch reftraint. When the prince was an able ftatefnian and warrior, he was able to preferve order ; but when he was weak and indo- lent, it was very common for two or three barons in con)un6lion to make war upon him ; and fome- timts it happened that all together leagued againft him at once. In every feudal country, where the people had not the fenle and fpirit to make them- felves of importance, the barons became an ariftocracy, inccflantly encroaching upon the crown, and, under pretence of limiting its autho- rity, took away from it one prerogative after an- other, until it was reduced down to a mere doge of Venice, or avoyer of Berne ; until the k ings, by incorporating ci:ies and granting privileges to the people, fet themx up agalnft the nobiesj and ob- tained by their means ftanding armies fufficicnt to controul both nobles and comimons. The monarchy of Poland, nearly abfolute, funk in the courfe of a few centuries, without any violent convulfion, into an ariftocracy. It came to be difputed whether the monarchy was heredi ar^ or elective, and whether its autho- rity was lovereign or limited. The firft queftion is refolved, by fuppofing that the crown continued always in the fame family, although, upon the death of a king, his fuccelTor was recognized in an alTem.bly of the nobles. The Iccond may be anfwered by fuppofing, that when the king was ailive and capable, he did as he pleafed ; but when he was weak, he was diftated to by a licentious nobility. Caffimir the Great retrenched the authority of the principal barons, and granted immunities to the Icilci: nobility and gentry j 76 Monarchical RepuhUcs. gentry ; well aware that no other expedient could introduce order, except a limitation of the vail influence, pollefied by the palatines or principal nobility. If this prince had been polTefTed of any ideas of a free government, he might eafily have formed the people and inferior gentry into an af- fembly by themfelves, and, by uniting his power with theirs, againft the encroachments of the no- bles upon both, have preferved it. His nephew, Louis of Hungary, who fucceeded him, being a foreigner, was obliged by the nobility to fubfcribe conditions at his acceffion, not to impofe any taxes by his royal authority, without the confent of the nation, that is, of the nobles, for no other nation is thought on : that in cafe of his demife without male heirs, the privilege of appointing a king fliould revert to the nobles. In confequence of this agreement Louis was allowed to afcend the throne : having no fon, with a view of infuring the fuccelTion to Sigifmund his fon-in-iaw, he pro- mifed to diminifli the taxes, repair the fortreffes at his own expence, and to confer no ofHces or dignities on foreigners. Louis died : but Sigifmund was emperor, and therefore powerful, and might be formidable to the new immunities. The Poles, aware of this, violated the compaft with Louis, neglecl:ed Sigif-. mund, and elected Ladiflaus, upon his ratifying Louis's promifes, and marrying his daughter. Ladiflaus, having reiinquiflied the right of im- pofing taxes, called an affembly of prelates, ba- rons, and military gentlemen, in their refpedive provinces, in order to obtain an additional tribute, Thefe provincial affemiblies gave birth to the die- tines : which now no longer retain the power of raifing money in their feveral diftrifts, but only fleet the nuncios or reprefentatives for the diet. Ladiflaui Poland. 77. Ladlflaus the third, the fon of the former, purchaled his right to the fijcceffion, during the life of his father, by a confirmation of all the concefilons before granted, which he folcmnly ratified at his accefTion. Caffimir the third, bro- ther of Ladillaus the third, confented to feveral further innovations, all unfavourable to reeal perogative. One was the convention of a na- tional diet, invefted with the lole power of grant- ing fupplies. Each palatinate or province was allowed to fend to the general diet, befides the palatines and other principal barons, a certain number of nuncios or reprefentatives, chofen by the nobles and burghers. Is it not ridiculous, that this reign fhould be confidered by the popular party, as the sera, at which the freedom of the conftitution was permanently eftablifhed ? This freedom, which confifts in a king without autho- rity ; a body of nobles in a ftate of uncontrouled. anarchy ; and a peafantry groaning under the yoke of feudal defpotifm: the greateil inequality of fortune in the world; the extremes of riches and poverty, of luxury and mifery, in the neigh- bourhood of each other ; a univerfal corruption and venality pervading all ranks ; even the firfl nobles not blufhing to be penfioners of foreign courts J one profeffing himfelf publicly an Auf- trian, another a Pruffian, a third a Frenchman, and a fourth a Ruffian ; a country without manu- fadiures, without commerce, and in every view the mofi: diilrelTed in the world. But to proceed with an enumeration of the meafures by which , they have involved themfelves in thefe pitiable circumdances : Cafiiriiir was involved in feveral unfuccefsful wars, which exhaufted his treaflires : he applied to the diet for fubfidies. Every 7$ MonarMal Rcpuhlics* Every fupply was accompanied with a lift of grievances, and produced a diminution of the royal perogative. The barons, at the head of their vaiTals, were bound to fight, and the king could require fuch feudal fervices in defence of the kingdom : but Caffimir the third, to obtain pecuniary aids, gave up the power of fummon- ing the nobles to his ftandard, and of enacting any Jaw v/ithout the concurrence of the diet. John Albert, to procure an ele6lion in preference to his elder brother, affented to all the iirimunities e;xtorted from his predecefibrs, and fwore to their obfervance, in 1469. Alexander, his fucccflbr, declared in 1 505, the following limitations of fbvereign authority to be fundamental laws of the kingdom, i. The king cannot impofc taxes. 2. He cannot require the feudal fervices. 3. Nor alienate the royal domains. 4. Nor ena6l laws. 5. Nor coin money. 6. Nor alter the procefs in the courts of juftice. Sigifmund the firft fuc- ceeded Alexander, and under his reign the Polifli conftitution was the mofl tolerable, as the pro- perty of the fubje6l was befl fecured, and the crown had confiderable influence: but this did not fatisfy the nobles. Under Sigifmund Augullus, fon and fucceflbr of Sigifmund the firft, that fa- vourite objeft of the Polifti nobles, the free elec- tion of the king was publicly brought forward, and the king obliged to agree, that no future monarch fhould fucceed to the throne, unlefs freely elefted by the nation : before this, the fo- vercigns upon their acceffion, though formally raifcd by the confent of the nation, ftiil refted their pretenfions upon hereditary right, always ftiling themftlves heirs of the kingdom of Poland. Sigifmund Auguftus was the laft who bore that title i at his death, in 1572, all title to the crown from Poland. j^ from hereditary right was formally abolifhed, and the abfolute freedom of election ellablifhed upon a permanent bafis : a charter of immunities was drawn up at a general diet, a ratification of which it was determined to exad: of the new fove- reign, prior to his eleftion. This charter, called pa^a conventa, contained the whole body of privi- leges obtained from Louis, and his fucceiTors, with the following additions : i. That the king fliould be eledlive, and that his fucceflbr fhould never be appointed during his life. i. That the diets, the holding of which depended folely upon the will of the kings, fhould be aflembled every two years. 3. That every nobleman or gentleman in the realm fhould have a vote in the diet of elec- tion. 4. That in cafe the king fhould infringe the laws and privileges of the nation, his fubjedts fhould be abfolved from their oaths of allegiance. From this period the pacf a conventa, occafionally enlarged, have been confirmed by every fbvcreign at his coronation. Henry of Vaiois, brother of Charles the ninth of France, who afcended the throne after the con- ftitution was thus new-modelled, fecured his eleftion by private bribes to the nobles, and by itipulating an annual penfion to the republic from the revenues of France. His example has been followed by every fucceeding king, who, befides an unconditional ratification of the pacla conventCy has always been conftrained to purchafe the crown by a public largefs, and private corruption. Such is Polifh liberty, and fuch the bleiTings of a mo- narchy elective by a body of nobles. Under Stephen Eathori, the royal authority, or rather the royal dignity, was farther abridged, by the appointment of fixteen fenators, chofen at each diet, to attend the king, and to give their opinion to Monarchical Repuhlks; opinion in ail matters of innportance, (o ih^i h^ conld not iffue any decree without their confcnt; Another fatal blow was given to the perogative in 1578, by taking from the king the fupreme jurirdi<5lion of the caui'es of the nobles : it was enafted, that without the concurrence of the king, each palatinate fhouid elecSb in their dictines their own judges, who Ihould form fupreme courts of juflice, called tribunalia regnij in which the caufes of the nobles fliall be decided without appeal i a mode which prevails to this day. In the reign of John Caffimir, in 1652, was introduced the liberum veto^ or the power of each nuncio to interpofe a negative, and break up a diet, a privilege which the king himfelf does not enjoy. When the diet was debating upon tranfadions of t^fi utmoft importance, which required a fpeedy decifion, a nuncio cried rut, ** I flop the pro- *' ccedings," and quitted the aflembly : and a Venal facflion, who fupportrcl his proteft, unheard- of as it was, obtained th-.^ majority, and broPie up the afTembly in confuf.on. The conflitution was thus wholly changed, and an unlimited fcope given to fadlion. The innovation was fjpporced by the great officers of ftate, the general, trea- furer, and marfhal, who being once nominated by the king, enjoyed their offices for life, refpon- fible only to the diets, confcious that they could at all times engage a nuncio to proted, and thus elude an inquiry into their admiiniflration j it was alfo fupported by the adherents of many nobles acculcd of capital crimes before the diet, the only tribunal before which they could be tried : all the nuncios who oppofed the railing of additional fubfidies by taxes, which the exigencies of the ftate then demanded, feconded the propofal of putting an end to the affembly. But die principal 2. cauic Poland, 8 1 taufe of all were the foreign powers, interefted to foment confufions in the Pohfh councils. Before this, they were obliged to fecure a majority j af- terwards, they might put an end to any diet un- friendly to their views, by corrupting a fingle member. This veto broke up feven diets in the reign of John Caffimir, four under Michael, fe- ven under John Sobieilci, and thirty during the reigns of the two Augufti. In confequence of this neceility of unanimity, which they call the deareft palladium of PoliHi liberty, Poland has continued above a hundred years almofl without laws. But as the king ftill beftowed the ftarofties, or royal fiefs, which are held for life, and conferred the principle dignities and great offices of ftate^ he was ftill the fountain of honour^, and maintain- ed great influence in the councils of the nations ; but this lafl: branch of the royal prerogative was lately wfefted from the crown at the eftablilhment of the permanent council. Thus it appears in the hiftory of Poland, as in that of Venice, Genoa, Berne, Soleure, and all others, that the nobles have continued with- out interruption to fcramble for diminucions of the regal authority, to grafp the whole executive power, and augment their own prl . iieges ; and have attained a dircd ariflocracy, under a mo- narchical name, where a few are above the con- troul of the laws, while the many are deprived of their protedion. The prefent wretched (late of the towns, com- pared with their former flourifhing condition j the poverty of the peafants, whofe opprefTions have increafed in proportion to the power of the nobles, having loll: a proredor when the king Vol. I. . H loll 8 2 Monarchical or regal Republics. lofl; his weight in the conftitiition ; the total Con^ fijfion in all public affairs ; the declenfion of im-' portance, and lofs of territory all fhew that ab- Iblute monarchy is preferable to fuch a republic. Would twelve millions of inhabitants, under an Englifli conftitution, or under the conftitution of any one of the United States, have been par- titioned and difmembered ? No ; not by a league of all the abfolute fovereigns of Europe againft them at once. Such are the effefts of colle6ting all authority into one center, of negleding an equilibrium of powers, and of not having three branches in the legiflature. The practice of cantoning a body of foldiers near the plain where the kings are elected, has been adopted by feveral foreign powers for near a century J and, although it may be galling to the nobility, prevents the effufion of blood that for- merly deluged the aflcmbly. This was done, at the eledlion of Staniflaus Auguftus, by the em- prefs of RufTia and the king of PruITia ; five thoufand Ruffian troops were ftationed at a fmall diftance from the plain of Vola. Staniflaus was in the thirty-fecond year of his age when he afcended the throne, in 1764. From his virtues and abilities, the faireft hopes were conceived of his raifing Poland from its deplo- rable fituation ; but his exertions for the public good were fettered by the conftitution, by the faftions of a turbulent people, and the intrigues of neighbouring powers. His endeavours to in- troduce order at home, and independence abroad, which would have increafed the power of his country, and her conlideration with foreign na- tions, alarmed the neiojhbourino; powers. The fpint of religious intolerance produced a civil war, Poland. 83 War, and the fcnate petitioned the ambaffador from Peterlburgh, not to withd'-aw th Ruffian troops. The royal troops, aid^rd by the Ruf- fians, whofe difcipline was fuperior, were in fa- vour of religious liberty. The confederates, fe- cretly encouraged by Auftria, aflifted by the Turks, and fupplied with money and officers by the French, were able to protract hofhilities from 1768 to 1772 : during this period the attempt "Was made to affaffinate the king. Count Pulafki, who was killed in the fervlce of the United States, is faid to have planned an enterprize (o much to his difhonour. No good caufe ever was, or ever will be, fcrved by aifaffi- nation ; and this is happily, in the prefent age, th^ univerfal fenfe of mankind. If a papal nun- cio was found in Poland, capable of bleffing the weapons of confpirators againft this tolerant king, he was a monfter, whofe bloody bigotry the libe- ral fpirit of the Pope himfelf mult, at this en- lightened period, abominate. The king did him- felf immortal honour by his interceffiion with the diet to remit the tortures and horrid cruelties de- creed by the laws of moft kingdoms in Europe againft treafon, and by his m.oderation towards all the confpirators. We are now arrived at the confummation of all panegyrics upon a fovereignty in a fir^le affem- bly the partition. Pruffia was formerly in a ftate of vaffalage to this republic ; Ruffia once faw its capital and throne poffelTed by the Poles ; and Auftria was indebted to John Sobiefki, a fovereign of this country, for compelling the Turks to raiie the fiege of Vienna, but a century ago. A republic io lately the prote6tors of its neighbours, would not, without the moft palpable imperfections in H 2 the $4 Monarchical or regal Republics, the orders and balances of its government, havtf declined in an age of general improvement, and become a prey to any invader much lefs would it have forced the world to acknowledge, that the tranflation of near five millions of people, from a republican government to that of abfo- lute empires and monarchies, whether it were done by right or by wi-ong, is a blefling to them. The partition was projefted by the king of Pruf- fia, who communicated it to the emperor and cmprefs. The plague was one circumftance, and the Ruffian war againft the Turks another, that favoured the defign ; and the partition-treaty was figned at Peterfourg, in February 1772, by the Ruffian, Auftrian, and Pruffian plenipotentiaries. The troops of the three courts were already in poffi^ffion of the greateft part of Poland, and the confederates were foon difperfed. The par- titioning powers proceeded with fuch fecrecy, that only vague conjectures were made at Warfaw, and that lord Cathcart, the Englifh minifter at Peterfburg, obtained no authentic information of the treaty until two months after its fignature. The formal notification, to the king and fenate at Warfaw, was made by the Imperial and Pruf- fian ambafTadors, in September 1772, of the pre- tenfions of their courts to the Polifh territory. The remonftrances of the king and fenate, as well as thofe of the courts of London, Paris, Stock- holm, and Copenhagen, had no effect j and the mofl humiliating record that ever appeared in the annals of a republic is feen in the king's fum- nions *^ Since there are no hopes from any " quarter, and any further delays will only tend " to draw down the moft dreadful calamities ''' upon the remiainder of the dominions which " are left to the republic, the diet is convened Poland. 85 *' for tlie 19th of April, 1773, according to the " will of the three courts ; never the! els, in order " to avoid all caufe of reproach, the k'ng, with " the advice of the fenate, again appeals to the ** guarantees of the treaty of Oiiva." It is not to be doubted, that if there had been in Poland a people in exigence, as there is in Holland, to have given this amiable prince only the autho- rity of a ftadtholder, he would havefaid, " I will " die in the laft ditch." Of the difnnembered provinces, the Ruffian, which is the Jargirrt territory, contains only one million and a haif of fouls j the Auftrian, which is the moft populous, contains two millions and a half; the Pruflian, which is the moft commer- cial, commanding the navigation of the Viftula, contains only eight hundred and fixty thoufand, and has given a fatal blow to the commerce of Poland, by transferring it from Dantzick to Me- mel and Konigfburg. The finifhing llroke of all remains. The three ambafladors, on the 13th of Sep- tember, 1773, delivered, " A part of thofe car- " dinal laws, to the ratification of which our " courts will not fuffer any contradiftion. " I. The crown of Poland fnall be for ever " eledive, and all order of fucceffion profcribed : " any perfon who Ihall endeavour to break this " law fhall be declared an enemy to his country, *' and liable to be puniflied accordingly. " II. Foreign candidates to the throne, being *' the frequent caufe of troubles and divifions, *' fhall be excluded ^ and it fhall be enacted, *' that, for the future, no perfon can be chofen ** king of Poland, and great duke of Lithuania, *^ excepting a native Pole, of noble origin, and <* pofTeffing land within the kingdom. The fon, H ^ '' VI- S^ Monarchical or regal Republics, *' or grandfon, of a king of Poland, cannot be " e!edcd innmediately upon the death of their *' father or giandfachcrj andare not eiigible, ex- " cepting after an interval of two reigns. *' 111. The governme.'it of Poland fhall be for " ever free, independenc, and of a republican " form. " IV. The true principle of faid government *' confifting in the ftrid: execution of its laws, '' and the equilibrium of the :hiee efbates, viz. ** the king, the fenate, and the equeftrian order, " a permanent council fhall be ellabiifhed, in " which the executive power fhall be velted. In " this counc"! liic equc^ftrian order, hitherto ex- *' eluded from the adminiftration of affairs in *^ the intervals of the diets, fhall be admitted, " as fhall be more clearly laid down in the future *' arrangcmiCnts." Thus the fuprem-e legiflatlve authority refides in the three eftaccs of the realm, the king, the fenate, and equeftrian order, afTembled in a na- tional diet ; but each eitate has no negative upon the other, and therefore is no balance, and very little check. The great families and principal palatines will flill govern, without any efFedtual controul. The executive power is now vefted in the fu- preme permanent council ; but here neither have they any checks, all being decided by the majo- rity, and the fame principal families will always prevail. Thefe augufl legiflators have acknowledged the principle of a fret republican government, that it confifts in a ftrict execution of the laws, and an equilibrium of eftates or orders : but how are the laws to govern ; and how is the equili- brium to be preierved ^ Like air, oil, and water, Ihaker^ Poland. 87 fhaken together in one bottle, and left in repofe j the firft will rife to the top, the laft fink to the bottom, and the fecond fwim between. Our countrymen will never run delirious after a word or a name. The name republic is given to things in their nature as different and contra- dictory as light and darknefs, truth and faliehood, virtue and vice, happinefs and rnifery. Thera are free republics, and republics as tyrannical as an oriental defpotifm. A free republic is the beft of governments, and the greatefl blefling which mortals can afpire to. Republics which are not free, by the help of a multitude of ri- gorous checks, in very fmali ftates, and for fliort fpaces of time, have preferved fome reverence for the laws, and been tolerable ; but there have been oligarchies carried to fuch extremes of tyranny, that the defpotifm of Turkey, as far as the hap- pinels of the nation at large is concerned, would perhaps be preferable. An empire of laws is a charaderiflic of a free republic only, and fhould never be applied to republics in general. If there fliould ever be a people in Poland, there willfoon be a real king; and if ever there fhould be a king in reality, as well as in name, there will foon be a people : for, inftead of the trite faying, " no bifliop, no king," it would be a much more exaft and important truth to fay, no peo- ple, no king, and no king, no people, meaning by the word king, a firft magiftrate polTefiTcd ex- elufivelyof die executive power. It may belaid down as a univerfal maxim, that every govern- ment that has not three independent branches in its legiflature will foon become an abfolute mo- narchy : or, an arrogant nobility, increafirg every day in a rage for Iplendour and magni c 'nc-.-, will annihilate the people, and, at.c-.JjJ 'v'-'>^ H 4 t':;::j; 88 Monarchical or regal Republics: their horfes, hounds, and vaflals, will run down- the king as they would hunt a deer, wifhing for nothing fo much as to be in at the death. The philofophical king Staniflaus felt mcfl fe- verely this want of a people. In his obfervations on the government of Poland, publifned in the the OEuvres du Fhilofophe bienfai/ant, torn. iii. he laments in very pathetic terms, the miferies to which they were reduced. *' The violences," fays he, " which the patri- " cians at Rome exercifc d over the people of that city, before they had recourfe to open force, and, by the authority of their tribunes, ba- lanced the povver of the nobility, are a ftriking pidture of the cruelty with which we treat our ^'^ plebeians. This portion of our ftate is more *' debafed among us than they were among the " Romans, whei e they enjoyed a fpecies of li- " b^rty, even in the times when they v>-ere moft '^ enOaved to the firfb order of the republic. " We may fay with truth, that the people are, " in Poiand, in a ftate of extreme humiiliation. *^ We miifl:, neverthelefs, confider them as the '* principal fupport of the nation ; and I am per- *' fuaded, that the little value we ^tt on them ^' will have very dangerous confequences. ^Who ** are they, in fail, who procure abundance ir^ "^ the kingdom ? who are they that bear the bur- '' thens and pay the taxes ? who are they that ** furnilh men to our armies ? who labour in our *^ fields ? who gather in our crops ? who fuftain '' and nourilh us ? who are the caufe of our in- '* adivity ? the refuge of our lazinefs ? the re- *' fource for our wants ? the fupport of our lux- ** ury ? and indeed the fource of all our plea- *^ fures ? Is it not that very populace that we <' treac Poland. 89 " treat with fo much rigour? Their pains, " their fwear, their labours, do not they merit " any better return than our fcorn and difdain ? '^ We fcarcely diftinguifh them from the brutes, " which they maintain for the cultivation of our ** lands ! we frequently have lefs connderarion *' for their ftrength, than we have for that of *^ thofe animals ! and too frequendy we fell them " to mafters as cruel as ourfelves, who imme- " diately force them, by an excefs of hard la- *' bour, to repay the price of their new llavefy ! *^ I cannot recollect without horror that law which *' impofes only a fine of fifteen livres upon a " gentleman who fhall have killed a peafant. *^ Poland is the only country where the populace ** are fallen from all the rights of humanity ; we *^ alone regard thefe men as creatures of another " fpecies, and we would almoft refufe them the *^ fame air which they breathe with us. God, la " the creation of man, gave him liberty'^ what " right have we to deprive him of it ? As it is *^ natural to fhake off a yoke that is rough, hard, " and heavy, may it not happen that this people *' may make an effort to wreft themfelves from " our tyranny ? Their murmurs and complaints " muff, fooner or later, lead to this. Hitherto, accuftomed to their fetters, they think not of '^ breaking them ; but Jet one fingle man arife, *f among thefe unfortunate wretches, with a maf- *' culine and daring fpirit, to concert and foment a revolt, v/hat barrier fliall we oppofe to the " torrent ? We have a recent inftance, in the " infurreclion in the Ukraine, which was only <^ occafioned by the vexations of thofe among us *' who had there purchafed lands. We defpiled * the courage of the poor inhabitants of that '' country ^o Monarchical or regal RepuhUcs* country they found a refouice in defpair, nnd nothing is more terrible than the defpair of thofe who have no courage. What is the con- dition to which we have reduced the people of our kingdom ? Reduced by niifery to the Hate of brutes, they drag out their days in a lazy ftupidity, which one would aimoil miftake for a total want of fentiment : they love no art, they value themfelvcs on no induftry ; they labour no longer than the dread of chaftifement forces them; convinced that they cannot enjoy the fiuit of their ingenuity, they ftifle their ta- lents, and make no eflays to difcover them. Hence that frightful fcarcity in which we find ourfelves of the moft common artilans ! Should we wonder that we are in want of things the moll nteceffary, when thofe who ought to fur- nifh them, cannot hope for the fmalleft profit from their cares to furniili us ! It is only where liberty is found, that emulation caa exifl." It would be a pleafure to tranilate the whole ; but it is too long. It is a pity that the whole people, whofe mifery he defcribes and laments^ were not as fenfible of the necefTity of a lefs cir- cumfcribed royal authority. LETTER Recapitulation^ ^i LETTER XXIII. RECAPITULATION. MY DEAR SIR, AS we have taken a curfory view of thofe countries in Europe, where the government may be called, in any reafonable conftruclion of the word, republican, let us now paufe a few monnents, and refleft upon what we have feen. Among every people, and in every fpecies of republics, we have conftantly found a frjl magif- trate, a head, a chief, under various denominations indeed, and with different degrees of authority, with the title of ftadtholder, burgomafter, avoyer, doge, confalloniero, prefident, fmdic, mayor, alcalde, capitaneo, governor, or king : in every nation, we have met with a diftinguiHied officer : jf there is no example in any free government, any more than in thofe which are not free, of a fociety without a principal perionage, we may fairly conclude, that the body politic cannot fub- fift without one, any more than the animal body- without a head. If M. Turgot had made any difcovery, which had clcaped the penetration of all the legiflators and philofophers who had lived before him, he ought at leaft to have communi- cated it to the world for their improvement j but as he has never hinted at any fuch invention, we may fafely conclude that he had none j and there- fore, that the Americans are not juftly liable to cenfures for infticuting govenion. 5 2 Recapitulation, In every form of government, we have feen a fenate,or little comicilj a compofition, generally, of thofe o'FiCers of ftate who have the moft experi- ence and pov/er, and a fev/ other members feleft- ed from the hightft ranks, and moft illuftrioiis reputations. On thefe leffer councils, with the firft magiftrate at their head, generally refts the princi[)al burden of adminiftration, a fhare in the leglflative, as well as executive and judicial au- thoiity of government. The admiffion of fuch fenates to a participiation of thefe three kinds of power has been generally obferved to produce in the minds of their members an ardent ariftocrati- cal ambition, grafping equally at the prerogatives of the firft magiftrate, and the privileges of the people, and ending in the nobility of a few fami- lies, and a tyrannical oligarchy : but in thofe ftates, where the fenates have been debarred fiom all executive power, and confined to the legifla- tive, they have been obferved to be firm barriers againft the encroachments of the crown, and often great fuppcrters of the liberties of the people. The Americans, then, who have carefully confined their fenates to the legillative power, have done wifely in adopting them. We have feen, in every inftance, another and a larger aflembly, compofed of the body of the people, in fome litde ftates i of reprefentatives chofen by the people in others ; of members ap- pointed by the fenates, and fuppofed to reprefent the people, in a third fort; and of perfons ap- pointed by themfelves or the fenate, in certain ariftocracies ; to prevent them from becom.ing oligarchies. The Americans, then, whofe afiem- blies are the moft adequate, proportional, and equitable reprefentations of the people, that are % knowA Recapitulation, gj Icnown in the world, will not be fthought erro- neous in appointing houfcs of reprefentatives. In every republic, in the fmalleft and moft po- pular, in the larger and more ariftocratical, as well as in the iargeft and nnoft monarchical, we have obferved a multitude of curious and inge- nious inventions to balance, in their turn, all thofe powers, to check the paflions peculiar to them, and to controul them from rufhing into thofe exorbitancies to which they are moft ad- dicted the Americans will then be no longer cenfured for endeavouring to introduce an equi- librium, which is much more profoundly medi- tated, and much more effectual for the protedion of the laws, than any we have feen, except in England : we may even queflion whether that is an exception. In every country we have found a variety of order Si with very great diftinflions. In America, there are different orders of offices, but none of men ; out of office all men are of the fame fpecies, and of one blood ; there is neither a greater nor a lefier nobility Why then are they accufed of eftabliihing different orders of men ? To our inexprefiible mortification we muft have remark- ed, that the people have preferved a fhare of power, or an exiftence in the government, in no country out of England, except upon the tops of a few inaccefTible mountains, among rocks and precipices, in territories fo narrow that you may fpan them v;ith an hand's breadth ; where, living unenvied, in extreme poverty, chiefly upon paf- turage, deftitute of manufactures and commerce, they ftill exhibit the moft charming picfture of life, and the moft dignified charadler of human nature. Wherever ^4 Rtcapltulatmt. Wherever we have fccn a territory fomcwhat larger, arts and fcicnces more cultivated, com- merce floLiriniing, or even agriculture improved to any great degree, an ariftocracy has nien up in a courfe of time, confifting of a few rich and honourable families, who have united with each other againft both the people and the firft ma- giftrate ; wrefted from the former, by art and by lorce, all their participation in the government, and even infpired them with fo mean an efleem of themfelves, and fo deep a veneration and flrong attachment to their rulers, as to believe and con- fefs them a luperior order of beings. We have feen thefe noble families, although neceflitated to have a head, extremely jealous of his influence, anxious to reduce his power, and conilrain him to as near a level with themfelves as pofTible ; always endeavouring to eftablifh a rotation by which they may all equally in turn be entitled to the pre-eminence, and equally anx- ious to preferve to themielves as large a fhare of power as poflible in the executive and ju- dicial, as well as the legiflative departments of the ftate. Thefe patrician families have alfo appeared in every inftance to be equally jealous of each other, and to have contrived, by blending lot and choice, by mixing various bodies in the elec- tions to the fame offices, and even by the horrors of an inquifition, to guard againft the fin that fo cafily befcts them, of being wholly influenced and governed by a junto or oligarchy of a few among themfelves. We have feen no one government, in which is a diftind: feparation of the legiflative from the executive power, and of the judicial from both, or Recapitulation. g^' or in which any attempt has been made to ba- lance thele powers with one another, or to form an eqiiil] brill m between the one, the few, and the many, for the purpofe of enabling and exe- cuting equallaws, by common confent, for the genera! intereft, excepting in England. Shall we conclude, from thefe melancholy ob- fervations, that human nature is incapable of li- berty, that no honeft equality can be preferred in fociety, and that fuch forcible caufes are al- ways at work as mud reduce all men to a fub- milfion to defpotifm, monarchy, oligarchy, or ariflocracy ? By no means. We have feen one of the firft nations in Europe, polTelTed of ample and fertile territories at hom.e, and extenfive dominions abroad, of a commerce with the whole world, immenfe wealth, and the greateft naval power which ever belonged to any nation, who have (till preferved the power of the people, by the equilibrium we are contending for, by the trial by jury, and by conftantly refufing a ftanding army. 1 he people of England alone, by pre- ferving their ihare of the legiflature, at the ex- pence 01 the blood of heroes and patriots, have enabled their kings to curb the nobility without giving him a ftanding army. After, all let us compare every conftitution we have feen with thofe of the United States of America, and we fnall have no reafon to blufh for our country ; on the contrary, we fhall feel the ftrongeil motives to fall upon our knees, in gratitude to heav^en for having been gracioufly pleafed to give us birth and education in that country, and for having deftined us to live under her laws ! We Ihali have reafon to exult, if we make ^$ llHapilutatton. make our comparifon with England and the Eng- lifh conftitution. Our people are undoubtedly fo- vereign all the landed and other prop-v-^rty is in the hands of the citizens not only their repre- fentatives, but their fenators and governors, are annually chofen there are no hereditary titles, honours, office'^, or diftindtions the legiflanve, executive, and judicial powers are carefully fepa- rated from each other the powers of the one, the few, and the many, are nicely balanced in their legiflatures trials by jury are preferred in all their glory, and there is no Handing army the habeas corpus is in full force the prefs is the moft free in the world and where all thefe cir- cumftances take place, it is unneceflary to addj that the laws alone can govern. LETTER Dr, Swift, 97 LETTER XXIV. ANCIENT REPUBLICS, AND OPINIONS OF PHILOSOPHERS. DR. SWIFT. MY DEAR SIR, THE authority of legiflators and philofo- phers, in fupporc of the fyftem we contend for, is not difficult to find. The greatcft lights of humanity, ancient and modern, have approved it, which renders it difficult to explain how it comes, in this enlightened age, to be called in queftion, as it certainly has been, by others as well as M. Turgot. I Ihall begin with one, who, though feldom quoted as a legillator, ap- pears to have confidered this fubjed:, and fui- nifhed arguments enough for ever to determine the queftion. Dr. Swift, in his Concefts and Diflenfions between the Nobles and Commons of Athens and Rome, obferves, that the beft legif- lators of ail ages agree in this, that the abfolute power, which originally is in the whole body, is a trurt too great to be committed to any one man or affembly : and therefore, in their k-vetal infti- tutions of government, powei* in the lalb rclort was always placed by them in balance, among the one, the few, and the many ; and it will be an eternal rule in politics, among every fiee people, that there is a balance of power to be h( Id by every ftate within itfelf. A mixed government, partaking of the known forms rectived in the Vol. I. I fchoois. og Ancient Repuhlks, &c. fchools, is by no means of Gothic invention, but hath place in nature and reafon, and feems very well to agree with tlie fentiments of mod legifla- tors ; for, not to mention the feveral republics of this compofition in Gaul and Germany, de- Icribed by Ca^far and Tacitus, Polybius tells us, the bed government: is that which confifc of three forms, regno, opirrnallum^ et populi imperio. Such was that of Sparta in its primitive inftitution by Lycurgus, who, obferving the depravations to which every one of thele was fubjed, com- pounded his fcheme out of all ; fo that it was made up o( reges, feniores, et populus. Such alfo was the Hate of Rome under its confuls j and fijch, at Carthage, was the power in the laft re- fort : they had their kings, fenate, and people. A limited and divided power feems to have been the mod ancient and inherent principle, both of the Greeks and Italians, in matters of govern- ment. The difference between the Grecian mo- narchies and Italian republics was not very great. The power of thofe Grecian princes who came to the fiege of Troy, was much of a fize with that of the kings of Sparta, the archon of Athens, the fufetes at Carthage, and the confuls at Rome. Thefeus eftablllhed at Athens rather a mixed mo- narchy dian a popular (late, afligning to himfeif the guardianfhip of the laws, and the chief com- mand in war. This inftitudon continued during the feries of kings to the death of Codrus, from whom Solon was defcended, who, finding the people engaged in two violent faflions, of the poor and the rich, and In great confufion, refu- fing the monarchy which was offered him, chofe rather to caft the government after another mo- del, wherein he made due provlfion {or fettling $hi balance of power, choofing a fenate of four hundred, Dr. Szvijt. 99 hundred, and difpcfing the- ma^-n-ncies and of- fices accoiding to men's eftatcs, lev:ving to the multitude their votes in rleLliiig, and ihe power of judging certain procefTes by appeal. This council of four hundred was chofen, one hundred out of each tribe, and feems to have been a body reprefen'ariv.: of the people, though the people collcdive rcferved a (hare of power to thena- felves. In all free ftates, the ''vil to be avoided is ty- ranny ; that is to fav, thtftrn na inperiiy or unlimit- ed power, foieiy in the hanas oi the one, the few, or the many. Though wt cannot prolong the period of a commonwealth beyond the decree of heaven, or the date of its nature, any more than human life beyond the (Irength of the feminal virtue ; yet we may manage a fickly conftitution, and preferve a ftrong one ; we miay watch, and prevent accidents j we may turn off a great blow from without, and purge away an ill humour that is lurking within ; and render a ftate long- lived, though not immortal. Some phyficians have thought, that if it were practicable to keep the feveral humours of the body in an exa6l ba- lance of each with its oppofite, it might be im- mortal ; and fo perhaps would a political body, if the balance of power could be always held ex- adtly even. All independent companies of men feem natu- rally to divide into the three powers, of the one, he few, and the many. A fee people met toge- ther, as foon as they fall inro any afts of civil fociety, do of themlclves divide into three ranks. The firft is, thar of foiiie one eminent fpirit, ^ho having fignalized his vr'oit J.nd forrune in de- fence of his country, or c^ "^^^^ pra6tiCe of po- pular arts at home, comes to have ^. :at influence I z n loo Ancient Republics ^ ^c. Oil the people ; to grow their leader in warlike expeditions ; and to pre fide, after a fort, in their civil affemblies. Tiie fecond is, of fuch men as have acquired large polTeffions, and confequently dependencies, or defcend from anceflors v;ho have left them great inheritances, together with an hereditary authority ; thefe, eafily uniting in opi- nions, and afting in concert, begin to enter upon meafures for fecuring their properties, which are beil uphe'd by preparing againft invafions from abroad, and maintaining peace at home : this commences a great council, orfenate, for the weighty affairs of the nation. The lad divifion is of the mafs of the people, whofe part of power is great and indifputable, whenever they can unite, either coUedtively or by deputation, to exert it. The true meaning of a balance of power is bed conceived by confidering what the nature of a ba- lance is. It fuppofes three things : firfl, the part which is held, together with the hand that holds it ; and then the two fcales, with whatever is weighed therein. In a (late within itfelf, the balance muft be held by a third hand, who is to deal the remaining power with the utmofb exaclnefs into the feveral fcales. The balance may be held by the weakeil, who by his addrefs, removing from either fcale, and adding his own, may keep the fcales duly poifed : when the balance is broken by mighty weights falling into either fcale, the power will never continue long in equal divifion between the two remaining parties, but, till the balance is fixed anew, will run entirely into one. This is made to appear by the examples of the Decemviri in Rome, the Ephori in Sparta, the four hundred in Athens, the thirty in Athens, and the Domi- natio Piebis in Carthage and Argos. In Dr. Swift, loi In Rome, from the time of Romulus to Julius Casfar, the commons were growing by degrees into power, gaining ground upon the patricians, inch by inch, until at laft they quite overturned the balance, leaving all doors open to popular and ambitious men, who deftroyed the wifeft republic, and enflaved the nobleft people, that ever entered on the ftage of the world. Polybius tells us, that in the fecond Punic war, the Carthaginians were declining, becaufe the balance was got too much on the fide of the people ; whereas the Romans were in their greateft vigour by the power re- maining in the fenate. The ambition of private men did by no means begin, or occafion, the war between Pompey and Caefar, though civil diffen- fions never fail to introduce and fpirit the ambi- tion of private men ; for while the balance of power is equally held, the ambition of private men, whether orators or commanders, gives neither danger nor fear, nor can poflibly enflave their country ; but that once broken, the divided par- ties are forced to unite each to its head, under whofe condu6l or fortune one fide is at firft vic- torious, and at laft both are flaves. And to put it paft difpute, that the entire fubvcrfion of Roman liberty was altogether owing to thofe meafures which had bioke the balance between the patri- cians and plebeians, whereof the ambition of pri- vate men was but the efFeft and confequence, we need only confider, that when the uncorrupted part of the fenate, by the death of Ciefar, had made one great effort to reftore their liberty, the fuccefs did not anfwer their hopes ; but that whole aflembly was fo funk in its authority, that thefe patriots were obliged to fly, and give way to the madnefs of the people, who, by their own difpofi- I 3 tionsj 102 Ancient Republics y &c. tions, (lirred up by the harangues of their ora- tors, were now wholly bent upon fingle and de- fpotic flavery ; elfe hov^ could fuch a profligate as Anthony, or a boy of eighteen like Oftavius, ever dare to J.ream of giving law to fuch an em- pire and fuch a people ? Wherein the latter fuc- ceeded, and entailed the vilefl: tyranny that Heaven in its anger ever infiidled on a corrupt and poifoned people. It is an error to think it an uncontroulable maxiai, that power is always fafer lodged in many hands than in one : for if thefe many hands be made up from one of thofe three divifions, it is plain, from the examples produced, and eafy to be paralleled in other ages and countries, that they are as capable of enflaving the nation, and of adinT; all m.anner of tyranny and oppreffion, as it is pofTible for a fingle perfon to be, though we fhouid fuppofe thei/ number not only to be four or five hundred, but three thoufand. In order to preferve a balance in a niixed ftate, the limits of power depofited with each party ought to be afccrtained and generally known : the dtfedi: of this is thecaufeof thofe ftruggies in a (late about prerogative and liberty ; about encroachments of the few upon the rights of the many, and of the many upon the privileges of the few ; which ever did, and ever will, conclude in a tyranny ; firft ei- the; of the few or the many, but at la(1:, infallibly of a. Jing/e per/on : for whichever of the three di- vifions in a Itdce is upon the fcramble for more pwwer than its own, as one of the three generally is (unlcis due care b^ t :ken by the other two) -, upon eve.y new quellion that arifes, they will be lure to decide in favour of themf-lves; they will make large demands, and fcanty conccfiionsj ever com- 3 ' i"g Dr, Swift. 103 ing off confiderable gainers j thus at length the balance is broke, and tyranny let in^ from which door of the three it matters not. The defires of men are not only exorbitant, but endJefs : they grafp at all, and can form nO fcheme of perfect happinefs with lefs. Ever fince men have been formed into governments, the en- deavours after univerfal monarchy have been bandied among them : the Athenians, the Spar- tans, the Thebans, and the Achaians, feveral times aimed at the univerfal dominion of Greece : the commonwealths of Carthage and Rome :iffe6b- ed the univerfal empire of the world : in like manner has abfolute power been purfucd by the feveral powers in each particular ftate, wherein fingle perfons have met with moft fuccefs, though the endeavours of the few and the many have been frequent enough -, yet, being neither fo uni- form in their defigns, nor fo direct in their views, they neither could manage nor maintain the power they had got, but were deceived by the popular ambition of fome fingle perfon : fo that it will be always a wrong llcp in policy, for the nobles or commons to carry their endeavours after power fo far as to overthrow the balance. With all refpedl for popular affemblies be it fpoken, it is hard to recolledt one folly, infirmity, or vice, to which a fingle man is fubjeft, and from which a body of commons, either colledive Or reprefented, can be wholly exempt ; from whence it comes to pafs, that in their refults have fometimes been found the fame fpirit of cruelty and revenge, of malice and pride ; the fame blind- nefs, and obftinacy, and unfteadinefs ; the fame ungovernable rage and anger ; the fame injuftice, fophiftry, and fraud, that ever lodged in the breail of any individual. . When a child grows cafy by 1 4 being I 4 jintient Republics, &c. being humoured, and a lover fatisfied by fmall comj-sliances v/ithout further purfuits, then expedl poj ular aflt-mblies to be content with fmall con- ccliions. If there could one fingle example be bi ought from the whole compafs of hiftory, of any one popular aHeinb y who, after bt-ginning to com end for ]x>wer, ever lat down quietly with a cert:^in ihare; or of one that ever knew^ or pro- pofed, or dtrciared, what fhare of power was their due, tht n might there be fome hopes, that it was a n^atter to be adjufted by reafonings, confe- rences, or debates. An ufurping populace is its own dupe, a mere under worker, and a purchafer in truft for fome fingle tyrant, whofe Hate and power thy advance to their own ruin, with as blind an inflind, as thofe worms that die with weaving magnificent habits for beings of a fupe- rior order. The people are more dexterous at pulling down and fetting up, than at preferving what is fixed ; and they are not fonder of feizing more than their own, than they are of delivering it up again to the worft bidder, with their own into the bargain. Their earthly devotion is fel- dom paid to above one at a time, of their own creation, whofe oar they pull with lefs murmuring and more fkill, than when they ihare the leading, or even hold the helm. You will perceive by the ftyle, that it is Dr. Swift that has been fpeakingj otherwife you might have been deceived, and imagined that I was entertaining you with further reflediions upon the (hort account previoufly given you in thcfe letters, of the modern republics. There is not an obfervation here that is not juftified by the hiftory of every government we have confider- ed. How much more maturely had this writer weighed the fubjed than M. Turgot Perhaps there Dr. FranUin. 105 there is not to be found, in any library, fo many accurate ideas of government exprefled with lb much perfpicuity, brevity, and precifion. LETTER XXV. DR. FRANKLIN. MY DEAR SIR, AS it is impoflible to fuppofe that M. Turgoc intended to recommend to the Americans a fimple monarchy or ariftocracy, we have admit- ted, as a fuppofition the moft favourable to him, that, by coileding all authority into one center, he meanc a fingle aflembly of reprefentatives of the people, without a governor, and without a fenate ; and although he has not explained, whe- ther he would have the affembly chofen for life, or years, we will nga-n admit, as the moft benign conftruftiottj that he meant the reprefentatives fliould be annually chofen. Here we fhali be obliged to confider the re- puted opinion of another philofopher, I mean Dr. Franklin : I fay reputed, becaufe I am not able to affirm that it is really his : it is^ however, fo gene- rally underftood and reported, both in Europe and America, that his judgement was in oppofi- tion to two aflemblies, and in favour of a fingle one, that in a difquifuion like this it ought not to be omitted. To be candid with you, a little be- fore the date of M. Turgot's letter. Dr. Franklin had arrived in Paris with the American conftitu- tions, and among the reft that of Pennfylvania, in which 1 o6 Ancient Republics ^ &c. which there was but one alTembly : it was report- ed too, that the doftor had prefidcd in the con- vention when it was made, and there approved it. M. Turgor, reading over the conflitutions, and adnniring that of Pcnnlylvania, was led to cenfure the reft, which were fo different frona it. I know of no other evidence, that the do6lor ever gave his voice for a fingle afTembly, but the com- mon anecdote which is known to every body. It isfaid, that in 1776, in the convention of Penn- fylvania, of which the dodor was prefident, a prcjcdl of a form of government by one affembly was before them in debate: a motion was made to add another alTembly under the name of a fenate or council ; this motion was argued by feveral members, fome for the affirmative, and fome for the negative ; and before the queftion was put the opinion of the prefident was requefted : the prefident rofe, and faid, that " Two afiemblies " appeared to him, like a praftice he had fome- *' where feen, of certain waggoners who, whers " about to defcend a fteep hill with a heavy load, *' if they had four cattle, took off one pair from *^ before, and chaining them to the hinder part " of the waggon, drove them up hill ; while the " pair before, and the weight of the load, over- ** balancing the ftrength of thofe behind, drew " them flov/ly and moderately down the hill." The prefident of Pennfylvania might, upon fuch an occafion, have recoilefted one of Sir liaac Newton's laws of motion, viz. ^' that re-ai5tion *' muft always be equal and contrary to action,'* or there can never be any reji. He might have alluded to thofe angry aftemblies in the heavens, which (o often overfpread the city of Philadelphia, fill the citizens with apprchenfion and terror, threatening to fct the world on fire, merely be- caufe Dr. Franklin, 107 caufe the powers within them are not fiijfRciently balanced. He might have recolledcd, that a pointed rod> a machine as fimple as a waggoner, or a monarch, or a governor, would be fufficient at any time, filently and innocently, to difarm thofe affemblies of all their terrors, by reftoring between them the balance of the powerful fluid, and thus prevent the danger and deflrutTlion to the properties and lives of men, which often hap- pen for the want of it. However, allufions and illuftrations drawn from paftoral and rural life are never difagreeable, and in this cafe might be as appofite as if they had been taken from the fciences and the fl<:ies. Harrington, if he had been prefent in convention, would have exclaimed, as he did when he men- tioned his two girls dividing and choofing a cake ; " Oh! the depth of the wifdom of God, which in the fimple invention of a carter, has revealed to mankind the whole myfl:ery of a commonwealth; which confifts as much in dividing and equalizing forces ; in controuling the weight of the load and the acTtivity of one part, by the rtrength of another, as it does in dividing and choofing." Harrington too, inftead of his children dividing and choofing their cake, might have alluded to thofe attrac- tions and repulfions by which the balance of nature is preferved : or to thofe centripetal and centrifugal forces by which the heavenly bodies are continued in their orbits, inftead of rufliing to the fun, or flying off in tangents among co- mets and fixed ftars : impelled, or drawn by dif- ferent forces in difi^erent direftion:], they are bief- lings to their own inhabitants and the neighbour- ing fyfliems ; but if thi y were drawn only by one, they would introduce anarchy wherever they fhould go. There is no objection to fuch allu- loS Ancient Republics, &c. fions, whether fimple or fublime, as they may amufe the fancy and illuftrate an argument:, all that is infifted on is, that whatever there is in them of wit or argument, is all in favour of a complica- tion of fo'ces, of more powers than one ; of three powers indeed, becaufe a balance can never be eftabliflied between two orders in fociety, without a third to aid the weakefl. All thr.t is furprifmg here is^ that the real force of the fi:nile fhould have been mifunderflood : if there is any fimilirude, or any argument in it, it is clearly in favour of two aiTemblies. The weight of the load itfelf would roll the waggon on the oxen, and the cattle on one another, in one fcene of deftrudion, if the forces were not djvKled and the balance formed , whereas by checking one power by another, all defcend the hill in fafe- ty, and avoid the danger. It ihould be remem- bered too, that it is only in defcending uncommon declivities that this divifion of ftrength becomes neceflary. In travelling in ordinary plains, and always in afcending mountains, the whole team draws together, and advances failer as v/ell as eafier on its journey : it is alio certain, there are oftener arduous fteeps to mount, which require the united ftrength of all, with all the fldll of the dircdor, than there are precipices to defcend, which demand a divifion of it. Let us now return to M. Turgot's idea of a government confifting in a fingle aiTembly. He tells us, our republics are ** founded on the equa- " lity of all the citizens, and therefore " orders" '^ and " equihbriums" are unneceflary, and occa- '^ fion difputes." But what are we to underfliand here by equality ? Are the citizens to be all of the fame age, fex, fize, ftrength, ftature, adivity, courage, hardinefs, induftjy, patience, ingenu- ity. Dr, Franklin, 109 Jty, wealth, knowledge, fame, wit, temperance, conftancY, and wifdom ? Was there, or will there ver be, a nation, whofe individuals were all equal in natural and acquired qualities, in virtues, ta- kntSj and riches ? The anfwer of all mankind muft be in the negative. It mufl then be ac- knowledged, that in every ftate, in the Maflachu- fetts for example, there are inequalities which God and nature have planted there, and which no human legiflator ever can eradicate. I ihould have chofen to have mentioned Virginia, as the mod ancient (late, or indeed any other in the union, rather than the one that gave me birth, if I were not afraid of putting fuppofitions which may give offence, a liberty which my neighbours will pardon : yet I lliall fay nothing that is not applicable to all the other twelve. In this fociety of MafTachufettenfions, then, there is, it is true, a moral and political equa- lity of rights and duties among all the individu- als, and as yet no appearance of artificial ine- qualities of condition, fuch as hereditary digni- ties, titles, magiftracies, or legal diftindions j and no eftabliflied marks, as ftars, garters, croiles, or ribbons : there are, neverthelefs, inequalities of great moment in the confideration of a legiflator, becaufe they have a natural and inevitable influ- ence in fociety. Let us enumerate fome of them: I, There is an inequality of wealth : fome indivi- duals, whether by defcent from their anceftors, or from greater fkill, induftry, and fuccefs in bufinefs, have eftates both in lands and goods of great value ; others have no property at all j and all the reft of the fociety, much the greater num- ber, are poflefTcd of wealth, in all the variety of degrees, between thefe extremes : it will eafily be conceived, that all the rich men will have many of 1 10 Ancient Republics, ^c. of the poor, in the various trades, manufa6lures, and other occupations in life, dependent upon them for their daily bread : many of fmaller for- tunes will be in their debr, and in many ways under obligations to them : others, in better cir- curnftances, neither dependent nor in debt, men of letters, men of the learned profeffions, and others, from acquaintance, converfation, and civi- lities, will he conneted with them, and attached to them. Nay farther, it will not be denied, that among the wifeft people that lives, there is a degree of admiration, abftradled from all depen- dence, obligation, expedlation, or even acquaint- ance, which accompanies fplendid wealth, en- fures fome refpedl:, and beftows fome influence. 2. Birth. Let no man be furprifed, that this fpecies of inequality is introduced here. L.et the page in hiilory be quoted, where any nation, an- cient or modern, civilized or favage, is men- tioned, among whom no difference vi/as made be- tween the citizens on account of their extraction. The truth is, that more influence is allowed to this advantage in free republics, than in defpo- tic governments, or than would be allowed to it in fimple monarchies, if fevere laws had not been made from age to age to fecure it. The children of iiluftrious famJiies have generally greater ad- vantages of education, and earlier opportunities to be acquainted with public characters, and in- formed of public affairs, than thofe of meaner ones, or even than thofe in middle life; and what is more than all, an habitual national veneration for their names, and the characters of their ancef- tors defcribed in hiftory, or coming down by tra- dition, removes them farther from vulgar jealoufy and popular envy, and fecures them in fome de- gree the favour, the affeftion, and refped of the public. Dr. Franklin, iii public. Will any man pretend that the name of Androfs, and that of Winthrop, are heard with the fame fenfations in any village of New Eng- land ? Is not gratitude the fentiment that attends the latter, and difguft the feeling excited by the former ? In the MaflachufettSj then, there are per- fons defcended from fome of their ancient gover- nors, counfellorSj judges, whofe fathers, grandfa- thers and great grandfathers, are remembered with efteem by many livings and who are mentioned in hiftory with applaufe, as benefadbors to the coun- try, while there are others who have no fuch ad- vantage. May we go a ftep farther Know thy- felf is as ufeful a precept to nations as to rnen* Go into every village in New England, and you will find that the office of juftice of the peace, and even the place of reprelentative, which has ever depended only on the (rte.^ eleftion of the people, have generally deicended from generation to generation, in three or four families at moil. The prefent fubjedt is one of thofe which all men refpedb, and all men deride. It may be faid of this part of our nature, as Pope faid of the whole : Of human nature, wit her word may write, We all revere it in our own defpight. If, as Harrington fays, the ten commandments were voted by the people of Ifrael, and have been enafted as laws by all other nations j and if we fliould prefume to fay, that nations had a civil right to repeal them, no nation would think proper to repeal the fifth, which enjoins honour to parents : if there is a difrerence between right ;ind wrong j if any thing can be facred i if there is 1 1 2 Ancient Republics, ic, is one idea of moral obligation j the decree of nature muft force upon every thinking being, and upon every feeling heart, the conviftion that ho- nour, affedlion, and gratitude are due from chil- dren, to thofe who gave them birth, nurture, and education. The fentiments and affeftions which naturally arife, from refleding on the love, the cares, and the bleffings of parents, abftraded from the confideration of duty, are fome of the moft forcible and moft univerfaJ. When reli- gion, law, morals, affedlion, and even fafhion, thus confpire to fill every mind with attachment to parents, and to ftamp deep upon the heart their impreflions, is it to be expelled that men fhould reverence their parents while they live, and begin to defpife or neglcfl their memories as foon as they are dead ? This is in narure impoffible j on the contrary, every little uhkindnefs aiid frverity is forgotten, and nothing but endearments re- membered with pleafure. The fon of a wife and virtuous father finds the world about him rometi."n.b as much difpofed as he himfelf is, to honour the memory of his father ; to congratulate him as the fuccefTor to his eitatCi and frequently, to compliment him with elec- tions to the offices he held. Afenfe of duty, his paffions and his interefl", thus confpiring to pre- vail upon him to avail himfelf of this advantage, he finds a few others in fimilar circumftances with himfclfj they naturally alTociate together, and aid each other. This is a faint Iketch of the fource and rile ot the family fpirit : very often the difpofition to favour the family is as ftrong, in the town, county, province, or kingdom, as it is in the houfe itfelf. The enthufiafm is indeed fometimes wilder, and carries away, like a tor- rent, all before it. Thefe Dr. Franklin. 113 Thefe obfervations are not peculiar to any age; ^ve have feen the effccTts of thenn in St. Marino, Bifcay, and the Grifcns, as well as in Poland, and all other countries. Not to mention any notable examples, which have lately happened near us, it is not many months fince 1 was witnefs to a converfation between fome citizens of MafTa- chufett's: one was haranguing on the jealoufy which a free people ought to entertain of their liberties, and was heard by all the company with pleafure ; in lefs than ten minutes the converfa- tion turned upon their governor j and the jealous republican was very angry at the oppofition to him : ** The prefent governor,", fays he, " has " done us fuch fervices, that he ought to rule " us, he and his pofterity after him for ever and '^ ever." Where is your jealoufy of liberty ? demanded the other. " Upon my honour," replies the orator, " I had forgot that; you have caught " me in an inconfiilency ; for I cannot know '^ whether a child of five years old will be a fon ^' of liberty or a tyrant." His jealoufy was the didate of his underflanding ; his confidence and enthufiafm the impulfe of his heart. The pompous trumpery of enfigns, armorials, and efcutcheons, are nor indeed far advanced ia America. Yet there is a more general anxiety to know their originals, in proportion to their num- bers, than in any nation of Europe; arifing from the eafier circumftances and higher fpirics of the common people: and there are certain families in every ftate, as attentive to all the proud frivoli- ties of heraldry. That kind of pride which looks down on commerce and manufa6tures as degrad- ing, may, indeed, in many countries of Europe, be a ufcful and neceflary quality in the nobiiity : it may prevent, in fome degree, the Wxhole nation Vol. I. K from T 14 Ancient RepuhUa. from being delivered up entirely to the fpirit of avarice : it may be the caufe, why honour is pre- ferred by fome to money : it may prevent the nobility from becoming too rich, and acquiring too large a proportion of the landed property. In America, it would not only be mifchievous, but would expofe the higheft pretenfions of the kind to univerfal ridicule and contempt. Thofe other hauteurs, of keeping the commons at a diftance, and difdaining to converfe with any but a few of a certain race, may, in Europe, be a favour to the people, by relieving them from a multitude of afllduous attentions and humiliating compliances, which would be troublefome; it may prevent the nobles from caballing with the people, and gain- ing too much influence with them in ele61:ions and otherwife. In America, it would juftly excite univerfal indignation ; the vaineft of all muft be of the people, or be nothing. While every office is equally open to every competitor, and the people mull decide upon every pretenfion to a place in the legiflature, that of governor and fe- nator, as well as reprefentative, no fuch airs will ever be endured. It muft be acknowledged ftill, that fome men muft take more pains to defervc and acquire an office than others, and muft behave better in it, or they will not hold it. We cannot prefume that a man is good or bad, merely becaufe his father was one or the other i and fliould always inform ourfelves firft, whether the virtues and talents are inherited, before we yield our confidence. Wife men beget fools, and honeft men knaves > but thefe inftances, al- though they may be frequent, are not general. If there is often a likenefs in feature and figure, there is generally more in mind and heart, becaufe education contributes to the formation of thefe as well Dr. Franklin, 115 well as nature. The influence of example is very great, and almoft univerfal, efpecially of parents over their children. In all countries it has been obferved, that vices, as well as virtues, run down in families, very often, from age to age. Any man may run over in his thoughts the circle of his acquaintance, and he will probably recolleft in- ftances of a difpofition to mifchief, malice, and revenge, defcending, in certain breeds, from grand- father to father and fon. A young woman was lately convifted at Paris of a trifling theft, barely within the law, which decreed a capital punifh- ment. There were circumftances, too, which greatly alleviated her fault -, {bme things in her behaviour that feemed innocent and modeft: every Ipedator, as well as the judges, was affefted at the fcene, and fhe was advifed to petition for a pardon, as there was no doubt it would be grant- ed. *' No," fays {he, " my grandfather, father, ** and brother, were all hanged for flealing j it " runs in the blood of our family to Ileal, and " be hanged ; if I am pardoned now, I fliall Ileal " again in a few months more inexcufeably : and *' therefore I will be hanged now." An hereditary paflion for the halter is a ftrong inftance, to be fure, and cannot be very common : but fome- thing like it too often defcends, in certain breeds, from generation to generation. If vice and infamy are thus rendered lefs odi- ous, by being familiar in a family, by the ex- ample of parents, and by education, it would be as unhappy as unaccountable, if virtue and ho- nour were not recommended and rendered more amiable to children by the fame means. There are, and always have been, in every flate, numbers pofTcflcd of fome degree of family pride, who have been invariably encouraged, if not flat- K 2 tsred X 1 6 Jurigftt Repuhlics, ^e. tered in it, by the people. Thefe have mod ac- quaintance, efteem, and friendfhip, with each other, and mutually aid each other's fchemes of intereft", convenience, and ambition. Fortune, it is true, has more influence than birth ; a rich man of an ordinary family, and common decorum of condud:, may have greater weight than any family merit commonly confers without it. 3. It will be readily admitted, there are great ine- qualities of merit, or talents, virtues, ferviceSj and, what is of more moment, very often of repu- tation. Some, in a long courfe of fervice in an army, have devoted their time, health, and for- tunes, fignalized their courage and addrefs, ex- pofed themfelves to hardfliips and dangers, loft their limbs, and fhed their blood, for the people. Others have difplayed their wifdom, learning, and eloquence in council, and in various other ways acquired the confidence and affeftion of their fel- low citizens, to fuch a degree, that the public have fettled into a kind of habit of following their example, and taking their advice. 4. There arc a few, in whom all thefe advantages of birth, for- tune, and fame are united. Thefe fources of inequality, which are com- mon to every people, and can never be altered by any, becaufe they are founded in the conftitution of nature; this natural ariflocracy among mankind, has been dilated on, becaufe it is a fa6t elTential to be confidered in the inftitution of a govern- ment. It is a body of men which contains the greateft coUedlion of virtues and abilities in a free government ; it is the brighteft ornament and glory of the nation ; and may always be made the greateft blcffing of fociety, if it be judicioufly managed in the conftitution ; but if it is not, it u always the moft dangerous; nay, it may be added. Dr, Franklin. 117 added, it never ails to be the defliu6lion of the commonwfahh. What fhall be done to guard againft it ? Shall they be all maiTacred ? This ex- periment has been more than once attempted, and once at leaft tried. Guy Faux attempted it in England ; and a king of Denmark, aided by a popular party, efFeded it once in Sweden ; but it anfwered no good end. The moment they were dead, another ariftocracy inftantly arofe, with equal art and influence, with lefs delicacy and dif- cretion, if not principle, and behaved more in- tolerably than the former. The country, for centuries, never recovered from the ruinous con- fequences of a deed fo horrible, that one would think it only to be met with in the hiftory of the kingdom of darknefs. There is but one expedient yet difcovered, to avail the fociety of all the benefits from this body of men, which they are capable of affording, and at the fame time to prevent them from under- mining or invading the public liberty -, and that is, to throw them ail, or at leaft the m.oft re- markable of them, into one aff^mbly together, in the legiflature ; to keep all the executive power encirely out of their hands as a body ; to eredl a firft magiftrate over them, invefted with the whole executive authority ; to make them dependent on that executive mag flrate for all public executive employments j to give that firft magiftrate a ne^ gaciveon the legiflature, by which he may defend both himfelf and the people from all their enter- prizes in the legiflature i and to ereft on the other fide of them an impregnable barrier againft them, in a houfe of commons, fairly, fully, and ade- quately reprefenting the people, who ftiall have the powei both of negativing all their attempts at encroachments in the legiflature, and of with- ^lolding both from them and the crown all fup- K 3 plies. ii8 Ancient Republics , &c. plies, by which they may be paid for their ferviccs in executive offices, or even the public fervicc carried on to the detriment of the nation. We have feen, both by reafoning and in ex- perience, what kind of equality is to be found or expefled in the fimpkft people in the world. There is not a city nor a village, any more than a kingdom or commonwealth, in Europe or Ame- rica ; not a hord, clan, or tribe, among the ne- groes of Africa, or the favages of North or South America; nor a private club in the world, in which fuch inequalities are not more or lefs vifi- ble. There is, then, a certain degree of weight in the public opinion and deliberations, which property, family, and merit will have: if M. Turgot had difcovered a mode of afcertaining the quantity which they ought to have, and had re- vealed it to mankind, fo that it might be known to every citizen, he would have defer ved more of their gratitude than all the inventions of philo- fophers. But, as long as human nature fhall have paffions and imagination, there is too much rea- fon to fear that thefe advantages, in many inftanceSj will have more influence than reafon and equity can jullify. Let us then refled, how the fingle affembly in the MafTachufett's, in which our great ftatefman wifhes all authority concentered, will be com- pofed. There being no fenate nor council, all the rich, the honourable, and meritorious, will ftand candidates for feats in the houfe of reprefentatives, and nineteen in twenty of them obtain eledions. The houfe will be found to. have all the inequali- ties in it, thgt prevailed among the people at large. Such an affembly will be naturally divided into three parts. The firft is, of fome great genius, fome mafterly fpirit, who unites in himfelf all th Dr. Franklin. ii^ the qualities which conftitute the natural founda- tions of authority ; fuch as benevolence, wifdom, and power ; and ail the adventitious attradlions of refpeftj fuch as riches, anceftry, and perfonal merit. All eyes are turned upon him for their prefident or fpeaker. The fecond divifion com- prehends a third, or a quarter, or, if you will, a fixth or an eighth of the whole ; and confifts of thofe who have the mod to boaft of refembling their head. In the third clafs are all the reft, who are nearly on a level in underftanding, and in all things. Such an aflembly has in it, not only all the perfons of the nation who are moft eminent for parts and virtues, but all thofe who are moft inflamed with ambition and avarice, and who are moft vain of their defcent. Thefe latter will, of courfe, conftantly endeavour to increafe their own influence, by exaggerating all the attri- butes they poflefs, and by augmenting them in every way they can think of; and will have friends, whole only chance for rifing into public view will be under their proteflion, who will even be more aflive and zealous than themfelves in their fervice. Notwithftanding all the equality that can ever be hoped for among men, it is eafy to fee that the third clafs will, in general, be but humble imitators and followers of the fecond. Every man in the fecond clafs will have con- stantly about him a circle of members of the third, who will be his admirers ; perhaps afraid of his influence in the diftrifls they reprefent, related to him by blood, connedled with him in trade, or dependent upon him for favours. There will be much envy too, among individuals of the fecond glafs, againft the fpeaker, although a fmcere veneration is ftiewn him by the majority, ^nd great external refped by all, 1 f?,id there JC 4 would I20 Anctent Republics, &c. would be envy; becaiife, there will be, among the fecond clafs, fevcral, whole forrunes, flinii'ies, and merits, in the acknowledged jud<:ement of all, ap- proach near to the firft ; and, from the ordinary ilkifions of felf-'ove and ftlf interefi", they and their friends will be much difpofed to claim the firft place as their own right. This will introduce controverfy and debate, as well as emulation ; and thofe who wifli for the fiift place, and cannot ob- tain it, will of, courfe, endeavour to keep down the fpeaker as near upon a level with themfelves as poffible, by paring away the dignity and im- portance of his office, as we fav/ in Venice, Poland^ and every where elfe. A fingle affcMTibly thus conftituted, without any counterpoife, balance, or equilibrium, is to have all authority, legiflative, executive, and judicial, concentered in it. It is to m.ake a conftitution and laws by its own will, execute thofe laws at its pleafure, and adjudge all controverfies that arife concerning the meaning and application of theiTi, at difcretion. What is there to reftrain them from making tyrannical laws, in order to execute them in a tyrannical manner ? Will it be pretended, that the jealoufy and vigilance of the people, and their power to difcard them at the next cleftion, will reftrain them ? Even this idea fuppofes a balance, an equili- brium, which M. I'urgot holds in fo much con- temr)"; it fupf^ofes the people at large to be a check and contioul to the reprefentative affembly, B'-iLt'^iis won ,1 be fourd a mere delufion. A jea- loufy between, the electors and the elected neither ought t) ex ill, nor is poffible to exift. It is a contrad.dion to fuppo!e, that a body of eledors fhouid have at one moaient a wariii affe6t!on and entire confidence in a man, lb as to incruft him with Dr. Frice, 121 with authority, limited or unlimited, over their lives and fortunes; and, the next momient after his eledion, to commence a fufpicion of him,that fhall piompt them to watch all his words, a6lions, and rnotions, and difpoie them to renounce and punifh him. They choofe him, indeed, becaufe they think he knows more, and is better difpofedj, than the gcneralicy, and even than themfelves very often. Indeed the heft ufe of a reprefenta- tive afiembly arifes from the cordial affedion and unreferved confidence which fubfifts between it and the colle{5live body of the people. It is by fuch a kind and candid intercourfe alone, that the wants and defires of the people can be made known, on the one hand, or the necc-lliries of the public communicated or reconciled to them, on the other. In what did fuch a confidence in one affembly end, in Venice, Geneva, Bifcay, Poland, but an ariftocracy, and an oligarchy ? There is no fpecial providence for Americans^ and their natures are the fame with others. LETTER XXVL DR. PRICE. DEAR SIR, TO demonftrate the necefTity of two afTem- blies in the legiflature, as well as of a third branch in it, to defend the executive authority, it may be laid down as a fiift principle, that neither liberty nor juftice can be f;cured to the individuals of a nation, nor its profperity pro- moted. 122 Jnctent Republics y 6T that the man fees nothing in the v/orld of im- portance to others, or himfelf, but in his objed:. The fubtiity of thefe thr^ paffions, which have been fele6ted from all the others becaufe rhey are ariflocratical paffions, in fubduing all others. Vol. I. L an4 I JO Attclent Republics, ^c* and even the underfl:anding itfelf, if not the cort- icience too, until they become abfokite and im- perious mafters of the whole mind, is a curioirs fpecLilation. The cunning with which they hide themielves from others, and from the man him- i'di' too ; the patience with which they wait for opportunities ; the torments they voluntarily fuf- ier for a time, to fecure a full enjoyment at jength ; the inventions, the difcoveries, the con- trivances they fuggeft to the underflanding, fome- tim.es in the dullell dunces in the world, if they could be defcribed in writing, would pafs for great genius. We are not enough acquainted with the phy- fical or m.etaphyfical effedts they may have on our bodies or minds, to be able to explain the particular reafon why every inftance of indulgence ftrengthens and confirms the fubfcquent emo- tions of defire. The caufe has been hitherto too deep, remote, and fubtle, for the fearch of cor- poreal or intelledual microfcopes j but the fad is too decided to deceive or efcape our obfer- vation. Men fliould endeavour at a balance of affections and appetites, under the monarchy of jeafon and confcience, within, as well as at a ba- lance of power without. If they furrender the guidance, for any courfe of time, to any one paf- fion, they may depend upon finding it, in the end, an ulurping, dom.ineering, cruel tyrant. They were intended by nature to live together in focie- ty, and in this way to reftrain one another, and in general are very good kind of creatures j but they know each other's imbecility fo well, that they ought never to lead one another into temp- tation. The paflion that is long indulged, and continually gratified, becomes mad 3 it is a fpe- *... cies Dr. Price, 131 ties of delirium j it fhould not be called guilt, but infanity ; but who would truft his life, liber- ty, and property, to a madman, or an aflembly of them ? it would be fafer to confide in knaves. Five hundred or five thoufand together, in an af- lembly, are not lefs liable to this extravagance than one. The nation that commits its aff'airs to a fingle afTembly, will affuredly find that its paf- lions and defires augment as fail as thofe of a king ; and therefore fuch a conftitution miift be eflenti- ally defedlive.. Others have feen this quality in human nature through a more gloomy medium^ Machiavel fays, thofe who have written on ci- vil government lay it down as a firft principle, and all hiftorians demonftrate the fame, that who- ever would found a ftate, and make proper laws for the government of it, mud prefume that all men are bad by nature ; and that they will not fail to fhew that natural depravity of heart, whenever they have a fair opportunity ; and, though poffibly it may lie concealed for a while, on account of fome fecret reafon, which does not then appear to men of fmall experience, yet time, which is therefore juftly called the father of truth, commonly brings it to light in the end. Ma- chiavel's tranflator remarks, that although this feems a harfli fuppofition, does not every Chrif- tian daily juftify the truth of ir, by confeffing it before God and the world ? and are we not ex- prefsly told the fame in feveral pafTages of the holy fcriptures, and in all fyftems of human phi- lofophy ? Montefquieu fays, " Conftant experience fhev?s " us, that every man invefted with power is apt " to abufe it : he pufiies on, till he corner to *^ fonicdiing that limits him. U it not ilrange, L 2 *' thouRh J 22 Ancient RepuhlkSj i^c. though true, to fay, that virtue itfelf has need of limits ? to prevent the abale of power, it is necel- fary, that, by the very difpofition of things, power fnould be a check to power. A government may be iO conftituted, as no man fnali be compelled to do things to which the law does not oblige him, nor forced to abftain from things which the law permits'. Swift. So endlefs and exorbitant are the defires of men, that they will grafp at all, and can form no fcheme of perfect happinefs with lefs* It is hard to recolleft one folly, infirmity^ or vice, to which a fingle m and commons, which they looked upon as more firm and liable, becaufe every one of thefe mem- bers would be a check upon the other ; and of thofe legiflators, Lycurgus certainly merits the higheft praife, who conflituted an eftablirnment of this kind at Sparta, which lafted about eight hun** dred years, to his own great honour, as well as the tranquillity of the citizens. Very different was the fate of the government eftabiiflied by Solon at Athens, which, being Jt fimple democracy only, was of \o fiiort continu- ance, that it gave way to the tyranny of Pififtra- tus before the death of the legiflator: and though, indeed, the heirs of that tyrant were ex- pelled about forty years after, and the Athenians not only recovered their liberty, but re-eiiablifh- Vol.' I. M ed 146 Mixed Governnienis. ed Solon's laws and plan of government, yet titby did not maintain it above one hundred years, not- withftanding they made feveral new regulations to retrain the infolence of the nobles, and the licentioufnefs of the commons ; the necefTity of which Solon had not forefeen : fo that for want of tempering his democracy with a fhare of ariftocracy and princely power, it was of Ihort duration in comparifon of the conftitution of Sparta. But to return to Rome. Though that city had not a Lycurgus to model its conftitution at firft, in fuch a manner as might prefervc its liberty for a long courfe of time, yet fo many were the accidents which happened in the contefts betwixt the patricians and plebeians, that chance ef- fected what the lawgiver had not provided for : fo that if it was not perfed at the beginning, it became fo after a while ; for though the firft laws were deficient, yet they were neither incapable of am.endment, nor repugnant to its future perfec- tion ; fince not only Romulus, but all the reft of the kings that fucceeded him, made feveral good alterations in them, and fuch as were well calcu- jiited for the fupport of liberty. But, as it was their intention to found a monarchy, and not a republic, when that city had fhaken off the yoke of a tyrant, there feemed to be many provifions ftill warning for the further maintenance of its freedom. And notwithftanding tyranny was at laft eradicated by the ways and means above- mentioned yet thofe who had chiefly contributed to it, created two confuls to fupply the place of royalty; by which it came to pafs, that the name alone, and not the authority of princes, was ex- tinguiftied : fo that the fupreme power being lodged only in the confuls and fenate, the govern- i.. liienC Machiavei. 147 iY^en't confifted of no more than two of the three tftates,, which we have fpoken of btfore, that is, of royalty and ariftocracy j it rennained, therefore, ftill necelTary to admit the people into fome Ihare of the government : and the patricians growing fo infolent in time (as I fhall iliew hereafter) that the plebeians could no longer endure it, the lat- ter took arms, and obliged them to relinquifh part of their authority, left they Ihould lofe the whole : on the other hand, the confuls and fena- tors ftill retained fo much power in the common- wealth, as enabled them to fupport their rank and dignity with honour. This ftruggle gave birth to certain officers, called tribunes of the peo- ple ; after the creation of whom, the ftate be- came more firm and compa6l", every one of the three degrees abovementionc-d having its proper fliare in the government ; and fo propitious was fortune to it, that although it was changed from a monarchy into an ariftocracy, and afterwards into a democracy, by the fteps and for the reafons already affigned, yet the royal power was never entirely abolifhed and given to the patricians, nor that of the patricians wholly to the plebeians: on the contrary, die authority of the three eftates be- ing duly proportioned and mixed together, gave it the higheft degree of perfeftion that any com- monwealth is capable of attaining to,- and this was owing in a great meafure, if not altogether, to the dilfenfions that happened betwixt the patri- cians and plebeians, as fhall be fliewn more at large in the following chapters. Ma LETTEH 1 48 Mixed or compojed Governments* LETTER XXVir. MIXED OR COMPOSED GOVERN- MENTS. SIDNEY, PAGE 22, . 10, DEAR SIR, SOME fmall numbers of men, living within the precincls of one city, have, as it were,- caft into a common flock, the right which they had of governing themfelves and children, and, by common conlent, joining in one body, exercifed fuch power over every fingle perfon as feemed beneficial to the whole ; and this men call perfed: democracy. Others chofe rather to be governed by a feleft number of fuch as mofl excelled in wifdom and virtue ; and this, according to the Iignification of the word, was called ariilocracy. V/hen one man excelled all others, the govern- ment was put into his hands under the name of monarchy. But the wifeft, belt, and by far the greatell part of mankind, rejefting thefe fimple fpecies, did form governments mixed or compofed of the three, as fnall be proved hereafter, which commonly received their refpeclive denomination fi"om the part that prevailed, and did receive praife or blame, as they were well or ill-proportioned. Sidney, p. 13S. . 16.- The befl governments of the world have been compofed of monarchy^ ariftocracy, and democracy. As for democracy, I believe it can ftiit only with the convenience of a fmall town, accom- panied widi fucli circumflances as are feldom found. Sidney. - 149 fburrd. But this no way obliges men to run into the other extrenne, in as much as the variety of forms, between m.ere democracy and abfolute mo- narchy, is ahrioft infinite. And if I fliould under- take to fay, there never was a good government in the world, that did not confifl: of the three fimple fpecies of monarchy, ariftocracy, and demo- cracy, I think I may make it good. This, at the leaft, is certain, that the government of the He- brews, inftituted by God, had a judge, the great Sanhedrim, and general ailemblies ot the people. .Sparta had two kings, a fenate of twenty-eight chofcn men, and the like aflemblies. All the Dorian cities had a chief magiftrate, a fenate, and occafional ailemblies. The cities of Ionia, Athens, and others, had an Archon, the Areo- pagitce, &c. J and all judgements concerning matters of the greateft importance, as well as the eleftion of magiftrates, were referred to the people. Rome, in the beginning, had a king and a fenate, while the eleftion of kings and judgements upon appeals remained in the peopl.e; afterwards, confuls reprefenting kings, and veiled with equal power, a more numerous fenate, and more fre- quent meetings of the people. Venice has at thiii day, a duke, the fenate ot the pregadi, and the great aifembly of the nobility, which is the v/hole city ; the reft of the inhabitants being only incolce, not cives J and thofe of the other cities or coun- tries are their fubjecls, and do not participate m the governm.ent. Genoa is governed in like manner -, Tucca not unlike to them. Germany is at this day governed by an emperor, the princes or great lords in their feveral precinfts ; the cities by their own magif- trates ; and by general diets, in which the whole power of the nation refides, and where the empe- M 3 ror, 150 Mixed or compofed Go'vernments. ror, princes, nobility^ and cities have their places in perfon, or by their deputies. Ail the northcrri nations which, upon the diflbhiticn of the Roman ennpire, pofiefied the bed provinces that had com- pofed it, were under that form which is ufuaily called the Gothic polity. They had king, lords, commons, diets, affemblies of eftates, cortcs, and parliam.ents, in which the fovereign powers of thofe nations did refide, and by which they were exercifed. The like was praftifed in Hungary, Bohemia, Sweden, Denmark, Poland : and, if things are changed in fome of thofe places within thefe few years, they muft give better proofs of having gained by the change than are yet feen in the world, before I think myfclf obliged to change my opinion. Some nations, not liking the name of king, liave given fuch a power as kings enjoyed in other places to one or more magiftrates, either limited to a certain time, or left to be perpetual, as beft pleafed themfelves : others, approving the name, made the dignity purely ele6live. Some have in their elecftions principally regarded one famiily as long as it lafted : others confidcred nothing but the titnefs of the perfon, and referved to themfelves a liberty of taking where they pleafed. Some have permitted the crown to be hereditary as to its ordinary courfe^ but rcftrained the power, ana inflituted officers to infpeft the proceedings of kings, and to take care that the laws were not vio-attrd. Of this fort were the Ephori of Sparta, the Maires du Palais, and afterwards the conflable of France, the jufticiar in Arragon, the reichs- hofmeeter in Denmark, the high fteward in Eng- land ; and in all places, fuch affemblies as are beforementioncd under feveral names, who had the power of the whole nation, &c. Sidney, Sidney. 1 5 1 Sidney, p. 147. . 18. It is confefTcfd, that a pure democracy can never be good, unlel's for a linall town, &c. Sidney, p. 160. . 19. As to popular govern- inent in the ftriftefl: fenfe, that is, pure demo- cracy, where the people in themfelves, and by themfelves, perfornn all that belongs to govern- ment, I know of no fuch thing; and, if it be in- the world, have nothing to fay for it. Sidney, p. 161. If it be faid, that thofe go- vernments, in which the democratical part go- verns mofl:, do more frequently err in the choice of men, or the means of preferving that purity of manners which is required for the well-being of a people, than thofe wherein ariftocracy prevails, I confefs it, and that in Rome and Athens;, the beft and wif^^ft men did for the moft part incline to ariftocracy. Xenophon, Plato, Ariftotle, Thucydides, Livy, Tacitus, Ci- cero, and others, were of this fort. But if our author there feek patrons for his abfolute monar- chy, he v.ili tind none but Phalaris, Agathocles, DionyfiLis, Cadline, Cethegus, Lentulus, with the corrupted crew of mercenary rafcals who did, or endeavoured to fet them up : thefe are they, qui^ bus ex lonefio nulla ejl /pes : they abhor the domi- nion of the laWy becaufe it curbs their vices, and make theriil(;ives fubfervient to the lulls of ^ nuT/t who may nourifli them. Sidney, p. 165. .21. Being no way concern- ed in the defence of dc-V'Ocracy, &c. I may leave our knight, like Don Quixote, fighting againd the phantafms of his own brain, and faying what he pleafes agalnfl fuch governments as never were, unlefs in fuch a place as St. Marino, near Sini- glagiia in Italy, v*'here a hundred clowns govern ' ' Ma I) bar-* 1 5 '2 Mixed or compofed Governments. a barbarous rock that no man invades^ and reJatei. nothing to our queftion. The republic of St. Pvlarino, next to that of Millingen in Switzerland, is the fnnallefl; republic in Europe. The linnits of it extend no farther than the bafe of the moun- tain on which it is feated. Its infignificance is its fecurity. No neighbouring prince ever thought it worth his while to deftroy the indepen- dency of fuch a beehive. See Blainville's Travels, vol. ii. p. 227. Addifon's Remarks on feveral parts of Italy. Sidney, p. 258. However, more ignorance cannot be expreffed, than by giving the name of democracy to thofe governments that are com- pofed of the three fimple fpecies, as we have proved that all the good ones have ever been i for, in a ftrid fenfe, it can only fuit with thofe, "where the people retain to themfelvcs the admini- stration of the fupreme power ; and more largely^ when the popular part, as in Athens, greatly over- balances the other two, and the denomination ia Cal^en from the prevailing part. LETTER Montefquieu, 1^2 LETTER XXVIII. MIXED GOVERNMENTS, Montesquieu, spirit of laws, b. ii. c. vi, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND. MY DEAR SIR, IN every government there are three forts of power ; the legiflative, the executive in refped; of things dependent on the law of nations, and the executive in regard to things that depend on the civil law. By virtue of the firft (i. e. the legiflative power) the prince or magiftrate enafts temporary or per- petual laws, and amends or abrogates thofe that have been already enadled. By the fecond, he makes peace or war, fends or receives embaf- fies, eftablifhes the public fecurity, and provides againil invafions. By the third, he punillies cri- minals, or determines the difputes that arife be- tween individuals. The latter we fhall call the judiciary power, and the other (imply the execu- tive power of the itate. The political liberty ef the citizen is a tran- quillity of mind, arifing from the opinion each perfon has of his fafety. In order to have this liberty, it is requifite the government be fo con- flituted, as that one citizen need not be afraid of another citizen. When the legiflative and executive powers are united in the fame perfon, or in the fame body of magiftrates, there can be no liberty ; becaufc apprehenflons may arife, left the fame monarch or (enate, or the fame fenate, fhould enact tyran- nical 154 Mix(d Gcvernments. jiical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical man-, ner. Again j there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not feparated from the legiflative and executive powers : were it joined with the legifla- tive, the life and liberty of the citizens would be expofed to arbitrary controul; for the judge would then be legiflator : and were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppreffor. There would be an end of every thing {tout feroit perdu) were the fame man, or the fame body, whether of princes, or of the nobles, or of the peo- ple,, to exercife thofe three powers j that of enact- ing laws, that of executing the public refolutions,^ and that of judging the crimes or differences of Individuals^ Mod kingdoms in Europe enjoy a moderate government, becaufe the prince, who is invefted with the two firft powers, leaves the third to his fubjefts. In Turkey, where thefe three powers are united in the Sultan's perfon, the fubje(fls groan under the v^eight of a moll frightful oppref- fion. In the republics of Italy, where thefe three powers are united, there is lefs liberty than in our monarchies. Hence their government is oblige^ to have rccourfe to as .violent methods for its fupport, as even that of the Turks ; wit j 'i the ilate inquifitors of Venir?, and the lion's mouth, into which every informer may at all hours throw his written accufations : what a fituation mufl the poor cidzen be in under thofe poor republics ! the fame body of magiftrates are poffefled, as executors of the laws, of the whole power they- have given themfelves in quality of legiflators. They might plunder the ftate by their general determinations ^ and as they have likewife the judiciary power in their haads, every private citizen Montefquieu. 155 citizen may be ruined by their particular ded- fions. The whole power is here united in one body ; and though there is no external pomp that indicates a defpotic fway, yet the people feel the cfFefts of it every moment. Hence it is, that many of the princes of Europe, whofe aim has been levelled at arbitrary power, have conftantly fet out vvith uniting in their own perfons all the branches of magiflracy, and all the great offices of fiate. I allow, indeed, that the mere hereditary arif- tocracy of the Italian republics does not anfwer exadily to the defpotic power of the eaftern princes. The number of magiflrates fometimes foftens the power of the magiilracy ; the whole body of the ncbics do not always concur in the fame defignsj and different tribunals are erected that temper each other. Thus, at Venice, the legiflative power is in the council, the executive in the pregadi, and the judiciary in the quarantia. But the mifchief is, that thefe different tribunals are compofed of magiftrates all belonging to the fame body ; which conftitutes almoft one and the fame power. The judiciary power ought not to be given to a {landing fenate ; it (hould be exercifed by per- fons taken from the body of the people, as at Athens, at certain timif s of the year, and purfuant to a form and manner prefcribed by law, in order to eret a tribunal that Ihould laft only as long as neceffity requires. By this means the power of judging, a power fo terrible to mankind, not being annexed to any particular ffate or profeffion, becomes, as it were, invifible People have not then the judges con- tinually prefent to their view ; they fear the office, l^ut not the magiftrate. t^6 Mixed Governments. In accufations of a deep or criminal nature, it is proper the perfon acciifed Ihould have the privi^ lege ofchufing, in fomemeafure, his judges, in con- currence with the law ; or, at leaft, he fhould have a right to except againft lb great a number, that the remaining part may be deemed his own choice. The other two powers may be given rather to magiftrates or permanent bodies, becaufc tht y are not exercifed on any private llibjedl ; one being no more than the general will of the ftate, aiid the other the execution of that general will. But though the tribunals ought not to be feed, yet the judgements ought, and to fuch a degree as to be always conformable to the exaft letter of the law. Were they to be the private opinion of the judge, people would then live in fociety with- out knowing exadlly the obligations it lays them iinder. The judges Qught likewife to be in the fame flation as the accufed, or, in other words, his peers, to the end that he may not imagine he is fallen into the hands of perfons inclined to treat him with rigour, Jf the legiflative leaves the- executive power in pofTefiion of a right to imprifon thofe fubjeds who an give fecurity for their good behaviour, there is an end of liberty, unlefs they are taken up in order to anfwer without delay to a capital crime; in this cafe they are really free, being fubject only to the power of the law. But fhould the legiflative think itfelf in danger,, by iomQ fecret confpiracy againft the ftate, or by a correfpondence with a foreign enemy, it might authorife the executive power, for a fhort and limited time, to imprifon fufpeded perfons ; who,^ in that cafe, would lofe their liberty only for a while, to preierve it for ever. And this is the Z onlf Montefquteii, tj7 Only reafonable method that can be fubftituted to the tyrannical magiftracy of the Ephori, and to the ftate inquifitors of Venice, who are alfo def- potical. As, in a free ftate, every man who is fuppofed a free agent, ought to be his own governor j fo the legiilative power fhould refide in the whole body of the people. But fince this is impoffible in large ftates, and in fmall ones is fubjed to many inconveniencies, it is fit the people fhould execute by their reprefentatives what they cannot execute by themfeives* The inhabitants of a particular town are much better acquainted with its wants and interefrs, than with thofe of other places ; and are better judges of the capacity of their neighbours, than of that of the relt of their countrymen. The members therefore of the leg;i(lature fliould not be chofen from the general body of the nation 3 but it is proper, that in every confiderable place^ g reprefentative fhould be eleded by the inhabi- tants. The great advantage of reprefentatives is^ their being capable of difcufling affairs j for this the people coUecliveiy are extremely unfit, which is one of the i^reateft inconveniencies of a demo- cracy. It is not at all neceffary that the reprefentatives who have received a general inftrudlion from their cie6lors, fhould wait to be particularly inftrufted on every affair , as is praclifed in the diets of Germany. True it is, that by this way of pro- ceeding, the fpeeches of the deputies might with greater propriety be called the voice of the na- tion : but, on the other hand, this would throw them into infinite delays ; would give each de-^ puty a power of controuling the aiTeasbly ; and on i_5 S Ancient Repuhlics, and Opinions on the mod urgent and preffing occafions, iht fprings of the nation nnight be ftopped by a iing^cJ caprice* LETTER XIX. ANCIENT REPUBLICS, and OPINION.^ OF FHILOSOPHERS. MY" DEAR SIR, IN fearching for the principles of governnrentj we may divide them into two kinds : the prin- ciples of authority, and the principles of power;. The firft are virtues of the mind and heart, fuch as wifdom, prudence, courage, patience, tempe- rance, juftice, &Ci. : the fecond are the goods of fortune, fuch as riches, extraftion, knowledge^ and reputation. I rank knowledge among the goods of fortune, becaufe it is the efFe(5t of edu- cation, ftudy, and travel, which are either acci- dents, or ufual effeds of riches or birth, and is by no means neceflarily connefted with wifdom or virtue : but, as it is univerfally admired and re- fpefted by the people, it is clearly a principle of power. The fame may be faid of reputation^ which, abftradled from all confideration whether it is merited or not, well or ill-founded, is another fource of power. Riches will hold the firft place in civilifed focieties at leaft, among the principles of powers and will often prevail not only over 'all the prin-* ciples of authority, but over all the advantages of birth^ knowledge, and fame. For, as Plarringtoa faygi of Thilofophers. ' *59 fays, " Men are hung upon riches, not of choice as upon the other, but of neceffity and by the teeth : for as much as he who wants bread, is his fervant that will feed him ; and if a man thus feeds a whole people, they are under his empire." It already appears, that there muft be in every Ibciety of men, fuperiors and inferiors, becaufe God has laid in the conftitution and courfe of nature the foundation of the diftinftion. And indeed, as Harrington fays, " an army may as well confift of foldiers without officers, or of officers without foldiers, as a commonwealth con- fift of a people without a gentry, or of a gentry without a people." " Let ftates take heed," fays Lord Bacon, "how their nobility and gendemen multiply too faft, for that makes the common fubjedl grow to be a peafant and bafe fwain driven out of heart, and in tffedt but a gentleman's labourer. How fhall the plow then be kept in the hands of the owners, and not mere hirelings ? how fhall the country attain to the charafler which Virgil gives of ancient Italy ? *I'erra potens armis, atque ubere gleba P how, but by the balance of dominion or property ?" Notwithftanding M. Turgot's averfion to ba- lances, Harrington difcovered, and made out, as Toland his biographer informs us, that " empire follows the balance of property, whether lodged in one, a few, or many hands." A noble difco- very, of which die honour folely belongs to him, as much as the circulation of the blood to Harvey, printing to Laurence Cofter, or of guns, companies, or optic glalTes, to the feveral authors. If this balance is not the foundation of all poli- tics, as Toland alTcrts, it is of fo much import- ance, that no man can be thought a mailer of the fubjed 1^0 Ancient Republics^ and Opinions fubjedb without having well weighed it. Mi Turgot, it is plain, had not the lealt idea of it. ^^ Tillage," lays Harrington, " bringing up a good foldiery, brings up a good commonwealth; for where the owner of the plow comes to have the fword too, he will ufe it irl defence of his own. Whence it has happened, that the people of Eng- land, in proportion to their property, have been always free, and the genius of this nation has ever had fome refemblance with that of ancient Italyj ivhich was wholly addicted to commonwealths^ and where Rome came to make the greaieil ac- count of her ruftic tribes, and to call her conliils from the plow : for in the way of parliaments^ which was the government of this realm, men of country lives have been ftill intruded with the greateft affairs, and the people have conftantly had an averlion to the ways of the court. Ambi- tion, loving to be gay and to fawn, has been a gallantry looked upon as having fomething in it of tlie livery; and hufbandry, or the country way of life, though of a grolTer fpinning, as the bed ftuff"of a commonwealth, according to Ariftotlej fuch a one being the moft obftinate aflTertrefs of her liberty, and the leaft fubjeft to innovation or turbulency. Commonwealths, upon which the city life has had the greateft influence, as Athens^ have feldom or never been quiet ; but at beft are found to have injured their own bufinefs by over- doing it. Whence the Urban tribes of Rome^ confiding of the turbaforerjis and libertinus, that had received their freedom by manumiffion, were of no reputation in comparifon of the ruftics. A commonwealth, confiding but of one city, would doubtlefs be dormy, in regard that ambition would be every man's trade : but where it confids of a country, the plow in the hands of the owner finds hi PI of Fhtlofophers. 1 6 1 Kim a better calling, and produces the mofl: inno- cent and fteady genius of a commonwealth. Oceana, p. 37. Domeftic empire is founded upon dominion, and dominion is property, real or perfonal j that is to fay, in iands^ or in money and goods. Lands, or the parcels of a territory, are held by the proprietor or proprietors of it, in fome proportion : and fuch (except it be in a city that has little or no land, and whofe revenue is in trade) as is the proportion or balance of dominion or property in land, fuch is the nature of the empire. If one man be fole landlord of a territory, or over-balance the people for example, three parts in four he is grand feignior : for fo the Turk is called from his property; and his empire is abfo- lute monarchy. If the few, as a nobility and clergy, be landlords, or over-balance the people to the like proportion, it makes the Gothic balance, and the empire is mixed monarchy, as that of Spain, Poland, and once of England : and if the whole people be landlords, or hold the lands fo divided among them, that no one man, or num- ber of men, within the compafs of the few, or ariftocracy, over-balance them, the empire is a commonwealth. If force be interpofed in any of thefe three cafes, it muft either frame the government to the foundation, or the foundation to the government ; or, holding the government not according to the balance, it is not natural, but violent : and there- fore if it be at the devotion of a prince, it is tyranny j if at the devotion of the few, oligarchy ; or if in the power of the people, anarchy. Each of which confufions, the balance ftanding other- wife, is but of fliort continuance, becaufe againft the nature of the balance : which not dcilroyed, deftroys that which oppofes ir. Vol. I. N Herg 1 62 Ancient Republics j and Opinions Here it would be entertaining to apply thefe obfcrvations to the force of fleets and arnnies, &c, applied by Great Britain in the late conteft with America. The balance of land, efpecialiy in New England, where the force was firft applied,- was neither in the king nor a nobility, but im- menfely in favour of the people. The intention of the Britifh politicians was to alter this balance, '^ frame the foundation to the government, by " bringing the lands more and more into the " hands of the governors, judges, counfellors, &c. " &c. who were all to be creatures of a Britifh " miniftry. We have feen the effedls." The balance dellroycd that which oppofed it. Harrington proceeds But there are certain other conTufions, which being rooted in the ba- lance, are of longer continuance, and of worfe confequence j as, firft, where a nobility holds half the property, or about that proportion, and the people the other half; in which cafe, without altering the balance, there is no remedy, but the one mufl ear out the other; as the people did the nobility in Athens, and the nobility the people in Rome. Secondly, where a prince holds about half the dominion, and the people the other half, which was the cafe of the Roman Emperors, (planted partly upon their military colonies, and partly upon the fenate and the people) the govern- ment becomes a very fhambles, both of the princes and the people. It being unlawful in Turkey that any lliould pofiefs land but the grand feignior, the balance is fixed by the law, and that empire firm. Nor, though the kings often fell, was the throne of England known to fliake, until the ftatute of alienations broke the pillars, by giving way to the nobiUty to fell their eftates. While Lacedemon held to the divifion of land made by Lycurgus, of "Philofophers, 163 Lycurgus, it was immoveable ; but, breaking that, could Hand no longer. This kind of law, fixing the ba'ance in lands, is called Agrarian, and was firft introduced by God himfelf, who di- vided theHland of Canaan to his people bv lot. The public fword, without a hand to hold it^ is but cold iron. The hand which holds this fword is the militia of a nation ; and the militia of a nation is either an army in the field, or ready for the field upon occafion. But an army is a bead that has a great belly, and muil be fed i wherefore this will come to what paftures you have, and what paftures you have will come to the balance of property, without which the public fword is but a name. He that can graze this beaft with the great belly, as the Turk does his timariots, may well deride him that ima- gines he received his power by covenant. But if the property of the nobility, ftocked with their tenants and retainers, b'j ih;? paf^ure of that beaft, the ox knows his mafter's cib ; and it is impoffi- ble for a king, in fuch a conftitution, to reign otherwife than by covenant ; or, if he breaks it, it is words that come to blows. Ariftotle is full of this balance in divers places, cfpecially where he fays, that immoderate wealth, as where one man or the few have greater pof- feflions than the equality or the frame of the commonwealth will bear, is an occafion of fedi- tion, which ends, for the greater part, in monar- chy J and that, for this caufe, the oflracifm has been received in divers places, as in Argos and Athens ; but that it were better to prevent the growth in the beginning, than, when it has got head, to feek the remedy of luch an evil. Machiavel, not perceiving that if a common- weak h be galled by the gentry, it is by their N 2 over- 164 Ancient Republics, and Opinions over-balance, fpeaks of the gentry as hodile to popular governments, and of popular governments as hoftile to the gentry ; which can never be proved by any one example, unlefs in civil war ; feeing that, even in Switzerland, the gentry are not only fafe, but in honour. But the balance, as I have laid it down, though unfeen by Ma- chiavel, is that which interprets him, where he concludes, " That he who will go about to make a commonwealth where there be many gentlemen, unlefs he firfl: deftroys them, undertakes an im- poffibility. And that he who goes about to in- troduce monarchy, where the condition of the people is equal, lliall never bring it to pafs, un- lefs he cull out fuch of them as are the moft tur- bulent and ambitious, and make them gentlemen or noblemen, not in name, but in effedt; that is, by enriching them with lands, caftles, and trea- fures, that may gain them power among the reft, and bring in the reft to dependence upon them j to the end that they, maintaining their ambition by the prince, the prince may maintain his power by them." Wherefore, as in this place I agree with Ma- chlavel, that a nobility, or gentry, over-balancing a popular government, is the utter bane and de- ft rudion of it, fo I ftiall ftiew in another, that a nobility or gentry, in a popular government, not over-balancin.o; it, is the verv life and foul of it. The public fword, or right of the militia, be the government what it will, or let it change ho\r it can, is inleparable from the over-balance in do- minion. Harrington's of Vhihfophers. 1 65 Harrington's prerogative of popular GOVERNMEMT, C. ill. p. 226. The balance of dominion in land is the na- tural caufe of ennpire ; and this is the principle which makes politics a fcience undeniable through- out, and the moft demonftrable of any whatever. If a man, having one hundred pounds a year, may keep one fervant, or have one man at his command, then, having one hundred times fo much, he may keep one hundred fervants ; and this multiplied by a thoufand, he may have one hundred thoufand men at his command. Now that the fingle perfon, or nobility, of any country in Europe, that had but half fo many men at command, would be king or prince, is that which I think no man can doubt. But, " No money, ** no Swifs."- The reafon why a fingle perfon, or the nobility, that has one hundred thoufand men, or half fo many, at command, will have the go- vernment, is, that the eftate in land, whereby they are able to maintain fo many, in any Euro- pean territory, muft over-balance the reft that remains to the people, at leaft three parts in four. Now, for the fame reafon, if the people hold three parts in four of the territory, it is plain there can neither be any fingle perfon or nobility able to difpute the government with them. In this cafe, therefore, except force be interpofed, they govern themfelves. So that by this computation of the balance of property or dominion in the land, you have, according to the three-fold foundation of property, the root or generation of the three-fold kind of government or empire. \i one man be fole landlord of a territory, or over-balance the whole people, three parts in four, or thereabouts, he is grand fcignior -, for fo the Turk, not from N % hia 1 66 Ancient Republics, and Opinions his empire, but property, is called -, and the em pire, in this cal'e, is abiblute monarchy. If the few, or a nobilitv, or a nobility with a clergy, be landlords to fuch a proportion as over-balances the people in the like manner, they may make whom chey pleafe king j or, if they be not pleafed with their king^ down with him, and fet up whom they like better ; a Henry the fourth, or feventh, a Guife, a Montfort, a Nevil, or a Porter, fhould they find that beft for their own ends and pur- pofes : for as not the balance of the king, but that of the nobility, in this cafe, is the caufe of the government, fo not the eftate of the prince or captain, but his virtue or ability, or fitnefs for the ends of the nobility, acquires that command or office. This for ariftocracy, or mixed mo- narchy. But if the whole people be landlords, or hold the lands fo divided among them, that no one man or number of men, within the com- pafs of the few, or ariftocracy, over-balance them, it is a commonwealth. Such is the branch in the root, or the balance of property naturally produ- cing empire. Then follows a curious account of the laws in Ifrael againft ufury, and in Lacedemon againft trade, &c. which are well worth ftudying. Page 254. That which introducing two eftates caufes divifion, or makes a commonwealth unequal, is not that fhc has a nobility, without which fhe is deprived of her moft fpecial orna- ment, and weakened in her condud, but when the nobility only is capable of magiftracy, or ofthefrnacej and where this is fo ordered, fhe is unequal, as Rome. But where the nobility is no otherwife capable of magiftracy, nor of the fenate, than by election of the people, the commonwealth confifts but of one orders and 2 is of Thilofophers, 167 is equal, as Lacedemon or Venice. Where the nobility holds half the property, or about that proportion, and the people the other half, the fhares of the land may be equal ; but in regard the nobility have much among few, and the people little among many, the few will not be contented to have authority, which is all their proper fhare in a commonwealth, but will be bringing the people under power, which is not their proper fhare in a commonwealth ; where- fore this commonwealth muft needs be unequal ; and, except by altering the balance, as the Athe-. nians did by the recifion of debts, or as the Ro- mans went about to do, by an Agrarian, it be brought to fuch an equality, that the whole power be in the people, and there remain no more than authority in the nobility, there is no remedy, but the one, with perpetual feuds, will eat out the other, as the people did the nobility in Athens, and the nobility the people in Rome. Where the carcafe is, there will be the eagles alfo; where the riches are, there will be the power : fo if a few be as rich as all the reft, a few will have as much power as all the reft j in which cafe the commonwealth is unequal, and there can be no end of ftaving and tailing till it be brought to equality. The eftates, be they one, or two, or three, are fuch, as was faid by virtue of the balance upon which the government muft naturally depend : exemplified in France, &c. Page 256. All government is of three kinds: a government of fervants, a government offub- jedts, or a government of citizens. The firft is abfolute monarchy, as that of Turkey; the fecond^ ariftocratical monarchy, as that of France ; the N 4 thirdj, 1 68 Ancient Republics, and Opinions third, a comrnonwealth, as Ifrael, Rome, Hol- land. Of tKefe, the government of fervants is harder to be conquered, and the eafier to be held. The government of fubjeds is the eafier to be conquered, and the harder to be held; The go- vernment of citizens is both the hardeft to be conquered, and the hardeft to be held. The reafon why a government of fervants is hard to be conquered, is, that they are under a perpetual difcipline and command. Why a go- vernment of fubjefls is eafily conquered, is on account of the factions of the nobility. The reafons why a government of citi^^ens, where the commonwealth is equal, is hardeft to be conquered, are, that the invader of fuch a fociety muft not only truft to his own ftrength, inafmuch as, the commonwealth being equal, he muft needs find them united j but in regard that fuch citizens, being all foldiers, or trained up to their arms, which they ufe not for the defence of flavery, but of liberty, a condition not in this world to be bettered, they have, more fpecially upon this occafion, the higheft foul of courage, and, if their territory be of any extent, the vafteft t)ody of a well-difciplined militia that is poflxblc in nature : wherefore an example of fuch a one, overcome by the arms of a monarch, is not to be found in the world. In the Art of Law-giving, chap. i. he enlarges ftill farther upon this fubjecl, and inftances Jo- feph's purchafe of all the lands of the Egyptians for Pharaoh, whereby they became fervants to Pharaoh j and he enlarges on the Englifh ba- lance, &c. In America, the balance is nine-tenths on the fide of the people ; indeed there is but one order ; and of Philofophefs^ 1 69 ^nd Gur fenators have influence chiefly by the principles of authority, and very little by thoie of power; but this nniiil be poftponed. LETTER XXX. ANCIENT REPUBLICS, and OPINIONS PF PHILOSOPf^ERS. MY DEAR SIR, MY defign is more extenfive than barely to fliew the imperfeflion of M. Turgot's idea. This might be done in a few words, and a very fhort procefs of reafoning : but I wifli to affembie together the opinions and reafcnings of philofophers, politicians, and hiftorians, who have taken the moft extenfive views of men and fo- cieties, whofe charafters are defervedly revered, and whofe writings were in the contemplation of thofe who framed the American conititu:ions. It will not be conteftcd, that all thele charafters are united in Polybius, who, in a fragment of his fixth book, tranflated by Edward Spelrr.an, p. 391. at the end of his tranflacion of the Ron an Antiquities of Dionyfius HaliicarnalknTs, ia'-^r, '' It is cuftomary to eftablifh three ioi cs of go- vernments i kingly government, ariiloc-acv, ird democracy : upon which one may vtry rropc iy afk them, whether they lay theie down r^s '.lie only forms of government, or as the bcil ^ (or ia both cafes they feem to be in an error, l:i:cc -t 3 lyo Jncient Republics, and Opinions manifefl:, that the bed form of government is that which is compounded of all three^ This is founded not only in reafon but in experience, Lycurgus having fee the example of this form of govern- ment in the inftitution of the Lacedemonian com- monwealth.*' Six kinds of government muft be allowed: kingly government and monarchy, ariftocracy and oligarchy, democracy, and the government of the multitude. Lycurgus concluded, that every form of go- vernment that is fimple, by foon degenerating into that vice that is allied to it, muft be unfta- ble. The vice of kingly government is mo- narchy; that of ariftocracy, oligarchy; that of democracy, rage and violence; into which, in procefs of time, all of them muft degenerate. Lycurgus, to avoid thefe inconveniences, form- ed his government not of one fort, but united in one all the advantages and properties of the beft government; to the end that no branch of it, by fwelling beyond its due bounds, might dege- nerate into the vice which is congenial to it ; and that, while each of them were mutually acfted upon by oppqfite pozvers, no one part might in-, cline any way, or out-weigh the reft; but that the commonwealth, being equally poifed and balanced, Jike 2ijhip or a waggon, afted upon by contrary powers, might long remain in the fame fituation j while the king was reftrained from excefs by the fear of the people, who had a proper Ihare in the commonv/ealth ; and, on the other fide, the people did not dare to difregard the king, from their fear of the fenate, who, being all elected for their virtue, would always incline to the jufteft fide ; by which means, that branch which hap- pened to be o.pprefTed became always fuperior, and, by the acceffional weight of the fenate, out- balanced of Thilofophers, 171 balanced the other. This fyftem preferved the lyacedemonians in Jiberty longer than any other people we have heard of ever enjoyed it. All the three principal orders of government were found in the Roman commonwealth ; every thing was conftituted and adminiftered with that equality and propriety by thefe three, that it was not poffible, even for a Roman citizen, to affeit pofitively, whether the government, in the whole, was ariftocratical, democratical, or monaichi-^ cal: for when we call our eyes on the power of the confuls, the government appeared entirely monarchical and kingly j whea on that of the fe- nate, ariftocratical j and when any one confidered the power of the people, it appeared plainly de- mocratical. The confuls, when they are at Rome, and be- fore they take the field, have the adminiftration of all public affairs 5 for all other magiftrates obey them, except the tribunes of the people : they introduce ambaffadors into the fenate j they alfo propofe to the fenate thofe fubjefts of debate that require immediate difpatch j and are folely entrufted with the execution of the decrees : to them belongs the confideration of all public affairs of which the people have cognizance, whom they are to aflemble upon all occafions, and lay before them the decrees of the fenate, then purfue the refolutions of the majority. They have ahnoft an abfolute power in every thing that relates either to the preparations of war, or to the conduct of ic in the field i for they may give what orders they pleafe to their allies, and appoint the tribunes ; they may raifc forces, and enlift thofe who are proper for the fervice : they alfo have a power, when in the field, of punifhing any who ferve Vncier them j and of expending as much as they plealc 172 Ancient Republic Sy and Opinions pleafeof the public money, being always attended by a qusftor for that purpofe, whofe duty it is to yield a ready obedience to all their commands. So that whoever cafts his eyes on this branch, inay with reafon affirm, that the government is merely monarchical and kingly. The fenate have, in the firft place, the com- mand of the public money : for they have the condu6tofall receipts and difburfements ; fince the quasftors cannot iflue money for any particular fervice without a decree of the fenate, except thofe fums they pay by the direction of the confuls. It has the powe^ over all difburfements made by the cenfors, every fifth year, in erefting and re- pairing public buildings ;--takes cognizance of all crimes committed in Italy, fuch as treafons, con.- fpiracies, poifonings, and aflaffi nations ; -fends embaffies out of Italy to reconcile differences, ufe exhortations, fignify commands, admit al- liances, or declare war j ^determines, when am- baffadors come to Rome, in what manner they are to be treated, and the anfwer to be given them. For theie reafons, when a foreigner comes to Rome in the abfence of the confuls, the govern- ment appears to him purely ariftocratical. There is ftill a m.oft confiderable fhare in the government left for the people. They only have the power of diftributing honours and punifh- ments, to which alone both monarchies and commonwealths, in a word, all human inftitu-' tions, owe their ftability : for wherever the diffe- rence between rewards and punifhments is not iinderftood, orjudicioufly applied, there nothing can be properly admin iftered, fince the worthy and unv.'CMthy are equally honoured ! They often take cognizance of thofe caufes where the fine is confiderable, if the criminals are perfons, of I^hilofophers, 17^ pclfons who have exercifed great employments ; and in capital cafes they alone have jurifdidtion j. and a cuftom prevails with them, to give thofe who are tried for their lives a power of departing openly to voluntary banilhment. They have the power of conferring the magif- tracy upon thofe they think worthy of it, which is the moft honourable reward of merit any go- vernment can beftow. They have the power of rejeding and confirm* ing laws, and determine concerning peace and war^ alliances^ accommodations, and conventions. So that, from hence again, one may with rea^ Ion aflert, that the people have the greateft fhare in the government, and that the commonwealth is democratical. Theie orders, into which the commonwealth is divided^ have the power to oppofe, affift, and ba- lance each other, as occafion may require. Though the conful at the head of his army irt the field, feems to have an abfolute power to carr/ every thing he propofes into execution, yet he ftill Hands in need of the people and fenate, and with- out their afiiftance can effetl nothing; for neither corn, clothes, nor pay, can be furniihed to the army without the confent of the fenate; who have alio the power of fending another general to fucceed him, as foon as the year is expired, or of continu- ing him in the command. Again, they may either magnify and extol, or obfcure and extenuate, the victories of the generals ; for thefe cannot cele- brate their triumphs unlefs the fenate confents to it, and furnilhes the neceflary expence. As the power of putting an end to the war is in the people^ the generals are under a neceffity of having their approbation, who have tlie right of ratifying and annulHng all accommodations and conven- 174 Jincient Republics y and Opinions conventions. It is to the people that the generals, after the expiration of their command, give an ac- count of their condud:: fo that it is by no means Mt for them to difregard the favour either of the fenate, or of the people. The fenate is under a necefTity of fhewing a re- gard to the people, and of aiming at their appro- bation ; as not having the power to punifh crimes of the firft magnitude with death, unlefs the peo- ple confirm the previous decree : if a law is pro- pofed, by which part of the power of the fenate is to be taken away, their dignities abolifhed, or even their fortunes diminifhed, the people have ic in their power either to receive or rejedt it. If one of the tribunes of the people oppofes the paf- fing of a decree, the fenate are fo far from being able to ena6l it, that it is not even in their power to confult or affemble at all. For all thefe rea- fons, the fenate (lands in awe of the people. The people alfo are fubjedl to the power of the fenate, and under an obligation of cultivating xhe good- will of all the fenators, who have many op- portunities both of prejudicing and advantaging individuals. Judges are appointed out of the fenate in mofl caufes that relate to contra6ts, pub- lic or private. There are many rivers, ports> gardens, mines, and lands, and many works rela- ting to erefting and repairing public buildings, let out by the cenfors, under the care of the fenate ; all thefe are undertaken by the people ; fome are purchafers, others partners, fome fureties for the contrads. All thefe things are under the controul of the fenate, which has povver to give time, to mitigate, and^ if any thing has happened to render the performance of the contract impraflicable, to cancel it. The people, thus dependent on the ienate, and apprehending the uncertainty of the occafions of Thilofophers, ly^ occafions in which they may (land in need of their favour, dare not refill or oppofe their will. In like manner, they are not eafily brought to obftruft the defigns of the confuls, becaufe all of them in general, and every one in particular, become fubjedt to their authority when in the field. Such being the power of each order to hurt and alTifl ea ': other, their union is adapted to all contingencies, and ii is impojjihle to invent a more perfeul Jyjiem. When the common fear of a foreign enemy compels them to ad in concert, fuch is the ftrength of the government, that nothing ne- Ceflary is omitted, or comes too late, fince all vie with each other in diredling their thoughts to the public good, and their endeavours to carry their defigns into execution. The commonwealth, from the peculiar frame of it, becomes irrefiftible, and attains whatever it propofes. When, in confequence of vi6lory, they live in profperity and affluence, enjoying their good for- tune free from the fear of a foreign enemy, they grow, through eafe and flattery, infolent and proud; their commonwealth is then chiefly obferved to relieve itfelf: for when any branch of it becomes ambitious, and, fv/elling beyond its bounds, aims at unwarrantable power, being fubjedl to the controul of the other two, it cannot run into any excefs of power or arrogance j but all three mufl: remain in the terms prefcribed by the con- ftitution. Thus, my dear Sir, you fee that Polybius's opinion of different orders, checks, and balances, in a commonwealth, is very difi^erent from chat of M. Turgor. The Roman conftitution formed the noblelt people, and the greateft power that has ever exifted. But if all the powers of the confuls. ijS Ancient RepuhUcSj and Opinions confuls, fenate, and people, had been centered in a fingle afiembly of die people, colle6tively or re- prefentatively, will any man pretend to believe that they would have been long free, or ever great ? The diftribution of power was, however, never accurately or judicioufly made in that conflitu- tion : the executive was never fufficienily lepa- rated from the legiflative, nor had thefe powers a controul upon each other defined with fufficient accuracy : the executive had not power to inter- pofe and decide between the people and the ienate. As we advance in this correfpondence, we may fee caufe to differ widely from the judgement of Polybius, " that it is impojjible to invent a more ferfei fyfiem of government.''^ We may be con- vinced that the confritution of England, if its balance is {^tn to play, in practice, according to the principles of its theory chat is to fay, if the people are fairly and fully reprefented, fo as to have the power of dividing or choofmg, of drawing up hill or downy inftead of being difpofed of by a few lords is a fyftem much more perfect. The conftitutions of feveral of the United States, it is hoped, will prove themfelves improvements, both upon the Roman, the Spartan, and the Englifh coinipnonweaUhs. LETTER df Philofophe'/s, 177 LETTER XXXL ANCIENT REPUBLICS, and OPINIONS OF PHILOSOPHERS. MY DEAR SIRj THE generation ana corruption of govern- ments, which may in other words be called theprogrefsand courfe of human paffions in fociety, are fubjedls which have engaged the attention of the grcateft writers ; and whether the eflays they have left us were copied from hiftory, or wrought out of their own conjectures and reafonings, they are very much to our purpofe, to Ihew the utility and neceffity of different or^d-ri of men, and of an equilibrium of powers and privileges. They de- monftrate the corruptibility of every fpecies of fimple government, by which I mean a power without a check, whether in one, a few, or many. it might be fufficient to fhew this tendency in iimple democracy alone, for fuch is the govern- ment of one aflembly, whether of the people col- lediively or reprefentatively : but as the genera- tion and corruption of all kinds of government have a fimilitude with one another, and proceed from the fame qualities in human nature, it will throw the more light upon our fubjedt, the more particularly we examine it. I fhall confine my- feif chiefly to Plato, Polybius, and your name- fake, Sir Thomas Smith. Polybius thinks it manifefl:, both from reafon and experience, that the befl form of government is not fimple, but compounded, becaufe of the Vol. L O ten- t75 AKcient Republic Sj and Ophnons tendency of each of the fimple forms to degene- rate ; even democracy, in which it is an eftabliflied cuftom to worfhip the gods, honour their parents, refped: the elders, and obey the lazvs, has a ftrong tendency to change into a government where the multitude have a power of doing whatever they defire, and where infolence and contempt of pa- rents, elders, gods, and laws, foon fucceed. From whencedo governments originally fpring ? From the weaknefs of men, and the confequent necefiity to aiTociate, and he who excels in ftrength and courage, gains the command and authority over the reft ; as among inferior animals, who are not influenced by opinion, the ftrongeft are, by common confent, allowed to be mafters. This is monarchy. Buc when the nation, by living together, acquires fome tinfture of honour and juftice, gratitude, duty, and their oppofites, and the monarch countenances thefe moral qualities, and treats every one according to his merit, they are no longer afraid of violence, but fubmit to him, and unite in fupporting his government, although he may again become weak and advanced in years. By this means a monarch infenfibly becomes a king, that is, when the power is transferred from courage and ftrength to reafon. This is the origin of true kingly government j for the people preferve the command, not only to them, but to their defcendants, being perfuaded, that thofe who have received their birth and education from fuch men will refemble them in their principles. But if they are diflatisfied with their defcendants, they then choofe magiftrates and kings, with regard only to fuperior fenfe and reafon, and not to ftrength and courage; having by experience been convinced of the difference between them. Thofc \vho were once chofen and invefted with the royal digriity. of Thllofophers. 179 dignity, grew old in the enjoyment of It, pofleffed themfelves of a territory, furroundcd it with walls, and fortified advantageous polls: thus confulring the fecurity of their fubjecls, and fupplying them with plenty of provifions, differing little in their clothes or tables from the people with whom they palled their lives, they continued blamelefs and unenvied. But their pofterity, fucceedingto the government by right of inheritance, and ^nding every thing provided for fecu'ity and fupport, they were led by fuperfluity to indulge their appetites, and to imagine that it becam^: princes to appear in a different ditfs, to eat in a more luxurious manner, and enjoy, widiout con- tradid:ion, the forbidden pleafures of love. The firft produced envy, the other refentment and hatred. By which means kingly government de- generated into tyranny. At the fame time a foundation was laid, and a confpiracy formed, for the deftruftion of thofe who exercifed it ; the accomplices of which were not men of inferior rank, but perfons of the mo(t generous, exalted, and enterprizing fpirit j for fuch men can lead bear the infolence of thofe in power. The people, having thefe to lead them, and uniting againft their rulers, kingly govern- ment and monarchy were extirpated, and arifto- cracy began to be eftablifhed, for the people, as an immediate acknowledgement to thofe who had deftroyed monarchy, chofe thefe leaders for their governors, and left all their concerns to them. Thefe, at firft, preferred the advantage of the public to all other confiderations, and adminiftered all affairs, both public and private, with care and vigilance. But their fons having fucceeded them in the fame power, unacquaipted with evils, ftran- gers to civil equality and liberty, educated from O 2 their t8o Ancient Repuhlks, and Opinions their infancy in the fplendour of the power and dignities of their parents, fome giving themfelves up to avarice, others to intemperance, and others to the abufe of women, by this behaviour changed the artjiocracy into an oligarchy. Their cataftrophe became the fame with that of the tyrants ; for if any perfon, obferving the gene- ral envy and hatred which thefe rulers have incurred, has the courage to fay or do any thing againft them, he finds the whole body of the people infpired with the fame paffions they were before pofTefTed with againft the tyrant, and ready to afTift him. Thereupon they put fome of them to death, and banifh others ; but dare not, after that, appoint a king to govern them, being ftill afraid of the injuftice of the firft ; neither dare they entruft the government with any number of men, having ftill before their eyes the errors which thofe had before Committed : fo that having no hope, but in them- felves, they convert the government from an oli' garchy to a democracy^ and take upon themfelves the care and charge of public affairs. And as long as any are living, who felt the power and dominion of the/fze;, they acquiefce under the prefent eftabiiftiment, and look upon equality and liberty as the greateft of bleflings. But when a new race of men grow up, thefe, no 1 >nger regarding equality and liberty, from being accuftomedto them, aim at a greater ftiare of power than the reft, particularly thofe of the greateft fortunes, who, grown now ambitious, and being unable to obtain the power they aim at by their own merit, diflipate their wealth, by alluring and corrupting the people by every method j and when, to ferve their wild ambition, they have once taught them to receive bribes and entertain- mentSj from that moment the democracy is at an 3 end. of Philofophers, 181 end, and changes to force and violence. For the people, accuftomed tolive at the expence of others, and to place their hopes of a fupport in the for- tunes of their neighbours, if headed by a man of a great and encerprizing fpirit, will then have re-.- courfe to violence, and getting together, will nnur- der, banifli, and divide among themfelves the lands of their adverfaries, till, grown wild with rage, they again find a mafter and a monarch. This is the rotation of governments, and this the order of nature, by which they are changed, transformed, and return to the fame point of the circle. Lycurgus obferving that all this was founded on neccffity and the laws of nature, concluded, that every form of government that is fimple, by foon degenerating into that vice that is allied to it, and naturally attends it, muft be unftable. For as ruft is the natural bane of iron, and worms of wood, by which they are fure to be deftroyed, fo there is a certain vice implanted by the hand of nature in every fimple form of government, and by her ordained to accompany it. The vice of kingly government is monarchy ; that of arif- tocracy, oligarchy ; and of democracy, rage and 'violence ; into which all of them, in procefs of time, muft neceflarily degeiierate. To avoid which Lycurgus united in one all the advantages of the beft governments, to the end that no branch of it, by fwelling beyond its bounds, might degenerate into the vice that is congenial to i:, and char, while each was mutually a6tcd upon by oppojite pozvers, po one part might outweigh the relt. The Romans arrived at the fame end by the fame rneans. Polybius, you perceive, my dear Sir, is more charitable in his reprefentation of human natui O 3 th4tv t82 Ancient Republics, and Opinions than Hobbes, Mandeville, Rochefoucault, Machia*- vel, Beccaria, RoulTcau, Dc Lolme, or even than our friend Dr. Price. He candidly fuppofes, that the firfl: k'nglv government will be wifely and honellly adminillx-red during the life of the father of his people ; that the firft ariftocracy will be conduced with caution and moderationj by the band of patriots to whom is due the glory of the expulfjon of the tyrant ^ and that the people, for a generation at leaft, who have depofed the oli- garchy, will behave with decorum. ' But perhaps it might be more cxa6lly true and natural to fay, that the king, the ariftocracy, and the people, as foon as ever they felt themfelves fecure in the poffeflion of their power, would be- gin to abufe it. In M. Turgot's fingle aflembly, thofe who, fhould think themfelves moft diftinguifhed by blood and education, as well as fortune, would be moft ambitious; and if they found an oppo- fition among their conftituents to their eledions, would immediately have recourfe to entertain- ments, fecret intrigues, and every popular art, and even to bi ibes, to increafe their patties. Thisi' would oblige their competitors, though they, might be inhnitely better men^ either to give up their pretenfions, or to imitate thefe dangerous pradices. There is a natural and unchangeable inconvenience in all popular ele<5lions. There are always competitions, and the candidates have often merits nearly equal. The virtuous and in- dependent electors are often divided : this natu- rally caufes too much attention to the moft profligate and unprincipled, who will fell or give away their votes for othtr confiderations than wifdom and virtue. So that he who has the deepeft purfe, or the feweft fcruples about ufing it, will generally prevail. It of Philofophrs. !$J It is from the natural aiiPtocracy in a (ingle af- fembly that the firft clanger is to be apprehended in the prefent date of manners in America ; and with a balance of landed property in the hands of the people, To decided in their favour, the progrefs to degeneracy, corruption, rage, and violence, might not be very rapid ; neverthelefs it would begin with the firft eledions, and grow fafter or flov^er every year. Rage and violence would foon appear in the affembly, and from thence be communicated among the people at large. The only remedy is to throw the rich and the proud into one group, in a feparate affembly, and there tie their hands ; if you give them fcope with the people at large, or their reprefentatives, they will deltroy all equality and liberty, with the confent and acclamations of the people them^ felves. They will have much more power, mix- ed with the reprefencatives, than feparated from them. In the firft cafe, if they unite, they will give the law, and govern all; if they differ, they will divide the ftate, and go to a decifion by force. By placing them alone by themfeives, the focjety avails itlelf of all their abilities and virtues : they become a folid check to the repre- fentatives themfeives, as well as to the executive power, and vou difarm them entirely of the power to do mifchief. O4 LE'BffER 184 Ancient Repuhllcs, , and Opinions LETTER XXXIL ANCIENT REPUBLICS, and OPINIONS OF PHILOSOPHERS. DEAR SIR, DIONYSlDS HalicarnafTenfis, in his feventh book, has given us an excellent fpeech in the fenate, made by Manlius Valerius, a nnan venerable for his age and wifdonn, and remarkable for his conftant frienddiip for the people. "If any of you, fathers 1 alarmed with an ap- prehenfion that you will introduce a pernicious cuftom into the commonwealth, if you grant the people a power of giving their fuffrages againft the patricians, and entertain an opinion that the tribunitian power, if confiderably ftrengthened, will prove of no advantage, let them learn, that their opinion is erroneous, and their imagination contrary to found reafoning : for if any meafure can tend to preferve this commonwealth, to aflure both her liberty and power, and to eftablifh a per- petual union and harmony in all things, the moft cffeftual will be to give the people a fhare in the government: and the moft advantageous thing to us will be, not to have a fimple and unmixed form of government J neither a monarchy, an oli- garchy, nor a democracy, but a conftitution tem- pered with all of them : for each of thefe formsj when fimple, very eafily deviates into abufe and excefs J but when all of them are equally mixed, that part which happens to innovate, and to exceed the cuftomary bounds, is always reftraincd by an- other that is fober, and a^haes to the eftablifhed ordero of Philofophers. 185 prder.-^Thus monarchy, when it becomes cruel and inlolent, and begins to puriue tyrannical meafures, is fubverted by an oligarchy, confiding of good men ; and an oligarchy, compofed of the belt men, which is your form of government, when elated with riches and dependants, pays no re- gard to juftice, or to any other virtue, and is de- ftroyed by a wife people : and in a democracy, when the people, from being modeft in their de- portment, and obfervant of the laws, begin to run into diforders and excefles, they are forced to return to their duty by the power with which, upon thofe occafions, the beft men of the com- monwealth is invefted. You, fathers, have ufed all pofTible precautions to prevent monarchical power from degenerating into tyranny -, for, in- ftead of a fingle perfon, you have invefted two with the fupreme power; and though you com- mitted this magiftracy to them, not for an inde- finite time, but only for a year, you neverthelels appointed three hundred patricians, the moft re- fpedable, both for their virtue and their age, of whom this fenate is compofed, to watch over their conduct ; but you do not feem hitherto to have appointed any to watch over your own, and to keep you within proper bounds. As for yourfelves, I am as yet under no apprehenfions, left you fhould fuffer your minds to be corrupted by great and accumulated profperity, who have lately delivered your country from a long tyran- tiy i and, through continual and laftlng wars, have not as yet had leilure to grow inlolent and lux- urious. But with regard to your fucceftbrs, when I confider how great alterations length of time brings with it, 1 am afraid, left the men of povv^er in the fenar.e ftiouJd innovate, and filently tranf- ^rm our conftitution to a monarchical tyranny ; whereas. iB6 Ancient Republics j and Opinion i whereas, if you admit the people to a fhare in the government, no mifcfiief can fpring from the fe- nate ; but the man who aims at greater power than the reft of his fellow citizens, and has form- ed a faftion in the fenate, of all who arc willing to panake of his counfel and his crimes (for thofe who deliberate concerning public affairs ought to foiefee every thing that is probable) this great, this awful pei fon, I fay, when tailed by the tribunes to appear before the people, mud give an account both of his adlions and thoughts to this people, inconfiderable as they are, and ^cy much his inferiors; and, if found guilty, fuffer the punifhment he deferves : and, left the people themfelves, when vefted with fo greac a power, fhould grow wanton, and, feduced by the worft: of demagogues, become dangerous to the beft of citizens, (for the multitude generally give birth to tyranny) fome perfon of confummate pru- dence, created diftator by yourfelves, will guard againft this evil, and not allow them to run into excefs ; and being inverted with abfolute power, and fubje6t to no account, will cut off the infeft- cd part of the commonwealth, and not fuffer that which is not yet infefted to be vitiated, reform the laws, excite the citizens to virtue, and ap- point fuch magiftrates as he thinks will govern with the greateft prudence : and having effedlecl thefe things within the fpace of fix months, he will again become a private man, without receiv- ing any other reward for thefe aftions, than that of being honoured for having performed them. Induced, therefore, by thefe confiderations, and convinced that this is the moft perfed: form of government, debar the people 'from nothing j but as you have granted them a power of choofing the annual magiftrates, who are to prefide over the who is forrriCd according to the Spartan republic ; and then, him refembling an oligarchy j tlien the dennocratic \ and then the tyranniic man> that we may contemplate the moil unjuft man ; and let him in oppofition to the moft jud, that our inquiry may be completed ! The ambitious republic is firft to be confidered : it is indeed dif- ficult for a city in this manner condltuted, i. C; like Sparta, to be changed ; but as every tkin^ which is generated is liable to- corrupt ion y even fuch a conjiituuon as this will not remain for ever, but be dijjclved. (I fhall pafs over ail the attrological and myftical whimfies which we meet with fo often in PJato, interfperfed among the moil: fub- iime wifdom and profound knowledge, and infert only what is intelligible.) The amount of what he fays in this place about numbers and mufic, is, that miflakes will infenfibly be made in the choice of perfons for guardians of the lawsj and by thefe guardians, in the rewards and promotion of merit. They will not always expertly diftin- guifh the feveral fpecies of geniufes, the golden, the filver, the brazen, and the iron. Whilft iron fiiall be mixed with filver, and brafs with gold, diffimiiitude and difcord arife, and generate war, and enmity, and fedition. When fcdidon is rifen, two of the fpecies of geniufes, the iron and brazen^ will be carried away after gain, and the acquifi- tion of land and houfes, gold and filver. But thei golden and filver geniufes, as they are not in want, but naturally rich, will lead the foul towards virtue and the original conftitutioni Thus divided, drawing contrary ways, and living in a violent manner, will not this republic be in the middle, between ariftoeracy and oligarchy, imitating, in fome things, the former republic, and in others, oligarchy ? They will honour 4 their Plato, I91 their rulers ; their military will abflain from agri- culture and mechanic arts ; they will have com- mon meals, gymnaflic exercifes, and contefts of war, as in the former republic ; but they will be afraid to bring wife men into the magiftracy, be- caufe they have no longer any fuch as are truly ^ fimple and inflexible, but fuch as are of a mixed kind, more forward and rough, more fitted by their natural genius for war than peace, efteeming tricks and ftratagems ; fuch as thefe fhall defirc wealth and hoard up gold and filver, as thofe who live in oligarchies. While they fpare their own, they will love to fquander the fubftance of others upon their pleafures : they will fly from the law, as children from a father, who have been educated not by perfuafion but by force. Such a republic, mixed of good and ill, will be mofb remarkable for the prevalence of the contentious and ambitious fpirit. What now fhall the man be, correfpondent to this republic ? He will be arrogant and rough towards inferiors ; mild towards equals, but ex- tremely fubmilTive to governors j fond of dignity and the magiflracy, but thinking that political management, and military performances, not elo- quence, nor any fuch thing, fhould entitle him to them : while young he may defpife money, but the older he grows the more he will value it, becaufe he is of a covetous temper, and not fincerely affeded to virtue and reafon. Such an ambitious youth refembles fuch a city, and is formed fomehow in this manner : His father, a worthy man, in an ill-regulated city, fhuns ho- nours, and magiflracies, and law-fuits, and all pub* lie bufinefs, that, as he can do no good, he may have no trouble. The fon hears his mother venting her indignation, and complaining that fhe i^i Ancient RepuhHcSf ISc. fhe is negle6led among other women, becaufe hef hufband is not in the magiftracy, nor attentive td the making of money j that he is unmanly and remifsj and fuch other things as wives are apt to cant over concerning fuch hufbands. The do- meftics, too, privately fay the fame things to the Ions, ftimulating them to be more of men than their father, and more attentive to their moneys When they go abroad they hear the fam.e things^ and fee that thofe who mind their own affairs are called fimple, and fuch as mind not their affairs are commended. The young man comparing the conduifl, fpeeches, and purfuits of his father with thofe of other men, the one watering the rational part of his foul, and the others the concu- pifcible and irafcible, he delivers up the govern- ment within himfelf to a middle power, that which is irafcible and fond of contention, and fo he be- comes a haughty and ambidous man. We have now the fecond republic, and the fecond man. This fecond repuHic will be fucceeded by oligarchy, founded on men's valuations, in which the rich bear rule, and the poor have no fhare in the government. The change from the ambi- tious republic to oligarchy is made by that trea- fury which every one has filled with gold : for firfi of all they and their wives find out methods of expence, and to tliis purpofe ftrain and difobey the laws ; one obferving and rivalling another, the generality become of this kind ; and proceeding to greater defires of making money, the more ho- nourable they account this to be, the more will virtue be thought difhonourable. Virtue is fb different from wealth, that they always weigh againfl each other. Whilft wealth and the wealthy are held in honour in the city, both virtue and the good mult be more difhonoured, and what is honoured Plato. 193 honoured is purfued, and what is difhonoured is neglefted. Inftead then of ambiuous men, they will beconne lovers of gain. The rich they praife and admire, and bring into the magiftracy, but the poor man they defpife. They then make laws, marking out the boundary of the conftitu- tion, and regulating the quantity of oligarchic power, according to the quantity of wealth ; more to the more wealthy, and lefs to the lefs : fo that he who hath not the valuation fettled by law, is to have no fhare in the government. Vv hat think you of this conftitution ? If we fhould appoint pilots according to their valuation, but never entruft a fhip with a poor man, though better fkilled in his art, we fliould make very bad navi- gation. Again, fuch a city is not one, but of necefiity two ; one, confiding of the poor, and the other of the rich, dwelling in one place, ,and always plotting againfl one another. They are, moreover, incapable to wage war, becaufe of the necefiicy they are under, either of employing the armed multitude, and of dreading them more than the enemy, or to appear in battle, truly oligarchic, and at the fame tim^e be unwilling to advance m.oney for the public fervice, through a natural difpofition of covetoufnefs. In fuch a government almoit all are poor, ex- cept the governors ; and where there are poor, there are fomewhere concealed thieves, and purfe- cutters, and facrilegious perfons, and workers of all other evils : thefe the magiliracy with dili- gence and force reftrains ; thefe are drones in a city with dangerous ftings. This is oligarchy. Now let us confider the man who refembles it. The change from the ^^mb!- tious to the oligarchic man is chiefly in this mian- VoL. I. P ncr : 194 Ancient Republics, i^c. ner : The ambitious man has a Ibn^ who emu-- lates his father, and follows his fteps ; afterwards he dafhes on the city, as on a rock, wafting his fubftance in the office of a general, or fome other principal magiflracy; then falling into courts of juftice, deftroyed by fycophants, flripped of his dignities, difgraced, and lofing all his lub- ftance. When he has thus fuffercd, and loft his fubftance, in a tenor he puflies headlong from the throne of his foul that ambitious difpofition ; and, being humbled by his poverty, turns to the making of money, lives fparingly and meanly, and applying to work, fcrapes together fubftance. He then feats in that throne the avaricious difpo- fition, and makes it a mighty king within himfelf, decked out with Perfian crowns, bracelets, and fcepters. Having placed the virtuous and ambi- tious difpofition low on the ground, he reafons on nothing but how lefler fubftance ftiall be made greater, admires and honours nothing but riches and rich people. This is the change from an ambitious youth to a covetous one, and this is the oligarchic man. Democracy is next to be confidered, in what manner it arifes, and what kind of man it pro- educes when arifcn. The change from oligarchy to democracy is produced through the infatiable defire of becoming as rich as pofTible. As thofe who are governors in it, govern on account of their poflcf- fing great riches, they will be unwilling to reftrain by law fuch of the youth as are diffolute, from having the liberty of fquandering and wafting their fubftance ; that fo, by purchafing the fub- ftance of fuch perfons, and lending them on ufury, they may ftill become richer, and be held in greater honour. While they negled: education, and fuller the youth tc grow licentious, they fome- Plato. i<)5 fomcnmes lay under a neceffity of becoming poor, fuch as are of no ungenerous difpofition : thefe fit in the city, fome of them in debt, others in contempt, hating and confpiring againfl thofc Xvho polTefs their fubftance, and with others very defirous of a change. But the money-catchers, ftill brooding over it, and drawing to themfelves exorbitant ufury, fill the city \mh. drones and poor. They negleft every thing but making of money, and make no more account of virtue than the poor do. When thefe governors and their fubjecls meet on the road, at public fhows, in military marches, as fellow foldiers or failors, or in common dangers, the poor are by no means contemned by the rich. A robuft fellow, poor and fun-burnt, befide a rich man, bred up in the fhade, fwoln with flcfli, and panting for breath, and in agony in battle, thinks it is through his own and his fellows fault that fuch men grow rich, and fays, Our rich men are good for nothing. The city foon grows into fedition between the oligar- chic and democratic parties; and the poor prevail- ing over the rich, kill fome and banifh others, and Ihare the places in the republic, and the mjagiitra- cies, equally among the remainder, and for the moll part the magiftracies are dilpofed in it by lot. In what manner do thefe live, and what fort of republic is this ? A democracy. The city is full of all freedom of action and fpeech, and liberty to do in it what any one inclines : every one will regulate his own method of life in what- ever way he pleafes. In fuch a republic will arife men of all kinds. This is the fined of all republics, variegated like a robe with all kinds of flowers, and diverfified with all forts of man- ners. The multitude, it is likely, judge this re- public the bell, like children and women gazing P 2 at 196 Ancient Republics^ l^c, at variegated things. In truth, it contains all kinds of republics, and it appears neceflary for any one, who wants to conftitute a city, as we do at prefent, to come to a democratic city, as to a ge- neral fair of republics, and choofe the form that he fancies : he will not be in want of models. Is not this a f.veet and divine manner of life for the prefent ? To be under no neceffity to govern, although you were able to govern j nor to be fubjeft, unlefs you incline j nor to be engaged in war when others are ; nor to live in peace when others do {o^ unlefs you be defirous of peace; and though there be a law refiraining you from go- verning or adminiftering juftice, to govern never- thelefs, and adminifter juilice if you incline. Have you not obferved, in fuch a republic, men condemned to death or banifhment, continuing Hill, or returning like heroes, and walking up and down openly, as if no one obferved them ? Is not this indulgence of the city very generous, in mag- nificently defpifing all care of education and dif- ciplinc, and in not regarding from what fort of purfuits one comes to act in public affairs, but honouring him, if he only fay he is well-aff^efted towards the multitude ? Thefe things, and fuch as thefe, are to be found in a democracy ; and it would be a pleafant fort of republic, anarchical and variegated, diftributing a certain equality to all alike without diftinclion. Let us confider now the charafter of a democra- tical man, and how he arifes out of that parfimo- nious one who, under the oligarchy, was trained up by his father in his manners. Such a one by force governs his own pleafures, which are expen- five, and tend not to making money, and are called unnecefTary. Eaung, fo far as conduces to pre- fcrve life, health, and a good habit of body, is a plea* Tlato. 1 97 pleafure of the necefTary kind: butthedefireof thefe things beyond thefe purpofes, is capable of being curbed in youth ; and, being hurtful to the body and to the foul, with reference to her attaining wifdom and temperance, rnay be called unnecellary : in the fame manner we fnali fay of venereal dcfires, and others. We juft now denominated a drone, the man who was full of fuch defires and plea- fures J but the oligarchic man, him who was un- der the necefTary ones. The democratic appears to arife from the oligarchic man in this manner : When a young man, bred up without proper in- ftrudlion, and in a parfimonious manner, comes to taile the honey of the drones, and affociates with thofe vehement and terrible creatures, who are able to procure pleafures every v/ay diverfi- fied from every quarter; thence imagine there is the beo-innino: of a change in him from the oligarchic to the democratic. And as the city was changed by the affillance of an alliance from without, with one party of it with which it was of kin, fhall not the youth be changed in the fame manner by the alTiflance of one fpecies of defires from without, to another within him which re- fembles it, and is akin to it ? By all means. If any alTiftance be given to the oligarchic party within him by his father, or the others of his family, ad- moni hing and upbraiding him, then truly arifes (edition and oppofition, and a fight within him with himfelf. Sometimes the democratic {)arty yields to the oligarchic ; fome of the defires are deftroyed, others retire, on the rife of a certain modefty in the foul of the youth, and he is again rendered fomewhat decent. Again, vvhen fome de- fires retire, there are others akin to them, which grow up, and through attention to the father's joftrudtions, become both many and powerful^ P 2 draw 19^ Ancient RepuhUcs^ &-c, draw towards intimacies among themfelves, and generate a multitude, feize the citadel of the foul of the youth, finding it evacuated of noble learning and purfuits, and of true reafoning, which are the beft watchmen and guardians in the underftand- ings of men beloved of the gods ; and then falfe and boafting reafonings and opinions, rufhing up in their ftcad, pofTefs the fame place in fuch a one, Thefe falfe and boarting reafonings, deno- minating modefty to be (tupidityi temperance, un- manlinefs; moderation, ruiticity; decent expence, illiberality ; thruft them all out difgracefully, and expel them their territories, and lead in, in triumiph^ infolence and anarchy, and luxury and impu- dence, with encomiums and applaufes, fliining with a great retinue, and crowned with crowns. Infolence they denominate education; anarchy, li- berty ; luxury, ma,gnificence ; and impudence, manhood. In this manner, a youth, bred up with the neceffary defires, changes into the licentiouf- nefs and remilTnefs of the unneceffary and unprofi- table pleafures ; his life is not regulated by any or- der, but deeming it pleafanc, free, and happy, he puts all laws whatever on a level ; like the city, he is fine and variegated, and many men and wo- men too would defire to imitate his life, as he hath in him a great many patterns of republics and of manners. It remains, that we go over the moft excellent republic, which is tyranny, and the miOfl: excellent man, who is the tyrant. The change is from de- mocracy to tyranny, as from oligarchy to demo- cracy. An infatiable defire of riches, and a neg- letSt of other things, through attention to making mioney, deftroys oligarchy ; and an infatiable third of liberty deftroys democracy. When a city is under a democracy, and is thirfting after li- berty, 4 Plato. 1 99 berty, and happens to have bad cup bearers, and grows drunk with an unmixed draught of it, be- yond what is neceffary, it punifhes even the go- vernors, if they will not be entirely tanne, and af- ford a deal of liberty, accufing them as corrupted, and leaning towards oligarchy. Such as are. obe- dient to magiftrates are abufed, as willing flaves, and good for nothing. Magiflrates who refemble fubje<5ts, and fubjefts who refemble magiftrates, are commended and honoured, both in public and private -, in fuch a city they of nectflity foon go to the higheft pitch of liberty, and this inbred anarchy defcends into private families. The fa- ther refembles the child, and is afraid of his fons. The fons accuftom themfelves to refemble the father, and neither revere nor ftand in awe of their parents. Strangers are equalled with citizens. The teacher fears and flatters the fcholars, and the fcholars defpife their teachers and tutors. The youth refemble the more advartced in years, and rival them in words and deeds. The old men, fitting down with the young, are full of merri- ment and pleafantry, mimicking the youth, that they may not appear to be morofe and defpotic. The flaves are no lefs free than thofe who purchafe them ; and wives havt* a pertecl equality and li- berty with their hufbands, and hufbands with their wives. The fum of all tb.efe thin^^, colleled together, make the fouls of the citizens \o delicate, that if any one bring near to diem any thing of flavery, they are filled with indignation, and can- not endure it ; and at leng-nh tbev rczcird ?iot the laws, written or unwritten, that no one whatever, by any manner of means, may become their maf- ter. This is that Sfovernment fo c:fau;iful and youthful, whence tyranny I'prings. But any thing in excefs, in animial or vesfetablc bodies, P4 ^ ii^ 200 Ancient Republics, ^c, in feafons or in republics, is worrt to occafion a mighty change to the reverie ; and excefTive li- berty feems to change into nothing but exceffive flavcry, both with a private perlbn and a city. Thus licentioufnefs deflroys the democracy. Out of no other republic is tyranny conftituted but out of democracy ; and out of the mod excefTive liberty, tlie greateft and m.oft favage flavery. The race of idle and profufe men, one part of which was more brave, and were leaders, the other more cowardly, and followers, were compared to drones, fome with fVino-s, others with none. Thefe two Springing up in a republic, raife dirturbance, as phlegm and bile in a natural body. Let us divide a democratic city into three, as it really is; for one fuch fpecies as the above grows through licentioufnefs in it, no lefs than in the oligarchic, but is much more fierce : in oligarchy, becaufe it is not in places of honour, but is debared from the magiftracies, it is unexercifed, and does not be- come Itrong ; but in a democracy this is die pre- liding party, excepting a few ; and now it fays and does the moft outrageous things. Some other party is now always feparated from the multitude; and while the whole are fomehow in purfuit of gain, fuch as are the moft temperate become the weakhieft, and have the greateft quantity of ho- ney ; hence the greateft quantity of honey, and what comes with the greateft eafe, is prefied out of thefe by the drones. Such wealthy peo- ple are the pafture of the drones. The people who mind their own affairs, and meddle not with any others, who have not much property, but yet are the moft numerous, and the moft pre- valent in democracy, zvhenever it is fully ajfe ruble dj would be a third fpecies : but it will not often fully afTemble, if it does not get fome fhare of the honey. It does, however, always get a fhare, for their Pto. 201 their leaders rob thofe who have fiibftance and give it to the people, that they may have the inoft themfelves. Thefe, then, who are thus defpoiled, are obliged to defend themfelves, faying and doing all they can among the people. Others, then, give them occafion to form defigns againft the people, and fo they become oligarchic, even although they fhould have no inclination to introduce a change of government : thence they go to accufations, lavv-fuits, and contefts, one with another, the leaders flandering, and the drones ftinging. The people are wont always to fet fome one in a confpicuous manner over themfelves, to cherifh him, and greatly to increafe his power. When- ever a tyrant rifes, it is from this root, and from nothing elfe, that he bloffoms. What then is the beginning of a change from a prefident into a tyrant? The wolf in the temple of Arcadia, de^ dicated to Lyccean Jupiter, had this infcription, " That whoever tafted human entrails, mixed with other facrifices, necefTarily became a wolf." In the fame manner, he who, being prefident of the people, and receiving an extremely flibmiffive multitude, abflaineth not from kindred blood, but unjufily accufmg them, and bringing them into courts of judice, ftains himfelf with blood- Hied, and baniflies and flays, and propofes the abolition of debts and divifion of lands ; muit not fuch a one either be defboyed by his enemie--, or exercife tyranny, and, from being a man, be- come a wolf? He now becomes feditious towards thofe who have fubllance, and when he fails he goes againft his enemies with open force, and be- comes an accomplifhed tyrant j and \i they be unable to expel him, or put him to death by an accufation before the city, they confpire to cut him off privately by a violent death. On this accountj ioi jinclent Republics , &c. account, all thofe who mount up to tyranny in- vent the celebrated tyrannical demand of the peo- ple, certain guards for their perfons, that the afllftance of the people may be fecured to them. The people, afraid of his fafety, but fecure as to their own, grant them. Then thofe who have fub- ftance, and rhe crime of hating the people, fly ; and if any one of them is caught, he is put to death. This prefident of a city, thus not behaving like a truly great man, tumbles down many others, and fits in his chair a confummate tyrant, inftead of a prefident of the city. Confider now the hap- pinefs of the man and the city in which fuch a mortal arifes : in the firft days, he fmiles and far lutes every one he meets, fays he is no tyrant, pro- mifes many things, both in private and in public, frees from debts, distributes lands both to the peo- ple in general and thofe about him, affefts to be mild and of the patriot fpirit towards all. But when he has reconciled to himfelf fome of his foreign enemies, and tranquillity is reftored, he raifes wars, that the people may want a leader, and that, being rendered poor by the payment of taxes, they may be under a neceflity of becoming intent on a daily fuftenance, and lefs ready to confpire againft him. If he fufpeftsany of them, who are of free fpirits, will not allo.v him to govern, in order to have fome pretext for deftroying them, he ex- pofes them to the enemy. On thefe accounts, d, tyrant is always under a neceflity of raifing war. While he is doing thefe things, he muft become more hateful to his citizens : fome of thofe who have been promoted along with him, and are in power, fpeak out freely, both to him and among themfelves, finding fault with the tranfactions. It behoves the tyrant then to cut off all thofe who are of a more manly fpirit, if he means to govern, till he he leave no one, friend or foe, worth any thing 5 he muft carefully obferve who is courageous, mao-- nanimous, wife, rich, and of neceffity he muft be an enemy to all thefe, and lay fnares, until he cleanfe the city of them. Thus he muft live with wicked people, and be hated bv them too, or not live at all -, the more he is hated, the more guards he will want. But the worthy men being de- ftroyed, the word muft be his guards. What a blefled pofTeflion ! But this army of the tyrant, fo beautiful, fo numerous, and multiform, muft be maintained. If there be any facred things in the city, thefe they will fpend, and the people obliged to pay the lighter taxes. When thefe fail, he and his drunken companions and aftfjciates, male and female, fhall be maintained out of the paternal in- heritance ; and the people who have made the tyrant fhall nourifh him. If the people be en- raged, and fay that they did not make him, to be llaves CO his Haves, but that they might be fet at liberty from the rich in the city, who are no\y called good and worthy men, and order him and his companions to be gone out of the city, as a father drives out of his houfe his fon, with his tumultuary, drunken companions ; then, indeed, the people fhail knov/ what a beaft they are them- felves, and what a beaft they have generated, hugged, and bred up. While they are the weaker, they attempt to drive out rhe ftronger. The tyrant will ftrip them of their armour. The peo- ple, defending themfelves againft the fmoke of flavery, have fallen into the fire of defpotifm; in- ftead of that excefTive and unfeafonable liberty, embracing the moft rigorous and wretched flavery of bondm.en. Thus, to fpeak modeftly, we have fufficiently fhewn how tyranny arifes out of de- mocracy, and what it is after it is rifen. END OF THE IGHTH BOOK, THE 204 Ancient R^puhlicSy &c, THE NINTH BOOK. THE tyrannical man hirnfclf remains yet to be confidered, in what manner he arifes cue of the democratic, and what kind of man he is, 'and whether he is wretched or happy : of thole pleafures and defires which are not neceffa.ryyfoms arerepugnant to law, thcfe, indeed, appear to fpring up in every one, but being chaflifed by the lau'Sy and the better defires, along with reafon^ they cither forfake fbme men altogether, or are lefs in number and feeble j in others they are in greater num.ber and more powerful. Thefe lawlefs defires are fuch as are excited in fieep, when the rational part of the foul which governs it is afleep, and the part which is brutal and favage, being filled with meats and drunkennefs, friflcs about, and pulhing away fleep, wants to go and accom- plifh its practices ; in fjch a one it dares to do every thing, as being loofed and difengaged from all modefly and difcretion -, for it fcruples not the embraces, as it imagines, of gods, men, or beafts ; nor to kill any one ; in one word, is wanting in no folly nor impudence. There is in every one a certain fpecies of defires, which is terrible, fa-. vage, and irregular, even in fome who feem to us to be entirely moderate. Recoiled now what kind of man we faid the democratic one was ; educated from his infancy binder a parfimonious father, who valued the avaricious defires alone; but being afterwards converfant with thofe who are more refined, run- ning into their manner, and all fort of infolence, from a deteftation of his father's parfimony ; how- ever, having a better natural temper than thofe who corrupt him, and being drawn oppofite ways, he fettles into a manner in the middle of both, and participating moderately, as he imagines, of each 2, of Plato. 20^ of them, he leads a life neither illiberal nor licen- tious, becoming a democratic man from an arifto- cratic. His Ion is educated in his manners, buc the fame things happening to him as to his father, he is drawn into all kinds of licentioufnefs, which is termed, however, by thofe who draw him off", the mod: complete liberty. His father, the do- meftics, and others, are aiding to thofe defires which are in the middle: but when the tyrant- makers have no hopes of retaining the youth in their power any other way, they contrive to ex- cite in him a certain love which prefidcs over the indolent defires, and fuch as minifter readily to their pleafures j and when other defires make a noife about him, full of their odours and per- fumes, and crowns and wines, and the pleafures of the mod diffblute kind, then truly he is fur- rounded with madnefs as a life guard, and that prcfident of the foul rages with phrcnzy, till he kills all modefty, is cleanfed of temperance, and filled with additional madnefs. This is the for- mation of a tyrannical man. After this there are feaftings among them, and revellings, banquetting, and miftrefles, and all fuch things as may be ex- pe6ted where the tyrant's love, drunkennefs, and madnefs govern all in the foul. After this there is borrowing and pillaging of fubftance, and fearching for every thing which they are able, by rage and phrenzy, deceit and violence, to carry off; pilfering and beguiling parents. When the fubftance of father and mother fails, he will break into houfes, rob in the ftreets, rifle temples. Thofe defires which heretofore were only loofe from their flavery in fleep, when he was yet tnhkr the lazvs and his father, when under democratic government, now when he is tyrannized over by his paffions, ihall be equally as loofe when he is awake, and from ^c6 Ancient RepuhUcSj and Opinions from no horrid flaughter or deed fliall he abftain j but the tyrant within him, livingwithout any rejiraint cf lazv and governtnenti fhalJ lead him on to every mad attempt. Such as thefe eftablifh as tyrant, the man who among them hath himfelf nnoft of the tyrant, and in greatefl (Irength within his own foul. If the city relucSts, he fhall bring in other young people, and chaftife his formerly beloved mother and father country^ as the Cretans fay. But liberty and true friendlhip the tyrannic difpofition never tailed. Let us finifh then our worft man J he will be awake fuch as we defcribed him afleep^ and he who appears the moil wicked, fhali really be the mofh v,'! etched j as many men as m.any minds ; as city is to city, as to virtue and happi- nefs, fo will man be to man j kingly government is the bed, and tyranny is the word. No city is more wretched than that which is under tyranny, Eor any more happy than that under regal power. Both the city and the tyrant fhall be flavifh, poor, timorous; and you will find more lamentations and groans, weepings and torments, than in any other city. We JI:ould not merely conje^ure about matters of fuch importance y but moji thoroughly inquire into themy by reafoning of this kind, jar the inquiry is concerning the moJi important matter, a good life and a bad. Such private men as are rich, and poflefs many (laves, have this rciemblance at leait of tyrants, that they rule over many : if they live fecurelyj and are not afraid of their domeftics, it is becaufe the whole city gives affiffcance to each particular man : but if a god fliould lift a man, his wife and children, with fifty flaves, out of the city, and let them down in a defart, in what kind of fear would he be about himfelf, his wife and children, left they Ihouid be deftroyed by the domeftics ? Such, of Pbilofophers. 267 Such, and much woife, is the tyrant in his tyrannical city ; envious, faithlefs, cowardly, un- juft, unfriendly, unholy, and a fmk and breeder of all wickednefs. Now tell me which is the firft and which the laft, as to happinefs, the regal, the ambitious, the oligarchic, the democratic, and the tyrannic man and city. The bed and jufteft is the happieft. Thus, Sir, you have fome of Plato's fentiments of morals and politics, how much they are to M. Turgot's purpofe, we may fhew in another let- ter ; mean time I am, &c. LETTER XXXIV. MY DEAR SIR, I PROMISED you to add to the refearches of Polybius and Plato, concerning the mutability of governments, thofeof Sir Thomas Smith, who, as he tells us, on the 28th of March, 1565, in the 7 th of Eliz. and 51ft year of his age, was am- baflador from that queen to the court of France, and then publilhed " The Commonwrealth of England," not as Plato made his Republic, Xeno- phon his Kingdom of Perfia, or Sir Thomas Moore his Utopia, feigned commonwealths, fuch as never were nor iTiall be, vain imaginations, phantafies of philoibphers, but as England flood, and was governed at that day. In his 7th chapter, and the two following, he gives US his opinion of the origin of a kingdom, an 2b8 Ancient Repi'Mics, and Opinions an ariftocracy, and democracy. The third he fuppofes to grow naturally out of the fecond, and the fecond out of the firft, which originated in patriarchal authority. But as there is nothing remarkable, either in favour of our fyftem or againft it, I fhould not have quoted the book in this place, but for the fake of its title. The con- ftitution of England is in truth' a republic, and has been ever lo confidered by foreigners, and by the mod learned and enlightened Englifhmen, although the word commonwealth has become unpopular and odious, fince the unfuccefsful and injudicious attempts to abolifh monarchy and ariftocracy, between the years 1640 and 1660. Let us proceed then to make a few obfervations upon the Difcourfes of Plato and Polybius, and fhew how forcibly they prove the necefiity of per- manent hv/s, to reftrain the pafTions and vices of men^ and to lecure to the citizens the bleffings of fociety, in their peaceable enjoyment of their lives, liberties, and properties ; and the neceflity of different orders of men, with various and op- pofite powers, prerogatives^ and privileges to watch over one another, to balance each other, and to compel each other at all times to be real guardians of the laws. Every citizen mufl: look up to the laws, as his mailer, his guardian, and his friend ; and when- ever any of his fellow citizens, whether magiftrates or fubjedts, attempt to deprive him of his right, he muft appeal to the laws ; if the ariftocracy encroach, he muft appeal to the democracy ; if they are divided, he muft appeal to the monarchical power to decide between them, by joining with that which adheres to the laws j if the democracy is on the fcramble for power, he muft appeal to the ariftocracy, and the monarchy, which by unit- of Pbilofophers. 209 5ng may reftrain it. If the regal authority pre- fumes too far, he mufl: appeal to the other two. Without three divifions of power, ftationed to watch each other, and compare each other's con- dud with the laws, it will be impofTibie that the laws (hould at all times preferve their authority, and govern all men. Plato has fufficiendy afierted the honour of the laws, and the neceffity of proper guardians of them ', but has no where delineated the various ordei-s of guardians, and the neceflity of a ba- lance between them : he has, neverthelefs, given us premifes from whence the abfolute neceflity of fuch orders and equipoifes may be inferred i he has fhewn how naturally every fimple fpecies of government degenerates. The ariftocracy, or am- bitious republic, becomes immediately an oligar- chy. What fliall be done to prevent it ? Place two guardians of the h'^'^ to watch the arifto- cracy : one in the fhape of a king, on one iide of it ; another in the fliape ot a democradcal afifem- bly, on the other fide. The ariftocracy, become an oligarchy, changes into a democracy. How fhall it be prevented ? By giving the natural arif- tocracy in fociety its rational and juft weight, and by giving it a regal power to appeal to againft the madnefs of the people. Democracy becomes a tyranny. Plow ftiall this be prevented ? By giving it an able independent ally in an arifto- cratical allembly, with whom it may unite againft the unjuft and illegal defigns of any one man. Vol. I. Q^ LETTER 2 10 Ancient Democratical RepublicSi LETTER XXXV* ANCIENT DEMOCRATICAL REPUBLICS. CARTHAGE, MY DEAR SIR, IN order to fhew 'the theory of Socrates, as re- ported by Plato, in a clearer light, and to be convinced that he has not exaggerated in his de- fcription of the mutability in the charaders of men, and the forms of government, we fhould look into the hiflory of thofe ancient republics from whence he drew his obfervations and rea- fonings. Although it is probable that Greece was his principal theatre, yet we may reafonably fuppofe that Carthage, and a multitude of other republics in Italy, befides that of Rome, were not unknown to him. The hiftory of Greece fhould be to our coun- trym.en, what is called in many families on the continent a boudoir J an odlagonal apartment in a houfe, with a full-length mirror on every fide, and another in the ceiling. The ufe of it is, when any of the young ladies, or young gentle- men if you will, are at any time a little out of humour, they may retire to a place, where, in whatever direction they turn their eyes, they fee their own faces and figures multiplied without end. By thus beholding their own beautiful per- ions. Carthage, 2 1 x fons, and feeing at the fame time the deformity brought upon them by their anger, they may re- cover their tempers and their charms together. A few Ihort flcetches of the ancient repubhcs will Itrve to fhew, not only that the orders we defend were common to all of them ; that the profperity and duration of each was in proportion to the care taken to balance them ; and that they all were indebted for their frequent feditions, the rife and progrefs of corruption, and their decline and fall, to the imperfedion of their ordei-s, and their de- fe6ls in the balance. As there are extant no writings of any Cartha- ginian philofopher, ftatefman, or hiftorian, we have no exadl information concerning the form of their commonwealth, but what appears in a few hints of Greek and Roman authors. Their com- merce and riches, their empire of the fea, and extenfive dominion of two thoufand miles on the fea-coaft, their obftinate military contefls with Rome, and the long duration of their govern- rnent, prove both that their population and power were very great, and their conftitution good ; ef- pecially, as for the fpace of five hundred years, their tranquillity was never interrupted by fedi- tion, nor their liberties attempted by the ambi- tion of any of their citizens. The national charafter was military, as well as commercial j and although they were avaricious, they were not effeminate. The monarchical power was in two fuffetes, the ariftocratlcal in the fenate, and the democra- tical was held by the people in a body. Thefe are faid to have been nicely balanced, but we know not in what manner. The chief magiftrates were annually elected by the people. The fena- QjL tors 212 Ancient Dcmocratical Repiihlki, tors were elefted too, and although it is not cer- tain, it is moft probable, by the people ; but it appears, that three qualifications were indifpen- fable in every fenator birth, merit, and wealth: this laft requifite rendered commerce honourable, even in the firft of the patricians and fenators themfelves, and animated the commercial genius of the nation. This government thus far refem- bles thole of the United States of America more than any other of the ancient republics, perhaps more than any of the miodern : but when we in- quire for the balance, it is not to be found. The luffetes had not more authority than Roman con- fuls ; they had but a part of the executive pov/er, and none of the Icgiilative : much of the execu- tive, and all the legiilative, was in the fenate and people : the balance then could only be between thefe two. Now it is impoffible to balance two aflfemblies, without introducing a third power; one or other will be mod powerful, and which- ever it is, it will continually fcramble till it gets the whole : in fad, the people here had the whole, as much as in any of our ftates j fo that while the citizens were uncorrupted, and gave their voces honeftly for fufFetes and fenators, all went well : and it is extremely remarkable, that with all their acknowledged eagcrnefs for money, this people were fo many centuries untainted with luxury and venality, and preferved their primi- tive frugality of manners, and integrity in elec- tions. As to the Roman accufations of infince- rity, there is no more reafon to believe them, than there would be to beiiev^ a Carthaginian who fliould retort the reproach. This, aS well as other inftances, may lead us to doubt the uni- verfality of the dodrine, that commerce corrupts manners. Carthage, 2 1 3 manners. There was another remarkable in- ftitution, that the fenate Ihould always be una- nimous; and if any one fenator infifted upon his own opinion againll all the reft, there could be no decifion but by an appeal to the people. This again gave a ftrong democratical caft to the conftitution. Such a tendency could only be balanced by the laws, which requiring a large fortune for every fenator and public officer, in order to fupport his dignity, and fecure him againll the temptations to corruption, coRuned the choice to the firfl: families and abilities uni- ted. This was liable to great objcdion, becaufe great abilities miglu often be pofieffed by men of obfcurer original, and fmaller property, v/ho were thereby excluded. To this law, never- thelefs, may be afcribed the duration of the republic. Another rem.arkable check, which was perhaps the original model from whence the Venetian in- quifition was copied, was a committee of one hundred and four members of the fenate, ap- pointed to watch the ambition of the great fami- lies. To this body all their admirals and gene- rals were required to render an account ot their condu(5t at the end of every year. Out of this body were eleiled a fub committee of five, who had very grec'.t power : their office was for life ; and they filled up their own vacan- cies out of the one hundred and tour, and all the vacancies, even in the one hundred and four, out of the fenate ; they had the fupreme tribu- nal of criminal jurifditlion. This power mull: have been terrible to all ; to die people, fenate, and fufietes ; yet it was the check which pre- ferved the ftate from fedition and convulfions. Q.3 1^ 214 Ancient Democratical Republics, It grew unpopular ; and the law which at laft made it annual and ele<5live, probably laid the foundation of the ruin of the comnnonweaith, by- changing the balance, and introducing the domi- natio plebis. The balances in this, the moft demo- cratical republic of antiquity, contrived by the people themfelv^es to temper their own power^ are extremely remarkable : the fuffetes repre- fented, like the confuls at Rome, the m?jefty of the commonwealth, and had a fhare of executive authority i the council of five had criminal jurif- diftion, and inquifitorial powers the one hundred and four were a body chofen out of the fenate, by the five, for their fupport ; then comes the fenate afUarge; and, laft of all, the people ac large. Here are five orders completely dillincfl, befides the necefTary l^gal qualification of great wealth : yet all thefe checks, although they pre- ferved the flare five hundred years, could not prolong its period above feven hundred j becaufe, after all, the balance was not natural nor effec- tual. The executive power was not feparated from the legiflative, nor the different parts of the legiflature properly divided or balanced : the exe- cutive power and judicial v*fere both chiefly in legiflative hands. The noble families thus fecured in poffefTion both of legiflative and executive power, could not be rcftrained by all the ligamicnts which had been contrived to preferve the equipoife between them and the people : they divided into two fac- tions, with the family of Hanno at the head of one, and that of Barcas of the other ; firfl at- tacked the council of five, whofe power was un- popular, as well as odious to the nobles ; eafily procured a lavv' to make that annually eledive, or^ Rome. 21^ or, in other words, an infirument always In the hands of the prevailing faction, as fuch a final! body, fo changeable, miift ever be, and over- turned the conilirution. The Romans had all the advantage of thefe diirenfions in the war, by which they finally deftroyed their rival power fo effedually, that fcarce a trace of it remains to be feen, even in ruins. Their virtues were not ex- tinguifhed to the lafi:, and fome of the greateft examples of patriotifm and heroifm were exhi- bited even in their expiring agonies. LETTER XXXVI. ANCIENT ARISTOCRATI^CAL REPUBLICS. ROME, MY DEAR SIR, DTONYSIUS Halicarnaflfenris has not only given us his own judgement, that the moft perfect form of government is that which con- fifts of an equal mixture of monarchy, arulocra- cy, and democracy, in the fpeech which he puts into the mouth of Valerius, but has repeated the fam^e fentiment in his own name in other parts of his work. In the feventh ledion of his fe- ^0|id book of the Roman AntiquitieSj he fay^ 0.4 ^? 2i6 Ancient Arlflocratlcal Republics. of Romulus, that he was extremely capable of inllituting the mod perfed form of govern- ment. And again, " I fball firft fpeak of the form of government he indituted, which I look upon, of ail others, to be the moft felf-fufii- cient to anfwer all the ends both of peace and war/' This is a mixture of monarchy, arifto- cracy, and democracy, extolled by Polybius, and is nearly the fame with that of Lycurgus, infti- tuted at Sparta about a hundred years before. As the constitutions of Rome and Sparta lafted fo many centuries longer than others of Greece and Italy, and produced efFecls fo am.azing upori the human character, we may rationally afcribe that duration and thofe effeds to this compofi- tion, although the balance was very imperfect in both. The legal power, both of the kings and people, in both, were unequal to that of the fe- nate, and therefore the predominant character in both was ariftocracy. In Sparta, the influence of the monarchy and democracy was derived chiefly from the oath taken by the kings and ephori to fupport each other. An authority founded thus in opinion, in religion, or rather fuperftition, not in legal power, would keep the fenate in fome awe, but not in any certain re- itraint. Romulus divided all the people into three parts, and appointed a perfon of the firft rank to be the chief of each of them. Then he fubdi- vided each of thefe into ten others, and appoint- ed as many of the braveft men to be the leaders of thefe. The greater divifions he called tribes, and the lefTer curiae : the commanders of the tribes were called tribuni ^ and thofe of the cu- rias, curiones. He then divided the land into thirty Rome. 2 1 7 thirty portions, and gave one of them to each curia. He diflinguifhed thofe who were eminent for their birth, virtues, and riches ; and to thefe he gave the name of fathers. The obfcure, the mean, and the poor, he called plebeians, in imi- tation of the government at Athens, where, at that time, thofe who were diftinguiflied b)^ their birth and fortune were called " well-born," to whom the adminidranon of government was com- mitted : and the reft of the people, who had no fliare in it, *^ hufbandmen." Romulus appoint- ed the patricians to be pricfts, magitbates, and judges. The inftitution by which every plebeian was allowed to choofe any patrician for his pa- tron, introduced an intercourfe of good officers between thefe orders, made the patricians emulate each other in adts of civility and humanity to their clients, and contributed to prefcrve the peace and harmony of Rome in fo remarkable a manner, that in all the contefts wliich hapf)v:ned for fix hundred and twenty years, they never pro- ceeded to bloodfhed. The king, according to the inftitution of Romulus, had f^veral important funftions, viz. i. Supremacy in religion, ceremonies, faciinccs, and worfhip. i. The guardianfhip of the laws, and adminiftration of juftice in all cafes, whe- ther founded on the law of nature, or the ci^^il law: he was to take cognizance of the greatell crimes in perfon, leaving the leiTer to the fenate; and to obferve, that no errors were committed in their judgements : he was to afiemble boih the fe- nate and the people ; to deliver his opinion firu, and purfue the refolutions of the majority. Ro- mulus, however, wifely avoided that remarkable Spartan abfurdity, of two kings. The 21 8 Ancient Anfiocratical Repuhlics, The fenate were to deliberate, and determine by a majority of votes, all quellions which the king fliould propofe to them. This inftitution alfo Romulus took from the conftitution of the Laccdasmonians. The kings, in both conftitu- tions, were fo far from being abfolute, that they had not the whole executive power, nor any negative upon the legiflaturej in Ihort, the whole power of the government was vefted in the fenate. The people had three privileges ; to choofe magiftrates (yet all the great employments muft be confined to the patriciansi) to ena6t laws; and to determine concerning war, when propofed by the king : but tiie concuirence of the fenate be- ing neceffary to give a iandlion to their decifions, their power was not without controul. To feparate the executive from the legiflative power, and the judicial from both, and to give the king, the fenate, and people, each a negative in the legifiature, is io fimple, and to us appears fo obvious an improvement of this plan, that it is furprifing it did not occur to Romulus, as weU as to Lycurgus : but, in thofe early times, per- haps neither kings, nor nobles, nor people, were willing to have their prerogatives and privileges fo exadly afcertained. The nobles^, in both na- tions, had almoft all the influence, and were, no doubt, as jealous of royal as they were of popu- lar power. It is certain that, although the go- vernment was called monarchical, it was in reality ariftocratical in an high degree. There is a remarkable example of ariftocratical art in the manner of obtaining the determination of the people : they were not permitted to vote in one coirimQn affembly 5 they were called in their cu- 2 ria? i Home, 219 rise ; the majority of votes in a curia decided its voice; and a majority of curise was the refolve of the whole people. Had Romulus died in peace, and left a fon, his monarchy would probably have defcended in his family ; but a conteft arofe immediately here (as it has done in all other nations where the peo- ple had not a negative, and where the executive power has been pardy in the hands of a king, iand partly in a fenate) between the king and the nobles -, and Romulus was put to death by the patricians, for aiming, as they pretended, at more power than his fhare. This enabled the patri- cians to carry their firft point; for it is always the firft point of the arifiocracy 10 make the firfl: magiftrate ele6live: in this they are always at firft joined by the people; but, after feeing the life which the nobles make of thefe ek<5lions a few times, the people themfelves have alvvays made it hereditary. Numa was chofen, a man of peace, piety, and humanity, who had addrefs enough to make the nobles and people believe that he was married to the goddefs Egeria, and received from his celeftial confort all his laws and meafures. Tullus Hoftilius, a man of great merit, was chofen in his ftead ; but after a glorious, at leaft a viftorlous reign of thirty-two years, was mur- dered by the patricians, headed by Ancus Mar- cius, grandfon of Numa by his only daughter, who thought his family-right prior to that of Tullius. Ancus was elefled king, and died a natural death. Lucius Tarquinius, after a reign of thirty- eight years, in which he had enlarged the terri- tory, beautified the city, and fhewn hlmfelf wor- thy 220 Ancient Ar'ijlqcratlcal Republics. thy of the crown, was afTaffinated in his palace by the two Tons of Ancus Marcius, who had learned the family policy : but their projecfl was unfortunate i the people loved Lucius, executed the inftrunnents of the murder, baniflied the two Ions of Ancus, and confifcated their eftates. Servius Tullius, who had married the daugh- ter of Lucius, was now elevated to the throne by the people, much againft the will of the fe- nate and patricians, becaufe Lucius v.'as not one of them, but of Greek extraction. Tullius was chiefly fupported by the people, always difagree- able to the patricians, who held his advancement to the throne to be illeo;al. The adminiftration of Tullius is an artful fyftem of duplicity, to preferve his charadcr, of the man of the people^ and, at the fame time, appeafe the fury of the patricians, by really undermining the authority of., the people, and throwing the whole power into their hands. In purfuance of his prin- ciple to pleafe both fides, he made excellent equitable regulations for regiftering tlie peoplcj^ eliablifliing a militia, and proportioning the bur- dens of war according to the property and abi- lities of all ranks ; but he fubdivided the fix clafles into one hundred and ninety-three cen- turies: the firft ciafs was compofed wholly of the rich, and contained ninety- eight of the cen- turies. If the centuries of the firft clafs were unanimous, as they generally were, they carried every point by a majority of three i if they dif- agreed, the centuries of the fecond ciafs were called i if they difagreed, the third came for- ward J and fo on, till ninety-feven centuries agreed: if the numbers continued equal, ninety- fix to ninety-fix, the fixth clafs was called, which \vas compofed wholly of the pooreft people, and contained, Rome, 221 contain^ but one century ; but even the votes of the fourth clafs were rarely called for, and the votes of the fifth and fixth were generally ulelefs. When the people voted by cuiiae, the vote of every citizen was given, and, as the poor were moll numerous, they were always fure of a large majority j but when thus taken by centuries, that numerous body of the poor which compofed the fixth century, were wholly infignificant, and thofe of the fifth and fourth very nearly fo. By chang- ing the votes from curia; to centuries, Tullius wholly changed the fundamental conftitution, and threw the elecElions of magiflrates, civil and mili- tary, the power of enacting and repealing laws, declaring war, and making peace, all into the power of the rich patricians. The people had not fenfe enough to fee this j nor to lee another thing of more importance, viz. that the king had been driven to the neceffity of this artful flattery of the patricians by his not being independent of them, and by their fharing with him in the executive power. Tullius had two daughters, married to the grandfons of his predecefTor, Aruns and Tarquinius. The patricians were ftili caballing againit Tullius, and fet up Tarquin, one of his fons-in-law, againft him; but as a ma- jority were not for his depofition, Tarquin and his impious and inceftuous wife joined the cabal in the murder of her firft hufband and her father. Tar- quin, in time, murdered, on ail hand2, patricians and plebeians. He was expelled by Brutus. This whole hiftory, from Romulus to Tarquin, is one continued ftruggle of the noble families for the firft place ; and another unanfwerable proof of the neceffity of having three orders, and each order independent, in order to form an effectual equilibrium. The peo^^le were very little 2 regarded 2 22 Jncient Arljlocratkal RepubUcs. regarded bv uvc fenatc or patricians ; the kings Only now and then courted the people for fup- port againft their rivals among the patrician fa- milies. The tyranny of Tarquin made the fiame of king odious and unpopular : the patricians, who were the princij^al condu6lors of the revolu- tion, took advantage of this ; for what ? To reftore and improve Rom.ulus's plan of a mixed government ? No ; but to cftablifh their favou- rite ariftocracy upon the ruins of monarchy. Two confulsj in imitation of the two Spartan kings, were to be eledled annually by the votes of the people, which carried the name of a democratical J)ower ; but the votes were taken by centuries, not by tribes, which made the patricians matters of the eleftions, and conftituted an ariftocracy in reality. From this moment a haughty faction of fetfifh patricians appears, who affeded to defpife the people, to reduce them to fervitude, and ef- tablifh a defpotic oligarchy. The people had fuf- fcrcd their prejudices to blind them fo far as to be tricked out of their king, who was at leaft a bet- ter friend to them than the patricians were, and now the contefts were wholly between patricians and plebeians : the former had now got the con- fuls, and confequently the executive power, as much in their hands as ever the nobles in Venice had their doge, or as the nobles in Poland have their king. The plebeians were now in a moft wretched fituation. They were obliged to ferve in the wars, to keep out the Tarquins and their allies, at their own expence, which frequently obliged them to borrow money at exorbitant intereft of the patri- cians, who had engrofled the greater part of the wealth ; and, as the country was often ravaged by the enemy, many loft all their effeds. Un- able Rome. 125 able to pay the principal, with accumulated loads of interefl upon intereft, they were frequently confined by their creditors in chains, and fcourged with whips ; for the law, to which they had fool- ifhly confented, had made the debtor a (lave to the creditor. The people began to demand an abolition of debts ; the fenate appointed a dila- tor. A confufion of foreign wars and domeftic diflenfions enfues, till we come to the (lory fo beautifully told by Livy and Dionyfius, of the man who had been in twenty-eight battles, who appeared before the people, and fhewed on his back the bleeding fears inflifted by a mercilefs creditor. At this time the patricians had plunged into their ufual difficulty, a violent conteft among themfelves, between a furious headlong party, which always appear for an oligarchy, and the moderate men, who defire to continue the arifto- cracy ; the young patricians generally follow the haughty Claudius, and the mild Valerius courts the people. The olig;irchy prevails, and the de- cemvirate is eftablifhed : their tyranny drives the people to the facred mountain ; and, at laft, the tribunate was eftablifhed. Here is the firft fymp- tom of any fyftem purfued by the people : this was a balance but what kind of balance ? No- body thought of another council, a houfe of re- prefentatives, who fhould have a negative ; and, if they had, it would not have availed without a king ; for fuch a new aifembly would foon have been either wholly fubjecSted to the fenate, or would have voted it ufelefs. In truth, the monarchical power being fuppreffed, and the executive autho- rity, as well as legiflative, being now only in the fenate and people, a ftruggle commenced between thefe two. The 424 Ancient Arifiocratkal RepublicL The people were on the fcramble foi" mctt power ; and firft obtained a law, that all laws paffed in their aflembly by tribes, fhoiild have equal force with thofe made in the aflembly by centuries j then, that all pofts and dignities fhould be enjoyed by the plebeians equally with the pa- tricians : and that the decrees of the people fhould have the fame force, and afFeft the patricians in the fame manner, as thofe pafTed by the fenate4 All this was very juft, and only brought the de- mocracy to an equality with the ariftocracy ; buc whenever thefe two are equal in legal power, nunbcrs will foon turn the balance in favour of the democracy, unlcfs there is a third power to intervene. Accordingly it fo happened, and the people W'Pnt on from itep to ftep, incrcafing their own importance, and diminifr; . viat of the fe- nate, until it v;as foirr" : : : up in Utica j but before this^ 'he '^''"]; , ^vere divided int-^ parties, and Ca::!^!-, :.l the head of one, pafled the Rubi- con, that is, fet the mod facred law of his coun- try at open defiance. From this time the govern- ment became a government of men, and the woril of men. From this example, as from all others, it ap- pears, that there can be no gov.-^rnment of laws without a balance, and that there can be no ba- lance without three orders ; and that even three orders can never balance each other, unlefs each in its department is independent and abfolute. For want of this, the ftruggle was firft between the king and fen ate j in which cafe the king mud alwa}'s give way, unlefs fupported by the people. Before the creation of triounes, the peo- ple were in no fenfe independent, and therefore could not fupport the kings. After the aboli- tion of kings, the fenate had no balance either way. Tacitus* 225 way, and accordingly became at once a tyran- nical oligarchy. When the people demanded their right, and obtained a check, they were not fatisfied ; and grafped at more and more power, until they obtained all, there being no monarchi- cal power to aid the fenate. But the moment the power became colle(5led into this one center, it was found in reality fplit into three ; and as Ca^far had the largeft of the three fhares, he in- ftantly ufurped the whole. LETTER XXXVII. ANCIENT MONARCHICAL REPUBLICS. TACITUS. DEAR SIR, BEFORE we proceed to the Greeks, we may even mention the favages. Every nation in North America has a king, a fenate, and a people. The royal office is eledlive, but it is for life; his fachems are his ordinary council, where all the national affairs are deliberated and refolved in the firfl: inftance: but in the greatefl of all, which is declaring war, the king and fachems call a national allembly round a great council iire, communicate to the people their refolution, and facrifice an animal. Thole of the people who approve tlje war, partake of the facrifice ; throw the hatchet into a tree, after the example of the Vol. I, R king^ 226 Ancient Monarchical RepuhUcs. king, and join in the rubfequent war fongs and dance?. Thofe who difapprovc, take no part of the lacrifice, but retire-. ANCIENT GERMANS. The ancient German nations mentioned by Ta- citus, had among them at Jeafl: two forrs of govern- ments. One was monarchy : and the l<.ing was abfolute, as appears by fhefe words : " Exceptis *' iis gencibus quae regnanturj ibi enim et luper *"* ingenues, et luper nobiles, afcendunt libeiti : " apud ccteros, impares libertini, libertatis argu- " mentum."* The other fpecies of governmenc was ariftocracy j for though there was a mixnure of monarchy, ariflocracy, and democracy, yet the power of the king and people was fo feeble, and that of the nobles, as comprehended under the titles of princes, dukes, and counts, was fo predominant^ * There cannot be a Wronger proof that this, that the monarchy was of the moft abfolute kind, that it was indeeti' a fimple defpotifm ; and Tacitus himl'elf gives the explana- tion of it, in his account of the original of this kind of flavery. " Aleam lobrii inter feria exercent, tanta lucrandi *' perdendive teineritate, ut, cum omnia defeceiimt, ex- ^' tremo ac noviffimo jaftu, de libertate et de cor])ore *' contendant. Victus voluntariam fervitutem adit ; quan- *' quam junior, qiianquam robuttior, alligari fe ac venire *' patitur : ea eif in re prava pervicacia ; ipii fidcm vocant. ** Servos conditionis hujus per commercia tradunt, ut fe *' quoque pudore victorice exfolvant. Liberti non nuiltum *' lupra fervos funt, rare aliquod momentum in domo, nun- " quam in civitate, excepris duntaxat iis gentibus qus " regnantur," Sic. ii in thefe nations thofe freedmen, who were nothing in the others, neither in the family or the Hate, were held in n:)ore eilimation, and advanced to more power, than the citizens, even than the nobles, thefe kings mult have been defpots, in the Ifidled fenfe of the word; othcnv'iie neither nobles nor people w^ould have fuftered the ifi dignity. that Tad t us, li'j that the government mud be denominated arif- tocratical. " De minoribus rebus principes con- *' fultant, de majoribus omnes; ita tiimeriy ut ea *' quoque, quorum penes plebem arbitrium eft, *^ apud principes pertradentur." If thole things which are mod clearly in the p )wer of the peo- ple, were firft difcuded among the nobles, the reference to the people afterwards feems to have been rather a comm.unication to them of the refult of C(." fenate, than a fubmiffion of it to the popular judgement. The nature and extent of the royal dignity and authority appears from thefe words : " Reges " ex nobilitate fumunt ; ncc regibus infinita aut ** libera poteftas." Kings were taken from the nobility, or kings were civofen for their noble de- scent ; fo that ordinarily the office defcended to the next of kin : but it is here exprefsly afcertained that their power was neither unlimited nor inde- pendent. They had no negative, and might in all things be over- ruled, at lead by the nobles and people conjoindy. The nature and extent of the ariftocratical dig- nities and authorities miay be collected from what follows : *'Ducesexvirtute fumunt; et duces exem- '^ p!o potius quam imperio,fi prompti.fi confpicui; " n ante aciem agant, admiratione prsfunt." The feudal hierarchy, even in thefe early times, was fully eitablifhed, although it was afterwards enlarged. The titles of dukes and counts, the rank and power they conferred, descended in families, although there was the bare formality of an election in the grand council. "Arma fuuiere, non ante cuiquam moris, ** quam ci vitas fufye^turum probaverit: tum, in ip- " fo confilio, vel principum a'iquis, vel pater, vet " propinquus, fcuto frameaque juvenem ornant. '^ infignis nobilitas, aut magna patrum merita, *' principis dignationem etiam adoiefcentulis af- R 2 '^' n.-rnant." 2 28 Ancient Monarchical Republics, " fignant." "When the young men were firft ad- " mitted into public fociety, it was in the great " council ; when fome one of the dukes, or the *^* father, or other relation, adorned the youth " with arms. And if he is of very noble birth, '^ or his father has great merit, the dignity of a ** duke is afllgned to him, young as he is." < From this it is pretty clear that the crown, as well as the titles of dukes and counts, defcended in the family line, although the formality of an ad- miflion into council was kept up. The nobles, among whom the king was little more than the firft among equals at leaft, he was not more fu- perior to the dukes, than the dukes were to the count: had the game in their own hands, and managed a rude people as they pleafed. This will appear probable from other paffages : " Cas- tcris robuftioribus, ac jam pridem probatis, ag- gregantur ; nee rubor inter comites afpici, gradus quinctiam et ipfe comitatus habet, judicio ejus quern fedantur. Magnaque et comitum ajmulacio, quibus primus apud prin- cipem fuum locus ; et principum, cui plurimi et acerrimi comites. Hasc dignitas, hffi vires, magno femper eledlorum juvenum globo cir- cumdari, in pace decus, in bello prsfidium ; ncc folum in fua gente cuique, fed apud fini- timas quoque civitates, id nomen, ea gloria eft, fi numero ac virtute comitatus emineat ; expetuntur enim legationibus, et muneribus or- nantur, et ipfa plerumque fama bella profli- gant. Cum ventum in aciem, turpe principi virtute vinci, turpe comitatui virtutem princi- pis non adasquare. Jam vero infame in omnem vitam, ac probrofum, fuperftitem principi fuo ex acie receftifte. Ilium defendere, tueri, fua quoque fortia fada gloriae ejus affignare, prse- " cipuun^ tad i us i2g ?' cipuum facramentiim eii. Principes pro vic- *' toria pugnant, comites pro principe. Si civi- '* tas, in qua orti funt, longa pace et orio torpenr, " plerique nobilium adolefcentium petunt ultro " eas nationes qus turn beiluni aliquod gcrunt ; " quia et ingrata genti quies, et faciiius inter " ancipitia clarefciin!:, magnumque coinitatuni " noa nifi vi bdloque tueare ; exigunt enim " principis iui liberalitate iUurn bellatorem " equum, illam cruentam viclriccmquc fra- ** meann : nain epuls, et quanquani incompti ^' largi, tamen, apparatus pro ftipendio cedunt ; *' materia magnificentise per bella et raptus. *^ Nee arare terrain, aut expeclare annum, tam ** facile perfuaferis quam vocare hodrs, et f vulnera mereri ; pigraai quinimo et incrs vi- " decur, fudore acquirere quod pofiis ianguine '^ parare." When the foregoing ties, by which the people or the common foldiers were attached to the nobles, and the young and inferior nobles to the fuperior^ are confidered, a better judgement may be formed of the authority which the people really had iri the grand council or national af- fembly. The powers and privileges of the people^ in aflenibly, appears from the following paliages : ^' Cceunt, nifi qu.d fortuitum et fubitum incide- V rit, certis diebus, cum aut inchoatur luna aut " impletur ; nam agendis rebus hoc aufpicatifTi- *^ mum initium credunt. Illud ex libertate vi- '' tium, quod nonjimid nee jujfi con-veniurj^ isid et *' alter et tertius dies cunttatione coeuntium ab- '^ fumitur." By this it fhould feem that the peo- ple were fo far from efteeming the privilege ot meetii g, that the king and nobles could fcarcely get them together. They had liich an. averfion to R 3 thefr cjo Ancient Monanhical RepukUcs. thefe civil and political deliberations, that the chiefs could baldly collfct rlie'Ti to receive th-^ir order?. '^ Uc tu: b;"e p'acu.t, cop.Hdu.it armati. " Siie.'Kiii.n pc/ UC' . dore;., cj'iibuj tuin et coer- " c -ndi iu.-^ r'l. iiiVj^L'. :icijr. Mox r^-jc, vq\ prin- " ceps, proiir str'.s ciiuuf^, prour n:>bilitas, prouc *' dccui DeJlo:u:ii, proiic f^cundii, audiuntur, " au6loritafe fui"*:-.''!;!: magis quam jubexii po- ** rcirar^. Si diijdi'.uit frntenri;?, frcTiiitLi nfpr^r- " na.rajr ; fm piaciiir, f amt-as concutiuatj* Plrrc is fome appearance of po. u'^r liberty : but when it is confidered ha* the nobles vveiepro- bablv ail the fpetKe.s ; tr.at the numbers were not counted, nor voices dillinclly taken ; affenr cx- prefTed by a clafh of arnns, and difient by a mur- mur or a groan ; and efpecially the dependence of the people on their leaders, and attachment to them by oath ; we may confider thefe aflemblies raiher as called to receive the proclamation of the laws or minds of the nobles, than as any efteclual democratical check. There was one thing, how- ever, of great importance, done in thefe alTemblies ; judges, the poffe comitatus, andju: ies, were here appointed to ^dminifhcr juftice. *' Eliguntur in *' iifdeai conciiiis et principes, qui jura per pa- " gos vicoique reddunt. Centeni lingulis ex " plebe comitcs, confilium fiinul et audoritas, " adfunt." An hundred commoners attended the judge, and out of thefe were juries appointed to give their opinion, " confilium ;" and others, or perhaps the fame, to afford their aiTiilancej " audoritas," in putting the fentences and judge- ment into execution. From other particulars related by Tacitus, it is very probable there had been communications between Germany and Greece ; from the wor- ihip of Hercules, M-irs, Minerva^ &c. -, if not from Tiidfus, 231 from the altar ofUlyfTt-s, and the name of Laer- tes, and the other monuments and infcriptions in Grefk letters, of which he fpcaks more doubt- fully. However this may have been, there is a remarkable analogy between thefe political infli- tutions of the Germans, and thofe defcribed by Homer in the times of the Trojan war. It wa?, in both, the prerogative of the king to lead in war, and to rule in peace ; but it is probable he was not fond of deliberating, any more than of fighting, without company : and though he may have done both fometiires, yet numbers of his followers were ready to attend him in either. The nation acknowledged him for their leader j but they wefe accuftomt-d, on great occafions, to affem.ble, and, without any IKidied form of demo- cracy, took the fovereigrty upon themfelves, as often as their pafTions were ilrongly enough af- fefled to unite them in a body. The fuperior clalfes, among themfelves, cam.e as naturally to hold their meetings apart j and afiembkd fre- }uently, when the occafion was not fufficient to engage the attention of the whole. There is one remarkabie diu'erence between the Germans and the Greeks. Among the form.er, the prieds were a diflin<5l body, and feem to have had more de- cifive authority than the kings, nobles, or people, in the general affeuiblies " Silentium per facer- " dotes, quibus turn et coercendi jus ell, im.pe- " ratur :" whereas, among the latter, the kings were themfelves at the head of the priefthood. In this fecond kind of German governments, we fee the three orders of king, nobles, and com- mons, diitindly marked, but no balance fixed, no delineation of the powers of each : which left room for ti2i.zh to claim the fovereignty, as we know they afterwards did; at kaft the king and R 4 the 23- Ancient Monarchical Republics. the nobles claimed and contended for it for nnany ages : the people fometimes claimed it, but at laft gave it up to the king, as the leaft evil of the twp, in every country except England. LETTER XXXVIIL HOMER. PH^ACIA. DEAR SIR, IN the kingdom, or rather ariftocracy, of Phse- acia, as reprefented in the Odyfley, we have a piftiire at full length of thofe forms of govern- ment which at that time prevailed in Greece. There is a king Alcinous;' there is a council of twelve Other kings, princes, archons, or peers, for they are called by all thefe names , and there is a multitude: but the laft do not appear to have any regular, legal, or cuftomary part in the government; They might be fummoned together by the heralds, or called by the found of trumpet, or a horn, to receive information of the refults of their chiefs j to affift at a facrifice or proceffion ; to fee a flranger or a fhow, or to partake of a feaft ; or they might aflemble of themfclves in a rage againft an oppreflbr, from enthufiafm for the royal fcepter, or other canfes : and the kings had often much dependance on their attachment to their hereditary right, their defcent from the gods, and the facred authority of the poets, who were generally royaiifts. The archons, too, were often afraid of the fuperftition of their people for the king, and his regal popularity. But the legal 3 power Homer. 233 power of the people was very far from being a tonftitutional check; and the ftruggle lay be- tween the kings and nobles. The lail finally pre- vailed, as they ever will againft a king who is not fupported by an adequate popular power. The authority in Phicacia was collected into one center, and that center was thirteen kings confederated together under a p.efident only. Each archon was a king in his own ifland, ftate, or diftrid, in which his dignity and power A'ere hereditary ; and in cale of a foreign war he commanded his own divifion in the general camp. Ulyfles is reprefented, at his firft entrance into the Phsacian dominions^ as obferving and admir- ing the palaces of the archons, after having fur- veyed the gardens, palace, and particular territory of Alcinous : He next their princes lofty dom.es admires, In feparate iflands crown'd with rifing fpires. Od. vii. 57. Alcinous is afterwards reprefented as defcribing the form of government to UlylTes : Twelve princes in our realm dominion fhare. O'er whom fupreme imperial pow'r I bear. Od. viii. 425. Mr. Pope, indeed, in his tranflation, has given him the air of a fovereign; but there is nothing like it in the original. There Alcinous, with all pofiible limplicity and modefty, only fays, " Twelve illuftrious kings, or archons, rule over *< the people, and I myfelf am the thirteenih." Alcinous and his twelve archons were all prefent at this interview ; Night 2^4 Ancient Monarchical Republics. Night now approaching, in the palace (land, "With goblets crown'd, the rulers of the land,&c. Od. viii. 182. The nobles gaze, with awful fear oppreft ; Silent they gaze, and eye the godlike gueft, &c. Od. viii. 192. Pleas*d with his people's fanne the monarch hears^ And thus benevolent accofts the peers, &c. Od. viii, 421. Th' afTenting peers, obedient to the king, In hafte their heralds fend the gifts to bring. Od. viii. 433. The precious gifts th' illuftrious heralds bear. And to the court th' embodied peers repair. Od. viii. 453. Then to the radiant thrones they move in ftate. Aloft the king in pomp imperial fate. Od. viii. 457, We muft not forger the poet, who, with his infpiration from the Mufes, was a principal fup- port of every Grecian king. It was the bard who lung the praifes of the king, and propagated the opinion that he was fprung from Jupiter, and inftrudted as well as dearly beloved by him. The bard an herald guides ; the gazing throng Pay low obeifance as he moves along. Od. viii. 515. Beneath a fculptur'd arch he fits enthron'd. The peers, encircling, form an awful round. Lives Homer. 235 Lives there a man beneath the fpacions fkies, IVho facred honours to the bard denies ? The iVlure the bard hjipires, exalts his mind; TheMufc, indulgent, loves th' harmonious kind. O, more than man! thy foul the Mufe inipires. Or Phcebus animates with all his fires. Od. viii. 532. Every peer, in his own diftricft or ftate, had another lubordinate council, and a people j lb that the thr^'f powers, ot the one, the few, and the many, appcartrd ir) every archonfliip ; and every aichon, in his o'.vn diftrift, claimed his office to be hereditary in his family : and all the archons agreed together to fupport each other in this Claim, even by arms. This, therefore, was raiher a contederacv of thirteen little kingdoms, than one great one. The firfl: archon of the confedera- tion was called king of all the people, and claimed his ofHcc as hereditary, and often as abfolute. The other archons were always difpofed to dif- pute the hereditary defcent, and to make it elec- tive. The fubordinate councils of the archons, 'in their kveral diftrifis, were probably often dif- pofed to deny their offices to be hereditary, and to infill upon ele6tions. Ulyffes, who was him- feli one of the greateft and ableft of the Grecian kings, discovers his perfect knowledge of the hearts of Alcinous, his queen, and nobles, in the compliment he makes them. AddrefTing him- feif to the queen, the daughter of great Rhexenor, To thee, thy conforr, and this royal train. To all that ihare the bleffings of thy reign, ***** * So may the gods your better days increafe. And all your joys defcend on all your race; So 23^ -^^cient MouarcrAcal Republics, 5o reign for ever on your country's breaftj. Your people biciling;, by your people bled. This fupplicatlon was addreffed to the king and queen, the princes, archons, dukes, counts, barons, peers, call them by what name you pl^afe, 9,nd it concludes with a compliment very flattering to all. UlyfTes knew the ruling paffion of Grecian kings and nobles to he, that their dignities, even fuch as had been conferred by the eiecftion of the people, fhould become hereditary. Mr. Pope has difguifed this fentiment, and made it conformable to the notions of Englifhmen and Americans;; but has departed from the fcnfe of Homer, an^d from the fact : " May you tranfmit to your children your " pofleffions in your houfes, and whatever gifts, *' rewards, or honours the people hath given ^'you." It is plain the kings claimed an hereditary right; yet the fuccefTion was fomietimes fet afide in favour of fome other noble, or branch of the royal blood : and perhaps it was always fet afide when any one of the nobles had more power than the heir appa- rent. The nobles, too, claimed their honours to be hereditary ; and they generally were fo : but the people were fometimes bold enough to fet up Com,petitors> and give them trouble. But, per- haps, there were never any very formal elections ; prefenting a fucceflbr, in prefence of the king and ;he other nobles, to the people for their acclama- tions, was probably the mod that was done : for as there were no records, nor written conftitution, or laws, the right of kings, archons, and people, muit have been very loofe and undefined. LETTER^ Homer, a^^* LETTER XXXIX. HOMER. ITHACA, DEAR SIR, THE court of Ithaca, in the abfence of Ulyf- fes, is an admirable example of the intrigues of the archons, and their infatiable ambition. The throne of Ithaca, and the fccpter of Laertes and former kings, were the objects which had fo many charms in the eyes of the fuitors; and Penelope's hand was chiefly courted, becaufe that would re- concile the archon who fhould poffefs her to the fuperftition of the people, and enable them to wield the fceptre. The luitors deny the fcepter to be hheredicary ; and Telemachus himfelf is doubt- ful : he threatens, indeed, to call a council or af- fembly of the people, but is afraid to trull them ; for fear they fhould fet up fome other Grecian prince, whofe blood might be nearer that of their ancient kings. To tempt the fpoufelefs queen with amorous wiles, Refort the nobles from the neighbouring iiles ; From Samos, circled with th' Ionian main, Dulichium, and Zacynthus' fylvan reign : Ev'n ^3$ Ancient Monarchical Republic s. Ev*n with prefuniptuous hope her brd t' afcend. The lords of ithaca their right pretend. Od. i. 315. My fentence hear; with ftern diftafle avow'd. To their own diftiids drive the luitor crowd. Od. i. 352, I to the peers affembled fhall propofe The firm relolve I here in few dilclofe; No longer live the cankers of my court. All 10 your fever al Jlafes with fpeed refort; Wafte in wild riot what your land allows. There ply the early feaft and late caroufe. Od, i. 475, If ruin to our royal race ye doom. Be you the fpoilers, and our wealth confume ; Then might we hope redrefs from jufter laws. And raife all Ithaca to aid our cauie : But while your fons commie th' unpunifh'd wrong. You make the arm of violence too ftrong. Od. 11. 83. Ele<5l by Jove his delegate of fway, With joyous pride the fumm.ons I'd obey. Should fadtious pow'r difpute my lineal right, ****** Some other Greeks a fairer claim may plead. To your pretence their title would precede. At leail, the fcepter loll, 1 ftill fliould reign Sole o'er my vallals and doncieftic train. Od, i. 501, To heaven alone Refer the choice to fill the vacant throne ,- Youf 4 Homer, 2J9 Your patrimonial dates in peace pofTefs, Undoubted all your filial claim confefs : Your private right fhould impious power in- vade. The peers of Ithaca would arm in aid. Od. i. 509. It is thus agreed on all hands, that, as one of the archons, his hereditary title of his eftates, vaf- fals, and government, was indifputable. This was the common caufe of all the archons, and they would arm in fupport of the claiin of any one. But the throne and fcepter of Ithaca were to be difpofcd of by augury, by the will of Jove, fignified by fome omen. To this Telemaclius pays fome refpe61:, but ftill infifhs on his right of blood ; and fays, that if the omen fhould be un- favourable to him, it would not promote the hopes of any of the archons of Itlmcaj but fjme other Greeks, nearer of kin to the royal blood, would fet up their claims. The archons, not likely to fucceed in their fcheme of getting the Icepter by the marriage of Penelope, nor by per- fuading Telemachus to fubmit the queftion to Jupiter and his omens, and afraid to appeal to the people, or to call them out in arms to dif- pute the fucceflion, knowing the family o( Laer- tes and Uiyfies to be more popular than them- fclves, they take the refolution to aiTairmate the young prince. But die he ftiall ; and, thus condem.n'd to bleed. Be now the fcene of inilant death decreed : Wait ye till he to arms in council draws The Greeks, avene toojintly to our caufe; Strike, ere the ftaces conv'^en'd the foe betray. Our murd'rous ambul]] on die wat'ry way. Of j%o Ancient Monarchical Republics. Or choofe, ye vagrant, from their rage to fly, Outcafts of earth, to breathe an unknown Iky ? But if fubrrjiffive you refign the fway. Slaves to a boy, go flatter and obey j Ketire tve inftant to our native reign. Nor be the wealth of kings confum'd in vain. Od. xvi. 386, Tclemachus had before declared, that if any archon of Ithaca, or any other Greek, obtained the fcepter, he Would no longer remain in the confederation, but would reign feparately over his paternal domain. Now Antinous declares^ that if the reft of the archons iubmit to the boy> he will not, but will retire to his native archon- fliip. Amphinomus afcends. Who o'er Di^ichium ftretch'd hisfpacious reign> A land of plenty, blefs'd with ev'ry grain. O friends, forbear, and be the thought with- ftood! 'Tis horrible to flied imperial blood ; Confult we firft th' all-feeing pow'rs above. And the fure oracles of righteous Jove. Neither in Poland nor in Venice was the arif- tocratical rage to render weak, unfteady, and un- certain^ the royal authority, m.ore confpicuous than it was here. They were afraid of the peo- ple and the auguries j but neither was a legal check : and we fliail fee hereafter, that thefe fl:ruggles of the archons very foon abolifticd every monarchy in Greece, even that of Sparta, until it was renewed upon another plan by Lycurgus, And the fame prcgrefs of paflions, through fcdi- tions, rebellions, and maflacres, muft, for ever, take Homer, 241 take place in a body of nobles againfl the crown, where they are not efiedlually reftrained b^ "^ independent people, known and eftablifhed in the legiflature, colleclively or by reprefentation. That the Grecian kings, claiming from Jupi- ter, and fupported by their auguries and ba ds, thought themfelves abfolute, and often punifhed the crimes of the archons very tyrannically, is true. Ulyfles is an example of it. Inftead of bringing the fuitors to trial before the nation, or their peers, he fhoots them all, without judge or jury, with his own bow. A more remarkable aflertion of a claim to abfolute monarchy cannot be imagined. Antinous would retire to his native diftridt, and fpcnd his revenues among his own people, not confume his royal wealth by attendance at a court of a confederation which would be no longer to his tafte. This was a popular fenti- ment in his own dominions j his people wifhed to have their king refide among them, and were very willing to have the confederacy broken. This principle it was that afterwards crumbled ail che Greek confederations to duft. Vol. I. S LETTER 142 Ancient Monarchieal Republics* LETTER XXXIX. ANCIENT MONARCHICAL REPUBLICS. ilOMEE:. MY DEAR SIR, THE fimilitude between the ancient Greek nnonarchies, as they are generally called, though the predominance of ariftocracy in all of them is very manifeft, and the feudal ariftocracies defcribed by Tacitus, is very obvious. The de- mocratical power is neverthelefs much more re- gular, though not independent, in the latter; for, in addition to what is before quoted, it ap- pears, that the judicial authority was commonly exercifed in national aflemblies ^' Licet apud. " concilium accufare quoque, et difcrimen capi- *' tis intendere. Diftinflio poenarum ex delifto, " proditores et transfugas arboribus fufpendunt ; *' ignavos, et imbelles, et corpore infames, coeno " ac palude, injeda infuper crate, mergunt. Di- '' verficas fupplicii illuc refpicit, tanquam {cq- " lera oftendi opporteat dum puniuntur, fiagitia *' abfcondi. Sed et levioribus delidlis, pro modo *' poenarum, equorum pecorumque numero con- *' vidti multantur j pars multze, regi vel civitati, ** pars ipfi qui vindicatur vel propinquis ejus " cxfolvitur." Although the mixture of monarchy, arifto- cracy, and democracy, is vifible in the republic of 'Corner. 245 tirPhseacia, yet the king appears little more among the archons than the firft among equals, and the authority of the people is dill more faint and fee- ble. In khaca there appears a (Irong claim of fovereignty in the king, and as ftrong a preten- fion to it in the archons j and, although the peo- ple nre dreaded by both, and their claim to in- terfere in the difpofition of the crown is impli- citly acknowledged, yet it feems rather to be as judges of certain religions ceremonies, by which the will of Jupiter was to be colledled, than as any regular civil authority. Homer was a royaiift, at lead as much as Plato and Ariftotle : *' Jove loves oiir chief, from Jove his honour fprings, " Beware ! for dreadful is the wrath of kings. "' Be filent, wretch 1 and think not here al- low'd " That word of tyrants, an ufurping crowd : " To one fole monarch Jove commits the fway j " His are the laws and him let all obey. //. ii. 233241. The name of a republic is not found in any of h'i's writings : yet, in every Grecian government defcribed by him, we find a mixture, not only of an ariltocracy, confiding in a council of princes, but of a democracy, in an affembly of the people. Agamem.non, in the fecond Iliad, calls toge- ther the whole body : Bid him in arms draw forth th' embattled ttain, Lead all his Grecians to the dudy plain. S 2 Tht 244 Ancient Monarchical Republics. The king difpatch'd his heralds with commands To range the camp, and fummon all the bands. The gath'ring hofts the monarch's word obey. While to the fleet Atrides bends his way: In his black fhip the Pylean prince he found, There calls a fenate of the peers around. Th' aflembly plac'd, the king of men expreft The counfels labouring in his artful breaft : Friends and confed'rates ! with attentive ear Receive my words, and credit what you hear j 111 fits a chief who mighty nations guides, Direfts in councils, and in war prefides. To whom its fafety a whole people owes. To wade long nights in indolent repofe. Now, valiant chiefs ! fince Heav'n itfelf alarms. Unite, and roufe the fons of Greece to arms ; But firft with caution try what yet they dare. Worn with nine years of unfuccefsful war. To move the troops to meafure back the miain. Be mine, and yours the province to detain. The kings, without delay, Diflblve the council, and their chief obey. The fcepter'd rulers lead^ the following hoft, Pour'd forth by thoufands, darken all the coall. Nine facred heralds now, proclaiming loud The monarch's will, fufpend the liil'ning crowd. The king of kings his awful figure rais'd, High in his hand the golden fcepter blaz'd ; Ye fons of Mars ! partake your leader's care. Heroes of Greece, and brothers of the war. Fly, Grecians, fly ! your fails and oars employ. And dream no more of heaven-defended Troy 1 His deep defign unknown, the hofts approve Atrides' fpeech ; the mighty numbers move. It Homer. 245 It appears from the whole narration, that the great body of the people were difcontented, and defirous of raifing the fiege. The king, alarmed, was obliged to call them together, with an artful defign to obtain their confcnt to perfevere. Ke feigns an intention to return home ; the people were rejoiced at it. Then Ulylfes and the other chiefs, in concert with Agamemnon, receives the fcepter of command, and endeavours to perfuade the people to make another effort. To this end Ulyfles harangues them : He runs, he flies through all the Grecian train: Each prince of name, or chief in arms ap- pro v'd. He fir'd with praife, or with perfuafion mov'd. But if a clamorous vile plebeian rofe. Him with reproof he check'd, or tam'd with blows : Be flill, thou flave, and to thy betters yields Unknown alike in council or in field ! Ye gods! what daftards would our hofl com- mand ! Swept to the war, the lumber of the land. Be filent, wretch ! and think not here allow'd That word of tyrants, an ufurping crowd. With words like thefe the troops UlylTes rul'd. The loudeft filenc'd, and the fierccft cool'd. Back to th' aflembly roll the thronging train, Defert the fhips, and pour upon the plain, Therfites only clamour'd in the throng. Loquacious, loud, and turbulent of tongue : Aw'd by no fhame, by no refpctl controul'd, In fcandal bufy, in reproaches buld, With witty malice, ftudious to defame. Scorn all his joy, and laughter all his aim : S 3 Eu- l4^ -Ancient Monarchical Repuhlks^ But chief he gloried, with licentious ftilc To lafh the great, and monarchs to revile. Spleen to mankind his envious heart poffeft. And much he hated all, but moft the bed ; XJlyfles or Achilles ftill his theme. But royal fcandal his delight fupreme. Long had he liv'd the fcorn of ev'ry Greek, Vext when he fpoke, yet ftill they hea,rd him fpeak. If from this only, and the fubfequent harangue pf Therfites, we were to form a judgement, we ftiould conclude, that popular aflem.blies were very frequent, and that the freedom of fpeech in them was far advanced and well eftablifhed ; but the furious anfwer of UlylTes, and the unmerciful flogging he gives him for his boldnefs, in the face of the whole aflembly, which is applauded uni- verfally, fhews, that the demagogues had yet but very little influence, very little courage, and that popular afiemblies had a,s yet very little conftitu- tional power. The principles of government were very little underftcod, and all the political inftitutions ex- tremely confufed, in the times of the Trojan war, and from thence to Homer's time. Nothing was precifely defined ; no laws were written. The moft diftin6t rules which are no\y to be traced, were a fupremacy in kings, in religion and war : fometimes they exercifed judicial power. Monar- chies were generally hereditary ; yet a right of the nation to interfere, and alter the fucceffion, is admitted. The right of the fons of the archons to fucceed to their eftates and diftridls, was an agreed point among them ; but thefe very archons ^*hofe to keep open to competition the fyccvflipn 4 ^% Homer* 14."] to the throne, fo that there might always be room for the pretenfions of the moll powerful, who would eafily make themfelves thought the mod worthy. The mofi: celebrated kings, when ad- vanced in years, and unable to fuftain the fatigues of war, and cares of government, were obliged to refign their power. The anxiety of Achilles, ex- preiTed to Ulyfles in the fhades, is a proof of this : Say, If my fire, the reverend Peleus, reigns Great in his Pthia, and his throne maintains ? Or, weak and old, my youthful arm demands To fix the fcepter ftedfaft in his hands ? Oh, might the lamp of life re-kindled burn. And death releafe me from the filent urn ! This arm, that thunder'd o'er the Phrygian plain. And fwell'd the ground with mountains of the flain, Should vindicate my injur'd father's fame, Crufh the proud rebel, and afiert his claim. ! Od. ii. 605. Kings and their families, claiming their defcent and power from Jupiter, contended very natu- rally and confiftently, that the one was heredi- tary, and the other abfolutcj and accordingly, when the prince who fwaycd the fcepter was adive, brave, and able, he kept the archons in awe, and governed as he pleafed ; but when he was feeble, the archons grew ambitious, difputed the fuccefiion, and limited the royal power. To this end both they and the kings, or heirs of kings, fomecimes looked to the people, and jeemed to admit in them a right to be prefcnt S 4. ap 248 Ancient Monarchical RepuhHcs. at the religious ceremonies bv which the will of* Jupiter was to be declared ; for all parties agree, thdt the will of Jupiter confers the fcepter, not the mere elcftion of the people. The right of primogeniture was favoured by popular opinion, as well as hereditary defcent, becaufe the fimily was the family of Jupiter, re- lated to hnrij and defcended from him by blood j and it was natural to fuppole, that Jupiter's in- clinations for deicent and primogeniture refembled thofe of other fathers of families. The chiefs, who are all called kings, as well as the head of them, or archons, were like the Teutonic counts or feudal barons, who exercifed royal rights within their own diftridls, dates, or feparate territoriL's. This principle preferved the real and legal power chiefly in their hands, and conftituted the whole government more properly an ariilocracy than a royalty. This gave an un- controulable pride to thefe nobles, which could not willingly fubmit to the pretenfions of the kings fas reprefentatives of Jupiter) to omnipo- tence, at leatl to unlimited power. Hence the coiitinual ftruggle between the kings and archons, from Homer's time to that ereat and memora- ble revolution throughout Greece, from monarchy to ariftocracy ; that is, from kings to archons. The people not yet pofiVfilng nor claiming an authority fufficiently regular and independent to be a check to monarchy or ariftocracy, the latter at laft prevailed over the former, as it ever did, and ever will, where the conteft is merely between thefe two. The people, only in extraordinary cafes, in the moft ellential matters, and when the chiefs were greatly divided, were at all confulted -, yet, in the courfe Homer. i^'(^ courfe of the ftruggle between the kings and ar- chons, the multitude were fo often called upon, and fo much courted, that they came by degrees to claim the whole power, and prepared the way, in many of the Grecian ftates, for another fubfequent revolution, from ariftocracy to demo- cracy. Through the v.'hole of Tacitus and Homer, the three orders are vifible both in Germany and Greece j and the continual flu6tuations of law, the uncertainty of life, liberty, and property, and the contradictory claims and continual revolu- tions, arofe entirely from the want of having the prerogatives and privileges of thofe orders defined, from the want of independence in each of them, and a balance between them. LETTER XL. ANCIENT ARISTOCRATICAL REPUBLICS. LACED^MON. MY DEAR SIR, FROM the days of Homer to thofe of Licur- gus, the governments in Greece were mo- narchical in name and pretenfion, but ariftocra- tical in reality. The archons were impatient of regal government, conftantly ftruggling agahift their kings J and had prevailed in every other city, except ^^o Ancient Arijlocratical RepulUcs. except Sparta, to abolifii the royal authority, and fubftitute an ariftocracy of archons in its place. In Lacedasmon, too, where there were eight and- twenty archons contending againfc two kings, they had brought the whole country into the ucmoft confufion. The circumflance of two kings, which, perhaps, prolonged the regal power longer in Sparta than in any other city, originated in the fbndnefs of a mother. Ariftodemus, one of the dependents of flercules, to whofe fhare Laconia fell, upon the diyifion of the Peloponnefus, after the return of that family from banilhment, leaving twin fons, Eurifthenes and Procles, their mother refufing to determine which had the right of pri- mogeniture, it was agreed that both fhould fuc- ceed to the crown with equal authority, and that the pofterity of each fhould inherit. The nobles took advantage of all the jealoufies which arofe between the two families, obliged each to court them, and from time to time to make them con- celTions, until the royal authority v/as lofl; and as the archons could not agree, each party now began to court the people, and univerfal anarchy prevailed. Lycurgus, of the family of Procles, and only- in the tenth defcent from Hercules, fucceeded his brother Polidedes i but being told his brother's widow was with child, he declared himfelf pro- te6tor only, and refigned the crown. Such a dif- interefted indifference to a crown in any one of royal or noble blood, was fo unexampled in that age, that no wonder it was much admired and very popular. The ambitious princefs, his filter, offered to marry him, and remove out of his way the only competitor by procuring an abortion. He deceived her by counterfeited tendernefs, and diverted her from the thoughts of an abortion, by promifin^ Lace daemon, 251 promlfing to take the difpofition of the child upon himlelf when it fhould be born. The infant was fent to him when at fupper with the principal magiftrates ; he took it in his arms, and cried, *'A " king, Spartans, is boJn to you," and placed it in his own feat. The company were touched at the tendernefs of the fcene, and fell into a tranfport of enthufiafm, both of piety to the blood of Her- cules, and admiration of die difinterefted integrity of LycurguSj who, like an able ftatefman, per- petuates the memory of the event, and the joy at it, by the name with which, upon the fpot, he chriftens the boy, Charilaus, the people's joy. But all this exalted merit, added to his acknowledged divine defcent, and the undoubted polTeflion of royal power, were not fufficient to over-awe the jealoufy of jhe nobles, a ftrong party of whom joined the irritated queen and her brother, and raifed continual fadlions againft him. Weary of cabals, and ftimulated with a thirft for knowledge, he determined to travel j vifited Crete and Egypt, the two fources of the theology and policy of Greece; and brought home with him, on his re- turn to his own country, Thales the poet, and the writings of Homer, with the refolution of adopting the martial difcipline and politicalliber- ty which he read in the poet, and had feen exem- plified in Crete. Nothing could be better calcu- lated than his two poets, to infpire the natioa with that enthufiafm which he wanted, and con- firm the belief, that kings were from Jupiter, and beloved by him, excepting the refponle of the oracle, which he took care to procure : " Wel- " come, Lycurgus, to this happy place ; thou ** favourite of Heaven ! I (lind in doubt whether *' I fhall pronounce thee god or man : inclining S^ flill to think thou art a 2;od !" Herodotus. 252 Ancient Arljlocratlcal Repuhlics. The diforders in Sparta were now become in- fupportable ; the kings had as little authoruy as the laws. All parties, except the two kings, in defpair of their private fchemes, applied to the great legiflator, pointed out to all, by his divine original, the ini'piration of Homer and Thales, his own integrity, wifdom, knowledge, and com- jnanding authority over the minds of m.en, as well as his fpecial divine milTion pronounced by the oracle, to be the only man capable of new- modelling the conftitution. In Crete he had acquired a deep infight into human nature, at lead he had informed himfelf fully of the length and breadth, the height and depth, of the palTion of ariibition in the human heart ; that complication of affcdion% which is called by fo many names j the love of efteem, of praife, cf fame, of glory j that {cn((t of honour in which Montcfquieu tells us monarchies are foun- ded J which Tacitus tells us made the ancient Teu- tons fubmit quietly to be fold by their inferiors,, when they had gambled away their liberty ; which at this day eniorces fo pundtual a payment of debts of honour contradled at play ; which fup- ports, againft all laws throughout Europe, the cuftom of duelling, and produces more fuicides. than any other caufe ; which is commonly known by the denomination of the point of honour^ and may with as much propriety be called ambition 5 Lycurgus appears to have undeiftood better than any other legiflator, and to have made the foun- dation of his inflitution : for this reafon, Plato with great proprietv calls it " The ambitious Republic." Lycurgus in fecret confulted the nobles, but not the kings ; formed a powerful party, called an afTembly of the people, before whom his friends 2 appeared Lacediemon, ^^'^ appeared in arms. Charilaus and Archilaus were not in rhe fecret, but found themfelves obliged to fubnnit. What is all this but a body of nobles completing, by the aid of Lycurgus, that aboli- tion of monarchy which they had been purfuing for ages, unreftrained by any legal check in the people, and unrefifted by any adequate power in the crown ? But what was his new inllitution ? In compliance with old prejudices, and from attachment to his family, he confirmed the two fami'ies on the throne, ellablilhcd the hereditary defcent of the crown, but limited its authority. The kings were to continue high priefts, to be commanders in chief of the armies, and prefidents of the fenate. Charilaus and Archilaus, terrified by the fate of all the other kings of Greece, agreed to accept of a certain, though limited au- thority, in lieu of pretenfions more abfolute and more precarious. The ancient dignities of the nobles were con- firmed and enlarged : a fenate of eight-and twenty of their chiefs was formed, at the head of whom the two kings were placed. To the people he committed the election of future fenators ; but as the prefent twenty-eight were for life, and the influence of kings and fenators would be com- monly ufcd with great unanimity in favour of the eldeft fon, to fill up a vacancy made by the death of his father ; and as the people were not permitted to debate, their choice was, perhaps, little more than a confent by acclamations to a nomination made by the king, and amounted to the fame thing with an hereditary houfe of peers. To this fenate the whole executive power was committed, and the moft im;portant part of the legiflative ; for as all laws were to originate there only, they had a n::gai;ive before debate. Here is ^54 Ancient Arifdcrattcal Repuhlics. is, indeed^ all authority nearly collefted into oit6 center, and that center the nobility ; for the king was but the firft annong equals, having no nega- tive upon the fenate. If the legiflature had refted here, his inftitution would have been in effe6l a finnple hereditary oligarchy, poiTefled of the whole legiflative, executive, and judicial power, and probably as reftlefs as ever to reduce the kings to eleftions for life, or years, and then to take from them the power of religion, the command of armies, and then to change the title from king to archon, or from the family of Hercules to other houfes. With a view to counter- balance this dangerous authority, he inftituted aflTemblies of the people, but intruded them only with the power of confirming or rejedling what the fenate propofed, and exprelsly forbade them all debate. The citizens were to give their fimple ayes or noes without being allowed to fpeak, even fb far as to give a reafon for their vote. He in- ftituted, moreover, as a farther check upon thcr fenate, five magiftrates to infpeft the adminiftra-^ tion, and maintain the conftitution ; to convoke^ prorogue, and diflblve both the greater afTembly of the people, compofed of nine thoufand inhabi- tants of the city, and the leffer, confiding of thirty thoufand inhabitants of the country or infe- rior villages. Thcfe magiftrates were called the ephori_, and were to be annually appointed. Bur the lawgiver faw that the king and people were both too weak, and the fenate would itill have power to fcramble after both ; he therefore con- trived a kind of folemn alliance to be perpetually renewed between the monarchical and democrati- cal branches, by which the fenate might be awed into moderation. He ordered an oath to be takeri every month by the kings and the ephori : th former Lacedi^mon, 255 former fwore to obfcrve the laws, and the latter fwore, for themfelves and the people whom they reprefented, to maintain the hereditary honours of the race of Hercules, to revere them as minif- ters of religion, to obey thera as judges, and fol- low them as leaders* This was indeed a balance founded in opinion and in religion, though not a legal and independent check, as it was not a ne- gative in either. In this conftitution then were three orders, and a balance, not indeed equal to that of England, for want of a negative in each branch, but the neareft refembling it of any we have yet i^tn. The kings, the nobles, the fenate, and the people in two afiemblies, are furely more orders than a governor, fenate, and houfe. The balance here attempted was as ftrong as religion operating on human nature could make it, though not equivalent to a negative in each of the three branches. Another balance was attempted, in the rigorous feparacion of the city from the country, in two afTemblies : it avoided the danger of jea- loufies between town and country in the delibera- tions of the people, and doubled the chances both of the monarchy and democracy, for preferving their importance in cafe o\ encroachments by the fenate. If the fenate and nobles fhould prevail in one aflembly of the people fo far as to carry any unconftitutional point, the kings and ephori would find a refource in the other to lead them back. The Lacedemonian republic may then, with propriety, be called monarchical, and had the three elTcntial parts of the beft poffible go- vernment ; it was a mixture of monarchy, arifto- cracy, and democracy. It failed, however, in that elTential particular, the balance. The arifto- cracy had a legal pov\'er, fo eminent above that of king or people, that it would foon have annihili- lated 1^6 Ancient Arljlocratical RepuhUcs. lated both, if other preca'itions had not been taken, which deftroyed a!l the real merit of this celebrated inftitution. That the glory of the defcendents of Hercules, and of their republic, might be the pride of every citizen, and that a fuperftitious attachment to both might be perpe- tuated, it was necefiary to extinguifh every other appetite, pafTion, and aftcclio;-!, in human nature. The equal divifion of property ; the banifhment of gold and filver ; the prohibition of travel, and intercourfe with flrangersj the prohibition of arts, trades, and agriculture j the difcouragement of literature ; the public meals ; the inceflant war- like exercifes ; the doftrine, that every citizen was the property of the ftate, and that parents fhould not educate their own children ; although they ferved to keep up the conftant belief of the divine miffion of Lycurgus, and an ethufiaftic pafTion for the glory of the republic, and the race of Her- cules y and although they are celebrated by the ariftociatical philofophcrs, hiftorians, and ftatef- men of antiquity ; muft be confidered as calcu- lated to gratify his own family pride, rather than promote the happinefs of his people. Four hun- dred thoufand flaves muft be devoted to forty thoufand citizens j weak and deformed children muft be expofed ; morality and humanity, as well as all the comforts, elegancies, and pleafures of life, muft be facrificed to this glaring phantom of vanity, fupcrftition, and ambition. Separated from the reft of mankind, they lived together, dcftitute of all bufinefs, pleafure, and amufement, but war and politics, pride and ambition j and thefe occupations and paffions they tranfmitted from generation to generation for feven hundred years ; as if fighting and intriguing, and not life *xid happinefs, were the end of man, and Ibciety ; Lacedanron. 2^y- ^s if the love of one's country and of glory were amiable paffions, when net linnired by juftice and general benevolence ; and as if nations were to be chained together for ever, merely that one family might reign among them. Whether Ly- curgus believed die defccnt of his anceftor frorn Jupiter, the divine infpiration of Homer and Thales, or the divinity of the Oracle, any more than Mahomet believed his divine miffion, may well be doubled. Whether he did or nor, he fhackled the Spartans to the ambitious views of his family for fourteen fuccellions of Herculean kings, at theexpence of the continual difturbancc of all Greece, and the conftant mifery of his owa people. Amidft the con traditions of ancient and modern writers^ that account has been followed concerning the inilitution of the ephori, which appears moft favourable to Lycurgus. The Ro- man tribunes, and, perhaps, the Venetian inquifi- tors, were borrowed from this inftitution. Human nature perifhed under this frigid fyftem of national and family pride. Population, the fjreft indication of national happinefs, de- Creafed fo flift, that not more than one thoufand old Spartan families remained, while nine thoufand ftrangers had intruded in fpite of all their prohi- bitory laws. The conquelt of Athens gave them a ta(te of wealth, and even the fear of the penalty of death could not reftrain them from travelling. Ihtercourfe with ftrangers brought in foreign manners. The ephori were fometimes bribed. Divifions arofe between the two kings, Agis and Leonidas: one joined with the people, ihe other with the nobles^ and the fedition proceeded to blood. Kings became lb fond of fubfidies from foreign powers, that Agefilaus received them from a king of Egypt, and his enemy at the fame Vol. I. ' T time. 25 8 Ancient Ar'tjlocratlcal RepiiMlcs. time. Agis was murdered by the order of the ephori, who, inftead of honouring the blood of Hercules, according to their oath, took the fove- reign power into their own hands. Here the balance broke ; Cleomenes, who endeavoured like Agis, to reftore the old laws and maxims, fell a facrifice, and nothing appears afterwards in the hiftory of Sparta but profligacy, tyranny, and cruelty, like that in Rome under the worlV of the Ciefars. The inflitution of Lycurgus was well calcu- lated to preferve the independence of his country, but had no regard to its happinefs, and very lit- tle to its liberty. As the people's confent was neceflary to every law, it had fo far the appearance of political liberty ; but the civil liberty of it w^is little better than that of a man chained in a dun- geon y a liberty to reft as he is. The influence of this boaffed legiflation on the human chara6ler was to produce warriors and politicians, and no- thing e]fe. To fay that this people were happy, is to contradidl every quality in human nature, ex- cept ambition. They had no other gratification: fcience and letters were facrificed, as w^ll as com- merce, to the ruling paffion ; and Milton had no reafon to " wonder how mufelcfs and unbookifli " they were, minding nought but the feats of *' war," fince it was not fo much becaufe Ly- curgus was '^ addiifled to elegant learning, or " to mollify the Spartan furlinefs wich fmooth " longs and odes, the better to plant among ^ them law and civility," that he brought the fcattered works of Homer from Ionia, and Thales from Crete, but merely to propagate his own and his family impoflure. The plan was profound, and means were, with greac ability, fitted to the end: but as a iy^QiXi of legiflation, which ihould never Lacedamon. 259 never have any other end than the greateft happi- nefs of the greateft number, faving to all their right Si it was not only the leaft rerpe6lable, but the nnoft deteftable in all Greece. To do it juf- tice, however, it is much to be defired, that exercifes like thofe eflablifhed by Lycurgus, run- ning, wreftling, riding, fwimming, fcating, fen- cing, dancing, fhould be introduced into pub- lic and private education in America, which would fortify the bodies and invigorate the minds of youth; inftead of thofe fedentary amufements which debilitate, and are taking entire pofTeffion of fociety all over the world. The ladies, too, might honour fome of thefe entertainments, though riot all, with their prefence and participation, to the great advantage of their own health, and that of pofterity, without injury to their charms, or their reputations. But, above all, the exiilence of an all-perfe6l Intelligence, the parent of nature, the wife and moral ruler of it; the refponfibility of every fubordinate intelleftual and moral agent; a future ftate of rewards and puniihmenis ; and the facred obligations of oaths, as well as of the relative duties of focial life, cannot be too clearly fixed by rational arguments in the minds of all the citizens. In this refped Lycurgus merits praife. But as a civil and political conftitution, taken all together, it is infinitely inferior to another which Americans have taken for their model. The Englifh conditurion is the refult of the mod ma- ture deliberation on univerfal hiftory and philo- fophy. If Harrington's council of legiflators had read over the hiftory, and ftudied the conftitution of every nation ancient and modern, remarked the inconveniencies and defe6ls of each, and bent the whole force oi their invention to difcover a T 2 remedy c6o Ancient Democratlcal Republics. remedy for it, they would have produced ncr other regulations than thole of the Engliflr conftitution in its theory, unlefs they had found a people lb circunnftanced as to be able to bear an- nual eleftions of the king and fenate. This inn- provement the Americans, in the prefent ftage of ibciety among them, have ventured on ; fenfible, however, of the danger, and knowing perfectly well a remedy, in cafe their eledlions fhould be- come turbulent. Of this, at prefent, there is ncr appearance. LETTER XLI. ANCIENT DEMOCRATICAL REPUBLICS. ATHENS* MY DEAll SIR, CECROPS, an Egyptian^, conducted a colony' that fettled in Athens, and firft engaged the wandering Ihepherds and hunters of Attica to unite in villages of hufbandmen. Although the government of Egypt was an abfolute monarchy, he found it neceflary to eftablilli his own upon a more limited plan. The two rival families of Perfeus and Pelops anciently contended for the dominion of the Gre- cian peninfula. The fortune of the defcendants of the latter prevailed, and their fuperior profperity led them to perfecute their enemies. The de- fcendants of Hercules, who was a fon of Jupiter by Alcmena, of the line of Ferfeus, was itripped of all their pofleffions, and driven into exile. After a feries of misfortunes, Temenus, Crefphontesj and Athens. 261 and Ariftodemus, defcendants, in the fifth degree, from Hercules, conduced an expedition into Greece, and conquered the whole country. The governments of the little dates of Greece, in the firft ages, though of no very regular and certain <:onftitudon, were all limited monarchies. When, therefore, the Heraclicles poffeffed them- felves of Peloponnefus, they eflablifhed every where that hereditary limited monarchy, which was the only government aflimilatcd to the ideas and temper of the age, and an equality among themfelves. Thofe vigorous principles oi arifto- cracy, and ibme traces of the fpirit of democracy, ~ which had always exifted in the Grecian govern- nients, began to ferment ; and, in the courfe of a few ages, monarchy was every where abolilhed : the very nanne of king was profcribed ; a repub- lic was thought the only government to which it became men to fubmit j and the term tyrant was introduced to denote thofe who, in oppofition to thefe new political principles, acquired monarchi- cal authority. Ablolute monarchy was unknown as a legal conllitution. The title of king implied a fuperiority of lawful dignity and authority in one perfon, above all others, for their benefit, not a right of abfolute power. Legiflation was never within their prerogative. A diftindion of fami- lies into thofe of higher and lower rank obtained very early throughout Greece, and no where more than at Athens, where, by the conftitution of Thefeus, the eupatrides, or nobly-born, formed a diftin6t order of the ftate with great privileges. Afterwards v/eaith became the principal crite- rion of rank, which amounted probably to the fame thing, as the nobly-born were generally mod wealthy. Every citizen in every Grecian ftate lias bound to military fervice, as in modern times T 3 among 2^2 Ancient Democrat} cal Republics. among the feudal kingdoms. It was natural that the rich fhould ferve on horfeback ; and this was the origin of knighthood both in ancient and modern nations. Where the noble or the rich held all ihe power, they called their own govern- ment ariftocracy, or government of the better fort, or optimacy, government of the beft fort. The people allowed the appellation of ariftocracy only to thofe governments where perfons, elected by thernfelves for their merit, held the principal power. Democracy fignified a government by all the freemen of the ftate, or the people at large, forming in aflfembly the legal, abfolute Ibvereign : but as this, above all others, was fub- jeft to irregularity, confufion, and abfurdity, when unchecked by fome balancing pov/er lodged in fewer hands, it was called ochlocracy, or rnob rule. Moft,of the Grecian ftates had lome mix- ture of two or more of thefe forms. The mix- ture of oligarchy and democracy, in which the former was fuperior, yet the latter fufficed to fecure liberty and equal right to the people, might, according to Ariftotle, be called arifto- cracy. That mixture where the democratic power prevailed, yet was in fome degree balanced by authority lodged in fteadier hands, is diftin- guiftied by that great author by the name of polity. An equal mixture of all three was never known in Greece, and therefore never obtained a diftinct nam.e in that language. A war happened between the Athenians and Peloponnefians ; the armies were encamped near each other, and the Delphian oracle was con- fulted. The anfwer of the Pythonefs implied, that the Peloponnehans would be viftorious, provided they did not kill the Athenian king. Codrus dif- guifing himfelf like a clown, with a faggot on h t 2 ihouider. Athens. 263 flioulder, and a fork in his hand, determined to devote his life, entered the enemy's camp, and was killed. The Peloponnefian chiefs finding the body to be Codius, and fearing the prophecy, withdrew their farces, and a peace enfued. Me- don, the eldcll: fon of Codiiis, was lame \ and bodily ability was held in ib high rank in popular efteem, that his younger bi other difputed the fuc- cefTion. Each had a jjowerful party i bnt the dif- pure brought forward a third, which was for aboiilhing the royalty, and having no king but Jupiter. Fatal duT-nfijns were apprehended, when a declaration or the oracle was procured in favour of Medon ; and it was amicably accommodated that Medon Ihould be firft magiflrate, with title of aichon, but not king, Although the honour was to be hereditary, and that the archon fhould be accountable to the aflembly of the people for his adminiftration, it was agreed that a colony fhould be fent to Afia Minor under Nelius and Androclus, younger Ions of Codrus. The moil reftlefs fpirits joined in the migration, and no fur- ther materials for hillory remain for feveral gene-? rations. From the period where Homer's hiftory ceafeSj to that in which the nrft profe hiflorians lived, a fpace of 250 years, there is litde light to be ob- tained. Twelve afchons are named, who followed Medon by hereditary fucceffion, and filled up 30Q years. On the death of Alcmeon, Charops was raifed to the archonfhip, upon condition of holding it for ten years only. Six archons followed Cha- rops, by appointment, for ten years ; but on the expiration of the archonfhip ofEryxias, it was re- folved that the office fliould be annual, and that there fhould be nine perfons to execute it. They had not all equal dignity, nor the farr.e iundions : T 4 one 2^4 Ancient Democrat teal Republics, one rfprefented the majerty of the ftate, and waa Tjfually called the arghon ; the lecond had the title of king, and was head of the chuichj the pole- march was third, and cb/ief of nnilitary afl^iirs. The other fix had the title of thefmothetes ; they pre- lided as judges in ordinary courts of jufticc. Tiie nine together formed the council of ftate j here_, methinks, I fee the Polifh nobles running down the kingj or thofe of Venice the doge, and di- viding the fpoils of his prerogatives among themfelves. Legifiation was in the afTembly of the people; but the whole adminiftration, civil, military, religious, and judiciary, was with the archons, who were commonly appointed by lot J but fometimes the afTembly of the people interfered, and exercifed the power of naming them. From the appointment of annual archons there was nothing but intefline troubles. That weight which, from earliefl: times, a few principal fam.ilies pofTelfed among the Attic people, and which was in a great degree confirmed to them by the conftitution of Thefeus, remained, amid all the turbulence of derfiocracy, to a late period. Among thofe families the AlcmjEonides, claiming fome connexion by blood with the perpetual ar- chons and kings of the ancient Neleid line, were of great fame. Megacles, head of this family, was archon when Cylon, a man of a very ancient and powerful family, attempted to acquire the fovereignty of his country. He feized the citadel of Athens with fome troops he received from Theagerus, tyrant of Megara, whole daughter he had maYried. His vanity was ejfcited not only by his biith and marriage, but hisperfonal merit, having bet-n viftor in a chariot race at theOlympic games. The people ran to arms under their ar- i:hons, and laid fiege to the citadel, Cylon fled, an4' Athens. 265 and his party fled to the altars : they were pro- piifed pardon, but condemned and executed. This was an atrocious infidelity, and made the aftors in it as odious, as it rendered Cylon and his party again popular and powerful. The m.iferies of" a flufluating jurifprudence be- came infufferable, and all parties united at laft in the refolution to appoint a lawgiver. Draco was raifed to this important office j a man whofe mo- rals and integrity recommended him to the peo- ple, but whofe capacity was equal to no im- provement in the political conftitution, and to no greater invention for reforming the judicatures, than that of inflicting capital punifhments in all offences : and the knowing ones had no other rem.edy, than to get the oracle to pronounce that the laws of Draco were written in blood ; an ex- prefTion which ftruck the imagination and touched the heart, and therefore foon rendered this fyftem unpopular. Salamis, perceiving the divifions at Athens, re- volted, and allied itfelf to Megara. Several at- tempts to recover it having failed, the lower peo- ple, in oppofition to their chiefs, carried a law, making it capital to propofe a renewal of the en- terprize. Solon, of an ancient royal family, who had hitherto purfued nothing but literature and poetry, perceiving that this rafh a6l of the popu- lace began to give general difguft and rej!)entance, efpecially to the young Athenians, ventured to lead the people to repeal it. He caufed it to be reported that he was mad, and for fome time kept his houfe : in this retirement he compofed a poem, fuch as he thought would excite the multitude; then watching his opportunity, during an afTem- \)\y of the people, he ran into the Agora like one franticj 266 Ancient Democratkal RepuhUcs. frantic, mounted on a rock, and read his poem to the people. Some of his friends, who were in the fecret, were prefcnt, and ready to wonder and applaud. The enthufiafm fpread, the law was repealed, and an expedition fent under So- lon's friends, which, being fls:i)ful]y conduiled, recovered the ifland. But the party of Cylon were ftill clamorous againft the partifans of Me- gacles for their breach of faith. Solon pcrfuaded the accufed to fubmit to a trial : they were condemned to banifhmentj but this punifhmenc not being fufficient to appeafe the Deity, the bones of thofe who had been executed were removt-d be- yond the mountains. During thefe troubles Sa- lamis was retaken. Superftition now gained the af- cendant j phantoms and omens were feen, and ex- piations and purifications were necellary. Epi- nienides, a Cretan philofopher of great reputation for religious knowledge, and an intimate friend of Solon, was invited to fuperintend the religion of Athens. Epimenides was the ollenfible dire6tor, but Solon concerted with him the various im- provements in jurifprudence. By means of reli- gious pomp, ceremony, facrifices, and procefTions, he amufed the people into fome degree of order and fufpenfion of their faftions j but the tranquil- lity was not likely to be lafling. Three political parties exifted : one for democracy, compofed of the landholders of the mouniains j another for an ariftocracy, of the rich, confifting of the pofielTors of the plain ; a third preferred a mixture of oligar- chy and democracy, confiding of the inhabitants of the coaft, and the mod difinterefted men. There was another divifion of the people, into the parties of the rich and the poor. Dangerous con- vulfions. Athens. 267 vulfions were fo apprehended, that many fober men thought the eftablifhment of a tyranny, in one, necefiary to prevent greater evils. Solon's reputation for wifdom and integrity was univer- fal J and, as he had friends in all parties, they procured the place of archon, with powe;- to re- form the conftitution. His firft obje6t was to reconcile the rich with the poor : this he accom- plifhed by lowering the intereft without annulling the debt, and by taking from the creditor the ex- orbitant powers over the perfon and family of the debtor. He found fuch a predilection for de- mocracy in the minds of the citizens, that he preferved to every free Athenian his equal vote in the affcmbly of the people, which he made fu- preme in all cafes, legiflative, executive, and ju- dicial. Fie had not, probably, tried the experi- ment of a democracy in his own family, before he attempted it in the city, according to the ad- vice of Lycurgus ; but was obliged to eftablifli fuch a government as the people would bear, not that which he thought the belt, as he faid him- As the laws of Solon were derived from Crete and Egypt, were afterwards adopted by the Ro- mans as their model, and have by them been tranfmitted to all Europe, they are a moft inte- refting fubjeft of inquiry -, but it is not poflible to afcertain exadlly which were his, which were thofe of Epimenides or Thefeus, or what was, in h&:^ the conftitution of Athens. The rtrft in- quiry is. Who were citizens ? By a poll that was taken in the time of Pericles, they v/ere found to be fourteen thoufand perfons. By another, in the time of Demetrias Phalerius, they were twen- ty-one thoufand : at the fame time there were ten 63 Ancient Democratkal Republics, ten thoufand freemen, confifling of foreigners anc| freed flaves, and four hundred thoufand fouls in a6tual bondage, who had no vote in the aflembly of the people. The perfons therefore who Ihared the power, being not a tenth part of the nation, were excufed from labour, in agriculture as well as manufadtures, and had time for education ; they were paid too for attendance on public af- fairs, which enabled the poorer citizens to attend their duty. This is one circumftance which ren- dered a government fo popular, practicable for a time : another was, the divifion of Attica into tribes and boroughs, or dillri6ls, like the Ame- rican counties, towns, and parifhes^ or the fhires, hundreds, and tythings of England. The tribes at firft were four, afterwards ten. Each tribe had its prefiding magiftrate, called phylarchus, analogous to the Englifh fheriff ^ and each bo- roiigh, of which there were one hundred and fe- venty-four, its demarchus, like a conflable or headborough. As the title of king was preferred to the high pried, fo the perfon prefiding over the religion of each tribe was called philobafileus, king's friend, and was always appointed from among the nobly-born, eiipatrides. Thus reli- gion was always in the hands of the ariftocratical part of the community. As the oracles and priefts were held by the people in fo much fa- cred veneration, placing them, with all their fplendid fhews and rites, always in the power of the ariftocratical families, or perfons of bed edu- cation, was as great a check to the democracy a> can well be imagined. It lliould be here recol- ledled too, that almoft all thefe eupatrides or no- bles, among the Greeks, were believed to be de- feended frorp the gods, nearly or remotely. No-;- bilitVa Athens, 269 b>Hcy, as well as royalty, were believed of divine light, becaufe the gods and goddefies had conde- fcended to familiar intercourfes with wonnen and men, on purpofe to beget perfons of a fupe- rior order to rule among nations. The fuperi- ority of priefts and nobles was afiumed and con- ceded with more confiftency than they are in Po- land, Switzerland, and Venice, and they mufb have had a proportional influence v.ith the peo- ple. Another check to this authority in one center, the nation, eftabliflied by Solon, was countenan- ced by precedent introduced by Thefeus, who divided the Attic people into three ranks : all magillrates were taken exclufively out of the firft. Solon, by a new divifion, made four ranks, determined by property, and confined all magif- tracies to the firfl three. By this regulation, he excluded ail thofe who had no will of their own, and were dependent on others ; but by ftill al- lowing to the fourth, who were more numerous than all the others, their equal votes in the af- fembly of the people, he put all power into hands the leafl capable of properly ufing it ; and accordingly thefe, by uniting, altered the confti- tution at their pleafure, and brought on the ruia of the nation. By thefe precautions, however, we fee the anxiety of Solon to avail himfelf of every advantage of birth, property, and religion^ which the people would refpecfr, to balance the fove- reign democracy. Widi the fame view, he inflitu- ted a lenate, of one hundred perfons out of each of the four tribes ; and this great council, to which, he committed many of the powers of the archons, he hoped would have a weight which all the ar- chons together had not been able to preferve. It was afterwards increafed to five hundred, when the 270 Ancient Democratical Republics the tribes were increafed to ten, fifty out of each, and was then called the council of five hundred. They were appointed annually by lot j but cer- tain legal qualifications were requircrd, as well as a blamelefs life. The members of each tribe in turn, for thirty-five days, had fuperior dignity and additional powers, with the title of prytanes, from whence the hall was called Prytaneium. The prytanes were by turns prefidents, had tlie cufto- dy of the feal, and the keys of the trealury and citadel, for one day. The whole afiembly formed the council of flate of the commonwealth, and had the conftant charge of its political affairs; the mofh important of which was the preparation of bufinefs for the affembly of the people, in which nothing was to be propofed which had not firft been approved here. This was Solon's law ; and, if it had been obferved, would have formed a balance of fuch importance, that the common- wealth would have lafted longer, and been more Heady. But fa6lious demagogues were often found to rtmiind the people, that all authority was col- lefted into one center, and that the fovereign af- lembly was that center ; and a popular afienjbly being, in all ages, as much difpofed, when un- checked by an abfolute negative, to overleap the bounds of law and conftitution as the nobles or a king, the laws of Solon v/ere often fpurned, and the people demanded and took all power, whenever they thought proper. Senfible-ihat the bufinefs of approving and re- jecting magiftrates, receiving accufations, cata- logues of fines, enacting laws, giving audience to ambafiadors, and difcufnons of religion, would very often be uninterefting to many even of the moll Judicious and virtuous citizens ; that every man's bufinefs is no man's; Solon ordained it cri- minal Athens, ayt minal in any not to take a fide in civil diftur- bances. Certain times were ftated for the meet- ing of the general afiembly ; all gates were fliut but that which led to it ; fines were impofed for non-attendance ; and a fmall pay allowed by the public to thofe who attended pundlually at the hour. Nine proedri were appointed from the council ; from whom the moderators, epiftates, were appointed too by lot, with whom fat eleven nomophylaces, whofe duty it was to explain the tendency of any motions contrary to the fpirit of the conftitution. 1 he prytanes too had diftind: and confiderable powers in the affembly. When any change in the law was judged neceflfary by the people, another court, confifting of a thou- fand perfons, called nomothetes, were direfted to confider of the beft mode of alteration, and pre- pare a bill ; after all, five fyndics were appointed to defend the old law before the afTembly, be- fore the new one could be enafted. A law pafTed without having been previoufly publifhed, con- ceived in ambiguous terms, or contrary to any former law, fubjefted the propofer to penalties. It was ullial to repeal the old law before a new one was propofed, and this delay was an addi- tional fecuriry to the conftitution. The regular manner of enabling a law was this : A bill was prepared by the council j any citizen might, by petition or memorial, make a propofition to the prytanes, whofe duty it was to prcfent it to the council if approved by them, it became a pro- boulema ; and, being written on a tablet, was expofed, for feveral days, for public confidera- tion, and, at the next aflembly, read to the peo- ple ^then proclamation was made by the crier, " who of thofe above fifty years of age choofes " to fpeak ?" When thcfe had made their ora- tions. 27 2 Ancient Deniocratlcal RepuhllcS. tions, any other citizen, not difqiialified by la\V for having fied frona his colours in battle, being deeply indebted to the public, or convicted of any crime, had an opportunity to fpeak ; buc the prytanes had a general power to enjoin filence on any man, fubjeft, no doubt, to the judge- ment of the afl'embly : without this, debates might be endlefs. When the debate was finiflied, the crier, at the command of the proedri, proclaimed that the queftion waited the determination of the people, which was given by holding up the hand: in fome uncommon cafes, particularly of impeach- ments, the votes were given privately, by cafting pebbles into urns. The proedri examined the votes, and declared the majority ; the prytanes difmiffed the aflembly. Every one of thefe pre- cautions demonftrated Solon's convi6lion of the neceffity of balances to fuch an aflembly, though they were found by experience to be all incfFec- tual. From the fame folicitude for balances ngainfl: the turbulence of democracy, he reftored the court of Areopagus, improved its conflitu- tion, and increafed its power : he compofed it of thofe who had held with reputation the office of archon, and admitted them into this dignity and authority for life. The experience, the reputa- tion, and permanency of thefe Areopagites mufi have been a very powerful check. From the Areopagus alone no appeal lay to the people : yet if they chofe to interfere, no balancing power exifted to refill their defpotic will. The confii- tution authorized the Areopagus to flop the judi- cial decrees of the aflTembly of the people ; annul an acquittal, or grant a pardon to dire(5t all draughts on the public treafury to punifh im- piety, immorality, and diforderly conduft to' fuperintcnd the education of youth y punifh idle-' 4 ^^^^ Athens, 273 nefs to inquire by what means men of no pro- perty or employment maintained themfelves. The court fat in the night, without Hght, that the members might be lefs Hable to prejudice. Plead- ers were confined to fimple narration of fads, and application of laws, without ornaments of fpeech, or addrefs to the paflions. Its reputation for wifdom and juftice was fo high, that Cicero faid, the commonwealth of Athens could no more be governed without the court of Areopagus, than the world without the providence of God. The urgent neceflity for balances to a fovereign affembly, in which all authority, legiflative, exe- cutive, and judicial, was colledied into one cen- ter, induced Solon, though in fo fmall a Itate, to make his conftitution extremely complicated : no lefs than ten courts of judicature, four for crimi- nal caufes, and fix for civil, befides the Areopa- gus and general affembly, were eftabliflied at Athens. In conformity to his own faying, cele- brated among thofe of the feven wife men, that " the moft perfect government is that where an '* injury to any one is the concern of all," he di- refted, that in all the ten courts caufes fhould be decided by a body of men, like our juries, ta- ken from among the people ; the archons only pjefidiacr like our judges. As the archons were appointed by lot, they were often but indifferent lawyers, and chofe two perfons of experience to affilt them ; thcfe, in time, became regular con- ilitutional officers, by the name of Paredri, af- feflbrs. The jurors were paid for their fervice, and appointed by lot. This is the glory of So- lon's laws : it is that department which ought to belong to the people at large; they are molt com- petent for this i and the property, liberty, equa- Vol. I. U ' lity. ^74 Ancle-nt Democratkal Republics. lity, and fecurity of the citizens, all require that they alone Ihould poileis it. Itinerant judges, called the Forty, were appointed to go through the counties, to determine affaults and civil ac- tions under a certain fum. Every freeman v/as bound to military fervice. The multitude of flaves made this neceffary, as well as practicable. Rank and property gave no other diftinflion than that of ferving on horfe- back. The fundamental principle of Solon's govern- ment was the mofh like M. Turgot's idea of any we have (q^u. Did this prevent him from eftab- lilliing different orders and balances ? Did it not render ncceffary a greater variety of orders, and more complicated checks than any in America ? yet all were infufficient, for want of the three checks, abfolute and independent. Unlefs three powers have an abfolute veto, or negative, to every law, the conftitution can never be long pre- JeJved ; and this principle we find verified in the fubfequent hiftory of Athens, notwithftanding the oath he had the addrefs and influence to per- fuade all the people to take, that they would change none of his inftitutions for ten years. Soon after his departure, the three parties of the highlands, lowlands, and coafts, began to flievv themfelves afrefh. Thefe v/ere, in faft, the party of the rich, who wanted all power in their own hands, and to keep the people in abfolute fub- jedion, like the nobles in Poland, Venice, Ge- noa, Berne, Soleure, &c. ; the democratical par- ty, who wanted to abolifh the council of five hundred, the Areopagus, the ten courts of judi- cature, and every other check, and who, with furious zeal for equality, were the readied inftru- meats of defpotifm i and the party of judicious- and Athens, 275 tind moderate men, who, though weaker than either of the others, were the only balance be- tween them. This lad party, at this time, was fupported by the powerful fiimily of the Alc- m^eonides, of whom Megacles, the chief, had greatly increafed the wealth and fplendour of his houfe, by marrying the daughter of the tyrant of Sicion, and had acquired fame by vi6lories in the Olympian, Pythian, and Klhmian games : the head of the oligarchic party was Lycurgus, not the Spartan lawgiver : the democratical party was led by Pififtratus, claiming defcent from Codrus and Neftor, with great abilities, courage, addrefs, and reputation for military condu6l in feveral en- terprizes. Upon Solon's return, after an ab- fence of ten years, he found prejudices deeply rooted ; attachment to their three leaders dividing the whole people. He was too old to direcl the ftorm : the faftions continued their manoeuvres ; and at length Pififtratus, by an artifice, became mafter of the commonwealth. Wounding him- felf and his horfes, he drove his chariot violently into the Agora, vv'here the afiTembly of the people was held ; and in a pathetic fpeech declared, " that he had been waylaid as he was going into " the country -that it was for being the maa '' of the people that he had thus fufix^red that " it was no longer fafe for any man to be a " friend of the poor it was not fafe for him to ^^ live in x\ttica, unlefs they v/ould take him '^ under their protedion." Arifton, one of his partifans, moved for a guard of fifty men, to de- fend the perfon of the friend of the people, the martyr for their caufe. In fpite of the ut.noll oppofition of Solon, though Pififtratus was his friend, this point was carried ; Pififtratus, with his guards, feized the citadel j and forcing his U 2 oppo- 2.y6 Ancient Democratical Fepuhlics. opporipnts into fubmifTion or exile, he became the fiift man, and from this time is called the Tyrant of Athens ; a term which meant a citizen of a republic, who by any means obtained a fo- vereignty over his fellow-citizens. Many of them were men of virtue, and governed by law, after being raifcd to the dignity by the confent of the people } fo that the term Tyrant was arbitrarily tifed by the ancients, fometimes to fignify a law- ful ruler, and fometimes an ufurper. Pifillratus, of whom Solon faid, " Take away his ambition, *^ cure him of his lull of reigning, and there is not *' a man of more virtue, or a better citizen," chang- ed nothing in the conftitution. The laws, aflem- bly, council, courts of juftice, and magiflrates, all remained ; he himfelf obeyed the fummons of the Areopagus, upon the charge of murder. Solon trufted to his old age againft the vengeance of the tyrant, and treated him in all companies with very imprudent freedoms of fpeech : but Pifif- tratus carried all his points with the people ; and had too much fenfe to regard the venerable legif- lator, or to alter his fyftem. He returned his reproaches with the highefl refpe<5l: j and gained upon him, according to fome authors, to conde- fcend to live with him in great familiarity, and zffiH him in his adminiftration. Others fay that Solon, after having long braved the tyrant's re- fentment, and finding the people loft to all fenle of their danger, left Athens and never returned. Solon died at the age of eighty, two years after the ufurpation. The ufurper foon fell. The de- prefTed wval chiefs, Megacles and Lycurgus, uniting their parties, expelled him ; but the con- federated rivals could not agree. Megacles pro- pofed a coalition with Pififtratus, and offered him his daughter in marriage. The condition was ac- cepted i Athens. ii*] cepted ; but the people in afT^mbly muft be gain- ed. To this end they drelTed a fine girl with all the ornaments and armour of IMinei va, and drove into the city, heralds proclaiming before them, " O Athenians, receive Pififtratus, whom Mi- nerva honouring above all m,en, herfelf conducts into your citadel." The people believed the maid to be a goddefs, worfhipped her, and received Pi- fiftracus again into the tyranny. Is this govern- ment, or the waves of the fea ? But Pifiliratus was foon obliged to retire to Eretria, and leave the party of Megacles mafters of Athens. He ftrengthened his connections j and in the eleventh year of this his f.^cond banifhment, he returned to Attica with an army, and was joined by his friends. The party of Megacles met him with another army, ill difciplined and commanded, from the ^ity J were attacked by furprize, and defeated. Pififtratus proclaimed that none need fear, who would return peaceably home. The known honour, humanity, and clemency of his chara6ter, procured him confidence; his enemies fled, and he entered, the city without oppofition. He made no funda- mental change in the conftitution, though, as head of a party, he had the principal influence. He de- pended upon a large fortune of his own, and a good underftanding with Thebes and Argos, to fupport him in it. He died in peace, and left his fon fucceflbr to his influence. Borh his fon^, Hip- pias and Hipparchus, were excellent charadters j and arts, agriculture, gardening, and literature, as well as wifdom and virtue, were fingulary cuki- vated by the vvhole race of thefe tyrants.' Har- modius and Ariftogeton, however, confpired the death both of Hippias and Hipparchus ; the lat- ter was killed, and Hippias v;as led to feverities : many Athenians were put to death. Hippias, to U ^ {Irengtheii 278 Ancient Democratkal Repuhllcs. flrengthen his interefl with foreign powers, mar- ried his only daughter to the Ton of the tyrant of .Lampfacus. Her epitaph fhews that the title of Tyrant was not then a term of reproach : " This " duft covers Archedice, daughter of Hippias, in '* his time the firft of the Greeks. Daughter, *' filler, wif", and mother of tyrants, her mind ' was never elated to arrogance." The oppofite party were watchful to recover Athens, and to increafe their intereft with the other Grecian ftates for that end, the temple of Delphi was burnt. The AlcmiSonides, to ingra- tiate themfelves with the oracle, the Amphiflyons, and all Greece, rebuilt it with Parian marble, in- flead of Porine ftone, as they had contra6led to do, without afking any additional price. The confequence was, that whenever the Lacedjemo- nians confulted the oracle, the anfwer always con- cluded with an admonition to give liberty to Athens. At length the oracle was obeyed ; and, after fome variety of fortune, the Alcmseonides, aided by Cleomenes the Spartan, prevailed, and Hippias retired to Sigeium. It was one maxim of the Spartans, conftantly to favour ariftocratical power J or rather, wherever they could, to eftablifh an oligarchy : for in every Grecian city there v;as always an ariftocratical, oligarchical, and demio- cratical faftion. Whenever the Grecian ftates had a war with one another, or a fedition within them- felves, the Lacedaemonians were ready to inter- fere as mediators.' They conducted the bufinefs generally with great caution, m.oderation, and fa- gacity ; but never loft fight of their view to ex- tend the influence of their ftate ; nor of their fa- vourite meafure for that end, the encouragement of ariftocratical power, or rather oligarchical : for a few principal families, indebted to Lacedse- mon Athens, 279 mon for their pre-eminence, and unable to retain it without her affiftance, were the bed inilruments for holding the ftate in alliance. This policv they now propofed to follow at Athens. Cleillhenes, fon of Megacles, head of the Alcmrconides, was the firfl perfon of the commonwealth. Having no great abilities, a party was formed againft him under Ifagoras, with whom moil of the principal people joined. The party of Cleifthenes was among the lower fort, who being all powerful in the general affembly, he made by their means fome alterations in the conftiuition favouring his own influence. Cleillhenes was now tyrant of Athens, as much as Pififtratus had been. In the contefts of Grecian fa61:ions, the alternative was generally vi6tory, exile, or death ; the inferior party therefore reforted fometimes to harfh expe- dients. Ifagoras and his adherents applied to La- ced^mon. Cleomenes, violent in his temper, en- tered with zeal into the caufe of Ifagoras, and fent; a herald to Athens, by whom he imperioufly de- nounced banifiiment againft Cleiithenes and his party, on the old pretence of criminality for the execution of the partifans of Cylon. Cleifthenes obeyed. Exalted by this proof of a dread of Spartan power, he went to Athens with a fmall military force, and banifhed feven hundred fami- lies at once : fuch was Athenian liberty. He was then proceeding to change the conftitution, to fuit the views of Spartan ambition, by diffolv- ing the council of five hundred, and connnitcing the whole power to a new council of three hundred, a.11 partifans of Ifagoras. Athens was not fo far humbled. The five hundred refilled, and excited the people, who flew to arms, and befiegcd Cleo- menes and Ifagoras in the citadel, who the third day furrendertd, upon condition that the l^acedse- U .L monians ^8o Ancient Demorattcal Republics. monians might depart in fafety. Ifagoras went with them. Many of his party were executed, and Cleifthenes, and the exiled families, returned; but confcious of their danger from their hoftile fellow-citizens, in concert with Lacedasmon, they fent to folicit an alliance with Artaphernes, the fatrap of Perfia. The anfwer was, If they would give earth and water to Darius they might be re- ceived, otherwife they muft depart. The ambaf- fadors, confidering the imminent danger of their country and party, confented to thefe humiliating terms. Although Athens was diftra6ted with do- meftic facftions, and prefled with the fear of an attack from Cleomenes, the conduft of her am- baffadors, in acknowledging fubmiffion to the Per- lian king, in hopes of his protection, was highly reprobated upon their return ; and it does not appear that Perfian affiftance was further defired : yet the danger which hung over Athens was very great. Cleomenes, bent on revenge, formed a confederacy againft them, of the Thebans, Corin- thians, and Chalcidians. Thefe could not agree, and the Athenians gained fome advantages of two of them. Cleomenes then pretended that Sparta had afled irreligioufly in expelling Hippias, who ought to be reftored ; becaufe, when he was be- fieged in the citadel at Athens, he had difcovered a collufion between the Delphic priefts and the Alcm^onides. Sparta was willing to reftore Hip- pias ; but Corinth, their ally, was nor. Hippias, defpairing of other means, now in his turn applied to Perfia, and brought upon his country the Per- fian war ; from which it was delivered by Miltia- des, at the battle of Marathon. Miltiadcs became the envy of the Alcmaeonide family. Xanthippus, one of the principal men of Athens, who had mar- ried a daughter of Megacles, the great opponent of Athens, 281 of Pififlratus, concluded a capital accufation againft him : he was condemned in a fine of fifty talents more than he was vvor h. His wound, which prevented him from attending the trial, mortified, and he died in prifon. In order to brand the family of Pififtratus, the fame of Har- rnodius and Ariftogeton was now cried up. They had aflafiinated Hipparchus from mere private revenge ; but they were now called afierters of public liberty. The tyrannicide, as it was called, was celebrated by fongs, ftatues, ceremonies, and religious feftivals. It mud be acknowledged, that every example of a government which has a large mixture of democratical power, exhibits fomething to our view which is amiable, noble, and I had almoft faid, divine. In every ftate hitherto mentioned, this obfervation is verified. What is contended for, is, that the people in a body cannot manage the executive power, and, therefore, that a fimple democracy is impracticable ; and that their (hare of the legillative power muft be always tempered with two others, in order to enable them to pre- ferve their fhare, as well as to corred its rapid tendency to abufe. Without this, they are but a tranfient glare of glory, which pafTes away like a flalli of lightning, or like a momentary appear- ance of a goddefs to an ancient hero, which, by revealing but a glimpfe of celeftial beauties, only excited regret that he had ever feen diem. The republic of Athens, the fchool-miftrefa of the whole civilized world, for more than three thoufand years, in arts, eloquence, and philofo- phy, as well as in politenefs and wit, was, for a fliort period of her duration, the mod democrati- cal commonwealth of Greece. Unfortunately their hiftory, between the abolition of their kings and the 2S2 Ancient Democratical Republics. the time of Solon, has not been circumilantially preferved. During this period, they feem to have endeavoured to collect all authority into one cen- ter, and to have avoided a compofition of orders and balances as carefully as M. Turgor : but tliat center was a group of nobles, not the nation. Their government confifled in a fingle aflcmbly pf nine archons, chofen annually by the people. But even here was a check; for by law the archons muft all be chofen out of the nobility. But this form of government had its ufual elfeds, by intro- ducing anarchy, and fuch a general profligacy of ynanners, that the people could at length be re- ftrain^d by nothing fhort of the ultimate punifh- ment from even the moft ordinai-y crimes. Draco accordingly propofed a law, by which death fliould be inflicted on every violation of the law. Hu- rnanity fhuddered at fo fhocking a feverity ! and the people chofe rather that all offences fhould go unpunifhed, than that a law thus written in blood, as they termed it, both in horror and contempt, fhould be executed. Confufions increafed, and divided the nation into three fad ions ; and their miferies became fo extreme, that they offered Solon an abfolute monarchy. He had too much fenfe, as well as virtue, to accept it 3 but employed his talents in new-modelling the government. Senfible, from experience, of the fatal effects of a government too popular, he wifhed to introduce an ariflocracy, moderated like that of Sparta i but thought the habits and prejudices of the peo- ple too lirong to bear it. The ajchons he con- tinued , but, to balance their authorityi he erefted, a fenate of four hundred, to be chofen by ballot of the people. He alfo revived the court of Areopagus^ which had jurifdidlion in criminal ^afes and the care of religion. He excluded from^ the Athens, 283 the executive, or the magiftracy, all the citizens who were not pofiefied of a certain fortune ; but vefted the fovereignty in a legiflative affcmbly of the people, in which all had a right to vote. In this manner Solon attempted a double balance. The Areopagus was to check the executive in the hands of the archonsj and the fenate of four hundred, the ficklenefs and fire of the people. Every one mufl: fee that thefe devices would have been no efFecflual controul in either cafe, yet they were better than none. It was very right that the people fliould have all eleftions ; but democra- tical prejudices were fb inveterate, that he was obliged not only to make them, affembled in a body, an effential branch of the legiflature, but to give them cognizance of appeals from all the fuperior courts. Solon him.feU, in his heart, muft have agreed with Anacharfis, that this conftitu- tion was but a cobweb to bind the poor, while the rich would eafily break through it. Pififtratus foon proved it by bribing a party, procuring himfelf a guard, and demolifliing Solon's whole fyftem before his eyes, and eftablifliing a fin^c tyranny. The tyrant was expelled feveral times by the oppofitions, but as often brought back, and finally tranfmitted his monarchy to his fons. One of thefe was aflaffinated by Harmodius and Arifto- geton; and the other driven into banifhment by the oppofidon, aided by the neighbouring ftate, Sparta. He fled to the Perfians, excited Darius againfb his country, and was killed at Marathon. Thefe calamities infpired the people with fuch terrors of a fingle tyrant, that, inflead of thinking to balance efFedUially their " orders," they efta- blifhed the oftracifm, to prevent any man from becoming too popular ; a check indeed, but a very injudicious one ; for it only baniihed thtir bell men. 284 Ancient Democratical Republics. men. Hiflory no where furnifhes fo frank a con- feflion of the people themfelves, of their own in- firmities, and unfitncfs for managing the executive branch of government, or an unbalanced fhareof the legifiature, as this inftitution. The language of it is, " We know oiirfelves fo well, that we dare " not truft our own confidence and affedions, our " own admiration and graticjde, for the greateft ^ talents and fublimeft virtues. We know our * heads will be turned, if we fuffer fuch charac- *' ters to live among us, and we fhall always make *' them kings." What more melancholy fpedacle ' can be conceived even in imagination, than that inconftancy which erects Itatues to a patriot or a hero one year, banifhes him the next, and the third ereds frefh ftatues to his memory ? Such a conftitution of government, and the education of youth which follows neceflarily from it, always produces' fuch characters as Cleon and Alcibiades ; mixtures of good qualities enough to acquire the confidence of a party, and bad ones enough to lead them to deftru(5tion j whofe fives ihew the miferies and final cataftrophe of fuch imperfedt polity. From the example of Athens it is clear, that the government of a fingle aflTembly of archons chofen by the people was found intolerable ^ that, to remedy the evilsof it, Solon eftablifhed four feve- ral orders, an aflem-bly of the people, an affembly of four hundred, an aflTembly of archons, and the Areopagus ; that he endeavoured to balance one fingly by another, inftead of forming his balance out of three branches. Thus thefe attempts at an equilibrium were incfieftual ; produced a never- ending fluctuation in the national councils, con- tinual faftions, maflTacres, profcriptions, banifh- ment, and death of the beft citizens : and the hi-f- tor^ Jthms, 28^ tory of the Peloponnefian War, by Thucidydes, will inform us how the raging flames at laft burnt out. The people in each of the United States have, after all, more real authority than they had in Athens. Planted as they are over large domi- nions, they cannot meet in one affembly, and, therefore, are not expofed to thofe tumultuous commotions, like the raging waves of the fea, which always agitated the ecclefia at Athens. They have all elections of governor and fenators, as well as reprefentatives, fo prudently guarded, that there is fcarce a polTibility of intrigue. The property required in a reprefentative, fenator, or even governor, is fo fmall, that multitudes have equal pretenfions to be chofen. No eledlion is confined to any order of nobility, or to any great wealth i yet the legiflature is fo divided into three branches, that no law can be paflfed in a paflion, nor inconfiftent with the conilitution. The exe- cutive is excluded from the two legiflarive affem- blies ; and the judiciary power is independent, as v.'ell as feparate from all. This will be a fair trial, whether a government fo popular can pre- ferve itfelf. If it can, there is reafon to hope for all the equality, all the liberty, and every other good fruit of an Athenian democracy, with- out any of its ingratitude, levity, convulfions, or fadions. LETTER 86 Ancient Democratical Repuhlics. LETTER XLVIL ANTALCIDAS. DEAR SIR, IN the year, 1 774, a certain Britifli officer, thcFi at Boflon, was often heard to fay, -^ I wifh " I were parliament : I would not fend a fhip *' or troop to this country j but would forthwith *' pals a ftatute, declaring every town in North *' America a free, fovereign, and independent " commonwealth. This is what they all defire, *' and I would indulge them ; I fhould foon ** have the pleafure to fee them all at war with " one another, from one end of the continent to *' the other." This was a gentleman of letters, and, perhaps, had learned his politics from Antal- cidas, whofe opinion concerning the government of a fingle aflembly is very remarkable -, but the Greek and the Briton would both have^ found their artifices in America ineffedtual. The Ame- ricans are very far from being defirous of fuch multiplications and divifions of dates, and know too well the mifchiefs that would follow from them : yet the natural and inevitable efFeft of M. Turgot's fyftem of government would, in a courfe-of time, be fuch a fpirit among the people. It is not very certain whether Antalcidas was a Spartan or not. If he was, he had violated the law of Lycurgus by travel, and had refided long a in Antalcidas. 5>Sy in Perfia, and maintained an intercourfe and cor- refpondence with feveral noble fannilies. He was bold, fubtle, infinuating, eloquent; but his vices and corruption were equal to his addrefs. The ftern Spartan fenate thought him a proper inftru- ment to execute an infidious commiffion at a pro- fligate court. The inftitutions of his own coun- try, Sparta, were the objedls of his ridicule ; but thofe of the demccratlcal ftates of Greece, of his fovereign contempt. The ancient maxim of fome of the Greeks, '^ Ihat every thing is lawful to a *' man in the fervice of his tountryj" was now ob- folete, and had given way to a purer morality ; but Antalcidas was probably one of thofe philo- fophers, who thought every thing lawful to a man which could ferve his private intereft. The Spar- tan fenate never a6ted upon a principle much better ; and therefore might, upon this occafion, have given their ambaffador the inftrudion which he pretended, viz. to offer *^ to refign all preten- " fions to the Greek cities in Afia, which they <^ would acknowledge to be dependencies of the *' Perfian empire ; and to declare all the cities " and iflands, fmall and great, totally indepen- '* dent of each other." Thefe articles, in confe- quence of which there would not be any republic powerful enough to difturb the tranquillity of Perfia, were more advantageous to them than the moft iniolent courtier would have ventured to propofe. The ambalTador v^as rev/arded by a magnificent prefent; and the terms of peace tranf- miitted to court, to be ratified by Artaxerxes. The negociation however languiflied, and the war was carried on Vvitli violence for ieveral years; and all the art, activity, and addrefs of Antalcidas were put to the trial, before he obtained the rati- fication. The treaiy was at lalt completed " that 288 Ancient Democratlcal Republics. ** That all the republics, fmall and great, fhould '^ enjoy the independent government of their own *' hereditary laws ; and whatever people reje(5led ** thefe conditions, fo evidently calculated for " preferving the public tranquillity, muft expert " the utmoft indignation of the Great King, who> " in conjundion with the republic of Sparta, *' would make war on their perverfe and dange- " rous obftinancy, by fea and land, with Ihips " and money." Antalcidas, and Teribazus, the Perfian fatrap, with whom he had concerted the treaty, had fore- feen, that, as Thebes muft refign her authority over the inferior cities of Boeotia as Argos muft withdraw her garrifon from Corinth, and leave that capital in the power of the ariftocratic or Lacedsmonian fadion and as Athens muft abandon the fruits of her recent viftories there might be an oppofition to the treaty made by thefe three ftates : to guard againft which, they had provided powerful armaments by fea and land, which, with Spartan and Perfian threats, fo intimidated ail, that all at laft fubmitted. This peace of Antalcidas forms a difgraceful ara in the hiftory of Greece. Their ancient con- federacies were diflbived ; the fmallcr towns were loofened from all connexion with the large cities ; all v^ere weakened by being difunlted. What infamiy to the magiftrates of Sparta, and their in- triguing, unprincipled ambafiador ! But Athens, Thtbes, and Argos, by the friendftiip of the de- mocralical cities and confederacies, had become powerful, and excited their haughty jealuufy. The article which declared the lir.aller cities in- dependent, was peculiarly ufeful to the views of Sparta j it reprefented them as the patrons of liberty, among the free. The fcern policy of Sparta Antalcilas. 11S9 Sparta had crufhed, in all her fecondary towns, the hope of independence.' The authority of Athens, Thebes, Argos, and all the democra- tical confederacies, were lefs imperious ; the Ibvereign and fubjefl were more nearly on a foot- ing of equality ; and the Spartans knew, that "'^ men are difpofed to reje6l the juft rights of " their equals, rather than revolt againil the '' tyranny of their mafters:" their own flaves and citizens had furnifhed them with conllant proof of this. But Sparta, by this mafter-piece of roguery, meant not only to hold ftill all her own fubordi- hate cities in fubjedion, not only to detach the inferior communities from her rivals, but to add them to her own confederacy. To this end, Ihe, by her emiflaries, intrigued in all the fubordinate cities. How? by promoting liberty, popular go-. vernment, or proper mixtures of a well-ordered commonwealth? By no means ; but by fupport- ing the ariftocratical faftions in all of them, fomenting animofities among the people againft each other, and efpecially againft their capitals. Complaints, occafioned by thefe cabals, were re- ferred to the Spartan fenate, which had acquired rhe reputation of the patron of the free, the weak, and the injured, and always decided in their own favour. But the ambition of Spartans, cool and cunning as it was, had not patience to remain long fatisfied with fuch legal ufurpations; they determined to mix the terror of their arms with the feduction of policy. Before we proceed to an account of their operations, we muft develop a litde more fully the policy of Antalcidas. ' Befides the free republics of Atrica, I'hcbes, and Argos, which confided of feveral cities, govern- ed by their firft magiftrate, fenate, and pcopl';', Vol. I. X in iipo Ancient Democratlcal Republics. in which the fiibordinate cities always complained of the inordinate influence of the capital, there were feveral republics reputed ftill more popular, becaufe they were governed by fingle alTemblies, like Bifcay, the Grifons, Appenzel, Underwald, Claris, &c. Thefe republics con- fiftcd of feveral towns, each governed by its own firfh magidrate, council, and people ; but con- federated together under the fuperintendance of a fingle diplomatical afll-mbly, in which certain common laws were agreed on, and certain com- mon magiftrates appointed by deputies from each town. Thefe confederacies are the only ex- amples of government by a fingle afilembly which were known in Greece. Antalcidas knew that each of thefe towns was difcontented with the adminiftration of their common affembly, and in their hearts wifhed for independence. It was to this foible of the people that he addreflTed that policy, in his Perfian treaty, by which he twifted to atoms, as if it had been a rope of fand, every democracical city and confederacy, and every one in which democracy and ariflocracy were mixed, throughout all Greece. The firft viftimofthis ambitious policy was Arcadia, in the center of Pek'ponnefus, whofe principal town was Manti- naea. Arcadia was a fertile and beautiful valley furrounded by lofty mountains : the fcattered vil- lages of fhepherds inhabiting thefe hills and vales had grown into cities, by the names of Tegea, Stymphalis, Heraea, Orchomonus, and Mantincea. The inhabitants were diftinguifhed by their innocence, and the fimplicity of their man- ners; but whenever they had been obliged, from neceflity, to engage in war, they had difplayed fuch vigour, energy, and intrepidity, as made their alliance very defirable. The dangerous neigh- Antalcidas, 291 neighbourhood of Sparta had obliged them to fortify their towns, and nnaintain garrifons ; but jealoufies arofe between Tegea and Mantincea, and cnnulations to be the capital. The year after the treaty of Antalcidas annbalTadors were fent by the Spartan fenate to the aflembly at Mantin^a, to command them to demolifh the walls of their proud city, and return to their peaceful villages. The reafons afiigned were, that the Mantinsans had difcovered their hatred to Sparta, envied her prolperity, rejoiced in her misfortunes, and, in the late war, had furnifhed ibme corn to the Argives. The Mantinsans re- ceived the propofal with indignation ; the ambaf- fadors retired in difguft : the Spartans proclaimed war, demanded the aid of their allies, and march- ed a powerful army under their king Agefipolis, and invaded the territory. After the moll de- ftru(5tive ravages of the country, and a long fiege of Mantinsea, they were not able to fubdue the fpirit of this people, until they turned the courfe of the river Opiiis, and laid the wails of t.'ie city under water j thefe being of raw bricks dif- folved and fell. The inhabitants, intimidated, offered to demolifh the walls, and follow Sparta in peace and war, upon condition they might be allowed to continue and live in the city. Agefi- polis replied, that v/hile they lived together in one city, their numbers expofed them to the de- Jufions of feditious demagogues, whole addrefs and eloquence feduced the multitude from their true intereft, and deftroyed the influence of their fuperiors in rank, wealth, and wifdoin, 0:1 whofe attachment alone the Lacedasmonans could de- pend ; and therefore, that they miud dcftroy their houles in the city, feparate into four communi- ties, and return to thole villages which their an- X 2 ccllors 29- Ancient Dcmocratkal Republics. ceftors had inhabited. The terror of an imme- diate afTault made it ncceflary to comply -, and the Spartans made a mighty merit of fuffering fixty of the moil zealous partifans of democracy to fly, unmurdered, from their country. The little republic of Phiius too, like every other where a balance is not known and preferved, was dillrafted by parties. The popular party prevailed, and baniihed their opponents, the friends of ariftocracy. The Spartans threatened, and the ruling party permitted the exiles to re- turn ; but not meeting with refpeftful treatment enough, they complained, and the Spartans, under Agefilaus, appointed commiflioners to try and condemn to death the obnoxious leaders of the people in Phiius. This odious office was executed with fuch unexampled feverity, as terri- fied thofe who furvived into an invariable attach- ment to Sparta. The confederacy of Olynthus was next at- tempted. A number of towns, of which Olyn- thus was the principal, between two rivers, had been incorporated or aflociated together, and grown into fome power, and greater hopes. This was enough to aroufe the jealoufy of Sparta.. They fent four or five fucceilive armies under their ableft kings, to take the part of the ariftocratical fadlion, and conquer this league. Such was the fpirit and refources of this little fpot, that they defended themfelves for four or five campaigns, and then were forced to fubmit. Thebes had been torn with ariftocratic and democratic fadlions, in confequence of the peace of Antalcidas, and Sparta joined the latter, which ultimately produced long and obftinate wars, and the exalted characters of Pelopidas and Epami" nondas, who, however, with all their virtues, were Ant a lei das. 293 were not able finally to eftablifh the indepen- dency of their country, though both perifhed in the attennpti Epaminondas, to the laft, refufing to the feveral communities of Boeotia their heredi- tary laws and government, although he was one of the democratical party. Sparta, in the next place, fent a detachment to fupport the partifans of ariftocracy in Argolis, Achaia, and Arcadia, but were obliged to eva- luate that country by Pelopidas and Epaminon- das J but the latter fupported ariftocratic govern- ment. As foon as he retired, the Arcadians com- plained againft him, that a people, who knew by their own experience the nature of arirtocracy, fliould have confirmed that (hvcre form of go- vernment in an allied or dependent province. The multitude in Thebes condemned the pro- ceedings of Epaminondas, and fent commifTioners into Achaia, who afTifled the populace, and a body of mercenaries, to diflblve the ariftocracy, and banifh or put to death the nobles, and infli- tute a democracy. The foreign troops were fcarcely departed, when the exiles, who were very numerous and powerful, returned, and, after a defperate and bloody ftruggle, recovered their ancient influence : the leaders of the populace were now, in their turn, put to death or expelled ; the ariftocracy re-eftabliflied ; and the magiftrates craved the protection of Sparta, which was readily granted. It would be endlefs to purfue the confequences of the peace of Antalcidas : uninterrupted con- tefts and wars in every democratical ftatc in Greece were the confequence of it -, ariflocratical and democratical factions eternally difpurir;g for fuperioricy, mutually banifhing and butchering ^3 each 294 Ancient Democratical Republics. _ each other ; profcriptions, aflafTinations (of which even Pelopidas was not innocent), treacheries, cruelties without number and without end. But no man, no party, ever thought of introducing an effectual balance, by creating a king, with an equal power, to balance the other two. The Romans bfgan to think of this expedient, but it was referved for England to be the firft to reduce it to pra61 ice. Would M. Turgot have faid, that if Thebes, Athens, Argos, and the Achaean, Arcadian, and 01ynth;an leagues, had been each of them go- verned by a legiflature compofed of a king, fe- nate, and affembly, with equal authority, and each a decifive negative, that the caufe of liberty in all Greece would have been thus crumbled to duft by fuch a paltry trick of Antalcidas ? Would the childifh humour of feparating into as many ftatcs as towns have ever been indulged or permitted ? Moft certainly they would not. And if the power of negociation and treaties, and the whole executive, had been in one man, could the perfidious ambaiTadors of Sparta and the other ftates have intrigued and embroiled every- thing as they did ? LETTER Achaia, 29^5 LETTER XLIII. ACHAIA. DEAR SIR, THE Ach^eans, whofe republic became fo famous in later times, inhabited a long but narrow ftrip of land along the Corinthian gulph, which was deftitute of harbours, and, as its fhores were rocl^y, of navigation and commercej but the impartial and generous fpirit of their laws, if we are to credit Polybius and their other panegyrifts, were fome compenfation for the natu- ral difadvantages of their fituation and territory. They admitted ftrangers into their community on equal terms with the ancient citizens; and, as they were the fiift^ and, for a long time^ the only republic of Greece which had iuch liberality, it is not ftrange that they fhould have enjoyed the praifes of all foreigners. In all other ftates of Greece, in which the people had any ikare in government, there were conftant complaints that one powerful capital domineered over the inferior towns and villages, like Thebes in Bceotia, Athens in Attica. In Laconia, Lycurgus avoid- ed this inconvenience by two popular aflemblies, one for Sparta, and one for the country ; but in Achaia there was no commercial town, antl all were nearly equal, having common laws and in- flitutions, and common weights and meafures. Helice, which is diftinguiflied by Homer as the jnoft ^onfiderable town of Achaia, was the place X 4 oC 2c^6 Ancient Deniocratical Republic s. of afiembly of the congrefs, until it was fwal- lowed up in an earthquake ; then i^igas became the feat of congrefs, who annually appointed pre- fidents in rotation, and generals, who were re- fponfible to the congrefs, as the nnembers of con- grefs were to the cities they reprefented. This is faid to be an excellent fyftem of government, becaufe it checked the ambition of Achaia, while it maintained its independence : and Polybius is full of the praifes of this people for their '^ virtue *' and probity in all their negociations, which " had acquired them the good opinion of the " whole world, and procured them to be chofen " to be arbitrators between the Lacedemonians " and Thcbans ; for their wife councils, and " good difpohtions ; for their equality and " liberty, which is in the utmofl perfeftion among *^ them ; for their laws and inftitutions ; for their " moderation^ and freedom from ambition," &c. Yet, whoever reads his own hiftory, will fee evident proofs, that much of this is the fond par- tiality of a patriot for his country ; and that they had neither the moderation he afcribes to them, nor the excellent government. Better, indeed, than the other republics of Greece it might be; and its congrefs, as a diplomatic aiTcmbly, might have governed its foreign affairs very well, if the cities reprefented in it had been well conflitutcd of a mixture of three independent powers: but it is plain they were not, but were in a continual ftruggle between their firft magiftrates, nobles, and people, for fuperiority, which occafioned tlieir fhort duration, and final ruin. As this example deferves to be fully examined by every American, let us explain it a little more particularly. Atreus, king of Argos and Mycene, was the fon of Pelops, and father of Agamemnon, wha was Achaia. ioy was the father of Oreftes, who was the father of Tifamenus: Pelops, after whom Peloponnefus was named, was the fon of Tantalus, a king of Phrygia ; and Tantalus was the fon of Jupiter, by the nymph Plota. Tifamenus, flying from Sparta, upon the return of the Heraclidse governed in Achaia, and was the firfl: king of that people. The dominion by him there founded was continued, in a rightful fucceffion, down to Gyges. Notwithftanding his defcent from Jupiter, his government was pro- bably like that of Alcinous in Ph^acia : Twelve archons prefided over the twelve cities, who, each in his diftrid", was the firft magiftrate ; and all able to make out, fome way or other, their con- nexion with fome of the ancient families, who were all alike honourably defcended, at leaft, from an inferior god or goddcfs. Tifamenus m.ade the thirteenth, and was firft among equals at leafl:. The fons of Gyges not governing by law, but defpotically, the monarchy was aboliflied, and re- duced to a popular ftate ; probably it was only an ariftocracy of the twelve archons. Thefe hints- at the genealogy of thefe kings are to fhew how intimately theology was intermixed with politics in every Grecian ftate and city ; and, at the fame time, to fhew that the whole force of luperftition, although powerful enough to procure crowns to thefe perfons, yet, for want of the balance we contend for, was not fufficient to reftrain the paf- fions of the nobles, and prevent revolutions al- moft as rapid as the motion of a wheel : nothing Jias ever been found to fupply the place of the balance of three powers. The abolition oi this limited monarchy was not effetled by the peoplf, for the purpofe of introducing democracy, or a mixed governmentj but by the nobles, for the fake 298 Ancient Democratkal Republics, fake of eftablifhing an ariftocracy. The new go-^ vernment, confequently, was a conf dcation of twelve archons, each ruh'ng as firft magiftrate in a fepaiate city, with his council and people, as an independent ftate. The twelve archons met in a general alTennbly, fometimes in perlbn, and fometimes by proxy, to conlult of general affa'.rs, and guard againft general dangers. This whole ftate codd not be larger than another Bijcay, and each city muft have been lefs than a mcwndade, and its general aflembly like the junta general: yet fuch is the paffion for independence, that this little commonwealth, or confederacy of common- wealths, could not hold together. The general aflembly was neglected ; the cities became inde- pendent ; fome were conquered by foreigners, and fome loft their liberties by domeftic tyiants, that is, by their firft magiftrates affuming arbi- trary power. Polybius difcovers as maich affec- tion for this litde republic as Rouffeau did for Geneva, and is very loth to contefs their faults : He colours over the revolutions they un- derwent for a courfe of ages, by faying, that " though the affairs were governed according " to the diverfity of times and occurrences, all " poffible endeavours were ufed to preferve the *' form of a popular ftate. The commonwealth ^ was compofed of twelve cities, which are in " being at this day, Olenus and Helice only ex- *' cepted, which were fwallowed up by the fea in an earthquake that happened not long before " the battle of Leuftra ; which cities are Patra, " Dyma, Phara, Trytasa, Leontium, jEgira, Pel- ' lene, iEgium, Bura, Ceraunia, Olenus, and " Helice. After the death of Alexander, and fince " the Olympiad we have mentioned, thefe cities <* fell into dangerous, diffenfions, chiefly by the, ** artifices Achaia, 299 ** artifices of the Macedonian princes, when every " city apart meditated on nothing but their own '* private profit and ends, to the prejudice and ^' deftru6lion of their neighbours ; and this gave " occafion to Demetrius and CafTander, and afcer- " wards to Antigonus Gonatus, to put garrifons " in fome of their cities ; and that others were *' invaded and governed by tyrants, who, in thofe " days, were very numerous in Greece. But *' about the 124th Olympiad^ when Pyrrhus in- *' vaded Italy, thefe people began to fee the ** error of their diffenfions, and laboured to re- " turn to their former union. Thofe who gave ** the firft example were Dym,a, Fatra, and Pha- " ra : five years afterwaids, iEgium, having caft " out the garrifon that was placed over them, ** were received into the confederacy. Bura fol- *' lowed their example, having firft killed the ty- *' rant ; and foon after Ceraunia did the like ; " for Ifeas, their tyrant, confidering how that *^ thofe of iEgium had expelled their garrifon, *' and he who governed in Bura was already flain *' by the practices of Marcus and the Achaians, *' and that it would be his lot to have them all ** quickly for enemies, he therefore refigned the " dominion, after having firft ftipulated with the *' Achaians for his indemnity for what was pafTed, *' and fo incorporated the city into the union of '* the Achaians. " The cities, then, we have mentioned con- ^' tinued for the fpace of five-and- twenty years to " preferve this form of government unchanged, ^' chufing in their general affembly two praetors " (or prefidents) and a fecretary. Afterwards '^ they concluded to have but one praetor only, '' who Iliould be charged with the management " of their affairs -, and the firft who enjoyed that " dignity 300 Ancient Democratical Republics. " dignity was Marcus the Carian, who, after foni* ** years of his adminiftration, gave place to Ara- ^* tus the Sicyonian, who, at the age of twenty " years, after he had, by his virtue and refolu* " tion, refcued his country from tyranny, joined ** it to the commonwealth of the Achaians, fo *' great a veneration had he from his youth for *' the manners and inftitutions of that people. " Eight years after, he was a fecond time chofen " praetor, and won Acro-corinth, which Antigo- ** nus had fortified with a garrifon, whereby Aratus *' freed all Greece from no fmail apprthenfion, *' When he had reflored liberty to Corinth, he 5' united it to the Achaians, together with the f* city of Megara, which he got by intelligence ** during his p::Etorfljip. In a word, Aratus, *' who in a fhort fpace brought many and great " things to pafs, made it manifcft by his councils " and a6lions, that his greateft aim was the ex- ** pplfion of the Macedonians out of Pelopon- *' nefus, to fupprefs tyranny, and aflcrt the liber- ** ty of his country : fo that, during the whole *' reign of Antigonus Gonatus, Aratus conftantly " oppofed all his defigns and enterprizes, as he ** did the ambition pf t^e ^tolians to raife them- ^' felves on the ruins of their neighbour ftates ; *' and, as in all the tranfa61:ions of his adminif- ** tration he gave fingular evidences of a fteady *^ mind and firm refolution, all his attempts fuc- ** ceeded accordingly, notwithftanding many ftates " confederated to hinder the union, and to deftroy " the commonwealth of the Achaians, After the ** death of Antigonus the Achaians entered intoa^ ** league with the iEtolians, and generouily af- *' lifted them in their war againft Demetrius ; fo V that the ancient hatred between thefe two peo- V pie fecmed for th^ prefcnt cxtinguiftied, and AchalA, ^oi the defirc of concord began, by degrees, to grow in the minds of the j^tolians. Demetrius died, when many great and noble occafions were given to the Achaians of finifliing the projeft they had conceived j for the tyrants who reign- ed in Peloponnefus, having loft the fupporc of Demetrius who gready favoured them, began now to defpair ; and, on the other hand, being awed by Aratus, who admoniflied them to quit their governments, on promife of great honours and rewards to fuch as voluntarily refigned, and threatening others with hoflility who re- fufed ; whereupon they refolved to defpoil themfelves of their dignities, reftore their peo- ple to liberty, and incorporate them with the Achaians. As to Lyfidas, the Megalopolitan, he, wifely forefeeing what was likely to come to pafs, frankly renounced his dominion during the life of Demetrius, and was received into the general confederacy of rights and privileges with the v.'hole nation. Arillomachus, tyrant of the Argicus, Xeno of the Hermonians, and Cleonymus of the Phliatians, refigning their authority at the time we mention, were likewifc received into the alliance of the Achaians. In the mean time the ^tolians began to conceive iealoufies at the growing greatnefs and extra- ordinary fuccefs of the Achaians, and bafcly entered into a league with Antigonus, who at that tim.e governed Macedon, and with Cleo- menes, king of the Lacedaemonians. Thefe three powers, Macedonia, Ijaced^emon, and ^tolia, were to invade Achaia on all fides ; but the great political abiliues of Aratus de- feated the enterprize. He confidered that An- tigonus was a man of experience, and willing enough to make alliances -y and that princes " have 002 Ancient Democratkal Republics. ** have naturally neither friends nor enemies, btrt *' meafure annities and enmities by the rules of ** intereft : he therefore endeavoured, after a good ** underftanding with that prince, and determined " to propofe the joining the forces of the Achai- **,ans to his. He propofed to cede him fome ** towns ; and the alliance was formed, and the " Cleomenic war commenced. In the profccution *' of it, Cleomenfes and his Spartans difplayed the " utmoft ferocity, and cruelty, particularly at " iEgium, where he put in practice fo many ouc- *' rages and cruelties of war, that he left not fo " much as any appearance that it had been ever -" a peopled place.'* There is great reafon to fuf- pedt that the Achaians were not lefs guilty of cruelty ; for Polybius profeffes to follow the ac- count given by Aratus himfelf, in ahiftory which that prxtor wrote of Achaia, who may be well fufpefted of partiality ; and Polybius himfelf was the Ion of Lycortas of jVIegalopolis, who perfefted and confirmed the confederacy of the Achaians, iand difcovers throughout his hiflory a ftrong at- tachment to this people. If the hiftory of Clear- chus was extant, we might poiTibly fee that the Achaians, the Spartans, and Macedonians, were equally liable to the accufation of inhumanity. Mantinasa was fubjedted to unfpeakable calamities as well as iEgium i but Polybius endeavours to cover this over with a veil by abufing Clearchus, accufing him with departing from the dignity of hiftory and writing tragedies, by reprefenting wo- men with difhevelled hair and naked breafts, em- bracing each other with melting lamentations -^nd tears, and complaints of men, women, and chil- dren, dragged away promifcuoufly. He attempts to juilify the punifhment of this city, by charg- ing it with treacheroufly betraying itfelf into the hands Achat a, -joi hands of the Spartans, and mafTacring the Achaian garrifon : but this was no more than the ufual cffedt of the continual revolutions in the Greek cities, from democracy to arilTocracy, from that to monarchy, and back again through the whole circle. In every one of thefe cities there were three parties ; a monarchical party, who defired to be governed by a king or tyrant, as he was then called ; an ariftocratical party, who wifhed to ered: an oligarchy ; and a democratical party, who were zealous for bringing all to a Itvtl, Each fadlion was for colleding all authority into one center in its own way j but unfortunately there was no party who thought of a mixture of all thefe three orders, and giving each a negative by which it might balance the other two : ac- cordingly the regal party applied to Macedonian kings for aids and garrifons ; the ariftocratical citizens applied to Sparta for the like affiftance, and the democratical fadions applied to Aratus and the i\chaian league. The confequence was, as each party prevailed, they brought in a new garrifon, and mallacred the old one, together with the leaders of the fadtion fubdued. But is fuch a fyftem to be recommended to the United States of America ? If the Americans had no more difcretion than the Greeks, no more hu- manity, no more confideration for the benign and peaceful religion they profefs, they would dill have to confider, that the Gieeks had in many places forty flaves, and in all places ten, to one free citizen ; that the flaves did all the labour, and the free citizens had nothing to do but cut one another*s throats. Wars did not cofi: money in Greece J happily for the world, at prefent they are very expenfive. An American foldier will not ferve one year without more money for pay than 304 Ancient Democrathal Repuhlics. than many of thefe Greek cities had for their whole circulating medlunn. --There is but one pof- fible rheans of realizing M. Turgot's idea. Let us examine it well before we adopt it. Let every towri in the Thirteeri States be a free, fovereign, and independent democracy : here you may nearly coUedl: all authority into one center, and that center the nation. Thefe towns will immediately go to war with each other, and form combina- tionSj alliances, and political intrigues, as ably as the Grecian villages did : but thefe wars and hegociations cannot be carried on but by men at leifure. The firft ftep to be taken, then, is to de- termine who fhall be freemen, and who Haves. Let this be determined by lot. In every fifty men, forty are to be flaves, and (lay at home un- armed, under certain overfeers provided with good whips and fcourges, to labour in agriculture and mechanic arts j all commerce and navigation, fifheries, &c. are to ceafe of courfe. The other ten are to be free citizens, live like gentlemen, eat black broth, and go out to v/ar ; fome in fa- vour of tyrants, fome for the well-born, and fome for the multitude : for, even in the fuppofition here made, every town will have three parties in it; fome will be for makins; the moderator a king, others for giving the whole government to the feled men, and a third fort for making and executing all laws, and judging all caufes, crimi- nal and civil, in town meeting. Americans will well confider the confequences of fuch fyftems of policy, and fuch multiplications and divifions of ftates, and will univerfally fee and feel the nfcef- lity of adopting the fcntiments of Aratus, as re- ported by Plutarch : '* That fmall cities could ** be preferved by nothing elfe but a continual " and combined force, united by the bond of " common ^ cofnmoU intereft ; and as the members of the ^ body live and breathe by their mutual com- '^' munication and connedlion, and when once fe- ^' parated pine a^vay and putrefy, in the fame '* manner are cities ruined by being difmembered ^^ from one another, as well as preferved, whcn> *' linked together into one great body, they en- *' joy the benefit of that providence and council *' that governs the whole." Thefe were the fen- timenrs which, according to the fame Plutarch, acquired him fo much of the confidence of the Achaians, " that fince he could not by law bd '*' chofen their general every year, yet every othef ** year he was, and by his councils and adlions *' was in effe6t always fo ; for they perceived that *' neither riches nor repute, nor the friendfhip of *^ kings, nor the private intereft of his own conn* *^ try, nor any other thing elfe, was fo dear to him as the increafe of the Achaian power and great* uefs," t< LETTER XLIV. CRETE* MY DEAR SIR> THIS celebrated ifland, with the fantartlcal honour of giving birth to fome of the gods of Greece, had the real merit and glory of com- municating to that country many ufeful improve- ments. Their infular fituation defended tlicm from invafions by land, and their proximity to Egypt afforded them an eafy intercourfe of commerce by Vol. I. Y Tea 3o6 Ancient Democratkal RepuUics. fca with^ the capital of that kingdom j where Rhadarnanthus in his travels had colledied thofc inventions and inftitutions of a civilized people, which he had the addrefs co apply to the con- firmation of his own authority. Minos is ftill more diftinguiflied : in his travels in the eaft, he favv certain families poflefled of unrivalled ho- nours and unlimited authority, as vicegerents of the Deity. Although the Greeks would never ad- mit, in the fulleil latitude of oriental fuperftition and defpotifm, this odious profanation, yet Minos, taking advantage of his own unbounded reputa- tion, and that enthufiafm for his perfon which his fkill and fortune in war, his genius for fcience, and talents for government, had excited among wandering credulous favages, fpread a report that he was admitted to familiar converfations with Jupiter, and received from that deity his fyftem of laws, with orders to engrave it on tables of bra's. The great principle of it was, that all freemen fhould be equal, and therefore that none Ihould have any property in lands or goods j but that citizt^ns fhould be ferved by flaves, who ihould cultivate the lands upon public account. The citizens fhould dine at public tables, and their families fubfift on the public llock. The monarch's authority was extremely limited, ex- cept in war. The magiflracies were the recom- pence of merit and age ; and fuperiority was al- lowed to nothing elfe. The youth were reftrained to a rigid tempeiance, modefty, and morality, en- forced by law. Their education, which was pub- lic, was diredled to make them foldiers. Such regulations could not fail to fecure order, and what they called freedom to the citizens ; but nine-tenths of mankind were doomed to Havery to fuppo;t them in total idlenefs, excepting thole exercifes Crete 307 exercifes proper for warriors, become more necef- fary to keep the Haves in fubiedlion, than to de- fend the flate againft the pirates and robbers with whom the age abounded. Idomeneus, grand- fon of Minos, and commander of the Cretan forces in the Trojan war, was among the mod powerful of the Grecian chiefs, and one of the few who re- turned in fafcty from that expedition. Here was a government of all authority in one center, and that center the moft aged and meritorious perfbns of the nation, with little authority in the king, and none in the reft of the people -, yet it was not of fufficient ftreng-th to hold together. The venera- ble old men could not endure the authority, or rather the pre-eminence, of the king. Monarchy muft be abolifhed j and every principal city be- came early a feparate independent commonwealth ; each, no doubt, under its patriarch, t^^ron, noble, or archon, for they all fignify the fame thing : and continual wars enlued between the feveral repub- lics within the ifland j and Cretan valour and martial fkill were employed and exhaufted in butchering one another, until they turned all the virtues they had left againft mankind in gene- ral, and exerted them in piracies and robberies, to their univerfal infamy throughout all Greece : nor was Crete ever of any weight in Grecian politics after the Trojan war. Y 2 LETTER 3o3 Ancient Democrat teal kepuhlks, LETTER XLV, CORINTH. ^lY DEA.R SIR, MONARCHY remained in this emporiunn of Greece longer th^n in any other of the principal cities ; but the noble families here Could no better endure the fuperiority of a mo- narch, than others in all countries ; and with nu- merous branches of the royal family (named Bac- chidse, from Bacchis, fifth monarch in fucc^ffion from Aietes) at their head, they accordingly put to death Tcleftes, the reigning monarch ; and tifurping the government, under an aflbciation among them/elves, inftituted an oligarchy. An annua^l fii ft magiftrate, with the title of Prytanis, but with very limited prerogatives, like a doge of Venice, was chofen from among themfelves. Seve- ral generations pafled away under the adminiftra- tion of this odious oligarchy : but the people at length finding it intolerably opprelTive, expelled the whole junto, and fet up Cuypfelus as a mo- narch or tyrant. He had long been the head of the popular party, and was defervedly a popular charadler, poffeffed of the confidence and affedlion of his fellow citizens to a great degree, or he never could have refufed the- guard which was offered him for the proteftion of his perfon againft the attempts of the defeated oligarchy. His mo- deration and clemency are allowed by all ; yet he is univerfally called by the Grecian writers, I Tyrant Corinth, 309 Tyrant of Corinth, and his government a Tyran- ny. Ariftotlc, 1. V, c. 12, informs us that his tyranny continued thirty years, bccaufe he was a popular man, and governed without guards. Pe- fiander, one of the feven wife men, his fon and fucceffor, reigned forty-four years, becaufe he was an able general. Pfampfneticus, the ion of Gor- gias, fucceeded, but his reign was fhort ; yet this -ipace of feven ty- feven years is thought by Arif- totle one of the longeft examples of a tyranny or an oligarchy. At the end of this period the no- bles again prevailed ; but not without courting the people. The tyranny was demolifhed, and a new commonwealth eftablifhed, in which there was a mixture of oligarchy and democracy, to prevent the firft from running into excefs of oppreffion, and the other into turbulence and licence. Here we find the ufual circle : monarchy firft limited by nobles only ; then the nobles, becom- ing envious and impatient of the monarch's pre- eminence, demolifh him, and fet up oligarchy. This grows infolent and opprelTive to the people, who let up a favourite to pull it down. The new idol's pofterity grow infolent ; and the people final- ly think of introducing a mixture of three regular branches of power, in the one, the few, and the many, to controul one another, to be guardians in turn to the laws, and fecure equal liberty to all. Ariflotle, in this chapter, cenfures fome parts of the eighth book of Plato, and fays, " That in '^ general, when governments alter, they change *^ into the contrary fpecies to what they before " were, and not into one like the former ; and " this reafoning holds true of other changes. For *' he fays, that from the Lacedaemonian form it " changes into an oligarchy, and from thenc Y o " intt) 3IO Ancient Democratlcdl Republics. " into a democracy, and from a democracy into '^ a tyranny -, and fometimes a contrary change " takes place, as from a democracy into an oli- " garchy, rather than into a monarchy. With re- *' Ipeft to a tyranny, he neither fays whether " there will be any change in it ; or, if not, to " what caufe it will be owing ; or, if there is, '' into what other ftate it will alter: but the reafon '^ of this is, that a tyranny is an indeterminate ** government j and, according to him, every " llate ought to alter into the firfl: and moil" per- *^ fe(ft : thus the continuity and circle would be *' preferved. But one tyranny often changed " into another ; as at Syria, from Muros to Clif- *' thenes ; or into an oligarchy, as was Antileos at " Chalcas j or into a democracy, as was Chari- ^' laus's at Lacedsmon, and at Carthage. An " oligarchy is alfo changed into a tyranny : fuch " was the rife of moil of the ancient tyrannies in " Sicily : at Leontium, into the tyranny of Pa- '/ n^etius ; at Gcla, into that of Cleander ; at *^ Rhegium, into that of Anaxilaus ; and the like " in many other cities. It is abfurd alfo to fup- *' pofe, that a ftate is changed into an oligarchy *^ becaufe thofe who are in power are avaricious " and greedy of money ; and not becaufe thofe, " who are by far richer than their fellow-citizens, " think it unfair that thofe who have nothing fhould have an equal fhare in the rule of the ftate with themfelves, who poffefs fo much : for in many oligarchies it is not allowable to be employed in money-getting, and there are many laws to prevent it. But in Carthage, which is a democracy, money-getting is credit- able ; and yet their form of government re- *' mains unaltered." Whether thefe obfervations of Ariftotle upon Plato Jrgos. 311 Plato be all jufl: or not, they opjy ferve to flrengthen our argiitnent, by Ihcwing the muta- bility of fimple governments in a tuller light. Not denying any of the changes ftared by Plato^ he only enumerates a multitude of other changes to which fuch governments are liable ; and there- fore fliews the greater nrccffity of mixtures of different orders, and decifivc balances, to preferve mankind from thofe horrible calamities which re- volutions always bring with them. LETTER XLVI, ARGOS. MY DEAR SIR, IN order to form an adequate idea of the mife- ries which were brought upon the Greeks by continual and innumerable revolutions of govern- ment, it fhould be confidered, that the whole Pe- loponnefus was fcarceiy two hundred miles in length, and one hundred and forty in breadth, not much more extenfive than the fmalleft of the Thirteen States of America, Such an inherent force of repulfion, fuch a difpofition to fly to pieces, as poffeflTed the minds of the Greeks, would divide America into thoufands of petty defpicable ftates, and lay a certain foundation for irreconcileable wars. Although Thucydides and Ariftotle, as well as Homer, inform us, that kingdoms were here- Y 4 ditary. 312 Ancient Democratlcal RepuhUcs. ditary, and of limited authority, yet the limfta' tions appear to be very confufed j they were the liniitations of nobles rather than of people j and the firft ftruggles for power were between kings and archons. The kings had no ftanding ar- mies; and all the forces under their authority^^ even when they took the field, could be com- manded only by the nobles, who had their pecu- liar dirtri(5ls of land and people to govern : thele were illuftrious and independent citizens ; like the barons who demanded the great charter, com- municated to each other their grievances, and took meafures to remove them : but, being ge- nerally as averfe to popular as to regal power, their conftant aim was an ariftocracy -, they ac- cordingly extinguiflied monarchy, but did not fecure the rights of the people. The immediate efFedl of this revolution only multiplied evils. OpprelTed by kings, Greece was much more op- prefled by archons > and, anciently too much di- vided, was ftill more fubdivided under the new forms of government. Many inferior cities dif- dained the jurifdi6:ion, and even the fuperior in- fluence, of their refpeftive capitals ; affefted inde- pendent fovereignty ; and each town maintained war with its neighbours. Each independent ftate had a right to fend two members to the Amphic- tyonic council. The abolition of royalty render- ing the independent ftates more numerous, in- creafed the number of Amphiftyons to one hun- dred members, and more ; and an oath was re- quired, that the member Ihould never fubvert any Amphi<5lyonic city : yet every excefs of ani- mofity prevailed among the Grecian republics, notwithilanding the interpofuion of the Am- phidyons. Argos ArgGS, 31^ Argos was founded by Danans, the Egyptian, about the time that Ai';ens was fettled by Ce- crops. At the Trojan war it was the firft of the Hates, and ever contin.ed the rival of Sparta. Though the royal dignity feemed more firmly fettled under Agamemnon than under any other chief, yet Argos was one of the firft of the ftates upon the continent to abolilh monarchy, and thac as early as on the death of Celfus, Son of Teme- nus, the defcendant of Hercules. No account of its new conftitution is preferved : but, from ana- logy, we may be convinced, that a reftlefs body of nobles overturned the monarchy ; and, as it was fubjedl to frequent and violent diforders, that the archons could not agree upon the form of their oligarchy ; and fet up for independency in their different diftrids, dates, or cities, a little fooner than in other republics. The higher and lower ranks were continually at variance; the de- mocratical faftion was commonly fuperior -, fome- times tyrants were fet up over all ; and once, ac- cording to Herodotus,* the flaves got poffeffion of the city, took upon them the adminiftration of affairs, and exercifed the magiftracies. The government muft have been ill confli- tuted, as no Rhadamanthus or Minos, no Ly- curgus or Solon, no Zaleucus or Charondas, nor any other legiflator of fuperior wifdom and pro- bity, ever acquired the power ; and no fortunate coincidence of circumftances ever occurred to unite liberty and adminiftration, law and govern- ment, upon a ftable bafis. One famous tyrant, Pheidon, lineal fucceffor of Hercules, a prince of great abilities, but no moderation, raifed him- fdf, rather than his country, to a fuperiority * Lib, vi. which 314' Ancient Demoeratkal Republics. which ceafed with him. For want of diftli^dl orders and fteady balances, by which the wills and the forces of the people might have been fubje6led to the laws, Argos loft that pre-emi- nence among the Grecian ftates which it had ob- tained under a monarchy. Every little town in Argolis was feized vxith the caprice of indepen- cience, and oppofed the general government, at the fame time that the metropolis betrayed an ambition to domineer over the inferior towns. Civil wars enfued : MyceniE, Troezene, Epi- daurus, and other villages of lefs confequence, were often conquered and garrifoned, but never fubdued. NecelTity taught them to unice. They reproached Argos with tyranny, and Argos the others with rebellion. Union enabled them to fet at defiance their capital, by means of in- trigues and alliances with Lacediemon, the never- faiiing refource of one party or the other in every democratical ftate. The pretence v/as, the Per- fian war, which Argos declined. This was called a bafe derelitStion, and excited, by the help of Spartan emifiaries, hatred and contempt in Si- cyon, Naupila, Heli^a, and other towns, be- fides thofe mentioned before. Argos alone, of all the cities in Peioponnefus, openly efpoufcd the caufe of Athens. This circumftance alone, if it was nor accidental, is enough to fhovv, that this city had more fenfe and profound wifdom than all the reft ; for Sparta was certainly then leading all Greece to deftru6tion. In other re- fpedls, the Argives difcovered the fame temper and the fame underftanding with all the otliers ; for they led their whole forces againft Mycenae, took it by ftorm, decimated the inhabitants, and demoliftied the town. Is it not fjblime wifdom to rufti headlong intQ all the diftradlions and di- vifions; Iphhus. 3 1 5 vifions, all the aflafTinations and maflacres^ all the feditions, rebellions, and eternal revolutions, which are the certain confequencc of the want of orders and balances, merely for the fake of the popular caprice of having every fifty families governed by all authority in one center ? Even this would not fatisfy ; the fifty families would foon diilolve their union, and nothing would ever content them fhort of the cr mplete individual in- dependence of the Mohawks ; for it may be de- pended on, that individual independence is what every unthinking human heart aims at nearly or remotely. LETTER XLVII. IPHITUS. DEAR SIR, ELEIA had been the fcene of athletic games, celebrated with great po-rp by afiemblies of ciiiefs from various parts of Greece. Iphitus, a grandfon of Oxylus, fucceeded to the throne of Elis. A6live and enterprifing, but not by in- clination a foldier, he was anxious for a remedy for the diforderly fituation of his country. Among all the violence, feuds, and wars, fuperilition maintained its empire, and the oracle of Delphi was held in veneration. Iphitus fent an cmbafTy to fupplicate informa- tion from the deity, " How the anger of the goJs, '* which 2i6 Jncient Democratical Republics, *^ which threatened total deflru6lion to Pelopon- * nefus, through the endlefs hoftilities among " its people, might be averted ?" He received an anfvver which he had probably dictated, '^ That ** the Olympian feftival miift be rtftored : for " that the neglect of that folemnity had brought ' on the Greeks the indignation of Jupiter and Hercules ; to the firit of whom it was dedi- ** cated, and by the laft of whom it had been in- ** ftituted." Iphitus proceed{:'d to model his in- ftitution ; and ordained that a feftival fliould be held at the temple of Jupiter at Olympia, near Pifa in Eleia, for all the Greeks to partake in, and that it fliould be repeated every fourth years that there fliould be facrifices to Jupiter and Her- cules, and games in honour of them ; that an ar- miftice fliould take place throughout Greece for fome time before the commencement of the fefti- val, arid continue fome time after its conclufion. ,A tradition was reported, that the Heraclides had appointed Oxylus to the throne of Elis, and the guardianfliip of the temple of Olympian Jupiter, and confecrated all Eleia to the god. A reputa- tion of fanclity became attached to the whole peo- ple of Eleia, as the hereditary priefthood of Ju- piter j and fecluded them from all neceffity of engaging in politics or war. But it was not pofTible, by any inftitutions of religion, to de- ftroy that elafticity given by nature to the mind of man, which excites continually to adion, often palpably againfl: men's interefts, which v/as ftrong in the general temper of the Greeks, and which can never be fubdued or reftrained in any nation but by orders and balances. Reftlefs fpirirs arofe, not to be fatisfied. The Eieians often engaged as auxiliaries in the wars of other ftates, on pre- tence of ailerting the caufe of religion 3 but even in IphituS, ^tj in that caufe itfelf they could not acrree among themfelves. While monarchy fubfirted in the pofterity of Iphitns, as it did for fome genera- tions, Eleia continued under one government ; but at length the fpirit of democracy prevailed there, as ellewhere in Greece, and with the fame f ffefts : every town claimed independency ; Pifa and Elis became feparate commonwealths. Olymi- pia was fituated within the territory of Pifa, on the northern bank of the river Alpheius, which alone feparated it from that city. Elis was thirty miles diftantj but the Eleians retained the guar- dianfhip of the temple, and fuperintendency of the feflival. The Pif^eans now difputed their right i wars arofe between the two cities ; each endeavoured to gain allies. At one time, Phei- don, tyrant of Argos, claiming to be by birth the proper reprefentative of Hercules, took to himfelf the guardianfhip of the temple, and pre- fided at the games ; at another time the Pifa^ans prevailed, and prefidcd at fome Olympiads. Ac length the Eleans deftroyed Pifa fo entirely, that not a ruin was left ; and ever after, excepting in the 104th Olympiad, when the Arcadians violently interfered, they held the prefidency un- difturbed. If a democracy could ever, in any cafe, hold together, it would be natural to expe<5t it in this inititution of Iphitus, which, founded wholly oni religion, had procured fo much profperity and veneration to his people : but it is as rational to expect that a glafs bubble, with a drop of water inclofed in it, will refill: the heat of the fire : the vapour within will blaft ic into duU and atoms. LETTER Ji8 Ancient Democratlcal Republics. LETTER XLVIII. THEBES. DEAR SIR, FABLE, and hidory too, relate that this city was governed anciently by kings ; fixteen of whom, from Cadmus the Phoenician, who founded it, to Xanthus, are enumerated. After the death of the laft, the Thebans changed their govern- ment to a democratical republic. Their orders and balances are not known ; but their fa<5lions and divifions, as well as their dulnefs, is remem- bered. From the analogy of all the other Gre- cian dates, it is probable that archons prefided over the feveral cities of Boeotia, as their fepa- rate diftrids, and had a king at their head, like UlyflTes in Ithaca, and Alcinous in Phsacia ; that the king, whofe domain was Thebes, had fome- times an inclination to favour his capital more than the fubordinate towns ; and that the archons grew impatient of his monarchy, and afpired at independency : the jealoufy and rivalry of cities favoured the fadlious views of the archons, and were probably fomented for that purpofe. Is it an inftance of their want of penetration, or was it from necelTity, that they chofe the two heads of oppofite fadions for their higheft annual magiftrates ? Ifmenias was one j an honeft man, a friend to liberty, and confequently an advo- cate for an equilibrium of powers in the confli- tution. Leontidas, the other, was ambitious of the whole power to himfelf, and of governing by Tbehes. 31^ by a council of his friends ; but, finding his rival more popular than himfelf, he fold the citadel to a Spartan general, upon condition that he and his party fhould rule. When this was efrefled, he feized his colleague, and had him tried, con- demned, and executed, for caballing againjl the go- *vernment. The friends of Ifmenias fled in a panic, and were banifhed by a public edid ; for ic ieems that a revolution without banifhments and con fife at ions, at lead, is a degree of moderation and felf-government of which nations are wholly incapable. The exiled cidzens, who in this cafe were the honeft men and friends of liberty, among whom was Pelopidas, returned from Athens in difguife, deftroyed the tyrant and his crew, and, with the help of Epaminondas and his friends, regained the citadel. Thefe two fages and heroes had now enough to do : firft, to infpire a little underftanding and unanimity into their fellow- citizens ; then to difcipline them for war, and conquer their enemies ; and, at lall, to frame a good conftitution of government. They accom- pliflied all but the laft, to their immortal glory : but Pelopidas was killed in battle before the war was finifhedj and Epaminondas grew unpo- pular, and was rejecfted by faction even from the command of the army : a fufficient proof that the ariftocratical and democratical faftions were nearly equal. He was re-inftated, indeed, after the blunders and defeats of his fuccefibr had .brought the citizens to re-pentance, but was llain in battle at the moment of vidory : fo that the Theban republic never had the benerit of his advice in the formation of a new code of laws; as fhe had never made any figure, excepting a momentary fame under thele two great men, and was at length totally deftroyed by Alexander. g The 320 Ancient Democratical RepuhlicS, The ruin 'of Boeotia was occafioned by the fineffe of Antalcidas, in his Pedian treaty. The Thebans, as well as Argives, had withheld their affiftance in the Perfian war. Antalcidas knew that the fubordinate cities of ThefpisD, Platea, Aulis, Anthemon, Larymna, Afchra, Coronea, Labadea, Delium, Alalkomene, Leuftra, Chae- ronea, all wifhed for independence j they accord- ingly reje(5led the jurifdidlion and fovereignty of Thebes. The Thebans folicited Sparta to take a part in their domeftic quarrels ; and, againft her own favourate treaty, made by her artful am- baffador, fhe accepted the propofal. The vir- tuous and anniable Spartan fenate perceived that it was equally their intereft that Argos fhould lofe her jurifdi6lion over her revolted towns, and that Thebes, the rival neighbour of Athens, fiiould recover her authority in Boeotia; but, not- "withftanding partial fuccefles, fhe could not re- gain her authority over all the cities, until Epa- minondas arofe, after eighty years of civil wars. Had there been a governor in Boeotia, and a fe- nate, and a houfe of reprefentatives, compofed of an equitable proportion of deputies from Thebes and all the leiTer cities and eachofthefe branches pofTefled of an independent negative in the legiflature, while the whole executive was in the governor would thefe civil wars have hap- pened ? thefe endlefs contentions between the nobles and people, the capital and fubordinate cities ? thefe intrigues of one party with Athens, and another with Sparta ? The very difinclina- tion, both in Thebes and Argos, to engage in the Perfian war, arofe wholly from their domeftic diflenfions j and thefe from the want of judicious orders and balances. After After the abolition of monarchy in Boeotia, ^here was an effort to colie61: all authority into one center; but the nation found, that, although Jaws might be thus made, they could not be fo ^executed. There mud, therefore, be an execu- itive magiftrate ; but not being able to agree, in order to pleafe both fides, the lecider of each fac- tion mult be chofen. They could not agree, as might have been forefeen, and fplit the nation at once into two hoftile armies ; one of which fought the alliance of Sparta, and the other that 'of Athens. Thus it ever was, and ever wili 'be, in fimilar cafes. It is much to be regretted, that Epaminondas did not live to difplay his talents as a legiflator ; the world might ppfTibly have been blefTed with fomething like an Englifh conftitution, two or three thoufand years fooner ^han it was. Vol. 1 2 LETTER 32 2 Ancient Arijlocratical Repuhlics, LETTER XLIX. ANCIENT ARISTOCRATICAL REPUBLICS. CROTONA. PYTHAGORAS. MY DEAR SIR, PYTHAGORAS, as well as Socrates, Plato, and Xenophon, were perfuaded that the hap- pinefs of nations depended chiefly on the form of their government : they were fully fenfible of the real mifery, as well as dangerous tendency, both of democratical licentioufnefs and monarchical tyranny; they preferred a well-tempered arifto- cracy to all other governments, Pythagoras and Socrates, having no idea of three independent branches in the legiflature, both thought, that the laws could neither prevent the arbitrary op- prelTions of magiftrates, nor turbulent infolence of the people, until mankind were habituated by education and difcipline to regard the great du- ties of life, and to confider a reverence of them- felves, and the efteem of their fellow-citizens, as the principal fource of their enjoyment. In fmall communities, efpecially where the ilaves were many and the citizens few, this might be plau- fible i but the education of a great nation can ne- ver accompliih fo great an nd. Millions muft be brought "Pythagoras. 32^ brought up, whom no principles, no fentiments derived from education, can reftrain from tram- pling on the laws : orders of men, watching and balancing each other, are the only fecurity j power muft be oppofed to power, and intereft to intereft. Pythagoras found this by experience at Crotona, where the inferior ranks, elated with the deftruc- tion of Sybaris, and inftigated by an artful ambiti- ous leader, Cylon, clamoured for an equal par- tition of the conquered territory : this was denied them, as inconfiftent with an ariftocratical go- vernment J a confpiracy enfued againfl the ma- giftrates, who were furprifed in the fenate-houfe, many put to death, and the reft driven from their country. Pythagoras was one of the banifhed, and died foon afterwards, in extreme old age, at Metapontum. The Crotonians had foon caufe to repent their infurreclion ; for they were defeated, with all their forces, by the Locrians arni Rhe- gians, with fmaller numbers. Theother Greek cities of Italy which had imi- tated the example of Crotona, in depofing their magiftrates, were harraffed with wars againft each other, and againft their neighbours. In confe- quence of theie diftreftes, the difciples of Pytha- goras again recovered their reputation and influ- ence ; and about fixty years afterwards, Zaleucus and Charondas, the one in Locris, and the o!:l"ier in Thurium, revived the Pythagorean inftitutions. In forty years more, a new revolution drove the Pythagoreans entirely from Italy, and completed the mifcry of that beautiful country. Thus ex- perience has ever fliewn, that education as well as religion, ariftocracy as well as democracy and monarchy, are, fmgly, totally inadequate to t!ie bufinefs of reft/aining the pallions of men, of preferving a fteady government, and protci^ling Z 2 the 324 Ancient Jrlfiocratlcal Republics. the lives, liberties, and properties of the people. Nothing has ever eiFcfted it but three different orders of men, bound by their interefts to watch over each other, and ftand the guardians of the laws. Religion, fuperftition, oaths, education, laws, all give way before paffions, intereft, and power, which can be refifted only by paffions, in- tereft, and power. It is no wonder that M. Turgot fhould have entertained very crude conceptions of republican legiflation j it is a fcience the lead underftood of any in the whole circle : all other orders of men of letters in Europe, as well as phyficians, for a long time, have thought it ** litters nihil fanan- *^ tes." It is a kind of erudition which neither procures places, penfions, embaiTies, chairs in academies, nor fam.e nor praftice in the pulpit, at the bar, nor in medicine. A minifter of flate of great abilities and merit, as well as reputation, advanced to the head of the affairs of a refpecla- ble monarchy, by one of the greateft princes that has ever lived, I mean the Baron de Hertfberg, has within a few years fet an example, in a royal academy of Iciences, of inquiry into this fubjeft. In a learned and ingenious difcourfe, delivered by himfelf, he has attempted to fhow the advantages of fimple monarchy over all kinds of republican governments, even that beft fpecies of them, li- mited monarchies : but did this worthy minifter expeft that any of his brother academicians would conteft with him the merits of fuch governments ? Men of letters are not fond of martyrdom in this age, nor of ruining their reputations. It is not, however, my defign to difcufs any queftions at pre- fent concerning abfolute monarchies, though the principles I contend for might be traced through the hiftory of every monarchy and empire in Eu- rope. Tythagoras. 325 rope. Even In thefe there are orders, checks, and balances contrived, at lead againft abufes in ad- miniftration, and for the prefervation of the laws. The fcience of governnnent has received very lit- tle improvement fince the Greeks and Romans. The necefiity of a ftrong and independent execu- tive in a fingle perfon, and of three branches in the legiflature inftead of two, and of an equality among the three, are improvements made by the - Englifh, which were unknown, at lead never re- duced to praftice, by the ancients. Machiavel was the firft who revived the ancient pohtics : the beft part of his writings he tranflated almoft literally from Plato and Ariftotle, without ac- knowledging the obligation ; and the word of the fentiments, even in his prince, he tranflated from Ariftotle, without throwing upon him the re- proach. Montefquieu borrowed the beft part of his book from Machiavel, without acknowledg- ing the quotation. Milton, Harrington, Sid- ney, were intimately acquainted with the an- cients, and with Machiavel. They were followed by Locke, Hoadley, Sec. The reputation which is to be acquired by this kind of learning may be judged of by the language of Mr. Hume : *^ Compofitions the moft defpicable, both for <* ftyle and matter, fuch as Rapin Thoyras, " Locke, Sidney, Hoadley, &c. have been ex- *' tolled, and propagated, and read, as if they '^ had equalled the moft celebrated rem.ains of *' antiquity." Hume's Hiftory of England, vol. viii. p. 323. Such is the ftyle in which this great writer fpeaks of writings which he moft probably never read. But akhough the time is long fince pafled when fuch writings were extolled, propagated, or read, the contempt of them is as falhionable, as likely to procure places and pen- Z 3 fions. 326 Ancient Arijlocratlcal Republics. fions, and to make a book fell now, as it was when Mr. Hume wrote. The fads in thefe letters relative to Venice are taken from the Abby Langier and Moor's Travels ; thofe relative to the ancient republics, excepting the authorities already quoted, are taken from Robertfon, Montague, Potter, the Univerfal Hiftory, and efpecially from Mitford, Giilies, and Fergufon, three very valuable and elegant produdions, which deferve to be care- fully ftydied by all America. I have made fi-ec life oF their expreffions as well as refiedions, without noting them ; if you would fee how much has been borrowed, you mud read, M. Turgot was as litde convcrfant in this kind of erudition as Mr. Hume. The former, however, was a lover of liberty ; but it was of that kind of liberty which he meditated to intro- duce into France, and could reconcile with a fimple monarchy : he was too good a fubje6t to think of introducing a free conftitution of go- vernment into his own country. For the liberty of commerce, the liberty of religious fentiments, and the perfonal liberty of the fubjed, fuch as are eftablifhed by the laws, in a monarchy, he was an enthufiaft 5 and enthufiafm for liberty, the common caufe of all mankind, is an amiable fervour, which is pardonable even when it is not according to knowledge ; but he was neither an enthufiaft for a free conftitution of government^ nor did he know in what it confifted. LETTER Charonda5 327 LETTER L. ANCIENT DEMOCRATICAL REPUBLICS. CYBARIS. CHARONDAS. MY DEAR SIR, nPHE city of Sybaris was a Grecian colony *- in ItalVj planted by Achaians ; and, ac- cording to Diodorus Siciilus,* its beautiful fitua- tion between two rivers, thv Crathis and the Sy- baris, the extent and fertility of its territory^ and the freedom of its laws, had, in a fhort fpace of time, drawn together a prodigious number of in- habitants, and greatly enriched them. But the common fate of all nations and cities attended them. They had three parties ; a chief^ a, better fort, and a people. The mod powerful citizens were caballing as ufual againfl: the chiefj whole name was Telys, and, whatever his cha- rafler for virtue was, appears to havr had more cunning than Grecian chiefs commonlv had, at lea.rt he difcerned better where the balance lay ; for he courted the people, by flattering their fol- lies. He excited a popular cry againft the arifto- cratical party, drove them from the city, confif- cated their fortunes, and diftributed them among the reft of the citizens. The exiles fled to Cro-. tona. Telys fent ambaflTadors to demand them, on pain of war. Pythagoras thought the caufe of his * Lib. xii. p. 6. Z 4 arifl:ocratical 52 & Jncleni Democrattcal RepnUhs^, ariftocratical friends juft, and perfuaded his fef* low-citizens to lefufc to deliver them up. The Sybarites marched an army ; but were met by another from Crotona, with Milo, the ftrong, man^ at their head, whofe reputation prevailed ; the Sybarites were all mafTacred, and their city pillaged and left a defart. Firft happy effeft of a government without acknowledged orders and legal balances! Fifty-eight years afterwards,, fome ThefTalians eftablilhed themfelves at Syba- ris : they had not been there five years, when the Crotonians came and drove them out. Under Callimachus, archon of Athens, it was re-peo- pled the third time, and had the name of Thu- rium. A populous colony was lent there, un- der Lampon and Xenocrates, who built a beau- tiful city for a capital, and twenty-five fubor- dinate cities : but the inhabitants could not long live in good intelligence among themfelves j they fell into diflenfions, grew extravagant, luxu- rious, and effeminate to a proverb. The quar- rel began in this manner : The old inhabitants of Sybaris erected themfelves into a kind of no- bility, and arrogated to themfelves all the public employments of any diftinfliony vouchfafing to the new-comers only thofe of leaft importance; they infifted, moreover, that their wives fhould facrifice the firft to the gods, and that the other ladies fhould not commence their devotions tilt the firfl had concluded : not content with diftinc- tions fo afTuming, they went farther, and took to themfelves, in the diftribunon of the lands, all thofe which were neareft the city, and left only the Qiore diftant to thofe whom they called fo- reigners. The latter, being more numerous and more brave, carried their refentments fo far, as ' to put all the old families to deaths and remained fole Charondas, 32^ fole pofTeflbrs of all the territory within the walls. Not having people enough left, they invited others from various parts of Greece, divid.:-:! houfes and lands among them, entered into alliance with Cro- tona, and became opulent. They divided the peo- ple into ten tribes, and eftablifhed among them a democratical government, and chofe for their le- giflator Charondas, who, having examined to the foundation the laws of all countries, chofe out of them, for his country, the wifeft and moil con- venient. Some others he added, drawn from his own meditations. His laws are loft, and there- fore his orders and balances are not known. Ic is, neverthelefs, certain, that orders- and balances exifted in his inftitution, from certain regulations prefer ved by Diodorus : I. -He excluded from all his public councils all men who, having children, Ihould marry a fecond timej and thus mortify their children with the authority of a ftep- mother. 2. As another check to his democracy, he ordained that all who fliould be convided of calumny, (hould be conduced through the ftreets crowned with tamarin ; a punifhmentfo infamous, that feveral put an end to their own lives rather than fubmit to it. 3. He prohibited all fociety with wicked men: for, fays he, the difpofition to evil is very ftrong ; and many of thofe who at firft love virtue, are often drawn in, by the charms of fecrct fedudions, to the greateft vices. 4. He ordained, that all the fons of every family fhould iearn to write and read under mafters in the pay of the public. This law alone has merit enough to confecrate to immortality the memory of this legiflator, and deferves to be imi- tated by every free people at leaft. 5. That 3JO Ancient Democratical Republics. 5. That the property of orphans fhould be ad- miniftered by the relations by the father j but their perfons and education entrufted to thofe by the mother. 6. All thofe who fliould refufe to take arms for their country, or quit their ranks in the arrny^ inftead of being punifhed by death, fhould be ex- pofcd three days in a public fquare of the city in women's clothes. 7. To prefcrve this democratical arrangement, he thought it neceffary to prohibit all propo- fals of changes in his laws. His principle was, that it was as advantageous to fubmit to the laws, as it is dangerous to fubje6t the laws to indivi- duals J and, therefore, in trials he reprehended and filenced all criminals, who fubftituted turns of eloquence and arbitrary interpretations in place of the lettt-r of the laws, and charged them with violating their authority and majefty. The quef- tion is, laid Charondas^ *' Whether you fhall fave " the law or the criminal ?" 8. Struck with the diforders and feditbns which he had feen in many democratical cities, he or- dained that no citizen Ihould prelent himfelf in the public affembly, to propofe any reformation or alteration in the law, without an halter about his neck, which he Ihould wear till the people had deliberated and determined: if the people decreed the propofed alteration hurtful or un neceffary, the reformer ihould be ftrangled on the fpot. This regulation filenced all new Icgiflators fo entirely, that only three examples occured of any changes. All his precautions were infufiicient : Return- ing from the country with his fword, which he had taken to defend himfelf againft highwaymen, he found the aflembly in divifion and confufion. He haftened to compofe the tumult. One of his 1 enemies Zakucus. 331 enemies reproached him with violating his own law, by coming into the aflembly armed. Charondas, who had forgotten the I'word, cried, I mean to obferve and enforce the law, and plunged it into his own heart, wearied, moft probably, into a contempt of life by the diforders incident to unbalanced parties. When every legiflator who has attempted a de- mocratical eftabhfhment, has confeffed its inherent tendency to immediate diffolution, by the ftrongeft rigours againfl propofals of innovation, and num- berlefs other provifiona to controul it, which have all been found ineffeftual, is it worth while fliil to cherilh the fond idea, when three branches are found, by experience, fo effeflually to check each other; when in two independent aflemblies im- provements and reformations may be fo eafily and fafely propofed and adopted, and fuch as are not beneficial rejeded ? LETTER LI. LOCRIS. ZALEUCUS. MY DEAR SIR, ZALEUCUS was of Locris in Italy, not faf diftant from Sybaris. He was a difciple of Pythagoras, of noble birth, and admirable morals. Having acquired the efteem and confidence of his fellow-citizens, they chofe him for their legiflator. Unfor- 33 2 Ancient Democrattcal Repuhlks, Unfortunately little remains of his laws but their preamble j but this is in a ftyle lo fupcrior to all the other legiflators, as to excitt. i egret for the ]ofs of his code. In this pr"..inbie lie declares, that all thofe who fhali inhabii the city, obght, above all things, to be perfuaded that there is a God ; and if they elevate their eyes and thoughts towards the heavens, they will be convinced, that the difpofition of the heavenly bodies, and the order which reigns in all nature, are not the work of men, nor of chance ; that, therefore, they ought to adore the gods, as the authors of all which life X prefents us of good and beautiful ; that they ihould hold their fouls pure from every vice, be- caufe the gods accept neither the prayers, offer- ings, or facrifices of the wicked, and are pleafed only with the juft and beneficent aftions of vir- tuous men. Having thus, in the beginning of his laws, fixed the attention of his fellow-citizens upon piety and wifdom, he ordains, above all things, that there fliould never be among them any irre- concileable enmity ; but, on the contrary, that thofe animofities which might arife among them, fcould be only a paflage to a fure and fincere re- conciliation ; and that he who would not fubmic himfelf to thefe fentiments, fhould be regarded as a favage in a civilized community. The chiefs of his republics ought not to govern with arrogance nor pride j nor fhould the magidrates be guided in their judgements by hatred nor by friendfhip. This preamble, inllead of addrefTing itfelf to the ignorance, prejudices, and fuperftitious fears of favages, for the purpofe of binding them to an abfurd fyftem of hunger and glory for a family purpofe, like the laws of Lycurgus, places re- ligion, morals, and government, upon a bafis of philofophy, which is rational, intelligible, and eter- I nal. Zaieuras. 33 j nal, for the real happinefs of man In Ibclety, and throughout his duration. The principle adopted by this legiflator, as the motive to adlion next to the fenfe of duty and fo- cial obligation, was the fenfe of honour, like that of Lycurgus. As Zaleucus was a difciple of Py- thagoras, whofe favourite plan of government waa a well-tempered ariitocracy, we may conjefture, that fuch was the form recommended to the Lo- crians : but all are loft, and certainly no argument can be drawn from them in favour of one popular affembly. If, in vifiting the Sybarites and Locrians, we have found nothing in favour of M. Turgot's fyftem, nor any thing very material againft it, we have found a greater advance to- wards civilization than in all the laws of Lycurgus and Solon, excepting only the trial by jury in- ftituted by the latter j I mean in the preamble of Zaleucus, and in the general education to letters in fchools, at the public expence, by Charondas. LETT'ER 334 Ancient Democrat kal Repuhlics, LETTER LII. ROME. PLEBEIANS SCRAMBLING AFTER PATRICIANS; OR DEMOCRACY HUNTING DOWN ARISTOCRACY; OR TRIBUNES IN CHASE OF A SENATE. MY DEAR SIR, WE have before feen, in the hiftory of Rome, with what eagernefs the ariftocracy pur- fued and demolifhed the nnonarchy : the kings are commonly reproached with tyranny, and the nobles are applauded for refiftance to it ; but it is clear that the nobles were as tyrannical, and that their eternal plots and confpiracies againft the kings, their power, their crowns, and their lives, were the caufe and the provocation to that tyranny. It is impolTible to fay which were word, the nobles or kings ; both certainly were bad enough in general, and both frequently vio- lated the laws, as it will ever happen when there are but two branches. The people as yet had no adequate power to aid or controul either. By the inftitution of Romulus, indeed, the Roman peo- ple, even the loweft clafs of the citizens, inftead of being prohibited to engage in all kinds of labour, after the example of the Spartans, were dir^ed^ to apply themfelves to pafturage, agricul- tUnBLand mechanic arts. This had its natural cfi^cri and immediately after the revolution, by which Rome. 22 S which the monarchy was abolifhed, and ariftocracy fet up, though we find the patricians at their ufual game of encroach ing-on the people, yet we find there was a people, a numerous, hardy, coura- geous people, who were not difpofed to fubmit : they foon began a refiftance, and to demand more power to refill ; and having obtained one concef- fion, they required another, until they obtained an equality with the patricians. So far they were in the right ; and if the two powers could have re- mained equal, juftice, liberty, and happinefs, the efFefl of equal laws, might have been enjoyed : but human nature can never reft once in mo- tion, it rolls, like the ftone of Sifyphus, every in- ftant when the refifting force is fufpended. Dio- dorus Siculus is very right, lib. xix. when he fays, ** It is of the nature of man to afpire continually " at fomething greater than his prefent condition, " and to wifh that his power might increafe in- " ftead of decreafing, or refting as it is." Dr. Fer- gufon, who follows very accurately Dionyfius of Halicarnafilis, Livy, and Polybius, will furnifh us with a good account of the fteps by which the Roman people proceeded to augment their own power, and diminifh that of the fenate, until they obtained the whole. I fhall give an abridgement of the ftory very nearly in Fergufon's words. In their career, however, the people loft their morals and their wifdom,as they ever will in fuch a courfe, and were ready to confer the fovereignty on the line of Csefars, even before they had completely obtained it. Thofe irregularities, and that final cataftrophe, were all occalioned by the imperfec- tions in their balance. If the confuls had been poiTefled of a negative in the legidature, and of all the executive authority, and the fenate and people had been made equal and independent in the firft clta- ^^6 Ancient Democratlcal Republic's^ cftablifhment of the commonwealth, icis impoffi* ble for any man to prove that the republic would not have remained in vigour and in glory at this hour. The government of Rome, in the a44th year from the building of the city after the expulfion of Tarquin, was become wholly ariftocratical : the nobles, exclufively, had the legiHative, execu- tive, and judicial power, without any third party to hold the balance between them and the people; for the confuls, although they were executive ma- giftrates, united in their perfons the dignities of the ftate : thofe of judges, magiftrates, and mili- tary leaders, were underftood to come in the place of kings, and performed all the functions of roy- alty ; yet they were only parts and miniflers of the fenate. While the exiled king was endeavour- ing, by continual invafions, to recover his power> difputes arofe between the parties who had united to expel him. Creditors, fupported by the arifto- cracy, of which the nobles were now in full pof- feffion, became fevere in the exaftion of debts, or the patrons laid claim to more than the clients were willing to pay. The ftate was diftrafted at once by its enemies from abroad, and by the dif-^ fenfion of parties at home. The authority of the new government not being fufficient to contend with thefe difficulties, the fenate refolved to place themfelves and the commonwealth, for a limited time, under the power of a fingle perfon, under the title of didtator. The inferior clafs of the people, almoft ex- cluded from any fhare in the new govern- ment, foon found, that under its influence, they had more opprefTion to fear from their pa- trons than they had ever experienced from the prince they had banifhed. So long as the king and Rome, 337 and the fenate fhared in the powers of the flate, the one took part with the people, when the other attempted to opprefs them ; and it was the ordi- nary intereft and policy of the prince to Vv'eaken the nobles, by fupporcing the plebeians againfl them. This effedtofthe monarchy ftill, in fome meafure, remained fo long as the exiled king was alive, maintained his pretenfions, and made the united fervices of the people neceflary to the fenate J but upon the death of the king, the nobles availed themfelves of their power, and en- forced their claims on the people with extreme feverity. In the capacity of creditors, they im- prifoned, ftripped, and enflaved thofe who were indebted to them, and held the liberties and lives of their fellow-citizens at their mercy. The whole body of plebeians was alarmed j they faw more formidable enemies in the perlons of their own nobility, than in the armies of any nation whatever. Many who had already fufFered under the rod of their creditors, when called upon to enlift, fhewed their limbs galled with fetters, or torn with ftripes which they had received by command of their mercilefs patrons. Thefe diftratlions obliged the fenate to have recourfe to another didlator j and Valerius, who was appointed for his popularity, repelled the enemy. The fenate, upon his return, not fulfilling his promifes to the people, they re- tired to the Sacred Mountain. The fenate was obliged to negotiate, to mitigate the feverities againft infolvent debtors, and confent to the ap- pointment of tribunes: this was in the year 260, fixteen years after the revolution. Had the ple- beians difcontinued their colleftive aftemblies for every purpofe but eleftions, and increaled their tribunes to four or five hundred reprefcntativcs, even this would not have been a radical cure. Vol. I. A a without 33S Ancient Dcmocrattcal RepuhUcs. without ffparating the confuls from the fenatc, and giving them, or one of them, the executive power, and a negative both upon the fenate and popular affembly in the legiflature : but there was too much prejudice, and too little knowledge, for fo great an improvement. The people con- tented themfelves with the appointment of a leader under the name of Tribune, who, without power to protect them effe(ftually, had enough to head every popular tumult, and blow up every fpark to a flame. An affembly of reprefentatives would have had an equal right with the fenate to propofe laws, to deliberate, debate, alter, amend, improve 5 but the tribunes were authorized only to forbid any meafure they thought injurious, but not to propofe any law, or move any refolu- tion. Not permitted to mix with the fenators, they had places at the door of the fenate houfe, as their ojfiice was felt to be a dangerous one. Their per- fons were made facred j and every one was de- voted to the infernal gods who fhould even ftrike them. An oath was to be taken to obferve this law ; and the idea of the fanftity of a tribune took fuch deep root, that the emperors after- , wards were protedled from affaffins by this facred tide of Tribune. The college of tribunes at firfl was not limited to any number j but in procefs of time they incrcafed from three to ten. Patricians could not by law be elected j yet the people, to fhew that they never will be fteady to any law, even to thofe moft diredtly contrived for their benefit, fometimes departed from this. The tri- bunes were at firft elected in the curis, where the vote of the pooreft citizen was equal to that of the moit wealthy. But even here the patri- cians, befides their great influence, had even a negative on all proceedings by holding the aulpices : Rome, 2o 9 aufpices : for this reafon it was thought necelTary to alter the form of the afiembly, in which the tri- bunes were eledted, to that of the tribes; and by this means to enable the people to make their eledlion without any controul from the nobles, either in virtue of the authority of the fenate, or the interpofition of the augurs. Thefe would have been real improvements of the conftitution, if they had proportionally augmented the authority of the confuls at the fame time ; but probably there would have been as many prejudices againft fuch a propofal among the people, as in the fenate. All the popular jealoufies and alarms at regal au- thority would have been excited by demagogues in the fenate as well as in the comitia ; for there are in all nations ariftocratical demagogues as well as democratical. Thefe expedients were adopted by the fenate to quiet the animofities of parties ; but tended, in fad, only to render the conteft between them more equal, and to multiply the fubjeds of difpute. The tribunes being vcfted with power to aflemblc the people, could not long be confined to the mere negative with which they were firft entrufted. The party of the plebeians, with thefe magiftrates at their head, were then in a pofture not only to preferve their right, but likewife to gain to their order continual accefTior.s of power. Happily for the ilate there was yet much ground to be gained without tranTgrefTing the bounds of order, or the authority of equitable government. The bar of hereditary diftindion was the ftrongelt obftacle which the popular leaders in this career had to break through. The nobles among the Romans, as well as among the Greeks, generally traced back their lineage, in fome manner or other, to gods and goddefTcs ; and the divine original of nobility, and the t-tfcnti:U A a 2 diftindion 34C> Ancient Democratka! Republics. diftinflion between the two orders of nobles and commons, the one being believed a fuperior order of beii:gs to the other, was founded in their infti- tutions of rel'.gion, and in popular belief: and aUhoiigh fome pretenfions are fet iipfti 1 in many parts of Ell. ope to the divine right of nobility, yet they are generally held in fo little eftimation, that a mcdern can hardly form an idea of the dif- ficulty the tribunes mult have found to overcome this inveterate prejudice of fupeiftition. No per- fonal merit, no aflual fervice, no meafure of abi- lity or virtue, could remove, as it was pretended, the difqualification of plebeian birth. One of the firft fteps towards abolifhing this diflinflion was to preclude every other power in the date from a negative on their proceedings. For this pur- pofe :t was ena6ted by the tribes, that no one, under pain of death, or of a fine at difcretion, Ihould interrupt a tribune while he was fpeaking to the people. Nothing can be more curious than thefe popular efforis to get the better of their own luj-ciftitious prejudices: they could not depend upon their own firmncfs to fupport their own pecuiiar magiftrate, till they made them- feives beiieve that his perfon was facrtd, as well as the other m.agiflrates. Being thus provided againft interruption, as they were bv a former law againft violence to theii* [ erfons, they not only tov.k up the coir plaints of'their conflituents, but fuggefted new fljims to be made by them; and at every fuccefTiOn to office, endeavoured to fignaiize their term by fome additional eftablifhment for the benefit of the people. They interrupted theflate in its councils and wars, and hung upon the wheels of government until the grievances they com- pldjffd of were redrefled, or the demands they made were complied with. In order to increafe the I^ome, 341 the nnmber of plebeian (.fiicprs, whofe aid the tribunes aiiedgcd was nrceff^iy to chcmieivrs, they, foon after their own inr;iriirir.n, piotu cd that of the ^diles, who were to infpe'ft the ma ket, and have chaigeofthe public buildings and pub- lic fhows. The qualitications of candidates for the office of conful fuinifhed, durir.g fome age?, the fubjecl of coniinual debates: civil and rrsiii- tary tianiadlions were condantly blt-nded toge- ther. The ft-nate frequently involved the iL.te in war, in order ro fufpend its inttlline divifionsj and the people as ofrcn to k occafion, f om t!ie difficulties in which the coitimunity vvas involved by its enemies, to extort a compliance with their own demands. The fiift fubjed of contention was the dillriburion of the corn which the lenate had putchafed a.s a provifi.-n agaiiilt rhe famine, which the late interruption of induftry and agri- culture, by the fecefllon of the per/ple, had occa- fioned Coriolatrus was for compelling the peo- ple, by hunger, to part with their tribunes, and the other concefiiohs which had been extorted from the fenate. The ycunger nobility applauded his fentimentSj but the majority were af. aid of ano- ther Uorm, and agreed to deliver corn f om the public gianaries at a modeiate pric^-. The peo- ple, however, were not appc afed ; they were greatly incenkd at;ainft Coiioianus; a.'d the tri- bunes cited hwn to appear before the tribunal of the people, to anfwer for the inluit he had otier d them. The lenate and patricians Wv re diipoied to protedl him ; but ex^eited to be able to acquit hini in the comiLia or the ccntuiies, the only tri- bunal before which any capit.il accufation of a Citizen had ever been tried. 'I he Ciibunes, how- ever, determined :o introduce an innovatio , and infilled that the people fiiould ailciiibie in their A a 3 tribes. 342 Ancient Deniocratical Republics. tribes. Coriolanus, feeing hin^fclf already con- demned by this method of proceeding, withdrew, and joined the enemies of his country. This no- velty made a total change in the conftitution ; for the aflembly of the centuries formed an arif- tocracy, that of the tribes a democracy. As it was not with any precifion determined by law what bufinefs fhould be done in one affembly, and what in the other, the patricians and ple- beians, inflcad of balancing each other by regular checks, were in danger of rendering the adminif- tration of the ftate a continual fcene of contradic- tions, wliich ferved to the laft hour of the re- public as an object of popular zeal, and fur- nifhed a fpecious pretence to ambitious and de- ligning men. This very uncertainty, producing continual altercations and wars, produced great ftatefmrn and warriors, no doubt; but a regular, well-ordered conftitution will never fail to bring forth men capable of conducting the national councils and arms j and it is of infinitely more importance to the national happinefs, to abound in good merchants, farmers, and mianufaclurers good lawyers, priefts,.^nd phyficians and great philofophers, than it is to multiply what are called great (latefmen and great generals. It is a milerable fervitude, whether you call it a repub- lic or a defpotifm, where the law is uncertain and "unknown ; and it is only under the fecurity of certain and known laws, that arts, fciences, agri- culture, commerce, and trades, can ever be made to flourifh. Another lubjedb of difpute was foon introduced, which ferved to the laft hour of the republic as an objedl of popular zeal, and fur- nifhed a fpecious pretence to ambitious and de- figning men co captivate the ears of the populace an equal diviHon of land, known by the name of an Kome. 343 lan Agrarian Law, By this was by no means meant a community of goods and lands, or an equal divifion of all the lands and goods ; the Roman people had too much fenfe and honefty ever to jhink of introducing into practice fuch an ab- furd figment of the brain : but the Romans, during the late ariftocratical times, and the wars againlt Tarquin, had fuffertd the conquered lands to pafs by connivance, occupancy, or purchafe, into the hands of powerful citizens, inftead of di- viding them equally among the people. Sp. Caf- fius, the conful, who was in favour with the people, and affefted ftill farther popularity by flattering the paffions of the inferior clafles, fore- feeing that the tribunes would foon think of this objed:, determined to make a merit to himfelf by anticipating them. PoflcfTing himfelf of fome of thefe lands, he oftentatioufly made a divifion of fhem among the more indigent citizens j and ob- tained an appointment of three commiffioners to inquire into the evil, and confider of a remedy, The patricians were alarmed ; but Cafllus had numbers on his fide, and was fo confident of fuc-p cefs, that he betrayed too foon his ambitious de- fign, by offering the freedom of the city to aliens, who at his invitation crowded from all parts to vote in the affemblies of the Roman people. This convinced all parties that his views were, by the means of aliens and indigent citizens, to ufurp the government, All parties combined againft him, and he was condemned for trealbn. The tri- bunes had no fooner deftroyed Cafllus, than they adopted his proje6t, and infilled on the law for the nomination of three commiiTioners : from this time commences a ftruggle between the tribunes j^nd fenate, patricians and plebeians, the various operations of which would take up too mucli, A a 4 fpace 344 Ancient Democratkal Republics. fpace to relate. The tribunes were honoured in proportion to the part they took in fupport of the popular caufe, and their animofity againft the fcnate. Every new tribune endeavoured to fig- nalize his year, by fuggefling fome new point to be gaint-d by the people. One law was obtained to fubllitute the affembly of the tribes for that of the cuiias, in the cleftion of tribunes; another to exclude the patricians entirely from the aflembly of the tribes. The agrarian law they frequently moved in the interval of other pretenfions, or together with other claims, in order to alarm the fenate, and force them to a compromife. The powers and artifices of both parties were foon exerted in another conteft,in which the people were in the right, and purfued the mod rational and neceflary objedt imaginable a new code of laws which fhould regulate the forms of judicial pro- ceedings ; yet even this was not purfued fo much from the love of juflice, or the fpirit of liberty, as to gain a point from the patricians, whofe power was gready fupported by the difcretionary judicial powers they had in their hands. This great objefl, which the Englifh nation have pur- fued for fo long a courfe of time, under the names of Folcright or Common Law, they alone have had the wifdom to accompany with prerogatives to the crown, and privileges to the nobility, which have fecured thofe two branches of the conftitu- tion ; at the fame time that, by eftablifhing a body of laws, and regular formal proceedings in the courts of juflice, they have fecured their own rights and liberties. The Roman people were not fo wife; by negleding to give any ade- quate prerogatives to the confuls, and by under- mining the power of the fenate in propor- tion as they introduced regular law to protedt their Rome, 345 their own rights, they undermined every other power in the conftitution, and devolved the whole upon themfelves. In the career they loft all their integrity and morals : they op- pofed an ardour not to be cooled or difcouraged, or reftrained by fcruples in the choice of means, to the great authority and addrefs of the nobles. A popular party are apt to think that the rules of veracity and candour may be difpenfed with, and that deceit and violence may without any fcru- ple be employed in their own favour. With lels honour and dignity to maintain than their adver- faries, they are lefs afraid of imputations that de- traft trom either ; and their leaders, fupported by the voice of the more numerous party, are lels apprehenfive of evil fame. In this conteft, ac- cordingly, fidticious plots and confpiracies were fabricated by the popular fide, and fiflitious de- figns againft the liberties of the people were im- puted to the patricians, in order to render them odious, and to deter them from appearing in fup- port of their real pretenfions. The fenate at lad agreed to the nomination of three commiffioners to be fent to Greece, and make a collection of laws. The report they made was accepted, and the decemvirs appointed by fenate and people to compile a body of laws. Thefe ten were in- tended only as a committee to prepare a draught for tne confideration of the fenate and people ; yet they had fo much credit with the people as to be veiled with a temporary fovereignty ; and fu- perfeded the authority of the fenate as well as the confuls ; and had unlimited power over the lives and fortunes of their fellow-citizens. They pre- fented a nuinber of laws, engraven on ten tables or plates, containing a fummary of the privileges of 34^ -indent Democratlcal Republics. of the people, the crimes to be punifhed, and the forms of judicial proceedings. They faid their plan was unfiniflied ; and, defiring a renevyal of their powers, obtained it for another year : two more tab'es were aided, which, with the former ten, made the Law of the Twelve Tables. In thcfc laws the diftindlion of patrician and plebeian was fo g-^eat, that peribns of thefe different orders were not permitted to intermarry. Bankruptcy was iriade a crime i and, without any dlftindion between fraud and misfortune, expofed the infol- vent debtor to the mercy of his creditors, wha night put him to death, diifecTt, or quarter him, and diiiribute his members among them. This law was brought from Greece, and fhews the at'ocious ideas and manners of the age. Al- though we have no account of the law being executed in its utmofl extent, we know that, ia confequencc of it, debtors were, by the courts of law, delivered bound into the hands of credi- torSj and frequently fcourged and whipped in a mofl cruel and unmerciful manner. Giving to fathers the power of magiftrates, or the power of life and death, over their children, may have fame reafons affigned for it i but nothing car\ ever account for the people's accepting fuch a law of debtor and creditor among the Greeks or Romans, but the fuppofition that property was entirely in the hands of patricians ; and that the people had the blindeft fupeiftitious opinion,, that the patricians, as defcendants of gods, were a fuperior order of beings. It is no wonder that the people, after this, often clamoured for an abolition or diminution of debts : why they never demanded an abolition of the law, is ano- ther queltion. One other of thefe laws deferv^s particuiajj particular notice. In private, every family were tree to worfhip the gods in their own way ; and in public, though certain forms were required, yet there was not any penalty annexed to the omiflion of them, as the puniflimcnt of offences in this matter was left to the offended god. This, probably, was the fourcc of that wife and hu- mane toleration which does fo much honour to the Romans, and reflects difgrace on almofl: every Ghriftian nation. The ardour of the peo- ple to obtain this code had nearly cod them their liberties. The power of a magiftrate was fup- pofed to determine only by his own refignation. The decemvirs, taking advantage o^ this defedt in the conftitution, continued the exercife of their power; and the people, to fhew that they never can be jealous of men who are in pofTeffion of their confidence, acquiefced in their ufurpation ; until the father of Virginia, by exercifing his lawful authority in defence of his daughter's honour, exhibited a fpe(fl:acle of horror which gave a turn to the imaginations, and aroufed ail the palTions of the people to the expulfion of the decemvirs, as fuch another event had before given occafion to the abolition of monarchy.-^Patricians and plebeians now united, and a tide of mutual confidence began to flow. Two very popular perfons were chofen confuls : the confecration of the tribunes was renewed, and extended to the sediles, and the other inferior officers who adled under the tribunes in preferving the rights of the people. The patricians contented to have the afls of the fenate formally recorded, placed in the temple of Ceres, and committed to the care of the asdiles. As the confuls had been hitherto the keepers and interpreters of their decrees, and had 34S Ancient Democratical Republics, had often fupprefTcd or carried into execution their ads at their plcafure, this was a confiJcrablc diminution of the power of the confuls. The comitia were of three {()rts the cuiis, the centuries, and the tiibes, 1 he crnturies alone, in which the patricians had an undoubted majo- rity as well as in the Icnate, had as yet the autho- rity of making laws for the commonwealth : this ftill prefervtd the ariftocratical charader of the republic. Now the plebeians denied the legif- lative authority of the lenate i and the fenate denied the. right of the tribes to make laws. Equity requiied that the plebeians fhould have a voice in, the legiflature j but inflead of becom- ing a branch of it, inftead of aiming at a delibe- rative or negative voice in it, by which they rright concur with the lenate and comitia of the centuries, or, which would have been infinitely better, with the lenate and confuls as two in- dependent branches, they obtained a feparate and independent power of legiflation. Hence the in- tricacy of this conftitution j hence three diltindt fources of laws dtciees of the lenate, adls of the centuries, and rtfolutions of the tribes fenatus coniiilta, leges, pltbiic.ta: a lource of divifion, diftraclion, and tumult, which never ceafcd to iflue ftreams till the authority of the fenate was wholly deftroyed, and a dommatio piebis began. The plebeians, having removed thele inequali- ties, grew fo much the more impatient of thofe which remained. They were Itili excluded from the office of conful, from that of the priefthood, and were forbidden intermarriage vvith the nobles. In the year of the city 308, Canuleius, a plebeia.n and a tribune, moved to repeal the law of the twelve tables, which prohibited the intermarriage 2 of Rome. .^49 of patricians and plebeians ; and the nine other tribun s claimed, that the office of conful fhould be held by plebeians as well as patricians. The fenate, and the whole oider of nobles, by ftudied delays, and by the ufual artifice of invol- ving the (late in foreign wars, fufpendcd the de- termination of thefe queflions ; but at length were obliged to gratify the people with the inter- marriages of different ranks, in order to pacify them on the refufal of their claim on the confu- late. To elude this demand, it was faid that the facrifices and other duties of the priefthood, many of which were to be performed by the conful, could not, by the facred laws of religion , be per- formed without profanation by perfons of ple- beian extradion, or by any but thofe of noble birth. This argument filenced the people for fome time ; but neither fuperftition nor the true religion, any more than education, oaths, mo- rals, or any other tie, will long reftrain an un- balanced party, urged by its intereft, and ftimu- lated by a growing paffion for power: an eva- fion, a mere change of a word^ will anfwer the purpofe of eluding fuperftitious fears, and even the didlates of conlcience. The title of Conful was changed for that of Military Tribune ; and no facerdotal fun6lion being included in the duties of this office, plebeians, though not qualified to be confuls, were elefted military tribunes, with confular power. The military and facerdotal funftions had before been united j they were now feparated, and, as the people thought, with- out profanation. But another office remained to tempt the people and their tribunes, that of Cen- for. The cenfus had been a principle objed of the executive power; the kings had always held it, and after them the confuls: at every period of 350 Jncient Democratical Repuhlics. of five years> they could difpofe of every man's rank, aflign him his clafs, place him in the rolls of the ftnate or the knights, or ftrike him off of either, degrade or disfranchile him, as they thought proper. A power fo important, although it had not been hitherto flagrantly abufed, might eafily be fo ; and the fenate would naturally dread the admiflion of the plebeians to it. While they ad- mitted them, therefore, to be eledled tribunes with confular power, they ftipulated that the cenfijs fhould be feparated from it, and that this charge fliould remain with perfons of patrician birth. The invafion of the Gauls had burnt the city, and, it was thought, extinguiibed the re- public for ever: Manlius faved the capitol, and Camillus reftored the commonwealth. During a period of one hundred and feventeen years which followed, the Romans were involved in perpetual wars againft the Equi, theVolfci, the Hernici, the Etrufcans, and fome of their own Latin confederates ; yet thefe did not wholly fuf- pend their internal convulfions, which gave birth to new political inftitutions. The plebeians, far from being fatisfied with their pad acquifitions, made continual efforts to extend their privileges. The tribunes, by traducing the fenate, and by difplaying in their harangues the feverities of the patrician creditor, and the fufFerings of the ple- beian debtor, ftill inflamed the animofity of the popular party. The republic itfelf was fo feebly eflablifhed, that ambitious citizens were encou- raged, by means of fa6lions raifed among perfons of the lower clafs, to entertain thoughts of fub- verting the government. In this manner Man- lius, the champion of the capitol, prefuming on his merit, thought himfelf above the laws, and .incurred the imputation of afpiring to be king. Four Rome, 551 Four hundred citizens, whom he had redeemed from their creditors, and releafed from chains* the fpoils of thirty enemies flain by himfelf in battle forty badges of honour, conferred on him by generals under whom he had ferved many citizens whom he had refcued from the enemy, amons: whom was Servilius, the feccond in com- mand to the dictator could not fave him from being thrown from the rock on which he had fo lately fignalized his valour. Such was the in- fluence of the fenate , fuch " the treafons for ** which the friends of the people were to be fa- " crificed to the fenate,*' as he faidj and fuch the popular prejudice againft the name of a king. Yet it is certain, that the bed thing the Roman people could have done at that time, would have been to have made him a king, with a negative; preferving at the fame time their own negative, and that of the fenate. The plebeians had been now above forty years in pofTeffion of a title to hold the office of confular tribune, but had not been able to prevail over the influence of the pa- tricians at any election : by the increafe of their numbers in the firft and fecond clalTes, by their intermarriages with patrician families, and by the affiduity and influence of individuals who afpired to the office, they at iaft obtained the dignity of confular tribune for one of their own order, and from thenceforward began to divide the votes of the centuries with the patrician candidates. They foon afpired to the title of confuls. Stolo and Sextius were placed in the college of tri- bunes to urge this point. They propofed three laws : I ft. For relief of infolvent debtors, by cheating their creditors of part of their debts, 2dly. To limit efliates in land to five hundred jugera, about three hundred acres, jdly. To reftore 352 Ancient Democratkal Repuhlics. reftore the elefiion of confuls, in place of confu- lar tribunes, with an exprefs provifion that at lead one of the confuls (hould be of plebeian defcent. The patricians prevailed upon fonne of the tribunes to difient from their colleagues, and fufpend, by their negatives, all proceedings upon thefe laws. Licinius and Sextius, in their turn, fufpended the ufual eleftion of magiftrates", and put a ftop to all the ordinary affairs of ftate. An anarchy of five years enfued. The patricians ftill infifted on the facrilege and profanation that would be incurred by fuffering the rites ufually performed by the confuls to pafs into plebeian hands. The tribunes, to elude this myfterious objedion, which laid faft hold on the fuperfti- tious minds of the people, contrived a Ihifr. They moved, that the ordinary attendants on the fecred rights fhould be augmented from two to ten ; and that of thefe one half fhould be named of plebeian extraflion. The patricians flruggled as long as they could, but were at lafl obliged to give way ift. To the adls in favour of in- folvent debtors. 2dly. To the agrarian law, or limitation of property in land. ^dly. To the new eftablifhment relating to the priefthood, and to the communication of the confulate itfclf to perfons of plebeian rank. The plebeian party prevailed in all their points, and raifed Sextius, the tribune, to the office of conful : and, from one ftep to another, they obtained that all the offices, whether of prsetor or sdile, of didlator or cenfor, were in procefs of time filled with perfons of either rank, and the diftinftion of pa- trician or plebeian became merely nominal. The only effed: it now had was favourable to the ple- beians, as it limited the choice of tribunes to their own order j while, in common with the pa- tricians. Rome. 353 tricians, they had acccfs to every other dignity in the (late. In this acccount of the Ronn^an con- ftitution, we are now come nearly to that (late of its maturity, at which Polybius began to admire the felicity of its inftitutions, and the order of its adminiftration. The mafs, however, was far from being fo well compacted, or the unity of power fo well eftablifhed, as it is in the Englifh conftitution j the fenate and the popular afiem- blies, in their legiflative capacities, counteradcd one another. However, from this time forward^ through a long period of wars, with Greeks, Gauls, Italians, and Carthaginians, the domxilic policy of the itate appears to be wife and orderly. The diftindlioh between patrician and plebeian was become altogether nominal j the defcendants of thofe who had held the higher offices of ftate were, in confequence of the preferments of their anceftors, confidered as noble ; and, as the ple- beians now found no difficulty in obtaining the offices of ftate, they were continually opening the way of their pofterity to the rank of nobles. The plebeians were entitled by law to claim one of the conful's feats, and frequently occupied both. The authority of the fenate, the dignity of the equeftrian order, and the manners of the peopk in general, were guarded, and in a great meafure preferved, by the integrity and ilrid: exercife of the cenforial power. The wilVft and moil re- fpefled of the citizens, from every condition, were raifed into office ; and the afiemblies, whe- ther of the fenate or the people, without envy and without jealoufy, fuffered themfelves to be governed by the counfels of a few able and vir- tuous men. The fpirit of the people was, how- ever, in a high degree democratical ; and though they fuffisred themielves to be governed by the Vol.1. Bb filent o54 J'uieni Democrat'ical RepuhUcs. lilent influence of perfonal authority in a few of their citizens, yet they could not endure any fpe- ciesofuncomnnon pre-eminence, even that which arofe from the kiftre and well-founded pretenfions of diftinguifhed merit. The condu6b of the Romans towards the Greeks fnould not be forgotten ; fince it appears to have been copied from the policy of Antalci- das in his Perfian treaty. The dates of the Achaean league, already on the decline, haften- ed, by the temerity ami diflradions of their own councils, the career of their fortunes to its ter- mination. The Romans, even vyhiie they fuf- fered this famous republic to retain the fhew of its independence, had treated its members, in many particulars, as fubjeds. At the clofe of the war with Pcrfeus, they had cited to appear at Rome, or taken into cuflody as prifoners of ftate, many citizens of Achaia: of thefe they had detained about a thoufand in different prifons of Italy. After a period of feventeen years, three hundred who remained alive were fet at liberty. Polybius was one of them : he attached himfelf lo Scipio, the fon of Emilius, and no doubt con- tributed much to his education and great cha- rafter. The Romans, while they detained fo many Greek prifoners, affumed the adminiftration of affairs in Greece, difpofed of every diRinftion, whether of fortune or power, to their own tools. They received appeals from the judgement of the Achaean council, and encouraged its mem- bers, contrary to the exprefs conditions of their league, to fend feparate embaffies to Rome. The Spartans, having been forced into the Achsean confederacy, continued refraftory in moft of its councils. By fome of their complaints at Rome, they Rome. 355 they obtained a deputation from the fenate to hear parties on the fpot, and to adjuft their dif- ferences. The Achasan council, incenfed at this infult which was offered to their authority, pro- ceeded to enforce their ovm decrees againft the republic of Sparta^ marched an army, and defeat- ed the inhabiLant> of that city vyho ventured to oppofe them. The Roman commiflicners arri- ving after tliele hoiiilities, fummoned the parties to affemble at Corinth, a^nd^ in the n.ame of the lenare, gave fentence 7hai Lacedamon, Corinth, Argos, Heradea, and OrchomenoSj not having been original members of the Achaan conjederacy^ /Jjould nozu be disjoined from it i and that all the cities which had been refcued from the dominion of Philip fhould be left in full pofTeffion of their free- dom and independency. A war enfued, in which Metellus and Mummius defeated the Greeks, and the Achffian league was diffolved. The enmity and the friendfliip of the Romans was equally fatal. As the Achs:an league was diflblvcd, on having incurred their refentment, fo the remnant of the Spartan republic per ifhed, in having accepted their prote(5tion : and nothing could be more juft than that rhe Spartans fhouM perifli under an infidious policy^ which they themfelves had firft invented^ pradifed, and fug- gefted to the Romans ; who, under the command of Flaminius, about fifty years before this date, in order to detach the Grecian cities from Philip, proclaimed with fo much oftentation, at the Ifth- mus of Corinth, general independence, and the free exercife of their ozvn laws, to all the republics of Greece. The Achsean league was diflblved, and all their conventions annulled. The ftates which had compofed it were deprived of their fove- reignty, fubjedted to pay a. tribute, and placed B b 2 under 3j6 Ancient Democrat teal Republics. under the government of a perfon annually (cnt from Rome with the title of Praetor of Achaia. But the fuccefs of the Roman arms abroad be- came the fource of a ruinous corruption at home. Jn the ftate itielf, the governing and the governed felt feparate interefts, and were at variance from motives of avarice, as well as ambition. Two hundred arki thirty years had elapfed fince the animofities of patrician and plebeian were ex- tinguiflied by the equal participation of public honours. This diftinclion itfelf was, in a great meafure, obliterated, and gave way to a new one, which, under the denomination of nobles and commons, or illujlrious and obfcurCy without in- volving any legal difparity of privileges, gave rife to an ariHocracy, which was partly hereditary, founded on the repeated fuccellion to honours in the fame family; and partly perfonal, founded on the habits of high ftation, and in the advantages of education, fuch as never fail to diftinguifli the conditions of men in every great and profperous Itate. Thefe circumftances conferred a power on the nobles, which, though lefs invidious, was not iefs real than that which had been poffefled by the Ancient patricians. The exercife of this power was iodged with the fenate, a body v/hich, though by the emulation of its members too much difpofed to war, and ambitious of conqueft, was never fur- pafled in magnanimity, ability, or in fteadinefs, by any council of ftate whatever. The people had iubmitted to the fenaie, as poflcfled of an authority which was founded in the prevailing opinion of their fuperior worth ; and even the moft afpiring of the commons allowed themfelves to be govern- ed by an order of men, amongft whom they them- felves, by proper efforts and fuitable merit, might hope to afcend The knights^, or the equeftrian order^ Rome, 357 order, being perfons pofTefTed ofeftates or effects of a certain valuation, and fecluded from the pur- fuit of political emolument or honour, formed, between thefenare and the people, an intermediate rank, who, in confequence of their having a capi- tal, and being lefs engaged than the fenators in affairs of ftate, became traders, contraftors, far- mers of the revenue, and conftituted a fpecies of moneyed intereft. Circumftances which appear to be fixed in the political ftate of nations, are often no more than a paflage in the fhifting of fcenes, or a tranfition from that which a people have been, to what they are about to become. The nobles began to avail themfelves of the high authority and advantages of their ftation, and to accumulate property as well as honours. Citizens contended for offices in the ftate, as the road to lucrative ap- pointments abroad j and when they had obtained this end, and had reigned for a while in fome pro- vince, they brought back from their government a profufion of wealth ill acquired, and the habit of arbitrary and uncontrouled command. When dii- appointed in the purfuits of fortune abroad, they became the leaders of dangerous factions at home : - or, when fuddenly poflefied of great wealth, they became the agents of corruption, to dilTeminate idlenels and the love of ruinous amufements in the minds of the people. The city was gradually crowded with a populace, who tempted with the cheap or gratuitous diftribution of corn, by the frequency of public ftiows, by the confequence they enjoyed as members of the popular affem- blies, flocked to Rome. There they were corrupted by idlenels and indigence ; and the order itfelf was continually debafcd by the frequent acceffion of emancipated flaves. A tur- bulent populace tyrannized, in their turn, over B b 3 the $^S Ariclent Dentocrailcal Repuhllcs. the mafters of the world, and wreaked on the conquerors of fo many nations the evils whith they themfelves had lo freely inflicted on man- kind. Citizens of this extraftion could not for ages arrive at any places of truft, in which they could by their perfonal defedls injure the commonwealth ; but they increafed, by their num- bers and their vices, the weight of that dreg, which, in great and profperous cities, ever finks by the tendency of vice and mifconduft, to the loweft condition. They became a part of that fa6lion, who are ever adluated by envy to their fuperiors, by mercenary views, or by abjeft fear ; who are ever ready to efpoufe the caufe of any leader againll: the reftraints of public order ; dif- pofed to vilify the more refpeftable ranks of men, and, by their indifference on the fubjeds of jufticc or honour, to fruitrate every principle that may be employed for the government of mankind, be- fides fear and compuHions. Although citizens of this defcription were yet far from being the ma- jority at Rome, yet it is probable that they were in numbers fufHcient to contaminate the whole body of the people ; and if enrolled promif- cuoufly in all the tribes, might have had a great weight in turning the fcale of political councils. This effect, however, was happily prevented by the wife precaution which the cenfors had taken, to confine aJl citizens of mean or flavifh extrac- tion to four of the tribes. Thefe were called the tribes of the city, and formed but a fmall propor- tion of the whole. Notwithftanding this precau- tion, we mud fuppofe them to have been very improper parties in the participation of fovereign- ty, and like'.y enough to dillurb the place of af- fembly with diforders and tumults. While the inferior people funk in their charaders, or were debafed Rome, 359 d^bafed by the circnmftances mentioned, the fu- perior ranks, by their application to affairs of irate, by their education, by the ideas of high birch and family didinflion, by the fuperiority of fortune, bi-^gan to rife in their eitimation, in their pretenfions, and in their power ; and they enter- tained fome degree of contempt for perfons, whom the laws ftill required them to admit as their fel- low-citizens and equ?.ls. In this difpofition of parties, fo dangerous in a commonwealth, and amidft materials fo likely to catch the flame, fome fparks were thrown, that foon kindled up anew ail the popular animofities which feemed to have been fo long extinguifhed. Tiberius Gracchus, born of a plebeian family, but ennobled by the honours of his father, by his defcent, on the fide of his mother, from the firft Scipio Africanus, and by his alliance with the fecond Scipio, who had married his filler, being now a tribune of the people, and pofTeiTcd of ail the accomplifhments required in a popular leader, great ardour, refolu- tion, and eloquence, formed a projefl in itfelf ex- tremely alarming, and in its confquences danger- ous to the peace of the republic. Being called to account for his conduct as qusftor in Spain, the feverity he experienced from the fenate, and the protection he obtained from the people, filled his breaft with animofity to the one, and a prepof- fefTion in favour of the other. Actuated by thefe difpofitions, or by an idea not uncommon to en- thufiallic minds, that the unequal dijtribution of pro- perty , fo favourable to the rich) is an injury to the poor, he propofed a revival of the law of Licinius, by which Koman citizens had been reftrained from accumulating eftates in land above the value of five hundred jugera, little more than half as iiiany acres. This was become impradicable, and B b 4 even 360 Ancient Democratlcal Republics. even dangerous, in the prefent ftate of the repub- lic. The dijlinclions of poor and rich are as necejjary, in Jlates of conjiderable extent^ as labour and good go- veynment. The poor are dejlined to labour ; and the rich, by the advantages of education, independence , and ktfure, are qualified for fuperior Jlations. The ennpirc was now greatly extended, and owed its fafety, and the order of its government, to a refpeftabk ariftocracy, founded on the pofTeffion of fortune, as well as perfonal qualities and public honours. The rich were not, without fonne violent convul- fion, to be ftript of eftates which they themfelves had bought, or which they had inherited from their anceftors. The poor were not qualified at once to be railed to a ftate of equality with per- fons enured to a better condition. The projedl: feemed to be as ruinous to governnnent as it was to the fecurity of property, and tended to place the members of the commonwealth, by one rafli and precipitate flep, in fituations in which they were not at all qualified to adl. For thefe rea- fons, as well as from motives of private interelt affedting the majority of the nobles, the proje6t of Tiberius was ftrenuoufly oppofed by the fenate : and, from motives of envy, intereft, or miftaken zeal foi- juftice, as warmly fupported by the op- pofite party. Ailing in concert with Appius Claudius, v/hofe daughter he had married, a fe- nator of the family of Crafllis, who was then at the head of the priefthood, and Mutius Scsvola the conful, he exhaufted all his art, and difplayed all his eloquerice in declamation ; but when he came to propofe that the law fhould be .read, he found that his opponents had procured M. 06lavius, one of his colleagues, to interpofd his ne- gative, and forbid any further proceeding in the bufmelii. HerCf according to the law and the conjli- tution. Rome. 3 5 1. tut ton J the matter JJoould have dropped : but inflamed and unbalanced parties are not to be reftrained by laws and conftitutions. The tribunes were infti- tuted to defend their own party, not to attack their opponents j and to prevent, not to promote innovations. Every fingle tribune had a negative on the whole. The reft of the ftory I mufl; leave.- The conftitution thus violated, Gracchus next violated the facred charafter of his colleague the tribune. The fenate were tranfported with indignation; violence enfued, and the two Gracchi fell. Afterwards Marius carried the popular pre- tenfions flill higher ; and Sylla might, if he would, have been emperor. C-^far followed, and com- pleted the cataftrophe. This commonwealth, by the fplendour of its a6tions, the extent of its empire, the wifdom of its councils, the talents, integrity, and courage of a multitude of charaflers, exhibits the faireft pro- fpet of our fpecies, and is the moft fignal exam- ple, excepting England, of the wifdom and uti- lity of a mixture of the three powers in a com- monwealth : on the other hand, the various vicif- fitudes of its fortune, its perpetual domeftic con- tefts, and internal revolutions, are the cleareft proofs of the evils arifing from the vyant of com- plete independence in each branch, and from an ineffeflual balance. LETTER 362 Conclufian. LETTER LIII. CONGRESS. MY DEAR SIR, BY the authorities and examples already re- cited, you will be convinced, that three branches of power have an unalterable foundation in nature ; that they exid in every fociety natural and artificial i and that if all of them are not ac- knowledged in any conftitution of government, it will be found to be imperfe6l, unliable, and foon enflaved ; that the legiflative and executive autho- rities are naturally diftin6t; and that liberty and the laws depend entirely on a feparadon of them in the frame of government ; that the legif- lative power is naturally and necefiarily fovereign and fupreme over the executive -, and, therefore, that the latter muft be made an efTential branch of the former, even with a negative, or it will not be able to defend itfelf, but will be foon invaded, undermined, attacked, or in fome way or other totally ruined and annihilated by the former. This is applicable to every ftate in America, in its indi- vidual capacity j but is it equally applicable to the United States in their foederal capacity ? The people of America, and their delegates in congrefs, were of opinion, that a fingle aflembly was every way adequate to the management of all their foederal concerns ; and with very good rea- fon, becaufe congrefs is not a legiQative aflembly, nor a reprefentative aflembly, but only a diplo- matic Congrefi. 3^3 sciatic affembly. A fingle council has been found CO anfvver the purpofe of confederacies very well. But in all fuch cafes the deputies are refponfible to the ftates ; their authority is clearly afcertain- cd J and the ftates, in their feparate capacities, are the checks. Thefe are able to form an effeftual balance, and at all times to controul their dele- gates. The fecurity againft the dangers of this kind of government will depend upon the accu- racy and decifion with which the governments of the feparate ftates have their own orders arranged and balanced. The neceffity w are under of fub- mi'ttingto a foederal government, is an additional and a very powerful argument for three branches, and a balance, by an equal negative, in all the feparate governments. Congrefs will always be compofed of members from the natural and arti- ficial ariftocratical body in every ftate, even in the northern, as well as in the middle and fouthern ilates. Their natural difpofitions then in general will be (whether they Ihall be fenfible of it or not, and whatever integrity or abilities they may be poflefled of) to diminifh the prerogatives of the governors, and the privileges of the people, and to augment the influence of the ariftocratical par- ties. There have been caufes enough to prevent the appearance of this inclination hitherto; but a calm courfe of profperity would very foon bring it forth, if efFedual provifion againft it be not made in feafon. It will be found abfolutely ne- cefTary, therefore, to give negatives to the gover- nors, to defend the executives againft the influence of this body, as well as the fenates and reprefen- tatives in their feveral ftates. The neceflTity of a negative in the houfe of reprefentatives will be called in queftion bv nobody. Dr. 364 Conclujton, Dr. Price and the Abbe de Mably are zealous for additional power to congrefs. Full power in all foreign affairs, and over foreign commerce, and perhaps fome authority over the commerce of the ftates with one another, may be neceffary ; and it is hard to fay, that more authority in other things is not wanted : yet the fubjed: is of fuch extreme delicacy and difficulty, that the people are much to be applauded for theif caution. To colleft together the ancient and modern leagues the Amphydionic, the Olynthian, the Argive, the Arcadian, and the Achaean confederacies, among the Greeks the general diet of the Swifs can- tons, and the ftates general of the United Nether- lands, the union of the Hanfe towns, &c. which have been found to anfwer the purpofes both of government and liberty; to compare them all with the circumftances, the fituation, the geo- graphy, the commerce, the population, and the forms of government, as well as the climate, the foil, and manners of the people, and confider what further foederal powers are wanted, and may be fafely given, would be a ufeful work. If your public engagements allow you the time to under- take fuch an inquiry, you will find it an agreeable amufement. LETTER. Locke, Milton, and Hume. 3^5 LETTER LIV. LOCKE, MILTON, AND HUME. MY DEAR SIR, CHIMERICAL fyftems of legiQation are nei- ther new nor uncommon, even among men of the mod refplcndent genius and extenfive learn- ing. It would not be too bold to fay, that fome parts of Plato and Sir Thomas More are as wild as the ravings of Bedlam. A phiiofopher may be perfeft mailer of Dcfcartes and Leibnitz, may purfue his own inquiries into metaphyfics to any length you pleafe, may enter into the inmolt re- celTes of the human mind, and make the nobleft difcoveries for the benefit of his fpecies ; nay, he may defend the principles of liberty and the rights of mankind with great abilities and fuccefs; and, after all, when called upon to produce a plan of legiflation, he may aftonifh the world with a fig- nal abfurdity. Mr. Locke, in 1663, was em- ployed to trace out a plan of legiflation for Caro- lina ; and he gave the whole authority, executive and legiflative, to the eight proprietors, the lords Berkley, Clarendon, Albemarle, Craven, and Afhleyi and Mcflleurs Carteret, Berkley, and Colleton, and their heirs. This new oligarchical fovereignty created at once three orders of nobility: barons, with twelve thoufand acres of land j ca- ciques, with twenty-four thoufand, &c. j and landgraves, with eighty thoufand. Who did this legiflator think would live under his government ? 3 He ^6 Conclufion. He fhould have firft created a few fpecles of be-, ings to govern, before he inftituted fiich a go- vernment. A man mq^y be a greater poei than Homer, and one of the mod karned men in tht world ; he may fpend his life in defence of liberty, and be at the fame time one of the mod irrepro:ichable moral chara6lers ; and yet, when called upon to frame a conftitution of government, he may de- monftrate to the world, that he has reflefted very little on the fubjefl. There is a great hazard in faying all this of John Milton ; but truth, and the rights of mankind, demand it. In his " Ready ^ndEafy Wayto eftablifh a Free Commonwealth,'* this great author fays, *' I doubt not but all in- " genuous and knowing men will eafily agree " with me, that a free commonwealth, without * fmgle perlbn, or houfe of lords, is by far the " beft government, if it can be had j for the '' ground and bafis of every juft and free govern- " ment is a general council of ableft men, chofen " by the people to confult of public aiEfairs, from " time to time, for the common good. In this "" grand council muft the fovereignty, not tranf- " ferred, but delegated only, and, as it were, de- *' pofited, refide ; with this caution, they mud '^ have the forces by fea and land committed to " them for prefer vation of the common peace and " liberty ; muft raife and manage the public re- " venue, at leaft with fome infpe6tors deputed " for fatisfadtion of the people how it is employ- " ed J muft make or propofe civil laws, treat of " commerce, peace, or war with foreign nations ; ** and, for the carrying on fome particular affairs " with more fecrecy and expedition, muft eledV, " as they have already, out of their own number " and others, a council of ftate. And although it " may Locke, Mrlton^ and Hume, 367 " may feem ftrange at fii ft hearing, by reafon that ^^ men's minds are prtpofleiTed with the notion of " fucceffive parliaments, I affirm that the grand *^ council, being well chofen, fliould be perpetual j " for fo their bufmefs is, or may be, and often- " times urgent; the opportunity of affairs gained " or loft in a moment. The day of council can^ " not be fet as the day of a feftival, but muft be " ready always to prevent or anfwer all occafions, ** By this continuance they will become every " way fkiifulleft, beft provided of intelligence " from abroad, beft acquainted with the people '^ at home, and the people with them. The fhip ** of the commonwealth is always under fail ^ " they fit at the ftern, and iftheyileer well, what " need is there to change them, it being rather " dangerous ? Add to this, that the grand coun- *' cil is both foundation and main pillar of the " whole ftate ; and to move pillars and founda- ** tions not faulty, cannot be fafe for the build- " ing. I fee not, therefore^ how we can be ad- " vantagcd by fucceffive and tranfitory parlia- " ments ; but that they aie much likelier conti- " nually to unfettle, rather than to fettle a free '' government; to breed commotions, changes, *^ novelties, and uncertainties ; to bring negle6t " upon prefent affairs and opportunities, while all '^ miinds are in fufpence with expectation of a new '* affembly, and the affembly, for a good fpace, " taken up with the new ft^ttling of itfeif, &c. " But if the ambition of fuch as think themfelves ^'^ injured, that they alfo partake not of the go- *^ vernment, and are impatient to be chofen, can- " not brook the perpetuity of others chofen be- " fore them j or if it be feared that long con- " tinuance of power may corrupt fincereft men, " the j68 Conclufion, * the known expedient is, that annually a third " part of fenators go our," &c. Can you read without fhuddering, this wild reverie of the divine immortal Milton ? If no better fyftems of government had been propofed, it would have been no wonder that the people of England recalled the royal family, with all their errors, follies, and crimes about them. Had Milton's fcheme been adopted, this country would have either been a fcene of revolutions, carnage, and horror, from that time to this, or the liber- ties of England would have been at this hour the liberties of Poland, or the ifland would have been a province of France. What ! a fingle aflembly to govern England ? an aflembly of fenators for life too ? What ! did Milton's ideas of liberty and free government extend no further than ex- changing one houfe of lords for another, and making it fupreme and perpetual ! What ! Crom- well, Ireton, Lambert, Ludlow, Waller, and five hundred others of all fefts and parties, one quar- ter of them mad v;ith enthufiafm, another with am- bition, a thiid with avarice, and a fourth of them honeft men, a perpetual council, to govern fuch a country ! It would have been an oligarchy of decemvirs, on the firft day of its fitting ; it would have inftantly been torn with all the agita- tions of Venice, between the ariftocracy and oli- garchy, in the afTembJy icfelf. If, by ballots and rotations, and a thoufand other contrivances, it could have been combined together, it would have ftripped the people of England of every Ihadow of liberty, and grown in the next gene- ration a lazy, haughty, oitentatious group of pa- latines : but if they had fallen into divifions, they would have deluged the nation in blood, till Locke, Mdton, and Hume. ^69 till one defpot would have ruled the wholes John Milton was as honed a man as this nation ever bred, and as great a friend of liberty ; but his greatnefs moil certainly did not confift in the knowledge of the nature of man and of govern- ment, if we are to judge frorh this performance, or from ^' The prefent Means and brief Delinea- " tion of a free Commonwealth," in his letter to General Monk. Americans in this age are too enlightened to be bubbled out of their liberties, even by fuch mighty names as Locke, Milton^ Turgot, or Hume; they know that popular elec- tions of one eflential branch of the legiflature, fre- quently repeated, are the only poffible method of forming a free conftitution, or of preferving the government of laws from the domination of men, or of preferving their lives, liberties, or properties in fecurity ; they know, though Locke and Milton did not, that when popular eledions are given up, liberty and free government muft be given up^ Upon this principle, they cannot approve the plan of Mr. Hume, in his '^ Idea of a perfeft Common- *^ wealth." ** Let all the freeholders of twenty " pounds a year in the county, and all the houfe- *' holders worth five hundred pounds in the towa ** parilhes, meet annually in the parifh church, **^ and choofe, by ballot, fome freeholder of the *' county for their member, whom we fhall call " the county-reprefentative. Let the hundred " county-reprefentatives, two days after their " eleftion, meet in the county-town, and choofe *^ by ballot, from their ov/n body, ten county- *' magiftrates and one fenator. There are, there- " fore, in the vv'hole commonwealth, one hun- ** dred fenators, eleven hundred county-magif- *^ trates, and ten thoufand county-reprefentatives ; " for we Iliali beftow on all fenators the autho- Vol. I. C c " rity 370 Locke, MiltoHi and Hume, rity of county-magiftrates, and on all coiinty- magiftrates the authority of county-reprefenta- tives. Let the fenators meet in the capital, and be endowed with the whole executive power of the commonwealth j the power of peace and war ; of giving orders to generals, admirals, and ambaiTadors, and in Ihort, all the prerogatives of a Britifii king, except his negative. Let the county-reprefentatives meet in their pa*rticular counties, and pofTefs the whole legiflative power of the commonwealth ; the greater number of counties deciding the queition j and v.'here thefe are equal, let the fenate have the cafting votj. Every new law muft firft be debated in the fenate j and, though rejefled by it, if ten fenators infift and proteft, it mufl be fent down to the counties : the fe- nate, if they pleafe, may join to the copy of the law their reafons for receiving or rejecting it." &c. The fenate, by the ballot of Venice or Malta, are to choofe a protector, who re- prefents the dignity of the commonwealth, and prefides in the fenate; two fecretaries of ftate, and a council of ftate, a council of religion and learning, a council of trade, a council of laws, a council of war, a council of the admiralty- each of five perfons, all fenators j and feven com- miftlonersof the treafury. If you compare this plan, as well as thofe of Locke and Milton, with the principles and exam- ples in the foregoing letters, you will foon form a judgement of them; it is not mydefign to enlarge upon them. That of Hume is a complicated arif- tocracy, and would foon behave like all other ariftocracies. It is enough to fay, that the repre- fentatives of the people may, by the fenators, be deprived of a voice in the icgiflature j becaufe the fenate Locke, Milton, a?id Hume. 371 fenate have their choice of fending the laws down, either to the county-magiftrates or county-rcpre- fentacives. It is an ingenious device,, to be lure, to get rid of the people and their reprefentatives ; befides that the delays and confufions would be endlefs, in fending the laws to be debated in as many feparate commonwealths as there are coun- ties. But the two decifive objeftions are, i. Let- ting the nobility or fenate into the management of the executive power ; and, 2. Taking the eyes of the people off from their reprefentatives in their legiflature. The liberty of the people depends entirely on the conftant and diredb communication between them and the legiflature, by means of their reprefentatives. The improvements to be made in the Englifh conftitution lie entirely in the houfe of commons. If county-members were aboliflied, and reprefen- tatives proportionally and frequently chofen in fmall diftridis, and if no candidate could be chofen bur an ellablifhed long- fettled inhabitant of that difcridt, it would be impoffible to corrupt the people of England, and the houfe of commons might be an immortal guardian of the national liberty. Inftead of proje(5ls to abolifh kings and lords, if the houfe of commons had been attended to, wild wars would not have been engaged in, nor countlefs millions thrown away, nor would there have remained an imperfection, perhaps, in the Englifh conftitution. Lee the people take care of the balance, and efpecially their part of it : but the prefervation of their peculiar part of it will depend ftill Oipon the exiftence and inde- pendence of the other two ; the inftant the other branches are deftroyed, their own branch, their own deputies, become their tytants. C c 2 LETTER J72^ Condujtm, LETTER LV. CONCLUSION. Crofvenor-fquare, Dec, 21, 17S6, MY DEAR SIR, ACCORDING to M. Turgot^s idea of a perfe6l commonwealth, a fmgle afiembly is to be poffefied of all authority, legillative, execu^ tive, and judicial. It vviil be a proper conclu- sion of all our fpeculations upon this, the molt interefling fubjed which can employ the thoughts of mien, to confider in v/hat manner fuch an af- iembly will condufl its deliberations, and exert its power. The executive power is properly the government j the laws are a dead letter until an adminiftration begins to carry them into execu- tion. Let us begin then with this. If there is an army to raife, this fingle afTembly is to ap- point all its officers. The man of the mofl: am^- ple fortune, the moll honourable defcent, the greattfl: abilities, efpecially if there is any one among them v;ho has had experience^ rendered important fer vices, and acquired fame in war, will be chofen general. This event is a great point gained by the ariftocracy ; and a great ad- vance towards the fec^tions of one, in caie of con- vulfions and confufions, for monarchy. The ge- neral has vaft influence^ of courfe^ with the whole nation^ Ccnclufion, 373 rjation, and efpecially with the officers of his army J whofe articles of war, and whofe habits, both of obedience and command, eftabHfh a fyf- tem of fubordination of which he is the center, and produce an attachment that never wears out. The general, even Vv'lthout being fenfible of it, till naturally fall in with the views of the arillo- craticai body, in prom>oting men of family, pro- perty, and abilities ; and, indeed, in general, it will be his duty to do this, as fuch are undoubt- edly, in general, the fitteft for the fervice : his whole corps of officers will grow habitually to refped fuch only, or at lead chiefly j and it mud be added, becaufe experience proves it, and the truth requires it to be mentioned, to entertaia fomiC degree of contempt for the reft of the peo- ple, as " rank and file." The general's recom- mendation will have great weight in the afTem- bly, and will, in time, be given chiefiy, if not wholly, to men who are either of the ariftocrati- cal body themfelves, or at lead recommended by fuch as are \o. All the other officers of the army are to be appointed by this affembly ; and wc muft fuppoie, that all the general officers and field officers will be of patrician families, be- caufe each candidate will be unknown to nine- tenths of the aflembly. He comes from a part of the date which a vail majority of the mem- bers of the aflem.bly do not particularly reprefent, and are unacquainted with ; they muft, therefore, take his charader upon truft from his patron in the houfe, fome member who is his neighbour, and who, perhapsj owes his eledion to him or his particular friends. 'Here is an endlefs fource of debate and delay. When there are two or more candidates for a commiffion, and there will ge- C c 3 nerally 374 Conclufion. nerally be feveral, how fhal! an alTcmbly of five hundred or one hund ed men, colleiflied from all the moft diftant parts of a large ftate, become in- formed of the merits and pretenfions of each can- didate ? It can on'iy be done in public or in pri- vate. If in public, it cxpofes the charadtcn^-. -^^ the candid.itt3 to a public difcufTion, whic. "^^ men can bf-ar j it confumes time without end.j and iiwili trcqnent'y happen, that the time of the whole airfiTibly il-iall be wafted, and all the pub- lic alTaiiS delayed, for days and weeks, in delibe- rating and debating, affirming and denying, con- tradieViiig and proving, in the appointment of a finglc officer; and, after all, he v/ho has friends of the m.ofb infiuence in the houfe, who will be generally of the ariftocratical completion, ,will be preferred. It is moderate to fay, that the lofs of tiine and delay of bufinefs will be a greater burthen to the ftate than the whole fupport of a governor and council. If there is a navy, the fame procefs muft be gone through refpefting admirals, Crspt.iins, and all other officers. All the officers of revenue, police, juftice, muft; be ap- pointed in the fame way. Ambaftadors, confuls, agents to foreign countries, muft be appointed too by vote of aflembly. This branch of buH- nefs alone would fill up the whole year, and be more than could be done. An aftembly muft be informed before it can act. The underftanding and confcience of every member ftiould be clearly farisfied before he can vote. Information is to be had only by debate, and examination of evidence. Any man may fee that this muft be attended with difficulty ; but no man, who has not feen the infide of fuch an aftfcmbly, can con- ceive the confufionj uncertaintyj and procrafti- nation Conclujion. 375 nation of fuch proceedings. The American pro- vincial congreflfes had experience enough of this ; and gentlemen were more convinced, by what they there faw, heardj and felt, of the necculty of three branches, than they would have been by realbning or reading i it was generally agreed, that the appointment of officers by lot would have been a more rational method. But this is not all : the army, the navy, revenue, excife, cuftoms, police, juftice, and all foreign minivers, muft be gentlemen, that is to fay, friends and connexions of the rich, Vv'ell-born and well-edu- cated members of the houfej or, if they are nor, the community will be filled with flander, fufpi- cion, and ridicule againft them, as ill-bred, ig- norant, and in all refpeds unqualified for their trufts ; and the plebeians themfelves will be as ready as any to join in the cry, and run down their charaders. In the fecond place, there ne- ver was yet a people who muft not have fome- body or fomething to reprefent the dignity of the Itate, the majeffcy of the people, call it what you will a doge, an avoyer, an archon, a prefidenr, a conful, a fyndic; this becomes at once an obr je6lof ambition and difpute, and, in time, cfdi- vifion, faftion, fedition, and rebellion. The nexc inquiry is, concerning the adminiilration of juf- tice. Shall every criminal be brought before this aflembly and tried ? fhall he be there accufed be- fore five hundred men > witnefirs introduced, counfel heard ? This again would take up more than the whole year ; and no man, after all, would confider his life, liberty, or property, i^^c in fuch a tribunal. Thefe all depend upon the difquifitions of the counfel, the knov/lcdge of the. kw in the judges^ the confrontation of parries C c 4 and 57^ Conclujion, and vvitneflfes, the forms of proceedings, by which the fafts and the law are fairly dated before the jury for their decifion, the rules of evidence, by ivhich the attention of the jury is confined to proper points, and the artifices of parties and counfel avoided. An aflembly of five hundred men are totally incapable of this order, as well as knowledge j for, as the vote of the majority mufl: determine, every member muft be capable^ or all is uncertain : befides, it is the unanimity of the jury that prcferves the rights of mankind- mud the whole five hundred be unanimous ? Will it be faid that the alTembly fnall appoint committees to try caufes ? But who are to make thefe appointments ? Will not a few haughty pa- latines in the afiem.bly have influence enough to determine the eleftion in favour of their fri^^nds ? and will not this make the judges the tools of a party ? If the leaders are divided into parties, will not one prevail at one year, and another the next ? and will not this introduce the m.oft "Wretched of fervitudes, an uncertain jurifpru- dence ? Will it be faid that the aflembly fliall appoint committees for the nomination of ofli- cers ? The fame intrigues, and greater ftruggles, would be introduced for the place of a com- mittee-man ; and there would be frequent ap- peals from thcfe committees to the body that appointed them. Shall the aflembly appoint a governor or prefident, and give him all the exe- cutive power I Why fliould not the people at large appoint him ? Giving this power to the aflembly will open a wider door to intrigue for the place; and the ariflocratical families will be fure, nine times in ten, to carry their choice in this way j, and,, what is much worfc, the firft ma- giftrate Conclujton, 377 giflrate will be confidered as dependent on every obfcure member of the houfe, but in reality he will be dependent only on a dozen or a fcore, perhaps on t'.vo or three, of the whole. He will be liable to daily motions, debates, and votes of cenfure. Inllead of thinking of his duty to the people at large, he will confine his attention chief- ly to the aflembly, and believe, that if he can fatisfy them, or a majority of them, he has done his duty. After all, any of thefe devices are only changing words ; they are, in reality, ere6ling dif- ferent orders of men, and aiming at balances, as much as the fyftem which fo much difpleafes M. Turgot 5 they are introducing, in eftefl, all the inequalities and difputes that he fo greatly apprehends, without any of that fecurity to the laws which ought to be the principal obiefti they render the executive power, which is in truth the government, the inflrument of a few grandees. If thefe are capable of a combination with each other, they will feldom difagree in their opinion, which is the richeft man, and of the firft family ; and, as thefe will be all their inquiries, they will generally carry their ele6lion : if they are divided, in conftant wrangles with each other, and perpe- tual attacks upon the prefidcnt about the difcharge of his functions, they will keep the nation an- xious and irritated with controverfies which can never be decided nor ended. If they agree, and the plebeians ftili carry the vote againft them, the choice will neverthelefs probably fall upon one of their number, who will be dilpofed to fa- vour them too much^ but if it falls upon a ple- beian, there commences at once a feries of con- telts betvveen the rich and the poor, which will never end but in the ruin of the popular power and ^7^ Concltifton. and the national liberty or, at leail-, in a revo- lution and a new conftitution. As the executive power, the efFence of government, is ever odious 10 popular envy and jealoufy, it will ever be in the power of a fev/ illuftrious and wealthy citizens to excite clamours and iineafinefs, if not commo- tions and feditions> againft it. Although it is the natural friend of the people, and the only defence which they or their reprefentatives can have againft the avarice and ambition of the rich and diftinguiflied citizens, yet fuch is their thoiight- lefs fimpHcity, they are ever ready to believe that the evils they feel are brought upon them by the executive power. How eafy is it then for a few artful men, among the ariftocratical body, to make a prefident, thus appointed and fupported, unpo- pular, though he condu6ls himfelf with all the integrity and ability which his office requires ? But we have not yet confidered how the iegif- lative power is to be exercifed in this fingle af- fembly ? Is there to be a conftitution ? Who are to compofe it ? The afTembly itfelf, or ji convention called for that purpofe ? In either cafe, whatever rules are agreed on for the prefer- vation of the lives, liberties, properties, and cha- racters of the citizens, what is to hinder this af- fembly from traafgreffing the bounds which they have prefcribed to themfelves, or which the con- vention has ordained for them ? The convention has publifhed its code, and is no more. Shall a new convention be called to determine every queftion which arifes concerning a violation of the conftitution ? This v.'ould require that the convention fliould fit whenever the aflembly fits, and confider and determine every queftion which is agitated in it. This is the very thing we con- tendl Conclujlon, 379 tend for, viz. that there may be two afiemblies ; one to divide, and the other to choofe. Grant me this, and I am fatisfied, provided you will confine both the convention and aflembly to le- giflation, and give the whole executive power to another body. I had almoft ventured to propofe a third aflembly for the executive power ; but the unity, the fecrecy, the difpatch of one man, has no equal j and the executive power fhould be watched by all men ; the attention of the whole nation fhould be fixed upon one point, and the blame and cenfure, as well as the impeach- ments and vengeance for abufes of this power, fhould be diredted folely to the minifters of one man. But to purfue our fingle aflembly. The firft year, or the firft feven years, they may be mioderate j efpecially in dangerous times, and while an exiled royal family, or exiled patricians or nobles, are living, and may return ; or while the people's paffions are alive, and their attention awake, from the frefh remembrance of danger and diflrefs : but when thefe tranfitory caufes pals away, as there is an affection and confidence be- tween the people and their reprefentatives, fup- pofe the latter begin to make diftinctions, by making exceptions of themfelves in the laws ? They may frank letters ; they are exempted from arrefls ; they can privilege fervants one little diftinftion after another, in time makes up a large fum. Some few of the people will com- plain ; but the majoricy, loving their reprefenta- tives, will acquiefce. Prefencly they are ex- empted from taxes. Then their duration is too fhorti from annual they become biennial, trien- nial, fepcennial, for life; and, at length, inftead. of applying to conftituents to fill up vacancies, the 3 So Conclujlon. the afiembly takes it upon itfelf, or gives it to their prefident. In the mean time, wars are conducted by heroes to triumph and conqucft, negotiations are carried on v/iih luccefs, com- merce iloiirifhes, the nation is profperous , the citizens are flattered, vain, proud of their feli- city, envied by others : it would be the bafert> the moll odious ingratitude, at lead, ic would be fo reprefented, to find fault with their rulers. In a word, as long as half a fcore of capital characters agree, they will gradually form, the lioufe and the nation into a iyftem of fubordi- nation and dependence to them.kives, and go- vern all at their difcretion a fimple ariftocracy or oligarchy in effeft, though a fimjple demo- cracy in name : but, as every one of thefe is emulous of others, and more than one of them is conftandy tormented with a dtrfire to be the firft, they will foon difagree ; and then the houfe and the nation gradually divides itlidf into four parties, one of which, at lead, will wifh for mo- narchy, another for ariftocracy, a third for de- mocracy, and a fourth for various mixtures of them ; and thefe parties can never come to a decifion but by a ftruggle, or by the fword. There is no remedy for this, but in a convention of deputies from all parts of the ftate : but an equal convention can hardly be obtained, except in times like thofe v'e have lately feen, when the danger could only be warded off by the aid and exertions of the whole body of the people : when no fuch danger from wid:iout fhail prefs, thofe v.'ho are proud of their wealth, bloody or wit, will never give way to fair and equal eftablifh- ments. All parties will be afraid of calling a convendon j but if it mult be agreed to, the arifto- Condujion. ^ti anftccratical party will pufh their influence, and obtain eleftions even into the conventions tor themfelves and their friends, fo as to carry points there, which, perhaps, they could not have carried in the affennbly. But fhall the people at large ele<5t a governor and council annually to manage the executive power, and a fingle affembly to have the whole legiflative ? In this cafe, the executive power, initead of being independent, will be the inilru- ment of a few leading members of the houfe ; becaufe the executive power being an objed: of jealoufy and envy to the people, and the legifla- tive an object of their confidence and afFedion, the latter will aUvays be able to render the former unpopular, and undermine its influence. But if the people for a time fupport an executive difagreeable to the leaders in ii\Q legiflative, the conftitution v/ill be difregarded, and the nation will be divided between the two bodies, and each muft at lad have an army to decide the queflion. A conftitution confifting of an executive in one fingle affembly, and a legiflative in another, is already compofed of two armies in battle array ; and nothing is wanting but the word of com- mand to begin the combat. In the prefent ftate of fociety and manners in America, with a people living chiefly by agricul- ture, in fmall numbers, fprinkled over large tradts of land, they are not fubject to thofe panics and tranfports, thofe contagions of m,adnefs and folly, which are ^^tn in countries v-'here large numbers live in fmall places, in daily fear of perifliing for want : we know, therefore, rhat the people can live and increafe under almofl: any kind of government^ or without any government ar I ^ti ConcluJtoH. at all. But it is of great importance to begin well ; mif- arrangements now made, will have great, extenfive, and diftant confequences ; and we are now employed, how little foever we may think of it, in making eftablifhments which will affc(5t the happinefs of an hundred millions of inhabi- tants at a time, in a period not very diftant. All nations, under all governments, muft have parties ; the great fecret is to controul them : there are but two ways, either by a monarchy and ftanding army, or by a balance in the con- ftitution. Where the people have a voice, and there is no balance, there will be everlafting fluc- tuations, revolutions, and horrors, until a ftanding army, with a general at its head, commands the peace, or the neceflity of an equilibrium is made gppear to all, and is adopted by all. I am. My dear Sir, With much efteem and afFedion^ Yours, John Adamj. William Stephens Smithy Efq^, POSTSCRIPT, C 3H ) POSTSCRIPT. npHE foreign gazettes and journals have an- nounced to the world that the Abbe De Ma- bly was applied to by the United States of Ame- rica for his advice and affiftance in the formation of a code of laws. It is unneceffary to fay any thing to this, only that it is a part of a million volumes of lies, according to the bed computation, which arc to be impofed upon pofterity, relative to Ameri- can affairs. The Abbe himfelf, in his obferva- tions, has faid that I defired his fentiments. This is true ; but the manner of the requeft ought to be known, that thofe who think it of any con- fequence may underfland in what (tn(h it is true. Upon my arrival in Paris, inOdober 1782, upon the bufinefs of the peace, the Abbe De Mably's book, upon the manner of writing hiftory, was put into my hands. At the conclufion of that publication he declared his intention of writing on the American revolution. Meeting the Abbe foon afterwards, at dinner at Monfieur De Cha- lut's, the farmer general, my friends the Abbes De Chalut and Arnowe, who were of the party, informed me that their friend was about writing^ the hiftory of the American revolution, and would be obliged to me ibr any fafts or memorials that might be in my power. The queftion was afl a *' la verite dcja deux ou trois Hiftoire generales " de la Guerre be Revolution Americaine, pu- *' bliees a Londres, & deux ou trois autres pu- " bliees a Paris ; celles en langue Anglaife ne font *' que des materiaux informes & confus fans dif- '* cernement, & toutes ces Hiftoires foit en An- ** glais foit en Fran^ais, ne font autre chofe que " des monuments de I'ignorance complette de *^ leurs auteurs fur ce fujet. " II faudrait la vie entiere & la plus longue, a " commencer des Tage de 20 ans, pour affembler ** de toutes les Nations & de toutes les parties " du monde, dans lefquels ils font depofes, les ** documents propres a former une Hiftoire com- " plettc Popfcrlpt, 389 " plette de la Guerre Amcricalne ; parce que c'efl: *' proprement I'Hiftoire du Genre-humain dans *' route cette epoque. II faut y reunir I'Hiftoire " de France, d'Kfpagne, de Hollande, d'Anglc- " terre, & des Puilfances neutres, auffi bien que " de TAmerique. Les materiaux en devraient " etre affcrmbles de toutes ces Nations, & les do- " cuments les plus importans des tous, auffi bien " que les caraderes des Afteurs & les reffbrts fe- *^ crets des A6lions> font encore receles dans les '* Cabinets & en chiffres. " Soit que vous, Monfieur, enterpreniez de " donnez un hiftoiregencrale, ou fimplement des " remarques & obfervations, femblablcs a celles *' que vous avez donnees fur les Grecs ^ les Bo- *' mains ; vous produirez un Ouvrage extreme- " ment intcrefTant & inftrudlif, pour la Morale, '* la Politique, la Legiflation, & je me ferais un *' honneur & un plaifir de vous fournir tous les " petits fecours qui feront en mon pouvoir pour * la facilitc de vos recherches. II m'eft impofli- *' ble de vous dire fi le Gouvernement de ce pays ** fouhaiterait de voir quelque ouvrage profonde- " ment ecrit, & par un Auteur d'une grande ce- " lebrite, en langue Fran^aife. II eft queftion ** d'expofer des principes de gouvernement, (1 " difFerens de ce qu'on trouve en Europe, ftir ** tout en France, qu'on ne verrait peut-etre pas " une entreprife pareil d'un ceil indifferent : ** c'eft cependant une chofe dont je ne me crois *' pas le juge competent. " Permettez, Monfieur, que je finifle cette Let- " tre en vous donnant une clef pour toute cette " Hiftoire. II y a une analogic gcncrale dans les ** Gouvernements & les Carad^eres de tous les " Treize Etats ; mais ce ne fut que lorfque les " debats & la guerre commencercnt en MafTa-. ** chuffetts-Bay, la principale Province de la " Nouvelle J90 Tojifcript. " Nouvelle-Angleterre, que les inftltutions pri- " mitives firenc k premier efFet. Qiiarre de ces " inftitiuions devraienr ctre bien etudiecs & am- '* plement examinees par quiconque voudrait ** ecrire avec connaillance de caufe de ce lujet ; *' car elles ont produit un effet decifif, non-feule- " ment dans les premieres determinations des de- * bats, dans les Confeils publics, & les premieres * refohitions de refilier par les armes, mais aufli ** par rinfluence qu'elles eurent fur les efprits ' des autres Colonies en leur donnant I'exemple, ** d'adopter plus ou moins les memes inftitucions " & des mefures femblables. Les quatres inflitutions mentionnees font, 1. Les Villes ou Diftridls. 2. Les Eglifes. 3. Les Ecoles. 4. La Milice. 1. " Les Villes font de certaines ctendues de " pays, ou diftri(5ls de territoire, dans leiquels " etant divifes le Maflachufetts-Bay, le Connec- " ticut, le New-Hampfliire & le Rhode Ifland. " Chaque Ville contient Tune dans Tautre fix " milles ou deux lieues quarrees, Les habitans ' qui vivent dans ces limites doivent former, en " vertu de la loi, des corporations ou corps po- ** liriques, &: font inveftis de certains pouvoirs " & privileges : comme par exemple, de reparer ** les grands chemins, d'entretenir les pauvres, de ** choifir les elus, les conflables, les colledteurs " des Taxes & d'autres officiers, &:; furtout leurs ** Reprcfentans dans la Legiflature ; comme audi *^ du droit de s'aflembler toutes les fois qu'ils ** font avertis par leurs elus, dans les aiTeiriblees *^ de Villes, afin de deliberer fur les affaires pu- " bliques de la Ville, ou de donner des inftruftions *' a leurs Reprcfentans. Les coniequences de " celtc Tcjlfcript. 39 " cette inftitution ont ete, que tous les habitants " ayant acquis des leur enfance une habitude de '* difcuter, de deliberer, & dejugerdes affaires '*^ publiques, ^'a etc dans cette ctendue de Villes " ou diftrids, que les fentiments du Peuple fe " font formes preinieremenc, & que leurs refblu- ** tions ont ete prifes, depuis le commencement " jufqu'a la fin des debats & de la guerre. 1. ** Les Eglifes font des Societcs Rcligieufes, ** qui comprennant le Peuple entier. Chaquc * diftriil contient une ParoifTe & une Eglife. La " plupart n'en one qu'une, & quelques-uns en ont " plufieurs. Chaque ParoifTe a une maifon d'af- " femblee, & un Minifl:re entretenu a fes propres '* depens. Les Conftitutions des Eglifes 'Lonx. *^ extremement populaires, & le Clerge a peu *^ d'influence ou d'autorite, a Texception de celles *^ que leur propre piece, leur vertu, leurs lumieres ** leur donnent natureliement. lis font choifis -*' par le peuple de leur ParoifTe, &: resolvent ** leur ordination du Clerge voifin. lis font tous '' maries, ont des families, & vivent avec leurs '* ParoifTiens dans une parfaite amitie & intimite. ^' lis vont voir les malades, exercent la charite *' envers les pauvi"es, affiftent a tous les mariages ** & enterremens, &: prechent deux fois chaque ** Dimanchej le moindre reproche fait a leur ca- '* ra(5Lere moral, leur ferait perdre leur influence, *^ & leur nuirait a jamais. De foite que ce font " des hommes fages, vertueux & pieux. Leurs *' fentiments font en general adaptes a ceux du " peuple, & ils font amis jaloux de la Liberte. 3. *' 11 y a des Ecoles dans chaque ville ; elles " font etabiies par une Loi exprefle de la Colo- " nie ; chaque ville confiftant en foixante families, *^ eft obligee, fous peine d'amendc, de maintenir *^ conftamm.cnt une Ecole & un m.ucre qui en- " fcigne a lire, a ecrire, rarithmeuq'ae, & les prin- ** cipes ,ig2 Tojlfcrtpt* '' cipes des langues Latine & Grecque. TotiS " les enfans des habitans, ceux des riches comme " des pauvres, ont le droit d'aller dans cette *' ecole publique. On y forme les etudians pour " les Colleges de Cambridge, de New-Haven, de " Warwich, & de Dartmouth ; & dans ces Col* ** leges on elcve des Maitres pour ces ecoles *' des Miniftres pour rEgllfe, des Do6leurs en " Droit & en Medecine, & des Magiftrats & ' Officiers pour le Gouvernement du Pays. 4. " La Milice comprend tout le Peuple. En " vertu des Loix du pays chaque habitant male " entre 16 & 60 ans, eft enrole dans une Com- " pagnie & Regiment de Milice, completement *^ pourvu de tous fes officiers. II eft oblige de *' tenir toujours dans fa maifon & a fes propres *' depens, un moufquet en bon ordre, une corne ** a poudre, une livre de cette poudre, douze " picrres a feu, vingt-quatre balies de plomb, ** une boete a cartouche, & un havre-fac. De- ** forte que toute la Contrce eft preta a marcher a " fa defenfe au premier fignal. Les Compagnies *' & Regiments font obliges de s'affembler a un *' certain tems de I'annee, fur les ordres de leurs ** officiers, pour la vifitation de leurs armes & ** munitions, & de faire leurs manoeuvres. " Voici, Monfieur, une petite efquifle des ** quatre fources princi pales de cette fagefle dans ** les Confeils, de cette habilete, de cette bravoure " rnilitaire, qui ont produit la Revolution Amc- " ricaine, &qui, j'efpere, feront faintement con- " fervees comme les fondemens de la Liberie, du '*' bonheur & de la profperite du peuple. S'il '* eft d'autres particularitcs fur lefquelles je puiflc ^* vous donner des informations, vous me ferez ** I'amitie de me le faire favoir. J'ai Thonneur ** d'etre. 1782. JOHN ADAMS/^ UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY Los Angeles This book is DUE on the last date stamped below. Dec 13 '^7 lar 20 '5^ iw. It '52 Mar 4 '60 U 12 61) m 1 4 ,963 ?^ /ifc:^ "^ iM jj!.w*i JAN 3 1 twi ir.- ;:B 8 \0 iIAN 221^7 KHfor JUN24 Kf^lltSil i-i3 Form I.9-17m-S,'5o(B3339s4)444 rj]3DNVS01^ \I1F0% ^MEUN1VER% ^-x^A/yt^j m UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY A A 000 010 682 3 J MKA JK 171 A 21 179ii v.l mm hh liillliiiiiliilHi